Text version follows

LAND FORCE
D6fense
nationale B-GL-323-004/FP-003
receipt
COU NTER{ NSU RGENCY OPERATIONS
(ENGLTSH)
This publication becomes active on
Published on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff
Canad?[
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE
PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE
RELEASED.
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l*l }:l!"m ffiil:?"
LAND FORCE
B-GL-323-004/FP-003
COU NTER.I NS U RG EN CY OPERATIONS
(ENGLTSH)
This publication becomes active on recelpt
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE
PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE
RELEASED.
Published on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff
OPI: DAD
Canadif
2008-'12-13
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Ohiel al Land Staf
Nalioilal Dslsr}cB
Headquailerg
Otawa, Onl,ario
K1A OK2
1600,t (DAr 3)
llDeecmler toor
Distribution List
THg tssut 0F B-cL-3?3-0$4lFP-003
COLIIVTER-IN$IN SPNETSIEE4IiQNS
l. The Canadian Army has recsntly treen ealled
upon to conduct significant and complex sounte r-
insurgcncy cperaticns. lt is highly I ikely that future
uperations will slso be charactsrised by the
requirement to continue to condrct countsr-
insurgency oper*lir:nr. As such, it is clearly tirne to
capture cur lessons leamcd and formaliss our
doctrine. It is most appropriate th6n, th8t the l\rrny
inues B-SL*323-0*{firy-S03 Counter-Insurgency
Oplerations, its first formal publication of this
n&ture.
7. Ccu*ler-insurgency is a specific eampaign
theme and although the key elements of our extant
doctrine rernain relevrnt in such carnpaigns. this
puhlicaticn articulates the specific framing
philesophy and guiding principles thal must be
conridered nt all levels of eommand in the
ptosecution of counler-insurgency. Thc publicatinn
clearly indicates that ins*rgeneies are r*oted in
pclitical and rccial issles and thus the mllitary has
an overall suppcding role to thosc other agencies
and institutions that will creste ths cnduring,
indigenaus-based sonditiorls fsr peace. In es*encc,
the military, particularly thc land forcc, provides
the manosuwe space fior those other agcncies and
e lenlents of power working to a *harcd campaig:r
end-state. Tactieal level actions by the land force
during a connter-insurgency campaign wil! be
planned and csnducted in keeping whh the general
principles of war and specific taflical principles;
hcwevcr, the tactieal actions should nct corlu&vene
U3
l*l };lym 3i[:x"
Chef d'6tal-major de I'Armee d€ l€rre
Quarti€r gdn6ml do
la D6fsn$s naiion6l6
Otlawa {0nlario}
KlA OK2
r6{n-l {DAD 3}
Le ddccmbre ?008
tirte de ditsusioa
PUBLICATION DE L,A
B.CL-3?3.004/FP-003, LES OPfRATIONS
C8|I:88.1I{SLRRECTT0N -
l. L'armde canadienne a rdcemmcnt €td applde h
rnenor d'imponantes rt complexes o1*,rations anti-
insunectionnelles. ll sst tr&s probable que des
o$rationr futurss seront dgalernent caractCrisdes par
le besoin de continuer & mener des o#raticns anti-
insuneetionnelles. A ce sujet, il e*( claircment temps
de xisir nos legons apprises et de formaliser notre
doctrine. Il cst {lor$ plur qu'*ppropride que l'ArnCe
de tene lance *a premi&re publication officislls do
c€ tte netxrc, la publication B -SL -3?3-004/TP-003
opdrations anti-in$unecticnnelles.
2. La lutle contre-insu.rrection constitu* un thaffie
de campagne paniculier et rndnre si le; dldments cl€s
dc notre doctrine actuelle restent pertinentr dans le
cadre de telles eampagnes, le nouve.&u manusl nrticrle
le eadrc philosophique e{ les principes directeurs qui
doivent 6tre considdr€s 1 tous les niveau,( de
comnrandemeni pour mencr les opdrations contre-
insurreetion. [x manuel indique clairement que les
insurrections prefinent racine dans les quertions
politiques e! sociales et qu'en canr€qucnce les forces
armdcsjcuent un rdle d'appui globat aupr&s des aures
arganisrnes et institutions qui crderrt les conditions
durabler ct fond€es sur les valeurs indig&nes qui
engendrent la p*ix. Fotd*msnulement* lss forces
anrdes, ct lcs forcc$ terresiras en particulier, offrent
I'espace ds manceuvre aux euircs organismer et
instrutts:tts du pouvoir qui viserrt l promouvoir uR
Ctat final voulu par chacun. l*s mesures dc niveau
taclique prisrs par la force ten?stre lors d'une
eampagne contrc-irsurreciio n doivenr €tre planifiCes
the guiding principles and philosophy descrilxd in
this publicatir:n^
3, The publicatian is n*rted within land
operatiotl$ doctrine in general and is
complen*nmry to th*t of our key *llies. It reflect*
rhe enduring nature of insurgencies and dr*ws
munh frorn both historicel and recent experienccs,
Although much of the publication's content is
gener*lly known and praeti$ed cuffently, the
publication is to bc formally implemenred in land
force operations *nd training institutions as
appropdatc.
4. As wilh any doctrine, this publication will
require tinnly fcedback in order tc; help kcep it
re|evant. The n*nnal lessons-learned proccsr
should be cxplolted in dsaling with pracriees and
procedurcs specifie to co$1:er-insurg€ncy
aperationr. These in turn *,ill be examined and
collated by LFDTS and implemented as apprq:riate
by its dccrine and training institrrtions. Comments
regarding the conccptual naturc cfthc philosophy
and principles af counkr-in;urgerley opcraticns, as
well *s vignettes from receni oprrations ftat hslp to
illuslrate the principler of ccunt*r-inrurgeney, may
be passed dire*ly to the publication's O?I,
Directorate of Army Doctrine 3 {Capstone).
5. Subsequent iterati*ns cf thin publicalion will
capture the invaluabl* experiences of rEceni and
eurrent opfrations. However, rhis wil! only be
possible if cunent practitioners actively provide
input and feedback,
et dirigdes dans le respeci des principcs de guene
gdndraux * des principes tactiques particulicrs.
Cependant, les nresures prises au niveau taetique ne
devraient pa$ enfrsr en c{}nflit avec l* philnsophie et
lcs prine ip*s direcleurs dtablis dans le manuel sur la
lutte contre-in$umction.
3, I-e contenu du manuel est irnbriqud dans la
doctrine des opdrations terestres en gdndral et
compl*te les textes de non alli{s cl&. ll tient comFte
du ceract&re persis{ant des insuneetions et est inspid
d"exSriences historiques et rdccntEs, M0nm si lc
con:,enu du manuel e$t g&lglalom€nt conru et qu'iletit
actuellernnt mis en pratique, il faut formcllement le
m*ttre en vigueur de fagon appropride dans lc cadrs
dns offrations de la ?orce tsnc$tre et I'incorporer i la
rnatiare de.s eours de ses institutions cl'enseigncment.
4, Comme dans le cas de lout autre 6ldmeni dr:
docrine- ce manu{:l dnit fairc I'objet d'unr dtroaetion
en temp$ opporlun pour rc$ler pcrtinent. Le proce$un
normal des lcEans *pprises dewait Otre exploitd au
msnlent de traiter des ndtkrdes ei procddures
pa rticuli bre s den opdratirns conlle- ins urreeticn. Cer
l*4.om seront dtudidm et recueillies par le SDIFT et
mises en cuvr* de fa6on appr*pride par scs
institutinns de doctrin* et d'lnsrructia,n. Des
cornmen{aires portant sur ta naiure canceptuelle de la
philosophie et des principes des opdration$ eontre-
innurrection de m0me que des vignette.r prdpard*s h
partir d'ol*rations rdcente.$ qui peuvenl aider l
illustrer les principes de eantre-i*sunection pounont
&tre eonmuniquds direetement au BFR. du rnanuel. le
Directeur * Doctrin€ de l',{rm6e de teffe 3
iFondernent).
5, Des modificatifs de ce manuel seront publi6s en
tenant compte des prfcieuses expdriences vdcuss lors
der q*rations actuelles et passdcs, Cependant, ee ne
sera po:sible de le faire qu'avec I'active dtraactinn et
la ccntribution der participants aux opdratians e n
c0urs,
Lieutenant-gdndral A,8. Lesl ie
Lieutenanl-freneral
Distrihution List (page 3)
a3
Linm de diffusion (pagc 3)
0istribution List
.4ction
LFAA ilal ifaxfCom#CCISl$3
SQFT Montreal/lCmdt/Cblv{163
LICA Tomnrol/ComdC0S/CI3
LF'WA Eetmonion//Comdlf 0SlG3
LFDTS K i ngston//Cornd/C0S
I CM BC Edmontorr//Comd/Cos/C3
2 CMBC Penwawa,{Camd/C0SlC3
5 CBMC Valcartierl/CmdllcEMlc3
CTC Cagetown/lComd
CMTC WainrightllComd
CLFCSC Kingstcnl/Cmdr
Inforrnatinn
CDSIVCDS
CAlleOM HQ#ConrdlCO S/J 3lJ7 LL
CETCOM HQI/CnndC0 Sl I 3 tt1 LL
CAS/lConxJ/COSi I Wi ng/CFAWC
CMSI/ComdlC0S
CDAI/CondlC0S
sJsr/D0s
pM0
DFAIT
&CMP
CMA
A8CA Naticnal Direetorlfoord
{Army LOs locared in ABCA nerion"i)
Liste dc diffiusion
Sxdcutian
$,A.FT Hal ifa#lCmddC3ld/G3
SQFT Montr€ al I I Crn*tl CBhdl 6 3
$f FT Toronral/CmdUCBlttrG3
SSFT Edmsnt a^l I CrndU Wtl C3
SpiFT Kirg$rn lcmducEM
I CMBC gdrnontodlcmdtcf,b{lC3
? CMBG Petawawa//Crn dtl CYMI Q3
5 GBb{C Valcar-iierllCmdtcf Ml03
CIC OagetownllCmdt
CCEM Wainwright//Cmd{
CCSFTC KingsternllCmdt
QG CSMr3ry/Cr*dtJ CE;W I 3 / t 7 L*
CEMFAI/Crn AVCYW f XscaelrelCCAFC
CE'lelFWlCmd.lCYM
ACO/lCmdt/CEM
rMIS//CEM
ocr
M},gCI
CR.C
,ECDI
Direeteur national ABCAlCoord
{lxs OL de I'Armde de terre *vec les pays de
rABCA)
N$HQ/ICOS Strat/COS Ops/DLS/LS Dirsctors QODX//CBM Sra#CEM Op#DL$/ Oireoteur;
gMAT
Infsrmation
CTMD/SCEMD
QC eOM Caneda/lCmddCEldlJ3lJ? l-R
cANoscoM HQ//condlco5{13{17 LL Qo eo&,{socAN//cmdrcE%ttS/17 Lft.
cA:{soFCoM HQ/lcorndcos/t3lJ? LL Qc ccMroscANllcrnd#c€tvuJ31J? LR
111
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
FOREWORD
1. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-lnsurgency Operations is issued on the authority of
the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario.
2. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-lnsurgency Operations is effective upon receipt.
3. The French version of this publication is B-GL-323-004/FP-004 Op6rations de
contre-insurrection.
4. The electronic version of this publication can be found in the Army Electronic Library,
accessible from the LFDTS Homepage, at http://lfdts.army.mil.ca.
5. Suggested amendments should be fonrvarded through normal channels to the OPI of
the publication, the Directorate of Army Doctrine.
@Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,
as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2008
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Counter- I nsurgency Operations
PREFACE
AIM
1. This publication, B-GL-323-004|FP-003 (FP-004 for French) Counter-lnsurgency
Operations, establishes doctrine for military operations in a counter-insurgency (COIN)
environment and campaign.
SCOPE
2. This publication provides a wide range of material in support of commanders and staff at
all levels of command. lt reflects the concepts of Canadian doctrinal philosophies and
principles. This publication addresses the following:
a. introductiontounderstandinginsurgencies;
b. a description of insurgencies and their objectives;
c. the overarching philosophy and principles by which a COIN campaign and its
operations should be conducted;
d. considerations for force employment at the strategic, operational and tactical
levels;
e. considerations for intelligence staff in support of a COIN campaign;
f. considerations for information operations, specifically focused on influence
activities;
g. considerations for sustainment in a COIN campaign; and
h. considerations for pre-deployment and in theatre training in support of a COIN
campaign.
PURPOSE
3. This publication is intended to assist in the planning and conduct of a COIN campaign
and its constituent operations. lt provides guidance to all levels of command,
ASSOCIATED PU BLICATIONS
4. A suggested reading list is affixed to this publication. This publication should be read in
conjunction with other appropriate CF and specifically Land Force publications. Particular
attention should be paid B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD............... ......................... i
PREFACE ...... iii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER.INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
101. lntroduction ..................1-1
sEcTtoN 1 DEFTNTT|ONS ......1-1
102. lnsurgency ...................1-1
103. Counter-lnsurgency .....1-3
SECTION 2 COIN CAMPAIGN AS PART OF THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS......1-3
104. General ......1-3
105. The Continuum of Operations Framework .......1-4
106. Predominant Campaign Themes .,...................1-4
107 . Full-Spectrum Operations............ .,...,.....,..,.....1-5
108, Comprehensive Operations........... ..................1-9
SECTION 3 AN OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER-INSURGENCIES .1-11
109. Development of an lnsurgency ....1-11
110. Development and Conduct of A COIN Campaign.. ..........1-13
SECTION 4 CONTRASTS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN INSURGENCIES
AND COUNTER-TNSURGENCY CAMPAtGNS............... ..........1-16
111. General ....1-16
112. lnitiative..... .................1-16
113. Focus on Population............. .......1-17
114. Role of Politics and Political Lead ..................1-17
115. Transition to Conflict and Campaign Duration .................1-18
116. Relative Costs....,.... ...1-18
117. Fluidity and Rigidity ....1-19
1 18. ldeology ...1-19
119. Enduring lrregular Nature of the lnsurgency ..1-20
CHAPTER 2 DESCRIBING AN INSURGENCY
SECTION 1 UNDERSTANDING AN INSURGENCY..... ...,..,.......,.2-1
201. lntroduction ..................2-1
202. Causes of an lnsurgency.......... .....2-1
203. The Aim of an lnsurgency.......... ......................2-1
204. Competitive Elements Over Populations-Strategic Centres of Gravity...............2-2
205. Characteristics of an lnsurgency-Unique and Local Aspects
of the Environment................. ......2-4
206. Transitional Nature of lnsurgencies............ .....2-5
207. Assessing the lnsurgency ............ ...................2-6
208. Forms of an lnsurgency.......... .......2-6
SECTION 2 SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF AN INSURGENCY.. ..........,...,2-7
209. lnsurgent Strategies ....2-7
210. Basic Tenets of an lnsurgency ......2-B
211. Motivating Central Cause ..............2-B
212. Leadership ...................2-B
213. Popular Support ..........2-9
214. Organization and Actors ................2-9
215. Narrative ..2-10
216. Context of an lnsurgency .......... ..2-11
217. Factors Affecting the Conduct of an lnsurgency .............2-11
218. Weaknesses and Aspects of lnsurgent Vulnerability ......2-13
SECTION 3 INSURGENT METHODS AND END-STATES .....,,.2-14
219. lnsurgent Tactics .......2-14
220. lnsurgent Tactics in a Rural Environment ................ .......2-19
221. lnsurgent Tactics in an Urban Environment................ ....2-19
222. lnsurgent Communications.......... ..................2-20
SECTION 4 CONCLUSION-A MEDICAL METAPHOR FOR AN INSURGENCY
AND CO|N ........2-21
CHAPTER 3 COIN PRINCIPLES
301. lntroduction ..................3-1
sEcroN 1 couNTER-TNSURGENCY PHtLOSOPHY............. ....................3-1
SECTION 2 PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY .,,...,....3-2
302. General..... ...................3-2
303. Effect Political Primacy in the Pursuit of a Strategic Aim...... .............,.3-3
304. Promote Unity of Purpose to Coordinate the Actions of Participating
Agencies-Control and Coordination ..............3-4
305. Understand the Complex Dynamics of the lnsurgency, lncluding
the Wider Environment................. ...................3-6
306. Exploit lntelligence and lnformation-The Overarching lmportance
of lntelligence.............. .................. 3-7
307. Separate the lnsurgents From Their Physical and Moral Sources of Strength .....3-9
vi
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
308. Physical Separation ...3-10
309. lntellectualand Moral Separation ..................3-12
310. Neutralize the 1nsur9ent........,...... ..................3-14
31 1. Sustain Commitment to Expend Political Capital and Resources
Over a Long Period ...3-14
312. Conduct Longer Term Post-lnsurgency Planning ............3-15
SECTION 3 FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
oF corN ......,,...3-15
313. Popular Support .........3-15
314, Avoidance of Moral Relativism.. ...3-16
315. Avoidance of Cultural Absolutism ..................3-18
316. PoliticalAwareness ....3-19
317. Acting Within the Law ..................3-19
318. Minimum Necessary Force ..........3-20
sEcroN 4 coNcLUSroN ...3-20
CHAPTER 4 STRATEGIC.LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY
sEcIoN 1 TNTRODUCTTON ...................4-1
sEcTtoN 2 THE GOVERNMENT CONCEPT .......... ....................4-1
401. The Setting ..................4-1
402. The Primacy of Host Nation Policies...... ..........4-2
403. The Primacy of Law .....4-2
sEcTtoN 3 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES .....................4-3
SECTION 4 THRESHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSIDERATIONS.......................4.4
sEcTtoN 5 MTLITARY COMM|TMENT...... ......,....,.....4-5
SECTION 6 THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES ...........4-6
ANNEX A LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF A
COUNTER.INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
4A01. lntroduction .............4A-1
4A02. National, or Domestic Legal Foundation ....44-1
4A03. lnternational Legal Foundation ...................4A-1
4AO4. Lawful Conduct of Operations in a COIN Campaign......... .............44-2
CHAPTER 5 OPERATIONAL.LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER.INSURGENCY
SECTION 1 JOINT AND COMBINED ASPECTS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY............5-1
501. lntroduction ..................5-1
502. Comprehensive Approach .............. ......,..........5-1
503. Comprehensive Operations........... ,.................5-2
504. Command Systems and Structures............. ....5-4
505. Single Commander System.... .......5-4
506. Committee System ......5-5
SECTION 2 THE PLANNING OF THE COIN CAMPAIGN ............5.7
507. Operational Campaign Planning ,....................5-7
508. Effects-Based Approach to Campaign Planning ............... ..................5-8
509. Campaign Aspects Unique to a COIN Campaign ...........5-14
510. Collaborative Planning ................5-14
511. Operational Centre of Gravity-lnsurgent Support .........5-15
512. Development of the Campaign P1an........... ... 5-16
513. Supporting and Transitory Role of the Military ................5-18
514. The Subordinate Role of Fires and Their Physical Effects ................5-20
515. Understanding Effects of Activities and the Compression Across Levels of
Command.. ......,.........5-21
516. War Gaming............... .................5-21
SECTION 3 IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN .........5-22
517. Expanding the Campaign Presence: Physically And Psychologically............ .....5-22
518. Securing a Firm Base and lnitial Government Planning.... ................5-23
519. Engagement of the Lower Levels of Government............. ................ 5-23
520. Clear Area of lnsurgent Presence and lnfluences............ .................5-25
521. Government Lead in the Return of Displaced Persons ...5-26
522. CIMIC Activities by the Military....... ...............5-26
523. Establish Low-Level (Community-Based) Development Councils .....5-26
524. Develop Security Presence and Set Conditions for Sustainable Security...........5-27
525. Set the Conditions for Sustainable Development.......... ..5-27
526. Continued Campaign Development and Transition.. .......5-28
SECTION 4 CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
IN A COIN CAMPAIGN ......5-30
527 . lntroduction ................5-30
528. Balance across Full-Spectrum Operations.............. ........5-30
529. Compression Across the Levels of Command ............... ...................5-31
530. Manoeuvrist Approach ................5-31
531. Mission Command. ....5-32
532. Describing Operational Success in a COIN Campaign ...5-32
533. Destruction of lnsurgents .............. ................5-33
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
534. Attacking lnsurgent Legitimacy ....5-33
535. Attacking lnsurgent Funding ........5-33
536. Simultaneity... ........... ..................5-34
SECTION 5 THE ROLE OF MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENTS AND INDIGENOUS
FORCES tN CO|N ...,..........5-34
537. Land Component .......5-34
538. Air Component............. ................5-34
539. Maritime Component................. ...5-35
540. Special Forces .........,.5-35
541. lndigenous Security Forces-Police Forces ..5-36
542. lndigenous Military Forces ...........5-37
543. lndigenous lrregular Auxiliary Forces ...,........5-37
CHAPTER 6 LAND COMPONENT OPERATIONS IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
sEcTtoN 1 TNTRODUCTTON ...................6-1
SECTION 2 ESTABLISHING THE FOOTHOLD-PHYSICAL AND MORA1.............,....,.6-1
SECTION 3 ATTACKING THE INSURGENTS'WILL ...................6-3
601. Role of the Tactical Commander .............. .......6-3
602. Pre-Emption .............,.. ...................6-4
603. Dislocation ...................6-5
604. Disruption.. ...................6-5
605. Appreciating Secondary and Tertiary Effects....... ..............6-5
SECTION 4 SECURING AND CONSOLIDATING A CONTROLLED AREA THROUGH
FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATTONS ............. ..............6-7
SECTION 5 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN ........ ....6-8
606. Types of Defensive Operations....,,.......... ........6-8
607. Defensive Activities and Protective Measures-Threat................ .......6-9
608. Responsibility.............. ...................6-9
609. Endurance .............,.....6-9
610. Balance ......6-9
61 1 . Objectives of Defensive Activities and Protective Measures ...............................6-10
612. Tactical Tasks for Defensive Activities ...........6-10
613. Counter-Surveillance Measures.. ...................6-1 1
614. Standing Patrols....... .,,..,,.......,.....6-11
SECTION 6 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN-GAINING THE
tNtTtATtvE .........6-12
615. lntroduction ................6-12
616. Attacks-Hasty Attacks.,,............. .................6-12
617 . Deliberate Attacks ..... 6-13
618. Large-Scale Offensive Operations ................6-13
619. Offensive Activities Against lnsurgent Command and ControlSystems ............6-14
620. Fighting Patrols-Raid and Ambushes ......... 6-15
621. Reconnaissance ln Force......... ... 6-16
SECTION 7 STABILITY OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN........ ....6-16
622. lntroduction ................6-16
623. Security and ControlTasks .........6-17
624. Patrolling and Observation Posts ..................6-17
625. Movement Control ..... 6-19
626. Crowd Control Measures.. ...........6-20
627. Search Tasks ............6-21
628. Support to Ddr And Ssr ...............6-22
629. Suppoft to Reconstruction and Governance-Civil-Military Transition Teams....6-23
630. Assistance to Other Agencies .....6-24
SECTION B ENABLING OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN......... ...6-25
SECTION 9 RESERVES AND QUICK REACTION FORCES ....6-26
SECTION 1O MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS............... .........6-26
SECTION 11 CONDITIONING THE TACTICAL LEVEL FOR
COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS ............6-28
SECTION 12 CULTURALAWARENESS...... ..............6.29
SECTION 13 THE TACTICAL-LEVEL COMMITTEE SYSTEM ....6-30
631. Establishing the Committees.......... ...............6-30
632. Challenges in the lmplementation of the Campaign Plan and
COIN Principles........... ................6-32
633. Facilitation of the Committee System ......,.....6-33
634. Execution of the Committee System-Command and Contro|............................6-33
SECTION 14 EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ARMS AND SUPPORT ARMS ...................6-34
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
ANNEX A CULTURAL INFORMATION
SECTION 1 RELIEF IN PLACE TEMPLATE ..,.........6A.1
6A01. Leadership and Power Structures ..............6A-1
6A02. Government ................ .............. 6A-2
6A03, Battlespace and Environment.......... ...........6A-3
6A04. Religion, Language and Customs................ ... .............64-3
6A05. Ongoing Cultural lnitiatives .......6,4-4
6A06. Security and Armed Groups...... ......... ........6A-4
6A07. Other lssues .......,.,.6A-5
CHAPTER 7 INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
sEcTtoN 1 TNTRODUCTTON ...................7-1
701. lntelligence Supporl to Counter-lnsurgency Operations ......................7-1
702. The lmpoftance of Human lntelligence ............7-2
703. Civilian Control and Political, Legal Constraints ................7-2
704. Activities in Support of lntelligence.............. ....7-2
705. Principles of lntelligence.............. ....................7-3
SECTION 2 ESTABLISHING A KNOWLEDGE BASE IN SUPPORT OF A
CoUNTER-TNSURGENCY CAMpAtcN......... ..........7-3
706. Assessment of the Environment................ ......7-3
707. A Spectrum of Relative lnterest .....7-5
sEcTroN 3 D|RECT|ON......... ..................7-6
708. General ,.....7-6
709. lntelligence Architecture and the Organization of lntelligence
in Counter-lnsurgency-Design of lntelligence Architecture........... ....7-7
710. Constraints ...................7-7
711. Straining Communications Networks............. ....................7-7
712. Centralized Control ......7-B
713. lntegration and the Committee System-Establishing an
lntelligence Committee ,............,....7-B
714. Functions of an lntelligence Committee.,......... ..................7-B
715. Central lntelligence Staffs ..............7-9
716. Fundamentals of lntelligence Organization................ ......7-10
717. lntelligence Staff Organization .....7-11
718. Factors Affecting Committee lntegration. .......7-11
719. All-Source lntelligence Centre .....7-12
xt
720. Tasking-The Commander's lntelligence Requirements............... ...7-12
721. Direction to the Collectors ...........7-13
sEcTtoN 4 co11ECTtON................ ......7-13
722. General..... .................7-13
723. Human lntelligence-Collection of Human lntelligence ...7-13
724. Coordination of Human lntelligence Collection ...............7-17
725. Open Source lntelligence And Publications-Open Source lntelligence ............7-17
726. Open Source Publications........... .................. 7-18
727. lmagery lntelligence ..7-18
728. Signals lntelligence ...7-19
729. Specialized Functions-Battle Damage Assessment and Measures of
Effectiveness...,.......... .................7-19
730. Selecting Measures of Effectiveness .......... ..7-20
731. Sensitive Site Exploitation .......... ...................7-21
sEcTroN 5 PROCESS|NG....... ..............7-22
732. Processing as a Discipline ............ ................7-22
733. Fusion of lntelligence ............. .....7-22
734. Databases .................7-22
sEcTroN 6 D|SSEMTNAT|ON ................7-23
735. Responsibility............. .................7-23
736. Use of lntelligence Architecture ...7-23
737. Security ...7-23
SECTION 7 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES ................,.......7-23
738. General..... .................7-23
739. Support to Civil-Military Cooperation............ ...................7-24
740. Support to Psychological Operations .......... ..7-24
741. Support to Public Affairs ..............7-24
742. Support to Decisions on Profile, Posture and Presence of Forces .....................7-25
743. Support to Deception................ ...7-25
sEcTtoN B TRA|N|NG............ ...............7-25
744. Pre-Deployment Training ............. .................7-25
745. Background lntelligence ..............7-26
746. Specialist Ski11s.......... ..................7-26
SECTION 9 CHALLENGES FACING AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN A
COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN ........ ........7.26
xil
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
747. Creation of the Broad Knowledge Base.......... .................7-26
748. Security of the Expanded Organization ....,.......... ............7-26
749. Conflict Between Centralization and Decentralization......... ..............7-26
750. Countering lnsurgent Propaganda .................7-27
751. Operating Restrictions .................7-27
CHAPTER 8 INFORMATION OPERATIONS_INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
sEcTtoN 1 TNTRODUCTTON ...................8-1
SECTION 2 PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION OF INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES...................8-3
801. General ......8-3
802. Commander's Direction and Personal lnvolvement......,...... ................8-3
803. Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution ...........8-4
804. Early lnvolvement and Timely Preparation ......8-4
805. Close Coordination and Sequencing ........,......8-4
806. Timely Counter-lnfo Ops........ ........8-5
807. Accurate lntelligence and lnformation............ ...............,....8-6
808. Comprehensive Targeting............. .. ....... ........8-6
809. Establishing and Maintaining Credibility............ ................8-7
810. Performance and Effects Monitoring and Assessment.......... ..............8-7
811. Summary... ................,8-10
SECTION 3 CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDA.............................8-11
812. General Characteristics ............ ...8-11
813. Themes of lnsurgent Propaganda ..,,......... ....8-12
814. Summary... .................8-14
SECTION 4 INFORMATION OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN
CoUNTER-INSURGENCY .......... ..........8-14
815. General ....8-14
816. Psychological Operations .............. ................8-14
817. Public Affairs ..............8-16
818. Civil-Military Cooperation ................ ...............8-17
819. Presence, Posture, Profile ...........8-19
820. Deception.. .................8-20
SECTION 5 CONCLUSION ...8-21
CHAPTER 9 SUSTAINMENT IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
SECTION 1 SUSTAINMENT PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING .......9-1
901. lntroduction ..................9-1
xilt
902. Factors Affecting Sustainment ................ ........9-1
903. Combat Service Support Reconnaissance Plan ....,..........9-3
904. Reconnaissance Party ..................9-4
905. Strategic Reconnaissance.......... .....................9-4
SECTION 2 SUSTAINMENT AND RESOURCES ......9-7
906. Sustainment System .....................9-7
907. Situational Awareness And Communications.. ..................9-B
908. Replenishment Through Air, Aviation and Sea Basing .....9-8
909. Use of Local Resources ......... .......9-9
910. Security ..... 9-9
SECTION 3 PERSONNEL ......9-9
91 1. Morale .......9-9
912. Medical Support ........ 9-10
CHAPTERlO COUNTER.INSURGENCYTRAINING
sEcTtoN 1 INTRODUCTTON .................10-1
SECTION 2 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAINING AND
PREPARATTONS ......... ...... 10-1
1001. Lessons ldentified During Campaigns .........10-2
SECTION 3 TRAINING PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING COUNTER-INSURGENCY
oPERATTONS ............ .........10-2
sEcTtoN 4 rN THEATRE TRA|N|NG.......,....... ........ 10-3
SUGGESTED READINGS
XIV
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Predominant Campaign Themes ....1-4
Figure 1-2: Ihe Continuum of Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations...........,.........,..........1-5
Figure 1-3: Tactical Activities and Tasks. ..........1-6
Figure 1-4: Comprehensive Operations........... ................1-10
Figure 2-1: Competition over the Populace as a Strategic Centre of Gravity... .......2-3
Figure 2-2: Competition over the Strategic Centres of Gravity-Populations .........2-4
Figure 2-3: Forms of an lnsurgency.......... ........2-6
Figure 2-4: An lnsurgency Spread as a Communicable Disease..... ...2-21
Figure 5-1: The Comprehensive Approach and Comprehensive Operations ...........................5-3
Figure 5-2: Example of a Possible Single Command System .. ............5-5
Figure 5-3: Example of a Committee System for a COIN Campaign ....5-7
Figure 5-4: Modelof a Campaign Plan and Supporting Operational Plans. ............5-B
Figure 5-5: Modelfor the Development of an Effects-Based Campaign P|an...........................5-9
Figure 5-6: Example of Lines of Operation for a Campaign P|an........... ...............5-13
Figure 5-7: Example of Lines of Operations, Operational Objectives and Decisive Points
Supporting Effects .....5-14
Figure 5-8: Example of a Campaign Plan Showing Lines of Operation,
Operational Objectives and Decisive Points / Supporting Effects .....5-18
Figure 5-9: lllustration of Transition of Stability Operations to Other Agencies... ..5-19
Figure 5-10: Example of the "lnk Spot" to Execute a COIN Campaign P|an........................,..5-29
Figure 6-1: Example Delineation of a Committee System....,. .,..,........6-32
Figure 7-1: lnterrelated Elements of an Environment and Society...... ....................7-4
Figure 7-2: The Spectrum of Relative lnterest ....................7-6
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Cou nter- I nsurg ency Operations
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER.INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
lnsurgency is rooted in squalor, and fear and suffering are its flowers.
-General Sir Frank Kitson
101. INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to define and introduce the concepts of insurgency
and counter-insurgency, and secondly, to provide a general overview for the conduct of a
counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign within the wider concepts of land operations and doctrine.
It will provide the reader a contextual understanding within which to view the details regarding
insurgency and COIN.
2. A COIN campaign is conducted using the same means as any other campaign: through
the application of a military force's fighting power.l lt is set within the continuum of operations
and is executed through a combination of tactical level activities and tasks. However, it is a
distinct campaign with its own philosophy and set of principles that provide guidance forthe
application of fighting power and the conduct of activities.
3. A number of concepts are discussed within this chapter that have been drawn from
B GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operafions. Fuller discussions of those concepts, as they apply
across the spectrum of conflict, will be found therein.
sEcTtoN 1
DEFINITIONS
102. INSURGENCY
1. lnsurgency is part of a wider set of irregular activities and threats to a secure and stable
environment, lrregular activity may be defined as: "behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent
change through the illegal use, or threat, of violence, conducted by ideologically or criminally
motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority."2
2. This broader set of irregular activities that threaten authority and stability beyond the
capabilities of normal law enforcement includes criminality, disorder, insurgency, terrorism and
irregular military forces (e.9., private or sectarian militias). lnsurgency is distinct from other
forms of threats in that it seeks a desired political effect, namely a desired change or re-ordering
of affairs.
3. A number of definitions exist for the term insurgency, and although many have been
developed over the years, most have contained the same key elements: violence, or at least the
threat of violence, subversion, intimidation of the broad population mass, propaganda and a
political aim. Again, it is the last element, a political aim, that distinguishes an insurgency from
other forms of conflict or threats to security and stability.
t
Fighting power is comprised of three components: moral, intellectual and physical. Combat power refers to
the application of physical elements. See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
2
Draft definition submitted to Army Terminology Panel (ATP) June 2007. For a more detailed discussion of
irregular activities, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
4. An insurgency has been defined as follows: "A competition involving at least one non-
state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve
political change."3 ln this definition, the following can be noted:
a. lnsurgency is not a movement or people. lt is a competition, struggle or conflict
involving different groups of people. As a manifestation of war, it is a competition
of wills.
b. lt must include at least one non-state movement to differentiate it from wars
between states.
c. The established authority need not necessarily be the government of the nation
subject to an insurgency. lt could be a local authority, a temporary military
authority or a government of a third party.
d. lnsurgencies seek political change like all wars. But the political nature of
insurgency is so important, it should be emphasized in the definition. The
change sought could be government collapse (typically an objective of 1950-60s
communist insurgencies) or a lesser objective such as self-determination,
regional autonomy or the release of political prisoners.
5. Because of the focus on attaining political change, insurgencies are political problems
and are not solely military problems. They require political solutions, with the military playing a
largely supporting role.
6. The key to any insurgency is gaining at the very least an indifferent attitude, if not the
outright support, of the population. Hence, many insurgencies have sought to persuade through
propaganda and subversion and to intimidate through violence large sectors of a population in
order to gain support for insurgent aims and undermine support for those countering the
insurgency. lnsurgents live and operate amongst the population, thus those forces and
agencies countering the insurgency must separate, physically and morally, the insurgent from
the population base. A hostile populace will create hostile conditions for any side in an
insurgency. Therefore, gaining the support of the people is paramount to any COIN campaign.
7. At the basis of an insurgency will be a narrative, a story. Central to this narrative is the
idea that motivates the insurgents and is formalized into an ideology. lt empowers the
insurgents and lends them legitimacy and provides justification for their ends and means.
B. lnsurgencies have political aims stemming from a number of sources and a guiding
ideology. Regardless of their origins and ideology, all insurgencies will have to some extent,
legitimate grievances at their root. These grievances may be wide ranging and include
political, social or economic characteristics. They will be exploited by the insurgent forces in
order to gain additional support and undermine the authority and legitimacy of the official
government and supporting forces. Thus, in order to solve an insurgency and create enduring
solutions to conflict in the environment, COIN forces must address these grievances.
9. A key to the eventual defeat of an insurgency is that the outbreak of an insurgency must
be properly identified as such. The classification or dismissal of a nascent insurgency as a
criminal or some other movement will only fuel the insurgency through inappropriate responses,
justify the insurgent narrative of systemic injustice and subjugation and provide political and
military leaders with the excuse to ignore the root, often legitimate, grievances of the insurgent
movement.
t
Definition as developed by a counter-insurgency study group during United States Marine Corps (USMC)
JOINT URBAN WARRIOR 2005.
1-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntrod uction to Counter-l nsurgency Operations
103. COUNTER-INSURGENCY
1. Counter-insurgency is defined as follows:
Ihose military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to
defeat an insurgency.a
2. Since an insurgency is a political problem, the military plays a largely supporting role to
other agencies and government departments in countering an insurgency. As indicated in the
definition, a wide range of agencies, elements of power and capabilities, in addition to the
military, must come together in a unity of purpose to defeat an insurgency.
3. A COIN campaign is conducted through a specific philosophy and a set of specific
principles that guide the application of combat power. lt is distinctly different from the conduct of
an insurgency itself, and the lines of operation within the COIN campaign must counter the lines
of operation of the insurgents. Within the guiding principles, each COIN campaign must be a
custom approach to the insurgency at hand. The constant is the fact that insurgency and
counter-insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support both at
home and in the theatre of operations. lf the strategic focal point is public opinion in the local,
domestic and international arenas, most initial military tactical efforts will be focused on breaking
the link between the insurgent and the people. This is not only a physical link, but the
psychological linkof moralsupport. Theformerwill entail physical activities,whilstthelatterwill
entail influence activities that undermine and attack the insurgent ideology, narrative and claims
to authority and legitimacy. This will include measures to address and resolve grievances that
lend support and credibility to the insurgency. lf the insurgent can be isolated, it is then
theoretically a relatively simple matter to eliminate him and his cause.
4. ln order to reach this point, a COIN campaign will involve more than military
engagement. Defeating an insurgency requires not only the neutralization of insurgent military
capabilities but also the resolution of the root causes of the political and socioeconomic
grievances that enabled its occurrence in the first instance. Therefore, it requires a
comprehensive approach, with multiple agencies and other government departments, often
enabled through a coalition effort. The mere attrition of insurgents is highly unlikely to result in
the defeat of the insurgency. lndeed, any attempt to win an insurgency through attrition may
only help fuel that insurgency. Only a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes
of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgents will obtain an
enduring solution.
SECTION 2
COIN CAMPAIGN AS PART OF THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS
104. GENERAL
1. Campaigns and subordinate operations often require military forces to operate
effectively across the spectrum of conflict, conduct a wide range of military activities
simultaneously and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly changing
operational circumstances. Commanders must be able to visualize how a campaign or
operation will likely evolve over time in light of changing circumstances.
o
NATO Allied Administrative Publication (MP) 6 NAfO G/ossary of Terms and Definitions.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-3
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
105. THE GONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS FRAMEWORKs
1. The concept of a continuum of operations identifies a number of campaign themes and
provides a framework for commanders to understand the complexity of the operational
environment and the manner in which missions contribute to a lasting peace or, at least, to an
environment in which conflict is diminished. The continuum of operations consists of four
aspects:
a. the spectrum of conflict;
b. predominant (operational level) campaign themes, including counter-insurgency;
c. types of tactical activities (offensive, defensive and stability); and
d. the simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical activities, termed
full-spectrum operations.
106. PREDOMINANT CAMPAIGN THEMES
L Military operations may be described through a series of predominant campaign themes
plotted at appropriate and relative locations on the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-l : Predominant Gampaign Themes
2. Campaign themes consist of the following: major combat, counter-insurgency, peace
support (which entails a range of peacekeeping and peacemaking campaigns) and peacetime
military engagement.6 The location of these themes along the spectrum of conflict is not fixed
5
See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 I Land Operations for a fuller discussion of the continuum of operations.
6
Peacetime military engagement is defined as: "planned military activities that involve other nations and are intended
to shape the security environment in peacetime. Note: it includes programmes and exercises that nations conduct
with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries and
improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners" (submitted to Army Terminology Panel
June 2007).
B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-lnsurgency Operations
but generally reflects the relative level of violence that can be expected within the campaign. A
limited intervention, such as a non-combatant evacuation or emergency humanitarian aid
mission, may occur at any point along the spectrum of conflict.T As well, there may be elements
of different campaign themes within a campaign theatre. For example, one region of a nation
may require peace support, while another is enduring an insurgency,
,107.
FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1. All campaigns are conducted through the combined and simultaneous conduct of
tactical-level operations: offensive, defensive and stability operations.t They are linked through
enabling operations.e Each of these types of operations consists of a set of tactical activities
that are realized through tacticaltasks (see Figure 1-2).
Figure 1-2: The Continuum of Operations and Full€pectrum Operations
2. Campaigns and operational plans are realized at the tactical level through the
simultaneous and sequential conduct of these tactical operations and their constituent activities.
The simultaneous conduct of tactical activities is termed full-spectrum operations.
3. As campaigns progress, efforts and resources ebb and flow between these different
tactical activities, and their balance reflects the nature of the campaign, the principles by which
the campaign should be conducted and the situation at hand.
4. Each of these tactical classifications consists of a number of tactical activities, which in
turn are realized through the conduct of tacticaltasks. These tactical level activities and their
simultaneous conduct are termed full-spectrum operations (see Figure 1-3).
t
Limited intervention is defined as: "a military operation limited in objective, scope and timeframe. Note: not
considered a campaign, but may involve cooperation with other agencies and government departments" (approved
by Army Terminology Panel, May 2007).
u
Stability operations are defined as: "tactical activities conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies
to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and
progress can be achieved" (Army Terminology Panel).
s
Enabling operations include those tactical activities that enable others. They include withdrawal, relief in place
and advance to contact. For more details, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
B-GL-323-004i FP-003 1-5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
Tactical Activities
. Attack
. Raid Ambush
. Exploitation
. Pursuit
. Break-out
. Feint and
Demonstration
Reconnaissance in
Force
' Security and Control
. Support to Demobilization,
Disarmament and
Reintegration (DDR)
. Support to Security Sector
Reform (SSR)
. Support to Civilian
lnfrastructure and
Governance
. Assistance to Other Agencies
Tactical Tasks
and Effects (Not
an all-inclusive
list)
. Destroy
. Seize
. Secure
. Support by Fire
. Block
. Occupy
. Counter-attack
. Guard
. Fix
. Retain
. Cordon and Search
. Observe/Monitor
. Vehicle Checkpoint (VCP)
. Framework Patrols
. Humanitarian Aid Delivery
. Train lndigenous Security
Forces
. Crowd Confrontation
Notes:
1. Mission statements will be written with both the activity and the task or immediate effect, further described by the
purpose, or secondary effect. The activity is not always stated in the mission statement, such as "...(attack to) seize
(object) in order to..."
2. Mission statements relating to stability activities and tasks will use the transient verb "conduct" to assign the
activity,suchas,"...will conductsecurityandcontrol inorderto..." Thiswouldthenbeallocatedastactical tasks
and effects to subordinates, such as VCPs, framework patrols, etc. At the lower tactical levels, only the tactical
tasks may appear in the mission statement, but again continue to use the verb "conduct," such as, "...will conduct
framework patrols in order to..." or "...will conduct humanitarian aid delivery in order to..." ln this manner, they are
similar to mission statements for enabling operations. See B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Sfaf Dufies for Land aperations
for further details.
Figure 1-3: TacticalActivities and Tasks
'1-6
B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-lnsurgency Operations
5. These types of tactical-level operations, together with tactical tasks, describe the total
tactical activity undertaken by a military force within a campaign. Each type is guided by a set
of principles.to Note that each subordinate type constitutes individual tactical tasks. An attack
may consist of a support-by-fire task and clearing task, while humanitarian assistance may see
one sub-unit distributing food and another one conducting a medical clinic. Again, it is important
to note that in any type of campaign theme, these tactical tasks may be conducted
simultaneously. For example, one sub-unit may be conducting an attack, another may be
conducting security of an area through vehicle checkpoints, and another may be distributing
emergency water and rations to refugees.
Full-Spectrum Operations during the lraq War-March 2003
Within a 48-hour period, between 22 and 24 March 2003, ZCoy, 1't Battalion, Royal
Regiment of Fusiliers (RRF) conducted full-spectrum operations at the sub-unit level.
rrd passage of lines with in-place US forces en route to Basra, ZFollowing a forward passage of lines with in-place US forc
Company Combat Team conducted the following operations:
r an attack on the near side of a bridge leading to the city of Basra;
r an attack, on their flank, to clear a small lraqi Army barracks;
r an attack, following nightfall, to seize the far side of the bridge;
. a hasty defensive position in their bridgehead;
' at first light, 23 Mar 03, the combat team had to undertake crowd control operations
within their defensive position for civilians attempting to flee Basra but refused
passage at the bridge for fear of enemy ex-filtration;
. the combat team defeated an enemy armoured counter-attack;
. whilst maintaining the defensive position, part of the combat team (one platoon,
company HQ and a fire team of tanks) conducted a penetration into the city of
Basra, destroying five T-55s and a number of infantry detachments in the process,
withdrawing after the contact and returning to the defensive position;
. maintained the defensive position the night of 23124 Mar 03;
' conducted a relief in place the morning of 24 Mar 03; and
. moved to the battle group's rear areas and conducted a series of stability activities,
including the delivery of aid, area security and route control, fire fighting and tasks
to stop looting and other criminal behaviour.
Whilst the combat team was conducting these activities, other sub-units of the 1 RRF
Battle Group were conducting other activities and tasks.
Source: Memoirs of OC Z Coy, 1 RRF, Major Duncan McSporan, RRF.
6. The conduct of tactical-level activities should not violate the guiding principles by which
the overall campaign should be conducted. For example, the pursuit of fleeing insurgents that
will gain a tactical success should not be conducted if it will break the overarching philosophy
and principles of a COIN campaign.
10
See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Operations
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-7
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
7. The conduct of campaigns should always seek to reach operational objectives and
reduce the level of conflict. When operating at any point along the continuum of operations,
commanders and staffs should consider how to prevent the escalation of violence by the
adversary. During peace support, for example, operations must be conducted with a view to
preventing escalation to an insurgency or to major combat. Force must be used discriminately
because the undue application of force, lethal or otherwise, can undermine the overall campaign
and, in fact, cause an escalation of conflict if secondary effects are not fully considered.
B. Recognizing changing circumstances or conditions, especially ones that require a
change to the major theme of a campaign, is both an intellectual as well as an intelligence
challenge. This is part of the art of war. The intelligence system must be attuned to, and look
for, indications of changes in the environment, and commanders and staffs must be able to
interpret the key indicators that demonstrate a shift is taking place. Commanders and staffs
must then react to the changing environment, either to prevent escalation of violence or facilitate
a shift to a lower level of violence, in such a way that the situation is manageable by the forces
at hand.
9. ln situations of political instability or disaffection, an insurgency may erupt. lnsurgencies
are complex and may have several significant factors, including intra- or inter-state violence as
well as factional violence between different insurgent groups. Although some models of
insurgency, such as the Maoist model, forecast a progression to conventional operations,
insurgencies, as defined above, will fall short of large-scale, conventional operations inherent to
a major combat campaign.
10. The military role in COIN is to create a security framework that precludes the ability of
insurgents to undertake offensive operations. The military will work in co-operation with other
agencies addressing the non-military aspects of the security environment in order to solve the
root causes and grievances that lead to conflict and insurgency. This will include many of the
tactical activities grouped under stability operations. Thus the military's role is one of supporting
other agencies by creating manoeuvre space for them through the provision of security and
protection and the neutralization of the insurgent threat. lt is these other agencies that will bring
the enduring political solutions to an insurgency.
1-8 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-lnsurgency Operations
Elements of different campaign themes may occur within the same theatre of
operations. ln 1967, the US Marine Corps was simultaneously conducting conventional
and counter-insurgency specific operations in I Corps, the USMC area of operations.
While fighting a conventional war against elements of the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) along the Laotian and North Vietnamese borders, the Marines were
concomitantly trying to support the Combined Action Program (CAP) that had been
slowly but successfully combating the influence of Viet Cong (VC) insurgents. The CAP
embedded Marine rifle sections with South Vietnamese militia to live and operate in
hamlets and villages throughout I Corps, which, in effect, implemented a form of
Lyautey's tache d'huile method of COIN. Despite the small size of the CAP at the time
(approximately 1 ,200 Marines and 2,100 Vietnamese militia), the manpower demands
of attrition wadare in the border regions hindered an expansion of the CAP,
undermining the overall COIN campaign.
The coordination of NVA conventionalwarfare operations and VC insurgent activities
was not a coincidence. North Vietnam's GeneralVo Nguyen Giap specifically created
and implemented a stratagem that sought to draw the bulk of US forces to the
peripheral areas of South Vietnam to be engaged in costly and demoralizing battles of
attrition in order to create physical and psychological manoeuvre space for insurgents in
population centres.
Commanders must be aware that a transition across campaign themes may occur over
time and space within a theatre, and a balance must be rirrri between competing
demands and principles. The main effort may shift between operational objectivei,
dependent upon the situation and threat. At all times, commanders must focus on
acirieving the operational objectives that will create conditions for enduring success.
Source: Michaet Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: the Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps,
1965-1972 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), pp.l28-132.
108. COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONSll
1. ln order to realize operational objectives, military forces create supporting effects
through the conduct of tactical activities, using a range of capabilities. This range of capabilities
and activities is classified as fires or influence activities. They are enabled in a simultaneous
and complementary manner through manoeuvre and battlespace management and are together
known as comprehensive operations (see Figure 1-4).
11
For a more detailed discussion on comprehensive operations and other related concepts, see
B-GL-300-001 /FP-001 Land Operations.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-9
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
Figure 14: Gomprehensive Operations
2. The construct is defined as follows:
a. Gomprehensive Operations. The deliberate use and orchestration of the full
range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects.
b. Fires. The physical means deliberately used to create or support the realization
of physical effects as first order effects.
NOTE
Fires include lethal and non-lethal systems. They also include electronic
counter-control measures of EW.
lnfluence Activities. An activity designed to affect the character or behaviour of
a person or a group as a first order effect.
NOTE
lnfluence activities affect understanding, perceptions and willwith the aim of
affecting behaviour in a desired manner.
3. Although a wide array of activities will create influences, influence activities are primarily
realized through psychological operations (PSYOPS), public affairs (PA), civil-military
cooperation (ClMlC), deception and the posture, profile and presence of forces.
4. Fires and influence activities are planned in a comprehensive and complementary
manner. For example, PSYOPS may be used to convince enemy conscripts to flee prior to an
attack, and CIMIC projects may repairdamages caused by offensive operations in orderto
maintain the support of affected populaces. ln accordance with the manoeuvrist approach,
fires, although creating first order effects on the physical plane, should be conducted with a view
to the effects on the psychological plane-the resulting effects on will and cohesion. Likewise,
1-10 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntrod uction to Counter-lnsurgency Operations
although influence activities may have first order effects on the psychological plane, they may
have subsequent effects on the physical plane. For example, PSYOPS that convince conscripts
to desert reduce the overall combat power of the enemy commander.
5. Many of the influence activities will be activities under the category of stability
operations. They will seek to build lasting solutions to the root causes of conflict and crisis.
6. The balance that a commander will strike between fires and influence activities will
depend upon the type of campaign, its guiding principles, the situation at hand and the desired
effects. ln campaigns that require the support of a population and the redress of grievances
and civil strife, a large portion of capabilities will be dedicated to influence activities, likely in
conjunction with other agencies.
sEcTtoN 3
AN OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER.INSURGENCIES
109. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSURGENCY
lnsurgencies are not a new phenomenon. For example, the Greek historian Herodotus
chronicled an insurgency by the Scythians against the rule of the Persian warrior-king
Darius in 512 B.C. which ultimately succeeded in forcing a Persian withdrawal. The
forces of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) and the Mongols also each suffered
significantly at the hands of insurgents. Similarly, terrorism has long been used as an
effective tactic. An early example of this is the use of terrorism as "propaganda of the
deed" by the Assassins in Persia in an effort to subvert the rule of the Seljuk Turks in the
1 1th and 12th centuries.
Sources: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History (New York, NY: Morrow, 1994); Brig'd
(ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures," PhD. Diss. (London:
Kng's College, 1979) (with permission).
L At its most basic, an insurgency is an uprising or insurrection against an established
form of authority, normally a government, occupying authority or social structure. Various
situations may give rise to an insurgency, and a single insurgency may have several root and
contributing causes. ln general, insurgencies spring from dissatisfaction with a social structure
or government policies. However, recent history has shown that criminal groups can foment a
form of insurgency by destabilizing a government to create conditions favourable to the pursuit
of criminal activity. This occurs in a number of ways, including the subversion of police and
security forces, the control of territory and the intimidation of the populace.
2. lnsurgencies develop in stages and often the government will only recognize the severity
of the threat after violence has begun to occur on a regular basis. ldeally, the government will
recognize a threat and act to preclude its development prior to the outbreak of widespread
violence.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-11
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
A recent example of early recognition of an insurgency was the Regional Assistance
Mission, Solomon lslands (RAMSI), which successfully halted a growing criminal
insurgency. The government of the Solomon lslands, hampered by corruption at many
levels, was no longer able to provide even basic services by the summer of 2003 and
requested international assistance. RAMSI, led by Australia, was able to successfully
dislocate, disrupt and disarm the major criminalgroups, help reorganize the police
forces and assist in the resumption of the provision of basic public services, all priorto
the onset of major violence.
Source: Russe/l Glenn, COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission,
Solomon lslands (Santa Monica: RAND,2007).
3. lnsurgencies are a method used by disaffected groups or those whose best interests are
served by destabilizing the existing government. By their very nature, insurgents quickly
become involved with other destabilizing elements within a society such as criminal entities.
Each exploits the other for their own benefits.
4. Each insurgency will have its own set of causes, aims and desired end-state. Some
insurgencies will stem from a political, social and/or religious ideology that envisions an
improved (even utopian) state of affairs. Other insurgencies will stem from unresolved real or
perceived grievances, while others will be conducted by a particular group that simply wishes to
gain power but cannot do so through legitimate means or conventional use of military power.
Still others will stem from nationalist desires for independence or autonomy. ln all cases,
insurgencies are supported by propaganda that justifies the use of subversion and violence.
5. lnsurgencies are more likely to occur in states where there are inherent racial, cultural,
religious or ideological divisions that lead to a lack of national cohesion and weak, inefficient,
unstable or unpopular governments. Additional factors, such as corruption and external
agitation, may facilitate an insurgency.
6. ln other words, many insurgencies will develop in failed or failing states where
governments have failed to address or satisfy the basic needs of their populace. These needs
will differ depending upon the region and culture involved, but in generalwill include the basic
essentials of a stable life, responsible government, religious freedom and economic viability. lt
is from such fertile environments that insurgencies will often grow.
7 . The aim or desired end-state of the insurgency may be quite extreme, such as the
creation of a new state or social construct. Others may simply seek to seize power, expel a
foreign power or acquire specific but limited political advantages or control. Whatever the aim,
the insurgents themselves feel that their causes and aim justify the use of violence and
subversion and even, in some cases, the use of terrorism against the civilian populace.
1-12 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-l nsurgency Operations
History holds several examples of Canadian involvement in insurgencies conducted on
various scales with differing aims. Some examples are as follows:
r United Empire Loyalists and the American Revolution (-1774-1783)
. Fenian Raids (1866, 1870)
' Northwest Rebellion (1S85)
' Siberia (1918*1919)
. Haiti (2004)
. Afghanistan campaign
B. The tactics used by insurgents will vary with each campaign and situation. They will
certainly include violence or at the very least the threat of violence. Subversion and
propaganda have traditionally been used to great effect. lnsurgent capabilities in this regard
have exponentially increased with the availability of sophisticated but inexpensive information
technologies that enable the exploitation of mass media to convey their message, propaganda,
threat and capabilities to a large audience. lnsurgents seek support internally and externally,
and they often conceal fund raising campaigns behind facades of charitable or political
organizations. Dense urban terrain will be exploited in order to attack high value targets, inflict
mass casualties and hide their own presence. Unfortunately, many insurgencies resort to the
tactic of terrorism as a means to realize their operational and strategic end. lnsurgents will also
exploit the inherent weaknesses of the society under attack, particularly liberal democracies and
states where religious or ideological tensions are high in order to support their operations. Their
words and deeds will continually paint themselves as the victims of an unjust social or power
structure, and their actions will often seek to provoke an overreaction from government forces
which will thereby support their themes and messages of persecution and victim hood.
9. lnsurgencies can cross international borders. lnsurgents may establish bases in a
sympathetic country or in states with weak governments. They may also have pan-national
aims and therefore conduct their attacks in more than one geographic area in order to create
results there or in other areas. During the Cold War, communist expansion followed this model,
and some radical religious/cultural-based terrorist groups have recently undertaken similar
measures.
10. lnsurgencies seekto gain the supportof a portion of the populace large enough to
achieve their goals. ln some cases, this will require support by the majority; in others, this may
only require the support of a powerful portion of the populace (tribe, business class, ethnic
minority). ln all cases, an insurgency requires only the indifference of a populace to operate, to
give it manoeuvre space that allows the development and expansion of an insurgency. As an
insurgency grows, those who do not rally to the cause are intimidated into silence, killed or
forced to flee. lnsurgencies usually gain their greatest success amongst that segment of the
population that is disaffected or disadvantaged-those who have gained the least from the
current social organization. Even if the majority of the population fails to eventually rally to the
side of the insurgents, the insurgents simply have to make defending the status quo too
expensive or difficult for the security forces, the governments concerned and the general
populace. An insurgency is, therefore, like all conflict: a battle of wills.
110. DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT OF A GOIN CAMPAIGN
1. Operations conducted within a COIN campaign aim to defeat an insurgency through
military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions. An overarching
demand of counter-insurgency operations is that military forces play a key but supporting role in
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-13
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
the campaign. The military role is to create the security framework to permit the legal and
political initiatives required for a long term solution to the root causes of grievances. Although
combat may occur, the primary strategic centre of gravity is the civilian populace. Only by
drawing the civilian population to the government side and therefore creating a hostile
environmentforthe insurgents can an insurgency be defeated. ln otherwords, the military
plays but one part of a COIN campaign that will involve a wide variety of other government and
non-government agencies. lt is these other elements of power that will bring about the enduring
solutions to the situation.
2. The overall effect sought in a counter-insurgency is not the death or capture of
insurgents but, more importantly, the provision of security to the population and the reduction of
popular support for the insurgency through reform. Although the military's role is limited, the
manner in which it conducts its responsibilities will influence the overall environment and
success in all facets of the campaign. For example, a heavy-handed response to insurgent
activities will be exploited by the insurgents' propaganda and thereby undermine the trust of the
local populace in the security forces.
3. A government facing an insurgency in its own territory is under direct threat and can
therefore be expected to bear a higher risk and accept higher casualties than a coalition partner
assisting it.
4. Although not specifically designed for such commitments, military forces have often
been used to conduct COIN campaigns. This is generally due to the levelof violence offered by
the insurgents and the resulting requirement for large numbers of well-armed troops to protect
high value targets, the populace and government and to engage and destroy the insurgents
when necessary.
5. Although combat may be intense at the start of a COIN campaign, there is typically a
lower prevalence of combat than expected in conventional major combat campaigns.l2 This
combat occurs primarily at the small-unit level-i.e., section, platoon, or company-although
larger organizations may sometimes be involved. The rate of resource consumption is also
lower than in major combat, although the campaign as a whole is likely to last much longer, with
several years being typical. Thus the overall resource requirement is usually higher. Certainly
the political and moral commitment of the government and people supporting the COIN
campaign in another nation must be prepared for a longterm commitment.
6. lnsurgencies have ambiguous start-dates, and COIN campaigns have ambiguous end-
dates. lt is unlikely that the conflict will be suddenly ended with a major military victory against
the insurgents, who will rarely offer the opportunity for decisive military engagement and are
typically organized into small clandestine cells. Although there are examples of insurgencies
and counter-insurgencies that have resulted in decisive military successes-e.g., Castro's
Cuban revolution in the former case, and the defeat of the North West Rebellion in the latter
case-the long-term solutions still require political and economic measures. ln short, military
forces do not defeat insurgencies; instead, they create the security conditions necessary for the
political resolution of the conflict.
7. lnsurgencies can only be effectively fought with consideration of diverse factors such as
politics, economics, police capability, social structure, culture and psychology along with military
t'
This is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Maoist model envisions a final phase of major conventional combat, and the
insurgencies in China, Vietnam and Cuba involved significant conventional combat. Similarly, lhe Front de Liberation
Nationale (FLN) in Algeria attempted to build a conventional army wlth which to challenge French conventional
military superiority.
1-14 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-lnsurgency Operations
power. Hence, any counter-insurgency must consist of a multi-pronged, multi-agency approach
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The causes and symptoms, such as the
insurgents themselves and their popular support, must be addressed through comprehensive
operations-through a combination of fires and their physical effects as well as influence
activities and their psychological effects. lt is the latter of these two, influence activities, that will
create enduring solutions to a COIN campaign by addressing root causes.
B. The COIN campaign will be realized through a thematic lines of operation that group
similar operational objectives together that build to the desired end-state. Some lines of
operation may be lead by the military as a supported element. Other lines of operation will see
the military in a supporting role with most activities conducted by other agencies. Here the
supporting role will utilize unique military capabilities such as strategic lift, medical support,
security provision, military training capabilities and/or intelligence collection, collation and
analysis. Some lines of operation may be conducted by other agencies entirely within the
overall security provided by police and military forces.
9. The multi-agency approach is termed the comprehensive approach.l3 lt sees the
military working in a unity of purpose and ideally in a unity of effort in order to create enduring
solutions to the root causes of the insurgency and reach the desired operational end-state. ln
all cases, successful COIN requires this comprehensive approach facilitated through a unity of
purpose.
10. The comprehensive approach may be illustrated by way of an example: while police and
military are cooperating in the search for insurgent bases and are providing security to
population centres and along lines of communication, international and non-governmental aid
organizations (along with military support) may be developing physical infrastructure in
disadvantaged urban areas. Concomitantly, the government, with international support, may be
reforming election laws and political structures.
11. Conventional armies may not necessarily be routinely structured to conduct a COIN
campaign. However, such campaigns are not the purview of special or elite military or para-
military forces (although they may have roles to play as well). History has demonstrated that
the most successful COIN operations have been conducted by ingenious, resourceful, non-
doctrinaire conventional (even conscript) armies that have deployed with simply a guiding set of
principles, developing their tactics as the situation became understood. Paramount to the
success of the military portion of the campaign has been firm, clearly articulated political and
strategic goals and the ability of officers to exercise command with freedom, flexibility and
confidence down to the lowest levels, using ingenuity and resourcefulness to take the battle to
the insurgents on one hand, whilst attempting to resolve the root causes on the other. lndeed,
those attributes of a regimental system-confidence afforded the commander in remote
situations, familiarity among comrades and across ranks and reliance on small unit actions-
have proven most effective in COIN campaigns.to
12. The commitment of western democracies and alliances to the stabilization of failed or
failing states and the desire to limit global effects of insurgencies in an era of weapons of mass
destruction means that governments will deploy both military forces and civilian agencies
together in order to address these threats to regional and global stability. Not only must
tt
For more details regarding a comprehensive approach including guiding principles, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001
Land Operations.
1a
Armies in Low-lntensity Conflict-A Comparative Anatysis, edited by David Charters and Maurice Tugwell
(Toronto: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989).
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-15
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
commanders understand the military's role in a COIN campaign, but they must be able to
understand the key role played by other agencies and how all agencies work together in a unity
of purpose to defeat insurgencies and their causes.
sEcTroN 4
CONTRASTS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN INSURGENCIES
AND COUNTER{NSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS15
,I'11.
GENERAL
1. Conventional wars and battles pit two relatively similar forces against one another with
the winner being able to exercise political control over the other. The forces involved focus on
military actions in similar timeframes and use comparable capabilities and methods to attempt to
dominate the other. Although the constituent elements of each force's fighting power may be in
different balance, there is a certain amount of symmetry within this competition.
2. This symmetry does not exist between an insurgency and counter-insurgency elements.
The nature of the environment, aims of each force, relative demands and the elements of
fighting power of each force-the moral, physical and intellectual-demand that the conduct of a
COIN campaign be distinctly different from the conduct of the insurgency itself.
112. INITIATIVE
1 . Within an insurgency situation, the initiative at all levels lies with the insurgent. The
insurgent will pick the moment at which to begin his campaign and at which moment to initiate
the use of violence. At the tactical level, the insurgent will continuously be in a position to
accept or decline engagement, and most tactical engagements will be a time and place of his
choosing.
2. The insurgent's use of propaganda and other means to influence audiences-activities
to create first order effects on the psychological plane-will often take an offensive nature that
will seek to undermine the credibility of the government and COIN elements and increase his
own legitimacy. Despite the lack of formal doctrine for information operations, the insurgent will
have honed propaganda skills and will quickly master skills in the manipulation of international
media. Knowing what activities and engagements will occur, the insurgent will have his
propaganda and media messages ready for immediate implementation. Furthermore, the
eagerness of international media to be obtain inside, exclusive stories will allow insurgents to
control messages and present images and stories that support their narrative, their grievances
and representation of victim hood.
3. Counter-insurgent forces will often be forced into a position of reaction. ln realizing this,
leaders must understand that insurgent forces will conduct activities, mostly atrocities, in the
hope of provoking a heavy handed reaction from COIN forces that will ultimately undermine
their own credibility and legitimacy.
4. lnsightful political and military leaders will ideally foresee the development of an
insurgency before the insurgencies gain significant support and/or resort to open violence. ln
such cases, they should, in addition to increasing intelligence collection and analysis, initiate
15
The basis for this section has been drawn from: David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice
(Westport, CT: Praegar Security lnternational,2006), pp. 3-10.
1-16 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-lnsurgency Operations
actions that will address any legitimate grievances being exploited by the insurgent leadership
and undertake measures to counter the insurgent narrative and ideology.
5. Attempts by government and COIN forces to seize the initiative must be carefully
considered. The use of physical attacks must be viewed from the perspective of long term
effects. Although physical attacks may result in short-term tactical success against an element
of the insurgent forces, they may cause secondary and tertiary effects, such as the death of
civilians or collateral damage, that hurt, perhaps irreparably, the long-term success of the
campaign.
