September 3, 2010

Afghanistan
and the War Legend

September 3, 2010 | 1608 GMT

STRATFOR Readers,As many of you know, Robert Merry joined STRATFOR as publisher in
January. While primarily focused on our business (bless him) he is also
a noted reporter (years with The Wall Street Journal as Washington
correspondent and head of Congressional Quarterly). Bob knows Washington
well, while STRATFOR has always been an outsider there. Since Bob
brings a new perspective to STRATFOR, we’d be foolish not to take
advantage of it. This analysis marks the first of what will be regular
contributions to STRATFOR’s work. His commentary will be titled
“Washington Looks at the World” and will focus on the international
system through the eyes of official Washington and its unofficial
outriders. In this first analysis, Bob focuses on the thinking that went
into President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31 speech on the end of U.S. combat
operations in Iraq. As with all of STRATFOR’s pieces, it treats
political leaders as rational actors and avoids ideology and advocacy.
Both are in ample supply in this country, and there is no need to add to
it. Bob is not trying to persuade, praise or condemn. Nor is he simply
providing facts. He is trying to understand and explain what is
happening. I hope you find this of value. I learned something from it.
By all means let us know what you think, especially if you like it.
Criticisms will also be read but will not be enjoyed nearly as much.
— George Friedman, STRATFOR CEO

By Robert W. Merry

U.S. President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31 Oval Office speech on the end
of U.S. combat operations in Iraq had many purposes: to claim a
measure of credit for largely fulfilling one of his major campaign
promises; to thank those who have served and sacrificed in the cause; to
spread the balm of unity over any lingering domestic wounds; to assure
Americans that it has all been worth it and that no dishonor was
attached to this foreign adventure, which was opposed by many in Obama’s
own party and by him from the beginning.
Of all those purposes, and any others that might have been conceived,
the need to express assurance of the war’s validity — and honor in its
outcome — is by far the most important. Any national leader must protect
and nurture the legend of any war over which he presides, even those —
actually, particularly those — he has brought to a close. The people
need to feel that the sacrifice in blood and treasure was worth it, that
the mission’s rationale still makes sense, that the nation’s standing
and prestige remain intact.

In terms of America, nothing illustrates this more starkly than the
Vietnam experience. This was a war that emerged quite naturally out of a
foreign policy outlook, “containment,” that had shaped American
behavior in the world for nearly two decades and would continue to shape
it for another two decades. Hence, one could argue that the Vietnam War
was a noble effort entirely consistent with a policy that eventually
proved brilliantly successful. But the national pain of defeat in that
war spawned an entirely different legend — that it was a huge mistake
and a tragic loss of life for no defensible purpose. The impact of that
legend upon the national consciousness could be seen for decades — in
war-powers battles between the president and Congress, in a halting
defense posture often attributed to what was called the “Vietnam
Syndrome,” in the lingering civic hostility engendered when the subject
emerged among fellow citizens, in the flow of tears shed daily at
Washington’s Vietnam Memorial.

So the presidential responsibility for the legend of war is no
trivial matter when young Americans begin returning home in body bags. A
wise president will keep it well established in his mind in selling a
war, in prosecuting it and eventually in explaining it at its
conclusion.

This important presidential function posed two particular challenges
for Obama during his Oval Office speech: First, his past opposition to
the war in Iraq created a danger that he might appear insincere or
artificial in his expressions, and second, it isn’t entirely clear that
the legend can hold up, that the stated rationale for the war really
withstands serious scrutiny. Yes, America did depose Saddam Hussein and
his regime. But the broader aims of the war — to establish a stable,
pro-Western regime in the country and thus maintain a geopolitical
counterweight to the regional ambitions of Iran — remain unfulfilled.
The president handled the first challenge with aplomb, hailing the war’s
outcome (so far) while avoiding the political schisms that it bred and
delivering expressions of appreciation and respect for his erstwhile
adversaries on the issue. Whether he succeeds in the second challenge
likely will depend upon events in Iraq, where 50,000 American troops
remain to support
Iraqi security forces and help maintain stability.

