Recent research has shown that the superlative quantifiers at least and at most do not have the same type of truth conditions as the comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. We propose that superlative quantifiers are interpreted at the level of speech acts. We relate them to denegations of speech acts, as in I don’t promise to come, which we analyze as excluding the speech act of a promise to come. Calling such conversational acts that affect future permissible speech (...) acts “meta-speech acts,” we introduce the meta-speech act of a GRANT of a proposition as a denial to assert the negation of that proposition. Superlative quantifiers are analyzed as quantifiers over GRANTS. Thus, John petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs the proposition that John petted n rabbits is n = 3. We formalize this interpretation in terms of commitment states and commitment spaces, and show how the truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrate how the theory accounts for a wide variety of distributional phenomena of superlative quantifiers, including the contexts in which they can be embedded. (shrink)

Abstract G.A. Cohen has produced an influential criticism of libertarian?ism that posits joint ownership of everything in the world other than labor, with each joint owner having a veto right over any potential use of the world. According to Cohen, in that world rationality would require that wealth be divided equally, with no differential accorded to talent, ability, or effort. A closer examination shows that Cohen's argument rests on two central errors of reasoning and does not support (...) his egalitarian conclusions, even granting his assumption of joint ownership. That assumption was rejected by Locke, Pufendorf and other writers on property for reasons that Cohen does not rebut. (shrink)

German supporters of the Kantian philosophy in the late 19th century took one of two forks in the road: the fork leading to Baden, and the Southwest School of neo-Kantian philosophy, and the fork leading to Marburg, and the Marburg School, founded by Hermann Cohen. Between 1876, when Cohen came to Marburg, and 1918, the year of Cohen's death, Cohen, with his Marburg School, had a profound influence on German academia.

This paper examines Hermann Cohen's idiosyncratic construction of a medieval Jewish philosophical tradition, focusing primarily, though not exclusively, on his Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis . This construction, not unlike modern accounts, is filtered through the central place of Maimonides. For Cohen, however, Maimonides' centrality is defined not by his systematization of Aristotelianism, but by his elevation of ethics over metaphysics. The ethical and pantheistic concerns of Maimonides' precursors, according to this reading, anticipate his uniqueness. Whereas Shlomo ibn Gabirol's (...) pantheistic doctrine of emanation, for example, assigned little weight to ethics, Abraham ibn Daud rebelled against such a doctrine. Ibn Daud—much like Bahya ibn Paquda and Abraham ibn Ezra—becomes part of a Jewish philosophical tradition that culminates in Maimonides' rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, this paper examines the way in which Cohen envisaged the pre-Maimonidean philosophical tradition, putting his highly critical reading of Shlomo ibn Gabirol and his pantheistic obsession with prime matter in counterpoint with his more favorable readings of Abraham ibn Daud and Bahya ibn Paquda. (shrink)

This paper seeks to deflate G. A. Cohen’s recent meta-ethical argument that fundamental principles must be “fact-insensitive.” That argument does not advance Cohen’s dispute with Rawls and other social contract theorists. There is attenuated sense of “factinsensitivity” which they can happily grant, which Cohen never rules out on specifically metaethical grounds. While his barrage of substantive (non-meta-ethical) arguments may retain independent force, the argument from fact-insensitivity is largely (though not entirely) inconsequential.

This essay is an attempt to piece together the elements of G. A. Cohen's thought on the theory of socialism during his long intellectual voyage from Marxism to political philosophy. It begins from his theory of the maldistribution of freedom under capitalism, moves onto his critique of libertarian property rights, to his diagnosis of the “deep inegalitarian” structure of John Rawls' theory and concludes with his rejection of the “cheap” fraternity promulgated by liberal egalitarianism. The paper's exegetical contention is (...) that Cohen's work in political philosophy is best understood in the background of lifelong commitment to a form of democratic, non-market, socialism realizing the values of freedom, equality and community, as he conceived them. The first part of the essay is therefore an attempt to retrieve core socialism-related arguments by chronologically examining the development of Cohen's views, using his books as thematic signposts. The second part brings these arguments together with an eye to reconstructing his vision of socialism. It turns out that Cohen's political philosophy offers a rich conception of objective and subjective freedom, an original understanding of justice as satisfaction of genuine need, and a substantive ideal of fraternity as justificatory community with others. If properly united, these values can suggest a full-bloodied account of the just polity, and give us a glimpse into what it means, for Cohen, to treat people as equals. (shrink)

