Ahmadinejad versus the Clergy

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has taken advantage of Iranian millenarianism in a well-orchestrated power play to bypass the established clergy. While Ahmadinejad’s populism is unlikely to ignite a messianic revolt against the clerical establishment, its manifestations–most notably leaks about the clergy’s involvement in economic corruption–will weaken their authority and allow the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to consolidate further control over the power structures of the Islamic Republic.

A wave of millenarianism is sweeping over Iranian society.[1] Amid social and economic unease, and with eschatological anticipation high, many Iranians interpret even the most mundane matters as signs of the realization of Shia prophecies of the end of the world and the imminent emergence of the Hidden Imam, often called the Imam of the Era in Persian-language sources. Communicated through both the Internet and mobile phones, millenarian rumors have mobilized the masses and occasionally led to riots.

Traditional Shia Millenarianism

Mainstream Shia doctrine holds that after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, leadership of the Muslim community passed to a succession of twelve imams, beginning with Imam Ali (599-661 AD) and continuing through the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad ibn Hassan al-Askari (born 868 AD), also known as Muhammad al-Mahdi. The Mahdi did not die, but in 873 or 874, went into what became known as the Lesser Occultation to escape persecution at the hands of caliphs fearing potential rivals. He briefly reemerged in 940 before entering the Greater Occultation and will return only before the Day of Judgment to purge both corrupt politicians and dishonest clergy and usher in an incorrupt and just Islamic government on earth.[2] Traditional Shia therefore believe that any government existing prior to the Mahdi’s reemergence is by definition unjust, corrupt, and imperfect. This interpretation is the basis of the quietism–the avoidance of any direct role in governance–to which the majority of Shia clergy subscribe, including such figures as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Iraq and Ayatollah Hossein Kazemeyni Boroujerdi in Iran.

The Iranian judiciary need not look far for those who claim contact with the Hidden Imam, for the Islamic Republic’s own president has, on several occasions, done so. Ahmadinejad’s belief may be as much political as religious.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini turned this mainstream exegesis on its head when, in 1970, he published Velayat-e Faghih: Hukumat-i Islami (Guardianship of the Jurist: The Islamic Government)–a compilation of his lectures written while he was in exile in Iraq–which argued that senior clerics could act as placeholders for the Hidden Imam and so could run government in his stead.[3] This became the theological basis that underlies the Islamic Republic installed in Iran after the 1979 revolution. Islamic Republic authorities must take millenarianism seriously, for any discussion of the Mahdi’s return undercuts the legitimacy of the Iranian government. After all, if the Mahdi returns, there is no need for placeholders to remain in power. Indeed, the Iranian constitution stipulates as much when it declares the supreme leader’s authority to be valid only “during the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance).”[4] After the Hidden Imam’s reemergence, the executive and spiritual leadership of the Iranian state and society will pass to the savior, and the supreme leader will be out of a job.

Millenarianism Boils Over

While Ahmadinejad has raised the profile of millenarianism in Iran, prior to his assumption of the presidency, religious superstition was already widespread. In November 2003, for example, rumors swept the Islamic Republic that God had punished a woman who had desecrated the Quran in Qom by transforming her into half woman, half tiger. A digitally altered photo of the “tiger-woman” circulated widely, raising the profile of the incident. When rumors spread that she had been arrested, thousands of people stormed the local police station to see her. When police denied that she was in custody, the mob attacked the station, beat several policemen, and set nearby banks and shops ablaze.[5]

Under Ahmadinejad, however, millenarianism has blossomed. Millenarian incidents now occur with increasing frequency. In May 2007, a mob invaded the Tehran neighborhood of Shahrak-e Gharb to see “the shadow of the Imam of the Era” in a pattern left on a wall by a leaking drain pipe.[6] In February 2008, law enforcement forces in the Kordestan province arrested a woman who claimed she could cure the terminally ill because she was the reverend mother of the Prophet Muhammad.[7] In June, a religious sect emerged in Qom calling itself “Followers of the Thirteenth Imam.” Its followers broke with both Shia and Sunni tradition by facing toward Jamkaran–from whence many Shia believe the Mahdi will return–rather than Mecca for prayer.[8] A clearly exacerbated public prosecutor complained not only about people claiming to be imams reincarnate, but also about people claiming to be the Fourteenth Imam.[9]

