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Description

Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years describes several theoretical and empirical branches of economic research related to Charles Tiebout's provocative hypothesis that consumer mobility and interjurisdictional competition result in an efficient allocation of resources to the local public sector.
The book provides insights on the issues being considered in policy debates regarding the appropriate means of providing essential public services. Chapters in the book include an overview of the Tiebout model; income redistribution in a federal system; empirical relationships in the political economy of local public finance; and two conflicting views of the incidence of the property tax.
Economists, local government leaders, and experts in public finance will find the book very insightful.

Table of Contents

Contents
Contributors
Preface
1. The Tiebout Model after TWenty-Five Years: An Overview
I. Introduction
II. An Overview
III. Conclusion
References
2. The Theory of Local Public Goods TWenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective
I. Introduction
II. The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics with Local Public Goods
III. Sufficient Conditions for the Efficiency of Local Public Goods Equilibrium
IV. Inefficient Local Public Goods Equilibrium
V. Land Capitalization
VI. Rental Capitalization
VII. Redistribution
VIII. The Decentralization of Pareto Efficient Allocations
IX. Conclusion
References
3. Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Government
I. Introduction
II. The Limits of Tiebout Models: How Far Can One Push the Competitive Analogy?
III. Exit and Voting in Local Government Models
IV. Toward a Political Economy of Local Government
References
4. A Review: Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax?
I. Introduction
II. The Tiebout Orthodoxy
III. Challenges to the Orthodoxy
References
5. The Incidence of the Property Tax: The Benefit View versus the New View
I. Introduction
II. Zoning, Capitalization and the Allocative Effects of the Property Tax
III. Interjurisdictional Competition and the New View of the Property Tax
IV. General Evaluation and Conclusions
References
6. Income Redistribution in a Federal System
I. Introduction
II. The Model
III. Optimal Federal Redistribution
IV. Deductibility of Local Taxes
V. Regional Cost of Living or Amenity Differentials
VI. Tax Avoidance or Elastic Labor Supply
VII. Conclusion
References
7. Are Property Taxes Capitalized into House Values?
I. Introduction
II. Studies Based on Aggregate Data
III. Studies Based on Cross-Sectional Micro-Data
IV. Studies Based on Micro-Data Representing Tax Changes
V. Conclusions and Suggested Further Research
References
8. Voting and Spending: Some Empirical Relationships in the Political Economy of Local Public Finance
I. Introduction
II. Perception and Intergovernmental Aid
III. Budget Cuts and Learning
IV. The Size of Majorities
V. Voter Turnout in Budget Elections
VI. SMSA vs. Other Districts
VII. Conclusion
References