[88] I have no doubt that the motion judge was well-intentioned. I have no doubt that he put a great deal of effort into resolving the jurisdiction issue. However, my review of the three endorsements leads me to conclude that the motion judge’s actions gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. He made unwarranted negative comments about the appellants – their counsel, their position, and their arguments – prior to the conclusion of argument and arbitrarily curtailed argument. He then wrote reasons that went beyond reflecting the reasoning process and entered the fray as an advocate for his actions and decisions in the Second Endorsement.

[20] There can be little doubt that the decision by the plaintiff to provide the defendant with an intimate video of herself engages issues of confidentiality and privacy. They had a close personal and romantic relationship of some duration. It was on the basis of that relationship that she agreed to provide him with private images of her. The plaintiff’s decision to send the video was premised upon the defendant’s assurance that he alone would view it. His decision to share it publicly was a clear breach of the terms upon which it was communicated to him.

[21] Mr. Sokol argued that there is considerable prejudice to the Minister due to the late service of the jury notice. He argued that the examination for discovery of Leadbetter and the mediation would have been done differently by the Minister had a jury notice been properly served. He also argued that the integrity of the mediation process would be undermined if a jury notice served two days after the mediation, such as this one, was not struck. He argued that I should assume that the parties “exposed” their trial strategies to each other at the mediation, thereby giving the plaintiff the unfair strategic advantage of changing the trial “landscape” to suit what was learned at the mediation. He relied heavily on the decision of Master Brott in Crummey, op. cit., at page 3 where she described discovery as a “watershed event” in determining the issue of prejudice concerning a late jury notice. The Master also made mention of a mediation that had taken place prior to the jury notice. The Crummey decision was referred to by Justice Perell in the Bragg decision at paragraph 33.