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POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1786
The Economics of Customs The Customs Union proposed
for four members of the
Unions in the 'Commonwealth of
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) -
and the Free TradeArea
Independent States established among the 12
members of the CIS- are
likely to lock those countries
Constantine Michalopoulos into the old technology of the
David Tarr former Soviet Union. The
effects of such organizations
will be especially negative for
the countries that have
already established relatively
liberal trade regimes.
The World Bank
International Economics Department
International Trade Division
and
Russia and Central Asia Department
June 1997
I POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1786
Summary findings
In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Customs Union. They conclude that the dynamic effects
trade among the new independent states collapsed. To of the Union (and the Free Trade Area) are likely to be
help reestablish interstate trade, the 12 members of the negative, because they would tend to lock the countries
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established into the old technology of the former Soviet Union. The
a Free Trade Area. More recently, four members of the static effects would tend to be mixed but would be more
CIS - Belarus, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and harmful to countries that have already established
Russia - agreed in principle to establish a Customs relatively liberal trade regimes with lower average and
Union. less-differentiated tariffs than the common external tariff
Michalopoulos and Tarr analyze the economic contemplated by the proposed Customs Union.
implications for potential members of establishing such a
This paper -a joint product of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department, and the Russia
and Central Asia Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to analyze the effects of different trade regimes in
countries in transition. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
20433. Please contact Minerva Patefia, room NS-048, telephone 202-473-9515, fax 202-522-1159, Internet address
mpatena@worldbank.org. June 1997. (30 pages)
The Policy ResearcP Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exctange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the vieW of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
THE ECONOMICS OF CUSTOMS UNIONS
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
by
Constantine Michalopoulos
and
David Tarr
JEL categories: F15; P33.
Address correspondence to:
David G. Tarr
Room N-5-037
The World Bank
1818 H. St., N.W.Washington D.C. 20433
E-mail: DTARR@WORLDBANK.ORG
The Economics of Customs Unions
in the Commonwealth of Independent States
Constantine Michalopoulos and David Tarr 1
I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union, trade among the new independent
states collapsed. Estimates vary, but the drop in volume terms may have been as much as 50%
between 1992 and 1995 (see table 1). We have discussed the reasons and the consequences of this
drastic decline elsewhere (Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1994; 1996).
The three Baltic countries decided, early on, to reorient their trade to Europe and the rest
of the world; and all three have signed association agreements with the European Union. The
other twelve countries (members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)), attempted,
mostly unsuccessfully, to maintain trade with each other through a variety of policy interventions,
including through the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In 1995 three countries,
Belarus, Kazakstan and Russia established a customs union which the Kyrgyz Republic agreed to
join in 1996.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the economic implications of a customs union
among transition economies, such as the one established by these four countries, for both existing
and prospective members. The next section of the paper describes in broad terms the current trade
regines of the CIS, including the arrangements that govern trade with each other. The third
section analyses the economic effects of the customs union, in part through the use of a partial
equilibrium model described in detail in the appendix. The focus is on the effects of joining the
I The authors are, respectively: Senior Advisor in the Russia and Central Asia Department, the World Bank;
and Lead Economist, International Economics Department, The World Bank. Helpful comments on an earlier draft
were received from Peter Hansen and Maurice Schiff of the World Bank, Svyatoslav Perfilov of the CIS Interstate
Economic Committee and international trade representatives of the 17 transition economies who participated at the
EDI seminar on Trade Policy in Transition and WTO Accession, January 31-February 6, 1997, Vienna, Austria.
We thank Minerva Patena and Maria Luisa de la Puente for logistical support. The views expressed are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank or those acknowledged.
I
customs union for countries which have not done so. As most CIS members are applying for
accession to the WTO, this section also draws some implications of the customs union for WTO
accession. The last section summarizes the policy conclusions and implications of the analysis.
While the analysis focuses on the CIS countries, some of the fmdings may be of relevance to other
countries in transition--for example, among the countries of the former Yugoslavia, that are
considering the establishment of similar arrangements.
II. The Trade Regimes
While the trade policy framework continues to be evolving and varies considerably among
countries, the following main features characterize the trade regimes of CIS members:
On the import side, most countries have so far avoided the establishment of quantitative
restrictions or licensing. But protectionist pressures are rising and leading to the imposition of
such controls in some countries (e.g., Uzbekistan) or sectors (alcoholic beverages-- in Russia).
The tariff regimes vary considerably, but on the whole countries have established few tariffs
exceeding 30%. Some countries have low and uniform tariffs, e.g., Armenia's maximum tariff is
10% and the Kyrgyz Republic has a 10% uniform tariff); while in others the range goes up to
100% for a few items. In Russia, the average is about 13-14% with a range from 0 to 30% for
most commodities, with some selected items considerably higher (see table 2 for details at a
somewhat aggregated level).
On the export side, there has been significant dismantling of export controls in most
countries; but controls of exports through state trading continues in some key exportables (cotton,
oil and natural gas).
Trade with each other, is in principle free under the terms of the FTA. Imports are duty
free, but it appears that export and foreign exchange controls in practice limit trade among some
of the countries. Weaknesses in the payments systems continue to hamper trade, leading to
continuing use of barter; but the previous state to state barter agreements have been by and large
eliminated. Many countries have established a mixed VAT system: "origin" based for CIS trade
2
and "destination" based with regard to the rest of the world. This means that with respect to CIS
countries, imports are not taxed but domestic producers pay the VAT regardless of whether the
good is exported or sold domestically. For the rest of the world, imports pay the VAT but exports
are zero rated.
The Customs Union members negotiated a common external tariff based on the Russian
tariff. But in the course of 1996, the three original members unilaterally introduced modifications
to the external tariffs they applied to some commodities (Rietzler and Usmanova, 1996); also, as
of the time of this writing, the Kyrgyz Republic had not taken any steps to introduce the common
external tariff but instead continued to apply a uniform 10% tariff to imports from the rest of the
world. All four countries are applying to the WTO on the basis of individual tariff schedules
rather than as a custom union. Thus, at present, strictly speaking, there is no common external
tariff for the Customs Union. But the agreements are still in place and the governments may
pursue further steps towards their full implementation.
I-. The Effects of Customs Union
There are two kinds of effects of customs unions, static and dynamic. The static effects
relate to the impact of the establishment of the customs union on welfare. The analysis in this
instance focuses on a comparison of the welfare of a country or groups of countries before and
after the establishment of the customs union; thus the analysis is one of comparative statics. The
dynamic effects focus on the impact the customs union on the rate of output growth of a country
or countries in the medium term2 Many analysts have noted (Winters 1996) that supporters of
customs unions and other regional preferential arrangements frequently find that the static welfare
effects are typically small and possibly negative. They then focus on the potential dynamic
benefits, which however, are difficult to define and even more difficult to measure.
