A Congressional Guide to Defense Transformation: Issues and Answers

A Congressional Guide to Defense Transformation: Issues and Answers

Transformation is
transforming. The Pentagon employs the term "transformation" to
describe its efforts to shift the military away from its Cold War
posture and toward a structure that is better prepared for future
conflict and threats. This process has always had two aspects. The
first is transformation for transformation's sake-applying emerging
technolo­gies to overmatch any potential adversary. That has
always been the Pentagon's priority. The second is transforming the
military to address the diverse secu­rity challenges that the
United States anticipates fac­ing in the 21st
century.

While both are valuable,
mastering the second remains the more crucial. To its credit, the
Adminis­tration has been transforming transformation to
reflect this precedence. Yet the three critical questions that are
raised most frequently in the transformation debate have still not
been addressed adequately:

What needs to be
transformed?

Should the U.S. build its force
based on existing threats or around broad capability
requirements?

Should the U.S. focus its
transformation efforts on platforms or on systems?

Ultimately, each question requires a complex
answer. Not everything needs to undergo transforma­tion, but
some things certainly do. The United States must seek new
capabilities within the context of potential threats, and neither
platforms nor systems can be ignored. Understanding how to address
each of these issues-as well as providing the robust defense
budgets needed to transform today's mili­tary into the right
armed forces for the decades ahead-must be a priority for
Congress.

A
Brief History of Transformation

The debate over radically
restructuring modern militaries for future war predates the end of
the Cold War.[1] After the fall of the Berlin
Wall, how­ever, calls for changes in the U.S. military became a
clarion call. Some analysts argued that the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of dramatic new military capabilities-such
as stealth aircraft, precision-guided weapons, and information
tech­nologies like computers-presaged an era of
trans­formation, "innovation on a grand scale,"[2]
undertaken to exploit major changes in the charac­ter of
conflict.

George W. Bush embraced
the concept of trans­formation in his first major address on
defense issues during his 1999 presidential campaign. At the
Citadel, Bush declared that he wanted to "take advantage of a
tremendous opportunity…created by a revolution in the
technology of war.… [T]he real goal is to move beyond
marginal improve­ments-to replace existing programs…to
skip a generation of technology."[3] These remarks
created high expectations that the new Administration would endorse
an approach to change that heavily emphasized transforming for
transformation's sake.

The Pentagon's new
leadership employed trans­formation rhetoric as well. The 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-a mandatory report to Congress
assessing the military's strategy, force structure, missions, and
resources-emphasized "capabilities-based planning," developing new
mil­itary means not tied to specific threats but based on
pushing the limits of what could be achieved with operational
concepts, organizations, and technolo­gies.[4] Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also created an Office of Force
Transformation. Among its many activities, the office crafted
planning guid­ance that defined transformation as "a process
that shapes the changing nature of military competition and
cooperation."[5] These efforts portended a
mili­tary transformation intent on achieving the
over­matching and unprecedented conventional combat power
promised in Bush's 1999 speech.

Uniformed military leaders
embraced this image of transformation because it allowed admirals
and generals to continue to focus on the mission with which they
were most comfortable: the challenge of fighting and winning wars
against conventional forces. Additionally, the open-ended nature of
transformation left the services largely to define the process
however they wished. For example, a Gov­ernment Accountability
Office report concluded that the Office of Force Transformation had
no charter, formal responsibilities, or authority to direct
changes.[6] There were no measures of
perfor­mance or means to judge progress and value. Thus, the
services could label acquisition programs that had begun long
before the end of the Cold War as transformational or define their
goals and rationale with little more than colorful PowerPoint
slides and a plethora of adjectives like "faster, lighter, and more
lethal."

However, the Citadel
speech was also infused with a call for an alternative approach to
transfor­mation that emphasizes changing to meet all the
national security challenges of the 21st century. Bush spoke of
preparing to deal with terrorism, ballistic and cruise missile
threats, information warfare, protecting the homeland, and
responding to disruption of finance, communication,
transpor­tation, and public health networks, as well as other
dangers that looked little like conventional warfare.

