New York — U.S. law enforcement officials have found a manual on the operation of cropdusting equipment while searching suspected terrorist hideouts, government sources tell TIME magazine in an issue out on Monday, Sept. 24th.
The discovery has added to concerns among government counterterrorism experts that the bin Laden conspirators may have been planning — or may still be planning —to disperse biological or chemical agents from a cropdusting plane normally used for agricultural purposes.

Among the belongings of suspected terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, sources tell TIME, were manuals showing how to operate cropdusting equipment that could be used to spray fast-killing toxins into the air.

The discovery resulted in the grounding of all cropdusters nationwide on Sunday Sept. 16th. The dusters have been allowed back up, but are not allowed to take off or land from what traffic controllers refer to as Class B airspace, or the skies around major cities.

WASHINGTON — In highly unusual testimony inside the federal supermax prison, a former operative for Al Qaeda has described prominent members of Saudi Arabia’s royal family as major donors to the terrorist network in the late 1990s and claimed that he discussed a plan to shoot down Air Force One with a Stinger missile with a staff member at the Saudi Embassy in Washington.

DXersaid

Graeme Macqueen refers to the “so-called hijackers.” I’m sorry. If Graeme doesn’t know that the hijackers flew those planes and killed 3,000 Americans, then he absolutely nothing to offer on the subject of Amerithrax.

But as the connections he says we no longer hear about, then maybe he simply isn’t familiar with the subject of the GAO’s inquiry.

DXersaid

A big break came when the son of the imprisoned blind sheik, Abdel Rahman, was captured in Quetta, Pakistan in mid-February 2003. The blind sheik’s son had recently had been in contact with Khalid Mohammed, Al Qaeda’s #3. (Khalid Mohammed may have narrowly escaped capture when Abdel Rahman was grabbed in Quetta.)
On March 1, 2003, authorities announced that Khalid Mohammed had been captured 400 miles from Quetta, in Islamabad. Mohammed had hands-on responsibility for planning 9-11. Reports of the arrest described his role in various operations over the years, including the thwarted “Operation Bojinka” in the Philippines in 1995. At that time, authorities searching a seized laptop computer found a letter signed by “Khalid Shaikh Bojinka.” The letter, apparently written by Mohammed and his associates, threatened to not only attack aircraft, the principal plot underway, but threatened to launch a biochemical attack if the blind sheik was not released from custody. Khalid Mohammed reportedly played a substantial role in trying to build Al Qaeda’s expertise in biological and chemical weapons. Specifically, it turned out that he knew quite a bit about the process for weaponizing anthrax.
The Dr. Abdul Qadoos Khan family who lived at the home where officials say they found Mohammed denies the official version of the al Qaeda arrests. The doctor now runs a respected cardiology institute called Hearts International. Dr. Khan and his wife, according to early accounts, had been at a wedding in Lahore. The family reports that at 3 a.m on Saturday, a squad of around 20 officers burst into the home. At no point, according to the family, was Mohammed or any other man in the house. The agents, according to the family, did not even ask about them. Officials at Pakistan’s interior ministry, in contrast, insist that Mohammed (along with another Arab al-Qaeda member) was arrested at the same time the son, Ahmed, was detained. The microbiologist had worked in Africa, including Sudan and Zambia. The day after the raid of the microbiologist’s home, authorities also detained another of the microbiologist’s sons for questioning, Major Adil in the Pakistan Army, though he was not arrested.
According to one isolated but dramatic report, a few days after the raid, in another predawn raid, 20 officers went back to the Qadoos home and asked for the microbiologist father. The father had not been quoted or pictured. The daughter who described the raid said his whereabouts were unknown. The Pakistan intelligence service, the ISI, confirmed he was wanted for questioning. At the first court date of the son, who later was released on bail, the son Ahmed embraced his mother and asked “How’s Daddy?” The son reportedly receives a stipend from the UN’s Farm and Agriculture Organization for having a low IQ due to lead poisoning. Described as an innocent by his mother, his mom says he lives for his budgies. Yet the international press focused on his arrest and bail rather than the charging and manhunt for his microbiologist father.
His father’s role came to be all the more important when the documents relating to the weaponization of anthrax were found on Khalid Mohammed’s laptop computer (which allegedly had been seized at the microbiologist’s home). On March 28, 2003, the father, at a hospital receiving treatment for his heart condition, was granted “pre-arrest bail”, which was confirmed the next day in court upon his arrest.
Dr. Abdul Qadoos Khan, a bacteriologist with access to production materials and facilities, previously worked in Sudan for the UN’s World Health Organization. According to his family, retired in 1985 after heart bypass surgery. “His career speaks about his honesty, and he has never been involved in any clandestine activities,” his counsel successfully argued in seeking bail. Al Qaeda was based in Sudan from 1992-1996.
Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on Al Qaeda, described Khalid Mohammed’s arrest as a big setback for the group, but detailed to NYC officials “what he said was the terrorist group’s efforts to encourage its operatives to use poisons to kill large numbers of people.” On March 17, 2003, in connection with the invasion of Iraq, the country went back on high alert, with State Department counterterrorism officials warning of multiple Al Qaeda attacks.
On March 23, 2003, the Washington Post reported on documents allegedly discovered at the Abdul Qadoos Khan residence — on Khalid Mohammed’s laptop — relating to biochemical weapons. The documents indicated that Al Qaeda leaders may already have manufactured some of them. As previously evidenced by a disc seized by Zawahiri’s right-hand man, Mabruk — 5 years ago — in addition to obtaining unweaponized anthrax, Al Qaeda obtained the materials required to make two biological toxins, botulinum and salmonella. The failure to put Zawahiri’s decade long quest to weaponize anthrax into historical context leads to a serious underestimation of the progress Al Qaeda likely made in recruiting the necessary talent. Zawahiri’s quest included 15 separate attempts over 10 years, according to one released Egyptian islamist interviewed in an Egyptian paper.
The documents at the Qadoos home reveal that Al Qaeda had a feasible production plan for anthrax. The Washington Post attributes the seizure of documents to 2003, when the raid of the home of microbiologist Qadoos occurred. The CIA, however, first seized a disc concerning Zawahiri’s plans a half decade ago in Azerbaijan in connection with the arrest of Zawahiri’s right-hand man, Mabruk. Vague undated instructions relating to spray drying, even assuming for the sake of argument, they were on the most recently seized disc but not the earlier one, do not add much to the analysis. Zawahiri’s intent and determination — as well as his acquaintance with numerous skilled scientists — was plain from the documentary evidence and sworn testimony on the subject a half decade ago.
Confronted with scanned handwritten notes on his computer, Mohammed reportedly began to talk about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program.
The Washington Post explains that “What the documents and debriefings show, the first official said, is that “he was involved in anthrax production, and [knew] quite a bit about it.” Barton Gellman in the Post explains that al Qaeda recruited competent scientists, including a Pakistani microbiologist who the officials decline to name. “The documents describe specific timelines for producing biochemical weapons and include a bar graph depicting the parallel processes that must take place between Days 1 and 31 of manufacture. Included are inventories of equipment and indications of readiness to grow seed stocks of pathogen in nutrient baths and then dry the resulting liquid slurry into a form suitable for aerosol dispersal.” The Washington Post story notes that U.S. officials said the evidence does not indicate whether al Qaeda completed manufacture. The documents are undated and unsigned and cryptic about essential details.
The Washington Post reported in March 2003 that “[t]wo officials said this month’s discoveries have changed their minds about the significance of an abandoned factory found a year ago in Kandahar… Some government analysts believe the Afghan laboratory may have been fully equipped and even operating before U.S. ground forces arrived.” (No traces of anthrax were found). “It has been moved elsewhere, in another country, and we haven’t been able to find it,’ the official said.” The Post explains that another official said “there is obviously a connection” between the seized documents and the evacuated lab.” The unnamed official notes that Al Qaeda need not have smuggled equipment out to rebuild the factory because the spraydrying equipment can be purchased commercially. The 9/11 Commission Report noted in passing that one idea KSM had was reservoir poisoning.
Susan Schmidt and Ellen Naskashima of the Washington Post, described the fruits of Khalid Mohammed’s ongoing interrogation:
“Mohammed has also told interrogators of [Zacarias] Moussaoui’s close association with Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali,* Mohammed has told interrogators that Sufaat took the lead in developing biological weapons for al Qaeda until he was arrested by Malaysian authorities.***Mohammed has also told interrogators that he knows nothing about why Moussaoui and some of the hijackers were interested in learning how to operate crop-dusters, but he has said it could have been connected to Sufaat’s work on anthrax.”
After his capture in the summer of 2003, Hambali confirmed to his U.S. interrogators, according to a summary of his statements under interrogation, that he had been “working on an Al Qaeda Anthrax program in Kandahar,” Afghanistan.
Mohammed has also told interrogators that he knows nothing about why Moussaoui and some of the hijackers were interested in learning how to operate crop-dusters, but he has said it could have been connected to Sufaat’s work on anthrax.
At the end of April 2003, another of Khalid Mohammed’s nephews, Tawfiq Bin Attash (“Khallad”), was captured in Karachi, along with five others (and 330 pounds of explosive they intended to use in Pakistan). He was a planner of the Cole bombing. He attended the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia and spoke with the two hijackers and Ramzi Binalshibh about 9/11.
Participants at a key meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 included Hambali, two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almidhar, Cole planner Attash aka Khallad, and others. According to some reports, KSM was also present. Tawfiq Bin Attash was a long time Bin Laden operative. The Yemeni first went to Afghanistan in 1989. He came to lead Bin Laden’s bodyguards and was an intermediary between Bin Laden and those who carried out the bombing of the Cole in October 2000. Khalid Almihdhar, one of the 9/11 hijackers, was from Saudi Arabia but was a Yemeni national. Almihdhar was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui.
The 9/11 Commission Report explained:
“Hambali played the critical role of coordinator, as he distributed al Qaeda funds earmarked for joint operations. In one especially notable example, Atef turned to Hambali when al Qaeda needed a scientist to take over its biological weapons program. Hambali obliged by introducing a U.S.-educated JI member, Yazid Sufaat, to Ayman al Zawahiri in Kandahar. In 2001, Sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda in a laboratory he set up near the Kandahar airport.”
The Commmission staff may have been relying on Malaysian interrogation reports in arriving at the odd phrasing.
Zacarias Moussaoui was alleged, at least initially, to have received his money from Yazid Sufaat, under the cover of a company managed by his wife named Infocus Tech. A legitimate company, the company has eight employees and virtually no connection to the US. The company was an importer of US computer software and hardware.
Sufaat, who was arrested upon returning from Afghanistan to Malaysia where he had been serving in a Taliban medical brigade, graduated from California State University, Sacramento in 1987. He received a bachelors degree in biological sciences, concentrating on clinical laboratory technology, with a minor in chemistry. Sufaat joined the Malaysian army, where he was a lab technician assigned to a medical brigade. After five years, he left the service with the rank of captain and worked for a civilian laboratory. In August 1993, he set up his own company, Green Laboratory Medicine. The 9/11 Commission Report notes that Sufaat started work on the al Qaeda biological weapons program after he participated in JI’s December 2000 church bombings.
After authorities found a letter signed by Yazid Sufaat purporting to authorize Zacarias Moussaoui as its marketing representative, authorities went looking for Sufaat. But by then, he had left for Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to his wife, he went to Pakistan in June 2001 because he wanted to do his doctorate in pathology at the University of Karachi. According to his wife, Sejarhtul Dursina, “He had planned to set up a medical support unit in Afghanistan, near Kandahar.” (Kandahar is where Al Qaeda established its anthrax lab.) Dursina had attended Sacramento State with him. It was her mother who encouraged Yazid’s religious studies.
According to Malaysian officials, Sufaat merely was a foot soldier who provided housing and false identification letters and helped obtain explosives. “I would put it this way: If Hambali [Al Qaeda’s point man in Southeast Asia] was the travel agent, Sufaat was the guy at the airport holding up the sign.” Sufaat admits to having purchased 4 tons of ammonium nitrate to build a truck bomb for the Singapore cell. The 9/11 Commission Report indicates Zacarias Moussaoui was also involved in arranging the purchase — one plan was to load the explosives on a cargo plane. The ammonium nitrate eventually was found buried throughout the grounds of a plantation.
The Malaysian officials report that they believe that Sufaat had no knowledge of what the hijackers who stayed at his condominium or Zacarias were planning. That is consistent with the principles of cell security ordinarily followed — also evasion in interrogation. At a minimum, however, the established facts relevant to the Amerithrax investigation show that in the Summer and Fall of 2001 an Al Qaeda supporter who had assisted in the 9-11 operation — and who was a lab technician working with anthrax — was in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Was he the fellow perceived as Filipino who the journalist met in Afghanistan in the Fall of 2001 bragging about his ability to manipulate anthrax? According to Sufaat’s attorney, Sufaat gave two FBI agents no fresh evidence during a 30-minute interrogation finally conducted in November 2002 (where they mainly wanted to know how he knew Zacarias). The U.S. asked for his extradition in connection with hosting of the two 9/11 hijackers, but Malaysia refused.
The connection between the folks in Karachi and the folks in Kuala Lumpur was further confirmed by the arrest in May 2002 of Mohammed Monsour Jabarah. This young man told interrogators that the codeword for Americans was “White Meat,” suggesting unclean pork. He was a go-between Khalid Mohammed in Karachi and Hambali in Kuala Lumpur. He delivered the money for the bombing attacks planned for Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Arrested in March 2002, he had joined Al Qaeda in May 2001. In his interrogation, the Catholic-schooled youth said that KSM had asked him to “go to Malaysia to meet with individuals who were planning an operation against the US and Israeli embassies in the Philippines.” Osama Bin Laden, with whom he met, valued the youth for his clean Canadian passport and fluency in English. KSM told the young man that he must leave Karachi to deliver the money to Hambali, Al Qaeda’s point man in Southeast Asia and the military chief for Jemiah Islamiyah, before September 11. He flew out to deliver the money on September 10, 2001. Hambali earlier had met with Mohammed Mansour Jabarah in Karachi in August 2001. Jabarah is cooperating and is available to testify in an Amerithrax prosecution. Documents relating to Jabarah’s brother’s role were found in May 2003 upon a raid in Riyadh that foiled an attempt that preceded the bombing of several residential compounds. The picture of his home in St. Catherines, Ontario, brings to mind the movie “Arlington Road” about the terrorist who lived next door.
Hambali fled Malaysia with his wife, Lee, not long after 9/11. His wife and her sister had studied at the school of Bashir, JI’s religious leader. He told his mother they were moving to Thailand. Hambali worked and his wife studied Arabic. Over the next two years, he also spent time in Cambodia and Myanmar. Soft-spoken and polite, the neighbors said he kept to himself in the apartment building. He reportedly also underwent plastic surgery to alter his appearance, but perhaps he just shaved his beard. Hambali was arrested in mid-August 2003 in Thailand. His wife, Noralwizah Lee Abdullah, an ethnic Chinese Malaysian who converted to Islam, was also detained. Hambali’s and Yazid Sufaat’s work on the anthrax program dates to long before Yazid Sufaat went to Afghanistan in 2001 as detailed elsewhere. The connection between 911 and anthrax could not have been more manifest than within the four walls of Yazid Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur condo.

