In war room, Obama honed troops' exit

Insider accounts show how Afghanistan strategy was born

WASHINGTON — It started out as advice from the military, intended only for the ears of the president and his top advisers. But in a war council meeting at the White House less than a month ago, President Barack Obama proposed making it public.

"Let's name that date," he said on Nov. 11, according to participants.

And then on Tuesday, he did.

The date, July 2011, is when the Afghan surge is supposed to be working well enough that some soldiers can start to come home.

Revealing that key marker on the U.S. military timeline has emerged as the most controversial component of the president's plan, attracting criticism from Capitol Hill and sowing anxiety among allies overseas.

It was also a contentious idea within the Pentagon. The date was first discussed as part of internal planning. The idea of sending a signal to enemies and allies alike that the U.S. was already planning a pull-out was of particular concern to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a key member of the war council.

Gates backed the plan once he felt he had adequate assurances that the pace of the U.S. military withdrawal would be determined by commanders, based on conditions on the ground.

Obama opted to take the highly unusual step, senior aides said, because in the end, administration officials believed the need to put tangible pressure on the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan outweighed any potential cost.

As Obama's aides coalesced around the plan in recent weeks they gave it a name -- "max leverage" -- that summed up its goal: Getting the greatest possible impact from 30,000 additional soldiers in the shortest amount of time.

The plan grew out of meetings chaired by Obama that began in September and lasted until the final one, before Thanksgiving, to forge a new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Under the previous U.S. approach, approved in March, the situation was deteriorating. The top U.S. commander sounded grim warnings and requested reinforcements.

For September and most of October, Obama conducted weekly think tank sessions on the situation, demanding new reports every few days and drilling his war council with questions.

Aides say he kept his own cards close to his vest, urging advisers to debate one another while he listened.

During a meeting in the last week of October, Obama began to zero in on the timing of an emerging troop surge, signaling that he wanted more troops moving into the region faster than military brass had proposed.

One succinct exchange would prove portentous. Based on an ongoing Pentagon analysis of its own plans, the president wanted to know when the effects of the new strategy would become apparent.

"When will we know that our concept is working?" Obama asked, recalled one official who was present.

"Our best sense," replied Gates, "will be in late 2010 and into mid-2011." By the accounts of senior officials in the Obama administration, that day's discussion set the tone for all that would come.

Two weeks later, Obama delayed his scheduled departure to Asia in part so he could drive home those points with his advisers.

On Veterans Day, after laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns, Obama convened his war council for the eighth time.

By this time, the staff was ready to present timelines. In a slide presentation projected onto a screen in the Situation Room, the group looked at a bell-curve graph projecting troop build-up over time -- a few at first, then an increasing flow that would crest and trickle off.

To emphasize his desire to speed up the deployment, the president held up a printout copy of the bell curve and pointed to its apex, where the peak of the flow was located.

"He says, 'I want to move this to the left,'" as one official recounted it, speaking on condition of anonymity. "'We need more troops in sooner.'"

Gen. David Petraeus, chief of U.S. forces in the Middle East, told the president that, yes, the military could pull off the surge he was requesting. "We did so in Iraq," Petraeus said. "We can do so again."

On the question of taking troops out, the president had grown more adamant about sending a clear signal to the Afghan leadership that their government would have to actively prepare to take over responsibility for their country's security.

"Gates has given him the date" by which results could be measured, said a second senior administration official, referring to the late 2010, mid-2011 time frame. "The president says: 'Let's name that date.'"

The logic was simple, as Obama made the case. He wanted to send a clear signal that the U.S. was not writing a "blank check" guaranteeing military support for an indefinite period of time. This, he believed, was the most effective way to ensure the Afghans took him seriously.

Aides knew he was serious too. Not long after Obama took off for Asia he called Gates from Air Force One.

Obama specifically asked him to work on the two-pronged plan: more troops in faster, and a date certain for drawdown to begin. It would maximize U.S. leverage, he said.