The abduction of Suleyman Shah

Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent scholar residing in İstanbul, with a wide interest in the politics, history and culture of the Balkans and the Greater Middle East. He attended the VUB in Brussels and did his graduate work at the universities of Essex and Oxford. In Oxford, Erimtan was a member of Lady Margaret Hall and he obtained his doctorate in Modern History in 2002. His publications include the book “Ottomans Looking West?” as well as numerous scholarly articles. In the period 2010-11, he wrote op-eds for Today’s Zaman and in the further course of 2011 he also published a number of pieces in Hürriyet Daily News. In 2013, he was the Turkey Editor of the İstanbul Gazette. He is on Twitter at @theerimtanangle

Turkey, ruled by the Justice and Development Party (or AKP), has over the past years openly opposed Bashar al-Assad's rule in Syria. Still, it took Recep Tayyip Erdogan many years to actually send his troops next door . . . until late February that is.

About three weeks after the lifting of the siege of Kobani right across the
Turkish-Syrian border and just days after having agreed to train
a new "Syrian rebel" force in the central Anatolian town of
Kırsehir, Turkey's AKP-led government ordered its Armed Forces
(or TSK, in its acronymized Turkish form) to perform a rather
spectacular operation that began late Saturday and ended in the
early hours of Sunday (21-22 February 2015).

Turkish troops crossed into Syrian territory to remove the
remains of "the grandfather of Sultan Osman, the founder of
the Ottoman dynasty" (an obscure historical figure called
Suleyman Shah) as well as the Turkish soldiers guarding his tomb
inside Syria.

This strange rescue operation received the name 'Shah Firat'. The
existence of this Turkish exclave on Syrian soil goes back to
1921 when Ankara's Grand National Assembly, then constituting the
country's provisional government, signed an agreement with the
French, bringing an end to hostilities and demarcating the
territories held by the provisional Turkish government and
France, respectively. The document's 9th article deals
specifically with the tomb of Suleyman Shah, stipulating that the building and its grounds
"shall remain, with its appurtenances, the property of
Turkey, who may appoint guardians for it and may hoist the
Turkish flag there.”

The tomb has been in the Turkish media for many months now. As
long ago as August 2013, the then-still-PM Tayyip Erdogan
declared that the "tomb of Suleyman Shah
[in Syria] and the land surrounding it is our territory. We
cannot ignore any unfavorable act against that monument, as it
would be an attack on our territory, as well as an attack on NATO
land . . . Everyone knows his duty, and will continue to do what
is necessary.”

As such, the Islamic State (or IS, then still primarily known as
ISIS/ISIL) had been threatening the Turkish exclave ever since
March 2014. In fact, in the course of the following month the AKP
leadership even appeared willing to organize a false flag attack
on the tomb to garner popular support in the then-upcoming local
elections. In the end, however, a leaked recording of an
incriminating conversation seems to have thwarted these efforts.
Turkey's government has long had diplomatic
contacts and ties with the IS and other
Islamist groups in Syria, notably the outfit named Ahrar al-Sham.

Protecting Turkey's Ottoman heritage or safeguarding Rojava

Now, with the Turkish Army's spectacular cross-border
intervention, involving 57 armored vehicles, 39 tanks, and
approximately 600 soldiers, the overtly pseudo-Ottomanist and
pro-Islamic AKP government actually ceded Turkish soil to the
enemy, a feat unique in Republican history.

Middle East experts Aaron Stein and Michael Stephens, both
affiliated with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),
explain the context of the 'Shah Firat' operation in the
following way, clarifying that the "tomb lies on the M4
highway that runs West-East from the coastal city of Latakia
across northern Syria to the Yaroubia border crossing with Iraq,
via Aleppo. The highway serves as a main artery across the
northern central part of Syria, and is a key supply route for
anybody wishing to move supplies and personnel quickly back and
forward across the country. In this instance between ISIS’
nominal capital Raqqa and the outskirts of Aleppo. The road was
frequently in use by ISIS particularly for those units travelling
between the town of Manbij and Raqqa. Indeed the rationale for
the string of ISIS offensives launched against the Kurdish city
of Kobani in 2014 (quite apart from their hatred of the PYD/YPG’s
socialist ideology) was to protect this particular highway and
afford ISIS logistical resilience and strategic depth for the
main arteries running between its major population centers.”