The Pentagon's generals
and admirals were less comfortable with notions of transformation
that did not center on high-tech equipment and fight­ing
conventional forces. Despite their intransi­gence, the second
path to transformation appears to have become more deeply rooted in
the Penta­gon's thinking. The cancellation of the Army's
Comanche helicopter seems to have been a case in point. The Army
decided to forgo the new aircraft less because it intended to skip
a generation in technology than because it realized that the money
could be used to support a range of programs that would better
enable the service to conduct all tasks requiring aviation
support.[7]

Indeed, transforming to
support more effectively the variety of future missions that the
military might be called upon to perform has emerged as a Pentagon
priority. For example, establishing mis­sile defenses and
creating U.S. Northern Command reflected an increasing emphasis on
protecting the homeland, a mission that had been largely neglected
before the September 11 terrorist attacks. The guidance issued for
the impending 2005 Qua­drennial Review included a "changing
security environment" or "threat" matrix defining four broad areas
of capabilities that the U.S. military needed to provide in the
future: responding to con­ventional military threats,
"irregular" challenges such as terrorism and insurgent campaigns,
cata­strophic dangers like weapons of mass destruction, and
"disruptive" threats emanating from military competitors who
develop new or unexpected capa­bilities, such as cyberattacks
or biowarfare.[8]

However, after four years,
the full character of the Pentagon's transformation strategy is
still far from clear. For example, while the leadership has called
for a mix of capabilities to meet many missions, its acquisition
plans still call for-much as they did during the Cold War-buying a
fleet of next-gener­ation short-range, manned aircraft that
will consume the lion's share of the Defense Department's
procure­ment budget for years into the future.[9]

Key
Transformation Questions

The results of this year's
QDR will help to define what the Pentagon does next. The challenge
for the Department of Defense (DOD) is to expand its capacity to
address irregular, catastrophic, and dis­ruptive dangers while
retaining a robust capability to deal decisively with conventional
military threats. One should not be sacrificed in pursuit of the
other. Achieving this balance may require skip­ping a
generation of technology in some cases. In other matters,
modernizing or recapitalizing assets, changing strategies, or
reorganizing current forces may be the right answer.

In the debate over setting
the best course for the Pentagon's transformation efforts, three
critical issues are routinely raised.

What needs to be
transformed?U.S.
security is guaranteed by all of the elements of national
power-the military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and
political instruments that allow America to act in the world. Which
instruments need the most radical reform?

Should threats or capabilities
drive future military developments?The 2001 QDR emphasized
capabilities-based planning. The 2005 QDR argues that the "threat"
matrix should define future needs. Which is right?

Should the military focus on
developing platforms or systems?Acquiring new plat­forms emphasizes
fielding a new generation of ground vehicles, aircraft, and ships.
Putting a priority on "system development" emphasizes overall
systems performance, not individual platforms. Which approach is
right?

Answering these questions
is central to keeping the military on the right transformation
path.

What
to Transform?

The fundamental
controversy regarding trans­formation is about what needs to be
transformed. Much of the transformation debate centers on
mil­itary capabilities.[10] On the other
hand, others argue that improving how the military is employed in
concert with the other instruments of national power-a process
often called interagency opera­tions-is more important.[11]

Calls for interagency
reform cut across the polit­ical spectrum. "Our real national
security goals transcend the Defense Department," argued Newt
Gingrich. "We do not today have an effective inter­agency
process…. [I]t is the heart of our ability to operate around
the planet and we frankly are not very well organized for it."[12] A recent report by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies also concluded that
transforming the interagency pro­cess, particularly cooperation
with the armed forces, should be the highest priority.[13]

Improving the integration
of defense activities with other agencies has always been
problematic. Disparate organizational cultures, resources, and
conflicting priorities make cooperation difficult. The DOD has made
only a modicum of effort to improve the interagency process. For
example, the Office of Force Transformation's planning guidance
states only that the DOD should "share information with other
agencies on its transformation programs and encourage other
agencies to follow suit."[14] Such direction offers little
likelihood of dramatic change, despite some recent modest
initiatives undertaken by the department.[15]

Even if the Defense
Department was fully committed to transforming interagency
opera­tions, it lacks the authority to implement such a program
without direction and support from the Administration. While the
QDR identifies important issues requiring improved interagency
processes and capabilities, as a DOD-authored document, it cannot
really speak to how national security issues should be addressed
across multi­ple agencies.

Congress and the
Administration must play an active role. They could clearly signal
the impor­tance of transforming how government protects America
by taking two steps:

Establishing a National
Security Reviewto
provide an independent assessment of the QDR as part of an overall
analysis of national security and to make recommendations on how to
improve interagency cooperation. Without a government-wide
assessment of America's national security apparatus, security
functions could gravitate to the wrong agencies or
departments.

