Why Is Mubarak's Vice President Running for Egypt's Presidency?

A supporter of Egypt's former vice president Omar Suleiman uses a mobile phone near images of him during a gathering in Cairo. Reuters

It is fair to say that Omar Suleiman's bid to be Egypt's next
president is one of the most unexpected developments in post-Mubarak
Egypt. The last time anyone had seen or heard from Suleiman, he
appeared on Egyptian television and declared:

Citizens, in these difficult circumstances the country is going
through, the President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak has decided to leave his
position as president of the Republic, and has entrusted the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces to administer the nation's affairs.

With those 41 words, Hosni Mubarak's almost three-decade rule came to
an ignominious end. Since then Omar Pasha has been a ghost. In the
giddy moments and considerable confusion after Mubarak's flight to Sharm
el Sheikh, there was an assumption that the intelligence chief and
two-week vice president would be taking a seat on the SCAF. It didn't
happen. He surfaced ever so briefly during Hosni Mubarak's trial. In a
pretrial investigation Suleiman reportedly told prosecutors that the
former president "knew of every shot fired" during the uprising. So
much for loyalty. In between and since, Suleiman was apparently holed
up in his home in Heliopolis. There were rumors in the late fall/early
winter of 2011 that he was back at work at the headquarters of the
General Intelligence Service, supporting his successor Major General Mourad Muwafie on the Israel-Palestinian file. This was perhaps wishful thinking among the felool--a sign that despite their electoral drubbing, a restoration was possible.

As of Sunday with the spectacle of Suleiman delivering his
presidential candidate registration papers (with more than three times
the 30,000 required signatures appended to his petition) to the High
Election Commission, the restoration seemed not just possible, but maybe
even imminent. Suleiman's decision to contest the presidency was a
dramatic twist in a drama filled week in which the Muslim Brotherhood's
number two and widely regarded to be the most powerful man in
post-Mubarak Egypt--Khairat al Shater--announced his own run for the
presidency and it was revealed that Salafist presidential candidate
Hazem Salah Abu Ismail's mother held an American passport. Yet Omar
Suleiman's emergence eclipsed all others. Immediately, the conjectures,
rumors, and theories attempting to make sense of al Shater's candidacy
gave way to intense speculation about who and what is behind Suleiman's
run.

There is any number of competing explanations for the return of Omar Pasha:

1. Let me caveat before I even begin. I don't think too many
Egyptians actually believe this one, but I've heard it and read it so it
deserves some attention. Here goes: Omar Suleiman is the Muslim
Brotherhood's solution to the Muslim Brotherhood's Muslim Brotherhood
problem. Not expecting the buzz saw of internal and
external criticism resulting from their nomination of Khairat al Shater
for president, the Brothers have struck some sort of deal with Suleiman,
calculating that the former intelligence chief and vice president will
win. This will relieve the Brothers of the responsibilities and risks
of controlling parliament, the presidency, and likely the government.
This argument hinges on the fact that during the uprising Suleiman
sought to negotiate with the Brotherhood's senior leadership rather than
the revolutionaries who instigated the demonstrations. Although
Suleiman's outreach to the Brothers during those eighteen days of
national upheaval demonstrated his inability to grasp the political
dynamics of that moment, it was a stunningly accurate assessment of
which group would likely play an influential role in Egypt's future. Be
that as it may, it seems unlikely that the Brotherhood would seek a
solution to their political problems through a deal with Suleiman. Why
enable even a partial restoration of the previous regime against which
the Brothers have been agitating since the 1950s, especially when power
seems to be well within the Islamists' grasp? Once more, the ferocious
rhetorical response to Suleiman's candidacy from Brotherhood figures
including Khairat al Shater who warned that the former vice president
was a "New Mubarak" suggests that the Brothers see Omar Pasha as a grave
threat to their political project. Things are not always what they
seem to be and there is a lot of "game playing" going on in Egypt as one
informant told me recently, but there is no reason to put any stock in
the MB-Omar nexus theory.

