About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

On ethics, part III: Deontology

by Massimo Pigliucci

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[This post is part of an ongoing series on ethics in which Massimo is exploring and trying to clarify his own ideas about what is right and wrong, and why he thinks so. Part I was on meta-ethics; part II on consequentialism.]

Most people are familiar with two types of deontological ethical doctrines: Judeo-Christian style commandments (of which, as we all should know, there are many more than the canonical ten, 613 to be precise) and Kant’s famous categorical imperative. For the purposes of this discussion I will set aside any theologically based system of ethics, for two reasons: a) I think the idea of deities is incoherent or at least irrational; b) Plato showed convincingly in his Euthyphro dialogue that even if gods existed they would not help at all settling the question of morality.

As far as Kant is concerned, I’ll touch on his ideas, of course, but I am interested here in the broader idea of deontological (i.e., duty based) ethics, just as in my previous post I talked about consequentialism as an approach to moral philosophy, not about its most popular incarnation, utilitarianism.

Broadly speaking, deontological approaches fall into the same category as consequentialism — they are concerned with what we ought to do, as opposed to what sort of persons we ought to be (the latter is, most famously, the concern of virtue ethics). That said, deontology is the chief rival of consequentialism, and the two have distinct advantages and disadvantages that seem so irreducible that some people (Thomas Nagel, for example) have suggested that we really ought to find a way to combine them (easier said than done, considering how radically different the underlying principles are).

Here is one way to understand the difference between consequentialism and deontology: for the former the consequences of an action are moral if they increase the Good (which, as we have seen, can be specified in different ways, including increasing happiness and/or decreasing pain). For the latter, the fundamental criterion is conformity to moral duties. You could say that for the deontologist the Right (sometimes) trumps the Good. Of course, as a result consequentialists have to go through the trouble of defining and justifying the Good, while deontologists have to tackle the task of defining and justifying the Right.

Before we get into more details, we also need to appreciate the difference between two major “modes” of deontology: agent-centered and victim-centered. Agent-centered deontology is concerned with permissions and obligations to act toward other agents, the typical example being parents’ duty to protect and nurture their children. Notice the immediate departure from consequentialism, here, since the latter is an agent-neutral type of ethics (we have seen that it has trouble justifying the idea of special treatment of relatives or friends). Where do such agent-relative obligations come from? From the fact that we make explicit or implicit promises to some agents but not others. By bringing my child into the world, for instance, I make a special promise to that particular individual, a promise that I do not make to anyone else’s children. While this certainly doesn’t mean that I don’t have duties toward other children (like inflicting no intentional harm), it does mean that I have additional duties toward my own children as a result of the simple fact that they are mine.

Agent-centered deontology gets into trouble because of its close philosophical association to some doctrines that originated within Catholic theology, like the idea of double effect. (I should immediately clarify that the trouble is not due to the fact that these doctrines are rooted in a religious framework, it’s their intrinsic moral logic that is at issue here.) For instance, for agent-centered deontologists we are morally forbidden from killing innocent others (reasonably enough), but this prohibition extends even to cases when so doing would actually save even more innocents.

Those familiar with trolleology will recognize one of the classic forms of the trolley dilemma here: is it right to throw an innocent person in front of the out of control trolley in order to save five others? For consequentialists the answer is a no-brainer: of course yes, you are saving a net of four lives! But for the deontologist you are now using another person (the innocent you are throwing to stop the trolley) as a means to an end, thus violating one of the forms of Kant’s imperative:

“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end.”

(The other form, in case you are wondering, is: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction.”)

It is because of these troubling examples that some deontologists turn to a victim-centered version of their approach. Victim-centered deontologies are right- rather than duty-based, which of course does raise the question of why we think of them as deontological to begin with. But there is no more appropriate term I was able to find in the philosophical literature, so let’s not quibble about semantics too much.

The fundamental idea about victim-centered deontology is the right that people have not to be used by others without their consent. This is were we find Robert Nozick-style libertarianism, which I have already criticized on this blog. One of the major implications of this version of deontology is that there is no strong moral duty to help others.

Incidentally, both agent-centered and victim-centered deontologists can claim Kant as one of their own: in the first case by invoking Kant’s insistence that it is intentions, not consequences, that are morally relevant; in the second case by pointing to one of the forms of Kant’s categorical imperative, the one about not using other people as ends to one’s means.

While agent-centered and victim-centered deontological theories get the lion’s share of the discussion, I have to note that there are also contractarian deontological theories. These deal with social contracts of the type, for instance, discussed by John Rawls in his theory of justice. However, I will devote a separate post to contractarianism, in part because it is so important in ethics, and in part because one can argue that contractarianism is really a meta-ethical theory, and therefore does not strictly fall under deontology per se.

Overall, then, deontological theories have the advantage over consequentialism in that they account for special concerns for one’s relatives and friends, as we have seen above. Consequentialism, by comparison, comes across as alienating and unreasonably demanding. Another advantage of deontology over consequentialism is that it accounts for the intuition that even if an act is not morally demanded it may still be praiseworthy. For a consequentialist, on the contrary, if something is not morally demanded it is then morally forbidden. (Another way to put this is that consequentialism is a more minimalist approach to ethics than deontology.) Moreover, deontology also deals much better than consequentialism with the idea of rights.

