Tuesday, September 07, 2010

A Farewell to the Philosophy of Religion? Why not a Farewell to Philosophy?

Steven Nemes informs me that Keith Parsons is giving up teaching and writing in the philosophy of religion. His reasons are stated in his post Goodbye to All That. The following appears to be his chief reason:

I have to confess that I now regard “the case for theism” as a fraud and I can no longer take it seriously enough to present it to a class as a respectable philosophical position—no more than I could present intelligent design as a legitimate biological theory. BTW, in saying that I now consider the case for theism to be a fraud, I do not mean to charge that the people making that case are frauds . . . . I just cannot take their arguments seriously any more, and if you cannot take something seriously, you should not try to devote serious academic attention to it.

Keith [Parsons] and I have emailed about getting out of the philosophy of religion. I've made the same decision. I'm through wasting my time trying to convince people who don't want to be convinced of the irrationality of their beliefs. And I have had more than enough verbal abuse from the Richard Purtills, the Peter Kreefts, and the Thomas Talbotts. We are all getting older and I, for my part, would much rather read books I want to read (or reread) and listen to great music that I either don't know or want to know better. Not to mention, spending more time with my wife instead of constantly yielding to the lure of the computer to work on yet another project that will convince few, antagonize some, and be ignored by most. Interestingly, Keith and I came to this conclusion more or less simultaneously but independently.

Steven Nemes comments in his e-mail to me:

I don't imagine you think the case for theism is so bad . . . . Any arguments in particular you think are promising? Any anti-theistic arguments you think are particularly good, too? (It was Parsons who said that the case for atheism/naturalism has been presented about as well as it ever can be by philosophers like Michael Martin, Schellenberg, Oppy, Gale, et al.)

Or perhaps you don't think the issues are so clear and obvious one way or the other in the philosophy of religion? In fact, is such dismissive hand-waving like Parsons' and Beversluis' ever acceptable in philosophy? Are there any issues that are settled?

Steven has once again peppered me with some pertinent and challenging questions. Here is a quick response.

Of course, I don't consider the case for theism to be a "fraud," to use Parson's word. I also don't understand how the case could be called a fraud if the people who make it are not frauds. But let's not enter into an analysis of the concept fraud. We may charitably chalk up Parsons' use of 'fraud' to rhetorical overkill, which is certainly not a censurable offense in the blogosphere. And when Parsons tells us that he cannot take the theistic arguments seriously any more, he is presumably not making a merely autobiographical remark. He is not merely informing us about his present disgusted state of mind, although he is doing that. He is asserting that the case for theism is not intellectually respectable, while the case for atheism and naturalism (which Parsons in his post brackets together) are intellectually respectable. (It is worth noting that while nauralism entails atheism, atheism does not entail naturalism: McTaggart was an atheist but not a naturalist. But this nuance needn't concern us at present.)

Parsons' metaphilosophical assertion does not impress me. I make a different assertion: There are intellectually respectable cases to be made both for theism/anti-naturalism and for atheism/naturalism. I don't think there are any 'knock-down' arguments on either side. There are arguments for the existence of God, but no proofs of the existence of God. And there are arguments for the nonexistence of God, but no proofs of the nonexistence of God. But of course it depends on what is meant by 'proof.'

I suggest that a proof is a deductive argument, free of informal fallacy, valid in point of logical form, all of the premises of which are objectively self-evident. I will illustrate what I mean by 'objectively self-evident' with an anecdote. In a discussion with a Thomist a while back I mentioned that the first premise of his reconstruction of Aquinas' argument from motion (the First of the Five Ways) was not (objectively) self-evident, and that therefore the First Way did not amount to a proof. The premise in the reconstruction was to the effect that it is evident to the senses that the reduction of potency to act is a real feature of the world.

