In 2012, Daily NK
has been working harder than ever to bring new voices to discussion of the
future of the Korean Peninsula, and as part of this effort is pleased to be
able to publish a new guest column by Professor Barthelemy Courmont.
Professor Courmont is currently at Hallym University in Chuncheon, South
Korea. He is also an associate research fellow at IRIS in Paris, France and
the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies in Montreal,
Canada. He has published several works on North Korea, including a book,
'L'autre pays du matin calme. Les paradoxes nord-coreens' (Paris, Armand
Colin, 2007), which was recently translated into Polish.

South Koreans had just elected their legislature;
meanwhile, North Korea was keen to make itself the subject of discussion,
something that came as no surprise to observers of the region. Already the
holder of a majority of posts inherited from his father, Kim Jong Eun became
the head of the Chosun Worker’s Party, the only political party in North
Korea. The date of his enthronement was not random: it coincided with the
legislative election in South Korea and fell within the framework of the
100th anniversary celebrations for the birth of Kim Il Sung. The young Kim is
now officially, no surprises, the strong man of the regime.

North Korea also stirred up the mix once again by reviving
the nuclear menace, so much so that it completely overshadowed the South
Korean election in the international media (which, with such a close result
and just months out from the presidential election itself, would otherwise
have been amply commented upon).

This media gamble was clearly a victory for Pyongyang, and
confirmed that the methods of the young Kim are going to be similar to those
of his father. The April 13th ‘Gwangmyungsung-3’ launch was a failure, but
the scope of attention given to its preparation showed again the North Korean
capacity to menace its enemies, albeit by rudimentary means.

Since the formula had worked before, the new regime was
never likely to hesitate to use it again. After the success (in the media,
most certainly) of its first nuclear test in October 2006, North Korea had
followed this same bargaining strategy to a second test in 2009. We should
note the relevance of this second test, which verified that the first one
really was a technical success. And since the second test was also a success
of sorts, and if we are to judge from the restart of negotiations so soon
after it then it certainly was, Pyongyang is now threatening to proceed with
another nuclear test, which some analysts see as imminent (and which they
believe the failure of Gwangmyungsung-3 might accelerate).

How, then, to negotiate anew with Pyongyang while taking
into consideration the security threat which the regime poses to its
neighbors and avoiding escalation at the same time? Facing this most
perennial of challenges, several options have been selected down the years by
the United States and others, but all with very mixed results.

However, among the real changes visible in Washington
today is that the Obama administration now considers the North Korean
regime’s actions to be rational, and excludes the possibility of it being any
form of a fool’s strategy. This is a noteworthy evolution from the previous
administration, especially in terms of the entourage that encircled President
Bush and Vice-president Cheney, people who viewed Pyongyang as a mafia
hardline state and never even tried to grasp its deeper meaning. On the
contrary, the Obama administration does try to understand the sense of
Pyongyang’s nuclear deterrent, an attempt in which it is now followed by the
majority of experts, even the conservative ones.

"(Kim Jong Il) is neither illuminated nor someone
living in an illusion," judged Michael Breen, author of a biography of
Kim Jong Il some years ago. He estimated that Kim was someone who had
"proven that he could be very cunning." In 2003, Colin Gray
identified the problem in relations with North Korea as "not an
irrational adversary, but more a perfectly rational enemy who searches with
determination and great rationality to accomplish objectives that seem
perfectly irrational. [The problem is] the enemy whose completely rational
behavior deliberately allocates instruments of political action (for example
suicidal attempts) to political objectives that are outrageous to our values,
including norms of international law and morality."

Rational does not necessarily mean reasonable, of course;
the North Korean example causes problems for the international community
because it involves actions totally beyond reason in the service of an actual
rationality that the regime does not appear to demonstrate. The Obama
administration thus decided upon a North Korea policy oscillating between
firmness and openness that matched the use of smart power the President
desired.

The nomination of Stephen Bosworth, a former US ambassador
to South Korea (1997-2000) and former executive director of KEDO, as
negotiator was a clear sign that Washington did not desire to take a dogmatic
position on the issue but did not intend to lower its guard, either. While at
KEDO, Bosworth had advocated for a mostly positive line in relations with
North Korea, estimating that dialogue was the best guarantee of significant
security progress.