This paper defends a Leibnizian rationalist interpretation of Hermann Cohen’s Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (1883). The first half of the paper identifies Cohen’s various different philosophical aims in the PIM. It argues that they are unified by the fact that Cohen’s arguments for addressing those aims all depend on a single shared premise. That linchpin premise is the claim that mathematical natural science can represent individual objects only if it also represents infinitesimal magnitudes. (...) The second half of the paper reconstructs the view that justifies that linchpin premise for Cohen, and argues that the premise depends on three Leibnizian rationalist principles: the principle of continuity, the priority of the infinite and continuous, and ultimately the principle of sufficient reason. Finally, the paper concludes by considering what this rationalist interpretation reveals about the philosophical significance of Bertrand Russell’s (1903) criticisms of Cohen’s PIM. (shrink)

This paper assesses G. A. Cohen's critique of Rawlsian special incentives. Two arguments are identified and criticized: an argument that the difference principle does not justify incentives because of a limitation on an agent's prerogative to depart from a direct promotion of the interests of the worst off, and an argument that justice is limited in its scope. The first argument is evaluated and defended from the criticism that once Cohen has conceded some ethically grounded special incentives he (...) cannot sustain his critique of special incentives. But it is finally rejected as a subtle form of an unreasonably demanding moral rigorism. The second argument is interpreted as the more plausible of Cohen's claims. It has, however, to be defended via two subsidiary theses: the claim that Rawls endorses a moral division of labour and that this in turn grounds a further commitment to moral dualism as opposed to moral monism. This argument is assessed and rejected. Neither the moral division of labour nor moral monism supports the claim that in applying the principles of justice to a basic structure one does not thereby apply them to the individuals constrained to act within that structure in the marketing of their labour. Nor is it plausible to identify local aspects of social relations where the principles of justice are suspended. Such principles are presupposed, for example in market relations or the family, but limitation in scope of direct application does not limit the scope of justification. That scope extends at least as far as individual decisions to market one's labour. The latter are made fair in the only possible way they could be made fair. Rawls's commitment to the revisionary socialism of James Meade illustrates this point. It is concluded that no version of Cohen's critique succeeds. However, Cohen's critique identifies the most plausible version of Rawls's egalitarianism. (shrink)

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen is well known within contemporary political philosophy for claiming that the scope of principles of justice extends beyond the design of institutions to citizens’ personal choices. More recently, he’s also received attention for claiming that principles of justice are normatively ultimate, i.e., that they’re necessary for the justification of action guiding principles (regulatory rules) but are unsuitable to guide political practice themselves. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between these claims as they’re applied (...) in criticism of John Rawls. It argues that ascribing normative ultimacy to justice entails its application to personal choice. However, it also argues that if Cohen’s right about Rawls’s difference principle being regulatory rather than ultimate, then his earlier claim that Rawls must extend it to personal choice on pain of inconsistency is refuted. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen is well known within contemporary political philosophy for claiming that the scope of principles of justice extends beyond the design of institutions to citizens’ personal choices. More recently, he’s also received attention for claiming that principles of justice are normatively ultimate, i.e., that they’re necessary for the justification of action guiding principles (regulatory rules) but are unsuitable to guide political practice themselves. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between these claims as they’re (...) applied in criticism of John Rawls. It argues that ascribing normative ultimacy to justice entails its application to personal choice. However, it also argues that if Cohen is right about Rawls’s difference principle being regulatory rather than ultimate, then his earlier claim that Rawls must extend it to personal choice on pain of inconsistency is refuted. (shrink)

