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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000214
NOFORN
S/CT FOR SHARRI R. CLARK AND BRUCE AVERILL NEA/ARP FOR MATT BLONG DOE/NNSA FOR OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE U.S. COAST GUARD FOR ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY AND STEWARDSHIP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAG: PTER, PREL, PGOV, ECON, ETTC, EAID, EFIN, EAGR, ASEC, KCIP, ENRG, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: 2009 CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT
REF: A. SECSTATE 15113 B. DOHA 152 (08) C. DOHA 75 (08) D. DOHA 311 (07)
Classified By: Amb. LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
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(S/NF) KEY POINTS
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-- Post assesses that U.S. investments in Qatar's energy industry, coupled with the onset of regular liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the U.S. 2009-12, constitute the main critical infrastructure and key resources in Qatar, which if destroyed, disrupted or exploited might have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States.
-- Embassy Doha continues to engage Government of Qatar entities across the spectrum to increase awareness and implement increased security procedures to identify and protect critical infrastructure. These entities include Qatar Petroleum and its Industrial Security Directorate, the Ministry of Interior, and the Qatar Armed Forces.
-- Key Qatari officials have recently made overtures of their willingness to embrace USG offers for assistance or requests for information/transparency on their current vulnerabilities and infrastructure protection programs. Embassy Doha assesses that there is considerable scope for cooperation with the GOQ on this issue, considerably more than at any time over the past three years.
-- Embassy Doha is currently preparing an interagency plan to engage GOQ entities in a synchronized fashion on this issue. End Key Points.
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QATAR'S KEY ENERGY RESOURCES
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¶1. (C) Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas field in the world. Qatar's portion contains an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, giving it the third-largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Qatar is believed to have an agreement with Iran providing a set extraction limit in the field; however, the details of this arrangement are not known to us. By 2009, Qatar's share of hydrocarbon revenue from natural gas and derivatives was about equal to that derived from oil. At 30 metric tons per annum (mta), Qatar is already the world leader in LNG exports. Current estimates are that by 2012 Qatar will produce 77 million tons of LNG annually, roughly a third of which Qatar hopes to export to the U.S. market. About half of the new global LNG capacity coming online in the next four years will be in Qatar. (Note: Per British Petroleum calculations, 1 million metric tons of LNG equals 48.7 billion cubic feet of natural gas.)
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QATAR'S CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS
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¶2. (C) There are three main industrial facilities of interest that if destroyed, or if their production is disrupted, could have an immediate effect on U.S. national economic security. In order of priority, these are Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC), Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, and Dukhan Industrial City. All three industrial centers are under the control and supervision of Qatar Petroleum (QP), a semi-autonomous government organization whose Chairman, Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, is also the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy and Industry. Natural gas production is primarily centered around the coast and offshore areas in the northeast of Qatar, in and round Ras Laffan; while, oil production is concentrated on the western coast near Dukhan as well as offshore platforms.
¶3. (C) Ras Laffan is Qatar's flag-ship industrial center, predominantly focused on the production of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and derivative petrochemicals obtained during the natural gas extraction process. Destruction or an attack disrupting production at RLIC would cause exceptionally grave damage to the world market and U.S. national economic security interests. As of 2008, Qatar LNG production for export to Japan and South Korean represented over 60 percent of those respective countries internal natural gas consumption; by 2012 a third of Qatari LNG produced could be destined for the U.S. market, at which time it is estimated that Qatar will be the largest source of imported LNG to the U.S. market. The current drop in global demand for gas will also result in more LNG being sent to the U.S. as the flexible market and storage capacity give the U.S. the ability to soak up excess global supply in the short-term.
¶4. (C) QP operating units QatarGas and RasGas are responsible for LNG production in Ras Laffan. QatarGas production trains three and four will produce LNG equivalent to 2.8 billion cubic feet of gas per day, and RasGas is currently building two trains at Ras Laffan with 7.8 million tons of annual capacity each. ("Trains" are the liquefaction plants which draw gas pumped at offshore platforms, liquefy it, and load it onto LNG tankers.) These four trains will be among the largest in the world, and their production will be allocated in part to U.S. markets. In addition, major U.S. energy companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips partner with Qatar and currently have over $13 billion invested in Qatar's natural gas industry. Therefore, Ras Laffan's importance as a critical facility will continue to grow as production and exports to the U.S. increase.
¶5. (S/NF) As of early 2009, Qatar Petroleum Industrial Security Directorate has continued security infrastructure improvements at RLIC and the expansive Ras Laffan Industrial City Port complex, after a series of security assessments conducted since 2005 by several western security firms. These improvements have included redesign and construction of a new main entry control point for RLIC, plans for redesign of existing port boundaries under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) code, construction of a new port entry control point equipped with radiological and nuclear material detection monitors and container screening portals, and incorporation of ground-based radar, overlapping CCTV coverage and biometric enabled identification.
