Somewhat
belated, but in many ways comprehensive information on the
development, goals, timing and course of the failed anti-terrorist
operations. The customers, beneficiaries, the geopolitical results
and little-known aspects of the incident.

The
timing of sabotage

1.
At the time of a personal visit of Erdogan to Russia.

2.
On the eve of the Crimean parliamentary elections.

3.
During the Olympic games.

The
goal of aggression

The
target of this sabotage was the critical infrastructure the Crimean
Peninsula. The ferries, the
Titan,
shipyards, the town of Krasnoperekopsk, aniline paints plant, gas
distribution stations, strategic highways, a water supply system,
stations of water purification, bridges.

Groundwork
for the sabotage operations

1.
The saboteurs repeatedly visited the Peninsula in advance under the
guise of tourists, conducted information gathering, surveys,
approaches, and studied the mode of operation of the objects under
the guise of fake IDs in related fields.

2.
Later, the group of saboteurs was divided into two parts. The first
continued to remain in Crimea under the guise of tourists, and kept
in touch with an organized network of local contacts. Second, the
officers of the military human intelligence of the GUR Ukraine
Ministry of Defense, a.k.a. the
Main directorate of intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine or HUR MOU,
left Crimea after conducting intelligence gathering.

3.
The operation was scheduled to start on the night of 6 to 7 August.

The
timetable of events

According
to the FSB of Russia, on the night of August 6th, a group of seven
armed men dressed in camouflage uniforms of the old Soviet model was
transferred by the inflatable boats across the Gulf of Perekop and
landed near Armyansk.

A
few kilometers from the coast, this saboteurs group was discovered by
a group of special counter-terrorist forces of the FSB
“Vympel.”
Three servicemen of this group were conducting the guarding of
this very complicated part of the border between Russia and Ukraine.
After asking for support of the border control troops, the FSB
servicemen become engaged into the armed conflict with the group of
saboteurs. During the collision, one counter-terrorism officer was
deadly wounded. Before he died he killed two of his adversaries. The
remaining five were corned and taken into custody alive.

Most
of the detained turned out to be the residents of Crimea, some of
them had Russian passports. In their testimonies, the detained
saboteurs stated that they were recruited and trained by the GUR of
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Plus, they disclosed information
about several other groups dispatched by the Ukrainian intelligence
on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula with the objective to
commit the acts of sabotage and other unlawful misconduct. This
particular group was involved in the organization of a series of
explosions at the various places around the resort. The testimony of
detainees indicated that the explosives for them were supposed to be
delivered by the second group which was planned to illegally enter
the territory of Crimea through a different route. Once in Russia,
this group was supposed to stock explosives and other weapons in a
specially prepared vault.

The
search operations the second sabotage group were conducted during the
day of August 7th. At night of September 8th, the paratroopers of the
247-th airborne assault regiment of the airborne troops (a group of
enforcement) detected the second group of the saboteurs. The members
of the second group made an attempt to retreat to the mainland
Ukraine across the shallow water of the Bay. A battle ensued.

At
the location of the armed collision there were found 20 improvised
explosive devices with total capacity of more than 40 kg of TNT,
ammunition and special means of initiation, regular antipersonnel and
magnetic mines as well as grenades and special weapons, consisting of
arms of special units of the armed forces of Ukraine. The detained
leader of this group was a citizen of Ukraine, Eugene Panov, born in
1977, a career officer of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of
Ukraine.

In
addition, it was discovered that Suleymanov, arrested by the Crimean
law enforcement in early August for planting a fake bomb at the
Simferopol airport has also been found associated with the events. In
the course of him giving his testimony he revealed that the
announcement about the bomb scare was supposed to distract the
attention of the Crimean law enforcement and to create the favorable
conditions for a successful passage onto the territory of Crimea the
subversive groups from Ukraine. In addition, it was assumed that the
calls with threats of explosions were to identify and reveal the ways
the Crimean law enforcement agencies would react to such messages.

The
aims and objectives

LOCAL:

1.
To destabilize the socio-political situation in Crimea on the eve of
elections to the Russia’s Parliament Duma and municipal councils.

2.
To cut off the flow of tourists from both Russia and from Ukraine,
that were receiving dangerous for the Kiev authorities knowledge
about the real situation on the Peninsula that didn’t not correlate
with the Ukrainian media propaganda about the “dying” Russian
Crimea.

3.
Bringing damage to the Russian economy.

GEOPOLITICAL:

1.
Recently, Crimea systematically being omitted of the global agenda
and is becoming increasingly unfit for international pressure on
Russia. In this context, the main aims of the series of the planned
terrorist attacks were:

a)
to return the Crimea into a focus of international media from the
position of the “Russian aggression,” in favor of this speaks the
fact of absolute silence of the foreign media in the days following
the incident. It’s clearly shows the arranged trap similar to
one that was set up on the eve of the events of 08.08.08., when the
first shots of the Russian side was immediately followed by the
massive coverage of foreign propaganda.

b)
to increase pressure on Russia and Europe to prevent the construction
of the North Stream-2, Turkey Stream, and the South Stream
(Considering that upon completion of these projects, the value of
such expensive Western assets like “Ukraine” and “Syrian
opposition” would turn into zero in its significance);

c)
to strengthen the “fifth column” inside Russia, under the
auspices and slogans about the “impotence of the Russian
authorities”.

