Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui

[FBIS Editor's Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted
Warfare," a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics
for developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military
inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war. The
selections include the table of contents, preface, afterword, and biographical
information about the authors printed on the cover. The book was written
by two PLA senior colonels from the younger generation of Chinese military
officers and was published by the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House
in Beijing, suggesting that its release was endorsed by at least some elements
of the PLA leadership. This impression was reinforced by an interview with
Qiao and laudatory review of the book carried by the party youth league's
official daily Zhongguo Qingnian Bao on 28 June.

Published prior to the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, the book has
recently drawn the attention of both the Chinese and Western press for its
advocacy of a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military,
to strike at the United States during times of conflict. Hacking into websites,
targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting
urban warfare are among the methods proposed. In the Zhongguo Qingnian
Bao interview, Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of
unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden."
Elaborating on this idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use
the same approach against weak countries because "strong countries make the
rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes . . .The United
States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its
purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world will not
trust it." (see FBIS translation of the interview, OW2807114599).

[End FBIS Editor's Note]

THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS
PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.

[FBIS Translated Text] Everyone who has lived through the last decade
of the 20th century will have a profound sense of the changes in the world.
We don't believe that there is anyone who would claim that there has been
any decade in history in which the changes have been greater than those of
this decade. Naturally, the causes behind the enormous changes are too numerous
to mention, but there are only a few reasons that people bring up repeatedly.
One of those is the Gulf War.

One war changed the world. Linking such a conclusion to a war which occurred
one time in a limited area and which only lasted 42 days seems like something
of an exaggeration. However, that is indeed what the facts are, and there
is no need to enumerate one by one all the new words that began to appear
after 17 January 1991. It is only necessary to cite the former Soviet Union,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, cloning, Microsoft, hackers, the Internet, the
Southeast Asian financial crisis, the euro, as well as the world's final
and only superpower -- the United States. These are sufficient. They pretty
much constitute the main subjects on this planet for the past decade.

However, what we want to say is that all these are related to that war, either
directly or indirectly. However, we definitely do not intend to mythicize
war, particularly not a lopsided war in which there was such a great difference
in the actual power of the opposing parties. Precisely the contrary. In our
in-depth consideration of this war, which changed the entire world in merely
half a month, we have also noted another fact, which is that war itself has
now been changed. We discovered that, from those wars which could be described
in glorious and dominating terms, to the aftermath of the acme of what it
has been possible to achieve to date in the history of warfare, that war,
which people originally felt was one of the more important roles to be played
out on the world stage, has at one stroke taken the seat of a B actor.

A war which changed the world ultimately changed war itself. This is truly
fantastic, yet it also causes people to ponder deeply. No, what we are referring
to are not changes in the instruments of war, the technology of war, the
modes of war, or the forms of war. What we are referring to is the function
of warfare. Who could imagine that an insufferably arrogant actor, whose
appearance has changed the entire plot, suddenly finds that he himself is
actually the last person to play this unique role. Furthermore, without waiting
for him to leave the stage, he has already been told that there is no great
likelihood that he will again handle an A role, at least not a central role
in which he alone occupies center stage. What kind of feeling would this
be?

Perhaps those who feel this most deeply are the Americans, who probably should
be counted as among the few who want to play all the roles, including savior,
fireman, world policeman, and an emissary of peace, etc. In the aftermath
of "Desert Storm," Uncle Sam has not been able to again achieve a commendable
victory. Whether it was in Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has invariably
been the case. In particular, in the most recent action in which the United
States and Britain teamed up to carry out air attacks on Iraq, it was the
same stage, the same method, and the same actors, but there was no way to
successfully perform the magnificent drama that had made such a profound
impression eight years earlier. Faced with political, economic, cultural,
diplomatic, ethnic, and religious issues, etc., that are more complex than
they are in the minds of most of the military men in the world, the limitations
of the military means, which had heretofore always been successful, suddenly
became apparent. However, in the age of "might makes right" -- and most of
the history of this century falls into this period -- these were issues which
did not constitute a problem. The problem is that the U.S.-led
multinational forces brought this period to a close in the desert region
of Kuwait, thus beginning a new period.

At present it is still hard to see if this age will lead to the unemployment
of large numbers of military personnel, nor will it cause war to vanish from
this world. All these are still undetermined. The only point which is certain
is that, from this point on, war will no longer be what it was originally.
Which is to say that, if in the days to come mankind has no choice but to
engage in war, it can no longer be carried out in the ways with which we
are familiar. It is impossible for us to deny the impact on human society
and its soul of the new motivations represented by economic freedom, the
concept of human rights, and the awareness of environmental protection, but
it is certain that the metamorphosis of warfare will have a more complex
backdrop. Otherwise, the immortal bird of warfare will not be able to attain
nirvana when it is on the verge of decline: When people begin to lean toward
and rejoice in the reduced use of military force to resolve conflicts, war
will be reborn in another form and in another arena, becoming an instrument
of enormous power in the hands of all those who harbor intentions of controlling
other countries or regions. In this sense, there is reason for us to maintain
that the financial attack by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist attack
on the U.S. embassy by Usama Bin Laden, the gas attack on the Tokyo subway
by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes
of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of destruction is by no
means second to that of a war, represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and
sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare.

But whatever you call them, they cannot make us more optimistic than in the
past. We have no reason for optimism. This is because the reduction of the
functions of warfare in a pure sense does not mean at all that war has ended.
Even in the so-called post-modern, post-industrial age, warfare will not
be totally dismantled. It has only re-invaded human society in a more complex,
more extensive, more concealed, and more subtle manner. It is as Byron said
in his poem mourning Shelley, "Nothing has happened, he has only undergone
a sea change." War which has undergone the changes of modern technology and
the market system will be launched even more in atypical forms. In other
words, while we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at
the same time we definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic,
and technological violence. However, regardless of the form the violence
takes, war is war, and a change in the external appearance does not keep
any war from abiding by the principles of war.

If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer "using armed
force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will," but rather are "using
all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military,
and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests."

This represents change. A change in war and a change in the mode of war
occasioned by this. So, just what has led to the change? What kind of changes
are they? Where are the changes headed? How does one face these changes?
This is the topic that this book attempts to touch on and shed light on,
and it is also our motivation in deciding to write this book.

[Written on 17 January 1999, the 8th anniversary of the outbreak of the Gulf
War]

"Although ancient states were great, they inevitably perished when they were
fond of war" -- Sima Rangju, Technology is the Totem of Modern Man
[1]

Stirred by the warm breeze of utilitarianism, it is not surprising that
technology is more in favor with people than science is. The age of great
scientific discoveries had already been left behind before Einstein's time.
However, modern man is increasingly inclined to seeing all his dreams come
true during his lifetime. This causes him, when betting on his own future,
to prostrate himself and expect wonders from technology through a 1000-power
concave lens. In this way, technology has achieved startling and explosive
developments in a rather short period of time, and this has resulted in
innumerable benefits for mankind, which is anxious for quick success and
instant rewards. However, we proudly term this technological progress, not
realizing that at this time we have already consigned ourselves to a benighted
technological age in which we have lost our hearts [2].

Technology today is becoming increasingly dazzling and uncontrollable. Bell
Labs and Sony continue to put out novel toys, Bill Gates opens new "Windows"
each year, and "Dolly," the cloned sheep, proves that mankind is now planning
to take the place of God the Creator. The fearsome Russian-built SU-27 fighter
has not been put to use on any battlefield, and already the SU-35 has emerged
to strike a pose [3], but whether or not, once it has exhausted its time
in the limelight, the SU-35 will be able to retire having rendered meritorious
service is still a matter of considerable doubt. Technology is like "magic
shoes" on the feet of mankind, and after the spring has been wound tightly
by commercial interests, people can only dance along with the shoes, whirling
rapidly in time to the beat that they set.

The names Watt and Edison are nearly synonymous with great technical inventions,
and using these great technological masters to name their age may be said
to be reasonable. However, from then on, the situation changed, and the countless
and varied technological discoveries of the past 100 years or so makes it
difficult for the appearance of any new technology to take on any self-importance
in the realm of human life. While it may be said that the formulations of
"the age of the steam engine" and "the age of electrification" can be said
to be names which reflect the realities of the time, today, with all kinds
of new technology continuously beating against the banks of the age so that
people scarcely have the time to accord them brief acclaim while being
overwhelmed by an even higher and newer wave of technology, the age in which
an era could be named for a single new technology or a single inventor has
become a thing of the past. This is the reason why, if one calls the current
era the "nuclear age" or the "information age," it will still give people
the impression that you are using one aspect to typify the whole situation.

There is absolutely no doubt that the appearance of information technology
has been good news for human civilization. This is because it is the only
thing to date that is capable of infusing greater energy into the technological
"plague" that has been released from Pandora's box, and at the same time
it also provides a magic charm as a means of controlling it [technology].
It is just that, at present, there is still a question of who in turn will
have a magic charm with which to control it [information technology]. The
pessimistic viewpoint is that, if this technology develops in a direction
which cannot be controlled by man, ultimately it will turn mankind into its
victim [4]. However, this frightening conclusion is totally incapable of
reducing people's ardor for it.

The optimistic prospects that it displays itself are intensely seductive
for mankind, which has a thirst for technical progress. After all, its unique
features of exchanging and sharing represent the light of intelligence which
we can hope will lead mankind out of the barbarism of technology, although
this is still not sufficient to make us like those futurists who cannot see
the forest for the trees, and who use its name to label the entire age. Its
characteristics are precisely what keep it from being able to replace the
various technologies that we already have in great quantity, that are just
emerging, or which are about to be born, particularly those such as
biotechnology, materials technology, and nanotechnology, these technologies
which have a symbiotic relationship with information technology in which
they rely on and promote one another.

Over the past 300 years, people have long since become accustomed to blindly
falling in love with the new and discarding the old in the realm of technology,
and the endless pursuit of new technology has become a panacea to resolve
all the difficult questions of existence. Infatuated with it, people have
gradually gone astray. Just as one will often commit ten other mistakes to
cover up one, to solve one difficult problem people do not hesitate to bring
ten more on themselves [5]. For example, for a more convenient means of
transportation, people invented cars, but a long string of problems followed
closely on the heels of the automobile -- mining and smelting, mechanical
processing, oil extraction, rubber refining, and road-building, etc., which
in turn required a long string of technical means to solve, until ultimately
it led to pollution of the environment, destroying resources, taking over
farmland, traffic accidents, and a host of thornier problems. In the long
run, comparing the original goal of using cars for transportation with these
derivative problems, it almost seems unimportant. In this way, the irrational
expansion of technology causes mankind to continually lose his goals in the
complex ramifications of the tree of technology, losing his way and forgetting
how to get back. We may as well dub this phenomenon the "ramification effect."
Fortunately, at this time, modern information technology made its appearance.
We can say with certainty that this is the most important revolution in the
history of technology. Its revolutionary significance is not merely in that
it is a brand new technology itself, but more in that it is a kind of bonding
agent which can lightly penetrate the layers of barriers between technologies
and link various technologies which appear to be totally unrelated. Through
its bonding, not only is it possible to derive numerous new technologies
which are neither one thing nor the other while they also represent this
and that, and furthermore it also provides a kind of brand new approach to
the relationship between man and technology.

Only from the perspective of mankind can mankind clearly perceive the essence
of technology as a tool, and only then can he avoid becoming a slave to
technology -- to the tool -- during the process of resolving the difficult
problems he faces in his existence. Mankind is completely capable of fully
developing his own powers of imagination so that, when each technology is
used its potential is exhausted, and not being like a bear breaking off corncobs,
only able to continually use new technology to replace the old. Today, the
independent use of individual technologies is now becoming more and more
unimaginable. The emergence of information technology has presented endless
possibilities for match-ups involving various old and new technologies and
among new and advanced technologies. Countless facts have demonstrated that
the integrated use of technology is able to promote social progress more
than even the discovery of the technology [6].

The situation of loud solo parts is in the process of being replaced by a
multi-part chorus. The general fusion of technology is irreversibly guiding
the rising globalization trend, while the globalization trend in turn is
accelerating the process of the general fusion of technology, and this is
the basic characteristic of our age.

This characteristic will inevitably project its features on every direction
of the age, and naturally the realm of war will be no exception. No military
force that thirsts for modernization can get by without nurturing new technology,
while the demands of war have always been the midwife of new technology.
During the Gulf War, more than 500 kinds of new and advanced technology of
the 80s ascended the stage to strike a pose, making the war simply seem like
a demonstration site for new weaponry. However, the thing that left a profound
impression on people was not the new weaponry per se, but was rather the
trend of systemization in the development and use of the weapons. Like the
"Patriots" intercepting the "Scuds," it seemed as simple as shooting birds
with a shotgun, while in fact it involved numerous weapons deployed over
more than half the globe:

After a DSP satellite identified a target, an alarm was sent to a ground
station in Australia, which was then sent to the central command post in
Riyadh through the U.S. Cheyenne Mountain command post, after which the "Patriot"
operators were ordered to take their battle stations, all of which took place
in the mere 90-second alarm stage, relying on numerous relays and coordination
of space-based systems and C3I systems, truly a "shot heard 'round the world."

The real-time coordination of numerous weapons over great distances created
an unprecedented combat capability, and this was precisely something that
was unimaginable prior to the emergence of information technology. While
it may be said that the emergence of individual weapons prior to World War
II was still able to trigger a military revolution, today no-one is capable
of dominating the scene alone.

War in the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated
the right of weapons to label war and, with regard to the new starting point,
has realigned the relationship of weapons to war, while the appearance of
weapons of new concepts, and particularly new concepts of weapons, has gradually
blurred the face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as a hostile
act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country's economy
be seen as a battle? Did CNN's broadcast of an exposed corpse of a U.S. soldier
in the streets of Mogadishu shake the determination of the Americans to act
as the world's policeman, thereby altering the world's strategic situation?
And should an assessment of wartime actions look at the means or the results?
Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, there
is no longer any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly realize
that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future
warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: Warfare
which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare.

If this name becomes established, this kind of war means that all means will
be in readiness, that information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield
will be everywhere. It means that all weapons and technology can be superimposed
at will, it means that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of
war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed,
and it also means that many of the current principles of combat will be modified,
and even that the rules of war may need to be rewritten.

However, the pulse of the God of War is hard to take. If you want to discuss
war, particularly the war that will break out tomorrow evening or the morning
of the day after tomorrow, there is only one way, and that is to determine
its nature with bated breath, carefully feeling the pulse of the God of War
today.

Footnotes

[1] In Man and Technology, O. Spengler stated that "like God, our father,
technology is eternal and unchanging, like the son of God, it will save mankind,
and like the Holy Spirit, it shines upon us." The philosopher Spengler's
worship for technology, which was just like that of a theologian for God,
was nothing but a manifestation of another type of ignorance as man entered
the great age of industrialism, which increasingly flourished in the
post-industrial age.

[2] In this regard, the French philosopher and scientist Jean Ladrihre has
a unique viewpoint. He believes that science and technology have a destructive
effect as well as a guiding effect on culture. Under the combined effects
of these two, it is very difficult for mankind to maintain a clear-headed
assessment of technology, and we are constantly oscillating between the two
extremes of technical fanaticism and "anti-science" movements. Bracing oneself
to read through his The Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and
Technology, in which the writing is abstruse but the thinking recondite,
may be helpful in observing the impact of technology on the many aspects
of human society from a broader perspective.

[3] Although the improvement of beyond visual range (BVR) weapons has already
brought about enormous changes in the basic concepts of air combat,
after all is said and done it has not completely eliminated short-range combat.
The SU-27, which is capable of "cobra" maneuvers and the SU-35, which is
capable of "hook" moves, are the most outstanding fighter aircraft to date.

[4] F. G. Ronge [as published 1715 2706 1396 2706] is the sharpest of the
technological pessimists. As early as 1939, Ronge had recognized the series
of problems that modern technology brings with it, including the growth of
technological control and the threat of environmental problems. In his view,
technology has already become an unmatched, diabolical force. It has not
only taken over nature, it has also stripped away man's freedom. In Being
and Time, Martin Heidegger termed technology an "outstanding absurdity,"
calling for man to return to nature in order to avoid technology, which posed
the greatest threat. The most famous technological optimists were [Norbert]
Wiener and Steinbuch. In Wiener's Cybernetics, God and Robots, and
The Human Use of Human Beings and Steinbuch's The Information Society,
Philosophy and Cybernetics, and other such works, we can see the bright
prospects that describe for human society, driven by technology.

[5] In David Ehrenfeld's book, The Arrogance of Humanism, he cites
numerous examples of this. In Too Clever, Schwartz states that "the
resolution of one problem may generate a group of new problems, and these
problems may ultimately preclude that kind of resolution." In Rational
Consciousness, Rene Dibo [as published 3583 0355 6611 0590] also discusses
a similar phenomenon.

[6] In The Age of Science and the Future of Mankind, E. Shulman points
out that "during the dynamic development of modern culture, which is based
on the explosive development of modern technology, we are increasingly faced
with the fact of multidisciplinary cooperation...it is impossible for one
special branch of science to guide our practice in a sufficiently scientific
manner."

"As soon as technological advances may be applied to military goals, and
furthermore are already used for military purposes, they almost immediately
seem obligatory, and also often go against the will of the commanders in
triggering changes or even revolutions in the modes of combat" -- Engels

The weapons revolution invariably precedes the revolution in military affairs
by one step, and following the arrival of a revolutionary weapon, the arrival
of the revolution in military affairs is just a matter of time. The history
of warfare is continually providing this kind of proof: bronze or iron spears
resulted in the infantry phalanx, and bows and arrows and stirrups provided
new tactics for cavalry [1]. Black powder cannons gave rise to a full complement
of modern warfare modes....from the time when conical bullets and rifles
[2] took to the battlefield as the vanguard of the age of technology, weapons
straightaway stamped their names on the chest of warfare.

First, it was the enormous steel-clad naval vessels that ruled the seas,
launching the "age of battleships," then its brother the "tank" ruled land
warfare, after which the airplane dominated the skies, up until the atomic
bomb was born, announcing the approach of the "nuclear age." Today, a multitude
of new and advanced technology weapons continues to pour forth, so that weapons
have solemnly become the chief representative of war. When people discuss
future warfare, they are already quite accustomed to using certain weapons
or certain technologies to describe it, calling it "electronic warfare,"
"precision-weapons warfare," and "information warfare."

Coasting along in their mental orbit, people have not yet noticed that a
certain inconspicuous yet very important change is stealthily approaching.

No One Has the Right to Label Warfare

The weapons revolution is a prelude to a revolution in military affairs.
What is different than in the past is that the revolution in military affairs
that is coming will no longer by driven by one or two individual weapons.
In addition to continuing to stimulate people to yearn for and be charmed
by new weapons, the numerous technological inventions have also quickly
eradicated the mysteries of each kind of weapon. In the past, all that was
needed was the invention of a few weapons or pieces of equipment, such as
the stirrup and the Maxim machine gun [3], and that was sufficient to alter
the form of war, whereas today upwards of 100 kinds of weapons are needed
to make up a certain weapons system before it can have an overall effect
on war.

However, the more weapons are invented, the smaller an individual weapon's
role in war becomes, and this is a paradox that is inherent in the relationship
between weapons and war. Speaking in that sense, other than the all-out use
of nuclear weapons, a situation which is more and more unlikely and which
may be termed nuclear war, none of the other weapons, even those that are
extremely revolutionary in nature, possesses the right to label future warfare.

Perhaps it is precisely because people recognize this point that we then
have formulations such as "high-tech warfare" and "information warfare" [4],
whose intent is to use the broad concept of technology to replace the concept
of specific weapons, using a fuzzy-learning approach to resolve this knotty
problem. However, it seems that this still is not the way to resolve the
problem.

When one delves deeply into this, the term "high-technology"[5], which first
appeared in the architectural industry in the United States, is in fact a
bit vague. What constitutes high technology? What does it refer to? Logically
speaking, high and low are only relative concepts. However, using an extremely
mutable concept in this irrational manner to name warfare, which is evolving
endlessly, in itself constitutes a considerable problem. When one generation's
high technology becomes low technology with the passage of time, are we still
prepared to again dub the new toys that continue to appear as being high
tech? Or is it possible that, in today's technological explosion, this may
result in confusion and trouble for us in naming and using each new technology
that appears? Not to mention the question of just what should be the standard
to determine whether something is high or not? With regard to technology
itself, each technology has specific aspects, which therefore means that
each has its time limits. Yesterday's "high" is very possibly today's "low,"
while today's "new" will in turn become tomorrow's "old."

Compared to the M-60 tank, the "Cobra" helicopter, and the B-52, the main
battle weapons of the 60s-70s, the "Abrams" tank, the "Apache" helicopter
gunship, the F-117, the "Patriot" missiles, and the "Tomahawk" cruise missiles
are high tech. However, faced with the B-2, the F-22, the "Comanche" helicopter,
and the "J-Stars" joint-surveillance target-attack radar system, they in
turn seem outmoded. It is as if to say there is the concept of high-tech
weapons, which is a variable throughout, and which naturally becomes the
title of the "bride." Then, as the "flowers bloom each year, but the people
change," all that is left is the empty shell of a name, which is continually
placed on the head of the girl who is becoming the next "bride." Then, in
the chain of warfare with its continuous links, each weapon can go from high
to low and from new to old at any time and any place, with time's arrow being
unwilling to stop at any point; nor can any weapon occupy the throne of high
technology for long. Since this is the case, just what kind of high technology
does this so-called high-tech warfare refer to?

High technology, as spoken of in generalities, cannot become a synonym for
future warfare, nor is information technology -- which is one of the high
technologies of the present age and which seems to occupy an important position
in the makeup of all modern weapons -- sufficient to name a war. Even if
in future wars all the weapons have information components embedded in them
and are fully computerized, we can still not term such war information warfare,
and at most we can just call it computerized warfare [6]. This is because,
regardless of how important information technology is, it cannot completely
supplant the functions and roles of each technology per se. For example,
the F-22 fighter, which already fully embodies information technology, is
still a fighter, and the "Tomahawk" missile is still a missile, and one cannot
lump them all together as information weapons, nor can war which is conducted
using these weapons be termed information warfare [7]. Computerized warfare
in the broad sense and information warfare in the narrow sense are two completely
different things. The former refers to the various forms of warfare which
are enhanced and accompanied by information technology, while the latter
primarily refers to war in which information technology is used to obtain
or suppress information. In addition, the contemporary myth created by
information worship has people mistakenly believing that it is the only rising
technology, while the sun has already set on all the others. This kind of
myth may put more money in the pockets of Bill Gates, but it cannot alter
the fact that the development of information technology similarly relies
on the development of other technology, and the development of related materials
technology is a direct constraint on information technology breakthroughs.
For example, the development of biotechnology will determine the future fate
of information technology [8]. Speaking of bio-information technology, we
may as well return to a previous topic and again make a small assumption:

If people use information-guided bio-weapons to attack a bio-computer, should
this be counted as bio-warfare or information warfare? I fear that no one
will be able to answer that in one sentence, but this is something which
is perfectly capable of happening. Actually, it is basically not necessary
for people to wrack their brains over whether or not information technology
will grow strong and unruly today, because it itself is a synthesis of other
technologies, and its first appearance and every step forward are all a process
of blending with other technologies, so that it is part of them, and they
are part of it, and this is precisely the most fundamental characteristic
of the age of technological integration and globalization. Naturally, like
the figures from a steel seal, this characteristic may leave its typical
imprint on each modern weapon. We are by no means denying that, in future
warfare, certain advanced weapons may play a leading role. However, as for
determining the outcome of war, it is now very difficult for anyone to occupy
an unmatched position. It may be leading, but it will not be alone, much
less never-changing. Which is also to say that there is no one who can
unblushingly stamp his own name on a given modern war.

"Fighting the Fight that Fits One's Weapons" and "Making the Weapons to Fit
the Fight"

These two sentences, "fight the fight that fits one's weapons" and "build
the weapons to fit the fight" show the clear demarcation line between traditional
warfare and future warfare, as well as pointing out the relationship between
weapons and tactics in the two kinds of war. The former reflects the involuntary
or passive adaptation of the relationship of man to weapons and tactics in
war which takes place under natural conditions, while the latter suggests
the conscious or active choice that people make regarding the same proposition
when they have entered a free state. In the history of war, the general unwritten
rule that people have adhered to all along is to "fight the fight that fits
one's weapons." Very often it is the case that only after one first has a
weapon does one begin to formulate tactics to match it. With weapons coming
first, followed by tactics, the evolution of weapons has a decisive constraining
effect on the evolution of tactics. Naturally, there are limiting factors
here involving the age and the technology, but neither can we say that there
is no relationship between this and the linear thinking in which each generation
of weapons making specialists only thinks about whether or not the performance
of the weapon itself is advanced, and does not consider other aspects. Perhaps
this is one of the factors why a weapons revolution invariably precedes a
revolution in military affairs.

Although the expression "fight the fight that fits one's weapons" is essentially
negative in nature because what it leaves unsaid reflects a kind of helplessness,
we have no intention of belittling the positive meaning that it has today,
and this positive meaning is seeking the optimum tactics for the weapons
one has. In other words, seeking the combat mode which represents the best
match for the given weapons, thereby seeing that they perform up to their
peak values. Today, those engaged in warfare have now either consciously
or unconsciously completed the transition of this rule from the negative
to the positive. It is just that people still wrongfully believe that this
is the only initiative that can be taken by backward countries in their
helplessness. They hardly realize that the United States, the foremost power
in the world, must similarly face this kind of helplessness. Even though
she is the richest in the world, it is not necessarily possible for her to
use up her uniform new and advanced technology weapons to fight an expensive
modern war [9]. It is just that she has more freedom when it comes
to the selection and pairing up of new and old weapons.

If one can find a good point of agreement, which is to say, the most appropriate
tactics, the pairing up and use of new and older generation weapons not only
makes it possible to eliminate the weakness of uniform weaponry, it may also
become a "multiplier" to increase the weapons' effectiveness. The B-52 bomber,
which people have predicted on many occasions is long since ready to pass
away peacefully, has once again become resplendent after being coupled with
cruise missiles and other precision guided weapons, and its wings have not
yet rested to date. By the use of external infrared guided missiles, the
A-10 aircraft now has night-attack capabilities that it originally lacked,
and when paired with the Apache helicopter, they complement each other nicely,
so that this weapons platform which appeared in the mid-70s is very imposing.

Obviously, "fight the fight that fits one's weapons" by no means represents
passive inaction. For example, today's increasingly open weapons market and
multiple supply channels have provided a great deal of leeway with regard
to weapons selection, and the massive coexistence of weapons which span multiple
generations has provided a broader and more functional foundation for
trans-generation weapons combinations than at any age in the past, so that
it is only necessary to break with our mental habit of treating the weapons'
generations, uses, and combinations as being fixed to be able to turn something
that is rotten into something miraculous. If one thinks that one must rely
on advanced weapons to fight a modern war, being blindly superstitious about
the miraculous effects of such weapons, it may actually result in turning
something miraculous into something rotten. We find ourselves in a stage
where a revolutionary leap forward is taking place in weapons, going from
weapons systems symbolized by gunpowder to those symbolized by information,
and this may be a relatively prolonged period of alternating weapons. At
present we have no way of predicting how long this period may last, but what
we can say for sure is that, as long as this alternation has not come to
an end, fighting the kind of battle that fits one's weapons will be the most
basic approach for any country in handling the relationship between weapons
and combat, and this includes the United States, the country which has the
most advanced weapons. What must be pointed out is that, the most basic thing
is not the thing with the greatest future. Aggressive initiatives under negative
preconditions is only a specific approach for a specific time, and by no
means constitutes an eternal rule. In man's hands, scientific progress has
long since gone from passive discovery to active invention, and when the
Americans proposed the concept of "building the weapons to fit the fight,"
it triggered the greatest single change in the relationship between weapons
and tactics since the advent of war.

First determine the mode of combat, then develop the weapons, and in this
regard, the first stab that the Americans took at this was "Air-Land battle,"
while the currently popular "digitized battlefield" and "digitized units"
[10] which have given rise to much discussion represent their most recent
attempt. This approach indicates that the position of weapons in invariably
preceding a revolution in military affairs has now been shaken, and now tactics
come first and weapons follow, or the two encourage one another, with advancement
in a push-pull manner becoming the new relationship between them. At the
same time, weapons themselves have produced changes with epoch-making
significance, and their development no longer looks only to improvements
in the performance of individual weapons, but rather to whether or not the
weapons have good characteristics for linking and matching them with other
weapons. As with the F-111, which was in a class by itself at the time, because
it was too advanced, there was no way to pair it up with other weapons, so
all they could do was shelve it. That lesson has now been absorbed, and the
thinking that tries to rely on one or two new and advanced technology weapons
to serve as "killer weapons" which can put an end to the enemy is now outmoded.

"Building the weapons to fit the fight," an approach which has the distinctive
features of the age and the characteristics of the laboratory, may not only
be viewed as a kind of active choice, it can also be taken as coping with
shifting events by sticking to a fundamental principle, and in addition to
being a major breakthrough in the history of preparing for war, it also implies
the potential crisis in modern warfare: Customizing weapons systems to tactics
which are still being explored and studied is like preparing food for a great
banquet without knowing who is coming, where the slightest error can lead
one far astray. Viewed from the performance of the U.S. military in Somalia,
where they were at a loss when they encountered Aidid's forces, the most
modern military force does not have the ability to control public clamor,
and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner.
On the battlefields of the future, the digitized forces may very possibly
be like a great cook who is good at cooking lobsters sprinkled with butter,
when faced with guerrillas who resolutely gnaw corncobs, they can only sigh
in despair. The "generation gap"[11] in weapons and military forces is perhaps
an issue that requires exceptional attention. The closer the generation gap
is, the more pronounced are the battle successes of the more senior generation,
while the more the gap opens, the less each party is capable of dealing with
the other, and it may reach the point where no one can wipe out the other.
Looking at the specific examples of battles that we have, it is difficult
for high-tech troops to deal with unconventional warfare and low-tech warfare,
and perhaps there is a rule here, or at least it is an interesting phenomenon
which is worth studying[12].

Weapons of New Concepts and New Concepts of Weapons

Compared to new-concept weapons, nearly all the weapons that we have known
so far may be termed old-concept weapons. The reason they are called old
is because the basic functions of these weapons were their mobility and lethal
power. Even things like precision-guided bombs and other such high-tech weapons
really involve nothing more than the addition of the two elements of intelligence
and structural capabilities. From the perspective of practical applications,
no change in appearance can alter their nature as traditional weapons, that
is, their control throughout by professional soldiers and their use on certain
battlefields. All these weapons and weapons platforms that have been produced
in line with traditional thinking have without exception come to a dead end
in their efforts to adapt to modern warfare and future warfare. Those desires
of using the magic of high-technology to work some alchemy on traditional
weapons so that they are completely remade have ultimately fallen into the
high-tech trap involving the endless waste of limited funds and an arms race.
This is the paradox that must inevitably be faced in the process of the
development of traditional weapons: To ensure that the weapons are in the
lead, one must continue to up the ante in development costs; the result of
this continued raising of the stakes is that no one has enough money to maintain
the lead. Its ultimate result is that the weapons to defend the country actually
become a cause of national bankruptcy.

Perhaps the most recent examples are the most convincing. Marshal Orgakov,
the former chief of the Soviet general staff, was acutely aware of the trend
of weapons development in the "nuclear age," and when, at an opportune time,
he proposed the brand-new concept of the "revolution in military technology,"
his thinking was clearly ahead of those of his generation. But being ahead
of time in his thinking hardly brought his country happiness, and actually
brought about disastrous results [13]. As soon as this concept -- which against
the backdrop of the Cold War was seen by his colleagues as setting the pace
for the time -- was proposed, it further intensified the arms race which
had been going on for some time between the United States and the Soviet
Union. It was just that, at that time no one could predict that it would
actually result in the breakup of the Soviet Union and its complete elimination
from the superpower contest. A powerful empire collapsed without a single
shot being fired, vividly corroborating the lines of the famous poem by Kipling,
"When empires perish, it is not with a rumble, but a snicker." Not only was
this true for the former Soviet Union, today the Americans seem to be following
in the footsteps of their old adversary, providing fresh proof of the paradox
of weapons development that we have proposed. As the outlines of the age
of technology integration become increasingly clear, they are investing more
and more in the development of new weapons, and the cost of the weapons is
getting higher and higher. The development of the F-14 and F-15 in the 60s-70s
cost one billion dollars, while the development of the B-2 in the 80s cost
over $10 billion, and the development of the F-22 in the 90s has exceeded
$13 billion. Based on weight, the B-2 [14], which runs $13-$15 billion each,
is some three times more expensive than an equivalent weight of gold [15].
Expensive weapons like that abound in the U.S. arsenal, such as the F-117A
bomber, the F-22 main combat aircraft, and the Comanche helicopter gunship.
The cost of each of these weapons exceeds or approaches $100 million, and
this massive amount of weapons with unreasonable cost-effectiveness has covered
the U.S. military with increasingly heavy armor, pushing them step by step
toward the high-tech weapons trap where the cost stakes continue to be raised.
If this is still true for the rich and brash United States, then how far
can the other countries, who are short of money, continue down this path?
Obviously, it will be difficult for anyone to keep going. Naturally, the
way to extricate oneself from this predicament is to develop a different
approach.

Therefore, new-concept weapons have emerged to fill the bill. However, what
seems unfair to people is that it is again the Americans who are in the lead
in this trend. As early as the Vietnam war, the silver iodide powder released
over the "Ho Chi Minh trail" that resulted in torrential rains and the defoliants
scattered over the subtropical forests put the "American devils" in the sole
lead with regard to both the methods and ruthlessness of new-concept weapons.
Thirty years later, with the dual advantages of money and technology, others
are unable to hold a candle to them in this area.

However, the Americans are not necessarily in the sole lead in everything.
The new concepts of weapons, which came after the weapons of new concepts
and which cover a wider area, were a natural extension of this. However,
the Americans have not been able to get their act together in this area.
This is because proposing a new concept of weapons does not require relying
on the springboard of new technology, it just demands lucid and incisive
thinking. However, this is not a strong point of the Americans, who are slaves
to technology in their thinking. The Americans invariably halt their thinking
at the boundary where technology has not yet reached. It cannot be denied
that man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic wave
and new biological and chemical weapons all constitute new concept weapons
[16], and that they have tremendous differences with what we normally speak
of as weapons, but they are still all weapons whose immediate goal is to
kill and destroy, and which are still related to military affairs, soldiers,
and munitions. Speaking in this sense, they are nothing more than non-traditional
weapons whose mechanisms have been altered and whose lethal power and destructive
capabilities have been magnified several times over.

However, a new concept of weapons is different. This and what people call
new-concept weapons are two entirely different things. While it may be said
that new-concept weapons are weapons which transcend the domain of traditional
weapons, which can be controlled and manipulated at a technical level, and
which are capable of inflicting material or psychological casualties on an
enemy, in the face of the new concept of weapons, such weapons are still
weapons in a narrow sense. This is because the new concept of weapons is
a view of weapons in the broad sense, which views as weapons all means which
transcend the military realm but which can still be used in combat operations.
In its eyes, everything that can benefit mankind can also harm him. This
is to say that there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon,
and this requires that our understanding of weapons must have an awareness
that breaks through all boundaries. With technological developments being
in the process of striving to increase the types of weapons, a breakthrough
in our thinking can open up the domain of the weapons kingdom at one stroke.
As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus
invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the
enemy country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country
on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.
A new concept of weapons provides direction for new-concept weapons, while
the new-concept weapons give fixed forms to the new concept of weapons. With
regard to the flood of new-concept weapons, technology is no longer the main
factor, and the true underlying factor is a new concept regarding weapons.

What must be made clear is that the new concept of weapons is in the process
of creating weapons that are closely linked to the lives of the common people.
Let us assume that the first thing we say is: The appearance of new-concept
weapons will definitely elevate future warfare to a level which is hard for
the common people -- or even military men -- to imagine. Then the second
thing we have to say should be: The new concept of weapons will cause ordinary
people and military men alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that
commonplace things that are close to them can also become weapons with which
to engage in war. We believe that some morning people will awake to discover
with surprise that quite a few gentle and kind things have begun to have
offensive and lethal characteristics.

The Trend to "Kinder" Weapons

Before the appearance of the atom bomb, warfare was always in a "shortage
age" with respect to lethal power. Efforts to improve weapons have primarily
been to boost their lethal power, and from the "light-kill weapons" represented
by cold steel weapons and single-shot firearms to the "heavy-kill weapons"
represented by various automatic firearms, the history of the development
of weapons has almost always been a process of continuing to boost the lethal
power of weapons. Prolonged shortages resulted in a thirst among military
men for weapons of even greater lethal power that was difficult to satisfy.
With a single red cloud that arose over the wasteland of New Mexico in the
United States, military men were finally able to obtain a weapon of mass
destruction that fulfilled their wishes, as this could not only completely
wipe out the enemy, it could kill them 100 or 1000 times over. This gave
mankind lethal capabilities that exceeded the demand, and for the first time
there was some room to spare with regard to lethal power in war.

Philosophical principles tell us that, whenever something reaches an ultimate
point, it will turn in the opposite direction. The invention of nuclear weapons,
this "ultra-lethal weapon" [17] which can wipe out all mankind, has plunged
mankind into an existential trap of its own making.

Nuclear weapons have become a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of
mankind which forces it to ponder: Do we really need "ultra-lethal weapons"?
What is the difference between killing an enemy once and killing him 100
times? What is the point of defeating the enemy if it means risking the
destruction of the world? How do we avoid warfare that results in ruin for
all? A "balance of terror" involving "mutually-assured destruction" was the
immediate product of this thinking, but its by-product was to provide a braking
mechanism for the runaway express of improving the lethal capabilities of
weapons, which was continually picking up speed, so that the development
of weapons was no longer careening crazily down the light-kill weapons --
heavy-kill weapons -- ultra-lethal weapons expressway, with people trying
to find a new approach to weapons development which would not only be effective
but which could also exercise control over the lethal power of the weapons.

Any major technological invention will have a profound human background.
The "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" passed by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948 and the more than 50 subsequent pacts related to
it have established a set of international rules for human rights in which
it is recognized that the use of weapons of mass destruction -- particularly
nuclear weapons -- is a serious violation of the "right to life" and represents
a "crime against mankind."

Influenced by human rights and other new political concepts, plus the integration
trend in international economics, the interlocking demands and political
positions involving the interests of various social and political forces,
the proposal of the concept of "ultimate concern" for the ecological environment,
and particularly the value of human life, have resulted in misgivings about
killing and destruction, forming a new value concept for war and new ethics
for warfare.

The trend to "kinder" [18] weapons is nothing other than a reflection in
the production and development of weapons of this great change in man's cultural
background. At the same time, technological progress has given us the means
to strike at the enemy's nerve center directly without harming other things,
giving us numerous new options for achieving victory, and all these make
people believe that the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to
kill. There have been changes in the concept of war and the concept of weapons,
and the approach of using uncontrolled slaughter to force the enemy into
unconditional surrender has now become the relic of a bygone age. Warfare
has now taken leave of the meat-grinder age of Verdun-like campaigns.

The appearance of precision-kill (accurate) weapons and non-lethal (non-fatal)
weapons is a turning point in the development of weapons, showing for the
first time that weapons are developing in a "kinder," not a "stronger" direction.
Precision-kill weapons can hit a target precisely, reducing collateral
casualties, and like a gamma knife which can excise a tumor with hardly any
bleeding, it has led to "surgical" strikes and other such new tactics, so
that inconspicuous combat actions can achieve extremely notable strategic
results. For example, by merely using one missile to track a mobile telephone
signal, the Russians were able to still forever the tough mouth of Dudayev,
who was a headache, and at the same time eased the enormous trouble that
had been stirred up by tiny Chechnya. Non-lethal weapons can effectively
eliminate the combat capabilities of personnel and equipment without loss
of life [19]. The trend that is embodied in these weapons shows that mankind
is in the process of overcoming its own extreme thinking, beginning to learn
to control the lethal power that it already has but which is increasingly
excessive. In the massive bombing that lasted more than a month during the
Gulf War, the loss of life among civilians in Iraq only numbered in the thousands
[20], far less than in the massive bombing of Dresden during World War II.
Kinder weapons represent the latest conscious choice of mankind among various
options in the weapons arena by which, after the weapons are infused with
the element of new technology, the human component is then added, thereby
giving warfare an unprecedented kind-hearted hue. However, a kinder weapon
is still a weapon, and it does not mean that the demands of being kinder
will reduce the battlefield effectiveness of the weapon. To take away a tank's
combat capabilities one can use cannons or missiles to destroy it, or a laser
beam can be used to destroy its optical equipment or blind its crew. On the
battlefield, someone who is injured requires more care than someone who is
killed, and unmanned weapons can eliminate increasingly expensive protective
facilities. Certainly those developing kinder weapons have already done cold
cost-effectiveness calculations of this. Casualties can strip away an enemy's
combat capabilities, causing him to panic and lose the will to fight, so
this may be considered an extremely worthwhile way to achieve victory. Today,
we already have enough technology, and we can create many methods of causing
fear which are more effective, such as using a laser beam to project the
image of injured followers against the sky, which would be sufficient to
frighten those soldiers who are devoutly religious. There are no longer any
obstacles to building this kind of weapon, it just requires that some additional
imagination be added to the technical element.

Kinder weapons represent a derivative of the new concept of weapons, while
information weapons are a prominent example of kinder weapons. Whether it
involves electromagnetic energy weapons for hard destruction or soft-strikes
by computer logic bombs, network viruses, or media weapons, all are focused
on paralyzing and undermining, not personnel casualties.

Kinder weapons, which could only be born in an age of technical integration,
may very well be the most promising development trend for weapons, and at
the same time they will bring about forms of war or revolutions in military
affairs which we cannot imagine or predict today. They represent a change
with the most profound implications in the history of human warfare to date,
and are the watershed between the old and the new forms of war. This is because
their appearance has been sufficient to put all the wars in the age of cold
and hot weapons into the "old" era. Nonetheless, we still cannot indulge
in romantic fantasies about technology, believing that from this point on
war will become a confrontation like an electronic game, and even simulated
warfare in a computer room similarly must be premised upon a country's actual
overall capabilities, and if a colossus with feet of clay comes up with ten
plans for simulated warfare, it will still not be sufficient to deter an
enemy who is more powerful with regard to actual strength.

War is still the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction,
and even the slightest innocence is not tolerated. Even if some day all the
weapons have been made completely humane, a kinder war in which bloodshed
may be avoided is still war. It may alter the cruel process of war, but there
is no way to change the essence of war, which is one of compulsion, and therefore
it cannot alter its cruel outcome, either.

Footnotes:

[1] Engels said, "In the age of barbarism, the bow and arrow was still a
decisive weapon, the same as the iron sword in an uncivilized age and firearms
in the age of civilization." (Collected Works of Marx and Engels,
Vol. 4, People's Press, 1972, p. 19)

With regard to how stirrups altered the mode of combat, we can refer to the
translation and commentary by Gu Zhun [7357 0402] of an article entitled
"Stirrups and Feudalism -- Does Technology Create History?"
"Stirrups...immediately made hand-to-hand combat possible, and this was a
revolutionary new mode of combat...very seldom had there been an invention
as simple as the stirrup, but very seldom did it play the kind of catalytic
role in history that this did." "Stirrups resulted in a series of military
and social revolutions in Europe." (Collected Works of Gu Zhun, Guizhou
People's Press, 1994, pp 293-309).

[2] "Compared to the development of any advanced new weapons technology,
the invention of the rifle and the conical bullet between 1850-1860 had the
most profound and immediate revolutionary impact.....The impact on their
age of high-explosive bombs, airplanes, and tanks, which appeared in the
20th century, certainly does not compare to that of the rifle at the time."
For details, see T. N. Dupuy's The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare,
part 3, section 21, "Rifles, Conical Bullets, and Dispersed Formations."
(Military Science Publishing House, 1985, pp 238-250).

[3] In the engagement of the Somme river in World War I, on 1 July 1916 the
English forces launched an offensive against the Germans, and the Germans
used Maxim machine guns to strafe the English troops, which were in a tight
formation, resulting in 60,000 casualties in one day. From that point, mass
formation charges gradually began to retreat from the battlefield. (Weapons
and War -- The Historical Evolution of Military Technology, Liu Jifeng
[0491 2060 6912], University of Science and Technology for National Defense
Publishing House, 1992, pp 172-173).

[4] If Wiener's views on war game machines are not taken as the earliest
discussion of information weapons. Then, a comment by Tom Luona [as published
5012 6719] in 1976 to the effect that information warfare is a "struggle
among decision-making systems" makes him the first to come up with the term
"information warfare" (U.S., Military Intelligence magazine, 1997,
Jan-Mar issue, Douglas Dearth, "Implications, Characteristics, and Impact
of Information Warfare"). Through independent research, in 1990, Shen Weiguang
[3088 0251 0342], a young scholar in China who has over ten years of military
service, published Information Warfare, which is probably the earliest
monograph on information warfare. On the strength of his Third Wave,
in another best-seller entitled Power Shift, Toffler gave information
warfare a global look, while the Gulf War happened along to become the most
splendid advertisement for this new concept of combat. At that point, discussing
"information warfare" became fashionable.

[5] Foreign experts hold that "high technology" is not a completely fixed
concept and that it is also a dynamic concept, with different countries
emphasizing high technology differently. Military high technology mainly
includes military microelectronic device technology, computer technology,
optoelectric technology, aerospace technology, biotechnology, new materials
technology, stealth technology, and directed-energy technology. The most
important characteristic of military high technology is "integration," i.e.,
each military high technology is made up of various technologies to form
a technology group. (For details, see "Foreign Military Data," Academy of
Military Sciences, Foreign Military Research Dept., No. 69, 1993).

