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Spy chief: Terror Risk High in France. The risk of a terrorist attack on French soil has never been higher, the head of the country's counterespionage agency said in an interview released Saturday.

Bernard Squarcini told Le Journal du Dimanche newspaper that France's history as a colonial master in North Africa, its military presence in Afghanistan and a proposal aimed at banning full-covering face veils in public all make the country a prime target for certain radical Islamist groups.

The risk of an attack is now as high as it was in 1995, before deadly attacks on the Paris subway by Algerian Islamic extremists, he said.

"Objectively, there are reasons for worry. The threat has never been as high" as now, the interview quotes Squarcini as saying. "We foil an average of two (planned) attacks a year, but one day or another, we're going to get hit."

Squarcini said the threat is threefold, coming from al-Qaida's North African affiliate - an Algerian insurgent group that allied itself with the international terror network several years ago and has targeted French interest in the region in the past - radical French converts to Islam and French nationals who have trained with extremist groups in Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia.

"All (such) scenarios are possible," Squarcini said.

He added that before the 1995 bombings on the Paris subway, which killed eight people and wounded hundreds, the risk came solely from insurgent groups from France's former colony, Algeria. One such group, the Armed Islamic Group, claimed responsibility for the 1995 attacks.

Next week, the Senate, the upper house of the French parliament, will vote on a bill that would ban the wearing of burqas or niqabs, fully covering Islamic veils, in public places in France. The proposal, which was overwhelmingly approved in the lower house of parliament in July, drew the indignation of the No. 2 of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahri, who said the drive to ban the veil amounted to discrimination against Muslim women.

The federal Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, issued a public interest certificate last week preventing senior intelligence officials from being questioned in a public hearing on why they still sought to keep the defense material secret.

A University of NSW senior lecturer, Clinton Fernandes, has applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for access to daily "situation reports" that were prepared by the Defense Department during the takeover of then Portuguese Timor by Indonesia in 1975.

Two senior officials - the director of the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), Ian McKenzie, and the Defense Intelligence Organization deputy director, Stephen McFarlane - told the tribunal that disclosure of many passages in the 42 documents would damage national security by disclosing sources and methods of intelligence gathering.

Some passages would reveal "highly sensitive communications from the US government which were then, and remain now, confidential", Mr. MacFarlane said in an affidavit. Release would damage the intelligence-sharing relationship.

As well as blocking disclosure of passages in the archived documents, the two officials have applied to appear at the tribunal behind closed doors, without Dr. Fernandes present.

Mr. McClelland's decision to support their application for a public interest certificate means the doors will be closed when the hearing of Dr. Fernandes's application starts. A timetable for the hearing will be established tomorrow.

Dr. Fernandes was a major in the Australian Army's intelligence corps. He had top secret security clearance that gave him access to the sort of material the Defense Department is now trying to keep from him.

He will represent himself at the tribunal against a team of government lawyers barristers and solicitors and had hoped to question Mr. McKenzie and Mr. MacFarlane about their assertions that disclosure of intelligence capabilities in 1975 affected national security now.

"They know they are not dealing with an amateur so they are trying to stop me cross-examining the DSD people," Dr. Fernandes said yesterday.

He wanted to demonstrate to the tribunal that the world of cryptography had changed decisively in the 1980s, making the signals systems the Indonesian military had used during the Timor crisis obsolete.

And the Defense reports had been "sanitized" to hide any clues to the source of information in case they fell into the wrong hands, Dr. Fernandes said.

That the DSD was intercepting Indonesian Army signals had been disclosed in the 2007 NSW coronial inquest into the killing of five Australian-based newsmen at Balibo in October 1975.

Dr. Fernandes said he would agree to US material not being disclosed if the tribunal verified that the Defense Department had asked its US counterparts for permission to make the material public and had been refused.

"The documents would tell us about the actual conduct of the Indonesian military against the Timorese people and Australia's knowledge of that," he said.

In a letter to Dr Fernandes, Mr. McClelland said the tribunal could still decide independently whether the documents should be made public.
[McDonald/SMH/12September2010]

A district court Wednesday said "yes" on condition that the person disseminated "groundless rumors with apparently malicious intent" to defame the country.

However, the court ruled in favor of a human rights lawyer and civic group leader, Park Won-woon, saying his remarks were not libelous enough to constitute defamation against the state as alleged by the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

The spy agency filed a suit against Park last year, demanding 200 million won ($172,000) in compensation for his comments in an interview with the magazine, Weekly Kyunghyang.

In the interview, the 54-year-old, a director of the Hope Institute, complained that the spy agency's alleged "pressure" of company donors to the civic group caused them to cut their donations.

The Seoul Central District Court delivered a ruling against the spy agency.

"The country is subject to criticism and oversight by the people. It can become a victim of defamation in such an exceptional case when it received clearly malicious attacks. Even in that case, the nation should prove that there was apparently malicious intent," Judge Kim In-kyeom said.

The judge said Park's criticism of the spy agency was not intended to slander the nation, though his criticism could be seen as lacking grounds.

In the interview with the magazine in June last year, Park said, "The NIS has contacted executives of donor companies and pressured them to stop helping us. Many civic groups critical of the conservative Lee Myung-bak government are facing similar problems. This state attempts to control civilians through the spy agency."

The intelligence unit refuted the allegation and filed a suit against him in September, arguing he defamed the country.

Judge Kim stressed that even if citizens' criticism against the government is recognized as "defamation" from a broad perspective, holding them accountable for that could restrict the freedom of expression and speech. [Park/KoreaTimes/17September2010]

Couple Accused of Passing Nuclear Arms Secrets. The arrests of P. Leonardo Mascheroni and Marjorie Roxby Mascheroni and a 22-count indictment came after a sting operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 2008 to 2009. A raid on the couple's home in Los Alamos last October hauled away cameras, computers and hundreds of files.

"If I were a real spy," Dr. Mascheroni told a reporter at the time, declaring his innocence, "I would have left the country a long time ago."

After their arrests on Friday, the couple appeared in federal court in Albuquerque. They were charged with handing over secret weapons information to an F.B.I. agent posing as a Venezuelan spy. The government did not accuse the Venezuelan government, or anyone working for it, of seeking weapons secrets.

Venezuela has begun exploring for uranium, but its president, Hugo Chávez, has denied interest in developing nuclear arms.

The defendants, if convicted of all the charges, face potential life sentences in prison. Dr. Mascheroni worked for Los Alamos, the nuclear laboratory, from 1979 to 1988, and his wife from 1981 until the raid on their home last year.

Dr. Mascheroni has long criticized the government's nuclear policies as misguided and has repeatedly accused federal agents of harassing him for his views.

"Leo is a gullible nut," said Hugh E. DeWitt, a California physicist, in a telephone interview on Friday. He knows Dr. Mascheroni and had testified before a grand jury. "He is a nut, but he has dug his own grave," Dr. DeWitt said.

The indictment says that Dr. Mascheroni, 75, a naturalized citizen from Argentina, and Ms. Mascheroni, 67, an American citizen, handed over weapons secrets in exchange for $20,000 in cash and the promise of nearly $800,000 in all.

"The conduct alleged in this indictment is serious and should serve as a warning to anyone who would consider compromising our nation's nuclear secrets for profit," David Kris, the assistant attorney general for national security, said in a statement.

According to the indictment, Dr. Mascheroni told an undercover agent in March 2008, that he could help Venezuela develop a nuclear bomb within 10 years and that under his program, the country would use a secret, underground nuclear reactor to make plutonium, a type of bomb fuel.

In July of that year, the F.B.I. agent provided Dr. Mascheroni with 12 questions supposedly from Venezuelan military and scientific personnel.

According to the charges, the physicist delivered to a post office box that November a computer disk holding a 132-page document, written in code, that contained "restricted data" related to nuclear weapons.

Written by Dr. Mascheroni and edited by his wife, the document was titled "A Deterrence Program for Venezuela," and officials say it laid out the physicist's weapons plan for Venezuela.

Dr. Mascheroni stated that the information he was providing was worth millions of dollars, but that his fee for producing the document was a mere $793,000, according to the indictment.

Earlier in the sting operation, the authorities say, Dr. Mascheroni asked the F.B.I. agent about obtaining Venezuelan citizenship. In June 2009, Dr. Mascheroni received from the box another list of questions, supposedly from Venezuelan officials, and $20,000 in cash as a first payment.

On his way to pick up these materials, according to the indictment, he told his wife he was doing the transaction for the money and was no longer an American.
[Broad/NYTimes/18September2010]

Defense Logisticians Face Critical Time. After fire destroyed a major Marine Corps supply center in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, last May, military logisticians quickly reconstituted the center and in doing so, improved the readiness of troops who depended on it for critical supplies, according to the Defense Department's senior logistician.

Alan Estevez, principal deputy assistant secretary of Defense for logistics and materiel readiness, described the fire incident last week to lawmakers in an effort to show how far the department has come in its ability to manage what might be the world's most complex supply chain.

"Afghanistan is about as hard a place as we could have picked to go to war," Estevez told members of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on July 27. Historically, most equipment and supplies have been shipped through volatile Pakistan from the Port of Karachi, but more recently, the Pentagon has expanded distribution operations in the north over four existing commercial routes that connect Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan through Russia and the Southern Caucuses and Central and South Asian states.

To date, the Defense Logistics Agency has booked more than 10,000 containers through the northern distribution network, accounting for 81 percent of all shipments.

Estevez had just returned from a visit to Afghanistan two weeks before he testified, where he reviewed efforts to move and support the 30,000 additional troops ordered there by President Obama in December 2009.

"At every place I visited, the troops and their commanders reported that for the most part, they are receiving the material they need when they need it," he said. Since the troop increase was announced, Defense has moved more than 17,000 portable buildings to Afghanistan to house troops while bases there are expanded.

"We are meeting a 1.1 million gallons a day demand for fuel for the U.S. and coalition forces while feeding 435,000 meals a day to U.S. service personnel and civilians on the ground," he said. In addition, the department has shipped 10,000 vehicles and the supplies necessary to keep them at a 90 percent readiness rate.

