CHAPTER XIV

The Air and Sea War, Mid-1952

Strategic and Tactical AirOperations

On the ground the Communist advantage in manpower was substantial,
but the U.N. Command still had control of the air space over North Korea. Despite
the build-up of the enemy air strength in Manchuria, the Communists made no
serious effort to challenge the UNC dominance aloft during the spring of 1952.
Fighters and bombers roamed at will with only occasional brushes with the enemy.

But a significant change in UNC aircombat operations policy
came about in May. The rail interdiction program had reached the same status
as the truce negotiations. As fast as the UNC pilots disrupted the rail system,
Communist repair crews put them back in operation again. It was apparent that
"to continue the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit skilled pilots, equipped
with modern, expensive aircraft, against unskilled oriental coolie laborers,
armed with pick and shovel."1 If military pressure was to be maintained
upon the enemy to influence the Communists to agree to a truce, then a shift
from the diminishing returns of rail interdiction seemed in order.

Accordingly, in early May the scope of interdiction operations
was broadened. Along the front, the Fifth Air Force's fighter-bombers concentrated
their attacks upon enemy supplies, equipment, and personnel massed within striking
distance of the battlefield, while medium bombers began to devote their attention
to airfields, railway systems, and supply and communications centers, in that
order. One of the first endeavors of the change came on 8 May when 485 fighter-bombers
descended on Suan, about forty miles southeast of P'yongyang, and over a 13-hour
period caused widespread damage to buildings, supplies, trucks, and gun positions
in the biggest single attack of the war up to that time.2

The North Korean Power Complex

As interest in rail interdiction lessened, the search for
profitable targets soon led the air planners back to the important, undamaged
hydroelectric complex in North Korea. The location of certain dams and plants,
such as that at Suiho on the Yalu, made them sensitive targets, since they furnished
power to the Chinese as well as to the North Koreans. To avoid giving the Chinese
an excuse to intervene, U.S. leaders had placed a ban upon the bombing of dams
and plants along the Yalu on 6 Novem-

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ber 1950 and it had never been rescinded.3 Later,
when the truce negotiations began, the restrictions on Yalu power plant bombing
had been repeated, but no mention had been made of the remainder of the power
complex.4

Fearing that an effort to destroy the power installations
might have an adverse effect upon the armistice proceedings, Ridgway had been
reluctant to permit the Air Force to bomb them. In March 1952, he informed General
Weyland that if the Communists appeared to be deliberately delaying an agreement
and strengthening their offensive capabilities, he might change his mind, but
in the meantime, he would not recommend an attack.5 It seemed to
him that as long as the primary use of the power facilities was for the civilian
economy, their destruction was not justified.6

General Weyland did not agree. In response to a request for
his views on the matter from the Air Force planners in Washington, he stated
that the disruption of electric power would complement other air attacks. By
cutting off this power, the U.N. Command could make it difficult for the enemy
to carry out repair work that was done in small establishments and in railway
tunnels. Through reduction of small-scale production, Weyland went on, added
pressure might be put on the Communists and spur them to speed up the negotiations.
As for the means, Weyland estimated that 500 fighter-bomber and 80 medium bomber
sorties could do the job over a period of several good flying days.7

It was not very surprising that Weyland's views should be
communicated swiftly to the JCS by the Air Force or that Ridgway showed a little
annoyance when the JCS questioned him on the divergence between Weyland and
himself on the subject. The U.N. commander informed his superiors that there
had been no unusual circumstances that would necessitate them to direct an attack
upon the hydroelectric installations rather than follow the normal procedure
of waiting for a recommendation from him. He was keeping a close watch on the
situation, Ridgway concluded, and he did not want an attack unless he decided
that it was warranted and opportune.8

On 12 May, Clark took over as Ridgway's successor. Shortly
thereafter, he surveyed the situation and decided to intensify the air pressure
campaign as much as possible. One of the most lucrative targets, he discovered,
was the untouched hydroelectric complex. Although he did not have the authority
to bomb the Yalu installations, he instructed Weyland to prepare plans for destroying
all other major hydroelectric facilities. The Air Force would be the co-ordinating
agent and the Navy would participate in the initial attack which was to be staged
as soon as possible.9

When the Joint Chiefs learned of Clark's desire to strike
the hydroelectric targets, they approached the Secretary of

