Germany – Global Politicshttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp
An International Affairs MagazineSat, 05 Aug 2017 07:38:12 +0000en-UShourly1From Brexit to Breakup: a Scottish View on the EU Referendumhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2016/06/22/brexit-breakup-scottish-view-eu-referendum/
Wed, 22 Jun 2016 14:15:42 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2606CC Image courtesy of Rareclass This piece was also published in Huffington Post on 23rd June 2016 Something we in Scotland learned the hard way in 2014 is that referendum questions are dangerous because they make both choices on the ballot paper seem equally plausible. By giving the people a choice we somehow assume that […]

Something we in Scotland learned the hard way in 2014 is that referendum questions are dangerous because they make both choices on the ballot paper seem equally plausible. By giving the people a choice we somehow assume that either option is a safe one. In the EU referendum context, that can make voters view leaving as an equally valid option compared to the status quo of remain. After all, what politician in his right mind would allow the people a democratic choice which might risk economic prosperity and the security of the West?

Of course, it is possible that David Cameron believed that he would never have to follow through on his referendum pledge–either due to the coalition with the Liberal Democrats continuing after 2015–or that in the unlikely event that he did have to hold a referendum, that it could be won easily. So much for that.

The Prime Minister has spent the last few years playing constitutional roulette with the integrity of the United Kingdom and we will discover this week whether his luck, and Britain’s, has finally run out. Such a distillation of the complex ledger of advantages and drawbacks of UK’s EU membership to a simple binary yes or no answer is wholly unequal to the magnitude of the stakes involved in this referendum. Professor Neil Walker of Edinburgh University observes that for most shades of political opinion in the UK and beyond “European ‘membership’ for a country of Britain’s size, influence and location should be less a matter of ‘yes or no’ than one of ‘more or less’.”

As a strong supporter of Scotland staying part of the UK in 2014, I wrote op-eds in the Scotsman, the Daily Record, and Huffington Post criticising Alex Salmond’s grievance and fantasy rich, but policy light, plan for Scotland existing outside the UK. I never imagined there could ever be a more divisive ideological campaign than the Scottish independence referendum, but the EU Referendum has managed it.

We are in grim times when Ms Hoey castigates the leader of a liberal democratic Germany, which has entrenched democracy and human dignity as the highest values in its constitutional order since World War Two, yet she is perfectly happy staging Titanic style photo ops on the Thames with a grinning demagogue who the next day was propagandizing a Goebbels-esque poster of helpless Syrian refugees.

Meanwhile, Oxford educated Michael Gove enunciates the words ‘elites’ and ‘experts’ with even more venom than Alex Salmond used to spit ‘Westminster’ – an achievement in itself. Despite his current hostility to experts, one senses that Mr Gove wouldn’t want a road sweeper performing open heart surgery on him anytime soon. There may be some truth to the writer Philip Pullman’s comment that “when a clever man starts advocating stupidity he’s after something and we should watch him.”

Those that want us to leave the EU claim that Britain can be a leading player on the world stage without the constraining influence of our European partners. In reality, the UK has influenced the EU far more than it has been constrained by it. When the UK joined the EU in the 1970s (after twice being vetoed in the 1960s by De Gaulle), it was far more aligned with French interests. But after over four decades of the UK being an EU member, exerting its influence and gaining allies, the EU has, as Professor Jan Werner-Mueller notes, “been reshaped in the image of the UK” and more closely reflects British interests. As highlighted above, the UK has a veto to prevent new countries joining the EU, but so do all other EU members, many of which have populations and politicians opposed, in particular, to Turkey joining.

My point here is not about the merits of countries such as Turkey joining, but rather that the EU is not a static organisation. It is the sum of its parts, which happen to be our European neighbours; not a small Brussels bureaucracy, about the same size as Birmingham City Council, which manages to serve 500 million people. Power in the EU lies not with bureaucrats but with Britain, Germany, France and all the other independent sovereign states which exert control through the European Council. If we can’t lead in Europe among countries that share our concerns and values on so many issues, the idea that we can exert any influence on other continents is for the birds.

If the UK votes to leave the EU then a second independence referendum in overwhelmingly pro- EU Scotland seems likely. Whether Scotland would vote to leave the UK in a second independence referendum following a Brexit is the million dollar question. Polling figures from Professor John Curtice indicate a possible post-Brexit swing of between 3 and 6 points, creating a narrow majority for independence of 51 or 52%, but still short of the 60% figure which the SNP is apparently looking for before it would risk holding a second referendum. All of these figures are, of course, purely hypothetical but they show that the risk of a second referendum and independence is real following a UK vote to leave the EU.

As a strong opponent of Scottish independence last time around and a strong supporter of being part of the EU, Brexit would certainly change my calculation when weighing up which way I would lean in a second Scottish independence referendum. Here are some thoughts:

Nicola Sturgeon has proved to be a much more able, more likeable, and less divisive First Minister than Alex Salmond. If the Scottish Government decided to hold a second independence referendum she would be a much more convincing advocate of independence than her predecessor. That would not be enough in itself though.

Ms Sturgeon would also have to make a significantly stronger case for Scotland’s ability to go it alone than was presented in 2014. The collapse in the price of oil since the last referendum has, of course, blown one major hole in the financial viability of an independent Scotland. However, there is more to the Scottish economy than just oil and a resurgence in the price of oil (possibly caused by geopolitical turmoil such as Brexit?) could change the context again.

What would change the economic equation significantly are both the consequences of Brexit to the Scottish economy, as well as the prospects of Scotland being able to join the EU. In 2014, EU figures such as former EU Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, did everything possible to discourage Scotland from seceding from one of its member states, the United Kingdom, lest it encourage separatist movements in other EU member states (with Catalonia being the most prominent example). That position would no longer hold after Brexit as the EU would no longer have a vested interest in maintaining the territorial integrity of a former member state. Indeed, a Scottish application to join might be positively welcomed to remind other restless states of the potential pitfalls of leaving the EU. Furthermore, as former European Court judge Sir David Edward noted at the time of the Scottish referendum, there is no question that Scotland could become an EU member; the only question would be the terms and timing of it.

Most people in Scotland, myself included, have no wish to repeat the experience of the 2014 Scottish referendum anytime soon. Neither, though, do we wish to be dragged out of the EU against our collective will, or for Great Britain to become Lesser England. However, a vote to leave the EU may well herald the beginning of the end of the United Kingdom as we know it today. So when casting your ballot on Thursday please consider the futures of all the peoples and nations of the British Isles and vote to remain in the EU.

David Miles is a Carnegie Scholar at the University of St Andrews researching American and German constitutionalism. He has written for the Huffington Post, the Daily Beast and the Scotsman, and is Managing Editor of Global Politics.

