The United States has defended South Korea for 50 years.
The alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK)actually a one-sided security
guaranteehas been Americas most consistently dangerous commitment since World
War II. The nearly 34,000 deaths in the Korean War have been supplemented by more recent,
occasional acts of war by North Korea: The Korea Defense Veterans of America organization
estimates 1,500 American dead over the years.1

Yet South Korea is
beginning to look away. Newly elected President Roh Moo-hyun suggested that his nation
mediate in any war between America and the North and called for
concessions from both sides.2
Indeed, he advocated: We should proudly say we will not side with North Korea or the
United States.3 Whatever value the US-ROK alliance once appeared to have is fast
disappearing.

Although recent
attention understandably has focused on North Koreas nuclear weapons program, an
equally important issue is the future of Americas relations with South Korea.
Indeed, the nuclear controversy grows out of Washingtons unnatural military presence
on the Korean peninsula, and no solution is likely until that unnatural presence is
removed. Well before the present contretemps it was evident that the presence of 37,000
American troops in the South was a Cold War artifact that had lost its raison detre.

Washingtons
commitment to the ROK resulted from the post-World War II division of the peninsula and
subsequent Chinese and Soviet support for North Korean aggression. Today the Cold War is
over, and China and Russia are friendlier with Seoul than with Pyongyang. Moreover, the
South has raced ahead of the North economically, enjoying 40 times the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), twice the population, and a vast technological edge. In 2000 South Korea
had a GDP of $462 billion, making it the worlds 12th largest economy. In con-

78/79

trast, North Korea
is an economic wreck, whose economy is estimated to have shrunk in half between 1993 and
1996 alone.

Only in the military
sphere does the North retain an advantage. Its military is large, but decrepit. Reports
Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Bruce Bechtol: The North Korean military is one
that is using antiquated 1950s and 1960s vintage weapons while the South Korean military
continues to strengthen itself with dynamic new programs such as the building of brand new
F-16s. In addition, the South is superior in other key aspects of military readiness, such
as command and control and training.4
To the extent that the ROKs military lags behind that of its northern antagonist, it
is a matter of choice, not necessity. As the South acknowledges in its own defense
reports, it chose to focus on economic development at the expense of military
strength, which it could do secure in Americas protection.5

Although no US
forces are needed to guard against the bankrupt North, they are ubiquitous. Thus occur
incidents from traffic deaths to violent altercations. After the recent acquittal in
military court of two soldiers charged in the accidental deaths of two children,
demonstrations erupted. Americans have been barred from restaurants, jeered, and in a few
cases physically attacked.

Placing even greater
pressure on this unequal arrangement is the disagreement about US and South Korean policy
toward North Korea. A misstep regarding Pyongyang would be bothersome for the United
States; it would be disastrous for South Korea. Says President Roh: War is such a
catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South
relations in such a way that we do not have to face such a situation.6

Yet, relates former
President Bill Clinton, he prepared military options for use against the North a decade
ago, with nary a nod to the South Koreans (or Japanese).7 President Bush has explicitly refused to rule out any
option, and some hawks are unconcerned about Seouls views. Opines Senator John
McCain: While they may risk their populations, the United States will do whatever it
must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual lectures
about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Koreas neighbors,
but we will make do without it if we must.8

The Evolving
Geopolitical Environment

For decades the
South has been drawn north by obvious cultural, ethnic, and family ties, while
repelled by a brutal totalitarian dictatorship that has impoverished its own people while
threatening those in the South. Seeming

79/80

breakthroughs often
beckoned over the years, only to end in disappointment. Then came 2000, with South Korean
President Kim Dae-jungs dramatic visit to Pyongyang.