Mashhad–the largest city in eastern Iran and home to the shrine of Imam Reza, the Eighth Imam–has, along with Qom, become a breeding ground for millenarianism. According to the Nowsazi News Agency, a “deviant sect” led by Seyyed Khorasani has arisen in the city, claiming that any government formed by man is imperfect. In the absence of infallible imams, the sect argues, any government is a revolt against God and must be defeated, a necessary condition for the hasty emergence of the Imam of the Era.[10] The Iranian press has reported similar instances of millenarianism in Behbahan, Karaj, Esfahan, Tehran, Tabriz, Saqez,[11] and even Shia communities outside Iran.[12]

The intensity and severity of such cases has led Seyyed Mehdi Khamoushi, head of the Islamic Propagation Organization, to warn against innovation, superstition, and religious deviation that he said have “always been utilized by foreigners to infuse their ideology and points of view into the Islamic society of Iran.”[13] Influential Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi; Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad Salimi, prosecutor of the Special Clerical Court; and Hojjat al-Eslam Hassan Rowhani, representative of the supreme leader in the Supreme National Security Council, also repeated the warning.[14] The problem has become so severe that according to the newspaper Kargozaran, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a decree to the judiciary to deal decisively with “those claiming contact with the Imam of the Era.”[15]

Ahmadinejad’s Millenarianism

The Iranian judiciary need not look far for those who claim contact with the Hidden Imam, for the Islamic Republic’s own president has, on several occasions, done so. Ahmadinejad’s belief may be as much political as religious. A chronological survey of his millenarian speeches suggests political rationale for the seemingly irrational. Ahmadinejad’s millenarian discourse can be divided into four distinct phases, each serving a distinct political purpose (see table 1).

The first phase–general mention of the Hidden Imam and the imminence of his reemergence–legitimized millenarian arguments in political discourse and prepared the public for justification of policy based on eschatological expectations. During this phase, Ahmadinejad and his followers claimed that belief in the savior was progressive,[16] not superstitious, and that the government served the purpose of preparing for the emergence of the savior.[17]

Once the public became accustomed to millenarian discourse, the second phase began with claims that Ahmadinejad’s administration and the president himself were miraculous and enjoyed the benevolence of the Hidden Imam.[18]

Indeed, Ahmadinejad and his supporters attribute his escape from alleged U.S. kidnap and assassination plots[50] and “victories” such as his speech to heads of state at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to the miraculous intervention of the Mahdi. Indeed, Ahmadinejad commented that at the UN, he felt a “halo of light” above him,[51] while at Columbia University, he said he felt the presence of the Imam of the Era.[52] Such rhetoric serves the purpose of extending divine legitimacy to Ahmadinejad.

The clergy look at the Iranian president’s claims of miracles and direct contact with the Mahdi with suspicion and consider his actions to be political infiltration into religion, over which the clergy claim a monopoly. Ahmadinejad’s reference to direct contact with the Mahdi, if believed, also makes the clergy superfluous.

Ahmadinejad’s eschatological rhetoric and the millenarian discourse necessitated calibration to political realities in the Islamic Republic. The third phase, therefore, underscored ideological adjustment. Thus, it was at this time that Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi entered the debate to insist that belief in the Imam of the Era is compatible with adherence to the supremacy of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[53] Mesbah-Yazdi sought to reconcile the two by arguing that the Islamic Republic is simply an early manifestation of the rule of the Imam of the Era,[54] who is the executive leader of all world affairs.[55] Even the grotesque claim that Ahmadinejad’s government represents the era of Zohour-e Soghra (the minor emergence)–creating a parallel to the Hidden Imam’s Lesser and Greater Occultation–aids ideological adjustment.[56] Ahmadinejad even links Iranian nationalism with the cult of the Hidden Imam, which is ironic because Iranian nationalism is often anti-Arab in character, and the Hidden Imam himself was Arab.[57]

If the rhetoric of phase three sounds outlandish to Western ears, it does not sound much better to many Iranians. A number of leading Shia clerics have criticized the Iranian president’s abuse of the public’s religious beliefs (see table 2). Ahmadinejad and his followers responded with a fourth theme in their millenarian discourse, exposing those who oppose the Hidden Imam’s reemergence. Thus, clerical critics of Ahmadinejad’s policies become, in the discourse of the president and his followers, enemies of God.[58]

