INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION:
CONFLICT, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION, AND
THE HEGEMONIC ROLE OF DOMINANT ACTORS

Earl Conteh-Morgan

Introduction

The end of the Twentieth Century is still characterized by geopolitical fluidity
and socio-economic effervescence that tend to challenge the sovereignty of the
developing state both from below and above. Violent ethnopolitical conflicts,
separatist movements, rivalry for autonomy or political power, or territorial
control, economic dislocation, among others, assail the integrity of the developing
state, thereby impelling hegemonic actors (major states, Intergovernmental Organizations
(IGOs), and International Financial Institutions - IFIs) to intervene in order
to: (1) uphold state integrity/sovereignty; (2) promote/enforce human rights
practices; or (3) forestall/contain the negative and dysfunctional aspects of
globalization processes in developing countries. The ever-increasing negative
effects of transnational social forces tend to generate the pervasive force
of a neo-liberal cosmopolitan moral view of international relations that increasingly
sanctions both military and non-military interventions to maintain the existing
structure of states and international society. The consequence is that states,
in particular, developing states, are progressively losing their individual
identities, rights, and obligations vis-à-vis civil society, in the wake
of external impositions. In other words, the disintegrative effects of globalization
as well as the dislocative aspects of weak developing economies are increasingly
undermining the twin pillars of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Conflict/peacekeeping
interventions and economic dislocation/external economic policy impositions
now constitute the most formidable sources of assault on the decision-making
autonomy, territorial integrity, and overall sovereignty of the developing state.

Essentially, the objective of this article is to utilize arguments and perspectives
from neo-Gramscian, neo-Marxist, and World Systems analyses to underscore the
fact that the developing state's sovereignty is being assailed by various transnational
globalization processes such as: (1) the expansion and internationalization
of peacekeeping/humanitarian efforts, or (2) newly emerging power relationships
and structures that derive from crisis in politico-economic systems, especially
in developing countries. The relationship between developing state sovereignty
and national/global systemic forces could be understood more fully by examining
the latter's impact on issues that generate external interventions. The focus
of the analysis is first, on peacekeeping as a hegemonic function, especially
the substantive shift from traditional intervention to new variation in peacekeeping.
Second, an emphasis on how the changing economic and political paradigms of
"good governance" over the decades contributes to the dialectic tensions
between the transcendental/universalizing trend of economic globalization and
the self-preservative/confirming interactions between state and society in developing
countries.

The conceptualization of intervention in this analysis is broad and includes
both coercive/military forms of intervention, and non-military/consensual forms
of intervention. Interventions even when consensual often have serious human
rights implications because of their tendency to subvert the managerial capacity
of the state vis-à-vis the welfare of its citizens (Cox, 1981; Szentes
1988). An example is the coercive consensual relationship or consensual domination
of the developing state by Great Powers and International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) in the area of economic policy. In post-Cold War international society
in which military-strategic-defensive issues have rapidly given way to socio-economic
globalization processes, non-military forms of intervention by Great Powers
and IFIs on developing state sovereignty are increasingly becoming a moral problem
as manifested in the reaction of large segments of developing state civil society
to external economic impositions, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF)
conditionalities.

In particular, the focus of this article will revolve around two dimensions
of transnational/ global developments that threaten the managerial autonomy
of the developing state. First is the changed nature of conflict in the international
system in the form of a rise in internal, intrastate violence as opposed to
inter-state conflicts which undermine the sovereignty of the state and produce
external peacekeeping interventions. Second, is the economic dislocative effects
of rapid globalization processes and deepening market forces that impel the
intervention of IFIs in developing state economies, thereby destabilizing the
"social contract" between state and citizens. In other words, to what
extent do violent conflicts within developing states and interventions by external
actors undermine the national sovereignty of the state? Or to what extent do
IMF/World Bank policy impositions affect the capacity of the state to provide
for the socio-economic welfare of its citizens? The issues of intra-state conflict/intervention
and economic impositions will be used as a body of empirical evidence to illustrate
the primary features of a declining developing state sovereignty, and its implications
for human rights practice.

Transnational Forces and the State: An Overview

There are three dimensions relevant to the analysis of socio political and
economic developments at the global level that adversely affect the developing
state's sovereignty. The first is the practical-conjunctural level viewed in
terms of intentional human agency (Robinson, 1996; Wallerstein, 1970). At this
level, it is important to draw the distinction between means (which are policies)
and ends (which are interests), and to recognize the tactical nature of many
disputes related to policymaking between the developing state and external actors
over the most effective means of achieving ends. The second dimension is the
underlying global structure in which states and groups engage with the broader
world system. Analysis at this level is structural analysis. Structure shapes
and conditions events and activities at the state level, often apart from intentionality.
The third dimension refers to processes in international society which straddle
both the practical-conjunctural and the underlying global structure. Through
its interconnectedness with the two, it enables analysts to identify mechanisms
that monitor functionalist teleology.

