He consequently sent out urgent
appeals for a relieving force. The regional British Commander-in-Chief
Sir John Nixon
- for whom much of the blame for Townshend's situation could be apportioned -
responded promptly.

Having learnt from Townshend
that his force had no more than two months of food supplies available to them at
Kut, he assembled a relief force under General Aylmer, boosted by the arrival of
three new Indian infantry divisions. These were despatched post haste to
the British forward base at Ali Gharbi, some 200km upriver from Nixon's Basra
HQ.

Aylmer found progress however
difficult to achieve, with the British force suffering - as ever - from
shortages of available transport, river and road. Nevertheless he set off
with 19,000 troops, 46 guns, three monitors and two aircraft on 4 January 1916.

Advancing up the River Tigris
Aylmer quickly found his way blocked at Sheikh Sa'ad, a bare 15km upriver from
Ali Gharbi (32km downstream from Kut). Turkish commander Nur-Ur-Din had
effectively blocked Aylmer's path by placing approximately 22,500 troops and 72
guns on both banks of the Tigris.

Consequently
Aylmer's initial attack on 6 January - directed against both banks - proved a
rapid failure, with heavy British losses.

A repeat of the attack the
following, once the bulk of Aylmer's force had arrived, similarly failed, with a
British advance along the east bank outflanked by a counter-attack authorised by
Nur-Ud-Din.

Repeating the attack yet again
on the night of 8/9 January Aylmer was surprised to discover the Turkish
trenches unoccupied; the Turkish forces had withdrawn overnight for reasons
unknown. Since Nur-Ud-Din could not himself justify his decision to
retreat he was summarily dismissed and replaced by
Khalil Pasha.

Exhausted and dispirited, the
British force had suffered around 4,000 casualties during the engagement for no
significant gain. The operation to relieve Townshend at Kut had not been
notably advanced.

Click here to view a map charting operations in Mesopotamia through to 1917.