Archive for the ‘Denied & Restricted Parties’ Category

Penalties imposed for violations of U.S. sanctions on Russia and Ukraine

Violations identified during pre-acquisition due diligence on contractor

Denied persons screening was conducted but missed prohibited parties

In late November 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that Cobham Holdings, Inc. agreed to pay $87,507 to settle violations of U.S. sanctions on Ukraine and Russia.

Violations Identified During Pre-acquisition Due Diligence

According to OFAC, the violations were committed by Cobham’s former subsidiary, Metelics, prior to the sale of Metelics to MACOM. It was MACOM that identified the violations during due diligence related to its acquisition of Metelics. And it was presumably MACOM that required Cobham to make the voluntary disclosure to OFAC that led to the penalty in this matter.

But as a cautionary tale, the Cobham matter is important to any exporter.

Products Sold to Entity Blocked Under U.S. Sanctions

According to OFAC, during a six-month period in 2014 and 2015, Metelics sold products through distributors in Canada and Russia to a blocked entity under U.S. sanctions. That entity – Almaz Antey Telecommunications LLC (AAT) – was not explicitly named as a blocked party on the OFAC List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the SDN List).

Yet AAT was nonetheless a blocked person because it was 51 percent-owned by a party – JSC Almaz-Antey – that was named on the SDN List. As OFAC has made abundantly clear, any entity that is owned 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons is a blocked entity itself.

Any blocked person, whether named on the SDN List or not, is effectively off limits to U.S. companies and individuals.

Screening Challenges Lead to Violations

The chronology of this matter demonstrates the challenges exporters face when screening third party business parties.

According to OFAC, on June 18, 2014, Metelics agreed to sell products to AAT through a Canadian distributor. On June 19, Metelics screened AAT against its prohibited parties screening software. At that time, JSC Almaz-Antey was not a prohibited party – and thus neither was AAT.

On June 27, Metelics shipped products to AAT. In connection with that shipment, Metelics again conducted denied parties screening and identified no match for AAT.

None of this is surprising or problematic from OFAC’s standpoint because JSC Almaz-Antey was not designated as an SDN until July 16, 2014. That is when things get more interesting.

On July 31, 2014, Metelics made another shipment to AAT. In connection with this shipment, Metelics again conducted denied parties screening for AAT and again did not identify any matches – even though JSC Almaz-Antey, the majority owner of AAT, was now named on the SDN List.

Based on this, OFAC deemed the screening effort to be insufficient. OFAC emphasized that Metelics proceeded with shipment to AAT “despite the inclusion of two uncommon terms [‘Almaz’ and ‘Antey’] in the names of both the SDN and [AAT].” OFAC’s statement suggests that the screening software should have identified at least a potential match, which Metelics would presumably have reviewed further before continuing with the transaction.

Notably, there is no indication that Metelics somehow set the software or screening mechanism to avoid identifying a match with AAT. In fact, in its press release, OFAC states that the screening software was set-up to identify “fuzzy” search criteria yet missed the similarities between AAT and JSC Almaz-Antey.

It thus appears that Metelic was not entirely to blame for these apparent violations. Yet in explaining the penalty in this case, OFAC also notes that Metelics “was subject to a consent agreement for violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations [ITAR]… resulting from recurring compliance failures.” Arguably those ITAR compliance failures should have made Metelics particularly vigilant about protecting against failures with its screening system.

While OFAC does not name the provider of the screening software in this case, the agency does state that “[p]ersons employing sanctions screening software should take steps to ensure it is sufficiently robust.” In other words, simply because a company uses software to conduct screening does not mean that software is adequate to protect against violations.

Analysis

This may be a tough lesson for exporters to absorb. It’s not clear that many exporters conduct quality control checks of their screening software. The raison d’etre for such software is to identify actual or potentially prohibited parties based on name similarities. That is exactly what Metelics expected its software to do.

The proliferation of prohibited and restricted parties – and the lists of such parties – makes it impossible for most companies to keep up-to-date with those lists on their own. That’s the reason so many companies seek software solutions to help meet their compliance obligations. It is the responsible thing to do.

Which makes it a little jarring to read the following exhortation from OFAC:

It is essential that companies engaging in international transactions maintain a culture of compliance where front line staff are encouraged to follow up on sanctions issues, including by promptly reporting to compliance personnel transactions suspected to involve sanctioned parties.

