2. To implement scientific, technical and cultural ties between the two countries
in accordance with the Constitution and the applicable laws and regulations
which are in force in each country, with necessary observance of the principles
of respecting sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality.

3. To encourage the exchanges of groups of specialists in the field of industry, agriculture, construction, trade, etc.

4. To encourage visits by scientists, persons active in higher education
and the educational system, and public health for the purpose of conducting
joint studies, exchanging experience, holding lectures, and learning about
the achievements of both countries; as well as to encourage exchanges of students
and graduate students to attend higher educational institutions.

5. To encourage visits by scientists and experts to international scientific conferences, congresses, symposia, and exhibits held by both countries, and to extend equal opportunities to all participants of such conferences, congresses, symposia, and exhibits.

6. To encourage exchanges of performers and performing troupes, to promote
trips of persons active in public and cultural affairs, repre-sentatives of
trade-union, women's, youth and other non-governmental organizations.

7. To promote the development of ties in the field of sports by organizing
trips of athletes and sports organizations; as well as to encourage tourist
trips of American citizens to the USSR and of Soviet citizens to the USA.

8. To promote the development of exchange of information between the two countries by organizing exhibits, exchanging radio and television programs and printed publications.

I assume that being guided by the aforesaid principles, both countries will regularly develop and sign agreements between our countries on exchanges in the field of science, technology, health, education, and culture, for terms of two years each.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that the aforesaid principles will come into force on receipt of your letter containing approval of these principles by your Government.

John McCloy, President's Adviser for Disarmament, who was in the Soviet
Union for bilateral disarmament talks with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Zorin, met with Chairman Khrushchev on July 26 and 27, 1961. Ambassador
Thompson reported on their discussions in telegram 323 to the Department of
State, July 28. Khrushchev "asserted Sovs not testing clandestinely and
assured McCloy would not do it in future either. Said strong pressure on him
to resume tests because many inventions and discoveries had accumulated and
designers want to test them. This pressure now stronger in view Berlin situation
and threat of war if peace treaty signed." Khrushchev "conceded no agreement
in Geneva in sight since US would not agree to troika and Sovs could
not abandon it." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume
VII, pages 110-112.

In a July 28 memorandum McGeorge Bundy recorded the President's decision
to send Arthur Dean back to Geneva about August 20 "to make one last effort"
to obtain Soviet agreement to the draft test ban treaty. Should there be no
progress within a week, "the President will then announce that in light of
Soviet folly he now has concluded that no workable treaty is possible." Bundy
also noted that the "President may, at some appropriate point, reach a decision
to authorize stand-by preparations for tests of nuclear weapons, such tests
to begin not earlier than 1962." For text, see ibid., pages 114-115.

Secretary of Defense McNamara informed McCloy in a letter of July 28 that
he was recommending that the Committee of Principals propose to the President
the initiation of preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing. It now seemed
evident, McNamara stated, "that the Soviet Union is not interested in a
treaty to discontinue nuclear weapons tests except on terms unacceptable to
the U.S." McNamara proposed a sequence of events starting with "an early
announcement that preparations for nuclear tests will start at once, but that
the decision to conduct tests will depend on the results of test ban negotiations
over the next five or six months," and culminating in the resumption of tests
if treaty negotiations were unsuccessful. McNamara stated further that, following
six months of underground testing, ten tests "might be made in and above the
atmosphere, on the surface of land or water and underwater, but designed to
produce a minimum of radioactive contamination." For text of McNamara's
memorandum, see ibid., pages 116-124.