Wednesday, July 20, 2016

America Can't Dump Taiwan

America Can't Dump Taiwan

Bill Clinton set off a political
firestorm in Taiwan and the United States [in 1998] when he chose to state what
are known as the "three no's" as official U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
. . .The words President Clinton chose to use in Shanghai—words used by no
previous President—have put the people of Taiwan at a severe disadvantage in
their 50-year struggle with the communist government of mainland China.

This is a delicate and dangerous time for
Taiwan—perhaps the most difficult period since the cross-strait crisis in
1995-96 that saw live fire exercises by Beijing, juxtaposed with a “shock and
awe” display of American sea power.

This is a delicate time because Taiwan has
a new president, Tsai Ing-wen, leading a political party that seeks to distance
itself from the mainland and any “One China, Two Systems” policy. Tsai is being
carried along by a wave of Taiwanese nationalism that itself is being propelled
by a combination of economic stagnation on the island, and the spectacle of a
“One China, Two Systems” Hong Kong being ground under Beijing’s authoritarian
boot.

This is a dangerous time because a
bullying Xi Jinping has responded in the worst possible way to Taiwan’s
peaceful transition of presidential power—with a cut-off of diplomatic ties,
punishing sanctions on trade and tourism and a steady drumbeat of hostile propaganda.
The mood on the island, which I just returned from after extensive talks with
government officials, business executives, academics and people on the street,
is one of quiet resolve. While there is no wish to provoke Beijing, there is
even less desire to bend to its authoritarian will.

6,700 miles away on the U.S. mainland, it
is critical there be no missteps in American policy towards Taiwan that might,
on the one hand, inflame China or, on the other hand, throw Taiwan—once
again—under Beijing’s bus. The inalterable fact here is that American foreign
policy towards Taiwan since its formation as a political entity in 1949 has
been highly uncertain.

On the one hand, Taiwan has periodically
been used by the White House merely as a “bargaining chip” in a game of amoral
realpolitik and “realeconomik” to woo and placate mainland China. The key
offending presidents here include Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton,
George W. Bush and Barack Obama; and some of the key “bargaining chip”
documents include both the “three communiqués” and some ill-timed and poorly
worded proclamations by Clinton—arguably the biggest sell-out to the People’s
Republic of China of any American president in history.

For example, the first “Shanghai Communiqué,” signed February
28, 1972 sealed the Nixon–Kissinger deal to play an
“enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend” China off the Soviet Union. While the
communiqué itself did not completely surrender Taiwan to China, it was part of
an overall set of initiatives that had begun with Taiwan being ousted from the
United Nations and replaced by Beijing in 1971 with little push back from the
United States. This was the end of Taiwan as a nation recognized
internationally, and the beginning of what has been a long period of increasing
isolation.

In a similar vein, President Carter’s 1979
“Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” showcased this neutering trifecta: the
end of America’s official diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a nation, the
withdrawal of troops from Taiwan soil, and the severing of America’s mutual
defense treaty with the island.

As for Bill Clinton, his was a mixed, and
ultimately shameful, bag. While he finally sent aircraft carrier strike groups
into the Taiwan Strait during the 1995-1996 crisis at the urging of Congress,
he had denied the president of Taiwan a visa in 1994.

Most injuriously for an increasingly
isolated Taiwan seeking to participate in the international order, Clinton also
publicly renounced any support for Taiwan independence in publicly embracing
Beijing’s “Three Nos” policy in 1998. In doing so, a
“throw-Taiwan-under-the-bus” Clintonstated:
“we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which
statehood is a requirement." Said Jim Mann in response to steps even Nixon
and Carter wouldn’t take:

When it comes to misleading the American
public, it's hard to top the Clinton administration…. Last week, during his
stopover in Shanghai, Clinton made what was the most important presidential
pronouncement on American policy toward Taiwan in more than 15 years. He gave
the imprimatur of the presidency to what are sometimes called, in shorthand,
the "3 no's." He said the United States will not support independence
for Taiwan; any solution that creates "two Chinas"—or one China and
one Taiwan; or its admission to organizations, such as the United Nations.

Of course, two years later, Clinton would
heavily lobby to shoehorn China into the World Trade Organization—a move that
resulted in a flood of illegally subsidized Chinese products, the closure of
over fifty thousand American factories, stagnant wages and a good bit of the
economic mess this country is now in.

A Countervailing Congress—and Strong President

As counterpoint to the
presidential selling out of Taiwan by Nixon, Carter, Clinton et. al., the
island democracy has also been periodically been treated with the kind of
dignity and respect it deserves as a beacon of democracy and key strategic ally
in Asia. This Janus face of American policy is reflected most completely in two
key policy documents.

