Narrative:Avianca Flight AV052 (Bogotá - Medellin - New York-JFK) took off from Medellin at 15:08 with approx. 81000lb of fuel on board. When arriving near New York, the aircraft had to enter 3 holding patterns. The first for 19 minutes over Norfolk, the second for 29 minutes over New Jersey, and the third pattern over the CAMRN intersection for 29 minutes. Over CAMRN the aircraft descended from FL140 to FL110. At 20:44:43, while holding at CAMRN for 26 minutes, the New York (NY) ARTCC radar controller advised AVA052 to expect further clearance at 21:05. At that moment the Avianca crew advised ATC that they could only hold for 5 more minutes and that their alternate Boston couldn't be reached anymore due to the low state of fuel. The flight left the holding pattern at 20:47 and the crew contacted the New York TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) who guided AV052 for a runway 22L ILS approach. On finals, at 21:15 the crew contacted JFK Tower and they were cleared to land four minutes later. Due to the bad weather (300 feet ceiling, 400m visibility, RVR - runway Visual Range of 2400 feet and wind shear of ca. 10kt) the crew had to carry out a missed approach at 21:23. ATC vectored the crew for another approach. About 21:32, at 12 miles SE of JFK Airport, engines number 3 and 4 ran down. Shortly afterwards followed by the remaining two. At 21:34, heading 250° and flaps at 14° and gear up, the aircraft impacted on a hillside in a wooded residential area on the north shore of Long Island. The starboard side of the forward fuselage impacted and fractured the wooden deck of a residential home.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The failure of the flight crew to adequately manage the airplane's fuel load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion occurred. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather. Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic flow management by the FAA and the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states. The Safety Board also determines that windshear, crew fatigue and stress were factors that led to the unsuccessful completion of the first approach and thus contributed to the accident."

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL PILOTS OPERATING COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT FLIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) MUST BE THOROUGHLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE FLIGHT OPERATING AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) RULES AND PROCEDURES, INCLUDING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY, FOR OPERATING IN THE U.S. NAS. THIS INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN SEVERAL PUBLICATIONS (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 21-FEB-1990

To: FAA

A-90-010

IMMEDIATELY DISSEMINATE THE CONTENTS OF THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS LETTER (A-90-9 THROUGH -11) TO ALL AIR CARRIER OPERATORS INVOLVED IN COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 21-FEB-1990

To: FAA

A-90-011

IMMEDIATELY ISSUE A GENERAL NOTICE (GENOT DIRECTING MANAGEMENT OF ALL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) FACILITIES TO FORMALLY BRIEF ALL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE JANUARY 25, 1990, ACCIDENT OF AVIANCA AIRLINES FLIGHT 052 AND TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO REQUEST FROM FLIGHT CREWS CLARIFICATION OF UNCLEAR OR AMBIGUOUS TRANSMISSIONS THAT CONVEY A POSSIBLE EMERGENCY SITUATION OR THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ATC ASSISTANCE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 24-JUN-1991

To: FAA

A-91-033

DEVELOP IN COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION A STANDARDIZED GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, TERMS, WORDS, AND PHRASES TO BE USED ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE TO BOTH PILOTS AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS REGARDING MINIMUM AND EMERGENCY FUEL COMMUNICATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 24-JUN-1991

To: FAA

A-91-034

CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL FLOW CONTROL FACILITY AND THE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BY THE OFFICE OF SAFETY/QUALITY ASSURANCE, TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND APPROPRIATENESS OF TRAINING, RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCEDURES, AND METHODS OF APPLICATION FOR THE TRAFFIC MANAGMENT SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Issued: 24-JUN-1991

To:

A-91-035

REQUIRE THAT TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUALS INCLUDE PROCEDURES SPECIFYING MINIMUM FUEL VALUES FOR VARIOUS PHASES OF AIRLINE FLIGHTS AT WHICH A LANDING SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED AND WHEN EMERGENCY HANDLING BY ATC SHOULD BE REQUESTED. THE MANUAL REQUIREMENT AND ASSOCIATED AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES SHOULD INCLUDE CRITERIA FOR WHEN ATC MUST BE NOTIFIED THAT THE AIRPLANE MUST BE EN ROUTE TO ITS DESTINATION OR ALTERNATE AIRPORT VIA ROUTINE HANDLING, AND WHEN EMERGENCY HANDLING IS REQUIRED. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)

Issued: 24-JUN-1991

To: FAA

A-91-036

INCORPORATE INTO AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE A RECORDER BROADCAST OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION THAT CAN BE MONITORED BY ALL AIRCRAFT WITHIN EACH CENTER\'S BOUNDARIES TO PROVIDE PILOTS WITH EARLY INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL DELAYS EN ROUTE. (Closed - Reconsidered)

Issued: 24-JUN-1991

To: DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE AERONAUTICA CIVIL, COLOMBIA

A-91-037

REVIEW POLICIES, PROCEDURES, TRAINING, AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON THE DUAL RESPONSIBILITY FLIGHT DISPATCHERS AND FLIGHTCREWS HAVE IN KEEPING EACH OTHER INFORMED OF EVENTS AND SITUATIONS THAT DIFFER FROM THOSE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON IN THE DISPATCH RELEASE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path. Distance from Rionegro/Medellín-José María Córdova Airport to New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY as the crow flies is 3817 km (2386 miles).