Tag Archives: far-right

The British political arena has long been an inhospitable place for minor parties. While UKIP is the latest to turn heads, from one election to the next history is littered with failed contenders. Back in the 1980s, it was noted how one of the more significant attempts to challenge the main parties, by the Social Democratic Party, was akin to an experimental plane: it began by soaring into the sky, glided for a while but then crash-landed into a muddy field.

While UKIP’s leader has already crashed into a field, the question of how long the party can soar through the electoral skies is up for debate. But what is certain is that its prospects look good. Never before has the British political landscape offered so much to a party that is hostile toward the main parties and immigration. But this raises another, intriguing question: with UKIP on the rise, and surrounded by a favourable climate, what happened to ‘the other’ right-wing insurgent?

Though founded only one year after the SDP in 1982, it was not until twenty years later when the British National Party attempted its own assault on the system. While never soaring, a series of impressive performances meant that the BNP did turn heads. Its number of votes at general elections climbed from only 7,000 in 1992, to over half a million in 2010. Along the way, voters gave the extreme right party over 60 local councillors, one seat on the Greater London Assembly and two seats in the European Parliament. By 2009, almost one million citizens were willing to vote for a party with a known history of violence, anti-Semitism and crude racism.

But, by 2012, it was all so different. The total number of BNP votes at local elections slumped, from more than 240,000 to under 26,000. The party’s average share of the vote in local seats tumbled, from 18 per cent to only 8 per cent. And in London, the 2012 mayoral contest saw the BNP attract fewer first preference votes than in 2000, and finish in seventh place. Further analysis of the numbers can be found in my latest article (which is free to download). Suffice to say that they confirmed the BNP’s meltdown and added to what was already a serious internal revolt against its leader, Nick Griffin. With not a single councillor in London, and only three nationwide, electorally the BNP was finished. How did this happen?

Some might argue that the BNP’s collapse owed much to wider changes that have taken place in British politics since 2010. As concern over the economy soared, levels of public concern over immigration began to fall: while 46% of the electorate once ranked immigration as one of the most pressing issues facing Britain, by 2012 this had dwindled to 20%. This also coincided with the rise of the Conservatives, who have long been more trusted on immigration.

But an approach that focuses on the wider environment is also misleading. As the more recent fortunes of UKIP underscore, there remain ample opportunities for a party that targets anti-immigrant, anti-establishment and anti-Europe politics. These are also mirrored in the results of our surveys with the Extremis Project, reported in the article. And as Tory strategists will know, their historic advantage on immigration is far from what once was. Last year, 26% of voters thought Cameron and co. were the best party to handle immigration and 18% backed Labour. But at the same time, 39% said ‘none of them’ or did not know.

Seen from another perspective, the demise of the BNP owes less to changes in the wider arena than factors that are internal to the party and, specifically, reputations. This builds on the argument that there is potential for radical right insurgents in most (if not all) Western states, and that what matters most are the characteristics of the parties that are attempting to convert potential into actual support. For instance, if this really was about economic insecurity and fiscal austerity, then surely parties like the BNP would be in the electoral fast-lane in every state that has undergone the transition to a global economy, and was then hit by the crisis? But they are not. Instead, the radical right in Austria is polling 21-23% amidst one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe. And amidst economic chaos and a collapse of political trust in Greece, Golden Dawn is ‘only’ attracting one out of every ten voter.

The varying fortunes of these parties have been shaped strongly by the legacies on which they build. The argument here is one of path dependency, that ultimately the electoral destiny of a party is intimately wrapped up in, and determined by, its own history. It draws on work by academics like Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, David Art and Sarah de Lange, who show how the origins of radical right parties can profoundly impact on their evolution and performance. Those that are rooted in more legitimate traditions (say, of Euroscepticism) enjoy allies in media and politics, attract credible activists and steer clear of the damaging effects of stigma by enjoying what Ivarsflaten describes as ‘reputational shields’. These bring three important benefits to a party, which I discuss in the article. But those that are rooted in toxic traditions struggle to attract experienced activists, lack media and political allies and an image of credibility. As a result they are simply unable to shield themselves from accusations that they are beyond the pale.

