Training is the process by which organization, manpower, and materiel are merged
within a doctrinal framework to achieve institutional goals. Beginning in the
mid-1970s with the all-volunteer force, the Army's approach to training shifted
from an emphasis on training for victory during a long period of mobilization
to maintaining highly trained and mobile forces that could deter aggression
or achieve combat success on short notice. The emphasis on training was further
spurred by the widely held view that the Soviet Union had closed, and in some
cases even surpassed, the technological gap with the United States.

Army leaders sought to offset Soviet advantages in both technology and superior
numbers with better training. Training in the Army during the 1970s and 1980s
ranged from a basic introduction to individual warfighting skills to unit training
that involved joint and combined exercises. It embraced acquisition of highly
specialized technical skills and imbuing soldiers with the qualities of exemplary
leaders. The application of technology to training techniques became a hallmark
of all Army training. By the end of the 1980s interactive computer-based teaching,
wargaming by computer to simulate tactical problems and force-on-force maneuvers,
and distributive training, or providing computer-generated training at home
stations, had become essential ingredients in training the force. Training doctrine
was increasingly centralized within TRADOC and the proponent schools, while
the conduct of training became more decentralized throughout the Army.

By FY 1989 most aspects of Army training had been recast from the pre-1970
mold. The mobilization-based Army Training Program (ATP) was replaced by the
Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). A performance-oriented program
for unit training, the ARTEP required squads through battalions to perform to
a standard, not simply to train for a specified period of time. It required
units to train as they would fight, achieving proficiency for specific missions
through the mastery of individual and unit tasks. The development of national
training centers was

the apex of the Army's unit training strategy. If the ARTEP reflected the Army's
quest for standardization and realistic assessment of unit training, adoption
of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) became the means to evaluate individual
proficiency. TRADOC's operating budget for FY 1989 was 15 percent less than
in FY 1987. During FY 1988 and 1989 shortfalls in TRADOC's training budget were
partly compensated by the diversion of funds from its base operations account,
but the practice exacerbated the backlog in facilities maintenance and repair.
Higher costs for training ammunition drove up training costs, and environmental
concern s impinged on training initiatives. At Fort Riley, Kansas, and other
posts, local residents objected to the Army's plans to acquire additional land
to expand maneuver areas and firing ranges. As FY 1989 began, the Army had culminated
a year of training initiatives that were part of the FY 1988 Year of Training.
During FY 1989 General Vuono stated that the Army would adhere to its training
philosophy, which emphasized the attainment of standards rather than simply
putting in time. A major step in institutionalizing this approach was Vuono's
approval on 15 November 1988 of FM 25-100, Training the Force, a manual
that espoused a training doctrine that prepared soldiers for AirLand Battle.
General Vuono formally introduced FM 25-100 to CONUS commanders at the Senior
Leader Training Conference (SLTC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in November 1988.
He made a similar presentation at a USAREUR senior leader conference at the
Seventh Army Training Center, Grafenwoehr, West Germany, in January 1989.

At both conferences General Vuono reinforced the themes that emerged from the
Year of Training. Prominent among them were the needs to have realistic training,
to align individual and unit training with the Mission Essential Task List (METL),
and to emphasize leader development. The Chief of Staff and the conferees extolled
the virtues of the realistic live - f ire training conducted at the combat training
centers (CTC) but recognized that the opportunities for units to train there
were limited. The conferees agreed on the importance of conducting training
at home stations that most closely approximated CTC training and that emphasized
combined arms training. They were unanimous in stressing that NCOs must play
a major role in individual training that supported a unit's METL. The CONUSA
Commander's Conference, held a week after the first SLTC, centered on reserve
component training. The CONUSA commanders stressed the importance of obtaining
at least 85 percent Military Occupational Specialty Qualification in RC battalions
and ensuring that RC personnel maintained their critical skills. Most importantly,
they underscored the need to stabilize missions and CAPSTONE assignments for
RC units to enable them to train properly for mobilization and deployment requirements.

248

Operating tempo, or OPTEMPO, measured the operating and sustaining resources
associated with a particular training strategy to predict readiness levels.
OPTEMPO included funds for all aspects of training  procurement of spares,
fuel, maintenance, and other support functions. Ground OPTEMPO was expressed
as a yearly rate in miles/hours for major items of equipment, such as tanks.
In FY 1989 the Army restored ground OPTEMPO from 725 miles in FY 1988 to 850
miles. Air OPTEM-PO reflected the number of hours flown per month by a crew
in rotary-wing aircraft to sustain training and mission support. For FY 1989
the Army sought an air OPTEMPO for active and reserve component units of 15.8
and 9.8 hours a month, respectively. While preserving the rate for active forces,
the FY 1989 budget reduced the RC rates to 8.8 for the USAR and 7.8 for the
ARNG. The Army's long-range training plan, approved by General Vuono in late
July 1989, reflected the impact of reduced funding, environmental concerns,
and the need to exploit technologies to restrain training costs without losing
realism. The cost to fire one cannon round from the M1 Abrams tank was $135,
while the cost to fire a round from the M1A1 tank was seven times greater. Transportation
costs to move troops to and from training centers continued to rise. The Military
Traffic Management Command estimated that the Army spent approximately $30 million
in FY 1989 to move personnel and equipment by rail to the National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California.