Institutionalization is an integral aspect of the Gramscian notion of hegemony
because institutions (whether political-military, or socio-economic) provide
the systemic legitimacy for dealing with conflicts either coercively or through
peaceful means (Gramsci, 1971). The underlying structure of interstate relations
intrinsically involves an enforcement potential under the control of the powerful
nations. The consequence is two distinct forms of Great Power-weak state relations:
coercive and consensual. In the latter sense, it is the condition whereby strong
states exercise leadership over weak states by gaining their perennial consent.
To a large extent the use of force is obviated to the point that the developing
state submits to the prevailing power relations. Continuous submission is enhanced
by the fact that the dominant states are willing to make concessions, implement
policy adjustments, that from time to time help to alleviate the politico-economic
burdens of the weak states. Institutions provide the legitimacy of power relations,
articulate the hegemonic mission of the powerful, and appeal for the cooperation
of the weak. For example, images of proper global economic relations have been
institutionalized and universalized by institutions like the IMF, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank,
among others. Similarly, institutional provision for dealing with intractable
and extensive conflict situations is located within the jurisdiction of the
United Nations Security Council, and more recently within regional security
organizations like NATO and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Developments are underway to make regional organizations like the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and so on,
more responsive to peacekeeping interventions. Thus hegemony which comprises
of both coercive and consensual relations help to cement and legitimize, and
internationalize the dominant moral and cultural values, and disseminate the
worldview of the dominant states. The hegemonic functions of the Great Powers,
with the "consent" of the weak states create functional unity in a
system of diversity.

To a large extent, then, subordinate states either give "unwilling consent"
or "voluntary consent" to the social logic imposed on specific issues
by the strong states. Accordingly, social forces that commence within the powerful
states soon spillover into weak states, and the policy implications or adaptive
mechanisms that accompany them imposed upon or integrated into the political
economy of these weak states. The socio-political developments produced by the
dynamics of the economic system in turn generate institutions and policy changes
that determine world orders (Colclough, & Manor, 1991; United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 1995; Toulmin, 1992). Stated differently,
economic crises and political transformations generate new policy imperatives
and/or social forces, which in turn bring about changes in the structure of
states and their relationship with civil society. For example, the transnational
social forces unleashed by both the Cold War competition and post-Cold War era
influence state structures in both the core and periphery. In other words, changes
in systemic polarity spawn forces that influence state structures, underscoring
the fact that state structures are largely a reflection of a particular structure
of world order and forces in existence.

A world hegemony in this sense is thus the expansive effects of the individual
and collective social forces of the dominant advanced industrial states. The
IFIs, the culture, the technology, and other entities associated with this collective
hegemony constitute guidelines for development models in developing states.
The dominant effects of such a collective hegemonic system also becomes a demonstration
effect which could have a profound effect on the lives of groups in poor countries.
In his analysis of world hegemony, Robert Cox makes reference to the effect
hegemony has on peripheral states as a passive revolution:

A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal
(national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The economic and
social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national
hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad. Such as expansive hegemony
impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive revolution. These countries
have not undergone the same thorough social revolution, nor have their economies
developed in the same way, but they try to incorporate elements from the hegemonic
model with disturbing old power structures....In the world hegemonic model,
hegemony is more intense and consistent at the core and more laden with contradictions
at the periphery (Cox, 1996:137).

The near policy convergence among advanced industrial countries in this post-Cold
War era, unifies socio-economic and political structures of this collective
hegemony into a system of universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which
spell out general rules of national and international behavior for states and
for those national actors whose activities transcend national boundaries. These
are rules, which in short, further institutionalize dominant modes of sociopolitical
and economic interactions.

However, the pervasive effects of core collective hegemony subvert the developing
state's monopoly of legitimate and autonomous decision-making within its own
territory. The rules that core states have developed, upheld, and institutionalized
help to maintain and deepen the marginalization of the developing state. Because
these norms and rules (both international law and less formal rules) are largely
handed down to them, it means the developing states undergo a process of socialization
involving both "coerced consent" and voluntary internalization. States
that deliberately challenge these transnational interstate rules are viewed
as a threat to world order and its juridical foundation and could be labeled
pariahs, rogues, or outlaws and face politico-economic sanctions from other
states and dominant non-state actors (Armstrong, 1993; Beckman, 1992).

The developing state shares but "unwillingly" in some developments
that affect national political economies, often unwilling to reverse asymmetrical
relationships with developed countries, or outrightly reject adverse policy
impositions from supranational institutions. For example, the developing states
of the international system attempted to reconstruct the international system
in the mid 1970s New International Economic Order (NIEO) demands, but because
of their weakness failed. In other words, fundamental transformation can only
occur in international systems through a process by which normative change in
states' relations is transmitted to the international stage by powerful states
or some hegemon, be it a military, economic, political, or cultural hegemon.
Because of powerful states and IFIs, for example, international systemic structures
are not immutable, but rather the very structures are dependent for their modification
or reproduction on the practices and changing institutions of these key actors.
Fundamental change in the international system occurs when principal actors,
through changes in their interests, power or practices, change the rules and
norms that underlie international relations. In essence, changes in the practice
of these hegemonic international actors depend on changes in the practices of
their key domestic actors--individuals, power elite, and civil society in general
(Gill, 1995; Ruggie, 1982). Thus profound developments in international relations
can occur when beliefs and identities of key domestic entities in advanced industrial
countries are altered thereby also altering the norms and rules that are constitutive
of international relations, often quite independent of both domestic and international
actors of weak states. For example, the end of the Cold War accelerated by changes
(perestroika, glasnost) in the Soviet Union, changed the nature, scope, and
intensity of violent conflict in many developing states, spawned new ones as
well; and ushered in a period of democratization urged on the developing states
by the powerful actors.