The QDR tends to lead Congress and the
Administration to focus excessively on mili­tary instruments as
the best solutions to national security challenges at home and
abroad. Indeed, "every problem looks like a nail, when all you have
is a hammer." Con­gress should give equal attention to ensuring
that all the U.S. national security instru­ments are adequate,
complementary, and properly integrated.

Scrapping the Pentagon's
network of regional commands.The Unified Command Plan (UCP), the
military's current global com­mand scheme, was set up to fight
a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. It is a relic. Regional
military commands such as the Euro­pean Command (EUCOM) should
be abol­ished. They should be replaced with Joint Interagency
Groups (InterGroups) designed for the challenges of the future, not
the prob­lems of the past.

The United States should maintain
major mili­tary commands for working with U.S. allies in Europe
and Northeast Asia and to protect the homeland. In addition, it
should establish three InterGroups composed of interagency staffs
and assets that are organized to provide the instruments of
national power needed to address U.S. security concerns in the
world's most troubled regions.

Changes in the military
alone are not enough. Transforming all the instruments of national
power to better address 21st century challenges must be a priority
for Congress.

Threats
or Capabilities?

Before the end of the Cold
War, assessments of strategy, force structure, and modernization
needs were based on evaluations of the Soviet threat. Even though
the first QDR (1997) was conducted almost a decade after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the review was still based on "threat
scenar­ios," such as a war with North Korea.

In contrast, the 2001 QDR
formalized a shift in defense planning to a new capabilities-based
model. This approach aimed to drive develop­ments based on "how
an adversary might fight, rather than specifically whom the
adversary might be, or where a war might occur."[17] "It is
clear," Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith told the
Senate Armed Services Committee, "that the Defense Department needs
to plan, but we must plan to be surprised." Feith argued that
implementing the capabilities approach was an essential corrective
to thinking that had long been based on the sure knowledge of the
nature of the enemy that the United States would be likely to face
in the future.

After four years of trying
to implement a capabil­ities-based approach, and with America
well into its second decade of post-Cold War operations, the issue
of what should drive transformation is again up for debate. Should
transformation continue to be driven by a capabilities-based
approach, or is there reason to return to a traditional
threat-based method of defining requirements?

The traditional
threat-based model, centering on an easily identifiable threat, is
certainly outmoded for today's security environment. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has rightly argued that "the old reliance
on presence and mass reflects the last cen­tury's industrial
age thinking."[18]

However, the
capabilities-based model, despite its current favor with planners,
also has shortcom­ings. The most significant problem is trying
to write a budget. The capabilities-based model is open-ended. It
is impossible to imagine, build, resource, and deploy every
possible desired capa­bility. It is also difficult to
prioritize which new capabilities are the most important without a
threat against which to measure requirements. The limit­ing
factor in capabilities-based planning is budget­ary, not
strategic, when it should be a combination of both.

There is an alternative
that incorporates the best aspects of each approach. It is not a
new idea. In the early 1990s, then-Chairman of the Joints Chief of
Staff Colin Powell developed such a model as part of the "Base
Force" formulation. General Powell's thinking addressed both
threats and capabilities in a combination approach to force
sizing.[19] A combi­nation
capabilities-based and threat-based model can assist planners
by:

Developing capabilities to fill
gaps, based on a meaningful risk assessment; and

Directing resources to
capabilities that are most likely to be needed.

Keeping DOD's
transformation efforts on track will require ensuring that the QDR
reflects a judi­cious combination of both threat-based and
capa­bilities-based planning.

The 2005 QDR should
revitalize and update the idea of a combined threat-based and
capabilities-based approach to suit today's security challenges.
The difference between General Powell's approach in the early 1990s
and today's changed security environment is that the U.S. has a
better apprecia­tion for the nature of post-Cold War threats.
Armed with this knowledge, the Pentagon must implement flexible
planning systems based on a combination of capabilities-based and
threat-based planning methods.

Systems
or Platforms?

Ever since the end of the
Cold War, the con­troversy over whether the Pentagon should
focus on buying new platforms or emphasize building new "systems"
(networks of weapons, equip­ment, people, and organizations
linked by infor­mation technologies) has continued unabated.
The Pentagon's rhetoric overwhelmingly empha­sizes the
importance of systems. "Networked forces and shared situational
awareness," declares the Office of Transformation's planning
guidance, "will transform warfare."[20] On the other
hand, service acquisition programs con­tinue to emphasize
purchasing new platforms including light armored vehicles, manned
fighter aircraft, and next-generation destroyers. DOD leadership is
still struggling to determine the right balance between systems and
platforms.

