Coëmgenu wrote:Ka existing and "rittaka = ritta of ka" being ridiculous are not mutually exclusive.

Can you develop?

Ok, I meant to say that:

There is no contradiction or inconsistency with pointing out that both Ka 'exists' as a Vedic deity and theories of etymology for Pāli involving Ka in the way that is suggested are ridiculous.

The two facts, both being true, are not, and cannot be, "mutually exclusive".

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Replying further:

ToVincent wrote:

Coëmgenu wrote:
If you figure the god Ka is so foundationally important to Buddhism, why does the Buddha not speak of him directly?

Buddha never talks about Mitra, although the god Mitra is just about the underlying notion behind Metta (see notes https://justpaste.it/1a3ol).

This one is too much of a non-sequitur. Can you decide if you want Ka to be Prajāpati, Mitra, or all gods? This is just deflection. Can you point out the Buddha speaking directly about "Ka", his presence, or his absence? This would involve more than "rittaka" contrivances.

ToVincent wrote:What is "foundationally important to Buddhism" is that there is no continuous and pervasive god, like in mid & late Vedic creed. And Sakkāyadiṭṭhi (Self-view) is just about that. (SN 22.47). Viz. this Atma>>Brahma>>Prajapati/Ka belief of the mid & l&te Vedic (unorthodox) Brahmins.

[/quote]If you want to call "self" Ka, you are allowed to, but your terminological innovations will cause issues like these on this very thread.

Why bother?

如無為，如是難見、不動、不屈、不死、無漏、覆蔭、洲渚、濟渡、依止、擁護、不流轉、離熾焰、離燒然、流通、清涼、微妙、安隱、無病、無所有、涅槃。Like this is the uncreated, like this is that which is difficult to realize, with no moving, no bending, no dying. Utterly lacking secretions and smothered in the dark, it is the island shore. Where there is ferrying, it is the crossing. It is dependency's ceasing, it is the end of circulating transmissions. It is the exhaustion of the flame, it is the ending of the burning. Flowing openly, pure and cool, with secret subtlety, and calm occultation, lacking ailment, lacking owning, nirvāṇa.Asaṁskṛtadharmasūtra, Sermon on the Uncreated Phenomenon, T99.224b7, Saṁyuktāgama 890

See how he didn't know about Ka in Vedism at 2017-09-09 00:08:51 - Calls it a silly idea at 00:26:39 - calls it the view of "utter dolts" at 00:54:01 - conclude that this argument is not serious and worthy of critical appraisal at 23:09:51 (a day later) - Yet on that same latter post, he does realize that Ka is not just the "lol-ed" Egyptian Ka, he had refered to, a day before.
So obviously, my argument has to be not serious and worthy of critical appraisal; otherwise he would look a bit like a "dolt" himself.
In other words, making my argument the argument of a dolt, just masks his utter ignorance of the concept of Ka.
Then, comes his twisting of the sources he provides; to make up, and end up with a "fastly made-up" and ludicrous:"The connection with the form kāya is a religio-linguistic invention of the grammarians".
(A big chunk on Panini being added, to hone his now solid knowledge about the matter (of grammarians) - looks more sturdy).

As far as Sujato's references to other suttas for such words as rittaka; may you send him to Müller's passage he quoted himself, where it is said that words can "acquire such legitimacy, as to call for a separate rule explaining its formation".
I'll even go further:
Our languages are full of words with a primary meaning, that are used later on, in a more trivial way.
The fact that Kāya went on meaning just "body" later on, is just an example of that.
We have seen above in ŚBr. 13.1.8.3, that kāya is evidently related to Ka. Yet, later on it just meant meant "body".
The same could apply to the word rittaka. That is to say, a more trivial use.

One thing for sure, is that the misconception of a self in SN 22.47, and the misconception of the Atma(Atta)>>Brahma>>Prajapati/Ka(atta) of the mid&late Vedic creed, has to do with this Ka.
Everybody knows by now, that Buddha did battle this creed.

coëmgenu wrote:
And this here is the misconception Müller talks about. The misconception made by the authors of the Brāhmaṇas.

And this is what the Buddha viewed as a misconception too!

What's your point?

Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------https://justpaste.it/j5o4

ToVincent wrote:
The fact that Kāya went on meaning just "body" later on, is just an example of that.
We have seen above in ŚBr. 13.1.8.3, that kāya is evidently related to Ka. Yet, later on it just meant meant "body".

