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Wednesday, January 26, 2011

Quaeritur: Please Explain the Previous Post

Quaeritur: Please Explain the Previous Post

Quaeritur: May I ask good sir that you explain the previous post for us slow people?

Respondeo: Let's see if I can rework Garrigou's reasoning syllogistically. I will structure each of his three criticisms (as numbered in the previous post) as a reductio ad absurdum, using the following format:

P1: Either a or b.

P2: If b, then c.

P3: If c, then d.

P4: But d is false.

Conc.: Therefore, b is false and a is true.

FIRST ARGUMENT:

Premise 1: Either (a) God is the primary cause of our free actions (Thomistic position), or (b) he is not the primary cause of our free actions (Molinist Position).

Premise 2: If (b) God is not the primary cause of our free actions, then (c) these actions are caused independently of him.

Premise 3: If (c) these free actions are caused independently of him, then (d) God is not the universal primary cause of all things.

Premise 4: But God is the universal primary cause of all things (d is false).

Conclusion: Therefore, God is the universal primary cause of our free actions (b is false; a is true).

Premise 1: God knows future free choices infallibly either (a) because He infallibly decrees them from all eternity (Thomistic position), or (b) because, without decreeing them, He can foresee (via Molina's so-called scientia media) what will happen given any circumstance (Molinist position).

Premise 2: If (b) because, without decreeing them, He can predict what will happen given any circumstance, then (c) human acts are infallibly determined by their circumstances; that is, given a certain set of circumstances, a human being can only act in one determined way (is not free to make different choices).

Premise 3: If (c) human acts are infallibly determined by their circumstances; that is, given a certain set of circumstances, a human being can only act in one determined way (is not free to make different choices), then (d) there is no freedom of the will, but rather a circumstantial type of fatalism (or "determinism of the circumstances").

Premise 4: But there is freedom of the will (d is false).

Conclusion: Therefore, God knows future free choices infallibly because He infallibly decrees them from all eternity (a is true; b is false).