But Obama’s effort to preserve the war’s legend, which was ribboned
throughout his speech, raises the specter of an even greater challenge
of preserving the legend of a different war — the war in Afghanistan,
which Obama says will begin to wind down for America in July of next
year. It remains a very open question whether events will unfold in that
nettlesome conflict in such a way as to allow for a reassuring legend
when the troops come home. That open question is particularly stark
given the fundamental reality that America is not going to bring about a
victory in Afghanistan in any conventional sense. The Taliban
insurgency that the United States is trying to subdue with its
counterinsurgency effort is not going to go away and, indeed, the

Taliban will likely have to be part of any accommodation that can
precede America’s withdrawal.
Thus, the Obama administration has become increasingly focused on
what some involved in war planning call “the endgame.” By that, they
mean essentially a strategy for extricating the country from Afghanistan
while preserving a reasonable level of stability in that troubled land;
minimizing damage to American interests; and maintaining a credible
legend of the war that is reassuring to the American people. That’s a
tall order, and it isn’t clear whether the nearly 150,000 U.S. and
allied troops in Afghanistan, under U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, can
affect the magnitude of the challenge one way or another.

Very quietly, top officials of the Obama administration have
initiated a number of reviews inspecting every aspect of this endgame
challenge. Some involve influential outside experts with extensive
governmental experience in past administrations, and they are working
with officials at the highest levels of the government, including the
Pentagon. One review group has sent members to Russia for extensive
conversations with officials who were involved in the Soviet Union’s
ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Others have traveled to Pakistan
and other lands, including the United Kingdom, Germany and France, to
master the diplomatic implications of any Afghan exit strategy.

It’s too early to determine just what impact these review groups will
have on administration thinking, which appears to remain in a state of
development. But it can be said that at least some of these outside
experts are pressing hard for an endgame approach that moves beyond some
earlier thinking about the war and its rationale. For example:

The need to involve Afghanistan’s neighbors in any accommodation
that would allow for at least a reasonably graceful American exit. In
addition to next-door Pakistan, these likely would include Russia,
India and perhaps even Iran. All have a stake in Afghan stability, and
all have their own particular interests there. Hence, the diplomatic
game will be extremely difficult. But it is worth noting that during the
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Russia served as a facilitator of U.S.
cooperation with the northern ethnic tribes, and Russians even provided
personnel and vehicles to America’s Northern Alliance allies. Iran also
helped facilitate the invasion by suggesting security for American
pilots faced with ditching over Iranian territory.

The necessity of working with local power centers and finding a way
of developing a productive discussion with the different ethnic groups
that need to be part of the Afghan endgame. How to do that reportedly
was one question posed to Russian officials who were involved in the
Soviet Union’s Afghan experience and who had to deal with insurgent
leaders on the way out.

A probable requirement that the United States relinquish any hope
that a strong
central government in Kabul will form and bring about stability in
the country. Afghanistan has never had a strong central government, and
the various ethnic and religious groups, local warlords, tribes and
khans aren’t going to submit to any broad national authority. Their
mountainous homeland for centuries has afforded them plenty of
protection from any invading force, and that isn’t going to change.

A probable need to explore a national system with a traditionally
weak central government and strong provincial actors with considerable
sway over their particular territories.

Underlying all this is a strong view that the U.S.-led International
Security Assistance Force cannot impose an endgame. The Taliban are not
going to submit to U.S. blandishments for negotiation as a result of any
fear of what will happen to them if they don’t. That’s because they
are winning and possess the arms, wiles, knowledge of terrain and
people and insurgency skills to keep on winning, irrespective of what
Petraeus does to thwart them. Besides, the tribes of Afghanistan have
demonstrated through the centuries that they have the patience to
outlast any invader.

If the Taliban
won’t negotiate out of fear of what the U.S. military can do to them,
the question becomes whether they will negotiate out of a sense of
opportunity — as a means of bringing about the U.S. exit that American
government officials increasingly seem to want as well. There are
indications the Taliban might be interested in participating in such a
negotiated American exit, perhaps in exchange for some kind of
international recognition. At this point, however, there is no firm
evidence that such an approach could prove fruitful, and hence this
question remains one of the great imponderables hovering over America’s
presence in Afghanistan.

But, if that does prove possible, the question of America’s war
legend will loom very large indeed. Those involved in the review groups
reportedly are well aware that the nature of the U.S. departure will
inform the legend, and they are intent on crafting an outcome that will
honor America’s Afghanistan war dead and U.S. war veterans. In other
words, in this view, there must remain a narrative that explains why
America was there, what was accomplished, and why the departure was
undertaken when it was. It must resonate throughout the nation and must
be credible.