2 It is important to note that output growth can not be equated to welfare growth, as some of the mechanisms that
may result in increasing the rate of growth of output in a future period may involve reduced consumption and welfare in
the present.
3
In the case of the CIS countries, there is already a FTA among all members as well as a
Customs Union (CU) among some of them however modified by specific exceptions for variation
from a common external tariff. Hence the analysis of both dynamic and static effects has to
compare the advantages and disadvantages of joining this specific customs union not just any one,
and assumes that in principle the alternative to joining, is continuation of the FTA among the CIS;
but the implications of a different alternative, under which countries that do not join the CU are
excluded from the FTA area, also briefly examined.
Static Welfare Effects
The principal impact of joining the customs union would be to replace the external tariff of
each of the countries with the common external tariff of the customs union. In general, under
these circumstances the benefits of joining the CU would depend to a considerable extent on the
height and structure of each of the countries external tariff compared to that of the Customs Union
external tariff. While in practice a Customs Union external tariff may not be in place at present,
for purposes of analysis, the Russian tariff is a good proxy of the Customs Union external tariff
that had been negotiated and will be used for the discussion in this paper. If a country such as
Armenia or the Kyrgyz Republic with lower external tariffs were to substitute the Russian tariff
for its own tariff structure, it would increase its unweighted average tariff to 13-14 percent (see
table 2). More importantly, assuming that following accession of new members, the common
external tariff is not changed, the Russian tariff exhibits considerably more dispersion compared
with the tariff for some of the countries (typically between 0 and 30 percent),3 meaning that for
selected highly protected products in Russia, the tariff would increase significantly. For other
countries, adopting the common external tariff would mean actually reducing their average tariff.
Starting with Jacob Viner (1950), international trade economists typically analyze
preferential trade arrangements, whether members of a FTA or a CU, in terms of trade creation
3 See table 2 for a listing of the Russian tariff by sector. Since an aggregation was performed in table 2, the
Russian tariff is higher for some tariff lines within the aggregates shown than for the sector as a whole.
4
and trade diversion. Trade creation in a product occurs, when additional imports come from
partner countries which displace sales of inefficient domestic producers and these imports are at
least as cheap as imports from non-partner countries. Trade creation results in improved welfare
for the importing country for much the same reasons as increased trade improves a country's
welfare. On the other hand, trade diversion occurs when suppliers in the rest of the world (who
continue to face tariffs) are more efficient than partner suppliers, but additional partner country
imports displace the more efficient suppliers. Trade diversion is typically (but not necessarily)
welfare reducing since the home country must pay more to import the product from the less
efficient partner country suppliers.
Although the general theory of regional trading arrangements is quite ambiguous in its
conclusions, we believe some definitive conclusions are possible with respect to the specific
customs union under consideration, at least for some of the CIS countries. Since the partner
countries in the potential customs union already have tariff free access to the other CIS markets
under the Free Trade Agreement, prices in these countries' markets cannot fall as a result of the
customs union, i.e., there will be little welfare gain from trade creation. Whatever trade creation
would occur, would come from third country suppliers in those products where the current
external tariff in the country is higher than that of the Customs Union external tariff. Since
welfare costs from a tariff increase with the square of the tariff rate, net welfare effects are little
impacted by reductions in tariffs by a few percentage points say, from ten to seven percent.
Rather what is crucial to the welfare effects are the changes that involve significant tariff
increases.4
Countries with Lower Tariffs Than in the Customs Union. Prospective partner country
suppliers will have the potential, under the higher tariffs of the customs union, to raise prices to
consumers in other CIS countries by the amount of the tariff preference over rest of world
imports. In the model we present in the appendix, we assume that they will do so. A principal
reason we believe they will do so is our judgment that advocates of the customs union propose it
4 See Morkre and Tarr (1980, chapter 2) for details.
5
as a means of expanding protection for inefficient domestic industries throughout the CIS. That is,
the customs union is an import substitution strategy for inefficient industries, where the structure
of the tariff is high in those industries that exist in the customs union, especially in Russia. In the
appendix, we elaborate some additional reasons why we believe they will do so. Thus, a key
assumption of our model is that prospective members of the customs union face upward sloping
supply curves from partner country suppliers who will raise prices by the extent of the tariff.
Moreover, since these countries have tariff free access to markets of the members of the
customs union and to Russia in particular, the exporters from a CIS country joining the CU will
not obtain improved access to the Russian market, which is by far the dominant market in the
customs union. Thus, for countries like the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia with already liberal
external tariffs or others like Georgia and Moldova which are also pursuing generally liberal trade
policies and assuming the common external tariff is not changed following their accession, the
usual tradeoffs that must be considered in the evaluation of a preferential trade arrangement (trade
diversion versus improved access and trade creation) do not apply. Thus, the CU would virtually
result in pure trade diversion (see the appendix for details).
High tariff protection for such small economies is generally very inefficient and costly.
Protection prevents the transmission of world prices to the economy and thereby prevents market
signals from inducing resource reallocation to areas of comparative advantage in the economy.
Experience has shown that over time, countries with high protection generally grow more slowly
than those with low protection (see, e.g., Thomas, Nash and others, 1991; and Sachs and
Warner, 1995). Moreover, we show in the appendix that increasing an external tariff within the
framework of a customs union with Russia and the other partners for a small CIS country, is much
more costly than simply raising tariffs, without preferential treatment to the customs union
members. In fact, in this example the customs union will be several times more inefficient and
costly to the small country than simply raising tariffs to the rest of the world in a non-preferential
manner.
6
Joining the customs union with a common external tariff such as that previously negotiated
is so costly for several reasons: First, partner country suppliers can raise prices under the tariff
protection they receive from preferential protection. Then for the quantities previously purchased
from partner country suppliers, consumers in member countries with a previously lower external
tariff will likely pay higher prices (excluding the tariffs) to partner country producers than they
were paying prior to participation in the customs union, i.e., there is an adverse terms-of-trade
effect on the initial quantities purchased from partner country suppliers. Second, since rest of
world imports are subject to a higher tariff, there will be a diversion of sales away from rest of
the world suppliers toward partner country suppliers. This trade diversion entails two costs: (a)
since the importing country does not collect any tariff revenue on imports from partner countries,
there is a loss of the tariff revenue on these trade diverting imports;5 and (b) excluding the tariff,
consumers will have to pay higher prices to partner country suppliers than they were paying to
rest of world suppliers prior to participation in the customs union.
