For
the petitioner, there were briefs filed by Kevin M. LeRoy,
deputy solicitor general, with whom on the briefs were Brad
D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha Tseytlin, solicitor
general. There was an oral argument by Kevin M. LeRoy.

For
the respondents Clean Wisconsin, Inc., Lynda A. Cochart, Amy
Cochart, Roger D. DeJardin, Sandra Winnemueller, and Chad
Cochart, there was a brief filed by Sarah Geers and Midwest
Environmental Advocates, Madison, with whom on the brief were
Katie Nekola and Clean Wisonsin, Inc., Madison. There was an
oral argument by Sarah Geers.

For
the respondent Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, there
was a brief filed by John S. Skilton and Perkins Coie LLP,
Madison. There was an oral argument by John S. Skilton.

DANIEL
KELLY, J.

¶1
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") says its appeal in Clean Wisconsin,
Inc. v. DNR, 2016AP1688 ("Clean
Wisconsin") is pending in the wrong district, and
asks us to exercise our supervisory authority to shepherd it
to the correct venue. Because we agree with the DNR, we grant
its petition for a supervisory writ and vacate the order of
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals transferring venue for
Clean Wisconsin from District II to District IV.

¶2
We accepted review because this case presents an important
issue of first impression regarding the right of an appellant
to select appellate venue under Wis.Stat. § 752.21(2)
(2015-16), [1]

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

¶3
The dispute giving rise to this petition for a supervisory
writ involves the DNR's decision to reissue a Wisconsin
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("WPDES")
permit to Kinnard Farms, Inc. ("Kinnard Farms")/ a
dairy farm in Kewaunee County. After a group of five
individuals (led by Lynda A. Cochart, hereinafter the
"Cochart Petitioners") contested the decision, an
administrative law judge concluded the permit should issue,
but only with the addition of two conditions to which Kinnard
Farms objected.[2] Kinnard Farms filed a petition with the
DNR requesting removal of the conditions. The DNR initially
denied the petition, but upon reconsideration found that
" [n] either [of the conditions] may be imposed upon
Kinnard [Farms] in this case, and therefore, these conditions
will not be added to or modified into the WPDES Permit."

¶4
Clean Wisconsin, Inc. ("Clean Wisconsin") and the
Cochart Petitioners each filed petitions seeking judicial
review of the DNR's decision. Clean Wisconsin filed in
Dane County (the county of its residence), while the Cochart
Petitioners filed in Kewaunee County (the county of their
residence). The Circuit Court for Dane County, as the court
in which the first petition was filed, exercised its
statutorily-granted discretion to consolidate the Kewaunee
County case into the Dane County case.[3] Subsequently, the
Dane County Circuit Court entered judgment on the merits in
favor of Clean Wisconsin and the Cochart Petitioners,
restoring the contested permit conditions that the DNR had
rejected. We will refer to Clean Wisconsin and the Cochart
Petitioners collectively as the "Administrative
Petitioners" so that we may more conveniently
distinguish their arguments from those of the Court of
Appeals when they diverge.

¶5
The DNR appealed the circuit court's decision, and
selected District II as the appellate venue. A single court
of appeals judge (sitting in District IV) issued an order,
sua sponte, transferring venue from District II to
District IV on August 31, 2016. The judge, relying on
Wis.Stat. § 752.21(1), wrote that District IV is the
proper venue because it encompasses the circuit court that
issued the judgment from which the DNR appealed. The DNR
moved for reconsideration. It asserted that § 752.21(2)
gave it the right to select appellate venue because Clean
Wisconsin had designated the circuit court venue. Sitting as
a three-judge panel in District IV, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion on September 29, 2016.

¶6
Approximately two weeks later, the DNR petitioned this court
for a supervisory writ requiring the Court of Appeals to
transfer venue back to District II. We stayed the appeal and
asked the respondents for a response to the petition. We
subsequently ordered full briefing and argument.

II.
DISCUSSION

A.
Supervisory Writs

¶7
The authority to issue supervisory writs depends on the
constitutional grant of jurisdiction to this court. In
relevant part, our constitution says:

(1) The supreme court shall have superintending and
administrative authority over all courts.

