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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities
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Summary
China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability
for conducting operations beyond China’s near-seas region. The question of how the United
States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization
effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular
importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved
Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.
As a part of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region announced in January
2012, Department of Defense (DOD) planning is placing an increased emphasis on the Asia-
Pacific region. Observers expect that, as a result, there will be a stronger emphasis in DOD
planning on U.S. naval and air forces. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding
constraints on U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be
maintained and strengthened.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs,
including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines,
surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization
effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine,
personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
Observers believe China’s naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities
for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or
defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s
view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive
economic zone (EEZ); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s
status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers
believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over
Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of
intervening U.S. forces. China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting
maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign
countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR)
operations.

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities
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Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming
years will be large and capable enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime forces
while also adequately performing other missions around the world; the Navy’s ability to counter
Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime A2/AD
capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.

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Introduction
Issue for Congress
China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability
for conducting operations beyond China’s near-seas region. The question of how the United
States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization
effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular
importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved
Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
Scope, Sources, and Terminology
This report focuses on the potential implications of China’s naval modernization for future
required U.S. Navy capabilities. Other CRS reports address separate issues relating to China.
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual DOD report to
Congress on military and security developments involving China,1
an August 2009 report on
China’s navy from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),2
published reference sources such as
Jane’s Fighting Ships, and press reports.
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization to refer to the
modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside China’s navy
that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based air
force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for
detecting and tracking ships at sea.
1
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2013. Washington, May 2013. 83 pp. Hereinafter 2013 DOD CMSD. The 2010-2012 editions of the
report are cited similarly. The 2009 and earlier editions of the report were known as the China military power report;
the 2009 edition is cited as 2009 DOD CMP, and earlier editions are cited similarly.
2
Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,
Suitland (MD), Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009. 46 pp. (Hereinafter 2009 ONI Report.)

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China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLAAir Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the Second Artillery Corps (SAC).
This report uses the term China’s near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and
South China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second
island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the
Philippines and Guam.3
Background
Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort4
Date of Inception
Observers date the beginning of China’s naval modernization effort to various points in the
1990s.5
Design work on the first of China’s newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later
1980s.6
Some observers believe that China’s naval modernization effort may have been reinforced
or accelerated by a 1996 incident in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike
groups to waters near Taiwan in response to Chinese missile tests and naval exercises near
Taiwan.7
A Broad-Based Modernization Effort with Many Elements
Although press reports on China’s naval modernization effort sometimes focus on a single
element, such as China’s aircraft carrier program or its ASBMs, China’s naval modernization
effort is a broad-based effort with many elements. China’s naval modernization effort includes a
wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship
ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles
(LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, aircraft
carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine countermeasures
3
For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2013 DOD CMSD, p. 81.
4
Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships
2012-2013, and previous editions. Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding
projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy
shipbuilding.
5
China ordered its first four Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993, and its four Russian-made Sovremenny-
class destroyers in 1996. China laid the keel on its first Song (Type 039) class submarine in 1991, its first Luhu (Type
052) class destroyer in 1990, its Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer in 1996, and its first Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G)
class frigate in 1990.
6
First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previous footnote) likely reflect design work
done in the latter 1980s.
7
DOD, for example, stated in 2011 that “The U.S. response in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis underscored to Beijing
the potential challenge of U.S. military intervention and highlighted the importance of developing a modern navy,
capable of conducting A2AD [anti-access/area-denial] operations, or ‘counter-intervention operations’ in the PLA’s
lexicon.” (2011 DOD CMSD, p. 57.)

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(MCM) ships, underway replenishment ships, hospital ships, and supporting C4ISR8
systems.
Some of these acquisition programs have attracted particular interest and are discussed in further
detail below. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in
maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and
exercises.
Quality vs. Quantity
Although numbers of some types of Chinese navy ships have increased, China’s naval
modernization effort appears focused less on increasing total platform numbers than on increasing
the modernity and capability of Chinese platforms. Changes in platform capability have been
more dramatic than changes in platform numbers. In some cases (such as submarines and coastal
patrol craft), total numbers of platforms have actually decreased over the past 20 years or so, but
aggregate capability has nevertheless increased because a larger number of older and obsolescent
platforms have been replaced by a smaller number of much more modern and capable new
platforms. ONI states that
Although [China’s] overall [navy] order-of-battle [i.e., numbers of ships] has remained
relatively constant in recent years, the PLA(N) is rapidly retiring legacy combatants in favor
of larger, multi-mission ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine
weapons and sensors.... Even if order-of-battle numbers remain relatively constant through
2020, the PLA(N) will possess far more combat capability due to the rapid rate of acquisition
coupled with improving operational proficiency.9
Limitations and Weaknesses
Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s naval
capabilities in recent years, observers believe China’s navy currently has limitations or
weaknesses in several areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations
in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of China’s military, antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), MCM, a dependence on foreign suppliers for some ship components, and a lack of
operational experience in combat situations.10
The sufficiency of a country’s naval capabilities is best assessed against that navy’s intended
missions. Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be
sufficient for performing missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As China’s navy reduces its
weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential
missions.
8
C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
9
[Hearing on] Trends in China’s Naval Modernization [before] US China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014],
10
See, for example, 2013 DOD CMSD, p. 35.

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Goals of Naval Modernization Effort
Observers believe China’s naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities
for doing the following:
• addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be;
• asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS)
and East China Sea (ECS);11
• enforcing China’s view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the
legal right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime
exclusive economic zone (EEZ);12
• displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and
• asserting China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power.
Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as
an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in
China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or
reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. (A2/AD is a term used by U.S. and other
Western writers; writers in China sometimes use the term counter-intervention force. During the
Cold War, U.S. writers used the term sea-denial force to refer to a maritime A2/AD force.)
ASBMs, attack submarines, and supporting C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of
China’s emerging maritime A2/AD force, though other force elements—such as ASCMs, LACMs
(for attacking U.S. air bases and other facilities in the Western Pacific), and mines—are also of
significance.
China’s maritime A2/AD force can be viewed as broadly analogous to the sea-denial force that
the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War to deny U.S. use of the sea or counter U.S.
forces participating in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. One potential difference between the Soviet
sea-denial force and China’s emerging maritime A2/AD force is that China’s force includes
ASBMs capable of hitting moving ships at sea.
China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting maritime security (including
anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and
conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
January 2014 ONI Testimony
In his prepared statement for a January 30, 2014, hearing on China’s military modernization and
its implications for the United States before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Jesse L. Karotkin, ONI’s Senior Intelligence Officer for China, summarized China’s
naval modernization effort. For the text of Karotkin’s statement, see Appendix A.
11
For more on China’s territorial claims in the SCS and ECS, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report
R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress , by Ben Dolven, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark
E. Manyin.
12
For more on China’s view regarding its rights within its EEZ, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
China for several years has been developing and testing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM),
referred to as the DF-21D, that is a theater-range ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable
reentry vehicle (MaRV) designed to hit moving ships at sea. DOD states that
The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in
the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km[810 nautical miles]
and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.13
Another observer states that “the DF-21D’s warhead apparently uses a combination of radar and
optical sensors to find the target and make final guidance updates.... Finally, it uses a high
explosive, or a radio frequency or cluster warhead that at a minimum can achieve a mission kill
[against the target ship].”14
Observers have expressed strong concern about the DF-21D, because such missiles, in
combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to
attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the
Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to
the DF-21 as a “game-changing” weapon. Due to their ability to change course, the MaRVs on an
ASBM would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry
vehicles.15
Regarding the operational status of the DF-21D, DOD states that China “began deploying [the
DF-21D] in 2010.”16
According to press reports, the weapon has been tested over land but has not
13
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 5. See also 2009 ONI Report, pp. 26-27.
14
Richard Fisher, Jr., “PLA and U.S. Arms Racing in the Western Pacific,” available online at
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp. A mission kill means that the ship is damaged
enough that it cannot perform its intended mission.
15
For further discussion of China’s ASBM-development effort and its potential implications for U.S. naval forces, see
Craig Hooper and Christopher Albon, “Get Off the Fainting Couch,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 42-
47; Andrew S. Erickson, “Ballistic Trajectory—China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
January 4, 2010; Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile
Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2009: 67-
114; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
May 2009: 26-32; Andrew Erickson, “Facing A New Missile Threat From China, How The U.S. Should Respond To
China’s Development Of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems,” CBSNews.com, May 28, 2009; Andrew S. Erickson,
“Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns,” China Brief, June 24, 2009: 4-8; Andrew S. Erickson and
David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval
War College Review, Autumn 2009: 53-86; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile,
Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009: 87-115; Mark Stokes, “China’s
Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability, The Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime
Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond, Project 2049 Institute, September 14, 2009. 123 pp.
16
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 38. Page 42 states:
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,000 km): The PLA is developing conventional
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), increasing its capability for near-precision strike out
to the second island chain. The PLA Navy is also improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting
(continued...)

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been tested in an end-to-end flight test against a target at sea. A January 23, 2013, press report
about a test of the weapon in the Gobi desert in western China stated:
The People’s Liberation Army has successfully sunk a US aircraft carrier, according to a
satellite photo provided by Google Earth, reports our sister paper Want Daily—though the
strike was a war game, the carrier a mock-up platform and the “sinking” occurred on dry
land in a remote part of western China.17
A January 27, 2014, press report stated:
In the view of the U.S. Navy, the Mach 10 test of a hypersonic glide vehicle that China
conducted on Jan. 9 reflects its predictions of future warfare. If and when China can put the
technology into service, Beijing will have a weapon that challenges defenses and extends the
range of its ballistic missiles against land and sea targets, but its offensive application is still
some years away and depends on solving tough challenges in targeting and guidance.
The hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) test appears to mark a step beyond China’s anti-ship
ballistic missile (ASBM) program, featuring a slower, shorter-range maneuverable reentry
vehicle (RV)—and may point to a second-generation ASBM.
To some analysts, the test underscores the need for the U.S. to field directed-energy
weapons, since interceptor missiles may be unable to handle targets that appear with little
warning and then maneuver at speeds above Mach 5. The U.S. is developing directed-energy
weapons, but it is not clear when they will be needed or available.
China’s HGV, called WU-14 by the Pentagon, was launched into space by an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) booster, after which it returned to the atmosphere to
glide at up to Mach 10. The test was conducted within China, says the defense ministry in
Beijing. On Jan. 19, another object was test-launched from the same space base at Taiyuan,
says analyst Richard Fisher of the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy
Center. The Jan. 9 test was first detailed by Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon....
A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, is operational, according to the Pentagon,
raising the possibility that HGV development will lead to a longer-range, more
maneuverable anti-ship weapon.18
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
Among the most capable of the new ASCMs that have been acquired by China’s navy are the
Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn (carried by China’s four Russian-made Sovremenny-class
(...continued)
capability with sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which can be used in conjunction with
reconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from China (thereby supporting long-
range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs).
Another DOD report published in 2013 states that “China has likely started to deploy the DF-21D.... ” (National Air
and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, 2013, p. 14.)
17
“PLA ‘Sinks’ US Carrier in DF-21D Missile Test in Gobi,” Want China Times (http://www.wantchinatimes.com),
January 23, 2013, accessed March 21, 2013, at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=
20130123000112&cid=1101.
18
Bradley Perrett, Bill Sweetman, and Michael Fabey, “U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV As Part of Wider Threat,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology (www.aviationweek.com), January 27, 2014.

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destroyers) and the Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler (carried by 8 of China’s 12 Russian-made
Kilo-class submarines). China’s large inventory of ASCMs also includes several indigenous
designs. DOD states that China “has, or is acquiring, nearly a dozen ASCM variants, ranging
from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B. China is
working to develop a domestically-built supersonic cruise missile capability. The pace of ASCM
research, development, and production has accelerated over the past decade.”19
Submarines
China’s submarine modernization effort has attracted substantial attention and concern. ONI
states that
China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence,
particularly when conducting “counter-intervention” against modern adversary. The large,
but poorly equipped [submarine] force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern
submarine force, optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major
sea lines of communication.20
Types Acquired in Recent Years
China since the mid-1990s has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSs) and put into service at least four new classes of indigenously built submarines,
including the following:
• a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design called the Jin
class or Type 094 (Figure 1);
• a new nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the Shang class or
Type 093;21
• a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 039A (Figure 2);22
and
• another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or Type 039/039G.
19
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 42.
20
[Hearing on] Trends in China’s Naval Modernization [before] US China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014], accessed February 12, 2014, p. 7.
21
Some sources state that a successor to the Shang class SSN design, called the Type 095 SSN design, is in
development.
22
Some sources refer to the Yuan class as the Type 041.

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Figure 1. Jin (Type 094) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine
Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.
The Kilos and the four new classes of indigenously built submarines are regarded as much more
modern and capable than China’s aging older-generation submarines. At least some of the new
indigenously built designs are believed to have benefitted from Russian submarine technology
and design know-how.23
DOD and other observers believe the Type 093 SSN design will be succeeded by a newer SSN
design called the Type 095. The August 2009 ONI report includes a graph (see Figure 3) that
shows the Type 095 SSN, along with the date 2015, suggesting that ONI projected in 2009 that
the first Type 095 would enter service that year.
23
The August 2009 ONI report states that the Yuan class may incorporate quieting technology from the Kilo class.
(2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)

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Figure 2.Yuan (Type 039A) Class Attack Submarine
Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.
DOD states that:
Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094) are currently operational, and up to five may enter
service before China proceeds to its next generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next
decade....
Two SHANG-class SSNs (Type 093) are already in service, and China is building four
improved variants of the SHANG-class SSN, which will replace the aging HAN-class SSNs
(Type 091). In the next decade, China will likely construct the Type 095 guided-missile
attack submarine (SSGN), which may enable a submarine-based land-attack capability. In
addition to likely incorporating better quieting technologies, the Type 095 will fulfill
traditional anti-ship roles with the incorporation of torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs).
The current mainstay of the Chinese submarine force is modern diesel powered attack
submarines (SS). In addition to 12 KILO-class submarines acquired fromRussia in the 1990s
and 2000s (eight of which are equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM), the PLA Navy possesses
13 SONG-class SS (Type 039) and eight YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). The YUAN-class
SSP is armed similarly to the SONG-class SS, but also includes an air-independent power
system. China may plan to construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.24
China in 2011 commissioned into a service a new type of non-nuclear-powered submarine, called
the Qing class according to Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013-2014, that is about one-third larger than
24
2013 DOD CMSD, pp. 6-7.

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the Yuan-class design. Observers believe the boat may be a one-of-kind test platform; Jane’s
Fighting Ships 2013-2014 refers to it as an auxiliary submarine (SSA).25
Press reports in December 2012 and March 2013 stated that China had signed an agreement with
Russia to purchase two dozen Su-35 fighters and four Amur/Lada class Russian-designed non-
nuclear-powered attack submarines for China’s Navy, with two of the submarines being built in
Russia and two being built in China.26
Russia, however, reportedly denied that such an agreement
had been signed.27
Figure 3 and Figure 4, which are taken from the August 2009 ONI report, show the acoustic
quietness of Chinese nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered submarines, respectively, relative to that
of Russian nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered submarines. The downward slope of the arrow in
each figure indicates the increasingly lower noise levels (i.e., increasing acoustic quietness) of the
submarine designs shown. In general, quieter submarines are more difficult for opposing forces to
detect and counter. The green-yellow-red color spectrum on the arrow in each figure might be
interpreted as a rough indication of the relative difficulty that a navy with capable antisubmarine
warfare forces (such as the U.S. Navy) might have in detecting and countering these submarines:
Green might indicate submarines that would be relatively easy for such a navy to detect and
counter, yellow might indicate submarines that would be less easy for such a navy to detect and
counter, and red might indicate submarines that would be more difficult for such a navy to detect
and counter.
25
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013-2014, p. 134.
26
“China Mulls Buying Russian Submarines,” Moscow Times, December 21, 2012, accessed March 21, 2013 at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/china-mulls-buying-russian-submarines/473437.html; “Russia to Sell
Lada Class Submarines to China: Report,” Want China Times (http://www/wantchinatimes.com), December 28, 2013,
accessed March 21, 2013, at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20121228000007&cid=1101;
Agence France-Presse, “China To Buy Russian Fighters, Subs,” DefenseNews.com, March 25, 2013.
27
Wendell Minnick, “Russia: No Deal on Sale of Fighters, Subs to China,” DefenseNews.com, March 25, 2013.

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Figure 4.Acoustic Quietness of Chinese and Russian Non-Nuclear-Powered
Submarines
(Non-nuclear-powered submarines are commonly referred to as diesel or diesel-electric submarines)
Source: 2009 ONI Report, p. 22.
China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and
wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. As noted in the above-quoted passage from DOD, 8 of the 12
Kilos purchased from Russia (presumably the ones purchased more recently) are armed with the
highly capable Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM. In addition to other weapons, Shang-class
SSNs may carry LACMs. Although ASCMs are often highlighted as sources of concern, wake-
homing torpedoes are also a concern because they can be very difficult for surface ships to
counter.
Although China’s aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old technology and are
much less capable than China’s newer-design submarines, China may decide that these older
boats have continued value as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw
out enemy submarines (such as U.S. SSNs) that can then be attacked by other Chinese naval
forces.
In related areas of activity, China reportedly is developing new unmanned underwater vehicles,28
and has modernized its substantial inventory of mines.29
DOD stated in 2012 that “China has
28
Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, “Coming Without Shadows, Leaving Without Footprints,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 2010: 30-35.
29
See, for example, Scott C. Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously, Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Naval War
College Review,” Spring 2012: 30-66.

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developed torpedo and mine systems capable of area denial in a Taiwan scenario. Estimates of
China’s naval mine inventory exceed 50,000 mines, with many more capable systems developed
in the past 10 years.”30
Submarine Acquisition Rate and Potential Submarine Force Size
Table 1 shows actual and projected commissionings of Chinese submarines by class since 1995,
when China took delivery of its first two Kilo-class boats. The table includes the final nine boats
in the Ming class, which is an older and less capable submarine design. As shown in Table 1,
China by the end of 2012 was expected to have a total of 40 relatively modern attack
submarines—meaning Shang, Kilo, Yuan, Song, and Qing class boats—in commission. As shown
in the table, much of the growth in this figure occurred in 2004-2006, when 18 attack submarines
(including 8 Kilo-class boats) were added, and in 2011-2012, when 9 attack submarines were
added.
The figures in Table 1 show that between 1995 and 2012, China placed or was expected to place
into service a total of 52 submarines of all kinds, or an average of about 2.9 submarines per year.
This average commissioning rate, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-
state submarine force of about 58 to 87 boats of all kinds, assuming an average submarine life of
20 to 30 years.
Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced
submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2012 is 40, or an average of about 2.2 per year.
This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a
steady-state force of domestically produced submarines of about 44 to 67 boats of all kinds, again
assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.
The August 2009 ONI report states that “Chinese submarine procurement has focused on smaller
numbers of modern, high-capability boats,” and that “over the next 10 to 15 years, primarily due
to the introduction of new diesel-electric and [non-nuclear-powered] air independent power (AIP)
submarines, the force is expected to increase incrementally in size to approximately 75
submarines.”31
A May 16, 2013, press report quotes Admiral Samuel Locklear, the Commander of U.S. Pacific
Command, as stating that China plans to acquire a total of 80 submarines.32
30
2012 DOD CMSD, p. 23.
31
2009 ONI Report, p. 21. The report states on page 46 that “Because approximately three-quarters of the current
submarine force will still be operational in 10-15 years, new submarine construction is expected to add approximately
10 platforms to the force.” See also the graph on page 45, which shows the submarine force leveling off in size around
2015.
32
Richard Halloran, “China, US Engaging in Underwater Arms Race,” Taipei Times, May 16, 2013: 8, accessed May
17, 2013, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2013/05/16/2003562368.

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JL-2 SLBM on Jin-Class SSBN
Each Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). DOD states that
The JIN-class SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile
with an estimated range of 7,400 km [3,996 nautical miles]. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will
give the PLA Navy its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability. After a round of
successful testing in 2012, the JL-2 appears ready to reach initial operational capability in
2013. JIN-class SSBNs based at Hainan Island in the South China Sea would then be able to
conduct nuclear deterrence patrols.33
A range of 7,400 km could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack
• targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to
China;
• targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle)
from locations south of Japan;
• targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and
Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii; and
• targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii.
Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-Based Aircraft34
China has begun operating its first aircraft carrier—the Liaoning, a refurbished ex-Ukrainian
aircraft carrier—and reportedly has begun construction of its first indigenously built aircraft
carrier. Observers expect that it will be some time before China achieves proficiency in the
operation of an embarked air wing on the Liaoning.
Liaoning (Ex-Ukrainian Aircraft Carrier Varyag)
On September 25, 2012, China commissioned into service its first aircraft carrier—the Liaoning
(Figure 5), a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier, previously named Varyag, that China
purchased from Ukraine as an unfinished ship in 1998.35
The Liaoning is named for the province
33
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 31. See also Bill Gertz, “Red Tide: China Deploys New Class of Strategic Missile Submarines
Next Year,” WashingtonTimes.com, July 23, 2013.
34
China, according to one set of observers, initiated studies on possible aircraft carrier options in the 1990s, and
approved a formal aircraft carrier program in 2004. (Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “The Calm Before the
Storm,” FP [Foreign Policy] National Security (www.foreignpolicy.com), September 26, 2012.) Another observer dates
Chinese activities in support of an eventual aircraft carrier program back to the 1980s. (Torbjorg Hemmingsen, “PLAN
For Action: New Dawn for Chinese Naval Aviation,” Jane’s Navy International, June 2012: 12-17.) Chinese officials
have been talking openly since 2006 about eventually operating aircraft carriers. A 2009 report from the Office of
Naval Intelligence states that “Beginning in early 2006, PRC-owned media has reported statements from high-level
officials on China’s intent to build aircraft carriers.” (Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy,
A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, Suitland (MD), August 2009, p. 19.
35
The Soviet Union began work on the Varyag in a shipyard in Ukraine, which at the time was part of the Soviet
Union. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, construction work on the ship stopped and the unfinished ship
became the property of Ukraine.

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containing Dalian, the port city where the ship was refurbished. In February 2013, it was reported
that the ship had been assigned a permanent home port at Qingdao, the home base of China’s
Northern Fleet.36
Figure 5.Aircraft Carrier Liaoning (ex-Varyag)
Source: “Highlights of Liaoning Carrier’s One-Year Service,” China Daily, September 26, 2013, accessed
September 30, 2013, at http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-09/26/content_30142217.htm. The article states, in a
caption to this picture shows the ship during a sea trial in October 2012.
The Liaoning is conventionally powered, has an estimated full load displacement of almost
60,000 tons,37
and might accommodate an eventual air wing of 30 or more aircraft, including
fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters. The Liaoning lacks aircraft catapults and instead launches
fixed-wing airplanes off the ship’s bow using an inclined “ski ramp.” By comparison, a U.S.
Navy aircraft carrier is nuclear powered (giving it greater cruising endurance than a
conventionally powered ship), has a full load displacement of about 100,000 tons, can
accommodate an air wing of 60 or more aircraft, including fixed-wing aircraft and some
helicopters, and launches its fixed-wing aircraft over both the ship’s bow and its angled deck
using catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability greater than that of
aircraft launched with a ski ramp. The Liaoning, like a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, lands fixed-
wing aircraft using arresting wires on its angled deck.
36
See, for example, “Reports: China Carrier Permanent Base Is Qingdao,” Associated Press, February 27, 2013,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/reports-china-carrier-permanent-base-qingdao.
37
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2012-2013 lists a full load displacement of 59,439 tons for the ship.

