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After the Copenhagen failure, recent negotiations have seen a shift from the Kyoto top-down agreement to the Durban bottom-up process of national pledges. Economic models had predicted that an effective (near-)global climate protection coalition was likely unstable. The public good character of emissions reductions, related positive externalities, and the resulting incentives for noncompliance and freeriding pose difficulties for achieving sufficient levels of international cooperation (Barrett 2005). Although the bottom-up approach may enhance negotiations, Lima has again shown the slow progress and the large uncertainties involved about the process. Formal analyses of the strategic interactions can shed light on the negotiators' behaviour, but often neglect the time-evolving (dynamic) process inherent in negotiations.

In this talk, we present a dynamic and stochastic game-theoretic model of the process of coalition formation and its implications for the prospects and uncertainties of bottom-up climate coalition formation under the usual assumption of rationality. It includes these novel features: (i) Unlike most existing models, we assume that over time, the major GHG emitting nations can form, grow, merge, shrink, split, or terminate any number of coalitions. (ii) In proportion to bargaining power, players can repeatedly propose changes in the coalition structure, and a proposal will be accepted if it is profitable for the responsible players and not dominated by another move of the same or fewer players. (iii) When assessing profitability, players may farsightedly anticipate later moves to some degree. (iv) Uncertainty about who will propose next leads to unresolvable uncertainty about the sequence of moves (the realised pathway), leading to a consistent scenario of different branching pathways and their probabilities. (v) Uncertainty about players' expectations may lead to the existence of severalcompeting consistent scenarios, each of which represents a different (but common to all players) set of expectations.

Our main findings support the hopes that a bottom-up process may work eventually: (1) for each parameter setting, there is typically more than one consistent scenario, but in all of them a stable global coalition will be formed eventually. (2) No formed coalition will be terminated later although the model explicitly allows unilateral termination of agreements. (3) Typically, there are several handsful of competing pathways towards global cooperation, and they differ in the number of steps needed and in their allocation of mitigation costs. (4) This path uncertainty is largest in the early steps of the process, where typically (a) the most vulnerable nations and those with the lowest mitigation potential (reluctant players) exhibit chicken-game-like behaviour by trying to delay their own cooperation, in order to free-ride for as long as possible and to achieve a better bargaining position for their later entrance into an existing coalition, while (b) at the same time, the least vulnerable players and those with the highest mitigation potential (eager players) compete for forming a coalition with many reluctant players and few other eager players, in order to get a higher share of the vulnerable nations' gains from avoided climate change via surplus sharing and to get a higher compensation from them for their mitigation services. (5) Surprisingly, in our model these strategic interactions do however not lead to a stalemate without progress since such a stalemate would not form a consistent set of expectations. (6) Among the alternative consistent scenarios, there is typically one focal (Schelling 1960), relatively symmetric scenario in which no player has a considerable advantage, and several asymmetric scenarios in each of which one player is at an advantage.

To complete our strategic analysis, we finally present a strategy by which a coalition of rational players may incentivise compliance with their agreement to make the latter self-enforcing (Heitzig, Lessmann, Zou, PNAS 2011). It consists of a simple temporary redistribution of liabilities in proportion to preceding shortfalls and can be seen as a renegotiation-proof improvement of the Kyoto protocol's noncompliance rules.

Building an Index of Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change

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The Index of Physical or Geophysical Vulnerability to Climate Change differs from the other indices on vulnerability to Climate Change by only considering this part of the vulnerability which does not depend on the present policy. To this aim it relies only on physical components likely to reflect an impact of climate change, without any use of socioeconomic data. It is an index of physical vulnerability to climate change, changing only progressively and slowly.

It also differs from other vulnerability indices, both from the more general environmental vulnerability indices, which most often include resilience and policy components, and from the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) used by the Committee for Development Policy for the identification of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The EVI is related only to physical vulnerability, as the present Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index (PVCCI), but it differs from the latter: it covers all kinds of exogenous shocks likely to affect economic growth, it refers to a shorter term horizon and it tries to capture a handicap to economic growth rather than a risk of a change in geophysical conditions. Thanks to these features, the PVCCI, set up at the country level, could be used as a criterion for the geographical allocation of the international resources available for the adaptation to climate change. It is a relevant criterion precisely because it doesnt depend on the present policy, and it only gives an indication of the need for adaptation. By the same way the EVI has been proposed as a possible criterion for the allocation of development assistance. The design of the PVCCI draws both from the environmental literature and from the attempt to measure physical economic vulnerability, as it is done by the Economic Vulnerability Index. As an environmental index, the index relies on components reflecting the physical consequences of climate change that can directly affect population welfare and activity, rather than an assessment of their long term economic consequences, which would be more debatable. The index relies on eight components, considered as relevant, reliable, and available for the whole set of developing countries and easily understandable, so that the index can be used in a transparent manner. These eight components respectively capture the risks related to progressive or cumulative shocks due to climate change and the risks related to the intensification of recurrent shocks due to it.

The PVCCI has been calculated on the basis of data covering the last 60 years for 146 developing countries and territories. Results evidence a high heterogeneity among countries in the level of physical vulnerability to climate change and an important vulnerability of SIDs, even within a same regional area. The high physical vulnerability to climate change of the LDCs and SIDs is highlighted by the index. These groups of countries are already found to have aa high economic vulnerability, as evidenced by EVI.

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A fundamental principle of the UNFCCC negotiations is that of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). Operationalizing this principle remains a core challenge in the development of a new international agreement, in part due to the nuances of national circumstances, which cannot be readily resolved without negotiation. However, the scientific and non-governmental community can contribute by providing quantitative interpretations of effort-sharing proposals in terms of emission mitigation targets and financial contributions.

Previous quantifications of burden-sharing proposals differ significantly, and a collation of existing studies identified a wide-range of targets for any individual Party or region (Höhne et al., 2014; IPCC WGIII, 2014). The ranges in reduction targets are partly due to differences in the fundamental underlying principle used to determine the fair-share distribution of emissions. For example, equal cumulative per capita emissions or a convergence toward equal per capita emissions. However, the ranges also result from different choices made in the method of quantification, global target emissions pathway, underlying data, and assumptions regarding future emissions growth and socioeconomic development. These differences in data and key assumptions complicate any comparison of results or understanding of the key factors determining fair-share allowances.

Using the PRIMAP (Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for probabilistic Assessment of emissions Paths) Emissions Module we generate and assess a suite of effort-sharing scenarios resulting from multiple policy and data options within the Greenhouse Development Rights effort-sharing regime (Baer et al., 2008). The Greenhouse Development Rights regime requires emissions, GDP, and population data projections, and incorporates multiple policy options, thereby providing a consistent framework for comparing these factors. We generate the effort-sharing scenarios using emissions projections from the IPCC AR5 and LIMITS databases, and socioeconomic data from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) developed for the IPCC 5th Assessment, all downscaled to the national level.

The generated scenarios are assessed in terms of the resulting 2025 and 2030 mitigation targets for individual countries and regions. We identify the key factors that make a quantitative difference in a countries fair-share mitigation target. Analysis of these factors allows the identification of areas of convergence and divergence from the perspective of different policy options, and the underlying effort-sharing principles.

Using the suite of effort-sharing scenarios, we explore several key policy questions. Including: What is the difference in ambition required for a 1.5°C or 2°C limit in global temperature change? For a given country, does the start year of historical accounting, or the balance of capability and responsibility have a greater impact on the fair-share allocation? What does it mean for 2030 mitigation targets if pre-2020 ambition is not increased? From a quantitative perspective, which of these issues is the most important?

Finally, we highlight how quantification methods can be improved to minimize the impact of data and scenario projection uncertainty on the evaluation of fairly distributed emissions targets.

References:

Baer, P., T. Athanasiou, S. Kartha, and E. Kemp-Benedict (2008) The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework: The right to development in a climate constrained world, second edition.

IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

Distributing the global RCP2.6 emissions: five versions of fair' country level allocations

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Current climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) aim to limit global warming to 2°C. The distribution of the corresponding greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation burden amongst countries is a major block in progress toward an international agreement on binding commitments. Scientists and national experts have proposed and quantified several equity principles to distribute the international mitigation burden (Baer, Fieldman, Athanasiou, & Kartha, 2008; BASIC experts, 2011; Jacoby, Babiker, Paltsev, & Reilly, 2008; Nabel et al., 2011). Studies modelling these principles distribute different GHG emissions of diverse global emissions pathways. However, these global emissions pathways may not achieve GHG mitigation at optimal cost and result in different temperature responses making cross-studies comparisons difficult.

The distribution of the annual GHG emissions of a global cost optimal scenario has not yet been compared across a set of approaches representative of the international equity debate. The Fifth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5) introduced the Representative Concentration Pathway 2.6 (RCP2.6), a cost optimal pathway that has a likely (greater than 66%) chance of limiting global warming to 2°C (IPCC, 2013; Meinshausen et al., 2011). The international distributions of the emissions associated with RCP2.6 following different equity principles would provide decision makers with a consistent comparison. What sets of national GHG emission pathways would reflect the proposed equity principles while matching the physical emissions of RCP2.6 at each time step? What would then be the regional and national GHG mitigation targets for 2025 and 2030 according to each effort sharing approach?

The IPCC AR5 presented regional 2030 mitigation targets collated from over forty studies and grouped into five categories according to the distributive justice concepts applied: equality, equal cumulative per capita, responsibility-capability-need, capability, and staged approaches (IPCC WGIII, 2014). We model five approaches representative of these five categories using the PRIMAP (Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for probabilistic Assessment of emissions Paths) Emissions Module (Nabel et al., 2011). Each of these approaches distributes the emissions of RCP2.6 amongst all UNFCCC parties. Consequently, the aggregation of the national emission pathways of each approach matches the emissions of RCP2.6 at each time step. For each approach, pathways are calculated for a range of parameters that account for transition period to the allocation start, historical emissions, historical and projected population data, and GDP projections.

At the next Conference of the Parties (CoP) in December 2015, the international community aims to establish a binding agreement to limit climate warming. Parties to the UNFCCC should announce their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) ideally by March 2015. Our analysis informs the debate on equitable mitigation burden sharing amongst the international community. In particular, it should help decision makers and the public to appreciate the consistency between INDCs and the global goal of limiting warming to 2°C according to the various concepts of equity.

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Climate change raises the issue of intergenerational equity, as catastrophes may unfairly affect some generations. As climate change threatens irreversible and dangerous impacts (IPCC, 2014), possibly leading to economic collapse, the tradeoff is no longer between present and future consumption, but between present consumption and the possible future extinction of civilization (Weitzman, 2009). This paper aims at identifying public policies that can reduce unfairness and strike a compromise between present and future generations when the potential impact of catastrophic climate change on the economy is accounted for. It explores the impact of inequality aversion and the impact of the attitudes towards population size on optimal climate policy when that catastrophic risk is accounted for.

We use an integrated assessment model which simulates the future joint evolution of the economy and the climate. The Response model is a dynamic optimization model (Pottier et al., 2015), which belongs to the tradition of compact integrated assessment models such as DICE. It combines a Ramsey-like macroeconomic module and a climate module, and can be used to determine the optimal climate objective by comparing mitigation costs and avoided climate damages. We account for the risk of extinction due to climate change, first by assuming an exogenous probability of extinction, then by assuming a probability of extinction that depends on the temperature and on the level of economic output. We assume that the states of the world where people are wealthy will show enhanced resilience to climate damages, and will therefore face a lower probability of extinction under a given level of climate damages.

Integrated assessment models can reveal the policy implications of various normative choices through the use of social welfare functions. Ideally, social welfare criteria should (i) account for inequality aversion (it should thus differ from the utilitarian criterion, which does not account for the distribution of utilities), (ii) satisfy the Pareto principle (i.e. it should account for the preferences of individuals) and (iii) be separable (i.e. the situation of past generations should not impact the evaluation). The Expected Prioritarian Equally Distributed Equivalent (Fleurbaey and Zuber, 2014) accounts for the inequality aversion of the social planner and respects a weak form of Pareto, but is not separable under risky prospects (but we will not consider past generations in our analysis). This criterion includes a critical level of consumption which can be interpreted as the level of subsistence.

In order to reveal the impact of inequality aversion on optimal climate policy, we consider various isoelastic functions φ, which translate the inequality aversion of the social planner, and various isoelastic functions u, which translate the risk aversion of the social planner. Inequality aversion here relates to the average consumption by individualat time t. Preliminary results using Response in the certain case (with no risk of extinction), and using the standard discounted utilitarian criterion, show that the optimal policy (i.e. the timing of optimal abatement) is identical for equal discount rates r = ρ + ηg, whatever the values of the pure time preference rate ρ and the degree of inequality aversion η. In the risky case, the degree of inequality aversion has a significant impact on the optimal climate policy. In order to reveal the impact of the attitudes towards population size N (which refers to the total number of individuals in all generations), welfare is weighted by the population size through αN, which is a bounded increasing sequence of N.In this case, the criterion gives priority to large populations.

Research on Global Carbon Emission Quotas Allocation in post-Kyoto Era

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Abstractï¼By using the bottom-up and top-down modeling methods, this paper build a global model on quotas allocation. Through simulation, we draw the following four conclusions: (1)due to the difficulties of determining abatement way, benchmark year and proportion of reduction, current global carbon reduction programs exist uncertainty. (2) single principle of quota allocation can not satisfy preferences of all regions, and may even lead to extreme result of quotas allocation. (3) the weighted principle of quota allocation based on controlling the total emissions can be adopted in the future. (4) the weighted principle of quota allocation should cover as many principles of quotas allocation as possible; meanwhile the target of emissions reduction determined by climate negotiations should be replaced by the weight of principles from voting.

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Climate analysis at local scale in the context of climate change

Issues related to climate change increasingly concern the functioning of local scale geo-systems. A global change will necessarily affect local climates. In this context, the potential impacts of climate change lead to numerous interrogations concerning adaptation. Despite numerous studies on the impact of projected global warming on different regions, global atmospheric models (GCM) are not adapted to local scales and, as a result, impacts at local scales are still approximate. Although real progress in regional climate modeling was realized over the past years, no operative model is in use yet to simulate climate at local scales (ten or so meters). It is therefore at a finer spatial scale, which considers land surface characteristics, it will be possible to assess the impacts of climate change. Our scientific approach aims to develop a methodology based on climatic observations in situ and on spatial modeling of climate, which permits to evaluate the spatial variability of atmospheric parameters at fine scales (mean values ââand climatic extremes). By completing the lack of data at local scales, this work allows to improve the understanding on climate changes that may appear at local scale and thus advance the assessment of the potential impacts. This methodology is developed and applied in agro climatology (viticulture) and in urban climatology.

In viticulture, the LIFE-ADVICLIM (LIFE13 ENV/FR/001512: ADapatation of VIticulture to CLIMate change : High resolution observations of adaptation scenarii for viticulture) project aims at observing climate at local scales in different European vineyards, representing the climate diversity in European wine regions ; simulating climate and climate change in order to produce a fine scale assessment of the climate change impacts, thereafter simulating scenarii of adaptation for viticulture. Climate modeling at fine scales will include (i) the output from numerical EURO-CORDEX models with a kilometer resolution (ii) the spatial modeling of climatic data from the measurement networks using multicriteria modeling at very high resolution (90 m), and (iii) the future climate simulations using meso-scale climatic model ran under different scenarios of climate change. (i) The coarse resolution output from numerical climate models require downscaling. We use the downscaling output of EURO-CORDEX. It will provide knowledge and understanding of climate variability at meso-scale in the different studied European wine regions. Climatic data from national weather station networks will be used to validate the outputs of modelled data. (ii) In order to construct fine-scale spatial temperature fields, the multicriteria modelling will be used. This approach takes environmental factors into account. Indeed, the role of topographic factors in the spatial variability of temperatures at fine scales, in addition to the influence of geographical location (latitude/longitude) at larger scale has already been demonstrated. This type of modeling will make use of the climatic data provided by the fine scale network. (iii) We use simulations of climate change scenarios (for Europe) carried out CORDEX program

For example, the results of the measurements and modeling adapted at terroir scales have permitted to highlight a strong spatial variability of climate at very small spaces. In terms of temperatures, the spatial differences generated by the local conditions (topography, etc.) are very often greater than the increase in temperatures simulated by the different scenarios of IPCC for the next 50 years. Vine growers adapt their practices to this spatial variability of climate that partly determines the characteristics and uniqueness of their wine. In the context of climate change, this approach of a spatial analysis could be a method to adapt to the temporal changes in climate, especially in the short and medium term.

In urban climatogy, the same scientific approach (measurement and modeling at fine scales) has been applied. The same methodology was applied in Rennes city. The results showed a strong spatial variability of the temperatures in relation to local characteristics of the city (eg green areas, densely built-up urban area...). In the context of global change, climate analysis at fine scales helps to define the development policies.

A Dynamic Intepretation of the Principle of Equity in the Next Climate Change Regime- Equity as a force of gravity

M. Rosa (University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway)

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A Dynamic Intepretation of the Principle of Equity in the Next Climate Change Regime- Equity as a force of gravity

M. Rosa (1) (1) University of Oslo, PluriCourts, Oslo, Norway

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Equity will play a crucial role in designing the post-2020 climate change policy. The principle of equity is intrinsically tied to sustainable development as an expression of inter and intra generations equity. The next climate agreement has to be felt as equitable in order to be signed by a majority of country states. So far Climate Equity has been interpreted through the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities as encompassed in Art.3 UNFCCC. The current interpretation has brought the so- called firewall between developed and developing countries, where the first are bound to all the emission cuts. In the latest years some developing countries have become major emitters. The current division of mitigation efforts can therefore not be regarded as equitable and should be changed.A dynamic treaty interpretation of the principle of equity could be one way to overcome this division.

This research demonstrates that the concept of equity should be interpreted dynamically because of its own intrinsic dynamism.

Since its early formulation in Art 38 of the ICJs Statute, equity principle has played a creative role in the public international law. Indeed core international law principles like pacta sunt servanda and unjust enrichment have arisen from equity considerations. In this manner equity acts as a force of gravity, dragging new contents into a treaty. In Climate discourse a dynamic approach to equity would highlight national circumstances rather than responsibility for global warming as a criteria for designing commitments. Equity dynamism calls also for flexibility and variety. The next Climate Agreement should be shaped as a flexible agreement in its contents, settings and outcomes. Mitigation commitments should be tailored to what a country is willing and able to afford. This would bring different commitments to different countries.

This presentation will examine the main emission-reduction schemes proposed, aimed at implementing a dynamic interpretation of the equity principle. It will then analyze which of the features within the proposals the next Climate Change Agreement should include in order to be equitable. To date three approaches- the Global Carbon Budget Approach, the GDRs Framework and the Mutual Recognition Approach- have gathered momentum. Every approach has strengths and weakness from an equity perspective.

Atmospheric CO2 increase from 1990 to 2010 from emissions traced to major industrial carbon producers

B. Ekwurzel (Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, United States of America), M. Allen (University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom), M. Dalton (Dalton Consulting, Brooklyn, United States of America), P. Frumhoff (Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, United States of America), R. Heede (Climate Accountability Institute, Snowmass, CO, United States of America), R. Mera (Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, United States of America)

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Atmospheric CO2 increase from 1990 to 2010 from emissions traced to major industrial carbon producers

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Financial regulators and shareholders from communities around the world are calling for increased reporting of direct greenhouse gas emissions during production and manufacture by major industrial carbon producers. Requests are also growing for increased disclosure of risks to the infrastructure owned by these entities from climate change consequences. Another approach that has emerged is to account for the emissions traced to 90 major industrial carbon producers (Marland et al., 2011, Heede, 2014). Emissions traced to these producers over the period from 1854 to 2010 were incorporated into an energy-balance, carbon-cycle climate model to assess their relative contribution to atmospheric carbon dioxide and the global mean surface temperature. The UNFCCC was formed in 1988 and 1990 became the reference year for comprehensive reporting by nations for greenhouse gas inventories of emissions. Emissions traced to the 90 major carbon producers account for more than half of the atmospheric CO2 increase in 2010 relative to 1990. The emissions traced to the top major carbon producers will be discussed in terms of the consequences in atmospheric CO2 and global mean surface temperature increase. Such calculations are one factor among many other factors that can inform public discussions as to who may be held accountable to contribute to climate mitigation, adaptation, and compensation for damages.

The contribution of emissions traced to major carbon producers to changes in meteorological and health risks during extreme events

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Recent studies have shown that ~63% of cumulative, world wide emissions of CO2 have come from only 90 major carbon producers (hereafter, carbon majors). Here, we use this result to model a hypothetical climate where the carbon majors never existed.

Specifically, we use a unique modelling capability to perform massive ensembles of climate model simulations (climateprediction-dot-net: CPDN), which enables assessment of any changing probabilities of particular meteorological extremes of interest. We use results from a sister study which compares scenarios representing the year 2003 (i) as it actually was (i.e. where both natural and anthropogenic conditions are used to drive the climate model; scenario 1), and (ii) as it could have been, if humans had not altered atmospheric gas composition (i.e. with only natural conditions; scenario 2). This type of scenario comparison is commonplace in probabilistic event attribution analyses. However, here, we go one step further by considering an intermediate third scenario to address the question: how would the frequency of a 2003-like heat wave change if the carbon majors never existed in 2003? (scenario 3).

A feature of CPDN is that each global simulation contains a high-resolution nested regional climate model centred on Europe. This high-resolution modelling capability allows us to perform much of the analysis at the city level. In our sister study we use Scenarios 1 and 2, and show how heat-related mortality changed over Paris during 2003. In this study, we then discuss the implications for such a change given our Scenario 3, which involves only the 90 carbon majors.

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Reducing carbon emissions is costly for current generations, and only benefits people living in the far future. Claims like this are common in the popular discourse on climate policy. However, they are mistaken: it is well known that, with overlapping generations, the beneficiaries of climate policies (future generations) can compensate those undertaking the effort (current generations). In other words, there exist climate policies which tackle the externality and leave everybody better off.

What is required for this is a climate-pension deal. Such a deal involves current generations reducing emissions, while pension adjustments shift the benefits of abatement from future generations to the present, as compensation for the abatement costs. This compensation ensures that consumption of the current generations does not fall, and may even increase. In this way current generations are not made worse off, even if they dont live long enough to experience the climate benefits. The counterpart of the pension transfers is lower investment in physical capital: in effect, the portfolio of saving is allocated from (private) physical capital to (public) natural capital.

We characterise the required climate-debt deal which moves society to some Pareto-efficient point. Using an overlapping-generations model, augmented with a climate externality, we assess the intergenerational distributional consequences of Pareto-improving climate policies and compare the fiscal burden due to the required transfers to existing debt and pension burdens. In this way, we assess whether intergenerational compensation is a big deal or not.

We also propose a new framework to assess the distributional consequences of climate policies. Typically, Pareto-efficient points are obtained using a social welfare function. A common choice is the weighted utilitarian sum, often with discount factors as weights. These weights are an opaque device, difficult to relate to the distributional consequences.

We propose an alternative which focuses on the distributional consequences. Efficient climate policy generates a surplus: we employ the idea of intergenerational bargaining over how this surplus is divided between various generations. For example, one Nash bargain would involve the generations splitting the surplus over the business-as-usual outcome evenly amongst themselves. Alternative bargaining outcomes incorporate the effect of sunk investments and split the surplus in favour of future generations, recognizing that full compensation for past investments may not be politically achievable. We present and compare several alternative bargaining notions, all of which share the feature that all generations must benefit from the bargain. We also consider an overlapping generations economy equivalent to the standard infinitely-lived agent economy and compare the results of our intergenerational bargains with those resulting from typical assumptions in the integrated assessment literature.[1]

In addition to assessing the magnitude of the flow of intergenerational compensation involved in Pareto-efficient climate policies, our results imply that the intergenerational distributional effects of climate policy can be corrected for, and are thus a secondary issue compared to questions about the international burden-sharing.