]]>The Renaissance of Right-Wing Populism: Learning from the Case of Austriahttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2016/05/31/renaissance-right-wing-populism-responses-learning-case-austria/
Tue, 31 May 2016 14:01:29 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2480Many parts of Europe currently face a renaissance of the xenophobic political right. Thus, it is certainly no coincidence that in a recent issue of the “New Statesman” Rowan Williams reminds us that “the toxic brew of paranoia and populism that brought Hitler to power” may not be so far away from liberal democracies as […]

Many parts of Europe currently face a renaissance of the xenophobic political right. Thus, it is certainly no coincidence that in a recent issue of the “New Statesman” Rowan Williams reminds us that “the toxic brew of paranoia and populism that brought Hitler to power” may not be so far away from liberal democracies as their inhabitants assume. Echoing Hannah Arendt, Williams concludes with the warning that “for evil to triumph, what is necessary is for societies to stop thinking”.

There is certainly more than a grain of truth in this piece: In democracies, the inability or unwillingness to think and judge critically can all too easily pave the way for the success of dangerous populists. What is often overlooked, however, is that the political left is not immune to the lure of simplistic ideologies and deceiving moral certainties. A closer look at the current situation in Austria teaches valuable lessons of how not to respond to the renewed popularity of the right.

Since its re-establishment as a sovereign state in 1955, Austria has been politically dominated by the Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party. At the same time, however, the country remained fertile ground for right-wing ideologues. Arguably the most talented of these figures was Jörg Haider, who led his Freedom Party to a major success in the 1999 parliamentary elections and negotiated its participation in the government, sparking strong international criticism. There is also a committed political left represented by the Green Party that preaches a political and moral cosmopolitanism by emphasising the importance of open borders, global solidarity and a rejection of nationalism. While this is, of course, a broad generalisation, it is safe to say that Austria`s political left consists of the well-educated, urban stratum of society which presents itself as open-minded, democratic and tolerant.

The first round of last month’s presidential election ended with a sweeping success for the candidate of the Freedom Party over his only serious opponent – the more intellectual and measured candidate of the Greens.1 In response, some on the left utilised statistics which analysed the electoral behaviour of Austrians in relation to their education to generate a narrative of the “educated” versus the “uneducated” voters – the gist of this analysis being that voters with a lower level of education tended to vote for the right-wing candidate, while “educated” voters preferred the candidate of the Greens. This readiness of left-wing parties to explain away the undesired outcome of the election on the basis of the supposed illiteracy and ignorance of the voters reveal both an unwillingness to accept the democratic result of the first round of voting and their refusal to address their own political shortcomings.

The shrillness of the political left and the widening gap between its self-defined maxims and its actual behaviour became even more apparent in the days after the first round of voting. The signpost outside a Viennese Café, barring the 35% who voted for the right-wing candidate, garnered huge public attention. However, the most illuminating insights into the mind-set of the left, came from a Facebook post of Thomas Glavinic, a prominent Austrian novelist. Here Glavinic criticised the assumed moral superiority of many on the left; in response, various commentators accused the author of defending right-wing positions, of contributing to increased polarisation in Austrian society or of being a hypocrite. What is almost impossible to detect in these counterattacks, however, is a proper engagement with Glavinic`s comments, let alone a hint of self-criticism. Fortunately, the story of Austria`s presidential election came to a satisfactory conclusion: In the run-off on 23 May, Alexander van der Bellen, the left-wing candidate, was able to fend off the challenge of his far-right opponent; eventually, the two candidates were separated by just 31000 votes out of more than 4.6 million votes cast. Nevertheless, this episode lays bare one of the major underlying weaknesses of the concept of democracy.

The ever looming dark shadow of populism is by definition the price we have to pay for the amenities and inclusiveness of a democratic system. Right-wing parties, it seems, are in a particularly comfortable position to exploit this weakness because they often propose simplistic solutions to complex problems. Hannah Arendt once brilliantly explained this phenomenon by observing that people tend to vote for the most average politician rather than for the ablest because they vote who they can best identify with.2 Therefore, the danger of populism is so central to the concept of democracy that it can never be completely eradicated and must never be denied or forgotten. The perennial question, in other words, of how to manage the balancing act of enjoying the advantages of a democratic system while, at the same time, taming its underlying risks, can never be solved definitively and has to be addressed time and time again. What is clear is that the answer cannot be to demonise, stigmatise or ridicule competing political opinions; rather, we must engage in an open dialogue that attempts to fuse horizons and celebrates rather than suffocates the plurality of opinions within the boundaries of law. Admittedly, this might sometimes be a tedious and exhausting exercise; yet it is the only viable strategy in dealing with dangerous populists. The recent success of parties like “Golden Dawn” in Greece or “Alternative für Deutschland” in Germany demonstrates that the stakes are extremely high. Arendt would probably have said that nothing less than “the world is at stake”3.

]]>Poland: A Foreign Policy in Fluxhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/09/07/poland-a-foreign-policy-in-flux/
Mon, 07 Sep 2015 21:07:55 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1869Just three weeks after entering office, Polish President Andrzej Duda’s first official visit to Berlin on August 28 allayed concerns in some quarters that his presidency would resurrect the combative foreign policy his right-wing party, Law and Justice, practiced the last time it was in power from 2005 to 2007. Back then, prickly ties with […]

Just three weeks after entering office, Polish President Andrzej Duda’s first official visit to Berlin on August 28 allayed concerns in some quarters that his presidency would resurrect the combative foreign policy his right-wing party, Law and Justice, practiced the last time it was in power from 2005 to 2007. Back then, prickly ties with Berlin, deep skepticism towards the European Union, and a clear preference for close security ties with the United States over engagement with the continent resulted in a common perception that Poland was an unreliable European partner.

Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk – now President of the European Commission – changed course after becoming prime minister in 2007 by revitalizing ties with Berlin and spearheading an era of constructive foreign policy that has raised Poland’s standing and influence in European affairs to unprecedented levels. Now that Law and Justice is projected to unseat the government in parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25th, many observers fear that Duda’s promise to recalibrate Polish foreign policy will include downgrading relations with Germany, a course that would be strategically catastrophic for Poland and paralyzing for the broader European community. If it returns to power this year, Law and Justice should unequivocally disown its failed foreign policy legacy and pledge to continue Poland’s unprecedentedly strong ties with its western neighbor.

