Xinhua Urumqi, July 21 (Ayi Nu’er reporting) — On July 21, twenty-three media managers from eighteen countries along the “One Belt one Road” gathered in Xinjiang Urumqi to take part in a “Silk Road Economic Belt research class for media managers from relevant Countries”, organized by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

At that day’s class opening ceremony, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee member of the standing committee and propaganda department director Tian Wen said that Xinjiang covers 1.6t million square kilometers, that it is a place where many cultures meet, and also a thoroughfare of the old Silk Road. After the “One Belt one Road” initiative had been put forward, Xinjiang, helped by its unique geographic situation and cultural advantages, as a core area for the Silk Road’s economic belt, actively built regional traffic hubs, trade and commerce logistics centers, financial centers, cultural science education centers, medical service centers, and comprehensively deepened exchanges and cooperation with the countries along the “Belt and Road”.

Taking part in this research class are media managers from France, Germany, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Canada, Egypt, and other countries, involving Asia, Europe, Africa, and North America.

Tarek Ramadan Mohamed Hussein, deputy editor in chief of Egpytian paper “Golden Pyramid Evening News”, said that the research and study class would be another step towards deepening awareness of the real level of Xinjiang’s development.

埃及《金字塔晚报》副总编塔里克·拉马丹·穆罕默德·侯赛因表示，研修班将进一步加深自己对新疆真实发展水平的认知。

From July 21 to 25, these media managers will have informal discussions and exchanges with Chinese experts and scholars from the fields of economics, culture, ethnic groups, religion etc.. They will also visit Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture and other places for visits and observations. After that, they will continue studies in Beijing.

What he was referring to is the human rights crisis Xinjiang is currently facing.

他指的是新疆当下面临的人权危机。

As chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Rubio convened a hearing at Senate Office Building1) on Thursday (July 26), to closely follow the situation of Uighur and other Muslim racial minorities’ situation in Xinjiang. This was the US Congress’ first public hearing about this issue.

Many witnesses attending the hearing said that an all-pervasive security system, DNA gathering, large-scale arbitrary detention, cruelty, extreme restrictions on religion and culture … the Chinese government was working hard to turn Xinjiang into the world’s most highly technogical “policing area”.

Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, said that from April 2017 on, said that the degree of repression by the Chinese authorities, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, was “shocking”, and even hard to compare with the peak time of the “Cultural Revolution”.

“There are bans on ‘unsusual’ beards, and bans on women wearing combinations of glasses and veils in public squares. Muslims refusing to wear shorts, to smoke, to drink alcohol or to eat pork are regarded as criminals. Even refusing to watch official television station’s programs are proofs of crime,” she said.2)

Gulchehra Hoja is a reporter3) at the Uighur team of Radio Free Asia’s headquarters in Washington D.C.. In February this year, she learned that nearly twenty of her own relatives in Xinjiang had been arrested by the Chinese public security department on that day. Before that, her younger brother had been arrested by police, and locked into a re-education camp.

“Testifying here today, and bringing this up still makes me feel sad. My parents remain trapped, and more than twenty of my relatives remain unaccounted for. It can be said with near-certainty that they have been locked into the Chinese government’s so-called ‘re-education camps’,” she said in tears.

Relatives of her five Uighur colleagues have also been arrested and sentenced in China, and this is only a microcosm of the tragedies going on in countless Muslim households in Xinjiang. According to a number of sources, the number of Uighurs imprisoned in the authorities’ “education and transformation” camps is currently at more than one million.

Well-known Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer told VoA that among her family people, more than thirty people had been arrested. She said that the actual number of Uighurs under arrest could be as high as 2 million, and that many children in the region had been sent to orphanages.

“What is happening in East Turkestan brings to mind the crimes of nazi Germany against Jews during the second world war,” she said. “US Congress should put forward a resolution to close these concentration camps. US officials should earnestly raise the issue of the Uighurs with Chinese officials.”

Kadeer also said that not only Americans, but Chinese people too, should stand up. She hoped to send this kind of message to the Han Chinese through the Voice of America: “Our today (is) their tomorrow.”

热比娅还说，不仅是美国，中国人也应该站起身来。她希望通过美国之音向汉人传达这样一个信息：“我们的今天，（就是）他们的明天。”

Rubio said that it was also disturbing that there were companies that intentionally or unintentionally became helpers in the Chinese authorities’ violations of human rights and privacy. He mentioned Hikvision and Dahua technology company as suppliers of monitoring equipment to the authorities in Xinjiang, and also criticized an American company from Massachusetts for supplying DNA gathering tools to Xinjiang.