In practice, what matters
most in joint warfare is overall systems performance, not
individual plat­forms. In fact, given the right system, even
old weap­ons can provide dramatic new capabilities. As Naval
War College Professor Mackubin Owens points out, creating new ways
of warfare is not an "all-or-noth­ing proposition"[21] that requires scrapping all
old weapons for new ones. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),
which turns a bomb built in the 1950s into a precision-guided
21st-century weapon by adding a $20,000 guidance kit, is a case in
point.

That said, even in
"systems-centric" warfare, platforms still matter. In war, systems
do not always perform as expected. Sometimes they fail, leaving
soldiers, sailors, and airmen dependent on their platforms. For
example, it is unclear whether or not the military can yet achieve
sufficient situational awareness of the battlefield to avoid all
threats and completely give up the lethality and protection that
some platforms provide in exchange for signifi­cantly lighter
weight and greater speed. In close combat, robust platforms still
matter. They are a hedge against the inevitable friction of battle
that drags against any system in wartime.[22]

While existing ships,
planes, and tanks can be used in new and effective ways when
plugged into these emerging information networks, the fact is that
many of these platforms were developed for different times,
different places, and different wars. Now is the time to develop a
long-term investment strategy for replacing them. Underfunding and
overuse during the 1990s, followed by three years of war since
September 11, 2001, have left the United States with military
equipment that is worn down and aging. Large portions of the force
will need to be replaced in the next decade. While this certainly
presents problems, it also presents an opportunity to make
significant changes in the force by implementing a coherent and
focused modernization strategy.

There are three
alternative approaches to buying new platforms: modernizing the
current generation of weapons, investing in next-generation
technolo­gies, or developing totally new futuristic
weapons.

Current-Generation
Weapons.Current-gener­ation
platforms, often referred to as the "legacy force," are the same as
or marginally better than the military has had for the past 20
years. A modern­ization strategy that focuses on legacy weapons
is the least expensive initially and the least time-con­suming
to put into operation. For example, instead of developing an
advanced multi-role fighter, the U.S. Air Force could quickly build
a consignment of F-16s-the mainstay of today's Air Force that was
developed during the 1970s. Or an aging weapons system could be
upgraded to a new ver­sion, retaining most of the
characteristics of the original system or program but employing
some new technologies that yield only marginally improved
capabilities.

On the other hand, the
disadvantages of main­taining legacy forces are not
insignificant. Less advanced systems cost more to maintain over
their lifetime, may lag behind the threat, and divert money away
from the acquisition of new, more capable systems. Yet this path
may be the best response when the quality of current equipment is
suitable for anticipated future missions. For exam­ple, while
it is possible to develop an entire new generation of land combat
vehicles that can be deployed in C-130 aircraft, it is not clear
that such a force is really necessary to meet the nation's
stra­tegic deployment needs. In many cases, purchasing new
weapons to replace aging ones of the same class is the right
answer. This approach will ensure a well-functioning and modern
force until the threat environment dictates a change.

Next-Generation
Weapons.Next-generation weapons
are the evolutionary extension of exist­ing weaponry. Instead
of producing more of the same weapons or marginally improving
existing platforms, investing in the next generation of weapons and
applying new designs and technol­ogies to current models will
yield much more advanced capabilities.

Such new weapons systems
should not only replace the previous generation, but also be
signif­icant upgrades to their predecessors. For example, while
the F/A-18 E/F infuses new technology into an old design, the Joint
Strike Fighter is the next generation of carrier-based tactical
fighters, utiliz­ing advanced technologies in both design and
pro­duction. Yet the Joint Strike Fighter is still a
continuation of the carrier-based weapons system. Although it
incorporates many technological advances that give it a distinct
advantage over the F/A-18 E/F, it only begins to redefine how the
Navy will conduct its operations.

Investing in the next
generation of weapons will enable the United States to maintain
military supe­riority over potential adversaries that pursue
simi­lar capabilities. Furthermore, by building in cost-saving
measures and employing efficient produc­tion practices, these
next-generation weapon sys­tems could cost less over their
lifetime.

However, a modernization
strategy that relies too heavily on next-generation weaponry also
has significant disadvantages. Next-generation weap­ons often
require a greater initial investment to complete development and
begin production. Fur­thermore, some evolutionary capabilities
may not be sufficient to meet the next threat, making further
investment useless. Buying next-generation sys­tems may also
prematurely "lock in" technology, committing the Pentagon to an
expensive research and acquisition program for platforms that
emerg­ing new tactics or technologies may quickly render
obsolete. Finally, investing too heavily in evolution­ary
systems could interfere with the Pentagon's ability to fund other
critical transformation efforts, such as repositioning and
reorganizing forces.

