Regardless of the near-term effects of Americas
efforts in Iraq and the global war on terrorism, one unmistakable fact has become
apparent. The style of warfare for which we prepared ourselves in the post-Vietnam era,
namely traditional force-on-force engagements waged within a finite campaign, is not as
likely to occur as irregular-style Long War conflicts. One worrisome consequence is that
the decisions on which the United States bases equipment acquisition and constructs
operational planning over the next decade are dependent upon traditional warfare-style
analysis. Our tools, models, and even the methodologies for assessing success are biased
toward measuring physical effects on near-peer forces, played out over the days or months
of a maneuver and attrition campaign.

This issue becomes
clear when examining how analysts and planners interpret data from current operations. The
US military and its partners are collecting vast amounts of data expressing the minutia of
coalition operations, enemy actions, logistics, and intelligence in Iraq and other areas
of operations. As a result, operational analysts are overcome by the sheer volume of raw
data. Therefore there is little foundational understanding of what success means in
irregular warfare that will assist analysts in interpreting operational effectiveness. An
audience of analysts, technology specialists, warfighters, and policymakers may hear the
same briefing, see the same collection of graphs and data, and come to diverse and
conflicting opinions as to how effective the militarys actions are in achieving its
goals. We do not yet possess a framework within which we might interpret success or
failure against insurgency or terrorism operations. Nor do we have a solid set of measures
of effectiveness (MOEs) with which to frame an understanding of the raw data.

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For example, a set
of numbers may express the rate of military casualties incurred by improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) over a three-month timeframe, the number of IEDs that caused these
casualties, and thereby the casualty rate per device. If the number of casualties is
nearly stable during the period and the number of IEDs is increasing, thereby diminishing
the casualty rate per device, what should the conclusion be? Have operations over the last
three months been successful? The technology specialist may see improvement, since the
warfighter is wounded less often. However, he or she must assume that tactics, techniques,
and procedures are not accounting for the decline. The solider may be exposed to fewer
situations that could lead to harm, such as reduced travel outside of a protected
compound. Policymakers may look at the numbers and see a stalemate since the number of
casualties is not increasing with increased activity by the insurgents. Analysts could see
the situation as worsening, since the insurgents have increased their operational tempo.

There has been a
great deal of historical analysis based on the review of tactics and strategies by major
powers conducting small war or counterinsurgency operations. Historical analogy is either
revered or reviled in its applicability to the present. There is, with good reason, an
increasing distrust of comparing the current situation in Iraq to historical insurgencies.1 The
authors of this article prefer that historical comparisons be made with extreme caution,
carefully examining the details of each situation before drawing any lessons for today.
Current policy, operations, and tactics have been compared to Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya,
and countless other battles between a large military and a small insurgency. However, the
literature is sparse in its examination of trends and indicators of effectiveness during
counterinsurgency operations. Strategists, analysts, and commanders all need to understand
the data being collected in terms of the overall effectiveness of a counterinsurgency
campaign. Only then can they understand whether changes in policy, strategy, or overall
operations are required.

Beyond Iraq, the
warfare analysis community must prepare for increasing emphasis on non-traditional
force-on-force conflicts. Current tools to assess campaigns and military operational
effectiveness are heavily biased in the assessment of warfare as a great conflict between
two large military forces on a physical battleground. For the future warfighter, the
analytic community

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needs to understand
how to measure and assess the effectiveness of irregular and insurgency warfare. Improved
MOEs for counterinsurgency operations enable better interpretation of collected
operational data. New MOEs may also be used to drive new models and simulations necessary
for future decisionmaking. These measures will also provide a means for the defense
acquisition process in helping to determine the value and benefit of acquired systems,
technologies, and equipment for non-traditional warfare.

This article is
meant to broaden the considered field of appropriate measures for these purposes. It does
not list specific measures that apply to all current and future analytic needs. Instead,
the authors prefer to illuminate new areas in which MOEs may be found, with historical
backing and a fictional example as illustration, avoiding the trap of predicting what
measures fit all future cases.