In response, the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) began to cautiously address the need for
economic reform in North Korea while reaching out internationally. Then momentum again
stalled, with relations almost always seeming to involve two steps forward but one step
back. In October 2002 came the trip by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly to Pyongyang. Kellys charge that the North was
cheating on the Agreed Frameworkby enriching uranium other than the spent fuel rods
in storage, violating the agreements spirit, if not its exact termssparked
North Koreas admission, Washingtons refusal to talk, the allies cut-off
of additional fuel shipments, and a series of increasingly provocative steps by the North.

This worrisome
spiral toward confrontation occurred in the midst of a bitter presidential campaign in the
South. The victor was Roh Moo-hyun, who most strongly endorsed engagement with the North
and criticized Washington.

The only reason the
United States entered the Korean War was because the Cold War gave strategic importance to
an otherwise irrelevant conflict in a distant land. The Korean Peninsula remained linked
to the Cold War until the waning days of the Soviet Union.

Today Russia is
playing a much smaller role than during its glory days as a superpower. It also has dumped
its alliance with the North in favor of economic ties with South Korea.

China is another
critical player. At high cost, Beijing saved the DPRK from defeat in the Korean War. The
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is the Norths largest trading partner, with
two-way trade amounting to $740 million annually, and China continues to provide some aid
to North Korea. Nevertheless, over the Norths strenuous objections, the PRC
recognized the South in 1992 and has since developed a strong relationship with Seoul.
Two-way trade with the South exceeds $30 billion annuallymore than 40 times the
trade between the PRC and the Northand annual South Korean investment in the PRC has
run as high as $900 million, challenging America for first place as the overseas
destination of ROK capital.

The Unnatural
American Relationship

The United States
established a permanent troop presence in the Korean peninsula with the onset of the
Korean War. But changing perceptions of the threat posed by the North, combined with
increasing national self-confidence in South Korea, are challenging bilateral relations.

South Korean
frustrations are not new, but they have gained greater force than ever before. Explains
Kim Sung-han of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security,
Anti-Americanism is getting intense. It used to be widespread and not so deep. Now
its getting widespread and deep.9
Although

80/81

polls show that a majority of South
Koreans still supports the US troop presence, a majority also pronounces its dislike of
America.

Some Americans hope
that the sentiments will recede and everything will go back to normal. However, the
generation grateful for American aid in the Korean War is passing from the scene. Younger
people associate the United States more with US support for various military regimes and
the indignities (and tragedies) of a foreign troop presence.

Policy differences
between Seoul and Washington also will likely worsen as the nuclear crisis proceeds. In
late January, President Kim Dae-jung offered veiled criticism of the United States:
Sometimes we need to talk to the other party, even if we dislike the other
party.10 At the same time, Washington was pushing the issue toward the UN
Security Council, which, in Seouls view, would short-circuit the diplomatic process.
Shortly thereafter the Bush Administration pointedly observed that military action
remained an option, generating a near hysterical response from Seoul.

Indeed, Roh
Moo-hyun, who once called for the withdrawal of US forces, ran on an explicit peace
platform that sharply diverged from US policy: We have to choose between war and
peace, he told one rally.11
He owes his narrow election victory to rising popular antagonism against the United States
and particularly the presence of American troops. Of course, he later tried to moderate
his position and called for strengthening the alliance. Yet he complained that so
far, all changes in the size of US troop strength here have been determined by the United
States based on its strategic consideration, without South Koreas consent.12

Moreover, proposed
reforms of the relationshipadjusting the Status of Forces Agreement,
moving Americas Yongsan base out of Seoul, withdrawing a small unit or two, changing
the joint command (which envisions an American general commanding Korean troops in
war)are mere Band-Aids. President Roh has called for a more equal
relationship and promised not to kowtow to Washington.13 But
the relationship between the two countries will never be equal so long as South Korea is
dependent on Washington for its defense. The United States cannot be expected to risk war
on another nations terms.

Bringing Home
the Troops

For years it was
hard to find an American analyst who did not recoil in horror at the suggestion that
American forces be brought home from Korea. Even now the Bush Administration has been
supplementing US forces in Asia. But a growing number of commentators, including some
resolute hawks, now say that the United States shouldnt stay if it isnt
wanted.14 And even if America is wanted, so what? Another nations
desire for US aid is no reason to provide it. The United States should do so only if doing
so advances American national interests.

