Shuttle Probe Tackles Re-Entry Question

PAUL RECER

Published 7:00 pm, Tuesday, May 13, 2003

Associated Press Writer

Investigators of the Columbia accident have quietly tackled the sensitive question of how close the shuttle's seven astronauts came to surviving the fiery re-entry and whether NASA might have done anything to rescue them, the head of the investigating board told senators Wednesday.

This line of inquiry did not begin until earlier this month _ more than three months after the accident _ because there were "too many emotions, too many egos," said retired Adm. Harold Gehman, chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee, Gehman said this part of his inquiry was in its earliest stages, starting just 10 days ago. But Gehman said he already has concluded it is "inconceivable" that NASA would have been unable or unwilling to attempt a rescue for astronauts in orbit if senior shuttle managers and administrators had known there was fatal damage to Columbia's left wing.

"Even a fix with a 10 percent chance of succeeding _ of course we would do something," he said.

Gehman told reporters after the hearing that answers to these important questions could have enormous impact, since they could place in a different context NASA's decisions against more aggressively checking possible wing damage in the days before Columbia's fatal return.

Investigators believe breakaway insulating foam damaged part of Columbia's wing shortly after liftoff, allowing superheated air to penetrate the wing during its fiery re-entry on Feb. 1 and melt it from the inside.

"If we find that something could have been done, then the benign bureaucratic decisions made earlier take on a whole new significance," Gehman said.

Among those decisions was the choice by NASA's senior shuttle managers and administrators to reject offers of satellite images of possible damage to Columbia's left wing before the accident. The subject dominated the early part of Wednesday's hearing.

Gehman complained that managers and administrators "missed signals" when they rejected those offers for images, a pointedly harsh assessment of the space agency's inaction during the 16-day shuttle mission.

"We will attempt to pin this issue down in our report, but there were a number of bureaucratic and administrative missed signals here," Gehman told senators. "We're not quite so happy with the process."

The investigative board already had recommended that NASA push for better coordination between the space agency and military offices in charge of satellites and telescopes. The U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency in March agreed to regularly capture detailed satellite images of space shuttles in orbit.

Still, Gehman said it was unclear whether even images from America's most sophisticated spy satellites might have detected on Columbia's wing any damage, which Gehman said could have been as small as two inches square. The precise capabilities of such satellites was a sensitive topic during the Senate hearing.

"Whether any photography could have detected that is fairly argumentative," Gehman said.

NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, seated next to Gehman during the hearing, said it was "infuriating" now to see how senior NASA managers decided against accepting offers for images of possible damage to the shuttle. He noted that, at the time, managers believed Columbia's safety was not at risk.

"It was a judgment call, and it was clearly the wrong judgment," O'Keefe said. "Looking back on this, the clarity is there."

Gehman complained that the board found "missed signals going up and going down" the management chain at NASA during the process in which the agency weighed whether to seek the satellite images. He blamed NASA's system, not any individuals, and said there was "not one person responsible."

Sen. Sam Brownback, R-Kan., pressed Gehman about who was responsible inside NASA for turning down the offer for shuttle images, but Gehman answered, "I'll have to duck that question."

"I would not characterize that decision as a mistake by any one individual," Gehman said. "When you've got an organization run by boards and committees, and these boards and committees don't work, I'm not sure you can blame one person."

Gehman's assertion about not blaming individuals drew a rebuke from Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the committee chairman, who said it was "equally infuriating that no one is responsible."

"Those decisions aren't made by machines," McCain said. "Some one is responsible."

"There is no question that the whole decision-making process has to be significantly altered," she said. "It just appears to me it was a very complicated decision-making environment. Red flags were not readily identified."