1. The case originated in an application (no.
66820/01) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Mrs
Astrīda Svipsta (“the applicant”), on 23 January 2001.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr J.-C. Pastille,
a lawyer practising in Berlin (Germany). The Latvian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Reine.

3. The applicant alleged that her detention on
remand had failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention and that it had exceeded a reasonable time, in breach of
Article 5 § 3. She further complained that she had been denied an effective
judicial review of her detention on remand, in breach of Article 5 §
4 of the Convention. Lastly, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
she complained of the length of the criminal proceedings against her.

4. The application was allocated to the First
Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that
Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of
the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5. By a decision of 6 May 2004, the Chamber declared
the application admissible.

6. The applicant and the Government each filed
observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided,
after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required
(Rule 59 § 3 in fine), the parties replied in writing to each other's observations.

7. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly
composed Third Section (Rule 52 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. Opening of criminal proceedings against
the applicant and her arrest

8. On 17 February 2000 I.S., a head of division
at the National Privatisation Agency, was murdered in front of the entrance
to the building where she lived in Riga. The same day the specialised
public prosecutor's office for organised crime and other offences (Organizētās
noziedzības un citu nozaru specializētā prokuratūra) opened
a preliminary investigation into the murder.

9. On 27 March 2000 the police arrested two men,
V.S. and V.B., on the ground that they were suspects (aizdomās turētie) in the murder and took them into police
custody. Shortly afterwards, they were charged and placed in detention
on remand.

On 18 April 2000 the Belarusian police, acting
on a request from the Latvian authorities, arrested two other men, I.F.
and I.Č., who had fled to Belarus in the meantime. On 28 April 2000
the men were extradited to Latvia. They too were charged with the murder
of I.S. and were brought before the relevant judge, who remanded them
in custody.

10. During the preliminary investigation, the
four co-defendants gave statements to the public prosecutor to the effect
that the applicant, who at the time had been the manager of a private
company, had ordered and funded I.S.'s murder for reasons of personal
revenge. According to I.F., the applicant had first given him 10,000
United States dollars (USD) as payment for carrying out the murder and
later comparable sums to enable him to flee the country. On 20 April
2000 I.F.'s girlfriend, who was questioned as a witness, said that she
had overheard a conversation between her boyfriend and I.Č. in which
both men had referred to V.B. as having perpetrated the murder.

11. Accordingly, on 1 June 2000, the applicant
was arrested on suspicion of being the principal organiser and instigator
of the murder. On being taken into police custody and questioned, the
applicant admitted having known the victim personally; however, she
denied any financial links with her.

The same day the police conducted two searches,
one at the applicant's home and the other at her office. They seized
a large number of documents and files, which were placed in forty cardboard
boxes and taken away.

12. On the following day, 2 June 2000, the public
prosecutor's office placed the applicant under investigation for murder.
At the same time, V.S., V.B., I.F. and I.Č. were charged with committing
the murder.

13. Also on 2 June 2000, the public prosecutor's
office applied to the Riga City Kurzeme District Court seeking to have
the applicant and the four suspected perpetrators of the crime remanded
in custody for an initial period of two months. In court, the prosecution
referred to the statements by the four men, which it considered to be
credible, and stressed the need to detain the applicant “so that it
[could] conduct a thorough preliminary investigation and establish the
facts of the case in an objective manner”. According to the prosecution,
“if A. Svipsta remain[ed] at liberty, there [was] a danger that she
[would] hinder the determination of the truth [and] evade investigation
and trial”.

In an order issued on 2 June 2000 following inter partes
proceedings attended by the applicant and her lawyer, the District Court
granted the public prosecutor's request. The order stated that the applicant's
detention was necessary in order to counter the risk of collusion and
prevent her from obstructing the investigation. Further reasons given
were the seriousness of the offence, the personality of the defendant
and “other circumstances”. The applicant did not appeal against
the detention order.

14. After being questioned on 6, 7 and 9 June
2000, the applicant eventually admitted that she had had financial links
with I.S. She stated in particular that, in December 1998, when she
had begun receiving income as an administrator of public undertakings
which were being liquidated, I.S. had started to extort money from her.
She also said, in contradiction of her earlier statements, that she
knew I.F. and had told him about a row she had had with the murder victim
on the subject of their financial links.

15. On 29 June 2000 the public prosecutor presented
the applicant with full details of the charges against her. According
to the facts as established by the prosecutor, the applicant and I.S.
had concluded a secret agreement in 1996, under the terms of which I.S.
had promised to appoint the applicant as administrator of the public
undertakings whose liquidation she was overseeing. In return, the applicant
had promised to pay her USD 500,000. By the time of I.S.'s murder, the
applicant had already paid her almost half the sum agreed.

16. On 12 July 2000 the public prosecutor's office
received a statement from a Latvian bank to the effect that the applicant
and I.S. had gone to Switzerland together; during the trip, the applicant
had paid all the expenses using her credit card. On 19 July 2000 the
State telecommunications company sent the prosecutor's office records
of mobile telephone conversations between the applicant and both I.S.
and I.F. and between the four suspected perpetrators of the murder.

B. Extension of the applicant's detention on
remand

17. On 24 July 2000 the prosecutor in charge of
the case requested the Kurzeme District Court to extend the applicant's
detention on remand until 29 September 2000 on the ground that a number
of investigative measures, specified by the prosecutor, still needed
to be carried out. The measures involved preparing expert reports on
the physical evidence gathered at the applicant's home and office and
on her state of health, organising at least six confrontations with
the defendants, questioning at least ten further witnesses and requesting
relevant information from Interpol's National Central Bureau. The prosecutor
also expressed the view that the applicant's guilt was “demonstrated
by the statements of her co-defendants and witnesses, the reports [on
the scene and the physical evidence], the expert opinions and the remaining
evidence in the case file”.

18. In an order of 26 July 2000 issued in the
presence of the applicant's lawyer, the relevant judge at the Kurzeme
District Court granted the public prosecutor's request. The order read
as follows:

“Order extending detention on remand

Riga, 26 July 2000

[L.B.], judge at the Riga City Kurzeme District Court, has examined
the evidence in the criminal file ... concerning the aggravated murder
of [I.S.], committed in the courtyard of 20 Valguma Street, Riga on
17 February 2000. The file was submitted by prosecutor [S.N.] of the
specialised public prosecutor's office for organised crime and other
offences, with a request for extension of the detention on remand of
Astrīda Svipsta, who has been charged under Articles 20 § 2 and 117
... of the Criminal Code. Having heard the observations of [S.N.] and
the opinion of the lawyer/lawyers [A.D.], the Court

having noted [the following]:

The time allowed for preferring the indictment
in this case has been extended until 29 September 2000.