What vital US
interest is being served by the continued stationing of US forces in Korea? Americas
presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK

81/82

from military
adventurism, but that does not mean US forces are necessary to do so.15 As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A
recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported simply:
Without US help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an
invasion from the North.16

Replacing the
American tripwire would be expensive for Seoul. But as one of the globes wealthiest
nations, South Korea is eminently capable of doing soand has studied the possibility
of doing so as recently as last year. The ROK has matured as a country and should face the
consequences of its own decisions and its own defense requirements.

Some argue that
maybe American troops should be withdrawn, only just not now. But for some policymakers
there will never be a good time to update US policy. Indeed, many desire to preserve
Americas troop presence even after eventual North-South reunification. Heritage
Foundation Vice President Larry Wortzel says, Keeping US forces in South Korea as
long as they are welcome there is good policy. Its important for Americans and South
Koreans to remember that for another 50 years.17

Advocates of a
permanent US occupation talk grandly of regional stability. However, it would be a
miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged in the Cold War and created to deter a
ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor turned out to be the perfect arrangement to
meet completely different contingencies in a completely different security environment.

In fact, there are
no secondary dual-use functions for Americas soldiers to perform. For
instance, US and Chinese interests might eventually collide, but Americas
deployments in Korea would provide little value in that scenario. No US administration
would initiate a ground invasion against the PRC. And South Korea, like Japan for that
matter, is unlikely to allow itself to become the staging ground for such a conflict. To
do so would turn itself into Chinas permanent enemy.

Containing a
resurgent Tokyo is an even more fanciful role. The greatest threats to regional stability
are internalinsurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and
ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious division in
Indonesia. But they impinge no vital American interests and are not susceptible to
solution by the US military.18 Even more distant are such
transnational threats as terrorism, piracy, drug-

82/83

trafficking, and
infectious diseases, cited in a recent article by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel
Carl Haselden.19 What, one wonders, would troops in Korea do to combat AIDS?

In sum, without any
connection to the larger Cold War and global hegemonic struggle, Korea is relatively
unimportant to the United States. So some American policymakers make an entirely different
argument: outposts in the ROK allow the United States to base soldiers overseas at someone
elses cost. But such security guarantees require Washington to create additional
units, a cost that Americas allies do not cover.20 Moreover,
friendly states are not likely to long accept a foreign occupation carried out solely to
save money for Americans.

What About
North Koreas Nukes?

The US-South Korean
relationship would be in trouble even had Washington and North Korea maintained the
fiction that all was well with the Agreed Framework, since the alliance no longer serves
its original purpose. And preventing the North from developing nuclear weapons offers no
substitute. Absent a US plan to invade the North, something that seems unlikely even from
the Bush Administration, the American presence performs no useful role.

In fact, the current
deployment leaves US forces as nuclear hostages if the North marries an effective atomic
bomb to a means of delivery. Moreover, the troop tripwire makes North Korea Americas
problem. Removing it, argues Adam Garfinkle, editor of the National Interest,
would force China and the other parties to the problem to face reality.21

The situation is
obviously serious. It is widely assumed that the North possesses one or two nuclear
weapons, or at least has reprocessed enough plutonium to make them.22
Once confronted by the United States, which cut off additional fuel oil shipments under
the Agreed Framework, the North announced a series of ever-more-confrontational steps that
could lead to development of a significant nuclear arsenal.

Alas, the best
strategy for handling the DPRK is not obvious. The North may have decided to cheat all
along. Early on it may have perceived that the Agreed Framework was unraveling.