They are functional homonyms created by misunderstanding, this "whoish" and "body" kāya. That is what I took from the Venerable's exposition. These two instances of kāya are different words, much like bank, in the sense of a snowbank, or the edge of a river, and bank in the sense of a where you go to handle your money. That is what I understood the Venerable to be saying. Two different understandings from two different periods and two different philosophies and teachings.

Last edited by Coëmgenu on Sun Sep 10, 2017 7:27 pm, edited 1 time in total.

如無為，如是難見、不動、不屈、不死、無漏、覆蔭、洲渚、濟渡、依止、擁護、不流轉、離熾焰、離燒然、流通、清涼、微妙、安隱、無病、無所有、涅槃。Like this is the uncreated, like this is that which is difficult to realize, with no moving, no bending, no dying. Utterly lacking secretions and smothered in the dark, it is the island shore. Where there is ferrying, it is the crossing. It is dependency's ceasing, it is the end of circulating transmissions. It is the exhaustion of the flame, it is the ending of the burning. Flowing openly, pure and cool, with secret subtlety, and calm occultation, lacking ailment, lacking owning, nirvāṇa.Asaṁskṛtadharmasūtra, Sermon on the Uncreated Phenomenon, T99.224b7, Saṁyuktāgama 890

ToVincent wrote:
These are called homonyms, this "whoish" and "body" kāya. That is what I took from the Venerable's exposition. These two instances of kāya are different words

No Sir!
This is just poor knowledge of the Veda.

Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------https://justpaste.it/j5o4

Coëmgenu wrote:
These are functional homonyms created my misunderstanding, this "whoish" and "body" kāya. That is what I took from the Venerable's exposition. These two instances of kāya are different words

No Sir!
This is just poor knowledge of the Veda.

Or good knowledge of Buddhism?

Last edited by Coëmgenu on Sun Sep 10, 2017 7:49 pm, edited 2 times in total.

如無為，如是難見、不動、不屈、不死、無漏、覆蔭、洲渚、濟渡、依止、擁護、不流轉、離熾焰、離燒然、流通、清涼、微妙、安隱、無病、無所有、涅槃。Like this is the uncreated, like this is that which is difficult to realize, with no moving, no bending, no dying. Utterly lacking secretions and smothered in the dark, it is the island shore. Where there is ferrying, it is the crossing. It is dependency's ceasing, it is the end of circulating transmissions. It is the exhaustion of the flame, it is the ending of the burning. Flowing openly, pure and cool, with secret subtlety, and calm occultation, lacking ailment, lacking owning, nirvāṇa.Asaṁskṛtadharmasūtra, Sermon on the Uncreated Phenomenon, T99.224b7, Saṁyuktāgama 890

Coëmgenu wrote:
These are functional homonyms created my misunderstanding, this "whoish" and "body" kāya. That is what I took from the Venerable's exposition. These two instances of kāya are different words

No Sir!
This is just poor knowledge of the Veda.

Or good knowledge of Buddhism?

Explanation of empty post: I had an argument here involving PIE roots (a *qéi vs a *kʷos), but it turns out that it was incorrect. So I deleted the argument altogether. I can't delete the post itself, though.

Last edited by Coëmgenu on Sun Sep 10, 2017 8:37 pm, edited 7 times in total.

如無為，如是難見、不動、不屈、不死、無漏、覆蔭、洲渚、濟渡、依止、擁護、不流轉、離熾焰、離燒然、流通、清涼、微妙、安隱、無病、無所有、涅槃。Like this is the uncreated, like this is that which is difficult to realize, with no moving, no bending, no dying. Utterly lacking secretions and smothered in the dark, it is the island shore. Where there is ferrying, it is the crossing. It is dependency's ceasing, it is the end of circulating transmissions. It is the exhaustion of the flame, it is the ending of the burning. Flowing openly, pure and cool, with secret subtlety, and calm occultation, lacking ailment, lacking owning, nirvāṇa.Asaṁskṛtadharmasūtra, Sermon on the Uncreated Phenomenon, T99.224b7, Saṁyuktāgama 890

And when you blabbermouth on me on other forum, (on which I don't go any longer), on things I write in this one - moreover, calling me "troll" and other things - please be nice enough not to taint it with intentional mendacity.
I will just take an example about many others.
Never did I say that: "The Pāli “language” is simply “degraded Vedic Sanskrit” that the monks forgot how to pronounce over time."
Never did I say that on this forum (DW).

