Monday, November 30, 2015

Iraq’s insurgency has drawn from many different groups in
Iraq, but two major ones were the tribes and Salafis. Many sheikhs turned
against the United States in 2003 due to the actions of the military and the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In the 1990s Saddam Hussein started his
Faith Campaign, which led to the growth of Salafism in the country. That
ideology fueled many to join Islamist insurgent groups later on. To help
explain these two phenomena is Dr. Amatzia Baram Professor Emeritus at the Department
of History of the Middle East and Director of the Centre for Iraq Studies at
the University of Haifa. He has authored several books on Iraq, his most recent
being Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003: Ba’thi
Iraq from Secularism to Faith.

1. Few expected the
secular Baathist regime in Iraq to turn to religion but it did in the 1990s
with Saddam’s Faith Campaign. Since then historians have disagreed whether this
was just an operational move to shore up support for the regime when it was
struggling under sanctions or whether there was true belief behind it. Where do
you stand on the issue?

The process of
Islamization and what it meant is described in my book in some detail, based on
a combination of open and internal Ba’thi documents. The last party congress
convened to combat al-tadayyun (religious devotion, piety) was convened
in June 1982. The first (secret) meeting of the party’s Regional-Iraqi and
Pan-Arab leaderships designed to legitimize a 180-degree about-face took place
in July 1986.Since then, Saddam pushed
the party leadership (less so the rank and file) relentlessly to Islamize
itself and with it the whole state system. Upon his death in 1989 the party
declared Michel Aflaq, the party’s founder, to be a convert to Islam. This was
the first public sign of the new party-line. Affixing allahu akbar to
the national flag on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War came next, and other steps
followed in rapid succession. There may be no doubt that the “return” to Islam
was at first a cynical, utilitarian policy designed to win the regime support
at home and in the Islamic-Sunni world in time of crisis (the war with Iran was
going very badly). Saddam was saying as much. Many Ba’this remained
more-or-less secular even today, in 2015. However, there are three developments
that need to be understood and appreciated.

1. In Islam, like in
Judaism, rather than believing in a doctrine, the public demonstration of
religiosity, i.e: fulfilling certain precepts, is the most important component.
Those precepts are mainly the five arkan al-islam or “al-ma’ruf”,
“thou shalt do”(in Hebrew: mitzvot) and fulfilling them has the highest
value when a person’s religiosity is considered. Nearly the same applies to the
public avoidance of “al-munkar”, “the forbidden”. Thus, not touching liquor
in public for example is seen by one and all as a sign of religiosity.Likewise, praying in the public eye serves as
an indicator of faith, certainly at the Friday public prayers, at least when it
comes to the Sunna. The Ba’th regime went through these and other motions and
therefore it created the impression of going Islamic.This was accepted by many Sunnis in Iraq
though not by the Shias. Over time (1986-2003) Islamic practices in the public
domain brought many Ba’this closer to religion even though, as pointed out
above, they did not necessarily become mutadayyinin (deeply religious or
pious).

2. Some party
members who were fairly religious to begin with (Izzat Ibrahim al-Dury for
example) but who still believed in the principle of a secular state became
overtime more religious once leader and party encouraged it.Furthermore, the regime supported
intellectual-academic circles that gradually became Sunni Salafis.In the 1970s they were persecuted and even
eliminated, but in the 1990s they thrived.As long as they did not come out against the regime and did not
establish opposition parties they were between tolerated and encouraged. Abu
Bakr al-Baghdad (Ibrahim ‘Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarra’i) is himself a
product of such a circle in Baghdad University.