(2) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all
courts and may hear original actions and proceedings. The
supreme court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction.

(3) The supreme court may review judgments and orders of the
court of appeals, may remove cases from the court of appeals
and may accept cases on certification by the court of
appeals.

Wis. Const, art. VII, § 3. We have previously observed
that with the grant of jurisdiction come all the writs
necessary to give it effect:

The framers of the constitution appear to have well
understood that, with appellate jurisdiction, the court took
all common law writs applicable to it; and with
superintending control, all common law writs applicable to
that; and that, failing adequate common law writs, the court
might well devise new ones, as Lord Coke tells us, as "a
secret in law."

¶8
"A supervisory writ is 'a blending of the writ of
mandamus and the writ of prohibition.'" Madison
Metro. Sch. Dist., 336 Wis.2d 95, ¶74 (citation
omitted). The court traditionally uses the writ of
prohibition "to keep an inferior court from acting
outside its jurisdiction when there [is] no adequate remedy
by appeal or otherwise." Id., ¶76
(internal marks and citation omitted). The writ of mandamus,
on the other hand, directs "a public officer to perform
his plain statutory duties." Id., ¶75
(citing Menzl v. City of Milwaukee, 32 Wis.2d 266,
275-76, 145 N.W.2d 198 (1966)). Thus, the supervisory writ
"serves a narrow function: to provide for the direct
control of lower courts, judges, and other judicial officers
who fail to fulfill non-discretionary duties, causing harm
that cannot be remedied through the appellate review
process." State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d
110. A supervisory writ is "an extraordinary and drastic
remedy that is to be issued only upon some grievous
exigency." Id., ¶17 (internal marks and
citation omitted).

¶9
A party may request a supervisory writ from this court by
petition.[5] Wis.Stat. § (Rule) 809.71. To justify
the writ, a petitioner must demonstrate that: "(1) an
appeal is an inadequate remedy; (2) grave hardship or
irreparable harm will result; (3) the duty of the trial court
is plain and it . . . acted or intends to act in violation of
that duty; and (4) the request for relief is made promptly
and speedily." Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶17
(citation omitted). Our deliberation on whether to issue the
writ "is controlled by equitable principles and, in our
discretion, we can consider the rights of the public and
third parties." Id. (internal marks and
citation omitted).

¶10
We will consider only the first three factors identified
above-the respondents do not contest the timeliness of the
DNR's petition, and we agree that filing within two weeks
of the Court of Appeals' order denying the motion for
reconsideration is, under these circumstances, unquestionably
"prompt and speedy." For the sake of analytical
clarity, our opinion addresses the three factors in the
following order. We begin with whether the Court of Appeals
will violate a plain duty to hear the DNR's appeal in the
proper district if the venue-transfer order stands. Then, we
will consider whether an appeal would be an inadequate
remedy. And finally, we will determine whether the DNR will
suffer grave hardship or irreparable harm if the writ does
not issue.

B.
Plain Duty

1.
Existence of the Duty

¶11
We start with determining whether the Court of Appeals has a
plain duty to hear the DNR's appeal in the proper venue.
A plain duty is one that is "clear and unequivocal and,
under the facts, the responsibility to act [is]
imperative." Id., ¶22 (internal marks and
citation omitted). "[C]lear and unequivocal" does
not require the duty to be settled or obvious. There may be a
plain duty even when it involves "a novel question of
law requiring harmonization of several statutory
provisions." See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 336
Wis.2d 95, ¶84.[6]

¶12
Appellate venue is governed by Wis.Stat. § 752.21, which
provides, in toto:

(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), a judgment or order
appealed to the court of appeals shall be heard in the court
of appeals district which contains the court from which the
judgment or order is appealed.

(2) A judgment or order appealed from an action venued in a
county designated by the plaintiff to the action as provided
under s. 801.50(3)(a) shall be heard in a court of appeals
district selected by the appellant but the court of appeals
district may not be the court of appeals district that
contains the court from which the judgment or order is
appealed.