¶6. (S/NF) Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, located approximately 40 km south of Doha, was officially established in 1996 and is the main shipping point for oil from Dukhan to the international market. Destruction or disruption of port services would effectively shut down oil shipments from Qatar, potentially affecting half of Qatar's petroleum revenue. In addition, the port complex is a key choke point for U.S. and coalition military equipment, munitions and bulk aviation fuel delivery to Al-Udeid Air Base and Camp As Sayliyah, the two Qatari military installations hosting U.S. Coalition forces. Any disruption to port operations would severely limit U.S. military operations throughout the U.S. Central Command AOR. As an example, in September-October 2007, strategic fuel reserves at Al Udeid Airbase were depleted because unscheduled, uncoordinated road construction caused increased transit time for fuel tankers. The situation continued for 30 days until resolved. Had the situation not been resolved, there would have been an impact on theater-wide combat and airlift operations.
¶7. (C/NF) Mesaieed is also the location of most of Qatar's light, medium and support petrochemical facilities; producing fertilizer, fuel additives, lubricants, plastics and vinyl for domestic consumption and export. The facility comprises four major treatment plants as well as a specialized holding area to store and export products. Natural Gas Liquids Plants 1 and 2 are designed to separate and fractionate LNG extracted from various production areas into a number of fractionated final products. Natural Gas Liquids Plant 3 is composed of separate units to treat gas and condensates, and plant 4 is an expansion and development of QP,s gas treatment capacity alongside the fractionation and treatment facilities in Mesaieed. All of these plants are directly adjacent to the port facilities, and a major incident at any of them could effectively shut down port operations.
¶8. (S/NF) The QP subsidiary Qatar Aluminum Company (QATALUM) plant currently under construction at Mesaieed is planned as the world,s largest aluminum production facility once completed and operational (circa 2011). In addition, subsidiary Qatar Chemical Company (QChem) plans to begin construction on the world,s largest chemical derivatives plant, and there are plans for a construction of a new Qatar Petroleum oil refinery, the Al Shaheen refinery, to fully satisfy internal consumption needs and begin export of refined product at a greater price than traditional crude export. Construction on both of these projects at Mesaieed was slated to begin in 2009, but has since been delayed due to the current economic downturn and high costs of building materials.
¶9. (C) Dukhan industrial city currently accounts for the majority of Qatar,s oil production. The destruction or disruption of production at Dukhan would have a severe impact on the Qatari economy and may affect global and U.S. economies.
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USG ENGAGEMENT
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¶10. (C/NF) Embassy Doha and the State Department have continued to identify Qatar's increasingly important role as a world producer in the oil and LNG sectors and its inherent high value as a potential terrorism target as points of concern. Qatar's expectation of becoming the world's LNG and gas-to-liquids (GTL) leader by 2012 necessitates a comprehensive energy infrastructure security program. Post assesses that Qatar's attention to energy infrastructure has improved since the previous CI/KR report, but is far from complete. While the Qataris have adequately planned a production and shipping infrastructure for the booming business, it appears they are still in the beginning stages to consider how to protect it. However, recent overtures made by the Director of Qatar Petroleum,s Industrial Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior Brigadier Abdulaziz Al-Ansari, to increased dialogue and cooperation have renewed Post,s efforts to engage GOQ officials on critical energy infrastructure security.
¶11. (C) Post has a DCM-led working group comprising Pol/Econ, DAO, GRPO, OMC, FCS, and RSO to lay the ground work for, and synchronize, engagement with the GOQ on critical infrastructure protection. This group met most recently to discuss results of the mid-March 2009 U.S. Coast Guard International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) team visit to Ras Laffan, Mesaieed and Doha ports. The team recommended a reciprocal Qatari visit to a U.S. port in June 2009, as well as the possible establishment of a bilateral security agreement with Qatar specifically addressing dedicated LNG shipments between the two countries. Post also wishes to restart the engagement process with the Qataris on the DOS/DOE Critical Energy Infrastructure program (CEIP) based on recent, positive signals from the host government.
¶12. (C) In addition, Post through the Department of Energy,s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Second Line of Defense Office, has been working with the Qatari Ministry of Environment,s Department of Nuclear Energy and Radiological Protection to provide training and equipment selection for Qatar's nascent radiological detection and response program since April 2008. In July 2008, Qatar sent 10 mid- to senior level personnel from the Ministry of Interior, Qatar State Security, Internal Security Force and Qatar Petroleum Security to a workshop on nuclear detection and monitoring at the HAMMER facility at the Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) in Washington state. Qatar intends to place vehicle and pedestrian radiological and nuclear material detection monitors at ports in Ras Laffan, Mesaieed and Doha, as well as Doha International Airport and the land border crossing with Saudi Arabia at Abu Samra.
