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entitled 'Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further
Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment Initiatives in
the Pacific' which was released on June 11, 2013.
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
June 2013:
Defense Management:
More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further Planning Needed to Inform the
Marine Corps Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific:
GAO-13-360:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-360, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
DOD has stated that it intends to rebalance its defense posture toward
the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts the largest U.S. forward-
operating presence in this region; the majority of the U.S. forces in
Japan are located in Okinawa. The United States and Japan planned to
reduce the U.S. military presence on Okinawa by relocating
approximately 9,000 Marines. DOD had originally planned to move the
Marines only to Guam, but revised its plans in 2012 to include other
locations in the Pacific. Congressional committees have directed GAO
to examine DOD’s initiatives in the Pacific, focusing on planning and
costs. This report discusses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed
a comprehensive cost estimate for the realignment of Marines, (2)
planned for and synchronized other movements to coincide with the
realignment, and (3) identified plans to sustain the force until all
initiatives are implemented. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed
relevant policies and procedures, reviewed and analyzed cost documents
related to the realignment initiatives, interviewed DOD officials, and
conducted site visits at U.S. military installations in the Pacific.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) preliminary cost estimate for its
current realignment plan is not reliable, because it is missing costs
and is based on limited data. According to DOD officials, DOD has not
yet been able to put together a more reliable cost estimate because it
will not have specific detailed information on the plan’s requirements
until the completion of environmental analyses and host nation
negotiations. Currently, DOD estimates that it would cost
approximately $12.1 billion to implement its realignment plan—-not
including the Australia segment of the realignment. Still, GAO found
that DOD did not include some up-front practices that could have
provided a more reliable estimate that are not dependent on the
completion of the environmental analyses and host nation negotiations.
Specifically, DOD omitted any costs associated with mobility support,
a critical component of the implementation, from its cost estimate.
Furthermore, although DOD based its cost estimate on several
assumptions, there was no evidence DOD conducted analysis needed to
determine the reliability of those assumptions. Without a reliable
estimate, DOD will not be able to provide Congress and other
stakeholders with the information Congress needs to make informed
decisions regarding the realignment.
DOD has not developed an integrated master plan for its current
realignment plan, and it has not developed a strategy to support the
development and oversight of the Japanese construction projects
associated with other realignment initiatives. DOD has taken initial
steps to develop an integrated scheduling document based on currently
known data, but indicated that specific requirements, schedules, and
costs cannot be formalized in an integrated master plan until several
studies and host nation negotiations are completed, which will take
several years. Developing a master plan could enhance the management
of the realignment by creating a systematic approach to planning,
scheduling, and execution. In addition, DOD has not developed a
strategy that identifies the resources needed to support the
development of and oversight for these projects. According to best
practices, a strategy identifies goals and resources and supports the
implementation of a program. Without the information contained in an
integrated master plan and a construction support strategy, Congress
will be unable to make informed decisions about the order in which it
needs to provide funding to support the realignment.
DOD has taken some steps to plan for the sustainment of U.S. forces on
Okinawa and Guam, but it has yet to fully identify sustainment needs
and costs for both locations during this period. At several
installations on Okinawa, some of the infrastructure has severely
deteriorated. DOD facilities planning guidance calls for updated
facility master plans that capture requirements and propose solutions.
On Guam, DOD has been maintaining an inventory of unoccupied family
housing that could potentially be used for Marines relocating to Guam.
However, DOD has not determined all the costs and benefits of
maintaining this housing or the Marines’ potential housing
requirements—-information needed to perform an economic analysis.
Without an estimate of the sustainment requirements for Okinawa, the
costs for maintaining housing, and the potential Marine requirements
for housing on Guam, DOD will be unable to make informed decisions on
whether continued investment in sustaining these facilities is
warranted.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD develop more reliable cost estimates and an
integrated master plan for the realignment of Marines, develop a
mechanism to share annual updates on the status of each, and identify
sustainment requirements for affected facilities until realignment
initiatives are complete. DOD generally agreed with GAO’s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-360]. For more
information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD's Initial Estimate for the Current Marine Corps Realignment Plan
Is Not Reliable:
DOD Has Not Yet Completed an Integrated Master Plan to Synchronize
Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific or a Strategy to Support
Japanese Construction:
DOD Has Taken Initial Steps but Has Not Fully Identified Sustainment
Needs and Costs on Okinawa and Guam:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the United States-Japan
Security Consultative Committee:
Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For Marine Corps
Realignment in National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 and 2012:
Appendix IV: Print-Friendly Version of Figure I:
Appendix V: Funded Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)-Related
Military Construction Projects on Guam Supporting Marine Realignment:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: History of DOD's Plans and Estimates for the Realignment of
Marines:
Table 2: Breakdown of Costs and Marine Corps Distribution for Current
Realignment Plan:
Table 3: Four Characteristics of a Reliable Cost Estimate:
Table 4. Summary Assessment of DOD's Current Realignment Cost Estimate
Compared to Best Practices for Comprehensive Cost Estimates:
Table 4: Okinawa Housing Redevelopment Plan as of February 2013:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S. Defense Posture in Asia:
Figure 2: Planned Location of Replacement Runway at Camp Schwab:
Figure 3: Okinawa Consolidation Plan:
Figure 4: Japanese-Constructed Runway at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni:
Figure 5: Government of Japan Host Nation Support and Realignment
Funding (in Billions of Yen) from Japan Fiscal Years 1979 to 2010:
Figure 6: Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements:
Figure 7: Unoccupied Military Housing on Guam:
Figure 8: Proposed Locations for Amphibious Landing Training on Tinian:
Figure 9: Ongoing Japanese Construction at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni:
Figure 10: Construction Errors on Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI) Projects in Okinawa as Identified by the Army Corps of
Engineers:
Figure 11: Examples of Deteriorated Conditions of Facilities in
Okinawa:
Figure 12: Japan Facilities Improvement Program Funding for All U.S.
Installations in Japan and for Marine Corps Installations on Okinawa
from 2002 to 2010 (in Billions of Yen):
Figure 13: Examples of Unoccupied Housing Units on Guam:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DPRI: Defense Policy Review Initiative:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
June 11, 2013:
Congressional Committees:
U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to
developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East
Asia into the Indian Ocean and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving
challenges and opportunities. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
stated that it would tailor its global presence and posture by
rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, emphasizing existing
alliances and expanding networks of cooperation with emerging partners
throughout the region to ensure collective capability and capacity for
securing common interests. One of the United States' most important
allies in the Asia-Pacific region is Japan, which serves as the United
States' most significant forward-operating location in the region,
accommodating approximately 39,000 U.S. military personnel, 43,000
dependents, and 5,000 DOD civilian employees. The majority of this
presence resides in Okinawa, an island prefecture south of the
Japanese mainland that represents less than 1 percent of Japan's
entire land mass. Although it is small, Okinawa currently hosts over
25 percent of the U.S. bases in Japan, and Okinawa's bases house
approximately 8,000 Air Force personnel and up to 19,000 Marine Corps
personnel on any given day. To balance the importance of this forward
presence to both the United States and Japan with the stated need to
reduce the burden on the Okinawa community, attempts to realign,
consolidate, and increase the sustainability of this presence have
been ongoing for nearly two decades. Most recently, after 6 years of
unsuccessful attempts to implement a realignment plan to move
approximately 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam,
representatives from the U.S. and Japanese governments announced in a
joint statement issued in April 2012, that they would adjust the plan.
[Footnote 1] The Marine Corps' current realignment plan would relocate
over 9,000 Marines from Okinawa and realign Marine forces throughout
the Pacific: 4,800 to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, and 2,500 to Australia.
[Footnote 2]
Conducting large-scale posture transformations during an era of
increasing budgetary pressures and competition for scarce resources
has proven to be a challenge for DOD. In May 2011, we reported that
while DOD had originally estimated that the cost to the United States
to execute the original plan to relocate 8,600 Marines and their
dependents from Okinawa to Guam would be $4.2 billion, the Marine
Corps estimated that it would actually likely cost the United States
in excess of $13 billion to fully execute.[Footnote 3] Congressional
committees have discussed the uncertainty surrounding the cost and
schedule information regarding the realignment.[Footnote 4] Congress,
in section 2207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012, and section 2832 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013, restricted the use of certain DOD funds to
implement the realignment of Marines until DOD provided to the
congressional defense committees specified information related to its
plans to move units to Guam and its overall posture in the Pacific.
[Footnote 5] In Senate Report 112-29, we were directed to conduct a
detailed assessment of posture initiatives in Japan, Okinawa, and
Guam, focused on planning, costs, long-term financial commitments, and
other topics.[Footnote 6] We were also directed, in Senate Report 112-
173, to assess and identify the costs associated with the new plan to
realign Marine Corps units to Guam, Australia, and Hawaii.[Footnote 7]
This report examines DOD's plans and the costs associated with the
most significant of these posture initiatives, the realignment of
Marines off Okinawa, and the effects of this initiative on the current
and future landscapes of Okinawa and Guam. Specifically, we report on
the extent to which DOD has (1) developed comprehensive cost estimates
for the realignment of Marines off Okinawa; (2) planned for and
synchronized other U.S. defense posture movements on Okinawa and Japan
to coincide with the relocation of Marines off Okinawa; and (3)
identified plans to sustain the force until the Marine Corps
realignment and other initiatives are completed.
For each of our objectives, we reviewed relevant policies and
procedures, and collected information by interviewing and
communicating with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Policy) and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller); the Air Force; the Army; the Navy; the Marine Corps;
the Joint Staff; United States Pacific Command; and the State
Department. We conducted site visits at Pacific Command and its
service components in Hawaii; U.S. Forces--Japan and its service
components; and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan; the U.S. Consulate
on Okinawa; and military installations on Guam. To determine the
extent to which DOD has developed comprehensive cost estimates for the
realignment of the Marines, we reviewed DOD's cost estimating
methodology and planning assumptions and compared them to the cost
estimating guidance in GAO's Cost Estimating Guide. Furthermore, we
interviewed relevant officials from the Marine Corps, Pacific Command,
U.S. Forces-Japan, Joint Guam Program Office, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and Office of Economic Adjustment to determine the
validity of the data. To determine the extent to which DOD has planned
for and synchronized other U.S. defense posture movements in Okinawa
and Japan to coincide with the Marine Corps realignment, we collected
relevant planning documentation and interviewed Marine Corps officials
in Washington, Honolulu, and Okinawa. Furthermore, we compared the
data we received from each component within the Marine Corps to one
another, and the data we collected from the Pacific Command, U.S.
Forces-Japan, Joint Guam Program Office, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to determine the status of planning consistencies
and synchronization. Finally, to determine the extent to which DOD has
identified a strategy to sustain its current forces on Okinawa and
Guam, we reviewed sustainment planning documentation, base master
plans, and historical host nation support and U.S. sustainment data
for Okinawa. We also interviewed relevant Marine Corps and Air Force
officials in Okinawa to determine sustainment planning needs and the
status of future sustainment funding requests. For Guam, we
interviewed Navy officials to determine the extent to which they have
planned for the sustainment of family housing on Guam, and we reviewed
planning documentation and analyzed current DOD cost data collection
methodologies used by the service.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to March 2013,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more
detailed description of our scope and methodology.
This report is one of a series of GAO reports on DOD's global defense
posture initiatives. Since 2006, we have reported on issues related to
DOD's overall global posture strategy and management practices, the
military buildup on Guam, the transformation of United States Army and
Navy posture in Europe, the transformation and consolidation of U.S.
defense posture in South Korea and Japan, and the establishment of the
United States Africa Command. Those reports make a number of
recommendations to improve DOD's management of these efforts and the
information about them that DOD makes available within the executive
branch and to congressional committees. Most recently, in May 2011, we
reported on U.S. defense posture in Asia, highlighting the need for
additional cost information and methods for evaluating posture in that
region. See the list of related GAO products at the end of this report.
Background:
The senior U.S. military authority in the Pacific Area of
Responsibility is the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Pacific
Command is one of six U.S. geographic combatant commands. Pacific
Command's area of responsibility spans roughly half the earth's
surface and encompasses 36 countries, including Australia, China,
India, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea.[Footnote 8] The
Pacific Command is supported by four service component commands: U.S.
Army Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific;
and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Each component command is generally
responsible for its service's actions and missions within the Pacific
Command area of responsibility and is supported by subordinate
commands, which help support the service's presence in the region. For
example, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, is supported by the III Marine
Expeditionary Force, a large Marine Corps unit forward deployed to
Japan and other parts of Asia, which stands ready to conduct
operations.[Footnote 9] Also supporting Marines in the Pacific is U.S.
Marine Corps Installations, Pacific, which is responsible for the
command and control of all Marine Corps installations in the region.
In Japan, U.S. Forces-Japan--a subunified command under the Pacific
Command--supports U.S. forward presence and ensures bilateral defense
cooperation with the government of Japan. According to U.S. Forces-
Japan, it focuses on war planning, the conduct of joint/bilateral
exercises and studies, administering the Status of Forces Agreement,
improving combat readiness, and enhancing the quality of life of
military and DOD civilian personnel and their dependents. See figure 1
for information on major U.S. forces and installations in Japan,
Okinawa, and Guam; approximate distances between Guam and other
strategic locations in the Pacific; and U.S. strategic allies in the
Pacific.
Figure 1: U.S. Defense Posture in Asia:
[Refer to PDF for image: interactive map]
Interactivity instructions: Roll over a button below to view more
information. See appendix X for the non-interactive, printer-friendly
version.
Buttons:
U.S. Forces;
Travel distances:
U.S. allies.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and other federal agency data.
[End of figure]
Realignment of U.S. Forces in the Pacific:
The U.S.-Japan alliance dates back to the U.S. occupation of Japan
after its defeat in World War II. The alliance is supported by the
1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security[Footnote 10] and a
related Status of Forces Agreement[Footnote 11] which today covers
about 51,200 U.S. servicemembers, 5,400 DOD civilian employees, and
42,200 dependents in Japan, as of January 2013. As a result of the
treaty, the Status of Forces Agreement, and related agreements, U.S.
forces have the use of nearly 90 installations throughout both
mainland Japan and Okinawa, for the purpose of contributing to the
security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and
security in the region. Under the treaty and Status of Forces
Agreement, the United States is granted the use of facilities and
areas in Japan, with specific facilities and areas to be determined by
the two governments. Generally, according to U.S. Forces-Japan
officials, Japan constructs the facilities, while the United States
bears the costs of maintenance--with each facility typically having a
50-year service life.
One issue that remains at the forefront of the alliance is the
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. Efforts to realign U.S. forces in
Japan date back to 1995. Discontent among the people of Okinawa
regarding the U.S. military presence led to the establishment of the
Special Action Committee on Okinawa in November 1995 by the Security
Consultative Committee, a bilateral group of high-ranking U.S. and
Japanese officials involved with overall bilateral policy regarding
the security relationship between the two countries.[Footnote 12] In
December 1996, this committee approved the final report of the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa, which included recommendations on how to
consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas and adjust
the operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa in order to
reduce the burden on local communities.[Footnote 13]
Realignment efforts did not gain much traction until the end of 2002,
when the United States and Japan launched an ambitious series of
realignment initiatives called The Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI).[Footnote 14] Under DPRI, both countries were seeking to reduce
the U.S. footprint in Okinawa, enhance interoperability and
communication, and better position U.S. forces to respond to a
changing security environment. The major realignment initiatives under
DPRI are outlined in the United States--Japan Roadmap for Realignment
Implementation (2006 Roadmap) which was issued in May 2006 by the
Security Consultative Committee,[Footnote 15] reaffirmed and
implemented in part in a 2009 bilateral agreement,[Footnote 16] and
recently adjusted in the April 2012 statement. There are four
initiatives under DPRI that are specific to the Marine Corps and its
current plans to realign its forces in the Pacific:
1. Futenma Replacement Facility,
2. Realignment of Marine Corps units,
3. Okinawa Consolidation, and:
4. Carrier Air Wing Move from Atsugi to Iwakuni.
Futenma Replacement Facility:
As envisioned by the 2006 Roadmap, the U.S. government would return to
Japan the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa once the
government of Japan constructed a fully operational replacement
facility (Futenma Replacement Facility), including a runway, in a
northern, less populated area of the island.[Footnote 17] This
facility was originally projected to be complete by 2014. According to
Marine Corps officials, some facilities have been constructed at the
planned site of the realignment--Camp Schwab; however, the
construction of the replacement runway has stalled.[Footnote 18] Those
same officials stated that before construction of the runway can
proceed, the government of Japan has to issue an environmental impact
statement for the construction of the runway, and the Okinawa
government has to approve a landfill permit. According to DOD
officials, in December 2012, Japan's Ministry of Defense submitted the
environmental impact statement to the Governor of Okinawa.
Subsequently, in March 2013, DOD officials informed us that the
government of Japan submitted the application for the landfill permit
to the Governor of Okinawa.[Footnote 19] Figure 2 shows the planned
location of the runway at Camp Schwab. The Marine Corps estimates that
its Operation and Maintenance and Procurement costs for the Futenma
Replacement Facility will be approximately $178 million over the next
5 years; however, this estimate does not constitute the total cost to
the United States and, according to Marine Corps officials, has not
been approved.
Figure 2: Planned Location of Replacement Runway at Camp Schwab:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Depicted: approximate level of landfill.
Line on the base bowling alley at Camp Schwab shows how high fill
material must rise to build the runway for the Futenma Replacement
Facility. GAO extended the line to show the impact of building the
runway on surrounding facilities and the nearby bay.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Because of the uncertainties surrounding the construction of the
runway at Camp Schwab and following direction from the Senate Armed
Services Committee, DOD has examined the feasibility of relocating air
assets from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Kadena Air Base, as an
alternative to constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp
Schwab.[Footnote 20] However, DOD concluded that it was not a viable
solution. In the April 2012 statement, the representatives from the
United States and Japan reconfirmed their view that the Futenma
Replacement Facility remains the only viable solution that has been
identified to date.[Footnote 21] In addition, the April 2012 statement
noted that both governments expressed their commitment to contribute
to refurbishment projects at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to
sustain safe mission capability until the Futenma Replacement Facility
is fully operational and to protect the environment. According to
Marine Corps officials, as of February 2013, a list of refurbishment
projects to be funded by the U.S. government and the government of
Japan has been identified, and planning for these projects is expected
to be completed by April 2013. Though time frames may vary, Marine
Corps officials expect work on these projects could start sometime in
2014.
Realignment of Marine Units:
After several years of planning to move approximately 8,000 Marines
off Okinawa to Guam, DOD revised its plan in April 2012 to relocate
some units from Okinawa to Guam, Hawaii, and the Continental United
States. Additionally, the plan includes establishing a rotational
Marine Corps presence in Australia, a move that, according to DOD
officials, stems from a November 2011 agreement between the United
States and Australia. To date, the Marine Corps has established a
small presence on Guam to prepare for the Marine realignment, but it
has not yet relocated any units from Okinawa to Guam, nor has it been
able to reduce its presence on Okinawa as anticipated under the April
2012 statement.[Footnote 22] According to Marine Corps officials,
Marines cannot be relocated until suitable replacement facilities are
constructed and made operationally capable on Guam and in other
locations.
The Marine Corps' current plan is to build facilities on Guam and live-
fire training ranges on Guam, Tinian, and Pagan--members of the
Mariana Islands--to support the realignment of approximately 5,000
personnel (mostly rotational) and any dependents to Guam.[Footnote 23]
Before any Marines can relocate to Guam, DOD must examine the
environmental effects of its proposed actions, pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.[Footnote 24] To address
this requirement in the past, DOD performed an environmental review of
certain proposed actions under the original 2006 realignment plan and
released the Guam and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Military Relocation Final Environmental Impact Statement in July 2010.
[Footnote 25] In September 2010, the Department of the Navy announced
in the record of Decision for the Guam and Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation that it will proceed with
the Marine Corps realignment, but deferred the selection of a specific
site for a live-fire training range complex on Guam pending further
study.[Footnote 26] In February 2012, the Department of the Navy gave
notice that it intended to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement to evaluate locations for a live-fire training range complex
on Guam.[Footnote 27] In October 2012, as a result of the current
realignment plan, the Department of the Navy gave notice that it was
planning to expand the scope of the ongoing Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement evaluating locations for the live-fire training range
complex, to determine the potential environmental consequences from
construction and operation of a main cantonment area, including family
housing, and associated infrastructure on Guam to support the recently
revised realignment plan.[Footnote 28] According to Marine Corps
officials, the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is expected
to be completed by 2014, and it is anticipated that a final decision
on all matters being evaluated will be released by 2015.[Footnote 29]
The Joint Guam Program Office, which was established by the Navy in
August 2006, leads this effort.
DOD, using costing data derived from previous cost estimates for Guam,
estimates that the total cost to relocate Marines to Guam as part of
the realignment plan will be $8.6 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars.