This paper explores Hermann Cohen's engagement with, and appropriation of, Maimonides to refute the common assumption that Cohen's endeavor was to harmonize Judaism with Western culture. Exploring the changes of Cohen's conception of humility from Ethik des reinen Willens to the Ethics of Maimonides and Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism , this paper highlights the centrality of the collective Jewish mission to bear witness against the dominant order of Western civilization and philosophy in (...)Cohen's Jewish thought. (shrink)

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds (...) for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements. (shrink)

This paper argues that that political context of British science popularization in the inter-war period was intimately tied to contemporary debates about religion and science. A leading science popularizer, the Quaker astronomer A.S. Eddington, and one of his opponents, the materialist Chapman Cohen, are examined in detail to show the intertwined nature of science, philosophy, religion, and politics.

In this article, Bakhtin’s early aesthetics is reread in the context of Hermann Cohen’s system of philosophy, especially his aesthetics. Bakhtin’s thinking from the early ethical writing Toward a Philosophy of Act to Author and Hero in Artistic Activity and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is followed. In Author and Hero , an individual is in his life conceived as involved in cognitive and ethical action but as remaining without a consummative form; the form, or the ‘soul’, is bestowed upon (...) a person by the creative activity of the artist alone. In his understanding of artistic creativity and the relationship between the ‘hero’ and the author, Bakhtin closely follows Cohen, with the exception that for Cohen the object of artistic form-giving is the universal, idealized man, whereas for Bakhtin it is an individual. In the concept of a ‘polyphonic novel’ as developed in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics , Bakhtin, however, considers this view of the activity of the artist (or the novelist) to apply to the “traditional” novel only, while in a Dostoevskyean novel the characters are not subordinated to any defining power of the author. Bakhtin’s theory of the Dostoevskyean novel is thus a return to the emphasis of the cognitive and ethical autonomy of the individual. His understanding of the encounter between persons as a ‘subject’—‘subject’ or an ‘I’—‘thou’ relation has a predecessor, among others, in Cohen. (shrink)

The three works dedicated to securing the foundation of Kantian doctrine are linked inextricably to Hermann Cohen's philosophical life's work. For as much as Cohen distanced himself from Kant's conclusions on individual points in building his own system, the methodological consciousness that inspired all of Cohen's individual achievements certainly first achieved clarity and maturity in his scientific, comprehensive analysis of Kant's fundamental works.

Abstract At the beginning of his best seller Meaning in History , Karl Löwith launches a violent attack against Jewish prophetism, using the philosophy of history of Hermann Cohen as his first and foremost example. This article purports to show that Löwith misinterpreted the thought of Hermann Cohen. It also reclaims Cohen's own position on history and on the philosophy of history by identifying the questions Cohen himself had asked in his time. At the end of (...) the article, some paths of research are indicated that might prove themselves fruitful today, in a further study of Cohen's thought. (shrink)

In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.

Historically, land grant universities and their colleges of agriculture have been discipline driven in both their curricula and research agendas. Critics call for interdisciplinary approaches to undergraduate curriculum. Concomitantly, sustainable agriculture (SA) education is beginning to emerge as a way to address many complex social and environmental problems. University of California at Davis faculty, staff, and students are developing an undergraduate SA major. To inform this process, a web-based Delphi survey of academics working in fields related to SA was (...) conducted. Faculty from colleges and universities across the US were surveyed. Participants suggested that students needed knowledge of natural and social science disciplines relating to the agri-food system. In addition, stakeholders suggested students learn through experiences that link the classroom to field work, engaging a broad range of actors within applied settings. Stakeholders also emphasized the need for interdisciplinary and applied scholarship. Additionally, they proposed a range of teaching and learning approaches, including many practical experiences. Given the diverse suggestions of content knowledge and means of producing knowledge, the survey presented unique challenges and called into question the epistemological and pedagogical norms currently found in land grant colleges of agriculture. This study has implications for land grant universities seeking to develop undergraduate curriculum appropriate to the field of SA. (shrink)