[6] Regarding the definition of "information warfare," to date opinions still
vary. The definition by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is: Actions taken to interfere with the enemy's information, information
processing, information systems, and computer networks to achieve information
superiority over the enemy, while protecting one's own information, information
processing, information systems, and computer networks. According to U.S.
Army Field Manual FM100-6, "the DOD's understanding of information warfare
leans toward the effects of information in actual conflicts," while the Army's
understanding is that "information has already permeated every aspect, from
peacetime to military actions in global warfare" (Military Science Publishing
House, Chinese translation, pp 24-25). "In a broad sense, information warfare
constitutes actions which use information to achieve national goals." That
is the definition given to information warfare by George Stein, a professor
at the U.S. Air University, reflecting a somewhat broader vision than that
of the Army. In an article in the 1997 summer edition of "Joint Force Quarterly,"
Col. Brian Fredericks proposed that "information warfare is a national issue
that goes beyond the scope of national defense," and perhaps this is the
most accurate description of information warfare in the broad sense.

[7] Running precisely counter to the situation in which the implications
of the concept of "information warfare" are getting broader and broader,
some of the smart young officers in the U.S. military are increasingly
questioning the concept of "information warfare." Air Force Lt. Col. James
Rogers points out that "information warfare really isn't anything new...whether
or not those who assert that information warfare techniques and strategies
will inevitably replace 'armed warfare' are a bit too self-confident." (U.S.
Marines magazine , April, 1997). Navy Lieutenant Robert Guerli [as published
0657 1422 0448] proposed that "the seven areas of misunderstanding with regard
to information warfare are: (1) the overuse of analogous methods; (2)
exaggerating the threat; (3) overestimating one's own strength; (4) historical
relevance and accuracy; (5) avoiding criticism of anomalous attempts; (6)
totally unfounded assumptions; and (7) non-standard definitions." (U.S.,
Events magazine, Sep 97 issue). Air Force Major Yulin Whitehead wrote in
the fall 1997 issue of Airpower Journal that information is not
all-powerful, and that information weapons are not "magic weapons." Questions
about information warfare are definitely not limited to individuals, as the
U.S. Air Force document "The Foundations of Information Warfare" makes a
strict distinction between "warfare in the information age" and "information
warfare." It holds that "warfare in the information age" is warfare which
uses computerized weapons, such as using a cruise missile to attack a target,
whereas "information warfare" treats information as an independent realm
and a powerful weapon. Similarly, some well-known scholars have also issued
their own opinions. Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot Cohen reminds
us that "just as nuclear weapons did not result in the elimination of
conventional forces, the information revolution will not eliminate guerilla
tactics, terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction."

[8] Macromolecular systems designed and produced using biotechnology represent
the production materials for even higher order electronic components. For
example, protein molecule computers have computation speeds and memory
capabilities hundreds of millions of times greater than our current computers.
(New Military Perspectives for the Next Century, Military Science
Publishing House, 1997 edition, pp 142-145).

[9] Even in the Gulf War, which has been termed a testing ground for the
new weapons, there were quite a few old weapons and conventional munitions
which played important roles. (For details, see "The Gulf War -- U.S. Department
of Defense Final Report to Congress -- Appendix")

[10] Starting with "Air-Land Battle," weapons development by the U.S. military
has mainly been divided into five stages: Propose requirements, draft a plan,
proof of concept, engineering development and production, and outfitting
the units. Development regarding the equipping of digitized units is following
this same path. (U.S. Army magazine, Oct 1995). In March, 1997, the
U.S. Army conducted a brigade-size high-level combat test, testing a total
of 58 kinds of digitized equipment. (U.S. Army Times, 31 March, 7
April, 28 April 1997). According to John E. Wilson, commander of the U.S.
Army's Materiel Command, his mission is to cooperate with the Training and
Doctrine Command, thinking up and developing bold and novel advanced technology
equipment for them which meets their needs. (U.S. Army magazine, October
1997).

[11] Slipchenko [si li pu qin ke 2448 0448 2528 3830 4430], chairman of the
Dept. of Scientific Research at the Russian General Staff Academy, believes
that war and weapons have already gone through five ages, and we are now
heading toward the sixth. (Zhu Xiaoli, Zhao Xiaozhuo, The New U.S. and
Russian Military Revolution, Military Science Publishing House, 1996
edition, p 6).

[12] The Journal of the National Defense University, No. 11, 1998,
carried an article on Chen Bojiang's interview of Philip Odeen, chairman
of the U.S. National Defense Panel. Odeen mentioned "asymmetrical warfare"
several times, believing that this is a new threat to the United States.
Antulio Echevarria published an article in Parameters magazine in which he
proposed that "in the post-industrial age, the thing that will still be most
difficult to deal with will be a 'people's war.'"

[13] U.S. defense specialists believe that Orgakov already saw that electronic
technology would result in a revolution in conventional weapons, and that
they would replace nuclear weapons with respect to their effects. However,
Orgakov's foresight and wisdom with regard to the issue of a revolution in
military affairs ran aground because of structural problems. "If, in keeping
up with the extremely high costs of the revolution in military affairs, a
country exceeds the limits that can be borne by its system and material
conditions, but it keeps engaging in military power contests with its opponents,
the only outcome can be that they will fall further behind with regard to
the military forces that they can use. This was the fate of Russia during
the czarist and Soviet eras: the Soviet Union undertook military burdens
that were difficult to bear, while in turn the military was unwilling to
accept the need for strategic retrenchment." (See U.S., Strategic Review
magazine, spring 1996, Steven Blank, "Preparing for the Next War: Some Views
on the Revolution in Military Affairs").

[14] In 1981, the U.S. Air Force estimated that it could produce 132 B-2s
with an investment of $22 billion. However, eight years later, this money
had only produced one B-2. Based on its value per unit weight, one B-2 is
worth three times its weight in gold. (See Modern Military, No. 8,
1998, p 33, and Zhu Zhihao's Analysis of U.S. Stealth Technology
Policy.)

[15] The U.S. Dept. of Defense conducted an analysis of the 13 January 1993
air attack on Iraq and believes that there are numerous limitations to high-tech
weapons, and that the effect of the combined effect bombs was at times better
than that of precision bombs. (U.S., Aviation Week and Space Technology,
25 January 93).

[17] The point in substituting the concept of "ultra-lethal weapons" for
the concept of "weapons of mass destruction" is to stress that the lethal
power of such weapons exceeds the needs of warfare and represents a product
of man's extremist thinking.

[18] The "kind" in "kinder weapons" mainly refers to the fact that it reduces
slaughter and collateral casualties.

[19] The April 1993 issue of the British journal International Defense
Review revealed that the United States was energetically researching
a variety of non-lethal weapons, including optical weapons, high-energy microwave
weapons, acoustic beam weapons, and pulsed chemical lasers. The 6 March 1993
issue of Jane's Defense Weekly reported that a high-level non-lethal
weapons steering committee at the Dept. of Defense had formulated a policy
regulating the development, procurement, and use of such weapons. In addition,
according to the 1997 World Military Yearbook (pp 521-522), the U.S.
Dept. of Defense has established a "non-lethal weapons research leading group,"
whose goal is to see that non-lethal weapons appear on the weapons inventory
as soon as possible.

[20] See Military Science Publishing House Foreign Military Data,
26 March 1993, No. 27, p 3.

Ever since early man went from hunting animals to slaughtering his own kind,
people have been equipping the giant war beast for action, and the desire
to attain various goals has prompted soldiers to become locked in bloody
conflict. It has become universally accepted that warfare is a matter for
soldiers. For several thousand years, the three indispensable "hardware"
elements of any war have been soldiers, weapons and a battlefield. Running
through them all has been the "software" element of warfare: its purposefulness.
Before now, nobody has ever questioned that these are the basic elements
of warfare. The problem comes when people discover that all of these basic
elements, which seemingly were hard and fast, have changed so that it is
impossible to get a firm grip on them. When that day comes, is the war god's
face still distinct?

Why Fight and for Whom?

In regard to the ancient Greeks, if the account in Homer's epic is really
trustworthy, the purpose of the Trojan War was clear and simple: it was worth
fighting a ten-year war for the beautiful Helen. As far as their aims, the
wars prosecuted by our ancestors were relatively simple in terms of the goals
to be achieved, with no complexity to speak of. This was because our ancestors
had limited horizons, their spheres of activity were narrow, they had modest
requirements for existence, and their weapons were not lethal enough. Only
if something could not be obtained by normal means would our ancestors generally
resort to extraordinary measures to obtain it, and then without the least
hesitation. Just so, Clausewitz wrote his famous saying, which has been an
article of faith for several generations of soldiers and statesmen: "War
is a continuation of politics." Our ancestors would fight perhaps for the
orthodox status of a religious sect, or perhaps for an expanse of pastureland
with plenty of water and lush grass. They would not even have scruples about
going to war over, say, spices, liquor or a love affair between a king and
queen. The stories of wars over spices and sweethearts, and rebellions over
things like rum, are recorded in the pages of history--stories that leave
us not knowing whether to laugh or cry. Then there is the war that the English
launched against the Qing monarchy for the sake of the opium trade. This
was national drug trafficking activity on probably the grandest scale in
recorded history. It is clear from these examples that, prior to recent times,
there was just one kind of warfare in terms of the kind of motive and the
kind of subsequent actions taken. Moving to later times, Hitler expounded
his slogan of "obtaining living space for the German people," and the Japanese
expounded their slogan of building the so called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere." While a cursory look at these slogans would suggest that the goals
must have been somewhat more complex than the goals of any previous wars,
nevertheless the substance behind the slogans was simply that the new great
powers intended to once again carve up the spheres of influence of the old
great powers and to reap the benefits of seizing their colonies.

To assess why people fight is not so easy today, however. In former times,
the ideal of "exporting revolution" and the slogan of "checking the expansion
of communism" were calls to action that elicited countless responses. But
especially after the conclusion of the Cold War, when the Iron Curtain running
all along the divide between the two great camps suddenly collapsed, these
calls have lost their effectiveness. The times of clearly drawn sides are
over.

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? These used to be the paramount
questions in regard to revolution and counterrevolution. Suddenly the answers
have become complicated, confusing and hard to get hold of. A country that
yesterday was an adversary is in the process of becoming a current partner
today, while a country that once was an ally will perhaps be met on the
battlefield at the next outbreak of war. Iraq, which one year was still fiercely
attacking Iran on behalf of the U.S. in the Iran-Iraq War, itself became
the target of a fierce attack by the U.S. military in the next year (see
Endnote 1). An Afghan guerilla trained by the CIA becomes the latest target
for an attack by U.S. cruise missiles overnight. Furthermore, NATO members
Greece and Turkey have nearly come to blows several times in their dispute
over Cyprus, and Japan and South Korea, who have concluded a treaty of alliance,
have come just short of an open break as a result of their dispute over a
tiny island. All of this serves to again confirm that old saying: "all friendship
is in flux; self-interest is the only constant." The kaleidoscope of war
is turned by the hands of self-interest, presenting constantly shifting images
to the observer.

Astonishing advances in modern advanced technology serve to promote
globalization, further intensifying the uncertainty associated with the
dissolution of some perceived self-interests and the emergence of others.
The reason for starting a war can be anything from a dispute over territory
and resources, a dispute over religious beliefs, hatred stemming from tribal
differences, or a dispute over ideology, to a dispute over market share,
a dispute over the distribution of power and authority, a dispute over trade
sanctions, or a dispute stemming from financial unrest.

The goals of warfare have become blurred due to the pursuit of a variety
of agendas. Thus, it is more and more difficult for people to say clearly
just why they are fighting (see Endnote 2). Every young lad that participated
in the Gulf War will tell you right up front that he fought to restore justice
in tiny, weak Kuwait. However, the real reason for the war was perhaps far
different from the high-sounding reason that was given. Hiding under the
umbrella furnished by this high-sounding reason, they need not fear facing
the light directly. In reality, every country that participated in the Gulf
War decided to join "Desert Storm" only after carefully thinking over its
own intentions and goals. Throughout the whole course of the war, all of
the Western powers were fighting for their oil lifeline. To this primary
goal, the Americans added the aspiration of building a new world order with
"USA" stamped on it. Perhaps there was also a bit of missionary zeal to uphold
justice. In order to eliminate a threat that was close at hand, the Saudi
Arabians were willing to smash Muslim taboos and "dance with wolves." From
start to finish, the British reacted enthusiastically to President Bush's
every move, in order to repay Uncle Sam for the trouble he took on their
behalf in the Malvinas Islands War. The French, in order to prevent the complete
evaporation of their traditional influence in the Middle East, finally sent
troops to the Gulf at the last moment. Naturally, there is no way that a
war prosecuted under these kinds of conditions can be a contest fought over
a single objective. The aggregate of the self-interests of all the numerous
countries participating in the war serves to transform a modern war like
"Desert Storm" into a race to further various self-interests under the banner
of a common interest. Thus, so-called "common interest" has become merely
the war equation's largest common denominator that can be accepted by every
allied party participating in the war effort. Since different countries will
certainly be pursuing different agendas in a war, it is necessary to take
the self-interest of every allied party into consideration if the war is
to be prosecuted jointly. Even if we consider a given country's domestic
situation, each of the various domestic interest groups will also be pursuing
its own agenda in a war. The complex interrelationships among self-interests
make it impossible to pigeonhole the Gulf War as having been fought for oil,
or as having been fought for the new world order, or as having been fought
to drive out the invaders. Only a handful of soldiers are likely to grasp
a principle that every statesman already knows: that the biggest difference
between contemporary wars and the wars of the past is that, in contemporary
wars, the overt goal and the covert goal are often two different matters.

Where to Fight?

"To the battlefield!" The young lad with a pack on his back takes leave of
his family as his daughters and other relatives see him off with tears in
their eyes. This is a classic scene in war movies. Whether the young lad
is leaving on a horse, a train, a steamship or a plane is not so important.
The important thing is that the destination never changes: it is the battlefield
bathed in the flames of war.

During the long period of time before firearms, battlefields were small and
compact. A face-off at close quarters between two armies might unfold on
a small expanse of level ground, in a mountain pass, or within the confines
of a city. In the eyes of today's soldier, the battlefield that so enraptured
the ancients is a "point" target on the military map that is not particularly
noteworthy. Such a battlefield is fundamentally incapable of accommodating
the spectacle of war as it has unfolded in recent times on such a grand scale.
The advent of firearms led to dispersed formations, and the "point" ["dian"
7820] type battlefield was gradually drawn out into a line of skirmishers.
The trench warfare of the First World War, with lines extending hundreds
of miles, served to bring the "point" and "line" ["xian" 4775] type battlefield
to its acme. At the same time, it transformed the battlefield into an "area"
["mian" 7240] type battlefield which was several dozens of miles deep. For
those who went to war during those times, the new battlefield meant trenches,
pillboxes, wire entanglements, machine guns and shell craters. They called
war on this type of battlefield, where heavy casualties were inflicted, a
"slaughterhouse" and a "meat grinder." The explosive development of military
technology is constantly setting the stage for further explosive expansion
of the battlespace. The transition from the "point" type battlefield to the
"line" type battlefield, and the transition from the two-dimensional battlefield
to the three- dimensional battlefield did not take as long as people generally
think. One could say that, in each case, the latter stage came virtually
on the heels of the former. When tanks began roaring over military trenches,
prop airplanes were already equipped with machine guns and it was already
possible to drop bombs from zeppelins. The development of weapons cannot,
in and of itself, automatically usher in changes in the nature of the
battlefield. In the history of warfare, any significant advance has always
depended in part on active innovating by military strategists. The battlefield,
which had been earthbound for several thousand years, was suddenly lifted
into three dimensional space. This was due in part to General J.F.C. Fuller's
Tanks in the Great War of 1914-1918 and Giulio Douhet's The Command of the
Air, as well as the extremely deep operations that were proposed and demonstrated
under the command of Marshall Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. Erich Ludendorff was
another individual who attempted to radically change the nature of the
battlefield. He put forth the theory of "total war" and tried to combine
battlefield and non-battlefield elements into one organic whole. While he
was not successful, he nevertheless was the harbinger of similar military
thought that has outlived him for more than half a century. Ludendorff was
destined only to fight at battlefields like Verdun and the Masurian Lakes.
A soldier's fate is determined by the era in which he lives. At that time,
the wingspan of the war god could not extend any farther than the range of
a Krupp artillery piece. Naturally, then, it was impossible to fire a shell
that would pass through the front and rear areas on its parabolic path. Hitler
was more fortunate than Ludendorff. 20 years later, he had long range weapons
at his disposal. He utilized bombers powered by Mercedes engines and V-1
and V-2 guided missiles and broke the British Isles' record of never having
been encroached upon by an invader. Hitler, who was neither a strategist
nor a tactician, relied on his intuition and made the line of demarcation
between the front and rear less prominent in the war, but he never really
understood the revolutionary significance of breaking through the partition
separating battlefield elements from non-battlefield elements. Perhaps this
concept was beyond the ken of an out-and- out war maniac and half-baked military
strategist.

This revolution, however, will be upon us in full force soon enough. This
time, technology is again running ahead of the military thinking. While no
military thinker has yet put forth an extremely wide-ranging concept of the
battlefield, technology is doing its utmost to extend the contemporary
battlefield to a degree that is virtually infinite: there are satellites
in space, there are submarines under the water, there are ballistic missiles
that can reach anyplace on the globe, and electronic countermeasures are
even now being carried out in the invisible electromagnetic spectrum space.
Even the last refuge of the human race--the inner world of the heart--cannot
avoid the attacks of psychological warfare. There are nets above and snares
below, so that a person has no place to flee. All of the prevailing concepts
about the breadth, depth and height of the operational space already appear
to be old-fashioned and obsolete. In the wake of the expansion of mankind's
imaginative powers and his ability to master technology, the battlespace
is being stretched to its limits.

In 1985, China implemented a "Massive Million Troop Drawdown" in its armed
forces. With this as a prelude, every major nation in the world carried out
round after round of force reductions over the next dozen or so years. According
to many commentators on military affairs, the main factor behind the general
worldwide force reductions is that, with the conclusion of the Cold War,
countries that formerly were pitted against each other are now anxious to
enjoy the peace dividend. Little do these commentators realize that this
factor is just the tip of the iceberg.

The factors leading to armed forces reductions are by no means limited to
this point. A deeper reason for the force reductions is that, as the wave
of information technology (IT) warfare ["xinxihua zhanzheng" 0207 1873 0553
2069 3630] grows and grows, it would require too much of an effort and would
be too grandiose to set up a large-scale professional military, cast and
formed on the assembly lines of big industry and established according to
the demands of mechanized warfare. Precisely for this reason, during these
force reductions, some farsighted countries, rather than primarily having
personnel cuts in mind, are instead putting more emphasis on raising the
quality of military personnel, increasing the amount of high technology and
mid- level technology in weaponry, and updating military thought and warfighting
theory [see Endnote 4]. The era of "strong and brave soldiers who are heroic
defenders of the nation" has already passed. In a world where even "nuclear
warfare" will perhaps become obsolete military jargon, it is likely that
a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a modern
soldier than is a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps. The best evidence
of this is perhaps a story that is circulating in Western military circles
regarding a lieutenant who used a modem to bring a naval division to its
knees [see Endnote 5]. The contrast between today's soldiers and the soldiers
of earlier generations is as plain to see as the contrast which we have already
noted between modern weapons and their precursors. This is because modern
soldiers have gone through the severe test of an uninterrupted technological
explosion throughout the entire 100 years of the twentieth century, and perhaps
also because of the salutary influence of the worldwide pop culture; viz.,
rock and roll, discos, the World Cup, the NBA and Hollywood, etc., etc. The
contrast is stark whether we are talking about physical ability or intellectual
ability.

Even though the new generation of soldiers born in the 70's and 80's has
been trained using the "beast barracks" style of training, popularized by
West Point Military Academy, it is difficult for them to shed their gentle
and frail natures rooted in the soil of contemporary society. In addition,
modern weapons systems have made it possible for them to be far removed from
any conventional battlefield, and they can attack the enemy from a place
beyond his range of vision where they need not come face to face with the
dripping blood that comes with killing. All of this has turned each and every
soldier into a self-effacing gentleman who would just as soon avoid the sight
of blood. The digital fighter is taking over the role formerly played by
the "blood and iron" warrior--a role that, for thousands of years, has not
been challenged.

Now that it has come on the stage of action and has rendered obsolete the
traditional divisions of labor prevailing in a society characterized by big
industry, warfare no longer is an exclusive imperial garden where professional
soldiers alone can mingle. A tendency towards civilianization has begun to
become evident [see Endnote 6]. Mao Zedong's theory concerning "every citizen
a soldier" has certainly not been in any way responsible for this tendency.
The current trend does not demand extensive mobilization of the people. Quite
the contrary, it merely indicates that a technological elite among the citizenry
have broken down the door and barged in uninvited, making it impossible for
professional soldiers with their concepts of professionalized warfare to
ignore challenges that are somewhat embarrassing. Who is most likely to become
the leading protagonist on the terra incognita of the next war? The first
challenger to have appeared, and the most famous, is the computer "hacker."
This chap, who generally has not received any military training or been engaged
in any military profession, can easily impair the security of an army or
a nation in a major way by simply relying on his personal technical expertise.

A classic example is given in the U.S. FM100-6 Information Operations
regulations. In 1994, a computer hacker in England attacked the U.S. military's
Rome Air Development Center in New York State, compromising the security
of 30 systems. He also hacked into more than 100 other systems. The Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and NASA suffered damage, among
others. What astounded people was not only the scale of those affected by
the attack and the magnitude of the damage, but also the fact that the hacker
was actually a teenager who was merely 16 years old. Naturally, an intrusion
by a teenager playing a game cannot be regarded as an act of war. The problem
is, how does one know for certain which damage is the result of games and
which damage is the result of warfare? Which acts are individual acts by
citizens and which acts represent hostile actions by non-professional warriors,
or perhaps even organized hacker warfare launched by a state? In 1994, there
were 230,000 security-related intrusions into U.S. DOD networks. How many
of these were organized destructive acts by non-professional warriors? Perhaps
there will never be any way of knowing [see Endnote 7].

Just as there are all kinds of people in society, so hackers come in all
shapes and colors. All types of hackers, with varying backgrounds and values,
are hiding in the camouflage provided by networks: curious middle school
students; on-line gold diggers; corporate staff members nursing a grudge;
dyed-in-the-wool network terrorists; and network mercenaries. In their ideas
and in their actions, these kinds of people are poles apart from each other,
but they gather together in the same network world. They go about their business
in accordance with their own distinctive value judgments and their own ideas
of what makes sense, while some are simply confused and aimless. For these
reasons, whether they are doing good or doing ill, they do not feel bound
by the rules of the game that prevail in the society at large. Using computers,
they may obtain information by hook or by crook from other people's accounts.
They may delete someone else's precious data, that was obtained with such
difficulty, as a practical joke. Or, like the legendary lone knight-errant,
they may use their outstanding on-line technical skills to take on the evil
powers that be. The Suharto government imposed a strict blockade on news
about the organized aggressive actions against the ethnic Chinese living
in Indonesia. The aggressive actions were first made public on the Internet
by witnesses with a sense of justice. As a result, the whole world was utterly
shocked and the Indonesian government and military were pushed before the
bar of morality and justice. Prior to this, another group of hackers calling
themselves "Milworm" put on another fine performance on the Internet. In
order to protest India's nuclear tests, they penetrated the firewall of the
network belonging to India's [Bhabha] Atomic Research Center (BARC), altered
the home page, and downloaded 5 MB of data. These hackers could actually
be considered polite. They went only to a certain point and no further, and
did not give their adversary too much trouble. Aside from the direct results
of this kind of action, it also has a great deal of symbolic significance:
in the information age, the influence exerted by a nuclear bomb is perhaps
less than the influence exerted by a hacker.

More murderous than hackers--and more of a threat in the real world--are
the non-state organizations, whose very mention causes the Western world
to shake in its boots. These organizations, which all have a certain military
flavor to a greater or lesser degree, are generally driven by some extreme
creed or cause, such as: the Islamic organizations pursuing a holy war; the
Caucasian militias in the U.S.; the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; and, most
recently, terrorist groups like Osama bin Ladin's, which blew up the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The various and sundry monstrous and virtually
insane destructive acts by these kinds of groups are undoubtedly more likely
to be the new breeding ground for contemporary wars than is the behavior
of the lone ranger hacker. Moreover, when a nation state or national armed
force, (which adheres to certain rules and will only use limited force to
obtain a limited goal), faces off with one of these types of organizations,
(which never observe any rules and which are not afraid to fight an unlimited
war using unlimited means), it will often prove very difficult for the nation
state or national armed force to gain the upper hand.

During the 1990's, and concurrent with the series of military actions launched
by non-professional warriors and non-state organizations, we began to get
an inkling of a non-military type of war which is prosecuted by yet another
type of non-professional warrior. This person is not a hacker in the general
sense of the term, and also is not a member of a quasi-military organization.
Perhaps he or she is a systems analyst or a software engineer, or a financier
with a large amount of mobile capital or a stock speculator. He or she might
even perhaps be a media mogul who controls a wide variety of media, a famous
columnist or the host of a TV program. His or her philosophy of life is different
from that of certain blind and inhuman terrorists. Frequently, he or she
has a firmly held philosophy of life and his or her faith is by no means
inferior to Osama bin Ladin's in terms of its fanaticism. Moreover, he or
she does not lack the motivation or courage to enter a fight as necessary.
Judging by this kind of standard, who can say that George Soros is not a
financial terrorist?

Precisely in the same way that modern technology is changing weapons and
the battlefield, it is also at the same time blurring the concept of who
the war participants are. From now on, soldiers no longer have a monopoly
on war.

Global terrorist activity is one of the by-products of the globalization
trend that has been ushered in by technological integration. Non-professional
warriors and non-state organizations are posing a greater and greater threat
to sovereign nations, making these warriors and organizations more and more
serious adversaries for every professional army. Compared to these adversaries,
professional armies are like gigantic dinosaurs which lack strength commensurate
to their size in this new age. Their adversaries, then, are rodents with
great powers of survival, which can use their sharp teeth to torment the
better part of the world.

What Means and Methods Are Used to Fight?

There's no getting around the opinions of the Americans when it comes to
discussing what means and methods will be used to fight future wars. This
is not simply because the U.S. is the latest lord of the mountain in the
world. It is more because the opinions of the Americans on this question
really are superior compared to the prevailing opinions among the military
people of other nations. The Americans have summed up the four main forms
that warfighting will take in the future as: 1) Information warfare; 2) Precision
warfare [see Endnote 8]; 3) Joint operations [see Endnote 9]; and 4) Military
operations other than war (MOOTW) [see Endnote 10]. This last sentence is
a mouthful. From this sentence alone we can see the highly imaginative, and
yet highly practical, approach of the Americans, and we can also gain a sound
understanding of the warfare of the future as seen through the eyes of the
Americans. Aside from joint operations, which evolved from traditional
cooperative operations and coordinated operations, and even Air- Land operations,
the other three of the four forms of warfighting can all be considered products
of new military thinking. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the former Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army, maintained that information warfare will be the basic
form of warfighting in future warfare. For this reason, he set up the best
digitized force in the U.S. military, and in the world. Moreover, he proposed
the concept of precision warfare, based on the perception that "there will
be an overall swing towards information processing and stealthy long-range
attacks as the main foundations of future warfare." For the Americans, the
advent of new, high-tech weaponry, such as precision-guided weapons, the
Global Positioning System (GPS), C4I systems and stealth airplanes, will
possibly allow soldiers to dispense with the nightmare of attrition warfare.

Precision warfare, which has been dubbed "non-contact attack" by the Americans,
and "remote combat" by the Russians [see Endnote 11], is characterized by
concealment, speed, accuracy, a high degree of effectiveness, and few collateral
casualties. In wars of the future, where the outcome will perhaps be decided
not long after the war starts, this type of tactic, which has already showed
some of its effectiveness in the Gulf War, will probably be the method of
choice that will be embraced most gladly by U.S. generals. However, the phrase
that really demonstrates some creative wording is not "information warfare"
or "precision warfare," but rather the phrase "military operations other
than war." This particular concept is clearly based on the "world's interest,"
which the Americans are constantly invoking, and the concept implies a rash
overstepping of its authority by the U.S.--a classic case of the American
attitude that "I am responsible for every place under the sun." Nevertheless,
such an assessment does not by any means stifle our praise of this concept
because, after all, for the first time it permits a variety of measures that
are needed to deal comprehensively with the problems of the 20th and 21st
centuries to be put into this MOOTW box, so that soldiers are not likely
to be in the dark and at a loss in the world that lies beyond the battlefield.
Thus, the somewhat inferior "thought antennae" of the soldiers will be allowed
to bump up against the edges of a broader concept of war. Such needed measures
include peacekeeping, efforts to suppress illicit drugs, riot suppression,
military aid, arms control, disaster relief, the evacuation of Chinese nationals
residing abroad, and striking at terrorist activities. Contact with this
broader concept of war cannot but lessen the soldiers' attachment to the
MOOTW box itself. Ultimately, they will not be able to put the brand new
concept of "non-military war operations" into the box. When this occurs,
it will represent an understanding that has genuine revolutionary significance
in terms of mankind's perception of war.

The difference between the concepts of "non-military war operations" and
"military operations other than war" is far greater than a surface reading
would indicate and is by no means simply a matter of changing the order of
some words in a kind of word game. The latter concept, MOOTW, may be considered
simply an explicit label for missions and operations by armed forces that
are carried out when there is no state of war. The former concept, "non-military
war operations," extends our understanding of exactly what constitutes a
state of war to each and every field of human endeavor, far beyond what can
be embraced by the term "military operations." This type of extension is
the natural result of the fact that human beings will use every conceivable
means to achieve their goals. While it seems that the Americans are in the
lead in every field of military theory, they were not able to take the lead
in proposing this new concept of war. However, we cannot fail to recognize
that the flood of U.S.-style pragmatism around the world, and the unlimited
possibilities offered by new, high technology, were nevertheless powerful
forces behind the emergence of this concept.

So, which [of many kinds of unconventional] means, which seem totally unrelated
to war, will ultimately become the favored minions of this new type of war--"the
non-military war operation"--which is being waged with greater and greater
frequency all around the world?

Trade War: If one should note that, about a dozen years ago, "trade
war" was still simply a descriptive phrase, today it has really become a
tool in the hands of many countries for waging non-military warfare. It can
be used with particularly great skill in the hands of the Americans, who
have perfected it to a fine art. Some of the means used include: the use
of domestic trade law on the international stage; the arbitrary erection
and dismantling of tariff barriers; the use of hastily written trade sanctions;
the imposition of embargoes on exports of critical technologies; the use
of the Special Section 301 law; and the application of most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment, etc., etc. Any one of these means can have a destructive
effect that is equal to that of a military operation. The comprehensive
eight-year embargo against Iraq that was initiated by the U.S. is the most
classic textbook example in this regard.

Financial War: Now that Asians have experienced the financial crisis
in Southeast Asia, no one could be more affected by "financial war" than
they have been. No, they have not just been affected; they have simply been
cut to the very quick! A surprise financial war attack that was deliberately
planned and initiated by the owners of international mobile capital ultimately
served to pin one nation after another to the ground--nations that not long
ago were hailed as "little tigers" and "little dragons." Economic prosperity
that once excited the constant admiration of the Western world changed to
a depression, like the leaves of a tree that are blown away in a single night
by the autumn wind. After just one round of fighting, the economies of a
number of countries had fallen back ten years. What is more, such a defeat
on the economic front precipitates a near collapse of the social and political
order. The casualties resulting from the constant chaos are no less than
those resulting from a regional war, and the injury done to the living social
organism even exceeds the injury inflicted by a regional war. Non-state
organizations, in this their first war without the use of military force,
are using non-military means to engage sovereign nations. Thus, financial
war is a form of non-military warfare which is just as terribly destructive
as a bloody war, but in which no blood is actually shed. Financial warfare
has now officially come to war's center stage--a stage that for thousands
of years has been occupied only by soldiers and weapons, with blood and death
everywhere. We believe that before long, "financial warfare" will undoubtedly
be an entry in the various types of dictionaries of official military jargon.
Moreover, when people revise the history books on twentieth-century warfare
in the early 21st century, the section on financial warfare will command
the reader's utmost attention [see Endnote 12]. The main protagonist in this
section of the history book will not be a statesman or a military strategist;
rather, it will be George Soros. Of course, Soros does not have an exclusive
monopoly on using the financial weapon for fighting wars. Before Soros, Helmut
Kohl used the deutsche mark to breach the Berlin Wall--a wall that no one
had ever been able to knock down using artillery shells [see Endnote 13].
After Soros began his activities, Li Denghui [Li Teng-hui 2621 4098 6540]
used the financial crisis in Southeast Asia to devalue the New Taiwan dollar,
so as to launch an attack on the Hong Kong dollar and Hong Kong stocks,
especially the "red-chip stocks." [Translator's note: "red-chip stocks" refers
to stocks of companies listed on the Hong Kong stock market but controlled
by mainland interests.] In addition, we have yet to mention the crowd of
large and small speculators who have come en masse to this huge dinner party
for money gluttons, including Morgan Stanley and Moody's, which are famous
for the credit rating reports that they issue, and which point out promising
targets of attack for the benefit of the big fish in the financial world
[see Endnote 14]. These two companies are typical of those entities that
participate indirectly in the great feast and reap the benefits.

In the summer of 1998, after the fighting in the financial war had been going
on for a full year, the war's second round of battles began to unfold on
an even more extensive battlefield, and this round of battles continues to
this day. This time, it was not just the countries of Southeast Asia, (which
had suffered such a crushing defeat during the previous year), that were
drawn into the war. Two titans were also drawn in--Japan and Russia. This
resulted in making the global economic situation even more grim and difficult
to control. The blinding flames even set alight the fighting duds of those
who ventured to play with fire in the first place. It is reported that Soros
and his "Quantum Fund" lost not less than several billion dollars in Russia
and Hong Kong alone [see Endnote 15]. Thus we can get at least an inkling
of the magnitude of financial war's destructive power. Today, when nuclear
weapons have already become frightening mantlepiece decorations that are
losing their real operational value with each passing day, financial war
has become a "hyperstrategic" weapon that is attracting the attention of
the world. This is because financial war is easily manipulated and allows
for concealed actions, and is also highly destructive. By analyzing the chaos
in Albania not long ago, we can clearly see the role played by various types
of foundations that were set up by transnational groups and millionaires
with riches rivaling the wealth of nation states. These foundations control
the media, control subsidies to political organizations, and limit any resistance
from the authorities, resulting in a collapse of national order and the downfall
of the legally authorized government. Perhaps we could dub this type of war
"foundation-style" financial war. The greater and greater frequency and intensity
of this type of war, and the fact that more and more countries and non-state
organizations are deliberately using it, are causes for concern and are facts
that we must face squarely.

New Terror War in Contrast to Traditional Terror War: Due to the limited
scale of a traditional terror war, its casualties might well be fewer than
the casualties resulting from a conventional war or campaign. Nevertheless,
a traditional terror war carries a stronger flavor of violence. Moreover,
in terms of its operations, a traditional terror war is never bound by any
of the traditional rules of the society at large. From a military standpoint,
then, the traditional terror war is characterized by the use of limited resources
to fight an unlimited war. This characteristic invariably puts national forces
in an extremely unfavorable position even before war breaks out, since national
forces must always conduct themselves according to certain rules and therefore
are only able to use their unlimited resources to fight a limited war. This
explains how a terrorist organization made up of just a few inexperienced
members who are still wet behind the ears can nevertheless give a mighty
country like the U.S. headaches, and also why "using a sledgehammer to kill
an ant" often proves ineffective. The most recent proof is the case of the
two explosions that occurred simultaneously at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam. The advent of bin Ladin-style terrorism has deepened the
impression that a national force, no matter how powerful, will find it difficult
to gain the upper hand in a game that has no rules. Even if a country turns
itself into a terrorist element, as the Americans are now in the process
of doing, it will not necessarily be able to achieve success.

Be that as it may, if all terrorists confined their operations simply to
the traditional approach of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and plane
hijackings, this would represent less than the maximum degree of terror.
What really strikes terror into people's hearts is the rendezvous of terrorists
with various types of new, high technologies that possibly will evolve into
new superweapons. We already have a hint of what the future may hold--a hint
that may well cause concern. When Aum Shinrikyo followers discharged "Sarin"
poison gas in a Tokyo subway, the casualties resulting from the poison gas
accounted for just a small portion of the terror. This affair put people
on notice that modern biochemical technology had already forged a lethal
weapon for those terrorists who would try to carry out the mass destruction
of humanity [see Endnote 16]. In contradistinction to masked killers that
rely on the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent people to produce terror,
the "Falange Armed Forces" [Changqiangdang Wuzhuang 7022 2847 7825 2976 5944]
group in Italy is a completely different class of high-tech terrorist
organization. Its goals are explicit and the means that it employs are
extraordinary. It specializes in breaking into the computer networks of banks
and news organizations, stealing stored data, deleting programs, and
disseminating disinformation. These are classic terrorist operations directed
against networks and the media. This type of terrorist operation uses the
latest technology in the most current fields of study, and sets itself against
humanity as a whole. We might well call this type of operation "new terror
war."

Ecological War: Ecological war refers to a new type of non-military
warfare in which modern technology is employed to influence the natural state
of rivers, oceans, the crust of the earth, the polar ice sheets, the air
circulating in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer. By methods such as causing
earthquakes and altering precipitation patterns, the atmospheric temperature,
the composition of the atmosphere, sea level height, and sunshine patterns,
the earth's physical environment is damaged or an alternate local ecology
is created. Perhaps before very long, a man-made El Nino or La Nina effect
will become yet another kind of superweapon in the hands of certain nations
and/or non-state organizations. It is more likely that a non-state organization
will become the prime initiator of ecological war, because of its terrorist
nature, because it feels it has no responsibility to the people or to the
society at large, and because non-state organizations have consistently
demonstrated that they unwilling to play by the rules of the game. Moreover,
since the global ecological environment will frequently be on the borderline
of catastrophe as nations strive for the most rapid development possible,
there is a real danger that the slightest increase or decrease in any variable
would be enough to touch off an ecological holocaust.

Aside from what we have discussed above, we can point out a number of other
means and methods used to fight a non-military war, some of which already
exist and some of which may exist in the future. Such means and methods include
psychological warfare (spreading rumors to intimidate the enemy and break
down his will); smuggling warfare (throwing markets into confusion and attacking
economic order); media warfare (manipulating what people see and hear in
order to lead public opinion along); drug warfare (obtaining sudden and huge
illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries); network warfare
(venturing out in secret and concealing one's identity in a type of warfare
that is virtually impossible to guard against); technological warfare (creating
monopolies by setting standards independently); fabrication warfare (presenting
a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy);
resources warfare (grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources); economic
aid warfare (bestowing favor in the open and contriving to control matters
in secret); cultural warfare (leading cultural trends along in order to
assimilate those with different views); and international law warfare (seizing
the earliest opportunity to set up regulations), etc., etc In addition, there
are other types of non-military warfare which are too numerous to mention.
In this age, when the plethora of new technologies can in turn give rise
to a plethora of new means and methods of fighting war, (not to mention the
cross-combining and creative use of these means and methods), it would simply
be senseless and a waste of effort to list all of the means and methods one
by one. What is significant is that all of these warfighting means, along
with their corresponding applications, that have entered, are entering, or
will enter, the ranks of warfighting means in the service of war, have already
begun to quietly change the view of warfare held by all of mankind. Faced
with a nearly infinitely diverse array of options to choose from, why do
people want to enmesh themselves in a web of their own making and select
and use means of warfare that are limited to the realm of the force of arms
and military power? Methods that are not characterized by the use of the
force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence
of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful
realization of the war's goals, if not more so. As a matter of course, this
prospect has led to revision of the statement that "war is politics with
bloodshed," and in turn has also led to a change in the hitherto set view
that warfare prosecuted through force of arms is the ultimate means of resolving
conflict. Clearly, it is precisely the diversity of the means employed that
has enlarged the concept of warfare. Moreover, the enlargement of the concept
of warfare has, in turn, resulted in enlargement of the realm of war-related
activities. If we confine ourselves to warfare in the narrow sense on the
traditional battlefield now, it will very difficult for us to regain our
foothold in the future. Any war that breaks out tomorrow or further down
the road will be characterized by warfare in the broad sense--a cocktail
mixture of warfare prosecuted through the force of arms and warfare that
is prosecuted by means other than the force of arms.

The goal of this kind of warfare will encompass more than merely "using means
that involve the force of arms to force the enemy to accept one's own will."
Rather, the goal should be "to use all means whatsoever--means that involve
the force of arms and means that do not involve the force of arms, means
that involve military power and means that do not involve military power,
means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties--to
force the enemy to serve one's own interests."

ENDNOTES

1. For more on the close relationship between Iraq and the U.S., the reader
may refer to Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint
Forces Commander, Junshi Yiwen [6511 0057 6146 2429] Publishing House,
p. 212. "Iraq had established extremely close relations with the United States.
Iraq had received weapons and valuable intelligence regarding Iranian movements
from the U.S., as well as U.S. military support for attacks on Iran's navy."

2. An article by the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin entitled "On
the Sea Change in the Security Environment" was published in the February,
1993, issue of The Officer magazine, (published in the U.S.):

A Comparison of The New and the Old Security Environments

1. In Regard to the Geopolitical Environment

OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Bipolar (rigid)

Predictable

Communism

U.S. the number one Western power

Permanent alliances

A paralyzed U.N.

Multipolar (complex)

Uncertain

Nationalism and religious extremism

U.S. only the number one military power

Temporary alliances

A dynamic U.N.

2. In Regard to Threats Faced by the U.S.

OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Single (Soviet)

Threat to U.S. survival

Clear

Deterrable

Europe-centered

High risk of escalation

Use of strategic nuclear weapons

Overt

Diverse

Threat to U.S. interests

Unclear

Non-deterrable

Other regions

Little risk of escalation

Terrorists using nuclear weapons

Covert

3. In Regard to the Use of Military Force

OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Attrition warfare

War by proxy

Reliance primarily on high technology

Forward deployed

Forward based

Host nation support

Decisive attacks on key targets

Direct reinforcement

Integrated use of high, medium and low technology

Power projection

Home based

Reliance on own strength

From the table above, one can see the sensitivity of the Americans to the
changes in their security environment, and also the various types of forces
and factors that are constraining and influencing the formation of the world's
new setup since the conclusion of the Cold War.

3. "Technological space" is a new concept that we are proposing in order
to distinguish this type of space from physical space.

4. According to the U.S. Department of Defense National Defense Report
for fiscal year 1998, the number of U.S. military personnel has been cut
by 32% since 1989. In addition, the U.S. retired a large amount of obsolete
equipment, thus actually increasing combat strength to some degree even while
large reductions in U.S. military personnel were being carried out. The U.S.
DOD issued its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in May of 1997. The QDR
emphasized "taking the future into consideration and reforming the U.S.
military." It advocated continued personnel cuts and building the U.S. military
in accordance with new military affairs theories. However, it also advocated
comparatively greater expenditures for the purchase of equipment.

5. This story first appeared in the British Sunday Telegraph. According
to this report, the U.S. military carried out a "Joint Warrior" exercise
from Sep 18 until Sep 25, 1995, in order to test the security of its national
defense electronics systems. During the exercise, an Air Force officer
successfully hacked into the naval command system, (see The Network is
King by Hu Yong [5170 3144] and Fan Haiyan [5400 3189 3601], Hainan
Publishing House, pp. 258-259.) There are many similar stories, but there
also are some military experts who believe that these are cases of "throwing
up a confusing mist before someone's eyes."

6. In their book War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler wrote:
"If the tools of warfare are no longer tanks and artillery, but rather computer
viruses and microrobots, then we can no longer say that nations are the only
armed groups or that soldiers are the only ones in possession of the tools
of war." In his article entitled "What the Revolution in Military Affairs
is Bringing--The Form War Will Take in 2020," a Colonel in the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces by the name of Shoichi Takama has noted that the
civilianization of war will be an important characteristic of 21st century
warfare.

7. Many hackers are adopting a new tactic which might be styled "network
guerrilla warfare."

8. Precision warfare is a new form of warfighting. It came about as a result
of combining increased weapons accuracy with increased battlefield transparency.
(See "From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond," by Colonel Richard J. Dunn
III [McNair Paper 13, 1992], quoted in World Military Affairs Yearbook
for 1997, [1997 Nian Shijie Junshi Nianjian], published by the PLA in
Chinese, pp. 294-295.)

11. After his research on the Gulf War, the Russian tactical expert I.N.
Vorobyev pointed out that remote combat is a warfighting method that has
great potential. (Military Thought, in Russian, 1992, #11.)

12. There was an article entitled "Financial Markets are the Biggest Threat
to Peace" in the August 23, 1998, issue of the Los Angeles Times.
The article noted: "At present, financial markets constitute the biggest
threat to world peace, not terrorist training camps." (See ReferenceNews [Cankao Xiaoxi 0639 5072 3194 1873], Beijing, September 7, 1998.)

14. An article entitled "A New York Corporation that Affects Economies" in
the July 29, 1998, issue of The Christian Science Monitor disclosed
how Moody's credit rating reports influence and even manipulate economic
trends in Italy, South Korea, Japan and Malaysia. See ReferenceNews, August 20, 1998.

15. Soros pours out all his bitterness in his book, The Crisis of Global
Capitalism. On the basis of a ghastly account of his investments in 1998,
Soros analyzes the lessons to be learned from this economic crisis.

16. Some security experts in the U.S. have suggested to the government that
it lay up large stores of antidotes, in order to guard against a surprise
chemical attack by a terrorist organization.

"Did the special nature of the Gulf War...trigger 'a revolution in military
affairs' or not? This is ultimately a question of perspective." -- Anthony
H. Cordesman, Abraham R. Wagner.

