'Missing' Fire Safety Officer From 9/11 Hiding in Plain Sight - May 21, 2004
A World Trade Center fire safety officer the 9/11 commission couldn't find but who could shed light on why a crucial FDNY radio channel appeared to fail is hiding in plain sight. "I live right here and I go to work every morning," said Lloyd Thompson, 48, outside his apartment in a large complex in Yonkers yesterday. (New York Post)

'Missing' Radio Worker Will Testify for 9/11 Commission - May 25, 2004
The World Trade Center official accused of failing to answer letters asking him to testify at the 9/11 commission hearings says he'll meet with commission members today. Lloyd Thompson, deputy fire safety director at 1 World Trade Center, insists he never got the panel's invitations. (New York Post )

9/11 Commission Questions Fire Chief on Radio Use During Attacks - May 16, 2004
Questions about the radio system used by the Fire Department during the World Trade Center terror attacks are being raised anew by the 9/11 commission, which has grilled a hero FDNY chief whose brother died when the buildings crumbled. (New York Post)

Fire Union Head Wants to Testify At 9/11 Commission - May 13, 2004
The city's top fire union officials have asked to testify at 9/11 commission hearings next week, but the commission says the hearings are "reserved for people in authority." (New York Post )

New York Firefighter Arrested On Federal Sex Charges
KATI CORNELL SMITH, Editorial Staff - Courtesy of The New York Post
Posted: Tue, 05/18/2004 - 12:00am Firehouse.com
RYAN HOGAN - Solicited teen sex: feds.
A rookie firefighter accused of scouring the Internet in search of sex with teenaged girls was arrested on federal charges after a cyber-vigilante group allegedly snared him in a sting operation. Ryan Hogan, 24, is accused of trying to rendezvous with a 14-year-old sex partner over the Internet

NYPD/FDNY Terror Protocol; Giuliani: Only One in Charge,
Editoral Staff Posted: Fri, 05/07/2004 - 12:00am
With a federal Sept. 11 hearing scheduled here in just two weeks, the Police and Fire departments are likely to work out a long-delayed protocol on how they handle major emergencies, several sources said.

NYPD on Alert for Truck Bombers - May 21, 2004
Cops will begin checking trucks entering the Big Apple and other major cities today after the FBI received information that terrorists may use truck bombs to attack high-profile targets like the Empire State Building, The Post has learned. NYPD and Port Authority cops will check trucks entering the city via bridges and tunnels, sources said. They will also check trucks already in the city if they look suspicious. (New York Post )

Kelly, Bloomberg Question 9/11 Commission's Judgment - May 24, 2004
Police Commissioner Ray Kelly took a parting shot at the 9/11 commission, labeling comments by panel member and former Navy Secretary John Lehman as "ludicrous" during a TV interview aired Sunday. Mayor Michael Bloomberg, speaking at Sunday's Salute to Israel Parade on Fifth Avenue, questioned the panel's right to pass judgment on New York officials. (Newsday)

"We love you, Dad, and we miss you," said Philip Hayes Jr., whose father, long retired from the Fire Department, rushed to the site that 2001 morning and ...

abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8544465&page=2

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Lloyd Thompson was deputy fire safety director in the north tower.
For several months, the national commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks has been searching in vain for a man it believes could help answer some of the most critical questions of what happened inside the World Trade Center that day. His name is Lloyd Thompson, and for much of that morning two and a half years ago he was posted at the epicenter of chaos.

As the deputy fire safety director in the complex's north tower, Mr. Thompson stood in the lobby, fielding panicked calls from those trapped on the upper floors. He struggled to make evacuation announcements over a public address system that was damaged by the plane crash. And, most significant, he had a role in overseeing a powerful piece of radio equipment that the commission believes is central to one of the core mysteries of what went wrong that day: Why did fire chiefs have such a hard time communicating with firefighters upstairs in the building?

Yesterday, weeks after the commission began sending him letters, interviewing former colleagues and checking with employers, Mr. Thompson emerged to tell his story. Contrary to what some investigators have speculated, Mr. Thompson said that he did not believe he ever touched the radio equipment known as a repeater, a device that amplifies the hand-held radios firefighters use.

The panel found that the repeater was working that day but fire chiefs mistakenly thought it was broken and stopped using it. The problem, the panel said in a report earlier this week, is that someone forgot to push a button, a mistake that created confusion about whether the repeater was working.

But the button was indeed pushed, although not by him, Mr. Thompson said yesterday as he gave an account that is at odds with the commission's leading theory on what went wrong.

