Moreover, elsewhere I tell the story how even at Chicago-Economics (where they were early and rather trenchant critics of the claims of value-neutrality of welfare economics), the new welfare economics was adopted: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628102For philosophers this paper may be entertaining (or a cautionary note) because I show how Kuhn's ideas were both anticipated and then aggressively promoted to create a mythic history (and, thus stiffle dissent) at 'Chicago'.

Friday, August 27, 2010

The following post about homeostatic property clusters (HPCs) is pretty long, so I've split it into several sections. Here's the very short version: Ereshefsky and Matthen argue that the HPC approach to natural kinds fetishizes similarity and is undone by polymorphism. I argue that it's not, and that the HPC approach is really about looking for causal structure.[crossposted at Footnotes on Epicycles]

But while I picked on the Copernicus article because of my own (no doubt rather eccentric) pet-peeves, the entry on "Enlightenment" is based on claims that do not withstand scrutiny. It is also clearly informed by a self-serving German (if not outright Kantian as understood by certain Rawlsians) historiography of Enlightenment. (This dawned upon me when I read that "Only late in the development of the German Enlightenment, when the Enlightenment was near its end, does the movement become self-reflective." Such a bizarre claim is only possible because Rousseau, who famously challenged the value of Enlightenment, is treated as an entirely moral-political thinker; his three Discourses are not even mentioned in the bibliography! [The secondary literature bibliography is rather limited.]

In what follows, I have tried to emphasize the HPS relevance of my concern. (This is not a reach because Newton plays a crucial role in the narrative: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/#TruSciEpiMetEnlSo when WIlliam Bristow writes, "It belongs centrally to the agenda of Enlightenment philosophy... to provide a metaphysical framework within which to place and interpret this new knowledge" he imposes the Kantian conception onto the subject; for many Enlightenment thinkers natural philosophy makes metaphysics irrelevant.)

Here are two claims from the entry's very first paragraph that reveal some of the article methodological and historical flaws:I. "Enlightenment thought culminates historically in the political upheaval of the French Revolution." If we think in strict calendar-periods--then one might be inclined to agree. But a) now it looks like the French [why not American?] Revolution is a kind of teleological outcome of Enlightenment thought; this goes against the self-understanding of a lot of politically-gradualist Enlightenment thinkers (especially in Scotland). And b) if the Enlightenment is a kind of regulative ideal (for future-oriented action), then the French revolution may mark the real (as opposed to merely theoretical) possibility of Enlightenment, but by no means its completion. (Think of Lincoln at Gettysburg who turned the US Constitution into an open-ended project.) This option not irrelevant for those (i.e., many eighteenth century historians) that wish to have a *science of history* that can shape the future. C) Why think that Enlightenment must culminate in political events rather than in a change of attitudes or knowledge?

II "The dramatic success of the new science in explaining the natural world, in accounting for a wide variety of phenomena by appeal to a relatively small number of elegant mathematical formulae, promotes philosophy (in the broad sense of the time, which includes natural science) from a handmaiden of theology, constrained by its purposes and methods, to an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles." Well, no. A lot of philosophy (including natural philosophy) remained in some respects a handmaiden of theology or natural theology. Newtonianism routinely got connected with theological (theo-cosmological) arguments. (It is as if Weber and Merton never wrote.) Many of the folk that are most eager to see philosophy end its handmaiden role (Spinoza, Hume, Diderot) are also most ambivalent about the course of mathematical natural philosophy. [Not to mention that there is now a very rich literature on Catholic Enlightenments.] The whole article conflates secularization and the advancement of science (as well as the idea of progress).

I could go on and on, paragraph by paragraph (and maybe I will in future postings), but this is long enough for now.