Despite tough campaign rhetoric promising to stand up to Germany in defense of Polish interests, Duda’s visit to Berlin was generally well received, with one major German daily proclaiming him “a declared friend of Germany.” In meetings with officials, including his counterpart President Joachim Gauck and later Chancellor Angela Merkel, Duda praised Poland’s constructive ties with Germany and in particular Merkel’s leadership against Russian aggression in Ukraine. One of Duda’s aides remarked that visiting Germany early in his term was “an important signal that the president wants to continue the dynamism and intensity of Polish-German relations.” Indeed, Poland’s need for robust ties with Germany stems from the core of Polish security policy: fearful that Russia’s military gaze might extend to other eastern European states in the wake of its armed intervention in Ukraine, Duda’s top foreign policy priority in the short-term will be achieving what the current Polish government has thus far failed to, namely persuading Germany to consent to permanent NATO installations on Polish territory as a deterrent against Russian aggression. Germany and the United States have long rebuffed Poland’s request, fearing that such a radical change in NATO policy would needlessly provoke Russia. Despite differences on this and other issues, however, there were sighs of relief in both countries that Duda’s conciliatory remarks signaled, at least for now, the continuation of healthy bilateral ties.

The possibility that a future Law and Justice government will alter Polish foreign policy to the detriment of Polish-German ties nevertheless remains real. Before his visit to Berlin, Duda insisted that his party would merely “correct,” not “revolutionize” foreign policy, but many hardliners in the Law and Justice camp demand that the party, once in power, resurrect its skeptical stance towards Berlin. Duda’s friendly remarks in Berlin suggest that at least he understands Poland’s challenging security environment makes dysfunctional relations with its important western neighbor unworkable given the need to leverage a united European front, including strong German support, against Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, since the Polish presidency is largely ceremonial and there is no telling yet what role the party’s leader, former prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, will have in domestic affairs after October, it is premature to declare that Polish-German relations will remain as strong as they are now in the coming years.

Given the complex situation NATO faces with Russia’s belligerent behavior and divergent views in Europe over the best approach to handling Moscow, the United States has a role to play in ensuring the continuation of friendly Warsaw-Berlin ties. The United States should make clear that it would oppose any attempt by Warsaw to create distance between itself, Berlin, and Brussels by stressing that Poland’s security, and by extension America’s regional interests, are best advanced by strengthening the continental ties Poland has impressively fostered since 2007. During the last decade when Law and Justice picked fights with Berlin and Brussels over issues ranging from energy policy to relations with Russia, Poland invested heavily in warm ties with the Bush administration, which enthusiastically courted “new Europe” as a source of international support for its foreign policy. This October, the United States should take the opportunity after congratulating the new Polish government to reaffirm their close relationship and Poland’s critical role at the heart of transatlantic relations, but also to stress that it would regard any new policy in Warsaw distinguishing Polish interests from constructive ties with Germany as contrary to the objective of achieving European security through unity and collaboration. This would dissuade policy makers in Warsaw from attempting to resurrect Law and Justice’s foreign policy playbook of the previous decade, when cooperation with European partners was downgraded in hopes that the United States would step in to bolster Poland’s security.

Polish-German reconciliation is one of the most significant stories of the postwar era. Hundreds of thousands of Poles still living today have personal memories of Nazi Germany’s brutal occupation, and despite the destruction wrought by that tragedy, the two neighbors have fostered economic, diplomatic, and security ties whose strength and comprehensiveness are a testament to the promise and potential of European integration. Presiding over a period of unprecedented economic growth and external engagement with the continent, Duda’s predecessor, Bronislaw Komorowski, as well as Donald Tusk and current Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz have recognized and capitalized on the economic and political opportunities of close Polish-German ties during the 8 remarkably fruitful years their party has been in power. If Poles choose to return Law and Justice to power this fall, the party should pledge to continue this vital prong of Civic Platform’s foreign policy, whose legacy has made Poland safer and more influential than at any other time in its recent history.

]]>Solidarity or Self-interest? European Integration and the German Questionhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/08/23/solidarity-or-self-interest-european-integration-and-the-german-question/
Sun, 23 Aug 2015 21:48:46 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1769This article was originally published by The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs in Carnegie Ethics Online on 17 August 2015. In Klaus Harpprecht’s 1995 biography of Thomas Mann, he highlights a statement which Mann wrote in 1947, which, as Harpprecht puts it, “one reads with a distinct shiver half a century later”: In […]

In Klaus Harpprecht’s 1995 biography of Thomas Mann, he highlights a statement which Mann wrote in 1947, which, as Harpprecht puts it, “one reads with a distinct shiver half a century later”:

In barely 50 years […] Germany will, in spite of everything, have all of non-Russian Europe in its pocket, as Hitler could already have if he had not been so impossible.

Less than 50 years later and the country was reunified, but it was a more restrained Germany on the European stage, deeply aware of its past and struggling to bear the economic burden of incorporating East Germany into the West German republic. Still, Mann was in many ways correct, for it is Germany’s financial might and its very deep resources which have so far kept the European integration bicycle pedaling forward. Yet as the recent negotiations over the third bailout of Greece illustrated, there are signs that Germany’s largesse and its willingness to sacrifice its own interests for the sake of the European project have definite limits.

Twenty-five years ago, everything seemed possible. “Do you realize that you are sitting opposite the direct successor to Adolf Hitler?” Chancellor Helmut Kohl said to an astonished Timothy Garton Ash shortly after re-unification. It was evident, said Ash, that as the first chancellor of a united Germany since Hitler, Kohl was profoundly conscious of his historical duty to do things differently.

Germany today is earnest in its desire to be a good European neighbor, but it does not believe that it can or should pay any cost as part of this role. One problem is that economic, not ethical values have become the lodestone of the European Union. As a hybrid construct, the EU lacks the societal dimension which, within the nation-state, is the critical element that allows one group of people to identify with another and which legitimize government actions designed to help one part of the community at the expense of another. People in London or New York accept, perhaps grudgingly, that their tax pounds and dollars may be used to fund projects for the benefit of people in Cardiff or New Orleans. They accept this because they recognize the others as being members of the same community.

Most liberal democratic states in the West succeed by having political and constitutional processes in place which legitimate policy choices that help one part of a society at the expense of another. Here, it is both the acceptance of the specific legitimation process by people (i.e. its constitutional and political processes) AND people’s recognition that they inhabit a common society that ultimately justifies taxation and spending decisions. As Keith Whittington of Princeton puts it, “constitutions cannot survive if they are too politically costly to maintain and they cannot survive if they are too distant from normal political concerns.”

This is a lesson which European, principally Franco-German leaders, often for the best of motives, have refused to take on board over decades. To understand their reluctance to consult with or seek to understand the opinion and belief of the people and the dilemma this has created for the EU, one must recognize the particular type of limited representative democracies which were established in Europe after the Second World War. If a constitutional system could bring the Nazis to power through a democratic election, as happened during the Weimar Republic, this was proof, especially to West Germany’s founders, that to prevent a country committing democratic suicide there had to be certain entrenched principles of democracy and of human rights that neither the people nor their representatives could change. At the state level these “highly constrained” democracies, as Jan Werner-Müller puts it, were characterized by unelected institutions (such as constitutional courts), while at the supra-national level European integration was meant to impose “further constraints on nation-state democracies through unelected institutions.”