According to DOD officials, the government of Japan is expected to
provide approximately $3.1 billion for this realignment.[Footnote 30]
As of June 2012, the United States had received $833.90 million from
the Government of Japan for this initiative; however, provisions in
the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013
restricted the use of funds provided by the government of Japan to
implement the realignment from Okinawa to Guam until DOD provided
certain information to the congressional defense committees.[Footnote
31] Although the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 restricts the use of funds, it contains exceptions allowing DOD
to use funds to complete additional environmental analysis for
proposed actions on Guam or Hawaii, initiate planning and design of
construction projects at Andersen Air Force Base and on Andersen
South, and to carry out certain military construction projects as
specified in the act.[Footnote 32]
As part of the current realignment plan, DOD plans to move some Marine
Corps units to Hawaii and the continental United States. As of March
2013, the Marine Corps has not moved any units from Okinawa to either
Hawaii or the continental United States. Additionally, DOD plans to
establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500 person Marine Air
Ground Task Force in an undetermined location in Australia. As an
initial step toward establishing a Marine Air-Ground Task Force in
Australia, the Marine Corps rotated approximately 200 Marines from Fox
Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Division from their home station at
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, to Darwin, Australia for a 6-
month rotation from April to September 2012.
Okinawa Consolidation:
The April 2012 statement noted that the United States is committed to
returning lands on Okinawa to Japan as designated Marine Corps forces
are relocated and as facilities become available for units and other
tenant activities relocating to other locations on Okinawa.[Footnote
33] Figure 3 depicts all U.S. installations on Okinawa and identifies
which installations have been designated to be partially or fully
returned to Japan according to the April 2012 statement. According to
the statement, the two governments will jointly develop a
consolidation plan, including sequencing of realignment steps, for
facilities and locations remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.
[Footnote 34] DOD officials said that they have not been able to
estimate U.S. costs for the consolidation, because consolidation plans
remain under development.
Figure 3: Okinawa Consolidation Plan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Okinawa]
Total return:
Camp Kinser;
Camp Lester
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma;
Naha Port.
Partial return:
Camp Foster.
Staying:
Camp Courtney;
Camp Hansen;
Camp McTureous;
Camp Schwab;
Camp Shields;
Chibana Industrial Park;
Kadena;
Tengan Pier;
Torii Station.
Source: DOD (data); Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Carrier Air Wing Move from Atsugi to Iwakuni:
Carrier Air Wing 5, a Navy unit paired with the aircraft carrier USS
George Washington, is currently located at Naval Air Station Atsugi
(about 35 miles southwest of Tokyo, Japan). On the basis of the 2006
Roadmap, Carrier Air Wing 5 would move its headquarters and fixed-wing
flight operations from Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni,
which is approximately 500 miles away. As a result, Marine Corps
officials expect that when this initiative is complete, the air
station will have increased in size from approximately 8,000 to 14,000
personnel. The air station's acreage is also expected to increase,
from 1,633 to 2,900 acres. According to Marine Corps officials, this
initiative calls for 1,306 new structures, at an estimated cost of
$3.0 billion to the government of Japan. The Marine Corps estimates
that the cost to the U.S. government for this initiative in fiscal
years 2013 through 2018 will be $389 million for operation and
maintenance, procurement, and family housing operation costs. However,
this estimate may not constitute the total cost to the United States
because it does not include such things as U.S. Navy collateral
equipment costs associated with Carrier Air Wing 5 facilities.
The government of Japan recently constructed a new 8,000-foot runway
at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, which is similar to the runway
planned for the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab (see
figure 4). The new runway was constructed using landfill material from
a nearby mountain and took nearly 13 years to complete. According to
Marine Corps officials, the government of Japan contributed $2.53
billion to the project, while the Marine Corps contributed $9.7
million. Furthermore, according to Marine Corps officials, an
important lesson learned from this runway project is that it is
important to identify sufficient landfill and concrete sources to
complete a project. Failure to do so could further delay construction
of the runway at Camp Schwab.
Figure 4: Japanese-Constructed Runway at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Government of Japan Host Nation Support:
In support of the security alliance, the government of Japan provides
host nation support to defray some of the costs of stationing U.S.
forces within its territory and contributes to the efforts to realign
U.S. forces in Japan. Support provided through a series of Special
Measures Agreements helps offset labor, utility, and some training
costs for U.S. forces in Japan. As part of host nation support, to
defray U.S. military construction costs the government of Japan also
constructs facilities--such as family housing--for U.S. forces through
the Japan Facilities Improvement Program. According to DOD officials,
this program is on a voluntary basis and from 1979 to April 2010 has
provided over $22 billion worth of construction for U.S. military
facilities in mainland Japan and Okinawa.
In addition to host nation support, the government of Japan provides
funding to support the realignment of U.S. forces within and from
Japan. The government of Japan began funding projects to implement the
Special Action Committee on Okinawa program in 1996 and the DPRI in
2006. These projects include land purchases and the construction of
replacement facilities to support realignment and consolidation
efforts. Although Special Action Committee on Okinawa and DPRI
realignment funding directly supports U.S. posture, according to U.S.
Forces Japan officials, it is accounted for in separate government of
Japan budget categories from host nation support.
As noted, the government of Japan has historically been a major
financial contributor in the form of host nation support funding;
however, as reflected in figure 5, after peaking in 1999 (at ¥276
billion), host nation support funding from Japan has steadily
declined. In 2010, the Government of Japan provided ¥187 billion, or
approximately $2 billion, in host nation support--the lowest total
since 1992.[Footnote 35] The most significant decline in host nation
support has come from the Japan Facilities Improvement Program, which
has declined nearly 80 percent since 1993. According to DOD officials,
much of the decline in host nation support can be attributed to the
increase in funding for the Special Action Committee on Okinawa and
DPRI realignment initiatives, as reflected in figure 5.
Figure 5: Government of Japan Host Nation Support and Realignment
Funding (in Billions of Yen) from Japan Fiscal Years 1979 to 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked line graph]
Japanese fiscal year: 1979;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 22.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 14 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1980;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 27.2 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 14.7 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1981;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 32.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 15.9 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1982;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 40.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 16.4 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1983;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 50.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 16.9 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1984;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 62.7 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 18 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1985;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 62.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 19.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1986;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 70.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 19.1 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1987;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 77.7 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 36.1 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1988;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 86.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 41.2 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1989;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 91.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 53.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1990;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 95.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 67.9 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1991;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 106.8 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 79.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 2.7 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1992;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 107.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 90.5 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 7.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1993;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 105 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 107.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 14.8 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1994;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 102.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 125.2 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 22.2 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1995;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 100.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 142.7 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 29.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1996;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 102.4 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 144.8 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 31 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 0.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1997;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 102.4 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 146.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 31.8 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 0.8 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 6.1 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 1998;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 87.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 148.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 31.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.2 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 10.7 billion yen;
0
Japanese fiscal year: 1999;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 84.7 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 150.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 31.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 12.1 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2000;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 80.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 149.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 29.7 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.1 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 14 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2001;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 80.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 148.5 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 26.4 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.2 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 16.5 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2002;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 74.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 148 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 26.2 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.2 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 16.5 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2003;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 68.4 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 144.7 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 25.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.2 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 26.5 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2004;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 67.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 143 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 25.8 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.3 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 26.6 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2005;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 61.4 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 143.6 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 24.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.5 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 26.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2006;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 42.2 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 143.5 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 24.8 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.5 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 28.5 billion yen;
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): 0.9 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2007;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 36.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 145.8 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 25.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 0.9 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 16.6 billion yen;
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): 14.1 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2008;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 20.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 146.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 25.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 17.2 billion yen;
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): 39.2 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2009;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 19.4 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 145.3 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 24.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.5 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 9.9 billion yen;
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): 76.4 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2010;
Host nation support: Facilities Improvement Program: 19.1 billion yen;
Host nation support: Labor: 141.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Utilities: 24.9 billion yen;
Host nation support: Training relocation: 1.6 billion yen;
US-Japan Special Action Committe on Okinawa: 19.9 billion yen;
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): 106.5 billion yen.
Source: GAO analysis of government of Japan data provided to DOD.
[End of figure]
DPRI-Related Construction Under Way on Guam:
Over the past several years, DOD has been conducting both U.S.-and
Japanese-funded military construction projects on Guam to support the
realignment.[Footnote 36] For example, DOD is working to improve
military wharves at Apra Harbor to support future Marine Corps
embarkation and disembarkation operations (see figure 6). As of
January 2013, DOD had expended approximately $129.8 million for
military construction and design projects and estimated that it would
need to expend an additional $220.8 million to complete those projects
(see appendix V for a list of ongoing projects).[Footnote 37] DOD also
had expended approximately $47.1 million for military construction and
design projects using funds provided by the government of Japan, and
had estimated that it would need to expend $157.6 million more to
complete those projects. According to DOD officials, these active
projects are in support of elements of the planned Marine Corps
realignment to Guam, covered by the 2010 Record of Decision, and based
on previously certified cost analyses, and remain necessary under the
current realignment plan.
Figure 6: Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
DOD's Initial Estimate for the Current Marine Corps Realignment Plan
Is Not Reliable:
Although DOD has developed a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost
estimate for its current plan to relocate Marines from Okinawa and
realign them to Guam and other locations in the Pacific, it is not
reliable, because it is missing costs and is based on limited data.
According to DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put together
a more reliable cost estimate for its current plan, because it will
not have the information needed to do so until the completion of
several key studies, including environmental analyses for Guam and
Hawaii. In addition, host nation negotiations--specifically those with
the government of Australia--have not been completed. As part of its
preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate, DOD currently
estimates that it would cost approximately $12.1 billion to implement
the current realignment plan--not including the Australia segment of
the realignment. However, this estimate is not reliable because it
omits potentially critical cost elements and risk parameters tied to
the assumptions, and lacks detailed information on requirements for
several key cost components that are needed to capture all costs
related to the realignment. GAO's cost estimation guide specifies four
characteristics of a reliable cost estimate--the extent to which an
estimate is comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible. We
found DOD's estimate only partially meets best practices for being
comprehensive, and according to best practices, when a cost estimate
is not comprehensive, it cannot fully meet the other characteristics
of a reliable cost estimate. As a result, we did not evaluate the
other three characteristics. According to DOD officials, specific
requirements and their associated costs cannot be developed for each
cost component until the necessary analyses and host nation
negotiations have been completed. Still, we found that DOD did not
include some up-front practices that could have provided a more
reliable estimate and could have been done despite the fact that the
environmental analyses and host nation negotiations are not complete.
For example, DOD officials identified mobility support as a critical
component to the implementation of the realignment; however, no costs
associated with mobility support were included in the estimate.
Additionally, DOD based its estimate on several assumptions, but there
was no evidence that DOD identified risk impacts or parameters for any
of these assumptions. Overall, the cost components not fully addressed
in the current estimate include the Guam physical layout and
requirements; the housing requirements on Guam; the requirements to
upgrade utilities and infrastructure on Guam; the Joint Training Range
Complex in the Northern Marianas; the Marine Corps requirements for
Australia; the Marine Corps requirements for Hawaii and other U.S.
locations; and mobility support. In addition, DOD continues to seek
funding for utilities and infrastructure projects on Guam that once
supported the original Marine Corps realignment plan. DOD officials
believe that some of these projects should not be affected by the
current realignment plan. However, assessments to determine the extent
to which these projects remain valid for the current realignment plan
have not been completed. As a result, it is unknown to what extent
these projects need adjusting, if at all, to support the new
realignment plan. Although DOD officials expect to develop a more
reliable estimate as the necessary environmental analyses are
completed and host nation negotiations have been finalized, they have
not determined when this estimate will be available for Congress.
DOD's Estimates for Prior Realignment Plans Were More Detailed than
the Estimate for the Current Plan:
DOD has revised its plans and updated its cost estimates several times
to relocate Marines from Okinawa and realign them to other locations
in the Pacific. Table 1 lists the significant features, the number of
Marines expected to leave Okinawa, and the estimated costs associated
with its plans.
Table 1: History of DOD's Plans and Estimates for the Realignment of
Marines:
Plan: Original Realignment Plan (2006)[A];
Significant feature:
* Establish large Marine Corps presence on Guam;
* Mostly Headquarter units relocate to Guam;
Planned number of Marines leaving Okinawa: 8,000;
Anticipated United States share of cost: $4.2 billion;
Anticipated Japan share of Guam cost: $6.1 billion;
Total estimated cost: $10.3 billion.
Plan: Original Realignment Plan Revised Cost Estimate (2010)[B];
Significant feature:
* Establish large Marine Corps presence on Guam;
* Mostly headquarters units relocate to Guam;
* Estimate includes more cost elements not included in prior estimate;
Planned number of Marines leaving Okinawa: 8,600[C];
Anticipated United States share of cost: $12.7 billion;
Anticipated Japan share of Guam cost: $6.3 billion;
Total estimated cost: $19 billion.
Plan: Current Realignment Plan (2012)[B];
Significant feature:
* Establish Marine Air-Ground Task Forces on Guam and in Australia,
and relocate some units to Hawaii and the continental United States;
* Smaller Marine Corps presence in Guam than in previous plans;
* Includes estimated costs for operation and maintenance and
procurement for Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) activities at
Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and the Futenma Replacement Facility
initiative on Okinawa;
Planned number of Marines leaving Okinawa: 9,500;
Anticipated United States share of cost: $9 billion[D];
Anticipated Japan share of Guam cost: $3.1 billion;
Total estimated cost: $12.1 billion[D].
Source: DOD.
[A] Estimates are in fiscal year 2008 dollars.
[B] Estimates are in fiscal year 2012 dollars.
[C] Although the 2006 Roadmap concerning the Guam realignment referred
to approximately 8,000 personnel, the Record of Decision for the Guam
and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation
referred to approximately 8,600 Marines. See Department of Navy and
Department of the Army, Record of Decision for Guam and Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation (September 2010).
[D] The $9 billion and $12.1 billion figures do not include costs for
Australia.
[End of table]
As noted in table 1, under the original realignment plan developed in
2006, the III Marine Expeditionary Force would have moved most of its
headquarters elements from Okinawa to Guam, but not the other
elements, such as ground forces and aviation units, that are needed to
create a full Marine Air-Ground Task Force capability.[Footnote 38] In
2010, DOD developed a revised cost estimate, referred to as the
Original Realignment Plan Revised Cost Estimate (see table 1). This
estimate is based on planning, studies, and defined facilities
requirements and included additional cost elements, such as operation
and maintenance, procurement, overseas housing allowance, and family
housing and operations. [Footnote 39] On the basis of this more
detailed analysis, DOD's estimate for the original realignment plan
increased from $10.3 billion in 2006 to $19 billion in 2010. Marine
Corps officials told us they believed that not having a full Marine
Air-Ground Task Force capability on Guam, a feature of the original
realignment plan, would have hindered the Marines' ability to properly
train or deploy as a combined-arms force. Therefore, between 2010 and
2012, DOD examined different options for realigning Marines in the
Pacific. Although different options were considered, the costs
remained significant to the United States and no option was officially
adopted.
In April 2012, DOD briefed its current realignment plan to the
congressional defense committees. The current realignment plan calls
for the establishment of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in Guam and
Hawaii, and a rotational presence in Australia. In 2012, DOD officials
developed a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate for the
current realignment plan, which relocates fewer troops to Guam and
realigns Marines to other locations in the Pacific. This preliminary
rough-order-of-magnitude estimate for the current plan, which was
briefed to congressional defense committees in the spring of 2012, is
$12.1 billion; however, this estimate does not include any potential
costs for the Australia segment of the realignment. Table 2 provides
more location-specific information on cost estimates and personnel
breakdown for the current realignment plan.
Table 2: Breakdown of Costs and Marine Corps Distribution for Current
Realignment Plan:
Total estimated cost:
Guam: $8.6 billion;
Hawaii: $2.5 billion;
Australia: n/a;
Continental United States: $0.4 billion;
Japan: $0.6 billion;
Total: $12.1 billion[B].
Planned number of Marines once realignment completed (approximate
figures):
Guam: 4,700;
Hawaii: 8,800;
Australia: 2,500;
Continental United States: 800[A];
Japan: 15,000;
Total: 31,000.
Source: DOD.
[A] The 800 number reflects the total number of Marines moving to the
continental United States due to the Realignment of Marines
initiative. It does not reflect the total number of Marines in the
continental United States, whereas the other figures represent an
approximate total population.
[B] The $12.1 billion figure does not include costs for Australia.
[End of table]
DOD officials informed us that the estimate for the current
realignment plan is lower than estimates for prior plans because of
several factors. One factor is that more Marines, approximately 1,300,
will remain in Okinawa than in previous plans, resulting in overall
lower operation and maintenance costs. For example, on Guam and
Hawaii, the United States will likely assume full responsibility for
such things as labor and utilities costs, whereas the government of
Japan provides significant host nation support for these two cost
categories in Japan. Since more Marines will remain on Okinawa,
operation and maintenance costs will not be as significant, causing
the overall cost estimate to likely go down. Another factor is a
reduction in expected military construction costs on Guam. According
to DOD officials, since approximately 5,000 fewer Marines are expected
to relocate to Guam, and most of those who do will be deployed on a
rotational basis, there will be a reduced demand for additional
facilities and housing. Furthermore, DOD officials stated that the
area cost factor for Guam had declined in 2011, helping to reduce the
overall cost estimate.[Footnote 40] DOD officials believe the cost
estimate for the current realignment plan will be lower than the
estimates for previous plans. However, DOD has not been able to apply
the same rigor as was used in developing previous estimates because,
unlike for previous estimates, key studies, like environmental
analyses, and host nation negotiations that will affect requirements
have not yet been completed.
DOD's Estimate for the Current Realignment Plan Is Not Reliable:
According to documentation attached to DOD's fiscal year 2013 budget,
DOD cannot continue the practice of starting programs that prove to be
unaffordable. Therefore, DOD plans to achieve program affordability by
working to ensure that programs start with firm cost goals in place,
appropriate priorities set, and necessary trade-offs made to keep them
within affordable limits. Furthermore, this documentation states that
understanding and controlling future costs from a program's inception
is critical to achieving the goal of affordability.[Footnote 41]
According to GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, whether or
not a program is affordable depends a great deal on the quality of its
cost estimate.[Footnote 42] A reliable cost estimate is critical to
the success of any government program, because it provides the basis
for informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation
and program resourcing, and meaningful progress measurement. Office of
Management and Budget guidance containing best practices indicates
that programs should maintain current and well-documented estimates of
program costs.[Footnote 43] In addition, our research has identified a
number of best practices that provide a basis for effective program
cost estimating and should result in reliable cost estimates that an
organization can use to make informed decisions. These practices can
be organized into the four characteristics of a reliable cost
estimate. The cost estimate should be comprehensive, well-documented,
accurate, and credible, as explained in table 3.
Table 3: Four Characteristics of a Reliable Cost Estimate:
Characteristic: Comprehensive;
Explanation: The cost estimate should include both government and
contractor costs of the program over its full life cycle, from
inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and
operation and maintenance, to retirement of the program. It should
also completely define the program, reflect the current schedule, and
be technically reasonable. Comprehensive cost estimates should be
structured in sufficient detail (at least three levels of cost
elements) to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double
counted.a Specifically, the cost estimate should be based on a product-
oriented work breakdown structure that allows a program to track cost
and schedule by defined deliverables, such as hardware or software
components. Finally, where information is limited and judgments must
be made, the cost estimate should document all cost-influencing ground
rules and assumptions.
Characteristic: Well-documented;
Explanation: A good cost estimate--while taking the form of a single
number--is supported by detailed documentation that describes how it
was derived and how the expected funding will be spent in order to
achieve a given objective. Therefore, the documentation should capture
in writing such things as the source data used, the calculations
performed and their results, and the estimating methodology used to
derive each work breakdown structure element's cost. Moreover, this
information should be captured in such a way that the data used to
derive the estimate can be traced back to and verified against their
sources so that the estimate can be easily replicated and updated. The
documentation should also discuss the technical baseline description
and how the data were normalized. Finally, the final cost estimate
should be reviewed and accepted by management on the basis of
confidence in the estimating process and the estimate produced by the
process.
Characteristic: Accurate;
Explanation: The cost estimate should provide for results that are
unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or optimistic. An
estimate is accurate when it is based on an assessment of most likely
costs, adjusted properly for inflation, and contains few, if any,
minor mistakes. In addition, the estimate should be grounded in a
historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences on other
comparable programs. Finally, a cost estimate should be updated
regularly to reflect material changes in the program, such as when
schedules or other assumptions change, and actual costs, so that it is
always reflecting current status.