"There was total chaos, and the situation at the console was not simple," he said in a telephone interview, referring to the security desk in the lobby at which he was stationed. "I think the commission will need to take a closer look at this."

Mr. Thompson's testimony is critical because communications difficulties have emerged as one of the leading problems that hindered emergency rescuers after the terrorist attack. The commission has concluded that the repeater could have provided an effective communication link among fire officials. Indeed, a fire chief in the south tower somehow later discovered that the repeater channel was working and used it to communicate as he climbed to the 78th floor.

These transmissions were captured in a tape recovered from the rubble and proved that, for at least a part of the morning, the repeater was working. But fire officials have consistently said the repeater did not work reliably enough to have been used.

At least a third of the 343 firefighters who died on Sept. 11 were in the north tower, where evacuation orders, issued before and after the collapse of the south tower, were not heard by many firefighters. On Wednesday, the families of some of those who died heckled former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as he testified before the commission because they said they did not believe he was honestly discussing the communication and other coordination problems.

Mr. Thompson said that he, too, continued to suffer the memories of that day. "The most painful thing is that they died, but I'm still alive," he said in an hour-long interview.

Mr. Thompson, who lives in Yonkers, said he wanted to rebut depictions of him as a mystery man who had made himself unavailable to the investigation. He said he never received the commission's letters or knew they were looking for him. "I was definitely not hiding. I've actually been seeking them out, not the other way around," he said. "I've been getting up every day and going to work just like a normal citizen."

Al Felzenberg, the commission's spokesman, said Mr. Thompson had left a phone message at the panel's New York office yesterday but no one from the commission had spoken to him yet. "The commission staff has tried to locate him, and I know they are looking forward to speaking with him," Mr. Felzenberg said.

Mr. Thompson, who still works as a fire safety director in a building, said the calls from the upper floors and the images from the lobby had been impossible to forget. After a year of psychological counseling, he said he still struggled with nightmares, and colleagues at work knew not to ask about what happened.

Visits to the families of the victims help in healing, he said. But he said he still could not watch video taken in the lobby that morning. "It's too painful," he said, his voice breaking.

Mr. Thompson, a fire safety director for 17 years, said he grew up in New York, dreaming of becoming a firefighter, but a spinal condition prevented him from passing the physical test. Instead, he worked as a fire safety director for private companies that help manage emergencies in buildings. He had been working in the trade center for eight years at the time of the terrorist attack and was employed by O.C.S. Security, which held the security contract.

From a command desk in the lobby, he was responsible for watching the building's various security and fire safety computer systems. A normal emergency might mean that one alarm button on the console would light, Mr. Thompson said. On Sept. 11, 2001, however, the panel was red with panic calls. "The problem was that no one had any idea what had happened," he said.

Mr. Thompson also sat near the console that operated the repeater, which was installed after the 1993 trade center bombing, when firefighters also had difficulty communicating with each other. Their radios have historically had problems sending signals in high-rise buildings because of the many layers of concrete and steel that must be pierced. The repeater was designed to boost the signal.

The repeater was in 5 World Trade Center, an adjoining building, but it could be operated from consoles in the lobbies of the north and south towers. The consoles, which looked like phones, had several buttons, one of which was pressed to turn on the system and a second that activated the handset to talk through.

The commission concluded that the second button was not pressed down, creating the perception that the repeater itself was not working when fire chiefs tested it. Consequently, the chiefs decided to switch to alternative radio channels that did not have the benefit of the booster.

Video from that morning shows Deputy Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, one of the first fire officials on the scene, asking Mr. Thompson to turn the repeater on. But Mr. Thompson said yesterday that when he looked over to check the repeater, which was about five feet from his post, it was already on. A red light that only came on when both buttons were pressed was lighted, he said, and several supervisors confirmed that the unit was operating.

But when Chief Pfeifer tested the system minutes later, he could not communicate with another chief standing nearby in the lobby. "I don't think we have the repeater," the video shows Chief Pfeifer saying to the other chief. "I pick you up on my radio, but not on the hard wire," he said, referring to the repeater's handset.

Chief Pfeifer has said he believed that he could not rely on the repeater at that point and switched to another radio channel. A spokesman for the Fire Department, Francis X. Gribbon, said yesterday: "There is overwhelming evidence that the repeater could not possibly have worked correctly and completely throughout the morning. Chief Pfeifer did not have the luxury of time to figure out what was wrong with it."

Without the boosted channel, a fire chief who tried to call units down to the north tower lobby at 9:32 a.m., about half an hour before the south tower collapsed, found that no one acknowledged his message. A second evacuation order given by Chief Pfeifer, after the south tower had collapsed, was heard by some firefighters.

