[235] Following the
decision to transfer Saturn to NASA, Richard Horner and Herbert York
worked out an agreement for NASA to exercise technical guidance of
the project until the formal transfer took place. The agreement
provided for a Saturn committee, consisting of NASA and DoD members
with a NASA chairman, to provide "advice and assistance" in technical
matters. The first and most pressing technical decision was on the
upper stages, and Horner requested Silverstein to establish a Saturn
Vehicle Team "to prepare recommendations for the guidance of the
development and, specifically, for selection of upper stage
configurations." Horner made his request on 17 November and wanted
the recommendations within thirty days. Silverstein lost no time In
getting his team organized.22 It consisted of:

Abe Silverstein, Chairman

NASA

Col. Norman C. Appold

USAF

Abraham Hyatt

NASA

Thomas C. Muse

DDR&E

G. P. Sutton

ARPA

Wernher von Braun

ABMA

Eldon W. Hall, Secretary

NASA

A brief review of the member's attitudes
towards hydrogen is in order.

Silverstein's strong advocacy of hydrogen as a
high-energy fuel for aircraft and rockets was well known. Research on
hydrogen as a rocket fuel at the NACA Lewis laboratory had been under
his direction since 1950. He had initiated a large program on
hydrogen for high-altitude aircraft in 1955 and strongly supported
more work on hydrogen for rockets. He was familiar with Hall's Saturn
studies showing the advantages of using hydrogen-oxygen in the upper
stages and was convinced this was the way to go.

Colonel Appold had been the Air Force's
manager of the Suntan project using hydrogen for a high-altitude
aircraft. In the spring of 1958, he had supported proposals that led
later to the initiation of Pratt & Whitney's development of a
hydrogen-oxygen rocket engine for Centaur. A large amount of money
had been spent on Suntan; and after its cancellation, Appold remained
interested in obtaining tangible returns on that investment in
technology and facilities. As the only Air Force member of the team,
however, Appold had other concerns. The Air Force believed that the
Glenn L. Martin Company had its hands full with the Titan ICBM
program and took a very dim view of ABMA vehicle proposals using
modified Titans, which could interfere with Martin's [236] work on
ICBMS.23 On the other hand, the Air Force was mildly interested
in a two stage Saturn as a possible launch vehicle for an advanced
Dynasoar-an application that did not need high-energy propellants.
Appold, therefore, represented somewhat conflicting views within the
Air Force.

Abe Hyatt came from Russia as a small boy,
served in the marines during World War II, and rose to chief
scientist of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics before joining NASA as
a flight vehicle and propulsion expert in 1958. He headed launch
vehicle and propulsion at NASA headquarters and reported to
Silverstein; Eldon Hall worked for him. The three were in agreement
on the need to use hydrogen in the upper stages of Saturn from the
outset.

Thomas C. Muse worked eleven years as an
aeronautical engineer at NACA's Langley laboratory and Douglas
Aircraft before joining the Secretary of Defense's staff as an
aeronautics expert in 1950. He was neutral with respect to
high-energy fuel preferences but recognized their
value.24

George P. Sutton, chief scientist of ARPA, was
the author of the standard rocket propulsion textbook widely used in
the United States since it first appeared in 1949. He came to ARPA
from Rocketdyne and, like Muse, was neutral on the subject ofliquid
hydrogen. He was, however, a strong advocate for ARPA
interests.

At the time the Saturn Vehicle Team was
organized, Wernher von Braun was cold to the idea of using liquid
hydrogen. While it is true that his organization proposed Saturn
configurations using liquid hydrogen, the early versions would use
hydrogen only in the third stage; this was the Centaur and it was
being developed by someone else. Of more immediate concern to von
Braun was getting confirmation of his plans for the first stage from
his new boss, NASA, and settling the long-delayed decision on the
second stage. Having been convinced that a cluster of existing
engines made sense for early development of the Saturn first stage,
he was now equally convinced that a smaller cluster of the same
engines made sense for the second stage as well. He could concentrate
on building and flight-testing the first two stages, useful for
earth-orbital missions, while General Dynamics-Astronautics developed
the hydrogen-fueled Centaur as a potential third stage for Saturn.
During the Centaur development, already a year old, there would be
time to "work out the bugs" in using hydrogen before von Braun had to
face the task of adapting it to a third stage.25 H is plan was logical but flawed, as we shall
see.

