Gordon
At The Wilderness (Part 2, May 6, 1864)Taken FromReminiscences
Of The Civil War
By
Lt. Gen. John B. Gordon, CSA

Chapter
XVIII--The Wilderness--Battle Of May 5

THE
night of the 5th of May was far spent when my command reached
its destination on the extreme Confederate left. The men were
directed to sleep on their arms during the remaining hours of
darkness. Scouts were at once sent to the front to feel their
way through the thickets and ascertain, if possible, where
the extreme right of Grant's line rested. At early dawn these
trusted men reported that they had found it: that it rested
in the woods only a short distance in our front, that it was
wholly unprotected, and that the Confederate lines stretched
a considerable distance beyond the Union right, overlapping
it. I was so impressed with the importance of this report and
with the necessity of verifying its accuracy that I sent
others to make the examination, with additional instructions
to proceed to the rear of Grant's right and ascertain if the
exposed flank were supported by troops held in reserve behind
it. The former report was not only confirmed as to the
exposed position of that flank, but the astounding
information was brought that there was not a supporting force
within several miles of it.
Much of this
scouting had been done in the late hours of the night and
before sunrise on the morning of the 6th. Meantime, as this
information came my brain was throbbing with the tremendous
possibilities to which such a situation invited us, provided
the conditions were really as reported. Mounting my horse in
the early morning and guided by some of these explorers, I
rode into the unoccupied woodland to see for myself. It is
enough to say that I found the reports correct in every
particular. Riding back toward my line, I was guided by the
scouts to the point near which they had located the right of
the Union army. Dismounting and creeping slowly and
cautiously through the dense woods, we were soon in ear-shot
of an unsuppressed and merry clatter of voices. A few feet
nearer, and through a narrow vista, I was shown the end of
General Grant's temporary breastworks. There was no line
guarding this flank. As far as my eye could reach, the Union
soldiers were seated on the margin of the rifle-pits, taking
their breakfast. Small fires were burning over which they
were boiling their coffee, while their guns leaned against
the works in their immediate front.
No more time was
consumed in scouting. The revelations had amazed me and
filled me with confident anticipations of unprecedented
victory. It was evident that General Grant had decided to
make his heaviest assaults upon the Confederate right, and
for this purpose had ordered his reserves to that flank. By
some inconceivable oversight on the part of his subordinates,
his own right flank had been left in the extremely exposed
condition in which my scouts had found it. Undoubtedly the
officer who located that battle line for General Grant or for
General Sedgwick was under the impression that there were no
Confederates in front of that portion of it; and this was
probably true at the time the location was made. That fact,
however, did not justify the officer in leaving his flank
(which is the most vulnerable part of an army) thus unguarded
for a whole night after the battle.
If it be true that
in peace "eternal vigilance is the price of
liberty," it is no less true that in war, especially war
in a wilderness, eternal vigilance is the price of an army's
safety. Yet, in a woodland so dense that an enemy could
scarcely be seen at a distance of one hundred yards, that
Union officer had left the right flank of General Grant's
army without even a picket-line to protect it or a vedette to
give the alarm in case of unexpected assault. During the
night, while the over-con-fident Union officer and his men
slept in fancied security, my men stole silently through the
thickets and planted a hostile line not only in his immediate
front, but overlapping it by more than the full length of my
command. All intelligent military critics will certainly
agree that such an opportunity as was here presented for the
overthrow of a great army has rarely occurred in the conduct
of a war. The failure to take advantage of it was even a
greater blunder than the "untimely discretion"
which checked the sweep of the Confederate lines upon the
Union right on that first afternoon at Gettysburg, or the
still more fatal delay on the third day which robbed Lee of
assured victory.
As soon as all the
facts in regard to the situation were fully confirmed, I
formed and submitted the plan which, if promptly adopted and
vigorously followed, I then believed and still believe would
have resulted in the crushing defeat of General Grant's army.
