09/30/2015

Reflections on the MCMP Summer Schools on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students

The Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) has hosted its second Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students in July of 2015 and we can say that – once again - it was a great success! In creating a space for only female students to learn about a variety of areas in mathematical philosophy, this event is the first of its kind. Although female-only events have been frequently viewed with a critical eye, this summer school has exceeded our expectations from the first time that we organized it in 2014. In both years, we received many more excellent applications than we were able to accept, lending evidential support to something that we already expected, namely, that there are a lot of very interested and extremely promising female students out there who wish to engage with philosophy and approach it with mathematical methods. Furthermore, both events show that students very much enjoy and also benefit from such a female-only event in mathematical philosophy. During the two summer schools, we got to know the students’ aspirations and concerns when it came to pursuing their philosophical interests and saw how much they appreciated the event, given their interests and concerns. We also received highly positive and encouraging feedback, making us believe that this kind of event is worth continuing. It is to this end that the MCMP has made a commitment to host the third Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students in July 2016, this time with a focus on formal methods applied in philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of psychology.

In recent years there have been important discussions about the gender gap in philosophy. Despite an equal initial interest in the discipline at the undergraduate level, there are comparatively fewer women who finish their bachelors, continue with a masters or PhD degree, or enter advanced positions in philosophy departments. This gender gap appears to be particularly prevalent in subfields of philosophy that use formal, mathematical and quantitative-empirical methods to study philosophical questions. In addition, there have been a number of studies identifying barriers that female academics face when entering philosophy - such as implicit biases and stereotype threats. Taking those discussions and their implications seriously, the MCMP summer school tries to take a small but concrete step towards overcoming some of those barriers and thereby fostering change. Our major aim is to support junior female students in following their interest in mathematical philosophy and in their attempt to prepare the ground for an academic career. And we think that bringing together female undergraduate and early-stage graduate students from philosophy or related areas at the MCMP, an institution that is representative for the field of mathematical philosophy, is one step towards this aim.

Besides the factors that prevent young female students from pursuing an academic career in philosophy, several factors that motivate and support female students to stay in academic have come to be seen as significant. For example, something that is often absent in (mathematical) philosophy are role models who have actually “made it.” Having mostly been taught by male teachers, the summer school students were able to see whether being exposed to successful female academics made a difference to how they themselves perceive the subjects, how they felt in the classroom, and how they engaged in philosophical debates. Such exposure questions the image of a typical philosopher as being male, an image that we still (and even if only unconsciously) hold all too often. Questioning this image in turn can motivate female students to picture themselves as potential future professors. By provoking the feeling that they themselves “can make it” as well, an event such as the summer school can aid students to overcome doubts and uncertainties attached to an academic career and as such motivate young female philosophers to pursue an academic career.

As we have learned from questionnaires and interviews conducted at both summer schools, another important factor that often describes the academic reality of young female mathematical philosophers is that they are lone fighters regarding their gender. Female students frequently find themselves to be the only women in classes on advanced logic or probability theory. While this does not seem to demotivate the students from following their interests, it nevertheless leaves them with the feeling that they are “alone in this,” fighting the doubts of acceptance into a field. It can furthermore reinforce the “typical philosopher is male” stereotype. By meeting fellow students with similar interests, this summer school has given participants the opportunity to see that there are others; that they are not “the only one.” Furthermore, informal networking opportunities with fellow students and faculty have frequently been considered crucial for an early career scholar. The setup of the summer school is designed to address these and other issues. By trying out new things each year, we can see what works and what does not in those regards.

From the feedback we have received, it is noticeable that our participants were not primarily interested in debating issues that are of concern only to female philosophers. While students discussed such matters informally, they first and foremost valued the relaxed and productive atmosphere in which they can study new materials and methods that they are interested in. This year, lectures were given by Julia Staffel [Washington University in St Louis] on formal epistemology, Kevin Zollman [Carnegie Mellon University] on network analysis in philosophy, and Isidora Stojanovic [CNRS and Institute Jean Nicod, Paris] on topics in formal semantics. The students had the opportunity to closely engage with the lecturers during the week, either in tutorials or in plenty of coffee breaks and group activities that were organized. To give students a broad overview of mathematical philosophy as a field, we had several PhD students, postdoctoral researchers and early career staff from the MCMP and elsewhere to give introductions into their area of expertise. Creating an interactive environment with a lot of time devoted to discussion, students could informally discuss their technical questions and also see what is possible with the methodological toolkit offered at the summer school.

Apart from being taught a field of philosophy in which students were particularly interested in, there was space to introduce them to issues faced by minorities in the academy, with a particular focus on the problems of female underrepresentation in philosophy. This year our distinguished speaker was Carla Fehr [University of Waterloo] who spoke about ‘Prioritizing Epistemic Arguments for Justice in the Academy’ [see video of Carla’s lecture here: http://www.rforge.com/lmucast/virtualplaylist/search_lmucast_results.php?keyword=MqTgpIglTT&attr=LMUcastID]. Carla presented strong arguments for why female underrepresentation is an impediment to progress in philosophy and focused on particular examples of the experiences female philosophers face at different stages of their career progression. An open reception after Carla’s lecture gave students the chance to discuss those matters with Carla and fellow students. This way, we had the opportunity to see just how impactful Carla’s talk was and how much it resonated with the students’ own perspectives, worries, and experiences. Carla’s talk was a perfect complement to last year’s evening lecture given by Helen Beebee on the gender gap, its causes, and how we can change it in small but concrete steps [see video of Helen’s lecture here: http://www.rforge.com/lmucast/virtualplaylist/search_lmucast_results.php?keyword=WmUquSI11O&attr=LMUcastID].

