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Although central banks have pursued the same objectives throughout their existence, primarily price and financial stability, the interpretation of their role in doing so has varied. We identify three stable epochs, when such interpretations had stabilised, i.e. the Victorian era, 1840s–1914; the decades of government control, 1930s–60s; the triumph of the markets, 1980s–2007. Each epoch was followed by a confused interregnum, searching for a new consensual blueprint. The final such epoch concluded with a crisis, when it became apparent that macro-economic stability, the Great Moderation, plus (efficient) markets could not guarantee financial stability. So the search is now on for additional macro-prudential (counter-cyclical) instruments. The use of such instruments will need to be associated with controlled variations in systemic liquidity, and in the balance sheet of the central bank. Such control over its own balance sheet is the core, central function of any central bank, even more so than its role in setting short-term interest rates, which latter could be delegated. We end by surveying how relationships between central banks and governments may change over the next period.

Larry Neal, How it all began: the monetary and financial architecture of Europe during the first global capital markets, 1648–1815

The Treaty of Westphalia created the modern nation-state system of Europe and set the stage for the long-term success of financial capitalism. The new sovereign states experimented with competing monetary regimes during their wars over the next century and two-thirds while they extended and perfected the financial innovations in war finance developed during the Thirty Years War. The Dutch maintained fixed exchange rates, the French insisted on exercising monetary independence, while the English placed priority on free movement of international capital. In struggling with the
trilemma of choosing among the goals of maintaining fixed exchange rates, monetary independence and free movement of capital, the governments of early modern Europe learned many valuable lessons. By the time of the Napoleonic wars, the
innovations that emphasised reliance on financial markets rather than on financial institutions proved their superiority.

We have reconstructed a new blue chips (large caps) stock index for France from 1854 to 1998, based on a modern methodology. Our index differs profoundly from earlier indices, and is more consistent with French financial and economic history. We suggest this result casts some doubt on many historical stock indices, such as those used in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton's Triumph of the Optimists. Investment in French stocks provided a positive real return during the nineteenth century, but a negative one – because of inflation and wars – in the twentieth. Despite this secular negative real performance, stocks proved the best financial asset in the very long run, although with an equity premium lower than in the US.

This article explores the structure of the italian capitalist system by focusing on the relationships between financial firms – banks, insurance and holding companies – and industrial companies in italy during the period 1952–72 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database – imita.db – containing data on over 30,000 directors of italian joint-stock companies for the years 1952, 1960 and 1972. After a descriptive statistical overview of the companies and the directors included in the database, the article develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated with a prosopographic study of the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The article confirms that italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. in particular, it argues that interlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the major private companies and their connections with state-owned enterprises. In 1952 and 1960 the system, centred on the larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurance and the major finance companies.

This article examines how trading on two geographically separate financial markets reflected political events before and during World War II. Specifically, we compare sovereign debt prices on the Zurich and Stockholm stock exchanges and find considerable (but not complete) symmetry in the price responses across the two markets in relation to turning points in the war, which suggests that markets worked efficiently. The use of a quantitative methodology on historical financial market data represents a useful complement to traditional historical analysis, offering large-scale evidence of individuals acting in their own pecuniary interest without producing any lasting systematic biases.

In 1693 Thomas Neale, groom porter to their majesties, organised a lottery that offered to its lucky winner a prize of £3,000. The scheme proved a great success, encouraging a variety of entrepreneurs to float similar projects. Indeed, by 1698 lotteries that offered tickets costing as little as one penny allowed all but the most destitute to indulge in dreams of wealth. Although these schemes may be seen as a mere manifestation of the contemporary love of gambling and games of chance, this article argues that they can also reveal much about the nature and progress of the financial revolution.

This paper explores the extent and nature of ‘Penny bank’ saving in Glasgow during the second half of the nineteenth century. Penny banks existed as part of the network of philanthropic organisations in the quintessential industrial city, and they were frequented by the poorer sections of the working class – those for whom saving represented a difficult and occasionally sacrificial effort. They were a voluntary and individualist decision to engage in saving, in contrast to the mutual organisations, such as friendly and industrial welfare societies which also proliferated in this period. The enormous success of penny banks in Glasgow, and throughout the United Kingdom, is powerful evidence that a great deal of saving was happening, even amongst the poorest sections of society. Careful examination of the activities of two penny banks suggests that they operated both as short-term liquidity stores and as vehicles for longer-term and larger-amount savings.

Many commentators have contended that British banking lacked competition for much of the twentieth century. This article examines a range of evidence relating to English clearing banks in the middle decades of the century, when the banking ‘cartel’ was believed to be at its strongest. Data on interest rates charged and paid, rate spreads, profitability and expenses ratios, including new evidence from archival sources, are considered. Some propositions about cartels are supported, others contradicted, and some left unresolved. We conclude that the banking ‘cartel’ can be described as ‘soft’, rather than ‘hard’ – that is, one which agreed strict output quotas and profits shares among its members.

The monetary powers embedded in the US Constitution were revolutionary and led to a watershed transformation in the nation's monetary structure. They included determining what monies could be legal tender, who could emit fiat paper money, and who could incorporate banks. How the debate at the 1787 constitutional convention over these powers evolved and led the founding fathers to the specific powers adopted is presented and deconstructed. Why they took this path rather than replicate the successful colonial system and why they codified such powers into supreme law rather than leaving them to legislative debate and enactment are addressed.

