"This was said by the Exalted One, said by the Worthy One, so have I heard:

`Monks, there are these two Nibbàna elements. Which two? The Nibbàna element with residual clinging and the Nibbàna element without residual clinging.

And what, monks, is the Nibbàna element with residual clinging? Herein, monks, a monk is an arahant, with influxes extinct, one who has lived the holy life to the full, done what is to be done, laid down the burden, reached one's goal, fully destroyed the fetters of exis­tence and released with full understanding. His five sense faculties still remain and due to the fact that they are not destroyed, he experi­ences likes and dislikes, and pleasures and pains. That extirpation of lust, hate and delusion in him, that, monks, is known as the Nibbàna element with residual clinging.

And what, monks, is the Nibbàna element without residual cling­ing? Herein, monks, a monk is an arahant, with influxes extinct, one who has lived the holy life to the full, done what is to be done, laid down the burden, reached one's goal, fully destroyed the fetters of existence and released with full understanding. In him, here itself, all what is felt will cool off, not being delighted in. This, monks, is the Nib­bàna element without residual clinging.'

To this effect the Exalted One spoke and this is the gist handed down as `thus said'.

`These two Nibbàna elements have been made known,By the one with vision, unattached and such,Of relevance to the here and now is one element,With residual clinging, yet with tentacles to becoming snapped,But then that element without residual clinging is of relevance tothe hereafter,For in it surcease all forms of becoming.

They that comprehend fully this state of the unprepared,Released in mind with tentacles to becoming snapped,On winning to the essence of Dhamma they take delight in seeing to an end of it all,So give up they, all forms of becoming, steadfastly such-like as they are."

And some comments (but it would be better to read the whole thing, lest I be accused of selective quotation... )

In the definition of the Nibbàna element without residual cling­ing, the same standard phrase recurs, while its distinctive feature is sum­med up in just one sentence: Tassa idheva sabba­veda­yi­tàni an­abhi­nanditàni sãtibhavis­santi, "in him, here itself, all what is felt will cool off, not being delighted in". It may be noted that the verb is in the future tense and apart from this cooling off, there is no guarantee of a world beyond, as an asaïkhata dhàtu, or `unprepared element', with no sun, moon or stars in it.

The two verses that follow purport to give a summary of the prose passage. Here it is clearly stated that out of the two Nibbàna ele­ments, as they are called, the former pertains to the here and now, diñ­­ñhadhammika, while the latter refers to what comes after death, sam­paràyika. The Nibbàna element with residual clinging, sa-upà­disesà Nibbànadhàtu, has as its redeeming feature the assurance that the tentacular craving for becoming is cut off, despite its exposure to likes and dislikes, pleasures and pains, common to the field of the five senses.

As for the Nibbàna element without residual clinging, it is defi­nitely stated that in it all forms of existence come to cease. The rea­son for it is none other than the crucial fact, stated in that single sen­tence, namely, the cooling off of all what is felt as an inevitable con­sequence of not being delighted in, anabhinanditàni.

Why do they not take delight in what is felt at the moment of pass­ing away? They take delight in something else, and that is: the very destruction of all what is felt, a foretaste of which they have al­ready experienced in their attainment to that unshakeable deliver­ance of the mind, which is the very pith and essence of the Dhamma, dham­­masàra. ...

Nibbàna is solely the realization of the cessation of existence or the end of the process of becoming. So there is absolutely no ques­tion of a hereafter for the arahant. By way of clarification, we have to revert to the primary sense of the term Nibbàna. We have made it sufficiently clear that Nibbàna means `extinction' or `extinguish­ment', as of a fire....

The popular interpretation of the term anupàdisesà Nibbànadhàtu leaves room for some absolutist conceptions of an asaïkhata dhàtu, unprepared element, as the destiny of the arahant. After his pari­nib­bàna, he is supposed to enter this particular Nibbànadhàtu. But here, in this discourse, it is explained in just one sentence: Tassa idheva, bhikkhave, sabbavedayitàni anabhinanditàni sãtibhavis­santi, "in the case of him" (that is the arahant) ", O! monks, all what is felt, not having been delighted in, will cool off here itself."

But when it comes to the distinction between sa-upàdisesa and anupàdisesa, the element upàdi has to be understood in a more radi­cal sense, in association with the word upàdiõõa. This body, as the product of past kamma, is the `grasped' par excellence, which as an organic combination goes on functioning even in the ara­hant until his last moment of life.

