This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-489
entitled 'Nuclear Safety: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by
Most Member Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide' which was
released on June 1, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Nuclear Safety:
Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by Most Member Countries as
Strengthening Safety Worldwide:
GAO-10-489:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-489, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Currently, 437 civilian nuclear power reactors are operating in 29
countries, and 56 more are under construction. After the Chernobyl
accident, representatives of over 50 nations, including the United
States, participated in the development of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, a treaty that seeks to promote the safety of civilian nuclear
power reactors. The Convention has been in force since 1996. GAO was
asked to assess (1) parties’ views on the benefits and limitations of
the Convention, (2) efforts to improve implementation of the
Convention, and (3) how International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
programs complement the Convention’s safety goals. GAO surveyed the 64
parties to the Convention for which it was in force at the time of
GAO’s review and analyzed the responses of the 32 that completed it,
analyzed relevant documents, and interviewed U.S. and foreign
officials.
What GAO Found:
The Convention on Nuclear Safety plays a useful role in strengthening
the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide, according to
most parties to the Convention that responded to GAO’s survey and
representatives of parties GAO interviewed. In particular, parties
indicated that the Convention’s obligations to (1) establish effective
legislative and regulatory frameworks and strong, independent nuclear
regulatory bodies and (2) prepare a national report every 3 years that
describes the measures the country has taken to achieve the
Convention’s nuclear safety goals, are among its most useful
contributions. The countries present their national reports at review
meetings, address questions that may arise about the reports, and
assess and ask questions about the reports of other parties. This is
known as the peer review process. Some concerns were raised about
limited public access to Convention proceedings, some countries’ lack
of resources to fully participate in the review meetings, and the
absence of performance metrics in the national reports to gauge
progress toward meeting safety goals and objectives. Half of the
parties responding to GAO’s survey stated that the lack of performance
metrics limited the usefulness of the Convention. Neither the
Department of State nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has
formally proposed the adoption of performance metrics. However, NRC
officials told GAO that performance metrics could be useful. In
addition, the number of parties posting their national reports to
IAEA’s public Web site has declined since 2005. NRC and Department of
State officials told GAO that the United States has always made its
national report available on the Internet. However, the U.S. approach
has been to lead by example rather than taking an active role in
encouraging other parties to post their reports. Further, universal
participation would advance achievement of the Convention’s goals.
Several representatives from countries who are parties to the
Convention told GAO that Iran should ratify the Convention. In their
view, without Iran’s participation, the international community has
limited or no insight on, or access to, Iran’s civilian nuclear power
program. Russia, which is helping Iran build the nuclear reactor at
Bushehr, may condition continued assistance on Iran becoming a party
to the Convention, according to Russian officials.
The parties have taken some actions to improve the Convention’s
implementation, and more proposals are being considered. Steps have
been taken to make the process for asking questions during peer review
meetings more open and to increase the amount of time available for
preparing for the review meetings.
IAEA nuclear safety programs, which predate the Convention, complement
the Convention’s safety goals through the Technical Cooperation
program, safety standards, and peer review missions. The Technical
Cooperation program supports, among other things, the development of
nuclear power. IAEA has established nuclear safety standards and also
promotes nuclear safety through peer review missions that evaluate the
operations of a member state’s nuclear regulatory system and nuclear
power plant operational safety.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Department of State, in
coordination with NRC, work with other parties to the Convention to
encourage the use of performance metrics in national reports to track
progress toward improving safety of civilian nuclear power plants and
expand efforts to increase the number of reports posted to IAEA’s
public Web site. The Department of State generally agreed with these
recommendations. NRC generally agreed with GAO’s report but did not
specifically agree or disagree with these recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-489] or key
components. To view the survey results online, click on [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-550SP]. For more information,
contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Majority of Parties We Surveyed and Interviewed Reported That the
Convention Has Strengthened Nuclear Safety Worldwide:
Steps Have Been Taken to Improve the Convention's Peer Review Process,
and Additional Proposals Are Being Considered:
IAEA's Assistance Programs to Member States Complement the
Convention's Safety Goals and Objectives:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety:
Appendix II: Information on U.S. and European Union Funding to Promote
International Nuclear Safety:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of IRRS Missions by Country, 1992 through 2009:
Table 2: Number of OSART Missions by Country, 1983 through 2009:
Table 3: Obligations and Expenditures for DOE's Safety Assistance
Programs as of September 30, 2009:
Table 4: Obligations and Expenditures for NRC's Reactor Safety
Assistance Programs as of September 30, 2009:
Table 5: Total Nuclear Safety Budget for the Technical Assistance to
the Commonwealth of Independent States Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Number of Countries Posting National Reports on IAEA's
Public Web Site, 1999-2008:
Figure 2: Number of Countries Posting Responses to Questions Received
on Their National Reports on IAEA's Public Web Site, 1999-2008:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
ENSREG: European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group:
EU: European Union:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations:
IRRS: Integrated Regulatory Review Service:
FSA: Freedom Support Act:
NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NSCI: Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument:
OSART: Operational Safety Review Team:
SEED: Support for Eastern European Democracies:
TACIS: Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States:
TC: Technical Cooperation:
WANO: World Association of Nuclear Operators:
WENRA: Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 29, 2010:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
There are currently 437 civilian nuclear power reactors operating in
29 countries, generating about 14 percent of the world's electricity,
and 56 more nuclear power reactors are currently under construction.
The safe operation of nuclear power reactors worldwide has been a long-
standing concern of the international community. In the aftermath of
the Chernobyl accident, representatives of over 50 nations, including
the United States, participated in the development of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety (the Convention), a multilateral treaty that seeks
to strengthen the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors.[Footnote
1] Established in the mid-1990s, the Convention seeks to achieve its
safety objectives through countries' adherence to general safety
principles rather than through technical standards. Officials describe
the Convention as incentive-oriented, designed to maximize the number
of countries that will support and sign it, with the goal of making it
acceptable and useful to countries with potentially unsafe power
reactors in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet
Union. According to U.S. officials, the main purpose of the Convention
is to get these countries, as well as developing nations, to make
commitments to improve their reactors and develop a safety
culture.[Footnote 2]
Currently, 65 countries and 1 international organization are parties
to the Convention, including all countries that currently operate
civilian nuclear power reactors.[Footnote 3] For the purpose of this
report, we refer to countries that have ratified, accepted, or
approved the Convention as parties. The United States ratified the
Convention in 1999.
The Convention calls on parties to, among other things, (1) establish
and maintain a legislative framework and an independent regulatory
body to govern the safety of nuclear installations; (2) establish
procedures to ensure that technical aspects of safety, such as the
siting, design, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors,
are adequately considered; (3) maintain an acceptable level of safety
throughout the life of the installations by, for example, considering
safety to be a priority and establishing a quality assurance program;
and (4) prepare and routinely test emergency plans. The Convention
does not impose sanctions when countries do not follow these safety
principles.
Under the terms of the Convention, each country--regardless of whether
it operates nuclear power plants or not--is required to submit a
national report that identifies the measures taken to implement each
of the nuclear safety obligations contained in the Convention.
Obligations cover such points as siting, design, construction, and
operation of civilian nuclear power installations. The parties to the
Convention have also established detailed guidance to help parties
prepare their national reports. The purpose of the guidance is to
encourage parties to describe the steps they are taking to meet the
Convention's obligations and to facilitate other parties' review of
the national reports of other countries. The countries meet every 3
years in Vienna, Austria, to present their national report, address
questions that may arise about the report, and assess and ask
questions about the reports of other parties.[Footnote 4] This is
known as the peer review process, and it is considered central to the
Convention's success because it is the means by which the parties
assess the steps being taken to meet safety obligations. As part of
this peer review process, countries meet in six groups composed
primarily on the basis of the number of reactors that each country
operates. This process ensures that the six countries with the most
reactors--the United States, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and
the United Kingdom--are never in the same group. Within this
confidential group setting, all member countries have the opportunity
to examine and review what each country reports it is doing to meet
its nuclear safety obligations. These meetings are hosted by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the
Convention's secretariat and provides administrative support.[Footnote
5] To date, four review meetings have taken place, and the fifth is
scheduled for April 2011.
The Convention has taken on increased significance in recent years as
countries are either expanding their existing nuclear power capacity
or planning to establish new programs. In 2009, IAEA estimated that by
2030 the world's capacity for nuclear electricity production will
significantly increase. Most of this increase in capacity is expected
to occur in countries that have established civilian nuclear power
programs, such as China, Japan, and South Korea. China, for example,
has announced its intention to spend $50 billion to build 32 new
nuclear plants by 2020 and currently has 21 plants under construction.
Both India and Pakistan are also moving forward with plans to
significantly increase their production of nuclear power, building
plants that will more than double their production of nuclear energy
in the next decade.
In addition, countries such as Jordan and the United Arab Emirates,
which do not yet have civilian nuclear power programs, are actively
moving to build the necessary regulatory infrastructure for such
programs as they explore agreements with the world's leading nuclear
reactor vendors. The United Arab Emirates, for example, recently
signed a $20 billion agreement with a consortium of South Korean
vendors to begin construction of four 1,400-megawatt nuclear power
reactors in 2012. Other countries, such as Indonesia, Libya, Thailand,
and Vietnam, have expressed their intent to build civilian nuclear
power plants. Still others, such as Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Nigeria,
and Yemen, are considering moving forward with civilian nuclear power
programs.
To assist Congress in its deliberations in the past, we identified
some limitations of the Convention.[Footnote 6] Specifically, we noted
that (1) public access to the peer review process was unclear and (2)
the effectiveness of the peer review process was uncertain because of
concerns about how well the country groups formed for peer review
meetings would function. We also pointed out that the Convention
lacked an enforcement mechanism.