DXersaid

In his book, he does not get to the merits of the attacks in the first 43 pages — which is the point I’ve reached.

Graeme writes: “Evoking Pearl Harbor, Kissinger made it clear that treating the attacks as a police matter was not enough.”

At page 31 he disputes the reaction of commentators on September 11 that the flying of the multiple airplanes into buildings, to include the Pentagon, was an “act of war.”

Well, Bin Laden had declared war on the United States in 1996. Bin Laden then in a carefully orchestrated plot launched a surprise attack that involved planes flown into several buildings simultaneously — to include the Pentagon and (had Flight 93 not been thwarted) the Capitol.

The friend of my former Facebook Friend Al Qaeda anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat was Moussaoui. Yazid Sufaat says Moussaoui wanted to fly the big planes like the other hijackers. And Graeme objects to the visceral reaction — even after the planes had flown into the buildings — to calling it an act of war.

Well, at that, in protest I’m going to rip the Canadian flag from the backpack I use hosteling in Europe.

The visceral reaction by commentators on 9/11 that it was an “act of war” is totally understandable. Yet the author disagrees.

So you can see therefore that his discussion of the anthrax attacks is going highly politicized — indeed, at page 43 he has not yet gotten to any substantive discussion of the whodunnit.

He clearly has been influenced by Frances Boyle who has published 7 books by Clarity. I once urged Frances to focus on the true crime whodunnit rather than politics — he wasn’t interested. Same with Barry.

It’s all politics for these guys. But the trouble is unless you take a factual, evidenced-based approach you reach the wrong conclusion and you base your politics on a false premise.

The bad guys — whoever they are — then get away.

It seems that this is not a book about the anthrax mailings so much as a book by someone whose reaction on 9/11 was not one of deep anger against those responsible as they watched the news reports that morning.

People are entitled to not like the United States. But don’t ever try to try to fly under the radar. Not on my watch.

DXersaid

“By September 26, even though, according to the official story, no one but the perpetrators knew anthrax had been released in the mails, there were open discussions in the press of an “anthrax scare.”2 After the death of Robert Stevens on October 5, the fears had a sound basis and grew rapidly.”

Well, I think I bought my Cipro on September 21 after the New York Times reported, as I best recall, Atta’s inquiries about the cropdusters and the concern that the inquiries related to anthrax. (If my purchase was 9/21, the NYT article may have been 9/18).

In another life, I had once done research involving Prince Bandar and knew that aerially-dispersed biochem weapons might be in the mix given the 100 TOW helicopters he financed for Iraq at the height of the Iraq-Iran war. See public, court-filed allegations of the late arms trafficker Sarkis Soghanalian.

It turns out that Moussaoui, the friend of the Al Qaeda anthrax lab director Yazid Sufaat, made similar inquiries or did similar research. The documents were found on his laptop. Unfortunately the documents were found too late because the agent’s adamant request to HQ for a warrant was denied.

It was the inquiries relating to cropdusters that was in the press, not an “anthrax scare” as such.

In hindsight, had the FBI accessed the laptop and optimally processed the information perhaps 3,000 lives might have been saved. That well illustrates why it is important to correctly connect the dots.
The CIA and FBI knew about the meeting at the Kuala Lumpu condo of Yazid Sufaat and there was a letter of introduction for Moussaoui in his luggage written over the signature of Yazid Sufaat. As Bob Graham noted, the difficulty is that intelligence analysis requires connecting the dots among many fragmented pieces of information.

DXersaid

I heard Denis J. Halliday — at least he was scheduled to speak, I don’t recall any talk by him specifically — at a fundraiser at the local mosque for Rafil Dhafir.

I do recall, though, that he was moved to resign his position at the UN because he reports that he was strongly motivated by innocents (e.g., children) harmed by the sanctions on Iraq — a noble cause, to be sure.

The question emphasized by the wonderful woman moderating was why 100 agents had come here and simultaneously interviewed 150 people. (They came here at the same hour and minute Ali Al-Timimi’s townhouse was raided in Virginia.)

As I explained to her and husband, Dhafir’s confidante, that day, the agents came because the investigation was cover for pursuing a lead in Amerithrax relating to the Ann Arbor-based charity in which Dhafir and Al-Timimi were key players.

DXersaid

James V. has explained that the AQ bio program was much more compartmentalized than its chemical weapons program.

Hawsawi’s “Substituted Testimony” in the Moussaoui case illustrates the compartmentalization of the 911 planes operation.

Hawsawi joined the media committee Afghanistan in approximately July 2000, before KSM joined in approximately February 2001. Hawsawi lived at the media office HQ.

The first time he was asked to become involved in operational activities was about March 2001, when he took his second trip to the UAE.

In approximately August 2001, Hawsawi, with KSM’s blessing, decided to take an English course.

KSM told Hawsawi that the four men he was assisting were working on a big operation. Hawsawi was in phone contact with Atta to provide them with their flight arrival information.

Two hijackers had not known they were going to the US when Hawsawi handed them their passports. [This illustrates the principles of cell security followed].

Hawsawi spoke to Atta three to five times while Atta was in the US. “During the phone calls, Atta did not disclose his location.” [This illustrates the principles of cell security followed].

Various of the hijackers returned money to Hawsawi prior to 9/11.

On September 9, 2001, Ramzi Binalshib (then in USA], “was the one who told Hawsawi when the operation would happen. Ramzi Bin al-Shibh insisted that Hawsawi go to Pakistan to which Sheikh Mohammed agreed.” [Hawsawi had been in UAE for five months: May to September 2001.

“Subsequent to leaving the USA, Hawsawi went to Karachi, Pakistan, and stayed one day in a hotel located in the southern bazaar section of the city. Hawsawi then took a flight the next day to Quetta, Pakistan.”

Hawsawi had met Qahtani, the so-called “20th hijacker” in July or August 2001. KSM had sent Qahtani. Qahtani was one of the men who Atta had asked to arrange flights.

“Hawsawi explained that while on the flight to the U.S., Qahtani did not know how to cmplete the U.S. immigration and naturalization forms. According to Hawsawi, when U.S. authorities saw that Qahtani could not answer the questions on the forms to the satisfaction of the U.S. authorties, Qahtani was sent back to the UAE.”

KSM and Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh had told Hawsawi that Qahtani “was to be the ‘last one’ and was sent to the U.S. to ‘complete the group.'”

“Hawsawi said that he assumed that Qahtani went to the U.S. to be one of the hijackers.”

“After 9/11, Sheikh Mohammed told Hawsawi that Qahtani’s job was to control the passengers.”

“Hawsawi further noted that Qahtani did not speak English.”

Hawsawi says that he had Moussaoui several times at the Kandahar guesthouse but never spoke to him. Hawsawi says no one ever introduced Moussaoui to him. “Hawsawi claimed that he and others knew of Mousssoui by another name, however, Hawsawi could not recall it.”

“Hawsawi stated repeatedly that he never conducted any activity, be it commercial, financial, travel-related or otherwise, with or on behalf of Moussaoui.”

“Hawsawi further stated that he had no knowledge of Moussaoui’s travel or financial dealings or anyone whom may have facilitated those activities for him. Hawsawi added that none of the brothers talked to him about Moussaoui.”

After 9/11, in Karachi he brought up against to Hambali the use of planes in connection with an Asian plot. (I would have to find the cite I recently posted somewhere).

Author Pater Conboy, in the 2006 The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network, at p. 138, writes:

“According to Malaysian intelligence sources, during the first quarter of 2001, Yazid Sufaat, who had just arrived in Afghanistan for training, was asked to help identify four Indonesian commercial pilots who might be enticed into giving their lives on a mission. “

Here is an account by the USG of what Hambali has said about Yazid Sufaat and Moussaoui during Moussaoui’s stay in Malaysia at Yazid’s condo. Hambali touches on the company “Green Lab” as a cover to buy 4 tons of ammonium nitrate. After 9/11, Yazid told Hambali that he was worried given the letter or recommendation he had given Moussaoui.

“Hambali described Moussaoui as very troubled, not right in the head, and as having a bad character. In mid-2000, Moussaoui traveled to Panang Island, Malaysia, to meet with Hambali. Hambali believes that Moussaoui was sent by Muhammad Atif (aks Abu Hafs al Masri) or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“Sheikh Mohammed”) in part to meet him, but Moussaoui showed up unannounced and Hambali was then in Indonesia. Hambali was informed by JI operatives Yazid Sufaat and Samudra
(a.k.a. Abu Omar) that Moussaoui showed up. Hambali went to Malaysia to meet Moussaoui and brought him to Kuala Lumpur. Hambali put Moussaoui up in Yazid’s condominium, which was often used to house guests.”

“Hambali learned that the purpose of Moussaoui’s visit was to enroll in flight school and take flying lessons. Moussaoui did not know why Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Hafs wanted him to take lessons. …

“Yazid assisted Moussaoui in looking for flight schools …. Moussaoui talked often about taking flying lessons and told Hambali that he had dreams about flying a plane into the White House. Hambali believed that Moussaoui was not diligent about his mission, as he never actually enrolled in a flight school. In addition, flight schools were very expensive in Indonesia and he did not believe Moussaoui had any money, as he was always asking Hambali for money. Hambali said he had no intention of paying for Moussaoui’s flight school unless Sheikh Mohammed or Abu Hafs specifically ordered him to do so.”

“Soon after arriving, Moussaoui told Yazid and Hambali that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Hafs had instructed him to buy 40 tons of ammonium nitrate for a mission.