Organizing such a summer school two years in a row does not yet allow us to draw conclusions about the impact this event has on the issue of female underrepresentation. However, we collected some data to address the more general question of how female students perceive philosophy as an academic discipline and themselves within that discipline. One striking result that seems to emerge from our data is that while female students do not necessarily see the immediate need and advantage of female-only events in advance, experiencing the event and being exposed to interaction and discussion with only female studies has a positive impact on them. While they initially consider the status quo as the ‘norm’ and acceptable, being exposed to a female-only event gives them a wholly new idea of how the experience of academia could be different. The experience allows them to compare such an environment to the status quo they encounter in their everyday university setting, which makes them see things differently. Female students who have experienced such a female-only environment can make their needs and worries explicit and voice concrete suggestions about how they think the academic environment should change to make it accommodating and comfortable for them.

Making this comparison possible by offering a summer school for female students is - we think - one important step towards change.

Comments

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Given the gender gap in favor of women in higher education generally outside this area, do you think that similar measures in other fields are appropriate for men? For example, in psychology, women earn 70% of all doctorates.

Generally, for 2016-7, the NCES is projecting that women will 60% of bachelor's degrees and 55% of doctorates.

Eric, I can't speak for the authors. But if there are fields where men are in the minority and having more men has epistemic, moral, and social benefits (and the opportunity costs are not too great), then I am not against looking at ways to increase male retention and inclusion (etc.). But that's up to folk in those fields with context-sensitive knowledge about their disciplines.

I have, however, never heard any such conditions placed on the need to ensure equal numbers of women in other fields. That is, the need for equal numbers of women seems to be insisted upon without any "context-sensitive" investigation of whether "having more [women] has epistemic, moral and social benefits (and the opportunity costs are not too great)." My own sense, perhaps mistaken, is that the goal of having equal numbers of women is urged on the moral grounds of sexual equality itself and that it is taken to be a nonnegotiable requirement for any just institution. If this is the reason, then the great moral crisis of higher education today is its inability to attract and retain men.

Perhaps, the opportunity costs of the measures and policies used to attain equal numbers of women were miscalculated, and the result is a university environment which is overall hostile to male inclusion. It may turn out that there is no stable equilibrium of policies and institutional conditions that will attract equal numbers of men and women into universities.

Eric, I fear your comments reveal a lack of knowledge about the discussion within professional philosophy about the situation of professional philosophy. At this moment we are very far of from attracting equal numbers of men and women into philosophy (in countries that include the majority of the readership of, say, this blog), and I am unfamiliar with any articulated goal in that direction. Most of the present activities within professional philosophy are designed to improve from a very low base-line of professioanal philosophers that are women (and other minorities).

I was probably unclear or you may have misread me. My comments were about the general "university environment" and "other fields," not philosophy, which I agree has the inequality you describe. But, in OECD countries, which I assume include almost of all of your readership, the gender-gap in higher education has been more to the disadvantage of men since the mid-1990s and is expanding. If equal representation by sex is a per se good, then the policies adopted by universities to attain this good may have been miscalculated because they are now resulting in an accelerating inequality, which happens generally to disfavor men.

I think it is relevant for those addressing gender inequality in specific fields, like philosophy, to consider that the well-meant and successful policies aimed at achieving female equality generally in universities have, in a sense, succeeded too well. Surely, there is a lesson there. If policies in specific fields simply replicate the environment of the university generally, they may then also replace the current problem, under-representation of women, with its opposite.

Furthermore, I find it interesting to consider the relation between the goal of general equality of representation in universities and the goal of equality of representation in individual fields. The two goals are not automatically harmonized. Creating gender equality for women in philosophy may further exacerbate inequality in the university if this action is not coordinated with measures to increase male success in the fields where men are underrepresented. This isn't an argument against seeking gender equality in philosophy as much as an argument against uncoordinated action. I am not sure exactly how societies committed to equal participation of men and women should consider a hypothetical measure that would create equal gender representation for women in a field at the price of increasing general unequal representation for men in the university.

Eric, undoubtedly whenever one proposes changes to the status quo there may be unintended and undesirable consequences, including ones. But you seem to be worried about positions that I have not encountered (in a very long time).
I have not signed up for a 'an equal representation' as a per se good argument/position in academic disciplines. Rather, as I noted, I think one should look at the "epistemic, moral, and social benefits" of various demographic populations in a particular discipline, and consider the "opportunity costs" of various policies of moving to more desirable populations.
My own arguments (again not necessarily the authors' of the post) don't involve "gender equality" as a goal (it's not that I am against it, but I don't think philosophy is a promising way to achieve it), but involve issues of quality and the epistemic benefits of diversity to a field like philosophy.