All this has occurred as the department is withdrawing tens of thousands of troops and their equipment from Iraq. "To date, we have moved 32,000 pieces of rolling stock, closed 369 bases and are on track to bring the force down to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31," Estevez said.

Sen. George Voinovich, R-Ohio, said he was encouraged by how well Defense was handling the simultaneous drawdown in Iraq and surge in Afghanistan.

"As the supply chain increasingly shifts to Afghanistan, the department will face a critical test to determine whether the dangerous logistical gaps that emerged during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom have been closed, and whether progress will continue in the areas of requirements forecasting, asset visibility and material distribution," Voinovich said.

He and committee chairman Sen. Daniel Akaka, D-Hawaii, questioned whether the department's latest strategic logistics plan, released last month, was sufficient to address its long-standing supply-chain management problems. The issue has been on the Government Accountability Office's high-risk list for 20 years now.

"DoD supply-chain management still suffers from inadequate strategic planning," Akaka said, noting Defense has a history of overstocking some supplies and underestimating the need for others.

Jack Edwards, director of defense capabilities and management at GAO, said the department's latest plan is an improvement over previous efforts, but it lacks clear performance measures and fails to adequately identify capability gaps and the resources needed to address them.

"GAO has some legitimate arguments," Estevez said. "There are areas where we can do better."

In October, as required by the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Defense will submit to Congress a comprehensive inventory management improvement plan. That plan will describe how the department will address demand forecasting, asset visibility, inventory management and the disposal of unneeded items.
[GovExec/16September2010]

MI5 chief Jonathan Evans, in a speech delivered in London, said his fears were linked to the impending release from prison of a number of men convicted of terrorist offences after the 2001 attacks in the US.

He did not give any numbers, but said many of the inmates were 'committed extremists and likely to return to terrorist activities.' Groups based in Somalia and Yemen were of 'important concern.'

Britain suffered a major terrorist attack in 2005, when suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured more than 700 in attacks on London's Tube and bus network.

All four of the attackers were later found to have had links with Pakistan.

The British government has previously said that some 75 per cent of terror plots investigated by the authorities can be traced back to Pakistan. But that proportion had now dropped to 50 per cent, Evans said.

He said there were a 'significant number of UK residents' training in camps in Somalia under the guidance of terrorist groups there. Yemen was another 'main country of concern.'

In addition, Britain was facing a growing threat from terrorists in Northern Ireland, where dissident groups linked to the former Irish Republican Army (IRA) had staged 30 attacks, and attempted attacks, so far this year.

He could 'not exclude the possibility' that the dissidents, who are opposed to the peace process in Northern Ireland, would stage an attack on mainland Britain.
[MonstersAndCritics/16September2010]

Former CIA Employee Speaks Against U.S. Intervention. Special guest Michael Scheuer, author of the 2004 bestseller Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, spoke to William and Mary students at an event entitled, "The Persian Gulf's Three Threats to U.S. Security." A CIA veteran with 22 years of service as well as the head of the Counterterrorist Center's Bin Laden station from 1996 to 1999, Scheuer discussed what he sees as the three biggest threats to America's national security and how the biggest danger is the way the government is handling them.

In Scheuer's opinion, the media and government press releases portray the Islamic jihadist as hating the Western world for the wrong reasons. Rather than the common image of the jihadist who harbors an intense hatred for Western culture and values, most in reality are driven to violence by America's persistent intervention into the affairs of the Middle East.

"Washington's Islamic enemy is the stuff of Hollywood farce," said Scheuer. "If that enemy existed, he would be a lethal nuisance, not a national security matter."

The first threat discussed by Scheuer was Iran, which he perceives as the least threatening. The hostage situation from 1979-1981 created an intense hatred for Iran in the U.S. which can be very easily exploited.

"So successful have these scare mongers been...that there has never been in U.S. history a more feared non-threat," said Scheuer.

What Scheuer sees as the real threat is the anti-western network Iranians have created within the United States. While Iran would be easily defeated if it attempted to strike Israel or the U.S. first, if America was the initiator of the conflict, this network could easily do significant damage from within.

The next threat Scheuer listed was Saudi Arabia, which is commonly seen as an ally of America due to its heavy involvement with America's oil trade. The fact that the U.S. has ignored Saudi Arabia as a threat has allowed subtle lobbying to occur in the government. More threatening is the fact that many Saudi religious leaders have been able to instill pro-jihadist ideology into Western Muslims who visit the Kingdom, leading to an increase in militant anti-western activities around the world.

"Because of these facts, Americans are never told the truth by the Kingdom's leaders," said Scheuer.

The final threat Scheuer discussed was that of Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and their allies. Their danger lies not in the fact that Al-Qaeda is innately more powerful than the U.S., but rather because the U.S. bipartisan elite have not accepted the reality that the jihadists' hatred is directed towards America's intervention, not its liberty. Scheuer believes that politicians from all sides of the political spectrum need to accept that this thinking has directly resulted in our failed involvement in the Middle East.

"[This rhetoric] will lead to nothing less than a mass-deception leading to great calamity," said Scheuer.

In suggesting how America might solve this current predicament, Scheuer referred to the common flight-safety instruction - "place oxygen mask on yourself before helping others." In order for America to be able to fully commit to helping other nations in the Middle East, the U.S. must first solve its own problems. To do this, Scheuer says America must return to the ideology of the Founding Fathers and take a less interventionist approach to foreign affairs. The foreign policy for about the past 35 years has only started an era of endless wars, exhausted the National Treasury, and caused America's leaders to bow to tyrants for more oil.

Scheuer suggests that the United States should further expand its work into discovering alternate-energy sources. If Saudi Arabia had no oil, America would have no reason to be so heavily involved with the affairs and conflicts of the Middle East. He also suggests that America should heavily reduce its support of Israel, a partnership which has no practical basis and only fuels the Middle Eastern perception that America is committed to an anti-Islamic policy.

"No western son should die for giving Iraq a chance for democracy and justice for foreigners who don't want it," said Scheuer.

Ultimately, America should return to the Founding Father's goal of America being the champion of its own liberty. In Scheuer's view, American soldiers dying for anything else is simply a waste of life, although after approximately 35 years of foreign policy in this direction it might be far too late to completely reverse what's been started.

"If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher," said Scheuer, quoting from Abraham Lincoln. In his conclusion to his lecture, Scheuer stated that he believes America seems to be attempting to adhere to Lincoln's words with its completely botched foreign policy in the Middle East.
[Mosier/DogStreetJournal/16September2010]

President Asif Ali Zardari told reporters after meeting the Afghan leader that the two nations' cooperation had improved since Mr. Zardari took office and "we intend to enhance it further."

"We need more security cooperation between our intelligence and their intelligence, which Pakistan is willing to offer," he said.

It was not clear, however, if the offer was endorsed by Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, which historically wields more power than its civilian rulers.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai described the men's meeting as wide-ranging and productive.

"This openness in dialogue in fact is a step forward in our relations," he said, saying the discussion was focused partly on Taliban bases in Pakistan's tribal areas.

"These are issues that we should discuss and these are issues that we should fight together," Mr. Karzai said.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have a long history of tense and complicated relations, marred in recent years by Afghan allegations that Pakistan is not moving against Taliban militants on its territory, and has even backed some of their attacks.

The United States has also urged Pakistan to do more against militants in its territory, and for the last 2 1/2 years has fired missiles from unmanned drones against insurgent targets in the northwest of the country. There were two such attacks Wednesday in the North Waziristan tribal area, intelligence officials said.

The first attack killed 12 people outside the main town of Miran Shah, the officials said. Hours later, four people were killed in a second attack in the region, the officials said, without giving their names in line with the policy of their
agency. There have been at least 13 missile strikes this month, the most intense barrage yet since they began in 2004.

Mr. Karzai publicly criticized Pakistan during his first years in office but has been sending conciliatory messages as he pushes ahead with efforts to strike a peace deal with members of the Taliban. He recently set up a council tasked with pursuing peace talks with rebels willing to break with al Qaeda, renounce violence and recognize the Afghan government in Kabul.

Pakistan has offered to help negotiate with the militants, but many Afghan officials remain wary of Pakistan's intentions.

The Pakistani government arrested the Taliban's No. 2 leader in February in a joint raid with the CIA - a move that some analysts believe was driven by Pakistan's desire to guarantee itself a seat at the negotiating table because Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was considered a likely channel in any talks with the top Taliban leadership.

Mr. Karzai proclaimed after a meeting with Mr. Zardari in March that Pakistan would be key to any talks with the Taliban.

"I think a lustration would be very useful for Ukraine. The Polish experience has shown an amazing fact: after the lustration it turned out that it was the right-wing camp that had more security officers than the left-wing. I think something similar could happen in Ukraine as well," Herman told journalists.

A lustration "will allow not just to purify the power and to increase confidence in officials, it will also protect those who are sometimes victimized by various sleazy provocations by the press," she said.

"You know how easy it is to make provocations and to accuse someone of having worked for the KGB. It is very difficult to protect oneself from this. If we open [the archives], hold a lustration and publish lists of those who cooperated, that means that those people who did not cooperate will be guaranteed that no one would upset them in this country," the deputy chief of the presidential administration said.

Herman made such statements on Friday after attending an exhibition about the East Germany's secret service (Stasi), which opened in Kyiv.

The secret filed can be declassified while people mentioned in them are still alive, she also said.

"I am not supporter of the idea that documents should remain classified as long as people named therein are still alive," she said.

"One has to know the truth, no matter what it is like and whoever might be involved, and one has to answer for the truth," she said.

"Our society needs to be purified. So far there are no such statutory acts and today we cannot force the Security Service to break the law. I suggest passing legislation for these documents to be handed over to institutions, in particular, the Institute of National Memory. It will be done," Herman said.
[KyivPost/20September2010]

The decision was made by Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, who had earlier ordered the closure of ISI's political wing.

The secret agency has been told to immediately stop gathering information pertaining to the country's politics, the source said. "MI is not involved in any kind of political business anymore."

