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just put that out there to show that they had use aircraft in Yemen (neither I, nor you have a detail of their entire air-operation over Yemen by type), and that besides your usual trolling, it has absolutely no bearing on whether they buy or are approved or not for the F-35 and when they may or may not receive them.

I do understand the implications of the UAE being sold the F-35 as it pertains to some other deals and prospectives in terms of the size, nature, and timeline of such a deal and why that why make some folks uneasy.

No one has exact knowledge about Yemen but you can still use logic. there are far more crashes of UAE airforce single engine fighters than twin engine fighters of Saudi airforce and Saudi airforce is far larger and when they run out of bombs they bough huge amount.
There is zero evidence that UAE has bough same scale of bombs as Saudi.

The F-35As out of Hill have engaged F-15Es from Mountain AFB in the past. It was part of the capstone prior to declaring IOC and likely later as well. The USAF and USN have hundreds of AESA equipped fighters that are not F-35As. I'm pretty sure the capability against all of them is pretty well understood with opportunities over the last year to put the aircraft against some of them like the capstone demonstration the ACC put together.

The F-35As out of Hill have engaged F-15Es from Mountain AFB in the past. It was part of the capstone prior to declaring IOC and likely later as well. The USAF and USN have hundreds of AESA equipped fighters that are not F-35As. I'm pretty sure the capability against all of them is pretty well understood with opportunities over the last year to put the aircraft against some of them like the capstone demonstration the ACC put together.

Norway became the first foreign nation to receive the delivery of Block 3F mission data from US Air Force’s 53rd Electronic Warfare Group’s Partner Support Complex last week.
“Our software provides the Norwegian F-35 an unprecedented precision attack capability – a crucial element to maintaining peace,” Robert Kraus, F-35 PSC director said in a statement Wednesday.
The delivery of Block 3F mission data is important because it enables the F-35 to accomplish its primary missions of air interdiction, close air support, and suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses. Mission data files enable the aircraft to know what threats to search for and when, providing the F-35 its means of deciphering the environment.
“Mission data files are essential to the combat capability of the Lightning II,” said Dylan Duplechain, F-35 PSC chief engineer. “They provide the warfighter situational awareness capability and an ability to react to the threat environment.”
The men and women of the PSC are charged with programing this essential mission data software for eight F-35 partner nations, to include Norway, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Denmark.

The United Arab Emirates Air Force will undergo a restructuring, guided in part by plans to buy two squadrans of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.

“We are currently forming a specialized committee to assess the risks, threats and needs of the UAE Air Force,” and then evaluate available platforms to meet requirements, according to an Emirati military source.

Much of the focus at the Dubai Air Show has been on the Gulf country’s progress toward authorization to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. According to military sources with knowledge of the matter, “the talks between the two parties are [focused on] sensitive systems in the aircraft that need export permit.” The sources refused to disclose the value of the deal, but said it would be limited in the first phase to the purchase of two squadrons, or 24 aircraft.

At the air show, the deputy commander of the UAE Air Force and air defense, Brig. Gen. Rashed M. Al Shamsi stressed the importance of “strengthening the UAE air capacity” in response to a question about the potential F-35 acquisition. He noted that “equipping the Air Force requires connected multi-role platforms with the ability to share data, enhanced intelligence collection and distribution of the capabilities, a responsive and persistent C4ISR, and a timely and reactive dynamic targeting process.”

For his part, Staff Maj. Gen. pilot Abdullah A.Al Hashimi, assistant undersecretary for support services in the UAE ministry of defense, commented on the matter: “We in the UAE already live in a 5th generation environment; so acquiring the F-35 fighter jet is only a step forward to cope with the 5th generation mindset.”

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also seeking to procure the F-35 jets, and talks are making an important progress, as stated by officials who refused to be named.

Gen. Stephen Wilson, the Air Force’s vice chief of staff, stressed the importance of the United State’s ongoing pursuit of potential new F-35 customers including the Gulf nation, since “we share threats, interests and responsibilities. We are going to explore options for those nations and partners to benefit from this capability.”

