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The Leiden Journal of International Law (‘LJIL’) has always endeavoured to promote diversity and interdisciplinary enquiries in the international law epistemic community. Interdisciplinarity and diversity, albeit necessary in the long-term to refresh and update the discipline, raise numerous questions and epistemic challenges in the short-term. On the initiative of Jean d'Aspremont and Larissa van den Herik, today continued under the present editorship, these challenges have been at the heart of past LJIL editorials.

Traditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.

After decades of rule-of-law promotion in world affairs, international law and legality have regained scholarly imperative. Yet this has not dissolved disciplinarity between international law (IL) and relations (IR), but furthered a priori theorizing and the unilateral extension of disciplinary research agendas. A prime example is the influential ‘legalization agenda’ of IR scholarship, where an institutionalist doctrine has renarrated the ‘L word’ through a fetishizing of rules and a managerial focus on rule compliance. However, this approach confronts a problem of relevance as international struggles increasingly involve contests over how to legally characterize issues, actions, and events, and this engages juridical and normative dimensions of rule application which are beyond the managerialism of compliance. This article argues for greater sociological and critical engagement with the way in which the concept of law operates through juridico-political practices of legality, and the aim is to provide a theoretical and empirical discussion that revives the significance of the juridico-political world for scholarships which have habitually underplayed the constitutive significance of lawyering for rule application. To do so, this article, first, addresses the profundity of Kant's work and concern over law's application by a rule-applier and, second, claims this has long invited a more critical sociology. To initiate that social exploration, the paper draws on both Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the ‘juridical effect’ and the Foucauldian notion of ‘normative law’ to theorize the significance of juridical and normative practices in the making of international law's rule. In the final section, I introduce the empirical benefit of these critical sociologies by turning to the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the ways juridical and normative power have enabled sophisticated militaries of the developed world to constrain the application of the LOAC in contemporary wars of asymmetric combat.

This article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By looking at constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in Articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that, since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in ‘first-instance enforcement action’.

The objective of this article is to evaluate whether the distinctive nature of the international law on indigenous peoples reflected in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) can be explained by reference to the service conception of authority developed by Joseph Raz. The article rejects arguments that the distinctive character of UNDRIP can be justified by ideas of ‘Indigenous Sovereignty’, not least because ‘sovereignty’ was developed in Western political thought in contradistinction to a constructed and imagined dystopian state of nature endured by the indigenous populations of the Americas. Instead, the work seeks to understand the UNDRIP regime in the light of Raz’s conceptualization of legitimate political authority, concluding that the inchoate and under-theorized international law on the rights of indigenous peoples becomes comprehensible within this framework.

Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is viewed as a major step in the development of a state, and the commitments made by acceding states are often interpreted as a symbolic commitment to international economic and political community. However, as a subject of scholarship, WTO accession is under-theorized – there has been no sustained academic attempt to build a theory that accounts for the complexity of the accession process. Traditional, positivist approaches can point to increasingly onerous terms of accession, but fail to probe past Article XII's one-dimensional concept of ‘the acceding state’ negotiating with ‘the WTO’. This perspective dislocates the accession process from the broader political, economic, and legal reforms that involve both state and non-state actors. This article examines the role of these actors as epistemic communities, and argues that these epistemic communities engage in a series of dialogues about the nature of law and the legal system in the acceding state.

This article discusses the Rwandan Law 18/2008 on genocide ideology in the light of international human rights standards. In order to put the genocide ideology law into context, it sketches a brief overview of the post-genocide scenario. Because of the influence that provisions restricting freedom of expression aimed at fighting negationism might exert on testimonies during genocide trials, it pays particular attention to the transitional justice strategies adopted in Rwanda. Finally, it assesses the law on the genocide ideology against the background provided by the measures implemented in some European countries to deal with the phenomenon of negationism.