However, as we have seen, deontological theories run into the problem that they seem to give us permission, and sometimes even require, to make things actually morally worse in the world. Indeed, a strict deontologist could actually cause human catastrophes by adhering to Kant’s imperative and still think he acted morally (Kant at one point remarked that it is “better the whole people should perish” than that injustice be done — one wonders injustice to whom, since nobody would be left standing). Deontologists also have trouble dealing with the seemingly contradictory ideas that our duties are categorical (i.e., they do not admit of exceptions), and yet that some duties are more important than others. (Again, Kant famously stated that “a conflict of duties is inconceivable” while forgetting to provide any argument in defense of such a bold statement.)

Finally, I mentioned earlier that some philosophers — aware of the differential advantages and disadvantages of consequentialism and deontology — have sought to combine the two. One famous attempt at this reconciliation was proposed by Thomas Nagel (he of “what is it like to be a bat?” fame). Nagel suggested that perhaps we should be consequentialists when it comes to agent-neutral reasoning, and deontologists when we engage in agent-relative reasoning. He neglected to specify, however, any non-mysterious way to decide what to do in those situations in which the same moral dilemma can be seen from both perspectives.

52 comments:

You write: "...is it right to divert the out of control trolley, which is about to kill five people, at the cost of killing one bystander? For consequentialists the answer is a no-brainer: of course yes, you are saving a net of four lives! But for the deontologist you are now using another person (the innocent bystander) as a means to an end...".

But I don't see how the innocent bystander is being "used as a means to an end". The diversion is successful whether the bystander is there or not. The presence or absence of the bystander is incidental to the fact that 5 people are being saved.

Note that this is different from the trolleology example where someone is pushed off a bridge to stop the runaway trolley. In that example (but that example only), the innocent bystander is not incidental.

>Where do such agent-relative obligations come from? From the fact that we make explicit or implicit promises to some agents but not others. By bringing my child into the world, for instance, I make a special promise to that particular individual, a promise that I do not make to anyone else’s children.<

I just don't understand where deontologists infer such promises. Where does the promise come from, do they say? (Putting aside those philosophers like John Finnis who'd deny there's a need to infer these obligations from anywhere.)

>From the fact that you caused a human being to come into existence without asking whether said human being wished to do so, for instance.

I see your point, but I think it's pretty obvious that relations to other people (children, spouses, friends) do carry implicit (and sometimes explicit) promises, which consequentialists simply duck.<

I just don't understand that. It sounds magical to me. I mean, when you create expectations in others it can create moral issues for a wide variety of ethics, but you're suggesting that something that is effectively an express promise arises, if I understand you correctly. Unless by "implicit promise" you just mean an expectation in the other person that has moral significance? Although in that case there might be problematic hypotheticals concerning when the expectation arose.

I really don't see anything magical here. On the contrary, it's quite commonsensical. Yes, the expectation is on the part of the person affected, but also on the part of the rest of society. You don't think that there is good reason why we expect parents to take care of their own children but not (other things being equal) of other people's children?

>I really don't see anything magical here. On the contrary, it's quite commonsensical. Yes, the expectation is on the part of the person affected, but also on the part of the rest of society. You don't think that there is good reason why we expect parents to take care of their own children but not (other things being equal) of other people's children?<

Yes, I do see reasons for it, but I never would have verbalized them with "promise." As for common sense, I suspect most mothers would not have articulated their bond with their child as being a promise, no? Granted, as I indicated, expectations can be important, and as that's what you meant by "promise" I should say I don't mean to raise a terminological point. There would be the issue of which expectations create obligations, but I'd imagine different deontologies handle that question differently.

I'm not sure that promises or commitments to one's children arise "From the fact that you caused a human being to come into existence without asking whether said human being wished to do so, for instance."In fact, said human being did not exist at the time parents engage in acts leading to its conception and birth. She cannot thus possibly have a say on such events. She is a product of biological reproduction, an animal born from its parents, perhaps without the parents' intention to reproduce. She did not exist at the time, and thus could hardly object or approve of her being brought into existence. She could retrospectively complain ("why did you got pregnant with me at the age of 16, when you had no chances of offering me a good upbringing") but this is similar to asking more general questions ("why was I born in a poor family instead of being born in a rich one" or "why I don't have the genes for blue eyes") which clearly entail no moral duty on the part of parents or more distant ancestors. And most important, the questions are pointless: the answer is sort of "just so".

On the other hand, biological reproduction do not necessarily entail any "moral duty". It is a purely biological process that we share with other animals, just as we share other biological properties like breathing or aging or inheriting genes. Human offspring are born by the same or similar processes that other animals apply for reproduction, without entailing (for other animals) any such "promises" or "moral duties" (if "ethics" is conceived of as a specifically human affair). Many animals, in fact, lend their offspring no help at all, as in the case of fish; mammals feed their young, of course, but we are talking other obligations here, much beyond lactation.

I would say that responsibilities arise from procreation. And, like most responsibilities, they are social in nature, such that the relevant question here is: Is a society wrong or right to expect such responsibilities? If I have to pay a little more in taxes to help provide care and protection for unwanted children, then I'm certainly willing to do so. But the generally agreed upon ideal is for parents to do the bulk of the work.

Anyway, I never thought of this social expectation as particularly deontological, but the argument makes sense - after all, responsibility implies duty.

I can never quite understand why most people who write in the discourse of ethics keep trying to figure out which ethical system or type of system is the best one. It should be clear by now that no existing system or type of system is, in all possible situations, better than all the others. This shouldn't be seen as a significant or unexpected condition given the vast variation of situations that human beings can experience.