¶13
The first subsection of Wis.Stat. § 752.21 contains the
general rule controlling appellate venue. The second
subsection contains a specific rule, which applies only to
the subset of cases in which the plaintiff designated venue
in the circuit court pursuant to Wis.Stat. § 801.50(3)
(a) . However, both the general and specific rules speak in
mandatory terms. The general rule uses the mandatory
"shall" in requiring the court to hear the appeal
in the district encompassing the circuit from which the
appeal is taken.[7] The specific rule, when applicable, is no
less mandatory in its requirement that the court hear the
appeal in the district selected by the appellant. Thus,
regardless of whether the general or specific rule determines
venue, the court of appeals has no discretion with respect to
where it must hear the appeal. Further, the correct venue
does not depend on uncertain factual developments or
circumstances outside the contemplation of the statute. Nor
does the court of appeals have the option of not acting: The
appeal must be heard somewhere. Therefore, the obligation to
venue the appeal in the correct district is clear,
unequivocal, and mandatory. It is, therefore, a "plain
duty" within the meaning of our supervisory writ
jurisprudence.

2.
Compliance with the Duty

¶14
Whether the Court of Appeals acted consonantly with its plain
duty when it transferred the DNR's appeal from District
II to District IV depends on the requirements of three
statutes, all of which have something to say about venue in
this case. The statute controlling appellate venue is
Wis.Stat. § 752.21, which we quoted above. Then there is
Wis.Stat. § 801.50(3) (a), which governs circuit court
venue. And finally, there is Wis.Stat. § 227.53(1)
(a)3., which restricts venue eligibility for administrative
appeals such as the one sub judice.

¶15
We determine the meaning of these statutes by focusing on
their text, context, and structure. "[S]tatutory
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute,
" and we give that language its "common, ordinary,
and accepted meaning." Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633,
¶¶45-46 ("Context is important to meaning. So,
too, is the structure of the statute in which the operative
language appears. Therefore, statutory language is
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language
of surrounding or closely-related statutes ...."). In
performing this analysis, we carefully avoid ascribing an
unreasonable or absurd meaning to the text. Id.,
¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . .
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.") .
We may also look to the statute's history where, as here,
there has been a significant revision to the language in
which we are interested. Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009
WI 9, ¶27, 315 Wis.2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 ("'A
review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning
analysis' because it is part of the context in which we
interpret statutory terms." (citation omitted)). If we
determine the statute's plain meaning through this
methodology, we go no further. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d
633, ¶45 ("If the meaning of the statute is plain,
we ordinarily stop the inquiry." (internal marks and
citation omitted)). See generally Daniel R. Suhr,
Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev.
969 (2017) .

a.
Applicability of Wis.Stat. § 801.50(3) (a)

¶16
The presenting question is whether the general or specific
appellate venue rule of Wis.Stat. § 752.21 is operative
in this case. According to the express terms of that statute,
the answer depends on whether the circuit court venue was
"designated by the plaintiff" pursuant to Wis.Stat.
§ 801.50(3)(a). This statute, in turn, says that:

Except as provided in pars, (b) and (c), [8] all actions in
which the sole defendant is the state, any state board or
commission, or any state officer, employee, or agent in an
official capacity shall be venued in the county designated by
the plaintiff unless another venue is specifically authorized
by law. [9]

¶17
The Administrative Petitioners tell us that Wis.Stat. §
801.50(3)(a) cannot apply at all to these proceedings for two
reasons.[10] First, they say it applies to
"actions, " not "special proceedings"
(like judicial review of administrative agency decisions) .
And second, they say § 801.50(3) (a) cannot apply
because they were "petitioners" in the circuit
court, and the statute refers only to "plaintiffs."