The critical importance of reputational shields is underscored by the demise of the BNP, and it could be argued the current success of UKIP. Despite a wider perfect storm and a relatively competent strategy, the BNP’s ambitions were checked from the outset by a highly toxic legacy of ‘racial nationalism’. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the BNP’s own choices strengthened associations in the minds of voters between the party, violence and extremism. By the time they became interested in elections, the party had fallen heavily dependent on a small cadre of inexperienced, extreme and tainted right-wing extremists. Few grasped the nature of the opportunities that lay before them, and few had the experience that was required for a professional vote-seeking strategy. The BNP’s attempt at ‘modernization’ failed, largely because from where the party emerged, it had nowhere to go.

The party’s toxicity was reflected in its bases of support. As we showed here, here and here, the BNP failed to emulate its more successful counterparts on the continent by reaching into more middle-class, younger and better educated segments of society. Instead, they fell dependent on a small rump of older, angry white men, who had extremely low levels of education, were deeply pessimistic about their prospects and concerned primarily about the effects of immigration. This base was sufficient to turn heads, but incapable of delivering a wider breakthrough.

Today, the BNP is faced with a growing number of rivals, most of whom are united by their focus on non-electoral strategies and share a legacy that is toxic and ill-suited to modern politics. Yet other contenders on the right lack these constraints and are now reaping the benefits of a reputational shield. Anchored by its history, the BNP can only look on…

The author is grateful to Michael Thrasher and Colin Rallings at the University of Plymouth, Gareth Harris, Robert Ford and David Cutts for their collaboration on previous studies, and the anonymous reviewers whose comments strengthened the paper.

Among academics who study elections and political parties, most accept that the way a party campaigns can have important effects on its overall performance. As scholars such as Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie have argued (and shown), amidst the decline of partisanship, the increased volatility and hesitancy of voters, and the professionalization of parties, campaigns at election time can assume a vital role in getting voters out of armchairs, and into voting.

But for various reasons, this research on campaigning effects has not diffused into the study of parties on the radical and extremist fringe. Instead, citizens who support the likes of Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen or Nick Griffin are often presented as passive beings, who suddenly switch allegiance from the mainstream to the margins in response to concerns over competing in a global economy, immigration or the performance of mainstream elites. While these wider trends are seen as important ‘push’ factors, few investigate how, come election day, campaigns run by radical right parties seek to ‘pull’ voters into the polling booth, and indeed whether these campaigns actually make a difference to their electoral performance. Sure, those who study the radical right routinely stress the importance of agency, giving a nod to the important role of ideology, leadership, organization and activists. But when we really put the literature under the microscope, how much detailed research on party campaigns is there?

Clearly, some will trace this gap to the difficulties of gathering reliable data on what Charlot described as the ‘secret garden’ of party life. For those who study the extremes, the pillars of party campaigns that are routinely explored in research on mainstream parties – such as membership, rates of activism, spending data and the targeting of seats – remain very much in the shadows. But in my own experience, through detailed and often painstaking analysis of documents, interviews and data submitted to official bodies, it is possible to paint an accurate picture of what these parties ‘do’ at the neighbourhood level.

In an article published by the European Political Science Review (and which is currently free to download), we drew on these and other data to examine the effects of the 2010 general election campaign by the British National Party (BNP). Seeking to enter Westminster, the BNP devoted significant effort to the contest, fielding over 330 candidates and adopting a targeted campaign (which you can read about here). But to what effect?

To explore this question we drew on a range of data from the British Election Study, which probes party-voter contact, and a war-chest of data on BNP finances, membership and local electoral support for the BNP and Labour (thanks to Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher). Aside from testing some broader theoretical models, we also wanted to see whether academics such as Cas Mudde were right in arguing that ‘local implantation’ is important to explaining how radical right parties -like all types of parties- rally support.

What did we find? Using Tobit regression analysis (see the paper for full info), we first of all confirmed what we previously found with Robert Ford. In its quest for an elusive breakthrough, in 2010 the BNP performed strongest in working-class areas, which depend more heavily on the (stagnating) manufacturing sector, where average levels of education are low and there are large Muslim communities. No real surprises.

