U.S. Satellite Imagery, 1960-1999

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 13

Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson

For more information contact:
Jeffrey T. Richelson at 202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Washington, D.C., April 14, 1999 – The use of overhead platforms to observe events on the earth can be traced
to the French Revolution, when France organized a company of aerostiers,
or balloonists, in April 1794. The United States employed balloons during
the Civil War, although little intelligence of value was obtained. In January
1911, the San Diego waterfront became the first target of cameras carried
aboard an airplane. Later that year the U.S. Army Signal Corps put aerial
photography into the curriculum at its flight training school. Between
1913 and 1915 visual and photographic reconnaissance missions were flown
by the U.S. Army in the Philippines and along the Mexican border.1

During World War II the United States made extensive use of airplane
photography using remodeled bombers. After the war, with the emergence
of a hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, the United States began
conducting photographic missions along the Soviet periphery. The aircraft
cameras, however, could only capture images of territory within a few miles
of the flight path.

On some missions aircraft actually flew into Soviet airspace,
but even those missions did not provide the necessary coverage of the vast
Soviet interior. As a result, beginning in the early 1950s the United States
began seriously exploring more advanced methods for obtaining images of
targets throughout the Soviet Union. The result was the development, production,
and employment of a variety of spacecraft and aircraft (particularly the
U-2 and A-12/SR-71) that permitted the U.S. intelligence community to closely
monitor developments in the Soviet Union and other nations through overhead
imagery.

The capabilities of spacecraft and aircraft have evolved from
being limited to black-and-white visible-light photography to being able
to produce images using different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum.
As a result, imagery can often be obtained under circumstances (darkness,
cloud cover) where standard visible-light photography is not feasible.
In addition, employment of different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum,
individually or simultaneously, expands the information that can be produced
concerning a target.

Photographic equipment can be film-based or electro-optical. A
conventional camera captures a scene on film by recording the varying light
levels reflected from all of the separate objects in the scene. In contrast,
an electro-optical camera converts the varying light levels into electrical
signals. A numerical value is assigned to each of the signals, which are
called picture elements, or pixels. At a ground receiving station, a picture
can then be constructed from the digital signal transmitted from the spacecraft
(often via a relay satellite).2

In addition to the visible-light portion of the electro-magnetic
spectrum, the near-infrared portion of the spectrum, which is invisible
to the human eye, can be employed to produce images. At the same time,
near-infrared, like, visible-light imagery, depends on objects reflecting
solar radiation rather than on their emission of radiation. As a result,
such imagery can only be produced in daylight and in the absence of substantial
cloud cover.3

Thermal infrared imagery, obtained from the mid- and far-infrared
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, provides imagery purely by detecting
the heat emitted by objects. Thus, a thermal infrared system can detect
buried structures, such as missile silos or underground construction, as
a result of the heat they generate. Since thermal infrared imagery does
not require visible light, it can be obtained under conditions of darkness--if
the sky is free of cloud cover.4

Imagery can be obtained during day or night in the presence of
cloud cover by employing an imaging radar (an acronym for radio detection
and ranging). Radar imagery is produced by bouncing radio waves off an
area or an object and using the reflected returns to produce an image of
the target. Since radio waves are not attenuated by the water vapor in
the atmosphere, they are able to penetrate cloud cover.5

However imagery is obtained, it requires processing and interpretation
to convert it into intelligence data. Computers can be employed to improve
the quantity and quality of the information extracted. Obviously, digital
electro-optical imagery arrives in a form that facilitates such operations.
But even analog imagery obtained by a conventional camera can be converted
into digital signals. In any case, a computer disassembles a picture into
millions of electronic Morse code pulses and then uses mathematical formulas
to manipulate the color contrast and intensity of each spot. Each image
can be reassembled in various ways to highlight special features and objects
that were hidden in the original image.6

Such processing allows:

building multicolored single images out of several pictures taken in different
bands of the spectrum;

making the patterns more obvious;

restoring the shapes of objects by adjusting for the angle of view and
lens distortion;

changing the amount of contrast between objects and backgrounds;

sharpening out-of-focus images;

restoring ground details largely obscured by clouds;

conducting electronic optical subtraction, in which earlier pictures are
subtracted from later ones, making unchanged buildings in a scene disappear
while new objects, such as missile silos under construction, remain;

Such processing plays a crucial role in easing the burden on photogrammetrists
and imagery interpreters. Photogrammetrists are responsible for determining
the size and dimensions of objects from overhead photographs, using, along
with other data, the shadows cast by the objects. Photo interpreters are
trained to provide information about the nature of the objects in the photographs--based
on information as to what type of crates carry MiG-29s, for instance, or
what an IRBM site or fiber optics factory looks like from 150 miles in
space.

Click on any of the following
images to view a larger version of the photo.

CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD

In its May 2, 1946 report, Preliminary Design for an Experimental
World Circling Spaceship, the Douglas Aircraft Corporation examined
the potential value of satellites for scientific and military purposes.
Possible military uses included missile guidance, weapons delivery, weather
reconnaissance, communications, attack assessment, and "observation."8

A little less than nine years later, on March 16, 1955, the Air Force
issued General Operational Requirement No. 80, officially establishing
a high-level requirement for an advanced reconnaissance satellite. The
document defined the Air Force objective to be the provision of continuous
surveillance of "preselected areas of the earth" in order "to determine
the status of a potential enemy's warmaking capability."9

Over the next five years the U.S. reconnaissance satellite program evolved
in a variety of ways. The success of the Soviet Union's Sputnik I and II
satellites in the fall of 1957 provided a spur to all U.S. space programs
- as any success could be used in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union.
In the case of U.S. reconnaissance programs, Sputnik provided a second
incentive. The clear implications of the Sputnik launches for Soviet ICBM
development increased the pressure on discovering the extent of Soviet
capabilities - something that the sporadic U-2 flights could only do in
a limited fashion.10

The Air Force program was first designated the Advanced Reconnaissance
System (ARS), then SENTRY, and finally SAMOS. Management responsibility
for SAMOS was transferred from the Air Force to the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), established on February 7, 1958, and then back to the Air
Force in late 1959.11

Concern about the the length of time it would take to achieve the primary
objective of the SAMOS program - a satellite that could scan its exposed
film and return the imagery electronically - led to President Dwight Eisenhower's
approval, also on February 7, 1958, of a CIA program to develop a reconnaissance
satellite. The CIA program, designated CORONA, focused on development of
a satellite that would physically return its images in a canister - an
objective which had been a subsidiary portion of the SAMOS program.12

While all the various versions of the SAMOS program would be canceled
in the early 1960s, CORONA would become a mainstay of the U.S. space reconnaissance
program for over a decade. It would take over a year, starting in 1959,
and 14 launches before an operational CORONA spacecraft was placed in orbit.
Nine of the first twelve launches carried a camera that was intended to
photograph areas of the Soviet Union and other nations. All the flights
ended in failure for one reason or another. The thirteenth mission, a diagnostic
flight without camera equipment, was the first success - in that a canister
was returned from space and recovered at sea.13

Then on August 18, a CORONA was placed into orbit, orbited the
Earth for a day, and returned its canister to earth, where it was snatched
out the air by a specially equipped aircraft on August 19. The camera carried
on that flight would be retroactively designated the KH-1 (KH for KEYHOLE)
and was cable of producing images with resolution in the area of 25-40
feet - a far cry from what would be standard in only a few years. It did
yield, however, more images of the Soviet Union in its single day of operation
than did the entire U-2 program.14

The next successful CORONA mission would be conducted on December 7,
1960. This time a more advanced camera system, the KH-2, would be on board.
From that time, through the end of the CORONA program in 1972, there would
be a succession of new camera systems - the KH-3, KH-4, KH-4A, and KH-4B
- which produced higher-resolution images than their predecessors, ultimately
resulting in a system that could yield images with approximately 5-6' resolution.
In addition, two smaller programs - ARGON (for mapping) and LANYARD (motivated
by
a specific target in the Soviet Union) - operated during the years 1962-1964
and 1963 respectively. All together there were 145 missions, which yielded
over 800,000 images of the Soviet Union and other areas of the world.15

Those images dramatically improved U.S. knowledge of Soviet and
other nations capabilities and activities. Perhaps its major accomplishment
occurred within 18 months of the first successful CORONA mission. Accumulated
photography allowed the U.S. intelligence community to dispel the fear
of missile gap, with earlier estimates of a Soviet ICBM force numbering
in the hundreds by mid-1962 becoming, in September 1961, an estimate of
between 25 and 50. By June 1964 CORONA satellites had photographed all
25 Soviet ICBM complexes. CORONA imagery also allowed the U.S. to catalog
Soviet air defense and anti-ballistic missile sites, nuclear weapons related
facilities, submarine bases, IRBM sites, airbases - as well as Chinese,
East European, and other nations military facilities. It also allowed assessment
of military conflicts - such as the 1967 Six-Day War - and monitoring of
Soviet arms control compliance.16

In February 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order
that declassified those images. 17

A KH-4A image of Dolon airfield, which was a major Soviet long-range
aviation facility located in what is now the Republic of Kazakhstan.
The image shows two regiments of Tupolev (Tu-16) Bear bombers. The
main runway is 13,200 feet long.

The KH-4A camera system was first introduced in August 1963. Resolution
ranged from 9 to 25 feet.

