Chicken bought at major supermarkets across Canada is frequently contaminated with superbugs — bacteria that many antibiotics cannot kill — an investigation by CBC TV’s Marketplace has found.

Marketplace researchers — along with their colleagues at Radio-Canada’s food show L’Epicerie — bought 100 samples of chicken from major grocery chains in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal… The 100 samples were sent to a lab for analysis. Two-thirds of the chicken samples had bacteria. That in itself is not unusual — E. coli, Salmonella and Campylobacter are often present in raw chicken.

What was surprising was that all of the bacteria uncovered during the Marketplace sampling were resistant to at least one antibiotic. Some of the bacteria found were resistant to six, seven or even eight different types of antibiotics.

“This is the most worrisome study I’ve seen of its kind,” said Rick Smith, the head of Environmental Defence, a consumer advocacy group.

I haven’t had time to watch the full program, but no question I think this kind of reporting is worth doing. Nothing brings the threat of agricultural antibiotic use home to people like showing them that resistant bacteria are living on the meat they might have brought home last night.

One important point, though: Don’t think for a moment this is just a Canadian problem.

E. coli from chicken exhibited high rates of resistance to ciprofloxacin (62.5%) followed by lamb/goat (10.9%), pork (15.7%), and beef (27.9%) meat. Resistance to nitrofurantoin dominated in the lamb/goat isolates (60%). Resistance to tetracycline predominated in pork (68.2%) and chicken (62.5%), and resistance to aminoglycosides dominated in lamb/goat meat isolates. S. aureus resistance to clindamycin predominated in lamb/goat isolates (50%), whereas resistance to ciprofloxacin predominated in the pork strains, but no resistance to methicillin was observed. Of the enterococci isolates 21.1% were resistant to vancomycin. High resistance to ampicillin (96%) was observed in Y. enterocolitica and all of the C. jejuni isolates were resistant to ampicillin, cephalothin, and cefuroxime. These results indicate that meat can be a source of resistant bacteria, which could potentially be spread to the community through the food chain.

Oh, but none of those countries are the United States, you say. Then take a look at these:

Those graphics come from a little-read report put out every year by the US Food and Drug Administration as part of its participation in NARMS, the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System that’s shared by the FDA, USDA and CDC. The FDA handles the part of NARMS that looks for resistant bacteria in meat (CDC does human illnesses, USDA does live animals), and the figures above show the percentages of Salmonella and enterococci that were found in retail chicken breasts between 2002 and 2008 (the most recent report) and were resistant to various drugs. The bar along the bottom of each figure shows the major drug classes. So in 2008: 45% of Salmonella on chicken were resistant to tetracycline and 30% to penicillins; among enterococci (common gut bacteria, and therefore common contaminants of meat during slaughtering), 65% resistant to tetracycline and more than 90% to lincosamides, which include the everyday drug clindamycin.

38.2% of chicken breast Salmonella isolates were resistant to ≥ 3 antimicrobial classes in 2008 compared to 51% in ground turkey, an increase in both from previous years. From 2002–2007, multidrug resistance to ≥ 3 antimicrobial classes ranged from 20–34.4% among chicken breast and 20.3–42.6% for ground turkey. More than 15% of chicken breast and ground turkey isolates showed resistance to ≥ 4 classes in 2008.

So, just to underline: Multi-drug resistant superbugs aren’t only on chicken in Canada; if you buy chicken in the United States, they are more than likely on your chicken too.

And whatever country they are occurring in, the solution is the same. Drug-resistant bacteria in food won’t diminish until we reduce the amount of drugs that food animals receive while they are raised.

Update: At Grist’s Meat Wagon, Tom Philpott very kindly points out that I actually broke the news of the latest NARMS report, which I didn’t realize (it was a busy day; see my next post for why). Apparently the report was posted to the FDA web site on Dec. 17, but neither of us can find any evidence that it was publicized, such as a press release on the FDA’s press site. His larger point is important:

We find out from the report that the FDA has been monitoring the situation since 2002 — and finding plenty of antibiotic-resistant strains on meat sold directly to consumers. And they’ve been sharing the information with other leading regulatory/public health agencies — but not so much to the people they’re supposed to be protecting and informing: i.e., us. … six weeks since the FDA report and a year since Sharfstein’s testimony [in 2010, promising scrutiny by the Obama adminsitration – m.], policy hasn’t moved at all. Where are the loud public statements from the FDA trumpeting the fact that our factory farms are cooking up superbugs that make their way to our meat? Where’s the USDA on this topic, which is supposed to protect the public from tainted meat? Where’s CDC?

