The procurement of ships in which to transport
food was no less important than the procurement of funds with
which to buy it. And more than any other department of the C.R.B.'s
activities shipping was directly affected by the course of military
events. Shipping problems began in the last days of October 1914,
when Hoover secured, not without difficulty, British permits for
the dispatch of the "Iris" and "Coblenz" from
London to Rotterdam; they continued in growing complexity until
five months before the Armistice in 1918, when the Allies and
the United States authorities having decided to regard relief
as a "war measure," agreed to furnish sufficient tonnage
for the needs of the work. No question --- unless it were finance
--- was more persistently difficult than ships, and none was more
vital to Belgian relief.

As is well known the shortage of ships very
nearly caused the Allies to lose the war. The great crisis did
not come until 1917, but long before that time the mounting needs
of the Allies and the steadily diminishing tonnage available were
reflected in the troubles of the C.R.B. These troubles, which
shippers everywhere experienced to a greater or less degree, were
augmented for the Commission because its tonnage requirements
were so great and because its ships, to reach their destination
at Rotterdam, had to cross the narrow seas where the naval war,
carried on largely under water, was most intense. The hazards
of mine and submarine were great, and owners, reasonably enough,
preferred to employ their ships elsewhere on equally profitable
and less dangerous voyages. Moreover, since the C.R.B. ships crossed
and recrossed both the British and German blockade lines, complicated
regulations were established and frequently revised by the blockade
officials. Notable among these requirements were: the C.R.B. flag;
special markings; safe-conduct passes; and special sailing routes.

The first phase of the shipping story concerns
British and German permits, regulations, and guarantees and successful
efforts of the Commission to secure immunity to non-neutral vessels
under its flag. The second, the effects of the German "War
Zone" decree of 1915. The third, Hoover's various projects
in 1915-16 to secure ships for relief service, i.e., the use of
interned German ships; the employment of United States naval colliers;
negotiations leading to the acquisition by the Commission of ships
under the Belgian flag as an inadequate but permanent relief fleet,
and the plans to purchase additional vessels. Then came the great
crisis: the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare
in 1917, its disastrous effects on relief shipping, and Hoover's
and Poland's efforts in America and London to prevent drastic
curtailment of the C.R.B. requirements, and finally, the successful
negotiations with Allied and American authorities in 1918 for
the provision of sufficient ships for relief.

.

1. The C.R.B. Flag. November-December
1914

On the 20th October 1914 the British Foreign
Office informed Ambassador Page(114) that the Government
was not stopping the shipment of food supplies for the civil population
of Belgium from neutral countries in neutral ships.
This negative and limited acquiescence to the penetration of the
blockade quickly proved inadequate to the needs of the Commission,
which aimed at the necessary program of 80,000 tons of provisions
each month calling for the employment of forty ocean steamers
under continuous charter. There was no huge volume of neutral
shipping, and that procurable was extremely expensive. Hoover,
recognizing that transportation was a major problem, at once approached
the British Foreign Office for further concessions. On the 5th
November 1914 he asked Sir Edward Grey(115) to give special
privileges to relief cargoes, and suggested that the real solution
to the shipping troubles was to permit the Commission to charter
ships flying the British flag. In addition to his request for
permission to use non-neutral vessels in the relief service
Hoover asked that Government Insurance(116) be made available
for British ships in the C.R.B. service. As far as the Commission
was concerned these two concessions were closely connected as
owners would not charter their vessels to make the hazardous passage
across the North Sea to Rotterdam without this insurance.

Before granting these concessions the British
demanded further guarantees from the German Government not to
interfere with any ships in the Commission's service. This assurance
the Germans promptly gave. Out of these negotiations came the
Commission's own flag on the seas, the special markings of its
vessels, and the rigid system of British and German safe-conduct
passes for each relief voyage.

Presuming on your kind offer to give us occasional advice in
our struggles I should be glad to know if it would be a possible
thing for us to approach the Foreign Office through the proper
channels to obtain the following scheme, viz.: that some kind
of document should be issued by the Foreign Office which would
serve as a pass for our complete cargoes consigned to the Commission
for Relief in Belgium care of the American and/or Spanish Ministers,
Rotterdam; these passes to be sent by us to the ports where we
have ships being despatched and to be there viséd by the
British Consul and to be attached to the bill of lading and taken
up with the bill of lading when the ship arrives. Such a document
asking immunity from all British Naval Authorities would be of
great encouragement to the people who are contributing free gift
ships---as there is some alarm in their minds that the ships may
be lost.

Memorandum,
by HOOVER, concerning British Government insurance for C.R.B.
ships

LONDON, 10 November 1914

Had a discussion with Ambassador Page in the matter of the
statement by Sir Edward Grey on the question of the British Government
insuring the ships of this Commission, Sir Edward having made
the statement that the British Government would be a great deal
influenced in this matter if the German Government would undertake
to interfere in no way with the Commission's shipping. I drafted
a cablegram to Mr. Gerard setting out the position to him and
asking him to interest himself in securing from the German Government
a series of passports for our ships leaving the United States.
This cablegram was dispatched through the American Embassy to
Mr. Gerard, via Washington.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 187

"Note Verbale,"
GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN, giving
Ding consent to the C.R.B. to use non-neutral ships for relief
shipments into Rotterdam

BERLIN, 23 November 1914

TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Department of Foreign Affairs has the honor to reply to
the Embassy relative to the "Note Verbale" of November
14th F.O. 1105, that the Imperial Government is entirely in sympathy
with the efforts of the American Commission in Brussels, designed
to supply food to the population.

For this reason the Imperial Government would consent willingly,
at least for the present, reserving the right to revoke this consent
should it become necessary, that foodstuffs should be sent to
Dutch ports even in other than neutral vessels, and would grant,
in such a case, for the use of those foodstuffs, the same guarantee
as if the delivery were made in neutral ships.

In order to avoid seizure by German warships, it is recommended
that these non-neutral ships be provided with a certificate by
the proper American authority in which it shall be declared that
these ships carry foodstuffs which are being transported by the
American Relief Committee, with the consent of the German Government,
to Belgium through Dutch ports for the purpose of feeding the
Belgian population. Further, these non-neutral ships should have
a passport drawn up in the form given below and issued by the
Imperial German Embassy in Washington.

[Translation]

.

DOCUMENT NO. 188

Letter,
BRITISH ADMIRALTY TO THE COMMISSION, giving permission to a British
ship with C.R.B. cargo to proceed to Rotterdam, but withholding
insurance

LONDON, 27 November 1914

John Beaver White, Esq.
The Commission for Relief in Belgium, London

SIR:

In further reply to your letter of the 25th instant, I am now
in a position to inform you that the proposed voyage of the S.S.
"Badminton" has been carefully considered.

It has been decided, so far as the Admiralty are concerned,
that the vessel may undertake the voyage to Rotterdam, but will
not be held covered against War Risks under the Government Insurance
scheme.

I feel convinced that you will realize that owing to the inevitable
risk which a vessel must run on such a voyage it would be inequitable
to expose shipowners, subscribing to a system of mutual insurance,
to risk of pecuniary loss on a voyage which the Admiralty cannot
recommend.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

(Signed) RICHARD WEBBDirector of Trade Division

.

DOCUMENT NO. 189

Circular letter,
ADMIRALTY TRADE DIVISION TO BRITISH WAR RISK CLUBS, suggesting
that shipowners decline to carry cargoes to Dutch ports

ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF,
LONDON 2 December 1914

SIR:

Cases are constantly occurring of applications being made by
British Shipowners as to the safety or otherwise of the route
to Dutch ports.

Quite apart from the safety or otherwise of the routes, it
is pointed out that the Admiralty considers it most undesirable
that any British vessels should be employed in adding to the already
very large supplies of grain, etc., which are flowing into Holland.

As you are aware, the Admiralty do not put an absolute prohibition
on such voyage, but merely rule it out of the permissible voyages
under the Insurance Scheme.

At the same time, it is hoped that British Shipowners will
in future decline to carry any such cargoes, and I should be much
obliged if you would circularize the members of your club accordingly.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

(Signed) RICHARD WEBBDirector of Trade Division

.

DOCUMENT NO. 190

Letter,
PERCY TO HOOVER, regarding the policy of the Admiralty in connection
with shipments to Rotterdam

FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON
6 December 1914

DEAR MR. HOOVER:

I have just got your letter and have represented the position
strongly to Captain Webb. I think you will now be sure that the
circular(117)
referred to matters totally different from the trade in which
you are engaged, and that all we now have to do is to make it
clear to shipowners that this circular does not supersede or alter
in any way the policy expressed in Captain Webb's letters to Mr.
White. I will push this matter with all the force I can.