6. lnitiative by COIN forces may seek to gain considerable success in terms of information
operations, specifically influence activities.l6 The ability to underlake effective psychological
operations amongst the local populace, the ability to quickly explain actions through public
affairs means and the ability to use CIMIC and other resources to address grievances and other
potential causes of the insurgency will seize a sense of moral initiative for the COIN forces and
wrestle much of the initiative from the insurgent.
113. FOCUS ON POPULATION
1. Because of the political aims of an insurgency and the lack of material resources in
comparison to the government forces, the insurgent will focus on gaining support of the
population. He will attempt, by whatever means deemed effective, to dissociate and isolate the
populace from the counterinsurgent and to gain its physical and moral support. As a minimum
the insurgent will seek to break the will of the population to resist. ldeally, the insurgent will
reach a point at which he can control the population through a combination of force and
intimidation or the populace willingly submits to the insurgent. Eventually, this will result in
success for the insurgent, for in the final equation, the exercise of political power depends upon
the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at least, on its submissiveness.
2. The COIN forces and government agencies must actively work to counter the insurgent
attempts to coerce or persuade the population. A careful analysis must be made of the
population and its culture in order to comprehend its grievances, motivations and the ways in
which the insurgent will target it and influence it. At the very least, the population must be
protected from security threats. But this will not be enough for enduring success. The
population must be persuaded to reject the insurgent narrative and ideology, which lends the
insurgency cred ibility and justification.
3. ln addition to the populace in the theatre of operations, the insurgent will attempt to
undermine the support and will of the domestic populace of any nation contributing forces to the
campaign, such as those in a coalition. This will be a strategic centre of gravity and must be
considered in the planning by COIN forces and governments.
1'14. ROLE OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL LEAD
1. ln a conventional conflict, military activities are foremost, and their planning and
execution focuses on effects against the military forces of the other side. Politics takes a
supporting role.
15
See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Qperations. Within land operations, the concept of information operations
has been refined to consist of influence activities only, that is, those activities that seek first order effects on the
psychological plane.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 1-17
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
2. The focus of insurgent and counterinsurgent actions on the populace and its support
brings politics to the fore in a COIN campaign. The military will take, for the most part, a
supporting role. Whilst the insurgent will be unencumbered by rules of engagement and the
laws of war and will seek through any means to intimidate the populace and to exhaust its will,
counterinsurgents must consider all their military actions in light of the secondary political and
social effects, which will have the enduring influence in a successful campaign.
3. With the population and its support and will as a centre of gravity in the campaign, most
actions become political. Thus, political action becomes foremost in the campaign to the point
that politics or political action is an instrument of the campaign. lt must be so, for only political
action will address the circumstances that lead to the insurgency. The military may only be
required to provide a security framework in which other agencies and government organizations
may manoeuvre and work.
115. TRANSITION TO CONFLICT AND CAMPAIGN DURATION
1. During an insurgency, the transition from peace to open conflict will be gradual when
compared to the sudden eruption of high levels of violence in a conventional war. The insurgent
will generally have no desire for a quick transition to open levels of conflict. He will wish to build
up resources and to shape the environment through propaganda and other activities in order to
eventually justify the use of violence. He will wish to avoid an early reaction by government
counterinsurgent forces that could undermine preparations. Additionally, the insurgent will hope
to gain significant strength and influence before the population realizes the true danger posed.
2. Once initiated, an insurgency will be a protracted affair. lt will take time to build up
forces and resources, to gain support from the populace, to undermine the legitimacy and
credibility of the counterinsurgent forces and to defeat them, either militadly or through a lack of
support by the population. Additionally, the lack of a localized, obvious target against which to
apply combat power will preclude a rapid defeat of the insurgent's forces.
3. This works to the insurgent's advantage, as a protracted conflict will serve to wear down
the will of the populace to resist and the will of the domestic populations of any forces
contributing to the COIN campaign. The insurgent must simply continue to sow disorder and
insecurity, whilst the COIN forces and government must fight to provide security and maintain
the commitment of the populace.
4. The only means to quickly end an insurgency is to come to a political resolution that
resolves motivating grievances and eliminates the vast majority of public support for the
insurgent.
116. RELATIVE COSTS
L Simply put, an insurgency is cheap, a COIN campaign is expensive. lt takes little for the
insurgent to sow disorder, undermine the credibility of the government and attack the will of the
population. Disorder will create insecurity and economic disruption and thus hardship for the
population.
2. Government and COIN forces have the responsibility to counter this disorder. Failure to
do so will loose the support of the population. Security measures to prevent disorder are hugely
expensive in terms of resources, particularly manpower. Routes must be secured, vital points
protected and damaged infrastructure rebuilt. This responsibility to provide security to a
populace creates an incredibly high ratio of forces to insurgents, as many as 20 to one or
1-1 8 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntroduction to Counter-l nsurgency Operations
higher.l7 However, failure to provide security will force the populace to seek it from elsewhere,
perhaps the insurgents themselves.
3. Paradoxically, security measures themselves that seek to protect the populace also tend
to frustrate the populace and may inadvertently undermine their support. They cost the public
inconveniences and invasions of privacy. Thus, they must be applied carefully with the aim of
limiting disruption to the local populace. Additionally, the necessity of such security measures
must be carefully explained to the public, and they must be reduced at the earliest opportunity.
ldeally, they are conducted by a nation's regular constabulary forces. Where this is not possible
and military forces must provide the security, they should be passed to constabulary forces as
the security situation improves and the latter's capabilities increase.
4. For counterinsurgent forces, particularly those from supporting third nations, the cost in
manpower from deaths may have an exponential effect. Although the relative cost in manpower
from deaths will be relatively low compared to losses typical of major combat, the political costs
will be high in terms of undermining nationalwill.
5. The relative costs in an insurgency situation allow and encourages the insurgent to
conduct a protracted campaign. This fact must be clearly articulated to all populations
supporting the COIN campaign,
1''7. FLUIDITY AND RIGIDITY
1. An insurgent has few if any responsibilities. He may hide amongst the populace and
represent himself as part of it. His line of operations are therefore fluid, and his capabilities and
activities will ebb and flow over time. lnsurgents have no rules of engagement and no
expectations of moral limits to the application of their combat power. They may use whatever
means, including overt propaganda, to influence and intimidate populations.
2. COIN forces on the other have rigid limits to the conduct of operations. They have
onerous responsibilities to secure the populace and their infrastructure. They must abide by
rules of engagement and conduct activities with a view to maintaining their legitimacy and the
moral high ground. They must carefully coordinate the activities of a wide range of agencies.
Furthermore, COIN forces must refrain from using any forms of propaganda and must ensure
that their PSYOPS and public affairs activities portray only truthful messages in order to
maintain credibility and avoid being irrevocably discredited in the eyes of the populace.
118. IDEOLOGY
1. At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for
the insurgency. This core idea becomes formalized as an ideology. lt is a highly motivational
tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent aims and justify
their actions.
2. Although the ideology and narrative may be powerful motivators for the insurgent core
and for new recruits, they will unlikely attract and hold the vast majority of a populace who
simply seek the basic requirements of security and well-being. ln the long run, it may be the
side that provides the best security and standard of living that wins the support of the populace.
1t
There is generally an upper limit to this ratio. Once pervasive security is required beyond the ordinary capabilities
of a constabulary, subsequent increases In insurgent numbers do not require an equal increase in counterinsurgent
forces.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 'l-'19
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
3. lt is unlikely that the counterinsurgent forces will have a central ideology as a rallying
point. However, two key issues must be kept in mind. Regardless of the ideology touted by the
insurgents, COIN operations must be conducted in keeping with the cultural and societal norms
of the theatre population. Not to do so will undermine the credibility of, and support for, the
COIN forces.rs Secondly, the influence activities of COIN forces must seek to solve legitimate
grievances from which the narrative and ideology draw strength, advertise those solutions and
indicate and exploit inconsistencies in the ideology, particularly any false attempt by the
insurgents to claim a moral superiority.
119. ENDURING IRREGULAR NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY
lnsurgencies can, in the end, only be quelled with a political solution. Lahcen Daoudi, the
leader of a moderate lslamist North African political party noted that, "if you let a cat into
the house, you can caress it. lf you leave it in the mountains, it becomes savage." ln
essence, this articulates that if the host nation political leadership engages in some
political dialogue with potential or existing insurgent elements, there is a reasonable
chance that the legitimate grievances underlying the insurgent cause can be addressed in
a non-violent manner and progress made towards an enduring solution.
Moderate lslamist PJD Party poised to win parliamentary control, The Globe and Mail, 19 May
2007, p. A18.
1. Throughout the life of an insurgency, the insurgent will likely remain unconventional.
Even if the insurgent comes to the point of mustering regular formations, he will continue to
exploit his flexibility of population support, guerrilla tactics and lack of rules of engagement. He
will not surrender this advantage.
2. COIN forces for their part must avoid becoming frustrated by the irregular nature of
insurgent forces. lndeed, the insurgent will seek to exploit such frustration in order to cause the
COIN forces to over-react and create undesired effects amongst a populace.
3. The only true means of turning an insurgent into a conventional force is to engage the
insurgent and bring him into the conventional political process.
18
Having said this, the idea of cultural respect or sensitivity cannot allow the practice of moral relativism. The
sanction of obvious morally wrong practices by local security forces and government leaders will only exacerbate the
security situation, undermine credibility and fuel support for the insurgents, particularly if they claim moral superiority.
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CHAPTER 2
DESCRIBING AN INSURGENCY
SECTION 1
UNDERSTANDING AN INSURGENCY
201. INTRODUCTION
1. ln order to successfully combat an insurgency, it is vital to understand the term, why they
occur and the various forms that they may take. Additionally, it is just as important to
understand the particular situation and culture in which an insurgency occurs. Without
comprehension of the causes and characteristics unique to each insurgency, there will be little
hope of successfully countering it.
2. As discussed in Chapter 1, an insurgency may be described as follows: "a competition
involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an
established authority to achieve political change."le ln addition to the characteristic of violence,
or at least the threat of violence, insurgencies usually share a number of other characteristics,
including propaganda, subversion and links to criminal activities and organizations.
3. Rarely will insurgents seek to, or believe that they can, defeat a government and its
conventional military forces through military pressure alone. lnstead, they seek to outlast the
will of the other side and to influence and persuade the mass of the population to either support
their aims or to at least cease supporting the established government or recognized authority.
202. CAUSES OF AN INSURGENCY
1. An insurgency may spring from many causes; however, the classic insurgency usually
begins with the perception of oppression due to political, societal and economic grievances.
When these perceptions become sufficiently emotive, leaders may emerge who are able to
organize violent protest or resistance and influence people to risk imprisonment and even death
in order to combat the established order.
2. lt must be remembered by those at all levels of command that at the root of most
insurgencies are legitimate grievances. lndeed, a certain amount of empathy may be justified in
dealing with insurgents. These grievances will often be of a political, social, historic and/or
economic nature, and therefore their enduring resolution will require more than the application
of military capabilities: they will demand the involvement of other agencies in a comprehensive
approach. The failure to resolve these grievances will likely lead to support for an insurgency.
Thus, commanders at all levels, particularly the strategic and operational, must understand that
a successful outcome to a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign will demand upon achieving
enduring solutions to the grievances at the root of the insurgency.
203. THE AIM OF AN INSURGENCY
1. An insurgency will aim to gain the advantage of power within a given political context in
order to realize socio-economic, cultural, religious and geographic goals or some combination of
these. lt seeks to realize a change or re-order to the extant political structure and/or
relationships.
t'
Definition as developed by a counter-insurgency study group during United States Marine Corps (USMC)
JOINT URBAN WARRIOR 2005.
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2. ln terms of overarching concepts, it is a competition between two political options. This
is, however, a simplification of insurgencies as they develop within a society. There will always
be root causes that drive individuals, groups and their leaders to take up arms to seek change.
Whilst a core leadership may share the same grievances, they will exploit a wide array of local
injustices or grievances in order to recruit a wide body of support.
3. By their very nature of being illegal, secretive and disadvantaged, insurgencies will
become quickly tied to other groups and irregular activities within a society. Not only will
insurgencies undertake criminal activities to raise funds and disrupt society, they may well be
infiltrated and/or exploited by criminal groups who see the numbers and military power of an
insurgent force as a means of meeting criminal objectives. Additionally, social and religious
leaders will see the insurgency as a means of spreading their own ideologies, with which the
ordinary follower of the insurgency may have little knowledge or may not support.
4. All of these complicating factors must not be allowed to mask the fact insurgencies and
their supporters have political and social grievances, perceived but often real, at their root.
They may be national, regional or local grievances or a combination thereof. Leaders at all
levels must understand this and the fact that an insurgency will only be solved through enduring
solutions to those grievances.
204. COMPETITIVE ELEMENTS OVER POPULATIONS_STRATEGIC CENTRES
OF GRAVITY
1. Within a society, there exists an inter-related trilogy, consisting of the government, its
military and its population. Each element of the trilogy affects the other elements. During an
insurgency, a competition occurs over control of and support from the population. This can be
represented in the figure below. Both the established, legitimate, recognized government and
the insurgent leadership, offering an alternate form of government or political arrangement,
compete for the support of the populace or at least control over it.
2. ln influencing the populace, the insurgent elements have the advantage of being able to
directly influence the populace through its guerrilla or military forces. Due to the lack of
requirement to follow any law of armed conflict, the guerrilla forces can directly target and
intimidate the populace. The government's military forces will ideally follow the law of armed
conflict and can only indirectly influence the populace in a positive manner. They can best
serve the populace by providing security and by being seen as a legitimate, lawful and moral
military force supporting the rule of law and good governance. The government must provide
the long-term solutions to any cause of the insurgency in order to gain and maintain the suppod
of the populace.
3. ln such a situation of insurgency, the populace is a strategic centre of gravity. Success
is impossible without the support of the populace or at least the willingness to combat the
insurgency.
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Insurgent Leadership -
Alternate Authority Government
Guerrilla Forces Military
Figure 2-1: Competition over the Populace as a Strategic Gentre of Gravity2o
4. ln accordance with the elements of campaign planning, lines of operation must be
developed that approach this centre of gravity. Those elements of the populace that support the
COIN campaign must be treated as a friendly centre of gravity and thus defended. Those
elements of the populace that are neutral or support the insurgency must be engaged and
convinced to support the COIN campaign.
5. Should the government combating the insurgency receive support from another nation
(or coalition), then another populace-that of the contributing nation(s)-becomes a strategic
centre of gravity. There will be added competition to influence the will of the domestic
population of the supporting nation(s). Those fighting the insurgency will wish to maintain
support amongst the domestic populations forwhat will likely be a lengthy campaign. The
insurgents will seek to undermine the will of the domestic population of the supporting nation(s)
and in turn force a withdrawal of those nations from the campaign. The insurgents will do this
through directly targeting the forces of the contributing nation(s) or even the domestic
populace(s) themselves in order to undermine a significant proportion of national will. ln order
to counter this threat to the domestic population's will, the supporting government(s) must work
to explain the legitimacy of, and requirement for, the COIN campaign. This competition is
represented in figure 2-2.
20
This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN
WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.
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lnsurgent Leadership -
Alternate Authority Government SupportingNation(s)
lnsurgents seeking to undermine
the will of the supporting
populace.
Figure 2-2: Competition over the Strategic Centres of Gravity-Populations
6. Whilst this model has best application to traditional forms of state government combating
an insurgency, it must be applied with some flexibility to various situations. ln many of the
remote regions of the world where insurgencies occur, elements of the populace will be unlikely
to recognize a central government authority beyond that of their own village or clan elder. Their
support for the insurgency may wax and wane depending upon the situation at any given time.
For example, they may take up arms against the government or coalition forces in order to
avenge recent collateral damages or the death of a village member. Once their need for
retribution is satisfied, they may no longer actively support the insurgency. Notwithstanding the
complex nature of such circumstances, the model still indicates that the support of the overall
populace will be a strategic centre of gravity vital for long term success of the campaign.
Additionally, the insurgents, or at least the hardcore leadership, will continue to attack the will of
any supporting nation's populace in order to force that nation from the campaign.
7 . lt is fundamental that military and political leaders understand that a key aim of the
insurgency will be to attack the will of any population(s) supporting the counter-insurgency, both
domestically and internationally.
205. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN INSURGENCY_UNIQUE AND LOCAL ASPECTS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Each insurgency is unique and will therefore have its own set of characteristics.
Although insurgencies may share similar characteristics, each will have exceptional features.
For this reason, intelligence and planning templates suitable for major combat or conventional
campaigns have reduced utility during a COIN campaign.
2. ln conventional manoeuvre warfare, the known structure of military formations, evident
pattern of troop concentration in specific terrain and known doctrine often give very good
indication of intent. For example, the concentration of army-level bridging assets in a
mechanized division's area of responsibility fronting on a river, with two armoured divisions
moving into assembly areas, are very good indications of a deliberate assault river crossing.
Contrasting to this, an insurgent movement may well organize and initiate activities using a
cellular structure within which the cells do not conform to a pattern amongst or within
themselves. Their combat indicators of forthcoming action will differ greatly throughout the
organization and will continually alter. Nonetheless, although much more complex, the intent of
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insurgents based on structures and planned actions can be determined. For example,
sustained observation may reveal certain cells linked with specific activities such as information
operations, kidnapping or bank robbery. As a security measure, insurgents may alter or
transform cells for specific operations in a random manner.
3. The one key attribute that distinguishes insurgency from most other forms of conflict is
the insurgent's aim of forcing political change. Not all followers of an insurgency will necessarily
adhere to or even comprehend the political agenda of the insurgency. A good number of
participants may simply join through family, clan or other social links. Others may simply join to
seek retribution for other grievances on a personal level. Therefore, even the motivations and
ideology of insurgents will be difficult to view in a monolithic or holistic sense. The
characteristics of an insurgency will vary at the local level and must be viewed and assessed
from this context.
4. Although there will be no escaping the need to address the root causes and legitimate
grievances of the overarching insurgency, much can be gained through operations and activities
at the local level. These must firstly avoid driving more individuals to resort to violence (e.9., the
avoidance of collateral damages in offensive activities) and secondly address local concerns
and grievances that will influence local leaderships and their groups to at least not support the
insurgency but ideally support the established authority.
5. ln order to understand the context of the insurgency, intelligence collection and
assessment must include all elements of the environment and the commander's specific
battlespace rather than just a focus on the insurgent forces themselves. The establishment of a
broad knowledge base will include understanding of the political, military, economic, social
(including religion), informational and infrastructure (PMESll systems) aspects of the
environment. Historical and cultural aspects of environment must be understood, for they
influence all the aspects and local power structures. This knowledge base will allow the
commander to better understand the context, power structures, influences and motivations of
the insurgency as well as how best to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgency and its
goals.
206. TRANSITIONAL NATURE OF INSURGENCIES
1. lnsurgencies are more likely to occur in states with inherent social boundaries, whose
racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences disrupt national cohesion. lnsurgencies thrive
in states lacking efficient, stable or popular governments, conditions that are aggravated by
economic weakness, corruption orforeign agitation. Although various insurgency models exist,
few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification such as rural or urban, Leninist or Maoist.
lnstead, effective insurgents will take previous campaigns' lessons and adapt them to their own
particular needs. For example, in the 1990s, Hamas profited by the Palestine Liberation
Organization's (PLO's) loss due to Arafat's alignment with Saddam Hussein and his relatively
moderate policies toward lsrael. The Saudis cut off money to the PLO, which caused them to
lose influence. While not lessening its anti-lsrael stance, Hamas avoided supporting the lraqi
dictator. Palestinians began looking to Hamas for leadership. By the end of the 1990s, Hamas
was carrying out most of the terror activity in lsrael. lsraeli sources claimed that in the 16
months before May 2002, Hamas received $135 million (US) from Saudi Arabia to meet
expenses."
21
Loretta Napoleoni, Terror lncorporated Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Nefworks (New York: Seven Stories
Press, 2005), pp.72-73 passlm.
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207. ASSESSING THE INSURGENCY
1. Examining the complete range of characteristics will assist a commander and staff in
predicting the insurgents' campaign plan. Previous experience and historical research may
provide valuable guidance, however, the key to an appropriate response remains an objective
military estimate. Essentially, to support operational planning, the estimate will identify the
insurgency's causes, the extent of its internal and external support-including the basis of the
insurgents' appeal to the target population-the motivation and depth of local commitment and
the likely weapons and tactics COIN forces may face.
208. FORMS OF AN INSURGENCY
1. As established above, it is vital to military success for commanders and staffs to fully
understand the nature of the insurgency. Tothis end, six mainforms of insurgency have been
defined, which are listed in Figure 2-3:
22
For example, The US Senate Nuclear Proliferation Survey assesses a 70 percent chance of nuclear/radiological
terrorism within the decade. Online http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf. Accessed 16 July 2005.
lntent is to destroy the system. There are normally no
plans to replace any form of government with
another system. The most potentially dangerous
form of insurrection is that of the anarchist group
which sets out to eliminate all political structures and
the social fabric associated with them.
Being very secretive, such groups remain
small and lacking public support. Given the
rising threat of terrorism based on
weapons of mass destruction, their
potential destructiveness to society cannot
be overlooked."
Seeks to impose centrally controlled structures and
institutions by mobilizing the people (masses) to
provide equality in the distribution of all state
resources.
This has been seen recently in two
variants: Communist (Malaya, Vietnam)
and contained in Ba'athist ideology.
Seeks to revert back to national/original values
rooted in the previous, often mythologized, history of
the region.
This type of insurgency often incites similar
movements elsewhere. Seen recently as
lslamic Jihad (Egypt) or Hezbollah
(Lebanon).
Seeks to remove themselves, and the area in which
they live, from the control of the remainder of the
state.
The form of political system adopted by
successful insurgents varies enormously.
Amongst the examples are the Tamils
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka.
This form of insurgency is similar to the separatist
type but more moderate, in that insurgent groups
fight for political, economic or social reforms and
possibly some form of autonomy, without
dramatically altering the political status quo.
Some insurgencies in Central and South
America that have sought reforms to
corrupt governments.
Figure 2-3: Forms of an lnsurgency
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Describing an lnsurgency
sEcTroN 2
SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF AN INSURGENCY
209. INSURGENTSTRATEGIES
1. lnsurgent leaders are generallywell informed, astute and will probably studythe lessons
of previous campaigns of insurgency. Globally, because popular insurgent strategies continue
to provide inspiration and assistance to diverse groups, the professional development of
intelligence and operations staff should include study in this area. The study and analysis of an
insurgent's strategic approach has practical application, including the production of doctrinal
COIN guidance. Five broad strategic approaches are suggested below, the elements of which
may be combined by the insurgents:
Conspiratorial Strategy. The oldest and least complicated of the strategies
features small cells attempting to release the energy of a disaffected society,
generating a "spontaneous" uprising by means of bold armed action. Designed
to operate in an urban environment where information may be quickly passed
and key installations exist, this was the strategy used by the Bolsheviks in 1917.
Typically, key points are seized before a decisive strike is made against the
governing regime. ln its modern variant, insurgents seek to garner control over
and exploit media coverage.
Protracted Popular War. This Maoist strategy sees three "phases": strategic
defence (organization), strategic equilibrium (guerrilla warfare), and strategic
offensive (open battle) culminating in the seizure of political power. lts tactics
involve a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, with the former
always predominating. Most applicable in rural, peasant-based environments
where government control is weak or non-existent, this strategy assumes that the
cause will attract ever-increasing numbers of supporters, allowing the insurgent
to expand outwardly from base areas. Favourable terrain in which to hide and
trade for time is essential for a protracted campaign, and therefore urbanization
may provide a suitable space to foster such insurrections.
Urban lnsurgency. ln its pure form, this strategy involves the application of
organized crime and terrorism in a systematic and ruthless manner as a catalyst
for political change. The urban environment provides a dense populace for
exploitation and intimidation. This strategy, more than the others, aims to
provoke a repressive military response that will alienate a volatile mass of the
urban poor and move them to revolt. lt relies primarily upon ruthless terror
tactics augmented by media manipulation to generate an air of panic, erode the
morale of the politicians, the administrators and the judiciary and the police and
the army with the aim of inducing a climate of collapse. The insurgency
anticipates that the government will then capitulate or be provoked into adopting
repressive measures and, above all, causing bloodshed. Against such
repression, the insurgent appears as the peoples' protector.
Military Focus. Also known as the foco theory, this strategy places political
action second to military victory, assuming the population willflock to the winning
side. Ascribed to the Cuban leadership (Fidel and Raul Castro and Che
Guevara), this strategy works only when the government is weak, discredited and
lacks reliable, effective, armed forces. Conventional military operations are not
the only option undertaken within this strategy. When a sharp asymmetric
balance of military force favours the establishment forces, immediate action may
a.
b.
c.
d.
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occur in the form of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. lt should be noted that other
types of insurgent groups will initiate their campaign with a well-publicized
military success so as to gain popular support but then undertake a different,
more political, strategy.
e. Liberation Strategy. Whilst many insurgencies may be focused on national
aims and the creation of a new state, some insurgencies may simply aim at the
expulsion of what is viewed as an occupying authority ornation(s). ln peace
support or stabilizing operations conducted by a coalition, even with an
internationally sanctioned mandate, a disaffected element (often one that has lost
power) may resort to an insurgency strategy in order to disrupt the efforts to
stabilize or cement the new political order.
2. lt must be remembered that insurgencies will adopt a number of strategies in order to
achieve their aims. They will combine the concepts listed above in order to best meet the
demands of the situation and to progress their goals.
210. BASIC TENETS OF AN INSURGENCY
1. All successful insurgents adhere to certain basic tenets. Naturally, such principles must
be applied rationally within the existing social and political circumstances when assessing an
insurgency. These tenets are:
a. a suitable cause;
b. leadership;
c. popular support;
d. organization and actors; and
e. a narrative.
211. MOTIVATING CENTRAL CAUSE
1. ln most insurgencies there will be legitimate grievances that may result in a central,
motivating cause to the insurgency or may be exploited by the insurgent leaders so that a lack
of grievance resolution suppofts the cited cause. As mentioned previously, the definition of "the
cause" is crucial as a rallying point. The cause must appeal to all levels, from supporting the
philosophic ideals of the strategic leadership to the tactical motivation of the rank and file. The
cause is articulated in the motivating idea and resulting narrative (see below). The sooner that
legitimate grievances are addressed by the authorities, the better will be the ability to influence
the populace to not support the insurgency.
212. LEADERSHIP
1. An insurrection often gives rise to a charismatic leader, who inspires followers, converts
the uncommitted and commands the respect or fear of those who normally support the
government. Often throughout history, such leaders have become cult figures whose very
name becomes a rallying point. Examples include Lenin, General Franco and Che Guevara.
They may even become moral centres of gravity.
2. lnsurgencies require leaders able to determine political/strategic aims as well as the
enabling tactics. While a strong leader is required in the early stages of an insurgency, when it
is necessary to enforce one's leadership against contending rivals or if the cause seems weak
or divisive, when the cause is sound, the leader need not be so charismatic.
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3. The value to removing or killing an insurgent leader must be carefully considered. The
costs involved and the undesired secondary effects (collateral damages, etc.) may outweigh the
tactical and operational advantages gained. lndeed, a powerful and charismatic leader open to
a negotiated settlement may be of more value alive, in terms of reaching an enduring end-state.
2''3. POPULAR SUPPORT
1. The cause and the leader must appeal to as wide an audience as possible. Those who
are uncommitted or hostile to the cause must be persuaded or coerced to join the cause. Some
may have to be killed to persuade the others. Popular support is important from a political point
of view and essential to the provision of intelligence, logistics and to support a protective
security screen around the insurgents' clandestine organization. The need to garner a decisive
level of popular support, or at least pervasive acquiescence, is necessary for eventual success.
214. ORGANIZATION AND ACTORS
1. lnsurgent groups often possess a cellular organization that both enhances force
protection and enables decentralized command and control. The cellular organization will limit
the numbers of personnel who know the actual names and locations of key actors of the
insurgency but still allows directives to be carried out. Thus if one or even multiple cells are
compromised, the threat to the overall organization is limited. The cell structure will extend to all
of the active supporters of an insurgency, including facilitators outside of the actual geographic
region where the insurgency is occurring. Although the cell structure is a very old method of
organization, modern information technologies increase its effectiveness by facilitating
networking and enhancing command and control in high risk environments.
2. Within an insurgent organization, the primary classes of actors are the top leaders,
lieutenants, foot soldiers and recruiters.23 Ancillary classes of actors include external suppliers
and facilitators, financiers, heads of supportive states, supportive population segments and
sources of moral and religious support.'o The most important of these are the committed actors
and the sympathizers that may reside in either the primary or ancillary classes of actors.2s
3. Alongside the primary and ancillary actors are people who play a more ephemeral or
transient role. There is much evidence from recent conflicts, including lraq and Afghanistan,
that insurgent and terrorist groups have paid, non-ideologically committed civilians to support
operations. ln particular, this has included substantial remuneration for such things as sniping,
placing improvised explosive devices and other booby traps, launching rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs) and conducting suicide attacks. lnsurgent groups will exploit unemployed or
disaffected members of the populace by offering remuneration that may in fact represent the
only viable means of supporting families. As well, the old maxim of "the enemy of my enemy is
my friend" will likely hold true in any conflict where multiple, disparate actors are involved,
particularly in societies where tribal affiliations are stronger than any national identity. The
support of all of these actors is transitory because of the lack of ideological ties to the
23
Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, Deterrence & lnfluence in Counterterrodsm (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002),
p" 13-15, figure 3.3.
2a
Loc cit.
25
Fred Burton, "The Psychological Battlefield," Stratfor Intettigence Repoft,10 August 2005.
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyld=253467 . Accessed 13 June 2006.
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insurgency. As such they represent an ideal target for influence activities to dissuade behaviour
at odds with host nation government and campaign objectives.
4. Many, particularly the younger members, willjoin an insurgency out of peer pressure, a
willingness to gain a sense of belonging or a sense of adventure. lnsurgents will actively recruit
based on these desires. The popularity of such choices is increased when unemployment rates
are high. Again, such non-ideologically committed individuals are key targets for influence
activities that seek to dissuade support for the insurgency.
215. NARRATIVE
1. At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for
the insurgency. lt motivates the primary and ancillary actors and allows the idea to be
formalized as an ideology. The narrative will be a plausible story that illustrates real or
perceived historical or extant injustices and grievances. The narrative will present a vision,
mission, strategy and goals that purport to resolve and redress those injustices. lt is a highly
motivational tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent
aims.
2. ln combination with actions, the narrative is used to attract devotees and supporters,26
The narrative willjustify insurgent actions and may advocate for the use of violence to achieve
political goals and eventually justify actions, even atrocities. Furthermore, it will be used to paint
the existing authority and power structures as the logical result of the injustices that are
described through the narrative. Similar to propaganda, most narratives will possess, at the
very least, a kernel of truth but may also include substantial amounts of mythology and may
illustrate a utopian ideal as an ultimate goal. The narrative may be published as a manifesto,
religious edict or in some other form, or it may simply be passed verbally.
3. Narratives underpin much of human thought. Narratives (or stories) influence the ability
to recall and understand history, motivate people to act, temper emotional reactions to events,
cue certain heuristics and biases, structure problem-solving capabilities and ultimately perhaps
even constitute individual identity.2T Narratives form not only the basis of insurgent
organizations but also of terrorist groups, national identities, culture, society and a host of other
things to which humans often cling in order to develop feelings of inclusiveness and identity.2s
4. Sub-narratives also form a substantial part of the overall narrative. This is true for all
individuals and groups. A further broad example is religion. All religions possess substantial
narratives and, indeed, the devotion of followers is predicated on faith in what is in essence a
story and, for branches and sects, the belief in sub-narratives that are offshoots of the primary
story. A narrative is not necessarily untrue, but neither can it be unquestioningly accepted as
completely factual.
26
Brigadier (ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measure," PhD. Diss.
(London: King's College, University of London, March 1979), p.307. Brigadier Tugwell, who continues to hold
complete copyright on his dissertation, graciously granted permission to quote from his work during a telephone
conversation on 13 February 2007.
tt
William Casebeer and James Russell, "storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 'Counter-Narrative
Strategy,"' Strategic /nsrghfs, Volume lV, No,3, March 2005 (Monterey CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict,
US Naval Postgraduate School). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.millsil2}l5lmarlcasebeerMar05.pdf Accessed
November 2006.
" Walid Phares, The War of tdeas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. xiii.
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Narratives exist in all situations and cultures. For example, Canadian narratives and
sub-narratives include, true or not, such notions as hockey as Canada's national sport,
Canada as a nation of peacekeepers, and the dollar "loonle" coin embedded in the ice
at the Salt Lake City Olympics.
5. The power of the narrative cannot be underestimated. lnformation operations (influence
activities) must work to counter the insurgent narrative and its supporting propaganda.
Countering the narrative will require the symbiotic use of words and deeds that seek to redress
the grievances exploited by the insurgent narrative while promoting the desired narrative of the
host-nation government and coalition.
216. CONTEXT OF AN INSURGENCY
1. Beyond the five basic tenets listed above, it is essentialfor a COIN campaign to consider
and comprehend the insurgency's context. Circumstances will often dictate what an insurgent
can and cannot do. For example, several uprisings that slavishly copied revolts in Russia or
Cuba were dismalfailures. The Spartacist revolts in Germany (1919)and Che Guevarra's
attempts in Bolivia (1967)failed given that ideologically based campaign plans did notfitthe
socio-political context of either environment. Nonetheless, a population that is dissatisfied with
its conditions in general and holds the perception of a weak government can provide fertile soil
for a skilled insurrectionary leader with a popular cause and competent organizational support.
2. A well led and organized insurrection may, if the government commands a wide
measure of suppotl and can rely on its security forces, devolve into a protracted competition of
attrition. Such an attrition campaign may still succeed if the insurgency can gradually erode the
will of the government's supporters at home and persuade public opinion amongst its foreign
allies that the government's cause is hopeless or too expensive to support.
217. FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSURGENCY
1. The factors affecting an insurgency can be as important as the tenets of the insurgency
itself and will contribute significantly to the end results if carefully applied. The factors are:
a. Protracted War. Although a weak government may fall quite quickly to a well-
organized rebellion, or even overnight to a coup d'6tat, a strong government may
only be defeated by a war of attrition. Time is on the side of the insurgent. ln a
rural-based insurgency, the territory supports a gradual occupation of a country,
as demonstrated by Mao Tse-tung in China. While the urban guerrilla's
operating environment is not so permissive, its inability to occupy territory can be
partially overcome by establishing "no-go" areas within cities. Here the strategy
is based not on an outright overall military victory but upon creating war-
weariness, emphasizing economic privation and demonstrating the inability of the
government to provide security.
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b. Ghoice of Terrain. Given the relative weakness, in relation to the government's
standing army, an insurgent force is compelled to make best use of terrain.
Without the ability to seize and hold ground or to quickly achieve victory, space
and time became weapons rather than goals for the insurgent,2e As such,
insurgents utilize the terrain to their advantage. This terrain will include
populations in which to take cover. They will make best strategic use of space
and attack their enemy in their rear or echelon areas.
...the guerrilla's greafesf advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself
has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants." To tum this
defeat into a victory, the counter-insurgent must recognize that "this total dependence upon
terrain and population is also the guerrilla's weak point.
Source: Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of COIN (New York: Praeger, 1964), cited in Robeft R.
Tomes, "Relearning CO\N Warfare,"Parameters (Spring 2004), pp. 18-19.
lntelligence. The insurgency threat picture is vastly more complicated than most
other forms of conflict given the wide range of elements, influences and factors
involved in an insurgency. Unlike conventionalwarfare, where mass fires and
manoeuvre may potentially substitute for comprehensive intelligence and
planning, neither the insurgency nor COIN can afford that luxury. For the
insurgent, the best source of intelligence is a sympathiser working for the
government, preferably in security-related employment. The media may also
contri bute to the insu rgent's information-gatheri ng process.
Establishment of an Alternative Society. The aim of imposing an alternative
view of society is common to all insurgent organizations. These viewpoints may
be motivated by nationalist, religious or political beliefs. While nationalism
presents an emotive call of patriotism to replace a government portrayed as
ruling against the country's interests, religious viewpoints promote a remoulding
of society along religious, dogmatic lines. Political motivations, regardless of the
supporting ideologies, are enhanced by a simple desire for power. Support for
these alternative perspectives will not be solely internal, as external support may
be received from sympathetic nations.
External Support^ lnsurgencies are seldom successful at obtaining their goals
without external assistance. As such, outside support of both foreign populations
and governments is enlisted for the insurgency. Sympathetic governments may
assist the insurgent openly, through providing diplomatic support, or
clandestinely, by supplying weapons and training assistance. Even if a
government is unwilling to lend support to the insurgents, groups may appeal
directly to the foreign populace, notably ex-patriot communities, through the use
of propaganda aimed to appeal to popular sentiment. The resulting sympathetic
population may pressure their home government, engage in protests or sign
petitions, all increasing the insurgent support base. The insurgent can then use
these overseas actions as propaganda to increase local support. Sympathetic
external populations often also prove to be a good source of financial support.
t'
John Shy and Thomas W Collier, "Revolutionary \Nar," Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pg.839.
c.
d.
e.
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Describing an lnsurgency
f. Concurrent Activity. The leadership will attempt to wage the insurgency on
political, economic, propaganda and military fronts simultaneously. This ability to
simultaneously conduct its range of activities enhances the effectiveness of the
insurgents' overall operations, thus creating a synergy. This has the additional
effect of heightening the public's perception of its cohesion and capability. As
such, the insurgency that looks and acts like a competent parallel state,
increases its ability to become the state.
218. WEAKNESSES AND ASPECTS OF INSURGENT VULNERABILITY
1. There are usually many potential weak points within an insurgency. These are
particularly apparent in the early days of a campaign, when the insurgency is vulnerable to
some form of pre-emption, dislocation and disruption by COIN forces:
a. Secrecy. Any group planning to use force and violence to prosecute its aims
must adopt a secretive, conspiratorial approach to its planning and actions.
While such discretion may add a degree of glamour and attractiveness to
potential recruits, this secrecy can quickly become counterproductive. Adverse
implications include affecting the necessary freedom of action, lowering
confidence in similar insurgent groups and readily lead to serious
misunderstanding within the organization. Consequently, a balance must be
struck between a too secretive and clandestine approach to insurgency actions
and the need to avoid undue attention from the authorities or rival groups. Some
insurgencies have attempted to minimize this difficulty by creating a more public,
political arm. For example, there is the lrish Republican Army's (lRA's)
associated political arm, Sinn Fein.
b. Gaining Support. Gaining popular support for the cause can be a difficult and
sensitive stage in the evolution of an insurgency. lf the publicly accepted reason
for rising against the government has appeal, it would seem that the insurgency
would therefore thrive. Unfortunately, various groupings and factions may hold
varying opinions, requiring different techniques, including possible compromises
and/or intimidation, to gain their support. lndifference, antipathy and likely fear of
government reprisal also have to be overcome. Publicity dramatically improves
the prospect of gaining popular support, as even bad publicity can advertise that
a group is resisting, consequently expanding recruitment.
c. Secure Operating Base. lnsurgents require a secure base from which to
operate. Selecting a location distant from activity centres may be potentially
more secure for the insurgents but may also put them out of touch with the
population and make them vulnerable to isolation. Alternatively, close proximity
likely eases the security force tasks of surveillance, infiltration and destruction.
Establishing an operating base in a border region can often provide temporary, or
perhaps permanent, headquarters beyond the reach and authority of the state.
d. Funding. All insurgencies require some degree of funding in order to acquire the
staples of conflict: weapons, ammunition, food and medicines. Lack of sufficient
funds can limit the scope of an insurgency, inhibiting its prospects for success.
Accordingly, state authorities must utilize this weakness to their advantage,
aiming to dismantle the insurgents'funding mechanisms. Lacking a friendly
nation or individuals to back the insurgency, funding can be found in criminal
activities such as narcotics trafficking, robberies and extortion. While the illegal
drug trade in particular has proven to be a more enduring source of income than
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bank robberies, it brings the movement into contact with unreliable, vulnerable
groups who can attract undue attention from the authorities. lnsurgencies will
attempt to gain income from low-profile, high turn-over criminal sources such as
movie and music pirating. External support may also have a political price
affecting the overall aim of an insurgency.
e. The Problem of Ghanging Aims. Changing aims is not a substantial problem at
an insurgency's onset but has a potentially damaging effect once an insurgency
has been operational for some time. lndeed, changing aims is common when an
insurgency is still coalescing. lnitial operations may change the outlook of a
number of insurgents, with some questioning the price of the overall aim
particularly if security force successes spread doubt about the cause or the
insurgency's leadership. A seemingly generous compromise offered by the state
to the insurgents could prove divisive; forcing insurgent leaders to apply ruthless
measures to ensure that unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims can
be further problematic given the aforementioned secrecy, which may spark
misunderstanding and suspicion throughout the insurgency.
f. Setting the Pace. Controlling the pace and timing of operations is vital to the
success of any campaign. Given that insurgents can control the start of
operations and have some measure of control over subsequent activity, it is
surprising to note that many insurgencies have failed to capitalize on
opportunities or have allowed the pace of events and scope of activities to be
dictated by the state authorities. Once momentum is lost, the strategic initiative
returns to the state, leaving the insurgency exposed.
g. lnformers. While informers have sometimes been infiltrated into insurgent cells,
it is far more common to achieve success by persuading the insurgent to become
an informer. This is someone already in the organization, or is a link between
clandestine cells and their public accomplices, such as the couriers or suppliers.
There is nothing more demoralizing to the insurgents than to fear that one of their
trusted comrades is giving information to the government. lnsurgent leaders will
try to pre-empt the recruitment of informers by ruthless exemplary punishments.
h. Lack of Moral Authority. Given its use of violence and the fact that an
insurgency will normally be related to and involved with criminal elements, its
leadership will be vulnerable to attacks on its moral authority and claimed
superiority. lts susceptibility to this will depend upon the culture in which the
insurgency occurs. This lack of moral authority must be pointed out to the
supporting and neutral populace. Furthermore, to exploit this weakness, COIN
forces must not only conduct their campaign from a standpoint of moral
superiority, in terms of conduct and application of the law of armed conflict, but
must advertize this fact through public affairs and psychological operations. This
will help to undermine the insurgency and its supporting narrative.
sEcTtoN 3
INSURGENT METHODS AND END.STATES
219. INSURGENT TACTICS
1. The deliberate promotion of adverse publicity against government agencies and security
forces is essential and complementary. This aspect has proven more effective with the growing
trend towards political groups using civil liberties and human rights to lower the tolerance of the
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Describing an lnsurgency
public for harsher COIN measures. The insurgents' claim to legitimacy is based on their
declared ability to improve the position of the oppressed. The essentially violent nature of
insurgencies moves in two concurrent complementary paths, one destructive and the other
constructive, as follows:
a. Destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the established order and
creating a climate of collapse in the states' authority. Destructive activities
include subversion, sabotage of the economic framework, terrorism and guerrilla
activity and large-scale combat operations.
b. The constructive effort, meanwhile, aims at creating an organization to
subsequently replace the established order at a suitable moment.
2. Subversion. Subversive activity attempts to undermine the political, economic and
military strength of a state without resorting to the use of force by the insurgent. Such activity
may provoke violent countermeasures, to be denounced as an overreaction by the authorities,
thus discrediting the government. As such, subversion probably poses the most difficult and
dangerous threat to a government engaged in a COIN campaign, Subversion takes many
forms, such as penetrating existing political parties and organizations and developing front
organizations that can have the appearance of challenging and defying the authority of
government. An insurgency will seek to win supporters within the government, especially the
security elements, in order to discern future plans and possibly any other economic and
financial information. These types of information are all useful for an insurgency to exploit as
required, particularly in the early days of an insurrection.
3. lnsurgent lnformation Operations. Propaganda is a key element of subversion. lt
includes publishing information detrimental to the government or security forces and the
spreading of rumours, whether true or false, designed to undermine trust and confidence in the
government.
4. Passive Resistance. Depending upon the society in which the insurgency is operating,
passive resistance may be a useful tactic. lt is more effective in liberal societies, given an
authoritarian regime's ability to crush such open dissent. Examples of passive resistance
include withdrawing labour from public services, obstructing the law or sit-ins in public places.
These measures to gain political change do not alone indicate an insurgency, which by
definition uses violence to acquire change. However, insurgent leaders will encourage passive
measures on behalf of the larger population in order to undermine the authority of the
government and disrupt civil society through agitation. They may also seek to provoke violence
during public demonstrations in hopes of causing an overreaction by the government forces and
creating another claim to injustice and a sense of alienation and frustration amongst the
populace.
5. Sabotage. Sabotage is disruptive activity that furthers the insurgents' interests. lt may
be active or passive.
a. Active sabotage sees insurgents set out to disrupt important services, functions
or industrial processes by violent means. Targets may be selected at random for
political or economic impact, or they may fit into a wider tactical plan with the aim
of increasing general confusion and tying down troops in the static defence of
installations. Suitable targets include bridges, roads, telephone lines or
dispersed military logistics sites. Targets whose destruction might cause mass
unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are in general
avoided.
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b. Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption by
deliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target can be
industry, public services, supplies or troops, where action is usually planned on a
wide scale through political front organizations. Data sabotage is facilitated by
the universality of computers in government, business and industrial control
systems. These can be carried out through cyber attack or by having an
insurgent or sympathizer physically damage the system.
6. The Tactic of Terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. Despite the attention that it receives,
terrorism is a tactical level undertaking; however, one that is normally used to influence the
situation at the operational and strategic levels. lt may be used by individuals, groups or states
as paft of a larger operational objective and strategy to intimidate and coerce governments,
societies or elements of each. Terrorist actions call attention to the perpetrators and their
causes and may help them win support of potential sympathizers. Terrorism is used to strike at
civilian targets which normally have limited means of self-defence.to The more spectacular or
outrageous the action, the louder it speaks. Terrorist attacks seek to undermine the legitimacy
of the indigenous government and security forces by demonstrating their inability to counter the
threat and prevent attacks. Thus, the key effect of terrorist attacks is psychological, in that they
seek to shape the perceptions of various audiences, locally, regionally and internationally. The
physical damages caused are simply the means of sending their message. Through the
resulting psychological impact, terrorist attacks seek to force policy changes or specific actions
by the effected governments. For example, at a tactical and operational level, they may seek to
cause an over-reaction by local security forces, thereby giving testimony to claims of
discrimination and bias against the perpetrating group. At the operational and strategic levels
they may seek to force a nation to withdraw its forces from a coalition campaign. Terror tactics
may include assassinations, bombings, hostagetakings, kidnappings, hijackings and sabotage.
The method chosen will try to exploit a perceived weakness within the adversary or to attack
what was thought to be a strength in order to heighten the psychological effect. Terror tactics
evolve with new technology and the availability of weapon systems, and seek to exploit
globalization, often through international criminal organizations. The speed of global
communications has supported and enhanced the messages that the perpetrators send through
their use of terror. These changes have served to strengthen the traditional network-based cell
structures favoured by organizations that use terror. This in turn reduces the efficacy of certain
traditionalcountermeasures, such as leadership targeting, and makes penetration more difficult.
ln short, recent developments in the nature of global communications have made terror a
cheaper and more effective tool than in the past.31
30
Bard O'Neill, lnsurgency and Terrorism: From Revolutionary to Apocatypse,2nd ed., Revised.
Washington DC: Potomac,2005. p. 33.
tt
Allan Castle, Trans-nationalOrganized Crime and International Security, University of British Columbia
lnstitute of lnternational Relations Working Paper No. 19, November 1997 .
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Terrorism is a tactic that may be used by a number of irregular threats including
insurgents. The importance of terrorist acts is not in the act itself, but in the message
that it sends to various audiences. lt is fundamentalto the propaganda campaigns of
many insurgent groups. One expert on insurgent propaganda, retired British Brigadier
and academic Maurice Tugwell noted the following regarding the messages that
terrorist acts can transmit to various audiences:
"The nineteenth century anarchist Bakunin coined the phrase, 'Propaganda of the
deed' to describe an act, usually of terrorist violence, committed more for its indirect
effect upon public opinion than for any direct benefit arising from the act itself. Mr. Paul
Wilkinson has suggested that "the terrorist by his act of violence is telling the world,
'We are here. Look what we can do. Heed us or there is worse to come.' We may
comment that this message is the one intended for'enemies' and that the same act is
telling 'neutrals' and 'friends' other things. To 'neutrals' it may say: 'We are here. See
how the weak oppose the oppressors. Obviously our cause has justice on its side.
Support us.' And to 'friends' it may impart this message: 'We are here. Look how the
mighty forces of the oppression fade before our blows. There is no cause to fear them.
Victory will be ours. Join."'
Every enemy action, even a seemingly irrational one such as a terrorist bombing of a
crowded market, is conveying a message, often at the strategic level, to various
audiences and is part of a larger propaganda campaign.
Source: Brigadier (ret'd) Maurice Arthur John Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-
Measures," Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, London: King's College, University of London, March 1979,
p.22.
lnsurgents who employ terrorism willjustifu its use in a number of ways. Among other
ways, terrorist acts will be justified as legitimate by portraying them as altruistic
because the act is supposedly for a greater good and that it is the only weapon
available given the enemy's superior military capabilities. Historically terrorists have
sought to distinguish themselves from common criminals because of adherence to and
support for whai they believe to be a legitimate cause and that those who die
committing such acts are martyrs who'll be remembered for their sacrifice. These
justifications have been used by groups throughout history, including lrish nationalists,
Jewish settlers desiring the creation of a Jewish state, Sri Lankan separatists, and
extremist lslamists of both the Sunni and Shia sects.
Source: Bruce Hoffman lnside Terrorism, rev. ed. NY: Columbia University Press,2006; Roger
Trinquier, Modern Waffare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport CT: Praeger
Security lnternational, 1964, 2006; Bard O'Neill, lnsurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to
Apocatypse,2no ed, rev., Washington D.C.: Potomac,2005.
7. Fund Raising. The insurgents' operating budget for weapons, medicines, political
bribes and other requirements will be substantial. An indicator of a developing insurgency
should therefore include fund-raising efforts. ln the early stages, this will probably be covert and
criminal, such as bank robbery, Subsequently, the political organization within the insurgency
will take on the task of extracting aid from well-intentioned, charitable and philanthropic
organizations and from sympathizers abroad. More violent methods may include, the extorting
of ransom from individuals (kidnapping) or from governments (hijacking) and perhaps the
enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population. Finally, as has been
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
demonstrated by the PLO and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a
mature insurgency can develop a parallel socioeconomic order, which may attain a level of
political legitimacy greater than that enjoyed by the legal government in the eyes of the local
populace.
Some criminal organizations blur the line between lawbreaking and insurgency. For
example, the Calidrug cartelfunds an insurgency in ColombiJthrough nJrco-ierrorism
that has spin-off economic benefits to the local growers of the coca plants. The sowing
of this general disorder helps allow freedom to operate for the drug cartel.
Source; Loretta Napoleoni,Terror lncorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New
York: Seven Sfories Press, 2005). See especla//y Chapter 2 '"The Macroeconomics of Terror," pp. 13-29
and Chapter 3 "The Privatization of Terror," pp. 31-48. Napoleoni examines and catalogues the methods
and effects of various insurgent movements' linkages, if not outright involvement, with narcotics trade and
other forms of parallel socioeconomic structure and activity.
8. Weapons and Equipment. lnsurgents tend to use basic weapons whose essentials
have not changed very much since the 1940s. Beyond simple availability, selection criteria are
based upon compactness, lethality and simple operating procedures. The following should be
noted:
Personalweapons are principally pistols, carbines, rifles and weapons with a
high rate of fire. ln recent times, weapons and bombs have been miniaturized,
explosives harder to detect and more lethal, accompanied by a dramatic increase
in improvised explosive devices (lEDs).
lnsurgents generally have access to a complete range of combat support
weapons. Sniper rifles utilizing armour-piercing ammunition are being seen more
frequently. lmprovised mortars are easy to make, although they are usually
inaccurate and unreliable. Most require some form of "flat bed" for
transportation. Acquisition of military mortars and ammunition significantly
increase the range and lethality of such weapons. Rocket-propelled grenade
(RPG)-type anti-armour weapons proliferate. Portable air defence missiles pose
a significant threat. The mere possession of air defence weapons, particularly
man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), by an insurgent group will
disrupt the government use of helicopters.
Explosives in various forms are the favoured weapons of insurgents. Military
mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, are frequently utilized by insurgents.
They have the dual purpose of hampering COIN forces' efforts while terrifying the
local population. lnsurgency forces are increasingly using lEDs. The
effectiveness of these weapons is well known, and expertise in their manufacture
and handling is often of a high order. Sophisticated initiating devices, anti-lifting
mechanisms and innovative tactical placement (including secondary lEDs) are
becoming common. Furthermore, any incident, bomb or hoax, can be used as a
bait to kill security forces and disposal specialists. Recently, the suicide bomber
has emerged as a particularly effective weapon. The suicide bomber is in effect
a precision weapon that also demonstrates the degree of the insurgent's
commitment.
Sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)weapons will
likely remain beyond the capability of insurgent groups. Since the release of
Sarin gas in Tokyo subway in 1995, the potentialfor insurgents to use crude
a.
b.
c.
d.
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Describing an lnsurgency
CBRN devices must be considered. Such a capability is to be expected only in
an insurgent group already employing terrorist tactics.
220. INSURGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT
1. Rural insurgencies continue as the allocation of land, water or other scarce mineral
resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, pafiicularly in areas where there
is a burgeoning population and a malevolent government. lnsurgent bases will be established
in remote areas, often in difficult terrain (mountains, jungles, forest, etc.), from which attacks
may be launched over as wide an area as possible to disperse scarce security resources.
These actions may be mistaken for banditry. Under the pretext of protection against such
banditry, isolated villages will be prepared for defence, including the discreet clearance of fields
of fire. Other indications that a campaign is developing include hoarding supplies, training and
arming of village "self-defence" groups and increased evidence of local intimidation and
coercion.
2. ln its early stages, a rural insurgency relies upon small bands assembling for a limited
attack, probably against a remote and inadequately guarded target. As the movement grows to
the stage where it can command significant support from the local population, so its objectives
will become more ambitious and larger forces will be necessary. The relative strength of
insurgent bands will always place them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the security forces, and they
will seek to avoid a pitched battle. Their tactics are therefore based on mobility and surprise,
generally using ambushes and explosives.
3. Rural populations are vulnerable to terrorism and intimidation, and very quickly a feeling
of insecurity can spread throughout a whole region. Such intimidation is common within rural
insurgencies because of the population's relative physical isolation from the protective security
forces and the government's presence.
4. Ambush is the most widely used insurgent tactic. lt is particularly effective against road
movement, especially when the ground makes it difficult for the government forces to move off
the road and take cover, ln addition to sniping and massed fires ambushes, there is a growing
trend in ambushes featuring lEDs and suicide bombing.
221. INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
1. With the degree of urbanization increasing globally, encountering urban insurgencies will
likely expand. Urban populations are vulnerable, providing relatively small insurgent forces with
the opportunity to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity sufficient to discredit the
government.
2. ln the urban environment, insurgents do not normally plan to occupy and control
territory, although they may seize small areas for a limited time to establish a presence from
which they can subsequently receive support. Lacking the ability to occupy territory on a
significant scale, insurgents will aim to make the government's position untenable by
engendering a state of war-weariness, frustration and anger against government emergency
measures. Under such conditions, the people may rally to any organization or leader who offers
stability.
3. Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The concentration of a large
population in a relatively small area provides cover for the insurgents, although they may find
support only in certain areas. Additionally, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of
urban living, could find a city brought to its knees through the interruption of power supplies,
non-collection of rubbish or the cutting off of water.
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4. For these reasons, the urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural
counterpad, and his tactics reflect this, lntimidating the local population, as seen in rural
insurgencies, also occurs in urban environments. ln this setting, population density facilitates
the insurgents' audacity, as they are able to readily disappear amongst the populace. However,
this too is a double-edged sword, for population density may also be used to advantage by the
COIN forces in the recruitment and placement of agents and in the stealthy infiltration of patrols.
5. The ready availability of large numbers of people in urban areas enables insurgents to
engineer demonstrations and assemble crowds with relative ease. The emotions of the
demonstrators can then be readily manipulated, often in an effort to provoke an overreaction by
security forces. Women and children may be purposely included in a demonstration because
they lend a certain legitimacy to the event, are easier to gain sympathy from observers and may
help create an enormous propaganda victory if the insurgents succeed in provoking a
government overreaction that causes civilian casualties.
6. Countering an insurgency in an urban area offers a number of challenges to the COIN
forces, particularly given the density and complexities of an urban environment. However, if a
city is an "urban jungle," then it too consists of a number of villages or local areas. Each urban
area may be divided into almost self-contained sections. Few individuals live throughout an
entire city; instead they live, work, socialize and worship in the same local area, often within
walking distance. The terrain analysis and knowledge base established by intelligence
assessment should work to identify the urban delineations and their internal power structures.
222. INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS
1. Given the political aims and secretive nature of insurgency, communicating is critical.
Contact amongst the insurgents is accomplished through small, surreptitious groups or cells.
lnsurgents make extensive use of secure methods, such as dead-letter drops or coded graffiti.
ln addition to the methods below, they will also use political literature such as manifestos,
magazines, posters and circulars communicate. Today, modern mass communications facilitate
the task of the insurrectionary leader and supporting cadres. They can gain secure
communications within their organization and stage broad appeals to the mass audience
provided by the public. Therefore, a modern military seeking to defend its parent or foster
society must be prepared to exploit modern media and deny its use to an opponent. Currently,
insurgents are known to employ modern communications as follows:
a. Gellular Telephone and Hand Held Radios. The mobile phone and similar
devices have become ubiquitous in the developing world. lnsurgents use them
for communication and deception. Veiled speech and false information are used
to compensate for and even exploit the open nature of these types of systems.
b. Radio. Radio is an increasingly used component of control as well as a means
of passing information or propaganda. Underground radio stations may
disseminate propaganda or order crowds out for demonstrations. They may also
use radio frequencies to detonate bombs.
c. Television. Almost every insurgent group has used television directly to
promote their cause or indirectly, ensuring that incidents are newsworthy enough
to be reported on television. lt is no coincidence that the steep rise in terrorist
and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as the growth in
television. The distribution of video tapes also enormously enhances an
insurgent cause, as seen by the linkage between certain media outlets and
terrorist organ izations.
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Describing an lnsurgency
d. Media. Coded messages may be included in newspaper advertisements,
articles in magazines or on posters or circulars to convey instructions to cells,
perhaps in conjunction with the dead letter box system. Such messages may be
used to pass information when time is not essential for the execution of an
operation or to inform an insurgent of the time and date a pre-planned attack or
incident is to be staged.
e. lnternet. The World Wide Web is being used increasingly within insurgencies.
Not only can it be used for propaganda purposes but also as a tool to pass along
terrorist and insurgent techniques and procedures. lnsurgents are increasingly
publishing their versions of events in order to attract support and show their
strength, often through video clips of attacks on security forces or killings of
kidnapped government supporters. Such websites thus become a primary
source of intelligence, as analysts seek indicators of insurgent morale,
noms-de-guerre, various factions and their motivators or ideologies, which may
then be useful for negotiations or PSYOPS targeting.
sEcTroN 4
CONCLUSION_A MEDICAL METAPHOR FOR AN INSURGENCY AND COIN
1. An insurgency may be compared to a communicable disease. The insurgent ideology
and its popular suppor"t are spread through a population by exposure to the equivalent of risk
factors: the exploitation of legitimate grievances, propaganda and the insurgent narrative.
Agents for the spread of the "disease" are memes-behavioural practices passed on by
imitation. Many individuals, especially young people, are not necessarily drawn to an
insurgency out of ideological commitment but rather through social and cultural associations
between family members and friends.
2. A communicable disease is countered through a holistic and systematic approach
involving a wide range of means: changes to behaviour and the environment, such as the
reduction of risk factors; isolation and quarantine; inoculation; and, treatment of the clinically
infected.
: r,..
, '1 '.":,'
Figure 24 An Insurgency Spread as a Gommunicable Disease32
3. Just as a communicable disease may be treated in a numberof ways, we can extend
the metaphor to illustrate how a COIN strategy may be applied to resolve an insurgency:
32
This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN
WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 2-21
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
a. Changes to Behaviour and Environment. Just as the spread of a disease may
be curtailed through changes to behaviour and the environment and the removal
of risk factors, the same idea may be applied to stop the spread of an
insurgency. Grievances and circumstances that fuelled the insurgency's start
and that continue to lend it credence and support must be resolved.
b. lsolation and Quarantine. Just as those who are infected with a disease are
often quarantined, COIN forces and policies must seek to separate insurgents
from the populace. This will firstly cut off supporl from the populace, but more
importantly, will help preclude the "infection" of others and thus an increase to the
insurgency membership. The insurgents must be isolated both physically and
cognitively from the populace. ln the latter sense, this will rely upon defensive
information operations and attacks against insurgent communication and
propaganda means.
c. lnoculation. Those not infected with a disease are inoculated. Likewise, whilst
legitimate grievances are being resolved, information operations will be needed
to counter the ideological infection of the populace with the narrative and
justification for the insurgency.
d. Treatment. Those who have been infected by a communicable disease undergo
treatment, ln the case of those supporting an insurgency, a number of means
may be required. ldeally, influence activities (information operations) may be
used to persuade and dissuade insurgents and their supporters to pursue
peaceful and legitimate means to resolve their grievances. lt may even be
possible to conveft some insurgents to support the military forces of the COIN
forces. ln other cases, committed insurgents unwilling to surrender may have to
be captured, killed or marginalized to the point that they are ineffective.
4. ln order to properly and effectively counter an insurgency, one must truly understand the
motivations, aims, strategies and context of the insurgency. Moreover, one must understand
thecultureinwhichtheinsurgencyisoccurring. Thisisvital,fortheoverallgoaloftheCOlN
campaign is to solve root causes and to convince the vast majority of the populace to support a
legitimate process and to reject the insurgency. This can only be done within the context of the
culture at hand.
5. The solution to an insurgency is a political one, which will require a comprehensive
approach incorporating a wide variety of agencies with the military in a supporting role. This is
reflected in the philosophy and principles that frame the conduct of a COIN campaign.
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CHAPTER 3
COIN PRINCIPLES
The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sorl of action which
a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing
as a purely military solution because insurgencyis nof primarily a military activity.
At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short
of surrender, because the very fact that a sfafe of insurgency exisfs implies that
violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by
the use of force.
-General Sir Frank Kitson, reflecting upon his experiences from
campaigns in Kenya, Malaya, Oman and Cyprus.
301. INTRODUCTION
1. No insurgency has been defeated solely by military means. Successful conduct of
counter-insurgency (COIN) requires a harmonized approach using political, social, economic,
psychological, informational and military measures to restore or establish the authority of a
legitimate government and address the root causes of the insurgency. The root causes will be
political, social and economic in nature and therefore require agencies and elements of power
other than the military to resolve.
2. Within this harmonized effort, military force will play a supporting role. The fundamental
maxim of all COIN is that a strategic centre of gravity is the populace of the threatened state or
region. Without the moral support of the people, no COIN campaign can succeed, Similarly, no
insurgency can succeed without at least the tacit acceptance of the populace. lnsurgents will
also seek to attack the will of nations contributing coalition forces and other elements of power
and capabilities to combat the insurgency. These domestic populations and their will to support
a long-term commitment must be considered strategic centres of gravity in the campaign.
Operations at all levels must be conducted with these centres to gravity in mind.
SECTION 1
COUNTER.INSURGENCY PHILOSOPHY
1. As in all campaigns, the application of military capabilities in a COIN campaign is guided
by doctrine, which consists of a philosophy, guiding principles and tested practices and
procedures. A COIN campaign is conducted using the same overarching philosophies that
guide the application of fighting power in other campaigns:
a. a comprehensive approach that uses military capabilities in conjunction with
other elements of power to create enduring outcomes;
b. adherence to the Principles of War;
c. a war-fighting ethos;
d. a manoeuvrist approach;
e. mission command; and
f. an ethical application of combat power.
2. Specific to the conduct of a COIN campaign is a philosophy that reflects the centres of
gravity that are generally common to any COIN campaign. The overarching philosophy of a
COIN campaign is encompassed by the following:
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An insurgency is a political problem that requires elements of power other than
the military to create an enduring solution and outcome. The military therefore
plays a supporting role.
A successful COIN campaign requires the support of the populace. Thus all
military activities must be conducted with a view to gaining and maintaining the
support of the local populace and, to this end, creating and maintaining the
legitimacy of the campaign. This must be understood at all levels of command,
including the lowest tactical levels.33
sEcTtoN 2
PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER.INSURGENCY
GENERAL
1. From the overarching philosophy, certain principles may be developed in order to guide
the military and other agencies in the conduct of a COIN campaign. These principles are based
on history and theory and draw on the experiences of friend and foe alike. lt must, however, be
remembered that principles are guidelines only and must be tempered by a realistic estimate of
the situation and an appraisal of the variables and potential responses. Like all principles, they
should be applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to
each campaign. The assessment of the situation will indicate where application of a principle
may not be possible (at least temporarily), where they may conflict or where there is overlap.
As with the principles of war, they must be balanced with one another, and all operations must
be examined against them. Part of the art of command will be to balance competing demands,
consider options and develop the best course of action possible, adhering as closely as possible
to the principles and the overarching philosophy. Plans and their implementation must be tailor-
made for the context in which they are to be implemented. Underpinning the principles are the
assumptions of minimum necessary force and legitimacy of all actions.
2. Although the military plays a supporting role in a COIN campaign, the failure of
commanders to properly apply the principles could easily and directly lead to failure of the entire
campaign.
3. ln any campaign, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)will routinely be modified in
order to meet the situation at hand. Particularly in a COIN campaign, where the adversary will
be adaptive, cunning and resourceful, this will be a continual process.
4. Principles offer the civil leadership and the heads of all agencies, including the military
commander, both a start point and useful guideposts. The COIN principles offered herein are
arranged in a logical sequence and provide a government and military commanders with a
general pattern on which to base and review strategy and operational plans.
5. The principles for the conduct of a COIN campaign are:
a. effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim;
b. promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies
(including government machinery);
tt
The ouerarching nature of this concept and the need for it to be understood at all levels of command, like mission
command, raises the need to gain popular support to the level of a guiding philosophy rather than have it as a
constituent principle.
a.
b.