The
military outcome of the operation

All
the detained are suspects in the preparation of acts of sabotage on
the territory of Crimea They are taken into custody, and each
of them will be receive a procedural evaluation. This is “the
toughest and the most reasonable in this situation, a preventive
measure“.
(N. Poklonskaya)

The
Russian side disclosed information about the death of an officer of
the special division “Vympel,” and a serviceman of the airborne
division. Losses on the Ukrainian side were not disclosed.

The
political outcome of these events

The
United States and Ukraine

For
the United States and for a part of the Ukrainian “elite” the
ideal outcome of this saboteur operation would be a direct military
response of Russia. The war would allow to write off of everything:
theft, the killings of civilians, and profits of the oligarchs.

The
Ukrainian elite would become an “elite in exile” with political
guarantees by the type of Saakashvilli had received. American hawks
would prove their thesis about “barbaric Russian,” with all the
ensuing economic and political consequences. Contracts and a number
of critical contracts with partners would be disrupted, the internal
social situation undermined the objectives are achieved.

However,
due to the prudent actions of the Russian leadership, all did not go
as planned. So, if until now the “modern Ukraine” got used to sit
on two chairs at once, holding its weight of the Russian “legs,”
after committing this insane act, these legs will be purposefully and
actively “broken”.

In
particular, by calling Poroshenko a terrorist, Putin is already
raising a bar, and with this he is increasing the internal opposition
in the Ukrainian society, giving a very clear signal to the Eastern
regions.

Europe

It
becomes harder to hide the fact that the existence of a terrorist
state between Europe and Russia is a thing far more dangerous than
“wild steppe.”

Russia

The
transition to terror by our “friends and partners” says a lot. In
particular, it means that other ways to achieve a desired results
simply don’t work. The resumption of hostilities in the Donbass
apparently seems to them futile, maps with the downed Boeing and
other preparations, finally exhausted itself and the entire arsenal
of forces and means, was parried by the Russian diplomacy, politics
and the army, unexpectedly successful.

In
addition, the positive aspect of this failed saboteur operation is
the fact that these events in Crimea would give to more Russian
citizens understanding as to why in 2014, LDNR were not included in
the Russian Federation.

For
reference, clarify that at the time of the “Russian spring”,
support for Russian actions on the part of the Crimean population was
94%. After joining, the only way to the Russian Peninsula from
Ukraine has become the way through 20 km long isthmus and a
full-fledged state border of the Russian Federation. From a military
point of view, the protection of the Peninsula to Russia – in the
conditions of an unfriendly neighbor, feasible with a high degree of
control and the success of the action. This was confirmed by the
events, but they also showed how difficult it is to ensure the safety
of citizens and the integrity of borders, even in such a positive
environment. In the mainland part, within the boundaries of the LDNR,
where each forest can have hiding places or Bandera style caches of
ammunition. Also, at the time of the “Russian spring” the support
of the local population was “suspended” somewhere at the bottom
mark (as evident from the migration of refugees, half of them at the
beginning of Ukrainian forces attacks on the civilian towns of
Donbass moved not in Russia, and to Ukraine.) In these conditions,
providing the security might become extremely challenging. The basis
for this complexity would be multiplied by the political realities
and related military and protective restrictions.

In
a similar way and for similar reasons, the Russian Empire at the time
didn’t absorb Istanbul, although according to generally accepted
international historians, it certainly could have from a militaristic
point of view.

GENERALIZATION

A
part of the citizens of our country believe that Russia should act
“directly and strongly,” and any other behavior for her is
erroneous and incorrect. Such an opinion is ill-advised.

In
its foreign policy Russia consciously acts not in a “direct,” but
more like “curved” way in accordance with its national interests,
and using any means including military, special intelligence,
and social, to drive the enemy into madness, while they are waiting
and trying to anticipate our next steps and planned actions. And this
practice shows that it’s absolutely the right modus of operation
for our “Polite Country.”

Since
Russia has no media that would be comparable with the Western by the
size of its audience, we have to act carefully, and anticipate what’s
coming from behind a curve. Modern Russia is not going to throw
mindlessly its weight around, as some would like. It works carefully
and accurately, and therefore produces results with minimum losses,
and maximum benefits.

Russia
with Putin, unlike many other incarnations of our country,
understands the most important thing. Threats call for the
appropriate responses. We can’t react to everything with the use of
the simple fact that we can fight the wars better than anyone else on
this planet. We will not respond to information war of the West –
with military action. We are not going to die, fighting with puppet
regimes, manipulated by the West. We don’t get engaged in
pre-planned and pre-prepared for us war in Ukraine.

Instead
of introducing an embargo of the Olympics, and having the wars with
half of the planet, Russia professionally acting from unfavorable
positions, without nervous breakdowns, took back South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, in one day had returned the Crimean Peninsula, has
protected and continues to provide support and patronage to DLNR,
successfully supports Assad, extends the influence of the state
hitherto in the region of the Middle East. Russia has demonstrated an
exemplary model of modern war in Syria, it’s building ICBMs and
“Kalibrs” to protect the country and its future, it’s rerouting
the Internet to its own territory. Russian has already have created a
competitive national satellite navigation system, went back into
space, confidently parries the attempts of its isolation, introduces
the round of Euro-sanctions, that make the inhabitants of the
European Union themselves to pressure hard on the European
authorities. It successfully without stress or strain on its forces
resists the US pressure on the world stage…

As
for the banana republic, described in this material, according
to the known principle, she’ll get hers, and predominantly by the
remote methods…