The vice chief of staff also replied to a question about possible adaptations needed for the F-35 to operate effectively in the Gulf environment, stating that “the fighter is used globally and doesn’t need any accommodations. The 5th-generation concept is about the sensor fusing of information and its networking.”

Ahmad Temsah, CEO of the Center on Regional & Eastern Studies, pointed to the growing Iranian threat as the key motivator to acquiring the F-35, adding that “nowadays, the main Gulf states enemy is Iran, an imminent and dangerous aggression.”

The UAE Air Force is also working on modernizing its pilot training schools by introducing a field training program focused on air encounters similar to the ones adopted by countries in Europe and the U.S.

Air Commander Philippe Adam, commander for operations in the aviation brigade at the French Air Force said that “the UAE military capabilities are getting better with time, and this was reflected in the Yemeni conflict. It is astonishing what they have accomplished in few years.”

“The challenge they might face in the near future is the know-how to use [new] systems in the battlefield,” as well as improvements to intelligence and surveillance capabilities, he added.

The UAE Air Force relies primarily today on 124 F-16 Block 60 and 65 Mirage-2000 fighter jets, which have been battle proven in the Yemeni conflict among others.

Correct. It is increasingly beginning to emerge that the DOD will unlikely allow co-existence and data sharing between these types or even with IADS. Since the F-35 is not part of any Indian competition/contract, I can speak of the UAE in that if and when they are offered the F-35, it will likely involve some sort of government-government assurance that it would not be operated alongside the said systems (likely also IADS). It may even come down to the UAE having to choose between the two systems. I think this is reasonable given that the F-35 isn't exactly short on sales and the production line will be producing aircraft well into the 2030s so there is really no reason not to ask for stuff like this in the short-medium term when your main problem isn't finding enough customers to provide aircraft to but overcoming the challenges associated with production increases and follow on development. I see this increasingly likely as a choice for the UAE to make in terms of the Su-35 and the F-35. If they choose the former, their acquisition of the latter may not happen or in the best case may be delayed significantly.

Turkey will be an interesting test-case for this. Clearly this is a political and hence a policy matter so USAF's leadership is just one stakeholder among many (DOS, DOD, Congress and WH), but their views/concerns on this appear to be quite clear. There may be a number of ways the Turkish scenario plays out. It could lead to the emergence of a model on how to firewall US hardware that has to operate along-side Russian systems (both high end latest gen. systems). Or, this could lead to major changes in the deal with Turkey for either the F-35 or S-400s. If it were up to me I'd re-appropriate the Turkish F-35As to the USAF via a Congressional increase in top-line as is done anyway (up to 20 more aircraft in FY18 alone) until such time as more clarity on their procurement and assimilation of Russian high end IADS is available. The deal could then be re-evaluated once the picture becomes clearer and either completed or cancelled outright. Defense deals advance both commercial and strategic/NatSec interests concurrently unlike purely commercial deals. At times the best decision one ever makes is simply to walk away if it is not entirely in your best security interests. If Dassault, Eurofighter, Sukhoi, MiG, or SAAB want to fill the void then that's perfectly fine by me and I'm sure LM bottom line won't be impacted much either.

Four squadrons, 48 aircraft "combat coded" in USAF parlance. 35% of the fleet.

UK defense procurement is befuddling. The USAF rule of thumb is about 60% of a fleet in active squadrons, the rest in training, test, and an attrition reserve. Any takers on a bet of when a few dozen lightly used F-35B will be declared "surplus" in a future white paper to make room for whatever comes out of FCAS?

If the MoD does this with one of the new carriers, there should rightly be an uproar from UK taxpayers. One could see the PoW on it's first sortie flying the White Ensign just long enough to sail it to it's new owners at INS Kadamba, or Rio.

Unless these F-35 are given for free to UAE or any country these country should have the ability to atleast integarate their data links with all types of Aircraft and IADS they operate be it US Russia Chinese or EU countries and vice verse is also true. There is no risk in sharing data from these system operated by host country. Data Link are like SOP and should be interoperable fleet wide.

Restricting your paid customer to be given a choice of either use this or else loose it is not a wise decision.