I agree with you (and I certainly did not mean to attribute any position to you but to comment on the justifications offered in the development literature with which I am familiar).

But I am surprised that the “position” I am forwarding is one you encountered a very long time ago. While the serious problem of male inequality in higher education began in the mid-1990s, it has received very little recognition (that I know of) until the OECD began highlighting the problem about five or ten years ago. The fact is that in almost all OECD countries, except very small rich ones like Luxembourg, males’ educational outcomes are in dismal shape compared to females’ at all levels. (The OECD also uncovered problematic evidence of discrimination against male students in evaluations compared to anonymous grading.)

But awareness of the crisis is growing. Just this year the New York Times, the BBC and the Economist, all ran serious pieces that addressed the problem.

I think the methods that you support are among the tools that will need to be considered to lure men into the university and into non-STEM fields, where they are sorely underrepresented. (You may also find it interesting to note that the OECD prescribes efforts to close pay gaps between men and women that largely run contrary to the goals of luring more women into philosophy. Because higher pay is found in STEM fields, the OECD recommends governments use strong efforts to shift women from humanities into higher paying fields to equalize the pay-gap between women and men, who generally choose higher paying fields.)

Similar methods to the ones you support in philosophy, I think, should also be considered in dealing with other disparities with epistemic consequences, specifically, the long existing disparities disfavoring religious students in humanities and social sciences. In hard sciences, religious people are far better represented than in these fields. My own intuition is that especially in the humanities and social sciences, having people with diverse views is just as important as having persons of diverse genders (but of the same base convictions) to ensure epistemic benefit.

Eric, if you can make the case that there are important epistemic and moral consequences of male under-representation in particular academic disciplines, I would welcome hearing that. (But you are speaking in very abstract generalizations and seem to be pushing an agenda that is only tangentially related to the original post.)

I am not denying that there are legitimate reasons for concern about systematic male under-representation in high schools and colleges, although I do wonder if male under-representation is worse than some other under-representations (class, ethnicity, race, etc.).

I think you are unfamiliar with professional philosophy, which has a growing and very vital group of philosophers with all kinds of religious commitments. (You can look for survey evidence of this in case you are interested.)

Finally, you misunderstood another point I intended to make: what I claimed not to have heard are arguments from the demand for 'an equal representation' as a good as such in academic disciplines.

Sorry, I didn't mean to push any agenda. I thought I was suggesting considering the means discussed to address women's inequality in philosophy as means to address what the world's leading development authorities already regard as an additional problem: overall male inequality. If that's too tangential, I apologize, but it seemed quite relevant to me, as relevant as proposing that we consider a good therapy to cure a broken leg as a means to cure a broken arm.

The difference according to the OECD between addressing educational inequalities facing women and minorities and those facing men is that we already address, pass laws and spend billions to improve the other inequalities, but in the case of male inequalities we are doing essentially nothing. If the OECD, which has been a world leader in promoting equal numbers of men and women in education, sees a problem, then there probably is one. They foresee deep social problems arising from this inequality like the others.

I am pretty familiar with religious philosophers and their associations. I enjoyed studying with Marilyn Adams and Nick Wolterstorff, who are, of course, prominent examples, as well as Gyula Klima, who may be less well known but introduced me to analytic philosophy in relation to scholasticism.

But the only hard evidence I know shows that religious people generally, and Christians specifically, are significantly underrepresented in humanities and social sciences generally. I know of no studies, parallel to the concern shown about women, studying religious demographics in philosophy. There also is no parallel reaction to the documented general under-representation of religious persons in the humanities and social sciences. I don't see that current religious philosophers and interest in religious philosophy dispels the existing documented evidence of overall disparities, anymore than the thriving group of feminist philosophers shows that there is no problem for women philosophers.

If you know of any evidence about the numbers of religious persons doing philosophy PhDs, I would be delighted to read about it. But I don't think it exists. I think we are left with the general studies showing strong inequalities disfavoring religious people generally in social sciences and humanities. If philosophy is immune to that general trend, that's great, but I don't think we know that and if we are consistent, we should be concerned to find out.

Very interesting! Although these surveys are quite different methodologically than the kinds of comprehensive studies we have for gender in philosophy, they support my inference from the broader studies of religious representation in all the humanities in the U.S. that the situation of inequality between religious and non-religious persons in philosophy and the U.S. population as a whole is likely as bad as or worse than the equality problems for men and women. Perhaps the APA need a committee on the status of the religious in philosophy, too.

Given the higher statistical religiosity of women in the population as a whole, it is possible that the problems attracting women to philosophy are related to or compounded by the problems attracting religious people generally.

In other words, attracting an equal or at least greater part of the religious population to philosophy would be a way of attracting more women. As I look back on my own university days, it is suddenly interesting to me that a much higher percentage of my female philosophy and law professors were religious compared to my male professors and how few philosophy professors overall were religious.