Now that the Convention has been in force for more than a decade, you
asked us to evaluate the extent to which it is achieving its primary
goal: promoting the safe operation of civilian nuclear power reactors
worldwide. Accordingly, we assessed (1) parties' views on the
perceived benefits and limitations of the Convention, (2) efforts to
improve the implementation of the Convention, and (3) how IAEA
programs complement the Convention's safety goals and objectives.
To assess parties' views on the perceived benefits and limitations of
the Convention for improving the safety of civilian nuclear power
reactors worldwide, we administered a Web-based survey--which can be
viewed at GAO-10-550SP--to 64 parties to the Convention and analyzed
the responses of the 32 that completed it.[Footnote 7] This report
does not contain all the results from the survey. To assess the
potential for nonresponse bias in our survey results, we compared
selected characteristics of nonresponding countries, such as (1)
length of time as a party to the Convention, (2) nuclear power status
and number of nuclear power plants, (3) region, (4) countries that
operate Soviet-designed reactors, and (5) European Union (EU)
membership, to those of the responding parties. The distribution of
these characteristics among responding and nonresponding parties was
well-balanced. To encourage respondents to complete the survey, we
sent an e-mail reminder to each nonrespondent about 2 weeks after our
initial e-mail message and followed up with additional e-mails and
telephone calls. Additionally, to encourage honest and open responses,
in the introduction to the survey, we pledged that we would report
information in the aggregate and not report data that could identify a
particular respondent. We also interviewed representatives of 17
nuclear and nonnuclear parties to the Convention, including officials
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of
State (State) who represent the United States at the Convention. Of
the 17 we interviewed, 9 completed the survey, and 8 did not. In
total, we obtained the views of 40 parties to the Convention. We also
analyzed various Convention-related documents from NRC and State as
well as from IAEA and the EU. To assess efforts to improve the
implementation of the Convention, we reviewed Convention documents and
interviewed NRC and State officials who have attended Convention
organizational, working group, and review meetings where such efforts
have been discussed. To assess the extent to which IAEA programs
complement the Convention's safety goals and objectives, we analyzed,
among other things, Convention minutes of meetings and rules of
procedure. We also interviewed IAEA officials, U.S. officials at the
U.S. Missions in Vienna and Brussels, and the representatives of 17
parties to the Convention. To determine the cost to the United States
to participate in the Convention and IAEA's costs to support the
Convention for one 3-year cycle, we analyzed budget information from
NRC, State, and IAEA. We also assessed the reliability of the data we
obtained and interviewed knowledgeable NRC, Department of Energy
(DOE), State, EU, and IAEA officials on the reliability of the data.
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. Appendix III explains our methodology in
greater detail.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to April 2010,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The Convention is one of a number of cooperative efforts by the
international community to improve nuclear safety worldwide and is
meant to complement these other efforts. For example, as we previously
reported, the United States and 20 other countries and international
organizations contributed $1.9 billion to improve nuclear safety in
countries operating Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.[Footnote 8] The
United States alone has spent over $770 million since the Chernobyl
accident on nuclear safety assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Armenia, and several other countries through DOE and NRC programs.
According to an agency official, DOE's nuclear safety assistance
programs have focused on physical safety enhancements to Soviet-
designed reactors, while NRC has worked to increase the capacity and
stature of recipient countries' regulatory bodies to ensure the
continuing operational safety of such reactors. In addition, a
separate fund was established to help stabilize the damaged reactor at
Chernobyl by constructing a new containment structure. As we reported,
the estimated cost of this effort was $1.2 billion as of 2007, of
which the United States pledged $203 million.[Footnote 9] Since 1991
the EU has spent over $1.9 billion on international nuclear safety
assistance. See appendix II for more information about U.S. and EU
expenditures to promote international nuclear safety. These
expenditures are not used to support the implementation of the
Convention. Matters pertaining to U.S. financial support to the
Convention are contained on page 28 of this report.
In addition to the Convention, other multilateral organizations--the
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA),[Footnote 10] the Western European Nuclear
Regulators' Association (WENRA),[Footnote 11] the European Nuclear
Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG),[Footnote 12] and the EU--are making
efforts to advance the safety of civilian nuclear power. All member or
observer countries of the NEA, WENRA, ENSREG, and the EU are also
parties to the Convention. The NEA, for example, has created several
specialized committees to facilitate exchanges of technical
information and to organize joint research projects to improve
national safety practices. WENRA works to develop common approaches to
nuclear safety among the chief nuclear regulators in Europe. ENSREG,
among other things, aims to maintain and continuously improve the
safety of nuclear installations in the EU. In June 2009, the EU
adopted a directive creating a framework for (1) maintaining and
promoting the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and its
regulation and (2) ensuring that EU member states provide a high level
of nuclear safety to protect workers and the public against radiation
from nuclear installations. This framework is based in part on IAEA
safety documents and the obligations of the Convention. EU members are
required to incorporate the directive into their national legislation
by June 2011.
Other conventions have been established to advance international
nuclear safety and are administered by IAEA's Department of Safety and
Security. Two "emergency conventions" obligate parties to provide
early notification of a nuclear accident and to render assistance in
the event of such an accident or a radiological emergency, and two
other conventions obligate parties to safely manage spent fuel and
radioactive waste and to take effective action to physically protect
nuclear material.
The Majority of Parties We Surveyed and Interviewed Reported That the
Convention Has Strengthened Nuclear Safety Worldwide:
The Convention on Nuclear Safety has played a useful role in
strengthening the safety of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide,
according to most survey respondents and representatives of parties to
the Convention we interviewed. In their view, efforts to improve
parties' nuclear regulatory capabilities and the obligation to prepare
a national report every 3 years are among the most useful
contributions the Convention has made to increased nuclear safety. In
addition, parties responded that the Convention has promoted
opportunities for communication and promoted sharing of useful
technical information about nuclear safety. According to most parties
we surveyed and interviewed, maintaining confidentiality about the
safety issues discussed was key to the success of the peer review
process. Despite the Convention's positive impacts on nuclear safety,
some parties have concerns about limited public access to the
Convention's proceedings, some parties' limited resources to fully
participate in Convention activities, and the absence of metrics to
assess progress toward meeting safety goals.
The Convention Has Strengthened Nuclear Safety by Promoting Improved
Regulatory Capabilities and Requiring National Reports:
Nearly all parties responding to our survey reported that the
Convention has been very useful or somewhat useful in helping to
strengthen nuclear safety both in their country and worldwide. In all,
these parties operate 404--or more than 92 percent--of the world's 437
operating civilian nuclear power reactors. In addition, we also
interviewed representatives from IAEA member states, nuclear
regulatory organizations, and the EU (17 in all) who expressed similar
views about the Convention. Survey respondents and parties we
interviewed identified several Convention obligations as having helped
strengthen the safety of civilian nuclear power programs. The
obligations cited most frequently were (1) establishing an effective
legislative and regulatory framework (laws and regulations) and a
strong, effective, and independent nuclear regulatory body[Footnote
13] and (2) preparing a national report every 3 years that describes
the measures the country has taken to achieve the Convention's safety
goals.
In addition, some of the 17 parties we interviewed stated that the
Convention has contributed to and promoted the independence and
effectiveness of their country's nuclear regulatory bodies. For
example, an Austrian nuclear regulator told us he thought that this
promotion of effective regulatory capacity is one of the Convention's
greatest contributions to international nuclear safety. Moreover,
representatives of China and Pakistan told us that the Convention was
influential in leading their countries to increase the independence
and effectiveness of their nuclear regulators. NRC officials expressed
a similar view, noting that parties to the Convention have taken many
steps to develop more effective laws and regulations and increase the
capacities and independence of their nuclear regulators.
The requirement to prepare a national report describing the steps
parties have taken to meet the Convention's nuclear safety obligations
also plays a large role in strengthening the safety of civilian
nuclear power programs, according to survey respondents. Almost all
survey respondents indicated that the presentation of national reports
in country groups was a very or somewhat effective way for sharing
best safety practices. Most survey respondents reported that preparing
the national report has either greatly or somewhat improved
opportunities to examine their country's civilian nuclear power
program. A number of parties we interviewed also said that this
national report has been helpful in strengthening nuclear safety
worldwide. NRC officials told us one effect of a national report is
that nuclear regulators and plant operators are forced to think about
even routine safety procedures and policies because the reports will
be scrutinized by their peers. For example, as a result of questions
raised by other parties on the national report prepared for the 2008
review meeting, the United States agreed to discuss with state
governments and NRC licensees the benefits and costs of adopting
stricter standards for protecting nuclear power plant workers and the
public from exposure to radiation.
In our survey, we also asked some additional questions about parties'
perceptions about how the peer review process affected the preparation
of the 2008 reports. Specifically, among other things, we asked how
likely parties thought reports were to include (1) comprehensive,
detailed descriptions of measures taken to strengthen safety; (2)
evidence that safety issues discussed in one review meeting were
revisited in the next meeting and that the actions taken to address
the issues were discussed in sufficient detail for parties to evaluate
whether the safety concerns had been adequately addressed; and (3)
sufficient technical detail to understand specific safety concerns. In
each case, most survey respondents indicated that they thought reports
were very or somewhat likely to include such information. We also
asked how effectively the peer review process encouraged parties to
provide detailed information in their 2008 national reports. Overall,
most survey respondents indicated that the peer review process was
very or somewhat likely to encourage parties to include detailed,
comprehensive, and accurate information in their national reports.
According to Parties We Surveyed and Interviewed, the Convention Has
Also Improved Communication and Promoted Sharing of Technical
Information about Nuclear Safety Issues:
According to both survey respondents and parties we interviewed, the
Convention has increased communication and encouraged the sharing of
technical information to improve nuclear safety worldwide. There was
wide agreement among the survey respondents that the Convention has
improved communication among nuclear regulators; nuclear power plant
operators; and other national organizations involved in the civilian
nuclear power industry, such as, in the case of the United States, the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).[Footnote 14] More than
half of the respondents to our survey indicated the Convention had
"greatly" improved communication about safety issues affecting
civilian nuclear power reactors. Most respondents to our survey agreed
that the Convention had improved opportunities for sharing technical
solutions to improve safety, such as reactor design improvements or
fire safety enhancements. Russian and Ukrainian officials we spoke to
provided examples of how the Convention has led to the sharing of
nuclear safety information. Following are some examples:
* Russian nuclear regulatory officials told us that the Convention has
played a useful role in promoting technical solutions to problems
shared by countries operating similar types of reactors. Specifically,
Russia and Finland have been developing a system to improve
communication between their plant operators based on discussions that
began with contacts made at Convention review meetings.