What if there were a food whose consumption carried a predictable risk of contracting a fatal illness?

What if consumption of that food were so deeply embedded in a culture that there was no chance of stopping people from eating it?

That’s not a hypothetical. It’s the dilemma facing Arctic indigenous communities and health authorities over the risk of botulism from traditional foods — raw fish, whale, seal, walrus or beaver — that are “cured” by being wrapped, buried and left to rot. Alaskan Natives and Canadian First Nations members have eaten them since some lost time in their history: They’re full of minerals, vitamins and beneficial fatty acids, fresh-food nutrients that are in short supply when the world is frozen over and dark.

The traditional foods aren’t fermented, strictly speaking; they’re decayed in an airless environment. That makes them friendly breeding grounds for Clostridium botulinum, the organism that produces botulism toxin. Since 1947, according to two newpapers in Clinical Infectious Diseases, there have been 317 cases (159 small outbreaks) of foodborne botulism just in Alaska, as tracked by the Indian Health Service and the Alaska Division of Public Health. Out of the 317 individual cases in those records, 8.2 percent died of the paralysis of botulism poisoning.

Measured against the population, the rate of botulism in Alaska is 836 times what it is in the Lower 48. It’s such a persistent problem that the Alaska division spends scarce funds to maintain a 24-hour botulism emergency line.

There’s something interesting hidden in those numbers: Since the 1970s, the incidence of foodborne botulism has been increasing. That’s roughly coincident with the point at which Native communities began a transition that must have looked like a good idea, from

placing meat and fat tissues into skin bags … which are sewn shut and aged for weeks or months under rocks or buried under gravel

to

us(ing) either plastic bags or buckets, metal barrels, or glass containers in place of the skin pouch. (Austin and Leclair)

It turns out that something in the modern materials may have increased the possibility of C. botulinum growth: maybe the temperature differential, since they are more likely to be kept above ground; maybe the lack of contact with soil microorganisms. (A hypothesis-generating experiment showed that salmon heads kept for 17 days in a plastic container produced botulinum toxin, but salmon heads buried in a moss-lined pit did not.) One of the papers notes:

Among outbreaks for which a preservation process was described, 67% (56 of 84) were associated with storage of food in sealed plastic or glass containers, 23% (19 of 84) with storage in wood or cardboard containers, 6% (5/84) with storage in sealed metal containers, 4% (3/84) with storage in moss- or tundra-covered holes, and 1% (1/84) with storage in a sealskin bag. (Fagan et al.)

The cured foods are so intricately tied to family, tribe and place that repeated rounds of public health education haven’t dislodged them from Inuit culture. One paper notes, rather wistfully:

…an educational botulism video was distributed to all rural schools and medical facilities in Alaska, but 1 year after distribution, only 38% of Alaska Native adults had seen the video, and no behavior changes were noted that might reduce risk for botulism. (Fagan et al.)

But modernity might yet prove the cure, in two dimensions. First, the mortality rate from botulism is going down, to less than 4 percent in recent years, probably because cases are recognized and antitoxin distributed faster than in decades past. Second, and probably more important in the long run, the taste for traditional foods may be passing from Native culture. Of those 317 cases,

If younger generations of Inuit no longer care for traditional foods, the risk of botulism will naturally diminish: no anaerobically rotted salmon heads, no Clostridium, no deaths. It ought to be something to rejoice in. I wonder though. There’s something especially compelling about foods tinged with risk; think of foraged mushrooms, or puffer fish. Inuit foods — which, I confess, I can’t quite imagine eating — must have offered deliciousness and danger, and comfort, and memory. It would have been a potent, and poignant, combination; for all its harms, a sad thing to lose.

Yesterday and today are early-publication days for the December issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, the free peer-reviewed journal published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (Are you reading it? Why not? Your tax dollars pay for it. Go, now.) Among many interesting stories — more on those in later posts — there are two important, complex and saddening papers updating the relentless spread of the “Indian supergene,” New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase or NDM-1.

(Pause for commentary: I hope we’ve put to rest by now the canard that naming this gene after New Delhi indicates some secret agenda to inflict stigma on the subcontinent’s burgeoning medical-tourism industry. It is a long-standing convention that the acquired metallo-beta-lactamases are named for their point of origin: Holland, Singapore, Germany, et al. You don’t see Vienna complaining, do you? ‘Nuf said.)

