Ukraine a Challenge to US's Russia Policy

Article excerpt

THE Western media have missed one of the biggest military
stories since the bombing of Pearl Harbor. A country so little
known that writers must remind their readers it is about the size
of France, emerged overnight as the world's third largest nuclear
power and formed the second largest army in Europe. No one foresaw
this radical and sudden military development: spy satellites could
not pick up any military buildup or mobilization. Nor were there
any indications that this country was engaged in an Iraqi
-like nuclear weapons acquisition program.

The country is Ukraine. Its August 1991 declaration of
independence not only changed the European balance of power, but
helped accelerate the collapse of the Soviet Union - leaving the
United States as the only real superpower. For US foreign policy,
the dissolution of its traditional military rival and Ukraine's
unexpected newfound status as a military nuclear power has become a
vexing dilemma.

The formation of Ukraine's military might did not occur in
secret. While still a Soviet republic, Ukraine's parliament
announced in July of 1990 its intentions to build an independent
army and thus break up the Red Army's nuclear, air, ground, and
naval forces. But no one took this declaration seriously. The
Soviet general staff all but ignored it. A Soviet Army marshal was
dispatched to Kiev to point out to Ukraine's provincial parliament
just how ludicrous the notion was. Half a year later, in August 1
991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev recruited President Bush to
scold these very same parliamentarians about the dangers of
"suicidal nationalism" and to urge them to forget their far-fetched
dreams of independence.

Only three weeks after Mr. Bush's so-called "Chicken Kiev"
speech (when the US president went to Kiev and argued that Ukraine
should stay in the Soviet Union) the Ukrainians declared their
independence and went on to conduct one of the most brilliant
military operations in modern history - gaining control of much of
the Soviet Red Army.

The first phase of this operation precluded a possibility that
the 700,000 Soviet troops in Ukraine could launch a coup against
the newly independent state. This was done through massive
propaganda aimed at pacifying the ranks. Ukrainian politicians
promised to address the sub-standard living conditions in the
military and guaranteed military job security. Equal opportunity
for servicemen was stressed, regardless of nationality.

To drive the point home, an ethnic Russian was appointed the
first defense minister of independent Ukraine. Not only did this
effort pacify the armed forces, it also convinced a majority of the
troops to vote for Ukrainian independence in the popular referendum
on Dec. 1, 1991. For example, more than two-thirds of the Black Sea
Fleet's sailor-supported independence.

A month after the referendum, troops stationed in Ukraine were
given the option of taking an oath of allegiance. Officers who
refused to take the oath were asked to continue their military
service elsewhere, or retire. Enlisted men were given the choice of
completing their military hitch in Ukraine or returning to their
native country. Military personnel swore allegiance to the "people
of Ukraine" rather than the "Ukrainian people." This wording was
conceived to acknowledge the ethnic diversity of the Uk
rainian state. Since ethnic Ukrainians constituted a minority of
the officers stationed in Ukraine, this was particularly important.

BY mid-February 1992 more than 80 percent of the soldiers in
Ukraine had taken the oath, despite objections from Russian
politicians and Commonwealth of Independent States military
officials. Thus, without firing a single shot and without any
serious negotiations with other former Soviet republics, Ukraine
gained control of a half-million-soldier military and most of its
weapons.

This was a remarkable feat, especially considering that a
majority of the officers who swore allegiance to Ukraine were
ethnic Russians. …