Success in
Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare

Since World War II,
the analysis of warfare has primarily been based upon two major concepts of effectiveness.
In the grand movement of military forces, the gaining and control of territory is
considered success. Those who control the land control the resources, population, and
legal structures within it. Taking the hill allows reconnaissance. Domination of the seas
allows free shipping and movement of supplies. Control of the skies permits surveillance
and restricts movement of the opposing forces. An observer only has to review joint
doctrine publications from the early 1990s to see the emphasis that domination of
territory is the US goal. Physical space is the battlefield.

The other
traditional metric of success is the order of battle (OOB). Force size, composition, and
capabilities matter when facing another force on the battlefield. Attrition predicts the
outcome of battle, and the analyst assumes that one side only has to reduce the size and
capability of the other side to a fraction of the original for success. Computer
simulations subtract manpower, equipment, and thereby capabilities according to the OOB
and lethality of each piece of equipment. They play the game like Battleship®, where so
many hits would defeat the fighting object on the other side. Winning, for the analyst, is
equated to having more left than the opponent when hostilities cease. Often, simulations
ignore the psychological aspect and play out the campaign until near-complete annihilation
is achieved, neglecting the point at which surrender might occur once defeat seems
inevitable. Still, attrition is the measure of success.

Such metrics assume
large force-on-force battles in a Clausewitzian-style engagement. When one introduces
irregular-style warfare, such as that used by terrorists, guerillas, or insurgents, these
MOEs are not sufficient to predict outcomes.

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The authors define
irregular warfare to include asymmetric and indirect uses of force to persuade and harass.
Enemy forces in this setting, if you can call them a force, are usually small
and have control of little or no territory. Their chances of achieving success would be
extremely low using traditional tactics, so they must pursue other means. Wearing down the
will or ability of the opposing military force to continue hostilities does not require a
fixed force structure or significant numbers. The insurgents chance of total victory
is small; history shows that they will either be annihilated or achieve some limited
semblance of their goal. Nevertheless, the counterforce needs to understand what
effectiveness means in these operations in order to assess their own success.

Historic
Effectiveness Measures in Irregular Warfare

Overwhelming force
can win small wars. This lesson, however, comes with a caveat important to current debates
regarding the Iraqi war. Historical counterinsurgencies have usually been indifferent
toward the number of casualties and atrocities they generate. This is not to say that
general conventions regarding the treatment and care of prisoners or non-militant
casualties were not followed. However, combat operations have defeated insurgencies by
overwhelming and annihilating the insurgency and its supporters through bombings, massive
raids, heavy shelling, and even torture and executions.

British forces
rebuffed the opportunistic Iraqi rebellion against the British civil administration in
1920, for example, after it had some initial success.2 The British
were reticent players, having liberated the region from the Ottoman Empire in 1916-17.
Wanting to limit their military commitment to the region, they discussed options for Arab
self-rule, even entertaining the idea of a pan-Arab government in the Middle East. The
tribes in the Iraqi region were unskilled in modern civil administration and had little
understanding of self-determination. Nevertheless, the idea implanted by the British grew
among the Shia and Sunni, only to be rejected by the majority of the worlds
leadership. The League of Nations split the Middle East, with most of the Levant,
Palestine, and Mesopotamia being managed by the British and French.

The British were
more concerned with the development of business interests than colonization, and placed
few military forces in the region to support civil administration. These forces were
inadequate to resist the protests that soon developed. Most tribes felt ignored, and few
Iraqis had positions of real power within the administration. The British found themselves
having to withdraw from many towns as the protests grew. Finally, reinforcements arrived
from colonial India, including troops, tanks, and aircraft, and quickly pushed the
ill-organized rebellion back. Retributive air attacks and strong-arm tactics squelched
much of the desire for protest. The British did, however, do something unique; they
established an Iraqi monarchy, albeit with heavy Brit-

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ish oversight, under
King Faisal. Following the swift demise of the rebellion, the British did accede to some
of the rebels original demands.