He said that some multi-national companies that didn’t like certain positions held by the US government refused to do business with the government, but lobbied in Washington every day, hoping to enter China’s vast markets, turning a blind eye to China’s governing Communist Party’s human rights violations.4)

Also testifying at the hearing were US department of commerce officials, scholars, and journalists. With several lawmakers, from the dimensions of US-Sino relations, they explored the political options of dealing with the issue, including raising world peoples’ attention to the fate of the Uighurs, restricting American companies’ relevant business with China, punishing Xinjiang central government officials based on the Magnitsky act, etc..

Notes

2) from Currie’s written statement (as of July 25, i. e. one day before the hearing):

The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking: authorities now prohibit “abnormal” beards and the wearing of veils in public, and classify refusal to watch state television, refusal to wear shorts, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, refusal to eat pork, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, or practicing traditional funeral rituals, as potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious views.

As I testify before you here today, it grieves me to no end to say that my parents remain under threat, and more than two dozen of my relatives in China are missing – almost certainly held in re-education camps run by authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Angela Merkel was to meet Xi Jinping on Thursday, her office’s website wrote earlier this week, referring to the state chairman and party secretary general as “president”. That’s routine in German federal and regional authorities’ contacts with China; party affiliations and roles are mostly ignored.

It was Merkel’s eighth visit to China, Xinhua newsagency informed statistics-obsessed readers. She first visited in August 1997, then as minister for environment protection and nuclear reactor safety. Visits as chancellor followed in May 2006, August 2007, October 2008, July 2010, February 2012, August 2012, and in July 2014.

An End to the “Golden Decade” of German-Chinese Cooperation?

Germany’s press is diverse at first glance, but much of what ends up in regional papers is written by relatively few correspondents or editorialists in Berlin, pooled in news agencies and correspondent’s offices that offer their services to any paper in the market. “Die Krisen reisen mit” (Crises travel along), written by two Deutsche Presseagentur (DPA) correspondents, was published by a number of small or medium-sized regional papers. Sebastian Heilmann, a sinologist, is quoted as saying that London had assumed the leading role in relations with China (this probably refers to the leading role in the European Union).

That Cameron, all of a sudden, only leers at business doesn’t necessarily suggest convictions and reliability, as can be read from internet users’ sardonic remarks. The chancellor enjoys much greater esteem. But Xi was probably happy to see the human-rights topic basically dropped under the table in London, and the Europeans being split. The [German] federal government takes no stock in this kind of policy changes and remains firm in its critical China policy. Chinese people appreciate reliability. Even the strength of Germany’s industries alone would ensure Germany’s position as China’s “definitely strongest trading partner”, the chancellery believes.

Deutsche Welle’s Mandarin service is more elaborate, drawing on a press release from the Mercator Institute for China in Berlin, r rather on the institute’s trade magazine “China Flash”. In an interview with the magazine, Heilmann, the institute’s director, said that Chinese demand for industrial commodities was going down, and at the same time,

there’s a certain disillusionment on the Chinese side, because jointly agreed projects are stagnating: from the Chinese perspective, German industry is too passive in technological cooperation, and the federal government has given too little profile to the issue.

As for an action framework for innovation partnership, adopted in Berlin in October 2014, with Chinese chief state councillor Li Keqiang and Merkel in attendance, Merkel would “need to cheer up disappointed interlocutors in Beijing”:

Peking had hoped that German companies would procure Chinese companies with innovative know-how on networked production. However, German companies are understandably skeptical: Industry 4.0 is about fundamental, sensitive future technology. The question if this kind of know-how can be protected in the Chinese context must be answered in the negative, at present.

In Heilmann’s view, Germany losing its status as an “anchor state” for Chinese engagement in Europe shouldn’t simply be attributed to London’s “fulminant diplomatic campaign”, but to intensifying Chinese interest in international financial markets and tertiary-industry-related know-how.

Human Rights: “Huanqiu Shibao” pities Merkel

Heilmann doesn’t seem to agree that China’s leaders would appreciate the federal government’s “critical China policy” (see first blockquote). It would be quite possible, Heilmann told “China Flash”, that Chinese government representatives wouldn’t listen to German expostulations “as patiently as they did last year”.

One had to pity Merkel, Huanqiu Shibao wrote in a slightly satirical article, republished here by Guanchazhe (Shanghai) on Thursday:

Today and tomorrow; German chancellor Angela Merkel visits China. So-called human-rights organizations like Amnesty International responded right away, on receipt of the news. This organization, which frequently causes China trouble, as well as the disreputable organizations “World Uyghur Congress” and “International Campaign for Tibet” recently published a joint open letter to Merkel and demanded that she should voice “concern regarding the situation in Chinese judiciary” and to voice her “support for suppressed Uyghur human rights lawyers”.