The crime of which A. Svipsta stands accused
is particularly serious. Accordingly, if she remains at liberty, there
is a danger that she will evade investigation and trial, commit further
criminal offences and hinder the determination of the truth in the criminal
case. [Consequently], without examining whether the defendant is guilty
or innocent of the charges against her, I consider it appropriate to
extend the period of detention in question.

Having regard to the above and on the basis of
Article 77 of the KPK [Latvijas Kriminālprocesa kodekss – Code of Criminal Procedure],

I hereby decide:

To extend the detention on remand of Astrīda
Svipsta ... until 29 September 2000.

This order is amenable to appeal before the Riga
Regional Court, the appeal to be lodged with the Kurzeme District Court.

Execution of the order shall not be stayed pending
such appeal.

Judge: [signature]”

19. The above order, which was one page long,
had been typed on a computer and printed out. However, the fields for
the date, the judge's name and the lawyer's name had been left blank,
and the relevant information (given in italics above) had been added
by hand.

20. The applicant appealed against the order before
the Riga Regional Court. In her memorial she submitted that the first-instance
judge had omitted to conduct a thorough examination of all the evidence
in the file before issuing the order. The applicant further argued that
the seriousness of the offence was not sufficient in itself to warrant
extending her detention and that there was nothing in the case file
to suggest that she intended to evade investigation or commit further
offences. In that connection she stressed that she had left the country
several times since the murder and had always returned to Latvia; this
proved that she had no intention of absconding or obstructing the investigation.

21. By an order dated 15 August 2000, issued following
a hearing attended by the applicant and her lawyer, the Riga Regional
Court dismissed the appeal in the following terms:

“... Having taken cognisance of the evidence
in the case file and heard evidence from the parties, the Court concludes
that there are plausible reasons to believe that, if A. Svipsta remains
at liberty, there is a danger that she will evade investigation and
trial and hinder the determination of the truth in this case. The Court
further takes into consideration the seriousness of the charges against
A. Svipsta; [it] considers that the order issued by the Kurzeme District
Court ... on 26 July 2000 is in accordance with the law and is justified.
...”

22. In the meantime, on 6 August 2000, the applicant
provided the public prosecutor's office with detailed information concerning
the sums of money she had paid to I.S. since January 1998. On 17 August
2000 she sent further information to the Prosecutor General's Office,
stating that I.S. had harassed her and extorted large sums of money
from her; accordingly, she requested that a separate criminal investigation
be opened into the alleged extortion and that she be acquitted.

23. On 18 September 2000 the public prosecutor's
office requested the Kurzeme District Court to extend the applicant's
detention on remand until 28 November 2000. In support of its request,
it referred to the need to organise at least two further confrontations,
question five further witnesses, study the new statements made by the
applicant alleging that I.S had extorted funds from her, examine and
analyse the evidence obtained from abroad as a result of international
judicial cooperation, examine certain items of physical evidence and
order a psychologist's expert report on the defendants I.F. and I.Č.

24. By an order dated 20 September 2000, the relevant
judge granted the public prosecutor's request. The wording and layout
(font, positioning of the text and line spacing) exactly matched those
of the order of 26 July 2000. Only the date, the judge's name, his signature
and the length of detention were different. The field for the lawyer's
name, meanwhile, had been left blank.

25. The applicant appealed against this order
before the Riga Regional Court which, in an order issued on 17 October
2000 following inter partes proceedings, dismissed the appeal on the grounds
that the applicant “[was] accused of a particularly serious crime
[and] ha[d] pleaded not guilty; that the crime in question [had been]
committed by an organised group; that there [were] good grounds for
suspecting that she might attempt to hinder the determination of the
truth in the case”.

26. On 30 October 2000 the applicant lodged a
complaint with the Prosecutor General's Office alleging that the public
prosecutor “ha[d], without any justification, disregarded the comments
and oral suggestions from the defence concerning the procedural aspects
of the case”. According to the applicant, her lawyer had made oral
requests for permission to consult the investigation file. The Prosecutor
General's Office did not reply.

27. On 17 November 2000 the public prosecutor
requested a further extension of the applicant's detention, this time
until 30 January 2001. The reasons given were essentially the same as
those cited in the request of 18 September 2000, the only differences
were the number of witnesses to be questioned (twenty-seven), and a
reference to the need to carry out biological tests, in particular DNA
tests.

28. On 22 November 2000 the judge ordered the
applicant's continued detention until 28 January 2001. This order was
drawn up in the same manner as those of 26 July and 20 September, with
the date and the lawyer's name having been added by hand. The judge's
name had first been typed but had then been crossed out with a ballpoint
pen, and the stamp of another judge had been added beside it; the order
had been signed by the second judge.

29. The applicant then lodged a fresh appeal with
the Riga Regional Court. In her memorial she submitted that the proceedings
leading to adoption of the document in question had constituted a serious
breach of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (Latvijas Kriminālprocesa kodekss – “the KPK”), which
was in force at the time. In that connection the applicant observed
that all the orders issued by the court of first instance, by three
different judges, had been absolutely identical, even in the way they
were worded. She inferred from this that the judges had merely signed
the draft orders prepared in advance by the prosecutor. In the applicant's
view, this theory was borne out by the fact that the most recent decision
had been taken in camera in the judge's office; the judge had allowed
the applicant's lawyer into the room only after he had spent approximately
twenty minutes alone with the prosecutor. Consequently, the lawyer had
not even been able to hear the prosecutor's observations, the defence
having been present only when the judge had signed the draft decision,
which had been prepared in advance. The applicant also reiterated her
previous arguments against her continued detention.

30. By an order made on 5 December 2000 after inter partes
proceedings, similar to the order of 17 October 2000, the Riga Regional
Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the impugned order,
observing that the murder in question had been committed by a group
of persons and that the applicant had pleaded not guilty. In court,
the applicant's lawyer was invited to speak first. However, despite
repeated requests on his part, the judge did not permit him to reply
to the prosecutor's observations. The Regional Court also did not reply
to the applicant's arguments based on Article 5 of the Convention as
interpreted by certain judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,
declining to take cognisance of the copies of the relevant judgments
or to add them to the case file.