That is surely good advice but it is not clear how it pertains to the facts in the Cobham matter. There is no indication that any Metelics employee was aware of a transaction suspected to involve sanctioned parties – or that any employee ducked their head in the sand.

Nevertheless, it is useful to remember the value of periodic risk assessments during which compliance policies, procedures, and processes are reviewed. Potential weaknesses can be identified and addressed before they lead to violations.

The Bass, Berry & Sims trade lawyers work closely with clients to assist in risk assessments and other compliance exercises. Our targeted, efficient approach to such matters leads to practical, effective solutions. Feel free to contact us anytime if we can assist you.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a settlement with Yantai Jereh Oilfield Services Group Co., Ltd., of Yantai Shandong Province, China (“Yantai Jereh”) in conjunction with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

BIS alleges that the company committed four violations of the EAR (Acting with knowledge of a violation and making false statements to BIS during the course of an investigation. Yantai Jereh has agreed to pay $600,000 to BIS and the company’s 5-year denial period will be suspended if the company pays the BIS fine, in addition to the penalty under their OFAC Settlement Agreement (details below). If at any time, the company commits any violations of the Regulations or fails to pay its penalties on time, BIS can revoke the denial suspension.

The settlement between the OFAC and Yantai Jereh is concurrent with the BIS settlement. The main difference is that the company had 11 violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations causing a much larger fine of $2,774,972. All 11 violations involved exportation or rexxeportation or the attempted exportation or reexportation of US goods to Iran by way of China. Two of the 11 shipments of oilfield equipment spare parts (coiled tubing strings and pump sets) were seized by US Customs and Border Protection before they left the US.

OFAC determined that the violations constituted an egregious case and the company did not voluntarily disclose their violations.

Countering American’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) allows sanctions to be imposed on persons that knowingly, engage in a significant transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The Chinese entity, Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission (EDD) formerly known as the General Armaments Department (GAD) has been added after engaging in a significant transaction with a person that is connected to the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The Secretary of State is also updating the previously issued guidance to specify additional persons:

Section 231(d) List Regarding the Defense Sector of the Government of the Russian Federation

Komsomolsk-na-Amur Aviation Production Organization (KNAAPO)

Oboronlogistika, OOO

PMC Wagner

Section 231(d) List Regarding the Russian Intelligence Sector of the Government of the Russian Federation

Trade tensions continue to rise between the world’s two largest economies as the US added dozens of export control restrictions to Chinese companies and added 44 Chinese entities to its export control list for posing “significant risk” to US national security or foreign policy interests. These controls will limit access to products that the US commerce department believes could have dual military or civilian use and may deny companies key components such as nuclear materials, telecoms equipment, lasers, and sensors.

The new restrictions impact key parts to China’s Made in China 2025 policy including air defense systems, satellite communications systems, semiconductors, and aerospace products. The Made in China 2025 policy was created to further China’s initiatives to become a hi-tech powerhouse, but the US views it as a threat to its global technological supremacy.

After announcing the latest US moves, US trade representative Robert Lighthizer said that Washington needs to “take strong defensive actions to protect America’s leadership in technology and innovation” and added: “China’s government is aggressively working to undermine America’s hi-tech industries and our economic leadership through unfair trade practices and industrial policies like Made in China 2025.”

Mohawk Global Logistics Corp. has been fined $155,000 for 3 violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) related to exporting to companies on the Entity List.

Around August 2012 Mowhawk exported an LNP-20 Liquid Nitrogen Plant (EAR99 and valued at $33,587) to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF). The company had a screening process in place and when they screened VNIIEF they got a hit and the shipment was initially flagged. During the BIS investigation Mowhawk acknowledged that the export supervisor accidently overrode (or ignored) the red flag and the shipment was processed. Mowhawk filed EEI and listed the shipment as No License Required (NLR) which would have been accurate had the end user not been on the Entity List. Since VNIIEF is a denied party a license is always required to export any items subject to the EAR. This was the 1st of 3 total charges.

