Chapter VII: The Impact of War

The transition from peace to war in the Philippines was a sudden one.
The civilian population and the untrained Filipino soldiers were ill
prepared to withstand the initial shock without displaying signs of
nervousness and apprehension. Although a war with Japan had been
expected for some time, bomb shelters had not been completed and the
Philippine Army was still in the process of mobilization. A voluble and
excitable people, the Filipinos saw danger everywhere and their fertile
imagination produced reports of enemy activity that kept the USAFFE
staff busy searching for the grain of truth in the wild tales that came
in over the wires.

The most fantastic reports were accepted and widely circulated.
During the first air raids, the belief that the Japanese bombers were
"at least partially manned by white pilots" was given sufficient
credence to be reported to the War Department.[1]
Dewey Boulevard was supposed to be lined, the planeless 27th
Bombardment Group heard, with A-20s ready to fly into combat. The same
unit also reported a telephone message stating that its A-24s were at
the docks being unloaded. A frantic but unprofitable rush to the water
front followed.[2]

Many residents in Manila reported hearing short-wave messages to
Japan, but the most careful search by Army authorities failed to reveal
a short-wave transmitter. One day there was news that the fleet was
sailing across the Pacific to he rescue; another day that the water
supply in Manila had been poisoned and that poison gas had been spread
in the port area. Again, the Japanese were supposed to have sailed in
to Manila Bay and put ashore 1,000 men at the mouth of the Pasig River.[3] From 9 December on, Admiral Hart, wrote,
"An extraordinary crop of incorrect enemy information flowed in over
the warning net. Too many reports came in of enemy sightings when
nothing actually was sighted. . ."[4]
"The Army," said one writer, "was traveling as much on rumors as on its
stomach."[5]

Each fresh rumor made the civilian population more uneasy. No one
knew what to believe. Numerous air raid alarms, all of them false, and
the blackout added to the tense and foreboding atmosphere. The air
alarms in Manila became so frequent that General Sutherland had to
order wardens to clear through the Army headquarters before sounding
the sirens.

The blackout was rigorously enforced, and the criminal element in
the city took full advantage of the darkness and confusion. They were
unwittingly aided by

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guards, sentries, and air raid wardens, who "popped up
seemingly at every corner to issue a nervous challenge."[6] If not answered promptly and satisfactorily, they
fired. In an effort to control crime and reported fifth-column
activity, the police were given order to shoot if the reply to a
challenge was not satisfactory. Many interpreted their orders narrowly,
challenging and firing at the same time. With sentries, air raid
wardens, and police shooting, sometimes at each other, the confusion
became even worse. Finally, USAFFE ordered all firearms turned in.

Manila showed all the signs of a modern city under attack. Shop
windows were covered with adhesive tape and entrances barricaded with
sandbags. Improvised bomb shelters appeared in shops and public
buildings. Those fortunate enough to have cellars in their homes spent
their nights there. Transportation was commandeered by the Army and
gasoline was rationed. Those who drove cars had to shade their
headlights in the approved fashion.[7]
Street traffic became disorganized, and trucks, ambulances, and
official cars raced through the streets at top speed with complete
disregard for traffic signals.

Life in Manila during these days was topsy-turvy. Residents fled
the city to seek safety in rural areas, and their country cousins
flocked to the city for the same reason. Main thoroughfares were
blocked with trucks, animal-drawn vehicles, and handcarts moving in
both directions. Vehicles were loaded with household goods, trussed
pigs, and chicken crates. To the rear trailed the dogs. To their
barking was added the squealing of the pigs and the clucking chatter of
the fowls. The skies were watched anxiously for any sign of Japanese
planes. People began to hoard food. Radio and cable offices were filled
and it was impossible to handle all the messages to the outside world.[8]

