Ethics Part 2,
Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
Propositions 48-49

E2: PROP. 48. In the
mind there is no
absolute or
free will; but the mind
is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been
determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to
infinity.

Proof.--The
mind is a fixed
and definite mode of thought
(E2P11),
therefore it cannot be the
free cause of its actions
(E1P17C2); in other
words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative
volition;
but (by E1P28)
it must be determined by a cause, which has
also been determined by another cause, and this last by another, etc.
Q.E.D.

E2: PROP. 48, Note.
--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the
mind no absolute
faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows, that
these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious, or are merely
abstract or
general terms, such as we are accustomed to put together from
particular things. Thus the
intellect and the
will stand in the same
relation to this or that idea,
or this or that
volition, as "lapidity"
to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.
The cause which
leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix
to Part 1 (E1APND). But, before
I proceed further, I would here remark
that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the
desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind
affirms or denies
what is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or
turns away from any given thing.
After we have proved, that these
faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from
the particular instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
volitions themselves are
anything besides the ideas
of things. We must
inquire, I say, whether there is in the
mind any
affirmation or
negation
beyond that, which the
idea,
in so far as it is an idea, involves. On
which subject see the following proposition, and
(E2D3), lest the idea
of pictures should suggest itself. For by
ideas I do not mean
images such
as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
the conceptions of thought.

Proof.--There is in the
mind
[by E2P48] no absolute faculty of positive or
negative volition,
but only particular
volitions, namely, this or that
affirmation, and this or that
negation.
Now let us conceive a particular
volition, namely, the mode of thinking
whereby the mind affirms, that the
three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
This
affirmation
involves the conception or
idea of a triangle, that is,
without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same
thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as it is to
say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this
affirmation
cannot be made (E2A3) without the
idea of a triangle. Therefore, this
affirmation
can neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a
triangle.
Again, this
idea of a triangle must involve this same
affirmation,
namely, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
angles. Wherefore, and vice versa, this
idea of a triangle can neither be
nor be conceived without this
affirmation, therefore
[by E2D2], this affirmation
belongs to the essence of the
idea of a triangle,
and is nothing besides.
What we have said of this
volition
(inasmuch as we have selected it at
random) may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but
an idea. Q.E.D.