In February 2014 and August 2015, Mokhawk once again exported to an organization on the Entity List, but this time they were in China. The company exported Real-Time Back Reflection Laue Camera Detectors and Accessories (EAR99 and valued at $177,156) to the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC). Once again, Mowhawk used screening software, but this time it failed to flag the transaction because Mowhawk didn’t screen UESTC’s full, unabbreviated name. This could be a common mistake, however, all of the documents that UESTC provided to Mowhawk clearly identified UESTC’s full name as it was listed on the Entity List along with an almost exact matching address. The shipment was processed in February 2014 and they filed EEI as NLR. As with the first charge, had the export not gone to someone on the Entity List a license likely would not have been required.

In August 2015 Mowhawk exported the same exact items to UESTC after they had been returned for warranty repair. This time, Mowhawk didn’t screen the transaction at all using their screening software and there was no EEI filed in connection with this particular export to UESTC. These transactions were charges 2 and 3.

Settlement Agreement:

Pay $135,000 in 3 separate payments

Payment of the remaining $20,000 is suspended as long as the company pays the $135,000 on time.

If payments are not received on time, BIS may issue an order denying all of Mowhawk’s export privileges

Mowhawk can’t take any action or make any public statement denying the allegations in the BIS Charging Letter or Order

Shuren Qin, 41, a Chinese national residing in Wellesley, Mass., was arrested and charged in connection with violating export laws. Qin was born in the People’s Republic of China and became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2014, according to charging documents. Qin runs several companies in China, which import U.S. and European goods used in underwater or marine technologies into China. Below lists his violations and findings from court documents:

Charged with violating export laws by conspiring with employees affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to illegally export U.S. origin goods to China.

Also charged with making false statements to acquire a visa to enter the United States and become a lawful permanent resident under the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa Program.

It is alleged that Qin was in communication with and/or receiving taskings from entities affiliated with the PLA, including the Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU), a Chinese military research institute, to obtain items used for anti-submarine warfare.

From at least July 2015 to December 2016, Qin allegedly exported approximately 78 hydrophones (devices used to detect and monitor sound underwater) from the United States to NWPU without obtaining the required export licenses from the Department of Commerce.

Qin concealed from the U.S. supplier that NWPU was the end-user and created false information to be filed with the United States Government.

Qin made false statements on his visa application stating that he had never “engaged in export control violations or other unlawful activity.” However, it is alleged that Qin engaged in many violations of U.S. export laws since 2012.

In an interview with Customs and Board Patrol Officers in November 2017, Qin stated that he “only” exported instruments that attach to a buoy. However, Qin had allegedly exported remotely-operated side scan sonar systems, unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, robotic boats, and hydrophones. These items have military applications and can be used for weapon delivery systems, anti-submarine warfare, mine counter-measures as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities.

The charge of conspiring to violate U.S. export laws results in a sentence of no greater than 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of $1 million. The charge of visa fraud results in a sentence of no greater than 10 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of $250,000. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The details contained in the indictment are allegations. The defendant is presumed to be innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

On March 23, 2017, Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation of Shenzhen, China, and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd. of Hi-New Shenzhen, China (collectively, “ZTE”) entered into a settlement agreement with the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (BIS) to resolve 380 violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) admitted by ZTE.

ZTE has followed the settlement terms and conditions by making a full and timely payment of $1,000,000,000 as ordered and has complied with the escrow requirements relating to the $400,000,000 suspended portion of the civil penalty. Therefore, BIS has terminated the 15 April 2018 Order, and BIS will remove ZTE from the Denied Persons List.

This order does not modify any provision of the Superseding Order or the Superseding Settlement Agreement.

In early 2017 China’s largest telecommunications company agreed to pay a nearly $900 million penalty to the US after entering a guilty plea for illegally shipping goods to Iran and North Korea. ZTE was charged with 380 violations of the EAR, including (1) Conspiracy (2) Acting with Knowledge of a violation in Connection with Unlicensed Shipments of Telecommunications Items to North Korea via China and (3) Evasion. The company also entered into a settlement with OFAC for violating the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”; 31 CFR Part 560). More Information on these charges can be found here.

A March 2017 Order suspended the 7-year denial of ZTE’s export privileges as well as $300 million of the nearly $900 million penalty if ZTE complied with several probationary conditions. The conditions required ZTE, among other things, to submit six audit reports related to their compliance with US export regulations as well as truthful disclosures of any requested information (Section 764.2(g) of the EAR).