With the first bombs the people rushed to the banks to withdraw
their money. Frantic mobs pushed and milled outside the banks and swore
at the tellers. Those banks and commercial houses that had not already
done so sent their gold to Australia and the United States. After
several days withdrawals were limited to 200 pesos in paper money
weekly. Filipinos hoarded silver money and the result was a shortage in
change. Most merchants sold only for cash, thus increasing the
difficulties of the business community.[9]

During these days of confusion, military and civilian authorities
worked closely to restore the confidence of the people. Bomb shelters
were constructed and the people began to pay less attention to the air
raid warnings when the Japanese failed to attack the city. The
Commonwealth Assembly met in emergency session and made available to
President Quezon the sum of $20,000,000 for defense. The United States
contributed an equal sum for civilian relief. Government employees were
given three months' advance in pay so that they could move their
families out of the city to places supposedly safer than Manila. But it
never became necessary to establish martial law, and after a week or
two the Filipinos quieted down and life in the capital became more
normal.

The troops were just as nervous as the civilians. Most of them
were convinced

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that a well-organized Japanese fifthcolumn existed in the
Philippines. Flares, rockets, strange lights, descending paratroopers,
cut wires, and interrupted communications were all observed and cited
as evidences for this belief. Rumors circulated as widely among the
troops as the civilians and were as firmly believed.

The assistant supply officer of USAFFE, Maj. Frank F. Carpenter,
Jr., on a visit to a barrio about fifteen miles north of Manila, heard
stories of American convoys, shortages of ammunition, the landings at
Aparri, and other military matters, which the average American soldier
did not know. He was told that Germans wearing the American uniform had
been seen and that 1,500 Japanese soldiers in civilian clothes were
living in Manila, "all set to take action at the proper time." It was
Major Carpenter's considered judgment that fifth columnists in the
uniform of the American soldier were spreading information and creating
dissatisfaction, and he asked the intelligence officer to investigate.[10]

Almost all survivors of the campaign agree that they saw flares or
that they know someone who did. These lights were apparently unlike
signal flares; they were small, orange in color, and could be seen
close to the ground or just above the trees. Other observers noted
rockets rising over uninhabited areas, and series of lights forming a
straight line pointing to an airfield or military target just before an
attack. Colonel Collier tells this story of the pre-dawn raid on
Nichols Field on the morning of 9 December: As the sound of the
Japanese planes became audible, an old automobile near Nichols burst
into flames, casting a glow over the field. At the same time, about a
dozen fishing boats were observed in the bay, just outside the
breakwater. They formed a circle with their light pointing toward the
center. The straight line from this point to the blazing automobile
formed a line which the Japanese bombers presumably followed to reach
the field.[11]

Similar stories are told about the raids on Clark Field and
Cavite. One witness states that he learned from an unnamed cavalry
officer--since killed--that a Filipino who operated a bar near Clark
Field was largely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack on
8 December. This Filipino is supposed to have had a powerful short-wave
transmitter with a beam director in a room in back of the bar and to
have informed the Japanese when all the B-17s were on the ground. He
was discovered at the dials of his transmitter after the raid, and a
"grim sergeant from the 26th Cavalry went into the place with a tommy
gun."[12] The presence of collaborators
at Clark is also mentioned by Lt. Joseph H. Moore, commander of the
20th Pursuit Squadron, who states that he found a mirror tied to a tree
above his quarters. Presumably the reflections from the mirror guided
the Japanese aircraft to he field.[13]

A variation of the Clark Field story was told of the raid on the
Cavite Navy Yard. Here a secret radio transmitter was also supposed to
have been found. The operators, according to this account, were and
American with a Japanese wife, both later discovered and arrested. At
Cavite, also, and attractive girl of Japanese ancestry, who was

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employed in a trusted position at the yard, was "caught
red-handed in act of treachery." Someone decided she had to be executed
immediately and the officers drew lots. The task fell, so the story
goes, to a young naval officer who was in love with the beautiful spy.
He led her outside and performed the sentence "without hesitation."[14] Official records do not support any
of the stories told about secret radio transmitters, beautiful spies,
or fifth columnist barkeepers.