The last paragraph of your letter does not exactly represent
what I understand to be the position. The question of the employment
of British ships by you, with or without an assurance from the
German Government, was received by Sir Edward, together with all
the other questions you raised at that interview, for the decision
of the Cabinet. Such a decision has never been come to, but I
have let this matter drop because you were able to settle the
question direct with the Admiralty, who are responsible. The question
of amount of risk involved to British shipping by a voyage
to Rotterdam isone which can be better and more expeditiously
settled direct between you and the Admiralty---it is far better
in such business matters to deal with the officials concerned
direct than with Cabinet Ministers! That is the only question
which the Admiralty have to decide; the question of the desirability
of facilitating your business in every way which is compatible
with the interests of the people of this country has already been
settled long ago by the Cabinet. That decision stands and you
must not let the momentary difficulties created by the action
of overworked officials at the Admiralty or elsewhere dishearten
you. Neither must you feel hurt if I put up to you from time to
time the unfounded rumors we hear about what is happening in Belgium.
I want to nail lies as they come up, but you mustn't take any
such enquiry as indicating that our sympathy with you in your
work is slackening in any way. Whatever appearances may be, please
accept my word of honour that we only desire to help, not to interfere.

Lord Eustace Percy has told me of your letter to him concerning
trade to Rotterdam, and in this connection I beg to enclose copy
of letter which has been sent to the War Risk Clubs in regard
to the vessels which you are proposing specially to charter to
take foodstuffs for the Belgian refugees.

I need hardly point out that the circular asking British shipowners
not to trade to Holland was in no way intended to hamper the work
of your Commission, but was dictated by other considerations in
connection with the war in which Great Britain is engaged.

Yours sincerely

(Signed) RICHARD WEBBDirector of Trade Division

TO BRITISH WAR RISK CLUBS:

In reference to my letter of the 2d instant, respecting voyages
of British vessels to Dutch ports, I beg to state that the desire
expressed therein was not intended to apply to ships carrying
supplies for the Belgian Relief Commission.

The Admiralty, while unable to allow such voyages to be made
under cover of the Government Insurance Scheme, are anxious not
to hinder the work of the Relief Commission.

Will you be good enough to inform those members of the London
group of War Risk Associations who are concerned in the matter.

The list of vessels probably chartered for this purpose is
attached.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

(Signed) RICHARD WEBBDirector of Trade Division

.

DOCUMENT NO. 192

Extract of letter,
HOOVER TO RUNCIMAN, requesting extension of British Government
insurance to cover C.R.B. ships to Rotterdam

LONDON, 10 December 1914

The Right Honorable Walter Runciman, M.P.
Board of Trade, London

. . . . . . . . . . . ..

The second matter is one of great importance to us---and that
is the question of British Government Insurance on cargoes and
vessels going to Rotterdam for our purpose.

Although the circular issued by the Trade Division of the Admiralty
to British owners suggesting that they should refrain from going
to Rotterdam was amended to the extent that the wishes of the
Government did not extend to our ships, the amended circular stated
that the British Government Insurance would not apply.

It appears that it had been the impression of the Protective
Clubs that British Government Insurance did apply to their ships
engaged on this mission and the owners with whom we now have charters
are compelled to take out independent insurance at Lloyd's. Furthermore,
the moral effect upon the shipping world has been so great as
to make it almost impossible for us to secure ships at all at
any price. The rates have been advanced in an extraordinary manner
for Rotterdam, and this combined with the insurance put upon us
bids fair to cost us something like £30,000 to £40,000
extra over what could be done if the British Government Insurance
applied to our ships as far as Rotterdam.

I have taken the matter up with the Belgian Government and
they have agreed that they will undertake to guarantee the British
Government against any loss which might be incurred on that section
of the voyage from British waters to Rotterdam and return, and
I understand they are prepared to do this without receiving any
proportion of the premium, so that if the British Government could
see its way to extend the Government Insurance to all our vessels
to Rotterdam the effect would not only be actual in facilitating
insurance but would be of the greatest moral and material benefit
to us in inducing the British shipowners to give us their help.

Some time since, in an interview with Sir Edward Grey, he suggested
that if an undertaking could be obtained from the German Government
that ships engaged on our work would not be interfered with, it
might facilitate the views of the British Government as to the
extension of insurance, although he could give no undertaking
in the matter. We have obtained this assurance from the German
Government so that so far as the risk extends to naval action,
that has been eliminated not only for the portion of the voyage
from British waters to Rotterdam but also throughout the ship's
whole voyage, thus to some extent possibly reducing the total
risk.

I would therefore greatly appreciate it if you could reconsider
the whole insurance question and see if the Government could manage
to meet our difficulty to this extent. As you are perhaps aware,
we had originally hoped to receive some subsidy from the British
Government in this work, but I understand that the Government
is not inclined to participate to this extent, and you can quite
readily appreciate our anxiety to reduce expenditure at any point
so that such funds as we have may produce the maximum results
in the way of foodstuffs introduced to the civil population in
Belgium. Such a concession as the above would not represent any
direct outlay on the part of the Government but would represent
to us a material subsidy.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) H. C. HOOVER

.

DOCUMENT NO. 193

Letter,
HOOVER TO RUNCIMAN, concerning the benefits of the Government
War Risk Insurance to C.R.B. ships

LONDON, 21 December 1914

The Right Honorable Walter Runciman, M.P.
Board of Trade, London

DEAR MR. RUNCIMAN:

We beg to acknowledge the receipt of your valued favor of the
19th instant.

It is quite right that the ships that I wrote you about on
the 10th instant are conveying only foodstuffs for the relief
of the civil population of Belgium, all of which are shipped and
distributed under the auspices of this Commission. Such being
the case we understand from your letter that your Board will give
such ships the benefit of the Government War Risk Insurance Scheme,
and we will therefore be obliged if you will be good enough to
notify the Shipowners Protective Associations so that the matter
will be made clear to all concerned. We have received from the
Admiralty general consent for the steamers proceeding and they
have advised that they win give special consent for each ship
if required.

We thank you most sincerely for what you have done for us in
this matter.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) H. C. HOOVER

.

DOCUMENT NO. 194

Telegram,
PAGE TO U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, regarding ships with whole cargoes
for Belgian relief

LONDON, 28 December 1914

SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

The Foreign Office informs me that the British naval authorities
will undertake in the future to facilitate the voyage only of
such charity ships to Rotterdam as contain whole cargoes of food
for Belgian relief. It is important therefore that such ships
should not contain other cargo, and to secure this protection
all ships for Belgium relief must be reported by Lindon Bates,
the Commission's representative in New York, to the British Ambassador
in Washington. After conferring with Sir Cecil Spring Rice it
might be advantageous to give this arrangement wide publicity
because certain societies and committees continue to ship contributions
of food on ships that carry other cargo.

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, LONDON

.

DOCUMENT NO. 195

Example of statement
required of masters of ships using the C.R.B. flag

ROTTERDAM, 27 January 1915

I undersigned, J. Hutcheon, Master of the British Steamer
"Polvarth," do hereby solemnly promise and declare not
to use the flag entrusted to me by The Commission for Relief
in Belgium for any purpose whereby any of the belligerent
nations have an advantage.

I further promise not to take any cargo on my homeward trip,
whilst flying the Commission's flag, and undertake to deliver
this flag immediately on arrival at the first port of call in
the U.K.

In supplement of its "Note Verbale" of 23d November
1914, No. II WK Be 179, relative to the supply of food for the
population of Belgium, the Foreign Office has the honor to inform
the Embassy of the United States of America that it appears desirable
that the following statements should be included in the certificates
with which nonneutral vessels are to be provided:

a) The express declaration:

1. That the ship contains solely food (and clothing) for the
population of Belgium to be unloaded in a Dutch port;

2. An undertaking of the master of the vessel on his word
of honor to abstain from any and all actions on the outward or
return voyage, involving assistance to our opponents.

b) It is further desired that the following should be pointed
out in the certificates:

3. That certificate and pass are valid only for the single
outward voyage, and are to be delivered to the German
Consul upon arrival at the Dutch port of destination, or to the
German Minister at The Hague if there is no such consul. Similar
papers for the return voyage will be issued by the Imperial German
Legation at The Hague;

4. That the papers do not bar a search of the vessel and the
cargo must be stowed so that search can be conducted quickly
and easily;

5. That the date of departure from the United States is to
be communicated to the Imperial German Ambassador at Washington,
the date of departure from the Netherlands on the return voyage
is to be communicated to the Imperial German Minister at The
Hague;

6. That an offence against these provisions or against the
obligations assumed works forfeiture of all rights to preferential
treatment.

The Foreign Office begs to request the Embassy of the United
States of America to be good enough to take the necessary steps
in order that the certificates may be worded in accordance with
what has been stated above.

[Translation]

.

DOCUMENT NO. 197

Copy of
German safe-conduct pass issued to ships used by the C.R.B.

The undersigned Imperial Minister hereby certifies on the strength
of the arrangement concluded between the Imperial Government and
the Government of the United States of America that the

British Steamer "John Hardie"
Master James Walker

has on board exclusively goods of the American Commission for
Relief in Belgium intended for the suffering civil population
in Belgium.

1. It is valid only for the present homeward voyage via Cardiff
or Barry and must be delivered immediately upon arrival in an
American port to the local Imperial German General-Consul or
to the Imperial German Ambassador at Washington.

2. The Master has undertaken upon his word of honor to abstain
during the outward and return voyages from any or all actions
that may involve assistance to Germany's enemies.

3. Vessels of the Imperial Navy have the right to search the
ship.

4. In case of non-compliance with the above conditions the
ships lose all right to preferential treatment.

THE HAGUE, February 6th, 1915

The German Minister

(Signed) VON MUELLER

.