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Some observers have referred to the Liaoning as China’s “starter” carrier.38
The PLA Navy is in
the early stages of learning to operate aircraft from the ship. DOD states that “The PLA Navy
successfully conducted its first launch and recovery [from the Liaoning] of the carrier-capable J-
15 fighter [see “Carrier-Based Aircraft” below] on November 26, 2012. The Liaoning will
continue integration testing and training with the aircraft during the next several years, but it is
not expected to embark an operational air wing until 2015 or later.”39
DOD further states that the
Liaoning
most likely will conduct extensive local operations focusing on shipboard training, carrier
aircraft integration, and carrier formation training before reaching an operational
effectiveness in three to four years. The carrier could operate in the East and South China
Seas in the nearer term and may be used for other mission sets as needed.40
A May 16, 2013, U.S. press report stated:
It will take less time for China to learn how to effectively operate aircraft carriers than it took
the U.S., the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic air arm, Rear Adm. Ted Branch said
Wednesday.
“They will learn faster than we did and they will leverage our lessons,” Branch said during a
panel at the at the [sic] EAST: Joint Warfighting 2013 symposium in Virginia Beach, Va....
But the PLAN [PLA Navy] will unlikely be proficient in carrier operations for several more
years.
“They have the advantage of starting with more modern technology but it’s still a tough nut
to crack to learn how to do this business,” Branch said.
“They still have a lot of learning to do before they have a viable capability.”41
A September 12, 2013, press report stated:
The Chinese navy is using its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, for training and testing and
will decide on an operational carrier for the fleet after a few years of evaluation, Admiral Wu
Shengli said on Thursday [September 12].
The navy chief of the People’s Liberation Army, on a military-to-military visit with his U.S.
counterpart, told reporters at the Washington Navy Yard that Chinese sailors would carry out
“very heavy” training over the next two or three years as they assess the carrier.
“After the training and experimentation we will have a final evaluation on the development
of the aircraft carrier for the PLA navy,” said Shengli, whose delegation included the
commander of the Liaoning and the first pilot to land on its flight deck....
38
See, for example, “China Plans New Generation of Carriers as Sea Disputes Grow,” Bloomberg News, April 24,
2013.
39
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 6.
40
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 65.
41
“Admiral: China Will Likely Learn Carrier Ropes Faster than U.S.,” USNI News (http://news.usni.org), May 16,
2013. See also “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Advances With jet Take-Off Drills,” Bloomberg.com, July 4, 2013.

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“We have around 36 airplanes operating on board our ship,” [Senior Captain Zhang Zheng,
the commander of the Liaoning] told reporters. “And we are still practicing and doing tests
and experiments for the equipment and systems.”
Wu, Zhang and Captain Dai Ming Meng, the pilot who first landed on the carrier, visited
several American ships in California earlier this week, including the carrier USS Carl
Vinson, where they met with their counterparts.42
Indigenous Aircraft Carriers
DOD states that “China also continues to pursue an indigenous aircraft carrier program ... and
will likely build multiple aircraft carriers over the next decade. The first Chinese-built carrier will
likely be operational sometime in the second half of this decade.”43
A January 20, 2014, press
report stated:
A senior Communist Party official in northeastern China said that China was at work on a
home-built aircraft carrier and had plans to operate a fleet of at least four of the vessels, a
Hong Kong newspaper reported.
The comments by Wang Min, the party secretary of Liaoning Province, are an official
indication of what outside observers have long predicted: that China’s commissioning of a
refurbished aircraft carrier in 2012 was only a first step in its effort to develop its capacity to
build and sail its own aircraft carriers.
According to the Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao, Mr. Wang said on Saturday that China’s
second aircraft carrier was being built at a shipyard in the coastal city of Dalian and should
be completed in six years.44
Carrier-Based Aircraft
China has developed a carrier-capable fighter, called the J-15 or Flying Shark, that can operate
from the Liaoning (Figure 6). DOD states that
The J-15 aircraft conducted its first takeoffs and landings from the Liaoning on November
26, 2012. Subsequently, at least two aircraft conducted multiple landings and takeoffs from
the ship. The J-15 carrier-based fighter is the Chinese version of the Russian Su-33. The J-15
is designed for ski-jump takeoffs and arrested landings, as required by the configuration of
the Liaoning. Although the J-15 has a land-based combat radius of 1200 km, the aircraft will
be limited in range and armament when operating from the carrier, due to limits imposed by
the ski-jump takeoff and arrested carrier landings.45
42
David Alexander, “China Navy Chief Says Operational Aircraft Carrier A Few Years Away,” Reuters.com,
September 12, 2013.
43
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 6.
44
“Work on New Chinese Aircraft Carrier Reportedly Underway,” New York Times
(http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com), January 20, 2014. See also “China Building Second Aircraft Carrier: Reports,”
Reuters.com, January 18, 2014; and Li Yan, “New Aircraft Carrier ‘Under Construction,’” Global Times (via
http://www.ecns.cn), January 20, 2014.
45
2013 DOD CMSD, pp. 65-66.

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Figure 6. J-15 Carrier-Capable Fighter
Source: Zachary Keck, “China’s Carrier-Based J-15 Likely Enters Mass Production,” The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), September 14, 2013.
In a September 14, 2013, blog post, one U.S. observer, noting recent press reports from China,
stated that
A number of recent reports in Chinese state-run media indicate that the country’s carrier-
based J-15 multirole fighter jets have entered mass production.
The Shenyang J-15 (also called Flying Shark) is China’s carrier-based fighter aircraft. It was
reverse[-] engineered from a Russian Sukhoi Su-33 that China acquired from Ukraine,
although it reportedly is equipped with some indigenous weapons, avionics and other
features that Beijing claims greatly enhances its capabilities....
Although hardly conclusive, the reports strongly suggest that mass production of the J-15 has
begun, or at least that the Communist Party wants to create that impression....
Meanwhile, one of the other J-15 articles that appeared on the People’s Daily website
compared it favorably relative to other countries’ carrier-based aircraft. Indeed, Admiral Yin,
who was also quoted in that article, is paraphrased as saying that the J-15 “reaches a similar
level to the U.S. F/A-18C/D Super Hornet” and is superior in terms of its air combat
capability.
However, Want China Times flags a Xinhua report that quotes Sun Cong, the J-15s designer,
noting that currently the aircraft cannot launch attacks against ships and ground targets when
taking off from the Liaoning. That is because the aircraft carrier utilizes a ski-jump ramp and
the J-15 would be too heavy to take off if it was carrying air-to-surface missiles and bombs.
Thus, until the Navy acquires a Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested-Recovery
(CATOBAR) carrier, the J-15, which is a multirole fighter, will be limited primarily to air
superiority operations (and ship defense).

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Notably, one of the People’s Daily reports observed that the J-15’s “front wheel is suitable
for catapult launch similar to the carrier-based fighter of the U.S. Navy. The catapult launch
was taken into consideration at the beginning of its design.”46
A September 28, 2013, press report stated:
In an unusual departure for mainland Chinese-language media, the Beijing-based Sina
Military Network (SMN) criticized the capabilities of the carrier-borne J-15 Flying Shark as
nothing more than a “flopping fish.”...
What sounded more like a rant than analysis, SMN, on Sept. 23, reported the new J-15 was
incapable of flying from the Liaoning with heavy weapons, “effectively crippling its attack
range and firepower.”
The fighter can take off and land on the carrier with two YJ-83K anti-ship missiles, two PL-8
air-to-air missiles, and four 500-kilogram bombs. But a weapons “load exceeding 12 tons
will not get it off the carrier’s ski jump ramp.” This might prohibit it from carrying heavier
munitions such as PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles.
To further complicate things, the J-15 can carry only two tons of weapons while fully fueled.
“This would equip it with no more than two YJ-83K and two PL-8 missiles,” thus the “range
of the YJ-83K prepared for the fighter will be shorter than comparable YJ-83K missiles
launched from larger PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] vessels. The J-15 will be
boxed into less than 120 [kilometers] of attack range.”...
Built by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, the J-15 is a copy of the Russian-made Su-33.
China acquired an Su-33 prototype from the Ukraine in 2001. Avionics are most likely the
same as the J-11B (Su-27). In 2006, Russia accused China of reverse engineering the Su-27
and canceled a production license to build 200 Su-27s after only 95 aircraft had been built.
Vasily Kashin, a China military specialist at the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies, suggests the J-15 might be a better aircraft than the Su-33. “I
think that there might be some improvements because electronic equipment now weighs less
than in the 1990s,” he said. It could also be lighter due to new composites that China is using
on the J-11B that were not available on the original Su-33.
Despite improvements, Kashin wonders why the Chinese bothered with the Su-33 given the
fact that Russia gave up on it. Weight problems and other issues forced the Russians to
develop the MiG-29K, which has better power-to-weight ratio and can carry more weapons.
“Of course, when the Chinese get their future carriers equipped with catapults, that limitation
will not apply and they will be able to fully realize Su-33/J-15 potential—huge range and
good payload,” Kashin said.
The Liaoning is the problem. The carrier is small—53,000 tons—and uses a ski jump. From
Russia’s experience, “taking off from the carrier with takeoff weight exceeding some 26 tons
is very difficult,” Kashin said.
46
Zachary Keck, “China’s Carrier-Based J-15 Likely Enters Mass Production,” The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com),
September 14, 2013. Press reports cited in this blog post (via live links) include: “With A Service Lifespan of About 30
Years, J-15 To Have Stable Performance Once in mass Production,” People’s Daily Online, September 10, 2013; “J-15
Better Than U.S. F/A-18 In Terms Of Air Action, Slightly Inferior In Terms Of Attack Against Sea Targets,” People’s
Daily Online, September 10, 2013; “J-15 A Major Threat to US (But Can’t Take Off With Payload),”
WantChinaTimes.com, September 13, 2013.

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Roger Cliff, a China defense specialist for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments in Washington, said this is “one of the reasons why sky-jump carriers can’t be
considered to be equivalent to full-size carriers with catapults.”
A number of unanswered questions are raised by the SMN report, Kashin said, including the
amount of fuel on board, carrier speed, wind speed and direction.
Cliff also raises issues with SMN’s conclusions. “It doesn’t make sense to me that the J-15
can take off with YJ-83s but not PL-12s, since the YJ-83 weighs about 1,800 pounds and the
PL-12 weighs about 400 pounds.”
A possible answer is that it was unable to take off with both. “The article says that it can only
carry ‘two tons’ of missiles and munitions when fully fueled, which is 4,400 pounds, and two
YJ-83s plus two PL-8s would weigh over 4,000 pounds, leaving no margin for any PL-12s.
But I don’t see why it couldn’t take off with PL-12s if it wasn’t carrying YJ-83s.” Cliff
concludes that the J-15 should be capable of carrying PL-12s when it is flying purely air-to-
air missions and that “it probably just can’t carry PL-12s when it is flying a strike mission.”47
Potential Roles, Missions, and Strategic Significance
Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is
acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to symbolize China’s
status as a leading regional power and major world power. DOD stated in 2011 that, “Given the
fact that Taiwan can be reached by land-based aviation, China’s aircraft carrier program would
offer very limited value in a Taiwan scenario and would require additional naval resources for
protection. However, it would enable China to extend its naval air capabilities elsewhere.”48
Chinese aircraft carriers could be used to impress or intimidate foreign observers, and for power-
projection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces. Chinese
aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)
operations, maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and non-combatant
evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly valuable to China
for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft carriers are viewed by
many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation involving opposing U.S.
naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships
and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing
other missions in a conflict situation with China.49
47
Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Media Takes Aim at J-15 Fighter,” DefenseNews.com, September 28, 2013.
48
2011 DOD CMSD, p. 38.
49
For further discussion, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “The ‘Flying Shark’ Prepares to Roam the Seas: pros
and cons [for China] of China’s aircraft carrier program,” China SignPost, May 18, 2011, 5 pp.; Aaron Shraberg,
“Near-Term Missions for China’s Maiden Aircraft Carrier,” China Brief, June 17, 2011: 4-6; and Andrew S. Erickson,
Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps,” Naval War College Review,
Winter 2012: 15-55.

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Surface Combatants
China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and put
into service 10 new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates (some of which are
variations of one another) that demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface
combatant technology. DOD states that China’s new destroyers and frigates “provide a significant
upgrade to the PLA Navy’s area air defense capability, which will be critical as it expands
operations into ‘distant seas’ beyond the range of shore-based air defense.”50
China reportedly is
also building a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates) and has put into service a new kind of
missile-armed fast attack craft that uses a stealthy catamaran hull design. ONI states that
Less than a decade ago China’s surface force could be characterized as an eclectic mix of
vintage, modern, converted, imported, and domestic platforms utilizing a variety weapons
and sensors and with widely ranging capabilities and varying reliability. By the second
decade of the 2000s, surface ship acquisition had shifted entirely to Chinese designed units,
equipped primarily with Chinese weapons and sensors, though some engineering
components and subsystems remain imported or license-produced in-country....
The PLA(N) surface force has made particularly strong gains in anti-surface warfare
(ASuW), with sustained development of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and
over-the-horizon targeting systems.51
Sovremenny-Class Destroyers
China in 1996 ordered two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in
1999 and 2001. China in 2002 ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia;
the ships entered service in 2005 and 2006. Sovremenny-class destroyers are equipped with the
Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM, a highly capable ASCM.
Six New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes
China since the early 1990s has put into service six new classes of indigenously built destroyers,
two of which are variations of another. The classes are called the Luhu (Type 052), Luhai (Type
051B), Luyang I (Type 052B), Luyang II (Type 052C), the Luyang III (Type 052D), and Louzhou
(Type 051C) designs. Compared to China’s remaining older Luda (Type 051) class destroyers,
which entered service between 1971 and 1991, these six new indigenously built destroyer classes
are substantially more modern in terms of their hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors,
weapons, and electronics. The Luyang II-class ships (Figure 7) and the Luyang III-class ships
appear to feature phased-array radars that are outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar
used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat system. Like the older Luda-class destroyers, these six new
destroyer classes are armed with ASCMs.
50
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 7.
51
[Hearing on] Trends in China’s Naval Modernization [before] US China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014], accessed February 12, 2014, p. 3.

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Figure 7. Luyang II (Type 052C) Class Destroyer
Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.
As shown in Table 2, China between 1994 and 2007 commissioned only one or two ships in its
first four new indigenously built destroyers classes, suggesting that these classes were intended as
stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navy’s destroyer technology incrementally before
committing to larger-scale series production of Luyang II- and Luyang III-class destroyers. As
shown in Table 2, after commissioning no new destroyers in 2008-2012, commissionings of new
Luyang II- and Luyang III-class destroyers appear to have resumed. Regarding the 2008-2012
gap in commissionings, one observer states, “The relocation of JiangNan shipyard and
indigenization of DA80/DN80 gas turbine (QC-280) delayed the production of follow-on units
[of Luyang II-class destroyers] for several years.”52
52
Blog entry entitled “2012 in Review,” December 28, 2012, accessed March 21, 2013 at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/12/2012-in-review.html.

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Four New Indigenously Built Frigate Classes
China since the early 1990s has put into service four new classes of indigenously built frigates,
two of which are variations of two others. The classes are called the Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G),
Jiangwei II (Type 053H3), Jiangkai I (Type 054), and Jiangkai II (Type 054A) designs. Compared
to China’s remaining older Jianghu (Type 053) class frigates, which entered service between the
mid-1970s and 1989, the four new frigate classes feature improved hull designs and systems,
including improved AAW capabilities. As shown in Table 3, production of Jiangkai II-class ships
(Figure 8) continues, and Jane’s projects an eventual total of at least 16.
Figure 8. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Class Frigate
Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.
DOD states that “China has continued the construction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class
FFG[s] (Type 054A), with 12 ships currently in the fleet and six or more in various stages of
construction, and yet more expected.”54
54
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 7.

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Figure 9.Type 056 Corvette
Shown under construction
Source: Blog entry entitled “PLAN’s New Type 056 Class,” August 12, 2012, accessed October 12, 2012, at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/08/plans-new-type-056-class.html.
One observer states that
The [Type] 056 program seems to follow an even more aggressive production schedule than
[Type] 022 FACs [fast attack craft]. We are seeing four shipyards (HuDong, HuangPu,
WuChang and LiaoNan) producing [Type] 056s simultaneously before the first [Type] 056
was ever launched. In fact, the first [Type] 056 launched from both HP and HD shipyard had
their funnels and the bow section reworked after they were already launched.57
Houbei (Type 022) Fast Attack Craft
As an apparent replacement for at least some of its older fast attack craft, or FACs (including
some armed with ASCMs), China in 2004 introduced a new type of ASCM-armed fast attack
craft, called the Houbei (Type 022) class (Figure 10), that uses a stealthy, wave-piercing,
catamaran hull.58
Each boat can carry eight C-802 ASCMs. The Houbei class was built in at least
six shipyards; construction of the design appeared to stop in 2009 after a production run of about
60 units.
57
Blog entry entitled “2012 in Review,” December 28, 2012, accessed March 21, 2013 at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/12/2012-in-review.html.
58
For an article discussing how the Type 022 design appears to have been derived from the designs of Australian high-
speed ferries, see David Lague, “Insight: From a Ferry, a Chinese Fast-Attack Boat,” Reuters, June 1, 2012.

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Figure 10. Houbei (Type 022) Class Fast Attack Craft
With an older Luda-class destroyer behind
Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.
Surface Ships Operated by Non-PLAN Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies
In addition to the PLAN surface combatants discussed above, China operates numerous
additional surface ships in maritime law enforcement (MLE) agencies that are outside the PLAN.
China in 2013 consolidated four of its six MLE agencies into a new China Coast Guard (CCG).
China usually uses CCG ships, rather than PLAN ships, to assert and defend its maritime
territorial claims and fishing interests in the South China Sea and East China Sea, although PLAN
ships are available as backup forces, and have also conducted exercises in parts of the South
China Sea that appear intended, at least in part, at asserting China’s claims over those waters.
While China’s CCG ships are often unarmed or lightly armed, they can nevertheless be effective
in confrontations with unarmed fishing vessels or other ships. China is rapidly modernizing its
inventory of CCG ships, and some of China’s newest CCG ships are relatively large. Figure 11
shows a picture of a Chinese maritime patrol ship called Haixun 01.

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Figure 11. Haixun 01 Maritime Patrol Ship
Source: “Chinese Patrol Vessel to Exercise with USCG in Hawaii,” Chuck Hill’s CG [Coast Guard] Blog, August
26, 2012, accessed online on October 11, 2012, at http://chuckhillscgblog.net/2012/08/26/chinas-largest-patrol-
vessel-to-exercise-with-uscg-in-hawaii/.
Amphibious Ships
Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship
China has put into service a new class of amphibious ships called the Yuzhao or Type 071 class
(Figure 12). Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013-2014 states that the first three ships in the class were
commissioned into service in 2007, 2011, and 2012, and that a potential fourth ship in the class
“is reported to be under consideration.”59
The Type 071 design has an estimated displacement of more than 18,500 tons,60
compared with
about 15,900 tons to 16,700 tons for the U.S. Navy’s Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49)
class amphibious ships, which were commissioned into service between 1985 and 1998, and
about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships, the
first of which was commissioned into service in 2006.
59
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013-2014, p. 152.
60
Unless otherwise indicated, displacement figures cited in this report are full load displacements. Jane’s Fighting
Ships 2013-2014, p. 152, does not provide a full load displacement for the Type 071 class design. Instead, it provides a
standard displacement of 18,500 tons. Full load displacement is larger than standard displacement, so the full load
displacement of the Type 071 design is more than 18,500 tons.

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Figure 13.Type 081 LHD (Unconfirmed Conceptual Rendering of a Possible Design)
Source: Global Times Forum, accessed July 31, 2012, at http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?p=
72083.
Potential Roles for Type 071 and Type 081 Ships
Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071 and the Type 081 would be of value for
conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe that
China is building such ships more for their value in conducting other operations, such as
operations for asserting and defending China’s territorial claims in the East China Sea and South
China Sea, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security
operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
Politically, larger amphibious ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and
engagement activities) and for impressing or intimidating foreign observers.
DOD states that “The PLA Navy currently lacks the massive amphibious lift capability that a
large-scale invasion of Taiwan would require,”66
and that “China does not appear to be building
the conventional amphibious lift required to support such a campaign.”67
66
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 58.
67
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 57.

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Air Cushioned Landing Craft
In June 2013, it was reported that China in May 2013 had taken delivery of four large, Ukrainian-
made air-cushioned landing craft (LCACs). The craft reportedly have a range of 300 nautical
miles, a maximum speed of 63 knots, and a payload capacity of 150 tons. Some experts
reportedly discounted the operational utility of the LCACs, describing them as “giant toys.”68
Land-Based Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Land-Based Aircraft
China has introduced modern land-based fighters and strike fighters into the PLAAir Force and
PLA Naval Air Force. These include Russian-made Su-27s and Su-30s and indigenously
produced J-10s and J-11s. At least some of the strike fighters are or will be armed with modern
ASCMs. China’s land-based naval aircraft inventory includes, among other things, 24 Russian-
made Su-30 MKK 2 Flanker land-based fighters, whose delivery was completed in 2004. The Su-
30 is a derivative of the Su-27. Some of the Su-30s might eventually be fitted with the Russian-
made AS-17A/B ASCM. (China’s air force operates at least 150 Su-27s; these aircraft could be
used for fleet-defense operations.) China’s navy also operates 100 ASCM-armed JH-7 land-based
fighter-bombers that were delivered between 1998 and 2004, and older ASCM-armed land-based
maritime bombers.
China in January 2011 reportedly began testing a stealthy, land-based, fighter-type aircraft, called
the J-20. Some observers believe, based on the aircraft’s size and design, that it might be intended
as a land-based strike aircraft for attacking ships at sea.69
China in June 2012 reportedly reached agreement with Russia to license-produce long-range TU-
22 Backfire bombers; the planned force of 36 Backfires would be armed with ASCMs.70
UAVs
DOD states that “acquisition and development of longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV[s]), including the BZK-005, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV[s]), will
68
Minnie Chan, “Experts Dismiss PLA Navy’s Landing Craft From Ukraine as Giant Toys,” South China Morning
Post, June 25, 2013.
69
See, Bill Sweetman, “Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter In Taxi Tests,” AviationWeek.com, January 3, 2011; Jeremy Page,
“A Chinese Stealth Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2011: 1; Phil Stewart, “U.S. Downplays Chinese
Stealth Fighter Status,” Reuters.com, January 5, 2011; Agence France-Presse, “US Downplays Concern Over Chinese
Stealth Fighter,” DefenseNews.com, January 6, 2011; Tony Capaccio, “China’s J-20 Stealth Fighter Meant to Counter
F-22, F-35, U.S. Navy Says,” Bloomberg.com, January 6, 2011; David A. Fulgham, et al, “Stealth Slayer?” Aviation
Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2011: 20-21, Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s New
Project 718/J-20 Fighter: Development outlook and strategic implications,” China SignPost, January 17, 2011, 13 pp.;
Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Opinions Vary Over China’s Stealthy J-20,” Defense News, January 24, 2011: 16; Stephen
Trimble, “J-20: China’s Ultimate Aircraft Carrier-Killer?” The DEW Line (www.flightglobal.com), February 9, 2011;
Carlo Kopp, “An Initial Assessment of China’s J-20 Stealth Fighter,” China Brief, May 6, 2011: 9-11; David Axe,
“Stealth Fighter or Bomber?” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com), July 26, 2011; Bill Sweetman, “Chinese J-20
Stealth Fighter Advances,” Aviation Week Defense Technology International, January 31, 2012.
70
Norman Friedman, “Back(fire) to the Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2012: 90-91.

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increase China’s ability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations.”71
A
September 21, 2013, press report states:
The government and military are striving to put China at the forefront of drone
manufacturing, for their own use and for export, and have made an all-out push to gather
domestic and international technology to support the program....
China is now dispatching its own drones into potential combat arenas. Every major arms
manufacturer in China has a research center devoted to drones, according to Chinese and
foreign military analysts. Those companies have shown off dozens of models to potential
foreign buyers at international air shows.
Chinese officials this month sent a drone near disputed islands administered by Japan;
debated using a weaponized drone last year to kill a criminal suspect in Myanmar; and sold
homemade drones resembling the Predator, an American model, to other countries for less
than a million dollars each. Meanwhile, online photographs reveal a stealth combat drone,
the Lijian, or Stealth Sword, in a runway test in May.
Military analysts say China has long tried to replicate foreign drone designs. Some Chinese
drones appearing at recent air shows have closely resembled foreign ones. Ian M. Easton, a
military analyst at the Project 2049 Institute in Virginia, said cyberespionage was one tool in
an extensive effort over years to purchase or develop drones domestically using all available
technology, foreign and domestic.
The Chinese military has not released statistics on the size of its drone fleet, but a Taiwan
Defense Ministry report said that as of mid-2011, the Chinese Air Force alone had more than
280 drone units, and analysts say the other branches have thousands, which means China’s
fleet count is second only to the 7,000 or so of the United States. “The military significance
of China’s move into unmanned systems is alarming,” said a 2012 report by the Defense
Science Board, a Pentagon advisory committee....
A signal moment in China’s drone use came on Sept. 9, when the navy sent a surveillance
drone near the disputed Diaoyu Islands, which Japan administers and calls the Senkakus.
Japanese interceptor jets scrambled to confront it. This was the first time China had ever
deployed a drone over the East China Sea. The Chinese Defense Ministry said “regular
drills” had taken place “at relevant areas in the East China Sea, which conform to relevant
international laws and practices.”
The drone appeared to be a BZK-005, a long-range aircraft used by the Chinese Navy that
made its public debut in 2006 at China’s air show in Zhuhai, said an American official....
“I think this is really just the beginning of a much broader trend we’re going to see—for
China to increase its ability to monitor the East China Sea and the Western Pacific, beyond
the Philippines, and to increase the operational envelope of their strike capabilities,” [Mr.
Easton] said....
Chinese strategists have discussed using drones in attack situations if war with the United
States were to break out in the Pacific, according to the Project 2049 report. Citing Chinese
military technical material, the report said the People’s Liberation Army’s “operational
71
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 95. See also Ian M. Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities, Project 2049 Institute,
March 11, 2013, 28 pp.; Bill Gertz, “Game of Drones,” Washington Free Beacon, March 26, 2013.