Indeed, the plan of battle may almost be said to have formed
itself, so naturally, so promptly and powerfully did it take
hold of my thoughts. That plan and the situation which
suggested it may be described simply and briefly:
First, there was
Grant's battle line stretching for miles through the
Wilderness, with Sedgwick's corps on the right and Warren's
next, while far away on the left was Hancock's, supported by
the great body of the Union reserves.
Second, in close
proximity to this long stretch of Union troops, and as nearly
parallel to it as circumstances would permit, was Lee's line
of Confederates.
Third, both of
these lines were behind small breastworks which had been
thrown up by the respective armies during the night of the
5th. On Lee's left and confronting Sedgwick was Ewell's
corps, of which my command was a part. In my immediate front,
as above stated, there was no Union force whatever. It was
perfectly practicable, therefore, for me to move out my
command and form at right angles to the general line, close
to Sedgwick's unprotected flank and squarely across it.
Fourth, when this
movement should be accomplished there would still remain a
brigade of Confederates confronting each brigade of Federals
along the established battle line. Thus the Union troops
could be held to their work along the rifle-pits, while my
command would sweep down upon the flank and obliquely upon
their rear.
As latex
developments proved, one brigade on the flank was all that
was needed for the inauguration of the plan and the
demonstration of its possibilities. The details of the plan
were as follows: While the unsuspecting Federals were
drinking their coffee, my troops were to move quickly and
quietly behind the screen of thick underbrush and form
squarely on Sedgwick's strangely exposed flank, reaching a
point far beyond that flank and lapping around his rear, so
as to capture his routed men as they broke to the rear. While
my command rushed from this ambush a simultaneous
demonstration was to be made along his front. As each of
Sedgwick's brigades gave way in confusion, the corresponding
Confederate brigade, whose front was thus cleared on the
general line, was to swing into the column of attack on the
flank, thus swelling at each step of our advance the numbers,
power, and momentum of the Confederate forces as they swept
down the line of works and extended another brigade's length
to the unprotected Union rear. As each of the Union brigades,
divisions, and corps were struck by such an absolutely
resistless charge upon the flank and rear, they must fly or
be captured. The effective force of Grant's army would be
thus constantly diminished, and in the same proportion the
column of attack would be steadily augmented.
Add to this
inestimable Confederate advantage the panic and general
demoralization that was inevitable on the one side, and the
corresponding and ever-increasing enthusiasm that would be
aroused upon the other, and it will be admitted that I do not
overestimate the opportunity when I say that it has been
rarely equalled in any war.
As far as could be
anticipated, the plan was devised to meet every contingency.
For example, as Sedgwick had no reserves in support behind
him, all having been sent to the Union left, his only chance
of meeting the sudden assault on his right and rear was to
withdraw from his intrenchments under the fire of this
flanking force and attempt to form a new line at right angle
to his works, and thus perhaps arrest the headlong
Confederate charge.
But it will be seen
that his situation would then be rendered still more
hopeless, because as he changed front and attempted to form a
new line the Confederates in front of his works were to leap
from their rifle-pits and rush upon his newly exposed flank.
He would thus be inevitably crushed between the two
Confederate forces.
When Sedgwick's
corps should thus be destroyed, the fate of the next Union
corps (Warren's) would surely be sealed, for in its front
would be the Confederate corps, led by that brilliant
soldier, A. P. Hill, ready to assault from that direction,
while upon its flank would be not only my two brigades, as in
the case of Sedgwick, but Ewell's entire corps, adding to the
column of attack. In practically unobstructed march around
Warren's flank Ewell would speedily envelop it, and thus the
second Union corps in the battle line would be forced to
precipitate flight; or if it attempted, however bravely, to
stand its ground, it would be inevitably crushed or captured
as Ewell assailed it in rear while Hill assaulted in front.
And so of the next
corps and the next. Had no part of this plan ever been
tested, the vast results which must have attended its
execution could scarcely be doubted by any experienced
soldier. Fortunately, however, for the removal of all doubt
in the premises, it was tested--tested at an hour most
unfavorable to its success and after almost the entire day
had been wasted; tested on General Lee's approval and by his
personal order and almost in his immediate presence. The
test, unfair as it was, furnished the plainest and most
convincing proof that had it been made at an early hour in
the day instead of at sundown, the 6th of May would have
ended in the crushing defeat of General Grant's army.