This poses another fundamental question: Is there an inherent
inconsistency between the outlook emerging from these governmental
review groups and the recent pronouncements of Petraeus? Many of the
review-group participants seem to be working toward what might be called
a “graceful exit” from Afghanistan. Yet Petraeus told The New York
Times on Aug. 15 that he does not see his mission in such small terms as
a “graceful exit.” Rather, he said his marching orders were to do “all
that is humanly possible to help us achieve our objectives.” By “our
objectives,” he seemed to mean establishing, through military force, a
sufficient degree of stability in the country to allow a negotiated exit
on American terms, with his Iraq record serving as the model. Even if
that is possible, it certainly will take considerable time. The general
made clear in the Times interview and in others that he fully intended
to press Obama hard to delay any serious troop withdrawal from
Afghanistan until well beyond the July 2011 time frame put forth by the
president.
Thus, the nature and pace of withdrawal becomes another big question
hovering over the president’s
war strategy. Many high-ranking administration officials, including
the president, have said the pace of withdrawal will depend upon
“conditions on the ground” when July 2011 arrives. Obama repeated that
conditional expression in his Iraq speech the other night. But that
leaves a lot of room for maneuver — and a lot of room for debate within
the administration. The reason for delaying a full withdrawal would be
to try to apply further military pressure to force the Taliban to become
less resistant. That goal seems to be what’s animating Petraeus. But
others, including some involved in the review groups, don’t see much
prospect of that actually happening. Thus, they see no reason for much
of a withdrawal delay beyond the president’s July deadline —
particularly given the need to preserve the country’s war legend. The
danger, as some see it, is that an effort to force an outcome through
military action, given the unlikely prospect of that, could increase the
chances of a traditional military defeat, much like the one suffered by
the Soviets in the 1980s and by the British in two brutal military
debacles during the 19th century.

Many of the experts involved in the Afghanistan review effort see a
link between the departure of U.S. combat troops from Iraq, as described
by Obama in his Oval Office speech, and the imperative to fashion an
Afghanistan exit that offers a war legend at least as comforting to the
American people. Certainly, the importance of the war legend was
manifest in Obama’s Iraq speech. First, he repeatedly praised the valor
and commitment of America’s men and women in uniform. Even in turning to
the need to fix the country’s economic difficulties, he invoked these
U.S. military personnel again by saying “we must tackle those challenges
at home with as much energy, and grit, and sense of common purpose as
our men and women in uniform who have served abroad.” He expressed a
resolve to honor their commitment by serving “our veterans as well as
they have served us” through the Department of Veterans Affairs,
emphasizing medical care and the G.I. Bill. And he drew an evocative
word picture of America’s final combat brigade in Iraq — the Army’s 4th
Stryker Brigade — journeying toward Kuwait on their way home in the
predawn darkness. Many Americans will recall some of these young men,
extending themselves from the backs of convoy trucks and yelling into
television cameras and lights, “We won! We’re going home! We won the
war!”

But, as Obama noted in his speech, this is “an age without surrender
ceremonies.” It’s also an age without victory parades. As he said, “we
must earn victory through the success of our partners and the strength
of our own nation.” That’s a bit vague, though, and that’s why Obama’s
speech laid out the elements of the Iraq success in terms that seemed
pretty much identical to what George W. Bush would have said. We
succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussein. We nurtured an Iraqi effort to
craft a democratic structure. After considerable bloodshed, we managed
to foster a reasonable amount of civic stability in the country so the
Iraqi people can continue their halting pursuit of their own destiny.
Thus, said the president, “This completes a transition to Iraqi
responsibility for their own security.” He added, “Through this
remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have
met our responsibility. Now, it’s time to turn the page.”

That’s probably enough of a legend to fortify the good feelings of
those young men yelling of victory from the backs of Stryker Brigade
vehicles on the way out of Iraq. But getting to even that degree of a
war legend in Afghanistan will be far more difficult. And, as the
endgame looms in that distant land, the administration will have to
grapple not only with how to prosecute the war and foster a safe exit
but also with how to preserve a suitable legend for that war once the
shooting stops.