A KH-4B image of the Moscow, with an insert of the Kremlin. In
the enlargement of the Kremlin, individual vehicles can be identified as
trucks or cars, and the line of people waiting to enter Lenin's Tomb in
Red Square can be seen. According to the CIA, the photograph "illustrates
some of the best resolution imagery acquired by the KH-4B camera
system."

The KH-4B was first introduced in September 1967 and generally produced
images with 6 foot resolution.

A KH-4B of image, taken on February 11, 1969 of a Taiwanese nuclear
facility. The United States intelligence community, relying on CORONA and
other forms of intelligence, has closely monitored the nuclear facilities
of both adversaries such as the Soviet Union and the PRC and those of friendly
nations such as Taiwan and Israel.

The Next Generations

The primary objective of the CORONA program was to provide "area surveillance"
coverage of the Soviet Union, China and other parts of the world. Thus,
CORONA yielded single photographs which covered thousands of square
miles of territory - allowing analysts to both examine images of known
targets and to search for previously undetected installations or activities
that would be of interest to the U.S. intelligence community.

The GAMBIT program provided an important complement to CORONA. Initiated
in 1960, it yielded the first "close-look" or "spotting" satellite. The
emphasis of GAMBIT operations, which commenced in 1963 and continued through
part of 1984, was to produce high-resolution imagery on specific targets
(rather than general areas). Such resolution would allow the production
of more detailed intelligence, particularly technical intelligence on foreign
weapons systems. The first GAMBIT camera, the KH-7, could produce photos
with about 18 inch resolution, while the second and last model, the KH-8
was capable of producing photographs with under 6 inch resolution.18

While the Air Force concentrated on the high-resolution systems, the
CIA (after numerous bureaucratic battles) was assigned responsibility for
the next generation area surveillance program. That program, which came
to be designated HEXAGON, resulted in satellites carrying the KH-9 camera
system - capable of producing images covering even more territory than
the CORONA satellites, with a resolution of 1-2 feet. Eighteen HEXAGON
satellites would be launched into orbit between 1971 and 1984, when the
program terminated.19

In late 1976, a new capability was added when the satellite carrying
the KH-11 optical system was placed into orbit. Unlike its predecessors,
the KH-11, also known by the program code names KENNAN and CRYSTAL, did
not return film canisters to be recovered and interpreted. Rather, the
light captured by its optical system was transformed into electronic signals
and relayed (through a relay satellite in a higher orbit) back to a ground
station, where the signals were recorded on tape and converted into an
image. As a result, the U.S. could obtain satellite images of a site or
activity virtually simultaneously with a satellite passing overhead.20

The 1980s saw a number of inadvertent or unauthorized disclosures
of U.S. satellite imagery. In 1980, as a result of the fiasco at Desert
One, where U.S. forces landed in preparation for an attempt to rescue U.S.
hostages held in Iran, KH-11 imagery of possible evacuation sites in Tehran
was left behind. In 1981, Aviation Week & Space Technology published
a leaked (and degraded) KH-11 photo of a Soviet bomber at Ramenskoye Airfield.

In 1984, two images of Soviet aircraft, taken by a KH-8 or KH-9 satellite,
were inadvertently published in Congressional hearings. That same year,
an employee of the Naval Intelligence Support Center provided Jane's
Defence Weekly with several images taken by a KH-11 satellite of a
Soviet naval shipbuilding facility.21

This 1984 computer enhanced KH-11 photo, taken at an oblique angle
was leaked, along with two others, to Jane's Defence Weekly by naval
intelligence analyst, Samuel Loring Morison. The image shows the
general layout of the Nikolaiev 444 shipyard in the Black Sea. Under
construction is a Kiev- class aircraft carrier (shown in the left side
of the photo), then known as the Kharkov, along with an amphibious
landing ship.
Morison was brought to trial, convicted, and sent to prison in a controversial
case.

These satellite photographs, showing a MiG-29 FULCRUM and SU- 27 FLANKER,
were shown to the House Appropriations Committee during 1984 budget hearings.
They were then published, apparently by mistake, in the sanitized
version of the hearings released to the public. During the 1985 trial
of Samuel Loring Morison, government prosecutors would acknowledge
the photographs were satellite images, produced by a system other
than the KH-11.

Current Systems

The United States is presently operating at least two satellite imaging
systems. One is an advanced version of the KH-11, three of which have been
launched, the first in 1992.

