This matter came before this Court pursuant to decisions and
recommendations of the Supreme Court Disciplinary Board (board)
that respondent, Joseph A. Cozzolino (respondent) be sanctioned for
misconduct in the course of the practice of law. Article III, Rule
6(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provides
in pertinent part: "If the Board determines that a proceeding * * *
should be concluded by public censure, suspension or disbarment, it
shall submit its findings and recommendations, together with the
entire record, to this Court. This Court shall review the record
and enter an appropriate order."

On July 3, 2001, this Court suspended respondent from the
practice of law for an indefinite period, and determined that we
would not consider any application for reinstatement until all his
then-pending disciplinary matters had been resolved. See In re
Cozzolino, 774 A.2d 891 (R.I.2001). Since that date the board has
heard three formal proceedings, involving complaints filed against
respondent by four clients. The respondent appeared pro se in these
proceedings. He was given the opportunity to present evidence on
his behalf, and in each of the proceedings he presented mitigation
testimony. The board made findings of fact and submitted a
recommendation of discipline in each matter. All respondent's
pending disciplinary matters before the board have now been
concluded.

After the decisions of the board were filed in this Court, we
ordered respondent to appear to show cause why he should not be
disciplined. The respondent appeared pro se before this Court on
October 10, 2002. After hearing the arguments of counsel and
examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion
that cause has not been shown and that respondent should be
disciplined. However, we decline to adopt the disciplinary
recommendations of the board and hereby disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The material facts supporting our decision are as
follows.

In January 2000, Darlene Look (Look) hired respondent to file a
petition for divorce on her behalf in the State of Connecticut,
where he also is licensed to practice. Look paid the agreed-upon
retainer fee of $1,000 in two installments, with the last payment
and the necessary information for filing the divorce provided to
respondent in February 2000. The respondent never initiated divorce
proceedings on her behalf.

On March 3, 2000, Look was served with a divorce petition that had
been filed by her husband in Rockville County, Connecticut. The
divorce petition had a return date of March 21, 2000. Look
delivered the petition to respondent, who advised her that he would
file an answer, counterclaim and motion for temporary orders on her
behalf. It is undisputed that respondent did not file these
pleadings in Rockville County. The respondent asserted, however,
that he filed those pleadings in another county.

Look placed at least ten telephone calls to respondent between
March and June 2000 to determine the status of her case. The
respondent did not return any of those calls. In June 2000, she
mailed to him a certified letter wherein she advised him that she
was hiring a new lawyer, and requested a refund of her retainer and
the return of her file. That letter was returned to Look by the
United States Postal Service marked "unclaimed."

On July 31, 2000, Look filed a complaint against respondent with
the board. The board forwarded a copy of the complaint to
respondent requesting that he provide an answer to the allegations.
No response was received. The board forwarded a second request. The
respondent did not respond with an answer until twenty-seven days
later. A hearing on the substantive charges eventually was held. On
the day of the hearing, almost five months after the formal charges
were filed and approximately one year from the time Look requested
the return of her retainer, respondent refunded her $500. He later
made an additional refund of the remaining $500.

The board concluded that respondent violated Article V, Rules 1.3,
1.4(b), 1.17(d), and 8.1(b) of the Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct. (fn1) Cognizant of respondent's extensive
disciplinary history, the board recommended that respondent's
misconduct warranted a nine-month suspension from the practice of
law, subordinate to the indefinite suspension that he currently was
serving, and that he be required to apply for reinstatement.

In the second matter before the board, a hearing was consolidated
on complaints filed by Jean Babcock (Babcock) and Steven DiMartino
(DiMartino). On September 12, 2000, Babcock paid respondent a $500
fee to represent her incarcerated son on a motion to reduce his
sentence. The respondent did not pursue such a motion or file an
entry of appearance with the court. The public defender's office
remained the attorney of record throughout respondent's
"representation" of Babcock's son. Babcock made numerous efforts to
communicate with respondent about her son's case, but he did not
communicate with her or take any action on her son's behalf. On
March 14, 2001, Babcock wrote a letter to respondent requesting a
refund. He did not reply to that request. She filed a complaint
with the board. The respondent subsequently repaid the retainer in
two $250 installments, after formal disciplinary charges were
filed.

