The history of the world is a vast and complicated story of how we got to where we are and why things are the way they are.
Here I write about things that I find interesting, mainly military, local and family history. This includes World War One & Two and the Kaiserliche marine.

Sunday, 22 January 2017

Desert offensive, Libya 1940

War
in North Africa was not a surprise and had been planned for since July 1937
with the Committee of Imperial defence reversing the Cabinet’s decision to
exclude any government expenditure for defence against Italian aggression
especially in North Africa where ports and the Suez Canal in need of protection
and the Desert air-force was in need of modernisation. The Air Ministry further
analysed the Italian threat in 1938 concluding that Italy would cross the
border with a significant air-force and two motorised divisions. The Italian
Airforce was appraised as already having 174 aircraft in Libya and be able to
direct a total of 730 aircraft against the RAF within two months whereas the
British could muster around 200 aircraft from across the Middle East with
squadrons based in Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Aden with very little hope
of significant reinforcements coming from Britain and arriving piecemeal.

A joint planning committee was set up
after General Wavell’s appointment as GOC-in-C of the Middle East in August
1939 with the newly created Air Officer commanding in Chief Longmore with the
aim of working with the Egyptian Government and local commanders in the Middle
East to coordinate against the Italian aggression.

The main aim of the defence policy in
the Air Ministry’s mind was to centralise their control of their forces but
maintain a flexible approach but bringing in support from artillery and fighter
forces but the Committee assigned the limited fighter forces to the Defence
commander removing the flexible approach. The Air Council also believed that
the key to victory was to destroy as many Italian Bombers before they reached
their targets but the tactic that the Fortress Commander was likely to employ
meant that the three fighter squadrons available would be scattered to the
desired defence points and perform standing patrols. Not only did this blunt
the offensive power of the fighters but would also mean they were unavailable
for escort missions for the Blenheim squadrons based in Egypt who were ideally
placed to carry out pre-emptive strikes on the Regia Aeronautica or their
bases. Although fighter organisation was modified by the Air Ministry its primary
role was for defence against the Italians with a secondary role for ground
attack whist at the same time ongoing talks were attempting to expand the
Bomber forces with two wings deployed to the Nile Delta and two squadrons for
Army co-operation to be put at the disposal of Wavell in the Western Desert
with communications passing from GOC HQ to the Squadrons rapidly with targets
to be hit.

The Director of operations at the Air
Ministry was keen to affect a German style approach and strike the opposition
as quickly as possible with potential targets being the Italian depots and
supply system and the Italian Airforce on the ground well aware that there was
no repair facility in Libya which could cope with major maintenance projects
meaning even moderate damage to an aircraft would result in it being a write
off or being shipped back to Italy. As the RAF carried out Douhet’s vision the
Royal Navy and French could disrupt resupply across the Mediterranean cutting
their supply line to Italian East Africa as well as Libya.

The relatively small British force was
assigned to carry out army cooperation, assault the supply

Regia Aeronautica SM 79 escorted by Fiats

system and Regia
Aeronautica whilst providing support to the Royal Navy. A very ambitious target
considering that by the 10 June 1940 AHQ in Egypt had five squadrons of
Blenheim Mk Is and one squadron each of Bristol Bombay and Valentia transports
that could be converted to carry a 2000 lb and 2200 lb bomb loads respectively
on underwing racks. A reinforcement plan had been implemented which saw the
obsolete aircraft in the theatre gradual replaced with the Blenheim with 211
Squadron being the first in April 1939, 45 squadron in June and 113 squadron by
September as were 30 and 55 squadrons who were transferred from Iraq giving a
total strength of 132 Blenheims and the possibility of another squadron to
follow. There was also a plan for up to twelve heavy bomber squadrons to come
from Britain with the Bombays and Valentias filling the gap until they arrived
but it was a gap that widened as events overtook the theatre with the
Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens being held through 1940 for operations
against the more pressing enemy, Germany.

