Saturday, October 31, 2015

Key Take-away:PM Abadi faces resistance over how to address Iraq’s debilitating
financial situation caused by a sharp drop in oil prices. The 2016 federal
budget is a hotly-contested piece of legislation, as it allocates funding for
government ministries. PM Abadi and the Council of Ministers (CoM) approved a
draft budget on October 19 and submitted it to the Council of Representatives
(CoR) for approval. The CoR will begin reading the budget after the CoR Finance
Committee reviews it, a process that does not have a set timeline. PM Abadi and
his opponents, including Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias, are at odds with
how much of the budget should go to the militias within the “Popular
Mobilization,” whose allocation decreased from the 2015 budget. Iranian proxy
militias are thus demanding that PM Abadi increase the share for the “Popular
Mobilization.” PM Abadi also introduced a new salary scale to reduce
expenditures and increase the pay of the poorest government employees. This has
led to a backlash against PM Abadi’s reform agenda, including from his most
powerful supporter, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and from PM Abadi’s primary
political opponent, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki. The final salary scale will
likely be heavily modified from its current form and less effective in reducing
expenditures. PM Abadi’s opponents will
use his unpopular measures to obstruct his reform agenda. Maliki in particular
will exploit discontent among political blocs with the reform agenda in order
to undermine PM Abadi’s authority and bolster his own prominence and profile, and has begun assembling a still-small coalition with potential to vote no-confidence in PM Abadi.

PM
Abadi’s political opponents consider PM Abadi’s current strategy to address
Iraq’s financial crisis unacceptable. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias and
supporters of Vice President Nouri al-Maliki oppose the proposed allocation of
funding to the “Popular Mobilization” in the federal budget, whose full text
has not been released. However, Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari stated that “20 percent” of the budget
pertains to defense. This includes funding allocated to the both the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and the militias in the “Popular Mobilization.” Early
reports indicate that the budget allocates less funding to the “Popular Mobilization”
than the 2015 budget. This number will be significantly less than what notable
militia figures requested by up to a third. Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, a powerful
Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, claimed that the budget allocated only 2.16
trillion. Iraqi dinars as opposed to the 6 trillion. Iraqi dinars in the 2015
budget, or more than 5bn. USD. The figures are likely incorrect, as more
reliable reporting puts the “Popular Mobilization” budget allocation for 2015
at 1 billion. USD. Nevertheless, the complaint demonstrates the degree to which
the proxy militias and the Iraqi government disagree over the appropriate size
of the money allocated for the “Popular Mobilization.” In particular, prominent
Iranian proxy militia leader and designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis openly
criticized the budget and pinned the
blame on
PM Abadi. Muhandis insisted that he repeatedly told PM Abadi about the need to
increase “Popular Mobilization” funding. An increase in “Popular Mobilization”
funding would give the “Popular Mobilization” greater capabilities and heighten
their profile at the expense of the ISF.

The
decrease in funding for the “Popular Mobilization” comes as part of
government-wide austerity measures stemming from Iraq’s acute financial crisis.
The figures for the 2016 budget are based upon the price and
production of oil, which the budget identifies as 45 USD per barrel. The budget also projects an increase in oil
production from 3 million barrels per day (bpd) to 3.6 million bpd. The
projected oil price is dramatically less than the basis figure for the 2015 budget, which assumed
that the price of oil was 80 USD per barrel. This was unrealistic, as Brent
crude prices dropped under 50 USD by the time the 2015 budget passed in January 2015. The smaller
budget is technically inadequate, as there is still projected to be a deficit of 21 billion.
and 25 billion. USD. The anti-ISIS fight demands so many resources that some
ministries have lost significant funding. Muhammad Sahib al-Darraji, the
Industry and Minerals minister, complained that his ministry did not receive any funding for 2016 and that he
had abstained from the CoM vote on the budget. Al-Darraji is a member of
al-Ahrar bloc, which supports PM Abadi’s reform agenda. Other al-Ahrar bloc
members did not appear to have abstained from voting.