Nagel is sort of on the right track in wanting to combine them, though it seems not in the right way.

The various systems that have arisen in the history of the discourse of ethics are simply different cognitive-behavioral technologies. They are tools. And like common tools, such as the hammer, the screwdriver and the wrench, its stupid to think one is going to be the best in all possible scenarios. Sometimes its obvious that we need a hammer rather than a wrench. But sometimes we are confronted with situations where none of our existing tools work particularly well or where several of them work to some extent but in different ways. Its bad faith [in the sartrean sense] to want some kind of algorithm that will relieve the individual of the need make a genuine act of will in these tough cases and live with and take responsibility for our choices.

In this way humanist ethics tends to be akin to traditionally religious ethics; seeking some authority to outsource our will and responsibility to. Humanist ethics simply replaces God with some kind of idealized rationality. It may be an improvement, but it still suffers from the same basic pathology.

To t-b remarks I may add that in fact moral "systems" exist only in the head of philosophers. Actual people do not have an explicit "system" of morality, in the sense of adopting a set of axioms and rationally deduce all its logical implications as moral precepts. In fact, they often face moral conundrums whereby a moral precept of theirs clashes with another, clearly showing that they are not logical and coherent deductions from a given set of non-contradictory axioms (Gödel impossibilities aside).What people have are psychological feelings and social norms, both evolved in a more or less haphazard manner over centuries or millennia. Some of them have biological basis, and analogous norms may be found operating among similar animals (such as caring for the young in species where the young need caring to survive): any "moral" or "axiomatic" or "philosophical" or "religious" justification for such behaviors is an after-the-fact rationalization, not a reason why the norm emerged in the first place. Other norms that people adopt have no biological origin; for instance, "respect your betters" may have some biological roots in small bands with dominant males, and peck orders generally, but "do not use insider information with the purpose of gain" seems to have evolved without any biological root whatsoever, just as many other norms of clearly cultural rather than biological origin. The whole set of norms that people follow, or are expected to follow, in any society are probably not a completely coherent set. Most rules admit exceptions, frequently devoid of clear grounds ("thou shalt not kill" is one major example: "thou shalt not kill except when executing a prisoner condemned to death, or fighting an enemy in the battlefield, or acting in legitimate defense, or assisting the terminally ill to die with dignity, or..."). Let us add that the exceptions vary with time and place: stoning an adulteress was an exception among Old Testament Jews, and is still one in present-day Arab countries; euthanasia has been long considered immoral, until increasing numbers of people started to allow it lately; abortion was (and still is, by some) regarded as murder, until this changed too. All in all, pace Massimo and his efforts, I still see these exercises in moral philosophy as a futile attempt to force a philosophical system on the messy and haphazard and constantly evolving ways of humankind.

> Humanist ethics simply replaces God with some kind of idealized rationality. It may be an improvement, but it still suffers from the same basic pathology <

I agree with most of your comments, but not your conclusion. Secular philosophies attempt to give as coherent an account of ethics as possible, which is a huge improvement over god-based systems. Coherence isn't a pathology. But I do agree that one system is not likely to do it at this point. In the last part of this series I will try to use precisely the kind of "it's a toolbox" approach you are hinting at.

Hector,

> said human being did not exist at the time parents engage in acts leading to its conception and birth. She cannot thus possibly have a say on such events. <

That is entirely besides the point. We have plenty of ethical commitments to people (or even animals) who don't have a say. It's not a negotiation.

> this is similar to asking more general questions ("why was I born in a poor family instead of being born in a rich one" or "why I don't have the genes for blue eyes") which clearly entail no moral duty on the part of parents <

Not the same thing. Being poor may be beyond the ability of parents to do anything about it, doing their best to nurture and not harm their child is in a different ballpark altogether.

For other animals that's true, but humans are cursed with the ability to foresee the possible outcomes of their own actions, hence their moral responsibility.

> moral "systems" exist only in the head of philosophers. <

Sure, like numbers exist only in the head of mathematicians. That doesn't mean they are not useful.

> Actual people do not have an explicit "system" of morality <

First of all, that's simply not true. Any time we argue for justice in a court of law we are invoking the implementation of an explicit moral system. Second, most people reason by way of implicit moral systems, and I would argue that it would be better if they actually thought about them explicitly.

> What people have are psychological feelings and social norms, both evolved in a more or less haphazard manner over centuries or millennia. <

I doubt any philosopher would dispute that. So? We have innate mathematical abilities that evolved over millennia, does that mean that engaging in rigorous mathematical training or thinking is useless?

> any "moral" or "axiomatic" or "philosophical" or "religious" justification for such behaviors is an after-the-fact rationalization, not a reason why the norm emerged in the first place. <

This is a logical fallacy: you are confusing explanations for the origin of X with way to improve the functioning of X. Totally different.

> The whole set of norms that people follow, or are expected to follow, in any society are probably not a completely coherent set. <

It doesn't have to be. Again, math: we know that mathematics (or logic itself) as a whole cannot be justified internally, this does not mean that we cannot use it and improve it.

> I still see these exercises in moral philosophy as a futile attempt to force a philosophical system on the messy and haphazard and constantly evolving ways of humankind. <

You could say the same thing about science's attempt to impose rational explanations on a messy nature. Both science and philosophy are imperfect ways to make sense of and improve things, total coherence is not the goal.

Baron,

> Really? <

Yup. That's what emerges from my readings of the deontological literature, as you will see if you follow the links provided in the main post.