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thinkers and scientists envision attacking U.S. aircraft-carrier battle groups with swarms of
multimission U.A.V.’s in the event of conflict.”72
Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons
A July 22, 2011, press report states that “China’s military is developing electromagnetic pulse
weapons that Beijing plans to use against U.S. aircraft carriers in any future conflict over Taiwan,
according to an intelligence report made public on Thursday [July 21].... The report, produced in
2005 and once labeled ‘secret,’ stated that Chinese military writings have discussed building low-
yield EMP warheads, but ‘it is not known whether [the Chinese] have actually done so.’”73
Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems
China reportedly is developing and deploying maritime surveillance and targeting systems that
can detect U.S. ships and submarines and provide targeting information for Chinese ASBMs and
other Chinese military units. These systems reportedly include land-based over-the-horizon
backscatter (OTH-B) radars, land-based over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-SW) radars,
electro-optical satellites, radar satellites, and seabed sonar networks.74
DOD states that
The PLA Navy is also improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with sky
wave and surface wave OTH radars, which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance
satellites to locate targets at great distances from China (thereby supporting long-range
precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs).75
Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters
Chinese navy ships in recent years have begun to conduct operations away from China’s home
waters. Although many of these operations have been for making diplomatic port calls, some of
them have been for other purposes, including in particular anti-piracy operations in waters off
Somalia. DOD states that
China has become more involved in HA/DR [humanitarian assistance/disaster relief]
operations in response to the [Chinese military’s] “New Historic Missions.” China’s
ANWEI-class military hospital ship (the Peace Ark) has deployed throughout East Asia and
to the Caribbean.... China continues its Gulf of Aden counter-piracy deployment that began
72
Edward Wong, “Hacking U.S. Secrets, CHina Pushes For Drones,” New York Times, September 21, 2013.
73
Bill Gertz, “Beijing Develops Pulse Weapons,” Washington Times, July 22, 2011: 1. Except for “[July 21],”
materials in brackets as in original.
74
See 2011 DOD CMSD, pp. 3 and 38; Ben Blanchard, “China Ramps Up Military Use of Space With New Satellites –
Report,” Reuters, July 11, 2011; Andrew Erickson, “Satellites Support Growing PLA Maritime Monitoring and
Targeting Capabilities,” China Brief, February 10, 2011: 13-18; Torbjorg Hemmingsen, “Enter the Dragon: Inside
China’s New Model Navy,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2011: 14-16, 18, 20, 22, particularly the section on target
tracking on pages 15-16; Simon Rabinovitch, “China’s Satellites Cast Shadow Over US Pacific Operations,” Financial
Times, July 12, 2011; Andrew S. Erickson, “Eyes in the Sky,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 36-41.
75
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 42. See also Shane Bilsborough, “China’s Emerging C4ISR Revolution,” The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), August 13, 2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/13/chinas-
emerging-c4isr-revolution/.

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in December 2008. Outside of occasional goodwill cruises, this represents the PLA Navy’s
only series of operational deployments beyond the immediate western Pacific region.76
DOD also states that
The PLA Navy remains at the forefront of the military’s efforts to extend its operational
reach beyond East Asia and into what China calls the “far seas.” Missions in these areas
include protecting important sea lanes from terrorism, maritime piracy, and foreign
interdiction; providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; conducting naval
diplomacy and regional deterrence; and training to prevent a third party, such as the United
States, from interfering with operations off China’s coast in a Taiwan or South China Sea
conflict. The PLA Navy’s ability to perform these missions is modest but growing as it gains
more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced
platforms. The PLA Navy’s goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional
force that is able to project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period
of several months, similar to the United Kingdom’s deployment to the South Atlantic to
retake the Falkland Islands in the early 1980s. However, logistics and intelligence support
remain key obstacles, particularly in the Indian Ocean.
In the last several years, the PLA Navy’s distant seas experience has primarily derived from
its ongoing counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and long-distance task group
deployments beyond the first island chain in the western Pacific. China continues to sustain a
three-ship presence in the Gulf of Aden to protect Chinese merchant shipping from maritime
piracy. This operation is China’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Asia region....
The PLA Navy has made long-distance deployments a routine part of the annual training
cycle. In 2012, it deployed task groups beyond the first island chain seven times with
formations as large as seven ships. These deployments are designed to complete a number of
training requirements, including long-distance navigation, C2, and multi-discipline warfare
in deep sea environments beyond the range of land-based air defense.
The PLA Navy’s force structure continues to evolve, incorporating more platforms with the
versatility for both offshore and long-distance operations.77
Some observers believe that China may want to eventually build a series of naval and other
military bases in the Indian Ocean—a so-called “string of pearls”—so as to support Chinese naval
operations along the sea line of communication linking China to Persian Gulf oil sources.78
Other
observers argue that although China has built or is building commercial port facilities in the
Indian Ocean, China to date has not established any naval bases in the Indian Ocean and instead
appears to be pursuing what U.S. officials refer to as a “places not bases” strategy (meaning a
collection of places for Chinese navy ships to occasionally visit for purposes of refueling and
restocking supplies, but not bases).79
DOD states that
76
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 29.
77
2013 DOD CMSD, pp. 38-39.
78
Bill Gertz, “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, January 18, 2005, p.1. See also Daniel J.
Kostecka, “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” China Brief, July 22, 1010: 3-5;
Edward Cody, “China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post, April 12, 2005, p. 1; Indrani Bagchi,
“China Eyeing Base in Bay of Bengal?” Times of India, August 9, 2008, posted online at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China_eyeing_base_in_Bay_of_Bengal/articleshow/3343799.cms; Eric Ellis,
“Pearls for the Orient,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 9, 2010.
79
Daniel J. Kostecka, “A Bogus Asian Pearl,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2011: 48-52; Daniel J. Kostecka,
(continued...)

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Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities
U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of
U.S. and Chinese ships. Although numbers of ships (or aggregate fleet tonnages) can be relatively
easy to compile from published reference sources, they are highly problematic as a means of
assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, for the following reasons:
• A fleet’s total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial
metric of its capability. In light of the many other significant contributors to
naval capability,83
navies with similar numbers of ships or similar aggregate
tonnages can have significantly different capabilities, and navy-to-navy
comparisons of numbers of ships or aggregate tonnages can provide a highly
inaccurate sense of their relative capabilities. In recent years, the warfighting
capabilities of navies have derived increasingly from the sophistication of their
internal electronics and software. This factor can vary greatly from one navy to
the next, and often cannot be easily assessed by outside observation. As the
importance of internal electronics and software has grown, the idea of comparing
the warfighting capabilities of navies principally on the basis of easily observed
factors such as ship numbers and tonnages has become increasingly less valid,
and today is highly problematic.
• Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines, destroyers, or
frigates) can obscure potentially significant differences in the capabilities of
those ships, both between navies and within one country’s navy.84
The
potential for obscuring differences in the capabilities of ships of a given type is
particularly significant in assessing relative U.S. and Chinese capabilities, in part
because China’s navy includes significant numbers of older, obsolescent ships.
Figures on total numbers of Chinese submarines, destroyers, frigates, and coastal
patrol craft lump older, obsolescent ships together with more modern and more
capable designs.85
This CRS report shows numbers of more modern and more
capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3,
respectively.
• A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that increases in total
numbers necessarily translate into increases in aggregate capability, and
that decreases in total numbers necessarily translate into decreases in
aggregate capability. For a Navy like China’s, which is modernizing in some
ship categories by replacing larger numbers of older, obsolescent ships with
smaller numbers of more modern and more capable ships, this is not necessarily
the case. As shown in Table 5, for example, China’s submarine force today has
fewer boats than it did in the 1990, but has greater aggregate capability than it did
83
These include types (as opposed to numbers or aggregate tonnage) of ships; types and numbers of aircraft; the
sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and networking capabilities; supporting maintenance and logistics
capabilities; doctrine and tactics; the quality, education, and training of personnel; and the realism and complexity of
exercises.
84
Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number of other factors, including sensors,
weapons, C4ISR systems, networking capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum
speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time the ship is available for operation).
85
For an article discussing this issue, see Joseph Carrigan, “Aging Tigers, Mighty Dragons: China’s bifurcated Surface
Fleet,” China Brief, September 24, 2010: 2-6.

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in 1990, because larger numbers of older, obsolescent boats have been replaced
by smaller numbers of more modern and more capable boats. A similar point
might be made about China’s force of missile-armed attack craft. For assessing
navies like China’s, it can be more useful to track the growth in numbers of more
modern and more capable units. This CRS report shows numbers of more modern
and more capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 1, Table 2, and
Table 3, respectively.
• Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take
into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting locations
of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide responsibilities, and a
substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the Atlantic. As a
consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might be available for a
crisis or conflict scenario in China’s near-seas region, or could reach that area
within a certain amount of time. In contrast, China’s navy has limited
responsibilities outside China’s near-seas region, and its ships are all homeported
along China’s coast at locations that face directly onto China’s near-seas region.
• Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into
account maritime-relevant military capabilities that countries might have
outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based air force aircraft
armed with ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant maritime-relevant
non-navy forces present in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries, this is a
particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and Chinese military
capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China
incident at sea might involve only navy units on both sides, a broader U.S.-China
military conflict would more likely be a force-on-force engagement involving
multiple branches of each country’s military.
• The missions to be performed by one country’s navy can differ greatly from
the missions to be performed by another country’s navy. Consequently, navies
are better measured against their respective missions than against one another.
Although Navy A might have less capability than Navy B, Navy A might
nevertheless be better able to perform Navy A’s intended missions than Navy B is
to perform Navy B’s intended missions. This is another significant consideration
in assessing U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, because the missions of the two
navies are quite different.
DOD Response to China Naval Modernization
Renewed DOD Emphasis on Asia-Pacific Region
Two DOD strategy and budget documents—a strategic defense guidance document that was
released on January 5, 2012,86
and a document outlining selected program decisions for DOD’s
86
Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense, January 2012, cover
letters and pp. 2, 4-5. For further discussion of this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.

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FY2013 budget that was released on January 26, 201287
—state that U.S. military strategy will
place an increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as one result, there will be a
renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that
notwithstanding constraints on U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened. Although Administration officials state that
the renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region is not directed at any single country, many
observers believe it is in no small part intended as a response to China’s military modernization
effort and its assertive behavior regarding its maritime territorial claims.
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept
DOD has been developing a new Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept that is intended to increase the
joint operating effectiveness U.S. naval and Air Force units, particularly in operations for
countering anti-access forces. The ASB development effort was announced in the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD has established an Air-Sea Battle Office to guide the
implementation of the concept.88
Although DOD officials state that the ASB concept is not
directed at any particular adversary, many observers believe it is focused to a large degree, if not
principally, on countering Chinese and Iranian anti-access forces. On June 3, 2013, DOD released
an unclassified summary of the ASB Concept; the document builds on earlier statements from
DOD officials on the topic. DOD’s unclassified summary of the ASB document is reprinted in
Appendix B.
August 2013 Press Report on Revisions to War Plans
An August 2, 2013, press report stated that
The U.S. military is conducting a sweeping overhaul of its war plans for potential conflicts
from the Middle East to the Pacific, as commanders adapt to a future of dwindling numbers
of ground troops.
Plans that had presumed the availability of large U.S. forces for invasions and occupations
are being redrafted to incorporate strategies such as quick-reaction ground units, air power
and Navy ships, according to officials. A big part of the new plans will be options for the use
of cyberweapons, which can disable enemies’ offensive and defensive capabilities....
... officials said the military had looked at existing plans for conflicts in the Middle East
involving Iran, as well as conflicts in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea and East
China Sea, where U.S. allies and partners have conflicting territorial claims with China....
A defense official said that with the war in Afghanistan coming to an end, the U.S. is at “a
strategic inflection point.” War plans hadn't been updated to conform with revisions to
military strategy outlined by President Barack Obama in 2012.
87
Department of Defense, Defense Budget: Priorities and Choices, January 2012, pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9.
88
Christopher P. Cavas, “Air-Sea Battle Office Targets DoD Blind Spots,” NavyTimes.com, November 10, 2011; Gabe
Starosta, “Pentagon Stands Up new AirSea Battle Office,” Inside the Navy, November 14, 2011; Ann Roosevelt, “DoD
Office Created To Implement Air-Sea Battle Concept,” Defense Daily, November 14, 2011: 6; Michael Fabey,
“Pentagon Acknowledges New Air-Sea Battle Office,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 14, 2011: 3.

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Defense officials said Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has received regular updates on the
work, and has reviewed the revised plans for Asia.89
Navy Response to China Naval Modernization
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of steps in recent years that appear intended, at least in part, at
improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities, including
but not limited to those discussed below. A November 14, 2012, article by Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, provides an overview of Navy activities associated with
the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific (which Administration officials state is not
directed at any one state in particular); the text of the article is presented in Appendix C.
Force Posture and Basing Actions
Navy force posture and basing actions include the following, among others:
• The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the
Navy “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally
available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to
support engagement, presence and deterrence.”90
• More generally, the Navy intends to increase the share of its ships that are
homeported in the Pacific from the current figure of about 55% to 60% by 2020.
• The Navy states that, budgets permitting, the Navy will seek to increase from
about 50 ships to about 60 ships (i.e., an increase of about 20%) the number of
Navy ships that will be stationed in or forward-deployed to the Pacific on a day-
to-day basis.
• In terms of qualitative improvements, the Navy has stated that it will assign its
newest and most capable ships and aircraft, and its most capable personnel, to the
Pacific.
• The Navy will increase the number of attack submarines homeported at Guam to
four, from a previous total of three.91
• The Navy has announced an intention to station up to four Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs) at Singapore by 2017,92
and an additional seven LCSs in Japan by 2022.93
• The United States is conducting talks with the Philippines about the possibility of
increased access at Philippine bases for U.S. forces, including visiting Navy ships
and rotationally deployed land-based maritime patrol aircraft.94
89
Julian E. Barnes, “Pentagon Conducts Overhaul Of War Plans,” Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2013: 5.
90
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. (February 6, 2006) p. 47.
91
“Fourth Attack Sub to be Homeported in Guam,” Navy News Service, February 10, 2014.
92
Jim Wolf, “U.S. Plans 10-Month Warship Deployment To Singapore,” Reuters.com, May 10, 2012; Jonathan
Greenert, “Sea Change, The Navy Pivots to Asia,” Foreign Policy (www.foreignpolicy.com), November 14, 2012.
93
Zachary Keck, “U.S. Chief of Naval Operations: 11 Littoral Combat Ships to Asia by 2012,” The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), May 17, 2013.
94
See, for example, Manuel Mogato, “Philippines Study U.S. Offer to Deploy Spy Planes,” Reuters.com, January 27,
(continued...)

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In addition to the above actions, U.S. Marines have begun six-month rotational training
deployments through Darwin, Australia, with the number Marines in each deployment scheduled
to increase to 2,500 in 2016.95
Acquisition Programs
As mentioned earlier (see “Limitations and Weaknesses” in “Background”), China’s navy
exhibits limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and
mine countermeasures (MCM). Countering China’s naval modernization might thus involve,
among other things, actions to exploit such limitations and weaknesses, such as developing and
procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines, torpedoes, unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs), and mines.
Many of the Navy’s programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapon systems
can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter
Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities. Examples of highly capable ships now being acquired
include Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers,96
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines,97
and
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, including the new Flight III version of the
DDG-51, which is to be equipped with a new radar for improved air and missile defense
operations.98
The procurement rate of Virginia-class submarines was increased to two per year in
FY2011, and the Navy wants to start procuring the Flight III version of the DDG-51 in FY2016.
Examples of highly capable aircraft now being acquired by the Navy include F-35C carrier-based
Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs),99
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and EA-18G Growler
electronic attack aircraft,100
E-2D Hawkeye early warning and command and control aircraft, the
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the Navy carrier-based Unmanned Combat Air
System (N-UCAS program) demonstrator program, and the follow-on Unmanned Carrier
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.101
Some analysts, such as those at
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an independent defense study
group, have emphasized the need for the Navy to develop and acquire a long-range unmanned
aircraft such as UCLASS for use on Navy aircraft carriers.
(...continued)
2012.
95
Seth Robson, “US Increasing Number of Marines On Rotation To Australia,” Stars and Stripes (Stripes.com), June
15, 2013.
96
For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
97
For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
98
For more on the DDG-51 program, including the planned Flight III version, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-
51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
99
For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah
Gertler.
100
For more on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G programs, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G
Aircraft Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
101
The Navy is currently developing a stealthy, long-range, unmanned combat air system (UCAS) for use in the Navy’s
carrier air wings. The demonstration program for the system is called UCAS-D. The subsequent production version of
the aircraft is called N-UCAS, with the N standing for Navy.

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The Navy is also developing a number of new weapon technologies that might be of value in
countering Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities, such as an electromagnetic rail gun
(EMRG) whose potential missions include air and missile defense, and high-power free electron
lasers (FELs) and solid state lasers (SSLs), whose potential missions also include air and missile
defense.102
An October 10, 2011, press report states that Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), in a memorandum dated September 23, 2011, “has launched a new review to
identify warfighting investments that could counter Chinese military methods for disrupting key
battlefield information systems.” According to the report, the memorandum “requests options for
warfighting in ‘the complex electromagnetic environment’ and for countering ‘anti-access/area-
denial’ threats—terms closely associated with China’s military.” The report quotes the
memorandum as stating that “Today’s weapons rely on EM [electromagnetic] sensors, EM
communications and EM seekers to complete their ‘kill chains,’ while defenders are increasingly
turning to EM methods for protection,” and that “some kill chains never leave the EM
environment at all, damaging an adversary’s military capability by affecting control systems
alone—no bomb or missile required.” The report states that the memorandum “directs the group
to ‘generate innovative concepts for [the] Navy to employ the EM environment as a primary line
of operation in a 2025-2030 warfighting campaign.”103
In a December 2011 journal article, Greenert stated that
regional powers in 2025 could use ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, and guided
rockets and artillery to prevent military forces or legitimate users from entering an area
(“anti-access,” or A2) or operating effectively within an area (“area-denial,” or AD). Those
capabilities can be characterized as defensive, reducing opposition to them, and they can be
deployed from the country’s mainland territory, making attacks against them highly
escalatory. Their intended purpose, however, is clear—intimidation of neighboring countries,
including U.S. allies and partners. Aggressors can threaten to hold key maritime crossroads
at risk, render territorial claims moot, and assert that intervention by the United States or
others in these disputes can be delayed or prevented. The stated or unstated implication is
that their neighbors should capitulate to the aggressor’s demands.
To help defend our allies and protect our interests, U.S. forces in 2025 will need to be able to
operate and project power despite adversary A2/AD capabilities. Over the next decade naval
and air forces will implement the new AirSea Battle Concept and put in place the tactics,
procedures, and systems of this innovative approach to the A2/AD challenge....
Over the next decade, maintaining the Navy’s war-fighting edge and addressing fiscal
constraints will require significant changes in how we develop the force. We will need to
shift from a focus on platforms to instead focus on what the platform carries. We have
experience in this model. Aircraft carriers, amphibious ships and the littoral combat ships are
inherently reconfigurable, with sensor and weapon systems that can evolve over time for the
expected mission. As we apply that same modular approach to each of our capabilities, the
weapons, sensors, unmanned systems, and electronic-warfare systems that a platform
deploys will increasingly become more important than the platform itself.
102
For more on the Navy’s laser-development efforts, see CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface,
Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
103
Christopher J. Castelli, “Memo: Navy Seeks To Counter China’s Battle-Disruption Capabilities,” Inside the Navy,
October 10, 2011.

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That paradigm shift will be prompted by three main factors. First, the large number, range of
frequencies, and growing sophistication of sensors will increase the risk to ships and
aircraft—even “stealthy” ones—when operating close to an adversary’s territory. Continuing
to pursue ever-smaller signatures for manned platforms, however, will soon become
unaffordable. Second, the unpredictable and rapid improvement of adversary A2/AD
capabilities will require faster evolution of our own systems to maintain an advantage or
asymmetrically gain the upper hand. This speed of evolution is more affordable and
technically possible in weapons, sensors, and unmanned systems than in manned platforms.
The third factor favoring a focus on payloads is the changing nature of war. Precision-guided
munitions have reduced the number and size of weapons needed to achieve the same effect.
At the same time, concerns for collateral damage have significantly lowered the number of
targets that can be safely attacked in a given engagement. The net effect is fewer weapons
are needed in today’s conflicts.
Together, those trends make guided, precision stand-off weapons such as Tomahawk land-
attack missiles, joint air-surface stand-off missiles, and their successors more viable and
cost-effective alternatives to increasingly stealthy aircraft that close the target and drop
bombs or shoot direct-attack missiles. To take full advantage of the paradigm shift from
platform to payload, the Fleet of 2025 will incorporate faster, longer-range, and more
sophisticated weapons from ships, aircraft, and submarines. In turn, today’s platforms will
evolve to be more capable of carrying a larger range of weapons and other payloads.
Those other payloads will include a growing number of unmanned systems. Budget
limitations over the next 10 to 15 years may constrain the number of ships and aircraft the
Navy can buy....
The future Fleet will deploy a larger and improved force of rotary wing unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) including today’s Fire Scout and soon, the armed Fire-X. Those vehicles
were invaluable in recent operations in Libya and in counterterrorism operations around the
Central Command area of responsibility. Deploying from the deck of a littoral combat ship, a
detachment of Fire Scouts can provide continuous surveillance more than 100 miles away.
Those systems will expand the reach of the ship’s sensors with optical and infrared
capabilities, as well as support special operations forces in the littorals. Even more
significant, the Fleet of 2025 will include UAVs deploying from aircraft carrier decks. What
started a decade ago as the unmanned combat air system will be operating by 2025 as an
integral element of some carrier air wings, providing surveillance and some strike capability
at vastly increased ranges compared with today’s strike fighters. Once that aircraft is fielded,
it will likely take on additional missions such as logistics, electronic warfare, or tanking.
Submarines will deploy and operate in conjunction with a family of unmanned vehicles and
sensors by 2025 to sustain the undersea dominance that is a clear U.S. asymmetric
advantage. Large-displacement unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will deploy from
ships, shore, or Virginia-class submarine payload tubes to conduct surveillance missions.
With their range and endurance, large UUVs could travel deep into an adversary’s A2/AD
envelope to deploy strike missiles, electronic warfare decoys, or mines. Smaller UUVs will
be used by submarines to extend the reach of their organic sensors, and will operate in
conjunction with unattended sensors that can be deployed from surface combatants,
submarines, and P-8A patrol aircraft. The resulting undersea network will create a more
complete and persistent “common operational picture” of the underwater environment when
and where we need it. This will be essential to finding and engaging adversary submarines,
potentially the most dangerous A2/AD capability.
The undersea picture is extremely important in terms of countering enemy mining. The most
basic of A2/AD weapons, mines can render an area of ocean unusable for commercial

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shipping for weeks or months while we laboriously locate and neutralize them. Even the
threat of mines is enough to severely restrict ship movements, significantly affecting trade
and global economic stability if it happens in key choke points such as the Malacca or
Hormuz straits. The mine countermeasure capabilities we are developing for littoral combat
ships and MH-60 aircraft rely heavily on unmanned sensors to rapidly build the underwater
picture, and unmanned neutralization systems to disable mines. By 2025 those systems will
be fully fielded, and their portable nature could allow them to be another swappable payload
on a range of combatants....
Electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations are increasingly essential to defeating the
sensors and command and control (C2) that underpin an opponent’s A2/AD capabilities. If
the adversary is blinded or unable to communicate, he cannot aim long-range ballistic and
cruise missiles or cue submarines and aircraft. Today, Navy forces focus on deconflicting
operations in the electromagnetic spectrum or cyber domains. By 2025, the Fleet will fully
operationalize those domains, more seamlessly managing sensors, attacks, defense, and
communications, and treating EW and cyber environments as “maneuver spaces” on par with
surface, undersea, or air.
For example, an electronic jammer or decoy can defeat individual enemy radar, and thus an
enemy C2 system using the radar’s data. A cyber operation might be able to achieve a similar
effect, allowing U.S. forces to avoid detection. This is akin to using smoke and “rubber-
duck” decoys in World War II to obscure and confuse the operational picture for Japanese
forces, allowing U.S. ships to maneuver to an advantageous position. The future Fleet will
employ EW and cyber with that same sense of operational integration.104
An August 20, 2012, press report stated that the Air-Sea Battle concept prompted Navy officials
to make significant shifts in the service’s FY2014-FY2018 budget plan, including new
investments in ASW, electronic attack and electronic warfare, cyber warfare, the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
(BAMS) UAV (a maritime version of the Global Hawk UAV). The report quoted Chief of Naval
Operations Jonathan Greenert as saying that the total value of the budget shifts was certainly in
the hundreds of millions of dollars, and perhaps in the “low billions” of dollars.105
A July 13, 2013, blog post states that
a new and dangerous mystery weapon has America’s admirals scared.
That’s according to a recent approval for up to $65 million over three years from the Naval
Research Laboratory to defense contractor ITT Exelis. The funds, according to a Navy
document, are for a suite of 24 electronic warfare systems to be mounted on U.S. warships
sailing near Chinese waters.
The reason? It’s “necessary to thwart an immediate threat for naval fleet operations,” the
Navy stated. The sailing branch wants the new defenses in place by March 2014.
104
Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 20.
Greenert’s statement about stationing several LCSs at Singapore followed statements by other Administration officials
dating back to June 2011 about operating a small number of LCSs out of Singapore. See, for example, Wong Maye-E
(Associated Press), “Gates Pledges Wider U.S. Military Presence in Asia,” USA Today, June 4, 2011; and Dan de Luce
(Agence France-Presse), “Gates: New Weapons For ‘Robust’ U.S. Role in Asia,” DefenseNews.com, June 3, 2011.
105
Christopher J. Castelli, “CNO: Air-Sea Battle Driving Acceleration Of Key Programs In POM-14,” Inside the Navy,
August 20, 2012. POM-14 is the Program Objective Memorandum (an internal DOD budget-planning document) for
the FY2014 DOD budget.

