1. The Select Committee is invited to consider
submissions and make recommendations within the general context
of the laws ( and at present mainly the absence of laws) which
are concerned with religious discrimination generally.

2. Bearing this in mind, the Select Committee
is requested to consider all of the AML Recommendations for the
Forthcoming Religious Discrimination Legislation dated the 14
July 2002, copies of which have already been made available to
the Select Committee.

3. The Select Committee should only consider
religious offences in the context of bona fide religions which
are based partly or wholly on a revelation from God and whose
principal purpose is the worship of God.

4. Protection under any laws governing religious
offences should not be extended to those whose beliefs and practices
do not involve adherence to a bona fide religion and the worship
of God.

5. Freedom of belief in general, including
the non-religious freedom not to believe in or worship God and
not to follow any bona fide religion should be protected by separate
legislation if this is deemed necessaryalthough in fact
these non-religious freedoms are already established as a social
norm and recognised by Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (the ECHR).

6. Article 9 of the ECHR which has been
incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA) recognises
inter alia the freedom of religious belief and the freedom to
put that religious belief into practice, whether alone or in a
group, subject to reasonable limitations.

7. Every freedom is subject to reasonable
limitations, including the freedom of speech.

8. In contravention of the ECHR, Article
nine religious rights have not yet been secured by English domestic
law in the sense of providing appropriate remedies if these rights
are unreasonably violated.

9. Since the bona fide religious communities
in the UK are minority communities, they are more vulnerable and
therefore more in need of the protection of the law than non-religious
majority communities.

10. If laws governing religious offences
and religious discrimination are developed in an uncoordinated,
haphazard mannerthen this is what they will be, dysfunctional.

11. The specific offences which the Select
Committee is considering should therefore be viewed as part of
an overall strategy to protect Article 9 religious rights from
being violatedunder both civil and criminal lawand
to provide appropriate remedies if and when they are violated
without reasonable justification.

12. In so doing, the Select Committee's
attention should be focused on where the line should be reasonably
drawn between valid freedom of expression on the one handand
on the other hand, unacceptable vilification. Since possible fact
situations are limitless and since knowing where to draw the line
is a delicate matter, this should be ultimately a matter for the
exercise of judicial discretion.

13. There are different degrees of vilification,
the lower end of which cannot be regulated by either civil or
criminal law. Vilification should rightly be regulated by civil
law when it causes real harm and hardshipand by criminal
law when it becomes really serious.

14. The specific offences which the Select
Committee is considering fall within the domain of criminal law
and are concerned principally with deterring the vilification
of those whose beliefs and practices involve adherence to a bona
fide religion and the worship of Godand of the religion
itself.

15. As regards deterrence of vilification
by criminal law (which includes the imposition of penalties on
those who commit an offence) the least serious offence is blasphemy,
followed by incitement to religious hatred, followed by incitement
to the commission of religiously aggravated offences, followed
by the actual commission of religiously aggravated offences.

BLASPHEMY:

16. The law of blasphemy should not be abolished.
Although in a minority comprised of different minorities, sincere
and God-fearing followers of bona fide religionswho
are certain of the life after death and who yearn for the Garden
and fear the Fireare correspondingly careful in their behaviour
and accordingly have a morally stabilising effect on society as
a whole. Since they are law-abiding minorities, they therefore
deserve the protection of the law.

17. The protection at present afforded by
the law of blasphemy exclusively to Protestant Christians and
Protestant Christianity should be updated, redefined and extended
so as to afford equal protection to all other bona fide religions
and their followers, including Islam and Muslims.

18. The new statutory definition of blasphemy
should be:

1(1) The crime of blasphemy is committed
by a person who intentionally makes public words, images or conduct
whereby the beliefs, doctrines, practices and rituals of any bona
fide religion are unreasonably vilified by abusive or violent
words or conduct which shock and outrage or are likely to shock
and outrage the feelings of the general body of believers who
follow any such religion.

(2) For the purposes of section 1(1) above:

(i) A bona fide religion is any
religion based partly or wholly on a revelation from God and
whose principal purpose is the worship of God;

(ii) God is the Creator, the Sustainer
and the Destroyer of all that exists;

(iii) It is for the court to decide,
taking all the circumstances and evidence into account, as to
what constitutes:

(a) a bona fide religion, and

(b) unreasonable vilification in any
particular case.

19. This definition would help protect the
sincere followers of bona fide religions from malicious attacks
which fall short of incitement to religious hatred and incitement
to the commission of religiously aggravated offences, whilst still
upholding the freedom of speech by permitting sincere theological
debate, reasoned scholarly criticism and light-hearted humour.
It would act more as a deterrent than a means of securing convictions.

