How does your research on the changing identity of Saudi Arabia and the
people of Saudi Arabia, help us understand what's been happening? Particularly
Sept. 11.

... Following this crisis, many people are looking at, what is really going on
in Saudi Arabia? ... When we look at Saudi Arabia, especially through the
Western media, people think it is a very homogenous whole. This is not really
the case. In 1932, [the Al Saud family] have united the Asir region, that very
difficult mountainous terrain in the south bordering in Yemen. And in fact,
most of the tribes in the Asir who still have loyalties to their tribe rather
than the national identity have affinities with tribes in Yemen.

Then you have the Hejaz, the largest, and the most populated, and the most
heterogeneous -- culturally and religiously the most heterogeneous region,
because they traditionally got all the pilgrims who came and settled and
intermarried.

In Mecca and Medina?

In Mecca and Medina. And then you've got, of course, on the other side, the
eastern province ... Of course everybody is aware that the sole and only source
of wealth of Saudi Arabia, oil, is in the eastern province. And that is where
the Shi'a are.

Yamani is a research fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in
London and the author of Changed Identities. After becoming the first
woman from Saudi Arabia to get a Ph.D. from Oxford, she moved to London, where
she works on the Middle East program at the Royal Institute of International
Affairs as a social anthropologist. In this interview, she discusses the role
of fundamentalist religion in Saudi society and why some Saudis see Osama bin
Laden as a savior. This interview was conducted on Nov. 5, 2001.

For people who don't understand, the Shi'a and the Sunni are, at times,
blood enemies.

Specifically because, prior to the unification, in the great mosque of Mecca
and in Medina, all the Islamic schools of thought were represented. They had
all the Sunni schools of thought; they had the Shi'a; they had each one their
own imam and somehow in different corners. ... It was after the unification of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 that a process of national homogeneity was
attempted. That was gradual. ...

... When the government came to power in 1932, from the beginning, it tried
to get rid of these various different groups, or ethnic groups or beliefs, and
unify it all into one?

Actually, yes. ... [into] the Wahhabi Islamic thought... They regarded it as
much purer because it's more fundamentalist, much more conservative than the
people who are like in the south, the people in Mecca, who had more mystical
religious trends, such as the Sufi trend, which is very mystical.

So the dominant religion, the state religion in Saudi Arabia is this pure,
stricter form of Islam?

This I'm finding very curious, and I think deserves investigation. Despite the
fact that Osama bin Laden, who refers to himself, stresses when we watch him on
al-Jazeera television, he says, "I grew up in the Hejaz, I studied in the
Hejaz," and he does not mention Saudi Arabia. ... And many of those tribal
names that we discover were involved on Sept. 11 had tribal names from Asir
and from the Hejaz. In fact, five were Hejazi ... names. ...

Meaning they're from the Mecca and Medina area?

Or from the tribes of the Hejaz. And ten of the others were from the Asir.

Which is in the south?

Which is in the south, bordering on Yemen. So when we're looking at that, I'm
asking, "Is it a coincidence that these are people from the region of bin
Laden?" We know, and throughout my studies as an anthropologist -- and I've
done research on the Hejaz region during the 1980s -- that those people still
feel at the periphery. Periphery is not only a geographical state, but a whole,
you know, politically. They feel isolated and marginalized. Is that linked --
the sense of marginalization, exclusion from the center, dissatisfaction, and
other sentiments -- to their relations and their support for bin Laden? That is
one question that should be asked and investigated. ...

By the 1970s, ... all the national educational curriculum emphasized the same
unified school of thought: the interpretation of Islam by the Wahhabis. So bin
Laden, who is a product of that system, and many others received that type of
education, irrespective of their region. ...

So this was a homogenization of thought?

That was a homogenization of thought.

And we're told by people we've interviewed that it's the nature of this
thought, its fundamentalist nature, that can be easily manipulated, so that
people would, for example, become violent or extremist.

I think that the new mood, the new trend, especially after the Gulf War, has
become for all these neo-Wahhabis ... [is to use] Islam ... as a platform for
political ideas and activities, using Islam to legitimize political, economic,
social behavior. These people have been brought up in a country where Islam
legitimizes everything. And they have used the teachings from the religious
establishment, but became more political in expressing dissent and criticism of
the regime.

And it's been exported. To Pakistan, through systems of madrassas and
throughout the Islamic world.

And it has been exported, yes, indeed.

... What is the assessment, for instance, of bin Laden from the people that
you listen to [in your work as an anthropologist] -- men and women?

Most people I talk to, irrespective of the region or the tribal belonging, or
what is known as "class," or even religious inclination, admire bin Laden. Now,
there is a difference between admiring him and sympathizing with him and
supporting him.

So those people admire him. Why? Because they think that he looks
compassionate. Or they say, "I don't think that this man has violence in
him," the way Osama bin Laden presents himself. And that's a very interesting
subject. But Osama bin Laden has managed to address major issues that have been
upsetting people in the country, and outside. Mainly, the dilemma of the
Palestinians, and the Palestinian problem that didn't look to have any
solution.