Training and Deployment to Kuala Lumpur
In the fall of 1999, the four operatives selected by Bin Ladin for the planes operation were chosen to attend an elite training course at al Qaeda’s Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin personally selected the veteran fighters who received this training, and several of them were destined for important operations. One example is Ibrahim al Thawar, or Nibras, who would participate in the October 12, 2000, suicide attack on the USS Cole. According to KSM, this training was not given specifically in preparation for the planes operation or any other particular al Qaeda venture. Although KSM claims not to have been involved with the training or to have met with the future 9/11 hijackers at Mes Aynak, he says he did visit the camp while traveling from Kandahar to Kabul with Bin Ladin and others.48

The Mes Aynak training camp was located in an abandoned Russian copper mine near Kabul. The camp opened in 1999, after the United States had destroyed the training camp near Khowst with cruise missiles in August 1998, and before the Taliban granted al Qaeda permission to open the al Faruq camp in Kandahar.Thus, for a brief period in 1999, Mes Aynak was the only al Qaeda camp operating in Afghanistan. It offered a full range of instruction, including an advanced commando course taught by senior al Qaeda member Sayf al Adl. Bin Ladin paid particular attention to the 1999 training session. When Salah al Din, the trainer for the session, complained about the number of trainees and said that no more than 20 could be handled at once, Bin Ladin insisted that everyone he had selected receive the training.49

The special training session at Mes Aynak was rigorous and spared no expense. The course focused on physical fitness, firearms, close quarters combat, shooting from a motorcycle, and night operations. Although the subjects taught differed little from those offered at other camps, the course placed extraordinary physical and mental demands on its participants, who received the best food and other amenities to enhance their strength and morale.50

Upon completing the advanced training at Mes Aynak, Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara went to Karachi, Pakistan. There KSM instructed them on Western culture and travel. Much of his activity in mid-1999 had revolved around the collection of training and informational materials for the participants in the planes operation. For instance, he collected Western aviation magazines; telephone directories for American cities such as San Diego and Long Beach, California; brochures for schools; and airline timetables, and he conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. He also purchased flight simulator software and a few movies depicting hijackings. To house his students, KSM rented a safehouse in Karachi with money provided by Bin Ladin.51

In early December 1999, Khallad and Abu Bara arrived in Karachi. Hazmi joined them there a few days later. On his way to Karachi, Hazmi spent a night in Quetta at a safehouse where, according to KSM, an Egyptian named Mohamed Atta simultaneously stayed on his way to Afghanistan for jihad training.52

Mihdhar did not attend the training in Karachi with the others. KSM says that he never met with Mihdhar in 1999 but assumed that Bin Ladin and Atef had briefed Mihdhar on the planes operation and had excused him from the Karachi training.53

The course in Karachi apparently lasted about one or two weeks. According to KSM, he taught the three operatives basic English words and phrases. He showed them how to read phone books, interpret airline timetables, use the Internet, use code words in communications, make travel reservations, and rent an apartment. Khallad adds that the training involved using flight simulator computer games, viewing movies that featured hijackings, and reading flight schedules to determine which flights would be in the air at the same time in different parts of the world. They used the game software to increase their familiarity with aircraft models and functions, and to highlight gaps in cabin security. While in Karachi, they also discussed how to case flights in Southeast Asia. KSM told them to watch the cabin doors at takeoff and landing, to observe whether the captain went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit. KSM, Khallad, and Hazmi also visited travel agencies to learn the visa requirements for Asian countries.54

The four trainees traveled to Kuala Lumpur: Khallad, Abu Bara, and Hazmi came from Karachi; Mihdhar traveled from Yemen. As discussed in chapter 6, U.S. intelligence would analyze communications associated with Mihdhar, whom they identified during this travel, and Hazmi, whom they could have identified but did not.55

According to KSM, the four operatives were aware that they had volunteered for a suicide operation, either in the United States or in Asia. With different roles, they had different tasks. Hazmi and Mihdhar were sent to Kuala Lumpur before proceeding to their final destination-the United States. According to KSM, they were to use Yemeni documents to fly to Malaysia, then proceed to the United States using their Saudi passports to conceal their prior travels to and from Pakistan. KSM had doctored Hazmi’s Saudi passport so it would appear as if Hazmi had traveled to Kuala Lumpur from Saudi Arabia via Dubai. Khallad and Abu Bara went to Kuala Lumpur to study airport security and conduct casing flights. According to Khallad, he and Abu Bara departed for Malaysia in mid-December 1999. Hazmi joined them about ten days later after briefly returning to Afghanistan to attend to some passport issues.56

Khallad had originally scheduled his trip in order to receive a new prosthesis at a Kuala Lumpur clinic called Endolite, and Bin Ladin suggested that he use the opportunity to case flights as well. According to Khallad, Malaysia was an ideal destination because its government did not require citizens of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states to have a visa. Malaysian security was reputed to be lax when it came to Islamist jihadists. Also, other mujahideen wounded in combat had reportedly received treatment at the Endolite clinic and successfully concealed the origins of their injuries. Khallad said he got the money for the prosthesis from his father, Bin Ladin, and another al Qaeda colleague.57

According to Khallad, when he and Abu Bara arrived in Kuala Lumpur they contacted Hambali to let him know where they were staying, since he was to be kept informed of al Qaeda activities in Southeast Asia. Hambali picked up Khallad and Abu Bara and brought them to his home, enlisting the help of a colleague who spoke better Arabic. Hambali then took them to the clinic.58

On December 31, Khallad flew from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok; the next day, he flew to Hong Kong aboard a U.S. airliner. He flew in first class, which he realized was a mistake because this seating assignment on that flight did not afford him a view of the cockpit. He claims to have done what he could to case the flight, testing security by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit onto the flight to Hong Kong. Khallad returned to Bangkok the following day. At the airport, the security officials searched his carry-on bag and even opened the toiletries kit, but just glanced at the contents and let him pass. On this flight, Khallad waited until most of the first-class passengers were dozing, then got up and removed the kit from his carry-on. None of the flight attendants took notice.59

After completing his casing mission, Khallad returned to Kuala Lumpur. Hazmi arrived in Kuala Lumpur soon thereafter and may even have stayed briefly with Khallad and Abu Bara at Endolite. Mihdhar arrived on January 5, probably one day after Hazmi. All four operatives stayed at the apartment of Yazid Sufaat, the Malaysian JI member who made his home available at Hambali’s request. According to Khallad, he and Hazmi spoke about the possibility of hijacking planes and crashing them or holding passengers as hostages, but only speculatively. Khallad admits being aware at the time that Hazmi and Mihdhar were involved in an operation involving planes in the United States but denies knowing details of the plan.60

While in Kuala Lumpur, Khallad wanted to go to Singapore to meet Nibras and Fahd al Quso, two of the operatives in Nashiri’s ship-bombing operation. An attempt to execute that plan by attacking the USS The Sullivans had failed just a few days earlier. Nibras and Quso were bringing Khallad money from Yemen, but were stopped in Bangkok because they lacked visas to continue on to Singapore. Also unable to enter Singapore, Khallad moved the meeting to Bangkok. Hazmi and Mihdhar decided to go there as well, reportedly because they thought it would enhance their cover as tourists to have passport stamps from a popular tourist destination such as Thailand. With Hambali’s help, the three obtained tickets for a flight to Bangkok and left Kuala Lumpur together. Abu Bara did not have a visa permitting him to return to Pakistan, so he traveled to Yemen instead.61

In Bangkok, Khallad took Hazmi and Mihdhar to one hotel, then went to another hotel for his meeting on the maritime attack plan. Hazmi and Mihdhar soon moved to that same hotel, but Khallad insists that the two sets of operatives never met with each other or anyone else. After conferring with the ship-bombing operatives, Khallad returned to Karachi and then to Kandahar, where he reported on his casing mission to Bin Ladin.62

Bin Ladin canceled the East Asia part of the planes operation in the spring of 2000. He evidently decided it would be too difficult to coordinate this attack with the operation in the United States. As for Hazmi and Mihdhar, they had left Bangkok a few days before Khallad and arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000.63

Meanwhile, the next group of al Qaeda operatives destined for the planes operation had just surfaced in Afghanistan. As Hazmi and Mihdhar were deploying from Asia to the United States, al Qaeda’s leadership was recruiting and training four Western-educated men who had recently arrived in Kanda-har. Though they hailed from four different countries-Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Yemen-they had formed a close-knit group as students in Hamburg, Germany. The new recruits had come to Afghanistan aspiring to wage jihad in Chechnya. But al Qaeda quickly recognized their potential and enlisted them in its anti-U.S. jihad.

DXersaid

Author Pater Conboy, in the 2006 The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network, at p. 138, writes:

“According to Malaysian intelligence sources, during the first quarter of 2001, Yazid Sufaat, who had just arrived in Afghanistan for training, was asked to help identify four Indonesian commercial pilots who might be enticed into giving their lives on a mission. “

DXersaid

Here is an account by the USG of what Hambali has said about Yazid Sufaat and Moussaoui during Moussaoui’s stay in Malaysia at Yazid’s condo. Hambali touches on the company “Green Lab” as a cover to buy 4 tons of ammonium nitrate. After 9/11, Yazid told Hambali that he was worried given the letter or recommendation he had given Moussaoui.

“Hambali described Moussaoui as very troubled, not right in the head, and as having a bad character. In mid-2000, Moussaoui traveled to Panang Island, Malaysia, to meet with Hambali. Hambali believes that Moussaoui was sent by Muhammad Atif (aks Abu Hafs al Masri) or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“Sheikh Mohammed”) in part to meet him, but Moussaoui showed up unannounced and Hambali was then in Indonesia. Hambali was informed by JI operatives Yazid Sufaat and Samudra
(a.k.a. Abu Omar) that Moussaoui showed up. Hambali went to Malaysia to meet Moussaoui and brought him to Kuala Lumpur. Hambali put Moussaoui up in Yazid’s condominium, which was often used to house guests.”

“Hambali learned that the purpose of Moussaoui’s visit was to enroll in flight school and take flying lessons. Moussaoui did not know why Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Hafs wanted him to take lessons. …

“Yazid assisted Moussaoui in looking for flight schools …. Moussaoui talked often about taking flying lessons and told Hambali that he had dreams about flying a plane into the White House. Hambali believed that Moussaoui was not diligent about his mission, as he never actually enrolled in a flight school. In addition, flight schools were very expensive in Indonesia and he did not believe Moussaoui had any money, as he was always asking Hambali for money. Hambali said he had no intention of paying for Moussaoui’s flight school unless Sheikh Mohammed or Abu Hafs specifically ordered him to do so.”

“Soon after arriving, Moussaoui told Yazid and Hambali that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Hafs had instructed him to buy 40 tons of ammonium nitrate for a mission. He would not tell Yazid or Hambali what the mission was, but since the instructions came from Sheikh Mohammed or Abu Hafs, they believed they needed to assist Moussaoui. Hambali said they thought Moussaoui must have been mistaken as to the amount of ammonium nitrate needed, as 40 tons was a tremendous amount, and they did not have enough money to purchase that much. Instead, they purchased four tons, hoping that was the actual amount requested by Abu Hafs or Sheikh Mohammed. Yazid, Samudra, and Moussaoui purchased the ammonium nitrate for approximately 8,000 Malaysian Ringets (approximately $1580 in July 2000). Hambali said he was not involved in the purchase and did not know the name of the company from which they bought it. They purchased the ammonium nitrate under the guise that it was for Yazid’s lab, which the detainee thought was called the Green Lab.”

“Hambali said that even four tons of ammonium nitrate was a huge amount, and they were very concerned about where to store it. When Moussaoui left, his JI hosts were stuck with the ammonium nitrate and the bill. Hambali said he, Yazid, and Samudra were puzzled and angered by this. When they later asked Sheikh Mohammed what they should do with the ammonium nitrate, Sheikh Mohammed professed ignorance, and said he had never told Moussaoui to buy ammonium nitrate, let alone 40 tons of it.”

“Moussaoui was in Malaysia for a total of two or three weeks. He stayed in Kuala Lumpur for the entire time, with the exception of four or five days in Jakarta. Hambali was not sure what Moussaoui was doing in Jarkarta, but believes Moussaoui may have been researching flight schools there. Upon his return, Moussaoui commented that al Qaeda had no support there, athough Hambali did not know on what Moussaoui based this observation.”

“According to Hambali, Moussaoui managed to annoy everyone he came in contact with Hambali had many arguments with Moussaoui because he was criticizing JI for sitting around and reading the Quran instead of conducting operations. He said Moussaoui was constantly suggesting operations which the rest of them thought were ridiculous, such as kidnapping local Chinese businessmen and holding them for ransom, and robbing motorists. Hambali told Moussaoui that if he wanted to do such things, he should do it in Europe, and not cause trouble in JI’s neighborhood. He said Moussaoui constantly complained. Hambali spent very little time with Moussaoui alone; most of his conversations with Moussaoui were in a group setting Hambali did not task Moussaoui with anything, as he did not trust him. He said Moussaoui had never mentioned any operations involving bio-weapons.”

