The Conventionalization of US Special Operations

“Innovation has nothing to do with how many R & D dollars you have. When Apple came up with the Mac, IBM was spending at least 100 times more on R & D. It’s not about money. It’s about the people you have, how you’re led, and how much you get it.” -Steve Jobs

It’s clear to me that very few people in academia and the main stream media understand the current issues facing the Special Operations community. The recent Council on Foreign Relations report on the future of SOF written by civilian Linda Robinson is a good document, but is missing some key elements, for example, how back-to-back combat deployments are affecting morale, family life, and readiness of force. The report includes some very valid data and conclusions however, you can’t expect someone to complete the full puzzle if they don’t have the required experiential background to know what the overall picture looks like.

I do share the report’s observation that the demand put on US SOF since 2001 has outpaced the strategic vision, and this is no doubt a major issue in itself.

US Special Operations Command (US SOCOM) has become very large, and when large organizations experience fast growth they are at risk of becoming marginalized by smaller and more innovative competition. In SOCOM’s case, their competition is violent extremists who promote terror and a radical religious ideology that does not tolerate freedom of choice.

The terrorists only rules? That there are no rules, and this gives them a major advantage.

A Look at US SOCOM

US Special Operations Command has become a massive organization, 60,000+ strong, with a budget that has grown from $2.3B to $10.4 since 2001. There’s an inherent inflexibility and bureaucracy that comes with an organization of this size. The question that begs to be asked is, “Are we moving towards conventionalizing SOF Forces?” I believe that this is the elephant in the room nobody is talking about.

US SOCOM was established in 1987 out of a necessity (e.g. failed Iran hostage rescue) to create a central node of communication and cooperation among the different SOF service branches of armed forces. It didn’t come without regular military pushback, which was understandable. Up to this point, Special Operations had largely served as the bastard child of the military, but all this was about to change, especially after 9-11-01. SOCOM initially included the Army, Navy, and Air Force – USMC initially declined but later realized the error in that decision (read more here), and now have a seat at the table.

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As I’ve stated previously, there’s going to be growing pains and inconvenient inherent traits that come with being so big. The biggest setbacks to most large organizations (see The Innovator’s Dilemma) are lack of innovation and losing the ability to act quickly in the market place, and SOCOM has a global market to think about. These are the biggest challenges I see facing US SOCOM in its current form.

McRaven has done a great job managing DC politics, but has the Admiral set up the necessary framework, and culture within SOCOM to ensure that innovation and the ability to act fast are not being marginalized? Are core SOF values around, unconventional thinking, and innovation instilled in the soul of SOCOM? Everything I’ve seen so far does not indicate that this is the case. I’ll only point to the current Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan to make my point. Conventional rules puts SOF in a very vulnerable position when fighting an enemy with no borders or play book. I can’t help but think that it’s very similar to how the American revolutionaries defeated a much larger British force who expected “civilized” warfare, and got unconventional instead.

On the larger scale, we’ve become good at winning battles but terrible at winning wars in the 21st Century. One of the reasons for this, and what SOFREP contributor Peter Nealen has pointed out, is that we’ve adopted the philosophy of “Limited War,” and its a fools strategy at best.

Issues facing SOCOM

A. Becoming conventional by size, structure, and nature.

The main advantage of the SOF unit of the past was that it could act with autonomy. This methodology has been slowly eroded since 2001, and replaced with a large command structure and slow-moving decision tree. Hell, a few of my friends had JAG lawyers waiting to interrogate them after actions on the objective.

“Risk aversion was the greatest trend I saw. SOF, especially Army SF, were originally started to be able to be small, fluid, flexible, and able to make serious international diplomatic decisions on their feet. I had one instance in Iraq where a CONOP for a counter-mortar LP/OP was disapproved because we “didn’t have enough team leadership on the operation,” even though it was two E-6s with four Iraqi Scouts.

