As Yevgeny Primakov’s government in Moscow takes shape, an uneasy calm prevails. But there is little sign that the new team can solve the crisis

IS THE abandonment of reform the price of political peace in Russia? As a coalition fumbling for ideas under Yevgeny Primakov emerges, that certainly looks grimly possible. By September 17th, not a single leading economic liberal nor any well-known battler for democracy had been appointed to a big job. Among the prime minister's most prominent and voluble colleagues is the new central-bank boss, Viktor Gerashchenko, whose previous sojourn in the post, which he held between 1988 and 1994, was marked by a propensity for printing money at will for dying industries. Another key figure is Yuri Maslyukov, the last head of the Soviet Union's much-reviled planning agency, Gosplan, who becomes a first-deputy prime minister in charge of the economy. His pronouncements suggest nostalgia for the Soviet past.

But some more reform-minded ministers have been kept on, including—at least for now—the finance minister, Mikhail Zadornov. A middle-of-the-roader, Alexander Shokhin, has been made a deputy prime minister with an eye on finance. A brighter, younger, reformer, 34-year-old Vladimir Ryzhkov, has been given the poisoned chalice of social, labour and cultural affairs. And to enhance a sense of continuity, the key “power ministers”, the men who run defence, security and the interior ministry, have not changed. But Boris Fedorov, the last outspokenly radical reformer hanging on to his job, which involved trying to collect taxes, looks set for the chop.

A mixed crowd, then. But so far the voices of the anti-reformers have been a lot more audible. Mr Gerashchenko's early dicta were the most striking—and the most disheartening to reformers. He has already asked the Duma, the lower house of parliament, to repeal a law that forbids the central bank to finance the government's deficit (in effect, by printing money). He has called for the return of currency controls on exporters' earnings and has promised preferential treatment for the country's corrupt and incompetent commercial banks (see article), bankrupted by the default on rouble debt announced on August 17th. Russian savers recall that, in his earlier spell at the bank, he summarily cancelled high-denomination bank-notes, then withdrew all those printed before a certain date.

Further raising the prospect of a dose of old-style state planning, a group of economists which was prominent in the late-Soviet era under Mikhail Gorbachev now seems to have Mr Primakov's ear. They suggest a “controlled emission” of new money, the indexation of wages and pensions, and curbs on imports. They also want to issue hard-currency bonds to domestic savers—an odd idea, seeing that nothing short of the knout is likely, in the present chaos, to induce Russians to lend their remaining dollars to the state. Mr Maslyukov, for his part, has argued for renationalisation, economic protection, and monopolies.

As for democracy and cleaner government, a most alarming appointment is the reported nomination of Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the governor of lawless Primorsky Krai (Maritime Territory) in Russia's Far East, as a deputy prime minister in charge of the regions. Reversing Russia's anarchic decentralisation is one of the few policies clearly spelled out so far by Mr Primakov. Presumably he believes poachers make the best gamekeepers.

Still, none of this amounts to a return to communism or dictatorship. Plenty of democracies have survived bouts of protectionism and inflation. And it is surely reasonable for him to decry the “awful divide” between Russia's rich and poor. So far Mr Primakov has sounded anodyne.

The real question is whether, if he does set off down the path apparently being mapped out by Messrs Gerashchenko and Maslyukov, he will change tack. “When they confront reality, they correct their ideas—that's the difference between these guys and real communists,” says Andrei Kozyrev, once foreign minister and now a liberal parliamentarian. Mr Primakov, for all his past Soviet loyalties (see article), is nothing if not adept at changing tunes.

The most immediate worry, however, is that this expensive political peace will be short-lived and the government's learning-curve soon broken by a social convulsion. Though the Communists, who dominate the Duma, backed Mr Primakov's nomination, they may already be edging away from his government. They are still calling a general strike for October 7th, while demanding, among other things, “public control of the media”. And they still want Boris Yeltsin booted out of the presidency.

Ordinary Russians still have plenty to complain about. Inflation has already raced to its highest monthly rate for six years. Unemployment is shooting up, especially in Moscow. Winter is set to bring exceptional hardship, especially in the provinces. Mr Primakov's first remedy—to pay wage and pension arrears with newly printed roubles—may give Russia, and his government, but the briefest and most illusory relief.