Individual Training

Several developments during FY 1989 highlighted the Army's commitment to leadership
training. A major step was General Vuono's approval on 30 June 1989 of the final
draft for FM 22-100, Military Leadership. In May 1989 the Chief of Staff
approved implementation of the Leader Development Support System, which sought
to accommodate leader development to changes in the Army. Its three functional
components were an advisory board to the Chief of Staff that consisted of senior
Army leaders; the Leader Development Off ice, Fort Leavenworth , Kansas, which
would assess and formulate leader development initiatives; and the Leader Development
Decision Network, composed of representatives from many Army organizations who
would examine leader development issues for the LDO.

Throughout FY 1989 the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth pursued
implementation of fifty-two initiatives that stemmed from the Officer Leader
Development Study completed in FY 1985 that were subsequently incorporated into
the Leader Development Action Plan. Thirty of the fifty-two initiatives had
been implemented by early FY 1989, and the remaining twenty-two were in various
stages of

249

implementation. Examples included the assignment of all lieutenants to TOE or
equivalent units following completion of the Officer Basic Course and assignment
of a functional area skill designator in the fifth, rather than the seventh
year of active service.

Two additional leader development studies were conducted in FY 1989. The NCO
Leader Development Study, conducted by a task force at the Sergeants Major Academy,
Fort Bliss, Texas, resulted in the NCO Leader Development Action Plan, signed
by General Vuono in October 1989. Another study, undertaken by TRADOC's Civilian
Training Directorate, addressed civilian leader development. Both studies were
slated for completion during the fiscal year. To hone leadership skills of new
field grade combat unit commanders, the Tactical Commander's Development Course,
a two-week course that followed the precommand course at the Command and General
Staff School, was introduced. Staff rides and computer simulations of combat
using the Army Training Battle Simulation System (ARTBASS) were examples of
other measures available in FY 1989 to enhance leader development. General Vuono
stressed self-development for leadership with professional reading guided by
the 1988 Contemporary Military Reading List, dated 1 October 1988, or
maintaining competency in a foreign language. The proliferation of professional
reading lists by branch schools and service journals led the Chief of Military
History in FY 1989 to advocate a consolidated Leader Development Reading List
for Military History.

Since 1945 the Army has conducted seven major studies that addressed officer
education and training, the latest being the leader development study initiated
in FY 1985. All of these studies have pointed to the necessity of adapting education
and training to the changing needs of the Army and the nation. They also reaffirmed
the three fundamental pillars of officer training and education  formal
education, operational experience, and self-development  grounded in current
doctrine and operations, the lessons of military history, constitutional and
democratic values, and professional military ethics. According to General Vuono,
the Army's objective was to produce professional soldiers and leaders who were
skilled in staff functions and combat at every echelon of command, attuned to
the requisites of joint and combined activities, and able to advise decision
makers at the highest policy and strategy-making levels.

The officer education system was structured to match the increased responsibility
of higher command assignments. It was grounded in the Military Qualification
Standards (MQS) system, which was being revised to accentuate combat skills.
The first level, MQS I, encompassed precommissioning training; MQS II, revised
in FY 1989, applied to an officer's first three years of commissioned service
and stressed company-level duties. Still being developed, MQS III would apply
to the fourth to tenth years of

250

an officer's career. Each MQS was divided into a set of military tasks, derived
from applicable METLs, and other military education components.

Precommissioning training was provided at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA),
in college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs, and at Army officer
candidate schools. Cadet enrollment at the USMA in FY 1989 totaled 4,543, with
1,011 cadets graduating in the Class of 1989. The ROTC program was the source
for most newly commissioned lieutenants in both the active and reserve components.
To increase opportunities for enlisted men to become officers, TRADOC's Cadet
Command devised a program, "Green-to-Gold," which allowed enlisted
soldiers to pursue a commission through ROTC. Under this program soldiers are
discharged from active duty to enroll in Army ROTC in an accredited college
program. By virtue of their earlier Army experience and education, participants
received credits toward a college degree and had to complete only the final
two years of ROTC training. The eight-year obligation incurred through enrollment
in the program could be served on active duty or in the reserves.

Advanced officer training began with selection to the Command and General Staff
Officers Course (CGSOC), designed to develop general staff officers and field
grade commanders. From a pool of 6,379 eligible majors and promotable captains,
the Army selected 913 officers to attend the CGSOC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
or an equivalent military college of a sister service or of an allied military
power during the 1989-1990 school term. During the 1988-1989 term an introduction
to joint planning and operations was introduced for all students in the CGSOC,
along with electives for officers preparing to become joint specialists. In
addition to resident students, approximately fifteen thousand additional officers
were enrolled in CGSOC correspondence courses. In FY 1989 the number of officers
selected to attend the CGSOC or an equivalent school during the next term increased
to 1,279, reflecting General Vuono's decision in January 1989 to increase resident
enrollment at the CGSOC by 20 percent. The increase was needed, in part, to
compensate for the influx of officers who in the past attended the Armed Forces
Staff College (AFSC) as an equivalent to the CGSOC. Under the new joint education
program the AFSC would constitute the second phase of joint training.

The zenith of institutional officer training was attendance at the Army War
College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, or one of several similar courses.
In the 1989-1990 academic year, 363 Army lieutenant colonels and colonels were
selected to attend senior service colleges  178 for the Army War College,
37 for the National War College, 55 for the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 27 for the Naval War College, 17 for the Air War College, 46 for various
fellowship programs, and 3 to attend an equivalent foreign service college.