Massimo:"Any time we argue for justice in a court of law we are invoking the implementation of an explicit moral system." Please replace "explicit moral system" by "explicit legal system". Moral reasons may have been used to justify the legal norms, but what is a stake in courts of law are legal norms, whatever one thinks of them in moral terms.

"[Hector wrote:]> I still see these exercises in moral philosophy as a futile attempt to force a philosophical system on the messy and haphazard and constantly evolving ways of humankind. < [Massimo comments:] You could say the same thing about science's attempt to impose rational explanations on a messy nature." Notice the difference between "explaining" a messy nature (or a messy behavior) and accommodating said behavior within an axiomatic system. Maths are different: our instinctive sense of numerosity or quantity or extension reflect imperfectly the idealized concepts of mathematics, that go much beyond instinctive folk math and are clearly superior (just as scientific biology or astronomy is better than folk biology or astronomy). But our instinctive sense of morality cannot be reduced to an axiomatic deductive "moral system". It can be DESCRIBED by a scientific account of human moral feelings and behavior, and explained by a variety of causal factors (biology, culture, psychology, whatever), but such system would be a "descriptive" and "explanatory" account of how people actually behave. Philosophical moral systems do not aim at describing or explaining actual feelings and behavior: they are "prescriptive"; they assume certain axioms that philosophers seem fit to adopt, and deduce norms that supposedly "ought to" be followed as a logical implication of those axioms. That's a totally different line of business.

>Another advantage of deontology over consequentialism is that it accounts for the intuition that even if an act is not morally demanded it may still be praiseworthy.<

I'd like to see this claim fleshed out a little more. I actually see the class of morally good but not required acts (supererogatroy acts) as a problem for of deontological ethics (at least Kantian versions). As I read Kant, an act has morally worth if and only if it is done in accordance with the dictates of duty, thus ruling out good but not obligatory acts.

I know Kant had a theory about imperfect duties, but I don't see how that can accommodate things like heroic actions. If you run into a burning building to save a child's life (which you totally would, I know) that's a good act. But I don't see how it could be argued that you had a duty (perfect or imperfect) to do so. Which means it doesn't meet the Kantian criterion for a morally worthy action.

> Moral reasons may have been used to justify the legal norms, but what is a stake in courts of law are legal norms <

Of course, my point is that in a just society the two better be (tightly) related.

> Philosophical moral systems do not aim at describing or explaining actual feelings and behavior: they are "prescriptive"; they assume certain axioms that philosophers seem fit to adopt, and deduce norms that supposedly "ought to" be followed as a logical implication of those axioms. That's a totally different line of business. <

Actually, it isn't. I have made several times the parallel between math/logic and ethical philosophy. Yes, the latter is prescriptive, obviously, but the prescriptions are based (ideally) on logically derived propositions that begin with reasonable axioms - just like in math and logic.

Also, notice that we are now debating meta-ethics, which was the topic of my initial post. This post is about deontology, which is not a meta-ethical position.

Oyster Monkey,

> As I read Kant, an act has morally worth if and only if it is done in accordance with the dictates of duty, thus ruling out good but not obligatory acts. ... If you run into a burning building to save a child's life (which you totally would, I know) that's a good act. But I don't see how it could be argued that you had a duty (perfect or imperfect) to do so. <

Correct, you don't have a duty to do so. But a deontologist can still say that your actions are morally praiseworthy. A consequentialist, on the other hand, may end up concluding that they are actually wrong, depending on his assessment of the situation (and on the outcome of the rescue attempt).

Massimo,"[Hector wrote] > Moral reasons may have been used to justify the legal norms, but what is a stake in courts of law are legal norms <[Massimo responds] Of course, my point is that in a just society the two better be (tightly) related."

Massimo, why do you think that postulating a "just" society is in order? Has it anything to do with the reality of human societies and their inner mechanisms of emergence and evolution? Is that concept of what is "just" dictated by some objective property of human societies? (Apparently not: societies we regard as utterly unjust, including current ones, have survived for millennia). Why some axioms about what is "just" must be valid for any one society or for all societies? Are societies actually tending over time towards "juster" states? Is there some universal definition of what is "just"? Is there any inner mechanism pushing societies towards whatever we regard as "just"? Is there any kind of "universally just" kind of society?

One may recall here Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, to the effect that principles about rights and the law (and implicitly moral precepts) are relative to a society's historical development and basic (mostly material) building blocks (economy, resources, power distribution, technology, biological background and so on.

Slavery was apparently regarded as "just" by Greeks, Romans and US South landowners, as genital mutilation of women is considered not only "just" and "moral" but conducive to a more moral social order in countries like Eritrea or Ethiopia.