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The urgent notice, first spotted by Military & Aerospace Electronics, is an unusually stark
warning for the planet’s mightiest fleet. Navy officials told the magazine the undisclosed
danger is a “newly discovered threat,” which caused U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Adm.
Cecil Haney to fast-track the project.
The Navy isn’t saying what the threat is, which country developed it or when it was
discovered by the Americans. Requests to the Navy for comment were not returned.
But it’s possible to make informed guesses. As the trade magazine notes, “shipboard
electronic warfare systems typically are designed to detect and jam enemy radar threats —
particularly the electronics in radar-guided anti-ship missiles.” (Our emphasis.)
And it’s reasonably safe to assume if there’s a new missile out there, it’s Chinese....
To be clear, nobody outside the Navy knows for sure what’s got the sailing branch so
startled. Until the Navy discloses exactly what the threat is, everyone will be guessing.
Besides China, the other players in this scenario are, of course, Russia, Iran and North
Korea.106
A July 28, 2013, blog post states that
The U.S. Navy has asked missile manufacturers to quickly design and build them a target
drone that will simulate sub-sonic Chinese anti-ship missiles. Previously the U.S. Navy had
spent a lot of effort developing and building similar drones to simulate super-sonic anti-ship
missiles. Apparently someone did the math and realized that the most likely near-term
opponents (China, North Korea, or Iran) all had a lot of Chinese sub-sonic missiles.107
Training and Forward-Deployed Operations
The Navy in recent years has increased antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training for Pacific Fleet
forces and conducted various forward-deployed operations in the Western Pacific, including
exercises and engagement operations with Pacific allied and partner navies, as well as operations
that appear to have been aimed at monitoring Chinese military operations.108
In a December 2011
journal article, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
Critical to shaping the environment is cooperation with partners and allies across the range of
operations. At the high end [of operations], we will expand our combined efforts with allies
in Japan, South Korea, and Australia to train and exercise in missions such as antisubmarine
warfare and integrated air and missile defense. Over the next decade, we will also increase
deployments of ships and aircraft for the cooperative missions our other allies and partners
106
“Mystery Weapon Terrifies America’s Admirals,” War is Boring (https://medium.com/war-is-boring), July 13,
2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at https://medium.com/war-is-boring/9b7312dc7bf5. See also John Keller, “ITT
Exelis To Help Navy With New EW System To Protect Ships From Recently Discovered Threat,” Military and
Aerospace Electronics (www.militaryaerospace.com), July 9, 2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at
http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/07/itt-shipboard-ew.html.
107
James Dunnigan, “U.S. Navy Hurries Preparations For War With China,” Strategy Page (www.strategypage.com),
July 28, 2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/U.S.-Navy-Hurries-
Preparations-For-War-With-China-7-28-2013.asp.
108
Incidents at sea in recent years between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) appear to involve, on the U.S. side, ships and aircraft, such as TAGOS ocean surveillance ships and EP-3
electronic surveillance aircraft, whose primary apparent mission is to monitor foreign military operations.

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need most. Our ships ships [sic] in Singapore will conduct cooperative counterpiracy or
countertrafficking operations around the South China Sea. Similarly, 2025 may see [land-
based] P-8A Poseidon [maritime patrol] aircraft or unmanned broad area maritime
surveillance aerial vehicles periodically deploy to the Philippines or Thailand to help those
nations with maritime domain awareness....
As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in a recent Foreign Policy article, the Asia-
Pacific region will be emphasized in our forward posture.... We will continue our robust
rotational deployments to the western Pacific, complemented with our forward-stationed
navy and marine forces in Japan, Guam, Singapore, and Australia.109
A July 2, 2013, blog post states that
The U.S. Navy’s multi-national exercises in the Pacific theater are growing in size and taking
on new dimensions due to the U.S. military’s overall strategic re-balance or “pivot” to the
region, service officials explained.
Although many of the multi-national exercises currently underway have been growing in
recent years, the U.S. military’s strategic focus on the area is having a profound impact upon
training activities there, Navy officials acknowledge....
“The Pacific re-balance is allowing us to do things we have not been able to do in the past.
Some of our allies were looking for something a little more compatible with what they had.
The LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] allows us to better train and adapt to our partner navies who
have been operating smaller, shallow-draft platforms for years,” said [Lt. Anthony] Falvo
[spokesman, U.S. Pacific Fleet].110
Statements of Confidence
Countering China’s naval modernization effort can also involve stating publicly (while
withholding classified details) the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter improved Chinese maritime
forces. Such public statements could help prevent Chinese overconfidence that might lead to
incidents, while also reassuring regional allies, partners, and neutrals. Conversely, some observers
might argue, having an ability to counter Chinese maritime military forces but not stating it
publicly could invite Chinese overconfidence and thereby be destabilizing. A February 1, 2011,
press report stated:
U.S. military commanders are expressing confidence that they can hold their own in the face
of faster-than-expected advances by China’s military, but looming cost cuts are adding to
doubts about the future of American power in the Pacific....
In an interview from an office at the Washington Navy Yard, a military base in the nation’s
capital, the top Navy commander said the military had plans in place to cope with advances
in China, and elsewhere. “We're not flat footed” in the response to China, Admiral Gary
Roughead told Reuters.
“I would say that we are responding, or advancing, our capabilities in such a way that we’re
pacing the global developments that are taking place,” he said.
109
Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 20.
110
Kris Osborn, “Navy Pivots Training to Match Pacific Transition,” DOD Buzz (www.dodbuzz.com), July 2, 2013.

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“That includes Chinese advances, it includes developments that are taking place in other
parts of the world as well.”111
Issues for Congress
Future Size of U.S. Navy
One potential oversight issue for Congress, particularly in the context of constraints on U.S.
defense spending, concerns whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to
adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately
performing other missions around the world of interest to U.S. policy makers. Some observers are
concerned that a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven reductions
in the size of the U.S. Navy could encourage Chinese military overconfidence and demoralize
U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific, and thereby destabilize or make it harder for the United
States to defend its interests in the region.112
Navy officials state that, to carry out Navy missions around the world in coming years, the Navy
will need to achieve and maintain a fleet of 306 ships of various types and numbers. Many
observers are concerned that constraints on Navy budgets in coming years will result in a fleet
with considerably fewer than 306 ships.113
The issue of whether the U.S. Navy in coming years
will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces is part
of a larger debate about whether the military pillar of the U.S. strategic rebalancing to the Asia-
Pacific region is being adequately resourced.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Under the Administration’s plans, will the Navy in coming years be large enough
to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions around the world of interest to U.S. policy
makers?
• What might be the political and security implications in the Asia-Pacific region
of a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven
reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy?
• If the Navy is reduced in size, and priority in the allocation of deployed Navy
ships is given to maintaining Navy forces in the Pacific, what will be the impact
on Navy force levels in other parts of the world, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian
111
Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Says Keeps Up With China; Is It Enough?” Reuters.com, February 1, 2011.
112
See, for example, Seth Cropsey, “China’s Growing Challenge To U.S. Naval Power,” Wall Street Journal, June 21,
2013: 13; Dan Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Asia Needs a Larger U.S. Defense Budget,” Wall Street Journal, July
5, 2011; J. Randy Forbes, “Defence Cuts Imperil US Asia Role,” The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com), October 26,
2011. See also Andrew Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” Washington Post, July 15, 2011: 15; Dean Cheng, Sea
Power and the Chinese State: China’s Maritime Ambitions, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2576, July 11,
2011, p. 10.
113
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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Ocean region or the Mediterranean Sea, and consequently on the Navy’s ability
to adequately perform its missions in those parts of the world?
• To what extent could the operational impacts of a reduction in Navy ship
numbers be mitigated through increased use of forward homeporting, multiple
crewing, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (i.e., “Sea Swap”)?
How feasible are these options, and what would be their potential costs and
benefits?
Air-Sea Battle Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Air-Sea Battle concept (ASB), which
has become a matter of some controversy. While there seems to be little disagreement over the
goal within the ASB effort to improve the joint operating effectiveness U.S. naval and Air Force
units, there is controversy about the effectiveness of the ASB concept as a means of deterring
potential Chinese aggression and reassuring U.S. allies and partners in the region, and about
whether attacking land targets on the Chinese mainland—something that some observers believe
to be an element of the ASB—would pose an unwanted degree of risk of escalating a smaller
crisis or conflict into a larger one. A July 27, 2013, press report, for example, stated:
Some critics have charged that the Air-Sea Battle concept is driving China to increase its
A2AD capabilities, often pointing to recently fielded weapons that could threaten US aircraft
carriers. [Jan van Tol, the principal author of the CSBA report] scoffs at the notion that such
developments are driven by Air-Sea Battle.
“China has been trying to field those capabilities well before ASB,” he observed. “Interest in
ASB did not trigger Chinese interest in fielding these systems.”
A leading critic of the concept feels otherwise.
Air-Sea Battle is designed to “break” China, said Amitai Etzioni, a professor of international
affairs at George Washington University (GWU) in Washington, who frequently writes and
speaks about the concept.
“The strategy requires going in to the Chinese mainland, because that’s where the anti-ship
missiles are,” Etzioni told Defense News. “The ASB requires you to go into the Chinese
mainland. And that leads to a major confrontation.”114
On April 29, 2013, one observer stated:
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) has become a much-debated Pentagon concept to counter China’s anti-
access/area-denial challenge. Yet while allies welcomed America’s military “rebalance”
toward Asia, they wonder what it means in concrete terms.
ASB is no exception. Indeed, uncertainties surrounding the concept have led to an image
problem even among close allies, such as Australia. It’s time for detailed debate between the
US and its allies about what ASB is and isn’t, what it is supposed to achieve, and what role
the allies could and want to play.
114
Christopher P. Cavas, “Defining Air-Sea Battle,” DefenseNews.com, July 27, 2013.

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The uncertainties stem largely from the fact that ASB remains classified. This not only
leaves allies wondering what the US expects from them, but its China dimension
significantly raises the stakes. While US officials insist that ASB is not country-specific,
everyone in Asia knows who is the major potential adversary for US forces.
Bluntly speaking, the US military is planning how to fight a future war with China without
fully consulting its allies.
In an allied context, this situation is unfortunate and risky. Unfortunate since ASB has the
potential to make a positive contribution to a changing Asia-Pacific strategic environment. It
signals to China America’s intention and willingness to project military power into maritime
zones increasingly contested by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Any Chinese leader would need to calculate the possibility and nature of a US reaction in
response to a major military action designed to change the status quo in the western Pacific.
ASB, therefore, could strengthen the credibility of US conventional deterrence in Asia and
reassure allies and partners.
Yet ASB’s potential to enhance regional stability is largely lost amid the lack of clarity of
what the concept entails and how it links military strategy to broader US political objectives
in Asia.
The result is an image problem of ASB as the military element of an emerging US
containment strategy vis-à-vis China. Such views certainly do not reflect actual US China
policy. But the US needs to better explain how the concept aligns with the US strategic
framework for dealing with China’s rise, or allies will perceive a disconnect between US
military doctrine and overall strategy.
Washington also needs to more clearly explain ASB to Beijing—the emergence of a military
strategy designed to counter China’s growing strength hasn’t gone unnoticed there.
Future high-level talks between Pentagon and PLA officials should particularly focus on the
relationship between ASB and nuclear escalation.
US advocates of ASB argue that in the event of conflict, escalation could be kept at the
conventional level. That is a dangerous proposition, given that the concept entails deep
penetration of Chinese territory to destroy and disrupt PLA command-and-control nodes
used for conventional operations.
Beijing might well perceive such attacks as American attempts to disarm China’s nuclear
deterrent, and could thus be tempted to nuclear pre-emption.
Put differently, minimizing the risk of nuclear escalation requires a very nuanced
understanding on the part of China’s strategic decision-makers that ASB’s conventional
response reflects an “escalation ladder” designed to avoid a catastrophic nuclear exchange.
Without mutual US-Sino understanding about the need for a new concept of strategic
stability, conventional strikes on the Chinese mainland in the context of ASB appear to be a
very risky proposition.
It also is risky to assume that ASB is the silver bullet for all Asian allies facing China’s
military challenge. It’s not. The concept appears optimized for deterring a high-intensity
conventional war between China and the US and its allies in East Asia, extreme cases such
as PLA attacks on Taiwan or US bases in Japan. Not surprisingly, Taiwan and Japan, front-
line states in the emerging US-Sino strategic competition, are the most supportive of ASB.

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However, because it’s a big stick, ASB will probably be far less effective against small-scale
Chinese aggression, such as coercive military actions in maritime territorial disputes, where
the stakes are small enough to (probably) avoid high levels of escalation. The US is thus still
searching for a credible deterrence strategy for such cases.
That’s why Southeast Asian allies are much more ambivalent when it comes to ASB, and the
US would be ill-advised to take their participation for granted.
Even close ally Australia does not see the benefit in openly signing up to a concept that so
far raises more questions than providing answers to its security problems.
The Pentagon needs to do much more to persuade allies that ASB is the right response to
China’s military challenge. A declassified allied version of ASB would be a very good
start.115
On August 2, 2013, another observer stated:
Air-Sea Battle proponents are right to highlight the growing vulnerability of forward-
deployed U.S. forces and right to enhance interservice collaboration. But civilian and
military leaders alike need to understand that Air-Sea Battle suggests the United States
would strike China before China strikes U.S. forces. That could precipitate a spiraling,
costly, and destabilizing arms race and make a crisis more likely to lead to hostilities. The
United States needs options to facilitate crisis management, deter aggression, and protect
U.S. forces that do not require early attacks on Chinese territory.
Here we suggest two: Shift toward a more survivable force posture in East Asia and improve
the means to prevent China—or any state – from projecting force in an act of international
aggression....
Disrupting or destroying China’s kill-chain is alluring. China has the resources to threaten
U.S. forces in the Pacific. Failure to develop countermeasures would leave the United States
with a declining ability to operate militarily, deter Chinese use of force, reassure and defend
allies, and exert influence in a vital region. Yet this simple idea could have dire
consequences: Air-Sea Battle’s targets would have to be struck before they could do
significant damage to U.S. forces. With the exception of ships at sea and satellites in orbit,
the targets that comprise China’s kill-chain—air and naval bases, missile launchers, land-
based sensors, command-and-control centers—are in China itself.
Attacking Chinese territory would have serious geopolitical consequences. China isn't the
menacing, isolated Soviet Union. It’s a huge and integral part of the world economy, as well
as a potential U.S. partner in managing world affairs....
Given all these concerns, what does Air-Sea Battle contribute to U.S. security? It could
indeed present China’s military with serious problems. The kill-chain on which its A2/AD
strategy depends is complex, fragile, and vulnerable to physical attacks and cyberattacks. By
disabling this chain, Air-Sea Battle could buy space, time, and security for the use of existing
U.S. strike forces. Or, as the Chinese see it, Air-Sea Battle could render China extremely
vulnerable to U.S attack.
At the same time, Air-Sea Battle does not solve the underlying problem of U.S. forces’
growing vulnerability in the Western Pacific. That is the result of military-technological
115
Ben Schreer, “Clarify Air-Sea Battle; Asian Allies Warily Mull US Strategy,” DefenseNews.com, April 29, 2013.

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trends, geographic realities, and the limitations and costs of defending overseas deployments.
Each factor favors A2/AD. Air-Sea Battle could provide a stopgap countermeasure until the
United States can address its vulnerability. But it also has the potential to deepen Chinese
fears of U.S. intentions, cause the Chinese to re-double their A2/AD effort—which they see
as essential for national defense—and even make conflict more likely. Importantly, the
advent of Air-Sea Battle should not divert the United States from developing other
capabilities that could serve the same ends without destabilizing Sino-U.S. relations....
Air-Sea Battle increases the odds that a crisis will turn violent. Already, the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) leans toward early strikes on U.S. forces if hostilities have begun or
appear imminent (this inclination is a first premise of the Air-Sea Battle concept). Given that,
to be most effective, Air-Sea Battle would need to take down Chinese targeting and strike
capabilities before they could cause significant damage to U.S. forces and bases. It follows,
and the Chinese fear, that such U.S. capabilities are best used early and first—if not
preemptively, then in preparation for further U.S. offensive action. After all, such U.S.
strikes have been used to initiate conflict twice in Iraq. This perception will, in turn, increase
the incentive for the PLA to attack preemptively, before Air-Sea Battle has degraded its
ability to neutralize the U.S. strike threat. It could give the Chinese cause to launch large-
scale preemptive cyber- and anti-satellite attacks on our Air-Sea Battle assets. Indeed, they
might feel a need, out of self-defense, to launch such attacks even if they had not planned to
start a war. It is a dangerous situation when both sides put a premium on early action....
We simply do not understand well enough how cyberwar with China would unfold and
whether it could be contained. Strategies that encourage mutual restraint rather than early
offensive action in this unfamiliar strategic domain may ultimately be advantageous to the
United States.
Most distressing, from a strategic perspective, is that Air-Sea Battle addresses how a war
with China could begin, but it begs the questions of what course such a war could take,
where it would lead, and how it could be ended on terms favorable to the United States. It is
one thing to attack Iraq or Libya (or even Iran). It’s quite another to attack the world’s
second most powerful state.
So what steps should the United States take to counter China’s growing A2/AD arsenal? Air-
Sea Battle capabilities are worth pursuing, but they cannot be the entirety of our military
posture. The United States needs options that facilitate crisis management, deter aggression,
and sustain U.S. force survivability without requiring early attacks on Chinese territory.
(Those should be a last resort, not the first.) To that end, we propose shifting toward a more
survivable force posture in East Asia. We also suggest developing America’s own A2/AD
capabilities, thus its ability to prevent China—or any other hostile state—from projecting
force.
A more sustainable and less destabilizing way to solve the vulnerability problem is to
overwhelm and confuse China’s targeting, which is the key to its A2/AD. Because forces
that could do this would pose a significant threat without placing a premium on deep, early
strikes, and because striking them in a comprehensive way would be very difficult and risky,
they would add to stability rather than detract from it. Taking full advantage of information
technology, the United States should shift toward such forces—more distributed, networked,
numerous, diverse, elusive, small, long-range, and hard-to-find – while also exploiting two
promising counter-offensive technologies: drones and cyberweapons. A more survivable
U.S. posture along these lines would discourage Chinese preemptive attack, obviate the need
for deep, early U.S. attacks, and allow time for a crisis to be defused....

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To complement a shift toward less targetable, more survivable forces, the United States
should develop a strategy to defeat force projection by regional powers, of which China is
the strongest but obviously not the only candidate. A2/AD works in both directions. If the
United States (and its partners and allies) can use defensive measures to prevent international
aggression, and if it is finding it increasingly difficult and costly to overcome the A2/AD of
lesser powers, then it should turn the tables on those powers. To clarify, if preventing
international aggression was the main reason for the United States to use force—lesser ones
being regime change, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian intervention—then U.S. defense
strategy should concentrate on it. Capabilities to counter force projection by regional
aggressors would give the United States options to deter them, to provide time and space to
defuse crises short of war, and to prevail militarily without necessarily firing the first shot or
immediately escalating to attacks on an adversary’s homeland. Partnerships with allies to
develop their A2/AD capabilities would be critical in this plan.
To bring such a strategy to fruition, all U.S. military services, along with combatant
commanders, would have to develop operational concepts not confined by current doctrine
and force structure. Honing U.S. capabilities for regional A2/AD would exploit targeting
technologies in which the U.S. military has and can retain superiority. The capabilities that
come immediately to mind include anti-air, cyberwar, anti-naval forces, and C4ISR—most
of which exist in U.S. inventories and are undergoing continuous improvement. Furthermore,
working to improve the defense forces of allies and partners would be a central element of
such an approach. Other regional A2/AD capabilities worth considering (and more
controversially) include new capabilities, such as land-based anti-ship missiles.
If the United States relied more on A2/AD capabilities of its own and its partners to prevent
aggression, escalation would no longer be an urgent imperative; it could be undertaken only
when no other good options remained. The United States could rely on regional partners to
deploy their own A2/AD capabilities at the onset of trouble, while withholding its A2/AD
measures until aggression was underway or certain. This would reduce both tensions before
crises develop and the need to attack first. It would also permit time to defuse crises on
favorable terms. Where China is concerned, a U.S. posture that is more clearly geared toward
defeating international aggression, while also more survivable (and almost certainly less
expensive), is less likely to stoke fear, distrust, and temptations to preempt than one that
depends on attacking China at the outset of a conflict. The shift in emphasis to regional A2/
AD would improve deterrence without raising the risks of escalation.116
Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s ASBMs
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s ability to counter China’s
ASBMs. Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a
“game changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered. There are several potential
approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in
combination. The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy
in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely
exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs.
116
David Gompert and Terrence Kelly, “Escalation Clause,” Foreign Policy.com, August 2, 2013. See also David C.
Gompert and Terrence K. Kelly, “U.S., China And An Unthinkable War,” LATimes.com, August 26, 2013; and Daniel
Hartnett, Air-Sea Battle, China, and the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, Center for National Policy, November 2013, 12 pp.

