1. Having taken note of the question “Whether in the light of cann.
281,
§1 and 1274 §1 Guideline 12 from the Charter of Priests Remuneration Fund of the
Diocese of XXX is in accordance with universal law,” presented by letter
dated February 1, 2000, from the Reverend Procurator/Advocate for a priest
incardinated in the Diocese of XXX, such letter being protocolled by this
Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts as N. 7194/2000.

2. Having clarified that the formal request of the Procurator/Advocate for an “official
interpretation” must be understood, obviously, in the sense that there must be a
pronouncement concerning the conformity of the particular norm to the
universal laws of the Church, pursuant to
Art. 158 of the Ap. Const. Pastor
Bonus.

3. Having examined carefully the documentation forwarded to this Dicastery and having
verified in particular that Guideline 12 of the new Charter provides that “It
is the Policy of the Priest’s Remuneration Fund to adjust payments from the Fund
in accordance with the full or part pension that a Priest might receive or be
entitled to receive. Priests who are eligible to apply for a pension are
expected to apply for this benefit for the common good. Remuneration benefits
payable under these guidelines will be adjusted accordingly,” and that this
Guideline substantially reproduces what had already been determined by Guideline
21 of the previous norms for the Priests Remuneration Fund (1976).

4. Having verified in law that, in actuation of that which had been foreseen by the Second Vatican
Council in the decree Presbyterorum Ordinis (nn. 20-21), the universal
laws of the Church and canonical scholarship have individuated the following
points of reference for an equitable system for the support of clergy:

4.1 The first paragraph of
can. 1274 establishes that every diocese
is to arrange for the establishment of a special fund “in accordance with
can. 281, for the support of the clergy who serve the diocese, unless they are
otherwise provided for.” While reference is made to
can. 281 in its
entirety, it is the first paragraph of that canon that is of interest in the
case at hand: “Since clerics dedicate themselves to the ecclesiastical
ministry, they deserve the remuneration that befits their condition, taking into
account both the nature of their office and the conditions of time and place.
It is to be such that it provides for the necessities of their life and for the
just remuneration of those whose services they need.”

The distinct emphases of the two canons are easily identifiable.
Can. 281, §1 speaks of the exercise of ministry without any reference to service
in favor of the diocese, an element that is specified, in contrast, in can.
1274. While can. 281 creates a generic right,
can. 1274, in the specific
context of the diocesan institute or fund, refers more narrowly to clergy who
render service to the diocese. One notes, moreover, that
can. 1274, §1 does
not foresee a “national” institute for the remuneration of priests, but only for
other purposes (cfr. §4).

The fact that
can. 281 is found in the chapter of Book II that sets
forth the obligations and rights of clergy leads to the logical conclusion that
remuneration is a right: a cleric has a right to adequate remuneration.

In establishing the “source” of that remuneration, can. 1274
follows an approach that leaves open many possibilities and does not impose a
direct correspondence between remuneration and those for whose advantage a
cleric exercises his ecclesiastical ministry.

The above-cited provisions involve a general affirmation that is
quite relevant: the remuneration of which can. 281 speaks cannot be considered
to be a “stipend,” that is, it is not to be considered compensation for work
performed, agreed upon and measured in relationship to either the quantity or
the quality of the services rendered.

A diocesan system for remuneration is extended to all those priests
who exercise in service of the diocese some “ministry,” as that concept is
determined in its concrete aspects by particular law; that same legislation,
moreover, is required to establish the parameters for remuneration and any
incidental factors relating to the same, taking into account two legal points of
reference: the nature of the office and the circumstances of time and place.

4.2. The remuneration that the Church must ensure for the cleric
who dedicates himself to the exercise of ministry according to the mandate of
the Bishop is not measurable according to the criteria of commutative justice,
that is, of reciprocity and of proportionality with respect to the particular
services rendered by the cleric. The Church, in fact, is not called upon to
ensure a “stipend” (can. 281, §1 uses, in fact, the term “remuneratio”,
which expresses a different concept than “stipendio”) for the work or
works performed by the cleric, but guarantees to the cleric honest sustenance,
whatever might be the assignment (or assignments) that he receives from the
Bishop, so that he might continue to exercise his ministerial service, requiring
the total giving of himself and his time, in serenity and complete liberty.

From this perspective, one sees the radical difference between the “remuneration”
given to a cleric and the salary or stipend paid to the laity:
above all, it is not the quantity of services performed that needs to be
recognized and proportionately compensated, but rather the person of the cleric,
who offers his services, or should offer his services, for reasons other than
those which would motivate the average laborer.

