B. Rational Public (B.
Page & R. Shapiro)

3.Public
opinion is collectively stable, structured and responsive to information

C. Public Opinion Is
Complex

Public
support was strong in 1965-67, with a majority favoring US involvement and a majority in April
1966 (75%) saying the US should blockade NV harbors.

But
support was equally strong to turn the ground war over to SV with: 71% favoring
this in Nov 1966, 73% in April 1967, 77%in Feb 1968
(after Tet Offensive)

A
majority did not favor immediate withdrawal.

D.
General Ignorance, but Can Follow Cues

1."Don't
Know's" are common

2.Those
polled often lack basic facts:

In 1964, in
one poll, only 38% of people knew that the Soviet Union was not part of NATO;

In
1980s, it took almost 2 years before a majority of those polled knew that the US was backing the rebels in Nicaragua.

3.Cognitive
Misers; no need to accumulate information

4.Responds
to international changes:

After the
outbreak the Korean War in June 1950, a majority v. a minority of the public
favored rearming Germany (44% to 62%). This preceded the
Sep. 1950 annoucement by the Truman administration to
do so.

C.
Precise causal mechanism is unclear

2.Are
gov official responding to the same trends that
public observes (e.g., increase in Soviet defense spending prompted rise in US
spending)

3.Matters
for understanding the CNN Effect:

-
is public interest generating gov.
response?

-
or is media generating public interest?

-
does media create public interest, or reflect what
public prefers?

-
is gov. anticipating change in PO, or genuinely interested in these
changes?

4. Little
evidence that CNN effect exists

- gov action precedes media coverage

-
media follows gov't role

-
public attention increases with media coverage, and
observers draw a spurious correlation

IV.
How Does the Government Educate, or Manipulate, Public Opinion

A.
Realist Theory of Presidenial Leadership

1.Realists
believe that president had an obligation to lead the public in supporting
foreign policy endeavors.

2.Without
such leadership, support for US action abroad would weaken

3.Example:
JFK sought to lead the public during his 1960 presidential campaign to support
foreign aid; used polls to assemble package of programs that public would
respond to favorably.

B.
Public will follow president at times.

1.In
1964, before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, only 42% of the public
supported US troop deployments in Vietnam. After the deployments, a majority
backed them.

2.Only
7% of Americans supported US invasion of Cambodia before Nixon ordered it, when 50%
approved of the policy.

3.69%
of the public opposed US intervention in Panama in 1989, before Bush ordered the
invasion in December 89.

C.
Rally 'Round the Flag Effect

1.President's
job approval ratings tend to improve following a use of force

2.Public
is "pretty prudent" about the use of force

*
One study looking at 38 uses of force and so-called displays of force between
1950 and 1988 found that the rally effect was stronger when the intervention was intended to deter or restrain
actions by another state than when the intervention was aimed at altering
internal conditions in another country.

*
The study found that when a use of force was reported on the front page of The
New York Times the presidential approval rating rose 6% more than when the
event was inside the paper.

*
The relatively slight effect was evidence that the public "pretty
prudent" about presidential uses of force.

*
An early study found that the higher a president's approval ratings, the more
likely the president was to use force.

*
Others found that poor economic indicators predict presidential use of force.
In the 1949-1994 period, Reps presidents were more likely
to use force when unemployment was high and Dems when
inflation was high. Other studies have confirmed the role of unemployment,
especially.

C.
Fear of Presidential Manipulation

1.Because
of information asymmetries and secrecy, president can withhold information or
mislead the public to gain support behind policies

2.LBJ
fails to disclose all facts around the Gulf of Tonkin incident

3.During the 1990-91 Gulf War, Bush adm
found that public was very concerned about possibility that Iraq might develop nuclear weapons.
Indeed, it was the only topic in Nov 1990 that a majority (54%) believed
justified an attack on Iraq. Within a week, the Bush adm emphasized this heavily.

Following
the 7 August 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed 12 US citizens and 250 Africans, the Clinton ordered airstrikes
on 20 August on a chemical factory in Sudan and alleged terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan (This was three days after the
president's quasi-apology for the Lewinsky affair). Bucking the usual trend, Clinton's approval ratings fell from 66% to
61% after the airstrikes.

Dec.
98 Airstrikes

Clinton's approval rating rose by 9%
following airstrikes against Iraq that ended a
hours after the House impeached him.