The Apollo 8 Decision

Perhaps the most significant point about the lunar-orbit flight proposed
for Apollo 8 was that the command and service modules would fly the same
route to the moon as for the actual lunar landing. NASA officials
realized that this was risky, since Apollo 7 had not yet qualified the
spacecraft when their tentative decision was made. And data from that
launch, using the Saturn IB, would not help them decide whether the
Saturn V could make the lunar mission.42

Phillips formally set the plan into motion in a directive issued on 19
August. Because of Webb's restrictions about waiting until the
performance of Apollo 7 was known, earth-orbital objectives were still
listed, but crew assignments were shifted and the mission was moved
forward one flight. That same day, NASA publicly announced the flight as
an expansion of Apollo 7, although agency spokesmen said that the exact
content of the mission had not been decided.43

CSM-103 arrived at the Cape in mid-August, and testing began. Some
modifications were necessary but, in most cases, no hardware changes
that might cause delays were acceptable. Mueller kept Paine informed of
the status, noting in detail how many days the work schedule lagged and
why. These holdups were usually minor, although Hurricane Gladys did
cause an additional two-day delay.44

Paine was still concerned about manning the Saturn V, because of the
pogo problem. Phillips told him that the Apollo leaders had decided,
about two weeks after Apollo 6, to plan for a manned flight
but to revert to unmanned, if necessary. Paine also questioned the
reliability of the service propulsion module. Mueller reviewed its test
history and reported that a complete flight system of the "present
configuration" had never failed to fire. Of all configurations,
only 4 firings had failed in 3,200 attempts, and Mueller assured Paine
that none of the problems encountered were characteristic of the present
engine.45

During a session of Mueller's Certification Board in Huntsville on 19
September, the Saturn V was given a clean bill of health, and the
members agreed that the launch vehicle was no longer a constraint to
manned flight. In the meantime, Huntsville and Houston had worked out an
agreement on payload weight. The load for Saturn 503 was set at 39,800
kilograms, including 9,000 kilograms for the lunar module test article.
(A fully fueled production lander, scheduled for subsequent missions,
would weigh 14,500 kilograms.)46

On 7 November, the Certification Board looked at all parts of Apollo 8 -
spacecraft, launch vehicle, launch complex, mission control network, and
spacesuits. A C-Prime Crew Safety Review Board had already studied these
items for Phillips and had "concluded that the Apollo 8 Space
Vehicle is safe for manned flight." Mueller's board concurred.47 Now it was up to Paine and the Apollo
executives to decide whether Apollo 8 would fly to the moon.

At the Apollo executives meeting on 10 November, Phillips summarized the
lunar-orbit proposal, James discussed launch vehicle status, Low gave
spacecraft status, Kraft talked about flight operations, Slayton
outlined the flight plan, and Petrone reported that the Cape could be
ready by 10 December, although there would not be a lunar launch window
until the 21st. Phillips said he recommended that NASA go for
lunar-orbit. Mueller then asked Low and Phillips to list the things that
were absolutely essential for a safe round trip. The program leaders
replied that the service propulsion system had to work, to get the
spacecraft out of lunar orbit, and there had to be at least 60 hours of
oxygen remaining to get the crew back to earth. Redundancies could
support the environmental system, barring a major break of the main
structure; and the fuel cells could handle the power demands with only
one of the three working - unless, of course, there was a complete
electrical short. There were risks, yes, but these risks would be there
on all missions; there was no way to ensure perfect safety. Next,
Mueller asked for the views of the attending Apollo executives.

Walter F. Burke (McDonnell Douglas): The S-IVB can
do any of the missions described, but I favor circumlunar rather than
lunar orbit since there has been only one manned CSM.

Hilliard Paige (General Electric): The checkout equipment is
doing the same thing it has done before; there are no reservations from
a reliability standpoint; and NASA should go, and is ready to go, into
lunar orbit.

B. P. Blasingame (AC Electronics): We have carefully examined
the guidance equipment and consider it ready for a lunar orbit mission.
It is the right size step.

T. A. Wilson (Boeing): We have confidence in the hardware. It
is right to go for lunar orbit.

Leland Atwood (North American): This is what we came to the
party for.

Robert E. Hunter (Philco-Ford): We have no reservations about
being able to support the complete mission.

Thomas F. Morrow (Chrysler): We have no hardware on this
mission and perhaps can be even more objective. I believe we should go
for lunar orbit, but the public should be aware that there are risks.

William P. Gwinn (United Aircraft): I am impressed by the pros
and cons of risk, but I believe General Phillips' recommendation is the
right one.

Joseph Gavin (Grumman): We also have no hardware on this
mission (except a test article), but the design of the mission makes a
lot of sense - it is one we should do.

William Bergen (North American): I agree with Morrow that lunar
orbit has more risk. It is questionable if we will get, and can expect,
the same high degree of performance from systems as we got on Apollo 7,
but a repeat flight is a risk with no gain.

G. H. Stoner (Boeing): I endorse the recommendation without
reservation.

Gerald T. Smiley (General Electric): Morale is now high; less
than lunar orbit would impact this morale.48

Thus on 10 November a second group voted yes on the proposition to send
man on his first flight to the vicinity of the moon.

The next day, Mueller told Paine he had discussed the proposal with the
Science and Technology Advisory Committee and the President's Science
Advisory Committee and both of these prestigious groups favored the
mission. The manned space flight chief said he also agreed "that
NASA should undertake a lunar orbit mission as its next step toward
manned lunar landing."

Paine listened to presentations by Phillips, James, Low, Kraft, and
Petrone on 11 November. The same day, Paine asked Gerald Truszynski if
the tracking network would be ready and Lieutenant General Vincent G.
Huston if the Department of Defense could support the mission. He called
in key members of his staff and the directors of the three manned space
flight centers for their statements. The acting administrator also
telephoned Frank Borman and learned that the astronauts supported the
mission wholeheartedly. Paine then approved Phillips' recommendation.
Phillips wired the field centers to be ready for a lunar-orbit flight on
21 December.#source49``49 NASA had crossed another Rubicon in its
decision-making - a historic one.