Compared to any war in history, the Gulf War can be considered a major war.
More than 300 warships from six carrier groups, 4,000 aircraft, 12,000 tanks
and 12,000 armored vehicles, and nearly two million soldiers from more than
30 nations took part in the war. Of the 42-day war, 38 days were air strikes,
while the ground war lasted only 100 hours. The U.S.-led multinational force
crushed 42 Iraqi divisions, and the Iraqi forces suffered 30,000 casualties
and 80,000 prisoners; 3,847 tanks, 1,450 armored vehicles, and 2,917 artillery
pieces were destroyed, while the U.S. forces only lost 184 people, but incurred
the enormous cost of $61 billion. [1]

Perhaps because victory was achieved so easily, to this day there are very
few people in Uncle Sam's wildly jubilant group that have accurately evaluated
the significance of the war. Some hotheads used this to ceaselessly fabricate
the myth that the United States was invincible, while some who could still
be considered cool-headed -- most of whom were commentators and generals
unable to take part in "Desert Storm" in a complex and subtle frame of mind
-- believed that "Desert Storm" was not a typical war [2] and that a war
conducted under such ideal conditions cannot serve as a model. When one listens
to such talk it smacks somewhat of sour grapes. Actually, viewed from a
traditional perspective, "Desert Storm" was not a classic war in the typical
sense but [since it was a war conducted just as the greatest revolution in
military affairs in the history of man to date was arriving it cannot be
measured with traditional or even outmoded standards. At a time when new
warfare required a new classic, the U.S.-led allied forces created it right
on time in the Gulf, and only those who were fettered by the old conventions
could not see its classic significance for future warfare. This is because
the classics for future warfare can only be born by departing from traditional
models. We have no intention of helping the Americans create a myth, but
when "Desert Storm" unfolded and concluded for all to see, with its many
combatant countries, enormous scale, short duration, small number of casualties,
and glorious results startling the whole world, who could say that a classic
war heralding the arrival of warfare in the age of technical
integration-globalization had not opened wide the main front door to the
mysterious and strange history of warfare - even though it was still just
a classic created by U.S. technology and the U.S. style of fighting?

When we attempt to use wars that have already occurred to discuss what
constitutes war in the age of technical integration-globalization, only "Desert
Storm" can provide ready-made examples. At present, in any sense it is still
not just the only [example], but the classic [example], and therefore it
is the only apple that is worthy of our close analysis [the author returns
to the analysis of analyzing an apple later in the chapter].

The "Overnight" Alliance

From Saddam's perspective, annexing Kuwait seemed more like a household matter
in the extended Arab family compared to the taking of American hostages during
the Iranian revolution, and besides, he had given notice ahead of time. However,
he overlooked the differences between the two. When Iran took the hostages,
it was certainly a slap in the Americans' face, but Iraq had seized the entire
West by the throat. Lifelines are naturally more important than face, and
the United States had no choice but to take it seriously, while other countries
which felt threatened by Iraq also had to take it seriously. In their alliance
with the United States, what most of the Arab countries had in mind was rooting
out the Islamic heresy represented by Saddam to keep him from damaging their
own interests were he to grow stronger unopposed, and it is very difficult
to really say that they wanted to extend justice to Kuwait. [3]

The common concerns about their interests enabled the United States to weave
an allied network to catch Iraq very quickly. The Western powers are already
thoroughly familiar with modern international political skills, and the anti-Iraq
alliance was assembled under the United Nations banner. The halo of justice
successfully dispelled the Arab people's religious complex, so that Saddam
was playing the role of a modern-day Saladin, whose plan to launch a "holy
war" against the Christians fell through. Numerous countries volunteered
to be responsible nodes in this alliance network. Although they were unwilling,
Germany and Japan finally seemed actually happy to open their purses, and
what was more important than providing money was that neither of them lost
the opportunity to send their own military personnel, thereby taking a stealthy
and symbolic step toward again becoming global powers. Egypt persuaded Libya
and Jordan to be neutral in the war and no longer support Iraq, so that Saddam
became thoroughly isolated. Even Gorbachev, who wanted to get the Americans'
support for his weak position domestically, ultimately tacitly recognized
the military strikes of the multinational forces against his old ally.

Even powers such as the United States must similarly rely on the support
of its allies, and this support was primarily manifested in providing legitimacy
for its actions and in logistical support, not in adding so many troops.
The reason that President Bush's policies were able to get widespread approval
from the American public was to a great extent due to the fact that he had
established an international alliance, thereby getting the people to believe
that this was not a case of pulling someone else's chestnuts out of the fire,
and it was not just the Americans who were funding the war and preparing
to have their blood spilled. They went so far as to send the VII Corps from
Germany to Saudi Arabia, mobilizing 465 trains, 312 barges, and 119 fleets
from four NATO countries. At the same time, Japan also provided the electronics
parts urgently needed by U.S. military equipment, and this further demonstrated
the increasing reliance of the United States on its allies. In the new age,
"going it alone" is not only unwise, it is also not a realistic option. [4]
For example, the alliance formed a kind of common need. From the Security
Council's Resolution 660 calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait to Resolution
678 which authorized the member countries to take any actions, international
society broadly identified itself with the alliance which was temporarily
cobbled together. One hundred and ten countries took part in the embargo
against Iraq, and more than 30 countries took part in the use of force, including
numerous Arab countries! Obviously, every country had fully estimated where
its interests were prior to this action.

The full-scale intervention of the United Nations was not sufficient to make
it possible for this fragile and dew-laden spider-web like alliance, which
was formed in a very short period of time, to easily withstand the impact
of a war. It can be said that, as far as the politicians were concerned,
the alliance was only a single high-level meeting following a careful weighing
of interests, a single contract signing, or even a verbal promise via a hot-line.
However, for the troops carrying out the allied warfare, no detail could
be overlooked. To avoid having U.S. soldiers violate Muslim commandments,
in addition to stipulating that they must abide strictly by the customs of
the country in which they were stationed, the U.S. military even leased a
"Cunard Princess" yacht and anchored it at sea to provide Western-style
amusements for the U.S troops.

To prevent the Israelis from retaliating against the "Scud" missile attacks
and throwing the camp which was assaulting Iraq into disorder, the United
States made a tremendous effort to provide the Israelis with air support,
taking great pains to look after the alliance network.

More profoundly, the appearance of the "overnight" alliance brought an era
to a close. That is, the age of fixed-form alliances which had begun with
the signing of the military alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary
in 1879. Following the Cold War, the period in which alliances were formed
on the basis of ideology faded away, while the approach in which alliances
are built on interests rose to primacy. Under the general banner of realpolitik,
in which national interests are paramount, any alliance can only be focused
more nakedly on interests, and at times they don't even feel like raising
the banner of morality. Without a doubt, the alliance phenomenon will continue
to exist, but in more cases they will be loose and short-term interest
coalitions. Which is also to say that there will no longer be any alliances
where only morality, not interests, are involved. Different periods have
different interests and goals, and that will be what determines whether there
are alliances or not. Increasingly pragmatic and unconstrained by any moral
fetters, this is the characteristic feature of modern alliances. All forces
are united by a network of interests, and they may be very short-lived but
extremely effective. The interest relationships of modern states, as well
as among trans-national organizations and even among regional forces have
thus begun to be increasingly transitory. As the rock and roll singer Cui
Jian sings, "It's not that I don't understand, it is that this world is rapidly
changing." Today's mode of ever-changing combinations of force, along with
the age of ever-changing technological integration and globalization, has
given rise to certain tacit alliances which are by no means fortuitous.
Therefore, the "overnight" alliance that was formed by the Gulf War formally
opened the curtain to a new alliance era.

Timely "Reorganization Act"

The supercilious Americans often engage in actions which cause them to reflect
on their mistakes, and this disposition, which would seem to be a contradiction,
time and again amazes those who want to witness the presumptuous Americans
suffering. At the same time it also enables the Americans to time and
again reap considerable benefits. It truly seems as if the Americans are
always able to find the key to open the door of the next military action
among the lessons of each military action. Struggles between the views and
interests of factions in the armed services have been around for a long time,
and this is so in every country. The competition by the various armed services
in the U.S. military to protect their own interests and strive for glory
is well known to all, and they are not equaled in this respect. In this regard,
what leaves a particular deep impression is that sixty years ago in combat
with Japan, to emphasize the roles of their own service arms, MacArthur and
Nimitz each came up with a Pacific strategy.

Even President Roosevelt, who was circumspect and farsighted, had trouble
balancing between the two. Another thing that demonstrates this point is
that the U.S. aircraft which bombed Vietnam 30 years ago actually had to
listen to commands from four different headquarters at the same time, which
is truly hard to believe. Up until about 15 years ago, there were separate
and independent command systems and it was not clear who was in authority,
and this had disastrous consequences for U.S. troops stationed in Beirut,
as it led directly to approximately 200 Marines losing their lives. However,
even after he was made commander-in-chief of the allied forces during "Desert
Storm," the problem that was exposed in Grenada was still fresh in the memory
of General Norman Schwarzkopf. When he was deputy commander of the joint
task force during the "Grenada" action, each of the service arms of the U.S.
forces taking part in the action went its own way. The question [raised by
this action] was, during joint operations, just who listens to whose commands?

It is somewhat ironic that this problem, which had troubled the U.S military
for several decades, was not overcome by generals who had experienced extensive
combat or experts who were steeped in statecraft, but was resolved by two
congressmen named Goldwater and Nichols. The "DOD Reorganization Act" [5]
proposed by these two which was passed by Congress in 1986, used the legislative
approach to resolve the problem of unified command of the various armed services
during joint combat.

Next, there were issues left over which required a war. Neither too soon
nor too late but just at this time, Saddam foolishly launched his invasion
of Kuwait and this was simply a heaven-sent opportunity for the Americans
who were anxious to test whether or not the "Reorganization Act" would work.
In that sense, rather than saying that the "Reorganization Act" was timely,
it would be better to say that the arrival of the Gulf War was timely.

Powell and Schwarzkopf were the lucky earliest beneficiaries of the
"Reorganization Act" and at the same time they also became the two most powerful
generals in the history of American warfare. As the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Powell for the first time had clearly attained the
position of the President's chief military adviser, which enabled him to
take orders directly from the President and the Secretary of Defense, as
well as issue orders to the three services based on that; and he no longer
had to serve as the coordinator for the endless wrangling that took place
among the chiefs of staff of the armed services. As the battlefield commander,
Schwarzkopf was spared the nagging and held the real power in his hands.
As for the incessant chatter coming from the Pentagon, he was free to choose
what to listen to and to do what he wanted to do with the air of a general
who is outside the country and somewhat beyond the command of the monarch,
while the great army swarming over the Gulf, as well as the satellites in
space and the frogmen under the water, all the way to each roll-on roll-off
ship, had to submit to his orders. This made it possible for him to exercise
the trans-service authority granted to the commander of the joint headquarters
by the "DOD Reorganization Act" without any hesitation when necessary. For
example, when the front line Marine commanders urgently requested to carry
out an amphibious landing on the shores of Kuwait, he looked at the overall
situation and resolutely exercised his veto power, continuing to concentrate
on operation "Left Hook," the well thought-out plan he had from the start.

That a law which had not been in effect for five years could be implemented
so thoroughly in a war that came along at the same time must be attributed
to the contractual mentality of the people in the legal society represented
by the United States. Furthermore, the new pattern of command which was derived
from this became the most successful and fitting application of military
command since the services were divided. Its direct result was to reduce
the levels of command, implementing true entrusted command and causing the
old deeply-rooted tree-structure command system to start to evolve toward
a network structure; and a side effect of this evolution was to enable more
combat units to share first-time battlefield information.

If the "Reorganization Act" is considered against the wider backdrop of the
age, it is not difficult to discover that this reorganization of the U.S.
military was by no means a chance coincidence, but was timely and in conformity
with the natural demands the new age posed for the old military command
relations, that is, by recombining the service arm authority which was originally
dispersed, then on that basis generating a super-authority that overrode
the authority of all the service arms and which was concentrated on certain
temporary goals, it became possible to be more than equal to the task in
any battlefield contest. The emergence of the "Reorganization Act" in the
United States and the effects it produced in the U.S. military are food for
thought, and any country which hopes to win a war in the 21st century must
inevitably face the option of either "reorganizing" or being defeated. There
is no other way.

Going Further Than Air-Land Battle

"Air-land battle" was originally a strategy devised by the U.S. military
to stymie the enemy when dealing with the masses of Warsaw Pact tanks that
could come pouring out like a flood at any time onto the plains of Europe,
but the military suffered from never having a chance to show what it could
do. The Gulf War provided a stage for a full performance by those in the
U.S. military, who were full of creativity and bloodlust, but the actual
battlefield conditions were quite a bit different from what people had envisioned
beforehand. "Desert Storm" was basically an "all-air," no-"ground" campaign
that lasted several dozen days, and they barely got to use "Desert Sword,"
which was displayed at the last moment, including that beautiful "left hook,"
for only 100 hours before wrapping things up in a huff. The ground war did
not become the next-to-last item on the program as hoped for by the Army,
but was like a concerto which winds up hastily after the first movement is
played. [6] Douhet's prediction that "the battlefield in the air will be
the decisive one" seems to have achieved belated confirmation. However,
everything that happened in the air over the Gulf far exceeded the imagination
of this proponent of achieving victory through the air. Whether in Kuwait
or Iraq, none of the air combat involved gallant duels for air supremacy,
but represented an integrated air campaign that blended all the combat
operations, such as reconnaissance, early-warning, bombing, dogfights,
communications, electronic strikes, and command and control, etc., together,
and it also included the struggle for and occupation of outer space and
cyberspace.

At this point, the Americans who proposed the "Air-land battle" concept have
already gone quite a bit further than Douhet, but even so, they will still
have to wait several years before they understand that, once they resort
to the theory of integrated operations in real combat, the scope will go
far beyond what they initially envisioned, extending over a broad and
all-inclusive range that covers the ground, sea, air, space, and cyber realms.
Although it will still require some time to assimilate the results of the
Gulf War, it is already destined to become the starting point for the theory
of "omni-dimensional" combat proposed by the elite of the U.S Army when they
suddenly woke up.

The interesting thing is that, while one may believe that the Americans'
insight came somewhat late, this actually had no effect on their early
acquisition of the key to "omni-dimensional combat." This is the famous "air
tasking order." [7] The "air tasking order," which ran up to 300 pages every
day, was drafted jointly by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and enabled
Schwarzkopf, the supreme commander of the allied forces who was from the
Army himself, to issue commands to the entire allied air force. It was the
soul of the air campaign, and every day selected the optimum strike targets
for all the aircraft in keeping with the overall operational strike plan.
Everyday upwards of 1000 aircraft took off from the Arabian Peninsula, Spain,
England, and Turkey and, in keeping with the computer-processed "air tasking
order," launched trans-service, trans-border, precise and coordinated air
strikes. Although in the eyes of the Navy this command program was overly
"Air Force-oriented" -- and because of this they even took the petty approach
of stealthily keeping behind some of their aircraft so they could be put
to good use when an opportunity for the Navy to shine presented itself (even
though it never came) -- ultimately this program successfully organized the
most massive and most complex air campaign in the history of warfare.

Not only that, but the "air tasking order" also provided a model for a kind
of organizational command for all subsequent combat operations. One "order"
represented an optimal scheme for combining the combat forces among the service
arms, and the complexity and success of its trans-national combinations was
where it really shone. In this respect alone, it was already far beyond the
range of what was envisioned by the architects of the "Air-land battle" theory.
This is to say that the U.S. soldiers unintentionally ushered the God of
War into an open area in which she had never set foot.

Who is the King of Land Warfare?

Isoroku Yamamoto was doubtless the most innovative and "extraordinarily talented"
military man of his age, and the use of aircraft carriers in the sneak attack
on Pearl Harbor and the great victory he achieved represent the stroke of
genius he left on the history of naval combat. What is hard to understand
is that the same Yamamoto actually was unable to grasp the epoch-making
significance of his own creative tactics. After commanding the combined fleet
in dealing a severe blow to the U.S. Navy, he still held to the belief that
only battleships were the main decisive force at sea, once again throwing
the key that would open the door to victory and that was already in his grasp
back into the vast waves of the Pacific ocean. While the first person to
make a mistake can still be an object of pity, the second person to make
the same mistake is simply incredibly stupid, particularly those people who
make mistakes which have already been made but which they are just unable
to anticipate. What is regrettable is that in the history of war there are
frequent examples like this in which thinking lags behind acting. Just as
with Isoroku Yamamoto at that time, although the U.S. Army used helicopters
to smash the Iraqi armored and mechanized units, once the gunsmoke in the
Gulf cleared it inexplicably reverted to its pre-war level of thinking, shunting
aside the helicopters which by all rights should have been the new favorites
in the war. It is said that during the entire ground war, other than one
desperate fight put up by the "Medina" armored division of the Republican
Guard when it was surrounded south of Basra by the U.S. VII Corps, there
was hardly any tank warfare worthy of the name. However, the Americans, who
had clearly already used helicopters to inaugurate a new age in ground warfare,
[proceeded to] increase development outlays for other weapons, including
tanks, while appropriations for helicopters was the only thing cut back.
Sticking to their outmoded ways, they are still treating tanks as the decisive
weapon in future ground warfare. [8]

Actually, as early as the Vietnam war, helicopters had begun to display their
abilities in the hands of the Americans, and soon afterward, the Soviet Union
let helicopters show their exceptional skills in the hilly regions of
Afghanistan, as did the British in the Falkland Islands.

However, because their opponents were mainly guerrillas and non-armored infantry,
it delayed the challenge that helicopters would pose to tanks a full 20 years.
The Gulf War finally gave helicopters an opportunity to show what they could
do. This time, not counting the helicopter units of the allied forces, the
U.S. military alone deployed 1,600 helicopters of various models to the Gulf,
and this enormous group of helicopters was sufficient to form one complete
helicopter army. However, at this time the Americans, who had all along boasted
of their innovative spirit, showed no originality at all, but just like the
French who in World War II dispersed their tanks and assigned them to the
infantry, they had the helicopters serve as a force attached to the armored
and mechanized units and other troops. Fortunately, the helicopters, which
were destined to establish their name in this war, did not allow this to
mask their royal demeanor.

Just as the Americans were praising the "Patriot", the F-117, the "Tomahawk"
missiles, and other battlefield stars to the skies via CNN, the helicopters
were unfairly given the cold shoulder (with just the "Apache," which was
a favorite, getting passing marks). Other than the "Final Report to Congress"
written by the Department of Defense after the war, very few people still
recall that it was the helicopters, not some of the other favorite new weapons,
that performed first-rate service in "Desert Storm." In the 20 minutes preceding
the start of the continuous bombing, which lasted more than a month, following
a ground-hugging flight of several hours, the MH-53J and AH-64 helicopters
used "Hellfire" missiles to carry out advance destruction of Iraqi early-warning
radar, opening a safe passage for the bomber groups and showing the incomparable
penetration capabilities of helicopters. As the most flexible flying platform
on the battlefield, they also undertook a large number of the supply transport,
medical evacuation, search and rescue, battlefield reconnaissance, and electronic
countermeasures missions, etc., and during the battle of Khafji, the main
force which rapidly checked the Iraqi offensive and finally drove back the
Iraqi military was again helicopters. During the war, the thing which truly
left a deep impression and demonstrated the deep potential of the helicopters
was "Operation Cobra." The 101st [Airborne] Division used more than 300
helicopters to perform the single most far-reaching "leapfrog" operation
in the history of war, establishing the "Cobra" forward operations base more
than 100 kilometers inside Iraq. Subsequently they relied on the base in
cutting off the only escape route for the Iraqi military scattered behind
the Euphrates River valley, as well as intercepting the Iraqi troops fleeing
along the Hamal [as published] dike road. This was definitely the most deeply
significant tactical operation of the ground war during the war. It proclaimed
that, from this point, helicopters were perfectly capable of conducting
large-scale operations independently.

When the throngs of Iraqi soldiers ran from the fortifications destroyed
by the helicopters and knelt to beg to surrender, they were in turn herded
into a group by the helicopters just like a cattle drive on the Western plains,
and the view that "only the infantry can ultimately resolve a battle" has
now been radically shaken by these American "flying cowboys." Originally,
however, the initial intent of the leapfrog operation by the helicopters
was just to provide support for the armored units that were to handle the
main offensive, but the unexpected success of the helicopter units caused
the plan to fall far behind the developments in the battle situation.

Because of this, Schwarzkopf had to order the VII Corps to attack 15 hours
ahead of time, and although under the command of General Franks the speed
of the advance of the VII Corps through the desert was far faster than that
of Gudarian, who became famous at the time for launching tank blitzkriegs,
he [Franks] did not win the good "blitzkrieg" reputation that the previous
generation did, but actually was rebuked for "moving forward slowly, one
step at a time, like an old lady." Following the war, General Franks refuted
the criticism that came from the allied headquarters in Riyadh, based on
the reason that the Iraqi military still had fighting capabilities. [9] In
reality, however, neither the critics nor those who refuted them had grasped
the essence of the problem. The reason that the mobility of the tanks under
General Franks' command was criticized was precisely because of the comparison
with the helicopters. To this day, there has still been no example of combat
which has demonstrated that any kind of tanks can keep up with the combat
pace of helicopters.

Actually, this did not just involve mobility. As the former "kings of land
warfare," the tanks are being challenged by the helicopters on all fronts.
Compared to the tanks, which have to constantly labor to overcome the coefficient
of friction of the earth's surface, the helicopters' battlespace is at treetop
level, so they are totally unaffected by any surface obstacles and their
excellent mobility is sufficient to cancel out the flaw of not having heavy
armor. Similarly, as mobile weapons platforms, their firepower is by no means
inferior to that of the tanks, and this represents the greatest crisis
encountered by tanks since they ascended the stage of warfare with the nickname
of "tanks." What is even tougher for the tanks is the energy required to
organize a sizable tank group assault (transporting a given number of tanks
to a staging area alone is a massive headache) and the risks one runs (when
tanks are massed, they are extremely vulnerable to preemptive strikes by
the enemy), so they really have no advantages to speak of when compared to
helicopters, which are good at dispersed deployment and concentrated strikes,
and which can be massed to engage in conventional warfare or dispersed to
fight guerrilla warfare. In fact, tanks and helicopters are natural enemies,
but the former is far from a match for the latter, and even the outmoded
AH-1 "Cobra" helicopters, not to mention the AH-64 "tank-killer" helicopters,
destroyed upwards of 100 tanks during the Gulf War while sustaining no casualties
at all of their own. Faced with the powerful strike capabilities of the
helicopters, who can still maintain that "the best weapon to deal with tanks
are tanks?" [10]

We can now say that helicopters are the true tank terminators. This new star,
which rose gradually over the waves of the Gulf, is in the process of achieving
its own coronation through the illustrious battle achievements during the
Gulf War, and there is no doubt that it is just a question of time before
it drives the tank from the battlefield. It may not take very long before
"winning a land battle from the air" is no longer an over-dramatized slogan,
and more and more ground force commanders are reaching a consensus on this
point. Furthermore, the new concepts of a "flying army" and "flying ground
warfare" in which the helicopter is the main battle weapon may become standard
military jargon and appear in every military dictionary.

Another Player Hidden Behind the Victory

Leaving aside the point that as commander in chief of the three services
Bush certainly knew the time the attack was to begin, when viewed simply
in terms of the CNN television broadcasts, the whole world was the same as
the U.S. president in that they saw at the same time the soul-stirring start
of the war. In the information-sharing age, a president doesn't really have
much more in the way of special privileges than an ordinary citizen. This
is where modern warfare differs from any wars of the past, with real-time
or near real-time reports turning warfare into a new program that ordinary
people can monitor directly via the media, and thus the media has become
an immediate and integral part of warfare, and no longer merely provides
information coming from the battlefield.

Unlike a direct broadcast of a World Cup soccer match, everything that people
saw, other than that which was first limited by the subjective perspective
of the television reporters (the 1300 reporters sent to the front lines were
all aware of the "Revised Regulations Regarding Gulf War News Reports" that
had just been issued by the Pentagon, so each person in his own mind exercised
restraint about what could and could not be reported), also had to go through
the security reviews at the joint news offices set up in Dhahran and Riyadh.
Perhaps U.S. military circles and the media had both learned the lesson during
the Vietnam war when the discord between the two was so great, but this time
the news agencies and the military got along very well. There is one figure
that perhaps can illustrate this issue very well. Of the more than 1300 news
items released throughout the entire period of the war, only five were sent
to Washington for review, and of these four received approval within several
hours, while the remaining item was canceled by the press unit itself. With
the concerted assistance of the news reporters, the battlefield commanders
successfully influenced the eyes and ears of the entire world, getting people
to see everything that the military wanted them to see, while no one was
able to see anything that they did not want people to know. The U.S. press
uniformly abandoned its vaunted neutrality, enthusiastically joining the
anti-Iraq camp and coordinating with the U.S. military just like an outstanding
two-man comic act, quite tacitly and energetically arriving at the same script
for the war, with the force of the media and that of the allied army forming
a joint force regarding the attack on Iraq. [11] Not long after Iraq invaded
Kuwait, reports quickly appeared in the various media that a massive U.S.
force was streaming into Saudi Arabia, causing the Iraqi military on the
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border to flinch and quietly creating the momentum for
a "hobbling" operation. The day before the start of "Desert Storm," the Western
media again trumpeted the news of a U.S. carrier fleet passing through the
Suez Canal, which served to confuse Saddam and have him believe that, with
disaster looming, the U.S. forces had still not completed their deployment.
Similarly, without the support of the embellishment by the media, none of
the so-called high-tech weapons sent to be used in the Gulf War would have
been as awesome as people believed. In the upwards of 98 press conferences
held throughout the entire course of the war, people saw images of how the
precision-guided missiles could penetrate the air vents in a building and
explode, of "Patriots" intercepting "Scuds," and numerous other shots that
left a profound impression. All these things represented an intense visual
shock to the entire world, including the Iraqis, and it was from this that
the myth about the unusual powers of the U.S.-made weapons was born, and
it was here that the belief was formed that "Iraq would inevitably lose,
and the U.S. was bound to win." Obviously, the media helped the Americans
enormously. We might as well say that, intentionally or otherwise, the U.S.
military and the Western media joined hands to form a noose to hang Saddam's
Iraq from the gallows. In the "Operational Outline" that was revised after
the war, the Americans took pains to suggest that "the force of the media
reports was able to have a dramatic effect on the strategic direction and
the scope of the military operations," while the newly-drafted field manual
FM100-6 (Information Operations) goes even farther in using the example
of the media war during the Gulf War. It would appear that, in all future
wars, in addition to the basic method of military strikes, the force of the
media will increasingly be another player in the war and will play a role
comparable to that of military strikes in promoting the course of the war.

Unlike battlefield propaganda, which has an excessively subjective tinge
and is easily rejected by an opponent or neutral individuals, because it
is cleverly cloaked as objective reporting the media has a quiet impact that
is hard to gauge. In the Gulf, in the same manner that the U.S.-led allied
forces deprived Iraq of its right to speak militarily, the powerful Western
media deprived it politically of its right to speak, to defend itself, and
even of its right to sympathy and support, and compared to the weak voice
of Iraqi propaganda, which portrayed Bush as the "great Satan" who was wicked
beyond redemption, the image of Saddam as a war-crazed aggressor was played
up in a much more convincing fashion. It was precisely the lopsided media
force together with the lopsided military force that dealt a vicious one-two
blow to Iraq on the battlefield and morally, and this sealed Saddam's defeat.

However, the effects of the media have always been a two-edged sword. This
means that, while it is directed at the enemy, at the same time on another
front it can similarly be a sharp sword directed at oneself. Based on information
that was disclosed following the war, the reason that the ground war abruptly
came to a halt after 100 hours was actually because Bush, influenced by a
hasty assessment of the course of the war that was issued on television by
a battlefield news release officer, later came to a similarly hasty decision
of his own, "dramatically shortening the time from strategic decision-making
to concluding the war." [12] As a result, Saddam, whose days were numbered,
escaped certain death, and it also left a string of "desert thunder" operations,
which were ultimately duds, for Clinton, who came to power later. The impact
of the media on warfare is becoming increasingly widespread and increasingly
direct, to the point where even major decisions by the president of a superpower
such as this one involving the cessation of hostilities are to a very great
extent rooted in the reaction to a single television program. From this,
one can perceive a bit of the significance that the media carries in social
life today. One can say entirely without exaggeration that an uncrowned king
has now become the major force to win any battle. After "Desert Storm" swept
over the Gulf, no longer would it be possible to rely on military force alone
without the involvement of the media to achieve victory in a war.

An Apple With Numerous Sections

As a war characterized by the integration of technology that concluded the
old era and inaugurated the new one, "Desert Storm" is a classic war that
can provide all-encompassing inspiration to those in the military in every
country. Any person who enjoys delving into military issues can invariably
draw some enlightenment or lessons from this war, regardless of which corner
of the war one focuses on. Based on that, we are terming this war, which
has multiple meanings with regard to its experiences and lessons, a multi-section
apple. Furthermore, the sectional views of this apple are far from being
limited to those that we have already discussed, and it is only necessary
for one to approach it with a well-honed intellect to have an unexpected
sectional view appear before one's eyes at any moment:

When President Bush spoke with righteous indignation to the United States
and the whole world about the moral responsibility being undertaken for Kuwait,
no responsible economist could have predicted that, to provide for the military
outlays of this war, the United States would propose a typical A-A "shared
responsibility" program, thereby launching a new form for sharing the costs
of international war -- fighting together and splitting the bill. Even if
you aren't a businessman, you have to admire this kind of Wall Street spirit.
[13]

Psychological warfare is really not a new tactic, but what was novel about
the psychological warfare in "Desert Storm" was its creativity. After dropping
an extremely powerful bomb, they would then have the airplanes drop propaganda
leaflets, warning the Iraqi soldiers several kilometers away who were quaking
in their boots from the bombing that the next bomb would be their turn! This
move alone was sufficient to cause the Iraqi units which were organized in
divisions to collapse. In the prisoner of war camp, one Iraqi division commander
admitted that the impact of the psychological war on Iraqi morale was second
only to the bombing by the allied forces. [14]

When the war began, the A-10 was viewed by the Americans as an outmoded ground
attack aircraft, but after forming what was dubbed a "lethal union" with
the "Apache" helicopter, by eliminating Iraqi tanks on a large scale it staved
off its own elimination, reaching the point where it became one of the myriad
dazzling stars in the air over the Gulf. By matching a weapon that was far
from advanced with other weapons, they actually achieved miraculous results
like this, and the design and use of these weapons can be an inspiration
that is hard to express in a few words.

With regard to General McPeak, who was hastily given the job of the Air Force
chief of staff not long before the war started, the toothmarks he left in
"this apple" were during the war, when he was able to achieve his dream of
breaking down the barriers between the strategic and tactical air forces
and establish mixed air force wings, as well as his use of the "subtract
seven and add four" approach following the war to bring about the most richly
original reform of the Air Force command structure in its history. That is,
following the elimination of seven Air Force commands, including the strategic,
tactical, transport, logistics, systems, communications, and security commands,
he organized them into the four air combat, mobility, material and intelligence
commands. [15] It is hard to imagine how General McPeak's colleagues would
have taken such a bold innovation had there been no Gulf War. [16] However,
those of us who were outsiders during the Gulf War have no way of achieving
enlightenment and lessons from it, et cetera, et cetera.

If we pursue this to the limit, we will see that there are even more aspects
to this apple, but not all of them are by any means things that can be pointed
out or circled everywhere. To tell the truth, its flaws and questionable
aspects are nearly as numerous as its strengths, but nonetheless this cannot
cause us to treat it with the slightest contempt. Although this was a war
that is rich with implications, it still cannot be treated as the encyclopedia
of modern warfare, at least it does not provide us with any completely ready-made
answers regarding future warfare. However, after all, it does represent the
first and most concentrated use of a large number of new and advanced weapons
since their appearance, as well as a testing ground for the revolution in
military affairs triggered by this, and this point is sufficient to earn
it the position of a classic in the history of warfare, as well as providing
a completely new hotbed for our budding thoughts.

Footnotes

[1] See "The Gulf War -- Final Report of the Department of Defense to Congress,"
"Defense in the New Age: Experiences and Lessons from the Gulf War," and
other research reports.

[2] The first chapter ("A Unique War") in the research report Military
Experiences and Lessons of the Gulf War put out by the U.S. Center for
Strategic and International Studies holds that "Actually, the uniqueness
of the Gulf War to a very great extent keeps us from being able to draw lessons
and experiences from it...in fact, just how much in the way of important,
long-term experiences and lessons can be drawn from the Gulf War is a major
issue." (The Gulf War, Vol 2, Military Science Publishing House, 1992
internal publication, p 155).

Following the Gulf War, people in the Chinese military, who had been shaken
intensely, from the very beginning accepted the views of Western military
circles almost completely, and at this point there are quite a few of them
who are beginning to rethink the lessons and experiences of the Gulf War.
(Conmilit, Nov 1998, No 262).

[3] The anti-Saddam alliance in the Arab world was centered around Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. According to General Khalid, who was a commander
of the allied forces in "Desert Storm," Iraq posed an enormous threat to
them, so "we have no other choice but to ask for the assistance of friendly
forces, particularly the United States." (see Desert Warrior, Military
Translations Publishing House, p 227)

The Americans also took the alliance very seriously. For details, see
"Attachments to the Final Report of the Department of Defense to Congress,"
No 9, "Alliance Construction, Coordination, and Combat".

[4] Chapter 2 ("U.S. Military Reliance") of the research report Military
Experiences and Lessons of the Gulf War put out by the U.S. Center for
Strategic and International Studies points out that "this war demonstrated
without a doubt that, whether with regard to politics or logistical support,
the U.S. military must rely on friendly states and allies. Without the
considerable help of other countries, the United States has no way to carry
out any major emergency operation. Other than in small operations, the option
of 'going it alone' is basically unworkable, and all diplomatic and defense
policy decisions must be based on this understanding." (Ibid.).

[5] In the research report on the Gulf War done for the House of Representatives
by L. Aspin and W. Dickinson, there is high praise for the "Goldwater - Nichols
DOD Reorganization Act," writing that "the Goldwater - Nichols DOD Reorganization
Act ensured that the three military services would pull together to fight
the same war." The report also quoted Secretary of Defense Cheney, saying
that the said act "is the legislation with the most far-reaching impact on
the Department of Defense since the 'National Security Act.'" The generals
in the military also had high praise for it, with Navy Admiral Owens, who
was formerly vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff terming the "Goldwater
- Nichols DOD Reorganization Act" "one of the three great revolutions in
military affairs in the United States," and "this act stipulated that in
all conflicts, the fight would be conducted using a joint force, and it also
clarified that chiefs of staff of the services are no longer combat commanders.
The combat commanders are the five theater commanders in chief." (Journal
of the National Defense University, No 11, 1998, pp 46-47;
Conmilit, No 12, 1998, p 24).

[6] General Merrill McPeak, who was Air Force chief of staff during the Gulf
War, stated that this was "a war which involved the massive use of air power
and a victory achieved by the U.S. and multinational air force units," and
"it was also the first war in history in which air power was used to defeat
ground forces" (Air Force Journal (U.S.), May 1991). In a statement
prior to the war, his predecessor Michael J. Dugan noted that "the only way
to avoid much bloodshed in a ground war is to use the Air Force." Although
Dugan was seen to have overstepped his authority and was removed from his
post, his views were not at all mistaken.

[7] Whether it is the report from the DOD or L. Aspin's report to the House
of Representatives, both give a high assessment of the "air tasking order,"
holding that "the air tasking order orchestrated a precisely-planned, integrated
air battle."

[8] According to predictions by Russian and Western military specialists,
"today, the lifespan of a tank as an individual target on the battlefield
does not exceed 2-3 minutes, and its lifespan in the open as part of a
battalion/company formation is 30-50 minutes." This kind of estimate by the
experts notwithstanding, most countries still have tanks serving as a main
weapon (Soldier (Russia), No 2, 1996). In an article entitled "The
Future of Armored Warfare," Ralph Peter states that "'Flying tanks' are something
that people have wanted for a long time, but when one considers the rational
use of fuel and the physical and psychological factors during battle, the
future need is still for ground systems. Seeing that attack helicopters are
already a concentration of the various features that we envisioned for flying
tanks, we believe that attack helicopters can complement armored vehicles,
but cannot replace them." (Parameters, Fall, 1997).

[9] Into the Storm: A Study in Command is the book that General Franks wrote
after retiring. In it he mentions that the speed with which the VII Corps
crossed the desert was not a mistake, and that the criticism from Riyadh
was unreasonable. (See Army Times (U.S.), 18 August 1997).

[10] See "Appendix to the Final Report of the Department of Defense to Congress,"
p 522.

[11] See "Appendix to the Final Report of the Department of Defense to Congress,"
Section 19, "News Reports."

[12] U.S. Army Field Manual FM100-6, Information Operations, discloses
the details of this dramatic event (See pp 68-69). The television news reports
on the "expressway of death" also had an effect on the overly-early conclusion
of the war. (Joint Force Quarterly, Fall-Winter edition, 1997-98).

[13] Section 16 of the "Appendix to the Final Report of the Department of
Defense to Congress" has a special discussion of the issue of "shared
responsibility." Contrary to the general belief, the main reason for the
U.S. to get their allies to share the costs of the war was not the economic
factor, but rather political considerations. In 21st Century Rivalries, Lester
Thurow notes that, with regard to the $61 billion that the war cost, "compared
to its annual GDP of six trillion dollars, this expense was hardly worth
mentioning. The reason that they wanted those countries which did not send
combat personnel to the war to provide fiscal assistance was entirely to
convince the U.S. public that the war was not America's alone, but was a
joint operation."

[14] In the magazine Special Operations, Major Jake Sam [as published]
reviews the circumstances of the psychological warfare conducted by the 4th
Psyops Group during the Gulf War. (See Special Operations, October
1992). In the December 1991 issue of the U.S. military's Journal of Eastern
Europe and Middle Eastern Military Affairs there is also an article devoted
to psychological warfare during the Gulf War.

[15] Air Force chief of staff McPeak advocated the use of "mixed wings" made
up of several kinds of aircraft to replace the wings made up of just one
kind of aircraft. He said that "if we were to do something else in Saudi
Arabia today, we would no longer use wings outfitted with 72 F-16s, but rather
a wing made up of some attack airplanes, air defense fighters, jamming aircraft
flying outside the air defense zone, "Wild Weasels," and refueling aircraft,
etc.... This tactic may be of use when an armed conflict breaks out in some
region of the world." (Air Force (U.S. journal), February 1991.

[16] Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice held that "the Gulf War explained
this point (experience) very thoroughly: Air power can make the greatest
contribution during the unified and integrated planning and implementation
of combat operations." General Michael Lowe [as published], commander of
the Tactical Air Command, pointed out that "using various terminology such
as 'strategy' and 'tactics' to limit the types and missions of aircraft is
impeding the efforts to develop air power, and at this point, we must carry
out organizational and structural reforms." (See Air Force Manual AFM1-1
Basic Aerospace Theories of the U.S. Air Force, p 329, footnote 8). Deputy
Chief of Staff for programs and operations Jenny V. Adams [as published]
believes that the lesson to be drawn from the Gulf War is "to modify, not
review, our combat regulations." USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for logistics
and engineering Henry Weiqiliao [as published] also approves of carrying
out reforms to reduce the weak links in the support area. See Jane's Defense
Weekly, 9 March 1991.

"Aerial combat was the decisive factor for victory in the war against Iraq...
High technology weapons were effectively used, and not only were they the
key reason that air and ground troops demonstrated remarkably in combat,
they also were the key reason United Nations forces were able keep their
casualties and fatalities so low. -- L. Aspen

The Gulf War has been the United States military's biggest war catch in the
past few decades. When the war had just ended, the American military, members
of Congress, and various civic organizations began to carry out a detailed
examination of this catch from different points of view. From each of the
reports submitted by them and each of the steps subsequently taken by the
American military, the tremendous achievements of this examination can be
seen. These achievements, moreover, are all extremely valuable to armies
and military personnel throughout the world, and there must be no delay in
looking at them. Because the nationalistic instincts of the Americans I
especially admire are particularly prominent in the long-standing sectarianism
that exists among the military services, theoretical blind spots and thought
errors are bound to occur in the research, to the extent that a grand warfare
investigation has been turned into a blind person trying to size up an elephant.
This is a topic that requires our clear re-examination and should not be
treated as an excuse to deny its value. But what is it, after all, that Americans
want to feel on this big beast? Let's first take a look at it.

The Hand Extended Under the Military Fence [Each Armed Service Views War
Differently]

The fence erected between the U.S. Army and the Navy since the time of the
Civil War not only could not be eliminated after the birth of the U.S. Air
Force, it instead became the fence separating the three branches of the military.
It became the historical chronic disease giving headaches to the President
and the Pentagon. Even though there was an effective "reorganization method"
during the Gulf War, it was not so much a clever way for getting to the root
of the problem as it was an expedient measure for bringing about a temporary
solution in light of this invisible obstacle. As soon as things had settled
down and all the troops had returned home, the doors were closed as before
and everyone went their own way. Nevertheless, the high ranking officers
at the head of each of the three military branches are certainly not a mediocre
generation of stupidly unchanging leaders. The course and outcome expected
from the Gulf War at the time when it shocked the whole world also deeply
shook these "Desert Storm" policymakers. The dumbfounded feelings of having
lost an adversary that came as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union along with the renewed motivation to establish the United States at
the forefront of the new world order made these leaders clearly realize the
urgency with which they must reform the armed forces even though they still
had no intention of abandoning their prejudices. In view of each of the
successive military combat regulations in the 1990s, its starting points
have without exception been established on the basis of the many fresh
experiences and lessons gained in the Gulf War. Just as "in the eyes of a
thousand people, there are a thousand views," what unfolded in the eyes of
the three branches of the U.S. military were three different Gulf Wars. In
this war, which not only was the last war of old times, but also the inaugural
war of modern times, each of the three branches stuck to its own arguments
and made every effort to find the evidence most advantageous to its respective
branch, hardly realizing that the hand outstretched from behind the military
wall could not possibly make heads or tails of such a big elephant as the
Gulf War.

General Sullivan felt what may have been an inflexible elephant's leg. Though
in the eyes of this officer, who at the time of the Gulf War was Assistant
Army Chief of Staff and became Chief of Staff only after the war had been
over for a few months, the U.S. Army's show was not unremarkable during "Desert
Storm," but it certainly could not be called outstanding. Especially when
compared with the 38 days of wanton and indiscriminate bombing by the Air
Force, four days of a ground warfare clean sweep were unable to bring long
expected glory to his armed forces. As someone who intimately knows each
key link of the Army, he understood better than anyone wherein lay the crux
of these age-old armed services in this landmark war. Even though the U.S.
Army's prestige was at its apex when he took his position in "Desert Storm,"
it turned into an even stronger military force with no one to battle because
the Soviet Army had declined and the facts were known. He still farsightedly
conveyed, however, prophetic concern for the common people. His greatest
concern was that after the tension of the Cold War had suddenly relaxed,
the Army structure would exhibit signs of aging, and the politicians who
were eager to take part in the dividends of peace would render his Army unable
to cross the threshold of the 21st century and preserve its leading position
among the armies of the world at the start of the new millennium. Its only
way of reviving was to swallow some very strong medicine and carry out a
complete remolding of itself. To this end, he advanced tentative plans for
building a completely new "21st century Army" in which the U.S. Army would
be redesigned at every segment," from the foxholes to the factories." [1]
In order to reduce to the greatest possible extent the spread of the effect
of bad bureaucratic practices at the various organizational levels, he initially
established a "Louisiana Drill Task Force" of only 1,100 people under his
direct command which used the experience and lessons drawn from the Gulf
War to mold this special force often referred to as the "digitized force".
Additionally, he used its successfully clever maneuverings to take the Army
to the edge of informational warfare, striding to the forefront of the armed
forces in one step, thus taking the Army down a road of bold innovation as
well as difficult future expectations. During the entire process, what he
did not make clear was that in carrying out such a completely attractive
reform there still were the selfish motives of the armed forces hidden within
-- the size of the military expenditure pie had shrunk during the past few
decades and the piece cut out for the Army was bigger than that of the other
military branches. Sullivan's successor, General Reimer, also knew this path
well and furthered these reforms on the basis of the blueprints drawn up
by his predecessor. [2]

Everyone knows that there was great expense in establishing a digitized force,
but what made this more shrewd on the part of Sullivan and Reimer was that
spending more money was precisely in the interest of acquiring more money.
From the "21st century Army" to the "post-2010 Army" and then to the "Army
of the future," it took two steps to make three flights. Using a rather
convincing development objective as bait, they attracted the support of Capitol
Hill and even more military expenditure to build up the Army. Regarding those
politicians who were totally ignorant of military issues and who could not
necessarily draw new conclusions and methods for victory in the face of the
generals, they mostly feared making fools of themselves, and so none dared
make irresponsible remarks to a man who might well be the next president.
Actually, no matter how much hubbub the "digitized force" caused, the time
when anyone will make a final conclusion on the validity of this plan is
still far off. What others do not say it that it is just a standard method
according to the U.S. Army, like a new weaponry purchase that goes from a
proposed requirement of the military to manufacture by the industrial sector
and then back to the military for testing, a process than can take as long
as 10 years. However, the two rhythms that cannot work together - the "18
month rule" for computer development and the "60 day rule" for network technology
- make it very difficult for the "digitized force" to finalize a technology
design and establish a military force, thereby turning it into a top spun
by the continually changing new technology. In the tired course of dealing
with these things, not only is it not known what course to take, nothing
is attempted and nothing is accomplished. [3] On this point alone, linking
an armed force's fate to the popularity of a certain type of technology,
a bold plan with leading characteristics, makes it difficult truly to become
the only road marker guiding the Army's future development. Moreover, who
now dares state with certainty that in future wars this heavy spending will
not result in an electronic Maginot line that is weak because of its excessive
dependence on a single technology? [4]

Regarding the Air Force, the straightforward General Dugan was relieved of
his post, and the Air Force troops under the command of an Army general during
the entire "Desert Storm" operation were not prevented from becoming the
big winners in the Gulf War. [5] "Global presence, global power," the founding
principle of the military, has for the first time withstood the test of war,
and the Air Force has been a force which could by itself succeed in strategy
and battle attack missions on any battle front, its position having never
been as illustrious as it is now. [6] This has made the smug General McPeak
and his successor determined to go even further. They feel that one victory
is enough to allow them to take the leading role within the armed forces
from this point on. The Air Force, which was molded 50 years ago from an
appendage of the Army, is no longer ignorant - it had suddenly grown wings
when it touched the elephant in the Gulf. Even though Air Force Chief of
Staff Fogleman and Army Chief of Staff Reimer were of the same mind and,
having gone through the Gulf War, "the two branches of the military both
had deep understanding of military wartime operations for the 21st century",
"relations between the Army and the Air Force became strained when the two
branches tried to work out details and uses for the lessons gained from the
Gulf War." [7] The reason is very simple - neither the Air Force, whose wings
were growing increasingly strong, nor the Army, which regarded itself as
the number one authority under heaven, were willing to hand over the right
to control operational command to the other. Those keeping to each respective
stand were seemingly justified, but upon surmounting it, one would discover
that it was a completely unbeneficial military struggle with the result that
each meeting of military leaders to study joint operations became a mere
formality and none of the new experience obtained from the Gulf War was fully
and effectively shared between them. One need only look at the successive
compendia and regulations issued by the Air Force and Army following the
end of the war to understand this point.