Characteristic: Credible;
Explanation: The cost estimates should discuss any limitations of the
analysis because of uncertainty or biases surrounding data or
assumptions. Major assumptions should be varied, and other outcomes
recomputed to determine how sensitive they are to changes in the
assumptions (i.e., sensitivity analysis). A risk and uncertainty
analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated
with the estimate. For management to make good decisions, the program
estimate must reflect the degree of uncertainty, so that a level of
confidence can be given about the estimate. Having a range of costs
around a point estimate is more useful to decision makers because it
conveys the level of confidence in achieving the most likely cost and
also informs them on cost, schedule, and technical risks.b Further,
the estimate's results should be cross-checked, and an independent
cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization
should be developed to determine whether other estimating methods
produce similar results.
Source: GAO.
[A] The appropriate number of levels for a work breakdown structure
varies from program to program and depends on a program's complexity
and risk. However, each work breakdown structure should, at the very
least, include three levels. The first level represents the program as
a whole and therefore contains only one element--the program's name.
The second level contains the major program segments, and level three
contains the lower-level components or subsystems for each segment.
[B] A point estimate is the most likely value for the cost estimate,
given the underlying data. The level of confidence for the point
estimate is the probability that the point estimate will actually be
met. For example, if the confidence level for a point estimate is 80
percent, there is an 80 percent chance that the final cost will be at
or below the point estimate and a 20 percent chance that costs will
exceed the point estimate.
[End of table]
Our assessment of DOD's preliminary estimate for the current
realignment plan is that it is not reliable, because it is missing
costs and based on limited data. To arrive at this conclusion, we
assessed DOD's preliminary estimate against one of the four
characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, comprehensiveness. As
shown in table 4, we found that the preliminary estimate only
minimally met best practices for being comprehensive.[Footnote 44]
According to best practices, when a cost estimate is not
comprehensive, it cannot fully meet the other characteristics of a
reliable cost estimate. For example, because the cost estimate is
missing some cost elements, the documentation is incomplete, and since
the requirements for the realignment are still being determined, the
estimate cannot be considered accurate. Finally, the cost estimate is
not credible because it does not include a full risk and uncertainty
analysis, and the potential exists that some of the costs have been
underestimated. Table 4 provides a summary of our assessment of DOD's
preliminary cost estimate.
Table 4: Summary Assessment of DOD's Current Realignment Cost Estimate
Compared to Best Practices for Comprehensive Cost Estimates:
Detailed best practice: Cost estimate includes all costs;
Detailed assessment summary: The estimate for the current realignment
plan does not include all costs; instead, it includes some detailed
cost elements from a previous cost estimate for Guam and relies on a
high-level cost factor to estimate military construction, and
operation and maintenance costs in other locations;
* The current estimate does not include detailed requirements for all
aspects of the plan and is missing some cost elements because it was a
preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate. In addition, the
current estimate omitted the cost of providing and supporting
additional lift capabilities such as the procurement of the Joint High
Speed Vessel (as well as other mobility costs to support the
relocation);
* The cost estimates for realigning Marines to other geographic
locations like Australia, Hawaii, and the continental United States
were not determined using detailed requirements and facilities
planning, but instead were developed using a high-level cost factor
based on Guam cost data from a previous plan. This estimating approach
did not provide the necessary details to determine if all military
construction, and operation and maintenance costs were accounted for
in the current realignment plan cost estimate.
Unless estimates account for all costs, they cannot enhance decision
making by allowing for design trade-off studies to be evaluated on a
total cost basis. Without fully accounting for all costs,
organizations will have difficulty successfully planning program
resource requirements and making informed decisions;
Assessment: Partially Met.
Detailed best practice: Cost estimate completely defines the program,
reflects the current schedule, and is technically reasonable;
Detailed assessment summary: The current estimate does not include a
document that contains a documented technical baseline description,
but technical details are available in other sources. For example, one
document outlines the number of Marines to be relocated from Okinawa,
and realigned to Guam and other locations. However, these technical
details are incomplete or remain unknown, because DOD has not been
able to perform the necessary planning and assessments until certain
environmental analyses and host nation negotiations have been
completed. As a result, DOD cannot yet fully account for the
requirements and costs associated with the following seven cost
components:
1. Guam Physical Layout and Requirements;
2. Housing Requirements on Guam;
3. Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam;
4. Joint Training Range Complex in the Northern Marianas;
5. Marine Corps Requirements for Australia;
6. Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations;
and;
7. Mobility Support.
Since specific technical details and any risks associated with them
are not yet available, the cost estimate technical baseline is not
sufficiently mature. Until this work is completed, and detailed master
planning for all locations is completed, an accurate and refined cost
estimate of budget quality cannot be prepared.
The key to developing a credible estimate is having an adequate
understanding of the technical definition and characteristics
associated with the program. Without these data, the cost estimator
will not be able to identify the technical and program parameters that
will bind the cost estimate and the quality of the cost estimate will
be compromised;
Assessment: Minimally Met.
Detailed best practice: Cost estimate Work Breakdown Structure is
product oriented, traceable to the statement of work, and at an
appropriate level of detail to ensure that cost elements are neither
omitted nor double-counted;
Detailed assessment summary: The current estimate breaks costs down
into two main levels: military construction and non-military
construction. Non-military construction costs include operation and
maintenance, procurement requirements, and--for the Guam realignment--
utilities and infrastructure upgrades. A detailed breakdown of costs
exists for the Guam realignment, but this breakdown was developed for
a previous realignment plan. Up-to-date and comprehensive cost
breakdowns do not exist for Guam or the other locations under the
current plan.
DOD officials said that a more detailed breakdown of costs for the
current realignment plan would not be available until certain
environmental analyses and host nation negotiations are completed;
Without a breakdown of costs at an appropriate level, we cannot
determine if all cost elements have been included. In addition, the
program lacks a framework to develop a schedule and cost plan that can
easily track technical accomplishments in terms of resources spent in
relation to the plan as well as completion of activities and tasks;
Assessment: Minimally Met.
Detailed best practice: Cost estimate documents all cost-influencing
ground rules and assumptions;
Detailed assessment summary: DOD provided us documentation of its
planning assumptions for the current realignment plan. These
assumptions include, but are not limited to:
* area cost factors for Guam, Hawaii, Australia and the continental
United States;
* a non-military construction cost factor;
* utilities and infrastructure costs of $600 million for Guam civil
military utilities;
* the number of months required to complete various environmental
studies; and;
* the number of personnel that would be realigned including which ones
would be have a permanent change of station versus those who would be
unit-deployed.
However, we found no historical data to support all of DOD's
assumptions, and no evidence that risk impacts resulting from
assumptions changing were identified. In addition, none of the
assumptions discussed included items such as additional lift
capabilities needed to support the Marine Corps realignment.
Because assumptions are best guesses, the risks associated with any of
these assumptions changing need to be identified and assessed. Unless
ground rules and assumptions are clearly documented, the cost estimate
will not have a basis for areas of potential risk to be resolved;
Assessment: Minimally Met.
Detailed best practice: Overall Assessment;
Assessment: Minimally Met.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
As discussed in table 4, we found that DOD's preliminary rough-order-
of-magnitude estimate does not fully include requirements and
associated costs for all segments of the realignment plan, because
this information will not become available until several environmental
analyses and specific host nation negotiations are completed. While
the reason for the missing requirements and their associated costs is
understandable, we also found that DOD omitted specific costs and risk
data that could have resulted in a more reliable estimate and are not
dependent on completion of the environmental analyses and host nation
negotiations. Most notably, the estimate did not include any costs for
mobility support, a component that DOD officials said was necessary
for the implementation of the realignment. According to some DOD
officials we spoke to, the potential cost for additional mobility
support could be considerable. In addition, we found that the estimate
was based on several assumptions, but there was no evidence that DOD
identified risk impacts or parameters for any of these assumptions.
For example, DOD assumed it would need $600 million to cover utilities
and infrastructure costs for Guam. There were no risk parameters put
on this assumption indicating the estimate could be higher or lower.
Considering that historical data from previous realignment plans
estimated utilities and infrastructure costs for Guam at over $1
billion, risk parameters could have identified the potential for
higher costs to DOD. Overall, we found that the preliminary estimate
does not adequately reflect the program because it cannot yet fully
account for the requirements and costs associated with the following
seven cost components:
1. Guam Physical Layout and Requirements.
2. Housing Requirements on Guam.
3. Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam.
4. Joint Training Range Complex in the Northern Marianas.
5. Marine Corps Requirements for Australia.
6. Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations.
7. Mobility Support.
We discuss each of the seven cost areas in more detail below.
Guam Physical Layout and Requirements:
DOD does not yet know the full facilities requirements for Guam or
potential environmental mitigations; therefore, it does not have
sufficient information to determine the full costs of building the
facilities and training ranges needed to support the Guam segment of
the realignment. The cost estimate for the Guam segment of the current
realignment plan--including the cost of establishing training ranges
in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and investing in
local civilian infrastructure--is approximately $8.6 billion, of which
a portion will be funded by the government of Japan.[Footnote 45]
However, this estimate does not fully capture the total costs of the
Guam segment of the realignment, because DOD has not determined the
physical layout of the Marine Corps presence on Guam, or fully
identified specific infrastructure requirements yet. To estimate the
costs for the Guam portion of the realignment, DOD officials assumed
that the main Marine Corps installation, or cantonment, would be
constructed at Finegayan (an area in the northern part of Guam just
south of Andersen Air Force Base), and that the training range
requirements would not have changed from those in prior plans.
However, since the current plan calls for fewer Marines to relocate to
Guam, and the composition of the Marine units that will relocate has
changed, different locations might be selected for the main Marine
Corps cantonment and live-fire training ranges. Those locations under
consideration include military space at Andersen Air Force Base and
Naval Base Guam. As of January 2013, DOD is assessing alternatives and
the possible effects that the current plan might have on Guam's
infrastructure and on the environment in order to develop the
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. The results of DOD's
assessments could affect where DOD builds, what the facilities
requirements will be, and what environmental mitigations DOD might
take. DOD officials told us that they will wait until this
environmental impact statement is completed before proceeding with any
further planning and assessments that may be needed to identify
specific requirements.
Housing Requirements on Guam:
DOD does not know the minimum level of government-provided housing
needed to accommodate the relocated Marines and to inform its housing
investment strategies to ensure that the housing needs of
servicemembers and their families are cost-effective on Guam. Of the
$8.6 billion estimate for the Guam segment of the current realignment
plan, DOD includes approximately $400 million to construct military
housing for Marines on Guam; however, DOD has not performed the
necessary housing analysis to validate this estimate yet, nor has it
determined how Navy housing policies and Joint Region Marianas housing
practices will affect Marine Corps housing requirements. According to
Joint Region Marianas officials, Joint Region Marianas is responsible
for maintaining and sustaining housing on Guam. In 2010, DOD performed
an analysis to determine the minimum level of government-provided
military housing needed to serve both unaccompanied and accompanied
servicemembers on Guam. However, this analysis was based on the
original realignment plan and is no longer valid. The current
realignment plan involves a smaller population and will consist
primarily of rotational personnel. Navy officials told us that a
realistic housing analysis identifying construction requirements for
the Guam segment of the realignment would not be able to be determined
until closer to the time when Marine Corps families are expected to
move to Guam, which is not expected for another 10 years. In the
interim, Marine Corps officials have said that they will plan to build
to 100 percent of the Marine Corps' housing requirement on Guam, an
assumption that will be used while completing necessary environmental
reviews for the Guam segment of the realignment. According to Joint
Region Marianas officials, their organization does not have the
authority or responsibility to determine how much housing the Marine
Corps should build on Guam. Navy housing policy is to encourage and
rely on private-sector housing whenever possible.[Footnote 46] Along
these lines, the practice of Joint Region Marianas is to rely on the
private sector for housing for servicemembers whenever
possible.[Footnote 47] A majority of the current Navy and Air Force
servicemembers choose to live in private housing on Guam. Joint Region
Marianas officials were uncertain what the effects would be if the
Marine Corps proceeds with building 100 percent of the housing it
needs for the relocated Marines, and whether the Marine Corps would
attempt to prohibit Marines from living in private, off-base housing.
Furthermore, according to DOD officials, if the decision is to house
Marines on any existing installations on Guam, such as Andersen Air
Force Base or Naval Base Guam, additional support infrastructure, such
as dining facilities and gymnasiums, will likely be required. Joint
Region Marianas also has a surplus of unoccupied military housing that
could potentially be used to house Marines (see figure 7 for
photographs of select unoccupied military housing units on Guam).
Unoccupied housing will be discussed in greater detail later in this
report.
Figure 7: Unoccupied Military Housing on Guam:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam:
DOD has not updated its list of utilities and infrastructure
requirements that is tied to the current realignment plan; therefore
DOD does not have an accurate estimate of how much it will cost to
upgrade Guam's utilities and infrastructure to support the planned
Marine Corps presence on the island. These public infrastructure
requirements include utilities and infrastructure improvements, as
well as projects to augment public health and social services, and
mitigate the social, economic, cultural, and environmental effects of
the Marine Corps realignment to Guam. In June 2009, we reported that
DOD had determined that existing utilities and infrastructure on Guam
were near or at their maximum capacities already, and would require
significant enhancements to support the increase in the island's
population expected under the original realignment plan.[Footnote 48]
In addition, during the development of the 2010 Final Environmental
Impact Statement, DOD, the Guam Waterworks Authority, and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency developed a list of water and
wastewater projects to address deficiencies in Guam's water and
wastewater infrastructure and respond to the increased population
driven by the original realignment plan.[Footnote 49] This list of
projects, estimated to cost approximately $1.3 billion, spanned the
first 5 years of an overall 30-year $5.3 billion capital improvement
plan. The government of Japan was expected to provide $600 million of
the needed $1.3 billion, with the remainder to be provided by DOD.
Funding outside this 5-year timeframe was expected to be covered by
the government of Guam and non-DOD federal government agencies.
According to DOD Office of Economic Adjustment officials, although
other federal agencies, such as the Department of the Interior's
Office of Insular Affairs, could help fund these improvements on Guam,
as of February 2013, there has been no financial assistance for these
projects from non-DOD agencies.[Footnote 50]
Although $1.3 billion in water and wastewater projects were connected
to the original realignment plan, the Marine Corps, as part of the
$8.6 billion estimate for the Guam segment of the current realignment
plan, only identified $600 million for all utilities and
infrastructure. According to Marine Corps officials, this $600 million
was to only fund water and wastewater projects that the government of
Japan was previously expected to finance, but is no longer obligated
to pay for as a result of the adjustments to the 2006 Roadmap
announced in April 2012. Marine Corps officials also said that the
decision to include only $600 million was a planning decision and not
based on any updated analysis of public infrastructure requirements
for the current realignment plan. These same officials said that any
updated analysis would not be available until the Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement for Guam was completed. According to
Office of Economic Adjustment officials, no matter how many Marines
relocate to Guam, significant improvements to the water and wastewater
infrastructure will be necessary; many of these improvements are
included in the $1.3 billion water and wastewater infrastructure
improvement estimate that was linked to the original realignment plan.
Joint Training Range Complex in the Northern Marianas:
DOD plans and designs for a joint training range complex on Tinian and
Pagan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands have yet to
be finalized, and the costs for this complex are not fully known. To
support the original realignment plan, DOD developed plans and designs
for live-fire training ranges on Tinian and Pagan, since not all
training could be accommodated by the proposed live-fire training
ranges on Guam. DOD also conducted several studies to identify
training shortfalls in the region and determined the Marine Corps
training requirements for units designated for realignment to Guam.
According to Marine Corps officials, these plans and requirement
studies have been under review since August 2012, and the studies have
been updated to reflect the changes made under the current realignment
plan. Marine Corps officials said that they intend to reexamine their
plans and designs as they prepare an updated environmental impact
statement for this complex; this environmental impact statement will
be a separate effort from the Guam Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement, and, according to DOD officials, will be entitled the
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Joint Military Training
Environmental Impact Statement. For the joint training range complex
environmental impact statement, Marine Corps officials plan to examine
alternatives and identify environmental mitigations needed to proceed
with the development of the complex. Marine Corps officials anticipate
issuing a Record of Decision by early 2016.
As part of the $8.6 billion estimate for the Guam segment of the
current realignment plan, DOD identifies military construction costs
for the complex to be approximately $800 million. However, this
estimate does not include updated costs associated with environmental
mitigations or operation and maintenance associated with the current
realignment plan. For example, Marine Corps officials said that
developing an amphibious landing training area on Tinian could require
coral realignment, which could cost approximately $10 million (see
figure 8 for photographs of select proposed amphibious landing
training areas). According to these same officials, the Marine Corps
will need to wait until environmental analyses are completed before
fully determining the costs for environmental mitigations associated
with the complex. Additionally, the Marine Corps estimated some
operation and maintenance costs to maintain and sustain the complex
under previous realignment plans, but has not updated these estimates
based on the current plan. According to Marine Corps officials, there
are currently no permanent DOD training facilities on Tinian, but the
Marine Corps intends to build permanent facilities to store equipment
and house civilians and servicemembers deployed to the island to
train. Furthermore, DOD has not developed a Concept of Operations for
the complex, which could be used to determine other associated costs,
such as transportation to and from the island.
Figure 8: Proposed Locations for Amphibious Landing Training on Tinian:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Dankulo Beach;
Chulu Beach.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Marine Corps Requirements for Australia:
DOD has developed some initial, rough-order-of-magnitude cost
estimates to establish a rotational presence of approximately 2,500
Marines in Australia; however, these cost estimates cannot be
considered comprehensive, because they are not based on finalized
plans or requirements. According to Marine Corps officials, facility
requirements for the Marine Corps have been provided to the government
of Australia; however, nothing has been finalized because there has
yet to be a formal agreement on host nation support options for the
provided requirements.[Footnote 51] In preparing to establish a
rotational Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Australia, the Marine Corps
rotated approximately 200 Marines to Darwin, Australia, for 6 months
beginning in April 2012. DOD officials have also visited Australia to
conduct site assessments and hold discussions with their Australian
counterparts. According to DOD officials, DOD cannot finalize plans or
fully determine facilities, housing, and training requirements until
negotiations with the government of Australia have concluded. For
example, Marine Corps officials said that the training requirements
for Marines in Australia will not differ from those of Marines on
Guam; therefore, officials did not know what additional infrastructure
and support facilities in Australia, if any, would be needed to
address these requirements. DOD officials acknowledged that the level
of host nation support has not been determined, including Australian
preferences for which Australian facilities will host the Marines,
whether new facilities need to be built and by whom, and how to
coordinate training ranges for exercises--all of which could
significantly affect the costs of rotating a presence to Australia.
Other details related to the Marine Corps presence will also need to
be negotiated. For example, according to Marine Corps officials, the
Marine Corps is considering prepositioning equipment in Australia,
since it may be cost-prohibitive to transport equipment with each new
deployment, given the costs associated with agricultural quarantine
inspections and transportation; however, Marine Corps and Defense
Logistics Agency officials we spoke with said it was too early to
determine any details related to prepositioned stock because no
requirements had been established yet.
Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations:
DOD has developed some initial, rough-order-of-magnitude cost
estimates to relocate Marines to Hawaii and the continental United
States; however, these cost estimates cannot be considered
comprehensive because they are not based on finalized plans or
requirements. According to Marine Corps officials, information needed
to help develop a comprehensive cost estimate will not be available
until necessary environmental analyses have been completed. The Marine
Corps and Navy have conducted initial assessments of possible
locations to expand the Marine Corps presence in Hawaii, but facility,
housing, and training requirements to support the realignment remain
undefined. According to Marine Corps officials, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command Pacific is currently in the process of conducting
three preliminary studies for the Marine Corps which will examine many
potential options (among all DOD lands on Oahu) for basing additional
Marines in Hawaii.[Footnote 52] The Marine Corps has yet to identify
possible locations for units relocating to the continental United
States. According to Marine Corps officials, before the Marine Corps
can relocate units to Hawaii and the continental United States, DOD
will need to perform environmental analyses and develop plans.
Mobility Support:
DOD did not include any estimates for mobility support in its
preliminary estimate and could not provide sufficient information on
how it intends to provide mobility support--which could be costly--to
Marine Corps units once the current realignment plan has been
implemented. According to Marine Corps officials, the current
realignment plan was developed under the assumption that sufficient
mobility capabilities would be available to support Marine Corps units
stationed in the Pacific; however, as of August 2012, although DOD
officials said studies looking at lift in the Pacific were underway,
DOD had not completed any studies to determine the implications for
mobility of distributing Marines to multiple locations in the Pacific.
Marine Corps officials responsible for managing and implementing the
current realignment plan could not provide us with information on how
the Marines would travel to and from routine operations, such as
training events, and contingency operations once the current
realignment plan was implemented. As of August 2012, DOD officials
said that the Department of the Navy was conducting a study of
possible mobility solutions to support the current realignment.