I granted to my interlocutor that what Thomas calls motion, i.e., change, is evident to the senses as a real feature of the world. But I pointed out that it is not evident to the senses that the actualization of potency is a real feature of the world. That change is the reduction of potency to act is a theoretical claim that goes beyond what is given to sense perception. For this reason, the first premise of the reconstruction of the First Way, though plausible and indeed reasonable, is not objectively self-evident. One can of course give many logically correct arguments for the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, but we can ask with respect to the premises of these arguments whether they are objectively self-evident. If they are not, then they do not amount to proofs given my stringent definition of 'proof.'

It is equally true, however, that one cannot prove the nonexistence of God, from evil say.

But it is no different outside the philosophy of religion. God and the soul are meta-physical in the sense of supersensible. But there is nothing supersensible about the bust of Beethoven sitting atop my CD player. It is a material object, a middle-sized artifact, open to unaided perception. But such a humble object inspires interminable and seemingly intractable debate among the most brilliant philosophers. I am currently exploring some of these issues in other threads, and so I won't go into details here. But consider Peter van Inwagen's denial of the existence of artifacts (which is part of a broader denial of the existence of all nonliving composite objects). You could say, very loosely, that van Inwagen is an 'atheist' about artifacts. Other philosophers, equally brilliant and well-informed, deny his denial.

Now it would take an excess of chutzpah to label van Inwagen's carefully argued denial of artifacts as intellectually unrespectable. I suggest that it takes an equal excess of chutzpah to label the case for theism intellectually unrespectable.

Steven asked me whether the dismissive attitude of Parsons and Beversluis is acceptable. I would say no. It is no more acceptable in the philosophy of religion than it is in other branches of philosophy where there are equally genuine but equally difficult and interminably discussable problems.

Let me end with this question: If one's reason for abandoning the philosophy of religion is that one cannot convince those on the other side -- "I'm through wasting my time trying to convince people who don't want to be convinced of the irrationality of their beliefs." (Beversluis) -- then is this not also a reason for abandoning philosophy tout court? After all, the brilliant van Inwagen did not convince the brilliant David Lewis that the latter was wrong about Composition as Identity -- and this is a very well-defined and mundane and ideology-free question.

The comments of Parsons and Beversluis don't sit well with me. It seems to me that they're trying to convince people of their position by saying, "Disagreeing with me on this topic is so absurd that I'm not even going to talk about it anymore. It's so crazy that it's not even worthy of being responded to." And that strikes me as an attempt, not to argue, but to get people to agree with them by tactics other than reason. It looks like an attempt to bypass people's reason and bully them into acquiescence. This coming when atheism is becoming less and less popular among philosophers. And of course it leaves them the room to come out of retirement to rebut an especially pernicious argument for theism, i.e. an argument that is convincing a lot of people.

"But I pointed out that it is not evident to the senses that the actualization of potency is a real feature of the world. That change is the reduction of potency to act is a theoretical claim that goes beyond what is given to sense perception."

That is an intellectually unrespectable position. If you knew the meanings of the terms "potency" and "act," their existence and necessary relationship would be self-evident.

"If change is evident to the senses, and change is nothing other than the reduction of some potency to act, then the reduction of some potency to act is evident to the senses."

(i) This isn't exactly the topic of the post.

(ii) Consider this counterexample. If the motion of my arm is evident to the senses, and the motion of my arm is nothing other than the firing of neurons in my brain and a long, complex physiological process taking place, than that my neurons are firing and a long, complex physiological complex is taking place is evident to the senses. Or, if the motion of my arm is evident to the senses, and the motion of my arm is nothing other God's causing me to be in certain mental states over a period of time, then that God is causing me to be in certain mental states over a period of time is evident to the senses.

What I found interesting is the authors John Beversluis cites as those he is tired or trying to convince. I have nothing against Peter Kreeft or others like him, but there are other philosophers who work, I think, is much more rigorous. The most notable example is Bill Craig. Though we come from two different places philosophically, I think is work on the kalam is outstanding and is not easily dismissed. The same can be said of David Oderberg's articles showing why Oppy has not succeeded in dismantling Craig's basic argument. The arguments presented by Craig and Oderberg are not the popular versions presented by Kreeft and others. I guess I'm Just very surprised by these ex-philosophers of religion.