One of his most innovative positions was the suggestion
that Washington not hold on to the idea of a hypothetical link between
Pyongyang and Damascus, as had been done during the last year of the Bush
administration. It was a line that Hillary Clinton seemed not to share, yet
Bosworth’s appointment showed clearly the wish not to slow down agreement on
the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Stephen Bosworth published his observations in Newsweek in
May 2008, inviting the administration to adopt a clearer long-term strategy
vis-a-vis North Korea despite the progress achieved in that year. In the
article he asserted, "Unlike the United States, Pyongyang has both a
short- and long-term policy toward its antagonist. It is willing to bargain
away its nuclear-weapons programs piece by piece starting now, but only in
return for a new, non-hostile relationship with Washington and more help for
its economy. Washington, by contrast, focuses solely on the issue of
denuclearization (and even on that Washington remains divided) and has no
broader approach to North Korea." The posture adopted by the Obama
administration could be summarized similarly: enlargement of the North Korea
question to other issues besides the nuclear one in order to facilitate
dialogue.

Journalist Bill Powell summed it up well after the second
nuclear test: "Bargaining with the Kims is the last thing Obama wants to
do, but the administration probably doesn't have a choice.” However, this
strategy of openness eventually failed, as confirmed by the November, 2010
attack on Yeonpyeong Island following the sinking of the Cheonan in March the
same year.

Facing an Obama administration willing to move on with the
issue, the North Korean regime had quickly backed up and forged new schemes.
That is how, in a position where we could reasonably have expected rapid
progress, North Korea modified the incentives again, undoubtedly seeing the
American attitude as a sign of easily exploitable weakness.

The current context is no different. Pyongyang’s demands
are the same and the maneuvering margin of its partners remains equally
limited. Add in the necessity for young Kim to assert his authority in front
of the army and the Party and we have all the ingredients to explain this new
regime rationale involving the use of a deterrent, no matter if it is a
deterrent supported by real capacities or not. Under these conditions, we
cannot speak of a fool’s strategy, because the "fool" is rational,
nor the deterring of the strong by the weak, since the "weak" in
question has not yet demonstrated that its arsenal, if there is any, is
operational. It is more of a virtual deterrent, and one that imposes a
disquieting idea and creates a dangerous precedent; that the most important
thing is not to have the nuclear bomb per se, but to make everyone else
believe that you do.

Conflict and intrigue over valuable energy supplies have
been features of the international landscape for a long time.Major wars over oil have been fought every
decade or so since World War I, and smaller engagements have erupted every
few years; a flare-up or two in 2012, then, would be part of the normal
scheme of things.Instead, what we are
now seeing is a whole cluster of oil-related clashes stretching across the
globe, involving a dozen or so countries, with more popping up all the
time.Consider these flash-points as
signals that we are entering an era of intensified conflict over energy.

1 A brewing war between Sudan and South Sudan: On April
10th, forces from the newly independent state of South Sudan occupied the oil
center of Heglig, a town granted to Sudan as part of a peace settlement that
allowed the southerners to secede in 2011.The northerners, based in Khartoum, then mobilized their own forces
and drove the South Sudanese out of Heglig.Fighting has since erupted all along the contested border between the
two countries, accompanied by air strikes on towns in South Sudan.Although the fighting has not yet reached
the level of a full-scale war, international efforts to negotiate a cease-fire
and a peaceful resolution to the dispute have yet to meet with success.

This conflict is being fueled by many factors, including
economic disparities between the two Sudans and an abiding animosity between
the southerners (who are mostly black Africans and Christians or animists)
and the northerners (mostly Arabs and Muslims).But oil -- and the revenues produced by oil
-- remains at the heart of the matter.When Sudan was divided in 2011, the most prolific oil fields wound up
in the south, while the only pipeline capable of transporting the south’s oil
to international markets (and thus generating revenue) remained in the hands
of the northerners.They have been
demanding exceptionally high “transit fees” -- $32-$36 per barrel compared to
the common rate of $1 per barrel -- for the privilege of bringing the South’s
oil to market.When the southerners
refused to accept such rates, the northerners confiscated money they had
already collected from the south’s oil exports, its only significant source
of funds.In response, the southerners
stopped producing oil altogether and, it appears, launched their military
action against the north.The
situation remains explosive.

2 Naval clash in the South China Sea: On April 7th, a
Philippine naval warship, the 378-foot Gregorio del Pilar, arrived at
Scarborough Shoal, a small island in the South China Sea, and detained eight
Chinese fishing boats anchored there, accusing them of illegal fishing
activities in Filipino sovereign waters.China promptly sent two naval vessels of its own to the area, claiming
that the Gregorio del Pilar was harassing Chinese ships in Chinese, not
Filipino waters.The fishing boats
were eventually allowed to depart without further incident and tensions have
eased somewhat.However, neither side
has displayed any inclination to surrender its claim to the island, and both
sides continue to deploy warships in the contested area.