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Defense to secure Presidential approval that would remove
the restrictions on the Suiho plant, since this was the largest and most important
installation in North Korea. President Truman's consent opened the entire complex
to air destruction and the JCS told Clark to go ahead at his own discretion.
The JCS warned that the ban on operations within twelve miles of the Soviet
border still applied and care should be exercised not to bomb Manchurian territory
inadvertently.10

Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark, who had assumed command of the
Seventh Fleet on 20 May, was anxious to have naval air units take part in the
Suiho attack as well as those against other power targets.11 He flew
to Seoul and easily convinced Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus that he should allow
Navy dive bombers and fighters to join the Fifth Air Force assault force.12
Thus, on 23 June, 35 Navy attack bombers (ADSkyraiders) and 35

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Panther jet fighters (F9F's) from the carriers Princeton,
Boxer, and Philippine Sea hit the Suiho plant while squadrons of
Air Force Sabrejets (F-86's) provided overhead cover. The Navy dive bombers
dropped their bombs while the Panthers provided antiaircraft suppression. As
soon as the Navy planes completed their mission, 79 Thunderjets (F-84's) and
45 Shooting Stars (F-80's) followed and dropped their loads. Over 200 Communist
fighters, perched on airfields across the Yalu, made no attempt to halt the
attack; many of them took off in haste and flew inland.

During the next three days the Fifth Air Force mounted over
700 fighter-bomber sorties and over 200 counterair sorties while the Navy launched
well over 500 sorties against the power system. Suiho was badly damaged, according
to the pilot reports, and ten other plants were made unserviceable. Two installations
suffered less vital hits. For two weeks a power blackout existed in North Korea
with only gradual restoration thereafter.13

The bombing of the hydroelectric installations drew immediate
fire in Great Britain from the Labour Party and from the press. Since the British
Defence Minister, Lord Alexander, had but recently visited Clark, the British
were upset that he had not been informed of the proposed strikes. Actually the
Clark request had not been approved by the JCS until after Alexander had left
Korea on 18 June, but it was difficult to convince the British on this score.
The Churchill government narrowly survived a Laborite motion of censure after
Secretary of State Acheson admitted in London that the United States had been
at fault and should have consulted the Brtish beforehand. Although there was
no compulsion for the United States to keep the British informed, Acheson said
that they should have been told about the power plant operations as a matter
of courtesy.14

Most of the British concern seemed to rest in the fears that
the power plant destruction might lead the Chinese to break off the truce negotiations
or to attempt retaliation. Clark later stated that he was somewhat surprised
by the furor the attacks had caused in Britain, but was determined to repeat
them, wherever profitable, until an armistice was concluded.15 It
should be noted that although the Communist negotiators complained that the
bombings were wanton, they neither ended the meetings nor sought revenge.

In the United States, the reaction was quite the reverse of
that in the United Kingdom. The question of why the power complex had not been
bombed earlier was raised in Congressional and other quarters. Clark could do
little to help the JCS answer this query since he saw no reason why they should
have been spared so long. On 19 July, Mr. Lovett told a congressman that seven
factors had forestalled prior efforts to strike the

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power targets: 1. the postwar reconstruction problem; 2. the
knowledge that some of the plants had been dismantled and only recently reconstructed;
3. the status of excess capacity in the plants; 4. possible losses of UNC air
forces; 5. use of North Korean power in Manchuria and in the USSR and possibility
that destruction of the plants might invite a Communist offensive; 6. estimated
effect upon the armistice talks; and other priority targets.16 As
it turned out, some of these factors had obviously been overrated or had become
obsolescent.

One by-product of this flurry was the appointment of a British
representative on the UNC staff. This had been discussed previously and rejected,
since Ridgway had felt that making an exception in favor of the United Kingdom
would lead to similar requests for representation from other U.N. countries
participating in Korea. When Alexander visited Korea, Clark told the JCS that
he was willing to accept a British staff officer despite the possible disadvantages.
To counteract opposition criticism that had led to the censure motion, Churchill

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announced on 1 July that a representative would be named shortly.
Actually, it was not until the end of the month that Maj. Gen. Stephen N. Shoosmith
was designated as a deputy chief of staff of the U.N. Command. His directive,
however, made it clear that his appointment was solely as a normal staff officer
and that liaison between the United States and the United Kingdom would be carried
on through normal political and military channels as it had been in the past,
both in Korea and in Washington.17

At any rate, the bombing of the hydroelectric system became
an accepted part of the air campaign. Suiho was subjected to a B-29 raid on
11-12 September and other plants were hit whenever they seemed to be getting
back into operation.

