CHAPTER 12

466. In this chapter I set out the conclusions
which I have reached on the question how Dr Kelly came to his
death and on the five groups of issues which arise from the evidence
which I have heard.

467. I am satisfied that Dr Kelly took his
own life and that the principal cause of death was bleeding from
incised wounds to his left wrist which Dr Kelly had inflicted
on himself with the knife found beside his body. It is probable
that the ingestion of an excess amount of Coproxamol tablets coupled
with apparently clinically silent coronary artery disease would
have played a part in bringing about death more certainly and
more rapidly than it would have otherwise been the case. I am
further satisfied that no other person was involved in the death
of Dr Kelly and that Dr Kelly was not suffering from any significant
mental illness at the time he took his own life.

(1) On the issues relating to the preparation
of the Government's dossier of 24 September 2002 entitled IRAQ'S
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, my conclusions are as follows:

(i) The dossier was prepared and drafted by
a small team of the assessment staff of the JIC. Mr John Scarlett,
the Chairman of the JIC, had the overall responsibility for the
drafting of the dossier. The dossier, which included the 45 minutes
claim, was issued by the Government on 24 September 2002 with
the full approval of the JIC.

(ii) The 45 minutes claim was based on a report
which was received by the SIS from a source which that Service
regarded as reliable. Therefore, whether or not at some time in
the future the report on which the 45 minutes claim was based
is shown to be unreliable, the allegation reported by Mr Gilligan
on 29 May 2003 that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes
claim was wrong before the Government decided to put it in the
dossier, was an allegation which was unfounded.

(iii) The allegation was also unfounded that the
reason why the 45 minutes claim was not in the original draft
of the dossier was because it only came from one source and the
intelligence agencies did not really believe it was necessarily
true. The reason why the 45 minutes claim did not appear in draft
assessments or draft dossiers until 5 September 2002 was because
the intelligence report on which it was based was not received
by the SIS until 29 August 2002 and the JIC assessment staff did
not have time to insert it in a draft until the draft of the assessment
of 5 September 2002.

(iv) The true position in relation to the attitude
of "the Intelligence Services" to the 45 minutes claim
being inserted in the dossier was that the concerns expressed
by Dr Jones were considered by higher echelons in the Intelligence
Services and were not acted upon, and the JIC, the most senior
body in the Intelligence Services charged with the assessment
of intelligence, approved the wording in the dossier. Moreover,
the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons section of the Defence
Intelligence Staff, headed by Dr Brian Jones, did not argue that
the intelligence relating to the 45 minutes claim should not have
been included in the dossier but they did suggest that the wording
in which the claim was stated in the dossier was too strong and
that instead of the dossier stating "we judge" that
"Iraq has:- military plans for the use of chemical and biological
weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these
weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them",
the wording should state "intelligence suggests".

(v) Mr Alastair Campbell made it clear to Mr Scarlett
on behalf of the Prime Minister that 10 Downing Street wanted
the dossier to be worded to make as strong a case as possible
in relation to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's WMD, and 10
Downing Street made written suggestions to Mr Scarlett as to changes
in the wording of the draft dossier which would strengthen it.
But Mr Campbell recognised, and told Mr Scarlett that 10 Downing
Street recognised, that nothing should be stated in the dossier
with which the intelligence community were not entirely happy.

(vi) Mr Scarlett accepted some of the drafting suggestions
made to him by 10 Downing Street but he only accepted those suggestions
which were consistent with the intelligence known to the JIC and
he rejected those suggestions which were not consistent with such
intelligence and the dossier issued by the Government was approved
by the JIC.