2. The German "War Zone"
of 1915. February-April 1915

The German "War Zone" specified in
the declaration of the 4th February 1915 included all the waters
surrounding Great Britain and Ireland and the English Channel.
After the 18th February every enemy merchant ship met in these
waters was to be destroyed and neutrals were warned that it might
not be possible to prevent attacks on their ships since the British
were alleged to be using neutral flags. Although paragraph 6 of
the German Admiralty's instructions of the 18th February 1915
to U-boat commanders provided that the Commission's ships should
be spared, the C.R.B. was advised to direct its vessels to avoid
the war zone and to follow a course designated by the German Admiralty
around the north of Scotland and thence down the eastern part
of the North Sea and through a lane twenty miles wide along the
Dutch coast. For many reasons, not unknown to the German Government,
it was impossible for the Commission to follow the German stipulations
and maintain the program of imports into Belgium. Some of these
reasons are given in the following documents.

The Commission's oversea purchases came largely
from North America where the vessels were supplied with German
safe-conducts at the time of departure. Important supplements
to these shipments were cargoes of maize from South America and
of rice from India. Following the trade custom the Commission
bought many of these cargoes afloat as they were en route to England.
The vessels with these cargoes could not be ordered to Rotterdam
without entering the war zone since the British required that
all relief cargoes which included those from North America report
at a British port for Admiralty inspection. Moreover these vessels
had to be furnished with a German safe-conduct which could not
be provided if the vessels did not put in at a British port. The
Commission also bought large quantities of supplies in the London
market and shipped these in small cross-channel boats which had
to traverse the war zone to reach Rotterdam. All these vessels,
after discharging at Rotterdam and receiving a new German safe-conduct,
were obliged to put in at some British port for bunker coal, thus
braving the war zone again. It was not until April 1915 that the
German Government, as a result of Hoover's energetic protests,
agreed to permit relief steamers to call at British ports and
to cross the English Channel immune from attack. In the meantime
the relief steamer "Harpalyce," outward bound in ballast
from Rotterdam, was torpedoed in the North Sea.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 198

Letter,
GERMAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, TO C.R.B., NEW YORK, recommending
that in view of the German "war zone" declaration,
C.R.B. ships take the northern route to Rotterdam

GERMAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON
15 February 1915

Lindon W. Bates, Esq., New York City

DEAR MR. BATES,

With reference to the recent declaration of a war zone around
the English coast I beg to draw your attention to the fact that,
though of course the German commanders will do their best to avoid
any mistake, every ship entering the war zone will be in
danger. Also the letters of safe-conduct which this Embassy gives
to the relief ships will not remove this danger as an examination
of these papers by submarines will probably not be feasible inside
the war zone. I can therefore only very strongly recommend that
the relief ships take the course north of Scotland indicated by
the German Admiralty.

Yours very truly

(Signed) E. v. HANIEL

.

DOCUMENT NO. 199

Telegram,
HOOVER TO C.R.B., NEW YORK, protesting against German requirements
that C.R.B. ships take northern route

LONDON, 17 February 1915

RELIEF COMMISSION, NEW YORK

Please inform German Ambassador our British Admiralty and Board
of Trade regulations and all our charter parties require all our
ships call Falmouth for orders and necessitate proceeding direct
Rotterdam through Straits, otherwise all charter parties break
down and will be impossible enforce delivery. Last Monday in Berlin
I discussed matter with Secretary Foreign Affairs who assured
me as ships are marked and can cross Channel in daylight Germans
would give instructions they not be interfered with in accordance
their previous undertaking with us. Unless we can proceed as usual
route entire supply to Belgium will break down.(118)

We have just been advised by local German Consul that German
Ambassador Hague refuses to give return passes to steamers employed
by our Commission, except those holding papers from American ports,
and these passes are only good for return via northern route.
German Consul unable advise at what port steamer can call in England
when proceeding by northern route. Have taken up with American
Legation Hague, and they are now asking for definite statement
from German Minister there, and will also take up with Gerard
in Berlin. German Legation Hague refuses any kind of pass on steamers
purchased en route. Are you guaranteeing safe return of all steamers
from Rotterdam to United Kingdom ports? Will advise result of
Hague negotiations as soon as possible. Three steamers have left
Rotterdam for England without passes but are using Commission
flag, namely: "Treneglos," "Ariel" "Rockabill."

RELIEF COMMISSION

.

DOCUMENT NO. 201

Telegram,
HOOVER TO C.R.B., ROTTERDAM, protesting against German regulations
outlined in preceding document

LONDON, 26 February 1915

RELIEF COMMISSION, ROTTERDAM

Please telegraph Whitlock and Gerard fully result your negotiations
and also forward each of them following telegram from me and I
am sending it direct to Van Dyke. Begins: Utterly impossible for
us to procure sufficient food supplies for Belgium exclusively
from North American ports and are therefore compelled to buy floating
cargoes and to engage foodstuffs from other quarters of the world,
some of which are transshipped from British ports. Furthermore
utterly impossible for us to deliver one pound of foodstuff in
Rotterdam if ships required to go or come north of British Islands
as shipping cannot be engaged under this condition, and unless
German Government is prepared to give instructions that the markings
on our ships, which are visible for miles, and our flag, are to
be respected in the passage of ships to and from British ports
to Rotterdam engaged solely on our work, the whole business becomes
absolutely hopeless. No ships will use our markings unless on
our mission. We are only securing the passage of these ships by
virtue of the insistence on our part that our flag will be respected
under the agreements which we have with the German Government
and the assurances given to me personally by His Excellency von
Jagow, and if the German Government is no longer prepared to respect
our flag and their undertakings to us it appears to us that our
efforts must come to an end. I cannot believe that there is any
intention on the part of the German Government to otherwise than
assist in every way in their power this humanitarian effort. Ends.

HOOVER

.

DOCUMENT NO. 202

Letter,
VON JAGOW TO GERARD, granting permission to C.R.B. ships to use
the Channel route

FOREIGN OFFICE, BERLIN
5 March 1915

MY DEAR EXCELLENCY:

Many thanks for your kind letter of the 1st instant enclosing
a copy of the telegram of Mr. Hoover. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg
and I retain the most pleasing remembrance of Mr. Hoover and both
he and Your Excellency may rest assured that the Imperial Government
maintains its former attitude to afford the humanitarian work
of the Relief Commission on the part of Germany every possible
support.

We had also been informed of Mr. Hoover's anxiety through our
Legation at The Hague, and I had thereupon ascertained at once
through the Imperial Admiralty that ships of the Relief Commission
should also proceed undisturbed by the English Channel route provided
that they be recognizable by the customary insignia, which should
also be illuminated so as to be plainly visible at night. The
German submarines have been instructed accordingly. Herr von Mueller
at The Hague will in the meantime have advised Mr. Hoover of this
fact through the American Minister at The Hague.

In this connection we must naturally assume that all means
will be taken to exclude the possibility of a misuse of the insignia
of the Relief Commission. To this end the Imperial Foreign Office
will invoke again in an official communication the kind mediation
of Your Excellency to obtain from the British Government a declaration
containing the assurance that only those ships that are actually
in the service of the Relief Commission may carry the insignia
of the Commission.

As Your Excellency will easily understand, we were unable,
in view of the existing danger from mines in the war zone, to
refrain from declining to issue safe-conducts to the ships of
the Commission for the journey to and from England. On the other
hand, we will gladly issue safe-conducts, as heretofore, to those
ships of the Commission which do not touch at English points,
and at the same time urgently recommend them, precisely on account
of the danger from mines, to choose the northern route around
Scotland indicated in the "Nachrichten für Seefahrer,"
No. 3161, 1914.

We believe that in this manner all the wishes of the Relief
Commission, whose efforts cannot too highly be appreciated, have
been met as regards sea traffic.

I am happy to avail myself of this opportunity to renew to
Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) VON JAGOW

[Translation]

.

DOCUMENT NO. 203

Telegram,
PAGE TO GERARD, protesting against German refusal to grant passes
to British ports

LONDON, 18 April 1915

AMBASSADOR GERARD, BERLIN

The refusal German Minister Hague to issue safe-conduct passes
to relief ships from Rotterdam to British ports amounts in effect
to withdrawal of German undertaking Not to interfere with ships
engaged in this humanitarian task and whole problem this shipping
needs renewed understanding with German Government. In order to
get matters clear they should understand: first, that while relief
cargoes from America bear safe-conduct to Rotterdam from German
Ambassador, yet they are compelled to call at Falmouth to secure
permission from British Admiralty to proceed, thus are compelled
touch British ports; second, owing high prices American food supplies,
nearly one-half relief cargoes are now River Plate and Indian
cargoes bought afloat, which come into Falmouth for orders and
only at this point come under control Commission, and at Falmouth
they receive Commission markings and British permit to proceed,
therefore the Commission should be supplied from The Hague with
German safe-conduct passes which they can hand to captains at
Falmouth to carry them to Rotterdam; third, practically all the
Commission's ships are engaged for only one single voyage, and
ships leave Commission's service not when they have discharged
at Rotterdam but when they have returned in ballast to their next
loading port, which is almost universally United Kingdom; also
even when engaged for second voyage they must under British orders
call at United Kingdom port and in any event usually must do so
for coal. Commission totally unable induce ships go Rotterdam
unless they can assure them safe-conduct return.

