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S E C R E T KUWAIT 001096
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/I, DHS FOR TOM WARRICK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2018
TAGS: PRELPGOVPTERCVISKU
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF DHS API/PNR PROGRAM RAISES
PRIVACY CONCERNS FOR GOK OFFICIALS
REF: A. WARRICK/JONES EMAIL DATED OCTOBER 11
¶B. 2008
¶C. KUWAIT 991
¶D. KUWAIT 1022
¶E. KUWAIT 1075
Classified By: A/DCM OLIVER JOHN FOR REASONS 1.4 b, d
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In follow-up to discussions held between
Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff and the Kuwaiti Prime
Minister held September 19, 2008, between, Homeland Security
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy Thomas
Warrick and accompanying delegation from DHS met with GoK
officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
Interior MOI National Security Bureau (NSB) and Kuwait State
Security (KSS) to discuss a proposed classified DHS program
to establish a legal framework and technical system for the
real-time acquisition and sharing of Advance Passenger
Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. DAS
Warrick highlighted Secretary Chertoff's commitment to
increasing counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information
sharing that would benefit both countries. The Kuwaitis
agreed that the API/PNR system would provide better
intelligence collection and linkage of known/unknown
terrorists entering/exiting Kuwait, but expressed
reservations about providing the United States with private
data on Kuwaiti citizens. GoK officials also pointed out
that domestic legal and political considerations would be
significant obstacles, but both Kuwait State Security held
and the NSB held out the possibility of providing data, on a
classified basis, for non-Kuwaitis. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) On October 20-21, 2008 DHS Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy Thomas Warrick and an
accompanying DHS delegation met separately with Deputy
Director of Kuwait's National Security Bureau, Shaykh Thamer
Al-Ali Al Sabah, Director, Follow-Up and Coordination
Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Khaled
Mohammed Al-Maqamis; Director of Kuwait State Security (KSS)
General Sulayman Muhaylan; and Director of Engineering,
Kuwait Civil Aviation, Sami Al-Hulaibi to propose
establishing a program for the real-time acquisition and
sharing of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data. DAS Warrick stressed that this initiative
had the blessings of both DHS Secretary Chertoff and Kuwaiti
Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al Sabah, and
briefed GoK officials on the prospective advantages to joint
U.S./Kuwait security that could be derived from participation
in the API/PNR program. These included obtaining access to
constantly updated data from airline records that would,
potentially, permit both countries to identify possible
terrorist or criminal threats.
¶3. (S/NF) Warrick noted that, additionally, the PNR portion
of the program would provide CT officials in both countries
access to data (e.g. telephone, email travel itinerary and
credit card information) that could expand information about
known persons of concern and broaden the scope of information
on these individuals to include other persons and entities of
interest with whom the target individuals may be in contact.
Information available from API/PNR, he noted, is much more
extensive than that Kuwait presently accesses through its
current APP (Computer-assisted) passenger pre-screening)
system Warrick noted that the European Union, after
resolving some initial privacy concerns, had announced it was
implementing an API/PNR-type system. Underscoring the
benefits to Kuwait of participation in API/PNR, Warrick told
GoK officials that an MOU would permit the USG to identify to
the GOK persons of concern through existing channels and
relationships for sharing information, and that armed with
this information, the GOK could either monitor such persons
or deny them entry.