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Breaking the ASBM’s Kill Chain
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e.,
“hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e.,
“soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing
ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack
various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to
carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and
localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM,
and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an
opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes
Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans,
and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill
chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”117
In an interview published on January 14, 2013, Admiral
Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
In order for one to conduct any kind of attack, whether it is a ballistic missile or cruise
missile, you have got to find somebody. Then, you have got to make sure it is somebody you
want to shoot. Then, you’ve got to track it, you’ve got to hold that track. Then, you deliver
the missile. We often talk about what I would call hard kill—knocking it down, a bullet on a
bullet—or soft kill; there is jamming, spoofing, confusing; and we look at that whole
spectrum of operations.
And frankly, it is cheaper in the left-hand side of that spectrum.118
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as
controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for
China to detect, identify, and track those ships.119
The Navy could acquire weapons and systems
for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for
attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying
and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in
flight include developing and procuring improved versions of the SM-3 BMD interceptor missile
(including the planned Block IIA version of the SM-3), accelerating the acquisition of the Sea-
Based Terminal (SBT) interceptor (the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase
BMD interceptor),120
accelerating development and deployment of the electromagnetic rail gun
117
David A. Fulghum, “USAF: Slash And Burn Defense Cuts Will Cost Missions, Capabilities,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, September 30, 2011: 6.
118
“Interview: Adm. Jon Greenert,” Defense News, January 14, 2013: 30. The reference to “the left-hand side of that
spectrum” might be a reference to soft kill measures.
119
For a journal article discussing actions by the Navy during the period 1956-1972 to conceal the exact locations of
Navy ships, see Robert G. Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight, The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations Under EMCON,
1956-1972,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2011: 79-95. See also Jonathan F. Sullivan, Defending the Fleet From
China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense, A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, April 15, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011 at
http://gradworks.umi.com/1491548.pdf.
120
For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the SBT, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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(EMRG), and accelerating the development and deployment of shipboard high-power free
electron lasers (FELs) and solid state lasers (SSLs). Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs
as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic
warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, that could confuse an
ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.121
A March 16, 2012, blog entry states:
China has developed a missile that would turn an aircraft carrier into a 2-billion-dollar hulk
of twisted metal, flame, and dead sailors. Publicly, the U.S. Navy downplays its importance.
Privately, the sailors are working out several different options to kill it before it kills them.
Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the Navy’s top officer, explained to reporters during a Friday
[March 16] breakfast meeting that the Navy has ways of exploiting some of the DF-21D
missile’s formidable technical capabilities, even before opening fire and praying.
As Greenert sees it, there’s a menu of options. Some involve convincing the DF-21D that the
carrier is in a different place. Others involve masking the electronic emissions of the carrier.
Still others are more traditional—like blasting the missile out of the salty air.
“You want to spoof them, preclude detection, jam them, shoot them down if possible, get
them to termination, confuse it,” Greenert said. “The concept is end-to-end, and the
capabilities therein [are] what we’re pursuing”
First up: the missile’s guidance systems. This is where Greenert wants the Navy’s investment
in jamming and electronic warfare generally to pay off.
“If whatever is launched has a seeker, can you jam it?” Greenert mused. “Yes, no, maybe so?
What would it take to jam it?” For now, that’s a job for the flying, jamming Growlers which
messed with Moammar Gadhafi’s anti-aircraft systems in Libya last year. Later on, the Navy
will have a next-generation jammer, also built onto some of its jets, which it wants to use to
infect enemy systems with malware. Alternatively or in supplement, the strike group would
go radio silent, to stop the missile from homing in on its electronic emissions.
Then comes the “more popular” part, Greenert said: shooting the missile down. The Aegis
missile-defense cruisers included in an aircraft carrier strike group would be tasked with that
over the next decade. Afterward, the Navy wants to use giant shipboard lasers to burn
through incoming missiles. But it’s by no means clear the Navy really can clear all the
technological obstacles to oceanic laser warfare by its mid-2020s deadline.
And shooting down this new missile isn’t a guaranteed proposition. “When do you have to
engage it? On the way up? Mid-course? Terminal?” Greenert said.
His answer: all of the above. “We call it links of a chain,” Greenert said. “We want to break
as many links as possible.” Navy weapons have to be ready to disable the DF-21D—either
through jamming it or shooting it—during “all” phases of its trajectory.
There’s also something that Greenert didn’t mention: he has time on his side.
The Navy conceded in December 2010 that the DF-21D had reached “initial operating
capability.” But its intelligence chief quickly added that blowing up a carrier is still past
121
Regarding the option of systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic
Implications of Obscurants,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84; Scott Tait, “Make Smoke!” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 58-63.

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China’s means. Hitting a moving object is difficult. Testing the thing at sea is too. Then
China needs to integrate the missile into its general surface warfare plans. And after all that
come the countermeasures Greenert outlined. Solving all that takes time.
And while China works on that, the Navy will continue its own development. If Greenert is
freaked out by a weapon that can punch through one of the most potent symbols of American
power, he’s doing a good job of hiding it in public.122
Endo-Atmospheric Target for Simulating DF-21D ASBM
A December 2011 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—the
DOT&E office’s annual report for FY2011—states the following in its section on test and
evaluation resources:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Target
A threat representative Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) target for operational open-air
testing has become an immediate test resource need. China is fielding the DF-21D ASBM,
which threatens U.S. and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While the Missile
Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program currently exists
for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is the Navy’s
responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency estimates the
non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30 million with each
target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target will be more expensive
to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy acquisition programs will
require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5)
may be sufficient to validate analytical models.123
A February 28, 2012, press report stated:
“Numerous programs will require” a test missile to stand in for the Chinese DF-21D,
“including self-defense systems used on our carriers and larger amphibious ships to counter
anti-ship ballistic missiles,” [Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test
and evaluation] said in an e-mailed statement....
“No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s
trajectory,” Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy “has not budgeted for any study,
development, acquisition or production” of a DF-21D target, he said.
Lieutenant Alana Garas, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the service
“acknowledges this is a valid concern and is assessing options to address it. We are unable to
provide additional details.”...
122
Spencer Ackerman, “How To Kill China’s ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missile: Jam, Spoof And Shoot,” Danger Room
(Wired.com), March 16, 2012, accessed online at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/03/killing-chinas-carrier-
killer/. The word “[are],” in brackets, as in original. See also Otto Kreisher, “China’s Carrier Killer: Threat and
Theatrics,” Air Force Magazine, December 2013: 44-47; and “Who’s Afraid of the DF-21D,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 10, 2013.
123
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p.
294.

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effectively could require completing development work on the Navy’s new anti-torpedo torpedo
(ATT) and putting the weapon into procurement.128
Navy’s Fleet Architecture
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s fleet architecture. Some
observers, viewing the anti-access aspects of China’s naval modernization effort, including
ASBMs, ASCMs, and other anti-ship weapons, have raised the question of whether the U.S. Navy
should respond by shifting over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture featuring a
reduced reliance on carriers and other large ships and an increased reliance on smaller ships.129
Supporters of this option argue that such an architecture could generate comparable aggregate
fleet capability at lower cost and be more effective at confounding Chinese maritime anti-access
capabilities. Skeptics, including supporters of the currently planned fleet architecture, question
both of these arguments.130
128
For articles discussing torpedo defense systems, including ATTs, see Richard Scott, “Ships Shore Up,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, September 1, 2010: 22-23, 25, 27; Mike McCarthy, “NAVSEA Seeks Industry Thoughts On Torpedo
Defense Systems,” Defense Daily, November 29, 2011: 4-5.
129
See, for example, David C. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific, RAND, Santa
Monica (CA), 2013, 193 pp. (RR-151-OSD)
130
The question of whether the U.S. Navy concentrates too much of its combat capability in a relatively small number
of high-value units, and whether it should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, has been
debated at various times over the years, in various contexts. Much of the discussion concerns whether the Navy should
start procuring smaller aircraft carriers as complements or replacements for its current large aircraft carriers.
Supporters of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that the Navy’s current architecture,
including its force of 11 large aircraft carriers, in effect puts too many of the Navy’s combat-capability eggs into a
relatively small number of baskets on which an adversary can concentrate its surveillance and targeting systems and its
anti-ship weapons. They argue that although a large Navy aircraft carrier can absorb hits from multiple conventional
weapons without sinking, a smaller number of enemy weapons might cause damage sufficient to stop the carrier’s
aviation operations, thus eliminating the ship’s primary combat capability and providing the attacker with what is
known as a “mission kill.” A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would make it more difficult for
China to target the Navy and reduce the possibility of the Navy experiencing a significant reduction in combat
capability due to the loss in battle of a relatively small number of high-value units.
Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that large carriers and other large ships are
not only more capable, but proportionately more capable, than smaller ships, that larger ships are capable of fielding
highly capable systems for defending themselves, and that they are much better able than smaller ships to withstand the
effects of enemy weapons, due to their larger size, extensive armoring and interior compartmentalization, and extensive
damage-control systems. A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would be less capable or more
expensive than today’s fleet architecture. Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue
could also argue that the Navy has already taken an important (but not excessive) step toward fielding a more
distributed fleet architecture through its plan to acquire 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), which are small, fast surface
combatants with modular, “plug-and-flight” mission payloads. (For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report
RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
The issue of Navy fleet architecture, including the question of whether the Navy should shift over time to a more highly
distributed fleet architecture, was examined in a report by DOD’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT) that was
submitted to Congress in 2005. OFT’s report, along with two other reports on Navy fleet architecture that were
submitted to Congress in 2005, are discussed at length in CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative
Force Structure Studies of 2005—Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The functions carried out by OFT
have since been redistributed to other DOD offices. See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., The New Navy Fighting Machine:
A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the
Composition of the United States Fleet, Monterey (CA), Naval Postgraduate School, August 2009, 68 pp.; Timothy C.
Hanifen, “At the Point of Inflection,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 24-31; and the blog entry
available online at http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/06/navy-is-losing-narratives-battle.html.

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Another question bearing on fleet architecture concerns the future role of Navy unmanned
vehicles in countering Chinese anti-access forces. A July 16, 2012, press report states:
The Navy is eying potential investments in revolutionary unmanned systems with greater
autonomy than today’s drones to counter advanced Chinese weapons capable of threatening
U.S. warships, according to draft guidance for a new assessment.
Although Defense Department and naval leaders have previously called for drones with
greater levels of autonomy, the “specific pathways” for the introduction of enabling
technologies have not yet been identified, states the draft terms of reference for the Naval
Research Advisory Committee’s planned review.131
Legislative Activity for FY2014
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-76)
House (Committee Report)
Section 1257 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960) as reported by the
House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 113-102 of June 7, 2013) states:
SEC. 1257. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
Congress—
(1) notes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to rapidly modernize and expand
its military capabilities across the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains;
(2) is concerned by the rate and scope of PRC military developments, including its military-
focused cyber espionage, which indicate a desire to constrain or prevent the peaceful
activities of the United States and its allies in the Western Pacific;
(3) concurs with Admiral Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, that
`China’s rapid development of advanced military capabilities, combined with its unclear
intentions, certainly raises strategic and security concerns for the U.S and the region’;
(4) notes the United States remains committed to a robust forward military-presence in the
Asia-Pacific and will continue to vigorously support mutual defense arrangements with
treaty allies while also building deeper relationships with other strategic partners in the
region; and
(5) urges the Government of the PRC to work peacefully to resolve existing territorial
disputes and to adopt a maritime code of conduct with relevant parties to guide all forms of
maritime interaction and communications in the Asia-Pacific.
131
Christopher J. Castelli, “Investments In Drone Autonomy Eyed To Counter China’s A2/AD Weapons,” Inside the
Navy, July 16, 2012.

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H.Rept. 113-102 states:
The committee is concerned about the Navy’s overall fleet size and the continuous sustained
demand for naval forces, especially in light of the Administration’s strategic shift to
operations in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the restriction precluding the Navy from retiring
seven Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and two amphibious ships well before the
end of their expected service life continues for fiscal year 2014. The committee would
provide additional funds to the Navy to properly modernize and maintain these critical naval
assets. The committee notes that it is less costly to maintain existing assets than to procure
new ones and this funding ensures the correct naval capabilities and fleet mix for the length
of time originally authorized by Congress. (Page 6)
H.Rept. 113-102 also states:
Offensive anti-surface warfare weapon development
The budget request contained $136.0 million in PE 64786N132
for offensive anti-surface
warfare weapon development.
In 2009, the U.S. Pacific Fleet validated an Urgent Operational Needs Statement for an over-
the-horizon surface warfare missile that can be launched from aircraft or surface vessels and
strike well-defended, moving maritime targets without reliance on external inputs. This need
is even more relevant today and is critical to meeting national security objectives and
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. The committee supports the Secretary of the Navy’s
pursuit for the rapid development and deployment of a long-range, anti-ship missile that is
capable of penetrating sophisticated enemy air-defense systems fromlong range. It should be
capable of operating autonomously in a denied signal environment, without relying on input
of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or global positioning system signals.
However, the committee notes recent inconsistencies with the Department of Defense’s
acquisition strategy for this type of air-launched/surface-launched missile capability.
Furthermore, the current effort does not appear to be consistent with the budget
documentation materials provided with the submission of the President’s fiscal year 2014
budget to Congress, and the committee understands that the Department of Defense has
revised the acquisition strategy since the President’s budget submission.
The committee recommends $136.0 million, the full amount requested, in PE 64786N for
offensive anti-surface warfare weapon development, and calls into question the Secretary’s
ability to execute $86.0 million of those funds in fiscal year 2014 for product-development
activities prior to achieving a milestone A for the program.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, the Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to submit to the defense committees by September 30, 2013, the most recent
OASuW Analysis of Alternatives completed by the Department of Defense.
The committee also directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide to the defense committees
by September 30, 2013, a report that: (1) outlines the Secretary’s near-, mid-, and long-term
capability and acquisition roadmaps for maintaining air-launched and surface-launched
132
Line items in DOD research and development accounts are referred to as Program Elements, or PEs. PE 64786N is a
line item in the Navy’s research and development account (as indicated by the “N” at the end) for offensive anti-surface
warfare weapon development.

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offensive anti-surface warfare weapon capabilities within the Department of Defense; (2)
describes capability gaps and shortfalls of the Navy regarding current and future OASuW
capabilities; (3) any supporting analysis that have informed the Secretary’s roadmap; (4) any
on-going technology experimentation, engineering, product development, or modification
efforts within the Department of Defense that would enhance the Secretary’s ability to
develop and field future OASuW capabilities, and an assessment of the maturity and
associated risks of those technologies and efforts; and, (5) updated budget estimates and life-
cycle funding estimates of the Department of Defense required to develop, engineer,
manufacture, test, field and sustain new or modified air-launched and surface-launched
OASuW missile capabilities in the planned roadmaps. The report may contain a classified
annex. (Pages 58-59)
H.Rept. 113-102 also states:
Air Sea Battle Office
The committee is aware that the military services established the Air Sea Battle (ASB) office
in 2012 as a result of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) disestablishment.
USJFCOM had an office focused on the Air Sea Battle concept integration, specifically as it
related to requirements, capability gaps and shortfalls, projects and programs directly related
to effectively employing in an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) contingency operation. The
committee is concerned whether the placement of the current ASB office outside of the Joint
Staff is the most logical and effective location for integrating ASB concepts across the
services. The committee believes the Secretary of Defense should evaluate the ASB office to
see if it is accomplishing its goals to enable and prepare the U.S. military to effectively
operate in an A2/AD environment, and whether the office provides a unique function and
perspective or it duplicates other efforts carried out elsewhere in the Department of Defense.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to determine the effectiveness of
the ASB office and whether the office is carrying out a unique function or duplicates other
efforts. Should the Secretary conclude that the ASB office is effective and non-duplicative of
other efforts, the Secretary should determine whether the ASB office should continue as is,
be modified, or placed within the Joint Staff. The committee directs the Secretary to brief the
House Committee on Armed Services by January 31, 2014, on the results of the analysis and
the future of the ASB office. (Page 193)
House (Floor Consideration)
On June 13, 2013, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1960, the House agreed to by voice vote an
en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment listed as Number 96 in
H.Rept. 113-108 of June 13 (legislative day June 12), 2013, which provided for the further
consideration of H.R. 1960. Amendment Number 96 became Section 903 of H.R. 1960 as passed
by the House on June 14, 2013. Section 903 sates:
SEC. 903. REPORT ON STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY
INSTALLATION OF THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND.
(a) Report Required- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report on the strategic value of each major
installation that supports operations in the United States Pacific Command.
(b) Content of Report- The report required by subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, an
assessment of the following with respect to each major installation covered by the report:

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(1) The strategic value of the operations of the installation in the Pacific Command Area of
Responsibility, including the strategic value of the installation for the global deployment of
airpower, military personnel, and logistical support.
(2) The usefulness of the installation for potential future missions, including military, search
and rescue, and humanitarian missions in a changing Pacific and Arctic region.
(3) The suitability of the installation for basing of F-35 aircraft and other future weapons
systems in the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility.
(4) The suitability of the installation for mission growth, including relocation of combat-
coded aircraft, Army units, naval vessels, and Marine Corps units from overseas bases.
(5) How critical the installation is in maintaining and expanding the North and Southern
Pacific air refueling bridge.
(6) The availability of the installation for basing remotely piloted aircraft.
(7) The proximity of the installation to scoreable, instrumented training ranges, with an
emphasis on joint-training.
(8) The impact of urban encroachment on the installation and its training ranges.
(c) Classified Annex- The report required by subsection (a) may include a classified annex if
necessary to fully describe the matters required by subsection (b).
Senate
Section 1232 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197) as reported by the
Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 113-44 of June 20, 2013) states:
SEC. 1232. ELEMENT ON 5TH
GENERATION FIGHTER PROGRAM IN ANNUAL
REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (10 U.S.C.
113 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(20) The status of the 5th
generation fighter program of the People’s Republic of China,
including an assessment of each individual aircraft type, estimated initial and full operational
capability dates, and the ability of such aircraft to provide air superiority.’.
Regarding Section 1232, S.Rept. 113-44 states:
Element on 5th
generation fighter program in annual report on military and security
developments involving the People’s Republic of China (sec. 1232)
The committee recommends a provision that would add a requirement for the Department of
Defense to include information on China’s 5th
generation fighter programs in the
congressionallymandated Annual Report on Military and Security Developments involving
the People’s Republic of China. Although recent versions of the report include information
about China’s 5th
generation fighters, this provision make this aspect of China’s military
development a permanent part of the annual report. (Page 200)

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S.Rept. 113-44 also states:
U.S. military posture and resiliency in the Asia-Pacific
The committee remains interested in the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region and
the implications of the strategic rebalance announced as part of the Defense Strategic
Guidance in January 2012. While this rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific encompasses more
than just U.S. military presence and posture, the current and future U.S. military force
posture in the Asia-Pacific region is a critical element of the overall geo-political security
strategy in Asia.
The committee understands that U.S. Pacific Command is currently conducting a study of
resiliency and developing an associated resiliency plan as one element of the force posture
and supporting infrastructure. The committee is reluctant to support new investments in
infrastructure until it has reviewed the study and the plan and better understands both the
linkage between resiliency and strategy and the long term affordability and sustainability of
the plan.
Accordingly, the committee urges the Secretary of Defense to provide the results of the U.S.
Pacific Command’s study of resiliency, with an explanation of how the resiliency plan
supports the overall theater strategic plan, to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. (Page 243)
S.Rept. 113-44 also states:
Offensive anti-surface warfare weapon development
The budget request included $136.0 million in PE 64786N for developing an offensive anti-
surface warfare (OASuW) weapon. This follows on an enacted funding level of $86.8
million in fiscal year 2013. The Navy hopes to use these funds to develop an OASuW
weapon system or systems solution that can be launched from the FY2014 DOD
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397/S. 1429) air or from surface vessels against hostile surface
targets. These efforts were largely in response to an urgent operational need statement
(UONS) seeking immediate capability.
In fiscal year 2013, the Navy had planned to release a request for proposal, award one or
more competitive prototyping contracts, and establish a government programoffice team. he
Navy also had planned to issue a contract for $31.5 million for an accelerated development
effort to field an interim OASuW capability in April 2013. That contract effort has since
been suspended due to changing priorities within the Navy, and some disagreement about the
validity of the UONS that initiated the effort. The budget exhibits indicate that the funds
instead would be used to mature technologies applicable to an OASuW program.
In fiscal year 2014, the Navy planned to spend the year preparing for a milestone A
acquisition decision that would not occur until at least the first quarter of fiscal year 2015. In
fiscal year 2015, the Navy budget exhibits indicate that the Navy will be conducting
competitive prototyping if required under new technology development contracts awarded in
fiscal year 2015. It is clear to the committee that the Navy intends to conduct no such
competitive prototyping, but will instead try to transition a developmental effort from the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) into a program of record.
The committee fails to see the need to invest so much in a program for which the urgency of
the UONS is now in doubt, and certainly not to down select prematurely to a single program
responding to a near-term requirement that would not deliver capability in the near term.

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Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $100.0 million in PE 64786N. The
committee believes it would be prudent to continue government support activities
anticipating a successful milestone A graduation in fiscal year 2015, but that the Navy
should be able to do this with $36.0 million in fiscal year 2014, an increase of roughly 39
percent above the fiscal year 2013 effort that was not related to the cancelled accelerated
development program.
The committee further expects the Navy to present a plan that: (1) pursues a more
competitive approach; and (2) yields a program proceeding to a technology readiness level 6
before deciding on a particular technical solution. (Pages 43-44)133
Final Version
Section 217(b) of the final version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
3304/P.L. 113-66 of December 26, 2013) states:
(b) Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Weapon Contracts of the Navy-
(1) PROHIBITION- Except as provided by paragraph (2), none of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for the offensive
anti-surface warfare weapon may be used to enter into or modify a contract using procedures
other than competitive procedures (as defined in section 2302(2) of title 10, United States
Code).
(2) EXEMPTION; WAIVER-
(A) EXEMPTED ACTIVITIES- The prohibition in paragraph (1) shall not apply to funds
specified in such paragraph that are made available for the development, testing, and fielding
of aircraft-launched offensive anti-surface warfare weapons capabilities.
(B) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER AUTHORITY- The Secretary of Defense may
waive the prohibition in paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is in the
national security interests of the United States.
133
In apparent connection with this committee report language, a September 16, 2013, press report states:
When the Defense Advances Research Projects Agency (Darpa) launched its Long-Range Anti-
Ship Missile (Lrasm) program in 2009, the threat to U.S. Navy warships from China’s ballistic and
supersonic anti-ship missiles looked serious. It still does, but now that the stealthy Lrasm has begun
flight tests, mixed messages from the Pentagon have led Congress to cut back on funding for
procurement....
... there is a move to reduce the increased funding requested for OASuW [Offensive Anti-Surface
Warfare] [research and development work] in fiscal 2014. Cutting $87 million from the Navy’s
$136 million request, House appropriators cited “poor justification” of the program by the
Pentagon, while Senate authorizers have proposed cutting $100 million, saying the program’s
urgency has been called into question by the Defense Department’s changing priorities.
OASuW was started in response to an urgent operational need from the Navy’s Pacific Fleet. But
the Pentagon dropped plans for accelerated fielding by 2018 of an interim weapon based on the
Raytheon Tactical Tomahawk, and is now aiming for initial operational capability of a new anti-
ship missile no later than 2024. To Congress, already wary that the Navy plans to move from the
Lrasm prototype of OASuW procurement without a competition, this signals doubt about the
urgency—in the Pentagon, if not in the Pacific.
(Graham Warwick, “Sneak Attacker,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 16, 2013:
42.)

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Section 1242 of the act states:
SEC. 1242. ELEMENT ON 5TH
GENERATION FIGHTER PROGRAM IN ANNUAL
REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (10 U.S.C.
113 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
`(20) The status of the 5th
generation fighter program of the People’s Republic of China,
including an assessment of each individual aircraft type, estimated initial and full operational
capability dates, and the ability of such aircraft to provide air superiority.’.
Regarding Section 1242, the explanatory statement for H.R. 3304 states:
Element on 5th
generation fighter program in annual report on military and security
developments involving the People’s Republic of China (sec. 1242)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 1232) that would add a
requirement for the Department of Defense to include information on China’s 5th
generation
fighter programs in the congressionally-mandated Annual Report on Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes this provision.
To improve insight into the dynamics of the relationship and interactions between the United
States and the People’s Republic of China and their impact on security, we direct the
Chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, not later
than March 15, 2014, to submit a report on the mandate and purpose of the Commission to
the appropriate congressional committees.
The report shall include: (1) A summary and description of the changes that have occurred in
the relationship between the United States and China since December 31, 2000, with respect
to those national security and economic issues that would impact the mandate of the
Commission; and (2) Recommendations of the Commission for statutory changes to update
the mandate and purpose of the Commission, taking into the account changes in the
relationship between the United States and China.
The appropriate congressional committees include (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives. (pdf page 259 of 532)
The explanatory statement also states:
Report on strategic importance of United States military installation of the U.S. Pacific
Command
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 903) that would require the Secretary of Defense
to submit a report on the strategic value of each major installation that supports operations in
the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility.

