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Seventh Circuit tackles poorly-drafted CAFA provision

With tongue firmly planted in cheek, Judge Easterbrook parsed the poorlydrafted CAFA provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) in Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc. The statute is an exception to the general rule of non-reviewability of remand orders stated in § 1447(d), and provides that the federal courts of appeals “may accept” appeals from district court orders granting or denying remand “if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order.” The case noted that the “garble[d]” language has spawned a number of cases and law review articles, but Congress has not yet corrected the text. The Seventh Circuit rejected the approach taken by five other circuits, which have read “less” to mean “more,” because “[t]urning ‘less’ into ‘more’ would be a feat more closely associated with the mutating commandments on the barn’s wall in Animal Farm than with sincere interpretation.” While agreeing with the other circuits that, notwithstanding the statute’s text, petitions seeking review of remand decisions are timely even when filed within seven days after the entry of the district court’s order, the Seventh Circuit departed from the other circuits for petitions filed more than seven days after the district court order, regarding such petitions as timely under the statute. The Seventh Circuit borrowed from Appellate Rule 4(a) and set the time limit for filing 1453(c)(1) petitions at 30 days.