One
of PM Abadi’s mechanisms for reducing expenditures has been the second point of
contention, and has drawn the ire of the Iraqi street. The CoM passed a comprehensive reduction in salaries for government
employees in order to reduce
expenses as
a reform package separate from the federal budget on October 13. The reductions
affect a large number of Iraqis, as 40
percent of available jobs are provided by the government. This sparked a
large backlash from government employees across the country. Those employees at
the higher end of the salary scale, such as university professors and employees
holding higher degrees, viewed the cuts as unfair. Some of these higher-earning employees saw
their salaries reduced by nearly 20
percent.
University professors and employees subsequently staged protests or in some
cases gone on strike in Basra, Diwaniya, Muthanna, and Baghdad.

The
ensuing backlash is indicative of the first real loss of support from the Iraqi
street for PM Abadi. His reform program had otherwise enjoyed widespread
support, despite its vastly diminished momentum. Protests against the salary
scale have been sporadic and involved few participants thus far, in particular
because government employees with the smallest salaries actually received slight
pay increases. Salary reductions had also been under discussion for months. The
CoM reduced CoM salaries, including PM Abadi’s pay, in July 2015. CoR members later
followed suit with a 45 percent reduction in
August 2015. PM Abadi first announced the discussions of the new changes to the
salary scale on October 5. The
discussions involved consultations with the members of the CoM. PM Abadi pointed out that the CoM
passed the salary scale changes. The major political parties have
representation within the CoM, and thus had prior knowledge and input regarding
the shape of the salary scale changes.

PM
Abadi’s allies also rejected the salary scale changes. PM Abadi’s reform agenda
has benefited from the support of the SLA’s two main political rivals within
the Shi’a political sphere: the Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) of Ammar
al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr’s al-Ahrar bloc. ISCI has supported PM Abadi’s
reform agenda since August
7, and al-Ahrar since August
9. Their support was largely aimed at undermining the SLA and Maliki in
order to improve their own influence within Baghdad and southern
provincial governments. An ISCI
member stated on October 28 that ISCI did not support questioning PM
Abadi or ending his premiership. However, an al-Ahrar bloc member criticized
the salary scale changes as a “red line” and PM
Abadi’s reforms as too slow. The Sunni Etihad bloc also rejected the salary
scale and PM Abadi’s lack of consultation regarding the reforms, as did the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Major Shi’a, Sunni, and
Kurdish parties likely rejected the salary scale to protect themselves from
public backlash after initially agreeing to the changes. After all, the CoM has
senior representatives from the major political blocs, whose votes were
necessary for the reform package’s approval.

More
troublingly, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s representative, Abdul-Mahdi
al-Karbala’i, rejected the salary
scale changes on October 23 in a Friday sermon, calling reductions in the
salaries of university professors and educated employees “unfair.” Evidently, Sistani
and PM Abadi have not been in lockstep over the required changes to the salary
scale. The disagreement is curious as Karbala’i advocated a change to the
salary scale in September. Sistani’s
support is essential for PM Abadi’s political survival, and the disagreement
robs PM Abadi of any realistic chance to see the salary scale changes approved in
the CoR in their current form. If the Shi’a religious establishment weakens its
support for Abadi, his Shi’a political rivals will sense the opportunity to
compete with him for power and influence.

PM
Abadi’s political opponents have used the most recent reform package to attack
PM Abadi for what they view as his unilateral and non-consultative approach to
reforming government. Many of PM Abadi’s opponents had already rejected PM
Abadi’s October 20 decision to
dismiss CoM Secretary Mahdi al-Alaq, a Dawa Party member of the SLA and an acting appointee who had only held the position for two months. Iranian proxy groups
like Badr Organization and Kata’ib
Hezbollah, as well as prominent Maliki allies like CoR member Hanan
al-Fatlawi, were outraged when PM Abadi replaced
Alaq on October 20 with a candidate who
holds American citizenship who had previously had disagreements with pro-Maliki Dawa Party
members.