Chief Pfeifer has said it was a good thing that he was not using the repeater channel when he made that announcement because the repeater antenna was damaged as the south tower collapsed, and thus no firefighters would have heard his order. Mr. Thompson agreed. "They would have been in trouble once the repeater system went down with the collapse of the first building," he said. "They would have had no other method for communicating."

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owned the trade center and installed the repeater at the Fire Department's request, has said it worked that morning. Mr. Thompson said he was not sure who was responsible for turning the repeater on.

On Monday, Mr. Thompson will release a statement of his account to the commission, said Ronald L. Kuby, his lawyer. Mr. Thompson said he hoped to move forward with plans to be married once the attention subsided. For now, he said, the anguish of Sept. 11 has returned, not just for him but for his family and fiancée.

"It's my duty to help in whatever way I can to get answers about the events that day," he said, "and I'm eager to do that. But in the end, I just want to get back to the healing process, which has taken a long time to start."

The communication failures in the north tower on Sept. 11 have been widely blamed on technical problems.

But the cause of the radio failure may have more to do with human error, not mechanical - and the human's name may be Lloyd Thompson.

The only problem is, Thompson is nowhere to be found. Thompson is a former fire patrol officer for a private security company hired by the managers of the World Trade Center at the time of the attacks.

Sept. 11 commission officials have been unable to trace him to inquire about his role that morning in enabling a "repeater" - a device that boosts radio signals to extend their reach.

After the 1993 Trade Center bombing revealed that Fire Department radios could not function up in the towers, a repeater was placed atop 5 World Trade Center.

On Sept. 11, the commission says, the repeater worked, and in the south tower, firefighters used it - even in upper floors.

The north tower was a different story. The repeater was not activated properly from that building, so the chiefs there thought it was broken and did not use it.

How that happened remains a bit of a mystery, though commission officials are convinced Thompson could shed some light on the matter.

Alan Reiss, former director of the World Trade Center, now a Port Authority deputy director, told the Commission that on Sept. 11, the chiefs responding to the south tower found the control panel and activated the repeater.

At the north tower, Deputy Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer, at the time a battalion chief, responded to a scene of chaos.

Pfeifer says he instructed a civilian fire patrol officer - Lloyd Thompson - to activate the repeater. On video shot by two French brothers that morning, Pfeifer can be seen talking to Thompson, officials said.

When he checked a few minutes later, Pfeifer found that the repeater was not working, so he assumed it was broken and resorted to two weaker channels to communicate.

That allowed him to give an evacuation order later, after the south tower collapsed, but that order reached only some firefighters. Officials agree that the repeater would have helped more firefighters hear the order to get out.

Sept. 11 commission members want to know if that repeater was ever turned on from the north tower, or if it was turned on improperly. The problem, they say, is that Thompson - who survived the attacks - is nowhere to be found.

"I have no knowledge of who actually turned it on," Reiss told the commission yesterday. "Something was wrong with the desk console. Either the volume was turned down or the right button wasn't pushed. I don't know."

At the time, Thompson worked for OCS Security, a private concern hired by developer Larry Silverstein, who had recently begun running the World Trade Center.

Officials at OCS did not return calls yesterday seeking comment.

GRAPHIC.

MIXED SIGNALS.

WHAT IS A REPEATER?.

A repeater is a radio receiver/transmitter that amplifies radio signals, extending the reach of wireless radios. Useful in congested areas, such as cities with tall buildings.

HOW DOES IT WORK?

It can be programmed to amplify select radio signals received on a designated frequency and retransmit it with more strength on another frequency.

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER

After the 1993 bombing of the twin towers, a repeater was placed atop the nine-story building at 5 World Trade Center.

Sept. 11, 2001

From the south tower, emergency personnel successfully accessed the repeater, programming it to accept and retransmit transmissions from that building.

In the north tower, the repeater system was not activated

correctly, so rescue workers were unable to hear warnings to evacuate.

The Rules of the City of New York, Local Law 5, enacted in 1973, established fire safety criteria that must be met in every high-rise building with a "Class E"-type fire alarm system (FAS). A high-rise FAS has a two-way voice system and a fire command center (FCC) in the lobby of each building. An FCC was present in each World Trade Center (WTC) tower and the other four buildings within the Plaza on September 11, 2001.