Another crisis facing the RAF in the
Middle East was a distinct shortage of spare parts with Blenheim spares unable
to support a war condition “for more than a short period” and the official
history gave the example of only two spare petrol tanks being available to each
squadron which would meant one of the most common areas to be hit would cause a
large number of aircraft to be lost to attrition. Sir William Mitchell managed,
with the approval of the committee of Imperial Defence, to “borrow” from
British based squadrons to increase supply stocks across the summer of 1939
knowing that there would be no more than a trickle if war broke out on the
continent. The arrival of the extra squadrons and their conversions to twin
engine Blenhims had further put strain on the repair facility at Alexandria and
steps were taken to free up space and to get tradesmen from Britain to
alleviate the strain whilst the older, more obsolete aircraft were being packed
away for dispatch to Afghanistan.

A further facility was established at
Abu Sueir to supply the operational squadrons with an aircraft storage section
to provide spares, equipment and stores whilst a pilot training school was
moved to the safety of Iraq. A motorised transport infrastructure was also
increased as it was not adequate enough to get the supplies and squadrons to
their forward bases. By December these facilities were far from perfect with
them still geared to repairing single engine aircraft which would cause
problems for the Blenheims who required engine replacement after 225 flying
hours, the equivalent of two months of flying meaning that sixty engines would
need replacing a month but the facilities could only cope with ten aircraft a
month.

Blenheim bombers were having a
difficult time acclimatising to the sand with their intakes being close to the
ground and very rapidly filling with sand which meant
regular cleaning but there was a shortage of cleaning equipment as well as
spare parts for the Lewis guns and the Blenheims Vickers K and 250 lb bombs with projections showing that
after fourteen days of maximum effort the bomber force would be useless. Dust
and sand would permeate into dials and interfered with the airscrews whilst the
heat would make the cockpit’s Perspex crack or pop out of its fittings which
put further strains on the maintenance crews, a strain not exerted by the older
obsolete aircraft who had their own faults in the fact that once their spares
ran out there would be no more. The sand thrown up by the aircraft taking off
was so thick that pilots visibility would be next to nothing so the bombers
would take off in a line abreast formation.

The airfields available in September
1939 included five permanent stations in Egypt at Aboukir, Ismalia, Abu Sueir, Heliopolis and Helwas with further desert
landing strips stretching to MersaMatruh south of Luxor with some emergency landing grounds around
the Suez Canal and Red sea. The desert landing grounds were very basic and in
1938 it was decided to build camp facilities and amass stocks of petrol and
ammunition so that they could be used operationally at a moment’s notice with
twelve of them operational by the outbreak of war however they varied in
quality and surface including lose sand which was far from ideal. Facilities
for the crews were also very basic including tented accommodation with
prefabricated operations rooms and cook houses as well as Bessoneau hangers. However
by the time war started some were still just patches of desert with the most
basic of facilities with the deployment of the squadrons being so rushed that
for the first raids armourers had trouble trying to find equipment and
ammunition to get the bombers ready to take off. These emergency landing
grounds were rendered unusable during the rainy seasons between November and
April. A further six airfields were immediately put into construction
with their completion date due to be 1941.

The forces and organisation available
were deemed adequate for the defence of Egypt
from the Italians but should Germany become involved then the Desert Air Force
would find themselves very stretched. It was also a concern to the Air ministry
that the amassing
of the force had been at the expense of the RAF’s bomber forces ear marked for
war against Germany. If the RAF in the Middle East was to get reinforcements
they had to look to factories in Egypt, India and South Africa especially as
the theatre was still considered a backwater compared to France and Singapore
as Germany and Japan were by far aggressively expansionistic than Italy.

The Prime Minister in 1937 had expressed
the view that Italy, although unlikely to be aggressive without assurances of
German support, could no longer be regarded as a reliable friend. Limited
expenditure to guard against a hostile Italy had therefore been authorised.
From then onwards periodic reviews of our position in relation to Italy had
been made.1

