Karl-Heinz KraemerDepartment of Political Science of South
Asia, South Asia Institute, University of
Heidelberg

The janajati and the Nepali state:
aspects of identity and integration

Paper presented at the First Annual Workshop of the Himalayan
Studies Network, Meudon, C.N.R.S., 25-26 September 1998

Introduction

In this circle of Nepal experts I don't have to dwell too much on
the historical facts and developments that have led to Nepal's current socio-political
situation. Right from the beginning of its unification the modern state of Nepal has been
an affair of elites belonging to some high caste Hindu groups. At the same time, the
numerous ethnic groups and the lower Hindu castes became marginalized and were prevented
from every kind of participation. This status was codified by the muluki ain of
1854 and it was further intensified in recent times by the unitarian politics of King
Mahendra's panchayat system.

It was only in the late seventies and early eighties that the
growing self-consciousness of ethnic elites led to the formation of ethnic organizations.
As turning point one can identify the students riots of 1979 and the national referendum
of 1980 which led to constitutional changes undermining the conservative basis of the
royal system. The people saw that political and social changes were possible by mobilising
the masses. Because of Nepal's ethnic diversity the ethnic organizations only represented
very small sections of society, even though their matters of concern were very similar in
nature. So the organizations started informal talks which, in 1986, led to the formation
of the Sarvajati Adhikar Manc (Forum for the Rights of All Nationalities).

A further step was the active participation of ethnic organizations
in the people's movement of 1990, now under the name of Vividh Dharma, Bhasha, Jati tatha
Janajati Sandharsha Samiti (Various Religions, Languages and Nationalities Action
Committee). The ethnic elites not only wanted a change of the political system but also
socio-political modifications and economic participation.

Beyond doubt, the political changes of 1990 have opened up broader
scopes for Nepal's numerous ethnic groups. Many of them have formed organizations to
preserve their cultural identity and to fight for equal rights and participation in the
Nepali state. Starting with criteria like race, language, religion and territory they have
detected the importance of history as a prerequisite for all their demands. They have
started to write down the history of their respective groups, not all of which have been
historically formed entities, and, thus, prove that they are part of the modern Nepali
nation.

On the other side, we have a Nepali state which until 1990 totally
disregarded the multiethnicity of its society. It was during the elaboration phase of the
new constitution that ethnic demands were presented in public. But there was no
participation of ethnic groups in the decision-making bodies, neither in the political
parties nor in the Constitution Drafting Commission. So, the result was half-hearted. The
Nepali state recognized the multiethnicity of society but it refused to introduce
institutions and regulations for a broader participation of the disadvantaged sections of
society.

Ethnic arguments

The ethnic elites are trying to reconcile their groups with their
cultural values but, at the same time, look for new ways of interpretation of tradition.
Their first argument is that of race. Most of Nepal's ethnic groups belong to the
Tibeto-Mongolian stock. There are only a few Tarai groups having relations to Indian
Mundas or Southeast Asian groups. By laying stress on their common Tibeto-Mongolian race
the ethnic elites  they usually speak of Mongols or Mongoloids  not only point
out their differentness from the high Hindu castes dominating in politics, society and
economy, but at the same time they also provide a common racial bond for Nepal's divergent
ethnic groups.

The elites' second argument is that of religion. It is claimed that
all ethnic groups of the country are Buddhists or, at least, are influenced by Buddhist
thought. This again brings them in contrast to the relative minority of high Hindu castes
who have declared Nepal to be a Hindu state. Different from race, the religion is one of
the fundamental pillars of ethnic culture. Thus it would be an ideal starting point for
ethnic reconciliation and for separation from the country's ruling elite. But the problem
again is that it is not clear, as well. The mixture of religious thoughts and practices
across ethnic boundaries has even been stronger than that of racial phenomena. The
religious base of most ethnic cultures is not Buddhism but some kind of animism or
shamanism which, within many ethnic cultures of the pahad region, has been
overlapped by Buddhist influences with different intensity. Other ethnic groups, because
of their long running contacts to neighbouring Hindu castes, have adopted a number of
Hindu values and practices.