The quick and
overwhelming smothering of an infant insurgency is a very effective tactic, but the debate
generated regarding the moral and ideological willingness to use near annihilation as a
tactic has a direct bearing on its effectiveness.3 When not immediately crushed, as many are not, the ideological
movement may increase its propensity for violent action while at the same time benefiting
from an increased stature as the rightful champion of the oppressed. An insurgency must
grow into a sustainable force possessing legitimate claims to its actions. These two
factors are key ingredients to ensuring the insurgency reaches a point of coherency,
stability, and most importantly, critical mass. Through its continued and prolonged
ability to challenge an opposing force, the insurgency demonstrates its viability and
builds an expanding credential with both the local populace and the opposing force. The
ability to sustain action and enter into the political debate is a key measure of success
for the insurgents. They need not grow militarily to overthrow the opposition; however,
they must survive while obtaining their civic role. While Mao held that insurgencies must
grow to overthrow, many that succeed simply outlast the counterforce.4

Another historic
example of irregular warfare was Algerias desire for independence, which grew slowly
in the twentieth century. The unrest began with native Algerians who had participated in
the liberation of France at the end of World War II. They experienced the pride of
nationalism, as well as witnessing the comparative opulence of European life. Algeria was
not a French colony like Morocco or Indochina, but was considered part of the Fourth
Republic. Following WW II, France divested itself of most colonial responsibilities. But
Paris would not consider independence for Algeria and would not permit native Algerians
what they considered adequate representation. Algerias local governments were
dominated by European-origin colons who established farms or businesses in northern
Africa.

The call for
independence grew into a series of movements. The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and
its armed counterpart, the Armée de Libération Nationale, initially undertook limited or
surgical violence. Police stations were bombed or strafed. The FLN also mounted a
concerted campaign to consolidate the different nationalistic organizations through merger
or elimination. This fusing of ideological rebellion and guerilla-style tactics received
little initial attention in Paris, permitting the FLN sufficient time to mature. The
violence rapidly escalated into horrific slaughters between the nationalists and colons.

Eventually, French
paratroopers intervened and established security and responsibility for governmental
authority. They quickly used conventional and unconventional means, including torture, to
find the head of the snake,

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i.e., the leadership
of the FLN. While the French were spectacularly successful, the insurgency floundered, but
did not die. Insurgent actions continued, and the people continued their call for
independence. The insurgency, or more accurately, the ideology behind the insurgency, had
become self-sustaining and legitimate. The violent tactics used by the French forces
created a firestorm back in France and increased calls to withdraw. The reinstated
President Charles de Gaulle, considered by the majority of the French people the right
leader for victory, found that the combination of Frances initial inaction and later
overreaction made this an unwinnable conflict. De Gaulle permitted a public referendum on
the question of independence in 1961.5 The FLN had won through sustainment
rather than direct military engagement.

To be sustainable,
an insurgency needs to be perceived as worthy of consideration by those outside its
operational group, especially the general population. It must be a legitimate avenue for
addressing the needs of society, rather than being perceived as merely a rogue band. The
Northern Ireland Troubles of the late 1960s through the 1990s exemplified how
the local population alternately conferred and withheld legitimacy for irregular
operations. The Northern Irish Catholic population had an entrenched set of grievances
beyond any nationalistic motivations. Their unequal status within the government was used
to justify the Provisional Irish Republican Armys (PIRA) violent actions against
both the Loyalist government and the British armed forces sent to re-establish security.
Nevertheless, the Catholic populations support for violence by the PIRA oscillated.
When grievances were high and political settlements seemed improbable, they directly
supported the PIRA with supplies, assistance, and diversionary actions. However, when
cease-fires were proposed and political resolution seemed possible, the crowds were less
accepting of PIRA actions that might disrupt the peace process. As political efforts
consistently and inevitably failed, popular support quickly returned for the PIRAs
actions, as it was again a legitimate avenue of discourse. In the face of massive British
intelligence operations, restrictions, and aggressive counterinsurgency tactics, the PIRA
could usually sustain or increase its actions during periods when the population actively
supported their cause.6

