In order to guarantee that our Party and country do not change
their color, we must not only have a correct line and correct
policies but must train and bring up millions of successors who
will carry on the cause of proletarian revolution. In the final
analysis, the question of training successors for the
revolutionary cause of the proletariat is one of whether or not
there will be people who can carry on the Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary cause started by the older generation of proletarian
revolutionaries, whether or not the leadership of our Party and
state will remain in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries,
whether or not our descendants will continue to march along the
correct road laid down by Marxism-Leninism, or, in other words,
whether or not we can successfully prevent the emergence of
Khrushchov's revisionism in China. In short, it is an extremely
important question, a matter of life and death for our Party and
our country. It is a question of fundamental importance to the
proletarian revolutionary cause for a hundred, a thousand, nay ten
thousand years. Basing themselves on the changes in the Soviet
Union, the imperialist prophets are pinning their hopes of
"peaceful evolution" on the third or fourth generation
of the Chinese Party. We must shatter these imperialist
prophecies. From our highest organizations down to the
grass-roots, we must everywhere give constant attention to the
training and upbringing of successors to the revolutionary
cause. What are the requirements for worthy successors to the
revolutionary cause of the proletariat? They must be genuine
Marxist-Leninists and not revisionists like Khrushchev wearing the
cloak of Marxism-Leninism. They must be revolutionaries who
wholeheartedly serve the overwhelming majority of the people of
China and the whole world, and must not be like Khrushchev who
serves both the interests of the handful of members of the
privileged bourgeois stratum in his own country and those of
foreign imperialism and reaction. They must be proletarian
statesmen capable of uniting and working together with the
overwhelming majority. Not only must they unite with those who
agree with them, they must also be good at uniting with those who
disagree and even with those who formerly opposed them and have
since been proved wrong in practice. But they must especially
watch out for careerists and conspirators like Khrushchev and
prevent such bad elements from usurping the leadership of the
Party and the state at any level. They must be models in applying
the Party's democratic centralism, must master the method of
leadership based on the principle of "from the masses, to the
masses", and must cultivate a democratic style and be good at
listening to the masses. They must not be despotic like Khrushchev
and violate the Party's democratic centralism, make surprise
attacks on comrades or act arbitrarily and dictatorially. They
must be modest and prudent and guard against arrogance and
impetuosity; they must be imbued with the spirit of self-criticism
and have the courage to correct mistakes and shortcomings in their
work. They must never cover up their errors like Khrushchev, and
claim all the credit for themselves and shift all the blame on
others. Successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat
come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in the great
storms of revolution. It is essential to test and judge cadres and
choose and train successors in the long course of mass
struggle.

Quoted in On Khrushchov's Phony
Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World (July 14,1964),
pp. 72-74.*

Our Party organizations must be extended all
over the country and we must purposefully train tens of thousands
of cadres and hundreds of first-rate mass leaders. They must be
cadres and leaders versed in Marxism-Leninism, politically
far-sighted, competent in work, full of the spirit of
self-sacrifice, capable of tackling problems on their own,
steadfast in the midst of difficulties and loyal and devoted in
serving the nation, the class and the Party. It is on these cadres
and leaders that the Party relies for its links with the
membership and the masses, and it is by relying on their firm
leadership of the masses that the Party can succeed in defeating
the enemy. Such cadres and leaders must be free from selfishness,
from individualistic heroism, ostentation, sloth, passivity, and
arrogant sectarianism, and they must be selfless national and
class heroes; such are the qualities and the style of work
demanded of the members, cadres and leaders of our Party.

"Win the Masses in Their Millions for the
Anti-Japanese National United Front" (May 7, 1937), Selected
Works, Vol. I, p. 291.*

Cadres are a decisive factor, once
the political line is determined. Therefore, it is our fighting
task to train large numbers of new cadres in a planned way.

"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in
the National War" (October 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II,
p. 202.