251

Specialized individual training often supplemented institutional training.
Army officers were prominent among students at the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center and the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program. Approximately
130 to 140 officers were enrolled in this rigorous program in FY 1989. More
than 60 percent of Army officers who had received FAO training eventually occupied
joint, combined, or DOD staff positions. Twenty FAOs have served with the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces on-site inspection teams in the Soviet Union. The revival of
interest in staff rides and battlefield tours to supplement and complement institutional
instruction continued in FY 1989. During FY 1989 the Center of Military History
conducted Civil War battlefield staff rides for members of the Army Staff and
also for students at the Army War College. A unique example of this genre of
training was the battlefield tour of Iwo Jima conducted jointly in the summer
of 1989 by USARJ/IX Corps and the History Department of the Japanese Ground
Defense Force.

The task of transforming civilians into soldiers begins with initial entry
training for which TRADOC expended about 50 percent of its FY 1989 training
funds. Basic and advanced training were carried out at s even installations
in the United States  Forts Bliss, Dix, Jackson, Knox , Leonard Wood,
McClellan, and Sill. A total of 68,900 members of active component and 43,142
members of the reserve enlistment program received basic combat training. One-station
unit training was conducted at five bases  Forts Benning, Knox, Leonard
Wood, McClellan, and Sill  and given to 32,607 active component and 12,185
reserve enlistees. During FY 1989, 17,851 active component and 14,350 reservists
received advanced individual training. During the year 130 training companies
supported basic training, and 102 companies carried out one-station unit training.

For the past several years the Army has reduced attrition among recruits during
the first six months of military service. In part, this success was attributable
to changes in recruit training adopted by TRADOC in the mid-1980s. These changes
included more emphasis on positive leadership and encouragement rather than
high-stress leadership that focused on recruits' weaknesses, greater attention
to the physical conditioning of recruits, and the assignment of more experienced
drill sergeants to training units. While physical fitness standards we r e unchanged
in FY 1989, the Army sought to maximize physical training. Examples were modifying
training regimens to minimize injuries and using aerobic exercises to develop
endurance rather than relying solely on long road marches.

In response to recommendations from its MACOMs, HQDA also clarified certain
policies pertaining to the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) in FY 1989. HQDA
retained the requirement for two tests a year, but changed

252

the interval from every six months to at least four months. Commanders could
administer the APFT as often as they wished, but had to tell troops when the
test was for record purposes. During FY 1989 the Army was revising AR 350-15,
The Army Physical Fitness Program, to conform to the principles contained
in FM 21-20, Physical Training, and to reflect changes in the standards
and frequency of testing. To improve physical fitness through-out the Army,
TRADOC considered adding the master fitness trainer program to all Army professional
schooling for officers and NCOs. The four-week master fitness trainer course
taught at the Army Physical Fitness School located at Fort Benjamin Harrison,
Indiana, during FY 1989 was attended by about one thousand active and five
hundred reserve component personnel. Course graduates, upon returning to their
units, would inject new training principles and techniques into unit training
programs. The school also sent military training teams to Europe and Korea.

Underscoring the importance of marksmanship, General Vuono, in October 1988,
stated that, "The ability to fire our weapons accurately is a fundamental
requirement in our business." He noted a wide disparity in Army marksmanship
training standards. The crux of the problem, in his view, was to teach junior
leaders to impart marksmanship skills and to make better use of training devices.
In response to General Vuono's concern, TRADOC formulated a program to train
officers and NCOs at advanced schools to become expert marksmen and also to
teach them to organize training programs for their units. A pilot program developed
at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, utilized the resident Army Marksmanship
Unit, which also sent training teams to other posts. Three additional marksmanship
teams were formed by FORSCOM in each CONUS corps to conduct similar training.
Within units, instruction would concentrate on detecting and correcting poor
firing techniques using means that varied from the traditional "dime test"
of balancing a coin on a rifle barrel to insure a steady hand to sophisticated
electronic equipment that simulated firing under battlefield conditions.

As projected in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, the service
planned for an enrollment of 559,714 trainees that included all training centers,
service schools, NCO courses, and drill sergeant schools. Actual attendance
was 451,545. Branch and other specialized schools operated by TRADOC accounted
for most non-IET training. School enrollment varied from 34,473 at the Infantry
School to 74 at the Army's Polygraph Institute. At branch proponent schools,
school commandants were responsible for meshing combat and training developments,
formulating training strategies that encompassed all branch-related individual
and unit training, and providing for distributive training. The introduction
of new or improved weapons and equipment, such as the MSE, spurred the initiation
or expansion of training programs. The US

253

Army Communications-Electronics Command for example, started a resident school
at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in FY 1989 to train soldiers to operate and maintain
the MSE, with instruction being provided by GTE, the prime contractor.

Impending budget cuts and base realignments and closings also caused changes
in the Army's training establishment. Looking to FY 1990, TRADOC directed schools
that offered MOS Level-1 training programs of ten weeks' duration to reduce
the course length by 10 percent. The Army leadership decided to consolidate
intelligence training at the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, when Fort Devens, Massachusetts, site of a major portion
of the Army's intelligence training, was nominated by Congress for closure.
The Army also considered closing FORSCOM's Air Assault Schools at Forts Hood,
Ord, and Drum, retaining only the FORSCOM-sponsored air assault school at Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, and TRADOC's Air Assault School at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
A decision was still pending at the end of FY 1989.