P'yongyang

During May the Far East Air Forces also proposed to mount
another attack upon the North Korean capital of P'yongyang. New military targets
near the city had been uncovered and could be destroyed, Weyland told Clark.
The latter was not averse to a strike on Pyongyang, but he was worried about
Prisoner of War Camp No. 9 which the Communists had placed close to the city.
Since air reconnaissance had not located this camp, Clark wanted the Far East
Air Forces to conduct the attack by visual means or with the assistance of shortrange
navigational beacons so that the prisoner camp would not be bombed.18

On 5 July, subject to these conditions, Clark approved the
operations against P'yongyang. In the course of eleven hours on 11 July, 1,254
sorties were flown. Fifth Air Force Sabrejets and Thunderjets, ROK and Australian
fighters, British Meteors, and Navy Panthers and Corsairs from the Seventh Fleet
vectored in three waves to hit the forty-odd targets in and around the city.
When night fell, B-29's arrived to bomb targets specially reserved for them.
Supply depots, factories, billeting areas, railway centers, and gun positions
were destroyed and damaged and the Communist radio claimed that 1,500 buildings
had been leveled and 900 others had suffered harm from the 1,400 tons of bombs
and 23,000 gallons of napalm dropped on the capital. Despite heavy and accurate
antiaircraft fire, only one air force and two naval fighters were lost. Eight
air force planes, however, were seriously damaged.19

On 4 August the Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers hit P'yongyang
again with 273 sorties, bombing buildings, a fuel dump, gun positions, and military
personnel. A third huge effort against the city came on 29 August. Clark and
Weyland decided that a psychological air blow should be struck while the Soviet
and Chinese representatives were conferring in Moscow. In another three-wave
assault, 1,403 Air Force and Navy sorties blanketed the capital and inflicted
additional damage. After this pounding P'yongyang possessed too few worthwhile

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targets to warrant major strikes for a time.20

Air Pressure and Air-Ground Support

General Clark realized that although there was little he could
do to increase the ground pressure against the Communists in Korea, he could
give the Air Force and Navy full encouragement to step up the pace of the air
campaign.21 The attacks on the power plants and on P'yongyang were
the most spectacular during the summer of 1952, but by no means the only ones
that were launched.

In late July 63 B-29's mounted their greatest single-target
effort thus far against the Oriental Light Metals Company, an aluminum alloy
plant within five miles of the Yalu River. Enemy jet and propeller-driven night
fighters provided but slight and ineffective opposition to this raid, which
inflicted heavy damage on the plant.22

On 27 July naval aircraft from the Bon Homme Richard attacked
a lead and zinc mine and mill at Sindok and others from the Princeton bombed
a magnesite plant at Kilchu the next day. On 1 September, carrier aircraft from
the Essex, Princeton, and Boxer struck the oil refinery at Aoji,
just eight miles from the Soviet border. Special permission from the JCS, enabled
the Navy to send over 100 fighters and fighterbombers against the previously
undisturbed oil supply center and reports indicated that the destruction was
extensive.23

Despite the nearness of many of the Air Force and Navy operations
to the Chinese border during the summer and the impressive fighter strength
of the Chinese Air Force located just across the Yalu, enemy air activity was
conspicuous by its absence. The MIG-15's generally avoided combat and the majority
of the aircraft losses was due to antiaircraft fire. As the bombing of industrial
targets increased in July and August, enemy aircraft began to be sighted more
frequently, but they showed little disposition to fight. When they did, the
Sabrejets usually took a heavy toll of Communist planes.24

The reluctance of the Communist fighters to defend their troops,
cities, and plants offered a contrast to the efforts of the UNC air forces to
afford their ground forces support during the summer of 1952. However, there
had been complaints from ground force commanders regarding the Van Fleet-Everest
agreement which had specified that 96 close air support sorties a day would
meet Eighth Army requirements under conditions of limited ground activity.25
In December 1951, Van Fleet himself had sought in vain to have one squadron
of fighter-bombers assigned to each of his corps, maintaining that this would
improve close air support operations. The parceling out of air combat units

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ran counter to Air Force doctrine and had been firmly rejected
on the grounds that such a system would be inflexible and wasteful inasmuch
as the squadrons could not be shifted to the more active fronts as necessity
arose. But Van Fleet was not easily dissuaded. After Clark became commander
in chief, he tried again. Early in June he suggested that the 1st Marine Wing
be placed under the operational control of the Eighth Army.26