In fact, there is hardly one behavior that has not been considered "moral" or permissible or desirable in at least some historical societies (including cannibalism, incest, mercy killing, suicide, slavery, serfdom, extermination of "inferior" or "dangerous" groups, promiscuity, monogamy, polyginy, polyandria, adultery, "honor" killing, and what not). One can assume whatever axioms one likes, but what are the grounds to regard them as "reasonable" except what is common belief in one's own society and times? The same axioms we may regard as reasonable today would have been outrageous at many past periods, will probably be seen as outrageous at some point in the future, and may be considered outrageous today by entire cultures, let alone individuals or groups within societies. And even if the axioms are somewhat accepted as acceptable, exceptions to their implications are hardly deducible from the axioms themselves: from "thou shalt not kill" many among us deduce that the death penalty is legitimate, but honor killing of daughters is not (or the reverse); that killing trespassers on your property is right but killing a mugger in the street is not; that terminating the life of a terminal cancer case is OK, but terminating the life of a healthy suicidal person is not (or perhaps it is as well). Out of respect for others' rights we (but not George Washington or Thomas Jefferson) deduce that slavery is wrong. Even rejecting slavery, we hold the belief that hiring people to work for a wage (even if the workers are forced to do so in order to survive and not as a high-minded choice intended for their "flourishing") is OK (Bernard Shaw envisaged a future when hiring wage workers would be a crime). Risking your life spying for your own country is heroism, but risking your life spying for a foreign country is treason (except that you may simultaneously be regarded as a hero in that foreign country).

I am totally for studying how people behave and what they believe is right or wrong, and trying to find causal explanations of it. But in my view nothing can be "deduced" from such investigations about what people "ought to" do or believe. Moreover, probably people keep some beliefs or norms that are "consequentialist" and at the same time they respect other norms that belong with "virtue ethics" or "deontology": this lack of "systematicity", or fidelity to a school in Moral Philosophy, must not elicit a response of philosophers criticizing people's norms, or trying to propose or foster a more coherent ethical system upon people: the world is messy, decisions are hard, and people make decisions that are often at odds with a particular moral "system" even if in other respects they behave according (to a point) with that "system".

Descriptive/explanatory systems of moral behaviors are OK, just as other such systems systematizing empirical reality in every realm (physical, biological, social, psychological). But as we cannot assume "reasonable" axioms to prescribe that planets ought to turn in circles instead of ellipses, we have no grounds to prescribe (just because we happened to adopt certain set of axioms out of an infinity of other axioms) that people "ought to" indulge or not indulge in honor killings, adultery, wars or the consumption of pork.

Massimo to Hector: I have made several times the parallel between math/logic and ethical philosophy. Yes, the latter is prescriptive, obviously, but the prescriptions are based (ideally) on logically derived propositions that begin with reasonable axioms - just like in math and logic.

I (and I suspect most people) have no problem with ethical philosophy as an aid to thinking about moral dilemmas. (In this sense, it seems fair to label it as a kind of technology.)

But I wonder what (if any) prescriptive impact any particular normative theory can have (never mind should have) on a trolley-like dilemma, where an individual seemingly can't help but to think like either a utilitarian or a deontologist, depending on the details of the case (i.e. where the scenario necessarily entails either collateral damage or direct sacrifice).

If the answer is (as I suspect) "little or none", then the prescription would seem rather academic, wouldn't it?

> why do you think that postulating a "just" society is in order? Has it anything to do with the reality of human societies and their inner mechanisms of emergence and evolution? <

Because that is what facilitates human flourishing, and who cares whether evolution produced something or not? Not even Dawkins thinks of human beings as shackled by their evolutionary roots.

> One may recall here Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law <

One might not, considering that Marx actually did claim that societies evolve (historically) in a particular direction, which is what you started by ruling out.

> Slavery was apparently regarded as "just" by Greeks, Romans and US South landowners <

And they were wrong, and we live in a better and more socially evolved society for having recognized that.

> One can assume whatever axioms one likes, but what are the grounds to regard them as "reasonable" except what is common belief in one's own society and times? <

See my first post.

> in my view nothing can be "deduced" from such investigations about what people "ought to" do or believe. <

That may be because you are not familiar with ethical reasoning. I suggest Michael Sandel's book on Justice as a good introduction.

> But as we cannot assume "reasonable" axioms to prescribe that planets ought to turn in circles instead of ellipses, we have no grounds to prescribe that people "ought to" indulge or not indulge in honor killings, adultery, wars or the consumption of pork. <

Clearly a comparison of apples and oranges. I find it increasingly amusing that all posts about ethics on this blog eventually degenerate into a meta-ethical discussion. Meta-ethics is interesting and worth discussing, but you'll never get anywhere if every discussion about ethics becomes meta-ethical.

Similarly, it is interesting - from time to time - to discuss the rational foundations of science (as in Hume's problem of induction, for instance. But most of the time we need to discuss the actual science, setting the meta-discussion aside.

mufi,

> I wonder what (if any) prescriptive impact any particular normative theory can have <

I am puzzled by what people might mean by "prescriptive impact." It seems like at some point people mean something like moral reasoning "compelling" people to do / not do certain things, like gravity compels objects to fall. But no moral philosopher has ever claimed anything that. Moral compulsion means just this: IF you wish to act according to logic, and IF you accept certain kinds of axioms (e.g., the goal of ethics is to increase human well being) THEN you ought to do X and not Y. Period.

The point of reflecting on moral dilemmas like the trolley ones is to bring to the surface otherwise unexamined assumptions about what and why we think is right or wrong. Nothing less, nothing more.

Massimo: "For a consequentialist, on the contrary, if something is not morally demanded it is then morally forbidden."

Me: "Really?"

Massimo: "Yup. That's what emerges from my readings of the deontological literature, as you will see if you follow the links provided in the main post."

I've found nothing that supports that clearly dichotomous view of consequentialism.

The following Wikipedia quote seems to sum up the differences between deontology and consequentialism more accurately:"The difference between these -- approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than in the moral conclusions reached. For example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences produced by lying — though a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might make lying acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any potential "good" that might come from lying."

it's always dangerous to rely on Wiki entries. First of all, different reasons for moral decisions may or may not lead to different actions. The interest part is when they do. Second, I explained the point you were interested in above, in my response to Oyster Monkey.

