China on Iran (Not the Party Line)

The most interesting Chinese reaction to the events in Iran is never going to be found in the Chinese newspapers. (The state-run press is, not surprisingly, adhering to the principle that all politics is local, so it has been consistently arguing against any disruption of the prevailing political order. On Tuesday, that meant, for instance: “Iranian Exile Groups Want to Use the Chaos to Overturn the Ruling Government.”)

A more nuanced conversation can be found elsewhere (and I’m not referring to the dissident liberal wing.) There is an engaged, relatively mainstream population that is thinking seriously about what Iran’s experience says about China. Several bloggers, for instance, are using the unrest in Iran as a way to benchmark China’s movement toward democracy. Wu Jiaxiang, an intellectual and former researcher in the General Office of the Communist Party Central Committee wrote the other day:

For over ten years, Iran’s presidential elections have had turnout exceeding seventy percent, so much so that the closing hours had to be delayed until midnight. What does that show? It means that indifference towards democracy comes from the lack of democracy. There is no excuse for non-democracy.

Even Iran, such a religious country, has had so many years of elections. Candidates can squabble, the results can be questioned, the legislature can talk, and Khamenei can keep right on working. We [in China] insist on appointing every single candidate in advance, even for the chief of Macau. This is more than a little lagging behind Iran.

Evan Osnos joined The New Yorker as a staff writer in 2008, and covers politics and foreign affairs.