Unit Training

Army units trained as they expected to fight; this varied from the home station
annual training plan to joint and combined exercises. Units could also engage
in special area training for varied climatic and terrain conditions. This training
entailed the rotation of battalions for training at the Jungle Warfare Training
Center at Fort Sherman, Panama; the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort
Greely, Alaska; or winter training at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. More realistic
and intensive unit training occurred within the Army's Combat Training Center
program.

The CTC program had four sites  the National Training Center at Fort
Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas; the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, West Germany;
and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) headquartered at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. The program was created to meet the Army's need for realistic combined
arms training for battalions and brigades. The training strategy sought to train
battalion task forces in joint and combined scenarios that replicated combat
from low to high intensity and to provide advanced training through command
post exercises for corps and division staffs. From its opening in FY 1980 to
FY 1989, the NTC trained 143 battalions. Each center provided force-on-force
training by an opposing force (OPFOR) that employed Soviet tactics and techniques
and integrated all elements of AirLand Battle doctrine through field training
and in its wargaming program. Congress has strongly endorsed the CTC program
and increased its funding from $192.5 million in FY 1988 to $259.1 million in
FY 1989.

254

Following the Chief of Staff 's decision in January 1987 to bring the CTCs
under a unified training umbrella, the Army continued to develop a Combat Training
Center Master Plan. On 31 May 1989, General Vuono indicated that the CMTC, JRTC,
and BCTP should be fully operational before expanding the NTC. Environmental
impact statements and a stationing study had to be completed prior to any decisions
to create new sites or expand existing ones. He also wanted to improve the quality
of the opposing forces and directed AMC and TRADOC to explore the feasibility
of acquiring better vehicles to replace the OPFOR's aging ones.

General Vuono insisted upon a high priority to fielding standardized tactical
engagement simulation and simulator devices such as MILES-PIP, the Intelligence
Electronic Warfare Training Evaluation Center, the Air Ground Engagement Simulation,
and Simulated Area Weapons Effects, which interacted with MILES to assess casualties
caused by indirect fire at all CTCs. Teams from the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL) at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the
Army Research Institute (ARI) collected and analyzed data at the CTCs on battlefield
performance and the effectiveness of training and doctrine. ARI researchers
at the NTC, for example, found that casualty exchange ratios had a strong correlation
to OPTEMPO and training that a unit undertook to prepare for its NTC rotation.

The NTC, operated jointly by FORSCOM and TRADOC, trained mechanized infantry
and armor battalion task forces in scenarios of mid-to high-intensity conflict
and was the only CTC site under FORSCOM's command. During FY 1989 twenty-eight
heavy and four light battalions trained at the NTC, including two ARNG roundout
battalions. The 4th Division completed a roundout rotation with elements of
the North Carolina ARNG. Fourteen of the rotations involved two battalions,
and several included a third, usually of light infantry, to test heavy-light
force mix. Each training cycle lasted about three weeks. The Army intended to
expand the NTC program to brigade rotations and to increase the mix of heavy,
light, and special operations forces. For more realism, AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters were added to the training program for the first time in FY 1989.
Eighteen Apaches from the 1st Battalion, 227th Aviation, 1st Cavalry Division,
from Fort Hood, Texas, arrived at the NTC early in 1989 to test and perfect
combined arms tactics and techniques with units training at the NTC. Valuable
experience was gained in employing the Kiowa OH-58D scout helicopter and the
Apache as a hunter-killer team. The scout helicopter scanned the battlefield
for suitable targets and relayed information to the Apache, which launched a
laser-guided Hellfire missile that the Kiowa helped guide to target.

Created in 1983, the JRTC trained nonmechanized battalion task forces in low-
to mid-intensity conflict scenarios. Most JRTC exercises

255

were conducted at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, but the Operations Group and OPFOR
were stationed at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, 150 miles distant.
Depending on the nature of the exercise, training could be conducted at other
specialized training areas. During FY 1989 nine battalion light infantry task
forces trained at the JRTC. Elements of the 6th, 7th, and 25th Infantry Divisions
(LID); the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); a ranger battalion; a light-heavy
force composed of elements of the 82d Airborne Division and the 194th Armored
Brigade; and two ARNG battalion task forces trained at the JRTC in FY 1989.

The JRTC FY 1989 Decision Study set forth a concept for a new training center
for light infantry and airmobile operations. Four possible locations 
Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; and Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas  were being considered. The prospective training center
would provide low-intensity conflict training opportunities for light infantry,
airmobile, parachute, ranger, and special forces in which Air Force participation
was fully integrated. The preferred basing strategy called for one permanent
site that could support three battalion/ brigade operations. A final decision
was not expected until FY 1990. TRADOC was studying a concept for mobile training
teams to export JRTC-type exercises to home training station sites as part of
its distributive training efforts.

The Combat Maneuver Training Center, located at Hohenfels Training Area, West
Germany, was intended to provide training similar to the NTC for USAREUR battalion
task forces. During FY 1989 the Army continued to prepare the facility by installing
a sophisticated instrumentation system, establishing an OPFOR, and organizing
a permanent Operations Group. The first unit rotation was anticipated in September
1989 and full operation by FY 1991. Congress had delayed funding because it
found that some allies would use it and not pay their share. Funds were released
after DOD adopted a policy that restricted its use to US forces.