302.
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COIN Principles
c. understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider
environment;
d. exploit intelligence and information;
e. separate the insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength,
including addressing their grievances, real and perceived;
f. neutralize the insurgent;
g. sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period;
and
h. conductlonger-term,post-insurgencyplanning.
303. EFFECT POLITICAL PRIMACY IN THE PURSUIT OF A STRATEGIG AIM
1. lnsurgencies are a political problem that cannot be countered solely by military means.
Although an insurgency may be slow in becoming apparent, once it is identified, the host
government and its international supporters must decide upon a strategy to stop, neutralize and
reverse any effects of the insurgency. This must include an effective, pro-active response to
any violence and intimidation generated by the insurgents. Apart from immediate shortterm
actions, many of which will be taken with the advice of the military force commander, the
government must formulate a long-term political plan-backed by political, economic and social
programmes-with the aim of addressing legitimate root grievances and legitimacy for the
insurgency. The military role will be to provide a security framework that creates conditions
conducive to implementing these programmes. That is, the military security and neutralization
of the insurgent violence will provide manoeuvre space for other agencies required for enduring
solutions. A COIN plan involving the police, military, locally raised militias and coalition security
forces will implement this security framework.34 ldeally, the security framework will be lead by
host nation police and military forces in order to provide additional legitimacy for the
government.
2. Political primacy underpins COIN as it legitimizes strategic, operational and tactical
actions. All actions follow the political lead and support its strategic aim. Within a COIN
campaign, the specific strategy determines which instrument of power (diplomatic, military,
economic or social) is the focus of effort, and which agency may have the lead at operational
and tactical levels. This will change over time as the COIN operation and situation evolve.
3a
Security forces include military, coalition military forces, national police, local police and locally recruited
support forces.
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Ensuring a Public Perspective in a COIN Campaign
Not only is it imperative that the military takes a supporting role to the other COIN players
during the execution of the campaign, it is also necessary that the fundamental of minimum
force be followed. Aggressive offensive actions should be viewed as a necessary, but
secondary, aspect to the campaign with only short-term value. The longer-term influence
aspects of the military's engagement, particularly in conjunction with other agencies, that
lead to enduring solutions of the crisis must be highlighted to both indigenous and domestic
audiences. This serves two purposes. Firstly it demonstrates to the indigenous population
that COIN forces are not theie to destroy their lives and property but rathlr to assisi them in
securing the basics of life and enhancini their quality of iife. This in turn garners their active
support for the campaign. Secondly, it illustrates to domestic populations of contributing
nations within a coalition that their sacrifice of treasure and lives are worthwhile in that
measures are being actively pursued to resolve underlying grievances and create enduring
stability. This is particularly important when the domestic populations hold an inaccurate
viewpoint focusing on the use of force only. ln order for this perspective to be better
balanced, efforts must be made to advertise the use of strategic-level advisory teams and
other means used to build lasting capacity within a developing nation. Such was the case
with the former Canadian commander of the Afghanistan Strategic Advisory Team engaging
a wide varie$ of audiences upon his return from theatre. Such publicity, locally and
domestic, may help protect two strategic centres of gravity.
304. PROMOTE UNITY OF PURPOSE TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS
OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES_CONTROL AND COORDINATION
1. The COIN effort requires a comprehensive approach involving a wide range of agencies
seeking to resolve the causes of the insurgency. This should be a number of agencies and
elements of power united by common objectives and end-state, thus a unity of purpose and
ideally a unity of effort will be achieved. This concept of a unity of effort may be implemented
through a variety of structures that promote various levels of common command, control and/or
coordination.
2. Many of these agencies have different philosophies, modus operandi and methods.
Unity of command across this array of national, government and non-government organizations
and agencies will be impractical. Although unity of effort is most desirable, it too may not be
achievable. Unity of purpose, however, must be achieved, and all agencies must agree to work
towards a common purpose and end-state. This will require close coordination, often led or
facilitated by local military commanders.
3. Within a national approach (i.e., that of the threatened nation or that of a coalition
contributing nation) and within a coalition, one person will ideally be granted responsibility for
the direction of the campaign and authority over all government agencies involved in the effort.
This will ideally allow differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impartial
director and centralized coordination in order to exploit in a complementary and mutually
supporting fashion the strengths of each contributing agency. While this single individual could
be a military commander, control will likely be vested in a politician, diplomat or civil servant. ln
any case, the individual will be working to strict government guidelines and overall control.
ldeally, the single commander will lead a joint command and control structure.
4. Single Gommand System: Unity of purpose and effort is facilitated by organizing the
COIN campaign under a single commander, or committee director. While the person so
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COIN Principles
designated may be civilian or military, it is critical that responsibility for overall direction is vested
in one headquarters. The commander will bring together both military and non-military elements
of power in a single command structure. Advisors will be made available from all of the relevant
participating elements, such as the civil service, international organizations, police and military.
The commander will oversee a staff system established to ensure that all plans and actions are
conducted towards a common goal.
5. The Gommittee System: Operational-level committees are formed, again, mirroring the
strategic-level command. These committees will conduct joint planning in order to ensure that
the representative subordinate elements execute such plans in a manner keeping with the
overarching campaign plan. The actual committee structure and representation willvary
between insurgencies and indeed will likely change as the conflict evolves. As a minimum,
representatives will include the host nation political and civil authorities, host-nation military and
security authorities, political and civiltroop-contributing representatives, troop-contributing
military commanders and select staff, intelligence, security-contributing representatives and
probably i nternational organizations' representatives.
6. Trust is a key factor in making such an organization functional. This is often difficult to
establish across differing organizational cultures. For example, the military requirement for
security and expertise in applied violence is potentially the antithesis of humanitarian non-
governmental organizations' (NGOs') neutral transparency and abhorrence of things military.
The committee director and all members must continually strive to maintain mutual openness
and confidence. A key component of this will be clearly communicating the purpose and
reasoning behind military operations, within the bounds of operational security (OPSEC)
considerations.
7. Role of Personalities: Given the inter-agency aspect of COIN operations and the need
for the military to work hand-in-hand with its civilian and police partners (many of whom will
have little understanding3s of military organization or command structures)the role of individual
personalities becomes magnified. Any system of control and coordination must be able to adapt
to the personalities of those involved. Military commanders must select their liaison officers and
committee members with care, exploiting those who can achieve progress through a balance of
charisma, persuasion and graceful force of personality. Commanders must be able to realize
that they themselves may not be the most suitable individuals to conduct daily faceto-face
operations and coordination with their civilian counterparts and therefore must select the most
suitable representative. This must be balanced with the message that the commander's own
personal presence will send at any given time.
B. Assistance to Allies and Foreign Powers: When a military provides assistance to a
foreign state, the forces assigned may necessarily be subordinate to that government in order to
preserve the host nation's sovereignty and the government's credibility in the eyes of its
populace. At the very least, the leadership role of the indigenous government must be
highlighted. ln such cases, assisting forces will likely be obliged to adopt the coordination
system of the host nation.
9. Government Planning and Military Support-Assessment and Estimate of the
Situation and Military Advisors. When the government is determining which of its objectives
can best be attained with the help of the armed forces, the military commanders and advisers
35
Experience has shown that some government political leaders, civil administrators and staff of NGOs will not only
have lack an understanding of how the military functions and operates but will have significant misconceptions and
even hold hostilities towards the military, and thus may be reluctant to cooperate.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
will be able to explain the forces' capabilities and limitations in the context of the particular crisis.
An analysis of the situation should reveal the areas in which the supported government and the
insurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are likely to be spread over the entire
political, economic, social and security spectrum. The aim will be to identify those government
vulnerabilities that are best suited to military defensive action and those vulnerabilities of the
insurgents that are most susceptible to offensive military action. The military will likely be able
to assist in certain areas of stability activities, such as reconstruction and governance, but the
capability limitations of the military and the perceptions of military involvement in these areas
must be fully assessed and clearly articulated to political leaders. Throughout the planning of a
COIN campaign, the supporting role of the military must be emphasized, and the concept that
insurgencies require enduring political solutions must be stressed.
10. Allocation of Priorities. The coordinated national plan that emerges from the above
estimate should address the political, economic, social and security spectrum and seek
enduring solutions to the insurgency causes. Determining the type of insurgency faced will
highlight two priorities: identification of physical and moral centres of gravity for the insurgents,
and identification of the government actions that will achieve meaningful results. Some of these
results, or at least the actions leading to them, should be achieved quickly so as to demonstrate
resolution. Others, such as re-building of an economic infrastructure, will take a long time to
achieve, but it will often be these actions that lead to enduring success. The national priorities
need to be addressed at this stage of the planning process. Once the overarching priorities are
identified, other allocations of tasks and resources will be identified, to include:
a. Roles and responsibilities between government departments and military offices
in order to avoid duplication of effort, gaps and potential conflict.
b. Priority of action between the social, economic, military and civil administration
fields.
c. Priorities within each field of activity (social, economic, military and civil
administration). Just as the military will apportion efforts across the operational
functions (command, sense, act, shield, sustain), so too must the civil, police and
other authorities set priorities across their own organizations and capabilities.
11. Campaign Design and Operational Planning. Once the strategic priorities and
objectives have been identified, campaign design and operational planning may begin. The
military will work in conjunction with the host nation and the other elements of power and
agencies involved. Operational objectives will be identified and grouped along thematic lines of
operation leading to the operational end-state. lt will be vital that the military conducts the
campaign design in cooperation with the other elements of power involved in order the truly
realize a unity of purpose and effort across all agencies.
305. UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF THE INSURGENCY, INCLUDING
THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT
1. The various inter-related dynamics of an insurgency will present profound intellectual
challenges for commanders and staff. ln order to understand the context of the insurgency, its
causes and motivations, a broad knowledge base must be created in order to understand it and
the environment in which it has grown. This will require an assessment of all the various
elements within the environment: political, military, economic, social (including culture and
religion), informational and infrastructure. lt will also demand an understanding of the various,
often competing, power structures present in the society and insurgency itself.
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COIN Principles
2. Given the large number of variables at work, it may very well be impossible to predict the
secondary and tertiary effects of specific actions. Still, effort must be expended to understand
these variables and dynamics at hand and how best to tackle them.
3. The dynamics of an insurgency may include:
a. cause-what makes the insurgency attractive to the uncommitted;
b. central idea (the narrative) of the insurgency-this may be an ideology or
religious ideal that also identifies a strategic end-state;
c. aims of the insurgency-long term, short term, advertised and hidden;
d. organization and capabilities-leaders, cadre, combatants, support base and
politicalwings;
e. external support-moral, physical and conceptual;
f. methodology-strategies and tactics; and
g, the wider environment-political, economic, sociological and technical.
4. For every dynamic within an insurgency, the lines of operation within the campaign plan
must anticipate and counter the evolving dynamics of the insurgency.
306. EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION_THE OVERARCHING
IMPORTANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
1. lntelligence is the key enabler that will allow the insurgency, its causes, its motivations,
its power structures and its weaknesses and vulnerabilities on both the physical and
psychological planes to be understood. lt will thus support the creation of an effective and
legitimate campaign plan. Such intelligence will demand a multi-faceted assessment and
analysis capability that will examine the entire environment and its influences, well beyond the
mere military capabilities of the insurgents.
2. Combating an insurgency requires a sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT)
network that includes not only local sources of intelligence but also a detailed collection plan
that incorporates all sources, from the soldiers who patrol daily to the agents of influence within
a society. A sophisticated, well-guided network is essential to develop a complete picture of the
strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency.
3. lnformation and intelligence must be exploited in a systematic and thorough manner. All
individuals concerned-civilians, commanders and soldiers of all ranks-must understand the
overriding importance of intelligence in actively defeating an insurgency and in gaining the
support of the populace. lntelligence will support direct military action against insurgents, guide
influence activities and psychological effects to attack the root causes of the insurgency, create
enduring solutions of standing grievances and allow for success to be measured. All-source
intelligence is the key enabler required to defeat an insurgency.
4. Operational-Level Application-Local Knowledge. Knowledge of the country-its
ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party leaders, the
clandestine political organizations and their undercover armed groups, the influence of
neighbouring states and the economy-will provide the essential backdrop to understanding the
insurgency. However, such a knowledge base takes time to build. lt is essential to do so
because the development of actionable intelligence relies on an ability to discern patterns of
change in behaviour. The host nation police and its intelligence service should be the prime
agencies for providing background intelligence at the start of a mission so that a baseline of
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local conditions can be established. Creation of a baseline understanding and its growth into a
broad knowledge base allows developing trends and changes in specific areas to be identified
and encouraged, if positive, or halted if negative. ln all cases, the best source of intelligence
comes from members of an insurgent group who have been detained or convinced to switch
loyalties.
All operations must be intelligence driven. This produces two benefits: first, it mlntmtzes
disruption to the general population by focusing on specific targets, allows refined risk
assessment and avoids collateral damages; and second, it creates a snowball effect,
as each targeted operation inevitably produces more intelligence.
Since the summer of 2003 US forces in lraq had been searching for and trying to
eliminate Abu Musab alZarqawi, the head of 'al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.' Al-Zarqawi
was personally responsible for innumerable suicide and roadside bombings, and
assassinations.
ln February of 2006 US forces had gleaned intelligence from a captured insurgent
detailing a number of safehouses and residences in the lraqi town of Yusufiya. This
intelligence was used to launch a number of raids in mid-April that captured more
insurgents and uncovered more intelligence. These operations had two effects: it
uncovered a videotape of al Zarqawi fumbling with a Cg (M249) light machine gun,
which was broadcast worldwide by the US in a counter-propaganda effort aimed at
demonstrating the incompetence of al Zarqawi and his immediate associates. The
second effect was more important. After weeks of interrogation by specially-trained
intelligence personnel, the captured insurgents revealed enough information to create
a detailed mapping o'f al-Zarqawi's organization's mid-level leadership. This
breakthrough allowed a number of targeted raids on 19, 14, and 17 May by SOF that
killed a number of insurgents and produced more physical intelligence.
Finally, at the beginning of June 2006 interrogators were able to produce intelligence
detailing the security precautions taken by Sheikh al-Rahman, a close advisor to al-
Zarqawi. Combined with electronic intelligence, this enabled US forces to identify the
location of a meeting between al-Rahman and al-Zarqawi, Using this intelligence, al-
Zarqawi was targeted and killed by aircraft-launched PGMs on 7 June 2006.
The deliberate, patient exploitation of intelligence guided and shaped an effective
series of operations that produced tangible results, resulting in a weakened and less
operationally effective adversary.
Source: Mark Bowden, "The Ploy," The Attantic Monthty,Volume 299, No.4, May 2007,
Washington DC: The Atlantic Monthly, pp.54-68.
5. Tactical-Level Application. Without accurate intelligence, the security forces are
reduced to conducting blind and ineffective operations, which often provoke a negative reaction
amongst the population. The ensuing negative media reporting can undermine domestic and
international support for the mission and benefit the insurgency. Furthermore, troops
conducting routine framework patrolling tend to loose their focus and motivation, with the result
often being the conduct of patrolling for the sake of patrolling itself. Tactical intelligence
requirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels, and all sources, specialist and
routine framework patrols alike, should be given specific informational requirements to gather.
Furthermore, specialists wherever possible, should be pushed down to the lower (sub-unit)
tactical levels so that they may remain responsive to their intelligence requirements while
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COIN Principles
fulfilling those of the units and formations. Every soldier is a source of information collection
and must come to understand the human and geographic terrain, including the operational
methodology of the enemy. Standing information requirements should be pushed down to the
lowest levels in order to focus routine operations such as security patrols and to allow the
requirements to be applied pervasively. ln the end, each successful operation becomes an
intelligence windfall and parlays into a stronger intelligence picture.
6. The tactical-level application of information and intelligence will allow large named areas
of interest (NAls) to be reduced to point NAls and eventually to target areas of interest (TAls) for
subsequent precision strikes. For example, HUMINT reports may indicate a gang and their
suspected weapons cache are located in a neighbourhood containing 20,000 occupants.
Patrols and other sources, through specific tasks and stated information requirements, may
reduce this area NAI to a specific city block or house. This will eventually become a TAI that
can be passed to operations staff and commanders for subsequent action-in this case, a
cordon and search activity.
7. The same can be said regarding information exploitation for psychological effects, For
example, HUMINT reports or interrogations may indicate that an insurgency is recruiting
members from a particular suburban region. Further examination and collection regarding this
area may reveal that it is an ethnic enclave with high unemployment. Hence, this area may
become a TAI for the application of civil-military cooperation (ClMlC) and other influence activity
capabilities in order to stimulate development of this enclave. Follow-up patrols can, in time,
gauge the public reaction to such measures. ln short, intelligence drives and focuses tactical
operations, limits collateral damage and assists in measuring success.
B. The lntelligence Organization. lt should be expected that intelligence organizations in
COIN campaigns will have to grow considerably compared to those in conventional operations,
which focus merely on a conventional enemy. ldeally, the intelligence organization should start
expanding in lock step with the insurgents' developing threat, lnevitably, however, there is an
interval before the expanded organization becomes effective. Such expansion should reflect
the need to understand the various elements of the environment that influence the campaign's
outcome, such as cultural and economic aspects.
307. SEPARATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL AND MORAL SOURCES
OF STRENGTH
1. Two Facets of lsolation. One of the primary operational objectives of the COIN
campaign is the physical and moral isolation of the insurgents from the sources of physical
resources and the population. Without the support, both physical and moral, of the population,
an insurgency will likely be unable to survive. Additionally, it is important to work to eliminate
the sources of funding and material support that sustain insurgent operations that come from
both internal and external sources. All agencies involved in the COIN operation must
understand this and work within their own fields to this end. Both elements must be addressed:
a. Physical Separation. lnsurgents must be separated from their physical support,
which includes recruits, finances and material resources that may be originating
from within the host nation or from external sources.
b. Moral Separation. lnsurgents must be undermined intellectually and morally
and any justification for their moral support by a population removed. A narrative
willform the foundation of insurgent propaganda and guide their actions. This
narrative will highlight real or perceived grievances and provide a vision and
strategic end-state as an alternative to the existing government or society. The
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308.
narrative will also provide moral justification for the insurgency and attempt to
capture the moral high ground from the government. Thus, undermining the
insurgency's narrative is critical to influencing the population to support the
government. To this end, a legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be
offered by the COIN campaign. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to
moral superiority.
PHYSICAL SEPARATION
1. Establish a Firm Base. The first requirement may be to secure the base areas
essential to the survival and functioning of the government and state. These normally include
the capital, key points of entry, vital installations such as public infrastructure and reinforcing
those areas that are loyal to the government. The provision of security in these vital areas
encourages their inhabitants to rally behind the government.
2. Expand Secure Areas. Once established, security forces expand outward from the
secure areas in a campaign akin to the spreading of an oil slick. As each area is consolidated,
loyal local forces could be raised to secure the area to release mobile regular troops to secure
the next area while the host state's civil administration and police re-establish themselves in the
recently liberated territory and gain, through social development, the support of the populace.
This is a proven approach to combating an insurgency.
The fache d'huile, or "oil spot," technique of counter-insurgency was first formalized by
French General Hubert Lyautey in the first decade of the 20th century. The premise of the
technique is the provision of a security umbrella or framework at the local level concomitant
to furnishing social services such as schools, health care and government administration.
Lyautey's aim was to physically and psychologically separate the insurgent from the
population and to slowly expand government control by using "the army not as an instrument
of repression but as a positive social force." Support for the government would come with
tangible improvements in the local populace's well-being. Versions of this technique have
been applied by, among others, the French in Morocco and Algeria, the US Marines in
Vietnam and the US Army on southern Luzon during the 1899-1902 Philippine War (even
though the term tache d'huile had yet to be coined).
Source: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The guerrilla in history (New York: Morrow, 1994), pp. 150-157.
3. Integration of Security Forces. The most effective way of expanding a COIN
campaign's affect and achieving physical separation of the insurgents is by having security
forces living amongst the population. History has proven that isolating security forces in fortified
strongholds is ineffective, allows insurgent infiltration and serves to separate the counter-
insurgents from the population, all of which is the reverse effect of that actually being sought.
Forthis "oilspot" or "ink spot" method to work as intended, the security forces must live and
interact intimately with the population and its established authority and government. Not only
does this create strong personal bonds between the people and the military, it enhances the
intelligence network and creates a hostile environment for the insurgents. This method is not
without risk. lndeed, risks may have to be taken in force protection in terms the relative
exposure of the soldiers is increased. This will also involve a political risk in terms of the
potential for higher casualties. Such risks must be carefully explained to soldiers and domestic
populations alike. ln order to mitigate such risks, a certain level of security is necessary before
such a tactic can be employed. ln the final analysis, it is imperative for a successful campaign
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that the security forces build confidence in the population, and it is unlikely that this can be
achieved from behind fortified walls.
4. Eliminate the Insurgent Subversive and Support System. The security forces'
operations must focus on eliminating the insurgents' subversive and support organizations.
This is an essential prerequisite to defeating any active insurgent group for the following
reasons:
a. The subversive organization controls the population, denies the government
popular support, spreads propaganda unchecked and prevents witnesses from
provid ing information.
b. Without such action, the insurgents continue to receive supplies, recruits and
information regarding the security forces and can continue to disrupt
development and stability even if the majority of their moral support has been
eliminated.
c. Once the subversive organization is destroyed or dislocated, the insurgents are
forced to operate more openly and thus expose themselves to deliberate military
actions and arrest.
d. Subversive elements arrested are the best sources of information on the
insurgent organization. These elements must be carefully handled, according to
legal constraints, by specialist staff skilled in extracting detailed intelligence.
5. Methods of Physical Separation. A thoughtful combination of methods by all agencies
involved is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive and suppoding constructs:
a. lntelligence should aim at the identification of support cells, quarter-master
functionaries, subversive cells and propagandists. This information should come
in good part from civilian police sources, but where police forces lack a physical
presence in a remote geographical area, the void may be filled with elements of
Special Forces assigned specific information requirements.
b. The provision of security for the populace, the overt supporters and informers.
This is best done proactively through the use of anonymous tip telephone lines,
specialist handling of sources and low-level security measures (such as face
masks) to hide the identity of informers working with security forces.
c. The gradual spread of government and security force control over areas.
d. Curfews and searches of individuals thought to be supporting insurgents,
e. Patrols, ambushes and vehicle checkpoints (the latter best done at low levels for
short intervals on likely routes).
f. lnterdiction operations against the entry of external supplies.
g. Closing national borders or imposing control measures over them.
h. lnternational diplomacy to staunch the flow of external fiscal, human and material
support for the insurgency. This may require government legal action in a
number of nations, particularly those contributing troops to an insurgency.
Certainly, evidence collected in a theatre of operations indicating the sources of
external funding and resources should be advertised widely to support
government action that will staunch this support.
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309. INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL SEPARATION
1. General. Undermining the narrative of the insurgents and removing grievances,
justification and causes of the insurgency is criticalto enduring end-states. lndeed, such action
will be decisive in the campaign.
a. Addressing this facet primarily involves dealing with the real and perceived
grievances that help to intellectually draw supporters and recruits to outwardly or
tacitly support the insurgents. Just as insurgent propaganda involves both words
and deeds, providing an alternative to the insurgent narrative requires both words
and actions. Therefore, not only does the campaign plan and its intent need to
be broadcast, it must be constantly reinforced, updated and supported by real
action that creates a sense of normalcy and improves the day{o-day lives of the
populace.
b. A legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be offered to members of the
insurgency, their supporters and the uncommitted in the population. Hand-in-
hand with this is the fact that the conditions that permit the spread of the
insurgency, and its justification in the eyes of many, must be addressed and
resolved with long-term solutions that are well publicized through information
operations.
c. Broadly speaking, this will often involve the reform of government and
government institutions and policies, and alternatives to the idealized vision of
society that insurgent propaganda will advertise. The insurgency must be
deprived of any claim to moral superiority.
d. ln general, the concept of separating the insurgent in a moral or intellectual
sense has been termed "winning the hearts and minds." More accurately, this
should be considered winning the minds and hearts of the population.
Specifically, planned influence activities must be conducted to affect the
understanding and perceptions (i.e., the mind) of the target audiences in order to
affect their will (heart) and ultimately their behaviour in a desired manner.
2. Reforming the Host Nation Government and lnstitutions. ln many cases, the
government under attack from an insurgency requires some type of reform in order to solidify its
legitimacy, win and maintain the support of its own populace and gain international support.
a. This may include the reform of unjust policies such as inequitable distribution of
land. Government actions within a moral context-such as observance of the
law, discrete use of force, the provision of public services, and equitable
distribution of benefits realized through social and economic development-will
help to produce a favourable climate domestically and internationally. ln other
words, the government must learn to envision and provide an equitable social
contract with its populace.
b. lnternationally, it is critical that the host nation government make real and
sustained efforts at any needed reforms for responsible and representative
government. The publics of supporting nations in a coalition will likely demand a
high standard of human rights, rule of law and good governance. Maintaining
this support is dependent partly on the efforts of the host nation to reform weak
institutions and develop internationally recognized legitimacy.
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3. Domestic and lnternational Diplomacy. Diplomacy must play a central role in the
intellectual and moral separation of the insurgents from the population. This involves both
diplomacy within the affected state and internationally.
a. Domestically, it is important that the host nation government negotiate with
disaffected groups to develop a sense of inclusion and ownership of the political
process. Broadening the base of stakeholders in a political process is critical to
increasing participation in the legitimate process. With regards to insurgents,
undoubtedly there will be die-hards that refuse to support anything but absolute
achievement of the stated goals. For these, the only options are capture, death
or to be made so irrelevant that they wield no influence or threat. However, the
vast majority of most insurgent groups are normally composed of less highly
motivated people who simply want to achieve a better life. Domestic diplomacy
is critical in trying to bring this group to the government side and, although their
trust will be difficult to gain, it is imperative that efforts to do so are made. lt is
highly unlikely that a permanent solution can be achieved otherwise.
b. lnternationally, diplomatic efforts aimed at cutting moral support from countries
that share ideological, cultural or religious links to an insurgency can play an
important part in countering the narrative underpinning insurgent propaganda.
This may simply involve greater support to a state that demonstrates the
compatibility of religion and democracy or a successful example of settling long-
standing grievances with government reforms. ln other cases, this may involve
encouraging governments to enforce legal constraints on religious leaders
advocating violence or the support of extremist propaganda.
4. Holding the Moral High Ground. lnsurgent narrative and propaganda will provide a
moral justification for the existence of the insurgency and for any violent acts committed. The
struggle to intellectually and morally separate the insurgents from the populace hinges on the
government being seen as morally superior to the insurgents and the alternative society being
offered by the insurgency. This involves establishing and ascribing to the rule of law. Host
nation governments and institutions may require detailed assistance in achieving this concept in
both practice and in the eyes of their populace. To this end, commanders and even their
soldiers must understand the need to help ensure the supported government remains legitimate
and acts accordingly. Where possible, they must assist in the raising of standards of conduct,
from the local level upwards. Violations must be reported to the military and civil chains-of-
command and addressed accordingly. Coalition forces involved in the campaign must, as part
of the solution, set the example for the host nation government were necessary. ln short, the
insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.
5. Apply Power Discriminately to lnfluence Human Will. Force must be applied
discriminately throughout a COIN campaign to avoid alienating the population through civilian
casualties or unnecessary damage to property. At times, short-term tactical success may have
to be forsaken in order to meet the longterm operational objectives of the campaign and
maintain the support of the populace.
a. Minimum use of force should guide the actions of the security forces. This
maxim must be reinforced at all stages of the campaign and at all levels of
command.
b. Furthermore, the exercise of power by any of the agencies involved in a
campaign must be conducted with legitimacy, within the rule of law and without
prejudice to any one group within the affected population.
B-GL-323-004/FP-004 3-1 3
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
c. Additionally, disruption to normal civic life must be limited to the greatest extent
possible. This principle must be applied at the operational and tactical levels.
For example, the imposition of curfews should be as limited in time and scope as
possible in order to avoid disruption to the lives of the majority of the populace,
who are always at risk of becoming fatigued by security measures. Likewise, the
conduct of a cordon and search in private homes may require forced entry into
locked rooms. lf the owners cannot locate keys, even when breaching tools are
produced, then the door should, whenever possible, be removed from its hinges.
lf nothing is found (as will often be the case), the door can then be replaced
without damage. This in turns limits embarrassment for the security forces, and
the extra effort taken to avoid damages to private property is, to a ceftain extent,
appreciated by the populace. lt in turn helps gain and maintain their support and
counter the propaganda undoubtedly spread by the insurgents regarding the
security forces and their methods.
310. NEUTRALIZETHEINSURGENT
1. The security forces of the government or coalition will have a significant role in the
selective destruction, disruption and dislodgment of insurgents. Confidence, trust and freedom
of action, without the need to refer routine and anticipated operations that will exploit often
fleeting opportunities back to a higher level(s) of command, must be afforded tactical
commanders (particularly down to sub-unit level) if they are to be successful in striking the
insurgent and dislocating him from his power base.
2. lt will be highly unlikely, if not impossible, to destroy the entire insurgent movement. Part
of the neutralization of the insurgent will be to neutralize his presence in affected areas. A
critical aspect of successful military COIN is command initiative and action at the lowest tactical
level that involves the junior commander (platoon and section level) leading small patrols36 into
the insurgents' area of operations. The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on "home ground"
using adequate force, but no more than is absolutely necessary. Proportionality must be the
measure applied when employing force.
3. All military tactical actions must be conducted in harmony with the other actions taken to
neutralize and defeat the insurgency: amelioration of the causes, reformation of the government
and development of local security forces (if necessary), information operations (to explain the
military actions) and social development. Without this multi-pronged approach, killing
insurgents simply becomes a form of attrition warfare and may encourage more converts to the
insurgency. lndeed, this point may be exacerbated by socio-cultural codes of conduct that
demand retribution for the death of a relative regardless of cause or justification.
311. SUSTAIN COMMITMENT TO EXPEND POLITICAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCES
OVER A LONG PERIOD
L lnsurgency and counter-insurgency, like all forms of warfare, are protracted contests of
will. lnsurgents understand that they do not have to win a decisive battle but have to make the
campaign too expensive and demanding (in terms of time, resources, financial and political
capital) for the government, the populace and/or the government's external supporters, some of
whom may be supplying troops to stabilize and support the state. Not only must the
36
The required size of the patrol will depend upon a number of factors considered in the estimate and planning
process, including threat, insurgent tactics, distance to be covered and tasks of the patrol.
3-14 B-GL-323-004 tFP-004
COIN Principles
commitment of the local populace be sustained, but the populations of any supporting nations
must be convinced to remain committed to the COIN. These are strategic centres of gravity
within the campaign.
2. A sustained commitment to the COIN is underpinned by unity of purpose across a wide
range of disparate elements and organizations involved in the campaign, that is, through the
comprehensive approach to the campaign. lnformation operations will have to work towards
this aim. Furthermore, realistic measures of success will have to be decided and promulgated
so that complementary lines of operation and successive operational objectives may be fully
identified, broadened and exploited.
312. CONDUCT LONGER.TERM POST.INSURGENCY PLANNING
1. The requirement for post-insurgency security and development probably holds the key to
effectively applying all of the other principles. Merely providing for the military defeat of
insurgents does not in any way end the government requirement to make suitable, longer-term
plans to address the perceived and real grievances that enabled the rise of an insurgency in the
first instance.
2. The plans and requirements to address these grievances must be communicated to the
populace of the host nation, the international public and the populaces of nations contributing
resources and manpower to the campaign. This will allow the COIN campaign to develop the
longterm legitimacy required to sustain what will undoubtedly be a lengthy and complex effort.
3. The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after the insurgency has
been defeated, or at least significantly neutralized, can have a real and significant effect on
winning the moral support of the population. Such initiatives should be designed at the same
time as the comprehensive strategic plans are being prepared to defeat the insurgency. The
timing of any statement about longer term plans could be of crucial importance and should be
handled in a sensitive and controlled manner by the state authorities in concert with the overall
information operations plan. lt is critical that the announcement of government reform initiatives
coincide with actual deeds. Failure to coordinate the words and actions of a strategy will
increase disenchantment with the government, both domestically and internationally.
ln the British Dhofar campaign (1970-1975), the end of insurgent activity occurred in
December 1975, but the authorities had to work relentlessly for several more years to
achieve continued support from the population before the causes of the insurgency had been
fully rectified. As with subduing a fire, the flames have to be out and the embers cold before
it can be considered fully extinguished.
SECTION 3
FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COIN
313. POPULARSUPPORT
1. lnsurgent Aims. An insurgency aims to discredit the government, its legitimacy and its
policies. lt will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with propaganda,
using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government and/or its
supporting authorities (e.9., support from an external nation) have been sufficiently undermined
and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from authority, the insurgency
will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign.
B-GL-323-004 tFP-OO4 3-1 5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
2. A Competition for Loyalty: Minds and Hearts. A government must convince its
population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better life than the
opposing insurgents in order to influence the minds and win the hearts of the population. This
will be a focal point for the information operations campaign. Just as an insurgency needs the
sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the population to survive and to
overthrow the government, so the government needs the people's support to appear legitimate
in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture of the terrorists. Violence,
or the threat of it, is aimed at the citizen's fears for his family and freedom to earn a wage to
feed them. Whoever can guarantee citizens security can often command their allegiance. An
insurgency is a competition between government and insurgent for the individual's loyalty.
Unless the government can offer reasonable protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own
or their families' lives by volunteering information, and the security forces will meet passive
resistance from the populace as a whole in addition to the active resistance of the insurgents.
3. Government Protection. Protection of the civilian population will require restrictions
and measures (searches, checkpoints, curfews, etc.) that will disrupt normal lives and frustrate
the local populations. Their frustration will increase with time. lnsurgents will seek to
misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppressive. Consequently, the
government and its security forces must anticipate a possible hostile public reaction to such
security measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgent propaganda in order to keep the
initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.
4. lnvolving the Local Population In the Gampaign. Even in situations in which the local
authorities and host nation police forces require significant reform, much effort should be made
to include them, within the dictates of force protection and OPSEC, in the campaign. lncluding
them will build their confidence, encourage higher standards and raise their profile in the eyes of
the local communities, Likewise, local populations should be made to feel that they have a vital
part to play in countering the insurgency and leading to its conclusion. Such confidence-
building measures may even extend to having remote communities raise their own local
defence forces. The trust the community initially places in its protectors is repaid by the trust
the government shows in them by allowing them to bear arms in a common cause.
5. Countering Insurgent Propaganda. lnsurgent propaganda must be monitored and
addressed by a deliberate and multi-faceted information operations campaign, that is, through
the use of influence activities. However, as much authority as possible must be pushed down to
the tactical levels in order that information operations at that level are able to be executed in a
timely and effective manner. Broad themes developed at the strategic and operational levels
must be tailored to the specifics of a local target audience at the tactical level in order to
address the specific issues at the local level. Canadian and coalition soldiers must be aware of
the key role that they play in countering insurgent propaganda, which, at the very least, will paint
them as foreign, oppressive occupiers, Their friendly (but professional) disposition, tone and
decorum while patrolling amongst the local population, their ability to relate to the populace, and
the discriminate use of force will quickly undermine that propaganda,
314. AVOIDANCE OF MORAL RELATIVISM
1. Moral relativism is the doctrine that morality exists in relation to culture, society or
historical context and that there is no absolute right and wrong. Moral relativism assumes that
morals are not universaland therefore confuses culture and morality. When working in another
society, there is a natural tendency to practise moral relativism and thus accept immoral
practices by members of an indigenous population and attribute them to immutable local
customs and cultural values.
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2. Such an assumption and the ensuing practice are wrong. Moral is defined as
"concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour."tt Value, as in cultural value, is
defined as "the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of
something."tt Because morals are concerned with principles, they can be considered
universal. Values are culturally specific, and the values and social constructs assumed by a
culture will vary to extreme degrees from those of other cultures. Values may change, but only
over very long periods of time. Both morals and cultural values are distinct from individual or
social practices, although all are related.
3. The practice of moral relativism in COIN, as in all campaigns, should be avoided
because it creates a substantial risk of alienating the population and undermining support for the
campaign. This can occur in two ways:
a. Firstly, moral relativism can sanction corrupt or otherwise illegal actions of people
in authority. This, in turn, will undermine their authority, legitimacy, credibility and
moral superiority along with that of the campaign in the eyes of indigenous and
international populations. Moral relativism must be avoided when dealing with
any individual or group, be they government officials and members of the host
nation security services or criminal elements, tribal authority figures, business
people, and members of the insurgency itself. The effects of moral relativism are
even greater when the sanctioned violations clearly undermine good governance
and the legitimacy, moral superiority and effectiveness of those authorities
fighting the insurgency. Thus moral relativism and its attribution of immoral
behaviour to simply extend local values and culture is counter productive as it
de-legitimizes the host nation government, the COIN campaign itself and the
forces conducting it.3s
b. Secondly, the illegal or immoral activities may have been one of the root causes
to instability in the society in the first place. By permitting, effectively sanctioning,
such behaviour as extortion by armed policemen at checkpoints, the
commanders will only forestall the longterm improvement of the society.
4. ln avoiding the practice of moral relativism and ensuring acceptable standards of
conduct from public officials and society itself, commanders must use a degree of common
sense and judgement. For example, armed police extorting money from civilians at a
checkpoint is different from a school teacher who charges parents a stipend per child in light of
poor or non-existent wages from a developing government.
5. Although it may be considered a social or cultural norm, by virtue of its ubiquity,
corruption and criminal activity cannot simply be dismissed as a cultural or moral norm and
indeed may have aggravated the root causes of an insurgency. The insistence that government
officials and other authority figures follow moral standards may require individual and societal
changes but unlikely changes to cultural values. Societal change is acceptable and may indeed
be necessary for the successful conclusion of the COIN campaign. Additionally, if the
improvement of the host nation populace's well-being is a primary goal of COIN, moral
relativism, with regards to permitting criminal activity and excusing a failure to fulfil the
government's social contract, cannot be accepted as a legitimate or beneficial practice.
tt
From The Oxford Dictionary of Engtish, 1dh ed. Revlsed, Oxford University Press, 1999, edited by Judy Pearsall,
p. 925.
"t tbid., p. 1584.
t'At
its worst, moral relativism in such cases may be considered racist for it assumes an indigenous population is not
capable of morally correct standards of behaviour. Again, this attitude will not garner support from the local populace.
B-GL-323-004/FP-004 3-17
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
6. ln trying to improve a society facing an insurgency, it must be realized that a reduction in
corruption and criminal activity will not occur instantaneously but rather over a period of time.
Forces conducting a COIN campaign must expect and insist upon the moral conduct of host
nation authority figures and security forces. This may become part of the long-term security
sector reform and governance development.
Ensuring Police Professional Conduct: Haiti, 2004
ln conducting low-level COIN operations against the criminal-based insurgency in Haiti in
early 20O4, Canadian troops conducted a number of cordon and search operations against
gang headquarters and gathering places, most of which contained brothels. lt quickly
became obvious that members of the Haitian national police routinely frequented such
establishments, thereby associating with gang members and exhibiting anti-social
behaviours. Some headquarters staff dismissed this issue as simply part of the Haitian
culture. Not only does this view disregard the lack of legitimacy of the local authorities, but it
assumes either that there is no moral yardstick that can be applied or that the local populace
is not capable of higher standards. Such conduct by local authorities certainly undermined
their legitimacy and trustworthiness in the eyes of the local populace. Throughout the
operation, the tactical-level commanders, from section commander upwards, continued to
insist on high standards from the local constabulary and reported violations to the upper
echelons of their chain-of-command.
Source; After-action reports from I Coy, 2 RCR, OPERATTON HALO.
315. AVOIDANCE OF CULTURAL ABSOLUTISM
1. lt is possible to assume that one's societal and cultural values and norms are universal
and equivalent to morals. Thus, one may attempt to impose social constructs unsuited to the
culture and society in which a campaign is being conducted. This is a form of cultural
absolutism.
2. Such an assumption and situation risks creating or exacerbating the perception that
foreigners are trying to impose values and beliefs at odds with those of the indigenous
population. Confusing what is morally universal (e.9., the right to education or responsible
government) with what is specific to a culture and society (e.9., secular democracy) and
attempting to apply it in another culture can lead to the creation of the perception that one is
seeking to impose cultural rather than societal change and will thus undermine the authority of a
campaign and its acceptance by an indigenous population. While this perception may exist
within the host nation population regardless, the practice of cultural absolutism is more likely to
generate feelings of illwill or cultural imperialism than would otherwise be the case.
3. For example, while responsible governance is considered a universal human right,4o it
must be recognized that there can be many forms of responsible government. Thus, secular
democracy as practised in Western nations may not be directly transferable to a culture that
does not necessarily ascribe to the notion of the separation of religion and politics. However,
this does not mean that forms of responsible, participatory government that incorporate religion
no
The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 18 through 21 , declare freedom of opinion,
expression, peaceful assembly and association and pafticipatory government as universal rights. These are all
fundamental tenets of democracy but may be inherent in other forms of representative, responsible government
not considered purely democratic in the Western sense.
a 10
B-GL-323-004 tFP-004
COIN Principles
into the political process should be dismissed as illegitimate if they do not violate the basic
principles of responsible government. Another example may be found in education
development. lf the desires of a village council is for a CIMIC team to coordinate and provide
for the construction of a religious school rather than a secular school, this request should be
granted. lt is not for the military commander to decide what type of education is offered.
lnstead, the aim is to facilitate education in general, keeping in mind that development is
incremental and long-term. ln this case, providing for a religious school at the local level may
allow parents and village leaders to moderate instruction at the school and avoid radicalized
teachings practised elsewhere.
4. lnsurgent propaganda, particularly from a point of moral superiority, will exploit the
practice of cultural absolutism by coalition forces, usually by claiming that grievances and
injustices are being perpetuated and that the fundamental, traditional culture is being attacked.
5. ln orderto avoid such situations and perceptions, commanders and those planning a
campaign must understand the traditional tenets of the culture and society in which they will
operate. They must understand how their words and actions will be viewed and interpreted.
They must attempt to effect individual and societal change where necessary for a successful
outcome, whilst adhering to the cultural and traditional arrangements and avoiding assumptions
of cultural absolutism. A campaign may require changes to a society, but they must occur with
the culture arrangements of the environment.
6. lt should be noted that the domestic populations of nations contributing troops to a
campaign may not comprehend the importance of working within cultural constructs and expect
social developments to reflect their own society's concept of development and progress. The
importance of working within a cultural construct reflective of the environment at hand may have
to be explained carefully to domestic audiences.
316. POLITICALAWARENESS
1. Commanders at all levels and individual soldiers must be aware of the consequences of
any action they may take. This is especially important should an unexpected opportunity
present itself to create a tactical success or in a sudden emergency when there is no time to
seek advice or direction from higher authority. Those with an understanding of the socio-
cultural and political nuances at the local level will be better able to assess the likely effect of
their actions on the local populace and to make correct decisions that will reinforce the larger
goals and objectives of the campaign. They must be ready to sacrifice short-term tactical
success in order to support the principles of a COIN campaign and the operational objectives
specific to the campaign.
2. All ranks must be briefed on the aims of both the COIN campaign and those of the
insurgency and trained to recognize themes and messages in enemy propaganda along with
the need to avoid feeding those propaganda messages. An understanding of the issues at
stake ensures that soldiers know how to reinforce the COIN effort and objectives. Furthermore,
commanders and soldiers must be made to understand that success in COIN is not necessarily
synonymous with physical destruction of insurgents and that achieving tactical success must not
take precedence over the longer-term operational and strategic goals.
317. ACTING WITHIN THE LAW
L Even though terrorists and insurgents use lawless and violent methods, the government
and security force response must be constrained by adherence to the rule of law. Operating
outside the law will only fuel discontent and the insurgent propaganda machine. lf the
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
government and its security forces lose the moral high ground, and thus legitimacy and
credibility, the people have no incentive to support them. The host nation security forces must
act within domestic law, while coalition forces must operate within the bounds of both
international and national law as well as within the bounds of accepted international norms,
which may not be formally stated but nonetheless exist. ln many nations, the police and local
military will require close supervision in order to ensure that they and their actions fall within
these parameters. Leaders at all levels must not be reluctant to voice their concerns with
respect to the conduct of local security forces, both on the spot and in their reports to their
chains-of-command.
318. MINIMUM NECESSARY FORGE
1. No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve an aim. The amount used
must be reasonable and it must not be punitive. Once the aim is achieved, no more force
should be used.
2. The need to use minimum force is not to be confused with deploying the minimum
number of troops. The appearance of a force large enough to contain a situation at the right
psychological moment may convince insurgents and other adversaries or dissidents that the
authorities are well prepared and determined to deal with lawlessness.
3. As in all operations, commanders remain morally responsible to ensure that all ranks
can apply their rules of engagement robustly and with confidence. ln doing so, commanders
and soldiers alike must recognize the need to limit collateral damages and to only engage
clearly identified threats. lnsurgents will undoubtedly attack from the shelter and screen of
civilian populations, and soldiers must ensure that they clearly identify the threat before
engaging with deadly force. This must be a key aspect of training.
4. Furthermore, insurgents will execute atrocities with the specific aim of causing an
overreaction from the security forces that will later be used in propaganda to undermine the
credibility of COIN forces and to enhance the insurgent's narrative. This should be kept in mind
by commanders when planning.
sEcTtoN 4
CONCLUSION
1. The principles and considerations articulated above are only intended to provide
guidance and are not meant to be read as hard-and-fast rules^ They are doctrinal principles
based on the overarching philosophy; they are not dogma and should be applied with flexibility
and common sense. All forms of warfare evolve, particularly during times of conflict, and
insurgency and counter-insurgency are not exceptions to this fact. However, the principles
listed and described represent the distillation of the facts of history and provide a reasonable
guide for the commander to comprehend a complex operational situation and develop plans that
will reinforce and complement the necessary political solution to the conflict.
3-20 B-GL-323-004 tFP-004
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 4
STRATEGIC.LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY
... the first requirement for fhe successful conduct of a COIN campaign is for the
governmenf fo sef up a sound framework within which it can take place.
-General Sir Frank Kitson
sEcTtoN 1
INTRODUCTION
1. ln its widest context, an insurrection will be politically motivated. Therefore, the
overarching strategy to defeat the insurrection must be political. While military activities will act
to form part of this strategy, they only encompass one arm of a multi-faceted campaign that
uses a comprehensive approach incorporating all elements of power in a unity of purpose. The
amount of emphasis placed the military's role will be dictated by the strength of the insurgent
forces and their tactics, techniques and procedures. Strategic and operational considerations
are fundamentally different for counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns than for conventional
campaigns. They require closer cooperation with ongoing diplomatic activities and more
consideration of the overarching political objectives at lower operational and tactical levels of
command. Usually this involves the selective use of force, as opposed to maximum firepower
and destruction, in conjunction with humanitarian and diplomatic activities. Therefore, closer
and more extensive coordination between the military and other governmental and non-
governmental agencies is required. Nonetheless, whether or not an insurgency develops to the
point at which there is major combat, as with the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army in 1947 or
the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2002, the outcome of a COIN campaign will be profound.
SECTION 2
THE GOVERNMENT CONCEPT
4O'1. THE SETTING
1. Alliances and global security arrangements enhance the security environment through
reducing the threat of attack against Canada while increasing the likelihood of support from
other nations. Also the willingness to contribute to allies, both regionally and on a global level
has been seen as effective in containing potentially unstable situations. As such, working with
other nations is an essential element of our foreign and defence policies. Here, the military has
a proven role in maintaining international policies and relationships.
2. The government of the day decides on participation in international deployments on a
case-by-case basis. Considerations affecting the decision making process include Canadian
interests and costs, risks to military personnel, probability of success, specificity of objectives
and mission duration as well as existing commitments.
3. lt is possible that a national government, an international organization or other lead
nation faced with an insurgent threat will request assistance from Canada. ln the event of the
Government of Canada agreeing to such a request, the Canadian military may deploy a force to
conduct COIN operations. Such a deployment may be a unilateral action or part of a
multinational coalition under the United Nations (UN) or other lead-nation or coalition
arrangements.
4. ln considering requesting Canadian military assistance, a national government or the UN
is likely to delay such a request in the hope that the existing situation will improve so that
B-GL-323-004/FP-004 4-1
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
outside assistance will not be necessary. lt should be expected, therefore, that any insurgency
will be well established by the time Canadian troops are committed.
5. Even before a firm commitment is made by the Canadian government, and most
certainly immediately following any public announcement, military leaders must work to ensure
that the enablers and conditions needed to help ensure campaign success will be provided. As
stated earlier, a COIN campaign requires a comprehensive approach, with the military working
in support of other agencies in order to address the root causes of the insurgency. The
involvement of other government departments and other agencies in the campaign planning,
training and deployment to the campaign and their long-term commitment to the campaign will
be essential for success. Given the military's unique understanding of COIN campaigns and the
principles by which they should be conducted, commanders must be prepared to take a lead in
encouraging the government to set these conditions for success in the campaign.
402. THE PRIMACY OF HOST NATION POLICIES
1. A COIN campaign must be conducted in accordance with an agreed, pervasively applied
national policy of the host nation (HN) and indigenous government. They must take the lead in
the campaign. ln the case of a failed, failing or re-established state, an interim government
mandate and its military campaign must be in accordance with any mandate issued by the
international organization sponsoring the overall campaign and coalition.
2. ln situations in which the indigenous government is nascent and only developing, it must
be mentored and brought to the fore in the public eye to the greatest extent possible. This will
give legitimacy to the campaign and to the indigenous government, and, ideally, a sense of
pride and ownership amongst the populace. Furthermore, even a nascent government will be
able to provide advice to coalition leadership regarding the perceptions and attitudes of its own
population and their view of coalition actions.
3. All actions and restrictions arising from strategic policy affecting the nation, its population
and resources must be carefully explained to the populace. Similarly, the operations of the
security forces must be seen to stem from national policy.
403. THE PRIMACY OF LAW
1. The legal framework within which COIN operations may be conducted will almost
ceftainly change from situation to situation, but the primacy of the law cannot be usurped by
military action. Where the national or mandated government maintains control of the country or
parts of the country, it should determine the policy and priorities for COIN operations and the
restoration of legitimate government.
2. lf martial law or emergency powers are enacted, these measures should be temporary in
nature and their purpose must be clearly explained to the people of the host nation. Such a
decision must be made carefully, for it will be readily exploited by insurgent propaganda as an
example of the unjust policies of the government.
3. These facts dictate that the highest level of government develop and distribute a
strategic message which pervades down to the lowest tactical level. Furthermore, restoration of
legal normalcy is a decisive factor.
4-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Strategic-Level Considerations for Counter-l nsurgency
SECTION 3
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
1. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, the ultimate objective will be achieved
by a combination of complementary objectives under the overall direction of the highest civilian
authority. These objectives, which will address the root causes of the insurgency, will be
achieved through:
a. political policy that will develop responsible governance, a competent civil service
and politically subordinate security forces;
b. economic policy that will create enduring and pervasive wealth to meet basic
needs and expectations;
c. social programmes that seek to develop current and future generations; and
d. security operations that create a framework in which other elements of power
may operate and foster the development of indigenous forces to assume and
fulfil their own security requirements.
2. ln a COIN campaign, strategic centres of gravity will be segments of the population
(generally the majority) and their support for the campaign. There will be a competition over the
support, or at least the acquiescence, of the broad mass of indigenous people.o' The domestic
populations of troop contributing nations and their will to support a long-term campaign will also
be a strategic centre of gravity, which the insurgents will try to influence, mainly through
attacking their will by inflicting a heavy cost on the coalition forces. Other strategic centres of
gravity may be individuals or groups who are moral centres of gravity.
3. The identification of centres of gravity becomes more complex at lower levels of
command, where subordinate commanders must deal with regional, sub regional and local
political, economic, social and military issues and influences. All activities, regardless of the
level at which they are conducted, must work to support the strategic and operational objectives
through the identified centres of gravity.
4. Although centres of gravity remain vital considerations in campaign and operational
planning, they cannot be the sole focus. Campaigns must focus on the strategic and
operational objectives that must be reached or created in order to realize the desired end-state.
These objectives will be reached through, or at least in relation to, the identified centres of
gravity. Given the nature of counter-insurgencies, this will in many cases be conducted on the
psychological plane vice only the physical plane of physical attack and defence.
5. ln certain situations, the insurgency itself may have become complex enough to be
considered as a combination of groups of insurgencies, perhaps with shifting alliances and
varying degrees of competition within and amongst groups. The insurgency in lraq during
2004-2005 is an example of this. Although planning will require perhaps greater complexity
and detail, plans should continue to apply the guiding principles for COIN campaigns.
6. ln a campaign in a foreign country, the objectives of the Canadian military will be
influenced by the policies of the host nation, the Government of Canada and the capabilities and
limitations of any coalition partners, be they military or other elements of power. The overall aim
is to create a situation in which the coalition military is no longer needed and the indigenous
security forces can provide a reasonable level of security, other agencies are capable of
ot
COIN forces will need to gain and maintain the support of the broad mass of the indigenous populace. For
their part, insurgents only need to intimidate or exhaust the will of the local populace to resist the insurgency.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 4-3
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
operating securely and can eventually pass development and aid issues to international and/or
indigenous agencies, and Canadian involvement may be withdrawn in the confidence of an
enduring solution.
SEGTION 4
THRESHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSIDERATIONS
1. lt is vital the political and military leaders recognize the development of an insurgency
whilst it is still in its early stages. During this threshold period, key decisions will be made that
will either alleviate the crisis and pre-empt the insurgency or worsen and inflame the situation.
ldeally, the effects of decisions and actions will be carefully considered before they are
implemented.
2. As a political and social situation deteriorates and an insurgency develops, the host
nation government may face a series of threshold circumstances. These will manifest in a
manner difficult to recognize, as a range of seemingly unrelated events such as politically
motivated strikes within key industries or demonstrations with potentially subversive political
undertones. Recognizing these actions as insurgent activity may be difficult because many of
these incidents occur with no subversive intent in normal times and no threat of violence.
lndeed, any related violence may be dismissed by some as simply criminal activity and an
attempt made to disassociate it from any political motivation.
3. Although one must be careful not to assume an insurgency exists where it does not, the
dismissal of a nascent insurgency as mere criminal behaviour is the surest way of fuelling it.
Such dismissal adds to the insurgent's narrative of subjugation and overall legitimacy and
provides political leaders with an excuse to ignore the root causes of the discontent
underpinning any growth in the insurgency.
4. ln dealing with a developing insurgency, all restrictive measures-curfews and
restrictions on movement, or in an extreme case, detention without trial-place a strain on
democracy, and any decision to introduce them must not be made lightly. lnsurgent incidents
often bring a public demand for extreme measures as the populace seeks security.
Simultaneously, the insurgent, through his actions, intends for the government, military and
security forces to respond in a repressive manner. This must be avoided at all costs, as an ill-
considered response will heighten the effectiveness of the insurgent campaign.
5. The government may conclude that a combination of selective legislation and small-
scale, precision security force operations would stand a good chance of nipping the insurgency
in the bud. ln practice, however, crossing that threshold is seldom easy, as sensitivity to
potential domestic and international repercussions firmly inclines a government towards the
deferment of painful decisions.
6. During this threshold period, the government will monitor the situation in the strategic
environment. lf it deteriorates, relevant departments and ministries, such as National Defence
and Foreign Affairs in Canada, will begin contingency planning. This will include informing the
respective ministers of possible capabilities, options and restrictions within the context of the
insurgency's perceived causes and objectives. From this initial planning, a strategic directive
should be prepared,a2 setting out the government's policy and objectives as the basis for
campaign design and a basis for the comprehensive approach to engage with political, military,
economic and social issues. The government should begin to bring together the military with
ot
B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations, daled 2000-12-18. See Chapter 3 "The Campaign plan,"
especially Section 1 "Campaign Design," article 301," The Strategic Environment," pg. 3-'l .
4-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Strategic-Level Considerations for Counter-l nsurgency
the other elements of power and national and international organizations needed to resolve the
crisis and conduct a successful campaign.
7 . Although such a scenario is likely to develop gradually as the seriousness of the threat
becomes obvious, there are a number of issues that would be particularly beneficial to military
planners, should the government give them early consideration. These include, but are not
limited to, formulating a longterm politicalaim, integrating and expanding the requisite
intelligence and security services and establishing a multi-agency framework for the planning
and conduct of security and other operations requiring civil, police and military cooperation.
Naturally, such efforts would be expanded should the situation continue to deteriorate.
SECTION 5
MILITARY COMMITMENT
1. Guided by the national strategic directive, the Canadian military will develop a military
strategy and campaign plan, which is a subset of national strategy. The degree of preparation
enabled by this military strategy and campaign plan during this early stage will determine the
ease of deployment and subsequent operations for Canadian troops. The earlier that liaison is
established between the Canadian Forces, government agencies, coalition and localforces, and
the more integrated the planning that has taken place beforehand, the smoother the deployment
will be.
2. ln the simplest of terms, the aim of military intervention is to restore the situation to the
point at which the host nation police and security forces are able to maintain law and order. At
the same time, the military will provide the security framework within which other agencies may
be able to operate in order to restore essential services and help develop indigenous
government capacity. lnitially, the security situation may be such that the military must assume
additional roles such as the re-establishment of essential services and emergency humanitarian
relief. As the security situation improves, these responsibilities should be assumed by other
organizations better suited to undertaking them. Concurrent with this must the hand-over of
security responsibilities to local authorities, ideally with a police lead. This will show progress,
lend legitimacy to the campaign and government and restore a sense of normalcy in the society.
A training and mentoring role may have to be adopted in order to develop the capability of the
local security forces to assume these responsibilities.
3. There is always the risk that a deploying military force will replace rather than
supplement local security forces. This situation must be avoided in the interests of maintaining
the military in a supporting relationship with government, police and other agencies, both
indigenous and international. This will lend legitimacy and support to both the campaign and
the local forces themselves. lt will be vital that a local face be given to any operation whenever
possible. Additionally, this will help preserve the security forces' morale and their standing with
the population they will have to serve upon the return to normalcy.
4. When acting within a coalition force, it will remain important to coordinate activities with
the local authorities. This will avoid the image of occupation and ensure that an understanding
of indigenous needs is gained and that planned operations and their effects are considered from
a suitable cultural perspective.
5. When operating in supporl of a friendly government, the military must be seen to operate
clearly in support of the civil power and not in isolation from it. This can be accomplished more
readily if the local security forces are incorporated into military planning whenever possible, and
the civil government is seen to be implementing those aspects of policy, planning and control
which closely affect military operations.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
sEcfloN 6
THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES
1. The strategic end-state should describe the withdrawal of all government agencies from
the campaign, whilst the operational end-state will describe the conditions leading to the
withdrawal of military forces.
2. The withdrawal phase of military disengagement may prove problematic. Whilst no
government or military aspires to a protracted conflict, history provides scant few examples of
shotl-lived counter-insurgencies. There is always the potentialthat public antipathy, manifest in
widespread opposition to a deployment and demands for withdrawal, could form a strategic
challenge to the government and the military to maintain the morale of the public and of military
elements deployed and in training to deploy. The key element in achieving these objectives is a
strategic public affairs programme.
3. Potentially, a domestic or international settlement may allow for a swift troop withdrawal.
Nevertheless, the history of COIN indicates a greater probability for a prolonged struggle of the
attrition of national will.
4. Because it is a political struggle on both the physical and psychological planes, a COIN
campaign takes years to succeed and to reach a point at which the military commitment may
hand-over to indigenous security forces and a normal force presence occur. Often the host
nation government will only regain control of its disaffected territory area by area over time.
This will necessitate a prolonged military withdrawal phase. This fact should be articulated at
the start of the strategic planning process, and the campaign plan must anticipate it and reflect
it.
4-6 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
ANNEX A
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF A COUNTER.INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
4A01. INTRODUCTION
1. Before any unit or component of the Canadian Forces (CF) may deploy on operations,
commanders at all levels need to understand the legal foundation for the pafticular mission or
operation to be undertaken. Generally, there are two legal regimes that govern the deployment
of the CF on missions oroperations outside Canada, including, forthe purpose of this manual,
counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The first regime is the body of national, or domestic, law
that provides the foundation for embarking on COIN operations. The second regime includes
that large body of international law that governs the conduct of the CF during the execution of a
COIN operation in another sovereign state.
4A02. NATIONAL, OR DOMESTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
1. There are two sources of authority in national, or domestic, law that provide the legal
foundation for the CF to engage in operations. The first source can be found in the National
Defence Acf (NDA). Sections 31 to 34 set out the authority of the government to place
members of the CF on active service, either for the defence of Canada or the consequence of
any action taken by Canada under the UN Charter, NATO treaty or other regional agreements.
Those sections of the NDA also provide that all members of the Regular Force are liable to
perform any laMul duty, and that members of the Reserve Force may be liable for laMul duty
when called out by regulations (i.e., Class B or C reserve service). ln addition, Part lll of the
NDA sets out the Code of Service Discipline. CF members on COIN operations are always
subject to the Canadian military justice system.
2. The second source of authority within the national legal regime is the general authority of
the government to engage in military activity under the rubric of crown prerogative. Crown
prerogative is a residual royal powerthat is currentlyvested in the Governor-in-Council (i.e., the
governor general of Canada acting on behalf of the cabinet) and provides the authority for the
cabinet to order military deployments, engage in international expeditions, enter into
international treaties and declare war without the constitutional requirement to refer the matter
to Parliament.
4A03. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION
1, The second regime that provides a legal foundation for operations abroad is set out in
international law. Under international law, Canada may engage in overseas operations in any of
four possible sources of authority. The first source consists of the authority to conduct
operations on the territory of another state by the request or consent of the host state. For the
purpose of COIN campaigns, requesting states may ask Canada to provide military assistance
in the form of equipment or training (e.9,, Congo in the 1960s, Sierra Leone, Sudan) or
humanitarian assistance to the host nation (e.9., Rwanda).
2. The second source of authority is found in the UN Charter. Each of Chapters Vl, Vll and
Vlll of the charter contain specific authority to conduct a spectrum of operations with UN
approval, and in the case of Chapter Vlll, by regional arrangement. ln the majority of cases,
Canada will only engage in operations that are approved by the UN or under internationally
recognized regional arrangements (e.9., lnternational Security Assistance Force tlSAF]).
Historically, Canada has not unilaterally engaged in expeditionary operations in another
sovereign state.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 4A-1
Cou nter- I nsu rgency Operations
3. A third source of authority is founded on the inherent right to self-defence, either
collectively or in defence of Canadian sovereignty. Both of these legal authorities to engage in
military operations are unlikely in a COIN situation, mainly due to the level of threat and slow-to-
evolve nature of insurgencies. While unlikely, it is possible that a nation that is a member of a
regional arrangement will request the assistance of another member nation to combat an
insurgency (e.9., Australian assistance to the UK COIN operations in Malaya).
4. A fourth and recently developing source of authority to engage in international missions
can be found in the principle of humanitarian intervention. While not universally accepted,
humanitarian intervention provides that a state may intervene in the internal affairs of another
state on the conditions that there is widespread humanitarian distress, the host nation is
unwilling or unable to deal effectively with the crisis, and the existing international organs have
failed to act. Humanitarian intervention must be limited in time and scope, and the intervening
force must withdraw once the situation is stabilized.
4A04. LAWFUL CONDUGT OF OPERATIONS IN A COIN CAMPAIGN
1. Once the government has decided to engage in COIN operation under one or more of
the authorities explained above, the law of armed conflict governs the conduct of the CF during
the mission. lt is well settled in COIN doctrine that maintaining the confidence of the legitimate
government and the citizens of the country suffering the insurgency is crucial to continued
military and governmental success. To that end, the conduct of the CF must be above reproach
when engaging in operations against the insurgents. Any real or perceived breach of the law of
armed conflict will undermine the legitimacy of the COIN campaign and those forces conducting
it. History has shown that once the citizens have lost the confidence of the military forces
engaged in COIN operations, their sympathies and support will be transferred to the insurgents.
2. There is a robust international and domestic legal regime controlling the conduct of CF
units and members on operations. Apart from the protections offered by the domestic law of the
host nation, international law sets out the standard of conduct in non-international conflicts. The
CF will always conduct operations within the parameters of international law. For COIN
operations, Additional Protocol ll (AP ll) to the Geneva Conventions provides protection to
victims of non-international armed conflict by applying the humanitarian principles found in
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions to non-international conflicts.
3. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is the absolute minimum standard of
treatment, and it states that persons not taking part in hostilities must be treated humanely and
without discrimination. Specifically, they must not be subject to violence to life or person, being
taken as hostages, subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. lf charged with a crime,
they must be afforded the judicial protections commonly guaranteed by civilized nations.
Finally, if wounded or sick, they must be collected and cared for. The standard of treatment
afforded by this article also applies to those insurgents, irrespective of their status under
international law, who have been captured, surrendered or rendered hors de combat by wounds
or sickness.
4. ln addition, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has stressed direction to the CF to the
effect that all persons detained by units or individuals of the CF must be accorded the standard
of treatment provided by the 3rd Geneva Convention,ot i.e., the standard of treatment afforded
to a prisoner of war. Because CF personnel will treat all captured individuals as prisoner of war
irrespective of subsequent determination of their status, using labels such as "unlaMul
ot
B-GG-005-004/AF-005 lJse of Force in CF Operations, dated 200't-06-01.
4A-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Annex A to Chapter 4
combatants," "detainees" or "personnel under custody" to identify captured insurgents are
irrelevant for the CF members involved with the capture, handling or treatment of detained
insurgents.
5. The greatest leadership challenge in COIN operations is maintaining the moral high
ground and the rule of law by resisting the provocations of the insurgents. History has shown
that overreaction to insurgent provocation has led to breaches of the law of armed conflict,
which in turn have provided valuable propaganda material to the insurgents, the loss of citizen
support and ultimately mission failure. To avoid such a situation, commanders and units must
be well disciplined, well trained and comfortable and confident with the rules of engagement.
6. While the legal foundation of the COIN operation may vary from situation to situation, the
primacy of the rule of law must never be displaced. CF personnel must conduct operations
within the accepted international norms of warfare and the Code of Service Discipline,
irrespective of the type of operation.
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PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONAL.LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER.INSURGENCY
lf the long-term political objective ls nof first in the mind of all pafticipants, there
will be a tendency to adopt shorl-term, ad hoc measures in response to insurgent
or terrorist activity.
