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Proxy access grants shareholders meeting certain ownership requirements the right to nominate directors for election to the board without going through a typical proxy contest. In August 2010 the SEC approved a rule granting proxy access for shareholders meeting specific ownership requirements. The rule was challenged by US Chamber of Commerce and overturned in July 2011. Shortly after the rule was overturned, rules governing shareholder proposal process were amended so that shareholders could put forward proposals on proxy access at individual companies. Proxy access did not garner significant attention during the first two proxy seasons after the rule was amended. However in the 2015 proxy season, over 100 companies received proxy access proposals. This case chronicles the debate on proxy access from the perspective of institutional investors, shareholders, and US company's board of directors and management.

Describes the situation facing the head of a rapidly growing industry-focused group within a consulting company. Highlights the dilemmas of being a "producing manager" (i.e., a professional who has both individual production as well as management responsibilities). Issues raised include: delegation, developing subordinates, developing an agenda, and building an organization.

On January 9, 2015, Nelson Peltz of Trian Fund Management launched a proxy fight for four out of the twelve seats on the DuPont board. The fund had previously published a public letter addressed to shareholders outlining its proposal to break the company into three areas: agriculture and nutrition, industrial materials, and performance chemicals and criticizing the company for its poor performance. CEO and Chairman Ellen Kullman and her board were left with the difficult decision. Should they allow four of Trian's nominees onto their board, knowing that it would mean replacing four highly experienced and valuable directors or should they go face to face with Peltz in a very public proxy fight?