Libya’s uncertain new government

Representatives of the two Libyan parliaments signed an agreement in Morocco in December, under UN auspices, that opened the way for the appointment in January of an interim Government of National Accord, consisting of 32 ministers led by Tripoli businessman Fayez el-Sarraj. This demonstrates the usefulness of the dialogue begun in 2014; despite tensions between geographical entities and rival groups, most of the adversaries, who only a year ago refused to meet, have made concessions, and even the most radical have not rejected conciliation. Though imperfect, the UN’s baby-steps approach, combined with the confidence-building efforts of local powers in the west of Libya, has helped contain the violence, and even reduce it.

Though western media often describe the situation in Libya as “chaos”, the adversaries are talking. In this country where apparent normality can rapidly degenerate into fighting, many favour talks and are pressing local leaders to work for peace.

Yet the December agreement, cornerstone of the reconciliation process, has major flaws: the signatories are not sufficiently representative, and the agreement seems to have been concluded — hastily and under strong pressure from the European powers — solely to allow a western intervention against militias and armed groups allied with ISIS.

For the past two years, political and military leaders from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and to a lesser extent Italy, have said repeatedly that such an intervention is inevitable. In 2014 Admiral Edouard Guillaud, then chief of the French defence staff, said: “In Libya, we should ideally mount an international operation. The problem in the south of the country is that there needs to be a government in the north.” (He was referring to a possible intervention in the south against groups that had left northern Mali after a French intervention.)

In spring 2015, after a number of boats carrying migrants from Libya had sunk in the Mediterranean, the EU launched the naval mission Operation Sophia; its second in command, French admiral Hervé Bléjean, later said: “A definitive solution will only be possible if we can get close to the networks themselves, and catch the big players, rather than the little ones who actually sail the boats. Which means that, at some point, we will have to work within Libya’s sovereign territory.” This will only be possible with the agreement of the legitimate authorities in Libya. The parliament in Tobruk, recognised by the West, has consistently refused to give its approval, unlike its rival in Tripoli.

‘Finish the job’

The November 2015 Paris attacks revived the idea of an international intervention. Though none of the French and Belgian perpetrators had been to Libya, the new war on terror announced by French president François Hollande includes it: militias in Derna (in eastern Libya) and Sirte (west-central) have sworn allegiance to ISIS. In late November, Rafale fighter-bombers made reconnaissance flights over Sirte, which is held by armed groups that regularly carry out raids, particularly on oil facilities.

Prime minister Manuel Valls said in December that “Libya is unquestionably the most important issue of the months ahead,” and that “We will certainly have to fight Daesh [ISIS]in Libya in the near future.” Le Figaro, quoting French defence ministry sources, said: “To eradicate the ‘cancer of Daesh and its secondary growths in Libya’, a military operation is considered indispensable within the next six months, or even before the spring.”

Strategy experts and systematic advocates of military intervention — those who in 2011 predicted the rapid fall of the Gaddafi regime and emergence of democracy — are now using the media to explain the need for a second expedition. Five years after the NATO operation, this is supposed to “finish the job”, language reminiscent of the US neoconservative rhetoric used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Some even claim it will be necessary to place the country under supervision in order to install a proper government.

To comply with the outward forms of international law, this intervention must be officially requested by recognised institutions. So the formation of a national unity government, legitimate in the eyes of the UN Security Council, was a prerequisite for any appeal for help. The UN secretary general’s new special representative, the German diplomat Martin Kobler, tackled this as soon as he was nominated in November. Before the two parliaments reached a consensus in December, he told Al-Jazeera, “It is now time for a rapid endorsement of the Libyan Political Agreement; the train has left the station,” implying this was a take-it-or-leave it proposal. The message was addressed to the parliaments, which both insisted they would have to ratify the composition of any national unity government.

The determination of the EU and UN to achieve a national unity government at any price was evident at the International Conference on Libya in Rome, jointly chaired by the Italian foreign minister and US secretary of state. Its final communiqué conferred the status of “sole legitimate government of Libya” on the national unity government, even before it was appointed.