What needs to be pointed out is that after the war, what the Air Force did
was of course not limited to scrambling for power and profit with the other
branches of the military. The main component of "Desert Storm" was the response
to the successful experience of the air attack campaigns -- they reorganized
all the air combat troops into mixed wings in accordance with effective models
that had already been proven. They then used a method of subtracting seven
and adding four to completely reorganize the entire Air Force command mechanism.
They are currently in the middle of testing the formation of an Air Force
expeditionary force that can reach any war zone in the world within 48 hours
and maintain combat capability during the entire course of any crisis and
conflict. The Air Force, which all along has demonstrated tremendous enthusiasm
for electronic warfare and even information warfare, had taken the lead in
establishing an Air Force information warfare center even before Sullivan
established the digitized force. These actions clearly are directly related
to the results of the Gulf War. What is regrettable is that such a good attempt
was unable to break free of the military's boundaries with the result that
the old cry for "joint military operations" was still just a slogan as before.
But then all of this did not prevent the generals of the U.S. Air Force from
following the example of their Army colleagues and using the positive changes
within the armed forces and the positive struggle outside the armed forces
as the two wheels that would advance their own branch's interests. A stagnant
military with no fresh plans is one that could not steal a good portion from
the pockets of the congressmen who administer military funds appropriation.
In this regard, the Air Force has its own multiplication table [xiaojiujiu
1420 0046 0046] [8]. In the military's intensifying budgetary struggle, space
flight weapons systems are a powerful trump card held by the Air Force. Even
though the "Star Wars" system advanced by President Reagan appeared to be
a bluff at the very beginning, and two presidents later it still has not
developed true combat capability, the enthusiasm of Americans for establishing
space combat power has never cooled. [9] Relying on this enthusiasm, many
Air Force Chiefs of Staff have striven for the most possible military funding
for their own armed forces. Probably only heaven knows whether American space
flight power will be as General Estes said, "What space flight troops
demonstrated in the Gulf War proved that they had the potential for independent
service."

If the Gulf War is really seen as a big elephant, then it can be said that
the U.S. Navy's front fin is hardly touching the fur of the elephant, which
is just the same as saying it is not touching the elephant at all. Perhaps
it is precisely because of this that the U.S. Navy's historically most painful
transformation of strategic theory has begun from the homebound voyage of
the proud and arrogant seamen who slid down from the cold bench of the "Gulf
War." This suffering has fully tormented for a year and a half those servicemen
growing gills. After that, a White Paper called "From Sea to Land" put forward
by several lieutenant colonels and colonels was placed on the desk of the
Naval Commander. This document clearly deviated from the creed and altogether
old regulations of the U.S. Navy's spiritual mentor, Mahan. Decisive battles
on the ocean striving for command of the seas must never again be treated
as the Navy's eternally unchanging sacred mission. For the first time, rather,
support of coastal and land based combat would rank as its chief responsibility.
This is as good as turning the long tailed sharks cruising on the deep oceans
into short mouthed crocodiles rolling about in the mire. What is even more
surprising is that unorthodox opinions like these have gone so far as to
obtain the joint signatures of the heads of the Navy, battle commanders,
and Marine Corps commanders to become the most significant naval document
since Mahan's "The Effect of Naval Power on History."

Sudden bold strategic changes have provided an important turn for the better
to this force which has been in search of a regenerative road against the
backdrop of great change in world structure. Although the objectives that
the Navy has established for itself are not as radical as those of the Army
nor as ambitious as the Air Force, its transformation is obviously more
fundamental and more complete. In doing its calculations, the Navy, which
is not one bit inferior to the Army and the Air Force, of course wants to
kill two birds with one stone in the areas of transforming itself and vying
for military funding. An armed force that did not play any significant role
in a major war, however, must put forward a very attractive plan and carry
out the most thorough reforms if it wants to be sure to get a fixed piece
of post-war benefit pie as well as ambitiously attempt to get a bigger piece.
Therefore, two years after putting forward "From Sea to Land", the Navy again
issued a new White Paper, "Forward Position... ... From Sea to Land" [10],
and poured new hormones such as the more vigorous "Existence of the Forward
Position," "Deployment of the Forward Position," "Combat of the Forward Position"
into the Navy's strategy. Another two years later, Navy battle commander
Admiral Boorda put forward "Naval Concepts for the Year 2020." After Boorda
killed himself to redeem his soldiers' honor which he had ruined, his successor,
Admiral Johnson, followed established rules and promoted the reforms begun
by all his predecessors. He classified "deterrence and prevention of conflict
in peacetime, and winning victory in wartime" as the three major responsibilities
of the U.S. Navy in the 21st century.

What never changed was that he was also the same as his predecessors in that
all of the plans he proposed treated the Navy as the axis without exception.
His reasoning this time is that among the many foreign combat tasks that
the U.S. military shoulders, the Army needs to draw support from many areas
to launch a deployment, and the Air Force is exceedingly dependent on the
bases of other countries. Only the Navy possesses cruise freedom in any maritime
space. Using the capability of multiple means for penetrating battle, the
result naturally is that the Navy should become the core of a joint combat
force. The thinking of this admiral is extremely clear. With consensus for
his theory from the three military commanders and the Department of Defense,
followed by logical thought, the probable outcome would be the preference
of his branch in getting budgetary allocations. According to what has been
divulged about the 1998 U.S. national defense budget, during the past ten
years in the course of a steady trend of U.S. military spending reductions,
the Navy and the Marine Corps are the two areas in the whole military that
have had the least reduction in spending. The Naval commanders have always
gotten what they wanted.

What is analyzed and outlined above is the general direction of the U.S.
military since the end of the Gulf War and the current situation of fracture
between the branches of the armed services. Perhaps you will be moved by
all the hard work done by the U.S. military to summarize this war, and perhaps
you will be influenced by the various methods adopted by the U.S. military
to defend the interests of the armed services. At the same time, however,
you may also have deep sympathy that so many outstanding soldiers and remarkable
minds went so far as to be separated inside the military fence, pinning each
other down and counteracting each other to the point that each of these
armed services with strong outlooks in the end still formed an American military
that had its entire pace disrupted by uncertain bugle calls.

The Illness of Extravagance, and Zero Casualties

Large-scale use of costly weapons in order to realize objectives and reduce
casualties without counting costs -- this kind of warfare which can only
be waged by men of wealth is a game that the American military is good at.
"Desert Storm" manifested once again the Americans' unlimited extravagance
in war and has already become an addiction. Airplanes which cost an average
of US$25 million each carried out 11,000 wanton and indiscriminate bombings
in a 42 day period, destroying the general headquarters of the renewed Socialist
Party with each US$1.3 million Tomahawk guided missile, taking aim at foxholes
with precision guided bombs worth tens of thousands of U.S. dollars... even
if the American generals knew as soon as they began that they need not spend
so much on this unrestrained battle banquet costing US$61 billion, using
such an ostentatious battle style of "attacking birds with golden bullets",
their over-extravagance would still not have been prevented. An American-made
bomber is like a flying mountain of gold, more costly than many of its targets.
Shouldn't hitting a quite possibly insignificant target with tons of American
dollars arouse people's suspicions? Aside from this, during the long duration
of 161 days, more than 52,000 personnel and over 8,000,000 tons of goods
and materials were brought over day and night to the front line from America
and all over Europe, including thousands of sun hats long since scrapped
in some warehouse and crates of American fruit rotting on Riyadh. Major General
Pagonis, the commanding officer in charge of logistic support, calls such
large-scale chaotic and extravagant safeguarding activities "possibly
historically unheard of" naval operations. However, according to the vivid
statements of the U.S. Department of Defense, this is analogous to having
moved all of the living facilities of Mississippi's capital city, Jackson,
to Saudi Arabia. Of all the soldiers in the world, probably only the Americans
would consider this a necessary extravagance in order to win one war. [12]

It is just this point that strikes people strangely. However, the Pentagon,
which was completely remolded by McNamara in the spirit of commerce, all
along could only estimate the innumerable costs of luxury style war. [13]
Even the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, an
organization that frequently conducts verbal warfare with four star generals
over money, did not even utter a word regarding the astonishing expenditures
of this war. In the respective investigation reports done on the Gulf War,
the key effect of high technology weaponry was given almost all equally high
appraisals. Secretary of Defense Cheney said "we lead fully one generation
in the area of weapon technology," and Congressman Aspen responded "the benefits
demonstrated by high tech weaponry have exceeded our most optimistic estimates."

If you cannot make out the overtones of my praises and only think they are
proud of the American military for having fully realized their war objectives
by defeating Iraq with the aid of high technology weapons, then you may think
that this however is the typical nonsense spoken by two who have different
opinions regarding the ability of technology to bring success, and you also
are not yet fully aware of the meaning of American style warfare. What you
must know is that this is a nationality that has never been willing to pay
the price of life and, moreover, has always vied for victory at all costs.
The appearance of high technology weaponry can now satisfy these extravagant
hopes of the American people. During the Gulf War, of 500,000 troops, there
were only 148 fatalities and 458 wounded. Goals that they long since only
dreamt were almost realized -- "no casualties." Ever since the Vietnam War,
both the military and American society have been sensitized to human casualties
during military operations, almost to the point of morbidity. Reducing casualties
and achieving war objectives have become the two equal weights on the American
military scale. These common American soldiers who should be on the battlefield
have now become the most costly security in war, like precious china bowls
that people are afraid to break. All of the opponents who have engaged in
battle with the American military have probably mastered the secret of success
- if you have no way of defeating this force, you should kill its rank and
file soldiers. [14] This point, taken from the U.S. Congressional report's
emphasis on "reducing casualties is the highest objective in formulating
the plan," can be unequivocally confirmed. "Pursuit of zero casualties,"
this completely compassionate simple slogan, has actually become the principal
motivating factor in creating American style extravagant warfare. Therefore,
unchecked use of stealth aircraft, precision ammunition, new tanks, and
helicopters, along with long distance attack and blanket bombing - for all
of these, weapons are okay as are tricks, so that there are no dual objectives
that at the same time carry contradictions - there must be victory without
casualties.

Warfare framed on this basis can only be like killing a chicken with a bull
knife. Its high technology, high investment, high expenditure, and high payback
feature, make its requirements for military strategy and combat skill far
lower than its requirements for the technological performance of weaponry.
Even in successful wars of this dimension, there is not one outstanding battle
that is laudable. Compared with the advanced technology that they possess,
the American military clearly is technologically stagnant and it is not good
at seizing opportunities provided by new technology for new military tactics.
Aside from effective use of advanced technological weaponry, we are not sure
how much of a disparity exists between the military thought revealed in this
war by Americans and other countries. The difference at least cannot be any
bigger than that between their weaponry. Perhaps it is precisely because
of this that this war was unable to become a masterpiece of military skill.
Instead it became, to a great extent, a sumptuous international fair of high
technology weapons with the United States as the representative and, as a
result, began the spread of the disease of American style war extravagance
on a global scale. At the same time as huge amounts of U.S. dollars were
trampling Iraq, it also muddled soldiers all over the world for a time. As
the world's leading arms dealers, Americans naturally are overjoyed. In the
face of this typical war with its advanced technology, dull warfare, and
huge spending, just as with a Hollywood movie, with its simple plot, complex
special effects, and identical patterns, for a long time after the war people
could not understand the main threads of this complicated affair and believed
that modern warfare is fought in just this way, leaving those who cannot
fight such an extravagant war feeling inadequate. This is why the military
forums in every country since the Gulf War are full of a faction yearning
for high technology weapons and calling for high technology wars.

In discussing the talented American inventor, Thomas Edison, poet Jeffers
writes, "We... ... are skilled in machinery and are infatuated with luxuries."
Americans have a strong inborn penchant for these two things as well as a
tendency to turn their pursuit of the highest technology and its perfection
into a luxury, even including weapons and machinery. General Patton, who
liked to carry ivory handled pistols, is typical of this. This inclination
makes them rigidly infatuated with and therefore have blind faith in technology
and weapons, always thinking that the road to getting the upper hand with
war can be found with technology and weapons. This inclination also makes
them anxious at any given time that their own leading position in the realm
of weaponry is wavering, and they continually alleviate these concerns by
manufacturing more, newer, and more complex weapons. As a result of this
attitude, when the weapons systems which are daily becoming heavier and more
complicated come into conflict with the terse principles required of actual
combat, they always stand on the side of the weapons. They would rather treat
war as the opponent in the marathon race of military technology and are not
willing to look at it more as a test of morale and courage, wisdom and strategy.
They believe that as long as the Edisons of today do not sink into sleep,
the gate to victory will always be open to Americans. Self confidence such
as this has made them forget one simple fact - it is not so much that war
follows the fixed race course of rivalry of technology and weaponry as it
is a game field with continually changing direction and many irregular factors.
Whether you wear Adidas or Nike cannot guarantee you will become the winner.

It appears that Americans, however, do not plan to pay attention to this.
They drew the benefit of the Gulf War's technological victory and obviously
have resolutely spared no cost to safeguard their leading position in high
technology. Even though the many difficulties with funding have brought them
up against the embarrassment of having difficulty continuing, they have not
been able to change their passion for new technology and new weapons. The
detailed list of extravagant weapons constantly being drawn up by the U.S.
military and approved by Congress will certainly get longer and longer [15],
but the list of American soldier casualties in future wars may not necessarily
be "zero" because of wishful thinking.

Group. Expeditionary Force. Integrated Force.

"What kind of army does the U.S. Army need in the 21st century?" This is
a question that has puzzled the U.S. Army for the last 10 years of the 20th
century. [16] During the Gulf War, the effect of the Army's mediocre show
along with the high technology weapons on the rhythm of battle formed a clear
contrast. The U.S. Army, which all along has been more conservative than
the Navy and the Air Force, finally became conscious of the need to work
out a system for carrying out reforms. What is interesting is that the role
of resistance in this instance was not the Army's upper echelon. Rather,
it was the new division commanders who had just climbed up to higher positions
from command levels and the new commanders who replaced them. The views of
those of the "brigade faction" wearing the eagle insignia and the sign of
the maple leaf, however, are in complete contradiction. They believe that
it is the Army troops that have been unable to pass the test of war and therefore
must undergo a major operation. The "crack troops," "model troops," and "primary
brigade," these three programs, have been handed over to General Sullivan.
Even though this Army Chief of Staff has admiringly embodied the third program's
"new thinking for future operations," he has still not been able to persuade
the majority of generals to accept it. The result has been that, after he
was relieved of his office, there was a change of heart between the conservatives
and the reformists and the Army made the Fourth Mechanized Unit the foundation
in January 1996 to organize a new experimental brigade of 15,800 men. [17]
The position of the "divisional faction" clearly prevailed. The members of
the "brigade faction", however, were not willing to just let the matter drop.
They staunchly believed that a "military force that is excessively massive
and cumbersome will be difficult to suit to the combat requirements of the
21st century." The military force which began to be implemented during the
period of short range to complex guns must be completely rescinded, and five
to six thousand new-type combat troops should be substituted to form the
new Army type for basic combat. In order to relieve the generals' feelings
of disgust, they displayed experience in the ways of the world and retained
equally high-ranking military positions as the old-style Army in the new
program. [18]

At just the critical moment of the incessant debate between the "divisional"
and "brigade" factions, the director of the U.S. Army Battle Command Laboratory,
Army Lieutenant Colonel Maigeleige [transliteration as printed 7796 2706
7191 2047] sounded another new call. In his book, "Break the Factional Position",
he advocated simultaneously abandoning the systems of divisions and brigades
and replacing them with 12 battle groups of about 5,000 men each. Its new
position is determined by the ousted establishment's set pattern of large
and small, and the human numbers of many and few. It could adopt building-block
methods according to wartime needs and put into practice mission-style group
organization. The reverberations that his viewpoint has brought in the Army
has somewhat exceeded expectations, to the point that General Reimer has
required all generals to read this book. [19] Perhaps the current Army Chief
of Staff has exceptional insight and recognizes that even though the lieutenant
colonels' key points may not find miracle cures for the difficult issues,
they can yet be regarded as the magical cure for sloughing off the
thought-cocoons of those old soldiers in general's clothes.

Originally, the concept of a "group" was certainly not new to the Army. The
reform of the "five group atomic troops" [20] in the 1950s and 1960s was
generally considered to be an unsuccessful attempt and even criticized as
having been an indirect cause leading to the U.S. military's poor show in
the Vietnam War. In the eyes of Maigeleige, however, a prematurely delivered
child may be unable to grow to manhood. If it is said that the birth of the
"group" 30 years ago was unlucky, then today it can be said that it is a
good time. Modernized weaponry has been enough to make any relatively small
scale force not be inferior to previously much larger armed forces in the
areas of fire power and mobility. The appearance of the C4I has
especially brought armed forces which have a mutual superiority advantage
to unite in battle, becoming the new growing point in fighting power. If
this time still embraces the 18-type weapons ready divisional system or brigade
system, then it can truly be said that it is incompatible with present needs.
However, even if military technological development is the emergence of new
high technology, it also is a turning point and certainly will not automatically
bring on advanced military thought and institutional establishments. One
good feature hides one hundred bad -- the leading position with military
technology and weaponry has hidden from view this fact: The U.S. military
is no different in the institutional establishment as in military ideology,
and is clearly behind the advanced military technology it possesses. In this
sense, using the "group" to destroy the position formed by the divisions
and the brigades is the most damaging concept in the institutional establishment
of the U.S. Army since the Gulf War and has represented the new thought wave
of the U.S. military system establishment reform.

Unlike the Army, the Air Force and the Navy do not have deep-rooted "positional"
traditions. The pace of their adjustments clearly are comparatively light.
The Air Force particularly made opportune use of the momentum of Desert Storm
to completely eliminate the divisional system in one blow, and they took
advantage of the opportunity to change all of the combat flight wings into
integrated wings and took the lead in achieving the first round of system
establishment reforms. After "global arrival, global power" was defined as
the new objective for Air Force strategy, it continued to flap the wings
of reform and began testing the plan for establishing an "Air Force Expeditionary
Force" advanced by Air Force Wing Commander John Jiangpo [transliteration
as printed 3068 3789]. According to this commander's idea, the so-called
"Air Force Expeditionary Force" is a capable and vigorous force of 1,175
men and 34 aircraft put together to aim at striving for superiority in the
air, carrying out air attacks, suppressing enemy air defense power, and
air-to-air refueling, etc., that can reach a theatre of operations within
48 hours of having received the order, and that can maintain air combat
capability throughout the entire course of a conflict. In this regard, it
can be said that the actions of the U.S. Air Force are supersonic. They currently
have established three "Air Force Expeditionary Forces" and also have completed
real troop deployment. When the fourth and fifth of these forces began to
be set up, its three predecessor "Air Force Expeditionary Forces" were already
outstanding in such military operations as the "Southern Watch" and "Desert
Thunder."

Regarding the Navy, since there already has been a new strategy of "Forward
Position... From Sea to Land," formation of an expeditionary force from a
combination of the Naval fleet and ground forces is logical. Unlike the Army,
which is taking strides to protect against difficulties, and the Air Force,
which is like a charging hurricane, the Navy is more willing to go through
repeated maneuvers and actual combat in order to polish the concept of the
"Naval Expeditionary Force." From [the advent] of the "Ocean Risk" of the
Atlantic Ocean general headquarters, of the "Double Assault" of the European
general headquarters, of the "Silent Killer" of the Pacific Ocean general
headquarters, and of the ground force's "Sea Dragon" maneuver since May of
1992, to the establishment of the "Southern Watch" no-fly zone in southern
Iraq, the "Vigilant Warrior" to deter Iraq, as well as the "Hope Renewal"
in Somalia, Bohei's [3134 7815] "Capable Guard", and Haiti's "Preservation
of Democracy" -- in each of these operations the Navy has been diligently
testing its new organization. [22]

The mission that they stipulate for this "Naval Expeditionary Force" of one
battleship group, one amphibious guard force, and Marine Corps task forces
is rapid control of the seas along with combat in coastal regions. What amazes
and pleasantly surprises the Navy most is that the amphibious landing equipment
needed by this expeditionary force actually obtained Congressional budgetary
approval. [23] The partiality that the American politicians have towards
the Navy caused the Navy and especially the Marines to be treated with coldness
upon their return from the Gulf War. Moreover, after establishing the new
Naval system establishment, they were fully confident of occupying the number
one position in the American armed forces.

The institutional reforms that began after the Gulf War not only adjusted
the internal structure of the U.S. military, but also gave impetus to changes
in weapons development and tactics, and even had a far-reaching effect on
America's national strategy. The small-scale, flexible, and quick "Expeditionary
Force," not only used for military attacks but also able to carry out non-warfare
tasks, has become the new style of establishment striven for by each military
branch as well as a convenient and effective tool in the hands of the U.S.
government. We have discovered that, because there are these highly proficient
"killer mace" [sha shou jian 3010 2087 9505] forces and a dangerous, worrisome
trend has even been brought about, in handling international affairs the
U.S. government has become increasingly fond of using force, makes moves
more quickly, and seeks revenge for the smallest grievances. These mutual
moves between the armed forces and the government, military and politics,
is causing the U.S. military to begin undergoing a deep yet quite possibly
disastrous change from system establishment to strategic thinking.

Currently, the U.S. Department of Defense is trying to set about organizing
the ground, air, and sea expeditionary forces into an integrated "Allied
Task Force." This is the newest move in this change. [24] It is still difficult
to foresee whether this completely integrated force will drag the U.S. military
and even the United States using the same special characteristics into a
troublesome mire while nimbly achieving the global mission bestowed on the
U.S. government.

From Joint Campaigns to Total Dimensional War - One Step to Thorough
Understanding When we say that American military theory is behind, it is
only behind relative to its advanced military technology. Compared to the
servicemen of other countries, the fully technological aspect of Americans'
military thinking naturally occupies an insurmountable leading position on
the scale of high-tech war in hypothetical future wars. Perhaps the Soviet
Arjakov [Ao'er jiakefu 1159 1422 0502 4430 1133] school of thought which
was the first to advance the "new military revolution" is the only example
that has come to light.

The "new military revolution" is vividly portrayed by the anvil forged in
the Gulf War. Not only with the American military but also with servicemen
of the whole world, these words have become a blindly ludicrous and popular
slogan. It is not a matter requiring great effort due to yearning for the
technology of others and following certain slogans. The only ones using a
great effort are the Americans. If they want to guarantee their own leading
position in a field of military reforms that has already begun and will be
completed right away, then the first thing that must be resolved is to eliminate
the lag that exists between U.S. military thinking and military technology.
Actually, the war dust has only settled [zhan chen fu ding 2069 1057 3940
1353].

The U.S. military has not yet completed troop withdrawal from the Persian
Gulf and has already begun top-to-bottom "thought exchange transfusion."
This means that, after military technological reforms are initiated, they
will not be able to be make up missed lessons of synchronized follow-up for
military thought reform. Even though in the final analysis they are also
unable to completely break away from their penchant for technology, Americans
still are in this unusual encirclement from which they are unable to break
free. They have achieved certain results that are equally beneficial for
American servicemen as well as servicemen all over the world -- first is
formation of the "joint campaign" concept, second is forging "total dimensional
warfare" thinking.

Formulation of the "joint campaign" originally came from the Number One
Joint Publication in November 1991 of the "United States Armed Forces
Joint Operations" regulations issued by the U.S. Military Joint Conference.
This is clearly brimming with new concepts of the Gulf War and has broken
through the confines of the popular "cooperative war" and "contractual war"
which are already dated, and even surpassed the "air/ground integrated battle"
theory seen by Americans as the magic weapon. This regulation exposes the
four key elements of the "joint campaign" - centralized command, equality
of the armed forces, complete unification, and total depth while doing battle.
It has made clear for the first time the command control authority of the
battle zone unified commander; it has stipulated that any one military branch
can take the leading battle role based on different situations; it has expanded
"air/ground integrated battle" into ground, sea, air, and space integrated
battle; and it has emphasized implementation of total depth while doing battle
on all fronts. Under the strong impetus of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff
meeting, each military branch is successively setting about formulating and
unifying mutually matching military regulations in order to make public this
new tactic representative of the direction of future wars. [While the services
have formally accepted this new concept], in private they still constantly
bear in mind the prominent core functions of their branches, and they especially
hope to carry out a unification that is clearly demarcated -- that is a
unification that makes clear each domain and authority, including regulations,
laws, and the differentiation among each other's military honors. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili feels that this does not intend
to indicate a compromise between each of the Chiefs of Staff. Adopting the
publication called, "The Plan for a Joint Force in 2010," The "Model" for
Leading the UnitedStates Military to Joint Operations [25],
he resolutely plays the part of a modern Moses, leading the U.S. military
to dismantle the fences separating the branches of the military, and stride
along the difficult path of really bringing about integrated unified operations
in the midst of a twilight which brings doubt.

Even though it is in the United States, a country which easily propagates
and accepts new things, the situation is still far more difficult than
Shalikashvili thought. In the wake of his retirement, criticism of the "joint
plan" for the U.S. military has gradually increased, and skepticism has again
gained ground. The Marine Corps believes that they "must not worship the
'joint [plan]' and stifle relevant future discussions on troop organization,"
that "the uniformity of the joint [plan] will lead to the loss of the
distinctiveness of the armed forces," and that this is mutually contrary
to the American spirit of "emphasizing competition and diversification."
The Air Force tactfully expressed the opinion that the "2010 unification
plan must develop in practice and encourage mutual emulation between the
armed services," that "in this era of change and experimentation our thinking
must be flexible and cannot become rigid." [26] The views of the Navy and
the Army in this regard are similar and have plenty of power to destroy
Shalikashvili's painstaking efforts in an instant. It is thus evident that
it is not only in Eastern reforms that the situation occurs where policies
shift with a change of the person in charge. As onlookers, we of course can
simply sacrifice a valuable ideology for the narrow benefit of a group.

Because the essence of "joint campaigns" and "joint plans" certainly is not
in the confirmation or expropriation of military advantage, rather its intention
is to enable each branch of the military to achieve unification of operations
within a centralized battleground space, and reduce to the greatest possible
extent the negative effects of each branch going its own way. Before a way
is found to truly integrate the forces, this is obviously a conceivable tactic
of high order. The limitation of this valuable thinking, however, lies in
that its starting point and ending point have both fallen onto the level
of armed force and have been unable to expand the field of vision of "joint"
to all of the realms in which humans can produce confrontational behavior.
The drawback of this thinking at the very end of the 20th century, a time
when an inkling of the broad sense of war has already emerged, is that it
appears to attract attention to such an extent that if the concept of "total
dimensional warfare" had not been set forth in the 1993 U.S. Army publication,
The Essentials of War, we would be simply astounded at the "anemic"
realm of U.S. military thinking.

Following the 13th revision of this programmatic document, there was a
penetrating insight into the various challenges that the U.S. military might
face in the following years and for the first time a completely new concept
of "non-combat military operations" was advanced. It was because of this
concept that people saw the possibility of carrying out total positional
warfare, and it brought the American Army to find an extremely lofty new
name for its war theory -- "total dimensional warfare." What is interesting
is that the person in charge of revising the U.S. Army's 1993 publication
of The Essentials of War and who displayed a fiercely innovative spirit
was General Franks, the man who was criticized by people as an operational
conservative when the Navy commanded the Seventh Fleet. If not for later
circumstances that changed the direction of thinking of Americans, this commander
of the US Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters who first took his post
after the war would have brought the history of American military thinking
to a historical breakthrough. Although General Franks and the officers who
compiled his military regulations were unable to reconcile the tremendous
discrepancy between the two sentences, "implementation of centralized air,
ground and sea operations supported by the entire theatre of operations"
and "mobilization of all mastered methods in each possible operation, both
combat and non-combat, so as to resolutely complete any mission assigned
at the least price" in this publication The Essentials of War, they were
even less able to discover that, apart from war as a military operation,
there still exists the possibility for far vaster non-military war operations.
However, it at least pointed out that "total dimensional warfare" should
possess the special characteristics of "total depth, total height, total
frontage, total time, total frequency, and multiple methods", and this precisely
is the most revolutionary feature of this form of battle that has never been
seen in the history of war. [27]

It is too bad that the Americans, or more specifically the American Army,
discontinued this revolution too early. In one case of dissension, Holder,
one-time regimental commander under General Franks who later held the post
of Combined Arms Commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters,
strongly cross-examined his superior officer's idea. The then-Lieutenant
General Holder already was not the out-and-out vigorous Colonel Holder on
the battlefield. This time he was playing the part of the Army mouthpiece
for conservative tradition.

His view was that "the belief that non-combat operations has its own set
of principles is not welcomed among combat troops and many commanding officers
are opposed to differentiating between non-combat operations and the original
meaning of military operations." After Holder's death, "the Army had formed
a common consensus to handle differentiation of non-combat operations as
a wrong practice." They believe that if "non-combat military operations"
are written into the basic regulations, it will weaken the armed forces'
trait of emphasis on military affairs and also could lead to confusion in
armed forces operations. With the situation going in this direction, General
Franks' revolution ended in an unavoidable miscarriage. Under the inspiration
of the next commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters, General
Hartzog, General Holder and the editorial group for the 1998 publication
of The Essentials of War finally made a major amendment to the new
compendium with "a single principle covering all types of the Army's military
operations" as the fundamental key. Their practice is to no longer distinguish
between non-combat operations and general military operations, but to
differentiate battle operations into four types -- attack, defense,
stabilization, and support -- and return the original manuscript to such
responsibilities of non-combat operations as rescue and protection and
reassembling the old set of combat operations in order to enable it to put
centralized combat principles on the right course and altogether discard
the concept of "total dimensional warfare." [28]. At face value, this is
a move of radical reform and simplification by simply cutting out the
superfluous. In reality, however, this is an American edition of poor judgment.
At the same time as the theoretical confusion brought by the unripe concept
of "non-combat military operations" was eliminated, the rather valuable
ideological fruits that they had accidentally picked were also abandoned
on account of the newly-revised compendium. It appears that in doing the
one step forward, two steps back dance, all nationalities are self-taught.

Nevertheless, pointing out the U.S. Army's lack of foresight is not equivalent
to saying that the "total dimensional warfare" theory cannot be criticized.
Quite the opposite, there are clear flaws in this theory from both its conceptual
denotation and connotation. Indeed, "total dimensional war's" understanding
of battle is already much broader than any previous military theory, but
as far as its innate character is concerned, it still has not escaped the
"military" category. For example, the "non-military combat operations" concept
we raised above is much broader in meaning than military combat operations
and can at least be placed along with comparable war realms and patterns
outside the field of vision of American servicemen -- it is precisely this
large domain that is the area for future servicemen and politicians to develop
imagination and creativity -- with the result that it also cannot count as
truly meaning "total dimensional." Not to mention the phrase "total dimensional"
in the U.S. Army, which also has not in the end reconciled how many dimensional
spaces are referred to, whether it is that each [space] is an interrelated
element of war or it is that there are two simultaneously. This is to say,
it still has not been elaborated on and is in a state of chaos. If, however,
what total dimension is referring to cannot be reconciled, then the nature
of the relationship between each dimension, this original concept with its
rich potential, can of course not be fully launched. Actually, there is no
one who can launch a war in 360-degree three-dimensional space with time
and other non-physical elements of total dimensionality added, and any particular
war will always have its particular emphasis and is always launched within
a limited dimension as well as terminated within a limited dimension. The
only difference is that in the predictable future, military operations will
never again be the entire war, rather they are one dimension within the total
dimension. Even adding "non-combat military operations" as proposed by General
Franks cannot count as total dimensionality. Only by adding all "non-military
combat operations" aside from military operations can total dimensional war's
complete significance be realized.

What needs to be pointed out is that this ideology has never emerged in all
of the theoretical research of the U.S. military since the Gulf War. [29]
Even though these concepts of "non-combat military operations" and "total
dimensional warfare" are full of original ideas and are already fairly close
to a military ideological revolution that started from the military technology
revolution, it can be said that it has already arrived under the last precipice
on the rugged mountain path, and the mountain peak of the great revelation
is still far away. Here, however, the Americans have stopped, and the American
hares who have always been ahead of every other country in the world in military
technology and military ideology have begun to gasp for breath. No matter
that Sullivan or Franks let out "running hare" breaths in so many military
theses after the Gulf War, they still cannot leave all the tortoises behind.

Perhaps now this is the time when Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley [30] and
these Americans who have called into question the capability of other countries'
military revolutions should examine their consciences:

Why has there not been a revolution?

Footnotes

[1] The 21st Century Army is written by Sullivan. From the time he
took his post until after he left it, he has always been unabatedly enthusiastic
about this issue. Even though many people within the U.S. military and the
forces of other countries have equated The 21st Century Army with
The Digitized Force, Sullivan certainly does not see it this way.
He believes that the U.S. Army should continually promote "integration" reforms,
and that The 21st Century Army should be treated more as "an attitude
and a direction" rather than an "ultimate plan." "Integration of a 21st century
includes such aspects as battle theory, system of organization, training,
commanding officer development, equipment and soldier issues, and base
facilities, etc." (United States Military Theory, May-June, 1995)
According to the general view currently held by the U.S. Army, "The 21st
century force is the current Army force carrying out information-age field
operations experiments, theoretical research, and equipment purchasing plans,
to enable the ground combat troops to handle preparations for carrying out
missions from now until 2010." (Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters Assistant
Chief of Staff, Colonel Robert Jilibuer [transliteration as printed 1015
0448 1580 1422], Armed Forces Journal, October 1996).

[2] General Dennis J. Reimer said, "'The 2010 Army Concept' is also the
theoretical link between 'The 21st Century Army' and 'The Army of Tomorrow'.
'The 21st Century Army' is the plan that the Army is carrying out right now...
'The Army of Tomorrow' is the Army's long-range plan that is currently under
deliberation... mutual coordination between the three has determined a complete
set of continuous and orderly changes, so as to guarantee that the Army can
develop along a methodical direction." (See The 2010 Army Concept
report, 1997).

[3] Technological renewal is a far faster phenomenon than weaponry, hiding
deeper disparities: "It is easier for forerunners to fall behind." (This
point can be verified from the development of the telecommunications industry
and changes in computers.) This perhaps is the single most difficult disparity
to bring into line for the professional military and information technology
established along the lines of big industry. It is for this reason that Americans
have a morbid sensitivity to the spread of all new military high technology
and even new civilian technology.

[4] There are also many people within the United States who are questioning
this. Colonel Allen Campen believes that "hastily adopting new tactics that
people do not fully understand and that have not been tested is risky" and
"quite possibly will turn a beneficial military revolution into a gamble
with national security." (United States Signal Magazine, July 1995).

[5] Even though the Joint Force Air Squadron Headquarters commanded by Air
Force General Charles Horner had to take orders from Schwarzkopf, in the
final analysis he received the most publicity during the Gulf War.

[6] Global Arrival, Global Power was the strategic plan of the U.S.
Air Force after the Cold War, published in June 1990 in White Paper format.
Six months later, the basic principle of this plan was tested and verified
in the Gulf War.

[7] See United States Army Magazine, December 1996, "Army and Air
Force Joint War."

[8] In 1997, the United States again proposed a new development strategy,
Global Participation - - The Plan for the United States Air Force in the
21st Century. "Our strategic plan can be summarized in one sentence:
'the United States Air Force will become the outstanding air and space force
in the world... it will be a global force enabling the United States to show
itself everywhere'." (See Global Participation -- The Plan for the United
States Air Force in the 21stCentury).

[9] Even though President Clinton announced the elimination of the "Star
Wars" plan, in reality the United States military has never relaxed the pace
of space militarization. Global Participation --21st Century United States
Air Force Concept especially points out that "the first step of this
revolutionary change is to turn the U.S. Air Force into an air and space
force, then to remold it into an air and space force." The sequence of these
changes has obviously embodied the core revisions. The space flight headquarters
is putting even more emphasis on the function of space flight troops
(specifically see United States Military Space Flight Troops and Unified
Space Flight Theory). In April 1998, the U.S. space flight headquarters
issued a long-range plan, "Tentative Plan For 2020," and advanced four war
concepts for military space flight -- space control, global war, total force
consolidation, and global cooperation. By 2020, space control must have achieved
the following five objectives: ensure entry into space; keep watch over space;
protect the space systems of the United States and its allies; prevent enemies
from utilizing the space systems of the United States and its allies; and
stop enemies from utilizing space systems. (See Modern Military Affairs,
1998, No. 10, pp. 10-11.)

[10] "The White Paper, 'From Sea to Land', issued in 1992 by the Navy and
Navy ground forces, marks changes in the core and emphasis of strategy...
emphasis on naval implementation of forward deployment, this is the most
essential difference reflected between 'Forward Position... From Sea to Land'
and 'From Sea to Land'." (Navy Admiral J.M. Boorda, Marine Corps
Magazine, March 1995) This admiral also bluntly demanded the "Navy's
preference in budgetary matters."

[11] See the U.S. Department of Defense's National Defense Report for the
fiscal year 1998.

[12] See The Gulf War -- Final Report of the U.S. Department of Defense to
Congress and Appendix 6.

[13] McNamara, who went from president of the Ford Motor Company to head
of the Department of Defense, introduced the business accounting system of
private enterprise and the concept of "cost comparison" to the United States
military. He has made the forces learn how to spend less money when purchasing
weapons, but they have other standards for how to fight. "The Department
of Defense must achieve the following objective: exchange our country's security
for the least amount of risk, least amount of expenditure, and, in the event
of a entering a war, the least number of casualties." (McNamara, Looking
Back on the Tragedy and the Lessons of the Vietnam War, pp. 27-29)

[14] Colonel Xiaochaersi Denglapu [transliteration as printed 1420 2686 1422
2448 6772 2139 2528] points out that "casualties are an effective way to
weaken America's strength... For this reason, enemies can bring about our
casualties by dashing ahead recklessly without regard to losses or by achieving
a blind tactical victory." ("Analysis From the Standpoint of the Enemy
'Unification Concept for 2010'," Joint Force Quarterly, 1997-1998
Fall/Winter).

[16] "What Kind of Army Does the U.S. Army Need in the 21st Century?" Xiao'en
Neile [transliteration as printed 5135 1869 0355 0519] in Army Times,
October 16 1995, reviews this issue in detail.

[17] According to the United States Army Times, "After five years
of analysis, study, and military internal discussion, Army authorities in
the end finally formulated a new establishment for armored units and mechanized
mobile units. The new plan is called 'The 21st Century Establishment'. ...a
support headquarters composed of troop units, one armored division, two
mechanized mobile units, artillery units (brigade level), one aviation unit,
and one unit for rear services management and support. The entire division
consists of 15,719 men (containing 417 reserve duty personnel)." The personnel
putting this establishment together explain that "this newly planned
establishment does not count as a revolutionary establishment... actually
it is seen as a relatively conservative establishment." (See Army Times,
June 22, 1998, Jimu Taisiwen [transliteration as printed 0679 1191 3141 2448
2429].)

[18] See John R Brinkerhoff, "The Brigade-based New Army," Parameter
Quarterly, Winter 1997.

[19] For the detailed viewpoint of the book Break Localized Fronts,
see the article by Xiao'en Neile in the United States Army Times,
June 9 1997.

[20] In order to suit the needs of nuclear war and to try to enable troops
to carry out combat in the nuclear battlefield as well as enable survivability,
in 1957 the U.S. Army reorganized the atomic divisions with the group divisions.
The entire division was between 11,000 and 14,600 men, divided into five
combat groups with strong motorization, and all with tactical nuclear weapons.
However, this division's attack capability on a non-nuclear battlefield was
relatively low.

[21] For the U.S. Air Force expeditionary force concept, see the article
by Air Force Brigadier General William Looney in Air Power Journal,
Winter 1996.

[22] Just as the Head of the Naval War Office, Kaiersuo [transliteration
as printed 0418 1422 4792], and Army Commander Wangdi [transliteration as
printed 5345 6611] said, under the circumstances of the continual cutting
of military spending and fewer and fewer bases abroad, "the United States
needs a unified combat force that is relatively small in scale but rapidly
deployed and easy to assemble and train." (May 1993, Naval Institute
Journal) For the "Naval Expeditionary Force," see Marine Corps
Magazine, March 1995.

[23] See November 1995, Sea Power, "From Over the Horizon to Over
the Beach": "More Than Expected Budget Funds -- The U.S. Congress recently
agreed to allocate funds in the fiscal year 1996 to build the seventh multi-use
amphibious attack vessel, making the Navy very happy. Because of budgetary
limitations, the U.S. Navy plans to wait until 2001 to apply for allocation
for this ship... the Navy originally decided to put off requesting allocation
to build the first LPD-17 amphibious dock transport until the 1998 fiscal
year rather than 1996. However, what exceeded expectations was that Congress
voted to approve allocation of US $974 million for this warship."

[24] In 1993, the United States Report on the Complete Investigation of
Defense proposed, "The following troop 'package' is enough to handle
a large-scale regional conflict: four to five Army units; four to five ground
force expeditionary units; 10 Air Force combat mechanized forces; 100 Air
Force heavy bombers; four to five Naval warship combat troops; special combat
forces... other than this, we have proposed a new concept for troops abroad
- 'self-adapted special establishment unified troops'. According to the
requirements of the battle zone command, it is organized from specially
designated Air Force troops, ground troops, and special type combat troops
and Navy troops."

[25] For the "Joint Doctrine for 2010" put forward in 1996 by the United
States joint military meeting, see Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996. In
the Winter 1996 edition of Joint Force Quarterly, Naval War Commander
Johnson and Air Force Chief of Staff Fogleman both expressed support for
the "Joint Doctrine for 2010." Army Chief of Staff Reimer also immediately
put forward the "Army Concept for 2010" in response to the "Joint Doctrine
for 2010."

[26] See the article, "Reform Will Not Be Smooth Sailing," by Commander Huofuman
[transliteration as printed 7202 1133 2581] in the United States Naval
Institute Journal, January 1998.

[27] There is a detailed introduction to "Total Dimensional Warfare" in the
1997 World Military Almanac. (pp 291-294)

[28] According to the article, "Changes to the Newly Published Draft of
'Essentials of War'," by Xiaoen Neile in the United States Army Times,
August 18, 1997.

[29] There probably is only the article, "A Military Theoretical Revolution:
The Various Mutually Active Dimensions of War," by Antuli'ao Aiqieweiliya
[transliteration as printed 1344 0956 0448 1159 1002 0434 4850 6849 0068],
that has pointed out that the "various dimensions" of war should not be such
things as length, breadth, and depth indicated in geometric and space theory.
Instead, it is such factors that are intimately related to war as politics,
society, technology, combat, and logistics. It is too bad, however, that
he still centers on the military axis to look at war and has not formed a
breakthrough in war denotation.

[30] At the Strategy Conference held by the United States Army War College
in April 1996, Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley wrote a paper for a
report entitled 21st Century China: Strategic Partner... or Opponent. The
conclusion was: "In at least the first 25 years of the next century, China
will be unable to carry out a military revolution." (See the Foreign Military
Data of the Military Science Academy Foreign Military Research Department,
June 1997.)

Therefore, soldiers do not have a constant position, water does not have
a constant shape, and to be able to attain victory in response to the changes
of the enemy is called miraculous. -Sun Zi

The direction of warfare is an art similar to a physician seeing a patient.
-Fu Le

The expression of "military revolution" is as fashionable as Jordan's NBA
fans. Aside from the appearance of each new thing having its factors of
necessity, I am afraid that even more essential is that it is related to
Americans being adept at creating fashions. The Americans who have always
liked to hold a leading position in the world in terms of various questions
are very good at putting pretty packaging on each perspective thing and then
afterwards dumping it on the whole world. Even though many nations have been
anxious about and resisted the invasion of American culture, yet most have
followed suit and completely imitated their views in terms of the issue of
the military revolution. The results are not difficult to predict, and so
when the Americans catch a cold, the entire world sneezes. Because Perry,
the former Secretary of the Department of Defense of the United States,
emphasized stealth technology and was renowned as the "father of the stealth,"
when answering the question, "what have been the important achievements and
theoretical breakthroughs in the military revolution of the United States"
that was posed by a visiting scholar from China, he answered without thinking,
"it is naturally stealth and information technology." Perry's answer represented
the mainstream view of American military circles -- the military revolution
is the revolution in military technology. From the view of those like Perry,
it is only necessary to resolve the problem from the technical standpoint
of allowing the soldiers in front of the mountain to know "what was in back
of the mountain" and then this is equivalent to accomplishing this military
revolution. [1] Observing, considering, and resolving problems from the point
of view of technology is typical American thinking. Its advantages and
disadvantages are both very apparent, just like the characters of Americans.
This type of idea which equates the technology revolution with the military
revolution was displayed through the form of the Gulf War and had a powerful
impact and effect on the militaries throughout the world. There were hardly
any people who were able to maintain sufficient calm and clarity within this
situation, and naturally there could also not be any people who discovered
that the misunderstanding begun by the Americans is now causing a
misunderstanding by the entire world of a widespread global revolution. The
slogan of "building the military with high technology" is like a typhoon
of the Pacific Ocean, wherein it lands in more and more countries [2], and
even China, which is on the western coast of the Pacific, also appears to
have splashed up a reverberation during the same period.