But beyond these standard measures, and more to the point, we also found that support for the BNP wassignificantly higher in areas where the party had actually campaigned. Even after we took account of prior support for the BNP, where the party campaigned more intensely, where it had more members and where it had established a track record of local electoral success, the party reaped greater electoral dividends. While earlier focus groups indicated that the BNP’s embrace of community politics had been important to its electoral growth, even suggesting that in some local wards voters experienced more face-to-face contact with BNP activists than with those from the main parties, our results provide broader evidence that the strategy was having positive electoral effects.

We also found evidence in support of the ‘Labour disaffection’ argument, which posits that the limited rise of the BNP owed much to disillusionment within the Labour heartlands. This was perhaps best reflected in the detailed qualitative study by Stuart Wilks-Heeg who pointed to the way in which, in areas where the BNP initially emerged, party competition at the grassroots was either stagnant, or virtually non-existent. Consistent with this picture, in 2010 the BNP polled strongest in areas where Labour had controlled local politics since the early 1970s. But on the other hand, and given recent debate over the rise of the UK Independence Party, it is interesting to note that where support for UKIP was strong, the BNP struggled to make headway.

Turning to the individual level, there is no question that the BNP (again) rallied voters who were chiefly concerned about immigration. Those who ranked immigration as the most important issue facing the country were five times more likely to support the BNP, than other parties. These voters were also less trusting of politicians and less likely to express support for European integration. But importantly, and even after we control for these attitudes and the campaigns of other parties, we found that the BNP campaign still mattered. Citizens who had been exposed to the BNP campaign were still significantly more likely to vote for the party.

In conclusion, our initial motivation to undertake the study stemmed less from an interest with the BNP than to examine whether wider findings on campaigning effects also apply to parties at the extremes. Like other types of parties, our findings suggest that when extreme right activists build local support, nurture their memberships and target resources, they can positively impact on their overall result. This throws doubt on the claim made by some that what these parties do at the grassroots is largely irrelevant for explaining their electoral performance.

But also, in Britain the BNP’s 2010 campaign was framed as a failure, which owed much to Nick Griffin’s failure to cause an upset in the outer-east London seat of Barking. In itself, this result prompted a grassroots rebellion inside the party, prompting many experienced organizers to abandon the BNP for rival parties, or leave politics altogether. Yet in objective reality, at the last general election the extreme right actually more than doubled its number of voters (to over 564,000), increased its share of the national vote (to 1.9%), increased its share of the vote in seats that were contested in 2005 (again, by 1.9%), and met the 5% hurdle in over 70 seats (as compared to only seven in 2001). Moreover, despite the party’s more recent electoral collapse, our findings suggest that the party’s embrace of pavement politics, and its decision to invest in the grassroots base, appeared to be working.

Today, Dr Matthew Goodwin has launched a new exploratory study of views among far right supporters toward violence. The study draws on a sample of 2,152 BNP, EDL and UKIP supporters, and for the first time probes the views of these citizens toward inter-group conflict and violence, as well as a wider range of issues. You can download the report here, or by clicking the image above.

In the aftermath of the attacks by a supposed ‘lone wolf’ in Norway, the discovery of a violent neo-Nazi cell in Germany and the murder of two Senegalese street traders in Florence, there has occurred an upsurge of interest in right-wing extremist violence: its current levels, its perpetrators, and the underlying causes. Against this backdrop, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) asked Dr Matt Goodwin to write a summary of the current evidence on far right violence. In short, the report sought to assess what we know and what we don’t about this particular form of violent extremism.

You can read the full report here (from page 36). But for now, let’s talk about the key findings. Specifically, there are four.

In contrast to a rapidly growing evidence base on AQ-inspired terrorism and processes of radicalization, we know little about extreme right-wing violence, including its underlying causes and adherents. This owes much to a lack of reliable, systematic and comparative data, and the fact that there have been only a few studies of right-wing extremist violence and potential disengagement strategies.