Members
of the SLA aligned with VP Maliki wrote a letter to PM Abadi on October 27,
criticizing his lack of consultation with political parties on the reforms and
his “overriding” of the
constitution. The complaints over constitutionality were directed at his
attempts to eliminate the VP position that requires a constitutional amendment,
which ISW documented
in August
2015. The members collectively criticized the salary scale changes and PM
Abadi’s reform movement on a whole, and stated that they “withdrew their
mandate” from PM Abadi and that they were “no longer responsible” for PM
Abadi’s actions. This does not mean that Maliki’s allies are intending to
attempt to withdraw confidence from PM Abadi. An SLA member denied that the SLA
sought to withdraw confidence from PM Abadi, though prominent SLA members have openly
speculated about doing so. The Dawa Party political leadership also reaffirmed
support for
PM Abadi and the reform agenda on October 30. It would be extremely difficult
for Maliki to muster the support within the CoR to even attempt a no-confidence
vote. However, Maliki and his allies do not actually intend to pursue this
course of action right now. Instead, public threats of withdrawing mandates and
speculating about withdrawing confidence are threats aiming to discourage PM
Abadi from pursuing any additional reforms without including the SLA in the
decision-making process.

The
SLA letter was the strongest open criticism of the reform movement since PM
Abadi launched his first package on August 9. Maliki later openly opposed PM
Abadi in a television interview on October 30. Maliki did
not specifically mention the salary scale, but he stated that PM Abadi’s reform
packages had “no legal force.” He also
insisted that the Vice Presidency had not been abolished and that any move to
do so would be unconstitutional. The interview was a departure from Maliki’s
prior methods of attacking PM Abadi, which largely involved voicing discontent
through his allies in the SLA or through coordinated pro-Maliki social media. Maliki will
use the rise in vocal opposition to the salary scales to heighten his profile
and undermine PM Abadi’s ability to operate independent of Iranian influence
and the SLA leadership’s direction.

It
is highly unlikely that the salary scale will pass a vote in the CoR in its
current form considering the opposition from Sistani as well as both PM Abadi’s
supporters and opponents. The salary scale will most likely be modified, but
pay cuts in some form across the board may be unavoidable as Iraq’s economy
continues to falter. Nevertheless, PM Abadi’s opponents will use the highly
unpopular salary scale change as ammunition against him and his performance. In
particular, Maliki’s cohorts will continue attacking PM Abadi and obstructing
his reforms in the CoR. Their obstinacy forms only one component of a larger trend
involving Maliki’s attempts to undermine PM Abadi’s power and set conditions
for Maliki’s eventual return to power. This trend will intensify as Maliki attempts
to use opposition to the salary scale changes against PM Abadi. It is unlikely
that the CoR will attempt a no-confidence vote at this time. Nevertheless,
Maliki may be able to exploit the current resistance to PM Abadi’s reforms to
solidify opposition to additional reforms in the future. This may force PM
Abadi to consult with the SLA before submitting any additional proposals.

It
will be equally interesting to see what results from the 2016 federal budget.
Iranian proxy militias and their supporters within the CoR consistently
advocate for a massive increase in the budget share for the “Popular
Mobilization.” Realistically, any increase for the “Popular Mobilization” will
require a reduction in the budget allocations for the legitimate security
institutions within the ISF. This will result in friction between PM Abadi and
his opponents over access to resources. Reallocating resources from the ISF to
the “Popular Mobilization” will directly affect PM Abadi’s ability to exercise
independent command and control over the security forces by reducing the
capacity of the ISF and increasing that of the “Popular Mobilization.” This
course of action would result in increased capabilities for militias that are
susceptible to Iranian influence. PM Abadi and his opponents competing over
access to resources indicate that the budget will not pass the CoR in quick
fashion.

The
Iraqi state and government faces a grave challenge. The budget crisis makes the
status quo intractable, but Abadi is not sufficiently powerful to force changes
of this magnitude. In fact, the greatest challenges to his premiership come
from within his own political bloc.