However, according to ISPR spokesperson Major General Athar Abbas, MI was always apolitical. "It is a totally baseless report. MI has nothing to do with the country's political affairs. It deals purely with the military's internal matters," he said. According to sources, MI has been told to concentrate on its main task, i.e., the country's national security with a key thrust on counter-terrorism.

Both the MI and ISI, along with the Intelligence Bureau (IB), have their own specific responsibilities, but all of them are also assigned the task of countering internal and external terrorism.

General Kayani had strictly barred the ISI from political hobnobbing during the 2008 general elections in the country. The step was taken by the army chief in an effort to ensure free and fair general elections.

It appears that General Kayani, who had also served as the head of ISI during General Pervez Musharraf's tenure, is clearing both the ISI and the MI of political dirt. But in his move to divert the military purely on professionalism, Kayani has managed to remove all those elements in the intelligence services who were not on board in the war against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

In February 2008, when General Musharraf was still the president, General Kayani removed the then MI chief Gen Nadeem Ejaz Ahmed, a close relative of Musharraf and one of his top aides. General Nadeem had played a key role when Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was forcibly removed by General Musharraf.

In January 2008, General Kayani through a directive had ordered military officers not to maintain contacts with politicians. On February 13, 2008 General Kayani ordered the withdrawal of serving military officers posted in civil departments.

On March 7, 2008, General Kayani confirmed that the armed forces would stay out of politics and support the new government. He told a gathering of military commanders in the garrison city of Rawalpindi that "the army fully stands behind the democratic process and is committed to playing its constitutional role." These comments were made at a time when the majority party in parliament was in the process of putting together coalition governments at the centre and in the provinces.
[ExpressTribune/20September2010]

The rise of "state capitalist" economies that may use government intelligence agencies to win commercial advantage for official-linked companies could pose a growing threat to their Western corporate rivals, experts say.

China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and India either have or are all pushing for security agency access to encrypted BlackBerry smart phones, which they say they need to monitor dangerous militants.

But while the skills of electronic snooping are important, where information ends up can come down just as much to private deals put together in anonymous offices by spy chiefs, companies and powerful individuals. "In somewhere like the UAE, if I was the CIA or MI6 station chief I might go to the head of local intelligence and ask for help in following or monitoring someone," said Fred Burton, a former U.S. counterterrorism agent now vice president for U.S. political risk consultancy Stratfor.

"If the Chinese station chief comes to him and makes a similar request, you want to be in a position where he is going to tip you off about it. A lot comes down to these personal relationships. Whoever has the best liaison relationship obtains the information."

What technology has revolutionized, of course, is how much can be stolen. Electronic hacking can lift truckloads of documents with barely a trace. But older tradecraft continues.

In some countries, hotel rooms are bugged and some local staff - particularly cleaners and drivers - may be being paid extra to keep an eye on their employers.

Local intelligence agencies - from small sub-Saharan African countries to global powers - may also have particularly close relationships with other powers. Many are legacies of the big power's Cold War practice of cultivating local proxies. How much support Western corporates received from their national intelligence services is similarly opaque - but once again, personal contacts look likely to be key. Some firms have a reputation for being particularly well-connected.

Officials from Britain's MI6 spy agency and Foreign Office, for example, have previously gone on to work for U.K. firms such as energy giant BP after leaving public service.

The MI6 website publicly acknowledges that the service acts in the interests of the economic well-being of the U.K., as well as on national security, defence and crime.

In more opaque emerging economies, it is generally accepted that intelligence and security officials may sell information or security access to the private sector for personal gain.

In Western economies, that is much less widespread - but Burton says it is far from unheard of.

"People using intelligence resources for their own private ends?" he said. "I'd love to say it doesn't happen. Doing someone a favour, maybe getting yourself a nice position on a board when you go into the private sector? It happens. Even in the United States."

Analysts say help provided by Western intelligence officers to personal contacts in companies more often will involve giving additional protective advice or tipoffs to firms that might be targeted by criminals or foreign intelligence agencies, rather than using government spy assets to snoop on rivals.

Alastair Newton, who worked for Britain's foreign office on both cyberwarfare and trade and is now senior political analyst for Japanese bank Nomura, says maintaining a good relationship with your embassy and government has its advantages.

"If you're on a trip to Ruritania organised by UK Trade and Industry (department) and you get a briefing from the High Commissioner on business opportunities, you won't ask exactly where he got his information from," he says - deliberately choosing an imaginary country.

"You just assume he knows what he's talking about." [Neumeister/Reuters/16September2010]

Witness in 1998 Bombings Identified at a Hearing. For years, the Tanzanian man had been a mystery, his identity undisclosed. And when he finally testified last week in a heavily guarded courtroom in Manhattan, security was so tight that prosecutors asked the judge to instruct sketch artists to obscure his face in their drawings.

The man, Hussein Abebe, 46, has been cooperating with the authorities against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a terrorism suspect captured in 2004, then held in a secret C.I.A.-run jail and later in the military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Last year, Mr. Ghailani became the first detainee moved into the civilian system, where he faces trial soon in the 1998 conspiracy to bomb the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, attacks that killed 224 people.

Prosecutors have said Mr. Abebe sold Mr. Ghailani hundreds of pounds of TNT that was used in the attack in Tanzania.

"This is a giant witness for the government," a federal prosecutor, Michael Farbiarz, told a judge last week, adding, "There's nothing bigger than him."

But a dispute has arisen over whether Mr. Abebe should be allowed to testify at trial because the government first learned of him from Mr. Ghailani when he was in C.I.A. custody where, his lawyers say, he was subjected to coercive interrogation and torture.

In a preliminary ruling, the judge, Lewis A. Kaplan of Federal District Court, called for a hearing to further explore whether the government could show that Mr. Abebe's decision to cooperate was voluntary, and only remotely linked to Mr. Ghailani's statements during his interrogation.

But after the hearing last week, Judge Kaplan appeared to have serious questions about Mr. Abebe's reasons for cooperating. For one thing, the witness contradicted F.B.I. testimony about what he had said earlier.

"It's just abundantly clear," the judge said, "that there are two remarkably different factual narratives that could be drawn from the evidence." He even seemed to ask whether the government might be considering dropping their plan to have Mr. Abebe testify.

The judge seemed skeptical, saying at one point, "If the government thinks there aren't any factual disputes here, you're on a different planet."

Ever since the Obama administration moved Mr. Ghailani into federal court, his case has been seen as a crucial test of President Obama's goal of trying detainees in the civilian system. Already, Judge Kaplan has rejected two key defense requests to dismiss charges, on grounds of government misconduct and speedy-trial violations, and prosecutors have said they do not intend to use statements from Mr. Ghailani's interrogation at trial.

While a ruling barring the witness from testifying would not lead to dismissal, it could make proving the case more complicated and have serious ramifications for other detainee cases.

"This is the moment," said Karen J. Greenberg, executive director of the Center on Law and Security at New York University, who observed the hearing. "This will establish the standard for how we deal with witnesses and other evidence that's the result of torture."

Judge Kaplan has never ruled on whether Mr. Ghailani was subjected to mistreatment while being detained, but he assumed he was coerced, to resolve the legal issue before him.

Testimony revealed that the C.I.A. and Tanzanian intelligence worked closely for more than a year to track down Mr. Abebe, based on information Mr. Ghailani was providing while in C.I.A. custody.

Mr. Abebe was from Arusha, a city where his family was in mining and had access to explosives, court papers and testimony showed.

He sold the TNT to Mr. Ghailani believing it would be used for legitimate mining, he said, but he learned otherwise after seeing a televised report on the bombing of the embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Mr. Abebe kept his own role a secret for eight years, he said. Then, in 2006, he was arrested by Tanzanian authorities and questioned by them and later by the F.B.I.

An F.B.I. agent, Philip Swabsin, testified that Mr. Abebe had said he lived in constant fear of being found out. The agent recalled him saying that "one day this day would come" and that "he would have a knock at the front door."

But when a defense lawyer, Peter E. Quijano, cross-examined Mr. Abebe, the witness denied ever having such fear. "I did not have worry about being arrested," he said.

Mr. Quijano inquired further, trying to clarify the apparent contradiction, but Mr. Abebe did not change his account.

Mr. Abebe also testified that Tanzanian officials had encouraged him to cooperate with the Americans so that he could go back to Arusha. In his earlier ruling, Judge Kaplan noted that Mr. Abebe had been released from custody only after the F.B.I questioned him and he had "promised to appear as a witness."

Mr. Abebe, speaking through a Swahili interpreter, said he had agreed to cooperate because of his anger that he had been deceived and that the explosives were used to kill people. "For myself, I cannot even kill a, slaughter a chicken," he said.

But he was not required to cooperate, he testified. "It was not a must," he said.

The hearing, in which a C.I.A. representative testified in a classified session, also shed light on how detainees in the agency's so-called black sites were used to support intelligence operations.

"There is at least some evidence that there was an ongoing interactive process between the efforts to smoke out Hussein and find him, identify him and find him," the judge said of Mr. Abebe, "and the interrogation of Ghailani by the C.I.A."

At one point, Judge Kaplan noted, "somebody in Tanzania" came up with "a great theory" of where Mr. Abebe might be found.

"They think they know the neighborhood," the judge said, and that led to a "further interaction with Ghailani."

"I won't say anything more on that," the judge added, "because of the sensitivity." But it appeared that the C.I.A. had gone back to Mr. Ghailani and interrogated him again for information that helped locate Mr. Abebe. [Weiser/NYTimes/20September2010]

Romanian-born Müller, who lives in Berlin, received the prize last December for her chilling books about the cruelty of communism and her own persecution by Romania's Securitate secret police.

Last year, she published a novel, entitled Atemschaukel (rocking of breath) in German, about a homosexual Romanian who is locked up by the Soviets in a Ukrainian gulag where many people starve to death.

Her close friend, Oskar Pastior, helped her till his sudden death in 2006 to write it. It was based on his true story.

On Thursday, a literary scholar revealed that Pastior, a poet and an ethnic German like Müller, had been a traitor.

Using the code name 'Otto Stein,' he worked as an informer from 1961 to 1968 for the Securitate, documents in Bucharest show.

