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Demonstrations in Taiz to force Huthi militia from the city, March 2015. Erem News. All rights reserved.While media coverage of the tragic situation unfolding in
Yemen in recent months has focused on armed clashes and other violence, there
has also been widespread and ongoing nonviolent civil resistance employed by a
number of different actors.

In fact, the most significant setbacks to the
Huthi militia in their march southward across the country in recent months have
come not from the remnants of the Yemeni army or Saudi air strikes, but from
massive resistance by unarmed civilians which has thus far prevented their
capture of Taiz, the country’s third largest city, and other urban areas. The
resistance efforts have also pressed the Houthis to withdraw their forces from
a number of previously-held areas, including universities, residential
neighborhoods, and even military bases. This
kind of nonviolent resistance by ordinary people is remarkable, but it is not
new in Yemen.

The fall of
President Saleh and rise of the Huthis

It was just four years ago, in 2011, when—inspired in part
by the successful civil insurrections against the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and
the Mubarak regime in Egypt—millions of Yemenis took to the streets in massive nonviolent
protests against the autocratic US-backed government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who
had held power for three and a half decades. An impressive degree of unity was forged
between the various tribal, regional, sectarian, and ideological groups taking
part in the pro-democracy protests, which included mass marches, sit-ins, and
many other forms of civil resistance. Leaders of prominent tribal coalitions
publicly supported the popular insurrection, prompting waves of tribesmen to
leave their guns at home and head to the capital to take part in the movement.
These tribesmen, along with the hundreds of thousands of city dwellers, were
encouraged to maintain nonviolent discipline, even in the face of government
snipers and other provocations which led to the deaths of hundreds of unarmed
protesters.

These ongoing nonviolent protests, combined with shifting
alliances between competing elites and armed factions, made President Saleh’s
continued hold on power increasingly untenable. Saleh was eventually forced to resign, but it
wasn’t long before conflict returned.
Backed by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the United
States, Saleh’s vice president, Major General Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi took over
as the head of state, over the objections of civil society and the masses that had
ousted the former president.

The new Hadi government was unpopular, lacked credibility,
and was widely perceived as inept and corrupt. These factors, combined with the mass
resignation of the cabinet, controversial proposals for constitutional change,
and support from armed groups allied with the former Saleh dictatorship led to
a power vacuum that enabled the Huthi militia (despite representing only the
Zaidi minority in the north of the country) to emerge as the most potent military
force in Yemen.

Popular resistance
to the Huthi takeover

Despite having participated in various
forms of nonviolent action in previous years, the Huthi militia made a decision
to begin engaging in violence, and on July 10, 2014 they attacked the city of
Amran, overrunning a military base, seizing a large array of weaponry, and killing
dozens of soldiers and civilians in the process. While the Hadi government was
unpopular, the Huthi attack was also summarily rejected by many Yemenis, and the
following day massive protests took place in Amran, Sana, Taiz, Ibb, Hadramout,
Dhamar, Al Bayda, and Ad-Dhale’e, condemning the Huthi attack (along with
Israel’s military campaign in Gaza), demanding investigations of the incident
and a return of the stolen weapons.

In August 2014, the Huthi’s
surprised the world by seizing the capital of Sana’a, which led to a new round of anti-Huthi
protests in September, with hundreds of thousands marching in Taiz against what
they called “threats of royalists” along with calls to resist the violent
groups that were trying to impose their control by force.

Major student protests swept the
country throughout the fall, primarily in Hodaidah, Ibb and Baydha. On November 2, hundreds of students and
employees of the Sana’a University formed a silent chain around their campus,
raising signs with slogans condemning the control of their campus by the Huthis.
Protests were continuous, with students insisting they would not stop until the
“Huthi occupation” ended. As a result of ongoing protests, Huthi forces finally
withdrew from the university on December 10.

In addition to demonstrations, a
wave of strikes took place across the country targeting a variety of sectors
where the Huthis attempted to assert their control: in addition to universities
and high schools, the military academy in Sana’a, the judiciary in several
cities, and fuel production facilities in Shabwa were shut down. Hundreds of prisoners
held captive by the Huthis went on hunger strike, as did President Hadi while
under house arrest prior to his escape. Scores of prominent Yemenis have
resigned from their posts in protest, including governors, police chiefs,
senior military officials, and top administrators in transportation, medicine,
communications, and other sectors.