(vii) As the dossier was one to be presented to,
and read by, Parliament and the public, and was not an intelligence
assessment to be considered only by the Government, I do not consider
that it was improper for Mr Scarlett and the JIC to take into
account suggestions as to drafting made by 10 Downing Street and
to adopt those suggestions if they were consistent with the intelligence
available to the JIC. However I consider that the possibility
cannot be completely ruled out that the desire of the Prime Minister
to have a dossier which, whilst consistent with the available
intelligence, was as strong as possible in relation to the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein's WMD, may have subconsciously influenced
Mr Scarlett and the other members of the JIC to make the wording
of the dossier somewhat stronger than it would have been if it
had been contained in a normal JIC assessment. Although this possibility
cannot be completely ruled out, I am satisfied that Mr Scarlett,
the other members of the JIC, and the members of the assessment
staff engaged in the drafting of the dossier were concerned to
ensure that the contents of the dossier were consistent with the
intelligence available to the JIC.

(viii) The term "sexed-up" is a slang
expression, the meaning of which lacks clarity in the context
of the discussion of the dossier. It is capable of two different
meanings. It could mean that the dossier was embellished with
items of intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable
to make the case against Saddam Hussein stronger, or it could
mean that whilst the intelligence contained in the dossier was
believed to be reliable, the dossier was drafted in such a way
as to make the case against Saddam Hussein as strong as the intelligence
contained in it permitted. If the term is used in this latter
sense, then because of the drafting suggestions made by 10 Downing
Street for the purpose of making a strong case against Saddam
Hussein, it could be said that the Government "sexed-up"
the dossier. However in the context of the broadcasts in which
the "sexing-up" allegation was reported and having regard
to the other allegations reported in those broadcasts, I consider
that the allegation was unfounded as it would have been understood
by those who heard the broadcasts to mean that the dossier had
been embellished with intelligence known or believed to be false
or unreliable, which was not the case.

(2) On the issues relating to Dr Kelly's meeting
with Mr Andrew Gilligan in the Charing Cross Hotel on 22 May 2003
my conclusions are as follows:

(i) In the light of the uncertainties arising
from Mr Gilligan's evidence and the existence of two versions
of his notes made on his personal organiser of his discussion
with Dr Kelly on 22 May it is not possible to reach a definite
conclusion as to what Dr Kelly said to Mr Gilligan. It may be
that Dr Kelly said to Mr Gilligan that Mr Campbell was responsible
for transforming the dossier, and it may be that when Mr Gilligan
suggested to Dr Kelly that the dossier was transformed to make
it "sexier", Dr Kelly agreed with this suggestion. However
I am satisfied that Dr Kelly did not say to Mr Gilligan that the
Government probably knew or suspected that the 45 minutes claim
was wrong before that claim was inserted in the dossier. I am
further satisfied that Dr Kelly did not say to Mr Gilligan that
the reason why the 45 minutes claim was not included in the original
draft of the dossier was because it only came from one source
and the intelligence agencies did not really believe it was necessarily
true. In the course of his evidence, which I have set out in paragraphs
244, 245 and 246, Mr Gilligan accepted that he had made errors
in his broadcasts in the Today programme on 29 May 2003. The reality
was that the 45 minutes claim was based on an intelligence report
which the SIS believed to be reliable and the 45 minutes claim
was inserted in the dossier with the approval of the JIC, the
most senior body in the United Kingdom responsible for the assessment
of intelligence. In addition the reason why the 45 minutes claim
was not inserted in the first draft of the dossier was because
the intelligence on which it was based was not received by the
SIS in London until 29 August 2002. Therefore the allegations
reported by Mr Gilligan that the Government probably knew that
the 45 minutes claim was wrong or questionable and that it was
not inserted in the first draft of the dossier because it only
came from one source and the intelligence agencies did not really
believe it was necessarily true, were unfounded.

(ii) Dr Kelly's meeting with Mr Gilligan was unauthorised
and in meeting Mr Gilligan and discussing intelligence matters
with him, Dr Kelly was acting in breach of the Civil Service code
of procedure which applied to him.