“Tibetan-independence” and “Xinjiang-independence” organization in Western exile have apparently learned something new, adding new concepts like “situation in Chinese judiciary” and “Uyghur human rights lawyers”. That’s very amusing.

From the perspective of the large public in mainland China, Western leaders who sing the praise of human rights every time when visiting China, come across as somewhat strange. Above all, what they mean by human rights is often different from what Chinese the common people mean. For example, Chinese people are above all concerned by social justice, with educational justice and fair access to medical treatment, home ownership, care for the elderly, etc..

Chinese people also want rule by law, they hope for unrestricted freedom of speech, and more democratic government. As far as these [issues] are concerned, the country has a diversity in practice, keeps summing up experiences, and indeed, there are problems on government level that need to be solved. Concepts like democracy and rule by law have found their way into socialist core values. In fact, Chinese society, more than any external force, is more concerned with doing this well, and engages in exploring these issues.

When foreigners talk to China about human rights, this frequently refers to the tiny minority of people who are in jail for challenging China’s political system, defined by the constitution and rules, in a way that is relevant under criminal law. Our strong impression is that they [foreign visitors] aren’t concerned about Chinese human rights which are constantly improving, that they aren’t concerned for the growing prosperity of a majority of Chinese people, but that they [my translation for the rest of this line may be rather vague or inaccurate – JR] want to help those who seek confrontation with the Chinese system. By this, they want to cause China trouble and force China to adopt government methods that don’t fit this country.

Many people from the West say that they are sincerely concerned about human rights and that they can’t ignore the arrests of “dissidents”. But apparently, they don’t understand what those “dissidents” did, that they weren’t seized for “differing opinions”, but for doing things, because of their “different opinion”, that are banned by Chinese law.1)

One had to understand that China frequently gave cause to misunderstandings, Huanqiu Shibao wrote. After all, this was a big world, and far-away China was therefore not easy to understand. However, Western people with strong views about intervention in China should know how to behave in delicate situations. This wasn’t the era of the eight-nation alliance, and China wasn’t in the [weak] position anymore to beg for capital or technology.

Self-confident as Chinese society is today, people know that there are individual Western leaders who visit China with the tic of discussing “human rights”. Therefore, [Chinese people] feel a bit sorry and pity visitors who need to grit their teeth and shoulder the task of discussing “human rights”, so as to report to their superiors at home afterwards. Apparently, Chinese society is more generous than societies that exert pressure on their leaders, and are at times understanding.

If the Western societies didn’t know how rotten the game in question was, remained unknown, wrote, Huanqiu Shibao. But if the window speeches absolutely had to continue, China would be of help.

“People’s Daily”: Japan should learn from Germany, and from Britain, too

If the Sino-British era is to become about as successful as the preceding Sino-German tandem, remains to be seen. Either way, much seems to suggest that human rights issues are now considered useless obstacles for relations with China.

That said, Hua isn’t as dissatisfied about Germany either. The really bad guys are the Japanese. If one saw how actively both Britain and Germany developed their ties with China, one couldn’t help but think of Japan. Different from Germany, Japan hadn’t dealt with its history, and that was affecting Sino-Japanese relations. And while London’s policies were marked by strategic far-sightedness and political courage, the Abe government had decided “to join the US and to bang the gong of a ‘Chinese threat’, thus paving the way for a Japanese military security policy of its own, and thus adding a complication factor to Sino-japanese relations.

Human Rights: Merkel meets Activists

The risk of the CCP leadership’s ire is exaggerated: after all, this isn’t the first meeting of this kind, and if China’s leaders had seriously objected, and considered it worth the price, they could have barred all nine activists from the meeting, as Mo Shaoping, who was invited to such a meeting in February 2012, can tell from his own experience.

1) Probably, the Chinese dissident who is most prominent abroad should be Liu Xiaobo. (He’s hardly known or remembered within China.) He has been under arrest continuously since December 2008, and was sentenced in December 2009, for “inciting subversion of state power”. As far as I can tell, there were no clear-cut reasons given for the judgment. A conjecturable motive for seizing Liu Xiaobo could be the Charter 08, co-authored by Liu and about to be published at the time.