The 'Shah Firat' operation effectively relocated the Ottoman
forebear's tomb and also led to the "accidental" death of one of
the Turkish soldiers involved. But, one can only wonder about the
timing of this military retreat. According to reports on social
media, a spokesman for the YPG (the fighting force consisting of
male soldiers affiliated to the PYD or the Kurdish Democratic
Union Party in Syria, allied to the Turkish PKK or Kurdish
Workers' Party), a certain Polat Can (@polatcano), called out for
help to save the Turkish soldiers guarding the Suleyman Shah Tomb
in order to get them safely to Turkey. Subsequently, claims that
his twitter account was hacked by members of the Islamic State
(or ISIS) emerged, and currently this account has been
terminated. Whether the AKP-led government was really moved to
intervene because of this Twitter action remains an open
question.

Following the TSK's cross-border movements, the actual remains of
the Ottoman forebear were relocated to a hillock in the vicinity
of the village of Ashme, to the west of the recently liberated
Kurdish Kobani and inside territory controlled by the PYD and its
armed forces, the YPG/YPJ (the latter being fighting force
consisting of female soldiers affiliated to the PYD). In fact,
pictures of the site have emerged on social media showing the
hillock, which is only 100 meters from the Turkish border, with
waving flags displaying the countenance of Abdullah Ocalan (the
now-imprisoned leader of the PKK, popularly known as Apo).
Turkey's state-run press agency Anadolu Ajansı (AA) subsequently
reported optimistically that the "tomb of Suleyman Shah,
Turkey's only exclave, was temporarily relocated to a new site
within Syria because of the ongoing conflict in the country, the
Turkish Foreign Ministry said Sunday, [,22 February ]".

And on Tuesday, 24 February, Turkey's Prime Ministerial Office of
Public Diplomacy even released a blueprint for the temporary tomb
for the remains of Suleyman Shah to be constructed on the site in
Ashme, in an obvious attempt to allay popular concern over
Turkish-Kurdish cooperation and to underline the AKP-led
government's pseudo-Ottoman credentials. But in fact, previously
the HDP (or Peoples' Democratic Party, a pro-Kurdish political
party in Turkey) MP for Sırnak, Habip Kaplan told the Turkish
press that the TSK had acted in conjunction with the YPG. In this
way, it would appear that Turkey-under-the-AKP has all but
colluded with the PYD (and arguably its Turkish arm, the PKK) to
secure the territorial integrity of Rojava, the Kurdish enclave
in northern Syria, while ostensibly saving the remains of an
Ottoman forebear. Turkey’s National Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz
for his part, was still able to declare with a straight face that
"this operation demonstrates our commitment to protect our
national interests.”

Turkey's role in Syria's not-so civil war

Ever since the outbreak of Syria's not-so civil war next door,
Turkey's government has been harshly condemning Bashar al-Assad as an evil tyrant
oppressing his hapless people, while apparently behaving rather
leniently towards the Islamist factions fighting the Damascus
government. Following the “successful” completion of the 'Shah
Firat' operation, Turkey's PM Ahmed Davutoglu declared that
"Turkey's Syria policy is based not on conjuncture, but on
principles . . . Under the new circumstances, our position
against the Syrian regime or DAESH [the Arabic acronym for ISIS
or the IS] remains unchanged. We are against both the atrocities
of the regime and the DAESH [or IS] terror, but we stand by the
Syrian people,” adding that Turkey is ready "to take any
unilateral step in the context of our national strategy when it
comes to our national security,” echoing Defense Minister
Yilmaz's words.