“Before leaving Kuala Lumpur, Moussaoui asked Yazid for a letter or recommendation which would assist him enrolling in flight school in Europe. Yazid owned a Malaysian company called Infocus. Hambali said the company set up computer networks and was not JI related. He did not have further details about the company. Yazid provided a letter of recommendation, written on Infocus stationery, saying that Moussaoui worked for the company. According to Hambali, Yazid gave him the letter in large part because they were all hoping he would go to Europe to enroll in flight school and become someone else’s problem.

“When it came time to go, Moussaoui had no money, so Hambali paid him approximately $20000 for a ticket to Europe, possibly Holland or London. Hambali acknowledged that he was frugal with money, but he willingly paid the ticket, as he was happy to get rid of Moussaoui.”

“After Moussaou left, JI operative Mukhlas (a.k.a. Ali Ghufron) went to Pakistan to see Sheikh Mohammed. Hambali and Yazid used this opportunity to have Mukhlas complain to Sheikh Mohammed about Moussaoui Sheikh Mohammed agreed that there was something wrong with Moussaoui, and he reimbursed JI for Moussaoui’s plane ticket and the ammonium nitrate.”

“Hambali said that Yazid did speak about Moussaoui after Moussaoui’s arrest following the 9/11 attacks…. Hambali said Yazid was surprised Moussaoui was arrested and was concerned for his own safety because Yazid Moussaoui had a letter from Yazid written on stationery with the letterhead of Yazid’s company.”

Comment: Muklis was Hambali’s right hand man. When captured, he said he had been trained to make anthrax. An explosives expert, Muklis cooperated with questioners over a bucket of his favorite spicy fried chicken.

I wonder if this fellow knew the Filipino-looking gentleman who was bragging about his skill in processing anthrax and working to develop “anthrax bombs.” As described in US News, a former reporter from the Kabul Times actually may have met a Filipino carrying papers from Zawahiri and bragging about his ability to manipulate anthrax. The man may have been Hambali’s lieutenant, Muklis Yunos, who had been Hambali’s right-hand man and was in charge of special operations for the Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front (”MILF”). British reporter Philip Smucker, explained that the Afghan reporter working with him spoke fluent Arabic and made regular undercover trips into Afghanistan from Pakistan. He had visited three functioning al Qaeda camps, at grave risk to his life. Smucker explains that his colleague had landed in a Kabul hotel with a Filipino scientist who had a signed letter from al Qaeda’s number two, Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, authorizing him to help the network develop biological weapons. The man at the hotel had described his own efforts to develop an “anthrax bomb.” Filipino Muklis Yunos was an explosives expert who had participated with Yazid Sufaat in the December 2000 church bombings. Upon his arrest in May 2003, Philippine intelligence said he had received anthrax training in Afghanistan. Perhaps he was who the journalist encountered.

The ammonium nitrate was purchased in 2000 and then the church bombings were in December 2000.

Was Hambali lying?

Certainly church bombings are about as despicable an act possible. I can see why someone might be motivated to lie. Such a person is as morally bankrupt and confused as one possibly can get.

If Moussaoui was so unreliable, why is then Yazid seeing him off at the airport in 2001 — when he is coming to the US?

“Specifically, the Hashim Salamat, the lead- er of the MILF, Yusof Alongan, the head of the MILF Finance Committee, and a man by the name of Mukhlis Yunos – who is now in Filipino custody – was the head of the MILF special operations group, a man who worked very closely with JI in a num ber of organizations, including one of the first operations mounted by JI in the Philip pines which was in December 30th of 2000. Soon after JI bombed 30 churches in Indo nesia, JI moved their operational members to Manila where they bombed five significant targets in Manila, and these targets were taken with the assistance of the MILF special operations group headed by Mukhlis Yunos.”

Muklis says he was trained in making anthrax weapons. Was he vaccinated like Yazid Sufaat and Yazid’s two assistants?

DXersaid

In this U.S. News & World Report article about the fellow boasting about his anthrax prowess and carrying papers from Ayman Zawahiri describing Muklis Yunos?

Muklis Yunos was Hambali’s right-hand man and involved in the December 2000 bombings. The article refers to the biochemistry graduate with “extensive experience in microbiology” and is working on viruses and germs to use against U.S. troops fighting the Taliban. Yazid was on a mission to develop bioweapons but it was Muklis Yunos who had special explosives expertise. (As Ken Alibek has explained, silica protects the anthrax from being destroyed upon explosion).

It was Muklis who was short rather than Yazid, right?

(40) The entry “Yazid Sufaat (alias (a) Joe, (b) Abu Zufar). Address: Taman Bukit Ampang, Selangor, Malaysia. Date of birth: 20.1.1964. Place of birth: Johor, Malaysia. Nationality: Malaysian. Passport No: A 10472263. National identification No: 640120-01-5529. Other information: Detained by Malaysian authorities in December 2001 and released from detention on 24.11.2008. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a (4) (b): 9.9.2003.” under the heading “Natural persons” shall be replaced by the following:

By: This article was reported by a former Kabul Times reporter whose name is being withheld for his safety.; Philip Smucker.

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN–“Have you ever heard of anthrax?” asks the diminutive Filipino standing at the reception desk in one of this shattered city’s crummy hotels. “That is the kind of thing I’m pretty good at making.”

An idle boast? Maybe, except for the letter the man hands the desk clerk. It appears to bear the signature of Osama bin Laden’s right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The letter grants the bearer free lodging. It is written on stationery emblazoned with the green Arabic letterhead of al Qaeda.

Clad in a white skullcap and clean gown, a pistol at his waist, the man claims membership in Abu Sayyaf, the militant Filipino group linked to bin Laden. He explains, a bit nervously, that he is a biochemistry graduate with “extensive experience in microbiology” and is working on viruses and germs to use against U.S. troops fighting the Taliban.

There is no way to know for sure whether the man is a biowarfare expert. But U.S. officials have been worried that al Qaeda and the Taliban might try to use chemical or biological weapons against American forces.

Of course, the Taliban is also relying on more conventional defenses. Caves, for instance. A strategic base in an old copper mine south of Kabul has been battered by U.S. bombs. But Arab fighters there are still using the caverns. Outside, fighters have formed a kind of Mad Max brigade with 25 motorcycles. “These motorcycles have been brought from Kabul to attack the American helicopters in case they try landing,” says a turbaned mechanic. “I’ve seen the riders training in the mornings with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and heavy machine guns. . . . They seem pretty good at what they do.”

Near the entrance to one cave, some 50 Arabs, most Yemenis, take a tea break. They wear pocketed vests containing what villagers say is dynamite. “They tell us they are walking antitank bombs,” says the mechanic. One of the Arabs nods his head in the direction of the conversation, adding: “We are ready to be martyrs.”

Nursing wounds. At the front lines in the north, there is less bluster. But there is more blood. In the village of Hussein Khil, three ambulances are crowded with patients moaning for help. Puddles of blood spread across the dirt as male nurses, who have used their turbans as tourniquets, splash the faces of their charges with water.

Heavy B-52 raids have turned bunkers into craters. Mullah Abdul Hadi, a 23-year-old Taliban soldier, scanned the front line as another salvo rained 25 bombs onto a nearby bunker. “If this heavy bombing and this weather keeps up, it’s bound to be a horrible winter,” he bitterly tells a senior commander. Nearby hospitals are so jammed that female nurses have been allowed to treat men. That’s a first for the Taliban. “We were prepared for 100 injuries a day,” says Nasa Rullah Stankizai, a doctor in Kabul’s largest hospital. “But we are flooded with 180.”

The only boost for the Taliban was the arrival last week of a few thousand veteran Pakistani fighters. They are being deployed as a second line of defense around Kabul. The militants arrived in trucks, with a loudspeaker blaring Taliban fight chants (without music, per Taliban law). One verse goes: “Oh, backers of Bush, come down and fight; why are you flying around like butterflies and not landing?”

Moreover, Mukhlis, who has claimed to have been trained to make bioweapons, is Filipino. Yazid is Malaysian.

The journalist who met the fellow bragging about his work with anthrax and carrying papers from Zawahiri described him as Filipino.

While it is true that Yazid is also prone to affable bragging, my bet is that the journalist met Mukhlis given that in interrogation he admitted to his anthrax training.

Blood testing by authorities perhaps would have confirmed whether he was vaccinated or not.

This role played by Mukhlis Yunos — and his CIA and Phillippine interrogation reports — is important because it explains why silica was used. Yazid and his colleagues wanted to use anthrax in anthrax bombs.

That was its original purpose when developed by Ken Alibek, who shared a suite with the scientist coordinating with 911 imam Anwar Awlaki.

DXersaid

Muklis Yunos was arrested on May 25, 2003. Agents reportedly became suspicious when an ambulance pulled over and delivered Yunos, who was wearing a plaster cast on a leg as part of a disguise. According to other reports, he was also wearing facial bandages. An Egyptian missionary accompanying him, Al Gabre Mahmud, was apparently on an international terrorist watchlist. Authorities became suspicious when the two went to the wrong gate (and did not go to the one typically used for medical transport). The pair then objected when officials wanted to remove some of the mummy-like bandages. AP reported that a police intelligence dossier describes him as “a fanatic of the extreme fundamentalist movement” who received training in an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, including lessons on the use of anthrax as a biological weapon. He is described as about five foot three and with the features of a Japanese-Korean. According to one report, Yunos initially was cooperating with authorities over a bucket of spicy Kentucky Fried Chicken, complaining about the arrogance and unhelpfulness of MILF leadership.

Hambali was arrested in mid-August 2003 in Thailand. Hambali had fled Malaysia with his wife, Lee, not long after 9/11. His wife and her sister had studied at the school of Bashir, JI’s religious leader. He told his mother they were moving to Thailand. Hambali worked and his wife studied Arabic. Over the next two years, he also spent time in Cambodia and Myanmar.
Soft-spoken and polite, the neighbors said he kept to himself in the apartment building.

His wife, an ethnic Chinese Malaysian who converted to Islam, was also detained. After being shipped to Jordan, where he was harshly interrogated, Hambali eventually began providing information about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program. He told interrogators that the terror network had what author Ron Suskind describes as an “extremely virulent” strain of anthrax before the September 11 attacks. In the autumn of 2003, Suskind claims, U.S. forces in Afghanistan found a sample of the virulent anthrax at a house in Kandahar. Pulitzer Prize winning author Ron Suskind writes: “One disclosure was particularly alarming: al Qaeda had, in fact produced high-grade anthrax. Hambali, during interrogation, revealed its whereabouts in Afghanistan. The CIA soon descended on a house in Kandahar and discovered a small, extremely potent sample of the biological agent.”

Suskind wrote:
“Ever since the tense anthrax meeting with Cheney and Rice in December 2001, CIA and FBI had been focused on determining whether al Qaeda was involved in the anthrax letter attacks in 2001 and whether they could produce a lethal version that could be weaponized. The answer to the first was no; to the second, ‘probably not.’ Though the CIA had found remnants of a biological weapons facility — and blueprints for attempted production of anthrax — isolating a strain of virulent anthrax and reproducing it was viewed as beyond al Qaeda’s capabilities.”

Suskind continued:

“No more. The anthrax found in Kandahar was extremely virulent. What’s more, it was produced, according to the intelligence, in the months before 9/11. And it could be easily reproduced to create a quantity that could be readily weaponized.”

“Alarm bells rang in Washington. Al Qaeda, indeed, had the capabilities to produce a weapon of massive destructiveness, a weapon that would create widespread fear.

Based on the additional information being provided in 2003, authorities also captured two mid to low level technicians — an Egyptian and a Sudanese. President Bush has explained that these mid-to low level technicians were part of a Southeastern Asian based cell that was developing an anthrax attack on the United States.

In Fall of 2006, President Bush explained:

“KSM also provided vital information on al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain biological weapons. During questioning, KSM admitted that he had met three individuals involved in al Qaeda’s efforts to produce anthrax, a deadly biological agent — and he identified one of the individuals as Yazid. KSM apparently believed we already had this information, because Yazid had been captured and taken into foreign custody before KSM’s arrest. In fact we did not know about Yazid’s role in al Qaeda’s anthrax program.

Information from Yazid then helped lead to the capture of his two principal assistants in the anthrax program.”

Comment: I posted in connection with Yazid Sufaat’s role on Sac State message boards and a Malaysian bulletin board in Spring 2002 looking for information. (Yazid posted on the internet in his native language). I think maybe the FBI just needed to pay more attention to Yazid from the start. FBI director Mueller went to Kuala Lumpur in March 2002 but the US did not take custody of Yazid Sufaat — like they did not take custody of Abdur Rauf. The FBI then botched Amerithrax in a $100 million investigation. That does not seem like money well spent given all the false factual premises set forth in the August 8, 2008 press conference.