Attribution of extreme heat events in the western US to emissions sourced from major industrial carbon producers

R. Mera (Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, United States of America), B. Ekwurzel (Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, United States of America), D. Rupp (Oregon State University, Corvallis, United States of America), P. Frumhoff (Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, United States of America), P. Mote (Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, United States of America), M. Allen (University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom), F. Otto (University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom), N. Massey (University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom), D. Mitchell (University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom)

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Attribution of extreme heat events in the western US to emissions sourced from major industrial carbon producers

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There exist highly-vulnerable populations facing detrimental climate impacts within a developed nation like the United States. There is a growing need for accountability for the damages incurred as well as funding for mitigation infrastructure. The concept of responsibility for climate change impacts is central to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and calls for acknowledgement by industrialized nations for their greater share of emissions. However, it has been argued that major industrial carbon producers should recognize the impact of their activities (Heede 2014). Nearly two-thirds of carbon pollution released into the atmosphere can be traced to carbon extracted from the earth by 90 major industrial carbon producers. Recent advances in climate attribution have allowed scientists to link extreme weather events to rising levels of greenhouse gases due to human emissions. Our research uses very large ensembles of regional model simulations to explore the fractional attribution of extreme heat events in the western US to emissions traceable to 90 major industrial carbon producers. The results show that record-setting high temperatures during July in the Central Valley of California were 3 times as likely to occur in the decade of the 2000s compared to a simulated world without industrial anthropogenic greenhouse emissions. The next phase of the project is to explore the increased risk of heat extremes attributable to major carbon producers.

Underlying causes of the growing adaptation deficit in the context of development

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Underlying causes of the growing adaptation deficit in the context of development

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Evidence is presented to show that climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) are promoted and implemented with little or no reference to the development practices that are generating increased risk. The reverse is also true. Aggregate public annd private investments made largely regardless of their contribution to increased exposure and vulnerability, exceed by orders of magnitude the present and projected expenditures on CAA and DRR. Reports on Inclusive Green Growth (World Bank 2012) and cumulative evidence on the changing pathways to impact (van de Berg and GEF 2013) provide information to show that the "cure to damage" ratio is in the order of 1:1,000. In the public sector a current estimate of what funds are available annually to developing countries for adaptation ($1 billion) compares with $1 trillion as a conservative estimate of amounts of public funding available for harmful practices such as subsidies for fossil fuels, water practices that deplete resources, fisheries and agriculture (IMF).

A similar story applies to increasing losses from "natural" disasters that will be increasingly related to weather and climate. The dominant economic and investmeent paradigm of development accords little attention to the incidental effects, in increasing exposure and vulnerability. Thus the adaptation deficit (Burton 2004) contines to grow along with the disaster risk reduction deficit.

Development investments (especially in the private sector) that increase risk are being explained as "the cost of doing business", or simply as "externalities". This is reminiscent of the problem of acid precipitation and other pollution issues of a generation ago, where eventually transboundary and regional agreements were achieved through the recognition of "the polluter pays principle". If humanity is to move more effectively towards a common future there will have to be a similar recognition of the principle "the creators of disaster risk and the adaptation deficit pays". Without such transformation the adaptation deficit and the disaster risk deficit are likely to keep on growing with serious consequences for our common future.

How have developing country climate mitigation practitioners engaged with the concept of 'development'? With some possible implications in the South African context

E. Tyler (University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa)

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How have developing country climate mitigation practitioners engaged with the concept of 'development'? With some possible implications in the South African context

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Tackling greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries has become a key aspect of the climate change challenge in recent years, attracting an increasing amount of timing and resources. However, despite this, the extent and pace of transformation of both current and future emissions profiles of these countries is not being impacted to the extent required (IPCC, 2014). This exploratory paper focuses on the concept of development in the context of advancing climate mitigation in developing countries; particularly how it is interpreted and engaged with by the climate mitigation policy community of practice. As such, the paper attempts to contribute insight and clarity into how the climate mitigation policy challenge has been approached in these countries to date, and whether there may be alternative or expanded ways of doing this in the future. Evidence from South Africa is drawn on by way of illustration.

To start, it is proposed that the term development itself is problematic within the climate mitigation context, given that it is subject to different ideological interpretations which have fundamentally different prescriptions for the appropriate approach, objective, form, actors and scale of mitigation policy activity. These differing interpretations of development often remain unresolved at the country level, a reality that greatly complicates the task of mitigation policy practitioners.

The paper goes on to argue that the mitigation policy community of practise has, until recently, interpreted and engaged with the concept of development in a way that is dominated by an international, climate-centric and applied science discourse. This discourse is struggling to find traction in developing contexts characterised by uniquely local circumstances, immature democracies, the immediate priorities of poverty alleviation, and extensive irrationality, particularly as these countries move towards the implementation phase of the policy cycle.

Whilst further research is required to understand the implications of this for the implementation of mitigation activity in developing countries, some early evidence exists from South Africa. A Cape Town meeting of international developing country climate mitigation experts in early 2014, The DevMit Forum, opened up both the content and discourse of the climate mitigation community of practise to the critique of their (South African) development counterparts from the employment, transport, urban settlements, poverty, trade and industrial policy, land use, and energy security fields. Theses experts responded both verbally through a panel session, and in written form through a series of retrospective briefing notes (MAPS, 2014). Later in 2014 a series of eight themed, facilitated, two-hour Conversations were held to consider the interaction between development and mitigation under the topics of cities, adaptation, consumption, employment, finance, poverty, economic growth and transport. Each involved both South African development experts (usually one practitioner and one academic) and climate mitigation researchers.

Both resulting datasets suggest that a lack of focus on the realities of the development context, such as institutions, skills, modes of implementation, complexity, systems and political economy may be constraining progress on mitigation action in the face of development priorities. Some more recent international climate mitigation programmes and projects such as the New Climate Economy also appear to be recognising this, and demonstrate a shift in both focus and approach towards the development  mitigation challenge.

Can climate compatible development provide an alternative development pathway for the global south?

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Climate compatible development (CCD) is increasingly important to policy makers as a triple-win strategy, combining climate adaptation and mitigation with development (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010). CCD characterises a development pathway in that it is multi- sector, multi-stakeholder and multi-scalar (Stringer et al, 2014). What is less clear is if in bringing together climate adaptation and mitigation with development, CCD is creating an alternative development pathway or providing a mechanism with which to connect already existing development trajectories to wider mitigation and adaptation initiatives. This is an important distinction, yet there has been little research addressing it, both conceptually and empirically.

To date much of the empirical research on CCD has been at the project level, analysing how initiatives such as climate smart agriculture are simultaneously lowering carbon emissions and improving rural livelihoods (Lipper et. al., 2014). However, there has been significantly less research on the institutional adaptation and implantation of CCD at the national level where such initiatives and policies are developed and approved (Ficklin et al, forthcoming). This is, in part, due to the complexity of contextualised framings of climate change and development issues and the diversity of how they are being integrated into policy frameworks. However, we argue that it is also because CCD is an emerging concept and there is not a clear conceptualisation of what CCD is, and how it differs from other development pathways such as climate resilience, green growth and low carbon development.

In this paper we compare and contrast the opportunities and challenges, motivations and resistance to creating an alternative CCD development pathway in Tanzania and Swaziland. The research presented draws from semi-structured interviews conducted with national policy makers and stakeholders in the NGO and private sectors working at and across multiple levels, to provide the institutional perspective of CCD that is missing in the current literature. In addition, analyses from existing and forthcoming climate adaptation, mitigation, and development policies for each country are presented. The data presented was analysed with coding software and thematic matrices to source similarities and distinctions between the two country contexts. We draw out key discourses around adaptation, mitigation and development, identify what kind of CCD is occurring, and how it is being presented in national polices. We present further findings on stakeholder engagement, analysing how CCD is being contextually understood and practised and whose definitions and values count at different levels.

Our data suggest that CCD rhetoric in policy is in its infancy and that its component parts are framed differently in each country context. Therefore triple-win thinking with adaptation, mitigation and development is not as yet being extensively considered in policy. However, as it is emerging it is provoking questions and debate about the definitions of adaptation, mitigation and development in policy and by extension the coherence of these definitions between institutions, policies and financers. Our data from Tanzania and Swaziland makes an interesting comparison between different contextualised national framings of climate change and development issues and how this affects the opportunities, challenges, motivations and resistance to CCD as a development pathway in two contrasting country contexts.

In analysing CCD as an alternate development pathway, this paper presents data about the conceptualisation and framing of climate change and development issues in Tanzania and Swaziland. Furthermore, it analyses how CCD rhetoric is shaping how adaptation, mitigation and development are defined in national policies and institutions, and the impacts this has on the opportunities and challenges presented by a CCD development pathway. Our analysis suggests that although CCD rhetoric is only just emerging, it is gaining traction with international financers and national policy makers. As such further research on CCD development pathways in both national and regional contexts is required.

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The assumption of a trade-off between climate change mitigation and poverty eradication generally goes unchallenged. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change established this trade-off, arguing that climate change responses take into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty (UNFCCC 1992). Developing countries can in theory call for support under the principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities, but the attempts to support Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) havent materialized at a large scale. Currently, countries focus on defining intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). The results will be presented in the next Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris.

This contribution is part of a research project that challenges this assumption asking the question whether this trade-off is always there or if win-win situations are possible? [1]

The main question of this contribution to the conference is to find out how the trade-offs between climate change mitigation and poverty eradication translate into the national climate policy process in developing countries. The findings can inform climate responses that can solve this trade-off and meet both climate and development objectives. Another purpose of the research is to better understand who benefits and loses from climate response and how barriers to institutional change can be overcome.

The theoretical contribution of the paper adds to the literature on institutional change in the studies of political economy. The paper identifies the drivers and barriers to institutional change in the existing literature (e.g. Streeck and Thelen 2005). It establishes the argument that trade-offs and distributional conflicts are significant determinants of success or failure of institutional change.

The methodology is an innovative discourse network analysis combining qualitative discourse and quantitative network analysis (Leifeld 2012). The analysis shows how actors organize in competing coalitions in relation to others depending on whether they support or oppose a specific policy intervention.

The research design consists of three climate change mitigation policies in South Africa. (There will be more results from Mexico and Thailand coming out later this year). The three policies are the carbon tax, the renewable energy program as part of the electricity sector reform, and the National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCR) process (RSA 2011). South Africa exemplifies the need for urgent emissions reductions and poverty eradication. The countrys emissions range with 0.9 Mt per capita at levels similar to Germany, while poverty levels remain at 39% counting the national poverty line of 390 Rand/~ 30 Euros per household per month (NPC 2011). The main source of greenhouse gas emissions is the coal dependent electricity and liquid fuels sector. All three policies were announced before the 17th COP held in Durban in 2011, but only the renewable energy program and the NCCR are under implementation. The analysis shows that the discourse in the debate on the carbon tax establishes trade-offs between economic growth, poverty alleviation and emissions reductions. Mechanisms to offsetting the carbon tax attempt to minimize these trade-offs. The reason for the lack of implementation lies in the distributional conflicts. The negotiations between the competing coalitions occur mostly without the participation of poor parts of the population and lack clear evidence of the impacts on low-income households.

Need for Subtle Policy Changes to ensure Food Security under Climate Change: Perspective from Global South

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Food basket, in India as well the global South, over the years, became Wheat/rice based but with inherent limitation of irriated land. For instance, India has only 42.9% land equipped with irrigation. Rest of region that cultivates Coarse Cereals such as Pearl millet, Finger Millet, Sorghum, Barley, but were left out as their produce is no more part of food system. 0n the other hand, there was a spike in global food prices in 2008. Some say that it is Indian attempt to offset its shortfall in paddy production from international market was the cause, making food affordability a global concern. Put differently, this inter-linkages stresses the need for diverse food basket for food security. On the other hand, records show that in India, from 2001 to 2011, an area of 3,768,000 ha which was under coarse grains such as Pearl millet, Finger Millet, Sorghum, Barley was put to other crops. Another angle of Indian agriculture is its changing land ownership pattern. With economy growing, contribution of agriculture as sole source of household income decreased. It contributed for increased absentee land ownership and lease farming. Neither of it cares for maintaining / promoting land fertility nor the global food security. However, we argue that with suitable subtle policy changes such as a) shift to more effective and direct transfer of benefits, b) promotion of coarse cereals, c) Focused target group benefits would help achieve food Security sooner.

Climate policy architecture for the Cancun's paradigm shift: Building upon the lessons from history

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In the succession of Conferences of the Parties (COP) since Copenhagen, the Cancun conference (COP-16) marked a turning point at least on paper: it calls for  a paradigm shift towards building a low-carbon society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures continued high growth and sustainable development (paragraph 10). It introduced a notion of equitable access to sustainable development (EASD) in the context of shared vision for long-term cooperative action and global peaking of GHG emissions. The economics of climate policy after Rio led to a climate centric paradigm which departs from the original UNFCCCs cooperative framework for setting climate policies in the perspective of sustainable development. This resulted in a pure cap-and-trade approach of which adverse effects on development should be mitigated through appropriate transfers. This fair burden sharing paradigm could not but fail to untie the development-climate Gordian knot and lead to lose sight of the benefits of cooperation in a global agreement to abate GHGs emissions.

The challenge is now to align development and climate objectives considering the changing context since the nineties with both a re-equilibrium of the world economic balances and the adverse context created by the 2008 financial crisis. This paper proposes an organization of carbon finance as part of a general reform of the financial system, with the adoption of a carbon value as a notional price to trigger a wave of low carbon investments in the world and redirecting parts of the global savings towards low carbon investments, thus providing a lever for an equitable access to development.

The paper begins first by elucidating the misconceptions about the Kyoto Protocol (KP) so as to identify which of these may impair any approach to enforce the Cancuns paradigm shift. Second, it discusses the rationale for an international climate regime when the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) embarked in the INDCs are considered as the primary tool of GHGs abatement. Third, it lays out the principles of a climate regime centered on scaled up climate finance, through the issuance of a carbon asset by the Central Banks of volunteering Parties. A right balance between an aspirational regime and a least common denominator regime should follow five principles: a) preserve the idea of allocating targets and timetables for countries with a controlled degree of when and where flexibility (COP3, 1997), b) leave latitude to Parties to select the NAMAS apt to align their climate and development policies so that there is no misgiving about environmental colonialism, c) follow principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in accordance with the article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, d) ensure that renegotiations every five years will not generate instable signals for economic agents, e) motivate countries to respect announced emissions pledges and to narrow the gap between these pledges and an emissions trajectory compatible with the 2°C target, and f) deprive a defaulter country of the benefits of the system approach of technological cooperation or in varied scholars proposals of a carbon club of voluntary countries.

A mechanism organized around carbon based assets could meet these principles through a pull-back force anchored around two pillars. The first pillar rests on allocating to each participating country a part of the global emissions budget. What makes a compromise easier with this mechanism force compared to the cap and trade system is that the pull-back force does not trigger immediate adverse impacts for households and industry. The second pillar rests on emissions pledges and commitments to issue carbon assets as means of motivating each country to announce emissions target at every five year period and to comply with their commitments.

The key features of this regime does not prescribe the content of the climate architecture several decades ahead but launches a learning process that follows principles robust enough to align climate and development policies without abandoning the 2°C stabilization objective.

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Reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions at acceptable costs requires the inclusion of developing countries into a climate policy regime because their emissions grow rapidly. But the less developed countries fear to suffer in terms of economic growth and domestic wealth. This study focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa as the lowest income region and demonstrates how it could benefit from joining an international climate agreement without delay. Based on a scenario analysis with the Integrated Assessment model REMIND, we estimate the economic costs and transformation needs under different assumptions on the climate stabilization target, cooperation and technology diffusion. From simulation results it turns out that Sub-Saharan Africa will suffer aggregated consumption losses of up to 3% under a global tax regime, but can even gain under a cap-and-trade climate policy regime that starts early with cooperative action and consistently follows acknowledged equity principles.

Climate Change-related loss and damage: An opportunity for transformative change?

E. Roberts (King's College London, London , United Kingdom)

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Climate Change-related loss and damage: An opportunity for transformative change?

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The residual impacts of climate change  or loss and damage  are already being experienced in both developing and developed countries and given current emission trajectories the level and extent of loss and damage will almost certainly increase. The fact that loss and damage is being incurred now is evidence that the global community has not been successful at achieving the objective of the international climate change regime, to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference on the climate system. Clearly the collective global mitigation effort has been insufficient to avoid loss and damage. However, it could also be argued that business as usual efforts at addressing the impacts of climate change through adaptation have also been insufficient to avoid the residual impacts of climate change. In fact, in many parts of the world the limits of incremental adaptation are being reached and human societies are being forced with a choice between incurring loss and damage or undertaking transformation. This paper will argue that the loss and damage agenda should be used as both a vehicle through which to implement comprehensive risk management frameworks and a platform to transform both development and adaptation to address the underlying drivers of vulnerability and enhance resilience.

Ending Energy Inefficient Foreign Aid

D. Hamza-Goodacre (ClimateWorks, CA, United States of America)

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Ending Energy Inefficient Foreign Aid

D. Hamza-Goodacre (1) (1) ClimateWorks, CA, United States of America

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Improving energy efficiency is one of the most effective ways to reduce energy demand and energy-related greenhouse gas emissions around the world. However, the adoption of energy efficient infrastructure and technologies often faces many barriers. One of the biggest barriers in the developing world, where many of the largest opportunities for improving energy efficiency reside, is financeaccess to predictable and affordable capital for infrastructure and manufacturing.

One of the most significant and influential sources of capital in developing nations is official development assistance (ODA) flowing through bilateral and multilateral development banks, such as US Agency for International Development and the World Bank.

Unfortunately, ODA may actually be helping to perpetuate the use of inefficient infrastructure and technologies in development countries. While international development agencies do finance energy efficiency investments$200 billion between 2007-2013they invest far larger sums in infrastructure and industry, without necessarily considering energy efficiency impacts. The extent to which ODA may actually be locking in energy inefficient infrastructure and industry and thereby contributing unnecessarily to climate change, energy poverty, air pollution and other development challengesis not well understood. And standards and best practice for mainstreaming energy efficiency into the core lending portfolios of international development institutions are not well developed.

ClimateWorks and Climate Advisors are currently researching and assessing the potential for energy efficiency improvements in current ODA financing in order to make recommendations to end energy inefficient ODA. Though difficult to quantify now because data is limited, such changes could deliver a massive reduction in climate emissions in key developing nations. The project seeks to measure the global mitigation potential of ODA reform relating to energy efficiency and assess the politically feasibility of securing those reforms. The latest project research will be shared at the conference and discussion stimulated about the sectoral, institutional and regional focus, to ensure maximum progress in ending energy inefficient foreign aid.

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Routes to an ambitious climate agreement in 2015

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As shown by the collective action for the protection of the ozone layer under the Montreal Protocol, the success of a multilateral agreement rests on three pillars: strong political commitment, an independent and rigorous monitoring system, and economic instruments that transmit the right incentives. For it to be a success, the 2015 Paris climate conference will need to make progress on each of these three pillars. The Climate Economics Chair has focussed its research efforts on the pillar of economic instruments.

- The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC states unequivocally that from 2020 all major emitters of greenhouse gas emissions must participate in the global effort to reduce emissions and limit average warming to no more than 2°C.

- In order to drastically curb emission trajectories, global carbon pricing should be rapidly introduced, so as to put pressure on governments to act cooperatively and to encourage economic actors to reduce emissions at the lowest cost.

- To encourage governments to reach a global agreement, a bonus-malus carbon pricing system, calculated on the basis of average emissions per capita, could be introduced at a rate of $7-9 per tonne of CO2 equivalent from 2020.

- The most realistic way of introducing an international carbon price into the global economy is to lay the foundation, between 2015 and 2020, of a transcontinental carbon market, based on prototypes developed in Europe, China and the United States.

- The introduction of double carbon pricing would be subject to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, aimed at reconciling joint action on climate change and the priority of access to development.

Using the theory of planned behaviour to understand and promote stakeholder engagement in local adaptation to climate change

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Most policy documents on climate change highlight the need for stakeholder engagement on policy making regarding local adaptation to climate change. There appear to different rationales for this. Engagement is promoted as way to achieve greater acceptance of policies and environmental awareness and to improve quality in decision making. In parallel, engagement ensures democratic legitimacy because citizens have a right to be included in climate-change related decisions that affect their lives (Lee et al., 2013). However, the levels of engagement in climate change issues are not typically high (e.g., Few, Brown, & Tompkins, 2006) and more research is needed to learn how engagement can be increased and improved.

The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) can be used to understand and promote engagement in adaptation to climate change. Even if several theories explain human behaviour and decision-making, this is one of most influential and powerful, both for its ability to predict and explain behaviour and for its contribution towards framing and evaluating behaviour change interventions (Nosek et al., 2010). Previous studies have used it to understand climate change mitigation (e.g., Tikir & Lehmann, 2011). In this study, we explored its usefulness to understand stakeholder engagement in adaptation to climate change. The theory of planned behaviour is a useful conceptual framework that incorporates central concepts in the social and behaviour sciences. It postulates that behaviour is motivated by situation-specific beliefs about the likely consequences of the behaviour (behavioural beliefs), beliefs about the normative expectations of others (normative beliefs), and beliefs about the presence of factors that may influence performance of the behaviour (control beliefs). Behavioural beliefs create a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the behaviour (attitude toward the behaviour); normative beliefs produce the perceived social pressure regarding the behaviour (subjective norm); and control beliefs create the perceived ability to perform the behaviour (perceived behavioural control). Behavioural intention, which is the immediate antecedent of behaviour, is formed based on the attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norm, and perception of behavioural control.

Based on previous research and on a literature review, we explored different types of behavioural beliefs (e.g., costs and benefits of adaptation, attitudes towards public participation), normative beliefs (descriptive and injunctive) and control beliefs (e.g., information on climate change and public participation, stakeholder salience). Stakeholders from different case studies in the Mediterranean were surveyed (e.g., policymakers, elected officers, researchers). Results show that the behavioural intention to engage in the process of planning adaptation to climate change was significantly predicted by particular variables of the theory of planned behaviour, depending on the characteristics of the case studies. Furthermore, descriptive results indicate which specific beliefs should be stressed in future interventions to promote stakeholder engagement.

This work has received funds from the ADAPT-MED project (CIRCLE2-MED).

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This study critically evaluates the Malaysian position on climate targets and preferences in the Lima Dialogues in 2014. To capture the local government climate roadmap and Malaysian emissions reduction agendas at the COP20 (CMP10), an Empirical Regional Downscaling Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy is deployed following the top-down disaggregation strategy. The model takes account of national macroeconomic indicators with various climatic variables, such as a temperature increase limit of 20C (agenda for COP20), carbon cycle, carbon emission reduction, climatic damage, carbon control, and carbon concentration, adapted from observational records of global warming climatic factors; and predicted climate targets for the years 2010 to 2110. Four scenarios forecasted based on the vision of the Copenhagen agendas, reintensified in COP20, are analysed and the results are contrasted with the prevailing baseline scenario of the Malaysian climate vision:2040, with Nordhaus and Stern proposing suggestions and calibrations. According to the COP20 targets, the findings indicate that the cumulative cost of climatic damage over the period 2010-2110 will amount to MYR40,128.1 billion under the present climatic regime in Malaysia, however, it would fall to MYR5,263.7 billion under the COP regime. Thus, the climate results are tempting in terms of prioritizing emission reduction and climate change mitigation for the future looking at the local government climate roadmap, but there are a number macroeconomic costs that the national economy needs to take on and these are critically raised for further action. The critical evaluations from this study would help national policy makers to take a proper climate decision in Malaysia before the COP21, scheduled to be held 2015 in Paris and elsewhere with similar economic environments.

Climate Change and Collective Action: Lessons from Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy

D. Cole (Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, United States of America)

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Climate Change and Collective Action: Lessons from Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy

D. Cole (1) (1) Indiana University, School of Law and School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, IN, United States of America

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Climate change has been largely mischaracterized as a public good subject to a Prisoners Dilemma game, where it is in the individual interest of each country to continue emitting greenhouse gases, even though it is the global interest for each country to curtail its emissions. Given this characterization, the collective action problem posed by anthropogenic climate change is practically insurmountable.

But climate change is, in fact, a different type of good and subject to a different kind of game to which a cooperative solution is available (though not guaranteed). Whereas prior to the Industrial Revolution it made sense to think of the climate as a public good (in its strict sense), the very existence of the climate change problem indicates that the climate is now more in the nature of a common-pool resource (CPR) with characteristics similar to many situations Elinor Ostrom studied during her storied career, albeit at a much larger scale. As a common-pool resource (CPR) the global climate is subject to the same kinds of analytical frameworks, theories, and methods that Ostrom and her colleagues in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University have used over the past 45 years to study other types of CPRs.