Tuesday, August 24, 2010

1st Dutch-Flemish Graduate Conference on Philosophy of Science and/or TechnologyThe NFWT organizes its first graduate conference for advanced master students, Phd-students, and recent Phd’s, working on philosophy of science and/or technology. The goal of this conference is to help young researchers establish a research network, and try out papers in a cordial setting. All participants will be alloted ca. 30 minutes to present a paper, followed by 15 minutes of discussion.There will be two keynote lectures on the topic of “levels of organization in the life sciences”, and contributions related to this topic are especially encouraged, without this being an exclusionary criterion.Abstract of maximum 500 words should be submitted no later than October 1, 2010, by email to: maarten.vandyck@ugent.be. Notification of acceptance will be sent by October 10.Dates: 25 and 26 November 2010Venue: Het Pand, Ghent University, GhentKeynote speakers: Jon Williamson (Kent University) and Gertrudis Van de Vijver (Ghent University)

Thursday, August 19, 2010

I want to offer one minor kvetch. The article claims: Copernicus "was responsible for the administration of various holdings, which involved heading the provisioning fund, adjudicating disputes, attending meetings, and keeping accounts and records. In response to the problem he found with the local currency, he drafted an essay on coinage (MW 176–215) in which he deplored the debasement of the currency and made recommendations for reform. His manuscripts were consulted by the leaders of both Prussia and Poland in their attempts to stabilize the currency."

The quantity theory is a major conceptual and 'scientific' achievement. It is a milestone in economic theorizing. Now, by failing to investigate this more fully, the entry at SEP perpetuates the blindness among philosophers to a) the shared history between philosophy and economics (and political economy); b) their ongoing mutual development; c) makes Copernicus' interest in theorizing about currency (shared by Galileo, Newton, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) seem largely insignificant.

13-15 May 2011, University of Toronto. Presented by the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto and the Fishbein Center for the History of Science and Medicine, University of Chicago

The philosophy of science has an illustrious history of attraction and antipathy towards metaphysics. The latter was famously exemplified in the Logical Positivist contention that metaphysical questions are meaningless, but in the wake of the demise of Positivism, metaphysics has found its way back into the philosophy of science. Increasingly, questions about the nature of natural laws, kinds, dispositions, and so on have taken a metaphysical cast. The metaphysics of sciencecommands significant attention in contemporary philosophy.While many philosophers embrace the increased contact between metaphysics and the philosophy of science, others are wary. Should science (and its philosophical study) lead us into doing metaphysics? If so, which metaphysical issues are genuine and which are illusory, and how might we tell? Such questions dovetail with similar soul-searching in metaphysics proper (sometimes under the banner of "meta-metaphysics", sometimes simply as methodology).This conference will examine ground-level debates about metaphysics within the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology, and broader methodological questions about the role of metaphysics in the philosophy of science. Participation is open and welcome from all parties to these questions: from those who hold that metaphysics must have a place within the philosophy of science, to those who hold itshould not.

CALL FOR PAPERS:Essays of 4,000-5,000 words (30 minutes allotted for presentations) concerning any aspect of metaphysics and the natural or social sciences will be accepted for review until January 10, 2011. Please include a short abstract (200 words or so), a few keywords, prepare your essay for blind review (do not include your name or otheridentifying references in the document), and submit it in PDF format here: http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=mpsc2011Notification by early February 2011.

Tuesday, August 17, 2010

I was in the Chicago philosophy graduate program during the 1990s. Myprimary field of study was philosophy of physics, but I spent a goodthird of my time on ancient Greek philosophy as well, most of it withIan. I adored Ian, both personally and professionally. I feelprivileged to have been his student, and even more to have known himas a person. I find as I make my way through the world of academicphilosophy that by and large the people who know Ian---and whensomeone in the field knows Ian, they invariably revere him---are thosepeople who themselves do the finest work.

Ian was a philosopher's philosopher---a true scholar and open-mindedthinker who never let his astonishing carefulness and thoroughnessdegenerate into pedantry. He was the only person I know who couldmake the commentaries and the apparatuses fun. (Indeed, this is thethanks I gave him in the "Acknowledgments" section of my doctoraldissertation, the second person I thanked there: "It is a pleasure toacknowledge and thank the following people.... Ian Mueller---forexemplifying the spirit of careful scholarship, and for making merealize that sometimes (not often, but sometimes) studying thesecondary literature can be almost as rewarding as reading theoriginal text.")