MaissimoIt seems that you had a choice. Ask if was theoretically possible to create a moral system by identifying some goal (Y) and then create some system (X) by which we can decide what human actions do or do not act as instruments that bring about (Y)......Or to ask a more practical question regarding what kind of actions should we judge as moral or immoral based upon their fostering a specific goal, stipulated by yourself. By insisting on the goal of "human flourishing" you rejected a purely theoretical discussion and introduced a practical, political, ideological discussion. Which do you prefer now...theoretical, or ideological discussion.

Massimo: The point of reflecting on moral dilemmas like the trolley ones is to bring to the surface otherwise unexamined assumptions about what and why we think is right or wrong. Nothing less, nothing more.

Yes, but here's what I gather from the trolley experiments: that trying to abide by either utilitarianism or deontology 100% of the time will lead one to counter-intuitive (or counter-instinctual) results.

If it's of interest, and iirc, it was in his "Doctrine of Right" that Kant discussed charity as (what we would call) a supererogatory act. It advanced welfare without discharging one's duties to free will, as I recall.

Massimo, I think our ideas are clear enough, so no need to pursue every particular dissonance between our views. However, one:Says Massimo: "[Hector wrote] > Slavery was apparently regarded as "just" by Greeks, Romans and US South landowners < [and Massimo respond]:"And they were wrong, and we live in a better and more socially evolved society for having recognized that."

Are you sure? Why? You probably says so because you adopt (as moral principles) the moral principles of our society, whereby our society is better than other societies. But that is surely very shaky ground. In fact, one may easily argue that Athenian society was "better" in many respects (cradle of civilization and reason, and all that), and many would argue that slavery with its paternalistic side cares more for slaves than many employers (e.g. Georgian or Victorian employers in England, or owners of today's sweatshops in Malaysia or Ciudad Juarez) care about their "free" workers. Regarding Marx, I think you are not familiar with his thinking about the foundations of Law. He saw it as grounded in the particular social relations established in a given society, corresponding to a given stage in the development of productive forces. He did not think that, say, Victorian workers were better off than Medieval peasants or guild members (in fact they were not), and carefully notes how work hours, pauperism and general misery increased from 1750 to 1840. There are streaks of "ladder of progress" ideology here and there in Marx's work, just as you may find such traces in Darwin's account of evolution, but they are not of the essence of their analyses of, respectively, biological evolution and historical change.

I'm afraid, Massimo, the discussion returns to meta-ethics because many readers of this blog do not buy into your discourse on schools of moral philosophy because they are not satisfied with your views on meta-ethics. I also think they are somewhat weak, but that's just me in my utter ignorance.

PS: Perhaps I should add that the trolley experiments also suggest to me that utilitarianism and deontology both contribute something to a description of our moral instincts. The problem they have is that those same moral instincts do not behave in a logically consistent way (i.e. the way their philosopher advocates might like), and it's far from clear that they should (even according to your algorithm involving human well-being).

"Second, I explained the point you were interested in above, in my response to Oyster Monkey."

The point I'm interested in, which was yours, and not mine, specifically concerns your contention that to a consequentionalist, "if something is not morally demanded it is then morally forbidden." That has not been "explained" by you or anyone else that I've been able to discover. Nor have you or anyone else come up with an "explanatory" example of something (consequential or otherwise) that is forbidden since, or because, it's not been demanded.

So, the difference between consequentialism and deontology is that consequentialists merely require that the consequences of an action are good (but particularly, if this isn't always said, that such consequences should be anticipated and justified AND as promising good) whereas a deontologist excludes consequences as a criteria for morally good actions (or, simply, morality) and, instead, demands, at least, that morality be truly justified (e.g., by appeal to universal will, or universal reasoning and morality).

Seems like the task of squaring the circle. How can knowledge be objective if morality is subjective? Dualism is obviously pervasive among Western moral theory to insist there be a difference between rules and actions, like a difference between mind and body, while also trying to reduce all possible rules and actions to some maxim that supposedly resists dishonesty.

For those of us who search for a discrepancy in rules or actions, there's obviously a need to do so, too. What is the total, concrete reality of the 9/11 conspiracy?

So, we need real situations in order to truly apply a moral theory, and in so doing, it ought to be justifiable by real circumstances (antecedents and causes, as well as consequences and effects) rather than merely by appeal to a moral theory. Ultimately, normative ethics is more important than meta-ethics, I think, but it's important to make certain meta-ethical distinctions and try, at least, to be consistent about the whole exercise.

I wouldn't try to outwit a professor. No, that wasn't my purpose (here, or on facebook). What seems crucial to the difference between consequentialism and deontology is the necessary reduction meant to simplify the exemplary instances of moral justification contrasting the two. Failure to state that or to understand it shouldn't make a carnival show of ethics (reminded of the ancient paradoxes).

"and who cares whether evolution produced something or not? Not even Dawkins thinks of human beings as shackled by their evolutionary roots."

The answer to that question is - apparently you do. When the subject of genetic engineering came up to unshackle us from our genetic destiny and give us genetic choices it was you who raised the hue and cry about the dystopian blonde future that awaited. Seemed to me that you were on board with the root shackling.

And what is it with philosophers and imagining you are an animal? First with the pigs and then with the bats. What's next imagining life and moral choices as a paramecium? Surely there are other metaphors?