...This cooling off happens just before death, without igniting an­other spark of life. When Màra comes to grab and seize, the ara­hant lets go. The pain of death with which Màra teases his hapless victim and lures him into another existence, becomes ineffective in the case of the arahant. As he has already gone through the supra­mundane experience of deathlessness, in the arahat­taphala­samà­dhi, death loses its sting when at last it comes. The influx-free deliver­ance of the mind and the influx-free deliverance through wisdom en­able him to cool down all feelings in a way that baffles Màra.

So the arahant lets go of his body, experiencing ambrosial death­lessness. As in the case of Venerable Dabba Mallaputta, he would sometimes cremate his own body without leaving any ashes.[37] Out­wardly it might appear as an act of self-immolation, which in­deed is painful. But this is not so. Using his jhànic powers, he simply em­ploys the internal fire element to cremate the body he has already discarded.

This, then, is the Buddha's extraordinary solution to the problem of overcoming death, a solution that completely outwits Màra.

What I find interesting about Ven Nanananda is that, although he argues (very eloquently) for a momentary interpretation of Dependent Origination in his earlier Sermons, and he argues (again eloquently) that there are problems with many of the classical interpretations of the details, his overall conclusion seems rather classical: the Arahant has ended the round of rebirth.

mikenz66 wrote:What I find interesting about Ven Nanananda is that, although he argues (very eloquently) for a momentary interpretation of Dependent Origination in his earlier Sermons, and he argues (again eloquently) that there are problems with many of the classical interpretations of the details, his overall conclusion seems rather classical: the Arahant has ended the round of rebirth.

Indeed... whilst some people may use a non-temporal model of dependent origination to deny rebirth, there is no inherent conflict between a non-temporal model of dependent origination, and the (conventional) notion of rebirth. What should be recognised though are that non-temporal dependent origination and rebirth are two discrete teachings - one using precise Dhamma terms, the other using conventional parlance... and thus they should not be mixed, lest confusion arise.

retrofuturist wrote:Indeed... whilst some people may use a non-temporal model of dependent origination to deny rebirth, there is no inherent conflict between a non-temporal model of dependent origination, and the (conventional) notion of rebirth. What should be recognised though are that non-temporal dependent origination and rebirth are two discrete teachings - one using precise Dhamma terms, the other using conventional parlance... and thus they should not be mixed, lest confusion arise.

I'm confused by this statement. My impression was that in Ven Nananada's model DO is non-temporal and hence has nothing to do with rebirth. It's not a question of different levels of description.

It's in the more conventional interpretations of DO, either in the Commentaries or by teachers such as Ven Thanissaro, where I would have thought you could argue that the teachings on "rebirth and kamma" are conventional ways of approximating parts of the DO sequence.

mikenz66 wrote:I'm confused by this statement. My impression was that in Ven Nananada's model DO is non-temporal and hence has nothing to do with rebirth.

Indeed. That's why I said two discrete teachings.

mikenz66 wrote:It's in the more conventional interpretations of DO, either in the Commentaries or by teachers such as Ven Thanissaro, where I would have thought you could argue that the teachings on "rebirth and kamma" are conventional ways of approximating parts of the DO sequence.

Yes, traditional explanations of three-life dependent origination, and rebirth and kamma, do seem to occur interchangeably... where "wheel of life" and "rounds of samsara" are equivalent expressions.

mikenz66 wrote:Am I missing something here?

Not sure - maybe you just thought I was saying or implying something I wasn't? Either way, I'm happy to clarify... though I'm a little wary, lest we stray too far from the more immediate question of nibbana vs. annihilation.

tiltbillings wrote:You need to define svabhava. And you need to explain why you are trying to read Sarvastivadin stuff into the Theravada.

i translate svabhava as 'essential nature' since that is what dhammas need in order to rightly be called a dhamma. a momemtary and dependent essential nature of course. if things had no such nature we wouldnt be able to establish anatta, since it wouldnt be clear what it is we were talking about, nor of what it is that mind is cognizing when it cognizes.