Impelled by its marginal status in the international system, the developing
world has often challenged Western European concepts of international law and
human rights (Lissitzyn, 1963). International law to these developing states
was originally created to protect and reflect the class and state interests
of the former colonial masters. It contains little or no substantive content
of equity and justice because when extended to Asia, Africa, or Latin-America,
it was frequently used as an instrument for the protection of the private economic
interests of the powerful Western states. Key international institutions (the
IMF, World Bank, or WTO), a reflection of international law, are the glue for
safeguarding the global politico-economic structure that ensures the dominance
of the advanced industrial states. In spite of the differences in interests,
culture, and levels of education among these developing states, they nonetheless
all exhibit, invariably, tendencies of resentment toward international law.
The underlying reasons for such resentment being past foreign domination, and
attitudes of superiority by the Western countries, their dependent development
status and general adverse experiences within the international legal framework
of the Westphalian state system (Oppenheim, 1955; Brierly, 1963). Nonetheless,
in varying degrees, they participate in the development and codification of
international law, they resort to its norms in disputes with other states, and
in deliberations in international organizations, but many have equally complained
about the overwhelming dominance of advanced industrial states in key international
organizations like the IMF and the World Bank.

Because of the perceptible current of discontent expressed by developing states
about traditional international law, many observers often advocate the further
development of international law so that it would play a more meaningful role
in North-South relations. The realization that international law needs to be
further developed, coupled with the constant concessions made by the North towards
the South is a realization that the traditional norms of international law do
not necessarily serve the needs and aspirations of the developing states. In
particular, some of the requirements of the international institutions that
reinforce the traditional norms of international law are often too painful when
applied to developing societies.

On a more general level, international law either intentionally or by accident
reinforced an international division of labor. In the process of global capital
accumulation that accompanied the modern world system, benefits accrued unequally
among nations creating a North-South gap in power, wealth, and prestige (Wallerstein,
1970; Amin, 1974; Sunkel, & Fuenzalida, 1979). The ensuing process of uneven
development and asymmetry has proved to be a constraint to the decisional latitude
of the developing state. The periphery, satellite, or underdeveloped states
have been superimposed upon, been penetrated and influenced, balkanized, and
even imposed upon in the capitalist process of surplus extraction from the South
to the North within a single global economy. Consequently, systemic struggles
over the appropriation of wealth take place between and within nations with
the developing states at the poor receiving end of an asymmetric relationship.
Changes in North-South relations automatically generate changes in national
political economies of the South. In particular, globalization processes as
aspects of a new phase of capitalism, are transforming, rather than merely having
a marginal effect on, all political ingredients in capitalist relations between
North and South. The consequence is a seeming tradeoff between equality/welfare
and efficiency/privatization. The transnationalization of the state produced
intensive and extensive internationalization embedded in globalization processes,
networks, and discourses is threatening the sovereign state by making it near
impossible for the state to perform its socio-economic and welfare functions
towards civil society. A further deepening and intensification of globalization
processes could make the developing state meaningless or obsolete (O'Brien,
1992; Weber, 1995; Strange, 1996; Friedman, 1992).

In the developing state, state sovereignty, and the authority and legitimacy
that go with it are not always by the overwhelming majority of individuals and
non-state collectivities. The sovereignty principle and even its practice seems
fated to be constrained and undermined at the international level, and it is
difficult to see how the weak developing state will regain what it has lost.
Although sovereign authority is not the same as the capacity to control everything,
it is nonetheless challenged in many parts of the world. Most, if not all, of
contemporary national struggles are struggles in which groups (guerilla forces
or ethnic insurgency) are pitted against the state because of the desire to
ensure group security or self-actualization. The clear challenge to the state
that is revealed by such struggles is, perhaps, the final and most convincing
evidence that the force of globalization coupled with the loosening of hegemonic
(spheres of influence) ties between great and small states is a significant
factor in rendering the state unacceptable or an obstacle to many groups. As
group frustration intensifies it escalates to violent outbursts which in some
cases produce external intervention, and a further diminution of state sovereignty
assailed from both within and without. Peacekeeping interventions, accordingly
develop within the context of transnational political processes and an extended
view of the nation state which transcends territorial integrity and the sanctity
of the doctrine of state sovereignty.

Conflicts and Peacemaking Interventions

While traditional international relations characterizes the international system
as one of anarchy, at the same time classical conceptions of state structure
tend to assume a territory comprised of people, sovereignty, and an effective
government that forestalls domestic anarchy or state collapse (Bull, 1984; Waltz,
1979). Yet, the experience of the post-Cold War era, in particular, is characterized
by centrifugal forces of violent ethnonationalism related to normative concerns
of human rights and democratization that in turn spawn responses (for example
peacekeeping interventions) from the international system. These interventions
reflect a shift away from a strict adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty
and the principle of non-intervention. The widening scope and intensity of violent
conflicts that produce Great Power and United Nations (UN) sanctioned interventions
in civil wars underscore the fact that principles, doctrines, and practices
institutionalized through constant application, may be modified, violated, or
changed in response to systemic disequilibrium. Such changes are done in response
to the increased focus on the international or national protection of human
rights: an idea that gained greater concern after 1945. Besides, such ideational
developments that are transformed into new practices that violate existing modus
operandi may originate from purely internal developments (for example, the clamor
for democratization that produces violent civil conflicts), or from external
developments and changing conceptions of policy such as the indexing of democratization
to IMF conditionalities. Interventions whether coercive or non-coercive are
undertaken by the key actors as part of the twin functions of "socialization"
and "homogenization" of international society.