DXersaid

But that’s not the end of the connection to the Phillipines. In mid-December 2003, two brothers, Michael Ray and James Stubbs, were arrested in a Manila suburb where they were fundraising for a charity that supported the militant islamists and allegedly in contact with militant brothers. Michael Ray, an American, had been a HVAC technician at Lawrence Livermore near San Francisco — until March 2000 — where the Defense Threat Reduction Agency had launched a program to combat the Bin Laden anthrax threat in 1998. He had a high security pass that he permitted him to go to labs throughout Lawrence Livermore, including those combatting the Bin Laden anthrax threat.

His brother, James, Jr., also known as Jamil Daud Mujahid. James reportedly was monitored saying that he had been a classmate of bin Laden and had named his son Osama. James once was a policeman in California and a teacher in Missouri. James allegedly met with members of Abu Sayyef and Moro Islamic Liberation Front while in the Philippines doing charity fundraising. The brothers had been under surveillance at the time of their arrest. James Stubbs, according to some reports, had recently left a job as a teacher in California to study Arabic in Sudan. Other reports suggested that his recent work instead involved training dogs. Authorities allege that the brothers in May 2003 had met with several charity groups suspected of being al-Qaida fronts, founded by Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law Khalifa.

In mid-April 2004, Patrick Hughes, Lieutenant General (Retired), Assistant Secretary for information Analysis, Homeland Security Department testified before the 9/11 Commission. He explained that interrogations and other evidence revealed that Al Qaeda wanted to strike the US with a nonconventional weapon, most notably anthrax.

It’s naive and uninformed to think that Al Qaeda could not have obtained Ames just because it tended to be in labs associated with or funded by the US military. US Army Al Qaeda operative Sgt. Ali Mohammed accompanied Zawahiri in his travels in the US. (Ali Mohamed had been a major in the same unit of the Egyptian Army that produced Sadat’s assassin, Khaled Islambouli). Ali Al-Timimi was working in the building housing the Center for Biodefense funded by the DARPA and had access to the facilities at both the Center for Biodefense and the adjacent American Type Culture Collection. For example, Michael Ray Stubbs was an HVAC system technician at Lawrence Livermore Lab with a high-level security clearance permitting access; that was where the effort to combat the perceived Bin Laden anthrax threat was launched in 1998. Aafia Siddiqui, who attended classes at a building with the virulent Vollum strain. She later married a 9/11 plotter al-Balucchi, who was in UAE with al-Hawsawi, whose laptop, when seized at the home of a bacteriologist, had anthrax spraydrying documents on it. Indeed, Bruce Ivins had supplied virulent Ames to a non-citizen from Egypt whose friends and classmates had been recruited personally by Dr. Ayman Zawahiri.

The reality is that a lab technician, researcher, or other person similarly situated might simply have walked out of some lab that had it.

Muklis trained at Kandahar’s lab where the hijacker with the blackened leg lesion came from in early June 2001.

Kandahar Souvenir: Hijacker Ahmed’s Blackened Leg Lesion

Yazid Sufaat’s lab was at Kandahar. A fellow named Ahmed Al-Haznawi was at Kandahar until June 2001 when he flew to Florida.

Ahmed Al-Haznawi, went to the ER on June 25, 2001 with what now appears to have been cutaneous anthrax, according to Dr. Tsonas, the doctor who treated him, and other experts. “No one is dismissing this,” said CIA Director Tenet. Alhaznawi had just arrived in the country on June 8. He had traveled with al Shehri from Dubai, United Arab Emirates via London-Gatwick, England to Miami, Florida. His exposure perhaps related to a camp he had been in Afghanistan. He said he got the blackened gash-like lesion when he bumped his leg on a suitcase two months earlier. Two months earlier he had been in camp near Kandahar (according to a videotape he later made serving as his last Will and Testament). His last will and testament is mixed in with the footage by the al-Qaeda’s Sahab Institute for Media Production that includes Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith. There are some spiders that on rare occasions bite and cause such a blackened eschar (notably the Brown Recluse Spider found in some parts of the United States).

Dr. Tara O’Toole of the Biodefense Center at John Hopkins, now head of biosecurity at Homeland Security, concluded it related to exposure to anthrax. The former head of that group, Dr. Henderson, and National Academy of Sciences anthrax science review panel member, explained: “The probability of someone this age having such an ulcer, if he’s not an addict and doesn’t have diabetes or something like that, is very low. It certainly makes one awfully suspicious.” Although no doubt there are some other diseases that lead to similar sores, it is reasonable to credit that it was cutaneous anthrax considering all the circumstances, to include the finding by the 9/11 Commission that ” in 2001, Sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda in a laboratory he set up near the Kandahar airport.” Now that Kandahar reportedly is where the extremely virulent anthrax was located, it makes it more likely that the Johns Hopkins people were correct that the lesion was cautions anthrax.

At the time, CBS reported that “U.S. troops are said to have found another biological weapons research lab near Kandahar, one that that was eyeing anthrax.” But CBS and FBI spokesman further noted that “Those searches found extensive evidence that al-Qaida wanted to develop biological weapons, but came up with no evidence the terrorist group actually had anthrax or other deadly germs, they said.” Only years later did author Suskind claim that in fact there was extremely virulent anthrax at Kandahar. Thus, a factual predicate important to assessment of the Johns Hopkins report on the leg lesion needed to be reevaluated after Hambali’s interrogation in Jordan.

DXersaid

“An police intelligence file describes him as “a fanatic of the extreme Islamic fundamentalist movement” who received training in an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, including lessons on using anthrax as a biological weapon.”

Saifulla Yunos (search), the suspected leader of the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (search) special operations group, was arrested Sunday with an Egyptian man at southern Cagayan de Oro airport as they tried to catch a flight to Manila.

Authorities became suspicious when an ambulance pulled over and delivered Yunos, whose leg was in a cast as part of a disguise and who was traveling under an assumed name.

The Egyptian, Al Gabre Mahmud (search), apparently is on an international terrorist watch list, police intelligence director Chief Supt. Jesus Verzosa said, without elaborating. The Egyptian Embassy could not be reached for comment Monday.

***

Police intelligence officials, however, say Yunos is among supporters and trainers of such groups as Jemaah Islamiyah, the alleged Southeast Asian branch of Al Qaeda blamed for several bombing plots, including last year’s attacks in Bali, Indonesia, which killed 202 people.

***

An police intelligence file describes him as “a fanatic of the extreme Islamic fundamentalist movement” who received training in an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, including lessons on using anthrax as a biological weapon.

A fellow trainee, Indonesian Fathur Roman al Ghozi, would later emerge as a key Jemaah Islamiyah operative in Southeast Asia, according to the report. Al Ghozi was arrested in Manila in January 2002, pleaded guilty to explosives possession charges and was sentenced to 10-12 years in prison.

When Jemaah Islamiyah, led by al Ghozi, planned to bomb the Israeli and U.S. embassies and other Western targets in Singapore in 2001, they turned to Yunos to produce five to seven tons of explosives, another police intelligence report said.

In exchange for Yunos’ help, al Ghozi gave him about 155 pounds of explosives later used in five almost-simultaneous bombings that killed 22 people in Manila on Dec. 30, 2000, police officials say.

DXersaid

The formerly “SECRET” document, produced now under FOIA for publication by this blog, state:

“Moussaoui was also asked about his foreign travel, answering that he has traveled to Morocco and all over Europe. He also advised that in connection with the Indonesian telephone card venture described above, he visited Malaysia for approximately three weeks, Indonesia for approximately one week and Pakistan for two months. He indicated that he was in Pakistan approximately six months ago and at first claimed that he was there in connection with the Indonesian telephone card venture.

When asked why the Malaysian and Indonesian visits were so much shorter than his trip to Pakistan, he explained that his reasons for being there were both connected to the business venture as well as personal. After being pressed to provide a reason, Moussaoui indicated that he was there attempting to get married, but that this did not work out.

Moussaoui stated that he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and that he stayed in hotels in that city the entire time. When asked who he contacted in Pakistan, he indicated that he was in touch with the brother of a close friend of Pakistani origin who resided in London.”

DXersaid

The formerly “SECRET” document now produced to this blog for publication describes the August 18, 2001 interview of Zacarias Moussaoui:

“Moussaoui was then confronted with teh information that he was known to be an extremist intent on using his past and future aviation training in furtherance of a terrorist goal. He was asked to provide the name of his group, the religious scholars whom they followed, and to describe his plan in detail. Moussaoui was visible surprised at the mention that he was a member of a group and that the FBI/INS were aware that he subscribed to fundamentalist beliefs. He began repeating his earlier claims that he was here to enjoy the 747-400 simulator and that this was all that interested him. A short time after this, he invoked his to “an immigration lawyer” and questioning was halted.”

Malaysian police on Monday arrested a high-profile terror suspect for alleged links to a locally based terrorist group.

Yazid Sufaat, a former captain in the Malaysian army who has a degree

in biochemistry from California State University-Sacramento, was arrested for allegedly being a member of a little-known terror group called Tanzim Malaysia Al-Qaeda. Mr. Yazid and his employee Muhammad Hilmi Hashim were arrested under the Security Offenses Special Measures Act.

Mr. Yazid had earlier been jailed for seven years for allegedly aiding two of the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks in the U.S., and only a week ago he and Mr. Hilmi had been set free from another terrorism charge. They denied those allegations of wrongdoing.

The police announced the arrests but gave no further information. Both men say they are innocent of the latest accusations.

“When they were arrested [on Monday], all that the police told them was they were being arrested under Section 130KA for terrorist activities, and that it is a security offense,” said Fadiah Nadwa Fikiri, a lawyer for both the detainees.

Mr. Yazid and his employee were arrested in February for alleged Syria terror links, becoming the first to be charged under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA). Offenses related to terrorism under section 130KA of the Penal Code are regarded as security offenses under SOSMA.

DXersaid

Here is a video of attacker justifying his machete attack minutes earlier in Woolrich today. His justification for evil rings as hollow as Yazid’s justfication for an attack that killed civilians. Just because Yazid bothers to memorize some old book doesn’t give him the moral high ground. Not at all. If you see evil done, tell the world. But don’t harm civilians. (Even under the book you think governs your conduct, it violates the hadiths and koran).

Yazid has the same blood on his hands even if his family can’t see it because he doesn’t have the courage of his convictions to be truthful.

He avoids the truth and thinks that Allah somehow looks on favor with a murderer who does not even have the courage to take responsibility for his actions.

DXersaid

The FBI failed to disclose for over a decade that Jdey had been detained at the same time (with biology textbooks) at the same time Moussaoui was detained (with crop-dusting manuals).

The suit filed recently in federal district court against the Federal Bureau of Investigation states: “Plaintiff is misleading the public about Abderraouf Jdey, a leading suspect in the 2001 anthrax mailings case.”

Shouldn’t FBI share information relating to his detention and release so as to avoid botched analysis that results from the compartmentalization of information?

DXersaid

Yazid says that the queue is very long of those who want to attack in the name of Osama Bin Laden. It seems that he would have spoken of his views with the two young men alleged to be headed for Syria. Did he also openly describe his work with anthrax to them (given that is what he is famous for)? Is the US receiving good cooperation from the countries involved in this prosecution?

In the past, Yazid has had an integrity that ricin defendant, Everett Dutschke, lacked. (See evidence revealed in the recent Affidavit unsealed yesterday).

Yazid, in my experience, has not engaged in false denials. He simply respectfully declines to answer.

I appreciate that may vary on any given day given the stress of a situation. The temptation to make false denials of wrongdoing can be strong. But judging from the detailed questions I submitted to him, his cordiality combined with a steadfast declination to provide substantive responses was greatly to the credit of his integrity. For example, I asked him about the pictured brown bottle that was harvested on June 7, 2001. He complimented the question but declined to answer. He informally pled the Fifth (even though inapposite as a formal matter).

The analysis in Amerithrax could be advanced by his response to a question as simple as what strain he was using. Tests (see Relman article) point to it being virulent Ames.

DXersaid

Yazid Sufaat, as I recall, saw Moussaoui off at the airport in February 2001. He says that Moussoui was determined to learn to fly like the other hijackers.

Then after Moussaoui was captured, Ali Al-TImimi spoke on the telephone with Bin Laden’s sheik Al-Hawali about fundraising for Moussaoui’s defense.
(Wasn’t Sheik Al-Hawali’s telephone in contact with Bin Laden’s satellite phone in Afghanistan?)