2) How sustainable “the Chinese public’s benevolence” and the foundations of the “British-Chinese Golden Decade” can be will also depend on a factor that could sound familiar to a message London received from Washington nearly three years ago. Back then, US president Barack Obama had informed David Cameron that he valued a strong UK in a strong European Union. Same message from Xi Jinping, according to Xinhua last week:

Xi Jinping emphasized that the European Union was China’s partner in a comprehensive strategic partnership. China hoped for a prospering Europe, a united Europe, and for an important EU member country, Great Britain, playing an active and constructive role in promoting and deepening Chinese-European relations.

The Taipei Times compared Pope Francis‘ and Xi Jinping‘s leadership styles: the Chinese traveller to America was outwardly strong and internally weak, while the Roman-Argentinian was the exact opposite, the paper wrote in an online article on Tuesday. As a man who kept close to the public, was met with large crowds of people wherever he went and held Mass for almost 1 million people, the Pope had been a perfect example of soft power.

That was a bit like lauding a model mineworker for churning out tons of coal every day, and criticizing a goldsmith for not doing likewise – or vice versa.

Soft power abroad? Quite a number of Chinese people – especially Chinese people with some exposure to foreign cultures and hurt feelings – may long for it, and the Economist logically threatened Xi with something worse than criticism: neglect. But the politburo could care less. As long as the results are satisfactory – and as long as people at home can be made believe that Americans (not just at Boeing) could hardly wait for the Chinese visitor, everything is staying the desirable course.

According to a list published by the Chinese ministry of commerce on September 26, the major consensus and results reached by the two sides can be counted as 49 points, fitting into five big categories. Obama, on his own initiative, reiterated that America maintained the one-China principle and did not support “Taiwan independence”, “Tibet independence”, “Xinjiang independence”, and that America would not get involved in Hong Kong affairs.*)

According to Xinhua reports, Xi Jinping made important suggestions concerning the next stage of Sino-American relations, emphasizing the need to promote Sino-American relations that would always develop along the correct track. The two sides agreed to continue efforts to build Sino-American great-power relations of a new type. He [Xi] also emphasized that the Chinese nation was highly sensitive about matters concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He hoped that America would scrupulously abide by the relevant promises, not to support any action aimed at harming China’s unity and stability.

In this regard, Obama, on his own initiative, reiterated that America maintained the one-China principle, scrupulously abided by the principles of the three Sino-US Joint Communiqués, and that this position would not change. America did not support “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence”, and “Xinjiang independence”, and would not get involved in Hong Kong affairs. This is the second time after denying American connection to Hong Kong’s “Occupy Central”, during the APEC summit last year, that Obama stated his position.*)

The 49 projects, results and consensus concern the five great fields of Sino-American great-power relations of a new type, practical bilateral cooperation, Asia-Pacific affairs, international affairs, and global challenges. Among these, nearly twenty negotiation points pertaining to financial and trade cooperation and the Sino-American Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), awaited by all circles, have made progress. The information published by the Chinese ministry of information pointed out that both the Chinese and American leader had reiterated that to reach a high-level investment agreement was “the most important economic issue between the two countries”, and that both sides had agreed to strongly push the negotiations and to accelerate the work.

The Chinese achievement list unequivocally mentions: “The two countries’ leaders reiterate that to reach a high-level investment agreement is “the most important economic issue between the two countries”, and both sides agree to “strongly push the negotiations and to accelerate the work, so as to reach a mutually beneficial, double-win, high-level investment agreement”.

China Institute of International Studies researcher Yang Xiyu says that this position [held by] the two heads of state was of historical significance, meaning that the world’s biggest developed and the world’s biggest developing country could, as fast as possible, achieve BIT, and that the world’s two biggest economic entities achieving BIT will raise the long-awaited effects, further solidifying the foundations of mutual trust in trade.

Within the list of achievements, several points of consensus have been reached concerning Sino-American network security cooperation, such as China and America agreeing that each country’s government must not engage in, or knowingly support, the stealing of intellectual property rights, including trade secrets, and other classified trade information. China and America committed themselves to jointly define and promote appropriate standards of international society conduct on the internet, and to establish a high-level, joint dialogue system between the two countries, to strike at cyber crime and related issues. A number of American experts said that this was an important outcome of this [Xi] visit, and that strengthening cooperation about network security was a really important field of work in Sino-American relations. Indiana University professor and high-level Council of Foreign Relations network security researcher David P. Fidler believes that the two countries’ having achieved this consensus is “of major significance, and welcome news”.