If Turkey is not getting it than most probably Egypt will also not get and there goes the 500 F-16 market. not to mention Turkey is to the North and Egypt is to the West. US maintain peace through carefull management of US weopons. once these countries are free from the constraints they will create alot of trouble.

How exactly do you propose they do this? Hand over JTIDS/MIDS tech and LINk-16 coding to manufacturers of weapon systems in Russia, China, and the like?

Use data link compatiable with across the board systems or provide an interface which will allow Link 16 or other datalink to be compatiable ....I am sure communicating & interfacing with data links across different platform is not a rocket science when much of what we see today is software driven.

Atleast with NATO allay like Turkey one can undestand but UAE is not even a NATO allay and Saudi has recently purchased S-400 systems plus as I understand Saudi operates some chinese radars

BTW if F-16IN wins Indias SE competition how would they interoperate Data Link with French and Russian and even UK aircraft that IAF flies since these teens would use the same DL

Defense sales are an extension of the national security policy and not purely commercial. With respect to introducing new waveforms or country proprietary data links that solves only one aspect of the problem. The data Generated by various means is still being transfered and this has many implications both technical ( as in how much fused or raw data transfer to allow) and policy wise ( as in whether it is in the best US NatSec interest to open it's systems up for interoperability with systems developed and at times even supported by a power adversarial to US interests). With legacy aircraft it is a different matter from a policy perspective since it is not latest generation technology. With latest generation sydtrms, particularly the F-35 where the USAF is sharing its MDFs with sensitive EW data this is more problematic.

As far as sales to Saudi Arabia is concerned, no where have I heard them wanting to integrate their US procured aircraft or IAMD systems with any Russian purchase. This also applies to the Command and Control system for IAMD that they are negotiating with Lockherd. Needless to say, if any such request is made it will be rejected. It is not unreasonable to expect the host nation for your defense wares to deny opening it's systems up for integration with those supplied and sustained by it's adversarial competitor. That too after the fact. Much like the UAE I expect them to be denied the F-35 if they peocure a large number of Russian air defense systems or aircraft.

Unless these F-35 are given for free to UAE or any country these country should have the ability to atleast integarate their data links with all types of Aircraft and IADS

What proprietary data links does the UAE have? The aircraft and data links they operate have their technical baselines and data rights owned and controlled by the host supplier. Of course they can run a complicated project to develop a proprietary waveform and pay for it to be integrated across their disparate fleet but testing integration and deveoping data sharing protocols will still be an issue. Even with an interface the US is not going to open up it's systems so that they can share data generated by them with Russian or Chinese systems. This is why the Saudi S400 will be interesting if it materializes. There is no chance it is going to be allowed to be integrated with their US made air and missiles defense systems.

BTW if F-16IN wins Indias SE competition how would they interoperate Data Link with French and Russian and even UK aircraft that IAF flies since these teens would use the same DL

Via a common India specific data link if one exists. But then this is the F-16 we are talking about here which is quite different from the F35 both technically and from an export policy perspective.

They need integration only to the extent that they can share those data , They need data integration or exchange not weapons system which is not possible in either case which is proprietary in nature and neither US or China/Russia would allow that, Data integration is very much possible either via some 3rd Party Interface where data are sensor fused to be used or the OEM provides an interface to fuse these data like says standard 1553B database or Open Architecture Framework.

There is no risk by sharing data and if countries have multiple systems they will have to share data among themself to work in an integrated manner.

India has been doing that for donkey years much before IAF had their own ODL , if you look at any indian navy system they operate Dutch and Russian Radar or Russian/Indian/Italian/UK Sensor/Weapon system etc and they are all integrated into one system via Combat Information System. There is no real risk there for either of these system.

Now if US wants to deny UAE any weapon system because they dont want a Su-35 and F-35 or F-16 to talk with each other its their call and they can arm twist their customers if they like but the whole idea that there is some greater security risk in sharing data of Weapons/Sensors etc is just BS , Even IN Jags operates Harpoon missile integrated wit Elta Radar or a Sea King system in past.

They need integration only to the extent that they can share those data

What other type of integration is there?

Data integration is very much possible either via some 3rd Party Interface where data are sensor fused to be used or the OEM provides an interface to fuse these data like says standard 1553B database or Open Architecture Framework.

