Coffman v. Unigroup, Inc.

Alleging
that their employers failed to pay the minimum wage required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206
and 216(b), John Coffman and David Lesperance sue (Doc. 19)
Unigroup and two Unigroup subsidiaries, Mayflower Transit and
United Van Lines. The defendants move (Doc. 113) for summary
judgment, and the plaintiffs oppose (Doc. 114).

BACKGROUND

Under
49 U.S.C. §§ 13102 and 13901, a “motor
carrier, ” defined as a person using a motor vehicle to
provide services related to the movement of passengers or
property, must register with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. Section 13902 establishes the requirements
governing the FMCSA's issuing that registration, called
an “operating authority.” Further, Section
13905(d) permits the FMCSA to suspend or revoke an operating
authority. To maintain operating authority - and continue to
transport customers' property - a motor carrier must
demonstrate “willingness and ability” to comply
with the federal trucking regulations, which include
commercial driver's license requirements;[1] record-keeping
requirements;[2] rules for operating a commercial motor
vehicle;[3] restrictions on hours of
service;[4] and rules for inspecting, repairing, and
maintaining a commercial motor vehicle.[5]

To
balance the administrative cost of acquiring and maintaining
an operating authority on one hand with the expense of
purchasing, maintaining, and operating a truck on the other
hand, the trucking industry has developed a practice of
“leasing.”[6]A “lease, ” according to 49
C.F.R. § 376.2(e), is a “contract or arrangement
in which the owner [of a motor vehicle] grants the use of
[the motor vehicle] . . . for a specified period of time to a
[motor carrier possessing operating authority] for use in the
regulated transportation of property, in exchange for
compensation.” In other words, an “independent
owner-operator”[7] can lease a truck to a motor carrier, and
the motor carrier can allow that operator to transport
property under the motor carrier's operating authority.

The
plaintiffs are “independent owner-operators.”
(Doc. 19 at ¶ 5) The defendants are two motor carriers
(Mayflower and United) - also called “household-goods
carriers, ” “van lines, ” or “moving
companies” - and their parent company (Unigroup). (Doc.
19 at ¶¶ 2, 29, 32-34; Doc. 113-2 at ¶¶
3-4; Doc. 128-1 at 3)[8] Both Mayflower and United possess an
operating authority. (Doc. 113-2 at ¶¶ 4, 12, 13;
Doc. 128-1 at 10-11, 23)

Between
the plaintiffs and the defendants stood three middlemen:
McCollister's Transportation Systems, Hilldrup Transfer
and Storage, and Planes Moving & Storage of Indianapolis.
These “Agents, ” who are not parties in this
action, are independently owned moving
companies.[9]

The
defendants entered an “Agency Agreement” with
each Agent. Each Agency Agreement authorizes the Agent to
“provide transportation services for [the defendants]
in interstate commerce and do so under the [defendants']
federal [operating] authorities.” (Doc. 113-2 at ¶
5) Further, each Agency Agreement renders the Agent
“responsible for providing all transportation services
related to the shipment of household goods, including
providing van operators to perform driving and moving
services.” (Doc. 113-2 at ¶ 6)

In
accord with “Independent Contractor Operating
Agreements” (ICOAs), both plaintiffs operated their
trucks for an Agent. David Lesperance agreed to an ICOA with
McCollister's (Doc. 113-5), and John Coffman agreed to an
ICOA with Hilldrup (Doc. 113-7) and another ICOA with Planes
(Doc. 113-8). Under the McCollister's-Lesperance ICOA,
Lesperance agreed to lease his truck to McCollister's.
(Doc. 113-5 at 5; Doc. 136-2 at 10) Although the
Hilldrup-Coffman ICOA includes a leasing term that is
identical to the leasing term in the
McCollister's-Lesperance ICOA, Coffman denies having
leased his truck to Hilldrup. (Doc. 136-1 at 38) Coffman
testifies that Planes purchased his truck. (Doc. 136-1 at
60-62)

Ultimately,
the plaintiffs and the defendants lacked a contract with each
other. Under the ICOAs, the plaintiffs “leased”
their trucks to, and provided moving services for, the
Agents. And in accord with the Agency Agreements, the
defendants authorized the Agents to transport household goods
under the defendants' operating authorities. By virtue of
these engagements - between the plaintiffs and the Agents and
between the Agents and the defendants - the plaintiffs
transported customers' household goods under the
defendants' operating authorities.

The
FLSA defines particularly “employee” and
“employer, ” and the FLSA's protection
extends only to an “employee” working for an
“employer.” Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311.
Section 203(e)(1) defines an “employee” as
“any individual employed by an employer, ” and
Section 203(d) explains that “[e]mployer includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee . . . .”
“Employ, ” according to Section 203(g), means
“to suffer or permit to work.” Although broad,
these definitions are not broad enough to permit an
independent contractor to enjoy the FLSA's protections.
Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311 (citing Rutherford
Food, 331 U.S. at 788-89).

Moving
for summary judgment, the defendants argue that the
plaintiffs were independent contractors who lacked
entitlement to a minimum wage under the FLSA. (Doc. 113 at
16-23) Whether a plaintiff is an “employee” or an
independent contractor depends on “the economic reality
of the relationship between the alleged employee and the
alleged employer and whether that relationship demonstrates
dependence.” Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311
(quotations and citations omitted). Six “factors . . .
guide[] the economic reality test”:

(1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's
control as to the manner in which the work is ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.