Include All Sides In Peace Talks

June 12, 1987|By Denis F. Doyon.

This week marks the 20th anniversary of the 1967 war in the Middle East. An entire generation of Palestinian youth has grown up resisting the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A generation of young Israelis has matured in a society beset by internal divisions and external threats. Twenty years after the Six-Day War, the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict is still claiming victims.

Perhaps the approach of this anniversary spurred the recent diplomatic moves toward convening an international peace conference on the Middle East. Over the last year, nearly all of the major parties have moved surprisingly close to an agreement outlining an acceptable negotiating process. This includes half of Israel`s national unity government, most of the PLO leadership, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and other Arab states, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Although significant differences remain, all of these parties are officially committed to some sort of international peace conference. This is remarkable; never before has there been such strong multilateral support for negotiations.

The broad outlines of the growing international consensus are well-known: negotiations between representatives of Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states in a conference sponsored by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the U.S., USSR, Great Britain, France and China). Disputes over two important issues, however, are preventing this conference from being convened: the role of the Security Council members, particularly the Soviet Union, and representation for the Palestinians.

Eager to limit Soviet influence, the United States has insisted that the international conference should serve only as a ceremonial umbrella for direct bilateral negotiations between the parties in the region. In addition, both Israel and the U.S. want to deny a formal role for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and let only non-PLO Palestinians join the Jordanian delegation. On both of these issues, the U.S. and Israel stand outside the international consensus.

These are not just procedural disputes; they are attempts to rule out certain options before the talks even begin. Keeping the Soviet Union out of the active negotiations would weaken its bargaining position and that of its major Middle East allies, Syria and the PLO. Keeping the PLO out might prevent the issue of Palestinian self-determination from even reaching the negotiating table.

If the United States and Israel succeed, they will be in a better position to push for a settlement on their own terms: no independent Palestinian state, and no role for the Soviets in regional security arrangements. But in the process, they might scuttle the chances for convening an international peace conference at all. The Soviets and the Palestinians will have little incentive to support it, and the Syrians and even Jordan may get cold feet. It would be tragic if the strategic opportunity for a peace settlement were sacrificed to the tactical objective of controlling the negotiating process.

Whatever else may be true about the PLO and the USSR, they are important and influential forces in the Middle East. For this reason alone, they should be brought into the negotiating process. Of course, it would be easier for Israel and the United States to negotiate with Jordan, but this would lead to a partial solution, not real peace. If a truly comprehensive settlement is to be reached, both the PLO and the Soviet Union must be included. More important, both now seem genuinely ready to enter negotiations with Israel and the U.S. They should be encouraged, not snubbed.

The United States should take bold steps to bring all sides to the bargaining table. This means dropping or modifying the objections it has raised to Soviet and PLO participation. If it doesn`t, we may lose the opportunity for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict for another 20 years.