December 31, 2017

Diving Into the Indo-Pacific

The following exchange originally appeared in the December 2017 edition of ASEAN Focus.

Q: What is your understanding of the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific concept as repackaged by the Trump administration?

A: The exact contours of this policy – including the
military dimensions – are still taking shape, and will do so over the coming
months. However, in terms of rhetoric, it draws upon Japan’s own, parallel
approach for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While the exact policies and scope
are still to be fleshed out, there is a shared understanding of: (1) the Indian
and Pacific Oceans as a single strategic space in which all these countries
have a stake, (2) an appreciation of the importance of the maritime domain for
both security and trade, (3) an emphasis on the rule of law in governing this
wide region, and (4) an understanding that India plays a vital role in the
regional balance of power.

Q: Do you think there is an inherent disconnect between
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept and President Trump’s “America First”
approach on trade?

A: The Trump Administration’s approach to trade and
international economics is somewhat discordant in two ways. One is the obsessive
focus on reducing trade deficits. The second discordant element is the
unilateral withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which cedes space in
setting the next generation of multilateral trade standards for the region.

Q: The Free and Open Indo-Pacific is meant to provide
strong alternatives to China’s infrastructure financing in the region. What are
the tools and resources available for the US and its partners to deliver on
this?

A: The US has only a limited ability to play a
competitive role in infrastructure financing in Asia. However, its partners
bring other strengths to the table. Japan is the only country that can rival
China in strategic infrastructure investment, and there is now palpable
competition between China and Japan in this respect across Southeast Asia,
South Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa. Together, the likes of the US,
Japan, and India can establish norms and principles for sustainable
infrastructure financing in the region.

Q: How would the Free and Open Indo-Pacific play out in
security terms?

A: Across the Indo-Pacific, the US has unrivalled
capabilities, including a network of military bases, treaty alliances, and
important security partnerships. The United States’ challenge in recent years
has been the will to employ these resources to preserve the status quo, as in
the South China Sea, where China has successfully militarized much of the sea
and airspace. That said, the US – for political, economic, and other reasons –
is increasingly keen on sharing the burden, and this is where Japan, India, and
Australia come in. The challenge will involve political will more than material
capabilities.

Q: What would be the role of the revived Australia-India-
Japan-US quadrilateral partnership (Quad) in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific?
Could Quad 2.0 be more viable than Quad 1.0?

A: The Quad is not an alliance. It is merely a gathering
of four democratic maritime powers, who have some convergent interests when it
comes to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and the requisite capabilities
to uphold that order. What has changed from its first meeting in 2007 to its
latest this year are the circumstances. Rather than assuming greater
responsibility with its rising power, China has become more authoritarian,
opaque, mercantile, and revisionist. Furthermore, in all four countries elected
governments attempted to reach accommodations with Beijing, but were spurned.
This means that despite a continued willingness to engage China by all four
parties, alternative mechanisms to uphold a rules-based order are being sought.
For this reason, Quad 2.0 is probably more viable than its predecessor.

Q: The Quad 1.0 centered on security dialogue and
military exercises. What is the possibility of the Quad 2.0 transforming itself
into something that should be more economically oriented?

A: The exact purpose and agenda of the Quad in its
present avatar will still have to be defined, although elements of the
priorities of the four countries are reflected in their statements. Today,
economics are increasingly intertwined with security. I expect we will
initially see the four parties sharing views on regional developments, followed
by better coordination, a gradual building of habits of cooperation and
familiarity, some investment in capacity building, and – should it continue and
progress – some contingency planning.

Q: India’s foreign policy has always been guarded around
the principle of non-alignment. What made India become a more proactive partner
in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific?

A: Non-alignment is long dead. That said, India sees
itself as an emerging pole in the international order and therefore is keen on
preserving its autonomy and flexibility of decision-making. It has also become
a more vocal proponent and supporter of a liberal international order. Finally,
India’s multi-faceted relationship with China – involving a long- standing
border dispute, differences over regional security, a sizeable if imbalanced
trade relationship, and some convergence on global governance – has
deteriorated, largely as a result of China’s own evolution. For these reasons,
Indian support for a free and open Indo-Pacific is a natural outcome

Q: How does the Free and Open Indo-Pacific dovetail with
India’s Act East policy?

A: The Act East policy represents a change from an
earlier Look East policy in three respects. First, Look East was primarily
economic in nature, with India seeking investment, technology, and economic
models from dynamic Asian economies. Act East is much more comprehensive and
includes a strong security component, including greater capacity building,
interoperability, and information sharing with Southeast and Northeast Asian
powers. Two, the scope of Act East has expanded to cover the entire
Indo-Pacific, beyond an earlier focus on Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and South
Korea. Three, Act East has been more focused on end results rather than
direction, which is a natural progression and also a sign of greater urgency.

The idea is that India must be fully integrated into
Asia- Pacific institutions (which it is, barring APEC), should be more
commercially integrated into regional value chains (which remains a work in
progress), and become a net security provider within its capabilities. These
objectives, and India’s overall evolution, dovetail nicely with the notion of a
free and open Indo-Pacific, whether articulated by the US or by Japan.