Von Braun's negative attitude towards hydrogen
extended far into his background. About 1937, he had observed
attempts by Walter Thiel to operate a small rocket engine with liquid
hydrogen at Kummersdorf, and the greatest impression he retained was
of the numerous line leaks and difficulties of handling liquid
hydrogen. It left him with a healthy respect for the safety and fire
hazards involved. This attitude would be helpful later in the
successful development of the Saturn V, but at the moment was a major
roadblock to his acceptance of liquid hydrogen for Saturn I's second
stage. At Fort Bliss in the 1940s, von Braun's group had considered a
variety of propellants for possible use in the V-2 for a
high-altitude sounding mission, The V-2 structure and engine were so
heavy that substituting a very low-density fuel like hydrogen would
have resulted in poor performance. Krafft Ehricke, who worked for von
Braun at Fort Bliss and later at Huntsville, recalls von Braun's
objections to low-density propellants. [237] So does Richard
Canright, who wrote a paper on the importance of exhaust velocity and
density during that period.26

Eldon Hall, the team's secretary, was the
sharp analyst who had worked closely with Silverstein since 1955 on
the application of liquid hydrogen for high-altitude aircraft and was
intimately acquainted with its problems. He had studied very light
structures. He had extensive analytical experience in both aircraft
and rocket performance. Like Silverstein, he was familiar with
liquid-hydrogen research at the Lewis laboratory and had confidence
in its practicality. Hall's earlier analyses of Saturn configurations
had convinced him that to keep vehicle mass within reasonable limits,
the upper stages should use high-energy propellants; and of all the
candidates, the combination of liquid hydrogen-oxygen was the closest
to practical application.27 He and Silverstein shared a common understanding and
view, and Hyatt-sandwiched between them at NASA-had been persuaded to
their view.

Silverstein, therefore, had three working
group members favoring his view: Appold, Hyatt, and Hall. Von Braun
was the chief opponent-the man who had to be convinced. Silverstein
knew that winning von Braun to his view was essential to his and
NASA's plans. Von Braun probably was unaware of the extent of NASA's
Saturn studies or the intensity of their views on its upper stages.
Certainly von Braun wanted to establish good working relationships
with his new organization, and he wanted to get on with the job of
building large launch vehicles. Although the stage was set for a
confrontation, nobody wanted it. Silverstein drew upon all of his
skill as chairman to guide the discussions, and he counted on Hyatt
and Hall to be strong advocates for his own views. The three met
during the course of the team's work to discuss how best to persuade
von Braun to their view.28

The vehicle team met for the first time on
Friday, 27 November. It met four more times and concluded its work on
15 December, with oral and written reports to the NASA
administrator.29

The first meeting was devoted entirely to
briefings: C. Beyer on management aspects of Saturn, E. M. Cortright
on NASA missions for Saturn, R. Smith on the Dynasoar program,
Wernher von Braun and H. H. Koelle on the technical aspects of the
ABMA Saturn systems study, F. L. Williams on the development and
funding of the same study, and J. C. Goodwyn on ARPA's evaluation of
the study. Upper stages were discussed the next day. Von Braun
stressed the importance of an immediate decision and the need to use
second stages of 5.6 meters in diameter to lessen bending loads. ABMA
was now opposed to using the 3-meter-diameter Titan I as the Saturn
second stage, but still favored a modified Titan of larger diameter
using RP-oxygen engines.

By the second meeting, the team had agreed on
a report outline and assignments of members to write the first five
sections, two of which were critical. One of these, about possible
Saturn configurations and their performance, was assigned to Koelle
of ABMA and Hall and Schwenk of NASA headquarters. The other, on
evaluation of Saturn configurations, was assigned to Goodwyn of ARPA,
Williams of ABMA, and Hall of NASA. Conclusions and recommendations
remained the responsibility of the entire team. The subgroups
assigned to prepare the five sections began their work while also
participating in meetings of the vehicle team as a whole.

[238] By 3 December a
consensus had emerged on one point: to recommend the Saturn first
stage under development at ABMA. Attention then shifted to upper
stage configurations. A short pitch for solids got little support;
von Braun was strongly opposed, because that would combine the
handling difficulties of both liquids and solids. Muse argued against
a program involving many vehicle changes in favor of going directly
to the final desired configuration. Hall noted in the minutes that
hydrogen's energy was needed in the upper stages for most
missions-although not for Dynasoar-so hydrogen problems had to be
faced and solved. Since Dynasoar had an alternative launch vehicle
under study, why not go directly to a hydrogen upper stage for
Saturn? The problem was really the second stage engine. One solution
was to use a stage powered by a cluster of four Pratt & Whitney
Centaur engines uprated to a thrust of 89-111 kilonewtons (20 000-25
000 lb) each. At the meeting the next day, von Braun was still not
convinced about using hydrogen-oxygen in the second stage. He pointed
out that no brand new rocket engine had ever been developed in less
than four years and that the development of a liquid hydrogen-liquid
oxygen engine more than ten times larger than the Pratt & Whitney
engine might take even longer. For this reason, he was not willing to
abandon conventional fuels. He also wanted to determine in greater
detail the problems with hydrogen-oxygen.