Personally I wonder why it is that happiness is the highest goal, and in fact pretty much the only goal that ever get's mentioned when 'flourishing' get's brought up. Just once I'd like to see understanding make the cut. If you want a race of happy people put drugs in the water along with the flouride. Alternatively you could tinker with people's genes to breed a happy population...

> here's what I gather from the trolley experiments: that trying to abide by either utilitarianism or deontology 100% of the time will lead one to counter-intuitive (or counter-instinctual) results. <

That may well be, but the production of counterintuitive results per se is no invalidation of either utilitarianism or deontology.

DJD,

> By insisting on the goal of "human flourishing" you rejected a purely theoretical discussion and introduced a practical, political, ideological discussion. Which do you prefer now...theoretical, or ideological discussion. <

I don't quite follow your dichotomy there. To me philosophical ("theoretical") discussions are interesting particularly when they carry practical consequences, i.e. when they affect our political and ideological discussions. So I don't need to choose.

Hector,

(on slavery and my comment that it is wrong) > Are you sure? Why? You probably says so because you adopt (as moral principles) the moral principles of our society, whereby our society is better than other societies. <

Yes, I also think the moral principles of our society (in this case) are better than those of Athenian society, because they are more in synch with principles like individual freedom, human dignity, personal and societal flourishing, and the basic idea that the slave owners wouldn't want themselves to be slaves, thereby violating egalitarian principles.

> the discussion returns to meta-ethics because many readers of this blog do not buy into your discourse on schools of moral philosophy because they are not satisfied with your views on meta-ethics. <

Oh, I don't know about "many" readers, seems like it's always the usual suspects who immediately turn to meta-ethics. At any rate, nobody needs to buy my views on meta-ethics (or on specific ethical theories). I just find it a bit frustrating that the discourse his so often highjacked in a meta-ethical direction even when meta-ethics has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

> That has not been "explained" by you or anyone else that I've been able to discover. Nor have you or anyone else come up with an "explanatory" example of something (consequential or otherwise) that is forbidden since, or because, it's not been demanded. <

The appropriate example is the one I discussed in response to Oyster Monkey above, let me know why you are ignoring it. And the entries on deontology in both the Stanford Enc. of Philosophy and the Internet Enc. of Philosophy deal explicitly with the point you are interested in.

electric fireplace,

> How can knowledge be objective if morality is subjective? <

Here we go again with the meta-ethical escape hatch. See comments above.

> Western moral theory to insist there be a difference between rules and actions, like a difference between mind and body <

I don't see the parallel at all.

Thameron,

> When the subject of genetic engineering came up to unshackle us from our genetic destiny and give us genetic choices it was you who raised the hue and cry about the dystopian blonde future that awaited. Seemed to me that you were on board with the root shackling. <

Seems to me you are comparing apples and oranges. That was a critique based on manipulating things we are far from understanding, and about the question of who would have access to those resources. It wasn't a defense of human nature *because* it is the result of evolution.

> what is it with philosophers and imagining you are an animal? First with the pigs and then with the bats. What's next imagining life and moral choices as a paramecium? <

Nagel's thought experiment had to do with the philosophy of mind, not ethics.

> I wonder why it is that happiness is the highest goal, and in fact pretty much the only goal that ever get's mentioned when 'flourishing' get's brought up. Just once I'd like to see understanding make the cut. If you want a race of happy people put drugs in the water along with the flouride. <

Again, there seems to be some confusion here. Flourishing (the Greek eudaimonia) *is* happiness, but not the sort that you get by hooking yourself to a drug pump. It is the sort that includes understanding, as in Socrates' idea of examining one's life and the Delphi oracle's injunction to know thyself.

I don't know about "many readers" either; maybe it's just Hector, Richard Wein, and myself. But when Massimo says it's "a bit frustrating that the discourse his so often highjacked in a meta-ethical direction even when meta-ethics has nothing to do with the issue at hand," I can't help but think, isn't Massimo doing a series of blog posts on conflicting moral foundations? I myself think that since meta-ethics is foundational to ethics, meta-ethics can never be irrelevant to ethical discussions. But if such cases do exist, is this really one of them?

I would never said that meta-ethical discussions are not relevant, of course they are. Just like discussions about the logical foundations of math are relevant to math, or debates about Hume's problem of induction are foundational to science. Still, one doesn't get much ethics, math or science done if one insists in indulging only or mostly in meta-debates.

As far as this series is concerned, the only meta-ethical entry was the first one. All the others, including the concluding one in which I will explicitly compare consequentialism, deontology, etc. and try to clear my head about how I combined them, deal with specific approaches to ethics and how they fare. In that context, meta-ethics is in the background, not the foreground.

That may well be, but the production of counterintuitive results per se is no invalidation of either utilitarianism or deontology.

Unless a utilitarian can convince me that the deontological response to the "active sacrifice" version of the trolley scenario is wrong, or a deontologist can convince me that the utilitarian response to the "collateral damage" version is wrong, then I'll have to disagree with you - but only to the extent that these normative theories try to prescribe moral action 100% of the time.

In other words, when I read how people actually respond to those trolley scenarios, the only thing "wrong" that I can see is that people tend to be both utilitarian and deontological in their thinking, depending upon the details of the situation. Such heterodoxy doesn't bother me (or, I suspect, most people), but I can understand why it might bother an orthodox utilitarian or deontologist.

ah, but there are other choices out there: for instance, I'm pretty sure a virtue ethicist would act as a utilitarian in one version of the trolley dilemma and as a deontologist in the other version...