* A Ukrainian official told us his country's participation in the
Convention has increased other countries' awareness of the safety
problems confronting Ukraine's aging Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
He further noted that the Convention is one of many forums that
Ukraine participates in that supports the strengthening of nuclear
safety.
Confidentiality among the Parties to the Convention Has Been Key to
the Success of the Peer Review Process:
According to most parties we surveyed and interviewed, maintaining the
confidentiality of information obtained during the Convention's
meetings is critical to the peer review process. Most party
representatives we spoke with agree that confidentiality should be
preserved. For example, when asked if the public should be allowed to
directly observe review meetings--and thereby gain direct access to a
party's national report and any concerns or questions raised about it
by other parties--approximately two-thirds of survey respondents said
the public probably or definitely should not be given such access.
Some parties we interviewed told us that, as a result of the
confidentiality of the peer review process, their country's national
reports have become more comprehensive. Three-quarters of survey
respondents indicated that the quality of national reports prepared
for review meetings had improved in the past 10 years.
Concerns Exist about Some Aspects of the Convention's Implementation:
While the parties' perceptions of the value of the Convention are
generally very positive, some concerns were raised about the lack of
information provided to the general public about the Convention's
proceedings, some countries' lack of resources to fully participate in
the review meetings, and the absence of performance metrics. In
addition, parties emphasize that without the participation of all
countries with nuclear power programs in the Convention, the
international community will have limited access and insight into
countries'--such as Iran--civilian nuclear power programs.
Limited Public Access to the Convention's Proceedings:
Notwithstanding the general agreement that preserving the
confidentiality of the peer review process is important, most parties
responding to our survey would like to see more public access to the
results of review meetings. We have testified that, according to some
experts familiar with international agreements that rely primarily on
peer review, the public dissemination of information about parties'
progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in
influencing compliance with the Convention's nuclear safety
obligations.[Footnote 15] Currently, only summary information of the
peer review meeting is released to the public. This summary provides a
brief introduction containing background on the Convention, an
overview of the review process, and a synopsis of what the parties
agree were the most important points discussed at the meeting. For
example, the public report on the fourth review meeting, which took
place in 2008, briefly summarizes the discussions of the parties on
many topics discussed at the meeting, including parties' efforts to
meet the challenges of maintaining adequate staffing and competence
levels and ongoing concerns about the degree of independence of some
parties' regulatory bodies. Any further details about any party's
national report or questions and answers on the report remain
confidential unless the party voluntarily releases it.
French officials in particular have expressed an especially strong
view regarding public access to information about the Convention's
proceedings. In July 2009, in written responses to our questions,
French officials stated that parties to the Convention should consider
making the opening and closing sessions of review meetings open to the
media. Further, a Norwegian official we spoke with suggested that some
nongovernmental organizations should be allowed to attend review
meetings as observers.
One way that some parties have attempted to increase public access to
the Convention's proceedings is by posting their national reports and
answers to written questions received on their national reports to
IAEA's public Web site. While the number of parties to the Convention
making their national reports available in this way has increased
since the first review meeting was held in 1999, it has not increased
significantly in several years and actually declined between the third
review meeting in 2005 and the fourth review meeting in 2008.
Specifically, 26 parties--about 43 percent of the 60 parties for whom
the Convention had come into force by the due date for submitting the
national report--posted their national report prepared for the 2008
review meeting. This was down from the 30 parties--or about 55 percent
of parties to the Convention--posting reports prepared for the 2005
review meeting. In fact, eight countries that posted their national
reports prepared for the 2005 review meeting--Argentina, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and South Korea-
-did not do so for the report prepared for the 2008 review meeting.
However, three parties posted their national reports for the first
time in 2008--Estonia and India, which had recently become parties to
the Convention, and Pakistan, which became a party in the 1990s.
Figure 1 shows the number of countries that posted their national
reports to the IAEA public Web site for the four review meetings held
thus far.
Figure 1: Number of Countries Posting National Reports on IAEA's
Public Web Site, 1999-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Review meeting: First: 1999; n=46;
Number of countries: 23.
Review meeting: Second: 2002; n=53;
Number of countries: 28.
Review meeting: Third: 2005; n=55;
Number of countries: 30.
Review meeting: Fourth; 2008; n=60;
Number of countries: 28.
Source: GAO analysis based on IAEA data.
Note: This figure, with n = the number of parties that were obligated
to submit a national report for that review meeting, includes national
reports from all parties to the Convention that submitted them,
regardless of their nuclear power status. All parties to the
Convention are required to submit a national report for peer review.
Parties that do not operate nuclear power plants, such as Austria,
submit reports focusing, among other things, on the steps they have
taken to prepare and test emergency plans to deal with an accident in
a neighboring country that operate a nuclear power plant. Other
nonnuclear countries may be considering establishing nuclear power
programs and it is important for them to provide information in their
national reports about the steps they are taking to meet the
Convention's obligations including, for example, reactor design and
siting requirements.
[End of figure]
Officials from NRC and State told us that the United States has always
made its national report available on the Internet. However, the U.S.
approach has been to lead by example rather than taking an active role
in encouraging other parties to the Convention to post their national
reports to the Internet. IAEA officials told us it was important for
parties to make as much information about their civilian nuclear power
programs accessible as possible, but that it was for each party to
determine how much information should be made public and how much
should remain confidential. In addition to its public Web site, IAEA
also maintains a secure, members-only Web site where parties are
encouraged to post their national reports. According to NRC officials,
parties have improved their participation in posting their reports to
this Web site. Parties posted 17, 22, 57, and 61 national reports in
1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008, respectively.
The overwhelming majority of parties have never posted their answers
to written questions about their nuclear power programs to the IAEA
public Web site. The written questions and answers provide a great
deal of information about each country's nuclear power program.
According to an IAEA official, over 4,000 questions were prepared for
the 2008 review meeting, and almost all were answered. As figure 2
shows, 3 countries posted these questions and answers to the IAEA
public Web site for the first review meeting in 1999. While 11
countries posted questions and their answers to the IAEA's public Web
site for the second review meeting, including the United States, 6 did
so for the third review meeting, and 5 did so for the 2008 meeting.
Only Slovenia and Switzerland--both nuclear power countries--have
posted these questions and answers for all four meetings; the United
Kingdom and Canada--the sixth and eighth largest nuclear power
countries as measured by the number of operating reactors,
respectively--have done so since 2002. The United States had not
posted its answers to written questions received on its national
report to IAEA's public Web site since 2002, although NRC officials
stated that they have always posted them to the NRC Web site. We also
found that other nuclear power countries such as Finland, Germany,
Japan, and Spain have not posted their answers to written questions to
the IAEA's public Web site since 2002, either. In 2008, Luxembourg
became the first, and thus far only, nonnuclear party to post the
answers to questions it received on its national report. Luxembourg's
responses focused primarily on how it would respond to a nuclear
accident in a neighboring country.
We met with NRC officials on March 15, 2010, to discuss an early draft
of this report. At that time, we informed them that their answers to
written questions on U.S. national reports were not available on
IAEA's public Web site. NRC officials acknowledged that these
responses were not readily accessible and said they would take steps
to post them. On March 17, 2010, NRC informed us of the availability
of their responses, and we verified that they were now on IAEA's
public Web site.
Figure 2: Number of Countries Posting Responses to Questions Received
on Their National Reports on IAEA's Public Web Site, 1999-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Review meeting: First: 1999;
Number of countries: 3.
Review meeting: Second: 2002;
Number of countries: 11.
Review meeting: Third: 2005;
Number of countries: 6.
Review meeting: Fourth; 2008;
Number of countries: 5.
Source: GAO analysis based on IAEA data.
[End of figure]
Lack of Resources to Fully Participate in the Convention's Review
Meetings:
Some respondents to our survey reported the lack of resources to fully
participate in the review meetings. Specifically, almost half of the
survey respondents--ranging from parties with well-established
civilian nuclear power programs to those with no nuclear power
programs--report that a lack of resources has limited their country's
ability to develop their national report. As we noted in our March
1999 testimony,[Footnote 16] NRC officials anticipated this lack of
staff resources and/or travel money could be a problem. We reported
that NRC officials told us that, because of differences in parties'
nuclear safety programs and available resources, they anticipated
unevenness in the quality and detail of some national reports. In
addition, half of the parties responding to our survey reported that a
lack of resources has limited their ability to attend review meetings,
and more than three-quarters indicated that a lack of resources has
inhibited their ability to send representatives to all of the country
group meetings. According to NRC officials, this is important because
the country groups meet simultaneously, and it is in these meetings
where the national reports are presented and questions about them are
addressed. Not being able to attend country group meetings reduces
opportunities to learn from other parties' nuclear safety experiences.
In addition, NRC officials recently told us that since much of the
peer review of national reports can occur in the 7 months before the
review meeting, limited resources may reduce the ability of some
parties to take full advantage of this opportunity. That is, according
to NRC officials, some countries do not have the staff resources to
devote to preparing for review meetings by reading national reports,
formulating and submitting written questions, and reviewing the
parties' written responses to the written questions.
