Opinion analysis: Court allows challenge to land acquisition for Indian casino

Posted Mon, June 18th, 2012 4:45 pm by Kevin Russell

This morning the Court issued its decision in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak. The Court held, by a vote of eight to one, that the federal government had waived its sovereign immunity to a suit challenging the government’s takeover of certain land in trust for an Indian tribe. [I previewed the case for the blog earlier this year.] The case arose when a Michigan Indian tribe persuaded the federal government to take certain land into trust for the tribe, thereby facilitating the tribe’s construction of a casino on the property. A neighbor who opposed the casino project sued the federal government, arguing that it lacked the power to take the land into trust for the tribe because the tribe was not federally recognized in 1934 – the year Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which authorized the government to take land into trust for Indian tribes.

In the lower courts, the tribe and the federal government argued that the suit was barred by the federal Quiet Title Act, which provides a mechanism for disputing the federal government’s ownership of real property but does not waive the government’s immunity for suits involving Indian trust lands (the kind at issue in this case). They also argued that the plaintiff lacked prudential standing to raise objections to the government’s compliance with the IRA. The D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected both arguments and allowed the suit to proceed.

In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Court affirmed, holding that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived the government’s immunity from suit, that the Quiet Title Act did not withdraw or limit that waiver of immunity, and that the plaintiff had prudential standing to assert his APA claim.

Justice Kagan explained that by its plain terms, the APA waives the government’s immunity to this kind of suit, unless some other statute “expressly or impliedly forbids the relief” being sought. So the real question was whether the Quiet Title Act fell within that proviso. The Court concluded that it does not. The Quiet Title Act, the Court concluded, prohibits only suits that fall within the bounds of a traditional quiet title action – namely, suits in which the plaintiff seeks to not only divest the government of title to land (which this suit arguably does) but also asks the Court to vest title in the plaintiff (which the present suit does not). The Court brushed aside the tribe and the government’s claim that the statute should be read more broadly, given its purposes, to reach any suit that would result in the government losing title to land. Justice Kagan acknowledged that the argument had “some force” and that it is possible that “Congress would – or Congress should” prohibits such suits as a matter of policy. But, the opinion continued, “that is for Congress to tell us, not for us to tell Congress.”

The Court also held that the plaintiff had prudential standing to bring his claim. The purpose of allowing the government to take land into trust for a tribe is to facilitate the tribe’s use of the land for economic development. And, the Court held, people living near that land, and affected by its use, therefore “arguably” fall within the “zone of interests” to be protected or regulated by the IRA and therefore have prudential standing to bring claims under it.

Plain English

In this case, the federal government took certain land into trust for an Indian tribe, which means that it took ownership of the land to allow the tribe to use it. The tribe planned to build a casino on the land. The Supreme Court held that a neighbor could sue the government to stop the casino project on the ground that the law did not permit the government to take the land into trust for this particular tribe.

On Friday the justices will meet for their March 23 conference; our "petitions to watch" for that conference will be available soon.

Major Cases

Trump v. Hawaii(1) Whether the respondents’ challenge to the president’s suspension of entry of aliens abroad is justiciable; (2) whether the proclamation – which suspends entry, subject to exceptions and case-by-case waivers, of certain categories of aliens abroad from eight countries that do not share adequate information with the United States or that present other risk factors – is a lawful exercise of the president’s authority to suspend entry of aliens abroad; (3) whether the global injunction barring enforcement of the proclamation’s entry suspensions worldwide, except as to nationals of two countries and as to persons without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, is impermissibly overbroad; and (4) whether the proclamation violates the establishment clause of the Constitution.

Gill v. Whitford(1) Whether the district court violated Vieth v. Jubelirer when it held that it had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge to Wisconsin's redistricting plan, instead of requiring a district-by-district analysis; (2) whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin's redistricting plan was an impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was undisputed that the plan complies with traditional redistricting principles; (3) whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the partisan-gerrymandering test employed by the plurality in Davis v. Bandemer; (4) whether the defendants are entitled, at a minimum, to present additional evidence showing that they would have prevailed under the district court's test, which the court announced only after the record had closed; and (5) whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable.

Carpenter v. United StatesWhether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cellphone records revealing the location and movements of a cellphone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.

Conference of March 23, 2018

Johnson v. Stinson Whether Johnson v. Jones precludes a federal appellate court from exercising jurisdiction over a challenge to a denial of qualified immunity that turns not upon disputed facts, but upon the disputed application of the inferences drawn by the district court from the facts, in concluding that a reasonable jury could find a violation of a constitutional right which was clearly established; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, sitting en banc, applied an impermissibly broad reading of Johnson v. Jones in vacating the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit's three-judge panel and denying jurisdiction over Dr. Lowell T. Johnson's appeal, where the appeal sought review of the district court's determination that a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Johnson violated respondent's right to due process.