The British
experience in Malay in the 1950s also showed the power of using popular opposition as a
counterinsurgency strategy. The Chinese were an ethnic minority on the Malay Peninsula,
and they were also the main source of support for an active Communist insurgency. The
British decided to relocate the Chinese, many of whom were squatters, and gave them
additional incentives if they would turn over or report insurgents in their midst. By
removing the legitimacy of the insurgents as the promoter of a better way of life, the
British identified and isolated the remaining militants, removing them from the greater
population. The British elevated their own legitimacy over that of the insurgents

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in the eyes of the
population by negating any prospect that the insurgency could improve the general safety,
stability, and standard of living. They established a stable civil environment and
eliminated the desire for a violent overthrow of the government.7
Legitimacy of cause and method, as measured by the local populations response, seems
to be a large factor in the success of insurgencies.

A third area in
counterinsurgency operations worth examining is the stability of the environment. It is
almost a tautology that insurgencies thrive on chaos. Terror produced by removing basic
securities and livelihoods feeds the populations desire for alternatives. The
uncertainty and fear generated by such conditions inspire the dissatisfieds to join the
cause. The insurgency tries to prove its claim as a viable solution by using or creating
the instability.

In another example,
the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Oakland, Calif., in the mid-to-late sixties was organized
as a self-defense training organization. Feeling that the peaceful civil disobedience
movements of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and others would inevitably fail, Huey Newton and
Bobby Seale taught revolutionary guerilla tactics. In Newtons words, the BPP was a
vanguard group:

It must teach the
correct strategic methods of prolonged resistance through literature and activities . . .
When the people learn that it is no longer advantageous for them to resist by going to the
streets in large numbers and when they see the advantage in the activities of guerilla
warfare methods, they will quickly follow this example . . . It is not necessary to
organize thirty million Black people in primary groups of twos and threes, but
it is important for the party to show the people how to go about a revolution.8

But polls from the
late 1960s showed that less than ten percent of young American blacks thought that
guerilla tactics espoused by the Black Panther Party were necessary for the
African-Americans to achieve their goals.9 The continued advances made through non-violent civil rights
movements, as well as aggressive actions taken by the US government, ensured that the
stability of the environment never permitted the BPP to become a major avenue for
addressing grievances.10

The fictitious white
supremacist rebellion described by the often-banned Turner Diaries faced the same
problem of inspiring a revolution within a stable environment. The racist novel tells of
an imagined uprising against an increasingly privacy-infringing government. The white-led
insurgency initially undertook a few terrorist acts to inspire the larger rebellion; the
first act was devastatingly re-enacted in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh. Midway through
the fictional presentation, the insurgency realizes that it must change tactics. The
American populace was just too complacent to rise in support of the cause:

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Tyranny, we have
discovered, just isnt all that unpopular among the American people.

What is really
precious to the average American is not his freedom or his honor or the future of his
race, but his pay check. He complained when the System began busing his kids to Black
schools 20 years ago, but he was allowed to keep his station wagon and his fiberglass
speedboat, so he didnt fight. He complained when they took away his guns five years
ago, but he still had his color TV and his backyard barbeque, so he didnt fight . .
. He hasnt an idea in his head that wasnt put there by his TV set. He
desperately wants to be well adjusted and to do and think and say exactly what
he thinks is expected of him. He has become, in short, just what the System has been
trying to make of him . . . a member of the great, brainwashed proletariat.11

Therefore, if the
populace will not support the violent movement, the insurgency must wage war with the army
it has at hand, and hopefully an acquiescent population will follow. While this fictitious
account is merely a portion of a morally reprehensible tale, it does portray incipient
insurgents struggling with the realization that they must actively create an environment
in which the insurgency can thrive.