One of the many requirements of The Settlement Agreement and March 2017 Order was that ZTE provide BIS with a status report on specific employees related to the violations found during the investigation or identified in two letters (sent November 30, 2016 and July 20, 2017) that ZTE sent to employees regarding the violations. During BIS’s investigation there were 9 specific employees named related to violations, later, ZTE would identify a total of 39 employees who would have action taken against them related to the violations.

ZTE’s November letter to employees was sent while BIS was investigating the company’s violations and ZTE explained that they had self-initiated employee disciplinary actions that it had begun to take as well as additional actions that they would take in the future that would, be “necessary to achieve the Company’s goals of disciplining those involved and sending a strong message to ZTE employees about the Company’s commitment to compliance.”

ZTE’s July letter was similar to the November letter and once again asserted the company’s commitment to compliance and claimed that the disciplinary actions had sent a strong message to ZTE employees. The letter “confirmed that the measures detailed by ZTE with respect to discipline have been implemented” specifically to the nine named employees identified during the investigation. It should be noted that the individuals that were identified by enforcement agents were those that were signatories on an internal ZTE memorandum on how to evade US export controls or were identified on that memorandum as a “project core member” and/or had met with ZTE’s then CEO to discuss means to continue to evade US laws. In a nutshell, BIS wanted to see that ZTE had reprimanded the 39 employees and officials that were related to the violations through the two letters that they sent.

Cue the problem, which ultimately caused BIS to propose activation of suspended sanctions. ZTE didn’t really send those letters of reprimand as timely as they had led BIS to believe. Come to find out, the November 30, 2016 letter wasn’t sent to employees until February 2, 2018. Not to mention, all but one of the identified individuals received their full 2016 bonus, ZTE originally said this compensation would either be cancelled or decreased.

On March 6, 2018, ZTE indicated, via outside counsel that it had made false statements in the November and July letters. On March 13, 2018 BIS notified ZTE of a proposed activation of the sanctions conditionally-suspended under the Settlement Agreement and the March 2017 Order based on the company breaking the cooperation provision related to providing the US government with false statements. The notice letter to ZTE gave the company an opportunity to respond, of which they provided the following (found in FR 17646):

“In its letter, ZTE confirmed the false statements and, as discussed further infra, posed certain questions in rhetorical fashion. ZTE then proceeded to summarize its response upon ‘‘discovering’’ the failure to implement the stated employee disciplinary actions prior to March 2018, including its decision to notify BIS of the failures. The company also described the asserted remedial steps it had taken to date, including the issuance in March 2018, of the letters of reprimand that were to have been sent in 2016–2017. ZTE additionally asserted that, for current employees whose 2016 bonus should have been reduced (by 30% to 50%), it would deduct the corresponding amount from their 2017 annual bonuses ‘‘to the extent permitted under Chinese law.’’ ZTE also said it will pursue recovery from (certain) former employees of bonus payments for 2016 that the company had informed the U.S. Government would be reduced, but, contrary to those statements, were paid in full. Finally, ZTE reiterated what it described as the company’s serious commitment to export control compliance and summarized its plan to continue its internal investigation of the matter.”

Ultimately, the US Government found that this was the last straw for ZTE. They released the following statement and activated the suspended denial order in full and to suspend the export privileges for ZTE for a period of seven years (until March 13, 2025).

“In issuing the March 13, 2018 notice letter to ZTE, and in considering ZTE’s response, I have taken into account the course of ZTE’s dealings with the U.S. Government during BIS’s multi-year investigation, which demonstrate a pattern of deception, false statements, and repeated violations. I note the multiple false and misleading statements made to the U.S. Government during its investigation of ZTE’s violations of the Regulations, and the behavior and actions of ZTE since then. ZTE’s July 20, 2017 letter is brimming with false statements in violation of § 764.2(g) of the Regulations and is the latest in a pattern of the company making untruthful statements to the U.S. Government and only admitting to its culpability when compelled by circumstances to do so. That pattern can be seen in the November 30, 2016 letter, which falsely documented steps the company said it was taking and had taken, as well as in the 96 admitted evasion violations described in the PCL, which detailed the company’s efforts to destroy evidence of its continued export control violations.”