This historical overlapping and reciprocal influencing of religions
has been intensified in modern times by the Nepali state through some form of guided
Hinduization of society. This process already started in some of the principalities of
western Nepal in pre-unification times, and it got its legal basis by the promulgation of
the muluki ain in 1854. The ethnic elites regard this legalisation of the Hindu
social order as principal cause for all inequalities in politics, economy and society. To
be non-Hindu becomes an important means of ethnic politics. Not animist practices but
Buddhism can provide an important counterbalance when entering into discussions with the
state Hinduism of the ruling elite.

Another argument of the ethnic elites is language. All
Tibeto-Mongolian groups speak Tibeto-Burman languages. This distinguishes them from the
Indo-Aryan Hindu population speaking Nepali, an Indo-European language, as mother tongue.
The language has been used by the Nepali state as one of the most important tools to
enforce its Hindu politics. The government's statistics showed a steady decline of the
number of people speaking ethnic languages while, at the same time, the share of Nepali as
mother tongue went up to more than 58% in the census of 1981. The current endeavour of the
ethnic elites to revive their mother tongues and, if necessary, equip them with script and
literature is based on the constitution's definition of the state as a multiethnic and
multilingual one. This is often an arduous task in face of the lingual heterogeneity of
many ethnic groups.

The ethnic elites demand an equal treatment of all languages in
education, administration, judiciary and the media, since Nepali is a foreign or only
secondary language for almost 50% of the population. They don't object the use of Nepali
as lingua franca but the special promotion of Nepali and Sanskrit to the detriment of
ethnic languages. Language may be a cultural element but, by using it as a fundamental
argument in their dialogue with the state, the ethnic organizations make it a political
one. This politization of the ethnic organizations is also forced by the Nepali state
which has made language a political issue since the time of military unification and
especially since the 1950s.

Ethnic organizations, having realised this, soon enter the next
stage of argumentation which definitely is a political one. If they talk about history, it
is first of all not the history of their own groups but it is the history of the Nepali
state, that they criticize and want to have re-written. According to their argumentation,
the integration of the different peoples of the country is only possible if all ethnic
groups are treated equally. There can be no talk of equality of all Nepali citizens as
long as the official version of Nepali history, as it can be read in a steadily growing
number of history books, is only a history of the ruling elite, in which the ethnic groups
are non-existent. The written history of the country is a mirror of the social order.

The history of the country, so the argumentation of the ethnic
organizations, must bear witness to the great injustice inflicted upon the numerous
peoples by the ruling elite in the past. Especially mentioned in this context are

deprivation of ethnic territories by the Nepali state,

allocation of ethnic territories in favour of members of high Hindu
castes,

enslavement, subjugation and indebtedness of once autonomous and
self-sufficient ethnic peasants,

systematic decomposition and dissolution of ethnic areas by
settlement of members of high Hindu castes,

deliberate cutting of ethnic areas by arbitrary drawing up of
administrative borders,

social and judicial incapacitation of ethnic groups by the
discriminating law code of the muluki ain,

introduction of caste values and prejudices into ethnic communities,
which  with the sole exception of the Newars  had casteless societies before,

withholding of every kind of education,

exclusion from all government offices,

non-participation in the politics and administration of the country,

destruction of ethnic cultures by perpetual state politics of
Hinduization.

According to representatives of the ethnic organizations, all this
has to be mentioned by name without extenuation or reservation. In this way, history
becomes the strongest and most important argument for the formation of consciousness and
identity among Nepal's ethnic groups. Their leaders argue that their situation can only be
changed by a fundamental revision of Nepali history.

But in order to re-write the national history of Nepal, ethnic
historiography is a precondition, if the ethnic leaders want to enter into discussions
with the Nepali state about the abolition of inequalities. By setting the classical ethnic
arguments  like race, language and religion  into the historical framework
they loose their exclusively cultural aspects and become a political issue. It is in the
historical context, that ethnic groups change from cultural entities to nationalities, janajati,
as they are called by the current ethnic leaders.