Which 3rd part interface exists with the UAE that can talk to a Russian system and the J-series protocol? Now you are not only taking about simple overlays, which are hard to do int his case as it is, but about the data being fused and entering into the realm of the data from disparate sources being fused which absolutely requires high fidelity data links and interoperability within these systems.

There is no risk by sharing data and if countries have multiple systems they will have to share data among themself to work in an integrated manner.

Of course there is risk since foreign OEMs are involved and the data-rights and technical baselines on those systems are still maintained by the respective host nation. Can any nation change, modify or upgrade any proprietary system "legally" on a foreign purchased aircraft without owning those rights? If no, then that involves working with the OEM to integrated changes.

India has been doing that for donkey years much before IAF had their own ODL , if you look at any indian navy system they operate Dutch and Russian Radar or Russian/Indian/Italian/UK Sensor/Weapon system etc and they are all integrated into one system via Combat Information System. There is no real risk there for either of these system.

The problem of multiple-sources of data being fused and data-sharing being an integral part of combat capability and sustainment has not existed to the extent as it does with the F-35. The premise behind the F-35 being the first US DOD program to be given blanket program_level export clearance (instead of system by system), and really being one of the first programs within it to be treated as such was that system security and integrity will be maintained at all levels, by all prospective customers and that the USDOD will ensure that it is the case. The MDFs that are critically important to its combat effectiveness for example are developed by a USAF Electronic Warfare squadron along with customer nation input. Nation's cannot either via their own industry or by contracting the OEM manage these systems (Israel has a work around but it is an exception for a trusted ally, yet that even took a lot of political mileage) but must become part of the team developing them.

You aren't going to be fusing data generated by it with systems aboard aircraft or air-defense systems supplied by Russia or China. That is not going to happen. There may be elegant ways of developing third party interfaces where you can perhaps pipe out some very basic level of information and receive some basic level of information from disparate systems and use it for overlays but forget about actual raw data traveling back and forth and being fused.

Now if US wants to deny UAE any weapon system because they dont want a Su-35 and F-35 or F-16 to talk with each other its their call and they can arm twist their customers if they like but the whole idea that there is some greater security risk in sharing data of Weapons/Sensors etc is just BS , Even IN Jags operates Harpoon missile integrated wit Elta Radar or a Sea King system in past.

I think this shows your lack of understanding on what levels of integration actually exists and what it takes to genuinely fuse data from multiple sources. Not all data-links are created equal, and not all data-sharing happens at equal level of integration. Even at the NATO level there is a minimum threshold protocol and 2 F-35's sharing data with each other and executing cooperative engagement isn't the same as an F-35 and an F-16 doing the same over a NATO or non NATO protocol.

As I said, there is a policy element to this as well. The only exception has been for Israel which has introduced its own sharing and communication protocol via a dedicated channel in the F-35's CNI suite.Even that was hotly contested and took a while to hammer out even though Israel is going to use it for its own weapons, and sub-systems and C2 setup and not go to China or Russia and ask for systems that can co-exist and data-share and integrate with the Adir.

And no, it is not unreasonable to deny this to the UAE or the Saudi's. They purchased an aircraft, not the rights to that aircraft. They are also purchasing air-defense equipment and command control solutions again not technical baselines and rights to those. They will receive exactly what they were promised, i.e. integration with their existing force structure. If tomorrow a nation X wants something it purchased to be integrated with a system produced by a power that is adversarial to the nation of a particular product than that government can obviously deny this. When you purchase a foreign system you are assuring the government that it will be protected as per the level of security required for that program. Similarly, if the UAE wants Su-35's proprietary data to be transferred to the F-16 and wants Sukhoi to make sure Lockheed has access to it, I am sure there will be an objection from the Russian side.

India has been doing that for donkey years much before IAF had their own ODL , if you look at any indian navy system they operate Dutch and Russian Radar or Russian/Indian/Italian/UK Sensor/Weapon system etc and they are all integrated into one system via Combat Information System. There is no real risk there for either of these system.