Italy was in a perfect position to cut
the British supply lines across the Mediterranean
with bombers operating across the Sicilian narrows and Libya as well as
threaten the Red Sea and Suez Canal with air and naval forces in Italian East
Africa. This would be their primary objective so that they could protect this
colony. Any advance towards Alexandria from Tripoli would have to cross 1,100
miles of open desert which would be vulnerable to air attack however Italy had
numerical superiority over Britain in the air and on the land. Italy’s air-force
would need to be split between offensive duties and defensive actions to secure
their maritime supply lines. The aircraft they had available according to the
British European Appreciation 0n 1 April 1939 was 96 bombers, 81 Army
co-operation and 90 fighters in Libya with the support of 444 bombers and a
similar number of fighters based in Italy which could be available for transfer
to the front to help cover the 250,000 troops. The Italians had
in reality carried out an exercise to test deployment of their bomber forces
with amazing efficiency but leaving mostly light bombers behind. The main
bomber in their arsenal was the Saviola Marchetti SM 79, a three-engine medium
bomber nicknamed “Sparviero” (Sparrowhawk) which was also known as the Gobbo
Maledetto – damned hunchback by its crews but it was considered to be “a fine
and robust bomber that unfailingly operated in the most difficult conditions
with great reliability.” The SM 79 had a top speed of 270 mph and a bomb load of
2645 lbs, heavier than a Blenheim. The SM 79 had a reputation from its brutally
efficient operations in Spain which saw only four lost in combat through the
war and killing 2800 civilians wounding a further 7000 in air raids however the
lustre was waning as the world’s best bomber with the appearance of Germany’s
modern Ju 88 and its reputation for invincibility being tarnished on 22 June
when F/Lt Burgess shot down Tenente Solimene’s MM 22068 on a reconnaissance of
Malta in a Gloucester Gladiator. A further

complication was that the SM 79 had
no dust filters on their engines and this led to many not being serviceable.
The levels of serviceability were compounded by severe shortages of spares and
stocks leaving many easily repaired aircraft laying around useless on
airfields. The British planners were concerned by the bomber force available to
the Italians and their projections for an all out attack on Alexandria by forty
eight SM 81 aircraft, each carrying 4000 lb bombloads could drop eighty-six
tonnes of bombs in a day on the city and each carrying six gun emplacements
making them difficult to shoot down by the RAFs Gladiators.The Italian fighter force was made up of the
robust CR 32 and CR 42 “Falco” biplanes which were on par with the Gladiator
and were favoured by their pilots for their aeronautical agility. The
Intelligence officers played down their capability in briefings claiming that
their level of endurance was only some twenty five minutes and that the
Blenheim could outpace them and belayed worry about damage by claiming that;
“If a stern attack developed the metal skin of the Blenheim will deflect the
(50 calibre) shot” In September A/Sgt Blair found out the folly of this as the
Blenheim he was in was attacked by an Italian fighter whose last 50 calibre
bullet passed through the fuselage with a loud bang, through the pilot’s chair,
through P/O Reynolds and out of the Perspex leaving Blair pulling the dead
pilot off the control column and nursing the aircraft home.

With Italy’s entry into the war the Mediterranean effectively
closed to the British and Malta immediately came under siege. A few days later
France’s surrender robbed Air Vice Marshal Longmore of 375 allied aircraft.
However all was not bleak as the preparations for war had built up a ninety day
surplus of fuel and explosives as well as a stockpile of spare aircraft but
beyond that was a seventy day journey from Britain via Cape Town and the Red
Sea through an ever growing gauntlet of U-Boats and light cruisers. Steps were
taken to shorten this with an air bridge implemented by Group Captain Thorold
in Takoradi with
various stops along the 3697 mile journey to Abu Sueir but despite the
length of the journey it only took six days! The first wave flew from Takoradi on 20 September.
Although very useful it did put an awful strain on the incoming aircraft with a
10% wastage and already tired engines were thrust into the front line.Longmore would often complain to London of
the shortages of aircraft much to Portal’s annoyance as his command suffered
heavy losses but to make matters worse his protestations were supported by
Wavell and Admiral Cunningham, both of whom were constantly making demands on
Longmore’s command and found they were left wanting but it was something
Churchill could not get to grips with and he readily criticised Longmore for
holding a thousand pilots and aircraft as well as 16,000 personnel in the
Middle East and suggesting he should return some to England to pass on their
experiences to training units.