It cannot be denied that the military technology revolution is the cornerstone
of the military revolution, and yet it is unable to be viewed as the entirety
of the military revolution, for at best it is the first step of this wild
whirlwind entering the course. The highest embodiment and final completion
of the military revolution is summed up in the revolution of military thought,
for it cannot stay on this mundane level of the transformation of military
technology and system formulation. The revolution in military thought is,
in the final analysis, a revolution in fighting forms and methods. The revolution
of military technology is fine as is the reform of the formulated system,
but their final results are based upon changes in fighting forms and methods.
Only the completion of this change will be able to signify the maturation
of the military revolution. [3] If the revolution of military technology
is called the first stage of the military revolution, then we are now in
the essentially important second stage of this revolution.

Approaching the completion of the revolution of military technology is to
a very large degree a foreshadowing of the beginning of the new stage, which
also to a very great extent presents problems in carrying out ideological
work in the first stage: while the revolution of military technology has
allowed one to be able to select measures within a larger range, it has also
made it so that one is threatened by these measures within the same range
(this is because the monopolizing of one type of technology is far more difficult
than inventing a type of technology). These threats have never been like
they are today because the measures are diverse and infinitely changing,
and this really gives one a feeling of seeing the enemy behind every tree.
Any direction, measure, or person always possibly becomes a potential threat
to the security of a nation, and aside from being able to clearly sense the
existence of the threat, it is very difficult for one to be clear about the
direction from which the threat is coming.

For a long time both military people and politicians have become accustomed
to employing a certain mode of thinking, that is, the major factor posing
a threat to national security is the military power of an enemy state or
potential enemy state. However, the wars and major incidents which have occurred
during the last ten years of the 20th century have provided to us in a calm
and composed fashion proof that the opposite is true: military threats are
already often no longer the major factors affecting national security. Even
though they are the same ancient territorial disputes, nationality conflicts,
religious clashes, and the delineation of spheres of power in human history,
and are still the several major agents of people waging war from opposite
directions, these traditional factors are increasingly becoming more intertwined
with grabbing resources, contending for markets, controlling capital, trade
sanctions, and other economic factors, to the extent that they are even becoming
secondary to these factors. They comprise a new pattern which threatens the
political, economic and military security of a nation or nations. This pattern
possibly does not have the slightest military hue viewed from the outside,
and thus they have been called by certain observers "secondary wars" or
"analogous wars." [4]

However, the destruction which they do in the areas attacked are absolutely
not secondary to pure military wars. In this area, we only need mention the
names of lunatics such as George Soros, bin Laden, Escobar, [Chizuo] Matsumoto,
and Kevin Mitnick [5]. Perhaps people already have no way of accurately pointing
out when it first began that the principal actors starting wars were no longer
only those sovereign states, but Japan's Shinrikyo, the Italian Mafia, extremist
Muslim terrorist organizations, the Columbian or "Golden New Moon" drug cartel,
underground figures with malicious intent, financiers who control large amounts
of powerful funds, as well as psychologically unbalanced individuals who
are fixed on a certain target, have obstinate personalities, and stubborn
characters, all of whom can possibly become the creators of a military or
non-military war. The weapons used by them can be airplanes, cannons, poison
gas, bombs, biochemical agents, as well as computer viruses, net browsers,
and financial derivative tools. In a word, all of the new warfare methods
and strategic measures which can be provided by all of the new technology
may be utilized by these fanatics to carry out all forms of financial attacks,
network attacks, media attacks, or terrorist attacks. Most of these attacks
are not military actions, and yet they can be completely viewed as or equal
to warfare actions which force other nations to satisfy their own interests
and demands. These have the same and even greater destructive force than
military warfare, and they have already produced serious threats different
from the past and in many directions for our comprehensible national security.

Given this situation, it is only necessary to broaden the view slightly,
wherein we will be able to see that national security based upon regionalism
is already outmoded. The major threat to national security is already far
from being limited to the military aggression of hostile forces against the
natural space of one's country. In terms of the extent of the drop in the
national security index, when we compare Thailand and Indonesia, which for
several months had currency devaluations of several tens of percentage points
and economies near bankruptcy, with Iraq, which suffered the double containment
of military attacks and economic boycott, I fear there was not much difference.
Even the United States, which is the only superpower which has survived after
the Cold War, has also realized that the strongest nation is often the one
with the most enemies and the one threatened the most. In the National Defense
Reports of the United States for several consecutive fiscal years, aside
from listing "the strong regional nations hostile to American interests"
in order of ten major threats, they also consider "terrorism, subversive
activities and anarchistic conditions which threaten the stability of the
federal government, threats to American prosperity and economic growth, illegal
drug trade, and international crimes" as threats to the United States. As
a result, they have expanded the multi-spatial search range of possible threats
to security. [6] Actually, it is not only the United States but all nations
which worship the view of modern sovereignty that have already unconsciously
expanded the borders of security to a multiplicity of domains, including
politics, economics, material resources, nationalities, religion, culture,
networks, geography, environment, and outer space, etc. [7] This type of
"extended domain view" is a premise for the survival and development of modern
sovereign nations as well as for their striving to have influence in the
world. By contrast, the view of using national defense as the main target
of security for a nation actually seems a bit outmoded, and at the least
is quite insufficient. Corresponding to the "extended domain view" should
be the new security concept of omnibearing inclusion of national interests.
What it focuses on is certainly not limited to the issue of national security
but rather brings the security needs in many areas including the political
security, economic security, cultural security, and information security
of the nation into one's own target range. This is a "large security view"
which raises the traditional territorial domain concept to the view of the
interest domain of the nation.

The increased load of this type of large security view brings with it
complications of the target as well as the means and methods for realizing
the target. As a result, the national strategy for ensuring the realization
of national security targets, namely, what is generally called grand strategy,
also necessitates carrying out adjustments which go beyond military strategies
and even political strategies. Such a strategy takes all things into
consideration that are involved in each aspect of the security index of the
interests of the entire nation, as well as superimposes political (national
will, values, and cohesion) and military factors on the economy, culture,
foreign relations, technology, environment, natural resources, nationalities,
and other parameters before one can draw out a complete "extended domain"
which superposes both national interests and national security - a large
strategic situation map.

Anyone who stands in front of this situation map will suddenly have a feeling
of lamenting one's smallness before the vast ocean: how can one type of uniform
and singular means and method possibly be used to realize such a voluminous
and expansive area, such complex and even self-conflicting interests, and
such intricate and even mutually repelling targets? For example, how can
the military means of "blood letting politics" spoken of by Clausewitz be
used to resolve the financial crisis of Southeast Asia? Or else how can hackers
who come and go like shadows on the Internet be dealt with using the same
type of method? The conclusion is quite evident that only possessing a sword
to deal with national security on a large visible level of security is no
longer sufficient. One log cannot prop up a tottering building. The security
vault of a modern national building is far from being able to be supported
by the singular power of one pillar. The key to its standing erect and not
collapsing lies in whether it can to a large extent form composite force
in all aspects related to national interest. Moreover, given this type of
composite force, it is also necessary to have this type of composite force
to become the means which can be utilized for actual operations. This should
be a "grand warfare method" which combines all of the dimensions and methods
in the two major areas of military and non-military affairs so as to carry
out warfare. This is opposite of the formula for warfare methods brought
forth in past wars.

As soon as this type of grand warfare method emerged, it was then necessary
to bring forth a totally new form of warfare which both includes and surpasses
all of the dimensions influencing national security. However, when we analyze
its principle, it is not complex and is merely a simple matter of combination.
"The Way produced the one, the one produced the two, the two produced the
three, and the three produced the ten thousand things." Whether it is the
two or the three or the ten thousand things, it is always the result of
combination. With combination there is abundance, with combination there
are a myriad of changes, and with combination there is diversity. Combination
has nearly increased the means of modern warfare to the infinite, and it
has basically changed the definition of modern warfare bestowed by those
in the past: warfare carried out using modern weapons and means of operation.
This means that while the increase of the measures shrinks the effects of
weapons, it also amplifies the concept of modern warfare. I am afraid that
most of the old aspirations of gaining victory through military means when
confronted with a war, wherein the selection of means to the range of the
battlefield is greatly extended, will fall into emptiness and "be marginally
within the mountain" [zhi yuan shen zai ci shan zhong 0662 4878 6500 0961
2974 1472 0022]. What all those military people and politicians harboring
wild ambitions of victory must do is to expand their field of vision, judge
the hour and size up the situation, rely upon adopting the major warfare
method, and clear away the miasma of the traditional view of war -- Go to
the mountain and welcome the sunrise.

Footnotes

[1] When Senior Colonel Chen Bojiang, a research fellow at the Institute
of Military Science, was visiting scholars in the United States, he visited
a group of very important persons in the American military. Chen Bojiang
asked Perry: "What are the most important achievements and breakthroughs
that have been brought on by the American military revolution?" Perry answered:
"The most important breakthrough is of course the stealth technology. It
is a tremendous breakthrough. However, I want to say that in a completely
different area something of equal importance is the invention of information
technology. Information technology has resolved the problem which has needed
to be resolved by soldiers for several centuries, namely: what is behind
the next mountain? The progress on solving this problem has been very slow
for several centuries. The progress of technology has been extremely rapid
over the last ten years, wherein there have been revolutionary methods for
resolving this problem." (National Defense University Journal, 1998,
No. 11, p. 44) As a professor in the College of Engineering of Stanford
University, Perry is naturally more willing to observe and understand the
military revolution from the technical viewpoint. He is no doubt a proponent
of technology in the military revolution.

[2] It was pointed out in the "Summary of the Military Situation" in the
1997 World Military Yearbook that: "A special breakthrough point in
the military situation in 1995-1996 was that some major nations began to
stress "using high technology to build the military" within the framework
of the quality building of the military. The United States used the realization
of battlefield digitization as the goal to establish the policy of using
high technology to build the military. Japan formulated the new self-defense
troop reorganization and outfitting program and required the establishment
of a "highly technological crack military force." Germany brought forth the
De'erpei [transliteration as printed 1795 1422 5952] Report seeking to realize
breakthroughs in eight sophisticated techniques. France proposed a new reform
plan so as to raise the "technical quality" of military troops. England and
Russia have also taken actions; some medium and small nations have also actually
purchased advanced weapons attempting to have the technical level of the
military "get in position in one step." (1997 World Military Affairs
Yearbook, People's Liberation Army Press, 1997, p. 2)

[3] Aside from the view which equates the military technology revolution
with the military revolution, many people are even more willing to view the
military revolution as the combined product of new technology, the new
establishment of the military, and new military thought. For example, Steven
Maizi [transliteration as printed 7796 5417] and Thomas Kaiweite [transliteration
as printed 0418 4850 3676] said in their report entitled Strategy and
the MilitaryRevolution: From Theory to Policy: "The so-called
military revolution is composed of the simultaneous and mutually promoting
changes in the areas of military technology, weapon systems, combat methods
and the troop organization system, wherein there is a leap (or sudden change)
of the fighting efficiency of the military." (Research report of the Strategic
Institute of the American Army Military College entitled Strategy and
the Military Revolution: From Theory to Policy) It is also considered
in a research report of the American Research Center for Strategy and
International Issues related to the military revolution that the military
revolution is the combined result of many factors. Toffler equates the military
revolution with the substitution of civilization being somewhat large and
impractical.

[4] See Zhao Ying's The New View of National Security.

[5] George Soros is a financial speculator; bin Laden is an Islamic terrorist;
Escobar is a notorious distant drug smuggler; [Chizuo] Matsumoto is the founder
of the heterodox "Aum Shinrikyo" in Japan; and Kevin Mitnick is the renowned
computer hacker.

[6] The Secretary of Defense of the United States mentioned the various threats
confronting the United States in each National Defense Report for
the 1996, 1997, and 1998 fiscal years. However, this type of wide angle view
is actually not a standard of observation which Americans can self-consciously
maintain. In May of 1997, it was pointed out in "The Global Security
Environment," the first section of the Four Year Defense Investigation
Report published by the Department of Defense of the United States, that
the security of the United States will be facing a series of challenges.
First will be the threats coming from Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, and the
Korean Peninsula; second is the spread of sensory technology such as nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons as well as projection technology, information
warfare technology, stealth technology, etc.; third is terrorist activity,
illegal drug trade, crimes by international organizations, and out-of-control
immigration; fourth is the threat of large-scale antipersonnel weapons. "Nations
which will be able to rival the United States will not possibly appear prior
to the year 2015, and yet after 2015, there will possibly appear a regionally
strong nation or a global enemy well-matched in strength. Some consider that
even if the prospects of Russia and China are unforeseeable, yet it is possible
that they could become this type of enemy." This report, which is a joint
effort by the office of the Secretary of the Department of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is naturally still wallowing in the so-called military
threat which is half-real and half-imaginary. In analyzing the threats of
the 1997 United States' National Military Strategy formed from this
report, there is a special section which mentions "unknown factors" and shows
that the Americans are anxious and fearful of future threats.

[7] Xiaomohan Malike [transliteration as printed 1420 5459 3352 7456 0448
0344] of Australia pointed out that the seven tendencies which will influence
national security during the 21st century are: globalized economy; the globalized
spread of technology; the globalized tide of democracy; polarized international
politics; changes in the nature of international systems; changes in security
concepts; and changes in the focal points of conflicts. The combined effects
of these tendencies form the sources of the two categories of conflict
threatening security in the Asian-Pacific Region. The first category is the
source of traditional conflicts: the struggle for hegemony by large nations;
the expansion of nationalism by successful nations; disputes over territorial
and maritime rights and interests; economic competition; and the proliferation
of large-scale destructive weapons. The second category is the new sources
of future conflicts: nationalism (racism) in declining nations; conflicts
in cultural religious beliefs; the spread of lethal light weapons; disputes
over petroleum, fishing, and water resources; the tide of refugees and population
flows; ecological disasters; and terrorism. All of these pose multiple threats
to nations in the 21st century. The view of this Australian regarding national
security is slightly higher than that of the American officials. (See the
United States' Comparative Strategies, 1997, No. 16, for details.)

The great masters of warfare techniques during the 21st century will be those
who employ innovative methods to recombine various capabilities so as to
attain tactical, campaign and strategic goals. - Yier Tierfude

Everything is changing. We believe that the age of a revolution in operating
methods, wherein all of the changes involved in the explosion of technology,
the replacement of weapons, the development of security concepts, the adjustment
of strategic targets, the obscurity of the boundaries of the battlefield,
and the expansion of the scope and scale of non-military means and non-military
personnel involved in warfare are focused on one point, has already arrived.
This revolution is not seeking operating methods which coordinate with each
type of change, but rather is finding a common operating method for all of
these changes. In other words, finding a new methodology which uses one method
to deal with the myriad changes of future wars. [1]

Flicking Away the Cover of the Clouds of War

Who has seen tomorrow's war? No one. However, its various scenes have already
passed through the mouths of many prophets and have been frozen on the
[sic] our mental screens like a vulgar cartoon. From the strangling
warfare of satellites in space orbits to the angular pursuits of nuclear
submarines in the deep areas of the oceans; from the precision bombs released
by stealth bombers to the cruise missiles fired from a Zeus Shield Cruiser,
they cover the heavens and the earth, and they can be said to be too numerous
to enumerate. The most representative of them is the description of a field
maneuver exercise with troops carried out by a digitized unit of the American
military at the Fort Irwin National Training Center:

With the command center's digitized units acting as the "blue troops," the
computer was continuously inputting and processing information transmitted
from satellites and "Joint Star" aircraft; the early warning planes monitored
the entire air space; the fighter bombers guided by satellites and early
warning planes used precision missiles to attack targets; the armored forces
and armored helicopters alternated initiating three-dimensional attacks against
the enemy; the infantry soldiers used laptop computers to receive commands
and used automatic weapons fired with sighting devices carried on helmets;
and the most splendid scene was actually one soldier who successively attacked
five mice and led the strong fire power of his own artillery and airmen towards
a group of enemy tanks on another side of the ridge. His computer screen
displayed [the results]: the enemy tanks had already been hit.

Called the "21st Century Army" and "blue troops" with fully digitized equipment
and conducted in the Mojave Desert, the final result of this exercise was
one win, one draw, and six losses, but the "21st Century Army" and "blue
troops" lost to the traditionally equipped "red troops." However, this did
not prevent Secretary of Defense Cohen from announcing in a news release
after the conclusion of the exercise that: I consider that you are all witnessing
a military revolution here. . . . [2]

It is obvious that the military revolution referred to by Cohen is identical
to the warfare understood by those prophets that we previously mentioned.

The winner always likes to coast on the path of victory. Like the French
military which relied upon climbing out of the trenches at Verdun to win
World War One and hoped that the next war would be carried out the same at
the Maginot Line, the American military which won a victory in the Gulf War
also hopes to continue the "Desert Storm" type addiction during the 21st
century. Although each calculation won glory like that of Schwartzkopf, all
of the American generals understand that it is not possible for wars in the
next century to be simple replays of the Gulf War. It was for this reason
that they began to carry out replacements of the weaponry of the United States'
military even before the smoke cleared, and they also made adjustments to
the original combat theories and organizational system. Military people
throughout the world saw the framework of the future American military and
the concept of American style warfare from The Concept of Joint Forces
in the Year 2010 to The Army of the Future. Taking into consideration
the loftiness of the hall, then this is quite out of the ordinary [that is,
the superiority of the American military force, like a majestic hall, is
overwhelming]. It was little imagined that the blind spot in the visual field
of the Americans would just appear here.

To date, the trends of the development of the weaponry of the United States
military, the changes in defense policies, the evolution of combat theories,
the renewal of ordinances and regulations, and the views of high-level commanders
are all following along quickly on one path. They affirm that military means
are the final means for resolving future conflicts, and the disputes between
all nations will ultimately end up with two large armies meeting on the
battlefield.

Given this premise, the American military is requiring itself to nearly
simultaneously win wars in two battle areas, and they have done a great deal
of preparation for this. [3] The problem is who is there in the Pentagon,
like the former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Bower, who so
clearly recognized that the United States was focusing most of its energies
in again fighting a "cold type war which would never come again" and was
very possibly using its own strength in the wrong direction? [4] This is
because the international trend at the end of the 20th century is clearly
displayed. As practically existing, the age of wars being a matter of moving
weapons and soldiers has still not been translated into history, but as a
concept it has already begun to noticeably fall behind. Following the increase
in the number of international treaties limiting the arms race and the
proliferation of weapons, the United Nations and regional international
organizations have enlarged their intervention power in local wars and regional
conflicts and relatively decreased the military threat to national security;
on the contrary, the springing up of large amounts of new high technology
will actually greatly increase the possibility of non-military measures
threatening national security, and the international community which is at
a loss of what to do upon being confronted with non-military threats with
such destruction no less than that of a war at the least lacks necessary
and effective limitations. This has objectively accelerated the occurrence
of non-military wars, and at the same time it has also resulted in the old
concepts and systems of national security being on the brink of collapse.
Aside from the increasingly intense terrorist attacks, as well as the hacker
wars, financial wars and computer virus wars which will dominate the future,
there are also the present various types of "new concept wars" to which it
is difficult to fix a name and are already sufficient to have the security
view of "resisting the enemy outside of one's national gate" become something
of the past in the space of an evening.

It is not the case that American military circles have not noticed this advantage
of eliminating the enemy against military and non-military threats (we have
already referred above to several National Defense Reports for several fiscal
years by the Defense Department of the United States), and yet they have
pushed the resolution of the latter problem on to the politicians and the
Central Intelligence Agency so that they have retreated from the existing
all dimensional wars, non-combatant military operations, and other new views.
They have tightened up more and more so that they have shrunk into a watching
tree hung full with various types of sophisticated weapon fruits waiting
alone for a muddle-headed and idiotic rabbit to come and knock into it. However,
after Saddam knocked himself dizzy at the bottom of this tree, who else is
there who would become the second type of this rabbit?

Given their state of mind of "looking around in the dark with daggers drawn,"
the American soldiers who had lost their opponent due to the collapse of
the former Soviet Union are vehemently searching for a reason not to allow
themselves to be "unemployed." This is because from the generals to the common
soldiers, from the spear of attack to the shield of defense, from major
strategies to minor methods of operation, everything that the American military
does is done in preparation of gaining victory in a major war. It should
not be said that as soon as there were no longer two armies facing off against
each other that American military circles and even the American Congress
would produce an empty feeling at having lost their goal. The result was
that without an enemy, one still had to be created. Therefore, even if it
is a tiny area such as Kosovo, they cannot pass up an opportunity to try
out their frosty blades. American military circles, which are digging deeper
and deeper into the insoluble problem of either using force or not using
any at all, seems, after stretching their own tentacles from war regions
to the realm of non-combat military actions, to no longer be willing to extend
themselves to a far distance, and are now in the realm of forming non-military
warfare. This is possibly owing to a lack of sensitivity to new things and
also possibly a result of work habit, and even more so possibly due to
limitations in thinking. Regardless of the reason, the American soldier always
locks his own field of vision in the range covered by war clouds, and this
is an indisputable fact.

Even though the United States bears the brunt of being faced with the threat
of this type of non-military war and has been the injured party time after
time, yet what is surprising is that such a large nation unexpectedly does
not have a unified strategy and command structure to deal with the threat.
What makes one even more so wonder whether to laugh or cry is that unexpectedly
they have 49 departments and offices responsible for anti-terrorist activities,
but there is very little coordination and cooperation among them. Other nations
are not that much better than the United States in this area. The allocations
and basic investment directions of various nations for security needs are
still only limited to the military and intelligence and political departments,
but there are few and pitiful investments in other directions. Again using
the United States as an example, it uses seven billion dollars in funds for
anti-terrorism which is only 1/25 of the US$250 billion military expenditure.

Regardless of how each nation turns a deaf ear to the pressing threat of
non-military warfare, this objective fact is encroaching upon the existence
of mankind one step at a time, expanding and spreading based on its own pattern
and speed. It is not necessary to point it out as people will discover that
when mankind focuses more attention on calling for peace and limiting wars,
many of the origins are the things in our peaceful lives which all begin
one after another to change into lethal weapons which destroy peace. Even
those golden rules and precious precepts which we have always upheld also
begin to reveal a contrary tendency and become a means for some nations to
be able to launch attacks against other nations or certain organizations
and individuals to do so against the entire society. It is similar to [the
following scenarios]: when there is a computer then there is a computer virus,
and when there is currency there is monetary speculation, freedom of faith
and religious extremism and heretical religions, common human rights and
national sovereignty, free economics and trade protection, national autonomy
and global unification, national enterprises versus transnational corporations,
information liberalization and information boundaries, and the sharing of
knowledge and the monopoly of technology. It is possible for each field that
at any moment tomorrow there will break out a war where different groups
of people are fighting at close quarters. The battlefield is next to you
and the enemy is on the network. Only there is no smell of gunpowder or the
odor of blood.

However, it is war as before, because it accords with the definition of modern
warfare: forcing the enemy to satisfy one's own interests. It is very obvious
that none of the soldiers in any one nation possesses sufficient mental
preparation against this type of new war which completely goes beyond military
space. However, this is actually a severe reality which all soldiers must
face.

The new threats require new national security views, and new security views
then necessitate soldiers who first expand their fields of vision prior to
expanding their victories. This is a matter of wiping away the long narrow
cloud covering of war cast over one's eyes.

The Destruction of Rules and the Domain of Losing Effectiveness

As an extreme means for resolving conflicts of survival and interests, war
has always been the beast truly tamed by mankind. On the one hand, it is
the street cleaner of the ecological chain of society, and on the other hand,
it is also the directly-formed threat facing the survival of mankind. How
can we order it about without being harmed by it? Over the last several thousand
years, and especially in the 20th century, during the intervals between the
fires of war, there has always been one matter pursued: making efforts to
lock the beast in the cage. It is for this reason that people have formulated
innumerable treaties and rules. From the famous Geneva Convention to the
United Nations and to the present, they have begun to continuously make various
resolutions concerning war, erected one railing after another on the roads
of crazy and bloody wars, and have wanted to utilize international laws and
regulations to control the harm of war to mankind to the lowest level, from
specifically not allowing the use biochemical weapons, not allowing the
indiscriminate killing of civilians, not allowing the mistreatment of prisoners,
and limiting the use of land mines, etc. to the widespread opposition to
the use of military force or the threat of the use of force in handling national
relations issues. All of these regulations are gradually becoming accepted
by each nation. The most commendable of these is a series of treaties on
nuclear non-proliferation, the banning of nuclear testing, bilateral and
multilateral reduction of nuclear weapons, etc. which have to date resulted
in mankind avoiding entrance into a nuclear winter. At the conclusion of
the Cold War, the entire world was overjoyed and considered that a "fearful
peace" was being entered from this. After Schwartzkopf used a "storm" fist
to down Saddam on the Gulf fighting stage, President Bush was elated with
success: "The new order of the world has already withstood its first test."
He was like Chamberlain returning from Munich announcing that mankind will
"get together in a world having the hope of peace." What was the result?
Like Chamberlain, he also boasted too early. [5]

Regardless of whether it is the end of the Cold War or the Gulf War, neither
was able to bring about the promises of politicians to the world and the
new international order anticipated by all of mankind. The collapse of the
polarized world resulted in the beasts of local wars roaring out of their
cages one by one drenching the nations and regions of Rwanda, Somalia, Bohei,
Chechen, Congo and Kosovo in pools of blood. People had again discovered
by this time how the efforts for peace over several thousand years could
collapse at one single blow!

The appearance of this type of situation is related to the practical attitude
embraced by each nation concerning the establishment of international rules.
Whether or not each nation acknowledges the rules often depends on whether
or not they are beneficial to themselves. Small nations hope to use the rules
to protect their own interests, while large nations attempt to utilize the
rules to control other nations. When the rules are not in accord with the
interests of one's own nation, generally speaking, the breaking of the rules
by small nations can be corrected by large nations in the name of enforcers
of the law. However, when large nations break the rules, for example the
United States enforcing supranational laws in Panama, wherein it grabbed
the head of another nation and brought him to be tried in their own nation.
Another example is India's disregard of the nuclear test ban treaty, wherein
it swallowed up the Himalayan nation of Sikkim, which was a similar action
to Iraq swallowing up Kuwait. The international community time and again
only sighed in despair, being at a loss of what to do. [6] However, in any
matter, there is always its unbeatable rival and natural enemy which is aptly
reflected in the Chinese popular saying: brine forms the bean curd, and one
thing always overcomes another. In the international community, the participation
by large nations, when facing the weak and powerless, in the formulation
and the utilization of rules as well as the disregard and even destruction
of rules when the rules are not advantageous to them, form a fresh contrast
with the springing up of those non-state forces who do not acknowledge any
rules and specialize in taking the existing national order as their goal
of destruction. As the natural enemy of the international community, and
especially large nations, while they threaten the survival of mankind, they
also produce minute effects on the balance of society and the ecology. In
other words, these non-state forces serve as a type of socially destructive
force which both destroys the normal international order and restrains the
destruction of the international community by those large nations. For example,
there were the warning intrusions of nameless hackers [7] to the web site
of the National Defense Ministry of India after it carried out nuclear
tests and the terrorist act by the rich Moslem Osama bin Laden because of
his dissatisfaction with the presence of the United States in the Middle
East. Even though it is still difficult for us now to delineate the positive
and negative effects of these actions, yet it can be determined that all
of these actions carry irresponsible and destructive characteristics which
disregard rules.

The direct result of the destruction of rules is that the domains delineated
by visible or invisible boundaries which are acknowledged by the international
community lose effectiveness. This is because all principals without national
power who employ non-military warfare actions to declare war against the
international community all use means that go beyond nations, regions and
measures. Visible national boundaries, invisible internet space, international
law, national law, behavioral norms, and ethical principles, have absolutely
no restraining effects on them.

They are not responsible to anyone, nor limited by any rules, and there is
no disgrace when it comes to the selection of targets, nor are there any
means which are not used. Owing to the surreptitious nature of their movements,
they have very strong concealment, create widespread damage because of their
extreme behavior, and appear unusually cruel as a result of their indiscriminate
attacks on civilians. All of this is also broadcast through real time via
continuous coverage by the modern media which very much strengthens the effects
of terrorism. When carrying out war with these people, there is no declaration
of war, no fixed battlefield, no face-to-face fighting and killing, and in
the majority of situations, there will be no gunpowder smoke, gun fire, and
spilling of blood. However, the destruction and injuries encountered by the
international community are in no way less than those of a military war.

Following the gradual fading out of the old terrorists who specialized in
kidnapping, assassination, and hijacking, new forces of terrorism quickly
appeared and very rapidly filled in the vacuum left by their predecessors.
During a short period of over ten years, they transformed from being persons
of nameless origins to world public nuisances, with the chief among them
being computer hackers. The popularization of personal computers, and especially
the formation of the internet, has resulted in the malicious acts of hackers
increasingly endangering the existing social order. The hackers we speak
of here refer to those network killers who steal information, delete and
change files, release viruses, transfer capital, and destroy programs on
the network. In order to differentiate them from the non-malicious hackers,
we should perhaps call the former "network bandits" or "network tyrants"
which would be much more accurate. Their powers of destroying the present
world are shocking. Early, in 1988, when the hackers were first beginning
their activities and people did not know anything about their danger, the
very small "worm" designed by Robert Morris completely paralyzed 6000 computers
of the military and civilian computer systems throughout the United States,
including the "Long-Range Planning Office" of the United States' Department
of Defense, the Research Center of the Rand Corporation, and Harvard University.
Afterwards, this type of event began to appear one after another in the internet
connections of nations and regions. Since the United States government began
to seriously attack network crimes in 1990, not only have hacker activities
not witnessed any decrease, but on the contrary, they have spread globally
and have the great force of a forest fire.

It is worth noting that following the "Information Warfare" ordinance of
the American military, which placed enemy nation armies or world opponents
on a par with non-approved users, inside personnel, terrorists, non-national
organizations, and foreign intelligence organizations as the six sources
of network threats, hackers with national or military backgrounds had already
begun to reveal clues. [8] This not only greatly strengthened the battle
formations of the hackers so that the actions of the disbanded and straggling
hackers quickly escalated into national (network tyrant) actions, it also
resulted in the increasing enlargement of the internet threat faced by all
nations (including those nations with national or military hackers), and
it becoming increasingly difficult to predict and guard against. The only
thing which could be predicted was that the damage of this type of threat
to the large network nation of the United States would certainly be greater
than for other nations. Faced with theses prospects, even J. Saiteerdou [as
printed 1049 3676 1422 6757], who is responsible for the investigation of
computer crimes in the FBI of the United States, said with both self-confidence
and worry: "Give me ten carefully chosen hackers, and within 90 days I would
then be able to have this nation lay down its arms and surrender."

When compared with "network bandits" -- these network terrorist hackers --
the terror of the bombs of bin Laden are closer to the traditional terrorism
in legacy. However, this does not prevent us from considering him to be within
the ranks of new terrorism. This is because aside from the religious or even
heterodox teaching background and tendency to oppose control by large nations,
from the person of bin Laden himself, we can see the shadows of those old
fighters who make loud and empty boasts, are so fond of the limelight, and
make use of light weapons and a single method, but in other areas they cannot
be spoken of in the same breath. Prior to the major bombings at the American
embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam which shocked the world, the name of
bin Laden was still not listed in the name list of the 30 terrorist organizations
published by the International Anti-Terrorist Organization, and even though
earlier he already had many murder cases attributed to him, he was only a
"nameless hero" in the Islamic world, owing to his having not boasted of
them. Even after the Americans had already launched cruise missiles at him
and issued an arrest warrant, he still repeatedly denied that he was personally
connected with the bombing cases. "Concealing oneself and shielding," having
weightier results, and unexpectedly gaining an undeserved reputation are
perhaps the first major characteristics of the new bin Laden type terrorist
organizations. In addition, having learned how to use economic means and
taking advantage of the loopholes in the free economics initiated by the
West, they set up management-type companies and banks and engage in large-scale
drug trafficking and smuggling, the resale of munitions, the printing of
large amounts of forged currency, and rely on the contributions of religious
followers to attain stable capital resources. [9] On this basis, the tentacles
of these new terrorist organizations extend to even wider areas, and the
means are also diversified, such as widely using religious and heretical
organizations to develop their own media for propaganda, setting up
anti-government militia organizations, etc. The easy accomplishment of raising
funds guarantees that they will be able to attain and master large amounts
of high technology means so that they will be able to kill even more people
with great ease. Even though the vast majority of the attacks they have launched
to date have been aimed at the rich nations and Western nations, especially
the large nations which have the capability to control other nations, yet
they are a common threat to the existing order, the destruction of commonly
acknowledged rules, and to the international community. It can be seen from
known conditions that these new developing terrorist organizations are merely
several black waves turning over within the new global terrorist activities.
It can be confirmed that there are even greater turbid currents which we
do not know about surging under the water surface.

Newly converging into this counter current are the international financial
speculators. Although there is still no one at present listing these immaculately
dressed and dapper fellows in the ranks of terrorists, yet in terms of their
actions and the calamitous consequences they have caused in England, Mexico
and Southeast Asia, none of those types, such as the "bandits" and bin Laden,
can even hold a candle to them. Taking the big financial crocodiles as
represented by Soros, on the strength of a daily business volume exceeding
US$120 billion in floating capital, he used financial derivative methods
as well as free economic regulations to repeatedly change his attitude and
play tricks to foment trouble, so as to bring about one financial upheaval
after another. As a result, the area of harmed nations gradually enlarged
from Southeast Asia to Russia and then to Japan, and finally to Europe and
the United States, which were watching from the sidelines and were also unable
to escape by sheer luck, so that the existing world financial system and
economic order were fundamentally shaken and it had already become another
new disaster threatening human society and international security. [10] The
typical characteristics of terrorism including being transnational, concealed,
without rules, and tremendously destructive, have given us reason to call
it financial terrorism.

Before the tremendous state apparatus, terrorists and their organizations
are perhaps not worth mentioning in terms of numbers of peoples and methods,
but in fact there is not one country which dares to look at them lightly.
The reason is that this is a group of maniacs which does not act according
to the rules. A terrorist organization which possesses nuclear weapons is
definitely much more dangerous than a nation with the same nuclear weapons.
The creed of bin Laden is "If I die, then I will also not let others live,"
and therefore, he would then stop at nothing, so that in order to kill over
ten Americans he would also drench several thousand innocent people in
a pool of blood. Soros's logic is "I entered the room to steal money
because your door was not locked." In this way, he does not have to be
responsible for destroying the economies of other nations and throwing the
political order of others into disarray.

For bin Laden who hides under the hills of Islamic fundamentalism, Soros
who conceals himself within the forests of free economics, and the computer
hackers who hide themselves in the green curtains of networks, no national
boundaries exist, and borders also are ineffective. What they want to do
is carry out wanton destruction within a regulated sphere and act wildly
and run amuck within an unregulated sphere. These new terrorist forces have
formed an unprecedented serious challenge to the existing world order, and
in turn they have made us doubt to a certain degree the logical production
of a fixed order. Perhaps those who check the destruction of rules and those
who revise the rules are both necessary. This is because any destruction
of rules always brings on new problems which need to be rigorously dealt
with. In an age when an old order is about to be removed, those in the lead
are frequently those who are the first to destroy the rules or those who
are the earliest to adapt to this situation. Naturally, in this respect,
the new terrorists have already walked to the head of the international
community.

The most ideal method of operation for dealing with an enemy who pays no
regard to the rules is certainly just being able to break through the rules.
Recently, in coming to grips with enemies which appear and disappear in the
domain of non-military warfare, the Americans have utilized cruise missiles,
the Hong Kong government has used foreign currency reserves and administrative
measures, and the British government has broken conventions so as to allow
their secret service organizations to "legally" assassinate the leaders of
foreign nations who they consider to be terrorists. This reveals an updating
of the rules and a changing of the methods of operation. However, it also
reveals the weaknesses of dullness in thinking and singleness in method.
It is said that the Americans have already decided to employ hacking methods
to search for and seal up the bank accounts of bin Laden in various nations,
so as to basically cut off his source of capital. This is no doubt a breakthrough
in method of operation which goes beyond the military domain. However, we
must also say that in this area, the new and old terrorists who consistently
uphold the principle of resorting to every conceivable means are still the
best teachers of each nation's government.

Cocktail in the Great Master's Cup

King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty three thousand years ago and Alexander the Great
over two thousand years ago definitely would not have known what a cocktail
was, and yet they were both masters of mixing "cocktails" on the battlefield.
This is because, like mixing a cocktail, they were adept at ingeniously combining
two or more battlefield factors together, throwing them into battle, and
gaining victories. 1+1 is the most elementary and also the most ancient
combination method. Long spears and round shields can prepare a soldier for
both attack and defense and give a basis for advancing and retreating; two
people comprise a unit, wherein "soldiers with long weapons are used for
defense and those with short weapons are used for holding positions," a pair
of soldiers coordinate with each other, and then form the smallest tactical
unit. [11] The knight Don Quixote and his attendant Sancho signify that the
separation of work of the general and the light soldier had already been
formed, and thus the team could set off on a long journey to dispel evil
for the imaginary princess. Such a simple combination embodies the profound
theory of infinite changes on the battlefield. From cold weapons to hot weapons
and then on to nuclear weapons and up to the combination of the so-called
high technology weapons of today, the musical instrument in the victorious
magical hand has always accompanied the entire history of warfare secretly
influencing the outcome of each war. King Wu attacked Zhuo with 300 military
vehicles, 3,000 brave warriors, and 45,000 armored soldiers which was far
less than the several hundred thousand foot soldiers of King Zhuo of the
Shang Dynasty. However, this small army composed of both vehicles and soldiers
became the cornerstone of the Zhou kingdom, because the proper combination
greatly strengthened the combat strength in the wilderness war and became
the evidence of the earliest combination war which we were able to find 3,120
years later. Given that this was the case in the East, the West was no exception.
The reason why Alexander was able to defeat a large army during one decisive
battle at Abeila was because he made adaptations just before going into battle,
wherein a linear pushing square matrix changed so that the opponent was taken
by surprise. His method was very simple. The position of the cavalry shifted
back and obliquely along the two flanks of the square matrix forming a "hollow
large square matrix," so that the flexibility of the cavalry and the stability
of the foot soldiers achieved the ideal combination in a unique battle array
wherein each developed their individual strengths most incisively. The result
was naturally that Alexander, whose military force was at a comparative
disadvantage, ultimately drank heartily the cup of victory. [12]

When perusing the military history of both East and West, we never find the
expression "combination" in any of the descriptions related to methods of
operation. However, all of the great masters of warfare throughout the ages
seem to have instinctively known this principle well. The King of Sweden
Gustav was the most highly praised military reformer at the beginning of
the firearms period. All of the reforms that he carried out in terms of battle
array and weapons deployment used the combination method. He very early realized
that the falling behind of the lancers and arranging them together in battle
array with the firearm soldiers allowed the former to be able to provide
cover for the later between shootings. This developed the strengths of each
to the greatest limits. He also often had mixed groupings of light cavalry,
heavy cavalry and firearm soldiers who took turns initiating charges against
the enemy's skirmish line under the heavy smoke of artillery fire. This king
was later called the "first great field artillery expert," and he understood
even better the functions and effects of artillery as the basis for engaging
in battles. He took the light artillery as a combination of "regimental
artillery" and infantry allowing the heavy artillery to independently form
an army, and the seemingly separately deployed light and heavy artillery
actually formed a perfectly integrated combination within the entire range
of the battlefield. It can truly be said that the effects of the artillery
were developed to the ultimate during that period. [13]

However, all of this occurred prior to the appearance of the expert of artillery
technique Napoleon. When compared with the short Corsican who pushed over
20,000 cannons on to the battlefield, the 200 guns in the hands of Gustav
can only be seen as "a small sorcerer in the presence of a great one." During
the period from 1793 to 1814, a total of 20 years, no one understood cannons
as completely as did Napoleon. No one was able to understand those under
his command more precisely than this commander, and naturally there was no
one who could fully combine the lethal force of artillery and the maneuverability
of cavalry, as well as the loyalty and bravery of Commander Davout and the
fierceness of Commander Murat to forge an offensive force which would make
all of their enemies flee at the very sight of them, and change the French
army into a fighting machine with which none in all of Europe could compete.
This machine was used from Austerlitz to Borodino to formulate the myth that
Napoleon won nearly every battle. [14]

General Schwartzkopf who created the miracle of a major battle in which only
over one hundred soldiers were lost cannot be considered to be on the great
master level. However, his luck appears to have been as good as all of the
masters of military techniques. Actually, what was really important was not
luck, but rather that this commander led a large modern army which, like
his predecessors, even more so gave importance to the combination of the
important elements of warfare. This is because during the 1990's the cards
which he held in his hand were many more than those held by his predecessors.
For him, the key to driving the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, restoring the life
line of oil to the West, and regenerating America's influence in the Middle
East, depended on how to ingenuously use the alliance, manipulate the media,
use economic blockades, and other methods, along with developing and bringing
together various armed services of the army, navy, air force, space, electronics,
etc. comprised by the militaries of over 30 nations, and thus jointly becoming
an iron fist to pound Saddam. He accomplished this and yet his opponent quite
shockingly was not at all aware of this. A great army of several hundred
thousand, several thousand tanks, and several hundred aircraft were like
unmixed cement, sand and reinforcing steel dispersed on the battle line,
penetrating several hundred kilometers and being basically unable to bear
the bitter attacks of the American style "fists" [as printed loaquan 5071
2164], which fully combined the rear solid structural components to become
as hard as reinforced concrete. In addition, there was first detainment and
then release of Western hostages, followed by one mistake after another,
and there was poor response in the areas of breaking political isolation
and economic blockades.

Regardless of whether the war was 3,000 years ago or at the end of the 20th
century, it seems that all of the victories display one common phenomenon:
the winner is the one who combined well.

While being able to ever increase the means used for warfare, as well as
make continuous improvements today so that the denotation of warfare is quickly
being amplified, the connotation of this has also begun to deepen. More factors
which had never appeared in the warfare of the past have entered the world
of warfare through the combination of various different methods. The addition
of each new element possibly causes changes in the modality and type of warfare
up until the outbreak of military revolution. Looking back upon the history
of warfare, regardless of whether it is stirrups, rifles, breechloaders,
smokeless gunpowder, field telephones, wireless telegrams, submarines, tanks,
aircraft, missiles, atomic bombs, computers, non-lethal weapons, or division
troop system, staff systems, "wolf pack tactics," [15] blitz, carpet bombing,
electronic countermeasures, and air-land battles, the appearance of all of
these elements all combine with earlier key battlefield elements to display
hybrid advantages and enrich the present world of warfare to different degrees.

Over the last 20 years, information technology, computer viruses, internet,
financial derivation tools, and other sources, as well as the technology
of non-military means even more so reveal the difficulties of predicting
the prospect for the outcome of tomorrow's wars. However, to date, for the
vast majority of soldiers or high-ranking military officers utilizing the
element combination method to carry out warfare is often a non-conscious
action. Therefore, their combinations often remain on the level of weapons,
deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects are
also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it. Only those
trailblazing military geniuses are able to stand alone in breaking convention,
breaking through limitations and consciously combining all of the means available
at the time to play the ageless masterpiece by changing the tonality of the
war.

If it is said that combination was only a winning secret formula of a few
geniuses, then consciously making combination the trend of a method of operations
now is already becoming clearer day after day, and warfare is now being taken
into an even broader and even more far-reaching domain; however, all of that
provided by the age of technological integration leaves combination with
more seemingly infinite possible space. It can be affirmed that whoever is
able to mix a tasty and unique cocktail for the future banquet of war will
ultimately be able to wear the laurels of success on his own head.

Using Addition to Win the Game

All of the cards have now been shown. We already know that war will not again
be displayed in its original form. To a very great extent, war is no longer
even war but rather coming to grips on the internet, and matching the mass
media, assault and defense in forward exchange transactions, along with other
things which we had never viewed as war, now all possibly causing us to drop
our eyeglasses. That is to say, the enemy will possibly not be the originally
significant enemy, the weapons will possibly not be the original weapons,
and the battlefield will also possibly not be the original battlefield. Nothing
is definite. What can be ascertained is not definite. The game has already
changed, and what we need to continue is ascertaining a new type of fighting
method within various uncertainties. It should not be that type of single
prescription for treating the symptoms and not the disease, but rather a
hybrid type of learning widely from the strong points of others and gathering
advantages so as to allow a pear tree to bear both peaches and apples. This
then is combination. We had actually shown this card already above.

What we have still not spoken of is another term: addition.

Addition is the method of combination.

In a boxing arena, a person who from start to finish uses only one type of
boxing method to fight with an opponent is naturally not one who can combine
straight punches, jabs, swings and hooks to attack his opponent like a storm.
The principle of this can be said to be extremely simple: one plus one is
greater than one. The problem is that such a simple principle which even
a preschooler can understand has been surprisingly unclear to many persons
responsible for the success and failure of the security and warfare of nations.
These people can excuse themselves saying they are using the method of
combination boxing to attack opponents. They have never forgotten the addition
of technology with technology, tactics with tactics, weapons with weapons,
and measures with measures. Moreover, they can also contemptuously come to
conclusions and combinations which cannot be considered to be anything new.
This has been done from Alexander to Napoleon and even up to Schwartzkopf.
They do not know that their ability to understand or not understand combinations
is not the key to the problem. What is truly important is whether or not
one understands what goes with what to implement combinations and how to
combine. Lastly, but certainly not the most important point, is whether or
not one has thought of combining the battlefield and non-battlefield, warfare
and non-warfare, military and non-military which is more specifically combining
stealth aircraft and cruise missiles with network killers, combining nuclear
deterrence, financial wars and terrorist attacks, or simply combining
Schwartzkopf + Soros + Xiaomolisi [transliteraton 1420 5459 6849 2448] +
bin Laden.

This then is our real hand of cards.

Whether it is combination or addition, both are but empty frames. Only when
blood or cruelty are added in is the situation able to become severe and
begin to be shocking.

Being confronted with this completely new concept of warfare, there is no
doubt that the impression of war to which people have already become accustomed
will be shaken. Some of the traditional models of war, as well as the logic
and laws attached to it, will also be challenged.