Local Law 5 also specifies that a certified fire safety director (FSD) must be present in the FCC of every high-rise office and hotel building when a box alarm is transmitted to the fire department. The FSDs, under the current law, do not have to be dedicated, meaning that they need not perform solely the job functions of fire protection and emergency action. However, the WTC building management did have a dedicated FSD, to ensure an appropriate life safety response. This dedicated FSD and a crew of nine, who made up the complex fire safety team, staffed the WTC Plaza 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Additionally, each floor had fire warden teams (FWT) consisting of fire wardens, deputy fire wardens, and searchers.

These buildings are also required to conduct fire drills every six months.

UPGRADES AFTER THE 1993 ATTACK

After the attack on the WTC in 1993, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA), which managed the complex, upgraded the FAS with a mobile fire command center that could be relocated to any building within the Plaza. The FAS was also rewired in a large continuous loop so that if one FAS sub-panel, which covered several floors, was disabled, the severed FAS sub-panel would backfeed the communications to the main FAS.

All stair towers within the WTC complex were enhanced with emergency lighting connected to a generator or a battery-pack light system. Self-illuminated signage and striping further improved the occupants' descent on the stairs.

FIRE SAFETY DIRECTOR

The FSD trains the floor fire warden team in evacuation procedures; how to use the warden phone; and how to communicate the evacuation progress. In the case of a fire, the wardens must also report the status of the fire. The FSD also trains the building's service people in emergency incident response.

Six of the nine FSDs died on September 11. Three were retired firefighters: James Corrigan, FDNY captain (ret.), Engine 320; Philip Hayes, FDNY firefighter (ret.), Engine 217; William Wren, FDNY firefighter (ret.), Ladder 166. The others were Richard Fitzsimons, Robert Mayo, and Lawrence Boisseau. Boisseau had experienced dreams several days before 9-11 about falling wreckage and people bringing massive amounts of food; he had talked of death with his wife.

EVACUATION ON 9-11

On 9-11, the WTC FSDs, the fire crew, and floor FWTs; Fire Department of New York (FDNY) firefighters; and the PA police and staff helped lead many people out of harm's way. The role of the FSDs was especially critical.

The FSDs, during the evacuation, stood fast alongside the fire department at the incident command posts in both towers. Knowing that the fire department's portable radio system was not functioning properly, when the fire department received orders to evacuate, Corrigan and a fire chief tried to make their way to the old command center to see if they could activate the intercom system and make an evacuation announcement that all emergency personnel could hear.

FSD Joseph Ward, one of the fire safety crew on duty that day, barely made it out alive. He remained at the FCC in WTC 5 until the first tower collapsed. Ward, Corrigan, and other FSDs evacuated some 30 children from the Nursery School in Building 5. The main exits were so crowded with people that the fire crew kicked out windows and carried the children to safety.

Ward became trapped—not once but twice—by crumbling ceilings. He sustained several broken ribs and a back injury. He survived, as did Kevin Horan and Lloyd Thompson.

CONFUSION AT FIRST

Michael Hurley, a PA/FSD, stationed in the South Tower, didn't really know what happened after peeking up at the North Tower. He thought it was a bomb. In the first few minutes of the attack, the initial fire alarm voice communication in the South Tower asked people to stay in place. Parts of the building, airplane debris, and victims hitting the plaza made evacuation hazardous. But all this changed when the second plane hit the South Tower. As long as the FAS was still operational, the FSDs were making announcements that the situation was serious and that occupants should evacuate immediately.

Many people who had experienced the 1993 WTC bombing began self-evacuating.

Others were confused and wanted to leave through the plaza, but the debris continued to rain down. The FSDs redirected them to the concourse level that led away from the towers and onto the Church Street side of the Plaza.

FWT MEMBERS AID EVACUATION

Some of the FWT members were killed while performing volunteer duties.

•John Griffin, on the 88th floor of the South Tower, quickly assessed the situation and began handing out wet towels for people to use as they evacuated.

•Patricia McAneney, who reportedly was rarely seen without her toy firefighter hat, was the fire warden for her floor in the North Tower.

•Mayra Valdes-Rodriques, a fire warden on the 103rd floor of the South Tower was last seen escorting people on the 78th floor toward the stairs.

•David Fodor, a fire warden on his floor in the South Tower, assisted in evacuating his entire floor.

•José Marrero, a fire warden on the 84th floor in the South Tower, was helping a man down the stairs when he got a call that someone else was trapped. He went back up.

•Rose Riso, a fire warden in the South Tower, would put on her red cap, carry a whistle, and bring a flashlight, even during fire drills. When the first plane struck the North Tower, she told all her staff, "Get out now!" She pulled a woman away from the phone, which allowed the woman to reach the lobby just seconds before the second plane hit.