However, at the time of our review, the study remained in draft format
and under review at DOD. Also, United States Transportation Command
and its subordinate commands have not assessed the implications of the
current realignment plan's mobility requirements for its current
operations and assets, because no request has been made to perform
such a study. According to United States Transportation Command
Officials, they did not assess mobility requirements associated with
distributing Marines to multiple locations in the Pacific in the
command's last Mobility Capability Requirements Study, and to their
knowledge, mobility requirements supporting the current realignment
plan were not assessed for the command's current study, due to be
published in summer 2013.
The Marine Corps uses a variety of assets to transport personnel and
equipment in the Pacific region. For example, the Marine Corps has in
the past chartered the Westpac Express, a commercial shipping vessel,
to transport personnel and equipment to various locations for training
exercises or contingency operations. Marine Corps officials stated
that they assumed that they would be able to use recently acquired
Joint High Speed Vessels to transport troops and equipment. The Marine
Corps can also use air and sea assets provided by U.S. Transportation
Command. Another option is the Amphibious Ready Group, which consists
of a group of Navy warships, including amphibious assault and dock
landing ships, and a landing force used to perform amphibious
operations.[Footnote 53] The Navy has one forward-deployed Amphibious
Ready Group stationed in Sasebo, Japan, that supports the 31st Marine
Expeditionary Unit. Pacific Command officials said that a possible
solution would be to deploy another Amphibious Ready Group to the
command's area of responsibility, but this could be costly if new
ships and supporting infrastructure are required. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, the average cost of constructing an
Amphibious Assault Ship[Footnote 54] alone is $4.3 billion.[Footnote
55]
DOD civilian, military, and State Department officials have all
stressed the importance of ensuring that sufficient mobility
capabilities are available to support the current realignment plan.
State Department officials said that U.S. allies in the region may
become concerned with DOD's ability to address threats, given the
distribution of Marine Corps units across the Pacific region, as
proposed under the current realignment plan. Military officials also
warn that a lack of mobility capabilities could affect the ability of
the U.S. military to both adequately train and execute missions.
DOD Sought Funding for Guam Utilities and Infrastructure Projects in
Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, but the Request Was Not Revalidated on the
basis of the Current Realignment Plan:
DOD has sought funding to upgrade utilities and infrastructure on Guam
prior to updating its assessment of requirements needed to support the
personnel and facilities changes in the current realignment plan.
According to Office of Economic Adjustment officials, $106.4 million
in funding was sought for the first stages of the Guam water and
wastewater improvements in fiscal year 2013. In addition to the water
and wastewater improvements, DOD sought an additional $33 million of
funding for the completion of mental health facilities, and the
construction of a public health laboratory on Guam in fiscal year
2013. The $33 million is the second half of a $66 million island-wide
socioeconomic improvement plan coordinated through the Economic
Adjustment Committee based on the sudden population growth associated
with the original realignment plan. [Footnote 56] The other $33
million, for projects that included the construction of a cultural
repository, the purchase of school buses (for emergency evacuations
and military dependents), and improvements to the Guam Mental Health
and Substance Abuse Facility, was sought in fiscal year 2012. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 authorized
appropriations for the Office of Economic Adjustment,[Footnote 57] but
did not include specific authorizations for the projects. [Footnote
58] According to DOD officials, funding for these projects has been
put on hold until restrictions imposed by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 have been addressed.
According to Office of Economic Adjustment officials, some of the
socioeconomic and utilities projects, such as the cultural repository,
and water and wastewater improvements, should not be affected by the
changes in personnel and facilities associated with the current
realignment plan; however, some projects, such as the improvements to
a mental health and substance abuse facility, may not be necessary due
to fewer Marines and dependents relocating to Guam. Office of Economic
Adjustment officials said that they intend to perform assessments, in
conjunction with the Joint Guam Program Office, to reexamine and
validate all utilities and infrastructure projects during DOD's
development of the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for
Guam. However, until these assessments are completed, DOD is seeking
funding for utilities and infrastructure projects that have either not
been fully estimated or may no longer be needed.
A Comprehensive Cost Estimate for the Realignment of Marines in the
Pacific May Take Years:
DOD officials told us that they intend to develop a more reliable cost
estimate for the current realignment plan as environmental analyses
and host nation negotiations are completed. According to DOD
officials, the completed analyses and finalized host nation
negotiations will provide the necessary information needed to complete
a comprehensive cost estimate for the current realignment plan, but
DOD officials have not determined when this estimate will be
available. They informed us that a more detailed estimate for the Guam
realignment would require the completion of an ongoing environmental
impact statement on Guam, which is expected to be completed in 2014,
and a separate environmental impact statement for the Joint Training
Range Complex on Tinian and Pagan, which is expected to be completed
in 2015. According to DOD officials, the Hawaii segment of the
realignment would also require an environmental analysis before a more
detailed cost estimate could be performed, but as of March 2013, they
did not anticipate that this analysis will be completed until a date
beyond 2018. Furthermore, DOD officials do not anticipate that a more
detailed estimate for Australia will be available until host nation
negotiations are complete, but no date has been determined for the
conclusion of these negotiations. According to the Office of
Management and Budget guidance containing best practices for cost
estimating in the context of capital programming, early emphasis on
cost estimating during the planning phase is critical to successful
life cycle management of a program or project.[Footnote 59] This
guidance recognizes that insufficient data and undefined risks are
some of the challenges in estimating costs. It also notes that the
cost estimating process is continuously updated, on the basis of the
latest information available, to keep the estimate current, accurate,
and valid. According to DOD officials, updated cost estimates will be
developed when additional data from ongoing analyses are available and
negotiations have been completed. However, until estimates are
developed that address the seven cost components described in this
report, DOD will not be able to provide Congress and other
stakeholders with a reliable cost estimate to make informed funding
decisions regarding the realignment of Marines.
DOD Has Not Yet Completed an Integrated Master Plan to Synchronize
Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific or a Strategy to Support
Japanese Construction:
In April 2012, DOD announced that it would be revising its previous
Marine Corps realignment plan; however, DOD has not yet completed two
key planning mechanisms: an integrated master plan that synchronizes
the various realignment initiatives with all geographic segments of
the realignment and a construction support strategy. Although DOD has
taken initial steps to begin the master planning effort for the
realignment, DOD has not yet been able to fully develop an integrated
master plan synchronizing the realignment with other DPRI initiatives
and laying out the necessary facilities, progression of construction,
unit movements, and costs to efficiently complete the realignment.
Furthermore, DOD has not developed a strategy to support a potential
surge of simultaneous Japanese construction projects associated with
the other DPRI initiatives that may occur concurrently with the
realignment of Marines.
Effects of Other Initiatives in the Pacific on the Sequencing of the
Current Realignment Plan Remain Uncertain:
DOD is moving forward with the current realignment plan; however,
Marine Corps officials are still determining how the projects
associated with the Futenma Replacement Facility and Okinawa
Consolidation are either related to or dependent on each other, and
what effects these projects might have on the realignment of Marines.
According to Marine Corps officials, uncertainties surrounding these
initiatives and the effects on the realignment of Marines will exist
until the government of Japan can provide a timeline for construction
of related facilities. The Futenma Replacement Facility is an
initiative in which Japan is constructing facilities and a runway to
replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. Okinawa
Consolidation is an initiative that involves returning land to Japan
that is currently occupied by U.S. military installations and
consolidating the remaining U.S. forces in less populated areas of
Okinawa once Japan has constructed necessary replacement facilities.
Under the 2006 Roadmap and the 2009 agreement, these initiatives,
along with the realignment of Marines to Guam, were directly linked
because progress on both Okinawa Consolidation and the realignment of
Marines was contingent on Japan making a certain level of progress
toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility and financial
contributions to fund development on Guam.[Footnote 60] However, as
part of the April 2012 statement, the Security Consultative Committee
decided to delink these initiatives, effectively no longer requiring
that progress on constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility be made
before the other initiatives could commence. This change, in theory,
allows all three initiatives to move forward independently of each
other; however, in practical terms, the three initiatives still have
elements that are linked, and each could ultimately affect the
progress of the others.
According to Marine Corps officials, since the three initiatives
remain likely to be implemented concurrently, the proper sequencing of
movements will influence whether the Marine Corps can maintain full
operational capability and how smoothly the realignment can be
accomplished. However, at the time of our review, it was too early to
tell how each of the three initiatives will affect the progress or
sequencing of the others. For example, Marine Corps officials said
that many elements of Okinawa Consolidation will still be contingent
on substantial progress--and in some cases completion--of the Futenma
Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab. In the April 2012 statement, the
Security Consultative Committee agreed that some segments of Okinawa
Consolidation could start immediately, but the sequencing and timing
of the more significant segments, such as those related to Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma and Camp Schwab, were going to have to be
determined through bilateral planning at a later date. At the time of
our review, the two countries had not finalized a bilateral plan for
Okinawa Consolidation; therefore, Marine Corps officials on Okinawa
could only make assumptions about the details of the
initiative.[Footnote 61] Furthermore, Marine Corps officials on
Okinawa believed that unless facilities related to the realignment of
Marines are constructed on Guam and Hawaii, significant elements of
the Okinawa Consolidation could not progress. For example, certain
Marine Corps units that currently reside at Camp Schwab on Okinawa
would have to be able to relocate to either Guam or Hawaii before
other units could move to Camp Schwab.
DOD Has Not Yet Been Able to Complete an Integrated Master Plan for
the Current Realignment Plan:
Since the original realignment plan in 2006, congressional committees
have been calling for DOD to submit a master plan or other information
regarding the realignment, including costs and schedules for projects.
However, DOD has not developed and finalized a master plan in support
of the realignment. Congressional committees have expressed concern
about the sweeping transformation in the Pacific, including concern
regarding the practicality and economic viability of the realignment.
In some instances, committees have sought a master plan or other
information regarding the realignment of Marines before they will
support the authorization or appropriation of certain funds to be used
towards the implementation of the initiative. Most recently, the
National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013
imposed restrictions on the use of funds to implement the realignment
until DOD submits certain information to the congressional defense
committees, including master plans.[Footnote 62] Previous GAO reports
on the original realignment plan have stressed the importance of a
master plan to provide Congress with a complete picture of facility
requirements and associated costs so that it can make informed funding
decisions.[Footnote 63] DOD was not able to provide a specific time
frame including when it plans to complete an overarching master plan
in support of the current realignment plan.
In the context of acquisition, the integrated master plan is a
fundamental management tool that is critical to performing effective
planning, scheduling, and execution of work efforts, according to a
guide prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on Integrated
Master Plan and Master Schedule Preparation and Use.[Footnote 64] It
consists of a hierarchy of program events, each event supported by
specific accomplishments and each accomplishment associated with
specific criteria that must be satisfied for its completion. In the
context of DOD installation development and management, master
planning is a continuous, analytical process that involves evaluation
of factors affecting the present and future physical development and
operation of an installation.[Footnote 65] The evaluation forms the
basis for determination of development objectives and planning
proposals to solve current problems and meet future needs, with each
step or element of the process building upon the preceding step,
providing a logical framework for the planning effort. A successful
installation master plan provides timely and correct planning
information and real property support for installation missions, and
supports informed decision-making. The integrated master plan for the
current realignment would not be an acquisition integrated master plan
and, unlike an installation master plan, would focus on a variety of
installations and locations. However, if developed on the basis of
similar concepts, the realignment integrated master plan could help
planners determine the necessary progression of Marine Corps
movements, and establish a logical sequencing of events. It could also
include all projects associated with each event, with the expected
costs and resource requirements for each. Additionally, an integrated
master plan for the realignment could take planners through "what if"
scenarios to determine whether certain aspects of the realignment are
actually executable.
At the time of our review, Headquarters Marine Corps, which is
conducting the master planning process for the realignment of Marines,
had started to develop what officials called the first step of an
integrated master plan. This first step, called the synchronization
matrix, is described by Headquarters Marine Corps officials as an
overarching scheduling tool that synchronizes the various realignment
initiatives and graphically depicts how these realignments are
interconnected and affected by both unit movements and facilities
construction. Specifically, the synchronization matrix attempts to
synchronize other DPRI initiatives--the Carrier Air Wing Move from
Atsugi to Iwakuni, Okinawa Consolidation, and the Futenma Replacement
Facility--with time frames and unit movements associated with the
realignment of Marines. During the course of our review we spoke with
Marine Corps officials from the Pentagon, Honolulu, and Okinawa, and
heard conflicting views on the logical order of unit movements, the
potential effects of the other DPRI initiatives on the realignment,
and the time frames associated with each move. For example,
Headquarters Marine Corps officials said they believed that fighting
forces should be the first to leave Okinawa and relocate to Guam;
however, Marine Corps officials we spoke to in Okinawa did not agree,
stating that headquarters units should move first, followed by the
fighting forces. According to Headquarters Marine Corps officials, the
synchronization matrix will serve as a tool to address any conflicting
internal views, determine how each initiative relates, and establish
the appropriate sequencing of events needed to complete all
realignment initiatives.
Although the synchronization matrix is an important first step of the
integrated master plan, it is still based on several assumptions
regarding environmental analyses, facilities planning, funding
availability, and, where applicable, host nation support, meaning that
it's always subject to change. As previously discussed, since
environmental analyses and host nation negotiations still need to be
completed, Marine Corps officials have not developed specific
projects, facility and resource requirements, and costs for the
realignment of Marines. According to Marine Corps officials, once the
necessary analyses and negotiations are completed for each geographic
segment--Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and the continental United States--
of the realignment, DOD can begin to finalize master plans specific
for each location. Each master plan, coupled with the synchronization
matrix, will eventually formulate an integrated master plan for the
realignment of Marines.
According to Marine Corps officials, they recognize the importance of
the master planning process for the realignment of Marines; however,
they know master plans for some geographic segments of the realignment
may take several years to produce. DOD officials stated that they can
only estimate when an integrated master plan can be completed, but it
will likely be beyond the 2018 time frame. Until then, Marine Corps
officials stated that they will continue to update the synchronization
matrix as geostrategic events change, and analyses and negotiations
conclude. Still, without an integrated master plan that reflects not
only the synchronization of DPRI initiatives with the realignment of
Marines, but the projects, facility and resource requirements, and
costs for all geographic segments of the realignment, congressional
committees will not have a complete picture of the requirements and
costs in order to make informed funding decisions.
It Is Unclear Whether DOD Can Support a Surge in DPRI-Related
Construction:
With several hundred projects associated with the remaining DPRI
initiatives in mainland Japan and on Okinawa, and the likelihood that
these initiatives will be implemented concurrently, it remains unclear
whether DOD would be able to support a surge of this magnitude in
construction in Japan. Although the April 2012 Security Consultative
Committee statement did not establish definitive time frames or
identify start and completion dates for the Futenma Replacement
Facility, Okinawa Consolidation, or the realignment of Marines, DOD
officials have stated that it is likely all three of these initiatives
will proceed concurrently with the ongoing DPRI initiative to relocate
a carrier air wing from Naval Base Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni in mainland Japan. It is anticipated that the government of
Japan will fund and construct the hundreds of projects associated with
the remaining DPRI initiatives in mainland Japan and Okinawa; however,
DOD will play a critical role in the design and construction oversight
of these projects, assuring that each project is built to U.S.
requirements and standards. Although DPRI-related construction at
Iwakuni commenced in the last year, and only 10 projects in Okinawa
have been completed to date, Marine Corps officials told us that DOD
has encountered several challenges in supporting the design and
construction of these projects; these challenges have led to delays in
construction and, in some instances, generated additional costs to the
United States. Several DOD officials we spoke with were concerned that
if the other DPRI initiatives were to begin, DOD might not be in a
position to support the surge in construction.
DPRI construction projects in mainland Japan and Okinawa fall under
the purview of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.[Footnote 66]
As the DOD construction agent, the Army Corps of Engineers is
responsible for working with each service to provide design and
construction criteria to the government of Japan, and then design and
construction surveillance and inspection to make sure that every DPRI
project is being completed in accordance with the appropriate
requirements and standards. However, according to Marine Corps
officials, the Army Corps of Engineers has had a difficult time
supporting the DPRI-initiatives at both at Iwakuni and at Okinawa. For
example, Marine Corps officials at Iwakuni told us that the Army Corps
of Engineers was both underfunded and understaffed to support initial
Japanese design and construction efforts, and that, as a result,
officials at Iwakuni circumvented the DPRI project development process
in order to move project design and development along more quickly.
According to these same officials, the government of Japan was
prepared to provide as much funding as was necessary to complete
construction of the facilities at Iwakuni as early as possible. Marine
Corps officials also told us that in its fiscal year 2011 budget, the
government of Japan allocated $700 million for the design and
construction of facilities at Iwakuni (see figure 9 for a photograph
of the ongoing Japanese construction at Marine Corps Station Iwakuni).
However, DOD and the Army Corps of Engineers were unprepared to
support an effort of this magnitude.[Footnote 67] According to
officials at Iwakuni, the Army Corps of Engineers did not have the
resources to support an accelerated buildup of this magnitude by the
government of Japan and questioned whether the Army Corps of Engineers
could fully support the entire DPRI initiative at Iwakuni, which will
eventually cost Japan nearly $3 billion to complete through 2017.
Figure 9: Ongoing Japanese Construction at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps officials we spoke with in Okinawa agreed with the
officials at Iwakuni, suggesting that the Army Corps of Engineers did
not have the appropriate resources to oversee the design and
construction of the DPRI-related projects in Okinawa. Although less
than 20 DPRI-related projects have been designed and constructed to
date, according to Marine Corps officials several of these projects
had errors that led to unplanned budget expenditures by DOD. Marine
Corps officials attributed most of the errors to a lack of
communication of proper requirements to the government of Japan, and
insufficient oversight during the construction process. For example,
the government of Japan designed and constructed a bachelor enlisted
quarters at Camp Schwab based on requirements provided by the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Marine Corps. After construction was
completed, the Marine Corps refused to accept the building, because it
discovered that the building's heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning systems did not meet Marine Corps standards. Army Corps
of Engineers officials said that they had not identified the
discrepancy between the Marine Corps' requirement and the government
of Japan's designs prior to construction, resulting in the error.
After about a year, the Marine Corps corrected the problem by
developing an ad hoc solution to the heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning systems issue at its own expense in order to bring the
building up to its standards. In another example, on the basis of
requirements provided by the Marine Corps and Army Corps of Engineers,
the government of Japan designed and constructed a new police station
with a fenced-in area to house military working dogs at Camp Foster.
After construction had been completed, it was discovered that the
fenced-in area had not met DOD standards for housing military working
dogs. As a result, the Marine Corps funded a corrective action. See
figure 10 for a list of additional DPRI-related construction errors in
Okinawa, as described by the Army Corps of Engineers.
Figure 10: Construction Errors on Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI) Projects in Okinawa as Identified by the Army Corps of
Engineers:
[Refer to PDF for image: map and data]
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning system:
The government of Japan constructed barracks that did not meet the
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system requirements laid
out by the Marine Corps. The Army Corps of Engineers approved the
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system that was included in
the building, but the changes that were made to the design were not
coordinated with the Marine Corps and U.S. Forces—Japan. The cost to
retrofit the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system is
being paid by the Marine Corps.
Military working dog kennel:
The government of Japan constructed a facility to house military
working dogs in a police station that did not meet the size
requirements laid out in DOD requirements. The design drawings for
this facility were reviewed by the U.S government, but the error was
not identified until after construction was completed. Upon
notification of the issue, the government of Japan declined to address
this issue. The Marine Corps is making the alterations.
Security fence:
A security fence constructed around a warehouse and armory by the
government of Japan did not meet the Marine Corps height requirements,
although the height of the fence was not specified on the design
drawings. The government of Japan offered to install the required
fence in the future, but the Marine Corps decided to fund and install
the fence itself given the urgent need for the facility to be secure.
Soil settlement:
Four buildings constructed by the government of Japan had settlement
issues due to compaction prior to construction and heavy rain. Upon
notification of these issues, the government of Japan promptly
repaired the buildings.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Army Corps of Engineers officials said they are aware of the setbacks
associated with the DPRI-projects in both Iwakuni and Okinawa;
however, Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that external
factors associated with its DOD counterparts (U.S. Forces-Japan and
the military services) may have helped to contribute to these
setbacks. For example, Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that
both a lack of proper master planning and circumventing the DPRI
project development process at Iwakuni led to an expedited process
that caused heightened risk. The expedited process, according to Army
Corps of Engineers officials, made it difficult to catch and correct
errors in the design phase of DPRI projects. Army Corps of Engineers
officials expressed concern that if DPRI projects in Okinawa proceed
in a similar, expedited manner as Iwakuni, similar problems will
occur, including heightened risk and an inability to appropriately
plan for resource requirements.