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The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement does not include the provision. (pdf page 195 of 532)
The explanatory statement also states:
Sense of Congress on military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1257) that would express certain findings and the
sense of Congress regarding the military developments of the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement does not include the provision.
We reaffirm our interest in the Asia-Pacific region and the implementation of the rebalance
to that region, as described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, dated January 2012. We
encourage the Secretary of Defense to continue engaging with the congressional defense
committees to facilitate the successful implementation of the strategic rebalance and to
continue to support the national security interests of the United States and its allies and
partners in the Asia-Pacific region. (pdf page 271 of 532)
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-
76)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-85 of August 1, 2013) on the
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (S. 1429), states
With the fiscal year 2014 budget submission, the Navy again proposes to prematurely retire
seven Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and two amphibious dock landing ships that
have a combined remaining service life of over 100 years. The Committee notes that this
proposal was rejected by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 2013 Department of Defense Appropriations Act; and
that Congress provided significant funds to man, operate, sustain and modernize these ships.
As previously expressed in Senate Report 112–196, the Committee is concerned with this
proposed elimination of force structure and believes it is disconnected fromthe strategic shift
to the Asia-Pacific, creates future unaffordable shipbuilding requirements, and exacerbates
force structure shortfalls that negatively impact the Department’s ability to meet Combatant
Command requirements. (Page 10)
The report also states:
The F/A–18E/F Super Hornet continues to be the Navy’s premier carrier asset for force
projection, and it will remain the backbone of the Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet for the next 25
years. The fiscal year 2014 budget indicates the end of domestic production with the final
procurement of EA–18G Growlers. The Committee is concerned with the decision to end
Super Hornet production and believes a strong carrier-based fleet is vital to the increased
emphasis on the Pacific region. Due to the delay in fielding the Navy variant of the Joint
Strike Fighter, ending the Super Hornet production prematurely creates risk in the Navy’s
strike fighter force structure, and in the Nation’s production capacity and a competitive

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industrial base. Therefore, the Committee recommends a $75,000,000 increase for advance
procurement of F/A–18 aircraft and expects the Navy to procure additional aircraft in the
fiscal year 2015 budget request. (Page 93)
The report also states:
The Committee notes that the fiscal year 2014 budget request submitted by the Navy, once
again, failed to present a plan to address the amphibious lift shortfall that exists today. In
January 2009, the Navy and Marine Corps determined a minimum force of 33 ships is the
limit of acceptable risk in meeting a 38-ship amphibious warship force requirement. As of
now, there are 28 ships in the Navy’s amphibious fleet, with an average of only 22 ships
operationally available at any given time due to maintenance and overhaul schedules. This
level of assumed risk with amphibious lift capability by the Department of the Navy deeply
concerns the Committee. Of particular concern is the impact it has on the ability of
Commanders to meet operations plans and crisis response requirements, particularly as
instability in the Middle East continues and as the Department of Defense rebalances its
global posture towards the Asia-Pacific region. (Page 101)
Final Version
The explanatory statement for the final version of the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division
C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76 of January 17, 2014) states (emphasis added):
SHIP MODERNIZATION, OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT FUND
In the fiscal year 2014 budget submission, the Navy again proposes to prematurely retire
seven Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers and two amphibious dock landing ships that
have a combined remaining service life of over 100 years. It is noted that this proposal was
rejected by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014, as well
as in P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013, and in
Division C of P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2013, and that Congress previously appropriated considerable funds to man, operate, sustain,
and modernize these ships. As previously expressed in Senate Reports 113-85 and 112-
196, and in House Reports 113-113 and 112-493, the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees are concerned with this proposed elimination of force structure and believe
this change is disconnected from the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region.
Additionally, this force structure change would likely create future unaffordable shipbuilding
requirements and exacerbate force structure shortfalls that negatively impact the
Department’s ability to meet Combatant Command requirements.
It is noted that some key assumptions that led the Navy to propose prematurely retiring these
ships have changed. This includes the material condition of at least one ship being superior
to what the Navy had assumed, as well as the scope and cost of modernization efforts
required for these platforms to maintain their operational relevance for the balance of their
service lives. It is believed that further adjustments to projected modernization efforts could
be made, resulting in cost savings while retaining valuable operational capability in the near-
term. Therefore, these proposed premature retirements are again denied, and the agreement
directs the Secretary of the Navy to retain this force structure in its entirety. The agreement
provides $2,244,400,000 to man, operate, sustain, upgrade, and modernize only CG-63, CG-
64, CG-65, CG-66, CG-68, CG-69, CG-73, LSD-41 and LSD-46 in the Ship Modernization,
Operations and Sustainment Fund, as specified by Section 8107 of this Act. Recognizing the
time required to plan and execute shipyard availabilities and modernization periods, these
funds are made available until September 30, 2021.

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However, upgrades to these ships have been delayed for too long, and therefore the Secretary
of the Navy is directed to upgrade at least one of the above listed Ticonderoga class cruisers
starting in fiscal year 2014. Further, the Secretary of the Navy is directed to provide to the
congressional defense committees, not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act, and
every 90 days thereafter, a written report, unclassified to the greatest extent possible and with
a classified annex if required, detailing for each of the nine ships listed above its readiness,
operational and manning status, planning efforts for modernization, deployment schedules,
as well as scheduled shipyard induction periods dating back to fiscal year 2012 and going
forward for each fiscal year until 2021. The agreement provides the fiscal relief required by
the Navy to maintain this critical force structure and allows the Navy sufficient time to
budget for this force structure in future budget submissions. Therefore, no funds provided in
this Act shall be used to prepare a budget submission to retire the above-listed ships. (pdf
pages 6-8 of 351)

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Appendix A. January 2014 ONI Testimony
This appendix presents the prepared statement of Jesse L. Karotkin, ONI’s Senior Intelligence
Officer for China, for a January 30, 2014, hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission on China’s military modernization and its implications for the United States.
The text of the statement is as follows:
TRENDS IN CHINA’S NAVAL MODERNIZATION
US CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
TESTIMONY
JESSE L. KAROTKIN
Introduction
At the dawn of the 21st
Century, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) remained
largely a littoral force. Though China’s maritime interests were rapidly changing, the vast
majority of its naval platforms offered very limited capability and endurance, particularly in
blue water. Over the past 15 years the PLA(N) has carried out an ambitious modernization
effort, resulting in a more technologically advanced and flexible force. This transformation is
evident not only the PLA(N)’s Gulf of Aden counter-piracy presence, which is now in its
sixth year, but also in the navy’s more advanced regional operations and exercises. In
contrast to its narrow focus a just decade ago, the PLA(N) is evolving to meet a wide range
of missions including conflict with Taiwan, enforcement of maritime claims, protection of
economic interests, as well as counter-piracy and humanitarian missions.
The PLA(N) currently possesses approximately 77 principal surface combatants, more than
60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped
small combatants. Although overall order-of-battle has remained relatively constant in recent
years, the PLA(N) is rapidly retiring legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission
ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.
During 2013 alone, over fifty naval ships were laid down, launched, or commissioned, with a
similar number expected in 2014. Major qualitative improvements are occurring within naval
aviation and the submarine force, which are increasingly capable of striking targets hundreds
of miles from the Chinese mainland.
The introduction of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles across the force, coupled with non-
PLA(N) weapons such as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and the requisite C4ISR
architecture to support targeting, will allow China to significantly expand its “counter-
intervention” capability further into the Philippine Sea and South China Sea over the next
decade. Many of these capabilities are designed specifically to deter or prevent U.S. military
intervention in the region.
Even if order-of-battle numbers remain relatively constant through 2020, the PLA(N) will
possess far more combat capability due to the rapid rate of acquisition coupled with
improving operational proficiency. Beijing characterizes its military modernization effort as
a “three-step development strategy” that entails laying a “solid foundation” by 2010, making
“major progress” by 2020, and being able to win “informationized wars by the mid-21st
century.” Although the PLA(N) faces capability gaps in some key areas, including deep-
water anti-submarine warfare and joint operations, they have achieved their “strong
foundation” and are emerging as a well equipped, competent, and more professional force.

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A Multi-Mission Force
As China began devoting greater resources to naval modernization in the late 1990s, virtually
all of its ships, submarines were essentially single-mission platforms, poorly equipped to
operate beyond the support of land-based defenses. The PLA(N) has subsequently acquired
larger, multi-mission platforms, capable of long-distance deployments and offshore
operations. China’s latest Defense White Paper, released in 2013, noted that the PLA(N)
“endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its forces for comprehensive offshore
operations… [and] develop blue water capabilities.” The LUYANG III-class DDG (052D),
which will likely enter service this year, embodies the trend towards a more flexible force
with advanced air defenses and long-range strike capability.
China has made the most demonstrable progress in anti-surface warfare (ASuW), deploying
advanced, long-range ASCMs throughout the force. With the support fromimproved C4ISR,
this investment significantly expands the area that surface ships, submarines, and aircraft and
are able to hold at risk. The PLA(N) has also made notable gains in anti-air warfare (AAW),
enabling the recent expansion of blue-water operations. Just over a decade ago, just 20
percent of PLA(N) combatants were equipped with a rudimentary point air defense
capability. As a result, the surface force was effectively tethered to the shore. Initially relying
on Russian surface to air missiles (SAMs) to address this gap, newer PLA(N) combatants are
equipped with indigenous medium-to-long range area air defense missiles, modern combat
management systems, and air-surveillance sensors.
Although progress in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is less pronounced, there are indications
that the PLA(N) is committed to addressing this gap. More surface platforms are being
equipped with modern sonar systems, to include towed arrays and hangars to support
shipboard helicopters. Additionally, China appears to be developing aY-8 naval variant that
is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) boom, typical of ASW aircraft. Over
the next decade, China is likely to make gains in ASW, both from improved sensors and
operator proficiency.
China’s submarine force remains concentrated almost exclusively on ASuW, with exception
of the JIN SSBN, which will likely commence deterrent patrols in 2014. The type-095
guided missile attack submarine, which China will likely construct over the next decade,
may be equipped with a land-attack capability. The deployment of LACMs on future
submarines and surface combatants could enhance China’s ability to strike key U.S. bases
throughout the region, including Guam.
Naval aviation is also expanding its mission set and capability in maritime strike, maritime
patrols, anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning, and logistics. Although it will be
several years before the Liaoning aircraft carrier and its air wing can be considered fully
operational, this development signals a new chapter in Chinese naval aviation. By 2020,
carrier-based aircraft will be able to support fleet operations in a limited air-defense role.
Although some older air platforms remain in the inventory, the PLA(N) is clearly shifting to
a naval aviation force that is equipped to execute a wide variety of missions both near and far
from home.
PLA(N) Surface Force
China analysts face a perpetual challenge over how to accurately convey the size and
capability of China’s surface force. As U.S. Navy CAPT Dale Rielage noted in [the U.S.
Naval Institute] Proceedings last year, key differences in the type of PLA(N) ships (in
comparison to the U.S. Navy) make it extremely difficult to apply a common basis for
comparing the order of battle. A comprehensive tally of ships that includes hundreds of small
patrol craft, mine warfare craft, and coastal auxiliaries provides a deceptively inflated picture

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of China’s actual combat capability. Conversely, a metric based on ship displacement returns
the opposite effect, given the fact that many of China’s modern ships, such as the 1,500 ton
JIANGDAO FFL, are small by U.S. standards, and equipped primarily for regional missions.
To accurately capture potential impact of China’s naval modernization, it is necessary to
provide a more detailed examination of the ships and capabilities in relation to the missions
they are likely intended to fulfill. For the sake of clarity, the term “modern” is used in this
paper to describe a surface combatant that possesses a multi-mission capability, incorporates
more than a point air defense capability, and has the ability to embark a helicopter. As of
early 2014, the PLA(N) possesses 27 destroyers (17 of which are modern), 48 frigates (31 of
which are modern), 10 new corvettes, 85 modern missile-armed patrol craft, 56 amphibious
ships, 42 mine warfare ships, over 50 major auxiliary ships, and over 400 minor auxiliary
ships and service/support craft.
During the 1990s, China began addressing immediate capability gaps by importing modern
surface combatants, weapon systems, and sensors from Russia. Never intended as a long-
term solution, the PLA(N) simultaneously sought to design and produce its own weapons
and platforms from a mix of imported and domestic technology. Less than a decade ago
China’s surface force could be characterized as an eclectic mix of vintage, modern,
converted, imported, and domestic platforms utilizing a variety weapons and sensors and
with widely ranging capabilities and varying reliability. By the second decade of the 2000s,
surface ship acquisition had shifted entirely to Chinese designed units, equipped primarily
with Chinese weapons and sensors, though some engineering components and subsystems
remain imported or license-produced in-country.
Until recently, China tended to build small numbers of a large variety of ships, often
changing classes rapidly as advancements were made. In the period between 1995 and 2005
alone, China constructed or purchased major surface combatants and submarines in at least
different 15 classes. Using a combination of imported technology, reverse engineering, and
indigenous development, the PRC has rapidly narrowed the technology and capability gap
between itself and the world’s modern navies. Additionally, China is implementing much
longer production runs of advanced surface combatants and conventional submarines,
suggesting a greater satisfaction in their recent ship designs.
The PLA(N) surface force has made particularly strong gains in anti-surface warfare
(ASuW), with sustained development of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and
over-the-horizon targeting systems. Most PLA(N) combatants carry variants of the YJ-8A
ASCM (~65-120nm), while the LUYANG II-class (052D) destroyer is fitted with the YJ-62
(~120nm), and the newest class, LUYANG III-class destroyer is fitted with a new vertically-
launched ASCM. As these extended range weapons require sophisticated over-the-horizon-
targeting (OTH-T) capability to realize their full potential, China has invested heavily in
maritime reconnaissance systems at the national and tactical levels, as well as
communication systems and datalinks to enable the flow of accurate and timely targeting
data.
In addition to extended range ASCMs, the LUYANG III DDG, which is expected to enter
the force in 2014, may also be equipped with advanced SAMs, anti-submarine missiles, and
possibly an eventual land-attack cruise missile (LACM) from its multipurpose vertical
launch system. These modern, high-end combatants will likely provide increased weapons
stores and overall flexibility as surface action groups venture more frequently into blue water
in the coming years.
Further enabling this trend, China’s surface force has achieved sustained progress in
shipboard air defense. The PLA(N) is retiring legacy destroyers and frigates that possess at
most a point air defense capability, while constructing newer ships with medium-to-long

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range area air defense missiles. The PLA(N) has produced a total of six LUYANG II DDG
with the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile (~55nm), and the LUYANG III DDG will carry an
extended-range variant of the HHQ-9. At least fifteen JIANGKAI II FFGs (054A), with the
vertically-launched HHQ-16 (~20-40nm) are nowoperational, with more under construction.
Sometimes referred to as the “workhorse” of the PLA(N) these modern frigates have proven
instrumental in sustaining China’s counter-piracy presence in the Gulf of Aden.
The new generation of destroyers and frigates utilize modern combat management systems
and air-surveillance sensors, such as the Chinese SEA EAGLE and DRAGON EYE phased-
array radars. While older platforms with little or no air defense capability remain in the
inventory, the addition of these newer units allows the PLA(N)’s surface force to operate
with increased confidence outside of shore-based air defense systems, as one or two ships
can now provide air defense for the entire task group. Currently, approximately 65 percent of
China’s destroyers and frigates are modern. By 2020 that figure will rise to an estimated 85
percent.
The PLA(N) has also phased out hundreds of Cold War-era missile patrol boats and patrol
craft as they shifted from a coastal defense orientation to a more active, offshore orientation
over the past two decades. During this period China acquired a modern coastal-defense and
area-denial capability with 60 HOUBEI class guided missile patrol boats. The HOUBEI
design integrates a high-speed wave-piercing catamaran hull, waterjet propulsion,
considerable signature-reduction features, and the YJ-8A ASCM. While not equipped for
coastal patrol duties, the HOUBEI is an essential component of the PLA(N)’s ability to react
at short notice to threats within China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and slightly beyond.
In 2012 China began producing the new JIANGDAO class corvette (FFL), which, in contrast
to the HOUBEI, is optimized to serve as the primary naval patrol platform in China’s EEZ
and potentially defend China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East
China Sea (ECS). The 1500-ton JIANGDAO is equipped for littoral warfare with 76mm,
30mm, and 12.7mm guns, four YJ-8 ASCMs, torpedo tubes, and a helicopter landing area.
The JIANGDAO is ideally-suited for general medium-endurance patrols, counter-piracy, and
other littoral duties in regional waters, but is not sufficiently armed or equipped for major
combat operations in blue-water. At least ten JIANGDAOs are already operational and thirty
or more units may be built, replacing both older small patrol craft as well as some of the
PLA(N)’s aging JIANGHU I frigates. The rapid construction of JIANGDAO FFLs accounts
for a significant share of ship construction in 2012 and 2013.
In recent years, China’s amphibious acquisition has shifted decisively towards larger, high-
end, ships. Since 2007 China has commissioned three YUZHAO class amphibious transport
docks (LPD), which provide a considerably greater capacity and flexibility compared to
previous landing ships. At 20,000 tons, the YUZHAO is the largest domestically produced
Chinese warship and has deployed as far as the Gulf of Aden. The YUZHAO can carry up to
four of the new air cushion landing craft YUYI LCUA (similar to LCAC), as well as four or
more helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops on long-distance deployments. Additional
YUZHAOs are expected to be built, as well as a follow-on amphibious assault ship (LHA)
design that is larger and with a full-deck flight deck for additional helicopters.
The major investment in a large-deck LPD signaled the PLA(N)’s emerging interest in
expeditionary warfare and over-the horizon amphibious assault capability, as well as a
flexible platform for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy
capabilities. In contrast, the PLA(N) appears to have suspended all construction of lower-end
tank landing ships (LST/LSM) since 2006, following a spate of acquisition in the early
2000s.

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The expanded set of missions further into the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, including
counter-piracy deployments, HA/DR missions, survey voyages and goodwill port visits have
increased demands on PLA(N)’s limited fleet of ocean-going replenishment and service
vessels. In 2013 the PLA(N) added two new FUCHI replenishment oilers (AORs) bringing
the total AOR force level to seven ships. These ships constantly rotate in support of Gulf of
Aden (GOA) counter-piracy deployments.
In addition, the PLA(N) recently added three state-of-the-art DALAO submarine rescue
ships (ASR) and three DASAN fast-response rescue ships (ARS). Other recent additions
include the ANWEI hospital ship (AH), the DANYAO AF (island resupply), YUAN WANG
5&6 (satellite and rocket launch telemetry), three KANHAI AG (SWATH-hull survey
ships), two YUAN WANG 21 missile tenders (AEM), and the large DAGUAN AG, which
provides berthing and logistical support to the KUZNETSOV aircraft carrier Liaoning.
Traditionally, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) has lagged behind ASuW and AAW as a
priority for the PLA(N). Some moderate progress still continues, with more surface ships
possessing modern sonars, to include towed arrays, as well as hangars to support shipboard
helicopters. Given these developments, the PLA(N) surface force may be more capable of
identifying adversary submarines in limited areas by 2020.
Over the past decade, China’s surface force has made steady proficiency gains and become
much more operationally focused. Beginning in 2009, the Gulf of Aden deployments have
provided naval commanders and crews with their first real experience with extended
deployments and overseas logistics. We have also witnessed an increase in the complexity of
training and exercises and an expansion of operating areas both within and beyond the First
Island Chain. To increase realism, the force engages in opposing force training and employs
advanced training aids. In 2012 the surface force conducted an unprecedented seven
deployments to the Philippine Sea. This was followed by nine Philippine Sea deployments in
2013. Extended surface deployments and more advanced training build core warfare
proficiency in ASuW, ASW and AAW. Furthermore, these deployments reflect efforts to
“normalize” distant seas training in line with General Staff Department (GSD) guidelines.
China’s Aircraft Carrier Program
With spectacular ceremony in September 2012, China commissioned its first carrier, the
Liaoning. China is currently engaged in the long and complicated path of learning to operate
fixed wing aircraft from the carrier’s deck. The first launches and recoveries of the J-15
aircraft occurred in November 2012, with additional testing and training occurring in 2013.
Despite recent progress, it will take several years before Chinese carrier-based air regiments
are operational. The PLA’s newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao recently noted, “Aircraft Carrier
development is core to the PLA(N), and could serve as a deterrent to countries who provoke
trouble at sea, against the backdrop of the U.S. pivot to Asia and growing territorial disputes
in the South China Sea and East China Sea.”
The Liaoning is much less capable of power projection than the U.S. Navy’s NIMITZ-class
carriers. Not only does Liaoning’s smaller size limit the total number of aircraft it can carry,
but also the ski-jump configuration significantly limits aircraft fuel and ordnance load for
take offs. Furthermore, China does not yet possess specialized supporting aircraft such as the
E-2C Hawkeye, which provides tactical airborne early warning (AEW). The Liaoning is
suited for fleet air defense missions, rather than US-style, long range power projection.
Although it has a full suite of weapons and combat systems, Liaoning’s primary role for the
coming years will be to develop the skills required for carrier aviation and to train its first
groups of pilots and deck crews.

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China’s initial carrier air regiment will consist of the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, which is
externally similar to the Russian Su-33 Flanker D. However, the aircraft is thought to
possess many of the domestic avionics and armament capabilities of the Chinese J-11B
Flanker. Likely armament for the J-15 includes PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles and
modern ASCMs. Six J-15 prototypes are currently involved in testing and at least one two-
seat J-15S operational trainer has been observed.
China is fully aware of the inherent limitations of the mid-sized, ski-jump carrier. While
Beijing has provided no public information on the size and configuration of its next carrier,
there is intense speculation that China may adopt a catapult launching system. Recent media
reports suggest that China recently commenced construction of its first indigenously
produced carrier.
Finally, as China expands carrier operations beyond the immediate region, it will almost
certainly be constrained by a lack of distant bases and support infrastructure. Although
commercial ports can provide some peacetime support, Beijing may eventually find it
expedient to abandon its longstanding, self-imposed prohibition on foreign basing.
PLA(N) Submarine Force
China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence,
particularly when conducting “counter-intervention” against modern adversary. The large,
but poorly equipped force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern submarine force,
optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major sea lines of
communication. Currently, the submarine force consists of five nuclear attack submarines,
four nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and 53 diesel attack submarines.
In reference to the submarine force, the term “modern” applies to second generation
submarines, capable of employing anti-ship cruise missiles or submarine-launched
intercontinental ballistic missiles. By 2015 approximately 70 percent of China’s entire
submarine force will be modern. By 2020, 75 percent of the conventional force will be
modern and 100 percent of the SSN force will be modern.
Currently, most of the force is conventionally powered, without towed arrays, but equipped
with increasingly long range ASCMs. Submarine launched ASCMs with ranges well in
excess of 100nm not only enhance survivability of the shooter, but also enable a small
number of units to hold a large maritime area at risk. A decade ago, only a few of China’s
submarines were equipped to launch a modern anti-ship cruise missile. Given the rapid pace
of acquisition, well over half of China’s nuclear and conventional attack submarines are now
ASCM equipped, and by 2020, the vast majority of China’s submarine force will be armed
with advanced, long-range ASCMs.
China’s small nuclear attack submarine force is capable of operating further from the
Chinese mainland, conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as
ASuW missions. Currently, China’s submarines are not optimized for either anti-submarine
warfare or land attack missions.
Like the surface force, China’s submarine force is trending towards a more streamlined mix
of units, suggesting the PLA(N) is relatively satisfied with recent designs. For its diesel-
electric force alone, between 2000 and 2005, China constructed MING SS, SONG SS, the
first YUAN SSP, and purchased 8 KILO SS from Russia. While all of these classes remain
in the force, only the YUAN SSP is currently in production. Reducing the number of
different classes in service helps streamline maintenance, training and interoperability.