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and faced with the prospect of a reunited Germany, French president François Mitterand sought to ensure that German reunification could only happen in parallel with the further integration of Europe, thereby binding Germany’s future to that of Europe. Mitterand told Germany’s foreign minister Genscher in November 1989 that if Germany did not commit itself to the European monetary union, “We will return to the world of 1913.” In Helmut Kohl, Mitterand had a partner who recognized that Germany would have to sacrifice its self-interest to reassure the rest of Europe. It was a policy, as Harold James put it, “derived not only from concern with foreign reactions to German power, and a French wish to harness Germany, but also from a German fear of German power.” This meant giving up the symbol of its post-war strength and stability – the Deutschmark – and committing the country to the European integration project by agreeing to monetary union (EMU). Closer union and EMU were the price that Germany had to pay to reassure its most important neighbor, France. In the heady days of German reunification the normative quest to be ‘the good neighbor’ in a new Europe had a special potency. But how much would Germany be willing to pay to play this role?

Those who criticize Germany for the ‘mental waterboarding‘ of Greece should recall the grumbling in the former West German states over the huge transfers of taxpayer wealth to the former East German states since reunification in 1990. Even today after approximately 2 trillion euros of investment in East Germany, German taxpayers still see a deduction on their paychecks for the so-called ‘Solidaritätszuschlag‘—the solidarity tax. If bailing out their own compatriots was done through clenched teeth, one immediately sees why additional money transfers to southern Europe to bail out Greece or other countries is for many Germans beyond the pale. Yet such fiscal transfers are seen by economists as the absolute pre-requisite necessary to make the eurozone work long-term.

The flaws in European monetary union that became so apparent at the start of the eurozone crisis in 2011 were to some commentators confirmation of just how ill thought-out it had been to allow different countries to share a currency without a political or fiscal union, and without any transfers of money from the stronger to weaker performing parts of Europe. Yet the flaws in monetary union were not just anticipated, but had been predicted from the outset. Far from being a project based on rosy expectations, those driving European integration embarked upon monetary union with the very belief that a crisis would develop at some point, since it was precisely through such challenges that the European cognoscenti in Paris, Bonn, and Brussels believed that closer political and fiscal union would develop. In a very prescient piece in Foreign Affairs from 1998, Timothy Garton Ash laid bare the delusion underlying the ‘crises will make Europe stronger’ fallacy: “It is a truly dialectical leap of faith to suggest that a crisis that exacerbates differences between European countries is the best way to unite them.”

Thinking Strategically, Thinking Morally

Supporters of the EU argue, often persuasively, that its success in promoting stability since World War Two can also be viewed as achieving a fundamentally moral purpose in preventing bloodshed and establishing the conditions in which societies might prosper and pursue policies that are both liberal democratic and ethical in nature. However, others like Robert Kagan have argued that Europe’s ability to operate and prosper in a post-modern utopia after 1945 was only possible because of the American-backed NATO security blanket which underwrote Europe’s capacity to pursue its liberal economic and social democratic policy desires, while safely being able to ignore thorny and usually scary geopolitical questions.

During the frantic negotiations over the Greek debt crisis in late June and July, the intervention by the U.S. government on behalf of Greece was noteworthy. The United States sees the geopolitical position of Greece between Europe and the Middle East as critical to the integrity of NATO’s south-eastern flank. Especially ironic was that it was the U.S., the citadel of free market capitalism and neoliberalism, that was having to remind social democratic European states about the risks of Greece crashing out of the eurozone due to a failure of European solidarity and compassion.

More problematic is whether most European leaders today are even capable of thinking strategically in geopolitical terms, given the dominant role of the U.S. in defending the continent during the Cold War. If thinking strategically can also involve acting (or appearing to act) morally, then the Marshall Plan after World War Two was certainly an example of how to turn bitter enemies into the staunchest of allies. It is far easier to turn so-called ‘solidarity’ into hostility or enmity, as eurozone leaders risk doing over Greece.

On one level, Angela Merkel is right to stress the importance of Europe getting its house in order to meet the economic and social challenges of the future. Her favorite statistic, as John Mickelthwait and Adrian Wooldridge note in their new book The Fourth Revolution, is that the European Union accounts for 7 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of its GDP, and 50 percent of its social spending. Europe’s long-term crisis of a declining working age population and people living longer is indeed a serious one, and when the chancellor mentions this statistic, as she did at the World Economic Forum in 2013, it is intended every bit as much for a French audience as for any in southern Europe. The eurozone cannot work in the long-run unless France reforms its economy and introduces the same sort of efficient working practices as Germany, and increases its pension age further. Such French reforms seem unlikely at present, forcing Germany into the position of lobbying for institutions which will bring fiscal, budgetary, and, ultimately, political union closer, but knowing full well that such institutions will be impotent if France doesn’t or can’t play ball when it comes to enforcing rules. Germany, which agreed to monetary union to ameliorate French concerns over reunification, finds itself playing Oliver Hardy to the French Stan Laurel: “Here’s another fine mess you got us into.”

The conundrum which has thus far proved impossible for the EU (as it is currently constituted) to solve is that the bloodless grey institutions which might make Europe function effectively as an economic entity are likely to make it fail as a social democratic project. Reliance on economic orthodoxy at the expense of a set of values that European citizens could relate to has led to growing disenchantment with mainstream parties of the center-left and center-right across the EU. In their 2013 study “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe,” Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow found that those who have engaged in new forms of social mobilization and political activity across Europe have cited concern about the failure of democracy as the reason for the engagement and protest. The study found that Europe was ‘invisible’ in public displays of subterranean politics, and when it was visible it was generally regarded as part of the problem as much as part of the solution.

Part of the problem with the rationalist emphasis on process and rules is that the human dimension of Europe has got subsumed underneath the technocrat-heavy institutional architecture found in Brussels. As far back as 2005, well before the financial crisis and eurozone crisis hit, EU commissioner Joe Borg addressed the disconnect between the EU and its people: “As the European Union advances, it seems that we are losing the European citizen somewhere along the way.”

One issue is that until the 1990s, European citizens were rarely asked directly in the form of referenda whether they wanted the ‘ever closer union’ specified in the Treaty of Rome. Nevertheless, as Timothy Garton Ash notes, “for about 40 years, the project of European unification could rely on at least a passive consensus among most of Europe’s publics.” With memories of the Second World War still so vivid this was understandable. Equally compelling as a driver of European integration was the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, but when that began to dissipate in the late 1980s, and then German reunification became a reality, Europe had to discover a new raison d’etre for itself, and also find a way of incorporating a country the size of Germany (“too big for Europe, too small for the world” in Kissinger’s words) into a re-energized European integration project.