This article examines as a critical case how newspapers reported the grant maintained schools policy. It argues that claims that press reporting of educational issues is frequently unfair are only partially substantiated. The quality press is more likely to be internally inconsistent and contradictory in its reportage of education policy and, on occasion, to inhibit debate through discourses of omision.

This paper was inspired by the intersection of Tom Lyson’s interest in how power is concentrated in society’s institutions and his concern for the role of the land-grant system in revealing and addressing inequities that occur as a result of such concentration. This study examines the power structure that governs land-grant universities by presenting social and demographic information on 635 trustees at the 50 US land-grant universities established by the Morrill Act of 1862. Along with these data, (...) Fortune 1000 companies with which land-grant universities are connected through board member interlocks are listed and charted out. The research found that land-grant governing boards are characterized by some degree of demographic homogeneity, but they are less corporately interconnected than their private university counterparts. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} In this paper the aim is to reconstruct the rationale of moral autonomy in Hermann Cohen´s ethics. In order to achieve this aim, I consider the complexity of the concept of moral autonomy at its four (...) levels. Mi hypothesis is that Cohen´s argumentation goes from the formal abstraction of the self-legislation to the concrete moment of the selfpreservation. I analyze then Eggert Winter´s critic of Cohen´s concept of moral autonomy, who questions the integration of the levels of the particularity and the universality in this fundamental moment of the theory. Against Winter I argue that Cohen´s process of argumentation succeeds in connecting the different levels of the concept of moral autonomy. (shrink)

Reporting effect sizes in scientific articles is increasingly widespread and encouraged by journals; however, choosing an effect size for analyses such as mixed-effects regression modeling and hierarchical linear modeling can be difficult. One relatively uncommon, but very informative, standardized measure of effect size is Cohen’s f2, which allows an evaluation of local effect size, i.e. one variable’s effect size within the context of a multivariate regression model. Unfortunately, this measure is often not readily accessible from commonly used software for (...) repeated-measures or hierarchical data analysis. In this guide, we illustrate how to extract Cohen’s f2 for two variables within a mixed-effects regression model using PROC MIXED in SAS ® software. Two examples of calculating Cohen’s f2 for different research questions are shown, using data from a longitudinal cohort study of smoking development in adolescents. This tutorial is designed to facilitate the calculation and reporting of effect sizes for single variables within mixed-effects multiple regression models, and is relevant for analysis of repeated-measures or hierarchical/multilevel data that are common in experimental psychology, observational research, and clinical or intervention studies. (shrink)

Reporting effect sizes in scientific articles is increasingly widespread and encouraged by journals; however, choosing an effect size for analyses such as mixed-effects regression modeling and hierarchical linear modeling can be difficult. One relatively uncommon, but very informative, standardized measure of effect size is Cohen’s f2, which allows an evaluation of local effect size, i.e. one variable’s effect size within the context of a multivariate regression model. Unfortunately, this measure is often not readily accessible from commonly used software for (...) repeated-measures or hierarchical data analysis. In this guide, we illustrate how to extract Cohen’s f2 for two variables within a mixed-effects regression model using PROC MIXED in SAS ® software. Two examples of calculating Cohen’s f2 for different research questions are shown, using data from a longitudinal cohort study of smoking development in adolescents. This tutorial is designed to facilitate the calculation and reporting of effect sizes for single variables within mixed-effects multiple regression models, and is relevant for analysis of repeated-measures or hierarchical/multilevel data that are common in experimental psychology, observational research, and clinical or intervention studies. (shrink)

