In a Reutersop-ed this week, Council on Foreign Relations’ scholar Edward Alden lavishes praise on the Obama administration for “quietly embrac[ing] the most ambitious agenda on trade and investment liberalization in the past two decades.” Ted’s take evokes thisWashington Post article from last March, in which Howard Schneider noted the emergence of a robust trade agenda and marveled at its meaning. At the time, the announcement of an October 2013 deadline for completing the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks, the launch of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, progress on a revised Information Technology Agreement, and fresh prospects for salvaging some elements of the Doha Round warranted a reappraisal of the state of U.S. trade policy.

In President Obama – both Alden and Schneider suggest – we are observing a metamorphosis from committed trade skeptic into someone seeking to create “a legacy in international economic and trade policy,” as another effusive optimist put it. At the time, I cautioned against crediting the president for a job not yet done and suggested that “Obama’s Trade Policy Should Be Judged on Its Accomplishments, Not Its Promise.”

Nine months later, it is waning promise more than notable accomplishment that explains any convergence between the two. Though Doha-lite-lite may have produced some minor agreements (news is still breaking), the ITA has so far failed, and it has become obvious that any benefits from the TTIP – if agreement is eventually struck – are several years away.

But it is the TPP that really matters most to U.S. trade policy. Much time, effort, and credibility have been invested in the TPP negotiations – the economic arm of the administration’s “pivot” to Asia. If TPP fails to produce a comprehensive, ambitious agreement, the economic and diplomatic consequences will be far reaching. Not only would a U.S. reputation already sullied by scandal, equivocation and hypocrisy slip further, but an alternative model for economic integration in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region driven by Chinese priorities would emerge to fill the void.

The stakes are higher than one would infer from the president’s efforts to date. Although his Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has worked hard to make progress toward an agreement with TPP negotiating partners, the president has been missing from the equally important and potentially trickier domestic discussion. Nearly four years into negotiations, which are alleged to be near completion, the president has not even secured the authority from Congress to negotiate foreign trade deals.

Congress has constitutional authority to “regulate foreign commerce,” which includes entering into trade agreements. Traditionally, Congress has delegated the authority to negotiate agreements to the executive through temporary legislation that conveys congressional parameters – the agreement must include A, B, and C and cannot include X, Y, and Z – in exchange for its commitment to consider the agreement expeditiously and without amendments. The claim that this process is unconstitutional – sponsored primarily by a group of committed Republican protectionists – is a poorly veiled attempt to sink the TPP.

“Fast Track” or “Trade Promotion Authority” makes negotiations more manageable and – it is commonly presumed – offers assurances to negotiating partners that completed trade deals will not be picked apart by 535 members and senators. (However, Colombia, South Korea, and Panama can attest to the fact that TPA granted no such assurances when Speaker Pelosi abrogated Congress’s commitment to give their respective bilateral deals timely consideration and to not revisit and revise their terms.)