-Sir Robert Thompson
SECTION 1
JOINT AND COMBINED ASPECTS OF COUNTER.INSURGENCY
501. INTRODUCTION
1. The planning and conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) at the operational level requires
a realization by commanders and political leaders alike that the campaign requires a wide range
of actors and elements of power and cannot involve the military alone. lndeed, in most areas of
activity, or lines of operation, the military will have a supporting role to other elements of power
and international organizations.
2. Despite this supporting role, military commanders will likely take the lead in campaign
planning, including the incorporation of other elements of power into the campaign plan. This
may occur within a formal command structure, within a cooperative, consensual arrangement or
within a combination of arrangements. Regardless, the approach to the campaign must be
comprehensive, addressing the root causes of insurgency.
502. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
1. The demands of a COIN campaign call for the application of a comprehensive approach
that sees the military working in conjunction with other agencies and elements of power to
address the root, systemic causes of a crisis (including an insurgency) and to produce enduring
outcomes in the campaign. The comprehensive approach is defined as "The application of
commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of
favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment. Note: The comprehensive
approach brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create
enduring solutions to a campaign."*
2. Many of the root causes of an insurgency cannot be addressed by military forces and
require the application of international organizations (lOs) and other agencies and elements of
power. The military must neutralize the insurgents through pre-emption, disruption and
dislocation and create freedom of manoeuvre for these other agencies. lndeed, once the
security situation has improved and can be maintained by indigenous forces, the military may
even withdraw whilst these other agencies remain.
3. The campaign plan must reflect this comprehensive approach. Each line of operation
will group together similar and related operational objectives and will likely involve a number of
agencies. ln many lines of operation, the military will have a supporting role. At times, such as
in a line of operation dealing with security issues, the military may be the lead agency supported
by other elements of power.ou
*
Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.
ou
For more details regarding the comprehensive approach, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-1
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
4. Working with a comprehensive approach will require a unifying theme, manifested in a
common end-state, a unity of purpose and, ideally, a unity of effort across all agencies. Much of
this approach will be realized at the lower operational and tactical levels through military forces
working hand-in-hand with other agencies.
503. COMPREHENSIVEOPERATIONS
1. Military units tend to be trained, organized and equipped for combating conventional
threats that are similar to themselves in terms of aims, structures and doctrine. A COIN
campaign necessitates a somewhat different emphasis. Many activities conducted by military
forces will seek to build confidence within a local populace and to convince them to support the
campaign vice the insurgents. Thus the military will conduct influence activities. These will be
activities that have first-order psychological effects in order to affect the understanding and
perceptions (i.e., the minds) of the populace and even the insurgents themselves and to
ultimately affect their will and behaviour (i.e., their hearts).
2. These influence activities may be short-term psychological operations and public affairs
or longer-term civil-military cooperation (ClMlC) related undertakings. Many stability operations,
such as the construction of infrastructure or the training of indigenous forces, may be
considered part of influence activities.
3. lnfluence activities are combined with fires-physical activities with first order physical
effects-to form the concept of comprehensive operations: the deliberate use and orchestration
of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects. The campaign
theme, together with the situation at hand, will dictate the balance that is struck between fires
and influence. They are planned and conducted in a synchronized and complementary manner
and coordinated through manoeuvre and battlespace management (see Chapter 1 and
Figure 1-4).
4. Together, fires and influence create effects on the physical and psychological planes
respectively and should be planned to support operational objectives. Many of these influences
will be conducted with or through other agencies that are best suited to meet humanitarian and
governance demands, thus realizing a comprehensive approach (see Figure 5-1).
5-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Strategic Level Planning &
Executive Authority
Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-l nsurgency
Comprehensive
Approach:
Multi-Agency
lntegration
Comprehensive
Operations:
Fires &
lnfluence
Activities
Across Multiple
Agencies
Figure 5-1 : The Gomprehensive Approach and Comprehensive Operations
5. The application of fires to neutralize the insurgents will ideally be done with indigenous
forces in order to develop their capabilities and to enhance the legitimacy of the campaign. ln
conducting the engagement of the insurgents, commanders must come to appreciate and avoid
undesired effects. The creation of collateral damage and civilian casualties, for example, will do
much to undermine the operational objectives and overall legitimacy of the COIN campaign and
will greatly detract from influencing minds and hearts. Thus planning must be done with this in
mind.
6. Planning of tactical-level activities must always be done in order to support the stated
operational objectives. The combination of fires and influence will support the neutralization of
the insurgent and the separation of him from his sources of strength. Fires and other physical
activities will separate the insurgent from his physical support, whilst influence activities, through
public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and other capabilities, will separate him from
his moral supporl and ideally neutralize his influence on indigenous and other populaces.
7. COIN will be conducted through a joint and combined command intimately linked with
civilian political activities and other agencies. The shift in emphasis from the destruction of
enemy manoeuvre forces to a balance between fires and influence requires greater awareness
of intelligence, information and the socio-cultural milieu of the area of operation. ln order to
gauge how influence messages will be perceived and understood and thus create the desired
effect, commanders must come to understand the overall environment, its systems and its
overall culture.
L Commanders must consistently emphasize the minimum use of force rather than
maximum firepower, with consideration of both primary and secondary effects, in order to
maintain legitimacy and avoid providing material for insurgent propaganda. All of these factors
will require a greater degree of cooperation and unity of effort across all agencies from all
participating countries, with a more diverse range of civilian and security force actors to deal
with than is customary to many within the military.
9. Structurally, organizations at the operational level will mirror those civil and military
arrangements created at the strategic level, thus ensuring continued joint and combined
integrity throughout the various levels of command. Military leaders at the operational level will
Tactical Level Planning &
Execution
Figure 5-1:
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-3
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
continue to ensure that military efforts remain subordinate to political-civil constraints and
requirements. This will hold true regardless of the shifting effort and emphasis as the
insurgency evolves.
10. At the operational level and below, the comprehensive approach, with its integration of
multiple agencies to create enduring solutions to the insurgency, may be realized and
implemented through the creation of civil-military transition teams.a6 These teams or groupings
combine military and other agencies to undertake a wide variety of tasks that focus on
reconstruction, governance and development. They may include a range of government
departments and international organizations supported by the military. Their overall tasks will
include essential services, sustainable development, infrastructure and governance
development. The military's role may be wide ranging, particularly in the early stages, but as a
minimum will likely include security, escort, liaison duties as well as the provision of expertise in
fields such as engineering.
11. These teams should be considered manoeuvre elements not in terms of combining
firepower and movement but in terms of psychologically out-manoeuvring the insurgents to
dislocate the insurgents and create lasting stability. They bring a customizable, multi-faceted
capability to the campaign, which will create effects in support of operational objectives. They
may work along a single line of operation or along a number of lines of operation.
504. COMMAND SYSTEMSAND STRUCTURES4?
1. The command and control structures adopted for a COIN campaign should include the
wide variety of agencies and elements of power needed to successfully prosecute the
campaign. These may be formal or informal arrangements. ln either case, they must be based
on a unity of purpose and common end-state and include the various elements of power needed
to address the causes and aggravating factors of the insurgency.
505. SINGLE COMMANDER SYSTEM4s
1. ln a single command construct, the chairman or director of the coordinated effort is in
overall command of the campaign. ln this system, policy and executive authority are vested in a
single commander, usually a military officer, with senior civil service, police and subordinate
military commanders as advisers. The system requires a perceptive and charismatic (team
building) commander. Whether military or civilian, the commander will be acting on behalf of the
government and will have a variety of military and civilian advisers. The executive authority of
ot
Ciuil-military transition team is defined as: "An organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and
multidisciplinary efforts within a given geographic region. Note: lts purpose is to develop capacity in local agencies
and institutions in order to promote long-term stability. lt may be referred to as a provincial reconstruction team
(PRT) in some theatres" (submitted to the Army Terminology Panel, September 2007). The use of (PRTs) during
the campaign in Afghanistan is an example of civil-military transition teams.
a7
"This section and the concept of single and committee command structures are based in part on the work of
General Sir Frank Kitson. See: Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber and Faber, 1977. passim."
a8
A recent example of a single command system can be found in the Australian command construct used in the
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon lslands (RAMSI), initiated in 2003. ln this case, a civil servanUdiplomat led
the mission with the military and police elements subordinate to him in a single command structure even though the
military contributed the majority of the forces deployed. lt is important to note, however, that the style of command
used was highly cooperative in nature. See: Russell Glenn, COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the
Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon lslands, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).
5-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
the commander must be well understood by all subordinate commanders, be they civil or
military,
2. A single command system will best suit a single nation's contribution to a campaign
(even as part of a larger coalition) or that of a closely knit coalition.
3. Although a single command system may exist, there will be important contributors to the
campaign that will not come under this command system. These may be international
agencies, private volunteer organizations, private business and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). ldeally, they will share a unity of purpose and close coordination will be a common
practice.
4. Within a nation's campaign contribution, a single command system should allow the
application of a comprehensive approach at all levels of command, with an appropriate mix of
military and civil elements of power at various levels of command (see Figure 5-2, which is a
theoretical example only).
Note: Diagram represents possible balance between civilian
and military elements at each level.
Figure 5-2: Example of a Possible Single Command System
506. COMMITTEE SYSTEM
1. lt may not be possible, particularly when dealing with a coalition, to form a single
command system across different civilian and military agencies. ln such a case, committees
may be formed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to coordinate all COIN
objectives and activities across all elements of power and lines of operation.
Head of Mission/Commander
(Civilian or Military)
Deputy Head of Mission
(Civilian & Military -
opposite of Gommander)
Command Support & Advisory Cell
(Mix of Civilian & Military)
May require military technical support
and security elements
Liaison Section
lnterface with other agencies
Snr National Military
Comd/Formation Comd
(Operational Level)
Provincial Civil-Mil
Transition Tm Military Fmns & Units
Military Units
(with possible civilian advisors
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
2. A committee lead, normally the civil administration, provides the chairman of the highest-
level committee, thus linking joint forces and other elements of power. Subordinate committees
may be formed to group together similar elements of power between international and
indigenous powers.
3. The organization of committees may reflect thematic lines of operation in the
campaign plan. Committees are replicated at each level-national regional and local-as
appropriate.
4. The police and the military provide members to the various security operations
committees at each level-national, regional and local-in the administrative and command
hierarchy. These must include elements of indigenous forces, particularly if they are mature
and reliable. The ability of indigenous forces, both police and military, to provide intelligence
and situational awareness cannot be underestimated.
5. Other elements of power, such as judiciary reform institutions and infrastructure
development organizations, may form their own cooperative committees with indigenous input
or leadership at national, regional and local levels in order to coordinate and harmonize actions.
Military forces may also be represented at these non-military committees in order to coordinate
support (e.9., engineer expertise, security and transport) and provide situational awareness.
6. Decisions are made jointly and implemented by the chairman and members through
their own civil service, police and military command. At various levels, the committees may also
include lead administrators from various NGOs and international bodies providing support to the
operation (such as the UN special envoy, United Nations High Commission for Refugees
[UNHCR] coordinator, etc.). The structure of the committees must be flexible and altered to suit
the circumstances at hand. A national police command and civilian intelligence agencies, both
indigenous and foreign, may be able to support.
7. While the committees at various levels will guide and coordinate operations, military
commanders at all levels must be prepared to exploit fleeting opportunities in order to do
damage to the insurgency movement. ln simple terms, time may not exist to refer potential
military actions back to a committee. Any military action taken, however, must be fully in
concert with the overall strategy of the COIN operation, use the minimal force necessary,
support the campaign objectives and avoid undesired effects that will undermine the legitimacy
of the campaign.
B. Under a committee system, arrangements will become fairly ad hoc and change over
time. Nations contributing to a coalition will determine the level of commitment and the levels
and regions in which they will participate, be it a military commitment, a civilian commitment or a
combination thereof.
5-6 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Cou nter-lnsurgency
COMMITTEE SYSTEM
Coalition
Elements
lndigenous
Elements
lnternational
Organizations
Notes:
1. Structure is representative only. Actual structure will depend upon the situation and environment.
2. The committees may be designed to relect potential lines of operation.
3. Subordinate Committees are replicated at regional and local levels.
4. In a supporting coalition situation, committees will blend indigenous and coalition elements, along
with elements of international organisations such as the UN, EU, World Bank, etc.
Figure 5-3: Example of a Gommittee System for a GOIN Campaign
SEGTION 2
THE PLANNING OF THE COIN CAMPAIGN
507. OPERATIONALCAMPAIGNPLANNING
1. The COIN principles identified for the successful conduct of operations, as detailed in
Chapter 3, must be clearly understood. They form the backdrop to the campaign plan and
continue to be applied through all levels of command and integrated into daily operations.
Developing the military aspects of a COIN plan depends on many factors but typically involves
the securing of a firm base from which to operate. Once this base is established, military forces
should then seize the initiative in separating the insurgent from the supporting population in
order to support the government's subsequent activities.
2. The nature of a COIN campaign and the demand to use a comprehensive approach
calls for all elements of power needed in the campaign to be involved, to the greatest extent
possible, in the development of the campaign plan.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-7
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
508. EFFEGTS.BASED APPROACH TO CAMPAIGN PLANNING
1. An effects-based approach will be used in the development of the campaign plan.ot The
effects-based approach is defined as "a planning philosophy combined with specific processes
that enable firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a
comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of
operational objectives."50 ln simple terms, an effects-based approach ensures that the military
activities are integrated with those of other agencies and that military activities are directly linked
to operational objectives-the results or effects of the activities directly contribute to operational
objectives.
2. The campaign plan for a COIN campaign must span a considerable length of time in
order to be realistic and address the systemic causes that led to the crisis. Once devised, the
campaign plan is implemented through a series of operational plans that are constantly
reviewed and issued on a continual basis. Assessment of the situation, the environment and
campaign progress is continuous and informs subsequent iterations of the operational plan.
Each successive operational plan adjusts operations to reflect the progress made in the
campaign. This is illustrated in figure 5-4.
EFFECTS.BASED APPROAGH TO OPERATIONAL DESIGN
Figure 54: Model of a Gampaign Plan and Supporting Operational Plans
3. ln dealing with an effects-based approach and specifically with a COIN campaign, the
normal taxonomy used in campaign planning must be expanded.st The campaign plan must
ot
For more details on the effects-based approach, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
uo
Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.
51
For the purposes of a military lexicon, effects are simply considered the results of activities. They may occur as
first order effects on the physical or psychological plane or on both planes when second order effects are considered
For more details, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
5-8 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Cou nter-lnsurgency
work towards a desired and well articulated operational end-state that supports the strategic
end-state and objectives. Such an operational end-state should envisage the termination of all,
or at least the majority of, military involvement in the campaign and a prevailing security
situation that allows other elements of power to operate freely and is maintained by indigenous
forces at a sustainable operating level. The campaign plan begins with an articulation of this
operational end-state.
4. From this operational end-state, the commander and planning staff determine key
centres of gravity, operational objectives that will support the end-state, supporting effects that
will realize operational objectives and finally the activities (assigned through the operational
plans) that will create those supporting effects. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Effects-Based Approach: Planning Operational End-State
Through to Activities
Key Centres of
Gravity
Op Plan &
Op Order
Figure 5-5: Model for the Development of an Effects-Based Gampaign Plan
5. The basic steps in completing such a campaign plan are as follows:
a. Review the Sltuation. The operating environment will be complex, and a wide
range of factors-political, military, economic, social (including culture and
religion), informational and infrastructure-will need to be analyzed for their
power structures and influences upon the successful outcome of the campaign.
This will form the broad knowledge base that will inform the remainder of the
operational and tactical planning process.
b. ldentify and Analyze the Problem.
(1) The commander and staff conduct a mission analysis to establish both
the mission and the operational end-state. lnitial operational objectives
may also be identified.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-9
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
(2) The staff conducts a detailed evaluation of the factors, building upon the
broad knowledge base. Based upon the operational end-state and
objectives, centres of gravity may be identified. Other operational
objectives and the supporting effects needed to create them may also be
identified at this point.
(3) The commander and senior staff conduct analysis of the factors to
discern the major building blocks of the campaign plan. They will select
and analyze the centre(s) of gravity that dominate the situation along
with their critical requirements and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, they will
confirm the desired operational end-state. Based on the key centre(s) of
gravity, the commander will determine the operational objectives needed
to achieve the end-state. Analysis will occur throughout in order to
confirm the validity of decisions. At this point, the commander should
have identified coherent operational objectives focused on the operational
end-state and addressing the key centre(s) of gravity. The commander
will issue planning guidance to his staff.
Frame the Campaign Plan and lnitial Operational Plan (OPLAN). With the
building blocks decided, the campaign plan may be devised.
(1) Forthe campaign plan, operationalobjectives may be grouped into
thematic lines of operation, which allow commanders and staff to
visualize the progress and direction of the campaign. The lines of
operation will indicate where the military has primacy and where it
supports other instruments of power. Note that all lines of operation,
regardless of the primary agency involved, move towards the operational
end-state. Once this framework is established, commanders and staff
may determine supporting effects or decisive points that create the
operational objectives. Measures of effectivenesss2 are also determined.
Commanders and staff must realize that many of the desired effects in a
COIN campaign will take extensive periods of time to realize, for they
relate to changes in understanding, perceptions and will mainly in relation
to supporting a campaign.
(2) Whilst the campaign plan depicts the longterm process, the near-term
requirements to commence the plan must be considered. Thus the
campaign plan is initiated through an operational plan (OPLAN), which is
updated and adjusted regularly to meet changes to the environment (see
Figure 5-4). The commander and staff select the decisive points that are
most relevant to the immediate situation and that must be achieved
before others can be achieved. Selection and prioritization of decisive
points will generate options, each of which will provide a potential
framework for an OPLAN. Based on his intuition, the commander will
select an option to decide which decisive points will be developed first. A
broad, outline scheme of manoeuvre may be developed.
Develop and Validate Courses of Action (GoAs). The broad direction
and scheme of manoeuvre issued by the commander must now be
u'
Measure of effectiveness (MoE) is defined as "A criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected
system behaviour or capabilities over time" (Army Terminology Panel, May 2006).
d.
5-1 0 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Cou nter-lnsurgency
developed into detailed courses of action. The decisive points / supporting
effects chosen for initial development will be analyzed to determine what
activities are needed to create them. This is done by staff in collaboration with
specialist advisors, such as cultural or political advisors, and subordinate
headquarters. The activities may be arranged in different courses of action that
will lead to the realization of the decisive points. Courses of action may be
developed and compared in terms of activity, resources, time and space.
Course of Action (CoA) Evaluation. Each potential CoA is evaluated and
compared using a number of means in order to determine the most feasible and
likely of success. ln doing so, the validity of selected decisive points may also be
examined to determine if they are deliverable and realistic within the constraints
of resources.
Commander's Decision and Plan Development. Once the CoAs for the
OPLAN have been compared and assessed, the commander may select or
develop the CoA most likely to be successful in terms of creating the required
decisive points / supporting effects.
6. The extant taxonomy for campaign planning must be expanded beyond the concepts
dealing with conventional forces linked to geographical features and become broader concepts
in order to support the objectives and environmental issues relevant to a COIN campaign. The
expansion of campaign planning taxonomy should incorporate the need to create operational
objectives that involve more than simply military forces operating against other military forces:
Lines of operation should be considered as thematic groupings of operational
objectives and their supporting effects. They connect and drive activities to meet
operational objectives and ultimately the operational end-state in relation to
identified centres of gravity.
Centres of gravity remain vital in the development of a campaign plan and will
dictate the development of operational objectives.53
(1) Centres of gravity should be considered capabilities, based on groups or
individuals, that can create effects. They may be physical, such as an
enemy armoured reserve, or they may be moral, such as a charismatic
religious leader. Centres of gravity will have characteristics and localities
of importance but must be considered as a capability to be affected or
influenced.
(2) Centres of gravity at the strategic and operational levels must be
identified and considered in the development of the campaign plan.
(3) Generally, within a COIN campaign, strategic centres of gravity are
populations and their support of the campaign. The population of the
region or nation in question is a centre of gravity over which the
insurgents and the COIN elements will fight for support. The domestic
populations of any troop contributing nations will also be centres of
gravity, which the insurgents will attempt to intimidate and convince not to
suppott the campaign,
tt
Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 defines a centre of gravity as "Characteristics, capabilities or localities
from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or
will to fight."
e.
b.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-11
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
(4) Operational objectives can be devised based on strategic and operational
centres of gravity. lf a population mass and its supporl is a key centre of
gravity, then operational objectives will seek to create the conditions-a
respons ible government, sustai nable infrastructure, etc.-that wi I I gai n
and hold their suppoft.
(5) At an operational level, centres of gravity may be regional governments
and leaders whose competence and legitimacy in providing support and
security to their populations will be vital. Other centres of gravity may be
regional groups or tribes whose support withdrawn from an insurgency
may be key to long-term success.
(6) ln attacking or defending these centres of gravity, there will be a
req u i rement for comprehensive operations-the synch ron ized
combination of fires and influence activities. lnfluence activities through
public affairs, PSYOPS, CIMIC and presence, profile and posture are
particularly important in terms of convincing population-based centres of
gravity to reject the insurgency and supporl the COIN campaign.5o
c. Operational objectives will not necessarily be terrain-linked objectives but more
in the nature of decisive conditions that have both physical and psychological
dimensions. They may be military and security related, or they may be related to
governance, civil institutions and infrastructure. Thus many operational
objectives will be reached or created by other elements of power, with the military
in a supporting role or providing security and perhaps, given an early security
situation, initial work. Operational objectives are the key building blocks of the
campaign.
d. Decisive points may be considered those supporting effects-results of
activities-that build to the operational objectives. For example, if, based on a
desired end-state, an operational objective is the creation of a competent,
politically subordinate military force, a decisive point or supporting effect required
for this objective may be the creation of a military training centre and professional
NCO corps. This supporting effect can then be created by the assignment of
tactical activities, in particular, those dealing with security sector reform (see
Figure 5-5). Several decisive points or supporting effects will likely be required to
achieve an objective.
e. Activities are tactical activities and tasks assigned in order to create supporting
effects or decisive points that together will realize operational objectives. ln this
manner, tactical activities are not conducted out of hand or from a preconceived
template but are directly related to operational objectives.
7. Once operational objectives have been identified, they may be grouped together in
thematic lines of operation. The figures below indicate an example of lines of operation for a
campaign.
u'
For more details with respect to influence activities, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations
5-12 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
NOTE
These are examples only and should not be considered a template for a COIN campaign.
8. During the campaign planning process, it is vitalthat appropriate measures of
effectiveness be determined in order to measure progress in creating supporting effects /
decisive points and their related operational objectives.
E.G.: Clan Y & Their Support for Central
Government
Figure 56: Example of Lines of Operation for a Campaign Plan
Line of Operation
Theme 1:
Governance
Op Objective 1: lnterim Governance Provided
Op Objective 2: Self{overnance Established
Line of Operation
Theme 2:
Line of Operation
Theme 3:
Political Process
Op ObJective 5: Electoral Process Reformed
Op ObJective 6; Elected Government
Empowered
Line of Operation
Theme 4:
Reconstruction
op objective 8: Sustained lnfrastructure
Established
* r-: rztr *{x} rxf & r av l2g
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-1 3
1ONAL END STATE
A lasting peace in, wttich lhe threat of violencE and civil war has been removed and Nation X has
stable political structures; supported by i€liable infrastruclure, governance and regional leaders,
providing prosperity and qegufity forrall of ils people.
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
Figure 5-7: Example of Lines of Operations, Operational Objectives and Decisive Points /
Supporting Effects
509. CAMPAIGN ASPECTS UNIQUE TO A COIN CAMPAIGN
1. Although the development and conduct of a COIN campaign at the operational level will
follow the same general process as that for any other campaign, there are several aspects that
warrant special consideration. These are reflective of the philosophy and principles unique to a
cotN.
2. The importance of these unique aspects orfactors cannot be overstated. Failure to
understand and consider them will ignore the principles for COIN and thus potentially lead to
campaign failure.
510. COLLABORATIVEPLANNING
1. By its vary nature a COIN campaign will require a comprehensive approach so that
elements of power other than the military may address and solve the underlying causes of the
insurgency and morally separate the insurgency from its legitimacy and support base. Thus,
many lines of operation and operational objectives will not only involve other agencies, but
those agencies may well be the lead element.
2. To this end, these other agencies-be they government departments, international
organizations or NGOs entering into the campaign in a spirit of cooperation-should be involved
in planning for the campaign. This will pose some challenges to agencies, including the military,
E;;_l
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I cou.,n"n.. I
I ercviaeo I
t;----_l
I objective2: I
|
".n-
I
I qovernanc" I
lesuorisnea I
Line of Operation Theme 1: Governance Line of Operation Theme 2: Security
|oo*i],*"1
|
"""u*
I
I Envircnment I
I E$abrished I
Ft t""-f
I setr- I
I sustalnins I
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tsl""*'_-l
I et"oion I
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Line of Operation Theme 3: Political Process Line of Operation Theme 4: Reconstruction
5-14 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
which are accustomed to working in isolation or working without a formal plan at the operational
level. Military commanders may have to take the lead and carefully explain to other
organizations the reasoning and process behind collaborative campaign planning. This will be
necessary whether the campaign hierarchy is based on a single command system or a
committee system.
3. ln the early stages of the campaign, the security situation may be such that only the
military forces are able to operate. ln such cases, some lines of operation that would normally
have a civilian agency lead may be assumed by the military in order to commence work, to
develop legitimacy for the campaign and to garner public support through the demonstration of
tangible progress. Restoration of essential services may be a case in point. ln such cases, the
military activities should be supportive of likely future work by other agencies. Collaborative
planning before the deployment will help ensure this complementary aspect of activities.
511. OPERATIONAL CENTRE OF GRAVITY-INSURGENT SUPPORT
1. Strategically, a small number of centres of gravity will exist. Within the nation itself,
these will likely be limited to the following possibilities:
a. the bulk of the population, their support for the COIN campaign and their
rejection of the insurgency;
b. the host government (members and structures) and their perceived legitimacy
amongst the populace, their capability and their physical and moral superiority to
the insurgents; and/or
c. any individual national leader who has pervasive influence across the nation as a
moral centre of gravity.
2. Gaining the support of the population will require effective political action, a safe and
secure environment and socioeconomic programmes that serve to substantively improve the
dayto-day lives of the people.
3. Operational centres of gravity for insurgents will likely be various groups of individuals
who support the insurgency. This may be a particular tribe or clan in a region known to forego
recognition of a central government or one that has been marginalized by a central authority.
Another operational centre of gravity may be an external supporter supplying resources to the
insurgent forces.
4. Each centre of gravity will have to be analyzed in order to determine its critical
requirements and critical vulnerabilities. These may be physical, moral or a combination. For
example, a specific tribe supporting an insurgency may have done so out of historic
marginalization by a central government. lf assessed as an operational centre of gravity, it may
be neutralized through a number of means: its grievances regarding political marginalization
may be solved through political reform, its moderate leaders motivated and their images
enhanced through PSYOPS, the tribe's tactical capabilities destroyed and hard line leadership
either destroyed or marginalized to the point that they are no longer influential. Thus, a
combination of fires and influence will be used to neutralize adversary centres of gravity.
5. lt is from operational centres of gravity that the insurgents draw their freedom of action,
physical strength and a portion of their will to fight. Although campaign planning must support
the overarching effort against the insurgents' strategic centre of gravity, operational-level
leadership must determine the relevant operational centres of gravity, analyze them and
determine how best to neutralize them. Methods of neutralizing these centres of gravity may
include destruction or disruption of insurgents' higher command and control structures, removal
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-1 5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
of fear of reprisals amongst the general population or influence activities seeking popular
support and legitimacy such as the provision of utilities and medical aid to society at large.
6. Analysis of operational centres of gravity will involve the same general process as any
centre of gravity analysis; however, a greater emphasis must be placed upon centre of gravity
capabilities and vulnerabilities on the psychological/moral plane, for the operational focus must
be on influencing groups of people to reject the insurgency. Such an analysis will help inform
the development of operational-level objectives and subsequent decisive points (supporting
effects) and activities. This will require immense support from the intelligence community in
terms of identifying and analyzing the various factors and influences in the environment in order
to understand how best to engage, physically and psychologically, these centres of gravity and
alter their behaviour in a manner desired.
7. Once this analysis is done, it will ultimately inform, shape and focus tactical-level
activities and their links to operational-level objectives. ln all cases, the indigenous population is
the primary centre of gravity because no insurgency can survive amidst the hostile terrain of an
unreceptive public. Other centres of gravity may include, but are not limited to, sources of
financing, weapons and munitions, groups of supporters and their motivations and political
conditions that fuel public grievances. Higher headquarters and national sources can provide
valuable intelligence and information but will seldom be able to provide information of the
requisite quality to conduct tactical operations. The operational planning process will therefore
dedicate a significant amount of effort towards acquiring the information necessary to target the
insurgents' centre of gravity.
5'12. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN
1. Once the centres of gravity and their critical vulnerabilities and requirements have been
identified and analyzed, operational objectives, lines of operation, decisive points (supporting
effects) and activities to meet those decisive points may be determined. ln short, the campaign
plan may be developed.
2. Part of this process should include an analysis of the insurgent's own campaign plan.
This will be part of the intelligence assessment. lt should determine the insurgent's aims,
intents and strategic and operational schemes of manoeuvre and thus should allow
commanders to identify likely lines of operation and objectives for the insurgents. ln turn, the
COIN campaign's planned objectives, lines of operation, decisive points and activities should
seek to counter insurgent lines of operation and pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the key
pillars of the insurgent campaign plan. Some of those key pillars will be to target friendly
centres of gravity. The commander must be aware of this fact and consider what actions may
be required to counter-act these insurgent efforts.
3. Specifically, insurgents will try to capitalize on the role public opinion plays in
democracies and will deliberately stage events and coordinate operations to undermine the will
of domestic audiences of campaigning nations in order to cease their participation in the
campaign. The domestic audiences of these nations and their support for the campaign are
strategic centres of gravity that the insurgents will attack. Plans must be made and activities
conducted to defend these centres of gravity. Paft of this battle will consist of a proactive public
affairs policy that seeks to highlight the legitimacy of the campaign to indigenous, domestic and
international audiences and, above all, ensures that the domestic audience of a campaigning
nation receives accurate and timely information regarding the campaign.
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Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
The support of the domestic public is critical to sustaining any COIN campaign the CF is
tasked to undertake and is therefore a friendly centre of gravity. Technology now allows
insurgents to more easily coordinate actions and effects and directly target the will of the
public of coalition partners. Domestic public opinion can and will be targeted a number of
ways, including media releases and interviews with Western media outlets, attacks timed and
coordinated to coincide with specific events in coalition countries, and strategies aimed at
causing rates of attrition unacceptable to coalition members. There are many historical and
recent examples of insurgents targeting the will of an adversary's domestic public. General
Vo Nguyen Giap specifically created a strategy that would target the will of the American
public during the Vietnam War. More recently, the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004
likely altered national election outcomes and led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from
lraq. At both the operational and strategic levels planners must anticipate and plan to counter
enemy lines of operation targeting friendly centres of gravity.
Sources: Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: the Marines and Revolutionary Wartare in t Corps,
1965-1972. Westport CT: Praeger, 1997, pp.128-129.
4. ln short, the insurgents too will seek to influence key target audiences. Thus the
commander must anticipate this with a combination of defensive and offensive information
operations / influence activities. The former will seek to protect domestic populations,
supportive indigenous groups and friendly forces from the insurgent propaganda and explain the
nefarious motivations of his actions and atrocities. The latter-offensive influence activities-
will seek to convince neutral or unsupportive target audiences to reject the insurgency and its
aims.
5. Alloperational objectives, decisive points and related activities of the campaign plan
should seek to undermine the physical and moral strength and legitimacy of the insurgents.
Given that the successful outcome of a COIN campaign is linked to the psychological
disposition of a population to support or reject an insurgency, destruction of the moral
superiority and legitimacy of the insurgent must underpin all operational objectives, supporting
effects and tactical activities. ln doing so, the military will have a supporting role to other
agencies and elements of power that can address social grievances, build campaign legitimacy
and convince the populace to invest in and support the campaign.
6. The various lines of operation for a COIN campaign will depend upon the thematic
groupings of the operational objectives. They may include such themes as security,
governance and social and economic development, to name only some possibilities. These will
be broad lines of operation containing a number of operational objectives and their related
decisive points. For example, a governance line of operation may include objectives and
decisive points in the area of economic and government development, the civil service, the
judiciary and the penal system. A line of operation dealing with security may include objectives
and decisive points regarding the military, paramilitary, constabulary, civil defence and border
security, to name just a few possibilities (see Figure 5-8 below). Many of these will of course
require elements of power other than the military to be successful. Thus, the campaign plan will
incorporate a comprehensive approach.
7. Once the campaign plan has identified the operational objectives and required decisive
points or supporting effects, then successive operational plans will assign the tactical activities
needed to create the decisive points and subsequent objectives.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-17
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NOTE.-vrE
Some decisive points may not be necessary depending upon the progress of a
campaign.
Governance Security Political Process Reconstruction
lnterim
Governance
Provided
Self-
Governance
Established
Secure
Environment
Maintained
Self-
Sustaining
Security
Electoral
Process
Reformed
Elected
Government
Empowered
Key
Restoration Sustainedlnfrastructure
Established
Transitional
government is
established
Military
control
reformed
Provincial
capitals
secured
Militia B
repatriated Elecloralprocess
designed
Government
structures
reformed
Essential
services re-
established in
all areas
Equitable
control
achieved
Provincial
governments
re-established
Police control
reformed
Border
crossings
secured
Military
training re-
established
Ethnic
leaders
engaged
Political
oversight of
security
institutions
Resource
infrastructure
secured
Accountability
procedures in
place
Economic
reforms for
distribution
Militia B
deterred
Police
training re-
established
lnterim control
of resources
achieved
Enduring
infrastructure
re-built
Militia B
defeated if
necessary
Sustained
growth
Figure 54: Example of a Campaign Plan Showing Lines of Operation, Operational Objectives and
Decisive Points / Supporting Effects
B. Once the campaign plan is developed, it must be revisited continuously, as insurgent
activities and tertiary effects will cause decisive points and objectives to shift both in time and
space. This shifting of decisive points and objectives may be addressed through the process of
designing and issuing successive operational plans that seek to progress the campaign plan.
513. SUPPORTING AND TRANSITORY ROLE OF THE MILITARY
1. Throughout the COIN campaign, the military will generally have a supporting role. lt will
undertake actions to neutralize the insurgent-through pre-emption, disruption and dislocation-
in order to allow manoeuvre space and freedom of action other elements of power need to bring
a successful end to the campaign.
2. Depending upon the security situation in the early stages of a campaign, the military
force may be the only element of power capable of working in the environment. Thus, it will be
the supported force and will initiate action along as many lines of operation as possible. Much
of this will be undertaken to neutralize the insurgent and seize the initiative but also to begin to
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Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
gain the understanding and support of the indigenous population. Thus the military can expect
to undertake a combination of offensive, defensive and stability activities.
3. Offensive activities will seek to seize the initiative from the insurgent and pre-empt and
disrupt his activities and influences. Defensive activities will seek to protect vital points,
vulnerable elements of the population and the force itself. Stability activities will seek to disrupt
the influence of the insurgent through area security and control, thereby establishing the
conditions for other agencies to begin work and undefiake initial reconstruction, governance and
security sector reform (SSR) tasks in order to gain the support of the local populace.
4. As the security situation improves, the ability and requirement to conduct stability
operations/activities will increase, and the military can expect to hand over some responsibilities
to other agencies, be they police or civilian. lt should also allow other lines of operation beyond
the military's capability to commence. ldeally, as the security situation continues to improve, a
greater proportion of the stability activities, including security and control, will be assumed by
other agencies, be they foreign, international or indigenous. ln the later case, this will also
occur as indigenous capabilities are developed (see Figure 5-9),
-------e Non-Military Agency
Contribution l-l ------t Military contribution toStability Operations/Activities
Figure 5-9: lllustration of Transition of Stability Operations to Other Agencies
5. Early involvement of those other agencies in the campaign plan will ensure that initial
military efforts in reconstruction, governance and security sector reform are done in accordance
with long-term objectives. Although commanders cannot assume this transition too early in the
campaign, the sooner it begins to occur, the greater will be the legitimacy of the campaign, for it
should indicate an improvement to the security situation and government action to address the
root social and/or economic causes of the crisis.
CAMPAIGN TRANSITION
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5'14. THE SUBORDINATE ROLE OF FIRES AND THEIR PHYSICAL EFFECTS
1. As discussed in earlier sections, the philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign
demand that the enduring solutions to an insurgency will require campaigning elements to
address the root and systemic causes of the insurgency and to not only physically neutralize the
insurgent but to morally separate him from his support base and the population in general.
Together, this will gain and hold the supporl of the mass of the populace and eventually cause
the insurgency to wither.
2. To this end, offensive operations-fires and their physical effects-will only go so far.
Regardless of how many successful engagements occur, it is highly unlikely that the insurgency
will succumb in a permanent sense to attrition. lndeed, such attempts will likely drive more
individuals to the insurgency and provide additional support for the insurgent's narrative and
propaganda. This will be magnified in certain cultures that practise an eye-for-an-eye sense of
retribution and justice.
3. The successful outcome of the campaign will require a greater emphasis on activities
that influence a wide variety of target audiences, be they groups of individuals or key leaders
who may be moral centres of gravity. The influence activities should seek to gain the support of
the populace and will include in large measure stability activities that will solve the root
economic/social causes of the insurgency, address political and civil development and enhance
domestic services and security forces. Other influence activities, through PSYOPS and public
affairs, should seek to pre-empt and dislocate that of the insurgents and protect the indigenous
and domestic populations from insurgent propaganda. Properly conducted, these influence
activities may even convince certain portions of the insurgent group to either convert to support
the COIN campaign or at least enter a peaceful negotiation process.
4. Such influence activities will take extensive periods of time, even years, to produce
tangible results. This will be a change for commanders accustomed to seeing the immediate
results or effects of fires, who may demand immediate feedback considering the possibility of a
relatively short period of time in theatre. However, acceptance of this subordination of fires and
the realization that measures of effectiveness for influence activities take considerable time are
essential for success in a COIN campaign.
5. ln light of this then, the operational plans through which the long-term campaign plan is
realized should not seek to resolve the campaign within a narrow time frame. lnstead, they
should analyze the current situation and environment and seek to make incremental progress
towards the desired end-state that will set the conditions for the next operational plan to be
issued.
6. The aim of military operations is to create a security framework that assists the host
nation government and other agencies in re-asserting control throughout the country and in
creating enduring solutions to the crisis. lt is imperative that the civil administration be able to
provide public goods and seruices in order that the people are given proof of the government's
legitimacy and capability to govern. A security framework that pre-empts, dislocates and
disrupts insurgent activity is a crucial enabler in achieving this imperative.
7. The military commander's task will not be as straightforward as is likely during
conventionalwarfare. The operational planning process must take account of a wide range of
political, economic, civil and security interests. This will ensure that the correct target audiences
are engaged through the appropriate influence activities that also take into account cultural
perspectives. These realities are reflected in the way in which operations are subject to the
approval of the civil administration through the joint committee system or single command
system. ln most instances, the operational plan will aim to isolate and neutralize the insurgents
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Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
both morally and physically through simultaneously conducted and parallel political, social and
military activities.
515. UNDERSTANDING EFFECTS OF ACTIVITIES AND THE COMPRESSION ACROSS
LEVELS OF COMMAND
1. The nature of a COIN campaign sees the main effort focused on gaining and holding the
support of the majority of the populace in contrast to them supporting the insurgent's will and
end-state. Tactical activities, even at the lowest levels, in a COIN campaign generally occur
amongst the populace for two reasons: they and their vital points must be secured against
insurgent attack, and insurgents tend to hide and operate amongst the populace. Thus the
effects of tactical activities are viewed and felt immediately by the very centre of gravity over
which insurgents and counter-insurgents are fighting.
2. A result then is a compression across levels of command, in which tactical activities may
have operational and strategic level effects. Thus the conduct of soldiers at a checkpoint, for
example, may influence the perceptions of the whole populace with regard to the campaign and
its legitimacy.
3. This compression across the levels of command must be understood at all rank levels.
The need to consider and avoid undesired effects, such as collateral damages and civilian
casualties, that will undermine campaign legitimacy and popular support must be considered in
planning and avoided. At times, risks must be taken or short-term tactical success must be
forsaken in order to avoid possible outcomes that will undermine support for the campaign.
516. WAR GAMING
1. Operational plans and their tactical activities must be war gamed in the same fashion as
those for campaigns against conventional adversaries. However, the factors that must be
considered in such COIN war gaming are more extensive and complicated.
2. Planning and subsequent war gaming must consider the political, military, economic,
social (including religious and cultural), information and infrastructure related systemsss in the
environment along with the influence that each system will have on the outcome of the
operation and campaign. Power structures and influential individual leaders must be identified
and considered in the war gaming. Additionally, other agencies and their reactions to
operational plans and activities must be considered.
3. To this end, war gaming will be fairly complicated, with staff and, ideally, experts and
advisors considering the planned activities from the viewpoint of these various environmental
systems and gauging their respective reactions. Such reactions must be informed by the
cultural perspective of the environment or group under consideration. Forthis purpose, cultural
and political advisors may be included in the war gaming process.
4. ln this way, proposed courses of action at the operational and tactical levels may be
considered in detail and in perspective of the local environment in order to help ensure that
desired effects, both physical and psychological, are obtained and undesired effects are
avoided.
uu
This range of environmental systems may be abbreviated as PMESII systems.
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sEcTtoN 3
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN
517. EXPANDING THE CAMPAIGN PRESENCE: PHYSICALLY AND
PSYCHOLOGICALLY
1. The operational plans that are issued to implement and execute the campaign may be
prosecuted in a number of ways. The concept of the campaigning COIN forces, and with them
their security and control and other agencies working to the same end, spreading like a tache
d'huile or ink spot over the contested environment is an effective, practical and methodical
manner of achieving success in the campaign. ln simple terms, it sees the expansion of the
campaign and its influences, both physically and psychologically, throughout the environment,
gradually dislocating the insurgent from his physical and moral support bases. This is
particularly effective when parts of a territory or nation have been lost to insurgent control.
2. The process of spreading the presence and control of the government and its
campaigning forces requires the comprehensive approach of all elements of power. This will
thus address the security and social issues inherent to the insurgency and in turn will build
legitimacy for the campaign and its forces and begin to influence the local populations to accept
and support the COIN campaign.
3. ln keeping with the philosophy and principles of COIN, political engagement will lead,
followed by simultaneous military and social/economic engagement. All should be advertised
and explained through information operations to the public audiences in order to influence the
understanding, perceptions and will of the indigenous populations and to win their support for
the campaign.
4. At every stage of the campaign plan implementation, local forces and agencies must be
seen to be in the lead and at the forefront to the greatest extent possible. This will enhance
their legitimacy and undermine insurgent claims that the COIN campaign is an occupation.
Every advance of the "ink spot" should be done in consultation with national, regional and local
authorities as appropriate.
5. As the deployment and manoeuvre of military forces cause insurgent activity and
presence to be pre-empted, dislocated and disrupted in a new area, other agencies (but
possibly the military initially) must undertake activities to relieve suffering, provide aid and
essential services, address grievances and generally gain support for the campaign. Thus
together, this will involve full-spectrum operations-simultaneous offensive, defensive and
stability operations.
6. The manoeuvrist approach taken to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgents will
involve both fires and influence activities (information operations) on the physical and
psychological planes as detailed below:
a. Fires, or physical activities, will physically separate the insurgents from the
populace by pre-empting their plans, dislocating their forces and presence in a
population and disrupting their activities. Fudhermore, military forces will directly
target the insurgents in order to destroy or deter them and their influences
whenever possible. Such activities must be done with a long-term view of
securing the population, allowing for the return of normal levels of civil activity
and deterring further insurgent actions.
b. lnfluence activities will seek to shape the understanding, perceptions and the will
of a wide variety of targets-be they adversary, friendly or neutral-in order to
gain and maintain support for the campaign:
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Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
(1) PSYOPS, through such means of radio stations and public messages, will
inform the indigenous population as to the purpose of the mission and
seek to undermine the narrative of the insurgents.
(2) Public affairs will support national and international media to ensure the
truth is presented in a public forum regarding the expansion of the
campaign and actions taken to support and protect the populace.
(3) CIMIC related projects will address essential services, emergency aid and
other projects that will quickly impact upon the well-being of the populace,
alleviate suffering and gain their support for the campaign.
(4) The profile, presence and posture of the forces, particularly those
providing a framework security presence amongst the public, must be
carefully considered. Forces should present hard targets to insurgents
but be accessible to the population at large. Apart from gaining support,
this may induce a flow of information on insurgent intentions and
activities.
7. ln such a manner, the insurgents will become not only physically, but psychologically,
separated from the local populace (see Figure 5-10).
518. SECURING A FIRM BASE AND INITIAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING
1. lt can be anticipated that the host nation government will have sufficient control of its
territory to provide a secure base where reinforcing coalition contingents can build up and
establish essential support elements. lf this is not the case, an initial entry into the nation may
establish a firm base or one can be found amongst a supportive element of the populace.
2. Consideration must be given to not overburdening the host nation with demands for
administrative support. This can be best achieved through increased self-sufficiency by the
deploying units. lncoming military formations and units should be deployed on the same
geographical basis as the host-nation security forces, corresponding with the boundaries of the
civil administration. lt is possible, however, that the situation is deteriorated to such an extent
that no area is safe from insurgent activity. lt may therefore be necessary to hold some logistic
assets afloat or in a third country while troops are committed to secure a base area. From this
secure area, troops are deployed into hostile territory to begin the process of re-establishing
control and security arca by area.
3. From this firm base, the COIN forces will conduct planning in cooperation with the
federal and/or regional political and civil authorities. This plan should layout the process for
spreading control and presence into the next area to be secured. Such a plan must take a
comprehensive approach and take into consideration all aspects of engaging in the new area,
using comprehensive operations to physically dislocate and pre-empt the insurgents and to
psychologically dislocate and disrupt them.
519. ENGAGEMENT OF THE LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
1. Once the plan has been agreed to by the national or higher regional government, the
expansion into the new district or area may begin. This expansion should have an indigenous
government lead to it. ln beginning to make this expansion, the following should be undertaken
or considered:
a. Key leaders in the area or district are engaged to develop a plan customized for
that region and the group or groups of people contained within it. This
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
engagement must incorporate all leaders-be they elected, appointed or
traditional-that wield influence and power within the population. The leaders will
be able to identify the grievances and issues unique to that area, the
expectations of the populace and the intent and capabilities of the insurgents in
that area.
b. A comprehensive approach must be incorporated from the outset, which sees the
military and other agencies planning the expansion hand-in-hand with local
leaders. Thus, engagement of the local leaders must be conducted with all
elements of power represented. Planning may follow the lines of operation
developed in the campaign plan. Any committee system established at the
higher national levels may be replicated at this local level in order to harmonize
information and plans between levels of government. A formal committee should
be established and regular meetings planned. This will support the coordination
of all campaign activities, be they offensive, defensive or stability.
c. A specific assembly or committee may be developed with local stakeholders and
power structures in order to identify the needs of the local populace from their
perspective. This may include short-term projects and/or longterm
developmental undertakings.
d. An information operations (influence activities) programme must be planned to
advertise immediately to the populace this cooperation between indigenous
government and COIN campaign forces.
e. lf not already present, indigenous police forces must be brought into the area.
Those already there should be enhanced if necessary. These local constabulary
forces must be integrated into the local government and into the campaign plan.
Wherever and whenever possible, they should have the lead in operations.
f. Quick-impact CIMIC projects may be conducted in order to relieve serious
suffering, quickly gain the support of a local, perhaps wary, populace and to build
campaign legitimacy. Military forces may undertake some of these projects,
particularly if they are the only agency in the area. This will include simple but
effective measures such as emergency medical care, medical clinics in villages
or neighbourhoods, repairs to schools or orphanages and/or delivery of aid.
g. ln addition to quick-impact projects, long-term development planning must begin.
The root causes or grievances of the insurgency likely result from long standing
and complicated social, political and economic issues that may be difficult to
resolve. This may require extensive development in such areas as infrastructure,
economic development and political reform.
h. Auxiliary security forces should be recruited and developed in these newly
secured areas. This will add legitimacy to the campaign, help provide enduring
security and help ensure a security vacuum is not created once campaigning
forces move to the next area. Such forces will require significant support but will
likely be able to provide excellent situational awareness and intelligence within
their areas. The raising and training of these forces should not be done as an ad
hoc measure once security forces arrive in the new area but should be part of the
plan from the beginning, and forces specifically designated for this training and
mentoring role should be allocated.
i. Simultaneous to the political engagement will be the establishment of a security
force presence in the new area. ldeally, this will include an indigenous element.
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Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-l nsurgency
The forces will establish a form of a fonruard operating base (FOB) within the area
in order to support and realise the physical and psychological dislocation of the
insurgent from the populace. These security forces will support other agencies
and provide the security framework for their operations. ldeally, initial expansion
will occur in areas traditionally loyal to the central government, where the
population will readily rally back to its allegiance once it feels secure from
insurgent actions and retributions.
(1) The selection of the area of the FOB must be one that can be
consolidated quickly and used as a base for further operations designed
to link up with the initialfirm base and be able to spread government
control and influences to other areas.
(2) Although an FOB is necessary, whenever possible military forces should
live and work amongst the population. Although the security situation
must be somewhat stabilized for this to occur, and that such a practice
may entail a higher level of risk to personnel, it is the only sure way of
developing solid relationships with the communities the security forces
are trying to protect. The constant and prolonged use of FOBs will create
in the minds of both the campaign forces and the indigenous populace a
fortress mentality and posture that physically and psychologically
separates the security forces from the population. This fact and
perception must be avoided.
520. CLEAR AREA OF INSURGENT PRESENCE AND INFLUENCES
1. Once security forces have moved into an area and are supported by a political plan and
scheme of manoeuvre in conjunction with indigenous forces, measures may be taken to clear
the area of insurgent presence and influence.
2. lnfluence activities (information operations) must be exploited to morally separate the
insurgents from the populace. This requirement to gain the support of the indigenous
population must be understood down to the lowest rank levels, and all operations must be
conducted with the ultimate goal in mind.
3. Daily contact with the local populace must also be used to gain valuable information
regarding the insurgents, their aims and methods as well as any reasons as to their support
amongst the populace. This will support the pursuit and engagement of the insurgents and
inform other activities that will seek to undermine the moral claims of the insurgents and
address root causes and grievances.
4. A combination of offensive and defensive operations will be used to directly pursue and
engage the insurgents. Where deemed prudent, Special Forces may be used to conduct direct
action.56
5. Wherever and whenever possible, indigenous forces should be seen to lead such
offensive and defensive operations. lf still developing, they may have to be mentored and
continuously trained by specially designated observer and mentoring teams. Even if local
forces are in a developing stage, they should still be involved and certainly consulted in terms of
56
Direct action is defined as "A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces
or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-
defined and often time sensitive results" (AAP 6).
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-25
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
situational awareness and intelligence information requirements. Particular caution may need to
be used when considering the operational security limits and challenges of indigenous forces.
6. Local police must be developed and exploited as greatly as possible. They bring a
sense of normalcy to the indigenous population and are significant sources of intelligence
regarding local insurgent groups and their support bases. This is particularly true since
insurgents often stem from or work with local criminal organizations, about which police forces
should have detailed knowledge. As the security situation improves, the role and presence of
indigenous police forces should be raised in order to give a visible sign of improvement and to
free up military forces for other duties.
7. Depending upon the situation and capabilities of the constabulary, local police forces
may be able to take the lead in pursuing and arresting insurgents whilst military forces assume
the manpower-intensive tasks of vital point security and routine patrols.
521. GOVERNMENT LEAD IN THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS
1. Once a designated level of security and stability has returned to the local area, national
and regional governments may take the lead in the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons (lDPs).
2. This must be handled carefully. Any underlying cultural or ethnic tensions between
competing groups must be managed and alleviated. As well, these groups cannot be returned
without a coherent and comprehensive plan that provides for their continued security as well as
for their welfare and sustainable employment. Displaced refugees will not stay, nor even begin
to return, if they cannot feel secure and have a means of supporting themselves.
3. The return of refugees and lDPs will not only be a sign of returning normalcy and
security but will breed additional security through their presence and support of the campaign.
522. CIMIC ACTIVITIES BY THE MILITARY
1. Even before non-military agencies arrive in the area to begin long-term development
projects, military forces may begin the process to alleviate suffering, spark development and
gain campaign support. Measures will involve quick-impact projects such as repairs to wells
and the conduct of local medical clinics, remuneration for collateral damages, low-level
employment schemes such as war damage repairs and checkpoint construction and delivery of
basic tools for work and agriculture.
2. Much of these CIMIC activities should be planned in advance and started as soon as
possible after expanding into a new area. Many of the initial supplies may be delivered quickly
to theatre having been pre-planned as part of the campaign. Funds, resources and the
authority to use them should be pushed prior to the actual requirement to the unit and sub-unit
levels so that the quick-impact CIMIC projects may be designed to meet the needs of the
immediate local populace.
3. ldeally, pre-planning with other agencies will allow these military lead projects to support
the further development of larger projects by other elements of power in due course.
523. ESTABLISH LOW-LEVEL (COMMUNTTY-BASED) DEVELOPMENT COUNCTLS
1. The establishment of community-based development councils will allow local leaders the
opportunity to guide the development in their local areas in order to meet local grievances and
needs. These councils must bring together all agencies, including the military and political
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leadership. This should ensure that not only are local needs met but that best use of resources
is made and duplication and conflicts are avoided. The committee should be able to identify
and vocalize priorities and specific projects.
2. Although the incorporation of local leadership is vital, care must be take to ensure that
the support won by such development is support and legitimacy for the campaign and is not
exploited by local leaders with their own agendas to gain support for themselves at the expense
of the larger campaign.
524. DEVELOP SECURITY PRESENCE AND SET CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE
SECURITY
1. Development can only be supported by a permanent security presence and stable state.
The presence of security forces must be expanded in a logical and measured manner. As the
security situation improves, security forces should be increasingly integrated into the local
populace in order to avoid development of a fortress disposition and mentality and to further
separate and dislocate the insurgent.
2. Local forces must play a key and ideally lead role. Their counsel will be vital in gaining
accurate and timely intelligence from the local populace and in identifying insurgents amongst
the local populace. Local security forces may require an ongoing training and mentoring
regime.
3. Key to local forces will be the establishment or re-establishment of constabulary forces.
The presence of police forces brings a certain sense of civil normalcy to a population.
Furthermore, police are ideal for tackling the criminal elements and activities that routinely
become part and parcel of an insurgency. The expansion of a police presence will see the
creation of police posts and sub-stations throughout the area, which may be co-located with
military forces for a certain amount of time.
4. Security forces should begin to raise auxiliary security forces, particularly such elements
as auxiliary police services. These will consist of locals who know their own areas and
populace the best and who have a vested interested in guarding stability and development.
This raising of auxiliary forces should be part of the overall security sector reform process.
ldeally, police training is conducted by civilian police forces as part of a comprehensive
approach.
525. SET THE CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
1. Once security has been established, other agencies within the comprehensive approach
should begin to create sustainable development. Agencies will include other government
departments (both indigenous and those of supporting nations), international organizations,
private business and NGOs. The activities of these organizations must be carefully coordinated
with those of the security forces through either a single command system or a committee
system.
2. Just as with the security forces, work towards sustainable development and improved
governance should be led by indigenous and local authorities. Only members of the indigenous
population will understand the needs and grievances of the local populace and be able to guide
development in a manner to address those needs and to meet local expectations. Without local
leadership, development may not meet the needs and expectations of the indigenous
population.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-27
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
3. Remediation and payment for collateral damages must be foremost in any scheme, as
the related grievances will be readily identified with the campaign and its legitimacy, Likewise,
any expropriation of private property must be immediately repaid and ideally should start from a
premise of negotiation. Failure to quickly re-pay incurred debts by the campaigning forces will
undermine legitimacy, build distrust of the campaign, create grievances and feed insurgent
propaganda.
4. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process of any former
military, militia or insurgent forces must be carefully planned and managed in detail by both
military forces and other agencies. Former soldiers and fighters cannot simply be disarmed and
sent home without a reintegration plan that will include gainful employment.
5. Expectation management of local populations must be carefully managed, as unrealistic
expectations that go unsatisfied will lead to discontent and a loss of legitimacy for the campaign.
Quick-impact projects and humanitarian aid should address short-term needs and gain quick
support for the campaign. Long-term development and its measured progress will have to be
welladvertised to local populations. ln orderto avoid initialdelays in development, the
campaign plan from the outset must include details for the sustainable development. Plans
should include project details, responsibilities and pre-approved funding envelopes. ln this
manner, delays that will lead to indigenous frustration and disappointment will be avoided to the
greatest extent possible.
526. CONTINUED CAMPAIGN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION
1. As the security situation improves, successive operational orders will continue to pass
increased authority and responsibility to local security forces and agencies in each area. Viable
improvements in each area should encourage similar development in other areas as the "ink
spot" expands (see Figure 5-10 for a summary of the process).
2. The expansion of the campaign into various contested areas will seldom follow a smooth
and orderly fashion, identical in each newly gained area. Regardless of how the COIN
campaign is conducted in detail, the following key elements must be maintained:
a. a political lead and engagement of acknowledged leaders in each area;
b. the incorporation of indigenous forces, ideally seen to be leading operations but
as a minimum done in cooperation with them and exploiting their local expertise;
c. the simultaneous engagement through influence activities to gain the support of
the indigenous population and gain the moral/psychological advantage over the
insurgents; and
d. sustainable development within carefully managed expectations based on a
comprehensive plan incorporated into the campaign plan from the outset.
5-28 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Cou nter-lnsurgency
Goord Federal or
regional government
Goncept of Ops for
next expansion at
District level. *
_
Government lead plan at
Lower Level:
- Key leader engagement
- Comprehensive approoach to the
plan
- EstaSliili a"deyelopment assembly
ofJocal stakehdlders
- lnfo ops supportinb plan to
atlvertise populationl
"
- Quick impact CIMIC projects
- Sustainable development planned
. and begun
- Recruit & train auxillary forces '\,
- Security force presence (FOB)
District to be
Targeted
Clear Area of lnsurgents:
- lnfo Ops to morally separate
insurgentg_;,& build leg iti macy
- SOf*DffectAdBqn if appropriate
*.-,,€elurity patrols \
"
- Local security forceb lead
- Local police backfill vlith permanent
presence
*
{
s
#
*
Regioribl government
j
4
1
Development
- lnternational Orgaqizations
- NGOs
- National government
PreSenCe & SitUatiOn - Seed money for businesi .
- Bqild FOB -" and development projects
- PoiiceFub-station/VGP*$.
r'
crMrc q
- Delivery gf work tools,
humanitArian aid
- "Cash fodWork" projects
(Cleappup war damage/build
'" *Veps)
- Quick lmpact projects
- Remunertion for war damage
Figure 5-10: Example of the "lnk Spot" to Execute a COIN Campaign Plan
Application of Campaign Expansion
During the period December 2006 to February 2007, Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan
achieved remarkable success using classic "ink spot" doctrine to counter the existing
insurgency in Kandahar Province. Although known officially as the Afghan Development
Zone (ADZ) concept, it was in reality nothing more than expanding the Government of
Afghanistan' influence using ink spot doctrine. ln essence security and quality of life had
been improved in the smalltown of Pajry Panjway (unofficially known as the "ink dot') to the
point where the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts of Panjway and Zhari assisted their
government and NATO forces in establishing security. As 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian
Regiment Battle Group and partnered Afghan NationalArmy units pushed fonryard to clear
the districts, the Taliban, knowing they had little support from the local population, withdrew.
ln conducting these operations, a workable step-by-step process was developed.
Source; Cotonet F.A. Lewis, Deputy Commander Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan, August 2006 to
February 2007
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-29
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
sEcTtoN 4
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
IN A COIN CAMPAIGN
527. INTRODUCTION
1. The conduct of any operational plan and subsequent tactical activities must be
conducted in keeping with the philosophy and principles inherent in a COIN campaign.
Furthermore, their conduct must all lead directly to the attainment of the operational objectives
delineated in the campaign plan.
528. BALANCE ACROSS FULL.SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1. The simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive and stability operations, that is, the
realization of full-spectrum operations, will occur throughout a COIN campaign. Commanders
must carefully balance forces and activities across these three sets of activities in order to
further the campaign and reach operational objectives.
2. Offensive operations are conducted in order to separate the insurgents from their
supporters, resources, suppliers and sources of information in the designated area. Such
operations must be based on actionable intelligence and sound planning. The secondary
effects of offensive operations must be carefully considered so that they do not cause undue
collateral damages or alienate the local populace. lndeed, there may be times when short-term
tactical success must be postponed in order to avoid undesired effects that will undermine the
campaign.
3. The resulting dislocation of the insurgents from offensive operations will allow civil
administration to be re-established. Essential seruices, infrastructure development and
improvement to governance may commence through a comprehensive approach. The military
security forces may provide robust support to the police or be asked to help train local auxiliary
forces that will support the police when military forces withdraw. These newly controlled areas
then provide firm bases for furlher security operations, until gradually the entire theatre or nation
is restored to civil government control and enduring stability.
4. Defensive operations will consist mainly of securing those areas from which the
insurgents have been displaced. They will secure base camps, government institutions, vital
points such as key infrastructure and the population at large. Military forces may assume many
of these manpower-intensive tasks in order to free up local constabulary forces so that they may
take the lead in pursing the insurgents and their related criminal activities and linkages.
5. There will be occasions when private security companies assume defensive activities.
These may be hired by the indigenous government, brought into theatre by coalition forces or
hired by NGOs, international organizations or private businesses. lf such private security
companies are considered part of the coalition, their rules of engagement, employment
responsibilities and limitations must be cleady defined. The local populace will not distinguish
between campaigning forces and these private security organizations, and indiscretions and
illegal use of force by either will undermine the campaign and its legitimacy.
6. Stability operations consist of security and control activities, support to disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration activities, support to security sector reform activities, support to
civilian infrastructure and governance and assistance to other agencies. ln due course, many of
these stability activities will be assumed by other agencies and indigenous government
services. Nevertheless, many stability activities, such as the training of new security elements
and the provision of military forces to augment the police in security patrols, will require direct
5-30 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-lnsurgency
military involvement or at least the military acting in a supporting role. Stability activities,
particularly the provision of security and control, will continue the dislocation of the insurgents
and will attempt to pre-empt or disrupt future insurgent activities. Other stability activities, such
as the training of indigenous forces and the development of local governance, will consolidate
the insurgent dislocation and morally dislocate the insurgents by addressing root causes and
grievances that support insurgent motivations and aims.
7. Military forces and other security forces will always be in short supply. A careful balance
must be struck between the three types of tactical operations in order to meet the demands of
situation and the operational objectives. Too much of an emphasis on offensive operations will
allow insurgents to infiltrate amongst the populace and its vulnerable infrastructure. The
insurgents will thus be offered an opportunity to achieve easy successes against poorly
protected vulnerable points and thus embarrass the government and undermine its support.
With too little emphasis on offensive operations and a focus on defensive and stability
operations, the insurgent organization may continuously grow, and an ever-increasing
proportion of the campaign's resources will become devoted to defensive countermeasures, so
that eventually the insurgents achieve their aim by making it appear that the price of further
resistance is too high.57
B. The security and control activities and tasks within stability operations should be
emphasized whenever possible as a means to take a measured approached to continued
dislocation and disruption of the insurgents. Offensive activities should only be initiated on
sound intelligence. Activities for security and control will create a security framework within
which the military and civilian agencies may operate and the local populace may assume
routine civil duties. Patrols, checkpoints, observations posts and similar stability tasks will
protect the populace and disrupt or pre-empt insurgent activities and movement. They will gain
valuable intelligence which will support subsequent selective offensive operations.
529. COMPRESSION ACROSS THE LEVELS OF COMMAND
1. The relationship between the operational and tactical levels of command during COIN
operations are somewhat compressed. Given the focus on winning popular support for a
campaign, actions at the tactical level can have far reaching operational and strategic
repercussions. Activities will be conducted in public view, and the manner in which routine
patrols, checkpoints and other tactical tasks are conducted will either support the attainment of
operational and strategic objectives or undermine them. The conduct of an individual soldier,
amplified by the media, can become an issue. A thoughtless move or overreaction at the
section or platoon level can easily have ramifications above the immediate tactical level that
undermine the legitimacy of a campaign and loose public support. Even if the majority of
tactical tasks are conducted with a view to gaining public support and winning campaign
legitimacy, the populace will remember and the insurgents will exploit those few poorly
conducted tasks that undermined legitimacy. Measures and precautions must be taken to limit
such occurrences. This must be understood by all levels of command, in all components,
including Special Forces.
530. MANOEUVRISTAPPROACH
1. The record of attritionalsuccess in COIN operations is generallya poorone. Effective
COIN operations place due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of
s7
Frank Kitson, Eunch of Five, London: Faber and Faber,1977. passlm.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-31
Counter- I nsurgency Operations
operations not simply the material. They emphasize the focus on people and ideas not only on
ground.
2. To this end, insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated, yet
discrete, force against key vulnerabilities. Surprise, tempo and simultaneity are used to
overurhelm and unhinge the insurgent, attacking will and shattering cohesion and ultimately
helping to create the conditions for political defeat. Force is applied selectively, and destruction
is a means not an end.
3. The successfulapplication of the manoeuvrist approach still has limitations in a COIN
campaign. Even if COIN forces are highly successful in destroying insurgent critical
vulnerabilities, the insurgent's will and cohesion are likely to remain intact or at least be less
affected than a conventional enemy, for insurgents are motivated by a political idea and
narrative. The insurgents may continue to fight, change tactics or simply go into abeyance and
re-appear at a later date.
4. Thus, the manoeuvrist approach must be expanded to include psychological attacks
directly against the will, motivation and cohesion of the insurgency. lnsurgents must be
defeated psychologically, as a first-order effect, and not solely through physical attacks.
lnfluence activities such as PSYOPS and CIMIC must seek to undermine insurgent legitimacy
and claims to a superior political option. The populace itself must be engaged with influence
activities that seek to gain their support and undermine or preclude support of the insurgency.