Lack of Performance Metrics to Gauge Progress in Strengthening Safety:
The Convention does not include performance metrics to gauge its
impact on improving safety. As a result, it provides no systematic way
to measure where and how progress in improving safety in each country
has been made. During the course of this review, we asked parties if
the lack of performance metrics limited the usefulness of the
Convention. Half the parties responding to our survey indicated that
it did. Performance indicators and benchmarks are currently being used
to track safety in civilian nuclear power plants that could be adapted
to help countries enhance safety. For example, the World Association
of Nuclear Operators (WANO)[Footnote 17] publishes quantitative
indicators of nuclear plant performance for 11 key areas, including
industrial safety accidents and unplanned automatic shutdowns of
nuclear power plants. Although the Convention itself lacks performance
metrics, one-quarter of parties responding to our survey reported that
they themselves measure progress toward Convention goals using
performance metrics--specifically, in some cases, by comparing their
activities with the results of IAEA safety review missions to
countries that request them and actions taken in response to questions
and comments from other parties at Convention review meetings.
Neither State nor NRC has formally proposed the adoption of
performance metrics. However, NRC officials told us that performance
metrics could play a useful role in helping parties measure their
progress toward meeting safety obligations and that they could be
introduced through a modification to the rules and procedures
governing the Convention. Specifically, Article 22 of the Convention
provides for the preparation of guidelines by the parties regarding
the form and structure of their national reports. The guidelines can
be revised by consensus at review meetings. The guidelines provide
only suggestions for drafting the reports; parties remain free to
structure their reports as they see fit. However, the suggestions
provided are very detailed and touch upon more than just form and
structure. For example, the guidelines provide detailed suggestions on
the content of the national reports. They also contain an appendix
detailing voluntary practices that parties are encouraged to engage in
regarding the public availability of their national reports.
Universal Participation Would Advance Achievement of the Convention's
Goals:
The Convention is designed to maximize the number of countries that
will participate in order to achieve its goal of promoting the safe
operation of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide; however, it is
voluntary in nature. By and large, this approach has worked. Since
2009, three countries that are considering developing civilian nuclear
power programs--Libya, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates--have
become parties to the Convention. Two others--Kazakhstan and Saudi
Arabia--approved the Convention in 2010 and are expected to become
parties to it later this year. An overwhelming majority of the parties
we surveyed and interviewed said that all countries should be
encouraged to join as soon as possible after making the decision to
consider developing a nuclear power program. At present, all countries
with such programs--except Iran--are parties to the Convention.
Several parties we interviewed told us that Iran, which is on the
verge of commissioning civilian nuclear power reactors, should ratify
the Convention in order to benefit from the safety expertise that
participation provides. In their view, without Iran's participation in
the Convention, the international community has limited or no insight
on, or access to, how Iran is developing, operating, and maintaining
its burgeoning civilian nuclear power program. Russian officials with
whom we spoke agreed that greater international access to Iran's
civilian nuclear power program is needed and that the Convention could
play a role in providing that access. Russia is helping Iran build the
civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, which is expected to be
commissioned in the near future. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officials told us that Russia's continued assistance to Iran's
civilian nuclear program may be conditioned on Iran's becoming a party
to the Convention.
The Convention Is Not a Mechanism for Shutting Down Unsafe Reactors:
The Convention does not require that unsafe reactors be closed down.
As noted in our 1999 testimony,[Footnote 18] the Convention neither
provides sanctions for noncompliance with any of its safety
obligations nor does it require the closing of any unsafe nuclear
reactors. However, more than 13 years after the Convention came into
force, Russia continues to operate 11 Chernobyl-style RBMK reactors.
[Footnote 19] These reactors pose the highest risk, according to
Western safety experts, because of their inherent design deficiencies,
including their lack of a containment structure. The containment
structure, generally a steel-lined concrete dome, serves as the
ultimate barrier to the release of radioactive material in the event
of a severe accident. Russian nuclear regulators told us that adequate
safety upgrades have been made to all 11 RBMK reactors and that they
will continue to operate for the foreseeable future. We also discussed
the matter of shutdown of Soviet-designed reactors with EU officials,
who told us that the Convention was never intended to be a mechanism
for closing unsafe Soviet-designed reactors. The European Union has
used a different strategy to accomplish shutdown of the unsafe nuclear
reactors in its member countries: making EU membership contingent upon
the closure of these reactors. As a result, all eight RBMK and first-
generation VVER 440 Model 230 reactors in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and
Slovakia have been permanently shut down in order for these countries
to obtain EU membership.[Footnote 20]
According to NRC officials, as is the case in other international law
on reactor safety, under the Convention each country is responsible
for regulating the safety of its own reactors. In addition, NRC noted
that the Convention relies on the peer review process, that it cannot
obligate countries to comply with safety standards, and that it does
not provide for sanctions such as the closing of any unsafe nuclear
power plants. State expressed a similar view. State pointed out that
the Convention was never meant to have the authority to require that
unsafe reactors be shut down. According to State, it is the position
of IAEA and its member states that each country operating nuclear
power plants should have its own nuclear regulatory agency that would
have the authority to shut down plants.
Steps Have Been Taken to Improve the Convention's Peer Review Process,
and Additional Proposals Are Being Considered:
The parties to the Convention generally agree that it would be
difficult to amend the Convention. Consequently, several parties have
taken the lead in making changes to the Convention's rules and
procedures. To date, some steps have been taken to improve the
Convention's peer review process, and parties are considering several
additional proposals.
Changes Have Been Adopted to Improve the Peer Review Process:
Several parties have focused on improving the workings of the
Convention's peer review process. The most significant change they
have made, in our view, is to allow the parties to more freely ask
questions about each others' national reports. NRC expressed concern
in our January 1997 report about the rules governing how parties'
country group assignments affect the parties' ability to discuss and
seek clarification about other parties' national reports at review
meetings.[Footnote 21] According to NRC officials, in the past,
parties assigned to a particular country group could ask questions
about other parties' nuclear programs that were assigned to that group
during the question-and-answer session following the presentation of a
national report. However, parties that were not assigned to that
country group could not ask questions unless they submitted a written
question several months in advance of the review meeting. This
restrictive practice began to change during the 2005 review meeting,
when at least one country group allowed parties that were not assigned
to it to ask questions. At the next review meeting in 2008, according
to NRC officials who attended both meetings, no restrictions were
placed on any parties' ability to ask questions about the national
reports of any other parties. An NRC official told us that this change
has made the process more open and accessible to all of the parties.
Another notable change to the rules and procedures of the peer review
process is the recent decision to move up the date for the
organizational meeting and the selection of officers for the upcoming
review meeting by almost a year and to advance by a few weeks the
deadlines for submitting national reports and written questions for
the peer review process. The purposes of the organizational meeting,
among other things, are to elect the officers for the upcoming review
meeting,[Footnote 22] adopt a provisional agenda for the meeting,
assign parties to particular country groups, and identify which
proposals for enhancing the peer review process should be considered
at the upcoming meeting. Previously, organizational meetings were held
about 7 months before the upcoming review meeting. However, the
parties at the 2008 review meeting agreed to hold the organizational
meeting for the 2011 review meeting in September 2009--19 months in
advance. According to NRC officials, the purpose of the scheduling
change was to put officers in place earlier to give them more time to
plan for the next meeting and to promote greater continuity from one
meeting to the next. Moving up the deadlines for submitting national
reports and written questions for peer review is intended to give
countries more time to both review the national reports of other
parties and answer any written questions submitted.
Parties Are Considering Additional Proposals to Improve the
Implementation of the Convention:
Additional proposals to improve the implementation of the Convention
are currently under consideration by the parties. Specifically, these
proposals include (1) allocating more country group meeting time to
discuss, among other things, the national reports of countries with
emerging nuclear programs; (2) expediting the process for calling a
special meeting between review meetings to discuss urgent safety
issues; and (3) changing the process for assigning parties to country
groups.
Allocating More Time to Countries with Emerging Nuclear Programs:
Some parties have suggested the peer review process might be more
effective if more review meeting time were allocated to discussing the
national reports of countries with emerging nuclear power programs or
topics of general concern and less time presenting and discussing the
national reports of parties with well-established nuclear programs.
For example, according to NRC officials, the United Arab Emirates,
which has only recently become a party to the Convention, is rapidly
moving to establish its nuclear regulatory infrastructure and is soon
to begin construction of several nuclear power reactors. Because its
civilian nuclear power program is so new, the United Arab Emirates
could benefit from more time to present its national report during the
peer review process. NRC officials told us that the United States, in
contrast, does not need as much time as it is allocated to present its
national report. Similarly, according to a senior NRC official, the
United States has proposed that more time at review meetings might
also be allocated to discuss topics of general concern--such as the
safety challenges of dealing with aging reactors or the challenges
parties face in maintaining adequate staffing and competence levels in
both the regulatory bodies and at nuclear power plants.
Expediting the Process for Calling Special Meetings:
Another proposal to be considered would create a more efficient
process for calling a meeting to discuss topical or urgent nuclear
safety issues that parties feel cannot wait until the next review
meeting. Currently, in order to have such a meeting, a majority of
parties are required to support the call for a meeting. One way of
streamlining this process, according to an NRC official, would be to
empower the officers elected for the most recent or upcoming review
meeting to call a special meeting. An urgent issue might be, for
example, a nuclear power plant accident. If such an accident occurred,
parties might wish to convene a special meeting to discuss the causes
of the accident and what might be done to avoid a similar accident.
Changing the Process for Assigning Parties to Country Groups:
Finally, to promote greater variation in the composition of country
groups from meeting to meeting, amending the method for assigning
countries to the six country groups is being considered.[Footnote 23]
Specifically, the experience of the first four review meetings has
been that the country groups have remained relatively static--that is,
there has been little variation in the membership of each group among
the nuclear power countries. According to NRC officials, it would be
useful if the composition of the groups were more varied from meeting
to meeting. While each group would still be anchored by a country with
a large number of operating civilian nuclear power reactors, the
remainder of the group would consist of a more varied mix of
countries. This type of mix would provide greater opportunities for
more information sharing among a more diverse group of countries. An
NRC official told us that many parties are generally in favor of some
adjustment to the existing process but that there is not yet
sufficient agreement on how to accomplish this change.