3. Most importantly:
until the early 1980s the Ba’th party’s approach to religion and even more so
to the religious establishment was scornful and disrespectful. Very religious
people and the clerics were seen as primitive, a remnant of the backward
past.Saddam defined the shari’ah
publicly as irrelevant to modern life. The new policy eradicated this attitude
altogether.Moreover: the Ba’this
recognized the power of Islam as a legitimizing force. Later on, after 2003,
Sunni Islam became an important banner that proved useful to attract supporters
in Iraq, Syria and abroad. Traditional party discipline and the proven utility
of religion has been sufficient to keep even unhappy Ba’this in line behind
Saddam. After his demise Islam’s usefulness was even more obvious. At the same
time, though, as pointed out above, some party members, especially the younger
generation, were more deeply influenced. Finally:drawing upon recorded secret meetings and the
private diary of Saddam’s half-brother, Barazan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, there
are a few indications that Saddam became personally a born-again-Muslim of
sorts. He still consumed alcoholic drinks, but he prayed, and his 2002 personal
secret letter to God is strengthening this impression.

2. How did the Faith
Campaign create a pool of people that would later join the insurgency?

The main
contribution of the 1990s towards the post 2003 era is the fact that even
secular army officers who remained essentially secular identified the power of
Islam as a magnet that later became crucial for recruiting supporters. Izzat
Ibrahim al-Duri influenced many army officers to join Sufi-mystical orders,
mainly the Naqshbandis who are combining Sufism with Orthodoxy. The army
officers, having been dismissed from the military, joined the insurgency,
forming a number of groups, some with perfectly secular, even all-Iraqi
ecumenical names like, “The 1920 Revolution”.Some joined the radical Salafist Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.As far as I know, though, in most part people
joined an organization based on personal friendships and family-tribe relations
rather than on their level of religiosity. In 2006 the Naqshbandis joined the
fray in protest against Saddam’s execution. By 2009 AQI (or the Islamic State
of Iraq) was essentially defeated by the American Surge and the Tribal
Awakening (al-sahwah) and most of these officers fled to Syria.There they established ISIS (The Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham) which came under a unified leadership that was
definitely Salafist.

Many of these Salafis
were themselves the fruits of Saddam’s Faith Campaign part of which was
transforming Iraq’s whole educational system from secular to religious.Not only in universities but also children
between the first and twelfth grades were now encouraged to spend time in the
mosques, something the Ba’th of the 1970s would see as a calamity.They were taught more hours per week Islam,
including Quran and Hadith, Islam teachers became the most prestigious in
school and the whole atmosphere became quite religious. More profoundly, Saddam
attempted to create a kind of a Sunni-Shi’i ecumenical Islam but failed: what
he created was in fact a soft Islamic-Sunni educational system.This prepared a whole generation of Sunni
children for ISIS (Daesh). Also: in the 1990s all Islamic
interpretations other than those approved by Saddam were suppressed, this time
not as before, in the name of Ba’thi pan-Arabism, but in the name of Islam.
This included the practice of giving Saddam a bay’ah, an oath of
allegiance, as was the practice under the caliphate. The latter-day caliph Abu
Bakr, too, demands absolute allegiance and strict adherence to his version of
Islam.

Last but not least:
to Saddam, Islamization also meant brutalization. Severing hands and feet for
any financial crime (defined as “theft”) became quite widespread, and beheading
“prostitutes” was practiced as well. These practices paved the way for even
more fiendish practices by ISIS. The main contribution of Saddam’s Faith
Campaign may be seen therefore in three respects: 1. Demonstrating religiosity
became bon ton or “in vogue” and no longer was a source of embarrassment
even for secular officials and officers. 2. Islam was recognized as a useful
tool to attract new recruits, and 3. The penal code went through a brutal
quantum leap.

3. Besides Islamists,
Iraq’s tribes have been another fertile recruiting ground for militants. From
2003 to the present the country’s tribes have been divided into three major
groups. Some are with the insurgents, some are with the government, while
others are sitting on the fence. What are some factors that have led to this
three-way divide?