Van Fleet's plan was essentially the same as it had been six
months earlier. He would put one squadron under each corps commander and establish
a joint operations center to control the use of the Marine units at each corps
headquarters. To counteract the Air Force argument that this system would be
inflexible, he intended to retain sufficient control at Eighth Army level to
divert aircraft not being used adequately to other corps or back to the Fifth
Air Force. The chief benefits, the Eighth Army commander maintained, would be
to reduce the time lag between the request for support and its arrival; to allow
the pilots to become familiar with the terrain that they would be called upon
to attack and the ground personnel they would be working with; to increase the
number of sorties per day by having the aircraft stationed close to the corps
front lines; and to insure better control of air strikes by eliminating the
spotter aircraft that now directed them.27

Although Clark sympathized with Van Fleet's approach, he had
no desire to stir up the old feud between air and ground forces on the role
of tactical aviation. On 1 July he turned down the Eighth Army commander's proposal
and directed his staff to improve procedures for carrying out air-ground operations
doctrine.28

Six weeks later Clark issued his plan for improving conditions. He did not
find anything basically wrong with the present system. One of the difficulties,
he maintained, was a lack of understanding at subordinate levels of the limitations
of the air arm and of the fact that air policies were only arrived at after
consultation between the Air Force and Army commanders. Clark felt that ground
commanders frequently called for air strikes when their organic artillery could
do the job better. After all, he went on, the air forces in the FEC had only
limited forces and had many tasks to perform. The Army could not afford to adopt
the Marine air-ground team system because it was not designed for the same kind
of operations and had entirely different allocations of artillery to carry out
its missions.29 Actually, Clark suggested, the tactical air forces
were engaged in three types of action- antiair, antimateriel and installations,
and antipersonnel. Ground support was not the least of these, although it seemed

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always to be mentioned last. He thought that cooperative training between the
air and ground forces would do much toward eliminating many of the misconceptions
that existed and proposed that steps be taken to allow more understanding of
mutual problems.30

In the meantime, Van Fleet had consulted with General Barcus,
Fifth Air Force commander, in June about applying the maximum air effort to
destroy the enemy air offensive potential close to the battle front. He feared
that the build-up of Communist strength close to the front might portend a possible
offensive before the rainy season, so he urged de-emphasis of the rail interdiction
program and increase in close air support. In addition, Van Fleet asked Clark
to let the B-29's, which were running into mounting enemy night fighter opposition
on their raids close to the Manchurian border, hit Communist personnel, supplies,
and material close to the front lines by employing night radar-controlled bombing
techniques.31

Barcus was willing. He informed Van Fleet that the air effort
from the main line of resistance to areas forty miles behind the enemy front
was growing substantially. But there were difficulties, he continued. Personnel
and supply bunkers were extremely hard targets to destroy since the enemy was
so well dug in.32 Admiral Clark, Seventh Fleet commander, was also
eager to help. After a tour of the Eighth Army front in May and talks with Van
Fleet, he came to the conclusion that naval aircraft were particularly well
suited for the type of pinpoint attacks that would be necessary to hit enemy
personnel and supply bunkers. Van Fleet and his ground commanders were all in
favor of naval air aid and the Seventh Fleet staff began to lay plans for joining
in the close combat support program.33

As the number of air support missions increased, fighter-bombers
and medium bombers (B-29's) began to unload their bombs and guns on targets
in the enemy's immediate rear. Van Fleet was encouraged. During the rainy season
in July, he was successful in securing light bomber and medium bomber support
from Barcus and Weyland, who were eager to co-operate if suitable targets could
be uncovered for the heavier aircraft.34

There is little doubt that the end of the rail interdiction
campaign opened a new and- to the ground forces- more satisfactory phase of
the air war. The growing numbers of aircraft overhead meting out punishment
to the enemy across the lines could not help but boost front-line morale. During
the bitter bat-

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tles of October, the U.N. Command air force flew almost 4,500
close support sorties against enemy personnel, equipment, supplies, and strongpoints,
and of these over 2,20o were in support of Operation SHOWDOWN alone. General
Jenkins, the IX Corps commander, sent his "grateful thanks" for the Fifth Air
Force's outstanding assistance.35

As the ground and air force officers began to swap visits
to the front and to the air control centers, some of the misunderstanding between
the two groups started to fade. The ground troops learned that they could help
the pilots by using proximity fuzes before air strikes to suppress antiaircraft
fire. Since losses of friendly planes had mounted during the close support campaign
because of heavy flak, the efforts of the artillery to reduce the hazard were
appreciated by the air force. Another symptom of the change for the better,
according to the official Air Force historian, came from Van Fleet himself.
By fall he no longer was urging that air squadrons be assigned to his corps.36
This in itself seemed to denote an overall improvement.

