Friday, September 7, 2012

Well over a year ago – 16 months to be precise –shortly after the
start of the Syrian revolt against the Baathist regime, I made the prediction
on this blog that the regime’s violent response was the sort of grave error that would put what
was then still largely a peaceful popular uprising at a point of no return.

Truth be told, that was more hope than insight, and an optimistic
bet that the fires of the Arab Spring would not be quelled in Syria. Today, no more
than 18 months since the start of the Syrian uprising it has potentially
reached a second point of no return. This prediction however, is the product of
fear and a gut-wrenching pessimism, rather than hope. The revolt in Syria is
going to triumph, to be sure and the regime will, sooner or later, fall. The
question is what comes next. Judging by the current situation, the outlook is
far from rosy. It is rather crimson: the color of blood. Many areas in Syria
today are in a veritable state of civil war. Encounters with many Syrians
living in Lebanon reveal tales that are eerily familiar. Neighbors with whom
one shared one’s life, are suddenly turning into mortal enemies simply because
they are of a different sect. The burning of houses and the killing of innocent
civilians is going on in Syria at two levels: the horrendous atrocities
committed almost daily by the regime, and the “spontaneous” attacks among the
population on the basis of sectarian and ethnic differences. This does not bode
well for the post-Baathist era and the long term future of Syria, as a chilling
New
York Times report from a Syrian refugee camp reveals. We would argue that a
sectarian civil war is in fact a greater danger to the Syrian revolt, than the
power of the regime’s security forces.

There is, however, a second, equally profound, threat to the Syrian
revolution: its lack of unity. Every popular revolt is made of an alliance of
different factions. This is inevitable, and not necessarily a threat in and of
itself. However, if the different factions do not resolve their disagreements
through a political, ideally non-violent, mechanism, the consequences can be
dire. It can be argued that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, although
they brought to power the Islamist parties that were certainly not among the
leaders of the revolution, did so by institutionalized mechanisms (elections)
that can be in turn used to unseat them from power. This is a highly advanced
achievement, that should be recognized as such, but one that is in fact rare in
the history of revolts. The norm for revolutions is that they devour their
children. The violent struggle after the French revolution (arguably the mother
of all modern revolutions!) brought a period of oppression and dictatorship
that resolved only slowly and over a significant amount of time. Closer to home
– literally – the Iranian revolution resulted in the violent oppression of
liberal Islamic and leftist parties that initiated the revolution, and the
establishment of a veritable theocratic dictatorship of fundamentalist
Islamists. That is precisely what the Syrian revolution is at risk of.

It is no secret that the Syrian rebels are currently a collection of
factions with little in common other than the immediate goal of the fall of the
Asad regime. The rise in sectarian tensions is strengthening the hand of the islamists,
particularly the more virulent fundamentalists among them, as is the active
involvement of Saudi and Qatari money and Turkish logistical support. Although
much of the resistance to the regime stems from the heroic fighting of local,
self-organized citizen militias, it is easily imaginable that the islamists
with foreign financial and military support will grab the reigns of power,
particularly if the fall of the regime brings with it a widened sectarian civil
war. It is very unlikely that their rule will be any less violent and
oppressive than that of the Iranian clergy. The repercussions for neighboring
Lebanon and the region at large could be dire.

In sum, the Syrian revolution today is facing a serious double-edged
risk. While it will certainly end the Baathist regime, as it stands, it is
likely to end up plunging Syria into a nightmarish civil war that is likely to
end with the rise of a fundamentalist Salafist take over. This might yet be the
worst legacy the Asad-led Baathist regime leaves behind!

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

This year, August, as opposed to
September was the month of Bachir Gemayel.The change in month is also coupled with a change in image. A new
re-looked Bachir, better suited for the 21st century, was unveiled
for the celebrations organised by his son Nadim in memory of the former’s 1982
election. The Lebanese Forces, stuck to a more traditional portrait of their
historical leader for the annual mass honouring their martyrs.

In times of crisis, and this is
certainly one for Lebanese Christianity, the soul searching seems to bring this
community back to the ‘golden era’ of Maronite domination ...and Bachir.

