30 November 2005

Metaphysics Θ 10 is the second passage which, according to Crivelli, indicates that Aristotle is committed to states of affairs. I turn then to a consideration of this. I shall quote the relevant passage from Aristotle on Truth in a subsequent post. But as a preliminary I wish to draw attention to the following two points.

1. Crivelli's interpretation of Θ 10 apparently depends upon his interpretation of Met. Δ 29, so that, if we conclude (as I have argued) that the latter provides little evidence for imputing the doctrine of 'states of affairs' to Aristotle, then it is unclear whether Θ 10, on its own, provides any evidence at all. This is the crucial paragraph, from Aristotle on Truth p. 52:

The beginning of Θ is about states of affairs. Both in T 1 [the passage from Δ 29] and in T 2 [the passage from the beginning Θ 10] Aristotle speaks of certain items with regard to which he uses the expression 'object' [pragma]. About each of the items with regard to which in T 1 he uses 'object', Aristotle there says that it is false just in case 'it is not combined or it is impossible for it to be composed' (1024b18-19). About each of the items with regard to which in T 2 he uses 'object', Aristotle there says that for it 'not to be' in the sense of being false is to be divided (see 1051a34-1051b3). But the items with regard to which Aristotle in T 1 uses 'object' are probably states of affairs. It can then be plausibly inferred that the items with regard to which Aristotle in T 2 uses 'object' are also states of affairs.(Highlighting mine.)

2. Yet although Crivelli does make his interpretation of Θ 10 depend on that of Δ 29, he does not advance his interpretation of Θ 10 with a view to what Aristotle says in Δ 7. This is surprising. In Δ 7 Aristotle distinguishes four senses of 'is', including 'is' in the sense of 'true', and explains this last sense. In Θ 10 Aristotle distinguishes three senses of 'is', including 'is' in the sense of 'true', and these appear to correspond to three of the four senses of Δ 7. It seems antecedently likely, then, that what Aristotle has in mind by 'is' in the sense of 'true' in Δ 7 (also E.2) is the same thing that he has in mind in Θ 10. Thus, if Δ 7 is rightly interpreted in such a way that it does not affirm a doctrine of 'states of affairs', then presumably Θ 10 should be interpreted in the same way--even if the latter contains words or phrases which, taken on their own, might at first suggest something else.