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Opinions

The Middle District of Pennsylvania offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2012, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Date

Month

Year

Judge

07/21/2008

On April 24, 2003, the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) approved Members First Credit Union’s request to amend its credit-union charter to cover six counties in south-central Pennsylvania. In doing so, the NCUA determined that the six-county area, which covers over 3,000 square miles and has a population of more than 1.2 million people, constitutes a “well-defined local community.” Plaintiffs, led by the American Bankers Association (“Association”),1 maintain that the area does not constitute a well-defined local community. Accordingly, the Association brought suit against the NCUA to challenge the NCUA’s approval pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Members First Credit Union and two other affected credit unions intervened as defendants.

03/24/2008

This matter arises out of the formation and operation of the Kilimanjaro Steak House Bar & Grill, a Pennsylvania General Partnership between the plaintiff, Alnoor Rahemtulla – a resident of New Jersey, and the defendant, Nazim Hassam – a resident of Pennsylvania. More specifically, the case involves allegations that Mr. Hassam fraudulently induced Mr. Rahemtulla into entering a partnership, which through a calculated plan of making empty promises and withholding crucial information, caused Mr. Rahemtulla to invest $340,000 towards what he believed to be his contribution to the partnership, when such funds were instead misappropriated and commingled with the other defendants for other purposes. On March 31, 2004, the plaintiffs commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, claiming, inter alia, fraud, misappropriation, conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment, and seeking an invalidation of the partnership documents, a disgorgement and return of the monies which they invested in the partnership, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. No. 1). Id. The defendants having filed a motion to dismiss and/or change venue, by order dated January 10, 2005, the District of New Jersey directed that the matter be transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Upon transfer, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned on March 29, 2005.

10/19/2007

On December 8, 2005, Defendants Terrance Williams and Eric Hayes and fourteen other individuals were named in a thirty-two count indictment alleging a multi-year, nationwide conspiracy to engage in the interstate sex trafficking of women, including juveniles. The indictment also separately charged Defendants with other related crimes.1 As part of its case-in-chief, the Government proposes to call Dr. Sharon W. Cooper as an expert witness to offer opinion testimony in three general areas: (1) the societal and criminal justice implications of prostitution and the sexual exploitation of women; (2) the medical and mental-health aspects of prostitution, including general testimony on victim risk and vulnerability factors and on common methods of grooming and deterrents to escape; (3) and the medical and mental-health impact that life as a prostitute had on certain women involved in this case. (Doc. No. 983; see also Doc. Nos. 949, 949-3.)

10/04/2007

Felipe Cordova-Lopez is a foreign national subject to deportation to Mexico. On August 8, 2007, this court ordered Felipe Cordova-Lopez to be detained for twenty days as a material witness for the United States. The United States sought Mr. Cordova-Lopez’s testimony in the prosecution against a defendant who was charged with immigration offenses. However, on August 28, 2007, this court dismissed the material witness warrant against Mr. Cordova-Lopez because the defendant entered a guilty plea. As a result, there was no trial and Mr. Cordova-Lopez was never called to testify as a material witness.

On August 20, 2007, Mr. Cordova-Lopez filed the instant motion for material witness fees, arguing that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) he should be compensated $40 for each day he was detained. (Doc. No. 39). The United States filed its opposition brief on August 30, 2007. (Doc. No. 52). Mr. Cordova-Lopez then filed a brief in support of his motion on August 31, 2007. (Doc. No. 53).

09/14/2007

Beginning in 1996, Plaintiff Sherry Wampler worked for the Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Wampler suffers from sleep-related medical issues, IgA deficiency,1 asthma, and susceptibility to upper respiratory infections. (Compl. ¶ 7.) On March 27, 1998, Wampler submitted a written request for a modified work schedule to accommodate sleep-related medical issues. (Compl. ¶ 4.) In addition, Wampler took sick leave due to her illnesses. In her complaint, Wampler alleges that Defendant criticized her, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for taking sick leave. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-10.) Additionally, Wampler alleges that her employment was terminated on February 9, 2006, “for allegedly leaving work early and taking extended lunches.”

Before the Court is an action under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., challenging an administrative order of the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”). The parties have extensively briefed two issues now before the Court for determination: (1) the standard of review the Court should apply when considering the NCUA’s decision; and (2) the proper scope of discovery. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that: (1) the challenged action of the NCUA must be reviewed on the merits under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of § 706(2)(A) and for procedural errors under § 706(2)(D) of the APA; and (2) that the agency’s action must be evaluated based on the administrative record before the Court.

08/30/2007

In his complaint the plaintiff alleges that on July 25, 2003 the defendants, all members of the Pennsylvania State Police, violated his civil and constitutional rights when they used excessive and unreasonable force against him after arrest . (Doc. No. 1). Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that while he was in custody, the defendants repeatedly hit, kicked, and threw him against barrack walls in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 23-25). He also alleges that the defendants deprived him of due process when they took, but never returned, $800 from his person. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 27-29). Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive him of these rights, and as a result, the plaintiff has suffered substantial injury. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32). Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff [hereinafter also referred to as Zuder] seeks the return of his $800, together with unspecified damages, punitive damages plus interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. pp.7-8).

05/22/2007

In this action Plaintiff Gertha Jones has alleged that Defendants’ termination of her employment and subsequent failure to hire her for two different positions constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of Plaintiff’s race, age, and disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 29.) For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted because Plaintiff is estopped from establishing a prima facie element of each of her claims, namely, that she was qualified for any of the jobs in question.

05/16/2007

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss indictments in two separate criminal actions: United States v. Kapp and United States v. Duncan. Defendants have moved to dismiss indictments for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, and have separately challenged the applicability and constitutionality of that statute on similar bases. For reasons of judicial economy, the Court will address both motions in a single order. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions will be granted.

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). (Doc. 11.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be granted.

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, section 1332 (“diversity of citizenship”). Because we are sitting in diversity, the substantive law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the instant case. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).