Stefan Sienerth, the scholar, disclosed Pastior's involvement in the literary quarterly Spiegelungen, publishing the June 8, 1961 document signed by Pastior in which he agrees to pass on information about his friends and associates to the secret police.

The document offered rehabilitation to Pastior. After his 1949 release from the gulag, Pastior wrote poetry in German, married and become a radio reporter. The spying ended when he was allowed through the Iron Curtain to live in the West in 1968.

The German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine quoted Müller on Friday saying that she had learned of the document's discovery several weeks ago, and 'felt both horror and rage.'

'It was like being slapped in the face,' she said.

Müller said she had since progressed to a state of mourning.

During a Thursday evening literary reading, Müller seemed to have bottled up her feelings again, speaking only of Pastior's ordeal in the gulag. They visited the former concentration camp site together before his death.

Over the years the writer has clashed with Romania's post- communist intellectuals with her remorseless campaign against former Securitate informers, demanding that writers and theatre people who were on the police payroll be unmasked and punished.

A Romanian poet Mircea Dinescu said Friday he was saddened by the disclosure of Pastior's involvement.

'It's just as well he is dead and does not have to live through his unmasking,' Dinescu told the German Press Agency dpa.

Sienerth, the Munich academic, said Pastior must have been put under immense pressure from the Securitate to collaborate.

'One should not forget that Pastior's contributions to literature were quite large,' he said.

The Securitate was one of eastern Europe's nastiest secret police agencies till communism collapsed in 1989. Scholars estimate Securitate officers made 10,000 people 'disappear' during its 40-year reign of terror.

It had 18,000 regular employees, plus a 50,000-strong paramilitary force and 162,000 informers under contract.
[MonstersAndCritics/19September2010]

All eyes have been focused on the American hiker Sarah Shourd, whose scheduled release from a Tehran prison over the weekend became entangled in Iranian politics. Two of her hiking companions remain jailed on charges of being American spies, which top U.S. officials vehemently deny.

But not a word surfaced about the fate of Levinson, who would now be 62, a 28-year FBI veteran who vanished without a trace on free-market Kish, off Iran's coast, in March 2007.

Various explanations have been proffered for the journey of Levinson, who had parlayed his investigative skills into a second career as a private investigator, to the notorious black market hub - an investigation into cigarette smuggling for British American Tobacco, and a book and movie project, were two - either of which could have been risky business under the watchful eyes of criminal syndicates and Iranian security agents.

U.S. officials have dismissed suggestions that Levinson, who once headed an FBI unit investigating Colombia drug cartels, was on assignment for a U.S. government agency. And a senior U.S. official told The Washington Post's Robin Wright in April 2007 that the purported book and movie project was "innocuous" and "had no connection with anything political."

Whatever the case, Levinson has not been seen or heard from since he checked out of his Kish hotel on March 9 to get a taxi to the airport, according to his wife Christine, who retraced his steps in 2007 and maintains a Web site devoted to his case.

"Every day, I wake up and hope that today is the day I hear that he is on his way home," she said on the third anniversary of his disappearance.

A former high-ranking FBI official says he had heard that U.S. intelligence "knew the exact location" of Levinson, "right down to the cell number" where he was being held in Tehran.

But Iranian officials say they know nothing of his whereabouts, and two former CIA officials said separately in brief interviews last week that no one has come forward with "proof of life" to document the ex-G-man's existence.

Which doesn't mean Iran (or someone else) doesn't have him, one of the former officials added.

During the Reagan administration, he recalled, a hostile foreign intelligence service (which he declined to identify) denied it was holding a CIA officer who had disappeared, until the White House dispatched the legendary intelligence operative, linguist and diplomat Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters with a message: Release the man or U.S. warplanes will reduce your headquarters to rubble.

It worked. Today's Iran, of course, is an entirely different case. [Stein/WashingtonPost/17September2010]

The issue of how governments use eavesdropping has come back into focus as several emerging governments in the Gulf and Asia demand access to encrypted Blackberry smart phones.

Most Western governments already have the ability to intercept almost all messages within their borders and often outside, and they say the economic intelligence they want is the kind that would help them fight crime and terrorism.

Whether they might snoop for commercial gain is a topic on which current and former officials refuse to be drawn, and but some experts say it is naive to assume it does not happen.

Ever since the invention of the telegraph and telephone, the temptation has existed to intercept the messages they convey.

"As long as the technology has been available, I think it is fair to say governments have at least sometimes used it for commercial ends," said Alastair Newton, one-time foreign office lead official for cyber warfare and now senior political analyst for Japanese bank Nomura. "In the past, the French have accused the British of "spying" on their defence industry and vice versa. They were probably both justified."

If major powers do use espionage for corporate ends, experts say the main threat is in strategic sectors such as defense.

"With any government, it really comes down to whether there is a belief that the issue is one of genuine national importance," said one security expert on condition of anonymity.

New Prime Minister David Cameron has said repeatedly that diplomats should do more to promote British business overseas - but it's far from clear whether this means its spies should serve the same function.

There are a host of issues around the links between state and business - not to mention legal restrictions on the use of phone taps. In the UK, authorities need the permission of the Home Secretary before tapping the contents of its citizens e-mails or telephone calls. Similar restrictions exist elsewhere - although how tightly they are followed is impossible to know.

While they rarely draw attention to it, the United States and Britain in particular - also working together with Canada, Australia and New Zealand - have built up a particularly formidable electronic surveillance network.

The two key responsible organizations - the U.S. National Security Agency and Britain's GCHQ - are the largest intelligence agencies in their respective countries.

They can hoover up large volumes of traffic. But their most urgent task today is to sift this mountain of data to extract messages about militant plots. That in itself limits the time available for any corporate or economic espionage, experts say.

"Their real focus has been stopping the smoking holes in the ground, the 9/11s, the London bombings, the Madrid attacks," said former US counterterrorism agent Fred Burton, now of security consultancy Stratfor. "They've been just so stretched that there is a limit to how much else they can do."

The idea of a monolithic U.S.-UK alliance may mislead. The two nations can and do spy separately, notably in competitive military technology and in the Middle East, observers say.

Their spy agencies have also sometimes been tripped up by the new electronic world. Experts were left aghast last year when family photos and details of the new head of MI6 were posted by a family member on networking site Facebook.

But continental European states have always openly suspected the Anglo-Saxon network might occasionally be used against them.

A European parliamentary report in 2000 said it believed a powerful global US-UK signals intelligence network called Echelon existed with the potential for industrial espionage.

It reported cases where European firms had their telephones tapped, most likely by intelligence agencies.

But it also noted the difficulties of gauging the scale of the issue - not least because private security consultants had a vested interest in talking up the threat.

More recently continental European states heightened their wariness of Blackberry smartphones, which uses servers in the UK and North America that those countries' spy agencies can read.

Senior officials in France, Germany and the European commission have all been restricted from using them - and many senior staff at European defence firms also avoid the devices.

Nigel Inkster, a former British Secret Intelligence Service officer and now head of transnational threats and political risk for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says some other European nations themselves had a dubious record.

"The French in particular have always had more of a reputation for industrial espionage," he said, pointing to long-circulated suggestions that French spies bugged business class seats on Air France jets to overhear conversations.

But he said the issue was increasingly complicated by intricate international ownership patterns for many companies. Many London listed firms are heavily owned by outside interests including emerging national sovereign wealth funds.

Experts say big Western agencies face increasing challenges from the latest encryption, and the Blackberry case shows their reliance on being given access by manufacturers and operators.

Every new level of sophistication takes more computer power to break, raising the cost. Growing use of Internet phone calls is also testing the eavesdroppers' ingenuity, although one cyber intelligence analyst said on condition of anonymity: "I suspect they have got around that more than they are willing to say."
[Apps/Reuters/20September2010]

State Security, Post-Soviet Style. In Soviet days, every corner of the KGB was under the tight control of the Communist Party. In Vladimir Putin's Russia, the FSB - the KGB's main successor - is largely unsupervised by anyone. Mr. Putin, briefly the FSB's boss in the late 1990s, gave the secret-police agency free rein after taking over as Russia's president from the ailing Boris Yeltsin in 2000. The FSB's license has continued under the Putin-steered presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. The agency's autonomy has been a catastrophe for Russia and should be a source of grave concern for the West.

Mr. Yeltsin encouraged competition between Russia's spooks, but - as Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan make clear in "The New Nobility," a disturbing portrait of the agency - Mr. Putin has given the FSB (from its Russian acronym Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or Federal Security Service) a near monopoly. Originally just a domestic security service, it has become a sprawling empire, with capabilities ranging from electronic intelligence-gathering to control of Russia's borders and operations beyond them. "According to even cautious estimates, FSB personnel total more than 200,000," the authors write. The FSB's instincts are xenophobic and authoritarian, its practices predatory and incompetent.

Critics of Russia see the FSB as the epitome of the country's lawlessness and corruption. But those inside the agency see themselves as the ultimate guardians of Russia's national security, thoroughly deserving of the rich rewards they reap. Nikolai Patrushev, who succeeded Mr. Putin as the agency's director in 2000 and who is now secretary of Russia's Security Council, calls his FSB colleagues a "new nobility." Mr. Soldatov and Ms. Borogan see a different parallel: They liken the FSB to the ruthless Mukhabarat, or religious police, found in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries: impenetrable, corrupt and ruthless.

Few people are better placed than Mr. Soldatov and Ms. Borogan to write with authority on this subject. They run the website Agentura.Ru, a magpie's nest of news and analysis that presents a well-informed view of the inner workings of this secret state. Given the fates that have befallen other investigative journalists in Russia in recent years, some might fear for the authors' safety. But the publication of the "The New Nobility" in English is welcome; it should be essential reading for those who hold naïve hopes about Russia's development or who pooh-pooh the fears of its neighbors.

The book provides a detailed history of the FSB's ascendancy over the past decade. It describes how Mr. Putin turned to the agency to consolidate his power. (The authors do not share the notion, held by some Russia-watchers, that it was the FSB - in those days a demoralized and chaotic outfit - that actually put Mr. Putin into the top job.) We're told that Mr. Putin gave the agency a seat at Russia's "head table," but "trough," rather than table, might be more accurate.