In their comprehensive theoretical treatment, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) describe a
model in which partner country suppliers have perfectly elastic supply curves. This situation might
be expected to apply if a country is forming a preferential trade area with a very large market,
such as the European Union or NAFTA, because competition among many suppliers in the large
market results in flat supply curves to the prospective new member country. In this case, there is a
much larger likelihood of the preferential trade area being welfare increasing since the new
member will not suffer a terms-of-trade loss on its purchases from the suppliers from the large
market.
Countries with Higher Average Tariffs Than in the Customs Union. For countries with a
higher average external tariff than that of the CU, the results are more ambiguous. On the one
hand, in converting to the common external tariff, since the average tariff is lower than in the
5 The loss of tariff revenue due to the diversion of imports away from the rest of the world is a loss of welfare
to the home country, since it will have raise tax revenue from other sources to offset the loss of government revenue.
This is in contrast to a reduction of tariffs multilaterally, where consumers benefit from a reduction in the price they
pay, and the increase in consumers' surplus offsets the loss of tariff revenue.
7
home country, there will be a number of products where the external tariff will be reduced. Then
there will be a welfare gain on those products where the external tariff is lowered because there
will be some trade creation from additional imports from rest of the world suppliers (partner
country suppliers already have tariff free access due to the FTA so no additional trade creation is
possible from CIS partners). On the other hand, the negotiated tariff of the CU is not uniforn;
rather it favors production of those products already produced in the CU. Even in countries with
higher average tariffs than in the CU, their tariffs typically favor their home production.
Substitution of the CU tariff will shift the tariff structure so that it favors the producers of the CU,
i.e., tariffs will be high on the products produced in the CU and low on the products produced in
the home country, and it is likely that even in countries with higher average tariffs, they will have
to raise their external tariffs on many products produced in their partner countries. This will
allow partner country producers to charge higher prices under the protection of higher tariffs on
third country producers, a significant welfare loss that is likely to dominate. A choice available to
a country in these circumstances is to lower its tariff on third countries, without joining the CU.
This option offers the gains from the trade creation on the products where the external tariff is
being lowered, without the losses of the trade diversion from having to pay higher prices to
inefficient partner country suppliers.
Russia, Kazakstan and Belarus. Finally, briefly consider the welfare impact on Russia,
Kazakstan and Belarus, the members of the Customs Union which had adopted the common
external tariff. Since the tariff structure favors production in these countries, then as more
countries join the Customs Union, in the short run producers in these countries will gain
additional profits and exports from the additional protection they receive against rest of world
imports in the new partner country markets. Since the costs of protecting home producers will be
borne in part by consumers in partner countries, the strategy has an initial appeal in the countries
whose producers receive the high protection. But, because the benefits of a liberal trade regime to
consumers are dispersed widely (presenting a free-rider problem where it is not typically worth it
to individual consumers to lobby their governments for liberal trade actions) while the benefits of
8
trade protection are concentrated in the industry receiving protection (which provides an incentive
for the industry to lobby its government for protection), the kinds of preferential trade areas that
will typically arise are those which are trade diverting (see Grossman and Helpman (1995)).
Thus, in order for the existing members of the Customs Union to convince additional members to
join, or at least to remain members over time, it is likely that the tariff structure will have to
change in a way that offers protection to producers of other CIS countries, i.e., the existing
members will have to offer protection in their markets to high priced products produced in non-
member CIS states. A country will not participate in a Customs Union if the Customs Union
offers neither enhanced protection for its producers nor widespread benefits for its consumers. 6
If the external tariff is adjusted to accommodate the inefficient producers of new members,
although some of the producers of the existing member countries may still gain from a wider
Customs Union, the benefits to the countries as a whole are going to be reduced and countries
could become net losers. That is, the short-run gains to existing producers mask potential longer
term costs of not opening up trade to the rest of the world. It is likely that the entire CIS is not
collectively large enough to approximate world market efficiency in most products. Thus, a
strategy of widening the protection of domestic producers through a Customs Union of a set of the
CIS countries, is really an import substitution policy through protection on a slightly larger scale,
a strategy that has retarded growth in many countries (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Krueger, 1973;
Sachs and Warner, 1995; and Thomas, Nash and others, 1991).7
6 We have already observed the manifestation of these problems, as Kazakstan and Belarus have selectively
suspended application of the common external tariff, i.e, the trade diversion costs were evident to the parties (see
Rietzler and Usmanova, 1996, p. 30)
7 If the common external tariff is renegotiated to reflect the interests of the non-member countries, then the
static welfare economics for non-member countries will not be as adverse as depicted in the sections above treating the
welfare economics of the non-member countries. Nonetheless, liberalization toward the world as a whole would
remain the preferred strategy to joining the Customs Union, since , as just discussed, even the CIS as a whole must be
wary of an import-substitution strategy.
9
Revenue Effects
Due to the potential impact on the fiscal deficit, macro stabilization and inflation,
governments must also be cognizant of the impact of preferential trade arrangements on their
revenues. In this section, we examine various aspects of this question for the CIS countries.
Tariffs. Joining the customs union is likely to have negative revenue implications on
individual new members. As there will continue to be no tariffs on trade within the customs
union, to the extent that rest of world imports are displaced, tariff revenue will be lost to the
customs union. In addition, despite the fact that the customs union agreements stipulate that the
tariff revenue will go to the country to whom the imports are destined, one can not overlook the
potential administrative problems associated with obtaining tariff revenues from the customs
offices of other member countries, especially given the weakness in tax reserve collections in all
these countries. And there are other reasons to believe that revenues of imports from the rest of
the world will be diminished. There are central administrative institutions of a customs union that
will have to receive funding. Funding for the administration of the customs union or any
centralized programs is typically done out of tariff revenue collected by the customs union.
Excise Taxes. Accession to the customs union will increase pressure on members to
harmonize excise tax rates. These rates are presently rather diverse both within the CU countries
and potential members. The tax revenue implications of unified rates would have to be assessed
in each case individually.
Value Added Taxes. The dominant practice among the CIS countries is to apply the value
added tax (VAT) on a mixed basis. That is, for trade outside of the CIS, imports are taxed but
exports are not, the "destination" system. For trade within the CIS, exports are taxed but imports
are not, the "origin system." Participation in the customs union will require a value added tax that
is harmonized with the system applicable in the customs union, i.e., the current mixed system.