(iii) It may be that when he met Mr Gilligan, Dr
Kelly said more to him than he had intended to say and that at
the time of the meeting he did not realise the gravity of the
situation which he was helping to create by discussing intelligence
matters with Mr Gilligan. But whatever Dr Kelly thought at the
time of his meeting with Mr Gilligan, it is clear that after Mr
Gilligan's broadcasts on 29 May Dr Kelly must have come to realise
the gravity of the situation for which he was partly responsible
by commenting on intelligence matters to him and he accepted that
the meeting was unauthorised, as he acknowledged in a telephone
conversation with his friend and colleague Ms Olivia Bosch after
his meeting with Mr Gilligan.

(3) On the issues relating to the BBC arising from
Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on the BBC Today programme on 29 May
2003 my conclusions are as follows:

(i)The
allegations reported by Mr Gilligan on the BBC Today programme
on 29 May 2003 that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes
claim was wrong or questionable before the dossier was published
and that it was not inserted in the first draft of the dossier
because it only came from one source and the intelligence agencies
did not really believe it was necessarily true, were unfounded.

(ii) The communication by the media of information
(including information obtained by investigative reporters) on
matters of public interest and importance is a vital part of life
in a democratic society. However the right to communicate such
information is subject to the qualification (which itself exists
for the benefit of a democratic society) that false accusations
of fact impugning the integrity of others, including politicians,
should not be made by the media. Where a reporter is intending
to broadcast or publish information impugning the integrity of
others the management of his broadcasting company or newspaper
should ensure that a system is in place whereby his editor or
editors give careful consideration to the wording of the report
and to whether it is right in all the circumstances to broadcast
or publish it. The allegations that Mr Gilligan was intending
to broadcast in respect of the Government and the preparation
of the dossier were very grave allegations in relation to a subject
of great importance and I consider that the editorial system which
the BBC permitted was defective in that Mr Gilligan was allowed
to broadcast his report at 6.07am without editors having seen
a script of what he was going to say and having considered whether
it should be approved.

(iii) The BBC management was at fault in the following
respects in failing to investigate properly the Government's complaints
that the report in the 6.07am broadcast was false that the Government
probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong even before
it decided to put it in the dossier. The BBC management failed,
before Mr Sambrook wrote his letter of 27 June 2003 to Mr Campbell,
to make an examination of Mr Gilligan's notes on his personal
organiser of his meeting with Dr Kelly to see if they supported
the allegations which he had made in his broadcast at 6.07am.
When the BBC management did look at Mr Gilligan's notes after
27 June it failed to appreciate that the notes did not fully support
the most serious of the allegations which he had reported in the
6.07am broadcast, and it therefore failed to draw the attention
of the Governors to the lack of support in the notes for the most
serious of the allegations.

(iv) The e-mail sent by Mr Kevin Marsh, the editor
of the Today programme on 27 June 2003 to Mr Stephen Mitchell,
the Head of Radio News, which was critical of Mr Gilligan's method
of reporting, and which referred to Mr Gilligan's "loose
use of language and lack of judgment in some of his phraseology"
and referred also to "the loose and in some ways distant
relationship he's been allowed to have with Today," was clearly
relevant to the complaints which the Government was making about
his broadcasts on 29 May, and the lack of knowledge on the part
of Mr Sambrook, the Director of News, and the Governors of this
critical e-mail shows a defect in the operation of the BBC's management
system for the consideration of complaints in respect of broadcasts.