Ideational change and international practice regarding intervention to protect
human rights were spawned by the end of the Cold War and its turbulence. Internally,
developing state sovereignty is assailed by ethnopolitical and other challenges
to the state, and externally, as a response to intense civil strife that result
in genocide and massive suffering. The Great Powers under the umbrella of the
UN have now extended their peacekeeping operations to include interventions
in civil wars. The end of great-power ideological rivalry has produced unity
in the pursuit of systemic stability and greater international cooperation under
the auspices of the UN and other international mechanisms. The outcome is greater
international social control by Great Powers and the UN Security Council over
developing states. A critical element in Gramscian thought is the idea of social
control which takes place on two levels: in civil society and through the state
(political society) (Robinson, 1996; Aguelli, & Murphy, 1988). Where entities
like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and so on, have at some point lost
social control through the state (political society), a rejuvenated and ascendant
Security Council, and a dominant rich North in cooperation exercise their hegemonic
functions by arresting total state disintegration through peacekeeping interventions.

Internally, the state is being challenged by what D. Horowitz (1985) has described
as the "powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive," (Levinson,
1993:4) force of ethnonationalism. The constant struggle for power and resources
in many resource-starved nations has produced a situation in which ethnic groups
have resorted to pressure politics and coalition-building as a means of gaining
political and economic power. Intractable and protracted conflicts have an especially
destabilizing effect on the nation-state. While conflict resolution efforts
do sometimes produce formal accords they rarely yield long-term peace and harmony.
The duration, intensity, and scope of these violent conflicts have led to near-state
collapse, and some state failures. These consequences stem first from the passionate,
primordial, and permeative aspects of ethnic solidarity--which are in turn related
to perceived high stakes in civil wars--the survival of a group, domination
of one ethnic group by another, or their domination by the other group.

The primordial sentiments and ethnopolitical factors involved in multiethnic
societies extend the violent conflicts beyond the obvious struggle for political
and economic control to powerful xenophobic and ethnocentric expressions of
hate. The consequence is that such conflicts become especially impervious to
rational resolution. Thus, while assailed internally by these centrifugal ethno
rigidities, the international (via the UN) response has been intervention to
maintain the structure of the state system. In most situations, international
organizations and key state actors have to contend with the state itself, which
in most situations is also a party to the dispute or has a stake in the victory
of one group at the expense of another group. External peacekeeping intervention
forces have at times had to carry out peace enforcement (doing battle if necessary
with the state or rebels) functions in their efforts to carry out their rescue
and humanitarian functions.

The UN Security Council in cooperation with the Great Powers, and regional
organizations have set the precedent of using accumulated physical power for
the performance of a world system-maintenance function that often challenges
the sovereignty of the nation in which it is applied. Since the early 1990s,
optimism for the role of Security Council backed use of force has encouraged
other states (and regional organizations) to use the same method. In 1992 former
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali deliberately sought to expand the
peace enforcement powers of the UN Security Council. In Agenda for Peace in
1992 he recommended authorization of the use of force (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
These developments of using the UN "fig leaf" to conduct military
interventions even in civil wars are impelled by public pressure amplified by
media effects in responding to grave violations of human rights in internal
armed conflicts: former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and so on. Public
outrage often turns into political pressure on both Great Powers and the UN
to intervene in order to halt humans rights violations whether by the state
or non-state aggressors.

With the end of the Cold War and the widening scope of violent intrastate conflicts,
rationalization of the use of intervention in internal matters in contravention
of the principle of non-intervention has developed as a trend in North-South
relations. It is now rationalized that although Article 2(7) of the UN charter
firmly endorses the principle of non-intervention, violent intrastate conflicts
constitute "a threat to international peace and security" under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, and therefore justifies UN Security Council use of force.
Thus, the Security Council has often exercised a wide mandate in the determination
of the existence of a threat to or breach of international peace, which tends
to undermine the sovereign integrity of the state.

In particular, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs appears
to have been modified, thereby legitimizing UN/Great Power intervention for
humanitarian purposes in conflicts of an essentially domestic nature (Harris,
1991). Resolution 688, for example, was adopted on 5 April 1991 in connection
with Iraq's suppression of Kurdish civilians following the Kurdish rebellion
of March 1991 after Iraq's defeat at the hand of the Gulf War coalition. For
Iraq, the Resolution itself amounted to a "flagrant, illegitimate intervention
in Iraq's internal affairs and a violation of Article 2 of the Charter."
Resolution 688, was the first Security Council Resolution to determine the existence
of a threat to international peace and security as a result of a state's violation
of its citizens human rights. The atrocities committed by Idi Amin of Uganda,
or Pol Pot of Cambodia, did not elicit such a determination, response, or use
of force by either the UN or the powerful states.

The internecine and genocidal character of the Yugoslavian conflict produced
Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991 which imposed an embargo on the entire region,
and later Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 imposing comprehensive economic sanctions
on Serbia and Montenegro. Both Resolutions transformed the Yugoslavian domestic
conflict into an international one (United Nations, 1995). By 1992 external
powers had intervened militarily in the civil war.

State failure or near-state collapse characterized by a total absence of state
sovereignty has in the post-Cold War era generated UN/Great Power intervention
in the developing state. In such cases, Somalia being a perfect example, the
total absence of legitimate state authority did not raise problems of state
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, the precedent of intervention
in domestic crisis had already been set in the case of Iraq and the Kurds and
in the former Yugoslavia. Thus when the Security Council first imposed the mandatory
arms embargo under Chapter VII (Resolution 733), there was little disagreement
among Security Council member states of the principle of non-intervention.

