MR. BERGER: Good afternoon. Let me give you a report on the
Yeltsin-Clinton meeting, which just broke up. It lasted about an hour.
It was a very good meeting, very constructive, very positive, and
I believe very productive.

President Yeltsin was in good form. He was strong, he was
forceful. His sense of humor was evident. And of the 17 meetings that
the President has had with President Yeltsin over the last almost
seven years, six and a half years, I think this was one of the best.

They agreed essentially that our two countries have gone through a
difficult period through the Kosovo war, Kosovo conflict. It put
substantial strains on our relationship, but it was now time to turn
to the future, to put that behind us, to cooperate on the peace, and to
spend the remaining period of President Yeltsin's term and President
Clinton's term getting things done for the United States and for Russia.

In that connection, President Yeltsin asked that the
Gore-Stepashin Commission, which I've talked to you about before -- the
commission the Vice President has had for a number of years with the
Russian Prime Minister -- be renewed, because it is such a productive
channel. And the President agreed, and I suspect that Prime Minister
Stepashin will be coming to the United States sometime in the summer.

President Yeltsin presented President Clinton with a very
interesting gift. He said that when he had come into office -- or at
least several years ago -- he had asked all of the agencies of the
Russian government to declassify any and all material related to
President Kennedy, and President Kennedy's assassination, both military
and civilian archives, as well as private archives. And he presented
to the President today a document which contains the material that was
the result of this review -- that has apparently taken several years.

The President expressed gratitude for this. He said that
President Kennedy's both life and death is a subject of enormous
interest and fascination to the American people, and this is something
that they will find very important and useful.

Q What's in it?

MR. BERGER: I don't read Russian and I don't know -- I haven't had a
chance to look at it.

Q It's in Russian?

MR. BERGER: The documents appear to be in Russian; whether there
is a translated version or not, I don't know.

Q -- a bomb shelter of some sort?

MR. BERGER: During the meeting, I was trying to pay attention to
meetings, so I didn't read the documents. (Laughter.) I'm sorry.

Q -- news cycle. (Laughter.)

MR. BERGER: I'm sure that those documents will be reviewed
carefully and all interesting elements will be made public.

The President said essentially that our relationship had gone --
had been tested over the past four months and that we had passed the
test. And he thanked President Yeltsin for not giving up on our
relationship, and for deciding even if they could not join us in the
war, they would help to make peace. And he said now it's time,
President Clinton said, for us to focus on other areas. And President
Yeltsin agreed very much with that formulation. So there's very little
looking back in this meeting.

On the arms control area -- let me start with that -- the two
Presidents agreed on a number of elements. Number one, President
Yeltsin said that they remain committed to START II; this is something
Prime Minister Stepashin had said yesterday. I believe it was Foreign
Minister Ivanov said he did not believe it was likely or possible for
that to happen before the Duma leaves for the summer, but it is
something they will return to.

At the same time, the two Presidents agreed that they will resume
discussions on START III and on the ABM Treaty in the fall. Now, this
is very significant because for the first time the Russians have agreed
to discuss changes in the ABM Treaty that may be necessitated by a
national missile defense system were we to decide to deploy one. At
the same time, we've indicated that we will continue the discussions
that have been going on at an expert level on what a START III package
might look like -- these are not really negotiations, these are
essentially consultations or discussions preliminary to negotiations
on START III, so that if START II is ratified the two sides will be
able to move very swiftly towards a formal START III negotiation.

And President Yeltsin said he wanted the ministers to report back
to the Presidents by July 30th; that if we left things only to the
experts, nothing would get done, and he wanted to maintain personal
control of this.

On economic issues, the President said that he thought there was
goodwill towards Russia in the West in terms of economic cooperation,
but it was extremely important to finalize an agreement with the IMF
and to complete the actions that the Duma needs to take. And once
that happened, we could turn, for example, to re-scheduling of the
Soviet-era debt in the Paris Club and other things that would help be
of economic assistance to Russia.

He said, again, the President said that it was very important to
finalize the agreement with the IMF. President Yeltsin said, "I am
personally committed to it."

They talked a bit about Jackson-Vanik. This came after President
Yeltsin said that it's very important that we get rid of these
irritants in our relationship that are just perennial. We've been
talking about Jackson-Vanik -- this is now me talking, not Yeltsin --
really since the beginning of Yeltsin's era, and there's been one thing
or another that has prevented us to achieving congressional approval.

The President said that he very much wanted to repeal
Jackson-Vanik, but that the issue that remained is in particular the
rise of anti-Semitic statements and rhetoric, particularly from the
nationalists, particularly from Yeltsin's opponents and enemies, and
that he would hope that Yeltsin would attend to this, and if he did,
that we'll go back to the Congress on Jackson-Vanik.

Yeltsin was very firm. He said, "provide me with all of the
material you have and I will really sit on them." (Laughter.)

