01475cam a22002417 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100002200069245007600091260006600167490004100233500001400274520056300288530006100851538007200912538003600984700002201020710004201042830007601084856003701160856003601197w4372NBER20150303182325.0150303s1993 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aShleifer, Andrei.10aCorruptionh[electronic resource] /cAndrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1993.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w4372 aMay 1993.3 aThis paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and the political process are a very important determinant of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments which do not control their agencies would lead to ultra-high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web.1 aVishny, Robert W.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w4372.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w437241uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4372