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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002872
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2029
TAGS: PRELPHUMMARRPGOVNKSKJPRUINCH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S DINNER WITH CHINESE ACADEMICS:
NORTH KOREA, POTUS VISIT, MIL-MIL, JAPAN, INDIA, SCO
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At an October 13 dinner with EAP
Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, three leading
Chinese international affairs experts urged the
United States to start bilateral talks with North
Korea. China had done its part by keeping pressure
on the DPRK, they said, but now it was up to the
United States to engage Pyongyang directly. The
scholars urged President Obama to use his upcoming
visit to interact with average Chinese and express
concern for China's underclass. President Obama
remained popular in China, they said, though the
decision to impose new duties on Chinese tires and
the President's plans to meet with the Dalai Lama
after his China visit had caused this public support
to soften. All agreed that the U.S.-China military-
to-military relationship lagged behind political and
economic ties, and they endorsed the idea of
building "strategic reassurance." One guest said
China was pleased by the Japanese Prime Minister's
promise not to visit the Yasakuni Shrine or meet
with the Dalai Lama. China was "cautious but open"
toward Japan's proposal for an East Asia Community,
but wanted to first conclude a trilateral free trade
pact with South Korea and Japan before considering
new regional multilateral initiatives. The scholars
said the United States should not be concerned by
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would
remain functional in nature and had limited
potential to expand. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) The DCM hosted a dinner with Chinese
international relations experts October 13 in honor
of EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell. The
Chinese participants were Jin Canrong, Vice
President of People's University's International
Relations Institute; Yuan Peng, Director of American
Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR, a think tank
affiliated with the Ministry of State Security); and
Zhu Feng, Director of the International Security
Program at Peking University's School of
International Studies.
North Korea
-----------
¶3. (C) CICIR's Yuan Peng told A/S Campbell that
China hoped the United States would "seize the
opportunity" presented by Premier Wen Jiabao's
recent visit to Pyongyang and engage North Korea in
bilateral talks. The North's most recent missile
launches, he said, were "another test" to gauge the
United States' reaction. He urged the United States
not to react in a "harsh way" to the latest missile
firings. The goal of all sides, Yuan added, should
be to prevent a third nuclear test by the DPRK. Zhu
Feng, of Peking University, agreed that the "ball
was now in the United States' court" and Washington-
Pyongyang bilateral talks were necessary to move the
process forward. China, Zhu said, was still unclear
about the DPRK's ultimate goals -- whether the North
wanted denuclearization, withdrawal of U.S. troops,
or something else -- and bilateral U.S.-North Korea
talks could help clarify this question. If
Washington-Pyongyang talks failed, "then we could
think of next steps." China had done its part by
keeping pressure on North Korea to return to the
Six-Party Talks, Zhu said, but now it was up to the
United States.
¶4. (C) A/S Campbell responded that the United States
was willing to engage in bilateral discussions with
the DPRK. However, the U.S. would not engage in a
protracted series of bilateral meetings with the
DPRK. The North would need to return to the Six-
Party Talks after one or two meetings. The DPRK
would also need to reaffirm its past commitments
made in the Six-Party Talks. A primary goal of the
United States, A/S Campbell stressed, was to
maintain solidarity among the five parties. The
North's recent missile tests, A/S Campbell added,
fit a well-established pattern of North Korea trying
to create higher anxiety at a critical moment.
POTUS Visit
-----------
¶5. (C) A/S Campbell told the scholars that President
BEIJING 00002872 002 OF 004
Obama was looking forward to his visit to China in
November and viewed the bilateral relationship with
great importance. People's University's Jin Canrong
said the majority of young people in China held
positive views of President Obama although the Nobel
Peace Prize decision had generated some controversy.
Yuan Peng, while agreeing that President Obama's
image in China remained good overall, said the
President's decision to impose duties on Chinese
automobile tires had put a dent in his popularity.
The White House announcement that President Obama
would meet with the Dalai Lama after his trip to
China also sparked a negative public reaction,
according to Yuan. "There is a feeling," Yuan said,
"that Obama needs China but still does not take
China's interests seriously."
¶6. (C) Zhu Feng urged President Obama to use his
visit to show concern for China's lower classes.
The President could meet with local-level social
workers and volunteers working with the disabled and
the poor. Yuan Peng, however, warned that such an
event could be misinterpreted as a criticism of the
Communist Party for not caring enough about
disadvantaged groups. Rather, President Obama
should meet with average people in a "less
political" way. President Hu Jintao had recently
visited Beijing's Summer Palace, where he shook
hands with Chinese tourists and rode a newly opened
subway line. President Obama could do something
similar, and this would show that Presidents Obama
and Hu were "coordinated" and that both leaders
cared about ordinary citizens. More generally, Yuan
added, President Obama should talk directly to
China's interests during the visit and "show respect
for China's model, social system and sovereignty."