IAEA's Assistance Programs to Member States Complement the
Convention's Safety Goals and Objectives:
IAEA has a long history of serving as a technical advisor to member
states to promote the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Although
this role predates the establishment of the Convention, and regulating
nuclear safety is a national responsibility, the Convention
complements the role the agency plays in these matters. IAEA promotes
the Convention's nuclear safety goals and objectives largely through
its Technical Cooperation (TC) Program, safety standards, and peer
review missions, which together help countries improve their nuclear
regulatory bodies and the safety performance of their civilian nuclear
power plants. Most survey respondents reported that they found IAEA
effective in serving as a technical advisor. In addition, almost all
parties responding to our survey consider IAEA to be effective in its
role as secretariat to the Convention.
IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program, Safety Standards, and Peer
Review Missions Play an Important and Growing Role in Promoting
Nuclear Safety Worldwide:
IAEA provides assistance to its member states to promote peaceful uses
of nuclear energy in several ways, including providing technical
cooperation, establishing safety standards, and conducting advisory
and peer review missions. The importance of its role in providing this
type of assistance was corroborated by our survey results. A majority
of survey respondents reported that IAEA was either very effective or
somewhat effective in serving as a technical advisor to countries
requesting assistance to improve civilian nuclear power safety. IAEA's
TC program supports, among other things, nuclear safety and the
development of nuclear power.[Footnote 24] For the 2009-2011
activities under the TC program, nuclear safety remains one of the top
three priorities for IAEA member states. IAEA currently conducts 551
TC projects in 115 countries and territories, and program activities
are tailored to the needs of each region. Specific TC projects have
included activities to extend the operating life of nuclear power
plants and establishing safety culture in nuclear facilities. TC
projects that support member states considering or developing nuclear
power also include strengthening nuclear regulatory authorities and
preparing an emergency plan for a nuclear power plant. In 2007, IAEA
disbursed approximately $5.6 million to support the safety of civilian
nuclear installations worldwide through the TC program. In addition to
its TC program budget, IAEA plans to spend approximately $15.1 million
in 2010 on other efforts to promote nuclear safety, such as
strengthening countries' abilities to respond to nuclear incidents and
emergencies and to assess the safety of the siting and design of
nuclear installations. The role and importance of IAEA in promoting
nuclear safety will likely grow if the cost of fossil fuels and the
threat of climate change spur a nuclear renaissance, as an independent
commission assessing the role of IAEA to 2020 and beyond reported
recently.[Footnote 25] According to this independent commission, this
growing role may involve (1) leading an international effort to
establish a global nuclear safety network, (2) helping countries with
emerging nuclear power programs put in place the infrastructure needed
to develop nuclear energy safely, and (3) ensuring that critical
safety knowledge is widely shared among IAEA member states.
In addition, IAEA has established safety standards that provide a
framework for fundamental safety principles, requirements, and
guidance for member states. The standards, which reflect international
consensus, cover a wide range of topics, including nuclear power plant
design and operation, site evaluation, and emergency preparedness and
response. Committees of senior experts from IAEA member states use an
open and transparent process to develop the standards and any
subsequent revisions. The guidelines governing the drafting of
national reports state that IAEA safety standards can give valuable
guidance on how to meet the Convention's safety obligations.
IAEA also promotes nuclear safety through advisory and voluntary peer
review missions--the most prominent are Integrated Regulatory Review
Service (IRRS) missions and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
missions. These missions evaluate the operations of a member state's
nuclear regulatory system and civilian nuclear power plant operational
safety, respectively. IRRS missions assess the safety practices of the
requesting country through an examination of its regulatory framework
and organization and compare the country's practices with IAEA safety
standards. Since 1992, IAEA has conducted 44 IRRS missions in 26
countries, with 15 of these missions taking place in countries that
have operated--and in some cases continue to operate--Soviet-designed
reactors. Table 1 shows the number of IRRS missions that member
countries had hosted through 2009. The United States has sent
approximately 20 experts on IRRS missions and has agreed to host an
IRRS mission in October 2010.
Table 1: Number of IRRS Missions by Country, 1992 through 2009:
Country: Armenia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Australia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Bulgaria;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Canada;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: China;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Czech Republic;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Finland;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: France;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Germany;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Hungary;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Indonesia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Japan;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Lithuania;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Malaysia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Mexico;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Pakistan;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Peru;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Romania;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 4.
Country: Russia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Slovakia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Slovenia;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Spain;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Switzerland;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Ukraine;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 3.
Country: United Kingdom;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 2.
Country: Vietnam;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 1.
Country: Total;
Number of IRRS missions[A]: 44.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[A] IRRS missions were preceded by a similar program from 1992-2004
called International Regulatory Review Team missions. This table
combines numbers for both types of missions.
[End of table]
Some parties that responded to our survey reported that they found
IRRS and OSART missions effective at improving civilian nuclear power
safety. In addition, according to the summary report of the
Convention's fourth meeting in 2008, many parties reported that they
had positive experiences with IRRS and OSART missions, and parties who
had not already hosted one of these missions were encouraged to do so.
In February and March 2010, IAEA conducted an IRRS mission to Iran,
which included a site visit to the nearly completed Bushehr nuclear
power plant. IAEA recommended, among other things, that Iran join the
Convention.
According to a senior Swedish official who was involved in drafting
the Convention, these missions are increasingly being used to measure
the safety standards of parties to the Convention. Parties face peer
pressure to submit to these voluntary missions, as they provide a way
for a country to show its commitment to enhancing safety. For example,
ENSREG has promoted the use of IRRS missions by EU countries.
Describing the missions as "well established and well respected,"
ENSREG has encouraged all EU member states to participate in one to
obtain advice on improvements and to learn from the best practices of
others.
IAEA also manages the OSART missions through which teams of experts
drawn from IAEA member countries--including the United States, which
has sent over 100 experts on missions--review operational safety at
specific nuclear power plants. IAEA has conducted over 150 OSART
missions in 32 countries since 1983, and has 9 more scheduled through
the end of 2011. Table 2 shows the number of OSART missions that
member countries had hosted through 2009.
Table 2: Number of OSART Missions by Country, 1983 through 2009:
Country: Argentina;
Number of OSART missions: 1.
Country: Belgium;
Number of OSART missions: 1.
Country: Brazil;
Number of OSART missions: 5.
Country: Bulgaria;
Number of OSART missions: 6.
Country: Canada;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: China;
Number of OSART missions: 10.
Country: Czech Republic;
Number of OSART missions: 8.
Country: Finland;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: France;
Number of OSART missions: 21.
Country: Germany;
Number of OSART missions: 6.
Country: Hungary;
Number of OSART missions: 2.
Country: Italy;
Number of OSART missions: 2.
Country: Japan;
Number of OSART missions: 5.
Country: Kazakhstan;
Number of OSART missions: 1.
Country: Korea, Republic of;
Number of OSART missions: 6.
Country: Lithuania;
Number of OSART missions: 2.
Country: Mexico;
Number of OSART missions: 4.
Country: Netherlands;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: Pakistan;
Number of OSART missions: 5.
Country: Philippines;
Number of OSART missions: 2.
Country: Poland;
Number of OSART missions: 1.
Country: Romania;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: Russia;
Number of OSART missions: 6.
Country: Slovakia;
Number of OSART missions: 5.
Country: Slovenia;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: South Africa;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: Spain;
Number of OSART missions: 5.
Country: Sweden;
Number of OSART missions: 6.
Country: Switzerland;
Number of OSART missions: 4.
Country: Ukraine;
Number of OSART missions: 14.
Country: United Kingdom;
Number of OSART missions: 3.
Country: United States;
Number of OSART missions: 6.
Country: Total;
Number of OSART missions: 155.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[End of table]
As table 2 shows, the 2 countries that have hosted the most OSART
missions are France and Ukraine, 21 and 14, respectively. Combined,
those 2 countries have 73 reactors. China and the Czech Republic have
hosted the second most missions, 10 and 8, respectively. These
countries have a combined total of 17 operating reactors. Japan, which
has 54 reactors, has hosted 5 OSART missions. Russia, which has 32
operating reactors, has hosted 6, and the United States, which has 104
operating reactors, has also hosted 6 missions. The only countries
with operating civilian nuclear power programs that have not hosted
OSART missions are Armenia and India, which operate 1 and 18 reactors,
respectively.
While recommendations that result from safety review services such as
IRRS and OSART missions are not mandates, IAEA officials told us that
the agency nevertheless sees a high rate of implementation of those
recommendations. IAEA also makes available on its public Web site a
compilation of best practices learned from recent OSART missions, as
well as the mission reports as authorized by the member states. This
compilation serves to help member states improve the operational
safety of their power plants and includes emergency plans and
preparedness, training, and maintenance.
Finally, IAEA also promotes civilian nuclear safety through other
means. For example, IAEA offers additional review services to member
states by focusing on issues such as siting, seismic safety, research
reactor safety, fuel cycle facilities' safety, power plant accident
management, and safety culture assessments. IAEA also promotes
education and training in nuclear safety through Web-based courses,
electronic textbooks, and workshops. This training covers topics such
as basic safety concepts, regulatory control of nuclear power plants,
and instruction on IAEA safety standards. Much of this information is
available to the public to download from IAEA's Web site. One survey
respondent from Eastern Europe commented that the training courses and
workshops had contributed significantly to the promotion of high
safety standards and best practices. Moreover, IAEA regularly holds
conferences and symposia on issues related to nuclear safety, with
some event summaries available online. Recent topics have included
promoting safety education and training for countries with new or
expanding nuclear programs, ensuring safety for sustainable nuclear
development, and managing nuclear power plant life.