Berglas (1981) has shown that under certain assumptions (including flexible exchange rates) the
origin or destination systems are equivalent and do not tax the trade regime if designed properly.
Since the VAT rates of most CIS are approximately equalized, the allocation of real resources
10
and trade flows among the other CIS countries is not seriously affected, but it is important to
harmonize these taxes within a mixed system to avoid arbitrage and distortions.8
What is more likely to be a problem with a mixed VAT system is the allocation of tax
revenues. Even if the VAT rates are harmonized, countries with a trade deficit within the customs
union and a trade surplus outside the customs union will experience an adverse transfer of VAT
tax revenues toward the partners in the customs union with the opposite trade pattern. To
illustrate, suppose the trade of Azerbaijan is balanced overall, but it imports exclusively from, say
Russia, and exports exclusively outside the customs union, and that Russia has the opposite trade
balance.
Since the destination system applies on trade outside of the CIS, and the origin principle
applies on trade within the CIS, Azerbaijan would collect no VAT tax revenues (neither on its
imports nor its exports), and Russia would collect all the VAT revenue on trade (Russia collects
VAT on both its exports to Azerbaijan and its imports from the rest of the world). Thus, even
though the mixed VAT system would not change relative prices and is therefore non-distortionary
because there is no impact on the allocation of resources, in this example it would represent a
transfer of VAT revenues from Azerbaijan to Russia.
Dynamic Effects
In general, there are two basic ways in which the rate of output growth can increase: First
through a faster growth of factor inputs and second through increases in the growth of total factor
productivity. Assuming no changes in population growth and in labor force participation rates, the
growth of factor inputs essentially boils down to the rate of investment in human and physical
capital. Total factor productivity on the other hand is thought to be dependent in the medium alnd
long term on improvements in technology and knowhow. More generally, access to a diverse mix
of products including modern technology appears to be very important for the growth process (see
8 The apparent (rather than real) incentives of the mixed system may present difficulties politically since it appears
to provide an incentive to import from the CIS (thus avoiding VAT on imports) and export to non-CIS countries
(where no VAT is paid).
11
e.g., Romer, 1994). New and diverse technologies are constantly appearing and these new
technologies allow an increase in the productivity of both capital and labor.9
The question that needs to be addressed then is how a customs union among the CIS
countries will affect output growth through its impact on access to technology that enhances
productivity and through its effects on the rate of investment in human and physical capital (see de
Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik, 1993). There is some evidence that developing countries total
factor productivity is positively related to the access of technology and knowledge embodied in
imports from developed countries (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister,
1995). In the case of CIS and other transition economies, access to diverse and modem
intermediate products from world markets appears especially crucial as these economies attempt to
transform themselves from an industrial structure that was inherited from the era of the former
Soviet Union, i.e., that was outdated and frequently not based on comparative advantage. It is
very important that these countries move away from reliance on technologies that are available
only in the countries that were part of the former Soviet Union, since the most dynamic and
modem technologies are found elsewhere. Yet, tariff protection for products that are produced in
the customs union will discourage the introduction of new products and technologies from outside
the customs union and free trade area, technologies that would boost the growth and development
of the CIS members. Thus, on the question of enhancing growth through improvements in total
factor productivity the effect of the customs union (and for that matter of the exisitng free trade
area) on all its members is likely to be very negative.
There are several ways through which a customs union could affect the rate of investment
in member countries: (a) through a change in tariffs and hence in the cost of imported capital
equipment that changes the rate of return on investment and the rate of capital accumulation; (b)
through affecting the financial system and the overall stability and effectiveness of economic
policies that improve the climate of investment; (c) by providing an incentive to foreign direct
9 See Rutherford and Tarr (1996) for a model quantifying this effect.
12
investmnent to locate and produce in the countries of the Union as opposed to exporting goods and
services( Winters 1996).
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make a credible case that these effects would be positive in
the case of a customs union in the CIS. First, it is likely that the cost of imported capital would
actually increase especially for some of the smaller members, as they could obtain capital goods
more cheaply from third countries. Second, while there are plans for greater integration of the
financial systems and economic policies of members which may have a positive impact on the
climate of investment in the future, there is very little chance that any of this will happen in the
immediate future. In fact, premature integration without adequate multilateral institutions may
resurrect some of the problems of the recent past which contributed to instability. For example,
the common ruble area of 1992-1993, without monetary coordination of the multiple central banks
was a root cause of inflation and the problems of trade (see Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992; 1993).
The key challenge in all countries is how to improve the national environment for private sector
development through the establishment of policies and institutions ( for example better
enforcement of contractual obligations) that improve the investment climate--policies that may best
be pursued unilaterally in the near term. Third, it is possible that as result of the establishment of
the customs union, there may be a positive effect on foreign investment that comes in to "jump"
the common external tariff. How big this effect will be is hard to predict simply because there are
so many other factors that constrain the inflow of foreign direct investment which countries need
to address first and which are likely to have a far greater impact on foreign direct investment than
the stimulus provided by the establishment of a customs union. More importantly, foreign direct
investment which is in response to tariff jumping can cause the welfare and growth rate of the
capital importing country to decline (see Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro, 1977). The reason is tht
foreign investment responds to the private return to capital, and the foreigners will repatriate
profits based on their private returns; but when the sector is highly protected, the social return to
investment in the sector is much lower than the private return.
13
In sum, while the dynamic effects of establishing or joining a customs union and of the
exisiting Free Trade Area in the CIS are difficult to demonstrate, they are likely to be negative,
especially because of the adverse effect of the preferential arrangements on technology and
productivity improvements.
The Threat of the Loss of the Free Trade Agreement
In the event that a CIS country fails to join the customs union, there is some possibility
that the members of the customs union would apply the common external tariff to the exports of
that CIS country; that is, they may revoke their Free Trade Agreements. Although we must be
cautious since the effects will vary from country to country and we do not have precise estimates,
the net welfare impact of participation in the Free Trade Agreement is likely to be negative for
most CIS countries; consequently, the threat of exposure to the common external tariff of the
customs union is not an event that should be feared for most CIS countries.
The reasons are as follows: If Russia, Kazakstan and Belarus, withdraw from the Free
Trade Agreements and apply the negotiated common external tariff of the customs union to
exports from the other CIS countries, there would be economic impacts on both the imports and
the exports of these CIS countries. Regarding imports, as explained in detail in the appendix,
applying tariffs on imports from former partner countries in the CIS results in displacement of
partner country imports by rest of world supply. This results in a gain in tariff revenue on these
sales. Moreover, since partner country suppliers are likely, in many products, to lower their
prices to the extent of reduction of the tariff on rest of world products (since marginally inefficient
partner country suppliers will be forced out of the market as competition from rest of world
producers becomes more intense), CIS consumers will be able to pay less to partner suppliers by
the amount of the tariff, and this is a gain to their economic welfare. Moreover, permitting
efficient imports from the rest of the world as opposed to preserving inefficient imports from
partners in the former Soviet Union, is very productive in terms of breaking away from the
outdated and inefficient technology of the Soviet past.