A few Sunni tribes
approached the American military commanders as early as 2005 for cooperation
against AQI.Each had its own
reasons.For example, by the spring of 2005 Albu Mahal near al-Qaym
on the Syrian border approached the Marines for cooperation against AQI because
the latter denied them reasonable profits from their traditional smuggling
operations (“import-export business”).A
few months later they were joined by a section of Albu-Nimr a little further
south east.It may be that the latter
had similar reasons but they had definitely an additional one: in 1995 Saddam
cracked down severely on Albu-Nimr and they could not forget nor forgive
it.Joining hands with the Americans
against the pro-Saddam insurgency was one way to get their revenge.By September-October 2006 Albu-Risha in
Ramadi joined hands with the American brigade there against AQI for a different
reason: even though beforehand they had collaborated with AQI, they experienced
a fall-out as a result of some disagreements and immediately suffered
casualties at the hands of AQI. Among those assassinated were also members of
the shaykhly family. Albu Risha killed a few AQI operatives in revenge and
accepted an American offer to join hands. Many other tribes joined in as they
became profoundly disillusions about AQI and the US offered them military and
financial support. Even Baghdad eventually agreed to “hire” the Sunni tribes of
al-Anbar. In other parts the Sunnis remained connected to the Americans.

Today, all the first
three Anbar tribes that had initiated the cooperation with the Americans are
still supporting Baghdad: they are paid from Baghdad, but I am not certain about
support in weapons and ammunition.A
minority, a few sections of tribes (even a small section of Albu-Nimr and
another of the super federation of Shammar Jarbah) are supporting ISIS, either
because they have been coerced, or because they are being offered deals, or
because they are more hostile to Baghdad, that oppressed them under an
American-sponsored Nuri al-Maliki, or all the above. The majority however are
still waiting for an American-Iraqi offer that will not leave them again at the
mercy of a bigot and hostile sectarian government in Baghdad once ISIS is
driven out.

4. Finally, part of
U.S. strategy in Iraq is based upon the belief of creating not only a new Sahwa
of tribal fighters but to recruit more Sunnis into the security forces. Prime
Minister Abadi seems to support this idea as well as he’s backed Sunnis joining
the Hashd for example. What needs to happen to make this successful, and what
kind of affect would it have on the war against the Islamic State?

The tribal troops of
Albu-Nimr and Abu Rishaare
already considered part of al-Hashad al-Sha’bi, but this is purely
symbolic because they are operating under their own command and there is no
mixing between the two sects in the Hashad.Abadi is indeed ready to integrate Sunni
officers into the national army as he is ready to provide the neutral Sunni
tribes and the rest of the Sunnis with guarantees that they will be properly
integrated into the Iraqi political and bureaucratic system.He is even not opposed to change radically
the de-Ba’thification laws so as to enable Sunni ex-Ba’this to be reabsorbed
into the professional and bureaucratic system (many Sh’is have already been
integrated).Indeed Abadi is not even
clearly against the Sunni demand for autonomy including National Guard units.The demand to change the de-Ba’thification
laws while acceptable to some Shi’is, came up against objection not only from
the pro-Iranian Shi’i militias and politicians but also from certain Sunni
quarters. One such group is the Iraqi Islamic Party (The Muslim Brothers). A
few senior Sunni politicians too are against it for fear that the rehabilitated
Sunnis will eclipse them and, in some cases, due to inter-Sunni grudges.The autonomy demands met with strong opposition
on the part of the pro-Iranian Shi’i militias and politicians (the latter led
by the former PM Maliki) and has even been opposed by Muqtada al-Sadr and his
political party, even though they are relatively independent of Iranian
tutelage.

The US
administration has been trying to influence PM Abadi to accept the Sunni
demands but he proved unable to “sell” it to the various Shi’i political
circles.Unless he manages to do it, the
prospect of liberation or “conquest” of Mosul, Falluja, Ramadi and other parts
of the Sunni area from ISIS by Shi’i troops under Iranian command is far from
being a good solution. The US will have to provide air support for the Shi’i
troops and the Hashadin
reoccupying the Sunni areas. This, too, is problematic because they will appear
as allies of Iran and enemies of the Sunna. NATO troops doing the same work
(however unlikely such a development is) will be accepted more readily by the
Sunni population, but without guarantees from Baghdad for Sunni political
rights, as soon as the foreign troops leave another insurgency will erupt. The
US needs to take advantage of the fact that Iraqi Shi’is prefer that the
Iranians stay in Iran, and to bear in mind that it has pressure points in
Baghdad. It needs to apply much more pressure to meet the Sunnis’ (and Kurds’)
minimal demands.After ISIS conquered
Mosul from Maliki’s corrupt and degraded Iraqi national military it became
clear that the highly-centralized Iraq was dead.The question is: can a decentralized Iraq
still survive. The answer is to be found in Baghdad and in Washington, DC.

