Post-war Kosovo:
February 2001, a bus with Serb civilians
blown up by Kosovo Albanian extremists

State-building
or Simulation of Democracy
in Kosovo

The
presentation by Veton Surroi at the Balkans Working Group meeting in
the US Institute of Peace under the title "Three Years Later: State-Building
in Kosovo" (June 10) is a kind of disappointment which one could
hardly expect from such a renowned public figure as Surroi. The entire
presentation seems to follow quite a misleading pattern and ignores
the most crucial problems which the Kosovan society is facing at the
moment.

In fact, Surroi's
message is quite concrete but excessively simplistic -- the situation
in Kosovo is not quite good because the society cannot be stabilized
without state prerogatives (i.e., independence). Almost all of Surroi's
blame now falls on UNMIK, which is seen as being responsible for corruption,
bad management, bureaucracy and failure to let "the Kosovars"
build a stable society by themselves. Just few years ago it was Serbia
which was solely blamed for all. Surroi still sees a significant part
of responsibility in Belgrade, which is accused of supporting the parallel
structures in North Mitrovica. In fact, for Surroi the sole reason why
Kosovo's final status issue cannot be raised now, after three years,
as promised by the former Secretary Albright at Rambouillet, is not
the incapability of K/Albanian leaders to demonstrate political maturity
and basic ethnic tolerance, but the alleged obstructive policies of
UNMIK and Belgrade. Apparently K/Albanians still seek to justify themselves
as perpetual victims of others and fail to demonstrate a minimum of
self-criticism.

Listening to Surroi's
eloquent presentation, one can get the impression that Kosovo is a place
where only people like him live. In that case, all what he said would
be quite appropriate because one could hardly doubt that Surroi could
play a much more constructive role than many other K/Albanian leaders
at this moment. But the problem is that the majority of Kosovo's "political
elite" share rather unrefined visions and in reality do not leave
Mr. Steiner much room to give them more authority in running the region.
Granting more authority to predominantly ethnic Albanian Kosovan structures
while the human rights of non-Albanians (primarily Serbs and Roma) are
being so grossly violated would be a serious mistake which would once
and forever destroy all prospects of a multiethnic society. One should
not overestimate the role of the new Kosovo Parliament because non-Albanian
MP's are only a facade for non-existent multiethnicity. Was not one
of the first important decisions by the Kosovo Parliament a direct attack
on international borders and violation of UNSC Resolution 1244? Was
it not a clear message to Serbs that their interests can be so easily
disregarded?

Surroi nevertheless
lobbies for more state prerogatives, ignoring the fact that such powers
might be disastrous for the vulnerable Kosovan society for the time
being. This appears to be the weakest point in Surroi's analysis, which
might impress at first glance, but only as the personal reflection of
a sophisticated intellectual who fails to understand the predominantly
uncouth society in which he lives. Either Surroi lives in his own dream
of "a civilized and European" Kosovo or he is intentionally
trying to create a false picture of what is going on and lobbying for
a long-awaited independence. It seems that many K/Albanians do not quite
understand Surroi, either. His efforts to impose himself on the political
scene have mostly failed so far because his ideas are still too remote
for the political taste of the average Kosovo Albanian accustomed to
lusty myths of blood and revenge. Therefore, Surroi can hardly be seen
as an objective observer of the Kosovo's reality. His observations fit
far better in the world of an academic analyst and could not serve as
a reliable foundation for serious decision-makers.

Another, astonishing
weak point in Surroi's presentation is his total indifference to human
rights issues, which are seen both by UNMIK and Western Governments
as a crucial benchmark on Kosovo's way towards the final status settlement.
In fact, one gets the impression that Surroi thinks that the human rights
problems, returns of IDP's and relations of Kosovo Albanians with other
peoples in the region would magically be resolved once a Kosovo flag
waves over the East River. Amazingly, this is the opinion of many K/Albanian
politicians, among whom one can immediately perceive an enormous gap
between their unrealistic wishes, and their ability and readiness to
demonstrate responsible leadership. Surroi's answer to the question
on returns is rather abstract and tends to create an impression that
Serbs have given up on going back to Kosovo after all. He may be right
that not many K/Serbs are ready to go back to the Province under the
present conditions, but the reason for this is not their wish to stay
in Serbia or Montenegro but the fact that K/Albanians have created an
atmosphere of such overwhelming intolerance and discrimination against
everything which is not ethnic Albanian. Of course, Surroi, as a devout
"Kosovar", would hardly be expected to speak of Albanians
and Serbs, but this is the reality which cannot be ignored. One cannot
abstractly speak of "Kosovans" as long as their rights and
freedom directly depend on their ethnicity, language and religion. As
long as the national anthem of the Republic of Albania is played openly
by the UCK fledglings in South Serbia and Macedonia, and Albanian national
flags are waved all around in "Albanian inhabited lands",
one can hardly ignore the reality that the Greater Albanian idea is
still alive in some shape or form. Although Kosovo Albanian politicians
do everything to make it clear that Great Albania is not on the agenda
at the moment, the pulse of Albanian pride beats strongly among the
common people, and it is they who chose their political leaders and
dictate the dynamics of political life. The riotous spirit of UCK is
still the strongest symbol in post-war Kosovo and hardly any politician,
including relatively urbane Rugova, would dare question its moral authority.