Young activists, many taking advantage of social
media networking, have played a role in resisting the Huthi armed advance and
have tried to emphasize the need for national unity and nonviolent means of
settling differences. A September 28 protest in front of the Ministry of Youth
and Sports in Sana’a incorporated national songs and dances in order to emphasize
Yemenis’ commonalities and to condemn the presence of armed groups. Protesters
chanted such slogans as “Dear my country, rise and shine, no weapons after
today” and “Altogether for a capital without weapons.” Similar themes were
stressed in a December 13 demonstration calling for national unity and
nonviolent action with protesters marching from Change Square to the president’s
house. The largest protests during this period took place on January 26, 2015
in response to the Huthi consolidation of their takeover, in which tens of
thousands took the streets in Sana’a despite violent repression by the Huthis.

By the end of January, a number of tribal groups and other
associations declared they would no longer comply with orders, military or
otherwise, coming from the Huthi-dominated government in Sana’a. The Huthis
began recognizing that control of government buildings in the capital did not
necessarily mean control of the country, even in areas where their forces were
present.

A
series of mass protests took place in response to the detention of anti-Huthi
activists, the most significant of which took place in Ibb on February 15.
Thousands of nonviolent protesters who took to the streets were met with
gunfire, with armed forces trying to separate the mass demonstration into
smaller more controllable units. The protesters not only held their ground, but
were able to seize a number of armed Huthis. As these citizens maintained
nonviolent discipline and refused to disperse, Huthi-led security forces then
refused commands by their superiors to continue firing on the crowd, calling it
“deliberate repression of peaceful demonstrators.”

Remarkably, even with the dramatic
escalation in fighting last month with the Huthi advance southward and the
subsequent Saudi military intervention, nonviolent resistance has continued.
The most impressive episodes took place in Taiz, located between Sana’a and the
strategic port city of Aden. On March 19, Huthi militiamen seized the important
Yemeni Special Forces camp on its outskirts and were expected to shortly take
over the entire city, no longer defended by Yemeni government troops, who had
fled or defected. However, largely youthful demonstrators massed outside gates
of the captured base, raising banners rejecting the Houthis’ armed presence,
and remained encamped to physically block additional militiamen from entering
the area. The region’s governor, Shawki Ahmed Hayel, called on all Taizis to join
the sit-ins and remain in place until the Huthis left the city.

On March 21, armed Huthis militiamen
attempted to break up the “human wall” surrounding the base with teargas and
gunfire, killing several unarmed demonstrators. This resulted in a public
backlash, with hundreds of thousands marching the following day from the center
of the city demanding that the Huthis withdraw their gunmen from Taiz. By March
24, a general strike was in effect to demand Huthi withdrawal from city. Taiz
effectively shut down and the mostly youthful protesters set up roadblocks preventing
access to the city by Huthi reinforcements. Despite additional casualties among
the protesters, the Huthis — who just days earlier were presumed to have been
preparing to occupy the entire city — were forced to withdraw from the captured
base and surrounding areas.

Conclusion

The recent military intervention by
Saudi Arabia has resulted in a mixed response. Popular anger at the Huthi
aggression has led many Yemenis to support the Saudi air strikes, with rallies
in support of the bombing taking place in Ibb, Hodeidah, and Taiz. Larger
rallies in opposition have taken place in Sana’a and Amran. Even among those who
oppose the Huthis, there is widespread suspicion regarding Saudi intentions and
actions due to their previous interventions in Yemen’s internal affairs, their
support for authoritarian and extremist elements, their maltreatment of Yemeni
guest workers, and their ultra-conservative Salafi brand of Islam.

The Saudi role in creating
conditions for the current crisis by marginalizing civil society elements in
supporting Hadi’s takeover of the presidency and their overall aspirations in
the Arabian Peninsula have led many Yemenis to fear that once again they seek
to usurp nonviolent nationalist pro-democracy forces. In addition, there has
been widespread outrage at the large-scale civilian casualties resulting from
the Saudi air assault.

It was the sidelining of civil
society and leaders of the 2011 nonviolent pro-democracy struggles by the
Saudis, GCC states, and the US which helped create the current crisis. It would
therefore behove the international community not to similarly ignore the
hundreds of thousands of Yemenis who, in the midst of the current chaos and
violence, have again taken to the streets in unarmed civil resistance.

The history and ongoing
manifestations of nonviolent action in Yemen is greater than is generally
perceived by the outside world, which has long dismissed the country as
“primitive,” “violent,” “tribal,” “chaotic,” and incapable of handling its own
affairs. The most effective means of ensuring stability and resisting the Huthis,
Al-Qaeda, or other armed extremists comes not from backing allied strongmen,
but from allowing civil society to take the lead in developing broad-based
democratic institutions without the use of arms.

Yet it is in this history of civil
resistance that lies the country’s greatest hope. The power of Yemenis of
various and even competing tendencies to wage their struggles nonviolently is something
that should be acknowledged and encouraged, not undermined in pursuit of
military solutions to complex political problems.

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