As in Sudan, multiple factors are driving this clash, but
energy is the dominant motive.The
South China Sea is thought to harbor large deposits of oil and natural gas,
and all the countries that encircle it, including China and the Philippines,
want to exploit these reserves.Manila
claims a 200-nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” stretching into the
South China Sea from its western shores, an area it calls the West Philippine
Sea; Filipino companies say they have found large natural gas reserves in
this area and have announced plans to begin exploiting them.Claiming the many small islands that dot
the South China Sea (including Scarborough Shoal) as its own, Beijing has
asserted sovereignty over the entire region, including the waters claimed by
Manila; it, too, has announced plans to drill in the area.Despite years of talks, no solution has yet
been found to the dispute and further clashes are likely.

3 Egypt cuts off the natural gas flow to Israel: On April
22nd, the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation and Egyptian Natural Gas
Holding Company informed Israeli energy officials that they were “terminating
the gas and purchase agreement” under which Egypt had been supplying gas to
Israel.This followed months of
demonstrations in Cairo by the youthful protestors who succeeded in deposing
autocrat Hosni Mubarak and are now seeking a more independent Egyptian
foreign policy -- one less beholden to the United States and Israel.It also followed scores of attacks on the
pipelines carrying the gas across the Negev Desert to Israel, which the
Egyptian military has seemed powerless to prevent.

Ostensibly, the decision was taken in response to a
dispute over Israeli payments for Egyptian gas, but all parties involved have
interpreted it as part of a drive by Egypt’s new government to demonstrate
greater distance from the ousted Mubarak regime and his (U.S.-encouraged)
policy of cooperation with Israel.The
Egyptian-Israeli gas link was one of the most significant outcomes of the
1979 peace treaty between the two countries, and its annulment clearly
signals a period of greater discord; it may also cause energy shortages in
Israel, especially during peak summer demand periods.On a larger scale, the cutoff suggests a
new inclination to use energy (or its denial) as a form of political warfare
and coercion.

4 Argentina seizes YPF: On April 16th, Argentina’s
president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, announced that her government
would seize a majority stake in YPF, the nation’s largest oil company.Under President Kirchner’s plans, which she
detailed on national television, the government would take a 51% controlling
stake in YPF, which is now majority-owned by Spain’s largest corporation, the
energy firm Repsol YPF.The seizure of
its Argentinean subsidiary is seen in Madrid (and other European capitals) as
a major threat that must now be combated.Spain’s foreign minister, José Manuel García Margallo, said that
Kirchner’s move “broke the climate of cordiality and friendship that presided
over relations between Spain and Argentina.”Several days later, in what is reported to be only the first of
several retaliatory steps, Spain announced that it would stop importing
biofuels from Argentina, its principal supplier -- a trade worth nearly $1
billion a year to the Argentineans.

As in the other conflicts, this clash is driven by many urges,
including a powerful strain of nationalism stretching back to the Peronist
era, along with Kirchner’s apparent desire to boost her standing in the
polls.Just as important, however, is
Argentina’s urge to derive greater economic and political benefit from its
energy reserves, which include the world’s third-largest deposits of shale
gas.While long-term rival Brazil is
gaining immense power and prestige from the development of its offshore
“pre-salt” petroleum reserves, Argentina has seen its energy production
languish.Repsol may not be to blame
for this, but many Argentineans evidently believe that, with YPF under
government control, it will now be possible to accelerate development of the
country’s energy endowment, possibly in collaboration with a more aggressive
foreign partner like BP or ExxonMobil.

5 Argentina re-ignites the Falklands crisis: At an April
15th-16th Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia -- the one at which
U.S. Secret Service agents were caught fraternizing with prostitutes --
Argentina sought fresh hemispheric condemnation of Britain’s continued
occupation of the Falkland Islands (called Las Malvinas by the
Argentineans).It won strong support
from every country present save (predictably) Canada and the United
States.Argentina, which says the
islands are part of its sovereign territory, has been raising this issue ever
since it lost a war over the Falklands in 1982, but has recently stepped up
its campaign on several fronts -- denouncing London in numerous international
venues and preventing British cruise ships that visit the Falklands from
docking in Argentinean harbors.The
British have responded by beefing up their military forces in the region and warning
the Argentineans to avoid any rash moves.