Here is the test
and here the results. With my own Georgia brigade and General
Robert Johnson's North Carolinians moving by the left flank,
so that we should have nothing to do, when the proper point
was reached, except to close up, to front face and forward,
we pressed through the woods as rapidly and noiselessly as
possible and halted at the point immediately opposite
Sedgwick's flank.
The solid and
dotted lines here given sufficiently indicate the approximate
positions occupied by the respective armies at the beginning
of my flank attack.
The Georgia brigade
(Gordon's) was directed to make the assault, and the North
Carolina brigade (Johnson's) was ordered to move farther to
the Union rear and to keep as nearly as possible in touch
with the attacking force and to gather up Sedgwick's men as
they broke to the rear. As the sun went down these troops
were ordered forward. In less than ten minutes they struck
the Union flank and with thrilling yells rushed upon it and
along the Union works, shattering regiments and brigades, and
throwing them into wildest confusion and panic. There was
practically no resistance. There could be none. The
Georgians, commanded by that intrepid leader, Clement A.
Evans, were on the flank, and the North Carolinians, led by a
brilliant young officer, Robert Johnson, were sweeping around
to the rear, without a shot in their front. There was nothing
for the brave Federals to do but to fly. There was no time
given them to file out from their works and form a new line
of resistance. This was attempted again and again; but in
every instance the swiftly moving Confederates were upon
them, pouring a consuming fire into their half-formed ranks
and shivering one command after another in quick succession.
The gallant Union leaders, Generals Seymour and Shaler, rode
among their panic-stricken troops in the heroic endeavor to
form them into a new line. Their brave efforts were worse
than unavailing, for both of these superb officers, with
large numbers of their brigades, were quickly gathered as
prisoners of war in the Confederate net; and nearly the whole
of Sedgwick's corps was disorganized.
It is due to both
General Ewell and General Early to say that they did all in
their power to help forward the movement when once begun.
There was, however, little need for help, for the North
Carolina brigade, which was in the movement, had not found an
opportunity to fire or to receive a shot; and the Georgia
brigade as a whole had not been checked for a single moment
nor suffered any serious loss. These men were literally
revelling in the chase, when the unwelcome darkness put an
end to it. They were so enthused by the pursuit, which they
declared to me, as I rode among them, was the "finest
frolic" they had ever been engaged
in, that it was difficult to halt them even when it became
too dark to distinguish friend from foe. With less than sixty
casualties, this brigade almost single-handed had achieved
these great results during the brief twilight of the 6th of
May. And possibly one half of the small loss that occurred
was inflicted after nightfall by Confederates who
enthusiastically charged from the front upon the Union
breastworks, firing as they came, and not realizing that my
command in its swift movement down the flank had reached that
point on Sedgwick's line. The brave and brilliant John W.
Daniel, now United States senator from Virginia, was then
serving on the staff of General Early. As he rode with me in
the darkness, he fell, desperately wounded, with his
thigh-bone shattered. He narrowly escaped death from this
wound, which has maimed him for life.
It will be seen
that my troops were compelled to halt at last, not by the
enemy's resistance, but solely by the darkness and the
cross-fire from Confederates. Had daylight lasted one
half-hour longer, there would not have been left an organized
company in Sedgwick's corps. Even as it was, all accounts
agree that his whole command was shaken. As I rode abreast of
the Georgians, who were moving swiftly and with slight
resistance, the last scene which met my eye as the curtain of
night shut off the view was the crumbling of the Union lines
as they bravely but vainly endeavored to file out of their
works and form a new line under the furious onset and
withering fire of the Confederates.