President Yeltsin made a plea for a greater degree of reliance by
the United States and by the international community -- the United
Nations -- on OSCE. I think this is implicitly not on NATO, to deal
with problems in Europe. The President agreed that we did want to see
a U.N. role and an OSCE role and, indeed, the U.N. would be responsible,
have overall responsibility for the carrying out of the civil
implementation of the Kosovo agreement.

President Yeltsin invited President Clinton to come to Moscow, and
at the end, President Yeltsin turned to Vice Minister Memedov and
Deputy Secretary Talbott, sort of wagged his finger and said, now, I
want you to do an accurate record of this meeting, an accurate record.
And they both said, yes, Mr. President. And the meeting ended.

It was a very -- as I say, it was a very friendly, warm meeting.
President Yeltsin was animated, and I would say it was a meeting of
renewal. That's how I would describe it.

Q Sandy, Ivanov has said that Clinton had told him he would
speak out in favor of writing off part of the Soviet-era debt. Is
that right?

MR. BERGER: Well, anything with respect to debt depends first
upon them finalizing agreement with the IMF. What the Russians would
like is essentially a writing off of all Soviet-era debt. I think the
President indicated that's something that we could examine, but we
don't hold much of that debt -- it's mostly German and other debt --
and that if he was not able to get agreement on that, we at least
would be able to reschedule the debt.

So he said he would make -- President Clinton indicated that he
would discuss with his colleagues whether debt relief, debt forgiveness,
would be possible, but that he was doubtful that would be achievable,
but at least we should do debt rescheduling as soon as the Russians
reached an agreement with the IMF.

Q Just to make sure I understand this, is he considering
writing off U.S.-Russia debt?

MR. BERGER: This would be a multilateral action through the Paris
Club. And most of the Soviet-era debt is not American, it's -- I
think the largest debtor, largest creditor is Germany.

Q Sandy, you mentioned the two Presidents have met something
like 17 times. In probably all 17 of those, Yeltsin has promised to
try to get START II through the Duma. Why should we put any more
stock in him saying it this time?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think there have been a number of times when
there really was a serious effort made by the Russian government to
get the START II ratified. In each case, something happened, whether
it was Kosovo or something else, that undercut the ability of the
government to do that; the fall of the government, for example.

They face a difficult situation in the Duma in getting this
ratified. But the Russian military is in favor of ratifying START II,
and I believe what President Yeltsin and the Foreign Minister were
saying is that they would make a good-faith effort to try to do it. I
don't think they made any promises on it.

Q Sandy, are you suggesting now the two countries can just keep
going as if Kosovo never happened? And is it your understanding as of
this hour, all the Serb forces did, indeed, leave Kosovo?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think that we are -- the two countries are
back in business. I don't think that -- I think Kosovo has left some
scars, presumably on both sides, but I think that the fact that we were
able to cooperate with the Russians in achieving the peace, the fact
that we've now reached an agreement in Helsinki which President
Yeltsin strongly endorsed for peacekeeping, and the fact that these
two Presidents want to get things done in their remaining -- certainly
before the end of President Yeltsin's term, which is next summer, I
think gives us forward momentum.

In terms of the Serb withdrawal, I can't answer, Ann, your question
exactly. I know as of this morning they were on schedule to be out by
the end of the day. Now, I don't know -- I have not heard anything in
the last five or six hours, and whether they will actually make it by
the end of the day or not.

Let me just add one other piece of information here, and that is
that the KLA and KFOR have agreed, ad ref to NATO, on an "undertaking
of demilitarization and transformation of the UCK." That is, they've
reached the demilitarization agreement, which now has to go to the NAC
to be approved. I'm not quite sure what the approval process is in
the UCK.

But it will provide for the KLA to maintain the cease-fire; to
cease carrying weapons in designated areas, towns and other routes; to
not engage in any military-related activities without the approval of
the commander of KFOR; within 30 days to place in designated storage
areas all prohibited weapons -- essentially everything except sidearms
and registered rifles, hunting rifles; within 30 days to ensure that
all KLA members of foreign origin have left Kosovo; to respect KFOR's
authority to take all necessary action to establish a secure
environment, to enforce the undertaking and otherwise carry out its
mission.

So I think that's a very positive development today; another step
along the way of trying to build a structure of peace in Kosovo.

Q Sandy, could you elaborate on Yeltsin's willingness to review
the ABM Treaty? Is that an indication that they would go for amending
the ABM Treaty so as to give us a green light for a national missile
defense, if that's where the U.S. is headed? Is that how far-reaching
it is?

MR. BERGER: What they have agreed to is to consider possible
changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM
Treaty. Now, in English, what that means is that we will have parallel
discussions in the fall on the one hand on what START III might look
like. There already have been some discussions we've had at the
expert level on that. And the second would be on modifications to the
ABM Treaty that may be occasioned by a national missile defense system
if we were to deploy one.

As you know, we have not made that decision, we will not make that
decision until June of next year, and then even if we were to make that
decision, there are a number of different so-called architectures that,
more or less, intrude upon the ABM Treaty.

