Fear of What’s Next in Syria Makes Russia’s Help Unlikely

Sharmine Narwani, a writer and political analyst covering the Middle East, is a senior associate at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and a writer for Al Akhbar English. She is on Twitter.

Updated March 31, 2015, 5:29 PM

When we look back at Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya this past year, we have to ask whether the premise of “dictator leaves, problem solved” is remotely valid.

It is a key reason why Russia has little incentive to relinquish support of its longtime ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Russian position was entirely evident during the recent Putin-Obama meeting when the question of Assad’s removal came up.

“Then what?” Putin is said to have responded.

Russia recognizes the dangers of militarization and foreign intervention and as armed conflict escalates, its motivation to help oust Assad will be further reduced, not encouraged.

Aside from Russia’s own strategic alliance with Syria, it has several urgent concerns. First, the Russian position is tied to that of the other BRICs -- the economic-political powerhouses Brazil, India and China -- who have resolved to redress a global imbalance of power. Syria has become a frontline state in this effort. The BRIC nations have insisted that Syrians should resolve their crisis with minimal intervention, which precludes forcing regime change from the outside.

Second, the external parties that are demanding Assad's ouster are the same handful of interventionists that brought us chaos in Libya under the cloak of humanitarian intervention. The Russians deeply regret having signed on to the Security Council resolution that enabled the unraveling of Libya, and will go to great lengths to prevent the same scenario in Syria.

Third, the creeping influence of Salafist oppositionists and even foreign jihadists is of concern to the Russians, who recall their own experience with these elements in Afghanistan, and worry about the potential spillover into their own Muslim communities if Syria implodes.

But while the Russians have been deliberately vague on their support for Assad himself, today they are unlikely to undermine him primarily because of the unpredictability of “what comes next.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton understood this reality when she said in June, “We are approached on a regular basis by representatives of different groups within Syria who are terrified of what comes next.”

Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the conflict in Syria is “a difficult internal problem which has not assumed huge proportions yet” and cautions against turning this into “a global problem.”

And here’s why: After 15 months of crisis and spin we have yet to see the emergence of a viable domestic or external-based Syrian opposition that offers a detailed political roadmap. Without a plausible alternative to Assad, Syria could quickly crumble into a failed state with broad spillover into the region and beyond.

The Russians are keenly touting the United Nations’ Annan Plan as the “only game in town.” They argue that Syria needs an urgent de-escalation in violence -- under the watch of U.N. monitors -- followed closely by a genuine process of political reconciliation, at the end of which Syrians can decide on the fate of their president.

Russia recognizes the dangers of militarization and foreign intervention, and seeks to preserve the "homegrown solution" option. And as armed conflict escalates, its motivation to help oust Assad will be further reduced, not encouraged.

Assad’s removal is not on Russia’s mind today -- its warships in Syrian waters make that clear. Russia has learned the hard way that forced regime change is not the solution -- it is usually the start of something much worse. Think Libya. Think Afghanistan. Russians have learned from those lessons.