The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is Iran’s
most powerful security and military organization, responsible for the
protection and survival of the regime.

The Guards are also currently Iran’s most powerful
economic actor, reinforcing their influence over political decisions.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the
Revolutionary Guards have formed a symbiotic relationship that buttresses the
supreme leader’s authority and preserves the status quo.

U.S. and international sanctions against Iran
compelled the Guards to support nuclear negotiations. However, they will
strongly resist major political and even economic reforms after a nuclear deal.

Overview

The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a.k.a The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Persian: سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی ‎ / Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi, or Sepāh for short) was created after the 1979 revolution to
enforce Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s concept of an Islamic state ruled by avelayat-e faqih
(guardianship of the jurist). The Guards played a
crucial role not only in crushing early opposition to Khomeini’s vision, but
also in repelling Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980. Since then, the
Guards have functioned as both the primary internal and external security
force. The IRGC has now eclipsed the Artesh, or conventional forces. It
operates substantial and independent land, sea and air forces. It commands
burgeoning missile forces. It runs asymmetric warfare through the elite Qods
Force and proxy groups, such as Hezbollah. And it would most likely command a
nuclear arsenal, if the regime chooses to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Over time,
the Guards have also been transformed into a leading economic and political
actor. The IRGC and its associated companies are involved in many sectors of
Iran’s economy, allowing it to amass unprecedented power. The Guards’
ascendance could not have happened without the support of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Khamenei relied on
the Guards to buttress his declining authority and to block political reform.
As guarantor of the revolution’s core principles, the IRGC played a key role in
marginalizing reformist and pragmatic conservative factions seen to challenge
those principles.

Military and
security role

The IRGC has
played an important role in suppressing groups that opposed Khomeini’s
objectives, such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Organization. The MEK, a
leftist group founded in the 1960s, backed the revolution but then split from
the theocrats; it was the largest Iranian opposition group until the 2009
election spawned the Green Movement. The Guards were also responsible for
putting down various leftist and ethnic insurgencies that broke out after the revolution.

Iraq’s 1980
invasion of Iran actually proved to be a boon for Khomeini and the Guards, as
it helped unite the nation around the new regime and bolstered the Guards as
Iran’s premier military force. The Artesh was the shah’s main prop; they were
also trained and supplied by the Unites States, so were viewed with suspicion
by the regime. The Guards, loyal to velayat-e faqih, took the
lead in repelling Iraq, although their involvement may have actually prolonged
the conflict because of their ideological commitment and lack of military
experience. Nevertheless, the Guards’ role in Iran’s so-called “holy defense”
against Iraq has been used over the years to burnish their credentials as
defender of the revolution and the nation.

The Guards
forces now number up to 150,000 men divided into land, sea and air forces. The
IRGC land forces are estimated to number between 100,000 and 125,000. The
IRGC’s navy may total as many as 20,000, though some estimates are
significantly lower. Another 20,000 are in the IRGC naval forces. And the Qods
Force totals around 5,000. The Basij militia, which is subordinate to the
Guards, can also mobilize hundreds of thousands of its members to defend Iran
against a foreign invasion.

The Guards
are also in charge of executing Iran’s strategy of asymmetric warfare in the
event of a U.S. or Israeli attack. The IRGC’s secretive Qods Force has trained
and equipped proxy groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite insurgents,
and even elements of the Taliban. Some surrogates have already been used to
target U.S. and other Western forces in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan; they
could be used against U.S. targets outside Iran in the event of a future
conflict.

The Guards,
especially Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, are in charge of Iran’s
policies in Iraq and are leading Iraqi Shia militias in their fight against the
Islamic State, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh. Soleimani, in particular,
has assumed a very public role in combatting ISIS. This is perhaps a way for
the Iranian government to demonstrate to Iraqi Shiites and the rest of the
region that Iran is a powerful force to be reckoned with.

Over the last
decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and aided Syria’s
security and military forces. Iran has played a crucial role in buttressing
President Bashar al Assad, through military advice, provision of weapons, and
funding of the cash-strapped Syrian government. Some Iranians have been killed
in Syria, including Iranian Revolutionary Guard General Mohammed Allahdadi in
January 2015. But Iran does not appear to be committing major ground forces to
the conflict. Tehran instead prefers to recruit Shiite militias from across the
Middle East and even Afghanistan to fight in places like Damascus and Aleppo.
Iran’s profile in Syria is lower than its profile in Iraq.

The Guards
have also developed an asymmetric naval strategy for use against the U.S. Navy,
which has a superior conventional force. The Guards have hundreds of fast
attack boats, anti-ship cruise missiles, and naval mines. Together they impede
U.S. operations in the Gulf, disrupt shipping, and impose a painful cost on
U.S. forces in the event of an armed conflict. The Guards also operate hundreds
of ballistic missiles that can target U.S. forces stationed in Gulf Cooperation
Council countries, in addition to Israel and beyond.

The Guards
are also Iran’s most powerful internal security force, at times cooperating and
competing with the ministry of intelligence and other security organizations.
The Guards’ intelligence organization appears to have eclipsed the ministry of
intelligence in scope and authority, especially after the disputed 2009
presidential election. Other security organizations such as the Basij and the
Law Enforcement Forces have become subordinate to the Guards.