¶18
With respect to the first objection, it is true that §
801.50(3) (a) refers only to "actions." But that
term encompasses "special proceedings" as well:
"Proceedings in the courts are divided into actions and
special proceedings, " and "[i]n chs. 801 to 847,
'action' includes 'special proceeding' unless
a specific provision of procedure in special proceedings
exists." Wis.Stat. § 801.01(1). The rules of civil
procedure apply to both types of proceedings: "Chapters
801 to 847 govern procedure and practice in circuit courts of
this state in all civil actions and special proceedings
whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity or of statutory
origin except where different procedure is prescribed by
statute or rule." § 8 01.01(2); Wagner v. State
Med. Examining Bd., 181 Wis.2d 633, 639, 511 N.W.2d 874
(1994) ("[W]hen a conflict occurs between the rules of
civil procedure and ch. 227, the dictates of ch. 227 must
prevail."); State ex rel. Town of Delavan v. Cir.
Ct. for Walworth Cty., 167 Wis.2d 719, 725, 482 N.W.2d
899 (1992) ("As chs. 801 to 847 apply to special
proceedings, sec. 801.58(7) necessarily applies to ch. 227
judicial reviews, unless foreclosed by different procedure
prescribed by ch. 227.") .

¶19
Therefore, in the absence of a contrary provision in chapter
227, it does not matter that the Administrative Petitioners
commenced this case as a "special proceeding"
rather than as an "action." Nor is this the first
time we have used Wis.Stat. § 801.50 in the specific
type of special proceeding known as "judicial
review." See, e.g., Prow v. Schwarz,
225 Wis.2d 362, 367, 592 N.W.2d 623 (1999), as amended on
denial of reconsideration (June 25, 1999) (§ 801.50
controlling venue in certiorari review proceeding);
Aparacor, Inc. v. PILHR, 97 Wis.2d 399, 407, 293
N.W.2d 545 (1980) (§ 801.50 controlling venue in
judicial review proceeding); Johnson v. Berge, 2003
WI.App. 51, ¶11 n.3, 260 Wis.2d 758, N.W.2d 418
("The trial court may consider whether to transfer the
entire case to Dane County pursuant to Wis.Stat. §
801.52, or whether to transfer Johnson's Wis.Stat. ch.
227 claim to Dane County and itself resolve Johnson's
other issues.") . The Administrative Petitioners
provided no authority for the proposition that §
801.50(3) cannot apply to judicial review of an agency
decision. Nor did they even acknowledge our opinions in
Aparacor, Inc. or Prow.

¶20
The second objection gives us no reason to doubt the
applicability of Wis.Stat. § 801.50(3) (a) because the
party denominations have no significance in this case. It is
standard practice to refer to the one who files the
initiating document in a special proceeding (such as a
petition for judicial review) as a "petitioner."
And that, by itself, has never ousted chapters 801 through
847 from their authoritative role. See Wis. Indus. Energy
Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89,
¶¶1, 13, 342 Wis.2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240 (applying
Wis.Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 to petition for judicial
review under both Wis.Stat. § 196.41 and Wis.Stat.
§ 227.52); Prow, 225 Wis.2d at 362-66 (applying
Wis.Stat. § 801.50 even though parties were denominated
as "petitioner" and "respondent");
Town of Pelavan, 167 Wis.2d at 721 (holding that
Wis.Stat. § 801.58(7) applies in a ch. 227 judicial
review; also applying Wis.Stat. § (Rule) 809.61);
Wis.'s Envtl. Pecade, Inc. v. PILHR, 104 Wis.2d
640, 644, 312 N.W.2d 749 (1981) (applying Wis.Stat. §
808.05(1) in case involving an underlying petition for
review). The Administrative Petitioners cite no authority for
the proposition that this difference in nomenclature has any
effect on the applicability of this statute. Consequently,
§ 801.50 applies to judicial review of an agency
decision-but only so long as it does not contradict a
relevant chapter 227 provision.

¶21
And that brings us to the third venue-related statute of
interest. The respondents say Wis.Stat. § 227.53(1) (a)
3. conflicts with, and negates, a petitioner's ability to
"designate" venue pursuant to Wis.Stat. §
801.50(3) (a) by requiring that it file its petition in its
county of residence. Specifically, § 227.53(1) (a)3.
says that "[i]f the petitioner is a resident, the
proceedings shall be held in the circuit court for the county
where the petitioner resides." This is important
because, if the respondents are right, then the
Administrative Petitioners could not have
"designated" venue for the circuit court
proceedings, ...

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