Masked pro-Russian activists guard a barricade at the regional administration building that they seized in Donetsk, Ukraine, on April 19. / Efrem Lukatsky, AP

by Anna Arutunyan, Special for USA TODAY

by Anna Arutunyan, Special for USA TODAY

MOSCOW - In early March, soldiers with automatic rifles, ski masks and dark-green uniforms without insignias appeared at key points throughout the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea.

Ukraine accused Russia of infiltrating its country for a takeover, and foreign diplomats including Secretary of State John Kerry demanded answers from Moscow as the world threatened to impose sanctions. Putin did answer, calmly and unswerving.

"There are many military uniforms. Go into any local shop and you can find one," he said, speculating the men were probably Ukrainians dressing up, but Putin also reserved the right of Russia to "protect the local people."

The response flummoxed diplomats, who appeared unsure how to respond. Sanctions were postponed and Russia annexed Crimea two weeks later. On Thursday, Putin admitted in a Moscow call-in radio show that the men were indeed Russian soldiers.

Now, mysterious soldiers have cropped up in eastern Ukraine where pro-Russian separatists have seized buildings and are demanding to be annexed like Crimea.

"There are no Russian divisions, no special forces in East Ukraine," Putin said during the call-in show. "They are locals."

Putin may be living in another world, but it's one where some subterfuge goes a long way in getting him ahead - and where he's careful to leave all options open when he talks, say analysts. He is balancing denials of Russia's involvement in Ukraine with threats of force, leaving the West to wonder about his intentions.

Mark Galeotti, clinical professor at New York University's Center for Global Affairs, says it is hard for Western leaders to respond successfully to Putin because he is playing by a different set of rules than they are used to.

"What the West should do is ditch the old rules of the game," says Galeotti, an associate member of NYU's History and Russian & Slavic Studies departments. "They are bound by this gentleman's agreement of diplomacy, which includes not calling people out when they are lying."

It's not as if the West hasn't seen the tactics before.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was serving Putin during the Georgia crisis of 2008 when Russia denied during meetings with Western leaders it had sent tank columns into the country. When it became clear Russia had invaded, French President Nicolas Sarkozy grabbed Lavrov by the lapels and called him a liar to his face.

"I hope I won't have to resort to the right to use force in Ukraine," he said, referring to approval he obtained from Russia's parliament to send troops across the border if necessary to protect the Russian population there.

Analysts say Putin is outmaneuvering Western diplomatic endeavors with his tactics. He is good at not being hemmed into a position, and is avoiding being caught with a smoking gun.

"If you can't prove it, then I can't be denied. And if you can't deny it, then I have a right to continue thinking that way. If you want to refute him, you need hard facts," he says of the tactic.

While there is mounting evidence that Russian security officers are helping pro-Russian militants mobilize in Ukraine, there is no solid proof on whether these are rogue elements acting on their own initiative or officers taking direct orders from Moscow.

Observers both in Russia and abroad have characterized it as a new form of warfare that uses volunteers or rogue elements. Meanwhile, whatever plans Putin may or may not have for eastern Ukraine, he is keeping everyone guessing.

During Thursday's show, he referred to eastern parts of the country as traditionally part of Russia.

"I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) back in the tsarist days - Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa - were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows," he said.

It appeared he had let slip his rationale for Russian annexation of East Ukraine, but no.

"The key issue is providing guarantees to these people. Our role is to facilitate a solution in Ukraine, to ensure that there are guarantees," Putin elaborated.

In the West and even in the East, leaders often announced their grand intentions for the country and where regional nations may fit into the plans. The United States has its State of the Union addresses; China has its five-year plans.

Putin has a vision in his head for Russia, but he won't reveal it, Zlobin says.

"He thinks that's not an effective way to rule," Zlobin says. "Nor does he have a grand plan for that vision. It's a policy of sprints rather than a marathon."

Putin doesn't have an overreaching plan on territorial expansion, according to Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the Russia in Global Affairs journal and chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. He sees his opportunities, and he takes them, he explains.

"Annexing Crimea wasn't part of some grand pre-planned vision," Lukyanov says. "But it could have been an option, a tactical plan worked out in advance in case circumstances favored that option."

Zlobin says that if the West wants to better predict what Putin may do, it should pay attention to Russian society.

"The issue is that Putin's predictability merely reflects the predictability of Russian society," Zlobin says. "It's not Putin's Russia, it's Russia's Putin. He feels exactly what the majority wants and what the elites want, and he plays on those factors."

Playing the Crimea card last month prompted Putin's approval rating to skyrocket to 80% according to the Levada Center, an independent polling agency in Moscow.

Lukyanov says Putin has actually been quite clear about his aims. He has said he wanted to maintain Russian influence in the former Soviet Republics and diminish Western influence in Eastern Europe.

When President Obama sought to forge a relationship with Putin in 2009 soon after taking office, he pulled the plug on plans for a U.S. missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Now some Republican senators in Washington are demanding the move be reversed.

"Putin's reflexes have largely remained the same; it's the circumstances that have changed," Lukyanov says.

"In the beginning, he wanted to reach an agreement with Europe about new rules of the game. But for various reasons that didn't work out," he says. "A lot of it was his fault, but a lot of it was that Europe and the United States were not ready for that."

Russia found that he could not talk NATO into spurning requests for membership in the U.S.-European defense alliance from former Soviet republics like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The West believed Putin would have to accept the post-Soviet setup where former captive nations are free to decide their fates. They are wrong, Lukyanov says.

"It convinced him that it was useless to negotiate, that you had to stand your ground, that agreements not fortified by the potential use of force were useless," Lukyanov says. As Putin saw it, brute force was the only way to be taken seriously, he says.

His short-term plan, Zlobin says, is to instill in the minds of Russians his values. Protecting Russians abroad - with or without military incursion - is part of that plan. And Western leaders are not partners to cooperate with, but hurdles to be overcome.

"He's become bolder; he considers himself a patriarch of global politics, who's been on the scene longer than many," Zlobin says.

"That is why he doesn't have very much regard for other leaders, who he sees as having appeared relatively recently," he says. "They depend on internal situations. He sees himself as above that."