The President affirmed our commitment to the ABM Treaty and our
desire to, if there were any changes necessary, to negotiate those with
the Russians. And this, I think, is a recognition on the part of the
Russians that they're prepared to have that discussion.

Q Is that apt to give you a freer hand on Capitol Hill? Things
have been pretty frozen with Helms and the Foreign Relations Committee
on the ABM amendment. Will that give you a little bit more leverage
now?

MR. BERGER: Our intent has been to wait until there is
ratification of START II, assuming that happens this year, and then
submit to the Senate together the START II, the protocol that we
negotiated in Helsinki that extends the period of START II, and the
agreement with respect to ABM-TM demarcation that we reached in
Helsinki -- to submit those as a package to the Senate. Senator Helms
has expressed a desire for a particular sequencing, but we will
continue to discuss this with him.

Q Any discussion of the seizure by the Russians at the Pristina
airport, or the misstatements by Ivanov surrounding that?

MR. BERGER: No, I think the President made a judgment, and I
think it was the right judgment here, to make this summit about the
future and not about the past.

Q Yeltsin didn't bring it up himself?

MR. BERGER: No. There was a discussion of Kosovo in the sense
that it put strains on our relationship, it had been a difficult period
in our relationship, strained our friendship, but that, in part because
of the intervention of the two Presidents and their staying in touch
with each other, the relationship managed to survive that, and now
let's get on with it.

Q What was Russia's position on the aid to Serbia had to be
included in the package?

MR. BERGER: Didn't raise it.

Q What about the invitation for the President to go to Moscow?
Wouldn't it be Mr. Yeltsin's turn to come to Washington?

MR. BERGER: No. At some point, obviously, it would be useful
for them to get together again. We'll decide which location would be
best.

Q Sandy, if President Clinton didn't raise the airport issue,
does that mean that he feels he has a full understanding of what
happened there, and full confidence that he knows who's in control of
what in Russia?

MR. BERGER: I think that we've already heard the Russian
explanation. I don't expect that there would have been any different
explanation had the President raised it. And it simply would have
diverted this meeting into a rehash of recriminations on both sides.
I think the President was determined, since we know what the Russian
explanation -- official explanation is, to focus on rebuilding the
relationship, on renewal. And I think he succeeded in doing that.

Q Did Yeltsin look healthy to you?

MR. BERGER: Yes. He looked robust. He walked a bit stiffly,
but he was very forceful -- the fist was pounding and at a couple of
points when some of his colleagues, his ministers and others, made
points and he didn't agree with them, he said, no, that's not what
I -- I don't believe that. If we let the experts, he said, do this,
we'll never get a done deal. There was othe talk at the other side of
the table, obviously. (Laughter.)

I thought he was very much in charge. I thought he seemed strong,
in good humor and very -- it was a very good discussion.

Q Roughly, how soon do you think the President will go to
Moscow? Is there an evident window, in the fall or something?

MR. BERGER: I have no idea. This was not something that I
anticipated happening in this meeting. We've got a pretty heavy
schedule of travel, as you know, including, perhaps, to OSCE and then
to the APEC meeting, which -- and the President today, at the leaders
meeting, I think got agreement from the leaders that there should be a
Balkan conference in the Balkans sometime in the not-too-distant future.

Q Would he go?

MR. BERGER: Yes. That is that the leaders should meet with the
frontline states someplace in the Balkans sometime in the next several
months. So I think you put all that together -- we'll have to figure
out the schedule.

Q Do you have a timetable --

Q Forgive me if you talked about this already. Where do things
stand with Russia vis-a-vis Western economic aid? And if you've
already discussed this, I apologize.

MR. BERGER: Well you know, I think the President indicated that
there was a strong willingness on the part of the West to be helpful
economically, but it depended upon Russia reaching a final agreement
with the IMF, which the President said would be a powerful signal to
the international community that Russia was committed to continue to be
committed to reform. President Yeltsin agreed with that. And then the
President said if that happens we can do other things, for example,
rescheduling debt in the Paris Club, et cetera.

Q Do you have a timetable on the KLA demiliterization?

MR. BERGER: Well, the timetable is -- I think that a number of
the agreements -- obligations adhere when it's entered, but there is
then a timetable, seven days to establish secure weapons storage areas,
30 days then to put all heavy weapons into this contanments, 30 days to
ensure that all KLA members of foreign origin have left. There are
various time tables.

MR. LEAVY: All right, Terry, last question.

Q Was there any discussion about when the Russian troops would
go into Kosovo, when they would deploy, take up their positions? Did
they reach an agreement on that?

MR. BERGER: No. I think that's something that will be resolved
with General Jackson very much at a military --

Q Is it our understanding that Russia today signed on to the
idea that there would be no reconstruction aid for Serbia unless
Serbian democratizes?

MR. BERGER: Did who sign on?

Q The Russians.

MR. BERGER: No. The issue did not come up in the meeting between
President Clinton and President Yeltsin. You'll have to ask Mr.
Steinberg whether it came up in the earlier --