Von Braun expressed concern over aerodynamic
heating of liquid hydrogen which required encapsulation of the
Centaur stage during flight through the atmosphere-a problem he felt
had not been adequately studied for a hydrogen second stage for
Saturn. Tank loading and venting problems on the launch pad, with
their attendant fire hazards, were other concerns.

By 10 December, Hall had prepared a working
draft of the report which contained a recommendation that the second
stage be powered by a cluster of four Pratt & Whitney RL-10
(hydrogen-oxygen) engines uprated to 89 kilonewtons (20 000 lb of
thrust) each. The stage diameter was 5.5 meters and length, 10.7.
There was also a recommendation for Centaur as the third stage and
initiation of development of a hydrogen-oxygen engine of 667 to 890
kilonewtons (150 000 to 200 000 lb of thrust) for later Saturn
stages.

It was inevitable that at some point during
the work of Silverstein's team and its subgroups, the ABMA and NASA
representatives would clash head on. Frank Williams, in Koelle's ABMA
group on future projects, recalled that the ABMA team was initially
so opposed to the use of hydrogen that plans were made "to confront
Silverstein with not no
but hell no!" Williams
worked hard assembling a four-hour presentation containing great
technical detail including cost, probabilliy of success, and impact
on Saturn I development schedule, and came to Washington all charged
up "to shoot Silverstein out of the saddle." Silverstein was the
first to speak and, according to Williams, gave a generalized
argument for hydrogen with no technical details: this is the
challenge for the long haul; hydrogen is the best fuel; sure it has
problems but we can solve them if we dedicate ourselves. Williams
considered it a talk along philosophical rather than technical lines
and was eager to spring up in rebuttal after von Braun introduced
him. To Williams's open-mouthed astonishment, von Braun said, in
effect: Abe has a good point. Williams never got the chance to
present his arguments. He, not Silverstein, had been "shot out of the
saddle"-by his own boss.30

Eldon Hall's group at NASA headquarters
tangled with Koelle's advanced design group at ABMA on another
occasion, which proved to be decisive. The NASA [239] headquarters
analysts were using their slide rules to calculate vehicle
performance whereas ABMA analysts used a complex program requiring
large computer runs. It was not an equal match, but the NASA
headquarters analytical group (Hall, Schwenk, and Nelson) had a great
deal of experience and judgment. They had noticed that all the Saturn
configurations showing promise had at least one upper stage using
hydrogen-oxygen. Configurations that used only "conventional" (lower
performance) propellants had total masses up to twice as great as
those using hydrogen-oxygen stages. The configuration favored by ABMA
at one point used four ICBM engines burning RP-oxygen to power the
second stage and a modified hydrogen-oxygen Centaur as the third
stage. Hall calculated that, by simply replacing the RP-oxygen second
stage with the Centaur alone, the resulting two-stage vehicle would
lift nearly as much payload to earth orbit as the three-stage ABMA
configuration. Hall so argued at one meeting and von Braun considered
it incredible. He telephoned Huntsville, where the computer was kept
busy all night. The following morning, ABMA telephoned von Braun that
Hall was right-the payload without the RP-oxygen stage was indeed
close to that with it!31 It was a powerful and convincing argument for the use
of high-energy upper stages. This, and the persuasive arguments of
Silverstein, convinced von Braun that hydrogen-oxygen for all the
upper stages of Saturn was the way to go.

The meeting of 14 December was spent on the
proposed report. Sutton questioned the payload figures and wanted to
wait for the final "official values" from ABMA, but time was running
out. He also argued unsuccessfully for considerably more study before
making specific recommendations and questioned the wisdom of omitting
a large diameter Titan I as a possbile second stage. By then,
however, the von Braun team not only opposed the modified Titan I,
because of its high bending stresses, but now strongly supported
hydrogen-oxygen in all upper stages. Oswald Lange, representing von
Braun, successfully argued that the large diameter Titan I with
RP-oxygen was a "dead end" course, and the report so indicated. On 15
December the Saturn Vehicle Team endorsed the recommendation that all
upper stages of Saturn be fueled with hydrogen and oxygen.
Silverstein, with help from Hall, quickly prepared the final report
which bears the same date. The unanimous decision for hydrogen in
Saturn's upper stages was a victory for the skillful chairman and his
quiet but sharp secretary.