SSRN Author: Wolf-Georg RingeWolf-Georg Ringe SSRN Contenthttp://www.ssrn.com/author=836081
http://www.ssrn.com/rss/en-usTue, 16 Dec 2014 15:09:24 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Tue, 16 Dec 2014 15:09:24 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would TakeThe project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has devised in the implementation of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361347
http://www.ssrn.com/1328377.htmlWed, 20 Aug 2014 06:27:28 GMTREVISION: Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would TakeThe project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has devised in the implementation of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361347
http://www.ssrn.com/1321315.htmlWed, 23 Jul 2014 15:15:55 GMTREVISION: Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would TakeThe project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has devised in the implementation of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361347
http://www.ssrn.com/1314250.htmlTue, 24 Jun 2014 09:05:17 GMTNew: Changing Law and Ownership Patterns in Germany: Corporate Governance and the Erosion of Deutschland AGGerman corporate governance and corporate law are currently undergoing a major change. The old “Deutschland AG”, a nationwide network of firms, banks, and directors, is eroding, ownership is diffusing and the shareholder body is becoming more international than ever. This paper presents new data to support this development and explores the consequences in governance and in law that have been taken or that need to be drawn from this finding. Consistent with market-based theoretical accounts on corporate law, it finds that the changes currently underway are mainly a response to global market pressure: German banks divested their equity stakes mainly as a consequence of increased international competition.
The paper extends the model of market-led change by two important observations: first, market pressure is not the only driver of legal change, but the law itself in this case contributed to facilitating competition. Notably, a taxation law reform enabled and accelerated the ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2457431
http://www.ssrn.com/1314049.htmlMon, 23 Jun 2014 06:09:58 GMTREVISION: Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would TakeThe project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has devised in the implementation of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361347
http://www.ssrn.com/1297673.htmlMon, 14 Apr 2014 10:32:11 GMTREVISION: Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would TakeThe project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has devised in the implementation of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361347
http://www.ssrn.com/1297119.htmlFri, 11 Apr 2014 13:54:58 GMTREVISION: Banking Union Resolution Without Deposit Guarantee: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would TakeThe project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework has been reached with difficulty, and it looks possible that resolution may follow soon. However, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the FDIC has devised in the implementation of the "Orderly Liquidation Authority" under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important institutions need to have in their liability structure sufficient subordinated term debt so that in the event of bank failure, the ... http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2361347
http://www.ssrn.com/1274795.htmlThu, 23 Jan 2014 13:48:28 GMT