Conversely, an
insurgency that evolves from a more stable environment may in fact have an easier time in
sustaining its actions once it achieves semblance of legitimacy. Consider again Northern
Ireland, with a higher standard of living than most insurgency locations. The cause
célèbre of the PIRA was not the poor standard of life, but the relative disparity in
both political power and economic standard. Once the cause had established itself,
compromise was hard to achieve. Basic needs were already being met; there was little
incentive to lessen demands, making a political solution that much more difficult. It has
been argued that the decades of violence finally accumulated into a fatigue, allowing a
third party to spur negotiations and encourage concessions.12 The
price for compromise had finally reached an acceptable limit.

Barring an
annihilation of the enemy at a sufficiently early phase, the campaign against irregular
warfare should gauge its effectiveness on three fronts. First, it must disrupt the
enemys ability to sustain a continuing level of violence. Maos theory that an
insurgency must grow into a conventional force has been disproved in a number of recent
cases; insurgencies simply have to out-last the will of the counterforce. They need to
undertake enough activity to demonstrate their relevance and legitimacy. This legitimacy,
the second area of effectiveness, is conferred by both the population and the
counterforce. Both see the insurgency as a threat to the status quo. The insurgents
ability to entrench their cause within the population will aid their sustainment and give
them a position of power once the counterforce is removed.

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Economic conditions
can either inspire the population to embrace the status quo, thereby rejecting the
legitimacy of the irregulars, or motivate them to seek alternatives. The continued actions
of the insurgency are normally directed toward the creation of chaos and insecurity. The
stability of the environment as perceived by the population, the third area of
effectiveness, is the most difficult for the counterinsurgency force to measure or affect.
A counterinsurgency forces effectiveness in maintaining a safe and stable
environment directly delegitimates the alternative causes use of violence. The three
areas of effectiveness are related and not independent. Strategists need to understand
this triad is not a three-legged stool, where one leg is critical to the entire set and
can be lopped off to effectively end the insurgency.

These three
areassustainability, legitimacy, and environmental stabilityare general topics
from which the analyst studying effectiveness in irregular operations can select specific
metrics. Measurements should, by their trends and deviations, permit counterforces to
gauge the effectiveness of actions, inactions, and strategies. The next specific example,
again from history, explores how measurements may be used to analyze events as they occur.

Selection of
MOEsA Historical Example

The three areas of
effectiveness allow inspection and generation of unique measures for assessing success in
irregular operations. Rather than pose a discrete list of MOEs for generalized, irregular
warfare operations, the authors feel that sustainability, legitimacy, and stability must
be interpreted within a particular operational context. The context of the specific
situation and the nature of the warfare in which one is engaged are utilized to tailor
measures consistent with analytic objectives. Data gathered from ongoing operations can
then be interpreted in the context of probable effectiveness or predictions made via
models, simulations, and estimates.

Historical evidence
can formulate a yardstick forces use to comprehend effectiveness, in their choice of
tactical operations and the data upon which they base counteroperations. Changes to those
measures, in hindsight, might be more indicative of future events and could be used to
develop hypotheticals as a basis for operations in support of counterforce objectives.13

The French efforts
against the FLN in the 1950s focused heavily on boundary security. The national borders
between Algeria and other North African nations were guarded to the greatest extent
possible given the vastness of the terrain. The French utilized ground and air patrols, as
well as active and passive surveillance systems in the effort. They counted the number of
weapons interdicted or captured, and interpreted that metric as a sign of success against
the insurgency.14 Their approach to resettlement (regroupment)
and separation (quadrillage) allowed them to minimize the area for active secu-

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rity operations and
surveillance. It also provided an additional sense of security for the Europeans, from
whom the native Algerians were separated. The French military desire for a smaller
surveillance area came at the expense of forcibly commixing the Algerian populace,
initially apathetic to nationalistic intentions, with the budding spirit of a full-blown
insurgency. This afforded the FLN a substantial persuasion and recruiting opportunity.15

The French
particularly emphasized one aspect of sustainment, the supply of materiel, a strategy that
achieved moderate success. The insurgency, however, improvised utilizing available
explosives, weaponry, and restrictions on movement to their advantage. They soon
discovered that the amount of materiel still entering the country was sufficient to
sustain operations. The insurgents tactics subverted the artificial and real
boundaries placed around them. While the French knew how much weaponry they captured, they
could not determine what they missed; therefore, the single metric provided only limited
insight into the rebels actual capability to sustain operations.