Moussaoui had cropdusting computers on his laptop. The FBI did not learn that until after 911 because headquarters denied the request for a FISA warrant even though his connection to Ibn Khattab was already known by the French and should have been known (and I think was known) by FBI HQ. In a formal report, the CIA later concluded that Atta’s and Moussaoui’s inquiries about cropdusters likely related to anthrax.

I guess I can understand HQ not appreciating that the FISA standard was met. Compartmentalization of information often leads to such flawed results. And hindsight is 20/20.

But what is the excuse for alarm bells not going off to learn that someone coordinating on Moussaoui’s defense walked the halls with the leading Ames anthrax researchers –given that Ames was the strain that had been used in the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings.

Interrogation reports make clear that KSM viewed the use of poisons and pathogens, in part, as deterrence for invasion. So when Ali Al-TImimi delivered a letter to Congress threatening dire consequences if Iraq was invaded, do you really think that FBI Agent Wade Ammerman was not clued in on the Ali Al-Timimi anthrax lead? By all accounts, he was firing on all pistons and doing good work well before early 2003. Catherine Herridge that he says the powers that be would not want to talk about what he was involved with in his contact with Anwar Awlaki. Wasn’t what he involved with the investigation of the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings? Isn’t that exactly what he already has told the Washington Post? Catherine Herridge would find things advanced if she went back to the Washington Post early seminal article on the subject and looped in its discussion of anthrax.

Ali’s red hot connections to the broader Al Qaeda network — and his location at the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense — combined so dramatically that it would have been hugely negligent if the FBI was not totally on top of things in pursuing the lead.

But having said that, why exactly is that exculpatory of Ali Al-Timimi? That just helps explain the righteous motivation for his prosecution — which defense counsel aptly describes, quoting the judge, as permeated with First Amendment issues. Why do some First Amendment scholars work so hard in defending the constitutional rights of people working to destroy Western Civilization — when I would think that the constitutional interests worth furthering are those working to build it?

DXersaid

The leading FBI scientist JB was the collections scientist at ATCC who allowed Ali Al-Timimi unfettered access to the largest microbiological repository in the world. While presuming everyone’s good faith, this constitutes an apparent conflict of interest. Given that there turned out to be no “there there” with the science case against Ivins, JB perhaps should have long ago sat on his hands while other scientists checked his work and conclusions.

Combined with the fact that the daughter of the lead Amerithrax prosecutor represented Ali Al-Timimi for free, the avoidance of conflicts of interest should be a top priority of the GAO.

anthrax — $2.5 million reward/looking for classmates of Yazid Sufaat
Graduated California State University — Sacramento in 1987 Age 37.
Pathologist/biochemist/microbiologist. Former Malaysian Army
Captain. Gave Zacarias M. $35,000 and a cover. (as Infocus Tech
representative).
FBI hasn’t sought extradition. US investigators now believe part of
9/11 planning done in Malaysia. Hijackers stayed at his condo outside
of Kuala Lumpur. Arrested on December 9 upon his return from Pakistan
(and Afghanistan) after he arrived in Thailand and went to travel to
Malaysia. Member of Jemmah Islamiyah, a group suspect of planning an
armed struggle to form an Islamic state across Malaysia, Indonesia and
the southern Philippines. Connection to Moro Front (e.g., bought
explosives for them). Travelled with papers from Zawahiri.
Filipino-looking man bumped into former Kabul Times reporter in
Afghanistan last Fall who then reported on the incident in the US
News. Claimed to be expert in manipulating anthrax. Has relatives
/ friends in New Jersey? Am I missing anything? Wrong about any of
the above? Are any of his classmates out there? Who do you know who
knows someone who knows someone who took biology classes with him.

Someone joined the conversation who had previously posted on the subject of Yazid in a February 2002 internet post. The poster (from Malaysia) reported Yazid Sufaat’s identify first became known to the cyber world around month July / August 2000 in a forum gebang thorikat. (that no longer existed by February 2002). Yazid attacked others with various accusations of polytheism and invite others repent. 1/

The poster explained that realhackerz hacked into Yazid’s email with his wife and posted it on the internet. In his original February 2002 post, the poster in Malay described the correspondence as poignant. 2/ (And indeed now with Facebook and Twitter expressions of love and poignancy are formally shared). Yazid reportedly asked his wife to be patient and confident will reward of God, pleased with the fate, etc., and asked that his wife take whatever money the company / business is to meet the necessities of life. At the same time, Yazid related that he had already got better.3/
He apparently was disturbed and in the Fall of 2000 had gone off wandering looking for something.

Yazid himself would now say that he felt that his family was financially provided for and so he felt free to go find some adventure in Afghanistan.

The February 2002 post is provided in full in the thread at the URL above but here are some pertinent excerpts.

The poster has his own views about the US. And he is mistaken in dismissing the role Yazid had come to play in the Hambali’s organization. The greatest usefulness lies in the Yazid’s original July/August 2000 internet posts — and his emails that were posted.

1/ In case I have mistranslated the passage appears as follows in Malay:

You can click “translate to English” for a very rough translation. But it would require human translation to make greater sense of it.

“Dollah X” as a general matter seems confused to think that mentally troubled and the weak-minded did not have an important place in Al Qaeda. Al-Zubaydah and Yazid’s friend, Moussaoui, are two counter-examples. (I don’t consider Yazid troubled or weak-minded — I just think his moral system needs overhauling.)

Moreover, “Dollah X” is overly defensive to think that the geographic location of the January 2000 terror summit factored significantly in Bush’s thinking. It was widely accepted that Kuala Lumpur was just a convenient place at the time for the terrorists to meet. (The Malaysian government was similarly defensive in public statements at the time).

But to the extent there are underlying corroborated contemporaneous posts and emails from Summer 2000 by Yazid, then that forum chat (if an archived copy can be located) might shed some insight into Yazid’s thinking. Given that KSM confirmed that Yazid was working with virulent anthrax, understanding his role is more important than may have been realized at the time.

KSM says he talked to the CIA because he thought they already knew what he was telling them.

Now the CIA does know — but FBI scientists say that they are withholding information because they do not want to embarrass a third party government.

Avoiding embarrassment is not a reason to withhold information == certainly not 13 years after the fact. Indeed, it points to the importance that such information be disclosed so that the history can be written and any ongoing threats can be understood.

As for the travels he embarked upon in Fall 2000, “Dollah X” writes:

“Yazid had to find someone knowledgeable to indon
medicated, and began to wander from Dumai (likely-its), taking the bus or
any other vehicle, but look like he stopped in several cities in
Sumatran and Javanese, on the road to a place on the island of Java
not mentioned.”

A convicted terrorist made new threats against the US in a propaganda video release by the Yemeni al Qaeda affiliate Wednesday.

Fahd al Quso convicted in Yemeni court for the terror attack on the US warship, the USS Cole, was featured in a video released by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), MEMRI reported Wednesday.

AQAP is the Yemeni branch of the terror organization. This is the first time that Al-Quso appeared in an AQAP propaganda video. Al Quso was convicted by the Yemeni courts and received a ten year sentence. He was granted early release by the Yemeni government in 2007 after serving about four years in prison.

In the video, al Quso threatens attack on the US homeland, embassies and war ships.

Al Quso was part of the terror conspiracy that targeted the USS Cole in October 2000 in the port of Aden. On day of the attack, al Quso was tasked with video taping the attack, which killed 17 US service members and wounded 49. He told investigators that he overslept and missed the bombing.

Al Quso was jailed in 2002, escaped prison in 2003 along with nine other USS Cole suspects and at that time indicted on 50 counts of terror related charges in US Federal court. He was captured and returned to jail in 2004. In 2007, al Quso was given a early release by the Yemeni government within a larger pattern of al Qaeda releases, described by some as “co-optation” of terrorists by the Saleh regime. Others believe it is the Saleh regime itself that has been co-opted by the ranks of Salafists in its ranks including former jihaddists and current bin Laden loyalists.

The danger of al Quso in particular is that he is trusted by the al Qaeda leadership, has operational experience, international connections and a major terror attack under his belt.

Al Qaeda in Yemen’s stated strategy is to lure US troops into Yemen, and their media presence reflects that. US military presence would generate likely substantial opposition in the heavily armed country from many Yemenites with no affiliation or sympathy to al Qaeda

AQAP released a video interview with Anwar Al Awlaki, the Yemeni-American al Qaeda internet recruiter and inspirational speaker on Sunday. Both Awlaki and al Quso hiding in a remote region of the Shabwa province of Yemen and belong to the Awlaki tribe. Most of al Qaeda in Yemen’s current leadership was formerly imprisoned in Yemen.

DXersaid

While American enforcement officials are expected to query terrorist suspect Yazid Sufaat over his alleged links with an al-Qaeda suspect detained in the US, his wife is confident that he will come out of the interrogation just fine.
Sejahratul Dursina @ Chomel Mohamad said she was “not too worried” about the upcoming Monday interview because her husband was barely acquainted with Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national who is currently in detention in the US on terrorism-related charges.

“I am not too worried because (Yazid) doesn’t know Zacarias Moussaoui that well. Yazid knows (Zacarias) as a businessman. That’s all,” she said when contacted today in Kuala Lumpur.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officers are expected to arrive in here today to interrogate Yazid over his alleged links to the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

Yazid has been held under the Internal Security Act (ISA) since December last year on charges that he is a member of the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), a ‘militant’ organisation which is said to have plotted to overthrow the government.

He was found to have hosted Zacarias during a visit to Malaysia a year before the Sept 11 attacks and provided him with a letter of appointment as a US marketing agent for Infocus Tech, a Malaysian computer software compan’y

Comment:

Yazid did not know Zacarias as a businessman. Moussaoui in fact was not a businessman – he was a jihadist learning to fly planes to use in an attack. Chomel reportedly was 20% shareholder in the business Infocus Tech. But she and the Infocus Tech Managing Director in 2002 explained that Yazid had no position in the firm -as officer or shareholder. Yazid’s firm was GREEN LABORATORY. Indeed, he gave Zacarias an email greenlaboratory@usa.com which was secretly accessed by the FBI on September 18, 2001. Thus, all of Yazid’s lies were for nothing.

The letter of introduction for Zacarias from Infocus Tech signed by Yazid, uploaded at the blog, was just a cover. Zacarias, who made cropduster inquiries that KSM apparently related to Hambali’s work with Yazid with anthrax, was a fellow jihadist. Zacarias told the federal court judge that he wanted anthrax to use that would only kill a particular religion. At the root of the problem is religious brainwashing and a lack of critical and moral thinking. Criminal defendants and their families — and their attorneys — commonly propagate lies without appreciating that it is the truth that will set the defendant free, in this life and in any afterlife.

DXersaid

Yazid says that authorities arrested Chomel in 2002 only to try to gain leverage over him to talk about his work in the Al Qaeda anthrax program — but that he refused to talk about that or his work for the once secret Malaysian biological weapons program. He says he refused to cooperate because he had felt betrayed by his country. For the first couple of months the interrogators had not known that he had worked in a secret biological weapons program — until a “friend” told them. Then Chomel was picked up, Yazid explains, to bring leverage.

The US media has never reported this.

FBI Director Mueller was unsuccessful in his trip to KL in March 2002 in arranging Yazid’s extradition. The failure of Amerithrax — the biggest counterintelligence analysis failure in the history of the United States — then flowed inexorably from that. The FBI first interrogated Yazid in November 2002 — at which time Yazid told them nothing (other than the lies).

If Yazid wanted to knock the United States Department of Justice and CIA on its rear, all he would have to do is tell the truth.

The problem is that both Yazid and the US DOJ are all about covering their ass rather than truth-telling.

Thursday, 18 April, 2002
Malaysia swoops on Islamic militants

Militants have been accused of targeting US interests
Police in Malaysia have arrested 14 suspected Islamic militants, including the wife of a man who is accused of helping two of the hijackers who carried out the 11 September attacks on America.

The 14 suspects were arrested across Malaysia on Wednesday and early Thursday, said police inspector general Norian Mai.

They have been held under Malaysia’s controversial Internal Security Act which allows for indefinite detention without trial of those who are accused of threatening national security.

There will definitely be more arrests, that’s for sure

Police Assistant Superintendent Samsudin Ali

Malaysia’s crack-down on Islamic militants has been warmly welcomed by the US. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is preparing for a visit to the White House in May where President George W Bush will thank him for his support on Washington’s war on terror.

Altogether 38 suspected militants have been detained in Malaysia since last December, although the raids on such groups date back to before the September attacks on America.

Many suspects are thought to belong to the groups Jemaah Islamiyah and the Malaysian Mujahideen Group (KMM), both of which analysts say want to establish an Islamic state across Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore.