•Fire Warden Ron Fazio, on the 99th floor of the South Tower, ordered his people to evacuate before the second plane hit. He held the door open for all before leaving himself. He was killed at the plaza level when he was struck by falling debris from the collapsing South Tower. His family has started a foundation named www.holdthedoor.com/ to help people with their loss.

•Since the WTC bombing in 1993, the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Company had practiced fire and full building evacuation drills above and beyond those required by code. On 9-11, evacuation was led by Fire Warden Richard Rescorla, a U.S. Army colonel (ret.), who barked out evacuation orders with his bullhorn in the smoke-filled stairwells. Only six of the company's 3,700 employees were lost that day; Rescorla was among them.

More than a dozen or so volunteer firefighters who worked full time at the WTC complex also perished.

Among those who made it out was Fire Warden Brian Clark (the South Tower, 84th Floor). Using his flashlight and whistle, he led groups of people down the stairs. On the 81st floor, they encountered a trapped victim. While the groups continued to proceed down the stairs, Clark and another person pulled the victim out from under wreckage. All three made it out alive.

TEMPORARY MEDICAL STATION

One Chase Manhattan Plaza, which was several blocks east, became a temporary medical station for those evacuating the WTC. The medical staff for J.P. Morgan Chase assisted many people who had been injured that day. Barbara Sauro, RN, treated many patients who had glass embedded in their bodies, a person with a severed foot, and one with internal injuries after having been tossed through the air. Sauro recalls that there were so many types of noises in the area that she never heard the second tower come down.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND OTHER NEIGHBORING BUILDINGS

During the early stages of the WTC attack, a full building evacuation was taking place at 37-story Deutsche Bank (130 Liberty Street), directly across the street from the South Tower. The building sustained heavy collateral damage from falling debris. A large section of the WTC tubular exterior wall had pierced through nine floors, and the spearing section was hanging precariously over the street for the first few weeks of the incident. While extinguishing some small fires on the rooftop of this building, a fire brigade member witnessed firsthand the second plane hit the South Tower.

The entire facade of a City University of New York building was ripped off. The building, just newly renovated, was scheduled to open later that week. Buildings in the immediate area of the Plaza built of materials with more fire resistance, in accordance with the 1938 Code, sustained very little damage.

•The 32-story Verizon Telephone Building, which stood between the collapsed WTC 7 and in the shadow of the North Tower, sustained very little exterior damage. The Federal Building had little exterior damage, and the 90 West Street building at the corner of West and Liberty streets was heavily damaged by fire but did not collapse. None of the area buildings constructed under the old code sustained as much damage as the lightweight buildings in the immediate area.

FSDA ASSISTANCE

During the first few days and weeks that followed the 9-11 destruction, the High-Rise Fire Safety Directors Association (FSDA) responded to several requests for assistance from the FDNY Special Operations Command. One of the earlier requests was for help in identifying a stair tower in which several victims were found. In the floor plans FDNY had, the stairs were designated by number (Stair 1, for example). Over the years, all stairs had come to be identified with a letter of the alphabet, such as "Stair A." Several attempts were made to obtain current building plans from the PA. The PA said it had already given the plans to the command post. The question then became, which command post—the City Police Department, the PA Police Department, or the Office of Emergency Management? Retired FDNY Chief Larry Byrnes was able to provide the information concerning stair identifications the same day. He responded from his home with an extra set of current blueprints.

Concerned with hazardous conditions such as the wind's effects on the remaining panes of broken glass and the conditions of the facades of the surrounding structures, the FSDA network was asked to contact individual FSDs and ask them to report to their respective buildings to help erect scaffolding and tarps that would enwrap the buildings and help alleviate unsafe conditions.

FUTURE HIGH-RISE CODES

Earlier this year, the FSDA appointed a task force to address new code requirements for high-rise buildings. The events surrounding the tragedy of 9-11 have heightened the public's concerns pertaining to the safety of high-rise buildings. This anxiety has manifested itself as deep-rooted apprehension, a perceived vulnerability.

The task force, whose members apply the vigor of this law on a daily basis, recognized that the new challenges created a need to address those issues that can be characterized as "changing circumstances" and that the local law should not remain a static entity. Instead, it must include, but not be limited to, changes such as the following: a dedicated fire safety director who shall be responsible solely for life safety and emergency actions; full high-rise building evacuations for emergencies other than fire; compartmentation limited to 5,000 square feet; a fully functional radio communications system for first responders within the high-rise; a rescue air-support system; a dedicated waterproof fire service elevator that has a low pressurized system to remove smoke; self-illuminated signs and directional arrows within the stair tower; increased fire protection for structural components; and a high-rise building intelligence tactical sheet (BITS) to enhance fire department field operations.