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) was designed to improve the warfighting
skills of corps and division commanders and staffs in all conflict scenarios.
Established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1987, the BCTP was modeled after
programs offered to unit commanders at the NTC. Ideally, the BCTP should be
scheduled within six months of a change of command. The BCTP program had three
phases: seminars and workshops at Fort Leavenworth, a warfighting exercise,
and a post exercise sustainment package. Using the Joint Exercise Support System
(JESS) developed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratories, the BCTP could simulate
a corps exercise through compatible computer equipment at the home station of
a participating unit. Phase one of the BCTP was a five - day seminar in which
the commander and his battle staff engaged in an intensive review of AirLand
Battle doctrine and

256

wargaming in workshops and decision-making exercises. Normally lasting nine
days, the warfighter segment, or phase two, included a five - d ay CPX conducted
against a simulated OPFOR driven by the Corps Battle Simulation system based
at Fort Leavenworth. The final phase was an assessment of the warfighter exercise
by the BCTP staff and a lessons learned package to sustain the level of proficiency
achieved during the CPX. During FY 1989 the CALL published a summary of lessons
learned derived from BCTP exercises.

TRADOC proposed in FY 1989 that all corps and divisions undertake the BCTP
every two years. Army training policy, as defined in AR 350-50, Combat Training
Center Program, called for division and corps commanders to receive the
BCTP sometime during their command tenure. General Vuono stipulated that participation
in the BCTP should come during the first year of each corps and division commander's
tour. This required five corps and eighteen active component divisions to undertake
BCTP every two years and ten ARNG divisions every four years. With only two
mobile training teams available to conduct BCTP seminars and warfighter exercises
(WFXes), adherence to these policies was impossible. Actual participation in
the BCTP in FY 1989 was as follows: the 1st Armored Division (USAREUR), 25th
Infantry Division (WESTCOM), I Corps, and the 82d Airborne Division participated
in seminars; the 3d, 5th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 3d Armored
Divisions held WFXes. The 3d Armored Division's WFX in November 1988 was the
first to be conducted in USAREUR. Elements of the C&GSC at Fort Leavenworth
participated in phase one of the BCTP as part of Exercise WARRIOR 90.

Army Exercise Program

The Army Exercise Program included unilateral, or Army only, exercises conducted
at corps level or below as well as participation in joint and combined exercises
sponsored by the JCS or one of the unified or specified commands. These exercises
allowed the Army to conduct total force training in its wartime missions, joint
operations, and interoperability training with allied forces. Every major joint
exercise included a significant RC presence. The basic objective of the JCS
Joint Exercise Program was to maintain the wartime readiness of forces assigned
to the unified commands. Joint exercises, both command post (CPX) and joint
field training exercises, have assumed greater importance since passage of the
DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. A comprehensive Joint Training Plan mandated
by the 1986 act, which derived from training requirements from joint mission
essential task lists and appropriate operation plans, was scheduled for completion
in FY 1990. During FY 1989 proponency for

257

Army participation in JESS was transferred from FORSCOM to HQDA. In FY 1989
the Army participated in about fifty JCS exercises.

Among the more significant training exercises in FY 1989 was Project ARCTIC
WARRIOR. One phase was Operation BRIMFROST, a joint/combined CPX and cold weather
field training exercise (FTX) sponsored by FORSCOM. Conducted between 3 January
and 1 February 1989 in Alaska to train elements of Joint Task Force-Alaska,
BRIMFROST involved about twenty-six thousand American and Canadian troops. US
Army participation included elements of the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions (Light)
and ARNG and USAR units. These forces engaged in Arctic Light Infantry Training
and received cold weather indoctrination. Other parts of ARCTIC WARRIOR were
WESTCOM's participation in Exercise FORTRESS GALE 89-1, along with Army air
defense units of the Alaskan North American Defense Region in Exercise FENCING
BRAVE. These exercises tested command relationships and joint interoperability
of two separate joint task forces from two unified commands, the Pacific Command
and FORSCOM, in the defense of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.

Ground forces of the ABCA nations  American, British, Canadian, and Australian
 joined in Exercise CALTROP FORCE `89 during March 1989 at Forts Ord and
Hunter Liggett in California. The quadripartite FTX and conference were hosted
by the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and brought together battalion task forces
from each of the four nations as a multinational brigade for the first time
since the Korean War. Joining US Army and Marine Corps elements were the British
1st Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade, the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment, and the 3d Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Its purpose
was to gain experience in coordinating procedures, equipment, and tactics in
a low- to mid-intensity scenario. Highlights of the exercise were an amphibious
assault, a night parachute drop, and an airmobile assault. As the combined force
headquarters, the 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), provided command
and control for the total force of about eight thousand. The most important
finding regarding standardization was the lack of interoperability between the
combat radio nets of each country.