Clerical Criticism of Ahmadinejad

A survey of clerical criticism of Ahmadinejad demonstrates two themes: Ahmadinejad’s incompetence in handling inflation and his abuse of Shia millenarian beliefs for political purposes. The first strain of criticism fits into standard clerical practice of speaking truth to power when religious figures feel government has gone astray, although, ironically, it is one that has been retarded since the revolution put clerics themselves into power. The inflation issue is particularly sensitive because the lower-income groups–the most devout in Iranian society–suffer most. Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli challenged the Ahmadinejad government’s claims about the true level of inflation and insisted that there indeed is such a thing as “rising prices and inflation.”[59] His criticism was shared by powerful religious leaders such as Ayatollah Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili,[60] Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi,[61] and even long-time Ahmadinejad supporter Mesbah-Yazdi.[62] From the left of the political spectrum, Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini, the Friday prayer leader of Qom, warned against “galloping inflation,” homelessness, high rents, and malnourishment among the poor.[63] Not satisfied with just criticizing the economic policies of the Ahmadinejad government, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said, “You can’t improve the economy by raising beggars”[64] and suggested that the Ahmadinejad government spreads poverty rather than wealth.

The Shia clergy’s protests against Ahmadinejad’s millenarian discourse should not be surprising. Ahmadinejad’s background is in the military, not theological seminaries. He has little formal training in theology. The clergy look at the Iranian president’s claims of miracles and direct contact with the Mahdi with suspicion and consider his actions to be political infiltration into religion, over which the clergy claim a monopoly. Ahmadinejad’s reference to direct contact with the Mahdi, if believed, also makes the clergy superfluous.

Palizdar the Proxy

Ahmadinejad’s “messianism” chafed the clergy throughout the first years of his administration, and the tension between the president and the religious establishment boiled over on May 27, 2008, when Abbas Palizdar–a former director of fundamental studies at the Research Institute of the Iranian Parliament and a member of an investigations committee under the Supreme Audit Court investigating cases of economic corruption[65]–exposed 123 cases involving alleged

economic corruption among high-ranking Iranian clergy during a speech at the University of Hamadan.[109] Subsequently, reports surfaced that he had made similar accusations during a speech at the University of Shiraz.

Effectively a proxy for Ahmadinejad in his battle against entrenched religious interests, Palizdar made allegations about clerical malfeasance ranging from illegal acceptance of automobiles from Iran Khodro, Iran’s largest automobile manufacturer, to lax attitudes in the fight against drugs, illegal takeovers of mines and factories, luxurious lifestyles, and even moral issues (see table 3). While Iranians understood Palizdar’s attacks against Rafsanjani in the context of the rivalry between Ahmadinejad and the former president, Palizdar’s attacks against the seemingly God-fearing Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, Ayatollah Alam al-Hoda, and against the Friday prayer leader of Tehran, Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani, were particularly damaging to the image of the clergy. Palizdar appeared a perfect proxy for Ahmadinejad because, like the president, he was a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, having volunteered at age fourteen.[110]

Initially, the Iranian officialdom sought to ignore Palizdar. His speeches received no attention in the state-controlled press for a couple of weeks.[111] But the story spread on the Internet, and foreign broadcasters such as Voice of America-Persian, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and Radio Farda pursued his allegations–Farda even aired an interview with Palizdar in which Palizdar claimed Ayatollah Hossein Nouri-Hamadani, chairman of the judiciary committee of the Iranian parliament, had attempted to suppress the findings of his investigations.[112] The press was forced to react. Initially, they sought to minimize Palizdar’s importance. The Research Institute of the Iranian Parliament claimed to have no knowledge of an employee by his name and even threatened Palizdar with legal action for claiming to work for the institute.[113] Hassan Kamran, another official serving on the investigations committee, also claimed ignorance of Palizdar’s membership, although the committee was forced to retract his statement when documents proved Palizdar’s employment.[114] After Alef News Agency released the news that Palizdar had earlier run for local Islamic Council elections on the Pleasant Scent of Servitude–the parliamentary faction supporting Ahmadinejad and featuring his son[115]– Ahmadinejad’s brother Davoud, the chair of the Special Investigations Office of the Presidency, condemned the crisis that Palizdar had “sparked off”[116] in society.