In response to the setbacks related to DPRI projects in both Iwakuni
and Okinawa, the Army Corps of Engineers has requested funding to
increase staff at Iwakuni by 75 percent in fiscal year 2013 and have
designed tools intended to prevent such setbacks in the future. For
example, Army Corps of Engineers officials developed case studies of
the errors and disseminated the information throughout their
organization to better prepare their staff. In March 2011, Army Corps
of Engineers personnel and senior leadership held an internal meeting
to review construction project errors and discuss ways of improving
their services. In addition, to ensure that they have sufficient
resources and staffing to support the Marine Corps and the other
services, Army Corps of Engineers officials have told us that they
have conducted analyses every 6 months since July 2011 to forecast
their future workload. These forecasts, according to Army Corps of
Engineers officials, will continue in the future and include planning
for any ramp-up needed in the immediate future.
DOD Does Not Have a Strategy for Supporting a Surge in Japanese
Construction:
Although the Army Corps of Engineers has recognized and attempted to
address the problems associated with the DPRI-related projects at
Iwakuni and Okinawa, at the time of our review it had not yet
developed a strategy, in conjunction with its DOD counterparts, to
support a surge in Japanese construction that would require Army Corps
of Engineers to support multiple, concurrent DPRI initiatives. Army
Corps of Engineers officials acknowledged that there is potential for
a surge in Japanese construction, so it is important that both the
Army Corps of Engineers and the services be prepared for such an
event. Furthermore, Army Corps of Engineers officials stated that the
way the government of Japan funds and plans for construction makes DOD
planning difficult. Specifically, according to DOD officials, the
government of Japan funds projects on a year-by-year basis, giving DOD
limited time to react in any given year. According to Army Corps of
Engineers officials, the lack of a bilateral integrated master
schedule for all DPRI initiatives between the United States and Japan
makes it very difficult to forecast its resource requirements more
than 1 year at a time. However, Army Corps of Engineers officials
agreed that they must still work to develop a strategy to deal with
the possibility that additional resources will be needed to support
any surges in Japanese construction up to 5 years in the future.
In previous work, we identified key elements that should be included
in a support strategy:[Footnote 68]
* Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures
set clear desired results and priorities, specific milestones, and
outcome-related performance measures while giving implementing parties
flexibility to pursue and achieve those results within a reasonable
time frame.
* Organizational roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts identify the relevant components. The
strategy clarifies the components' relationships in terms of leading,
supporting, and partnering.
* Resources, investments, and risk management identify, among other
things, the sources and types of resources and investments associated
with the strategy and where those resources and investments should be
targeted.
Without a strategy to address future construction surges, the Army
Corps of Engineers and the services will not have a clear picture of
how the design and construction process should be handled moving
forward, or the resources needed to support the effort. Such a
strategy would allow both the Army Corps of Engineers and service
officials--mainly the Marine Corps--to establish a process that
assigns specific responsibilities, with time frames, to participating
parties and assist the Army Corps of Engineers in identifying funding
needed to support construction projects being conducted by both the
United States and Japan. Without a strategy, DOD may not be in a
position to successfully support upcoming DPRI-related projects and
may face further planning and construction errors that have in the
past led to unplanned funding needs and delayed completion schedules.
Delayed completion schedules may ultimately affect the implementation
of the realignment of Marines or other DPRI initiatives.
DOD Has Taken Initial Steps but Has Not Fully Identified Sustainment
Needs and Costs on Okinawa and Guam:
DOD has taken some steps to plan for sustaining its forces on both
Okinawa and Guam until the Marine Corps realignment is implemented and
consolidation initiatives on Okinawa are complete, but it has not yet
fully identified what will need to be done to sustain the facilities
at these locations and what it will cost for the immediate future.
Facility maintenance and replacement for installations on Okinawa that
were identified to be returned to the government of Japan have been
limited for many years. As a result, many facilities have reached the
end of their useful life and are in a state of disrepair.
Specifically, DOD has identified the sustainment needs on Okinawa for
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma; however, it has not identified
sustainment needs for other facilities on the island that are expected
to be eventually returned to Japan or fully planned for the
sustainment of its family housing units on Okinawa. In Guam, DOD has
begun to develop initial sustainment plans for its family housing
units; however, these plans have not been updated to reflect the
Marine Corps' current realignment plan.
Many Okinawa Facilities Have Reached the End of Their Projected
Service Life, and Maintenance and Replacement Has Been Limited:
According to Marine Corps officials on Okinawa, many of the facilities
supporting U.S. forces there are old, and are in need of resources to
sustain them. We observed multiple facilities in various states of
disrepair during our site visit to the island. For example, we
observed facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma that had been
shuttered because service officials deemed them too dangerous to
occupy; in some cases, there was so much mold growth that an extensive
removal process would be necessary before the facilities could be
occupied again. In addition to mold removal, some of these facilities
would require other improvements or complete renovation before they
could be used again. Marine Corps officials said that in some of the
Marine Corps installations south of Kadena Air Base several facilities
either are nearing or have already exceeded their 50-year service life
and will need to be either renovated or replaced. The most significant
examples of aging and deterioration that we observed were at Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma, the installation that has been at the
center of controversy on Okinawa for nearly two decades. At Futenma,
at several facilities currently in use, we observed concrete ceilings,
staircases, and walls that showed evidence of deterioration, ranging
from superficial cracks on the exterior of the structure to severe
fracturing that rendered the facility unsafe for occupancy. Figure 11
shows some examples of deteriorated conditions at two locations on
Okinawa.
Figure 11: Examples of Deteriorated Conditions of Facilities in
Okinawa:
[Refer to PDF for image: map and 4 photographs]
Camp Hansen:
Gym ceiling with mold and water damage.
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma:
Office building room under repair for significant spalling on ceiling.
The floor is littered with bits of concrete from the ceiling.
Barracks with a cracked door frame and new duct work for the Heating
Ventilation, and Air Conditioning system. Sandbags placed in front of
the doors to prevent flooding from heavy rain.
Crack in a staircase.
Source: GAO (photos); Map Resources (map)
[End of figure]
On Okinawa, DOD conducts routine maintenance and repair to keep its
facilities in good working order over a 50-year service life and has
historically relied on the government of Japan to fund the
construction of new U.S. facilities to replace deteriorating, obsolete
structures.[Footnote 69] The government of Japan will demolish these
structures and construct new ones through the Japan Facilities
Improvement Program. The program allows DOD to identify necessary
projects from across the services and installations in Japan, rank
them by priority, and submit them to the government of Japan for
funding consideration.
In recent years, sustainment funding and facility replacement by the
government of Japan has been limited because delays in the Marine
Corps realignment, construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility,
and Okinawa Consolidation have left unclear what facilities will need
to be available and sustained--and for how long. Since 2006, in the
face of the uncertainties surrounding these initiatives, both DOD and
the government of Japan have questioned how they will proceed with
maintaining some existing facilities on Okinawa. According to Marine
Corps officials, because of the uncertainties surrounding the timing
of the various realignment initiatives, the government of Japan has
been hesitant to invest in constructing new facilities on Okinawa.
Figure 12 shows a steady decline in funding since 2002 under the Japan
Facilities Improvement Program. In 2002, Japan provided approximately
¥75 billion, or approximately $834 million. Of that ¥75 billion,
approximately ¥6 billion, or $67 million, was for Marine Corps
installations in Okinawa.[Footnote 70] The figure shows a significant
decline for funding in 2006, the year the 2006 Roadmap was developed
outlining the realignment initiatives.
Figure 12: Japan Facilities Improvement Program Funding for All U.S.
Installations in Japan and for Marine Corps Installations on Okinawa
from 2002 to 2010 (in Billions of Yen):
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Japanese fiscal year: 2002.
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 6.2 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 74.6 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2003;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 5.4 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 68.4 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2004;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 5.3 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 67.6 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2005;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 5.5 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 61.4 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2006;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 1.7 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 42.2 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2007;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 0.3 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 36.3 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2008;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 0.9 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 20.1 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2009;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 0.1 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 19.4 billion yen.
Japanese fiscal year: 2010;
Marine Corps installation on Okinawa: 0.1 billion yen;
All other U.S. installations in Japan: 19.1 billion yen.
Source: GAO analysis of government of Japan data provided to DOD.
[End of figure]
DOD officials told us that, to date, the services have submitted over
$1.2 billion in backlogged construction replacement projects to the
government of Japan under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program.
However, according to DOD officials, the projects in this total for
Okinawa are on hold until firm requirements can be determined for what
will be needed to support the final Marine Corps end strength left in
Okinawa to avoid the government of Japan constructing new facilities
on lands that will subsequently be returned. DOD officials told us
that a large portion of these backlogged projects are family housing
projects.
Family Housing:
The Air Force, which is the executive agent for military family
housing on Okinawa, had 7,823 family housing units in its active
inventory as of February 2013. In February 2013, approximately 75
percent of its housing units were occupied. According to DOD
officials, similar to other DOD facilities on Okinawa, many of the
family housing units are old and in need of renovation or replacement.
At Kadena Air Force Base, we observed several vacant housing units
that had not been renovated and showed significant mold damage. We
also observed several recently renovated units. According to Air Force
officials, approximately 58 percent of the military family housing
units on Okinawa have been assessed as inadequate.[Footnote 71]
However, inadequate units are not necessarily uninhabitable. Air Force
officials told us that one reason these units have been assessed as
inadequate is that they were built to Japanese standards, which can
differ significantly from Air Force standards. For example, Japanese
accommodations tend to be smaller than housing units constructed by
the services, so that kitchen, bathroom, and bedroom space may be more
limited than it is in family housing units at other DOD locations,
although the units are still viewed as safe to occupy.
The Air Force developed a family housing master plan in November 2011
to provide a corporate, requirements-based housing investment strategy
that integrates traditional construction funding and private sector
financing. This master plan covered the period of fiscal years 2012
through 2017 and estimated that the total funding required to maintain
adequate military family housing and bring all housing-related
infrastructure on Okinawa up to modern DOD standards would be $690.7
million; this figure includes $131.7 for military construction and
$559.1 for operation and maintenance. On the basis of its analyses and
master plan, the Air Force has been working to modernize or replace
6,988--89 percent--of its family housing units on Okinawa through
various initiatives. Under its Post-Acquisition Improvement Program,
the Air Force intends to renovate 3,747 housing units; these
renovations are considered to be more extensive than minor repair and
maintenance work and are intended to ensure that the renovated unit
remains habitable for their full service lives. The government of
Japan planned to build 1,770 new units under the 1996 Special Action
Committee on Okinawa report and another 1,471 under the Japan
Facilities Improvement Program, but as of February 2013 it had built
only 38 percent of the first group and 13 percent of the second. (See
table 5 for list of family housing projects and status as of February
2013.)
Table 5: Okinawa Housing Redevelopment Plan as of February 2013:
Funding program: Special Action Committee on Okinawa;
Funding source: Japan;
Total estimated cost: $1.032 billion;
Housing units planned for repair: 1,770;
Percent of units completed: 38%.
Funding program: Japanese Facilities Improvement Program;
Funding source: Japan;
Total estimated cost: $882 million;
Housing units planned for repair: 1,471;
Percent of units completed: 13%.
Funding program: Post-Acquisition Improvement Plan;
Funding source: United States;
Total estimated cost: $650 million;
Housing units planned for repair: 3,747;
Percent of units completed: 69%.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
The Air Force's current master plan and supporting analyses were based
on the premise that approximately 8,600 Marines and 9,000 dependents
would relocate to Guam by 2014--as anticipated under the original
realignment plan. However, under the current realignment plan, DOD is
planning to move only 4,700 Marines and their dependents to Guam. Air
Force officials informed us that because many of the replacement
projects funded by the government of Japan are on hold, they have
developed a "bridging strategy" to fund minor renovations for a select
number of units, in order to meet DOD's housing needs on Okinawa until
additional units are constructed or renovated. As a result of the
deterioration of its facilities and replacement projects being on
hold, Marine Corps officials have stated that a sustainment funding
strategy is going to be critical to maintain some of its
infrastructure that has deteriorated past its useful life for the
immediate future.
DOD Has Taken Some Steps but It Has Not Fully Identified Sustainment
Needs for Facilities on Okinawa:
Marine Corps officials have stated that the uncertainties regarding
the timing of the realignment initiatives have made it difficult for
them to determine what sustainment projects will be needed for
facilities on Okinawa, because they do not know when the realignment
initiatives will be completed and therefore do not know how long the
existing facilities will continue to be used. Marine Corps officials
in Okinawa informed us that construction and sustainment projects
described in the base master plans for each of the Marine Corps
installations on Okinawa have not been updated to take into account
delays in the realignment and consolidation plans, and that these base
master plans remain in draft form. DOD has not developed any updated
sustainment plans for these installations as part of their base master
plans--with the recent exception of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
Many of the facilities on Futenma are 30 to 50 years old and have
degraded over time due to limited investment in sustainment and the
harsh tropical and corrosive saltwater environment of Okinawa. In
response to the April 2012 Security Consultative Committee statement,
and the delay in the Japanese construction of a replacement facility
at Camp Schwab, the United States began to identify sustainment needs
for Futenma. In April 2012, in a preliminary estimate, the Marine
Corps identified approximately $165 million in funding needed to
sustain Futenma for the next 10 years. In October 2012, the Marine
Corps developed a draft sustainment plan after performing an
assessment of the facilities on Futenma to identify, validate, and
prioritize its sustainment needs. This plan included a priority list
of repair and maintenance projects, and new construction projects
needed to ensure that Futenma could continue to meet operational and
training demands until the Futenma Replacement Facility is constructed
and fully operational. The plan prioritizes facility repair and
renovation projects to address critical mission and quality-of-life
requirements. U.S. Forces-Japan officials said that DOD and the
government of Japan are negotiating a possible cost-sharing
arrangement, and that as of February 2013, both sides had agreed to a
list of projects that the government of Japan had submitted to its
legislature for funding consideration.[Footnote 72] Marine Corps
officials said that, without sustainment investment, the
installation's ability to support operations would be put at risk.
Although DOD has developed a sustainment master plan for Futenma in
response to the uncertainties surrounding the construction of the
replacement facility on Okinawa, no plans of this type have been
developed for any of the other installations on Okinawa. DOD
Instruction 4165.70 requires that base master plans or comprehensive
plans be developed for all installations and that these plans include
a specific, annual listing of all construction and major repair and
sustainment projects over the period covered by the plan.[Footnote 73]
According to the Unified Facilities Criteria, installation planning
and programming staff must capture facility requirements and propose
solutions to meet those requirements from the options available.
[Footnote 74] The Unified Facilities Criteria also indicates that a
facility's master plan will be revised and updated to maintain its
relevance as a useful planning and management tool.[Footnote 75]
Furthermore, guidance on DOD housing management indicates that DOD
housing--both family and unaccompanied--is to be operated and
maintained to a standard that protects the facilities from
deterioration and provides safe and comfortable living places for
servicemembers and their dependents.[Footnote 76] DOD policy is to
rely on the private sector as the primary source for family housing
for personnel stationed at locations within the United States. DOD
guidance indicates that in overseas locations where servicemembers are
given an overseas housing allowance to reimburse them for the cost of
housing, the policy of relying on off-base housing first is not
mandatory, but should be encouraged where appropriate.[Footnote 77]
DOD guidance also indicates that for installations on U.S. soil, to
determine the need for military housing at the installation, the
military services must perform a housing requirements and market
analysis to determine whether the adjacent community can accommodate
the housing needs of the military and must identify the minimum
housing requirement--the minimum level of housing needed on base to
allow the installation to effectively accomplish base missions. If the
base is located overseas, the military service may determine the need
and applicability of the housing requirements, and market analysis is
not mandatory. DOD policy also states that master plans for housing
should address, among other things, military housing requirements.
The Air Force's current housing requirements and market analysis for
Okinawa do not reflect current plans. While the Marine Corps has
provided the Air Force with the number of Marines that will remain on
Okinawa following the full implementation of all realignment
initiatives, the Air Force office responsible for family housing on
Okinawa has not been able to update its housing requirements and
market analysis, and housing master plan, because the Marine Corps has
yet to provide the Air Force with the incremental schedule and unit
movements associated with the realignment initiatives on Okinawa.
According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps cannot provide
incremental data until bilateral negotiations on the Okinawa
Consolidation initiative and the subsequent master plan are finalized.
Air Force officials told us that while they plan to update their
housing requirements and market analysis in the summer of 2013, this
will only cover the next 5 years. Considering that the realignment
initiatives in Okinawa have no definitive timelines and may
potentially take decades to complete, the Air Force office responsible
for family housing on Okinawa told us that it needs a better
understanding of when facilities will be constructed and units moved
over the next 10-15 years. This incremental data will help Air Force
officials conduct housing analyses and develop housing plans based on
more short-term and intermediate housing requirement needs on Okinawa.
Until the Air Force knows what the incremental Marine Corps housing
requirements will be for all phases of the realignment initiatives in
Okinawa, it will not have sufficient information to project housing
demand and assess the housing sustainment cost for the current
realignment plan. As a result, the Air Force will not be able to
determine how to sustain its housing inventory on Okinawa in a cost-
effective manner, which could lead to overinvesting in certain housing
areas and underinvesting in others. Without identifying sustainment
needs for all its infrastructure that will be used until the
realignment and consolidation actions are implemented, DOD risks not
having the information necessary to make informed decisions about
maintaining its infrastructure at an acceptable level to carry out its
mission.
DOD Has Not Accounted for the Marine Realignment in Its Housing Plans
on Guam, and Housing Cost Data Are Limited:
DOD is in the process of developing plans to meet the housing needs
for U.S. forces on Guam, but these plans will not take into account
the housing requirements associated with the current realignment.
According to Joint Region Marianas officials, Joint Region Marianas is
responsible for overseeing all military housing on Guam, but Naval
Base Guam and Naval Support Activity, Andersen, are each responsible
for implementing their own housing operations. Joint Region Marianas
and its installations face many of the challenges associated with
sustaining aging housing units that we reported are being experienced
by the Air Force on Okinawa. A June 2012 assessment of housing on
Naval Base Guam found housing deficiencies such as mold, broken
windows, and inoperative fans and ventilation systems. While in Guam,
we observed several unoccupied housing units that showed significant
pest infestation and mold growth in their interiors and heavy
vegetation and mold growth on their exteriors. Figure 13 shows
pictures of some of the housing units we observed.
Figure 13: Examples of Unoccupied Housing Units on Guam:
[Refer to PDF for image: map and four photographs]
U.S. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, Finegayan:
Mold growing on the exterior of housing units.
Andersen Air Force Base:
Mold growing on the outside of a housing unit.
Housing unit with damage to the garage.
Plant growing out of window in housing unit.
Source: GAO (images); Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
There is currently a surplus of military family housing on Guam. As of
January 2013, approximately 67 percent of available military housing
on Guam--1,577 housing units--are occupied, and 785 units remain
vacant.[Footnote 78] In addition, there are 311 additional housing
units that have been classified as inactive, which according to Joint
Region Marianas officials, means that those units are viewed as
uninhabitable and are no longer considered part of the active housing
inventory. Joint Region Marianas officials said that the low occupancy
rate in their housing units can be attributed to several factors.
First, since many servicemembers are eligible to live off base, many
choose to do so to enjoy the benefits of living in the local
community. Many servicemembers also choose to reside in private
housing to take advantage of the high overseas housing allowance and
utilities stipend. According to the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, in 2011 approximately 3,800 personnel from the Air Force,
Army, Navy and Marine Corps who were stationed on Guam received a
combined total of $96.1 million in overseas housing allowance. Under
the auspices of Joint Region Marianas, both Naval Base Guam and
Andersen Air Force Base have developed housing plans that seek to
address the low occupancy rate in their on-base housing and make more
effective and efficient use of their housing inventories. To increase
the occupancy rate, Joint Region Marianas officials are assessing
several alternatives, including revising their housing policy to make
more DOD-civilians eligible to reside in military housing, requiring
more servicemembers to reside in military housing, and reducing the
number of housing units in the inventory. However, Joint Region
Marianas officials informed us that, until the Marine Corps completes
its requirements determination, arrival dates, and housing policy,
none of their alternatives or plans will consider housing requirements
associated with the current Marine Corps realignment plan that will
eventually send nearly 5,000 Marines to Guam. Moreover, they said that
they do not have plans to set aside and sustain existing facilities to
support the realignment of Marines.
Joint Region Marianas officials informed us that, because of the
uncertainty regarding when Marines will begin relocating to Guam, they
had decided to proceed with developing housing plans independently of
the Marine Corps realignment initiative. They explained that delaying
action on meeting their housing needs could adversely affect their
ability to provide housing to servicemembers currently stationed on
Guam. Initially, Joint Region Marianas was making preparations to
support the Marine realignment. The Department of the Navy had
conducted a housing requirements and market analysis to identify the
demand for military housing on Guam based on the Marine Corps
requirements associated with the previous realignment plan. Joint
Region Marianas had identified surplus housing units that could have
been used to provide transitional housing for Marines relocating to
Guam. However because of the delay of the realignment and reduced
number of troops relocating, the Marine Corps data that the Navy used
when it conducted its housing requirements and market analysis were no
longer valid. Because no firm requirements or a time frame for the
realignment are available, Joint Region Marianas officials are
currently only addressing the housing issues directly relevant to its
immediate needs.