Reports of paratroops were frequent also, but upon investigation
all proved to be false. A drop of 20,000 paratroops about ten miles
east of Clark Field was reported on 10 December. USAFFE placed enough
reliability on the report to order the Philippine Division there to
meet and destroy the enemy. When the reported Japanese paratroopers
failed to appear, the division was ordered elsewhere.[15]

Interrogation of Japanese officers after the war and a study of
Japanese and American records fail to support the belief that a
Japanese fifth column existed in the Philippines. There is not a shred
of evidence to indicate that any organized effort was made by the
Japanese to utilize the sympathies of the Japanese population in the
Islands or of Filipino collaborators. To have done so would have
involved knowledge by a Japanese organization in the Philippines of the
14th Army's detailed plans well in advance of the attack,
communications with the airfields of Formosa, and an elaborate
organization to receive information from agents and relay it on to
Japanese headquarters in Formosa. Such an organization did not exist.
If an effort to assist the attacking Japanese was made, it must have
been sporadic and on an individual basis.

It is possible to explain some of the observed phenomena on
grounds other than fifth-column activity. The flares may have been
caused by American and Filipino troops using faulty .30-caliber tracer
ammunition of World War I vintage. No one was ever able to find any
person who fired flares, and examination invariably revealed that the
strange lights and flares came from an area where American troops were
stationed. Sometimes those searching for the origin of the flares used
lights which others reported as signs of fifth-column operations. The
reports of Japanese paratroopers can be explained by parachuting pilots
from damaged aircraft, by the descending burst of antiaircraft fire, or
by jettisoned spare gas tanks. The heated imagination of men during the
first days of war is capable of conjuring up visions far more fantastic
than strange lights and descending paratroopers.

The possibility of sabotage and fifth-column activity had been
anticipated in prewar plans. The Philippine Department G-2 and the
Commonwealth secret service had listed enemy aliens and had kept many
individuals under surveillance. Provision had been made to secure
information and locate enemy agents in the event of a Japanese attack.
Several FBI operators of Japanese parentage (Nisei) had been brought
from Hawaii before the war to circulate among the Japanese population.
Many American businessmen, engineers and planters had been enrolled
secretly in the intelligence organization and provided a potential
American fifth column in the event of a Japanese occupation of the
Islands. The Philippine Constabulary also

At the outbreak of hostilities, all suspected persons were quickly
and quietly taken into custody. Japanese civilians living in the
Japanese section of Manila were ordered to remain in their homes, and
the military police took over the guard of this area.[17] On the first day of war, General MacArthur
reported to the War Department that 40 percent of the enemy aliens in
Manila, and 10 percent of those in the provinces had been interned.[18] The Philippine Constabulary picked up
aliens wherever found--in homes, offices, clubs, and on the streets. On
13 December, two days after Germany and Italy declared war on the
United States, German and Italian residents in the Philippines were
also interned.[19] The aliens were
first screened at Bilibid Prison in Manila and those cleared were
released at once. Those not able to explain their business
satisfactorily were then transferred to a camp south of the city to
await examination by a board consisting of a representative of the High
Commissioner and several Army officers.[20]

Although the civilian population and the untrained troops were
nervous during the first days of war, the task of mobilizing the
Philippine Army continued. According to the prewar plan the last units
were scheduled for induction on 15 December, a week after the attack
came. Some, such as the 43d Infantry, had already been brought in and,
as soon as hostilities opened, all remaining units were immediately
mobilized. Those divisional elements not yet in service, usually the
third infantry regiment and the field artillery regiment, were brought
in immediately. A provisional Constabulary regiment, later designated
the 4th, was formed and, with the 1st and 2d Regiments, became the
bases for the 2d Regular Division, organized early in January and
consisting entirely of Constabulary troops. The 1st Regular Division
(PA), which in peacetime consisted mainly of cadres for training
reservists, was brought up to strength and inducted, without an
artillery regiment, on 19 December. It was assigned to the South Luzon
Force and its 1st Infantry moved at once to the Mauban area along Lamon
Bay.[21]

