Taiwan ignites hopes of Ma-Xi meeting at Apec summit

TAIPEI (AFP) - Taiwan's minister in charge of China affairs on Wednesday said he would support a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Taiwanese counterpart Ma Ying-jeou, suggesting the Apec leaders summit as an ideal opportunity.

Mr Wang Yu-chi, chairman of the island's top China policy decision-making body Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), made the comments ahead of his historic trip to China next week - the first official contact between the two former bitter rivals in more than six decades.

In a further sign of fast-warming ties between Taipei and Beijing, Mr Wang told reporters: "We'd be pleased to see leaders from the two sides meet at a proper time and venue."

"I won't raise the proposal for a meeting between President Ma and Xi, but if they did (meet), we think the Apec leaders summit would be the best venue," Mr Wang said at a Taipei meeting for Taiwanese firms doing business in China.

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Internally, the Chinese natsec apparatus has gelled around a consensus option for Taiwan that does not involve any direct political control over the island. China is comfortable with the status quo, but would like a few de facto moves from the island in return for a formal peace treaty:

1. A united front against Japan on the Diaoyu Islands
2. Basing rights at deepwater ports along Taiwan's east coast -

China would like basing rights at Hualien, Suao, Hsincheng, and Taitung for the East China Sea fleet, including the likely stationing of China's second or third aircraft carrier in Taiwan, as well as substantial numbers of conventional and nuclear submarines.

China would also like to take over US/Japanese ELINT facilities on the island, or at least dismantle them.

China would also like to gain takeoff, landing, and emergency basing rights for aircraft and drones, especially stealth bombers, tankes, and AEW&C, as well as storage and launch rights for general ordnance, anti-ship cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

China would like basing rights at Suao for at least a half-dozen nuclear attack submarines or a dozen diesel submarines.​

In return, China will offer 50 years of non-interference in Taiwan's political affairs, a formal peace treaty, and an open offer for Taiwan to join the UN.

If such an agreement were pulled off before Ma's term lets up in 2016, China would make it impossible for Japan to threaten China's shipping, while at the same gaining the ability to interdict Japanese shipping at will from an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Since Ma is the elected representative of the Taiwanese people, any agreement he signs will fulfill the 'self-representation' and 'mutual consent' clauses in the 1979 declarations.

Ever since China got a bloody nose in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979, the leadership has struggled to come to terms with managing the spectrum of military activity from normal training to use of force. The lack of sophistication was evident in its use of ballistic missile launches against Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. Both cases said as much about the politics within China’s leadership about the use of force as they did about its capacity to use military power in pursuit of political goals.

The 2013 White Paper titled the “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” shows a leadership more attuned to the spectrum and how to manage it. The 2015 White Paper, China’s Military Strategy, represents a clear evolution of China’s sophistication in understanding the conflict management spectrum. It places a premium on “enhancing realistic training”: “The PLA will continue to attach strategic importance to combat training in realistic conditions” and “The PLA will continue to conduct live-setting training.” An analysis by Gary Li for the Jamestown Foundation in February 2015 gives us an excellent overview of the poor state of PLA training, and the interest of the leadership in it since 2013. He refers to a decision of the Central Military Commission in 2014 on “Recommendations Concerning the Improvement to the Realism of Military Exercises.” The article provides useful insight into the training facility at Zhurihe.

This provides context for the reports from China and Taiwan in July about the building of a mock-up of the Presidential Palace in Taipei at the Zhurihe training base and its use in combat training. The background above also helps us to understand why the PLA or its political commissars might have wanted to show the attack scenes on Chinese TV.

In terms of military realities, if China was to attack Taiwan – for which it actively plans – the type of military unit involved in seizing the building would probably not be an ordinary garden variety infantry unit. It would probably be a highly specialized unit, either air-dropped in, or more likely infiltrated covertly. Only a small number of troops (perhaps 500-1000) would need to be trained each year for the politically sensitive task of occupying the Presidential offices.

Yet the value to the ground forces of the PLA in showing itself to the leadership as having the political focus on possible use of force against Taiwan and offering realism in training through a mock-up of an urban environment should not be under-estimated. The ground forces are in an environment where they are now competing for funds with the navy, air force and missile force (the main arm of Chinese military strategy toward Taiwan).

Since China’s peace diplomacy toward Taiwan has borne amazing results in the past two decades (after 1996) and since the relationship survived the administration of the independence-oriented Democratic Progressive Party for eight years under Chen Shui-bian, Chinese leaders would think twice before abandoning the current posture in favor of any military pressure.

Yet the airing of the TV footage about attacks on the mock-up of the Presidential offices in Taipei cannot be seen as incidental or routine. It means something. The next Presidential election in Taiwan will be held on January 16, 2016. Somebody in China in a leadership position in the armed forces, the ground forces, the propaganda department or the Central Military Commission is signaling something. We cannot be certain who and why. My best estimate is that this is a signal from the Central Military Commission to both Taiwan and to those in the civilian leadership in China that the military option against Taiwan is very much alive and needs to be on the table. I would not go as far as the headline in The Diplomat about a “mock invasion of Taiwan” indicating a “new level of aggressiveness” by China towards Taiwan.

The article in The Diplomat gives some context to the PLA’s use of mock-ups. Here is a link to another tantalizing episode from 2006 and picked up again in 2011. That location appears to be home to a more fully developed military base on the site, but the mock up there of “terrain” remains.

Everday all kinds of disinfo or media hype arising as "news" it takes a sober mind to distinguish what is credible.

Prez. Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan is to step down next year and the current ruling party KMT will definitely lose the 2016 general election to DPP in a landside way. What's the point of a Xi -Ma meet? Or any likelihood of a " formal " peace treaty ? Or "united front" blah blah. Or China's basing rights in Taiwan ports? All sound nothing but ridiculous misinfo!

It's pointless for Xi to meet a lame duck and let KMT, which is likely to slip into iblivion soon, earn some brownie scores in the upcoming campaigns.