Cohen is
America’s leading expert on South Asia. What he says in this book, which came
out in 2004, is still relevant to the quandary facing Pakistan today.

Stating that
early on Pakistan fell into the grip of an oligarchy comprising the army, the
civil service, and the feudal lords, Cohen reminds us that Aristotle regarded
oligarchy as the evil twin of aristocracy.

While Jinnah’s
vision for Pakistan was that of a secular state, Iqbal’s vision was suffused
with religious overtones. Over time, the tension between these two visions
was exploited by various groups to push their own agenda.

Governor-General
Ghulam Muhammad, a former civil servant, deposed the democratically-elected
prime minister in 1953, striking the first of many mortal blows on democracy.
He acted in connivance with the army chief General Ayub Khan. The US looked the
other way, anxious to enlist Pakistan into the Cold War.

In 1954, the US
provided Pakistan hardware and munitions to raise five-and-a-half army
divisions and ten air force squadrons. This strengthened the position of the
army-dominated military in the political establishment, and led to Ayub’s coup
in 1958. Three more coups would occur as history unfolded.

Cohen presents three
conflicting visions for the future of Pakistan: a state for the Muslims of
South Asia, an Islamic state, and a democratic state.

The first vision
fell apart in 1971 with the secession of East Pakistan. At partition in 1947,
Pakistan accounted for two-thirds of the Muslims in South Asia. Now it accounts
for only one-thirds, negating the main tenet of the two-nation theory.

Of course, this
has not bothered the ideologues from calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Cohen
rightfully says that the relentless pursuit of Kashmir has done more damage to
Pakistan than any other single issue. Elsewhere, he has argued that Kashmir is
just a symptom of a bigger problem between the two siblings.

Over time, “Pakistan has adapted to
changing strategic circumstances,” Cohen observes, “by ‘renting’ itself out to
powerful states,” such as the US, Saudi Arabia and now China. This strategy has
not yielded
any clear benefits to Pakistan

Recognising
the disparity in conventional forces, Pakistan has adopted the strategy of
waging a covert war in Kashmir, in addition to building nuclear weapons. It has
armed, trained and funded guerillas that operate in Kashmir as ‘freedom
fighters.’

Since the
Afghan-Soviet war ended in 1989, these groups have embraced the use of terror
for political gains and have even attacked targets in India. Cohen traces their
terrorist ideology to Maudoodi’s writings, but this appears to be a weak
inference since the latter never supported terrorism.

The second
vision is that of an Islamic state. There is no unique interpretation of
an Islamic state, since there are numerous sects and sub-sects within the
Islamic faith. The pursuit of this vision is fraught with danger since any
brand of Islam that comes into power would seek to impose itself over the
others.

The third vision
is that of a democratic state. Such a state would provide civil and
human rights to the citizens. A democratically-elected government would
determine national security strategy and defense policy. The army would not
determine who would be elected to public office. That would appear to be the
ideal end-state. But it is doubtful whether the Pakistani military with its
oversized political agenda will ever let this vision come to pass.

Cohen rightfully
critiques militarism and describes how it has harmed national security. The
army, at 600,000, is 50 percent greater in size than it was during the 1971
war, when half of the country was lost. By diverting resources from social,
political and economic development, it has compromised national security, a
fact acknowledged by the Abbottabad Commission.

Ironically, the
West has often supported militarism in Pakistan. Samuel Huntington of Harvard
called Field Marshal Ayub Khan a Solon after the great Athenian lawgiver. Nixon
praised General Yahya for giving him the opening to China. Reagan and Thatcher
praised General Zia for being a bulwark of freedom against the USSR. Bush
praised General Musharraf for his role in the war on terror.

Over time, “Pakistan
has adapted to changing strategic circumstances,” Cohen observes, “by ‘renting’
itself out to powerful states,” such as the US, Saudi Arabia and now China.
This strategy has not yielded any clear benefits to Pakistan.