Mil-Mil and Strategic Reassurance
---------------------------------
¶7. (C) A/S Campbell told the scholars that the
American and Chinese militaries remained too
distrustful of one another and the USG wanted to see
a resumption of mil-mil dialogue. Yuan Peng agreed
that the mil-mil aspect of the relationship lagged
behind political and economic ties. The first 30
years since U.S.-China normalization had been marked
by many political and economic successes, Yuan said,
but military and security ties represented the
"future" of the bilateral relationship over the next
30 years. Zhu Feng observed that the People's
Liberation Army remained "very conservative" in its
approach to mil-mil relations. Zhu said he was
familiar with Pentagon complaints that the PLA did
not reciprocate with adequate openness. The
relationship between the PLA and the U.S. military
was in a "downturn, but not a spiral," Zhu said, and
the mil-mil dialogue "still needs a critical push
from the top leadership" to get off the ground. Jin
Canrong, however, disagreed that PLA distrust of the
United States was on the rise. PLA views of the
United States, he argued, were actually steady.
What had changed in recent years was the Chinese
military's increasing outspokenness within China's
political system. In the past, Jin said, the PLA
had remained silent. Now, the PLA was more
confident and willing to speak out. The U.S. side
needed to "be patient" about the mil-mil
relationship and get used to a PLA that "speaks
louder." The two sides should continue to let the
political relationship develop and, if things stayed
on the current track, then the mil-mil side would
eventually improve too, Jin said.
¶8. (C) Yuan Peng, referring to Deputy Secretary
Steinberg's September 24 speech to the Center for
New American Security, asserted that building
"strategic reassurance" and trust was more important
than mil-mil dialogue. The U.S. counter-terrorism
front, he said, was moving eastward and pushing
against China's western border and its security
interests in Xinjiang. The PLA, meanwhile, was
seeking to expand its space in the Indian Ocean and
the South China Sea, which also created potential
friction with the United States. Hence, the two
presidents should speak frankly about their
respective strategic intentions, and the United
States side could do more to explain its counter-
terrorism strategy. The Deputy Secretary's concept
of "strategic reassurance" was a "positive idea from
China's perspective" and showed that the U.S.
BEIJING 00002872 003 OF 004
intended to adapt to China's rise, but, Yuan said,
it was unclear how much President Obama supported
the concept. A first step toward building greater
strategic trust, Zhu Feng said, would be to change
the tone of the Quadrennial Defense and Nuclear
Posture Reviews. Zhu said the China language in the
last QDR had worried the PLA and Chinese military
leaders would be watching the upcoming QDR closely.
A/S Campbell said the strategic reassurance concept
needed to be fleshed out and the two sides had to
think about how to put the idea into operation. The
Obama Administration, A/S Campbell stressed, wanted
to create a new vision for relations with China that
focused on constructive issues and not threats.
India
-----
¶9. (C) Asked about the state of China-India
relations, Jin Canrong said China wanted a stable
relationship with India but "the mentality of Indian
elites," who were fixated on the memory of the
India-China border war, was standing in the way.
Some in China, Jin added, were concerned about
expanding U.S.-India ties, but the mainstream view
in the Chinese government was that India could have
good relations with both the United States and
China.
Japan, East Asia Community
--------------------------
¶10. (C) Turning to China-Japan relations, Zhu Feng
said China had been pleasantly surprised by Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama's announcement that none of
his cabinet members would visit the Yasakuni Shrine.
Zhu claimed that Hatoyama had also pledged not to
meet with the Dalai Lama. China, however, remained
uncertain in its dealings with Japan because the
Chinese side was unsure how long Hatoyama's
government would be able to stay in power. If the
new Japanese government survived beyond a year, Zhu
said, then the two sides would have a "historic
opportunity" to improve long-term relations. A/S
Campbell asked how China had reacted to Hatoyama's
proposal to establish an East Asia Community. Zhu
said China was "cautious but open" to Hatoyama's
idea. China's current focus, however, was on
reaching a trilateral free trade agreement with
South Korea and Japan. Such an FTA, if achieved,
could become the cornerstone of an East Asia
Community. But if the FTA failed, Zhu said, then
"we can forget the EAC proposal." Jin Canrong added
that there was no desire in China to create an East
Asia version of the European Union. Future
multilateral cooperation in East Asia would continue
to be issue oriented, Jin said. Jin added that
there were already "too many multilateral
arrangements and meetings" and this was creating
fatigue in the Chinese government. Jin said Premier
Wen Jiabao had reportedly complained to his staff
about having to attend "one conference after
another" with few concrete results.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
---------------------------------
¶11. (C) The three scholars downplayed the
significance of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), characterizing it as having
little potential to expand. The SCO, Zhu Feng said,
remained in a "nascent" stage with a narrow focus on
functional issues. Yuan Peng said China viewed the
SCO as important for combating the "three evils"
(terrorism, extremism and separatism) and for
creating a "buffer zone" to China's west. China was
witnessing the expansion of U.S. influence in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian states.
The SCO, Yuan said, thus offered China a way to
"play a role" in the region, though China did not
view the SCO as a "hedge" against the United States.
Jin Canrong said there were still "natural limits"
on the SCO. The SCO, he said, had been initiated by
the Central Asian states that wanted to reduce their
traditional reliance on Russia by reaching out to
other big powers. The "stans" had proposed the SCO
as a way to engage China, and this remained the
driving dynamic behind the organization. The
Central Asian states, however, also wanted to pursue
relations with other powers, including the United
States, India, Japan and the EU. Russia also did
BEIJING 00002872 004 OF 004
not want the SCO to become too active, according to
Jin.
¶12. (U) A/S Campbell's delegation cleared this
message.
HUNTSMAN