The criterion the Communist Party should apply in
its cadres policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in
carrying out the Party line, keeps to Party discipline, has close
ties with the masses, has the ability to find his bearings
independently, and is active, hardworking and unselfish. This is
what "appointing people on their merit" means.

Ibid.

It is necessary to maintain the system
of cadre participation in collective productive labour. The cadres
of our Party and state are ordinary workers and not overlords
sitting on the backs of the people. By taking part in collective
productive labour, the cadres maintain extensive, constant and
close ties with the working people. This is a major measure of
fundamental importance for a socialist system; it helps to
overcome bureaucracy and to prevent revisionism and
dogmatism.

Quoted in On Khrushchov's Phony
Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World (July 14,
1964), pp. 68-69.*

We must know how to judge cadres. We must
not confine our judgement to a short period or a single incident
in a cadre's life, but should consider his life and work as a
whole. This is the principal method of judging cadres.

"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in
the National War" (October 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II,
p. 202.

We must, know how to use cadres well. In the final
analysis, leadership involves two main responsibilities: to work
out ideas, and to use cadres well. Such things as drawing up
plans, making decisions, and giving orders and directives, are all
in the category of "working out ideas". To put the ideas
into practice, we must weld the cadres together and encourage them
to go into action; this comes into the category of "using the
cadres well".

Ibid.

We must know
how to take good care of cadres. There are several ways of doing
so. First, give them guidance. This means allowing them a free
hand in their work so that they have the courage to assume
responsibility and, at the same time, giving them timely
instructions so that, guided by the Party's political line, they
are able to make full use of their initiative. Second, raise their
level. This means educating them by giving them the opportunity to
study so that they can enhance their theoretical understanding and
their working ability. Third, check up on their work, and help
them sum up their experience, carry forward their achievements and
correct their mistakes. To assign work without checking up and to
take notice only when serious mistakes are made - that is not the
way to take care of cadres. Fourth, in general, use the method of
persuasion with cadres who have made mistakes, and help them
correct their mistakes. The method of struggle should be confined
to those who make serious mistakes and nevertheless refuse to
accept guidance. Here patience is essential. It is wrong lightly
to label people "opportunists" or lightly to begin
"waging struggles" against them. Fifth, help them with
their difficulties. When cadres are in difficulty as a result of
illness, straitened means or domestic or other troubles, we must
be sure to give them as much care as possible.This is how to take
good care of cadres.

Ibid., p. 203.

A
leading group that is genuinely united and is linked with the
masses can gradually be formed only in the process of mass
struggle, and not in isolation from it. In the process of a great
struggle, the composition of the leading group in most cases
should not and cannot remain entirely unchanged throughout the
initial, middle and final stages; the activists who come forward
in the course of the struggle must constantly be promoted to
replace those original members of the leading group who are
inferior by comparison or who have degenerated.

If our Party does not have a great many new cadres
working in unity and cooperation with the old cadres, our cause
will come to a stop. All old cadres, therefore, should welcome the
new ones with the utmost enthusiasm and show them the warmest
solicitude. True, new cadres have their shortcomings. They have
not been long in the revolution and lack experience, and
unavoidably some have brought with them vestiges of the
unwholesome ideology of the old society, remnants of the ideology
of petty-bourgeois individualism. But such shortcomings can be
gradually eliminated through education and tempering in the
revolution. The strong point of the new cadres, as Stalin has
said, is that they are acutely sensitive to what is new and are
therefore enthusiastic and active to a high degree - the very
qualities which some of the old cadres lack. Cadres, new and old,
should respect each other, learn from each other and overcome
their own shortcomings by learning from each other's strong
points, so as to unite as one in the common cause and guard
against sectarian tendencies.

Our concern should extend to
non-Party cadres as well as to Party cadres. There are many
capable people outside the Party whom we must not ignore. The duty
of every Communist is to rid himself of aloofness and arrogance
and to work well with non-Party cadres, give them sincere help,
have a warm, comradely attitude towards them and enlist their
initiative in the great cause of resisting Japan and
reconstructing the nation.

"The Role of
the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" (October
1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 202.