Beware China’s Grand Strategy, Jason Thomas — The Australian

Yesterday I suggested that there’s no need for any kind of air, sea or land invasion when our very own political class are happy to sell our heritage out from underneath us with absolutely no idea as to the long game being played by China. With that in mind this makes for interesting reading 24 hours later in The Australian.

Cut and paste and full column below —

“….China’s investment in a range of strategically located foreign ports around the world is more than smart supply-chain management. These investments create enormous leverage for China in the domestic and foreign policy interests of the countries that sold these ports to China. The effect of this positioning can be subtly played out in votes at the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, the World Trade Organisation and a range of other multilateral bodies.

When former US president Barack Obama failed to enforce his “red line” against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, this sent the message to other nations that they could expand regional hegemonic claims without repercussions.

The suggested methods include disrupting the networks of trade, telecommunications and transportation on which the West depends, as well as electricity grids and avenues of information technology (for instance through incessant hacking) including mass media, plus financial and economic manipulation…”

FULL COLUMN BELOW

Although Basil Liddell Hart and John Boyd may be considered two of the most brilliant military strategists of the modern era, the father of pure grand strategy is Greek military commander Epaminondas (418-362BC).

A year after the Battle of Leuctra, Epaminondas marched across the Peloponnesian peninsula in Sparta. The Spartans refused to be engaged in the open, so Epaminondas elected to pursue what Liddell Hart called “true grand strategy”. In the middle of Sparta Epaminondas founded a new city at Mount Ithome in Messenia state, then another, Megalopolis, in Arcadia.

Across time this resulted in an infiltration of Sparta’s population, the creation of an insurgency and the loss of most of its workers. Significantly, it established influence over more than half of Sparta’s territory, controlling trade and economic routes. No battle was fought, not an arrow was fired nor a spear thrown.

Similarly, by penetrating the integrated systems and networks of government, business information, media, resources and strategic energy and maritime assets, China has sought to weave together an impressive influence within Australia and many other parts of the world. China’s pure grand strategy presents a significant geopolitical risk for us, particularly for investors, where these crucial areas of business, government and politics intersect.

When crossing the river on the border of Cote d’Ivoire and Mali with the Dozos (traditional hunters who act as a kind of village neighbourhood watch), you can see them ride their motorbikes on to a canoe and remain in the seat until they cross to the other side, where they ride off into the Mali savanna. No one told them they couldn’t do that, so they adapted.

No one told China it couldn’t build new islands on partly submerged reefs and claim them as Chinese territory with an exclusive zone of influence. No one said it couldn’t then place missiles, airstrips, helipads and satellite infrastructure on those islands. Throughout the history of China’s claim for the South China Sea, nothing was done to contain its application of grand strategy, except an appeal to a toothless international tribunal whose decision no one is willing or able to enforce.

The geopolitical risks built around this form of pure grand strategy are borderless and their effects can emerge in ways that may seem incongruent. When former US president Barack Obama failed to enforce his “red line” against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, this sent the message to other nations that they could expand regional hegemonic claims without repercussions.

Indeed, whenever concern is expressed over the militarisation of the South China Sea islands, China plays the Obi-Wan Kenobi Jedi mind trick by claiming “there is nothing to see here”.

China’s use of pure grand strategy through the indirect approach was revealed three years before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US, when two senior serving officers in the People’s Liberation Army, colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, wrote Unrestricted Warfare. In this slim volume the PLA officers advocate the use of non-military methods of waging war to defeat technologically superior opponents, such as the US.

The suggested methods include disrupting the networks of trade, telecommunications and transportation on which the West depends, as well as electricity grids and avenues of information technology (for instance through incessant hacking) including mass media, plus financial and economic manipulation.

This indirect approach is a clever means of gaining geopolitical advantage while avoiding direct military conflict.

China’s investment in a range of strategically located foreign ports around the world is more than smart supply-chain management. These investments create enormous leverage for China in the domestic and foreign policy interests of the countries that sold these ports to China. The effect of this positioning can be subtly played out in votes at the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, the World Trade Organisation and a range of other multilateral bodies.

Not surprisingly, the authors also advocate manipulating the West’s commitment to international rules and conventions, such as the Law of Armed Conflict. Liang and Xangsui believe in fully exploiting the way the West imposes political and moral restraints on how its military forces can fight.

China has one of the largest seaborne guerilla fleets in the world. Under the cover of fishing, the on-water militia acts as a proxy force to extend and enforce China’s maritime interests. If it is attacked or threatened, China can claim its civilians are being unfairly targeted and generate strong nationalistic sentiment among mainland Chinese and those living abroad.

China shares a border with more countries than any other state. Since 1949, it has had border disputes with every one of its neighbours. Yet China also has resolved its border disputes with most of them, including Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan and Laos. It even has managed to reach territorial settlements with former enemies, notably Vietnam and Russia.

One of the best questions to ask an Australian prime minister is: how does Australia position itself between the US, our most important ally, and China, our most significant trading partner and increasingly the major owner of strategic assets in Australia and throughout our region?

One thing is for sure: given that the consequences of military conflict between leading powers threaten greater harm than perhaps at any time in history because of the complex and deeply integrated nature of economies and populations, now that these strategic locations and assets are lost, China’s ability to influence our ­national interests is likely only to grow.

Jason Thomas teaches risk management at Swinburne University and specialises in field-based assessments of complex project environments in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.