The press then turned to character assassination. Fars News Agency and Kayhan–a newspaper whose editor is a direct appointee of the supreme leader–both claimed Palizdar had been involved in an embezzlement scandal as a shareholder in a dairy factory,[117] and Kayhan wrote that Palizdar had stolen top secret information on the Iranian military, allegations also repeated by the Revolutionary Guards Sobh-e Sadegh weekly.[118] Raja News Agency said that Palizdar’s master’s degree from a university in Maryland was fake.[119] In a reference to Palizdar, Friday prayer leader of Tehran Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani assured the Iranian public that “plotters and accusers are bound to be punished by God,”[120] and a week later, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami depicted the Palizdar affair as “conspiracy and sabotage against the Islamic Republic.”[121]

On June 11, 2008, security forces arrested Palizdar on charges of “economic abuse, false accusations, spreading of lies in order to disturb the public mind and spreading of rumors.”[122] In subsequent days, police arrested a number of alleged Palizdar associates–including parliamentarians[123]–sparking demonstrations in Tehran that took riot police and tear gas to disperse.[124]

Indeed, the rioting is indicative of the frustration ordinary Iranians feel over corruption among their leaders and the lack of accountability of many clergy to the law. Several Ahmadinejad supporters leapt to Palizdar’s defense. Nowsazi News Agency, which generally supports Ahmadinejad’s policies, depicted Palizdar as “a decent man.”[125] On a website close to the student wing of the paramilitary Basij, a certain Dr. Taha Jazayeri stressed the necessity of an open trial at which not only Palizdar, but also allegations of elite corruption could be investigated.126 The Islamic Society Association, which had invited Palizdar to Hamadan, stressed the importance of airing public criticism.[127] In a not-too-subtle show of support, Ansar News Agency released pictures–which now have been removed–of Palizdar as a soldier in the Iran-Iraq war to mobilize support from war veterans.[128]

Conclusion

Iranian society often turns to millenarianism during times of uncertainty because of a lack of legal channels for expressing political dissatisfaction. Ahmadinejad’s fantastic claims of miracles and direct contact with the Hidden Imam use these beliefs to his advantage. He presents his government grotesquely as one paving the road for the emergence of the Shia messiah and blames the ills of the state-controlled economy on the enemies of the Imam of the Era who want to delay the Day of Judgment. If his assertions take hold, they will dislodge the clergy from their monopoly on religious interpretation. After all, what use is there for the rule of the supreme leader as the intermediary between man and the Imam of the Era if the Iranian president manages to democratize access to the Shia messiah? In the long run, such a development would undermine the authority of the senior clergy in the political affairs of the Islamic Republic.

As the president interfered more in religious matters, the clergy increased their criticism of Ahmadinejad’s economic management and, understandably, his primitive use of millenarianism. Then came the Palizdar affair–Ahmadinejad’s apparent response. Rather than getting involved in a theological battle that he and his supporters would have lost to intellectually superior Shia clergy, Ahmadinejad used the Palizdar affair in an attempt to taint the clergy and further damage the sanctity of men of God.

While neither Ahmadinejad’s millenarianism nor Palizdar’s corruption allegations will ignite a revolt against the clergy, they have already tarnished the clergy’s image. In the never-ending battle for predominance among the Islamic Republic’s pillars, the Revolutionary Guards, from which the laical Ahmadinejad rose, are the chief beneficiaries of the weakening of the clergy. And so, as two battle-hardened veterans declare war on the clergy, the victors will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps: the self-perceived holy warriors of Islam could take political power by claiming direct communication with the divine element without the Shia clergy as intermediaries. The Shia clergy would then have to take up once again their historical role of protecting the Shia community from abuse at the hands of rulers.

Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a visiting research fellow at AEI and a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Copenhagen.

Mr. Alfoneh thanks the Royal Danish Defense College for its support of his research and Washington Institute for Near East Policy visiting fellow Mehdi Khalaji for his insights. AEI resident scholar Michael Rubin and associate editor Christy Hall Robinson worked with Mr. Alfoneh to edit and produce this Middle Eastern Outlook.