General Horace
Porter, who served with distinction on General Grant's staff,
speaking in his book of this twilight flank attack on the 6th
of May, says: "It was now about sundown; the storm of
battle which had raged with unabated fury from early dawn had
been succeeded by a calm .... Just then the stillness was
broken by heavy volleys of musketry on our extreme right,
which told that Sedgwick had been assaulted and was actually
engaged with the enemy. The attack against which the
general-in-chief during the day had ordered every precaution
to be taken had now been made. . . . Generals Grant and
Meade, accompanied by me and one or two other staff officers,
walked rapidly over to Meade's tent, and found that the
reports still coming in were bringing news of increasing
disaster. It was soon reported that General Shaler and part
of his brigade had been captured; then that General Seymour
and several hundred of his men had fallen into the hands of
the enemy; afterward that our right had been turned, and
Ferrero's division cut off and forced back upon the Rapidan
.... Aides came galloping in from the right, laboring under
intense excitement, talking wildly and giving the most
exaggerated reports of the engagement. Some declared that a
large force had broken and scattered Sedgwick's entire corps.
Others insisted that the enemy had turned our right
completely and captured the wagon-train .... A general
officer came in from his command at this juncture and said to
the general-in-chief, speaking rapidly and laboring under
considerable excitement: 'General Grant, this is a crisis
that cannot be looked upon too seriously; I know Lee's
methods well by past experience; he will throw his whole army
between us and the Rapidan and cut us off completely from our
communications.'"
This extract from
General Porter's book is given merely to show what
consternation had been carried into the Union ranks by this
flank attack, which had been delayed from early morning to
sundown. The question is pertinent: What would have been the
result of that flank movement had the plan of battle
suggested been promptly accepted in the early morning and
vigorously executed, as was urged ?
If we carefully and
impartially consider all the facts and circumstances, there
cannot be much disagreement as to the answer. If that one
Georgia brigade, supported by the North Carolinians, could
accomplish such results in such brief space of time, it is
beyond question that the Confederate column of attack,
constantly augmented during an entire day of battle, would
have swept the Union forces from the field. Indeed, had not
darkness intervened, the Georgia and North Carolina brigades
alone would have shattered Sedgwick's entire corps; and the
brigades and divisions of Ewell, which confronted those of
Sedgwick on the general line, would have marched steadily
across to join the Georgians and North Carolinians, instead
of rushing across in the darkness, firing as they came, and
inflicting more damage upon my men than upon the enemy.
General Porter,
speaking of General Grant's promptness after dark in
"relieving the situation," says:
"Re-enforcements were hurried to the point attacked, and
preparations made for Sedgwick's corps to take up a new line
with the front and right thrown back." These movements
were such as were to be expected from so able a commander as
General Grant. But it will be seen that neither of them could
have been accomplished had this flank assault been made at an
early hour of the day. General Grant's army on the other
flank was so pressed that he could not have safely weakened
his force there to aid Sedgwick. Both armies on that flank
were strained to the utmost, and Lee and Grant were both
there in person, superintending the operations of their
respective forces. When night came and put an end to the
fighting on his left flank, then, and not till then, was
General Grant in position to send reŽnforcements to
Sedgwick. Moreover, had the plan of battle proposed to Early
and Ewell been accepted, Lee, of course, would have been
fully advised of it, and of every stage of its progress. He
would, therefore, have made all his arrangements auxiliary to
this prime movement upon General Grant's exposed right. The
simple announcement to Lee of the fact that this right flank
of the Union army was entirely unprotected, and that it was
in close proximity to his unemployed troops, would have been
to that great Southern soldier the herald of victory. He
would have anticipated at once every material and commanding
event which must necessarily have followed the embracing of
so unexampled an opportunity. As soon as he had learned that
his troops were placed secretly and squarely across
Sedgwick's right, Lee could have written in advance a
complete description of the resistless Confederate charge--of
the necessary flight or capture in quick succession of the
hopelessly flanked Union commands, of the cumulative power of
the Confederate column at every step of its progress,
compelling General Grant to send large bodies of men to his
right, thus weakening his left. In front of that left was Lee
in person. With a full knowledge of the progress made by his
own flanking columns, and appreciating the extremity in which
such a movement would place the Union commander, Lee would
have lost no time in availing himself of all the advantages
of the anomalous situation. Knowing that General Grant would
be compelled to send a large part of his army to meet the
Confederate column, which had completely turned his flank and
was pressing his rear, Lee would either have driven back the
forces left in his front, thus bringing confusion to that
wing also, or he would have detached a portion of the troops
under his immediate command and sent them to Ewell to swell
the column of Confederates already in Grant's rear, forcing
him to change front and reform his whole battle line under
the most perilous conditions.