14
Weighed against this potential gain in welfare from application of tariffs on imports in the
CIS is the loss in welfare from lost preferential access to the markets of countries in the Customs
Union. Exporters from the CIS countries outside the Customs Union would no longer be able to
obtain higher prices than producers from the rest of the world on exports to the countries in the
Customs Union, since like exporters from the rest of the world, their exports would also be
subject to the tariff. But since the negotiated tariff of the Customs Union is based on the Russian
external tariff, it tends to be high in those items important to Russian producers. That is, products
important to the exports of the CIS tend to be inputs into production in Russia and therefore have
relatively low tariffs in the Customs Union. Although we must again be cautious since this effect
will vary from country to country and we do not have precise estimates, this implies that most CIS
countries outside Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan likely derive little terms of trade gain on their
exports to the Customs Union, from the fact that they are in the Free Trade Agreement. That is,
most CIS countries perhaps with the exception of Ukraine, would likely be able to sell the vast
majority on their products in the same markets with small losses losses that are considerably
smaller than the losses suffered by their consumers from having to pay higher prices to the
exporters from the Customs Union. Moreover, the dynamic effects of the free trade area could
also be negative, for all its members.
It would be desirable for CIS exporters to find alternate marketing channels outside of the
CIS Customs Union countries. This would reduce dependence on a limited number of countries
for markets and transportation facilities. Absent Free Trade Agreements, it will become even
more imperative for exporters from the CIS to find alternate markets and marketing channels.
Moreover, while finding new markets outside of the Customs Union countries may require a
difficult adjustment period, the experience of the Baltic countries between 1992 and 1994
demonstrates that rapid adjustment is possible. 10
10 In earlier papers (Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992; 1993) we argued in favor of temporary Free Trade
Agreements among the newly independent states. The argument was based on easing transition costs due to the heavy
interlinkages of the production structures in the countries of the FSU. The justification for the continuation of the Free
Trade Agreements on the basis of easing the adjustment costs, however, becomes progressively weaker over time and
the importance of integrating with the rest of the world becomes more important over time. These concerns were
15
Accession to the World Trade Organization
Most CIS members have begun the process of accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The WTO permits custom unions as long as they meet two basic requirements: (a) they
cover substantially all trade among the partners; and (b) do not result in an increase in the level of
protection to the outside world relative to before the establishment of the CU. In the past these
WTO provisions have been applied quite flexibly and it is quite possible that the CU negotiated
among the four CIS members would meet the WTO standards. Thus participation in this customs
union will not by itself prevent an individual country from joining the WTO. The question is
whether it would be useful for individual countries to enter the CU and join the WTO as part of
the CU or individually. Judging from recent experience, it will complicate the accession process
to the WTO of individual CIS members to present an accurate picture of its trade regime to the
members of the WTO "working party" who will be charged with the negotiation of their accession
if they were to move to make commitments in joining the CU before they become members of the
WTO. That is, the WTO working party would perceive that the present trade regime of the CIS
country will be changed significantly in the future if it joins the Customs Union. Perhaps it is for
this reason that Belarus, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Russia are applying to accede to the
WTO on an individual basis, not as members of a CU.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. For small CIS countries, with relatively open trade regimes, joining the Customs Union
that has been established by several CIS members could be economically quite costly.
These costs could be mitigated, but probably not fully offset, if as a consequence of the entry of
new members, both the average level and the dispersion of the previously negotiated external tariff
of the customs union were reduced. For these countries, maintaining an open trade regime without
reflected in our weakened endorsement of the Free Trade Agreements in Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994), and our
considerable reservations toward them in Michalopoulos and Tarr (1996).
16
preferences is the best policy that maximizes welfare and growth prospects. It will also facilitate
entry into the WTO, a key objective for these countries' trade policies.
2. Even for the existing customs union members, and for others with more restrictive
trade regimes than those of existing members, preferential arrangements that provide strong
incentives to orient trade towards partners in the former Soviet Union contain significant long
term risks. The main risks are that the preferences (through customs union or free trade
arrangements) lock in traditional technologies and production structures, reduce innovation and
competition, and hence result in inefficient industries that absorb scarce resources that could be
better used elsewhere.
3. The discussion has focused on preferences and a specific customs union arrangement
among CIS countries. But it has relevance for preferential arrangements, including customs
unions, that might be considered in the context of other country groupings in the CIS as well as in
transition economies in Eastern Europe, e.g. former Yugoslavia. In this case as well, the main
problems would arise from lack of competition and the absence of dynamic technology. The
discussion is not intended to apply to countries in transition joining the EU, where different
circumstances prevail which improve the prospects for economic benefits.
4. The key difference between preferential arrangements among CIS members and other
preferential arrangements (NAFTA, the EU) is that in the latter the markets are large enough to
promote competition and encourage the flow of new technology which increase the probability that
distortions introduced through preferences are more than offset by new trade creation and
the dynamic effects of investment embodying new technology.
5. We had advocated preferential arrangements for CIS members as useful transitional
devices to mitigate the severe disruption of trade among the new independent states in the
aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union (Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992; 1994). Although
based on duration of unemployment measures, two years appears to be a sufficient period of
adjustment in market economies,"' there is no standard period for adjustment or transition; and the
See S. Matusz (1997) for a survey.
17
breakup of the Soviet Union clearly created unprecedented disruption which may have warranted a
greater adjustment period. The new independent states have had five years to adjust to
international competition. Given the inherited burden of inefficiencies that plagues a sizable
portion of CIS industry, there are serious costs of continuing preferential arrangements
indefinitely, and integrating more closely through a customs union at this time appears ill-advised.
18
Appendix
Model to Evaluate the Consequences of Joining the Customs Union
In this appendix, we develop a simple partial equilibrium model to assess the
consequences of adopting the common external tariff, where the common external tariff is higher
than the initial tariff. The model would apply rather broadly to countries with low tariffs, such as
the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia. The model would also be relevant for many products in
countries with higher tariffs on average than the Customs Union tariff. Since the Customs Union
tariff is not uniform, there are many products where the tariff in the Customs Union exceeds the
home country tariff. The model is an extension of the model of Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996)
and is shown in figure 1. A basic description of these techniques may be found in Morkre and
Tarr (1980).