People were watching on al-Jazeera transnational [satellite] and other
transnational Arab [television]. They have been watching day after day after
day in their rooms images of the victimized brothers and sisters in Palestine,
while the fathers of the nation -- in a patrimonial state, this is how the
rulers are seen -- the fathers of a nation were doing nothing to help the
brothers and sisters. And meanwhile, the United States is seen as supporting
the victimizers. So that, I think, had a very big impact on people's sense of
identity [and] their relationships with the rulers. ...

You say that people see bin Laden as a savior of sorts?

When they're waving his pictures, it's like a flag. They pick up Osama bin
Laden's picture to represent a certain flag for a leaderless people -- people
who feel they need a new form of leadership; for all those people who feel
dissatisfied, thinking that they've lost their pride. ... He fills a gap, a
political need, a rallying point for all those people. ...

You said that 15 of the 19 hijackers who are Saudis, some come from one
region or another and feel marginalized probably, because these are the
minority groups, if you will, within the Saudi kingdom. But why this fanatic
belief in him? Why be willing to go to your death? In fact, these people are
relatively well educated, it turns out, from middle-class families. We're not
talking about people who had nothing to lose.

OK, now we've moved from the simple admirer, who would even deny that bin Laden
has anything to do with violence, to those who actually are ready to give their
life and kill others. I cannot really go into the psychology, and I think it's
a very important subject. But I can only refer to these people's concept of
jihad.

Their explanation, or some new explanations of this, is that if we are going to
live in humiliation, there is no point. And since then again on the video that
I've watched, Osama bin Laden's words, a person is going to die anyway. It's
better that he dies with dignity, and for a cause. And the cause is Islamic --
the dignity of Muslims, and fighting the oppressors. So it's better to die than
to remain living.

Now look at bin Laden himself. He represents to the people a very wealthy man,
from a very wealthy family, who left all the comforts to go and sit in a cave
in an austere way of life, to say the least. ...

When Sept. 11 happened, we are told that some people in Saudi Arabia, at
least quietly, celebrated, or thought that this was about time the United
States learned a lesson, or applauded.

Other than shock and horror, really, there was a range of opinions. I go back
to the fact that Saudi Arabia is a very vast country. There is not one opinion.
And some people were frightened, horrified. Some had a contained jubilation.
Because ... in Saudi Arabia, you don't go out on the street to express
yourself. And you can't express yourself at a university. You can't even now at
the mosque. So it's not a place where you publicly give an opinion, political
or otherwise.

So perhaps there were a lot of people who were thinking, "Well, now they know
how we feel when we watch our brothers the Palestinians die. And maybe they
will understand." ... But I must say that [when] the majority of decent human
beings watched the atrocity ... there was a lot of sadness. It was painful.
...

Prince Bandar says to us, 'Those crowds in the street, I can get as many
people as you want to wave my grandmother's picture. Just give them some
money." He acts as if bin Laden is a nuisance who they, the royal family,
initially underestimated, but who is not so important. Is this the arrogance of
a monarchy? Or is it the reality that they're firmly in power?

We know very much that none of those poor Indonesians, nor Pakistanis, nor
Palestinians, nor other Muslims in Arab anywhere, were waving his picture
because anybody gave them money. In fact, they risked getting shot. Those
people who most probably were linked and supporters of bin Laden, and go and
commit suicide -- the hijackers -- you can't give them money and say, "Go kill
yourself." Besides, most of them did not need the money. So I think that we
must go beyond all these preconceived ideas, whether we're a Saudi or an
American, and try to understand issues in a different way.

But I guess what I'm getting at is, how unstable is Saudi Arabia? Is there
reason for the royal family to be concerned about the loyalty of the people, in
terms of your talking with them? Is this the beginning of a revolution in Saudi
Arabia?

This is not the beginning of a revolution. But this is the beginning of a very
difficult, turbulent time in Saudi Arabia. The gap between the ruled and the
rulers has widened. And there is a lot of anxiety, agitation, among people, and
even anger. There are going to be opinions expressed. And I do hope that we
would not have more terrorism in the country. ... I do not think that there is
any problem for the stability of the ruling elites. But I think the pressure is
building, and there must be ways of allowing people more space. ...

We are told that it's this form of fundamentalist religion represented by
this Wahhabi-influenced Islamic, if you will, ideology, or view, that has
created, if you will, a seedbed for people to become violent, to become
anti-American, and to do the kinds of things that we call "extremism" now. Is
that true?

I don't think it has to do with Islam. I don't think it has to do with any form
of this ... Islamic interpretation. ... Of course there is a problem with
dogma. But I think the problem lies with the political systems that use
religion. ...

There's been a politicization of Islam. You've said it. But bin Laden, and
his, if you will, similar people, are using Islam to promote political goals.

Yes.

They base this on a dogmatic interpretation of the religion itself, black
and white. Is the base of support that they are gaining a result of this
proliferation of this view of Islam? It may not have initially been designed
... Wahhabism is what I am talking about. ... Is there a relationship between
that and this development that we see of bin Laden and his movement?

Probably there would be a relation between an interpretation of Islam that
lacks tolerance, and is a more narrow vision of the world. But particularly the
problem is about the political systems that promote this type of interpretation
of religion. This gives people the excuse, the platform, to go ahead and
express themselves in Islamic language to suit their purpose of political ends.