Few will argue convincingly
against the new reality in effect since the mid 1990s. The balance of power is
now unashamedly shared between three population blocks, with Sunnis and Shiaas
no longer constituting a single political and social ‘Islamic’ entity. As the
heating conflict between Sunni sand Shiaas escalates to boiling point, we hear
a deafening silence on the Christian front of the Lebanese confessional
arrangement. The burning tyres in the
Southern suburb and the sniper shots in Tripoli seem to have a muffling effect
on the figureheads of the Christian camp, all affiliation included.

Nonetheless the delusion of power
seems unshakable. For many of these a return to pre-1989 if not 1943 remains a
realistic goal.The nostalgia for better
times is certainly deeply engrained in the Christian Lebanese psyche and
perpetuated by the affiliated media. Politically, it is fuelled mostly by the
posturing of General Michel Aoun, darling of the Christian middle classes and
embodiment of their state of denial.Michel Aoun for his supporters is what they want him to be; father
figure, saviour, astute political mover, and visionary. The man himself is less
important than the function he fulfils: Michel Aoun is everything they would
have expected from an older Bachir Gemayel, had the latter not been brutally
assassinated on that fateful day of 14th September 1982.

It is well known that those who
die young, at the height of their productivity, are always idealised in the
minds of their public.This applies to
Bachir Gemayel (who died age 35), as much as it did to the guerrilla leader Che
Guevara (died age 39) or the singer from the doors Jim Morrison (died age 27)
with the obvious differences between these characters.Exploiting their memory is often a cleansing
experience to those left behind, who end up being compromised by life and
experience.

The grief suffered by the
Christian population, at the time hurled in an ever narrowing ghetto, and
gripped by the paranoia of a threatening increasingly alien surrounding,
lingered for many years. There were no obvious replacements to Gemayel. Neither
the mild mannered, always neatly dressed Ameen could fill his brother’s shoes,
neither did the second nor third in command in the Lebanese Forces, who had
operated under Bachir as loyal sidekicks without much clout.For the following years, the leadership
struggle resembled more a boardroom overhaul rather than a true fight for the
soul of the Christians. This is until the final showdown in the mid-1980s
between Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika, resulting in the dominance of the first
and the exile of the second. The
Christians of the ‘centre’, effectively those who originated from parts of
Mount Lebanon and Beirut did not take to Geagea, son of a northern village.His humble origins did not fit with their
image of themselves as the country’s intellectual and financial elite. The fact
he had not completed his medical studies, although for very justifiable
reasons, did not sit well with the liberal professionals (doctors, lawyers). Despite
his articulate style and his ruthless determination, Geagea in military garb or
in a suit could simply not replace Gemayel.

Enters Michel Aoun in 1988. Until
then a respected yet not over-influential army general, Michel Aoun became the
last minute attempt at avoiding a complete disintegration of state
institutions. The man brought in as a stop-gap until better solutions could be
found had other plans and a well-rehearsed rhetoric to accompany his ambitions.
Words such as ‘state’ army’ ‘order’ security’ have the effect on the Christian
Middle Classes you would expect from a 7 year old child presented with a cone
of ice cream.Aoun used them again and
again in a litany that mimicked the simple message that had sold Bachir Gemayel
(the one of 1982, not 1976) to the hearts of that population: We, the
Christians can reverse the effect of the civil war and can bring back order and
prosperity to this country, working hand in hand with those from other
confessions who choose to be as patriotic as us.

This perverse view of patriotism
as more inherent to one sect over others, unfortunately explains why the
alliance between Aoun and Hezbollah is viewed so positively by large sections
of the Christian population, despite its obvious imbalance in favour of the
Shiaa militant organisation, with which they have little in common, culturally,
politically and socially. It also explains why March 14th has not succeeded
in breaking Aoun’s popularity. By adopting Geagea, maybe by default, as a
Christian figure head and allowing the Hariri clan to treat their disparate
array of Christian allies with some disdain, they had gone too far in trampling
on the pride of the Christian middle classes. This situation persists
today.Despite the shift in his
discourse, which should assure him a broader appeal, Geagea, it is doubtful
that he will ever be in a position to capture the imagination of the majority
of Christians. This handicap is what maintains the hope of the new generation
of Gemayelsin regaining a position of
leadership they believe is rightfully theirs. But their real challenge is
elsewhere. If they ever manage to ever place their differences to one side, it
is primarily the Patriotic movement they will need to wrestle for the ghost of Bachir
Gemayel.

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