The risk averse leadership is promoted from within because their OER looks better, and the free-thinking, daring officers and NCOs tend to leave the force for the civilian world… sometimes for no other reason than getting away from the insanity.” -Former Army Special Forces/Green Beret Blake Miles

Broken families, PTSD, domestic violence, NDA violations, and illicit drug addiction, to name a few. These are major issues, and something nobody wants to talk about outside of closed doors. SOFREP isn’t naming names but we’re calling it like we see it, and left unchecked by current leadership, this current culture will not end well when these violations come to light in the main stream press. It’s a bad case of exemplary leadership that many should be ashamed of. To the men I know who’ve stood up and said something, and been punished for it, at least you can sleep with yourself at night knowing you were on the right side of things.

C. Lack of clear overarching strategic objective for the organization as a whole.

What is SOCOM’s Mission statement in two sentences? Most people I know in SOF cannot recite it. If it’s not clear from the bottom up, then it’s a problem. In football terms, you have players on the field who don’t know what it takes to win, or what direction to run in order to score a touchdown. This was also addressed in the current Council of Foreign Relations report on the future of SOF.

D. Tier One unit infrastructure and cultural issues.

CAG (Delta) vs. DEVGRU (ST-6). Delta is composed primarily of active duty support personnel, making it move faster but with some continuity issues. In comparison, DEV is mostly comprised of GS (General Schedule contractor) support, slower moving but this maintains continuity. Most I’ve talked to prefer an active duty organization that rotates ideas, energy, and morale over a long-term GS organization. Culturally, Delta has always been more of “the quiet professionals” when compared to my own community and that of SEAL Team 6. SEAL Team 6 has done a better job at the politics of war, and has traditionally been given more high-profile missions because of it. CAG could take a lesson in politics from the Navy, and on the flip side, NSWDG could do a better job being the “quiet professionals.” Many in my community will disagree with this, but I only have to point to the book No Easy Day, active DEV guys consulting for the video game Medal of Honor (TTPs?), and the recent Esquire article featuring one of the UBL team members to make this point.

“..you need a massive intelligence and logistics infrastructure to accomplish complicated and technical Special Operations missions, but it also leads to a bloated bureaucracy filled with staff officers who have no real job other than to interject white noise into the decision making process. However, I see the real problem in SOCOM being careerism and CYA risk aversion before the real obstacle and not a simple matter of the numbers involved. SOCOM is still way too top-heavy with officers, though. It is so bad that it is to the point that entire new bureaucracies were created overseas just so that officers could have jobs. One is the CJSOTF which is not a doctrinal part of Special Forces operations. ODAs do JCETs all over the world without a CJSOTF and seem to do just fine. The CJSOTF may be required for some logistical resupply operations and unit deconfliction, but it has grown into a monster over time which has created this inverse relationship in which Officers now see the CJSOTF as the maneuver element, and ODAs as the supporting mechanism for this bureaucracy.” -Former Special Forces/75th Ranger Jack Murphy

What Next

McRaven should look to ensure that US SOCOM gets off the path to conventionalization that is all about conventional rules, shiny boots, starched uniforms, online sensitivity training, and loss of cultural innovation. It’s ok to break the right rules every now and then but the wrong rules are being broken (failed drug tests, broken NDAs, and violent crime etc.). Unconventional warfare needs to remain the heart and soul of US Special Operations Command, and component commands. Small unit autonomy, breaking the right rules, cultural influence, and relationship building has always been the heart Special Operations. Something must be done to ensure these are not lost to the big machine of SOCOM.

A clear mission plan written by operators (not consultants) needs to be implemented to get everyone on the same map. If we are going to engage in warfare in the modern century, then we should do it with clear, achievable, and measurable strategic goals that everyone can understand. We don’t have this now in Washington or Afghanistan; we have Warfighters busying themselves in a game of war with rules and objectives that are unclear. They are lions led by the lambs of political elites in Washington.

Lastly, we must include an important component that is missing in today’s modern Special Operations warfare: the strategy of prevention. We can’t kill our way to peace. How do we address, and reduce, not increase, the evil and hate in the world. Right now we are minting radical extremists and feeding the hate machine at a record pace.