One of the contemporary posters - UCK symbol, Adem Jashari and the
Flag - the symbols
which bring together ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, Macedonia, South
Serbia and Albania. This kind of mythology could hardly encourage
interethnic tolerance and integration.

The
most recent positive signals from the new Kosovo Government have not
demonstrated that anything essential has changed in K/Albanian visions
except the rhetoric. Everyday news of desecrations of Serb Orthodox
cemeteries and the toppling of the last Serb monuments in the Province,
sometimes even by Kosovo's Ministers, give quite a different picture
of the real situation on the ground. Despite "serious concern"
for returns, there have been almost no preparations in terms of allocating
new funds and repairing infrastructure for the returnees by either UNMIK
or local K/Albanian municipal councils. The remaining Serbs in their
enclaves do not feel any significant changes in their miserable lives
despite rosy promises. Many younger Serbs decide to leave Kosovo while
K/Albanian business crop up everyday on the recently sold Serbian-owned
fields which surround relatively poor and isolated Serb villages. Calls
for integration within the Albanian dominated society sound more and
more like cynicism because three years after the war, few Serbs enjoy
relative freedom of movement and they still have almost no free access
to medical and educational institutions. A society in which elderly
women cannot buy bread in a shop only because they belong to a different
ethnic group and speak a different language can hardly encourage Serbs
to believe in good will of their K/Albanian neighbors.

At the same time,
Kosovo is overwhelmed by organized crime, corruption and mafia which
are definitely not a result of UNMIK's failure to give the power to
Albanians. In fact, without UNMIK the things would be far worse. It
would be quite absurd to believe that giving more authority to Kosovan
political leaders would stop the organized crime because it is directly
or indirectly sponsored by many of those leaders themselves. An independent
judiciary could hardly become effective in the atmosphere of prevailing
Albanian tribal laws of silence and gjakmarrja (blood feud). Companies
which operated with much fewer personnel in pre-war times can now hardly
cope with the new challenges despite ample funds from the EU/UN and
professional assistance. Even the most optimistic economic experts cannot
easily believe that Kosovo can become self-sustainable state with the
present mentality. That is why it is surprising indeed that Surroi uncritically
overestimates the ability of Kosovan society to create a viable state
with absolutely no state-running experience in its long history. The
Kosovo region has always been a part of one state or another without
a clearly distinct cultural and political identity. Without UNMIK, efforts
to keep things under relative control would quickly fail and the Kosovan
society would implode, like Albania a few years ago. One has to remember
how substantial funds were sent to Kosovo during Tito's time, mostly
from Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. At that time, Kosovo was not ruled
by Serbia, being an autonomous province, but nevertheless, it was a
bottomless hole. It is no secret that the largest portions of money
went into private hands. How else could K/Albanians build such an opulent
suburb like Dragodan despite the Serbian repression? Surroi is definitely
aware of all this but it is hard to understand why he assumes that others
are not.