In conclusion Commission must have right to secure from German
Minister Hague, upon application and usual declarations undertakings
and markings safe-conduct passes from United Kingdom ports to
Rotterdam and likewise on application at Hague must receive passes
for ships from Rotterdam to United Kingdom or other port where
she is proceeding in ballast. Otherwise British Admiralty will
refuse issue any permits for British ships proceed to Rotterdam
and as there are practically only British ships available whole
business comes to an end.(119)
All these ships carry vivid markings of the Commission and the
Commission puts every ship under bond to surrender markings upon
reaching destination of her service; moreover British Government
has entered widest undertaking not to use and to prevent use these
markings for any other purpose than the Commission's work. The
whole requires most energetic solution as the irritation growing
here over sinking of "Harpalyce" is developing the hand
of that party opposed on military grounds to feeding the Belgians;
and if German Government is desirous Commission should be able
to continue it requires complete agreement by them with these
moderate requests and better precautions that Commission's markings
shall be respected. Moreover if it develops that sinking "Harpalyce"
was done by torpedo in broad daylight without warning while carrying
Commission markings and safe-conduct pass it appears that German
Government to preserve its good name and faith should take some
appropriate action.

PAGE

.

DOCUMENT NO. 204

Extract of telegram,
C.R.B. ROTTERDAM TO HOOVER, reporting refusal of German Minister
at The Hague to grant safe-conduct passes to C.R.B. ships touching
England for coal or otherwise

ROTTERDAM, 16 April 1915

HOOVER, LONDON

German Embassy Hague has refused to issue safe-conduct passes
to any ships touching England for coal or otherwise. German Embassy
states that they only agreed issue safe-conduct passes back direct
to America. White seeing Legation today and will wire further
details later. First ship refused is "Dowgate," who
have put responsibility up to us .....

RELIEF COMMISSION

.

DOCUMENT NO. 205

Extract of Telegram,
HOOVER TO WHITE, C.R.B. ROTTERDAM, quoting message sent to Washington
urging the President to press German Government to resume issue
of passes to C.R.B. ships

LONDON, 16 April 1915

JOHN WHITE
RELIEF COMMISSION, ROTTERDAM

Have asked Page telegraph Washington following import tonight:

"Commission informs me German Minister at Hague refuses
grant further safe-conduct passes ships unless they proceed direct
United States for further cargoes for Commission without calling
at United Kingdom ports. This is direct contravention of original
undertakings to safe-conduct all Commission ships whether going
or coming Rotterdam. Most their ships chartered for single voyage
and return and leave service of Commission when they have returned
in ballast to United Kingdom port after discharging cargo in
Rotterdam. In any event all ships which intend make second voyage
on behalf Commission must call English port for coal. This gross
violation agreements may make work impossible particularly as
insurance and charters are undertaken in cognizance of agreement
of non-interference. While it is possible they can secure continued
service by offering extra payment and cash guarantees it makes
their already overtaxed funds totally inadequate as they have
today sixty large ships under charter. In this matter the Germans
are not only violating their undertaking but are rendering the
work almost impossible as it is nonsense to assume Commission
can charter ships go Rotterdam without provision for their return.
Doubt arises in minds Commission as to whether Germans endeavoring
to break down Commission's work by this action and anxious to
know whether or not German Government wishes them discontinue
feeding Belgian civil population. Ask President name humanity
and interest ten million noncombatants dependent on Commission
for daily bread use his influence through Ambassador Gerard obtain
amelioration of this impasse and provide for safety of Commission
and people who serve it."

Seems to me Mr. Ballin would be glad assist you in Berlin get
this whole pass business straightened out and you could also take
up "Harpalyce."(120)
If proves to have been torpedoed they should contribute our funds
£150,000 as some compensation for increase on insurance
rates. War risk concessions are already agitating on this matter
of passes and proper attitude of German Government is more importance
to us than(121)
interned ships unless we could get interned ships out at once
and unless the Germans themselves would insure them.

HOOVER

.

DOCUMENT NO. 206

Letter,
VON JAGOW TO GERARD, stating that the German Government had issued
instructions to its Minister at The Hague to resume the issue
of passes to C.R.B. ships

FOREIGN OFFICE, BERLIN
18 April 1915

EXCELLENCY:

In reply to your two kind communications of 17th April, I would
emphasize anew that the philanthropic work of the Relief Commission
for Belgium is fully appreciated as far as Germany is concerned,
and that every support will gladly be lent it. Accordingly, the
German submarines have now been directed to allow the ships of
the Relief Commission to proceed unmolested, if they are recognizable
by their marks of identification, so that a special letter of
safe-conduct would not really be necessary.

However, the Imperial Legation at The Hague has now been authorized
by me, by telegraph, to issue to the vessels of the Relief Commission
letters of escort not only for the return voyage to America, but
also for the trip to England, provided that the ships in question
are required by the terms of their charter to return to England
and that they take no cargo for England.

For their safety, however, and in order to avoid errors in
identification, the ships in question must be strongly urged to
carry by day and by night clearly recognizable marks of identification.

Furthermore, it is to be recommended to the Commission's ships,
should they wish to return to America, not to call at English
ports solely for the purpose of coaling, but rather to provide
themselves with coal at Rotterdam.

To make this possible, we shall gladly lend our assistance
that they may be able to purchase German coal in Rotterdam

I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurance of my highest respect.

(Signed) VON JAGOW

[Translation]

.

3. A Relief Fleet. March 1915-May
1917

By the time the Commission had won the right
to use nonneutral ships, a new problem had to be faced. Within
a few months after the outbreak of the war the demands of governments
and private commerce for ships drove charter rates to unprecedented
heights. Obliged to compete in this rising market, the Commission
found itself forced to spend an ominously increasing proportion
of its inadequate funds for transport instead of supplies. Hoover
realized that this condition would get worse rather than better,
and in December 1914 he instituted various projects with the object
of securing a permanent relief fleet which would make the Commission
virtually independent of the market. His first proposal concerned
German interned ships.

There were at this time a great many merchant
ships flying the German flag which, on the outbreak of the war,
in order to escape capture, had taken refuge in neutral ports
in various parts of the world. There they had been interned and
there they remained. Early in 1915 Hoover had discussed informally
with officers of the Hamburg-American line(122) the question of
using some of these vessels. According to preliminary discussions
of the project a neutral Dutch shipping company was to operate
the vessels at low rates for the Commission. As the documents
which follow show, Hoover began negotiations with the British
Foreign Office on the 13th January(123) and secured British
Government approval with many restrictive stipulations. He then
received the approval of the German Government and finally completed
contracts with actual shipowners under the very difficult conditions
imposed. At this point, though the contracts had the support of
the British Government (who realized the impending ship shortage),
the French Government peremptorily refused to approve the transaction.
Months afterward when the French became desperate for shipping
they requested the Commission to revive the question, but the
German Government on this occasion refused. The failure of the
French Government to approve the plan probably cost the Allied
Governments hundreds of millions in freight charges before the
war was over. The negotiations themselves were spread continuously
over sixteen months and bring out many angles of the war mind.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 207

Letter,
GREY TO HOOVER, concerning conditions under which the British
Government would permit the C.R.B. to use German interned ships

FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON
16 March 1915

DEAR MR. HOOVER:

I have carefully considered your letter of the 13th January(124) regarding
your desire to employ certain German ships now in neutral ports
to carry foodstuffs for your Commission.

I enclose a memorandum showing the general conditions on which
we should feel obliged to insist in regard to any such transaction.
If you can negotiate an arrangement which fulfils these conditions
we shall, I think, be able to give you an undertaking to respect
these ships in the same way as we now respect the ships employed
by you.

The temporary transfer of these ships to a neutral flag would,
however, have to form the subject of a special informal arrangement
between His Majesty's Government and the neutral Government concerned,
before we could consent to its coming into force.

As regards the limit fixed for the payment you are to make
to the neutral firm, the object of this limit is of course to
secure that the German owners shall at most receive merely a nominal
profit on the transaction. It is understood that you will do your
best to secure the necessary tonnage at a price as far as possible
below that limit, and as near as possible to the minimum which
would afford a reasonable profit to the neutral company without
leaving any share whatever to the German owners. We feel that
you should be able to negotiate on this basis with the German
owners, since the latter will benefit to a considerable extent
by the mere fact that they are relieved from the heavy upkeep
expenses and from the deterioration which must result from the
present enforced idleness of these vessels.

Yours sincerely

(Signed) E. GREY

EMPLOYMENT OF GERMAN SHIPS BY THE COMMISSION FOR
RELIEF IN BELGIUM

1. The title to these ships must be transferred to a firm in
some neutral country. The transfer must be made in a form which
would not normally entitle the ships to a change of register or
to fly the flag of the neutral country concerned; and the ships
must either revert to the German owners as soon as they cease
to be exclusively employed by the Commission, or must in any case
be recognised to be liable to be treated as German ships so soon
as they cease to be so employed. A special arrangement must be
made between His Majesty's Government and the neutral Government
concerned by which the ships shall, for the period of their employment,
be permitted to fly the neutral flag.