Key Takeaway: The
Russian air campaign in Syria reportedly expanded into the southern
province of Dera’a one month after Russian airstrikes in Syria
commenced. Credible local sources reported that Russian warplanes
conducted overnight strikes near Tel al-Harra and other nearby villages
east of the Golan Heights in Dera’a Province on October 28. Tel al-Harra
is the location of a Russian signals intelligence facility, which was
seized by rebels in October 2014. These airstrikes follow reports that
the Syrian regime and Hezbollah reinforcements arrived in northwestern
Dera’a Province on October 27. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not release official
airstrike reports for October 29-30. However, credible local activist
sources continued to report instances of Russian airstrikes throughout
Dera’a, Damascus, Homs, Idlib, and Aleppo. Russian airstrikes largely
concentrated around rebel-held areas in the northern Homs countryside
and within Aleppo City.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports
corroborated both by official government statements reported through
credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist
networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary
sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain
disinformation.

Friday, October 30, 2015

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and "Popular Mobilization" recaptured
the Baiji Oil Refinery on October 21 following operations to recapture Baiji
city on October 14. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi then visited Baiji city on
October 23, marking the city's full recapture. ISW is thus upgrading Baiji and
the Baiji Oil Refinery from Contested to ISF-held locations. PUK Peshmerga have
also maintained limited gains in villages in southern Kirkuk near Taza and
Daquq as part of anti-ISIS operations that began on September 12. ISIS has not
launched substantive counter-attacks against the Peshmerga in these areas, and
they remain under Peshmerga control. ISW has thus expanded the Populated areas
under PUK Peshmerga control in southern Kirkuk.

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes near Aleppo targeted rebels
from October 27-28 as the Syrian regime’s ground offensives suffered
setbacks. Syrian regime ground offensives against rebels in the southern
countryside of Aleppo and against ISIS near the besieged Kuweires
Airbase east of Aleppo City largely stalled following ISIS's offensive against
the regime-held town of Safira in the southeastern Aleppo countryside
on October 26. Russian airstrikes, however, largely concentrated in
rebel-held areas south of Aleppo City and within the city center
according to local activist reporting. Rebel forces have historically
leveraged ISIS’s offensives against the regime in Aleppo in order to
advance against both the regime and ISIS elsewhere in the province. The
intensity of Russian airstrikes in Aleppo may limit the Syrian
opposition’s ability to capitalize on the regime’s stalled offensive.

Iranian state news claimed that
Russian warplanes targeted ISIS and Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusra near the Syrian Golan Heights on October 28. Local reporting in
Syria has not yet substantiated these claims. ISW therefore does not
assess these strikes with even low-confidence at this time. If
confirmed, Russian airstrikes in southern Syria could be a sign of
Russian cooperation with Israel and Jordan after both countries
established independent coordination “mechanisms” with Russia on September 21 and October 23,
respectively. The strikes could alternatively represent an escalation
against Syria’s southern neighbors if not coordinated with Amman and Tel
Aviv.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports
corroborated both by official government statements reported through
credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist
networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary
sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain
disinformation.

ISIS launched a multi-phase counterattack against the Syrian regime and its allies in Aleppo Province which threatens the regime’s control over its primary ground line of communication (GLOC) to Aleppo City. ISIS seized multiple checkpoints along the highway between the towns of Khanaser and Ithriya in southern Aleppo Province on 23 OCT. These gains blocked the route used by the Syrian regime to deploy reinforcements to Aleppo from Hama and Homs Provinces. ISIS subsequently initiated a major attack targeting the key regime-held town of Safira southeast of Aleppo City. Safira serves as a key node for Iranian military activity in Syria. The town also contains a complex of strategic defense factories implicated in the production of chemical weapons and ‘barrel bombs’ for the Syrian regime. ISIS fighters have reportedly advanced into the far-northern outskirts of Safira despite initial deployments of regime reinforcements to the area.