31. On 10 December 2000 the applicant lodged a
second complaint with the Prosecutor General's Office, alleging a series
of procedural irregularities, in particular the refusal of the relevant
prosecutor to grant defence counsel access to the file. In a letter
dated 8 January 2001, the Prosecutor General's Office rejected this
complaint on the ground that the requests supposedly made by the defence
did not feature in any official record; the letter added that a copy
of the entire file would be sent to the applicant once the investigation
had been completed.

32. On 2 January 2001 the public prosecutor's
office attempted to obtain information concerning the transfers of funds
between the applicant and the murder victim. To that end it made enquiries
of fifteen Latvian banks; none had accounts under the names in question.

33. On 16 January 2001 the public prosecutor's
office applied for a further extension of the applicant's detention
on the ground that she had made further statements in the meantime to
the effect that I.F., one of the suspected perpetrators of the murder,
had raped her and then subjected her to pressure. The prosecution further
cited the need to carry out the same investigative measures referred
to in its previous requests, the only difference being the number of
witnesses to be questioned (six).

34. In an order of 25 January 2001, the Kurzeme
District Court extended the applicant's detention until 30 March 2001.
Again, the order was virtually identical to the previous orders issued
by the same court, apart from a few details concerning the names of
the judge, the prosecutors and the lawyer. This time the whole order
had been typed and no additions or corrections had been made by hand.

35. On 31 January 2001 the applicant lodged an
appeal with the Riga Regional Court, complaining in particular of the
refusal of the public prosecutor's office and the court to allow her
lawyer access to the documents in the investigation file on which her
continued detention had been based. On 9 February 2001 the court dismissed
her appeal in an order which was to all intents and purposes identical
to those of 15 August and 17 October 2000. In addition to the seriousness
of the crime, this order also cited as a reason the risk that the applicant
might abscond or evade justice.

36. In the meantime, on 26 January 2001, V.S.,
one of the applicant's co-defendants, had been released and placed under
police surveillance (nodošana policijas uzraudzībā). In addition, on 30 April
2001, the public prosecutor's office drew up a fresh charge against
the applicant, charging her with commercial corruption within the meaning
of Article 199 of the Criminal Code.

37. In two orders dated 29 March and 30 April
2001, the Kurzeme District Court extended the applicant's detention
until 30 April and 18 May 2001 respectively. In both cases the court
was ruling on requests from the public prosecutor's office based on
the necessity of carrying out a number of additional investigative measures.
As in its previous requests, the prosecutor's office cited the need
to question further witnesses (four). However, it laid particular emphasis
on the need to send the documents in the file to the applicant, her
co-defendants and their lawyers, to prepare the final indictment and
to prepare the case for trial.

The layout of the two orders was again identical
to all the previous orders given by the same court in the instant case.
Although the order of 29 March 2001, having been typed entirely on a
computer, differed in appearance from the other orders, it was identical
to them in content.

38. On 30 March and 2 May 2001 the applicant lodged
appeals with the Riga Regional Court, complaining in particular of the
refusal by the public prosecutor's office and the court to allow her
lawyer access to the documents in the investigation file on which her
continued detention had been based.

On 17 April and 11 May 2001 the Riga Regional
Court dismissed the applicant's appeals and upheld the impugned orders.
All the decisions of the Riga Regional Court were drafted in terms virtually
identical to the orders of 15 August and 17 October 2000. Only the decision
of 17 April 2001 specified that the applicant's continued detention
was justified on account of her personality and that the first-instance
court had had legitimate grounds to fear a risk of collusion, since
the applicant had made the arrangements for her co-defendants to flee
the country.

C. Referral of the applicant for trial and
the subsequent proceedings

39. On 11 May 2001 the public prosecutor's office
concluded the investigation and sent copies of the documents in the
file to the applicant. On 14 May 2001 the applicant began studying the
file, which comprised sixteen volumes.

On 5 July and 1 August 2001 the applicant complained
to the Prosecutor General's Office about the attitude of the prosecutor
handling her case, who had sent her only a few documents at a time and
at long intervals. In letters of 30 July and 7 August 2001, the Prosecutor
General's Office rejected her complaints without giving any reasons.

40. Meanwhile, on 18 May 2001, the latest order
for the applicant's detention expired. However, as she had begun studying
the documents in the investigation file, her release was “suspended”
in accordance with the fifth paragraph of Article 77 of the KPK (see
paragraph 60 below). She therefore remained in detention.

41. On 18 July 2001 the applicant finished studying
the documents in the file. On the same day she requested the public
prosecutor's office to question a number of persons who had allegedly
seen her in a Riga hotel the day after I.S.'s murder. The request was
rejected for failure to give reasons; the prosecutor's office took the
view that the defence had not made sufficiently clear how the evidence
of the persons concerned could establish the applicant's innocence or
contribute any new evidence to her file.

42. The applicant's co-defendants, V.S., I.F.,
V.B. and I.Č., finished studying the file on 2 August, 3 August, 2
October and 5 October 2001 respectively. On 5 October 2001 the prosecutor
dealing with the case informed the applicant that all the parties had
now taken cognisance of the file.

43. On 8 October 2001 the public prosecutor signed
the final indictment (apsūdzības raksts) against the applicant and her four co-defendants.
The file was subsequently sent to the trial court, in this case the
Riga Regional Court. On 11 October 2001 the relevant judge of the Regional
Court found that there was sufficient evidence in the file and decided
to commit the applicant for trial (lēmums par apsūdzētās nodošanu tiesai). As to the preventive
measure applied to the applicant, the judge decided to extend it, without,
however, giving any reasons.

44. On 12 October 2001 the applicant wrote to
the same judge requesting that she be released. She asked him to convene,
if necessary, a preparatory hearing (rīcības sēde) to examine whether her detention was justified.
In a letter of 19 October 2001, the judge rejected the request, reminding
the applicant that she stood accused of a crime punishable by life imprisonment,
and that the preventive measure reflected the seriousness of the offence
and her personality. The judge further stated that there were “no
grounds” for convening a preparatory hearing. Lastly, he observed
that the applicant would have an opportunity to reiterate her request
for release at the hearing on the merits of her case, and informed her
that the hearing had been set down for 2003.

45. On 31 October 2001 the applicant requested
the President of the Riga Regional Court to review the merits of her
detention and to take steps to expedite the consideration of her case,
arguing in particular that a prolonged term of detention was in breach
of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. In a letter of 9 November
2001, the President replied that the Regional Court did not have jurisdiction
to review procedural decisions taken by the lower court in charge of
a case. As to the timetable for consideration of the case, the President
said that it was impossible to speed it up. He observed that “[c]riticism
of, or requests made to, the court concerning its hearing of the case
'within
a reasonable time' [were] of no relevance whatsoever, as the
court work[ed] with the resources allocated to it by the State”.

