400. Editorial Note

December 7, 1964, elections in British Guiana resulted in Jaganʼs Peoplesʼ Progressive Party
gaining 45.6 percent of the popular vote and 24 seats in the
legislature. Burnhamʼs Peoplesʼ
National Congress (PNC) won 40.5 percent
of the popular vote and 22 seats in the legislature. However, in
accordance with the constitutional tradition in the United Kingdom and
the Commonwealth, the Governor offered the Premiership to Forbes
Burnham as the person
commanding the most [Page 893]confidence
of the legislature as a whole. Burnham was asked to form a government, and he did so by
placing his party in coalition with Peter
DʼAguiarʼs United Force (UF), which had won 12.5 percent of the popular vote and 7
seats in the legislature. It took several weeks for the PNC and the UF to agree on terms for a coalition.

Jagan initially refused to resign
as Premier and he did so only after an Order in Council was issued in
London authorizing his removal. Jagan later held a press conference in which he promised
strong but non-violent opposition to the new government.

In telegram 196 from Georgetown, December 10, Carlson reported that the most striking aspect of the
election was the extent of racial voting. He reported that “in one
district after another the number of votes for Jaganʼs PPP was approximately the same as number of registered
Indian voters.” Carlson said that
the cause of “such complete racial voting by Indians apparently stems
from fear and distrust of African-led government” and that the PPPʼs propaganda and pre-election violence
played on those fears and “created psychology which made Indians
impervious to reason. Thus Indians deserted United Force with its
advocacy of multi-racial approach, non-violence, and prosperity.
Likewise rejected was Justice Party leader Raiʼs logical appeal to
Indian self-interest to obtain share in non-PPP administration which was certain to come about as
result of election.” Carlson
concluded that the consequence of this racial voting was that the PNC–UF
coalition would have to govern without significant Indian
representation.

Considering the future, Carlson
was pessimistic about the depth of the racial cleavage in British
Guiana. He speculated that while the Burnham administration would probably try to
“demonstrate responsibility, improved government, and assistance” to all
Guianese, it seemed unlikely that such an approach would lead to
Burnhamʼs re-election within
the next few years, “especially in view of increased number of eligible
Indian voters at that time. Therefore it might be expected before
another election Burnham
administration may seriously toy with more radical solutions, possibly
e.g. seeking obtain independence in order to tamper with the electoral
system.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL 14 BR GU)