In the Theravadin Abhidhamma Pitaka text, the Katthavatthu (I 6-8 pgs 115-55 in the Pali and pgs 84-104 in the translation POINTS OF CONTROVERSY), the Sarvastivadin position is directly addressed and rejected.

yes, you can negate the substantiality of past and future but still be classified under the general term "Vaibhashika" as explained by the early indian buddhists. there are many schools within vaibhashika and many of them made many subtle distinctions between one another. the point at which one differs too greatly from the general vaibhashika view is generally when both past and future are asserted as being mere negations, when one accepts reflexive awareness, and when being able to perform a function is equivalence to ultimate truth.

for the record mahayana does not say that vaibhashika or theravada assert unchanging and unconditioned natures. only nonbuddhists assert such things, and mahayana considers vaibhashika and thervada to be buddhist. what mahayana has a problem with is are changing and conditioned natures at the heart of all dhammas.

For the Theravadins there is no eternal nature to the dhammas. Dhammas are empty of self.

this shows confusion to me since noone is asserting eternal natures, at all. what Sarvastivadin means when they talk about past present and future equally existing is that all three exist substantially (ie. past and future have the ability to perform a function equally, just as the present does). this needs to be studied closely, since such an assertion does not necessitate the need of an unchanging or unconditioned nature. rather, the opposite.

5heaps, anything about that unclear?

i shouldnt have brought in abidharmakosha, i should have just merely made my other point which was that the elements are commonly accepted in theravada.however1. avoid the abhidharmakosha and sautrantika at your own peril2. Nagarjuna isnt negating unchanging unconditioned natures. your school already does that pretty well. he is negating changing conditioned natures by establishing emptiness and dependent origination in a radical way.3. sorry for the long post

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

mikenz66 wrote:What I find interesting about Ven Nanananda is that, although he argues (very eloquently) for a momentary interpretation of Dependent Origination in his earlier Sermons, and he argues (again eloquently) that there are problems with many of the classical interpretations of the details, his overall conclusion seems rather classical: the Arahant has ended the round of rebirth.

Hi Mike & all,

The main problem with the classical interpretation is that it defines nibbāna as an existent thing (atthi dhamma) that ultimately exists (paramatthata atthibhāva). Thus the inability to see through this whole atthi/natthi and bhāva/abhāva bifurcation.

It is possible to distinguish the cessation of perception & feeling by distinguishing what it is not. It is not the jhana of nothingness, nor is it the jhana of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Think about what exactly that means.

Nibbana is when the mind is no longer coming or going, but that does not mean it's frozen. Because it is the greatest form of freedom. In whatever we might conceive as "nothingness," there is no freedom. And in whatever we might imagine to be a "mystical transcendental state", there is coming and going. And in both states, there is craving, rebirth, and suffering, even if incredibly subtle.

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

tiltbillings wrote:You need to define svabhava. And you need to explain why you are trying to read Sarvastivadin stuff into the Theravada.

i translate svabhava as 'essential nature' since that is what dhammas need in order to rightly be called a dhamma. a momemtary and dependent essential nature of course.

But the point is, as I have shown, with sources (something you have not done), that essential nature, svabhava, of a dharma for the Sarvastivada: In fact, Yasomitra, commenting on the Abhidharmakosa, maintained that “by ‘own nature’ [svabha] means by the ‘self’ [atman].” And let us not forget that a self is unchanging and eternal.

In the Theravadin Abhidhamma Pitaka text, the Katthavatthu (I 6-8 pgs 115-55 in the Pali and pgs 84-104 in the translation POINTS OF CONTROVERSY), the Sarvastivadin position is directly addressed and rejected.

yes, you can negate the substantiality of past and future but still be classified under the general term "Vaibhashika" as explained by the early indian buddhists.

Early Buddhists, the Theravada, directly addressed and rejected the Sarvastivadin position. There is no justification that you have shown to classify the Theravadin with the Sarvastivadins/"Vaibhashika."

there are many schools within vaibhashika

And the Theravada is not one of them.

for the record mahayana does not say that vaibhashika or theravada assert unchanging and unconditioned natures.

As I already have pointed out above, it is part of the Indian Buddhist commentarial position that begs to strongly to differ with you.

only nonbuddhists assert such things, and mahayana considers vaibhashika and thervada to be buddhist. what mahayana has a problem with is are changing and conditioned natures at the heart of all dhammas.

I do not care what the Mahayana has to say, assuming you are accurately reflecting a Mahayana position (which is not at all a safe assumption). Vaibhashika and Theravada are not equivalent, nor are their dhamma/dharma theories the same, either generally or in particular, which has been shown.

For the Theravadins there is no eternal nature to the dhammas. Dhammas are empty of self.

this shows confusion to me since noone is asserting eternal natures, at all.