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The YUAN SSP is China’s most modern conventionally powered submarine. Eight are
currently in service, with as many as 12 more anticipated. Its combat capability is similar to
the SONG SS, as both are capable of launching Chinese-built anti-ship cruise missiles, but
the YUAN SSP also possesses an air independent power (AIP) system and may have
incorporated quieting technology from the Russian-designed KILO SS. The AIP system
provides a submarine a source of power other than battery or diesel engines while still
submerged, increasing its underwater endurance, thereby reducing its vulnerability to
detection.
The remainder of the conventional submarine force is a mix of SONG SS, MING SS, and
Russian-built KILO SS. Of these, only the MING SS and four of the older KILO SS lack an
ability to launch ASCMs. Eight of China’s 12 KILO SS are equipped with the SS-N-27
ASCM, which provides a long-range anti-surface capability out to approximately 120nm.
Although China’s indigenous YJ-82 ASCM has a much shorter range, trends in surface and
air-launched cruise missiles suggest that a future indigenous submarine-launched ASCM will
almost certainly match or exceed the range of the SS-N-27.
China is now modernizing its relatively small nuclear-powered attack submarine force,
following a protracted hiatus. The SHANG SSN’s initial production run stopped after just
two launches in 2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China resumed production with four
additional hulls of an improved variant, the first of which was launched in 2012. These six
submarines will replace the aging HAN SSN on nearly a 1-for-1 basis over the next several
years. Following the completion of the improved SHANG SSN, the PLA(N) will likely
progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many
areas such as quieting and weapon capacity, to include a possible land-attack capability.
Perhaps the most anticipated development in China’s submarine force is the expected
operational deployment of the JIN SSBN in 2014, which would mark China’s first credible
at-sea second-strike nuclear capability. With a range in excess of 4000nm, the JL-2
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), will enable the JIN to strike Hawaii, Alaska,
and possibly western portions of CONUS from East Asian waters. The three JIN SSBNs
currently in service would be insufficient to maintain a constant at-sea presence for extended
periods of time, but if the PLA Navy builds five units as some sources suggest, a continuous
peacetime presence may become a viable option for the PLA(N).
Historically, the vast majority of Chinese submarine operations have been limited in
duration. In recent years however, leadership emphasis on more realistic training and
operational proficiency across the PLA appears to have catalyzed an increase in submarine
patrol activity. Prior to 2008, the PLA(N) typically conducted a very small number of
extended submarine patrols, typically fewer than 5 or 6 in a given year. Since that time, it has
become common to see more than 12 patrols in a given year. This trend suggests the PLA(N)
seeks to build operational proficiency, endurance, and training in ways that more accurately
simulate combat missions.
PLA(N) Air Forces
The capabilities and role of the PLANAF have steadily evolved over the past decade. As
navy combatants range further from shore and more effectively provide their own air
defense, the PLANAF is able to concentrate on an expanded array of missions, including
maritime strike, maritime patrols, anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning, and
logistics. Both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will play an important role in enabling
fleet operations over the next decade. Additionally, in the next few years the PLANAF will
possess its first-ever sea-based component, with the Liaoning CV [aircraft carrier].

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Every major PLA(N) surface combatant currently under construction is capable of
embarking a helicopter, increasing platform capabilities in areas such as over the horizon
targeting, anti-submarine warfare, and search and rescue (SAR). The PLA(N) operates three
main helicopter variants: the Z-9, the Z-8, and the Helix. In order to keep pace with the rest
of the PLA(N), the helicopter fleet will almost certainly expand in the near future.
The PLA(N)’s primary helicopter, the Z-9C, was originally obtained under licensed
production from Aerospatiale (now Eurocopter) in the early 1980s. The Z-9C is capable of
operating from any helicopter-capable PLA(N) combatant. It can be fitted with the KLC-1
search radar, dipping sonar, and is usually seen with a single lightweight torpedo. A new
roof-mounted electro-optical (EO) turret, unguided rockets, and 12.7 mm machine gun pods
have been observed on several Z-9Cs during counter piracy deployments. There are now
approximately twenty operational Z-9Cs in the PLA(N) inventory and the helicopters are still
under production. An upgraded naval version of the Z-9, designated the Z-9D, has been
observed with ASCMs.
Like the Z-9, the Z-8 is a Chinese-produced helicopter based on a French design. In the late
1970s, the PLA(N) purchased and reverse engineered the SA 321 Super Frelon. This
medium lift helicopter is capable of performing a wide variety of missions but is most often
utilized for SAR, troop transport, and logistical support roles. It is usually observed with a
rescue hoist and a nose radome and typically operates unarmed. The Z-8’s size provides a
greater cargo capacity compared to other PLA(N) helicopters, but is limited in its ability to
deploy from most PLA(N) combatants. An AEW variant of the Z-8 has been observed
operating with the Liaoning.
In 1999, the PLA(N) took delivery of an initial batch of eight Russian-built Ka-28 Helix
helicopters. The PLA(N) typically uses the Ka-28 for ASW. They are fitted with a search
radar, dipping sonar and can employ sonobuoys, torpedoes, depth charges, or mines. In 2010
China also ordered nine Ka-31 Helix AEW helicopters.
Fixed-wing Aircraft
Over the last two decades, the PLANAF has significantly upgraded its fighters and expanded
the type of aircraft it operates. As a consequence, it can successfully performa wide range of
missions including offshore air defense, maritime strike, maritime patrol/antisubmarine
warfare, and in the not too distant future, carrier-based operations. A decade ago, this
modernization was largely reliant on exports from Russia, however, the PLANAF has
recently benefited from the same domestic combat aircraft production that has propelled
earlier PLAAF modernization.
Historically, the PLA(N) relied on older Chengdu J-7 variants and Shenyang J-8B/D Finback
fighters for the offshore air defense mission. These aircraft were limited in range, avionics,
and armament. The J-8 is perhaps best known in the West as the aircraft that collided with a
U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft in 2001. In 2002, the PLA(N) purchased 24 Su-
30MK2, making it the first 4th
generation fighter fielded with the navy. These aircraft feature
an extended range and maritime radar systems, enabling the Su-30MK2 to strike enemy
ships at long distances, while still maintaining a robust air-to-air capability.
Several years later, the PLA(N) began replacing older J-8B/Ds with the newer J-8F variant.
The J-8F featured improved armament such as the PL-12 radar-guided air-to-air missile,
upgraded avionics, and an improved engine with higher thrust. Today, the PLA(N) is taking
deliveries of modern domestically produced 4th
generation fighter aircraft such as the J-10A
Vigorous Dragon and the J-11B Flanker. Equipped with modern radars, glass cockpits, and
armed with PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles, PLA(N) J-10A and J-11B aircraft are among
the most modern aircraft in China’s inventory.

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For maritime strike, the PLA(N) has relied on the H-6 Badger for decades. The H-6 is a
licensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 Badger, which can employ advanced ASCMs against
surface targets. As many as 30 Badgers likely remain in service with the PLA(N). Despite
the older platform design, Chinese H-6 Badgers benefit from upgraded electronics and
payloads. Noted improvements include the ability to carry a maximum of four ASCMs,
compared with two on earlier H-6D variants. Some H-6s have been modified as tankers,
increasing the PLA(N)’s flexibility and range. The JH-7 Flounder, with at least five
regiments fielded across the three fleets also provides a maritime strike capability. The JH-7
is a domestically produced tandem-seat fighter/bomber, developed as a replacement for
obsolete Q-5 Fantan light attack aircraft and H-5 Beagle bombers. The JH-7 can carry up to
four ASCMs and two PL-5 or PL-8 short-range air-to-air missiles, providing it with
considerable payload for maritime strike missions.
In addition to combat aircraft, the PLANAF is expanding its inventory of fixed-wing
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), Airborne Early Warning (AEW), and surveillance aircraft.
The Y-8, a Chinese license-produced version of the ex-Soviet An-12 Cub, forms the basic
airframe for several PLA(N) special mission variants. As the navy pushes farther from the
coast, long-range aircraft play a key role in providing a clear picture of surface and air
contacts in the maritime environment.
Internet photos from 2012 suggest that the PLA(N) is also developing a Y-8 naval variant,
equipped with a MAD (magnetic anomaly detector) boom, typical of ASW aircraft. This
ASW aircraft features a large surface search radar mounted under the nose and multiple
blade antennae on the fuselage for probable electronic surveillance. It also appears to
incorporate a small EO/IR turret and an internal weapons bay forward of the main landing
gear. The aircraft appeared in a primer yellow paint scheme, suggesting that it remains under
development.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
In recent years China has developed several multi-mission UAVs for the maritime
environment. There are some indications the PLA(N) has begun to integrate UAVs into their
operations to enhance situational awareness. For well over a decade, China has actively
pursued UAV technology and they are emerging among the worldwide leaders in UAV
development. China’s latest achievement was the unveiling of their first prototype unmanned
combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), the Lijan, which features a blended-wing design as well as
low observable technologies.
The PLA(N) will probably employ significant numbers of land and ship based UAVs to
supplement manned ISR aircraft and aid targeting for various long-range weapons systems.
UAVs will probably become one of the PLA(N)’s most valuable ISR assets in on-going and
future maritime disputes and protection of maritime claims. UAVs are ideally suited for this
mission set due to their long loiter time, slow cruising speed, and ability to provide near real-
time information through the use of a variety of onboard sensors. The PLA(N) has been
identified operating the Austrian Camcopter S-100 rotary-wing UAV from several
combatants. Following initial evaluation and deployment of the Camcopter S-100, the
PLA(N) will likely adopt a domestically produced UAV into ship-based operations.
Naval Mines
China has a robust mining capability and currently maintains a varied inventory estimated at
over 50,000 mines. China also has developed a robust infrastructure for naval mine related
research, development, testing, evaluation, and production. During the past few years China
has gone from an obsolete mine inventory, consisting primarily of pre-WWII vintage moored
contact and basic bottom influence mines, to a robust mine inventory consisting of a large

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variety of mine types including moored, bottom, drifting, rocket propelled and intelligent
mines. China will continue to develop more advanced mines in the future, possibly including
extended-range propelled-warhead mines, anti-helicopter mines, and bottominfluence mines
equipped to counter minesweeping efforts.
Maritime C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
China’s steady expansion of naval missions beyond the littoral, including counter-
intervention missions are enabled by a dramatic improvement in maritime C4ISR over the
past decade. The ranges of China’s modern anti-ship cruise missiles extend well beyond the
range of a ship’s own sensors. Emerging land-based weapons, such as the DF-21D anti-ship
ballistic missile, with a range of more than 810nm are even more dependent on remote
targeting. Modern navies depend heavily on their ability to build and disseminate a picture of
all activities occurring in the air and sea.
For China, this provides a formidable challenge. In order to characterize activities in the
“near seas,” China must build a maritime and air picture covering nearly 875,000 square
nautical miles (sqnm). The Philippine Sea, which could become a key interdiction area in a
regional conflict, expands the battlespace by another 1.5 million sqnm. In this vast space,
many navies and coast guards converge along with tens of thousands of fishing boats, cargo
ships, oil tankers, and other commercial vessels.
In order to sort through this complex environment and enable more sophisticated operations,
China has invested in a wide array of sensors. Direct reporting from Chinese ships and
aircraft provides the most detailed and reliable information, but can only cover a fraction of
the regional environment. A number of ground-based coastal radars provide overlapping
coverage of coastal areas, but their range is limited.
To gain a broader view of activity in its near and far seas, China requires more sophisticated
sensors. The skywave over-the-horizon radar provides awareness of a much larger area than
conventional radars by bouncing signals off the ionosphere. China also operates a growing
array of reconnaissance satellites, which allow observation of maritime activity virtually
anywhere on the earth.
Conclusion
The PLA(N) is strengthening its ability to execute a range of regional missions in a
“complex electromagnetic environment” as it simultaneously lays a foundation for sustained,
blue water operations. Over the next decade, China will complete its transition froma coastal
navy to a navy capable of multiple missions around the world. Current acquisition patterns,
training, and operations provide a window into how the PLA(N) might pursue these
objectives.
Given the pace of PLA(N) modernization, the gap in military capability between the
mainland and Taiwan will continue to widen in China’s favor over the coming years. The
PRC views reunification with Taiwan as an immutable, long-term goal and hopes to prevent
any other actor from intervening in a Taiwan scenario. While Taiwan remains a top-tier
priority, the PLA(N) is simultaneously focusing resources on a growing array of potential
challenges.
China’s interests in the East and South China Seas include protecting its vast maritime
claims and preserving access to regional resources. Beijing prefers to use diplomacy and
economic influence to protect maritime sovereignty, and generally relies on patrols by the
recently-consolidated China Coast Guard. However, ensuring maritime sovereignty will

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remain a fundamental mission for the PLA(N). PLA(N) assets regularly patrol in most of
China’s claimed territory to conduct surveillance and provide a security guarantee to China’s
Coast Guard.
In the event of a crisis, the PLA(N) has a variety of options to defend its claimed territorial
sovereignty and maritime interests. The PLA(N) could lead an amphibious campaign to seize
key disputed island features, or conduct blockade or SLOC interdiction campaigns to secure
strategic operating areas. China’s realization of an operational aircraft carrier in the coming
years may also enable Beijing to exert greater pressure on its SCS rivals. Recent acquisitions
speak to a future in which the PLA(N) will be expected to perform a wide variety of tasks
including assuring the nation’s economic lifelines, asserting China’s regional territorial
interests, conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and demonstrating a
Chinese presence beyond region waters.134
134
[Hearing on] Trends in China’s Naval Modernization [before] US China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014], accessed February 12, 2014, 12 pp., at http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Karotkin_Testimony1.30.14.pdf.

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Appendix B. Background Information on Air-Sea
Battle Concept
This appendix provides additional background information on the Air-Sea Battle Concept.
October 10, 2013, Hearing
On October 10, 2013, the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee held a hearing with several DOD officials as the witnesses that focused to a
large degree on the Air-Sea Battle concept.135
One of the witnesses—Rear Admiral Upper Half
James G. Foggo III, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations, Plans and Strategy)
(N3/N5B)—provided the following overview of ASB in his opening remarks:
So let me begin by answering the question, what is the AirSea Battle concept? The AirSea
Battle concept was approved by the Secretary of Defense in 2011. It is designed to assure
access to parts of the global commons, those areas of the AirSea, Cyberspace, and Space that
no one necessarily owns but which we all depend on such as sea lines of communication.
Our adversaries’ Anti-Access/Area Denial strategies employ a range of military capabilities
that impede the free use of these ungoverned spaces. These military capabilities include new
generations of cruise, ballistic, air to air, surface to air missiles with improved range,
accuracy and lethality that are being produced and proliferated.
Quiet, modern submarines and stealthy fighter aircraft are being procured by many nations
while naval mines are being equipped with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Both
space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and contested.
Accordingly, AirSea Battle in its concept is intended to defeat such threats to access and
provide options to national leaders and military commanders to enable follow-on operations
which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster
response. In short, it is a new approach to warfare.
The AirSea Battle concept is also about force development in the face of rising technological
challenges. We seek to build at the service level a pre-integrated joint force which empowers
U.S. combatant commanders, along with allies and partners to engage in ways that are
cooperative and networked across multiple domains—the land, maritime, air, space and
cyber domains.
And our goal includes continually refining and institutionalizing these practices. When
implemented, the AirSea Battle concept will create and codify synergies within and among
our services that will enhance our collective war fighting capability and effectiveness.
So that's, in a nutshell, what the AirSea Battle concept is. But now, what is it not? Sir, you
pointed out the AirSea Battle concept is not a strategy—to answer your question on the
difference between AirLand Battle and the AirSea Battle concept. National or military
135
The title of the hearing as posted on the House Armed Services Committee website was: “USAF, USN and USMC
Development and Integration of Air/Sea Battle Strategy, Governance and Policy into the Services’ Annual Program,
Planning, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process.”

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strategies employs ways and means to a particular and/or end-state, such as deterring
conflict, containing conflict or winning conflict.
A concept in contrast is a description of a method or a scheme for employing military
capabilities to attain specific objectives at the operational level of war. The overarching
objective of the AirSea Battle concept is to gain and maintain freedom of action in the global
commons.
The AirSea Battle does not focus on a particular adversary or a region. It is universally
applicable across all geographic locations, and by addressing access challenges wherever,
however, and whenever we confront them.
I said earlier that the AirSea Battle represents a new approach to warfare. Here’s what I
meant by that. Historically, when deterrence fails, it’s our custom to amass large numbers of
resources, leverage our allies for a coalition support and base access or over flight and build
up an iron mountain of logistics, weapons and troops to apply overwhelming force at a
particular space and time of our choosing.
This approach of build up, rehearse and roll back has proven successful from Operation
Overlord in the beaches of Normandy in 1944 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Middle
East. But the 21st
Century operating environment is changing. Future generations of
American service men and women will not fight their parents’ wars.
And so I'll borrow a quote from Abraham Lincoln, written in a letter to this House on 1
December, 1862 when he said, “We must think anew, act anew. We must disenthrall
ourselves from the past, and then we shall save our country.”
New military approaches are emerging specifically intended to counter our historical
methods of projecting power. Adversaries employing such an approach would seek to
prevent or deny our ability to aggregate forces by denying us a safe haven from which to
build up, rehearse, and roll back.
Anti-Access is defined as an action intended to slow deployment of friendly forces into a
theater or cause us to operate from longer distances than preferred. Area Denial impedes
friendly operations or maneuver in a theater where access cannot be prevented.
The AirSea Battle concept mitigates the threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial by creating
pockets and corridors under our control. The reason conflict in Libya, Operation Odyssey
Dawn in 2011, is a good example of this paradigm shift.
Though AirSea Battle was still in development, the fundamental idea of leveraging access in
one domain to provide advantage to our forces in another was understood and employed
against Libya’s modest Anti-Access/Area Denial capability.
On day one of combat operations, cruise missiles launched from submarines and surface
ships in the maritime domain targeted and destroyed Libya’s lethal air defense missile
systems; thereby enabling coalition forces to conduct unfettered follow-on strikes and
destroy the Libyan Air Force and control the air domain.
Establishing a no-fly zone, key to interdicting hostile regime actions against innocent
civilians—and that was our mission, to protect civilians—was effectively accomplished
within 48 hours of receiving the execution order from the President. I was the J3 or the
operations officer for Admiral Sam Locklear, Commander of Joint Task Force, Odyssey
Dawn. And I transitioned from U.S.-led coalition operations to Operation Unified Protector
as a taskforce commander for NATO.

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During the entire campaign which lasted seven months, NATO reported in its UN After
Action Report that there were just under 18,000 sorties flown, employing 7,900 precision
guided munitions. That’s a lot. More than 200 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles were used,
over half of which came from submarines.
The majority of the Libyan Regime Order of Battle, which included 800 main battle tanks,
2,500 artillery pieces, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, 360 fixed wing fighters and 85
transports were either disabled or destroyed during the campaign.
Not one American boot set foot on the ground; no Americans were killed in combat
operations. We lost one F-15 due to mechanical failure but we recovered both pilots safely.
Muammar Gaddafi, as you know, was killed by Libyan rebels in October. 2011.
The AirSea Battle Concept, in its classified form, was completed in November 2011, one
month later. I provided Admiral Locklear with a copy of the AirSea Battle concept and we
reviewed it on a trip to United Kingdom. Upon reading it, I thought back to the Libya
campaign plan and I wondered how I might leverage the concepts of AirSea Battle to fight
differently, to fight smarter.
Operation Odyssey Dawn accelerated from a non-combatant evacuation operation and
humanitarian assistance to kinetic operations in a very short period. There was very little
time for build-up and rehearse our forces. To coin a phrase from my boss, this was like a
pickup game of basketball. And we relied on the flexibility, innovation and resiliency of the
commanders of the forces assigned to the joint taskforce.
The Libyan regime’s Anti Access Area Denial capability was limited as I said. And we were
able to overwhelm and defeat it with the tools that we had. But we must prepare for a more
stressing environment in the future. AirSea Battle does so, by providing commanders with a
range of options, both kinetic and non-kinetic to mitigate or neutralize challenges to access in
one or many domains simultaneously.
This is accomplished through development of networked integrated forces capable of attack
in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat the adversary. And it provides maximum operational
advantage to friendly joint and coalition forces. I'm a believer and so are the rest of the flag
and general officers here at the table with me.136
DOD Unclassified Summary Released June 2013
On June 3, 2013, DOD released an unclassified summary of the Air-Sea Battle concept.137
The
following pages reprint the document.
136
Source: transcript of hearing.
137
Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle[:] Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges,
May 2013, 12 pp., accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-
May-2013.pdf, and at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/files/2013/06/ASB-26-June-2013.pdf. The latter of these two URLs
provided a version with a smaller file size. For a DOD announcement of the document’s release, see Jason Kelly,
“Overview of the Air-Sea Battle Concept,” Navy Live, June 3, 2013, accessed July 5, 2013, at
http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/06/03/overview-of-the-air-sea-battle-concept/.
DOD officials had discussed the ASB concept in earlier statements; for example:
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Mark Welsh, the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, discussed the ASB concept in a May 16, 2013, blog post; see Jonathan Greenert and Mark Welsh, “Breaking the
Kill Chain[:] How to Keep America in the Game When Our Enemies Are Trying to Shut Us Out,” Foreign Policy, May
(continued...)

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(...continued)
16, 2013, accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/
breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle.
• General Norton Schwartz, then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of
Naval Operations, discussed the ASB concept in a February 20, 2012, journal article; see Norton A. Schwartz
and Jonathan W. Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle, Promoting Stability In An Era of Uncertainty,” The American
Interest, February 20, 2012, accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?
piece=1212.
• The Air-Sea Battle Office released a statement on the ASB concept on November 9, 2011; see “The Air-Sea
Battle Concept Summary,” accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=
63730.

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Press Reports
An August 20, 2012, press report stated that the ASB concept has prompted Navy officials to
make significant shifts in the service’s FY2014-FY2018 budget plan, including new investments
in ASW, electronic attack and electronic warfare, cyber warfare, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF), the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV
(a maritime version of the Global Hawk UAV). The report quoted Chief of Naval Operations
Jonathan Greenert as saying that the total value of the budget shifts was certainly in the hundreds
of millions of dollars, and perhaps in the “low billions” of dollars.138
An August 2, 2012, press report on the ASB concept states:
When President Obama called on the U.S. military to shift its focus to Asia earlier this year,
Andrew Marshall, a 91-year-old futurist, had a vision of what to do.
Marshall’s small office in the Pentagon has spent the past two decades planning for a war
against an angry, aggressive and heavily armed China.
No one had any idea how the war would start. But the American response, laid out in a
concept that one of Marshall’s longtime proteges dubbed “Air-Sea Battle,” was clear.
Stealthy American bombers and submarines would knock out China’s long-range
surveillance radar and precision missile systems located deep inside the country. The initial
“blinding campaign” would be followed by a larger air and naval assault.
The concept, the details of which are classified, has angered the Chinese military and has
been pilloried by some Army and Marine Corps officers as excessively expensive. Some
Asia analysts worry that conventional strikes aimed at China could spark a nuclear war.
Air-Sea Battle drew little attention when U.S. troops were fighting and dying in large
numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now the military’s decade of battling insurgencies is
ending, defense budgets are being cut, and top military officials, ordered to pivot toward
Asia, are looking to Marshall’s office for ideas.
In recent months, the Air Force and Navy have come up with more than 200 initiatives they
say they need to realize Air-Sea Battle. The list emerged, in part, from war games conducted
by Marshall’s office and includes new weaponry and proposals to deepen cooperation
between the Navy and the Air Force....
Even as it has embraced Air-Sea Battle, the Pentagon has struggled to explain it without
inflaming already tense relations with China. The result has been an information vacuumthat
has sown confusion and controversy.
Senior Chinese military officials warn that the Pentagon’s new effort could spark an arms
race....
138
Christopher J. Castelli, “CNO: Air-Sea Battle Driving Acceleration Of Key Programs In POM-14,” Inside the Navy,
August 20, 2012. POM-14 is the Program Objective Memorandum (an internal DOD budget-planning document) for
the FY2014 DOD budget.

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Privately, senior Pentagon officials concede that Air-Sea Battle’s goal is to help U.S. forces
weather an initial Chinese assault and counterattack to destroy sophisticated radar and
missile systems built to keep U.S. ships away from China’s coastline.
Their concern is fueled by the steady growth in China’s defense spending, which has
increased to as much as $180 billion a year, or about one-third of the Pentagon’s budget, and
China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.
“We want to put enough uncertainty in the minds of Chinese military planners that they
would not want to take us on,” said a senior Navy official overseeing the service’s
modernization efforts. “Air-Sea Battle is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win
this competition.”
Inside the Pentagon, the Army and Marine Corps have mounted offensives against the
concept, which could lead to less spending on ground combat.
An internal assessment, prepared for the Marine Corps commandant and obtained by The
Washington Post, warns that “an Air-Sea Battle-focused Navy and Air Force would be
preposterously expensive to build in peace time” and would result in “incalculable human
and economic destruction” if ever used in a major war with China.
The concept, however, aligns with Obama’s broader effort to shift the U.S. military’s focus
toward Asia and provides a framework for preserving some of the Pentagon’s most
sophisticated weapons programs, many of which have strong backing in Congress.139
An April 2012 press report that provides a historical account of the ASB concept states: “In truth,
the Air Sea Battle Concept is the culmination of a strategy fight that began nearly two decades
ago inside the Pentagon and U.S. government at large over how to deal with a single actor: the
People’s Republic of China.”140
A November 10, 2011, press report states:
Military officials from the three services told reporters during a [November 9, 2011, DOD]
background briefing that the concept is not directed at a single country. But they did not
answer when asked what country other than China has developed advanced anti-access arms.
A senior Obama administration official was more blunt, saying the new concept is a
significant milestone signaling a new Cold War-style approach to China.
“Air Sea Battle is to China what the [U.S. Navy’s mid-1980s] maritime strategy was to the
Soviet Union,” the official said.
During the Cold War, U.S. naval forces around the world used a strategy of global presence
and shows of force to deter Moscow’s advances.
“It is a very forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says we will not sit back and be
punished,” the senior official said. “We will initiate.”
139
Greg Jaffe, “Real Tensions Over A Theoretical War,” Washington Post, August 2, 2012: 1.
140
Bill Gertz, “China’s High-Tech Military Threat and What We’re Doing About It,” Commentary, April 2012: 15-21.
The quoted passage is from page 16. See also Yoichi Kato, “Japan’s Response to New U.S. Defense Strategy:
“Welcome, But ... ” Asahi Shimbun, March 9, 2012, accessed online at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/
politics/AJ201203090025.