The two sides will also strengthen anti-corruption cooperation, strengthen high-speed rail cooperation, strengthen cultural exchange cooperation, and reach consensus in reaction to global challenges, broaden practical cooperation on bilateral, regional and global levels, and manage and control differences and sensitive issues in a constructive manner, continuously achieving new positive results.

A benevolent label for these outcomes could be progress, and an accurate one would be unverifiable progress. It’s sort of obvious that Washington and Beijing wouldn’t issue a snafu statement at the end of the talks. What Beijing might consider a real achievement, however, is the prevention of an exchange of sanctions in the wake of the “network security”, i. e. hack-and-spy, controversies. That doesn’t go without saying – news coverage during late summer pointed to a chance that this could happen.

Hong Kong website Fenghuang(or Ifeng), in an article on September 22, attributed much of the success in defusing the conflicts to a visit by a delegation to Washington from September 9 to 12:

From September 9 – 12, politburo member and the central committee’s political and judicial committee secretary Meng Jianfu visited America in his capacity as Xi Jinping’s special envoy, together with [a delegation of] responsibles at offices for public security, the judiciary, network communication, etc.. He had talks with secretary of state John Kerry, homeland security secretary Jeh Johnson, national security adviser Susan Rice, and other central [US] authorities, to exchange views about cyber crime and other outstanding problems, and to achieve important consensus. Meng Jianzhu’s trip broke with old habits. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s diplomacy has become more direct and more practical.

That, and some more soothing soundbytes from Beijing, appeared to have had their effect on Washington, suggests Fenghuang:

On September 16, Obama made remarks about cyber security again, but according to Reuters, America will not impose sanctions on so-called “cyber attacks” before Xi Jinping’s visit, and maybe not afterwards either.

16日，奥巴马再次就网络安全放话，但据路透社报道，美国不会在习近平访美之前对所谓的“网络攻击”进行制裁，之后可能也不会。

After all, the main goal of the Obama administration had been to put pressure on Beijing, and to address domestic complaints, the Fenghuang article believed.

What looks credible – because it’s said to be long-established practice anyway – is that whatever consensus was indeed there between Washington and Beijing had been reached before Xi Jinping even set foot on American soil.

When he reached the American West Coast from Beijing, he meant business, not soft power – although there’s probably something charming to a 300-aircraft order form, at least among the stakeholders. The traditional microcosms were also conscientiously cultivated, even if Winston Ross of Newsweek was not convinced:

[Xi Jinping’s] handlers, who had corralled me and the reporters from the Associated Press, Bloomberg and the Los Angeles Times for the previous hour in anticipation of this exchange, apparently assumed we all spoke Mandarin. The Times reporter shot me a bewildered look. I shrugged. Xi said something to Oregon Governor Kate Brown that she found hilarious. We asked for a transcript of his remarks. We were not given one.

That occasion, Xi’s first stop – i. e. the meeting with American governors and Chinese provincial governors -, wasn’t (much) about substance, Ross alleged. He could have known better, even without translation: maintaining contacts between many layers of business and politics – not just the top echelons – is both a Chinese move to keep contacts going even if top-level relations between China and another country should deteriorate. Besides, while Confucius Institutes and other means of indoctrination soft power may face some scrutiny at federal or central governments of democratic countries, regional authorities may lack the resources that such scrutiny would require.

Chinese central leaders waste no time with unsubstantial meetings. They waste no time with soft-power ambitions either. It’s the technology, stupid.

____________

Note

*)VoA has a somewhat different take on this: according to their newsarticle on Wednesday, Obama referred to both the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act, and that had been the only public remarks made about Taiwan during Xi’s state visit in Washington. Ta Kung Pao omitted the mention of the TRA.

Huanqiu Shibao has an editorial about the attack on the Charlie Hebdo editorial staff:

The bloody terrorist attack in Paris has been condemned by many countries’ governments. However, in some non-Western societies, notably in Islamic ones, real popular reactions may be much more complex. But although values are diverse, we believe that under conditions like these, the condemnation of terrorism should be unconditional. In the face of a major issue of right and wrong, any other choice would be out of line with the common interest of humankind.

When terrorist attacks occurred in China in the past, the position of Western public opinion was often not firm enough. After official findings in China, Western mainstream media put the descriptions of bloody terrorism in Xinjiang between quotation marks, saying that China claimed it to be “terrorist” incidents. This made Chinese people very angry.

Of course, one can debate about strategies to combat terrorism. We notice that the leaders and mainstream media of many Western countries, when commenting on the “Charlie Hebdo” incident, all purposely expressed “support for freedom of information”. We find this debatable.