The French military
eventually did take strong and active measures against the leadership of the insurgency,
discovering and eliminating the head of the snake through coercion and
informants. The cell structure of the insurgency made this strategy extremely tedious, but
the French were ultimately successful.16 They discovered, however, that the
insurgency was in a mature stage and continued activity did not rely on specific
individuals or ideologues to direct operations. Observers could argue that the FLN had
become self-sustainable by the time the French resorted to these operations. The
insurgents had, thanks to quadrillage, established a robust recruitment flow and
substantial operational safe havens. FLN objectives had taken root in the more
general population, and self-directed activities were accomplished through imitation and
practice rather than direction.

At the beginning of
the uprising, Paris failed to recognize that a major insurgency was afoot. The local
government was left to handle the situation. Initial insurgent actions were primarily
violence against Algerian police units and small settlements of Europeans. The failure by
the Fourth Republic to recognize the insurgency in its infancy delayed the search for a
moderate voice within the native Algerian population. Political conciliations were offered
fairly quickly as matters progressed, but always within the structure of the current
governmental institutions dominated by the colons. As conditions worsened, the French
found themselves dealing with an increasingly strong, violent, and nationalistic FLN.
Moderate positions within the population were already lost.17

The French measured
legitimacy from the standpoint of their current governmental institutions. Native
Algerians were not overly involved in the system of government; and the impact of their
non-participation could not be

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assessed.18 In contrast, when there were signs of local jurisprudence
being established by the native population such acts underscored the diminishing
legitimacy of the token government among Algerians. The establishment of shadow controls
and security by the insurgent force is a strong indicator of both the strength of the
insurgency and its legitimacy with the Algerian people.19

The calls for
national labor strikes by the FLN could have afforded the French with a metric for
measuring the struggle for popular legitimacy between the FLN and the French within the
business sector. The two sides vied for coercive and voluntary influence over businessmen
in Algiers. The difficulty required for the French to break the strikes showed that the
FLN had made tremendous inroads with the Islamic business community and reflected how
seriously the business community perceived both the FLNs coercion and its promise
for a more stable environment.20

The final posited
area of effectiveness for irregular warfare is the stability of the environment. The
number of terrorist events, such as bombings and shootings, numbered close to 800 per
month at the height of the revolution and pointed directly to the lack of security within
the country.21 Availability of infrastructure services would also have been a
valid way to analyze perceived stability in the Algerian way of life. French forces should
have understood the impact of the rate of emigration, especially by various social
classes. The loss of middle- and higher-social classes left a growing proportion of
lesser-includeds. The French never seemed to realize that their gestures toward moderating
positions related to governmental and economic inequities had no audience to receive them.

An Analytic
FrameworkTime and Prediction

Hindsight makes it
easy to identify harbingers of success or calamity. Nevertheless, the purpose of the
identified areas of effectiveness is for operations analysts to focus on specific measures
that are more likely, within the situational context, to be indicators of success in
irregular conflict. Military operations that counter the sustainment and legitimacy of the
insurgents and support the stability of the general situation seem to be highly
influential. Analysts need to rework their analytic framework to account for this new
method of measuring success. This revision of areas of emphasis removes the analysts
tendency to focus solely on physical effects and measures. Any framework for analysis must
now account for other battlespaces. It should also take into account longer operational
timelines, beyond the traditional one- to three-month campaign.