Transformational
Weapons.Transformational weapons
(or skipping a generation of technology) are platforms that bring
new capabilities to bear that change how operations are conducted.
Much as gunpowder, aircraft carriers, and nuclear weap­ons
changed how wars were fought in the past, information technology is
doing the same today. These could include such weapons as unmanned
combat aircraft, long-range bombers that trans­verse space, or
directed-energy weapons such as lasers and microwaves.[23] For example, the Chinese are
developing passive air-defense systems that detect the slight
turbulence of commercial radio and television waves caused by
aircraft flight-a capability that could prove effective against
Amer­ica's stealthy aircraft. A revolutionary response would be
to develop space bombers or hypersonic cruise missiles.

Skip-generation platforms
might take advan­tage of emerging technologies, such as
robotics, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and microelec­tronic
mechanical systems.[24] By investing in them, the
United States would be better prepared to defend its interests
against future threats. Rev­olutionary systems also could be
far less expensive to develop and deploy over the long term than
much of today's force because they would be less manpower-intensive
and would incorporate new, more efficient technologies.

A transformational
modernization strategy also has certain disadvantages. Most of
these systems exist only on paper or are early in their
develop­ment. Developing them on a more rapid timetable would
require a large up-front investment and involve a significant time
lag before they could be deployed. Furthermore, funding for
research, development, and acquisition of these systems would be
diverted away from other systems that could be brought into the
current force more rap­idly, and there is always the risk that
the technolo­gies may never pan out. Most important, these
systems do nothing to address current and near-term
threats.

Ultimately, there is no
one approach to defense modernization. Instead, Congress must look
at programs and capabilities and individually assess which approach
is best. In making those deci­sions, the following
modernization principles offer a useful guide.

Long-term investments should
not be made at the expense of near-term requirements.A prudent modernization strategy
requires a deft understanding of current and future threats to U.S.
interests and America's current ability to counter them.
Identifying future threats is important, but ignoring current
threats is irre­sponsible. Preparing for future tasks cannot be
done at the expense of sustaining the ability to conduct current
missions.

Modernization efforts should
not neglect warfighting.Building defense programs that enhance
the ability of the U.S. military to fight and win wars must remain
a priority. Other capabilities should not be developed at the
expense of warfighting means. Additionally, the military should not
develop capabilities for nonessential missions, such as
peacekeeping operations. Modernization should focus on providing
capabilities to secure U.S. vital national interests.

Modernization should sustain a
competitive advantage for the United States over its potential
adversaries.Modernization should address the
military's unmet needs.

Modernization should balance
capabilities with efficiency.Efforts to modernize the U.S. military
should achieve efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Modernization should respond to
a techno­logically and strategically changing security
environment.The United
States does not hold a monopoly on technological innovation. Much
of the technology available to the United States is also available
to potential future adversaries. Therefore, the United States must
be prepared to face adversaries who may trans­form
themselves.

In short, Congress needs
to insist that the DOD place a premium on systems and
platforms. Defense modernization strategy should look much like a
sound financial portfolio, with a balance of investments that
promote growth, hedge against risks, and preserve current
assets.

Avoiding
the Hollow Force

Even if the Pentagon
correctly determines how to address the three key challenges of
mapping a course for transformation, it will be wasted effort if
the Congress does not provide adequate resources. The greatest
challenge facing today's military is to avoid becoming a hollow
force.

Reductions after World War
II and the Vietnam War left the Army without sufficient soldiers,
train­ing, and modern equipment to handle its world­wide
commitments. As a result, U.S. troops were dangerously unprepared
for the Korean War and lacked the conventional forces to deter the
Soviets in Western Europe throughout the 1970s.[25] To
avoid a similar fate, today's military must have suf­ficient
resources to balance overseas commitments, readiness needs, and
transformation requirements.

One presidential term,
particularly with the high demand for military forces in the war on
terrorism, was not enough to provide the military with what the
U.S. needs for the 21st century. Iraq is making transforming even
tougher. Operations are strain­ing the force. Helicopters are
wearing out at five times their anticipated rate. Trucks are going
into overhaul five times faster than anticipated. Amer­ica's
military is serving the nation well, but it is becoming a tired
warhorse.