Reports of Europe’s Demise are Premature

European integration has revolved around firstly building an institutional framework for Europe, and then hoping that a European identity would develop in time alongside national identities. As former Polish foreign minister, Bronislaw Geremek observed, “Now that we have Europe, we need Europeans.” However, Rome wasn’t built in a day. As Walter Murphy observed, even 75 years after the establishment of the United States government, Jefferson Davis and Robert E Lee still considered themselves citizens of their states first, of the South second, and of the “United States” last.

The European project, with all of its messy contradictions, is still better than any of the political alternatives. One need only look at some of the unappealing political figures (andPutin admirers) wanting the European Union to fail, such as Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Geert Wilders to recognize what a giant step back it would be economically and politically for Europe to return to a continent of feuding, self-interest, and parochial nationalism.

To find an antidote to these right-wing sirens of division and recrimination one need look no further than Eastern European countries such as Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania—states that lived under the shadow of the Soviet Union, and now, Putin’s Russia. As important as NATO membership is to these countries, the values of the European Union are about more than pure economics. For many of these countries, the values of the EU also symbolize their own journeys towards liberal democracy. As one Polish politician put it to Gideon Rachman shortly before his country joined the EU: “Imagine there is a big river running through Europe. On one side is Moscow. On the other side is Brussels. We know which side of the river we need to be on.”

Issues like migration, terrorism, climate change, and drug trafficking cannot be effectively tackled by nation-states acting alone. The logical and practical reasons why everyone (except perhaps terrorists, drug smugglers, and Farage et al) should want the European project to succeed are manifest. Young people from every member state of the EU have benefited from the opportunities to work, study, and travel throughout Europe, often with the support of immensely successful cultural exchange schemes like Erasmus.

A more heartfelt attachment to the idea of Europe may still be some way off; but, as Robert Schuman put it in 1950, “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”

The crisis of confidence in the EU since the eurozone crisis is more than simply a question of democracy, legitimacy, and allowing people more opportunities to participate in political processes. It also reflects a much more fundamental question about the type of society that people wish to live in, which, as we have seen with the independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia, is as much a challenge within states as for supra-state bodies like the EU.

The challenge for the European Union and its member states, particularly Germany, is in balancing the often incongruous demands of co-operation and self-interest, and thus demonstrate to their own citizens that concrete achievements can still create a Europe of solidarity and prosperity as Schuman envisaged.

]]>Save TTIP or Risk the Alliancehttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/03/25/save-ttip-or-risk-the-alliance/
Wed, 25 Mar 2015 23:18:14 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1399The European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) have been negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) since 2013. Intended to revive the transatlantic economies by eliminating tariffs and accepting various degrees of regulatory convergence or mutual recognition across a wide range of sectors, and solidify EU-U.S. relations, it now appears to be […]

The European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) have been negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) since 2013. Intended to revive the transatlantic economies by eliminating tariffs and accepting various degrees of regulatory convergence or mutual recognition across a wide range of sectors, and solidify EU-U.S. relations, it now appears to be in trouble. There are numerous sectors and issues where, for political, cultural, and legal reasons, the EU and the U.S. look unlikely to recognize each others’ standards, potentially causing the agreement to collapse. This raises two critical concerns. First, since a deal will require legislative ratification on both sides of the Atlantic, public backing is essential. Growing public opposition, especially in Europe, is primarily focused on sectors where negotiations are stuck. Second, a failed TTIP will have far-reaching ramifications beyond trade and investments, affecting security developments in NATO, policies in East Asia, and efforts to counter Putin’s complete disregard for domestic and international law.

Unlike their previous, separate bilateral trade agreements with third countries, where the EU and the U.S. used their size and attractiveness to extract concessions and regulatory changes, negotiations between equals have proven immensely challenging. For example, the U.S. wants scientific findings to be the only basis for granting EU market access to American beef, poultry, and pork. The EU refuses. Europeans trust science to guide most policies, but food regulations are driven equally much by culture and perceptions. There is an expanded use of the precautionary principle, where products are not approved if there are any doubts of their effects and consequences. Add in that many Europeans, led by Germany, perceive the U.S. as having lower safety standards, and the result is that even though most processes used by the U.S. to ensure safe food production have likewise been deemed safe by the European Food Safety Agency, political approval has remained elusive. Interestingly, Americans also doubt German standards. My own discussions with U.S. officials indicate that Congressional support for TTIP is contingent on expanded access for American poultry. Other areas of contention include investments, financial regulations, public procurement, and public services.

Polls show continuously declining support for TTIP, especially in Europe. Support for TTIP now stands at 39% in Germany and Austria, whereas a majority of Brits, primarily concerned with privatization of public health services, doubt TTIP will serve them well. European and American public interest groups have skillfully combined traditional tactics (protests, lobbying) with savvy use of all kinds of social media and other online tools to present “regulatory convergence” as meaning bans on improvements to public safety by cementing current standards, while “regulatory compatibility” and “common standards” are interpreted as euphemisms for lowering labor, environmental, and consumer standards. The controversial Investor-to-State-Dispute Settlement system (ISDS), a mechanism to ensure that foreign investors have access to non-legislative, de-politicized, non-domestic, legal redress for compensation when a host country’s government violates the terms of the treaty (for example through an illegal expropriation), is slated for inclusion. Both parties agree on revisions to ensure transparency and limit national liabilities. Yet interest groups are opposed, presenting ISDS as “corporate favoritism.” While language manipulation and creative associations may be little better than public officials citing frequently criticized economic models in order to create overly optimistic expectations of jobs and economic growth stemming from TTIP, there is one big difference: the public believes civil society groups.

Both allies have significant geopolitical interests in Asia, but a failed TTIP will compound existing disagreements over how to approach the challenge of a globally active China. The size and importance of the transatlantic market place to the rest of the world’s producers and service providers means that common transatlantic standards would, as has been repeatedly stated by President Obama and other officials on both sides of the Atlantic, in effect set global standards before others (read China) can write the rules of the game. Samsung for instance, is reported to be undecided on whether to use American or European specifications for its next generation electronics, and if the Atlantic partners fail to agree, it may go with Chinese standards. A failure to include investor protection in TTIP will also significantly weaken prospects for its inclusion in bilateral investment treaties with China, which both the EU and U.S. are currently negotiating. Even citizen groups I have spoken with are under no illusion that the state-run Chinese judicial system will award foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. Adding to transatlantic differences over China’s currency manipulation (a huge concern in the U.S.), and Europe’s more welcoming approach to Chinese investments, was the March 2015 decision of the four largest European states to join the China-led Asian International Infrastructure Bank, much to the chagrin of the U.S. The latter is also increasingly upset that leading European countries are backtracking on commitments to increase defense spending to the commonly agreed NATO target of 2% of GDP. A further test to transatlantic cohesion arose when a number of EU states explicitly questioned the wisdom of continued sanctions against Russia, even if they eventually agreed to keep sanctions in place until December 2015. If TTIP collapses America may well lose patience with what appears to be a wavering European partner.