UN/Great Power intervention in a developing state can be precipitated if a
"unique and exceptional circumstance" is recognized. For example,
the Security Council in 1993 determined that the situation in Haiti threatened
international peace and security. Accordingly, in Resolution 841 of 16 June
1993 an embargo was imposed on trade with Haiti. The unique and exceptional
circumstances in Haiti were caused by the following factors: a January 24, 2001
coup d'état that forced into exile the legitimate government of President
Jean-Betrand Aristide; an environment of fear, persecution, and economic dislocation
that threatened to generate numerous refugees to neighboring countries; the
request for a UN trade embargo by the legitimate government of Haiti; and the
fact that an Organization of American States (OAS) embargo was previously in
existence and only required to be universalized and further mandated by a Security
Council sanction. Resolution 841 was thus precipitated by a coup d'état
and thus marked a change in Security Council practice in the area of intervention
in domestic affairs, as the Council had never before been directly involved
in restoring an ousted regime in the aftermath of a coup d'état in a
sovereign state, an issue previously considered purely internal in character.
Although the Security Council President announced that the Resolution should
not be regarded as constituting a precedent, it nevertheless marked a change
in Security Council practice.

In February 1998, and following the post-Cold War precedent of intervention
to prevent massive human rights violations and to restore democracy, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group, known as ECOMOG,
used its forces dominated largely by Nigerian soldiers to oust the military
junta in neighboring Sierra Leone that in May 1997 had ousted a democratically
elected government. ECOMOG intervened to restore the ousted regime with the
full support of the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations Security
Council. In other words, domestic instability, massive atrocities, and the maintenance
of democracy are increasingly becoming the concern of external actors, and no
longer just the exclusive preserve of internal sovereignty and the principle
of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Between 1990 until the creation of
a stable environment in Liberia in 1997, ECOMOG forces had intervened to stop
the carnage and ethnic bloodletting that pitted Gio/Mano ethnic groups on the
one hand, and Krahn/Mandingo groups on the other (Magyar, & Conteh-Morgan,
1998).

Following the Gulf War, the objectives of forced intervention were initially
limited to humanitarian purposes, but have gradually expanded in response to
changing military needs in the conflicts concerned. The new resolutions spawned
by the growing intensity of new conflict situations have implications for state
sovereignty. But following the end of the Cold War, Security Council authorization
of the use of force by states was introduced primarily for humanitarian purposes.
Often the victim of the armed conflict was not a sovereign state, but civilians
within the territory of a single state. Accordingly, the objective of the use
of force in Resolution 770 of August 13 concerning the Bosnian conflict was:
to "facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance" in order to
guarantee the population's minimum humanitarian needs (United Nations, 1992).
Similarly, Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) regarding Somalia and Resolution
929 (22 June 1994) in Rwanda, and in the case of Haiti (Resolution 940 of 31
July 1994) humanitarian needs were one reason for UN intervention. Despite initial
US reluctance to intervene in 1992, the deteriorating humanitarian situation
in Haiti and the rapid increase in refugees finally impelled the UN to act.
President Bill Clinton demanded that the military leadership in Haiti yield
power immediately, and emphasized his resolve: "when firm brutality occurs
close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility
to act" (Clinton, 1993). Since the Korean War, virtually all military operations
based on Security Council authorized use of force have been led and dominated
by Great Powers, especially the US forces. Some critics argue that Security
Council authorization has only served as an instrument to perform a systems
maintenance function to the benefit of Great-Power national interests. However,
Security Council authorized use of force cannot work effectively without the
political leadership of the Great Powers and the participation of their overwhelming
military power. While in conflict with state sovereignty, intervention nonetheless
helps to preserve the state and stop genocidal massacres and the blatant violation
of human rights practices.

However, in the domain of peacekeeping, because of post-Cold War political
effervescence manifested in civil strife and various forms of ethnopolitical
violence, the outcome has been not a shared conceptual and implementational
consensus, but to a multiplicity of suggestion for effective peacekeeping. The
result, it might be said, is that while the scope of peacekeeping has increased,
methods for its application is varying from region to region, and from entity
to entity.

At the microlevel, the socio-economic and political patterns have been forged
by a tendency on the part of peoples (ethnic, religious, and regional groupings)
to resort to self-help in the attempt to guarantee their security (Horowitz,
1994; Gurr, 1993). The consequence is a gradual attack on the integrity of the
state and a subversion of the national integration process. The idea of self-help
results in the inability of the state and sub-entities to confront and solve
big problems of collective political violence. The outcome is peacekeeping or
humanitarian intervention to stop ethnic bloodletting, to put collapsing states
together again, or to feed refugees and victims of starvation. Accordingly,
the resulting sense that people have is that it is the responsibility of the
UN and industrialized countries to prevent massive suffering, carnage, and uncontrollable
escalation of conflicts. In other words, while the notion of state sovereignty
is the underlying principle of socio-economic and political interactions in
the global system, it is at the same time threatened by the fear of insecurity,
the increase in world order problems associated with inter-ethnic conflicts
and other forms of political violence. The empirical statehood of developing
nations is even more fragile in the post-Cold War era than ever before (Jackson
and Rosberg, 1982).