5. ln this way, the manoeuvrist approach within the campaign involves a blend of fires that
attack the insurgent's capability to ultimately affect his will and cohesion and influence activities
that attack his understanding, perceptions, will, cohesion and legitimacy directly. Together
these fires and influence activities are synchronized through manoeuvre and battlespace
management.
6. Furthermore, classic police work will undermine insurgent cohesion by evidence
gathering, arrest and legal action. Surprise can be achieved, for example, through developing
information by all sources then acting on the cue of intelligence gathering technology or human
intelligence (HUMINT). Rapid exploitation of this intelligence by either covert action or rapid
concentration of combat forces into a given area sows confusion and disruption throughout the
insurgent's command structure. This occurs in large part because the level of trust within and
amongst insurgent cells is compromised and reduced.
531. MISSION COMMAND
1. Success in COIN requires all participants to be actively aware of the long-term goals and
the plan to achieve them. Tactical-level commanders must be made to understand the
philosophy and principles by which a COIN campaign is conducted. The mission command
approach to leadership reaffirms this view, emphasizing informed initiative throughout the force.
This methodology is particularly applicable to COIN, given the key role played by low-level
tactical commanders. Militarily, COIN is quite often a platoon and section conflict.
532. DESCRIBING OPERATIONAL SUCCESS IN A COIN CAMPAIGN
1. Success is defined by the state of affairs that needs to be achieved by the end of a
campaign-an end-state. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the
desired end-state of the government (and supporting nations) falls short of an identifiable victory
in a strictly military context.
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Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-l nsurgency
2. Success in COIN may equate to reducing the threat to a point at which the situation may
be passed to the civil police or simply not losing control to the insurgents. lf, for example, the
intention of committing troops is to buy time in which to address particular grievances, then
dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counter-productive. Troops must be aware of
the military role, which is normally a supporting one, and commanders should select accurate
measures against which to judge the effectiveness of military tactics. Ground captured has
much less significance in COIN than it does in conventional warfighting. Militarily speaking,
operational success may equate to the containment or reduction of violence and threats to a
level at which the police can deal with the situation and civil society functions normally.
533. DESTRUCTION OF INSURGENTS
1. ln COIN, physical destruction of the enemy may still have an important role to play.
Despite the best efforts of influence activities to persuade insurgents and their supporters to
pursue peaceful means to affect political change, there will be some insurgents who will remain
committed to the violent destruction of the in-place political and social structures. These
insurgents must be captured, killed or so physically and psychologically isolated that they are no
longer effective.
2. Attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is
absolutely necessary to achieve success. Wherever possible, non-lethal methods of
neutralizing the enemy such as arrest, physical isolation or subversion are more likely to
advance the campaign's cause. Given intense media scrutiny and domestic and international
legal oversight, sound judgement and close control of lethal force will need to be exercised.
534. ATTACKING INSURGENT LEGITIMACY
1. The political and moral legitimacy of the insurgents must be attacked if a COIN
campaign is to be successful. lnsurgencies gain legitimacy through a combination of words and
actions that emphasize flaws and injustices in the government or status quo while providing
evidence of the insurgent narrative and ideology as a viable alternative. lnsurgent legitimacy
must be undermined through coordinated influence activities, including those aimed at
specifically countering the insurgent propaganda. These should aim to erode the narrative of
the enemy, exposing fallacies and fabrications. Other influence activities, such as ClMlC,
governance reform and public affairs, must reinforce the legitimacy of the campaign, the
government and its long-term objectives.
535. ATTACKING INSURGENT FUNDING
1. Although many insurgencies will be fiscally supported from abroad, it is important that all
sources of funding within the host nation be identified and neutralized. lnsurgents use funding
not only for the purchase of weapons, equipment and explosives but to pay informants,
supporters and members of the local population to be proxy fighters.
2. lnsurgent funding will likely be complex and involve sophisticated networks that include
international electronic banking and trading. lt may also involve criminal activity such as
narcotics production and trafficking and the use of fraudulent charitable organizations or
legitimate charities that have been duped. lnsurgent funding will also come from rather low-
profile and mundane sources such as pirated media sales. Attacking the sources of funds that
support the insurgency will be a complex effort that relies as much upon police and legal efforts
as military activity. However, it is absolutely vital that such an effort be made.
5-33B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
536. SIMULTANEITY
1. All effective insurgent strategies emphasize simultaneity by creating parallel political and
social challenges to the in-place authorities in addition to military challenges. lf the use of
simultaneity is productive for the insurgent, then it is equally applicable for the COIN effort.
Tactically, it can be achieved through the restrained and carefully considered use of, and by
grouping for independent action, a mix of agencies, such as joint military-police patrols with
compatible communications reporting to a single headquarters. Operationally, it is achieved
through the development of a harmonized campaign plan using a comprehensive approach
along multiple lines of operation. This will attack the insurgents physically, undermine their
legitimacy and gain support of the local populace in a concerted and complementary fashion.
sEcTtoN s
THE ROLE OF MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENTS AND INDIGENOUS FORCES IN COIN
537. LAND COMPONENT
1. The predominant service in counter insurgency is the land force, although air elements
often play a strong suppoding role. Unless the insurgents are joined by an outside power with
significant naval and air forces, counterinsurgency will remain primarily a land force
responsibility with the other two services acting largely in support. This reflects the nature of
COIN and its focus on the indigenous population. lnsurgents can only be countered
comprehensively through deploying troops on the ground, amongst the population.
2. The land force can expect to be called upon, particularly at the tactical level, to employ
its traditional skills, ranging from providing observation and security to closing with and
destroying the enemy. The subtle political nuances underpinning COIN operations, the focus on
gaining popular suppott and the dispersed nature of the battlespace, however, require greater
initiative and flexibility at the sub-unit, platoon and section levels. (See Chapter 6 for a further
discussion on the employment of land forces in a COIN campaign.)
538. AIR COMPONENT
1. The use of the air component during various COIN and peace support campaigns has
clearly demonstrated the potential of advanced technology for surveillance, target acquisition,
reconnaissance and attack of targets. These capabilities have been expanded upon through
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have become a significant enabler of land
operations. The use of air support in a COIN campaign has been able to be expanded and
enhanced through precision weapons that have made improvements in reducing casualties and
collateral damage to infrastructure near the target area.
2. For COIN operations, fixed-wing aircraft can provide the same types of support-troop
lift and resupply and photographic and visual reconnaissance-as they do for conventional
operations. Air component capabilities can be employed for ground attack missions, when
confirmed targets can be found along an insurgent's lines of communication and when
insurgents are engaged by ground manoeuvre forces. Nonetheless, one must not
underestimate the insurgent's ability to counter air power through deception, reduced signature
and even low-level air defence weapons such as man-portable air defence system (MANPADS).
3. The use of air component assets to attack insurgents must be carefully considered and
targets confirmed in terms of their authenticity and value. Collateral damages and civilian
casualties will do much to undermine the campaign and its public support, both indigenously
5-34 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Cou nter-lnsurgency
and abroad. lnsurgents will exploit such incidents through propaganda and will be the first to
ensure international media coverage.
4. Air-land integration and battlespace management will require careful planning. The
nature of COIN operations and the high volume of aircraft sorties available compared to
conventional operations will likely cause air-land integration coordination teams to be pushed to
lower levels of command.
5. Aviation assets have obvious roles for troop carrying, surveillance, liaison and over-
watch of ground troops. Given the nature of COIN and the dispersed nature of insurgent
targets, it is unlikely that aviation will be used as a manoeuvre arm. Aviation can be used in
many roles comparable to those given to armoured reconnaissance regiments, such as
surveillance, point and area reconnaissance, imagery support to intelligence, economy of force
tasks and command and control (C2),
6. Aviation assets may be employed in close fire support to ground manoeuvre forces.
Their target acquisition systems, responsiveness and ability to remain in the immediate area
make them valuable fire support assets.
539. MARITIMECOMPONENT
1. Much of the world's population lives in littoral states and in large coastal cities.
Therefore, maritime considerations may be an important factor when campaigning in such
regions. Naval support may consist of providing deterrence and presence patrols, enforcing
international sanctions and blockades and providing some degree of support for troops ashore,
The presence of naval forces can also send a strong political statement and message to
insurgents and their supporters.
2. Naval ships may be close enough to provide a timely, high profile appearance to
demonstrate support for a threatened ally. Conversely, naval forces have the ability to loiter
over the horizon for prolonged periods, providing a warning to hostile elements with minimum
provocation.
3. They can be used in a sea basing concept for command and control and for resupply of
forces ashore. ln addition, naval air support can potentially augment the air assets in theatre.
4. Naval forces may also provide the initial firm base needed to support expansion into a
new territory. This may be the initial entry, or it may be an expansion further along the littoral
regions of a nation. Despite the advantages to the use of maritime resources, security must be
vigilant. Given the concentration of resources onboard ship, a single successful surface attack
by insurgents could cause significant loss of life and material,
540. SPECIAL FORGES
1. The organization of Special Forces (SF) units, the high quality, versatility and
comprehensive training of these troops, and their capacity to work well in small groups make
them particularly suitable for a supporting role in COIN campaigns. Care should be taken,
however, that they be used to complement rather than replace conventional units.
2. Tasks for Special Forces may be wide ranging and include special reconnaissance,
close protection, deep penetrations and covert observation in remote or difficult areas. They
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-35
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
may undertake direct actionss tasks. However, care must be taken that Special Forces do not
become employed in tasks that are within the capability of line units, for this would be a waste of
valuable resources.
3. Despite their capabilities and independent nature of operating, Special Forces must be
employed in line with the same principles of COIN as other forces. They too must understand
the need to win and maintain popular support and, to this end, avoid collateral damages and
civilian casualties. To the greatest extent possible, their operations must be coordinated with
the local tactical commanders in whose area they are operating, for these local tactical
commanders know their own areas and will be left to deal with the repercussions of the
operations.
4. Special Forces may be used to train indigenous forces, however, this should be limited.
Training and mentoring forces should train forces that have identical or similar roles, mainly for
purposes of commonality, identity and mentoring. Thus Special Forces may be used to train
indigenous Special Forces and units responsible for typical special force operations.
541. INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES_POLICE FORCES
1. lndigenous police forces may play a valuable role in the conduct of a COIN mission and
will be a key element in a comprehensive approach. lndeed, if competent and trustworthy,
they will likely have a detailed knowledge of insurgent leaders and their links to criminal
elements. The presence of police forces, particularly if seen to be leading operations, will have
a normalizing effect on the population.
2. Military COIN forces must be closely coordinated with police forces, and military forces
will likely be employed in support of police forces in order to provide security and protection for
them in their routine duties. ln some cases, police forces may play a supporting role, such as
the arrest of insurgents captured and detained by military forces.
3. Police and military forces may be co-located in stations and sub-stations in order to
conduct joint operations and to afford the police additional protection, particularly in the early
stages of a campaign.
4. The role of police in the host nation and the level of employment of those police are
often dependent on the competency of the police force and judiciary and their reputation
amongst the population. For example, if a police force or judiciary is regarded as corrupt, the
people will have little trust that the police will have the best interests of the people in mind or
that the force can provide real security.
5. Military forces may be used, at least initially in a campaign, to train indigenous civilian
police. ldeally, this responsibility will be assumed by supporting police forces so that they
receive proper mentoring and training in all aspects of police duties. Nevertheless, the military
will continue to work closely with police forces and mentor them when necessary.
6. Close and routine coordination with police forces will also provide valuable intelligence
sources. Joint intelligence and analysis centres may be established in order to exploit the
capabilities and resources of both military and police forces.
58
Direct Action is defined as 'A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces
or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-
defined and often time sensitive results" (AAP 6).
5-36 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Cou nter-l nsurgency
7. As security improves, police forces should assume a greater role and profile amongst
the populace. This will enhance the sense of civil normalcy and free up military forces for other
duties. lt will also increase the sense of campaign success and legitimacy.
B. lt is possible that the police forces of a state are not organized or controlled in a manner
common to responsible governance. There have been many instances when police forces have
been poorly organized and trained, ill equipped and corrupt. lndeed, the behaviour of police
and other security forces in a nation may have been an aggravation of the crisis leading to the
insurgency. One must also understand the potential ramification of using former combatants as
police. Account must be taken of these factors when planning the overall campaign, and
measures taken to improve these circumstances must be foremost in the minds of planners.
Plans must be made to rectify the professionalism, competency and role of the local
constabulary forces. lt is unlikely that a nation will be considered stable without a competent
police force.
542. INDIGENOUS MILITARY FORCES
1. lndigenous military forces will vary from situation to situation in terms of quantity, quality
and effectiveness, ln terms of a standing army, they may be non-existent. However, regardless
of theirstate of existence atthe startof a COIN campaign, theywill be indispensable in terms of
creating enduring solutions to the crisis.
2. lndigenous military forces, if existing and supportive of the campaign, will be a key
source of intelligence and situational awareness for campaigning forces, particularly those of a
coalition not familiar with the local terrain, people, power structures and culture.
3. Even if still under development, indigenous forces should be seen, to the greatest extent
possible, to be leading missions against the insurgents. This will indicate an attempt at a local
solution to the insurgency and add legitimacy to the overall campaign. Furthermore, it will help
to further develop the indigenous forces in terms of their professional skills, both individual and
collective.
4. The lead role of indigenous forces must be respected even if they remain a developing
force with limitations. Although coalition forces may produce a more effective outcome if
leading, the issue of establishing and maintaining campaign legitimacy and popular support is
so crucial that indigenous lead should be emphasized even at the risk of losing some short-term
tactical success. Notwithstanding this, coalition forces will continue to train and mentor
indigenous forces, even in the midst of operations.
5. The training and development of indigenous forces will be a key part of security sector
reform. This requires a comprehensive approach with the military and other agencies working
in a synchronized and complementary manner to develop not only police and military forces but
other aspects of security and governance, such as border police, prison services and judiciary
services. Security sector reform must be part of the campaign plan from the outset, and the
campaign plan and resulting initial operational order should clearly annunciate the security
sector reform responsibilities of each agency.
543. INDIGENOUS IRREGULAR AUXILIARY FORCES
1. ln almost all COIN campaigns, governments have attempted to mobilize the local
population to protect themselves by forming auxiliary forces. When soundly based, sensibly
organized and properly coordinated with other units, these forces have proved indispensable
and indeed, on occasion, the key to a successful campaign.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
2. lt is not unusual for regular soldiers to be scathing about the appearance, operational
efficiency, fighting potential and loyalty of auxiliary forces. This attitude, usually stemming from
an ignorance of the characteristics of auxiliary forces and a misunderstanding of their motivation
together with a lack of appreciation of the wider issues at stake in a COIN campaign, may have
unfortunate consequences. lt can hinder the proper development of auxiliary forces and their
integration into the overall operational plan. Although the nature of these forces may differ
between campaigns, commanders and staff need to understand the characteristics of these
forces and the requirements and problems associated with their raising, training and
employment.
3. Auxiliary forces contribute significantly to the campaign. Apart from providing the
needed manpower to replace regular and coalition forces, they have access to local intelligence
and detailed situational awareness that can help support further operations. They also have the
advantage of having a committed interest in seeing the campaign and its stability and
development succeed. The commitment of the local population through the raising of auxiliary
forces also adds further legitimacy to the campaign.
4. The government campaign to defeat an insurgency will succeed only if it wins the loyalty
and support of the population. The real test of loyalty is whether the people will actively support
the COIN campaign since this will inevitably involve risk.
5. COIN is expensive in terms of personnel. Successful campaigns may require a security
force-to-insurgent ratio of up to 20:1 . Auxiliary forces help meet the personnel requirement.
They are particularly useful for defensive and stability operations, releasing the more mobile,
better-trained regular troops and police for offensive operations.
6. The intimate and thorough knowledge that auxiliary forces can provide of their local area
and its people considerably ease the intelligence problem. They are more likely to pick up
information from the network of informal contacts throughout the populace, and that may even
extend to the insurgent forces. Furthermore, they will be able to advise on local power
structures and provide guidance to regular commanders regarding issues of cultural or social
significance, which in turn will help avoid offence to the local populace.
7 . Finally, some auxiliary forces may have specialized skills developed as part of their
social culture that complement those of the regular forces. While they have neither the training
nor equipment to operate like regular soldiers, they may excel in certain skills such as tracking,
patrolling, observation, the use of ground and communicating with the local population.
B. Auxiliary forces may be employed as independent units to secure areas cleared of
insurgent control. Given their value and skills, padicularly in language and local knowledge,
auxiliary forces will prove highly valuable if they are used to augment regular and coalition
forces.
9. Other security forces in an indigenous population may also help secure the gains of the
campaign. Customs, immigration, border police and coastguards are all designed to control
movement across frontiers and coastlines and to prevent smuggling. While they tend to
concentrate their efforts at officially designated crossing points, they may also incorporate a
mobile element for patrolling unwatched sectors. These services are usually well acquainted
with the identities, habits and routes used by the smugglers and illegal border crossers that an
insurgent organization will use to move troops, arms and equipment.
10. The use of auxiliary forces will create challenges in operational and information security.
Whilst care and caution must be exercised, some risk may have to be taken, at least in the early
stages, until auxiliary forces become a better known element. lt must be recognized that, in
many cases, members of auxiliary forces accept considerable risk to themselves and their
5-38 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Operational-Level Considerations for Counter-l nsurgency
families in volunteering to combat insurgents. Therefore, a certain level of trustworthiness
should be assumed.
11. By the time coalition forces arrive for the campaign, local auxiliary forces may be under
considerable pressure and discouraged by insurgent successes. They will need support and
encouragement as well as the opportunity to play a positive and constructive role in operations.
As areas are successively brought back under government control, they will be handed over to
the local administration together with its police and armed forces. Those auxiliary forces
recruited and deployed on a territorial basis near their homes will be key to securing those areas
and allowing long-term development and stability.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 5-39
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 6
LAND COMPONENT OPERATIONS IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
The fight against the guerrilla must be organized methodically and conducted
with unremitting patience and resolution. Except for the rare exception, it will
n eve r ach i eve spectacu I a r resu/fs. 5e
sEcTroN 1
INTRODUCTION
1. Amongst all the various military assets deployed to a counter-insurgency (COIN)
campaign, the land force plays the central role. lts tactical units conduct all operational
functions (command, sense, act, shield and sustain) through execution of tactical operations:
offensive, defensive, stability and enabling. lndeed, given the nature of COIN operations, the
emphasis in terms of time and resources will be allocated to stability activities.
2. ln the conduct of full-spectrum operations, units will carry out tactical tasks that will be, in
terms of their effects, shaping, decisive or sustaining in support of the overall objectives and
campaign. Through the operational functions, they willfind, fix and strike. Within a single unit's
area of operations (AO), one sub-unit may be defending industrial vital points, another may be
attacking a recently discovered insurgent headquarters (HQ), another assisting police in
conducting snap vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) and another providing security for civilian
contractors and assisting in a reconstruction project.
3. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) must remain flexible and should be altered to
meet the threat and situation in theatre and to exploit any immediate lessons learned during
operations. The campaign plan must ensure that all tactical activities are directly linked to, and
work towards, operational objectives. Although tactical operations may be planned and
coordinated at the highest levels, they must be controlled and executed at the lowest levels.
Units become enablers for their sub-units, which in turn prosecute the tactical tasks in a
decentralized but coordinated fashion. The battle, which will involve a combination of fires and
influence activities creating physical and psychological effects, is fought and won at the section
and platoon level.
4. Tactical activities, such as an attack, will be conducted in accordance with the principles
for offensive operations.to However, their conduct and adherence to their own principles should
not violate the overarching philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign. To do so will
undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the overall campaign.
sEcTtoN 2
ESTABLISHING THE FOOTHOLD_PHYSICAL AND MORAL
1. As with any military operation, the first phase of a COIN campaign will likely involve
establishing a viable and secure base of operations. A unit/sub-unit will normally be assigned
an AO in which it will be responsible for the conduct of full-spectrum operations. This can be
considered the first "spot" in the fache d'huile or ink spot technique.
ut
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, 2006),
p. 54.
50
See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Operations regarding the principles for tactical operations and activities.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-1
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
2. This physical foothold should follow the principles and characteristics of the defence but
adjusted for COlN.6r This foothold will become (at least initially) the base of operations for the
uniVsub-unit. lt should be located on key terrain that will allow the forces to respond rapidly to
any threat or incident in the AO, to seize sudden opportunities and to provide a constant
presence in the AO. Although it must be defensible, the location cannot be viewed as a fortress
on a hill, remote and distant from the local populace. lt is critical that the soldiers integrate with
the population. By establishing physical and emotional connections with the population, close
relationships will be developed that will increase popular affinity for the government, trust in the
security forces and provide intelligence that can be exploited in operations. These
psychological or moral connections and affinity will enhance the overall legitimacy and
popularity of the campaign, ln short, the forces will establish a moralfoothold as well as a
physical foothold.
3. Whilst the commander will seek out and identify the key public figures in the area-
police chief constable, local mayor, industry managers, etc.-human intelligence (HUMINT),
counter-intelligence and possibly Special Forces (SF) intelligence specialists will seek to identify
and contact the actual power brokers within the social structure, who may be different from the
public figures.
4. Patrols create links with the population and are the most obvious representation of a
nation's commitment and resolve. Platoon and section patrols will seek to establish contact with
the average citizens in the streets and villages. The tone and demeanour set by the patrols is
critical and demands exemplary standards of conduct.
5. A certain amount of risk management must be taken to allow patrols to set this needed
profile and to send the appropriate message to the populace. This of course does not mean
that the troops conduct themselves in a relaxed manner. Although the patrol leader may be
talking with local school children or shopkeepers, other members of the patrol maintain a secure
stance that implies the patrol remains a hard target for insurgents. This blend of openness and
a stern professional exterior impresses the civilians, gives them confidence and unnerves the
insurgents, who will always be watching.
6. This foothold not only begins to reassure the populace and dislocate the insurgent, but it
begins the tactical-level intelligence collection, against which measures of effectiveness will be
devised and used as the campaign progresses.
7. As the situation develops, other satellite camps or patrol bases may be established,
permanently or temporarily, even at the platoon level. This spreads the influence of the security
forces, supports intelligence collection and dislocates the insurgents. This represents part of
the "spreading" component of the ink spot or tache d'huile technique.
6l
For example, the area will have observation posts (OPs), stand-to positions and interlocking arcs of fire-
defensible, force protection measures-but will unlikely clear fields of fire in the urban area. Liaison and close
surveillance will occur with locals in the immediate area in order to identify the local patterns of everyday life.
o-z B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
Establishing Physical and Moral Footholds
Upon arrival in Haiti in March 2004,1 Coy, 2 Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR) established
their company location in the centre of their AO, on the main supply route (MSR), across
from a public park. Within hours of arriving, an observation post (OP) reported a civilian man
beating a woman in the park. Whilst many may have simply dismissed the matter as a non-
military affair, or as just an aspect of Haitian culture, the company recognized the incident as
firstly a violation of the rule of law and secondly as simply unacceptable behaviour in their
AO. The quick reaction force (ORF) was dispatched, and the man was apprehended and
detained. The action and the reasons for it were explained to the individual and those in the
immediate area. After a quick medical inspection, the detainee was transported to the
nearest civilian police station and passed to their authority. Although it was highly unlikely
that any civilian charges resulted, a clear message had been sent to the populace. The
security forces had established their physical and moralfoothold in the area. ln addition, the
action began to dislocate the influence of the criminal and insurgent elements in the region.
The next day, normal levels of civilian activity returned to the immediate area of the camp
location.
Source: Op HALO, After Action Repofts.
sEcTtoN 3
ATTAGKING THE INSURGENTS' WILL
601. ROLE OF THE TACTICAL COMMANDER
1. Even at the tactical level, a manoeuvrist approach to a COIN operation will seek to
disrupt and dislocate the adversary's moral and physical cohesion rather than pursue his
wholesale destruction, lf afforded confidence and freedom of action and supported by good
intelligence, commanders at the tactical level will be able, through ingenuity and a pro-active
stance, to undermine the power, authority and eventually the will of the insurgent.
2. Commanders must be able to quickly identify and exploit those opportunities to pre-
empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgency and its operations. Opportunities will be fleeting.
Therefore, recognizing and exploiting these opportunities in a timely and effective manner
requires a high level of tactical awareness and ingenuity. ln this way, the power that the
insurgents hold over the local populace, which is often founded on intimidation, can be severed.
3. ln order to be successful in attacking the insurgent on the physical and moral planes, the
tactical commander requires more assets, independence and authority than he would normally
possess in conventional operations. Some examples are as follows:
a. lndependence and flexibility to establish and (if possible) chair, operational and
intelligence committees appropriate to his level of command with non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), coalition padners and local police and civic
authorities.
b. Resources (namely monetary) and authority to conduct low-level civil-military
cooperation (ClMlC) and reconstruction projects in order to create an immediate
impact, which will, in turn, reinforce the positive aspects of the security force's
presence.
c. Authority to respond immediately to calls for assistance from local police and
security forces, without reference to higher authority as long as the requirements
B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
fall within the rules of engagement (ROE), tactical tasks assigned to the unit and
the campaign objectives.
d. Authority to conduct information operations (lnfo Ops) that follow approved broad
lnfo Ops themes and messages. lt is of the utmost importance that commanders
be able to pre-empt and counter the propaganda messages of the insurgents.
602. PRE-EMPTION
1. Pre-emption is the taking of action so as to prevent an anticipated event from occurring.
ln military operations, particularly COIN, pre-emption will require the seizing of opportunities
before an enemy can act in order to preclude insurgent operations and to deny them
advantages. The insurgents may be constantly destabilized by the initiative of security force
actions with both fires and influence activities (psychological operations [PSYOPS], deception,
profile, posture and presence, CIMIC and public affairs).
2. Pre-emption is facilitated by a sensor-to-shooter link that is instituted through doctrine,
technology, training and organization. Pre-emptive operations will depend on a pro-active and
responsive intelligence system linked with a rapid decision-making process in such a way that
the detection of an opportunity can be translated into a successful outcome.
3. Key to pre-emption is a covert surveillance capability at the unit and sub-unit level. This
may consist of dismounted reconnaissance assets, sniper detachments or rifle platoon elements
rehearsed and equipped for the task. Cunning use of surveillance will act as triggers for other
forces to deploy to exploit the fleeting opportunity.
4. Even overt presence patrolling can pre-empt insurgents.62 For example, threats by
insurgents to keep the local schools closed and attempts to intimidate families to keep children
home can be pre-empted by the placement of standing patrols at the schools until such time
that confidence returns to the population and the insurgents have been displaced from the
neighbourhood.
5. ln COIN it is frequently the case that one success leads to opportunities for another: an
arrest may lead to the discovery of an arms cache and so on. Special forces (SF) and reserves
such as quick reaction forces (QRFs) must be available, properly positioned and able to exploit
unplanned opportunities to strike at the insurgency. Locating the QRFs with surveillance assets
(for example, covertly, inside a dilapidated building) will ensure an immediate response. Police
and other government agencies must move in quickly behind the military forces to re-establish
and retain control and influence.
6. Pre-emption should also be a goal of influence activities (lnfo Ops). A flyer handed out
by patrols that explains the purpose of the security forces and their future operations may pre-
empt insurgent propaganda that paints the security forces as oppressors. Likewise, the timely
implementation of reconstruction projects at local schools will rob insurgents of a possible
grievance that the current regime fails to provide for the country's citizenry and future.
u'
Presence patrolling is considered part of a broader concept of framework operations, which are those generally
overt military operations conducted to establish a safe and secure environment, which in turn contributes to the
defeat of the insurgent in an area (British Land Force Field Manual, Vol 1, Part 10, Counter-lnsurgency Operations\
Framework operations generally consist of those security and control tasks and activities that are part of stability
operations. They provide the secure environment in which normal civil society can function and other agencies
may conduct their activities in support of the campaign.
6-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
603. DTSLOCATTON
1. One of the main aims of presence patrols, checkpoints and other security and control
activities is to dislocate the insurgents and their influence over the populace. Dislocation denies
the insurgents the ability to bring their strength to bear and goes beyond merely frustrating the
enemy's plans by making their strength irrelevant by refusing to fight on their terms. lt will
consist of deterrence and security measures such as protection of vulnerable targets, search
operations, overt surveillance of potential mounting areas or meeting places or places of
intimidation and a proactive lnfo Ops message that reinforces the legitimacy of the government
and security forces. The results of a determined effort to dislocate the insurgent may not be
spectacular and may not even be apparent to troops on the ground, but over time will rob the
insurgent of the initiative.
604. DISRUPTION
1. Disruption seeks to attack the insurgent selectively, targeting his most important assets
and so throwing him into confusion. Well-executed, overt military operations will help to disrupt
the insurgent by threatening deployment and escape routes, locating arms caches and
restricting movements. Even the threat of aggressive covert and overt operations can be
effective in creating disruptive physical and psychological effects. lnsurgents who know that
they are being actively hunted will be tempted to flee the AO.
2. Disruption will also occur as security forces in the process of conducting security and
control tasks encounter insurgents attempting to infiltrate or operate in the area. Forces should
be prepared to not only disrupt and prevent the insurgents,but ideally will be able to fix them so
that they may be struck by reserve forces or other forces operating in the local area.
3. Disruption callsfortacticalawareness, cunning and a robust use of forces so long as
collateral damages and civilian casualties can be avoided. Commanders should also appreciate
that rare opportunities may be better exploited by other agencies (a minor arms find for example
could, if left undisturbed, become a fruitful ambush site). Speed and aledness will be essential.
4. ln order to create disruption, tactical commanders must be afforded freedom of action.
Commanders cannot await authority from higher echelons, as the opportunity to strike
effectively will likely be lost.
605. APPRECIATING SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EFFECTS
1. Commanders and staff must understand that every action will have second- and third-
order effects. On one hand, pro-active security and control activities, robust deliberate
operations and thoughtful lnfo Ops measures to influence target audiences will dislocate and
disrupt the insurgents' presence and influence amongst the populace and in turn corrode and
undermine their confidence and will. On the other hand, these operations-particularly if they
create undesired results such as collateral damages, do not meet their immediate aims or
produce physical signs of improvement-may cause embarrassment to the security forces,
unwanted disruption to the population and in turn undermine the public's confidence and
empathy and the overall legitimacy of the campaign. Long-term success in COIN will be
affected by these second- and third-order effects of activities.
2. This issue may best be illustrated by the following example. A cordon and search
operation of a suspected weapons cache in the heart of an insurgent controlled neighbourhood,
conducted in conjunction with local police forces may find few if any weapons. However, the
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
second- and third-order effects may be significant and will be either positive or negative in
nature:
a. The positive secondary and tertiary effects may include the following:
(1) New intelligence sources are identified within the establishment and from
within the spectators who gathered during the conduct of the operation.
(2) lnsurgent leaders are identified either through arresVdetentions or from
evidence found at the scene.
(3) The use of local police forces may have several effects:
(a) increase the legitimacy of the military forces in that they are seen
to be working with local authorities;
(b) increase the profile and esteem of the local police forces (who
may not be well-regarded by the local population); and/or
(c) improve the professional conduct of the local police force by way
of example and through the training value of the operation.
(4) lnsurgents, knowing that they and their resources are being sought
actively, are forced further underground and may even flee the area.
(5) The local populace begins to feel more secure and less afraid of the
insurgents and their power.
(6) Weapons are forced further underground and are less readily available to
insurgent forces.
b. The negative effects in this example may include the following:
(1) embarrassment in that no weapons were found;
(2) insurgent propaganda highlights this lack of success and attempts to
demonstrate that the security forces are incompetent, over-reacting,
heavy-handed and not to be trusted;
(3) intelligence sources could be compromised;
(4) interference to the local population's daily routine incites anger;
(5) local police assisting with the action loose confidence and trust in the
security forces; andior
(6) damage occurring to shops and homes during operations angers the
populace.63
3. lnformation operations (influence activities) should be planned to exploit the positive
follow-on effects and attempt to mitigate the impact of the negative effects. Commanders must
ensure that this is considered from the outset of planning.
63
Commanders must insist that, during such operations, collateral damages are limited to the greatest extent
possible. Although troops must be prepared for breaches, locked doors can usually be removed from their hinges,
cut locks can be replaced and damages repaired by engineers in the days immediately following the operation.
6-6 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
sEcTroN 4
SECURING AND CONSOLIDATING A CONTROLLED AREA THROUGH
FU LL.SPECTRU M OPERATION564
1. Once the presence of a security force has been established, operations to clear, secure
and consolidate the next area to be brought under government control are launched from
established operating bases. While offensive and defensive activities will establish and
consolidate gains made in dislocating insurgents and securing a geographical area, the
presence and influence of COIN forces are maintained mainly through stability activities.
2. The immediate aim of security and control tasks is to expand the area controlled by the
government. This can be viewed as another component of the spreading ink spot or tache
d'huile concept. The goal is to separate the insurgents from their sources of moral, fiscal and
logistical support as well as disrupt their intelligence networks. These continuous stability
activities such a presence patrols, mobile checkpoints and searches aim to wrest territory, and
more importantly the hearts and minds of people who live in it, from insurgent control and
influence. To this end, the profile and posture of troops and the manner in which they dealwith
the populace will be crucial. Every action must seek to gain support for the campaign. Other
activities such as PSYOPS, CIMIC and public affairs must work to keep the profile of COIN
forces high, gain credit for the campaign and ultimately gain popular support. Stability activities
and the information they gain from the populace should also lead to opportunities to conduct
offensive operations such as attack or raid against the insurgents.
3. The security and control activities of stability operations will include surgical cordons and
searches, raids, presence patrolling and mobile checkpoints. These tactics force the insurgents
to react or surrender the initiative.
4. Specific offensive activities will stem from specifically gained intelligence. Well planned
and organized ambushes destroy the adversary. When the opportunity arises, infiltrations and
attacks may be used to destroy known and vulnerable insurgent camps and base positions.
Success, however, rests on very good intelligence, and commanders must make every attempt
to verify the accuracy and veracity of reports. lnsurgents or others may plant false information
to cause embarrassment to security forces and to undermine the campaign. Furthermore, the
conduct of offensive activities, such as an attack on an insurgent stronghold, must not
undermine or counter the principles inherent in a COIN campaign, They must not risk effects,
such as civilian casualties or collateral damages, that will ultimately undermine public support
and cause segments of the populace to support the insurgents.
5. Defensive tasks will likely include operating base security and defence of civilian vital
points such as key infrastructure.
6. As areas of the hostile territory are cleared of insurgents, the civil administration must be
re-established. This will be part of the overall stability operations. lt is possible that many of the
area's former civil servants, magistrates and police may have escaped the initial insurgent take
over and would be able to put their local knowledge to good use on their return. However, they
and the civil police will undoubtedly need the backing of suitable military forces for some time
and certainly until the neighbouring regions have been brought back under government control.
Consideration must be given to the possibility that corruption in the civil administration may be a
legitimate grievance. lf this is in fact the case, the commander must work closely with other
agencies participating in the campaign to devise a solution that redresses this problem.
6a
See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Operations for further details of full-spectrum operations.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-7
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
7. ln the absence of civil administration or in the presence of a corrupt or developing
administration whose shortcomings may have led in paft to the insurgency, campaigning forces
must be prepared to assume governance and administrative duties. This should be identified in
the campaign planning stages and other agencies used to implement it. ln such a
circumstance, measures even at the lowest level must be taken to develop indigenous
governance capabilities and to have indigenous leaders at the forefront of governance
development. Agencies other than the military will be key to such development, and their work
in this endeavour will be their equivalent of tactical-level activities supporting operational
objectives. Such development in terms of governance and infrastructure will be the true
consolidation of the military operations that removed the insurgents.
8. Part of this development will include the stability activities inherent in security sector
reform (SSR). The military and appropriate other agencies will, in a coordinated and
complementary manner, undertake reform and development of various security services and
related governance and administration. Beyond military and police reform, SSR may include
prison services, the judiciary, border security, customs authorities, civil defence and auxiliary
forces.
9. lnter-agency cooperation at the tactical level within a comprehensive approach may take
the form of a civil-military transition team. A civil-military transition team is defined as: "An
organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and multidisciplinary efforts
within a given geographic region. Note: lts purpose is to develop capacity in local agencies and
institutions in order to promote long-term stability. lt may be referred to as a provincial
reconstruction team (PRT) in some theatres."65
10. This construct will see a number of agencies working in a cooperative and formal
manner to develop the infrastructure and governance of the nation. lt may work on a single line
of operation or on a number of lines of operation. Generally, they focus on reconstruction,
development and governance development and mentoring. lt could include SSR
responsibilities. ln sod, the transition team willfocus on stability activities that create long-term
solutions to the crisis. The military will likely have a supporting role and will provide security and
possible command and control assistance. The military may also support some reconstruction
and quick impact projects.
SECTION 5
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN
606. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. Defensive operations include the activities of defence and delay. Unless insurgent
forces reach the point at which they develop manoeuvre forces, it is unlikely that a delay battle
will be required.
2. The defence will play a major role in securing the local populace, their infrastructure and
territory gained through offensive operations. The defence will be realized through a wide array
of tactical tasks such as standing observations posts, standing patrols, vital point protection and
defensive positions, particularly around operating base locations (see Chapter 1, Figure 1-3).
3. Defensive operations by the security forces will assist in the stabilization of the area and
allow the government and other agencies to effect their tasks. Defensive activities will seek to
tu
Submitted to Army Terminology Panel, September 2007.
6-8 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
create a form of protection and sense of confidence for the security forces, the populace and
their institutions.
607. DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES-THREAT
1. ln most COIN campaigns, areas of operation will be non-linear and perhaps non-
contiguous. The threat will be irregular, and no area can be assumed to be safe, although
significant improvements in security will lower the threat level. Even in a cleared and
consolidated area, the insurgents may still likely have a capability that can launch bomb attacks
or carry out assassinations. They may attempt to reintroduce insurgent cells to launch terrorist
attacks both for their propaganda value and in an attempt to force a redeployment of police and
troops to remove the pressure from their forces elsewhere. Hence, defensive measures and
protection may be necessary for a wide range of people, areas and facilities.
608. RESPONSIBILITY
1. The issue as to what security forces conduct these defensive measures will depend
greatly on the situation and may vary from area to area within the same theatre. lf indigenous
security forces, particularly with a police lead, are capable of fixing and striking the insurgents,
then military forces may assume manpower-intensive defensive tasks. lf indigenous,
particularly constabulary, forces lack the capability or resources and are continuing to develop,
campaigning security forces may have to assume the fixing and striking of insurgents whilst
local forces assume defensive roles. ldeally, as time progresses and the security situation
improves, auxiliary forces and police may be able to assume many of the static defensive
duties.
2. ln some campaigns, it may be desirable and practical to use private security companies,
particularly in terms of supporting NGOs or private organizations that are working in the theatre.
These private security companies must be employed carefully if they are part of the campaign
plan. They must be given a limited and specific mandate, clearly defined tasks and clear rules
of engagement.
609. ENDURANCE
1. Defensive activities and protective measures will still be required in the most secure
base areas, although the tasks may eventually be handed over progressively to the police or
auxiliaries. A priority will be force protection of the security forces' base areas. lf the security
forces cannot protect their own infrastructure, the populace will have little confidence the
security forces can protect them. Government, infrastructure and economic vital points and
lines of communications will require protection, for they provide high value targets for the
insurgents. At all times and at all levels, vigilance must be stressed and enforced.
610. BALANCE
1. Defensive activities and protective measures in high risk areas are manpower intensive.
Many of the tasks are routine and boring, and soldiers tend to lose their vigilance after long
periods without an incident. lf possible, troops on such duties should be rotated with those on
more active operations, and every effort must be made to maintain a continual training
programme in theatre.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-9
Cou nter- I nsurgency Operations
611. OBJECTIVES OF DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES
1. Defensive activities and protective measures will have to be taken with respect to
security forces themselves, other agencies in the campaign and the local populace and their
infrastructure. The general aims of defensive activities and protective measures include the
following:
a. ensure security of all base areas, including forward operating bases and
temporary bases;
b. secure controlled areas;
c. secure lines of communication;
d. disrupt supply and reinforcement of insurgent units;
e. secure key infrastructure;
f. protect vulnerable groups or individuals; and
g. prevent disruption of the economic life of the nation.
612. TACTICAL TASKS FOR DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES
1. Defensive activities and protective measures will include a wide variety of tasks. ln the
conduct of defensive activities, tactical-level units will be expected to conduct the following:
VIP Protection. Protection may be required for key members of the
government, certain security force commanders and visiting dignitaries. lt may
include the training of local forces in this role. Close protection will likely be
conducted by military police and SF troops, while temporary outer cordons may
be conducted by line troops.
Security of Troops and Base Areas. Security force troops, their resources and
their locations will all require a certain level of defence. Administrative moves of
troops often expose concentrations of troops as soft targets. Forces will likely
have to be allocated for their protection.
Convoy Security. The security forces will be expected to secure government
and NGO convoys as well as their own. This may be done through escorts or
through defence of the convoy route.
Protection of Other Agencies. Other agencies within the environment and
campaign may, at least initially in the campaign, require levels of protection that
can only be provided by military forces. This will include protection of their base
camps and of their movements. This requirement will increase when
battlespaces are non-contiguous.
Securing Routes and Lines of Gommunication. Main supply routes (MSR)
and lines of communication will always be vulnerable to attack. Likely or
previously used ambush areas may require picketing. Technology can be
exploited and pickets located on dominating terrain will be able to act as triggers
for the dispatch of reserves to either increase protection or disrupt an insurgent
operation.
Static Defensive Positions. Security forces will not only have to secure their
own locations but may be tasked to guard civilian installations and vital
infrastructure along with government institutions. These will be augmented by
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
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standing patrols and clearing patrols around vulnerable sites, which will continue
the disruption of insurgent activities and surveillance. They should also seek to
disrupt the placement of mines and improved explosive devices (lEDs).
613. COUNTER.SURVEILLANCE MEASURES
1. lnsurgent groups will rely on committed members, sympathisers and coerced neutrals
for surveillance and information on indigenous and coalition security forces' actions, capabilities
and weaknesses. Much of the purposeful surveillance will occur in a fairly open, low-technology
fashion, with watchers blending in with the general public, shadowing patrols or watching base
camps. lntelligence gathered by sympathisers and coerced neutrals will be collected through
simple surveillance of security force practices. Counter-measures must be employed at all
levels. Vigilance must be stressed and practised constantly. Soldiers should be assured that,
in most cases, their departures and movements are reported. Some methods of countering
such surveillance include challenging suspicious persons or those shadowing patrols, and
avoiding patrolling patterns, and the use of clearing patrols around fixed locations.
614. STANDING PATROLS
1. Apart from static defensive posts, the establishment of a network of overt and covert
standing patrols occupying key positions provides an important means of furnishing a defensive
posture and acquiring information. This in turn will assist in dominating an area and dislocating
and disrupting possible insurgent offensive activities.
2. Standing patrols will generally have an assigned area that includes one or more
dominating positions from which they can maintain observation. The tasks allocated to standing
patrols may include:
a. over-watch of locations, both permanent (such as base camps) or temporary
(such as VCPs);
b. clearing insurgent watchers from points of observation;
c. obtaining information on insurgent activity and noting patterns;
d. observing the movement and activity of curfew breakers and crowds;
e. identifyingring-leadersandlaw-breakers;
f. directing patrols, police, reserve units or helicopters to incidents;
g. providing covering fire to vehicle and foot patrols should they come under a level
of attack which necessitates the use of firearms; and/or
h. assisting in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and crowd confrontations by
passing information to elements of the security forces involved in crowd control.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
Gou nter-Su rveillance Measures
Surveillance by insurgent gangs began as soon as Canadian troops arrived in Haiti in early
2004. Observant soldiers in observation posts (OPs) and clearing patrols quickly identified
and eliminated watchers. Patrolcommanders detained individuals who were shadowing
patrols, removed (temporarily) their cell phones and recorded the names and numbers in the
calling memory and directory. This information was passed to United States Marine Corps
(USMC) regimental and Canadian intelligence staffs who used it to identify the insurgent
organization and command.
Source: Op HALO After ActionReports.
sEcTtoN 6
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN_GAINING THE INITIATIVE
615. INTRODUCTION
1. Offensive operations support the military's key role in neutralizing the insurgent. They
effectively take the battle to the insurgent in order pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt him. They will
be key to gaining the initiative over the insurgent.
2. Offensive operations include a wide range of activities, each of which are realized
through a wider range of tactical tasks (see Chapter 1, Figure 1-3). During a COIN campaign,
the most likely offensive activities that will be employed are:
a. attacks, hasty or deliberate, against insurgent positions and locations, including
command and control centres and systems;
b. fighting patrols for the conduct of a raid66 or an ambush;
c. reconnaissance in force; and
d. pursuit and exploitation.
3. The conduct of offensive activities will follow their own principles and TTP. However, the
conduct of offensive activities should not violate the overarching philosophy and principles
inherent in the conduct of a COIN campaign. At times, the tactical success offered by a
potential offensive activity may have to be delayed in order to support the operational objectives
of the campaign. For example, the pursuit of a fleeing adversary may have to be ceased or
postponed in order to secure an urban area or provide emergency humanitarian assistance to a
local populace that has been under adversary control. Whilst the pursuit may destroy some
insurgents, the emergency assistance to the population will engender popular support and gain
legitimacy for the campaign.
616. ATTACKS-HASTYATTACKS
1. Occasionally, COIN forces will be able to wrest the initiative from the insurgent and
conduct hasty attacks. Any such opportunity should be fully exploited in order to gain the
tt
Raid is defined as: "An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure
information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. lt ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion
of the assigned mission" (AAP 6). Note that a raid differs from a cordon and search.
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initiative and undermine insurgent will and sense of impunity. These opportunities will be
fleeting, and commanders must have standing authority to assume offensive operations as the
opportunities arise. Depending upon the nature of the campaign, many of these opportunities
may occur at the section and platoon level during the conduct of presence patrols. Here,
commanders will have to make a rapid transition from stability activities to offensive activities.
2. Any hasty attack should be conducted with a view to avoiding undesired effects such as
collateral damage and civilian casualties. A successful attack may kill a small number of
insurgents, but if completed with collateral damages and civilian casualties, it will do irreparable
harm to the campaign in the eyes of many. lndeed, it may even drive neutral members of the
populace to support the insurgency.
3. ln the conduct of hasty attacks, commanders must be cautious of insurgents seeking
shelter amongst local populations and institutions.
6'17. DELIBERATE ATTACKS
1. As in any campaign, deliberate attacks will require detailed planning and
reconnaissance. ln a COIN campaign, they will likely occur against insurgent bases and
concentrations of forces. Given the nature of insurgency, the opportunities for deliberate
attacks will not routinely occur,
2. ln the conduct of the battle procedure, operational security (OPSEC) will be paramount
and, given the nature of insurgent information collection practices, difficult to maintain. Special
consideration must be made to ensure the OPSEC is maintained.
3. Apart from the conduct of the attack itself, plans should focus on the exploitation of
success. This will include the pursuit of fleeing insurgents (ideally by specially designated
forces), emergency aid to any non-combatants in the area and consolidation of the position.
Considerations must be given to the need for and possibility of permanent occupation of the
cleared location. The success of the deliberate attack will be limited and impermanent if
security forces withdraw and insurgents are permitted to re-establish their presence and
continue to influence any local populace,
618. LARGE.SCALEOFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. ln cases where an insurgency controls large areas of the theatre, the insurgents may
raise and deploy a sizeable force. Such a situation is most likely to occur where they have
access to a friendly neighbouring country which they use as a haven to assemble, train and
equip.
2. Large-scale offensive operations are attractive for many commanders, as they imply
initiative and provide the opportunity to be pro-active and gain a major success against the
insurgent. They will include a variety of offensive activities such as deliberate and hasty
attacks, fighting patrols, pursuits and large scale "sweeps."
3. Past campaigns, however, do not provide many examples in which large-scale offensive
operations gained significant advantages and led to success. Difficulties with OPSEC and the
scale and inherent tactics of such operations allow insurgents adaptable to dispersalto ex-
filtrate and avoid decisive engagement.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-1 3
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
4. ldeally, insurgent forces should be engaged and destroyed in battle while they are
relatively small and before they pose a major threat. This may not be feasible for a number of
reasons:
a. the threat is likely to develop in a remote area while the host government focuses
on securing vital areas close to the capital, the main towns and their surrounding
well-populated and economically important rural areas;
b. the host nation may have neither the troops available nor the means of projecting
force over a considerable distance into a remote and possibly mountainous
jungle region; and/or
c. there may also be a risk that operations on the border of a stronger, hostile
neighbour may provoke an unwanted intervention on the pretext that the
neighbouring country's borders have been violated or its security threatened.
5. There are a number of prerequisites for the success of a large-scale offensive operation:
a. Good Intelligence. The locations of units, headquarters and key leaders are as
important as the knowledge of the enemy's positions and security screen.
Equally important is good intelligence on the insurgent's supporting political and
logistic organization.
b. lsolation. The area chosen for the operation must be isolated as much as
possible to prevent insurgent reinforcement or exfiltration. lf the escape of small
padies cannot be stopped, the enemy should not be able to evacuate formed
units. Enemy escape routes should, as far as possible, be blocked.
c. Surprise and Deception. Obtaining surprise presents the greatest problem.
Preparations and preliminary moves that cannot be hidden must be disguised.
Patrolling to obtain information should be carried out in as many areas as
possible, with no obvious emphasis on the selected area. Rumours of possible
operations planned to take place elsewhere may be fed into the insurgent
intelligence organization through channels which the insurgents are known to
trust. Demonstrations and feints may be launched in such a manner as not to
arouse suspicions as to the location of the main effort, its aims and its objectives.
6. The execution of such an operation requires rapid deployment to encircle the main
enemy forces. lnsurgent forces should not just be surrounded by a cordon, which is likely to
prove porous in the best circumstances, but located and pinned down. Once surrounded,
disorganized and broken up, the insurgents must be pursued.
7. Success must be followed by rooting out the insurgents' political and logistic support
organization and replacing it with the host government's administration. The people in the area
must be protected from future covert insurgent infiltration by insurgent political cells and/or
forces.
619. OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST INSURGENT COMMAND
AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
1. Offensive operations should include when possible action against insurgent command
and control (C2) systems. Such actions may be a particularly effective and often the most
economical means of reducing the combat effectiveness of insurgents, applicable at all levels of
command. The primary objectives of offensive operations directed against insurgent command
and control capabilities include the following:
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a. slow his tempo in relation to that of the security forces;
b. disrupt his activities;
c. degrade the insurgent commander's ability to command and control;
d. interdict electronic signals used to detonate improvised explosive devices; and
e. disrupt his ability to generate and sustain offensive activities.
2. Technological advances will greatly enhance the ability of security forces to affect the
insurgents' command and control systems. Care must be taken, however, to minimize negative
consequences for the non-combatants. Also, one must be aware of the effect upon potential
intelligence collection. For example, shutting down a cellular telephone grid in order to deny its
use by insurgents has a strong negative impact on the civil society in addition to precluding
electronic wa rfa re exploitation of intercepted commu n ications.
620, FIGHTING PATROLS_RAID AND AMBUSHES
1. Fighting patrols are distinct from other patrols, particularly presence patrols for the
purposes of security and control (stability operations), in that they are conducted for the
purposes of conducting an ambush or raid. The purpose of fighting patrols is to pre-empt or
disrupt the insurgent and his aims. A series of fighting patrols followed by the establishment of
a permanent security force presence will dislocate the insurgents. Fighting patrols bring troops
into contact with the insurgents on favourable terms.
2. Fighting patrols are particulady effective in COIN campaigns in terms of gaining tactical
success over the insurgents, pre-empting and disrupting their activities and undermining their
will and cohesion. The inherent tactics of patrolling match those of the insurgents: planning is
detailed and they are conducted by small, mobile elements exercising initiative.
3. Fighting patrols must be based upon good, accurate and specific information and
intelligence regarding the planned objective. Such information may be obtained from a variety
of sources, including police and military collection, technical sensors including imagery,
HUMINT sources, reconnaissance, routine presence patrols, tracking and, sometimes, a lucky
contact.
4. Fighting patrols will be planned in detail, but they must retain the ability to develop and
adapt flexible TTP that can counter the mutable tactics of the insurgent. Lessons learned during
patrols should be disseminated quickly so that they may be incorporated into follow-on activities.
5. Fighting patrols, particularly those conducted for ambushes, need not have a specific
target in mind but may simply be executed on the basis that the opportunity to ambush the
adversary may be encountered and exploited. lt must be remembered that despite the
offensive nature of fighting patrols, normal rules of engagement (ROE) will apply and must be
followed.
6. ln close terrain, where it is seldom possible to set in a stealthy manner a cordon
successfully, a fighting patrol has a better chance of scoring a success. The patrol may be able
to set a hasty ambush or raid an insurgent base. Used judiciously, fighting patrols are an
excellent way of keeping small groups of enemy on the move, inducing a sense of insecurity
and dislocating insurgent plans.
7. Ambushes are usually deliberate, but drills must be developed to enable a section or
patrol to move rapidly and quietly into an ambush position when its lead elements spot insurgent
forces moving. Ambushes may be conducted in areas under government control or in areas still
under the control of insurgents. Because they are followed by a withdrawal, raids will be
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-1 5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
conducted against insurgent camps or strong points in areas not yet under the control of
government forces.
B. Ambushes and raids may be conducted with any combination of the following aims:
a. the destruction of an insurgent force;
b. the capture or killing of a wanted insurgent;
c. the capture or destruction of weapons and equipment;
d. gaining of intelligence;
e. deterring the insurgent from using an area; and/or
f. preventing the insurgents from approaching friendly positions.
621. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
1. Campaigning forces may conduct reconnaissance-in-force tasks in order to gain
required information regarding insurgents, their location, disposition, strength, intentions and
influence in a region and amongst its population. Such activities will likely be conducted in a
more overt fashion than fighting patrols, which rely upon stealth to reach their objective and
withdraw. Reconnaissance in force may be mounted or dismounted.
2. Although information collection will be the primary aim of a reconnaissance-in-force
activity, forces must be prepared to exploit opportunities such as the ability to ambush insurgent
groups. Well-practised drills, good communications and high levels of training will ensure the
required flexibility to exploit fleeting opportunities.
sEcTtoN 7
STABILITY OPERATION56T AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN
622. INTRODUCTION
1. Stability operations are defined as "tactical activities conducted by military forces in
conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order within which
responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved."6u Stability
activities seek to gain support and legitimacy for a campaign by addressing the root causes of a
crisis. They include tasks that seek to protect an area and populace in order to allow other
agencies and the civilian populace to function, and they include reconstruction, training and
development. Compared with offensive and defensive activities, they are generally the
predominant type of operation in COIN and peace support campaigns.
2. Stability operations consist of the following activities:
a. security and control tasks;
b. support to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR);
c. support to SSR;
tt
For a more detailed discussion of stability operations, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.
t'
Army Terminology Panel. NATO defines stability activities as: "Tactical activities that seek to stabilise the situation
and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities
to restore services and support civilian agencies" (NATO AJP 3.2).
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d. support to civilian infrastructure and governance; and
e. assistance to other agencies.
3. These stability activities are realized through a wide array of tactical tasks, such as:
cordon and search, vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), curfew implementation, presence patrols,
humanitarian aid delivery, training of indigenous security forces and crowd confrontation to
name a few.
4. lnitially in a campaign, the military may be the only agency in theatre or the local area
that is able to conduct stability activities and tasks. The military will initiate some aspects of the
work and establish the security and control needed for other agencies and civilian society to be
able to operate. Many stability activities require other agencies. SSR, for example, will require
not just the military but other agencies to conduct reform of other facets of a security apparatus,
such as prisons, police, border control and the related civilian and political administration and
oversight.
5. Stability activities set the conditions for an enduring stable and secure situation and thus
future sustainable development. They often address many of the conditions and circumstances
that led to the instability and insurrection in the first place.
623. SECURITY AND CONTROL TASKS
1. Security and control tasks seek to create a security framework that will allow the conduct
of normal civil society and will permit other agencies to conduct their operations. ln other words,
the creation of a security framework will permit other agencies to operate and manoeuvre.
Security and control may be imposed through a wide variety of tactical tasks that support this
aim but will normally be conducted through presence patrols, observation posts, cordon and
searches, checkpoints, curfews, movement control and the use of reserves to react to
emergencies or threats.
2. Security and control tasks often support the collection of information, namely from the
local populace and troops on the ground, which leads to the conduct of other stability activities
or even offensive activities.
624. PATROLLING AND OBSERVATION POSTS
1. Most patrolling and observation posts conducted for the purposes of security and control
will be overt. However, in certain circumstances, they may be covert and seek to lure out
insurgents or other irregular threats, such as criminals, that threaten security. Such activities
are often termed framework operations or framework patrols, for they help create that security
framework that permits other agencies to operate.
2. Patrols are a mainstay of COIN operations and must be conducted with a robust spirit,
taking into consideration, however, that they will be occurring often amongst civilian populations.
Most types of patrols should be assigned standing and specific information requirements (lRs)
to support the overall campaign and specifically planned operations. Given the overt nature of
most COIN patrolling, patrols are more vulnerable to ambush than those conducted in
conventional operations. Every effort should be made to avoid creating predictable habits,
including standardized routes and timing. Failing to do so will invite effective enemy attacks.
3. Presence patrols provide a force presence that helps to create the secure environment,
They dislocate insurgents' presence and influences and disrupt any insurgent activities. They
provide protection and should actively seek information through their contact with the public and
through observation.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
4. Presence patrols may operate as a complete platoon or in a dispersed manner at the
half-section or section level, albeit controlled at the platoon level. They may operate on a half-
platoon or multiple system.6e The tactics and procedures will vary in accordance with the
environment, the threat, insurgent tactics, their task and the involvement of other security force
elements.
5. The patrols may work from firm bases or from temporarily established patrol bases.
They may be mounted or move on foot. Patrolling should avoid creating a pattern of predictable
habits. ln broad terms, their tasks are to:
a. Provide local protection for security force bases by complimenting other
protective measures such as standing patrols, observation posts (OPs) and
sensors.
b. lnhibit insurgents'freedom of movement by random deployment at different times
in different areas. This supporls the dislocation of the insurgent.
c. Through their presence and positive influence on the public, dislocate the
influence of insurgents and their psychological hold over the populace.
d. lncrease the chances of intercepting gunmen, bombers or weapon runners.
e. Conduct snap VCPs or "cordon and knock" operations.To
f. Be in position to react to a threat or developing situation in a particular area or to
reinforce other patrols.
g. Deter an insurgent attack or sniping operation by saturating an area and
threatening the escape route of a bomber or sniper.
h. Gather information and intelligence through the issue of standing and unique lRs.
6e
ln a multiple patrol system, the basic tactical element is the four-man brick. Hence, a rifle section will consist of two
bricks. A multiple will normally consist of three bricks, and thus a platoon can form two multiples, one commanded by
theplatooncommander,theotherbytheplatoonsecond-in-command. Brickspatrol insupportofoneanother,
normally within visual, or at least radio, contact, and are thus able to support one another while remaining flexible
enough to out-manoeuvre any insurgents encountered,
70
Roving snap VCPs are often more effective than static VCPs, which will quickly become known to the insurgents.
Patrols will often encounter suspicious activity, notice an irregular action or notice something out of its ordinary place
or simply receive a tip from a local. The patrol commander must be prepared to stop and search suspicious vehicles.
Additionally, he must be prepared to conduct a low-level cordon and search. With the combat power available, or
with additional reinforcements, he may simply set an immediate cordon and "knock" on the premises, explaining the
situation to any occupants and then conducting a search.
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During the deployment to Haiti in 2004, intelligence sources at the United States Marine
Corps (USMC) regimental level indicated that a hardware store in the west end of Port au
Prince was a possible weapons cache, as the store was owned by a known gang leader.
This was added to a company target list, and framework patrols assigned to this area were
tasked to search for and identify this store. Eventually, after about 20 days later, a patrol
located the store. The patrol commander conducted his combat estimate and after receiving
authority to do so from the company command post, the patrol conducted a cordon and
knock operation. Nothing was found, and two locks had to be cut during the operation. lt
was explained to the store manager that if the owner wished, he could report to the company
location and his locks would be replaced. Three days later, the owner and other man arrived
at the camp seeking new locks. The two men were, and had been, posing as Haitian
National Police (HNP) officers and were listed on the HNP most wanted list, a copy of which
was held in the company command post. They were detained and turned over to HNP
authorities.
625. MOVEMENT CONTROL
1. Control of movement is a vital aspect of COIN operations. Although manpower
intensive, it is necessary to dislocate and disrupt insurgent activities and reassure the public.
Movement control measures can also be highly inconvenient to the general public and a point of
contention. Therefore, the need for them must be clear and well advertised (in terms of
purpose, vice location and time) through the lnfo Ops communication plan. ldeally, movement
control measures are conducted in conjunction with the local police, with the latter seen as
being in the lead.
2. Principal Methods. Before movement controls are imposed, aims and plans and must
be discussed between the civil authorities, the police and the military to make sure the
enforcement is a practical proposition and that the necessary police and soldiers are available
to put them into effect. The principle methods of movement control are:
a. road blocks;
b. checkpoints, both snap and deliberate;
c. traffic control points; and
d. curfews.
3. Controlling movement may have any of the following aims:
a. permit security forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in the
government's ability to protect them;
b. disrupt insurgent groups and plans by making movement difficult and precluding
coordination between insurgent cells and groups;
c. dominate an area to prevent crowds from gathering and to deter hostile action;
d. control the movement of crowds that do form and prevent their reinforcement;
e. intercept and discourage the illegal movement of arms, explosives, medical
supplies and food;
f. seal off an area to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives and
subversive propaganda material ;
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-19
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
g. arrest wanted persons;
h. record movement to detect patterns and obtain information; and/or
i. facilitate the movement and operations of the security forces (for example, part of
an outer cordon of a deliberate operation may include a temporary road-block).
4. Vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) will be a regular means of controlling movement and
disrupting insurgentactivity. ln the conductof VCPs in a COIN operation, thefollowing points
should be considered:
a. Planning must be detailed and appropriate resources applied. These should
include enough resources and mobility to provide effective cut-off and pursuit
elements.
b. Reserues or QRFs should be aware of the operation and prepared to support if
necessary.
c. Modern communication devices, particularly cellular telephones, will alert
insurgents seeking to avoid the VCP to its presence within minutes of its
establishment. Thus the use of snap VCPs at the section level put in location for
very short periods and the simple stopping of suspicious vehicles and individuals
will do more to pre-empt and disrupt insurgents than long-term VCPs.
d. Vehicle checkpoints provide members of the public the opportunity to pass
information to the security forces without raising the suspicion of insurgents.
Troops conducting VCPs must be prepared to receive such information or to
provide the informant with a contact.
5. Large-scale or continuous movement control measures will require much consideration,
planning and coordination. Likely public reaction must be taken into account during the
planning stage. Agitators will be quick to exploit any adverse reaction, and the need for any
unavoidable irksome restrictions should be anticipated and explained to weaken hostile
propaganda. lll-conceived measures that lead to the collapse of public services must be
avoided. The committee system exists to discuss these plans and their likely consequences. A
sound plan must be based on good intelligence, which involves close liaison and joint conduct
with the police. The concept must be supported by a specific lnfo Ops plan explaining the
purpose and goals of the control measures.
626. CROWD CONTROL MEASURES
1. Crowds and violent demonstrations are often a feature of insurgencies and are easily
exploited by insurgents for their own ends. lnsurgents will stage events to draw crowds and
often attempt to provoke security forces to over-react to a demonstration. These events will be
filmed by insurgents and the images quickly disseminated internationally in a carefully
coordinated propaganda effort. Crowds and resulting riots undermine the overall security
situation, weaken the government's control and destroy civil infrastructure.
2. ln spite of measures to prevent it, crowds may rally around a particular issue and
assemble, usually in urban areas, in front of government offices, security force camps or in
public spaces, The civil police may be unable to cope with the situation, and military assistance
may be required. The size of a crowd is no indication of its attitude. A large crowd containing
many curious onlookers may be docile, until agitators begin to influence it. A small crowd may
be peaceful, or it may be a concentration of those with extreme views. The military commander
on the spot must use his own judgement as to how to deal with any particular situation.
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3, Crowd control operations (CCO) require specialtraining in specific TTP and equipment.
These should not be acquired on the job and must be included in all pre-deployment training. ln
theatre, regular training schedules should include a CCO refresher. Likewise, CCO-specific
equipment must be positioned forward with tactical sub-units, for violent crowds can gather with
little notice. Furthermore, when there is a threat of crowd confrontation, the mere appearance of
properly prepared troops can help dissuade the crowd from turning violent.
627. SEARCH TASKS
1. As security forces impose control over urban and rural areas, search tasks become a
mainstay of the security environment. Searches must be guided by accurate intelligence in
order to minimize disruption of the population and embarrassment for the security forces.
2. The purpose of search tasks is to isolate a selected area by deploying a cordon, either
by stealth or at such speed that the intended quarry has no chance to escape, and then
searching it thoroughly. The target area may be a single house or an entire city block.
Obviously, the more precise the target area can is the better.
3. Search tasks are conducted whenever possible with police authorities. They may be
conducted in order to:
a. capture wanted persons, weapons, communication devices, propaganda
materials and means, explosives or documents;
b. disrupt insurgent activities;
c. eliminate insurgent activity in a specific locality, particularly with a view to
expanding a controlled area;
d. gain evidence to suppoft prosecutions or to prove links with expatriate
communities and fraudulent fund raising schemes; and
e. gain information to support future operations.
4. ln conducting such tasks with the local police and other forces, OPSEC is essential. lt is
not uncommon for local security forces to be infiltrated by insurgents or to contain informants
who pass the insurgents information. lf this is a concern for military commanders, methods
should be used to conceal the nature and area of the task until the last minute.
5. The establishment of the cordon and the search are two separate activities but are
mounted as one task. Because the search part of the task is usually a lengthy affair that
disrupts the life of a locality, cordons and searches should only be mounted on reliable
information. A series of fruitless operations merely alienates the population from the
government and unnecessarily provides the insurgent with propaganda.
6. Cordon and search tasks are not easy to execute, due in good part to the difficulty of
closing the cordon so quickly that the insurgents have no chance to escape. lt is easier to
position a cordon in open country with a good road network, long fields of observation and with
the help of helicopters. ln close terrain (iungle, urban) it is virtually impossible to position and
link up a cordon because movement is restricted, buildings are connected, watchers may see
the forces coming and alert the target area, and observation may be restricted to a few metres.
lngenuity will be required by commanders to work around these challenges.