Cohen presents six
scenarios of the future: (1) continuation of the status quo, which involves
rule by the oligarchy, now known as the Establishment, (2) liberal, secular
democracy, (3) soft authoritarianism, (4) an Islamist state, (5) divided
Pakistan and (6) postwar Pakistan.

These scenarios,
while intuitively plausible, represent Cohen’s personal opinions. They lack the
rigor that would have come from using cross-impact matrices of driving factors
or a Delphi process involving multiple experts. He also seems to assign
probabilities to the scenarios but the methodology is unclear.

He notes that
American policy toward Pakistan has always given short-term gains priority over
long-term concerns. This is no longer feasible, since ignoring the long term
could have grave consequences.

While discussing
the ebb and flow of the tide in American-Pakistani ties, Cohen does not explore
the reasons why the tide has always been at a flood when a Republican
administration has been in power in the White House and a military dictatorship
in Islamabad and at ebb otherwise.

Currently,
terrorism has zoomed to the top of the American agenda but it needs to be given
a long- term preventive quality, not just a short-term military quality. He
says the US should incent the government of Pakistan to increase the share of
its expenditures that go for education, especially primary education, by
reducing military aid if a minimum amount is not spent on education.

In Cohen’s view,
the army remains the biggest threat to democracy in Pakistan, not corrupt
politicians. Elsewhere, he has called it the largest political party. Even when
it is not in power, it has unlimited access to the government’s budgetary and
foreign exchange resources and dominates the nation’s foreign policy. These
points are amplified in Aqil Shah’s book, Army and Democracy, which
is also a great read.

The Idea of
Pakistan covers a
lot of ground. However, by the time one gets to the end, many questions remain
unanswered. For example, Cohen says the Pakistani army is long on memory and
short on foresight, but he does not discuss why that is the case or whether it
will ever change. In addition, by presenting a scenario where the oligarchy
continues to rule as the most probable scenario, he seems to be endorsing
Pakistan’s recidivist militarism. He says it is improbable that liberal
democracy will take hold in Pakistan. Just a couple of decades ago, the same
had been said of Latin American and Eastern Europe where democracy is now
widespread.

The book’s
implicit hypothesis is that Pakistan’s insecurities have led to military rule.
But why is that not true of India, since it has security problems with Pakistan
and China, and has to contend with numerous separatist movements?

Cohen does not
rely on surveys or polls to enrich his analysis, nor does he provide a
cross-country comparison. Despite all these limitations, the book is a classic
and a must-read.

The writer
has written “Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan.” He can
be reached at ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com

About Me

Dr Shabir Choudhry has done extensive research on the issue of Kashmir and Indo Pakistan relations. He passed BA Honours in Politics and History, and Mphil in International Relations (title of the thesis, ‘Kashmir and Partition of India’); and title of his PhD thesis is ‘Kashmir- An issue of a nation not a dispute of a land’.

Apart from this Dr Shabir Choudhry passed Post Graduates Certificates in Education, and NVQ Assessor’s qualifications; and taught English in London.

Political Achievements

Founder member of JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front established in 1977) and got elected as a Press Secretary in 1984.

Became its Secretary General in 1985, and resigned from this post in 1996.

Got elected President of JKLF and Europe in May 1999, and decided not to contest in elections of July 2001.

Said good - bye to the JKLF as it is in many groups and is largely seen as advancing a Pakistani agenda on Kashmir dispute, and set up a new party Kashmir National Party in May 2008.

.

At present, he is:

·Spokesman Kashmir National Party and Director Diplomatic Committee;

·Spokesman for International KashmirAlliance;

·Founder member and Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs;

Previously

·A founder Member and Trustee/ Director of London based registered charity, Kashmir Foundation International and resigned from this position in August 2001.

·Regularly take part in the Sessions of the UN Human Rights (Commission) now Council in Geneva; and address various conferences and seminars to oppose violence and highlight the Kashmir cause.