When Argentina and the U.K. fought their war over the
Falklands, little was at stake save national pride, the stature of the
country’s respective leaders (Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher vs. an
unpopular military junta), and a few sparsely populated islands.Since then, the stakes have risen
immeasurably as a result of recent seismic surveys of the waters surrounding
the islands that indicated the existence of massive deposits of oil and
natural gas.Several UK-based energy firms,
including Desire Petroleum and Rockhopper Exploration, have begun off-shore
drilling in the area and have reported promising discoveries.Desperate to duplicate Brazil’s success in
the development of offshore oil and gas, Argentina claims the discoveries lie
in its sovereign territory and that the drilling there is illegal; the
British, of course, insist that it’s their territory.No one knows how this simmering potential
crisis will unfold, but a replay of the 1982 war -- this time over energy --
is hardly out of the question.

6 U.S. forces mobilize for war with Iran: Throughout the
winter and early spring, it appeared that an armed clash of some sort pitting
Iran against Israel and/or the United States was almost inevitable.Neither side seemed prepared to back down
on key demands, especially on Iran’s nuclear program, and any talk of a
compromise solution was deemed unrealistic.Today, however, the risk of war has diminished somewhat -- at least
through this election year in the U.S. -- as talks have finally gotten under
way between the major powers and Iran, and as both have adopted (slightly)
more accommodating stances.In
addition, U.S. officials have been tamping down war talk and figures in the
Israeli military and intelligence communities have spoken out against rash
military actions.However, the
Iranians continue to enrich uranium, and leaders on all sides say they are
fully prepared to employ force if the peace talks fail.

For the Iranians, this means blocking the Strait of
Hormuz, the narrow channel through which one-third of the world’s tradable
oil passes every day.The U.S., for
its part, has insisted that it will keep the Strait open and, if necessary,
eliminate Iranian nuclear capabilities.Whether to intimidate Iran, prepare for the real thing, or possibly
both, the U.S. has been building up its military capabilities in the Persian
Gulf area, deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups in the neighborhood
along with an assortment of air and amphibious-assault capabilities.

One can debate the extent to which Washington’s
long-running feud with Iran is driven by oil, but there is no question that
the current crisis bears heavily on global oil supply prospects, both through
Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for forthcoming
sanctions on Iranian oil exports, and the likelihood that any air strikes on
Iranian nuclear facilities will lead to the same thing.Either way, the U.S. military would
undoubtedly assume the lead role in destroying Iranian military capabilities
and restoring oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. This is the
energy-driven crisis that just won’t go away.

All of these disputes have one thing in common: the
conviction of ruling elites around the world that the possession of energy
assets -- especially oil and gas deposits -- is essential to prop up national
wealth, power, and prestige.

This is hardly a new phenomenon.Early in the last century, Winston
Churchill was perhaps the first prominent leader to appreciate the strategic
importance of oil.As First Lord of
the Admiralty, he converted British warships from coal to oil and then persuaded
the cabinet to nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the forerunner of
British Petroleum (now BP).The
pursuit of energy supplies for both industry and war-fighting played a major
role in the diplomacy of the period between the World Wars, as well as in the
strategic planning of the Axis powers during World War II.It also explains America’s long-term drive
to remain the dominant power in the Persian Gulf that culminated in the first
Gulf War of 1990-91 and its inevitable sequel, the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The years since World War II have seen a variety of
changes in the energy industry, including a shift in many areas from private
to state ownership of oil and natural gas reserves.By and large, however, the industry has
been able to deliver ever-increasing quantities of fuel to satisfy the
ever-growing needs of a globalizing economy and an expanding, rapidly
urbanizing world population.So long
as supplies were abundant and prices remained relatively affordable, energy
consumers around the world, including most governments, were largely content
with the existing system of collaboration among private and state-owned
energy leviathans.

But that energy equation is changing ominously as the
challenge of fueling the planet grows more difficult.Many of the giant oil and gas fields that
quenched the world’s energy thirst in years past are being depleted at a
rapid pace.The new fields being
brought on line to take their place are, on average, smaller and harder to
exploit.Many of the most promising
new sources of energy -- like Brazil’s “pre-salt” petroleum reserves deep
beneath the Atlantic Ocean, Canadian tar sands, and American shale gas --
require the utilization of sophisticated and costly technologies.Though global energy supplies are
continuing to grow, they are doing so at a slower pace than in the past and
are continually falling short of demand.All this adds to the upward pressure on prices, causing anxiety among
countries lacking adequate domestic reserves (and joy among those with an
abundance).