After weighing the
unparalleled advantage which such a situation would have
given to such a commander as Lee, can any impartial military
critic suggest a ma-noeuvre which could possibly have saved
General Grant's army from crushing defeat? If so, he will
have solved the embarrassing problem which a completely
flanked and crumbling army must always meet.
The simple truth is
that an army which is expending all its strength, or even the
major part of it, in repelling attacks along its front, and
permits itself to be completely flanked, is in the utmost
extremity of peril. Among the highest military authorities
there will be no dispute, I think, as to the correctness of
the proposition that when opposing battle lines are held by
forces of even approximate strength and of equal fighting
qualities, and are commanded by officers of equal ability,
the one or the other is in a practically hopeless condition
if, while met at every point on its front, it is suddenly
startled by a carefully planned and vigorous assault upon
either its flank or rear. Its situation is still more
desperate if assaulted both in flank and rear. This is
especially true when the plan of attack is based upon the
certainty of rapidly accumulating strength in the assaulting
column. It is not too much to say that the position of an
army so flanked is absolutely hopeless unless, as in this
case, the coming of darkness intervenes to save it.
Another inquiry to
which I feel compelled, in the interest of history, to give a
full and frank answer is this: Who was responsible for the
delay of nine hours or more while that exposed Union flank
was inviting our attack ?
When the plan for
assault was fully matured, it was presented, with all its
tremendous possibilities and with the full information which
had been acquired by scouts and by my own personal and
exhaustive examination. With all the earnestness that comes
from deep conviction, the prompt adoption and vigorous
execution of the plan were asked and urged. General Early at
once opposed it. He said that Burnside's corps was
immediately behind Sedgwick's right to protect it from any
such flank attack; that if I should attempt such movement,
Burnside would assail my flank and rout or capture all my
men. He was so firmly fixed in his belief that Burnside's
corps was where he declared it to be that he was not
perceptibly affected by the repeated reports of scouts, nor
my own statement that I myself had ridden for miles in rear
of Sedgwick's right, and that neither Burnside's corps nor
any other troops were there. General Ewell, whose province it
was to decide the controversy, hesitated. He was naturally
reluctant to take issue with my superior officer in a matter
about which he could have no personal knowledge, because of
the fact that his headquarters as corps-commander were
located at considerable distance from this immediate
locality. In view of General Early's protest, he was
unwilling to order the attack or to grant me permission to
make it, even upon my proposing to assume all responsibility
of disaster, should any occur.
Meantime the
roaring battle to our right was punctuating with tremendous
emphasis the folly of our delay. A. P. Hill, in impetuous
assault, had broken and hurled back almost upon General
Grant's headquarters a portion of Warren's corps. The zone of
the most furious fighting was, however, still farther off and
on the extreme right of our line, where the heaviest forces
of both armies were gathered. The almost incessant roll of
musketry indicated that the fighting was tremendous. From
4:30 o'clock in the morning, through the entire forenoon, and
until late in the day, there had been at different points
along the lines to our right alternate and desperate assaults
by the two armies, with varying success; but not a shot was
being fired near us. My troops and the other portions of
Ewell's corps were comparatively idle during the greater part
of the day, while the bloody scenes to our right were being
enacted. It is most remarkable that the desperate struggle on
that far-off flank, coupled with the stillness on ours,
failed to impress my superior officers as significant. In the
early hours of the day Hancock had pressed back the
Confederate right, doubling it up and driving it, as was
asserted, for a mile or more. Meantime Longstreet arrived
with his superb corps. Hancock was checked, and General
Grant's forces, in turn, were hurled back by the Confederate
assaults. Like an oscillating pendulum, victory was vibrating
between the two armies through all of that eventful day,
while at any hour of it the proposed movement on Sedgwick's
flank by Ewell's idle Confederates was not only perfectly
feasible, but full of promise to the Confederate army.