Civil wars and their spillover effects, refugeeism, the increase in actual and
potential conflict situations, are but a few of the transnationalizing issues
that seem to be rendering traditional peacekeeping methods rather inadequate,
and prompting the adoption of new and perhaps questionable peacekeeping efforts.
Among the broad consequences of challenges to global stability, three possibilities
seem especially worthy of note: (1) the unity, authority, and legitimacy of
many nation states may be forced to disintegrate under the mounting weight of
centrifugal forces of ethnicity and nationalism, and further putting into question
traditional methods of peacekeeping; (2) the distinction between civil and international
conflict related issues may become increasingly obscure; and (3) the intersection
of domestic problems of social heterogeneity and global interdependence issues
may have become inextricably woven into a worldwide international security problem
manifested largely in ethnic bloodletting, refugee creation, starvation, and
the outbreak of deadly diseases in many countries.

It is no surprise that with the end of the Cold War, the UN has launched nearly
double the peacekeeping missions that it had in its roughly forty years of existence.
The expansion of peacekeeping efforts is reflected in the Security Council peacekeeping
resolutions adopted, in the UN active involvement in preventive diplomacy, and
in the increasing involvement of regional and subregional organizations in active
peacekeeping. Along with this expansion of peacekeeping activities, the concept
and practice of peacekeeping seems to be undergoing a paradigm shift or adaptive
competence from peacekeeping (the deployment of military forces to forestall
the escalation of a dispute) to preventive diplomacy (efforts made to abort
disputes before they widen and intensify) to peacemaking (proactive intervention
to encourage warring parties settle their dispute) to peace enforcement (the
mandate to "impose" a ceasefire, or do battle with violators if need
be) to peacebuilding (assist in reconstruction efforts after conflict resolution
in order to prevent a fresh eruption of the conflict). Instances have occurred
in this post-Cold War turbulence, where the bloodletting, carnage, or starvation
were such that peace enforcement has been encouraged. Somalia, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone (the ECOMOG intervention), and Bosnia, among others are cases in
point.

External Economic Interventions and State Crisis

While UN Security Council-sponsored interventions tend to protect the human
rights of citizens in volatile and explosive states, external economic policy
impositions (interventions) by IFIs are limiting to a large extent, the sovereign
exercise of certain rights and duties by the developing state in relation to
its citizens. Intervention in the form of globalization imperatives (in particular
Structural Adjustment Policies-SAPs) undermine the ability of the developing
state to manage, accumulate, and redistribute economic resources within its
own territory (Beckman, 1994). Accordingly, this may be limiting the developing
state's capacity to achieve national political integration among its varied
ethnocommunal groups, as well as its legitimacy vis-à-vis civil society
in general.

Great Power and IFI intervention in the developing state started with the economic
collapse experienced during the late 1970s and early 1980s triggered by: sharp
price fluctuations on the raw materials market, the adverse terms of trade on
exports as a result of these downward fluctuations, the oil shocks that produced
a downward spiral in the payments position of these developing states thereby
directly generating the debt crisis of the 1980s.

The combination of these deep-seated domestic problems and the recessionary
international economic environment adversely affected the sustainability of
the "social contract" and the various neopatrimonial alliances and
networks built around it to guarantee political stability. As the developing
state became increasingly distressed by economic crisis, the legitimacy of the
state and the model of nation-building on which it was based, was called into
question by both civil society and international society. Thus, in order to
maintain stability in developing states and arrest the deepening crisis in economic
management, the key state actors and IFIs inaugurated a shift from welfarist
principles based on Keynesianism to neo-liberal principles that placed greater
emphasis on market forces and the struggle against inflation (Vilas, 1996).
This shift translated into a de-emphasis on the Keynesian goal of full employment
and the role of the state in the economy. Coupled with this shift to neo-liberalism
in economic policymaking, was the effect of the process of economic globalization
which impacted greatly the management of national economic policies all over
the wold. For example, the deregulation of financial markets from the late 1970s
in powerful states meant that even they started to lose control over their own
national economic policies.

Neoliberalism eventually became an instrument for maintaining world order under
the direction of the IMF, World Bank, and the Group of Seven (G7) powers. The
catalyst for IMF imposition of neoliberal ideas into the developing state came
with the debt crisis of the 1980s. Further resources to combat severe payments
problems, budgetary, inflationary, and debt servicing burdens was made conditional
on the adoption of SAPs. They entailed a strict application of massive and repeated
currency devaluations, exchange and interest rate liberalization, public enterprise
privatization, the withdrawal of all subsidies, and the abolition of state marketing
boards, among others. Eventually SAPs resulted in massive unemployment as large
numbers of public sector employees were laid off. Increasing donor (IMF, World
Bank, G-7) intervention in national economies meant a generalized curb on developing
state intervention in economic processes.

The economic austerity inherent in and produced by SAPs generated economic
deprivation in both the poor and middle class alike. SAPs also complicated the
deepening social crisis in developing states, crisis which escalated into social
unrest, social fragmentation and greater inequality. In political terms, SAPs
were often not the result of domestic consultation and popular approval, but
were often the result of secret negotiations between external actors and unwilling
state actors. Thus, developing state actors became increasingly accountable
to powerful state and non-state donors rather than to their own citizens. The
minimal human rights of citizens were further diminished when local opposition
to the SAPs was often brutally repressed or stifled. Neoliberal ideas gradually
became involved in political debates about poverty, gender, the environment,
governance, and even human rights. In the process, the developing state is increasingly
losing its decision-making autonomy to the hegemonic functions of powerful external
actors.

As crisis deepened in the developing state, so did the "managerial dilemma"
or "the fiscal crisis of the state" intensify (O'Connor, 1973; Barnet,
& Muller, 1974). These were directly passed on to ordinary citizens in the
form of severe economic deprivations. The state has thus abandoned its welfare
function to supranational institutions, in particular the IMF and the World
Bank. In other words, neoliberal internationalism is being progressively manifested
in what Gill and Law (1989) refer to as the imposition of the "structural
power" of transnational capital over the "direct power" of the
state. In particular, images or intersubjective agreements of what constitute
proper global economic relations are further reinforced by these transnational
institutions as part of the dominance of the strong over the weak.