Here’s where the story gets interesting…

On May 13, 2018 President Donald Trump pledged in a tweet to help give ZTE “a way back into business, fast,” “Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done!” Trump tweeted, adding that he was working with Chinese President Xi Jinping to help the company resume operations.

A day later, amid criticism over why Chinese jobs were a priority during trade and investment negotiations with China, Trump tweeted: “ZTE, the large Chinese phone company, buys a big percentage of individual parts from U.S. companies. This is also reflective of the larger trade deal we are negotiating with China and my personal relationship with President Xi.”

Just last week it was released that a deal was in the works between Commerce and China that would involve China buying more US farm goods and removing tariffs on imported US agricultural products in exchange for the denial order against ZTE to be reconsidered. ZTE would still face “harsh” punishment, including enforced changes of management and changes at the board level.

Rumors are swirling that there was a “handshake deal” on ZTE between U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He during talks in Washington last week that would remove the ban in exchange for the purchase of more US agricultural products. Another person said China may eliminate tariffs on US agriculture products it assessed in response to US steel duties, and that ZTE could still be forced to replace its leadership, among other penalties. Both sources said the deal, which has not been confirmed, will likely be finalized before or during a planned trip by US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross to Beijing next week to help reach a broader trade pact to avert a trade war.

As of July 12, 2017, the statutory debarment of Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation has been lifted and the company reinstated, according to the Department’s authorities under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

In June 2012, Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation plead guilty to violating the AECA (US District Court, District of Connecticut, 12-CR-146-WWE), making the company statutorily debarred in accordance with section 120.1 of the ITAR with certain exceptions, pursuant to section 127.7(b). Section 38(g)(4) of the AECA, 22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(4) prohibits any party that has violated the AECA from issuing export licenses or other approvals for the export of defense articles or services. The notice debarring Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation in all its locations was published in the Federal Register July 6, 2012.

According to section 127.7 of the ITAR, a statutory debarment may be repealed once appropriate US agencies concur that the violating company has taken appropriate steps to alleviate any law enforcement concerns. The Department of State consulted with other US agencies and concluded that Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation has appropriately addressed the causes of violations and mitigated any law enforcement concerns.

Effective July 12, 2017, the statutory debarment is removed and Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation may now participate in any activities subject to the ITAR , in accordance with section 38(g)(4) of the AECA and sections 127.7(b) and 127.11(b) of the ITAR.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List (Venezuela-related Designations):

ALBISINNI SERRANO, Rocco, Miranda, Guarico, Venezuela; DOB 06 Mar 1982; Gender Male; Cedula No. 15481927 (Venezuela); President of Venezuela’s National Center for Foreign Commerce (CENCOEX); Former Vice Minister of the State and Socialist Economy of Venezuela’s Ministry of Economy and Finance; Current or Former Principal Director of Venezuela’s National Development Fund (FONDEN) (individual) [VENEZUELA].

FLEMING CABRERA, Alejandro Antonio, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 03 Oct 1973; Gender Male; Cedula No. 11953485 (Venezuela); Vice Minister for Europe of Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Former Vice Minister for North America of Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Former President of Venezuela’s National Center for Foreign Commerce (CENCOEX); Former President for Suministros Venezolanos Industriales, C.A. (SUVINCA) of Venezuela’s Ministry of Commerce; Former Ambassador of Venezuela to Luxembourg and Chief Ambassador of the Venezuelan Mission to the European Union (individual) [VENEZUELA].

ZERPA DELGADO, Simon Alejandro (Latin: ZERPA DELGADO, Simón Alejandro), Sucre, Miranda, Venezuela; DOB 28 Aug 1983; Gender Male; Cedula No. 16544324 (Venezuela); Vice President of Finance for Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) ; President of Venezuela’s Economic and Social Development Bank (BANDES); President of Venezuela’s National Development Fund (FONDEN); Vice Minister of Investment for Development of Venezuela’s Ministry of Economy and Finance; Principal Director of Venezuela’s Foreign Trade Bank (BANCOEX); Principal Director of Venezuela’s National Telephone Company (CANTV); Current or Former Presidential Commissioner to the Joint Chinese Venezuelan Fund; Current or Former Principal Board Member of Venezuela’s National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC); Former Executive Secretary of Venezuela’s National Development Fund (FONDEN) (individual) [VENEZUELA].