The authors recount how the Russian government has made outright land grants in much sought-after areas to high-ranking FSB officials, who then build gaudy mansions down the road from their oligarch neighbors. "Whether in the form of valuable land, luxury cars, or merit awards, the perks afforded FSB employees (especially those in particularly good standing) offer significant means of personal advancement. Russia's new security services are more than simply servants of the state - they are landed property owners and powerful players."

Mr. Soldatov and Ms. Borogan also present a chilling account of how the FSB, along with the prosecutor's office and the interior ministry, has closed down independent political life in Russia, intimidating bloggers and trade unionists, infiltrating and disrupting opposition parties, and tarring all critics of the regime as "extremists."

The authors give skimpy treatment to the FSB's downgraded but still important rivals within the Russian bureaucracy: the GRU military-intelligence service and the SVR, which retains the main responsibility for foreign espionage (including the maintenance of an extensive network of "sleeper" agents, such as those unmasked in the U.S. over the summer). "The New Nobility" is unbeatable for its depiction of today's FSB, but the book might have paid more attention to the long-term debilitating effects of the agency's corruption and nepotism: Those may contain the seeds of the FSB's ultimate destruction.

Mr. Soldatov and Ms. Borogan rightly highlight the grim results of FSB power in Russia. Its counterterrorism efforts have been a fiasco. Russia faces a terrorist threat from alienated and brutalized Muslims in the North Caucasus that is far worse than it was in the Yeltsin years.

Greed, rather than selfless patriotism, has been the hallmark of Mr. Patrushev's "new nobility." The FSB may indeed be in some respects as dreadful as the indolent, spendthrift and brutal Russian aristocracy toppled in the Bolshevik revolution. But that is presumably not the parallel that the grand-duke of spookdom had in mind. [Mr. Lucas is the international editor of the Economist and the author of "The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West."]
[Lucas/WallStreetJournal/16September2010]

Before J. Edgar Hoover awakened, the Soviets had set up a massive spy network and the damage had been done.

At the heart of the conspiracy was a South Philadelphian who became one of Russia's most important and diligent spies, according to Allen M. Hornblum's richly researched book, The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb.

Gold was a nebbish, a pudgy, intellectual do-gooder who became involved as a favor to a friend who had helped his impoverished family at the depth of the Depression.

Gold started by stealing from his employer, Pennsylvania Sugar Co., industrial techniques that were legally available. Seducing Gold into getting them illegally was how his handler enmeshed him in espionage. It ended with Gold passing secrets of the atomic bomb to the Soviets, which helped Russia enslave Eastern Europe for a half-century.

The man whom Hornblum calls "the world's most unlikely secret agent" was a Philadelphian through and through. He left his footprints at Southern High (graduating third in his class), he lived in South Philly and Oxford Circle, he attended Penn and Drexel, he worked at Philadelphia General Hospital. He lived and died for the Phillies.

Hornblum writes that the submissive Gold had a psychological need to help people, a trait that led him to become a thief who first betrayed his boss, then his country. But he never was one of the communists, whom he regarded as "despicable bohemians who prattled of free love . . . lazy bums who would never work under any economic system."

The issue of work was central to Gold, who learned from his father's example to work hard and to not complain - even though Samson Gold was a victim of vicious anti-Semites in his cabinet-making job at RCA Victor in Camden. Anti-Semitism was a blood sport in that era.

Gold's desire to help the impoverished Russian masses propelled him to steal information to ease their lives.

A spy for 15 years, he convinced himself that he fought fascism by helping Russia, the only nation that had made anti-Semitism a crime against the state. By the time Russia's Stalin launched show trials to murder his Bolshevik brothers to consolidate dictatorial power, Gold was in too deep to pull out.

Even though it became apparent the "workers paradise" was not what he had hoped, he still labored on, securing secrets that would harm the U.S. even as his younger brother Joseph was in the army defending the U.S.

Hornblum's research and writing for the book - due out Sept. 28 from Yale University Press - took eight years and included interviews with close to 50 people who knew Gold, from South Philly neighbors to admiring corrections officers at Lewisburg, where Gold spent 16 uncomplaining years.

Hornblum reveals how the spies communicated in the days before cell phones, e-mail and Twitter, how they used recognition codes and how every plan to meet had a backup plan if something spooked an operative.

Once captured, Gold told everything he knew, partly to make amends for his deeds, partly to alleviate the disgrace that had fallen over his father and brother like a black blanket. As devotedly as he once followed orders from Moscow, he as earnestly cooperated with Washington's efforts to pull up the spy network by its roots.

In his confessions, which went on for weeks, he pointed an unshaking finger at Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, America's most notorious spies, the ones who stole A-secrets for the Russians.

The Rosenbergs' conviction created a cottage industry of left-wing propagandists who insisted that the progressive pair were the victims of an FBI frame-up. For a current corollary, think of Mumia Abu-Jamal's defenders.

Gold came clean. In an only-in-America twist, the immigrant Jew was defended by Philadelphia lawyer John Hamilton, a WASP former chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Hamilton's defense was hamstrung by Gold's demand to plead guilty. He sought no plea bargain, insisting only that the portion of the charge claiming he desired to hurt the U.S. be dropped. He never wished to hurt the U.S., he said, only to help struggling Russia.

Hornblum was 3 when Gold, who died in 1972, was arrested and communists and fellow-travelers labored to paint the truth-telling Gold as a rat to exonerate the lying Rosenbergs. When secret KGB files were opened after the fall of the Soviet Union, it became clear that the Rosenbergs were Soviet spies.

The information didn't change the minds of those "immune to new scholarship," Hornblum says.

He still feels that the Rosenbergs were framed. He used to know they were framed.

"It's not a clear case they were spies," he says from his Florida retirement. "There was a general movement against communists."

There was - and rightly so. Hornblum writes that at least 500 Soviet spies - in industry, science, and government - were digging in America's files.

Today, when we hear of the Red Scare of the '50s, many have the impression that it was a time of fear in America - it was - and that the FBI was chasing nonexistent subversive phantoms - it wasn't.

That proof came from a South Philadelphia nebbish, the world's most unlikely secret agent.
[Bykofsky/PhiladephiaDailyNews/20September2010]

Bloomsbury Readies Under Wraps MI6 Title. Bloomsbury is launching its history of the secret intelligence service, Keith Jeffery's M16, on September 21st, as the book trade's high-profile start to the autumn looks set to continue.

A three-part serialization of the heavily embargoed title commenced in the Times last weekend (Saturday 18th). Jeffery will be interviewed on BBC Radio 4's "Today" program on Tuesday, before a full press conference to be attended by over 100 journalists and camera crews from 15 countries. Pre-recorded TV packages on the book will go out on breakfast, lunchtime and evening TV news programs and Jeffery will write op-ed articles and give interviews.

Jeffery will be speaking at the Cabinet War Rooms on publication day and at events at Bletchley Park (21st November), The National Archives at Kew, Queen's University Belfast (23rd September), at Ely and Bath for Topping & Co, and at the Henley, Ilkley and Cheltenham Literary Festivals. Bloomsbury said the title would have in-store promotion in Waterstone's on publication and be in all the Christmas catalogues.

M16: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 is described as an "unprecedented" study of the best-known intelligence organization in the world. Jeffery, professor of British History at Queen's University, Belfast, had "full and unrestricted" access to MI6's closed archives. The campaign closely resembles that for Christopher Andrew's successful history of M15, published by Penguin last year.
[TheBookSeller/20September2010]

Keith Batey, Mathematician Who Broke Nazi Code. Keith Batey, one of the leading code-breakers working on the German Enigma machine ciphers at Bletchley Park during World War II, whose skills helped MI5 counter-intelligence control the Nazi espionage network in Britain, has died. He was 91.

Batey was among the first mathematicians to be recruited to work in Hut 6, the section of the British government's Code and Cipher School, which broke German army and air force Enigma messages.

He later moved to the ISK section, where Alfred ''Dilly'' Knox had broken the Abwehr (German military intelligence) Enigma before dying of stomach cancer in 1943.

For his part, Batey made important breakthroughs in decrypting the Abwehr Enigma system that helped MI5 to control the entire German spy network in Britain. The intelligence was crucial to the Double Cross system - under which MI5 turned German agents sent to Britain and used them to feed the Abwehr false information. It also revealed what the Germans did and did not know about the D-Day invasion plans.

Crucially, the Allies were able to use the double agents to ''reveal'' to the Germans the presence of a bogus US Army group stationed in East Anglia and south-east England that was to land in the Pas-de-Calais. As a result, Hitler kept two key German armoured divisions that had been destined for Normandy in the Calais area.

Batey was born at Longmoor, Cumberland; his father, John, had been invalided home from the Somme in World War I, and his mother, Elsie, supported the family on her wages as a part-time teacher.

Batey was educated at Carlisle Grammar School, from where he won a scholarship to read mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge. It was there that he was recruited to Bletchley Park by a former scholar at Trinity, Gordon Welchman.

In 1942, Batey felt guilty that he was doing a reserved ''cushy'' job while his contemporaries were fighting, so he asked to be released to train as a pilot. He was informed that no one who knew that the British were breaking Enigma could be allowed to fly in the RAF because of the risk that he might be shot down and captured.

He then suggested that he join the Fleet Air Arm, flying over the sea in defense of British ships, arguing that he would be either killed or picked up by his own side. Worn down by his persistence, his superiors reluctantly agreed.

On his solo flight during training, Batey came in to land so low that the examiners had to dive to the ground to avoid decapitation. Nonetheless, he passed - probably because of the desperate need for new pilots.

In November 1942, shortly before he left for advanced flying training in Canada, Batey married Mavis Lever, also a code-breaker. However, no sooner had he arrived in North America than he was ordered back to Bletchley because he was considered more valuable working on the Abwehr Enigma than flying naval aircraft.

After Knox made the initial breakthrough into the machine, in August 1943 Batey solved the Enigma ciphers of the Sicherheitsdienst, the Nazi party's intelligence wing. Three months later, he cracked the cipher used by the Spanish military attaches in Berlin and Rome to report back to Madrid on German and Italian military plans and assessments.