A brief recap, for those who spent August focused on something more interesting that bacterial resistance: NDM-1 is a gene that produces an enzyme that confers resistance on gram-negative bacteria to almost all the drugs used to treat them. The American Type Culture Collection, which sells isolates for research, recently published the table of resistance results, and it’s phenomenal: All Rs, all the way down. It was first identified in 2008 in a native of India, resident in Sweden, who had been hospitalized while on a visit back home; then found in the UK in 2009; and then found in the US in June this year. It renders bacteria that are common causes of hospital-acquired infections — Klebsiella, Acinetobacter, E. coli — resistant to all but one or two drugs. It’s extremely bad news. (My NDM-1 posts are here.)

It’s been clear since 2009 that NDM-1 is spreading around the world with great speed. The newest papers in EID confirm that and fill in the details — and wow, some of them are so sad.

One of the frustrations of being a working journalist and a blogger is that, when a big blog-story breaks, you’re likely already to be working on something else. And so it is, unfortunately, with NDM-1: I’m on a magazine assignment and will be off interviewing people when I should be blogging.

(This s a great time to recommend that, for any breaking infectious disease news, you follow Crof at H5N1 (@crof) and Michael Coston at Avian Flu Diary (@Fla_Medic), who are dedicated, thoughtful, nimble and smart.)

Since I last posted, there’s been lots of additional coverage of the “Indian superbug.” Much of it, blog and media, is just echo chamber cannibalizing of the earliest reports (including but certainly not only mine), but there are some important new developments worth noting, which I’ll list below.

There are also some important points that are getting lost in the echo-chamber bounce: First, it is not correct to say that every person who acquired this was seeking cheap medical care or engaged in medical tourism; a few of them were treated on an emergency basis while traveling, and a few have no apparent healthcare tie. So this is not a situation of people seeking to save money and, as some commenters seem to be suggesting, receiving their karmic payback. (C’mon: Seriously?) Second, it is also not correct to say that every case of this has been linked to a hospital — it’s quite clear in the Lancet ID paper that in South Asia, a number of the cases were community infections. So it is not just a case of hospitals that are dirty or have poor infection control (which by the way is a problem in the US as well, right?); NDM-1 is already a community bug, which will make detection and defense much more complex.

OK, curated list:

First, if you’re interested in more from me, CNBC asked me to write up a piece about NDM-1, which ran Thursday; and Friday morning I was on the WNYC-FM (and nationally syndicated) radio show The Takeaway.

Second, the list of potential victims of NDM-1 is growing. Most of them have survived, so marking their cases is really a way of measuring the resistance factor’s previously undetected spread:

The UK has released a new statement, updating its earlier warning, and says it has found “around 50” cases carrying NDM-1, an update from the Lancet ID paper. (Side note: This statement, and the earlier warnings, came from the UK’s Health Protection Agency. The UK has just announced that it will be shutting down that agency in a cost-cutting measure. Great timing.)

The government of Hong Kong has announced that it has seen one case of NDM-1, but the patient recovered.

Canada has disclosed that it has had two cases, not the one mentioned in the Lancet ID editorial, in two different provinces.

Australia says that it has had three cases scattered across the country.

And finally — sadly but probably not surprisingly — India is objecting to the stigma of being characterized as the source of NDM-1. The study’s first author has disassociated himself from the paper and members of the government are claiming a “pharma conspiracy.” Medical tourism has become a significant industry in India, and it is true some of these reports cast doubt on its safety. But still, I find this reaction disappointing.

Evading the stigma of an emerging disease is not a new impulse: Recall how the government of China suppressed for 6 months the news of the start of the SARS epidemic. They did not stop the epidemic, of course — it eventually sicked more than 8000 people across the globe and killed about 775 — but their suppression of the details of its spread kept other jurisdictions from mounting a defense in time. From my teaching gigs in Hong Kong I can testify how much bitterness endures in Hong Kong over this.

China’s actions in 2002-03 led to the enactment of the new International Health Regulations by the WHO, which specify that, because expanding epidemics take no notice of borders, it is inappropriate for any government to attempt to impede the free flow of information about their spread. India is a signatory to the IHRs.

