Going to the Ground: Lessons from Law Enforcement

Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) go “hands on” in both armed and unarmed
physical confrontations more often than perhaps any other armed
professionals. Within the self-defense and martial arts communities,
this naturally has led to a great deal of interest in the experiences
of officers in physical encounters. And no other information coming
from the law enforcement community has received as much attention as an
elusive set of statistics that purportedly show that 90% (or more) of
physical altercations “go to the ground.”

The responsibility for
the popularizing of this statistic is most often laid at the feet of
the famous Gracie family, proponents of the art of Brazilian jujitsu,
and dismissed as a shameless attempt at marketing themselves and their
family fighting system which, not coincidentally, emphasizes fighting
on the ground.

Unfortunately, I have
yet to see a single source within the martial arts community --
affiliated with the Gracies or otherwise -- that accurately cites the
actual study, or that does not either accept the statistics (or
repudiate them) almost wholesale. If the constantly repeated Internet
forum discussions and “letters to the editor” to various trade
magazines are any indication, the topic has actually become an
emotional argument for some. That argument usually finds those who
practice Brazilian jujitsu or a similar system with a strong ground
fighting component supporting the stats, and those who practice an art
with minimal or no ground grappling denying their relevance. After
personally posting the information below on several Internet forums
with a wide dissemination, I still see the statistics often misquoted,
misunderstood, and misapplied. I have seen them dismissed as pertaining
“only to law enforcement,” and explained away as not offering lessons
for self-defense.

The statistics provided
here are quoted directly from the ASLET (American Society of Law
Enforcement Training) pamphlet for their July 1997 Use of Force
Training Seminar. The training was presented in Los Angeles by Sergeant
Greg Dossey, Sergeant John Sommers, and Officer Steve Uhrig of the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). It includes a description of the
study and methodology used in investigating Use of Force incidents by
LAPD.

In 1991, Sergeant
Dossey, an exercise physiologist with the LAPD, completed a comparative
study of use of force incidents reported by LAPD for the year 1988.
Sergeant Dossey looked at all 5,617 use of force incident narratives
written by officers in 1988, and devised a method for codifying the
information contained and analyzing it for what they identified as
dominant altercation patterns. The study was replicated in 1992 by
LAPD’s Training Review committee.

Below, I will provide
direct quotes (in italics) from the 1997 ASLET report along with
some analysis and commentary which should help shed more light on what
lessons law enforcement and the concerned citizen can glean from the
study. After that, I will do the same with information taken from a
2003 survey of attendees at a Calibre Press Street Survival Seminar.

For the purposes of this
article, the significant findings of the 1997 ASLET study are: [EN1]

1. During 1988, there
were 316,525 arrests made by LAPD.

5,617 (1.7%) of
these arrests required the completion of a use of force report.

2,031 (0.6%)
altercations developed from these arrests. “Of the 5,617 reports
examined, only 2,031 incidents contained a sufficient level of
aggressive resistance by the suspect toward the officer to qualify as
an altercation.”

Thus, the study confirms
what every police officer knows: most arrest situations involve little
or no use of force, and minor resistance does not qualify as a “fight”
(or in this case, altercation). Semi-compliant persons are often
stopped by a mere order to comply or with a firm control of an arm or
wrist for handcuffing. Nonetheless, even these low level uses of force
may require use of force reports in many agencies, as does the pointing
of a firearm at a subject who may not resist physically in any way.
This study has accounted for these facts.

2. During 1988, there
were an average of 867 arrests and 5.6 altercations per day. Eight
hundred fifty six officers reported injuries from such altercations.
These 856 officers missed a total of 2,095 days from work due to
injuries sustained in altercations.

3. Altercations were
most likely to develop from the following field activities:
disturbances of the peace (33.8%), traffic stops (18.5%), and observed
narcotics activity (14.8%).