The world has long been bifurcated between energy-surplus
and energy-deficit states, with the former deriving enormous political and
economic advantages from their privileged condition and the latter struggling
mightily to escape their subordinate position.Now, that bifurcation is looking more like
a chasm.In such a global environment,
friction and conflict over oil and gas reserves -- leading to energy
conflicts of all sorts -- is only likely to increase.

Looking, again, at April’s six energy disputes, one can
see clear evidence of these underlying forces in every case.South Sudan is desperate to sell its oil in
order to acquire the income needed to kick-start its economy; Sudan, on the
other hand, resents the loss of oil revenues it controlled when the nation
was still united, and appears no less determined to keep as much of the
South’s oil money as it can for itself.China and the Philippines both want the right to develop oil and gas
reserves in the South China Sea, and even if the deposits around Scarborough
Shoal prove meager, China is unwilling to back down in any localized dispute
that might undermine its claim to sovereignty over the entire region.

Egypt, although not a major energy producer, clearly seeks
to employ its oil and gas supplies for maximum political and economic
advantage -- an approach sure to be copied by other small and mid-sized
suppliers.Israel, heavily dependent
on imports for its energy, must now turn elsewhere for vital supplies or
accelerate the development of disputed, newly discovered offshore gas fields,
a move that could provoke fresh conflict with Lebanon, which says they lie in
its own territorial waters.And
Argentina, jealous of Brazil’s growing clout, appears determined to extract
greater advantage from its own energy resources, even if this means inflaming
tensions with Spain and Great Britain.

And these are just some of the countries involved in
significant disputes over energy.Any
clash with Iran -- whatever the motivation -- is bound to jeopardize the
petroleum supply of every oil-importing country, sparking a major
international crisis with unforeseeable consequences.China’s determination to control its
offshore hydrocarbon reserves has pushed it into conflict with other
countries with offshore claims in the South China Sea, and into a similar
dispute with Japan in the East China Sea.Energy-related disputes of this sort can also be found in the Caspian
Sea and in globally warming, increasingly ice-free Arctic regions.

The seeds of energy conflicts and war sprouting in so many
places simultaneously suggest that we are entering a new period in which key
state actors will be more inclined to employ force -- or the threat of force
-- to gain control over valuable deposits of oil and natural gas.In other words, we’re now on a planet
heading into energy overdrive.

Michael Klare is a
TomDispatch regular, professor of peace and world security studies at
Hampshire College, and the author, most recently, of The Race for What’s
Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources.

by Christopher Runckel, President of Runckel & Associates (www.Business-in-Asia.com)

Education and the system of higher learning and technical schools is very important to business as it provides the trained workers and also a system to transfer skills and train new employees needed in a modern business society.

In Vietnam, the economy in recent years has had a remarkable performance. GDP growth increased 8.5% in 2006, 8.2% in 2007 and 8.5% in 2009. In 2009, according to the Asia Development Bank (ADB) in their latest late September, 2009 revision the bank predicted that growth would be 4.7% for all 2009. Growth in 2010 is projected at 6.5 percent according to the same source. Future growth is highly dependent on a high quality workforce who are better skilled and trained in modern education and with better quality language skills.

Education has always had a central role in Vietnam culture and society. It is seen as the avenue of advancement and families routinely sacrifice much to ensure their offspring get the required education. The government of Vietnam has for some time set the priority of education in terms of its budget. Currently, education occupies approximately 20% of all state budget expenditures and accounts for 5.5% of GDP (source: Department of Finance and Planning, MOET, 2008). Below is a chart that shows the current education system in Vietnam:

The education system in Vietnam

Flowchart of educational system in Vietnam

With a country with over 86 million people and with more than 60% under the age of 35 (Source: General Department of Statistics of Vietnam, 2009), Vietnam’s education needs for this young population are huge. Despite attention by the government only about 1.6 million (about 2%) actually are now at higher education institutions. Each year approximately 1.2 million students graduate from secondary education but the enrollment to higher education is only around 300 thousand (Source: Department of Higher Education, MOET).