As war became more and more likely
Longmore believed that a Douet syle assault on Alexandria with SM 79s out
pacing the Gladiators to devastating and so preparations were made whilst Air
Commodore Collishaw believed that his group of three Blenheim squadrons should
get in first. On the 10 June he ordered his squadrons to prepare for action and
at nine minutes past midnight received the order from Longmore that his forces
should:

Should carry out reconnaissance as arranged.
Bombing formation as available should accompany reconnaissance in Northern area
favourable targets observed especially concentrations of aircraft 2

The Blenheims of 45 squadron took off at
first light and made their approach towards El Adem air

field by the safety of
the sea. A signal from a 211 Squadron Blenheim reported the airfield was
covered in parked aircraft with none of them dispersed. The force of eight
Blenheims broke into sections and began their low level attacks dropping high
explosives and incendiaries whilst excited gunners fired at anything that moved
and at the flak batteries that began their belated accurate fire. The squadron
began to gain height and reform off the coast near Torbruk when Sgt Bower’s
Blenheim peeled away in flames and crashed into the sea. On the return flight
F/O Finch had to make a force landing with a damaged engine and Sgt Thompson
brought his damaged craft down at Sidi Barrain where it immediately burst into
flames consuming the crew killing them all. A follow up raid by eighteen
Blenheims of 55 and 113 squadron that afternoon suffered no losses and reported
more heavy damage to the airfield and the aircraft still on the field and only
the final raid’s B flight was chased by CR 32s who attacked from 12,000 feet
diving down onto the Blenheims who were flying in a lose formation. Despite
accurate fire they were easily outrun with the limited endurance possessed by
the fighters showing through rather than the skill of the gunners. A/Sgt Ian
Blair of 113 squadron had taken drums of a hundred rounds of ammunition rather
than the usual sixty so that he would be able to fire longer and was found
himself firing wildly at one aggressive CR 32 who pressed his attacks home.

This guy must have been twenty or thirty yards a CR
32 he was lethal from where he was. His deflection couldn’t have been very good
but he was firing and I was going to have a blast at him but just as I was
about to fire he broke off.3

The standing patrols of Gloucester Gladiators reported a similar lack of
Italian air activity along the border and not one bombing raid had been carried
out. So where were they? The Italian High Command had indeed declared war on
the Allies but had forgotten to inform their Imperial territories so aircraft
were not dispersed, no raids were planned and no fighters on standby. A
complication that arose over the coming months was concern about British
fighter superiority as Longmore had made every opportunity to publicise the
movements of his solitary Hurricane around his command making it look like
several squadrons. Italian planners were hesitant to fling their bombers into
action against superior forces which would leave them decimated.

The first raid on Italian forces was
hailed as a success by Collishaw and his men with many aircraft destroyed
(actually eighteen) for the ttal loss of two aircraft and crews. The losses,
although acceptable by Bomber Command standards in France they were concerning
for Longmore who was well aware of the shortfalls of reinforcement and sent a
message to Collishaw to be careful with his numbers.

The following day the Blenheims were
pressed into supporting a Naval sweep into the waters off Torbruk with twenty
four Blenheims of 45, 113 and 211 squadrons were ordered to take off at dawn to
target the port and airfields but low cloud meant six of 45 squadron returned
to base whilst two of 211s bombers crashed on take-off and a third into a
parked Bombay. The remaining six made it to the target but were intercepted by
CR 32s who were easily outpaced with two of the Italians claimed by C flight.
The only damage sustained came from the accurate Flak barrages thrown up by the
ships in the harbour including the old First World War cruiser the San Giorgio with one of the bombers
losing a propeller but managing to limp back to the British lines. The crews of
55 squadron were just as unlucky with Sgt Lulan, one of the observers, being
struck by a propeller, a second Blenheim wouldn’t start whilst a third had to
return due to mechanical issues. The remaining two powered on but found the
target area swarming with some fifty fighters and decided that withdrawal was a
better option. The only squadron to have any real luck was 113 squadron whose
aircraft all got through. By the end of the day reconnaissance reported the San Giorgio was on fire and beached and
a naval jetty was on fire.

The 14 June was the Army’s turn to
request assistance after a day’s rest. Fort Ridotta Capuzzo on the border was
considered to be weakly held and of old Turkish brick construction so easily
destructible. That morning eight of 211 squadron came in at low level dropping
eleven second delayed fuses on the castle but the fuses were defective and
exploded on contact showering the bombers with shrapnel. They turned for home
leaving the fort still standing but damaged and an ammo dump on fire whilst
that afternoon an army formation took the fort and 208 Italian prisoners.
Elsewhere tow of 45 Squadron’s bombers hit Sidi Azoiz airfield and three Fort
Maddalene leaving it damaged which was similarly captured by the army. A final
aircraft was dispatched to bomb Giarabob and failed to return, its burnt out
airframe was spotted near the target on a reconnaissance photograph near the
target confirming its fate as the only confirmed loss of the day. In retaliation
the Italians began bombing the British border positions.