46. Notwithstanding the date initially set for
the first hearing, consideration of the merits of the case began on
26 June 2002. The applicant pleaded not guilty in court.

On 14 August 2002 the prosecution addressed the
court. On the following day, it was the turn of the defence.

47. In a judgment delivered on 13 September 2002,
the Riga Regional Court found the applicant guilty of organising the
murder. However, it considered that no intention to kill on the part
of the applicant and two of her co-defendants had been established;
accordingly, they were found guilty of manslaughter.

V.B., meanwhile, was found guilty of murder and
illegally possessing a knife. The court also found it established that,
after V.B. and V.S. had been arrested, the applicant had paid the other
two co-defendants substantial sums to enable them to flee the country.
Finally, the court considered that the applicant's guilt on the charge
of commercial corruption had been sufficiently established.

Consequently, the Regional Court sentenced the
applicant to twelve years' imprisonment. Her co-defendants also received
long prison sentences: seventeen years in the case of V.B., twelve years
in the case of I.F. and ten years in the case of I.Č. V.S. received
a suspended sentence of four years' imprisonment.

48. The applicant and her co-defendants lodged
an appeal against this judgment with the Criminal Division of the Supreme
Court. In a judgment of 11 September 2003, the Criminal Division upheld
the applicant's conviction for manslaughter. However, it acquitted her
on the charge of commercial corruption and reduced her overall sentence
to ten years' imprisonment.

49. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points
of law with the Senate of the Supreme Court. In a final judgment of
6 February 2004, the Senate dismissed the applicant's appeal and those
of her co-defendants.

II. RELEVANT
DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

...

B. Procedural law provisions

52. The former Code of Criminal Procedure (KPK),
a legacy of the Soviet era which was amended on numerous occasions,
was applicable at the material time. It remained in force until 1 October
2005, when it was replaced by the new Criminal Procedure Act (Kriminālprocesa likums).

1. Preventive measures

(a) Detention on remand as part of the overall
system of preventive measures

53. Under the terms of Article 68 of the KPK,
a preventive measure could be applied where plausible reasons existed
to suspect that the accused would seek to evade investigation or hinder
the determination of the truth in the case. Eight types of preventive
measure existed: an undertaking not to change one's residence, personal
guarantees, financial guarantees, police surveillance, house arrest,
detention in prison and two measures specifically applicable to minors
and members of the armed forces.

54. Under Article 72 of the KPK, a preventive
measure had to be chosen and implemented on the basis of the following
criteria: the seriousness of the alleged offence; the personality of
the accused; the likelihood that he or she would seek to evade investigation
and hinder the determination of the truth in the case; and the accused's
occupation, age, domestic circumstances and health and other relevant
criteria. Any preventive measure had to be applied on the basis of an
order giving sufficient reasons.

55. Under the terms of Article 76 of the KPK,
a period of detention on remand could be ordered only by a judge and
only in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable by imprisonment.
The detention order was to be issued following adversarial examination
of the evidence submitted by the prosecution service or the police;
the presence of the accused was in principle compulsory.

(b) Length of detention on remand and possibility
of appeal against the detention measure

56. At the material time, the principles governing
the length of detention on remand and the system of appeal were fundamentally
different for the preliminary investigation stage (pirmstiesas izmeklēšana) and the judicial stage (iztiesāšana) of the proceedings.

(i) The preliminary investigation

57. At the preliminary investigation stage (comprising
the police investigation and preparation of the case file), the initial
period of detention on remand could not exceed two months (Article 77
of the KPK). However, where it was not possible to complete the preliminary
investigation and commit the accused for trial within that time, and
where “there [were] no grounds for amending the preventive measure”,
the prosecutor could request the judge to extend the term of detention.
In such cases, evidence was heard from the accused and his or her lawyer
“if necessary”.

58. The Law of 20 June 2001 (in force since 12
July 2001) amended the second paragraph of Article 77 by setting a two-month
limit on each successive extension of the term of detention. The detained
person could appeal against an order extending his or her detention
by means of an appeal before a higher court, which had to consider the
appeal within seven days of receiving it. After hearing evidence from
the detained person and the public prosecutor's office, the higher court
took a decision by means of a final order (Article 222-1 of the KPK).

59. At this stage in the proceedings, the total
length of detention on remand could in no circumstances exceed eighteen
months. If, after eighteen months had elapsed, the case had still not
been sent for trial, the accused person had to be released.

60. The fifth paragraph of Article 77 of the KPK
read as follows:

“On completion of the investigation, and before
the maximum statutory period has elapsed, the documents in the file
must be sent immediately to the accused and his or her counsel so that
they may familiarise themselves with it. The time spent by all the accused
in familiarising themselves with the documents in the file shall not
be taken into account in calculating the period of detention on remand
...”

In practice, the prosecuting authorities and
the courts interpreted the second sentence of this provision as authorising
the continued detention of the accused person throughout the time during
which he or she and any co-accused were studying the file, even if the
validity of the last detention order given by the judge had expired.

(ii) The trial stage

61. After drawing up and signing the final indictment,
the public prosecutor's office had to forward the file to the trial
court (Articles 209-11 of the KPK). Within fourteen days of receiving
the file, the trial court, without ruling on the accused's guilt, had
to decide whether the file provided a sufficient basis for committing
the accused for trial, or whether the case should be referred back for
further information or no further action should be taken.

As a rule, the order committing the accused for
trial (lēmums
par apsūdzētā nodošanu tiesai) was given by a single judge
(Articles 223 and 226), who also had to rule on whether the preventive
measure in place should be extended, amended or lifted. Where the judge
considered that the preventive measure was justified, he confirmed it
by means of a final decision. If, on the other hand, he had doubts as
to the lawfulness of the measure or its justification, he convened a
preparatory hearing (rīcības sēde) to examine the issue. The order given following
the preparatory hearing was amenable to appeal before a higher court.

62. Under the terms of Article 241 of the KPK,
“consideration of the case at a hearing [had to] begin not more than
twenty days or, in exceptional cases, one month from the date on which
the court receive[d] the file”. However, this provision, which was
a legacy from the Soviet era and had never been amended, was very rarely
complied with by the Latvian courts.