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Major
fighting continued in Anbar and Salahaddin during the third week of November
2015 where government forces were attempting to clear areas. The Islamic
State’s car bomb campaign and terrorist attacks in Baghdad continued as well.
Several mass graves discovered in Sinjar after its liberation earlier in the
month led to a rise in casualties as well.

From
November 15-21 there were 140 security incidents reported in the press. That
broke down to 58 in Baghdad, 27 in Anbar, 23 in Ninewa, 20 in Salhaddin, 7 in
Babil, 3 in Diyala, and one each in Kirkuk and Irbil. That was the most attacks
for November, but was not much different from previous weeks.

There
were 358 deaths and 420 wounded for the week. 240 people were killed in Ninewa,
62 in Baghdad, 18 in Babil, 17 in Anbar, 16 in Salahaddin, and 5 in Diyala. 1
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighter died, along with 12 Hashd al-Shaabi, 27
Peshmerga, 32 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and 286 civilians,
while 1 Asayesh, 23 Peshmerga, 39 Hashd, 40 ISF, and 317 civilians were
injured. The number of casualties was up from the 265 dead and 354 injured from
the week before because of the discovery of several mass graves in Sinjar.

Violence In
Iraq By Week 2015

Date

Incidents

Dead

Wounded

Jan 1-7

205

466

464

Jan 8-14

176

733

518

Jan 15-21

193

403

528

Jan 22-28

197

492

899

Jan 29-31

91

306

568

JAN

862

2,400

2,977

Feb 1-7

159

408

688

Feb 8-14

178

443

566

Feb 15-21

175

592

383

Feb 22-28

178

391

730

FEB

690

1,834

2,367

Mar 1-7

186

373

595

Mar 8-14

156

398

656

Mar 15-21

170

1,304

505

Mar 22-28

186

273

406

Mar 29-31

76

205

219

MAR

774

2,553 + 4

2,381 + 150

Apr 1-7

130

218

422

Apr 8-14

140

674

531

Apr 15-21

175

729

717

Apr 22-28

167

497

483

Apr 29-30

51

162 + 7

182 + 299

APR

663

2,280

2,335

May 1-7

159

627

450

May 8-14

161

420

549

May 15-21

128

963

387

May 22-28

115

341 +
1,499

348

May 29-31

38

66

164 + 646

MAY

601

2,417 + 1,499

1,898 + 646

Jun 1-7

133

431

476

Jun 8-14

126

522 + 405

394

Jun 15-21

141

365

373

Jun 22-28

162

306

474

Jun 29-30

61

122 + 58

189 + 106

JUN

623

1,804

2,012

Jul 1-7

161

435

719

Jul 8-14

140

384

570

Jul 15-21

109

359

597 +
4,024

Jul 22-28

145

527

590

Jul 29-31

53

193 + 260

203 + 400

JUL

608

2,158

3,079 + 4,024

Aug 1-7

154

650 + 760

298

Aug 8-14

133

756

640

Aug 15-21

135

345

354

Aug 22-28

136

342

296

Aug 29-31

59

112

169

AUG

617

2,205 + 760

1,757

Sep 1-7

139

285

352

Sep 8-14

144

368

394

Sep 15-21

123

323

488

Sep 22-28

128

190

258

Sep 29-30

39

106 + 19

147 + 8

SEP

573

1,291 + 314

1,647 + 3,003

Oct 1-7

105

291

398

Oct 8-14

144

254

389

Oct 15-21

142

208

279

Oct 22-28

129

216

366

Oct 29-31

49

110

116 + 1

OCT

569

1,079

1,549

Nov 1-7

125

186

316

Nov 8-14

120

265

354

Nov 15-21

140

358

420

Security by
Province Nov 2015

Provinces

Nov 1-7

Nov 8-14

Anbar

26 Incidents

9 Killed: 2 Civilians, 7 ISF

45 Wounded: 1 Hashd, 10 Civilians, 34 ISF

11 Shootings

3 IEDs

2 Mortars

19 Suicide Bombers Killed

24 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

11 Incidents

1 Killed: 1 Sahwa

3 Shootings

12 Suicide Bombers Killed

17 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

