Postconflict in Colombia (16). The missing actor

For the peace-building scenario in Colombia to
be complete, an autonomous, meaningful negotiation process,
with full respect for the political identity of the “other” guerrilla force, is
crucial. PortuguêsEspañol

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Demobilized rebels of the National Liberation Army, ELN, Colombia's second largest rebel group, surrendering to the army back in 2009 in Tumaco, Colombia. AP Photo/William Fernando Martinez. All rights reserved.

Today, the peace process
in Colombia is the world’s main referent in peace-building. On September, 26, the
Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) concluded
the agreements that put an end to 52 years of armed confrontation. If the
Colombian citizens endorse these agreements in the October, 2, plebiscite, this
will be the main peace-building achievement since the end of the war in Nepal
in 2007. These, however, will still be lame agreements, because they do not include
the other armed movement in Colombia - the insurgent National Liberation Army (ELN).
Without the ELN, peace will not be full.

Even though on March, 30,
the government and the ELN announced the start of formal negotiations, on the
basis of a five-point agenda, so far the talks have stalled over procedural
disagreements. The government has urged the guerrilla force to put an end to kidnappings
before proceeding with the peace talks, to which the insurgency has replied
with astonishment that it accepts no condition for starting negotiations. This
disagreement has resulted in major discredit for the guerrillas before a public
that does not understand and does not accept that kidnapping should be something
to negotiate. But this has not only meant a
media and moral blow to the guerrilla force - the government and the country
have also lost out.

To have the ELN on board
of the peace process is a priority as a matter of political coherence on the
part of the government and also for practical reasons. If negotiations with the
ELN fail, what we are risking is an all-out offensive against the guerrillas.
But this option would seriously delegitimize the governmental commitment to
resolving the politically-based conflicts through dialogue. How would you explain
in Colombia, and to the world at large, that while you are negotiating with one
set of guerillas you are fighting the other?

From a practical
perspective, the government urgently needs to negotiate a bilateral ceasefire
with the ELN to facilitate compliance with the recently agreed ceasefire with
the FARC. Such an agreement with the guerrillas would greatly ease the task of the
security forces in fighting and controlling the remaining illegal armed groups
in the conflicting territories.

Two
guerrillas, two processes

The ELN has fewer combatants
than the FARC and a political-military strategy that tends to put more emphasis
on strengthening social movements and underground political opposition than carrying
out armed actions. This means less visibility in the media and
also, in military terms, it is perceived as a minor guerrilla force.

At the same time,
decision making within the guerrilla is more horizontal –“democratic” in elena (from ELN) terminology – than the
FARC’s. This entails slower processes, in which internal dissent is more likely
to surface, and which sometimes produce confusing results. If to this we add the
fact that the different fronts enjoy broad operational autonomy, it is not
surprising that the guerrillas are perceived as indecisive and somewhat
incoherent.

Finally, an unwavering
commitment to social and political change, to which it has devoted as many
years as the FARC has, persists in the ELN’s ethos. Clearly inspired by the liberation theology, its
interpretation of commitment to the disadvantaged and historically marginalised
underclasses leaves little room for compromise. A profound distrust of the country’s
ruling class prevents them from committing themselves to disarming if no
guarantees of structural transformations are given.

Many do not understand
the reasons why the elenos have not jumped
on the peace train. They are being criticized for their alleged failure to
understand the political situation in the country, for being prisoners of outdated
ways of thinking and practices, and for missing an unprecedented window of
opportunity.

And yet, from the elena point of view, there are serious
objections to the established peace process. They experience some degree of frustration
because their lower military activity as compared to the FARC’s has placed them
in a secondary role. They disagree with the elitist character of the
negotiations in Havana, where a small group of people has taken decisions
affecting the whole country. And there is much unease at the apparent renouncement
by the FARC to ensure greater social, political and economic changes at the
negotiating table.

The
negotiations scenario

Despite
the current setbacks, Nicolás Bautista "Gabino", the guerrilla’s top
commander, has insisted in a recent interview on the ELN’s commitment to
the peace negotiations and expressed his
confidence that the dialogues will prosper.

On the premise of a
formal start of the peace talks, the most pressing questions are
methodological. If the central axis of the process with the ELN is citizen
participation, how should it be structured? More specifically, four key
questions must be answered: Who calls for participation (who has the necessary power
to convene the whole of society)? Who is to systematize information of the participatory
process? Who will make the final decisions? And how long will this negotiation process take?

Several social organizations have made
proposals about these, and one of the first decisions at the negotiating table will
be to answer these questions. Given the social and political dynamics of the
country, three guiding ideas could be suggested for the pending discussion:

Drawing upon what has been built up.
Social movements have been, for years, structuring agendas for social,
economic, political and even cultural change. Moreover, the government and
society have undertaken multiple negotiation processes - with the unions, at
the Agrarian Summit, regarding indigenous and African descendants’ claims, and
citizen resistance to big energy-mining projects. Several of these agendas are
clear enough, and there are even government commitments, legislation and court
rulings that point to significant changes. However, these changes are slow or they
are not seen coming. The talks should then start with a shared diagnosis about
the flaws in the existing participation mechanisms before drafting a new, long
"market list".

Recognizing autonomy.
The dynamics of citizen mobilization and negotiation with the state are
characterized by a high degree of autonomy. The negotiating table can make
these initiatives visible and recognize them, and thus increase their impact. It
can also promote other processes throughout the country. But a centralized
design for the peace process is just not possible, nor desirable. A creative
formula must be found for promoting synergies between the different, autonomous
social processes and the negotiating tables, and no one should claim to have or
assume representative and binding power. A positive outcome of this exercise
would have a major impact on the commitment to strengthen democracy.

Delimiting the timings. Change
does not come with the peace agreement, it is rather the peace agreement that should
lead to changes. To avoid frustration and possible new violent episodes, it is
important to identify clearly the results that can be expected from the peace
process in the short, medium and long term. The most significant success in the
short term would be to put an end to violence in politics. This is what
prompted the armed uprising of the guerrillas in the first place. Other changes
will take longer, such as the processes for agreeing and implementing new public
policies at the local, regional and national levels. Unfortunately, to do away
with structural and cultural violence could take decades.

A confluence framework for the negotiations with the ELN and the
FARC.

The
government must guarantee that the ELN will be able to negotiate in dignity - that
is, that it will not offer them to simply join the agreement with the FARC, but
that it will conduct an autonomous, meaningful negotiation process, allocating the
necessary resources and allowing for the time needed, and with full respect for
the political identity of the ELN.

At the same time, it is
essential that both processes share a common framework. In this sense, it seems
appropriate to recall the sequence of the negotiating process agreed by the government
and the FACR in 2012: the aim of the negotiations in Havana is "to end the
armed conflict", while "peace-building" is a task that must be
undertaken by the whole of Colombian society once the negotiations are
concluded. This task has just been announced, but the agenda, the actors, the processes
and the timings of what is known as Phase 3 of the peace process have yet to be
specified. By emphasizing citizen participation, democracy and transformations
for peace, the process between the government and the ELN could fill this gap
and thus complete a new global framework for peace-building.

Necessary
gestures and decisions

Making peace is harder
than waging war. It requires vision, courage, leadership and capabilities to
replace a polarized, maximalist rhetoric with actions that respond to the
diversity of expectations in society.

Having failed to get the
support of social majorities, the guerrillas start from a complex situation. Before
a skeptical – or even hostile - public opinion, they need to demonstrate with
facts their commitment to peace. So
does the government.

Peace-building
requires not only restoring confidence between the government and the insurgencies,
but also between both of them and the whole of society.

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