A strong and unified transatlantic message about not only the economic benefits of TTIP, but which also makes clear that TTIP cannot change either side’s regulatory system (a trade agreement cannot alter domestic legal processes, only domestic legal processes can do that), is essential if negotiations are to succeed. So too is an emphasis on maintaining a liberal, rules- based international order. This can only be achieved through a concerted and holistic approach that is proactive. It must unite media relations, and use all channels of communication, including online and social media, where many voters get their information. The fallout from a failed TTIP is something either partner can ill afford.

]]>Mediterranean Migration Reveals Flaws in Dublin Conventionhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/02/21/mediterranean-migration-needs-collective-european-action-down-with-the-dublin-regulation/
Sat, 21 Feb 2015 15:56:43 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1126John Donne famously reminded us that ‘no man is an island’. Likewise in today’s polycentric, ever-globalized, and interconnected world, no state can remain untouched by social, economic, or political influences from neighbouring states. As terrible as Islamic State has been for people living in Syria, Iraq and Libya, its effects on Europe are also increasingly being felt. […]

John Donne famously reminded us that ‘no man is an island’. Likewise in today’s polycentric, ever-globalized, and interconnected world, no state can remain untouched by social, economic, or political influences from neighbouring states. As terrible as Islamic State has been for people living in Syria, Iraq and Libya, its effects on Europe are also increasingly being felt.

The rise of migration from North Africa and the Middle East to Southern Europe has resulted in a tragic increase in human suffering. The great exodus began last June as ISIS moved through Iraq, expelling Christians and other religious groups from cities such as Mosul. The United Nations Refugee Agency reported that in 2014 Europe saw a 25% increase of asylum applications, with urgent European action required to stop rising refugee and migrant deaths at sea. Furthermore, mounting pressure has fallen on neighbouring nations, as the UNHCR attempts to cooperate and interact with volatile governments in Syria, Sudan, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt in hopes of dealing with the ever-growing numbers of refugees.

Unsurprisingly, there has been increasing demand for the services provided by illegal transport cartels offering to take refugees from North Africa to Europe (namely Spain, Malta, Greece and Italy). These modes of travel are highly dangerous, as highlighted recently when over 300 migrants drowned after attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Tripoli in rough seas.

Desperate refugees are herded like cattle into overcrowded fishing boats and inflatable rafts, which are turned onto ‘auto pilot mode’ (as the well-paid smuggler jumps off), leaving the illegal immigrants to face their fate at the mercy of the elements. The BBC reported that the average value of a boat of migrants to traffickers can be more than $1m, which these human trafficking “businesses” receive, regardless of whether their human cargo survive the journey.

Under the current legislation of the 2003 Dublin Regulation, if the boat is picked up by a European naval or coast guard service, or is fortunate enough to dock on dry land, the first European country to offer assistance is responsible for the adequate protection and provision of the illegals. The purpose of this convention is firstly, to allocate the responsibility for asylum applications to one member state to prevent situations where an asylum seeker is passed from one country to another without anyone prepared to examine the merits of the claim, and secondly, to deal with ‘asylum-shopping'[ref]Sandgren, P.(2001). The Dublin Convention, The University of Lund p.1[/ref], when an asylum seeker lodges applications in several different countries at the same time.

Article 8 of the Dublin Convention establishes that if the asylum seeker has never been in contact with any state within the EU, the asylum seeker is not allowed to freely choose in which state he or she wishes to lodge an application; instead, the state whose territory he or she enters is responsible[ref]Sandgren, P.(2001). The Dublin Convention, The University of Lund, p.18[/ref].

Unfortunately, the instrument has not functioned as intended, partly due to subjective determinations of whether a country is ‘safe’. For example, a refugee from Iraq who traveled through Egypt to get to Italy may have their asylum claim refused if the authorities deem Egypt to be the first safe state traveled through.

Europe’s Schengen Acquis adds further strain to these major immigrant receiving countries. Both the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement deal with the allocation of responsibility for processing asylum claims. The existence of borderless travel among European States can result in further complications, such as an asylum seeker refused refuge in France being deported back to the original state he or she initially came through.

Even those who make it across the Mediterranean to the continent are not guaranteed safety or comfort. The UNHCR highlighted that some governments are more concerned about keeping people out than treating them as individuals who may be fleeing war or persecution. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, noted that “Security and immigration management are concerns for any country, but policies must be designed in a way that human lives do not end up becoming collateral damage,”.

The strain is also greatly felt by the Greek and Italian economies. The Economist estimates that these naval and humanitarian operations cost Italy €9.5 million a month. Neither Greece nor Italy is in a position to begin to look after up to 5000 immigrants per weekend. Angelino Alfano – Italy’s Interior Minister, has repeatedly insisted the European Union must relieve the pressure on Italy’s services. Instead, the UN has had to step in and provide assistance for the 350,000 people stranded on Europe’s shores. These figures are three times higher than in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts in Libya, which saw a previous annual high of 70,000 people.

Frontex, the EU agency that manages the cooperation between national border controls, and help prevent illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorist infiltration, has a budget of €89.1 million. Frontex is able to coordinate border surveillance operations, but its role is not to replace border control of national authorities, but rather to provide ‘those EU countries that face an increased migratory pressure’ with additional assistance. This assistance and extra funding has not been enough, though, to cope with the demand for search and rescue operations, as illustrated by the thousands of deaths that have occurred in the past year alone.

The EU currently runs a border control operation called Triton to help these vulnerable European states. However, it cannot pre-empt problems occurring in international waters and is limited in remit and legal capacity, as it can only act when lives are immediately at risk. Deborah Haynes of The Times notes that with the recruitment of 6,000 extremists to ISIS since October, this North African and Middle Eastern migration is set to grow. For a number of geographically “peripheral” and often vulnerable states, the Dublin Convention is unsustainable. Its enactment preserves landlocked countries such as Austria and Hungary, along with more remote countries like the UK and Ireland from the brunt of this humanitarian crisis, while Italy’s exposed peninsula must deal with almost everything that fate and circumstance throws at it.

With IS having recently incited Egypt, Jordan, Japan, and Australia through provocative terror and publicity videos, the consequences of the fear spreading from the Middle East has already resulted in increased military action, which will continue to play a pivotal role in shaping events for the foreseeable future. With President Obama having just asked Congress to formally authorize military force against the Islamic State group, there seems little sign of stability just yet.