First, there is the1979 Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA)—passed by an angry Congress in strong and
stinging rebuke to Jimmy Carter’s Second Communiqué. Of the six main policy
points stated in the document, one of the most important is the clear statement
that “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”

Importantly here, the TRA not only indirectly commits the United States to a
defense of Taiwan if Beijing uses kinetic force. The TRA also recognizes “three
warfare” tactics like the tourist boycotts and trade embargoes that Beijing is
currently inflicting on Taiwan as weapons that constitute “other than peaceful
means,” that may justify U.S. intervention.

In addition, the TRA guarantees continued
“arms of a defensive character” to Taiwan—although the White House (most
recently both Bush and Obama) often tries to skirt this commitment by denying
the sale of some of America’s more advanced weapons to Taiwan.

As for the second key document guiding
U.S. policy, these are the “Six Assurances” from the desk of the
only president since the 1960s who truly understood the concept of peace
through strength, Ronald Reagan. The most important of these assurances include
that the United States will not “formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over
Taiwan,” “pressure Taiwan into negotiations with China,” or “consult with China
in advance before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.”

Here again, however, kowtowing presidents
have often violated these assurances, e.g., Clinton’s undercutting of Taiwan on
the sovereignty issue, Obama’s kowtowing signaling behavior to Beijing on the
arms sales issue.

Where Do We Now Stand?

With the above observations as background,
let me know reflect on what is likely to be the best direction for U.S. policy
at this critical juncture and some critical “do’s and “don’t’s.”

On the “don’ts” front, the guiding
principle here is that there is no need to unnecessarily poke the Panda. Ergo,
American leaders should never refer to Taiwan as a “nation” or “country”—even
as they should recognize it as a “democracy” and “political entity,”
thereby signaling Taiwan’s de facto, if not de jure, independence. Here, words
matter very much indeed—far more to Beijing, and far more in Asia, than
American political sensibilities often grasp.

Second, American leaders should never
acknowledge the “One China, Two Systems” policy—nor even refer to the “One
China” policy again. Here, if one carefully reads documents like theShanghai Communiqué,
there is really no acknowledgement of a “One China,” but rather (and only) the
far more subtle acknowledgement that both China and Taiwan agree there is only
one China—while having significant disagreements about what that “One China”
constitutes.

As noted in the Communiqué: “The United
States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” Here,
again, words matter deeply—which is why Clinton’s behavior in embracing the
“Three Nos,” in particular, was so egregious.

Third, it is critical that both Congress
and especially the White House stop publicly acknowledging the need to
appease China in the consideration of any arm sales to Taiwan. This is not only
a violation of Reagan’s Six Assurances. It also demonstrates
weakness on the part of America on the Taiwan question even as it undercuts
Taiwan.

Some Do’s and Don’t’s

On the “do’s” front, the guiding principle
is to continually assure Taiwan and the world of America’s commitment to both
the Taiwan Relations Act and Reagan’s Six Assurances. That both the House and
Senate recently reaffirmed the TRA by unanimous votes was, for example,
extremely welcomed by Taiwan’s leaders at this critical juncture. A similar
statement by the White House and the major presidential candidates would
likewise be both welcomed and prudent at this time of heightened tensions.

Over the longer term, it would be useful
for the number of visits by Congressional members and Cabinet members (other
than State and Defense) to increase. This sends the appropriate signal both to
Taiwan and other allies in the region, and it can be done without any loss of
face to China—although such visits will no doubt be condemned in the Chinese
press.

Moreover, these visits need not be merely
symbolic. There are very real issues America can help Taiwan with—from its
economic development and upping its game in the energy dependence arena to
improved education for its military forces and military modernization.

On this note, and at the operational
level, one intriguing suggestion I heard repeatedly on the island was to send
more private, retired military contractors to the island to help train the
troops. This approach would deftly skirt any “red line” involving any U.S.
military troops stationed on the island.

More broadly, with the
rise of China’s aggression in the East and South China Seas, it is now time for
America to more fully commit to the modernization of Taiwan’s defense
capabilities. As I have argued in both my Crouching Tigerbook andfilm, maintaining
Taiwan as an independent, pro-U.S. ally is absolutely critical for
strategically balancing against the rise of an increasingly militaristic China.

Here, I should note that any doubt about
this was erased in several lengthy discussions with experts on the island about
what it would exactly mean if Beijing controlled MacArthur’s famous “immovable
aircraft carrier” in the Pacific. Specifically, it would mean a submarine base
on the east side of the island rivaling that of theYulin naval
base at Hainan Island and immediate access to the deep waters of
the Pacific.