Since the combination of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education into the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) in 1990, MOET has had responsibility for all education and training at the national level. Under Vietnamese government decree 322008-ND-CP, MOET is divided into 19 separate departments and several related units, of which the most important are the following - units responsible for primary and secondary education, higher education, teacher education, adult education and the finance and planning department. MOET’s responsibilities include every level of education including pre-school, general education, professional education, tertiary education and continuing education. MOET’s responsibilities include:

Setting of policy and promulgation of regulations affecting curriculum
the research, writing and publishing of text books
enrollment and student management
academic assessment procedures and quality assurance
infrastructure and facility maintenance
staffing and personnel selection for educators
development of future education plans
suggesting and initially drafting proposed legislation for submission to the government for regulations of education matters such as establishment and construction of universities, policies on study abroad and building of an educated elite, scholarship, etc.

Although MOET plays in many ways the lead role in education in Vietnam, there are several higher education institutions in Vietnam that are under other line ministries or government agencies. Examples of this are the Hanoi Medical College that falls under the Ministry of Health and the Water Resource University under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Also, a further example of this is the two National Universities who though nominally under MOET operate independently as separate entities and report directly to the Office of the Government of Vietnam.

Although MOET has the primary role in education, there is some change occurring. Decree 85/2003 and Decree No. 166/2004/ND-CP allow local education authorities more power and responsibility to initiate long-term local education programs in their respective areas. Further, Universities are increasingly obtaining autonomy over financing(self management of funding), training, research, human-resources, and international cooperation. Resolution No. 14/2005, dated November 2, 2005 and the Government’s Higher Education Reform Agenda 2006-2020 have acted to require university and college managing boards to prepare their own spending plans and to implement them under oversight from MOET. Much discussion is occurring about how these new policies and others might facilitate better quality research and teaching while also providing a legal framework of responsibility and with increased accountability.

The Education Law

The Education Law of 2005 sets forth more explicitly the requirements for the Vietnamese higher education system. This law defined higher education as what one receives at the college or university level. It further set the degrees available and the structure for pursuing them. Under the system described in the law, a person with a high school diploma may pursue either a 4-6 year academic program for a bachelor’s degree or alternatively a 3-year academic program at a junior college. A junior college degree holder may then continue for an additional 1-2 years to secure a bachelor’s degree. A student with a bachelor’s degree may pursue and additional two years to qualify for a master’s degree and 3-4 years more to obtain a doctorate.

The law further sets-out which institutions may grant what degrees. Junior colleges are responsible for 3-year training programs but Universities also have some responsibilities in this area. Universities may also offer 4-6 year training programs and with permission of the Prime Minister, master’s and doctoral degrees. Research institutes are primarily responsible for doctoral degrees but also with the permission of the Prime Minister can provide Master’s Degrees in cooperation with Universities. Doctorate degrees in Vietnam are more comparable in Math and Science disciplines to those in Europe and with less training than those of major U.S. institutions.

Educational Institutions in Vietnam

x

Universities in Vietnam, Higher Education Institutes

Basically there are two broad grouping of educational institutions in Vietnam; the traditional mono-disciplinary or specialized institution and the multi-disciplinary university. The first group was the more common in Vietnam under the pre-Doi Moi (renovation) policy. It focusses on a single area or subject of focus, for example law, fine arts, engineering, economics, etc. In the last several years many of these former single focus institutions have taken on a multi-disciplinary focus. For example, Hanoi University of Foreign Studies was focussed most on foreign language training now has a broader focus on business and other standard University subjects. Multi-disciplinary universities are on the increase and there are currently 2 national universities, 3 regional universities and 14 pilot universities with more being added all the time. Additionally, MOET has been authorized to allow the private sector to set-up colleges and universities and companies such as FPT in Hanoi and Becamex with their Mien Dong or Eastern International University in Binh Duong province are already doing this. Vietnam already has a foreign university in the RMIT International University which opened in 2001 and now has over 3,000 students and a German University is soon to open outside Ho Chi Minh City in the South as well. Additionally there are over 200 joint-degree or co-operation programs between Vietnam Universities and foreign institutions.

The Higher Education Reform Agenda 2006-2020 has built on a changing education environment which has seen a growth in the number of public, semi-public and private higher education institutions. Between 1999 and 2007, the total number of higher education enrollments increased by 72.5% (from 893 to 1,540,000). The number of higher education institutions also grew markedly - from 153 in 2000 to 369 in 2008 and an even higher number today. According to MOET, in 2008 there were more than 40 non-public universities, accounting for 25% of the total number of universities and training 188,838 students or 11.7% of the total number of students.