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The concept, according to defense officials, grewout of concerns that China’s newprecision-
strike weapons threaten freedom of navigation in strategic waterways and other global
commons.
Defense officials familiar with the concept said among the ideas under consideration are:
• Building a new long-range bomber.
• Conducting joint submarine and stealth aircraft operations.
• New jointly operated, long-range unmanned strike aircraft with up to 1,000-mile ranges.
• Using Air Force forces to protect naval bases and deployed naval forces.
• Conducting joint Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force strikes inside China.
• Using Air Force aircraft to deploy sea mines.
• Joint Air Force and Navy attacks against Chinese anti-satellite missiles inside China.
• Increasing the mobility of satellites to make attacks more difficult.
• Launching joint Navy and Air Force cyber-attacks on Chinese anti-access forces.141
An October 12, 2011, press report states that
The Pentagon is engaged in a behind-the-scenes political fight over efforts to soften, or
entirely block, a new military-approved program to bolster U.S. forces in Asia.
The program is called the Air Sea Battle concept and was developed in response to more
than 100 war games since the 1990s that showed U.S. forces, mainly air and naval power, are
not aligned to win a future war with China.
A senior defense official said Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta is reviewing the new
strategy.
“We want to do this right,” the official said. “The concept is on track and is being refined to
ensure that we are able to implement it wherever we need to—including in the Asia-Pacific
region, where American force projection is essential to our alliances and interests.”
The official noted that the program is “the product of unprecedented collaboration by the
services.”
Pro-defense Members of Congress aware of the political fight are ready to investigate. One
aide said Congress knows very little about the concept and is awaiting details.
Officially, the Pentagon has said the new strategy is not directed at China.
But officials familiar with the classified details said it is designed to directly address the
growing threat to the United States and allies in Asia posed by what the Pentagon calls
141
Bill Gertz, “Battle Concept Signals Cold War Posture On China,” Washington Times, November 10, 2011: 13.

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China’s “anti-access” and “area denial” weapons—high-technology arms that China has
been building in secret for the past several decades....
The U.S. response in the Air Sea Battle concept is said to be a comprehensive program to
protect the “global commons” used by the United States and allies in Asia from Chinese
military encroachment in places such as the South China Sea, western Pacific and areas of
Northeast Asia.
The highly classified program, if approved in its current form, will call for new weapons and
bases, along with non-military means. Plans for new weapons include a long-range bomber.
Other systems and elements of the program are not known....
However, defense officials said China’s government was alerted to some aspects of the
concept earlier this year when the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank
presented its own concept for a new warfighting strategy against China.
Andrew Krepinevich, the center’s director who recently left the Pentagon’s Defense Policy
Board, could not be reached for comment.
As a result of the disclosure, China launched a major propaganda and influence campaign to
derail it. The concept was raised in several meetings between Chinese and U.S. officials,
with the Chinese asserting that the concept is a sign the Pentagon does not favor military
relations and views China as an enemy.
Officials in the Obama administration who fear upsetting China also are thought to have
intervened, and their opposition led Mr. Panetta to hold up final approval.
The final directive in its current form would order the Air Force and the Navy to develop and
implement specific programs as part of the concept. It also would include proposals for
defense contractors to support the concept.142
An October 2011 magazine article stated:
AirSea Battle emerged from a memorandum between the air and sea services in 2009. The
Air Force and Navy realized sophisticated threats involving high technology, networked air
defenses, modern ballistic missile, and sea and air capabilities, and anti-space weapons
required the services to marry up many of their respective strengths. The plan, which has
received a great amount of attention since the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, mandated
the creation of an operations concept to protect US and allied access to certain areas in the
world while also protecting forward-based assets and bases....
Both services are said to be fully on board with the plan, and to weed out duplication,
officers from each branch have been cleared to see “all the black programs,” or classified
projects, of the other service as the ASB plan has matured....
The plan had been vetted by both services by June [2011], and is awaiting blessing from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.... Service officials have been predicting a formal release
of more information on the doctrine for months as well.
142
Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, October 12, 2011 (item entitled “Air Sea Battle Fight”).

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As early as Feb. 17 [2011], Lt. Gen. Herbert J. Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff
for operations, plans, and requirements, had said a public document explaining the outlines
of ASB in detail would occur “possibly within two weeks.” The now-retired Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. Gary Roughead told reporters in Washington in March he expected to
release details on ASB in “a few weeks,” as the service Chiefs of the Marines Corps, USAF,
and Navy were “basically done” with their work on the concept. The majority of the plan
will remain classified, he added, “as it should be.”143
A sidebar to this magazine article stated:
The AirSea Battle rollout was repeatedly delayed over the course of 2011. According to
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials, new Secretary of Defense Leon E.
Panetta is reviewing the ASB plan—a sort of executive summary of the overall operations
concept (which, as of early September, remains classified).
However, then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, now the CNO,
told the House Armed Services Committee in late July he expected a release of unclassified
portions of the plan soon.
The AirSea Battle concept was signed by the USAF, Navy, and Marine Corps service Chiefs,
and the Air Force and Navy Secretaries on June 2 and “forwarded to the [Secretary of
Defense] for approval,” the Air Force said in a brief official statement Aug. 2.
Previous Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who departed July 1, had the document in his
possession and had told senior Air Force officials he would sign it before his departure. In
late July, however, Air Force and DOD officials privately indicated the concept was held up
in OSD’s policy shop, and Gates did not sign the document before leaving the Pentagon.
Air Force and defense officials have indicated both publicly and privately that there are
strong international political considerations at play. Spin “concern” has likely contributed to
the delay in officially rolling out the AirSea Battle concept. In late July, USAF officials
privately indicated that there is a great deal of concern within OSD about how China will
perceive and react to the concept.144
A September 29, 2011, press report on a reported new DOD Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
document quoted “a senior defense official” as stating: “It seems clear that there will be increased
emphasis on [the] AirSea Battle approach going forward.”145
A July 26, 2011, press report, stated:
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is reviewing an Air Force-Navy battle concept that was
ordered by the Pentagon last year in response to China’s military buildup and Iran’s
advanced weapons, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert said today.
The Navy and Air Force have submitted to Panetta the equivalent of an executive summary
of the battle concept with the intent to release unclassified portions within weeks, depending
143
Marc V. Schanz, “AirSea Battle’s Turbulent Year,” Air Force Magazine, October 2011: 32-33.
144
“An ASB Summer,” Air Force Magazine, October 2011: 33.
145
Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD Aims To Boost Investment In Capabilities For Major-Power War,” Inside the
Pentagon, September 29, 2011.

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on Panetta’s reaction, Greener told a House Armed Services readiness panel and a
Bloomberg News reporter after the hearing.
The plan aims to combine the strengths of the Navy and Air Force to enable long-range
strikes. It may employ a new generation of bombers, a new cruise missile and drones
launched from aircraft carriers. The Navy also is increasing funding to develop new
unmanned submarines.146
A June 10, 2011, press report stated that “while defense officials publicly insist that the military’s
new AirSea Battle concept, a study meant to reshape the way the U.S. military fights future wars,
is not focused on China, one Navy team is quietly contradicting their claims. The group, called
the China Integration Team, is hard at work applying the lessons of the study to a potential
conflict with China, say sources familiar with the effort.” The report also stated that “though
sources familiar with the study have said that the first draft of the concept has been completed,
those same sources highlighted that the project is ongoing—something that official spokesmen
have stressed as well.”147
A January 10, 2011, press report stated that “the AirSea Battle concept
study, meant to outline the future of Navy and Air Force operations in anti-access environments,
is near completion and is being briefed to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and Air Force Secretary
Michael Donley this month, according to sources familiar with the study.”148
146
Tony Capaccio, “Panetta Reviewing Air-Sea Battle Plan Summary, Greenert Says,” Bloomberg News, July 26,
2011.
147
Andrew Burt and Christopher J. Castelli, “Despite Improved Ties, China Weighs Heavily In Pentagon’s War
Planning,” Inside the Navy, June 13, 2011.
148
Andrew Burt, “Final AirSea Study Being Briefed To Mabus And Donley This Month,” Inside the Navy, January 10,
2011. See also David Fulghum, “Money Walks? Service Leaders Fight to Explain, Justify AirSea Battle Strategy,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 4/11, 2012: 71; Philip DuPree and Jordan Thomas, “Air-Sea Battle: Clearing
the Fog,” Armed Forces Journal, June 2012.

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Appendix C. Article by CNO Greenert on Navy’s
Rebalancing Toward Asia-Pacific
This appendix presents the text of a November 14, 2012, article by Admiral Jonathan Greenert
that provides an overview of Navy activities associated with the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward
the Asia-Pacific. The article states:
Our nation’s security priorities, and our military, are in transition. In the Middle East, we
ended the war in Iraq and are reducing ground troops in Afghanistan with the shift of
security responsibilities to Kabul. At home we are reassessing our military’s size and
composition as we seek to align our spending with our resources. And around the world we
face a range of new security challenges, from continued upheaval in the Arab world to the
imperative of sustaining our leadership in the Asia-Pacific. These challenges place a
premium on the flexibility and small ground footprint of naval forces, which are being
deployed longer and more often to advance our nation’s interests.
The Department of Defense’s January 2012 strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership - Priorities for 21st
Century Defense, addressed this new environment and our
security priorities in it. Overall, the strategy focuses on important regions and current
readiness and agility, while accepting reduced capacity and level of effort in less critical
missions. In particular, the strategy directed that our military rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific while continuing to support our partners in the Middle East. Naval forces will be at
the heart of both efforts.
After two decades of ground conflict in the Middle East, our security concerns and ability to
project power in the region both center on the sea. U.S. ground forces continue to drawdown
in Afghanistan and around the region, so our commanders increasingly rely on naval aircraft
to support and protect troops. Meanwhile, Iranian leaders speak provocatively about
impacting maritime traffic throughout the Arabian Gulf. In response, we turned to maritime
forces, doubling our minesweeping forces in the Gulf and deploying an additional carrier
strike group to the region.
The focus of our rebalance, the Asia-Pacific, is fundamentally a maritime region. Our friends
there depend on the sea for their food and energy, while more than 90 percent of trade by
volume makes its way through the region over the water. Maritime security for Pacific
nations is a matter of economic survival. Militarily, the vast maritime distances in the region
make access via the sea essential to deterring and defeating aggression. Our fleet deployed in
the Asia-Pacific will exploit the mobility of being at sea to project power against aggressors
and avoid attacks, while their reinforcements and supplies will arrive via the ocean from the
United States or regional bases.
The importance of the Asia-Pacific, and the Navy’s attention to it, is not new. Five of our
seven treaty allies are in the region, as well as six of the world’s top 20 economies. We have
maintained an active and robust presence in the Asia-Pacific for more than 70 years and built
deep and enduring relationships with allies and partners there. While we remain present and
engaged in the Middle East to address today’s challenges, the Navy will build on its
longstanding Asia-Pacific focus by rebalancing in four main ways: deploying more forces to
the Asia-Pacific; basing more ships and aircraft in the region; fielding new capabilities
focused on Asia-Pacific challenges; and developing partnerships and intellectual capital
across the region.
Deploying more forces to the Asia-Pacific

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The most visible element of our rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region will be an increase
in day-to-day military presence. Although it is not the only way we are rebalancing, forces
operating in the region show our commitment to the Asia-Pacific and provide a full-time
capability to support our allies and partners. About half of the deployed fleet is in the
Pacific—50 ships on any given day. These ships and their embarked Marines and aircraft
train with our allies and partners, reinforce freedom of navigation, and deter conflict. They
are also the “first responders” to large-scale crises such as the Great East Asian Earthquake
and Tsunami in 2011.
The long distance between the continental United States and Asia makes it inefficient to
rotate ships and aircraft overseas for six to nine months at a time. To avoid this transit time
and build greater ties with our partners and allies, more than 90 percent of our forces in the
Asia-Pacific are there permanently or semi-permanently. For example, about half of our 50
deployed ships are permanently home-ported in Japan and Guam along with their crews and
families. Our logistics and support ships use rotating civilian or military crews to obtain
more presence for the same number of ships.
Although we plan to reduce our future budgets, the Navy will continue to increase its
presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The benchmark year of the Defense Strategic Guidance
is 2020, and by then the Navy Fleet will grow to approximately 295 ships. This, combined
with the impacts of our plans for operations and basing, will increase the day-to-day naval
presence in the Asia-Pacific by about 20 percent, to 60 ships by 2020. In addition to growing
the fleet, three factors will allow us to increase the number of ships in the Asia-Pacific by
2020:
First, we will permanently base four destroyers in Rota, Spain over the next several years to
help defend our European allies from ballistic missiles. Today we do this mission with 10
destroyers that travel in rotation to the Mediterranean from the United States. The six
destroyers freed up in the process will then be able to rotationally deploy to the Asia-Pacific.
Second, new Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) under
construction today will enter the fleet and take on security cooperation and humanitarian
assistance missions in South America and Africa, allowing the destroyers and amphibious
ships we use today for those missions to deploy to the Asia-Pacific. These amphibious ships
will begin deploying instead to the Asia-Pacific in the next few years to support Marine
operations, including those from Darwin, Australia. Additionally, the new JHSV and LCS
are also better suited to the needs of our partners in Africa and South America.
Third, we will field more ships that spend the majority of their time forward by using
rotating civilian or military crews. These include the JHSV, LCS, and our new Mobile
Landing Platforms and Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB).
In addition to more ship presence in the Asia-Pacific, we will increase our deployments of
aircraft there and expand cooperative air surveillance operations with regional partners.
Today we fly cooperative missions from Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, where we
build our shared awareness of activities on the sea by either bringing partner personnel on
board or sharing the surveillance information with them. We may expand these operations in
the future to new partners concerned about threats from piracy, trafficking, and fisheries
violations. To expand our surveillance capacity, the Navy version of the MQ-4 Global Hawk
unmanned air vehicle will operate from Guam when it enters the fleet in the middle of this
decade.
Basing more ships and aircraft in the region

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To support our increased presence in the Asia-Pacific, we will grow the fraction of ships and
aircraft based on the U.S. West Coast and in the Pacific from today’s 55 percent to 60
percent by 2020. This distribution will allow us to continue to meet the needs of Europe,
South America, and West Africa while more efficiently providing additional presence and
capacity in the Asia-Pacific.
Each ship that operates from an overseas port provides full-time presence and engagement in
the region and delivers more options for Combatant Commanders and political leaders. It
also frees up ships that would otherwise be needed to support a rotational deployment.
Today, we have about two dozen ships home-ported in Guam and Japan. In 2013, with the
USS Freedom, we will begin operating Littoral Combat Ships from Singapore, eventually
growing to four ships by 2017. The LCS will conduct maritime security operations with
partner navies throughout Southeast Asia and instead of rotationally deploying to the region,
the ships will stay overseas and their crews will rotate in from the United States, increasing
the presence delivered by each ship.
Fielding new capabilities focused on Asia-Pacific challenges
We will also bolster the capabilities we send to the Asia-Pacific. Using the approach
described in the Air-Sea Battle concept and in concert with the U.S. Air Force, we will
sustain our ability to project power in the face of access challenges such as cruise and
ballistic missiles, submarines, and sophisticated anti-air weapons. Air-Sea Battle’s operations
to disrupt, destroy, and defeat anti-access threats will be essential to maintain the credibility
of our security commitments and ability to deter aggression around the world. Our improved
capabilities will span the undersea, surface, and air environments.
Undersea
The Navy’s dominance in the undersea domain provides the United States a significant
advantage over potential adversaries. Our undersea capabilities enable strike and anti-surface
warfare in otherwise denied areas and exploit the relative lack of capability of our potential
adversaries at anti-submarine warfare. We will sustain our undersea advantage in part
through continued improvements in our own anti-submarine warfare capability, such as
replacing the 1960s-era P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft with the longer range and greatly
improved sensors of the P-8A Poseidon.
We will also field improved platforms and systems that exploit the undersea domain for
power projection and surveillance. In the coming years, newer, multi-mission Virginia-class
submarines with dramatically improved sensors and combat systems will continue to replace
aging Los Angeles-class submarines. With their conversion from Cold War-era ballistic
missile submarines, our four Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGN) are now our
most significant power projection platforms. During Operation Unified Protector, USS
Florida launched over 100 Tomahawk missiles at Libyan air defenses to help establish a “no-
fly” zone. When she and her counterparts retire in the mid 2020s, the Virginia-class
submarine “payload module” will replace their striking capacity with the ability to carry up
to 40 precision-strike cruise missiles, unmanned vehicles, or a mix of other payloads.
Improved sensors and new unmanned systems allow us to augment the reach and persistence
of manned submarines, and are essential to our continued domination of the undersea
environment. These unmanned vehicles will enhance the persistence of undersea sensing,
and expand its reach into confined and shallow waters that are currently inaccessible to other
systems. This will enable detection of threats, for example, to undersea infrastructure.

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Surface
But undersea forces have limited effectiveness at visible, day-to-day missions such as
security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, missile defense, and freedom of navigation.
Surface ships will continue to conduct these operations and show our presence in the Asia-
Pacific. Our surface fleet and embarked personnel will continue to be the most versatile
element of the naval force, building partner capacity and improving security in peacetime
and transitioning to sea control and power projection in conflict. Their credibility and their
ability to execute these missions depends on their ability to defeat improving threats,
especially anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM).
We will defeat ASCMs at long range using an integrated fire control system that combines
the proven Aegis weapon system and upgraded airborne early warning aircraft with new
long-range anti-air missiles on cruisers and destroyers. To defeat ASCMs at short range, the
Navy is upgrading point-defense missiles and electronic warfare systems to destroy
incoming missiles or cause them to miss by deceiving and jamming their seekers.
Navy forces will defeat ASBMs by countering each link in the operational chain of events
required for an adversary to find, target, launch, and complete an attack on a ship with a
ballistic missile. The Navy is fielding new systems that jam, decoy, or confuse the wide-area
surveillance systems needed to find and target ships at long range. To shoot down an ASBM
once launched, the fleet will employ the Aegis ballistic missile defense system and SM-3
missile. And, to prevent an ASBM from completing an attack, the Navy is fielding new
missiles and electronic warfare systems over the next several years that will destroy, jam, or
decoy the ASBM warhead as it approaches the ship.
To improve the ability of surface forces to project power, we will field new long-range
surface-to-surface missiles aboard cruisers and destroyers in the next decade and improve
our ability to send troops ashore as new San Antonio-class amphibious ships replace their
smaller and less-capable 30-year-old predecessors over the next two years.
Air
The Navy and Air Force will improve their integrated ability to defeat air threats and project
power in the face of improving surveillance and air defense systems. This evolution involves
the blending of new and existing technology and the complementary use of electronic
warfare, stealth, and improved, longer-range munitions. The carrier air wing in Japan
recently finished upgrading to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet strike fighters with improved
jamming and sensor systems and the new E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. This
air wing will also be the first to incorporate the F-35C Lightning II, which will enable new
operational concepts that combine the F-35C’s stealth and sensor capability with the payload
capacity of the F/A-18 E/F to project power against the most capable air defense systems.
Developing partnerships and intellectual capital
Perhaps most importantly, rebalancing the Navy’s emphasis toward the Asia-Pacific region
includes efforts to expand and mature our partnerships and establish greater intellectual focus
on Asia-Pacific security challenges.
First, we are increasing the depth and breadth of our alliances and partnerships in the Asia-
Pacific. Our relationships in the region are the reason for our engagement there and are the
foundation of our rebalanced national security efforts. Our connection with Asia-Pacific
allies starts at the top. Our naval headquarters and command facilities are integrated with
those of Japan and South Korea and we are increasing the integration of our operating forces
by regularly conducting combined missions in areas including anti-submarine warfare and

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ballistic missile defense. We are also establishing over the next year a headquarters in
Singapore for our ships that will operate there.
We build our relationships with operational experience. The Navy conducts more than 170
exercises and 600 training events there every year with more than 20 allies and partners—
and the number of events and partners continues to grow. Our 2012 Rim of the Pacific
Exercise, or “RIMPAC,” was the world’s largest international maritime exercise, involving
more than 40 ships and submarines, 200 aircraft, and more than 25,000 sailors from two
dozen Asia-Pacific countries. This year RIMPAC included several new partners, such as
Russia and India. It also incorporated naval officers from Canada, Australia, and Chile as
leaders of exercise task forces. Like our other exercises, RIMPAC practices a range of
operations, building partner capacity in missions such as maritime security and humanitarian
assistance while enhancing interoperability with allies in sophisticated missions such as anti-
submarine and surface warfare and missile defense.
Second, we are refocusing attention on the Asia-Pacific in developing and deploying our
intellectual talent. The Naval War College is the nation’s premier academic center on the
region and continues to grow its programs on Asian security, while the Naval Postgraduate
School expanded its programs devoted to developing political and technical expertise
relevant to the Asia-Pacific. We continue to carefully screen and send our most talented
people to operate and command ships and squadrons in the Asia-Pacific.
Third, as described above, the Navy is sharpening its focus on military capabilities needed in
the Asia-Pacific. Most important is the ability to assure access, given the distances involved
in the region and our treaty alliances there. Having a credible ability to maintain operational
access is critical to our security commitments in the region and the diplomatic and economic
relationships those commitments underpin. We are developing the doctrine, training and
know-how to defeat access threats such as submarines and cruise and ballistic missiles
through our Air-Sea Battle concept. With Air-Sea Battle, we are pulling together the
intellectual effort in needed areas, including intelligence and surveillance, cyber operations,
anti-submarine warfare, ballistic missile defense, air defense, and electronic warfare. The
Air-Sea Battle Office leads this effort with more than a dozen personnel representing each
military service.
Our credibility in these missions rests on the proficiency our forces deployed every day in
the Asia-Pacific. We increased our live-fire training in air defense and in surface and anti-
submarine warfare by more than 50 percent, and expanded the number and sophistication of
training events we conduct in theater with our partners and allies. For example, in RIMPAC
2012, U.S. allies and partners shot 26 torpedoes and more than 50 missiles from aircraft and
ships against a range of targets and decommissioned ships.
A Global Fleet
Even as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the Navy will remain engaged around the world.
We will maintain our presence to deter and respond to aggression in support of our partners
in the Middle East. In Europe we will build our alliance relationships. Our basing of ballistic
missile defense destroyers to Spain is part of this effort, as an element of the overall
European Phased Adaptive Approach. The home-porting of U.S. ships in Europe will yield
greater opportunities for integration with European forces as well.
In South America and Africa we will shift, as the Defense Strategic Guidance directs, to
“innovative, low-cost approaches,” including JHSV, AFSB, and LCS. In contrast to our
approach today, which is to send the destroyers and amphibious ships we have when
available, these new ships will be better suited to operations in these regions and will be
available full-time thanks to their rotational crews.

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The Asia-Pacific will become increasingly important to our national prosperity and security.
It is home to the world’s largest and most dynamic economies, growing reserves of natural
resources, and emerging security concerns. Naval forces, with their mobility and relevance in
peacetime and conflict, are uniquely poised to address these challenges and opportunities and
sustain our leadership in the region. With our focus on partnerships and innovative
approaches, including new ships, forward homeporting, and rotational crewing, the Navy can
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific while being judicious with the nation’s resources. We will
grow our fleet in the Asia-Pacific, rebalance our basing, improve our capabilities, and focus
intellectually on the region. This will sustain our credibility to deter aggression, preserve
freedom of maritime access, and protect the economic livelihood of America and our
friends.149
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
149
Jonathan Greenert, “Sea Change, The Navy Pivots to Asia,” Foreign Policy (www.foreignpolicy.com), November
14, 2012.