One thing is clear: Special Operations and unconventional warfare is the way future wars will be fought on any scale. I only hope that the core values of SOF are not lost, and that US SOCOM takes a hard look in the mirror at what it’s become, and to steal a quote from Churchill, “However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.” Both at home, and abroad.

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About the Author

Brandon Webb
is a former Navy SEAL, and combat veteran, with deployments to Afghanistan, and Iraq. His last tour he served as Chief Petty Officer & Naval Special Warfare sniper Course Manager. He is the founder of Hurricane Media, a Dad to three amazing kids, Experimental Pilot, and New York Times bestselling author. His books include his bestselling memoir, The Red Circle, Among Heroes, Benghazi: The Definitive Report, The Killing School, The Power of Thought, and Total Focus.

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Waterborne

First let me say, i agree with the author that in order to have the best force possible to be able to successfully complete the mission, these things need to be dealt with and nipped in the bud before it blooms into another useless fighting force... Absolutely... But is having a capable force even the goal?
The best fighting force in the world is nothing but a social experiment with certain people in charge of it. As we all are witnessing, once again... As well, even with the right people in charge, all it takes is poor command and control from on high to turn it into another disaster... We can focus all day long on building the best most capable force, as long as we continue to elect politicians instead of patriots to lead it, what difference does it really make?
This isnt political. Democrats may dilute the military and keep it at bay, republicans abuse our military and send it off to fight wars that they know will either fail, or be surrendered away by the next democrat potus. Either way, the best fighting force in the world is useless, regardless whos in command of it... Rarely is our military "allowed" to succeed...
If all the upper eschelon jobs were being created to see to the success of the mission, and take it away from the elected leadership(who always fucks it up), then sure id be all for it. But these jobs are nothing but golden parachutes for career brass, not for mission success...
Again this isnt a political problem, its a mission problem. Is the mission of SPEC OPS to succeed and win at war? Or is the new mission simply to minimize "boots on the ground" by using SPEC OPS to fight a PC War? If SPEC OPS is going to be the future of PC war fighting, which it is btw, then silly little things like unit cohesion moral and capability become secondary to its mission of keeping politicians from being blamed for fighting wars...
As long as the TV doesnt show conventional forces, and the war can still be waged, the politicians are happy... The idea of having the best brightest most capable force is simply not needed when they are only to be used to fight PC wars... Success isnt determined anymore by achieving goals, its determined by how much blame the politicians get... Blameless war is now a successful mission, not actually achieving the goals... Just a thought

JBernardFiedler

YankeePapa A Dark Horse has the advantage, if they understand the people in charge and the enemy.

NicholasP

gmad1026 So many things wrong with this I'm not sure where to begin. Why fuck with something that isn't broken, SOF? Why take the winning formula and dilute it? There is a solution to this issue, if you want to be SOF, go to selection! We need more conventional Light Infantry and Airborne units and a greater emphasis on small unit tactics at the platoon and below level. The Heavy Mechanized units should be focusing more on the traditional conventional mission to fight a large conflict against a nation state such as Russia, China or North Korea.
Here's the thing, anybody can do the basics and do them well. You need to train to shoot, move, communicate and survive constantly. Keep yourself in top physical condition. Take your training seriously. So far, I've mentioned nothing here that is special.
Now, put a soldier through the most physically and mentally gruelling selection process you can imagine. Push the body past the limits and test the capacity of the mind to override the flight mode. Continuously pile on increasingly complicated mental tasks and observe the effects as the body breaks down. There is a very specific type of person that the evaluators are seeking during the selection process, dare I say a "SPECIAL" person. After that, place the soldier into months of specialized training, add six months of language and SERE training etc... How do you do that for nearly 2 million active and reserve soldiers. Who is going to pay for that? The bottom line is that not everybody can be SOF or like SOF but they can do very well in a conventional unit.
Let the SOF guys go back to their corners and be the bastard stepchild of the military. It is MUCH better than losing our identity and becoming just another conventional force. SOF and conventional forces can and should conduct periodic joint training operations, but they must remain separate entities.

