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Monday, May 09, 2016

India is Making Up for the Lack of Vision by Bandwagoning with the US

Following Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the United
States last December, his American counterpart, Ashton Carter, waxed
eloquent. “We’ve done so much more in the last year, probably more than
we’ve done in the ten years before that,” said Carter. “I’m guessing
that in the next ten months, we will yet again do more than we’ve done
in the last year,” he added.
Carter was merely expressing what most observers believe to be true.
Through the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years, former Defence
Minister A.K. Antony stood like a Leftist rock against closer military
links with the US, despite the views of his boss, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh. Antony knew he had Sonia Gandhi’s blessings, and he was
able to successfully block all measures to enhance the India-US military
relationship, which had looked so promising when the two countries had
signed the New Framework of Defence Cooperation in 2005, and the
Maritime Cooperation Agreement of 2006.

With the IIT-educated, tech-savvy Manohar Parrikar as the Defence
Minister of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government,
the US has made it more than obvious than its military ties with India
are on a roll. In February this year, the news agency Reuters reported
that India and the US had discussed the idea of joint patrols in the
South China Sea. The item, by the world’s leading news agency, implied
that the discussions had taken place during Parrikar’s visit, and that
there had been follow-up discussions since.
But the next day, a spokesperson in Washington DC issued a clarification, saying, “At this time, there are no plans for any joint naval patrols.” On March 5, at a press conference, Parrikar too said:
“As of now India has not taken part in joint patrols, but we do
participate in joint exercises. So the issue of joint patrols at this
time does not arise.” Neither side is categorically denying the idea of
joint patrols; all they seem to be saying is that it is a matter of
time.The foundational agreements
In the run up to US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to India
in April, the two countries have been having intense discussions on a
range of issues, and joint patrolling is only one of them. The
discussion is focussed on the need for India to sign ‘foundational’
agreements which will enable the India-US military relationship to grow
deeper roots. The three agreements are the Communications and
Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics
Support Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence.

Of the three, the LSA is said to be the closest to being
signed by the Indian side, despite resistance from the military and
civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence. Initially, this was
called the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) but later it was
renamed the Logistics Support Agreement. The ACSA is a standard
agreement that the US has with its NATO allies and other countries like
Singapore, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The US and
Pakistan also signed an agreement in 2002, which lapsed in 2012.

Under the LSA, the two sides can access supplies, spare
parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and
ports, which can then be reimbursed.

In the past, India has provided logistics assistance to the
US on a ‘case by case’ basis. So for a short while, we permitted the
refueling of American aircraft in Bombay during the first Gulf War in
1991. During Operation Enduring Freedom, India permitted US ships to
visit Indian ports for repair and fuel. It also offered the US military
bases for operations in Afghanistan before Pakistan was coerced into
doing the needful. India also escorted US vessels through the Malacca
Straits in this period.

The CISMOA would allow the US to provide India with its
encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US
higher commanders, aircraft and ships can communicate with each other
through secure networks in peace and war.

The BECA would provide India with topographical and
aeronautical data and products which will aid navigation and targeting.
These are areas in which the US is very advanced and the agreement could
definitely benefit India, although the armed forces which use systems
from many other countries like Israel and Russia are not comfortable
with sharing information about their systems with the US.

India has told the US that it is agreeable ‘in principle’
to all these agreements but wants them to be modified to be ‘India
specific’, in other words, allay India’s reservations, wherever they
exist.

All these agreements are reciprocal. But only the most
obtuse analyst can ignore the fact that in the ultimate analysis, we are
talking about a relationship, a partnership if you will, between two
very different countries: a country with a global military reach, and
another which is hard put to remain afloat in its own region. India may
have the potential of being a regional power, but at present and for
another decade at least, this potential is all there will be.

Two other agreements are not being discussed, but remain problematic.
These are the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) and the Enhanced End
Use Monitoring Agreement (EEUMA).

The US requires all foreign buyers to sign up to these
agreements, and this includes close allies like the UK and Australia. In
response to a question about the EUMA in Parliament in 2014, Minister
of State in the Ministry of External Affairs VK Singh said that India
had various end use monitoring arrangements with the US since the 1990s.

Then in 2009, the two sides signed a generic agreement to smoothen
the process. This is not a formal agreement, but an India-specific
arrangement. The EUMA and EEUMA remain major deal-breakers when it comes
to India acquiring US equipment, because India cannot always permit the
US to access locations where equipment or weapons systems are located.
What do you do about, say, air-to-air missiles which are located in
operational locations?

Does India need the foundational agreements?

The big question is: Does India need the foundational agreements?

The answer to this is complex. If India intends to maintain
its relations with the US at the current level, it can live without
them. But if it plans to enhance its ties to the level of strategic
coordination, or even cooperation, India would be well advised to sign
them.