After Iraq, there will be
pressure to balance the budget on the back of defense cuts. Before
work on the 2005 QDR began in earnest, the Pentagon began to float
proposals for trimming spending. Getting the military back in shape
will require sustained invest­ments for the foreseeable future.
Until the drawdown in Iraq begins, Congress must provide timely
supple­mental funding. After Iraq, robust annual defense
budgets should be axiomatic. Keeping spending at about 4 percent of
GDP (only half of Cold War spend­ing levels, but about 25
percent higher than the Clin­ton years) is a reasonable goal
for sustaining the resources needed to transform the military and
pro­vide trained and ready forces.

Next
Steps for Transformation

The coming year could be a
critical one for chart­ing the course of transformation. The
Pentagon must continue to emphasize transforming the force to meet
the security challenges of the 21st century.

Congress and the
Administration can support these efforts by insisting that the QDR
address the critical unresolved issues of the transformation
debate. In particular, Congress should:

Insistthat transformation address not just the
military, but all the requirements for effective interagency
operations.

Demandthat the Pentagon develop a
require­ments process that balances the need to address threats
and capabilities.

At the same time, Congress
must provide ade­quate resources to support current operations,
pre­serve combat readiness, and promote further
transformation.

James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National
Security and Homeland Security, Jack Spencer is Senior
Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security, and Kathy Gudgel
is a Research Assistant in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.

This paper is part of The
Heritage Foundation's Quadrennial Defense Review Project, a task
force of representatives from research institutions, academia, and
congressional offices studying the QDR process.

[12]Newt
Gingrich, "The Transformation of National Security," speech at the
Board of Overseers Meeting, Hoover Institution, July 18, 2002, at
www-hoover.stanford.edu/research/conferences/boo2002july.html
(April 13, 2005).

[15]The
DOD has made some efforts to improve its cooperation with other
federal departments. As part of its experimentation program, for
example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command initiated a Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept to establish
operational connections between civilian and military departments
and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the
government. See James T. Hill, statement before the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 13, 2003, p.
16, at
armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/March/Hill.pdf
(April 14, 2005). Another defense initiative is the National
Defense University's Interagency Transformation, Education and
After Action Review (ITEA) program. See National Defense
University, "Program for Interagency Transformation, Education and
After Action Review," at
www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/535/ITEA_Overview_Revised,_Web_site.pdf
(April 14, 2005).

[21]Mackubin
Thomas Owens, "Transforming Transformation: Defense-Planning
Lessons from Iraq," National Review, April 23, 2003, at
www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens042303.asp (April 14,
2005). See also Williamson Murray and Thomas O'Leary, "Military
Transformation and Legacy Forces," Joint Force Quarterly,
No. 30 (Spring 2002), pp. 20-27, at
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0630.pdf (April 16,
2005). The authors examine cases of effective military
transformation during the years between World War I and World War
II and prior to the Persian Gulf War to demonstrate that new
con­cepts of war can be introduced with forces using mostly
extant capabilities and only a modicum of new technologies and
advanced equipment.

[22]Another
example of the danger of overreliance on systems can be taken from
the business world. The downfall of AT&T offers a case in
point. The company had a brilliant vision to transform itself from
a long-distance carrier to a full-service telecommunications
provider, but every piece of their new system had to arrive on time
and on budget for the whole thing to work: They did not, and the
company's profits plummeted, costing AT&T its blue chip status.
See Paul Bracken, "Cor­porate Disasters: Some Lessons for
Transformation," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 32 (Autumn
2002), p. 84, at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1532.pdf
(April 16, 2005).

[23]For
example, see Jack Spencer and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "The Use
of Directed-Energy Weapons to Protect Critical Infrastructure,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1783, August 2, 2004,
at
www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1783.cfm.

[25]In
1980, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer used the term
"hollow Army" in congressional testimony to describe the shortage
of soldiers available to fill the service's field units. The term
is now widely used to characterize short­ages of personnel,
training, and equipment that significantly impinge on military
readiness. U.S. Department of Defense, "CJSC Guide to the
Chairman's Readiness System," September 1, 2000, p. 3. For an
illustration of the "hollow army" and its impact on the Korean War,
see William W. Epley, "America's First Cold War Army, 1945-1950,"
Association of the United States Army, Institute for Land Warfare
Studies Land Warfare Paper No. 32, August 1999, at
www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/ lwp32.pdf (April 14, 2005). A
similar pattern of neglect occurred after the Vietnam War. For
example, see Vincent H. Demma, Department of the Army Historical
Summary, Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Center
of Military His­tory, 1998), p. 4, at
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/DAHSUM/1989/CH1.htm (April 14,
2005).