Waller argues against the existence of moral responsibility, while defending the existence of free will. For Waller, free will, at the most basic level, is simply the occasional breaking away from habit, the pursuit of a neglected path. The white-footed mouse exhibits this when, even though having found a path leading to food, explores another unknown path anyway. The value of free will is understood in Darwinian terms: food (mates, etc.) will not always be in the same place. The organism should occasionally explore other locations in case the main food source runs out and a backup is needed.

There is also higher-order free will. One has habitually acted on some desires and approves of them automatically. But, on occasion, one stops and reconsiders one’s established pattern of action, granting alternative desires greater consideration. Just as the white-footed mouse can explore a novel pathway, the human can consider a new ranking of first-order desires. As a result, one may decide that a new first-order will is preferable to one’s usual first-order will. An internet addict may reconsider their habitual approval of the impulse to go online first thing each morning. They may decide that the desire to exercise should be ranked above the desire to log on.

Freedom comes in degrees. For simpler organisms, it’s a matter of degree how likely it is to escape a potentially infinite loop in a computational subroutine. A classic illustration of lacking free will is the digger wasp, which is easily trapped in stereotyped behavior. For a cognitively more sophisticated organism, degree of freedom corresponds to how likely one is to pause and question an otherwise reflexive condoning of one’s first-order will. This corresponds to the extent of one’s knowledge, self-awareness, richness of one’s environment, and sense of self-efficacy. These shades of gray are obscured by an assumed tight connection between free will and moral responsibility. Questions of responsibility "demand clear black-and-white answers, because the answers determine whether the people in question will or will not be subject to blame and punishment" (pp. 70-1). One must pry freedom apart from responsibility to understand either properly.

This understanding involves knowing that responsibility as an illusion. People with free will, being highly rational and self-controlled, tend to do good things. Lacking free will can result in seriously wrong actions. But one has no ultimate control over whether or not one is free. Like Wolf, Waller affirms that willing something evil relieves one of responsibility by indicting one’s psychological integrity or knowledge of the Good. He goes even further by saying that the one who freely acts properly had no ultimate control in their good luck in being able to do so, thus meriting no praise. Couldn’t someone be highly free and properly informed and still choose evil? If a psychologically healthy and properly educated person chooses evil, this is due to a neural fluke or pathological circumstance (as revealed by the Milgram experiments). One never merits praise or condemnation.

Belief in responsibility stems from prehistoric impulses for revenge serving to demonstrate that one is not weak, reducing risk of further attack. Even hurting someone other than the culprit is useful, from this Darwinian perspective. For Waller, belief in responsibility served as an improvement over the messy business of "lynch mobs and personal vendettas" (p. 41). By using criteria for distinguishing the guilty from the innocent, much potential suffering from indiscriminate scapegoating has been avoided. So, at least historically, attributing responsibility was justified by its consequences.

Waller presents evidence meant to show that consequences no longer justify attributing responsibility. He notes that there is less violent crime, and milder punishment relative to the same crime, in places with more equal distribution of wealth. Sweden is an example. But this looks more like evidence favoring redistribution of wealth rather than for abolishing punishment. He notes evidence from aviation, medicine, and manufacturing which show that blaming mistakes on the system is more efficient than blaming individuals. Again, this seems off target, as it conflates sloppiness with crime. Despite criminal negligence, they are largely distinct.

Sometimes, Waller appeals to what he takes to be enlightened common sense without mentioning evidence. Isn’t it obvious that boot camps for youthful offenders make them worse? Possibly, but evidence is needed. Isn’t it obvious that the high achiever doesn’t require much positive reinforcement, while the low achiever does? No. Lavishing high praise on the underachiever for a middling performance might be acutely embarrassing. A mere nod when a workaholic genius produces yet another masterpiece might be offensive and discouraging. Waller claims that the evolutionary origins of our belief in responsibility also cast doubt upon it: "the more we learn about the dark strike-back roots of this moral responsibility intuition, the less plausible it seems as a legitimate moral guide" (p. 266). He denies committing the genetic fallacy (pp. 13-4), for unclear reasons.

Given that responsibility would be all or nothing, belief in it encourages one to think, erroneously, that all minimally competent people occupy an even playing field. This benefits the rich and hurts the poor. But Waller’s calls for social reform are undeveloped. He suggests that a system of "restorative justice" might have better consequences than the current system, but makes the point in only two paragraphs, leaving the reader uncertain as to what he has in mind. Waller approvingly quotes James Gilligan on the need for replacing prisons with therapeutic "residential colleges" (p. 302), but does not say enough about them for the reader to form an opinion.

Waller’s review of the philosophical literature could benefit from more editing. He habitually will cite a number of philosophers all of whom make essentially the same point. Typically, a lengthy quote from each is included. Occasionally, this may be necessary for showing that a certain view is widespread, but here it is typically just name-dropping. The long-windedness is compounded by unnecessary repetition, even to the point of re-using long quotations. The review is not always meticulous. Waller mistakenly claims that Frankfurt considers the self-satisfied drug addict to have free will (pp. 59, 326). According to Waller, on the medieval Christian worldview, there are "no obligations beyond our abilities to fulfill them" (p. 182). This contradicts the doctrine of original sin. The discussion is also lopsided; the critique of the consequentialist case for retributive justice is much less developed than the discussion of merit. This is unfortunate, since many readers may see the question of consequences as the only question.

If true, Waller’s conclusion is enormously important. If possible, one would like to see a more empirically solid case for claiming that retribution is no longer justified by its consequences.

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