President Obama's European tour went remarkably
smoothly. Many expected the G20 summit to end in fights over stronger
regulations of the global financial system, but despite president Sarkozy's hard-line position
the outcome was surprisingly consensual. The US and most West European
governments were even able to agree on a common candidate for NATO's new
Secretary General, an issue that has led to rather longer arguments in the
past. Everyone seemed to be in high spirits until Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan
disturbed the party with his publicly declared opposition to the candidacy of
Anders Fogh Rasmussen - a diplomatic clanger.

An ultimate veto against the candidate
could only be avoided by reportedly broad concessions to Turkey, chief among
which was the appointment of a Turkish deputy to Rasmussen and the shut-down of
the allegedly pro-PKK TV channel Roj TV,
which operates from Denmark. Despite the seeming resolution of the situation,
the implications of the choice of Rasmussen remain problematic. The quarrel
indicates two developments that will pose great challenges to both NATO and the
European Union. First, Erdoğan's conduct demonstrates a new Turkish
self-assurance in standing up to its Western partners, that can largely be
traced back to a general strategic reorientation in Ankara. The case also
highlights a serious lack of sensitivity towards the ‘Islamic world' on the
part of central NATO member states, calling into question NATO's strategic
reorientation.

The
causa Rasmussen

Rasmussen has become a persona non grata in
much of the ‘Islamic world' due to his fervent support of the Iraq war and his
mismanagement of the cartoon
controversy in 2005. After the cartoons were published in Denmark several
ambassadors from Muslim countries tried to enter into dialogue with Rasmussen
on how to defuse the situation. The Danish Prime Minister arrogantly snubbed
them. While insisting on free speech as a vital component of civil liberties in
his country, he nevertheless failed to acknowledge the need to communicate this
principle or to engage in dialogue over what had occurred. His behavior left
the ambassadors startled and ruined his reputation in the ‘Islamic world'.
Moreover, Rasmussen's minority government has long relied on toleration of the
right-wing Dansk Folkeparti, a group that
has repeatedly used racist, anti-Muslim rhetoric.

It is indeed surprising that it took an
embarrassing public declaration by Erdoğan to point out the implications of the
candidate. Still NATO chose to ignore Rasmussen's bad standing in a key region
of the globe and a primary area of operation for NATO. It is essential for a
Secretary General of NATO to be able to get along well with the ‘Muslim world'.
Rasmussen's appointment comes as a welcome present for the propagandists of Al
Qaeda and the Taliban, who have long declared NATO's intervention in
Afghanistan anti-Muslim. It also contradicts president Obama's efforts to
reorganize NATO and clearly shift its focus
to AfPak.

Turkey's
reorientation

Turkey's geographical proximity to the
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus locates it at an intersection of
pivotal energy and transportation networks. Its political and economic ties to
Syria, Iran and other Southern neighbours provide Ankara with unique access to
and influence in one of the most troublesome areas of the globe. Turkey's position
benefits the increasingly outward-oriented EU and NATO when it comes to
influence and credibility in this area; an asset that shouldn't be trifled
with.

The country has always been torn between
its ties to these neighbours and to the European Union. Atatürk's secular model
of the state launched Turkey on a westernising path, but this path is by no
means uncontested. After having lost some eight percent of the popular vote in
the recent parliamentary
elections, Erdoğan has come under increased pressure from within his party.
Conservative elements in the AKP have long demanded a more self-assured
position for Turkey against its Western allies, particularly the European
Union. The ‘special treatment' that has characterized the long and troubled
process of Turkey's accession to the Union has alienated many Turks from the
western orientation of Erdoğan's early years. His and his party's steadily
decreasing popularity signify this, as does the subsequent cessation of Turkish
reform efforts towards meeting the Copenhagen
criteria since 2005. The political costs of the accession process are
starting to outweigh the gains that Turkey aspired to. It gets harder and
harder for the pro-EU parties to keep up their support for the accession
process in the light of a rising popular reservation against further
concessions without clear signals from the EU.

Erdoğan's refusal to support Rasmussen's
candidacy emphasizes the implications of Turkey's strategic reorientation.
Turkey will increasingly turn towards its Southern neighbours in order to
assert its power in the region. The assurance of a distinctively pro-Muslim
policy will highlight Turkey's key role and further its position as a spokesman
of the ‘Muslim world'. Erdoğan's row
with Shimon Peres in Davos hinted at such a strategy, underlined by Turkey's
successful conduct as a mediator between Syria and Israel.

openDemocracy, "Turkey
and a new vision for Europe" (12 December 2007)At the same time this emphasizes the
strategic importance of the only Muslim NATO member as a key ally both for the
Alliance and the EU. It is high time for the Union to acknowledge Turkey's
geopolitical potential and its uniqueness as a secular democracy with a
predominantly Muslim population. Turkey as an EU member (provided it meets the
Copenhagen criteria) will be an invaluable asset in the region because it can
better than any other country play the role of the honest broker. Moreover, as
the only NATO member keeping diplomatic contact with Tehran, Ankara is a prime
channel for a rapprochement. If the EU continues to alienate Turkey and invent new strategies to
protract the accession process it will lose the Turks. It becomes increasingly
hard to explain to the Turkish people why they face harsh visa restrictions
when traveling to the EU while most EU citizens can freely go to Turkey. And
Ankara's elites are hesitant to perform any further pro-European reforms as
long as European governments - especially Germany and France - continue to undermine
the perspective of full membership.

The window of opportunity that the Erdoğan
government has represented (at least in its earlier years) is closing. A future
Turkish administration is much likely to be a lot less pro-Western.

NATO's
strategic choice

President Obama's visit to Turkey and his
call for the EU to fast-track the accession of Ankara are signs that the new
American administration acknowledges the importance of NATO's only
predominantly Muslim member. It also came as a well-placed nod to moderate
Islam. Turkey's ties
to Iran and Syria may be another reason here, as is the potential use of
Turkish territory during the US pullout from Iraq. Many in Europe still believe
that cooperation with Turkey is nothing more than a benevolent gift to an
emerging country. It's not. From a geopolitical perspective, and for economic
reasons, strong ties are a win-win-situation. Obama's visit has made this very
clear: there is something to gain for America in Turkey. And despite strong
anti-American sentiments, the Turks seem to respond positively to Obama's open
hand. Again the Europeans are losing ground.

The whole controversy around the
appointment of the new NATO secretary general emphasizes that a few calls
between Washington, London and Berlin are no longer sufficient to govern a
multipolar world. Other states need to be actively incorporated in order to
achieve a broad consensus and thus a strong strategic position. Engaging Turkey
is a first step - and a smart one given Ankara's influence.

Obama's call for a large-scale reform of
NATO towards a more flexible, globally operating security force is highly
controversial within the Alliance, especially among its larger Western European
members. However, NATO's future mission will undoubtedly include a more active
role in regional crisis areas, especially in the wider Middle East. The
importance of its image in the region therefore must not be underestimated,
which NATO still does given the symbolic meaning of a Secretary General
Rasmussen. The issue comes as a huge ideological burden for NATO's operations
in Afghanistan and elsewhere; a needless mistake, that should have been
avoided. And yet another reason to embrace Turkey.

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