He later went on to write much of the official history of the ISK section, which has still not been released by British authorities.

After the war, Batey used his formidable intellect in another direction: he passed the Foreign Office examination and served in the high commissioner's office in Ottawa from 1947 to 1951, and then as private secretary to Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

He was transferred to several other civil service departments, one of which involved dealing with guided weapons, and in 1955 was appointed secretary of the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, working there for 12 years. In 1967, Batey got the job of Oxford University's financial officer, and five years later was invited to become treasurer of Christ Church.

When he retired in 1985, he was presented with bookshelves made from the original timber of the frame of Great Tom, the bell in Tom Tower, which sits over the main gate to Christ Church and was designed by Sir Christopher Wren.

Batey was recently asked to contribute to a history of his alma mater, Portrait of Trinity - an enterprise to counter the damage done to the college's image by its having produced four members of the so-called Cambridge spy ring (Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross).

He reassured the college that it had also made a positive contribution to British intelligence operations, with five of the leading code-breakers - Welchman, Stuart Milner-Barry, Bill Tutte, Rolf Noskwith and himself - all recruited while at Trinity.

Batey retained his faculties to the end. Given the standard compos mentis test by his doctor shortly before his death, he answered every question correctly and then said: ''Now, young man, what do you know about Fourier analysis?'' before proceeding to give the startled doctor a lecture on the subject.

Batey is survived by his wife, son and two daughters. [TheAge/19September2010]

Rear Admiral Ralph Edward Cook. Ralph Edward Cook, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret) passed away on August 27 at Hale Ho Aloha Nursing Home in Honolulu. He would have been 95 in December. He is survived by his wife Clara of 30 years.

Admiral Cook retired from the United States Navy in 1974. He became Admiral in 1968. In 1963 he commanded the Naval Security Group with headquarters at the Navy Security Station in Washington, DC. With rank as Commander at the National Security Agency in 1954 he was Chief of Military Personnel. In 1971 he moved to Honolulu and became Chief of NSA Central Security Service, Pacific. For exceptional leadership in furtherance of United States security interests he was awarded the Legion of Merit in 1968 and again a Gold Star in 1974.

Ralph enlisted in the Navy as a Radioman in 1934 after graduating from Montana State College with a degree in Electrical Engineering. He worked for IBM as a customer engineer prior to being called to active duty. In January 1941 he was commissioned as Ensign and assigned to the Naval Communications Station in the Philippines. When Manila fell to the Japanese he was transferred to the Navy's radio intelligence group in Corregidor. His IBM experience was invaluable to this group called CAST. On the night Bataan fell in 1942 he was evacuated in the third and last submarine to Melbourne, Australia.

As Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) his group worked with Royal Australian Navy radio intelligence during World War II. FRUMEL supported HYPO , the radio intelligence group advising Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor, the 7th U.S. Fleet in Australia and Gen. Douglas MacArthur who was Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area. FRUMEL made substantial contributions to the Navy's victory at the battle of Midway in June 1942 and supported submarine activities throughout the south west Pacific during the war. His group targeted the flight of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander of the Japanese Navy. It resulted in his death when his plane was shot down over Bouganville. ADM Yamamoto had planned and directed the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941. While in Melbourne Ralph was given a commendation by the Royal Australian Navy.

After World War II, he served at the National Security Agency and the Naval Security Group in Washington. On 23 August 1963 Ralph became Director of the Naval Security Group as well as Deputy Director, Naval Communications. In June 1967 he was appointed Deputy for Cryptology, Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

His first wife Valda Thompson, a Pharmacist from Melbourne, died in Washington. Ralph was a "people" person who supported those who served with him. He was an amateur radio operator and enjoyed listening to tube driven stereo equipment. He was an avid golfer. Admiral Cook will be buried at the Punch Bowl National Military Cemetery on Oahu. Graveside services are not planned.
[NavyCaptain-TheRealNavy/18September2010]

John McGlashan, MI6 Officer. John McGlashan, who has died aged 88, was a British MI6 officer linked to a plot to assassinate Egypt's President Nasser during the Suez crisis and subsequently accused of espionage - a capital crime.

Exactly how he came to be seized in Cairo in August 1956 by agents of the Egyptian mukhabarat, or secret police, remains a mystery. But on February 8 the following year The Daily Telegraph reported President Nasser's demand for four other British "plotters" to hang, under the headline "Egypt Demands Death for 'Spies'".

Equally mysterious was the manner in which McGlashan - or John Reidmack Glashem, as some papers mangled it - was smuggled out of Cairo to safety. In June 1957, in his absence, he was accused in a major show trial with James Zarb, a Maltese businessman, and James Swinburn, Cairo business manager of the British-operated Arab News Agency (ANA). Both Zarb and Swinburn were jailed (then rapidly released), but McGlashan was acquitted.

Based at the British embassy in Baghdad, where he operated under diplomatic cover as third secretary, McGlashan was one of 20 people said to have belonged to a "dangerous" Secret Intelligence Service spy ring, and to have monitored Egyptian naval movements in the run-up to the 1956 Suez invasion.

The ANA was SIS's local commercial cover in Cairo and also served as a useful conduit for British propaganda; it sowed "disinformation" about Nasser via news outlets throughout the Arab world.

Its journalists, including the agency's head, Tom Little, a correspondent for The Times and The Economist, were British intelligence officers, a fact quickly grasped by the Egyptians, who raided its offices in August 1956 and closed it down. This immediately compromised SIS's ability to work in Egypt - including on the plan ordered by the prime minister, Anthony Eden, for British agents to assassinate the Egyptian leader and facilitate a coup d'état, in response to "the Muslim Mussolini's" declaration the month before that he intended to nationalise the Suez Canal.

Along with McGlashan and the other British personnel, 11 Egyptians were also accused of espionage, including Swinburn's principal agent, who was later executed. With MI6 in Cairo effectively neutered, the plot to assassinate Nasser was turned over to outside agents, including the BBC Panorama reporter James Mossman, who was posted to Egypt as The Daily Telegraph's correspondent.

Pressed to help, Mossman reluctantly agreed to drop off a package from the boot of his Morris Minor at a spot 12 miles from Cairo. It contained £20,000 in British banknotes, intended as a bribe to Nasser's doctor to poison the Egyptian president. Telephoning to confirm safe delivery, Mossman realised he had given the money to the wrong man.

McGlashan had spent some years after the war running a firm of wine importers, but was recruited by SIS in 1952, and for the next 27 years his professional life was shrouded in secrecy. He served in several overseas postings, ostensibly as third secretary at the British embassy in Baghdad from 1955; second secretary in Tripoli from 1963; and station commander, under first secretary cover, in Madrid from 1968.

Befitting the nature of his work, McGlashan was unforthcoming about his activities, even to his wife and children. They recalled stories of "difficult and dangerous" moments at the time of the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, shot at point blank range in 1975, and how a powerful handshake from President Idi Amin of Uganda nearly broke McGlashan's wrist.

John Reid Curtis McGlashan was born in Hampstead, London, on December 12 1921, the son of a chartered accountant. Educated at Fettes, he was 18 when he joined the RAF in 1940, training as a pilot before joining No 218 Squadron, which operated from Marham in Norfolk.

Returning in his Wellington bomber from Nuremburg on October 12 1941, he was forced to crash land his aircraft, but he and his crew survived uninjured. They were less fortunate three weeks later. On the night of November 7/8, the C-in-C Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, decided to mount a major effort against Berlin despite the forecast of storms and freezing weather on the route and the concerns of some of his group commanders.

With 392 aircraft sent out on the night's operations, 169 of them to Berlin, this was a record effort and included virtually every serviceable bomber in the Command. McGlashan and his all-sergeant crew took off at 17.30 hours and headed for Berlin.

En route, his aircraft was forced down over Germany and all aboard were captured. According to his family the German officer who greeted McGlashan on the ground at gunpoint really did observe: "For you, the war is over". Of the other bombers sent to Berlin, 21 failed to return from the disastrous raid.

McGlashan was to spend the rest of the war as a prisoner-of-war in a series of five prison camps, including Stalag Luft IV, where he helped to set up and run the RAF School for Prisoners of War. This offered PoWs lectures on 34 subjects from Latin to hotel management. Although many of them went on to pass exams, McGlashan believed the true value of the courses lay in preserving morale in the camp. He also taught bridge.

Georgetown Law seeks Graduate Clinical Teaching Fellow and Legislative Lawyer with an Emphasis on National Security and Foreign Affairs. The Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic (FLAC) at the Georgetown University Law Center seeks a bar-admitted legislative lawyer to supervise advanced law students during a graduate clinical teaching fellowship starting January 2011. Candidates must have excellent analytical, writing, and interpersonal skills, and keen interest in all of the following: clinical teaching, legislation, and the national security / foreign affairs field. Candidates must be admitted to the District of Columbia bar as of the start of the fellowship, or be admitted in another jurisdiction with an application to waive into the D.C. bar pending. The duration of the fellowship is negotiable and may be one half year, 1.5 years, or 2.5 years. Fellows who successfully complete a fellowship of 2.5 years receive an LL.M. The fellow receives an annual stipend of approximately $50,000 (taxable, and pro-rated during the first academic term), health and dental benefits, and all tuition and fees for the LL.M. program. The fellow supervises approximately five students and works with the FLAC director and national security / foreign affairs clients on important real-world policy and legislative initiatives. More information about the clinical fellowship may be found at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/clinics/documents/GLClinics09.pdf (page 26). Not later than Monday, September 27, 2010, submit a concise statement of interest, CV, list of references, law school transcript (if possible), and writing sample to Visiting Associate Professor Dakota Rudesill, Interim Director, Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic, 111 F Street NW, Room 340, Washington, D.C. 2000-2095. Send a contemporaneous email with all materials, and direct any questions, to Loretta Moss, FLAC Executive Assistant, at moss@law.georgetown.edu. Interested candidates who previously applied for a FLAC fellowship should communicate their continued interest along with any relevant updates to their files.

