Court stresses Charter
of Fundamental Rights applying to Member States only when implementing EU law,
not creating any new competence for European Union.

>> This reference for a preliminary
ruling from the Administrative Court in Sofia, essentially concerned the question
whether non-recognition in national law of the right to a
judicial remedy in respect of decisions imposing a financial penalty and the
deduction of pointed for certain breaches of road traffic regulations, was compatible
with Art. 2 of Protocol
No 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights; Arts 47 and 48 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’); Arts 67 TFEU, 82
TFEU and 91(1)(c) TFEU; and well as several provisions of secondary European
legislation.

While carrying out a manoeuvre in reverse gear
in a car park in Sofia (Bulgaria), Mr Vinkov collided with another vehicle.
Following that accident, a decision was taken in regard to Mr Vinkov by the
Nachalnik Administrativno-nakazatelna deynost v otdel “Patna politsiya” na
Stolichna direktsiya na vatreshnite raboti (Head of administrative penalty
cases in the “traffic police” department of the Directorate for Internal
Affairs in the capital region), by which he was held liable for a “minor
traffic accident” and fined BGN 20, and four points were deducted from his
driving licence.

Mr Vinkov lodged an appeal against that
decision before the Sofiyski rayonen sad (District Court of Sofia), which
dismissed the appeal by an order declaring it inadmissible. The Sofiyski
rayonen sad considered that, having regard to the applicable provisions of the
Law on road traffic, a decision, imposing a financial penalty of less than BGN
50 could not be challenged in court. Mr Vinkov challenged that order in the
Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Sofia Administrative Court).

>> Articles 67,
82 and 91 TFEU

The Court however held that with regard to Arts
67 TFEU, 82 TFEU and 91(1)(c) TFE it must be noted that since all of those
provisions were directed solely at the institutions of the European Union and
none of them concerned the system of penalties applicable to breaches of road
traffic regulations they were not applicable in the main proceedings.

The Court reiterated that it had no
jurisdiction to answer a question referred for a preliminary ruling where the
interpretation of rules of EU law which was sought by the national court had no
relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose, and those
rules were incapable of applying in the main proceedings (see, in particular,
Case C‑567/07 Woningstichting Sint Servatius [2009] and Case C‑245/09 Omalet [2010]).

Consequently, the questions referred for a
preliminary ruling were, in so far as they related to Arts 67 TFEU, 82 TFEU and
91(1)(c) TFEU, declared inadmissible.

>> Purely
internal situation

The Court of Justice reached a similar
conclusion with regard to the secondary legislation referred to. It held that
in the present case, the dispute was purely internal. It concerned a person
residing in Bulgaria who challenged the decision by which the authorities of
that Member State imposed a penalty following a traffic accident that occurred
in Bulgaria. Therefore, an interpretation of that principle of mutual
recognition was of no relevance to the outcome of that dispute.

>> Charter of
Fundamental Rights

With regard to the question of the referring
court queries whether EU law precluded the rules of Bulgarian law at issue in
the main proceedings in so far as they involved an infringement of the right to
an effective remedy enshrined in Art. 6 of the ECHR and Arts 47 and 48 of the
Charter, the Court held that the requirements flowing from the protection of
fundamental rights were binding on Member States whenever they implemented EU
law (see orders in Case C‑339/10 Asparuhov Estov and Others
[2010]; Case C‑457/09 Chartry [2011]; and order of
14 December 2011 in Joined Cases C‑483/11 and C‑484/11 Boncea
and Others [2012].

The Court pointed out that Article 51(1) of the
Charter stated that the provisions of the Charter were addressed to the Member
States only when they were implementing EU law. Moreover, the Court pointed out
that tunder Art. 6(1) TEU, which conferred on the Charter the same legal value
as the Treaties, the Charter did not create any new competence for the European
Union. (on these provisions and their legislative background, see this article I published in the Common Market Law Review
some years ago)

The Court held that, consequently, in a
reference for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU, where national
legislation fell within the scope of EU law, the Court must provide all the
criteria of interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine
whether that legislation was compatible with the fundamental rights which derived
in particular from the Charter (see, to that effect, Case C‑299/95 Kremzow [1997] and Case C‑256/11 Dereci
and Others [2011]

In the present case, however, the Court found
that was not apparent from the order for reference that the national
legislation constituted a measure implementing EU law or that it was connected
in any other way with EU law. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Court to
rule on the reference for a preliminary ruling in so far as it related to the
fundamental right to an effective remedy was not established