I am not suggesting that India is attempting any suppression of news about NDM-1 — there’s no evidence of that — but the volatile language being used does concern me. I acknowledge that India is an extremely open society, with degrees of political expression that can sound surprising from this distance. But let’s hope the government takes its commitment to the IHRs as seriously as any signatory should.

Hi, everyone. Apologies for dropping out of sight! As SUPERBUG’s publication draws closer (and it’s very close now), I keep finding new tasks that I have do to. Last week’s was to go to New York to shoot a video for the Simon & Schuster website — and while there, I got caught in Snowpocalypse, got delayed coming home, and picked up a nasty cold. So I’m a bit behind.

But there’s exciting news tonight to start us up again: “pig MRSA,” ST398, causing human infections in Canada and Denmark.

From the January issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, published by the CDC (and therefore free. Must I keep urging you to read it? Go, already), here’s a roundup of bad news about bad bugs.

In Canada, researchers from that country’s Public Health Agency have found a “strong correlation” between the use of ceftiofur, a third-generation cephalosporin, in chickens; the rates of a resistant strain of Salmonella in chickens; and the appearance of that same strain in humans. The strain is Salmonella enterica serovar Heidelberg, one of the most common salmonella strains in North America, and one which can be nasty: It may cause mild illness, but also causes septicemia and myocarditis and can kill. Quebec created an unplanned natural experiment: Hatcheries there were broadly using ceftiofur until 2004, backed off from its use in 2005 and 2006, and then began using it again in 2007 in response to a growing problem with a particular infection. When the drug was withdrawn, resistant infections in birds and humans plunged; when it was reintroduced, they rose again. (Look at the black and red lines in the graph above left.)

Meanwhile, broiler chickens in Iceland are passing fluoroquinolone-resistant E. coli to humans there. Researchers at the University of Iceland were puzzled by an earlier finding that bacteria resistant to fluoroquinolones (a family that includes the human drug Cipro) were increasing among chickens raised in Iceland, despite strict controls on antibiotic use in food animals and stringent disinfection in chicken batteries after cohorts of birds were sold for slaughter and removed. They have two findings: The source of the resistant bacteria in the birds appears to be feed contaminated with resistant E. coli; and resistant bacteria in Iceland residents are microbiologically indistinguishable from those in the birds. Because E. coli is a very diverse organism, the very close resemblance between the isolates from chickens and the isolates from humans pins chickens as the likely source.

And just to make clear we’re not blaming every microbiological evil on farming: Seagulls in Portugal have been found carrying multi-drug resistant E. coli in their feces. The public health concern here is obvious: Just think back to the last time you were at a beach, or anywhere else seagulls frequent, and envision a seagull perch — and the masses of seagull droppings streaking it. Now imagine those droppings transmitting antibiotic-resistant E. coli into the surrounding environment: the boardwalk, the beach, the towels… Additional problem: Seagulls are migratory birds, so the resistant bacteria easily cross borders and oceans.

Constant readers, those of you who follow the pressing issue of MRSA in animals will know the work of J. Scott Weese, DVS, associate professor of pathobiology at the University of Guelph in Ontario and supervising author of manycrucialpapers on MRSA in food and companion animals, including the first finding of MRSA in pigs and pig farmers in North America.

You may not know that Weese and his postdoc Maureen Anderson publish an excellent blog on veterinary and zoonotic diseases called Worms and Germs. This weekend they have an important post that deserves wider attention: Antibiotics: A Dose of Common Sense. In it, they propose that one way to reduce the overuse of drugs in food animals is to make animal antibiotics prescription-only. It’s worth taking the time to read it.

Those of you in the cities may not know this, but out here in the Great Flyover, antibiotics for veterinary use are surprisingly easy to buy (as I discovered when I stumbled into a farm-related store in search of a Carhartt jacket against the Minnesota winter). They’re not even over-the-counter — they’re on the shelf, or stacked on the floor with the implements and feed, or blended into the feed itself. And as Weese points out in this post, they are also available without prescription over the Internet (as human antibiotics are too).

It’s a potentially controversial proposal: I don’t think I have any farming readers, but I would imagine their response would start with an objection to the extra cost of hiring a veterinarian to assess whatever situation might require the drugs. And since most farmers (NB: not the overarching ag-biz companies, but the farmers themselves) exist on razor-thin economic margins, they would have a point. But as we know from the excellent work of Extending the Cure and the Center for a Livable Future, unnecessary antibiotic use comes with a cost as well — one that is borne by all of us when antimicrobial resistance prevents antibiotics from working.