At the same time, the US-led allied air strikes against the
Caliph's Islamic State continue unabated, even though President
Obama has asked the US Congress to formally authorize the use of
military force in the war against the IS. But, the US President
immediately followed up his request with the words that the
"US should not get back into another ground war in the Middle
East - it's not in our national security interest and not
necessary for us to defeat ISIL.”

In this way, by means of the official adoption of the
“Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant,” Barack Obama appears to have, once
and for all, ended the discussion on the issue of
boots-on-the-ground. About a fortnight later then, Turkey's 'Shah
Firat' operation conclusively proves that other actors are
equally able to provide the men and firepower necessary to
initiate a ground war in Syria, either directed against the Assad
regime in Damascus or its Islamist opposition, spearheaded by the
IS. The ‘Prez’, Erdogan and his PM have thus made a convincing
case for allowing other interested parties to intervene
militarily if necessary, within the three-year period stipulated
in the joint resolution. The training program in Kırsehir is
part-and-parcel of Obama's expansion of the war effort, with
three more sites about to be finalized in Jordan, Qatar and Saudi
Arabia.

Election fever 2015

Quite apart from Turkey's active role next door in Syria, it
could also be argued that the AKP-led government in some ways
also had the 'Shah Firat' operation realized for the benefit of
Turkey's Kurdish audience. In the immediate aftermath of the
lifting of Kobani's siege, the ‘Prez’ declared publicly that the
establishment of an independent Kurdish area in northern Syria
was not a desired outcome for Turkey, thereby signaling Ankara's
continued distrust of the PYD as the PKK's Syrian arm and thus
also arguably further alienating Turkey's Kurds. But now, one
could argue that on a symbolic level, relocating of tomb of
Suleyman Shah to a spot under the direct control of the PYD is
very much a goodwill gesture towards Turkey's Kurdish minority, a
minority that has over the past years received a definite moral
if not outright political boost from the establishment of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (or KRG) in Northern Iraq. The mere
fact that the AKP has established commercial ties with the KRG,
ensuring the ready flow of oil and gas into Turkey has also
proven to be a shot in the arm for Turkey's Kurds.

The ‘Prez’ and his PM Davutoglu have now clearly taken Turkey
down a post-Kemalist route, and the medium to long-term
goals of the AKP government seem an incongruity with Kurdish
demands for greater autonomy and recognition. As I outlined some time ago, the "de-construction of
the Anatolian Turks into Anatolia’s Muslims of different ethnic
strip united under a Muslim and/or possible Neo- or
Pseudo-Ottoman banner" now appears to have gotten underway
in earnest, but before such lofty goals can be attained the
‘Prez’ and his party will need to gain a convincing victory in
this year's electoral contest, set for 7 June. Then Turkish
voters will elect 550 new members to the Grand National Assembly
or parliament.

Ever since his election to the presidential office, Tayyip
Erdogan has been touring the country delivering speeches which
appear to be in breach of his supposed supra-political role as
the nation's President. Instead, he appears to be attempting to
convince his audiences to cast their ballots in favor of the
ruling AKP. And, for the AKP to gain a secure victory in June the
support of the country's Kurds, constituting about 20 percent of
the total population, would appear to be crucial. The AKP has
been overseeing a peace process with the Kurds that is now
apparently approaching its final conclusion. And as a kind of
illustration of the importance of the Kurdish vote for the ruling
AKP, the extremely popular singer of Arabesk songs Ibrahim
Tatlıses (popularly known as Ibo), who is of Kurdish origin and
whose support for the PKK has in the past caused quite some
controversy, just a few days ago announced his intentions to run
for office in his native Sanlıurfa, as a candidate for the AKP.

Will placing Suleyman Shah under Kurdish tutelage and Ibo's
candidacy suffice to sway Turkey's Kurds and make them vote for
the AKP in the upcoming elections? Or will Turkey instead simply
be called upon to do Obama's dirty work in Syria? And will the
‘Prez’ and the PM succeed in their post-Kemalist designs and
transform Turkey beyond recognition in the years to come,
accommodating Turks, Kurds, and other ethnicities inside a
pseudo-Ottoman realm in Anatolia?

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.