The advances by ISIS near Aleppo City demonstrate the limited capabilities of the Syrian regime despite expanded support from Iranian-backed proxy groups and Russian airstrikes. ISIS remains unlikely to seize Safira due to the strategic importance of the town to both Iran and the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, ISIS’s counterattacks have successfully forced the regime to assume a defensive posture and deprioritize the ongoing offensive to relieve the besieged Kuweires Airbase. ISIS may intend to exploit this redirection of forces through further attacks against the regime either northeast of Aleppo City or further south in eastern Hama Province. Rebel forces in Aleppo Province also stand to benefit from the redeployment of pro-regime forces away from frontlines south of Aleppo City. The Syrian regime made no significant gains against rebel forces in Aleppo Province over the past four days following major advances last week. Recent intensifications in Russian and Iranian support to the Syrian regime may not be sufficient to force a rapid change in the dynamics of the Syrian Civil War.

Tuesday, October 27, 2015

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) resumed
reporting of airstrikes in Syria on October 26, following a hiatus of
reports about airstrikes from October 23-25. The Russian MoD claimed to
carry out “59 sorties” from October 24-26 in the Syrian provinces of
Idlib, Latakia, Homs, Damascus, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zour. Russian
airstrikes from October 25-26 largely supported regime ground offensives
against Syrian rebels near the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama
Province and south of Aleppo City. Meanwhile, ISIS captured sections of
the road between Khanasser and Ithriya in southeastern Aleppo Province
from October 22-26 and claimed to sever the regime supply route to
Aleppo City amidst ongoing regime advances near the besieged Kuweires
Airbase east of Aleppo. The Russian MoD claimed airstrikes near the city
of Palmyra in central Syria; however, local reporting has not yet
substantiated these claims. ISW therefore does not consider the Russian
MoD reports concerning Palmyra to be credible at this time. No
high-confidence Russian airstrikes occurred against ISIS’s positions
during the reporting period. Meanwhile, the U.S. Coalition did not report airstrikes in Syria from October 24-26,
an unusual break in the pattern of reported airstrikes following the
U.S.-Russian MOU concerning air safety protocols over Syria.

Russia continued its disinformation campaign in an effort to present
itself as a constructive force in Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov announced on October 24 that Moscow is willing to provide air support to
Western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups if the U.S. shares
intelligence on the locations of both FSA-affiliated groups and
“terrorists.” The majority of Russian airstrikes in Syria to date have
targeted rebel forces throughout Syria, however, undermining the
credibility of Russian rhetoric regarding cooperation with the moderate
FSA-affiliated opposition. Russian warplanes have targeted several
moderate U.S.-backed TOW missile recipients since the start of the
Russian aerial campaign in Syria on September 30, including Liwa Suqour
al-Jebel and Tajamu' al-Izza in the provinces of Idlib and Hama, as well
as the Martyr Lieutenant Ahmed Abdou Battalion in Damascus and the
First Coastal Division in Latakia. Human Rights Watch released a report on
October 25 detailing a Russian strike targeting the home of a commander
in the FSA-affiliated Islamist Harakat Tahreer Homs, killing 59
civilians.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports
corroborated both by official government statements reported through
credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist
networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary
sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain
disinformation.

Sunday, October 25, 2015

Key Takeaway: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
discontinued the release of official reporting on airstrikes in Syria
from October 23 – 24 amidst reports of high civilian casualties.
However, credible local sources continued to report instances of Russian
airstrikes throughout Aleppo, Latakia, Idlib, Hama, Homs, and Damascus
Provinces. Russian airstrikes reportedly hit three separate hospitals in
the provinces of Idlib, Hama, and ar-Raqqah since October 20, including
a strike against a hospital in the town of Al Latamneh in northern Hama
on October 23. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed on
October 23 that Russian airstrikes resulted in the deaths of almost 151 civilians in Syria. These reports come in direct conflict with the
Russian MoD’s insistence that airstrikes are not targeting populated
locations in Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports
corroborated both by official government statements reported through
credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist
networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary
sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain
disinformation.