63. In principle, once the order for the accused
person's continued detention had been given, the decision remained in
force throughout the proceedings at first instance. In other words,
before 1 November 2002, there was no limit on the length of detention
on remand at this stage in the proceedings. The Law of 20 June 2002,
which came into force on 1 November 2002 and amended Article 77 of the
KPK, set a limit of one year and six months on the period of detention,
which ran from the time the trial court received the investigation file
until delivery of the judgment at first instance. Once this time-limit
had been exceeded, the detained person had to be released immediately.

Originally, however, if the case concerned “particularly
serious crimes involving violence or the threat of violence”, the
Senate of the Supreme Court could extend the term of detention beyond
the maximum period. Following a Constitutional Court judgment of 27
June 2003 which found part of this provision to be in breach of the
Constitution, Parliament amended it by means of a Law of 25 September
2003 which guaranteed the person concerned the right to submit his or
her observations on an exceptional extension of this kind, and set out
the individual's procedural rights.

64. In practice, although the legislation contained
no express provision enabling accused persons to appeal against detention
at this stage, the courts considered all applications for release made
by detainees. The response generally took the form of a simple letter,
against which no appeal was possible. However, in more complex cases
the court gave its decision in the form of an order (see Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, § 45, 28 November 2002).

65. A Law amending Articles 237, 248 and 465 of
the KPK, which came into force on 1 April 1999, introduced a right of
appeal against orders imposing preventive measures at the judicial stage
of the proceedings. However, the Law related only to the period after
adversarial examination of the case had begun. Moreover, the right to
appeal was subject to the condition that examination of the case had
been adjourned for a minimum period of one month. The appeal had to
be lodged within seven days of the order being served and the court
was required to consider it within seven days of receiving it.

66. Finally, the third paragraph in fine of Article 226 stipulated that the accused could reiterate
his or her request for release at the hearing on the merits.

2. Access by the lawyer to the documents
in the file at the preliminary investigation stage

67. The third paragraph of Article 97 of the KPK
read as follows:

“Defence counsel shall have the right to take
cognisance of all the documents in the file and to copy out extracts
from it by hand or using technical means:

(1) in cases where the accused are persons covered
by Article 98, points 1 and 2, of the present Code [minors or the physically
or mentally disabled] – from the time when the person concerned is
placed under investigation;

(2) in all other cases – from the time the person
concerned is placed under investigation, with the consent of the investigating
authority or the prosecutor;

(3) in all cases – in the circumstances referred
to in Article 204 of the Code [on completion of the preliminary investigation
and before the file is forwarded to the trial court].”

68. The seventh paragraph of the same Article
prohibited the lawyer from disclosing information obtained during the
proceedings. Article 130 of the KPK reinforced this duty of confidence,
stating that information obtained during the preliminary investigation
could be disclosed only with the permission of the head of the investigating
authority or the prosecutor and only where the aforementioned authorities
considered it practicable. If necessary, the prosecutor was required
to remind the witnesses, victims, lawyers and other participants in
the proceedings of the fact that failure to comply with this requirement
rendered them criminally liable.

THE LAW

...

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Government's preliminary objection

114. In their additional observations of 19 October
2005, the Government raised a preliminary objection in respect of the
applicant's complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Government
maintained that, in her observations following the decision on the admissibility
of the application, the applicant had widened the scope of this complaint,
applying it also to the period between 18 May and 11 October 2001. Had
she wished to complain of the lack of effective judicial review of her
detention during that period, however, she should have done so within
six months of the date on which it ended, namely 11 October 2001. As
the six-month period had ended in April 2002, the Government considered
that the complaint in question had been lodged out of time and should
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

115. The applicant did not submit any specific
observations on this point.

116. The Court reiterates first of all that, for
the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, a period of detention
should be regarded in principle not as an instantaneous act, but as
a continuing situation. Consequently, the six-month period under that
provision starts running only from the end of that situation – hence,
in the majority of cases, when the person concerned is released. In
addition, in applying Article 35 § 1, the Court endeavours to look
behind mere appearances, without excessive formalism (see, in particular, Jėčius
[v. Lithuania,
no. 34578/97], § 44[, ECHR 2000-IX]). That being said, it has generally
accepted that, in relation to Article 5 of the Convention, it is the
overall period of detention which must be taken into account for the
purpose of applying the six-month rule.

117. Admittedly, in its judgment in Assanidze v. Georgia ([GC], no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II), the
Court adopted a different approach, dividing the applicant's detention
into two separate periods, even though there was no gap between them,
and examining compliance with the six-month rule in respect of each
of these periods. However, the detention in question had been imposed
on the applicant in two separate sets of proceedings which had completely
different statutory bases (ibid., § 159). The instant case, on the
other hand, concerns a single set of criminal proceedings. The Court
notes that after the last order for the applicant's detention had expired
on 18 May 2001, she continued to be held in prison under the fifth paragraph
of Article 77 of the KPK (see paragraph 60 above). This change in statutory
basis had no impact, either in fact or in law, on the applicant's situation,
as she remained in detention just as she had been before the above-mentioned
date.

Accordingly, the Court considers that the overall
period of the applicant's detention on remand must be taken into account
for the purpose of applying the six-month rule in the present case.
As the applicant's detention for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (c)
of the Convention ended on 13 September 2002, the date of her conviction
at first instance (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 104, ECHR 2000-XI,
and Lavents,
cited above, § 66), the Court is unable to conclude that the complaint
in question was submitted out of time.

118. Furthermore, and in so far as the Government
claim that the applicant widened the scope of her application in an
arbitrary manner, the Court reiterates that, under Rule 55 of the Rules
of Court, if the respondent Government wish to raise a plea of inadmissibility,
they must do so in their written or oral observations on the admissibility
of the application. In the instant case, the former First Section of
the Court gave notice of the application to the respondent Government
on 28 February 2002, asking them two separate questions in relation
to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, concerning the periods before and
after 11 October 2001. The period between 18 May and 11 October 2001
was therefore clearly and fully covered by the scope of the case as
determined initially by the Court. That being the case, it was open
to the Government to raise this objection at the admissibility stage,
something they omitted to do. Since there are no particular reasons
justifying this omission, the Court considers that the Government are
now estopped from raising this objection (see, mutatis mutandis, Hartman v. the Czech Republic,no. 53341/99, §§ 53-54, 10 July 2003, and Prodan v. Moldova, no. 49806/99, § 36, ECHR 2004-III).

119. Having regard to the above, the Court dismisses
the Government's preliminary objection.

B. The merits of the complaint

120. The applicant complained of the lack of any
effective judicial review of the lawfulness of her detention on remand.
In that connection she relied on four circumstances which, in her view,
amounted to a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention: the summary
nature of the reasons given in the orders extending her detention, the
refusal of the judge in question to allow her lawyer access to the investigation
file, the unfairness of the proceedings before the Riga Regional Court
and the absence of an adequate remedy with which to challenge her detention
at the trial stage.

Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provides:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

1. The parties' submissions

(a) The Government

121. Firstly, with reference to the reasons given
for the orders extending the applicant's detention, the Government took
the view that, while the orders in question had not addressed specifically
the arguments adduced by the defence, they had nonetheless complied
with Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Before issuing the orders, the
judges had examined the evidence in the file carefully and had heard
the observations of both parties, as required by Article 76 of the KPK.
Similarly, the Government rejected the applicant's argument as to the
uniform wording of the orders in question. In that connection, they
stressed that the wording of several of the orders had been different;
they could not therefore have been prepared in advance. In any event,
the Government argued, only the final orders issued on appeal by the
Riga Regional Court were to be taken into consideration on this point.
The Government therefore contended that the applicant's complaint was
“of a formal nature”, and requested the Court to focus on “content
rather than form”.

122. Secondly, with regard to the applicant's
complaint that her lawyer had been unable to obtain access to the investigation
file, the Government argued that she had not exhausted the domestic
remedies available to her. In that connection they pointed out that,
under Article 97 of the KPK, the lawyer was entitled to take cognisance
of the investigation file “from the time the person concerned [was]
placed under investigation, with the consent of the investigating authority
or the prosecutor”.

123. As to the condition laid down in Article
97, the Government explained that it had been prompted by the need to
preserve the confidentiality of the investigation file until the investigation
had been completed. In the instant case the applicant's lawyer had omitted
to apply to the relevant prosecutor in order to request access to the
file, merely complaining instead to the judge that he had been unable
to obtain access. None of the letters from the public prosecutor's office
provided evidence of the lawyer having made oral requests for permission
to consult the file.

It was true that one of the letters in question
had informed the lawyer that “access to the whole file [would] be
possible once the investigation [was] complete”. However, this was
simply a procedural reminder which was not sufficient to demonstrate
that the lawyer had indeed requested access. Likewise, the Government
stressed that the lawyer had lodged only two written complaints on the
subject with the Riga Regional Court, on 31 January and 2 May 2001, whereas
he could have submitted at least six complaints from the time his client
was placed under investigation. Given that the applicant had omitted
to make use of the effective procedural remedies available to her under
Latvian law, the Latvian State could not be held to have breached Article
5 § 4 of the Convention.

124. Thirdly, with regard to the supposed unfairness
of the proceedings concerning the applicant's continued detention, the
Government maintained that the proceedings had met the fundamental requirements
of procedural fairness. In particular, the fact that defence counsel
had been unable to reply to the prosecution's observations could not
in itself be considered contrary to the principle of equality of arms.

125. Lastly, with reference to the lack of a regular
judicial review after 11 October 2001, the Government did not consider
this to be in breach of Article 5 § 4. Once an accused had been committed
for trial, the need for his or her detention was assessed by the judge
responsible for examining the merits of the case. If the judge had originally
considered that the circumstances of the case and the personality of
the accused constituted grounds for keeping him or her in prison, it
was unlikely that the defence would be able to adduce any new arguments
capable of countering the evidence in the case file and changing the
judge's mind. The Government therefore concluded that any such review
would be a mere formality.

(b) The applicant

126. The applicant argued that Article 5 § 4
of the Convention imposed a clear obligation on the domestic courts
to set out in detail the reasons for detaining an accused person. Such
reasoning was necessary in order to hold the courts accountable for
their decisions, to ensure that the review by the courts of the lawfulness
of detention was conducted in a transparent manner and to allow the
accused to adopt a defence strategy; the obligation was therefore far
from a formality. In the instant case the reasons given by the Latvian
judges had been patently inadequate, as most of the orders had been
virtually identical in form and content.

127. As to the question of access by defence counsel
to the file, the applicant argued, referring to supporting documents,
that she had exhausted the domestic remedies available to her. Even
before completion of the preliminary investigation, she had made several
requests for access. Likewise, her lawyer had made repeated oral requests
for access when various steps in the investigation were taken by the
public prosecutor's office. No response had been received to any of
these requests. The applicant stressed in particular that, in a letter
of 8 January 2001, the prosecuting authorities had rejected her complaints
on the ground that these requests had not been recorded in any official
report. However, the applicant could not be held responsible for the
omissions or negligence of the public prosecutor's office in failing
to prepare such a report. She argued that her requests for access to
the file were a matter of established fact; the mere fact that there
was no record of such requests in the case file was not in itself sufficient
to prove that they had not been made.

128. Finally, the applicant challenged the Government's
assertion that a regular judicial review of her detention after she
had been committed for trial would have been “a mere formality”.
The issue whether an accused person's detention on remand continued
to be lawful was quite separate from issues of substance. In any event,
new facts were not the only possible reason for releasing an accused;
the simple passage of time also called for a regular review of the arguments
for and against detention. Latvian law did not make adequate provision
for reviewing the lawfulness of detention on remand at the judicial
stage of the proceedings. While, in practice, the relevant judge at
the Riga Regional Court had considered the applicant's request for release
made on 12 October 2001, he had simply rejected it by means of a letter,
without holding a hearing or giving the applicant adequate opportunity
to make representations.

2. The Court's assessment

(a) General principles established by the Court's
case-law

129. The Court reiterates the principles established
by its consistent case-law regarding the interpretation of Article 5
§ 4 of the Convention:

(a) By virtue of Article 5 § 4, arrested or detained
persons are entitled to a review bearing upon the procedural and substantive
conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, within the
meaning of Article 5 § 1, of their deprivation of liberty (see, among
many other authorities, Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1988,
§ 65, Series A no. 145-B). That review must be capable of resulting
in a speedy judicial decision ordering the termination of their detention
if it proves unlawful (see Baranowski [v. Poland, no. 28358/95], § 68 [, ECHR 2000-III]).

(b) Like every other provision of the Convention
and the Protocols thereto, Article 5 § 4 is intended to guarantee rights
that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective (see,
among other authorities, Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37, and Schöps v. Germany,
no. 25116/94, § 47, ECHR 2001-I).

(c) The existence of a remedy within the meaning
of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention must be sufficiently certain, failing
which it will lack the accessibility and effectiveness required for
the purposes of that provision (see E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990, § 60, Series A no. 181-A, and Sakık and Others
v. Turkey, 26 November 1997, § 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII).