Let me work on two examples since you bring up the Indian context and the data link with which I am not familiar with at all (hence will be asking questions). Who owns the baseline to the indian Su-30 mission systems? Are these Russian systems, data busses and data-links? Same for the Rafale for example? Now, what is the minimum level of data fusion that occurs between an MKI and Rafale? Is it to the same extent as 2 french Rafale's? Will the rafale use the ODL to overlay data generated by an Su-30MKI or S-300/400 defense system? What is the level of integration? Would love clarity on that. Is it data-overlay, data-fusion or some other even deeper level of integration?

There is no need to over complicate things with Wall of Words , Data Link Integration can be done either at the source level with OEM providing the interface to integrate or via intermediate system that does it if the OEM cannot do that.

There are many system from many countries that integrate multiple data from many sources and provide not just data integration but also firecontrol solution , India is a classic example where system from multiple countries have been integrated to work coherently , Even the P-8I uses BEL supplied Data Link.

Eventually it is just the willingness of OEM to do that for the customer , What the USAF General is stating is either you buy Su-35 or F-35 .....that is just a political statement sort of threat.

After all if there is willingness to share data which US has shown in case of P-8I or F-16IN if India goes with it or for that matter Grippen or Rafale it can be done. IAF uses ODL and even the US says it can be integrated https://www.aviation-defence-univers...dian-dogfight/

The F-16 was the first multi-role fighter to incorporate a data link capability, and the IAF’s Operational Data Link (ODL) can be integrated onto the F-16IN when available, ensuring interoperability with other IAF aircraft. Data integrates through all phases of the mission – from mission planning, navigation, communication and target prosecution to return to base – transforming the pilot from an aircraft system manager to a tactician, is Lockheed Martin’s claim.

Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has delivered the Indian-designed Data Link II for the P-8I. Data Link II is a communications system that enables exchange of tactical data and messages among the Indian Navy aircraft, ships and shore establishments. BEL has also delivered the identification friend-or-foe interrogator, a battle management system that enables the aircraft to distinguish friendly aircraft and forces.

Beyond that it is just a political unwillingness masqueraded as technically it cannot be done.

If US does not wants UAE to buy Su-35 that is fine it is their choice if they dont want to sell F-35 but the idea that F-35 and Su-35 cant operate with each other or share data via data link etc is just not true.

Data Link Integration can be done either at the source level with OEM providing the interface to integrate or via intermediate system that does it if the OEM cannot do that.

Until and unless you own the technical rights to the mission systems you have procured, you cannot integrate new stuff to it without going through the OEM and the host nation. At least legally. There is no "intermediate system" that has the legal authority to modify nation specific proprietary systems unless legally granted access to do so (BAE briefly obtained this for F-16's form the USG)

There are many system from many countries that integrate multiple data from many sources and provide not just data integration but also firecontrol solution , India is a classic example where system from multiple countries have been integrated to work coherently , Even the P-8I uses BEL supplied Data Link.

Who integrated the BEL supplied data link on the P-8? What information does the BEL data link share and with which platforms? Data from which sensors is offloaded from a P-8 and on to which platforms? Again, details matter so I would love to know this since it is pointless to discuss without them.

The questions I asked in my previous post still apply. What does the ODL do? What data is shared via it? Does it use data to overlay information from elsewhere or does it fuse data from disparate systems to deliver true sensor fusion? You were referring specifically to data and sensor fusion so these things are very much pertinent and not a WALL of WORDS.

Boeing states P-8I integrated with BEL Data Link 2

Again, the devil is in the details since you were specificly taking about fusion. What "tactical data" is exchanged via the DL-2 and with which platforms? What constitutes "communications"? Is it messaging and re-reouting messages, voice communications? sharing of a CIP? development of a true sensor fused CIP? raw data ? etc etc etc. Is it of the same fideilty and is the protocol as extensive as exists within NATO standard J-series or Link16 format?

Details matter!

Beyond that it is just a political unwillingness masqueraded as technically it cannot be done.

This is your inability to grasp that this as I mentioned in my very first post on the topic is both a technical, and policy matter. You for some odd reason bring up an Indian data-link which doesn't even apply to the UAE. Do they operate it? What other competing data-link is integrated on US systems that can interface with Russian systems? What access does Sukhoi need to have to sensor-fuse data being piped out of a Lockheed aircraft? Similarly, what data does Lockheed need from the Sukhoi? Who does the integration, and what is needed for it?

