WikiLeaks: Canberra mission

WikiLeaks cable: Canberra
mission

This is one of the diplomatic cables
about New Zealand held by Wikileaks.

February 24, 2005
Canberra Mission After a meeting between Australian Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer and the US Commander of UN Command
in Korea, General Leon LaPorte

This record is a
partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available.

1. (C) SUMMARY: In a
meeting with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on
February 16, U.S. General Leon LaPorte, Commander of the UN
Command in Korea, described the dramatic changes taking
place in the ROK, in particular at the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ), where the UN Command's role is also changing rapidly.
He outlined the significant transformation of the U.S. and
ROK forces and gave context to the drawdown of 12,500 troops
from South Korea, a "rock solid" U.S. ally. While agreeing
that the Six-Party Talks should continue, Downer thought the
international community ought to do more to pressure the
DPRK, such as by invigorating Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) activities against the North Koreans. As
LaPorte described the current conventional war-fighting
capabilities of the DPRK military, Downer speculated on the
actual number of nuclear warheads Pyongyang might possess.
Downer suggested that aid that could prop up the DPRK's
failing infrastructure should be withheld in order to bring
an end to the regime's tyranny. End Summary.

CHANGES
ON THE KOREAN PENNINSULA

2. (C) General LaPorte
briefed FM Downer, at his request, on the current status of
the Korean Penninsula. Explaining that he was visiting
Australia and New Zealand in his role as UN, and not U.S.,
Commander, LaPorte noted the significant changes taking
place in the ROK. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), after 50
years as the world's most heavily defended turf, had also
changed dramatically over the past 18 months. While only
handfuls of people had traversed the DMZ previously, now
hundreds, and potentially thousands, were doing so daily,
thanks to the construction of two super highways and railway
lines linking the two sides. The UN Command's role was to
enforce the armistice and facilitate crossings, so its role
was changing as well. This was a result of the Roh
Government's outreach policy to the North Koreans. LaPorte
praised the ROK as a "rock solid" ally of the U.S.

RECONFIGURING U.S. FORCES

3. (C) Asked by
Downer about the downsizing of U.S. Forces in Korea, LaPorte
explained that a total of 12,500 U.S. troops would be
withdrawn from a total of 37,500 over five years. Five
thousand had already departed. Meanwhile, technological
capabilities were dramatically improving. The U.S. forces
had been spread among 100 camps and stations across South
Korea. Where they had once been ""at the end of a dusty
trail,"" many of the U.S. bases were now surrounded by urban
developments and therefore needed to be reconfigured. As
both U.S. and ROK forces transformed and consolidated their
bases to reduce irritants to local communities, certain
military tasks were also being transferred to ROK forces.
Because the U.S. military was an all-volunteer force, it was
significant that the consolidation of bases would enable
improvements to the quality of life for the stationed
troops, which would in turn facilitate recruitment.

4.
(C) Downer agreed that capabilities were more important than
numbers of troops in this era, but he asked whether all
South Koreans agreed that this was the right time to
downsize. LaPorte said some Korean conservatives were
concerned, but after 50 years it was time to readjust the
U.S. force structure. The USG's commitment and adherence to
the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK remained
steadfast, and USFK were being transformed in cooperation
with the ROKG and the South Korean people. He pointed to a
USD 11 billion investment in improving U.S. forces'
capabilities in the ROK.

CAPABLE ROK FORCES

5.
(C) Downer asked for details on ROK forces. LaPorte told him
there were 780,000 in uniform, and about 450,000 of those
were army. He said the South Korean conscripts were quite
well-equipped and trained. Downer asked COL Moug, the
Australian Defence Attache in Seoul who attended the
meeting, for details of interaction between the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) and ROK forces. Moug replied that most
interactions were high-level exchanges, although several
South Korean exchange students were also at Australian
Defence Academies. He noted that the two countries' Special
Forces officers had expressed interest in exercising
together.

NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES

6.
(S/NF) FM Downer asked if it was correct that DPRK forces
could unleash artillery shells and missiles into the Seoul
basin and inflict tremendous damage before UN forces could
neutralize their capability. LaPorte said there were some
250 North Korean underground artillery positions within
range of Seoul which could fire high-explosive or
chemicalfilled shells. DPRK missiles could reach all of
South Korea and Japan. However, the North Koreans' ability
to win a conventional war was doubtful. Even with 1.2
million under arms, its air force and naval capabilities
were limited. The DPRK had 18 MIG-29s; the other airplanes
were much older. Its tanks were mostly old T-55s. DPRK
pilots averaged 12 hours of flight training per year, while
U.S. and ROK pilots received 12 - 15 hours per month.
Sustainability and logistics capabilities were "not there,"
LaPorte stated. The artillery, though old, was the main
threat. So the DPRK's leverage, Downer surmised, was the
damage it could inflict on Seoul. LaPorte concurred, calling
it the "tyranny of proximity." "Not that any of us believe
in preemption," Downer chuckled, but what could the UN
forces do if they thought it was necessary? General LaPorte
emphasized that all of the Combined Forces Command (CFC)
operational plans were premised on reacting to a North
Korean attack.

SIX-PARTY TALKS: WHAT ELSE CAN BE
DONE?

7. (C) Downer stated that the universal line
that the Six-Party Talks (6PT) had to resume was correct,
but they also had to be effective. He thought there ought to
be ways to bring additional pressure to bear on the DPRK
leadership. He assumed Japan would be the first to apply
sanctions; the rest of us needed to have plans in place, he
urged. How the North Koreans would react to Japanese
sanctions was anybody's guess, Downer said. General LaPorte
noted that U.S. Ambassador to Korea Chris Hill had been
named to replace EAP/AS James Kelly, and would take over the
U.S. lead on the 6PT as well. The General expressed the
USG's desire to continue the 6PT process and find a
diplomatic solution, pointing out the irony of the
accusations about U.S. unilateralism when the U.S. was
working hard to keep the negotiations with the DPRK
multilateral. North Korea would like nothing better than
bilateral negotiations with the U.S., he remarked.

8. (C)
Downer said bilateralizing the talks with the DPRK would be
a huge mistake, not least because it was China which had the
most leverage on North Korea. He noted that China wanted to
play the role of honest broker and that was not good enough;
Beijing had to understand that it had to bring its leverage
to bear on Pyongyang. In addition, new strategies had to be
devised to further constrain the North Koreans. The Foreign
Minister called the PSI a worthy initiative, mentioning that
Australia was a core player. Perhaps, he suggested, the PSI
could be brought to bear more vigorously, although the North
Koreans would "cry blue murder" in Beijing.

NORTH
KOREAN NUKES

9. (S/NF) The FM asked General LaPorte
how many nuclear warheads he thought the DPRK had: two or
three? Downer and his Senior Adviser Haynes mentioned that
IAEA DG ElBaradei had said Pyongyang could have as many as
six, based on the number of fuel rods the North Koreans
possessed. LaPorte thought the DPRK had the capacity to make
more than two or three warheads, given the amount of
plutonium "harvested" before the 1994 agreement and based on
the DPRK's own claim of having reprocessed the 8,000 spent
fuel rods after the agreement had ended. It was a high-risk
strategy, he observed, that the North Koreans thought would
lead to a big payoff but most likely would not. Downer
agreed, noting it only strengthened the resolve of the
international community. LaPorte commented that North
Korea's ambiguity about whether it had nuclear weapons had
served it well in the past. Now that it had confessed to
having them, countries that had been sitting on the fence
would have second thoughts.

UN COMMAND, DPRK
INFRASTRUCTURE AND BLEEDING HEARTS

10. (C/NF) Asked
to describe how the U.S. forces and the UN Command structure
worked, LaPorte and COL Kevin Madden of the UN Command's
Military Armistice Commission, explained that a U.S. General
served as the UN Commander and the U.S. Secretary of Defense
served as the UN Command's Executive SIPDIS Agent. The UN
Command in Korea reported annually to the UN Security
Council and could do so more often if it wished. LaPorte
emphasized that the transportation corridors through the DMZ
represented the greatest change to the way South Koreans, at
least, had lived for the past 50 years. Downer and Madden
compared their personal experiences in Pyongyang, with
Downer calling the DPRK capital "pathetic" with its darkened
streets, cracked pavements and unmowed grass. LaPorte
concurred that the DPRK infrastructure, including the power
grid and rail lines, was decrepit. In closing, Downer
remarked, "let the whole place go to s--t, that's the best
thing that could happen." Speaking off the top of his head,
he added that aid should not be given that would prop up the
infrastructure. If U.S. officials wanted to hear the
"bleeding hearts" view of "peace and love" with respect to
North Korea, Downer joked, they only had to visit his
colleagues in New Zealand. Downer said he personally agreed
with President Bush that tyranny had to be ended.

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