A not insubstantial
factor in its current behavior also may be the Norths belief that the Bush
Administration has targeted Kims regime for a preventive war. One need not be a
communist apologist to note that if military threats may deter, they may also provoke.
Pyongyang certainly has reason to worry. As one North Korean official reportedly
explained: Your President called us a member of the axis of evil . . . your troops
are deployed on the Korean peninsula . . . of course we have a nuclear program.23 Equally dramatic was the war in Kosovo, which effectively
divided the world between countries that bomb and those that get bombed. CIA Director
George Tenet implicitly acknowledged the problem without noting Americas role,
suggesting that if the North goes ahead and non-

83/84

proliferation
weakens, other states might view the acquisition of nukes as the best way to match
neighbors and deter more powerful nations.24

Threatening
War

Irrespective of who
is to blame, what is to be done? It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within
easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective on
coercion. Those in Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout,
missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil, and regional chaos. There is no
constituency anywhere in the region, even among the countries most vulnerable to a North
Korea with nuclear weapons, for war.

Some advocates of a
preemptive, or preventive, US military strike say dont worry, that Pyongyang would
choose not to retaliate to save itself. But such an attack would destroy the prestige of
the regime. Moreover, Pyongyang might decide that a military strike was evidence of
Americas determination to remove it, the opening phase of a war for regime change.
In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. This is how the North is threatening
to respond to any US strike: total war and its own preemptive strike.25

Bill Taylor,
formerly of the US Military Academy and the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, and who met with Kim Il-sung and other senior leaders a decade ago, believes:
Faced with a major military strike on its territory, the North Korean leadership
will respond with everything it has against Americans and our allies.26 A high-ranking defector, Cho Myung-chul, estimates the
chances of general war at 80 percent in response to even a limited strike on the
Norths Yongbyon facilities.27

Most likely would be
a limited but devastating retaliatory strike centered against the Yongsan facility in
Seoul. Retaliation could easily lead to a tit-for-tat escalation that would be difficult
to halt short of general war.28 The perception that South Koreans died
because the United States acted against the wishes of the Roh government would create a
divisive, and perhaps decisive, split between Seoul and Washington.

Attempts at lesser
levels of coercion also would be controversial and risky. Sanctions probably would not
trigger a North Korean military reaction, but might not work against what remains a
largely isolated country whose leaders willingly tolerate mass starvation. Moreover,
sanctions require support from the surrounding countriesenforcement by South Korea
and Japan, UN approval by Russia and China. All hesitate risking the collapse of the DPRK,
which could spark internal armed conflict and mass refugee flows.

Given the risks of
war and problems with sanctions, negotiations are the obvious place to start. The United
States could offer security guarantees, political recognition, and economic aid in
exchange for the verifiable termination of the Norths nuclear and missile programs.
Some analysts would add demobiliza-

84/85

tion and withdrawal
of conventional units from their advanced positions to the agenda. A few even want to
include human rights guarantees.

Given the stakes,
South Korea and the other neighboring states are likely to insist on being involved in
shaping policy. Involving them is in Americas interest. Argues Shi Yinhong, a
professor at Chinas Peoples University, it is highly doubtful that
Washington alone can end the Norths nuclear ambitionspeacefully, anyway.29

But the United
States cannot take the support of regional states for granted. For instance, China could
play the most important role in dissuading the North from its nuclear course. Yet so far
Beijing has been disinclined to solve what is seen as primarily Americas problem.
China lacks the Norths full trust and is suspicious of Washingtons willingness
to assert its power globally. Concludes analyst Stephen Richter: The North Korean
crisis is helping to chip away at US credibility in the world, and it is even leading to
tensions between the United States and its allies in Asia, such as South Korea and Japan.
All that suits China just fine.30

The key to enlisting
China (and Russia) is to convince them that doing so would help them. One tactic would be
to tell them that by failing to support us they put their relations with us at
risk, writes Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations.31
That might or might not work, but only at great cost, given the many other issues also at
stake in those relationships. It would be better to point out the adverse consequences to
them, as well as to America, if Pyongyang does not desist.

Can Peace Be
Maintained?