20. This definition would also not afford
any protection to those religious extremists who in seeking to
champion their own religion are unreasonably excessive in their
assessment of other religions and in their behaviour towards the
followers of other religions.

21. The purpose of making blasphemy a criminal
offence is not only to ensure respect and honour where respect
and honour are due, but also to act as a deterrent against the
commission of related and more serious offences, namely incitement
to religious hatred and incitement to the commission of religiously
aggravated offences.

INCITEMENTTO
RELIGIOUS HATRED:

22. Incitement to religious hatred involves
a higher degree of vilification than that which constitutes blasphemy.
When blasphemy ceases to manifest in isolated instances and is
established as a socially acceptable, legally permitted, officially
condoned norm, then at this point it becomes the precursor of
incitement to religious hatred and incitement to the commission
of religiously aggravated offences.

23. Incitement to religious hatred constitutes
an attempt to mobilise public opinion against both the followers
of a bona fide religion and the religion itself so that
they are lead to fear for their own personal safety and for their
property.

24. Incitement to religious hatred is a
degree of vilification which if left unchecked is likely to motivate
people to inflict physical harm on the people who are the object
of that vilification as well as physical damage to their property.

25. An obvious example of the kind of mischief
which legislation should criminalise is the BNP leaflet, cassette
and CD campaign in the summer of 2001 which precipitated attacks
against Muslims especially in the north of England and which led
to disturbancesfor which Muslims were then held largely
to blame, even when acting in self-defence after their calls for
protection had been ignored by some police.

26. Unfortunately the present Home Secretary
either could not or would not or did not either see or understand
this.

27. Other recent examples of the kind of
mischief which legislation should criminalise include the vilification
and incitement to religious hatred and incitement to the commission
of religiously aggravated offences which both preceded and accompanied
the "Christian" Nazi rape and massacre of European Jews,
the "Christian" Serbian rape and massacre of Bosnian
and Kosovan Muslims, the "Christian" Russian rape and
massacre of Chechenian Muslims, the "Hindu" Indian rape
and massacre of Gujerati and Kashmiri Muslims and the "Jewish"
Israeli massacres of Palestinian Christians and Muslims.

28. This degree of vilification and incitement
to religious hatred and incitement to the commission of religiously
aggravated offences should be outlawed just as much as the destruction
of human life and property to which it invariably and inevitably
leads if left to freely fester unchecked and legally permitted
to flourish. Understandably, British Muslims do not want to experience
a similar escalation of vilification and incitement to religious
hatred and their consequences re-enacted in the UK.

29. Thus incitement to religious hatred
constitutes words or behaviour which are likely to lead sooner
or later to the commission of religiously aggravated offences
if not legally deterred.

30. The new statutory definition of incitement
to religious hatred should be:

1(1) The crime of incitement to religious
hatred is committed by a person who intentionally makes public
words, images or conduct whereby the beliefs doctrines, practices
and rituals of any bona fide religion are unreasonably
vilified by abusive or violent words or conduct which lead or
are likely to lead the general body of believers who follow any
such religion to fear for the well-being of their lives and their
property.

(2) For the purposes of section 1(1) above:

(i) A bona fide religion is any
religion based partly or wholly on a revelation from God and whose
principal purpose is the worship of God;

(ii) God is the Creator, the Sustainer
and the Destroyer of all that exists;

(iii) It is for the court to decide,
taking all the circumstances and evidence into account, as to
what constitutes:

(a) a bona fide religion, and

(b) unreasonable vilification in any
particular case.

31. The definitions in paragraphs 18 and
30 should be combined as follows:

(1) The crime of blasphemy is committed by
a person who intentionally makes public works, images or conduct
whereby the beliefs, doctrines, practices and rituals of any bona
fide religion are unreasonably vilified by abusive or violent
words or conduct which shock and outrage or are likely to shock
and outrage the feelings of the general body of believers who
follow any such religion.

(2) The crime of incitement to religious
hatred is committed by a person who intentionally makes public
words, images or conduct whereby the beliefs, doctrines, practices
and rituals of any bona fide religion are unreasonably
vilified by abusive or violent words or conduct which lead or
are likely to lead the general body of believers who follow any
such religion to fear for the well-being of their lives and their
property.