This new framework
for irregular warfare analysis needs to be constructed in such a manner as to assess
operations in three battlespaces. MOEs

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previously described
occur not only within the physical battlespace where kinetic actions have effect, but are
primarily measured in the cognitive and information battlespaces. This expansion requires
understanding the phenomenology in these dimensions and their interrelationships. The
analysts of World War II faced a similar challenge, having to create a mathematical
underpinning for the physical effects of war.22 The creation
of todays operational research methods, mathematics, and analytic techniques grew
from those early efforts. Operational analysts have only begun to establish the knowledge
set necessary to have any chance of assessing operational effectiveness in an environment
dominated by irregular warfare.

This historical
review is not meant to imply judgment of the correctness of tactics or the effectiveness
of operations related to ongoing conflicts. It is, however, useful to consider past
experiences in an effort to place current occurrences in context. By focusing upon three
areas that are usually neglected in terms of assessment, the authors hope that more
fruitful and accurate MOEs may be developed for two primary purposes.

First, the conduct
of operations under wartime conditions provides the opportunity for the collection of data
necessary in the creation of new knowledge supporting the irregular warfare framework.
Actual events, polling, and logistics data can be used to create and test theoretical
relationships and causality, as well as enabling analytic and mathematical techniques to
be tested and verified. Analysts are currently overwhelmed with data they cannot
interpret. As a community, analysts must develop a framework which uses this data to
rationally generate, test, discard, and modify operational alternatives.

Finally, new
measures of effectiveness and the accompanying framework should guide the use, creation,
and verification of new models and simulations for future analysis. A growing number of
simulations are being developed to predict hearts and minds effects on the
intricacies of irregular operations. But without stepping back to examine the fundamental
premises of what success means in irregular warfare, decisionmakers cannot have confidence
in their methodologies or results. A foundation needs to be purposefully and artfully laid
before analysts and strategists consider developing a new branch of operational analysis.

History has possibly
provided a first step in suggesting new measures of effectiveness for irregular
operations. These should be tested with real-world operational data under the most
rigorous scrutiny the community can provide. Whether history has taught us anything is
left to the reader.

NOTES

The authors would
like to thank Lucas Kagel for his invaluable assistance.

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1. The best example
is David Kilcullens Counterinsurgency Redux, Survival, 48 (Winter
200607), 11130. T. X. Hammes has put together a required reading list,
The Way to Win a Guerrilla War, for The Washington Post, 26 November
2006, p. B2, that offers other historic and modern thinking on the subject.

7. John Coates, Suppressing
Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1992) is a wonderful resource for the analyst making sense of the British
counterinsurgency experience in Malaya. Also recommended is T. N. Harper, The End of
Empire and the Making of Malaya (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

13. Karl Goetzke,
A Review of Algerian War of National Liberation Using the U.S. Armys Current
Counterinsurgency Doctrine (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, 2005) uses the same
case study to compare US Army doctrines in Iraq. We have specifically avoided comparisons
to current operations across the globe to stress the more general need for effectiveness
measures for all irregular and unrestricted warfare as defined by Qiao Liang
and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Chinas Master Plan to Destroy America
(Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing, 2002) in the longer term.

14. Shrader examines
logistics and operations during the campaign and specifically shows weaponry counts and
estimates for both sides. Infiltration routes for re-supply and border control and
security tactics are also discussed.

15. Shrader also
describes the French shortage of personnel exacerbated by quadrillage through 1955.
The tactic minimized the reconnaissance area but required massive patrol and checkpoint
oversight. Also see Kettle, p. 332.

16. See Horne, pp.
195-207.

17. Ibid., pp.
98-99, for French initial indifference and Muslim moderates reaction to French
concessions.

18. Kettle, p. 396.

19. Horne; Metz.

20. For the dual
outcome of the national strike in January and February 1957, see Horne, pp. 190-92.

Jim Clancy is an undersea
warfare analyst with 20 years of operations analysis experience. Chuck Crossett has 15
years of experience in engineering performance analysis and architecture assessment and is
a graduate student at The Johns Hopkins University Department of History of Science and
Technology. Both are employed by the National Security Analysis Department at The Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.