·Participated in a Round Table Conference on Kashmir, organised by Socialist Group of European Parliament in Brussels in 1993.

·Addressed as a Chief Guest in a seminar on issue of Mangla Dam during the UN Sub Commission’s proceedings in August 2003.

·Addressed as a key - note speaker in a seminar on the issue of Gilgit and Baltistan, organised by Association of British Kashmiris.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker on human rights conference in Paris in 1991.

·Addressed at CambridgeUniversity as a Chief Guest in a conference on Kashmir in 1990.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker at New Delhi conference on Kashmir, which was part of Track Two diplomacy in November 2000.

·In September 2008, addressed a Conference arranged by Interfaith International in Geneva, topic of which was:“Kashmir Issue, Terrorism and Human Rights”.

·Addressed as a speaker in a NGO Conference on Self - Determination in Geneva in August 2000.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker in a fringe meeting of Liberal Democrats at their Annual Conference in Brighton in 1995.

·Participated in World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993.

·Before President Clinton's visit to India and Pakistan in 2000, lead a JKLF delegation to the State Department to discuss Kashmir dispute and situation in South Asia.

·Also had two rounds of meetings with senior State Department officials before President Musharraf’s meeting to Washington in June 2003.

·Apart from that had meetings with senior officials including Ministers of different countries, and also held many meetings with the State Department and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials on number of occasions.

·Played important role in advancing a Kashmiri perspective on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir; and also helped Baroness Emma Nicholson with her report ‘Kashmir: present situation and future prospects’, which was adopted by the European Parliament in May 2007.

·Won first prize in an essay competition in Urdu in 1976. It was organised by High Commission of Pakistan in London, and title of the essay was 'Qaaid-e- Azam's role in Islamic History'.

·Apart from that have addressed conferences in Brussels, Geneva, Toronto, Islamabad, Delhi, and

Publications

·Got first Urdu novel ‘Fareena’ published at the age of eighteen.

·Second Urdu novel ‘Bay-Khataa’ which was about the problems of Asian youths living in UK published in 1983.

·Third Urdu book ‘Pakistan and Kashmiri struggle for independence’ published in 1990.

·Fourth Urdu book is also on Kashmiri struggle, 'Is an independent Kashmir a conspiracy?'

·Apart from that has twenty books and booklets published in English on various aspects of the Kashmiri struggle.

·Recent publications are: Kashmir dispute as I see it

·Different perspective on Kashmir

·JKLF visit to Pakistan Administered Kashmir

·Kashmir Needs Change of Heart

·If not self - determination then what?

·Emma Nicholson report- who has won?

·Struggle for independence, Jihad or proxy war (Introduction by Baroness Emma Nicholson)

·

Future publications

Following books were completed some time ago and shall be published in near future:

In Search of Freedom - My visit to Srinagar and Islamabad

Kashmir and Partition of India

A brief background

Dr Shabir Choudhry was born in a small village called Nakker Shimali (near Panjeri) in District Bhimber, Azad Kashmir. He went to UK in 1966, and like other people from the region, holds a dual nationality. He left secondary school in 1970 with no qualifications and began his life as a textile worker.

In 1975 he started part time studies and passed Matriculation from Government High School Panjeri, passed ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels from UK, and resumed full time degree course in 1981, and passed BA (Hons) in Politics and History in 1984.

He continued full time and part time jobs until he got his Mphil. He passed his PGCE (Post Graduates Certificate in Education) in 1990, and then started full time job as a Lecturer. Due to health problems he resigned from teaching in 1999. At present he is self - employed, provides private tuition, translation and interpretation and consultancy.

Through out his adult life he has actively worked for the cause of Kashmir, and even during long illness he effectively carried out his responsibilities as a leader of the JKLF, a ‘prolific writer’ and consistent campaigner of Rights Movement and peace in Jammu and Kashmir and South Asia.