Would the North
respond to a message that significant diplomatic and economic rewards are possible, but
only for positive, verifiable disarmament? It is dangerous to bet on the goals of Kim
Jong-il and other policymakers in the North, but they might be willing to be bought off.
Perhaps most significantly, the DPRK has behaved more responsibly toward and been more
engaged with the outside world (everything is relative) over the last decade than ever
before; thus, it now has much more to lose from confrontation, isolation, and war.
Pyongyangs emphasis so far on negotiation with America also suggests a willingness
to bargain.

85/86

Still, Pyongyang may
have already decided, or may decide in the future, that it requires a significant and
perhaps growing nuclear arsenal, irrespective of its economic hopes. In that case, no deal
will be possible.

America (and to a
lesser degree North Koreas neighbors) would pay no attention to the bankrupt,
starving nation if it lacked a nuclear capability. An atomic bomb also eases defense in an
ever more dangerous world. Joseph Nye of the Kennedy School of Government wryly observes,
What North Korea shows is that deterrence is working. The only problem is that we
are the ones being deterred.32 Pyongyang might decide that such
deterrence is worth preserving.

If Pyongyang ends up
moving ahead with its nuclear program, there would be no good answers. The United States
should distinguish between two different dangers. The most serious but also potentially
most manageable would be if the DPRK matched missile sales with plutonium sales,
including, conceivably, to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. Such a prospect would
warrant consideration of interception of any air or naval shipments abroad, a possibility
that Pyongyang should be made aware of long before such a course appeared likely. Beyond
that would be sanctions, blockade, and even destruction of the Norths nuclear
reactors. A Plutonium R Us to Americas enemies would be
unacceptable, but Pyongyang would probably draw back from putting out an international
sale sign that would draw Washingtons wrath.

Quite different is
the threat of the North expanding its presumed arsenal of one or two atomic bombs. Such a
development would be worrisome, to be sure, but the DPRK could also be deterred. With
regime survival Kim Jong-ils highest priority, he need only know that use of such
weapons would lead to the destruction of his regime.

However, maintaining
a permanent nuclear umbrella over the South and Japanthe likelihood of the North
attempting to strike the United States, given current missile capabilities, is quite
smallwould unnecessarily keep the United States entangled in a dangerous situation
potentially forever. It would be better to warn Pyongyang that more aggressive behavior on
its part would encourage both Japan and South Korea to respond in kind. North Korea then
could find itself confronting two new nuclear powers, neither of which would be kindly
disposed to the DPRK.

Washington need not
push its allies to deploy nuclear weapons, however; it simply needs to withdraw its
objection to their doing so. The threat is useful even if Washington or its friends
ultimately drew back from such a policy. Indeed, the mere prospect of Japan (and maybe
Taiwan) acquiring nuclear weapons would likely spur China to engage Pyongyang more
seriously.

Obviously, such a
step would be controversial throughout Asia. Yet such a course might merely accelerate
reality. In the coming years Washington is likely to feel increasingly uncomfortable being
tasked to shield its allies from a more powerful China. Might such a course spark an arms
race? Perhaps. Yet what is more chilling than having to risk Los Angeles to protect Taipei
or Tokyo? As Garfinkle explains: If North Korea becomes a six-or-more-weapon nuclear
power,

86/87

we will be far away,
with deterrence reasonably intact, and with a decent if imperfect ability to prevent North
Korea from exporting fissile materials and missiles.33

Conclusion

That which is
must always be was for decades the policy in both Seoul and Washington. Alliances
exist to serve a purpose. Yet in Korea the means has become an end. America pays the bill
but gains little benefit from doing so. Indeed, ingratitude is replacing appreciation.

Washingtons
military presence is not necessary to protect the South. The US troops there play no role
in constraining China or preventing war elsewhere in the region. Americas forces
should be brought home and the misnamed mutual defense treaty should be terminated.

