China is on the warpath - in rhetoric. Its usually anodyne politicians have
lately delivered a slew of acid criticisms of the way the West runs its
house.

Premier Wen Jiabao questioned profligate US spending habits, and warned America not to scramble his $2 trillion nest-egg. Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, suggested the dollar should be replaced as the lingua franca of global finance. As President Hu Jintao jets into London's G20 meeting to duke it out with other heads of state, China may seem readier than ever to take on the world.

There are good reasons for the newfound confidence. China was last into the financial crisis, and should be first out. Growth is still positive. Banks are well capitalised and light on toxic derivatives. Electricity production, manufacturers' sentiment and heavy industrial orders are already ticking up as Beijing firmly guides the economy. Consumption, while relatively small, has held up, and there are signs the "wealth effect" is returning, notably in enhanced stock market performance.

But don't be deceived. While China has avoided some of problems that beset wealthier nations, it isn't ready to lead the way into a new world order. At home, battles remain, unemployment being the most worrisome. Officials have said 20m migrant workers are out of work as falling global trade asphyxiates China's exports.

The true figure is probably higher. Urban unemployment is nudging 10pc, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Some idle hands present a risk to civil stability - especially since inequality between city and rural communities has been replaced by inequality within them.

The putative solution, a fiscal stimulus of Rmb4 trillion ($585bn), poses its own threats. Bad debts are likely to pile up on bank balance sheets, as the government mandates increased lending. Some Rmb2.7 trillion ($395bn) of new loans were doled out in January and February. Industries such as aluminium and microchips are already dealing with overcapacity.

The stimulus may help the underemployed for a while, but when it ends, domestic consumption, the main pillar of a stable economy, won't take up all the slack right away.

China's athletic growth rates were probably due for some moderation, global crisis or not. The country has undergone three previous bursts of energy since its 1978 experiment with capitalism began, each fuelled by a different steroid - first rural reform, then the introduction of market economics, and latterly accession to the World Trade Organisation. After each sprint, a slump followed. In 1989, GDP growth fell from 11pc to 4pc. Another deus ex machina is not in sight.

Still, China has a case for rejecting some complaints from G20 countries. China is getting rich fast, but GDP per capita still lags Armenia and El Salvador. Yet the US and Europe demand it behave like a fully developed nation. Developing economies might need different rules when it comes to protecting nascent industries or the environment. Or foreign exchange rates - a big bone of contention.

Acting tough on the global stage - especially when there is a good case - could be the most effective way to play to the crowds back home and smooth over the domestic tensions that could threaten China's considerable 30-year achievements.

The urban and rural, state-owned and private, developed and developing, autonomous and federal sit uncomfortably together. Regional politics create another fault line, as local governments, tasked with deploying stimulus capital, fight to preserve jobs and factories in their own regions first. A divided China is still in no position to dictate terms to its global peers.

One day, the China century may begin in earnest. The country could eventually unseat the US as the world's foremost consumer. But how will it get there? The financial crisis has probably put paid to most hopes that China would follow the path America laid down.

Instead, it's likely to pick and choose - pairing market economics with national protectionism, for example, or Western corporate governance structures with state control. Even more than the US, China may want to supply most of its own needs, be they compact cars or luxury handbags.

When that happens, other nations will have to adjust accordingly. Even if there is throw-down at the G20, that day hasn't yet arrived.