The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Abstract

The Rules of Thought develops a Fregean theory of mental content and a rationalist approach to epistemology. According to the Fregean theory of mental content developed in Part I, content and rationality are deeply connected; what it is to think is to be governed by certain normative rational relations—quite literally the “rules of thought.” This conceptual role theory differs from prominent alternatives in the literature by allowing a rather sophisticated (and indirect) psychological realization of the core inferential patterns that are constitutive of contents. Part II applies t ... More

The Rules of Thought develops a Fregean theory of mental content and a rationalist approach to epistemology. According to the Fregean theory of mental content developed in Part I, content and rationality are deeply connected; what it is to think is to be governed by certain normative rational relations—quite literally the “rules of thought.” This conceptual role theory differs from prominent alternatives in the literature by allowing a rather sophisticated (and indirect) psychological realization of the core inferential patterns that are constitutive of contents. Part II applies the rationalism developed in Part I, arguing that many prototypical instances of philosophy are genuinely a priori, and that the general capacity for thought is sufficient to ground the rational abilities needed for philosophical knowledge. The resultant approach to the epistemology of philosophy and the a priori is resistant to many of the standard arguments against apriority. The approach of the book differs from that of many contemporary rationalists by denying any central epistemic role to intuitions; this feature of the view is explored and defended in Part III.

End Matter

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