This means it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to identify the profile and motives of perpetrators, what factors render some citizens (or communities) more susceptible than others to this type of violence and, alternatively, what might increase their resilience (or the resilience of vulnerable communities) to this activity. Put simply, this particular and increasingly salient form of violent extremism remains under researched, and poorly understood.

We also know little about the relationship between extreme right-wing violence and extreme right-wing political parties. Not every supporter of extreme right and populist radical right parties are necessarily violent, or even prone to violence. This is evident in states such as the UK, where surveys suggest that although large numbers of citizens are potentially responsive to these types of political parties, their support is conditional these parties rejecting violence. But to what extent is there a relationship between violence and voting, and what are the dynamics of this relationship? Is far right violence higher in states that lack successful far right parties, on the basis that those who would otherwise channel their grievances into the conventional political process instead choose to express these via violent acts? Or is violence higher in states with successful far right parties, on the basis that these movements contribute to a combative and exclusionary political climate that is conducive to violence?

The current response to right-wing extremist violence is further weakened by the lack of consensus over an accepted and commonly adopted definition. Across Europe, this form of extremism is often defined in different ways. Furthermore, clarity over this activity is further muddied by a tendency for security agencies to record acts of violence in different ways. This makes it difficult to accurately compare overall trends in levels of violence, the actual ‘threat level’ and any geographical variations that exist across Europe.

In the aftermath of the atrocities in Norway, the Guardian asked Matt Goodwin to join a roundtable discussion on the far right, with Dan Hodges, journalist Matthew Taylor and Hugh Muir which which you can listen to here.

1. The distinction between actions and attitudes is an important one. Large majorities of citizens in Europe reject violence, but large numbers are also concerned about the same issues that feature in the ‘Breivik manifesto’: concern over Islam, anxiety over immigration and rising diversity, and dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties. This does not equal a mass of would-be bombers, but it does mean that there is a pool of potential around the European far right.

2. We need to ask ourselves whether we have focused too heavily on one form of religiously-motivated extremism, at the expense of other (in this case political) forms of extremism. For example, in Britain we have spent much of our time talking about how best to counter radicalisation within Muslim communities, and prevent violent extremism. But what about other communities and forms of political action that might not be openly violent, but certainly contain a culture of violence?

3. This is a game-changer in how we approach the far right. This movement was often dismissed as the dog which doesn’t bark. Sadly, over the weekend, it barked. We need to get past the conventional wisdom that says that far right groups and their followers are only a marginal, disorganized and weaker cousin to their al-Qaeda (or AQ) counterparts.

4. We need far more evidence on the far right. It has become pan-European in scope, developing new networks, both online and offline. This is not a problem only for Norway, for Scandinavia or Britain. This is a challenge for Europe and the responses from security services and policy-makers should reflect that.

5. Breivik will almost certainly become a heroic figure among some sections of the ultra right-wing in Europe, much in the same way that Timothy McVeigh was held up by sections of the American militia movement, or David Copeland was praised by British neo-Nazis. These are figures who cross the line that separates ideas from action. In this case, they have also left a detailed blueprint for how to act to any would-be copycat attacker. It is not alarmist or sensationalist to worry about this threat. Both American and British security services have warned about it for some time.

According to Ipsos MORI 75% of Britons believe that immigration is a ‘problem’ while Islamophobia appears to be on the rise.

The three main parties have sought, in their different ways, to address these issues but most of the running has been made by parties beyond the mainstream, on the far-right. Since its disappointing performance in the 2010 general election the BNP has however gone through a difficult period of internal upheaval and others, possibly UKIP, look likely to benefit.

Reflecting the importance of these issues Ballots and Bullets has published a number of posts that have looked at their different manifestations.

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This blog is produced by members of the School of Politics and International Relation at the University of Nottingham, and will include occasional guest pieces. The analysis contained in each entry is informed by our internationally-ranked research, and we hope it will help readers better understand the political dynamics that underpin the world in which we all live.

By Philip Cowley This week is party manifesto launch week for the parties, starting with Labour today. For those interested, there are three useful articles in Parliamentary Affairs on manifestos:… Read the rest