No man is an island, but neither is any nation. For now, the International community must view the IS threat and Libyan migration within the context of International Security. Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, is doing admirable work but other European States also need to take responsibility and send aid. In 2012, Germany was the third highest recipient and host of refugees in the world, supporting 589,700 refugees. However, there is great disparity across Europe, with the UK hosting just shy of 150,000 individuals and Ireland accepting an embarrassing total of just 6000.

There has to be a full-scale and collective effort to deal with the thousands of people who are drowning in the Mediterranean, especially in the coming months when the seas become calmer and the migration season begins again.

]]>Focus on Greece Ignores Need for German Economic Reformhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/02/16/should-we-be-discussing-german-reform-as-well-as-greek/
Mon, 16 Feb 2015 21:18:17 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1074With Greek debt negotiations reaching a critical point, it may be time for a reminder that there are more problems within the eurozone than just southern European debt. Austerity rightly remains firmly in the headlines, but looking beyond the struggles in Athens reveals that economic changes may be needed further north. Indeed, while the new […]

With Greek debt negotiations reaching a critical point, it may be time for a reminder that there are more problems within the eurozone than just southern European debt. Austerity rightly remains firmly in the headlines, but looking beyond the struggles in Athens reveals that economic changes may be needed further north. Indeed, while the new Greek government awaits the next round of Eurogroup talks it is time to look again at the colossal German current account surplus and ask why Germany feels able to call for structural change in Greece when it refuses to address the imbalances in its own economy.

Any economics student knows that running a persistent current account surplus may not always be wise. Under normal circumstances, this can cause exchange rate appreciation or imply weak domestic demand. Within a currency union however, we may think that exchange rate appreciation should not be a factor, with all eurozone economies theoretically sharing a similar macroeconomic basis from which to pursue competitiveness in exports. However, Germany has long pursued policies designed to boost the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector that have resulted in years of wage restraint and excessively restrained fiscal policy. Germany’s low relative unit-labour costs in particular have given it a competitive edge over its eurozone partners. This type of imbalance should in theory be avoided by the ECB’s requirement that national wage trends should follow a norm equal to national productivity growth plus the agreed eurozone inflation rate. Germany, however, not only misses this norm by the widest margin, but does so in a downward direction. Germany’s relative lower production costs make its goods artificially cheap and thus make it an aggressive exporter within the European common market. German goods crowd out those from other countries such as Greece, Italy or Spain.

But that’s not all. Germany’s current account surplus and exports outside the EU have in recent years not been offset by large current account deficits of its eurozone neighbours. This appreciated the value of the euro, which then impacted on demand for goods from Germany’s (relatively) less competitive southern European partners. With the recent fall of the euro against the dollar and the pound this issue is somewhat off the immediate agenda, but it has been a factor in European industry over recent years.

Germany’s domestic demand is weak and is in part related to its low relative wage increases. This adds to eurozone deflation fears and is compounded by the country’s conservative fiscal policy. Deflation is a cause for concern all round as it pushes up real interest rates and increases the burden of debt experienced by the southern European states. As inflation falls, the level of primary budget surplus required to fulfil debt obligations rises. A spiral of austerity therefore threatens to spin out of control.

So, for all the rhetoric about Greek structural adjustments, where are the talks relating to German trade imbalances? Why are the media not more vocal in calling for more expansionary German fiscal policy and wage appreciation in order to balance its economy and level the eurozone playing field? We all know that Germany has an ingrained fear of (hyper)inflation and in many ways they are right, since the aftermath of the first world war demonstrated its severe consequences beyond doubt. As Lenin rightly said, ‘the surest way to destroy a nation is to debauch its currency’. However, as part of a currency union Germany has an obligation to act in the collective interest and this implies addressing its artificially induced competitiveness.

But at the root of this problem is one of ideology. Germany prides itself on the strength and competitiveness of its economy and urges other countries to follow its example. But low relative wages are not something to be desired by many countries and low domestic demand is nothing to aspire to. Greece and others need an environment where they can make structural adjustments to their economies that are tailor-made to their own economic and cultural fabrics. Much of the talk in the media calls for a fiscal union to support the currency union but this would once again be dominated by the larger Eurozone economies. Yes, it would create the possibility of making fiscal transfers within the EU so that richer national economies would be able to support weaker ones in the interest of union stability but would this actually happen? Also, would anyone actually want this to happen, bearing in mind the additional loss of national sovereignty it would bring?

For several years the single currency was welcomed as an opportunity to break down national barriers and move towards a more economically and socially interconnected world. But the crisis years of austerity and the Troika have eroded much of the support and enthusiasm for a wider European ‘state’. The economic, sociological and political heritages of the different EU nations are vast and there is burgeoning discontent about the subjugation of national sovereignty to EU policy.

So what does this mean for the people of Greece, Spain and other southern European states who are increasingly vocal in their opposition to current policies? For Greece, continued austerity and a high primary budget surplus seem unsustainable and the Greek people have voted for change. Is it fair to ask then if it is hypocrisy that Germany can impose this system on the Greek people when it won’t address its own structural issues that have exacerbated the problem? The war of words between Athens and Berlin has so far encompassed debt, morality and repayment of war loans. But the US Treasury, the IMF and the EC have all voiced their concerns of what is often said to be Germany’s ‘beggar thy neighbour’ trade policy, and it cannot be long before this hits the headlines once again in the context of the current debate.

It may also be worth noting that if Greece is ultimately forced out of the eurozone, the consequent financial and political contagion could threaten the existence of the euro itself. If this were to happen, and Germany were to revert to the mark, its currency could quickly appreciate in nominal terms vis-à-vis its former eurozone partners and its competitive edge would be quickly lost. This may still be a long way off as politicians fight to shore up the eurozone defences and integrity, but it is a reminder that there is more to European discord than just sovereign debt. No doubt Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis have not been slow to bring this up behind closed doors. Whether anyone is listening, however, remains to be seen.

]]>Merkel’s Warning to the Germans a Lesson for UK Politicianshttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/01/02/merkels-warning-to-the-germans-a-lesson-for-uk-politicians/
Fri, 02 Jan 2015 20:34:39 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=652I haven’t been wildly impressed by how Angela Merkel has handled the eurozone crisis, but this speech to the German people shows why (for my money) she’s easily the most impressive political leader in Europe, if not the world, right now. At a time when too many UK politicians have been pandering to extreme tendencies in a craven attempt […]

I haven’t been wildly impressed by how Angela Merkel has handled the eurozone crisis, but this speech to the German people shows why (for my money) she’s easily the most impressive political leader in Europe, if not the world, right now. At a time when too many UK politicians have been pandering to extreme tendencies in a craven attempt to win votes on the back of a non-existent immigration issue, it is refreshing to see a leader actually face down racism and bigotry and honestly tell her fellow citizens that they are lucky to live in a successful country that less fortunate people want to come to.