Bibliography
"Portraits of Grief," New York Times, Oct. 2001 – July 2002.
"Loss and Reco

JACK J. MURPHY JR. is the fire marshal (ret.) and former deputy chief of the Leonia (NJ) Fire Department. He has a master's degree in education and several undergraduate degrees, including those in industrial technology and fire science. Murphy is an editorial board advisory member for Fire Engineering and the FDIC coordinator for classroom education, is vice-chairman of the New York City Fire Safety Directors Association, and was the charter president of the Bergen County (NJ) Fire Chiefs Association. He is the author of RICS/Rapid Incident Command System (Fire Engineering, 1998). He also serves on the John Jay College (NY) Board of Directors for the Fire Safety Foundation and is an honorary FDNY battalion chief.

Firefighters on New York's streets on September 11, 2001.Picture:Reuters

Lloyd Thompson's testimony may change the way we understand the World Trade Centre's last day. By Ian Urbina and Kevin Flynn.

For several months, the commission investigating the September 11 attacks has been searching in vain for a man it believes could answer some of the critical questions of what happened inside the World Trade Centre that day. His name is Lloyd Thompson, and for much of that morning in 2001 he was at the epicentre of the chaos.

As deputy fire safety director in the complex's north tower, Mr Thompson stood in the lobby, fielding calls from those trapped on the upper floors. He struggled to make announcements over a public address system damaged by the planes' impacts. And, most significantly, he had a role in overseeing a piece of radio equipment that the commission believes is central to one of the day's mysteries: why did fire chiefs have such a hard time communicating with firefighters upstairs?

On Friday, weeks after the commission began sending him letters and checking with employers, Mr Thompson emerged to tell his story. Contrary to some speculation, he said he did not believe he ever touched the radio equipment known as a repeater, designed to amplify the hand-held radios firefighters use.

The panel has found that the repeater was working that day but fire chiefs mistakenly thought it was broken. The problem, the panel said in a report earlier this week, is that someone forgot to push a button and, with that oversight, created confusion about the device's status.

But the button was indeed pushed, although not by him, Mr Thompson said on Friday as he gave an account that is at odds with the commission's leading theory on what went wrong.

"There was total chaos and the situation at the console was not simple," he said in an interview, referring to the desk in the lobby at which he was stationed. "I think the commission will need to take a closer look at this."

The commission has concluded that the repeater could have been an effective tool to link commanders in the lobby with fire companies on the upper floors. Indeed, a fire chief in the south tower later discovered it was working and used it to communicate as he climbed to the 78th floor. These transmissions were captured on a tape. But fire officials have consistently said the repeater did not work reliably enough to be used.

At least a third of the 343 firefighters who died on September 11 were in the north tower, where evacuation orders, issued before and after the collapse of the south tower, were not heard by many.

Mr Thompson said he continued to be strongly affected by the memories of that day. "The most painful thing is that they died, but I'm still alive," he said in an hour-long interview.

He said he wanted to rebut recent depictions of him as a mystery man who had made himself unavailable to the investigation. He said he never received the commission's letters or knew they were looking for him.

Mr Thompson had been working in the World Trade Centre for eight years and was employed by OCS Security. From a desk in the lobby, he was responsible for the building's security and fire safety computer systems. A normal emergency might mean one alarm button on the console would light up, he said. On September 11, 2001, the panel was red with panic calls.

The repeater, installed after the 1993 bombing of the building, was in 5 World Trade Centre, an adjoining building, but could be operated from consoles in the north and south towers. The consoles, which looked like phones, had several buttons, one of which was pressed to turn the system on and a second to activate the handset.

The commission concluded that the second button was not depressed, creating the perception that the repeater was not working. Consequently, fire chiefs decided to switch to radio channels that did not have the benefit of the booster.

Video from that morning shows deputy assistant fire chief Joseph Pfeifer asking Mr Thompson to turn the repeater on. But Mr Thompson said on Friday that when he looked over to check the console, a couple of metres from his post, it was already on. A red light that came on only when both buttons were pressed was lit, he said, and several supervisors confirmed the unit was operating.

Yet when Mr Pfeifer tested the system minutes later, he could not communicate with another chief standing nearby. He has said he believed that he could not rely on the repeater and switched to another channel. A spokesman for the Fire Department, Francis Gribbon, said on Friday: "There is overwhelming evidence that the repeater could not possibly have worked correctly and completely...Chief Pfeifer did not have the luxury of time to figure out what was wrong with it."