4.3. The Code of Canon Law, in accord with what has already been
presented, leaves open a vast array of possibilities regarding the “sources”
from which it is legitimate to receive the “quantum” necessary for the
remuneration of clergy.
Canon 1274, §1, in fact, speaks of a diocesan institute
for the support of the clergy, “unless they are otherwise provided for.”
Based on that phrase, one can deduce that the remuneration of a cleric may come
from other sources, whether taken singularly or pooled together. Schematically,
there are three types of sources for the necessary sustenance:

a. ecclesiastical entities for which the priests exercise their ministry,
whether full-time or part-time;

b. subjects from which the priests receive what corresponds to a true and
proper stipend, or a pension, according to the norms in force of the relevant
juridical order;

c. the diocesan institute or fund.

It is recognized that, in practice, there are priests who
simultaneously provide services to a number of ecclesiastical entities.
Such ecclesiastical entities may be at the diocesan level or at a broader
level. All of these entities are bound, by virtue of the service requested, to
make their proper economic contribution, according to particular law.

The payers of stipends may be either ecclesiastical entities
(imagine, for example, a Catholic school, etc.) or civil entities - whether
private or public - for which the priests exercise a task, by virtue of an
express or tacit mandate of their own Ordinary.

The diocesan institute or fund has the task, in those cases
in which the designated level of remuneration for the individual cleric is not
met, of supplementing the partial remuneration received from ecclesiastical
entities or the stipend received from other sources. Nothing prohibits the
entities subject to the Diocesan Bishop, or having contracted with him, from
paying directly to the diocesan institute the contribution owed to the
individual priest, if the fiscal system in use would make that advantageous.

The taking into account of all the possible sources of remuneration
falls explicitly within the ratio legis intended by the canonical
legislator. Such action is required both to express the unity of ministerial
service of the priests incardinated in a diocese and to guarantee an adequate
equalization of work and of remuneration between all the priests.

4.4 From the legislative references set forth above, one clearly
deduces that, where a diocesan system of remuneration is in existence, it is
not permitted for the individual cleric to “refuse” the relevant contribution
derived from one of the available sources or to “not request” whatever belongs
to him, and, at the same time, to claim the usual supplement. By such an
act, in fact, he would damage the entire system that, in concrete, is
interrelated in a manner that is akin to the relationship described by the
principle of physics known as “communicating vessels”: that which the
individual refuses must be paid by the common fund, resulting in damage to the
others drawing from the common fund.

With respect to the inclusion of pensions collected, or which
could be collected (inasmuch as they are owed, if requested, by the State),
one notes that, taking into account the state of the economic resources of the
diocese and of the specific context of the general principles set forth above,
they could be included in the calculation of remuneration. If one considers the
necessary equality that should exist among the priests of a diocese, it may be
appropriate or necessary to include in the pool of resources to be redistributed
all those incomes that are able to be objectively quantified. It is not only
licit but also appropriate to take into account - whether partially or totally,
depending on the circumstances - the income received by the individual, as long
as it does not come from strictly personal savings. There have been some
objections that pensions should be considered as income from personal resources
and not be figured into the accounting. However, other than the practical
difficulty involved in a system of remuneration that seeks to encompass even
personal income derived from inheritances or from capital, one cannot forget
that a pension “owed” by the State and income from personal goods are economic
goods that are quite different.

4.5 The statutes and by-laws of a diocesan fund,
regardless of whether it has been erected as a juridical person, are true and
proper particular norms, as long as they were established or approved by the
diocesan bishop and published. As such, they have full validity as long as they
are not contrary to the universal laws. Given the nature and the relative
breadth of the power of the diocesan bishop (cfr. cann. 383, §1 and 291),
decisions concerning the extension of particular laws which are either
secundum legem or praeter legem fall within his discretion.

Even though the relevant norms presently in effect in the Diocese of
XXX are designated as Guidelines, it is clear that those Guidelines which
set forth precise “dispositions” - such as the one now being examined - must
substantially be considered as diocesan regulatory norms, inasmuch as they are
expressly approved and published by the Diocesan Bishop.

4.6. The present case does not, moreover, present circumstances for
invoking the principle of canonical equity. “Aequitas canonica” is a
canonical notion that comes into play at the moment that the law is applied, to
correct any abstractness in the law that would render it inadequate or unjust in
relationship to a concrete situation. A norm such as the one here in question,
however, could be considered to be contrary to canonical equity only in the case
that it, when considered in itself and not in its application, would be contrary
to natural right. The diocesan norm in question, as such, does not injure in
any way the right of the individual cleric to adequate remuneration; it serves,
rather, to guarantee it. It constitutes a stimulus so that the negligence of
some would not cause damage to the well-being of the others.