In the Visayas and in Mindanao, mobilization was about one-half
completed when war came. On orders from MacArthur's headquarters, the
72d and 92d Infantry (PA) were sent to Luzon on 9 December. Numerous
provisional units were organized and equipped by local commanders.,
These units consisted of volunteers, ROTC cadets, and reservists not
yet called or who had failed to report.[22]

All reservists were ordered to report to the nearest unit or
mobilization center on 8 December. As a result, some units found
themselves overstrength and additional units were hastily organized.
Men undergoing instruction and not yet assigned were organized into
separate units. Coast artillery personnel at Fort Mills (Corregidor),
for example, were organized into the 1st Coast Artillery (PA), with a
headquarters battery of twenty-eight men and four gun

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batteries of one hundred men each. The coast artillery
reservists at Fort Wint in Subic bay were similarly organized.[23]

In some cases, units were formed to utilize armament or equipment
lying in warehouses or elsewhere. At the suggestion of General King,
MacArthur's artillery officer, the 301st Field Artillery (PA) was
formed from two groups of volunteers, altogether 700 men, and equipped
with 24 wooden-wheeled 155-mm. guns of World War I type, and 2 155-mm.
howitzers of the same vintage. These were the 155's that had been sent
to the Philippines to protect the straits leading into the inland seas
and were the only weapons of this caliber in the Philippines, outside
of Corregidor. Col. Alexander S. Quintard was brought from Mindanao to
command the unit.[24] At about the same
time, three separate provisional battalions of field artillery of four
4-gun batteries each were formed. These units were armed with 48 of the
50 75-mm. guns on self-propelled mounts that had been shipped to the
Philippines in October. Personnel was secured from the Philippine
Scouts, Philippine Army reservists, and the 200th Coast Artillery (AA).
Two of the battalions were assigned to the North Luzon Force, and one
to the South Luzon Force.[25]

Immediately upon the outbreak of war, USAFFE ordered all
procurement agencies to fill their needs by purchase in the local
markets. The quartermaster bought all the new and used automobiles and
trucks he could find, as well as large quantities of clothing and food.
Several motor transport companies were taken over by the Army, lock,
stock, and barrel. The Signal Corps purchased all available
photographic, radio, and telephone equipment, and took control of the
Manila Long Distance Telephone Company, commissioning its president,
Joseph Stevenot, a lieutenant colonel. The Medical Corps gathered up
all the medicine, bandages, and surgical equipment it could find in the
Islands. Buildings of all kinds were occupied by the Army--the Jai
Alai Club became a hospital; Rizal Stadium, a medical depot.[26] The officers assigned to the former
inherited the food, chefs, and service of the club, and for a few days
dined sumptuously on onion and mushroom soup, steak, broiled lobster,
and Viennese pastry, served on snowy linen gleaming with silver by
waiters in natty green and white uniforms. After headquarters heard of
this arrangement, the medics ate Army fare.[27]

Manila, the commercial center of the Islands, was exploited for
supplies to supplement existing stocks. On orders from General
MacArthur the quartermaster took over from the large oil companies all
their bulk petroleum products stored in the vicinity of Manila. He
sought especially to procure food from local sources, for it was
evident already that there would be a shortage should the campaign last
long. From Chinese merchants in Manila, the Army secured thousands of
125-pound sacks of polished rice, and from ships in the

--120--

harbor large quantities of food. The quartermaster took
over from Armour, Swift, and Libby large quantities of canned meats and
other foods.[28]