This is one of my fondest memories of Ian. We were in the weeklygroup he used to lead on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, going through aparticularly difficult passage in Book Lambda, as always going throughthe text line by line, word by word (while always keeping an eyefirmly fixed on the bigger picture). At one point, I recalled thatRoss, in the commentary to his edition of the Greek, had aninteresting take on a disputed reading, so I offered my recollectedgloss on it. Ian looked puzzled, and said surely that was not right,that was not what Ross had said. I guess I was feeling cocky, becausenormally I would have deferred to Ian's mastery of the apparatus, buton that occasion I was sure I was right and said so. Like duelinggunslingers, Ian and I simultaneously and gleefully (albeit, Ian inhis understated way) reached for our copies of Ross and scrambled tobeat each other to the relevant part of the commentary. At about thesame moment, again, we each declared ourselves to be right. Andlooked at each other puzzled, because we could not both be right.After a moment's confusion, we worked out that I had the secondedition of Ross and Ian had the first. I figured that was the end ofthe matter, but Ian asked to see my copy. Lovingly he lay the twoeditions side by side and perused them in turn for several moments,working out the details and subtleties of Ross's apparent change ofheart, clearly trying to figure out not only the substance but thereasons behind it. Finally, dreamily, he looked up, eyes on thePlatonic Heaven, and said softly, "God help me, I love this stuff."

I tried to tell Ian several times how much he meant to me, how much hehad contributed to my intellectual development---how much of myteaching and research, even to this day, even on topics not related toancient philosophy, is still done with him consciously in my mind as aparagon. He always brushed it aside with a shy modesty that washumbling to me. I know full well that I am far from the only one ofIan's ex-students to feel this way.

The main point of the entry is revealed in its closing paragraph. It is to answer unnamed "Critics of contemporary philosophy" who "sometimes complain that in using thought experiments it loses touch with reality...Once imagining is recognized as a normal means of learning, contemporary philosophers’ use of such techniques can be seen as just extraordinarily systematic and persistent applications of our ordinary cognitive apparatus."

I offer four observations:1. First, Williamson makes it easy on himself by simply asserting without evidence that contemporary philosophers’ use of imagination can be seen as just extraordinarily systematic and persistent applications of our ordinary cognitive apparatus. The blog clearly implies that if the imagination is good enough for science it is good enough for philosophy. But Williamson makes no effort to show that contemporary philosophers systematically constrain the use of the imagination in the manner that scientists (perhaps?) do. He just asserts philosophers' systematicity and persistence. (The piece ends a line later.) This is an argument from authority.

2. Nevertheless, my reason for blogging about this entry is not to continue to harping about the tendency of leading analytic philosophers to claim the mantle of science when it suits them. Rather, it is to note the surprising (to me!) impact of recent (well, post-Kuhnian!) history and philosophy of science on Williamson's thought in at least two ways. First, Williamson takes the context of discovery very seriously. It is what grounds his appeal to the authority and use of the imagination. Second, he asserts that even in the context of justification the imagination plays a very important role, and this is a good thing.

3. So, perhaps philosophers of science can engage Williamson on these two previous points in constructive fashion? The recent methodological turn of my leading (and young) analytic metaphysicians should be an opportunity in this respect.

4. I end with a historical note. Williamson's position is a rediscovery of David Hume's and especially his friend's Adam Smith's understanding of science. In Smith's "The History of Astronomy," the imagination plays a positive constructive and justificatory role in natural science and philosophy: "Philosophy, therefore, may be regarded as one of those arts which address themselves to the imagination." As Smith writes, "For, though it is the end of Philosophy, to allay that wonder, which either the unusual or seemingly disjointed appearances of nature excite, yet she nevertriumphs so much, as when, in order to connect together a few, in themselves,perhaps, inconsiderable objects, she has, if I may so, created anotherconstitution of things, more easily attended to, but more new, more contraryto common opinion and expectation, than any of those appearances themselves."(IV.33, 75)

I always think of philosophy as an epistemic egalitarian enterprise--you are as good as your last argument.