Like virtually all other CPRs, the collective action problem posed by climate change really is not in the nature of a Prisoners Dilemma, but more like an Assurance Game, as originally defined by Amartya Sen. In contrast to a Prisoners Dilemma, an Assurance Game has both cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. Which equilibrium solution is reached depends largely on the level of reciprocal trust among the players. The higher the level of mutual trust, the higher the payoffs from cooperation, relative to non-cooperation.

In a variety of experimental and field settings, Ostrom and her colleagues found that, under the right conditions, mutual trust can be fostered over time, raising the perceived returns to cooperation. Among the conditions they found that fostered trust are frequent opportunities for communication and interaction. Specifically, Ostrom found that increased communication (1) facilitates development of socially optimal strategies; (2) allows for exchanges of promises; (3) increases mutual trust; (4) adds value to payoffs; (5) reinforces shared norms; and (6) promotes the development of shared or group identities. However, the building of mutual trust does not depend on communication alone but also on the ability to observe and verify that others are acting in a trustworthy fashion. Thus, monitoring and accountability are crucial parts of the puzzle for successful collective action to resolve any kind of CPR problem, including climate change. Trust is not a matter of blind faith; verifiability is part and parcel of trust.

Beyond culling lessons from Ostroms large corpus of empirical, theoretical, and analytical studies, I will exemplify those lessons by reference to recent trust-building, cooperative ventures on climate policy between the US and China. The regular, bilateral negotiations of the US-China Climate Change Working Group already has achieved substantial positive outcomes for climate policy, and more quickly than anyone had imagined possible. Meanwhile, cooperation is ongoing at various levels of governance, including the local government level and even in private governance. Thus, climate negotiations are becoming increasingly polycentric, as Vincent and Elinor Ostrom defined that term.

Far from being a threat to global negotiations under the UNFCCC and its Protocols, these lower-level negotiations should be perceived as activities in furtherance of goals established in global-level agreements. They are the kinds of interactions that are in fact necessary to build, over time, the kind of mutual trust that is required to make further progress on climate change mitigation at the global level. The increasing bilateral and multilateral communications and agreements we have been witnessing do not guarantee a cooperative outcome to the Assurance Game of climate change, but without them a non-cooperative outcome is almost guaranteed.

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Even without internationally concerted action on climate change mitigation, there are important incentives for countries to put a price on their domestic emissions, including public finance considerations, internalizing the climate impacts of their own emissions, and co-benefits, such as clean air or energy security. Whereas these arguments have been mostly discussed in separate strands of literature, this article carries out a synthesis that exemplifies how policies to put a price on emissions can be conceptualized in a multi-objective framework. Despite considerable uncertainty, empirical evidence suggests that different countries may face quite different incentives for emission pricing. For instance, avoided climate damages and co-benefits of reduced air pollution appear to be the main motivation for emission pricing in China, while for the US generating public revenue dominates and for the EU all three motivations are of intermediate importance. We finally argue that such unilateral incentives could form the basis for incremental progress in international climate negotiations toward a realistic climate treaty based on national interest and differentiated emission pricing and describe how such an agreement could be put into practice.

Adaptation of Legal Framework to Combat Climate Change in India

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India is facing challenge of sustaining rapid economic growth while dealing with the global threat of climate change. The threat mainly is from increasing greenhouse gas due to industrialization, automobile, intensive agriculture, reduction in green cover and high consumption life styles. This phenomenon may alter the distribution and quality of Indias natural resources and adversely affected the livelihood of its people. With the economy closely tied to its natural resource base and climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, water and forestry, India may face a major threat because of the projected climate change. Recognizing this fact and knowing that climate change is a global challenge, India has entered actively in multilateral negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in positive, constructive and forward-looking manner.

India signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) on June10, 1992 and ratified it on November 1, 1993. It ratified the Kyoto Protocol on August 26, 2002, with the objective to establish an effective, cooperative and equitable global approach based on the principal of common but differentiated responsibility, enshrined in the UN framework.

India is one of the leading developing countries in so far as having incorporated into its Constitution the specific provisions for environmental protection in year 1950. Article 48A of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country. Similarly, Article 51A (g) makes it obligatory for every citizen of India, to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures. Despite the fact that Indias contributions to greenhouse gas emissions are very small, the Government of India has taken many measures to improve the situation in this regard. India has initiated several climate-friendly measures, particularly in the area of renewable energy. It has one of the most active renewable energy programmes besides having a dedicated Ministry for non-conventional energy sources in general and mitigation of greenhouse gases in particular.

This paper is an attempt to provide an overview of the legal framework for combating climate change in India and to examine the existing environmental law and policies which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It reviews existing national legislation, relevant overarching policies in the environmental field so as to reduce their impact specifically on climate change.

Does fragmentation pay? Multiple international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

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Does fragmentation pay? Multiple international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

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While the negative effects of greenhouse gas emissions and the global climate change are relatively well acknowledged amongst scientists, solutions for what should and could be done to tackle these problems are less agreed upon. Spillovers and the absence of clear property rights make it difficult to reach effective cooperation through international environmental agreements (IEAs). In light of the slow progress in international climate negotiations, the idea of climate clubs is getting increasing attention while the aim of negotiating one single universal agreement is identified as one primary obstacle to a global treaty within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign multiple parallel environmental agreements. In a two-stage game, countries first choose whether they sign one agreement, or to be a non-signatory. In the second stage, each coalition acts as a unitary actor in a non-cooperative Nash game between the coalitions and the non-signatories. We compare emissions abatement and coalition stability in the multiple IEAs case with the standard case where not more than one IEA is possible. After solving the model for the case of constant marginal benefits from abatement and constant marginal costs of abatement with two agreements we relax our assumptions and allow for multiple coalitions with multiple types of asymmetric countries. We then analyze the effect of multiple coalitions for the case of increasing marginal costs of abatement as well as for decreasing marginal benefits of abatement more generally. The results are sensitive to the assumptions on the benefits from abatement. For constant marginal benefits, the possibility of multiple agreements increases the number of cooperating countries and total abatement (compared to the standard case with a single agreement). For decreasing marginal benefits, total emissions are independent of the number of admitted agreements.

The comparison of the different cases shows that the effect of climate clubs substantially depends on the qualitative properties of abatement benefit functions. However, we can generally show for the above made assumptions that climate clubs are at least not detrimental to global cooperation. This paper already shows how different assumptions lead to different effects of country clubs. It is thus a consequent stepping stone towards a more detailed understanding of the determinants for beneficial or detrimental effects of climate clubs. In any case, it has to be concluded that the idea of climate clubs enhancing global climate protection has to be taken with precaution, but that it clearly deserves more analytical attention.

Global emissions chains and multinational enterprises: measuring responsibilities following the control criterion

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The Kyoto Protocol framework establishes the Production-based (PR) criterion (IEA, 2001) as the emissions responsibility allocation method. Greenhouse Gases emissions (GHG) are assigned depending on the country where they occur, regardless of the country where the consumption is done. This approach has generated controversy and is the point at which many emerging and large exporting countries base their refusal to sign the emissions reduction international agreements. Emerging countries argue that they are adversely affected in a context where production and consumption decisions are increasingly separated in different parts of the world. Moreover, carbon leakage through international trade threatens national reductions achievements at global level. One of the most popular scientific literature on alternative approaches proposes to shift responsibility to the consumer (Peters and Hertwich, 2008 or Davis et al., 2012). A country would be responsible for the emissions generated in the production of goods that are consumed within its borders, independently where the goods or services are produced. However, the consumer responsibility criterion (CR) has not managed to become part of international environmental legislation yet.

The global nature of climate change requires the establishment of allocation responsibility criteria that allow to involve more participant agents of different countries in the process: governments, consumers, suppliers, workers, investors (Hoekstra and Wiedmann 2014). Taking into account the presented context, in this paper a control-based criterion is proposed, previously presented in López et al. (2014), in order to allocate the responsibility to the firms that take decisions, in many cases, of locating thousands of kilometres away in countries with weaker environmental policies. This criterion assign to those firms all the emissions embodied in linkage effects along the production chain. Taking into account the control criterion, the limits of enterprises responsibility is not determined by the countrys borders, this limit is given by the control that the parent companies has on its subsidiaries firms and suppliers too, regardless of geographical location and where are citizens of the world that are consuming the goods produced by these enterprises.

Therefore it is necessary to find new frameworks that encourage more countries to sign emissions reduction international agreements and also that allow the responsibility transfer to companies and citizens as main actors in the mitigation of climate change. To shift the focus to the role of companies, instead of nation-states, has some advantages as, for instance, not to deal with the problem of restricting responsibility to territory (PR) or of the ability of governments to act beyond their frontiers (CR). Moreover, recent research states that nearly two-thirds of historic emissions can be attributed to 90 companies (Heede 2014). Companies, and thus consumers, do not become knowledgeable about the environmental impacts of their production networks (ORourke, 2014); these firms do not take responsibility for the external costs associated to these impacts. The quantification of these emissions under the control criterion and the allocation of responsibility to firms would help to provide positive incentives for the more efficient management in environmental terms of the global value chains by the companies.

The aim of this paper is to calculate a control-based criterion for China in a multiregional input-output context (MRIO), which allows the assessing of the impact of international trade considering all the emissions associated with the entire global value chains. The Chinese choice is due to foreign enterprises operating and exporting in China account for 54% (Feenstra et al., 2013) and have a strong potential influence over the global production chains with respect to technology and emission intensities (Skelton, 2013). Estimations will be done using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) that provides information about 41 regions with a sectorial disaggregation of 35 industries. These data will be combined with information about multinationals operating in China for the year 2009.

The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models

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International climate policy suffers from the adverse incentive structure of public good provision, and it is well known that non-cooperative behavior results in under-provision of such goods. How much a climate coalition improves upon this dilemma depends on the costs and benefits of the individual nations. It is particularly dependent on their heterogeneity and whether nations can compensate each other, i.e. the existence of transfer schemes. In this study, we investigate coalition formation with real-world heterogeneity and various transfer schemes for the first time using an ensemble of five numerical models.

Numerical models give particularly valuable insights beyond those of their analytical counterparts, when the analysis depends on regional heterogeneity in costs and benefits, quantitative estimates, or detailed representations of reaction functions. The models in this study are diverse both in their modeling approaches and in the data sources used for calibration, representing a range of estimates for the costs and benefits of real-world regions and their dynamics. We make these differences in cost and benefit assumption comparable through two new indicators measuring the abatement potential and climate change damages for key countries and world regions. We find that the five models frequently differ in the assumed costs/benefits structure of specific countries or regions, with stronger disagreement about regional damages and better agreement about mitigation costs, which mirrors the large uncertainty in our knowledge about climate change impacts.

Consequently, the models do not necessarily agree in their assessment of the stability of specific coalitions. Remarkably, however, the models are very consistent in translating the cost/benefit information revealed by the indicators into whether or not a region supports a climate agreement, i.e. coalitions with similarly characterized signatories are stable in all models. Thus, the reason why a specific coalition is found to be stable only in a subset of models is traced back to the cost/benefit assumptions.

We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives. By comparison, transfers that specifically take the incentive to sign a climate agreement into account frequently differ from the transfers implicit in common normative and pragmatic burden sharing schemes, which are found to be comparatively high in volume and often to transfer payments in the wrong direction.

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So far, the UNFCCC climate negotiations have not delivered a decrease in global greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to this lack of ambition at the global level, several local, national, and regional initiatives have emerged in the past that pursue more ambitious unilateral abatement targets  for example the European Union or California  and more initiatives can be expected to emerge in the future. This comes as a surprise in view of classical theory, which suggests that ambitious unilateral provision of a global public good is never beneficial for the actor performing the abatement. Instead, global emissions tend to increase as a consequence of unilateral action, reducing the effectiveness of the abatement and resulting in losses for the leader. Recent academic advances in climate leadership have however revealed diverse consequences of unilateral emission reductions that lead to decreases as well as increases in global emissions. Taking all negative and positive reactions into account, leadership in ambitious abatement efforts could pay off for some actors, at least in expectation. The ongoing debate on the effectiveness of climate leadership in greenhouse gas abatement among the academic, the political as well as the public sphere emphasizes the importance of a clear and comprehensive understanding of the net consequence of unilateral action.

We analyze all major channels through which countries are influenced by unilateral abatement of a climate leader and derive functions for the resulting reaction in emissions. Carbon leakage effects are included by considering that (i) countries increase their emissions because more of the public good is provided, which decreases the demand for the individual production of the public good of all other countries, (ii) the leader decreases demand for emission intensive energy carriers which decreases their global price and leads to increasing demand in other countries and hence higher emission, and (iii) emission intensive production relocates from the leading country to countries with less stringent policies and hence emissions increase abroad. The negative carbon leakage effects are counterbalanced by several positive reaction functions, in which countries decrease their emissions in response to unilateral abatement. First, the leading country will develop new technologies to decrease its emissions in the face of ambitious abatement targets. Through technological spill-overs to other countries global emissions decrease even without additional emission policies by other countries. Second, a leading country decreases abatement cost uncertainty by performing ambitious emission reductions. Risk-averse countries will in turn increase their emissions reduction targets after learning about the costs of the leader. Third, through the process of policy emulation, policies diffuse to and are adopted by other countries because of their normative and socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics. Fourth, countries may have an incentive to reciprocate to the ambitious actions of a leader. Lastly, a leading country may signal to other countries that it is implementing the cooperative effort, inducing other countries to adopt an analogous effort.

The common modeling framework for each of the above described effects enables us to identify the critical parameters that shape the overall reaction to unilateral emission abatement and allows us to distinguish in how far the reactions differ among following countries and for the leading actor. The analysis suggests that effective leadership in climate action is facilitated by (i) high visibility and credibility in the actions of the potential leader, (ii) a strong international connectedness, both in economic and political terms, (iii) a leader whose emitting sectors are similar to those of the main global emitters, and (iv) the capacity and infrastructure to develop technology effectively.

However, due to the number of channels of interaction between leader and others, each of which is only imperfectly known, we expect the actual reactions of countries without ambitious targets to be highly uncertain. We show that despite this, leadership may be profitable (in expectation) for the leading country if it has a high valuation for the public good or exhibits little risk aversion. Our analysis can thus produce rationales for observed ambitious abatement of current climate policy leaders and their future abatement policies, and help to identify possible future leaders in the abatement of greenhouse gases.

Preferences for Energy Efficiency vs. Renewables: How Much Does a Ton of CO2 Emissions Cost?

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Concerns about climate change are growing, and so is the demand for information about the costs and benefits of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This paper seeks to estimate the benefits of climate change mitigation, as measured by the publics willingness to pay for such policies. We investigate the preferences of Italian and Czech households towards climate change mitigation policy options directly related to residential energy use. We use conjoint choice experiments, which are administered in a standardized fashion to representative samples in the two countries through computer-assisted web interviews (CAWIs).

In our choice experiments, the alternatives are policy packages described by four attributes: i) the goal of the policy, i.e., addressing energy efficiency or promoting renewable energy; ii) the policy mechanism(s) (which may entail one or more of the following: incentives, taxes on fossil fuels, standards or information); iii) the reduction in CO2 emissions per household, and iv) the cost of the policy to the respondents household. Items iii) and iv) are expressed as per year for each of 10 years.

The questionnaire was self-administered using CAWI by a total of 1005 respondents. The Italy survey was conducted in July 2014. The Czech Republic survey was similarly structured, and the section of the questionnaire dedicated to the renewables or energy efficiency policies, and the associated discrete choice experiments, was identical to that in the Italy survey instrument (translated into the Czech). The design of the choice experiments was likewise identical across the two surveys. The Czech Republic survey was conducted in August and September 2014 using CAWI and yielded a total of 1385 completed questionnaires.

The responses to the policy choice questions appear reasonable: About 40% of the Italy survey respondents selected program A, 37% program B, and 23% opted for the status quo. The Czech shares are, 33%, 36% and almost 31%. Clearly, the Czech respondents choose the current situation more often than the Italians, implying that their WTP for the policy packages is lower. Responses are stable over the choice exercises, and there is no evidence of anomalies or unusual response patterns. This is the case for both the Italy and the Czech Republic respondents.

We fit the conditional logit models separately for the Italy and Czech Republic samples. The results from the Italy sample are reasonable and suggest that individuals were correctly trading off the attributes of the policies when selecting their most preferred ones. The status quo is the omitted category, and so the positive and significant coefficients on the energy efficiency and renewables dummies indicate that these policies were generally preferred over the status quo. However, the coefficient on the renewable dummy is greater than that on the energy efficiency goal dummy, and a Wald test indicates that they are significantly different from one another at the conventional significance levels. Our survey respondents also have a preference for incentives over other implementation options. The coefficient on fossil fuel taxes is negative and significant, and similar in absolute magnitude to those on energy efficiency standards and information-based approaches, but the latter two are statistically significant only at the 11% and 5% levels, respectively.

The larger the CO2 emissions reductions delivered by the program, the more likely is a respondent to choose a policy, and the lower the cost, the more attractive the policy, all else the same. These effects are strongly statistically significant at the conventional levels. The results from the surveys indicate that respondents prefer policies that promote renewables over policies that target energy efficiency, and, all else the same, they prefer incentive-based policies over standards and information-based approaches. The respondents in the two countries differ sharply in terms of their preferences for fossil fuel taxes: The Italians have a strong dislike for them, but the Czechs are relatively neutral. The willingness to pay per per ton of CO2 emissions avoided is 130 from the Italy sample and CzK 1514 from the Czech sample, and implies an income elasticity of willingness to pay equal to one.

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This paper aims at being relevant to the overarching theme of the Day 4 (themes: Climate Governance, Transforming Science to Transform Society, Information for Decision-Making, Mediating Climate Change Dialogue, Transformative Solutions, Adaptation Governance, Equity and Responsibility, Collective Action, Social Movements, SDGs and Climate Agreement). It could be relevant for Day 3 too (themes: Innovation, Technology Deployment and Policies; Climate Policies; Governance and Justice; Conflicts and Climate Change).

If climate sciences requires interdisciplinary approaches (Jeandel and Mosseri, 2011), it is the same for climate multilevel governance (Winter, 2011; Brondizio, et alii, 2009; Bache I. and Flinders M., 2004). We have to explore transformative solutions to climate change from a cross-sectorial perspective in order to reach integrated solutions especially through collaboration. This collaboration concerns different levels. 1) The actors level covering the complex and inter-related socio-political and human aspects (individuals, associations, institutions), 2) The level of different kinds of responsibilities, 3) The level of different sources of knowledge. The latter concerns scientific knowledge on the climate (description and forecast) as well as normative justifications and decisions (political, economical, legal and ethical). We have the entities, their respective responsibilities and the disciplines, more or less relevant to treat the different problems. To lead to transformative pathways to climate change challenges, we have not only to make up solutions across a range of stakeholders and sectors that encompass technological, institutional, economic and behavioural changes, but across disciplines, they are descriptive and predictive or normative and prescriptive. To be complete we have to consider multiple scales (spatial and temporal). The governance perspective of this paper is not only multi-lateral, managing different entities from a political perspective, but multi-disciplinary to explore the wide range of topics that cut across climate change issues, from physical feedbacks to social and economic impacts. Indeed to reach relevant, responsible and high quality collective decision on the international level, we need to take into account these three levels and match them carefully.

We need new concepts to match these three different levels. We have chosen here three promising ones: deliberation, precaution (precautionary principle) and responsibility.

Deliberative system is promising in the democratization of global climate governance (Stevenson, Dryzek, 2014). Precautionary Principle has the potential to combine both sides of assessment, scientific and normative in case of uncertainty (Gardiner, 2006; Reber, 2015). Moral responsibility help to make the link between mitigation and adaptation and the two kinds of justice entailed (corrective and distributive) that is not already done in UNFCCC. The common climate requires a common approach according a balanced cooperation between the three levels of governance, that can be constructed through the combination of inclusive and deep deliberation among actors (humans, publics and institutions), balanced between scientific and normative assessments, in a "conversation" among distributed responsibilities.

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Transparency and Accountability in Climate Finance Governance

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Climate finance, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to adapt to the harmful effects of climate change, remains one of the central issues of current international negotiations. Progress in the fulfilment of the developed countries collective commitment, adopted in 2009 in Copenhagen and set out, the following year, in the Cancun Agreements, to provide new and additional resources to developing countries, in the range of 100 billions of dollars by 2020, may determine the conclusion of an inclusive and ambitious agreement in 2015.

However, some developed countries advanced the argument of the economic crisis to postpone the provision of public finance, to ask for the efficiency of funds provided in terms of climate change mitigation, and to consider that a major part of the climate finance will come from the private sector. Many developing countries, more preoccupied by the effectiveness of climate finance, conditioned their participation within a 2015 agreement to the actual disbursement of funding and consideration of adaptation to climate change, as well as capacity building, to estimate their needs. Finally, voices had been raised against inter alia human rights infringements resulting from previous climate projects, putting emphasis on the need for the integrity of climate finance.

These demands for efficiency, effectiveness and integrity of climate finance plea for transparency and accountability at all stage of the funding cycle, that is to say from its mobilisation to its disbursement and administration. Indeed, transparency and accountability are core democratic values, linked to the procedural rights to information, participation in decision-making and access to justice that should apply to the overall governance of climate finance. These elements, participating to public scrutiny in the field of climate finance, are particularly important to enhance developing countries confidence by ensuring that developed countries respect their commitment and to evaluate, progressively, developing countries needs in order to take up the challenge of dealing with climate change. They also appear crucial to adopt a holistic approach of climate action by avoiding deleterious side effects of internationally funded projects, and more broadly favouring public acceptation of the efforts needed.

Yet, the assessment of the provided and received financial support, its new and additional character or its effects on the ground raises numerous difficulties. Despite the establishment of a Green Climate Fund (GCF), meant to centralize as much as possible the financial mechanism of the international climate regime, and the setting up of a Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), intended to encourage the coordination of climate finance, governance in this domain remains highly fragmented. Different scales of decision and action are mobilized (international, regional, national and local), within the climate regime (UNFCCC) as outside. Climate funds are functioning, moreover, according to different rules and are not all managed by the same institutions. This is even truer if one takes into account private climate finance next to public climate finance.

Therefore setting up a transparency and accountability system in climate finance constitutes a major challenge, as related rules and procedures are currently incomplete and inconsistent. That is why, to elaborate such a system, the SCF and the GCF are proceeding from relatively unprecedented way, in particular by encouraging involvement of all stakeholders. Initiatives from multilateral banks of development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and some non-governmental organisations, like Transparency International, are also relevant in this regard. From then on, it is especially interesting to study in details this process of normative production that could apply to other fields of climate governance.

Indeed, it first favours a better understanding of the mapping of the current transparency and accountability systems relevant for climate finance, which is necessary to compare them, in order to identify their harmonisation and/or articulation potential. This presentation aims to analyse these four stages to improve the overall climate finance governance.

How to increase mitigation? Some lessons from the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone

J. De Sepibus (University of Benr, Bern, Switzerland)

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How to increase mitigation? Some lessons from the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone

J. De Sepibus (1) (1) University of Benr, Law Faculty, Bern, Switzerland

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The necessity to increase mitigation efforts, while addressing carbon leakage and generating climate finance, represents one of the most daunting challenges of the future climate regime. We argue that these goals could be achieved through the adoption of an agreement (hereafter the Agreement) by a group of countries that set ambitious mitigation targets for specific sectors and impose border tax adjustments on commodities from non-parties that do not meet comparable carbon standards. The institutional architecture of such an agreement would be construed along the lines of the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, i.e. it would contain rules that assure that nonâparticipants loose more from being outside the agreement than they gain. Moreover, to induce countries to participate, carrots would be offered in the guise of financial and technical assistance, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

As the Montreal Protocol the new Agreement would a) provide for majority voting for the adoption of amendments b) have effective compliance mechanisms and c) rules ensuring due process of law. It would depart from the model of the Montreal Protocol insofar as 1) it would not address a progressive phase-out of specific substances, but aim at a progressive tightening of mitigation goals in specific carbon-intensive sectors, 2) it would not use trade bans of controlled substances from non-parties but adopt carbon taxes at the border 3) it would principally depend on the revenue of carbon taxes to pay financial and technical assistance. To ensure the comparability of mitigation efforts the Parties would inter alia develop common rules for sector data requirements, measurement, reporting and verification practices, methodologies underlying the calculation of the level of BCA from non-parties.