DOD data on the cost of maintaining vacant and inactive housing on
Guam are limited.[Footnote 79] Joint Region Marianas officials said
that they have yet to determine the average cost of maintaining a
vacant or inactive housing unit on Guam. Officials from Andersen Air
Force Base estimated that the average annual cost of maintaining an
inactive unit on the Air Force Base, including the cost of providing
electrical power and ground maintenance, is approximately $4,500 per
house. However, Joint Region Marianas officials said that similar data
have not been calculated for Navy housing on Guam. Joint Region
Marianas officials told us that Navy housing units on Guam can be
found both on the military installations and embedded in the local
community and that, because different types of costs are involved for
the two types of housing units, it becomes difficult to determine an
average cost for maintaining inactive housing units. For example,
officials stated that certain services, like fire protection and
security, for Navy housing units located on military installations
would be incorporated into the base operating support expenses for
that installation; however, for certain Navy housing units embedded in
the local community, officials stated that Joint Region Marianas would
pay for these services from accounts other than base operating
support, and it may be difficult to isolate and merge this data.
DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision making states that the
purpose of such an analysis is to give decision makers insight into
economic factors bearing on accomplishing a project's objectives and
that alternatives must be fully investigated and a determination made
on whether an alternative satisfies the functional requirements for
the project.[Footnote 80] This guidance also indicates that, as part
of assessing the costs and benefits of alternatives, an economic
analysis should include all measurable costs and benefits to the
federal government that are incident to achieving the stated
objectives of the project. However, without the Marine Corps housing
requirements being considered and the total costs of maintaining
vacant and inactive housing units known, Joint Region Marianas'
planned assessment of alternatives will not fully measure the costs
and benefits to the federal government of its housing plans. As a
result, decision makers will not have sufficient information to
identify an investment strategy that addresses both Joint Region
Mariana's current housing needs and the Marine Corps' housing
requirements once the realignment is completed.
Conclusions:
DOD believes that rebalancing and strengthening its posture in the
Asia-Pacific region offers many advantages, including reassuring
allies and partners in the region of the United States' commitment and
shaping the security environment, while also providing forward
capabilities to deter and defeat aggression. However, in an era of
significant budgetary pressures and competition for resources, it is
important to conduct detailed planning, supported by comprehensive
cost information, to ensure that DOD is making the most efficient use
of its resources. Although DOD has revised its plan to relocate
Marines off Okinawa, it has yet to identify the total costs,
requirements, or sustainability of a move that will realign Marine
Corps forces throughout the Pacific. In our assessment of DOD's
preliminary estimate for the realignment, we found that DOD's estimate
is not reliable because it omits potentially critical cost elements
such as mobility support and risk parameters tied to the assumptions,
and lacks detailed information on requirements for several key cost
components that are needed to capture all costs related to the
realignment. According to DOD officials, specific requirements and
their associated costs cannot be developed for each cost component
until the necessary environmental analyses and host nation
negotiations have been completed. Still, we found that DOD did not
include some up-front practices that could have provided a more
reliable estimate and could have been done despite the fact that the
environmental analyses and host nation negotiations are not complete.
Office of Management and Budget guidance indicates that it is a best
practice to continuously update the cost estimating process to keep
estimates current, accurate, and valid; and DOD's overview of its
fiscal year 2013 budget states that DOD cannot continue the practice
of starting programs that prove to be unaffordable and that it will
work to achieve program affordability by working to ensure programs
start with firm cost goals in place, appropriate priorities set, and
necessary trade-offs made to keep programs within affordable limits.
Without comprehensive cost estimates developed for the realignment
plan, DOD will be hampered in achieving its affordability goal of not
starting a program without firm costs goals in place. DOD acknowledges
that it will be 2018 or later before an integrated master plan can be
completed to provide Congress with the necessary information it needs
on all of the specific projects, requirements, schedules, and costs to
aid it in its decision making regarding the realignment of Marines in
the Pacific. However, DOD has made a first step in capturing some of
its planning information including integrated schedules of its planned
actions in its synchronization matrix. While we acknowledge that this
type of information will periodically change as environmental analyses
and negotiations are completed, and plans start to be implemented,
this type of information would provide Congress with current plans in
the interim until such time that the integrated master plan can be
completed.
Furthermore, it is unknown what the government of Japan's long-term
construction schedule will be for building the infrastructure to
complete its plans for Iwakuni and Okinawa. DOD currently has not
developed a strategy to identify the resources it needs to assist with
the development and oversight of these projects that may involve a
surge in concurrent construction. Without a strategy, DOD will not
have the safeguards in place to help ensure facilities are being built
to standard and that problems that already existed on a smaller scale
are not magnified. Finally, uncertainties surrounding this realignment
have disrupted planning for current facilities and family housing on
Okinawa, and family housing on Guam, leaving the potential for
hundreds of millions of dollars in unplanned sustainment projects in
the future. Without developing comprehensive cost estimates and
further planning to support the realignment, DOD risks requesting
realignment funds without fully determining requirements, and Congress
may be asked to fund requirements without knowing the full cost.
Furthermore, without developing updated sustainment plans on both
Okinawa and Guam, DOD lacks reasonable assurance that it will have
adequate facilities to support operations and the lives, health, and
safety of servicemembers and their families.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide DOD and Congress with more reliable information to inform
investment decisions associated with the realignment of Marines and
U.S. military posture in the Pacific, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense update the current cost estimate to include additional
estimates for mobility support, and additional analysis that would
quantify the risk impacts and parameters to account for its various
assumptions changing. Furthermore, as appropriate environmental
analyses and host nation negotiations are completed, update the
estimate with comprehensive cost estimates (as identifiable) that
factor in and include the following seven cost components associated
with the current realignment plan:
* Guam Physical Layout and Requirements;
* Housing Requirements on Guam;
* Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam;
* Joint Training Range Complex Requirements including associated
environmental mitigation in the Northern Marianas;
* Marine Corps Requirements for Australia;
* Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations;
* Mobility requirements to support the current realignment plan to
conduct routine operations, training, and any contingency situations.
To provide DOD and Congress with sufficient information to make
informed decisions about the sequencing of projects supporting the
realignment of Marines and the interdependent projects on Okinawa and
about the timing for the funding needed to simultaneously support
these projects and those already planned on mainland Japan, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
* As the master planning process continues over the next several
years, require the Secretary of the Navy to develop annual updates on
the status of planning efforts for appropriate congressional
committees until such time as master plans are completed for each
geographic segment of the realignment. These updates should include,
but not be limited to, providing congressional committees with up-to-
date information on the status of initiatives, identified requirements
and time frames, and any updated cost information linked to specific
facilities or projects.
* Direct the Secretary of the Army to require the Army Corps of
Engineers to coordinate with appropriate military service officials
involved in the planning and management of DPRI projects in Japan,
including U.S. Forces-Japan, Marine Corps Installations Pacific, and
Marine Corps Headquarters, to develop a strategy to identify how the
design and construction process of DPRI projects should be handled
moving forward and the necessary resources needed to support any surge
in construction associated with posture-related initiatives in both
Iwakuni and Okinawa.
To aid DOD and Congress in obtaining sufficient information to make
prudent investment decisions for the sustainment of U.S. forces on
Okinawa and Guam while implementing the planned movements associated
with the realignment of Marines and the consolidation efforts on
Okinawa, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following
three actions:
* Direct the appropriate service officials to update Okinawa
installation master plans to include sustainment requirements and the
costs to sustain the U.S. presence on Okinawa until the Marine
realignment and Okinawa consolidation efforts are completed. At a
minimum, these plans should identify both short-term needs and long-
term needs to account for the uncertainty regarding the time needed to
implement the realignment and consolidation initiatives on Okinawa.
* Direct appropriate service officials to provide, as they become
available, annual master schedule and unit movement updates associated
with the realignment initiatives on Okinawa to the appropriate Air
Force officials. These updates should include any updated housing
requirements such as the demographics of Marine families required to
be housed on Okinawa during the future phases of the realignment
initiatives on Okinawa, thus allowing the appropriate Air Force
officials to perform up-to-date assessments and develop housing
investment strategies reflecting the updated schedule and housing
requirements.
* Direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct an economic analysis to
include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on Guam to
arrive at an informed decision weighing the cost of maintaining or
renovating this housing versus the construction of new facilities to
support the requirements for the Marine Corps realignment to Guam.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred
with five of our recommendations, partially concurred with two
recommendations, and stated it would work with DOD components to
implement the recommendations. While DOD agreed with the content of
the report and the recommendations, the department expressed concern
with the report's title. DOD believes the title suggests the
department currently has the ability to produce comprehensive cost
estimates and complete planning for the realignment initiatives but
has not done so. Our report title Defense Management: More Reliable
Cost Estimates and Further Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps
Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific conveys that more reliable
estimates and comprehensive planning will be needed to inform decision
makers. We acknowledged in our report that DOD will not be in a
position to provide comprehensive cost estimates and complete planning
documentation for the realignment to Congress until the environmental
studies and host nation negotiations have been completed. However, it
is important to ensure that Congress is aware that current cost
estimates provided to them to date are not reliable because they are
incomplete for the reasons stated above and in our report. As a
result, we did not change the title of the report.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to update its current
cost estimate for the realignment to include additional estimates for
mobility support, and additional analysis that would quantify the risk
impacts and parameters to account for its various assumptions
changing. DOD stated that it is in the process of responding to
requirements contained in Section 2832 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which also requires an
assessment of the necessary strategic and logistical resources.
However, the provision does not specifically require DOD to include
risk impacts and parameters. Furthermore, DOD stated that estimates
for mobility support will not be available until the department
completes the required environmental planning documents. As our report
states, we acknowledge that comprehensive estimates for most costs
tied to the realignment cannot be completed until appropriate
environmental analyses and host nation negotiations are complete.
However, we believe DOD should update its current estimate to include
risk parameters to produce a more reliable cost estimate by accounting
for potential cost fluctuations (if its assumptions change) and
include an initial estimate for mobility support, a cost that DOD
officials told us could be considerable.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to update the cost estimate for
the realignment with comprehensive estimates as environmental analysis
and host nation negotiations are completed and consequently more
specific data becomes available on seven specific cost components
including Guam physical layout and requirements; housing and utilities
infrastructure on Guam; joint or Marine Corps training and other
requirements in the Northern Marinas, Australia, and Hawaii; and
mobility requirements. DOD stated that it plans to identify and
incorporate comprehensive cost estimates as they become available upon
completion of necessary environmental planning documents.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to provide annual updates on
the status of master planning efforts to the appropriate congressional
committees, until such time as master plans are completed for each
geographic segment of the realignment.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Army
Corps of Engineers to coordinate with appropriate military service
officials to develop a strategy to identify how the design and
construction process of Defense Policy Review Initiative projects
should be handled moving forward, and the necessary resources needed
to support any surge in construction in both Iwakuni and Okinawa. DOD
noted that it would take these steps, but stated that the effort
necessarily relies upon a detailed master plan that has been
coordinated among several organizations within DOD in order to
identify the necessary resources to support a surge in construction.
We agree that developing a master plan is the first step, and
coordination with the various DOD organizations will be required to
complete this task.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to update Okinawa installation
master plans to include sustainment requirements and the costs to
sustain the U.S. presence on Okinawa until the Marine realignment and
Okinawa consolidation efforts are completed. DOD stated that the
completion of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan in April 2013
removed much uncertainty and will allow the development of more
detailed master plans for each camp.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to provide, as they become
available, annual master schedule and unit movement updates associated
with the realignment initiatives on Okinawa to the appropriate Air
Force officials including updated housing requirements and
demographics of Marine Corps families required to be housed on
Okinawa. DOD stated it will direct U.S. Pacific Command and the Marine
Corps to provide current fiscal and unit movement data to the Air
Force, and update as plans are reviewed and revised.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to conduct an economic analysis
to include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on Guam.
DOD stated that the Navy is conducting a housing market analysis to
establish a baseline for long-term military family housing
requirements on Guam and that, once the baseline requirements are
established, the Navy will conduct a cost/benefit analysis for
addressing new requirements related to the Marine Corps realignment.
We also provided the Department of State with a draft of this report
for official comment, but it declined to comment since the report
contains no recommendations for the Department of State. DOD and State
provided technical comments separately that were incorporated into the
report as appropriate. DOD's written comments are reprinted in
appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Secretary
of State; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
appropriate organizations. In addition, this report will be available
at no charge on our website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable James Inhofe:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dick Durbin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Mark Kirk:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Pete Visclosky:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Culberson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Sanford Bishop:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To evaluate defense posture initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, we
interviewed and collected information from various Department of
Defense (DOD) officials including:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy);
* Department of the Army;
* Department of the Air Force;
* Department of the Navy;
* U.S. Pacific Command and its Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
component commands;
* U.S. Forces, Japan and its Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
component commands;
* U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and its Japan Engineering District;
* Joint Region Marianas; and:
* Joint Guam Program Office.
We conducted site visits to:
* Yokota Air Base and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in mainland
Japan;
* Kadena Air Base, Camps Schwab and Kinser, and Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma on Okinawa;
* Andersen Air Force Base and several Naval installations on Guam; and:
* the proposed training locations on Tinian.
Specifically, to determine the extent to which DOD has developed
comprehensive plans and cost estimates for the realignment of Marines,
we interviewed appropriate DOD and State Department officials,
collected plans and cost estimates related to this initiative, and
applied the best practices included in the GAO Cost Estimating and
Assessment Guide to our assessment of the available data. In addition
to the agencies listed above, we interviewed and collected data from
officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the
Joint Staff; the Office of Economic Adjustment; U.S. Transportation
Command; the Defense Logistics Agency; the Naval Center for Cost
Analysis; and U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, and U.S. Consulate in
Naha, Okinawa. For this review, we collected DOD plans and cost
estimates associated with the original and current Marine realignment
plans, DOD budget data on U.S. projects related to the Defense Posture
Review Initiative (DPRI) and the Marine realignment, budget data on
DPRI and Host Nation Support expenditures provided to DOD by the
government of Japan, military base master plans and housing
requirements analyses, and other relevant documentation. To assess the
comprehensiveness of DOD's realignment cost estimate, we analyzed
DOD's plans, cost analyses, and cost estimating process and compared
them with the best practices included in the GAO Cost Estimating and
Assessment Guide.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for and synchronized
other U.S. defense posture movements in Okinawa and Japan to coincide
with the Marine Corps realignment, we reviewed planning documentation
associated with these posture movements for completeness and
coordination. We interviewed and collected relevant planning
documentation from officials in the DOD offices listed above. We
compared the data we received from each component within the Marine
Corps to one another, and compared the data we collected from U.S.
Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Japan, the Joint Guam Program Office, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the status of
planning consistencies and synchronization. We evaluated these plans
with criteria established in relevant DOD guidance and Key Elements
for Developing a Strategy.
To determine the extent to which DOD has identified a plan to sustain
its current forces on Okinawa and Guam, we interviewed the DOD
officials listed above and conducted site visits where we observed the
conditions of facilities and housing, collected appropriate planning
documentation and cost data, and assessed the data against GAO cost
estimating guidance and DOD planning guidance. We interviewed
officials to identify DOD requirements and plans for sustaining U.S.
forces on Okinawa until realignment efforts are completed. We
collected sustainment planning documentation, base master plans, and
historical host nation support and U.S. sustainment cost data for
Okinawa and compared them to GAO cost estimating guidance and DOD
guidance on installation master planning to determine the extent to
which DOD has planned for the sustainment of U.S. forces on Okinawa
until realignments efforts are completed. We interviewed officials to
determine the extent to which they have planned for the sustainment of
family housing on Guam, reviewing planning documentation and analyzing
current cost data collection methodologies used by the Air Force and
the Navy. We compared sustainment plans to criteria established by
relevant DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision making and
installation master planning.
To determine the reliability of the numerical data provided to us by
DOD organizations, we collected information on how the data was
collected, managed, and used through interviews and a survey provided
to relevant DOD officials. By assessing this information against GAO
data quality standards, we determined that the data presented in our
findings were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to March 2013,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the United States-Japan
Security Consultative Committee:
Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee:
April 27, 2012:
By:
Secretary of State Clinton;
Secretary of Defense Panetta;
Minister for Foreign Affairs Gemba;
Minister of Defense Tanaka.
The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reconfirmed that
the U.S.-Japan Alliance, supported by a robust U.S. military presence
in Japan, including U.S. Marine Corps forces in Okinawa, continues to
provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of
Japan and for the maintenance of peace, security, and economic
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
In view of the increasingly uncertain security environment in the Asia-
Pacific region. the Ministers reiterated their commitment to advance
the Common Strategic Objectives set forth in the June 21, 2011 SCC
Joint Statement. The Ministers also expressed their intention to
enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation in line with that
Joint. Statement and to identify ways to strengthen engagement with
countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Government of Japan welcomed the January 2012 announcement by the
U.S. Government of the new Strategic Guidance for the Department of
Defense. which states the U.S. intent to rebalance defense priorities
toward the Asia-Pacific region, and also welcomed U.S. efforts to
advance its diplomatic engagement in the region.
To achieve the goals of the shared partnership between the two
countries, the SCC decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 1,
2006 SCC Document entitled, "United States-Japan Roadmap for
Realignment Implementation" (Realignment Roadmap). As part of these
adjustments, the Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel from Okinawa to
Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress
on the Futenma Replacement Facility.
The Ministers affirmed that these adjustments are necessary to realize
a U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region that is more
geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically
sustainable. The adjustments, moreover, do not alter the fundamental
goals of the Realignment Roadmap, which are to maintain deterrence and
mitigate the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. The
adjustments also strengthen interoperability between U.S. forces and
the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and support the development of
Guam as a strategic hub.
The Ministers also affirmed that the unit composition described in
Section I would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the U.S.-
Japan Alliance. Furthermore, the Ministers underscored that the
deterrence capabilities of the Alliance would be strengthened through
Japan's efforts, such as development of a dynamic defense force and
enhancement of its defense posture in areas including the Southwestern
Islands. They also noted that bilateral dynamic defense cooperation,
including timely and effective joint training, joint surveillance and
reconnaissance activities, as well as joint and shared use of
facilities, would strengthen deterrence.
I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa:
The Ministers announced their intent to adjust the composition of U.S.
Marine Corps units in Okinawa and Guam. Because the authorized
strength of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Okinawa has grown slightly
since the Realignment Roadmap, and in order to maximize the
operational capability of the departing and remaining units, both
governments have decided on certain adjustments to the end-state
composition of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam and Okinawa.
The United States plans to locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
(MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and intends to establish a
rotational presence in Australia in order to establish a
geographically distributed force posture while sustaining the forward
presence of U.S. Marine Corps forces in the region. This revised
posture will ensure a more capable U.S. Marine Corps presence in these
locations, strengthening deterrence and enabling flexible and rapid
responses to various contingencies. The Ministers confirmed that these
steps would contribute to Japan's defense and to peace and stability
throughout the AsiaPacific region.
The Ministers confirmed that a total of approximately 9,000 U.S.
Marines, along with their associated dependents, are to be relocated
from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. U.S. Marine Corps forces
remaining in Okinawa are to consist of the III MEF Headquarters; the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters; the 3rd Marine Logistics Group
Headquarters; the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit; and base sustainment
elements of Marine Corps Installations Pacific, along with essential
aviation, ground and support units. The Ministers reaffirmed their
commitment to achieve an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in
Okinawa consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment
Roadmap. Consistent with the usual practice of Alliance consultations,
the U.S. Government is to notify the Government of Japan of changes to
the organizational structure of the U.S. Marine Corps units in Okinawa.
The United States is working to establish an operational U.S. Marine
Corps presence in Guam consisting of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Brigade Headquarters; the 4th Marine Regiment; and elements of
aviation, ground and support units from III MEF. A base sustainment
unit is also to be established there. The authorized strength of U.S.
Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel.
In conjunction with these adjustments, the U.S. Government also
informed the Government of Japan that is establishing a U.S. Marine
Corps rotational presence in Australia, with other U.S. Marines moving
to Hawaii to enhance operational capability there. In executing these
moves, U.S. government reaffirmed its commitment to sustain current
military presence and enhance military capability in the Western
Pacific.
To reinforce the long-term sustainability of the U.S. military
presence in Okinawa, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from
Okinawa mentioned above is to occur when appropriate facilities are
available to receive them. Recognizing the strong desires of Okinawa
residents, these relocations are to be completed as soon as possible
while ensuring operational capability throughout the process.