Utilising a new sample of interwar initial public offerings (IPOs), I consider the effectiveness of the interwar stock market for firms going public. Consistent with the pecking order theory, IPO proceeds contributed only modestly to domestic industry's capital expenditure needs. IPOs of capital-hungry new manufacturing industries raised no more finance than did the rest of manufacturing. This was in part attributable to the detrimental effect of weak financial regulation on investor appetite for newer, riskier enterprises. In terms of the quality of firms allowed onto the market, IPO survival rates of the early and late 1920s were shockingly low, just as earlier research has shown. However, survival rates rebounded strongly in the following decade due not only to the economic recovery but also to tougher scrutiny of listing applications by the London Stock Exchange.

We document the transition from goldsmith to banker in the case of Richard Hoare and his successors and examine the operation of the London loan market during the early eighteenth century. Analysis of the financial revolution in England has focused on changes in public debt management and the interest rates paid by the state. Much less is known about the evolution of the financial system providing credit to individual borrowers. We show how this progress took time because operating a deposit bank was new and different from being a goldsmith. Learning how to use the relatively new technology of deposit banking was crucial for the bank's success and survival.

Using the transfer records and ledger books of the Bank of England, this article examines women's market activity during and after the South Sea Bubble. Women are classified by marital or social status. During 1720, women's activity constituted 13 per cent of transactions measured by value, 10 per cent of total sales and 8 per cent of total purchases. While individual women lost and made money from their market activity, women's net position over the Bubble was positive. We also provide a case study of Johanna Cock, one of the larger broker/jobbers in Bank stock. By September 1720, women made up 20 per cent of Bank shareholders holding 10 per cent of the capital stock. By September 1725, women held nearly 15 per cent of a much larger capital stock.

Debasement has generally been condemned as a defect of premodern money, that was eventually amended by the institution of the gold standard. Building on monetary history and thought from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, this article argues that debasement was instead an instrument designed to maintain the metal standard where it was needed, in the circuit of long-distance trade, while preserving the possibility of an autonomous distribution within local economies. The theoretical distinction between monetary functions (measure and means of exchange) was made effective by the articulation of ideal and real money (via debasement and enhancement), providing complementary economic areas with complementary currencies. Moreover, the distinction between monetary functions also appears as a constituent feature of money from the perspective of a reappraisal of the milestones of monetary thought, from Smith to Keynes.

Stock transferability and liquidity are viewed as vital characteristics of capital markets. Surprisingly, we know very little about the level of trading activity on, and liquidity of the market for, company stock during the rapid growth of the British capital market in the nineteenth century. This article attempts to shed some light on this important issue by examining the market for bank shares using trading data collected from bank archives. Our evidence suggests that trading activity and liquidity changed imperceptibly over the century. We also find that ownership structure is a major determinant of trading activity and liquidity; whereas shareholder liability regimes don't appear to affect liquidity.

This article explores the development of the closed-end investment trust in both the UK and the US, in the context of the investment management strategies adopted and whether they provided value-added services for investors. Although US investment trusts of the 1920s boom years were heavily influenced by their earlier UK counterparts, they differed from British investment trusts in a number of key ways, in particular, size, capital structure, tax and accounting practices, management, and costs. These differences led to their relatively much worse performance in the stock market crash of the late 1920s and early 1930s. This poor US trust performance led directly to the creation of the US open-ended ‘fixed trust’, marketed as an antidote to the generally poor management of conventional closed-end investment trusts. As confidence in mutual funds slowly returned in the United States, open-ended funds were gradually given more flexibility, but US investment trust companies, with share prices at a steep discount to liquidation value, and partly blamed for the crash, were encouraged to convert to mutual fund status by the 1936 Revenue Act. By 1944, open-end funds had overtaken investment trusts in terms of asset size, a phenomenon that did not occur in Britain for another 30 years.

This article examines the investment practices of life assurance firms within the United Kingdom, through an analysis of the asset holdings of the sector over the period 1900 to 1965. The data are drawn from the detailed annual returns to the Board of Trade. Aggregate, sectional and individual company data are used in the study. Major trends in investment practice are identified and analysed; and cross-sectional comparisons are made. The main emphasis is on the contribution of the life assurance sector towards provision of financial support to the British industrial sector. From the beginning of the period a significant proportion of life firms' investments was held in corporate securities, although over time the composition moved away from fixed-interest stock towards share holdings. The study highlights the great variation in investment practice across individual life assurance firms, with no strong evidence of convergence over time excepting investments in equity holdings.

The article examines the early history of provident institutions or trustee savings banks in Ireland. Combining aggregate data and an archive-based study of one savings bank, it describes the growth and performance of this ‘institutional import’. By and large, Irish savings banks catered for the lower-middle and middle classes, not the poor as intended by the founders of the movement. The article also explains how the collapse of three savings banks in 1848 dealt savings banks in Ireland as a whole a blow from which they never really recovered.

In the discussion of our contemporary economic disease, the Great Depression analogy refuses to go away. Almost every policy-maker referred to conditions that had ‘not been seen since the Great Depression’, even before the failure of Lehman. Some even went further – the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England notably called the crisis the worst ‘financial crisis in human history’. In its April 2009 World Economic Outlook, the IMF looked explicitly at the analogy not only in the collapse of financial confidence, but also in the rapid decline of trade and industrial activity across the world. In general, history rather than economic theory seems to offer a guide in interpreting wildly surprising and inherently unpredictable events. Some observers, notably Paul Krugman, have concluded that a Dark Age of macroeconomics has set in.