“Today many people are again shouting on Mondays: ‘We are the people’. But in fact they mean: ‘You do not belong – because of the colour of your skin or your religion’.”

“I say to all those who go to such demonstrations: do not follow those who have called the rallies because all too often they have prejudice, coldness, even hatred in their hearts.”

]]>Berlin, 1989 by Michael Penhallowhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2014/12/10/berlin-1989-by-michael-penhallow/
Wed, 10 Dec 2014 22:55:22 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=504Ronald Reagan did not bring the Berlin Wall down, not even close. How do I know? Because I was there. I remember his speech at the wall, right in front of the Brandenburg Gate. It was June 12, 1987 and despite the media reports to the contrary there were relatively few in attendance. We stood alone in […]

How do I know? Because I was there. I remember his speech at the wall, right in front of the Brandenburg Gate.

It was June 12, 1987 and despite the media reports to the contrary there were relatively few in attendance. We stood alone in the sun, a few government types in the background, with Tom Brokaw reporting for NBC. The reason the crowds were far smaller than expected was that the U.S. embassy had sent out warnings for all American citizens to avoid his speech since they had ‘inside information’ that violence was expected. Nothing happened, the politicians went home and the wall stood for a few more years.

And I was there when it finally did fall almost two and a half years later.

Did Ronald Reagan really have anything to do with it?

Could Mikhail Gorbachev, who brought in glasnost and perestroika to his fellow Soviets, be partially responsible? Maybe. Or Saudi Arabia for independently lowering the price of oil to force the Soviet economy into recession in retaliation for Moscow’s disastrous invasion of Afghanistan? Both of them have to be high up on the list. And what about Lech Walesa and Pope John Paul II? Surely they played a pivotal role when they constantly preached democracy in their native Poland?

And shouldn’t ‘the Boss’ get part of the credit?

On 19 July 1988, 16 months before the wall came down, Bruce Springsteen and the E-Street Band played a live concert in East Berlin attended by 300,000 people. Springsteen spoke to the crowd in German, saying: “I’ve come to play rock ‘n’ roll for you in the hope that one day this barrier will be torn down.” There was a huge cheer that could be heard right up Unter der Linden.

Or was it J.F.K after his June 1963 ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech in which he declared his never-ending support for West Germany and the people of West Berlin?

And then there was John Runnings from Seattle, known as “the Wall Walker”. He made it his own personal mission to bring down the wall. For more than 20 years he put his life on the line by climbing the wall in protest and was eventually jailed by the East Germans. They let him go after 3 months after they learnt that he was harmless and more of a pest than a political threat. He returned to his own individual act of protest by climbing the wall again. Inevitably the order came to ignore him.

Maybe Hungary should be given some credit. They opened their border with Austria on 19 August 1989 and eventually more than 13,000 East Germans escaped into Austria. This set up a chain of events. These East Germans flooded the West German embassy and refused to return home.

Or was it Conrad Schumann? He along with similar brave East German souls simply took off on their own accord decades before Reagan ever visited the wall.

Demonstrations broke out all over East Germany in September 1989. Initially, protesters were mostly people wanting to leave to the West, chanting “Wir wollen raus!” (“We want out!”). But then they began to chant “Wir bleiben hier”, (“We’re staying here!”). It was the start of what became known as the Peaceful Revolution of 1989.

Less than a year after predicting that the wall would stand for 50 or 100 years more, longtime East German leader Eric Honecker was forced to resign.

It is a mystery to me why so many still believe that Ronald Reagan had anything to do with the wall coming down. After all, it took another two and a half years to actually show any signs of cracks. Sure, his speech played a small role but there were numerous other characters, both political and civilian, who played pivotal roles in the fall of the Berlin Wall. Some of them paid for it with their lives.

November, 1989. I was walking just south of the Brandenburg Gate when crowds started to form around the main gate at Leipziger Strasse.

It was cold and grey, typical Berliner weather. I was wearing a green Barbour coat and my little dachshund Trixie was tucked inside, her head just visible. We had searched everywhere for wire-haired dachshunds and found one only a few months before. Now, here we were with our new puppy in front of the Berlin Wall. Given that she was a dachshund, several photographers had me pose for photos in front of the wall. I think it made for a good photo shoot. What I wouldn’t give to have a copy of that photo now.

We followed the path towards the crowds, passing a huge scaffolding of lights that held Tom Brokaw and his NBC crew reporting live above the masses. It felt a little strange that they needed to be high up in the security of the sky and not mingling with the thralls of crowds that were growing by the minute down on the ground.

We saw people hacking through the concrete wall and being urged on by spectators. Couples sat at the top of the 4 meter concrete blocks, drinks in hand. And East German security guards mingled in the crowds, stunned by what they were seeing.

Annie had a Polaroid camera and was taking portraits of the ‘Ossies’ or Easterners as they came through the hole in the Leipziger Strasse crossing. She passed these out freely. Most looked in shock as the photos developed before their eyes. Of course they had never seen a Polaroid camera before. This was the first of many new experiences they were about to encounter.

Annie carried a flag made by the Colombian born Matias Jaramillo who was one of her favorite artists and whose family was German. He had asked her to plant it in a crack in the wall. She found the perfect place and I snapped a shot. That photo is ingrained in my memory like an Ektachrome negative.

The flag bore the following slogan:

“Peace is worth more than a pound of potatoes”.

From its construction in 1961 to its destruction in 1989, the Berlin Wall signified the most compelling symbol of communism’s moral bankruptcy. However, as the jubilant crowds moved west, there were some who headed east with everything they owned. They knew that all they had worked towards had been destroyed. One of them was a young Vladimir Putin who had piled his German dishwasher and American refrigerator on top of his East German Trabant. Putin was a senior KGB officer stationed in Dresden at the time.

Putin and his fellow senior officers are still very much in control of modern Russia. The rest of the Russian elite are members of President Yeltsin’s infamous table meeting where the wealth of Russia was divided up between them. These men came in the room as penniless ‘communists’ and left as billionaires.

They now feel that their identity is still threatened by the existence of freedom loving democracies on their immediate doorstep. Is it so surprising that Putin and his cronies think of the world in more or less the same terms as they did in their late thirties?

“Peace is worth more than a pound of potatoes”.

In some ways, these words carry far more significance than Reagan’s ‘Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall’. This is because Reagan had little idea or plan for what would replace the wall or where an eventual united Germany would sit in a rapidly changing world order.

The words spelled out the dilemma exactly: freedom comes at a price. Are we willing to pay that price? That is the question that we are still left pondering 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.