Western freedom of information is part of its political system and social shape, and also one of the core values of Western society. But in the era of globalization, if related Western practice and the core values of other societies collide, there should be a Western will to ease conflicts, as it is not suitable to put ones own values into the center and to increase frictions with a zero-sum attitude.

An English-language article, much of it identical with or similar to the Chinese version, is also available online, but there are some differences, too. The paragraph with the line I can’t translate properly is entirely missing in the English version.

The idea of enemies of China feasting on calamities within the country is a recurring theme in domestic Huanqiu Shibao articles, from the Dalai Lama‘s alleged indifference and his cliques’cold and detached gloating after the Wenchuan earthquake 2008 to complaints from the Xinjiang CCP branch about a lack of compassion from Washington after the Bachu County incident in April 2013. In the English edition – which differs greatly from the Chinese one in terms of content anyway -, there’s a tendency to drawing a more positive and self-confident image of China.

While Huanqiu, a paper focused on international affairs, carries at least two Charlie-Hebdo-related stories on its main page online, and the above editorial topping the page, Tianjin’s official news portal Enorthpublished a list of the twelve victims in a less prominent article today, one that had previously been published by China News Service (中国新闻网, CNS).

In another Enortharticle, also originally from CNS, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei is quoted as saying that China had made its position clear on the attack, stating shock and condemnation and expressing condolences to the victims and their relatives:

China is opposed to all forms of terrorism and supports French efforts to safeguard state security.

中方坚决反对一切形式的恐怖主义，支持法方为维护国家安全所做努力。

Hong Lei said that China’s foreign minister had sent a message to French foreign minister Fabius expressing condolences, and emphasizing China’s principled stance against all forms of terrorism.

洪磊说，中国外交部长已经向法国外长法比尤斯致慰问电，向遇难者表示哀悼，并强调了中方反对一切形式恐怖主义的原则立场。

Also today, Enorth republished an article by the Beijing Times (京华时报), with a detailed account of the attack and its victims.

____________

Footnotes

*) This may also point to active use of terrorism by the West to “alter China”, but I’m not sure if that would be an accurate translation.

Tsering Woeser writes that Li Fangping, a lawyer, has recorded a statement by Ilham Tohti, the Uyghur economist who was sentenced to life inprisonment by the Intermediate People’s Court in Urumqi on Tuesday. Tohti made his statement after he was sentenced, and said that he shouts out loudly for his Uyghur nationality, and even more for the future of China. He feels that he can endure his fate, that he will not betray his conscience. If I emerge from jail self-injured or after suicide, this will definitely be false [information].

I firmly believe that China can do better, and that the constitutional rights will be respected. God gave peace to Uyghurs and Han Chinese, and only when there is peace, good intentions will work in the interests of both.

During the eight months in prison so far, he had only been allowed outside his cell for three hours. He could still count himself lucky, compared to other people accused of separatism, as he could choose his lawyer – a Han nationality lawyer -, in that his family could listen on during the trial, and in that he had been able to say what he wanted to say. He hoped that his case could help to further the rule of law in Xinjiang, even if only a bit.

He slept well last night, for over eight hours, better than anytime during the eight months in prison. He felt strong, but unable to report his situation to his mother. “Just tell her that I’ve been sentenced to five years in prison. That should do.”

Ilham Tohti (伊力哈木·土赫提), an associate economics professor at Beijing’s Minzu University, has been sentenced to life in prison, reports CNN. The Intermediate People’s Court in Urumqi found Tohti “guilty of separatism”, according to CNN. According to the report, the court also ordered the confiscation of all of Tohti’s assets. Liu Xiaoyuan (刘晓原), one of Tohti’s lawyers, reportedly said that he and Tohti had been prepared for a guilty verdict and that they would appeal.

Wang Lixiong, Woeser’s husband and a tibetologist, wrote that “on September 23, the authorities have created an Uighur Mandela.” However, he did not believe that Tohti would remain behind bars forever, “because the delay of justice won’t last forever.”