The Continental Approach to Climate Change: An Analysis of the European Union's Emissions Trading System

J. Wellman (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom)

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The Continental Approach to Climate Change: An Analysis of the European Union's Emissions Trading System

J. Wellman (1) (1) London School of Economics and Political Science, Geography and Environment, London, United Kingdom

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The European Unions Emissions Trading System stands as a model for managing a changing climate in a complicated international environment. As the international community prepares for negotiations on a post-Kyoto climate regime, an understanding of players and their performance in the EU's governance system is essential to validating the potential success of emissions markets. Concerns that wealthy countries will purchase permits, rather than reduce their real emissions, have created skepticism about emission trading's potential for success.

In this study, I examine ambition exhibited by countries in using less than maximum levels of offsets to achieve Phase II reductions. Through fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I explore a number of variables including: economic growth, Green Party representation, public opinion, and renewable energy investment to construct a model explaining variety in exhibited ambition among ETS countries. Results show that renewable energy and public opinion play the most significant role in explaining a countrys use of offsets. Specific case studies demonstrate wide variance in explanation for member state performance, tied closely to business group influence and early environmental action.

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The process and flow of information and expertise on climate change is complex. The multiple interfaces existing between scientists, policymakers and practitioners are far from well understood to adequately assess and refine strategies for climate adaptation. The gathering of evidence for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports is an exercise conducted primarily by the scientific and political communities, and does not take into account the needs, and the role, of the experts working on the ground. Although increasing efforts are being made to improve the sciencepolicy interface, the disconnection between science and practitioners remains a key barrier to progress in climate change adaptation.

The latest findings from Working Group 2 on Impacts and Adaptation of Climate Change remain largely inaccessible to practitioners and do not fully incorporate their ongoing work on climate change issues. This is mainly the result of the IPCC process being highly academic-oriented and based on the peer-review mechanism with long lag times, and communication challenges, including different language and cultural interpretations. Building on the IPCCs recent review of how to make its reports more accessible going forward, this research assesses the extent to which models of co-production can capture the depth and breadth of the practitioner communitys work and effectively incorporate this into the IPCC process. For example the practitioner community is starting to adopt the term resilience instead of adaptation.

The premise for adopting models of co-production acknowledges that knowledge from different stakeholders (e.g. academics, policy, media, NGO, business, public, and practitioners) can be seen as 'useful frames for capturing different approaches to knowledge production. Such a process would ensure that future IPCC reports are more up-to-date, robust and complete in their analysis and that the climate change resilience solutions proposed incorporate the most practically viable research.

Through a series of workshops and interviews with academics, policy officials and practitioners in the United Kingdom this research focuses on the following three questions:

Can a co-production process facilitate the incorporation of practitioner expertise in IPCC reports?

What are the limits and opportunities from (i) adopting such an approach and (ii) incorporating practitioner based evidence?

How can the role of those involved in this process ensure better communication of the IPCC and wider climate messages and better co-design climate resilience?

This presentation will outline preliminary findings from these workshops and interviews and will provide valuable insights into how a co-production approach and the incorporation of practitioner based evidence could improve the production, dissemination and use of IPCC WG2 reports going forward in designing strategies for climate resilience.

Who governs local climate adaptation? A comparative analysis of governance arrangements in urban areas

Who governs local climate adaptation? A comparative analysis of governance arrangements in urban areas

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The allocation of responsibilities between public and private actors has become a key urban governance issue for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. While this issue has been explored conceptually to some extent, empirical studies are scarce and have not yet been performed in a systematic manner. This paper addresses the research question of who governs urban climate adaptation, by offering a synthesis of three empirical studies in which governance arrangements between public and private actors are analysed and compared. Each study contains an in-depth comparative case-study analysis of arrangements for adaptation measures in frontrunner cities in Europe and North America: 1) green roofs for storm-water retention purposes, 2) adaptive flood risk measures for water safety purposes, and 3) a selection of measures for heat stress prevention. In total, 20 governance arrangements were analysed and compared based on data derived from over 100 policy documents; from 97 in-depth interviews; and from two multi-stakeholder workshops. The meta-analysis offers insights into emerging patterns of urban climate adaptation governance arrangements. Furthermore, it offers a first evaluation of the performance of those governance arrangements in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy and fairness. Finally, conclusions related to the types of responsibilities of local public authorities are drawn, showing how indispensable they are for both adaptation planning and action.

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Many studies agree that a transition to a sustainable energy supply is needed in order to safeguard the supply of energy for future generations and abate greenhouse gas emissions. Limiting the average global surface temperature increase to 2°C, compared to pre-industrial average, is commonly regarded as an adequate means of avoiding dangerous climate change. In many scenarios that envision a development of energy supply that would be in line with a 2 degrees target, a large component of the solution consists of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Renewable energy would be in the range of 200-300 EJ in 2050, equivalent to 40-80% of total primary energy supply in 2050. This means an increase by a factor of 3 to 4 compared to 74 EJ in 2012 (IEA, 2014).

In spite of a significant increase in the use for renewable energy in the period 2000 to 2012 (from 54 EJ to 74 EJ), the share of renewable energy in total energy use has remained constant at 13%. A reason can be found in the growth of total energy use and hence non-renewable energy use, which increased likewise.

This research explores past growth rates for different types of renewable energy and required future growth rates in available 2 degrees scenarios. For this purpose past trends in renewable energy use in the period 1971 to 2012 are analysed and future contributions are explored.

From the analysis of past trends it becomes clear that in spite of comparatively high growth of renewable energy in the period 2000-2012, the share of renewable energy stayed the same due to similar increases in non-renewable energy use. Only a few countries managed to increase the share of renewable energy in their fuel mix. Most notably Germany demonstrated an effective increase in renewable energy from 3% in 2000 to 11% in 2012. This was achieved by a high overall growth rate for renewable energy of 11%/yr and a decrease in primary energy use of 0.7%/yr. Energy and climate policies in EU28 overall showed an effect by increasing the share of renewable energy from 6% in 2000 to 11% in 2012 with slightly decreasing energy use. China and India showed decreasing shares of renewable energy due to a high growth rate for total energy use combined with more moderate overall growth rates of renewable energy.

The overall increase in renewable energy amounted to 2.2%/yr in the period 1971-2012 and 2.6%/yr in the period 2000-2012. In order to be consistent with a 2 degrees pathway these growth rates would need to increase to 3-5%/yr. Biomass is at the moment the largest source of renewable energy used globally, equivalent to 10% of total primary energy use in 2012, followed by hydro power responsible for 2%. A transition of energy supply in order to help achieve a 2 degrees target would not only require a strong growth of renewable energy in absolute and relative sense, but also a strong shift to other renewable energy sources than biomass and hydro. Especially high growth would be required for wind, solar and geothermal in the order of 10%/yr. This would lead to a change in the mix of renewable energy used, with a much higher share of variable renewable energy sources (VRES). Overall wind and solar energy use would need to increase by as much as a factor of 30-60 in 2050, in comparison to 2012 (from 3 EJ to 58-155 EJ). The share of renewable energy would be in the range of 40-80% of energy use, with the share of wind and solar amounting to 25-54% of renewable energy use.

However most notable from the assessment of future needed growth rates is, the strong difference in the required development of energy use, compared to past trends. For decades primary energy use needs to consistently decrease by 0.1-0.5%/yr for OECD regions. A decrease in energy use has not occurred in the past 40 years in OECD countries, except for a couple of years during a time of recession. This would therefore require a breach from past trends. But especially for non OECD regions the needed change is large. Regional growth rates for energy use in the period 2000-2012 range from 1.5%/yr to 5.5%/yr and should decrease to be within the range of -0.2%/yr to 0.9%/yr. Therefore, a main challenge, besides increasing the uptake of renewable energy, would lie in the decrease of energy use growth rates in non-OECD countries.

The Road to Paris and beyond: Prospects for International Climate Policy

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The Road to Paris and beyond: Prospects for International Climate Policy

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All commentators agree that the climate conference in Lima (COP20) left a great deal of work for diplomats on the road to Paris later this year. The talks produced a quarry of language the negotiators can choose from. What was a mere annex to the Lima Call for Climate Action was further expanded in a first round of intersessional meetings in Geneva in February and formally adopted as a negotiating text. Narrowing down the options will be the major task for the upcoming sessions. While the progress on the post-2020 agreement (Workstream 1) was perceived as slow and tedious, somewhat surprisingly the developments in Workstream 2 (pre-2020) were rather positive and it has developed into a forum of open exchange, thus establishing a new and fruitful mode of collaboration within the UNFCCC process.

Our analysis is guided by a structurational regime model (Arts, 2000). This model assumes that the UNFCCC institutional system serves as part of the structure that guides the agency of firms and individuals within those socio-technical systems that are responsible for driving global climate change. The UNFCCC structures behaviour via the implementation of formal treaties in the respective national law of the Parties to the treaty, but also directly by providing signification and legitimation to transnational and subnational institutions to govern climate change, and immediately to corporations and consumers to develop more sustainable behavioural routines.

Based on this model, we analyse the Lima Call for Climate Action, the negotiating text formally adopted in Geneva in February 2015, and other developments in Lima and therafter. We look into the elements that have been tabled for the new global treaty to be agreed in Paris in 2015 and discuss their potential contributions. From this we derive recommendations for a fair and effective treaty.

Our analysis shows that the UNFCCC hitherto failed to provide an adequate impulse to act on climate change. It has become increasingly obvious that the UNFCCC institutional system as it is designed now is not delivering what it is supposed to do according to Article 2 UNFCCC: to prevent a dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. This is due in large part to the consensus-based approach, which does not work well with a quantity-based system of commitments but rather calls for other forms of cooperation. The concept of Multi-Dimensional Commitments developed by the Wuppertal Institute might offer a way out of this dilemma. Furthermore, the article explores a fresh start, options to supplement the UNFCCC system with an alliance of countries that want substantial progress on climate protection  an alliance of the ambitious or a forerunner club. Such a special treaty outside of the UN framework, if appropriate feedback mechanisms are established within UNFCCC, could help injecting some of the much-needed dynamic that is required to bring our civilization on a path compatible with earths ecological limits.

Climate change governance in Small Island developing States

M. Scobie (The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago)

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Climate change governance in Small Island developing States

M. Scobie (1) (1) The University of the West Indies, Institute of International Relations, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

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Climate change governance in Small Island developing States (SIDS) is a pressing priority to preserve livelihoods, biodiversity and ecosystems for the next generations. Understanding the dynamics of climate change policy integration is becoming more crucial as we try to measure the success of environmental governance efforts and chart new goals for sustainable development. At the international level, climate change policy has evolved from single issue to integrated approaches towards achieving sustainable development. New actors, new mechanisms and institutions of governance with greater fragmentation in governance across sectors and levels make integration of policy in the area of climate change governance even more of a challenge today. What are the best frameworks to achieve successful climate change policy integration in environmental governance - especially as the complex interconnectivity of new actors, institutions and mechanisms make the process of integration even more challenging? Are the same climate change policy coherence frameworks useful or indeed applicable for environmental governance in developing states more generally and for SIDS in particular? This article reviewed the debates around policy coherence for climate change governance, creates a framework to test or measure policy coherence and examines how relevant this has been to actual regional climate change governance processes in Caribbean States. The findings fill a gap in the literature on climate change governance through policy coherence in SIDS.

Top Down' AND Bottom Up' AND Sideways' Climate Governance Solutions: The Realities, Potentials and Perils of a Pluralistic International Institutional Landscape

T. Brewer (ICTSD, Geneva, France)

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Top Down' AND Bottom Up' AND Sideways' Climate Governance Solutions: The Realities, Potentials and Perils of a Pluralistic International Institutional Landscape

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The Realities, Potentials and Perils of a Pluralistic International Institutional Landscape

Thomas L. Brewer

The chapter on International Cooperation in volume 3 of the IPCC AR5 documents that the international climate change institutional landscape already consists of a variety of institutional arrangements that include hierarchical top down relationships (as in the multilateral UNFCCC) as well as bottom up initiatives (such as unilateral subnational mitigation and adaptation programs). There are sideways relationships (such as those among cities), and there are also sideways relationships between climate and non-climate regimes. Institutional proliferation along multiple pathways seems likely, including for example sideways linkages among carbon markets. These realities of a pluralistic institutional landscape should be taken into account in order for effective new international institutional arrangements to be devised; ignoring these proliferating tendencies could result in a dysfunctional fragmented international system. Each pathway has its own distinctive combination of advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis standard evaluative criteria: effectiveness in promoting climate change mitigation and/or adaptation, equity in the distribution of benefits and costs, economic efficiency, political viability and administrative feasibility. Analytic work and diplomatic initiatives are needed to develop pathways that will ensure collaboration and coherence among diverse institutional arrangements.

This presentation explores the implications of these observations for international institutional design. Empirical data and case information are drawn from the energy sector and the international transport sector, which are of course inherently significant in terms of their contributions to greenhouse gas and particulate emissions. The sectors are also significant for international institutional design issues because of their differences and interactions. The international maritime shipping industry is subject to regulation by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as per provisions of the UNFCCC. The sectors emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and black carbon are thus potentially covered by the IMO. At the same time, the Arctic Council and the Clean Air and Climate Coalition (CACC) also have black carbon and methane on their agendas, and the World Trade Organization has some aspects of international maritime shipping within its purview. There are therefore many potential sideways relationships among them. Yet, the memberships of these various international institutions vary from only 8 member states in the Arctic Council to 39 in the CACC to 170 in the IMO, and their decision-making procedures are quite disparate. In short, there is already a complex mixture of sectoral, multilateral, regional and plurilateral institutional arrangements concerning emissions of black carbon, methane and carbon dioxide. Yet, there is not yet an adequate institutional arrangement in place to address the carbon black and methane emissions issues in the international maritime shipping sector. The presentation thus proposes the negotiation of an Arctic Black Carbon Agreement (ABCA) and an International Maritime Methane Agreement (IMMA). The proposals take into account top down as well as bottom up and sideways institutional relationships.

The presenter is: IPCC Lead Author, International Cooperation chapter, AR5, volume 3; author of articles in the refereed journals Climate Policy and Energy Policy; author of The United States in a Warming World: The Political Economy of Government, Business and Public Responses to Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, 2014; and Senior Fellow, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva. All views expressed are entirely his own as an independent scholar.

Unlocking deadlocked negotiations: The relevance of group pressure and policy learning in the global climate negotiations

K. Rietig (Department of Politics and Public Policy, Leicester, United Kingdom)

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Unlocking deadlocked negotiations: The relevance of group pressure and policy learning in the global climate negotiations

K. Rietig (1) (1) Department of Politics and Public Policy, De Montfort University Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

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The UNFCCC negotiations have been deadlocked for over 20 years due to incompatible national interests. At the same time, the objective of avoiding dangerous climate change drifts out of reach as we near the end of this decade. Yet, there is increasing scope to break up this deadlock, for which mutual learning, policy diffusion and capacity building will be central. Initial evidence suggests that learning is a key-multiplying factor in accelerating policy diffusion via the international level. Learning can be a helpful factor to progress along transformative pathways to sustainable development, in particular effective climate mitigation and adaptation. Within the UNFCCC negotiations, countries can learn from each others successes in low carbon economic development, share knowledge on designing domestic climate legislation that is co-beneficial for sustainable development and even come to understand that addressing climate change is an opportunity to create a green industrial revolution, thus entering on transformative pathways towards sustainable development. Realizing that there are long-term benefits from acting on climate change can even influence how actors understand the issue and result in readjustments to negotiation positions based on altered national interests. In combination with group pressure, these experience, knowledge and belief-based types of learning are currently altering the negotiation dynamics within the UNFCCC. Transgovernmental city networks and non-governmental organizations are creating non-negotiation settings for governmental representatives to explore options and learn from other countries successes. These learning platforms and networks were established by a number of actors to help countries share their experiences with low carbon economic development plans to address climate change while decoupling their economic growth from negative climate impacts. Based on interviews and participant observation at the UNFCCC negotiations between 2013 and 2015, this contribution examines the learning among government representatives about each other's low carbon economic development plans and climate legislation within (UNFCCC) non-negotiation forums and increasingly formal negotiations. Mutual learning and policy entrepreneurial strategies of key negotiators helps to create positive competition towards more ambitious climate legislation on the national level. Presenting these national climate policies in the UNFCCC creates group pressure among countries to revise their negotiation positions towards improving action on mitigating climate change to avoid being branded as 'laggards'. The key implication of this research points towards the importance of better understanding underlying learning mechanisms, which can contribute to overcoming negotiation deadlocks by helping countries shape their national interests over time towards increasing cooperation on sustainable development.

Why establish a climate legislation to address climate change in a Latin American context?

Why establish a climate legislation to address climate change in a Latin American context?

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The most ambitious Latin American countries have had a sustained political commitment with regards to the climate change actions as it can be seen in the public policies elaborated since the signature of the UNFCCC - especially in the commitment of 2009 - and the current resourceful position during international negotiations.

In this context, the initiative of a climate legislation seems to be an adequate way for institutional strengthening and coordination of climate change at national, regional and local level. This is relevant in the current context of the national contributions definition with regards to the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris in 2015.

The overall objective of this presentation is to demonstrate the necessity and viability of climate change legislation for Latin American countries and outline the recommended basic content of such a law to support the determination of the countries Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) which are to be presented to the UNFCCC secretariat in the lead-up to the 21st COP in Paris in 2015. At a time when strengthening public policy on climate change can be a cause for concern in certain sectors of society, the results of this presentation will ground the debate on climate change legislation in objective terms and will deliver concrete inputs and tools to demonstrate the need and viability of such legislation.

Fostering Socio-Ecological Resilience to Climate Change by Shifting from National to Negotiated Law-Making Approach

O. Barriere (Researcher in Environmental Law and Anthropology, Institute of Research for Development (IRD), Montpellier, France), B. Mohamed (Head, Research Laboratory on Territorial Governance, Human Security and Sustainability (LAGOS), Agadir, Morocco)

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Fostering Socio-Ecological Resilience to Climate Change by Shifting from National to Negotiated Law-Making Approach

O. Barriere (1) ; B. Mohamed (2) (1) Researcher in Environmental Law and Anthropology, Institute of Research for Development (IRD), Umr espace-dev, Montpellier, France; (2) Head, Research Laboratory on Territorial Governance, Human Security and Sustainability (LAGOS), Public law department, faculty of law, economics and social sciences of agadir, Agadir, Morocco

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International and national laws constitute a legal positivism which, by definition, excludes any form of legal pluralism. At these scales, we remain exogenous to territorialized communities since regulatory frameworks are mostly enacted on international or national levels. Face to climate change challenge, it is increasingly important to investigate how local communities can be involved in climate actions if we assume that existing top-down regulatory frameworks will not fully consider socio-ecological adaptations and resilience as highly crucial for local communities to persist and maintain their identities.

The interrelations between governance scales cannot exclude local territories. At the local level, communities tend to adapt and build their resilience to climate change by regulating the relations among groups and individuals and between social and ecological systems. Therefore, the idea of ââa law emerging from the bottom is becoming increasingly relevant in order to enhance the bottom-up approach as an appropriate coping strategy. In other terms, the law-making processes will no longer remain exclusively vertical but will evolve in a horizontal mode, thus abandoning the power relations to embrace the logic of negotiation.

Two examples of negotiated law-making will be presented in this research: the first pertains to the ongoing construction of a socio-ecological resilience pact in the Moroccan High Atlas involving two tribes (including four rural communities and regions); and the second case concerns the formalization of an already-implemented pastoral pact being adopted in the French Cevennes and involving sixteen counties (including one department and one region). In each case, the co-construction process is put forward and analyzed on the basis of a territorial project. The three-dimensionality aspect of the project (involvement of agro-pastoral actors, decision makers and experts) is presented as the core pillar of the design and implementation of concerned regulatory frameworks. These frameworks, materializing a territorial law perceived and formalized in a solemn text labeled "territory pact", fully integrate national laws by local deliberation.

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This paper assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely no special rules, minimum certainty thresholds and discounting proportional to uncertainty. Our microeconomic model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions  likely representative of many practical cases  the regulator has no interest in reducing unbiased monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry monitoring uncertainty may hamper the integrity of climate policy. We find that in that case applying discounting proportional to monitoring uncertainty is preferable to setting minimum certainty thresholds or not enforcing any constraints at all, as it is currently practiced in most carbon pricing mechanisms.

Review of the experience with monitoring uncertainty requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism

Review of the experience with monitoring uncertainty requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism

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In order to ensure the environmental integrity of carbon offset projects, emission reductions certified under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have to be real, measurable and additional, which is ensured inter alia through the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) process. MRV, however, comes at a cost that ranges from several cents to EUR1.20 and above per ton of CO2e depending on the project type. This article analyzes monitoring uncertainty requirements for carbon offset projects with a particular focus on the trade-off between monitoring stringency and cost. To this end, existing literature is reviewed, overarching monitoring guidelines, as well as the 10 most-used methodologies are scrutinized, and finally three case studies are analysed. It is shown that there is indeed a trade-off between the stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier for the implementation of offset projects in some sectors. It is then demonstrated that this trade-off has not been systematically addressed in the overarching CDM guidelines and that there are only limited incentives to reduce monitoring uncertainty. Some methodologies and calculation tools as well as some other offset standards, however, do incorporate provisions for a trade-off between monitoring costs and stringency. These provisions may take the form of discounting emissions reductions based on the level of monitoring uncertainty  or more implicitly through allowing a project developer to choose between monitoring a given parameter and using a conservative default value.

Ex-post evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol: Four key lessons for the 2015 Paris Agreement

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Ex-post evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol: Four key lessons for the 2015 Paris Agreement

R. Morel (1) ; I. Shishlov (1) (1) CDC Climat, PARIS, France

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Agreed in 1997, following the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is the first international tool focused on greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation involving as many countries: in its final configuration, thirty six developed countries committed to reduce their emissions by 4% between 1990 and 2008-2012  the first commitment period (CP1). In April 2014, the data from the CP1 was officially published. This report thus presents the first comprehensive ex-post analysis of the first period of the KP.

Based on the results of this report, it is possible to draw four key lessons from the Kyoto experience for the establishment of a new global agreement that is expected to be signed in Paris in 2015:

1. Expanding the coverage: striking a balance between overall environmental integrity and flexibility for specific circumstances

2. Removing the virtual specter of internationally legally binding commitments and limiting the focus on methods of compliance

3. Focusing on MRV processes

4. Providing flexibility in the agreement and its adoption process

Climate Diplomacy from the Perspective of the Emerging Climate Security Paradigm'

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Within the UNFCCC process, various efforts have been made to craft a regulatory system for managing climate change, which gave birth to a complex of tangentially connected regimes and various bilateral and unilateral initiatives from top-down and bottom-up approaches. To engage effectively with this complex framework, state actors are supposed to go beyond conventional and reactive forms of diplomacy to take an approach that merges climate and foreign policy in creative, proactive, and preventive ways. At the upcoming UNFCCC meeting in Paris 2015, it is hoped that nations will commit to a new and binding agreement on climate. At present, the goal of climate diplomacy is to build the political conditions to make this goal achievable. However, the current failure to agree on how to limit dangerous climate change through an effective and equitable regime is generally pointed out as one of the greatest ongoing failures in modern diplomacy. Many observers consider the weak political will and leadership among main carbon emitters and the lack of trust within the international community as the key factors behind this failure. This has been heightened by the fact that some nations have backtracked on their commitments to reduce emissions or to provide assistance to countries with limited adaptive capacities, while other nations efforts to reduce emissions have gone unacknowledged. This fractured political environment hinders advanced commitments and deepens the North-South divide, especially with regard to the question of how to best allocate the critical global mitigation responsibility.

Within this context, climate diplomacy may present a way to overcome existing dilemmas since it is essentially an interface between national interest debates and international cooperation. It is capable of ensuring the accurate assessment of other countries interests and intentions, and finding the needed space for agreement. To do this it must interpret conflicting national interests around many issues such as climate vulnerability, low carbon businesses opportunities, high carbon asset exposure, sovereignty and perceived fairness. Climate diplomacy must ensure national priorities are reflected and understood in the often abstract world of international climate change agreements. It is indeed the role of climate diplomacy to deliver the timely construction of international climate regime, ensure its effective operation, and shape its evolution to address emerging challenges.