A maximal almost disjoint (mad) family $\mathscr{A} \subseteq [\omega]^\omega$ is Cohen-stable if and only if it remains maximal in any Cohen generic extension. Otherwise it is Cohen-unstable. It is shown that a mad family, A, is Cohen-unstable if and only if there is a bijection G from ω to the rationals such that the sets G[A], A ∈A are nowhere dense. An ℵ 0 -mad family, A, is a mad family with the property that given any (...) countable family $\mathscr{B} \subset [\omega]^\omega$ such that each element of B meets infinitely many elements of A in an infinite set there is an element of A meeting each element of B in an infinite set. It is shown that Cohen-stable mad families exist if and only if there exist ℵ 0 -mad families. Either of the conditions b = c or $\mathfrak{a} ) implies that there exist Cohen-stable mad families. Similar results are obtained for splitting families. For example, a splitting family, S, is Cohen-unstable if and only if there is a bijection G from ω to the rationals such that the boundaries of the sets G[S], S ∈S are nowhere dense. Also, Cohen-stable splitting families of cardinality ≤ κ exist if and only if ℵ 0 -splitting families of cardinality ≤ κ exist. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that G. A. Cohen’s defense of the feminist slogan, “The personal is political”, his argument against Rawls’s restriction of principles of justice to the basic structure of society, depends for its intelligibility on the ability to distinguish—with reasonable but perhaps not perfect precision—between those situations in which what Nancy Rosenblum has called “the logic of congruence” is validly invoked and those in which it is not. More importantly, I suggest that the philosophical shape of (...)Cohen’s critique makes it difficult for him to supply the required criterion, and that the methodological “intuitionism” he claims to be committed to is at odds with his larger argument against Rawls concerning the subject of justice. (shrink)

The philosophical question "what is?" plays different roles in the work of Cohen and Rosenzweig. According to Cohen, it expresses the authentic meaning of the Socratic concept, which has its methodical-transcendental foundation in the Platonic Idea as answer, since it gives an account of the concept. So Cohen turns the question into an epistemological problem, because it ultimately refers to the necessary condition of knowledge. In contrast, Rosenzweig sees in the "what is?" question grounds to condemn the (...) "old" philosophy founded on the identity of being and thought. In his view, the question is the original sin of the "philosophy of the All", which has always reduced everything to something completely different by means of the altering word "is" in the "is"-question. Nevertheless, with regard to the "what is?" question, it is possible to detect a kind of agreement between the two philosophers: namely, Rosenzweig opposes a claim of ontological reduction that Cohen also rejects. (shrink)

For a ⊆ b ⊆ ω with b\ a infinite, the set D = {x ∈ [ω]ω : a ⊆ x ⊆ b} is called a doughnut. A set S ⊆ [ω]ω has the doughnut property [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D] if it contains or is disjoint from a doughnut. It is known that not every set S ⊆ [ω]ω has the doughnut property, but S has the doughnut property if it has the Baire property ℬ or the Ramsey property ℛ. (...) In this paper it is shown that a finite support iteration of length ω1 of Cohen forcing, starting from L, yields a model for CH + equation image + equation image + equation image. (shrink)

Cohen seeks to rescue the concept of justice from those, among whom he includes Rawls, who think that correct fundamental moral principles are fact-sensitive. Cohen argues instead that any fundamental principles of justice, and fundamental moral principles generally, are fact-insensitive and that any fact-sensitive principles can be traced back to fact-insensitive ones. This paper seeks to clarify the nature of Cohen's argument, and the kind of fact-insensitivity he has in mind. In particular, it distinguishes between internal and (...) external fact-sensitivity – that is, whether facts are referenced in the content of the principle, or must otherwise be the case in order for the principle to apply at all. Cohen himself seems likely to endorse internally fact-sensitive fundamental principles. This leads to a discussion of Cohen's Platonism about moral principles and the extent to which his arguments cover all its rivals. 1. (shrink)