It's not only because I am a huge fan of wikipedia that I am reserved about Leiter's trust in the experts and their authority. Let me explain, but, first, epistemic egalitarianism (EE) should not be confused with Bush-ite science-bashing. EE is not anti-science, it is just very skeptical of claims from authority. What *in the context of public policy* could be said in favor of EE's stance? (Within a scientific community EE rules in some limited sense.)1. Scientific authority can get willfully abused (Nazi medicine, eugenics, etc). But let's leave this aside.2. A. Scientific expertise is fairly narrow and it can easily be misapplied in public policy domains. B. Few scientific experts are trained in neighboring fields as to judge the interactions among their expertise and other experts.3. scientific expertise gets selected for by interested parties, including (alas) self-selection.4. scientific experts are normal rent-seeking agents. 5. When scientific experts get it wrong in matters of policy they do not tend to run the costs of their errors.Note that none of these (2-4) points mean we should not seek expert advice or base policy on scientific knowledge. (The fifth one may incline us to be very cautious about scientific experts.) But points 2-4 do encourage transparency of the sort that EE insist on in order to let (skeptical) non-experts weigh in on and scrutinize expert authority in decision-making processes. (Incidentally, there are good feminist, stand-point theorist's arguments for this position.)

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Ian Mueller supervised my preliminary essay on Plato's Laws and was -- due to his extensive knowledge of Marx and his love of philosophy, more generally -- a very valued and critical reader of my dissertation (on Newton, Hume and Adam Smith).

Ian was one of two people at The University of Chicago that I nominated for a graduate teaching award. He won it the same year, I believe, as his wife, Janel, a very distinguished scholar of Renaissance English literature. His graduate teaching style can be best described as follows: you take a canonical text. You go through it line by line with your students, eliciting from them the now standard/canonical (often very dull) reading (sometimes you assign that, too). You then carefully show with them how it cannot possibly be right. Then you draw attention to an exciting, non-standard reading. Just before the end of class you show it, too, has fatal objections. Class ends (like a Platonic dialogue) in aporia. Repeat exercise at next class. (As Eric Brown reminded me, sometimes he would go through many more flawed positions.)

I always though of Mueller's as the (contemporary) philosophers' philosopher introduction to Euclid (and Greek math more generally). His book is just full of subtle arguments and observation. Like most of the great commentaries on Euclid (with which Ian was very familiar) it is as informative about Euclid as it is about the state of play in philosophic reflection on mathematics of its own day. Ian's contribution to Kraut's Cambridge Companion to Plato I continue to re-read with pleasure. I am always annoyed by those who tried to treat Ian as a niche scholar of ancient math--I am convinced that his papers help unlock far wider issues in Ancient Greek thought (no surprise given the importance of mathematical thinking in their philosophy) and, given the centrality of Euclid to western 'scientific' thought, to our philosophic culture.

My qualifying paper on the Laws was a commentary, and (despite opposition by others in the department) he was very supportive of it. If it weren't for his encouragement I probably would have left the discipline. But after the whole ordeal he told me he doubted anybody would ever get Plato convincingly right, but that there was still much to learn from Plato reception, both in the Ancient world but also from later periods (something I take to heart in some of my Early Modern scholarship). I had chosen the commentary form without much reflection, but much later something dawned upon me. While I did not keep up with all of his recent scholarship or the translations of the commentators, which I suspect he viewed as a kind of service to the discipline, but -- more poetically -- as a way of rehabilitating the commentary tradition as a philosophic art. He will be missed.

Upon return from holiday, I learned that Ian Mueller and David Hull had died during last few days. In an earlier discussion on this list I had listed Mueller's Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid as one of the most important contributions to HPS since the 1980s:http://itisonlyatheory.blogspot.com/2010/01/canonical-texts-post-1980-in-philosophy.htmlWhat I did not know then is that Dover reprinted Mueller's book, so it is easily and cheaply available.I had failed to include Davide Hull's *Science as a Process*, which is a landmark in HPS work of the era; it's empirical, reflexive, very informed and offers a challenging account of scientific practice. It is also widely discussed (760 hits on scholar.google), and, thus, was surprisingly left out of my original list; unaccountably it then went unmentioned in the learned discussion.