The Kojo Demonstration

Naval surface operations during the summer of 1952 consisted
mainly of routine patrol and blockade of the Korean coast, mine sweeping operations,
and the shelling of targets along the coast to harass and interdict the enemy's
lines of communication. For the ROK I Corps the naval surface guns provided
splendid artillery support whether on offense or defense.

But the biggest naval operation was the demonstration at Kojo
on the east coast of Korea. In July Clark had asked Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe,
the naval commander, whether it might not be wise in the interest of economy
to hold a landing exercise in connection with the movement of the 1st Cavalry
Division's 8th Regimental Combat Team to Korea. Owing to housing difficulties
in Japan, Clark had decided to rotate the three RCT's of the 1st Cavalry to
Korea, one at a time. Since the first team was scheduled to be transferred from
Japan in October, Clark felt that the opportunity for alarming the Communists
should not be missed.

Admiral Briscoe was heartily in favor of some action and suggested
that an amphibious demonstration be mounted. This could conceivably lure enemy
reinforcements out on the roads and expose them to attack by air and surface
craft. In addition, the training would be excellent for all the UNC forces involved,
Briscoe concluded. Encouraged by this reception, Clark told his naval commander
to go ahead with the planning and to co-ordinate with Eighth Army and XVI Corps
staffs on the role of the 1st Cavalry Division units.37

Under Admiral Clark, the Seventh Fleet commander, joint Amphibious
Task Force Seven was set up and 15 October established as the target date. The
demonstration was scheduled for the area near Kojo and planning for the land,
sea, and air phases proceeded at a swift pace. For purposes of deception, only
the highest echelon of command

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knew that the maneuver was to be only a demonstration.38

Although the 187th Airborne Regiment was to be withdrawn and
prepared for an airdrop and Eighth Army was to prepare for an offensive to link
up with the amphibious forces, Clark told Van Fleet this was simply to confuse
enemy intelligence and no more than limited land objectives would be attacked.39

On 12 October rehearsal operations held at Kangnung ran into
high surf conditions and had to be broken off. For the next three days, FEAF
and naval planes hit the enemy positions around Kojo and naval surface craft,
led by the battleship Iowa, shelled the beach area. The assault troops climbed
down to the assault landing craft in the early afternoon of 15 October and made
a pass at the shore. Sudden high winds made recovery of the boats a difficult
task, but there were no serious casualties.

The enemy response to the elaborate scheme was disappointing.
Little evidence of significant troop transfers came to light and the Communist
shore batteries threw only a few answering shells at the assault force. Whether
this denoted a lack of mobility to respond quickly or perhaps a preference to
wait until the UNC troops had landed and then to launch a counterattack was
impossible to surmise. Evidently the discovery that the operation was only a
feint added to the frustration of all the UNC personnel who had not been in
on the secret. The realism of the planning and mounting of the operation had
built up UNC expectations and although the training was adjudged valuable, the
damage to morale served to balance this off.40

As operations tapered off in the fall, the results of the
fighting during the May-October period remained open to speculation. Although
the air pressure campaign had evoked some protests from the Communists at Panmunjom,
it had in no way softened their attitude toward an early armistice on the UNC
terms. On the ground the hill battles had caused the enemy more casualties than
the UNC had suffered, but gains on both sides had been minor. and neither could
claim a victory. Communist attrition in men, supplies, materiel, and installations
was considerable during the six-month span, but they showed no sign of cracking
or of submitting to a truce. From every aspect it was still a stalemate and
no end was in sight.

29 The 1st Marine Division had the 11th Marine Regiment as its artillery regiment.
The regiment had basically the same armament as the four separate battalions employed
by the Army to support divisions-three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one
battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. In Korea, it was part of a corps and received
corps artillery support. Ordinarily, however, Marine divisions did not have corps
artillery at their disposal to take care of the longrange, heavy-duty artillery
tasks, and Marine air support was often used as a substitute.