Devolution or federalism: which way for Nigeria?

It is not the incumbent central government that should determine unilaterally which power to transfer to regions or states.

Today’s piece first appeared in April 2014. It is being republished today for obvious reasons. First members of the National Assembly, according to the Senate President voted against devolution of powers because they are not sure of the difference between devolution and restructuring. Second, the ruling APC federal government has established a special committee to understand what restructuring is about. Third, governors of the 19 northern states have commissioned a task force to study calls for restructuring. Other groups including lawmakers in the Senate and the House are even saying the reason some people are asking for restructuring is that the central government is not doing enough to make citizens happy enough not to worry about restructuring.

The conference modalities (2014 National Conference) passed by the Secretary to the Federal Government to delegates and the day-to-day response of delegates to the modalities continue to deconstruct the unitary constitution from which the central government and the President derive their powers to discuss the problems that have made the country’s unity and peaceful development precarious over the years.

Delegates are not freely chosen representatives of their people; they are nominated by the President and governors at the instance of the federal government. They cannot determine number of committees nor choose chairpersons of committees. More importantly, delegates are not free to determine what they deliberate on; they are handed a list of topics to consider by the agency that convenes and sponsors the conference. The rules to guide the conference include what conference delegates cannot discuss: dissolution of the federation. Conference rules also include what delegates can discuss: devolution, federalism, regionalism, etc.

Exercising control of the power of signification characteristic of unitary governments, the federal government even chooses concepts that delegates should examine. An example of such semiotic confusion or control is the listing of federalism under Devolution of Power and also under Political Restructuring. As trivial as this may sound or look, it has the capacity to create confusion for delegates and reduce their focus on what should be the matter at hand: freeing the country from unitary model of governance and endowing it with a federal system. It is important for citizens observing the proceedings of the conference and waiting for some results to know ahead of conference deliberations that Devolution is not synonymous with Federalism. It should not even serve as a set that includes federalism as subset.

Devolution does not automatically lead to federalism. It is, simply put, the shedding of functions belonging originally to any central government – unitary or federal— to subnational government levels. A unitary government that feels overburdened or over-pressured can choose to transfer some of such functions to any subnational government, without losing its superintending authority over implementation of transferred functions. So can a central government devolve new functions (not previously shared with subnational governments) to subnational governments to carry out in compliance with whatever standards the central government establishes for performance of such functions by the tier of government to which new responsibilities have been devolved or transferred. Such devolved functions are funded through grants or special allocations from the central government. France is a good example of a unitary government that devolves a lot of functions to other levels of government. China is another example. Closer to home, Ghana operates a unitary system that delegates some functions to provincial governments that are defined as subordinate to the central government. An abiding aspect of devolution without federalism is that the central government reserves the right to take back whatever functions it delegates to subnational governments. Such devolution is generally not embedded in the constitution and is not subject to negotiation between federating units.

If delegates had been elected as representatives of communities, they would not have been under any obligation to base their discussion on the paradigms handed down by the central government. They would have been given issues to negotiate by their communities. Elected delegates would have been briefed that the crux of the matter and raison d’etre for the conference is federalism, not mere devolution of responsibilities by an overarching central government. It is still not too late for delegates to be reminded of citizens’ assessment of the cause of the failure of the central and most state governments to deliver public goods that can enhance the quality of life of citizens. It is obvious that communities have no power to hold delegates accountable, having not had a hand in how they get to the conference. But it is proper for delegates and conference convener to know that citizens have the ability to detect subtle efforts (via modalities handed to and adopted by conference leaders) at constraining discussion at the conference.

What was taken away by military autocrats and sustained by post-military constitution and rulers is proper relationship between the central government and subnational governments. Federalism has been removed since 1979 from the form and content of government in the country. This cannot be remedied by mere devolution. It can only be restored through establishment or re-establishment of federal system of government. Whether this is called political restructuring or restoration of federalism, what is at issue is having a proper sharing (not devolving) of powers between the central government and regions or states (as federating units).

Proper relationship between national and subnational governments in a federal system should be a case of give-and-take between the two levels in a context of free negotiation between the two tiers. Thus, the relationship between national and subnational units must be framed as constitutionally guaranteed interaction and transaction between coordinates, rather than between superordinate and subordinate. The two levels are not to share just functions; they are to share sovereignty including resource sovereignty. It is not the incumbent central government that should determine unilaterally which power to transfer to regions or states. It is both levels of government that should negotiate which powers to leave for the central government for the common good and which to leave for regions or states for effective delivery of public goods and services to citizens. These are the central issues that pertain to constructing a federal polity.

Knowing that the ongoing national conference is not sovereign and does not have the power to determine what to discuss and how to turn the outcome of discussion into a constitution, the only thing left is to appeal to delegates to find time to listen to members of their respective communities about what to do to re-invent Nigeria. For example, agreeing to just transfer a few functions from the current Exclusive list of the central government to regions or states and adding 5% to funds from the federation account to subventions to states may not solve the problem that stimulated convening of the ongoing conference (or other conferences).

Restructuring is about constituting a new federal government that is based on guidelines from citizens of the various federating units—be they regions or states. Unlike devolution, restructuring involves deliberating on new terms for a new structure of governance distinct from the one believed or perceived by citizens as too flawed to be sustained, thus requiring of a new form to be negotiated by representatives of citizens from various federating units. For the avoidance of doubt, terms of sharing of responsibilities and powers between the central government and federating units need to be constitutionalised to replace the constitution that citizens believe to have outgrown any usefulness in terms of keeping components of the federation together. The call for a new architecture of governance requires creation of a new constitution to reflect the consensus of those who negotiate for the new design. Those who believe it is their sacred duty to amend the constitution being overhauled through restructuring should have no duty to perform in respect of constructing a new constitution for the new design unless citizens choose to assign that duty to them through a referendum.