IAEA Is Effective as the Convention's Secretariat, according to Almost
All Survey Respondents and Parties We Interviewed:
Almost all parties responding to our survey and parties we interviewed
reported that IAEA effectively carries out its role as secretariat as
outlined in the Convention. In this capacity, IAEA hosts the review
meetings in Vienna, Austria; prepares documents; and provides
translation and interpretation services. There was widespread
agreement among the respondents that the agency is effective in
convening, preparing, and servicing the meetings and at transmitting
information received or prepared in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention.
Some survey respondents and parties we interviewed called for more
IAEA support during the Convention's review meetings in such areas as
more translation services for all country group sessions and more
administrative assistance for parties to the Convention. The
Convention permits IAEA to provide other services in support of the
review meetings, if the parties reach consensus. Finally, some survey
respondents reported that IAEA should play a more active role in the
following areas:
* helping prepare national reports,
* providing other assistance to help prepare for the next review
meeting,
* providing other technical support to improve safety, and:
* helping address concerns about a country's civilian nuclear power
program.
IAEA estimates its costs to support the last review meeting in 2008 at
nearly $118,000 and expects to spend approximately $130,000 for the
fifth review meeting scheduled for April 2011. The costs associated
with the review meetings are modest for the U.S. government as well.
NRC and State spent approximately $725,000 preparing for and
participating in the 2008 review meeting and estimate they will spend
$825,000 for the next review meeting.
Conclusions:
The Convention plays an important role in strengthening nuclear safety
and enjoys broad support among the parties we surveyed and
interviewed. Support for the Convention continues to grow as evidenced
by the increasing number of countries that have joined it,
particularly those with emerging nuclear programs, such as the United
Arab Emirates. Many parties to the Convention told us that all
countries that are considering embarking on a nuclear power program--
or currently operating civilian nuclear power reactors--should be
encouraged to join the Convention, including Iran.
We are encouraged that the parties have taken steps to improve the
Convention's peer review process. However, the Convention does not
require parties to include performance metrics in their national
reports, which makes it difficult to gauge its impact on improving
nuclear safety. Without such metrics there is no systematic way to
measure where and how progress has been made in improving safety in
each country that operates civilian nuclear power reactors. In
addition, more than half of the survey respondents reported that the
lack of metrics hampers the Convention's usefulness, and NRC has noted
that it would be feasible to add performance metrics into the
guidelines that implement that national report process called for by
the Convention. There are already international organizations that use
such indicators to track nuclear safety improvements and which could
perhaps be incorporated into the guidelines as voluntary practices
that parties are encouraged to implement. Further, public awareness
about parties' progress toward meeting the terms of the Convention can
play a key role in influencing compliance with the Convention's
nuclear safety obligations. However, to date the public has had
limited access to parties' national reports and written answers to
questions about their nuclear power programs. More than half of the
national reports prepared for the 2008 review meeting are not posted
to IAEA's public Web site, and even fewer parties make their answers
to written questions received on their national reports available on
IAEA's public Web site. Putting this information on the Web site could
increase public awareness of the nuclear safety issues facing
countries and how they are addressing them.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To further enhance the usefulness of the Convention in promoting the
safety of civilian nuclear power programs worldwide, we recommend that
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, work with other parties to the
Convention to take the following three actions:
* Encourage parties to include performance metrics in national reports
to better track safety in civilian nuclear power plants and help
countries more systematically measure where and how they have made
progress in improving safety.
* Expand efforts to increase the number of parties' national reports
made available to the public by posting them to IAEA's public Web site.
* Promote greater public dissemination of parties' written answers to
questions about their nuclear power programs by posting this
information to IAEA's public Web site.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to NRC and State for comment. We
also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the
draft report. State and NRC provided written comments on the draft
report, which are presented in appendixes IV and V, respectively.
IAEA, State, and NRC also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
NRC generally agreed with our report but did not specifically agree or
disagree with the report's recommendations, and State generally agreed
with the recommendations to (1) encourage parties to the Convention to
include performance metrics in their national reports to better track
safety in civilian nuclear power plants, (2) increase the number of
parties' national reports made available to the public by posting them
to IAEA's public Web site, and (3) promote greater public
dissemination of parties' written answers to questions about their
nuclear power programs by posting this information to IAEA's public
Web site. In its written comments, however, State provided some
clarifications concerning the recommendations. First, State noted that
it might be difficult to achieve metrics that would be meaningful
across so many countries' nuclear power programs and to agree on the
specific metrics to be used. Second, State noted that initiatives to
increase public access to information would run counter to strong
concerns regarding confidentiality of information on civilian nuclear
power plants held by many parties. In addition, State asserted that
the report somewhat mischaracterizes the Convention by noting that the
Convention does not require that unsafe reactors be shut down. State
noted that the Convention was never meant to have that authority,
which would be contrary to IAEA practice and policy. It is the
position of IAEA and member states that each country operating nuclear
power plants should have its own national regulatory agency that would
have the authority to shut down plants.
Regarding the first point, while it might be challenging to establish
a common set of performance metrics, we believe there are already
examples of standard metrics being used, such as those published by
WANO. We believe that WANO's metrics, for instance, could be used as a
benchmark for parties to follow in measuring safety progress when
developing their national reports. With regard to encouraging public
dissemination of information about the Convention, we agree that
maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information about what is
discussed among the parties during the peer review process should be
maintained. However, we also believe that increasing public awareness
of the Convention's proceedings--even on an incremental basis--through
the posting of national reports to IAEA's public Web site is a
worthwhile goal and should be encouraged to the extent practicable.
Finally, with respect to the issue of unsafe reactors, we have not
mischaracterized the Convention. Rather, we pointed out in the report--
as we have previously reported--that the Convention does not require
the closing of any unsafe nuclear reactors. We also noted in this
report that nuclear safety is a national responsibility and have not
suggested or implied that the Convention is flawed because it does not
require unsafe reactors to be closed. The fact remains, however, that
Russia, which has ratified the Convention, continues to operate
numerous nuclear power plants that pose a safety risk according to
Western safety experts. However, based on State's comments, we have
clarified the text regarding this issue.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other interested
parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety:
Country: Argentina[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 16 July 1997.
Country: Armenia[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 1;
Entry into force: 20 December 1998.
Country: Australia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 March 1997.
Country: Austria;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 November 1997.
Country: Bangladesh;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Belarus;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 27 January 1999.
Country: Belgium[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 7;
Entry into force: 13 April 1997.
Country: Brazil[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 2 June 1997.
Country: Bulgaria[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Canada[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 18;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Chile;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 20 March 1997.
Country: China[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 11;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Croatia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Cyprus;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 15 June 1999.
Country: Czech Republic[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 6;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Denmark;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 11 February 1999.
Country: Estonia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 4 May 2006.
Country: Finland[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 4;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: France[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 58;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Germany[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 17;
Entry into force: 20 April 1997.
Country: Greece;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 18 September 1997.
Country: Hungary[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 4;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Iceland;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 2 September 2008.
Country: India[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 18;
Entry into force: 29 June 2005.
Country: Indonesia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 11 July 2002.
Country: Ireland;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Italy;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 14 July 1998.
Country: Japan[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 54;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Jordan;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 10 September 2009.
Country: Korea, Republic of[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 20;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Kuwait;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 9 August 2006.
Country: Latvia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 23 January 1997.
Country: Lebanon;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Libya;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 11 November 2009.
Country: Lithuania;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Luxembourg;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 6 July 1997.
Country: Mali;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Malta;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 13 February 2008.
Country: Mexico[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Netherlands[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 1;
Entry into force: 13 January 1997.
Country: Nigeria;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 3 July 2007.
Country: Norway;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Pakistan[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 29 December 1997.
Country: Peru;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 29 September 1997.
Country: Poland;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Portugal;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 18 August 1998.
Country: Republic of Moldova;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 5 August 1998.
Country: Romania[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Russian Federation[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 32;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Saudi Arabia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 16 June 2010[B].
Country: Senegal;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 March 2009.
Country: Singapore;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 15 March 1998.
Country: Slovakia[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 4;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Slovenia[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 1;
Entry into force: 18 February 1997.
Country: South Africa[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 2;
Entry into force: 24 March 1997.
Country: Spain[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 8;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Sri Lanka;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 9 November 1999.
Country: Sweden[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 10;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Switzerland[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 5;
Entry into force: 11 December 1996.
Country: The FYR of Macedonia;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 13 June 2006.
Country: Turkey;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: Ukraine[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 15;
Entry into force: 7 July 1998.
Country: United Arab Emirates;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 29 October 2009.
Country: United Kingdom[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 19;
Entry into force: 24 October 1996.
Country: United States[A];
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 104;
Entry into force: 10 July 1999.
Country: Uruguay;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 2 December 2003.
Country: EURATOM;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 0;
Entry into force: 30 April 2000.
Country: Total;
Number of civilian nuclear reactors: 437.
Source: IAEA.
Note: The total of 437 reactors represents the reactors in the list
plus 6 reactors in Taiwan, which IAEA includes in the total number
worldwide.
[A] Indicates that the state has at least one nuclear installation
that has achieved criticality in a reactor core.
[B] Anticipated date of entry into force. Saudi Arabia deposited its
instrument of accession to the Convention on March 18, 2010. By the
terms of the Convention, it will enter into force for Saudi Arabia 90
days after the date of deposit of the instrument of accession.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Information on U.S. and European Union Funding to Promote
International Nuclear Safety:
United States:
Table 3 reflects the cumulative amount of nuclear reactor safety
assistance funds provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) from the
inception of these programs.
Table 3: Obligations and Expenditures for DOE's Safety Assistance
Programs as of September 30, 2009 (Dollars in thousands):
Recipient: Ukraine;
Funds available: $369,223;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $369,223;
Funds obligated and spent: $360,918;
Funds obligated but not spent: $8,305.
Recipient: Russia;
Funds available: $179,917;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $179,917;
Funds obligated and spent: $179,917;
Funds obligated but not spent: $0.
Recipient: Central and Eastern Europe;
Funds available: $44,680;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $44,680;
Funds obligated and spent: $44,504;
Funds obligated but not spent: $176.