One of Surroi's
complaints is regarding too much administrative control over RTK (Kosovo's
Radio Television). This might not sound positive in the U.S. but every
international official in Kosovo is aware that RTK is often disseminating
highly discriminatory news and programs which are almost exclusively
made to suit Albanian ethnic interests. RTK, the recipient of a lot
of international funds, should not be allowed to undermine the efforts
of the UN Mission to create an atmosphere of tolerance and reconciliation.
The same is true of other media as well as school curricula. In September
2001 the Serbian Orthodox Church strongly protested to UNMIK because
of preposterous writings against the Church which appeared in a few
leading K/Albanian newspapers, including Surroi's Koha Ditore. It is
really disappointing that some renowned K/Albanian publishers and journalists
strongly oppose administrative control of media while at the same time
turn a blind eye towards the defamation of Serbs in those media. While
dozens of newspapers were published and printed in pre-war Kosovo, not
a single Kosovo Serb newspaper is printed in the Province at the moment,
not to mention a television program. There is no need to speak of press
distribution problems in face of the overwhelming lack of free movement.
At the heart of this one-sided liberalism lies the perception of many
K/Albanian leaders that the freedom of Albanians can develop freely
at the expense of other discriminated communities. This is a totally
misguided vision which will eventually drag Kosovo back to a monoethnic
and totalitarian society. Free media without professionalism and responsibility
may be disastrous weapons in hands of those who use their freedom to
oppress others.

Finally, paraphrasing
the last ICG report, Surroi pointed to North Mitrovica as an example
of Belgrade's open involvement in Kosovo. One cannot deny that certain
former Serbian structures survived in Kosovo after the war but it is
really not Dr. Covic or the Serbian Government who are pushing the Serbs
towards Belgrade but Kosovo Albanian leaders themselves. In a society
in which Kosovo Albanians are not ready to offer anything but empty
words (in the best case) to the Serb population, one can hardly expect
Serbs to look towards Pristina as their capital and forget Belgrade.
This is seen primarily in North Mitrovica which is the only urban center
where Serbs can normally walk in the streets, go to a hospital, work
and build their homes without fear of being killed or abducted for speaking
a hated Slavic language. Many bridge watchers undoubtedly used to live
on Belgrade funds in the time of Milosevic but they have long ago created
their own sources of income through extortion, racket and smuggling
and are less and less tolerated by the Mitrovica Serbs themselves. Many
Serbs there would now prefer to see Serb Kosovo Police officers instead.
The common Serb people there have, nevertheless, a legitimate right
not to allow themselves to be expelled from Kosovo and they should not
simply be identified with the agenda of the bridge watchers and some
bullheaded political figures behind them who act on behalf of their
personal interests. In short, ethnically divided Mitrovica is a problem,
but a much less serious problem than an ethnically clean Pristina, Prizren
or Pec. Even the latest ICG report had to admit that North Mitrovica
is, paradoxically, one of most multiethnic areas in today's Kosovo.
One can hardly expect to resolve Mitrovica problem by taking it out
of the Kosovo wide context.

It is still not
quite clear whether Surroi's one-sided analysis comes from his academic
aloofness or whether he just came to Washington D.C. to lobby for independence,
presenting Kosovo as the American success story. Besides many crucial
benchmarks which should precede the final status settlement, Surroi,
not surprisingly, mentions U.S. involvement as the most decisive. Of
course, no one can deny the importance of the U.S. role in the process
but hinting that all things can be resolved in Washington D.C. despite
lack of progress in human rights, multiethnicity, regional dialogue,
etc., gives a clear idea of the present K/Albanian strategy. This point
makes the entire Surroi's analysis much less independent and objective
in the eyes of any expert on the Balkan issues.

Surroi's claim that
Kosovo is "the most pro-American society in Europe, despite its
Muslim background", is puzzling and even humorous. It is not quite
clear whether he meant that a pro-American sentiment is better demonstrated
by following the American patterns of democracy and freedom or by waving
U.S. flags above gas stations and displaying "Winston" billboards
along bumpy Kosovo roads.

Commentary by Fr.
Sava (Janjic)
Serbian Orthodox Church
written on June 15, 2002

"Today's
violence--more than two months after the arrival of NATO forces--is
more than simply an emotional reaction. It is the organised and
systematic intimidation of all Serbs simply because they are Serbs
and therefore are being held collectively responsible for what
happened in Kosovo. Such attitudes are fascist."

Three
years after the war UN administred Province of Kosovo remains torn
by intolerance, ethnic and religious discrimination. With the leaving
of Milosevic from the political scene in October 2000, Kosovo is
leading in human rights abuses in Europe despite the presence of
more than 30.000 NATO led peacekeepers and the UN Mission.

The only parlaimentarians
in Europe which arrive to their sessions
in miliatary armoured vehicles under a heavy police escort
Serb MP's arrive to session of Kosovo Parliament, Pristina 2002