I did say though, that the Buddha, who certainly did speak Pali with his compatriots, was philosophically fostered through Vedic/Sanskrit, the language of the Vedas. This language was the prime language of the highest varnas, of which the Prince was part as a kśatrya. Just like nobles in 16th century Europe, were brought up through Latin. Vedic/Sanskrit of the Vedas, was the elite's language.
I have never said that the Pāli “language” is simply “degraded Vedic Sanskrit”.
It did borrow a lot from it.

So, if you quote me, please do so. But don't interpret.

I would appreciate - Thank you.

Last edited by ToVincent on Sun Sep 10, 2017 8:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.

Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------https://justpaste.it/j5o4

I will delete that thread promptly if you doubt my good intentions. In fact, have done so already, the result of that is pending as we speak. Everything I wrote in it, though, is an understanding of what you say that I gleaned from your writings here and on your website. Anything presented wrongly was my fault.

Either way, the post will be gone shortly, as you have objected to it. Never to be seen by anyone ever again. And that is quite fine.

Now, I wrote this post as a farewell for the day, however, honesty compels me to write one point further, here.

This here:

Coëmgenu wrote:Can you point out the Buddha speaking directly about "Ka", his presence, or his absence? This would involve more than "rittaka" contrivances.

I have already used the word "ridiculous" here, so I wont backtrack and use a kinder word in the interest of being honest about my own less-than-skillful choices of words. This is not an allowance for what I truly do (and other as well do) consider a "ridiculous" contrivance, namely that the "ka" in rittaka (tucchaka, asāraka et al.) is an explicit reference to Prajāpati.

However, in the interest of presenting an even view, and also holding myself up to the same level of highly critical scrutiny I am directing against ToVincent, I need to make two points: 1) that there are no references to this "ka=prajāpati" notion in the EBTs may not be quite correct, and 2) depending on if the *qéi and the *kʷos I was consulting earlier are actually two divergent renderings of the same root, I think it might actually be established that kāya (referring to the word as "body"), as a word, does indeed derive from a personal pronoun.

This makes my statement here:

Coëmgenu wrote:Similarly, कायक (kāyaka) is the "kāya (KA + īya) of Ka". Its all rather meta with that compound.

Is only half as correct a critique of the methodologies I was doubting as I initially believed. We still have the claiming of the "ka" at the end of these words as an explicit references to Prajāpati (unless ToVincent would like to later, in the interest of not having me misrepresent his stances, correct me as to his view regarding the particular ka and the end of kāyaka). I still think this is equally as ridiculous as rittaka (tucchaka, asāraka, et al). It is a confusion of grammar, as I see it, which is why I began the questioning with the example of "Abhidhammika", which is not a reference to Prajāpati. For another perspective, Ven Sujato sees the "ka's" at the ends of these words as diminutives. This all, this paragraph here, addresses the "ka" at the end of words and claims about it. Moving on to "ka" in a different context.

This is the line that potentially changed my mind regarding specifically kāya, from DN, which is widely speculated to have been a collection compiled with the express purpose of converting Brahmins:

Brahmakāyo, specifically here, I think there is a possible argument for the "Whoish" reading of kāya specifically rather than the "collection/body" reading. Although, to be fair, I think it is complicated by the immediate presence of dhammakāyo, to which the "body/collection" reading far more readily applies.

What moves me toward the "Whoish" reading for brahmakāyo is the highly tenuous, syncretic, and Christian reading I had previously held for brahmakāyo & brahmabhūto, highly influenced, as it was, by the notion of theosis:

"For the Son of God became man so that we might become God." -Saint Athanasius of Alexandria

I had never been convinced of this, though. It always seemed too "convenient". However, that the practitioner becomes the "body of Brahma" seems as nice a metaphor as anything else for the ultimate achievement.

However, looking at brahmakāyo in light of the sacrificial altar, and looking at the kāyo as "that which is dedicated to", and looking at kāyo as a burnt offering (I am thinking here of "extinguished" as a notion, i.e. Nibbāna). I think that this reading is actually much less contrived than my previous theosis-influenced reading was, at the very least. Although I myself would not vouch for it independently.

I would like to remain clear that my position regarding rittaka, tucchaka, asāraka, et al, is the same.

---------
---------
---------

All in all, I have to be on my way, and cannot argue any longer for today. Perhaps we will be able to enjoy our mutual disagreements another time.