Rating: Nonsense

2. Omar Suleiman's candidacy represents the Egyptian
intelligence community's bid for supremacy in post-Mubarak Egypt. Not
only possible, but also entirely plausible. It is important to remember
that throughout the uprising and the transition, politics, street
demonstrations, and periodic spasms of violence have buffeted and taxed
the ministries of defense and interior, which are rivals anyway. Yet
the General Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence have, to the
extent that one can see into these opaque organizations, remained intact
and more than capable of carrying out their functions, which include
both domestic and foreign intelligence. In many ways, the uncertainty
of post-uprising Egypt is an environment in which intel operators
well-versed in the dark arts of manipulation, denial and deception, as
well as intimidation, thrive. The GIS has its own organizational
interests, views, and goals that may conflict with Egypt's other primary
political actors--the SCAF, parliament, Muslim Brotherhood, and the
revolutionary groups who may not command the authority and resources
necessary to challenge intel's bid for leadership.

What about the military intelligence? One of the great myths of
Egypt's transition is that the SCAF is in control of the country, its
ministries, and all of the branches of the military. Field Marshal
Tantawi et al certainly wanted Egyptians and observers to believe that.
Throughout the transition, however, the Ministry of Defense has found
itself at odds with the Ministry of Interior, demonstrated an inability
to compel civilian politicians to comply consistently with its orders,
and utterly failed to provide order, coherence, and leadership to the
transition. Under these circumstances, it is entirely possible that
Suleiman, his former employees at GIS, and the officers from his former
branch of service may believe now is a propitious moment for the
intelligence people to make a move and secure "the chair" for one of
their own, given how the SCAF has made a mess of things.

Rating: Possible and Entirely Plausible

3. It has become accepted wisdom in certain circles, particularly the
media, that Omar Suleiman is the SCAF's candidate. There is reason to
believe this. He is a military officer
with the rank of Lieutenant General. He saw combat in Yemen and Sinai
in both 1967 and 1973. As noted above, Suleiman's statements during the
Mubarak investigation/trial demonstrated some political deft and
deference to the SCAF, letting the military off the hook. This stood in
stark contrast to the former president who, in a deposition before
trial, claimed that the military was responsible for events in Egypt
beginning the evening of January 28, 2011 (the Day of Rage), which would
make Tantawi culpable for the more than 800 deaths during the ensuing
two weeks. Most importantly, if the SCAF wanted to put forward a
military figure with political experience, a potential reservoir of
popular support, and a history of keeping the Islamists in their place,
Omar Suleiman is their only choice.

Yet there is something too neat about the "Suleiman is the military's
candidate" theory. True, he is an officer, but he hasn't worn a
uniform in decades, was not in the chain of command, and was noticeably
left off the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, though that may be a
political asset at this point. There are also persistent, but never
verified, rumors that military officers targeted Suleiman in an
unsuccessful assassination attempt during the uprising. In addition,
why would the military want Omar Pasha? Ostensibly, he is one of them
and will protect their interests, but he seems to have a base of power
independent of the Ministry of Defense. The officers can't control
Suleiman and he likely has a file on everyone in uniform from colonel to
the Field Marshal. Mubarak was more dependent on the military than
many suspected and acted that way, working hard to ensure their senior
command's parochial concerns like the flow of aid from the United States
and core interests in stability and the military's place in Egypt's
political system. As much as the NDP became the vehicle for the
Mubaraks and their immediate cronies, it was, according to one of
Mubarak's top lieutenants, "a circus." It sounds cliché, but the
military is the backbone of the regime--the political system that was
founded in the 1950s after the Free Officers' coup.

Finally, if the fix was in for a military officer to fill the
presidency, why did the military wait so long before Suleiman was put
forward? Likely because he is not their candidate. Ahmed
Shafiq--Mubarak's last prime minister and a former air force officer is
more likely the military's preferred candidate.

Rating: Plausible, but not as much as everyone thinks

So why is Omar Suleiman running? Perhaps there is no better
explanation than blind ambition and opportunism. Suleiman is somewhat
different than the caricatures of him. For example, he is more
thoughtful on foreign policy than one might suspect, but unless he had a
change of heart over the last 15 months, he is hardly a progressive on
domestic politics. He was, in part, responsible for Egypt's alleged
stability during 18 of Mubarak's 29 years 3 months, and 28 days in
power. Suleiman, no doubt, believes that he can return stability and
security to Egypt's streets, providing a critical component for an
economic recovery, but can he? No matter where they stand on the
important issues, it seems that many Egyptians have rejected Omar
Pasha's methods, which, if the uprising was any measure, proved to be
largely ineffective against millions of people who desperately wanted
change.

This article originally appeared at CFR.org, an Atlantic partner site.

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