Maybe A Ceasefire, But Not Peace

In the early morning hours of February 12, leaders of Russia, France, Germany
and the Ukrainian junta emerged bleary-eyed from the presidential palace in
Minsk to announce a deal that would halt the fighting in eastern Ukraine. At
first glance, the 13-point
memorandum agreed upon isn’t very different from the first ceasefire negotiated
in the Belarus capital last September, the collapse of which in early January caused
the current carnage. Are hopes for peace more justified this time? Hardly.

Desperate Diplomacy

The talks, which began Wednesday afternoon and ended up lasting through the
night, were a result of continental European diplomacy. For the past week, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel shuttled between Kiev, Moscow and
Washington – accompanied by French president Francois Hollande in the first
two instances – to try and set up a truce.

There are several reasons for this. In early January, the Kiev junta launched
an ill-conceived
offensive against the two rebel provinces in the east. Donetsk and Lugansk
had declared independence last May, as a response to the US-backed Maidan coup,
and inflicted a humiliating defeat to Kiev’s armies in late August, resulting
in the first Minsk ceasefire. What had possessed the junta to break it? Most
likely, the promises of aid from Washington, in the form of the "Ukraine
Freedom Support Act", and the visit
from the head of US forces in Europe, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, in late January.

As a result, the rebels took control of the Donetsk airport, and by the beginning
of February managed to cut off several thousand government troops at the town
of Debaltsevo. Parallel with these military fiascoes, Ukraine’s economy continued
its meltdown. Meanwhile, in Washington, a chorus
of voices began singing the tune of "arm Ukraine" – a move Moscow
warned would cause an escalating response. Having already suffered the brunt
of the damage from Washington’s trade war on Russia – launched last year as
a supposed counter to "Russian aggression" – the continental European
powers decided to do
something before the war got out of hand.

A Tentative Truce

Apparently, the reason it took all night to agree on a truce barely different
from the abortive September one was that the president of the Kiev junta, Poroshenko,
was kept
in the dark by his own generals about the real situation on the front. Both
the army and the "volunteer battalions" (led by "Right Sector"
Nazis) kept claiming there was no encirclement at Debaltsevo, or that they had
broken through. Just like Kiev’s repeated claims of "Russian invasion,"
these were self-serving lies.

Confronted with the harsh reality that his troops were losing, and that no
support from Washington was immediately forthcoming, Poroshenko agreed to the
truce. However, the actual memorandum was signed by the retired Ukrainian president
Kuchma, the two rebel leaders, and the head of the OSCE observer mission – rather
than any of the presidents or prime ministers in attendance.

Between that, the similarity of the second Minsk paper to the first one, and
the fact that Americans were nowhere
to be seen, many have concluded
that this truce won’t amount to much. Even if by some miracle it does hold,
it is hardly
the political solution required to actually stop the war.

The Spin Begins

It was instructive to watch the first reactions to the Minsk agreement, before
the spin machine kicked in. The handful of Atlanticists in Russia, for example,
screamed
about "Western betrayal" of Ukraine. Typical Western coverage
cherry-picked quotes from Putin and Poroshenko, continued to uncritically repeat
Kiev’s claims of "Russian invasion," and show Kiev-supplied battlefield
maps that did not correspond to reality on the ground. In an AFP
roundup, one Kiev analyst even claimed that the talks had established
"a genuine anti-Putin coalition: Poroshenko-Hollande-Merkel." Meanwhile,
the Economist spun a
surreal narrative of "Russian aggression" extending beyond
Ukraine.

Over at the State Department, the inimitable Jen Psaki called "on both
sides to abide" by the ceasefire, but dismissed
the question about the possibility Kiev might violate it as "a little bit
ludicrous" – basically confirming that in Washington’s eyes, Kiev can do
no wrong.

Poroshenko himself told a Ukrainian
TV channel that his government had used the previous cease-fire to rearm,
resupply and prepare for continuation of the war – clearly implying his intent
to do so again, hoping perhaps to replay Croatia’s US-backed blitzkrieg
in 1995.

Bosnia Redux

The Kiev junta wasn’t the only one with its mind on the 1990s Yugoslav Wars.
The show in Minsk was indeed eerily reminiscent of Western diplomacy during
the 1992-95 war in Bosnia: every time the US-backed Muslim regime suffered a
battlefield setback, there would be calls for a ceasefire. Europeans would try
to broker a deal – usually obsolete by that point – but Washington would encourage
the Muslims to reject it, while blaming the Serbs.

The US establishment is openly invoking
Balkans parallels, trying to paint Russia’s Vladimir Putin as "another
Milosevic." Western media routinely whitewash
the Nazis fighting for Kiev, just as they did with Islamic fighters in Bosnia.
Kiev’s propaganda is uncritically reported, even when it consists of fake
photos. Incidents such as the downing of flight MH17, the bus shelling
in Volnovakha, or rocket attacks in Mariupol and Kramatorsk, are used to drum
up outrage against the "aggressors" – but vanish from the headlines
as soon as evidence of Kiev’s culpability emerges. Even the song-and-dance about
giving Ukraine weapons "to defend itself" is recycled from the Bosnia
days, when the imperialists in Washington demanded the US arm the Bosnian Muslims.

Ironically, the most recent plan to aid the Kiev junta involved buying ammunition
from Bosnia – a deal that the country’s Serb half successfully
vetoed recently. The Empire may well go next door instead, as the quisling
government in Serbia just announced a
sale of heavy weapons…

Battle for Europe

The war in Bosnia eventually ended at a time and place of Washington’s
choosing, with little regard for desires and hopes of its Muslim protégés
and Croat "junkyard dogs." Though officially the American intervention
was all about human rights and values, the architect of Dayton Accords admitted
himself that Washington aimed to reassert dominance in Europe following
the Cold War.

That helps explain how Washington was so involved in Ukraine’s supposed "European
future" – even as senior US officials "midwifing" the February
2014 coup explicitly
expressed their thoughts about the EU. Preventing any sort of European
independence, let alone cordial relations with Russia, is a principal objective
of Washington’s foreign policy; for without dominion over Europe, the US ceases
to be a global empire.

This is why Washington is recycling its Bosnia policy, and why the second
Minsk agreement will probably end up like the first. Trouble is, Moscow has
actually
learned the lessons of Yugoslavia’s demise. Russian officials keep mentioning
this in their public statements, hoping perhaps to forestall further Western
stupidity. It won’t work: memories are not only short this side of the Atlantic,
they are also usually
wrong.

Author: Nebojsa Malic

Nebojsa Malic left his home in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords and currently resides in the United States. During the Bosnian War he had exposure to diplomatic and media affairs in Sarajevo. As a historian who specializes in international relations and the Balkans, Malic has written numerous essays on the Kosovo War, Bosnia, and Serbian politics. His exclusive column for Antiwar.com debuted in November 2000.