Dilemmas Posed by Economic Interventions

The violence (riots in Venezuela, Egypt, Nigeria, or Indonesia) spawned by
the imposition of SAPs constitute human rights violations because of the coercion
needed to enforce them, and also because of the economic deprivations they produce
among groups in society. The imposition of SAPs also constitute paternalism:
deciding for the developing state what will be the most efficient way to manage
its economy and govern its society. In the end, since Western paternalism ends
up imposing its will on an often reluctant state leadership, the outcome in
the relationship is one of consensual domination.

Democratization and its accompanying economic liberalization seems to undermine
the 20th Century ethos of the state as responsible for a substantial portion
of the economic well?being of its citizens. The state, in other words, bears
responsibility for functions ranging from the maintenance of domestic tranquility
and protection of the territory against external attacks to contributions to
the material security of the members of society. The developing state, in particular,
came into being when the twentieth?century notion of the welfare state was already
the modus operandi of many states in the international system. Many states in
this regard strive to achieve a guaranteed minimum through the dominant role
played by the public sector and manifested in government subsidies on education,
health, food, housing, and other sectors. In other words, many developing states
aim at a greater availability of collective and distributional goods and institute
policies directed at greater social and economic equality.

Democratization involves the gradual establishment of values such as respect
for civil rights and political liberties, as well as greater citizen participation
in the politics of society. In general, however, such political liberalization
devoid of societal cohesion and a high level of economic development is often
plagued by electoral conflict and intense political rivalry. Besides, the indexing
of economic liberalization to political liberalization may be acting as a stumbling
block to the realization of political stability in many developing countries
(Gibbon, Bangura, & Ofstad, 1992). The immediate reactions to economic austerity
measures inherent in economic liberalization policies have been varied but destabilizing.
Many take the form of spontaneous uprising against the government in response
to the sudden experience or fear of loss of economic privileges. In countries
where this has occurred it is often the military that is used to coerce the
people back into peaceful behavior. The use of the military to put down riots
is counterproductive of young experiments in political liberalization.

The developmental success of advanced industrial countries is generally a strong
argument that economic liberalization and political liberalization are interconnected
and mutually supportive processes (World Bank, 1991). However, evidence from
developing countries suggests that there is no consensus as to the real dynamics
between them. To a large extent, the general relationship between the two so
far, is one of a dialectical tension with economic liberalization acting as
a constraint on political liberalization because of the limits it can put on
the extent of political reforms. The consequence of the dialectical tension
between the two is an oscillation between progress and regress within a context
of lingering authoritarianism, caution, and control.

The interaction of economic liberalization and political liberalization present
serious dilemmas for developing states because of their contradictory consequences.
In Africa, for example, economic liberalization in the form of structural adjustment
measures decreases the role of the state in the economy thereby causing adverse
effects on poorer classes (Olukoshi, 1996). The government is often confronted
with the choice of when, and how much, to liberalize the economy, or how to
prioritize the various adjustment programs that constitute economic liberalization
and reform. Often, the state, concerned about the negative consequences of economic
liberalization, can deliberately stall in its implementation of the required
measures. The state is thus forced to waver between strict state control and
restricted elections. In the final analysis, political liberalization can act
as a brake on economic liberalization, and the latter can in turn severely undermine
democratization. The fear of political instabilities caused by severe distributional
inequities often keep the state heavily involved in the economy. After all,
the so?called East Asian economic miracles of the 1980s and early 90s are a
result of effective state intervention in stimulating the export?led sectors
of those countries.

Developing state governments operating in a context of fragile legitimacy and
a legacy of military intervention in politics are often faced with the dilemma
of whether to shield the military or other groups from the austerity measures
inherent in structural adjustments. If certain groups are privileged by economic
liberalization the government is invariably confronted by resistance from the
economically deprived and politically excluded groups in society whose interest
are not protected by the new political economy. Generally political liberalization
without visible economic improvements is likely to cause enough deprivation
that would delegitimize the incumbent regime, awaken nostalgia for a more authoritarian
regime, intensify ethnic divisions, or instigate a military intervention in
politics (Deng, Kostner, & Young, 1990). This lack of sustained political
confidence in incumbent regimes is to some extent responsible for the shifting
economic development strategies in many developing countries. For example, many
African governments have shifted from import substitution industrialization
to what is now referred to as a free-market development strategy.

Democratization and it's accompanying economic liberalization policies raise
serious questions related to social justice in developing societies. The institutional
structures that underlie the markets and economic behavior in many developing
states are not adequately developed to integrate the bulk of the population
into meaningful and viable political and economic existence. The link between
economic and political liberalization is not a compatible one and thus works
against the effective protection of the lower classes and the disadvantaged.
In others words, despite the general emphasis on privatization and reduced government
spending, the establishment of sensible social welfare systems is still a preserve
of the state. Redistributive policies do not always promote efficiency and sustained
economic growth. In some countries, the politically dominant segments of society
(industrialists, top civil servants, the military, and the middle class) have
been the beneficiaries of economic growth and liberalization. Thus, instead
of liberalization and the probable economic growth diminishing the overt inequalities
and divisive elitism in such countries, it has instead entrenched the power
and position, and preserved the elitist traditions of these dominant groups.
The further consequence is the increase in widespread corruption, economic distortion,
and authoritarian tendencies. Such a situation results in the further alienation
and marginalization of the lower classes, and the utter failure of economic
and political liberalization programs.