E2: PROP. 49 Corollary, Note.
--[I.] We have thus removed the cause which
is commonly assigned for error. For we have shown above, that
falsity consists solely
in the privation of
knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and
confused. Wherefore,
a false idea,
inasmuch as it is false, does not involve
certainty. When we
say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no
doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is
certain, but only that he
does not doubt,
or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there
are no reasons, which should cause his
imagination to waver (see
E2P44C1N).
Thus, although the man be
assumed to acquiesce in what is
false,
we shall never say that he is
certain. For by
certainty we mean
something positive (E2P43
and E2P43N), not merely the absence of
doubt.
However, in order that the
foregoing proposition may be fully
explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and I will
furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our
doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it
worth while to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom. I
say " some," for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set
forth in the fifth part.
[II.] I begin, then, with the first point,
and warn my readers to make an
accurate distinction between an idea,
or conception of the mind, and the
images of things
which we imagine. It is further necessary that they
should distinguish between idea and
words, whereby we signify things.
These three--namely,
images,
words,
and ideas
--are by many persons either
entirely confused
together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy
or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the
will, both for
philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.
Those who think
that ideas consist in
images which are formed
in us by contact with
external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things,
whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments,
which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as
though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this
misconception, do not see that an
idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
involves an affirmation or
negation.
Again, those who confuse
words with
ideas,
or with the affirmation
which an idea involves, think that they can
wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This
misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature
of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of
extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a
mode of thinking)
does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The
essence of words and
images
is put together by bodily motions, which in no
wise involve the conception of thought.
These few words on this subject
will suffice: I will therefore pass on
to consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine.
[III.A.(i)] Of
these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider
scope than the understanding,
and that therefore it is different
therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief, that the will has
wider scope than the understanding, is that they assert, that they have no
need of an increase in their faculty of assent, that is of
affirmation or
negation,
in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not
perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of
understanding.
The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the
latter being finite and the former infinite.
[III.A.(ii)] Secondly,
it may be objected
that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to
suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive; this is
confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit
that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits
in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be
taught more clearly by experience, than that the
will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of
understanding.
[III.A.(iii)] Thirdly, it may
be objected that one affirmation
does not apparently contain more reality
than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming,
that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what
is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or
perfection than another,
for as objects are some more excellent than
others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others;
this also seems to point to a difference between the
understanding and the
will.
[III.A.(iv)] Fourthly,
it may be objected, if man does not act from
free will,
what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in
the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I
say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the
statue of a man rather than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he
would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.
Other objections might also
be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that
anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I
have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.
[III.B.(i)] To the first objection I answer,
that I admit that the
will has a wider
scope than the understanding, if by the
understanding be
meant only clear
and distinct ideas; but I deny that the
will has a wider scope than the
perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the
faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty
of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm
an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an
infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of
feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies.
If
it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot
perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking,
nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged,
if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be
obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a
greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to
say that, if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an
infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give
us a greater understanding,
but not a more universal idea of entity than
that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We
have shown that
will is a
universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all
particular volitions--in other words, that which is common to all such
volitions.
As, then, our opponents
maintain that this idea, common or universal to
all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they
assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the
limits of the understanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of
one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.
[III.B.(ii)] To the second objection
I reply by denying, that we have a
free power
of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone suspends his
judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the
matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore,
strictly speaking, a perception, and not
free will.
In order to illustrate
the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving nothing
else. Inasmuch as this
imagination
involves the existence of the horse
(E2P17C), and the boy does
not perceive anything which would exclude
the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as
present: he will not be able to
doubt of its existence,
although he be not
certain thereof.
We have daily experience of such a state of things in
dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain
that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he
should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it
happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment,
namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further, I grant that no one can be
deceived, so far as actual
perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
imaginations,
regarded in themselves, do not involve error
(E2P17CN); but I deny,
that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any
affirmation. For
what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has
wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it
would regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons for
doubting
its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the
imagination
of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of
the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it
possesses of a winged horse is
inadequate,
in which case it will either
necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in
doubt on the subject.
[III.B.(iii)] I think that I have
anticipated my answer to the third objection,
namely, that the will
is something universal which is predicated of all
ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas,
namely, an affirmation,
whose adequate essence must,
therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
abstract,
be in every idea, and be, in this
respect alone, the same in all, not in so far as it is considered as
constituting the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
affirmations
differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance,
the affirmation
which involves the idea of a circle, differs from that
which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle
differs from the idea of a triangle.
Further, I absolutely deny,
that we are in need of an equal power of
thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that
that which is false is true. These two
affirmations, if we regard the
mind, are in the same relation to one another as being and not-being; for
there is nothing positive in ideas,which constitutes the actual reality of
falsehood
([E2P35,]
E2P35N, and
E2P47N).
We must therefore conclude,
that we are easily deceived, when we
confuse universals with singulars, and the
entities of reason and
abstractions with realities.
[III.B.(iv)] As for the
fourth objection,
I am quite ready
to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as
perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain
drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I
am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than
a man; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools,
madmen, etc.
[IV.] It remains to
point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine
as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been
said. The doctrine is good,
[A.] Inasmuch as it
teaches us to act solely according to the decree of
God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we
perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a
doctrine not only completely tranquillizes our spirit, but also shows us
where our highest happiness or
blessedness
is, namely, solely in the
knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as
love and piety shall
bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
estimate of virtue
are those who expect to be decorated by God with high
rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured
the direst slavery; as if
virtue
and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
[B.] Inasmuch as it
teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with
respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our own
power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should
await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing
that all things follow from the
eternal
decree of God by the same
necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three
angles are equal to two right angles.
[C.] This doctrine
raises social life,
inasmuch as it teaches us to
hate
no man, neither to despise, to
deride, to
envy, or to be angry with any.
Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and
helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish
pity, favour, or
superstition,
but solely by the guidance of
reason, according as the time
and occasion demand, as I will show in Part 3.
[D.] Lastly, this
doctrine confers no small advantage on the
commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not
so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things
are best.
I have thus fulfilled the promise
made at the beginning of this note,
and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have
therein explained the nature and properties of the
human mind at
sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with
sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be
known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.