A weekly look at the Middle East, focusing on some of the issues and debates that you may have missed.

Without God on our side

One of the most refreshing things about the Tunisian uprising – and very unusual for the Middle East – has been the lack of meddling by external interests. Apart from a few mouse-like squeaks from the state department, the US stayed out of it and so too did God, along with his self-appointed representatives on earth.

In most Arab countries, Islamists are seen as the main alternative to existing regimes – which suits the regimes fine because it scares people into supporting them. In Tunisia, though, as George Joffe explained, the organisational strength of the uprising came mainly from the country's biggest trade union, the UGTT, with students and thousands of disaffected citizens also joining in. The rhetoric was broadly leftist rather than religious.

Hopefully, what Tunisia can provide for the Middle East is a new model – a secular alternative to the Iranian revolution. There are no ayatollahs waiting in the wings. The Islamists will probably to resurface after two decades of suppression, but there are no indications that they have a large popular following in Tunisia and they are unlikely to play anything more than a minor role in the country's political future.

If the Tunisian revolution continues on its current path, we could even see the beginnings of a post-Islamist phase in the Arab countries.

Revolting on the internet

Staying with the Tunisian uprising for a moment, there is a growing debate about the role of the internet. Having followed the events on the internet myself, I'm sure it was a very important element in the struggle – though I wouldn't go so far as to call it a "Twitter revolution".

The WikiLeaks documents released a couple of weeks before the trouble started (and gathered here on the TuniLeaks website) undoubtedly had a powerful effect, portraying President Ben Ali as someone who refused to listen to advice, discussing the widespread hatred directed against his wife (a sort of Tunisian Imelda Marcos), detailing the family's involvement in corruption and describing the disgustingly extravagant lifestyle of the president's son-in-law.

Tunisians probably knew most of this already, though they weren't allowed to talk about it in public. WikiLeaks shifted it out of the private sphere and created a sense of "Now, it's official!". The depictions of extravagant wealth and corruption in the ruling family could also be readily contrasted with the plight of Mohamed Bouazizi, the unemployed fruit-seller who set fire to himself..

My impression is that Twitter, Facebook and YouTube were not used much as organisational tools by the protesters but they did have an important mobilising and inspirational effect. In the absence of first-hand TV coverage they provided information about what was happening on the streets.

Dozens of videos were posted, showing demonstrations and the police brutality that often accompanied them. In a country where people are accustomed to lies and propaganda in their newspapers, videos tend to be trusted as sources of truth.

Spinster power

A Saudi newspaper has highlighted the growing number of unmarried women in the kingdom. By 2015 there could be as many as 4 million "spinsters" (women over 32 who have never been married).

This is an interesting trend in a society where religious elements actively promote early marriage (in childhood, in some cases) and failure to marry is often regarded as a social disaster. The paper discusses some possible explanations, such as Saudi men preferring foreign brides, but I think it's also a sign that Saudi women are gradually becoming more independent.

"A factor not mentioned in the article, though often offered to me by Saudi women, is that many Saudi men don't meet the women's expectations. Low levels of education, too tied to traditions, unwillingness to allow their wives to work or even study … If there is no sense of equality between partners, then marriage seems to lack a basic necessity. Keeping parents happy by producing grandchildren isn't sufficient incentive."

Yemen and its tribes

In many parts of Yemen there is no real government apart from the tribes. The tribal areas largely govern themselves and have their own "customary" laws, which sometimes conflict with those of the state. They also have their own militias. Whether they are a force for good or ill is a much-debated question.

In article for the Yemen Times, Michael Horton, an analyst who writes for Jane's Intelligence Review among other publications, says: "Yemen's tribes have a long and varied history of self governance that, like the written history of states, is characterised by periods of both enlightened and tyrannical rule."

For a long time, the Yemeni state was able to maintain a semblance of control by making deals with the tribes – especially through patronage and bribery. But with the country facing a desperate economic crisis, that system is breaking down, Horton says:

"The Salih regime's inability to continue to fund its elaborate patronage system has caused it to shift toward more confrontational policies to ensure the authority of the state. Under the guise of fighting terrorism, the state has often moved troops into tribal areas, bombed recalcitrant tribes and shut down roads to force tribes to comply and submit to its rule."

He sees this as "an ominous shift from a policy that was once focused on largely nonviolent co-option in order to maintain power and is certain to further destabilise the country".