To deal with the internal and external challenges to success, climate diplomacy must draw on the best practice of modern diplomacy and also innovate new approaches, especially as it is evolving in scope and complexity as the climate regime shifts its focus from target setting to implementation and climate risk management. This shift has prompted better integration of climate change into broader foreign policy and geopolitical discussions, a proliferation of overlapping alliances between both state and non-state actors, and new approaches to shaping a global dialogue on the consequences of, and solutions to, climate change. However, and in order to boost the evolution of climate diplomacy within this perspective, while anchoring commitment to climate change at the highest level on the international political agenda and raising the level of ambition for an efficient global climate governance, the security implications of climate change  from human, economical, environmental, and geopolitical perspectives  should be widely recognized and mainstreamed.

Based on these assumptions, this research aims to investigate the following topics:

What is the relevance level of the climate security discourse, and in which areas further research and investigation should be undertaken to qualify the climate security paradigm as a referential for building an effective climate regime?

Are there any risks of linking climate change to security such as the ones which assume that framing climate change as a security issue may overshadow important social and environmental concerns and sending ironically fear-based and disturbing messages to relevant decision making processes?

To what extent the mainstreaming of climate security as a priority in the agenda of climate diplomacy can narrow, or otherwise broaden, the scope and scale of action internationally and domestically?

What kind of adjustments to be undertaken on all levels to make the climate security approach relevant and effective in terms of climate governance?

Citizenship participation in the public policy making processes in Chile: A glance back

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Citizenship participation in the public policy making processes in Chile: A glance back

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The citizenship participation in the environmental issues has been a standing requirement of the legal systems as of the principle 10, established in the Rio Declaration. In line with the above, the international law regime of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has promoted, in a systemic manner, that climate change governance must be developed and pursued by the States involving to the citizenship in the decision making process.

This article explores the evolution of the citizenship participation in the Chilean climate change governance, mainly expressed during the public policymaking processes, leads by the Environmental Ministry. The different state of proceedings information, the public consultation process, and the answers to the questions raised have been fundamental to monitor the real impacts of the citizenship intervention.

As a global conclusion is possible to observe a slow but sustained and effective increase in the participation levels, contrasting with others on-going process which are being carry out in the region.

Preventive communication and risk preventive policy in Guadeloupe

V. Charneau (Université des Antilles, Pointe-à-Pitre, France)

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Preventive communication and risk preventive policy in Guadeloupe

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Located in an area geographically and geologically unstable, the Caribbean basin, is regularly attacked by natural hazards. Thus, earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and all their consequences are an integral part of the lives of various people and institutions in the Caribbean area. The threats that people must face and that institutions must support the policies of prevention and risk management. Since the recent decades, the focus was on climate change by the scientific community. The result is party to the increase in the temperature of which one of its consequences is the increase in the frequency and magnitude of natural hazards.

The Guadeloupe is part of the French Departments of America, it has implemented the risk of public policies, among them measures relating to the dissemination of preventive information. Because, recently, the effectiveness of natural risk prevention and management plans based on the citizens' information procedures. But public policy risk through natural risk prevention plan does not clearly define the information broadcasts measures. Thus it is clear will to respond to threats that raise natural hazards and of involving people in the management of these, the association "consensus-communication" under the Risk Prevention Plan. Then, reaching to emerge, communication as a "means to mobilize" in the context of preventive actions, and also prevent the risk from climate upheaval.

This study aims to analyze public policies for risk management and dissemination process of preventive information. To do this, it will make a brief review of the history and contributions of the state of the scientific literature in the humanities and social sciences, the concept of risk, highlighting briefly science developments information, communication, and finally, it will analyze synthetically the natural risk prevention plan for the city of Petit-Bourg in Guadeloupe, especially for highlighting the organization of public consultation required by the plan.

Medium term implications for Africa's adaptation planning in Agriculture

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Many of the sustainable development goals to 2030 recognize the role agriculture can play in ending hunger, assuring food and nutrition security as well as promoting healthy lives with a sustained income and economic growth; thereby reducing poverty globally. For Africa, a post 2015 agreement presents the opportunity to merge a shared vision on sustainable development with that which stipulates a pathway to a low carbon transition of food systems. However, it is unlikely, given the short time available to prepare an agreement in Paris in 2015, that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies and work streams will conclude discussions on agriculture to pave way for a new climate deal.

The national adaptation plan (NAP) process was established in 2010, under the Cancun Adaptation framework of the UNFCCC. It was intended as a mechanism for countries to address their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, building their capacity to adapt to current and future climatic changes. A key focus is to integrate climate change adaptation into development planning processes and strategies across all sectors and at local to national scales. Under this framework NAPs address medium to longer term needs building on the experiences of Least Developed Countries (LDC) National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs). If we examine the state of the negotiations, the subsidiary body on implementation (SBI) is currently considering guidelines for the formulation of NAPs. The LDC Expert Group (LEG) has identified the need to fast track the application of NAP guidelines emphasizing integrated development planning as a key consideration. Through the adaptation planning process, we examine how Africa is dealing with agriculture.

Since NAPA experiences are being incorporated into a new set of guidelines for NAPs, it is expected that any emerging protocol will highlight specific agriculture, fisheries and forestry actions. The result is that agriculture and food security, which is to a great extent reflected in proposed and ongoing country NAPA programmes, receives greater attention in defining the medium and long-term issues around food security and food consumption. Because these issues are not yet well understood, and are often bundled with concerns about trade and commerce and non-food products from alternative land uses such as with bio fuels, it is important to foster dialogue for the parties as they prepare for the upcoming COP21 in order to reach agreement on how to treat agriculture in a new global deal on climate.

Under the NAP process, many countries have conducted some or other form of impact assessment, usually on a sectoral basis. There exist no guidelines for initiating and completing risk and vulnerability assessments of the agriculture sector and particularly as it relates to the impacts of climate change on agriculture as well as the impacts of agriculture as a contributor to climate change. In many cases too, the economic impacts of climate related risks has not been enumerated therefore compromising the design of effective adaptation strategies and measures at the national level. The inclusion of national planners is therefore critical to this process, such as from the ministries of finance and the support for LDCs under the Global Support Progamme (GSP) is crucial to advancing the NAP process. In addition, the identification and procurement of funding for adaptation is only nascent and limited to early action, therefore it is not expected that agricultural adaptation will receive significant funding commitments in the foreseeable medium term period post 2015 and pre-2020.

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Soft and/or Hard - What Set-Up for a Future Governance System to Implement a New Climate Deal?

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A new climate regime is not only about the nature, reach and ambition of such an international agreement, but also about effective arrangements to ensure its implementation. This presentation will analyse the existing governance system under the Kyoto Protocol (KP). By shedding light on how implementation of the emission reduction targets under that regime have been monitored so far, the aim is to understand what elements of the governance mechanism were useful for fostering compliance and why. In particular, the role of facilitative elements is assessed. Building on existing literature on reasons for non-compliance/ lack of implementation and ways to best achieve compliance/implementation, advantages and disadvantages of facilitative and coercive approaches are addressed both from a theoretical and practical angle.

Empirically, enforcement has often, although not always, been rather successful in achieving compliance with commitments under the KP. However, many states have shown not to be inclined to subscribe to such hard measures. Therefore, knowing about the (perceived) usefulness of soft elements to support and facilitate compliance of states is of high relevance, especially when discussing a new governance system for compliance/implementation.

The presentation will start by outlining the current compliance system under the KP, focusing in particular on the interplay between facilitative and enforcement elements. Lessons learnt will be developed by drawing on empirical findings of usefulness perceptions hold by different stakeholders, in particular of the soft components of compliance monitoring. These insights will be used to develop different scenarios for a future governance system. The talk will finish with an outlook of plausible and desirable governance set-ups post-2020.

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L. Kemp (1) (1) Australian National University, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Canberra, ACT, France

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The current practice of UN based climate multilateralism under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) focuses upon broad, consensus based legal treaties that cover a large number of issues. It is an approach that is creating diminishing returns over time. Despite this, it appears that the next climate agreement to be decided upon at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC, will also prioritise the construction of a treaty with 'universal participation'. This paper argues that a switch towards smaller treaties which attempt to work by coalitions of the willing are a more viable approach forward. By drawing together ideas from a range of fields such as The Theory of Critical Mass from sociology, Bandwagoning and Norm Cascades from international relations, pluritilateral proposals for both the climate and trade regimes, and practical examples from the EU and Kyoto Protocol, a theory of Critical Mass Multilaterism for climate change is developed. These disparate ideas and examples all deal with the notion of positive feedback: that a single action can cause further effects which amplify it over time. Accordingly, there is both a theoretical foundation and precedence for the mitigation actions of a few states to spread to others. This conceptual framework is then applied to case studies of both the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Kyoto Protcol and Montreal Protocol. The Theory of Critical Mass Multilateralism would suggest the the next climate agreement should focus on facilitating and linking strong unilateral and pluritlateral actions, instead of seeking a universal and consensual deal with the ratification of all major players including the US. The future of climate multilateralism, should, and most likely will, be in a number of smaller, more focused treaties, regardless of whether the Paris negotiations succeed or fail. The primary challenge of a future climate treaty is not to address free-riding and carbon leakage concerns, but to enable a critical mass of action that will generate the neccessary feedbacks in terms of market prices, norms and political will. Addressing climate change internationally is not a matter for a global deal, but simply a critical mass of progressive actors.

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Climate change will profoundly shape the future of human societies (IPCC 2014, Smith et al. 2011). Addressing climate change requires sustainability transitions of deeply entrenched drivers of climate change (Meadowcroft 2009). Uncertainties, the likelihood of surprises, non-linear and extreme impacts resulting from climate change demand managing social-ecological resilience across scales and times (Pelling 2011, Nelson 2011, Wise et al. 2014, Jäger et al. 2012). From the integration of transitions and resilience scholarships, we developed a conceptual framework for dealing with high uncertainty contexts and navigating through high level of complexity found in these contexts (Hölscher et al. 2014). The developed governance framework conceptualises about the different types of agency capacities needed so as to reorient and/or transform on-going processes towards sustainability while fostering systems resilience, transilience.

Transilience governance requires scale- and time-dependent stabilising and maintaining of system functions (adapting), creating of fundamentally new system structures and functions (transforming), and strategising towards sustainability within environmental and social preconditions. The governance capacities reside in public and private actors at local, regional, national and international levels and their abilities to define the content of public goods and to shape the social, economic, and political processes by which these goods are provided (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002:43). In this paper we will address the following research question: How do certain agency factors shape the capacities for transilience governance?

We approach this question by developing and testing a conceptual capacities framework that is based on a literature review of transition studies, resilience thinking, social-ecological systems and climate change literatures. Our framework encompasses adaptive, transformative and strategic capacities that together enable transilience governance (Table 1). We conceptualise that the capacities are interrelated (Marshall et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2013). The capacities are produced by the collective abilities of actors (individuals, organisations, networks) in social-ecological-technological systems. One actor can also enact different capacities.

The ability to adapt system structures in order to maintain and stabilise system functions, reduce and/or enable coping with disturbances and/or operate upon origins and attributes of disturbances

The ability to transform system structures and functions in order to create fundamentally new system structures and functions when limits of adaptation are met and/or to operate upon origins and attributes of disturbances

The ability to strategise towards sustainability goals within environmental and social preconditions to orientate, balance and build adaptive and transformative capacities.

We test our capacities framework by conducting an exploratory, comparative case study (Yin 1994) of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative and New York Citys PlaNYC programme. Both programmes are set up to establish and implement sustainability and resilience policy goals in important urban deltas adversely affected by climate change. We explore how agency factors shape the capacities to transilience governance. This yields insights on how the three capacities interrelate over time and how climate governance could be facilitated.

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International negotiations are under way to conclude a 2020+ agreement in Paris in December 2015 within the confines of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Neither are the contours of such an agreement presently clear nor whether any agreement will be concluded by the end of this year. To fill this void, we undertake a prediction of select dimensions of the present negotiations with the Predictioneers Game (Bueno de Mesquita 2009a).

The Predictioneers Game builds on three decades of model development. In essence, it is an advanced expected utility negotiation model with incomplete information between N parties who make bilateral negotiation offers and counteroffers. Based on knowledge of who the actors (or stakeholders) are, their basic influence in world politics, the salience of the specific issue under negotiation (see below), the actors position on the issue, as well as their flexibility on that position, the Predictioneers Game forecasts the negotiated outcome round-by-round until no additional utility can be gained on average. The model has been used to predict outcomes on a wide range of governance and policy issue. The Predictioneers Game correctly predicted the outcome of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties  despite high expectations for a cooperative outcome at the time (Bueno de Mesquita 2009b).

For the conference Our Common Future Under Climate Change, we will undertake a prediction of the likely common mitigation goal of the parties negotiating under the auspices of the UNFCCC. We will concentrate on the most important country actors and pertinent negotiations groups. In addition, we will undertake a prediction of the likely outcome of the present negotiations on loss and damage and its potential inclusion in a Paris agreement.

In order to calibrate our input data, we will draw, on the one hand, on the expertise provided by CICEP Norwegian Center for Excellence in Research - Strategic Challenges in International Climate and Energy Policy, which comprises CICERO, the University of Oslo, and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, and PIK  Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, on the other hand.

The analysis will be undertaken in April-June 2015 in lieu of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), corroborated by a broad range of robustness checks to both reflect uncertainty about input values and external shocks on the negotiation dynamics.

Initial test calibrations of the model suggest that the common mitigation goal will not substantially differ from those discussed at Lima in late 2014, an agreement will be reached after late 2015, and an extension of the loss and damage negotiations towards a compensation fund will not materialize in the near future.

References

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2009a. The Predictioneer's Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future. 1st ed. New York: Random House.

. 2009b. "Recipe for Failure - Why Copenhagen Will Be a Bust, and Other Prophecies from the Foreign-Policy World's Leading Predictioneer." Foreign Policy.

Explaining climate bargaining strategies of developing countries

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Although the efforts made during the last COPs, Parties are still far from achieving an agreement for the implementation of a new climate regime. As demonstrated by the debate about the interpretation of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities principle, the growing role played by developing countries in negotiations is one of the main causes behind the deadlock. For this reason, attention should be paid to the composition of the negotiating coalitions of developing countries. By applying a cluster analysis, this paper aims at investigating the role played by the heterogeneity in structural features of developing countries in forming bargaining coalitions in the climate negotiation.

The final cluster structure reveals that developing countries are grouped into nine clusters, which are very different from each other depending on some crucial characteristics. The principal driving forces forming the clusters are related to the energy system, the climate vulnerability and the economic development level.

It is worth noting that these are all crucial variables for climate change negotiations and might help better understanding the reasons behind bargaining positions of these countries, as well as the effective impacts of a potential climate agreement on heterogeneous interests.

Turning to the specific results of this statistical analysis, four out of the nine clusters deserve particular attention. A first group represents large energy exporting countries, mainly formed by OPEC countries. A second group very closed to the first one is formed by small energy exporting countries. Even though this second group has different structural features from the first one, the driving force played by the particular vulnerability to climate agreement caused by the dependency on energy exports might influence this second cluster to make a coalition with the large energy exporters, thus influencing substantially the negotiations outcome. The first policy suggestion for climate governance is to refine the criteria to protect energy exporting countries in order to account for their relative dependence on fossil fuels export with respect to their economic sustainability.

The third cluster gathers the largest number of countries, grouping together the Least Developed Countries in Africa and South East Asia. This group is characterized by a high vulnerability degree to climate change and a low responsibility in GHGs emissions. This explains why LDCs ask for a stringent agreement including emerging economies. In terms of climate governance, this group might influence the final agreement in the direction of a challenging mitigation action but they also need a strong financial support for recovering climate damages. This particular double interests position might reduce their bargaining influence in the climate negotiations since they will not contribute to mitigation costs and they will benefit the most from international assistance.

On the contrary, the fourth cluster reveals that there are countries whose structural features put them in a contrasting position with respect to any potential climate agreement outcome. More specifically, these are poor and vulnerable countries with a strong economic dependency from fossil fuels export. This means that if a challenging mitigation action will be settled, they will be negatively influenced by the reduction in international energy demand. At the same time, if the current GHGs emission pathway is not corrected by a climate agreement, these are countries that would face several damages caused by global warming. This can lead these countries to advocate different interests, joining alternative bargaining coalitions (LCDs as well as fossil fuel producers) during different COPs. Given that whatever the results in negotiations, they always lose as they have to sacrifice an improvement in terms of vulnerability in favour of economic benefits or vice versa, this specific group represents a source of particular uncertainty in the climate governance process.

The results obtained by applying a statistical cluster method to group developing countries involved in climate negotiations help highlighting the specific features driving vulnerability as well as bargaining positions. This brings to suggest to policy makers that in order to facilitate climate governance is highly recommended to take into account the largest number of vulnerability sources to climate issues, in order to design specific complementary measures necessary to minimize costs for every country.

Framing a post-Kyoto Climate Accord

J. Mathews (Macquarie University, Sydney NSW, France)

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Framing a post-Kyoto Climate Accord

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The forthcoming Paris conference of the parties under the UNFCCC, to be staged in November 2015, is tasked with developing a global climate agreement focused on carbon reduction, as successor to the Kyoto Protocol. If this Paris Protocol (if such is to be its name) is to be effective it will need to go beyond a list of countries committing to make reductions in carbon emissions, to incorporate measures needed to address the promotion of green industry and its diffusion around the world. A putative Part II to the Paris Protocol could be addressed to the WTO, and list green products or processes that are agreed will lead to reduced carbon emissions  and as such provide countries with justifiable exemption from the rules of fair trade for a designated period. It is argued that such a bold step is needed to reduce the severity and frequency of trade disputes over green industrial policies and clear the way for the carbon reductions anticipated to come to fruition.

Lost at sea? Charting wave energy's difficult journey towards commercialisation since a resurgence in UK government support

M. Hannon (Imperial College, London, United Kingdom)

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Lost at sea? Charting wave energy's difficult journey towards commercialisation since a resurgence in UK government support

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Large-scale support for wave energy innovation in the UK can be traced back to the early 1970s, a movement triggered by a sharp rise in fossil fuels following the oil crisis (Mukora et al. 2008). During this time wave energy became the principal focus for public research, development and deployment (RD&D) funding for renewable energies. However, as oil prices fell and the UK became a net exporter of oil during the 1980s and 90s funding began to decline rapidly. This shift is embodied by the termination of the UKs Wave Energy Programme in 1982, which was discontinued on the basis that official government cost estimates projected that wave energy would be more expensive in the long run compared to other promising (e.g. wind, nuclear) and established (e.g. coal) sources of energy (Ross 1996).

It wasnt until the late 1990s and early 2000s that ocean energy enjoyed a renaissance on the basis that UK government believed it could play a central role in meeting its carbon emissions reduction targets, whilst at the same time stimulating economic growth (LCICG 2012; Jeffrey et al. 2013; RCEP 2014). Subsequently, $120 million of UK public funds have been committed to ocean energy RD&D since 2000. However, despite this resurgence in support there are still no commercial wave energy devices operating in UK waters today, with no major roll-out of devices expected until at least the 2020s (LCICG 2012).

In this context the presentation explores why wave energy technology has failed to reach commercialisation in the UK despite a rich history of wave energy RD&D and a recent resurgence in public RD&D support since the turn of the millennium. It takes a detailed look at what have been the subsequent successes and failures during this period and which factors have been responsible. To answer these questions the presentation draws upon a combination of qualitative (i.e. interviews, documentary analysis) and quantitative (i.e. IEA RD&D repository) analysis to provide underpinning evidence. To conclude, some recommendations are presented to inform the design of the UK governments energy and innovation policy, with a view to accelerate the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies and help it meet its carbon emissions targets.

Scaling up technology transfer through the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism

K. Wada (RITE, Kyoto, Japan)

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Scaling up technology transfer through the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism

K. Wada (1) (1) RITE, Systems Analysis Group, Kyoto, Japan

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This paper contributes to debates about technology transfer through the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism for climate change mitigation and adaptation. The purpose of this study is to understand the challenges that the current UNFCCC approach faces and to make policy recommendations on how the UN process can be brought closer to the actual need of technology to address climate change. This analysis is relevant to international negotiation in the post 2020 climate regime.

The mechanism has played a limited role in technology transfer so far, failing to materialize in actual technology deployment. Technologies can be transferred through various channels, ranging from official development assistance (ODA) to private economic activities, such as foreign direct investment (FDI). The UNFCCC, however, deals with technology transfer, as a government-to-government process and disvalues the role of private sector. This narrow focus cannot deliver a significant level of low-carbon technology required to curb GHG emissions in developing countries.

There are number of reasons why the UNFCCC needs to structuralize business activities, rather than governmental support, as a basis of technology transfer. First of all, the private sector owns most of the low carbon technologies. Without their engagement and innovative capability, the existing UNFCCC process will not deliver the scale of change that is necessary to achieve climate goal. Thus far, carbon credits via the CDM have facilitated private sector participation, but future flexible mechanism is under uncertainty, which lacks the necessary signals to stimulate investment in low-carbon technologies. Furthermore, financial resources to support technology transfer, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF), have limited availability and the eligibility criteria for the Technology Mechanism is still unclear. Lastly, but not least, about 30 developing countries with a total population of 2 billion are projected to exceed the income threshold for ODA eligibility over the period until 2030 due to their substantial economic growth, according to the OECD projection. These imply further efforts to involve private sector both in developed and developing economies are crucial.

The Technology Mechanism established in 2010 can be a potential platform to bring the UNFCCC process closer to the enabling frameworks that facilitate private sector investment. The Technology Executive Committee (TEC), together with the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), is mandated to facilitate the effective implementation of technology transfer. The CTCN strives to stimulate technology cooperation and to enhance climate technology development and transfer. CTCN operations are supposed to be conducted via partner institutions with expertise in climate technologies with an international network of academic, finance, NGO, private and public sector institutions. National Designated Entities (NDEs) are also nominated as national CTCN focal points to coordinate and submit technical assistance requests to the CTCN.

Technology has rarely been transferred explicitly yet through this premature mechanism. Hence, I would propose three specific ideas to enhance the mechanism. First, the CTCN, whose current network members are mostly public sector institutions, needs to involve more private firms that have technology solutions and financial sector, such as regional development bank, to harnesses more private sector investment. Secondly, the function of NDEs in developing countries needs to be expanded. The present role of NDEs is limited to a focal point to their technology needs to the CTCN, but it can be strengthened as a liaison between local technology needs and businesses opportunities by helping the national enabling environments that facilitate private investment. Finally, link

LIFE programme and Climate Change

P. Fetsis (Neemo EEIG / AEIDL, Brussels, France)

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LIFE programme and Climate Change

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- THE LIFE PROGRAMME -

OVER 20 YEARS IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN THE EU

The LIFE programme was established in 1992 and is the EUs funding instrument for the environment. The general objective of LIFE is to contribute to the implementation, updating and development of EU environmental policy and legislation by co-financing pilot or demonstration projects with added value.

With 4171 initiatives supported to date, LIFE has improved the environmental performance of a wide range of sectors and fields across Europe. Pressure on water resources is being exacerbated by climate change. LIFE projects have focused on tackling water scarcity and natural water hazards, both in urban and rural contexts. Optimisation of water use through innovative water management infrastructure, water resource planning and allocation modelling, techniques for groundwater storage improvement, cost analysis and water pricing services are amongst the practices developed and tested when addressing the impact of climate change on floods, as well as on supply and availability of water.

Below you can find some examples of LIFE projects on specific themes:

Europe, flood risk management

Floodscan: The project aimed to limit flood risk by testing an innovative and cost-efficient method of mapping flood hazard areas. A web mapping service was developed to provide reliable and accurate information about flood risk not only for the general public and businesses but also for local and regional authorities, enabling them to take more effective planning decisions (e.g. to ban building in certain areas).