List of large higher education institutions in Vietnam

What Does Going to University in Vietnam Cost

According to the September 21, 2009 issue of the Vietnam News most public universities have announced fees of VND 240,000 (US$14) per month or VND 2.4 million for the 10-month academic year. Others charge more, some charging VND 3.52 million a year. The HCMC City University of Industry charges VND 110,000 per credit and its curriculum requires each student to enroll for at least 32 credits a year, which is VND 3,530,000 per year according to Tuoi Tre (Youth) newspaper. Can Tho University in the Mekong Delta requires at least 34 credits a year at VND 80,000 each. Many Universities are above the government announced rates according to the same article with the HCM City Open University being VND 4 million per year, the HCMC Finance-Marketing University is over VND 5.5 million and the Ton Duc Thang University is over 5-6 million. At the HCM City Private University of Technique and Technology, the tuition fees are now VND 9.3 million. Although these are low in international terms, they are increasing considerable in local currency terms.

For most Vietnamese students, University study at either the Bachelors, Master’s or PhD level in the U.S. is the ultimate goal. Till now, U.S. Universities have not focussed sufficiently on attracting the many students interested. This is changing and in a University Education fair organized by IIE in Vietnam in late September there were over 86 booths promoting mainly overseas education.

Continuing Issues - Faculty

university faculty in Vietnam, Higher education faculty in Vietnam

Developing faculty has been a big challenge for higher education in Vietnam - both in terms of quality and also quantity. The ratio of lecturers/students is around 1/30 which is relatively high. The number of PhD holders at higher education institutions is still low. In some new universities there only one or two PhDs. MOET has announced a plan to train 20,000 PhDs of which 10,000 will be trained overseas by 2020. There also is a plan to attract Vietnamese overseas professors and researchers to return to teach but so far the reality on this has been very disappointing with the government still being very reluctant to make adequate use of this overseas resource.

Testing, recruiting and enrolling students

Vietnam university students, recruiting and emrollment

Vietnam has a two step process of qualifying for University. First, students must first take and pass the Secondary School Leaving Examination (SSLE). This exam consists of a comprehensive achievement test in six subjects (math, literature, a foreign language, and three alternating subjects) each with a maximum value of ten points. In order to graduate, a student at least needs to achieve a score of 30 points. A score below this will disqualify a student from sitting for University entrance Examination. The next step is the University Entrance Examination (UEE) which usually requires that a student take an exam of 3 of 4 fixed groups of subjects. MOET has proposed a plan to merge the SSLE and the UEE in 2-3 years from 2009.

Credit System

A credit system is now in place at a number of Vietnamese Universities to replace the older subject based system. In the new credit system, each course is assigned a credit amount. Each credit represents one hour of theoretical lectures plus one hour of preparation per week over a 14-16 week semester. A four year program will normally require a total of 210 credits. Five-year programs require 270 credits and six-year programs require 320 credits.

Grading System

Vietnam follows a 10-point grading system. The normal passing level is a 5. The following is MOET’s published definition of grades but at the tertiary level there is substantial variation. Here is the definition:

9-10 - Excellent
8-9 - Very Good
7-8 Good - about 35% of the students are at this level
5-6 - average - about 50% of students at this level
4 or below - Fail

Overseas study in Vietnam

Overseas education has become increasingly popular in recent years as it is viewed as offering the student likelihood of better future employment. Overseas study can be either by scholarship or through personal finances.

The overseas-study consulting market in Vietnam is highly competitive. Hundreds of education consulting centers and non-profit organizations are operating in the big cities. Moreover, the internet also gives students the ability to find the scholarships and the school and the opportunities to go oversea to study by themselves. In addition, the oversea-study exhibitions organized by the educational institutions have provided opportunities to the student and introduced the student to ways to assess the U.S educational institutes by themselves. This has also increased price competition in the market.

Over 60,000 students in Vietnam are now studying overseas according to the Foreign Press Center and based on statistics from MOET. According to statistics of the International Education Institution (IIE), the number of Vietnamese students studying in the U.S reached the 13th ranking in 2008. Even though most students would prefer going to the U.S. rather than other countries, the rank showed here is relatively low due to perceived difficulty by many young people in getting a visa from the U.S. Embassy and Consulate. I would note the word "perceived" in the above sentence. In actual fact, most U.S. Consular officers make the point that they will approve any student who applies who has a realistic and well thought out plan for their education. The U.S. Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City has also made this point repeatedly in speeches and in talks with students and the sentiment is in my opinion real. The problem in Vietnam is primarily one that students often work with education counselors that have insufficient knowledge of Universitities and their programs. They are insufficiently informed and professional and often do not represent their students adequately. Therefore many people apply for Universities or Colleges that do not really have the programs that the student is seeking or the student can't adequately explain the education needs and their plan in a logical and reasonable way to the Consular officer. Another major problem is that students and parents are often only focussed on U.S. Universities close to known locations in the U.S. or elsewhere with overseas Vietnamese populations like California and thereby miss many better opportunities in colleges and Universities in other locations like Philadelphia, the Northeast U.S. or elsewhere. The numbers of the students going overseas have also increased rapidly in the past years, particularly the number of Vietnamese students in the U.S: 8,769 in 2008; 6,036 in 2007; 4,597 in 2006 and 3,670 in 2005. (Source : Tran Thang (IVCE) - Thanhnien newspaper, 3 March 2009). Therefore, this market segment still has potential opportunities for growth in services.