After Jenkins was
killed and Longstreet had been carried back on a litter,
seriously wounded, General Lee's attention was necessarily
confined to that portion of the field where General Grant was
superintending his own aggressive operations. This was one of
the crises when General Lee took personal command of his
troops; and as Gregg's superb brigade of Texans pressed to
the front, the commander-in-chief spurred his horse through a
gap in the trenches and attempted to go with them. As these
brave men recognized General Lee, a ringing protest ran down
the line, and they at last compelled him to yield to their
entreaties: "Go back, General Lee; go back !"
General Grant
during that day was full of apprehension that Ewell would
attempt some offensive tactics against Sedgwick, while Lee
was wondering why it was not done. Lee knew that it ought to
be done, as will appear later, if for no other object than to
divert Grant's attention from his prime purpose and thus
bring incidental relief to Longstreet and the other heavily
pressed Confederates far off to our right. General Horace
Porter, in his "Campaigning with Grant," more than
once refers to General Grant's uneasiness about Sedgwick. He
says: "The general-in-chief was devoting a good deal of
thought to our right, which had been weakened." Well
might General Grant be apprehensive. Had he been fully
apprised of that strangely exposed flank of his army, he
would have been impelled to send troops to protect Sedgwick's
right. On the other hand, had Lee been advised, as he should
have been, of the reports of my scouts and of myself, he
would not have delayed the proposed movement against
Sedgwick's flank a moment longer than was necessary to give
an order for its execution. The correctness of this opinion
as to what Lee would have done is based not merely upon the
knowledge which every officer in his army possessed of his
mental characteristics, but upon his prompt action when at
last he was informed of the conditions as they had existed
for more than nine hours.
Both General Early
and I were at Ewell's headquarters when, at about 5:30 in the
afternoon, General Lee rode up and asked: "Cannot
something be done on this flank to relieve the pressure upon
our right ?" After listening for some time to the
conference which followed this pointed inquiry, I felt it my
duty to acquaint General Lee with the facts as to Sedgwick's
exposed flank, and with the plan of battle which had been
submitted and urged in the early hours of the morning and
during the day. General Early again promptly and vigorously
protested as he had previously done. He still steadfastly
maintained that Burnside's corps was in the woods behind
Sedgwick's right; that the movement was too hazardous and
must result in disaster to us. With as much earnestness as
was consistent with the position of junior officer, I
recounted the facts to General Lee, and assured him that
General Early was mistaken; that I had ridden for several
miles in Sedgwick's rear, and that neither Burnside's corps
nor any other Union troops were concealed in those woods. The
details of the whole plan were laid before him. There was no
doubt with him as to its feasibility. His words were few, but
his silence and grim looks while the reasons for that long
delay were being given, and his prompt order to me to move at
once to the attack, revealed his thoughts almost as plainly
as words could have done. Late as it was, he agreed in the
opinion that we could bring havoc to as much of the Union
line as we could reach before darkness should check us. It
was near sunset, and too late to reap more than a pittance of
the harvest which had so long been inviting the Confederate
sickle.
Where was General
Burnside on the morning of the 6th? Where was he during the
entire day !
General Early never
yielded his convictions that had I been permitted to attack
Sedgwick's exposed right flank in the morning, the movement
would have led to Confederate disaster, because of the
presence of Burnside behind that flank. He was so thoroughly
satisfied of this that in his book, written and published
since the war, he insists:" Burnside's corps was in rear
of the enemy's flank on which the attack was suggested."
In the years that have passed I have made no effort to
controvert General Early's opinions in this matter. Now,
however, the time has come when the publication of my own
reminiscences makes it necessary for me to speak. The recent
printing by the Government of the War Records makes public
the official reports of the Federal officers who fought in
the Wilderness on that 6th of May. I shall quote only from
Federal officers or Northern history.
In his report
General Hancock says: "I am
not aware what movements were made by General Burnside near
Parker's store on the morning of the 6th, but I experienced
no relief from the attack I was informed he would make across
my front--a movement long and anxiously waited for ....