HydroClimateStrategyRiga: The project aimed to create a flood risk management plan for the city of Riga in order to create the means necessary to ensure that hydrological processes intensified by climate change phenomena are adequately investigated and incorporated into the citys planning system. Methodological guidelines were developed, based on existing and future flooding trends in Riga and reinforced by best practices in the identification, planning and management of flood risk zones as adopted in Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg.

Mediterranean Basin / Innovation, Technology deployment & policies

Water Agenda: The main objective was to apply the Water Framework Directive principles and guidelines in order to reverse water degradation trends at a local level in the Anthemountas river basin, in Greece. A sustainable water resource management policy was developed and agreed amongst locals, demonstrating adequate social, technical, administrative and economic techniques and tools (e.g. allocation of water, real-time cost/benefit data, water pricing), mainly focusing on how to address water quantity/quality problems according to the regions development trends, natural and social characteristics.

WIZ: Developed and demonstrated an innovative online platform that includes two informative services (WIZ4All & WIZ4Planners), able to incorporate the protection and sustainable management of water in urban planning processes and local policy areas. An analysis of long-term management of drinking water integrated into land use planning was conducted, enabling water authorities to prepare investment plans and harmonize data characterising the water demands of an area. Information on water resources availability based on the effects of climate change or active reporting on the quality of drinking water are amongst the activities making an optimum participatory management approach possible.

Device of dew and rain collectors in Guéné, Northern Benin

G. Koto N'gobi (Abomey-Calavi University, Cotonou, Benin)

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Device of dew and rain collectors in Guéné, Northern Benin

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Dew phenomenon is a process where water vapor condenses on various types of surfaces, such as grass, crops, roofs or vehicles, which are daily experience. Dew occurs at night or early in the morning, when nocturnal radiative cooling leads to surface temperature decrease, and humid air nearby the surface condenses as its temperature falls down below the dew point temperature of the surrounding atmosphere. Dew is important in several domains and has been the focal point of various scientific researches during many years. Its ecological and social importance has been shown in arid and semiarid areas or Islands. A condenser is a surface on which dew can condense on. Three main geometrical shapes of condensers are generally presented: flat condensers, conical condensers and truncated condensers. Guéné is a semiarid village in northern Bénin with hard scarce drought conditions. The objective of this work is to present the different phases of making a truncated dew condenser, using local materials in order to pull better profit from dew water as an alternative source of water to adapt to climate severe conditions in Guéné. A device of rain water collector combined with the truncated condenser increase the amount of water that can be mobilized. During 62 days of measurements, 44 dew events and 5 rain events were observed. The results show that: (i) the truncated condenser can collect about 166 Liters, which represent about 2.7L per night, or 3.77L per dew night (ii) until 10 m3 of rain water can be stocked during the rainy season, (iii) dew amount represents about 36% of the total rain amount during dew measurement period. The collected dew and rain water represent the only source of water used in Guéné primary School for daily academic activities.

Modelling Malaysia's Potential for Deployment of Biomass for Bioenergy in the Power Sector

Modelling Malaysia's Potential for Deployment of Biomass for Bioenergy in the Power Sector

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Biomass is a primary source of renewable energy and accounted for about 10% of the total global primary energy supply in 2008. The Special Report of the IPCC on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN) suggested that the potential bioenergy deployment levels of biomass for bioenergy by 2050 could be in the range of 100-300 EJ; a substantial potential that could contribute to the global total primary energy supply. In the context of developing countries, this work is aimed to assess the future role of bioenergy in the power sector in Malaysia, focusing on power generation capacity and its utilisation under the scope of energy system framework analysis using TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL EFOM System) Model. The model is used to simulate scenarios based on bioenergy implementation under a number of national policies and action plans against a reference base case scenario. The biomass-based electricity promotion policies are contained in its National Renewable Energy Policy and Action Plan (2012-2050) and the National Key Economic Area (NKEA) for Palm Oil Sector under the Economic Transformation Programme. Simulations conducted include increasing biomass-based electricity production from palm oil mills under the NKEA Programme and other agricultural residue use in electricity generation. The results indicate that implementation of the NKEA programme is the most critical factor to achieve the bioenergy and environmental targets; both in terms of electricity generation capacity and in CO2 avoidance.

Community Investment in Wind Farms: Funding Structure Effects in Wind Energy Infrastructure Development

J. Beery (The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, 3010, Australia), J. Day, (The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia)

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Community Investment in Wind Farms: Funding Structure Effects in Wind Energy Infrastructure Development

J. Beery (1) ; J. Day, (2) (1) The University of Melbourne, Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning, Parkville, Victoria, 3010, Australia; (2) The University of Melbourne, Faculty of architecture, building and planning, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia

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Wind energy development is an increasingly popular form of renewable energy infrastructure in rural areas. Communities generally perceive socioeconomic benefits accrue and that community funding structures are preferable to corporate structures, yet lack supporting quantitative data to inform energy policy. This study uses the Everpower wind development, to be located in Midwestern Ohio, as a hypothetical modeling environment to identify and examine socioeconomic impact trends arising from corporate, community and diversified funding structures. Analysis of five National Renewable Energy Laboratory Jobs and Economic Development Impact models incorporating local economic data and review of relevant literature were conducted. The findings suggest that community and diversified funding structures exhibit 40 to 100 percent higher socioeconomic impact levels than corporate structures. Prioritization of funding sources and retention of federal tax incentives were identified as key elements. The incorporation of local shares was found to mitigate the negative effects of foreign private equity, local debt financing increased economic output and opportunities for private equity investment were identified. The results provide the groundwork for energy policies focused to maximize socioeconomic impacts, while creating opportunities for inclusive economic participation and improved social acceptance levels fundamental to the deployment of renewable energy technology.

The role of public-private partnerships in energy innovation and technology development

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The role of public-private partnerships in energy innovation and technology development

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Innovation is key to delivering an affordable and secure low carbon energy system. There is no time to invent and deploy a set of novel breakthrough technologies and the cost of adaptation will inevitably be higher than the cost of mitigation. So, whilst breakthrough technologies will always be welcome we cannot wait on them and neither do we need to. A transition to low carbon can be achieved by developing, commercialising and integrating known but currently underdeveloped solutions.

This means that the emphasis of technology innovation shifts from basic research and development towards scaling up, demonstration, early deployment and systems integration to prove and improve performance, drive down cost and build developer and investor confidence.

This scaling up of known but underdeveloped technologies implies different challenges and risks to earlier stage R&D and requires different skills to deliver it as well as an increase in funding levels. In a world with a functioning carbon market providing clear market signals public sector investment in early stage R&D should leverage investment from the private sector to further develop and deploy the most promising technologies. However, given the long lead times and high capital costs for many energy technologies, even with a functioning market, there is potentially a significant valley of death in which the risk/ reward balance remains insufficient to attract the levels of finance needed for demonstration and early scale deployment.

Current market structures and carbon pricing appear unlikely to provide a sufficient market signal to incentive the private sector alone to deliver the level of change needed in the timeframe required. In fact the lack of a carbon price in many ways reinforces the somewhat pessimistic view from many of the larger companies in the energy sector that there is insufficient political will and co-ordination to contain global warming to 2degC, even though it is technically feasible and affordable to do so. Current policies, economic drivers and the rise of renewables, do encourage continued substantial private sector investment in improving the efficiency and performance of incumbent technologies but this alone is insufficient to deliver the scale of transition needed. An alternative is increased government-led support with penalties and incentives tailored to each sector, such as the Contracts for Difference introduced in the UKs Electricity Market Reform, to deliver a policy pull until a carbon market is established. This approach is not without its challenges; not least the need to award Contracts through a transparent and competitive process in a particular sector, whilst also evaluating the value of proposals in terms of their long term contribution to decarbonising the energy system. Given the short term nature of the policy mechanism it also doesnt adequately address the valley of death for some of the large scale technology and infrastructure developments that are potentially key to an affordable transition. Moreover, private sector organisations tend to be focussed on a particular sector (or component of a sector) of the energy landscape whilst the public sector needs to integrate and assess priorities across and between sectors.

A successful transition requires the free markets efficient allocation of resources, innovation and deep technical skills to be combined with the governments ability to prioritise between sectors, its access to low cost of capital, democratic legitimacy and protection of consumers role. Without a functioning carbon market (and probably even with it) the public sector plays an essential role in providing long term funding and taking much of the risk in demonstration and early deployment of key technologies. However to be successful this must leverage financing and draw on the skills of the private sector. The UKs experience suggests that working in partnerships is a way to combine these elements that the public and private sectors need to bring to a successful transition.

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Re-engeneering a Flood Control in Jakarta as a capital city of Indonesia

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Re-engeneering a Flood Control in Jakarta as a capital city of Indonesia

Subhan Ali Yusuf1, Eris Agustin2, Firman3

1Universite Bordeaux 1, Jakarta, subhan_ay@hotmail.com

2Coca-Cola Amatil, Jakarta, agustin.eris@gmail.com

3Universite Bordeaux 1, Bordeaux, firman_090392@yahoo.com

Keywords

Flood Control, Innovation, Technology, Re-engineering.

Background: Without an integrated system and good infrastructure as well as lacks of feeling sense of quality, these implies inconsistent in various aspects. The aversion of the goverment and company to invite along experts from Universities to optimize the system of flood control in Jakarta as capital city of Indonesia is also become an obstacle. However the need of research to solve these problems is urgently necessity, because now Jakarta attracts more investors from abroad and domestic where Jakarta is the center of all interests and decisions. Therefore a good infrastructure that guarantee safety, comfort and health can boost the condition by giving the effectivity, efficiency and also its quality.

Project: The paper is done by following the estimation of design flood and the control for 3 months by observing several values for flood routing, flood mitigation, flood forecasting, drainage system, infrastructure, maintenance of the assets, zoning by direct observation and some interviews with officials of reservoir. The problem that occurred is always every year and mostly in the same place. Also the information that we get from the website is non-interactive.

Problem and solution:

1. Rainwater that fell and the overflow of rainwater from the higher regions provinces can not be managed properly. For instance, it rained only 5 hours it could cause flooding in several locations. It needs urgently to designing flood protection measures, Hydrology of the catchment area, it meanshow to build up a design flood based on the knowledge of hydrology of the catchment area.

2. Storage reservoirs currently not functioning optimally and manually operated. Thereafter, this required to plan re-engineering structures, its schedule of operations, so that the flood cannot cause serious damage downstream.

3. Today flooding could come suddenly without early notification to residents and may causing loss of material and human life. Further as the floodwave passes through a stream it is necessary to know how the stage varies with respect to time and distance for the design of river engineering works as well as for issuance of flood warning by the civil authorities.

4. Current water pump system is not well integrated, electricity is not equipped with backup power, so if the power fails then the pump is can not use. It is need an installing pumping facilities which comes under drainage engineering and with integration system.

Conclusion:

With this current state, it is no wonder if Jakarta famous with the flood in every year. This must be repaired and done some innovations by cooperating with universities to conduct research and continuous improvement for a greater goal. Ensure operation and maintenance personnel are part of project planning and development process including developing criteria for the initial commissioning of the project and wherever possible, choose an easily maintained system. Knowledge is considered today to be one of the main assets of a company. Together company and university can try to develop new approaches and find answers to those challenges.

The role of innovation and deployment policy mixes for innovation in renewable power generation technologies: a survey analysis of German technology providers

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The decarbonization of energy systems constitutes one of this centurys key challenges for human society in the fight against climate change (van Vuuren et al 2013). In such a transition so-called policy mixes play a crucial role in redirecting and accelerating technological change towards low-carbon solutions (Rogge and Reichardt 2013). Yet precisely how policy mixes affect technological innovation remains poorly understood. Rather, studies so far have focused on the impact of single policy instruments on environmental innovations, and also on their stringency as one of their design features (Kemp and Pontoglio 2011). However, in reality complex policy mixes are at play, implying that studies should focus on the interaction of policy instruments (Flanagan et al. 2011) and on overarching characteristics of such policy mixes, such as their consistency (Rogge and Reichardt 2013).

We address this gap in the literature by studying the case of the German Energiewende. More precisely, we analyze the role of the policy mix for firm-level innovation activities in renewable power generation technologies within the German power sector. Since this sector is supplier-driven (Pavitt 1984) we focus on German technology providers, and extend existing qualitative work in the sector (Rogge et al. 2011, Hoppmann et al. 2013) by conducting a suryey of companies innovation activities. The questionnaire for this survey was designed in line with the Community Innovation Survey, but was adjusted to the context of renewable power generation technologies and extended by a questions on companies perceptions of the policy mix. The survey was conducted by telephone from April 9 until June 22, 2014, with interviews lasting around 30 minutes. In this time period we contacted all German renewable power generation manufacturers and suppliers and achieved a response rate of approximately 36% (n=390).

In our econometric approach we employed a bivariate Tobit model to estimate R&D expenditure equations for the years 2014 and 2015, where the error terms captured possible correlations between R&D expenditures in different years. In this case, the use of univariate Tobit probit models can lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimations (e.g. Greene, 2012). The simulated maximum likelihood estimations were carried out with STATA 13, relying on Barslund (2009).

Findings of our econometric analysis suggest that R&D expenditures in both years are larger for companies with higher current and expected future turnovers (including export) in the respective renewable power generation technology, which is in line with other studies on the key relevance of domestic and foreign demand pull instruments (Peters et al. 2013). Likewise, higher R&D expenditures are positively related to the amount of subsidies received for R&D from German or EU public funding bodies, thereby confirming the importance of technology push instruments for innovation. Further, future R&D spendings are larger if respondents perceive the current instrument mix to be consistent in its support of renewable energy, and if they perceive a high credibility of the overarching policy mix, as measured by the uniform cross-party support for the expansion of renewables within the German Energiewende. This confirms and extends qualitative findings for offshore wind in Germany pointing to the importance of policy mix consistency and credibility for R&D and adoption activities of emerging renewable power generation technologies (Reichardt and Rogge 2014). Finally, the time a company has been on the market for the respective renewable power technology considered is positively related to the magnitude of innovation expenditures, i.e. more experienced firms invest more in innovation.

Based on our findings we derive recommendations for policy makers on how to tailor policy mixes to support innovation in low-carbon technologies. These policy implications are not only relevant in the context of the German Energiewende but for any country aiming to promote innovation activities of domestic manufacturers in renewable power generation technologies. Such support enables the build-up and strengthening of low-carbon industries and the global deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies, thereby contributing to mitigating global climate change.

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M. Yarime (1) (1) University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Public Policy, Tokyo, Japan

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Many countries have introduced policies to encourage innovation through technology transfer academia to the private sector, often with exclusive agreements on intellectual property rights. While some successful cases have been reported in transforming knowledge created by university researchers into industrial products, the existing models of university-industry-government collaboration tend to focus on narrowly-defined technical issues, mainly targeted to commercial applications. For tackling sustainability challenges, a new approach would be required to promote innovation, involving a wider variety of stakeholders with more diverse knowledge and expertise in scientific and technological fields. Smart cities and communities are particularly considered to be one of the key areas in which a variety of science and technological knowledge need to be integrated effectively through collaboration among multiple actors. A smart city would involve an advanced technological system for efficient electricity supply and applications, incorporating all the behavior of the actors involved, including generators, distributors, technology developers, and consumers, through an intelligent information network. As a smart city integrates a diverse mixture of hardware as well as software in a complex way, different approaches would be possible to introducing and implementing the concept of smart cities in practice, depending on the economic, social, and environmental conditions and purposes, such as energy efficiency, operating cost, environmental impact, resilience to external shocks and disturbances, and accessibility and inclusiveness to end users.Recently, leading research universities around the world have started to apply their expertise and sources of innovation to the goal of building smart cities and communities. In this paper, we examine approximately 80 cases of the leading initiatives led by universities through stakeholder platforms in Japan, Europe, and the United States. A particular focus is placed on smart cities and communities, involving relevant stakeholders in academia, industry, and the public sector. A close examination of the leading initiatives reveals the important functions of university-driven stakeholder platforms in implementing innovation to address societal challenges. These include the creation of future visions based on science, setting of concrete and practical goals and targets, joint scenario making with stakeholders, securing active participation and serious engagement of stakeholders, collection and analysis of data on societal needs and demands, development of new technologies and systems through social experimentation at universities as living laboratories, assessment of impacts with transparency, objectivity, neutrality, legitimation of innovation in society, provision of effective feedback to decision makers, incorporation into institutional design, and contribution to agenda setting at regional, national, and global levels. On the other hand, difference are also found with regard to the direction and process of technological development on smart cities and communities between Japan, Europe, and the United States. The Japanese approach is characterized by a strong focus on sophistication of application technologies for extensive use of home appliances and electric vehicles. In Europe an emphasis is placed on establishing a basic infrastructure in which information about the behavior of all the stakeholders is collected and distributed among the stakeholders appropriately so that the various objectives of the electricity grid are achieved in a more equitable way. In the United States a strong interest can be observed in creating and maintaining security through improvement in resilience against physical as well as virtual threats. These asymmetries in conceptualizing and implementing

The role of micro-grid on decoupling sharp fluctuations of electricity demand

The role of micro-grid on decoupling sharp fluctuations of electricity demand

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Among the many human activities that produce greenhouse gases, the use of energy represents by far the largest source of emissions (IEA, 2014). This paper presents the relationships that sharp electricity demand fluctuations have with CO2 emission and describe how the shape of fluctuations interact with power dispatch, contributing to increase greenhouse gases that influence climate change. The impact on peak loading is particularly important, since occasions of extreme temperatures are likely to stress electricity systems in meeting demand (Parkpoom & Harrison, 2008). The Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impacts (MESSAGE) is used to simulate different daily load profile and thus power output can be evaluated for both centralized generation and distributed generation.

Peak demand fluctuations may occur on daily, weekly, monthly, seasonal and yearly cycles. Different power system or different categories of consumers (Residential, Industrial and Commercial) can have similar or distinct daily demand curves. Daily load profile shape has a significant influence on power dispatch and thus, during the peak hours most of power plants need to run on their maximum output. Since peak power plants are in most case fossil fuel power plants due to their operation costs, it can be assumed that the need of covering peak demand contribute to aggravate CO2 emission. The shape of the daily load curve is associated with plant capacity factor. High plant capacity factor leads to increase of power production.

Plant capacity factor = (Average annual Output/Plant capacity*8760)

In order to avoid peak demand, different measures can be implemented (energy efficiency, micro-grid system, renewable technologies etc.). According to IEA (2007), micro grid systems show strong potential to optimize asset utilization by shifting peak load to offâpeak times, thereby decoupling electricity growth from peak load growth. Apart from this advantage, micro grid systems improve power quality and reliability due to decentralization of supply and better match of supply and demand. Economic operation of micro grid systems should be ensured through generation scheduling, economic load dispatch and optimal power flow operations (Chowdhury & Crossley, 2009). MESSAGE is a powerful tool for assessment of economic load dispatch and optimal power flow operations. For example, considering that renewable technologies such as solar PV and wind power plants are no dispatchable, connecting them off-grid can make those technologies competitive with other dispatchable technologies such as gas and coal power plants.

Grey water treatment by slanted soil system under real conditions in rural area

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Grey water treatment by slanted soil system under real conditions in rural area

H. Amadou (1) (1) International Institute for Water and Environmental Engineering, Research Direction, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

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The Performance of the slanted soil for grey water was evaluated in light of required water quality of irrigation reuse. This study aimed to assess the treatment performance of grey water system by slanted soil and check the possibility of reuse this water treated in irrigation. The greywater was collected every week in two pilot families in Kologondiéssé village. The levy was made at the input and output of grey water in the treatment system and the storage tank points. Samples were submitted to physicochemical and microbiological analysis. Following changes to the treatment system, it is expected a strong improvement of purifying performance of this system. The results of this survey showed a very good purification performance of organic matters up to 89.78% for suspended solids (SS), 86.75% for chemical oxygen demand (COD) and 87% for biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). Regarding the reduction of bacterial pollution, the obtained results are greater to those of previous studies with 2.48 μlog, 3.33 μlog and 1.99 μlog respectively for E. coli, coliforms and enterococci. These results are slightly higher than the standards of reuse in irrigation.

The impact of policy and uncertainty on innovation in the wind industry: evidence from European countries

The impact of policy and uncertainty on innovation in the wind industry: evidence from European countries

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The 2010 moratorium on the level of feed-in-tariffs in the French solar photovoltaic industry offers one of the best illustrations of how impactful an abrupt policy change can be. Fearing the development of a green bubble, the French government suspended the grid connection permissions for solar PV installations over 3 kilowatts peak for a period of 3 months. Since then, the French solar industry has repeatedly been described as plunged in an induced coma with dramatic social and economic consequences. Projects backlog reached ~3.6GW at the end of December 2010 fell by 58% as of June 2012, employment in the French photovoltaic sector declined from 32,500 in 2010 to 18,000 in 2012.

This is one of many examples highlighting the negative impact of policy uncertainty, namely of uncertainty arising from policy change and complexity. Similar anecdotal evidence and case studies can be found in the academic literature for other renewable energy technologies. For instance, Barradale (2010) describes how chronic uncertainty over the renewal of the production tax credit in the U.S. has been driving investment volatility. Meyer and Koefoed (2003) investigate how changes in the policy regime in Denmark has generated uncertainty for investors. Agnolucci (2006) shows how the introduction of a biennial revision of feed-in-tariffs in Germany through a modification of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) may cause significant uncertainty. While praising the results achieved by the German renewable energy policy, he demonstrates that political uncertainty was behind the decrease in additional capacity in 1997-1998, 2000 and 2003.

The uncertainty surrounding policy may be a strong determinant of the development of renewable energy sources. However, a brief overview of the economic literature on climate change and energy policy shows that less attention has traditionally been devoted to its impacts than to those of economic or technological uncertainty. Moreover, most of the discussion in this respect has remained theoretical. This is a major shortcoming, as policy making and design should be informed about the negative impact on private investors decisions of changing rules, conditions, and more in general of not being able to provide a sufficiently stable policy environment.

This paper attempts to bridge a gap in the empirical literature and provide policy-relevant insight on the impact of uncertainty on wind innovation in 18 European countries over the years 1995-2009. We go a great length towards constructing sound empirical proxies for environmental policy strigenty and policy uncertainty. Inspired by the real option theory, we propose two novel proxies, one for environmental policy stringency and one for the uncertainty that charachterizes such policy. Unlike those used in previous studies on renewable energy technologies, our proxies for policy stringency and policy volatility are robust to three major concerns. First, we net out the effects of those non-policy factors which might drive capacity addition on top of government policies. Second, our proxies account for the fact that rational investors refer to expected policy and policy changes, namely future capacity additions rather than current ones, to make their decisions. Finally, and more fundamentally, we clean our proxies from the issue of potential reverse causality between installed capacity (and its volatility) and innovation. More specifically, we control for the fact that innovation may stimulate capacity additions through technology improvements resulting in greater efficiency and/or lower costs.

We confirm the positive inducement effect of environmental policy on innovation and most importantly show that indeed policy uncertainty counters such positive effect. We find that if both policy and uncertainty increase by one standard deviation in the sample, the benefits to innovation due to the increased stringency level are wiped away due to the negative effect of policy uncertainty.

Resource-Policy-Innovation Nexus for Entrepreneurial Roles across Scales and Sectors of Low Carbon Pathway in Climate Governance

A. Tiwari (National Institute Of Technology, NITB, India)

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Resource-Policy-Innovation Nexus for Entrepreneurial Roles across Scales and Sectors of Low Carbon Pathway in Climate Governance

A. Tiwari (1) (1) National Institute Of Technology, NITB, India

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In the next 25 years, the world needs to invest 40 trillion dollars in infrastructure modernization. It is important to ensure that these financial resources are invested in low-carbon technology instead of conventional carbon-dependent systems. For developed economies where investments will mainly involve replacing out-of-date technology, the transition to a climate-friendly society will involve replacing existing fossil intensive systems. For developing economies, the transition to a larger extent concerns changing the course for implementing new entire systems. This brings opportunities and challenges for sustainability entrepreneurs. Nations not yet subject to fossil technology and institutional lock-in could potentially skip certain development stages (such as the fossil era), thus leap-frogging into the new low-carbon economy. Indeed, fast-growing economies will have to leapfrog past much fossil technology, or we will not be able to meet the climate challenge.