如無為，如是難見、不動、不屈、不死、無漏、覆蔭、洲渚、濟渡、依止、擁護、不流轉、離熾焰、離燒然、流通、清涼、微妙、安隱、無病、無所有、涅槃。Like this is the uncreated, like this is that which is difficult to realize, with no moving, no bending, no dying. Utterly lacking secretions and smothered in the dark, it is the island shore. Where there is ferrying, it is the crossing. It is dependency's ceasing, it is the end of circulating transmissions. It is the exhaustion of the flame, it is the ending of the burning. Flowing openly, pure and cool, with secret subtlety, and calm occultation, lacking ailment, lacking owning, nirvāṇa.Asaṁskṛtadharmasūtra, Sermon on the Uncreated Phenomenon, T99.224b7, Saṁyuktāgama 890

Yet, that word kāyaka, became through time, a more common way to say "concerning the (mere physical) body".

For what is interesting, is the later use of kāya in kāyaka.
As I said in a previous post, some words can go "trivial" (more common,) along the way, and lose their primary meaning.

kāyaka, for instance, went to mean "relating to (concerning) the corporeal body".
While Kāya, in pre-Bhuddist and Buddhist philosophy, has quite a wider range of meaning, than the later use of a mere "corporeal body".
kāyaka becomes almost śarīra ( शरीर ) [√ शॄ śṝ (shattered-decay) + -॰ईर -īra (which goes)].

However, śarīra, the physical body, is not kāya, the "body", viz. the "organs" of early Indian philosophy.
Note that here, "organs" do not just mean the ear, the nose, the liver, the stomach, etc.
I suppose that, to have the insight of what the "organs" mean in early Indian philosophy, requires more than a quick "one day" google search fix.
Knowing to discern the commonalities in the extensiveness of the development of Brahma>>Prājapati(Ka), among the different views of the Ṛśis, requires more than picking quickly some informations, here and there, on the WWW - particularly on a short range of time.

Now, what imports to me in this discussion coming from another thread, is that people understand that the Self/self, was considered as pervasive and continuous, in late Vedic philosophy - and that the Buddha did raise against this view.
His rationale was that, it could not be continuous, because the khandhas (and their subsequent dhammas) are impermanent.
Simple as that.
So "anatta" means a "not continuous" self - unlike the continuous Self/self of the Upaniṣadic creed, at the time of Buddha.

And what is "atta"?
- atta in Vedic terms, is the person, the individuality, that has an inherent character of continuity.
- atta in Buddhist terms, is the person, the individuality, that has no inherent character of continuity.

End of discussion, as far as I am concerned.

Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------https://justpaste.it/j5o4

ToVincent wrote:However, śarīra, the physical body, is not kāya, the "body", viz. the "organs" of early Indian philosophy.
Note that here, "organs" do not just mean the ear, the nose, the liver, the stomach, etc.

ToVincent wrote:However, śarīra, the physical body, is not kāya, the "body", viz. the "organs" of early Indian philosophy.
Note that here, "organs" do not just mean the ear, the nose, the liver, the stomach, etc.

Ohlala!
Although what I mean in my previous post, has very little to do with what comes below, I am marveling at where we are heading to here; with this odd habit of you, to take references out of the context of the EBTs (or without parallels).
It, quite often, makes things a lot more complicated than they seem.

Let's take the eye, for example.
For you, at the time of Buddha:
- the physical eye was "akkhi" (a word that does not appear in the EBTs, with parallels).
- and the "sight" (the faculty,) was "cakkhu".

On my part, I consider the eye, in the perspective of what is depicted in SN 22.47 - (viz. related to the descent (avakkanti) of the faculties (indriyāni) of the grounds or fields of experience (āyatanāni).
That is to say "cakkhu" - as an āyatana - an "eye" that is both the physical eye without its faculty (sight), and "cakkhu" as an "eye" with its faculty.
(see note as the bottom of this page https://justpaste.it/18u12).

In other words, (from my reading of the EBTs, with parallels) I consider cakkhu as a general field of experience that is, or not, propeled by its indriya.

Passati bhagavā cakkhunā rūpaṃ,
the Blessed One sees a form with the eye,
Chandarāgo bhagavato natthi.
yet there is no desire and lust in the Blessed One.
SN 35.232

From the above extract, would you say that:The Blessed One, because he restrains his faculties (indriyāni), has no "sight"(?) - which explains that he has no desire and lust?

We are in the sensory realm.
We are here, first and before all, into sensory experiences, through the six internal āyatanāni.
It's not the "sight" that counts. It is the nature of the experience*, through the six fields of sensory experience.* something that "some", don't want to see change.

----

What is the "range" of certain "organs" was my real underlying question.
Are these experiences all through the "sensory" realm (saḷāyatana); or is there vedanā out of the sensory realm?