Saturday, October 24, 2015

Several international actors including partners within the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition recently changed or clarified their narratives concerning the future role of
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any political settlement to the Syrian
Civil War. The shift in narratives has likely been driven by the Russian
intervention into Syria and its concurrent outreach to U.S. regional partners.
These changes constitute a metric for measuring the increasing influence held
by Russia over Middle Eastern security concerns relative to the U.S. ISW previously
published key statements by international actors including Russia, Iran,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the European Union, and the U.S. on September 30, in
order to capture the emergent shift in attitudes. This post provides an update
to significant statements regarding international leaders’ positions on Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad between September 30 and October 24.

The U.S. and several
of its regional partners have begun to coalesce around a proposal for a
political transition which would permit Assad to retain his position in a
limited capacity for up to six months in exchange for guarantees of his ultimate
departure. Turkey and Saudi Arabia in particular softened their demands for an
immediate departure of Assad and privately expressed an ability to tolerate his
temporary presence in a transitional government. Russia and Iran nevertheless continue
to defend Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria while their military forces
change conditions on the ground in his favor. Several regional powers normally
aligned with the U.S. including Egypt and Jordan established military
cooperation agreements with Russia that may move them closer to the Russian position
on a negotiated settlement to end the Syrian Civil War.

Significant
Statements:

United Kingdom – The United Kingdom reaffirmed its willingness to accept a
temporary role for Assad in a transitional administration in exchange for a
successful settlement to the conflict.

Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond: 04 OCT – “If the price for [ending the Syrian
Civil War] is that Assad will remain as titular head of state for a period
of time, do I really care if that’s three days, three weeks, three months, or
even longer? I don’t think I do.” (The Telegraph)

European Union – The European Union released a joint statement on the Syrian
Civil War which attempted to merge the differing stances towards Assad held by
Europe. France maintains a strong position calling for the removal of Assad
while Germany and several other European states have been much more reticent in
their approach.

European Council Joint
Statement: 12 OCT – “There cannot be a lasting
peace in Syria under the present leadership and until the legitimate
grievances and aspirations of all components of the Syrian society are
addressed.” (EU)

Russia –
Russian attempted to portray itself as a neutral actor in the Syrian Civil War
through hints that Assad may depart as the leader of Syria over the long-term.
Nonetheless, Russia continued to defend the legitimacy of Assad and the Syrian
regime as a whole.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev: 17 OCT - “We are not fighting for
specific leaders, we are defending our national interests…at the
moment Russia is working on the basis that Assad is the legitimate
president.” (AFP)

Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabia softened its position on Assad by expressing an
ability to tolerate his presence in a transitional government for several
months. This apparent shift conflicts with other statements reflecting
persistent Saudi demands for Assad’s immediate departure.

Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir: 19 OCT – “After the formation of this
[transitional] governmental body, President Assad must step down. If it
is a matter of months, two or three months or less, that is not important. But
Assad has no future in Syria." (Reuters)

Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir: 22 OCT – [On whether Assad could play a
role in an interim Syrian government] “His role would be to leave Syria...
The best case scenario is that we wake up in the morning and Bashar al-Assad is
not there."

Turkey – Turkey also softened
its stance on Assad following diplomatic talks with the U.S. and other partner
nations, acceding to a transitional administration which preserves Assad as a
titular head of state for up to six months.

Anonymous Turkish
officials: 20 OCT – Turkey provided initial support for a political transition that
retains Assad as the “symbolic president” of a “transitional administration”
for up to six months on the condition that Assad hold no control over the
Syrian military or intelligence apparatus and that there be a "guarantee
of his departure". The proposal was reportedly formed with a group of
nine countries including the U.S. during the UN General Assembly sessions in
late SEP 2015. (Hurriyet)

Iran –
Iran mirrored Russian rhetoric on the future role played by Assad in a
reflection of the deepening strategic alignment between the two countries over
the Middle East.