If China were to take Taiwan, it would also mean other bases that would
significantly extend the effective range of China’s air force. None of these
developments would provide comfort to the American fleet or forces on Guam—or
to our friends in Japan concerned about security along the Ryukyu Island chain
that includes Okinawa.

As a further consideration, Taiwan
urgently needs to upgrade its defensive capabilities, and Taiwan’s leaders
clearly understand that such capabilities must be focused on developing a
similar set of “anti-access, area denial” capabilities that China is now using
to deter U.S. sea and air power in Asia. One key to any such strategy is the
development of a fleet of conventional diesel electric submarines with state of
the art air independent propulsion systems. As Seth Cropseyhas noted
in the National Interest:

According to the Pentagon’s 2014 report on
China, if war were to break out Taiwan would face upwards of 34 People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines. A dozen subs connected with advanced
sensors and weapons could contest the PLA for control of the waters surrounding
Taiwan. No other Taiwan platform could oppose a maritime blockade as
effectively. The ability of submarines to act autonomously and stealthily would
give Taiwan an effective defense against a real threat. The inability of
hostile forces to detect submarines also helps assure the uninterrupted flow of
sea-borne commerce. Taiwan is the U.S.’s 10th largest trading partner. A
modern, deployable fleet of submarines is critical to the sustained defense of
Taiwan.

Thus far, however, Beijing has been very
successful in bullying other nations that sell modern subs, e.g., Sweden,
Germany and Japan. An alternative strategy is to develop an indigenous
submarine production capability. However, this, too, has been thwarted by
Beijing’s pressure as countries are similarly unwilling to share blueprints and
help Taiwan in developing its submarine industry. It is now time for the United
States to help break this embargo. Here, again, as Cropsey notes:

The United States has not constructed a
diesel submarine since the late 1950’s, but could provide design engineers. The
U.S. could work with Japanese shipbuilders who make excellent submarines. The
U.S. could also relax export controls on items needed to build the submarines.
Several U.S. defense contractors have solid working relationships with Taiwan.
In 2002, when the U.S. Navy discussed options with the RoC Navy (ROCN), General
Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon all expressed interest
in being the prime contractor. All of these companies have maintained interest
in Taiwanese defensive abilities. Working with a U.S. company to design an ROCN
submarine could set Taiwan on an accelerated path towards development while
giving Taiwan control over production and manufacturing.

Another option is to use the blueprints of
an existing model and customize it to fit the ROCN’s requirements. Japan is
both capable and possibly willing—with the right encouragement—to assist Taiwan
in constructing diesel-electric submarines. A transnational industrial cooperation
with Japan could help strengthen security partnership between defense
ministries that face the same threat.

With the more hawkish Shinzo Abe now at
the helm in Japan, and with a United States finally awakening to Beijing’s
threat in the Western Pacific, this may indeed be the time to move in this
direction. The construction of such a submarine industry would not only help
defend Taiwan. It would also create new, high-skilled jobs at robust wage
levels—the most critical need of a Taiwan that, like America, has offshored far
too much of its industrial base to China.

As a further consideration, Taiwan needs
all the American help it can get integrating this island democracy into as many
international organizations as possible. Currently, the lack of official
“statehood” limits Taiwan’s options, but there are many cases where statehood
is not a requirement.

One glaring example is the now current
exclusion of Taiwan from the Rim of the Pacific annual military exercise based
in Pearl Harbor—even as the People’s Republic of China is allowed to
participate. To many in Congress—and the Navy!—this is exactly backwards.

China’s participation
provides this increasingly hostile country access to both allied technologies
and tactics. Taiwan’s exclusion denies the island a precious opportunity to
improve its defensive and coordinating capabilities. It’s dumb and offensive to
many in an American navy that is going to bear the brunt of the causalities if
and when China starts firing its swarms of anti-ship ballistic missiles and
torpedoes at American aircraft carrier strike groups.

Finally, one of the requests I also heard
repeatedly during my travels in Taiwan was the need to better integrate Taiwan
into the region’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance or “C4ISR” systems. With Taiwan hosting one of
the most important radar facilities with respect to deep penetration into the
Chinese mainland, this is a “win-win” for the United States and allies like
Japan and Australia.

At the end of the time, it’s time for America to fully and firmly recommit to
an island that is indeed both a beacon of democracy and critical to the U.S.
defense strategy in Asia. The chessboard is now clear on the matter of the
dangers posed to the region by a rising China, and we need to stop sacrificing
friends like Taiwan to placate what is increasingly morphing from a trading
partner and strategic rival into a hostile enemy.