The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the
relocation of Marines to Guam described above is $8.6 billion in U.S.
fiscal year 2012 dollars. In order to expedite the establishment of an
operational U.S. Marine Corps presence in Guam, and considering the
aforementioned unit composition, the two governments reaffirmed that
Japan's financial commitment is to be the direct cash contribution as
stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. The
two governments affirmed that other forms of Japanese financial
support to Guam relocation would not be utilized. Any contributions
from Japan to develop training areas as referred to in Section II are
to be a part of the aforementioned commitment. The remaining costs and
any additional costs are to be borne by the U.S. Government. Any funds
already transferred by the Government of Japan to the U.S. Government
under the 2009 Guam International Agreement are to be counted as part
of the Japanese contribution. The two governments are to complete a
bilateral cost breakdown. They are also to consult regarding further
actions to be taken in light of the 2009 Guam International Agreement.
The Ministers noted the importance of continued consultations on the
programmatic and technical details of these initiatives with the
legislative branches on both sides.
II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and
Prosperity:
The Ministers confirmed the great importance of working together to
promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region,
and enhancing effective, efficient and creative cooperation.
In this context, the U.S. Government plans to continue to help allies
and partners in the region to build their capacity with training and
exercises. The Government of Japan, for its part, plans to take
various measures to promote safety in the region, including strategic
use of official development assistance, for example through providing
coastal states with patrol boats.
In order to develop Guam as a strategic hub and mitigate the impact of
the U.S. military presence on local communities, both governments plan
to explore new efforts to promote bilateral dynamic defense
cooperation in the region based on the assessment of the changing
security environment. The two governments are to consider cooperation
in developing training areas in Guam and he Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by U.S. forces and
the JSDF. Both governments are to identify specific areas of
cooperation in this regard by the end of 2012.
III. Consolidation of Bases and Land Returns in Okinawa:
The total or partial return of the following six facilities and areas
remains unchanged from the Realignment Roadmap:
* Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester): Total return.
* Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster): Partial return and consolidation of
remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
* Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma: Total return.
* Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser): Total return.
* Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including
additional staging area, to be constructed at Urasoe).
* Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1: Total
return.
The United States committed to return lands on Okinawa as designated
U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa, and as facilities
become available for units and other tenant activities relocating to
locations in Okinawa. The Government of Japan noted its responsibility
to relocate all functions and capabilities that are resident in
facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces
remaining in Okinawa, including the housing necessary to support the
remaining U.S. Marine Corps units, in coordination with the U.S.
Government. Coordination with local communities is to take place as
necessary.
Land of the aforementioned facilities and areas is to be returned as
early as it becomes possible. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.
In order to reduce the impact of U.S. forces on Okinawa as early as
possible, both governments affirmed that the following areas utilized
by U.S. forces are eligible for return:
* The Ministers confirmed that the following areas are eligible for
immediate return upon completion of necessary procedures:
- West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster);
- The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser);
- Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area;
- A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering
Compound in Camp Zukeran (after the provision of a replacement
warehouse at another location).
* The Ministers confirmed that the following areas are eligible for
return once the replacement facilities in Okinawa are provided:
- Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester);
- Lower Plaza Housing area, a part of Kishaba Housing area, and the
Industrial Corridor of Camp Zukeran;
- Elements of Makiminato Service Area, including the preponderance or
the storage area;
- Naha Port;
- Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1.
* The Ministers confirmed that the following areas are eligible for
return as U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa to locations
outside of Japan:
- Additional elements of Camp Zukeran;
- The remainder of Makiminato Service Area.
A consolidation plan, including sequencing of relocation steps, is to
be jointly developed for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa,
with a particular focus on determining the end-state of Camp Zukeran
(Camp Foster), by the end of 2012. This effort should consider the
land usage at Camp Zukeran required by this revised unit composition,
as well as the possible impact of the joint and shared use of
facilities on Okinawa, The Ministers noted that joint and shared use
of facilities was a key objective of the Realignment Roadmap. This
consolidation plan would be available for public release as soon as
possible. The Ministers welcomed the formation of a working group,
which is to include appropriate officials of their respective
capitals, to develop and oversee this consolidation plan.
IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma:
The Ministers resolve to continue to work toward the relocation of
MCAS Futenma in a way that meets the criteria: operationally viable,
politically feasible, financially responsible, and strategically
sound. The Ministers reconfirmed their view that the FRF, planned for
construction at the Camp Schwab-Henoko saki area and adjacent waters,
remains the only viable solution that has been identified to date.
The Ministers confirmed their commitment to resolve the issue of the
FRF as soon as possible in order to avoid the indefinite use of MCAS
Futenma, while maintaining Alliance capabilities.
Both governments expressed their commitment to contribute mutually to
necessary refurbishment projects at MCAS Futenma, such as those to
sustain its safe mission capability until the FRF is fully operational
and to protect the environment, on a case-by-case basis and consistent
with existing bilateral arrangements, including Host Nation Support,
Bilateral discussion of specific refurbishment projects is to be
conducted through a channel separate from the one used to discuss
realignment initiatives, with initial refurbishment projects to be
identified by the end of 2012.
Conclusion:
The Ministers welcomed the close and fruitful cooperation embodied in
this Joint Statement, and they directed that the adjusted realignment
package should be implemented expeditiously, in consultation with the
legislative branches on both sides. The further expressed confidence
that the package would ne a solid foundation for a deeper and broader
U.S.-Japan Alliance. The Ministers noted a number of significant
achievements with realignment initiatives since the last SCC meeting
in June 2011, including progress in the environmental impact
assessment process regarding the FRF; the expansion of aviation
training relocation programs to Guam, the relocation of the Japan Air
Self Defense Force (JASDF) Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base; and
progress in the relocation of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force
(JGSDF) Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Camp Zama. The
Ministers expressed their intent to achieve further progress on
realignment goals and more broadly to evaluate Alliance roles,
missions, and capabilities (RMC), in order to fortify the Alliance for
the evolving challenges of the regional and global security
environment.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For Marine Corps
Realignment in National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 and 2012:
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013[Footnote 81]
Sec. 2831. Certification Of Military Readiness Need For A Live Fire
Training Range Complex On Guam As Condition On Establishment Of Range
Complex.
A Live Fire Training Range Complex on Guam may not be established
(including any construction or lease of lands related to such
establishment) in coordination with the realignment of United States
Armed Forces in the Pacific until the Secretary of Defense certifies
to the congressional defense committees that there is a military
training and readiness requirement for the Live Fire Training Range
Complex.
Sec. 2832. Realignment Of Marine Corps Forces In Asia-Pacific Region.
(a) Restriction On Use Of Funds For Realignment.--Except as provided
in subsection (c), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated
under this Act, and none of the amounts provided by the Government of
Japan for construction activities on land under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Defense, may be obligated to implement the
realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam or Hawaii
until each of the following occurs:
(1) The Commander of the United States Pacific Command provides to the
congressional defense committees an assessment of the strategic and
logistical resources needed to ensure the distributed lay-down of
members of the Marine Corps in the United States Pacific Command Area
of Responsibility meets the contingency operations plans.
(2) The Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense
committees master plans for the construction of facilities and
infrastructure to execute the Marine Corps distributed lay-down on
Guam and Hawaii, including a detailed description of costs and the
schedule for such construction.
(3) The Secretary of the Navy submits a plan to the congressional
defense committees detailing the proposed investments and schedules
required to restore facilities and infrastructure at Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma.
(4) A plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies is provided
to the congressional defense committees detailing descriptions of
work, costs, and a schedule for completion of construction,
improvements, and repairs to the non-military utilities, facilities,
and infrastructure, if any, on Guam affected by the realignment of
forces.
(b) Restriction On Development Of Public Infrastructure.
If the Secretary of Defense determines that any grant, cooperative
agreement, transfer of funds to another Federal agency, or supplement
of funds available in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 under Federal programs
administered by agencies other than the Department of Defense will
result in the development (including repair, replacement, renovation,
conversion, improvement, expansion, acquisition, or construction) of
public infrastructure on Guam, the Secretary of Defense may not carry
out such grant, transfer, cooperative agreement, or supplemental
funding unless such grant, transfer, cooperative agreement, or
supplemental funding is specifically authorized by law.
(c) Exceptions To Funding Restriction.--The Secretary of Defense may
use funds described in subsection (a):
(1) to complete additional analysis or studies required under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) for
proposed actions on Guam or Hawaii;
(2) to initiate planning and design of construction projects at
Andersen Air Force Base and Andersen South; and:
(3) to carry out any military construction project for which an
authorization of appropriations is provided in section 2204, as
specified in the funding table in section 4601.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Distributed Lay-Down.--The term "distributed laydown" refers to
the planned distribution of members of the Marine Corps in Okinawa,
Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and possibly elsewhere that is contemplated
in support of the joint statement of the United States-Japan Security
Consultative Committee issued April 26, 2012, in the District of
Columbia (April 27, 2012, in Tokyo).
(2) Public Infrastructure.--The term ''public infrastructure'' means
any utility, method of transportation, item of equipment, or facility
under the control of a public entity or State or local government that
is used by, or constructed for the benefit of, the general public.
(E) Repeal Of Superseded Law.--Section 2207 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (division B of
Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1668) is repealed.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012[Footnote 82]
Sec. 2207. Guam Realignment.
(a) Restriction On Use Of Funds.--Except as provided in subsection
(c), notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated under this Act, and none of the amounts
provided by the Government of Japan for military construction
activities on land under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Defense, may be obligated to implement the realignment of United
States Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam as envisioned in the
United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation issued May
1, 2006, until:
(1) the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the
Commander of the United States Pacific Command, provides the
congressional defense committees the Commandant's preferred force lay-
down for the United States Pacific Command Area of Responsibility;
(2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense
committees a master plan for the construction of facilities and
infrastructure to execute the Commandant's preferred force lay-down on
Guam, including a detailed description of costs and a schedule for
such construction;
(3) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees that tangible progress has been made regarding the
relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma;
(4) a plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies is provided
to the congressional defense committees detailing descriptions of
work, costs, and a schedule for completion of construction,
improvements, and repairs to the non-military utilities, facilities,
and infrastructure on Guam affected by the realignment of forces; and:
(5) the Secretary of Defense:
(A) submits to the congressional defense committees the report on the
assessment of the United States force posture in East Asia and the
Pacific region required under section 346 of this Act; or:
(B) certifies to the congressional defense committees that the
deadline established under such section for the submission of such
report has not been met.
(b) Development Of Public Infrastructure.
(1) Authorization Required.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, if the Secretary of Defense determines that any grant,
cooperative agreement, transfer of funds to another Federal agency, or
supplement of funds available in fiscal year 2012 under Federal
programs administered by agencies other than the Department of Defense
will result in the development (including repair, replacement,
renovation, conversion, improvement, expansion, acquisition, or
construction) of public infrastructure on Guam, such grant, transfer
cooperative agreement, or supplemental funding shall be specifically
authorized by law.
(2) Public Infrastructure Defined.--In this section, the term "public
infrastructure" means any utility, method of transportation, item of
equipment, or facility under the control of a public entity or State
or local government that is used by, or constructed for the benefit
of, the general public.
(c) Exception To Restriction On Use Of Funds.--The Secretary of
Defense may use funds described in subsection (a) to carry out
additional analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 to include the following actions:
(1) A re-evaluation of live-fire training range complex alternatives,
based upon the application of probabilistic modeling; and:
(2) The ongoing analysis on the impacts of the realignment and build-
up on Guam as described in subsection (a) on coral reefs in Apra
Harbor, Guam.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Print-Friendly Version of Figure 1: U.S. Defense Posture
in Asia:
South Korea:
* Allied since 1953 when United States-Republic of Korea Mutual
Defense Treaty was signed. Under this treaty, the United States agreed
to help South Korea defend itself against external aggression;
* Currently, the United States has roughly 28,500 servicemembers
stations in South Korea;
* U.S. and Korean forces participate in bilateral and multinational
exercises, such as Invincible Spirit, a combined maritime and air
readiness exercise.
Japan:
* Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of
1960 and related agreements, U.S. forces are stationed in Japan to
assist in the security of Japan and to maintain peace and security in
the region;
* U.S. forces were deployed in Japan for Operation Tomodachi,
providing disaster relief assistance after the March 2011 earthquake
and tsunami disaster that struck Japan;
* Both countries also engage in training exercises such as the
bilateral command post exercise, Keen Edge.
The Philippines:
* The Philippines is considered a major non-NATO ally. The Philippines
became an independent state in 1946, but was formerly a U.S.
territory. In 1951, the U.S. and the Philippines signed a Mutual
Defense Treaty that, along with other agreements, serves as the basis
for its security partnership with the United States;
* The United States provides significant military education training
assistance to The Philippines military and has provided assistance to
boost its capacity to conduct offensive counterterrorism operations.
Thailand:
* Thailand is considered a key U.S. security ally in Asia and was
designated a major non-NATO ally in 2003. Thailand and the United
States are signatories of the 1954 Manila Pact, which, along with
other agreements, serves as the basis for the U.S. security
relationship with Thailand;
* U.S. and Thai forces participate in Cobra Gold, the longest-standing
military exercise in the Pacific. The Cobra Gold exercise held in 2012
involved roughly 20,000 military personnel from the United States and
six other countries.
Australia:
* Australia has had a military alliance with the United States since
both nations signed a multimateral security treaty in 1951. Australia
invoked this treaty after the 9/11 World Trade enter attack and
participated in coalition military action against Iraq in Operation
Iraqi Freedom;
* Australian special forces also deployed to Afghanistan to help
provide security for the September 2005 elections;
* Recently, the United States deployed a Marine Corps unit for a 6-
month rotation in preparation for establishing a continuous Marine
?Corps presence in Australia, The United States also intends to place
a C-Band ground-based radar system in the country,
U.S. Forces on mainland Japan:
* U.S. Forces—Japan established on July 1, 1957;
* Roughly 25,400 servicemembers are stationed in mainland Japan with
about 22,000 dependents;
* Major Elements include:
- U.S. Army, Japan;
- 111 Marine Expeditionary Force;
- Commander, Naval Forces, Japan;
- U.S. 7th Fleet;
- U.S. Air Forces, Japan/5th Air Force.
U.S. Forces on Okinawa:
* 111 Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Corps Installations,
Pacific, are headquartered on Okinawa;
* Roughly 25,800 servicemembers are stationed on Okinawa, accompanied
by about 20,100 dependents;
* Kadena Air Force Base is home to the 18th Wing and other units.
U.S. Forces on Guam:
* U.S. military presence on Guam since 1898;
* Joint Region Marianas established in 2009 as a consolidation of U.S.
Naval Base Guam and Andersen Air Force Base;
* Roughly 6,000 servicemembers are stationed on Guam with 7,108
dependents;
* Naval Base, Guam is home to Submarine Squadron 15, Naval Special
Warfare Unit One, and other tenant commands;
* Andersen Air Force Base is home to the 36th Wing and other units.
From Guam:
Anchorage, Alaska:
9.25 flight hours;
10.5 ship days;
3,987 nautical miles.
Yokosuka, Japan:
3.4 flight hours;
4 ship days;
1,348 nautical miles.
Taiwan:
3.6 flight hours;
4 ship days;
1,462 nautical miles.
Hawaii:
7.7 flight hours;
8.5 ship days;
3,302 nautical miles.
Sydney, Australia:
6.7 flight hours;
9 ship days;
2,857 nautical miles.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and other federal agency data.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Funded Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)-Related
Military Construction Projects on Guam Supporting Marine Realignment:
Government of Japan-funded:
Project: Guam Utilities and Site Improvements - Phase 1;
Funding category: Design;
Start date: 14-Feb-09;
Estimated budget: $8.544 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $8.544 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $0.000.
Funding category: Construction;
Start date: 11-Aug-11;
Estimated budget: $196.100 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $38.547 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $157.553 million.
Funding category: Project total;
Estimated budget: $204.644 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $47.091 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $157.553 million.
U.S. government-funded:
Project: Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements I;
Funding category: Design (I and II)[A];
Start date: 14-Feb-09;
Estimated budget: $6.396 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $6.396 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $0.000.
Funding category: Construction;
Start date: 30-Sep-10;
Estimated budget: $127.033 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $68.857 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $58.176 million.
Funding category: Project total;
Estimated budget: $133.429 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $75.253 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $58.176 million.
Project: Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements II;
Funding category: Construction;
Start date: 27-Nov-12;
Estimated budget: $39.105 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $0.000;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $39.105 million.
Project: Working Dog Facility Relocation;
Funding category: Design;
Start date: 25-Oct-08;
Estimated budget: $1.539 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $1.539 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $0.000.
Funding category: Construction;
Start date: Project: 29-Sep-10;
Estimated budget: $14.000 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $3.529 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $10.471 million.
Funding category: Project total;
Estimated budget: $15.539 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $5.068 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $10.471 million.
Project: Andersen Air Force Base North Ramp Utilities I;
Funding category: Design;
Start date: 3-Dec-09;
Estimated budget: $1.222 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $1.222 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $0.000.
Funding category: Construction;
Start date: Project: 6-Apr-11;
Estimated budget: $21.500 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $6.136 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $15.364 million.
Funding category: Project total;
Estimated budget: $22.722 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $7.358 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $15.364 million.
Project: Andersen Air Force Base North Ramp Parking I;
Funding category: Design;
Start date: 3-Dec-09;
Estimated budget: $2.197 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $2.189 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $0.007 million.
Funding category: Construction;
Start date: 6-Apr-11;
Estimated budget: $88.797 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $39.692 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $49.105 million.
Funding category: Project total;
Estimated budget: $90.994 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $41.881 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $49.112 million.
Project: Defense Access Roads;
Funding category: Construction[B];
Start date: 13-Jul-11;
Estimated budget: $48.860 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $0.268 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $48.592 million.
Project: U.S. government-funded total[C];
Estimated budget: $350.648 million;
Cost incurred from inception to December 31, 2012: $129.829 million;
Estimated remaining cost to complete: $220.819 million.
Source: DOD.
[A] Design includes Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements I and II projects.
[B] Project executed by Federal Highway Administration. Construction
funds used to develop design.
[C] Figures in table may not sum correctly due to rounding error.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense:
Policy:
2100 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20205-2100:
May 23, 2013:
Mr. Brian S. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD response to the GAO draft
report, GA0-13-360, "Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates
and Further Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment
Initiatives in the Pacific" dated April 22, 2013.
The Department concurs in five recommendations and partially concurs
in two or them. Clarification and further information are included for
each recommendation on the accompanying pages.
We have expressed concern with the title of this report, which
suggests the Department currently has the ability to provide
comprehensive cost estimates and complete planning for all
realignment initiatives but has failed to do so. As the report notes,
there are environmental studies that must be completed before the
Department can develop reliable cost estimates and finalize planning
for related initiatives. We expect to issue the Guam Record of
Decision in 2015, and sometime after that point, the Department will
commence the Hawaii Environmental Impact Statement, with a completion
date yet to be determined.
The U.S. Marine Corps realignment is a critical priority for the
Department and a central element of our strategy for rebalance to the
Pacific. We remain committed to providing Congress with the
comprehensive costing and detailed planning necessary to solidify
support for this key effort.
We will work with DOD components to implement these recommendations,
and we look forward to further dialogue with GAO and Congress on
details associated with Marine Corps realignment initiatives in the
Pacific.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kathleen H. Hicks:
Attachment: As stated.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
update the current cost estimate to include additional estimates flu
mobility support, and additional. analysis that would quantify the
risk impacts and parameters to account for its various assumptions
changing:
DoD Response: Partially concur. The Department is currently in the
process of responding to the legislative requirements contained in
Section 2832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, which also requires an assessment of the necessary strategic and
logistical resources required for distributed laydown. When the
Department has identified a preferred option for mobility support, the
current cost estimate can be updated to include assumptions and
parameters. However, comprehensive estimates for mobility support will
not be available until completion of the required environmental
planning documents.
Recommendation 2: As appropriate environmental analyses and host
nation negotiations are completed, the GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Defense update the estimate with comprehensive cost
estimates (as identifiable) that factor in and include the following
seven cost components associated with the current realignment plan:
Guam physical layout and requirements; housing requirements on Guam;
requirements to upgrade utilities and infrastructure on Guam; Joint
Training Range Complex requirements including associated environmental
mitigation in the Northern Marianas; Marine Corps requirements for
Australia: Marine Corps requirements for Hawaii and other U.S.
locations; mobility requirements to support the current realignment
plan to conduct routine operations, training, and any contingency
situations.
DoD Response: Concur. The Department plans to identify and incorporate
comprehensive cost estimates as they become available upon completion
of necessary environmental planning documents, to include the seven
cost components identified for inclusion.
Recommendation 3: As the master planning process continues over the
next several years, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the Secretary of the Navy to provide annual updates on the
status of planning efforts with appropriate congressional committees
until such time as master plans are completed for each geographic
segment of the realignment. These updates should include, but not be
limited to, providing congressional committees with up-to-date
information on the status of initiatives, identified requirements and
time frames, and any updated cost information linked to specific
facilities or projects.
DoD Response: Concur. The Department of the Navy regularly provides
updates on the status of initiatives to the congressional committees.