Massimo, the Stanford site re consequentialism says: "All acts are seemingly either required or forbidden."And the Oyster Monkey example was: "A consequentialist, on the other hand, may end up concluding that they are actually wrong, depending on his assessment of the situation (and on the outcome of the rescue attempt)." You can remove the 'seemingly' and the 'may' and come up with your version, but it's so far just your version. On the other hand its also your blog, so you get to choose the final consequence.

check the entry for Deontological Ethics in the SEP, particularly the section on "advantages of deontological theories":

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/#AdvDeoThe

As for the example by Oyster Monkey, here is what I responded:

"But a deontologist can still say that your actions are morally praiseworthy. A consequentialist, on the other hand, may end up concluding that they are actually wrong, depending on his assessment of the situation (and on the outcome of the rescue attempt)."

"But a deontologist can still say that your actions are morally praiseworthy."

I'm still not convinced that the deontologist has the grounds for asserting the moral worth of supererogatory acts (the SEP article just asserts that it does). Acts are morally worthwhile if and only if they are done according to a moral rule (the deontologist says). For Kant, the moral rule is whatever reason prescribes as a duty. Nothing else makes an action good except the fact that it is determined by this rule of reason. Virtue is only relevant to Kant insofar as it makes fulfilling duties easier.

Kant recognizes perfect duties and imperfect duties, but supererogatory acts don't fit neatly into either category. Heroism isn't a perfect duty, otherwise we'd all be required to be heroes all the time. But neither is it an imperfect duty, in which case we'd be obligated to do some acts of heroism, just not every one that presents itself to us.

Maybe the response is, well, Kant is wrong about what makes actions morally praiseworthy. But then what's the alternative ground for the moral rule?

I think you (like many) read Kant a bit too strictly. In part this is the result of the classical focus on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. But Kant talks a lot about virtue in his other works, including Metaphysics of Morals, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.

Massimo, you found one place where the sentence on the subject agreed with your original contention, and I found a place earlier in the same essay where the sentence didn't. And your Oyster Monkey example continues to agree with my selection rather than with yours.

But again, if "this should make it clear," I've missed the point somewhere, and you win.

I'll take another look at the Metaphysics of Morals, it's been a while. And I'm not as familiar with the other two works as I probably should be.

But here's a passage from the Critique of Practical Reason that addresses whether we should even hold up moral acts as exemplary for moral teaching:

"[A]ctions of others which have been done with great sacrifice and solely for the sake of duty may be praised as noble and sublime deeds, yet only in so far as there are clues which suggest they were done wholly out of respect for duty and not from aroused feelings…. For all actions which are praiseworthy, if we only search we shall find a law of duty which commands and does not leave us to choose what may be agreeable to our propensity."

That seems to me to argue pretty forcefully that moral praiseworthiness is grounded on duty.

it's not a question of winning. As the SEP article says explicitly, at least some people do think of consequentialism that way. If you are that interested in that particular point (frankly, I'm not), you may need to check the references in the SEP article.

Oyster,

yes, that sounds pretty clear. But as I said, Kant seems to say different things in other writings, and he is certainly not the only deontologist around. (And I'm no Kant scholar, nor do I have a beef in this particular discussion.)

After reading recent posts at Jerry Coyne's, Jason Rosenhouse's and Eric MacDonald's blogs (or website, in one case) dealing with a catholic apologist called Edward Feser, I was wondering about one type of, as far as I understand, Deontology in particular, i.e. Natural Law Philosophy.

Unfortunately, I did not take the opportunity to inquire more deeply about it when I was still in the same institute as two thoughtful catholics, and now I am apparently surrounded mostly by atheists, agnostics and liberal protestants, but I wonder if it actually is anything but a proud use of the naturalistic fallacy. Or is there more substance to it? Anyone care to comment?

If I understand correctly, it goes like this: our sexual organs are "obviously for" reproduction, so their use for reproduction is our moral duty and any use of them that does not serve reproduction is morally forbidden. Of course, by that logic, one can have a lot of fun with Natural Law: Reproduction is "obviously for" producing new independent adults, so we are morally obliged to abort any fetuses that have genetic defects that will keep them from reaching adulthood. Or something? Am I doing it rite?

you are correct, it is an egregious example of the naturalistic fallacy. It makes some sort of sense only if one thinks that *god* designed X for Y, and that it is therefore his implicit command that X be used only for Y. Though even then, how do they know that god didn't design sexual organs for reproduction *and* pleasure? (Natural selection certainly did.)

I think if you give the natural-law theorist John Finnis a far more generous reading than he warrants, then what he's saying is that what appears to be a breach of the is-ought gap is actually a version of epistemological foundationalism (the idea that some foundational propositions ("basic beliefs") are rational to hold true even though the agent does not infer them from any other propositions). But while foundationalists view particular propositions as basic, Finnis advocates taking the mental association of a descriptive proposotion and a normative one as basic. He never actually mentions foundationalism in his book, but the structure of his system mirrors it in being non-inferential, he discusses "immediate understanding" and "self-evident propositions" in what sounds like an epistemological way, and really he needs all the help he can get.

Why not stick with the negative Golden Rule: don't do to others what you would not want to be done to you (and let's not get involved in whether or not the Spanish Inquisition was in the soul-saving business).