因言论获罪，因为办了媒体获罪，因为说了真话获罪
Where you can go to jail for what you say, for running a website, for just speaking the truth
我愿意，我觉得是很荣耀的事情
Which for me would be an honor
而且真的那种时刻出现的话
As I’ve said before
我以前就说过，用我卑微的生命呼唤自由
To trade my humble life to call for freedom
这是幸福的事情，骄傲的事情
Gladly, I’d be proud to
所以这不应该是很痛苦的
So this probably won’t hurt much
短期，一听的时候可能紧张，我有过
The thought makes me nervous, but not for long
但可能只持续几分钟，甚至可能是几个小时
A few minutes, or at most a few hours
我唯一的牵挂就是母亲和孩子们
My only concern is for mother and the children
要是判死刑，我有心理准备
I’m even prepared for the possibility of a death sentence
这也许是我们民族的人要付出的代价吧
That just might be the price our people have to pay
我伊力哈木付出代价，虽然把我送进去
When I, Ilham Tohti, pay that price; then though I may have to go in
可能更能引起对我们民族的关注
Perhaps that will draw more attention to the plight of our people
可能引起更多的思考
People will think more about it
可能引起我们民族内部、还有外边的……
And perhaps more people will know about me
更何况很多汉人、很多外国的朋友、很多不同民族的朋友知道我
Uyghur, Han, foreign friends, people from other ethnic groups
而且知道我的理念
Will learn about me and my ideas
我不是暴力的，我没有任何违法的事情
Learn that I was not violent, hadn’t broken any law
只不过，我真的努力想发表一些声音
And that I only tried hard to make our voice heard
努力把我们的文化，我们的一些情况…
And to speak about our culture and our situation…
虽然我们做的不好
Although we’ve not been perfect
还有，我认为我不在的话“维吾尔在线”可能搞的更好
And, I think Uyghur Online could be even better run if I weren’t around
将来很多朋友，像你这样的朋友，我相信你们的良知
I believe in the conscience of my friends, friends like you
有人说我是维吾尔的良知，我不够格
Some say I’m the Uyghur people’s conscience, I think that overstates it / I can’t live up to that
我希望维吾尔人的良知在我身上体现
I hope to see the Uyghur people’s conscience in many others
像在很多人的身上体现
Not just in me.
我尽量成为有良知的人，对民族有良知的人
I’ve done my best to be a person of conscience, conscience toward the Uyghur people
要成为民族的良知是很骄傲的
That’s something to be proud of
我是很幸运的呀
And indeed I am lucky
我很骄傲，若我真的做到的话
And proud, if I can truly be that person
而且我也想，我有生之年要是能创造出某种理论或者模式
And I think, if with the time I have left, I can come up with ideas, with a model
维吾尔人能和平地争取自治的权利，一种抗争的模式
A way for Uyghurs to struggle peacefully for their right to autonomy, a mode of resistance
而且能够取得主流社会的认同，我觉得死了也很幸福的
And win acceptance from mainstream society, my death will have been worth that
我不喜欢暴力，我不会提倡暴力
I don’t like violence and I won’t advocate it
我并不认为汉民族是我们的敌人
And I definitely don’t think the Han are our enemy
哪怕是再这样，仇恨、仇杀发生的时候
Not even if racial hatred or killings should happen again
甚至发生民族屠杀的时候
Even if genocide were to happen
我也会呼吁：汉民族应该是我们的朋友
I would still say: the Han should be our friends!
我也会说出：我们应该成为朋友而不是敌人
I would say: We should be friends, not enemies
但是这个国家什么事都会发生
But in this country anything is possible
所以呢，你都会随时有准备
Which is why I’m already prepared
你没有想过的很惨的事情，也会发生在你的家庭，你的身上…
That the unthinkable could happen, to your family or yourself
我也有疑虑，当把我污名化的时候
I have doubts, like when they smear my name
比如，说我卖白粉、说我卖武器、说我组织过暴力
Say I peddled coke or sold weapons, or organized violence
我是东突恐怖分子，甚至说他去过拉登的基地
Or that I’m an East Turkestan terrorist, or even that I’ve trained with Bin Laden
他是拉登的人，他是美国的特务
That I’m agent of his, or America’s
他是热比亚的人，他是世维会在中国的什么……
Or that I work for Rebiya Kadeer, or I’m the World Uyghur Congress’ man in China, etc…
我不知道，反正各种的东西……
I don’t know, all sorts of stuff…
所以呢，很多东西无所谓，应该勇敢地面对
So whatever happens, we should face it with courage
当然呢，我是很希望到时候依法处理，这是一
Of course, first, I want to see things done according to law
二，很希望不要因为我而和汉民族之间发生仇恨的事情
And second, I don’t want to see any conflicts/tension? with the Han just because of me
当然呢，我也不希望这个时候没有维吾尔人的声音
And I hope when the time comes, we will hear Uyghur
汉人的声音，理性的声音
And Han people speak up, we will hear the voice of reason?
这是我对汉民族的期望，对维吾尔民族的期望
This is my hope for the Han people and for the Uyghurs
对两者的期望
My hope for both peoples
第三呢，我很希望，哪怕出现死亡的事情，把我埋在新疆
Third, I hope that if I do end up dead, I’m buried in Xinjiang
就是维吾尔人的家园
Which is home for Uyghurs
哪怕是冰山上，哪怕在沙漠或是路边
It could be on an iceberg, in the desert, even by the side of the road
我希望别让我的遗体留在新疆之外的地区
I just don’t want my body to be buried outside of Xinjiang
然后，最担心的就是孩子了
Lastly, I worry most about my children
怕他们遭到迫害，因为他们已经遭到了迫害
I’m afraid they’ll face persecution, more than they already have
他们没有学校上，旁听生
Forced to merely audit classes at schools that won’t take them as regular students
我怕到那时候旁听生都没有了
I’m afraid later they won’t even be able to audit classes
小孩儿会很茫然，不知道（怎么办）
My kids will be lost, and there won’t be anything I can do
我相信我女儿的良知，她很不一样
I believe in my daughter, there’s something special about her.
她受我影响很大，我相信她的良知
I have influenced her a lot/Much of what she knows she learned from me, I trust her conscience
她会成为一个有道德，爱自己的民族，爱人的人
I trust that she will grow into a moral person who loves her people, loves all people
我就担心她遭到迫害
But I worry people will go after her
还有一个担心，妻子现在又有孩子了
My other worry stems from my wife, who is now again pregnant
她没有工作，将来回新疆也不可能有工作
She’s unemployed now, and when she returns to Xinjiang she will not be able to find work
就是我将来的孩子……我妈妈也老了
My future child, and my mother who is getting on…
我就担心我家的两个孩子…
I’m worried about my two children…
但可能很残忍的，虽然很担心……明白吧？
It could all end tragically, in spite of my worries, you know what I mean?
但我觉得没有办法，需要付出的代价嘛，虽然你不愿意
But there’s nothing I can do. This is the price to be paid, whether you want it or not
但我现在想，我虽然有各种各样的信息，有各种预感
So I think, in spite of different things I hear, and all that I anticipate
我还是不敢相信
I refuse to believe it
这个国家，真的会把没有危害性的我
That this country might actually do such things to me
真弄成这样？有时候我也怀疑
Me who poses no threat. Sometimes I wonder
但我现在得到的信息、预感就是这样
But what I hear confirms what I suspect
然后呢我就考虑到，我要生存下去
And I think about how I’ll survive
生存然后才能给自己的民族做事儿
And by surviving, what I can do for my people
忍气吞声，是不是啊
So I bite my tongue, right?
所以现在就是这样，什么事儿都可能发生
So that’s what it’s like know: anything could happen
但有时候也想，不可能吧
But sometimes I think, there’s no way
不可能那么卑鄙，再卑鄙也不能那样吧
Surely, nothing that abhorrent could happen
还是一种，人家说我是幻想吧，对政府
Or, people say it’s just my wishful thinking
哎，它在改变呀有些东西……
That the government could ever change…