¶13. (S/NF) Post is formatting a detailed multifaceted response on a way forward in our efforts to engage Qatar that would leverage the various agencies of the country team (septel). This response will address a three-prong approach to various Qatari governmental and energy-related organizations featuring political/economic engagement, military to military training and assistance with the Qatari Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior, and the leveraging of commercial contacts with Qatar Petroleum and the Ministry of Energy. Post will be preparing a plan bringing together each of the various threads of this engagement.
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U.S./QATARI JOINT EFFORTS
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¶14. (C/NF) As a result of an S/CT and DS/ATA June 2007 visit, Post drafted a joint working group framework to continue dialogue on energy infrastructure security. To date, the GOQ has been slow in embracing the framework agreement; however, Post, Department and USG concerns have not fallen on deaf ears. GOQ officials have expressed their own concerns, identifying a risk associated with critical infrastructure, during meetings with Post officials and USG visitors since early 2007. In January 2009 meetings with Qatar Petroleum Security,s Brigadier Al-Ansari and Poloff Zebley, Al-Ansari indicated he had received a read-out of the November 2007 USG-GOQ sponsored Gulf Security Dialogue from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and wanted to discuss further cooperation with the USG. Al-Ansari, who concurrently serves as the number three uniformed member of the Ministry of Interior as MOI Director of Logistics, appears to be the key decision maker on all critical industrial infrastructure issues at our identified key facilities ) Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed Industrial City.
¶15. (C) The Qatari government's appreciation of U.S. training and technology presents numerous prospects for U.S. engagement. We know that Qatar will need trainers, assistance on selection of physical security equipment (such as delta pop-up barriers, fences and anti-vehicle berms), nonlethal weapons and tactics, and other technological equipment (CCTV, etc). Offshore protection is an area with the greatest potential; Qatar will need additional and more advanced offshore patrol vessels, plus enhanced maritime surveillance and communications equipment, weapons and trained crews. There is currently a lack of standardized security practices; however, the Qatari government has identified gaps in security infrastructure and has worked with U.S. and European commercial firms to begin acquisition and training in the use of technical security equipment.
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GOQ INTEREST AND PLANS
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¶16. (S/NF) In 2005, the GOQ contracted with a U.S. security and safety company to perform a top-down, zero-based review of critical infrastructure protection; the study encompassed organizational lines of command and control for the security services and industrial facility security at the three facilities identified previously. The resultant report finished by the U.S. company in 2007, which has not been shared with the USG and remains highly classified by the GOQ, reportedly identified and prioritized deficient areas and provided recommendations in each. Subsequent to the report, Qatar Petroleum Security Directorate placed a tender for a detailed security infrastructure assessment in March 2009. The assessment will identify needed technical and security equipment and related facilities (security control buildings, barricades, etc).
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Qatari Strategic Security Initiatives
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¶17. (S) As detailed in the Ref C January 2008 meeting between Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Kevin Kolevar and Minister of State for Energy and Industry Mohammed Saleh Al-Sada, the Heir Apparent had established an Industrial Security Steering Committee, under the Ministry of Interior and headed by Brigadier Al-Ansari, charged with managing the current nationwide industrial security apparatus and improving overall security capacity. The creation of the steering committee was part of the Heir Apparent's strategic security initiatives, which include the planned establishment of an integrated National Command Center (NCC) and development of the National Security Shield (NSS). The NCC would provide coordinated command and control of security and civil defense units in response to national emergencies, while the NSS would create a series of interconnected fixed and mobile radar platforms to identify threats by sea, air and land.
¶18. (S/NF) As of mid-March 2009, the NCC was under the operational control of the MOI and co-located at Camp Duheil with the MOI,s Police Training Center. The center was staffed 24/7 by various Qatari civil defense, heath and security organizations and maintained direct contact with Qatar Petroleum Security officials.
¶19. (S/NF) In February 2009, the NSS placed a tender for the construction of the first-phase of the NSS, which consisted of the construction of 18 80-meter metal lattice towers for placement of integrated European Aeronautics, Defense, and Space Corporation (EADS) radars for interlocking coverage along the land border with Saudi Arabia and coasts. However, Post has been unable to ascertain specifics on the radar system and/or the ultimate Qatari organization responsible for management of the program, even though, select coverage provided by the NSS would be shared with Qatar Petroleum Security and integrated within the NCC.
¶20. (S/NF) The Qatar Armed Forces have for several years been considering adopting an integrated air defense system that could include the Patriot PAC-3 missile system. The Qatar Armed Forces have made clear that a major purpose of an air defense system would be the protection of their critical energy infrastructure. To that end, the Qataris have asked us to explore ways in which the coverage area for U.S. military-controlled Patriots currently in Qatar could be expanded to include the LNG facilities at Ras Laffan. Qatar's interest in an air defense system presents another opportunity for U.S.-Qatar engagement on critical infrastructure protection. LeBaron