Torbruk offered up the most tempting
target with tis naval oil reserves, army and air-force headquarters, ships of
all manner in the harbour and an airfield with thirty-four aircraft operating
from it. The heavy defence had precluded attack during the day but had been
steadily assaulted by singular Bombays despite the first mission being scrubbed
for fear of striking non-military targets. There were encouraging results with
several small vessels being struck and a naval vessel sunk. Anti- aircraft fire
was intensive and included “flaming onions” and searchlights which were not
always effective but none of the raiders were lost. Combined raids were also
carried out with eighteen Blenheims of 113 and 55 Squadron following up a
successful night raid on the 15/16 June with a dawn strike but the fifteen that
arrived were turned back by fighters having not done much damage. On other
occasions a singular Blenheim of 113 squadron would act as a rudimentary
pathfinder by bombing the port facilities at Torbruk and illuminating the
target and anti-aircraft batteries for the Bombay as it approached with quite
some success.

Longmore had evaluated the Italians as being put on the defensive by
Collishaw’s activities.”It obviously took the Italians by surprises and, in the
case of the aerodromes, before they had effected adequate dispersal of aircraft
and supplies”

Despite this the Italians were
stepping up to deal with the constant beestings and despite not attacking in
the large knockout blow Douhet would have been proud of, their dawn and dusk
raids on Sidi Baranni, Matruk and positions at Sollum with a dozen bombers
caused problems for the RAF.

The constant headache of reinforcement
was also started to effect operations with Longmore conscious that every
aircraft lost could not be readily replaced and his repeated requests for aid
by fast destroyer were not being met with success. Portal simply had no spare
aircraft to send and with France’s surrender and imminent German invasion
looking likely his priorities were elsewhere. On top of this the Air staff gave
a fresh estimation of Italian strength giving them four hundred bombers against
Longmore’s two hundred across the theatre. Orders affectionately known as
“Muzzling orders” were issued to Collishaw stating that “whilst fully
appreciating the initiative and spirit shown by the squadrons operating under
your command in the Western Desert, I must draw your attention to the urgent
necessity of conserving resources”

Longmore also took the precaution to
remove 45 squadron from the desert and redeploy them in the Sudan. Air
Commodore Drummond reported to Longmore that the time may come to face the
Luftwaffe sooner than they had hoped.

It is clear that it would be a long while before we
get any substantial wastage replacements for our forces which we shall
ultimately need most desperately to ensure our holding of this country (Egypt).
I therefore feel that we must consider very carefully every air operation we embark
on. 4

Operations were duly cut back to only
those that provided the Army or Navy with a strategic advantage rather than
short term tactical gain. Other raids were rewstricted to night operations or
single aircraft. These cutbacks only emboldened the Italians who began bombing
the RAFs airfields casing a retaliatory strike by four Blenheims on El Adem in
conjunction with a singular on Torbruk and a withdrawal of forces from forward
strips.

A sweeping assault in conjunction with
the navy was planned for the 21 June with the Navy intent on shelling Badria
which after original misgivings, it was agreed that the RAF should participate
with 33 Squadron flying cover for the fleet as well as bombing Torbruk harbour
and airfield to keep away the enemy whilst 55 Squadron had nine aircraft
detailed to attack warships in the harbour. The mission was deemed so important
that reserve aircraft were attached to the formation to replace any that
suffered from mechanical failure. Blenheims of 55 squadron took off to attack the
harbour and despite fighter interception which chased B flight away without
dropping their bombs others attacked successfully leaving a large ship in the
harbour on fire all for no lose but claiming two probable CR 42s who chased A
flight and were kept at bay by concentrated fire. The attack by five aircraft
of 211 squadron on the airfields at Torbruk and El Adem was also a success
whilst the cruiser force of HMS Orion,
HMS Neptune, HMAS Sydney and French battleship Lorraine all struck enemy positions and ammunition
dumps encountering no problems.