4. Over 90% of the
subjects involved in altercations were male; only about 9.5% were
female.

5. Five scenario
patterns accounted for 95% of the altercations: “Within each of
these five patterns, a description of the most frequent first, second,
and final combative action was generated by the computer… Four
combative actions by suspects accounted for almost two thirds (65.8%)
of these I.O.D. injuries; the officer was kicked 23.4 percent, punched
16 percent, thrown/tripped 15 percent, or was bitten 11.4 percent. In
1988 the average officer in uniform and assigned to the field was in
less than 3 altercations.” The thrown/tripped statistic includes
injuries sustained from wrestling on the ground.

As for the five
patterns, they were:

Subject pulls
away from an officer’s attempt to control the subject’s arm. “33.7%
Officer grabbed the subject by the arm and the subject pulled his arm
away; the most frequent second act was the officer applying a joint
lock (32%) and the most frequent final subduing act was the officer
taking the subject down to the ground (46%)”

Subject attempts
to punch or kick the officer.“25.4% Subject ran at the officer
and swung punches and kicks; the most frequent second act was the
officer evading the subject and striking him with the baton (26%; a
close second was taking the subject to the ground 22%) and the most
frequent final subduing act was taking the subject to the ground (35%).”

Subject refuses
to assume a searching position.“19.3% Subject refused to
assume a searching position as verbally ordered by the officer; the
most frequent second act was the officer applying a joint lock (35.5%)
and the most frequent final subduing act was taking the subject to the
ground (36.5%).”

Subject flees and
officer pursues.“10.5% Subject ran from the officer, officer
chased the subject; the most frequent second act was the officer taking
the subject to the ground (40%) and the most frequent final subduing
act was also taking the subject to the ground (39.5%).”

Subject takes a
combative posture, but does not attempt to strike the officer.“6.8%
Subject assumed a fighting, martial arts, or boxing stance but did not
attack the officer; the most frequent second act was the officer
striking the subject with the baton (38%) and this was also the most
frequent final act (41%).”

The study also included
the percentages of injuries based on targeting of the attacks. For
example: kicking resulted in injuries to the legs (36%), the head
(27%), the rib cage (22.5%), and the groin (14%). Although several
fractures occurred, the most common injury was a bruise to the legs,
head, ribs, or groin. The most common injury suffered in ground
fighting was a strained lower back.

6. The report concluded:
“Nearly two thirds of the 1988 altercations (62%) ended with the
officer and subject on the ground with the officer applying a joint
lock and handcuffing the subject.” Given this, it is better put
that the LAPD data says when officers physically fought with suspects
(versus simply encountering minor resistance or non-compliance which
required a minor use of force, but did not escalate into an
altercation), 95% of the time those fights took one of five patterns,
and 62% of those five types of altercations ended up with the officer
and subject on the ground with the officer locking and handcuffing the
suspect.

After this report was
published, LAPD instituted a program that included training in ground
control skills, which in turn were based on modern judo and jujutsu
grappling skills specially adapted for law enforcement. A follow-up
study presented the following conclusions:

Use of force
incidents and use of force percentages were reduced. The average
5.6 altercations per day in 1988 reduced to 1.7 altercations per day in
1991. Certainly, other factors were involved, [EN2]
but Sergeant Dossey
has been quoted (at Defend University, www.defendu.com)
as saying he believes this was in part due to increased confidence in
handling altercations.

Injuries were
reduced. Suspect injuries were down 34.6% and officer injuries were
down 17.7% in 1991.

The same 5
patterns still accounted for 90% of altercations. Although the same
basic patterns applied, the chance of officers receiving a punch or
kick attempt increased from a 2-11% chance (depending on scenario) to a
25-71% chance (depending on scenario). Officer involved in shootings
increased by 6.3% as well. Thus, it appears that even as officers
became better trained, suspects were becoming more violent.

Calibre
Press Survival Seminar, 2003

In its April 2003 online
newsletter, Calibre Press published results of a research project
completed along with PPCT Management Systems. This project
measured the other side of the equation, namely the frequency in which
police officers were forced to the ground by attackers. About 1,400
cases were reported by officers attending the Calibre Press Street
Survival Seminar. [EN3]

Respondents were asked
whether an attacker had ever attempted to force them to the ground.
More than half (52%) reported this had occurred. Of that number, 60%
reported that their attackers had been successful in taking them down.
Of the 60% taken down, 52% reported receiving ground control training
prior to the event, and 40% after.