During the night of the 5th I received orders to move on the
enemy again at 5 A.M. on the 6th." He adds that his
orders informed him that his right would be relieved by an
attack of other troops, among them "two divisions . . .
under General Burnside." It will be remembered that
Hancock held the extreme left of Grant's army. Burnside was
there with Hancock. This officer describes the places and
times where and when Burnside was to move, and adds:
"The same despatch directed me to attack simultaneously
with General Burnside."
This was during the
morning hours. Later in the day General Meade locates him
thus: "Soon after Hancock fell back, about 2 P.M.,
Burnside attacked toward the Orange plank road to the right
and in advance of Hancock's position."
General Grant
himself (speaking of Burnside's movements) says in his
official report: "By six o'clock of the morning of the
6th he was leading his corps into action near Wilderness
Tavern," etc.
Swinton, in his
history of" The Army of the Potomac," says:
"The Union line as formed by dawn of the 6th was
therefore in the order of Sedgwick on the right, next Warren,
and Burnside and Hancock on the left."
General Porter
says: "At four o'clock the next morning, May 6, we were
awakened in our camp by the sound of Burnside's men moving
along the Germanna road. They had been marching since 1 A.M.,
hurrying on to reach the left of Warren."
He adds:"The general now instructed me to ride out to
Hancock's front, inform him of the progress of Burnside's
movement," etc. This was early on the morning of the
6th, and Hancock and Burnside were on the extreme left. It is
established, therefore, beyond question that Burnside was not
in rear of Sedgwick when I insisted upon attacking that
exposed right flank in the early morning. tie was not there
at all during the entire day. He was on the other flank of
Grant's army morning, noon, and evening. The Federal reports
so locate him, and there can be no longer any dispute as to
Burnside's locality, upon which the entire controversy rests.
General Early, in
his book, states that General Ewell agreed with him as to the
impolicy of making the morning flank attack which I so
earnestly urged. Alas! he did; and in the light of
revelations subsequently made by Union officers, no
intelligent military critic, I think, will fail to sympathize
with my lament, which was even more bitter than at
Gettysburg, over the irreparable loss of Jackson. But for my
firm faith in God's Providence, and in His control of the
destinies of this Republic, I should be tempted to imitate
the confident exclamation made to the Master by Mary and
Martha when they met Him after the death of Lazarus:
"Hadst thou been here, our brother had not died."
Calmly reviewing the indisputable facts which made the
situation at Gettysburg and in the Wilderness strikingly
similar, and considering them from a purely military and
worldly standpoint, I should utter my profoundest convictions
were I to say: "Had Jackson been there, the Confederacy
had not died." Had he been at Gettysburg when a part of
that Second Corps which his genius had made famous had
already broken through the protecting forces and was squarely
on the Union right, which was melting away like a sand-bank
struck by a mountain torrent; when the whole Union battle
line that was in view was breaking to the rear; when those
flanking Confederates in their unobstructed rush were
embarrassed only by the number of prisoners--had Jackson been
there then, instead of commanding a halt, his only order
would have been, "Forward, men, forward !" as he
majestically rode in their midst, intensifying their flaming
enthusiasm at every step of the advance.
Or had he been in the Wilderness on that fateful 6th of May,
when that same right flank of the Union army was so strangely
exposed and was inviting the assault of that same portion of
his old corps, words descriptive of the situation and of the
plan of attack could not have been uttered fast enough for
his impatient spirit. Jackson's genius was keener-scented in
its hunt for an enemy's flank than the most royally bred
setter's nose in search of the hiding covey. The fleetest
tongue could not have narrated the facts connected with
Sedgwick's position before Jackson's unerring judgment would
have grasped the whole situation. His dilating eye would have
flashed, and his laconic order, "Move at once,
sir," would have been given with an emphasis prophetic
of the energy with which he would have seized upon every
advantage offered by the situation. But Providence had willed
otherwise. Jackson was dead, and Gettysburg was lost. He was
not now in the Wilderness, and the greatest opportunity ever
presented to Lee's army was permitted to pass.