7. During COIN, cordon and search tasks will often be conducted based on HUMINT
sources. lnformation from informants must be treated with caution. lt is always possible that an
informant may simply wish to "set up" a local rival or may wish to lead the security forces into an
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
ambush. Caution must be exercised at all times and information gained, when possible, should
be confirmed by other sources.
628. SUPPORTTO DDRAND SSR71
1. The design of required demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and
security sector reform (SSR) programmes should begin as part of the overall campaign planning
process. Specifically designated forces will normally be required, padicularly forthe SSR
programme.
2. The military will play a supporting role in the overall DDR process, which sees various
armed elements undergo a dissolution process. DDR by its very nature will require the
involvement of any number of other agencies in order to properly demobilize and reintegrate
former combatants. These former combatants may be regular army members, conscripts,
private militia members, former insurgents and other irregular actors.
3. lt must be remembered that the DDR process cannot simply disarm former combatants
and return them to their homes without support or employment. Such actions will breed
instability, criminality and possibly insurrection. Therefore, other agencies are required to work
to avoid such problems. Work schemes and re-training will be necessary to occupy former
soldiers and to support wider development. Special programmes may be required to deal with
situations involving child soldiers.
4. To this end, the DDR process will require a wide range of agencies, with the military
forces playing a supporting role. The likely tasks that the COIN military forces will undertake in
a DDR process include:
a. disarmament of security forces, militias and/or illegally armed groups;
b. weapons collection and accounting;
c. weapon destruction;
d. protection, escort and transportation of demobilized personnel, particularly where
they may be threatened by elements yet to be demobilized; and
e. assistance in selection for a new security service.
5. Not all former combatants may be demobilized. Many, either as collective groups or
individuals, may undergo a reform process in the creation of new security forces.
6. Likewise, the SSR process will require a comprehensive approach involving a wide
range of agencies. Reform may be required for a variety of elements within a security
apparatus, including the military, police, judiciary, border and customs control, prison services
and national defence control, administration and governance. The level of reform required will
depend upon the situation and state of the indigenous securityforces and administration.
7. Many possibilities exist for the development or reform of security forces. The design of
the SSR programme should be undertaken within the campaign planning process, and
specifically assigned forces should be allocated. The design for the reformed security sector
should reflect the nation and environment (including social structures and culture) within which it
71
See B-GL-300-000/FP-00 I Land Qperations for details regarding demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
(DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes.
6-22 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
will occur. Structures or power arrangements that may have lead or contributed to the
insurgency or crisis in the past should be avoided to the greatest extent possible.
B. Tribal lines and loyalties will have to be overcome in some cases. This may occur
between unit and sub-unit lines, in which units (battalion level) are integrated, but at the sub-unit
level, they are affiliated along regional or tribal lines. lndigenous traditions and opinions will
have to feed whatever construct is designed,
9. The military's role in the SSR programme will likely include the following tasks:
a. selection and recruitment of future security force personnel;
b. allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure; and
c. training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility to indigenous military and, in the
short term, other security forces such as police and border guards.
629. SUPPORT TO RECONSTRUCTION AND GOVERNANCE-CIVIL.MILITARY
TRANSITION TEAMS
1. Although the military forces may assume initially some provision of essential services,
reconstruction and governance, long-term development and governance maturity will require the
application of other agencies, working in conjunction with the military.
2. Reconstruction and governance should initially seek to provide emergency and essential
services to a population, This will not only address issues and stresses within the environment
but will gain local support for the campaign and increase campaign legitimacy.
3. Reconstruction and governance will require a comprehensive approach with the military
in a supporting role to other agencies better suited for these inherent development tasks. This
may be realized through the creation of civil-military transition teams (ClMlTTs). These are
defined as: "An organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and
multidisciplinary efforts within a given geographic region. Note: lts purpose is to develop
capacity in local agencies and institutions in order to promote long-term stability. lt may be
referred to as a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in some theatres."72
4. Civil-military transition teams will incorporate a number of agencies under a single
construct and ideally command in order to conduct capability building within the developing
nation, its government and administration. lt will attempt to address the root causes of instability
and the insurgency itself if possible. lt will gain support and legitimacy for the campaign and
create the solutions for enduring stability. lt may assume a wide variety of tasks, such as
training of police and prison officials, government leadership training, infrastructure repair and
development and other civil capacity development and expansion. These organizations should
be considered units or formations that undertake tasks and create effects that support
operational objectives. They must operate in cooperation and synchronization with other units
and activities in the theatre.
5. The military's role will be a supporting one. The military may assume some of the
capacity building, particularly in the early stages of the campaign when not allof the other
agencies have deployed. The military will be responsible for local security, defence and force
protection of other agencies. The military may also assist with C2 structures and support,
intelligence and threat analysis support and liaison support, to name a few possibilities.
t'
Submitted to the Army Terminology Panel, September 2OO7
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-23
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
6. Likely military tasks within infrastructure reconstruction and development include the
following:
a. provision of mobility on roads, railways and watenruays;
b. restoration of airfields, harbours and ports;
c. provision of essential water, fuel and power;
d. restoration of essential health and public buildings and services, including
sewerage and waste;
e. limited medical assistance/advice;
f. enabling of humanitarian aid; and
g. securing key national infrastructure.
7. As the security situation improves, many of these tasks should be assumed by other
agencies, including indigenous elements.
B. The military may assume some initial governance tasks, but ideally these will be
undertaken by other agencies better suited for their conduct and development. Requirements
for interim governance by military forces and other agencies may include the following:
a. commercial support and economic institutions (e.9., establishment of local
markets, banks and village business cooperatives);
b. public transportation nodes such as ports and airports;
c. management of essential services and industries;
d. educationinstitutionsandinfrastructure;
e. public civil service institutions, including refuse, health, customs, media, etc.;
f. political institutions, particularly at the local, municipal level, such as a mayor's
office and support staff;
g. humanitarian assistance and aid distribution;
h. enabling political negotiation at local level;
i. providing pan-agency C2 framework;
j. rule of law implementation, specifically policing duties against criminal activity
and border control; and
k. support to elections.
9. The provision of infrastructure and governance support will be developed and
implemented through the campaign plan and its lines of operation. Detailed plans will have to
be refined once the command and control relationship has been established across any
coalition and with the indigenous authorities.
630. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES
1. Within the comprehensive approach to the campaign, there will be agencies operating
that may require military assistance. This assistance may include provision of transport and
security to select NGOs or other such assistance to their operations. Such assistance must be
clearly linked to the lnfo Ops being concurrently conducted to ensure a unified message and
effect are created. Such assistance must also be in line with operational objectives and, where
6-24 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
possible, provide additional opportunity for information collection and the development of
situational awareness.
sEcTtoN I
ENABLING OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN COIN
1. Enabling operations consist of those activities and tasks that enable forces to conduct
other tactical operations. Enabling operations include activities such as the withdrawal, relief in
place, passage of lines and advance to contact to name a few.7'
2. Enabling operations within a COIN environment will be conducted using extant principles
and TTP. However, special consideration will have to be made with respect to the threat and
overall COIN campaign and environment.
3. Echelon forces will require additional security and protection given the ubiquitous nature
of insurgent threats. lt may be unlikely that the conduct of an advance to contact will be
required, but all forces moving from one point to another must conduct such movement as a
tactical movement prepared for engagement.
4. Relief in place will occur repeatedly throughout a COIN campaign at all levels of
command. The details required for passage to the incoming force must not only include the
immediate tactical situation and threat but must include a holistic hand-over of the environment,
its actors and influences, local culture and power structures.
5. Reconnaissance patrols will continue to be conducted within a COIN campaign and will
likely include both mounted and dismounted patrols. As in conventional operations, they may
be conducted as point, area or route reconnaissance. The information requirements will vary
with the specific task; however, they will likely focus on both physical terrain and elements of the
local populace. Within a COIN environment, the conduct of reconnaissance patrols will require
some specific considerations:
a. Small reconnaissance patrols (which are relatively weak) will be vulnerable,
particularly if conducted overtly. They can be easily attacked in any terrain or
swarmed by crowds in urban areas.
b. Coveft patrols have a reduced threat profile, avoid early warning to insurgents of
their presence and do not reveal the information being sought.
c. Reconnaissance patrols with technical requirements (e.9., route reconnaissance)
should include specialists such as engineers, where applicable. Depending upon
the intended mission, it may include members of other agencies, such as NGOs
(although these will more likely be classified as liaison visits).
d. The insertion of covert patrols and OPs is very difficult in dense urban areas.
lngenuity must be used to disguise their insertion, which can be concealed
amongst an overt operation.
e. A QRF must be prepared to extract or reinforce the patrol.
f. The patrol may assume additional responsibilities, as opportunities present
themselves, such as the conduct of snap VCPs.
73
See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Operations for more details regarding enabling operations.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-25
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
sEcTroN I
RESERVES AND QUICK REACTION FORCES
1. Quick reaction forces (aRFs) are formed at the tactical levels in order to react to the
unexpected, exploit opportunities and success and supporUreinforce threatened areas and
friendly forces. They are simply a form of reserve forces.
2. ln addition to supporting military forces, there will be a requirement to provide rapid
support through a QRF to local security forces and institutions. Even in dense urban areas,
civilian police stations and other offices of local authorities can feel isolated and threatened. ln
rural areas, police outposts and border stations are vulnerable to attack due to their isolation. lt
is important that such local forces be made aware the military forces are willing and capable of
rapidly and effectively coming to their aid. Without this confidence, they will be unwilling to
undertake operations and may flee from their posts, thereby allowing insurgents to destabilize
an area and undermine the government control.
3. Likewise, coalition military forces operating from small platoon-sized bases or patrolling
at the section and multiple levels will at certain times require reinforcement or extraction. QRFs
must be ready to respond to such calls for support. QRFs may also be used to exploit brief
opportunities to strike at insurgents or to secure intelligence finds.
4. Thus, QRFs must be identified and held in readiness to go to the aid of threatened
detachments or to exploit possible successes. The planning of QRFs in a COIN operation
should consider the following:
a. The establishment of fixed communications means between the force and those
local security elements (such as police posts) that are within the unit's AO and for
which the units are responsible.
b. The allocation and practice of alternative routes in order to reduce the risk of
ambush from insurgents who have deliberately planned to attack the relieving
force.
c. The allocation of armoured vehicles to the QRF to increase mobility and force
protection. There is a possibility that they may be blocked on an approach route
or ambushed with anti-armour weapons.
d. The use of helicopters for rapid movement. This is often the best option for rapid
insertion but is vulnerable to all types of fire and may not be able to land in dense
urban environments.
e. The design of a QRF as an all-arms grouping is based on manoeuvre forces with
embedded supporting forces such as field engineers, fire support and medical
support.
sEcTtoN 10
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
1. Within the continuum of operations, overall success is generally measured by progress
along the spectrum of conflict towards the end of less violence. Whilst this holds true for COIN,
there can be much finer indications of success as operations are conducted over a period of
time. Even though the measurement of overall success is of interest to all levels, strategic to
tactical, many of the indications will be measured at the tactical level.
o-zo B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
2. ln order to determine progress in a campaign, a commander will assess the conduct of
the campaign through measures of performance (MoP) and measures of effectiveness (MoE).74
Whilst MoP ask the question, "Are we doing the task right?" MoE ask the question, "Are we
doing the right tasks to create the desired effects?"
3. MoE are defined as; "a criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected system
behaviour or capabilities over time."7u MoE refer to the desired effects and whether or not the
activities conducted have created those effects, that is, achieved results. They apply to both
fires and influence activities.
4. With respect to fires and their effects on the physical plane, MoE remain relatively
obvious. An attack may have been conducted well, but if it failed to seize the assigned objective
or failed to achieve its purpose, then the MoE were not met and the activity failed.
5, With influence activities and effects on the psychological plane, MoE are applied to
activities and the resulting changes in understanding, perception and the will of the target
audience. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making
process, developing MoE for influence activities and effects on the psychological plane may be
one of the most daunting intellectual tasks facing a commander. lnfluence activities seek to
work through external and internal filters in order to affect understanding and will. These filters
are often culturally and socially based. Hence, the planning and conduct of these activities is an
arf requiring the commander's subjective feel for their effect. The results of these influence
activities require as defined a set of indicators as possible in order to detect changes in
perceptions, understanding, attitudes and behaviours. These indicators need to account for the
effect of cultural and environmental influences.
6. Developing appropriate MoE to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very
difficult task. Willpower, perceptions and beliefs are all less-than-completelytangible variables
that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of
gauging a target audience's attitude. Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and this
will be difficult to identify.
7. At the start of an operation, the start-state of the security situation should be noted and,
ideally, recorded statistically. lndicators to be examined in a specific area may include the
following:
a. number of murders or killings;
b. number of insurgent attacks on government buildings, persons and security
forces;
c. number of violent incidents and general levels of crime;
d. number and intensity of public demonstrations;
e. state and provisions of civil services such as sanitary collection services, schools
open and government offices open;
f. police station manning and equipping and the profile of police presence in public;
g. commercial activities, particularly small shops and open markets; and
'o For a more complete discussion on measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, see
B-GL-300-001 /FP-001 Land Operations.
tu
Army Terminology Panel, May 2006.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-27
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
h. public activities in urban areas, particularly at night.
B. As the mission progresses, improvements in the above indicators will indicate the
measure of effectiveness. The development and application of measures of effectiveness is key
to understanding and fostering success in a campaign.
9. Success, that is, improvements in the civil situation, will not occur evenly over a region.
lmprovements may occur in one area, while an area in which the insurgents have more
influence and power will be slower to improve. Likewise, improvements may come more rapidly
in the daytime, but the situation will be worse at night. Such indicators will allow the security
forces to focus their resources more effectively.
sEcTtoN 11
CONDITIONING THE TACTICAL LEVEL FOR COUNTER.INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
1. Commanders and soldiers alike must be made to appreciate the differences between
COIN and conventional campaigns. Their actions and activities must be guided by the
philosophy and principles of COIN. This must begin in the training for deployment and continue
throughout the operation. lt is very much an intellectual challenge that must accompany the
training in TTP specific to COIN. Points that must be considered in educating commanders and
soldiers in COIN will include the following:
a. Cultural training that will inform attitudes towards the civilian population. A lack
of cultural awareness and understanding can generate considerable animosity
between civilians and soldiers. Cultural training must include not only macro-
level factors (religion, language, geography, etc.) but also micro-level factors
(traditional, local political constructs, tribal identities and relations, local
mannerisms and the like). Soldiers must be made to appreciate the fear, stress
and frustration that the civilian populace will feel in times of an insurgency.
Furthermore, they must appreciate the effect that their tactical operations will
have on the local populations. Simply trying to imagine how one would feel if an
insurgency and COIN operations were taking place in one's own neighbourhood
will go a long way towards developing an understanding attitude and empathy
towards civilians during operations.
b. Junior leaders and soldiers must be made to realize the key importance that they
have in the information gathering and intelligence process. Every soldier must
realize they are a sensor or information collector. Patrol commanders must
conduct detailed patrol debriefs with their troops and provide detailed patrol
reports to the intelligence and operations staff. Additionally, soldiers require
regularfeedback regarding the value and usefulness of the information they
provide.
c. Commanders and soldiers must have measured expectations regarding the
quality and calibre of the local security forces. ln many failed or failing states, the
local police and military will not be of a standard common to many soldiers. They
must realize that these assets, despite some shortcomings, have great
knowledge of the local issues, threats and insurgents' methods. Furthermore,
soldiers and junior leaders must be made to realize that part of their mission is to
educate and improve localforces where necessary.
d. Junior leaders and soldiers must be made to realize that COIN is a complicated,
long process and that success only comes after a long period of security and
development. Furthermore, success cannot be measured by offensive action
6-28 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
and the number of insurgents killed because for every insurgent killed there will
be at least one more recruit ready to take the deceased person's place. ln fact,
the soldier must understand that COIN is a battle of wills and that attrition may be
the insurgent's friend. They must understand that success comes through the
gaining and maintaining of the public will over the long term.
e. All ranks must realize the operational and strategic implications that individual
actions at the tactical level can have across the entire operation. An overreaction
to a threat or failure to react to a small civilian emergency can critically
undermine the operation and the esteem of the security forces in the minds of the
public, nationally and internationally.
sEcTtoN 12
CULTURAL AWARENESS
1. General. Historically, an understanding of the host nation's (HN's) culture is critical to
success in COIN. Cultural awareness (CA) can reduce battlefield friction and the fog of war
during COIN and thus improve the ability to accomplish the mission. CA gives insight into the
intent of insurgents and other groups in the battlespace, while reducing cultural friction with the
HN peoples. Additionally, CA assists in building rapport while preventing misunderstandings
that undermine support for the security forces.
2. Gultural Considerations. Culture is a broad and encompassing term. The following
descriptions define the key aspects of culture:76
a. Cultural Terrain. Culture is simply another element of the terrain, environment
and a particular battlespace. Cultural terrain parallels geographic terrain for
military consideration as both influence decisions. Cultural terrain presents
battlespace obstacles and opportunities.
b. Gultural Factors. Cultural factors are dynamic aspects of society that have the
capacity to affect military operations. They include religion, ethnicity, language,
customs, values, practices and perceptions. All these factors affect the thinking
and motivation of the individual or group and make up the cultural terrain of the
battlespace. Not all factors are applicable to all operations, and additional factors
may be considered as necessary.
c. Gultural Awareness. Cultural awareness is the knowledge of cultural factors
and an understanding of their impact on the planning, conduct and outcome of
military operations. Cultural awareness results from both standardized and
specific training.
3. Power Structures. Within an environment and its culture(s), commanders must come
to understand the power structures, both formal and informal, that exist and will influence the
outcome of the campaign. Within a single group or situation, there may be a number of power
structures. Those who appear to be in charge, may, in actual fact, have very limited powers.
Not all elements within a social group may acknowledge uniformly the actual power and
influence of a certain leader. Furthermore, leaders in one field, such as religion, may have
influence and power in other social fields, such as politics. ln many communities, the only
authority figure that locals acknowledge may be a local or tribal elder, despite the existence of a
76
Excerpt from American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) Cultural Awareness Project Team Final Report,
March 2005.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-29
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
central government. Commanders must come to understand these power structures and work
with them to further the campaign objectives.
4. Operations. Cultural considerations must be fully incorporated into the conduct of
operations. Commanders must understand the impact of culture on the execution of their
operations and plans and the implications inherent in the fluid nature of the complex
environment. All personnel must consider culture during the reassessment of the battlespace,
the amendment of existing plans and transition of authority/battle handover.
5. Cultural Awareness During Relief in Place. A key piece of the successful relief in
place between tactical units and formations is the exchange of cultural information.
6. Training. Any pre-deployment training for a specific mission area must include briefings
concerning the culture issues relevant to the operational area. lf a specific AO is known prior to
deployment, then cultural awareness training should include any aspects that are unique to that
particular region. Aspects of the culture should be folded into pre-deployment training
exercises.
SECTION 13
THE TACTICAL.LEVEL COMMITTEE SYSTEM
631. ESTABLISHING THE COMMITTEES
1. General. The comprehensive approach and its multi-agency execution of the COIN
campaign demands close cross-agency planning and coordination down to the lowest levels.
The committee system of coordination provides for such cooperation in the multi-faceted
approach to defeating the insurgency in both the short and long terms. lt is especially important
when a formal single chain of command has not been established or other agencies and
organizations not within the formal chain of command participate in the campaign.
2. Roles. The committee system will mirror that which is built at the operational level but
will be implemented and influenced at an appropriate level of civilian and police authority. The
various committees established should reflect the lines of operation established in the
campaign plan. ln many cases, the committees will be based on geographical and civilian lines
of organization, such as municipalities and counties. At the tactical level, the role of the
committee system remains the same as that of operational level or national committees:
a. establishment of priorities;
b. coordination of intelligence and security;
c. coordination between security and civil activities;
d. joint consultation and, as far as security will permit, joint planning;
e. joint direction of operations;
f . arrangements for public safety and protection of public institutions; and
g. direction of the lnfo Ops / influence activities.
3. The committee system will harmonize the fires and influence-the comprehensive
operations-of the campaign at the tactical level.
4. Regional, Provincial and District Committees. Fully integrated coordinating
committees are necessary at various subordinate, tactical levels. These will comprise the
regional representatives of the agencies cooperating in the conduct of the COIN. The
6-30 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
committees will often be based on boundaries that reflect civil administration and local
government boundaries in regions, provinces, counties and/or districts.
5. Committee Features and Membership. Depending upon the level concerned, a
number of committees may be formed, or at the lowest social levels, a single committee may be
formed to dealwith all issues. ln the establishment and conduct of the tactical-level committee
system, the following should be noted:
a. These lower-level committees and any subordinate coordinating bodies may be
referred to as operations or action committees. The taxonomy may have to be
flexible to reflect the desires of indigenous leaders or those of international
organizations participating.
b. The chairman is usually the senior officer/administrator of the local indigenous
civilian administration, in whose support the security forces are working.
Depending on the size of the area, he could be a minister appointed for the
purpose, a provincial governor, the chairman of a county council, a civil chief
executive officer or a mayor of a large city. Depending upon the local culture and
society, he may be a religious leader with influences in other fields.
Commanders and agency leaders must avoid assuming that the same social or
political delineations that exist in their own societies will work in the society and
culture in question.
c. The local police and military commanders and the intelligence and security
organization representatives will form the membership of appropriate security
and supporting intelligence committees. Local civilian experts may either be full
members or "in attendance," as the occasion demands. Coalition formation
commanders of the appropriate level would normally attend the appropriate host
country's committees,
d. Senior administrators from various NGOs and international organizations
operating in the region may sit on the committee(s) or be in attendance.
e. Depending upon the culture concerned, local religious and/or tribal leaders may
also attend the committees.
6. Town, Ward and Village Level. Smaller, less formal committees are needed to
coordinate civil, police, military and intelligence operations at the lower levels without
jeopardizing security or creating a cumbersome bureaucracy. This is the level at which the
campaign plan is implemented as tactical-level action. lt must be seen to succeed to retain the
loyalty and support of the people. lt is important that local interests are represented and that the
people can relate to government policy. Locally acknowledged leadership figures must be
included if the system and campaign are to have legitimacy and thus support at the local level.
Failure at this level will mean defeat. The chairman is normally the head of the civil
administration, possibly the local mayor, the chief administrative officer, the rural council
chairman or even tribal elder. The membership reflects the police, military and other interests at
this level. The military representative may be a battalion or company commander, depending
on the scale and geographical area concerned.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-31
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
Figure 6-1: Example Delineation of a Gommittee System
632. CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN AND COIN
PRINCIPLES
L lt will be important that all members of the committees, at whatever level, fully
understand the role and capabilities of the military element. They must also understand their
limitations in terms of resources, skills and ROE. Furthermore, they must understand the
national strategy and campaign plan, including their individual roles and that of the committee
itself. Many members of the committee will not be familiar or even comforlable with these
issues, and military personalities must be prepared to take a leadership role in what may be,
initially at least, a collective education process. Likewise, military members of the committees
will have to become familiar with the abilities and limitations of their counterpart agencies.
2. The committees, even at the local level, may incorporate more than military, police and
local government; they may include leaders from other government departments,
representatives from international organizations and even NGOs if appropriate. Sub-
committees focusing on specific issues such as security or regional development may also be
created as required.
3. Military commanders must remember that principles are easier to affirm than to apply,
particularly in a COIN campaign with its inherent variables, tensions and multiple agencies. The
committee system will help coordinate actions and harmonize means across the various
agencies. ln many failed orfailing states where insurgencies will occur, there will be a lack of
professionally trained administrators, and other professionals will lack depth and extensive
tt
At this level, formal committees may not exist, but the military commander will conduct individual liaison and
coordination and call together ad hoc meetings as an issue may warrant.
78
-.'- The same manner of ad hoc coordination may be required at the platoon level should
a platoon be operating
away from the sub-unit with its own AO.
6-32
Senior government
official or minister of
defence or internal
affairs.
UN special envoy or
other international
parties. National
religious leaders.
Senior provincial
minister or federal
representative.
Mayor or large city.
Administrators for
major NGOs. Local
religious leaders.
Local police chief,
Division commander
or paramilitary
police.
Mayor or senior
administrative officer
for city/town or
county administrator.
Town, district. Sub-unit
commanderTT
(possibly platoon
level in remote
areastt).
Station police
chief(s).
Mayor or district
representative.
Tribal leader.
Religious leader.
Local NGO. Local
religious authority.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
training. Hence, progress and implementation of the principles and planwill be slowand require
patience on the part of the military.
4. For their part, military commanders must remember that enduring campaign success will
only be realized through the benefits and development for which other agencies are required.
Other agencies enhance and truly enable the concept of comprehensive operations. Only in
this manner will the support of the populace be obtained.
5. There will be a need for tact, understanding and compromise as individuals and
organizations are persuaded to give up some of their power and influence in the interests of
greater efficiency and closer cooperation.
633. FACILITATION OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
1. Boundaries. Civil administration, police and military unit boundaries should be the
same in the interests of liaison and planning and coordination and to avoid operational and
intelligence conflicts and confusion. Police boundaries usually coincide with those of the civil
administration. ln cases of disagreement, military boundaries should conform to the civil/police
ones because the latter are usually well established and will remain when the land force
withdraws. Occasionally, it may be expedient to adjust boundaries in order to bring a known
insurgent organization within the area of responsibility of one commander.
2. Location of Headquarters and Joint Operations Gentre. A joint operations centre at
each level of command in support of the committee system provides the focal point for the
conduct and coordination of operations and for the collection and processing of information. lt
also provides a secure meeting place for the civil authorities, police and military commanders
and has the staff machinery for disseminating decisions for implementation by all the various
forces and organizations within the local boundary. Other points to note in the establishment of
the HQ and joint operations centre are:
a. it should be located, if possible, at the police HQ where police files and
intelligence are readily accessible;
b. if the military HQ is not co-located, communications must be established between
the two locations; and
c. OPSEC will remain an important consideration when working with local
government and police forces.
634. EXECUTION OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM_COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. Committee Directives and Operational Orders. The committee framework will vary
with each situation but should run along the following lines:
The committee chairman or director of operations will issue a policy directive for
the implementation of the national and campaign plan at that regional level.
Military assistance in drafting this document may be required. The directive
should reflect the lines of operation and objectives in the campaign plan and tie
together the activities for all agencies involved at that level and in that region. lt
is issued initially as a guiding document and reviewed periodically.
Formation and unit commanders issue operational orders that reflect and
implement the committee policy directive and highlight the military's support to
each of the lines of operation. lt translates the general policy direction into
tactical activities. lt will need regular review and adjustment based on the MoE.
a.
b.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 6-33
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
c. Regular, and at some levels daily, operational meetings will provide feedback
between agencies and allow for coordination and updated direction as required.
d. At the unit level, the operational order should guide the day-to-day activities of
the sub-units, however, it will require regular updating particularly the priority
intelligence requirements (PlRs) and lRs. Specific orders are then issued for
individual deliberate operations.
2. Command and Control. Much emphasis has been placed on the need for centralized
direction and decision-making. However, the function of the committee system is essentially to
provide a forum for planning and coordination. The command function remains the prerogative
and responsibility of each military and police commander or civil department head. These
officers and officials will be expected to consult one another before taking any initiatives or
making any changes to previously agreed policy or plans.
3. Rapid Decisions. There will be occasions when a quick decision is needed, perhaps to
exploit a fleeting opportunity or to foil an unexpected insurgent initiative. lf there is no time for a
military commander to consult his superior or his committee members, he will have to make a
timely decision and act upon it. Provided that a good understanding exists amongst the
members of the local committee and within the chain of command, and that some thought has
been given on how to react to foreseeable contingencies, the commander's decision should be
a sensible one. A commander who tells his superior, the police officer and, if necessary, the
chairman of his committee what he has done and why he has done it should expect rapid
support and cooperation. ln making such decisions and taking independent action,
commanders must consider the effects that will occur with regard to these other agencies.
Decisions and actions should reflect the principles of COIN and supporl the long-term
operational objectives of the campaign.
sEcTtoN 14
EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ARMS AND SUPPORT ARMS
1. General. The land force will play the key role in the conduct of a COIN. As with any
type of military campaign, the combat arms and support arms will all have separate, but
mutually supporting, roles to play. Military forces generally face a lower threat from insurgents
than they do when facing a conventional enemy. However, the nature of COIN operations
creates a high demand for patrolling and interaction amongst the civil population and a unique
level of exposure to an enemy indistinguishable from the local populace. A premium will be
placed on infantry for these tasks. Hence, non-infantry arms may be required to re-role in order
to undertake these manpower-intensive operations. Regardless of the situation, such units
must be prepared to conduct their normal combat functions should the threat warrant it.
2. lnfantry. Given the nature of COIN-with its requirement for pervasive, wide-spread
operations-infantry units will be in high demand. Both mechanized and light infantry complete
their missions dismounted (in all operations, not simply COIN). Mechanized infantry have the
advantage of protection, mobility and firepower, while light infantry adapt more readily to close
terrain such as urban areas, jungle and mountainous terrain. Given the need for rapid reaction,
the size of AOs and the "ink spot" doctrine of continually extending the influence of the security
forces and their campaign, even light infantry will require integral means of transport for the
conduct of operations. Regardless of the means of transport, all junior leaders and soldiers
must understand that success in COIN will only be realized by dismounting and spending time
amongst the local populace and gaining information from them.
3. Armour. Armour, and all heavy firepower, must be used most judiciously in COIN so as
to avoid the "David versus Goliath" PSYOPS advantage this could give to the enemy, as well as
6-34 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Land Component Operations in Counter-lnsurgency
to limit unnecessary collateral destruction. Nonetheless, particularly in high intensity COIN
operations, armour plays a valuable role with its characteristics of firepower and protection. ln
rural areas, armour provides both breaching capabilities and the power to strike at insurgents
outside the effective range of many of the typical insurgent small arms. ln urban areas, armour
can provide invaluable protection, neutralize strong points and assist in breaching structures.
When not employed in this capacity, the troops may be employed in presence patrolling and
movement control.
4. Armoured Reconnaissance. The mobility, protection, firepower and surveillance
capabilities that are offered by armoured reconnaissance forces make them usefulfor a variety
of tasks. Apart from surveillance and mounted reconnaissance patrols, they can perform area
security, lines of communication security, route picketing, convoy escort and form part of a QRF,
amongst other tasks. Nonetheless, armoured reconnaissance personnel must be prepared to
dismount and interact with the local population in order to maximize their usefulness as
i nformation collectors and confidence bu i lders.
5. Dismounted Reconnaissance and Snipers. Given the requirement for intelligence
gathering and the need to conduct covert operations in close terrain, reconnaissance and sniper
detachments will prove very useful. Apart from gathering information, they can establish and
man covert OPs that will trigger the deployment of other forces to kill or capture insurgents and
disrupt their actions. They can also provide over-watch and protection for deliberate operations
such as cordons and searches.
6. Aviation. Aviation assets deployed in a COIN will prove most useful in the same
manner as conventional operations. Apart from troop movement, sensor tasks and fire support,
aviation assets provide valuable over-watch during deliberate operations. Timings become
crucial as their appearance before the start of a deliberate operation will give early warning to
insurgents.
Prior to any ambush, we would se/ecf and prepare our ambush posifions, but we would not
occupy them since helicopters would always overfly the route ahead of the convoy looking
for ambushes and roadblocks...The helicopter over flight was our usual tip off that the
convoy was coming and a signatfo us fo put out the r6adbtock and occupy our positions.
-Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif, a mujahideen from the Soviet-Afghan war
Col. A. Jalati and LesterGrau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War,
Vol.1, Stirling VA: The Military Press, 2000, p. 11.
7. Artillery. Precision capabilities will allow the employment of artillery against pinpoint
targets. When not providing observation and fire support, their forward observation teams can
act as liaison cells for rifle companies and assist in manning command posts. The batteries
may be employed in presence patrolling, including assistance providing force protection for firm
bases.
B. Engineers. During COIN, engineers will continue to provide their mobility, counter-
mobility and general engineer support to all forces in theatre. This will include a focus on the
detection and clearing of lEDs. Their capabilities will be a mainstay of military-led development
and reconstruction tasks, and their impact can be substantial. Commanders must give careful
consideration to the balance of resource and time allocated between CIMIC and support to the
force itself. A heavy weighting of resources to support for the force, vice CIMIC projects, may
send the wrong message to the local population.
6-35B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
9' signals' ln ad-dition to providing
communications to the
force itself, the mititary
wiil berequired to establish communications
wlth.other;d;;;;,'!r"n
as porice. This may
entair the
S::l'r::" of sisnars detachments to tnosl rocationi. pilil;;;y if communications are to be
10' Military Potice' Military police
may
.b.e tasked to provide direct liaison to civilian police
ffilJ::::??ri.:"r:?;#Jlj,u. uor" to piouio" un u..r,i"lssessment or the capabirities and
6-36
B-cL-323-004/FP_003
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
ANNEX A
CULTURAL INFORMATION
RELIEF IN PLACE TEMPLATE?g
1. General. This template provides commanders and staff with a guide/checklist that
identifies key questions pertaining to cultural information that must be addressed during a TOA.
This template may also be useful as a reference document during the conduct of a counter-
insurgency (COIN). lt should be used in conjunction with Chapter 2.
2. Transfer of Gultural lnformation. Cultural information included in this template should
be made available to units, down to the lowest level, preparing to enter the battlespace. As a
minimum, the following should be addressed during the TOA.
6A01. LEADERSHIP AND POWER STRUCTURES
1. Who are the leaders in your battlespace?
a. What groups or interests do they represent?
b. What are their personality types?
c. What is your unit history with each leader?
d. What is your personal assessment of each leader?
e. What level of control does each leader exert on his/her group?
f. What level of influence does each leader have within the battlespace?
g. What strategies have you used to interact with each leader?
h. Do some leaders have more or less power than it appears?
i. How often do you meet with each leader and why?
i. What meeting format do you use? What works best?
k. What negotiating strategies do you find most effective with each leader?
l. ls there a succession plan?
m. lf so, what is the plan to manage this change?
n. What specific incidents with your units during your tour have impacted your
relationship with each leader, and what have you done to alter perceptions based
on that impact?
o. What are the relationships between leaders, and how have those relationships
impacted your mission?
p. How have you attempted / how do you plan to influence relationships between
leaders to alter the battlespace environment?
q. What outstanding issues do you have with each leader that may impact the
mission/battlespace? What current contracts are in force with each leader?
r. Hand over all meeting reports from meetings with leaders as available.
s. Hand over all biographical reports on each leader as available.
7e
Excerpt from ABCA Cultural Awareness Project Team Finat Report, March 2005.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 64-1
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
t. Hand over all intelligence assessments on each leader as available.
2. What are the influential groups in your battlespace?
a. How influential is each group?
b. How does each group influence the battlespace?
c. Has each group had a helpful, neutral or hostile relationship with your unit, and
how has that impacted your mission?
d. What strategy have you employed to influence the behaviour of each group?
e. What specific incidents with your units during your tour have impacted your
relationship with each group, and what have you done to alter perceptions based
on that impact?
f. How does each group interact with other groups, and what impact have those
interactions had on your mission and/or the battlespace?
g. What is the source of power for each group, and how can you influence that
source of power to accomplish your mission?
h. What outstanding issues do you have with each group that may impact the
mission? What current contracts are in force with each group, and how do those
contracts influence the group to support the mission?
i. How does each group fit into the campaign plan?
j. What non-traditional shadow groups influence the battlespace but may not be
readily apparent to an outsider?
k. Hand over all meeting reports and intelligence reports on each group.
6A02. GOVERNMENT
1. What is the current government structure in the battlespace, and how does this structure
differ from historical data?
2. Which elements of government are functioning well, and which are functioning poorly?
whv?
3. What actions have you taken to alter, improve or change the government in your
battlespace?
4. What government services do you consider vital to mission success, and what actions
have you taken to ensure they continue?
5. How much influence does each government leader have, and from where is their power
derived? (Appointed? Elected? Took power through force?)
6. What financial, support or construction contracts are currently in force or signed with the
government, and how do those contracts influence your relationship with the government,
people and groups within the battlespace?
7. ln what key ways does the battlespace differ from your pre-deployment impressions and
studies, and how can we avoid these misperceptions?
6A-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Annex A to Chapter 6
6A03. BATTLESPACE AND ENVIRONMENT
1. What are the atmospherics (sense of the community) of each village, town, city,
province, region or other key areas within your battlespace, and how do those atmospherics
impact your mission?
2. Where have your units encountered the most cultural friction? (Cultural friction may
include reactions like open hostility, hostile gestures, sullen looks, etc.) How have you
attempted to deal with this friction?
3. What are the perceptions of your soldiers/personnel of the people, groups and leaders in
each area and why?
4. What are the perceptions of people, groups and leaders of your soldiers/personnel in
each area and why?
5. What are general perceptions or misperceptions of your unit that have hindered or
helped your ability to accomplish the mission? How have you attempted to discourage or
encourage these perceptions?
6. What are the cultural hot spots within your battlespace? (lnclude any site where cultural
friction could lead to a negative incident that would detract from mission accomplishment.) How
can these hot spots be dealt with to reduce friction?
7. What patterns are common on the streets, and how do changes in those patterns
indicate shifts in hostility or supportiveness?
B. What other cultural factors may impact your mission? What are the normal working
hours and working days? What days are children in school and from what age? How does this
i nformation d iffer from pre-deployment assessments?
9. What external cultural forces, such as religious influence, impact behaviour in your
battlespace, and how have you reacted to that influence? What is the cultural significance of
outside groups and/or leaders on the groups and leaders in the battlespace?
6A04. RELIGION, LANGUAGE AND CUSTOMS
1. What are the key religions in your battlespace, and how do you perceive religious
influence? How do your current perceptions differ from pre-deployment assessments, and how
do you account for these differences?
2. Where are the key religious sites within your battlespace? How does each religious site
influence your mission (e.g., "no-go" areas to reduce friction)?
3. What influence does religion have on each group and/or leader within the battlespace?
How are religious groups and leaders linked with secular groups and leaders, and how does
that relationship impact the battlespace?
4. What political influence does each religious group have within the battlespace, and how
do they exercise that influence?
5. How does religion influence the everyday behaviour, action and reaction of people within
the battlespace?
6. How do religious perceptions and beliefs affect the relationship between your
soldiers/personnel and the people? How have you attempted to influence those perceptions
and beliefs?
64-3B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
7. What religious minorities live within your battlespace, how are they treated, how do they
interact with majority religious groups, and what has your relationship been with these groups?
B. Have you been forced to interject yourself into any religious issues (e.9., minority rights),
and how did that action affect the perception of your unit with each group?
9. What are the dominant languages within your battlespace, and how does language
impact the relationship between various groups?
10. What major stumbling blocks has language caused between your unit and the people/
groups/leaders?
11. What is the availability of local translators, and have you found them to be trustworthy,
effective, biased/unbiased? What tactics can you recommend for recruiting, employing and
monitoring local translators?
12. How effective was your pre-deployment language training? What did you do to improve
the language capability of your personnel during operations? What phrases or translation tools
did you find the most usefulto reduce culturalfriction caused by language barriers?
13. What local customs have caused the most friction between your personnel and the
people? How have you adjusted operations to reduce this friction?
14. Recommend strategies to follow local customs without compromising mission
requirements.
15. Which localcustoms do you recommend must be followed without exception, and which
can be ignored without causing undue friction?
16. What customs have your personnelfollowed that have given you the most dividends in
i mproved perception/atmospherics?
6A05. ONGOING CULTURAL INITIATIVES
1. What cultural initiatives have you undertaken to improve perceptions, reduce friction and
gain compliance or neutrality? What initiatives would you recommend for the future, and what
would you recommend against?
2. What cultural exchanges have you attempted with groups, people and/or leaders? Have
these exchanges been effective?
3. How effective have civil affairs projects been in influencing the battlespace? What
strategies and tactics would you recommend to improve or make best use of civil affairs projects
and missions?
4. Where do you recommend applying civil affairs projects in the near term to achieve the
greatest effect?
6406. SECURITY AND ARMED GROUPS
1. What cultural influence have you used, or is available, to coerce hostile forces within
your battlespace?
2. What cultural tactics (e.9., religious hatred) have hostile forces within your battlespace
used against you? How effective were these tactics? How did you try to counter them?
6A-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Annex A to Chapter 6
3. What are the cultural vulnerabilities of hostile, non-hostile and supportive groups within
the battlespace? Are there inherent cultural frictions that can be leveraged to reduce their
effectiveness? How have you exploited these vulnerabilities to ensure mission success?
4. lf you are training or working with local security forces, what cultural issues have
helped/hindered your relationships? What training strategies work best within this culture?
5. What cultural frictions exist within the security forces that undermine their ability to
accomplish their missions? How can we reduce that friction?
6. How do locals view the security services? How do those perceptions impact their
effectiveness, and how can we reduce frictions / improve effectiveness?
7. When and on what day do hostile forces conduct attacks and why? ls there any
religious or cultural significance to these patterns that can be exploited or used in assessments?
B. What are the crime levels, what types of crime are committed, and what are the reasons
behind crime trends? Are there cultural factors that we can influence to reduce crime or identify
criminals or criminal groups? How do people accept or reject criminal activity, and how have
you used that perception to impact crime?
6A07. OTHER ISSUES
1. What are the cultural differences between rural and urban populations, and is there any
resulting cultural friction? How does this affect your mission?
2. Are there any outstanding debts owed to any group, leader or individual in the
battlespace? What do we owe and why? Are there any outstanding debts such as
compensation or contract fees?
3. What have we promised (money, contracts, support, medical aid, etc.)to groups, leaders
or individuals within our battlespace? What benefit will we receive from following through on
these promises, and what are the consequences of not following through?
4. Which relationships (with leaders, groups, individuals)should we maintain, which ones
should we end, and which ones should we alter and why?
5. What cultural opportunities do you see in this transition? Where can a fresh start help,
and where would it hurt?
6. Which groups, leaders and/or individuals will try to take advantage of our relative
ignorance of the battlespace environment? What actions are they likely to take and why? How
can we counter these actions or use them to our advantage?
7. What are the greatest cultural challenges and dangers to our mission? How should we
overcome these challenges?
8. What has been your most successful culturaltactic (e.9, frequent meetings, meals, aid
delivery)? What would you like to have tried but didn't because of a lack of resources?
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 64-5
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 7
INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER{NSURGENCY
They have already learned to regret the emergence of new intelligence targets
that lack any concrete form: aggressive belief systems not subject to central
authority, shifting alliances of dangerous malcontenfs, sfate/ess migranfs disloyal
to any country of settlement. lt is from those backgrounds that the agents of anti-
Western terrorism are recru ited.80
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
701. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTER.INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
1. Good intelligence is vital in any campaign and throughout the conduct of all of its lines of
operation. lt is especially inextricable to successful counter-insurgency (COIN), where it will be
in constant and continuous demand. Sound intelligence supports continuing success that over
time will wear down the insurgent movement, restricting its capability and reducing its morale.
Accurate intelligence will permit commanders to conduct operations with precision, reducing the
detrimental effect on the host nation (HN) population and minimizing casualties among friendly
forces. The combined effect will be to secure and maintain the morale among the security
forces and raise their standing with the civilian population.
2. Effective and precise use of means on both the psychological and physical planes will
earn legitimacy and respect, which are vital in the campaign for popular support. lll-directed and
indiscriminate use of force will merely serve to alienate any HN population. lt must be
appreciated,therefore,thatsoundintelligenceisaprecursortoall COlNoperations. ltmustbe
built up quickly and sustained efficiently from the start of a campaign.
3. Thorough knowledge of the extent of the insurgency, the political and military aims,
command structures and logistic network of the insurgents should allow the HN government and
coalition forces to develop a long-term overall strategy and sensible military policies to defeat
the insurgency on the physical and psychological planes. At all levels, intelligence will permit
commanders to put the strategy and policies into practice, allowing for the defeat of the
insurgents by killing, capturing or arresting individuals and depriving them of targets,
intelligence, the means of command and communication, weapons, ammunition, food and other
supplies. Attrition of all these elements will reduce the insurgents' ability to maintain the
campaign.
4. ln orderto be truly successful in a COIN campaign, the concept of intelligence and its
analysis must be extremely broad. lntelligence staff will be key to establishing a broad
knowledge base regarding all systems within the environment: political, military, economic,
social (including religious and cultural characteristics), informational and infrastructure. They
must come to understand and describe for the commander power structures and the
relationships between these systems and their overall influence on the successful outcome of
the campaign. lf the objectives of a COIN campaign are in general to gain support of the
population and address the underlying causes of the insurgency, these can only be achieved if
this broad knowledge base is created. For example, accurate intelligence regarding the exact
locations of insurgent forces will be important but will not lead to enduring success if the
to
John Keegan, tntetligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to AI-Qaeda (London: Key Porter
Books, 2003), pg. 364.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 7-1
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
intelligence picture does not assess the root causes of the insurgency, such as a lack of
economic development and political representation of a particular ethnic minority.
5. Furthermore, intelligence analysis must include the establishment of measures of
effectiveness, sothat progress on each of the campaign's lines of operation may be measured.
This will include a base line or start-state along with specific means to measure progress.
6. There is nothing radical in the application of the fundamentals of intelligence to a COIN
campaign. There are, however, three aspects that will carry greater emphasis than might be the
case in conventional campaigns:
a. the predominance of human intelligence (HUMINT);
b. the influence of the civilian authority on COIN operations and the consequent
constraints and complications on intelligence gathering; and
c. the appearance that, at times, operations are in support of intelligence rather
than the reverse.
702. THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
1. ln any campaign, the purpose of intelligence is to determine the threat (by accurate and
timely assessment of both capability and intentions) and the influencing environmental factors
so that the commander may develop a plan to bring about a successful mission and ultimately
conclusion to the campaign. ln COIN operations, the insurgency-not just the insurgent but the
insurgency's idea and appeal-must be defeated, and this can be done only if commanders are
given sufficient knowledge of the enemy and other environmental factors.
2. ln situations where the insurgent lives among the population without uniform or a
recognizable military structure, his capabilities and intentions will be largely determined from
information provided by the population and individuals moving in close proximity to him.
Sophisticated intelligence sensors, crucial in generalwar, normally cannot match the HUMINT
agent, the informer, surveillance from observation posts or the reports from routine police or
army patrols. Time-consuming collation of detail and painstaking analysis may then prove the
key to unravelling important aspects of the insurgent's activity and his ability to influence
populations. Processing HUMINT is enhanced with the use of recent software applications such
as link analysis and spreadsheets.
703. CIVILIAN CONTROL AND POLITICAL, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
1. lntelligence gathering in a COIN campaign will, in all probability, lack the freedom that
may be enjoyed in conventional operations. The primacy of civilian political control, the balance
between efforts to defeat the insurgency and those expended on crime prevention and
resolution, the need to share with other agencies, legal limitations and the need for admissible
evidence for prosecution will all constrain the gathering of intelligence. Military intelligence
staffs may find themselves in unfamiliar circumstances, subordinated to civilian control and
methods of operating (particularly when supporting police).
704. ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF INTELLIGENCE
1. ln operations where the reliance on HUMINT is paramount, many operations and
activities will be conducted for the express, or at least parallel, task of gaining information. This
is particularly the case for dismounted presence patrols. The dismounted soldier becomes the
eyes and ears of an intelligence organization. The value of extensive patrolling and subsequent
7-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntelligence in Cou nter-lnsurgency
debriefing may not be readily apparent to the soldier. For example, the true aim might be to
develop a picture of patterns of insurgent behaviour over a protracted period rather than short-
term reconnaissance for immediate offensive action. The need to win the minds and hearts of
the population so to weaken sympathy for insurgents and thus increase the potential flow of
information may also try the soldier's patience and morale as he is obliged to adopt a less
aggressive stance than he might otheruuise have chosen.
2. The importance of information collection must be stressed to the soldiers, and they also
benefit from and are motivated by an information feedback that demonstrates how the
information they collected has benefited the mission.
705. PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE
1. The four stages of the lntelligence Cycle (direction, collection, processing and
dissemination) and the application of the eight principles of intelligence remain extant in COIN
and provide the structure within which the intelligence organization operates. The eight
principles of intelligence are:
a. centralized control;
b. timeliness;
c. systematic exploitation;
d. objectivity;
e. accessibility;
f. responsiveness;
g. source protection; and
h. continuous review.
sEcTtoN 2
ESTABLISHING A KNOWLEDGE BASE IN SUPPORT OF
A COUNTER.INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
706. ASSESSMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
1. The conduct of a successful campaign may require a broad range of elements or
systems within an environment to be considered for their role and influence in the campaign.
Such is the case in a COIN campaign, in which the population and its various leaders and
institutions will play a key role in campaign success, for their support is vital for success. Thus,
the systems within the environment must be considered and will cover the range of political,
military, economic, social (including culture and religion), information and infrastructure
(PMESll). Their relationship to the population and support for the campaign must be assessed.
It is this necessity that makes the campaigning environment complex and demands that
intelligence staff focus on and evaluate all these systems vice simply the insurgent and his
military capabilities (Figure 7-1 illustrates the complexity of an environment).
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 7-3
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
o
o
o
CL
o
0)
o
c)
o
CL
E
o
o
(E
o
c,
5
o
t
Rule of
Education
Religion
Humanitarian
& Health
lnformation
Military/Security
Economic/Commercial
A Nation
or Society
Constituents of
a Nation or SocietyAdministrative,
Political&
Governance
Figure 7-1: lnterrelated Elements of an Environment and Society
2. Therefore, the intelligence staff must work to formulate a broad knowledge base that will
allow all relevant systems to be understood and engaged as required to create enduring
solutions to the insurgency. The knowledge base must include the influences that history and
culture play in each system.
3. The knowledge base must also analyze each element of the society, along with the key
members of each element, and understand the role they play in the environment, their aims in
relation to the campaign and overall srlccess, and the influence they have on other systems
within the environment. Apart from creating a detailed situational awareness, the knowledge
base should identify root causes and grievances that led to the insurgency and crisis in the
first place. This will help inform the development of operational objectives and supporting
effects. Only in this way will the commander know what, who and how to engage within the
campaign to move towards the desired objectives and end-state.
4. Given that enduring solutions to underlying grievances and problems in many of the
PMESII systems are beyond the capabilities of military forces, the COIN campaign demands a
comprehensive approach that will use various elements of power-multiple agencies-to
conduct the campaign and create enduring solutions.
5. Regardless of what agencies are used to undertake activities, much of the assessment
in support of operations will come from military intelligence staff. However, just as with the rest
of the military, intelligence staff will be limited in their capabilities to conduct a full assessment of
all these systems and their major players.
6. Thus, intelligence staff will seek out expertise in each of these areas as required. These
may include cultural, economic and political experts, to name a few. Many of these experts will
reside in other agencies, and their support of military analysis will be facilitated by the use of
intelligence committees.
7. The creation of such a broad knowledge base and its accompanying analysis will allow
the commander to decide what effects need to be created in each of these systems in order to
7-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lntelligence in Counter-lnsurgency
rcalize operational objectives and thus what activities need to be conducted. The development
of the knowledge base will take time and must be guided by an intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (lPB) process designed for the complexity of the operating environment.
707. A SPECTRUM OF RELATIVE INTEREST
1. The systems in an environment do not exist without the people or actors who populate
them. lt is these individuals and groups, along with their attitudes regarding the outcome of the
campaign, that must be considered and assessed. Hence, this requires a classification of all
the actors, which range from the adversary through hostile and neutral to friendly forces and
allies within the battlespace, as they relate to the interests and objectives of the friendly force.
This may be labelled the spectrum of relative interest, and where these actors fit along the
spectrum in relation to the desired end-state willweigh heavily on the commander's
consideration of what effects he will apply to modify their positions and align them with his
interests, that is, have them support the campaign (see Figure 7-2). Some of these effects will
be physical, but many others, specifically those seeking to engender support from the target, will
be psychological effects, the result of influence activities. The individuals and groups are all
targets or target audiences for engagement, either on the physical plane, the psychological
plane or both.81
2. This approach requires a cultural understanding and stems in part from the need to
engender support from local populations and to engage other elements of an environment. ln
order to support this approach, the knowledge base must gain insight into the psychological
plane and the intent, motivations, and relationships of elements in the battlespace in order to
move them, through an effect of influence, to a position of acceptance, cooperation, or even
support. The assessment and analysis that leads to this spectrum of relative interest
categorization supports the targeting process, for each of the audiences on the spectrum of
relative interest is assessed with respect to how they may be influenced and moved to a
position of support or acceptance.
tt
With respect to the term "targets," a broader understanding the term must be used. Targets will include adversary
elements, friendly and allied elements and neutral audiences. Nothing nefarious is meant by the term, but it should
be viewed in the sense of a business advertisement "targeting" a particular audience. Thus, all target engagements
are considered together in a complementary and comprehensive fashion.
B-GL-323-004i FP-003 7-5
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
SUPPORT FOR THE
MORE LESS
Figure 7-2: The Spectrum of Relative lnterest
3. Each of the groups within an environment may be plotted along the spectrum of relative
interest, and an assessment may be made as to what activities are required to either maintain
their support or to move them to a position of support-to produce effects on their perceptions,
understanding and will, in supporl of the end-states of the campaign.
4. This approach must also recognize the paradigm shift in information acquisition. ln
major combat operations, a significant part of the information required to establish
understanding by the commander might flow from national or higher echelon sources.
However, in a COIN campaign, this shifts towards an information flow model that is more
bottom-up, with soldiers in direct contact as the key source of information. ln many such
circumstances, actionable intelligence regarding adversary targets and the motivations for their
support will come from contact with the local populace. Furthermore, such contact will provide
useful input for measures of effectiveness, particularly in terms of gauging the reaction of the
local populace to the campaign's activities and conduct.
sEcTroN 3
DIRECTION
708. GENERAL
1. The intelligence cycle will begin with direction that stems from the requirements
determined in the campaign planning process and subsequent planning processes for
supporting operational plans.
2. Direction will be implemented through national chains of command and through HN and
coalition chains of command. Once the campaign begins, plans and direction will likely be
formulated, at least in the coalition and with the HN authorities, through a committee system.
Whilst there will be certain frustrations in working through a committee system, it will ensure
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close coordination and integration amongst different agencies and capabilities, which will allow
for effective and complementary direction to be issued.
709. INTELLIGENGE ARCHITECTURE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY_DESIGN OF INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE
1. Early in a COIN campaign, it will be necessary to establish a chain of operational
command that reflects the political and military requirements of the HN and assisting coalition,
When this has been established, there will be a need for a supporting structure of intelligence
staffs placed at appropriate levels in order to provide timely, responsive intelligence for
commanders. lt is inevitable that the intelligence structure will develop with the campaign. The
architecture must anticipate this and deploy progressive stages of capability that can be readily
linked together. ln parallel with these staffs, a communications network that permits the rapid,
efficient passage of intelligence data of different types upwards, downwards and sideways must
be established. ln a coalition operation, it will need to cross national, military, civilian and
service boundaries so that it can link staffs and agencies at every level.
2. Unlike the military chain of command, which is purely hierarchical, this network should
be constructed on the principle of providing intelligence from where it is available to wherever it
is required. This may result in it bypassing some levels of command in order that it reach the
appropriate user. This "skip-echelon" system, like collaborative parallel planning, will ensure
information is available on the "pull" rather than the "push" principle at whatever level of
command may need it. The intelligence architecture is not simply a communications network,
for it includes the allocation of areas of intelligence responsibility (AlR) to each level of
command. lt specifies precisely the authority to task individual collection assets and allocates
the reporting authority-who is responsible for the provision of fused intelligence reports-
based on information from collectors. The intelligence architecture should form an annex to the
operational directive under the title of the intelligence plan.
3. ln support of operations, it may be necessary to form an all-source intelligence centre
(ASIC), within which there may be a variety of enabling groups such as HUMINT support group
(HSG), a cryptological support group (CSG) or an image intelligence (lMlNT) support group
(lSG). These may be an element within the contingent of a single nation, or they may be part of
a committee system. Specialist intelligence should always be kept under close review when
operating with allies, as it can encourage exclusivity and reduce the mutual trust so necessary
for effective cooperation,
710. CONSTRAINTS
1. There will be constraints on this free flow of data caused by the necessity to apply the
"need to know" principle. This is vitalfor HUMINT source protection. Some intelligence,
perhaps that which is provided from strategic sources, may not be made available to all
intelligence staffs at every level. For example, material with national caveats may be made
available from a domestic agency for national commanders only. There will be a need for
special handling procedures for this and other such material. ln such circumstances, as a
minimum, a national intelligence cell (NlC) may be established.
71'1. STRAINING COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
1. lnevitably, extensive intelligence data networks will place a large burden on the
communications available. This should be borne in mind when designing the intelligence
architecture with as much use being made of existing systems as possible. ln a COIN
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
campaign, the usage by intelligence organizations of available bandwidth will outstrip that of all
other users due to the need for access to national databases, imagery products and the output
of national agencies. This is pafticularly the case when satellite communications are
established in the theatre.
2. Operational planning must take into consideration this demand on communications
infrastructure.
712. CENTRALIZEDCONTROL
1. The Need for Centralized Control. lntelligence assets are normally centralized at the
highest appropriate level of command in order to be available across the widest possible area of
operations and group of users. ln COIN operations, there are further imperatives for centralized
control. Where several intelligence organizations are working against a common target, there is
the danger of overlap. While some duplication is necessary to improve the evaluation of
information (by its being confirmed from more than a single source), the danger exists in the
possibility of a single source being exploited by more than one agency, each in ignorance of one
another. This can lead to false confirmation and, in turn, gives the source greater credibility
than may be its worth. There is also the potential for undesirable wastage of effort and
resources.
2. The Director of lntelligence. ln designing the intelligence organization, a decision
must be made to centrally coordinate all intelligence staffs-military, civilian, HN and coalition.
ldeally, a single director of intelligence should be established at the national level, with similar
posts at each lower level of command. This may be the civilian administrative authority or
military command depending upon the circumstances.
713. INTEGRATION AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM_ESTABLISHING AN
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
1. lntelligence committees should be established at each level of command in order to
coordinate the collection, processing and dissemination of information and intelligence. Each
committee would owe allegiance to the next higher level, which would be responsible for the
effectiveness and coordination of the intelligence efforts of those below it. lntelligence
committees may be sub-committees of military-police security force committees. lntelligence
committees should meet regularly if there is to be a useful exchange and discussion of
intelligence and a good working relationship between civil authorities, police and military
intelligence staffs established.
2. Membership of the intelligence committee should be arranged mutually between the HN
intelligence services, both civilian and military, and those of coalition intelligence staffs. Security
classifications will restrict complete sharing of information, and there may be established inner
committees of nations with similar resources and interests. This, however, has the potential of
creating two classes of nations and accompanying animosity. Efforts must be made to avoid
such situations.
714. FUNCTIONS OF AN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
1. The functions of an intelligence committee are as follows:
a. At the HN level, to keep the government, the civil and military commanders,
chiefs of staff, and operations staffs informed of all aspects of intelligence and
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security operations and to facilitate the exchange and provision of the intelligence
necessary for the prosecution of a strategic campaign.
b. At subordinate levels, to keep its related operations committees and the next
higher intelligence committee fully informed with relevant intelligence for
operational planning.
c. To advise operational staffs on security and protective measures.
d. To develop the collection plan, against which the collection agencies will be
tasked.
e. To direct the collection agencies. The intelligence staffs, through the G3
operations staff, will allocate tasks and priorities along with limitations for when
the information must be obtained.
f. Where possible, to establish common procedures for all HN and allied
intelligence and security organizations.
g. To provide an appropriate dissemination service to commanders.
h. To ensure coordination. The intelligence committee should ensure that
coordination in the following areas occurs:
(1) Civil, police and army boundaries are the same and accord with the civil
authority and security force command system. This may not always be
possible.
(2) Agreed plans and direction from the committee is allocated to respective
members in an appropriate fashion.
(3) lnformation and intelligence flow downwards as well as upwards and
sideways to neighbouring committees where appropriate.
(4) Representatives of government departments and HN experts are co-
opted for special advice and local or culture perspectives, with due regard
for security. They might come from wide variety of agencies, such as
customs services and coastguards, the transportation department, rail
services, inland water transporl, civil engineering, telecommunications,
power and water suppliers and from a wider circle of the HN community,
which might include farmers, businessmen and other traders.
715. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE STAFFS
1. Subordinate to the committees, there should be a centralized, integrated staff capable of
performing collection, coordination and intelligence requirements management (CCIRM),
database management and fusion functions on behalf of all the intelligence staffs of that
particular mission. For this reason, the concept of the ASIC was developed. As part of the
intelligence plan, clear orders should be given regarding which level has responsibility for
maintaining a master database. lt is essential to prevent every level of intelligence staff running
databases in parallel. Although it will never be possible to avoid some duplication of record-
keeping, there should be a minimum of databases with a single level-probably the highest HN
or lead coalition nation-maintaining the master database, with subordinate and other levels
submitting changes to it in the form of data-change requests. Maintenance of a single database
is facilitated by the "pull" rather than the "push" method of information retrieval and by close
cooperation between all collectors, analytical staffs and committees.
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2. While intelligence committees give general direction-laying down policy and allotting
general aims, collection tasks and priorities-they do not exercise command. Command and
control remains the prerogative of the commanders, civilian and military, over both their
respective intelligence staffs and their collection agencies.
716. FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
1. Whatever the design of the intelligence architecture, the organization and the sources
and agencies deployed, there are a number of fundamentals that should be considered in
intelligence architecture organization. These must be considered at the outset and plans made
for their inclusion in the structures.
Gontinuity. Units should be kept in the same area of responsibility (AOR) for as
long as possible. This ensures that they become familiar with the HN
inhabitants, power structures, other security forces, the terrain and infrastructure.
Consequently, they are better able to measure their opponents and they acquire
the ability to develop information into intelligence. ln short, they get a feel for
what is normal as a background against which to observe the abnormal.
Flexibility. An intelligence organization is designed to meet a specific situation,
but it must be receptive to the adjustments needed when the insurgent threat
develops in new directions, themes, strategies and tactics, or the situation
changes in some other way. Such changes in the situation may make fresh
demands upon specialist services such as imagery interpretation or interrogation.
Commanders and their intelligence staffs must be able to respond quickly to new
needs by redeploying resources and, where necessary, adjusting the functions
they fulfill. Furthermore, intelligence staff and the organizations must be capable
of collecting and assessing information regarding all systems within the
environment rather than simply collecting information on the enemy.
Robust Information Handling Capability. The intelligence system, whatever
its shape, must be able to cope with an increasing amount of information as
units, with growing experience, become more productive and betterfocused. lt is
hoped that with time the indigenous population becomes sufficiently confident to
pass more information to the security forces. As this happens, sufficient
intelligence-trained personnel must be made available to collate the additional
information, analyze and fuse it, interpret its meaning and disseminate the
resulting intelligence in time for it to be used operationally.
(1) Specialists. The training of analysts, source handlers, surveillance
operators, imagery interpreters, linguists, interrogators and other
intelligence specialists must be developed as early as possible if the
inevitable shortage of such skilled personnel, which exists at the
beginning of any campaign, is to be overcome. The careful husbandry of
scarce skills, specific to the ongoing campaign, is necessary throughout a
campaign but particularly essential at the beginning until more trained
specialists become available.
(2) Liaison. lf the intelligence organization is to work effectively and
efficiently, good liaison between all intelligence organizations and
agencies-HN, allied, civilian and military-is paramount. The specialists
referred to above are vital elements in establishing effective liaison with
HN intelligence agencies, The sensitivities of such intelligence liaison
b.
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duties require the liaison officer to have wide experience of military
capabilities and knowledge of intelligence.
Security, The need for security, especially source protection, must be
fully understood within the intelligence organization and among those to
whom it is disseminated. The "need to know" principle has to be enforced
and clear guidelines given on dissemination, particularly to HN, civilian
authorities.
ln the immediate era of Canadian Confederation, 1864-1870, the first Canadian lntelligence
Service was formed under one Gilbert McMicken, a stipendiary magistrate based in Wlndsor,
Ontario. This period saw numerous and confusing alarms brought on by the American Civil
War and the subsequent Fenian insurrectionary movement (an extreme lrish nationalist
movement) that raided Canada with the aim to influence British policy on lreland. McMicken
"had organized an excellent detective force along the frontier, and had a wide acquaintance
of spies and informers. [Prime Minister Sir John Alexander] Macdonald usually knew more
about the plans of the Fenians than the Fenians did themselves."
Extract and quote from Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald; The Young Politician (Toronto: the Macmillan
Company of Canada, Ltd., 1956) pages 393, 421 and 438-439.
717. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION
1. There is no fixed establishment for an intelligence organization, nor is there any pre-
determined scale on which to base its composition. lts size will be determined by the extent and
nature of the threat, the commander's requirements, the architecture necessary to support
operations and the intelligence collection agencies that can be made available.
2. Within a COIN campaign, there will be an enormous demand for information regarding
the systems in the environment (PMESll) that may influence the support of the population and
the successful outcome of the campaign. The intelligence staff organization must grow to
include specialists in those non-military areas. They will be able to advise the commander and
staff planners regarding the role and influences of these systems, the cultural context within
which they operate and the means needed to create desired effects within them. ln addition to
political advisors, intelligence staff may include economic, cultural and religious advisors as
necessary. They will also be helpful in the determination of measures of effectiveness.
3. As no two campaigns are ever fought in quite the same circumstances, it follows that the
intelligence organization for each new commitment should be customized, although past
campaigns will provide guidance and lessons where there are useful parallels. ln all cases, the
principles of intelligence and fundamentals for organization should be followed.