Notable among the JTXs that entailed Army and Air Force cooperation was Exercise
BLUE FLAG 89-1, an Air Force sponsored CPX held in January 1989. It trained
participants in the concepts of AirLand Battle coordination using the US Central
Command's Southwest Asia campaign plan as the exercise scenario. Major Army
participants included Third US Army in its role as US Army Forces, Central Command,
and I Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps. The largest air defense field exercise
ever held in the United States, ROVING SANDS, was conducted 14 through 23 August
at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. A joint Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps exercise, it involved about eight thou-

258

sand troops. Major Army participants were the six battalions of the 11th Air
Defense Artillery Brigade assembled from Fort Bliss; Fort Bragg, North Carolina;
and Fort Stewart, Georgia, along with ARNG air defense units from Florida and
New Mexico. Most Army air defense weapons were employed, including Patriot,
HAWK, Chaparral, and Stinger missiles and Vulcan 20-mm. guns. Marines manned
ground radar command and control centers and provided air cover with Harrier
AV-8 aircraft. Air Force participation was confined largely to the role of the
aggressor.

Exercise TEAM SPIRIT, conducted annually in South Korea as a joint/combined
exercise sponsored by the Commander in Chief, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command,
took place between 13 and 23 March 1989. Its purpose was to increase combat
readiness and interoperability of ROK and American forces in combined operations
and to demonstrate American resolve to deter aggression in Korea. American and
South Korean participation in the ground phases of the FTX involved two field
army headquarters, four corps headquarters, six active divisions, two reserve
divisions, and one mechanized/armor brigade. Ground operations allowed for large-scale
maneuvers using a full array of tactics, combat and combat service support,
and an operation that linked up with an amphibious force.

American participation included elements of the 2d, 7th, and 25th Infantry
Divisions and sixty-seven USAR and forty-nine ARNG units. TEAM SPIRIT tested
mobilization, emergency deployment and logistical readiness, and strategic mobility.
The I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, for example, mobilized and deployed more
than twelve thousand troops, half of them from the reserve components. The USAR
164th Support Group and the AC 45th Support Group functioned as subordinates
of the USAR 311th Corps Support Command (COSCOM) to provide supply, service,
and maintenance support to approximately twelve thousand troops of I Corps and
the 25th Infantry Division (Light). The logistical play of TEAM SPIRIT suggested
that more effective combat service support could be achieved by organizing the
corps support group into multifunctional forward support battalions similar
to the division support command.

For the past twenty years the most significant training exercise in Western
Europe was REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany), an annual exercise to reinforce
NATO. Because of unanticipated increases in transportation costs and the weakening
of the dollar relative to European currencies in FY 1989, REFORGER 89 was canceled
and combined with REFORGER 90, scheduled for early 1990. Exercises that entailed
computer simulation by satellite links to players in the continental United
States helped to compensate for the cancellation of REFORGER. Examples were
COURAGEOUS GUARDIAN 88, conducted by NATO 's Northern Army Group and III Corps
in October 1988 and 6 Allied Tactical Air Force CPX DISTINCT JAVELIN in

259

April 1989. These exercises sought to replicate REFORGER training
at a fraction of the maneuver and environmental impact costs. The REFORGER
Enhancement Program allowed allied commanders in Europe to conduct interactive
free play down to corps level from home bases. In addition, NATO held its
biennial command post exercise, WINTEX-CIMEX (Winter Exercise-Civil Military
Exercise), in early 1989. A JCS-directed, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers,
Europe (SHAPE), and European Command (EUCOM) sponsored, NATO-wide CPX, it
was held in February and March 1989 to train civil authorities and military
commands in the use of operation plans and to test procedures and communications
for NATO command and control functions in time of crisis.

Exercise CARAVAN GUARD 89 was conducted in September 1989 by V Corps to test
USAREUR's REFORGER Enhancement Program. It used computers to simulate battlefield
conditions and to integrate command post and field exercises. CARAVAN GUARD
89 conducted selected unit US Army Training and Evaluation Program tests; provided
division, brigade, and battle staff training; and evaluated new training concepts
that made extensive use of computer simulation. The SHAPE commander emphasized
the benefits of repetitive exercises by small units, rather than one large exercise,
to increase combat readiness. Nevertheless, CARAVAN GUARD entailed about 200,000
troops including West German, French, and Canadian troops. All major Army headquarters
under USAREUR took part in the exercise, and the 10th Mountain Division (LID)
from Fort Drum, New York, was the major stateside participant in the computer-simulated
CPX of CARAVAN GUARD 89.

Growing cooperation between American military forces and the armed forces of
neighboring Latin American and Caribbean nations was also manifested through
joint and combined training exercises. Exercise TRADEWINDS 89, the third in
a series of annual exercises that involved the participation of selected Caribbean
countries, was conducted during May and June 1989. Active component SOF and
elements of the Virginia ARNG took part in the exercise. The exercise tested
mutual and internal defense security arrangements; examined operational concepts,
particularly those of SOF elements; evaluated military training provided through
American security assistance programs; and offered area orientation to American
participants.

During FY 1989 deployment for training (DFT) took place in Latin America, primarily
Honduras. Sponsored by USSOUTHCOM and managed by US Army, South, DFT was a small-unit
deployment program of teams, companies, and battalions from the active component
that sometimes worked with reserve component units in overseas deployment training.
DFT's goal was to support a US presence in the region that promoted regional
stability, improved American capability to conduct combat

260

operations, and provided humanitarian assistance. During the
fiscal year there were thirty-eight DFTs of three principal types  medical,
engineer, and infantry.

