Milestones: 1969–1976

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Shuttle Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1975

In January and May 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
engaged in “shuttle diplomacy,” a term coined by the members of the media who
followed Kissinger on his various short flights among Middle East capitals as he
sought to deal with the fallout of the October 1973 war. After three weeks of
fighting, a ceasefire found Israeli forces entangled with the Egyptian and
Syrian forces. This presented President Richard Nixon and Kissinger with an
opportunity to play a lead role in disengaging these armies from one another and
possibly laying the groundwork for further steps to peacefully resolve the
25-year conflict. In January 1974, Kissinger helped negotiate the first
Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in eight days, and in May, he arranged
a Syrian-Israeli disengagement after a month of intense negotiations.
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy secured one last deal in September 1975 with the
conclusion of a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

The map of the second disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in
1975. (Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State)

The origins of the first shuttle started with Israel’s proposals for
disengagement with the Egyptians on January 4 and 5, 1974. Israel’s proposals
demonstrated to Kissinger that the two sides were close enough for him to engage
in intensive diplomacy between Jerusalem and Cairo to find a way to negotiate a
solution. Nixon, who had become severely distracted by the growing Watergate
crisis, encouraged Kissinger to make the trip, but Nixon’s involvement in this
negotiation and the ones to follow before his resignation was minimal.

On January 11, Kissinger arrived in Aswan, Egypt where President Anwar
Sadat worked during the winter. The negotiations would center
around three key items: first, where the forward line of each army would be
located; second, the size of the zones where armor was to be limited; and third,
the types of armor to be limited in these zones. The Israelis also wanted the
Egyptians to reopen the Suez Canal and sought assurances guaranteeing Israeli
passage through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and Bab el-Madeb.
Furthermore, Israel desired Egypt to reconstruct cities along the Suez Canal so
as to ensure that the danger to Egyptian civilian populations would deter Egypt
from starting another war. Kissinger shuttled between Israel and Egypt for a
week, reaching an agreement on January 18. The highlights of the agreement
included limited Egyptian and Israeli forces divided by a U.N. buffer zone on
the east bank of the Suez Canal. Egypt also agreed to most of the assurances
that Israel had requested.

Following the conclusion of this Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement,
commonly known as Sinai I, U.S. attention moved to Syria, the other country with
armies entangled with Israel’s forces. Kissinger hoped moving on the
Syrian-Israeli front would lead the Arab members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to lift the oil embargo they had imposed
on the United States in retaliation for American assistance to Israel during the
war.

Unlike the relatively short negotiations that led to the Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement agreement, negotiations for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement proved
far more arduous and took much longer. By March 18, OPEC lifted the oil embargo,
but it would be subject to review on June I. With a need to show progress in
negotiations between Israel and Syria before then, Kissinger moved forward in
laying the groundwork for another shuttle. Through the end of March and most of
April, Kissinger met separately in Washington with Israeli officials and a
senior- level Syrian emissary to discuss the groundwork for negotiations.

By the end of April, Kissinger decided the time was right to begin his second
shuttle in the Middle East. On May 1, he left for Jerusalem to begin nearly a
month of intense negotiations between the Israelis and Syrians. The negotiation
centered on the town of Quneitra in the Golan Heights, three kilometers within
the zone Israel had captured during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Since
Quneitra did not include any Israeli settlements, the Syrians wanted the town
returned as part of any agreement, as well as the territory taken during the
October war. After the first week of negotiations, the Syrians and Israelis had
shared with Kissinger their views of a line of disengagement. They were close to
one another; however, control of Quneitra and three hills that surrounded the
town remained the key stumbling block. By mid-May, both sides had agreed to
compromises that put their proposals within a few hundred meters of each other,
and Israel had assented to a civilian Syrian presence in Quneitra. Despite the
progress, neither side would close the gap needed to complete an agreement. On
May 16, Kissinger offered an American proposal that sought to find the common
ground necessary to reach a compromise. Both sides wanted modifications to this
American proposal, however, and negotiations dragged on for another two weeks
with Kissinger almost ceasing the negotiations on three separate occasions.
Finally, on May 31, Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement.

On August 9, Nixon resigned the presidency, and Vice-President Gerald
Ford assumed the office while keeping Kissinger on board as both
Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. During the fall, much to the
U.S. Government’s disappointment, an Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco virtually
eliminated any hopes of a Jordanian-Israeli agreement. The Arab representatives
announced a resolution on October 28 that recognized the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and
affirmed its right “to establish an independent national authority over all
liberated territory.” Despite previous Jordanian efforts during the year to
engage the Israelis in negotiations over the West Bank and Jerusalem, this
resolution forced King Hussein to defer to the PLO in future negotiations with
Israel over the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

With Jordan no longer in a position to press the United States for a negotiation
with Israel, and Israel unwilling to talk with the PLO, Sadat convinced
President Ford and Kissinger that they should spend 1975 pushing for a second
agreement between Israel and Egypt over the Sinai. Unlike Sinai I, however,
negotiations for this second agreement proved far more challenging and lasted
several months. After initial discussions with the Egyptians and Israelis, Ford
concluded that the Israelis were not as forthcoming as Egypt, and in March, he
called for a reassessment of U.S. policy towards Israel. This sparked an outcry
from the U.S. Senate, and Ford backtracked during the early summer. Ultimately,
by August, an agreement was within sight, and Kissinger finished the second
Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, known as the Sinai Interim Agreement
or Sinai II, which Egypt and Israel signed on September 4. This agreement led to
the withdrawal of Israeli forces further east in the Sinai and a U.N. buffer
zone put in the place of the Israelis. The agreement also committed major U.S.
resources through the establishment of three manned stations and three unmanned
electronic sensor fields in the Sinai.