3. The Commission shall charter the ships from the neutral
firm who shall operate them.

4. The Commission shall submit the name of the neutral firm
in question to His Majesty's Government before the transaction
is finally concluded.

5. The ships shall, after His Majesty's Government have finally
approved the transaction and have made the necessary agreement
with the neutral Government, be immune from interference on the
part of His Majesty's Government to the same extent and in the
same way as the ships at present employed by the Commission, so
long as they are employed solely and absolutely in carrying foodstuffs
on behalf of the Commission, and the Commission shall notify His
Majesty's Government immediately it ceases to employ any particular
ship.

6. A list of such ships in the employ of the Commission shall
be furnished to His Majesty's Government and any change in the
list of ships immediately communicated.

7. The Commission shall not pay for more than 4s. per ton deadweight
per month as charter money to the neutral Company and no other
payment outside this sum shall be made by the Commission to the
German owners. The Commission shall inform His Majesty's Government
of the terms of the whole transaction before it is finally put
into force.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 208

Letter,
WHITE TO HOOVER, concerning negotiations in Berlin with officials
of the Hamburg Line and the Royal Dutch Lloyd Line relative to
the use of interned German ships

ROTTERDAM, 17 April 1915

H. C. Hoover, Esq.
Commission for Relief in Belgium, London

DEAR HOOVER:

GERMAN INTERNED SHIPS

In connection with the negotiations for the above, Mr. Hulse
was in Berlin and saw Mr. Ballin, arranging for a meeting at Amsterdam
yesterday with Mr. Loezer, Director of the Hamburg America Line,
and Mr. Wilmink, President of the Royal Dutch Lloyd. We enclose,
herewith, preliminary contract agreed to at that meeting. This
will be subject to some changes at a further meeting which we
hope to have as soon as we learn from you whether or not the Royal
Dutch Lloyd will be acceptable to the British Government.

The Hamburg Line have vessels in all parts of the world and
will be able to supply us with any possible number of vessels
we may require.

There may be some difficulty in regard to securing crews. It
is proposed to make an arrangement for ten boats as soon as they
can be got ready and for more boats to be taken on as fast as
crews can be arranged for them and as soon as they can be used
by the Commission. Under these conditions it seems to me that
it would be a mistake for the moment to take any further charters,
especially in view of the very considerable stores now on hand
in Belgium and the large tonnage arrivals for next month.

It seems to me that there will unquestionably be complications
in regard to the nominal transfer to the Dutch flag of these vessels,
and there may be difficulties in getting the agreement of the
British Government to the contract on the terms proposed.

In connection with the arranged rate of 4/- per ton, you may
be interested in knowing that the idea which the Hamburg America
people had when Mr. Hulse was in Berlin was 8/-; they then stated
that it would be impossible for them to find anything under 6/-,
and Mr. Hulse finally laid on the table an agreement under which
we are working with the British Admiralty, from which they were
able to see that it was impossible to secure a better price than
4/-. As to whether we shall be able to get under this figure I
do not know, but I have the feeling that unless the people here
have an opportunity of making some profit out of the business,
and that the German owners can at least make a nominal profit,
we shall have difficulty in getting the business through.

On account of the sinking of the Dutch boats, the wages of
the crews will be largely increased, and in any case it will be
very difficult to secure crews at all. In regard to the question
of an engineer of the Hamburg American Line of German citizenship
above military age, going as a passenger or supercargo on each
vessel, you will understand the wishes of the German owners for
this requirement. They would be willing to undertake that this
engineer should not be allowed on deck on passing through the
English channel or otherwise in accordance with any regulations
that it might be necessary for the British Government to make.
In the interests of the operation of the boats, it would be desirable
to have an engineer who thoroughly understands all the machinery,
to be available, and it may be possible that this point will be
the one on which our negotiations will fall down, especially if
a cut in the price is insisted on. You can understand that if
the owners of the vessels can be assured that the machinery will
be well looked after, they would be willing to have the vessels
operated at a price less than if this point were left uncertain.
Director Loezer stated the case of a ship which they had chartered
some time ago where their engineers were not in charge and where
the machinery of the vessel was badly damaged by an engineer who
did not know thoroughly the mechanical working of the boat. You
can easily see that an engineer might do more damage in operating
boats for several months than any possible profit that could be
made out of the figure mentioned in the contract plus the actual
cost of keeping the boat lying in port as at the present time.

We believe that the present contract is. sufficiently accurate
for you to place before the necessary authorities for their approval.

Immediately on hearing from you that the Dutch Lloyd is satisfactory,(125) we shall take
the necessary steps here to have them approach the Dutch Government,
also to have the matter placed before the Dutch Government by
the Legation.

There is another question raised which we shall be obliged
if you will take up, by cable, with the Government at Washington
or through the office at New York as seems best. This has to do
with the sending of the crews to the United States for the vessels
now interned there. We understand that the law dealing with the
bringing in of neutral crews to join vessels is uncertain, and
the Dutch Lloyd would not be willing to go on with the agreement
until this point is cleared up. The German crews, or at least
the important members of the same, are still at New York or in
South American ports, and it is the intention to send out Dutch
crews from here to take over the vessels. Under the immigration
laws of the United States it is uncertain whether this would be
allowed. It seems to us, however, that it should be possible to
overcome this point and to get the necessary permission from the
authorities in New York or Washington through our New York office,
who would probably know the proper authorities to approach in
the matter. As this may take some time we think it would be advantageous
if they get on with it immediately.

Yours sincerely

(Signed) J. BEAVER WHITE

.

DOCUMENT NO. 209

Letter,
HOOVER TO CHEVRILLON, asking for the consent of the French Government
to the project of use of German interned ships by the C.R.B.

I think I informed you from time to time that we were negotiating
to try and get the right to use German interned ships for this
trade. These negotiations have been going on since last December
and we have finally formulated contracts, of which you will find
enclosed two copies. The British Government has approved, and
has asked for the approval of the other Allies, which I understand
they have received with the exception of the French, and the whole
matter is now held up at that point.

In a general way the price which we pay for these ships works
out at about 40 per cent of the price at which we have to charter
ships in the market. It will make a difference of about 4 centimes
per kilo in the price of bread in Northern France. Aside from
the fact that it will save us from £100,000 to £150,000
a month and thereby decreases the cost of the ravitaillement in
Northern France very appreciably, it also has an important bearing
from the point of view of the Allies. At the present moment we
are the largest shippers outside of governments, and our entrance
into the shipping market maintains the price of transatlantic
shipping at fully 10 per cent above what it would be if we got
out of it, and it affects the price of bread in both England and
France in just about that proportion of their transport costs.
Under the arrangements made the sums of money going to the Germans
for the use of their ships is infinitesimal. Four shillings per
ton deadweight on a 5,000 ton ship would represent £1,250
per month, and out of this practically the whole operating expenses
of the ship have to be paid, and it is estimated by our shipping
experts that the margin over operating expenses will not exceed
£500 a month. Of this margin one-half goes to the Dutch
firm which operates the ships, and one-half to the Germans, so
that on a ship of this size the Germans would only be getting
a revenue of £250 a month. They of course have the benefit
of being relieved of the cost of maintaining their idle ships,
which is the principal thing which has influenced them. They have
also been greatly influenced by the humanitarian aspects of the
enterprise, and we had strong support from the humanitarian elements
in the German Government in our different negotiations with Herr
Ballin.

I was wondering if it would be possible for you to stir up
the French Foreign Office a little, in view of the above, and
see if you could get them to signify their approval to the English
Government.

The matter is one of pressing importance as we are having the
greatest possible difficulty in securing enough shipping for our
work, and, in any event, the freight that we lose represents a
considerable sum of money in which the French people are directly
interested.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) H. C. HOOVER

.

DOCUMENT NO. 210

Letter,
CHEVRILLON TO HOOVER, outlining the objections of the French
Government to the use of German interned ships by the C.R.B.

PARIS, 6 October 1915

H. C. Hoover, Esq.,
President The Commission for Relief in Belgium, London

DEAR HOOVER:

I have had several long conversations yesterday at the French
Foreign Office with the outcome that the ship question is decidedly
taking a bad turn. There was a note in the handwriting of Mr.
Delcassé himself giving his opinion as inclined to be adverse,
and, curiously enough, a very long letter from Mr. Klobukowski,
the French Minister to Belgium, very strongly giving his arguments
against the proposed combination.

I immediately saw one of the very high officials of the Department,
but found that his conviction was also made and strongly opposed
to our proposal. A note will be presented to the English Government
setting out the objections of the French Government, more or less
in the manner formulated by Mr. Klobukowski.

For your information, I will now present the case as set forth
in this letter and such as I remember it from having had it read
to me rapidly:

"In the first place it is a known fact that the Hamburg-America
Company is on the verge of failure and the proposed combination
might just save it. The upkeep of the boats in New York(127) is a very considerable expense,
of which that Company would be relieved.

"The boats having a neutral crew, many German sympathizers
might be employed in the service, which might lead later to deplorable
consequences. Also, at the close of hostilities, the boats would
be scattered in such a way that many of them would be probably
in home waters and therefore in a position to be immediately
utilized by Germany to start at once on a career of industrial
competition instead of lying in New York until they can be put
in service again.