Last edited by ToVincent on Tue Sep 12, 2017 7:20 pm, edited 1 time in total.

Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------https://justpaste.it/j5o4

ToVincent wrote:Let's take the eye, for example.
For you, at the time of Buddha:
- the physical eye was "akkhi" (a word that does not appear in the EBTs, with parallels).
- and the "sight" (the faculty,) was "cakkhu".

It's great that you express your understanding of my words. This makes it possible to detect the misunderstanding.
If you would like to understand me, please reread my words. And please recheck the occurences of "akkhi" in all the declensions.

Yet, I must say, I am tired of efforts to maintain semblance of understanding, and of your remarks.

Dmytro wrote:It's great that you express your understanding of my words. This makes it possible to detect the misunderstanding.
If you would like to understand me, please reread my words......
.....
Yet, I must say, I am tired of efforts to maintain semblance of understanding, and of your remarks.

Sorry if my "remarks" have offended you; but I do believe that reliance on post-Buddhist texts, are a restraint to a simple understanding of the EBTs. It leads too often, to just a reinforcement of incorrect views.
My somewhat acerb tone, might have had also to do, with the general attitude you seem to have towards me. https://justpaste.it/1b6o3 - And I am very dispirited to have to go to such low level, to have things be a bit more fairly moderated.
In other words, being good in Pali, does not make you a pundit in Buddhism. Otherwise, grammarians would be teaching philosophy at universities.

On Fri Aug 31, 2012, you say:
In the recently published Pali-English dictionary Margaret Cone gives the appropriate contemporary meanings:
cakkhu, 1. the eye; the organ of sight; the faculty of seeing, sight;...

Sue Hamilton ... concludes that "cakkhu" (eye), etc. do not refer to the physical organs.

And, from the above, you have concluded that:the "cakkhu", etc., denote the sense spheres (ayatana), and not the physical organs.

This is why I said that you (and the two people you quote,) are making a distinction between the physical organ, and the ability of that organ.

----

However, the problem is that the issue is not in making a distinction between the physical organ (eye, nose, ...) and its ability (sight, smell, ...); but in seeing how the faculty (indriya) operates on, for instance, the cakkhu, considered as a general field of sensory experience (viz. the physical organ, as well as its ability).

By the way, what Margaret Cone calls a "faculty" should be called an "ability", to make things clearer.

One has to make a real distinction between what one generally calls "faculty" (indriya,) in Buddhism, and the ability (sight, smell, ...) of a physical organ, that we also call "faculty". That is why, it is better to call the latter "ability".
You will see in the following, that the "ability" (sight, smell,) of an organ (taken as a all), is of a marginal interest in a Buddhist sensory experience.

As I said in my previous post, when one read the following extract:

Passati bhagavā cakkhunā rūpaṃ,
the Blessed One sees a form with the eye,
Chandarāgo bhagavato natthi.
yet there is no desire and lust in the Blessed One.
SN 35.232

One cannot say from the above extract, that the Blessed One - because he restrains his faculties (indriyāni) - has no "sight"(?).
And that this is the reason why, he has no desire and lust?

It's not the "sight" that counts. But the nature of the sensory experience, through the magnitude of the indriya.

So one can say from the above extract, that the Blessed One - because he restrains his faculties (indriyāni) - has a sensory experience proportional to its indriya.
The ability of "sight" is just there, as a quite irrelevant interface.
Indriya does not really interact with the "sight".
Indriya interacts with the nature of the sensory experience, through the particular organ.

It is the nature and amplitude of a particular sensory experience, linked to the nature of a particular organ, and induced by the intensity of the indriya, that matters.

(Please see the notes at the bottom of this page https://justpaste.it/18u12 , for further explanation).
Also, maybe you should look at the following, to see how a sensory experience takes place in Buddhism https://justpaste.it/1ac3r. (all suttas with parallels).

P.S.
All the post & late Buddhist texts have just emphasized the distinction between the physical & the ability. Which is not the real issue.
Reinforcement in nescience, I suppose.

Some working for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; some for the Unborn.
.
In this world with its ..., māras, ... in this population with its ascetics.... (AN 5.30).
------
We are all possessed - more or less.
------
And what, bhikkhu, is inward rottenness? Here someone is immoral, one of evil character, of impure and suspect behaviour, secretive in his acts, no ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one, inwardly rotten, corrupt, depraved. This is called inward rottenness.”
SN 35.241
------https://justpaste.it/j5o4