4. The size of any national contribution to a COIN campaign will have to be designed in
consultation with the senior intelligence officer and the intelligence staff of the HN. Almost
cedainly, the size of intelligence staffs will grow as the campaign develops,
718. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMITTEE INTEGRATION
1. Although a single, centrally controlled, integrated intelligence organization answering to
a single director of intelligence is the ideal, the circumstances prevailing in a HN and coalition
campaign may not be conducive to such a system. Where it cannot be achieved, a compromise
(3)
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solution must be brokered between the interested parties. The establishment of a centralized
system may be affected by a variety of factors, including:
a. The effectiveness, reliability and vulnerability of the HN's security forces and its
intelligence and security organization.
b. Willingness by all parties to cooperate, to share information and details of,
perhaps sensitive, HN sources, other intelligence details and, pafticularly at the
higher levels, matters of political sensitivity.
c. The different points of view and doctrine of the security forces, both HN and
allied. Because the HN's security forces, in parlicular the police, must continue to
live and work among the population after the eventual departure of the allies,
they will be subject to greater internal pressures and constraints. lt is important
that intelligence staffs overcome this problem as failure to integrate will seriously
impede the intelligence effort.
d. The degree of authority delegated to officials at each level of the command
structure and committee level (national, provincial, regional and district).
719. ALL.SOURCEINTELLIGENCECENTRE
1. Whether or not an intelligence committee is established, the normal focus for intelligence
for campaign forces will be the all-source intelligence centre (ASIC) or, if a joint operation, the
joint ASIC (JASIC), which will be located alongside the joint operations cell (JOC), forming the
hub of any joint task force headquarters (JTFHQ).
2. Within the ASIC will be the senior intelligence officer and his staff. This will include
CCIRM and the all-source cell (ASC), in which fusion and analysis will be conducted.
Representatives of the agencies (e.9., HSG, CSG and ISG) will be located in the ASC. ln some
cases, it will be necessary for these elements to be afforded their own segregated area with
more stringent access controls.
720. TASKING_THE COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
1. Direction will begin with a determination of the commander's intelligence requirements or
as they are more commonly termed, priority intelligence requirements (PlR). These will be the
product of his mission analysis and should be discussed with the senior intelligence officer, who
will be able to ensure that they are accurately focused.
2. lt may not be possible in the early stages of a campaign to fully state the commander's
intelligence requirements. When this is the case, the intelligence staffs have the responsibility
of giving guidance to commanders on the kind of intelligence that they will require. This may be
done by an intelligence estimate. An intelligence estimate takes the commander's plan, no
matter how broadly defined, and compares it with existing intelligence on the insurgency.
3. Concurrent with the intelligence estimate, the staff should apply intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (lPB). Together, the intelligence estimate and IPB will give the intelligence staff
a good idea of the gaps in their knowledge, which can form the basis of the initial collection
plan. lt is likely, particularly in the initial stages, that there will be a shortfall in intelligence, with
more basic intelligence than current intelligence available. The preparation of an initial
collection plan will also give some indication of the necessary collection assets and intelligence
architecture that will be needed for the campaign.
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4. IBP within a COIN campaign must focus not only on matters of terrain, but on the
culturalfactors and environmental systems (PMESll)that are at play in the insurgency.
721. DIRECTION TO THE COLLECTORS
1. Even when an intelligence organization has been established, information does not flow
automatically into the hands of the intelligence staff and then to the commander. lf direction is
poor, the intelligence organization may be in danger of collecting large quantities of irrelevant
information.
2. A commander must give his intelligence staff clear direction and a firm indication of the
priorities to be allotted to his intelligence requirements. On receipt of the commander's
intelligence requirements, the intelligence staff will, with the aid of the intelligence estimate and
lPB, identify gaps in the intelligence already held. These gaps should be filled by tasking
collection agencies (units and resources) to collect against them. The questions put to the
collectors are known as information requirements (lR), and their collection is carefully planned
by the senior intelligence officer in conjunction with his CCIRM staff, who will coordinate the
collection plan, lRs and the related intelligence requirements. The resultant collection plan
must, in turn, be approved by the commander before collectors receive their direction from the
operations and intelligence staffs. The collection plan will normally be maintained on a
collection worksheet that will show the allocation of tasks, in order of priority, to individual
collection agencies and the time and form in which information is to be reported.
SECTION 4
COLLECTION
722. GENERAL
1. There are two aspects of collection: exploitation by intelligence staffs of their sources
and agencies, and the timely delivery of collected information to intelligence staffs for
subsequent processing into intelligence or, when appropriate, directly to weapon systems.
Collection will be based on the collection plan drawn up by the intelligence staffs under the
direction of commanders and the intelligence committees during the direction phase. The
CCIRM staff will manage collection.
723. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE_COLLEGTION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
1. The most effective source of intelligence during a COIN campaign will be that derived
from the direct questioning of persons, whether formally or informally, in other words, from
HUMINT sources. HUMINT sources may include the following:
a. Coalition Military Sources, This will include all ranks of the security forces,
especially those whose duties require them to move among the HN population,
on patrols, on collection of locally-produced supplies, on liaison with HN
authorities, dock workers, airport workers, aid workers and the like. lt is vital that
all such personnel are thoroughly briefed on the gaps in intelligence that their
duties might enable them to fill. They should be made "intelligence aware" so
that they are always prepared to report information which may appear trivial but
which, when added to other pieces, may be important. Dismounted patrols are
critical to collection in COIN operations, and all soldiers are sensors who should
be debriefed upon return. Patrol report formats may have to be amended to
better suit the environment in which forces are operating.
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HN Security Forces. HN security forces will include military, paramilitary,
auxiliaries, reserves and police forces. They will be an excellent source of
information along with the cultural reference, but they must be handled with great
sensitivity. The forces' intimate knowledge of the local population, culture and
related grievances will provide more accurate information, of value both when on
duty and on leave. Like their coalition counterparts, they should be encouraged
to become intelligence aware. Attempts should be made systematically to brief
those going on leave locally and debrief them on return, Care must be taken not
to duplicate the information collection from police officers being undertaken by
their own intelligence staff. Police equivalents are very likely to be handling their
own sources among the population. lt is probable that there will be a strong
reluctance to disclose these sources to intelligence staffs, but their tasking and
the information they provide should be coordinated and fused by the centralized
intelligence machinery.
Military Surveillance. All the usual conventional campaign surveillance
sources-observation posts (OPs), mounted and dismounted patrols,
reconnaissance units, air reconnaissance and troops supplemented by specialist
surveillance equipment-are equally useful in COIN operations. They must be
tasked and briefed with great care because insurgents operate more covertly
than a conventional enemy. Units will frequently be tasked to mount operations
specifically to obtain information or to give cover to other intelligence-gathering
operations, for example, the insertion or retrieval of covert OPs.
Govert Surveillance. Coveft surveillance can obtain significant amounts of
information for later exploitation, criminal prosecution and for the triggering of
security forces to fix and strike targets. Line forces and Special Forces (SF) may
be used in this capacity. When SF are deployed, it will be normal for there to be
SF liaison officers in the HQ of the formation to which they are assigned.
lrregular Forces. lrregular or auxiliary units may also be raised locally from the
police, the HN's army and from friendly sections of the civilian population for the
purpose of defensive and stability operations in order to continue the dislocation
and disruption of insurgent activity and influence. Defensive operations include
the guarding of key points, storage areas and, most importantly, towns and
villages that have come to the HN government's side. ln Malaya, such irregulars
were used to infiltrate the insurgents' command structure by completely replacing
a group in one particular area. They then operated to unravel the chain of
command from the inside. ln Kenya, during the Mau Mau campaign of the early
1950s, "pseudo-gangs" were used to attack insurgents in their own territory.
These groups were comprised of soldiers, local security forces and former
insurgents convinced to support the government campaign. Such use of
irregular troops is, however, relatively sophisticated, and these operations can be
developed only over a protracted period in an environment that is very well
understood by the i ntelligence orga n ization.s2
lnterrogation and Tactical Questioning. Prisoners can be an important source
of information. lnterrogation in a COIN campaign can, however, be a sensitive
82
Although the Mau Mau campaign is a useful study for counter-insurgency lessons, the campaign is considered to
have been especially brutal. Some of the techniques used at the time are unacceptable today and, in the long term,
would only serve to undermine the legitimacy of a COIN campaign.
b.
d.
e.
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matter. lt must only occur when authorized and by specifically trained personnel.
It must be subject to rigorous oversight by the chain of command. Any abuses
must be dealt with in accordance with regulations and quickly, for they will only
cause campaigning forces to loose the moral superiority and damage campaign
legitimacy. lt is important to be fully aware of the legal basis under which
interrogation takes place. Systematic interrogation of captured insurgents can
have excellent results, particularly in building a picture of command structures,
communications and other aspects of the insurgents' infrastructure. ln low-level
conflict, interrogation is less likely to produce intelligence of immediate tactical
value, simply because insurgent operational methods normally involve a very
restricted circle within which future plans are discussed. ln general terms, but
not always so, interrogation should be capable of producing evidence that will be
acceptable in court. lt is vital, therefore, that it is conducted strictly in accordance
with rules laid down by the HN's judiciary and the law of armed conflict.
Debriefing. Arrangements must be made to provide a debriefing team (DDT),
personnel skilled in debriefing willing subjects. These will normally include
domestic citizens or ex-patriots with recent knowledge of the HN situation and
environment. Such people might include travelers, airline crews, expatriate
workers and members of Canadian diplomatic missions. lf the crisis has resulted
in an exodus of such people from the country, then debriefing will be established
in a domestic location. lf such people have remained in the country, then a
debriefing team may deploy for debriefing operations in the HN.
HUMINT Support. Both interrogation and debriefing require close steerage and
extensive intelligence support if they are to be effective. Liaison representatives
will be established at appropriate ASICs and will need extensive analytical and
research support.
Gaptured Documents, Equipment and Stores. These are valuable sources of
information. Troops must be trained to realize their worth and encouraged to
make them available to intelligence staffs at the earliest opportunity. Documents
found on suspects may assist in the questioning of prisoners by providing
interrogators with information that they can exploit during interviews. ln certain
instances, it may be necessary to employ specially trained personnel to
undertake sensitive site exploitation (SSE) when rules of evidence or human
rights investigations may be indicated. Documents and equipment captured may
also lead to evidence of third nation or party support of the insurgency, which can
be attacked using legal means in those other nations.
HN Population. Undoubtedly, the HN population will, if systematically exploited,
be the best source of HUMINT. An informant is one who gives information-a
casual source. Great care must be taken in developing the HN population as
sources which must be done in close coordination with HN intelligence agencies.
HN informants should be given the opportunity to contact the security forces
confidentially. This can be done by making confidential telephone lines, text
message numbers or post office box numbers available and by keeping routine
military patrols in close proximity to the population. They may also be permitted
to pass information during vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), during cordon and search
operations or during other activities such as civilian medical clinics. Doing so will
permit a budding informant to pass information without unduly drawing attention
to himself and thus fearing reprisal by insurgents. lnsurgents may use bogus
informants to plant false information or uncover the source-handling network,
h.
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k.
thus efforts must be made to verify sources and/or information. All military
patrols must be trained to talk to HN people as a matter of course and should be
given standing PlRs to address. The intelligence organization will be capable of
developing a system for making contact with, or being contacted by,
sympathizers.
lnformers and Agents. Much of the useful information that reaches the
intelligence staff will come from informers and agents. ln HUMINT terms, an
agent is a person specifically recruited and trained, placed in a hostile
organization and who is tasked with information gathering on the organization of
which he is part, in other words, a controlled source. An informer is a person
who, perhaps uninvited, passes information to an opponent about his
organization, in other words, an uncontrolled source. A small number of well-
placed and reliable agents can provide information of value well beyond their
cost, particularly if aimed at the pivotal points in the insurgents' command. lf
agents are able to penetrate the top level of the insurgents' command and control
organization, information may be provided on the development of their strategies,
the identification of important leaders, the system of liaison between the military
wing and the insurgent political leadership and the methods of acquiring
resources. At lower echelons, informers are useful in providing information on,
for example, personalities, tactical plans and weapon caches. At these levels, if
continuity is to be maintained, it is important that the agent network expands at a
similar rate to that of the insurgent movement, othenruise their relative value will
diminish. The problem with acting on information supplied by an individual is
source-protection. ln an insurgent organization, the circle of knowledge is kept
small. lf an informer reports the move of weapons to a new hide, for example,
perhaps only three insurgents have been made aware: the courier, the
commander and the quaftermaster. A subsequent, immediate operation by the
security forces to recover the weapons might raise suspicions. This could
seriously jeopardize the security of the source. Therefore, care must be
exercised in such matters and the advice of the HSG sought when planning
operations.
Non-governmental Organizations/lnternational Organizations. Reports,
surveys and databases created by non-military organizations and other agencies
offer a potential wealth of information for the intelligence organization. Materials
created by these organizations may contain information not available to military
sources due to the close contact these organizations enjoy with the public. lt
should be noted that in the interest of maintain impartiality, neutrality and a
favourable operating environment, some of these organizations may not be
interested in sharing their information with the military. These relationships must
be cultivated with care and will often depend upon the personalities involved.
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I ntelligence in Counter-l nsurgency
ln Czarist Russia, the Okhrana had succeeded in infiltrating the Bolshevik Party to such an
extent and with such zeal, it became difficult to tell whether the agents were acting as
Bolsheviks or agents. When the triumphant Bolsheviks seized the Okhrana record, Lenin
discovered that some of his most trusted companions and advice givers had been in the pay
of the Czals police. Although the use of the agents did not produce a wholly successful
COIN campaign for the Czar, infiltration to such a high degree can produce significant
tactical victories. One example of such victories was when Okhrana agents were able to
engineer a provocation that ended in the assassination of an influentiai Grand Duke.
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (U.S.A.: Praeger Security tnternational, 1964),
ps. 46.
724. COORDINATION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
1. Whenever HUMINT sources are to be exploited, it is imperative that all HUMINT
collection agencies operating in the theatre effect liaison closely with each other. This liaison is
vital to ensure:
a. De-confliction. No source should ever be run by more than a single agency. lf
a single source works for more than one agency, it is possible that his reports
can, unwittingly, confirm themselves. This false confirmation, sometimes called
false corroboration, is a danger to the intelligence process and can cause the
source to gain greater credence than his worth. Furthermore, if the situation
becomes known to the insurgents, they can exploit the false collateral at the
expense of the security forces.
b. Veracity. There is always the risk of a source, if not properly handled, producing
information which is unreliable or even acting as a double agent. Tasking must
be rigidly controlled to reduce the likelihood of this happening. Reliability of
sources must always be evaluated with great care and records maintained by the
HUMINT agency.
c. Security. The smaller the circle of people knowing the identity of a source, the
safer he can operate. lf sources are to be maintained, and confidence spread,
source-protection must be effective and be seen to be effective.
725. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLICATIONS_OPEN SOURCE
INTELLIGENCE
1. lntelligence derived from open sources (OSINT) is playing an increasingly important role.
Nowhere, however, will the role of the media be more important than in COIN. The actions of
the security forces will be scrutinized closely and will play a major pad in forming public opinion
and in building and maintaining the legitimacy of the campaign. Relations with the media are
not the direct responsibility of the intelligence staff. They should remember, however, that
reporters can get access where security forces often cannot. Furthermore, press teams are
often out and about for protracted periods. A warm relationship, built up between intelligence
staffs and individual members of the press corps, can reap dividends in the form of low-level
information.
2. Many journalists will cover the campaign for an extended period, visiting the country for
a number of weeks at a time before returning home for one or two months. They may even be a
regional expert with a unique range of contacts. lf an intelligence staff develops a sufficient
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Counter-l nsurgency Operations
relationship with individual members of a media team, information might be forthcoming in
return for, perhaps, a sanitized update or a security brief on their return to the theatre of
operations. Journalists may be useful in providing insight into the feelings and concerns of the
local populace or the opinions of local leaders.
3. Media reports should always be regarded with caution. They are likely to include a bias
to some particular purpose rather than be a straight reporting of unabridged or unelaborated
facts. Commanders may have seen the morning news on television about the campaign
immediately before being briefed by the staff. This will inevitably lead to staffs having to
respond to press reports rather than leading on subjects of their choosing with unfortunate
results. lntelligence officers should take steps to avoid briefings developing in this way. HN
media, in particular, will have a vital role to play in building campaign legitimacy and in gaining
the support of the populace, and intelligence staff can expect to play a part in this with the public
affairs staff.
726. OPEN SOURCE PUBLICATIONS
1. ln addition to the current reporting of news teams in theatre, there is likely to be
considerable open-source material produced prior to the campaign which will go some way to
meeting intelligence staffs' requirements for basic intelligence. This can include the lnternet,
atlases, encyclopaedias, travel books, statistical summaries and a host of other references
produced by the specialist-interest press covering the armed forces and the political, economic
and geographical situations inside the country.
2. Additionally, with a media savvy opponent, the intelligence staffs should attempt to
catalogue insurgent publications, for they can sometimes reveal aspects of the insurgents that
are otherwise unknown.
3. lt must be remembered that the insurgent movement will also attempt to make use of the
media to spread its own views and discredit those of the government and the security forces.
While they may use the media as a mechanism to air legitimate grievances, insurgents will also
manipulate the media to their advantage to disseminate manifestos, broadcast staged acts and
gain the public's sympathy. The monitoring and assessment of such propaganda will allow staff
planners to develop plans to counter insurgent propaganda and to even pre-empt it at times.
727. IMAGERYINTELLIGENCE
1. lntelligence derived from imagery (lMlNT) will play an important operational supporting
role in any campaign, including COIN. Product coverage will include a wide range of imagery,
ranging from map-quality prints from airborne platforms, both satellite and aircraft, to thermal
imagery (Tl), and infra-red (lR) pictures. Tl is excellent at detecting bodies that are warmer than
their surroundings, such as people concealed in dense foliage or a warm vehicle engine. lR
imagery is capable of detecting disturbed soil, which is valuable for detecting buried arms
caches, command wires for booby traps and improvised explosive devices (lEDs).
2. Collection platforms will include satellites, strategic aircraft, tactical air reconnaissance
(TAR), helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). OPs and other reconnaissance
capabilities can expect to be equipped with hand-held cameras, video recorders, Tl equipment,
radar and image intensifiers (ll). Coordination of IMINT is the task of an lSG.
3. There will be a constant demand for photographic coverage of areas of operations. The
ISG will be able to provide intelligence derived from the analysis of all kinds of imagery. Much
analysis will be done through computer processed images rather than printed (hard) copies.
Although prints of images can be made available, care should be taken to ensure that they are
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demanded only when necessary, for example, as briefing aids. Prints should not be demanded
as proof of intelligence reports as a matter of course. The time taken to interpret results of an
IMINT task is considerably lengthened when prints of the imagery are required.
728. SIGNALSINTELLIGENCE
1. lnsurgent groups have a need to communicate, and when they do via any electronic
medium, they are vulnerable to intercept, which provides a means for the gathering of signals
intelligence (SlGlNT). Besides deriving intelligence from communications (COMINT), SIGINT
analysts will exploit emissions from radars and other electronic emitters. This electronic
intelligence (ELINT) can enable the detection of, for example, radio-control devices and missile
control, guidance and targetseeking radars. Where SIGINT collection is envisaged, a CSG will
be available to coordinate its collection and to interpret the results within the ASC.
2. Electronic warfare (EW) detachments will provide useful information and intelligence by
exploiting insurgent weakness in modern civil and tactical communications. Given the nature of
COIN operations, it will not be unusual to see EW detachments employed at sub-unit level.
They will provide not only intelligence collection on behalf of higher headquarters but will
monitor communications during the conduct of tactical operations for the purposes of
intelligence collection and force protection. The monitoring of communications nets may give an
indication of impending attack or an attempt to flee an area during the conduct of a tactical
operation, thus allowing forces to take preventative or protective action.
3, The detection of insurgent command and control (C2) networks may be considered a
target for possible engagement. However, the advantages to be gained from attacking their
means and locations must be weighed against the advantages to be gained from monitoring
their C2 means and exploiting them for purposes of intelligence gathering and force protection.
729. SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS_BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND MEASURES
OF EFFECTIVENESS
1. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is defined as "The assessment of effects resulting
from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective."83
BDA examines the results of activities, and its collection may be the responsibility of a number
of entities including G2 staff.
2. Measures of performance examine the accomplishment of a task and are defined as "a
criterion used to evaluate the accomplishment of a task."8a They ask, "was the task done right?"
This is the purview of a commander to assess.
3. Measures of effectiveness (MoE) relate directly to BDA and are defined as "a criterion
used to evaluate how a task has affected selected system behaviour or capabilities over time."8s
They ask the question, "was the right task done to create the desired results?" lntelligence staff
will be key to measures changes in terms of target capabilities and behaviour.
4. MoE must be determined from the outset, based on the starting state of the planned
target and the desired objective. Whilst MoE for engaging insurgent capabilities with fires will
tt
NATo AAP 6.
uo
Army Terminology Panel, approved May 2006.
tu
Arry Terminology Panel, approved May 2006.
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be fairly straightforward, objective and immediate, MoE for targets that are to be changed
through influence activities and psychological effects will likely be subjective to a certain extent
and will require measurement over an extended period of time in order to note desired changes
in a system.
730. SELECT!NG MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
1 . lntelligence staff will play a role in the determination and application of MoE. ln order to
overcome the difficulties in their selection and application, some basic principles exist that can
aid in the development of useful MoEs:
a. Causality.st A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established
between the activity and the effect attempting to be measured. Given the cultural
and other variables present, there has to be a reasonable likelihood that the
planned activity will create the desired effect. Secondly, commanders and staff
must be able to assess any other extant factors that may be causing the effect
other than their own activities. Likewise, they must ascertain if the measured
effect is merely coincidental.
b. Quantifiable.sT An MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the
subjectivity that plagues MoEs on the cognitive plane. Quantification allows
accurate trend measurement.ss
c. Observable and Attributable. When drafting MoEs, consideration should be
given to the possibility that all of the variables influencing an activity and change
in behaviour cannot be observed. The MoEs must be able to recognize a trend
or change and confirm the connection or attribution to the activity. For example,
if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being used as an informal
indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an urban area, observers
will ideally be able to ascertain its timing (i.e., when itwas done); its attribution to
a particular group (e.9., political, criminal, military); the group's motive and
whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in terms of
cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or action; and, its
location in relation to the cultural makeup of the local environment.
d. Gorrelated to Effects, Objectives and End-States. Just as activities are
planned to lead to specific effects and objectives within a line of operation, MoEs
should be selected to correlate to the achievement of each effect and be
reflective of the level of employment. The strategic and operational levels require
measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign, and many MoEs at the
86
For a detailed discussion of causality, see William S. Murray, "A Will to Measure," ParametersVol. 31, No. 3
(Autumn 2001), pp. 134-147.
87
The quantifiable, observable and timeliness principles are adapted from LtCol. David Grohoski, Steven Seybert,
and Marc Romanych, "Measures of Effectiveness in the lnformation Environment," Military lntelligence Professional
Bulletin Vol. 29, No. 3 (July-September 2003\, pp. 12-16.
88
Colonel Ralph Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander's Perspective on lnformation Operations,"
Military Review (May-June 2006), pp. 13-32. For example, during a tour in lraq, 2BCf ,1'tArmored Division
monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in 2 BCT's area of operations as an MoE.
This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which contributed to discerning the effectiveness of
ongoing activities.
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operational and tactical levels will measure the incremental progress through
effects and objectives.
Flexibility. Although MoEs should be drafted at the planning stage, they should
remain under regular review, and commanders must be prepared to adjust them
as required. They must evolve as a mission progresses, particularly as the
consequence of their activities leads to the attainment of operational effects.
Similarly, MoEs are likely not transferable from mission to mission. Even if a
mission takes place in the same area of operations (AO), the passage of time will
force reconsideration of MoEs previously employed.
Collection. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the
intelligence necessary to apply an MoE and provide the direction and guidance to
do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoEs through all units in the
AO as part of the G2 information collection plan. Collection may be assisted by
other agencies, however, without a formal command relationship, this may have
to be done informally. Nevertheless, other non-military agencies may prove to be
an effective gauge of progress in creating desired perceptions and will in a target
audience. For example, increased cooperation with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or other government departments (OGDs) may indicate a
greater acceptance of the campaign.
Relativity. lmprovements sought in a given environment must be relative to the
specific environment and to what is considered normal for that particular
environment and culture. Expectations for situational improvement must be
reasonable given the starting state and the normal state of that particular
environment. lmprovements to a situation that will make it relatively normal for
that environment may come quickly; however, systemic improvements in
absolute terms may require cultural changes over a very long period of time.
Expectations for change and the related MoEs should be set as incremental
milestones so that improvement can be measured and demonstrated as tangible
progress over time. For example, a decrease in criminal activity must be initially
compared with the normal levels for the environment that existed before the
security situation demanded military intervention.
2. Developing appropriate MoEs to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very
difficult task. Willpower, perceptions and beliefs are all less-than-completely-tangible variables
that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of
gauging a target audience's attitude, Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and this
will be difficult to identify.
731. SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION
1. lntelligence staffs will be required to support the conduct of sensitive site exploitation
(SSE), in which specially trained personnel systematically search a specific location in the
search for evidence or other information or material. lntelligence staffs will help identify the
target location, immediate threats and evidence or items to be sought.
2. SSE will often be used to collect information for additional operations or for evidence to
support subsequent legal prosecution of insurgent suspects. Much of it, therefore, will be
planned and done in conjunction with civilian counterparts.
g.
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SECTION 5
PROGESSING
732. PROCESSING AS A DISCIPLINE
1. The processing stage of the intelligence cycle incorporates the work of the intelligence
staff in collation, analysis, integration or synthesis and interpretation of information.
2. The processing staff will normally be trained intelligence operators, often from all three
services, supported by specialists in the collection disciplines. Where appropriate, specialists
from other arms and services willjoin the analytical staff, for example, engineer intelligence
operators, with their specialist knowledge of terrain, explosives and route construction.
Alternately, ammunition technicians, with their training in explosives, firing devices and weapon
inspection, are able to develop weapons intelligence in conjunction with the police forensic
scientists. This discipline, based on such techniques as weapon matching, will be able to trace
weapons to their sources of supply, to rounds they have fired, explosives and detonators to their
origin and so on.
3. Given the need in a COIN campaign to create a broad knowledge base incorporating the
PMESII systems of an environment, the processing stage will be complicated and require the
process to be applied to an enormous volume of information. lt is in this staff discipline where
many of the non-military analysts will reside.
733. FUSION OF INTELLIGENCE
1. The best results will be obtained from those intelligence organizations that are fully
integrated and work to a centrally-agreed collection plan, employing effective CCIRM personnel,
fusion and database managers, analysts and other intelligence specialists who approach their
task in a structured, objective and systematic way.
2. One of the critical tasks performed in the ASIC is that of fusion. This is the collation of
reports and information from the separate, single-source agencies such as HUMINT, SIGINT
and IMINT into a single assessment. Each agency produces its own view of an event or activity
and reports it to the intelligence staff. This is known as "single-source picture compilation." The
fused assessment-the assessment made by the comparison of more than one single-source
report-becomes the recognized tactical ground (or maritime or air) picture. The recognized
picture will be produced at the level with responsibility for reporting, which is usually the level
maintaining the database, as that is where the broadest view will exist. This fused assessment
becomes the authoritative view, which forms the basis for assessments by all subordinate
intelligence staffs. lt will be disseminated upwards, downwards and to the flanks in the form of
intelligence summaries (INTSUMS).
734. DATABASES
1. One of the fundamentals of effective processing is the maintenance of an efficient
database. ln a COIN campaign there will be a plethora of small, apparently insignificant and
unconnected data. Only effective collation and cross-referencing will enable analysts to assess
the significance of individual pieces and make best use of them.
2. Additionally, databases will be key to a successful relief in place, when units and
headquarters rotate between AOs or into a theatre. Consideration should be given to a trickle
relief in place of key analysts so that a relief in place maintains some form of continuity in
database familiarity.
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sEcTtoN 6
DISSEMINATION
735. RESPONSIBILITY
1. Dissemination of intelligence to subordinate commanders is the responsibility of the
director of intelligence at the highest level and of the senior intelligence officers at subordinate
levels. Where intelligence committees are established, individual intelligence chiefs of the
represented services and agencies will accept responsibility for briefing their own commanders
and subordinate representatives.
2. Depending upon the committee system used and the agencies involved, limited
distribution of some products may occur given security restrictions.
736. USE OF INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE
1. lt should be emphasized that intelligence should flow not necessarily in a hierarchical
manner, as orders along an operationalchain of command, but quickly and efficiently, from
whoever holds it to whomever needs it. This will mean that, on occasion, it will bypass some
levels of command. This flow is greatly aided by the use of information technology. INTSUMs
should be disseminated at regular intervals, These can be supplemented by detailed reports on
specific topics (e.9., insurgent ORBATS or incidents) as required.
2. As with intelligence reporting in any campaign, care must be taken to avoid "circular
reporting," in which parts of a summary from one intelligence staff are plagiarized in another and
returned to the originator as apparent confirmation of initial assessments. This problem is
particularly acute in combined operations, where the different national authorities include reports
from third parties in their own summaries. The best defence against this is clear orders for
reporting authority and a thorough knowledge, on the part of intelligence officers, of the sources
and agencies available to all the intelligence staffs providing reports for the theatre.
737. SECURITY
1. While intelligence is of use only in the hands of operational decision-makers, its
dissemination should be closely controlled. Source-protection must always be a priority. lf a
source is at risk, intelligence should be sanitized or disguised in such a way as to conceal its
source.
2. Access to intelligence in such circumstances should be restricted to those with a real
need to know. Security of intelligence must always be balanced against the value to be gained
from its dissemination. Agencies generally have strict guidelines for dissemination of
intelligence in an emergency, perhaps when lives are at risk. lntelligence officers need to
acquaint themselves with these procedures so that emergency dissemination can take place
with a minimum of delay,
sEcTtoN 7
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
738. GENERAL
1. Procedures and methods of intelligence support to fires are well established and
practised. Given the overarching philosophy and many of the supporting principles of a COIN
campaign which seek to gain campaign legitimacy and popular support for the campaign and its
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
objectives, there is a significant emphasis on influence activities. These are activities with first-
order effects on the psychological plane that affect understanding, perceptions, will and
ultimately behaviour. Some influence activities, such as psychologicaloperations (PSYOPS)
and deception, will support offensive operations. However, the aim of the majority of influence
activities in a COIN campaign will be to undermine support for the insurgency, separate the
insurgents morally and physically from the populace, address root causes and grievances and
ultimately win mass support for the campaign.
2. To this end, influence activities consist of deception, PSYOPS, civil-military cooperation
(ClMlC), public affairs and presence, profile and posture of forces. The conduct of each of
these will have to be supported by intelligence staff in terms of addressing requirements,
targeting appropriate audiences and developing and collecting measures of effectiveness.
739. SUPPORT TO CIVIL.MILITARY COOPERATION
1. Before CIMIC detachments assess the requirement for coordination and eventual
reconstruction and governance development, intelligence staffs will assess the overall state of
the civil institutions and infrastructure and their relation to the root of grievances and tensions
that sparked the insurgency. Such assessment will have to be done in relation to other PMESII
factors and systems, such as social or ethnic divides. For example, economic and social
disadvantages in one region or for one ethnic group may have helped cause the insurgency.
Therefore, intelligence assessment must identify these root causes and requirements for
enduring resolution.
2. Once this is done, CIMIC staff may undertake a prioritization of needs and work in
cooperation with local and international agencies to build civil capacity and resolve civil
grievances. lntelligence staff, through their HUMINT network, should also be able to identify to
CIMIC staff and commanders local officials whose agenda may not support the campaign and
indeed who might seek to gain personal benefit from infrastructure and governance
development.
3. For their part, CIMIC staff will be able to provide their own assessment to intelligence
staff regarding the situation amongst the populace and its leaders and their attitudes towards
the campaign.
740. SUPPORT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
1. PSYOPS elements and commanders should work very closely with the all-source
intelligence cell to plan PSYOPS and to integrate these with other influence and fires activities.
lntelligence staff should assist PSYOPS staff in target audience assessment. This will be
particularly true for delineating between various ethnic or tribal groups and between various
leaders and power structures.
2. lntelligence staff will be able to assist in historicalanalysis of the nation, its traditions and
past experiences, all of which will help formulate the PSYOPS message.
741. SUPPORT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS
1. The ability of intelligence staff to support public affairs will be limited. Public affairs will
have to seek assistance in terms of sanitized information that can be given to media and what
threats to media exist in the environment.
2. lntelligence staff may be able to assist public affairs in assessing the legitimacy and
affiliations of indigenous media outlets and personalities.
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742. SUPPORT TO DEGISIONS ON PROFILE, POSTURE AND PRESENCE OF FORCES
1. How soldiers and commanders present themselves can send strong messages to target
audiences and the public at large. Although commanders should be able to make intuitive
decisions in this field, to a great extent intelligence staff and, in particular, cultural advisors will
be able to recommend to commanders how force postures will be viewed by indigenous groups.
2. Some groups may seek a robust show of force and capability in initial contacts as a
means to accepting a force's legitimacy, whilst other groups will be alienated by what they
consider to be an offensive first impression. Commanders should seek advice from intelligence
staff regarding how the indigenous populations and constituent groups or tribes will view force
postures.
3. Additionally, intelligence staff should be able to assist the commander in making risk
assessments regarding reductions in the profile, presence and posture of troops.
743. SUPPORT TO DECEPTION
1. The only targets acceptable for deception are the insurgents themselves and normally in
direct support of an offensive or defensive action, such as the use of tanks in a demonstration to
divert attention away from the main effort of an attack.
2. lntelligence supports deception planners by analyzing an insurgent's reconnaissance
capabilities and identifying his perception of the battlespace and his perception of the COIN
forces. Staff also advise on insurgent deception doctrine, tactics/procedures, capabilities and
intentions. This requires an insight into an insurgent commander's way of thinking, including the
estimate process.
3. During the execution of deception operations, all-source intelligence, pafiicularly on
insurgent movemenVdeployments, is required to monitor the insurgents' response and to
determine whether the deception operation is achieving its aim. ln analyzing this intelligence,
attention must also be paid to possible insurgent deception plans to protect his own operations.
sEcTroN 8
TRAINING
744. PRE.DEPLOYMENTTRAINING
1. All personnel involved in the direction, collection, processing and dissemination of
intelligence should deploy to the theatre having made thorough preparation, as a cohesive unit.
They must be clear on their role in the intelligence organization within a COIN campaign, having
had the opportunity to rehearse the issues with which they will be dealing and with those with
whom they will be working.
2. Senior intelligence officers, in particular, should take the time to examine the forthcoming
operation against the principles of intelligence. lt is necessary to order their thoughts on
architectures and intelligence support in such a way that they can clearly conceive the
infrastructure necessary to meet their aim of supporting the commander's plan. Those
personnel with a role requiring them to conduct liaison with other authorities should have had
the opportunity to make contact with them, to discuss the issues and, particularly, agree on their
means of communication. ldeally, they should have the opportunity to exercise using similar
communications systems before departure.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
3. Pre-deployment training must begin with the principles, practices and tools that have
served intelligence staff well in the past. This will ensure a suitable and confident start point
common to all personnel involved, based on proven methods and procedures. At the very least,
this will ensure well honed methods are used initially in theatre. Any changes required once in
theatre are then taken from the confidence of proven practices and procedures. Any changes to
practices and organization either in training or in operations should be assessed in terms of the
principles of intelligence to ensure that real improvement will be obtain from the change and that
the changes will not violate extant and proven principles.
745. BACKGROUNDINTELLIGENCE
1. Military staff should be as thoroughly briefed as possible on the situation in the theatre of
operations before deployment. Personnel recently returned from theatre or those there already
but returned to advise will be able to assist with individual and unit training on intelligence
matters, current affairs, lessons learned, practices tailored to the theatre and other aspects of
the insurgency.
746. SPECIALIST SKILLS
1. Military staff with specialist skills should ensure that as much training as possible is done
prior to arrival in theatre. Problems are much easier to solve, particularly those involving
technical equipment, in a benign environment where extensive support facilities exist than in a
potentially hostile, austere environment after deployment.
SECTION 9
CHALLENGES FAGING AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
IN A COUNTER.INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
747. CREATION OF THE BROAD KNOWLEDGE BASE
1. The requirement for intelligence staff to not only produce intelligence regarding the
insurgent capabilities and military intentions but to assess all the systems within the
environment regarding their influences on the campaign will tax intelligence staff and their
organizational capabilities greatly. Staff and capabilities will have to expand greatly, as will their
conceptual understanding of their role within the campaign and environment.
2. Additional staff, specialists and subordinate cells will have to be created. ln doing so,
the principles of intelligence and the basic fundamentals of organization should be respected.
748. SECURITY OF THE EXPANDED ORGANIZATION
1. Finding and vetting suitable personnel while preventing insurgent penetration of a rapidly
enlarging intelligence system will present difficulties and risks. The difficulties may be overcome
by effort and cooperation. The risks have to be accepted with open eyes and minimized by
good security.
749. CONFLICT BETWEEN CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION
1. At the higher levels of command, the principle is to centralize intelligence. At the tactical
level of a COIN campaign, there will be a great expectation for sub-unit commanders to exercise
initiative. Furthermore, operations will be conducted in a dispersed nature, likely in a non-
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contiguous battlespace. Together, these characteristics will demand a decentralization of
intelligence support.
2. By applying the principle of mission command, the centralized direction of intelligence
policy and overarching plans need not stifle the initiative necessary to counter an insurgency
and will support this decentralized demand. Sub-unit level commanders may require an
intelligence processing capability within their headquarters element. Even without formal
intelligence support, they should seek to establish an intelligence cycle that links and drives an
operations cycle within their scope of command. This will be particularly the case if the
battlespace is organized such that each sub-unit has its own AO.
3. Despite this decentralization of capability and process, a lack of at least centralized
direction and policy will erode the control of intelligence work and product. ln order to avoid this,
the following must be kept in mind:
a. Dissemination of lntelligence. Given the inter-agency framework necessary for
the conduct of a COIN campaign, there will likely be a need to share sensitive
information with a broader audience. Whilst there will remain demands to control
classified information, a delineation will be required between the information and
the source. lnformation may therefore be shared with a broader than normal
audience as necessary (maintaining reasonable precautions) but without
revealing the source.
b. Collection Methods. Methods used to collect information can no longer be
controlled rigidly from central government. HUMINT must be handled at the
lowest level possible and practical. However, poor procedures and control of
sources may lead to a breakdown in reporting, double reporting and infiltration by
insurgents.
c. Decisions on the Threat and Force Protection. Commanders at various levels
must discuss personally the threat assessment within their own areas of
responsibility. Whilst local commanders will undoubtedly know their own areas
and inhabitants the best and be able to interpret measures of effectiveness,
insurgents will not respect the boundaries imposed by the battlespace
organization. A threat in one area may easily migrate, even temporarily, to
another area. Thus, despite the acknowledgement of success at local levels, the
overall threat assessment must be made from a holistic, centralized view.
750. COUNTERING INSURGENT PROPAGANDA
1. lnsurgent propaganda will work to give the impression that the military forces, and in
particular their intelligence agencies, are rogue elements in the environment acting without
control, appropriate governance or legitimacy. This message must be effectively countered.
The relationship between the government, the judiciary, the security forces and intelligence
should be indivisible, and they should all be seen to be working to a central, common authority.
751. OPERATINGRESTRIGTIONS
1. ln combined operations, the charge may be made and exploited by the insurgents that
the government is under the control of foreigners. The resultant sensitivity may cause the
government to place greater restrictions on a coalition's freedom of action. This might include
restrictions on intelligence-gathering, particularly sensitive collection in the HUMINT and SIGINT
fields. Again, friendly messages must work to dispel any such propaganda.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 7-27
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 8
INFORMATION OPERATIONS_INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
lnsurgency is ultimately a war of ideas...Recognizing this fact, successfu/
counterinsurgents have devoted as much efforl to defeating the enemy's
propaganda as they have to defeating his fighters. Winning the war of ideas
has often been the decisive line of operations in successfu/ counterinsurgency
campaigns.se
-Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, US Army
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1. One of the strategic centres of gravity of any counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign is the
local population. History has shown that insurgents require only the indifference of a population
to operate successfully. The insurgent operates amongst the population and depends on the
tacit acceptance or open support of the populace for a supportive operational environment.
Thus the primary target audience of information operations (lnfo Ops) in a COIN campaign is
that portion of the population that is mildly supportive, neutral or hostile to the insurgent
movement. The goal is to increase support for the host nation (HN) government or, at the very
least, decrease insurgent legitimacy by undermining the narrative of the adversary through a
combination of words and deeds. Ultimately this will lead to greater support for the government
and decreased support for the insurgency. Absent a neutral or friendly populace, insurgents
cannot operate or thrive. A second primary goal of lnfo Ops is the promotion of campaign
legitimacy and its objectives.
2. lnfo Ops doctrine, as developed over recent years and in line with NATO,'o has included
three key activity areas: counter-command activities (CCA), information protection activities
(lPA), and influence activities. ln a review of this construct, it must be realized that CCA and
IPA are simply offensive and defensive activities respectively and create first order effects on
the physical plane. lnfluence activities, however, seek to affect understanding, perceptions and
thus affect will and behaviour of the target audience as first order effects on the psychological
plane. For the purposes of both land force operations and this publication, lnfo Ops will be
considered as influence activities only.
3. lnfluence activities are defined as "an activity designed to affect the character or
behaviour of a person or a group as a first order effect. (Note: lt affects understanding,
perceptions and will, with the aim of affecting behaviour in a desired manner.)"ei lnfluence
activities are considered as any other operation, as a function of capabilities. Specific
capabilities that conduct influence activities are those that have first order effects on the
psychological plane and thus that affect understanding, perceptions and will as first order
effects: deception, PSYOPS, civil-military cooperation (ClMlC), presence, profile and posture (of
troops and commanders) and public affairs (PA). They affect the minds (understanding and
perception) and the hearts (will) of target audiences.
4. They will comprise the bulk of activities in a COIN campaign, for they will create the
enduring solutions to a campaign, namely development and the redress of grievances, and thus
tt
John Nagl, "A Better War in lraq," Armed Forces Journal, August 2006.
e0
See NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.
t'
Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 oao-l
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
gain and hold the population's support. lnfluence activities seek to predispose, persuade,
convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce approved target audiences by promoting desired
themes and messages. These activities may use one or more capabilities dependent upon the
desired effect.
5. ln a COIN campaign, much of this will be done to gain support for the campaign and
undermine support for the insurgency, Thus, activities such as the presence of security forces
in the streets, the building of infrastructure, the resolve of economic and social hardship that led
to the insurgency and the advertisement of campaign objectives in the media should all be
aimed at gaining support for the campaign and undermining insurgent claims to legitimacy.
6. lnfluence activities are combined with fires-physical activities (including electronic
warfare [EW] attacks and defence) that create first order physical effects-to be comprehensive
operations. Fires and influence activities are planned, targeted and conducted together in a
synchronized and complementary fashion through manoeuvre and battlespace management.s2
7 . Due to the focus on the will of the population, COIN operations are less about the
application of physical force (fires) than the influence of perceptions and ultimately will and
behaviour. Given this focus, the influences of all activities, be they first order or second order
effects, must be carefully considered. Every action, even the most innocuous seeming, will
create effects that will influence someone. All activities and operations must be considered for
unintended effects and plans made to avoid undesired effects. For example, a successful
tactical engagement of the insurgents may cause such collateral damages that it ultimately
undermines the support of the population and is further exploited by insurgent propaganda.
B. The government's and campaign's overall information/influence plan will concentrate on
the two broad aims of winning the population's support and confidence, whilst simultaneously
lowering the morale and effectiveness of the insurgents and their supporters. Some degree of
success with the first aim may be a prerequisite for progress with the second. Leadership at all
command levels must be aware of the psychological implications of and the correlation between
the political, the military and the moral aspects of the campaign. ln particular they should take
care that action in one sphere, despite promising a quick return, does not jeopardize the
success of the other two spheres and so of the campaign as a whole. For example, an
opportunity to ambush a particular insurgent leader may have serious negative repercussions if
the attack includes unacceptable collateral damage or the removal of a leader who may be
persuaded to ultimately supporl the campaign.
9. The primary influence activity capabilities are PSYOPS, presence, posture and profile
(PPP), PA, CIMIC and deception. All activities must be supporting of the overall objectives, and
some activities such as PSYOPS and PA must maintain clear distinctions while maintaining
close coordination.
10. The integration of influence activities will be complex and must be viewed as a
continuous set of operations, As such, the operations staff (J/G3 and J/GS) is responsible for
lnfo Ops planning and coordination. lnfluence activities (lnfo Ops) are not considered
separately from other activities, specifically fires. They are considered, planned, targeted and
conducted together with fires as comprehensive operations. Thus, in actual fact, there is no
separate lnfo Ops plan but simply a single plan that balances fires and influence activities.
11. Moreover, because all successful COIN campaigns have possessed detailed thematic
direction from the strategic and political levels, influence activities must be integrated
t'
For a more detailed discussion on comprehensive operations, see B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Operations.
B-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lnformation Operations-lnfluence Activities
horizontally and vertically across and up and down the chain of command. For example, the
destruction of an insurgent safe house and seizure of a munitions cache may be combined with
a CIMIC-coordinated project that provides resources to a non-governmental organization
(NGO), publicized by PSYOPS in theatre and PA internationally, protected by a robust security
element displaying a strong deterrent posture to the enemy but a friendly and helpful profile to
the population and thus increase campaign and HN government legitimacy and establish a safe
environment for economic development. Obviously, such a series of operations requires
substantial inter-agency cooperation in both planning and execution to be successful.
Supporting Host Nation Legitimacy and Authority
An important component of the COIN campaign conducted by the Regional Assistance
Mission Solomon lslands (RAMSI)was a gun amnesty programme seeking to remove illegal
firearms from the general public. The lnteinational Committee of the Red Lrorr, which
helped to facilitate part of the gun amnesty, wanted to publicize their involvement by
displaying their symbol on all signs related to the programme. Although an understandable
request, RAMSI officials denied permission to display ICRC symbols in direct relation to the
amnesty programme. Not all agencies involved in a COIN campaign might realize the
importance of reinforcing the perception of host government legitimacy. ln this case, it was
felt necessary to create the impression that the amnesty program was solely a government
initiative, the goal being to improve perceptions of government competence. Establishing
and improving government legitimacy is a central goal of all COIN lnfo Ops, and even the
most innocuous seeming actions should be judged against this maxim.
Source; Russe// G/enn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance
Mission Solomon lslands (RAMSI), (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,2007).
sEcTroN 2
PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION OF INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
801. GENERAL
1. The principles that apply to lnfo Ops / influence activities must be carefully considered
and used as a guide to the conduct of influence activities within a COIN campaign. The concept
of affecting understanding, perceptions and the will of the populace and key individuals must be
well understood at all levels of command in order for the campaign to be successful.
2. As with other activities, influence activities must be directly linked to the operational
objectives of the campaign plan. They will likely appear on all lines of operation in the campaign
plan to one degree or another.
802. COMMANDER'S DIRECTION AND PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
1. The commander's personal involvementdrives lnfo Ops, and he exercises controlover
all lnfo Ops activity within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and down
the chain of command and with other agencies as appropriate. Following mission analysis, the
commander formulates a unifying theme, articulated in his stated intent. Tactical-level planning
is based on that intent, with its defined end-state and supporting effects, and harmonizes lnfo
Ops activities with other activities. Without the guidance of the commander's unifying theme
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 8-3
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
and intent, the lnfo Ops effort will lack focus and will not achieve the desired effects in harmony
and simultaneity with other activities. Messages risk becoming confused and contradictory.
2. The importance of lnfo Ops must be understood and communicated by the commander
to his subordinates. Placing faith in influence activities may seem counter-intuitive to the
commander, however, it is essential that this cognitive leap is made. No successful COIN
campaign has been conducted without a sophisticated and integrated set of influence activities
(even though it may not have been described as such at the time)^ Moreover, the commander
must understand that influence activities may reside outside of some soldiers' "comfort zone."
The confidence to trust in and properly employ influence activities will only occur if the
commander demonstrates his own faith in non-physical activities. Furthermore, commanders
and staff must realize and accept that the measures of effectiveness (MoE) of influence
activities will require an extensive amount of time, years in some cases. Because of this, the
commander will need to be intimately involved in planning and ensure that influence activities
are given due focus and support.
803. CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
1. The principles of centralized planning and decentralized execution apply to lnfo Ops at
all command levels. However, centralized execution may be required for certain types of
targeted information activities, when all involved force elements are required to adhere rigidly to
a plan or when strategic assets are used. The approval level and process for PSYOPS
messages must be as low and streamlined as possible in order ensure messages are timely
and relevant to the environment at hand.
804. EARLY INVOLVEMENT AND TIMELY PREPARATION
1. Planning for influence activities must start early because both planning and execution
take time and results can be slow to develop, Hence, a commander's intent and direction must
be viewed right from the start in relation to lnfo Ops capabilities and be maintained throughout
the planning process. Targeting staff and advisors such as PSYOPS detachment commanders
need to be fully involved in the planning process to integrate lnfo Ops within the overall plan.
2. Conceptualizing and providing resources for influence activities is as complicated as the
planning work required for physical activities. COIN experiences demonstrate that lnfo Ops are
far more effective when lnfo Ops planners are amongst the first on the ground in theatre.
Whenever the security environment allows, key personnel involved in lnfo Ops planning should
be amongst the earliest elements deployed, as this enables an early and accurate assessment
of the general mood of the population. This requirement should be reflected in logistics
planning.
805. CLOSE COORDINATION AND SEQUENCING
1. The very nature of lnfo Ops and the large, diverse target set means that there needs to
be very close integration, vertically and horizontally, within a command and with other agencies
to create complementary effects in support of common objectives. The principle of close
coordination and sequencing is arguably of greater import in a COIN campaign than in any other
type of mission because there is an adversary whose sole purpose is the de-legitimization of the
host government and friendly forces. Contradictory messages or inaccurate information will
undermine credibility and legitimacy and do great harm. All lnfo Ops activities must be
coordinated, de-conflicted and synchronized horizontally and vertically across the chain of
command and with other political and civil activities in order that one activity does not
8-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
I nformation Operations-lnfluence Activities
compromise, negate or diminish the desired effect of another. This is the responsibility of the
commander, assisted by targeting staff and subordinate commanders. The smooth integration
of influence and physical activities is critical to maintaining message and theme continuity
across all government and cooperating agencies.
806. TIMELY COUNTER.INFO OPS
1. Even the most effective plan for influence operations will be frustrated in execution if
deliberate actions are not taken to counter the lnfo Ops actions of the adversary. A significant
portion of the planning should be dedicated to the preparation for reaction to enemy lnfo Ops.
There are numerous recent examples of a militarily weaker opponent effectively conducting an
lnfo Ops programme that has influenced foreign and indigenous populations, from Kosovo in
1999, to Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, to anti-coalition elements in lraq and Afghanistan
today. Modern information technologies allow the targeting of domestic populations, seeking to
undermine the political will and popular support for the mission. lt is for this reason that PA
must be fully integrated into the operational and tactical plans. Failure to adequately counter
the enemy's story in a timely and credible fashion can undermine not only a public's morale but
it can also bolster an enemy's popularity and rally public opinion against the mission. lnfo Ops
planning must dedicate resources to monitoring enemy lnfo Ops and remain flexible enough to
counter erroneous information disseminated by an adversary. Timeliness is paramount
because the first story released is often the story that gets the greatest distribution and
attention. Measures must be taken to counter the propaganda of adversaries and to reveal their
falsehoods.
2. A number of factors serve to leave the initiative of lnfo Ops in the hands of the insurgent.
First, the insurgent will have no moral or legal compunction to use only the truth in the conduct
of influence activities. Second, modern information technologies enable the rapid and broad
dissemination of text, audio, video and photographic material. This means that the news cycle
is now much shorter than in previous eras and therefore reaction to enemy propaganda cannot
wait even 24 hours. Third, because the insurgent will be operating on "home turf," his sources
of intelligence will be superb.
3. The insurgents require only a small amount of truth on which to base their propaganda.
Events will be staged to incite an overreaction by the security forces or simply to produce
images such as wounded and killed civilians that can be claimed to be a result of security force
actions. All told, friendly forces will be forced into a defensive, reactive stance, compelled to
monitor local and international media and other sources of information in order that false stories
can be rapidly countered with accurate information. This will likely be an unfamiliar stance for
friendly forces accustomed and trained to seize the initiative in operations. Despite this,
offensive lnfo Ops targeting the key lines of operations of the insurgent must take place
simultaneous with defensive lnfo Ops which seek to counter enemy propaganda. Only by
careful identification and analysis of the enemy's centres of gravity (physical and moral) and
lines of operation can friendly forces conduct offensive lnfo Ops. lnsurgent propaganda will
work hard to undermine public, domestic and international support for the campaign. This
propaganda must be actively countered and ideally precluded before it even occurs. Truthful
information provided to the public domain will aid in supporting campaign legitimacy and will
serve to undermine and even dislocate the insurgent propaganda. Such information provided in
a timely, proactive manner will be the most effective means of countering insurgent deceit and
propaganda.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 8-5
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
807. ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
1. Like all COIN activities, accurate and timely intelligence is criticalto successfully
planning lnfo Ops. This intelligence must include information about potential adversaries, other
approved lnfo Ops targets and the operating environment. ln particular, intelligence will need to
answer as many of the questions on cultural factors posed by commanders as possible. The
operations and plans staff focusing on influence capabilities should work closely with the
intelligence staff to define requirements necessary to plan, execute and assess the
effectiveness of lnfo Ops. lntelligence preparation of the battlespace (lPB) should include
analysis of human factors (including culture, religion, languages, etc.), information technology,
decision-making infrastructure and processes and network vulnerabilities. This portion of IPB
forms the basis of the lnfo Ops contribution to the command estimate.
2. The enemy will be operating on familiar ground and will be able to gather accurate
intelligence with comparative ease as long as the population is not openly hostile to his
activities. lt will require a significant amount of work for friendly forces to gain a similar amount
and quality of intelligence. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is critical. Throughout the world,
word-of-mouth and rumour is often accepted as a credible and legitimate source of information.
Rumours are spread between personal contacts, not formal mediums. The only way to
determine what stories, positive or negative, are being spread by these means is to develop and
maintain a large and dependable HUMINT network.
808. GOMPREHENSIVETARGETING
1. At the operational level, targeting starts with a detailed understanding of the operational
environment, its constituent systems and entities and the commander's objectives.
Commanders and targeting staff identify lnfo Ops effects required to achieve the desired
objectives and a range of activities that, when integrated into the overall operation plan, will
achieve those effects. lt is important to realize that any element of targeting activity may
influence a range of target audiences and create unintended effects. The targeting staff,
therefore, must analyze the impact of such activity and propose appropriate measures to avoid
unintended effects. lnfo Ops targeting is not planned separately from the targeting of fires
process but in conjunction with it so that created effects are complementary.
2. lnfluence activities will comprise the bulk of a COIN campaign. The use of fires will be
severely circumscribed because of the possibility of unintended effects. This is not to say that
physical destruction will not play a role in the campaign; rather, it is meant to reinforce the fact
that the primary strategic centre of gravity for both the insurgents and friendly forces is the
indigenous population. Thus the bulk of targeting in a COIN campaign will focus on the neutral
and indifferent portions of the populace.
3. Although there are historic examples where the undermining of insurgent will has
brought about the collapse of an insurgency, the committed insurgent will be resistant to direct
influence. Particularly in groups motivated by fundamentalist religious ideology, the core
members of an insurgent movement are likely highly motivated, dedicated and unafraid of
mortal consequences of their actions. ln fact, fundamentalist ideologues will likely view death
as part of a divinely mandated act that will please whatever deity they worship and therefore will
be incredibly resistant to any lnfo Ops message." This does not mean that all insurgents are
invulnerable to the effects of PSYOPS; in fact, the ephemeral actors (those not ideologically
" Whalid Phares, The War of ldeas: Jihad against Democracy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 4344.
B-6 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
lnformation Operations-lnfluence Activities
committed to the insurgency) may be decisively influenced by PSYOPS and should be identified
as a primary target audience. However, in general, the neutral or indifferent members of a
population that indirectly enable the survival, movement and actions of an insurgency will
always be an important target audience. The result will be a hostile operating environment for
the insurgent. A second order effect of this may be the undermining of an insurgent's will due to
the inability to increase public support for the cause.
809. ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY
1. ln orderfor lnfo Opsto be successful in creating influences-in operating on the
psychological plane-the source of the lnfo Ops must have significant credibility in the eyes of
the target audience. Poor or non-existent credibility has been identified as a primary cause of
failure of lnfo Ops in past campaigns. Whether a source is seeking to generate support from an
indigenous population or convince enemy troops to surrender, the lack of credibility will hinder
success. For example, an indigenous population with strong religious and cultural bias against
campaigning troops may distrust messages created and disseminated by a western military
force such as NATO.
2. Credibility will take time to develop and is intimately tied to the actions of a military force
and the host government. The PPP of a force will have a significant impact on credibility.
Depending on the specific context, a force may need to show strength, decisiveness,
friendliness or a limited footprint or several of these at once. The credibility of a force may have
to be established in a planned, incrementalfashion. Even when possessing credibility,
indigenous proxies such as social, religious or political leaders who have credibility with target
audiences and are sympathetic to the mission should be used to broadcast desired messages.
It must be remembered that all actions should reinforce the perception of host government
legitimacy, credibility and competence, and the use of indigenous voices will further this goal.
Every action of the soldier must be considered a means of influence and should be judged
for potential unintended effects. The simple act of picking fruit from an orchard or vegetables
from a field by resting soldiers can alienate a village dependent on that produce for winter
survival. Without asking permission of the farmer and offering suitable compensation, this
seemingly harmless acf could be misconstrued and used by an adversary for propaganda
purposes (e.g., "the wealthy western invaders care little for the average person and steal
your food"). Every action has effects, and all soldiers must understand the repercussions of
even seemingly benign acts.
810. PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTS MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
1. As with any military activity, the results of information operations are assessed using
measures of performance (are things being done right?) and measures of effectiveness (are the
right things being done to create the desired effects?) are employed.
2. Measures of performance (MoP) for info ops are relatively straightforward and similar to
MoP used for other activities. MoP refer to the mechanisms of planning and implementation.
They can be viewed in the same manner as the delivery of indirect fire: reaction times, quality of
product, correct target identification and assessment and suitability of engagement means, to
name a few. Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) refer to the desired effects and whether or not
the activities conducted created the effects.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
3. The successful prosecution of lnfo Ops relies on continuous monitoring and assessment
of the short- and longterm effects of inter-related activities. This is achieved by collection of all-
source intelligence and other feedback on the lnfo Ops activities. MoE must be included in the
lnfo Ops planning from the outset and are integrated in the intelligence collection activities.
Particular attention should be paid to changes in the adversary's or other audience's will and
actions, including such items as changes in the attitude of the civilian population, political
activity and expressions of unrest. Also, changes in an adversary's capability, such as reduced
efficiency, disorganization and slower reactions to events and specific actions in response to
deception or destruction, may be used as an MoE.
4. lnfluence activities may take a significant amount of time to achieve recognizable effects.
ln some cases, effects may not become apparent until well after an individual unit or
commander's tour has ended. Short-term suppor( and friendliness that may be a result of
personal relationships with a particular commander or unit should not be mistaken for
confidence in the government. Although these relationships are critical, winning over the trust of
the target audience will take time and considerable effort and likely span several rotations.
Furthermore, deeds at the tactical level will have the greatest effects, both positive and
negative. The positive effects are critical steppingstones to success, while negative effects will
carry far beyond the limited tactical context in which they originated. Negative effects will also
be remembered longer and are easily exploited by insurgent propaganda.
5. Changes in behaviour may take place over a lengthy period of time and be
imperceptible. For example, the effects of a radio broadcast campaign may take years to
become apparent. Additionally, it is very difficult to develop a causal link between a single lnfo
Ops action and target behaviour, even when direct messages are used at the tactical level. For
example, changes in driving behaviour around military convoys may be due to several
concomitant factors: PSYOPS products, previous use of warning shots or past incidents of
civilian casualties when proximity to a suicide bombing targeting coalition forces resulted in
collateral damage. Despite these difficulties, MoE are criticalto gauging the usefulness of lnfo
ops.
6. With influence activities, MoE are applied to activities and changes on the cognitive
plane. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making
process, developing MoE for lnfo Ops on the cognitive plane may be one of the most daunting
intellectual tasks facing a commander. lnfluence activities seek to work through external and
internal filters composed of the socio-cultural, political and economic factors in order to
persuade or dissuade and thus affect behaviour and action. Hence, the planning and conduct
of these activities is an arf requiring the commander's subjective feel for their potential effect. A
sophisticated comprehension of the cultural factors at play is necessary to first establish a
baseline measure at the beginning of a mission and to detect changes in perceptions, attitudes
and behaviours throughout the campaign.
7. MoE will vary significantly between missions and even within missions. Commanders
must clearly define the end-state and ideally any milestones on the path to that end-state.
Using whatever means are most appropriate, MoE measure and indicate progress in the target
audience towards that end-state. MoE must be tailored to the specifics of not only the overall
change desired but to the environment, that is, the commander's battlespace and area of
operations. Because of the intangible factors involved and the subjective nature of influencing
will and perceptions, the MoE may very well be subjective. Moreover, because affecting
behaviour is the ultimate aim (either by maintaining non-action or causing the target audience to
adopt a particular course of action), they require a significant amount of time to determine
effectiveness. Therefore, they must be assessed as a set routine to attempt to recognize
changes, trends and slight yet significant indicators. The commander exercises judgement as
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lnformation Operations-lnfluence Activities
to when an adjustment or change to an activity against a target must be made in reaction to
behavioural changes in the target audience.
B. Some fundamentals that can aid in the development of useful MoE are:
a. Causality.eo A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established
between the activity and the effect to be measured. There has to be a
reasonable likelihood that the planned activity will create the desired effect. As
well, commanders and lnfo Ops staff must be able to assess any other extant
factors that may be causing the effect other than their own activities. Likewise,
they must ascertain if the measured effect is merely coincidental.
b. Quantifiable.es An MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the
subjectivity that plagues MoE on the psychological plane. Quantification allows
accurate trend measurement, For example, during a tour in lraq, one formation
monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in their
AO as an MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which
helped to discern the effectiveness of ongoing lnfo Ops.e6
c. Observable and Attributable. This principle may seem obvious, however,
when drafting MoE, consideration should be given to the possibility that all of the
variables influencing an activity and change in behaviour cannot be observed.
The MoE must be able to recognize trends or alterations in behaviour and
confirm the relationship between the target audience behaviour and the lnfo Ops
activity. For example, if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being
used as an informal indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an
urban area, observers will ideally be able to ascertain its timing, that is, when it
was done; its attribution to a particular group (political, criminal, military) and their
motive and whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in
terms of cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or
action; and, its location in relation to the cultural make-up of the environment.
d. Correlated to Decisive Points and Objectives. Just as activities are planned
to reach sequential decisive points along a line of operation, MoE should be
selected to correlate to the achievement of each decisive point and should be
reflective of the level of employment. Although strategic lnfo Ops require
measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign, many MoE at the
operational and tactical levelwill measure the incremental progress through
sequential decisive points.
e. Flexibilty. Although MoE should be drafted at the planning stage, they should
remain under regular review, and commanders must be prepared to adjust them
as required. MoE must reflect mutable conditions in an AO. They must evolve
as a mission progresses, particularly as decisive points are reached and
to
Fo,
" detailed discussion of causality, see William S. Murray, "A Will to Measure," Parameters, Vol. 31, No. 3(Autumn 2001), pp. 134-147.
e5
The quantifiable, observable and timeliness fundamentals are adapted from LtCol David Grohoski, Steven Seybert,
and Marc Romanych, "Measures of Effectiveness in the lnformation Environment," Military lntelligence Professional
Bulletin, Vol.29, No. 3 (July-September 2003), pp. 12-16.
" Baker, Col Ralph O., "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on lnformation
Operations," Military Review, May-June 2006 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Combined Arms Center/USCGSC),
pp.13-32.
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secured. Similarly, MoE are likely not transferable from mission to mission.
Even if a mission takes place in the same AO, the passage of time will force
reconsideration of MoE previously employed.
f. Gollection. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the
intelligence necessary to employ an MoE and provide the direction and guidance
to do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoE through all units in the
affected battlespace. As well, collection may be assisted by other agencies,
however, absent a formal command relationship, this may have to be done
informally. Notwithstanding this, non-military agencies may prove to be an
effective gauge of progress through lnfo Ops. To this end, attempts should be
made to develop working relationships with agencies from all participating
governments, the HN and NGOs active in the environment.
g. Relativity. lmprovements sought in a given environment must be relative to that
environment. lt is imperative that a baseline measurement of the overall
environment be established as early as practicable in the campaign planning.
Absent a comparative baseline, it may be impossible to accurately determine the
effectiveness of lnfo Ops and ultimately campaign progress. Expectations for
situational improvement must be reasonable given the starling state and the
normal state of that particular environment. This does not mean that moral
relativity should be applied to excuse gross criminal behaviour.tt Some change
in the environment may occur quickly; for example, an immediate drop in crime in
a particular neighbourhood may result from the presence of regular patrols.
However, systemic and social improvements that will create an enduring
improvement may require a substantial amount of time and be measured in
multiple years or even decades. Thus measuring an overall drop in gang and
criminal activity throughout a theatre must be measured in relation to the levels
that existed under pre-crisis circumstances and could take years to achieve.
Furthermore, systemic change will be the result of numerous concomitant
factors. Expectations for change and the related MoE should be set as
incremental milestones so that improvement can be measured and demonstrated
as tangible progress over time.
811. SUMMARY
1. Developing appropriate MoE to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very
difficult task. Willpower, motivations, perceptions and beliefs are intangible variables that defy
simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a
target's attitude, will and behaviour change. Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and
this will be a complex but crucial initial task. Difficulties aside, accurate MoE can make the
difference between meeting desired objectives or ending a campaign in frustration.
tt
Gross criminal behaviour such as the abuse of basic human rights, corruption ortheft from the public purse cannot
be justified as simply being normal. However, all situations must be judged in context. For example, an under paid
schoolteacher in a struggling nation charging students to attend an ostensibly public-funded school is a different case
to an armed policeman extorting funds at a checkpoint, particularly if this is the only means by which the teacher can
survive. Careful judgement is necessary when establishing a baseline of conditions in an AO.
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sEcTroN 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDAgE
812. GENERALCHARACTERISTICS
1. A substantial proportion of COIN influence activities will concentrate on refuting
insurgent propaganda. This may be seen as defensive influence activities. Thus it is useful to
illustrate the major characteristics of insurgent propaganda to better understand how to
construct themes and messages that will support friendly lnfo Ops while undermining those of
the enemy. Deconstructing the themes of enemy propaganda allows the commander and staff
a better understanding of the enemy's lines of operation and what counter-measures will best
undermine the enemy campaign. The characteristics illustrated below are broadly applicable to
all insurgencies.