Recipient: Armenia;
Funds available: $50,813;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $50,813;
Funds obligated and spent: $47,734;
Funds obligated but not spent: $3,079.
Recipient: Kazakhstan;
Funds available: $7,732;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: v7,732;
Funds obligated and spent: $7,317;
Funds obligated but not spent: $415.
Recipient: Noncountry specific;
Funds available: $73,269;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $73,269;
Funds obligated and spent: v73,269;
Funds obligated but not spent: $0.
Recipient: DOE subtotal;
Funds available: $725,634;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $725,634;
Funds obligated and spent: $713,659;
Funds obligated but not spent: $11,975.
Source: DOE.
Notes:
Expenditures identified in this table are not linked to the Convention
on Nuclear Safety. Rather, they refer only to DOE bilateral assistance
programs to support nuclear safety efforts in various foreign countries.
According to DOE, funding appropriation end dates for the programs are
as follows:
Ukraine: 2008;
Russia: 2005;
Central and Eastern Europe: 2006;
Armenia: 2011 (estimated);
Kazakhstan: 2007;
Noncountry specific: 2004.
According to DOE, all programs will expend funds through at least
fiscal year 2010, with the exception of Russia, which ceased expending
funds in fiscal year 2006.
[End of table]
Table 4 reflects the cumulative amount of nuclear reactor safety
assistance funds provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
from the inception of these programs.
Table 4: Obligations and Expenditures for NRC's Reactor Safety
Assistance Programs as of September 30, 2009 (Dollars in thousands):
Recipient: Ukraine;
Funds available: $22,083;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $22,083;
Funds obligated and spent: $21,482;
Funds obligated but not spent: $601.
Recipient: Russia;
Funds available: $17,794;
Funds unobligated: 0;
Funds obligated: $17,794;
Funds obligated and spent: $17,493;
Funds obligated but not spent: $301.
Recipient: Central and Eastern Europe;
Funds available: $8,044;
Funds unobligated: 0;
Funds obligated: $8,044;
Funds obligated and spent: $8,044;
Funds obligated but not spent: 0.
Recipient: Armenia;
Funds available: $7,715;
Funds unobligated: 0;
Funds obligated: $7,715;
Funds obligated and spent: $6,899;
Funds obligated but not spent: $816.
Recipient: Kazakhstan;
Funds available: $6,920;
Funds unobligated: 0;
Funds obligated: $6,920;
Funds obligated and spent: $6,920;
Funds obligated but not spent: 0.
Recipient: Total;
Funds available: $62,556;
Funds unobligated: $0;
Funds obligated: $62,556;
Funds obligated and spent: $60,838;
Funds obligated but not spent: $1,718.
Source: NRC.
Notes:
According to NRC, these funds are provided through the Support for
Eastern European Democracies (SEED) Act, which funded Central and
Eastern European countries, and through the Freedom Support Act (FSA),
which funds Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. SEED Act figures
are cumulative from fiscal year 1991, and FSA figures are cumulative
from fiscal year 1992.
These expenditures identified in this table are not linked to the
Convention on Nuclear Safety. Rather, they refer only to NRC bilateral
assistance programs to support nuclear safety efforts in various
foreign countries.
According to NRC, fiscal year 2008 was the last year for which NRC
obligated FSA funds for Russia, shifting its focus with Russia to
cooperation instead of assistance. NRC will expend all remaining FSA
funds for assistance for Russia during fiscal year 2010.
[End of table]
European Union:
Table 5 reflects nuclear safety expenditures from the European Union's
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States program.
Table 6: Total Nuclear Safety Budget for the Technical Assistance to
the Commonwealth of Independent States Program (Dollars in millions):
Year: 1991;
Amount: $97.8.
Year: 1992;
Amount: $112.9.
Year: 1993;
Amount: $145.8.
Year: 1994;
Amount: $149.8.
Year: 1995;
Amount: $169.8.
Year: 1996;
Amount: $198.6.
Year: 1997;
Amount: $100.9.
Year: 1998;
Amount: $121.7.
Year: 1999;
Amount: $86.8.
Year: 2000;
Amount: $61.2.
Year: 2001;
Amount: $100.2.
Year: 2002;
Amount: $86.6.
Year: 2003;
Amount: $136.5.
Year: 2004;
Amount: $145.3.
Year: 2005;
Amount: $96.3.
Year: 2006;
Amount: $109.4.
Total:
Amount: $1,919.5.
Source: "International Nuclear Safety Actions of the European
Commission," EuropeAid Co-operation Office.
Notes:
Figures are in millions of 2010 dollars.
The expenditures identified in this table are estimates and are not
linked to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
The figures include funding for the Russian Federation, the Northern
Dimension Fund to the 'Nuclear Window,' Ukraine, other countries, and
the Chernobyl Shelter Fund.
The Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(TACIS) program was replaced in 2007 by the Nuclear Safety Cooperation
Instrument (NSCI), which finances measures to support nuclear safety,
radiation protection, and safeguards of nuclear materials. The NSCI
has a budget of roughly $730 million for 2007-2013.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which the
Convention on Nuclear Safety is achieving its primary goal: promoting
the safe operation of civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide.
Specifically, we assessed (1) parties' views on the perceived benefits
and limitations of the Convention; (2) efforts to improve the
implementation of the Convention; and (3) how International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) programs complement the Convention's safety goals
and objectives. In addition, we are providing information in appendix
II about funding provided by the United States and the EU to promote
international nuclear safety since the early 1990s.
To assess parties' views of the perceived benefits and limitations of
the Convention and efforts to improve implementation, we (1)
interviewed representatives of 17 nuclear and nonnuclear parties to
the Convention as well as officials from NRC and State responsible for
representing the United States at the Convention; (2) analyzed various
Convention-related documents from NRC, State, IAEA, and EU; and (3)
conducted a Web-based survey of 64[Footnote 26] parties to the
Convention. To encourage honest and open responses to our survey, we
pledged member countries confidentiality[Footnote 27] in their
responses and indicated that we would report only aggregate
information or examples that would not identify a particular party.
The survey included questions about the usefulness of the Convention,
the effectiveness of Convention activities, and the role of IAEA in
the Convention.
To develop the survey questions, we analyzed the text of the
Convention itself, as well as related rules and procedures. We also
interviewed parties to the Convention and other experts to identify
issues related to the Convention. Finally, we reviewed previous GAO
reports to identify past issues and concerns related to the Convention
and developed survey questions to gauge whether these issues were
still relevant. The survey was pretested to ensure that (1) the
questions were clear and unambiguous, especially to nonnative English-
speaking respondents; (2) the terms we used were precise; (3) the
survey did not place an undue burden on the officials completing it;
and (4) the survey was independent and unbiased. In addition, the
survey was reviewed by an independent, internal survey expert and by
NRC.
The survey was conducted using self-administered electronic
questionnaires posted on the World Wide Web. We sent e-mail
notifications to 64 parties to the Convention to alert them that we
were conducting the survey and would be sending them log-in
information in a separate e-mail. We also e-mailed each potential
respondent a unique password and username to ensure that only members
of the target population could participate in the survey. To encourage
respondents to complete the survey, we sent an e-mail reminder to each
nonrespondent about 2 weeks after our initial e-mail message. We also
sent an additional e-mail reminder that extended the deadline to
complete the survey. In addition to these e-mails, we also conducted
extensive telephone and personalized e-mail follow-up to encourage
those parties who contacted us with questions about the survey and to
encourage the nonrespondents from the 17 parties whose representatives
we interviewed to complete the survey. The survey data were collected
from October 2009 through December 2009. Half (32) of the 64 parties
to the Convention responded to the survey. To assess the potential for
nonresponse bias in our survey results, we compared selected
characteristics of nonresponding countries, such as (1) length of time
as a party to the Convention, (2) nuclear power status and number of
nuclear power plants, (3) region, (4) former Soviet bloc alignment,
and (5) EU membership, to those of the responding parties. The
distribution of these characteristics among responding and
nonresponding parties was well-balanced. For example, 3 of the 32
respondents have been parties to the Convention for 2 years or less, 2
respondents for 3 to 9 years, and 27 respondents for 10 or more years.
In addition, we also received responses from 13 nonnuclear countries
and 19 nuclear countries and 17 EU-member countries and 15 nonmember
countries. To eliminate data- processing errors, we independently
verified the computer program that generated the survey results. This
report does not contain all the results from the survey; the survey
and a more complete tabulation of the results are provided in an
electronic supplement to this report (this supplement can be viewed
online at GAO-10-550SP).
To assess how IAEA programs complement the Convention's safety goals
and objectives, we analyzed budget and other relevant documents from
the Convention, such as meeting minutes and rules of procedure. We
also interviewed IAEA officials; U.S. officials at the U.S. Missions
in Vienna and Brussels; and the representatives of 17 parties to the
Convention in Vienna, Brussels, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. To
determine the amount of money the United States has spent promoting
nuclear safety from the early 1990s through September 30, 2009, we
obtained expenditure information from DOE and NRC. To assess the
reliability of the information provided, we interviewed knowledgeable
officials from each agency to understand (1) how they had developed
the estimates and (2) what supporting documentation had been used to
develop them; we determined the information provided was sufficiently
reliable for our purposes. To determine the amount of money the EU has
spent promoting nuclear safety from 1991 through 2006, and the amount
they have budgeted to spend from 2007 to 2013, we obtained budget
information from EU officials. However, the reliability of these EU
estimates is undetermined because we did not receive responses to our
data reliability questions. Given these limitations, we characterize
these costs as estimates, and we use them only as background. Because
the EU budget information was provided in euros, we converted the
original values to dollars. In all instances, when converting euros to
dollars, we used nominal and purchasing power parity average annual
exchange rates from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. When converting euro values for future projections into
dollars, we used the latest available annual exchange rate. In
addition, to determine the amount of money IAEA has budgeted for
nuclear safety in 2010, we obtained information from the agency's
Programme and Budget for 2010-11. These IAEA budget figures--which we
converted to dollars from euros--are also of undetermined reliability
because we were unable to obtain sufficient detail about how they
developed the estimates or the data sources that supported them. To
determine the cost to the United States to participate in the
Convention, and IAEA's costs to support the Convention for one 3-year
cycle, we obtained expenditure information from NRC, State, and IAEA.
