Abstract [en]

Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.

Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.

Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability

Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

Abstract [en]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 86 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.

Landström, Mats

Abstract [en]

A difference-in-difference approach was used to investigate whether central bank independence (CBI) reforms matter for inflation, based on a novel dataset including the possible occurrence of such reforms in 132 countries during the period 1980 to 2005. CBI-reforms are found to have contributed to bringing down high inflation rates where those existed, but they seem unrelated to performance in low-inflation countries.

Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov

Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics.

Landström, Mats

Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics.

Rudholm, Niklas

Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics.

2013 (English)Report (Other academic)

Abstract [en]

Using data on the occurence of central bank independence (CBI) reforms in 131 countries during 1980-2005, we test whether they were important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability. CBI reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average 3.31% when countries with historically high inflation rates are included. But countries with lower inflation have reduced it without institutional reforms granting central banks more independence, undermining the theoretical time-inconsistency case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI reforms have helped reduce inflation variability.

Landström, Mats

Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics.

(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)

Abstract [en]

Data on central bank independence (CBI) and implementation dates of CBI-reforms were used to investigate the relationship between CBI and a possible trade-off between inflation variability and output variability. No such trade-off was found, but there might still be stabilization gains from CBI-reform.