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This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

Relationships between international, EU, domestic law – Different legal orders – Different jurisdictions – Validity, rank, effects of international law in EU legal order – Kadi – Court of First Instance in Kadi – Advocate-General in Kadi – European Court of Justice in Kadi – Pluralism concept of AG Maduro – European legal pluralism reconsidered

Conseil constitutionnel and Conseil d'Etat now both hold that Article 88-1 of the French Constitution contains the duty to implement Community law – The Conseil constitutionnel tests whether acts of parliament manifestly contravene unconditional and precisely phrased provisions of Community law – Duty to implement Community law limited by France's constitutional identity for the Conseil constitutionnel, by the absence of equivalent protection on the Community level for the Conseil d'Etat – Supremacy of the Constitution not affected

The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn disputes illustrate the growing problem of concurrent jurisdiction between international courts and tribunals and the ECJ. This article argues that in cases in which Community law is involved in a dispute between two EC member states, international courts and tribunals must accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 292 of the EC Treaty to decide these cases. However, only the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in the MOX Plant case stayed the proceedings and requested that the parties first find out whether the ECJ had jurisdiction, whereas the OSPAR as well as the IJzeren Rijn arbitral tribunals rendered their awards despite the implications of Article 292. Thus it appears that every arbitral tribunal decides the issue of Article 292 as it sees fit. This situation, it is argued, requires the creation of some sort of hierarchy between the growing number of international courts and tribunals in order to co-ordinate and harmonize their decisions so as to avoid a fragmentation of international law.