"A further reason is that the hostile press would not
fail to say that the German submarine war has been so active
and so successful that the Allies are obliged to take this course
as the only temporary remedy to a very grave difficulty.

"Finally, the proposed combination is nothing else but
'dealing with the enemy.' The Allied Governments still consider
that the work of the Commission is only tolerated under the plea
of humanitarianism. The duty of provisioning and victualing the
populations in a territory occupied by German troops is incumbent
upon the German Government; the work is performed at the expense
of the Allied nations under protest, and the idea of chartering
a German fleet, of paying a German company, of relieving it from
an enormous expense, of guaranteeing its ships from any attack,
of putting them in perfect train for immediate action after the
war is over, all this for a service which Germany should perform,
cannot for a moment be entertained. No Allied Government could
accept such a paradoxical position as that of a German fleet
of steamers circulating freely, the only steamers of any of the
belligerent governments immune from war risks or capture."

Such will be the reasons presented by the French Government
in answer to the English suggestion, and I am afraid that the
Foreign Office here will refuse to budge from its position unless
some profound modification of the proposed arrangements is agreed
upon.

I will add that it is the opinion of the French Foreign Office
that, at the time when the English consent was given, no adequate
idea was formed of the important tonnage involved. I have it from
the British Embassy here that the figure of tonnage came as a
surprise when the matter was discussed for approval by the French
Government. I do not quite understand how our French Minister
at Havre came to be consulted, but it is certainly a fact that
his communication came at a moment when the Foreign Office here
was hesitating and clinched a decision.

I will be glad to have your suggestions on any further steps
on this side, but I believe that, for the present, the only action
to be taken is with the English Government.

Yours sincerely

(Signed) L. CHEVRILLON

.

DOCUMENT NO. 211

Extract of letter,
HOOVER TO C.R.B., ROTTERDAM, anticipating consent of British
and French Governments as to the use of interned German ships
for carrying relief

LONDON, 6 March 1916

Mr. C. A. Young, Rotterdam

DEAR MR. YOUNG:

GERMAN SHIPS

I understand that you will receive formal permission from the
British Government during this week to complete the contract for
the use of the German ships. I hope to be able to telegraph to
you in a day or two that you can take the matter up with Mr. Wilmink.

The French Government seems to have seen some light in the
matter as a result of my visit.(128)

As to publication of the amount of shipments into Belgium,
there is not the slightest objection to this . . . .

Yours faithfully

(Signed) HERBERT HOOVERChairman

.

DOCUMENT NO. 212

Telegram,
HOOVER TO C.R.B., ROTTERDAM, stating final consent of British
Government and authorizing resumption of negotiations with Royal
Dutch Lloyd

LONDON, 15 March 1916

RELIEF COMMISSION, ROTTERDAM

Have now received final authorization from British Government
to conclude contracts regarding use of interned German ships in
the terms of the original agreements. You will please take the
matter up with Wilmink and others as may be necessary to determine
what is the present position.

RELIEF COMMISSION

.

DOCUMENT NO. 213

Letter,
WILMINK TO HOOVER, reporting the refusal of the German Government
to permit the use of the interned ships

AMSTERDAM, 1 July 1916

Herbert Hoover, Esq.
Chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, London

DEAR SIR:

I have received today a letter from Mr. Ballin asking me to
inform you that a favorable decision in the question of tonnage
for your Commission is not to be expected for the moment. According
to Mr. Ballin the opinion in Berlin seems to be that with the
Belgian ships at your disposal you can provide sufficiently for
the feeding of the Belgian population, and for this reason apparently
they will not allow---at least not for the moment---the use of
German tonnage for this purpose.

For your guidance, I expect to be in London some time during
the latter half of July and will not fail to make an appointment,
in case you might wish to see me.

I am, dear Mr. Hoover

Yours sincerely

(Signed) WILMINK

.

The German decision not to permit the C.R.B.
to use interned ships was closely related to the growth of the
influence in Germany of the naval party which demanded unrestricted
submarine warfare. To those in Berlin who supported this policy
the humanitarian aspect of the Commission's plan was presumably
less important than the realization that to permit the C.R.B.
to use the interned ships would relieve the Allies of an equivalent
tonnage burden. During the course of these negotiations the shipping
situation had been getting steadily worse. In 1915 the Commission
had lost six ships by mines or torpedoes in the North Sea. In
the spring of 1916 Germans began a more aggressive naval policy(129)
in the war zone; the available tonnage considerably diminished,
while shipping rates mounted. The refusal of the Germans to allow
the use of interned ships for .relief would have left the Commission
in much more desperate straits than was actually the case had
not Hoover some months before the final German decision undertaken
negotiations in other directions to find the needed tonnage. A
scheme to establish a shipowning company as a part of the Commission
was discussed but had to be abandoned. An appeal to the United
States Government to permit naval colliers to be used by the Commission
failed for the reasons shown in the documents which immediately
follow.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 214

Resolution,
H.R. 79, 64th Congress, 1st Session, in the House of Representatives,
by Mr. Loud, relative to the use of navy colliers, etc., for
the transfer of relief supplies

WASHINGTON, 6 January 1916

Mr. Loud submitted the following resolution,(130) which was referred to the Committee
on Naval Affairs and ordered to be printed.

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS the people of the United States, through various relief
organizations, in compassion for the destitution of needy people
of Europe, caused by the war now raging there, have contributed
and are contributing large amounts of money, materials, and supplies
for their relief; and

WHEREAS for the ocean transportation of such relief materials
and supplies a large portion of the amounts so generously contributed
has heretofore been paid: Therefore be it

Resolved, That such materials and supplies shall, during
the present calendar year be transported in the auxiliary ships,
to wit, colliers and supply ships, of the Navy, without cost to
the relief organizations:

Provided, That such materials and supplies shall be
in suitable cargo lots, and that the loading and discharge of
such cargoes shall conform to such regulations as the Secretary
of the Navy shall deem necessary to carry out the intent of this
resolution:

Provided further, That not more than one-fourth of the
tonnage of all such auxiliary ships of the Navy shall be used
at any one time in such service.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 215

Letter,
U.S. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO HOOVER, declining to authorize
the use of naval colliers in relief work

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON
14 February 1916

Mr. Herbert C. Hoover,
Chairman Commission for Relief in Belgium, New York City

SIR:

I have given careful consideration(131)
to the subject of transportation for Belgian relief supplies in
Navy colliers. to Belgium, as requested in your letter of 10 February
and a telegram of 11 February from Mr. Bertron.

After consultation with regard to the matter, and after due
deliberation, we have decided that it is impracticable to authorize
the use of Navy colliers for this purpose.

I regret exceedingly that conditions make it impossible for
us to aid you in your deserving work.

Very truly

(Signed) JOSEPHUS DANIELSSecretary of the Navy

.

In addition to the proposals already noted,
Hoover presented still another which, in spite of obstacles, was
in part accepted by the governments concerned.

Among the vessels which the Commission had
secured for relief service were a number which were Belgian owned.
In general these had been bargained for by the Commission for
each trip in the same manner as the British and neutral charters.
In January 1916 Hoover proposed to bring all these vessels to
the service of the Commission on a permanent basis. Some of these
Belgian owned boats were flying the Belgian flag and the remainder
had been transferred to British registry early in the war. The
acquisition by the Commission of these ships for relief service
would have meant a real contribution to the Commission's shipping
program, but difficulties were immediately encountered with the
Shipping Control Committee,(132) which opposed releasing Belgian
ships under the British flag to the exclusive use of the Commission.
Nevertheless with the assistance of the Belgian Government the
Commission did secure most of the vessels under the Belgian flag
and was thus assured of the permanent service of some nineteen
vessels at a reasonable charter rate, and it could look ahead
with some confidence toward successfully meeting part of its program
each month. Though Hoover continued to press the Allied Governments
for those Belgian vessels under British flag, the decision was
finally adverse and the Commission was obliged to find the additional
tonnage required in the open market as heretofore.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 216

Telegram,
HOOVER TO MINISTER HYMANS, describing the shipping difficulties
of the Commission and requesting the assistance of the Belgian
Government in securing Belgian owned ships for relief service

LONDON, 12 January 1916

MINISTER HYMANS, Care of Prime Minister de Broqueville

Commission Relief in Belgium has been unable secure any British
charters since 12th December and all our British ships en route
Rotterdam have been detained here since 23rd December owing to
Admiralty refusing permission to proceed until North Sea more
free from mines. Situation is extremely serious and the outlook
very alarming. We are endeavoring to arrange for all available
Belgian-owned ships to enter our service but find that many are
under the English flag and therefore liable to be prohibited from
proceeding to Rotterdam. Please discuss situation with Minister
Segers and raise question whether ships under Belgian flag which
have been requisitioned could be released for our service and
replaced in so far as required by Belgian-owned ships under British
flag.