What would India gain by them? India could definitely benefit from
BECA. The LSA can theoretically extend the reach of the Indian Navy
deep into the Asia-Pacific region, where it has no base facilities. But
this begs the question: does India intend operational deployment in
those areas anytime in this decade?
The LSA could also be useful in Indian operations in its backyard in
the Indian Ocean, but could it access American facilities in Oman for
some future contingency in relation to Pakistan? Probably not.
The downsides of the CISMOA are obvious – it would enable the US to
listen in on Indian conversations in operations where the US may be
neutral or even adversarial, such as contingencies relating to Pakistan.
It is for this reason that India has refused to accept advanced
communications equipment with US made C-130J transports and P8I maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, and instead outfitted them with non-US
communications equipment.

As for the US, it does not quite have to depend on an
Indian LSA. It has prosecuted two wars in the past decade and more,
without any real need for Indian facilities. But getting India to sign
up on the LSA, CISMOA and BECA would serve the purpose of binding India
closer to the US militarily, because it would make their equipment
interoperable.

The US’ larger goals in its ties with India are no secret.The 2006
version of the National Security Strategy of the United States noted
that US interests required a strong relationship with India, and that
“India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with
the United States in a way befitting a major power.”
More recently, at the Raisina Dialogue on March 2, 2016, Admiral
Harry B Harris, of the US Pacific Commander called for the two countries
to not just exercise together, but “to conduct joint operations.” In
the context of India’s exercising with Australia and Japan as well, he
said, “As India takes a leading role as a world power, military
operations with other nations will undoubtedly become routine.”
But the Indian perspective remains clouded because it has no declared
national security strategy, and hence it is difficult to determine what
exactly it is seeking from its relationship with the United States. The
most obvious and general answer is that it wants high-technology, trade
and good political ties with the world’s primary power which would aid
its economic growth. Only the US has the clout to line up the Nuclear
Suppliers Group to waive its rules governing civil nuclear trade, as it
did in 2008. American blessings are needed to get rid of other
technology restraints arising from the Wassenaar Arrangement or the
Australia Group, and for the big prize – a permanent seat in the UN
Security Council.

But would India be game for joint military operations? If
so against whom? China or Pakistan, or some other party? These things
could be fraught with hazards if they are not thought through. India and
the US do not have a common world or regional view – the US may be
inimical to China, but its relations with Beijing are denser than those
between India and China.

Likewise, it may have difficulties with Pakistan, but not
of the kind India has. India views good ties with Iran as a strategic
asset, and the US position is different. The same could be said of
Russia on whom the Indian military machine will be dependent for at
least another decade and a half.

But the American pressure is very much on. The draft US-India Defence Partnership Act
which was introduced in the US Congress some weeks back seeks to amend
the US Arms Control and Export Control Act to give India a special
status equivalent of US treaty allies and partners.
In addition, this act will call on the US president to “develop
military contingency plans for addressing threats to mutual security
interests” as well as call on the president to “annually assess the
extent to which India possesses strategic operational capabilities to
execute military operations of mutual interest to the United States and
India.” Presumably, if India lacks those capabilities, the US will help
to make up the deficit.
The obvious point is whether India wants that kind of a relationship
with the US. “Military operations of mutual interest” implies a military
alliance. And military alliances come up when there is an imminent
sense of danger.

What India needs to do
So, the one calculation that India has to make is whether the balance
of power in its region has become so skewed and the situation so
dangerous in its relations with China that it needs a military
alliance with the US to maintain the balance of power.

If indeed India we feel that we need US muscle to deal with
China, we need to clearly assess whether or not Washington and New
Delhi are on the same page on issues relating to not just the South
China Sea, but the Sino-Indian border, the Sino-Pakistan relationship
and so on. We need to gauge whether the US will be there for us if we
need them. And that is where we go into an entirely new realm of
analysis.

Actually, the real problem with India is its inability to
be cynical about its relationship with the US. It tends to go overboard,
and this is a special weakness of the NDA which when asked to bend,
tends to crawl before Uncle Sam. In 2003, when the US asked for Indian
troops to participate in the Iraq War, almost the entire NDA Cabinet
backed the decision. It was just one wise man, Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, who stood against his entire cabinet committee on
security lineup, and said “No.”

New Delhi should learn from the way other US allies and
proto-allies have dealt with Washington. Countries like Turkey,
Pakistan, and even China have gained a great deal of political and
strategic support or military aid by lining up with the US. But at the
end of the day they have played their own game. The trick, as discerning
readers will detect, is not to be carried away by the rhetoric, and to
relentlessly pursue the national interest (provided you have a clear
idea of what the national interest is).

Finessing the ability to play Uncle Sam is the name of the game. If
you are up to it, signing the foundational agreements is not a major
problem – none of them are so drastic that they will by themselves alter
the nature of the Indo-US relationship. At the bottom of all this is
the vision you have for India. If you think partnering with the US will
take you there, by all means do so. But first figure out where “there”
is. Is it a “great nation” status, or an independent pole in a
multi-polar world? Or do we have the gumption to dream, like China
does, of becoming the lead – not the MEA’s ‘leading power’ in the
future?Unfortunately, what India really seems to be doing is making up for the lack of vision by bandwagoning with the US.The Wire April 4, 2016