(v) The Governors were right to take the view that
it was their duty to protect the independence of the BBC against
attacks by the Government and Mr Campbell's complaints were being
expressed in exceptionally strong terms which raised very considerably
the temperature of the dispute between the Government and the
BBC. However Mr Campbell's allegation that the BBC had an anti-war
agenda in his evidence to the FAC was only one part of his evidence.
The Government's concern about Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on 29
May was a separate issue about which specific complaints had been
made by the Government. Therefore the Governors should have recognised
more fully than they did that their duty to protect the independence
of the BBC was not incompatible with giving proper consideration
to whether there was validity in the Government's complaints,
no matter how strongly worded by Mr Campbell, that the allegations
against its integrity reported in Mr Gilligan's broadcasts were
unfounded and the Governors failed to give this issue proper consideration.
The view taken by the Governors, as explained in evidence by Mr
Gavyn Davies, the Chairman of the Board of Governors, that they
had to rely on the BBC management to investigate and assess whether
Mr Gilligan's source was reliable and credible and that it was
not for them as Governors to investigate whether the allegations
reported were themselves accurate, is a view which is understandable.
However this was not the correct view for the Governors to take
because the Government had stated to the BBC in clear terms, as
had Mr Campbell to the FAC, that the report that the Government
probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong was untruthful,
and this denial was made with the authority of the Prime Minister
and the Chairman of the JIC. In those circumstances, rather than
relying on the assurances of BBC management, I consider that the
Governors themselves should have made more detailed investigations
into the extent to which Mr Gilligan's notes supported his report.
If they had done this they would probably have discovered that
the notes did not support the allegation that the Government knew
that the 45 minutes claim was probably wrong, and the Governors
should then have questioned whether it was right for the BBC to
maintain that it was in the public interest to broadcast that
allegation in Mr Gilligan's report and to rely on Mr Gilligan's
assurances that his report was accurate. Therefore in the very
unusual and specific circumstances relating to Mr Gilligan's broadcasts,
the Governors are to be criticised for themselves failing to make
more detailed investigations into whether this allegation reported
by Mr Gilligan was properly supported by his notes and for failing
to give proper and adequate consideration to whether the BBC should
publicly acknowledge that this very grave allegation should not
have been broadcast.

(4)(A) On the issue whether the Government behaved
in a way which was dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous in
revealing Dr Kelly's name to the media my conclusions are as follows:

(i) There was
no dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous strategy by the Government
covertly to leak Dr Kelly's name to the media. If the bare details
of the MoD statement dated 8 July 2003, the changing drafts of
the Q and A material prepared in the MoD, and the lobby briefings
by the Prime Minister's official spokesman on 9 July are looked
at in isolation from the surrounding circumstances it would be
possible to infer, as some commentators have done, that there
was an underhand strategy by the Government to leak Dr Kelly's
name in a covert way. However having heard a large volume of evidence
on this issue I have concluded that there was no such strategy
on the part of the Government. I consider that in the midst of
a major controversy relating to Mr Gilligan's broadcasts which
had contained very grave allegations against the integrity of
the Government and fearing that Dr Kelly's name as the source
for those broadcasts would be disclosed by the media at any time,
the Government's main concern was that it would be charged with
a serious cover up if it did not reveal that a civil servant had
come forward. I consider that the evidence of Mr Donald Anderson
MP and Mr Andrew Mackinlay MP, the Chairman and a member respectively
of the FAC, together with the questions put by Sir John Stanley
MP to Dr Kelly when he appeared before the FAC, clearly show that
the Government's concern was well founded. Therefore I consider
that the Government did not behave in a dishonourable or underhand
or duplicitous way in issuing on 8 July 2003, after it had been
read over to Dr Kelly and he had said that he was content with
it, a statement which said that a civil servant, who was not named,
had come forward to volunteer that he had met Mr Gilligan on 22
May.

(ii) The decision by the MoD to confirm Dr Kelly's
name if, after the statement had been issued, the correct name
were put to the MoD by a reporter, was not part of a covert strategy
to leak his name, but was based on the view that in a matter of
such intense public and media interest it would not be sensible
to try to conceal the name when the MoD thought that the press
were bound to discover the correct name, and a further consideration
in the mind of the MoD was that it did not think it right that
media speculation should focus, wrongly, on other civil servants.