Deputy Foreign
Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian: 21 OCT -
"In any political process the role played by Bashar al-Assad will be
important...we are not working for Assad to stay in power forever as
president. But we are very cognizant of his role in the fight
against terrorism and the national unity of that country. The people of
Syria will make the final decision – and whatever decision they take, we will
endorse.” (The Guardian)

Friday, October 23, 2015

Key Takeaway: Russian airstrikes continue primarily to target
rebel-held terrain in support of Syrian regime ground offensives in
northwestern Syria. Russian airstrikes from October 19-20 largely
supported regime ground offensives in rebel-held areas of the southern
countryside of Aleppo and northern Hama Province far from core ISIS-held
terrain. However, Russia continues to sustain its counter-ISIS
narrative by claiming sporadic strikes against ISIS in Deir Ez-Zour and
Raqqa Provinces. Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported two strikes
against ISIS in Deir ez-Zour Province from October 21-22. However, only
one strike was verified through local reporting on October 21. Russian
airstrikes reportedly hit a hospital in ar-Raqqah City on October 22.
Local sources released pictures of damages to the hospital and
surrounding buildings. However, the Russian MoD has not yet confirmed
the strike, or any strikes from 1:00PM EST on October 22 and 3:30PM EST on October 23, claiming a technical problem with its website.

The Russian air campaign in Syria increases the Assad regime’s
asymmetric capabilities against the Syrian opposition. Like the Assad
regime, Russia is likely willing to inflict heavy civilian casualties in
the process. Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesperson Col. Steve Warren
reported the Russian use of cluster bombs in populated locations in Hama
and Idlib Provinces, citing open source reports during a Department of Defense Press Briefing on October 21. Human Rights Watch released a report documenting
the use of Russian cluster munitions on October 4, 2015 targeting the
rebel-held village of Kafr Halab in northwestern Syria. However, Human
Rights Watch could not determine whether the Russian-made munitions were
dropped by Syrian or Russian aircraft. Pro-regime aircraft also used cluster munitions in Hama Province on October 11, according to local activist reports.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports
corroborated both by official government statements reported through
credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist
networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary
sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain
disinformation.

Thursday, October 22, 2015

ISIS
escalated efforts to inspire terror attacks in Israel over the past week,
through digital and possibly in-person recruitment. The organization released a
wave of 10 propaganda videos between October 17 and 20 inciting
Muslims in Israel and Palestine to attack Israelis, Fatah, Hamas. ISIS is
exploiting a growing sectarian conflict in Jerusalem focused on access to the
Al Aqsa mosque, a significant religious site for Jews and Muslims. Protests
in late September regarding Israel’s limitations on Palestinian access to the
mosque fueled a recent surge
in violent attacks. At least 8 Israelis and 50 Palestinians have been
killed in 39 incidents over October, several involving stabbing
attacks by Palestinians on Israelis. ISIS referenced the stabbings in its
outreach, urging supporters to also consider “explosive
devices” and running over enemies.

ISIS’s
outreach attempts have resonated with some Israeli Arab individuals. Israel’s
state-run television station claimed on October 21 that ISIS-linked operatives
are recruiting
Israeli Arab students attending foreign universities in Jordan and Saudi
Arabia. ISIS has already recruited
several individuals in Israel since 2014 to fight
and live with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and has inspired a group of
supporters to attack Israeli soldiers. Israel also convicted a group of Arab
citizens, including four teachers, in July 2015 for allegedly promoting
ISIS’s ideology to students. ISIS released its first video by a Hebrew-speaker
on October 22, in which a fighter threatened the destruction of Israel’s
borders, echoing ISIS’s frequent refrain about overturning state borders. Inflamed
conflict between Israeli and Palestinian citizens likely will facilitate
radicalization and recruitment, potentially enabling ISIS to resource the
attacks it is already encouraging.

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