Relations with the United States

As the civil conflict intensified after 1981 and its effects rippled
through the economic and political life of the nation, El Salvador
turned toward the United States in an effort to stave off a potential
guerrilla victory. The administrations of presidents Jimmy Carter and
Ronald Reagan responded to the Salvadorans' appeals, and by the
mid-1980s government forces appeared to have the upper hand in the field.

Total United States aid to El Salvador rose from US$264.2 million in
fiscal year (FY) 1982 to an estimated US$557.8 million in FY 1987. On average
over this period, economic aid exceeded military aid by more than a
two-to-one ratio. Economic aid was provided in the form of Economic
Support Funds (ESF), food aid under Public Law 480 (P.L. 480), and
development aid administered by the United States Agency for
International Development (AID). ESF was intended to provide balance of
payments support to finance essential non food imports. Assistance with
food imports as well as the direct donation of foodstuffs was
accomplished through the P.L. 480 program. Development aid covered a
broad spectrum of projects in such fields as agriculture, population
planning, health, education, and training. For FY 1987, regular non
supplemental ESF appropriations totaled US$181.7 million, and combined
food and development aid amounted to US$122.7 million. The regular FY
1987 appropriation for military aid was US$116.5 million.

This aid was crucial to the survival of the Salvadoran government and
the ability of the armed forces to contain the insurgency. The situation
amplified the personal importance of Duarte after his 1984 election to
the presidency. Well known and respected in Washington, Duarte was able
to foster a consensus within the United States Congress for high levels
of aid as a show of support for the incipient democratic process in his
country. These large aid allocations, in turn, promoted stability by
deterring possible coup attempts by conservative factions of the
military and other opponents of PDC rule. At the same time, the lifeline
of aid also rendered El Salvador dependent to a large degree on the
United States. A certain amount of popular resentment over this
dependence was reflected in adverse reaction from some Salvadoran
politicians, journalists, and other opinion makers to Duarte's October
1987 gesture of kissing the United States flag while on a visit to
Washington. Some analysts also identified an element of anti-United
States sentiment in Arena's March 1988 electoral victory.

El Salvador's dependence on United States support sometimes led to
policy moves or public pronouncements that were perceived as responses
to pressure from Washington. The 1986 economic austerity measures were
one example. Another was Duarte's repeated call for the Nicaraguan
government to negotiate with its armed opposition--the so-called contras--in
spite of the president's public refusal to endorse the United States
policy of aid to the contras. El Salvador also was quick to
condemn Panamanian strongman General Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno for
his February 1988 ouster of President Eric Arturo Delvalle; most Latin
American countries were somewhat circumspect with regard to the
Panamanian situation, not wishing to be seen as favoring United States
intervention in that country. Some actions by the Salvadoran government
were clearly and unequivocally influenced by direct United States
pressure, such as Duarte's April 1987 decision to deny political amnesty
to the convicted killers of six United States citizens and others in a
June 1985 terrorist attack in San Salvador. By taking this action,
Duarte averted the loss of US$18.5 million in economic aid.

Although the United States exerted significant influence over
government policy in El Salvador, it did not enjoy the absolute control
ascribed to it by leftist propaganda. In some areas, Washington's policy
goals were frustrated by the intransigence of certain political actors.
The obstruction of full implementation of agrarian reform by
conservative legislators was one example; another was resistance among
the officer corps to the introduction of counterinsurgency tactics.
Perhaps the most vexing issue for United States policymakers was human
rights. Despite an impressive statistical decline in the mid-1980s,
political killings continued. These acts, perpetrated by both right-wing
and left-wing groups, helped to feed the climate of violence that
inhibited the institutionalization of the democratic process.

United States influence in El Salvador was also diminished
temporarily by the 1986-87 revelations surrounding the so-called
Iran-Contra Affair. The Reagan administration's preoccupation with these
revelations, its loss of international prestige in connection with them,
and the embarrassing disclosure of covert Salvadoran military
involvement in the contra supply network all combined to lessen
United States involvement in and influence over Salvadoran affairs. Many
observers have seen evidence of waning United States influence in
Central America in the Duarte administration's decision to sign the
Central American Peace Agreement in August 1987 at Esquipulas,
Guatemala, despite the last-minute announcement of an alternative peace
plan by Reagan and United States speaker of the House of
Representatives, James Wright.

Another point of contention between the two governments was United
States immigration reform. By most estimates, there were some 500,000
Salvadorans residing illegally in the United States in the late 1980s.
Modifications of the United States immigration law enacted in 1987
technically mandated the expulsion of illegals who had entered the
country after 1982. Since the bulk of Salvadoran illegal immigration
took place after that date, the new law threatened the majority of this
population with repatriation. This prospect was worrisome to the Duarte
government for two major reasons: such a large influx was certain to
place added strain on employment and public services, already areas of
serious concern for the government; and the return of Salvadorans
resident in the United States meant the loss of dollar-denominated
remittances regularly transmitted to family members who had remained
behind in El Salvador. Estimates of the total amount of remittance
income--a valuable source of foreign exchange for the economy--ranged as
high as US$1.4 billion a year. Duarte's pleas for a Salvadoran exemption
from the immigration reform were denied by the White House. Action to
deport Salvadoran illegals, however, was held up pending consideration
in the United States Congress of bills granting exemptions to Salvadoran
and Nicaraguan immigrants.

Relations between the United States and El Salvador appeared to be
entering a period of transition after the March 1988 elections. Under
both the Carter and the Reagan administrations, United States policy had
supported the centrist PDC as the surest path to the development of a
functional democratic system. The decline of the PDC and the ascendancy
of Arena called for some adjustment in that policy. Despite some marked
anti-United States sentiment among the areneros, there were no
early indications of potential friction between the United States and an
Arena government. The nomination of Cristiani as the party's 1989
presidential candidate instead of the more controversial D'Aubuisson was
seen by some observers as a conciliatory gesture toward Washington.