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Why the Pentagon Should Care about Scotland’s Referendum

As Scottish voters contemplate whether to withdraw from their
307-year-long union with the rest of the United Kingdom on Sept.
18, U.S. policymakers have their own problem to ponder: What will
be the ramifications and potential costs of Scottish independence
for U.S. foreign and security policy?

To citizens of a country that celebrates its independence from
Britain every July 4, there’s nothing threatening about Scottish
independence. But policymakers are worried. And they should be.
Scottish independence places the United States at risk of losing
its key partner in global affairs, leaving the foreign policy and
military capability of the remainder of the United Kingdom (let’s
call it: the “RUK”) in chaos in the short-term and diminished in
the long-term. In addition, the loss of Scotland as a maintenance
port for America’s nuclear submarines poses both logistical and
strategic issues for Washington.

The United Kingdom has played a strong and supportive role in
U.S. foreign policy since World War II. During the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, British soldiers constituted the
second-largest contingent of troops, comprising over 18,000 of the 23,000 non-U.S. troops involved
in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The United States and United
Kingdom also have strong military and intelligence cooperation
— particularly on issues relating to terrorism — and
share between them the Trident nuclear submarine arsenal. Britain
also continues to be one of the largest non-U.S. military spenders
within NATO, contributing around 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP each year, a level
matched only by France, Greece, and Estonia.

Scottish independence
could be a disaster for U.S. foreign policy from Syria to the
Arctic Circle.

If the Scots secede, the United Kingdom would lose at
least 8 percent of its population and tax base, as well as the
majority of Britain’s current oil and natural gas revenue, valued
at between $4.7-9.5 billion each year. Although less
likely, the possibility that an independent Scotland will repudiate
its share of Britain’s debt also risks leaving the RUK with a
higher debt-to-GDP ratio than at present, increasing borrowing
costs. Finally, the transaction costs of the independence process
would also impose significant strains on the RUK’s budget, as
government agencies are reorganized, and new procedures
implemented.

As a result, Scottish independence would severely impact the
capabilities of the RUK to act as a partner on foreign and defense
issues. the RUK is expected to retain a U.N. Security Council seat
(and veto) in the event of independence, but the country would be
smaller, poorer, and less able to commit to joint ventures with the
United States.

But the effects on Scottish independence for U.S. security
policy aren’t only long term. A “yes” vote in the referendum will
immediately cause chaos within the RUK’s defense and foreign policy
apparatus. There are no official figures on how many of Britain’s
civil servants are Scots, but Scots have typically enjoyed strong representation in the diplomatic and
intelligence services — including Dame Mariot Leslie,
recently the U.K. ambassador to NATO (now retired), and Paul
Johnston, current ambassador to Sweden. Of course, Britain’s two
most recent prime ministers, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair, were
Scots.With no official position by the U.K.
government on whether civil servants would retain their British
citizenship or jobs, there would be years of turmoil.

Similarly, the many Scottish-born members of the armed forces
(roughlyone in 10 service members) would be in limbo.
Scottish nationalists say these soldiers would be eligible to
enlist in the new Scottish Defense Force, but their future with RUK
forces would be unclear. Non-Scottish service members currently
stationed in Scottish regiments and bases would need to be
reassigned elsewhere. During this transition period, the United
States will need to fill any gaps in military- and
intelligence-sharingthat result from the loss of
this cooperation. For example, the National Security Agency
funds various programs with its British
counterpart, the Global Communications Headquarters; the two
agencies operate a joint base in Cyprus. Such programs would be
impacted by a nebulous transition process.

Transition problems extend to bases and weapons, too. In the
event of a yes vote, negotiations would commence between the
government in London and the new government in Edinburgh on how to
split the existing British military and diplomatic assets.
Unsurprisingly, the two sides have widely varying opinions on how
this divorce would play out. The Scottish nationalists’ white paper on independence asserts that any
independent Scottish state would be entitled to a share of British
embassy facilities and military assets proportional to their
population. The current U.K. government, on the other hand,
insists that any division of assets will be
based on the success of negotiations on the currency and national
debt. Either way, the rebuilding of the RUK’s armed forces to an
acceptable level of readiness will cost billions of dollars,
reducing amounts available for contributions to NATO, and to any
joint security operations in Syria, Ukraine, or wherever the next
crisis pops up.

But the biggest security issue with an independent Scotland by
far comes down to nuclear submarines. The yes campaign has pledged that the future Scotland will be nuclear-free.
As of right now, Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, at Faslane,
Scotland, hosts Britain’s nuclear submarines. The United Kingdom
currently has four Vanguard-class submarines, equipped with Trident
II D-5 ballistic nuclear missiles. The missiles themselves are
leased from a joint U.S.-U.K. pool, and are identical to those
carried on U.S. Ohio-class submarines. All four subs are based at
Clyde, with one submarine always on patrol. They would have to be
relocated.

U.S. nuclear submarines are based primarily in the states of
Georgia and Washington, but Faslane is strategically important.
It’s close to North Sea patrolling areas and was a key deployment
area for submarines during the Cold War. It remains a frequent
maintenance area and port of call for U.S. submarines. There are no
obvious alternative sites for the relocation of Trident: the main
options (Barrow-in-Furness, Milford Haven, and Plymouth) all have
flaws, with waterways potentially too shallow for submarines, and
locations dangerously close to population centers. It’s possible
that British submarines could be relocated to Kings Bay, Georgia,
alongside America’s Trident submarines. In either case, Scottish
independence will again result in short-term chaos, followed by the
long-term loss of a useful, difficult-to-replace forward strategic
base.

Neither Scotland, nor the RUK, nor both together would make for
the kind of dependable and trustworthy partner Washington has grown
accustomed to in London. The white paper on independence proposes a
substantially smaller Scottish Defense Force, comparable to those
of the Nordic countries, focused on minimal conventional defense,
with no real force projection ability.

The nationalists also indicate that they want to move away from
the Anglo-American alliance to better integrate with the
EU’sCommon Foreign and Security Policy, which aims to
consolidate the military and foreign-policy capacities of European
Union states. As many observers have pointed out, the white paper
does not make any attempt to assess the costs or time required to
set up independent Scottish diplomatic or intelligence operations
— effectively from scratch. As a result, an independent
Scottish state, although a probable member of NATO, would have
little to contribute to U.S. foreign-policy or military
initiatives. In particular, an independent Scotland is unlikely to
commit military forces or technical support to ventures such as the
current U.S. action in Iraq.

While the impending war against the Islamic State may crowd out
the headlines and the fevered discussions in Washington, U.S.
policymakers are clearly worried about the possibility of a
Scottish yes vote. Although President Obama’s public remarks on the topic in June stressed
that the decision is up to Scottish voters, he also emphasized that
the United States has a “deep interest in making sure that one of
the closest allies that we will ever have remains strong, robust,
united, and an effective partner.” In August, the U.S. Congress
tabled a resolution expressing strong support for continued union,
and cited in particular the fact that “military cooperation between
the U.S. and U.K. is essential to U.S. national security.” Recent polls indicate a small lead for the no
campaign in the Scottish referendum, but this lead has narrowed in
recent weeks, with several polls showing a lead of around 5
percent, and one showing the race too close to call. As the day of
decision nears, policymakers in Washington are watching anxiously
— with good reason.