Constitutional regulations

The introduction of the new constitution in 1990 offered a chance to
reconsider the state's politics of nationalism. How did the ruling elites use this
opportunity? Article 2 of the constitution defines that all "Nepali people
irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe collectively constitute the nation (rastra)."
This sounds positive since no section of population is excluded. But this positive aspect
is revoked by article 4 (1) which, on the one hand, concedes that Nepal is a multiethnic
and multilingual state but, at the same time, defines the country as a Hindu kingdom (hindu
adhirajya). This definition as Hindu state is underlined by a number of symbols
mentioned in the constitution like the flag and the coat of arms representing different
aspects of Hindu myths and society.

Another important aspect of the constitution is the definition of
Nepali as the language of the nation (rastra bhasa) (article 6). Of course, the
country is in need of a common language, and there is no other language as widespread as
Nepali. But it is the mother tongue of only 53% of the population according to the census
of 1991. For the rest of the population, Nepali is some kind of foreign language. Having
only rudimentary knowledge of colloquial Nepali these people feel deprived of their
fundamental rights guaranteed elsewhere by the constitution, especially in face of the
ever growing Sanskritization of the high standard language to the detriment of indigenous
terms.

Thus the ethnic elites regard the national language Nepali as
another symbol of high Hindu caste domination. Against the background of Nepal being a
multilingual country social tensions are to be preprogrammed the faster the political and
social consciousness of the ethnic groups is growing. The constitution has named the other
languages as national languages (rastriya bhasa) without providing further
specification. That they are not meant for official use has quite recently been declared
by the Supreme Court, when the District Development Committees (DDC) of Kathmandu,
Dhanusha and Rajbiraj were prohibited to use Newari respectively Maithili during their
meetings. Even Village Development Committees (VDC) comprising members of one single
ethnic group only are not allowed to use their mother tongue. Among the few positive
reactions of the state must be mentioned that Radio Nepal is sending short news programmes
in ethnic languages, spoken by more than 1% of the population, and that the Royal Nepal
Academy has started to publish books on ethnic languages.

During the drafting phase of the constitution in 1990 the
transformation of Nepal into a secular state had been demanded by ethnic and women
organizations as well as by representatives of the Buddhists, Muslims, Christians and the
so-called untouchable Hindu castes. But there had been a vehement opposition against this
idea from Hindu traditional organizations which had strong propagators within the then
interim government, the greater political parties and sections of the press.

The chairman of the Constitution Drafting Commission and later Chief
Justice, Vishwanath Upadhyaya, called all demands concerning religion, language, caste and
ethnicity, which comprised about 90% of the public recommendations, as being of minor
importance for a democratic Nepal, comparing them to communalism:

Statements which foster communalism and sow the seeds of
religious intolerance cannot be justified. Such improper tendencies, if not checked in
time, will create obstacle in our efforts to establish a democratic constitutional system.

That only a non-Hindu alignment is regarded as communal can be seen
from Article 112 (3) which denies the recognition of any political party or organization
formed on the basis of religion, community, caste, tribe or region. Must not the state
itself be called communal because of its Hindu affiliation? This is further verified by
the fact that after 1990 regional parties were recognized as long as they did not oppose
the Hindu state, e.g. the Nepal Sadbhavana Party, but they were rejected whenever they
opposed the Hindu state and supported the cause of ethnic groups like the Mongol National
Organization.

Attitudes of government and political parties

Right from the beginning the Nepali political parties have been
dominated by members of the upper Hindu castes, especially by Bahuns. This fact, too, has
its reason in the historical development of unified Nepal, which now is so strongly
criticised by the ethnic elites. Prithvinarayan Shah and his successors founded their
power on the support of a number of Bahun and Chetri families who, in return, got a share
in political and economic respects. Later when a new aristocracy arose with the ascent of
the Ranas, those better off families settled in the Tarai or in India, where they had the
chance to send their children to Indian schools. They not only became educated but,
actively participating in the Indian independence movement, they also got political
consciousness. It was this younger generation of expatriate Nepalis that in the late
forties founded parties like the Nepali Congress and the Nepal Communist Party in India.