Demand. We refer to the home country as country A. The figure shows the demand for
imports in country A for a representative product group, assuming for simplicity that imports
from various sources are homogeneous. Demand for the domestic good (assuming there is
domestic production) would be depicted on a separate diagram but (assuming otherwise
undistorted domestic markets) we may calculate welfare effects from the demand for imports
diagram.
Rest of World Supply. The rest of the world, denoted R, (outside the customs union) is
assumed to be large in relation to country A considering membership and hence the supply curve
from the rest of the world for any product is depicted as a perfectly elastic flat supply curve at the
world price of the product PR. In the initial equilibrium, the supply curve from the rest of the
world is represented by PR(1 +t), reflecting the fact that since rest of world suppliers must receive
PR to be induced to supply the product, consumers in country A must pay PR to foreign suppliers
plus t*PR to the government in tariffs. Converting to a higher tariff of the customs union
(weighted average of 13-14 percent) implies that the supply curve of the rest of the world
increases to PR(1 +t').
19
Partner Country Supply. The group of countries who are in the Customs Union are
denoted country P, for potential partner countries. For this representative product, the aggregate
supply curve to country A from all countries that are potential partners with A in the Customs
Union (such as Russia and Kazakstan) is depicted as S(P). Imports from these countries are not
subject to a tariff. If tariffs were imposed on imports from these countries, it would be necessary
to pay a tariff inclusive price to attract the supply. That is, the appropriate supply curve would be
a function of the tariff inclusive price. Then the tariff supply curve to country A including the
tariff would shift up and to the left. In figure 1, we write this as S[P/(1 +t)].
In figure 1, we have depicted partner country supply as upward sloping. One reason why
this could occur is that partner suppliers have a factor of production in limited supply that implies
that it produces at increasing costs within the range of outputs under consideration. This might be
because of continuing bottlenecks for selected inputs. Even though the market in country A may
be small, the partner country who has firms producing the product will have to allocate supply
throughout all the preferential trade area, and may more experience capacity constraints when
supply to the whole region is taken into account. Another reason we could have an upward sloping
supply curve is that the tariff protection of the Free Trade Area induces new firms and industries
within the Free Trade Area to develop under the preferential tariff protection. These industries
may not have been profitable without the preferential protection. We have drawn the supply curve
such that within the range of tariff changes contemplated, there is not a full displacement of rest of
world supply. In the case of upward sloping supply curve of the partner country, without full
displacement of rest of world supply, the price in country A will increase by the full amount of
the tariff. 12
In the event that partner country supply is not upward sloping for some products (that is,
partner country supply is flat due to constant costs within the range of relevant outputs) the
12 Effective cartel pricing among producers within the customs union would also imply that they will raise prices
in response to the increase in the tariff, but in that case we could not depict a supply curve and the price increase
would not necessarily equal the increase in the tariff. Partner producers could price as a dominant cartel subject to a
competitive fringe, where rest of world supply is the competitive fringe.
20
welfare economics of participating in customs unions and free trade agreements will be less
disadvantageous.13 It is likely that for some products imported within the potential customs union,
there are constant costs for partner country suppliers, and for others products there are increasing
costs as depicted in figure 1. Thus, the welfare costs of participating in the customs union are
likely to be somewhat less than would be indicated from reliance solely on the analysis of figure
1.
Initial Equilibrium: A Non-Preferential Ad-Valorem Tariff
We begin with the situation that prevailed prior to the Free Trade Agreement: a tariff rate
at rate t is applied on all imports. That is, there are no Free Trade Agreements with any countries,
i.e., no tariff preferences for customs union members or others. In the initial equilibrium, the
external tariff is t, the price of imports from the rest of the world to consumers in country A is
PR(1 +t). Thus, the quantity demanded of imports is Mo. Country A consumers must pay the
same tariff inclusive price to future partner country suppliers, so the price paid for their products
may be read off their tariff ridden supply curve Sp/(1 +t), i.e., QO. Rest of world suppliers
supply the quantity Mo - QO. Tariff revenue is obtained on all imports, so initial tariff revenue
equals the area MIAD. The tariff revenue is decomposed into SRAD obtained on imports from
rest of world suppliers and SRIM on imports from future partner country suppliers.
The short-run static welfare losses of the tariff are equal to the triangle ADL. Consumers
in country A must pay the higher price PR(1 +t), rather than PR, and thus there is a loss of
consumers' surplus equal to the trapezoid MIAL. But, since the government recovers the area
MIAD in tariff revenue, this area is not a loss to the economy. On the other hand, he area ADL is
a loss to the economy: it represents consumption inefficiency loss as consumers in country A shift
purchases from imports of this good to goods that they preferred less before the tariff.
13 The original analysis of Viner (1950) considered constant costs for partner countries. Both trade creation and
trade diversion are possible in the constant cost case. See Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) for a general treatment of
the various cases.
21
The Impact of the Free Trade Agreement
Now consider the impact of participating in a Free Trade Agreement, given a tariff rate of
t on imports from the rest of the world. Since the external tariff is unchanged at rate t, the price
of imports from the rest of the world to consumers into country A remains unchanged at PR(1 +t).
Thus, the quantity demanded of imports remains MO. Since imports from partner countries are not
subject to the tariff, supply from partner countries shifts out and to the right to the supply curve
Sp. Consumers in country A must pay the same price to partner countries suppliers, so the price
paid for their products may be read off their supply curve Sp, i.e., QO*. Rest of world suppliers
supply the quantity Mo - QO*. The government obtains tariff revenue on the imports from the rest
of the world, equal to the rectangle GHAD, but imports from partner countries enter without
paying tariffs.
What is the welfare economics of the Free Trade Agreement, compared to the initial
equilibrium with non-preferential tariffs at rate t on all imports? A tariff at the rate t still induces a
loss of consumer surplus equal to the trapezoid MIAL, but again not all of this is a loss to the
economy. The area ADL remains as a loss to the economy, representing consumption inefficiency
loss. The area of tariff revenue GHAD, however, is recaptured by the government, so does not
represent a loss to the economy. On the other hand, the shaded area MIHG is a loss to country A
due to the Free Trade Agreement. This area is a loss to country A because it is paying higher
prices to partner suppliers on the quantity QO compared to what country A would have to pay
from rest of the world suppliers. Part of this higher payment for partner country imports (the
trapezoid MNHI) is captured by partner country suppliers as producers' surplus. But part of the
higher prices paid by country A consumers is pure inefficiency loss, i.e., producers' deadweight
loss equal to NGH, because the preferential tariff induces additional supply from partner country
suppliers who are marginally inefficient compared to world suppliers. The net change in welfare
to the government of the Free Trade Agreement, given no change in tariffs to the rest of the
world, is a loss equal to the rectangle MIHG. The combined loss of the tariff and the Free Trade
Agreement is the sum of the areas ADL and MIHG.