At the time of the
assault, most of the assailants were under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs. Most of the takedown incidents occurred during domestic
and other disturbance calls, or during traffic stops. These are the
same situations in which the majority of officers are assaulted and
killed each year (31% during disturbances, accounting for 15.6% of
officer deaths, followed by traffic stops, accounting for 15.1% of
officer deaths).

45% of the attempts
to take the officer down occurred during interviews

40% occurred at
handcuffing

10% at escort

5% during booking

Standard assault
patterns took the following forms:

Pulling the officer
to the ground (33%)

Pushing the officer
to the ground (28%)

Tackling the officer
to the ground (24%)

Kicking or punching
the officer to the ground (15%)

Once the officer was
down:

The subject
continued to assault the officer once the officer was down (64%)

The subject fled
(31%)

The subject waited
for the officer to get back up to continue the fight (5%)

Of the ground fights,
suspects generally continued with grappling and pinning techniques
(77%), or used punches, kicks, and strikes (66%). However, in 21% of
the cases, the subjects attempted to disarm the officer, with 5% being
successful. As a side note, the FBI states that of 594 law enforcement
officers killed between 1992 and 2001, 46 were killed with their own
weapon.

On the ground, the
officers tended to use weapons other than firearms:

Pepper spray (OC)
was used 29% of the time

Impact weapons
(sticks, batons, flashlights, handcuffs, etc.) were used 26% of the time

Hands, feet, holds,
etc., were used 24% of the time

Officers used firearms
in just 13 cases (less than 1% of attacks). However, during these 13
uses of firearms, three resulted in suspect fatalities.

Final
Comment

Statistics should be
viewed more as guidelines than as specifics. The varied situational,
environmental, physical, and psychological intersections that occur
within confrontations make each and every one different. However, if
similar patterns occur time and again, the patterns should not be
ignored.

The LAPD study does not
show that “90% of fights go to the ground.” Instead, the LAPD study
shows that 95% of altercations took on one of five familiar patterns
(with which any street cop will be intimately familiar). It also shows
that of that 95%, 62% ended up with both the officer and the suspect
grappling on the ground.

Obviously, being
professionally charged with restraining someone versus being primarily
focused on escaping an attack will change the dynamic of a
confrontation after the initial engagement. This is why I believe
police in an arrest situation are more likely than a citizen in a
self-defense situation to stay on the ground during a physical
encounter.

Nonetheless, it is
interesting to note that more than half the officers surveyed by
Calibre Press reported that suspects had attempted to take them down,
and that the suspects accomplished this 60% of the time. Of that
number, the overwhelming majority stayed on the ground grappling with
the officer (77%). When considering these patterns of assault, they are
of the same nature as criminal assaults on citizens. In other words,
the mechanics of an assault (versus the mechanics of arrest) do not
change simply because one of the people involved is a police officer.
[EN4]

To conclude, one can
quibble with the exact percentages, but being on the ground happens
frequently during serious altercations. Could a person’s being taken
down and not having an effective means to deal with the situation
increase odds of death or serious injury, either to him/herself or to
the assailant? My personal view is that this is the case.

About the Author

The author is a law enforcement officer and use of force instructor in
the Pacific Northwest.

EN1.
The 1997 ASLET study also goes into liability concerns such as
excessive force complaints, lawsuits, and settlement amounts paid out,
but these are beyond the scope of this article.

EN2.
During this period, TASER use increased by 76.7%. This factor should
not be ignored when evaluating the reduction of altercations and
suspect/officer injuries.

EN3.
These seminars take place yearly throughout the United States and
include officers from all walks of the law enforcement profession, from
federal agents to patrol and tactical officers, detectives and
corrections personnel, and any other type of sworn law enforcer.

EN4.
In the cases involving violence that I have seen in which neither of
the involved parties was an LEO, most had a significant portion (or at
least a significant moment) during which one or both of the
participants was on the ground, or fighting under conditions that were
similar to ground fighting (e.g., on a bed, on a couch, etc.).