The study outlines the essential role of entrepreneurs to operate within resources unaccounted for effects, within which they find opportunities to create value. These efforts are easier when property rights and legal rules are clearer. Challenges to environmental entrepreneurs include environmental problems that cross international boundaries--the transaction costs and financial resource institution of dealing in different legal structures and property rights systems are huge. As this space for environmental entrepreneurship based on property rights and win-win outcomes shrinks, the space for political entrepreneurship expands. One form of political entrepreneurship is alertness to previously unnoticed rent-seeking opportunities. Cross-boundary environmental issues are characterized by more than usual actions by political entrepreneurs. An example is the potential for climate change caused by humans producing greenhouse gasses, effects of which are globalized. This calls for consideration of effects on global emissions including from import and export.

The research utilizes the policy umbrella under which shifting from product focus to service focus will be central in establishing demand-side incentives for innovation through public procurement policies, which can play an important role as an early test market for climate technology while pushing down costs for new technology and provide low-carbon innovations in different types of businesses. Using the theoretical lenses of multi-level governance, socio-technical transitions, and corporate sustainability and sustainability entrepreneurship the paper highlights the achievement of low-carbon future through economic policy by particularly examining the climate policy within the major themes of globalization as climate objectives have more weight in economic policy than environmental policy. The climate goals manifested in economic policy for decarbonizing economies have potential clear short-term benefits, with short-term costs, and coincide with peoples economic goals for greater acceptance and appreciation and in turn fostering involvement.

The study meets the challenges of institutional path dependency as existing institutions and interested parties are typically tied to existing technologies and systems, which hinder transition to the low-carbon economy by the fact that carbon emitting technology does not carry its full climate cost, or that innovations typically require higher upfront investment than fossil intensive systemswhile subsequent costs for operations are lower, and due to which short-sighted financial analyses favour fossil intensive systems. In this context, the research allows for collective entrepreneurial effectiveness to be higher than the sum of individual roles in administering linear resource flows with input, process, and waste that will be replaced by cyclical flows. The outcomes favour entrepreneurial roles in dynamic interplay between nonstate, or subnational, actors (such as municipalities, state and provincial authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society groups), international knowledge networks and organisations.

Interrogating the transformative power of renewable energy support instruments: the example of feed-in tariffs on photovoltaics

B. Cointe (CIRED, Nogent sur Marne, France)

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Interrogating the transformative power of renewable energy support instruments: the example of feed-in tariffs on photovoltaics

B. Cointe (1) (1) CIRED, Nogent sur Marne, France

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The deployment of renewable energy is considered to be a crucial part of mitigation strategies, and its promotion on the policy agenda has been largely driven by concerns related to climate change. This is particularly true of the European Union, where renewable energy policy and climate policy now go hand in hand. Besides being coupled, these two EU policy have in common their reliance on market mechanisms as means to trigger change in socio-technical systems by triggering innovation and redirecting investments towards mitigation solutions. As far as renewable energy is concerned, feed-in tariffs (FITs) have been one of the main instrument of transformation, and they have indeed proved effective in attracting investment towards renewable energy technologies, especially wind power and photovoltaics.

However, the transformations triggered by such instruments do not exactly conform to expectations: feed-in tariffs have driven the deployment of markets for electricity from renewable energy sources and the increase in renewable energy installed capacity, but they have also had many unintended effects and consequences that had to be addressed on the go. The difficulties in managing the dynamics triggered by such mechanisms are especially striking in the case of photovoltaics, which have developed at a dramatic pace and led to political reforms and crises of varying intensities in several countries (e.g. France, Germany, Spain, UK ). Feed-in tariffs, it turns out, transform not only markets and technologies, but society and politics as well. This contribution will attempt to conceptualise the transformative power of such instruments and the issues related to its management by suggesting an alternative account of the functioning and effects of feed-in tariffs for photovoltaics.

To this end, it will rely on actor-network theory research on market-making and politicisation and on studies on governmentality. From this theoretical perspective, it will explore FIT-driven photovoltaics development in three sites, each of which sheds light on specific aspects and tensions of feed-in tariffs for photovoltaic electricity understood as political prices: the emergence and sophistication of feed-in tariffs for photovoltaics in the context of European renewable energy policy; the overflowing of the photovoltaic market that they provoked and the political crisis that ensued in France between 2009 and 2012; and the way in which they can be seized as instruments for territorial development and translated into economic and political resources. The contribution will show that feed-in tariffs for photovoltaic electricity can be described as political market agencements meant to trigger the deployment of electricity generation capacities as much as to foster innovation and experimentation around photovoltaic technologies. The articulation of this dual aim is delicate, especially since the modularity of photovoltaic technologies enables them to proliferate and spread rapidly, making their deployment hard to steer. This re-interpretation of feed-in tariffs will thus suggest ways to account for and analyse the difficulties in regulating current emerging renewable energy markets. It will also contribute to the analysis of the implications and challenges of driving transformations through the creation and engineering of new markets that seems to characterise many climate policies.

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The availability of fresh water has become a serious problem in arid and semiarid areas of the world. There are large areas in the world, mainly in arid or semi-arid climate, with chronic shortages of fresh water, which has been aggravated consequence of climate change, population growth and, agricultural and industrial activities. As the demand for fresh water is constantly growing, vast areas that historically had no problems with availability of fresh water, have become areas with intermittent water shortages or even permanent. The problem of water shortage has been acute in Chile, particularly in the north and increasingly in the central area, affected by the intensive use of water in agriculture mainly. As a consequence of the problem of water scarcity, various technologies have been developed in order to capture not only fresh water from conventional sources such as rivers or groundwater, but also unconventional sources such as seawater treatment through processes such as distillation, reverse osmosis, nano-filtration and electro-dialysis, and from the atmosphere as is the case of fog precipitation and dew collection based on radiative cooling.

Dew formation by radiative cooling occurs when a solid surface radiates heat into sky causing its temperature becomes lower than the dew point of the water vapor contained in the surrounding air, causing condensation (liquid water). This condition usually occurs during cool nights with high relative humidity, low cloud cover and moderate or low wind speed. Once the condensation process occurs, the liquid water may be collected by natural drainage on an inclined surface (by gravity) and then stored in tanks. The water produced by the system may have uses such as irrigation or human consumption (pre purification treatment if necessary).

This work aims to assess experimentally the dew water collection based on radiative cooling using galvanized steel sheets as radiative surface. Experimental tests were carried out in the city of Valparaíso, which is located in the central coast of Chile. The amount of dew water produced was experimentally quantified, and the quality of dew water produced in the test location was analysed. The testing location included five experimental units (modules), each of which consist of galvanized steel sheets with zinc-aluminum, supported by a steel frame. Each sheet was thermally insulated on its back by Styrofoam. The sheets were coated with a paint containing an additive infra-red emitting minerals (TiO2 and BaSO4) in the atmospheric window, and a non-soluble surfactant that render the surface more hydrophilic (manufactured by OPUR, France). An experimental campaign with a total duration of 30 days was carried out.

The results indicated the following: the collectors produced amounts of dew between 0 and 89 ml/m2 per night and the analysis of dew water showed alkaline pH for all samples which may be due to the proximity of the ocean. Weather station measurements indicated significant changes in several atmospheric parameters on daily as well as hourly basis, including humidity and wind speed which could explain the variability of the amount of dew obtained. The next steps in this project include; chemical and biological analysis to determine whether dew water is potable in the study area, analysis of spatial gradient of temperature in the collectors and a test campaign of one year to determine the seasonal variability of dew yield in the study area

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by FONDECYT N° 11140863 project from CONICYT (Chile) and DI 37.0/2014 project from the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso (Chile).

We don't want that offer "development"! The reinvention of the territories in the semi-arid region of Brazil and Argentina: the case of the peasant community radios

G. Lopes (University of Nairobi, Buenos Aires, Argentina)

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We don't want that offer "development"! The reinvention of the territories in the semi-arid region of Brazil and Argentina: the case of the peasant community radios

G. Lopes (1) (1) University of Nairobi, Buenos Aires, Argentina

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We speak from a epistemic place, from a locus of enunciation. In modernity, the actors and institutions of rational European thinking relate and proclaim themselves as if they were located in a higher stage of human knowledge (developed) and as such, they award themselves the right to invalidate, discard, (des)authorize, ticketing as lower all the other modes of knowledge. From a decolonizing epistemic turn, we seek visibilize and put in dialog two experiences of reinvention of the territories, carried forward by rural communities in arid regions of Latin America (Sergipe, Brazil and Santiago del Estero, Argentina), through its community radios. To propose and disseminate via radio the proposal of coexistence with the semi-arid and drought, the peasantry is proposing-living an alternative to development. In this way, resisting/re-exist in the public policies of rural development, who proclaim the 'fight to the drought', the peasantry reinvents its territories face/slowing the advance of the hegemonic model of rural development (agro-exporting mining extractive), collecting/spreading ancestral knowledge and technologies for collection and distribution of water from rain, which allows them to reduce the impacts of climate change. Look at that process demands geopolitics of knowledge, therefore the translation inter-cultural is the methodological tool necessary to achieve thinking with and together with the other.

Local beliefs and strategies of adaptation to climate change in Korhogo (Côte d'Ivoire)

N. Boko (UNIVERSITE FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast)

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Local beliefs and strategies of adaptation to climate change in Korhogo (Côte d'Ivoire)

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The precedent decades, the area of Korhogo, Côte d'Ivoire, has experienced climate variability which disturbs populations' agricultural activities. This survey has been conducted from March 2009 to February 2012 in order to identify the perceptible causes of change; be they climatic or environmental to the populations, and their endogenous strategies of adaptation. A qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews, life stories and focus groups has been used for data collection. The historical and comprehensive method enabled to establish a relationship between populations' perceptions and beliefs and, the indicators of climate variability and environment changes but also, their endogenous strategies of adaptation. As indicators, the populations notice an extension of the dry season at the expenses of the rain season, advanced deterioration of vegetation, draining of sources of water supply (rivers, backwaters and wells) and disappearance of some animals like elephant and hyena and, some floristic species used by sculptors and traditional healers.

The survey also shows that the causes of the phenomenon are not only related to human activities but are mystical or metaphysical (non-compliance with customary practices, fetishes, totems (make love in the bush, commit blood crimes) and prohibitions related to nature; the multiplicity of religions, degradation of traditional values and the upheaval of society's rules (non-compliance of the elderly, liberalization of land working). Thus, the coping strategies of the populations based on two fundamental pillars: social capital of actors (contributions of NGOs and technicians, media and social networks) and occult practices related to beliefs. The study noted three types of strategies. The first is the survival strategy that is neither planned nor based on any knowledge of the phenomenon but obey of an instinct and the need of the population survival ("climatic" migration and exodus rural, reconversion of populations and the development of certain sectors of activity).

The second type of strategy is the suggested coping strategies that are based on a scientific understanding of the causes and consequences of the phenomenon and developed and / or proposed by scientists (researchers), technicians and professionals (agriculture officers, NGOs). These strategies are related to the abandonment of long-cycle crops to new and more adapted varieties (integration cassava), the practice of crop against season, the use of improved planting materials, the reconversion of the population to income generating activities and the development of vegetable gardening.

The third strategy developed by the population is related to local knowledge, guided by the Traditional Environmental Knowledge (TEK) and beliefs guided by the metaphysical causes attributed to the phenomenon. Here, people are consulting "Fodonons" or rainmakers and also request the help of marabouts or charlatans for sacrifices in the direction of ancestors and gods protectors, prayers are organized in mosques and churches asking God's mercy and return of the rains. Eventually, the survey shows that populations' adaptation strategies are mainly based on local traditional beliefs and knowledge which are at the same time a barrier and an opportunity for the adaptation to climate variability. This article shows in the same time the importance of taking into account local knowledge in order to develop efficient adaptation strategies.

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In the past decade, the increased frequency and intensity of tropical typhoons brought by the changing climate had clearly brought severe damages to industrial tree plantations (ITP) in the Philippines. These damages resulted in loss of high-value timber and increased economic costs. The risk of wind damage from strong storms and typhoons should be an important component of plantation management plans. The problem, however, is that risks that were not conceived before may have become relevant in the present. Such is the case of an ITP in Mindanao, Philippines where the unprecedented increase in the frequency of storms and typhoons is now causing serious wind damages to plantations. In this consideration, the sites probability of risk to wind damage was estimated empirically using logistic regression analysis. Specifically, the influence of stand-level attributes such as average stand height, elevation and topographic exposure on damage probability were assessed. For the analysis, post-storm inventory data from 2012 Typhoon Bopha, in combination with previous stand inventory data, were used.ãResults show that all three stand-level variables are influential and that damage probability has a direct relationship with the variables. By considering constant terrain conditions, the effect of average stand height was determined. Results indicate that there are critical average stand height levels which put each site at high risk of being damaged. Critical stand heights of 25 m, 20 m and 10-15 m were identified for low, medium and high-risk level sites. This information, when combined with site productivity, could be used as a basis for determining risk-sensitive rotation ages at which certain species can be grown while reducing wind damage to plantation. Moreover, topographic stand variables used were derived from DEM thereby addressing the high-cost issue associated with developing damage probability models. Amidst the issue of climate change and the projected increase in weather disturbances, these results can improve management plans and make them more relevant and responsive to changing times.

Dealing with integrated soil research and training to face climate change, overcome land degradation and ensure food securing in Madagascar

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Madagascar in a tropical country, hotspot of biodiversity, where people welfare greatly depends on natural resources, i.e., soil, water, forests, biodiversity. As a rural country, the need of agriculture and forest product is important inducing pressures on lands which have negative feedbacks on population such as soil erosion, loss of fertility, loss of biodiversity, vulnerability to climate change, deforestation, etc. Population livelihood and resource preservation together are therefore integrated in national development policies. These issues are also closely related with international objectives designed by three major conventions of the United Nations: Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, Convention on Biological Biodiversity UNCBD, Convention to combat Desertification UNCCD. In this context, there is a great need and urgency to undertake research and capacity building. For 10 years, the Laboratoire des RadioIsotopes (LRI, University of Antananarivo) and IRD (French Institute of Research for Development, Research Unit Eco&Sols  Functional Ecology and Biogeochemistry of soils and agroecosystems) developed integrated research and educational activities on the understanding of soil ecosystem services and their responses to global change for a better decision-making on ecosystem and agrosystem management to improve livelihood and contribute to national development. LRI and IRD together undertook jointly research on Malagasy soil properties and cartography, soil and biomass carbon sequestration, greenhouse gas GHG emissions from eco- and agrosystems, nutrient recycling and crop production, and the role of soil biodiversity in these processes. Part of these studies is related to international frameworks such as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation), REALU (Reducing Emissions from All Land Uses)and/or is shared with other African countries such as in the case of the CaSA framework (Soil Carbon for a sustainable agriculture in Africa, funded by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Studies were undertaken at different levels: from plots to local and national levels. Different agroecosystems were also studied in order to cover the variety of existing systems and depending on the ecosystem services measured. Carbon storage in vegetation and soil pools were measured or assessed using modern methodologies and technologies such as Medium InfraRed Spectroscopy MIRS, digital mapping/RS. Modelling (Ex-Act, Ex Ante Carbon-balance-Tool, FAO) was also used for upscaling and mapping for decision making on a sustainable development.

Some results showed that natural forests and agroecological systems were the agroecosystems which allow soil carbon sequestration and there could be as much as carbon in soil pool as in biomass pool, or even more (particularly in natural forests). Actually, they could store up to 100 Mg C.ha-1 in the first 30 cm depth, and more than 270 Mg C.ha-1 in 100 m depth[F2] , particularity in forest ecosystems.

Soil biodiversity has especially been studied in cropped fields from a functional point of view. The aim of theses studies is to understand which and how soil organisms are involved in different ecological functions, i.e., nutrient cycling, carbon dynamics and maintenance of soil structure. These studies are planned to be extended to forest systems.

The municipal solid waste (MSW) management studies showed that MSW composting reduced the amount of deposits in landfill (65% of initial mass of windrow) and creating product at relatively low-cost that is suitable for agricultural purposes. And after six years of organic fertilization the stock of SOM has increased by 48%, and the content of Olsen P and resin P, has increased respectively by 85% and 35%.

From a teaching point of view these issues are now integrated in different university courses such as the master of Agroecology (Higher School of Agriculture), the recent international master ABC (Agroecology, Biodiversity, Climate-Change, University of Antananarivo), the Doctoral School A2E (Agriculture, breeding, environment). The research conducted on soil ecosystem services for poverty alleviation and population development permitted the training of more than 15 PhDs. Efforts are also made by the team to train environment and agriculture stakeholders.

Exploring the links of artisanal fishery to climate change for developing a resilient livelihood for coastal communities in Ghana

O. Pabi (University of Ghana, Accra, France)

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Exploring the links of artisanal fishery to climate change for developing a resilient livelihood for coastal communities in Ghana

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By nature, artisanal fishery operates on minimal investments and basic technology, and is therefore considered less adaptable and highly vulnerable. The paper argues that, though productive, it depends largely on natural marine productivity, which is closely linked to climatic elements. Studies conducted in the West African sub-region have not adequately demonstrated clearly the links between artisanal fishery and climate, due to the use of annual rather than intra-annual data and analyses. This impedes information generation suitable for informing fishery operational decisions, adaptive policy development and climate-resilient livelihood options. This study analyzed records of rainfall, atmospheric temperature, sea surface temperature (SST) and fish catch of three species with different sensitivities to temperature, on different time scales using time series techniques. Upwelling was derived from SST using the Bakun Model. It examines the interactions between the variables at different time scales to determine exposures and sensitivities. It also sought verifications from fisher perspectives, based on experiences and knowledge in respect of climate change dynamics and real impacts on fishery. The results depicted clear association in trends of sea surface and atmospheric temperatures; seasonality of rainfall and upwelling; fish catch and SST intensities, with round sardinella and anchovy showing clear sensitivities to temperature changes. Whereas the upwelling season period is typically three (3) months, in some cases it contributes some 60% of the total annual catch. Based on the evidence of high exposure and sensitivity of artisanal fishery to climate change, and overdependence of fishers on the artisanal fishery, the study proposes options of adaptive strategies for a climate change-resilient coastal fisher community livelihood.

How can knowledge about health consequences promote acceptance of climate action?

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Health is currently not prominent in climate policy. It is regarded as one of many climate sensitive sectors. However, arguments deriving from health and physiology, if properly communicated to climate decision makers, could play a strong role as a driving force to motivate them (and citizens) to accept new policies and new behaviors for the transformation towards a low carbon society. This is based on three sets of arguments, which have recently been corroborated by new evidence (since IPCC AR5), which we present, and which highlight further the need to communicate the strong influence health arguments should have at the COP21 negotiations. These sets of arguments are as follows:

(i) There are huge health benefits from climate friendly policies and behaviors. Although the concept is not new, but new evidence points to the large scope of known health benefits accruing from physical activity from walking and biking, insulated housing, low meat diets. Two recently identified co-benefits generate considerable additional health gains:

Large health gains from reducing local pollutants, particularly in low and middle income countries. Fine particles and black carbon have recently been recognized as climate active pollutants. Black carbon are of particular interest for climate policy, as reducing its emissions leads to a fast reduction of stocks in the atmosphere.

Recent population projections till 2100 significantly exceed previous UN estimates. Gerland et al. publishing their modeling results in Science 2014[1] project a 2100 population size of between 9.3 to 12.6 billions. This urgently call for even greater efforts for voluntary family planning, hence reaping even larger the linked health benefits accruing to mothers and their fewer children.

(ii) There are clear limits to societys capacity to adapt to the projected health impact of climate change. This holds to some extent in a 2°C world, but definitely in a 4°C warmer world. This holds even given maximal resource allocation to the task (e.g. 2).

(iii) Heat stress lead to reduced in work productivity in a warmer world, particularly in a 4° climate (e.g. 3). This concerns mainly the large populations in (sub-) tropical and arid areas and applies both to outdoor work, such as farming and construction and to indoor industrial production in non-air conditioned factories. Hence the physiological impossibility to work and generate further body heat is a health argument of significant bearing on economic output.

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This presentation aims to reflect about the epistemological implications of knowledge production in the frame of international collaborative research networks on climate and its social impacts. The way in which climate change knowledge is produced in the frame of international interdisciplinary networks and integrated into social actors ´practices is a complex process where a numerous of factors intervene: knowledge production conditions, sociopolitical, environmental and socio-structural settings (macroeconomics, social structure, etc.), among others. An effective appropriation of expert knowledge by social actors and politicians requires not only methodological tools with the ability to integrate these factors within a dynamic of knowledge co-production, but also an analysis of the social field concerned in order to understand in which historic- political thread is this trying to get involved. This analysis is not related to a techno-methodologic matter but it summons to a political economy of knowledge. The challenges this epistemological perspective opens express both in the social as the scientific field and on the design of public policies. Basing in our own experience as social sciences researchers in two different climate research networks of this kind, our objective is not to present a social network analysis but to analyze the dynamics of this research networks as an apparatus (Foucault, 1977), whose ambition is to produce a governance response to climate change problem. These apparatuss are generally organized in a three-part logic: pluridisciplinary (diverse interdisciplinary interactions inside network´s working groups), multilocation (interaction among diverse academic institutions and countries) and transectoriality (interaction between researchers and society actors).

This work is organized in five sections. In the first one, we introduce and describe our networks of interest, as well as the ethnographic approach we have applied to study this research apparatuss. In second section, we present a brief description of the historic construction and management dynamics of scientific production on the extensive areas of post-normal concern, and we analyze the structure and logics of these networking research apparatus. Then, interdisciplinary dynamics is analyzed in the third section, showing how different disciplinary approaches, theoretical frameworks and concepts are engaged with the aim of legitimizing this network apparatus three-part logic. In the fourth section we analyze transectorial collaboration, describing its dynamics, the way stakeholders, policy makers and local communities are conceived by researchers, and discuss the possibilities of climate knowledge appropriation. Finally, we present our conclusions reflecting on the epistemological implications of these apparatus considering the role of global political-scientific agenda in the construction of climate change problematic, the hegemony of the techno scientific logic, and the relevance of political dimension for the creation of alternative responses facing the challenges and interests of our globalized world.

Three perspectives on global energy transitions and the promise of inter-disciplinary dialogue

A. Cherp (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary)

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Three perspectives on global energy transitions and the promise of inter-disciplinary dialogue

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Humans use of energy in the 21st century could result in the collapse of the global climate, persistent poverty, and international conflicts over access to increasingly scarce resources. Alternative energy scenarios portray climate stabilization, universal access to modern energy, and strong global cooperation. Yet our knowledge of what political forces could trigger sustainable global energy pathways is still scarce and fragmented. Three distinct scientific disciplines strive to explain the driving forces behind the evolution of energy systems. Energy-economy models base their explanations on equilibrium between growing energy demand and supply constrained by resource scarcity and cost-optimization by rational actors. Technology studies analyze emergence and diffusion of energy technologies across socio-technical systems stressing innovation, performance and non-linearity. Political economy focuses on interests, ideas and institutions that impede or promote certain types of energy systems. Due to their diverse historic origins and different disciplinary roots, these scientific fields rarely communicate or cooperate. This paper outlines a transdisciplinary research agenda involving the three perspectives on energy transitions. It subsequently uses several examples from developing, developed and emerging countries to illustrate how a meaningful scientific dialogue between these fields could help to understand and guide sustainable energy transformations.

Artisticc: An Art and Science Integration Project to Enquire into Community Level Adaptation to Climate Change

Artisticc: An Art and Science Integration Project to Enquire into Community Level Adaptation to Climate Change

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The purpose of this paper is to present the Belmon Forum "Adaptation Research a Transdisciplinary community and policy centered appoach" (ARTisticc) project. ARTisticcs goal is to apply innovative standardized transdisciplinary art and science integrative approaches to foster robust, socially, culturally and scientifically, community centred adaptation to climate change. The approach used in the project is based on the strong understanding that adaptation is: (a) still "a concept of uncertain form; (b) a concept dealing with uncertainty; (c) a concept that calls for an analysis that goes beyond the traditional disciplinary organization of science, and; (d) an unconventional process in the realm of science and policy integration.

The project is centered on case studies in France, Greenland, Russia, India, Canada, Alaska, and Senegal. In every site we jointly develop artwork while we analyzie how natural science, essentially climate sciences can be used in order to better adapt in the future, how society adapt to current changes and how memories of past adaptations frames current and future processes.