(3) For the purposes of section 1(1) and
(2) above:

(i) A bona fide religion is any
religion based partly or wholly on a revelation from God and whose
principal purpose is the worship of God;

(ii) God is the Creator, the Sustainer
and the Destroyer of all that exists;

(iii) It is for the court to decide,
taking all the circumstances and evidence into account, as to
what constitutes:

(a) a bona fide religion, and

(b) unreasonable vilification in any
particular case.

32. The purpose of making incitement to
religious hatred an offence is for this to act as a deterrent
against the commission of something worse, namely incitement to
the commission of religiously aggravated offences, followed by
the actual commission of religiously aggravated offences.

ENFORCEMENT:

33. Generally speaking, experience regarding
the effectiveness of the Race Relations and Sex Discrimination
legislation, especially in the sphere of employment, has shown
that it is sometimes difficult to actually prove that racial or
sexual discrimination has occurred, especially when discrimination
is subtle and sometimes even unintentional, and often when it
is indirect rather than direct.

34. Up to now it has been even more difficult
to prove that religious discrimination has occurred since the
law provides no protection against this and it is therefore necessary
to "prove" that religious discrimination is racial or
sex discriminationeven when this is not actually the casein
order to secure a legal remedy for a party whose feelings have
been injured and who may also have suffered financial loss as
a result of religious discrimination.

35. These problems are unlikely to be as
common in the context of the offences of blasphemy and incitement
to religious hatredsince they do at least recognise that
religious discrimination can occur. Furthermore, abusive and violent
vilification is usually not only intentional but also maliciousand
since it is usually expressed in no uncertain terms, it is not
only direct and explicit but also clearly self-evident. It is
gross not subtleand therefore easy to identify, especially
by its recipients.

36. As already pointed out, the difficulty
lies in drawing the line between upholding the rightful exercise
of the precious freedom of speechwhich should be protected,
and the wrongful exercise of unacceptable vilificationwhich
would be prevented. This is the crux of the matter. When can words,
images or behaviour be regarded as "fair comment"and
when do they become so irresponsible and excessive that the harm
they do outweighs the excellence of being able to speak freely,
so that the law must intervene in order to restore and ensure
a just balance. As already stated in paragraph seven, every freedom
is subject to reasonable limitations, including the freedom of
speech.

37. There is also the same likelihood as
with criminal offences in general, especially as regards incitement
to religious hatred, that victims and witnesses may be reluctant
to give evidence because they fear that they may be victimisedboth
in the legal as well as in the lay meaning of the wordas
a result of their giving such evidence.

38. It is hoped however that the success
of the introduction of these new offences will be measured more
by the general deterrent effect they havewhich should be
large, rather than by the number of prosecutions and convictionswhich
should be few.

PLACESOF
WORSHIP:

39. The problem with the Section 2 of the
Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 kind of offence is
that sometimes both perpetrators and victims are initially arrested
and charged, whilst the instigators remain discreetly in the background,
untouchedas is the case at present as regards those who
are still legally free to incite people to religious hatred and
to the commission of religiously aggravated offences, with impunity.

40. In the context of the Muslim community
it sometimes happens that "the mafia element" attempt
to take over a mosque or Islamic centre by force from the people
who originally established it. Sometimes the trustees who repulse
such a takeover bid end up being falsely accused and even convicted
of having started and being involved in the trouble for which
"the mafia element" are actually responsible.

41. Another way of dealing with this problem,
by means of the civil law, is to advise trustees to have a clause
in their trust deed which entitles them to exclude from the premises
any person who breaches or threatens to breach the peace either
in or near the mosque or Islamic centre. This strategy makes it
easier to obtain an injunction in the County or High Courts if
matters become serious.

42. Section 2 of the Ecclesiastical Courts
Jurisdiction Act 1860 will only be of use if the people who are
really responsible for any "riotous, violent or indecent
behaviour" are charged. Furthermore, not all places of worship
are actually registered as places of worshipin which case
section 2 would not be applicable. As with most current laws which
still govern religion, this law is a product of a historical situation
which once justified the introduction of such laws but which no
longer exists. There is therefore no real need to preserve this
particular offence.

43. There is a pressing need to introduce
new laws to deal with the current situation.

44. The social texture of society in the
United Kingdom has undergone profound change during the last century.
In the new multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-faith society which
is now evolving, bona fide religious minorities which were
virtually unknown in the UK fifty years ago are now becoming firmly
established as positive and valuable elements of modern society.
Those bona fide religious minoritiesand as recent
studies have shown, especially the Muslimsare in urgent
need of the protection of the law, both civil and criminal, from
those people (however few or many) who wish to discriminate against
them by insulting them, or by humiliating them, or by driving
them outor even by destroying them.