Training in Honduras was conducted under the umbrella of Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS
89 North and South, a joint training exercise that entailed Army and Air Force
elements. Army heavy engineer battalion-size task forces constructed roads and
other projects. In FUERTES CAMINOS South the 62d Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood,
Texas, augmented the road improvements and repair efforts of the reserve units
by upgrading an existing 850-man base camp. In FUERTES CAMINOS North the 46th
Engineer Battalion, Fort Rucker, Alabama, built a 750-man base camp, while reserve
engineer units built and improved roads in the Jora, Jacon, and San Lorenzo
regions of Honduras.

Deployment for training in other Latin American countries in FY 1989 included
the following: The 47th Engineer Company, Fort Wainwright, Alaska, in February
1989 constructed culverts and headwalls in Panama in connection with road construction
by the 536th Engineer Battalion. Elements of the 36th Engineer Brigade, Fort
Benning, Georgia, participated in Exercise CAMINO DE LA PAZ, an unscheduled
JCS exercise conducted in the first half of 1989 on the Osa Peninsula of Costa
Rica. The 30th Engineer Group, Fort Benning, Georgia, served as the command
and control element of units that included the 43d Engineer Battalion (Combat)
(Heavy) and Air Force construction teams. Well-drilling teams were sent to Costa
Rica and Guyana.

In FY 1989 the ODCSLOG prepared the Army Long Range Logistics Training Master
Plan, which stressed training for individual technical proficiency and underscored
realistic unit training, especially for CAPSTONE units. The plan also highlighted
civilian training, leader development for CSS officers, and marksmanship training
for CSS soldiers. LOGEX 89, an annual joint logistical CPX developed by the
Army Logistics Center, was conducted from 4 to 16 June 1989. Participants were
the Fifth US Army and the 13th COSCOM's CAPSTONE units from USAR and ARNG (75
percent. of the units were RC). In addition to nearly eighteen hundred Army
players, there were elements from all services, including the Navy's Military
Sealift Command and the Coast Guard, 33 related DOD logistical agencies, 16
theater headquarters, and 19 allied nations. The exercise tested the integration
of combat support and combat service support functions in joint and combined
scenarios and logistical concepts in support of AirLand Battle doctrine.

Exercise SOLID SHIELD 89, sponsored by US Commander in Chief, Atlantic (USCINCLANT),
was a joint field training exercise conducted at various East Coast facilities
by an estimated six thousand Army personnel that sought to improve joint operating
procedures for over-the-

261

shore operations. AMMOLOGEX, a field training exercise conducted from 20 to
28 May 1989 by the Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School, Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama, was the first field deployment of the Tactical Army Combat
Service Support Computer System (TACCS) to operate a field ammunition supply
point. Held biennially in accord with AR 50-6, Chemical Surety, the
Service Response Force Exercise-1989 conducted 12-16 June at Pine Bluff Arsenal,
Arkansas, tested the Army 's ability to respond to a chemical accident. Approximately
350 persons from AMC, FORSCOM, Health Services Command (HSC), USAISC, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and state and local organizations participated.

Range Modernization

Since 1984 the Army has pursued an aggressive range modernization program by
upgrading existing facilities or building new ones. The program consisted of
standardized ranges for individual and unit training equipped with computerized
targetry such as the Remote Engaged Target Systems which portrayed a realistic
opposing force. Work continued in FY 1989 on construction of the military operations
on urban terrain (MOUT) training facility at the Hohenfels Training Area in
West Germany, and funds were provided for a similar training complex at Fort
McClellan, Alabama. Sixteen MOUT complexes were under construction in FY 1989,
and completion of five was expected by the end of the year  the Hohenfels
site; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Ord, California; and Fort
McClellan. At Fort Rucker, Alabama, work continued on the Army 's first Aerial
Gunnery Range for evaluating AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunnery,
expected to be operational in FY 1990.

The Multipurpose Range Complex (MPRC) was the Army's principal facility for
weapons training and gunnery exercises by armor and mechanized infantry platoons
as well as for dismounted infantry and attack helicopter scenarios. Of 18 planned
MPRCs, 12 AC and 2 RC were completed or under construction during FY 1989. MPRCs
at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Hunter Liggett, California; and the Yakima
Firing Center, Washington were completed in FY 1989. Ranges at Forts Hood, Irwin,
Riley, Bliss, Bragg, Stewart, and Carson and Camp Casey, South Korea, were upgraded
to state-of-the-art MPRC-Heavy ranges. Despite these efforts, the Range Modernization
program had ongoing problems with declining construction funds and growing maintenance
costs.

Congress had been concerned that training ammunition requirements were not
objectively supported by clearly defined training standards. The Army sought
to improve its management of training ammunition through

262

more realistic requirements and the use of simulators. In FY 1986, for the
first time, computer models were used to develop training ammunition requirements.
The models were revised in FY 1987 and FY 1988 because expenditures were less
than authorizations. Expenditures and authorizations were more closely aligned
in FY 1989; expenditures for tank, Bradley, artillery, and mortar systems
were computed at 110 percent of historical usage and all other systems at
105 percent.

Training Devices, Simulators, and Simulation

The Army regarded training devices, simulators, and simulation (DSS) as the
key to overcoming constraints on training imposed by austere funding, time,
safety, and environmental concerns. Gunnery proficiency training for the TOW
and Dragon missiles, the AT-4 antitank weapon, and the Hellfire missile mounted
on the Apache helicopter relied heavily on DSS. For example, the Unit Conduct
of Fire Trainer for fire training has enabled soldiers to train by firing fewer
rounds. Computer modules were used increasingly to facilitate instruction of
complex tasks and for maintenance training on major weapons systems. About fifteen
hundred Electronic Information Delivery Systems (EIDS), personal computers combined
with interactive videodiscs, were delivered to Army schools in FY 1989. EIDS
made it possible for soldiers stationed anywhere to avail themselves of realistic
training.

