Periodic analysis and discussion about corruption in Iraq and other countries from a consultant and Certified Internal Auditor who worked in Baghdad for 23 months to help setup the new Iraqi anti-corruption agency, Commission of Public Integrity (CPI). This main page contains postings for the current month. Go to categories list or scroll down to archive lists to see earlier entries. You can also reach this blog by visiting www.FiscalRangers.com .

Tavares, FL - July 17, 2011 - I give up. I have been writing this blog on corruption in Iraq and the World, including Afghanistan, since mid-2006.

The news on corruption keeps repeating itself and the US State Dept and USAID don't improve, and neither does the corruption climate in Iraq or Afghanistan. Congress keeps having hearings, and issuing reports, but they don't fire anyone and establish known methods to reduce corruption in foreign aid and reconstruction programs in "conflict" countries.

Besides, the Wall St. Journal now has a "Corruption Currents" blog with daily postings and two guys who are PAID to do it, so why compete? However, they have no clue how to FIX corruption, just report it.

Here is the link to one of their recent postings on their online blog:

The military’s mantra for Afghanistan was “winning hearts and minds.” And a key part of that strategy was cold, hard cash.

During a decade of war, the Pentagon gave more than $2 billion to commanders to spend as they wished on a broadly defined grab bag of “urgent humanitarian” needs. The goal was to gain support from the locals for both the U.S. military and the nascent Afghan government. It was, the military said: “money as a weapons system.”

Troops spent their mad money in a myriad of ways. Nearly $5,000 went to a father whose daughter and son were caught in crossfire. Another $182,000 was doled out on sweaters. A motorcycle shop owner received a $903microgrant to replace equipment the Taliban stole. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent on large projects, such as a hospital in a rural area that had no healthcare.

Today, SIGAR released an audit of the $562.2 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan's civil aviation sector, primarily administered by the DOD ($500 million) and the FAA ($56.5 million).

The audit notes:

-- The U.S. and its international partners have succeeded in strengthening Afghanistan's civil aviation capabilities over the past 12 years.

-- Despite accomplishments, the U.S. could not transfer airspace management operations to the Afghan government at the end of 2014, as it had originally planned, due in part to a lack of trained Afghan civil aviation personnel, particularly air traffic controllers.

-- Despite its efforts, the FAA was not able to train enough air traffic controllers for Afghanistan to operate airspace management services on its own

-- As of October 2014, the majority of the FAA-trained Afghan personnel had not yet completed required on-the-job training programs.

-- FAA attempted to train students abroad, but faced problems obtaining passports and visas for the students, and some students did not return to Afghanistan after being sent for training in other countries, including the U.S. Additionally, due to security concerns, Afghan students could not access the facilities they needed for on-the-job training.

-- The Afghan government's failure to award an airspace management contract resulted in the U.S. paying $29.5 million for an interim contract to continue those services. The Afghan government did not award a contract, citing what it believed to be excessive costs. Unless the Afghan government awards a follow-on contract before the interim contract expires, the U.S. government could be called upon to fund another interim contract.

-- The Afghan government uses only a portion of the about $34.5 million revenue collected from airspace over-flight fees for civil aviation purposes, despite the government's stated commitment of using its civil aviation revenue to finance aviation services and infrastructure development.

Today, SIGAR released a financial audit of $175.8 million in expenditures
for the Department of the Army's Legacy East Project. The prime contractor
for this project was Jorge Scientific Corporation, which was reorganized and
rebranded as Imperatis Corporation in 2013.

Today, SIGAR released a supplement to the January 2015 quarterly report to
Congress. The supplement contains information that received classified or
otherwise restricted responses from DOD, but which have now been
declassified. Additionally, this supplement lists 10 of the 21 missing data
call questions that the State Department did not answer or respond to until
after the quarterly report publishing deadline.

February 06, 2015

I found this statement about a former anti-corruption specialist in Iraq regarding his 2007 firing after testifying with Congress about State Dept. failure to act on corruption issues in Iraq. I was twice asked to testify to the same committee after I left Iraq in early 2006, but scheduling conflicts prevented it. I also knew about the Iraqi law that prohibited the Iraqi anti-corruption agency from prosecuting corrupt Iraqis' without permission of the head of their Iraqi MInistry (i.e. oil, transportation, etc). I also brought it up at internal anti-corruption meetings run by the State Dept. and they took no action. One issue is that to address the matter with the Iraqi government, our coalition partner, the UK, was the coalition partner in charge of relations with the Iraqi Parliament, and would have to be involved, and they were interested in trade development, and not fixing corruption.

Vance Jochim

I had a relatedposition in 2004-2006, but he held it later after I left Iraq.

The Managing Editor of Flashpoints, James Mattil, served in Iraq as Chief of Staff, U.S. State Department, Office of Accountability & Transparency (OAT) at Embassy Baghdad, Iraq during 2006 and 2007. The OAT mission was to train and assist the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) in fighting corruption.

In April 2007, Mattil discovered "Secret Orders" isued by Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki that banned CPI from investigating or prosecuting corruption in Iraq, but when Mattil passed this information up the chain of command, embassy officials suppressed the information, witholding facts from headquarters, from Congress and the American people.

In July 2007, Mattil reported the information to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, chaired by Rep. Henry Waxman and disclosed a number of reports describing the depth of corruption and the embassy's dysfunctional anti-corruption programs. Rep. Waxman invited Mattil to testify before the Committee on Sept. 12, 2007. One day later, Mattil was relieved of duty and forbidden to return to Iraq in retaliation for his communications with Congress - a right protected by law (5 USC 7211 and others). His employment ended in late October.

Mattil filed a lawsuit against the State Department, which has dragged on for nearly six years. In October 2011, the MSPB judge issued an Initial Decision upholding the agency's actions, but in Dec. 2012 that decision was vacated on appeal to the MSPB Board. A new hearing will be scheduled in 2013.

As others like Pvt. Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden and now Aurelia Fedenisn has been victimized in whistleblower cases, Mr. Mattil has decided to publicize his case and bring daylight to the government misconduct that motivates whistleblowers and the abuses of power that attempt to cover-up that misconduct.