There is growing evidence that the core of the insurgency
is almost purely Baathist:

1.
The Fallujah experience

Prior
to the operation in Fallujah, it was generally believed
that the majority of the insurgent leadership were foreign
Arab Salafi extremists. However, this is now in question.
Arab Salafi extremists, like those associated with the militant
Abo Musab Al-Zarqawi, explicitly seek out 'martyrdom' as
their victory. On the other hand, Baathists have no interest
in being killed and every interest in defeating the new
Iraqi government and wearing out the US-led coalition into
withdrawal. The sheer
ease with which US and Iraqi forces overran Fallujah
indicates that most insurgents had left the city. Such a
move is not characteristic of Salafi extremists who would
have relished a final battle against their perceived enemy.
It is, however, characteristic of a Baathist-led insurgency
that does not want to face the US at its time of choosing
but would rather slip away and attack at a time of their
choosing.

2.
Baathists were not defeated

Policy
makers would do well to remember that whilst the Baathist
regime lost the war, it was never defeated. The core of
the Baath Party, who made up the dozens of security organizations
and local networks trusted by Saddam Hussein, were concentrated
in central Iraq. While Saddam's regime threw thousands of
foot-soldiers to the south to slow down the advancement
of the coalition, the Baathists never fought once the coalition
reached central Iraq. In the city of Ramadi, a bastion for
the Baath Party, not a single bullet was fired - the Baathists
simply melted away amongst the civilian population. The
failure of the coalition governments to recognize this danger
has allowed these Baathists to lead the insurgency: planning,
organizing, and coordinating terrorist activity while using
the same 'Islamic' propaganda as Saddam did to lure in militants
to carry out the suicide bombings and their other dirty
work.

3.
The Kurdish phenomenon

Furthermore,
every Iraqi city has suffered numerous suicide bombings,
explosions and terrorist acts, except for those located
in the former Kurdish
safe-haven. A foreign terrorist does not have
any preference as to where he carries out his attack as
he is foreign to all regions of Iraq - so why then is there
such a geographic phenomenon? Some argue that this is because
the foreign terrorists cannot find any sanctuary in the
former safe-haven region, but this is a flawed assumption.
There are Salafi Kurdish groups based in these regions and
they would be more than willing to provide automatic shelter
and help to their ideological brothers. In contrast, external
Arab terrorist are very unlikely to find any sanctuary in
many Shia cities yet such cities have not been spared from
insurgent activity. Therefore, the presumption that the
insurgency is at its core made up of foreign Arab Salafi
extremists cannot explain the discrepancy between the former
Kurdish safe-haven and the rest of Iraq. However, this phenomenon
can be easily explained if we assume the insurgency is Baathist
at its core. The Baath regime of Saddam have been excluded
from the Kurdish safe-haven since 1991, they no longer have
a working knowledge of the area, they lack the Baath network
which exists in the rest of Iraq, and are therefore unable
to carry out any operations in this region.

Policy
Strategy

With
the evidence pointing to a Baathist-led insurgency, most
likely comprising of former members of Saddam's security
services and local Baathist leaders concentrated in what
is called the Sunni triangle (which would be more appropriately
named the Baathist triangle), there must be a clear strategy
to finally defeat the Baathists if security is to be restored.
This can be done by:

Stopping
the process of re-Baathification. Why it should come as
a surprise that the new Iraqi security forces continue
to be 'infiltrated' when Baathists are actively recruited
and reinstated in top-level positions is staggering. Building
Iraq's security around the people who wish to destroy
it is sheer stupidity and dangerously incompetent. Furthermore,
this process has only served to alienate those who suffered
under the Baath regime, especially amongst the Shia and
Kurds, and has done nothing to pacify or appease non-Baathist
Sunnis.

Actively
rounding up any 'former' Baathists associated with Saddam's
security forces and local Baathist ring-leaders. For the
first few months after the war, when most Baathists had
fled their neighbourhoods and were in hiding, the security
situation was remarkably calm. When they found they were
not being hunted, they grew in confidence and began to
launch attacks. There has been a sustained upsurge in
terrorist activity since then, dramatically increasing
after re-Baathification was launched in the summer. We
should have them on the run, not giving them the freedom
and time to plan and organize more terror. They should
be living in fear of being arrested, not inflicting fear
on the people of Iraq.

Reinvigorate
the process of de-Baathification. The Baath Party has
not been defeated by the war as many of its key members
are still in positions of power, helping their 'comrades'
on the outside (see the IPO's November
1, 2004 analysis for examples of this).

Before
an enemy can be defeated, it must be identified. The US-led
coalition and the Interim Iraqi Government can continue
to convince themselves that the insurgency is not Baathist
at its core; they can continue with the failed process of
re-Baathification. However, the Fallujah phenomenon will
be repeated again and again and Iraq's security will spiral
even more out of control and ultimately innocent Iraqis
will pay the price.