He argued that when the UK Government assessed whether a non-state actor presented an imminent threat they drew on the five considerations (first outlined by Sir Daniel Bethlehem in 2012):

“The nature and immediacy of the threat;

The probability of an attack;

Whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity;

The likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence of mitigating action; and

The likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defence that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss or damage”.

This is clearly more expansive than the traditional definition and could potentially lessen the burden of proof needed before the use of force against an individual. This is especially true given the assertion made by Bethlehem, and repeated by Wright, that:

“…the absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of the right of self-defence, provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent”

This suggests that the government is accepting a wider margin for error than it has done in the past, by lowering the level of detail that must be known before conducting a strike. However, it is unclear how much this burden of proof has been lessened by. James A. Green maintains that the definition of imminence is too vague, and “tells us very little unless it is clear what is meant by imminence”. Monica Hakimi also notes that “the devil is in the detail”; she argues that without knowledge of how the factors Sir Daniel outlines “relate to one another, or how much weight any particular one carries” we cannot know how they apply.

Reducing the level of evidence may increase the risk that people followed because of mistaken identities or flawed intelligence could be killed sooner.

It has become devastatingly obvious in recent weeks how hard it is to find and prove imminent threats to the UK. The attacks on London and Manchester were planned by a loose network of individuals whose role inspiring, enabling attacks in the UK remains unclear. However, if specific evidence of an attack is no longer needed, it is more likely that individuals who demonstrate patterns of suspicious behaviour (such as meeting with members of militant groups) but do not necessarily represent a genuine threat to the UK could end up being targeted on the basis of incomplete evidence. Reducing the level of evidence may also increase the risk that people followed because of mistaken identities or flawed intelligence could be killed sooner.

It is important to note that Wright specifically noted in his speech that the UK position “is a very long way from supporting any notion of a doctrine of pre-emptive strikes against threats that are more remote.” However, without a better understanding of how the rules are applied it’s hard to know where the line is drawn and how these dangers are avoided.

This is not an abstract concern; the UK has moved closer to the United States position of targeted killing – which has shown the dangers of an expansive policy. Both countries have now officially adopted the same legal definition of imminence. As Wright noted in his speech, US officials have directly quoted Sir Daniel’s criteria as their own guiding principles. In the wake of this confirmation, legal charity Reprieve argued the UK legal basis “copies [the] failed US drone programme”.

It has been well publicised that the US has expanded key legal definitions to pursue an expansive targeted killing policy against al-Qaeda and associated forces. While the Government claimed to be targeting only high value targets (HVT), it became clear that the US was targeting a far wider pool of individuals than just a small number of leaders directly planning attacks on the US. For example, the US has engaged in “signature strikes” against all military aged males “on battlefields around the world” and has killed a number of individuals whose threat to the US remains unclear (such as 16-year-old Abdulrahman Anwar al-Awlaki, the son of Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemeni imam and supporter of al-Qaeda).

There must be greater transparency over how this definition is used to ensure that we do not lower burden of proof needed before the use of lethal force too much, leaving individuals in other parts of the world to pay the ultimate price for our mistakes.

Abigail Watson is a research officer at the Remote Control Project, a UK-based policy unit analysing the rise of remote warfare in the West’s counterterrorism strategy. Abigail is also a freelance writer at Future Foreign Policy, writing on issues such as the new challenges to international humanitarian law and Britain’s foreign, security and defence policy. Abigail holds an MA (with Distinction) in Contemporary European Studies, with a trans-Atlantic track, from the University of Bath and a BA in Politics from the University of York.

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The Remote Control project is a project of the Network for Social Change hosted by Oxford Research Group. We examine and challenge changes in military engagement, in particular the use of drones, special operations forces, private military and security companies (PMSCs) and cyber and intelligence activities.

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