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Despite the fire that raged in 90 West St. for 24 hours on Sept. 11, the landmarked 1907 building designed by Cass Gilbert is structurally sound, according to the Landmarks Preservation Commission and the Lower Manhattan Development Corp.

"But it's in terrible shape inside," said Andrew Winters, director of design for L.M.D.C. Debris from the World Trade Center, a block from 90 West St. with an intervening parking lot, fell on the north face of the building; the mansard roof was severely damaged and the terra cotta ornamentation on the limestone facade was largely destroyed. The building was vacated on Sept. 11 and remains unoccupied.

Nevertheless, L.M.D.C. heeded the pleas of preservationists and included a proposal calling for restoration of the 23-story building in the preliminary blueprint for the future of Lower Manhattan, making it the only individual structure mentioned in the report.

The owner of the building, FPG 90 West, a subsidiary of Agon, a Dutch insurance company, was in the midst of a $20-million restoration on Sept. 11, according to Michael Gelfand, an architect who worked in the building for Gruzen Samton Associates.

Heather McCracken, Landmarks spokesperson, said Landmarks Chairperson Sherida Paulsen has been consulting with the owner. "They are considering options for restoration and cleaning and whether to rebuild the interior," McCracken said. Still to be decided is whether the building will be restored for commercial use or converted into a residential tower.

The Gruzen firm, with 130 employees, had moved into the third and fourth floors of 90 West St. about nine months before the World Trade Center attack, Gelfand said. "Of course the architecture and history of the building was one of the attractions for us," he said, adding that the firm spent more than $1 million building out its space at 90 West St.

"My office was on the south side and when the north tower was hit, I thought a scaffold had collapsed," said Gelfand, noting that the facade of the building was undergoing restoration at the time. But from the West St. window, he said he saw body parts on the street and a car that appeared to be cut in half. When he got to the north side of the office, Gelfand noticed what turned out to be a section of the north tower's skin with an airplane wheel embedded in it had been projected across both the Trade Center site and the parking lot, landing just in front of the Cedar St. entrance to 90 West St.

Gruzen employees evacuated the building after the second plane struck the south tower. The firm lost almost everything except for some drawings preserved in a fireproof safe and some digital data, Gelfand said. The building began burning after the towers collapsed. The upper floors and the bottom suffered the most damage, Gelfand said. Gruzen is now located at 330 W. 13th St. on a 14-year lease.

The building at 90 West St. between Albany and Cedar Sts. was designed by Gilbert shortly before he designed the Woolworth Building on Broadway. The AIA Guide to New York City says 90 West St. is "increasingly interesting and complex the higher you raise your eyes," It was designed to be seen from the harbor or from the upper floors of adjacent skyscrapers. The colonnaded and mansard-roofed top floors were opened in 1907 as Garret's Restaurant and billed as the "world's highest restaurant," a forerunner of Windows on the World, says the Guide, the latest version of which was published two years ago.

Gilbert, who moved his architectural practice from St. Paul, Minn., to New York City in 1898 designed the U.S. Custom House on Bowling Green, the Broadway Chambers building at 277 Broadway and the U.S. Courthouse at 40 Centre St., which was completed by his son, Cass Gilbert, Jr.

Monday, December 6, 2010

BY CHRISTOPHER OSTER STAFF REPORTER OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Jeffrey W. Greenberg, chairman and chief executive of Marsh & McLennan Cos., had just arrived at his midtown Manhattan office Tuesday when the first attack hit. One of his colleagues ran to his office and told him, "You need to come around and see this."
From the midtown offices of the world's biggest insurance broker, Mr. Greenberg had an unobstructed view of the towers and the unfolding horror that has affected few big companies as personally as this one.
Marsh & McLennan, which also has large consulting and money-management businesses, occupied floors 93 to 100 in the north tower, 1

WSJ: 254 employees are confirmed dead. 23 others are reported missing. Company is directing business from offices at 1166 Ave. of the Americas.

April 23, 1993, New York Times, "BankAmerica Signs A Lease for 8 Floors At the Trade Center," by Thomas J. Lueck,

The BankAmerica Corporation announced yesterday that it had signed a 15-year lease to move 1,100 workers to eight floors of Tower One of the World Trade Center.