HOOVER

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DOCUMENT NO. 217

Telegram,
HOOVER TO PRIME MINISTER DE BROQUEVILLE AND MINISTER SEGERS OF
THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT, urging that the Belgian Government pass
the necessary legislation making it legal to requisition Belgian
ships

LONDON, 26 January 1916

PRIME MINISTER DE BROQUEVILLE, AND MINISTER SEGERS, HAVRE

According information received from representatives of English
Marine it is probable that friendly arrangements can be made between
the Belgian shipowners and ourselves for the chartering of Belgian
vessels for the Commission. In order to allow the Belgian owners
to break their existing contracts, it is urgent that a bill should
be passed making it legal to requisition Belgian ships without
a moment's delay. Each day's delay means one day for Belgium without
bread. The security of the boats themselves makes it necessary
to place them under requisition. Whilst waiting this step no charters
can be definitely fixed.

HOOVER

[Translation]

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DOCUMENT NO. 218

Letter,
HOOVER TO CHEVRILLON, describing the relief-shipping situation
and outlining proposals for using Belgian ships

LONDON, 19 January 1916

Louis Chevrillon, Esq., Paris

DEAR CHEVRILLON:

We have been investigating and discussing Belgian-owned ships
and we find that there are about twenty-five Belgian ships flying
the English flag which would be suitable for our purposes, and
there are about twenty-six Belgian ships flying the Belgian flag
besides those already in the services of the Belgian Government
which would also be suitable. Belgian-owned ships which fly the
British flag are necessarily subject to English law and ten of
them are at present requisitioned by the British Admiralty. Through
the Belgian Legation here we have put up an urgent request that
the English Government should requisition the remaining fifteen
such ships, in order that they might terminate legally all their
outstanding contracts and charters, and that immediately afterwards
they be released (the whole twenty-five ships) on condition that
they enter into our service at a reasonable rate. Furthermore,
we have telegraphed this morning to the Belgian Government at
Havre, urging them strongly to requisition, on their own account,
the twenty-five ships which fly the Belgian flag, and are therefore
subject to Belgian law, that they should then release the ships
from requisition, subject to the owners entering into a reasonable
contract with us, we undertaking that if the Belgian Government
should require any of them for military purposes we would hand
them over at once. This amount of shipping, together with such
neutral ships as we could engage, would solve our whole problem,
and this looks to be the only immediate solution. Even if we obtained
the German refugee ships, there are not enough of them, under
our present agreement, to serve our whole needs, and at any rate
it would be at least three months before a single cargo would
be delivered into Rotterdam by this means, which would mean that
Belgium and Northern France would have been without food for a
period of from thirty to forty-five days. If it should eventuate
that we obtain the Belgian ships and also the German, we could
release the Belgian ships for the general traffic of the Allies.
I do not, of course, know whether we shall succeed on this Belgian
line, or not, but in any event, it is no real solution of the
shipping position from the Allied Governments' point of view,
because all this Belgian tonnage is already in the service of
the Allies and in some capacity or another, either private or
public.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) H. C. HOOVERChairman

.

DOCUMENT NO. 219

Letter,
CHEVRILLON TO HOOVER, discussing French attitude to the plan
to use Belgian ships

PARIS, 29 January 1916

H. C. Hoover, Esq., President
The Commission for Relief in Belgium, London

DEAR HOOVER:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 26th instant
suggesting that I should seek support from the French Government
of the Belgian scheme. I have, within the last two days, called
at the various ministries, Admiralty, War, Foreign Office, Public
Works; and although I find all earnestly interested in the question
of a prompt solution of our difficulties, I find no inclination
to give a blind support without more information than that which
I possess. I have therefore cabled you yesterday as follows:

"Belgian scheme favorably considered, but Government will
not recommend blindly, without knowing to what extent will affect
military necessities. Insists on full list of ships in order to
examine which can possibly be spared, as even those under British
flag may be working for French military account."

You must, of course, consider that when I apply to the French
Government I have in reality to take up the matter with a number
of officials of various departments, each of which must be covered
as to responsibility and refuses to recommend a measure unless
he feels that he may consistently do so without prejudice to his
other responsibilities, which are, of course, very numerous, very
urgent, and very large.

I thoroughly realize that having cleared the matter in London
and come to an understanding you may be under the justified impression
that the French assent amounts to a mere approval of what the
British Government considers proper to do.

Quite unfortunately this is not at all the case, and I am convinced
here that negotiations to convince the Government that a certain
measure is urgent will take more time and worry here than it does
in more practical England.

I have, however, the positive assurance that in the instant
I can lay before them a list of the ships to be requisitioned,
with the particulars of each, and the exact number of ships needed
by the Commission to complete its fleet, our matters will be attended
to with prompt despatch. However, I am meanwhile trying to obtain
a recommendation from the French Government of the requisition
of Belgian ships by the Belgian Government provided that as each
ship is requisitioned the French Government is allowed to accept
or refuse requisition according to military necessities. This
is the best I can do at present and I will not fail to write you
further developments.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) Louis CHEVRILLON

.

DOCUMENT NO. 220

Telegram,
HOOVER TO CHEVRILLON, notifying him that the adverse decision
of the Shipping Control Committee in London left the Commission
with the few ships under Belgian flag which might have to be
confined to the service solely of the Belgian population

LONDON, 3 February 1916

CHEVRILLON, PARIS

Am informed that decision here has been adverse to use by Commission
of Belgian-owned ships flying British flag, which forces us back
practically solely on Belgian ships flying Belgian flag. These
at best could deliver only about 300 grams food per diem to Belgian
population alone, and I fear we shall have to take decision these
ships be confined to service of Belgians and full responsibility
providing shipping for French population must rest on French Government
who primarily Government most concerned.

HOOVER

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DOCUMENT NO. 221

Letter,
HOOVER TO A. SHIRLEY BENN, describing the urgency of the shipping
problem

LONDON, 4 February 1916

A. Shirley Benn, Esq., London

MY DEAR BENN:

I have a feeling that perhaps I have not effectively stated
the necessities of our case. The Belgian and French people themselves
made certain demands upon us as representing the absolute minimum
of food on which they could continue to keep their populations
alive. We, on the other hand, in a desire that there should be
no over-representation to the Allied Governments in the present
critical shortage of ships, have most seriously reduced in its
quantities the demand made upon us, down to a point representing
what we consider an absolute minimum on which these populations
can be kept going. I have the feeling that the Committee(133) must have taken the attitude
that we were probably asking for twice what we could get along
with and thereby reduced us one-half.

In round numbers, we have ten million people to deal with.
Cutting us down to a carrying capacity of, say 60,000 tons per
month of, shipping under the Belgian flag, means 200 grams per
capita per diem of food to these people. It is our obligation
to furnish them with practically their entire supplies of bread,
bacon, lard, rice, peas, beans, maize, condensed milk, soap, and
supplies to some portions of the country of sugar, coffee, etc.,
etc. You can realize what this reduction in tonnage means when
I tell you that the British people alone consume over 400 grams
of flour per diem, to say nothing of all the other commodities.
In other words, the effect of our position will be simply that
the Allies are saying to their kindred in Belgium and Northern
France, "We, of course, must have 400 grams of bread for
our own people; we must have the bacon, lard, peas, beans, rice,
potatoes, etc., which they require; but you, on the other hand,
being prisoners in hands of the Germans, shall be further penalized
by having your foodstuffs reduced to a quantity on which a human
being cannot survive."

Therefore, do you not think it would be a square deal to these
people that the whole of the breadstuffs of the Allied Nations
should be pooled and that Belgium and Northern France should get
their share? Is there any reason why we should not have our share
of the ships to provide practically our share in such a pool?
A reduction of 20 grams per day---that is, less than three-fourths
ounce per day---in the bread consumption of the United Kingdom,
would give us more tonnage than we want.

There is a deeper question involved than the above. It is not
my position as neutral to point out political results. My sole
job is to advocate on humane grounds the feeding of these people,
and I think it would be desirable for you and other friends of
the Belgians to point out to the Government the seriousness of
the political mistake of reducing the foodstuff of these people
to a point where they can justly say they have been deserted by
the Allies, who are hogging after the food for their own people.

Now, after all this violence, I wish to make a constructive
suggestion. In the first place, of the Belgian-owned ships under
the British flag, some twelve or fourteen are at present requisitioned
by the Admiralty. On the other hand, some ten or twelve of these
ships are free and engaged in general trade. It cannot therefore
concern the Admiralty particularly if the ships which are free
from requisition at present are handed over to us, and in order
to enable the owners to cancel their outstanding charters it is
necessary that these ships should be requisitioned. This, I believe,
could be accomplished by the Food Committee without bothering
the Admiralty. Furthermore, we have fourteen voyage charters of
English ships arranged for future dates, carried over some four
months, and if we could have an assurance that these charters
would not be requisitioned away from us this would also help.

Again, I may mention that on this general question there are
a good many British ships plying in the Pacific between neutral
ports, and there are even some ships on the list we asked for,
which are trading between neutral ports, and it does seem to me
that, in all these circumstances, it must be of some interest
to the Allies to feed their own people rather than facilitate
outside trade.