The outcome of the contest is not the collapse of the traditional mansion
but rather one portion of the new construction site being in disorder. From
the perspective of law, most of us will see collapse.

Up to this point, we have already found the reason, beginning from the appearance
of "high tech" on stage, that this military revolution has slowly been unable
to be completed. From the perspectives of human history and the history of
warfare, there has never been one military revolution which was declared
to have been completed merely after technology or organizational revolutions.
Only after signifying the appearance of this revolution of military thought
with the highest achievement will the entire process of the military revolution
be finalized. This time is no exception so that whether or not the new military
revolution brought about by high technology can bring it to a final conclusion
depends on whether it can travel far upon the road of the revolution of military
thought. It is only this one time that it needs to jump outside of the ruts
made by the war spirit that has persisted for several thousand years.

To accomplish this, it is only necessary to be able to seek help from addition.
However, prior to utilizing addition, it must go beyond all of the fetters
of politics, history, culture, and ethics and carry out thorough thought.
Without thorough thought, there can be no thorough revolution.

Before this, even Sun Zi and Clauswitz locked themselves in the barrier of
the military domain, and only Machiavelli approached the realm of this thought.
For a very long period of time, owing to the fact that the thought of the
Prince and its author were both way ahead of their time, they were held in
contempt by the knights or rulers. They would naturally not be able to understand
that going beyond all limits and boundaries was an ideological revolution,
which included the premise of a revolution of military thought. In the same
way, to date, those who only understand an imposing array of troops on the
battlefield and who think that war is just killing people and methods of
operation are just methods to kill people and that there is nothing worth
giving attention to other than this, have been unable to understand this
point.

The Americans have actually not been so dull as to not have the slightest
reaction to this problem. Steven Maizi [as printed 7796 5417] and Thomas
Kaiweite [0481 4850 3676] of the Strategic Institute of the Army War College
of the United States who brought forth the problem of "the frequency band
width of the new military revolution" had actually become sensitive to this
point. They discovered the gap between the American military in terms of
military thought and the real threat facing national security. Having thought
lag behind reality (much less to speak of surpassing it) is not only a
shortcoming of American soldiers, but it is very typical of them.

When "a military gives excessive focus on dealing with a certain specified
type of enemy," this can possibly result in their being attacked and defeated
by another enemy outside of their field of vision. Steven Maizi and Thomas
Kaiweite correctly expressed their concerns about this. They further pointed
out that "Even though official documents stress the army (we can understand
it as meaning the entire American military - note by the authors [Steven
Maizi and Thomas Kaiweite]), it is necessary to break through fixed modern
Western thinking to broaden the conception of future conflicts. However,
most of the descriptions of how the digitized troops of the 21st century
will conduct war sound like an armored war using new technology to fight
with the Warsaw Pact nations." It is because the American military is making
war preparations guided by this type of military thinking that they naturally
hope war is like running into their own muzzle which is what they expect.
Such ridiculous wishful thinking can only bring on one type of future prospect,
"The vast majority of development plans of the present American military,
such as those of the army for the 21st century, are all focused upon dealing
with an enemy with conventional heavy armor, and if the United States encounters
an enemy with low level technology, an intermediate level enemy, or one with
equivalent power at the beginning of the next century, then the problem of
insufficient frequency band width will possibly occur." [16]

Actually, with the next century having still not yet arrived, the American
military has already encountered trouble from insufficient frequency band
width brought on by the three above mentioned types of enemies. Whether it
be the intrusions of hackers, a major explosion at the World Trade Center,
or a bombing attack by bin Laden, all of these greatly exceed the frequency
band widths understood by the American military. The American military is
naturally inadequately prepared to deal with this type of enemy psychologically,
in terms or measures, and especially as regards military thinking and the
methods of operation derived from this. This is because they have never taken
into consideration and have even refused to consider means that are contrary
to tradition and to select measures of operation other than military means.
This will naturally not allow them to add and combine the two into new measures
and new methods of operation. In actuality, it only requires broadening one's
outlook a little and being uninhibited in thought to be able to avail oneself
of the lever of the great volumes of new technology and new factors springing
up from the age of integrated technology, thus prying loose the wheel of
the military revolution rusted as a result of lagging behind in terms of
thinking. We can here appreciate the deep significance of the old saying,
"a stone from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one."

It would be well if we were somewhat bold and completely mixed up the cards
in our hand, combined them again, and saw what the result would be.

Supposing a war broke out between two developed nations already possessing
full information technology, and relying upon traditional methods of operation,
the attacking side would generally employ the modes of great depth, wide
front, high strength, and three-dimensionality to launch a campaign assault
against the enemy. Their method does not go beyond satellite reconnaissance,
electronic countermeasures, large-scale air attacks plus precision attacks,
ground outflanking, amphibious landings, air drops behind enemy lines ...
the result is not that the enemy nation proclaims defeat, but rather one
returns with one's own spears and feathers. However, by using the combination
method, a completely different scenario and game can occur: if the attacking
side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being
aware of this at all and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets,
then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker
detachment in the opponent's computer system in advance, while at the same
time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian
electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network,
telephone communications network, and mass media network are completely
paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street
riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down
by the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the
enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty. This admittedly does
not attain to the domain spoken of by Sun Zi, wherein "the other army is
subdued without fighting." However, it can be considered to be "subduing
the other army through clever operations." It is very clear who was superior
and who inferior when comparing these two methods of operation.

This is, however, only a thought. However, it is certainly a feasible thought.
Based on this thought, we need only shake the kaleidoscope of addition to
be able to combine into an inexhaustible variety of methods of operation.

Military

Trans-military

Non-military

Atomic warfare

Conventional warfare

Bio-chemical warfare

Ecological warfare

Space warfare

Electronic warfare

Guerrilla warfare

Terrorist warfare

Diplomatic warfare

Network warfare

Intelligence warfare

Psychological warfare

Tactical warfare

Smuggling warfare

Drug warfare

Virtual warfare (deterrence)

Financial warfare

Trade warfare

Resources warfare

Economic aid warfare

Regulatory warfare

Sanction warfare

Media warfare

Ideological warfare

Any of the above types of methods of operation can be combined with another
of the above methods of operation to form a completely new method of operation.
[17] Regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional, the carrying
out of combined methods of operation using different methods of operation
that go beyond domains and categories has already been applied by many nations
in the practice of warfare. For example, the countermeasure used by the Americans
against bin Laden is national terrorist warfare + intelligence warfare +
financial warfare + network warfare + regulatory warfare; another example
is what the NATO nations used to deal with the Southern Alliance Kosovo crisis:
deterrence with the use of force + diplomatic warfare (alliance) + regulatory
warfare; prior to this, the United Nations under pressure mainly from the
United States adopted the methods of operation against Iraq: conventional
warfare + diplomatic warfare + sanction warfare + media warfare + psychological
warfare + intelligence warfare, etc. We also noticed that the means adopted
by the Hong Kong government during the financial security warfare in August
of 1998 to deal with financial speculators were: financial warfare + regulatory
warfare + psychological warfare + media warfare, and even though they paid
a heavy price, yet the results of the war were very good. In addition, the
methods for matters, such as the large quantity printing of counterfeit Renminbi
in Taiwan, very easily became a warfare measure of financial warfare + smuggling
warfare.

We can see from these examples the miraculous effects of applying
addition-combination in methods of operation. If it is said that, owing to
the limitations of technical measures and conditions, those engaged in warfare
in the past were still unable to freely combine all factors for winning wars,
then today the great explosion of technology led by information technology
has already provided us with this type of possibility. Only if we are willing
and do not allow subjective intentions to depart from objective laws, will
we then be able to arrange the cards in our hand into various types of hands
based on need until finally winning the entire game.

However, there is no one who can write a guaranteed winning prescription
for all future wars. Various types of methods of operation have appeared
in the history of human warfare, and most have been forgotten with the passage
of history. When examining the reasons, all of these methods of operation
were all determined based upon a specific target, and when the target
disappeared, then the method of operation also lost its existing value. Methods
of operation which truly possess vitality must be an "empty basket." This
empty basket only relies upon its thinking and principle of utilizing the
non-changing to deal with the myriad changes. The combination of which we
speak is just this type of empty basket, an empty basket of military thinking.
It is not the same as any of the very strongly directed methods of operation
of the past, for only when the basket is filled with specific targets and
contents does it begin to have directionality and aim. The key to whether
or not victory is won in a war is nowhere else but in what things you are
able to pack into this basket.

Yue Fei, the military strategist during the Song Dynasty in China, stated
when discussing how to employ methods of operation that "the subtle excellence
of application lies in one-mindedness." Although this statement sounds very
abstruse, yet it is actually the only accurate explanation of the correct
application of combination. Only if we understand this point will we then
be able to attain a method of operation which goes beyond the multitude of
methods of operation. This is then having the myriad methods converge into
one. It is even the final stage of methods of operation. Aside from combining
the transcendence of being unfettered, you have no way of imagining what
other method of operation can transcend the net of combination.

The conclusion is thus so simple, and yet it will definitely not arise from
a simple brain.

Footnotes

[1] War is the most typical game, and yet it is often not susceptible to
the theories of classical games. War is intrinsically the irrational behavior
of man, and based on the various conjectures of the "rational man," it naturally
and easily fails. The fearful aftereffects of nuclear weapons have caused
mankind to gradually find its way back to the long-lost rationality from
the most irrational behavior. Moreover, the course of globalization has pushed
mankind to accord with the thinking of the "rational man" while seeking national
security, learning how to cast off the "predicament of the convict," and
no longer falling into the hegemony-type "cockfight game" of the United States
and the Soviet Union. The economic game with both cooperation and competition
has begun to seep into the military sphere and influence warfare in the new
era. (Reference can be made to the discussion in Zhang Weiying's [1728 4850
6601] Game Theory and Information Economics, Sanlian Bookstore of
Shanghai, Shanghai People's Press, 1996).

[2] Beginning on March 15, 1997, the United States' Army carried out 14 days
of digitized brigade task force high level operations exercises at the Fort
Irwin National Training Center in California. According to remarks by Army
Chief of Staff General Rymer, the aim of this test was to determine whether
or not troop technology of the 21st century would be able to instantly answer
three crucial questions in actual warfare: Where am I? Where are my companions?
Where is the enemy? In view of the test conditions, the troops that underwent
rearrangements and used new weapons with digital technology had much faster
operating speed, greater killing power, and stronger survival capabilities
than the present army. See the reports in Defense News of the United
States, March 17-23 of 1997, for details regarding this exercise.

[3] It was again stressed in the "1997 National Army Strategy" of the United
States that the task and military capability level of the United States Army
was to simultaneously win two large-scale regional wars. This actually still
continued the military strategy and army building policy of the "Cold War"
era. James R. Blacker pointed out in his article entitled "Building a Military
Revolution-Type United States Army - A Troop Reform Plan Different From the
'Four Year Military Examination Report'" that this policy "was a military
plan designed 20 years ago and selected during a period which ended 10 years
ago." (Summer edition 1997 of the American magazine Strategy Review).

[4] See the research report of the Strategic Research Institute of the United
States Army War College, Strategy and the Military Revolution: From Theory
to Policy, Section 8.

[5] Actually this was an Iraqi problem which Bush was also unable to thoroughly
resolve. Saddam increasingly became a sore point which the Americans found
difficult to remove.

[6] The "Desert Fox" action adopted recently by the United States and England
is also an obvious serious offense of large nations in violation of the United
Nations' Charter.

[7] The original meaning of "hacker" was neutral and did not carry any derogatory
sense. Early hackers used their obsession with technology and good intentions
for society to form a unique hacker standard of logic which was strictly
adhered to by many people over several generations of hackers. However, in
the network space of today where the moral degeneration is getting worse
day by day, there is no longer this gentlemanly attitude.

[8] In 1996, the Information System Office of the United States Department
of Defense was set up so as to strengthen the protection of military information
systems. In the same year, the establishment of the President's Committee
on the Protection of Key Infrastructure of the United States was also announced.
This Committee is responsible for protecting the telecommunications, financial,
electric power, water, pipeline, and transport systems. All of this was directed
at real threats, and the FM100-6 Field Command Information Operations
of the United States military clearly stated that "the threats facing the
information infrastructure are real, their source is the entire globe, they
are manifested in many areas of technology, and moreover these threats are
growing. These threats originate from individuals and groups and what is
driving them is the military, political, social, cultural, religious, or
individual and trade benefits. These threats also come from information madmen."
(Chinese translation [of FM100-6], p. 7)

[9] What is most satirical is that the construction company of the bin Laden
family had been the builder of the barracks of the American army in Saudi
Arabia.

[10] The most unsettling aspect of finance terrorism is "hot money" which
is able to launch destructive attacks upon a nation's economy within several
days, and the target varies from national central banks to poor people.

[12] Military History of the Western World, written by J.F.C. Fuller,
translated by Niu Xianzhong [4781 0341 6988].

[13] The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, T.N. Dupuit, p. 169-176.

[14] Biography of Napoleon by Taerli [as printed 4781 0341 6988].
Biography of Napoleon I by John Roland Ross.

[15] A technique for attacking merchant vessels during World War I using
submarines invented by Dengnici was printed 6772 1441 5412], Commander
of the Submarine Forces of the German Navy. The main method of operation
was that after a submarine discovered a merchant vessel, it immediately notified
other submarines, and after waiting for many submarines to arrive, the submarines
then launched an attack like a pack of wolves against a prey.

[16] Research Report of the Strategic Institute of the United States Army
War College, Strategy and the Military Revolution: From Theory to
Policy.

[17] In our view, the three types of warfare here are all down-to-earth warfare
and not allegorical or descriptive. Military-type wars are always traditional
and classical wars which use weapons; the various types of wars among the
non-military type are confrontational and nothing abnormal, yet they display
warfare behavior and they are all novel; trans-military type wars are situated
between the two wherein some have previous methods such as psychological
warfare and intelligence warfare, and some are comprised of completely new
methods such as network warfare and virtual warfare (this refers to the methods
of electronic virtual and of Mozi [1075 1311] thwarting Gong Shu Ban [0361
6551 3803]. See the chapter entitled Gong Shu Ban Sets Up Machinery for the
State of Chu to Attack the State of Song in Strategies of the Warring
States, Protective Strategies of the Song).

"I usually make surprising moves; the enemy expects surprising moves; but
I move in an unsurprising manner this time to attack the enemy. I usually
make unsurprising moves; the enemy expects unsurprising moves; but I move
in a surprising manner this time to attack the enemy." --Li Shimin

However much is said about combination, we still have to say that it is not
enough to focus on combination. It is necessary to further sharpen the focus,
to see whether there is any secret closer to the core. Without understanding
the secret of how to conduct combination, it will be useless to conduct
combination 100 times incompetently.

In the history of war, there has never been a victory achieved in a smooth
manner. Thus, in all its versions, the book Jun Yu [Military
Talk] contains such terms as direction of main attack, main targets of
striking, feint attack, feint move, and outflank which entail distinguishing
between the main and secondary actions. What is behind such terms is not
only consideration of the need to deceive the enemy or the sound use of force.
There must be some other reasons. In terms of instinct, all those famous
generals who have won countless victories, or obscure people, have all realized
the existence of something which perhaps should be called "rules of victory."
Those people have also got close to such rules tens of thousands of times.
Nevertheless, to this day, no commander or philosopher has ever dared to
say: I have found the rules. Not even the job of naming such rules has been
completed. But, actually, the rules are hidden in the waves of military practice
of mankind. It is proper to say that every classical victory has testified
to the rules. However, each time, people either do not want to admit or do
not dare to affirm their encounters with rules of victory, but, instead,
often attribute the effects of the rules to the favor of some mysterious
fate. Many "belated pronouncement" works on military history offer arguments
which are difficult for people to grasp because the arguments describe the
rules' effects in an excessively mysterious manner. But, rules of victory
do exist. They are there. Like an invisible man, they accompany every war
of mankind. The party to which their golden fingers point will go through
the arch of triumph by stepping on the sorrow of the vanquished. However,
even the victors in war have not truly seen their real faces.

Secretly Conforming to the Rule of the Golden Section

"Everything is a matter of numbers." Along this line of thought, the ancient
sage Pythagoras [1] unexpectedly encountered a set of mysterious digits:
0.618. As a result, he found the rule of the golden section! [A mathematical
formula showing the derivation of the figure 0.618 omitted]

In the 2,500 years since then, this formula has been considered by formative
artists as the golden rule of aesthetics. As convincingly testified to by
the history of arts, almost all artistic works considered masterpieces, whether
created in a casual manner or through intentional effort, have all been close
to or in accord with this formula in their basic aesthetic features. People
had long marveled at the beauty of the Parthenon Temple of ancient Greece,
suspecting it to be the creation of a god. With measurement and calculation,
it was found that the relationship between its vertical lines and horizontal
lines were entirely in accord with the 1:0.618 ratio. In his book Vers
Une Architecture, the great modern architect Le Corbusier also established
his most important theory of "basic design scale" on the basis of the rule
of the golden section, a theory which has had profound and extensive influence
on architects and architecture in the world. [2]

Regrettably, this formula which the Creator may have meant to use for revealing
to mankind a rule for all spheres through a demonstration in one sphere has
never moved beyond the realm of artistic creation. Except those Muses with
extraordinary gifts, almost no one has realized that this golden rule of
aesthetics may become, or is, a rule that should also be followed in other
spheres.

It was not until 1953 that J. Kieffer, an American, discovered that seeking
experiment points according to the rule of the golden section would make
it possible to reach the optimal state the most quickly. His discovery was
refined by the Chinese mathematician Hua Luogeng and turned into the "optimum
seeking method," or the 0.618 method. The method was popularized in China
for a time. As far as we know, such a popularization campaign based on the
human-wave tactic produced little effect, but this episode demonstrated the
prospect of applying the rule of the golden section in spheres other than
the sphere of arts. [3] [The text does not indicate the location of footnotes
4-12, although they are included in the footnote section at the end of the
chapter] In fact, before the emergence of the notion of consciously grasping
the rule of the golden section, people had repeatedly applied it to their
own spheres of practice on the basis of their instincts. Of course, the military
sphere had not been left out. We can easily see the ephemeral marks of the
paws of this mysterious beast in the famous amazing campaigns and battles
in the history of war. Without looking afar, you will see examples of conforming
to this rule everywhere in the military realm. The shadow of 0.618 can be
seen in such things ranging from the arc of the cavalry sword to the apex
of the flying trajectory of a bullet, shell, or ballistic missile and from
the optimum bomb-release altitude and distance for an aircraft in the dive
bombing mode to the relationship between the length of the supply line and
the turning point in a war.

By casually reading pages of the history of war, you will be certain to be
silently amazed by the fact that 0.618, like a golden belt, can be faintly
seen in ancient, modern, Chinese, and foreign wars. In the Yanlin battle
between Jin and Chu during the Spring and Autumn Period, Duke Li of Jin led
a military force in attacking Zheng. The Jin force had a decisive battle
with the Chu force at Yanlin. Adopting advice made by Miao Penghuan, a defector
from Chu, Duke Li used a portion of his middle army to attack the left army
of the Chu force, used another portion to attack the middle army of the Chu
force, and used the upper army, lower army, new army, and forces of the lords
to attack the right army of the Chu force. The point of attack selected was
exactly at the point of the golden section. We mentioned above the Battle
of Arbela between Alexander and Darius. The Macedonians selected the juncture
of the left flank and the center of the Persian force as the point of their
attack; marvelously, the point was exactly the "golden point" for the entire
front.

For hundreds of years, people have found it difficult to understand why the
Mongol cavalry of Gengis Khan were, like a hurricane, able to sweep across
the Eurasian continent. Such factors as the barbarians' truculence, cruelty,
and cunningness or the mobility of the cavalry did not provide convincing
explanations. Perhaps there were other more important reasons? As can be
expected, the rule of the golden section showed its miraculous power again:
We can see that the battle formation of the Mongol cavalry was different
from the Western traditional phalanx. In regard to their five-row formation,
the ratio of heavy cavalry to light cavalry was 2:3, with 2 for armored heavy
cavalry and 3 for fast and mobile light cavalry, that is, another example
of the golden section! You have to admire the genius-level understanding
achieved by that thinker on horseback. It was natural for a force under the
command of such a commander to have more striking power than the European
forces that it confronted.

It seems that, while highly gifted in applying the rule of the golden section
to religion and arts, Christian Europeans were late in coming to understand
the application of this rule to other spheres. The Dutch general Maurice,
who had been the first to transform the traditional phalanx by mixing similar
numbers of musket-armed soldiers and pike-armed soldiers, failed to realize
this point even in the black powder period when muskets were gradually replacing
pikes. It was King Gustavus of Sweden who adjusted this formation of a strong
front and weak flanks, thereby turning the Swedish army into an army with
the strongest combat power in Europe of that time. What he did was to have
an additional 96 musket-armed soldiers in addition to the squadron composed
of 216 pike-armed soldiers and 198 musket-armed soldiers. This change gave
immediate prominence to the use of firearms, thereby becoming the watershed
separating battle formations of the periods of cold weapons and hot weapons.
Needless to say, we again saw the shining light of the rule of the golden
section in the ratio of 198 plus 96 musket-armed soldiers to 216 pike-armed
soldiers.

There is still more. Let us see how it had stubbornly "manifested" itself
to give us clear suggestions before we recognized it as something more than
a rule of arts. Napoleon attacked Russia in June 1812. In September, after
failing to eliminate effective Russian forces in the Borodino battle, he
entered Moscow. At that time, Napoleon did not realize that his genius and
luck were gradually leaving him bit by bit, and that the peak and turning
point of his lifelong career were approaching simultaneously. A month later,
the French forces withdrew from Moscow as it snowed heavily. There were three
months of victorious advance and two months of declining. It seems that,
in terms of the time sequence, the French emperor was standing on the line
of the golden section when looking down at the city of Moscow through the
burning fire. In another June 130 years later, Nazi Germany started the
Barbarossa Plan against the Soviet Union. For as long as two years, German
forces maintained their offensive momentum. It was in August 1943 that German
forces turned into defense at the conclusion of the Castle action and would
no longer be able to launch an action that can be called a campaign against
the Soviet forces. Perhaps we also have to call the following fact a coincidence:
The battle of Stalingrad, which has been considered by all historians of
war to be the turning point in the Soviet Patriotic War, happened exactly
in the 17th month of the war, that is, November 1942. This was the "golden
point" in the time axis encompassing 26 months during which the German forces
turned from booming to declining.

Let us also take a look at the Gulf War. Before the war, military experts
estimated that the equipment and personnel of the Republican Guards would
basically lose their combat effectiveness when losses resulting from aerial
attacks should total or exceed 30 percent. To make Iraqi forces' losses reach
this critical point, U.S. forces extended the bombing time repeatedly. When
the Desert Sword was taken out of its shield, Iraqi forces had lost 38 percent
of their 4,280 tanks, 32 percent of their 2,280 armored vehicles, and 47
percent their 3,100 artillery pieces, and only around 60 percent of the strength
of the Iraqi forces was left. Through such cruel data, the mysterious light
of 0.618 began to flicker again in the early morning of 24 January 1991.
The Desert Storm ground war ended 100 hours later.

Such instances scattered across history have truly been something marvelous.
When viewed in isolation, they do look like accidents happening one after
another. But the Creator never does anything without a reason. If too many
accidents demonstrate the same phenomenon, can you still calmly view them
as accidents? No, at this moment, you have to admit that there is a rule
here.

Victory's Grammar--The Side-Principal Rule

In Chinese grammar, there is a basic sentence structure. This structure divides
a sentence or phrase into two parts, the modifier and the center word. The
relationship between them is that of modifying and being modified, that is,
that the former modifies the latter and determines the tendency and features
of the latter. Put more clearly, the former constitutes appearance, and the
latter constitutes the organism. We usually determine the difference between
one person or object with another person or object not according to his (its)
existence as an organism or mechanism but according to his (its) appearance
and look. From this perspective, relative to the center word, the modifier
should, to a greater extent, be considered the center of a sentence or phrase.
For instance, red apple. Before being modified by "red," apple only refers
to a kind of fruit in general and is thus general in nature. But, "red" gives
this apple a specificity that makes it possible to determine it to be "this
one." Obviously, "red" plays a significant role in this phrase. Also, for
instance, special economic zone. Without the word "economic," special zone
is only a concept of geographical division. When modified by "economic,"
it acquires a special character and orientation, becoming the point of support
for the economic lever used by Deng Xiaoping to reform China. This structure
is a basic mode in Chinese grammar: The side-principal structure.

This structure of having the principal element modified by a side element
exists extensively in the Chinese language to the extent that a Chinese speaker
will not be able to speak without using it. For, if there are only subject
words in a sentence, without directing modification, the sentence will lack
clarity because of the absence of such elements as degree, location, and
mode which can be grasped in a concrete manner. For example, if the modifiers
in such phrases as "good person," "good thing," "tall building," "red flag,"
and "slow running" are all removed, then the center words will all become
neutral words without specific references. As shown here, in the side-principal
structure, the "side" element, as compared with the "principal" element,
is in the position of qualitatively determining the sentence or phrase. In
other words, in a certain sense we can use the understanding that in the
side-principal structure the center word is the principal entity, with the
modifier serving as the directing element, that is, that the "principal"
element is the body for the "side" element, while the "side" element is the
soul of the "principal" element. With the body established as the premise,
the role of the soul is obviously of decisive significance. The relationship
of the principal entity's being subordinate to the directing element is the
foundation for the existence of the side-principal structure. At the same
time, as one of the forms of structure of the system of symbols corresponding
to the objective world, it seems to suggest to us something lawlike which
goes beyond the scope of language.

Going along this path, we will soon see that the side-principal relationship
exists in a big way not only in such phrases as "good person," "bad thing,"
"tall building," and "red flag" or such military terms as aircraft carrier,
cruise missile, stealth aircraft, armored personnel carrier, self- propelled
artillery, precision bombs, rapid response force, air-land war, and joint
operation. This relationship also exists everywhere in the world outside
the scope of language in a myriad manner. This is the significance of our
borrowing--just borrowing--but not copying this rhetorical device, only seen
in human language systems, in our theory. We do not intend to arbitrarily
juxtapose war with rhetoric, but only intend to borrow the term "side-principal"
to enunciate the deepest core element of our theory. For we believe this
side-principal relationship exists in a big way in the movement and development
of many things, and that in such a relationship the "side" element, instead
of the "principal" element, often plays the role as the directing element.
For the time being, we describe this role as "modification by the side element
of the principal element" (note: this is not the original meaning of the
side-principal structure as a rhetorical device, but an extended meaning
as used by us). For instance, in a country, the people are the principal
entity, while government is the directing element of the country; in an armed
force, soldiers and middle- and lower-level officers constitute the principal
entity, while the command headquarters constitute the directing element of
the armed force; in a nuclear explosion, uranium or plutonium is the principal
entity, while the means of bombarding them constitute the directing element
for triggering chain reactions; in a Southeast Asian-style financial crisis,
the victim countries are the principal entities, while financial speculators
are the directing element generating the crisis. Without the direction provided
by government, the people will be a heap of loose sand; without the direction
provided by the command headquarters, soldiers will constitute a mob; without
means of bombardment, uranium and plutonium will be a heap of minerals; without
financial speculators' activity to create disturbance, the regulating mechanisms
of victim countries should have enabled them to avoid financial catastrophes.
In such a relationship, if the factor of two-way interactions is put aside,
it is self-evident which is the side element, which is the principal element,
and which modifies which.

As shown through discussions above, this side-principal structure is an
asymmetrical structure. Thus, the relationship between the side element and
the principal element is an unbalanced relationship. On this point, the situation
is very similar to that regarding the rule of the golden section: 0.618 and
1 form an asymmetrical structure and an unbalanced relationship. We are fully
justified in regarding it as another way of stating the side-principal formula.
For, in this side- principal structure, what is important is the side element,
but not the principal element. This is also true with the rule of the golden
section. What is important is 0.618, but not 1. This is the common feature
of the two. Laws tell us that two things with similar features must follow
some similar rules. If there is any common rule governing the golden section
and the side-principal structure, it should be the following:

0.618 = deviation toward the side element

The best case to illustrate this point is perhaps the story of Tian Ji's
horse racing. In a situation of inferior overall strength, the great military
strategist Sun Bin made his classical move which was an adequate example
of Chinese gaming wisdom. He started by racing Tian Ji's worst horse with
the best horse of the king of Qi. After inevitably losing that race, he used
his side's middle and best horses to beat the opponent's worst and middle
horses, thereby ensuring the two-win advantage necessary for achieving a
victory. This method of using the strategy of losing one and winning two
(directing element) to win the overall game (principal element) can be viewed
as having a typical side-principal structure. The result of winning two of
three games conformed entirely to the golden ratio of 2:3. Here, we are seeing
the perfect confluence and unity of the two rules:

The golden rule = the side-principal rule.

Finding a rule is both the end and the beginning of studying an issue. As
long as we believe that something called the side-principal rule can be seen
in the functioning of all things, we should also believe that this rule,
like the rule of the golden section, will not leave the military sphere
untouched.

Facts are indeed so.

The Changshao battle between Qi and Lu: As the two forces confronted each
other on theattlefield, the Qi force was very aggressive, but the Lu force
remained motionless. The Qi force attacked three times with three rounds
of drum beating but failed to unsettle the front of the Lu force, resulting
in an obvious decline in momentum. The Lu force took the opportunity to launch
a counterattack, achieving a complete victory. After the battle, the advisor
Cao Gui revealed the reason for Qi's defeat and Lu's victory in this battle:
The enemy force "had a great momentum at the first round of drum beating,
had a weaker momentum at the second round, and was exhausted at the third
round. As the enemy force was exhausted, while our force had full vigor,
our force prevailed." The entire process of the battle can be divided into
five phases: the Qi force's first round of drum beating--the Qi force's second
round of drum beating--the Qi force's third round of drum beating--the Lu
force's counterattack--the Lu force's chase. From the first to third phases,
Cao Gui adopted the strategy of avoiding the enemy's attack, so that the
Qi force quickly passed the golden point of its attack power without achieving
any results.

Meanwhile the Lu force precisely selected this point as the time of
counterattack, thereby fully testifying to the rule of the golden section
on the battlefield 2,700 years ago (3:5 approximately equals 0.618). It can
be certain that at that time Cao Gui could not have known Pythagoras and
his theory of the golden section of 200 years later. Furthermore, even if
he had known the theory, it was not possible to accurately determine where
the 0.618 point was amid an ongoing battle. But, by instinct, he found the
point of section with flickering golden light. This is a gift common to all
military geniuses.

Hannibal thought in the exactly same way as Cao Gui during the Cannae battle.
As Cao Gui did, he understood the secret of declining attack power of enemy
forces. Thus, unusually, he deployed the weakest force from Gaul and Spanish
infantry at the center of the front where the best force should have been
deployed, letting such weak forces to bear attacks from Roman forces. As
such forces were unable to withstand the attacks, there gradually emerged
a crescent- shaped indentation. Whether this curve was created intentionally
by Hannibal or accidentally, it became a huge buffer for absorbing the attack
power of the Roman forces. As this strong power gradually weakened because
of the lengthening of the front and came to the low point of its momentum
at the time of approaching the bottom part of the Carthaginian front, the
Carthaginians, who were inferior in overall strength but superior in cavalry
force, quickly launched their flanking cavalry forces to complete the
encirclement of the Roman forces, thus turning Cannae into a killing field
for killing 70,000 people.

The two battles were different but had a common way of working. In both,
the dominant strategy was to evade enemy frontal attacks and to weaken the
enemy momentum. An operational approach of obviously deviating from frontal
fighting was adopted, and the point of decline of enemy attack power was
properly selected as the optimal moment for the relevant forces' own
counterattacks. The operational method used obviously conformed to the rule
of the golden section and the side-principal rule.

If the two cases of warfare are not viewed as coincidental or isolated phenomena,
then we will see the shining of the light of the rule of the golden section
move widely in the history of war. This point has been perhaps even more
prominent in modern warfare. During the Second World War, the entire German
operation of attacking France was immersed in the pith of the two rules that
we discussed. Such moves as changing tanks from being subordinate to infantry
to being the main battle weapons, using blitzkrieg as the main operational
doctrine on the basis of discarding First World War practices, and selecting
the Ardennes mountains as the main direction of attack of the German forces,
an action which surprised not only the enemy but also conceptually obsolete
old generals at the German high command, must have seemed to be unorthodox
and had a prominent character of deviation toward the side element. It was
this deviation character that led to the fundamental change in military thinking
of the entire German military and also made Schlieffen's dream of "sweeping
across the English Channel" a nightmare for the British at Dunkirk. Before
that time, who would have thought that the blueprint of this miracle would
come from the hands of two relatively low-level officers--Manstein and Guderian?
During the same world war, there was also the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
which was similar to the operation of attacking France, an operation with
a prominent side-principal tendency. Isoroko Yamamoto used aircraft carriers
in the same way Guderian used tanks.

Conceptually, Yamamoto still viewed battleships as the main force for decisive
naval battles in the future, but sensitively and correctly selected aircraft
carriers and their carrier-borne aircraft as the principal weapons for operations
against the U.S. Navy. More interestingly, he did not carry out frontal attacks
on the long Pacific coast of the continental United States when launching
attacks on the Americans. At the same time, he fully considered the attack
radius of his joint fleet, that is, the optimal location that his fist was
capable of hitting. Thus he selected, as the point of attack, Hawaii which,
while being of critical importance to controlling the entire Pacific Ocean,
the Americans refused to believe to be the point of attack even after receiving
intelligence before the operation. As should be pointed out, this believer
in decisive naval battles chose a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, instead of
a naval battle dreamed about by him all the time, in the first major battle
bearing on the future course of the war. Consequently, he won a victory with
surprising moves by hitting side targets.

With the analysis above, we should understand that neither the rule of the
golden section nor the side-principal rule should be understood literally
in a narrow manner; instead it is necessary to grasp their essence. A rapidly
changing battlefield will give any military leader or commander neither adequate
time nor adequate information for carefully determining the point of the
golden section or the degree of deviation toward the side element. Even the
two core elements of the two rules, 0.618 and "deviation toward the side
element," are not constants in a mathematical sense. Rather, they represent
the thousands of manifestations of the god of victory in ever-changing courses
of wars, battlefields, and war situations.

It is sometimes manifested in the selection of means. For instance, during
the Gulf War, Schwartzkopf used aerial bombings as the dominant means, while
using as supporting forces the army and the navy which had always been the
main combat forces.

It is sometimes manifested in the selection of tactics. For instance, Donitz
changed ship-to-ship naval warfare into submarines' attacks on merchant ships;
this "Wolfpack" tactic posed a much greater threat to Britain than naval
battles.

It is sometimes manifested in the selection of weapons. For instance, Napoleon's
artillery, Guderian's tanks, Yamamoto's aircraft carriers, and the precision
ammunition used in Operation Gold Coast were all main weapons which were
able to shift the balance in war.

It is sometimes manifested in the selection of the point of attack. For instance,
during the Trafalgar naval battle, Nelson wisely selected the rear portion,
instead of the forward portion, of the French fleet as the main point of
attack, thereby producing a naval war victory, which would lead to the birth
of a maritime empire. [13]

It is sometimes manifested in the selection of opportunities of fighting,
For instance, in the Fourth Middle East War, Sadat selected 6 October, in
the month of Ramadan for Muslims, as the D-day for Egyptian forces' crossing
of the Suez Canal, and launched the attack in the afternoon when sunlight,
going from west to east, was directed at the pupils of the Israeli's eyes,
thereby demolishing the myth of Israeli invincibility. [14]

It is sometimes manifested in the uneven deployment of forces. For instance,
before the First World War, the German High Command formulated the Schlieffen
Plan for invading France, planning the bold move of deploying 53 of the 72
German divisions on the right flank to be used as the main attacking force
and deploying the remaining 19 divisions along the long frontlines of the
left flank and the center. In this way, the sand-table exercise became the
most famous war plan in history which was never implemented.

It is sometimes manifested in the use of stratagem. For instance, in 260
BC, there was a rivalry between Qin and Zhao. The Zhaoxiang King of Qin was
not in a hurry to have a decisive battle with the enemy, and adopted Fan
Sui's advice, first attacking Shangdang in Han to deprive Zhao of its backing.
Then he faked a willingness to negotiate a peace, and, as a result, the lords
stopped giving assistance to Zhao. He used the stratagem of sowing discord,
and, as a result, the king of Zhao dismissed General Lian Po and appointed
armchair strategist Zhao Kuo as commander. As a consequence, the Zhao force
was defeated at Changping. Qin's victory and Zhao's defeat in this battle
should be, more properly, be attributed to Fan Sui's stratagem, rather than
to the Qin force's powerfulness. [15]

We should also pay focused attention to and study another phenomenon, that
is, that more and more countries are looking beyond the military sphere when
handling important issues such as political, economic, and national security
issues. They use other means to supplement, enrich, or even replace military
means, so as to achieve objectives which cannot be achieved by military force
alone. This has been the most important episode of the side element's modifying
the principal element in relation to war on the basis of a conception of
war. At the same time, this also indicates that in future wars there will
be increasingly frequent occurrences of the side- principal structure formed
by the military means and other means.

All the selections discussed above had the character of "deviation toward
the side element." Like the rule of the golden section, the side-principal
rule is opposed to all forms of parallel placement, balance, symmetry, being
all-encompassing, and smoothness, but, instead, advocates using the sword
to cut the side. Only by avoiding frontal collisions, will it be possible
for your sword to cut apart things without being damaged. This is the most
basic grammar of victory for the ancient article of war.

If we call the rule of the golden section in the sphere of art the rule of
aesthetics, then why do we not also call the side-principal rule--its mirror
image in the military sphere--the rule of victory?

The Dominant Element and the Whole Thing: the Essence of the Side-Principal
Structure

Among the many internal elements comprising a thing, there must be a certain
element which assumes a prominent or dominant position among all the elements.
If the relationship between this element and the other elements is harmonious
and perfect, it will be in accord with the 0.618:1 formula in some places
and, also, in accord with the side-principal rule. For, here, "all the elements"
constitute the main body, that is, the principal element; the "certain element"
serves as the directing element and is thus the side element. Once an object
has acquired specific purposefulness, the side element and the principal
element will form a dominant-subordinate relationship. When two bulls fight,
the bulls constitute the principal element, while the horns constitute the
side element. When two swords are pitted against each other, the swords
constitute the principal element, while the edges constitute the side element.
It is very clear which is dominant and which is subordinate. When the purpose
is changed, a new dominant element will emerge and replace the old dominant
element and form a new side-principal relationship with all the existing
elements. Grasping the relationship between the dominant element and all
the elements in an object is tantamount to grasping the essence of the rule
of the golden section and the side-principal rule.

On the basis of such an understanding, we can quickly establish five most
important relationships among all the complex relationships of war: the dominant
weapons and all the weapons; the dominant means and all the means; the dominant
force and all the forces; the dominant direction and all the directions;
and the dominant sphere and all the spheres. The relationship between the
five dominant elements and all the elements in the five areas basically represent
the side-principal relationship which exists in wars in a widespread manner.
Take again the example of the Gulf War. In Operation Desert Storm, the dominant
weapons used by the Allied forces were stealth aircraft, cruise missiles,
and precision bombs, with all other weapons playing a subordinate role. The
dominant means was the 38 consecutive days of aerial bombardment, with other
means playing a supplemental role. The dominant force was the air force,
with all other forces playing a supporting role. The dominant direction was
to hit the Republican Guards as the target of focused attacks, with all other
battlefield targets serving as secondary targets. The dominant sphere was
the military sphere, with all other spheres providing comprehensive support
in the forms of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and media offensives.

However, it is not our goal to just clarify such relationships. To people
engaged in war, what is the most important is not to clarify things but to
grasp and apply such relationships. As we know, all countries' war resources
are limited. Even such a powerful country as the United States still has
to continually think about cost-effectiveness (the principal of the "least
consumption of energy") and how to fight wars in a more marvelous way and
to produce more splendid war results. Therefore, it is very necessary for
any country to use and allocate war resources in a sound and strategic manner.
This will require finding a correct method, that is, the issue of how to
consciously apply the side-principal rule. In fact, many countries have already
subconsciously applied this rule before now --

After the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Russia's military capability
has declined continually. It has not only lost its superpower position of
confronting the U.S. forces, but has even found it difficult to maintain
national security now. Under such circumstances, the Russian high command
has adjusted its future strategy in a timely fashion, despite being in a
difficult position, making tactical, or even strategic, nuclear weapons the
dominant weapons of first choice if a war is launched against Russia. On
the basis of this decision, it has also adjusted the distribution of conventional
weapons and nuclear weapons in an overall way. Contrary to Russia, being
the only superpower in the world, the U.S. Armed Forces have established
as their new strategic objectives for the three services a "comprehensively
superior" (army), [16] a (navy) "moving from sea to land," and a "globally
engaged" (air force)." [17] On that basis, digitized equipment, new types
of amphibious attack vessels, and long-range stealth aircraft have been selected
as a new generation of weapons, which appear to be replacing contemporary
trump cards like tanks of the M-1 series, aircraft carriers, and F-16 fighters
as the dominant weapons in the U.S. arsenal.

As can be seen in the strategic adjustments made by Russia and the United
States in regard to their respective dominant weapons, it seems that the
practice of selecting the dominant weapons on the basis of the magnitude
of destructive power is obsolete. As far as the selection of the dominant
weapons is concerned, the destructive power of weapons is but one of many
items of technical performance of weapons. What is more important than technical
performance is the basic consideration of the war aim, operational objectives,
and security environment. Thus, the dominant weapons should be the most effective
weapons for accomplishing the above-mentioned goals. Furthermore, it is necessary
to have them organically combined with other weapons, so as to formulate
the dominant element of a complete arms system. Under conditions of modern
technology, dominant weapons are no longer individual weapons, but "systems
of weapons," which are also components of larger systems. [18] The emergence
of a lot of high and new technology and the continual adjustment of war aims
have provided enough space for the selection of dominant weapons and the
combination of dominant weapons with other weapons, and have, at the same
time, also made the dominant-subordinate relationship between dominant weapons
and the other weapons even more complicated. [19]

The same factors are also affecting the use of the means of war. It is becoming
obsolete to automatically consider military action the dominant means and
the other means supporting means in war. Perhaps, in the not too distant
future, the military means will be only one of all the available means in
wars such as one of fighting terrorist organizations of the bin Laden category.
A more effective means that can strike at bin Laden in a destructive way
is perhaps not the cruise missile, but a financial suffocation war carried
out on the Internet.

As means have become more complicated, there has emerged a consequence that
is unexpected to all soldiers: the civilianization of war. Therefore, here
the issue of the relationship between the dominant force and all forces under
discussion here also encompasses the issue of degree of participation of
the entire population in war, in addition to the deployment, allocation,
and use of military forces in combat operations. As professional soldiers'
war or quasi-war activities have increasingly become an important factor
affecting national security, the issue as to which constitute the dominant
force in future wars, an issue which has never been a question, has become
a question worldwide. For example, the incidents of attacks conducted by
"web rascals" on the network centers of the U.S. Defense Department and the
Indian Defense Ministry were evidence in this regard.

Whether an action is a pure war action, a nonwar military action, or a
nonmilitary war action, any action of a combat nature will entail an issue
of how to accurately select the main direction of operation and the main
point of attack, that is, to determine your main orientation in view of all
the factors of the war concerned, the battlefields, and the battle fronts.
This is the most difficult issue even for all those commanders who are in
control of good weapons, a multitude of means, and sufficient manpower. However,
Alexander, Hannibal, Nelson, and Nimitz as well as Sun Wu and Sun Bin of
ancient China were good at selecting main directions of attack which would
surprise enemy forces completely. Liddle Hart also noted this point. He referred
to the approach of selecting the line of least resistance and the direction
of action least expected by the enemy as the "indirect strategy." As the
arena of war has expanded, encompassing the political, economic, diplomatic,
cultural, and psychological spheres, in addition to the land, sea, air, space,
and electronics spheres, the interactions among all factors have made it
difficult for the military sphere to serve as the automatic dominant sphere
in every war. War will be conducted in nonwar spheres. This notion sounds
strange and is difficult to accept, but more and more signs indicate that
this is the trend. In fact, even in ancient times, war was not always confined
to one single sphere. Lian Xiangru's diplomatic battle of "returning the
jade in an undamaged condition to Zhao" and the virtual war conducted by
Mo Zi and Gongshu Ban were classical examples of winning or precluding a
war with nonmilitary actions. This method of resolving the problem of war
through actions in multiple spheres should give insights to people today.
The era of comprehensive use of highly developed technologies has provided
us with much greater room for applying wisdom and means than ancient people,
so that people's dream of winning military victories in nonmilitary spheres
and winning wars with nonwar means can now become reality. If we want to
have victory in future wars, we must be fully prepared intellectually for
this scenario, that is, to be ready to carry out a war which, affecting all
areas of life of the countries involved, may be conducted in a sphere not
dominated by military actions. It is now still unknown what weapons, means,
and personnel such wars will use and in what direction and sphere such wars
will be conducted.

What is known is one point, that is, that whatever the mode of warfare, victory
always belongs to the side which correctly uses the side-principal rule to
grasp the relationship between the "dominant" and the "whole."

A Rule, Not a Set Formula

War is the most difficult to explain and understand. It needs support from
technology, but technology cannot substitute for morale and stratagem; it
needs artistic inspiration, but rejects romanticism and sentimentalism; it
needs mathematical precision, but precision can sometimes render it mechanical
and rigid; it needs philosophical abstraction, but pure thinking does not
help to seize short-lived opportunities amid iron and fire.

This is no formula of war. No one dares to arrogantly claim to have the perfect
method in the sphere of war. No one has ever been able to use one method
to win all wars. But, it does not mean that there are no rules regarding
war. A few people have had their names listed in the roster of ever-victorious
generals because they have discovered and grasped rules of victory. Those
names testify to the existence of rules of victory, but no one has revealed
the secret. For a long time--almost as long as the history of war--people
have regarded them as flashes of electricity in the brains of gifted commanders,
but have seldom realized that they are hidden in bloody fighting characterized
by collisions of swords and the smoke of gunpowder. In fact, any rule is
like a sheet of paper, and what is important is whether you are able to poke
a hole in it.