----------------------------------

From The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law: Director, Liberty and National Security Project. The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law seeks a Director for its Liberty and National Security (LNS) Project, an initiative of its Justice Program. The Project strives to ensure that our government's response to terrorism conforms to the nation's deepest Constitutional values. Building on our work on checks and balances and detention policy, we are expanding our efforts on government transparency and accountability, and domestic counterterrorism policies, particularly those that may lead to ethnic or religious profiling and undue invasions of privacy. We deploy policy analysis, research, scholarship, public education, convenings, counseling of officials and activists, legislative drafting and advocacy, and litigation. We publish reports and books; wage legislative advocacy campaigns; work with affected communities; and conduct litigation (including before the U.S. Supreme Court).

The Position: The Director develops and implements the Project's overall vision and strategy, is deeply involved in substantive initiatives, and manages a team of attorneys, policy associates, research associates and consultants. In addition, the Director works closely with the Development Department to raise funds and with the Communications Department to coordinate public education and media strategies.

Qualifications: The ideal candidate will have a law degree, an extensive background in issues involving the intersection of national security and civil liberties, and human rights, and a demonstrated commitment to pursuing justice. We seek a candidate with exceptional leadership and vision, and a broad array of skills including: excellent research, writing, and analytical ability; demonstrated skill as a litigator and/or policy advocate; outstanding communications and public speaking skills; a strong work ethic and capacity for juggling multiple responsibilities; ability to work with diverse clients, coalition members, and governmental officials; ability to fundraise; and demonstrated ability to supervise staff. Lawyers in public interest, private practice, government, journalism, academia, or the military are encouraged to apply. The job is located in New York or Washington, D.C.

The Brennan Center, an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer, is strongly committed to diversity and welcomes applicants of all races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations, including people who have been previously incarcerated.

The Center: The Center is a nonpartisan public policy and law institute that focuses on the fundamental issues of democracy and justice. The Center has approximately 55 staff, including attorneys, researchers, and public affairs professionals. The Center operates offices in New York and in Washington, D.C. For more information, visit: http://www.brennancenter.org .

[CAVEAT: Members are reminded, under no circumstances, should they reveal classified means and methods in their replies to any requests, nor should they necessarily trust the sincerity of research projects. As long as they exercise professional caution, they should feel free to respond to appropriate requests for assistance, or employment offers seeking detailed background information, within those boundaries.]

Bangladesh Coups. Dear Sir/Madam: I am studying the coups in Bangladesh in 1975, 1981 and 1982. I would appreciate very much if you could help me with any information that you might have or if you could lead me to someone who might be able to give me some information.

Dr. John Behling served in the Office of
Strategic Services and Military Intelligence during and after
WWII. He was a member of the Office of Intelligence and Research
with the State Department, a Foreign Service officer, a free lance
contract agent for the CIA, and a university professor. He has
numerous publications dealing with language studies, the USSR, and
terrorism. AFIO members are invited to join us as Dr. Behling
shares a chapter from his forthcoming book The DNA of Terrorism.
The event takes place in the Commonwealth Room in the DeSales
University Center on the DeSales University campus (2755 Station
Avenue, Center Valley, PA 18034). For questions please email Dr.
Andrew Essig at Andrew.Essig@desales.edu or call 610-282-1100 x1632. No RSVP is required. This event is open to the public and free of charge.

The speaker is on the National Defense Intelligence College faculty.
He has over ten years' experience as a China analyst. He was a
supervisor in the FBI's China counterintelligence analysis unit and an
all-source intelligence analyst in DIA's Korea and China divisions. He
is a retired US Army Reserve Military Intelligence officer who has
served as Deputy Chief of CENTCOM J2's Iraq current intelligence team
and as liaison officer to the CIA Iraq Operations Group.
The speaker's remarks about Chinese intelligence will be off the record and not for attribution.
Events takes place at Pulcinella Restaurant, 6852 Old Dominion Drive, McLean, VA.
Pay at the door with a check for $29 payable to DIAA, Inc
Social hour starts at 1130, lunch at 1200.
The Defense Intelligence forum is open to members of all Intelligence Community associations.
RSVP by Friday, 17 September, by email to diforum@verizon.net
-- In your response, give your name and the names of your guests. For
each, choose chicken al limone, salmon, lasagna, sausage, or pasta with
portabello.
-- Include also telephone numbers and email addresses.
Pay at the door with a check for $29 per person.
-- Make checks payable to DIAA, Inc.
-- The DIAA does not take cash. If you do not have a check, the
restaurant will have you prepay the $29 using your credit. The copy of
the restaurant's receipt allows you to check-in for lunch.

Gary Noesner, the founding chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit shares a
firsthand account of many dramatic cases -- the D.C. Sniper, Waco and
Montana Freemen -- highlighting successes, failures and lessons for
resolving all types of crises. Event being held in Research I, Room 163
on Fairfax campus of George Mason University. For more information visit www.fairfaxcounty.gov/library

"Forty-five years ago…a group of young Air Force pilots volunteered
to be 'sheepdipped' from the Air Force to the CIA to fly an unidentified
aircraft at an undisclosed venue to replace the U-2." --Frank Murray,
A-12 pilot The Air Force's high-flying SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft,
which literally flew faster than a speeding bullet, is legendary. Much
less well known is the CIA's version, the A-12, which first flew two
years before the SR-71 under the OXCART program. Built by Lockheed's
famous "Skunk Works," the plane was an engineering marvel. It made
repeated flights over Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, providing
photographs to commanders in less than 24 hours from the end of a
mission. In 1968, in a ten minute mission that photographed all of North
Korea without being detected, an A-12 located the captured American spy
ship, Pueblo. Only recently has the veil of secrecy been lifted from
this amazing aircraft, allowing the full story to be told, including its
enduring legacy. Now the program's pioneers gather to share its
history: from sky-high successes to fiery crashes. CIA chief historian David Robarge will be joined by program veterans Robert B. Abernethy, inventor of the J-58 engines used in the A-12, Thornton D. Barnes, hypersonic flight specialist, and AFIO's President S. Eugene Poteat, the CIA officer who assessed threats to the A-12, and others. Kenneth Collins,
an A-12 pilot who flew six missions over Vietnam, will also tell his
story, along with other test pilots. Tickets: $12.50 per person Register
at www.spymuseum.org

The career talk and recruitment visit will be held at the LMU
campus-Hilton Building in Room 304. The guest speaker will be
Multi-Disciplinary Recruiter Sharon Cordero from the Central
Intelligence Agency's Recruitment Center, she will conduct a
presentation on Recruitment for the 21st Century. Please RSVP via email
to afio_la@yahoo.com if you will attend, complimentary refreshments will be served

W. George Jameson gives this one-day course
examining the legal and policy framework that governs the U.S.
Intelligence Community. It presents the core legal authorities and
restrictions - derived from the Constitution, statutes, and Executive
orders - and explores how and why they are applied to the conduct of
U.S. intelligence today. Designed for a wide audience, the course
reviews the history and evolution of intelligence law and policy and
provides an in-depth look at selected laws that affect intelligence
activities. Topics include: the National Security Act and
establishment of the CIA and other intelligence elements; electronic
surveillance and FISA; the role of the DNI; privacy, civil liberties,
and restrictions on the conduct of intelligence; covert action;
congressional oversight; protection of sources and methods,
classification, and leaks; and the laws and relationships that govern
the fight against terrorism. Finally, the course provides an
introduction to how the laws are applied to emerging national security
concerns such as cyber threats.
Fee: $750.
Location: The Intelligence & Security Academy, 1890 Preston White Dr Suite 250, Reston, VA 20191
To Register: https://www.regonline.com/intelligence_and_the_law

The U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian is pleased to
invite AFIO members to a conference on the American Experience in
Southeast Asia, 1946-1975, which will be held in the George C.
Marshall
Conference Center at the State Dept. The conference will feature a
number of key Department of State personnel, both past and present.
Those speaking will include:
* Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
* Former Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte
* Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard A.
Holbrooke
The conference will include a panel composed of key print and
television
media personnel from the Vietnam period discussing the impact of the
press on public opinion and United States policy. A number of
scholarly
panels featuring thought-provoking works by leading scholars will also
take place. Registration information will be available at the State
Dept
website, http://history.state.gov,
after August 1.

Dmitri Bystrolyotov was a man out of the movies:
dashingly handsome and fluent in many languages, he was a sailor,
artist, doctor, lawyer, and artist. He was also a spy for Stalin's
Soviet Union. By seducing women, including a French diplomat, the wife
of a British official, and a Gestapo officer, he was able to deliver
many secrets back to his masters in Moscow. His espionage career came
to an end in 1938, however, when he was caught up in Stalin's purges.
Sent to the Gulag for twenty years, he suffered tremendous physical
hardship but he also came to see the reality of the regime for which he
had spied. Join us for a fascinating talk about Bystrolyotov's rise to
greatness and fall from Stalin's graces with author Emil Draitser,
once a journalist in the Soviet Union and now a professor at Hunter
College in New York. Free! No registration required! Join the author for
an informal chat and book signing. More information at www.spymuseum.org

The event features three outstanding speakers. The first speaker
will begin his presentation at 1030. We'll work in the next 2 speakers
and lunch at 1200. We'll adjourn at ~1430.
Our speakers will be: Major Bryan K. Pillai,
Chapter Member Edward M. Jankovic,
Author John Weisman.
Bios of the three speakers are available from: afionechapter@gmail.comLocation: the Salem Waterfront Hotel located in Salem MA. The hotel web site is here: http://www.salemwaterfronthotel.com/. For directions to the hotel look here: http://www.salemwaterfronthotel.com/location.html
Information about Salem MA and local hotels can be found here: http://salem.org/
Note, as this meeting is a one day event we have not made any hotel arrangements. For additional information contact us at afionechapter@gmail.com
Advance reservations are $25.00, $30.00 at the door - per person. Luncheon reservations must be made by 15 September 2010.
Mail your check and the reservation form to: Arthur Hulnick, 216 Summit Avenue # E102, Brookline, MA 02446;
617-739-7074 or hlnk@aol.com