Several authors I have quoted say otherwise as does the Indian Buddhist commentator, Yasomitra.

what Sarvastivadin means when they talk about past present and future equally existing is that all three exist substantially (ie. past and future have the ability to perform a function equally, just as the present does).

Rather nicely makes my point.

5heaps, anything about that unclear?

i shouldnt have brought in abidharmakosha, i should have just merely made my other point which was that the elements are commonly accepted in theravada.

Elements? Dhatu? You want to get into that? But you have not read what I wrote with any care. Let me repeat: This is, after all The General Theravada discussion section for discussing things from a Theravadin point of view. 5heaps, anything about that unclear?

1. avoid the abhidharmakosha and sautrantika at your own peril

There is no risk to the Theravada. Being a complete, full path to full awakening, the Theravada does not need the Abhidharmakosha or the sautrantika and it certainly does not need Nagarjuna.

2. Nagarjuna isnt negating unchanging unconditioned natures. your school already does that pretty well. he is negating changing conditioned natures by establishing emptiness and dependent origination in a radical way.

I have to wonder if you have actually studied Nagarjuna, and I have to wonder if you really understand what the Theravada teaches. Do I need to quote you know what again?

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12

Individual wrote:Nibbana is when the mind is no longer coming or going, but that does not mean it's frozen.

Do not mistake meditative experiences for nibbana. Nibbana's most basic definition is the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion. A mind freed no longer colors its experiences by grasping after, by pushing away or by assuming a self.

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12

Lazy_eye wrote:Now this line of thinking raises a rather important question: what kind of state is Nibbana?

For a physicalist, suicide leads to utter annihilation. It's not simply the extinguishing of conditioned consciousness but of any sort of awareness whatsoever. If we draw an equation between the goal of Buddhist practice and the goal of suicide, then we are implying that Buddhist nibbana is identical to annihilation and oblivion (what a materialist would expect to happen after death). But is that the case?

Alex replied:

Alex123 wrote:The difference between Dhamma and Atheistic one-life-only is that Dhamma teaches that there is cause-effect stream of delusive "I, me, mine" making that goes on until citta is no longer producing future effect (Arhatship). Death is not the end unless one doesn't produce any new cittas.

This extract that I quoted from Ven Nanananda seems quite consistent to Alex's post:

Ven Nanananda wrote:Nibbàna is solely the realization of the cessation of existence or the end of the process of becoming. So there is absolutely no ques­tion of a hereafter for the arahant. By way of clarification, we have to revert to the primary sense of the term Nibbàna. We have made it sufficiently clear that Nibbàna means `extinction' or `extinguish­ment', as of a fire....This cooling off happens just before death, without igniting an­other spark of life. When Màra comes to grab and seize, the ara­hant lets go. The pain of death with which Màra teases his hapless victim and lures him into another existence, becomes ineffective in the case of the arahant....This, then, is the Buddha's extraordinary solution to the problem of overcoming death, a solution that completely outwits Màra.

Another related issue that arose was the question of when dukkha actually ceases for an Arahant:

Alex123 wrote:Right. Even the Buddha experienced Physical dukkha. He just didn't experience emotional/mental one. He was "shot with one arrow" rather than "being shot with two". It may shock some, but even being an Arhat is still dukkha, just much less dukkha than being someone below that. The most peaceful and totally dukkha free is PariNibbana. Even an Arahant/Buddha has pain due to existence of remaining aggregates.

Dhammanando wrote: All saṅkhāras are dukkha in the sense of being oppressed by rise and fall (udayavaya-ppaṭipīḷana) and they continue to be so whether they arise for a puthujjana, a sekha or an asekha. Hence the saying: "Whatsoever is felt, all that is included in dukkha."

I do, however, have some misgivings about how Alex expresses some of these ideas. For example:

Alex123 wrote:Existence = presence of mind and/or body.

It is ultimately more or less dukkha, but still dukkha. The cessation of all dukkha is real peace.

Some think that happiness lies in pleasant feelings. But real "happiness" is absence of any and all dukkha.

Ven Nanananda wrote:Venerable Sàriputta once declared that he neither delighted in death nor delighted in life, nàbhinandàmi maraõaü nàbhinandàmi jãvitaü.[36] So the embers go on smouldering until they become ashes. It is when the life span ends that the embers finally turn to ashes. [36] Th 1001, Sàriputtatheragàthà.