While effective economic liberalization may be a necessary aspect of viable
democratic reform, it is nonetheless a sacrificial and prolonged process. Besides,
the effectiveness and viability of structural adjustment programs are called
into question when the state is not inclined to an "equitable" distribution
of the gains from market reform. The widespread deprivation caused by adjustment
programs, the vulnerable state of markets, and the ill-developed institutional
infrastructure in many African countries, for example, suggest that there is
a need for a "strong" state to ensure basic human needs, and to put
in place the necessary structures for a functioning market economy (Francis,
1995). A decrease in glaring economic disparities through socio?economic inclusion
of all classes and segments of society diminishes the probability of intergroup
conflicts or violent challenges against the state. In the final analysis, formidable
ethical questions still remain unanswered where economic and political liberalization
are concerned. Does the goal of establishing a market economy based on long?term
viability and sustained economic growth justify the initial negative social
consequences of liberalization programs? How do we in fact know that such liberalization
programs will ever work in many developing states where the institutional structures
and societal values may be quite at odds with the Westphalian, European legal-political
order? What is the most effective way to ensure an "acceptable" and
less strenuous political, social, and economic impact of economic liberalization
policies for all segments of society?

With the end of the Cold War, the relationship between people's rights (human
rights) and state rights (sovereign rights) became one of the key issues within
states and in world politics. For example the argument over whether state sovereignty
is absolute or dependent on popular consent was reflected in the debate over
the occupation of Haiti by the U.S. in 1994 in order to reinstall the elected
government of President Jean?Bertrand Aristide, which had been overthrown by
a military coup. In terms of Great-Power relations with weak states, it has
now become generally acceptable in international politics for donors to impose
foreign aid conditions on recipient states. Such impositions are considered
legitimate and outside the bounds of blatant interference in the internal affairs
of a sovereign state. Even economic and political agreements between the World
Bank and the IMF are considered legitimate because they are based on the state's
consent, and on negotiations. However, in the context of the state's sovereignty
versus popular sovereignty, does the state have the right to negotiate and agree
on adjustment policies that impose intense deprivations on societal groups without
their consent? Should not such intervention by powerful state and non?state
donors be approved by popular consent? Should the state be made to succumb to
external impositions that undermine its contractual obligations to its citizens,
which is to ensure a modicum of welfare?

Developing state economic crisis and external impositions are an integral part
of the internationalization of the state. The motivation of state policy has
shifted from domestic welfare to international competitiveness whose requirements
include decreased state capacity or intervention in the economy. Internationalization
effects call into question the very identity of the state vis-à-vis civil
society. But in the case of the developing state, it is unable to overcome this
progressive diminution of state capacity and legitimacy through a reconceptualization
of its identity and internationalization of the national interest. For the developing
state, state policy has been narrowly transformed into a desire to enhance the
global competitive position of the national economy, rather than, for example,
making efforts to increase levels of domestic employment. In other words, domestic
concerns have been subordinated to the requirements of globalization emanating
from the dominant actors.

Conclusion

In the Westphalian model of interstate relations, intervention is generally
believed to be legally and morally unacceptable. However, the violent conflictual
nature of the post-Cold War international system and its attendant humanitarian
imperatives is challenging the twin principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention
because the intensity of genocidal massacres and ethnic bloodletting are very
repulsive to international society. There is also a growing consensus in the
international relations of states that when such interventions are collectively
authorized by either a regional organization, the international community, or
Great Powers, they acquire legitimacy. This cosmopolitan moral theory of international
relations is increasingly recognizing that members of the family of nations
have an obligation to intervene to stop massive human rights violations. Thus,
the once sacrosanct principle of non-intervention and sovereignty is being steadily
undermined by the new scope and intensity of intra-state conflicts. However,
such interventions could be viewed in terms of the need by dominant actors of
the international system to perform their hegemonic function of preserving the
integrity of the existing state-centric system and reducing the level of anarchy
in the international system.

In the economic realm, economic interventions are outcomes of the impact of
globalization processes on the sovereignty of the state. Their relationship
portrays a serious tension as SAPs as an aspect of globalization challenge both
state sovereignty and identity in the developing world. The transnationalization
and supranationalism involved in SAPs challenge the effectiveness of both domestic
and international state policies. The key international organizations embody
the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders. They reflect
orientations favorable to the dominant social and economic forces emanating
from the powerful states, but which often have some negative human rights consequences
for the developing state. It has become evident that SAPs do not by themselves
reduce poverty, and macroeconomic recovery does not translate into a significant
social improvement. In many developing states, the "national popular state"
(or welfare state) declined as a result of SAPs. With the neoliberal model,
the state was forced to abandon its role as an agent of social development and
integration.

In sum, the developing state is a sociopolitical and economic example of an
externally-imposed and intersubjective creation of Great-Power responses to
material conditions. All the anomalies, paradoxes, and dilemmas inherent in
the weak developing state, are products of a prevailing ontology, in this case,
a post-Cold War ontology. The modern state system comprised of both developed
and developing states is constitutive of contending interest-based images of
appropriate socio-economic and political order which divide North and South,
and create tensions among competing ethnocommunal groups.

References

Amin, Samir. 1974. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory
of Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review.

Armstrong, David. 1993. Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State
in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press.