-----------------------
GoK Says Sharing API/PNR Data on Kuwaitis Poses Domestic and
Legal Obstacles
-----------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Shaykh Thamer expressed several reservations
about providing the USG data on Kuwaiti citizens, chiefly
privacy concerns. Thamer pointed out that he, personally,
would be very uncomfortable knowing that the USG or other
agencies had access to his personal travel itinerary, credit
card information or other personal data and that similar
objections from many members of Parliament -- especially from
those who have Hezbollah or Islamist connections -- would
constitute a severe political legal obstacle to acceptance of
such a program. Speaking candidly, Thamer also stated that
he had concerns over a perceived disinclination on the part
of the USG to cooperate in the sharing of CT-related
information. He asserted that the GOK has appealed to the
USG for the rationale behind the U.S. Treasury's designation
of the Kuwait-based Revival of the Islamic Heritage Society
(RIHS) but had received nothing in response. Thamer
indicated that the USG,s non-cooperation on RIHS did not
encourage the GOK to sign on to API/PNR. Thamer also noted
that Kuwait,s constitution limits the government,s ability
to collect data of the kind proposed under API/PNR and that
changing this was difficult given current political
realities. Thamer suggested, as an alternative, that the USG
examine the possibility of going through the UNSC to obtain a
mandate for the exchange of information akin to that
contemplated under API/PNR; such a step would ease the way
for the GOK to work through its domestic legal underbrush.
¶5. (S/NF) In response, Warrick noted that DHS has taken
great pains to ensure that privacy concerns were protected
and that only persons of real CT or criminal concern are
tapped by the program. The system, he noted, significantly
expands the capacities of participating countries to protect
themselves from terrorists or criminals beyond what is
available at present from API or simple visa checking
processes. While acknowledging Thamer,s concerns and
expressing a willingness to explore these further, Warrick
emphasized the USG,s strong interest in developing a DHS/NSB
relationship. Turning to the subject of legal obstacles,
Warrick also urged Thamer to explore whether, as has been
done in other countries, simple administrative procedures and
regulations -- such as the ones the GOK presently uses to
obtain APP data -- might be utilized to enhance cooperation
without the need for new legislation. Thamer took this on
board but was non-commital.
---------------------
CT Cooperation A Major Concern for the GoK
---------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The Director of MFA's Follow-up and Coordination
Department, Ambassador Maqamis was receptive to the
information presented by DAS Warrick, pointing out that the
GoK is on the same side when it comes to fighting terrorism.
He was chiefly concerned with the technical aspects of the
system, noting that he was familiar with the operating system
already in place (Note: GoK currently operates under the APP
system which links directly with SITA (an information
technology company based in Geneva with facilities in the
U.S. that handles an extensive communication network for
government agencies and air transport companies) and asked
whether DHS would provide the necessary technical assistance
to implement a new system. He also requested a written
version of the technical aspects of the system, as well as a
copy of the proposed MOI, to present to officials in the GoK
for further discussion.
¶7. (S/NF) Warrick said a team from DHS would provide
technical assistance and answer any questions for the GoK.
He added that the proposed Memorandum of Intent had been sent
to Kuwait's Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Salem
Al-Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah and would be provided to the
GoK. Maqamis said he would request a copy from Ambassador
Salem. Maqamis was also interested in how Kuwait's current
system compared to the new system. Warrick explained that
the major difference between APP and API/PNR is the greater
use to which API and PNR information can be put. It allows
the host country to make connections between criminals and
terrorists it already has knowledge of, and previously
unknown associates, through exchange of information i.e.
credit card, telephone, and travel companions. Maqamis was
receptive to the system adding that it was a very positive
and advanced step regarding the exchange of information.
-------------------------
Kuwaiti Citizens Privacy A Sensitive Subject to KSS
-------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Kuwait's State Security (KSS) Director General
Sulayman Muhaylan provided DAS Warrick with a general
overview of the obstacles that KSS has faced over the past
two years following Kuwait's implementation of APP. He noted
that for certain companies and institutions, in the past GoK
allowed the entry of foreign nationals without receiving the
approval of KSS, making it difficult for KSS to know who was
entering/exiting the country. General Muhaylan boasted that
he had succeeded in taking control of this issue mostly
through a direct line of communication with Kuwait Civil
Aviation (KCIA). Muhaylan cautioned that the sharing of
private information on Kuwaiti citizens with the U.S.
Government was a sensitive issue. He also noted that such a
program, given the privacy issues, would be rejected by
Parliament.