Undue haste

Experts on Libya expressed reservations, and thinktanks such as the International Crisis Group (headed by former UN under-secretary general for peacekeeping operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno) warned against hurrying through an agreement not validated by the greatest possible number of Libyan stakeholders (1). Kobler disregarded this and did everything to achieve one, regardless of cost; he met the commander in chief of the Libyan national army, General Khalifa Haftar, based in Cyrenaica and opposed to the Tripoli government, and promised that he would retain his position.

At the request of the sponsors of the International Conference, the December agreement provides that the future government will have the right to ask the UN, the international community and competent regional organisations for any necessary assistance on security issues. UN Security Council resolution 2259, proposed by the UK, confirmed this, saying that “the situation in Libya constitutes a threat to international peace and security”. Article 12 urges member states “to swiftly assist the Government of National Accord in responding to threats to Libyan security and to actively support the new government in defeating ISIL [ISIS], groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar al-Sharia, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya, upon its request.”

On paper, the demands of the western powers have been satisfied, and the legal basis for a new intervention is in place. In practice, this agreement risks creating new fault lines and exacerbating the violence. The Tobruk parliament, which was represented by 75 members out of 188 at the signing of the peace agreement in December, rejected (by 89 votes to 15) the national unity government proposed by the presidential council. From Cyrenaica, General Haftar declared that he would recognise the national unity government, but seems unlikely to stop fighting his political adversaries in Tripoli. Ibrahim Jadhran, another eastern strongman in charge of guarding Libya’s oil facilities (his powerful militias face those of ISIS in the gulf of Sirte), supports the peace agreement, but accuses Haftar and his embryonic national army of playing into ISIS’s hands by not making the fight against it their first priority.

The greatest problems are in the west of the country. Only 26 out of 136 members of the former General National Congress of Tripoli attended the signing of the Morocco agreement, so the overall number of parliamentarians supporting the national unity government is fewer than 75. Some who oppose it, such as Abdelkader al-Huweili, see it as a “foreign conspiracy against Libya”. Though some militias in Zintan, Misrata and Zawiya say they will back the new government, the four most powerful militias in Tripoli say they will oppose it. The Misrata militias affiliated to Salah Badi’s Jabhat al-Sumud (Steadfastness Front) have declared themselves hostile. The grand mufti of Libya, Sadik al-Ghariani, has said that this agreement imposed by foreign powers does not conform to Islamic principles. The positions of influential figures in Misrata, including Abdulrahman Suweihli, who oppose the text in its current form, will depend on Kobler’s ability to respond to their demands. They want greater weight given to the former General National Congress, elected in 2012, to balance the Tobruk parliament, which under the terms of the agreement must continue to be the principal legislative body. A majority of Tripoli parliamentarians oppose Haftar’s appointment as army commander in chief.

The UN has pushed through an agreement that is unsatisfactory to many influential Libyan stakeholders, and which may lead to a new stalemate. To avoid this, the UN should be more flexible, pursuing negotiations with the parties that do like the arrangement, and starting a security dialogue with local political and military figures, and militia leaders. Otherwise, there could be a repeat of 2014, when the international community recognised the Tobruk parliament as sole representative of the Libyan people, though it controlled at most a third of the country.

Though it was quickly appointed, the national unity government may not find it easy to establish itself in Tripoli, let alone remain there. Even if it can, it should avoid calling for foreign intervention. If militias in Misrata and eastern Libya work together, they should be able to beat those affiliated to ISIS in Sirte. Any foreign interference, apart from undermining the government’s credibility and seriously impeding efforts to rebuild the nation and state, would feed ISIS propaganda: the West would be bombing Arabs again. This would resonate with a population largely hostile to foreign intervention, and would help ISIS recruit. But it is unlikely that western political and military leaders will take this into account. Many believe the next war in Libya is only weeks away.

Patrick Haimzadeh

Diplomat at the French embassy in Tripoli from 2001 to 2004. He is the author of Au cœur de la Libye de Kadhafi, (Inside Gaddafi’s Libya), Jean-Claude Lattès, Paris, 2011

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Translated by Charles Goulden

Patrick Haimzadeh was a diplomat at the French embassy in Tripoli, 2001-4, and is the author of Au Coeur de la Libye de Kadhafi (Inside Gaddafi’s Libya), Jean-Claude Lattès, Paris, 2011.