1728

Section 1510 of Title 18, United States Code, proscribes endeavors
to
obstruct Federal criminal investigations "by means of bribery." See,
e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423, n.3, (2d Cir.
1991). Prior to its amendment by the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982,
the provision also prohibited obstruction of criminal investigations by
"misrepresentation, intimidation, or force or threats thereof" as well as
retaliation against informants. Obstructions of Federal criminal
investigations
by all means enumerated in former 18 U.S.C. § 1510 other than bribery
are now
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). Obstructions by intentional
harassment,
a new misdemeanor, is an 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) offense. Retaliation
against
informants is now covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1513.

Section 1510 proscribes only endeavors that are "willfully"
undertaken
and "require(s) proof of a specific intent to obstruct justice." United
States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
439
U.S. 850 (1978); seeUnited States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d 314,
317
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). "[T]he
defendant
[must] have actual knowledge that the intended recipient of the information
[is]
a federal criminal investigator." Id. at 317; accordUnited
States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1036-37 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449
U.S. 830, 919 (1980); United States v. Williams, 470 F.2d 1339, 1342
(8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973). It is not required that
the
defendant actually know that information has been or is about to be supplied
to
a Federal criminal investigator. All that is required is that the defendant
reasonably believe that information had been, or would be, supplied.
United
States v. Leisure, 844 F. 2d 1347, 1364 (8th Cir. 1988); United
States v.
Kozak, 438 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 996
(1971). SeeUnited States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1176 (9th
Cir.
1980), cert. denied, sub.nom.Carbone v. United
States, 450 U.S. 916, 985, andcert. denied, sub.nom.Williams v. United States, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). Neither
is
it necessary to show that a defendant in fact obstructed justice or
prevented a
person from communicating to a criminal investigator. United States v.
Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub.nom.Moore v. United States, 474 U.S. 979 (1985).

For the statute to be violated there is no requirement that an
investigation be underway. United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d at
1364.
Butcf.United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 627
(7th
Cir. 1993) (it is unclear whether section 1510 is applicable if no
investigation
is underway). The requirement is only that there is an obstruction of a
communication to a criminal investigator. United States v. Lippman,
492
F.2d at 317. The scienter requirement is satisfied by showing that the
defendant
had a reasonably founded belief that information had been or was about to be
given. United States v. Abrams, 543 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Section 1510 applies to behavior occurring prior to and after the
commencement
of an official proceeding. United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288,
1298-99 (9th Cir. 1984). The fact that the criminal act occurred after the
institution of judicial proceedings is immaterial. United States v.
Roberts, 638 F.2d 134, 135 (9th Cir.) (offense occurred 18 days after
conviction), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 909 (1981). Similarly, it is
immaterial that the act was intended to impede the future communication of
information to Federal criminal investigators. United States v.
Koehler,
544 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 (5th Cir. 1977) (offense occurred subsequent to
indictment). The plain language of section 1510 suggests that it should not
be
used to prosecute a person who gives false or misleading information to a
criminal investigator.

Section 1510(b) proscribes officers of financial institutions from
obstructing a judicial proceeding by notifying another person about the
existence
of a subpoena for records of that financial institution or about information
that
has been furnished to a grand jury in response to that subpoena.

Section 1510(d) proscribes persons engaged in the business of
insurance
from obstructing a judicial proceeding by notifying any person about the
existence of a subpoena for records of that person engaged in such business
or
about information that has been furnished to a Federal grand jury in
response to
that subpoena.