Al-Qaeda links

Among the latest detainees was Sejahratul Dursina, wife of former Malaysian army captain Yazid Sufaat, who has already been detained under the ISA since December on accusations that he let two of the hijackers that flew a plane into the Pentagon stay in an apartment belonging to the couple in January 2000.

The US alleges that he also gave assistance to Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen who has been jailed in the US on charges of conspiracy in the September attacks.

Authorities say south-east Asian Muslims have plotted bomb attacks on the US embassy and other pro-West targets in Singapore.

In January, Singapore arrested 13 people it accused of plotting attacks on US interests and servicemen there.

Muslim militant suspects have also been arrested in Singapore and the Philippines. On Thursday an Indonesian man, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, was jailed in Manila for 10 years on for illegal possession of explosives.

DXersaid

KUALA LUMPUR: Yazid Sufaat, who was arrested together with two others for their alleged involvement in promoting terrorism, has been linked to terrorist activities in the past.

The trio, who were arrested in Kajang by police on Thursday, are believed to be the mastermind in recruiting several locals for terrorist activities.

Born on January 20, 1964 in Johor, Yazid received his degree in biochemistry from California State University, Sacramento in 1987 before serving as medical technician in Malaysian army (ranked as a Captain).

In 1993, he set up a pathology laboratory called Green Laboratory Medicine and he was believed to have been affiliated with Al-Qaeda as an anthrax researcher.

In 2000, there was majorAl-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) meeting in Kuala Lumpur to which four people who attended the meeting had stayed with Yazid at his home.

He has also been alleged to provide lodging for two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi and providing working documents for Zacarias Moussaoui.

Through his laboratory, Yazid acquired four tonnes of ammonium nitrate for JI/MILF bomb-maker Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi.

The intention was to create bombing spree in Singapore but the plot was discovered by the authorities and Fathur managed to escape arrest in Singapore in December 2001 but was captured in Phillipines a month later.

During the September 11 tragedy, Yazid was in Afghanistan and fled to Malaysia via Pakistan.

He was soon arrested in Malaysia in December 2001 and was wanted by United States for his links to the tragedy.

His assets was frozen by the US government on September 5, 2003.

During that time, he was already detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) but was freed in December 2008.

DXersaid

“The horrifying terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax strikes that soon followed gave the United States new reason to fear unconventional enemies and atypical weapons. These fears have prompted extensive research, study, and planning within the U.S. military, intelligence, and policy communities regarding potential attacks involving biological weapons. In Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? Kathleen M. Vogel argues for a major shift in how analysts assess bioweapons threats. She calls for an increased focus on the social and political context in which technological threats are developed. Vogel uses case studies to illustrate her theory: Soviet anthrax weapons development, the Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs, and two synthetic genomic experiments. She concludes with recommendations for analysts and policymakers to integrate sociopolitical analysis with data analysis, thereby making U.S. bioweapon assessments more accurate. Students of security policy will find her innovative framework appealing, her writing style accessible, and the many illustrations helpful. These features also make Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? a must-read for government policymakers and intelligence experts.”

Comment: The context and contents associated with Moussaoui’s laptop would make a good case study. The socio-political context included Bin Laden’s relationship with Khattab (which should have been known by the FBI officials making the decisions re the FISA warrant). Knowing that would have permitted access to the laptop under FISA if not also Title III. Knowing the socio-political context was necessary before the data analysis was even possible. Additional context concerned Moussaoui’s support for the blind sheik Abdel-Rahman. Fellow blind sheik supporter Jdey was detained and released at the same time but the FBI kept that secret for a decade — and still hasn’t admitted it. Moussaoui had the cropduster manuals while Jdey had the biology books. Then when you picture Yazid seeing his buddy Moussaoui off at the airport you don’t so easily get distracted by a theft of a book from a sorority a quarter century ago or some stained panties in the garbage.

DXersaid

A friend delivered to me a copy of the book. At page 47, Kathleen Vogel writes:

“On the heels of the anthrax attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, U.S. government forces captured a laboratory site consisting of a fwe pieces of equipment known to be used by al-Qaeda operatives. Although crude and not yet operational, the laboratory findings suggstd that al-Qaeda had acquired an avirulent strain of anthrax bacteria, limited biotech equipment, and some scientific articles. U.S. officials determined that one Ph.D.-level microbiologist from Pkistan was in charge of planning the design and work of the laboratory; he had also visited bioctechnology companies and conferences. Subsequent open-source publications by intelligenc officials and prominent scientists calld attention to these findings as evidence of a growing bioweapons threat by al-Qada and other terrorist groups.”

On this point she cites the early 2003 (I think) excellent article by Petro and Relman in SCIENCE titled “Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness.” She uses the word “biotech companies.” Did he not visit a B3 lab? And weren’t the 1999 and 2000 Porton Down conferences sponsored by the leading US and UK Ames researchers? And isn’t this established both by SFAM records and the correspondence betwen Rauf Ahmad and Ayman Zawahiri? Dr. Relman who has seen the material relating to the testing says it is not prudent to conclude that Al Qaeda had not acquired virulent anthrax. indeed, he points to the discovery of Ames anthrax in testing. He published that view in the SCIENCE, the very publication she relies upon. So then why is she relying on Milton’s years-old (8?) conclusions based on his reversrng of the undated handwritten and typed letters and Milton’s failure to disclose in the cited treated Rauf Ahmad’s announcement to Zawarahi that he had achieved the targets? Virulent Ames was precisely the reason for his visit to the B3 labs.

Now Milton and Kathleen are free to conclude that a letter from Rauf to Ayman means that he had achieved the targets — on his mission to acquire virulent anthrax — just meant that he had done his laundry and was on schedule. But others might conclude that he had achieved the targets of the mission to acquire virulent anthrax. Indeed, some ambitious reporter might even think to pick up the goddamn phone and call Rauf or Yazid and ask them.

Kathleen writes:

“Yet declassified U.S. government reports about this Afghani makeshift laboratories have indicated that al-Qaeda was unable to obtain a pathogenic culture of the anthrax bacteria, and there was no evidence of any technical work done at this site, suggesting that al-Qaeda’s 2001 bioweapons capabilities never went beyond the trivial.” \

Now who does she cite on this last point? None other than Milton’s treatise from years ago when he reversed the order of the undated correspondence, mistakenly concluding (without any basis) that the handwritten letter post-dated the typed letter. The NYT reporter, after interviewing ML, then did the same. To the contrary, the handwritten letter was written after the visit to the lab that had only nonpathogenic strains which is why he had to go to the second lab. Kathleen should first take greater care in her data analysis and documentary examination before concerning herself with socioeconomic analysis. Why is she citing secondary material when primary material has been uploaded? A full set of Rauf Ahmad’s correspondence has been uploaded on Lew’s blog. On the general issue of approaching the correspondence useful sources include Joby Warrick’s Washington Post article combined with the official history of the MI5 that mentions the equipment taken from Rauf’s luggage after a conference.

I have had email exchanges with Rauf Ahmad but while he can be as chatty as Yazid, he is interested in money.

DXersaid

After relying on ML’s 2005 book and his dismissive view of Yazid’s capabilities (note that Yazid, for his part, tells me that he can do “magic”), she then cites the contrary views of the USG.

At the outset, I should note that she might have first mentioned the unclassified 2003 CIA report that said Moussaoui’s inquiries relating to cropdusters related to dispersing anthrax. (Kathleen should take to heart that Yazid and Moussaoui were buds.)

“However, these shortcomings in al-Qaeda’s alleged bioweapons activities were not discussed in a high-level U.S. government report issued in 2005 by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the WMD Commission). Instead, the report emphaized, that, in spite of the crude laboratory setup, al-Qaeda appeared to have achieved more progress before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan than had been previously been assessed by the U.S. intelligence. The report concluded that the U.S. intelligence community had once again underestimated another diffuse, nonstate bioweapons threat. In a separate chapter, this same 2005 commission report emphasized the growing risks of bioterrorism from advances in biotechnology.”

Milton and those he influences should heed an important lesson. If you want information, go get it. And don’t content yourself with thinking that citing some 8 year-old secondary source in a library constitutes sound intelligence analysis when the safety of the American public is at issue. Failure in analysis is not an option.

DXersaid

Kathleen doesn’t address Amerithrax besides relying on ML’s 2005 book. She come from Peace Studies at Cornell with funding by Ploughshares, I think. (ML also). I do not mean to address or undermine her extensive discussion of Curveball (which I have not had a chance to read). Curveball proved tremendously important to the course of history and involvement of the US in an expensive and needless war. Someone from Cornell’s Peace Studies deservedly focuses on that. But put most simply, Curveball serves to illustrate that the IC should have gone to the source rather than rely on secondary sources.

Kathleen should stay the heck away from Amerithrax unless she is going to learn something about it. Her comments on AQ and anthrax are contained at page 46-47 of her exensively sourced 374 page book. On Amerithrax she notes in a footnote only the fact of Dr. Ivins;’ suicide and that there as no trial. Given that the threat comes from Al Qaeda, however, and not Iraq, the entire book seems to have missed the boat — the train too. It does not matter if the train is on time if it is going in the wrong direction and on the wrong track.

She claims to emphasize the social and political context but yet nowhere discusses Zawahiri, the blind sheik, the announcement of Zawahiri’s plan to use anthrax (or the reasons), the Egyptian Islamic Group etc. Indeed, she is the one ignoring the social and political context of the anthrax mailings just as ML did before her.

DXersaid

“There is no Islam without unity, no unity without leadership, and no leadership without obedience.” — Umar ibn al-Khattab (رضي الله عنه)

Comment:

Umar ibn Al-Khattāb was one of the most powerful and influential Muslim caliphs (rulers) in history He was a sahābi (companion) of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. He was an expert Islamic jurist and is best known for his pious and just nature, which earned him the title Al-Faruq (“the one who distinguishes between right and wrong”). While Umar was on his way to visit Syria, he was received by the governor of Syria, who informed him about plague and its intensity and suggested Umar go back to Madinah. The plague cost 25,000 lives.

Question: I’ve noted my respectful disagreement with Kathleen M. Vogel and Milton L on the question whether Yazid was working with virulent anthrax. (Apart from the positive tests relating to the Ames strain of anthrax noted by Dr. Relman in his recent article in SCIENCE (see documents submitted to NAS), I’ve separately pointed to the plans established by the documents to move the lab every three months and to decontaminate it with paraformaldehyde upon each move.)

But I find the more difficult question to be: Did Al Qaeda have plague?

What does Yazid say? While pleading the Fifth Amendment on the Ames strain of anthrax, he might be less reticent on the issue of plague.

Why was the former Zawahiri associate supplied virulent Ames by Bruce Ivins vaccinated for plague? Was the decontamination agent being tested also tested on plague? If so, who assisted with the research?

DXersaid

:”For this study, I draw on concepts rooted in the sociology of scientific knowledge to analyze how the judgments produced through the U.S. bioweapons accessessments are the result of an assemblage of technological frames — …. — and anaytic practices….”

Then at page 46-47, with ML providing a review of an early draft, she advances ML’s conclusions relating to Al Qaeda and anthrax based on his 2005 discussion of some correspondence that had been seized between Rauf Ahmad and Ayman Zawahiri.

This book is published by a distinguished academic press (JHU). Such a press tends to take a full year to get a book out. (I don’t know offhand when this manuscript was submitted.) In the acknowledements, she describes ML review as relating to an “early draft” so I don’t know when it occurred given that the manuscript was written over a period of years.

As a result, the author is citing a 2005 book about a lab found in 2001 without any mention or citation to the numerous details in Detainee Assessments that were provided to the public via some hacker group (Wikileaks, as I recall). This blog has uploaded those witness statements.

Moreover, as far as I’ve seen so far, the author does not discuss the NAS testing regarding the Al Qaeda lab. Why not? She makes no mention fo the important David Relman in article about such testing. Why not? She certainly is hardworking and skilled and thoughtful judging by the book. The reason is the reality of the vehicle in which she is publishing her analytic conclusions (at page 46-47) about Al Qaeda and anthrax. If an analyst or researcher publishes conclusions based on information that does not come close to representing the best source of information, and then it takes a year to publish those conclusions, there is a very good chance that the conclusions will be in error. Ironically, that is what the entire book is about — the systemic reasons why so many intelligence assessments about bioweapons have been wrong. The book is Exhibit A of the perils of a process she chose to use in publishing her conclusions about Al Qaeda and anthrax. I haven’t yet seen that she even made mention of the pending GAO review.

The book nonetheless gets sent off to lilbraries around the world. The history is written. The publisher encourages Intelligence analysts at government agencies to read it. And as a result the world faces whatever hazards there are with seriously flawed assessment based on seriously dated information.