There are an increasing number of types of scholarship available to study overseas. Each year there are approximately 25 U.S. Government Fulbright Fellowships and around 40-50 U.S. Government Vietnam Education Foundation (VEF) Fellowships available for masters degree students only. Additionally there are approximately 10 Canadian government scholarships, 70 scholarships to study in the UK, 200 scholarships for study in France, 150 for study in Australia, 70 short-term and 10 long-term scholarships in Thailand. A large number of additional students receive scholarships directly from universities, nongovernmental organizations, foundations and other bodies. The Vietnamese Government through MOET also has a program to approve approximately 400 scholarships for state workers to study abroad to improve their skills. In 2009, the Vietnam International Education Development (VIED - replaced the Management Committee of Project 322) will on behalf of Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) select and award many scholarships for studies overseas. These scholarships comprise the following:

500 scholarships for full time doctoral study overseas,
200 scholarships for full time masters study overseas,
30 scholarships for short term training courses overseas,
100 scholarships for doctoral and master study at joint programs,
About 150 scholarships for undergraduate study overseas.

Another estimated 20,000 students are studying abroad each year on institutional scholarships or on their own finances. These figures are further growing yearly as the government implements its so-called 10,000 PhD program with a goal of creating 20,000 new PhDs by 2020 through training abroad.

Continuing Problem Areas

Based on data from MOET in 2007, access to higher education is still low and only about 2% of the population moves into higher education study. This figure is low in both a regional and an international context.

Ratio of students to faculty is low at 1/30.

Quality of faculty is not as high as needed an only 14% of faculty have a doctoral degree and 33% have a masters degree.

Quality assurance in education remains weak

Enrollment is concentrated in a few academic disciplines. Nearly 50% of all students major in economics/business.

Future Goals

The “Socio-economic Development Plan 2006-2010” and the “Resolution on Comprehensive and Fundamental Reform of Higher Education in Vietnam 2006-2020 (No. 14/2005) have set the following targets for higher education in Vietnam:

Increasing enrollment in universities and colleges by 10 percent annually, to reach a level of 200 students for 10,000 population by 2010 and 450 students per 10,000 populations by 2020
revenue from science and technology activities increased to 15 percent of total university revenue by 2010, and to 25 percent by 2020;
proportion of university teaching staff with masters level degrees increased to 40 percent by 2010, and to 60 percent by 2020;
proportion of university teaching staff with doctoral level degrees increased to 25 percent by 2010, and to 35 percent by 2020;
ratio of university students to teaching staff reduct to 20:1 by 2020
encouraging the establishment of private institutions, including high-quality, accredited and 100 percent foreign-invested institutions in science, technology, and economic management; encouraging foreign scientific and educational experts and Vietnamese expatriates to teach in Vietnam.

As can be seen from the above, the government has set some substantial goals. Now the challenge will be in finding the money and in getting continual supportive and consistent policies over time to achieve the goals set out.

About the Author:

Christopher W. Runckel, a former senior US diplomat who served in many counties in Asia, is a graduate of the University of Oregon and Lewis and Clark Law School. He served as Deputy General Counsel of President Gerald Ford’s Presidential Clemency Board. Mr. Runckel is the principal and founder of Runckel & Associates, a Portland, Oregon based consulting company that assists businesses expand business opportunities in Asia. (www.business-in-asia.com)

Until April of 1999, Mr. Runckel was Minister-Counselor of the US Embassy in Beijing, China. Mr. Runckel lived and worked in Thailand for over six years. He was the first permanently assigned U.S. diplomat to return to Vietnam after the Vietnam War. In 1997, he was awarded the U.S. Department of States highest award for service, the Distinguished Honor Award, for his contribution to improving U.S.-Vietnam relations.