That very afternoon the GOC urgently
requested attacks on a build-up of Italian forces at Bir El Gobi. A British
advance managed to take Sidi Azeiz airfield following 113 squadron’s eleven
strong attack and discovered dummy aircraft on the runways, a tactic claimed to
be common place according to one POW throwing doubt on the RAFs claims in
previous bombing missions. Another raid on 24 June on a force of 10,000
partially mobilised troops was carried out by eight of 55 squadron all
reporting to drop bombs in the target area but failed to stop the formation
advancing on the 29 June retaking Sidi Azeiz and Fort Capuzzo.

Other operations were more successful
including preparing to meet a rumoured Italian division at Solum and more
single aircraft night raids including on the night of the 22/3 June when a lone
Blenheim was guided into the target by the Italians who believed it was a
friendly aircraft coming in to land and received a stick of bombs.

The most successful attack was carried
out on 27 June following information that the Italians were massing their
aircraft at El Adem to El Gutti providing a temporary target. Twelve aircraft
of 55 and 211 squadron attacked at dusk and caught around a hundred Italian aircraft
on the runway and oil tanks in Torbruk four miles north west from the airfield.
Despite heavy flak the Blenheims reported no fighters or serious damage. The
follow up attack by 114 squadron at dawn the next morning did hit the airfield
but encountered fighter opposition which engaged losing two of their number in
the ensuing battle but claiming two of the British machines as well with a
further one damaged. Another British aircraft was claimed to have been shot
down over the sea with the San Giorgio beginning
the barrage and joined by the airfield’s defensive guns. The wreckage that was
recovered though was that of the SM 79 which was bringing Marshal Italo Balbo,
Governor of Libya and military Commander in chief to the city with his remains
recovered and buried on the 4 July. Further reports from POWs and
reconnaissance showed that the airfield was soon abandoned and used as a
transportation park.

Although the number of sorties were
scaled back at the end of June and into July the Blenheims were still called
upon for further raids of strategic importance such as the rail head at Bir el
Gobi on 4 July with intelligence estimating the Italians had gathered a
significant level of supplies. Seven of 55 Squadron attacked but caused no
significant damage to the gathered rolling stock. Between the 11-16 June
Collishaw’s men had flown 106 sorties for the total loss of one Blenheim but
between the 17 June and 5 July they had flown 100 sorties losing five but were
starting to lose the initiative with the Regia Aeronatica becoming bolder with
attacks on the Nile Delta and Desert outposts despite the Gladiator Squadrons
claiming thirty four of their number in the same fortnight. On the night of 22
June Alexandria was attacked for the first time by bombers coming from the west
in a clear light sky dropping bombs on the quayside and AME station. Longmore
had to remain rigid though; Defensive operations but local offensive if
opportune.

One such attack saw Collishaw working
closely with his naval colleagues and dispatched nine bombers with six
Gladiator escorts to attack the Bomba seaplane base whose aircraft had been
harassing the Royal Navy. In a swift low-level attack saw the fifteen seaplanes
on the base and their slipways bombed whilst the fighters strafed the area and
set fire to a massive fuel depot whose flames also demolished a tool shed and
caused two of the Italian aircraft to explode with a further ten being
confirmed destroyed. A further raid on Bomba was carried out on the 20/21
August to test the defences, look for torpedo netting and evidence of Submarine
activity. On the 22 August following a night raid by a Bombay three Swordfish
assigned to Collishaw attacked the two submarines and their tender in the gulf
of Bomba sinking one submarine and the Monte
Gargane. The Blenheims of 202 group were also called to provide an aerial
umbrella for naval reinforcements entering the area on 31 August and to attack
all of the airfields in Cyrenaica by small formations of two or three Blenheims
which were then carried out again as the Mediterranean fleet swept back to
Malta with a total of eighty nine sorties being flown and successfully keeping
the Italian air-force away from the British ships.

The first phase of war in the desert
was very successful with the RAF opening the hostilities with amazing effect
before attrition and numerical superiority started to take its toll and the
ever cautious Longmore was forced to “muzzle” his men. However his prediction
that strong moral over numerical strength shone through as the four Blenheim
squadrons of 202 group shone through with excellent performances for
comparatively small loss.

About Me

History writer and blogger, former Libdem activist. I also write of bad sci-fi and fan fiction. More importantly I'm a husband to a beautiful wife, father of three crazy children and live in Gillingham, Kent.