gmad1026

Honestly, I am an outsider looking but, I have several
questions to ask that can help reveal the civilian thinking Brandon spoke
about. Please know that I am just playing
the devil’s advocate…
First, SOF is solving the hard problems and they are the
industry leaders and winners, so why not conventionalize it? Based on articles I read from this outlet and others, it seems like SOF gets shit done with good intelligence. As Brandon has
mentioned before, there will be growing pains but that is how an organization grows. I think our leadership will
fuck it up but remember; the best big businesses operate like a small business
(to long of a topic to discuss). For an example, to keep a big business operating
small, it should recruit the right people, such as, individuals with extremely
high standards, uphold individual responsibility, and has a curious creativity.
Second, SOF doesn't hurt our leadership ratings, so why not
conventionalize it? For an example, back in 2003-2008 how many times did the
media cry out about a conventional soldier's death! Perhaps it was on the order
of a billion times? The media doesn't report SOF deaths, so the sheep won't cry
out . Therefore it won’t hurt political ratings of the leadership. Also SOF operations don't get out to the media
so there are no public implications in that regard.
Finally, as our culture moves away from the warrior culture
we will see our conventional military break down. If the conventional military
breaks down (already has) then there will be the need to have a more SOF like
military. Why not make SOF the normal thing?
Perhaps there is a possible solution, if the leaderships wants
more SOF like soldiers then why not make the conventional forces more like SOF?
Raise the bar, raise the standards, raise individual responsibility, and raise
the stakes if there is failure. I think George Patton would be pissed if he saw the conventional military today and correct them like how he did in North Africa during the 2nd world war. Plus, the leadership could start making programs in
public schools, trade schools, and academies that trains everyone to be
competitive. Fuck make the boy scouts more interesting again…

Alloyjane

"The question that begs to be asked is, 'Are we moving towards conventionalizing SOF Forces?' I believe that this is the elephant in the room nobody is talking about."
Uh, wasn't that the plan that Obama hinted at two years ago? I distinctly remember some address he gave right around the time the force reduction announcement was made that the US military would be relying on SOF to carry its weight. I have no real input regarding how to solve for the extremist mentality in combat or how to work towards peace but I have many opinions about the support structure surrounding all of this. Like to hear it HERE IT GOES.
Call me simplistic but I see much of this as wholly an admin problem. I wish I had a better understanding of the internal process. As in, I wonder why the fuck they do it this way because it seems stupid and inefficient. The whole purpose of administration is so that you have a firm foundation to support the active parts of the body. It isn't to throw a wrench in the works to make functioning more difficult. But I suppose that has to do with a general lack of accountability leading to bureaucracy.
Proliferation is not a required component of administration. All you have to do is look at how a nonprofit works. They do a lot with a little and they don't all have volunteers as reinforcements. It's about understanding what needs to be done and doing it, and being willing to put yourself in a position to understand what you're propping up. That, to me, is the problem with the military. You have egotistical dipshits running the show who have no clue what they are directing and thus are inefficient at their jobs. It's an unwieldy thing to get a hold of because once again, it all stems back to accountability and that trickles down from the top. If the top of the chain isn't willing to crack heads to maintain integrity, you'll always have problems lower down.
In reference to the continuity issue of an active duty support system, that is a problem that is easily solved. Always keep three designated office bitches. One outgoing, one in the middle, and one incoming. Your operations manual is the core and you update as you go along, keeping what works and chucking what doesn't. You archive past versions so that there is no repetition with experimentation and you notate which methods are tried and true so incoming folks don't waste their time fixing a perfectly functioning clock. It's not that hard, but it requires an understanding of the importance of maintaining the foundation and a bit of punitive inspiration for the insecure/lazy. If you, as an office bitch, cannot ensure that the process can be carried on in your absence, then you have failed at your job. Admin is not brain surgery, anyone can do it.