After having just read the three essays in this forum by Michael Gorman (“Web 2.0: The Sleep of Reason,” “The Siren Song of the Internet,” and “Jabberwiki”), I happened to go to a local museum exhibit on “Modernism.” The term is applied to a set of beliefs, assumptions and goals, both artistic and social, that characterized much of avant-garde thought in the early decades of the last century. I couldn’t help noticing a few parallels between that set of beliefs and some of our own, regarding our current “digital age.”

One striking feature of Modernism was its infatuation with the new technologies of its time: load-bearing steel frames enabled the exteriors of buildings to become sheer panels of glass, elegant in their simplicity (“Less is more,” in Mies van der Rohe’s famous phrase). Concrete allowed mass-production of large buildings that would have taken decades to erect with old-fashioned masonry construction techniques. Airplanes, sleek ocean liners, and concrete autobahns allowed transportation at speeds and distances never before imagined; the world was becoming connected in exciting new ways.

In aesthetics, a new value was placed on simplicity, standardization, and mass production. Architects created elegant drawings of vast, uniform housing and office complexes, breathtakingly rendered cinematically in Metropolis and Things to Come. Designers produced clean-lined uniforms for the proletariat and standardized kitchens that scientifically reduced the number of their steps from oven to dining table. Every object in the built environment, from teapots and chairs to railroads and skyscrapers, was re-engineered, simplified, and streamlined. Abstract painting, too, re-figured nature in geometrical cubist perspectives, portraying it not as we actually see it, but as it appeared to a new and expanded vision that could take in all sides simultaneously.

The re-engineering of the built environment and the rejection of customary perspectives went hand in hand with visions of transforming humanity itself: if man’s environment could be changed to increase his interconnectedness with the world, surely his nature would expand, too, beyond narrow and self-centered horizons towards a greater concern for the whole human race. Socialism and communism were the waves of the future, offering designer versions of mass society on scientifically plotted grids, portraying “the new man” as unstoppable in his march towards ever greater “progress” and material abundance for all. The proletariat, in its streamlined uniforms and cross-cultural collective wisdom, would shake off artificial prejudices and locally-entrenched limitations of class and nationality: “Workers of the world, unite! You have only your chains to lose!” The planned economy, with standardized commodities for all, scientifically managed, would finally bring about world peace, prosperity, and Utopia. “The new” trumped “the old.” The progressive trumped the static. Futurism trumped tradition. Forward-looking vision trumped backward-looking experience.

Except that . . . well, the world didn’t quite fit very well into the Modernist template. Nobody wanted to actually sit in a Frank Lloyd Wright chair. As much as they appreciated cubism, people continued to want portraits of themselves that looked like persons rather than geometrical demonstrations. The factories that produced the steel for the new skyscrapers and the coal for the dynamos also produced byproducts of pollution and grime and occupational disease. Some people liked living in homes of wood and brick and stone. Trees somehow retained a value not captured by aluminum. People didn’t want to wear the uniforms that the futurists had designed for them. The autobahns and airplanes that improved transportation turned out to facilitate not just utopian cooperation but also the movement of armies and the bombing of cities. The people who were assigned to live in the great housing collectives–the ones whose designs looked so elegant in architectural renderings–wound up cheering louder than anyone else when the Pruitt-Igoe projects in St. Louis, and the Robert Taylor high-rises in Chicago, were dynamited to the ground (even as comparable blunders remain, literally, set in concrete in the former Soviet states). The scientifically managed societies had a way of changing the goal of political equality of rights into one of material egalitarianism of possessions–an outcome easier to measure–at the expense not only of redefining equality, but of denying liberty and justice. No one rejoiced more at the demise of communism than those who had to live under it. New technologies and visionary optimism, ultimately, could not trump recalcitrant human nature. It turned out that the world to come, as envisioned by the avant-garde, made for aesthetic excitement; but the imposition of that vision on the world of lived experience proved to be more of a fad, and less of a world-transformation, than futurists of the time envisioned.

I can’t help but see a few cautionary lessons here for our own Brave New Digital World, in ways that support Mr. Gorman’s views. I suspect that the Internet will not bring about world peace any more than airplanes did; terrorists use it as much for their purposes as peace-mongers do for theirs.