Artforms are mobilized in order to share scientific results with local communities and policy makers, this in a way that respects cultural specificities while empowering stakeholders, ARTISTICC translates these real life experiments into stories and artwork that are meaningful to those aff ected by climate change.

The scientific results and the culturally mediated productions will thereafter be used in order to co-construct, with NGOs and policy makers, policy briefs, i.e. robust and scientifically legitimate policy recommendations regarding coastal adaptation. This co-construction process will be in itself analysed with the goal of increasing arts and sciences performative functions in the universe of evidence-based policy making.

The project involves scientists from natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, as well as artists from the performing arts (playwriters, film directors) as well as the visual arts (photographs, designers, sculptor) working in France, Senegal, India, Russia, Greenland, Alaska, and Canada.

Science and art together

C. Villegas Ivich (ArNaMe International, Paris, France)

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Science and art together

C. Villegas Ivich (1) (1) ArNaMe International, Paris, France

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Science and art together

For decades worldwide scientists rely considerable efforts to bring to the world and particularly to decision makers of the planet, all the knowledge that allow us to understand the causes of global warming, and its predictable and irreversible consequences on the environment and on the balance of the world. In other words, thanks to science, we have for a long time and especially today, sufficient dates to take necessary decisions and measures. Despite this, greenhouse gas emissions have risen, and on the contrary, nothing has been done to effectively fight against global warming. It seems that knowledge is not enough to raise awareness, create responsibility and encourage ethical behavior in front of the current climate crisis. Would it be because conscience, responsibility and ethics are not only forged with scientific or rational considerations? It is undoubtedly an urgent need to enrich and strengthen the contribution of science with other forms of perception and understanding of the world in order to go further in this thought. To understand and internalize what is at stake in environmental and climate issues, we should perhaps call upon our sensitivity and our emotional intelligence. This could probably help us to understand better what science tells us, because what we live and experience dont just have a rational explanation. This would bring us, among other things, to develop our empathy, carry us to change the way we see and understand our relationship to life, to ourselves and to someone other than Me. This Other than me is plural and singular, he surrounds us and expects from us another way to coexist and live on this planet. We must be able to pass to the other side of the mirror, to go beyond the immediacy of things, to really understand what is our place and responsibility in the community of the livings. Among the possibilities that are available in order to succeed in this passage, the better of them is probably art. Indeed, it could best go along with science to bring us further in the process of evolution of our awareness, our understanding of reality and our way of being in the world. In the creative process of art, logos and sensitivity merge together and the result offers to our senses stimulates our mind, sharpens our perception, our vision widens and expands our critical and analytical skills. In this paper we try to show, with ongoing experiments, how this collaboration between science and art can happen. How, while working together, they can create a new perception and a new understanding of environmental and climate issues and in the end, how this alliance and this merger can contribute to the development of awareness and willingness into order to act in responsible ways.

Carlos Villegas Ivich

Anthropologist, philosopher and visual artist

President of the International Association of Artists for Nature and the environment (ArNaMe International)

Young Voices: Developing narratives for engaging young people on climate change

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Young Voices: Developing narratives for engaging young people on climate change

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Young people are in a unique position as they face the reality of a changing climate:

potentially they are best-placed to push for and define the long-term societal response to climate change, yet they are also the most vulnerable to the legacy of decisions made by older generations. Young voices are not prominent in the climate change discourse, and engagement with climate change among this crucial demographic is in many ways limited.

In this presentation, we will report the findings from a series of qualitative narrative workshops involving 36 young adults in the UK during May/June 2014. The research found that young people see climate change as a problem for the here and now and respond positively to messages that frame climate change as a contemporary concern requiring an immediate response. However, young people sometimes find it difficult to talk about climate change with their peers because of a perception that it comes with a certain stigma and is uncool, or preachy to do so.

Most participants were either unaware or uninterested in the idea of organised climate change scepticism, suggesting that campaigns to counteract science-based scepticism will not be particularly useful for this audience. Debating solutions  rather than the science  was identified as a much higher priority. Some commonly used climate advocacy phrases (such as 2 degrees or managing climate risks) were either unfamiliar or unpopular with the young people we engaged.Participants were receptive to the idea of protecting the things they love from climate change, but to avoid trivialising the issue, felt that it was important to always make the link between the everyday and the bigger picture, joining the dots between the personal andthe political.

We will present and discuss these and other key findings, and explore the implications for developing narratives to engage young people more effectively in future initiatives.

Has Political Action On Global Warming in the United States Been Forestalled by Gangsters? A Historical Analysis

M. Roddy (independent, Yucca Valley Ca, United States of America)

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Has Political Action On Global Warming in the United States Been Forestalled by Gangsters? A Historical Analysis

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Action behind the scenes to hide and sabotage climate change awareness is pervasive, especially in English speaking countries such as the United States, Australia, and Canada. Causes include fossil fuel influence on mainstream media, as well as educational institutions and government agencies.

This fossil fuel campaign, abetted by corporate sectors such as banking and construction, is well organized and financed. Global warming activists are relatively underfunded and poorly represented in American media. We propose a historical analysis employing biting satire in order to correct this situation.

The author achieved prior success in this regard through his Climate Villains series, published in Alternet and Buffalo Beast, and republished in over 40 internet magazines. Actors such as the Koch Brothers and media puppets like George Will and Lord Moncton were portrayed in biting satirical fashion. The author has also published serious research pieces in Energy Future and Climate Progress.

The proposed article for Paris is being written at present, and will employ the gangster metaphor, along with examples from European history. Examples will come from the 14th and 17th centuries, periods of difficult climactic conditions that led to large areas of Europe being controlled by armed bands of mercenaries. Consequences included disregard for any laws or social norms, as these "companies" of armed thugs sacked towns, raped and pillaged, and sold their services to the highest bidder. These companies were often employed by heads of state, or religious leaders such as Cardinal Richilieu.

We are seeing gangsters take control of the United States, using political leaders as proxies. Included are control of media messaging via corporate advertisers, and placing puppets on courts and in local political offices. Violence is routinely employed, as in American bombing campaigns in the Middle East, assassination of reporters, and intimidation of political opponents. These actions are mostly employed by Republican Party political operatives, acting on instructions from fossil fuel and banking firms, but Democrats are also often complicit. Evidence can be seen in the majority support of the Keystone Pipeline in the US Senate, where 63 Senators insist on allowing a pipeline that could devastate aquifers, will increase GHG emissions, and provide no significant job growth or increase in US oil supply. The end products, too dirty to meet US standards, will be shipped to the Latin American market.

The beneficiaries of the pipeline are the Koch Brothers, the largest owners of Tar Sands operations, and the owners of the refineries in Texas where the Tar Sands oil will be shipped. Their net worth of approximately $100 billion US has enabled this level of political control. Estimates of their reported cash contributions to political puppets have exceeded $1 billion US, with dark money contributions possible.

I propose to use historical analogies, and make recent comparisons to American gangsters of Sicilian origin. This portrayal will be illustrated by Ian Murphy of Buffalo Beast, whose satirical art work is among the best in the world. Koch, Tillerson of Exxon, and Boyce of Peabody Energy (a coal company) will be drawn in expensive Italian suits, similar to what is worn by actors in shows such as Boardwalk Empire and The Godfather series. Along with the satirical drawings will be detailed summaries of their criminal activities. These fossil fuel executives have killed far more people through pollution and greenhouse gas emissions than any Sicilian mob ever did, and evidence will be cited to support this assertion.

The analogy is based on evidence, but somewhat imperfect. The goal is to reach a wide popular audience, establishing the gangster meme and illustrating how it plays out in considerable detail. By illustrating financial ties, including degradation of education and media reporting, we propose to put pressure on bad actors in the United States and elsewhere.

Communicating Climate Change to the General Public and Policy Makers

H. Cutting (Climate Nexus, San Francisco, California, United States of America)

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Communicating Climate Change to the General Public and Policy Makers

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The results of polling surveys, academic literature, and practitioner field work in communications suggest that the work of communicating climate science should be calibrated in a strategic manner against the mind-set and experience of audiences, the larger landscape of communications by all voices that construct the public narrative, a clear theory of change, and a clear understanding of the goal of science communicators. Scientists are highly sought after communicators in pubic discussion on climate change - but that dynamic is driven more by the high regard and trust the public places in scientists when discussing a controversial issue than any public interest in taking a deep dive into the science. Polling in the context of climate change communications is best used as a road map, illustrating audience mindset, not as a compass heading indicating direction of travel. Support for climate protection in the general public is often a mile wide but only an inch deep. One barrier is the impression of climate change as a distant and future threat. Extreme weather offers a teachable moment addressing a key mispercptions regarding climate change. Another issue is the analog of smog that audiences bring to their understanding of carbon pollution. Another compounding problem is the self-identification by the audience of bad actors. The experience of science communications on tobacco control offers a helpful soltution here. Action on climate change requires what sociologists call "hot cognition," a story element that goes beyond the physical science of climate change. Principles for effective climate science communication include: tell us what you know (not what you don't know) and choose metaphors that not only illustrate the science but highlight the signifiance of the situation. The bathtub metaphor for carbon sinks and sources is one example of a techically correct metaphor that often sends the wrong message. Scientists can leverage their validating authority to affirm the basic climate science narrative that speaks to the interests of the general public and policy makers, a narrative that centers on the salience of the science for public policy, not on the physics or chemistry of the science. The narrative is centered on five key points:

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Climate risk management in long-term and in global scale is a key topic in this century to achieve global sustainability. Therefore, we need to develop risk management strategy to encounter problems caused by climate change. However, climate risk management is still controversial and complicated issue especially in developed countries. One reason is that there are various issues and stakeholders (SHs) play various roles in the society and relationship among them are very complicated. In order to provide arena of discussion for SHs, it is extremely important to provide appropriate scientific knowledge for all SHs in an easy-to-use manner with an understanding of the actual social context.

ICA-RUS, Integrated Climate Analysis  Risks, Uncertainties and Society, a research project funded by the Ministry of the Environment, Japan, in order to deliver scientific findings to SHs and to develop climate risk management strategy for various sectors in Japan. From this project, we organized SH dialogue for communicating and developing a framework of climate risk management. We set two objectives; framing climate risk management problems and understanding SHs needs. Framing problems is expected to extract agenda, to develop a framework of relationships among perspectives and values, and to understand key factors to influence on problems. Understanding SHs needs is to know these three points; what kinds of information sources they would like to use for judgment, how scientists should deliver information for the society and what they expected scientists and different SHs to do for contributing to the better consequences of climate risk management in the future.

This SH dialogue can contribute to develop global strategy and stimulate comprehensive and active discussion in the society. However, conventional methods of interview and discussion are not effective for uncertainty relationship with SHs and issues. In addition, people are not familiar with expressing their opinions to others in public in Japan and many Asian countries. People also feel non-experts should not talk about issues. In Asian culture, we need to reform and integrate methods for supporting participants to express their views even in front of experts. Thus, we have designed a triangulation approach for the dialogue and its analysis.

The SH dialogue contains three steps: information sharing from experts, in-depth interview, and focus group discussion. This step by step approach encourage participants to join dialogue actively gradually. We also collected relatively small number of people (4-5 people in a group) as focus group than conventional manner. This helps everyone get opportunity and reason to utter in a group. We chose SHs from those who are involved in global climate talks and related activities. The structure of dialogue is divided in two sections; current perspectives in a semi-structured group interview and long-term strategy in an interactive focus group discussion. In the dialogue, we observed group dynamism became active gradually.

From the dialogue records, we made verbatim transcriptions. We analyzed it by the qualitative research method for understanding key categories or points. To utilize all utterance and to integrate the quantitative research methods, content analysis was also adopted to transcriptions. We give attention to real voice deeply but also to comparison analysis and integration in an easy-to-understand manner. Therefore, we can share findings from a multilateral perspectives.

From these triangulation approach, we discussed key categories and related SHs of climate risk management, like international governance, mechanism of decision-making, communication, future vision and so on.

Multiple research design seems to be an effective way for framing complicated issues and setting agenda from it. This diversity of choices in findings is expected to invigorate discussions in the society.

Climate Communication: Bringing It All Together

R. Mccarthy (Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom)

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Climate Communication: Bringing It All Together

R. Mccarthy (1) (1) Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom

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When it comes to matters of global importance a wide view is needed.

This talk brings together independent studies in the fields of communication, media, phsychology, lingustics and the physical sciences to identify the optimum way forward for climate communication. Recommendations as to how climate communications could be improved have been made by various institutions, but as of yet no multi-disciplanary, or multiple-institution strategy has been unveiled. This talk is designed to bridge that gap and work to bring disciplines together.

An analysis of opinion polls and the reporting of the detail of climate matters primarilly in European and American newsapers  including the provision of renewable energy generation indicate equallly a 'will' to address climate issues and a 'dis-satisfaction' at current action.

The talk specialises in analysing these divides but with a particular and focused experience in lingustics. The scientific language uses words in a different way to 'regular' english. This talk asks what we can learn from a very proficient use of the english language. The issues of conveying clear messages around climate variabilty and change transcends these boundaries.

This lecture looks at these lingustic, societal, and scientific issues, drawing them togther to make a cohesive way forward.

A linguistic analysis of IPCC Summaries and its coverage in scientific and popular media

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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Summary for Policymakers (SPM) is the most widely read section of IPCC reports and the main springboard for the communication of its assessment reports. Its findings should be communicated in a way that can be understood by a non-scientific audience. Existing studies have focused on the way in which IPCC probabilistic statements are interpreted, and on the discursive construction of the IPCC in national newspapers, including the influence of grammatical and word choices. We have undertaken a linguistic analysis of SPMs and related scientific and popular media coverage on the launch of each IPCC assessment report from 1990 to 2014. We employ widely-established sentiment analysis tools and readability metrics to explore the extent to which information published by the IPCC differs from the presentation of respective findings in the popular and scientific media within this time-frame. IPCC SPMs clearly stand out in terms of low readability, which has remained relatively constant despite the IPCCs efforts to consolidate and readjust its communications policy. In contrast, scientific and broadsheet newspaper coverage has become increasingly readable and emotive. Our findings reveal easy gains that could be achieved in making SPMs more accessible for non-scientific audiences.

Geography of International Trade, Maritime Transport and Climate Change in XXI Century: A Descriptive Basis for Multilateral Action from a South Perspective

E. Tancredi (Universidad Nacional de Lujan, Lujan, Argentina)

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Geography of International Trade, Maritime Transport and Climate Change in XXI Century: A Descriptive Basis for Multilateral Action from a South Perspective

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This paper puts the focus of its analysis in the relationship among the main tendencies of the international trade of goods, the essential characteristics of the seaborne trade and the challenges of climatic change. From the beginnings of the XXI century, three economic characteristics can be pointed out. First, the significant expansion of the global value chains that represent the new form of disintegration and de-localization of the production of goods and services which has driven to a new international division of the production (WTO, 2014). Second, the deepening of the regional integration and the cooperation South-South that reconfigure the seculars unequal relationships between the North and the South. In third place, the exponential growth of commercial exchanges. In this context, 80% of the world trade is carried out by maritime mean. Supply places have been diversified due to technological improvements and transport efficiency. Marine routes have been enlarged and new ones have been open (i.e. Channel of Panama and Artico routes). While some emergent economies (specifically in South Asia) reorient their exports toward medium and high technological incorporated manufactures, many other monopolize their exports in agricultural products or mineral resources. Volumes expanded at the rate of 3.8% of nearly 9.6 billion tons. Of these shipments, dry cargo (major and minor dry commodities carried in bulk, general cargo, breakbulk and containerized trade) accounted for the largest share (70.2%), followed by tanker trade (crude oil, petroleum product and gas) which held a 29.8% share (UNCTAD, 2014). Developing countries have increased their contribution to these flows, although in an uniqual contibution at individual terms. Regionally, Asia remained the main loading and unloading area in 2013 with its share of imports (unloading) being particularly dominant. Americas is the other major loading area and Europe on the unloading side. These shares are likely to further evolve with changing trade patterns and partners, the emergence of Africa and developing America as areas with a significant growth potential, and fast growing trade on secondary container trade routes supporting SouthSouth and intraregional trade. Global containerized trade is projected to grow, given among other factors by improved prospects for mainlane EastWest trade. The global fragmentation of the production and the development of multimodel systems of international transport are the elements that also lead to a reorganization of the ports.In this context, the sector of marine transport needs to adjust its commercial strategies to adapt to the changes of the world economy and rules of the trade, besides risks and current environmental uncertainties. As world seaborne trade increases, the main challenges  especially from the perspective of a social and environmentally sustainable development, as well as from the point of view of the transport and trade facilitation  consist in reducing the GHG (mainly CO2) emissions from international shipping and define mitigation and adaptation policies. In terms of CO2 emissions/ transported ton, it is recognized that the marine transport is the more effective one. Nevertheless, due its enormous scale, it is estimated that ship emissions (especially from oil-tankers and container ships) represent 11,8% of the emissions of the transport sector and 1,6 to 4,1% of the CO2 world emissions resulting from burning; according to the International Maritime Organization (OMI), they will increase in a factor from 2,4 to 3 between 2007 and 2050 (UNCTAD, 2008; OMI, 2009; OMC/PNUMA, 2009) This linking of climate change challenges with the tendencies of international seaborne trade and their emissions of GHG have relatively little presence in the multilateral negotiations. But OMI has recently adopted a group of technical and operative measures to improve the energy efficiency and of GHG emission from ships with the aim to promotes trade but in turn energy efficiency and sustainable development, according to the principle of the common but differed responsibilities among developed and developing countries. In this sense then, it is sought to advance in this proposal a detailed characterization of the main tendencies of international trade and seaborne trade in the XXI century, analyzing their complex links with climate change, and the main challenges for a negotiated multilateral action, putting the accent, as case analysis, in the emergent economies of Latin America (in particular Brazil, Mexico and Argentina).

Avoiding dangerous climate change: the role of shipping in delivering on the IPCC's latest carbon budgets

Avoiding dangerous climate change: the role of shipping in delivering on the IPCC's latest carbon budgets

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In 2015 and with global emissions rising at unprecedented rates one clear certainty is that the future will be very different from the past. Whether the world continues to follow a trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions exceeding those in RCP8.5, the highest in the IPCC's suite of scenarios and associated with an expected temperature increase of between and 3°C and 5°C, or whether we begin a programme of stringent mitigation, is a decision for the international community. These two paths lead to very different futures, each radically different from the past. This paper reflects on and analyses the role of the global shipping industry as an important player in both these potential futures.

The Kyoto Protocol has called on the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to ... [control greenhouse gas emissions from shipping]. In 2009, the then secretary general of the IMO concluded that our collective way of life has become unsustainable and stressed the need to make some tough decisions and to start putting life ahead of lifestyle. In contrast, the baseline suite of six shipping emissions scenarios in the 2nd IMO GHG Study (2009) has CO2 emissions between 2007 and 2050 rise by a factor of between 2.2 and 3.1. Similarly, the 3rd IMO GHG Study (2014) presents a suite of sixteen scenarios, with rises of up to 3.5 times those estimated for 2012.

It is important to that the updated emissions estimates in the 3rd IMO GHG Study (2014) demonstrate a fall in CO2 over the period 2007 to 2012. It argues that much of this emission reduction was due to slow steaming in response to a global economic downturn. Recent emissions reductions may, therefore, represent latent CO2, that could be realised once the economic situation changes and vessels revert to pre-crisis speeds.

The paper contrasts the different emissions pathways for the shipping sector, placing them in the quantitative context of global emissions scenarios and associated temperature responses. It concludes that steering a mitigation course has never been more critical, nor the choice more stark.

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The Durban platform calls for strengthening the multilateral rules-based regime under the [UNFCCC] convention. Issues of particular importance still to be decided are the particular legal form to be applied; if elements of the legal form are to be legally binding; how responsibilities are to be balanced across and among developed and developing countries; and the agreements role, if any, in regulating or facilitating international emissions trading. Of the three approaches to choose from (expanded Kyoto-like approach, legalization of the Cancùn architecture, multi-track approach), this session will focus on aspects of a multi-track approach. This approach would allow a variable geometry with different configurations of countries involved in different parts of the overall regime. [1]

The session is built around the observation that the climate regime needs innovative modes of governance that recognize that the current regime is a transnational regime complex that is increasingly inadequate for inter-state governance. The chair will then note that the speakers suggestions are all built around clubs of firms/cities/states that are conducive to the goal of building confidence (e.g. tackling easier problems such as soot with co-benefits; start linking with like systems to build confidence; designing smart border measures). This confidence-building approach is needed to build the collective action that has eluded the climate regime so far.

The chair will close by taking the example of the ongoing negotiations on an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), a good example of the three elements that are needed for a successful climate agreement (all were missing from the Kyoto Protocol). First, the treaty must encourage and promote full participation by countries. Second, the treaty must demand that parties change their behaviour substantially. Third, the treaty must provide parties with an incentive to comply with the obligations they have pledged to fulfil. Depending on the willingness of the parties engaged in the ongoing negotiations which should be concluded prior to the COP21, the EGA could turn out to the first global climate agreement. [2]

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Opportunities and challenges for decarbonising the shipping sector

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The growth in transport emissions poses a particular challenge in meeting wider 2 °C emission targets. The demand for shipping experienced a significant period of growth during the first half of the previous decade, prompted by growth in regions such as Asia in conjunction with an increasing trade in manufactured material and dry bulk goods. This incentivised speculative ordering of new ships which meant that the fleet experienced over-capacity during the subsequent reduction in demand during the economic downturn. The third greenhouse gas report commissioned by the IMO estimates that between 2007and 2010 CO2 emissions due to international transport decreased by 13%. This can be attributed to an increase in ship size in some instances but also due to a reduction in ship speed, made possible by the overcapacity of ships. Therefore a reduction in ship speed and an increase in ship size (in conjunction with a reduction in demand) represent an opportunity to reduce the emissions associated with the shipping sector.

As the ships which experienced the greatest reduction in speed appeared to be the fasted ships, (such as large container vessels) it could be argued that such vessels will have the most to gain by resuming pre-existing speeds once demand returns. Therefore the cyclical nature of the shipping sector may be seen as an opportunity for opportunistic emissions reductions but makes realising long term savings difficult. Through the generation of alternative scenarios for future global shipping emissions, this study seeks to better understand the elements, both internal and external to, the shipping sector which may assist or hinder it in reducing its emissions, commensurate with meeting wider 2 °C targets, which require a significant reduction in carbon emissions by 2050. For example while a significant reduction in speed is necessary, it must also be compensated for by making sure sufficient fleet capacity (in terms of number and size) is available to ensure adequate scheduling needs are met.

Furthermore as shipping remains a derived demand, changes to existing trading patterns will influence the extent to which the sector can decarbonise. However the shipping sector itself cannot readily influence the demand for trade. Scenario results show that under a different decarbonisation scenarios, a reduction in fossil fuel trade may be compensated for by an increase in biomass trade, or the successful implementation of carbon capture and storage technology may allow fossil fuel trade to continue. A scenario in which the future demand for trade is projected to increase makes decreasing the carbon intensity of shipping even more important. In that regard, decarbonisation cannot be envisioned without penetration of both appropriate technologies and the availability of alternative low carbon fuels. The scale of the emission reduction necessary implies that widespread uptake of new-build and retrofit technology will be necessary. The efficiency of former will depend on levels of ship turnover which also reflect fluctuations in the shipping market. Supporting technological uptake will necessitate the availability of appropriate financing and opportunities to de-risk the uptake of new technologies. This will require identification of the most appropriate technological solutions, such as identifying the optimal routes for the application of wind technology. However lack of available berth space as well as a lack of appropriate training can impede the uptake of retrofit technologies.

Despite the scale of the challenge, the shipping sector arguably has greater opportunity to decarbonise than other sectors, such as aviation sector. However, given the urgency, it is imperative to identify synergies which may assist in sectorial decarbonisation in the near term. A reduction in trade demand, in conjunction with an increase in ship size will make a reduction in speed more viable, which can increase the impact of low carbon technologies. Modifying the conditions of vessel hire or enhancing supply chain flexibility will also assist in making fuel savings more attractive and viable. In summary, allowing shipping to meet its commitments within a 2 °C framework may not be wholly within the gift of the sector itself and will require support from the wider system of which shipping is a reactive part.