(d) Article 5 § 4 does not compel the Contracting
States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination
of applications for release from detention. Nevertheless, a State which
institutes such a system must in principle accord to the detainees the
same guarantees on appeal as at first instance (see Toth v. Austria, 12 December 1991, § 84, Series A no. 224;
see also Rutten v. the Netherlands, no. 32605/96, § 53, 24 July 2001,
and Lanz
v. Austria, no. 24430/94, § 42, 31 January 2002).

(e) The proceedings referred to in Article 5 §
4 need not always be attended by the same guarantees as those required
under Article 6 § 1 for civil or criminal litigation, as the two provisions
pursue different aims (see Reinprecht v. Austria, no. 67175/01, § 39, ECHR 2005-XII).
However, they must have a judicial character and give to the individual
concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty
in question (see, among other authorities, D.N. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27154/95, § 41, ECHR 2001-III).
In order to determine whether proceedings provide adequate guarantees,
regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances in
which such proceedings take place (see, for example, Megyeri v. Germany, 12 May 1992, § 22, Series A no. 237-A).
In any event, the proceedings must meet, to the largest extent possible,
the basic requirements of a fair trial (see Lietzow v. Germany, no. 24479/94, § 44, ECHR 2001-I, and Schöps,
cited above, § 44).

(f) The first fundamental guarantee which flows
naturally from Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is the right to an effective
hearing by the judge examining an appeal against detention. While Article
5 § 4 does not impose an obligation on the judge to address in detail
every argument contained in the appellant's submissions, its guarantees
would be deprived of their substance if the judge, relying on domestic
law and practice, could treat as irrelevant, or disregard, concrete
facts relied on by the detainee and capable of putting in doubt the
existence of the conditions essential for the “lawfulness” of the
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (see Nikolova v.
Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 61, ECHR 1999-II).

(g) Next, in the case of a person whose detention
falls within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, Article
5 § 4 requires that a hearing be held (see Kampanis v. Greece, 13 July 1995, § 47, Series A no. 318-B,
and Włoch
v. Poland, no. 27785/95, § 126, ECHR 2000-XI). The hearing must
be adversarial; this normally involves legal representation and, where
appropriate, the possibility of calling and questioning witnesses (see Hussain
and Singh
v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1996, § 60 and § 68 respectively, Reports
1996-I).

(h) Proceedings concerning an appeal against detention
must ensure equality of arms between the parties, that is, between the
prosecutor and the detained person (see Nikolova, cited above, § 58, and Włoch, loc. cit.). One of the most important implications
of equality of arms is the right of access to the investigation file;
the opportunity of effectively challenging the statements or views which
the prosecution bases on these documents presupposes in principle that
the defence has access to them. The appraisal of the need for a remand
in custody and the subsequent assessment of guilt are too closely linked
for access to documents to be refused in the former case when the law
requires it in the latter case (see Lamy v. Belgium, 30 March 1989, § 29, Series A no. 151). While
the national authorities may satisfy this requirement in various ways,
whatever method is chosen should ensure that the defence will be aware
that observations have been filed and will have a real opportunity to
comment thereon (see Lietzow, § 44, and Schöps, § 44, both cited above).

(b) Application of these principles to the
present case

(i) Reasons given for the orders extending
the applicant's detention

130. The Court observes that, during the preliminary
investigation of the case, the applicant's detention on remand was extended
on six occasions: on 26 July, 20 September and 22 November 2000 and
on 25 January, 29 March and 30 April 2001. The file shows that on each
occasion the Kurzeme District Court ruled on a written request from
the public prosecutor's office after holding a hearing attended by the
prosecutor and defence counsel. The Court does not know what oral arguments
were adduced by the latter at the hearings. However, it observes that,
in all its written requests, the public prosecutor's office referred
to the specific facts it had uncovered and the investigative measures
which, in its view, were necessary and warranted the applicant's continued
detention. On the other hand, it appears that the judge in question
responded in each case using a very brief and stereotypical formula,
merely enumerating the statutory criteria and completely disregarding
the arguments of the two parties.

The Court does not dispute the Government's assertion
that, before giving the impugned orders, the judge had on each occasion
read the documents in the file and heard the observations of the parties.
However, it is the wording of a judicial decision which most clearly
reveals the precise intentions and reasoning of the court. In the instant
case, not one of the six orders in question contained any indication
that the judge who issued it had taken into consideration the arguments
and specific facts submitted to the court.

131. Moreover, the Court notes the virtually identical
manner in which the six orders were drafted. The orders of 26 July,
20 September and 22 November 2000 and those of 25 January and 30 April
2001 were identical not just in terms of their content – apart from
the dates, the names of the judges and participants and the length of
detention – but also in terms of their layout, including such details
as the font used, the positioning of the text and the line spacing (see
paragraphs 24, 28, 34 and 37 above). The decision of 29 March 2001 was
different in appearance, but its content was exactly the same. Moreover,
several of the orders, which had been typed on a computer and printed
out, contained blanks to be filled in by hand; in the order of 22 November
2000 the judge's name had also been corrected using a ballpoint pen
(see paragraph 28 above).

Accordingly, the only reasonable conclusion,
in the Court's view, is that the orders extending the applicant's detention
were based on a pro forma model, prepared in advance, which underwent
minor alterations each time before being printed out and signed in summary
fashion at the end of each hearing. The Court acknowledges the fact
that Article 5 § 4 contains more flexible procedural requirements than
Article 6 while being much more stringent as regards speediness (see Reinprecht,
cited above, § 40). It therefore accepts that a procedure of this kind
may not always be contrary to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention; however,
it will certainly be in breach of that provision if it reflects the
absence of an effective examination of the parties' observations. In
the Court's view, the practice of the court of first instance amounts
to a classic case of denial of the fundamental guarantees contained
in Article 5 § 4.

132. The Court points out that all the orders
extending the applicant's detention on remand were the subject of an
appeal before the Riga Regional Court, which upheld them by final orders
dated 15 August, 17 October and 5 December 2000 and 9 February, 17 April
and 11 May 2001. It acknowledges the fact that these decisions were
more detailed than those of the first-instance court. However, here
again, the appeal court merely made vague references to the seriousness
of the offence, the fact that it had been perpetrated by an organised
group, the applicant's personality and the risk of collusion, without
substantiating these allegations. Only the order of 17 April 2001 referred
to the specific acts committed by the applicant; however, this is merely
one exception which is insufficient to render the proceedings as a whole
compatible with Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

133. As regards the proceedings after the case
had been sent for trial, the Court notes that no reasons were given
for the decision of the Regional Court judge of 11 October 2001 ordering
the applicant's continued detention for an indefinite period. Accordingly,
this order too must be considered to be incompatible with the requirements
of an “effective judicial review” of the lawfulness of the detention
in question.