"It's pretty shocking. I didn't think stuff like this still went on."
--Scott Inouye, neighbor to two Russian spies On 29 June, 2010
Americans were stunned and then bemused to learn of the arrest of ten
Russian "deep-cover" spies who had lived among us for decades as
neighbors and Facebook friends-while at the same time operating with
secret mission: to meet influential Americans and exploit them for their
knowledge of government policy. "Illegals," like these spies, have been
a Moscow specialty for years, but traditionally are used sparingly-for
only the most sensitive of operations. Seldom has the U.S. government
been able to find and arrest "illegals," so Americans are generally not
aware of this threat. Join H. Keith Melton, renowned
intelligence historian, technical advisor to American intelligence
agencies, author of Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs,
from Communism to Al-Qaeda, and International Spy Museum board member,
and Brian Kelley, counterintelligence specialist with
over forty years experience as a USAF and CIA case officer specializing
in double agent and deception operations, a recipient of the
Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, and currently adjunct professor
at several graduate schools on counterintelligence and national
security issues, as they shine a spotlight on the murky world of
illegals: what they are, how they operate, and the threat they pose.
With access to never-before-seen images, Melton will demonstrate both
the classis and up-to-date spycraft used by these "spies next door."
Retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin will also provide commentary based on his years running agents in the U.S. Tickets: $12.50 per person. Register at www.spymuseum.org

SPEAKER: Representative Kevin C. Ambler, District 47, who serves in the Florida State House of Representatives. District 47 is located in Northwest Hillsborough County. Representative Ambler attended Cornell University on a four-year Air Force ROTC scholarship where he received his Bachelor of Science degree in economics in 1983. Upon graduation, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force. In 1986, he received his J.D. from Southwestern University School of Law in Los Angeles, California. Soon after, he was appointed as an Air Force judge advocate and assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, where he served for nearly 5 years in several positions including Chief of Claims, Chief of Legal Assistance, Chief of Military Justice and Chief of the Civil Law division. During this same time, he also was appointed by the U.S. Attorney General as a Special Assistant United States Attorney and was responsible for prosecuting criminal cases in federal court against civilians arising on MacDill AFB. Later, his responsibilities expanded to defending the United States in federal court in medical malpractice and personal injury cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Representative Ambler entered private practice and transferred to the Air Force Reserves in 1991. During his first year as a reservist, he was awarded the Harmon Award by the Air Force Judge Advocate General as the Most Outstanding Reserve Judge Advocate in the U.S. Air Force. Representative Ambler's other military decorations include the Air Force Achievement Medal, two Air Force Meritorious Service Medals, and two National Defense Services Medals. RSVP no later than October 7th with the names of any guests. Check-in at 1130 hours; opening ceremonies, lunch and business meeting at noon, followed by our speaker, who will be announced. We have maintained the all-inclusive cost at $15. The cash wine and soda bar will open at 1100 hours for those that wish to come early to socialize. You must present your $15 check payable to "Suncoast Chapter, AFIO" (or cash) at check-in to cover the luncheon. Should you not have a 'bumper sticker' or ID card for access to MacDill AFB, please so state in your RSVP. Be sure to include your license number, name on drivers license and state of issue for yourself and for any guests you are bringing on base. Anyone with special roster gate access should proceed to the Bayshore Gate. If you need directions, please let us know. The main gate will send you to the visitor's center and they will not be able to help you enter the base, only give you directions to the Bayshore Gate. To register: afiosuncoastvp@aol.com

There will be a panel discussion in the morning on "The Future of
the Intelligence Community -- Too Big, Too Small, Just Right?" The
panel will be moderated by Patrick Weadon and the panel will consist of
Mr. Rich Haver, Lt. Gen (Ret) Ken Minihan and Ms. Rachel Martin.
There will be a discussion on various aspects of the Cyber Command in
the afternoon session. Details are available on the NCMF Web site at www.cryptologicfoundation.org. Invitations will be mailed to all active members shortly (About the Foundation, Coming Events)

Mr. Steve Hooper and Mr. Mark Gygi will discuss the "FBI's Evolving Domestic Intelligence Mission." Hooper
and Mr. Mark Gygi, who co-manage the Phoenix FBI's overall Intelligence
Program, will be speaking on the FBI's Evolving Domestic Intelligence
Mission, with an emphasis on how this intelligence mission impacts
locally on things like the South-West border. Hooper has been an FBI
Special Agent for more than 25 years. He has served in Portland,
Baltimore, Annapolis, and FBI Hqs. He was detailed to CIA's
Counterterrorism Center for a period after 9/11. He has been in the
Phoenix office for 3 years, where he serves as Assistant Special
Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) of the intelligence program. Gygi has been
involved in the U.S. intelligence community for more than 25 years,
having lived and served abroad for 13 plus years. His overseas
assignments took him to Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia.
As a senior officer he is currently detailed to the Phoenix FBI to
co-manage the intelligence program for that Bureau office. He has been
in Phoenix for 2 and 1/2 years. Event is being held at: McCormick RANCH
GOLF COURSE (7505 McCormick Parkway, Scottsdale AZ 85258 ~ Phone
480.948.0260). Our meeting fees are as follows: $20.00 for AFIO
members, $22.00 for guests. For reservations or questions, please email Simone sl@4smartphone.net or simone@afioaz.org or call and leave a message on 602.570.6016. Art Kerns, president@afioaz.org.

There have been significant changes to U.S. Counterintelligence in
2010, as well as challenges and opportunities. Hear the latest
information on CI from the premier DIA Defense Counterintelligence and
HUMINT Center Senior intelligence leaders from DIA who will discuss the
entire CI Enterprise and CI training. Army, Navy, and Air Force
leadership will address the latest changes to their organizations from
their services perspective. The various Combatant Command CI
representatives will provide the current CI picture from their
particular geographic areas. A special Army and NATO CI unit will
address CI issues in a wartime environment. The FBI will weigh in by
discussing the latest issues concerning domestic CI threats and
responses to them. The critical areas of CI analysis and the CI
interface with cyber will round out the symposium. To register or for
more information visit: https://www.123signup.com/event?id=mnszh

Harry Gold was literally the man who handed the Soviets the plans
for America's nuclear bomb. A Russian-Jewish immigrant from Switzerland,
he became a spy for the Soviets while studying chemistry in the United
States during the depths of the Great Depression. His KGB code names,
such as "Goose" and "Mad," belied his importance as a liaison to
important spies within the scientific and engineering communities.
During World War II, he was entrusted to be the KGB's handler for
physicist Klaus Fuchs, who had burrowed deep into the Manhattan Project,
America's super-secret program to build an atom bomb. After Gold's
arrest in 1950, his testimony helped send Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to
the electric chair. Journalist and historian Allen Hornblum will help us understand how a decent and well-intentioned man helped
commit the greatest scientific theft of the twentieth century.
Free! No registration required! Join the author for an informal chat and book signing. More information at www.spymuseum.org

Location: Christopher Newport University, Newport News.
Theme: Maritime and Port Security
We seek sponsorship at all levels to help cover costs. Please advise
if you know of a company or organization that might like to sponsor the
event.
Sponsorships start at $250.
RSVP: Melissa Saunders mwsaunders@cox.net

"One of the gunmen seemed to be talking on a mobile phone even as he
used his other hand to fire off rounds." — Nisar Suttar, eyewitness,
November 2008
On 26 November 2008, ten highly trained and disciplined men used
covert intelligence and off-the-shelf technology to terrorize and
immobilize the city of Mumbai, killing 166 people and wounding over 300.
The attackers were able to effectively overwhelm the Mumbai police and
Indian security forces utilizing integrated tactics, superior weaponry,
and sophisticated covert communications that provided their Pakistani
handlers with "real time" command and control as events unfolded. This
change in tactics has presented a challenge for the West: how can we
find ways to defend against similar attacks in the future? H. Keith
Melton, renowned intelligence historian, technical advisor to American
intelligence agencies, author of Spycraft: The Secret History of the
CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to Al-Qaeda, and International Spy Museum
board member, has thoroughly researched the planning and technology
behind the attack. Using videotape of the surviving attacker's
confession and intercepts of terrorist voice communications during the
assault, he will offer a strategic overview of the attacks and explore
the tactical phases, and the use by the terrorists of "commercial
off-the-shelf" (COTS) technologies and the Internet.
Tickets: $12.50 per person. Seating is limited. Register at www.spymuseum.org

SPYCRUISE®: A National Security Educational Lecture/Seminar Series.
The CI Centre and Henley-Putnam University are sponsoring a new
SpyCruise®, November 13-20, 2010. Join them on the Holland American MS Eurodam as they set sail from Ft. Lauderdale, FL to the Grand Turks, San Juan,
St. Thomas and Half Moon Cay in the Caribbean. Speakers include former
DCI’s Porter Goss and Gen. Michael Hayden plus many others. AFIO member and retired CIA operations officer Bart Bechtel continues his role as the “SpySkipper.” For more information about this year’s SpyCruise®, go to: http://spytrek.com/spycruise.html. RESERVATIONS: www.DFunTravel.com or call 1-888-670-0008.
Fees for an eight day cruise: $1,199 inside cabin; $1269 Ocean View
Cabin; $1449 Verandahs; $1979 Suites. Price includes program, taxes,
port charges and gratuities.
Colorful brochure here.

"CIA and ISI operatives depend on each other for their lives…" - so says an anonymous senior ISI official, December 2009
As the U.S. hunts down Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, the CIA appears
to be working closely with the Pakistan Intelligence Service (ISI). But
the two services have a long and rocky history with frequent betrayal
by ISI members saying one thing, and aiding the Taliban
behind-the-scenes. While the ISI has helped with the capture of Afghan
Taliban leaders, some they have released Taliban figures they caught on
their own. What is the future of this relationship? Are the CIA and
ISI endgames compatible? Join this panel of experts as they explore
what's opinions of what's happening on the ground in Pakistan and a few
predictions for the future: Farhana Ali, senior lecturer, AFPAK Team, Booz, Allen & Hamilton; Seth Jones, RAND analyst and author of Counterinsurgency in Pakistan; and Shuja Nawaz, director, South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
Fee:
Tickets: $12.50 To register, visit www.spymuseum.org

Weekly
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