22
In summary, a tariff will induce inefficiency losses, but the Free Trade Area with partners
with upsloping supply curves greatly magnifies the losses. With a non-preferential tariff of t, the
economy loses only the triangle of consumption inefficiency loss, ADL. The Free Trade Area
increases the losses due to the tariff in the amount of MIHG. This explains why preferential trade
arrangements with small partner countries or with countries that may be expected to increase
supply at higher protected prices can be expected to be very inefficient, more inefficient than non-
preferential tariff protection.
Weighed against these costs are the benefits obtained from increased access to partner
country markets. There will likely be a terms of trade gain on these exports, since exports have
preferential tariff protection against rest of world supply. Producers' surplus to the exporters from
country A within the Free Trade Area (not depicted) would reduce the losses from the Free Trade
Area. We have argued above, however, that the gain on exports is likely to be less than the losses
on imports.
Converting the Free Trade Area to a Customs Union
Now consider the impact of imposing the common external tariff at the rate t', starting
from the Free Trade Agreement in place. The supply curve including the tariff of the rest of the
world and the new equilibrium price increases to PR(1 +t'), where the quantity demanded for
imports declines to M1. Partner country suppliers also receive this higher price and then the
quantity they supply increases to Q1. The quantity supplied from the rest of the world declines to
M1 - Q1
The welfare costs to country A are strongly negative, and may be decomposed into three
parts. First, there are consumer deadweight losses because country A consumers are induced to
reduce their consumption of total imports from MO to M1 in favor of alternate goods available that
were previously less preferred (this could include domestic substitutes in this product category or
goods in other product categories). These were equal to the triangle ADL in the initial
equilibrium, but they increase to BCL. The difference is the shaded area ABCD, representing the
23
increase in consumers' deadweight loss due to the common external tariff. Second, there is an
increase in the triangle of producers' deadweight losses, from NGH to NFE. The difference is the
shaded area FEHG, representing the increase in producers' deadweight loss due to the imposition
of the common external tariff. Partner country producers are able to obtain higher prices in
country A, which attracts less efficient higher cost supply. Absent a tariff, supplies from the rest
of the world would have been available at the price PR. Third, part of the higher prices received
by partner country suppliers results in an increase in their profits or producers' surplus. The
increase in partner country profits or producers surplus is HIJE; this is a transfer from country A
consumers to producers in partner countries.
Overall the loss of moving to the customs union, given that a Free Trade Agreement is
already in place, is the sum of the three shaded areas in figure 1: ABCD + FEHG + HIJE. The
losses to the economy of increasing tariffs through the common external tariff of the customs
union, given a Free Trade Agreement, are considerably greater than non-preferential tariff
increases from an average rate of t to t'. That is, if tariffs were applied in a non-preferential
manner and were increased from t to t', the costs to the economy of the increase in the tariff
would be the shaded area ABCD. The customs union imposes the additional costs equal to the
areas FEHG and HUE, representing inefficiency losses and transfers to partner country suppliers,
respectively.
Combined Loss of the Customs Union and the Free Trade Agreement
The combined loss of the Free Trade Agreement and the customs union is larger than the
loss of the customs union or the Free Trade Agreement alone and equals the triangle BCL plus the
rectangle MFEJ. A non-preferential tariff of rate t' would produce a welfare loss equal to the
triangle BCL. The difference is equal to the area MFEJ which derives from the fact that
consumers in country A pay higher prices to partner country producers than they would have to
pay to rest of the world producers. The area MFEJ would be captured for country A as tariff
revenue and not lost to the economy if the tariff were not preferential. Instead with a the
24
combination Free Trade Agreement and customs union the area MFEJ is added to the losses of
country A, thereby greatly magnifying the losses. The area MFEJ represents a combination of
transfers to partner country suppliers (the area MNEJ) plus inefficiency (deadweight) losses of
using marginally inefficient partner country suppliers (the triangle NFE). It is necessary to
reduce this estimate of the losses by the increase in the terms of trade earned by exporters from
country A on their sales within the PTA. Since the tariff primarily benefits existing Customs
Union members, these gains may be expected to be small.
Conclusion
A tariff will induce inefficiency losses, but preferential trading areas with partners with
upsloping supply curves greatly magnify the losses. This explains why preferential trade
arrangements with small partner countries or with countries that may be expected to increase
supply at higher protected prices can be expected to be very inefficient, more inefficient an non-
preferential tariff protection at the same rate.
25
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Bhagwati, Jagdish and Anne Krueger (1973), Exchange Control, Liberalization and Economic
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Bhagwati, Jagdish and Arvind Panagariya (1996), "Preferential Trading Areas and
Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes," in J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya (eds.), The
Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements, Washington D.C.: AEI Press.
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former USSR, Finance and Development, March.