As for your point (i), it is interesting how so many will ignore the main point of a post and seize upon some detail.

As for (ii), you are exactly right. Examples are easily multiplied. That there is water is evident to the senses. But Water is H2O. Should we conclude that it is evident to the senses that there are H2O molecules?

What the two dogmatic Thomists who showed up here do not understand is that the pre-analytic fact of change can be analyzed in different ways. That change is the reduction of potency to act is only one way.

I did not realize that I was a dogmatic Thomist for asking a simple question, please forgive me for asking a philosophical question on your philosophy blog.

I would also ask forgiveness for asking a question not relevant to the main point of the post, but the dogmatic Thomist Edward Feser's comment made me think about it and therefore ask you what you thought about it. It is puzzling why you would become so defensive over this. I thought I was being respectful. For my part, I agree with the main point of your post wholeheartedly.

Actually Steve, your counter-example is exactly why I asked my question. I was unclear about what, precisely, is evident to the senses and what is not. Using you example, we can say that the motion of my arm is nothing but a change. Should we then say that change itself is not evident to the senses?

E.R. Bourne said: "Actually Steve, your counter-example is exactly why I asked my question. I was unclear about what, precisely, is evident to the senses and what is not. Using you example, we can say that the motion of my arm is nothing but a change. Should we then say that change itself is not evident to the senses?"

(i) I don't know how to distinguish between what is evident to the senses and what isn't; I was just pointing out that your inference was invalid.

(ii) Suppose I grant that if motion of my hand is evident to the senses, and that motion of my hand is nothing but a change, then change is evident to the senses. I need not hold that this inference is universally valid. There may be instances in which reasoning from the properties of the part to the properties of the whole isn't obviously fallacious or yields false conclusions (for instance, if every part of my shirt is red, then the whole shirt is red), but that does nothing to show the inference rule is universally valid.

Steve, I was not arguing that it was universally valid, since, as you admit, it need not be for particular instances to be true.

Also, I did make a statement, but it was still a question in the sense that it was submitted to your blog for good faith criticism. If you think it is wrong then just say so. It is rude to lump me in with a man you called an idiot and then imply that I am thread jacking out of some ideological zeal for "dogmatic Thomism." Whether my post ended with a question mark or not is irrelevant to my point, namely, that you were being unnecessarily strident. Your insult at the end of your last statement just shows that I was right.

E.R. Bourne said: "Steve, I was not arguing that it was universally valid, since, as you admit, it need not be for particular instances to be true."

Undoubtedly, however, that instances of reduction of potency to act are evident to the senses is false, which was your original statement! Now I'm not sure what you mean to be asking!

If your whole question is: what is evident to the senses and what isn't?, then my answer is: I don't know where to draw the line. I suppose I am a particularist about this sort of thing--some things are, and some things aren't, and we just have to decide on a case-by-case basis. Thomist metaphysics, however, is arguably no more evident to the senses than Berkeleyan idealist metaphysics is.

I like your reference to Berkeley. Berkeley may be wrong about the external world, but if he is, it is not evident to the senses that he is. Kicking a stone barefooted will cause you pain whether or not Berkeley's metaphysics is true.

Another example. Suppose that inherent in a wine glass is the disposition to shatter if suitably struck or dropped. Can I prove that there is that disposition by dropping the wine glass and observing its shattering? The shattering is evident to the senses, but that the shattering is the exercise or realization of a disposition is not evident to the senses. That is not to say that there aren't reasonable arguments for the positing of dispositions.

If you had written your comment as follows then I wouldn't have lumped you in with the cyberpunks and those with whom it is a waste of time to converse.

"While I agree with the main point of your post, I am puzzled by what you say about potency and act. It seems to me that the following argument is sound:
1. Change is evident to the senses
2. Change is the reduction of potency to act
Therefore
3. The reduction of potency to act is evident to the senses.

Why doesn't this refute what you said?"

Had you approached me like that, then I would have spent time explaining things to you, as I am doing now.