Abstract

The government-led creation and incubation of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is a striking success for advocates of strong industrial policy. It has led to the island nation's domination of the global "foundry" business in which firms like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) manufacture the designs of "fabless" design companies. The two have a combined global market share of close to 70% of this global business segment. This success was all the more striking because when the initiative began, the country had few of the large-scale firms that could support the R&D and scale necessary to enter such sophisticated capital-intensive industries. There were no firms with the deep technological roots or the skill base to even begin. Yet government planners recognized the challenges of upgrading the nation's technology base and formulated a strategy that entailed the creation of "pilot agencies" that would serve as vehicles to bridge between sources of leading-edge technology (predominantly sourced from overseas) and the commercialization to be carried out by local firms.

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When Dalian Wanda Group of China announced its plan to acquire the AMC Entertainment theatrical exhibition chain in the United States, many people in the U.S were mystified. Unlike China where theatrical exhibition was experiencing rapid growth, the U.S. market was viewed as mature, and rapidly changing technology was giving consumers a widening range of choices for movie viewing. AMC was owned by a group of private equity firms, and their pessimistic view of the industry influenced their strategies and investment decisions. AMC's management team had yet a different view on the prospects of the industry. Thus three present or potential stakeholders, all looking at the same data, had distinctly different views of future prospects. How could this be? The (B) case looks at AMC's performance in the year after the acquisition.

When Dalian Wanda Group of China announced its plan to acquire the AMC Entertainment theatrucal exhibition chain in the Unityed States, many people in the U.S were mystified. Unlike China where theatrical exhibition was experiencing rapid growth, the U.S. market was viewed as mature, and rapidly changing technology was giving consumers a widening range of choices for movie viewing. AMC was owned by a group of private equity firms, and their pessimistic view of the industry influenced their strategies and investment decisions. AMC's management team had yet a different view on the prospects of the industry. Thus three present or potential stakeholders, all looking at the same data, had distinctly different views of future prospects. How could this be?

The American Airlines in 2011 case was developed to provide a setting for the comparative analysis of two very different business models in the U.S. domestic airline industry—the network carrier and the low cost carrier (LCC). These models offer very different value propositions. Firms allocate resources into distinctively different processes, and they earn returns using parallel but different profit models. Yet while most scholars view the LCC model as disruptive, the two different models have been able to co-exist for over forty years, albeit with substantial evolution. By unpacking how one of the major network carriers was able to evolve its model successfully for such a long time before industry structural changes necessitated a radical overhaul, the cases seek to give students insights into how the different business models were established, how competitive forces have driven their evolution, and the importance of constantly evolving and tuning a firm's model.