However, it seems to me that Sariputta's delight is the result of becoming an Arahant. Taking up this attitude doesn't seem to me to be a useful way to get to that state, and would likely be rather destructive in a non-Arahant, and, at the very least be a grasping at a particular view. So, I presume that Alex is simply expressing his intellectual understanding of the teachings, not his attitude to life.

youre a little wrong about the application of svabhava. you yourself quoted "They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhaava]".

the meaning of svabhava depends entirely on the context and tenet system we are operating from. for example in madhyamika svabhava can refer even to emptiness itself (ie. an illustration of svabhava is example x has no svabhava).

as a theravadin, you dont want to be saying that things lack svabhava, because for you this word is not equivalent to atman. you want to say the opposite, because persons possess svabhava, they are anatman (ie. no unchanging essence to persons). what is the exact context of Yasomitra's comment? can you quote it more fully?

Rather nicely makes my point.

no. asserting that the past and future are able to perform very specific functions does not in any slight way imply unchanging essences. one of the things it implies is negations perform functions.

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

5heaps wrote:as a theravadin, you dont want to be saying that things lack svabhava, because for you this word is not equivalent to atman. you want to say the opposite, because persons possess svabhava, they are anatman (ie. no unchanging essence to persons).

Hi 5heaps,

This is nonsense. What school posits that persons (puggala) are sabbāva or possess sabbāva? Theravāda certainly doesn't make such claims.

Ñāṇa wrote:This is nonsense. What school posits that persons (puggala) are sabbāva or possess sabbāva? Theravāda certainly doesn't make such claims.

of course things exist through their own characteristic natures. are you a nihilist such that you want to deny that things exist?as the insurmountable wikipedia says "It is that which makes a dharma what it is".

A Japanese man has been arrested on suspicion of writing a computer virus that destroys and replaces files on a victim PC with manga images of squid, octopuses and sea urchins. Masato Nakatsuji, 27, of Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, was quoted as telling police: "I wanted to see how much my computer programming skills had improved since the last time I was arrested."

5heaps wrote:of course things exist through their own characteristic natures. are you a nihilist such that you want to deny that things exist?as the insurmountable wikipedia says "It is that which makes a dharma what it is".

For the Theravada sabhava is what makes a dhamma a dhamma, and that own-nature, sabhava is "exists" by the nature of interdependence, as the various quotes I have given show.

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12

5heaps wrote:of course things exist through their own characteristic natures. are you a nihilist such that you want to deny that things exist?as the insurmountable wikipedia says "It is that which makes a dharma what it is".

For the Theravada sabhava is what makes a dhamma a dhamma, and that own-nature, sabhava is "exists" by the nature of interdependence, as the various quotes I have given show.

And just out of curiosity, what does Nagarjuna say: Whenever existing things exist by nature of their interdependence, this is called "emptiness; For whatever existing things exist by nature of their interdependence, they lack self-existence. - v 22 Vigraha-vyavartani, trans F. Streng.

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12

you yourself quoted "They are dhammas because they uphold their own nature [sabhaava]".

Try the fuller context.

as a theravadin, you dont want to be saying that things lack svabhava, because for you this word is not equivalent to atman. you want to say the opposite, because persons possess svabhava, they are anatman (ie. no unchanging essence to persons).

Don’t put words in my mouth. First of all the Buddha did not teach sabhava. That is a later doctrine.

"On the contrary, before their rise [the bases, aayatana] they had no individual essence [sabhaava], and after their fall their individual essence are completely dissolved. And they occur without mastery [being exercisable over them] since they exist in dependence on conditions and in between the past and the future." Visuddhimagga (PP) page 551 XV 15. This certainly not what the Sarvastivadins teach. Dhammas lack a self-existing sabhava, and quite frankly, sabhava for the Theravadins, is simply one way of talking about the interdependent nature of dhammas.

what is the exact context of Yasomitra's comment? can you quote it more fully?

What I have is what I gave you.

Rather nicely makes my point.

no. asserting that the past and future are able to perform very specific functions does not in any slight way imply unchanging essences. one of the things it implies is negations perform functions.

Since you quote nothing to support your position, I am not taking what you say here as being indicative of the Sarvastivadin position, especially since in runs counter to everything I have quoted.

This being is bound to samsara, kamma is his means for going beyond. -- SN I, 38.

“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?” HPatDH p.723

>> Do you see a man wise[enlightened/ariya]in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.<<-- Proverbs 26:12