Ending
Americas military presence would also be in South Koreas interest. The
relationships diminishing utility is most evident in the South. Seoul bears the cost
of hosting foreign troops, having its security controlled by a self-centered great power,
and lacking the respect due a country moving toward the first rank of nations.

The growing nuclear
crisis only makes an American withdrawal more necessary. The United States is threatened
primarily because it insists on remaining next door and being threatened. And the US
tripwire does more to hinder than to solve the problem. Only by withdrawing its forces can
Washington return responsibility for regional stability to those nations most affected.

Washington tends to
think only of itself. President Rohs election is a big headache,
complained one US official to the Economist.34 But the ROK
is entitled to elect its own leaders, assess its own interests, and chart its own course.
America and South Korea have grown apart. Its time for an amicable divorce rather
than a much more bitter parting in the near future.

4. Bruce Bechtol,
Jr., Who Is Stronger? A Comparative Analysis on the Readiness and Capabilities of
the North and South Korean Militaries, International Journal of Korean
Unification Studies, 10 (No. 2, 2001), 21.

6. Quoted in Howard
W. French, South Koreas President-Elect Rejects Use of Force Against North
Korea, The New York Times, 17 January 2003, p. A11.

7. He apparently
also threatened military action if the North Koreans reopened the Yongbyon reactor. Dana
Milbank, U.S. Open to Informal Talks with N. Korea, The Washington Post,
30 December 2002, p. A4.

8. John McCain,
Rogue State Rollback, Weekly Standard, 20 January 2003. Columnist Fred
Hiatt makes a similar argument, complaining that South Koreas proximity to
North Koreas army, in fact, may cloud its vision of the danger of a nuclear
arsenal. Fred Hiatt, Seoul May Not Know Best, The Washington Post,
6 January 2003, p. A15.

15. Some US
officials are complaining that the United States doesnt have enough troops to fight
two overseas wars at once. But why should it be expected to fight in Korea when the South
possesses ample manpower and economic resources? See, e.g., Rowan Scarborough, U.S.
Ability to Fight Two Wars Doubted, Washington Times, 25 December 2002, pp.
A1, A9.

16. A Working Group
Report of the CSIS International Security Program, Conventional Arms Control on the
Korean Peninsula (Washington: CSIS, August 2002), p. 14.

18. Not that there
arent people who desire US intervention. Burmese insurgents and Indonesian
Christians alike have told me that the United States should repeat its policy in Kosovo to
coerce their respective governments to stop oppression and murder. The mind boggles at the
prospect of sending in the Marines for such a purpose.

22. Although a
reasonable assumption, it is at least possible that Pyongyangs atomic capabilities
are more bluff than real. In fact, the South Korean Prime Minister told parliament that
we believe that they do not have any. Quoted in Jae-suk Yoo, S. Korea
Has Doubts on Norths Nukes, Associated Press, 11 February 2003.

23. Quoted in Steve
Chapman, North Korea is Not the Same as Iraq. Or is It? 3 January 2003,
http://www.townhall.com. More generally, see Bruce Cumings, Endgame in Korea, The
Nation, 25 November 2002, http://www.thenation.com.

24. Michael R.
Gordon and Felicity Barringer, North Korea Wants Arms and More Aid from U.S., Chief
of C.I.A. Suggests, The New York Times, 13 February 2003, p. A15.

28. Robert Gallucci,
who negotiated the Agreed Framework, worried about just such a possibility. Quoted in
Patrick Goodenough, North Korean Nuke Threat: US Options Debated, CNS News, 18
December 2002, http://www.cnsnews.com.

29. Quoted in Joseph
Kahn, To China, North Korea Looks Radioactive, The New York Times, 2
February 2003, p. WK-4.

34. Quoted in
Sorry, No Times for a Honeymoon, Economist, 4 January 2003, p. 31.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato
Institute in Washington, D.C., and the author and editor of several books, including Tripwire:
Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World. He is a former Special Assistant to
President Reagan and Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.