We saw the same thing with Mr. Willman’s book. He never corrected his reliance on Judith McLean. Neither did Gregroy Saarthoff correct his EBAP report submitted to the federal court. And so we just have an unending parade of books citing previous books that relied on seriously dated and flawed information. In the case of MIRAGE MAN, Judith had already published her 2009 book in which she explained that at the time of counseling Dr. Ivins she thought she was controlled by an alien that had implanted a microchip in her butt… and thought murderous entities were attached to her clients… for which she would have to have emergency exorcisms.

Athough not the points intended by the distinguished author, the take home I get from the book, starting at the beginning and just a few a pages in, is:

1. DON’T RELY ON DATED INFORMATION.
2. GO TO THE PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL.
3. MAKE THAT PRIMARY SOURCING AVAILABLE AND TRANSPARENT.
4. DON’T HORDE.* OR ALLOW WITHHOLDING OR COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF INFORMATION TO OBSCURE THE CORRECT ANALYSIS
5. CORRECT ERRORS.

Let J.M. Berger’s approach to issues be a guide — and see how helpful his uploading of document excerpts is to sorting out the apparent error in Fox News current report about Awlaki booking some mid-August 2001 flights.

*Milton wouldn’t share the Rauf correspondence with me so I had to request it for myself. He hadn’t uploaded it but just selectively characterized it. If I hadn’t obtained the documents from DIA I would not have seen that, to my eye, his interpretation of the documents is mistaken. I think his failure to disclose the lead sentence announcing that the targets had been achieved in the second visit resulted in a seriously flawed analysis. It certainly seems to have served to have mislead Dr. Vogel.

DXersaid

She discusses cognitive biases at page 21 and their influence. I raised the issue of Milton’s cognitive bias when he called me in 2002 or so to ask if I was Mossad.* He said “Sure, everyone knows who I am and where I’m coming from.” But, he said, that I was new and he was seeking to understand where I was coming from.

I come from a land where documents and intercepted communications are king.. A land of Lt. Columbo. Where you go to the bad guy and ask them respectfully if they did it. Some lawyer up. Some politely plead the Fifth. Some say that they are not going to address it. Some ask if I am ever going to mention their name. And some help you understand what the facts are.

There’s no tenure at the Columbo / Monday Mystery school of intelligence analysis. There is no need to publish. Just tomorrow’s news story. Milton’s view of the supporters of the blind sheik and friends of Ayman Zawahiri as unskilled has no factual basis. He is just uninformed.

Ayman has 40 doctors in his family including leading faculty at Cairo Medical where he recruited every Friday. Dr. Vogel should have spent less time reading Howard Aldrich and David Sklansky and more time reading Lawrence Wright if she wanted to understand Al Qaeda and anthrax. (The name Zawahiri does not even appear in her index hich is absurd given the subject of her book.) Better yet, people should read everything that might bear.

Knowing an analyst’s cognitive biases, if any, is indeed important. But that is best avoided by transparency in the documents being relied upon. The document should speak for itself. See J.M. Berger’s exampler in his FP blog today in addressing the Awlaki story.

Now what page of the Rauf correspondence Dr. Vogel show — revealing her cognitive bias and Milton’s cognitive bias that led to his critical error in analysis? She pictures the handwritten letter from Rauf reporting on his FIRST visit in 1999 to the lab that did not have nonpathogenic bacteria. (see page 22 of her book) It was the result of that lack that he promptly arranged a SECOND VISIT — which was reported on in the TYPED letter — in which in the first sentence Rauf Ahmad tells Zawahiri that he had achieved the targets.

The key to being an good intelligence analyst is to have a curious mind and not accept gaps in knowledge. What second lab did Rauf Ahmad visit? Doesn’t Dr. Vogel think it important to know?

*Who is ML’s wife? Why was she in Afghanistan? Does that lead to his cognitive bias? I love Ithaca more than KV does — and so it’s not the water. It’s what one chooses to read. And it is a big mistake not to read everything that might bear.

DXersaid

Here is an early report on Yazid’s arrest by Malaysian authorities and the lies he was telling. After a “friend” told Malaysia that he had been part of the Malaysian offensive biological weapons program, authorities detained his charming wife, another Sac State alum (for a couple of months). Authorities sought to gain leverage over him and get him to cooperate. He never cooperated.

JAKARTA, April 14 (IslamOnline) – Alleged Al-Qaeda operative, Yazid Sufaat, denied terror charges, while he admitted that he met two Arab nationals at his condominium in Kuala Lumpur two years ago, a news report from Malaysiakini.com said on Sunday.

However, Sufaat, high on the FBI list of suspects from South East Asia, who might be members or operatives of the Al-Qaeda, stressed the duo could not be involved in the Sept 11 attacks as they were amputees shopping for prosthetic legs in Malaysia.

The 37-year-old pathologist and former army captain, who is also a businessmen in Malaysia, told this to a three-member review panel at the Kamunting Detention Centre in Perak last Thursday. This was his second hearing, one of his lawyers told IslamOnline.

Sufaat was arrested in December last year following a petition filed by the FBI against a French-Morocan citizen Zacharias Massaoui, who is believed to be the first Al-Qaeda operative charged in court.

In the pettition, Yazid Sufaat’s name was mentioned as a business sponsor of Massaoui, who was entitled to a salary of US2000 for representing the import export company of Sufaat.

Sufaat was arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) and is now currently in detention in Kamunting, without trial, for two years.

His lawyer Saiful Izham Ramli said the detainee had presented his defence in a 29-page affidavit to the panel, answering each allegation made against him.

Ramli said the second hearing of Sufaat was not really fair because police refused to provide them with certain “privileged information”.

The U.S. has urged Malaysia for the extradition of Sufaat, considering him a main link to Osama bin Laden in the region. Malaysia has refused to accede to the request arguing that there were no proof yet that Sufaat was engaged in activities linked to the Al-Qaeda.

Malaysian police said it was detaining Sufaat for allegedly attempting to cause trouble on Malaysian territory. Police also linked him to the Malaysian Mujahidin Movement (KMM), which Sufaat denies.

According to information passed to IslamOnline by a lawyer who preferred to remain unnamed, the suspect told the police that he was not involved in the KMM or the Al-Qaeda.

Sufaat was among 23 people rounded up by the police early this year for their alleged involvement in Jemaah Islamiah, said to be a secret cell under the so-called KMM.

The KMM is believed to be part of a regional network to overthrow Southeast Asian governments and set up an Islamic state in their respective countries.

Jemaah Islamiah was also said to have ties with the Osama bin Laden-helmed Al-Qaeda network, which was blamed for the Sept 11 attacks on the United States.

The police have alleged that Yazid contributed money to Jemaah Islamiah to fund sectarian violence in the Ambon Islands of Indonesia, and against the Philippine army in Mindanao.

A lawyer to Sufaat said the latter never denied assisting Muslim in Ambon or in Mindanao, considering this his duty as a Muslim to help others in need, IslamOnline was told.

He was also alleged to have purchased four tons of ammonium nitrate to be made into bombs in the jihad or holy war against Christians in Ambon.

DXersaid

Note that according to this April 2002 news report, Yazid Sufaat admitted to knowing Khallad bin Attash who was being refitted for a prosthetic leg in December 1999 and then moved into Yazid’s condo in early January a few days before the meeting with the 911 planners at the condo — and just a day before key 911 hijacker Nawaf arrived.

From History Commons (which has hyperlinks to sources):

“Some attendees of the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), arrive early. Al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash had lost a leg while fighting in Afghanistan in 1997. In early December 1999, he was in Afghanistan with Abu Bara al-Taizi (a.k.a. Zohair Mohammed Said) and others, attending a hijacking training course (see Late 1999 and Early December 1999). Bin Attash and al-Taizi have been selected by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to be hijackers for a planned Asian portion of the 9/11 plot (which will later be cancelled).

Surgery for Bin Attash’s Leg – Bin Attash goes early to an al-Qaeda summit where hijacking plans will be discussed, in order to have prosthetic surgery for his leg. Al-Taizi goes with him. Malaysian security is said to be lax for Islamist militants, and Malaysia does not require a visa for citizens of many Middle Eastern countries. There is a clinic in Kuala Lumpur called Endolite, and other wounded militants have said they successfully concealed the origins of their combat wounds when receiving treatment there. Bin Attash got a prosthetic leg in Malaysia not long after losing his leg in 1997, but he is coming back to get a better one. He apparently gets the money for the prosthesis from his father, Osama bin Laden, and another al-Qaeda figure.

Link with Hambali – When bin Attash and al-Taizi arrive in Kuala Lumpur, they contact Hambali, the top al-Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia. Hambali picks them up at the airport and takes them to his home. Then he takes them to the Endolite clinic. Bin Attash and al-Taizi stay at or near the clinic for about 10 to 14 days. Bin Attash then takes about four flights in Southeast Asia to learn about security for the hijacking plan (see December 31, 1999-January 2, 2000), while al-Taizi apparently stays in Kuala Lumpur. According to Hambali’s later Guantanamo prison file, bin Attash and al-Taizi also investigate the security of US aircraft carriers in the region.

Others Arrive – On January 3, with bin Attash back from his flights, the two of them move to Yazid Sufaat’s condominium where the al-Qaeda summit will be held. Future 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi arrives there the next day. 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar arrives the day after that, and other attendees are arriving as well, allowing the summit to begin (see January 5-8, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 158-159; US Department of Defense, 12/6/2006; US Department of Defense, 10/25/2008; US Department of Defense, 10/30/2008] Note that this information is based on prisoner interrogations, which can be highly unreliable. However, it should be noted that the accounts of bin Attash, Hambali, and al-Taizi appear to largely match.”

DXersaid

Trained and unrepentant murderer Yazid Sufaat looks forward to the New Year.

He writes:

“The Roman ruler Julius Caesar established January 1 as New Year’s Day in 46 BC. The Romans dedicated this day to Janus , the god of gates, doors, and beginnings. The month of January was named after Janus, who had two faces – one looking forward and the other looking backward” The World Book Encyclopedia. Nak celebrate jugak ke~

An analyst handed out the briefing packages Tenet had just seen and began to speak. “His opening line got everyone’s attention,” Tenet wrote, “in part because it left no room for misunderstanding: ‘There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months!’”

The team laid out in a series of slides its concerns, based on intelligence that included information “from the past 24 hours.”

Citing his notes on the briefing, Tenet wrote, “A chart displayed seven specific pieces of intelligence gathered over the past twenty-four hours, all of them predicting an imminent attack. Among the items: Islamic extremists were traveling to Afghanistan in greater numbers, and there had been significant departures of extremist families from Yemen. Other signs pointed to new threats against U.S. interests in Lebanon, Morocco, and Mauritania.”

A second chart followed, listing a summation of the most chilling comments by al-Qaida. According to Tenet, they were:

• A mid-June statement from Osama bin Laden to trainees that there will be an attack in the near future.

• Information that talked about moving toward decisive acts.

• Late June information that cited a “big event” that was forthcoming.

• “Two separate bits of information collected only a few days before our meeting in which people were predicting a stunning turn of events in the weeks ahead.”

Another slide detailed how Chechen Islamic terrorist leader Ibn Kattab had promised some “very big news” to his troops.

Comment:

Yet note tthat the warrant was not allowed by FBI HQ because Moussaoui’s known connection was to Ibn Khattab rather than BIn Laden.

DXersaid

[ Laurie Garrett ] said the anthrax threats and infections were a form of asymmetric warfare—where one side spends very few resources and has a huge impact on the other side. While those responsible for the biological attacks spent an estimated $200,000, the United States spent millions in chemical forensics and tracking down “phony” tips.

Comment: Yazid Sufaat lacks the moral courage to admit Al Qaeda is behind the anthrax mailings. He initially said he was available to answer all questions and people can think what they will. But then he “took the Fifth” on every single substantive question. He was a very gracious fellow and I respect that. But I had to “defriend” him because I only find substantive details and truth-telling interesting. When the Amerithrax 302s are uploaded, his thunder will have been stolen and it will be the FBI documents that write the history.

The evolution of law in biopreparedness.
Hodge JG Jr.
Biosecur Bioterror. 2012 Mar;10(1):38-48.

Commentary seems pretty academic when the head of the lab at Kandahar who gave Moussaoui $35k and a monthly stipend, knowing he was studying to fly a 747, was never charged with conspiring to use anthrax against the US. Tara O’Toole, in the inaugural edition of the journal in January 2003, should have published the relevant commentary that might have moved Director Mueller off his apparent fixation on Dr. Hatfill. Later, as Homeland person in charge of biosecurity, she should have seen to it that Amerithrax was reopened.