The side-principal rule is just such a sheet of paper. It is both simple
and complicated and both fluctuating and stable. As has often happened, a
person with a lucky finger sometimes unintentionally pokes a hole in it,
and the door of victory opens to him immediately. It is so simple that it
can be expressed by a set of digits or a rule of grammar. It is so complicated
that you are unable to find an answer even if you are proficient in mathematics
and grammar. It is like smoke and is difficult to grasp. It is as constant
as a shadow and accompanies every sunrise of victory.

Consequently, we regard the side-principal rule as a principle, but not a
theorem. We have taken full account of the relativity of the principle. Relative
things should not be applied mechanically and require no precise measurement.
Relativity is not absolute whiteness, and thus does not fear black swans.
[20]

However, through study of the history of war, we have determined that the
side-principal rule is a rule of victory, but how it can be used correctly
will be an issue for each individual operator to determine in view of the
particular circumstances. For the phenomenon of antimony in war has always
puzzled every person pursuing victory: those acting against the laws will
undoubtedly fail, but those sticking to set practices are also unlike to
win. "Six multiplied by 6 is 36. There are stratagems in numbers, and there
are numbers in stratagems. The yin and the yang are coordinated. Opportunities
are there. It is not possible to manufacture opportunities.

Manufacturing will not work." The "36 stratagems" constitute the revealing
of the way things work. That is, no matter how many examples of war we can
find to demonstrate that the causes of victories involved were in accord
with 0.618, the next person who plans a war, battle, or engagement strictly
in accordance with the rule of the golden section will almost certainly eat
the bitter fruit of defeat. Whether the rule of the golden section or the
side-principal rule is involved, the key is to grasp the essence and apply
the principle, instead of making mechanical applications, as the legendary
Dong Shi emulated the beauty Xi Shi. In the famous Rossbach battle and the
Luzern battle in European history, the attacking sides in both cases used
the Alexander-style "diagonal attack formation," but the results were totally
different. In the Rossbach battle, commanders of the French-Austrian force
copied the history of war faithfully. They made troop movements and built
battle formations right under the eyes of Frederick the Great. The
French-Austrian force attempted to use the diagonal formation to attack the
left wing of the Prussian force. As a result, it was thoroughly beaten by
the Prussian force which made adjustments in deployment in a timely manner.
A year later, at Luzern, Frederick again encountered an Austrian force which
was three times as large as Frederick's force. But, this time, he performed
brilliantly. He also used the diagonal attack formation, but managed to
annihilate the Austrian force. It is thought-provoking that the same method
of operation produced entirely different results. [21] This incident tells
us that there are no method of war which is always right. There are only
rules which are always correct. It also tells us that correct rules do not
guarantee that there will always be victories; the secret to victory is to
correctly apply rules. Similarly, with regard to the side-principal rule,
the emphasis is on using the side element for modifying the principal element,
but it is not the case that deviation toward the side-element will always
produce a victory. Deviation toward the side element means mainly deviation
in terms of lines of thought and essence, instead of deviation in form. For
instance, in actual warfare, it is not the case that every time the point
of attack should be located at the point of deviation in a 0.618 style in
order to be in accord with rules of victory. It is possible that this time,
rules of victory call for frontal breakthroughs. Thus, this time, the "principal"
element is the "side" element. This is the nature of war as art. This art
element cannot be replaced by mathematics, philosophy or other areas of science
and technology. [22] Thus, we are sure that in this sense the military
technological revolution cannot replace the revolution in the art of military
affairs.

As should also be indicated, the side-principal principle is unavoidably
similar to the "surprise- non-suprise" principle advocated by ancient Chinese
strategists; nevertheless they are not entirely the same. For, ancient
strategists advocated the use of surprise moves and non-surprise moves at
different times. As Sun Zi said, "in fighting, it is necessary to use non-suprise
moves to gather strength and to use surprise moves to achieve victory. Fighting
entails just surprise and non-surprise moves. There is endless change to
the use of surprise and non-surprise moves." [23] The side element and the
principal element are not two methods which can each be used without the
other, but are an expression of an objective law. The most important distinction
is the following: It is certainly true that in the history of war the cases
of winning with surprise moves have all been marvelous because of their excellent
execution, but not all victories have been achieved through surprise moves.
There have also been many examples of achieving victories through non-surprise
moves. The side-principal principle is different. Through analysis, the trace
of the rule of victory can be seen in every victory, whether the victory
has been achieved through surprise or non-surprise moves: that is, that the
victory is the effect of the side-principal principle demonstrated in either
in a "surprise" or "non-surprise" way.

No matter how clear we state the side-principal rule or the rule of victory,
we can only proceed with the application of the rule in a fuzzy way. Sometimes,
being fuzzy is the best way of reaching clarity. For only fuzziness is good
for being grasped in an overall manner. This is the Eastern style of thinking.
But, in a peculiar way, it has met Occidental wisdom at the golden point
of 0.618. As a result, Occidental logic, reasoning, and precision and Eastern
instinct, understanding, and murkiness have provided the basis for joining
Eastern and Occidental military wisdom and have generated the rule of victory
that we have discussed. It shines with glitter, has both Eastern mystery
and Occidental rigor, as if eaves at the Taihe Palace are placed on a column
at the Pathernon Temple, looking majestic and vibrant.

Footnotes

[1] Pythagoras was a philosopher and mathematician of ancient Greece whose
famous axiom was, "Everything is a matter of numbers." That is, all existing
things can be viewed, in the final analysis, as relationships of numbers.
In Pythagoras' theory, things rational and things nonrational were mixed,
but his theory still exerted profound influences on the development of ancient
Greek philosophy and Medieval European thought. Copernicus recognized Pythagoras'
astronomical concepts as precursors of his proposition. Galileo was also
considered an advocate of Pythagoras' theory. Using the golden section to
demonstrate harmonious relationships in the world was only one specific
application of Pythagoras thinking; see Concise EncyclopediaBritannica, Vol 1, p 715.

[2] See Summerson, Classical Language of Architecture, p 90.

[3] Divide a straight line of the length of L into two sections in such a
way that the ratio of one section to the entire line equals the ratio of
the other section to this section, that is, X:L=(L-X):X. Such a division
is called the "golden section," and the ratio is approximately 0.618. From
ancient Greece to the 19th century, people believed this ratio was of aesthetic
value in formative art. In actual application, the simplest method is to
use as approximate values such ratios as 2:3, 3:5, 5:8, and 8:13 produced
on the basis of the series of numbers of 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21 . . . ; see Ci
Hai [A Grand Dictionary] (Shanghai Dictionary Press), 1980, pp
2057-2058.

[4] Dive bombing is a main method used by attack aircraft to launch short-range
missiles, rockets, and guided and unguided bombs. During an attack, an attack
aircraft flies at a low altitude to reach the combat point (40-50 km from
targets) and then rises to 2,000-4,000 meters, changing into the combat
direction. At 5-10 km from the target, it begins to dive and drops ordinance
at 1,300-1,600 meters and 600-1,000 meters from angles of 30-50 degrees.
In diving attacks, weapons' destructive precision is the highest [graph omitted];
see the Russian periodical, Foreign Military Reviews, No. 10 (1992).

[6] See Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Vol 1, p
117. This book contains a good analysis of the battle of Arbela and also
illustrations graphically depicting the situations of the battlefield.

[8] See "Biographies of Sun Zi and We Qi," in Shi Ji [Records of
History].

[9] See "Cao Gui's Analysis of War," in Zuo Zhuan. Later, when participating
in the Qi-Lu meeting at Ke, Cao Gui seized Duke Heng of Qi with a knife,
thereby forcing Qi to return to Lu land seized from Lu. He was a good general,
with both courage and wisdom; see "Biographies of Assassins," in Shi Ji.

[10] The battle of Cannae was the most famous battle in Western History and
has been mentioned in almost all works on the history of war. The book How
Great Generals Win, written by Bevin Alexander (U.S.), depicts the battle
of Cannae vividly with the support of illustrations, and can help to understand
the "side-principal rule" that we have discussed; see TongshuaiJuesheng Zhi Dao [How Great Generals Win] (Xinhua Press, 1996),
pp 11-13.

[11] In 1937-1938 Manstein was the first deputy chief of staff of the German
Army. Because of internal conflicts in the German Army, Manstein was expelled
from the Army Command and became commander of the 18th Division. In 1939,
the German Army Command issued an operational plan for the western front,
the "Yellow Operation Plan," indicating the intention to use frontal assaults
carried out by strong right flank forces to defeat the British-French forces
expected to be encountered in Belgium, while using weaker forces to cover
the flanks. Obviously, this plan was a refurbished version of the 1914 Schliffen
Plan. Manstein, then chief of staff of Group Army A, formulated his own
operational plan in the name of Group Army A. He submitted the plan to the
Army Command repeatedly in the form of a memorandum or a draft operational
plan. But it was rejected by high-raking generals of the Army Command each
time. Annoyed at Manstein, the Army Command transferred Manstein to the post
of commander of the 38th Army. Manstein reported to Hitler his ideas by taking
advantage of his meeting with Hitler, and persuaded Hitler who, entirely
a layman in the area of military affairs, had a high level of capacity for
understanding. The main point of one plan, called the Manstein Plan by Liddle
Hart after the war, was to conduct a surprise attack through the Ardennes
mountains, conducting focused assaults on the left flank and using armored
forces in a concentrated way; see Mansitanyin [Manstein], Shiqu de Shenli
[Lost Victory] (The Academy of Military Science of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army, 1980). Guderian was commander of the 19th Armored
Army and the best implementing agent of the Manstein Plan; see Gudeli'an
[Guderian], Shanji Yingxiong [Blitzkrieg Heroes] (Zhanshi Press,
1981).

[12] After becoming commander of a joint fleet, Yamamoto rejected the Japanese
Navy staff's idea of attacking the Philippines first and believed it necessary
to launch a sneak attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet first, so as to paralyze
it. On 7 December 1941, under General Nagumo's command, 6 aircraft carriers
with 423 aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor according to Yamamoto's plan, sinking
the battleship Arizona and three other battleships of the U.S. Navy and
destroying 188 aircraft, greatly damaging the U.S. Pacific Fleet; see Liddle
Hart, History of the SecondWorld War, pp 276-335.

[13] Before the Trafalgar naval battle, Nelson told his subordinate captains
a "secret method," that is, to change the traditional naval linear operational
method by dividing the warships into two groups. One group would attack the
middle of the enemy fleet at a 90-degree angle, separating the rear portion
from the middle portion. Then concentrated force would attack ships of the
rear portion of the enemy fleet. Another group would separate the middle
portion from the forward portion and conduct a concentrated attack on the
middle portion. It would be too late when ships of the forward portion of
the enemy fleet should try to come back to provide help. The Trafalgar naval
battle proceeded almost exactly as Nelson predicted. Although he was killed
from a battle wound, the British Navy achieved a complete victory; see Ding
Chaobi, ShijieJindai Haizhan Shi [The History of Modern
Naval Wars of the World] (Haiyang Press, 1994), pp 143-155.

[16] "Comprehensive superiority" was a strategic goal advocated by the U.S.
Army in its document, "Conception of the Army in 2010."

[17] "Global engagement" was a 21st-century air force development strategy
put forward by the U.S. Air Force at the end of 1997 to replace the "global
force for global reach" strategic doctrine used to deal with the situation
after the Cold War. In this respect, the six core areas of capability of
the air force were emphasized: air and space superiority; global attack;
global rapid mobility; precision strike; information superiority; and flexible
operational support; see "Global Engagement and the Conception of the U.S.
Air Force in the 21st Century."

[18] The concept of the "system of systems" was the result of joint research
conducted by Admiral Owens, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and his senior advisor, Black. According to Owens, the contemporary
military technological revolution is no longer a matter of revolution with
regard to warships, aircraft, tanks, and other weapon platforms, but there
has been the entry of such factors as sensor systems, communication systems,
and precision guided weapons systems. The entry of such systems will generate
a fundamental revolution in the force structure and modes of operation of
the military. Perhaps, in the future, there should no longer be the division
into an army, a navy, and an air force, but the division into a "sensor force,"
"mobile striking force," and "smart support force"; see the interview of
Owens by Chen Bojiang, Guofang Daxue Xuebao, Xiandai Junshi, and Shijie Junshi.

[19] We do not support the optimistic view of the technology faction with
regard to the military revolution. We do not believe that technology can
penetrate the fog of the "contingency" of war, for contingency in war does
not come from physical or geographical obstacles, but from people's minds.

[20] The side-principal rule is not the kind of theorem such as the statements
that "all men will die" and that "all swans are white." Rather it is a rule
for guiding people to victory in war.

[21] See Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Vol 2, p
201; A Concise History ofWar, p 86.

[22] We do not reject or neglect mathematical analysis, especially in the
era of widespread use of computers and in this country of ours where there
is a tradition of advocating fuzziness and a dislike of precision. In his
Guoji Zhengzhi Yu Junshi Wenti Ruogan Shulianghua Fenxi Fangfa
[Several Methods of Quantitative Analysis of International Political and
Military Issues], Li Hongzhi mentioned the use by Nigula Shiweite [as
printed 1441 0657 2139 2457 1218 3676] of the "Beiyete [as printed 6296 0673
3676] method" to analyze the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the
Arab-Israeli wars. In 1993 Li Hongzhi and others made accurate forecasts
of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war by using the method; see Guoji Zhengzhi
Yu Junshi Wenti RuoganShulianghua Fenxi Fangfa (Military Science
Press).

[23] The quotation is from "Momentum," in Sun Zi Binfa [Art of
War by Sun Zi]. The "surprise- non-surprise" principle is an important
concept used by ancient military strategists in relation to methods of war.
To unpredictably make moves unexpected by the enemy is the "surprise" method;
to confront the enemy on the battlefield in an open manner is the "non-surprise"
method. Emperor Taizong of Tang had a good understanding of the
"surprise-non-surprise principle." The Weiqing engagement was an example
in this regard. "A Dialogue Between Emperor Taizong of Tang and Li Weigong"
recorded the views of Li Shimin and Li Jing on the "surprise-non- surprise
principle."

Today's wars will affect the price of gasoline in pipelines, the price of
food in supermarkets, and the price of securities on the stock exchange.
They will also disrupt the ecological balance, and push their way into every
one of our homes by way of the television screen. --Alvin Toffler

Understanding the rules by which victory is achieved [the subject of the
previous chapter] certainly does not equate to having a lock on victory,
any more than knowing the techniques of long-distance racing equates to being
able to win a marathon. Discovery of the rules of victory can deepen people's
knowledge of the laws of warfare, and increase the standard by which military
arts are practiced. But on the battlefield, the victor will certainly not
have won because he has detected more of the rules of victory. The key will
be which contender truly grasps the rules of victory in their essence.

In a possible future war, the rules of victory will make extremely harsh
demands on the victor. Not only will they, as in the past, demand that one
know thoroughly all the ingenious ways to contest for victory on the battlefield.
Even more so, they will impose demands which will mean that most of the warriors
will be inadequately prepared, or will feel as though they are in the dark:
the war will be fought and won in a war beyond the battlefield; the struggle
for victory will take place on a battlefield beyond the battlefield.

Using this specific meaning, even modern military men like Powell, Schwartzkopf,
or even Sullivan [U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1991-1995] or Shalikashvili cannot
be considered "modern." Instead, they seem more like a group of traditional
military men. This is because a chasm has already appeared between traditional
soldiers and what we call modern soldiers. Although this gap is not unbridgeable,
it does require a leap in terms of a complete military rethink. To many
professional military people this is potentially something they could not
hope to achieve if they spent the rest of their lives on it. In fact it is
very simple. The [necessary new] method is to create a complete military
Machiavelli.

Achieve objectives by fair means or foul, that is the most important spiritual
legacy of this Italian political thinker of the Renaissance.[1 ] In the Middle
Ages, this represented a breakthrough against romantic chivalry and the declining
tradition of knighthood. It meant using means, some possibly comprehensive,
without restraint to achieve an objective; this holds for warfare also. Even
though Machiavelli was not the earliest source of "an ideology of going beyond
limits" (China's Han Feizi preceded him[2 ]), he was its clearest exponent.

The existence of boundaries is a prerequisite for differentiating objects
one from another. In a world where all things are interdependent, the
significance of boundaries is merely relative. The expression "to exceed
limits" means to go beyond things which are called or understood to be
boundaries. It does not matter whether they fall into the category of physical,
spiritual, or technical, or if they are called "limits," "defined limits,"
"constraints," "borders," "rules," "laws," "maximum limits," or even "taboos."
Speaking in terms of war, this could mean the boundary between the battlefield
and what is not the battlefield, between what is a weapon and what is not,
between soldier and noncombatant, between state and non-state or supra-state.
Possibly it might also include technical, scientific, theoretical, psychological,
ethical, traditional, customary, and other sorts of boundaries. In summary,
it means all boundaries which restrict warfare to within a specified range.
The real meaning of the concept of exceeding limits which we propose is,
first of all, to transcend ideology. Only secondarily does it mean, when
taking action, to transcend limits and boundaries when necessary, when they
can be transcended, and select the most appropriate means (including extreme
means). It does not mean that extreme means must be selected always and
everywhere. When speaking of military people in this technologically integrated
era, there are actually more facets to consider now, an abundance of usable
resources (meaning all material and non-material resources), so that no matter
what limits military people face, there is always a means which can break
through those limits, many more means than in the environment from whence
Machiavelli came. Thus, the requirements for modern military people with
regard to transcending their way of thinking also involve being more thorough.

We said earlier [p. 146] that combinations were the cocktails in the glasses
of the great masters of warfare. [That is, Alexander the Great and the martial
kings of the Zhou Dynasty never heard of cocktails, but they knew the value
of the combined use of things.] But in past wars, the combination of weapons,
means, battle arrays, and stratagems was all done within the limits of the
military sphere. This narrow sense of the concept of combinations is, of
course, very inadequate for today. He who wants to win today's wars, or those
of tomorrow, to have victory firmly in his grasp, must "combine" all of the
resources of war which he has at his disposal and use them as means to prosecute
the war. And even this will not be enough. He must combine them according
to the demands of the rules of victory. Even this will still not be enough,
because the rules of victory cannot guarantee that victory will drop like
ripe fruit into a basket. It still needs a skilled hand to pluck it. That
hand is the concept of "going beyond limits," surpassing all boundaries and
conforming with the laws of victory when conducting warfare with combinations.
Thus we obtain a complete concept, a completely new method of warfare called
"modified combined war that goes beyond limits." [ "pian zheng shi chao xian
zuhe zhan" 0252 2973 1709 6389 7098 4809 0678 2069]

Supra-National Combinations [Chao Guojia Zuhe]

[Combining National, International, and Non-State Organizations]

It seems we now face another paradox: in terms of theory, "going beyond limits"
should mean no restrictions of any kind, going beyond everything. But in
fact, unlimited surpassing of limits is impossible to achieve. Any surpassing
of limits can only be done within certain restrictions. That is, "going beyond
limits" certainly does not equate to "no limits," only to the expansion of
"limited." That is, to go beyond the intrinsic boundaries of a certain area
or a certain direction, and to combine opportunities and means in more areas
or in more directions, so as to achieve a set objective.

This is our definition of "combined war that goes beyond limits."

As a method of warfare with "beyond - limits" as its major feature, its principle
is to assemble and blend together more means to resolve a problem in a range
wider than the problem itself. For example, when national security is threatened,
the answer is not simply a matter of selecting the means to confront the
other nation militarily, but rather a matter of dispelling the crisis through
the employment of "supra-national combinations."

We see from history that the nation-state is the highest form of the idea
of security. For Chinese people, the nation-state even equates to the great
concept of all-under-heaven [tianxia 1131 0007 classical name for China].
Nowadays, the significance of the word "country" in terms of nationality
or geography is no more than a large or small link in the human society of
the "world village." Modern countries are affected more and more by regional
or world-wide organizations, such as the European Community [sic; now the
European Union], ASEAN, OPEC, APEC, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, the WTO, and the biggest of them all, the United Nations. Besides
these, a large number of multinational organizations and non-state organizations
of all shapes and sizes, such as multinational corporations, trade associations,
peace and environmental organizations, the Olympic Committee, religious
organizations, terrorist organizations, small groups of hackers, etc., dart
from left and right into a country's path. These multinational, non-state,
and supra-national organizations together consitute an up and coming worldwide
system of power.[3]

Perhaps not many people have noticed, but the factors described above are
leading us into an era of transformation in which great power politics are
yielding to supra-national politics. The main characteristic of this era
is that it is transitional: many indications of it are appearing, and many
processes are just now beginning. National power is a main part, and
supra-national, multinational, and non-state power is another main part,
and the final verdict on which of these will play the main role on the
international stage has yet to be delivered. On the one hand, the big powers
still play the dominant part. In particular, that all-round big power, the
United States, and the big economic powers like Japan and Germany, and the
rising power China, and the fading power Russia, are all trying to exert
their own influence on the overall situation. On the other hand, there are
far-sighted big powers which have clearly already begun to borrow the power
of supra-national, multinational, and non-state players to redouble and expand
their own influence. They realize they cannot achieve their objectives by
relying only on their own power. The most recent and most typical example
is the use of the euro to unify the European Community. This vigorous process
has continued to today, but it has just now emerged from a period of floundering.
The time when the process will conclude is still far off. The recent direction
and the long-range prospect are not clear-cut. They are things which come
about as a matter of course. Nevertheless, some signs of a trend are evident;
that is, the curtain is now slowly falling on the era in which the final
decision on victory and defeat is made by way of state vs. state tests of
strength. Instead, the curtain is quietly opening on an era in which problems
will be resolved and objectives achieved by using supra-national means on
a stage larger than the size of a country.[4] In view of this, we list
"supra-national combinations" as being among the essential factors of warfare
that exceeds limits.

In this world of mutually penetrating political, economic, ideological,
technical, and cultural influences, with networks, clones, Hollywood, hot
girls [la mei 6584 1188 -- internet pornography], and the World Cup easily
bypassing territorial boundary markers, it is very hard to realize hopes
of assuring security and pursuing interests in a purely national sense. Only
a fool like Saddam Hussein would seek to fulfill his own wild ambition by
outright territorial occupation. Facts make it clear that acting in this
way in the closing years of the 20th Century is clearly behind the times,
and will certainly lead to defeat. Also pursuing its national security and
national interests, as a mature great power the United States appeared much
smarter than Iraq.

Since the day they stepped onto the international stage, the Americans have
been seizing things by force or by trickery, and the benefits they obtained
from other countries were many times greater than anyone knows than what
Iraq got from Kuwait. The reasons cannot be explained as merely "might makes
right," and they are not just a problem of an evasion of international norms
and vetoes. This is because, in all its foreign actions, the United States
always tries to get as many followers as possible, in order to avoid becoming
a leader with no support, out there all alone. Except for small countries
like Grenada and Panama, against which it took direct and purely military
action, in most situations the United States pursues and realizes its own
interests by using supra-national means. In coping with the Iraq problem,
the method the Americans used a very typical supra-national combination.
During the entire course of their actions, the Americans acted in collusion
with others, maneuvering among various political groups, and getting the
support of practically all the countries in the United Nations. The United
States got this, the premier international organization in all the world,
to issue a resolution to make trouble under a pretext provided by the United
States, and dragged over 30 countries into the joint force sent against Iraq.
After the war, the United States was again successful in organizing an economic
embargo of Iraq which has continued for eight years, and it used arms inspections
to maintain continuous political and military pressure on Iraq. This has
left Iraq in long-term political isolation and dire economic straits.

Since the Gulf War, the trend toward supra-national combinations in warfare
or other conflicts has been increasingly obvious. The more recent the event,
the more prominent this characteristic is, and the more frequently it becomes
a means used by more and more countries. In the past ten years this trend
has become the backdrop for drastic international social turbulence. Worldwide
economic integration, internationalization of domestic politics, the networking
of information resources, the increased frequency of new technological eras,
the concealment of cultural conflicts, and the strengthening of non-state
organizations, all bring human society both convenience and troubles, in
equal means. This is why the great powers, and even some medium and small
sized countries, act in concert without need of prior coordination and set
their sights on supra-national combinations as the way to solve their problems.[5
]

It is for just this reason that threats to modern nations come more often
from supra-national powers, and not from one or two specific countries. There
can be no better means for countering such threats than the use of supra-national
combinations. In fact, there's nothing new under the sun, and supra-national
combinations are not newly discovered territory. As early as the Spring and
Autumn period [770-476 B.C], the Warring States period [475-221 B.C.], and
the Peloponnesian War [431-404 B.C], supra-national combinations were already
the oldest and most classical of methods employed by ancient strategists
in the east and in the west.[6 ] The idea has not lost its fascination to
this day. Schwartzkopf's supra-national combination in the Gulf War can be
called a modern version of the classical "alliance + combined forces." If
we must point out the generation gap between ancient times and today and
describe the difference between them, then it is that for the ancients the
idea was combinations of state with state, and not vertical, horizontal,
and interlocking supra-national, trans-national, and non-state combinations.[7
] These three ancient peoples could not have imagined that the principle
would remain unchanged in the present. Nor could they imagine the revolutionary
changes which have occurred, from technical means to actual employment. The
brand-new model of "state + supra- national + trans-national + non-state"
will bring about fundamental changes in the face and final outcome of warfare,
even changing the essential military nature of warfare which has been an
unquestionable truth since ancient times. This method, resolving conflicts
or conducting warfare not just with national power, but also with combinations
of supra-national, trans-national, and non-state power, is what we mean by
the general term supra-national combinations. From an examination of some
prior, successful examples it can be foreseen that from now on, supra- national
combinations will be a country's most powerful weapon in attempting to accomplish
national security objectives and secure strategic interests within a scope
larger than the country itself.[8 ] As the world's only world-class superpower,
the United States is the best at using supra-national combinations as a weapon.
The United States never misses any opportunity to take a hand in international
organizations involving U.S. interests. Another way to put it is that the
United States consistently sees the actions of all international organizations
as being closely related to U.S. interests. No matter whether the nature
of the international organization is European, American, Asian, for some
other region, or worldwide, the United States always strives to get involved
in it, and manipulate it. The 1996 U.S. Department of Defense Report put
it straightforwardly, "To protect and achieve U.S. interests, the U.S. Government
must have the capability to influence the policies and actions of other
countries. This requires the United States to maintain its overseas involvement,
especially in those areas in which the most important interests of the United
States are endangered."[9 ] For example, regarding the establishment of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, the initial idea of its
conceptualizer, Australian Prime Minister Hawke, was that it would only include
Asian countries, Australia, and New Zealand. However, this idea immediately
encountered strong opposition from President Bush, and it was then expanded
to include the United States and Canada. At the same time, so as to check
the momentum of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, the United States spared
no effort in instigating some Asian countries to sign independent agreements
with the North American Free Trade Area. Not only did the United States make
its way in, it also dragged others out. It might well be said that the United
States used a double-combination tactic.

What people sense as a closely guarded secret is the attitude and methods
of the Americans in dealing with the Asian financial crisis. When the storm
erupted, the United States immediately opposed a Japanese proposal to set
up an Asian monetary fund. Instead, the United States advocated the
implementation of a rescue plan, with strings attached, by way of the
International Monetary Fund, of which it is a major shareholder. The implication
was that Asian countries should be forced to accept the economic liberalization
policy promoted by the United States. For example, when the IMF extended
a $57 billion loan to South Korea, it was with the condition that Korea must
open up its markets completely and allow American capital the opportunity
to buy up Korean enterprises at unreasonably low prices. A demand such as
this is armed robbery. It gives the developed countries, with the United
States as their leader, the opportunity to gain unrestricted access to another
country's markets, or to get in and clear out some space there. It is little
different from a disguised form of economic occupation.[10] If we completely
tie together these sorts of American methods; the sniper attacks against
the finances of Asian countries' by the likes of Soros; the increase over
ten years in the Americans' general fund total from $810 billion to $5 trillion,
still growing at the rate of $30 billion per month[11]; Moody's, Standard
& Poor's, and Morgan Stanley lowering the credit ratings of Japan, Hong
Kong, and Malaysia at the most critical or most delicate times; Greenspan's
concern over whether or not the Hong Kong government's counterattack against
"fund raiders" will change the rules of the game; the Federal Reserve Bank's
exception to the rules to aid the Long-Term Capital Management (LCTM)
Corporation, which lost money on speculation; and hearing the sound of "no"
during all the bustle and excitement in Asia and hearing the words "Asian
Century" less frequently with each passing day; consider all this and discover
how cleverly it is all seamlessly linked together. [12 ] Supposing these
things were all combined and used to attack a long-coveted target, would
not that be a successful combined action with supra-national organizations
+ trans-national organizations + non-state organizations? Although there
is no direct evidence to prove that the United States government and the
Federal Reserve have painstakingly designed and used this extremely powerful,
concealed weapon, judging from the signs, at a minimum it can be said that
certain actions had their prior encouragement and tacit consent. The key
to the issues which we want to discuss here certainly does not lie in whether
or not the Americans have intentionally used such a weapon. But as a
super-weapon, is it practical?

The answer is affirmative.

Supra-Domain Combinations [Chao Lingyu Zuhe 6389 7325 1008 4809 0678]

[Combinations Beyond the Domain of the Battlefield]

"Domain" is a concept derived from the concept of territory and used to delineate
the scope of human activities. Seen in this sense, a domain of warfare is
a demarcation of the scope of what is encompassed by warfare. As with the
concept of "supra-national combinations," the idea of "supra-domain combinations"
which we propose is also a shortened form. To be precise, these terms should
be followed with the words "of actions in warfare" if we are to convey in
full the intent of these concepts which we are constructing and employing.
This is to make clear the point that views about "supra...combinations" driven
by beyond-limits thinking are confined to the scope of warfare and its related
actions.

The concept of supra-domain combinations lies between the previously discussed
concept of supra-national combinations and the concept of supra-means
combinations [chao shouduan zuhe 6389 2087 3008 4809 0678], which will be
explained below. As with its placement in our discussion, the concept of
supra-domain combinations is an indispensable link in the groundbreaking
line of thought about going beyond limits. Just as aircraft had to break
the sound barrier before they could fly at supersonic speeds, those who are
engaged in warfare must break out of the confines of domains if they are
to be able to enter a state of freedom in thinking about warfare. Breaking
the boundaries of ideology is a prerequisite for breaking the boundaries
of action. Without breaking ideological boundaries, even in the event of
a breakthrough in action being made by relying on intuition, it will still
be difficult in the end to achieve complete peace of mind. For example, the
U.S. Army's doctrine of "full-dimensional operations" [see TRADOC Pamphlet
525-5] and our "supra-domain combinations" are different in approach but
equally good in their effect (the term "full dimensional" means in all domains),
but the U.S. Army's "full- dimensional operations" seems more like a burst
of unusual thinking by a group of smart military people, and not something
built on the foundation of a line of thought which is by its nature a complete
breakthrough. And so, because ideas which are not completely thought out
will certainly face all sorts of obstacles, this ideological spark which
could have set off a revolution in military affairs very quickly, and
regrettably, died out.[13 ]

The expansion of the domain of warfare is a necessary consequence of the
ever-expanding scope of human activity, and the two are intertwined. Mankind's
understanding of this phenomenon has always lagged behind the phenomenon
itself. Although as long ago as Cao Gui [hero of the Spring and Autumn period]
and as recently as Collins [John M. Collins, author of GrandStrategy: Principles and Practices] there have been farsighted possessors
of superior insight who to varying degrees pointed out the mutually restricting
relationships among the various domains of warfare, up to now most people
involved in warfare considered all the non-military domains where they were
as being accessories to serve military needs. The narrowness of their field
of vision and their way of thinking restricted the development of the battlefield
and changes in strategy and tactics to within one domain. From Kutuzov torching
Moscow [before abandoning it in 1812], without pity destroying over half
the country in the strategy of strengthening defense works and laying waste
to the fields as his way of dealing with Napoleon; to the massive bombing
of Dresden and the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, inflicting
countless civilian casualties in the pursuit of absolute military victory;
to the strategic propositions of "massive retaliation" and "mutually assured
destruction;" none of these broke this mold. It is now time to correct this
mistaken trend. The great fusion of technologies is impelling the domains
of politics, economics, the military, culture, diplomacy, and religion to
overlap each other. The connection points are ready, and the trend towards
the merging of the various domains is very clear. Add to this the influence
of the high tide of human rights consciousness on the morality of warfare.
All of these things are rendering more and more obsolete the idea of confining
warfare to the military domain and of using the number of casualties as a
means of the intensity of a war. Warfare is now escaping from the boundaries
of bloody massacre, and exhibiting a trend towards low casualties, or even
none at all, and yet high intensity. This is information warfare, financial
warfare, trade warfare, and other entirely new forms of war, new areas opened
up in the domain of warfare. In this sense, there is now no domain which
warfare cannot use, and there is almost no domain which does not have warfare's
offensive pattern.

On October 19, 1987, U.S. Navy ships attacked an Iranian oil drilling platform
in the Persian Gulf. News of this reached the New York Stock Exchange and
immediately set off the worst stock market crash in the history of Wall Street.
This event, which came to be known as "Black Monday," caused the loss of
$560 billion in book value to the American stock market. This is an amount
equal to the complete loss of one France. In the years since then, time after
time military actions have touched off stock disasters which then led to
economic panic. In 1995-96, mainland China announced that it would conduct
test launches of missiles in the Taiwan Strait and that it would conduct
military exercises. As the missile tracks etched the sky, the Taiwan stock
market immediately slid downward like an avalanche touched off by a bang.
Although these two events are not examples of the supra-domain combinations
of which we are speaking, these two especially do fall in the category of
stupid acts like lifting a rock only to smash one's own foot with it. Their
unexpected outcomes nevertheless suffice to set our train of thought into
motion: if one intentionally takes two or more mutually unconcerned domains
and combines them into a kind of tactic one can use, isn't the result better?

From the point of view of beyond-limits thinking, "supra-domain combinations"
means the combining of battlefields. Each domain may, like the military domain,
constitute the principal domain of future warfare. But one of the objectives
of "supra-domain combinations" is to consider and select which domain will
be the main battlefield, the one most favorable for the accomplishment of
the objectives of the war. From the practical experience of the conflict
between the United States and Iraq we can see that the 42-day military action
of Desert Storm was followed by eight continuous years of military pressure
+ economic blockade + weapons inspections, which was [and example of] the
United States using supra-national combinations to attack Iraq on new
battlefields. And without mentioning the huge non-military damage caused
in Iraq by the economic blockade, the attack on Iraq's military potential
in the form of the United Nations Special Committee for Weapons Inspections
led by Butler, checking and melting down large numbers of casualty-producing
weapons for several years, has already far exceeded the results of the bombing
during the Gulf War.

These things make it clear that warfare is no longer an activity confined
only to the military sphere, and that the course of any war could be changed,
or its outcome decided, by political factors, economic factors, diplomatic
factors, cultural factors, technological factors, or other non- military
factors. Faced with the far-reaching influence of military and non-military
conflicts in every corner of the world, only if we break through the various
kinds of boundaries in the models of our line of thought, take the various
domains which are so completely affected by warfare and turn them into playing
cards deftly shuffled in our skilled hands, and thus use beyond-limits strategy
and tactics to combine all the resources of war, can there be the possibility
that we will be confident of victory.

[Combination of All Available Means (Military and Non-Military) to Carry
Out Operations]

During a war between two countries, during the fighting and killing by two
armies, is it necessary to use special means to wage psychological war aimed
at soldiers' families far back in the rear area? [14 ] When protecting a
country's financial security, can assassination be used to deal with financial
speculators? [15 ] Can "surgical" strikes be made without a declaration of
war against areas which are sources of drugs or other smuggled goods? Can
special funds be set up to exert greater influence on another country's
government and legislature through lobbying? [16 ] And could buying or gaining
control of stocks be used to turn another country's newspapers and television
stations into the tools of media warfare? [17 ]

Apart from the justifiability of the use of the means, that is, whether or
not they conform to generally recognized rules of morality, another point
in common among the above questions is that they all touch on the use of
means in a supra-national, supra-domain way. They are also issues in what
we are talking about when we say "supra-means combinations." And if we are
to make clear what supra-means combinations are, and why there should be
such things, then we must first make clear the following: What are means?

This question is practically not a question at all. Everybody knows that
a is a method or tool by which to accomplish an objective. But if things
as big as a country or an army and as small as a stratagem are all imprecisely
called means, then the question is far from simple.

The relativity of means is an issue on which people have expended considerable
effort.

We can see this sort of relativity in the fact that on one level, something
may be a means, while on another level it may be an objective. When speaking
of supra-national actions, a country is a means, but when speaking of national
actions, an armed force or another country's force is a means, and the country
becomes an objective. Pushing further with this reasoning, means of unequal
size are like a set of Chinese boxes one inside the other. A means at one
level serves a higher objective, while at the same time being the objective
for the means at the next lower level. Dropping this discussion of objectives,
the complexity of what a means is still remains. We can take any object and
examine it from any angle or on any level and understand what a means is.

From the angle of domains, the domains of the military, politics, diplomacy,
economics, culture, religion, psychology, and the media can often be seen
as means. And domains can be subdivided. For example, in the military domain,
strategy and tactics, military deterrence, military alliances, military
exercises, arms control, weapons embargoes, armed blockades, right down to
the use of force, these are all without doubt military means. And although
economic assistance, trade sanctions, diplomatic mediation, cultural
infiltration, media propaganda, formulating and applying international rules,
using United Nations resolutions, etc., belong to different domains such
as politics, economics, or diplomacy, statesmen use them more and more now
as standard military means.

From the angle of methods, philosophical methods, technical methods, mathematical
methods, scientific methods, and artistic methods are all used by humanity
to bring benefit to itself. However, they can also be used as means in war.
Take for example, technology. The emergence and development of information
technology, materials technology, space technology, bioengineering technology,
and all other new technologies are part of the expanding array of means.
Another example is mathematics. There is nowhere in which the influence of
mathematical methods is not seen in military terminology such as disposition
of forces, base figures [used to plan consumption] of ammunition, calculation
of trajectories, probabilities of deaths and woundings, combat radii, and
explosive yields. Moreover, philosophical, scientific, and artistic methods
are also effective in supporting military wisdom and military action. This
is why people often refer to military ideology, military theory, and military
practice as military philosophy, military science, and military art. Liddell
Hart [British officer and military theorist] defined the word strategy as
"the art of using military means to achieve political objectives."

From this we can see that the concept of means covers a lot of territory,
on numerous levels, with overlapping functions, and thus it is not an easy
concept to grasp. Only by expanding our field of vision and our understanding
of means, and grasping the principle that there is nothing which cannot be
considered a means, can we avoid the predicament of being confronted with
too many difficulties to tackle all at once and being at wit's end when we
employ means. During the crisis in 1978 when Iran occupied the U.S. Embassy
and took hostages, at first, all the United States thought of was the rash
use of military means. Only after these failed did it change its tactics,
first freezing Iran's foreign assets, then imposing an arms embargo, and
supporting Iraq in the war with Iran. Then it added diplomatic negotiations.
When all these channels were used together, the crisis finally came to an
end.[18] This shows clearly that in a world of unprecedented complexity,
the form and the scope of application of means is also in a state of continuous
change, and a better means used alone will have no advantage over several
means used in combination. Thus, supra-means combinations are becoming extremely
necessary. It's a pity that not many countries are aware of this. On the
contrary, it is those non-state organizations in pursuit of various interests
which are sparing no effort in search of the use of means in combination.
For example, the Russian mafia combines assassination, kidnapping for ransom,
and hacker attacks against the electronic systems of banks in order to get
rich. Some terrorist organizations pursue political objectives by combining
means such as throwing bombs, taking hostages, and making raids on networks.
To stir up the waters and grope for fish, the likes of Soros combine speculation
in currency markets, stock markets, and futures markets. Also they exploit
public opinion and create widespread momentum to lure and assemble the "jumbos"
such as Merrill Lynch, Fidelity, and Morgan Stanley and their partners [19
]to join forces in the marketplace on a huge scale and wage hair-raising
financial wars one after the other. Most of these means are not by their
nature military (although they often have a tendency to be violent), but
the methods by which they are combined and used certainly do not fail to
inspire us as to how to use military or non-military means effectively in
war. This is because nowadays, judging the effectiveness of a particular
means is not mainly a matter of looking at what category it is in, or at
whether or not it conforms to some moral standard. Instead, it mainly involves
looking at whether or not it conforms to a certain principle; namely, is
it the best way to achieve the desired objective? So long as it conforms
to this principle, then it is the best means. Although other factors cannot
be totally disregarded, they must fulfill the prerequisite that they be
advantageous to achieving the objective. That is, what supra-means combinations
must surpass is not other [means], but rather the moral standards or normal
principles intrinsic to the means themselves.

This is much more difficult and complex than combining certain means with
certain other means.

We can only shake off taboos and enter an area of free choice of means --
the beyond-limits realm -- if we complete our picture of the concept of
beyond-limits. This is because for us, we cannot achieve objectives merely
by way of ready-made means. We still need to find the optimum way to achieve
objectives, a correct and effective way to employ means. In other words,
to find out how to combine different means and create new means to achieve
objectives. For example, in this era of economic integration, if some
economically powerful company wants to attack another country's economy while
simultaneously attacking its defenses, it cannot rely completely on the use
of ready-made means such as economic blockades and trade sanctions, or military
threats and arms embargoes. Instead, it must adjust its own financial strategy,
use currency revaluation or devaluation as primary, and combine means such
as getting the upper hand in public opinion and changing the rules sufficiently
to make financial turbulence and economic crisis appear in the targeted country
or area, weakening its overall power, including its military strength. In
the Southeast Asian financial crisis we see a case in which the crisis led
to a lowering of the temperature of the arms race in that region. Thus we
can see the possibility that this will happen, although in this case it was
not caused by some big country intentionally changing the value of its own
currency. Even a quasi-world power like China already has the power to jolt
the world economy just by changing its own economic policies. If China were
a selfish country, and had gone back on its word in 1998 and let the Renminbi
lose value, no doubt this would have added to the misfortunes of the economies
of Asia. It would also have induced a cataclysm in the world's capital markets,
with the result that even the world's number one debtor nation, a country
which relies on the inflow of foreign capital to support its economic prosperity,
the United States, would definitely have suffered heavy economic losses.
Such an outcome would certainly be better than a military strike.

The reality of information exchanges and intertwining interests is continually
broadening the meaning of warfare. Also, any country which plays a decisive
role has various capabilities to threaten other countries, and not just with
military means. The use of means singly will produce less and less effect.
The advantages of the combined use of various kinds of means will become
more and more evident. This has opened the door wide for supra-means
combinations, and for the employment of these sorts of combinations in warfare
or quasi-war actions.

Supra-Tier Combinations [Chao Taijie Zuhe 6389 0669 7132 4809 0678]

[Combine All Levels of Conflict Into Each Campaign]

When a war becomes a phase of history, the course of the war emerges little
by little, like the gradual cooling of molten steel. From the earliest
small-scale local fights, to campaigns consisting of interrelated battles
on all sides, to wars consisting of a few or even several campaigns, and
finally to the possibility that a war could spread and become a great
intercontinental or worldwide war; in this way a war proceeds tier by tier
up invisible steps.

Possibly it might also go back down. On each level are strewn moaning casualties
and the bodies of the dead, the muzzles of the victor's guns raised high
and the rifles of the defeated lying abandoned, as well as many plans and
stratagems, either wise or stupid. If we start with the last page of a war's
history and go backwards chapter by chapter, we will discover that the entire
process is an accumulation, and all of the outcomes resulted from this
accumulation. Victory is an accumulation, and so is defeat. In terms of the
two combatant sides, they followed a single road to their outcomes. The only
difference is to be seen in whether one ascended the stairs and went higher
or ascended the stairs and fell on them. Leaps and sudden changes all occur
when you set foot on the final step.

This is practically a rule.

But rules must be respected. To evade or break the rules requires prudence.

The issue is that what we are thinking about is precisely how to evade or
break such rules. We do not believe that all wars must gradually progress
in level-by-level sequence, accumulating until a fateful moment of destiny
is reached. We believe that moment is something which can be created. Finding
a way by which we can continuously create that moment and not wait for the
accumulation, and then fixing that method as a kind of strategy, that is
the thing which we should do.

Of course, we know that one battle does not constitute a war, any more than
one soldier constitutes an army. But this is not the issue we want to talk
about. Our issue is how to use some method to break down all the stages,
and link up and assemble these stages at will. For example, take a fight
or an action on the tactical level, and combine it directly with an action
on the level of wars, or on the strategic level. We could change warfare
into something like a dragon with interchangeable limbs, torsos, and heads,
which we could put together as we like, and which could swing freely in any
direction.

This is what is meant by the method "supra-tier combinations." A level is
also a kind of restriction, similar to national boundaries, territorial
boundaries, and the boundaries around means. All are boundaries which must
be surpassed in the actual practice of supra-combinations warfare.

Herman Kahn divided the threshold to nuclear war into a number of stages.
Stages like them exist in other forms of warfare as well. But if we truly
follow Kahn's line of thought, we discover that the delineation of his 44
levels is excessively fine, and is not easy to work with. [20] Also, because
he focused more on dividing warfare into stages based on intensity, he lacked
penetrating insight into the essential nature of the levels of war. In our
view, if the cuts dividing the levels of war are made based on the two aspects
of the scale of war and the corresponding methods of war, then the levels
of war are greatly simplified, and division into four levels is sufficient.
On this point, our views and those of some American military analysts are
basically the same, and differ only in their wording. Our specific delineation
is as follows:

The first level is "grand war - war policy." In terms of scale, this is military
and non-military actions of warfare with supra-national as the upper limit
and the nation as the lower limit. The function corresponding to it is "war
policy," which is what Collins calls "grand strategy." We call it "war policy"
because strategy at this level mainly involves the political stratagems for
warfare. The second level is "war - strategy." National level military actions
include non-military actions of warfare on this level. The function corresponding
to it is "strategy," that is, a country's military stratagems or stratagems
of war.