Babil

4 Incidents

3 Killed: 3 Civilians

12 Wounded: 12 Civilians

4 IEDs

3 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

2 Wounded: 2 Civilians

2 Shootings

1 IED

Baghdad

47 Incidents

58 Killed: 1 Sahwa, 3 ISF, 54 Civilians

156 Wounded: 1 ISF, 155 Civilians

14 Shootings

22 IEDs

3 Sticky Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb Destroyed

54 Incidents

94 Killed: 2 Hashd, 5 ISF, 87 Civilians

263 Wounded: 3 Hashd, 19 ISF, 241 Civilians

12 Shootings

28 IEDs

7 Sticky Bombs

4 Suicide Bombers

1 Suicide Car Bomb

Basra

-

3 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

2 Shootings

1 Sound Bomb

Diyala

7 Incidents

8 Killed: 2 Hashd, 2 Civilians, 4 ISF

4 Wounded: 4 Civilians

3 Shootings

1 IED

6 Incidents

4 Killed: 1 ISF, 1 Hashd, 2 Civilians

3 Wounded: 3 ISF

2 Shootings

1 IED

1 Suicide Car Bomb Destroyed

Kirkuk

6 Incidents

9 Killed: 1 ISF, 3 Civilians, 5 Peshmerga

16 Wounded: 4 ISF, 12 Peshmerga

3 Shootings

4 Suicide Bombers

1 Car Bomb

3 Incidents

1 Killed: 1 Peshmerga

2 Wounded: 2 Civilians

1 Shooting

1 IED

1 Sticky Bomb

Ninewa

14 Incidents

70 Killed: 7 Peshmerga, 63 Civilians

30 Wounded: 4 Civilians, 26 Peshmerga

5 Shootings

1 IED

1 Car Bomb

2 Mortars

4 Suicide Bombers Killed

1 Suicide Car Bomb Destroyed

21 Incidents

120 Killed: 23 Civilians, 45 Peshmerga, 52 ISF

53 Wounded: 53 Peshmerga

7 Shootings

2 IEDs

8 Suicide Bombers

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Mortar

1 Rockets

22 Suicide Bombers Killed

9 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

Salahaddin

21 Incidents

29 Killed: 3 Civilians, 12 ISF, 14 Hashd

53 Wounded: 24 ISF, 29 Hashd

7 Shootings

53 IEDs

3 Suicide Bombers

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Mortar

14 Suicide Bombers Killed

22 Car Bombs Destroyed

19 Incidents

40 Killed: 6 ISF, 9 Hashd, 24 Civilians

31 Wounded: 2 Hashd, 10 ISF, 19 Civilians

11 Shootings

3 IEDs

10 Suicide Bombers Killed

2 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

1 Car Bomb Destroyed

Provinces

Nov 15-21

Anbar

27 Incidents

17 Killed: 2 Hashd, 4 Civilians, 11 ISF

45 Wounded: 1 Hashd, 2 ISF, 42 Civilians

8 Shootings

1 IED

5 Mortars

3 Suicide Bombers Killed

2 Suicide Motorcycle Bombs Destroyed

20 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

14 Car Bombs Destroyed

Babil

7 Incidents

18 Killed: 4 ISF, 14 Civilians

35 Wounded: 1 Hashd, 4 ISF, 30 Civilians

2 Shootings

3 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

1 Suicide Bomber

Baghdad

58 Incidents

62 Killed: 2 Hashd, 6 ISF, 54 Civilians

204 Wounded: 6 Hashd, 14 ISF, 184 Civilians

14 Shootings

37 IEDs

4 Sticky Bombs

1 Car Bomb Destroyed

Diyala

3 Incidents

5 Killed: 5 Civilians

11 Wounded: 1 ISF, 10 Civilians

1 Shooting

1 IED

1 Motorcycle Bomb

Irbil

1 Incident

1 Shooting

Kirkuk

1 Incident

1 Shooting

Ninewa

23 Incidents

240 Killed: 1 PKK, 10 ISF, 27 Peshmerga, 202 Civilians

65 Wounded: 23 Peshmerga, 42 Civilians

20 Shootings

1 Car Bomb

1 Mortar

1 Rocket

1 Suicide Bomber Killed

8 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

Salahaddin

20 Incidents

16 Killed: 1 ISF, 8 Hashd, 7 Civilians

60 Wounded: 1 Asayesh, 9 Civilians, 19 ISF, 31 Hashd

18 Shootings

2 IEDs

2 Suicide Bombers Killed

3 Suicide Car Bombs Destroyed

4 Car Bombs Destroyed

Anbar is where the heaviest fighting is taking place in