The advanced KH-11 satellites have a higher orbit than that exhibited
by their predecessors--operating with perigees of about 150 miles and apogees
of about 600 miles. In addition, they also have some additional capabilities.
They contain an infrared imagery capability, including a thermal infrared
imagery capability, thus permitting imagery during darkness. In addition,
the satellites carry the Improved CRYSTAL Metric System (ICMS), which places
the necessary markings on returned imagery to permit its full exploitation
for mapping purposes. Additionally, the Advanced KH-11 can carry more fuel
than the original model, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 pounds. This permits
a longer lifetime for the new model--possibly up to eight years.22

A second component of the U.S. space imaging fleet, are satellites developed
and deployed under a program first known as INDIGO, then as LACROSSE, and
most recently as VEGA. Rather than employing an electro-optical system
they carry an imaging radar. The satellites closed a major gap in
U.S. capabilities by allowing the U.S. intelligence community to obtain
imagery even when targets are covered by clouds.23

The first VEGA was launched on December 2, 1988 from the space shuttle
orbiter Atlantis (and deorbited in July 1997). A second was orbited in
March 1991, from Vandenberg AFB on a Titan IV, and a third in October 1997.
The satellites have operated in orbits of approximately 400 miles and at
inclinations of 57 and 68 degrees respectively.24

When conceived, the primary purpose envisioned for the satellite was
monitoring Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor. Recent VEGA missions included
providing imagery for bomb damage assessments of the consequences of Navy
Tomahawk missile attacks on Iraqi air defense installations in September
1996, monitoring Iraqi weapons storage sites, and tracking Iraqi troop
movements such as the dispersal of the Republican Guard when the Guard
was threatened with U.S. attack in early 1998. VEGA has a resolution of
3-5 feet, with its resolution reportedly being sufficient to allow discrimination
between tanks and armored personnel carriers and identification of bomb
craters of 6-10 feet in diameter.25

The LACROSSE/VEGA satellite that was launched in October 1997
may be the first of a new generation of radar imagery satellites. The new
generation will apparently have greater resolution, and constellation size
may be increased from 2 to 3.26

An advanced KH-11 photograph of the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant, Sudan.
This degraded photo, of approximately 1-meter resolution, was officially
released after the U.S. attack on the plant in August 1998 in retaliation
for attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa. The U.S. alleged, at least
partially on the basis of soil samples, that the plant was involved in
the production of chemical weapons.

The photograph was used by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and
General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
brief reporters on the U.S. cruise missile attack on the facility.

One of over twenty degraded advanced KH-11 photos, released by
the Department of Defense in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox.
The higher resolution, and classified, version of the image was used by
imagery interpreters at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to assess
the damage caused by U.S. airstrikes.

The arrows in this degraded advanced KH-11 image, used in a Pentagon
press briefing on December 19, 1998, show two areas where the Secretariat
Presidential was damaged due to Operation Desert Fox airstrikes.

Commercial Imagery

The U.S. intelligence community has also used imagery, including
multispectral imagery, produced by two commercial systems --LANDSAT and
SPOT. The LANDSAT program began in 1969 as an experimental National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) program, the Earth Resources Technology
Satellite (ERTS). Currently there are two operating LANDSAT satellites--LANDSAT
4 and LANDSAT 5--launched in 1982 and 1984.27

LANDSATs 4 and 5 operate in 420 mile sun-synchronous orbits and each
carries a Thematic Mapper (TM), an upgraded version of the Multispectral
Scanner (MSS) on earlier LANDSATs. A typical LANDSAT images is 111 by 102
miles, providing significant broad area coverage. However, the resolution
of the images is approximately 98 feet--making them useful for only the
coarsest intelligence tasks.

SPOT, an acronym for Le Systeme Pour l'Observation de la Terre, is operated
by the French national space agency. SPOT 1 was launched in 1986, followed
by three additional satellites at approximately four year intervals. SPOT
satellites operate in about 500-mile orbits, and carry two sensor systems.
The satellites can return black and white (panchromatic) images with 33
foot resolution and multispectral images with 67 foot resolution. The images
are of higher-resolution than LANDSAT's but cover less territory-- approximately
36 miles by 36 miles.28

U.S. intelligence community use of commercial imagery will expand dramatically
in the coming years if the new generation of commercial imaging satellites
lives up to expectations--which include images with 1-meter resolution.
Such imagery and the reduced cost of attaining it when purchased commercially
will permit the U.S. intelligence community to fill part of its needs via
such commercial systems.

Among the commercial satellites that are expected to produce high resolution
imagery are the Ikonos satellites to be launched by Space Imaging Eosat
(which also operates the LANDSAT satellites). The first of the satellites,
scheduled to be launched in the summer of 1999 from Vandenberg AFB, is
designed to generate 1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral images.
A similar satellite is scheduled for launch in September 1998.29

Also promising to provide 1-meter panchromatic imagery and 4-meter multispectral
imagery are the satellites to be developed by EarthWatch and Orbital Sciences.
EarthWatch's 1-meter resolution Quickbird satellite is scheduled for launch
in late 1998 or 1999. Orbital Science's OrbView-3 satellite is to be launched
in 1999. It is expected to have a 3-5 year lifetime and produce images
covering 5x5 mile segments with 1-meter resolution.30