3. Scottish Referendum

The Financial Times had celebrated the referendum as a very civilized struggle (in English on September 12) or as a civilized struggle between unity and independence (in Chinese on September 16). The author was Mure Dickie. That was too much for Beijing – the referendum was, of course, deemed an internal UK matter by official China, but Dickie got a (semi-official – my take of it) reply from Zhi Zhenfeng (支振锋) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).

Yes, it was surprising that the UK was willing to let eight percent of the population and about a third of the territory go peacefully, and the consultative, democratic and peaceful procedure deserved praise. In 19th-century America, a referendum had been replied to by war, and the Crimea referendum in March had been carried out under very different circumstances. All that made the British tolerance displayed in the referendum a precious thing.

However, that didn’t make the referendum a great example for the rest of the world. It did reflect particular Western values, which had brought Europe huge technological and economic progress (besides religious wars and separatist chaos), but even in Europe, the referendum was a contested approach, and even within the West, not every referendum and its results had been accepted peacefully. All too often, people in the West had been unable to foresee the long-term effects of their purportedly rational choices.

5. Ma Ying-jeou’s 19th-Plenary-Session speech on September 14

And as this collection of links starts with Taiwan, let’s take a look at what Taiwan Explorer, usually not a terribly “political” blog, has to say about Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president who has moved into the third year of his second term in office this year.

Nanfang Shuo (aka Wang Hsing-ching / 王杏慶), predicted in summer 2011 that word-games were no solution for the problems that lying ahead if Ma would win a second term as president. Ma’s speech a week ago seems to suggest that he won’t abandon the word games during his remaining time in office – but by now, they appear to have become offensive.