OVERVIEWS

General

2000s

E - G

Clark comment: This work is not about Intelligence as a discipline, but rather about a concept for achieving positive interactions across cultures. However, the relationship between some of the ideas presented and the perceived need for greater cultural knowledge and sensitivity in Intelligence Community collection and analysis has led to its inclusion here.

According to Riva, Studies 49.2 (2005), this work "provides a framework for understanding cultural adaptation complexities that confront both organizations and individuals. Intelligence Community managers, course developers, and trainers will gain insight into how to develop culturally intelligent officers by integrating behavioral, cognitive, and motivational facets into courses with significant cultural elements. In addition, it presents practical ideas for designing and refining cross-cultural training that can improve analysis of the performances of individuals, groups, and organizations operating in foreign cultural milieus."

This article explores "the role of tactical and operational intelligence in dictating force employment schemes and as a decisive element in five strategically significant battles -- the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), Tannenberg (1914), Midway (1942), Inchon (1950), and the Israeli air strike initiating the Six-Day War in 1967." The author argues that "it was neither technology nor material superiority that won the day, but accurate, timely, actionable intelligence, combined with leaders willing to treat intelligence as a primary factor in deciding outcomes."

Faligot, Roger, and Rémi Kauffer. Histoire mondiale de renseignement. [A World History of Intelligence] 2 vols.

Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), says that "this work's howlers ["errors of detail"] destroy much of its usefulness.... Books like this give popularizers a bad name!" Volume II "deals only with spies and says nothing about such important forms of intelligence as satellites and codebreaking."

Ferguson, Harry. Spy, A Handbook. London: Bloomsbury, 2004.

Jensen, I&NS 19.4 (Winter 2004), suggests that this work "is rather better than one might expect of something created as part of the marketing strategy for a [BBC] television series." Although "there is a cetain artificiality to the book,... those seeking insight into what might be contained in a training program for prospective 'spies'" will find it "informative, at times amusing, and rather helpful."

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), finds that for the author "the role of intelligence in both diplomacy and military operations today is quicker paced, subject to greater confusion, is still vulnerable to false data or interpretation and the refusal of decisionmakers to accept well-documented truth. No revolution has occurred in these areas, and thus the human role is even more important. This is an important work."

Erskine, I&NS 22.2 (Apr. 2007), notes that most of this book's chapters "are revised versions of articles ... that have appeared previously." However, "[m]ost have also been significantly expanded.... John Ferris's work attains the highest standards, as this impressive collection of his personal favorites among his many articles attests. These revised versions reveal his deep knowledge of his subjects, and the wide range of his research." Regrettably, the hardback is priced such as to "put it beyond the reach of most individuals -- and too many libraries."

According to Jackson, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), "[m]uch of the book is devoted to introducing the field of 'intelligence studies' to France as a serious academic sub-discipline." The authors "succeed brilliantly" in this undertaking.

"[D]o not mistake the intelligence-gathering apparatus with the nation.... [W]hat Hanssen and Ames should take to their graves is simply this: In the broadest sense, their treason achieved nothing. It just didn't matter." We won; they lost.

Clark comment: The author's language is sprightly, if at times overblown (note, for example, his description of Rommel's situation prior to El Alamein: "It was as if the Desert Fox, bereft of his senses, could not see the red-coated huntsmen, smell the sweating horses, or hear the baying hounds as they closed in on him"), making this an entertaining read of several oft-told stories. Gannon outlines the cases he has chosen well, if not always with complete accuracy. The absence of references to the Allies use of HF/DF in the retelling of the Battle of the Atlantic (pp. 59-71) is a significant omission, even if it was done to keep the story focused on codebreaking. In sum, this is not a book for the historian of intelligence; but it does supply a good survey for the general reader of some significant instances where intelligence (most often codebreaking) played a role in historic events in the 20th century.

Erskine, I&NS 18.1, sees this as "a collection of largely unrelated essays" drawn primarily from secondary sources. Therefore, the work "contains no real revelations." Although the "book contains several detailed errors..., Gannon writes well and has indeed some good stories to tell." For Kruh, Cryptologia 28.1, a number of "dramatic episodes" of espionage and codebreaking are "detailed in this intriguing book."

According to Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005), "[t]he 39 chapters in this 10-part reader ... provide the foundation for a variety of college-level courses on intelligence. They pull together often hard to find articles by a diverse group of professionals.... Scholars are urged to consult this work for a comprehensive overview of this complex profession -- intelligence." Medby, NWCR 58.4 (Autumn 2005), says that these "essays by an impressive list of authors address[] many of the issues especially salient to intelligence practitioners and their consumers in this time of reflection and reform.... [T]his book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community."

According to Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), the authors offer what they see as a theory of intelligence that "involves adopting political and social science concepts not often encountered in the study of intelligence.... But in the end, the reader is left wondering just how their ideas for a 'more self-consciously analytical and theoretical' approach to intelligence will help." This work "may help clarify the nature of the gap between intelligence professionals and elements of academia, but it does not close it." Glees, I&NS 24.5 (Oct. 2009), says that "[t]his is one of those rare textbooks that is actually a good and even amusing read."

Kahn, Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), notes that this work "assembles a dozen theoretically-directed articles on intelligence." For Webb, Studies 53.2 (Jun. 2009), the essays demonstrate that "scholars are still struggling with definitions.... [T]he debate promised in the subtitle never really takes place. Instead, the authors essentially talk past each other." The work "focuses too narrowly on failure." In the end, "a more robust set of questions and debates is still needed."

Warner, Studies 53.2 (Jun. 2009), calls this work "perhaps the most ambitious project to date for comparing intelligence systems.... The effort deserves praise for both the attempt and its results.... The Handbook's method produces useful evidence that is both contemporaneous and orderly." The book's "only real lack is that of sustained attention to how technology factors into different intelligence systems."