The Simulation Networking-Training (SIMNET) and its successor, the Close Combat
Tactical Trainer (CCTT) Simulator System, were major elements of DSS. SIMNET
was a group of simulators with networked data bases that allowed a combined
arms force to conduct maneuvers on a simulated battlefield. It was the ground
force portion of an Army/DOD project, the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer. By
FY 1989 the SIMNET system was 85 percent fielded to active and reserve forces
in the United States and overseas. When completely fielded, SIMNET will consist
of 236 simulators deployed at eleven battalion-company sites worldwide. The
CCTT, an extension of SIMNET, will add such elements as the effects of heavy
artillery, terrain, and weather to simulated combat scenarios. AIRNET, a variant
of SIMNET for flight training, was operational at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

During FY 1989 work progressed on fielding the Army's Family of Simulators
(FAMSIM) Concept that extended training simulation from battalions to echelons
above corps. FAMSIM could link widely dispersed units into one interactive exercise
through satellite links to the Joint Warfare Center and the BCTP Warrior Preparation
Center. Simulations generated by the Warrior Preparation Center could be distributed
to unified and Army commands in Europe through the Defense Advanced

263

Research Projects Agency 's Distributed Wargaming System (DWS) . DWS's ability
to simulate REFORGER exercises was demonstrated in V Corps' Exercise CARAVAN
GUARD 89. Six corps FAMSIM sets that included one dedicated as the base for
the National Simulation Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were programmed.
FAMSIM and SIMNET were complemented by the Battalion/Brigade Simulation (BBS)
system, a derivative of the earlier Army Training Battle Simulation System
(ART-BASS). Eleven ARTBASSes had been fielded by the end of FY 1989; and the
BBS allowed staffs to engage in operational and logistical planning and play
from brigades to platoons. The first of eleven BBS systems was delivered in
December 1988 to the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, while others were installed
at Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia.
Initial distribution to the RC was made to the Battle Projection Center at
the USAR 75th Maneuver Area Command in Houston, Texas.

Force-on-force engagement DSS technology, such as that used by the Multiple
Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and the Simulated Area Weapons Effects,
can simulate the most realistic training short of actual combat. The system
was used extensively at the CTCs. MILES is a laser transmitter that simulates
live ammunition from direct fire weapons and also laser detectors affixed to
opposing troops and weapons systems to record hits. By FY 1989 MILES detectors
were used on hand-held and large weapons systems. The Air-Ground Engagement
System (AGES) is a laser-compatible assessment system for helicopters. AGES
I was used on older helicopters such as the AH-1 Cobra. The AGES II enlarged
AGES I coverage to additional air and air defense weapons to enhance simulation
of the combined arms battle. The AGES II readiness test conducted at Fort Hood,
Texas, in March 1989 revealed numerous defects, and the use of AGES II prototypes
with the Apache during the 1st Cavalry Division rotation at the NTC in July
1989 indicated persistent problems in accurately replicating Hellfire missile
engagements at ranges of seven to eight kilometers. AGES II worked better at
shorter ranges with the Kiowa helicopter operating as a remote designator for
the Apache.

Conclusion

The important human element in Army training has often been obscured by the
emphasis on technology in training systems. Technology, nevertheless, has been
a potent catalyst for change in the Army, not only in how it trained but also
in how it organized, equipped, and planned to fight. The relationship between
weapons and training development was becoming more crucial than in the past.
The Secretary of the Army

264

emphasized to project managers that equipment to train troops and simulate the
operation of a weapon must be in place when the hardware enters the field. The
Heavy Forces Modernization Program illustrated the nature of future training.
Units that received new heavy equipment would use "embedded" training
equipment, and separate training systems and devices would further accommodate
training for forces deployed overseas. Moreover, because the Heavy Forces Modernization
Program would be a "family" of weapons, training developers would
have to formulate training materials and devices so that soldiers could learn
how multiple subsystems and missions came together as an integrated whole.

As FY 1989 ended, the Army was formulating a Combined Arms Training Strategy
(CATS) to facilitate the transition from near-term to long-term approaches to
training. Building on the precepts of FM 25-100, Training the Force,
the aim of CATS was to devise training that synchronized heavy and light combat
elements, aviation, special operations, and support forces of both the AC and
the RC for AirLand Battle-Future. By the close of FY 1989 lower budget projections
threatened to compromise CATS and the development of training systems. The Commanding
General of TRADOC advised General Vuono in September 1989 that training development
was "crumbling." He anticipated severe budgetary constraints in FY
1990 that could delay the growth of training centers, the fielding of training
simulators, and development of the building blocks of TRADOC's mid- and long-range
training plans. The Army's training accomplishments in FY 1989 were less ambivalent
than future plans. The Army could look back with satisfaction on a training
establishment that had changed significantly during the 1980s in its underlying
philosophy, strategy, and tangible resources. Battle-focused training for both
individuals and units and earnest efforts to inculcate leadership and professionalism
would soon be tested in Panama and Southwest Asia.