One of the most remarkable developments of the new millennium has been the expansion of debates on culture at the highest levels of the international community's decision-making processes. This has, out of necessity, had an impact on the empowerment of cultural rights, enhancing their justiciability. Substantial progress has been made both at a regional and international level. Yet not all thresholds have been reached. The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has never explicitly addressed cultural rights in its case law. Despite its multicultural composition, it is only with great difficulty that the Court examines questions related to culture. However, a thorough examination of the jurisprudence of the ICJ reveals that opportunities to take cultural rights seriously have arisen more than once. Recent judgments of the Court reveal the emergence of a certain trend calling for a culturally sensitive understanding of legal issues brought to the Hague. This article submits that this trend is beneficial not only for the protection of cultural rights, but also for the maintenance of human and cultural diversity, as well as for the survival and livelihood of indigenous peoples. In light of the urgent worldwide need for peace, addressing culture as a legal issue before the ICJ, in accordance with Articles 36 and 60 of its Statute, may be a fruitful pathway for the Court to follow in order to resolve international disputes.

HAGUE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: International Criminal Courts and Tribunals

For the first time in the history of international criminal justice, victims of mass crimes have been granted the status of so-called ‘civil parties’ at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). This status grants them – at least theoretically – the right to participate in the proceedings as a formal party with broad participatory rights similar to the those of the defence and the prosecution. While the ECCC is exemplary in how it has addressed the issue of victims’ participation, practical necessities and judicial skepticism have led to significant changes in the civil party mechanism and continuously constrained participatory rights. First, changes in the ECCC's Internal Rules have significantly altered the original civil party mechanism and led to a form of victim participation similar to the one practised at the International Criminal Court (ICC), thus departing from the true meaning of a partie civile. Judicial decisions by the ECCC's judges, as well as changes in the Internal Rules, have abrogated the strong civil party mechanism that was originally anticipated in Cambodian criminal procedure law. Second, the practical challenges surrounding victim participation have been enormous. The Court itself was struggling due to lack of funding and lack of prioritization of a meaningful outreach program for victims and civil parties. The ECCC's Public Affairs Section (PAS) and the Victims Support Section (VSS) held the responsibility of reaching out to the general Cambodian population. However, it was Cambodian NGOs that ultimately established a collaborative outreach system and collected more than 8,000 Victim Information Forms (VIFs). All these efforts notwithstanding, only political willingness and a Cambodian discussion of how to deal with the vast number of perpetrators beyond a handful of criminal trials, can lead to a process of coming to terms with one's past.

When an international criminal tribunal establishes its headquarters in a state, its legal relationship with that state must be carved out. This legal relationship has the potential to exclude the applicability of human rights protection by curtailing the host state's jurisdiction in parts of its territory. Despite this, there is little clarity as to when when such curtailment should arise. This problem is illustrated by the situation regarding witnesses at the International Criminal Court, which has recently been the subject of decisions of the Hague District Court and of the European Court of Human Rights. These two courts disagree on the threshold at which the human rights issues engaged by the situation are brought under the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. This article submits that the European Court in Djokaba Lambi Longa v. The Netherlands set the threshold for jurisdiction under the Convention too high. In applying easily distinguishable previous case law, and failing to take into account all relevant facts, the Court's finding of inadmissibility is unconvincing. The Dutch Court, on the other hand, took a broader approach from which the European Court of Human Rights could learn. Ultimately the two decisions give contrasting interpretations of the relationship between the ICC and its host state, which could have wider ramifications.

This article compares and contrasts the interpretation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999 by the International Court of Justice, the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the European Court of Human Rights. In doing so, it critically analyses the approach of the three different tribunals and attempts to explain the differences identified on the basis of the jurisdictional scope of each tribunal and the substantive law each has been tasked to apply. This comparison is both substantive and procedural. The article then examines the impact of these three tribunals on two specific aspects of the rule of law: legal accountability and legal certainty, both internationally and in the countries under examination. It is argued that, while these tribunals have enhanced legal certainty and accountability on the international level, any contribution they have made to the domestic rule of law has been questionable.