Since then not much has changed in the rank and file of the parties.
The 1950s, sometimes called a phase of democratic experiments, has been more a time of
restoration of royal power, especially under King Mahendra, doing little to participate
greater sections of society in the political process. Following a period of 30 years in
underground the political parties of the 1990s are only just starting to become mass
organizations. They are still dominated by a handful of now elder politicians of the
foundation years. But the problem is that the inevitable regeneration of the parties is
not taken as a chance to participate different sections of society within the party rank
and file. In 1991 37% of the
Nepali Congress candidates and 48% of those of the CPM-UML were Bahuns and another 22%
respectively 16% were Chetris, even though these groups have only a share of 13%
respectively 16% in the population of the country according to the census of 1991. Or to
mention another figure, among the ministers of the two Girija Prasad Koirala cabinets 50%
were/are Bahuns.

Another constitutional institution criticized by the ethnic
organizations is the National Assembly (rastriya sabha). In its current form it is
some kind of reduplication of the House of Representatives (pratinidhi sabha), the
latter nominating 35 of the 60 members of the National assembly according to the party
strength in the lower house. The ethnic elites, instead, want the National Assembly to be
a house of parliament were all population groups of Nepal are represented. In 1991, when
the rastriya sabha was constituted for the first time, 40% of its members were
Bahuns, which is similar to the figures of the pratinidhi sabha.

This ethnic number game could be continued endlessly. It proves that
people of ethnic groups dont have equal chances of participation even in democratic
Nepal. This was confirmed to me by Rai and Limbu MPs of eastern Nepal, who said that they
only have a chance on the local level but not in the central hierarchy of their parties.
Most of the persons involved in ethnic activities are closer to left parties than to the
Nepali Congress. The reason may be that the latter party is identifying more and more with
the traditional forces of the country. The ethnic organizations want fundamental changes
of state and society, and these dont seem to be possible with the Nepali Congress.
In a society characterized by poverty and socio-religious inequalities the people are
looking for a kind of political representation that opens up perspectives and hopes
changing their fate.

The continuation of the Hindu state has been the highest maxim of
both the conservative forces and the leading party politicians of democratic Nepal,
because this alone guarantees their elite privileges. Secularism has always been
identified with the lifting of the ban of missionary practices. There are talks of the
decline of Hinduism, its eradication by Christian missionaries and finally the expulsion
of Hindus from Nepal. Taking the mean practices of some of the numerous Christian aid
organizations working in the country for common, there are never ending talks of thousands
of conversions to Christianity day by day.

But the discussion of dangerous Christian missionary distracts from
the negative attitudes of the Hindu state for the many indigenous cultures. In support of
the Hindu state-religion the king and the politicians are courting Hindu dignitaries and
sponsoring Hindu organizations and events. One never hears any word about the danger of
Christian missionary for the ethnic cultures, the Buddhists and the Muslims, not to talk
about the danger of state Hinduism for these religions and cultures.

Conclusion

Nepals ethnic groups are still lacking integration and
participation in the modern democratic state. But their situation has, nevertheless,
improved compared to panchayat times. The guarantee of fundamental rights is much
safer today. Especially the right of freedom of opinion and expression and the freedom to
form organizations (article 12) have helped the ethnic elites to make their arguments
heard among their own groups and in the general public.

The greatest problem is still the attitude of the Nepali state.
There is hardly any organization outside the ethnic camp that is really understanding the
ethnic argumentation. An outstanding example are the human rights organizations which have
come into existence in greater number. They may be talking about indigenous groups, but
like the political parties they, too, are dominated by members of high Hindu castes,
especially Bahuns. These people cannot understand the arguments of the ethnic leaders,
since they have never learnt to view the Nepali state and society from the ethnic
perspective because of the one-sidedness of the national education system.

Nepal must make the diversity of her ethnic groups, religions and
cultures an essential feature of her nationalism. The unity of the nation can only be
preserved, if the uniforming politics of the Hindu state are brought to an end, and if the
constitutional declaration in the multiethnicity of the country is implemented by politics
of integration and equal treatment of all groups of the Nepali society.