That is a technical challenge and a policy challenge as exporting wares is as much a technical decision as it is political.

There are datalinks and then there are datalinks. Sure, UAE could develop some proprietary datalink which would allow the F-35 and Su-35 to send basic messages, air tracks, etc (what about IFF? EW signals and ID? doubtful). It would defeat the purpose of buying advanced fighters if they could not share the tactical picture.

Even now, the USAF is struggling with how to share the massive amounts of data that F-35's (or -22's) can send via MADL and IDFL with the legacy fleet. Have you seen the TALON HATE pod on an F-15C? Even with Link-16, there is a limit with how much F-35's can share with legacy platforms due to bandwith and SIGNIT concerns.

What they can't do (and wouldn't be allowed to do by anyone: USA, Russia) is what you seem to be alluding would be easy: Connect a mixed fleet via Link-16, or S-108. Neither nation would share the encryption data.

Eventually it is just the willingness of OEM to do that for the customer , What the USAF General is stating is either you buy Su-35 or F-35 .....that is just a political statement sort of threat.

- This wasn't a political statement, he was talking about feasibility. Would it be impossible? No, but again, it would defeat the purpose of purchasing the F-35 (or Su-35s) in the first place if one or the other was incapable of a deep level of integration with each other, AWACS, and air defense networks.

The point worth nothing is that not all Data links act, perform or serve the same role/function. NATO standard Link-16 is a standard but when it comes to its use with an F-35 or F-22 it does not allow the ability to share, process, and cooperatively fuse data to the same level as other data-link solutions proprietary to these systems do. It too, despite being the data and communication backbone of some of the most advanced air-forces in the world still is incapable of what you describe as fusion (which in the context of the F-35 is multi-ship fusion).

The USAF, at its highest levels is working on true-multi ship/multi-platform fusion via Talon Hate and the MAPS efforts but is some time away from a workable breakthrough. This is a technical challenge even for some of the top OEMs involved with their work. Simply stating " Pop in a ODL or an XYZ data-link from a third party and problem solved" isn't a credible answer unless you go deeper into what interface that data-link solution uses, what limitations in terms of fidelity, bandwidth, data-sharing etc it comes with and how it differs from what the F-35 does with its NATO allies that all share in the progress, success and security of the Link-16 format.

As FBW mentions this is just as it pertains to basic communications b/w disparate fleet. Forget about cooperatively doing IFF or EW work both systems embedded deep in the F-35 concept of operations.

The technical problem is not in creating a software defined waveform using the surplus channels currently sitting in the F-35 CNI that is common across the UAEs systems, but developing protocols that then enter the realm of policy in terms of what data that particular waveform ports out or ports in. The Cyber-paranoia within Congress is so severe that no longer is an NSA-red teaming of all waveform utilizing systems (combat use and ALIS) is considered enough, with the Congress asking the DOT&E to develop processes and testing procedures even on top of the usual NSA approval process. The data-link and its abilities are secondary, the security and the integrity of the sensor generated data is the policy challenge. Israel interfaces its C2 solution on top of the existing CNI suite using the SDW only to interact with IDF unique C2 and weapons systems. That is very different from passing F-35 data to an Su-35 or an S-400 operator and Russian ESM systems on products that will be sustained and supported by Russian OEMs.

Grant agreed that a S-400 acquisition creates issues for Turkey’s use of the F-35.

“It’s a significant concern, not only to the United States, because we need to protect this high end technology, fifth-generation technology” but for “all of our partners and allies that have already purchased the F-35,” she said.

As far as potential actions the United States might take, Grant said the government will have to work through its options.

Grant spoke to Defense News on the floor of Dubai Air Show, where she met with companies and partner countries over the past four days. During this time, she did not have conversations with the Turkish delegation, she acknowledged.

Her comments echoed those of Gen. Petr Pavel, chairman of NATO’s military committee. In October, Pavel said that Turkey is free, as a sovereign nation, to make its own decisions in regards to military procurement, but will face “consequences” if a S-400 buy goes through.