DiMartino hired respondent to represent him before the Family Court
relative to child custody and visitation matters and paid a
retainer fee of $250. The respondent did not take any substantive
actions on DiMartino's behalf, despite his promise to obtain a
court hearing within one month. He also did not communicate with
DiMartino or return his file, asserting that he was still
"representing" him even though he had been suspended from the
practice of law. The board concluded that respondent had
violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(b) and 1.17(d). The board recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for an indefinite
period.

The last matter before the board concerned client Anthony
Bevilacqua (Bevilacqua). Bevilacqua received a demand letter for
payment from a builder who had done work on his home, and retained
respondent to represent him in responding to that payment demand
and to initiate legal action against the builder for failing to
complete the work specified in the contract. Bevilacqua paid
respondent a $300 retainer. Bevilacqua made numerous attempts to
contact respondent, but his telephone calls were not returned.
Bevilacqua was served with a complaint filed against him by the
builder. The respondent did not answer the complaint, file a
counterclaim against the builder, or file an entry of appearance in
the civil action. A default judgment in the amount of $3,800 was
entered against Bevilacqua.

Bevilacqua obtained new counsel and attempted to set aside the
default. The respondent fully cooperated with Bevilacqua's new
counsel, and admitted that he had failed to file an answer. The
board concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4(b). The
board recommended that respondent be reprimanded. We concur with
the findings of the board. However, we do not agree with the
recommended sanctions.

Having concluded that respondent has violated his ethical
obligations in these matters, our only remaining duty is to
determine the appropriate level of discipline to impose. Our review
of the facts of these cases and respondent's past dealings with the
board and this Court lead us to conclude that the public can be
best protected by disbarring respondent from the practice of law.
See In re O'Donnell, 736 A.2d 75, 81 (R.I.1999). In fashioning an
appropriate sanction we weigh both the mitigating and aggravating
factors present in each case. See In re Fishbein, 701 A.2d 1018,
1020 (R.I.1997). The respondent's disciplinary history is
extensive. He has been admonished by the board on eight separate
occasions since 1988. The board has issued three letters of
reprimand to respondent, one in 1995, and two in 1999. On three
occasions this Court has been compelled to order respondent to
reply to disciplinary complaints under penalty of immediate
suspension. He previously has been suspended from the practice of
law for sixty days, see In re Cozzolino, 767 A.2d 71, 74
(R.I.2001), and currently is serving an indefinite suspension. See
In re Cozzolino, 774 A.2d at 893.

The respondent appeared before this Court at its conference on
October 10, 2002. After hearing his representations it is patently
clear to this Court that respondent utterly fails to grasp the
significance of his misconduct and that he is incapable of
appreciating his duties to his clients. His long history of
neglecting legal matters entrusted to his care, his chronic
inability to properly communicate with his clients, and his
persistent failure to cooperate in a timely manner with the
disciplinary process established by this Court leads us to conclude
that we must impose the most serious disciplinary sanction.

We give great deference to the recommendations forwarded to us by
the board. The volunteer lawyer and public members of the board
render a great service to this Court and the citizens of this
state, and diligently perform their often thankless tasks. However,
the final determination of the appropriate sanction in an attorney
disciplinary case rests with this Court. In this instance for the
above-stated reasons, we deviate from the recommendation of the
board, and hereby disbar respondent from the practice of law in
this state.

Finally, we note that the respondent has maintained his law office
in Rhode Island as his sole place of business, and has continued to
represent clients in the State of Connecticut during his indefinite
suspension. We believe this creates the very real possibility of
confusion about his authority to practice law in this state.
Accordingly, we direct the respondent to close his office in Rhode
Island forthwith. In addition, we hereby place all lawyers admitted
to the practice of law in this and other jurisdictions on notice
that a suspension or revocation of the right to practice law in
this state requires the closure of any office established for the
practice of law in Rhode Island.

"Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned."