Saturday, May 07, 2005

Rogue States, War Criminals, & Liable Electorates

A top secret British memorandum dated 23 July 2002 wasleaked in the run-up to yesterday's parliamentaryelections in the UK (which Blair won, though hisLabour Party was much weakened by public disgust withsuch shenanigans as the below). I mirror the memobelow, from the Times Online site. It summarizes areport to Blair and others in the British governmentby Sir Brian Dearlove (This is the press release whenhe was appointed in 1999). The head of MI6, or theforeign intelligence service of the UK, is known as"C."

Here is the smoking gun:

"C [Dearlove] reported on his recent talks inWashington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude.Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bushwanted to remove Saddam, through military action,justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. Butthe intelligence and facts were being fixed around thepolicy.

It is not surprising on the face of it that Bush haddecided on the Iraq war by summer of 2002. It it isnotable that Dearlove noticed a change in views on thesubject from earlier visits. By summer of 2002, theAfghanistan war had wound down and al-Qaeda was on therun, so Bush no longer felt vulnerable and was readyto go forward with his long-cherished project of anIraq War. What is notable is that all this was notwhat Bush was telling us.

Bush was lying to the American people at the time andsaying that no final decision had been made on thewar.

Godfrey Sperling of the Christian Science Monitorcould write on August 27, 2002, "Indeed, Bush has saidhe welcomes a 'debate' on Iraq from those in Congressand from the public. But he has made it clear that hewill make his decision based on what his intelligencepeople are telling him."

But Dearlove's report makes it clear that Bush hadalready decided absolutely on a war already theprevious month, and that he had managed to giveBritish intelligence the firm impression that heintended to shape the intelligence to support such awar. So poor Sperling was lied to twice. Any "debate"was meaningless if the president had already decided.And he wasn't waiting to make his decision in thelight of the intelligence. He was going to tell theintelligence professionals to what conclusion they hadto come. "But the intelligence and facts were beingfixed around the policy."

Why would it even be necessary to turn theintelligence analysts into "weasels" who would have totell Bush what he wanted to hear?

It was necessary because the "justification" of the"conjunction" of Weapons of Mass Destruction andterrorism was virtually non-existent.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw admitted it atthe meeting: "It seemed clear that Bush had made uphis mind to take military action, even if the timingwas not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam wasnot threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capabilitywas less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

So the "justification" would have to be provided by"fixing" the intelligence around the policy. Bush wasjust going to make things up, since the realities didnot actually justify his planned war! The Britishcabinet sat around and admitted to themselves that a)there was no justification for the war into which theywere allowing themselves to be dragged and b) that thewar would be gotten up through Goebbels-liketechniques!

It is even worse. British Attorney-General LordGoldsmith was at the meeting. He had to think up ajustification for the war in international law.Britain is in Europe, and Europe takes internationallaw seriously. You could have war crimes trials.(Remember that Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochetalmost got tried in Spain for killing 5000 people inthe 1970s).

Goldsmith was as nervous as a cat in a roomful ofrocking chairs: "The Attorney-General said that thedesire for regime change was not a legal base formilitary action. There were three possible legalbases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, orUNSC authorisation. The first and second could not bethe base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of threeyears ago would be difficult. The situation might ofcourse change."

The driness of the wit is unbearable. "The desire forregime change was not a legal base for militaryaction"! Naked aggression is illegal, he could havesaid. Then he reviews the three possible grounds for awar. You could have a war if Iraq attacked you. Iraqhad not attacked the US. Or you could have a war if itwas a humanitarian intervention (e.g. under thegenocide convention). But Saddam's major campaigns ofdeath had been a decade before. Or you could get aUnited Nations Security Council resolution authorizingthe war, in accordance with the UN charter. ButGoldsmith makes it clear he thought you would need anew resolution, that the old ones wouldn't work forthis purpose.

The Attorney General of the United Kingdom thought thereports Dearlove and Straw were bringing back fromWashington reeked of an illegal war. People who planout illegal wars are war criminals. He knew this. Hewas stuck, however. They were all stuck.

The man from Connecticut with the Crawford ranch haddecided to cut down some trees. And they were allhostages in his guest house and he was going to putchain saws in their hands and make them help, whetherthey liked it or not. Goldsmith's hands trembled as hereached out for the chainsaw rig. He saw himself andthe others sitting in the Hague, one day, facing thesame judges that Milosevic harangued. Charged.

But it is a long way from Crawford to the Hague. Theman from Connecticut with the cowboy boots and thefake twang would get away with it. They would all getaway with it.

by Ray McGovern"Intelligence and facts are being fixed around thepolicy."

Never in our wildest dreams did we think we would seethose words in black and white – and beneath a SECRETstamp, no less. For three years now, we in VeteranIntelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) have beensaying that the CIA and its British counterpart, MI-6,were ordered by their countries' leaders to "fixfacts" to "justify" an unprovoked war on Iraq. Moreoften than not, we have been greeted with stares ofincredulity.

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copiesshould be made. It should be shown only to those witha genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latestJIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based onextreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likelyto be by massive military action. Saddam was worriedand expected an attack, probably by air and land, buthe was not convinced that it would be immediate oroverwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours toline up with the US. Saddam knew that regular armymorale was poor. Real support for Saddam among thepublic was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. Therewas a perceptible shift in attitude. Military actionwas now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to removeSaddam, through military action, justified by theconjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligenceand facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSChad no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasmfor publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record.There was little discussion in Washington of theaftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 UStroops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move upto Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqicasus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the aircampaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, withbasing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for eitheroption. Turkey and other Gulf states were alsoimportant, but less vital. The three main options forUK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SFsquadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets inaddition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraqentering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had alreadybegun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on theregime. No decisions had been taken, but he thoughtthe most likely timing in US minds for military actionto begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this withColin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush hadmade up his mind to take military action, even if thetiming was not yet decided. But the case was thin.Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMDcapability was less than that of Libya, North Korea orIran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum toSaddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.This would also help with the legal justification forthe use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regimechange was not a legal base for military action. Therewere three possible legal bases: self-defence,humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. Thefirst and second could not be the base in this case.Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would bedifficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a bigdifference politically and legally if Saddam refusedto allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMDwere linked in the sense that it was the regime thatwas producing the WMD. There were different strategiesfor dealing with Libya and Iran. If the politicalcontext were right, people would support regimechange. The two key issues were whether the militaryplan worked and whether we had the political strategyto give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if theUS battleplan was workable. The military werecontinuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddamused WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapseand urban warfighting began? You said that Saddamcould also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, addedthe Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not goahead with a military plan unless convinced that itwas a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interestsconverged. But on the political strategy, there couldbe US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we shouldexplore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam wouldcontinue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow theinspectors back in only when he thought the threat ofmilitary action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Ministerwanted UK military involvement, he would need todecide this early. He cautioned that many in the USdid not think it worth going down the ultimatum route.It would be important for the Prime Minister to setout the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK wouldtake part in any military action. But we needed afuller picture of US planning before we could take anyfirm decisions. CDS should tell the US military thatwe were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question ofwhether funds could be spent in preparation for thisoperation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details ofthe proposed military campaign and possible UKcontributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the PrimeMinister the background on the UN inspectors, anddiscreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on thepositions of countries in the region especiallyTurkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a fullintelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: theAttorney-General would consider legal advice withFCO/MOD legal advisers.