Updates will continue through the completion of the master planning
process for each location.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to require the Army Corps of
Engineers to coordinate with appropriate military service officials
involved in the planning and management of Defense Policy Review
Initiative (DPM) projects in Japan, including U.S. Forces Japan,
Marine Corps Installations Pacific, and Marine Corps Headquarters, to
develop a strategy to identify how the design and construction process
of DPRI projects should he handled moving forward, and the necessary
resources needed to support any surge in construction associated with
posture-related initiatives in both Iwakauti and Okinawa.
DoD Response: Partially concur. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
manages the design and construction process for posture-Mated
initiatives in Iwakuni and Okinawa and will coordinate with
appropriate military service officials to develop a strategy to
identify how this process should be handled moving forward; however,
this effort necessarily relies upon a detailed master plan, that has
been coordinated with U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), the U.S. Marine Corps
(USMC) Installations-Pacific, and Headquarters (HQ), USMC, to identify
necessary resources to support any surge in construction.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate Service officials to update Okinawa
installation master plans to include sustainment requirements and the
costs to sustain the U.S presence on Okinawa until the Marine
realignment and Okinawa consolidation efforts are completed. At a
minimum, these plans should identify both short-term needs and long-
term needs to account for the uncertainty regarding the time needed to
implement the realignment and consolidation initiatives on Okinawa.
DoD Response: Concur. Once the new April 2013 bilateral Okinawa
Consolidation Plan (OCP) was signed/published by the United States and
Japan (with completion date goals for each phase of the land returns),
much of the uncertainty that previously existed for a general OCP
timeline was removed, allowing the development of more detailed
installation master plans for each camp.
Recommendation 6: The CIAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct appropriate Service officials to provide, as they become
available, annual master schedule and unit movement updates associated
with the realignment initiatives on Okinawa to the appropriate Air
Force officials. These updates should include updated housing
requirements such as the demographics of Marine families required to
be housed on Okinawa during the future phases of the realignment
initiatives an Okinawa, thus allowing the appropriate Air Force
officials to perform up-to-date assessments and develop housing
investment strategies reflecting the updated schedule and housing
requirements.
DoD Response: Concur. The Department will direct. U.S. Pacific Command
and HQ US MC to provide current Future Years Defense Plans (FYDP) and
long-range Okinawa master schedule and unit movement updates to HQ
USAF, and to provide future updates as plans are reviewed and revised
by USFJ and USMC. Updates will include the demographics of Marine
Corps families required to be housed on Okinawa during the future
phases of the realignment.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct an economic analysis to
include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on Guam, to
arrive at an informed decision weighing the cost of maintaining or
renovating this housing versus the construction of new facilities for
the Marine Corps realignment to Guam.
DoD Response: Concur. The Navy is conducting a housing market analysis
to establish a baseline for long-term military family housing
requirements on Guam, including families associated with incoming
Marines. Additionally, the strategy to address military housing
requirements on the island will be further informed by final
cantonment decisions. following completion of environmental planning
documents. Once the baseline requirements are established, the
Department of the Navy will conduct a cost/benefit analysis for
addressing the new requirement related to the Marine Corps realignment
that compares initial renovation with replacement investment costs, as
well as recurring costs over the life of the assets. The recurring
costs include the cost of operating and maintaining units (occupied or
unoccupied). This analysis will allow the Navy to determine whether it
is more cost-effective to retain and repair existing housing on the
island versus construction of replacement or additional housing.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant
Director; Jeff Hubbard; Gilbert Kim; Joanne Landesman; Ying Long;
Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Karen Richey; Michael Shaughnessy;
Amie Steele; and Lindsay Taylor made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to
Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-711]. Washington, D.C.: June 6,
2012.
Military Buildup on Guam: Costs and Challenges in Meeting Construction
Timelines. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-459R].
Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2011.
Defense Infrastructure: The Navy Needs Better Documentation to Support
Its Proposed Military Treatment Facilities on Guam. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-206]. Washington, D.C.: April 5,
2011.
Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input
Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-131]. Washington, D.C.: February 3,
2011.
Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of Basing
Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-745R]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2010.
Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794]. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010.
Defense Management: U.S Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency
Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges
Conducting a Large Military Operation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-801]. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010.
National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges
at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-962T]. Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010.
Defense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to Meet
Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and Programs to
Support a Larger Military Presence. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-90R]. Washington, D.C.: November
13, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Provide Updated Labor
Requirements to Help Guam Adequately Develop Its Labor Force for the
Military Buildup. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-72].
Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771].
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Ability to Manage,
Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-706R]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Challenges Could Increase Risks for
DOD in Providing Utility Services When Needed to Support the Military
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-653].
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,
Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated
with the U.S. Africa Command. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181]. Washington, D.C.: February
20, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of
Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master
Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1005]. Washington, D.C.: September
17, 2008.
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and
Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-947T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military
Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet
to Be Addressed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-722T].
Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD
Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1015].
Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852].
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Joint
Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Apr. 26, 2012).
Hereinafter referred to as the "April 2012 Statement", the entire
statement is reprinted in appendix II of this report.
[2] According to Marine Corps officials, these are approximate numbers
and do not include any numbers specific to the continental United
States; however, some units from the 9,000 relocating from Okinawa are
expected to relocate to the continental United States.
[3] Although the document developed by representatives from the two
governments concerning the original Guam realignment referred to
approximately 8,000 personnel, the Record of Decision for the Guam and
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation referred
to approximately 8,600 Marines. See Department of the Army and
Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for the Guam and
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation
(September 2010).
[4] See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-705, at 867-68, 969-70 (2012)
(Conference Report, accompanying the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2013); S. Rep. No. 112-173, at 257, 258-59 (2012)
(Senate Armed Services Committee report, accompanying a bill for the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013); S. Rep. No.
112-29, at 8-11 (2011) (Senate Appropriations Committee report,
accompanying the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and
Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2012).
[5] See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832 (2013) and Pub. L. No. 112-81, §
2207 (2011). Section 2832(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 superseded and repealed section 2207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. In addition
to the information to be provided by DOD, both provisions also
required the submission to the congressional defense committees of a
plan coordinated by all pertinent federal agencies, see § 2832(a)(4)
and § 2207(a)(4), and contained certain exceptions to the restriction.
See § 2832(c) and § 2207(c). Please see appendix III of this report
for full text of the respective sections in the Fiscal Years 2012 and
2013 National Defense Authorization Acts related to restrictions on
the use of funding for Marine Corps realignment initiatives in the
Pacific.
[6] See S. Rep. No. 112-29, at 11 (2011).
[7] See S. Rep. No. 112-173, at 257 (2012).
[8] The Unified Command Plan establishes combatant commanders'
missions and geographic responsibilities. Combatant commanders link
operational military forces to the Secretary of Defense and the
President. The Secretary of Defense deploys troops and exercises
military power through the combatant commands.
[9] The III Marine Expeditionary Force is a formation of multiple
Marine units forward-deployed in Japan and Asia to support the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan, and other alliance relationships of the United States. It is
able to deploy rapidly and conduct operations across the spectrum from
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to amphibious assault and
high-intensity combat.
[10] See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, Jan.
19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632.
[11] See Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11
U.S.T. 1652.
[12] The Security Consultative Committee is made up of the U.S.
Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan's Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and Minister of State for Defense.
[13] GAO has performed a review of U.S. realignment efforts under this
agreement. See GAO, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the
Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-66] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
2, 1998).
[14] GAO has done work on posture issues related to Japan. See GAO,
Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of
Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316] (Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2011).
[15] United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document,
U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (May 1, 2006). This
document provided implementation details for realignment initiatives
described in United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee
Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the
Future (Oct. 29, 2005).
[16] See Agreement Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of
III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from
Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State Dep't No. 09-
89.
[17] The plan to return Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the
Government of Japan dates back to 1997. See Special Action Committee
on Okinawa Final Report (Aug. 5, 1997).
[18] According to Marine Corps documentation, the construction of 10
projects at Camp Schwab has been completed.
[19] Subsequent to the completion of the audit work on this
engagement, in April 2013, DOD announced the completion and public
release of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan that, according to
DOD officials, stated that the best-case scenario for the completion
of the runway is in 2022 or later.
[20] Kadena Air Base is a United States Air Force base in the towns of
Kadena and Chatan and the city of Okinawa, in Okinawa Prefecture,
Japan. Kadena Air Base is the hub of U.S. airpower in the Pacific, and
home to the United States Air Force's 18th Wing and a variety of
associate units. In 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed
the Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility of relocating Air
Force assets at Kadena Air Base and moving Marine Corps aviation
assets from Futenma to Kadena, in lieu of building a replacement
facility at Camp Schwab. See S. Rep. No. 112-26, at 242 (2011).
[21] See United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Joint
Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Apr. 26, 2012).
[22] The Security Consultative Committee statement noted that
relocation of Marine Corps units from Okinawa was to occur when
appropriate facilities were available to receive them, to be completed
as soon as possible while ensuring operational capability throughout
the process. See id.
[23] Rotational refers to Marine Corps units that are deployed for
periods of approximately 6 months to any given location.
[24] Pub. L. No. 91-190 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4347). Under the act, federal agencies must assess the effects of
major federal actions--those they propose to carry out or to permit--
that significantly affect the environment. The act has two principal
purposes: (1) to ensure that an agency carefully considers detailed
information concerning significant environmental impacts and (2) to
ensure that this information will be made available to the public.
[25] Department of the Navy, Final Environmental Impact Statement:
Guam and CNMI Military Relocation: Relocating Marines from Okinawa,
Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Air and Missile Defense
Task Force (July 2010).
[26] The Departments of the Navy and Army released a Record of
Decision in September 2010, which announced their decision to proceed
with the Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Military Relocation. See Departments of the Navy and Army, Record of
Decision for Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (Sept. 2010); 75 Fed.
Reg. 60,438 (Sept. 30, 2010).
[27] See 77 Fed. Reg. 6,787 (Feb. 9, 2012).
[28] See 77 Fed. Reg. 61,746 (Oct. 11, 2012).
[29] A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 prohibited DOD from establishing a live-fire training range
complex in Guam (including any construction or lease of lands related
to such establishment) in coordination with the realignment of forces
in the Pacific until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the
congressional defense committees that there is a military training and
readiness requirement for the complex. See Pub. L. No. 112-239, §
2831. Section 2831 is reprinted in appendix III of this report.
[30] Under a 2009 agreement implementing the 2006 Roadmap, the
government of Japan had agreed to provide up to $2.8 billion in fiscal
year 2008 dollars in direct cash contributions to support the Guam
relocation, subject to certain U.S. funding. See Agreement Concerning
the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force
Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, art.
I, ¶ 1, Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State Dep't No. 09-89. In its April 2012
statement, the Security Consultative Committee reaffirmed that Japan's
financial commitment would be these direct cash contributions.
According to DOD officials, the contributions would amount to roughly
$3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars.
[31] See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832 and Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 2207.
The provisions similarly restrained the use of funds authorized to be
appropriated by the respective National Defense Authorization Acts and
contained certain exceptions. See id. See appendix II for the text of
these provisions.
[32] See § 2832(c).
[33] The facilities that would be fully returned to Japan are Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma, Camp Kinser, Naha Port, Kuwae Tank Farm,
and Camp Lester. Camp Foster would be partially returned.
[34] Subsequent to the completion of the audit work on this
engagement, in April 2013, DOD announced the completion and public
release of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan for forces
remaining on Okinawa.
[35] ¥187 billion equals about $2 billion, based on a 89.96 foreign
exchange rate
[36] According to agency officials, the projects currently being
constructed on Guam were being built with fiscal year 2010 and 2011
funding, and were being constructed before any restrictions were
placed in the law.
[37] For a more detailed list of projects associated with the military
construction on Guam, see Interagency Coordination Group of Inspectors
General for Guam Realignment Annual Report (Feb. 1, 2013).
[38] Specifically designed for swift deployment of Marine forces by
air, land, or sea, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force provides a broad
spectrum of response options when the nation's interests are
threatened. Coordinating a balanced team of ground, air, and logistics
assets under a central command, these self-sustained, combined-arms
forces conduct the full range of operations. Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces can be tailored in size and capability to meet the needs of
each mission.
[39] In GAO's May 2011 report, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-316], DOD identified over $13
billion in potential costs to the United States associated with the
realignment of Marines.
[40] The area cost factor is used by planners to adjust average
historical facility costs to a specific project location, taking into
consideration the costs of construction material, labor, and
equipment, along with factors such as weather, climate, seismic
conditions, mobilization, overhead and profit, labor availability, and
labor productivity for each area.
[41] Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief
Financial Officer, Overview - FY 2013 Defense Budget (February 2012).
[42] GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[43] See Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide:
Supplement to OMB Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition
of Capital Assets, appendix 8 (V 3.0, July 2012).
[44] For this analysis, we focused only on the comprehensive
characteristic. The cost estimate under review is a preliminary rough
order of magnitude estimate. Since the Marine Corps and DOD do not
consider this a "budget-quality" estimate and had intended to use it
for bilateral negotiations and assessment of alternatives instead of
as the basis of budget requests, we determined that it was not
necessary to perform a more in-depth review at this time.
[45] Under a 2009 agreement implementing the 2006 Roadmap, the
Government of Japan had agreed to provide up to $2.8 billion in fiscal
year 2008 dollars in direct cash contributions to support the Guam
relocation, subject to certain U.S. funding. See Agreement Concerning
the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force
Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, art.
I, ¶ 1, Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State Dep't No. 09-89. In its April 2012
statement, the Security Consultative Committee reaffirmed that Japan's
financial commitment would be these direct cash contributions.
According to DOD officials, the contributions would amount to roughly
$3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars.
[46] See Commander Navy Installations Command, Navy Housing
Eligibility, Assignment, and Termination Criteria, Instruction 5009.5,
para. 4 (May 13, 2008).
[47] However, Joint Region Marianas has made a determination that
adequate housing in sufficient quantity to accommodate civilian
employees is not available from the private sector on Guam. See Joint
Region Marianas, Region Family Housing, Eligibility, Assignment and
Governance, Instruction 11101.2, para. 7.b (Sept. 30, 2009).
[48] See GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Planning Challenges Could
Increase Risks for DOD in Providing Utility Services When Needed to
Support the Military Buildup on Guam, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-653] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2009).
[49] See Departments of the Navy and Army, Record of Decision for Guam
and Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation
(September 2010).
[50] The Office of Economic Adjustment is DOD's primary source for
assisting communities that are adversely affected by defense program
changes, including base closures or realignments, base expansions, and
contract or program cancellations. This office manages the Defense
Economic Adjustment Program, and coordinates the involvement of other
federal agencies to assist affected communities.
[51] According to Marine Corps and State Department officials, as of
March 2013, there is no time frame for the completion of negotiations
between the United States and Australia.
[52] Marine Corps officials told us that these preliminary studies
will be complete in December 2013 and will inform future environmental
analyses.
[53] An Amphibious Ready Group can consist of approximately 5,000
personnel and include Amphibious Assault Ships, Amphibious Transport
Docks, Dock Landing Ships, AV-8B Harrier II jets, CH-53D/E Sea
Stallion Helicopters, CH-46D/E Sea Knight helicopters and AH-1W Super
Cobra helicopters.
[54] Amphibious assault ships are the second largest ships in the
fleet at 40,000 tons. They form the centerpiece of Amphibious Ready
Groups and each can carry as many as 30 helicopters and 6 fixed-wing
Harrier jump jets.
[55] Estimate for LHA-6 amphibious assault ship over the 2013-2042
period. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy's
Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2012).
[56] The Economic Adjustment Committee is chaired by the Secretary of
Defense or his or her designee, and is made up of representatives from
22 federal agencies. The committee is to develop procedures for
ensuring, among other things, that communities that are substantially
and seriously affected by certain DOD actions are notified of
available federal economic adjustment programs. The committee is also
to advise, assist, and support the Defense Economic Adjustment
Program, which assures coordinated interagency and intergovernmental
adjustment assistance concerning defense impact problems and serves as
a clearinghouse to exchange information among federal, state,
regional, metropolitan, and community officials involved in the
resolution of community economic adjustment problems, among other
functions. See Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 15,
1992), amended by Exec. Order No. 13, 286, § 33, 68 Fed. Reg. 10, 619,
10,625 (Feb. 28, 2003) and Exec. Order No. 13,378, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,413
(May 12, 2005), reprinted as amended in 10 U.S.C. § 2391 note.
[57] See Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 301, 4301.
[58] The restriction on use of funds for realignment, noted
previously, includes a restriction on DOD grants, cooperative
agreements, transfer of funds to another federal agency, or supplement
of funds available in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 under federal programs
administered by agencies other than DOD. If the Secretary of Defense
determines that one of these actions will result in the development of
public infrastructure on Guam, he may not carry out the grant,
transfer, cooperative agreement, or supplemental funding, unless it is
specifically authorized by law. See § 2832(b). Office of Economic
Adjustment officials stated that they need specific authorization to
spend funds for the public infrastructure and socioeconomic projects
on Guam.
[59] Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide:
Supplement to OMB Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition
of Capital Assets, App. 8 (V 3.0, July 2012). The information in the
appendix on cost estimating is based in part on GAO guidance.
[60] The 2009 Agreement provided that the relocation of Marines from
Okinawa to Guam would be dependent on "tangible progress" towards the
completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility by Japan as stipulated
in the Roadmap. See Agreement Concerning the Implementation of the
Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their
Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, art. 3, Feb. 17, 2009,
Temp. State Dep't No. 09-89; see also Roadmap, § 1(d). Furthermore,
the Roadmap provided that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary
Force Marines and dependents needed to relocate to Guam prior to the
commencement of Okinawa Consolidation. See Roadmap, § 1(d).
[61] Subsequent to the completion of the audit work on this report, in
April 2013, DOD announced the completion and public release of the
bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan for forces remaining on Okinawa.
DOD officials are in the process of updating planning documents to
reflect this plan.
[62] See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832(a)(2) and Pub. L. No. 112-81, §
2207(a)(2). Section 2832(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 superseded and repealed section 2207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The master
plans called for by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 would be for the construction of facilities and
infrastructure to execute the Marine Corps distributed lay-down on
Guam and Hawaii, including a detailed description of costs and the
schedule for such construction. See § 2832(a)(2). See appendix III
[63] GAO,Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness
of Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master
Planning Effort for the Military Build-Up on Guam, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1005] (Sept. 17, 2008).
[64] Department of Defense, Integrated Master Plan and Integrated
Master Schedule Preparation and Use Guide, ver. 0.9 (Oct. 21, 2005).
[65] See Department of Defense, Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01:
Installation Master Planning (May 15, 2012).
[66] According to its Japan Engineering District, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers is responsible for the design, engineering, and
construction oversight of all projects in Japan, including military
construction projects built by the United States. In mainland Japan
and Okinawa, about 80 percent of construction projects are funded and
built by the government of Japan.
[67] According to DOD officials, the Japanese fund construction
projects on a year-by-year basis, and not the typical 5-year basis
that DOD uses to fund its projects.
[68] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C., Feb. 3,
2004).
[69] According to Marine Corps officials, the service life of
buildings before the government of Japan will replace them is
dependent both on the type of building and the type of construction.
[70] The U.S. dollar figures are based on the January 2013 foreign
exchange rate of 89.86 to indicate an approximate value.
[71] These officials explained that they used the Condition Assessment
Matrix to assess housing conditions in Okinawa. Housing units that
score below 3.75 are deemed inadequate.
[72] Marine Corps officials stated that planned U.S. government
sustainment funding for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma for fiscal
years 2013-2015 is $36 million, while the planned government of Japan
sustainment funding during the same time frame is $28 million.
However, funding requirements for fiscal year 2016 and beyond have yet
to be determined.
[73] See Department of Defense Instruction 4165.70, Real Property
Management, para. 6.1 (Apr. 6, 2005).
[74] See Department of Defense Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01,
Installation Master Planning, para. 2-11.1.
[75] See id., para. 3-2.4.
[76] See Department of Defense Manual 4165.63-M, DOD Housing
Management, encl. 3, para. 2.a (Oct. 28, 2010).
[77] See id., paras. 1.a, 1.f.
[78] The data presented here are not reflected, as of January 2013, in
the enterprise Military Housing Database used by Joint Region Marianas
officials to manage their housing operations. These officials are in
the process of updating this database. According to the database,
there are 1,227 total units recorded on Guam; 739 are occupied, 270
vacant, and 218 inactive, as of January 2013.
[79] Joint Region Marianas identified vacant units as those that are
suitable for occupancy but not occupied and inactive units as those
that are not suitable for occupancy and will not be used for
habitation.
[80] See Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis
for Decisionmaking, encl. 3, para. E3.3, E3.3.2 (Nov. 7, 1995).
[81] Pub. L. No. 112-239 (2013).
[82] Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011). Section 2832 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 repealed section 2207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. See Pub. L.
No. 112-239, § 2832(e) (2013).
[End of section]
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