134. In sum, the Latvian courts, by extending
the applicant's detention on remand by means of orders which did not
give sufficient reasons, acted in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

(ii) Access by defence counsel to the investigation
file

135. As regards the applicant's complaint that
the public prosecutor's office had refused her lawyer access to the
documents in the investigation file, the Court notes at the outset that
the parties disagreed as to the facts. The applicant maintained that
her lawyer had made an oral request to consult the file even before
30 October 2000, the date on which he allegedly complained to the Prosecutor
General's Office of the refusal of his request by the prosecutor dealing
with the case (see paragraph 26 above). In any event, on 10 December
2000 the applicant had lodged a second complaint to this effect with
the Prosecutor General's Office, which was rejected (see paragraph 31
above). The Government challenged this assertion, claiming that the
existence of any such application could not be proved in the absence
of a specific written reference to it in the file. However, they acknowledged
that in the appeals lodged with the Riga Regional Court on 31 January
and 2 May 2001 the defence had raised the question of access to the file.

136. The Court reiterates that, while an accused
complaining of a denial of access to the investigation file must in
principle have duly applied for such access in compliance with the national
law, the mere absence of any record of such a request in the case file
is, in itself, not sufficient proof that it has not been made (see Schöps,
cited above, § 46). In the instant case the Government acknowledged
that the applicant's lawyer had complained to the judge of his inability
to consult the investigation file; however, they argued that he should
have made a request to that effect to the prosecutor. In that connection
the Court reiterates that, in cases similar to the present one, both
the national authorities and the Court must, as a rule, avoid excessive
formalism (ibid., § 52). The third paragraph of Article 97 of the KPK
guaranteed defence counsel “the right to take cognisance of all the
documents in the file ... with the consent of ... the prosecutor”.
However, it did not lay down any formal requirement to apply to the
prosecutor before making a request to the judge. That being the case,
the applicant's lawyer cannot be criticised for having raised the question
directly before the court, which could always have directed him to the
prosecutor in order to seek the necessary permission.

137. The Court acknowledges the need for criminal
investigations to be conducted efficiently, which may imply that part
of the information collected during them is to be kept secret in order
to prevent the accused from tampering with evidence and undermining
the course of justice. However, this legitimate goal cannot be pursued
at the expense of substantial restrictions on the rights of the defence.
Therefore, information which is essential for the assessment of the
lawfulness of a person's detention should always be made available in
an appropriate manner to his or her lawyer (see Lietzow, cited above, § 47, and Garcia Alva v. Germany, no. 23541/94, § 42, 13 February 2001).

138. In any event, it is not disputed that in
2001 the applicant did not have access to the case file, despite having
complained twice of her lawyer's inability to consult the documents
relating to the investigation. It seems that at this time the case file,
which was already voluminous, contained a series of items which appear
to have played a crucial role in the decision to keep the applicant
in detention. These included not just the statements from the applicant's
four co-defendants, V.S., V.B., I.F. and I.Č., naming the applicant
as the organiser of the murder (see paragraph 10 above), but also various
witness statements, physical evidence, expert reports and information
obtained in the context of international judicial cooperation, all of
which were extensively cited by the public prosecutor's office in its
requests for extension of the applicant's detention. It was therefore
vital for the defence to be able to consult the file in order to be
able to challenge effectively the lawfulness of the applicant's detention
on remand which, by January 2001, had already lasted for over six months.
Without that possibility, the proceedings concerning the applicant's
detention did not satisfy the fundamental requirement of equality of
arms, which is an inherent part of fair judicial proceedings.

139. There has therefore been a violation of Article
5 § 4 of the Convention on this point also.

(iii) Alleged unfairness of the proceedings
before the Riga Regional Court

140. As regards the alleged unfairness of the
appeal proceedings before the Riga Regional Court, the Court has held
that the principle of procedural fairness, and in particular of equality
of arms, which constitutes its core element, was violated on account
of the fact that defence counsel did not have access to the investigation
file. It considers that this conclusion makes it unnecessary to examine
whether or not the proceedings taken overall were fair.

(iv) Alleged absence of an adequate remedy
at the trial stage

141. Finally, with regard to the trial stage,
the Court observes that, by an order of 11 October 2001, the relevant
judge at the Riga Regional Court decided to commit the applicant for
trial while keeping her in detention. The Court has held that this order
failed to meet the fundamental requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention (see paragraph 133 above). However, even assuming that this
were not the case, it should be pointed out that under the KPK there
was no time-limit on this extension which, in principle, remained in
force until judgment had been given on the merits. It appears that no
remedy was available under Latvian law whereby the lawfulness of detention
could be periodically reviewed at the trial stage. In that connection
the Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4 cannot be construed as making
detention immune from subsequent review of its lawfulness merely because
the initial decision issued from a court; on the contrary, the very
nature of this provision requires a review of lawfulness to be available
at reasonable intervals (see, mutatis mutandis, Iribarne Pérez v. France, 24 October 1995, § 30, Series A
no. 325-C). The Court considers that this principle applies also at
the trial stage as defined in Latvian law.

142. It is true that the judge examining the case
considered the application for release lodged by the applicant on 12
October 2001. However, the Court observes that this was simply a practice
followed by the Latvian courts that had no clear statutory basis and
that could be changed at any time (see paragraph 64 above). This remedy
did not therefore meet the requirements of accessibility and effectiveness
laid down by Article 5 § 4. Similarly, the Court notes that the above-mentioned
request was rejected simply by means of a letter which, by definition,
does not amount to a judicial decision.

Admittedly, the Latvian legislature had amended
the KPK on 1 April 1999 to provide a remedy by which to challenge detention
on remand ordered at the trial stage. However, this remedy was available
only after examination of the merits of the case had begun and on condition
that the examination had been adjourned for at least one month (see
paragraph 65 above). Clearly, these conditions were not met in the instant
case.

143. The Court therefore considers that, after
11 October 2001, the applicant did not have an adequate remedy by which
to obtain a review of the lawfulness of her detention on remand, in
breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

(c) Conclusion

144. In view of the above, the Court concludes
that, at the different stages of the proceedings, the applicant did
not have available to her a judicial remedy which satisfied the requirements
of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation
of that provision in the present case.

...

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Dismisses the Government's preliminary objection;

...

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of
the Convention;

...

Done in French, and notified in writing
on 9 March 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.