(iii) It was reasonable for the Government to take
the view that, even if it sought to keep confidential the fact
that Dr Kelly had come forward, the controversy surrounding Mr
Gilligan's broadcasts was so great and the level of media interest
was so intense that Dr Kelly's name as Mr Gilligan's source was
bound to become known to the public and that it was not a practical
possibility to keep his name secret.

(4)(B) On the issue whether the Government failed
to take proper steps to help and protect Dr Kelly in the difficult
position in which he found himself my conclusion is as follows:

(i) Once the
decision had been taken on 8 July to issue the statement, the
MoD was at fault and is to be criticised for not informing Dr
Kelly that its press office would confirm his name if a journalist
suggested it. Although I am satisfied that Dr Kelly realised,
once the MoD statement had been issued on Tuesday 8 July, that
his name would come out, it must have been a great shock and very
upsetting for him to have been told in a brief telephone call
from his line manager, Dr Wells, on the evening of 9 July that
the press office of his own department had confirmed his name
to the press and must have given rise to a feeling that he had
been badly let down by his employer. I further consider that the
MoD was at fault in not having set up a procedure whereby Dr Kelly
would be informed immediately his name had been confirmed to the
press and in permitting a period of one and a half hours to elapse
between the confirmation of his name to the press and information
being given to Dr Kelly that his name had been confirmed to the
press. However these criticisms are subject to the mitigating
circumstances that (1) Dr Kelly's exposure to press attention
and intrusion, whilst obviously very stressful, was only one of
the factors placing him under great stress; (2) individual officials
in the MoD did try to help and support him in the ways which I
have described in paragraphs 430 and 431; and (3) because of his
intensely private nature, Dr Kelly was not an easy man to help
or to whom to give advice.

(5) On the issue of the factors which may have led
Dr Kelly to take his own life I adopt as my own conclusion the
opinion which Professor Hawton, the Professor of Psychiatry at
Oxford University, expressed in the course of his evidence:

[2 September, page 132, line 2]

Q. Have you considered, now, with the benefit
of hindsight that we all have, what factors did contribute to
Dr Kelly's death?

A. I think that as far as one can deduce, the
major factor was the severe loss of self esteem, resulting from
his feeling that people had lost trust in him and from his dismay
at being exposed to the media.

Q. And why have you singled that out as a major
factor?

A. Well, he talked a lot about it; and I think
being such a private man, I think this was anathema to him to
be exposed, you know, publicly in this way. In a sense, I think
he would have seen it as being publicly disgraced.

Q. What other factors do you think were relevant?

A. Well, I think that carrying on that theme,
I think that he must have begun - he is likely to have begun to
think that, first of all, the prospects for continuing in his
previous work role were diminishing very markedly and, indeed,
my conjecture that he had begun to fear he would lose his job
altogether.

Q. What effect is that likely to have had on
him?

A. Well, I think that would have filled him with
a profound sense of hopelessness; and that, in a sense, his life's
work had been not wasted but that had been totally undermined.

LORD HUTTON: Could you just elaborate a little
on that, Professor, again? As sometimes is the case in this Inquiry,
witnesses give answers and further explanation is obvious, but
nonetheless I think it is helpful just to have matters fully spelt
out. What do you think would have caused Dr Kelly to think that
the prospects of continuing in his work were becoming uncertain?

A. Well, I think, my Lord, that first of all,
there had been the letter from Mr Hatfield which had laid out
the difficulties that Dr Kelly, you know, is alleged to have got
into.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And in that letter there was also talk that
should further matters come to light then disciplinary proceedings
would need to be instigated.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And then of course there were the Parliamentary
Questions which we have heard about, which suggested that questions
were going to be asked about discipline in Parliament.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Were there any other relevant factors?

A. I think the fact that he could not share his
problems and feelings with other people, and the fact that he,
according to the accounts I have been given, actually increasingly
withdrew into himself. So in a sense he was getting further and
further from being able to share the problems with other people,
that is extremely important.