2. lnsurgencies are supported by a closely coordinated and mutually supporting triad of
political goals, propaganda and military action. Like friendly lnfo Ops, propaganda can take
severalforms and will be reinforced with action. Words will be supported by deeds and vice
versa.
3. The insurgent cause is advanced predominantly by discrediting the government and
security forces, reducing public morale (both indigenous and that of coalition forces) and vilifying
pro-government media. lnsurgents and their propaganda will exploit any government mistake,
especially incidents in which the police and military may be seen to have overreacted, Unlike
the government, the insurgents do not have to prove anything; they simply have to make the
government appear incompetent. Because of this fact, the insurgents can use falsehoods and
heavy manipulation of information to support their propaganda, while a legitimate government
and campaign will be constrained by the imperative to use only truthful information while
maintaining basic freedoms.
4. A consequence of all this is the necessity for campaign forces to disclose what may be
considered bad news. Despite the best efforts, errors will be made in COIN campaigns,
including breaches of rules of engagement (RoE) and inadvertent civilian casualties. When
these errors occur, they must be quickly acknowledged and amends made to limit the potential
propaganda value to the enemy. Modern technologies guarantee that bad news will eventually
be disseminated; therefore, it is better to deal with the story and have some control over it than
try to cover it up and have no controlwhen it becomes widely known,
5. Propaganda must be effectively countered if a COIN campaign is to be successful. Like
all lnfo Ops, counter-propaganda requires a unified multi-agency approach throughout the levels
of command and must include political direction on approved themes and messages.
Propaganda is effective and cannot be ignored. lt is through propaganda that the adversary
increases his popular support, reinforces his narrative, gains recruits and material resources
and ultimately develops legitimacy and credibility.
e8
Propaganda is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed., revised) as a mass noun meaning
"information." By this definition, friendly lnfo Ops could be considered propaganda. However, the dictionary definition
also states that propaganda is especially used to denote information "of a biased or misleading nature." The term
"propaganda" is used throughout this manual in this latter, pejorative sense. The vast majority of this section is
adapted from Brigadier Maurice Tugwell's doctoral dissertation Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-
Measures (London: King's College, Universityof London, March 1979). See in particularChapterS, pp.295-335.
Brigadier (ret'd) Tugwell graciously granted permission to reference his dissertation during a telephone conversation
with Neil Chuka (DAD-4 contractor) on 13 February 2007.
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6. The goal of counter-propaganda is to refute insurgent propaganda and to present the
truthful justification for the legitimacy and credibility of the host government. Effective counter-
propaganda is required to convince both domestic and international audiences that the
campaign is legitimate. Public opinion must be considered throughout the campaign by all
levels of command, including the political element. Clearly, PA will play a leading role in
communicating the truth to the international public. The effort to counter enemy propaganda
must explain government strategy and goals, present facts and expose the fallacies of the
enemy message and the illegitimacy of enemy motives.
7. All propaganda contains some kernel of truth, however miniscule, which is distorted to
play upon the preconceived notions, attitudes and perceptions of the target audience as well as
socio-political trends that have led to discontent. Adversary lnfo Ops target the same segments
of the indigenous population as friendly lnfo Ops: the neutral or wavering portions from which
new supporters can be drawn.
B. Perhaps more importantly, modern information technologies enable insurgents to target
the domestic populations of those states contributing to a COIN campaign. The internet in
particular allows insurgent groups to immediately distribute propaganda internationally, monitor
the political climate and public opinion in campaigning nations and synchronize activities to
maximize effects on the will of the allied domestic public. This is a critical factor because most
contemporary insurgent groups will be politically savvy and understand that it is far easier to
undermine the will of the public in a democracy, and thus the political support for a campaign,
than it is to militarily defeat a superior armed force. ln fact, there is much evidence suggesting
that the survival and success of a contemporary insurgent movement is dependent on the
mastery of the use of modern information technologies and the manipulation of international
public opinion.ee
813. THEMES OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDA
1. There are a number of overarching themes that characterise insurgent propaganda.
Although some of these themes become more prevalent as an insurgency evolves, the themes
will likely be used simultaneously, targeting different specific audiences, tailored to suit the ebb
and flow of the struggle.
a. Righteousness. The insurgent cause is right and just and supported by the
divine. This theme is founded in faith and ideas rather than fact.
b. Hatred. The government or opposing international force is painted as heretical
or morally and spiritually corrupt. Since the government opposes the
righteousness of the insurgent cause and has sought to suppress the people, it
and its agents are deserving of hatred and death.
c. lnevitable Triumph. Because the struggle is portrayed as a moral and righteous
affair, the insurgency can only end in triumph, regardless of the time required to
achieve victory. This theme is highlighted in conflicts involving fundamentalist
ideologies.
d. Allegiance. "You are with us or against us" is given as a stark choice. Although
insurgencies only require the ambivalence of the population to exist and thrive,
propaganda will leave no uncertainty about the ultimate requirement to support
se
See for example, Clifford Bob, Ihe Marketing of Rebettion: lnsurgents, Media, and tnternational Activism
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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the cause. This theme seeks to paint those opposing the insurgency as traitors,
cowards or unfaithful apostates.
Moral Certainty. A concept of moral certainty is used to bolster active
supporters of an insurgency. This theme seeks to implant the notion that the
moral high-ground lies with the insurgent and that all acts committed by
supporters are just, both legally and spiritually.
Terror. Although terrorism is a tactic, the theme of terror is used in insurgent
propaganda to coerce assistance from the civilian population and to enforce
discipline within an insurgency. This theme must be supported by violent action
which may be limited in scope but can cause terror out of all proportion to the act
itself.
Martyrdom. Also known as glorification of heroes, this theme will highlight the
actions of insurgents and glorify the fallen to bolster internal morale and impress
the civilian population.
Praise of Violence. Violence is portrayed as a righteous and spiritually
cleansing,
Justified Reaction. All actions are justified as a necessary and just reaction to
government suppression.
Long War. lnsurgencies do not succeed overnight, and in order to sustain
support, it is necessary to reinforce the notion of inevitable triumph by
communicating that the struggle will be long and difficult and may span several
generations. This is often portrayed in religious terms to exploit belief in the
transcendental nature of the divine and the afterlife to give strength to religiously
motivated insurgents.
Guilt. This theme is directed at the enemy government and supporters. lt will
play upon the sensitivities of the populations of liberal democracies. This theme
is heavily exploited using modern communications technologies to publicize real
and contrived incidents.
Bad Faith. This theme seeks to undermine attempts by the government to reach
out to insurgent supporters and to portray government efforts to improve the lot
of the people as a fagade meant to dupe the people.
Security Force lncompetence. This theme will try to demonstrate an inability of
the government to provide a safe and secure environment as well as an
impotence to stop the insurgency. This theme will be supported with violent
actions targeting security forces themselves as well as segments of the
population.
Legitimacy. lnsurgencies will ultimately attempt to develop legitimacy through
both deeds and words. Advance insurgent elements will use international
propaganda to paint themselves as a popular representative of populations and
will use reconstruction aid to create this sense of legitimacy.l00
'oo An e*"mple of this is Hezbollah's international propaganda campaign in the summer of 2006 and infusion of
reconstruction aid in war-devastated neighbourhoods in Lebanon immediately after the cessation of hostilities with
lsrael. The goal was to demonstrate both the illegitimacy of the enemy, lsrael, and the powerlessness of the secular
government to provide for the needs of the people.
e.
g.
h.
k.
m.
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o. Gredibility. The ultimate purpose of propaganda is to establish credibility in the
eyes of the civilian population. Developing credibility is an important step to
gaining the outright support of the civilian population.
814. SUMMARY
1. Commanders and planning staff must understand the aims of insurgent propaganda and
seek to counter these themes and the objectives that they support. They cannot wait for the
propaganda to appear and then attempt to counter it. They must anticipate the messages and
aims of the insurgent propaganda and actively pre-empt them. This will be pre-emption on the
psychological plane.
SECTION 4
INFORMATION OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
815. GENERAL
1. The primary influence activities grouped under the lnfo Ops title are PSYOPS, PA,
ClMlC, PPP and deception. All may be applied in an offensive or defensive sense. All, save for
PPP, are discussed in detail in their respective manuals, which should be read in conjunction
with this chapter. The specific uses of each activity in a COIN campaign are discussed in this
section.
816. PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
1. The primary purpose of PSYOPS is to influence the understanding, perceptions,
attitudes, will and ultimately behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with
mission or campaign objectives. PSYOPS has first order effects on the psychological plane.
2. Unlike PA, which simply provides truthful information for dissemination by others,
PSYOPS retains direct control over content and dissemination of a message and focuses on a
specific target audience. PSYOPS is not propaganda in the pejorative sense. CF PSYOPS
only disseminates truthful messages. The use of falsehoods or misleading information only
undermines legitimacy over the long-term and is therefore not practised.
3. Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of resources such as linguistic, support,
graphics and print capability and various electronic broadcasting means. Mediums for the
broadcast of messages include faceto-face contact, print, radio, television, loudspeakers, the
lnternet, faxes, pagers and mobile phones.
4. PSYOPS is one of the most cost-effective components of a COIN campaign.
Coordinated with other influence activities and fires and properly applied, PSYOPS can ensure
that the indigenous population receives and comprehends the activities and objectives of the
campaign. Strategic-level direction and close coordination between all command levels are
required to seamlessly integrate themes, messages and actions. All messages must be
reinforced with action because deeds and words must not be contradictory. Close coordination
does not indicate a requirement for rigid control. The need for consistency in theme and
message is essential, but it must not be regarded as a requirement for restrictive control of
subordinates.
5. Although the distributive means may be similar, the purposes of operational- and
tactical-level PSYOPS differ. Operationalthemes will address long-term objectives. Tactical
PSYOPS should support and reinforce operational themes but may also have very limited
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tactical aims, such as the surrender of insurgents in a specific area. lt is only through seamless
integration and coordination of PSYOPS into the overall campaign plan that conflicting
messages can be avoided.
6. PA is used at the strategic level to communicate information. Modern information
technologies make it impossible to limit the target audience for strategic-level products and thus
preclude the use of PSYOPS at this level. At the operational level, PSYOPS are typically
directed at modifying general attitude sets to alter longterm behaviour. Typically, this will
involve some form of rational argument that may be forcefully or subtly presented. An example
of a forceful message would be continued publicizing of public infrastructure projects in a
province. An example of a subtle message would be the broadcast of popular music targeting
15-25 year olds to emphasize that religious ideals and liberal societies are not incompatible. ln
many ways, operational-level PSYOPS can be viewed in marketing terms as building brand
recognition. ln essence, the messages and themes are trying to build a relationship between
the target audience and the campaign, that is, the brand.101
lmmediately prior to the launch of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a leaflet campaign was
planned to communicate the purpose of the mission to the Afghan people. The first leaflet
that was to be used pictured B-52s bombing a green valley. ihe leaflet, almost identical to
one used in the 1991 Gulf War against lraq, was deleted from the campaign at the last
minute out of concem that the pamphlet would create the perception that ihe Afghan people
were being targeted for retribution for 9/1 1 . Further confusion over the proper uie of both
the dissemination method (leaflet bomblets) and the target audience (PSYOPS planners
designed the leaflet for a tactical, not strategic, application) highlights the requirement for
coordination and the need to tailor PSYOPS products to specific audiences.
Source: Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational
Experience (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Sepfem ber 2005), p. 71.
7. At the tactical level, PSYOPS will present a concise message geared towards modifying
specific behaviours. The target audience will be more specific than at the operational level, and
emotive and rational arguments may be used in the message. The goal is to cause a target
audience to act rather than to think about and rationalize a message. Examples of tactical-level
PSYOPS are leaflets informing a village of an impending operation or posters hung along
popular thoroughfares demonstrating safe driving behaviour around a military convoy.
L A nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural environment in which PSYOPS are
conducted is essential to success. Mere awareness of the socio-cultural milieu is insufficient for
those involved in the conception, design and approval of PSYOPS products. Tribal or clan
relations are also a necessary consideration. Urban operations hold the potential for vastly
different socio-cultural constructs in different neighbourhoods. PSYOPS products must be
specifically tailored to the target audience. The potentialfor unintended effects is great if an
error in target audience analysis is made.
to'
Tim Calkins, "The Challenge of Branding," in Alice Tybout and Tim Calkins, eds., Kettogg on Branding (Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley, 2005), pp. 1-4. As quoted in Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul, Russell Glenn and Megan McKernan,
Enlisting Madison Avenue: the Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Suppoft in Theaters of Operation (Sanla
Monica, CA: RAND, Forthcoming 2007). This document is not yet cleared for release to the public.
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9. PSYOPS products must not endanger the target audience. Depending on a number of
factors, including the security situation, some products may be unsuitable. For example, leaflets
may endanger anyone possessing a leaflet in a locale where insurgents are highly active and
coalition presence is sporadic. ln such a situation, another medium such as television, radio or
text messaging may be more appropriate. A poor product is worse than no product at all.
10. Time is an uncedain ally. On the one hand, PSYOPS themes and messages need to be
lasting and continuous to make an impression; on the other hand, over-prolonged exposure to a
single message may result in boredom and irritation. Fine judgement is needed to draw the line
between the advantages to be gained from the consistent exploitation of a fact or theme and the
dangers of saturation. The audience is not stupid.
11. Political and military oversight must ensure that PSYOPS and supporting activities are
consistent with the HN and national policies and conform to any specific political guidance. The
psychological dimension of counter-insurgency is so important that a PSYOPS staff officer
should be nominated in all formation headquarters and indeed at the battlegroup level if deemed
appropriate. A staff officer specializing in PSYOPS may work under the G3 (G5 for plans) and
will be in addition to any PSYOPS detachment or platoon commander supporting the formation.
At lower levels, the PSYOPS detachment commander will have the combined role of
commanding his capability, advising the commander and assisting in planning.
817. PUBLIC AFFAIRS
1. The aim of PA is to protect the credibility and legitimacy of operations and promote
widespread understanding, thereby gaining support for military operations while not
compromising essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). PA accomplishes this task by
communicating information to audiences through the medium of local, national and international
news media and other means. Unlike PSYOPS, PA has no control over the production or
dissemination of the information it presents. lts task is simply to provide information for others
to analyze.
2. An important facet of any military operation is to communicate the principal themes and
messages while providing a clear and complete understanding of the operation but all the while
maintaining operations security (OPSEC). Although PA is primarily focused on informing and
educating audiences, its impact is much wider. lt is therefore essential that PA staff and those
of other lnfo Ops capabilities work together closely to ensure that a coordinated message is
delivered to the intended audiences and that all of them are coordinated with fires. Particular
attention must be paid to local and regional media and to other media sources that are
influential with indigenous populations. To avoid giving the false impression that the media are
being manipulated in any way, a clear distinction must be maintained between PSYOPS and
PA. However, this does not obviate the requirement of PA to be fully integrated into the overall
plan and to understand the desired effects of influence activities.
3. ln COIN operations, it is essentialto conduct media relations in a positive manner. Such
relations must project an accurate and balanced picture of the aims of the campaign in general
and of the role of security forces in particular. They must demonstrate the practical contribution
soldiers are making to the solution of a difficult and frequently hazardous mission. Creating and
maintaining a positive public image of the COIN forces includes countering potentially hostile
media activity.
4. Operational PA is a G3 staff function and should be coordinated at the levelof the
highest formation headquarters in the theatre of operations. Public affairs officers (PAO) are
responsible to the commander for all aspects of news media relations, including the provision of
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suitable facilities for the news media, the nomination of units to embed reporters and the
requirement to escort reporters and provide other resources.
5. ln periods of intense operational activity or during major incidents, the PA section may
need additional support, particularly in urban areas. Sub-units should be prepared to help the
PA personnel in terms of news media escorts, movement and the assistance of the news
media. lf the PA office is to provide an authoritative, consistent and credible information
service, the news media office must receive prompt and accurate information from subordinate
headquarters and units. lt must also receive early warning of planned operations together with
clear instructions on how to deal with news media enquiries, preferably in the form of a media
response lines or questions and answers.
6. ln many aspects, dealing with the news media is no different in a COIN campaign than in
any other operation. When speaking to the news media, and in accordance with security
regulations, individuals must talk in their official capacity only, about their own job, their own
expertise and responsibility. No statements are to be made concerning government policies,
political decisions or topics likely to be politically sensitive. Nor are they to speculate. A large
numberof journalists representing the print, radio and television can be expected to reporton
COIN operations. To facilitate an effective two-way passage of information and to better
manage and reduce news media queries, standing orders should give guidance on the limits of
information that can be disclosed. Before any information is passed to the news media, it must
be cleared for release by the appropriate military agency (e.9,, G2, G3) and the appropriate HN
or police authorities and where applicable, approved by the commander through the PAO.
7 . No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist's freedom to do his/her job. lt
is in the interests of law and orderthat the news media should have facilities to expose
terrorism, acts of violence and the intimidation of civilians. Members of the news media have
the same rights, liberties and obligations under the law as any other citizen. Furthermore,
enabling a free press presents a positive example to be emulated by HN government agencies
and the populace in theatres where such freedoms are nascent or non-existent. lf an on-scene
commander believes that a member of the news media is prejudicing OPSEC, the matter should
be dealt with on the advice of the PAO.
You have no influence with the press if you do not talk to them...Not talking to the press is
the equivalent of ceding the initiative to the insurgents, who fare] quite adept at spinning
information in adverse ways to further their objectives.
-Lt.Col. Ralph Baker, USA, on the importance of engaging domestic and international
media in COIN operations
Source: Ralph Baker, '"The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commandels Perspective on lnfarmation
Operations," Military Review, May-June 2006 (Fort Leavenworth, KS; US Combined Arms Center), pp. 13-32.
818. CIVIL.MILITARYCOOPERATION
1. Civil-Military Cooperation (ClMlC) is defined as "coordination and cooperation in support
of the mission, between commanders and civil actors, including the national population and
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and
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agencies."ro' CIMIC is a coordination and liaison function that facilitates operations in relation to
civil authorities and non-military organizations and leads to activities that support local
authorities. These activities may include reconstruction, infrastructure development,
governance development and mentoring. Because of their ability to inform, demonstrate,
persuade, influence and even co-opt, CIMlC-related activities are influence activities that affect
understanding, perceptions, will and behaviour of the target audience. For example, the
building of essential services and the development of governance institutions will build
campaign legitimacy and influence individuals and groups to create enduring solutions to the
crisis and support the successful outcome of the campaign.
2. CIMIC and the resulting activities are part of operations, for they deliver a capability that
creates desired effects in support of operational objectives. They are therefore the remit of
operations staff for planning and execution (G/JS and G/J3 respectively). CIMIC detachment
commanders facilitate related CIMIC assessments and activities.r03
3. CIMIC is centralto any COIN campaign because the perception of host government
competence and campaign legitimacy must be reinforced. lt is often a key capability in
addressing the root grievances of an insurgency. The perception of competence and legitimacy
is tied to security and the ability to provide for the day{o-day needs of the populace. lmproving
the social, physical and economic well-being of the populace is a central goal of any COIN
mission. Thus, CIMIC actions aimed at infrastructure development, reconstruction and
assistance to governance are crucialto achieving success.
4. CIMIC provides information in the form of physical evidence of the legitimacy, credibility
and competence of the host government. CIMIC will comprise a significant proportion of the
deeds that must support the words of a campaign. Failure to follow through on promises made
will alienate the population and damage credibility and legitimacy. Care must be taken that
expectations are not created in the population that cannot be met. CIM|C-related activities
therefore need to be coordinated within the overall plan, in terms of impacts upon civil
audiences and their leaders in order to ensure that activities work to support overall objectives.
5. CIMIC facilitates cooperation between military forces and the civilian environment by:
a. Considering and assessing social, political, cultural, religious, economic,
infrastructural and environmentalfactors in support of military operations and
objectives. CIMIC staff should be a valuable source of information to intelligence
staff in creating a knowledge base of the environment, but CIMIC cannot be
perceived as intelligence gathering assets.
b. Liaison and coordination with domestic agencies, government officials and
elements of power, international organizations (lOs) and NGOs.
c. Forging an effective relationship between military and civilian authorities,
organizations, agencies and populations.
6. lt is critical that CIMIC projects reflect the needs and desires of the population.
Moreover, it is pointless to build institutions such as a school or medical facility that cannot be
staffed or funded. A satisfied population is a benign population. CIMIC is a most useful tool to
to'
Taken from NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6, NAfO G/ossa4u of Terms and Definitions
for Military Use.
'ot The construct of G9 staff function for CIMIC was sufficient for the conduct of conventional, major combat
campaigns when CIMIC supported operations. With the development of CIMIC as a type of stability operation
and set of activities, it belongs under the G3 staff responsibility.
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address the underlying causes of an insurgency, as it has the potential to directly influence the
day-to-day lives of the people.
During the 1899-1902 Philippine War, CIMIC formed a significant portion of the US Army
strategy to gain the support of the population on southern Luzon. The improvement of civil
government, the building and operation of schools and the provision of medical services
enticed the population back to the villages from jungle refuges. The strategy integrated
native police and village presidenfes (mayors) into the effort. This increased support for the
US mission and physically and psychologically isolated the insurgents from the population.
Separated from their sources of food and other provisions and harassed by constant US
patrols, the insurgents were robbed of the initiative and forced to attack US occupied towns
and villages in a desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defeat the US strategy.
Although not termed "ClMlC" at the time, the improvement of the dayto-day lives of the
populace was instrumental to the success of this COIN campaign.
Source: Brian McAttister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1 899-1 902
(Chapel Hill, NC: lJniversity of North Carolina Press, 1989), pg. 164.
819. PRESENCE, POSTURE, PROFILE
1. The appearance, presence and attitude of a force and its overall profile may have
significant impact on perceptions and attitudes, particularly on neutral or potentially adversarial
audiences. Deploying even limited capability to the right place at the right time can add
substantial credibility to messages being delivered through other channels and provide a major
contribution to the deterrence of a threat. Similarly, too heavy a presence with a one-
dimensional, menacing profile may cause misperceptions and mistrust as to the purpose of a
mission. The posture of troops on the ground can demonstrate both commitment and intent and
must be considered and balanced with the requirements of force protection. The decision to
wear berets instead of helmets can make a considerable difference to the perceptions of both
the adversary and local people. The public profile of commanders at all levels will impact on
perceptions, and therefore the public role of the commander must be carefully analyzed and
opportunities used to transmit key messages. Commanders must understand and assess the
attendant risk that accompanies any decision regarding posture and profile against the need to
send a particular message.
2. The profile and posture of troops will have to be considered carefully in relation to the
local culture. A serious, robust image will help dissuade potential attackers. However, it may
be needed to impress even local, potentially friendly populations who are attracted to symbols of
strength. This profile, however, cannot be the only image presented to the populace. lt must be
carefully blended with an approachable, cooperative and protective aspect when dealing with
the local populace and its leaders.
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The lmportance of Posture, Profile and Presence in RAMSI 2003
One of the priorities of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon lslands (RAMSI) was to
present a strong, competent, yet friendly, posture that would reassure the populace while
intimidating the warlords and gangs which had undermined lawful order on Guadalcanal.
lnitial planning called for the landing of C-130s loaded with infantry simultaneous with the
arrival offshore of the HMAS Manoora. Soldiers disembarking from the C-130s were fully
armed and ready to engage any resistance but held their weapons in a relaxed, non-
threatening manner. Significantly, police and civilian members of the mission arrived with the
initial series of flights, ensuring that the political, military and law enforcement elements were
together at the start. tne posiure of the soldiers and the presence of the Manoora and other
patrolling navalvessels demonstrated readiness and a decisive military superiority. The
police and civilian political elements successfully created a competent, non-threatening,
reassuring and committed perception with the populace. Moreover, throughout the mission,
off-duty soldiers were allowed only limited freedom to frequent the capital of Honiara to
minimize disruption to the Jocal economy. The early consideration of presence, posture and
profile in the RAMSI planning process proved instrumental to displacing a developing
insurgency.
Source; Russe// G/enn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance
Mission Solomon lslands (RAMSI) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,2007).
820. DECEPTION
1. Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by manipulation,
distortion orfalsification, etc. Deception is defined as "Those measures designed to mislead the
enemy by manipulation, distortion, orfalsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner
prejudicial to his interests."104
2. Deception is a complex art that demands considerable effort, a high level of security and
a sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking. lt is normally used to dislocate the
attention and combat power of an adversary. ln operations it can directly contribute to the
achievement of surprise and indirectly to security and economy of effort. Deception will likely
use a combination of physical means (such as a feint or demonstration) supported by other
information cues such as false radio traffic.
3. Deception is aimed directly and solely at enemy forces and commanders. Although it is
an influence activity, it cannot be confused and associated with those other influence activities
that seek to inform and influence other audiences such as indigenous populations. Deception is
a planning (J/Gs) and operations staff (JiG3) responsibility.
4. Deception is a broad concept that spans tactical camouflage to sophisticated strategic-
level operations. Deception also includes the planting of false information, and commanders
must continually be on guard regarding insurgent uses of deception. For example, an insurgent
could plant false information which could cause an overreaction or inaccurate targeting by
security forces.
'oo NATo AAP 6.
B-20 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
I nformation Operations-lnfluence Activities
sEcTroN 5
CONCLUSION
1. The success of any counter-insurgency campaign hinges on the support of the
indigenous population. A primary centre of gravity is the neutral and friendly portions of the
populace whose suppott is vital for campaign success. lnfo Ops will play a central role in
countering the adversary narrative and disseminating and supporting the friendly message. lnfo
Ops influence activities will comprise a significant amount of the activities that a military force
undertakes in a COIN campaign.
2. Info Ops forms an integral part of any operational plan through the use of influence
activities. These influence activities demand complex planning, for they demand consideration
of the effects across a wide spectrum of target audiences and environmental systems.
Understanding how to influence those audiences requires careful consideration by commanders
and staff. Furthermore, all activities eventually create influences. Thus commanders at all
levels, even down to the lowest tactical levels, must understand the lasting impressions and
ramifications, be they positive or negative, intentional or unintentional, that all activities create
on target audiences. ln the end, all activities, be they fires or influence, must seek to undermine
the insurgent and build support and legitimacy amongst the populace.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 9
SUSTAINMENT IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
SECTION 1
SUSTAINMENT PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING
901. INTRODUCTION
1. The principles of sustainment remain extant within a counter-insurgency (COIN)
campaign and are just as applicable in that context as in any other campaign. However, the
characteristics of a COIN campaign will cause some to be emphasized more than others in their
application. These principles are:
a. foresight;
b. economy;
c. flexibility;
d. simplicity;
e. cooperation;
f. self-sufficiency;
g. visibility;
h. responsiveness; and
i. survivability.
2. Given the characteristics of COIN campaigns, with their dispersed nature, their need of a
comprehensive approach and the pervasive threat, the principles that will be emphasized the
most in COIN campaigns will likely be flexibility, cooperation, responsiveness and survivability.
3. Regardless of the nature of COIN, and indeed partly because of it, the echelon system
of integral sub-unit, unit and formation echelons remains a valuable asset that must be
maintained and used. Failure to use such a system contravenes the principles of sustainment,
902. FACTORSAFFECTINGSUSTAINMENT
1. Some modifications to normal combat service support (CSS) practice and procedures
are necessary to allow for the circumstances under which COIN operations take place:
Dispersion. Non-contiguous deployment of the security forces in small
detachments over a wide area increases difficulty in the provision of support.
There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse CSS units to support widely
deployed security force elements. However, the support of isolated sub-units
and platoons may be a problem better solved by increasing the level of self-
sufficiency through robust A echelons. Nevertheless, some dispersion of CSS
units may be inevitable.
Security. There will be a host of security threats:
(1) A surface-to-air missile and small arms threat may complicate the
provision of replenishment by air.
a.
b.
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Counter-l nsurgency Operations
c.
d.
(2) Dependence on local resources/labour for endeavours such as
construction, purchase, storage and perhaps distribution adds to the
overall security problem.
(3) Static installations should be sited in an area secured and protected,
commensurate with operational and geographical factors. lf the scale
and intensity of the operation warrant the establishment of forward
support groups (FSGs), their elements are likely to be more at risk,
requiring greater security force effort to defend them.
(4) The greater the amount of air and helicopter lift that is available, the more
it will be possible to cut out intermediate bases with the advantage of
economies in ground resources, convoys, guards and theatre transport.
The use of aviation support will allow rapid resupply of forward echelons.
Where possible, the use of a sea-based echelon would ease some of the
physical security and protection demands.
(5) With respect to operational security (OPSEC), care must be taken that
CSS preparations do not prejudice the security of information and plans.
Sudden increases in stock levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and
air movement, the arrival of new CSS units in certain areas and the local
purchase of unusual items are just some examples of changes in a
normal pattern of replenishment which might betray a future operation. A
combination of secrecy, insofar as it is possible to hide CSS preparations,
and convincing deception plans help to preserve security. Discretion in
dealing with contractors and taking care not to discuss operational
matters, especially future plans, within hearing of local labour are
essential if elementary precautions are to keep our intentions secret.
Manpower. Because COIN operations are manpower intensive, there will be
pressure for economy in CSS manpower. While, on the one hand, low rates of
expenditure of combat supplies reduce the CSS burden, the dispersed
deployment of units in a COIN campaign increases it. Manpower limitations may
increase dependence on local labour.
Multi-national Forces. Canada will most likely deploy as part of a multi-national
coalition security force. This could lead to potential coordination and
standardization problems.
9-2 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
903. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RECONNAISSANCE PLAN
1. Given the nature of COIN, it is unlikely that campaigning forces will have to make a
forced entry into the theatre of operations. Thus, the deployment of troops and supporting
reconnaissance parties will have the consent of the standing government. Where no central
authority exists and deployment is supported by an international or perceived mandate, an entry
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
may be forced or at least must expect little indigenous support until some sort of permanent
presence and representation have been established.
2. The reconnaissance plan may have to be adjusted given the situation. lt may have to be
conducted from a third nation from which forces may be staged, or it may be the responsibility of
the advance party. Regardless of the situation, the need for some form of reconnaissance and
confirmation of planning details needs to occur prior to the deployment of the main body.
904. RECONNAISSANCEPARTY
1. Prior to initial deployment to the campaign or in support of a relief in place, a CSS
reconnaissance party will be deployed. lt may return prior to deployment of the main body or
remain in theatre to link up with the advance party and main body upon their arrival. lnformation
would thus be passed back by electronic means. Points to note in the mounting and conduct of
the reconnaissance party are:
a. The reconnaissance party sent to a new theatre will be organized on a joint
service basis. The party will aim to make early contact with the host nation (HN)
government through the local diplomatic representative. ln doing so, an
assessment of the resources available in the theatre must be undertaken to
provide an estimate of the requirements, which must be sent out from Canada.
b. ldeally, the reconnaissance party will represent the campaign's comprehensive
approach in that the support elements of other government departments also
deploy in support of their planning. lf this is not the case, but the campaign is to
include known agencies other than the military, then CSS planners may have to
consider the sustainment of these other agencies. ldeally, responsibilities
between agencies for sustainment will be cleady delineated prior to the departure
of reconnaissance parties.
c. The joint reconnaissance party must include a strong CSS element headed by a
sufficiently senior officer who is fully aware of the envisaged operation and of the
CSS requirements to support it. He should have the executive authority to
arrange liaison with the HN and allies, to make decisions and to make
recommendations to the task force commander and, through the diplomatic staff,
to the appropriate HN ministry.
d. The earlier the reconnaissance party is sent out and the sooner CSS
preparations for the arrival of forces are made, the better.
905. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE
1. J4 logistics staff and other national representation will possibly conduct a strategic
reconnaissance, depending upon the security situation in theatre. The CSS element of the
reconnaissance party must make arrangements with the HN government for facilities and
procedures regarding the reception and logistic support of campaign forces, The following
points must be considered:
a. Liaison. Liaison procedures for coordinating CSS requirements with the HN,
any other allies and Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) must
be established.
b. Accommodation and Real Estate. The estimated requirement for operational
and logistic accommodation and real estate must be assessed prior to and during
the reconnaissance. lt may be given to the HN's government liaison or
9-4 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Sustainment in Counter-lnsurgency
representation if such indigenous control and bureaucracy exists. Suitable
locations for deploying forces must be found within their planned area of
operations (AO). lt will violate the principles of COIN if forces are located at a
base camp outside of their AO, in which case they will not be able to establish
control of their AO or properly respond to situations. ldeally, it will be arranged
so that forces may deploy directly to their own AOs. The procedures for
obtaining accommodation on loan-by requisition, by leasing or by purchase-
must similarly be worked out with the HN's authorities with all possible speed.
The availability of local labour, building material, services (electricity, water,
sewage, etc.) must be ascertained quickly.
Provision of Resources. The capacities of the HN or coalition partners to
provide combat supplies, services and consumer items must be determined
before finalizing what must be brought in from Canada or neighbouring countries.
lnfrastructure. Availability and capacity of HN infrastructure must be assessed.
This assessment should include the following:
(1) Port Facilities. As well as berthing, the reconnaissance party should
consider discharge rates using existing unloading facilities and storage
accommodation at and near the main port of entry, unloading and
lighterage facilities at small ports, inland water transport and road and rail
exits. Liaison with the harbour authorities should occur if possible.
(2) Airports. Agreement should be sought on the main entry airfield and
availability of fonryard airfields or airstrips in conjunction with the air force
component of the reconnaissance party. Agreement should be reached
on aircraft schedules, leading to a planned flow of troops, reinforcements
and supplies.
(3) Railroads. Rail transport within the nation must be assessed along with
access from third nations.
(4) Road System and Network. Roadways need be assessed along with
the measurements and classifications of bridges and tunnels on main
supply routes and theatre entry routes, Border controls and access from
third nations must be assessed.
Arrival of GSS Units. The build up of CSS units must be planned to support the
combat elements as they arrive, taking into account the assistance available from
the HN and other coalition forces.
Accounting. There will be a need for financial staff representation on any
reconnaissance party. Agreement with the host government, if such local
authority exists, will be needed on cost sharing, accounting procedures and
domestic banking facilities.
2. Operational Reconnaissance. The deploying force J/G4 will conduct an operational-
level reconnaissance as part of a reconnaissance party. This level of reconnaissance may be
combined with the tactical level. The following will be considered:
a. Firm Bases and Potential Forward Operating Bases. Detailed planning for
the establishment of CSS installations, medical facilities and the siting of unit
camps needs to be concurrent. ln conjunction with the intelligence (J/G2) and
operations (J/G3) staffs, it will be necessary to draw up a plan for the provision of
c,
d.
e.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 9-5
Counter-lnsurgency Operations
protection from blast, indirect fires and rocket attack for key or exposed
headquarters, installations, isolated bases and positions.
b. Allocation of Main Supply Routes. ln a country with a limited road network, it
may be necessary to allot time blocks for the road movement of resupply
convoys and routine troop movements.
c. Level of Self-Sufficiency Required. Based on the deployment of the force
elements, basic load quantities must be established. Despite the establishment
of a centralized support element for the theatre, the integral echelon system of
combat and combat support units must be maintained to ensure adherence to
the principles of sustainment.
d. Equipment Support. The equipment support plan must be geared to providing
special requirements:
(1) enhanced electronic repair facilities to deal with extra radios, security
systems, alarms and electronic warfare (EW) equipment;
(2) modifications to vehicles to be made in theatre (e.9., armouring) along
with local repair facilities; and
(3) operational stocks must be estimated and maintained with the exception
of significant vehicle casualties from operation.
e. Security. The G4 must work with the G2 and G3 to establish a responsive and
appropriate security plan for CSS elements, convoys and activities.
f. Labour. Detailed requirements must be developed for each installation and area
in terms of skilled and unskilled labour.
g. lnterpreter Support. Plans will have to be made to obtain sufficient interpreter
support for the deploying forces. The option of using expatriates should be
considered. Rules of engagement must clearly articulated and make provisions
for the moral obligation to defend interpreters.
h. Civilian Contractor Services. A determination should be made regarding what
levels of civilian contracting services are appropriate for the initial stages of the
campaign given the threat and availability of in theatre services.
i. Requirement for the Conduct of Stability Activities. CSS elements will
undoubtedly be expected to undertake stability activities in theatre in support of
certain operational objectives. Possible activities and tasks might include
assistance to other agencies (e.9., delivery of humanitarian aid), the mentoring or
training of indigenous security forces (especially staff and planners) and the
provision of medical services to other agencies and the conduct of local medical
clinics. The anticipated level of support and activities should be forecasted to the
greatest extent possible in consultation with the commander and take into
account his expectations and envisioned scheme of manoeuvre. National
authority is required to undertake activities and tasks such as the provision of
national medical supplies to the indigenous population.
3. Lack of Host Nation Support. lt must be remembered that a situation may exist in
which the HN government lacks real control over ports of entry into the nation or in which a
forced entry is required in order to initiate the force deployments into the theatre. ln such cases,
the reconnaissance may be limited to neighbouring third nations. CSS bases may have to be
established in neighbouring territories until the initial entry force has secured sufficient bases
9-6 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Sustainment in Counter-l nsurgency
and routes to allow the deployment of CSS elements. The initial entry force will have to be self-
sufficient and resupplied by air or sea until the echelon system can deploy forward to ground
bases.
SECTION 2
SUSTAINMENT AND RESOURCES
906. SUSTAINMENTSYSTEM
1. ln developing the sustainment system and architecture in support of the campaign, the
G4 staff must:
a. Decide on the stock levels to be held in the echelon locations and the self-
sufficiency level of units to provide for:
(1) the predicted intensity of operations;
(2) the length of time by which the echelon system can be established to full
capacity within theatre;
(3) a cushion of reserves to meet interruptions in the replenishment system
by insurgent action; and
(4) the changing dependency of units.
b. Demand commodities through the national authority or contract through the HN
and work out a movement and distribution plan to transport materiel from the
entry points to the base installations.
c. Organize distribution for commodities in the operational areas and allocate
dependency for units based on the nearest or most appropriate source of supply.
d. Arrange rail transport, road convoys, inland and coastal water transport, fixed or
rotary wing airlift and/or air dropping.
e. Along with intelligence staff support, conduct an assessment on the insurgent
threat to CSS units and the means of resupply.
f. Confirm resupply procedures, methods and levels of security and protection to be
implemented.
g. Develop a traffic control and route protection plan. ln conjunction with the G3
staff, it will be necessary to arrange:
(1) escotls and pickets;
(2) route opening and closing policies and procedures; and
(3) avoidance of a routine and predictable pattern of convoy movements in
areas where there is high risk of insurgent attack.
h. Determine locations and procedures for distribution points and transition between
echelons.
i. Advocate for enlargement and reinforcement of echelons at unit level in order to
provide for an increase in unit self-sufficiency, robustness and force protection,
j. Determine unit and sub-unit responsibility for the movement of material from the
distribution points to their own areas. Units may require helicopter lift or even
pack animals in difficult country.
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 9-7
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
907. SITUATIONALAWARENESS AND COMMUNICATIONS
1. Situational awareness (SA) is criticalto sustainment in COIN operations. Enemy forces
will likely put a high priority on destroying or disrupting CSS elements as they will be seen as
soft, predictable targets. CSS units down to the lowest level must have the ability to react
immediately to enemy action and changing support requirements.
2. SA also demands that upto-date and accurate figures be known for sustainment
requirements of the lower echelons. Robust communications on dedicated administrative nets
from unit level upwards will provide such SA and allow for a suitable balance between push and
pull replenishment. ln times of deployment and engagement, the command net is too busy to
support communications for administrative, recovery, evacuation and sustainment needs.
908. REPLENISHMENT THROUGH AIR, AVIATION AND SEA BASING
1. ln certain situations-be they influenced by terrain, threat or a combination of other
elements-fixed or rotary wing aircraft may become the method of choice for replenishment for
the following reasons:
a. Forces can be supplied in inaccessible areas, thus avoiding the necessity for a
vulnerable surface supply route.
b. Troops are better able to move with light scales of equipment, unencumbered
with echelon transport, thus exploiting the principle of flexibility to give them a
good level of tactical mobility.
c. Subject to the capacity of the airlift resources, weather and terrain air
replenishment is quicker than overland resupply.
d. Reserve stocks can be reduced and held centrally, allowing the establishment of
fewer but larger bases situated in more secure areas.
e. Reducing the dependency on surface routes lessens the risk of ambush and cuts
the convoy protection commitment. Aviation replenishment may become the
preferred method in situations of high threat.
f. Rapid casualty evacuation improves wounded soldiers' chances of survival, thus
improving morale,
g. The urgent needs of the civilian population in isolated areas can be met quickly.
2. Aerial delivery (parachute or unmanned aerial vehicle IUAVI) means of replenishment is
less economic than air or aviation landed resupply but is often necessary in very broken country
where there are no landing zones, even for helicopters and for covert Special Forces. The
penalties for air dropping are that the recovery of parachute equipment may be difficult or
impossible and there may be a risk that the supplies fall into insurgent hands.
3. Landing strips and helicopter landing zones (LZs) should be constructed whenever
possible and as soon as possible to economize in airlift. lt should be standard operating
procedures (SOP) that whenever a forces stops or plans a deliberate activity, such as a cordon
and search, helicopter LZs are designated (initially from the map and confirmed once on the
ground) in order to support emergency evacuation.
4. There is a need for close cooperation between the CSS, operations and air staffs. A
detailed analysis will have to be conducted regarding the threat to aviation and air and the
general, routine demand that will be placed on air and aviation resources.
9-B B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Sustainment in Counter-lnsurgency
5. Consideration should be given to the concept of at least initially basing CSS elements
and supplies at sea, from which they can operate in a fairly secure manner. This will be a
possible solution early in the campaign, however, once security forces have established a firm
base and begun to expand, CSS echelons will have to be deployed forward if the campaign is to
be conducted for any length of time.
909. USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES
1. The maximum use of local resources to reduce the CSS lift resources deployed from
national resources must be made. Simultaneously, care must be taken not to cause shortages
in the HN's home market and consequent price rises, although this must be balanced against
the advantages to be gained by boosting the local economy. lf the civil population suffers from
increased shortages and inflation, the campaign will loose legitimacy and the insurgents will be
handed a ready grievance to exploit through propaganda.
910. SECURITY
1. Insurgent lnfiltration of Labour. lt must be assumed that hostile intelligence agents
will infiltrate local labour. At the very least, their supporters will exist amongst ready labour
pools. lt will be difficult for incoming units and security sections to distinguish between loyal and
disloyal elements. To reduce the potential threat to base installations, ports, airpofts, roads and
railways, reliance must be placed on good unit and installation security and an efficient local
vetting system. The method of vetting must be agreed with the host government, whose police
and security units may be largely responsible for its implementation. The system may never be
foolproof, and measures must be taken to guard vulnerable installations from attack and to
prevent the leakage of plans and intentions. All soldiers, especially CSS troops employing
civilians, must be carefully briefed on security matters.
2. Protection of Labour. Labour must be protected from insurgent attack and intimidation.
lf the HN cannot provide suitable protection, additional forces may have to be deployed in an
escort and protection role. Rules of engagement must clearly reflect the moral obligation to
protect civilian labour in the employment of campaigning forces. This is especially important for
interpreters employed with combat units.
3. lnstallations, CSS installations must be suitably sited for security and defence, and
theymustbeeffectivelyguarded. lnthebestcase,theHNwill provideprotection. lfthisisnot
possible, extra forces may have to be provided because CSS units do not normally have
sufficient personnel to carry out their functions and guard themselves except against the lightest
of threats. Nevertheless, CSS troops must be sufficiently well trained in combat skills to be able
to defend themselves.
sEcTroN 3
PERSONNEL
911. MORALE
1. Soldiers and their Families. Troops will often be operating in small groups for long
periods in trying conditions often out of regular contact with their families. Soldier's families may
be worried by press coverage of action and casualties in the areas where the soldier is
stationed. When a campaign lasts for a considerable time, lack of progress may discourage
soldiers and their families. The insurgents may try to aggravate a discouraging situation with
propaganda means. With or without hostile propaganda, rumours spread and may be difficult to
B-GL-323-004/FP-003 9-9
Counter-l nsurgency Operations
dispel or refute when troops are deployed in small detachments over a wide area. Families will
require regular updates and reassurance regarding the conduct of the campaign. This is best
furnished by home units and garrisons.
2. Promotilg Good Morale. Morale is a key element to the moral component of a force's
fighting power.'ou While motivating soldiers by pointing out good and sound reasons for the
conduct of the campaign itself and the need for continued, patient commitment is the duty of the
commander and a function of leadership at all levels, certain other measures can be taken to
help maintain morale. They include:
a. Reliable information services, lnternet and national and local newspapers.
b. A quick and frequent mail service to and from home.
c. Welfare telephones and lnternet services at reasonable rates orfree.
d. Access to television and radio receivers.
e. Gymnasium equipment in protected areas where outdoor recreation is not
feasible.
f. Local leave centres in secure and attractive surroundings, if possible in a
temperate climate, and periodic home leave if sustainable from a mission and
manning perspective.
g. Responsive unit rear parties that take appropriate action to preclude problems
with families and family support. Many problems or frustrations can be avoided
through thorough family pre-deployment briefs that lay out the points of contact,
manage expectations, articulate limitations to available support services and help
families create their own support networks.
h. Confidence in a robust and efficient casualty evacuation and treatment system.
i. A rapid and efficient system for notifying relatives of deaths and casualties as
they occur.
912. MEDICAL SUPPORT
1. Providing medical support for small and widely scattered detachments places a strain on
the medical services. The problem can be alleviated by consideration and implementation of
the following:
a. refresher training for all ranks in combat first aid;
b. training at least one member of isolated detachments in advanced first aid and
providing such trained soldiers with additional medical supplies and the means of
stabilizing casualties;
c. providing sufficient combat medics, even down to rifle platoon level;
d. provision for quick casualty evacuation on all operations, including armoured
ambulances and aviation, especially in urban areas, remote areas or on routes
subject to insurgent targeting; and
r05
For further discussion of fighting power and its components, see B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Operations.
9-1 0 B-GL-323-004/FP-003
Sustainment in Counter-lnsurgency
e. ensuring that all ranks receive a comprehensive health briefing before
deployment.
2. ldeally, a period of acclimatization will be possible for troops deploying to environs with
extreme conditions. This may occur in a third, neighbouring nation. Where this is not possible,
such as early entry forces and advance parties, activities will have to be paced whilst troops
become accustomed to the climatic extremes and conditions. At any rate, the idea of opting out
of coalition operations in times of crisis for want of acclimatization should be avoided.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
CHAPTER 1O
COUNTER.INSURGENCY TRAINING
sEcTroN 1
INTRODUCTION
1. Training for conventional campaigns provides a sound basis for the conduct of counter-
insurgency (COIN) operations in terms of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)for offensive
and defensive activities. However, in preparation for COIN, there is a requirement for additional
training that is campaign and mission specific. This training and preparation across all ranks is
as much intellectual as it is physical. Not only do units and sub-units have to undertake skill
training in preparation for the likely tactical tasks (stability activities such as urban presence
patrolling, cordon and searches and vehicle checkpoints) but they have to be trained in the
principles unique to COIN, the importance of the support of the civilian populace and the
importance of local cultural and social dynamics.
2. lt must be remembered that doctrine for COIN operations will provide guiding principles
and methods for the conduct, The most successful armies in COIN operations have not treated
doctrine as dogma but have afforded commanders trust and confidence and freedom of action
within the allocated mission. Sound TTP can be identified and practised prior to any
deployment, but TTP will change rapidly in a theatre of operations as the insurgents come to
learn the TTP used by security forces and vice versa. Commanders at all levels must be
flexible and dynamic, and lessons learned at the lowest levels must be passed quickly for wider
implementation.
sEcTtoN 2
OPERATIONAL.LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS
1. The military is only one of many agencies that will be used in the conduct of COIN. lt is
vital that the agencies involved in a comprehensive approach plan, train and prepare to the
greatest extent possible in order that responsibilities and requirements can be identified and
addressed prior to deployment.
2. At the earliest opportunity, all agencies and civilian and security forces should come
together to conduct joint training. ln some cases, the military may have to take the lead in the
education of agencies less knowledgeable in the conduct of COIN. This training can begin with
seminars and conferences before developing to actualfield exercises. Standing points of
contact and positions for liaison teams can be identified in much of this training.
3. All security force elements designated for COIN operations should come together at the
earliest opportunity. Training should begin with seminars and war games for leaders and
progress to tactical field exercises for all levels. lncorporating other COIN partners may be
useful during such seminars and war games so as to provide the most accurate scenario
possible and to become familiar with expectations.
4. Such early collaboration across agencies will help a unity of purpose become a unity of
effort.
5. Training in simulated environments and in the field should encompass full-spectrum
operations. Hence, field training exercises (FTXs) should, whenever suitable, ensure that
scenarios reflect the continuum of operations and the required changes to force structures,
tactics and intellectual challenges. For example, a scenario may begin with entry into a major
combat campaign and then progress to an insurgency situation that will require a greater
balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations. This will force commanders and
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
soldiers at all levels to adjust their plans, orders, TTP and mindsets in order to reflect the
changing scenario.
6. Training with coalition partners will readily identify differences in approaches and
methods in a COIN campaign and will identify potentialfor liaison positions, particularly in the
early stages of a campaign. This will also offer the opportunity to circumvent some of the
coord ination and standard ization problems routi nely encou ntered.
1001. LESSONS IDENTIFIED DURING CAMPAIGNS
1. lt is vitalthat as actual campaigns progress, lessons identified are captured, assessed
by doctrine staffs, schools and training systems and then implemented pervasively. This will
require formal and informal reporting methods, the submission of detailed after-action reports,
their widest dissemination and staff visits to operational theatres. Formal links between
lessons-learned staffs, doctrine writers, training authorities and trainers need to be established
and exploited.
2. Commanders in the field must be forthright in lessons learned and honest and candid in
the acknowledgement of errors so that others may learn, missions may be better accomplished
and unnecessary loss of life avoided.
sEcTtoN 3
TRAIN IN G PRIOR TO UN DERTAKING COU NTER.INSU RGEN CY OPERATIONS
1. Training plans in preparation for a COIN operation should consider inclusion of the
following:
a. Training in TTP for COIN operations, with great emphasis on the sub-unit level,
probably in a non-contiguous battlespace. There must be an emphasis on junior
leader training. Computer based training in simulated environments offers very
little benefit for section and platoon commanders. Their skills will only be truly
developed when leading their subordinates through physical and intellectual
challenges, ranging quickly across the full-spectrum of operations.
b. lnstruction in the root causes, grievances and conditions that led to the
insurgency and reasons for the motivations of the non-committed populace. The
need to gain the support of the population must be placed foremost in the mind of
the soldiers and their commanders, and they must come to understand that all
their actions will be seen to either build or undermine campaign legitimacy and
public support.
c. lnstruction in the insurgent operational techniques, their TTP, structures and
equipments. All forces, particularly those of the echelons, must be made aware
of and trained in the pervasive, asymmetric threat that is posed by insurgent
forces.
d. Acclimatization and environmental training, reflective of the planned operational
theatre.
e. Culturaltraining regarding the indigenous populations to be encountered, their
customs, laws, beliefs, etc., including their motivations for supporting or not-
suppofting the insurgency.
f. Specialist training required to expand the force capabilities in urban operations,
intelligence operations, psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military
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Counter-lnsurgency Training
cooperation (ClMlC), the local language(s), health aspects, improvised explosive
devices (lEDs) and mines.
The marry-up of specialist detachments such as public affairs and PSYOPS to
the units and formations to which they will belong during the deployment.
The use in training of PSYOPS and other influence activities so that they may be
integrated with fires in a routine and seamless manner.
The skills required for human intelligence (HUMINT) collection through presence
patrolling and other stability activities. Soldiers and their commanders must
understand the important role that they play in gathering information and
intelligence for the development of targets and measures of effectiveness.
lntensive training to ensure physical fitness, as troops acclimatize more quickly if
they are in good physical condition upon arrival in the theatre.
lntellectual training for all ranks to ensure that they all understand the unique
aspects of a COIN campaign, the potential operationaland strategic impacts that
low-level decisions and actions can have and the need to influence the will of the
local population in order to support the campaign.
Rules of engagement (ROE) training.
Media training.
Crowd control operations (CCO). The use of CCO equipment, which can cause
death if not used correctly, and CCO TTP cannot be learned in theatre, at the
time of its employment. lt must be part of pre-deployment training and refreshed
in theatre.
Training teams from units already in theatre or just recently returned and reverse
technical assistance visits (TAVs) should be used to train on the local situation
and up-to-date TTP and threats.
2. Good tactical training will prepare soldiers well in the conduct of a COIN operation. At
the same time, however, commanders must ensure that all ranks, particularly those in daily
contact with the populace, understand the pervasive threat posed by insurgents and the vital
impodance of gaining and holding the support of the local populace.
sEcTtoN 4
IN THEATRE TRAINING
1. When deployed on operations, training must continue and commanders must ensure
that they allocate appropriate time, resources and supervision to it. Commanders should
ensure that regular refresher training of TTP, ROEs and equipment is conducted in theatre
throughout the mission. ln addition, commanders and staff should consider the following:
a. Reconnaissance and advance parties must quickly assess the operational and
tactical situation and identify any aspects in training that troops may have not yet
covered or that require greater emphasis. lf these training requirements cannot
be met prior to deployment, then they must seek training venues for the units to
use following their arrival but prior to operational commitment. Temporary battle
schools may be established by the in theatre force to provide training to troops,
on new enemy TTP or equipment, which was not available for pre-deployment
training. Staff planners must balance the training need with the need to at least
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begin to undertake tactical operations in support of the besieged authority and a
coalition commander.
Commanders may precede their main bodies and be attached to units already
committed to operations. The lessons they learn can then be used to hone final
training or guide in theatre training. Commanders need not return home but may
marry-up with their troops once they deploy.
Physicalfitness training should continue in theatre to any extent possible.
Physicalfitness will save lives.
Troops should be given regular situation updates in terms of the overall mission
and campaign progress and their contribution to it. They should be briefed on
what measures are proving successful, and they should be given feedback as to
the usefulness of the intelligence that their patrols are providing. This will keep
the troops motivated and focused on the success of the mission.
2. Units engaged in COIN campaigns should undergo continuous training at all levels to
ensure that basic individual and collective skills are maintained to a high standard. Particular
attention should be paid to the maintenance of individual skills during periods of little activity.
b.
c.
d.
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Suggest Readings
SUGGESTED READINGS IN COUNTER.INSURGENCY
As well as these books, there is an enormous body of periodical and academic journal
literature on counter-insurgency. While the books below will provide a solid foundation
for understanding insurgency and counter-insurgency, the reader is encouraged to look
to some of the material in periodicals, much of which is available online.
Anderson, David, Hlsfories of the Hanged: The Dirly War in Kenya and the End of
Empire. New York: Norton, 2005.
A multitude of variables influence insurgencies. This volume provides a look at some of
the legitimate grievances that may drive an insurgency, including some of the self-
interested parties in the colonial government, and some of the less than palatable
techniques used by British counter-insurgents in Kenya.
Armstrong, Karen. lslam. New York: Random House, 2000.
This book provides a comprehensive and easy to understand introduction to lslam, its
origins, history, and sects.
The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism. New York:
Ballentine, 2001.
This work documents how fundamentalism has taken root and grown in all three of the
monotheistic religions. A useful volume to provide a basic understanding of the root
causes of radicalised religion and to provide context for one of the major factors in
contemporary global affairs.
Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. New York: Morrow,
1 994.
A comprehensive overview of guerrilla warfare, from the Scythians to the Afghan-Soviet
War, this volume helps develop perspective on insurgency and counter-insurgency,
forms of warfare that are often characterised by the layman as 'new'.
Bickel, Keith. Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine:
1 915-1 940. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.
This work examines details the process that led to the creation of one of the best and
most durable military doctrinal manuals ever produced, the US Marine Corps Small
Wars Manual. Bickel's book details the operations, lessons learned, and bureaucratic
process that led to the creation of the manual.
Birtle, Andrew. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine
1860-1941 . Washington: Centre of Military History United States Army, 1998.
This work documents the initial COIN operations engaged in by the US army and their
impact on advancing the evolving doctrine. Paft I of a detailed study of the origins of US
Army counter-insurgency doctrine.
. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine
1942-1976. Washington: Centre of Military History United States Army, 2006.
Building on the first volume, Birtle continues his analysis of US Army counter-insurgency
practices, and the effect of operations upon doctrine. These two books are critical to
understanding the roots of the oft-criticised counter-insurgency practices of Canada's
most powerful ally.
Clifford, Bob. The Marketing of Rebellion: lnsurgents, Media and lnternationalActivism.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Clifford Bob's recent study helps to detail the relationship between insurgent groups,
information technologies, the media, and non-governmental organisations. This book
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rejects dominant views that needy groups readily gain help from selfless
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). lnstead, the author argues that they face a
Darwinian struggle for scarce resources where support goes to the savviest, not the
neediest.
Bohannan, Charles and Napolean Valeriano. Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The
Philippine Experience. Westport: Praeger, 1962.
Written by two officers who fought as guerrillas against the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines in WW ll and who went on to defeat the Huk rebellion in later years. This
work examines the means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of insurgencies with
a focus on the importance of intelligence in combating insurgent movements
Charters, David, and Brig. (Ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, eds. Armies in Low lntensity
Conflict: A Comparative Analysis.London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989.
This edited volume is a comparative analysis of how Western armies adapted to
unconventional roles and missions in the post 1945 political-military environment of low
intensity conflict.
Elkins, Caroline. lmperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya.
London: Henry Holt and Company, 2005.
A detailed account of the brutal counter-insurgency techniques used alongside more
palatable efforts by the British in Kenya. Elkins'work is founded on new archival and
field research that counters the common view of British post-Ww ll COIN as a universal
modelto be followed in contemporary times. This book must be read to understand the
entirety of past British COIN techniques so that alternatives to unsuitable techniques can
be devised for modern COIN operations.
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958. Santa Monica CA: RAND,
1e63 (2005).
Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the Algerian district of
Greater Kabylia, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on
counterinsurgency and pacification. ln the process, he discusses the larger political,
psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for
present-day counterinsurgency operations.
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York'. Praeger,
1e64 (2006).
Galula builds upon his first study for RAND to "define the laws of counterinsurgency
warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy
and tactics." His book provides an analysis of how to undermine insurgency and the
broad elements that the counter-insurgent will likely face.
Geraghty, Tony. The lrish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British
lntelligence. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2000.
This work explores the role of British lntelligence and the SAS in Northern lreland. A
useful study that details the complexity in the use of intelligence and special forces in
combating an insurgency in urban terrain, underscoring the requirement and
effectiveness of i ntel li gence-d riven operations.
Glenn, Russell. COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance
Mission, Solomon lslands (RAMSI). Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2007.
This study is an example of a recent and ongoing COIN campaign that highlights the
importance and effectiveness of the comprehensive approach to operations. A number
of highly relevant points are drawn out by the author, including the role of criminal
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Suggest Readings
elements in destabilisation, the importance of intervening at the earliest stages to halt
budding insurgencies, the absolute necessity for careful consideration of influence
activities throughout a campaign, and the critical role of law enforcement in COIN.
Gunarathna, Rohan. lnside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Beverly
Books, 2002.
This book, which details al Qaeda's leadership, ideology, structure, strategies, and
tactics, is usefulto understand the difference between insurgency and globalterrorism.
The two are not the same, and personnel deployed on counter-insurgency must
understand how to differentiate between terrorists and insurgents and the role of al
Qaeda-like terrorists in modern conflict.
Hennessy, Michael. Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Wartare in I
Corps, 1965-1 972. Westporl, CT: Praeger, 1997.
The US Marines in Vietnam conducted some of the most successful COIN in the
Vietnam War while simultaneously fighting a conventional war of attrition against regular
units of the North Vietnamese Army. This book helps draw out the fact that there are
highly relevant lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War at the political, strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of command. Of great interest should be the development
and application of the CAP program, the US Marine version of the tache d'huile
technique of COIN in a rural setting as well as an enemy strategy that successfully
employed a comprehensive approach to operations.
Jalali, Colonel A, and Lester W. Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
Tactics in the Sovlef Afghan War. Yolumes l-lll. London: The Military Press, 2000.
This three volume series outlines the operations of the Afghan Mujahideen resistance
during their struggle against invading Soviet forces. This series is critical to
understanding the learning process and origins of tactics that continue to be used in
Afghanistan to this day on the exact same terrain as in the Afghan-Soviet War.
Kitson, General Sir Frank. Bunch of Five. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977.
This work discusses General Kitson's personal involvement in a variety of British
conflicts, specifically focusing on Oman, Kenya and Malaya, to provide a first hand
account of the implementation of COIN strategy.
Kitson, Frank. Low lntensity Operations; Subversion, lnsurgency, Peacekeeping.
London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971 .
This work outlines the why non-traditional methods will not defeat an adversary in low
intensity operations before delving into particulars regarding the army's contribution and
the preparation required.
Lawrence, T.E. Revolt in the Deseft. U.S.A.: Tess Press,2004.
An abridgement on Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom, this work offers insight into the
author's First World War experience with irregular troops in the Arabian Desert.
McAllister Linn, Brian. The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War,
1899-1902. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
ln this book, Linn details the complex environmentfaced bythe US Army as it began its
occupation of the Philippines after Spain's defeat, looking at the shape of both the
insurgency and US counter-insurgency activity in different parts of the Philippines. Not
all the US efforts were successful and this volume provides a useful contrast between
different methods as well as the role commander personality can play in COIN.
Mockaitis, Thomas. British Counterinsurgency in the Post lmperialEra. Oxford:
Manchester University Press, 1 995.
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Counter-lnsurgency Operations
This work offers a history of the development of British counter-insurgency principles
and practices since 1960. Through case studies in Borneo, South Arabia, Oman and
Northern lreland, Mockaitis links emerging British approaches to internal conflict to
colonial and post colonial policies.
Mockaitis, Thomas. British Counterinsurgency 1919-69. London: MacMillan, 1990.
Here Mockaitis discusses the differences between insurgency and counter-insurgency,
along with the learning process inherent in the British evolution from lmperial Policing to
counterinsurgency, and subsequent Lessons Learned.
Nagl, John A. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam: Learning to Eat
Soup with a Knife. Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 2002.
ln this popular book the author compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine
and practice by the British in the Malayan Emergency to that of the US Army during the
Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. Nagl argues that the ability to analyse operations, learn
lessons and adapt as an institution is critical for any military to succeed in COIN.
Newsinger, John. Brlfish Counter lnsurgency: From Palestine to Nofthern /reland. New
York: Palgrave,2002.
Newsinger highlights the successes and failures of British COIN in the post-WWll era
highlighting both the useful and brutal techniques employed. This book provides a
balance to other works that tout the 'British model' as the ideal COIN methodology to be
followed in the modern era.
O'Neill, Bard E. lnsurgency and Terrorism-lnside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. New
York: Brassey's, 1990.
This author systematically dissects insurgency and terrorism, examining the nature of
revolutionary war, strategies used by terrorists and insurgents, and supporting factors
before providing a framework so one can understand the nature of a particular conflict.
Paget, Julian. Counter-lnsurgency Campaigning. London: Faber and Faber Limited,
1967.
ln this work Paget, who fought in a number of the post-WWll British COIN campaigns,
emphasises the need for political supremacy in COIN, while outlining the various factors
affecting counter-insurgency operations.
Carment, David and Martin Rudner, eds. Peacekeeping lntelligence: New Players,
Extended Boundaries. New York: Routledge, 2006.
This book is an edited collection of essays that evaluates the role and dynamics of
intelligence in peace support operations. lt considers the intelligence requirements for
successful PSO and is applicable to COIN as well. The book also addresses the roles of
coalition forces, law enforcement agencies, development institutions and NGOs that
commonly influence operations.
Phares, Walid. The War of ldeas: Jihad Against Democracy. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2007.
At a broad level, this book can help the reader understand the role of the narrative in
motivating people. lt highlights the role of ideology in contemporary conflicts and the use
of information technologies and the manipulation of the media by ideologues.
Smith, M.L.R. Fighting for lreland? The Military Strategy of the lrish Republican
Movement. London: Routledge, 1995.
This work examines the evolution of the complex military strategy of the IRA over the
entire length of the conflict in Northern lreland. lt is an excellent study of the internal
struggles common to insurgent groups as well as the critical importance of words and
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Suggest Readings
deeds in propaganda targeting both the will of the indigenous population and that of the
security forces.
Tanham, George. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet
Cong. USA: Fredrick Praeger, 1967.
This work, whose author managed the US rural development program in South Vietnam,
was among the first major published analyses by an American expert on the insurgency
in lndochina. ln addition to tracing the Chinese influence on the Vietminh cadres and the
French military response, the book describes the organization, logistics, and tactics of
the communist movement.
Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda From the Ancient
Wortd to the Present Day. 3'd Edition. Oxford: Manchester University Press, 2003.
Taylor, one of the foremost authorities on propaganda, traces the use of propaganda
throughout history. A highly readable book, this study illustrates the importance of
synchronising words and deeds when conducting influence activities.
Thompson, Sir Robert. Defeating Communist lnsurgency: Ihe Lessons of Malaya and
Vietnam. St. Petersburg FL: Hailer,2005.
This work presents keys to victory and success in COIN operations waged against
communist structured insurgencies, based upon the author's experience in Malaya.
Trinquier Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, New York:
Praeger, 1964.
A classic of COIN literature, Trinquier examines how French officers in lndochina fought
fierce rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and
1950s, revealing COIN techniques and tactics from a French perspective.
Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: University of lllinois Press, 1961.
ln this book Mao discusses the differences between guerrilla and "orthodox" military
forces, as well as how such forces can work together for a common goal. Other topics
covered include propaganda and political concerns, the formation of guerrilla units, the
qualities of a good guerrilla officer, discipline in a guerrilla army, and guerrilla bases.
Tugwell, Maurice. "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures" PhD
Dissertation, London: King's College, March 1979.
Brigadier Tugwell, who has operational experience with the British Army in a number of
COIN campaigns, dissects the role and features of ideological propaganda through the
use of historical case studies. This is one of the best works examining propaganda, the
role of narratives, and the importance of coordinated words and deeds in motivating
fighters as well as undermining the will of the adversary. Available through inter-library
loans.
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