The Belgian people have a feeling that if they requisition
the entire shipping flying the Belgian flag for our purpose, this
shipping could be devoted to feeding the Belgian population; but
this leaves the French population of two and a half million people
dependent on a few British charters which we have and such neutral
charters as we may pick up, and of course the Belgian shipping
does not provide enough tonnage for even a minimum bread supply
for the Belgians alone. My only right of complaint in this matter
is not personal but purely on behalf of the ten million people
whose very existence is imperilled and the last I want to do is
to give offense in the advocacy of their interests. So do not
allow any one to take my sentiments as being in the slightest
of an unfriendly character to the interests of the situation as
a whole.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) HERBERT HOOVER

.

DOCUMENT NO. 222

Letter,
HOOVER TO CAPTAIN BULTINCK OF THE ADMINISTRATION DE LA MARINE
BELGE, requesting the use for the C.R.B. of certain ships of
the Royal Belgian Lloyd

With regard to our conversation of today on the needs of the
Relief Commission in shipping, I beg to say that although we have
taken a sufficient number of neutral charters to supplement the
Belgian ships during the third quarter of the year, we have as
yet been unable to secure the necessary supplement to the Belgian
fleet for the fourth quarter and from thence forward it seems
to us that the only solution of the needs of the Relief Commission
is to obtain from the Belgian Lloyd further ships for our regular
employ, beginning with the fourth quarter of this year and from
thence forward.

We are receiving complaints from the Bunker Committee that
we are disorganizing the neutral chartering market by our extravagant
bidding for shipping, and we are quite unable to do otherwise
as we must have the ships and the only way to prevent this disorganization
by having our independent bidding on the market, is to put into
our hands sufficient regular shipping from the Belgian Lloyd.
We simply cannot take the responsibility of leaving Belgium and
Northern France without food supply so long as we can obtain neutral
ships at any price, and therefore we are constantly under pressure
to bid against the Government for such shipping. We have repeatedly
tried to lower prices by holding back lower bids, etc., until
delays have threatened our supplies. It seems to us therefore
that it is in the interests of all parties that we should have
the Belgian Lloyd ships, in order to guarantee us a regular supply
of food and at the same time to reduce our pressure on the neutral
shipping market.

Unless we can obtain some assurance that we shall have a regular
line of shipping for the fourth quarter we are compelled at once
to begin a campaign for more neutral ships for this quarter and
possibly disrupt things again in the same way as during the third
quarter of the year. A few weeks ago we were without sufficient
shipping for this quarter and we were compelled to go out and
obtain ships at some price, and the result is the very reasonable
complaint of the Bunker Committee which it is beyond our capacity
to remedy. It appears to us that a common sense view of the situation
is that there are so many ships in the world that we have got
to have our proportion and that unless our energies die out we
shall get them some way, but it is much better that we should
be put beyond the necessity of being a disturbing factor to the
whole shipping world.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) HERBERT HOOVER

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DOCUMENT NO. 223

Memorandum,
HOOVER TO WHITLOCK, outlining the progress of negotiations for
the use of Belgian ships

LONDON, 8 February 1916

MINISTER WHITLOCK, BRUSSELS

SHIPPING

The Belgian Government completed the Law of Requisition last
Sunday and it is now in force. The necessary requisition orders
are going out today for all the ships flying the Belgian flag,
of which there are nineteen. They are badly scattered all over
the world, and it will take at least two months to get the whole
fleet into action on our behalf. We shall, however, be able to
get deliveries from some of the ships within the next thirty days.

This fleet will give us about 60,000 tons per month in Rotterdam
and with a certain number of neutral charters, which we can no
doubt get at some price, we shall be able to deliver at least
an undercurrent of food supply. Our position has become considerably
brighter the last few days because of this success with the Belgian
ships and because of our having been able to secure a few more
neutral charters. Also, what is more, we have had only one ship
sunk in the last fifteen days. The shipping we have arranged seems
to assure us normal deliveries in Rotterdam until the end of March
and we have about one-third of our requirements arranged for April,
all of this being entirely aside from the Belgian shipping.

The second part of our shipping program, that is, the securing
of Belgian-owned ships which fly the British flag, has met a curt
refusal from the Control Committee. I enclose herewith a letter
written to Mr. Shirley Benn for this committee before the refusal
and another written immediately after.

I may mention that Lord Curzon is chairman of this committee
and is at present with the King of the Belgians, who has been
asked by Mr. Hymans to take the matter up with Lord Curzon.

Furthermore, I have informed the French Government formally,
that shipping under the Belgian flag will be unable to entirely
supply the Belgian people, and that reluctantly we have been compelled
to take the decision that we cannot ask the Belgian people to
starve in favor of the French, and that the responsibility for
the people in Northern France is primarily that of the French
Government and that unless they can furnish us shipping we have
to decline to continue. This attitude has produced a perfect storm
in Paris, and I am going tomorrow to see if I can direct the hurricane
so as to secure the second stage in our shipping program.

.

DOCUMENT NO. 224

Letter,
BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE TO MINISTER HYMANS, describing the shipping
difficulties which impelled the Government to requisition another
vessel under charter to the Commission

FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON
22 February 1916

Monsieur Paul Hymans
Belgian Minister, London

SIR:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of
the 10th instant (No. 1463) regarding the requisitioning of the
S.S. "Flandrier" chartered by the Commission for Relief
in Belgium.

I have laid this whole question before the competent authorities
and I have the honour to assure you that it is the policy of His
Majesty's Government to give to the Commission for Relief in Belgium
such facilities for obtaining tonnage as are possible in present
circumstances. But I wish to lay before you, for the consideration
of the Belgian Government, the very great difficulties, and indeed
dangers, to which the Allied Governments are exposed by the present
extreme shortage of shipping. His Majesty's Government are in
the position of having in large measure to supply the urgent needs
of the other Allies, and they are therefore responsible in that
measure for the due and proper allotment of resources on which
the ability of the Allies to give effect to the guarantees just
solemnly renewed to the Belgian Government must largely depend.

While, therefore, I welcome the representations you have recently
been good enough to make in this matter, as tending to bring to
a clear issue the question of relief to which your Government
naturally attach such supreme importance, and while everything
possible will be done to meet these representations with a favourable
response, I trust you will represent to your Government the great
difficulties in which His Majesty's Government are placed and
will make it clear to them that the conflict, which so frequently
takes place between the military requirements of the Allies on
the one hand and those of the Belgian Government in connection
with the work of relief on the other, is not to be construed as
throwing doubt on the good will repeatedly expressed by His Majesty's
Government towards that work. I have the honour to be, with the
highest consideration, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant

(For the Secretary of State)

(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN

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DOCUMENT NO. 225

Letter,
HOOVER TO PERCY, stating the shipping requirements of the Commission

LONDON, 8 September 1916

Lord Eustace Percy
Foreign Office, London

DEAR LORD EUSTACE:

With regard to the shipping situation, I can only reiterate
that the actual tonnage which we now want to deliver into Belgium
and Northern France is 101,000 tons, actual weight. The tonnage
required by virtue of space measurements and the necessity for
the provision of some small margin for delays is another 24,000
tons, or, say, a total of 125,000 tons. Out of this as long as
we can ship rice, beans, and some other commodities from this
country, we do not need overseas for approximately more than 16,000
tons, leaving a balance of overseas tonnage required of 109,000
tons. The twenty ships we have in our constant employment flying
the Belgian flag, should deliver approximately 60,000 tons per
month, leaving 44,000 to be provided. If we obtained this tonnage
from the States we should be able to handle it with ten voyage
charters, or, in our regular employ, with an additional twenty
average steamers per month. All this of course depends upon our
being able to continue shipping supplies of beans from this country
and upon our being able to obtain commodities in the States without
having to go to the Argentine. Our position is that we have enough
tonnage arranged to the end of October and we have about 50,000
tons of arrivals arranged for November. If we could get the twelve
Belgian Lloyd ship's which fly the British flag, which are under
discussion, to add to our regular fleet, we would only need to
go into the neutral market to secure about four or five voyage
charters per month. I believe this would be a much more satisfactory
arrangement, as it seems to us obvious that there would be a drop
in neutral rates by removing our competition, and the same neutral
ships would be available to the Allied Governments that are available
to us.

Yours faithfully

(Signed) HERBERT HOOVER

.

The refusal of the British authorities to turn
over to the Commission the remaining Belgian vessels under British
registry and the great difficulty of procuring charters in the
open market led Hoover to revive the project of buying ships outright
for the use of the C.R.B. In early 1917 plans were in hand to
buy eleven ships of the American Transatlantic Steamship Company-the
so-called Wagner fleet. These vessels were "blacklisted"
by the Allies, for the reason that though they were of American
registry, they were suspected of being German owned. The total
cost of such a purchase involved some $10,000,000. Several of
the vessels were already in British and French Prize Courts, and
the ensuing diplomatic and legal complications held up the project.
Another plan of a similar nature which involved the purchase of
vessels just constructed in American shipyards proceeded to the
actual signing of the contracts of sale. Both plans were dropped
in May 1917 when the Commission learned that the Allied and American
Governments proposed to requisition all steamers under their flags
and pool their shipping resources.

Cancel all arrangements with White and others regarding purchase
ships. Pool to include all Allied shipping will probably be formed
to control purchase and assignment of tonnage and even should
we purchase ships now it would only mean that we would have that
much less tonnage assigned us later on.