Abstract : The research question asks, What should be the capabilities of the heavy division in Europe to perform tactical deception in defensive operations, The study first analyzes the theory of deception from the writings of Mao, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart and Barton Whaley to determine what theory says our capabilities should be. Next it traces the U.S. Army's development and use of deception from history. Theoretically and historically-derived capabilities to deceive at the tactical level are contrasted to current U.S. and Soviet doctrine. This background in theory, history and doctrine is then compared to contemporary evidence of U.S. tactical deception efforts of divisions employed in European REFORGER exercises. The final sections draw conclusions and implications concerning tactical deception in the U.S. Army, focusing upon the areas of doctrine, training, resources and command and staff processes. This study concludes there is a significant gap between what should be and what actually is a U.S. division's capability to perform tactical deception in the defense. This study recommends the Army review its deception doctrine for sufficiency by appointing an Army level proponent. From there, it should focus its efforts and resources to improve training of deception elements, division commanders and staffs for deception to regain prominence as an effective force multiplier.