Economic giant

The Guards’
involvement in the Iranian economy began during Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani’s presidency. Reconstruction of Iran’s economy, battered by nearly
10 years of war and revolution, was one of his major priorities. The IRGC had
the manpower to engage in reconstruction activities. Rafsanjani may have also
hoped to co-opt the Guards by giving them a slice of the economic pie.

Over the next
25 years, however, the Guards became Iran’s largest economic force. The Guards
currently dominate most sectors of the economy, from energy to construction,
telecommunication to auto making, and even banking and finance. Khatam al Anabia (the Seal of
the Prophets), the Guards’ construction headquarters, is involved in much of
the Guards’ official economic activities. But the IRGC is also linked to
dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of companies that appear to be private in nature
but are run by IRGC veterans. So the Guards’ economic influence activities
encompass a broad network of current and former members rather than a single
official or centrally administered organization.

The IRGC has
taken advantage of its national security authority to extend its control. The
Guards prevented a Turkish company from building the Imam Khomeini
international airport in 2004 on national security grounds. The takeover of the
Telecommunications Company of Iran by a Guards-affiliated consortium in 2009 may
have also been motivated by security concerns, especially after the
presidential election and subsequent unrest.

The Guards
have arguably benefitted from international sanctions and Iran’s isolation,
which hurt their domestic and foreign business competitors by increasing
business costs. The IRGC’s ability to tap into state funds and its relatively
vast independent resources have provided a decisive advantage. Under
Ahmadinejad, the Guards were awarded hundreds of no-bid government contracts in
addition to billions of dollars in loans for construction, infrastructure and
energy projects. Some of the Guards may have become rich from the sanctions
regime, but overall the Guards, like the rest of the country, have felt the
heavy burden of sanctions. This made the Guards support President Rouhani’s
nuclear negotiations despite some of their objections and criticisms.

Political role

One of the
key issues dividing reformist and conservative factions has been the role of
the Guards in Iranian politics. Reformists and even some conservatives contend
that Khomeini explicitly forbid the Guards’ involvement in politics. The
Guards, they argue, were established only to protect the regime. The Guards’
political ascent began during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami between 1997
and 2005. Khatami and his supporters envisioned a series of political, social,
and economic reforms to make the Islamic Republic a more “modern” Islamic
system. But the reformist agenda threatened the conservative ideology,
political power and ideological authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who
succeeded Khomeini in 1989. Reformist intellectuals questioned Khamenei’s
leadership, and even the efficacy of having a supreme leader. Khamenei viewed
the Guards as an effective bulwark against the reformist agenda.

The Guards’
rank and file has historically reflected Iranian society and politics at large.
Many Guards members supported Khatami in 1995 and Mir Hussein Mousavi in 2009.
Nevertheless, the Guards’ top leadership is comprised of conservatives and
“principlists” deeply opposed to political reforms. The IRGC leadership’s
opposition to Khatami’s reforms was manifested in the “chain murder” of reform
intellectuals. The Guards also wrote a letter to Khatami threatening a coup
d’etat if he did not rein in the 1999 student demonstrations.

The 2005
election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard and a
“principlist,” could not have been possible without the active support of
Khamenei and the Guards. Allegations of fraud and ballot-stuffing by the Guards
and Basij surrounded Ahmadinejad’s victory over Rafsanjani. After the election,
Ahmadinejad awarded the IRGC even more government loans and contracts. Guard
members also won increasing control of Iran’s internal and national security
organizations. IRGC ideologues loyal to Ahmadinejad and the political status
quo were also appointed to replace reformists, pragmatic conservatives and
technocrats in the bureaucracy.

The 2009
presidential election confirmed the Guards’ role as Iran’s preeminent power
broker, after the supreme leader. Senior Guards officials indicated they would
not tolerate a reformist such as former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi,
Ahmadinejad’s leading opponent. Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli, a former
Guards officer turned businessman who was responsible for supervising the
election, played a crucial role in Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And after the
disputed poll, the Guards were in charge of crushing the mass protests that
flared for six months. The reformist and Green Movement accused the Guards of
conducting a coup.

But the
Guards are not a united or monolithic force. And not all IRGC members are
ideologues. Many respect Mousavi, who was prime minister in the 1980s, for his
devotion to the revolution and his conduct during the Iran-Iraq War.

Rouhani has
expressed appreciation for the Guards’ role in protecting the revolution and
even their involvement in some economic activities. But overall, he is eager to
curtail the Guards’ political and economic power. Rouhani’s agenda of
decreasing Iran’s isolation and privatizing the economy cannot be achieved with
the Guards as Iran’s primary political and economic actor. The nuclear deal
could lead to a big rupture between the Guards and Rouhani.

Trend Lines

The nuclear deal could pose a threat to the Guards
if Rouhani pursues significant political and economic reforms. While the top
Guards echelon mostly supports the nuclear agreement, they are against domestic
reforms.

The nuclear deal could empower Rouhani, but the
Guards are likely to benefit from an easing of sanctions and a less
economically isolated Iran. The deal, however, is not going to allow Rouhani to
completely sideline the Guards from their dominant political, economic, and
security roles in Iran.

Alireza Nader,
a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, is co-author of
"Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership
Dynamics."