The move by the nation's second largest bank holding company was portrayed by bank executives and government officials as a vote of confidence in the Twin Towers after the terrorist bombing of Feb. 26. In the wake of the explosion in lower Manhattan, fears surfaced that security concerns would prompt many companies to move out when their leases were up and others to decide not to move in.

It was clear yesterday that the Port Authority, which owns the trade center, was forced to offer extraordinary incentives. Officials close to the negotiations said BankAmerica would receive two years' free rent, effectively giving it a square-foot rental lower than many other tenants in the towers pay.

The bank's decision to move workers from at least 10 other buildings in Manhattan followed weeks of rumors that it had changed its mind about moving into the tower after the bombing. Bank officials said at a news conference that it had looked at alternative buildings in New Jersey, Phoenix and California, and had, in fact, postponed any decision after the bombing.

But Dan Costello, the corporation's executive vice president in charge of real estate, said that after bank officials reviewed security systems in the World Trade Center, including improvements made since the bombing, they were convinced that the complex was "the safest building in New York, and perhaps even in the country."

BankAmerica executives announced their decision at a news conference attended by Mayor David N. Dinkins, Gov. Mario M. Cuomo and other officials, who described it as a major expression of confidence in the troubled complex. "BankAmerica is sending an important message to the world that the World Trade Center is back," Governor Cuomo said.

Although not all details of the deal were disclosed, it was clear that the city, the state and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had mounted an aggressive campaign for at least nine months to lure the company to the World Trade Center and prevent it from leaving Manhattan.

Sales-Tax Breaks

The bank holding company, second in size to Citicorp, is to receive sales-tax breaks and other incentives from the city and state worth $15.5 million over the 15 years. The package includes a promise by New York City to buy some machinery and equipment to be used by BankAmerica.

BankAmerica, based in San Francisco, also said yesterday that it had signed a new 20-year lease and will retain 360 employees at the Bank of America Building at 335 Madison Avenue, near 46th Street. It will also retain 240 employees at 40 East 52d Street, the former Security Pacific Building. Its 1,700 Manhattan employees are in international banking, foreign exchange trading, stock trade processing and other operations.

Financial incentives have become all but routine in government efforts to attract and retain big business. In an example last year, Morgan Stanley & Company, which had threatened to move 4,100 employees to Stamford, Conn., received a tax-incentive package worth $39.6 million over a 10-year Manhattan lease.

But, according to people close to the negotiations, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, it was deep concessions offered by the Port Authority that were most critical in attracting BankAmerica. The effort almost certainly created political conflicts for the agency since it is accountable to both New Jersey and New York and was courting a large tenant that might otherwise have selected a New Jersey office building.

After BankAmerica begins paying rent, authority officials said, it will pay between $25 and $35 a square foot. Though they declined to be more specific, they said the Tower One space would have brought 20 percent more in the robust years for Manhattan real estate in the mid-1980's.

It was unclear yesterday whether the Port Authority had offered the free rent before the Feb. 26 explosion, or whether BankAmerica used the uncertainty after the bombing to extract the further concessions.

BankAmerica had made a verbal pledge to lease its World Trade Center space by December, several officials said. But by the February blast, they said, that oral promise had not been made formal in a legally binding contract, and a legion of economic development officials set out on a fresh campaign to persuade the bank holding company to sign its lease.

With BankAmerica occupying eight floors of Tower One, authority officials said the complex would be 92 percent occupied. The rate is higher than before the explosion, when 88 percent of the complex was filled.

BankAmerica's committment to the complex comes at a time when most tenants in the buildings say life has returned almost to normal.

No large tenants have left the complex since the bombing. But because all are required to meet legal requirements of their leases and would lose money if they left before the leases expire, it is not known whether some will elect to leave when they have the option in coming months and years.

Not Back in Offices Yet

One of the last remaining World Trade Center tenants that has not yet returned to its offices in the complex is Deloitte & Touche, the accounting firm, which has seven floors in Tower Two and moved 1,200 workers to other buildings in Manhattan. Because of the pressures of the government's April 15 deadline for filing income tax returns, the firm had said it had not plans to return to its trade center offices until after that deadline.

Yesterday, Paul Higgins, a Deloitte & Touche spokesman, said the firm had still not returned. The reason, he said, is that cleaning the firm's Twin Tower offices -- the Port Authority's responsibility -- had not been completed. He declined to say when the firm would return.

But other companies said their return to the trade center complex was accomplished without any snags.

"There are no lingering problems," said George Mullen, executive vice president of Fiduciary Trust International, an investment management concern, which returned with 500 employees to five floors of Tower Two on March 25. Since then, it has signed a lease for an additional floor for 45 employees.