The third level is "campaigns - operational art." In terms of scale, this
refers to combat actions lower than a war but higher than battles. The function
corresponding to this level has no title, and often the concept of "campaigning"
is used indiscriminately. Obviously this obscures the implications of the
scope and methods of combat operations, and so we have chosen the term
"operational art [ zhanyi; or war arts or art of warfare]. The selection
of the positioning of this level, lower than strategy and higher than tactics,
would require elaboration on the meaning of the art of warfare.

The fourth level is "battles - tactics." This is combat actions on the most
basic scale. The function corresponding to them is "tactics."

It can be seen at a glance that each of these levels has a corresponding
combat function. Speaking of traditional military men, perhaps throughout
their lives their lessons were on how to be skilled in employing these functions
and fighting well at whatever level they were on. But for soldiers who are
about to be in the next century, it is far from sufficient for them just
to practice these functions on these four fixed levels. They must study how
to disrupt these levels, to win wars by combining all the factors from
supra-national actions to specific battles. This is certainly not a mission
which cannot be accomplished. To put it quite simply, as an attempt to match
up war policy, strategy, operational art, and tactics with methods, the principle
of supra- tier combinations is nothing more than a matter of interchangeable
and easily transposed roles. Examples are using a strategic method which
is some sort of non-military action to go along with the accomplishment of
a tactical mission, or using a tactical method to accomplish an objective
on the war policy level. This is because, the trend of warfare shows more
and more clearly this sort of indication: it is definitely not the case that
the problems at one level can only be solved by the means at one level. No
matter whether it is allocating only a fraction of the resources, or using
a big machete to kill a chicken, it is a feasible method so long as it works
well.

Bin Laden used a tactical level method of only two truckloads of explosives
and threatened U.S. national interests on the strategic level, whereas the
Americans can only achieve the strategic objective of protecting their own
safety by carrying out tactical level retaliation against him. Another example
is that in past wars, the smallest combat element was the combination of
a man and a machine, and its usefulness would normally not go beyond the
scale of battles. In beyond- limits war, by contrast, the man-machine combination
performs multiple offensive functions which span the levels from battles
to war policy. One hacker + one modem causes an enemy damage and losses almost
equal to those of a war. Because it has the breadth and secrecy of trans-level
combat, this method of individual combat very easily achieves results on
the strategic and even war policy levels.

This is the gist and significance of supra-level combinations.

In warfare and non-military warfare which is primarily national and
supra-national, there is no territory which cannot be surpassed; there is
no means which cannot be used in the war; and there is no territory and method
which cannot be used in combination. The applicability of the actions of
war to the trend of globalization is manifested in the word "beyond." This
word is sufficient to mean using one to apply to ten thousand, but what we
mean by ten thousand methods combined as one is precisely covered by the
word "beyond."

It must be pointed out once again that combined war that goes beyond limits
is first of all a way of thinking, and only afterwards is it a method.

FOOTNOTES

[1] B. Russell said of Machiavelli, "People are always shocked by him, and
sometimes he was indeed shocking. But if people could shake off their hypocrisy,
as he did, then quite a few of them would think as he did... (as Machiavelli
saw it,) if an objective is considered to be good, then we definitely must
select some means which are sufficient to accomplish it. As for the issue
of the means, this can be handled with a purely scientific approach, without
regard for whether the objective is good or bad." (Junwang Lun (On
Monarchs), Hunan People's Publishing House, 1987, pp. 115-123.)

[2 ] Born during the Warring States period [475-221 B.C.], Han Feizi was
the great product of the Legalist school of thought. In speech and actions,
he emphasized the actual effect, as in "the target at which words and deeds
are aimed is results." There were no other objectives or constraints. (See
Zhongguo Sixiang Tongshi (A Comprehensive History of Chinese
Thought), Hou Wailu et al., eds., People's Publishing House, 1957, p.
616.)

[ 3] In his book Powershift : Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge
of the 21st Century, Alvin Toffler devotes a small section to a discussion
of "new types of worldwide organizations:" "We are now seeing an extremely
significant shift of power, namely, from single countries or blocs of countries
to worldwide 'wrestlers'." By worldwide wrestlers he means non-state bodies,
large and small, from the European Community to multinational corporations.
According to statistics from the United Nations' 1997 Investment Report,
the world then had 44,000 multinational parent corporations and 280,000 foreign
subsidiary companies and subordinate enterprises. These multinationals controlled
one third of the world's production, and had within their grasp 70% of the
world's direct foreign investment, two thirds of the world's trade, and over
70% of all patents and other technology transfers. (Source: Guangming
Daily, Dec. 27, 1998, p. 3, essay by Li Dalun titled "The Duality of
Economic Globalization.")

[4 ] In Brzezinski's view, a number of groups of countries will appear in
the 21st Century, such as a North American group, a European group, an East
Asian group, a South Asian group, a Moslem group, and an Eastern European
group. The struggle among these groups will dominate conflict in the future.
(Da Shikong yu Da Hunluan, a Chinese translation of Out of Control
:Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century, China
Social Sciences Publishing House, p. 221.) The usefulness of the United Nations
will increase continually, a trend which is already evident. (See Zouxiang
21 Shiji de Lianheguo (The United Nations, Toward the 21stCentury), World Knowledge Publishing House.

[5 ] For example, ASEAN, the OAU, and other organizations have become or
are now becoming supra-national, regional problem solving groups which cannot
be ignored.

[6 ] The "north-south" (six states united in opposition to the Qin) and
"east-west" (Qin united as one, or an alliance of a number of states to attack
another) of the Warring States period are examples of alliances between
countries. (Zhanguo Ce Zhushi (Warring States StrategyExplained), China Press, 1990, p. 4)

[7 ] Today, supra-national combinations are not just among countries. They
also include combinations between countries and trans-national or even non-state
organizations. In the Southeast Asian financial crisis we can see some countries
working in combination with the International Monetary Fund, and good cooperation
against fund raiders.

[8 ] In his new [1997] work, The Grand Chessboard : American Primacy and
its GeostrategicImperatives, Brzezinski writes out a new prescription
for world security, the establishment of a "trans-Eurasian security arrangement."
The center of this system is the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia,
India, and other countries. No matter whether Brzezinski's prescription is
effective or not, at least it clearly points out a line of thought identical
to our own, that of resolving national security problems in a larger sphere.
Carl Doe has said, "International organizations are frequently seen as the
optimum path by which to lead mankind out of the ethnic national era," and
that the primary mission of integration is "to maintain peace." (See Guoji
Guanxi Fenxi(Analysis of International Relations), World Knowledge
Publishing House, p. 332.) [author's name approximated from the Chinese version]

[9 ] Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1996
[translated into Chinese], Military Sciences Publishing House [Beijing],
p. 5.

[10 ] In an essay titled "A Discussion of the New Asian Resistance to
Foreigners," in the August 1998 edition of the Japanese magazine Bungei
Shunju, Shintaro Ishihara expresses the view that these various moves
by the United States make clear its strategic plot to attack Asia. Although
the opinions of this "Mr. No" [he was a co-author of the nationalistic book
The Japan That Can Say No] are somewhat extreme, but not unique to him. (See
Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), August 15-16, 1998.) [Reference
News is a newsletter with internal distribution only among China's Party
and government officials.]

[11 ] See Reference News, September 29, 1998, p. 11, reprinting an
article from the American magazine Fortune.

[12 ] The number of observers who hold views similar to those of Shintaro
Ishihara is certainly not small. Economic observer Konstanin Sorochin expressed
a similar opinion in an article titled "What Role does the CIS Play in the
Asian Financial Crisis?", published on July 16 in the Russian publication
Forum. (See Reference News, August 15, 1998.)

[13] In today's U.S. Army, "full-dimensional" is a concept limited to the
military sphere. For example, the principle of "full-dimensional protection"
in Joint Vision 2010 mainly means strengthening the U.S. military's information
protection. In the opinion of General [Johnnie] E. Wilson of the U.S. Army
Materiel Command, the "Army of the future" capable of moving throughout the
entire world is a "full-dimensional force." So it can be seen that the U.S.
Army's thinking on the concept of "full-dimensional" discards its essence
and just keeps the name. (See Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1996.)
[Joint Forces Quarterly is a publication of the U.S. National Defense
University. That issue carried an article titled "Joint Vision 2010: America's
Military-Preparing for Tomorrow."]

[14 ] The U.S. Department of Defense has tightened control over military
web sites on the Internet to prevent hostile powers from using family addresses,
Social Security Numbers, and credit card numbers to attack service members.

[15 ] Since the British government allows its secret agents to assassinate
the leaders of what are designated as terrorist countries, if some countries
saw financial speculators who launch destructive attacks against their economies
as war criminals or terrorists, would it be considered proper if those countries
dealt with the speculators in the same manner?

[16 ] The legislatures of countries with representative forms of government
cannot evade encirclement by lobbying groups. For example, America's Jewish
organizations and its Rifle Association have well-known lobbying groups.
Actually, this practice was to be seen long ago in ancient China. In the
war between the Chu and the Han at the end of the Qin Dynasty [209-202 B.C.],
Liu Bang gave Chen Ping a great deal of money in order to defeat Xiang Yu
off the battlefield. [Rebel general Liu Bang ousted Xiang Yu, who had won
the fight to succeed the Qin Dynasty.]

[17 ] An article revealed that Soros controls Albania's political scene through
control of the country's newspapers.

[19 ] Morgan Stanley Holding Company's worldwide strategic analyst Barton
Biggs is considered the world's most influential investment strategist because
he is the president of that $30 billion company and he holds 15% of its stock.
Before the financial storms in Thailand and Hong Kong, he and his company
both took certain actions which pointed out the direction for speculators.
(See the article "A Preliminary Exploration of the Patterns of Action of
Today's International Capitalism," by Song Yuhua and Xu Yilin, in Zhongguo
Shehui Kexue (ChinaSocial Sciences), No. 6, 1998.)

"Principles are a code of conduct, but not an absolute one." --George Kennan

In the history of warfare, the first person credited with using principles
to regularize methods of fighting should be Sun Tzu. Principles which he
advocated, such as "know the enemy and yourself and in a hundred battles
you will never be defeated," "strike where the enemy is not prepared, take
him by surprise," and "avoid the solid and strike the weak," are still articles
of faith for modern strategists. But in the West, 2,400 years later, Napoleon
would reveal his real desire to the world famous Saint-Cyr Military Academy,
which would one day emblazon his name above its main doorway: "To write a
book, describing the principles of war precisely, and provide it to all
soldiers." Unfortunately, when he fought and won wars he had no time to write,
and after he was defeated he was no longer in the mood. To a marshal who
created nearly 100 victories in his lifetime, this should be neither too
big nor too little a regret. But having been born a great man, it was enough
for him to leave behind a brilliant record of victories for posterity to
scour in search of his path to victory. A hundred years afterwards, from
the wars directed by this old enemy who elicited dread from British people
both during life and after death, a British general by the name of J.F.C.
Fuller induced five principles for directing modern wars. [1] All of the
West's principles of modern warfare are descended from these. Although later
military regulations of quite a few countries and several military theorists
proposed this or that as a principle of war, all of those things differ only
in minor ways with those originated by Fuller. [2] This is because, from
the beginning of the Napoleonic wars to the time prior to the Gulf War, apart
from the continual increase in lethality and destructiveness, there was no
reason for an essential change in the nature of war itself.

Now the situation has changed, because of all that happened during and after
the Gulf War. The introduction of precision guided weapons, non-lethal weapons,
and non-military weapons has derailed warfare from its mad dash down the
track toward increased lethality and destructiveness. Events have set in
motion the first change of course since the dawn of history. This has laid
a new track for war in the next century, and given rise to principles with
which professional military people are unfamiliar.

No principle can rest on a flimsy platform waiting to collapse. This is even
more true of principles of war. Regardless of which military thinker produced
them, or whatever military headquarters regulations they come from, the
principles are all undoubtedly the product of repeated tempering in the furnace
and on the anvil of war. If there had been no wars in the Spring and Autumn
period there would be no principles of Sun Tzu. If there had been no Napoleonic
wars, there would be no principles of Fuller. In the same way, if there had
been no large and small military, quasi-military, and even non-military wars
throughout the world before and after the Gulf War, then there would not
be proposals for new concepts such as the Americans' "full- dimensional
operations" and our "beyond-limits combined war." And of course, the principles
of war which emerge with these concepts would be out of the question.

While we are truly sorry that "full-dimensional operations" theory died on
the vine, we are resolved that "beyond-limits combined war" will not be confined
to the level of theoretical speculation. Instead, we want to see it incorporated
into combat methods with practical application. Even though the intent of
the "beyond limits" ideology which we advocate is to break through all
restrictions, nevertheless there is one constraint which must be strictly
observed, and that is, to abide by essential principles when carrying out
combat actions. Only in some exceptional situations should a principle itself
be broken.

When deep thought about the rules of warfare congeals to become some type
of combat method, a principle is born along with it. Whether or not these
combat methods and principles, as yet untested in a new round of wars, can
become road signs pointing the way to the next victory is still very hard
to say. But the proposal of essential principles is no doubt an indispensable
theoretical process for perfecting a combat method. Here's a gyroscope, let
it dance here for us.

Let's have a look at the principles below and see what they can bring to
"beyond-limits combined war."

Omnidirectionality

Synchrony

Limited objectives

Unlimited measures

Asymmetry

Minimal consumption

Multidimensional coordination

Adjustment and control of the entire process

Omnidirectionality -- 360-degree Observation and Design, Combined Use of
All Related Factors

"Omnidirectionality" is the starting point of "unrestricted war" ideology
and is a cover [fugai mian 6010 5556 7240] for this ideology. As a general
principle of war, the basic demands it makes on the prosecutor of a war are
to give all-round consideration to all factors related to "this particular"
war, and when observing the battlefield or a potential battlefield, designing
plans, employing measures, and combining the use of all war resources which
can be mobilized, to have a field of vision with no blind spots, a concept
unhindered by obstacles, and an orientation with no blind angles.

In terms of beyond-limits warfare, there is no longer any distinction between
what is or is not the battlefield. Spaces in nature including the ground,
the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but social spaces such
as the military, politics, economics, culture, and the psyche are also
battlefields. And the technological space linking these two great spaces
is even more so the battlefield over which all antagonists spare no effort
in contending. [3] Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military,
or it can be non-military. It can use violence, or it can be nonviolent.
It can be a confrontation between professional soldiers, or one between newly
emerging forces consisting primarily of ordinary people or experts. These
characteristics of beyond-limits war are the watershed between it and traditional
warfare, as well as the starting line for new types of warfare.

As a very strong principle applicable to actual warfare, omnidirectionality
applies to each level of beyond-limits combined war [described in Chapter
7]. At the war policy level, it applies to the combined use of a nation's
entire combat power, up to supra-national combat power, in an intercontinental
or worldwide confrontation. At the strategic level, it applies to the combined
use in warfare of national resources which relate to military objectives.
At the operational level, it applies to the combined use on a designated
battlefield of various kinds of measures, and mainly an army or force of
that scale, to achieve campaign objectives. And at the tactical level, it
applies to the combined use of various kinds of weapons, equipment, and combat
methods, and mainly one unit or a force of that scale, to execute a designated
mission in a battle. It must be kept in mind that all of the above combinations
must also include intersecting combinations among the respective levels.

Finally, it must be made clear that the scope of combat operations in each
specific war will not always expand over all spaces and domains, but the
first principle of beyond-limits combined war is to ponder omnidirectionality
and grasp the combat situation.

Synchrony -- Conducting Actions in Different Spaces within the Same Period
of Time

The technical measures employed in modern warfare, and in particular the
spread of information technology; the emergence of long-range warfare technology;
the increased ability to transform the battlefield; the linking together
of battlefields which stretch forever, are scattered, or are different by
their nature; and the introduction of various military and non-military forces
on an equal footing into the war -- all these things greatly shrink the course
of warfare. So many objectives which in the past had to be accomplished in
stages through an accumulation of battles and campaigns, may now be accomplished
quickly under conditions of simultaneous occurence, simultaneous action,
and simultaneous completion. Thus, stress on "synchrony" in combat operations
now exceeds the stress on "phasing." [4]

Taking as a given the requirement for thorough planning, beyond-limits war
brings key factors of warfare which are dispersed in different spaces and
different domains to bear in the same, designated space of time. These factors
revolve around the objectives of the war, executing a well-arranged team-effort
and combined attack to achieve surprise, secrecy, and effectiveness. A single
full-depth, synchronized action may be just one short beyond-limits combat
operation, but it may be enough to decide the outcome of an entire war. What
we mean by "synchrony" here is not "simultaneity," differing by not even
a second, but rather "within the same time period." In this sense, beyond-limits
war is worthy of the name "designated time warfare."

Using this as a standard, the armed force whose military capabilities most
nearly reach this level is that of the Americans. Given its current equipment
and technology, one of the U.S. military's information campaign systems [xinxi
zhanyi xitong] can within one minute provide data on 4,000 targets to 1,200
aircraft. In addition to this is the extensive use of long-range attack weapons
systems. This has led to a proposal for a "full-depth simultaneous attack"
operations ideology. In terms of space, the U.S. military is starting to
abandon the pattern of actions with a gradual push from the periphery towards
the depth, and in terms of time, it is abandoning the obsolete combat model
of sequential actions. However, judging from some documents openly published
by the military, the Americans' line of thought in this regard so far is
still confined to the scope of military action, and they have been unable
to expand it to battlefields beyond the military sphere. [5]

Limited Objectives -- Set a Compass to Guide Action within an Acceptable
Range for the Measures [Available]

Limited objectives means limited in relation to measures used. Thus, the
principle of setting limited objectives means that objectives must always
be smaller than measures.

When setting objectives, give full consideration to the feasibility of
accomplishing them. Do not pursue objectives which are unrestricted in time
and space. Only with limits can they be explicit and practical, and only
with limits can there be functionality. In addition, after accomplishing
an objective, one will then have the resilience to go on and pursue the next.
[6] When setting objectives, one must overcome the mentality of craving great
successes, and instead consciously pursue limited objectives and eliminate
objectives which are beyond one's abilities, even though they may be proper.
This is because every objective which is achievable is limited. No matter
what the reason, setting objectives which exceed allowable limits of the
measures available will only lead to disastrous consequences.

The most typical illustration of expanding objectives is the mistake which
MacArthur made in the Korean War. Subsequent to that are similar mistakes
committed by the Americans in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, which
prove that no matter what sort of action it is and no matter who is executing
it, when objectives are greater than measures, then defeat is certain. Not
all of today's statesmen and strategists are clear on this point. The 1996
U.S. Department ofDefense Report contains this premise from President
Clinton: "As the world's most powerful nation, we have a leadership obligation,
and when our interests and sense of values are subject to great danger we
will take action." When he spoke those words, obviously even Clinton was
unaware that national interests and sense of values are strategic objectives
of two completely different scales. If we say that the former is an objective
which American power can protect through action, the latter is neither an
objective that its power can achieve nor is an objective which the United
States should pursue outside its own territory. "World's number one," an
ideology corresponding to "isolationism," always makes the Americans tend
to pursue unlimited objectives as they expand their national power. But this
is a tendency which in the end will lead to tragedy. A company which has
limited resources but which is nevertheless keen to take on unlimited
responsibilities is headed for only one possible outcome, and that is bankruptcy.

Unlimited Measures -- The Trend is Toward Unrestricted Employment of Measures,
but Restricted to the Accomplishment of Limited Objectives

We speak of unlimited measures as related to limited objectives. [7] The
trend toward no limits is a trend toward continual enlargement of the range
of selection and the methods of use of measures. It is not intemperate use
of measures, and even less is it absolutist use of measures, or the use of
absolute measures. Unlimited measures to accomplish limited objectives is
the ultimate boundary.

Measures are inseparable from objectives. For a measure to be unlimited means
that to accomplish some designated objective, one can break through restrictions
and select among various measures. This is not to say that a measure can
be separated from objectives and used however one likes. Atomic weapons,
which can annihilate mankind, have been viewed as absolute measures precisely
because they violated the principle that a measure must serve to accomplish
an objective. Finally people laid them aside. The employment of unrestricted
measures can only be, as Confucius put it, "as one pleases, but not beyond
the rules." Here, "rules" means objectives. Beyond-limits ideology expands
"as one pleases" the range of selection and the methods of use of measures,
but this certainly does not mean expansion of objectives "as one pleases."
It only means to employ measures beyond restrictions, beyond boundaries,
to accomplish limited objectives. Conversely, a smart general does not make
his measures limited because his objectives are limited. This would very
likely lead to failure on the verge of success.

Thus, the limited must be pursued by way of the unlimited.

Sherman's advance toward Savanna in the American war between the north and
south was not in search of combat, it was to burn and plunder all along the
way. It was a measure used to destroy the economy in the southern army's
rear area, to make the southern populace and the southern army lose the ability
to resist, thus accomplishing the north's war objective. This is an example
of the successful use of unlimited measures to achieve a limited objective.

In contrast to this example, in the fourth Mideast War [the Yom Kippur War,
1973], to accomplish the combat objective designated by its front-line generals,
which was the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the battle plan of the Egyptian
Army's Supreme Command was just to break through the Bar Lev Line and consolidate
control of the Sinai. Egypt attempted to use limited measures to achieve
a limited objective. The results are well known. Egypt lost its hold on victory
when victory was in its very grasp. [8]

Asymmetry -- Seek Nodes of Action in the Opposite Direction from the Contours
of the Balance of Symmetry

"Asymmetry" [fei junheng 7236 0971 5899] as a principle is an important fulcrum
for tipping the normal rules in beyond-limits ideology. Its essential point
is to follow the train of thought opposite to the balance of symmetry [junheng
duicheng 0971 5899 1417 4468], and develop combat action on that line. From
force disposition and employment, selection of the main combat axis and the
center of gravity for the attack, all the way to the allocation of weapons,
in all these things give two-way consideration to the effect of asymmetrical
factors, and use asymmetry as a measure to accomplish the objective.

No matter whether it serves as a line of thought or as a principle guiding
combat operations, asymmetry manifests itself to some extent in every aspect
of warfare. Understanding and employing the principle of asymmetry correctly
allows us always to find and exploit an enemy's soft spots. The main fighting
elements of some poor countries, weak countries, and non-state entities have
all used "mouse toying with the cat"-type asymmetrical combat methods against
much more powerful adversaries. In cases such as Chechniya vs. Russia, Somalia
vs. the United States, Northern Ireland guerrillas vs. Britain, and Islamic
Jihad vs. the entire West, without exception we see the consistent, wise
refusal to confront the armed forces of the strong country head-to-head.
Instead, the weaker side has contended with its adversary by using guerrilla
war (mainly urban guerrilla war) [9], terrorist war, holy war, protracted
war, network war, and other forms of combat. Mostly the weaker side selects
as its main axis of battle those areas or battlelines where its adversary
does not expect to be hit. The center of mass of the assault is always a
place which will result in a huge psychological shock to the adversary. This
use of asymmetrical measures which create power for oneself and make the
situation develop as you want it to, is often hugely effective. It often
makes an adversary which uses conventional forces and conventional measures
as its main combat strength look like a big elephant charging into a china
shop. It is at a loss as to what to do, and unable to make use of the power
it has. Apart from the effectiveness it displays when used, asymmetry in
itself is a rule of action suggested by the golden rule. Of all rules, this
is the only one which encourages people to break rules so as to use rules.
Also it is an effective prescription for methodical and well-balanced medical
treatment for a chronic illness of thought.

Minimal Consumption -- Use the Least Amount of Combat Resources Sufficient
to Accomplish the Objective

The principle of minimal consumption is, first of all that rationality is
more important than thrift [10]; second, the size of combat consumption is
decided by the form of combat [11]; and third, use "more" (more measures)
to pursue "less" (lower consumption).

Rationality involves two aspects, the rational designation of objectives
and the rational use of resources. Rational designation of objectives, besides
specifying objectives that fall within the circle of the measures to be used,
also refers to the need to compress the objectives' load, and as much as
possible make them simple and concise. Rational use of resources obviously
means using the most appropriate method to accomplish an objective, and not
just imposing a single- minded requirement to economize. Economizing, that
is, using the minimum amount of resources, has meaning only if the prerequisites
for accomplishing an objective are met. More important than perfect familiarity
with principles is how the principles are applied. Whether or not the minimum
amount of combat resources is used to accomplish an objective depends on
what form of combat operation is selected. The Verdun campaign is called
by war historians a meat grinder, because both sides waged a senseless war
of attrition. By contrast, the reason Germany was able to sweep away the
joint British-French force after crossing the Maginot Line was because it
combined the shortest length of time, the optimum route, and the most powerful
weapons in a blitzkrieg. So it can be seen that the key to truly achieving
"minimal consumption" is to find a combat method which makes rational use
of combat resources. Today, with objectives and the measures to accomplish
them assuming many complex forms as never before, confronting a complex objective
in just one sphere and with just one measure will definitely fall short of
the mark. The result of a mismatch between measures and objectives is inevitably
high consumption and low effectiveness. The line of thought leading out of
these difficulties is to use "more" to attain "less." That is, to combine
the superiorities of several kinds of combat resources in several kinds of
areas to form up a completely new form of combat, accomplishing the objective
while at the same time minimizing consumption.

Multidimensional Coordination -- Coordinating and Allocating All the Forces
which can be Mobilized in the Military and Non-Military Spheres Covering
an Objective

"Multidimensional" here is another way of saying multiple spheres and multiple
forces. It has nothing to do with the definition of dimensionality in the
sense of mathematics or physics. "Multidimensional coordination" refers to
coordination and cooperation among different forces in different spheres
in order to accomplish an objective. On the face of it, this definition is
not at all novel. Similar explanations are to be found in many combat
regulations, both obsolete and newly published. The only difference between
it and similar explanations is, and this is a great difference, the introduction
of non-military and non-war factors into the sphere of war directly rather
than indirectly. In other words, since any sphere can become a battlefield,
and any force can be used under combat conditions, we should be more inclined
to understand multidimensional coordination as the coordination of the military
dimension with various other dimensions in the pursuit of a specific objective.
It is not the case that in all wars military action must be considered as
the primary form of action. With warfare facing the equalization of the various
dimensions, this concept will become a formula for addressing the questions
of future wars. [12]

The concept of multidimensional coordination can only be established within
the context of a specific objective. Without an objective, we cannot speak
of multidimensional coordination. But the size of an objective determines
the breadth and depth of the coordination of each dimension. If the set objective
is to win a war at the war policy level, the spheres and forces needing
coordination may involve the entire country, or may even be supra-national.
From this we can generalize that in any military or non-military action,
no matter what the depth of the spheres and the quantity of forces it involves,
coordination among the various dimensions is absolutely necessary. This certainly
does not imply that in each action the more measures mobilized the better.
Instead, the limit is what is necessary. The employment of an excessive or
an insufficient amount in each dimension will only cause the action to sway
between edema and shriveling, and finally the objective itself will be in
jeopardy. The bit of Eastern wisdom, "going beyond the limit is as bad as
falling short," is helpful to our understanding and our application of this
principle.

In addition, we urgently need to expand our field of vision regarding forces
which can be mobilized, in particular non-military forces. Besides, as in
the past, paying attention to conventional, material forces, we should also
pay particular attention to the employment of intangible "strategic resources"
such as geographical factors, the role of history, cultural traditions, sense
of ethnic identity, dominating and exploiting the influence of international
organizations, etc. [13] But this is still not enough. In applying this principle
we must also come up with beyond-limits action, and to the greatest extent
possible make multidimensional coordination a commonplace move in ordinary
operations, and bring about interlocking, gradational combinations at every
level from war policy to tactics.

Adjustment and Control of the Entire Process -- During the Entire Course
of a War, from its Start, through its Progress, to its Conclusion, Continually
Acquire Information, Adjust Action, and Control the Situation

Warfare is a dynamic process full of randomness and creativity. Any attempt
to tie a war to a set of ideas within a predetermined plan is little short
of absurdity or naïveté. Therefore, it is necessary to have feedback
and revisions throughout the entire course of a war while it is actually
happening, in order to keep the initiative within one's grasp. This is what
is meant by "adjustment and control of the entire process."

Because of the addition of the principle of synchrony, we cannot understand
the adjusted and controlled "entire course" to be a prolonged one. With modern,
high-tech measures, this process may take the blink of an eye. As we said
before, the time it takes to fight one battle can be sufficient to wind up
a whole war. This may make the entire course of a war extremely short, and
incidentally make adjusting and controlling it much more difficult.

Today, with information technology welding the entire world together into
a network, the number of factors involved in a war is much, much greater
than in past wars. The ability of these factors to cloud the issues of war,
and their intense influence on war, means that loss of control over any one
link can be like the proverbial loss of a horseshoe nail which led to the
loss of an entire war. [14] So, faced with modern warfare and its bursts
of new technology, new measures, and new arenas, adjustment and control of
the entire process is becoming more and more of a skill. It is not a kind
of technology. What is needed to grasp the ever-changing battlefield situation
is greater use of intuition, rather than mathematical deduction. More important
than constant changes in force dispositions and continual updating of weapons
is the whole set of combat rules which are the result of the shift of the
battlefield to non-military spheres. The outcome of all this is that one
will be sent to an unexplored battlefield to wage an unfamiliar war against
an unknown enemy. Nevertheless, one must adjust and control this entire
unfamiliar process if he is to win.

"Beyond-limits combined war" is this use of strange, completely new methods
of combat to wage war.

All of the above principles are applicable to any beyond-limits combined
war.

Victory is certainly not in the bag just because a side adheres to the above
principles, but violating them no doubt leads to defeat. Principles are always
essential conditions for victory in war, but they are not the only conditions.

In the absence of a principle that victory is certain, there are only essential
principles. We should always remember this point.

Footnotes

[1 ] The five principles which Fuller summarized from the Napoleonic wars
are attack, maneuver, surprise, concentration, and support. Besides this,
following the views of Clausewitz, Fuller also induced seven principles similar
to those of the Napoleonic wars: maintain the objective, security of action,
mobile action, exhaust the enemy's offensive capability, conserve forces,
concentrate forces, and surprise. These principles became the foundation
of modern military principles. (See "The Writings of Fuller" in Zhanzheng
Zhidao (Combat Command), Liberation Army Publishing House, pp.
38-60.)

[2] An example is the U.S. Army's nine main military principles: objective,
offensive, concentration, economy of force, mobility, security, surprise,
simplicity, and unity [of command]. These are very similar to the principles
of war of the Napoleonic era.

[3] The battlefield of beyond-limits war differs from those of the past in
that it encompasses all natural spaces, such as the social realm, and the
continually developing sphere of technology where space is now measured in
nanometers. Today, these spaces are interlocked with each other. For example,
outer space can be seen as a natural space, and also as a technological space,
because each step in the militarization of outer space requires a technological
breakthrough. In the same way, the interdynamics between society and technology
are to be seen constantly. There is no more typical example of this than
the effect of information technology on society. From these things we can
see that the battlefield is ubiquitous, and we can only look upon it with
"omnidirectionality."

[4] Wars in the past involved, in terms of space, forces charging from boundary
areas into depths, and in terms of time, division into phases. By contrast,
in terms of space, beyond-limits war instead goes straight to the core, and
in terms of time it is "synchronous" and will often no longer be characterized
by phases.

[5] [Footnote not marked in original text, but assumed to belong here] There
is no more typical example of this than four principles in the U.S. military's
Joint Vision 2010, which are, "dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused
logistics, full-dimensional protection." All of these proposed new principles
are for military warfare.

[6] Setting limited objectives is not a matter of whether or not one is
constrained subjectively, but rather whether or not restricted measures are
exceeded. Measures are "restrictions" which cannot be exceeded when setting
objectives.

[7] For details, see How Great Generals Win by Bevin Alexander, pp.
101-125.

[8] Before the Fourth Mideast War, the Egyptian "Baierde Plan" [inaccurate
Chinese phonetic for "Badr"? (the war began on the anniversary of the Battle
of Badr, 626 A.D.)] was divided into two steps. The first step consisted
of forced crossings of the Suez Canal, breaking through the Bar Lev Line,
and taking control of a 15-20 km [deep] area of the east bank of the canal.
The second step was to attack and capture a line running from the Mitla Pass
to the Giddi Pass to the Khatima Pass, guarantee the security of the east
bank of the canal, and then expand into the enemy's depth as the situation
warranted. But in actual combat, as soon as the Egyptian Army crossed the
canal it went on the defensive. It was five days before it resumed its offensive,
and this gave the Israeli Army an opportunity to catch its breath.

[9] The famous researcher of the development of capitalist society, Buluodaier
[Fernand Braudel? 1580 5012 0108 1422], placed particular emphasis on the
"organizational usefulness" of large cities in the capitalist world. Despite
its big size, this world nevertheless has a number of fulcrums, central cities
such as New York, London, Tokyo, Brussels, and maybe Hong Kong. If these
were attacked simultaneously or if guerrilla war broke out there simultaneously,
it would leave the world in chaos. (The Motive Force of Capitalism,
Buluodaier [Fernand Braudel?], Oxford Press)

[ 10] Military principles have always included [the concept] "economize,"
mainly referring to the need to pay attention to controlling the consumption
of manpower and materiel during wartime. In beyond-limits warfare, "rational
usage" is the only correct [way to] economize.

[ 11] Beyond-limits war allows for a great deal of leeway in the selection
of the forms of combat. Naturally there is a big difference between the cost
of conventional military warfare and warfare in which finance plays the leading
role. Therefore, the cost of a future war depends mainly on what form of
warfare is selected.

[12] The most important [step toward] equality among various dimensions is
to overcome the concept that "the military is supreme." In future wars, military
measures will only be [considered] one of the conventional options.

[ 13] In this regard, China is richly endowed by nature. A long cultural
tradition, peaceful ideology, no history of aggression, the strong economic
power of the Chinese people, a seat on the United Nations Security Council,
etc., all these things are important "strategic resources."

[14] In modern warfare, fortuitous factors influence the outcome of wars
just as they did in antiquity. If a fuse in a command center's computer were
to get too hot and burn out at a critical moment, this could lead to a disaster.
(This is entirely possible. It was a factor in a mistaken attack by an F-16
over the Gulf. It happened because the electrical circuit in the "friend
or foe device" aboard a Blackhawk helicopter frequently overheated, and the
aviators would occasionally switch it off to lower the temperature.) This
is perhaps the modern version of the loss-of-a-horseshoe story. For this
reason, then, "adjustment and control" must continue "through the entire
course."

"Computerization and globalization...have produced several thousand global
enterprises and tens of thousands of international and inter-government
organizations." -- E. Laszlo

"Mankind is making progress, and no longer believes that war is a potential
court of appeals." -- Bloch

At a time when man's age-old ideal of "the family of man" is used by IBM
in an advertisement, "globalization" is no longer the prediction of futurists.
An era in which we are impelled by the great trend of technological integration
that is plastered all over with information labels, agitated by the alternately
cold and warm ocean currents from the clash and fusion of civilizations,
troubled by local wars rising first here then there and by domino-like financial
crises and the ozone hole over the South Pole, and which causes everyone,
including the futurists and visionaries, to feel strange and out of place
- [such an era] is in the process of slowly unfolding between the dusk of
the 20th century and the dawn of the 21st century.

Global integration is comprehensive and profound. Through its ruthless
enlightenment, those things which must inevitably be altered or even dispelled
are the positions of authority and interest boundaries in which nations are
the principal entities. The modern concept of "nation states" which emerged
from the Peace of Westphalia [1] in 1648 is no longer the sole representative
occupying the top position in social, political, economic and cultural
organizations. The emergence of large numbers of meta-national, trans-national,
and non-national organizations, along with the inherent contradictions between
one nation and another, are presenting an unprecedented challenge to national
authority, national interests, and national will. [2]

At the time of the emergence of the early nation states, the births of most
of them were assisted by blood-and-iron warfare. In the same way, during
the transition of nation states to globalization, there is no way to avoid
collisions between enormous interest blocs. What is different is that the
means that we have today to untie the "Gordian Knot" [3] are not merely swords,
and because of this we no longer have to be like our ancestors who invariably
saw resolution by armed force as the last court of appeals. Any of the political,
economic, or diplomatic means now has sufficient strength to supplant military
means. However, mankind has no reason at all to be gratified by this, because
what we have done is nothing more than substitute bloodless warfare for bloody
warfare as much as possible. [4] As a result, while constricting the battlespace
in the narrow sense, at the same time we have turned the entire world into
a battlefield in the broad sense. On this battlefield, people still fight,
plunder, and kill each other as before, but the weapons are more advanced
and the means more sophisticated, so while it is somewhat less bloody, it
is still just as brutal. Given this reality, mankind's dream of peace is
still as elusive as ever. Even speaking optimistically, war will not be wiped
out rapidly within the foreseeable future, whether it is bloody or not. Since
things which should happen will ultimately come to pass, what we can and
must focus on at present is how to achieve victory.

Faced with warfare in the broad sense that will unfold on a borderless
battlefield, it is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons
alone to achieve national security in the larger strategic sense, nor is
it possible to protect these stratified national interests. Obviously, warfare
is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units,
and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians,
scientists, and even bankers. How to conduct war is obviously no longer a
question for the consideration of military people alone. As early as the
beginning of this century, Clemenceau stated that "war is much too serious
a matter to be entrusted to the military." However, the history of the past
100 years tells us that turning over warfare to the politicians is not the
ideal way to resolve this important issue, either. [5] People are turning
to technical civilization, hoping to find in technological developments a
valve which will control war. But what makes people despair is that the entire
century is just about gone, and while technology has made great strides,
war still remains an unbroken mustang. People still expect wonders from the
revolution in military affairs, hoping that high-tech weapons and non-lethal
weapons can reduce civilian and even military casualties in order to diminish
the brutality of war. However, the occurrence of the revolution in military
affairs, along with other revolutions, has altered the last decade of the
20th century. The world is no longer what it was originally, but war is still
as brutal as it has always been. The only thing that is different is that
this brutality has been expanded through differences in the modes in which
two armies fight one other. Think about the Lockerbie air disaster. Think
about the two bombs in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Then think about the financial
crisis in East Asia. It should not be difficult to understand what is meant
by this different kind of brutality.

This, then, is globalization. This is warfare in the age of globalization.
Although it is but one aspect, it is a startling one. When the soldiers standing
at the crossroads of the centuries are faced with this aspect, perhaps each
of them should ask himself, what can we still do? If those such as Morris,
bin Laden, and Soros can be considered soldiers in the wars of tomorrow,
then who isn't a soldier? If the likes of Powell, Schwartzkopf, Dayan, and
Sharon can be considered politicians in uniform, then who isn't a politician?
This is the conundrum that globalization and warfare in the age of globalization
has left for the soldiers.

Although the boundaries between soldiers and non-soldiers have now been broken
down, and the chasm between warfare and non-warfare nearly filled up,
globalization has made all the tough problems interconnected and interlocking,
and we must find a key for that. The key should be able to open all the locks,
if these locks are on the front door of war. And this key must be suited
to all the levels and dimensions, from war policy, strategy, and operational
techniques to tactics; and it must also fit the hands of individuals, from
politicians and generals to the common soldiers.

We can think of no other more appropriate key than "unrestricted warfare."

Footnotes

[1] The general term for the European agreement of 1648. This brought an
end to the 80-year war between Spain and Holland, and the Thirty Years' War
in Germany, and it is also seen as laying the foundation for all the treaties
concluded up to the break up of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.

[2] The state's position as the ultimate entity is being challenged from
various quarters, and the thing that is most representative as well as being
most worrisome, is that the state's monopoly on weapons is being seriously
challenged. According to the views of Earnest Jierna [as published 0679 1422
4780] in Nationality and Nationalism, a state is defined as the only entity
that can use force legally. According to a 1997 public opinion survey by
Newsweek magazine in the United States regarding "where the threat
to security will come from in the 21st century," 32 percent believed it would
come from terrorism, 26 percent believed that it would be international crime
and drug trafficking groups, 15 percent believed it would be racial hatred,
with nation states only coming in fourth. In a small pamphlet that the U.S.
Army has put on the Web, but which has not been published (TRADOC PAMPHLET
525-5: FORCE XXI OPERATIONS), the non-nation forces are clearly listed
as "future enemies," saying that "non-nation security threats, using modern
technologies that give them capabilities similar to those of nation states,
have become increasingly visible, challenging the traditional nation state
environment. Based on the scope involved, these can be divided into three
categories.

(1) Subnational. Subnational threats include political, racial, religious,
cultural, and ethnic conflicts, and these conflicts challenge the defining
features and authority of the nation state from within.

(2) Anational. Anational threats are unrelated to the countries they belong
to. These entities are not part of a nation state, nor do they desire to
establish such a status. Regional organized crime, piracy, and terrorist
activities comprise these threats.

(3) Metanational. Metanational threats transcend the nation state borders,
operating on an interregional or even global scale. They include religious
movements, international criminal organizations, and informal economic
organizations that facilitate weapons proliferation. See The World Map
in the Information Age, Wang Xiaodong, Chinese People's University Press,
1997, p. 44-46. The U.S. military does not treat transnational companies
which seize monopolistic profits as security threats, and in addition to
their deeply-rooted awareness of economic freedom, this is also related to
the fact that they still limit threats to the military arena. Transnational
companies such as Microsoft and Standard Oil-Exxon, whose wealth rivals that
of nations, may also constitute real threats to national authority, and can
even have a serious impact on international affairs.

[3] Legend has it that after Alexander the Great led his army into the interior
of Asia Minor, he went to worship in the temple of Zeus in the city of Gordium.
In the temple there was a wagon which had formerly belonged to Midas, king
of Phrygia. It was secured very tightly by a jumbled cord, and it was said
that no one had been able to untie it. Faced with this, Alexander pondered
for a moment, then suddenly pulled out his sword and severed it at one stroke.
From this, "Gordian knot" has come to be another term for intractable and
complex problems.

[4] In future wars, there will be more hostilities like financial warfare,
in which a country is subjugated without spilling a drop of blood. Think
about it for a moment. What would the disastrous impacts have been on the
economies of Hong Kong and even China if the August 1998 battle to protect
Hong Kong's finances had failed? Furthermore, such situations are by no means
impossible, and if it had not been for the collapse of the Russian financial
market, which caused the financial speculators to be under attack from the
front and the rear, it is still hard to predict how things would have turned
out.

[5] Regardless of whether we are talking about Hitler, Mussolini, Truman,
Johnson, or Saddam, none of them have successfully mastered war. This also
includes Clemenceau himself.

[FBIS Translated Text] The motives for writing this book originated
from military maneuvers which caught the attention of the world. Three years
ago, due to participation in the maneuvers, Xiangsui and I encountered each
other in a small city in Fujian called Zhao An. At the time, the situation
was becoming daily more tense on the Southeast coast, both sides of the straits
were all set for a showdown, and even the task force of two American aircraft
carriers rushed a long way to add to the trouble. At that time, the storm
was brewing in the mountains and the military situation was pressing so that
people were suddenly moved to "think up strategies when facing a situation."
We therefore decided to write this book, a book which would be able to
concentrate together the concerns and thoughts each of us had over the past
several decades and especially during the last ten years concerning military
issues.

There is no way of relating in detail how many telephone calls we made, how
much mail was sent, and how many nights we stayed awake over the next three
years, and the only thing which can serve as evidence for all of this is
this small and thin book.

We must first apologize to readers for the fact that, even though we were
very conscientious and toiled painstakingly in the writing of this book,
yet after the written word reflecting ideas were set down much like shooting
stars traveling across the sky and cooling into meteorites, all of you (including
ourselves) will still be able to find many mistakes and places which are
inappropriate.

We shall not employ the apologetic words of "We request your kind solicitude"
to seek forgiveness but shall rather only make corrections in the second
edition (if there is one).

Upon the occasion of the publication of this book, we would like to here
sincerely thank the Chief-of-Staff Cheng Butao and Assistant Chief-of-Staff
Huang Guorong, of the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House for their
unswerving support whereupon this book was able to be so quickly published
within such a short period of time. We would also like to thank Xiang Xiaomi,
Director of the First Book Editing Department. She has carefully and rigorously
proofread the entire book as she had done with the other four books which
we have edited, and provided many very valuable recommendations. We do not
know any better way of expressing our thanks aside from the deep gratitude
which we feel.

Lastly, we would also like to thank our families for the sacrifices they
made towards the completion of this book, and this is again something which
cannot be expressed in words.

The entire book was completed in manuscript form between March 2 and December
8 of 1998 in Gongzhufen - Baizhifang in Beijing.

Qiao Liang [0829 5328], whose ancestors came from Hunan Province, was born
in Xin [1823] County, Shanxi Province, to a military family in 1955. He is
a member of the Chinese Writers' Union. Presently, he is assistant director
of the production office of the air force's political department and holds
the rank of senior colonel in the air force, along with being a grade one
[yi ji 0001 4787] writer.

His most important works include Gate to the Final Epoch [Mori
Zhi Men 2608 2480 0037 7024]; Spiritual Banner [Ling Qi
7227 4388]; and Great Glacial River [Da Bing He 1129 0393 3109].
He has repeatedly won national and military awards. In addition to his literary
creations, he has applied himself over a long period of time to the research
of military theory and joined with other writers to pen A Discussion of
Military Officer Quality [Junguan Suzhi Lun 6511 1351 4790 6347
6158]; Viewing the Global Military Big Powers [Shijie Junshi Lieqiang
Bolan 0013 3954 6511 0057 0441 1730 0590 6031]; and A Listing of the
Rankings of Global MilitaryPowers [Quanqiu Junli Paihang
Bang 0356 3808 6511 0500 2226 5887 2831].

Wang Xiangsui [3769 3276 4482] was born in Guangzhou to a military family
in 1954. He joined the army at the end of 1970. He successively assumed the
positions of political instructor, group political commissar, section deputy
head, regiment political commissar, and division deputy political commissar.
Presently, he works in the Guangzhou Military Region Air Force Political
Unit and holds the rank of senior colonel.

He has cooperated with other authors to write the books A Discussion of
Military Officer Quality; Viewing the Global Military Powers;
and A Record of Previous Major Global Wars [Shijie Lici Dazhan
Lu 0013 3954 2980 2945 1129 2069 6922].