After Xinjiang Violence, Hints of a New Approach

A recent resurgence of violence in China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang is clearly of concern to the Communist Party leadership.

But it’s Party conservatives who should be worried the most, for the clashes in Xinjiang have provided Xi Jinping and his reformist allies with another opportunity to strengthen their argument that many of the old ways of governance aren’t working.

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On the surface, Beijing’s response to the unrest might seem to be part of same old policies followed by Xi’s predecessors: There was the immediate dispatch of a high-level Politburo delegation to the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi, and the usual strong condemnation of the deadly rampage, which was said to be the result of “ethnic separatist forces inside and outside Xinjiang…a small number of violent criminals who had been stepping up activities to affect social stability in Xinjiang” (in Chinese).

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People watch as paramilitary police prepare to ride in armored vehicles during a ‘show of force’ ceremony in Urumqi after a series of terrorist attacks recently hit Xinjiang, on June 29, 2013.

Chinese security forces also moved in rapidly, displaying the sort of strength and firepower available to the government, if any local trouble threatened to develop into larger turmoil.

But if some of the reaction from Beijing was only too familiar, there were signs of a new, more subtle approach at work.

The Politburo contingent that arrived in Urumqi on the weekend was nuanced in its public assessment of the situation in the province. Instead of focusing on what was branded “terrorism” in the Chinese media, Yu Zhengsheng, who headed the delegation from Beijing, urged cadres in Xinjiang to “comprehensively strengthen the social aspects of overall prevention and control” and focus on “grassroots work, by closely relying on the extensive mobilization of grassroots organizations and Party members.” Yu suggested that officials should look to work with the masses to “prevent, control and treat” the circumstances that produce the violence to start with.

That’s not the usual head-cracking hardline that Hu Jintao and his fellow conservatives followed for nearly all of their tenure. Instead, it’s what Xi has been urging cadres to do in recent days: change their work style to gain a greater sense of the needs and dreams of the masses they are supposed to be supervising.

Indeed, other members of the same Politburo group–security czars Meng Jianzhu and Guo Shengkun—in conducting inspection tours of police headquarters and villages close to the area affected by violence, reminded officers that their first task was “prevention against crime, and maintaining social peace” (in Chinese)—hardly the syntax of strong-arm coercion.

That silkier strategy should also appeal to those in Xinjiang who simply want to go about their daily lives—a theme that has been played up in the Party media (in Chinese) ever since the most recent outbreak of violence.

Of course, Yu was not being gentle when, in the same speech, he called on local authorities “to continue to carry out violence against terrorist groups and extremist organizations, and for special operations to increase the pursuit efforts.”

But, in fact, Xi’s people are finding ways to move beyond that catch-all concept of their predecessors, for they plainly see “social stability” and “maintaining stability” as too restrictive, tied to old traditions and not part of the new style of politics that Xi continues to cultivate and the “cadres of quality” he and his associates want to emerge (in Chinese).

The clashes in Xinjiang have helped them make some headway in this regard, too.

For example, some of the coverage in the Party media about the recent unrest simply uses the word, “stability.” By dropping the word “social,” reformers are signaling the lower ranks that there’s a line they’re testing that’s different from the previous leadership.

Leading Party newspapers have also been departing from the tried and tired smackdown script by giving prominence to “actual and effective operations of peace-building,” both just before and following the clashes in Xinjiang (in Chinese).

Also, “safeguarding the people’s safety” – a phrase that implies deferring to local conditions on the ground and sometimes precedes references to “stability” — is taking a foothold in a number of speeches, slogans and editorials, as well (in Chinese).

These directions in the Party media beckon cadres to be more creative in deciding how to attain harmony on the streets — to not just rely on the usual strong-arm tactics. Inspiring cadres to stay calm and cast off past practices isn’t going to be easy, especially when the central leadership is taking a hard look at itself and its own shortcomings.

But as a front-page editorial in the authoritative People’s Daily stated on Sunday, the clashes in Xinjiang “will only make more people keep their eyes open, and clearly distinguish right from wrong” (in Chinese).

Xi Jinping and his allies want that statement to be true — and not just for Xinjiang.

Russell Leigh Moses is the Dean of Academics and Faculty at The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.

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