Iraq. The joint forces were making more headway towards the center of Ramadi.
On November 15 the
Euphrates River was crossed into downtown. Several important government
facilities were cleared including the Anbar court complex, the Anbar
Operations Command, and the Presidential palaces. On October
21 it was announced that the ISF and Hashd were just 500 meters from the
Anbar Operations command. It took three weeks to cover that distance showing
the difficulty of the campaign.

At the same time the government’s forces were struggling in
other areas. Albu Faraj to the north of Ramadi was declared cleared on October 14, but
there were 11 car bombs there during the third week of November. Likewise, Albu
Hayat in the Haditha district in western Anbar was said to be freed on November
11, but fighting never stopped there. This points to a bad habit of
officials to call areas secured before they actually are to promote an image of
constant progress. It’s also true that IS is attempting to re-infiltrate areas
causing repeated operations in the same areas again and again.

Southern Baghdad received the most attacks for the second
week in a row. There were 25 incidents there with 21 from November 8-14. The
violence in the south had the trademark of IS with 20 IEDs and two sticky bombs.
After that there were 14 incidents in the east, 8 in the west, 5 in the north,
three in unknown locations, and one in the center. As IS has stepped back from
major offensives it has come to focus upon terrorist attacks in the capital to
keep pressure on the government. That province is the only one in the country
where incidents have gone
up during the year.

Violence in Baghdad, Nov 15-21, 2015

Center: 3 – 1 Shooting, 2
IEDs

East: 13 – 1 Robbery, 5 IEDs,
7 Shootings

Outer East :1 – 1 IED

North: 1 – 1 IED

Outer North: 4 – 2 Shootings,
2 IEDs

South: 15 – 2 Shootings, 2
Sticky Bombs, 11 IEDs

Outer South: 10 – 1 Shooting,
9 IEDs

West: 5 – 1 Shooting, 1
Sticky Bomb, 3 IEDs

Outer West: 3 – 1 Sticky
Bomb, 2 IEDs

Unknown: 3 – 1 Car Bomb
Dismantled, 1 IED, 1 Kidnapping

In comparison, there is hardly any insurgent activity in
Diyala and Kirkuk recently. There was only one incident in the latter, which
has been quiet for weeks now. In Diyala there was a surge of attacks in October,
but in November that has died down with only 3 reported attacks from November
15-21.

Irbil had a rare case of violence when a man shot at the
Peshmerga Ministry building in in Irbil on November
20.

In Ninewa the Peshmerga continued to mop up the Sinjar area.
Six more villages were cleared in the area. Three
mass graves were also discovered with 148 Yazidis executed by IS. The group
also killed 53 people including two Peshmerga and 10 police in the Mosul area.

Mopping up operations continued in Salahaddin’s Baiji. The thermal
power plant for example was cleared for the second time. There was also
heavy fighting in the Makhoul Mountains to the north even though it was
supposedly freed
at the end of October. Intense clashes have been occurring outside of Samarra
for several weeks as well in the center of the province.

IS’s car bomb campaign is still going on. From November
15-21 there were 51 vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) with
only one hitting its target in Ninewa against the Peshmerga. There were 34 in
Anbar, 8 in Ninewa, 7 in Salahaddin and one in Baghdad.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com