The Strategic Rocket Forces reported that four silo-based Topol-M missiles joined the Tatishchevo division and have started active service. This deployment was expected and it was already reflected in the 2007 year-end summary. The total number of silo-based Topol-Ms stands at 48 missiles.

According to a representative of the Rocket Forces, two more silo-based missiles of the Topol-M type will be deployed in Tatishchevo by the end of 2008, completing deployment of the fifth regiment in Tatishchevo. The total number of Topol-M missiles in Tatishchevo will probably reach 60 by 2010, after which deployment of these missiles was expected to be moved to Uzhur. It is more likely, however, that after the end of 2009 the emphasis in deployement will shift toward mobile missiles, the RS-24 MIRVed version of Topol-M in particluar.

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The Strategic Rocket Forces announced today that they plan to deploy 11 new Topol-M missiles by the end of 2008. The commander of the Rocket Forces General Nikolai Solovtsov was quoted as saying at a press-conference that his service will...

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(Sorry for off-topic comment.)

Pavel, what in your opinion is the U.S. motives for developing the ABM system?

Presently, strategic ABM system cannot be made effective against missiles carrying warhead decoys. There does not appear to be even a remote possibility for development of a technology able to discriminate between decoys and real warheads (until the terminal part of the trajectory) in the foreseeable future, perhaps not ever at all.

It also can be reasonably assumed that any nation able to build ICBMs should also be able to develop decoys with little added effort.

Thus if Iran or another nation potentially hostile to the U.S. builds ICBMs, they can as well build ICBMs that won't be intercept-able by the ABM system, at least strategic ABM system.

Yet, the U.S. is aggravating its budget deficit with investment into development of the system that seems to be of little practical defense value, but despite that these expenses get approved by the Congress on a yearly basis.

Perhaps, initial resumption of ABM development in early 2000's could have been a "knee jerk" after 9/11, but why did it not come under closer congressional scrutiny in the subsequent years?

What is the U.S. rationale for all these seemingly senseless expenses?

What is the thinking and argument of Congressional budget office and subcommittees involved?

These are all very good questions. A short answer to the question about the motives is that there are many people who have many (often very different) reasons to believe that missile defense is a good idea. I tried to look at the U.S. thinking about missile defense in a paper in Yaderny Kontrol a few years ago. That was my best shot.

This wouldn't be the first time the United States (or the Soviet Union or Russia, for that matter) is involved in senseless missile defense spending. Right now the congress does not care that much about the cost - what is ten billion dollars a year compared to the spending in Iraq? But I think (and I wrote about it in the YK article) that eventually it will be the congress that will kill the system because of its cost and ineffectiveness. But it will take time and anyway probably won't happen before the money is spent. Just like it was in the past, with SDI etc.