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26
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c:\kyr\kyrcu9.doc
27
TABLE 1. Foreign Trade of the New Independent States with Each Other 1991-95
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Millions of Current US Dollars at Market Exchange Rates
Armenia 3,823 4,686 243 292 124 159 159 206 167 335
Azerbaijan 9,091 7,013 797 665 591 1,036 283 499 222 242
Belarus 23,151 20,375 1.939 2,128 3,092 3,348 2,085 2,990 3,292 3,868
Estonia 3,836 2,996 147 146 343 244 575 407 536 634
Georgia 5,594 4,806 144 224 295 433 156 280 75 110
Kazakstan 14,285 16,949 2,141 2,463 3,126 3,576 2,014 2,042 2,874 3.435
Kyrgyz Republic 5,163 4,293 236 344 282 378 325 402 272 357
Latvia 5,920 4,365 451 472 539 488 503 495 601 637
Lithuania 9,268 6,251 505 624 929 1,111 1,170 1,285 1,033 1,679
Moldova 6,190 5,525 313 470 303 452 413 483 485 583
Russia 108,571 83.333 10,954 9,246 15,752 10,546 15,407 10,978 16,586 14,493
Tajikistan 3,456 4,361 93 172 118 198 170 252 265 488
Turkmenistan 6,314 3,684 616 410 1,731 876 1,689 1,002 1,434 1,024
Ukraine 49,598 61,217 5,262 6,425 5,669 9,185 5,543 7,593 7,289 9,032
Uzbekistan 13,761 14,100 628 827 2,085 2,225 1,408 1,086 1,317 1,292
Former Soviet Union 268,022 243,954 24,468 24,907 34,980 34,253 31,900 29,999 36,448 38,209
Volume of Trade (1991 =100)
Armenia 100.0 100.0 70.5 35.3 30.2 25.8 19.9 18.2 14.4 16.2
Azerbaijan 100.0 100.0 50.7 46.6 24.6 23.4 10.8 18.4 6.1 7.1
Belarus 100.0 100.0 77.8 76.1 59.2 61.8 42.0 45.3 64.8 57.2
Estonia 100.0 100.0 37.9 38.7 21.5 17.6 13.2 18.8 15.4 25.8
Georgia 100.0 100.0 24.3 37.5 22.7 33.0 11.1 13.8 5.2 5.3
Kazakstan 100.0 100.0 95.8 110.1 63.8 72.3 32.4 30.8 45.3 32.1
Kyrgyz Republic 100.0 100.0 45.8 56.1 22.8 31.5 18.5 21.5 15.1 18.6
Latvia 100.0 100.0 79.6 80.4 23.5 25.1 17.0 23.1 20.2 24.4
Lithuania 100.0 100.0 48.2 71.1 28.9 28.3 14.5 18.5 17.0 19.6
Moldova 100.0 100.0 52.1 61.3 45.9 46.9 28.5 27.0 32.1 29.6
Russia 100.0 100.0 72.2 86.2 46.7 54.2 32.5 44.9 33.8 58.2
Tajikistan 100.0 100.0 26.1 32.2 15.1 16.2 16.5 13.4 25.1 25.4
Turkmenistan 100.0 100.0 95.5 114.7 54.5 100.0 48.2 23.0 40.0 23.0
Ukraine 100.0 100.0 64.8 79.3 39.8 56.5 24.9 26.3 27.2 24.8
Uzbekistan 100.0 100.0 45.0 49.4 43.3 43.6 28.9 18.2 26.4 21.1
Former Soviet Union 100.0 100.0 67.4 77.4 43.7 52.1 29.0 32.7 31.5 36.7
SOURCES: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1995 Annual for the following countries and periods: Armenia 1994-95; Azerbaijan 1992-95;
Estonia 1993-95; Latvia 1993-95; Lithuania 1994-95; Moldova 1992-95; Russia 1994-95, Ukraine 1994-95. For all other countries and periods,
national official statistics and World Bank staff estimates were used. For further information on sources and methods, see Michalopoulos, C. and
D. Tarr, Trade in the New Independent States, 1994. Studies of Economies in Transformation No. 13. World Bank, Chapter I and Appendix;
Belkindas, M. and O.V. Ivanova, Foreign Trade Statistics in the USSR and Successor States, 1996. Studies of Economies in Transformation
No. 18. World Bank, Chapter 8.
28
Table 2: Tariff Rates of the Russian Federation
Sectors Unweighted
Food manufacturing 14.7
Beverages 23.1
Tobacco 7.5
Textiles 16.4
Wearing apparel 24.1
Leather products 9.7
Footwear 20.0
Wood, cork, and products 17.5
Wooden furniture & fixtures 24.7
Paper products 14.2
Printing & publishing 12.5
Industrial chemicals 5.7
Other chemical products 7.4
Petroleum refineries 5.0
Petroleum & coal products 9.0
Rubber products 6.0
Plastic products nec. 13.8
Ceramic products 22.9
Glass & glass products 14.5
Other nonmetal min prods 15.8
Iron & steel B-met ind 5.6
Nonferrous B-met ind 13.1
Metal products nec 18.8
Nonelectric machinery 12.4
Electrical machinery 10.1
Transport equipment 16.6
Scientific equipment 15.7
Other manufacturing 20.5
Source: World Bank estimates for 1996.
29
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Policy Research Working Paper Series
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of Contracts between Government
and State Enterprises
WPS1770 Poverty and Social Transfers Christiaan Grootaert May 1997 G. Ochieng
in Hungary 31123
WPS1771 Government Employment and Pay: Salvatore Schiavo-Campo May 1997 A. Panton
A Global and Regional Perspective Giulio de Tommaso 85433
Amitabha Mukherjee
WPS1772 What Drives Deforestation in the Alexander S. P. Pfaff May 1997 A. M. Maranon
Brazilian Amazon? Evidence from 39074
Satellite and Socioeconomic Data
Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title Author Date for paper
WPS1773 The Costs and Benefits of J. Luis Guasch June 1997 J. Troncoso
Regulation: Implications for Robert W. Hahn 38606
Developing Countries
WPS1 774 The Demand for Base Money Valeriano F. Garcia June 1997 J. Forgues
and the Sustainability of Public 39774
Debt
WPS1 775 Can High-inflation Developing Martin Ravallion June 1997 P. Sader
Countries Escape Absolute Poverty? 33902
WPS1776 From Prices to Incomes: Agricultural John Baffes June 1997 P. Kokila
Subsidization Without Protection? Jacob Meerman 33716
WPS1777 Aid, Policies, and Growth Craig Burnside June 1997 K. Labrie
David Dollar 31001
WPS1 778 How Government Policies Affect Szczepan Figiel June 1997 J. Jacobson
the Relationship between Polish Tom Scott 33710
and World Wheat Prices Panos Varangis
WPS1779 Water Allocation Mechanisms: Ariel Dinar June 1997 M. Rigaud
Principles and Examples Mark W. Rosegrant 30344
Ruth Meinzen-Dick
WPS1 780 High-Level Rent-Seeking and Jacqueline Coolidge June 1997 N. Busjeet
Corruption in African Regimes: Susan Rose-Ackerman 33997
Theory and Cases
WPS1781 Technology Accumulation and Pier Carlo Padoan June 1997 J. Ngaine
Diffusion: Is There a Regional 37947
Dimension?
WPS1782 Regional Integration and the Prices L. Alan Winters June 1997 J. Ngaine
of Imports: An Empirical Won Chang 37947
Investigation
WPS1783 Trade Policy Options for the Glenn W. Harrison June 1997 J. Ngaine
Chilean Government: A Quantitative Thomas F. Rutherford 37947
Evaluation David G. Tarr
WPS1784 Analyzing the Sustainability of Fiscal John T. Cuddington June 1997 S. King-Watson
Deficits in Developing Countries 31047
WPS1785 The Causes of Government and the Simon Commander June 1997 E. Witte
Consequences for Growth and Hamid R. Davoodi 85637
Well-Being Une J. Lee