¶9. (S/NF) On the other hand, he said KSS is very interested
in collecting information on non-Kuwaitis, and that this
would not be a concern since only Kuwaiti privacy was
protected under Kuwaiti law. Muhaylan said the Kuwaitis were
proposing to establish a committee to discuss the sharing of
information, to include implementation of the proposed
API/PNR system, noting that in order to establish the
committee it would have to be approved by the Minister of
Interior. Muhaylan said he would recommend the committee
discuss implementation of API/PNR, data collection concerns,
exchange of information and legal concerns. Once the
committee was formed, he asked if DHS would provide a
technical team to answer questions and provide explanations
to the committee. Finally, he stressed that KSS is not the
final authority to approve the API/PNR; while KSS would
support any cooperation with the U.S. and is very open with
U.S. intelligence agencies, privacy is a very sensitive issue
in the Gulf Region.
¶10. (S/NF) Warrick asked Muhaylan about establishing a
working group to discuss all aspects of API/PNR and to sort
out legal and other concerns. Warrick asked Muhaylan what
specific provisions of Kuwaiti law governed privacy issues,
but Muhaylan did not identify any specific provisions of
Kuwaiti law, nor did he take Warrick up on an invitation to
have lawyers sit together so the USG could better understand
Kuwaiti law on this subject. Warrick stressed that the
exchange of information between GoK and USG would provide
intelligence information that would benefit both countries
and make Kuwait aware of people about whom they should be
concerned but were aware. In regard to legal concerns
pertaining to Kuwaiti citizens, he asked if the GoK would be
receptive to moving forward with API/PNR implementation were
it to collect information only on non-Kuwaitis. The General
responded by stating that, "in regards to non-Kuwaitis, KSS
is very open to an exchange of information."
------------------------------
Regional Implementation Would Benefit All GCC Countries
------------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) During their October 21 meeting at Kuwait
International Airport, KCIA Engineering Director, Sami
Al-Hulaibi told DAS Warrick that he was pleased with the
benefits of the current APP system and welcomed any
improvements to the system, adding that he would like to see
such a system implemented globally. He noted that 19 of 43
airlines are currently cooperating with KCIA (including Iran
Air) in providing required information and expects more to
come on board in the near future. Warrick asked why all
airlines were not complying with the APP requirements, to
which Al-Hulaibi replied that the problem is the lack of
Kuwaiti law requiring compliance or providing penalties for
non-compliance. He stressed that the Memorandum of Intent
which had overall security responsibility for the country,
should require compliance from all airlines. (Note:
Al-Hulaibi said following Chertoff's meetings with the Prime
Minister, he has seen more cooperation from the MOI End
note.) He also stressed that unless all countries in the
region implement the same system, API/PNR would not benefit
Kuwait, pointing out that some regional airports lack the
required infrastructure and technology.
¶12. (S/NF) Warrick asked how KCIA was able to secure
legislation to implement the use of APP at Kuwait
International Airport and whether the same approach might be
used to implement API/PNR. Al-Hulaibi explained that the
Higher Council of Aviation, which includes the President of
DGCA, Minister of Commerce and the Undersecretary Ministry of
Interior, agreed a system was needed to increase security at
Kuwait's Airport. The Ministry of Finance financed the
project and a Directive was sent to KCIA requiring
implementation of APP. Expressing concern over privacy
information and legislative issues, Al-Hulaibi said getting
the approval for sharing API/PNR information with the U.S.
Government would be an obstacle.
¶13. (S/NF) Comment: The Kuwaitis were clearly offering up a
coordinated interagency position that they could not or would
not provide the USG with API/PNR data on Kuwaiti citizens.
The GOK is unwilling to have this become yet another
flashpoint in relations with the Kuwaiti Parliament. KSS did
not claim a legal problem with collecting API/PNR data on
their own citizens. Thus, it remains to be explored whether
the Kuwaitis would agree to accept DHS assistance to set up
an API/PNR program that would give API/PNR data on
non-Kuwaiti citizens to the USG. End comment.
¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Tom Warrick
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
JONES