Within a few days after the opening of hostilities, the port area
in Manila had become crowded with rapidly expanding military
installations. Fort Santiago, headquarters of the Philippine
Department, was on the edge of this area, as was the mouth of the Pasig
River, now jammed with inter-island freighters and other craft. The
supply services that had warehouses and depots in the area decided it
would be safest to move out, although Manila had not yet been bombed.
The engineers were the first to go; they moved to the University of the
Philippines. The quartermaster took over Santo Tomas University, and
the other services followed. By 20 December most of the service
installations in the port area had quietly moved to safer quarters.[29]

An unexpected addition to the tanks of Col. James R.N. Weaver's
Provisional Tank Group was received shortly after the start of war. The
Japanese attack left marooned in Manila Harbor the Don Jose, a
vessel belonging to the Canadian Government and carrying a cargo of
motor equipment for two Canadian motor battalions in Hong Kong.
MacArthur immediately requested that this matériel be released
for use in the Philippines, and the War Department secured the Canadian
Government's consent. The cargo included fifth-seven Bren gun carriers,
forty of which were made available to Colonel Weaver. Unfortunately,
the guns for the carriers were not included in the cargo, and they had
to be armed by the Manila Ordnance Depot.[30]

The immediate reaction at Headquarters, USAFFE, to the first
Japanese landings was one of calm. General MacArthur optimistically
reported that the Philippine people had withstood the shock of war
"with composure," and that there were "no signs of confusion or
hysteria."[31] The Japanese moves were
correctly analyzed but a counteroffensive was not launched to drive
off the invaders. "We did not disperse forces," says General
Sutherland, "but waited for what we felt would be the main attack."[32]

More concern was felt during the first days of the war over the
rapid dissolution of the Far East Air Force than over the Japanese
landings. "The present phase of enemy action," MacArthur told the War
Department on 12 December, "involves a series of concentric thrusts
probably intended to confuse and demoralize northern movement. Probably
has the additional objective of securing airdromes for operation of
land based aircraft."[33] The next day
he declared that the enemy's intent was clearly revealed. The Japanese,
he said, were seizing airbases outside the heavily defended area of
central Luzon, and ground action could be considered sporadic and
unimportant.[34]

--121--

This view was expressed also in Col. Charles A.
Willoughby's intelligence estimate to the War Department on 13 December
1941. He expected the Japanese forces at Aparri, Vigan, and Legaspi to
be reinforced, but pointed out that the landing areas were not suitable
for the employment of strong forces in offensive operation. The purpose
of the landing, he correctly analyzed, was to establish advance
airbases. "As soon as air support is established," he warned, "a major
landing effort can be expected; it is estimated after 15 days."[35]

The only change in plans made by MacArthur as a result of the
Japanese landings was the new mission given the North Luzon Force on 16
December. Before that time General Wainwright had been charged with the
defense of all northern Luzon, and his orders were to meet the enemy at
the beaches and drive him back into the sea. The main line of
resistance was the beach. Such a mission was impossible of execution
with the available means and in the absence of air and naval support.
On the 16th the North Luzon Force was relieved of responsibility for
the defense of that portion of Luzon north of San Fernando, La Union,
and required only to hold the enemy north of an east-west line through
that city.[36]

Within a few days after the landings the pattern of the Japanese
plan had become clear to the American command. First, Japanese air and
naval forces were to cut off the Philippine Islands from all possible
aid. Then, Japanese aircraft could destroy or neutralize the defending
air and naval forces and gain superiority in the air and on the sea. At
the same time, Japanese ground forces would secure advance bases at the
northern and southern extremities of the island of Luzon and on
Mindanao where the opposition was negligible or nonexistent. The major
enemy effort, it was clear, was still to come. That it would come
soon--Colonel Willoughby thought 28 December--there was no doubt, and
when it did the objective would be Manila, the capital. Before the year
was out, the worst fears of the early pessimists were to be realized.
Even before the advance landings were completed, the main elements of
General Homma's 14th Army were already nearing the Luzon coast.

[28]
Alvin P. Stauffer, Quartermaster Operations in the War Against Japan,
Ch. I, p. 45, a forth-coming volume in this series. This excellent
manuscript was made available by the author before publication.