To assess the reliability of this information, we also interviewed
knowledgeable officials from each agency to understand (1) how they
had developed the estimates and (2) what supporting documentation had
been used to develop them. We determined the information provided by
NRC was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However, the
reliability of the State and IAEA information is undetermined. The
reliability of State estimates are unknown because staff typically
combined work and travel related to the Convention with other work
duties, so it is not possible to accurately determine the amount of
money spent exclusively on Convention participation. IAEA estimates--
which we converted to dollars from euros--are of undetermined
reliability because they do not formally track costs to run the review
meetings.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to April 2010,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix IV:
Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Cheif Financial Officer:
Washington, DC 20320:
April 19, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "NUCLEAR
SAFETY: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by Most Member
Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide," GAO Job Code 361054.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Jan
Fladeboe, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of International Security
and Nonproliferation at (202) 647-6957.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO — Glen Levis:
ISN — Vann Van Diepen:
State/OIG — Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Nuclear Safety: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by Most Member
Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide (GA0-10-489, GAO Code
361054):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"Nuclear Safety: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by Most Member
Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide." With the anticipated
growth in the number of nations worldwide that operate nuclear power
plants, the role of the Convention on Nuclear Safety will become more
important in ensuring the safe operation of these plants.
Promotion of the safe operation of nuclear reactors worldwide is one
of the U.S. Government's top foreign policy and national security
priorities. The Convention on Nuclear Safety plays a very important
role in the realization of that. However, it must be understood that
the Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to
ensure fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and
sanction but is based on their common interest to achieve higher
levels of safety which will be developed and promoted through regular
meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit
reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review"
at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA. The GAO report
focuses on suggested changes to these reports and their promulgation
to the public.
The Department of State generally concurs with the recommendation to
encourage Parties to include performance metrics in national reports
to better track safety in civilian nuclear power plants and help
countries more systematically measure where and how they have made
progress in improving safety. However, it must be recognized that it
will be difficult to achieve metrics that would be meaningful across
so many countries' nuclear power programs. Further, due to the
consensus nature of the Convention, it will also be difficult to agree
on the specific metrics to be used.
The Department of State generally concurs in efforts to increase the
numbers of Parties' national reports made available to the public by
posting them to the IAEA's public Web site. However, this initiative
will run counter to strong concerns regarding confidentiality of
information on civilian nuclear power plants held by many Parties.
While the Department of State generally concurs in the promotion of
greater public dissemination of Parties' written answers to questions
about their nuclear power programs by posting this information to the
IAEA's public Web site, again the concern of Parties over the
confidentiality of information on their respective civilian nuclear
power programs will make this problematical.
All of the above suggestions are in conflict with the IAEA's precept
that it is up to each Party to determine what information should be
made public and what should remain confidential. This is an important
aspect of the Convention and its implementation, and is one of the
factors that have convinced countries to join the Convention.
In addition, the GAO report somewhat mischaracterizes the Convention
in its criticism that it "does not require that unsafe reactors should
be shut down." The Convention was never meant to have that authority,
which would be contrary to IAEA practice and policy. It is the
position of the IAEA and Member States that each country operating
nuclear power plants should have its own national regulatory agency
that would have the authority to shut down plants. If the GAO report's
position were taken, then the United States would be in a situation
where an outside international body would have the authority to shut
down a U.S. reactor, even over the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
authority. Further, the Convention does not require the imposition of
sanctions when countries do not follow the safety principles the
Parties are called upon to follow.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
United States:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001:
April 16, 2010:
Mr. Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and submit
comments on the April 2010 draft of the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report "Convention on Nuclear Safety is Viewed by Most
Member Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide."
In general, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) agrees with
the draft GAO report. However, I am providing certain technical
comments concerning the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in the
attached enclosure.
Should you have any questions about these comments, please contact Mr.
Jesse Arildsen of my staff at (301) 415-1785 or at
Jesse.Arildsen@nrc.gov.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
R. W. Borchardt:
Executive Director for Operations:
Enclosure:
NRC Technical Comments Regarding GA Draft Report, GAO 10-489:
cc: Chairman Jaczko:
Commissioner Svinicki:
Commissioner Apostolakis:
Commissioner Magwood:
Commissioner Ostendorff.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis, Assistant
Director; Dr. Timothy Persons, Chief Scientist; Antoinette Capaccio;
Frederick Childers; Nancy Crothers; Bridget Grimes; Kirsten Lauber;
Rebecca Shea; and Kevin Tarmann made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] On April 26, 1986, the worst accident in the history of civilian
nuclear power occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
Ukraine, where an explosion destroyed the core of a reactor containing
approximately 200 tons of nuclear fuel. The explosion also destroyed
much of the reactor building, severed the reactor's cooling pipes, and
spewed hot fragments of reactor fuel from the core. The explosion and
heat from the reactor core propelled radioactive material up to 6
miles high, where it was then dispersed over 60,000 square miles of
land primarily in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Smaller amounts of
radioactive material spread over Eastern and Western Europe and
Scandinavia and were even detected in the United States.
[2] Safety culture implies individual and organizational awareness of
and commitment to the importance of safety. It also refers to the
personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in
any activity that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants.
[3] Appendix I contains a list of these countries.
[4] The Convention also requires that no more than 3 years pass
between meetings held to review national reports.
[5] IAEA, an independent international organization based in Vienna,
Austria, that is affiliated with the United Nations, has the dual
mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying
that nuclear technologies and materials intended for peaceful purposes
are not diverted to weapons development efforts. IAEA had 151 member
states as of March 2010.
[6] GAO, Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward International Agreement to
Improve Reactor Safety, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-153] (Washington, D.C.: May
14, 1993); GAO, Nuclear Safety: Uncertainties about the Implementation
and Costs of the Nuclear Safety Convention, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-39] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2,
1997); and GAO, Nuclear Safety: The Convention on Nuclear Safety,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-127]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 1999).
[7] At the time we disseminated our survey in October 2009, the
Convention had not yet entered into force for two other countries,
Libya and the United Arab Emirates, and we did not include them in our
survey.
[8] GAO, Nuclear Safety: Concerns with the Continuing Operation of
Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Reactors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-97] (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
25, 2000).
[9] GAO, Nuclear Safety: Construction of the Protective Shelter for
the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Faces Schedule Delays, Potential Cost
Increases, and Technical Uncertainties, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-923] (Washington, D.C.: July 19,
2007).
[10] The mission of the NEA is to assist its member countries in
maintaining and further developing, through international cooperation,
the scientific, technological and legal bases required for the safe
and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
[11] WENRA is an organization composed of the chief nuclear regulators
of EU countries with nuclear power plants and other interested
European countries. WENRA's main objectives are to facilitate the
exchange of nuclear safety information and experience among
regulators, develop a common approach to nuclear safety, and provide
an independent capability to examine nuclear safety in affiliated
countries.
[12] ENSREG is an independent, authoritative expert body composed of
senior officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety
authorities from all 27 member states in the EU.
[13] According to NRC, a critical element of the U.S. international
safety assistance administered by NRC since the early 1990s has been
to promote the independence and effectiveness of countries' nuclear
regulatory authorities.
[14] INPO is a private organization established by American nuclear
power plant operators to promote the safe and reliable operation of
nuclear power plants.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-127].
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-127].
[17] WANO was established in 1989 to improve nuclear power plant
safety worldwide. Every organization in the world that operates a
nuclear electricity generating plant is a member of WANO. Members work
together to improve nuclear safety through power plant assessments,
benchmarks, mutual support, the sharing of information, and the
promoting of best practices.
[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-99-127].
[19] The Soviet-designed RBMK (reactor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny, or
in English, high-power channel reactor) is a pressurized water reactor
that uses ordinary water as its coolant and solid graphite (a form of
carbon), a very pure form of the same graphite found in pencils, as
its moderator. These reactors were favored by the former Soviet Union
primarily because, in addition to producing both power (electricity
and heat) and plutonium, they were able to be refueled while the
reactor was still running. This ability was important to the Soviet
Union's national security.
[20] Bulgaria and Slovakia operated a different type of Soviet-
designed reactor: the VVER-440-230. The VVER-440-230 is also an
inherently unsafe reactor design, according to nuclear safety experts.
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-39].
[22] Officers--a president and two vice presidents (one each from a
nuclear power country and a nonnuclear country)--are elected for the
upcoming review meeting at the organizational meeting. In addition,
four officers are elected for each of the six country groups: a
chairperson, vice-chairperson, rapporteur, and coordinator.
[23] Presently, NRC officials told us that parties are assigned to one
of six country groups according to their number of operating civilian
nuclear power reactors. For example, as the party with the most
reactors, the United States is assigned to group 1; France, with the
second largest number of reactors, is assigned to group 2; and Japan,
with the third largest number, is assigned to group 3. This process
continues until all the countries with operating civilian nuclear
power reactors are assigned to country groups. Nonnuclear countries
are assigned to each of the six groups on a random basis.
[24] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to
Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical
Cooperation Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-275] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5,
2009).
[25] "Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity:
The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond," prepared by an independent
commission at the request of the Director General of the IAEA (May
2008).
[26] As of the time we disseminated our survey, the Convention had not
yet entered into force for two other countries, Libya and the United
Arab Emirates, and we could not send our survey to a country for which
it had not entered into force.
[27] We informed respondents that GAO is not authorized to withhold
information from Congress, but that we received a written agreement
from our congressional requester that he would not ask for
individually identifiable survey information.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: