Responsibilities of a Military Negotiator During Peace Talks

ANTHONY D. MARLEY

The presence of American military officers in the recent peace
negotiations for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their participation in
the shuttle diplomacy preceding the Dayton meetings, demonstrate
the important roles the military can play in any peace process.
It may seem paradoxical to some that the military--generally associated
with brute force resolution of conflict--can add much to peace
negotiations. Contributions by military participants in recent
peace talks, including those in Mozambique and Angola, suggest
the contrary.

Regional specialists and other military officers often have acquired
deep insights into the cultures of the nations they have studied
and among whose people they have lived. When experience has combined
knowledge and insight with an understanding of the negotiating
process, military officers can sometimes be the means to solving
seemingly intractable problems originating from cultural differences.

Officers and others involved in peace discussions will need a
concept of how negotiations evolve. All members of the negotiating
team must have a common understanding of our national political
and military interests in the conflict and its resolution, as
well as their absolute and relative importance. From that information
the negotiator develops a general sense of how he or she can protect
those interests, based on positions taken by the various parties
to the negotiations. Those positions must be analyzed in relation
to the issues and the personalities with which they are identified.

Members of the US team will seek to develop prospective solutions
that satisfy the interests of as many of the parties as possible.
This process should identify which positions could become show-stoppers,
positions that unless modified will become nonnegotiable. The
military negotiator usually can make a significant contribution
at this point in the process, since some of the potentially intractable
issues will be military issues. A well-coordinated team will seek
advice on underlying interests that can either facilitate or prevent
reaching mutually acceptable positions during the negotiations.

To suggest how the foregoing process can appear to participants,
this article first examines aspects of a typical peace settlement
that require direct and significant involvement by the military
members of the team. Thereafter, important features of the negotiating
process are illustrated by specific examples from peace negotiations,
including those in which the author participated. The desired
outcome is to heighten the awareness of all participants in the
interagency process to the value added by the military members
of a negotiating team.

Military Negotiating Issues

Cease-fire and Disengagement of Forces

Details concerning the cessation of hostilities and disengagement
of forces need to be defined and carefully coordinated to avoid
accidents and incidents that can jeopardize the peace process.
These include the timing and sequenced steps of the cease-fire;
the deployment of cease-fire monitors; the enumeration of permissible
and proscribed activities; the determination of how alleged cease-fire
violations will be handled; and the establishment of a peacekeeping
force.

To be fully effective, the accord should anticipate and provide
the means for handling the inevitable incidents that will jeopardize
the cease-fire. The agreement should include a method for dealing
with such problems, either through a reaffirmation of normal procedures,
or by providing a mechanism to address each violation on an exceptional
basis.[1]

A comparative study of six United Nations peacekeeping operations
identified the following limiting factors that increase the probability
of failure in a cease-fire operation:

an ambiguous or unclear mandate for the cease-fire monitors
or peacekeeping force

poor terrain that inhibits mobility and observation

lack of a clear cease-fire line, contributing to confusion
on the part of the warring factions and the cease-fire monitors

deployment of cease-fire monitors in cities divided into opposing
sectors (such as Beirut and Mogadishu)

ready availability of weapons to civilian personnel

poorly disciplined chains of command among the warring factions

poorly educated or illiterate populace in the country in question,
leading to poor comprehension of the purpose for the cease-fire
monitors, their mission, authority, and responsibilities, and
their neutrality concerning the conflict in question[2]

The military negotiator should keep these limiting factors in
mind when the cease-fire and disengagement process is discussed
during negotiations. It should be possible to ensure that a clear
mandate is provided for the cease-fire monitors or a peacekeeping
force. It may be possible to adjust the cease-fire line to make
use of advantageous terrain while avoiding deployment of the monitoring
force in cities. While the negotiators cannot affect the education
level of the populace or the proliferation of weapons in the region,
both factors should be taken into account when devising the terms
of the disarmament program. Additionally, if there is to be a
public information campaign by the peacekeepers to explain their
mission to the local population and seek its cooperation, the
education level of the populace should be considered when determining
the publicity medium and style of presentation.

Encampment and Disarmament

A number of complex issues must be addressed concerning the encampment
and disarmament of combatants. These include such details as the
number and location of camps for each faction; identification
of personnel and organizations that must be encamped and disarmed;
timelines for the opening, closing, and possible consolidation
of camps; determination of how security for the camps will be
provided; establishment of logistics procedures to support the
encampment process; and disposition of weapons turned in during
the disarmament campaign.

The negotiators should also identify as early as possible the
functions that can best be filled by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Once these are
identified, these groups should be brought into the planning process
as early as possible. If a need normally filled by an NGO or PVO
cannot be met by those participating in the process, the negotiators
need to determine how the gap will be filled. Examples of services
the NGOs and PVOs can provide include getting rations and medical
supplies to the encampment sites as part of their effort to provide
such services to the population as a whole. In late 1991 in Angola,
delays in providing food supplies to the camps, caused by initial
reluctance of international assistance organizations to participate,
threatened the continuation of the encampment process and the
implementation of the national peace process itself.

Integration of Forces

When seeking to bring peace to a civil war, the military negotiator
must address numerous issues concerning the integration of the
warring factions into a single national military force. Integration
of standing forces and demobilization of the excess are among
the most complex and problematic of the military issues. They
directly affect the ability of the factions to return to the battlefield
if they fail to secure their objectives through the peace process.

There are a number of political issues affecting the military
as an institution, and the individuals within it, that need to
be discussed during the course of negotiations. The US military
participant is often looked upon as a neutral resource during
such discussions. He or she not only needs to know current US
law or policy on the issues on the table, but should be aware
as well of American military traditions pertaining to the issues
(if they differ from current practice) and be cognizant of traditions
on the issues in other professional militaries around the world.
The negotiator also should understand the traditions concerning
such issues both in the country of conflict and in the neighboring
states in the region.

Political-military issues that should be addressed include how
the office of the Minister of Defense will be organized and staffed,
and what political rights military personnel will be permitted
to exercise. Issues such as whether the integrated force can (or
must) vote, whether its members can become open advocates for
a political party, or whether they can publicly support a candidate
in an election may well have to be settled during the negotiations.
The question of whether the military will have the right to unionize
may also arise.

One of the central issues in creating a strong civilian defense
ministry is developing a ministry staff that is competent in defense
issues. In Mozambique there was a great deal of confusion concerning
the degree of authority the civilian defense ministry staff would
have over the armed forces, and what issues properly remained
the responsibility of the military headquarters staff. In South
Africa, the staff of the new Ministry of Defense is initially
composed almost entirely of retired military officers, until civilian
staff members can be recruited and trained in their areas of responsibility.
The hope there is to create a permanent civilian staff that will,
when augmented by assigned active-duty personnel, constitute the
majority of Defense Ministry personnel, as is the case with the
British Ministry of Defense and the US Office of the Secretary
of Defense.

Multiple issues concerning force structure and missions need to
be addressed during the course of negotiations. Some range from
the seemingly unimportant, such as what the force will be called,
to the always important issues of the mission, size, composition,
and organization of the armed forces. One of the most volatile
issues to be negotiated is the percentages of the force that will
be provided by each of the warring factions. Conflicts in Angola
and Mozambique involved two factions; in such situations, each
of the insurgent groups normally seeks to provide 50 percent of
the new, integrated national military.

The negotiations will nearly always identify the selection criteria
that will be used for the acceptance of new personnel (those joining
in the future, rather than those currently in one of the warring
factions) into the postwar national army. Quotas may be imposed
based on regional and ethnic representation in an effort to stress
the national character of the new defense forces. Selection criteria
could include citizenship, age, health, education or literacy
level, and criminal record.

The negotiations may also identify the criteria that govern the
military personnel system, including promotion, training (especially
eligibility for attendance at foreign schools), and retirement,
as well as a code of conduct. If the negotiations do not go into
such detail, they generally identify the process or mechanism
by which the criteria eventually will be determined.

One of the confidence-building measures that can be included in
a peace agreement is a series of safeguards giving each faction,
to the degree possible, visibility over the activities of strategic
military units. Minimizing the element of surprise decreases the
likelihood that a key unit could be deployed in a preemptive strike
against one of the factions.

Another key issue is the start date and duration of the force
integration period. Force integration could begin prior to the
arrival of the international peacekeeping force, if one is scheduled
to participate, but frequently will be delayed until after the
peacekeepers are in place. The negotiations should determine how
personnel will be trained during the integration process in a
manner that facilitates the restoration of peace and security.

The negotiations should determine whether the police forces and
other paramilitary organizations will be integrated as part of
the peace process. The factions also should decide whether ex-soldiers
will be allowed to join the police force.

Demobilization

The demobilization of military forces in the Third World has been
studied and reported on extensively in recent years. A military
participant in peace negotiations should become familiar with
the literature and be prepared to serve as a resource to the negotiating
process by providing copies of the key works to the mediator and
the warring factions.[3]

Much of the detailed work concerning implementation of the demobilization
program, especially those aspects related to reintegration of
ex-combatants into the civilian society, will be handled by governmental
and nongovernmental assistance organizations, to include the World
Bank. The broad lines of the demobilization program, however,
such as the numbers of personnel to be discharged, will be determined
during the military phase of the peace talks.

Unrealistic expectations can pose a threat to the demobilization
and reintegration processes. The leadership of the warring factions
normally will use the promise of discharge benefits to help sell
the agreement to its military personnel in the field. The risk
is that the military and political leadership may, in good faith,
promise demobilization benefits that cannot be delivered from
either the donor community or national resources.

A military participant in the negotiations also should understand
that there is a reluctance on the part of assistance organizations
to treat ex-combatants significantly better than returning refugees
are treated. In some cases there have been attempts to assimilate
the two groups into a single reintegration program. While the
assistance organizations understand that one of the reasons for
the demobilization benefits is to "buy" the cooperation
of those carrying weapons, they are morally disinclined to treat
what they see as the villains who provoked refugee flows better
than the victims who fled the fighting. The risk is that such
issues may cause a significant delay in the start of the demobilization
program, straining the political will of the factions and their
confidence in the peace process. Additionally, in cases such as
Mozambique and Liberia, most refugees are reluctant to return
to their homes until they see that disarmament and demobilization
are, in fact, working, and that there has been a verifiable improvement
in the level of security within the country.

De-mining Operations

Land mines--the hidden killers--have become a scourge of wars
in the Third World.[4] Recent attempts by the international community
to develop a consensus related to the production, sale, and use
of land mines suggest that they will be with us for a long time.
Hence, a military negotiator can expect to deal with a number
of mine-related issues during peace negotiations. Their existence,
and associated eradication efforts, have a significant effect
on the building of confidence between the parties, on the safety
and operations of an international peacekeeping force, on the
return of refugees, and on the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of the country during the postwar period.

One of the key issues that needs to be addressed is the disclosure
and identification of minefields by the warring factions. In many
Third World conflicts, detailed minefield information has never
been available even to the side that deployed the mines. In such
cases information can be exchanged concerning the general location
of the minefields and the types of mines contained therein.

Another important matter is the determination of who will conduct
de-mining operations. The warring factions themselves may carry
out de-mining of their country. If so, they might work jointly,
or each might remove its own minefields. Other possibilities are
that the peacekeeping force might carry out de-mining, or that
civilian contractors might be employed.

Negotiating Successfully

Experience in various peace negotiations has identified a number
of key features of such processes that any military participant
should be aware of. Some are obvious but worth repeating, while
others are less evident but still very important. Some bear primarily
on the negotiations phase, while others will more directly affect
implementation of an agreement.

US Role

The military member of a negotiating team must understand what
the United States is expected to contribute to the peace negotiations.
Possible roles include advising the mediator, acting as a neutral
broker, serving the mediator and the factions as a technical resource,
and assisting with program planning. In the Bosnia talks, for
example, the United States served as the mediator.

In the Angola talks, the United States was expected to provide
advice to the negotiations, assist with planning, and pressure
the insurgent group UNITA (whom we had previously supported in
the war). In Rwanda, where the United States had little political
or economic involvement, the United States provided advice to
the mediators (the Organization of African Unity and the government
of Tanzania) and served as a technical resource for both the mediators
and the warring factions.

Desired Outcome

The negotiator also must understand what the US stake is in the
negotiations. He or she needs to know if there are desired outcomes
for the negotiations beyond the end of the conflict. In many areas
in which the United States has never had a significant national
interest, our primary concerns are to end human suffering stemming
from the conflict and to reduce the levels of humanitarian assistance
that we are providing for war refugees and displaced persons.
In other conflicts we may have been a longtime supporter of the
government, or we may be concerned about protecting against greater
regional destabilization that could be caused were the war to
intensify.

In both Mozambique and Rwanda, a major US objective was to encourage
hundreds of thousands of refugees to return to their homes from
neighboring countries. The continued presence of enormous refugee
populations was placing severe economic and political strains
on the neighboring countries' governments.

Participants and Roles

In addition to the official mediator, frequently there are other
participants who serve either as observers to verify the fairness
of the process, or as "friends of the mediator" to assist
the process by providing advice and information. During the Mozambique
peace talks, for example, the Catholic lay order of Sant Egidio
served as the official mediator, with assistance from the Italian
government. The United States, France, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom served as "friends of the mediator" throughout
the negotiations. This role was especially important during the
military portion of the talks, because none of the three official
members of the Sant Egidio mediation team had any military skills
or experience.

The military negotiator needs to know which other governments
or organizations will participate in the negotiations, what their
official status will be, and what their probable agenda for the
talks may be. Former colonial powers may well have a different
political agenda than does a less-interested United States. Likewise,
neighboring states will probably see the situation differently
than does the more distant United States. They may try to slow
or manipulate the negotiating process to achieve their own interests.

The Italians' colonial experience in Somalia, which lasted from
the late 19th century until 1960, gave them a dramatically different
perspective on the situation there from that of the United States,
whose firsthand experience in dealing with Somalia dated only
from the mid-1970s. Similarly, the French association with Rwanda,
including a defense pact signed in 1975, colored their views of
both the conflict and the US role in the peace process during
the negotiations seeking to end that war. Likewise, the Russians
have had close associations with the Serbians for more than 150
years. They cannot help but view the situation there, and the
peacekeeping operation, in a different light than does the United
States.

US Resources

The military negotiator needs to have an understanding of what
resources the United States is willing to commit to the peace
process. Possible resources might include funding to support the
demobilization program, humanitarian assistance to aid the civilian
populace, or materiel or training support (sometimes both) to
facilitate establishing the integrated armed forces.

Availability of US resources may be determined through an interagency
working group. If so, the information probably will be provided
to the military negotiator in the form of written terms of reference.
Information about resources frequently resembles the chicken-and-egg
proposition: An interagency position is rarely established until
the full scope of the final agreement has been set. That process,
however, does nothing to help the negotiator. Should the interagency
group play the waiting game, the military negotiator should ask
for guidance on the matter from the Department of State regional
office in charge of the negotiations.

Realistic Timelines

The US military negotiator should attempt to ensure that the factions
understand the probable delays before a peacekeeping force can
be approved, deployed, and complete its mission. The peace agreement
should include realistic timelines for each of the phases, based
on local realities ("ground truth").

For example, it took six months to deploy the international peacekeeping
force to Mozambique following its approval by the United Nations
Security Council. Although they were frequently reminded of this
fact throughout their peace negotiations, the Rwandan factions
specified in their agreement that the international peacekeeping
force must be deployed within 39 days of the signing of the agreement.
In the event, it took two months following the signing of the
agreement before the UN Security Council approved the establishment
of a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, and six more weeks before
the initial elements of the peacekeeping force were in place.

Peacekeeping Auspices

The US negotiating team should not permit the negotiations to
bog down over the issue of what organization will provide the
peacekeeping or monitoring force. Instead, the team should identify
the responsibilities and functions of the peacekeeping force and
see who can carry out the mission. The military representative
on the team can help to keep the horse before the cart in this
phase of the negotiations.

During the Rwanda negotiations the government of Rwanda was demanding
that the United Nations conduct the postwar peacekeeping operation,
while the insurgent Rwandan Patriotic Front preferred that the
Organization of African Unity, which already had a small observer
force in the field, maintain responsibility for the peacekeeping
operation. After several days during which neither side seemed
able to discuss the issue, US negotiators were able to convince
the two parties to refer to the hypothetical postwar peacekeepers
as the "Neutral International Force" for the purposes
of discussion. Once they started talking about the roles and responsibilities
for the "NIF," they quickly agreed to the mission and
mandate for the postwar peacekeeping force. Once the size, cost,
and mandate of the peacekeeping force were identified, the Organization
of African Unity's participants stated that the operation would
be beyond the OAU's capabilities. The Rwandan Patriotic Front
then agreed to the presence of a United Nations force.

Peacekeeping Mandate

The peacekeeping mandate needs to be defined carefully. The mandate
must clearly identify the authority and responsibilities of the
peacekeeping force and define the relations between the peacekeepers
and the warring factions. As stated by the US Ambassador to Mozambique,
"The military terms of any peace agreement need to be subject
to aggressive, intrusive, outside oversight, and an effective
mechanism for resolving disputes and investigating alleged violations
must be established." The leadership of the peacekeeping
force must have the authority and responsibility to apply the
mandate in a flexible and dynamic manner in order to adjust to
changing realities. The warring factions must not be allowed to
claim national sovereignty as a reason for delaying or failing
to implement the terms of the peace agreement.[5]

The desired end states, objectives, and success criteria outlined
in the mandate should be event-driven and clearly defined. There
should, however, be time-driven "sunset clause" review
points in the peacekeeping mandate at which the peacekeepers compare
developments on the ground with the implementation schedule and
determine whether the peacekeeping operation should be continued.
These review points maintain pressure on the factions to fully
implement the terms of the peace accord rather than permitting
a status quo ad infinitum as occurred in the peacekeeping operation
in Cyprus.

The negotiator needs to know how the conflict in question, and
the peace accord, fit the peacekeeping guidelines contained in
US Presidential Decision Directive 25, which identifies the criteria
that must be met before the United States will support the creation
of an international peacekeeping operation. The military negotiator
may be able to influence the negotiations to ensure that a peacekeeping
force would have clear mission objectives, that there is a mandate
appropriate to the mission, and that an endpoint to the operation,
based on time, events, or a combination of the two, can be identified
clearly.

There Are Always Losers

The military negotiator needs to be aware that there are always
losers in any negotiated settlement. This harsh reality runs counter
to the popular idea that every peace agreement represents a "win-win"
situation. Rogue soldiers and semi-autonomous warlords profit
economically from the continuation of the war through their control
of territory and resources, often at little personal risk. Such
individuals and groups will be reluctant to see the end of the
conflict if it leads to increased risk or economic loss to them.
At a minimum, those who have enjoyed unchecked power until the
settlement will lose, in relative terms, as their authority and
perquisites are reduced or shared with others.

In Somalia, the various sub-clan militias are able to "tax"
humanitarian organizations for the movement of relief supplies
through their territory. They would lose that source of income
in a stable, unified Somalia. In Liberia, numerous insurgent military
leaders would suffer economically if they were to lose their control
of the gold and diamond diggings through the implementation of
a national peace agreement. Additionally, many of the semi-literate
19- and 20-year-old "generals" in Liberia would not
even be commissioned officers in a postwar, professional national
military force. In Rwanda, ethnic extremists attempted to prevent
the political participation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, as
had been agreed to in the peace accord, out of fear that they
themselves would be marginalized and criminalized by the postwar
government. Their fears led to the genocide that claimed the lives
of more than 500,000 Rwandans.

Another group that believes itself to have lost in a peace accord
is the Serbian populace of Sarajevo, who fear persecution should
the Bosnian government reestablish its authority over their enclave.
CNN footage of Serbs evacuating parts of Sarajevo underscores
this perception. The negotiator should attempt to ensure either
that such groups' interests are looked after in the peace process
in some manner, or that the groups can be effectively marginalized
by the peace accord (and peacekeeping force) so that they will
not pose a threat to the peace process.

Negotiation versus Implementation

The experienced negotiator soon discovers how great is the distance
between successful negotiation of a peace accord and successful
implementation of its provisions. The outcome in each case is
related to the degree of detail in the accord itself. The greater
the level of detail included in the negotiated document, the harder
it is to get the parties to agree to it. Some of the issues to
be negotiated may appear to be intractable throughout the formal
negotiations. Rather than permit those issues to block agreement
on the general provisions of a peace accord, the parties may agree
to defer discussion of specific matters until later. By doing
so, they hope that following the signing of a peace accord and
after the peace process is underway, the dynamics of the ongoing
process will make it easier to reach agreement on the issues in
question.

Conversely, the greater the level of detail included in the negotiated
document, the easier it is for the warring factions and any peacekeeping
force to implement and verify the peace process. This is similar
to the difference between grading a multiple-choice examination
and grading an essay. Vague or poorly worded protocols leave room,
at the very least, for misinterpretation or for different interpretations
by all concerned. They also leave loopholes which one or all of
the parties may attempt to exploit in an effort to gain a perceived
economic, social, political, or military advantage in the implementation
phase. Decisions to defer difficult issues in the quest for a
quick political settlement will invariably complicate the work
of carrying out the terms of the basic agreement.

Equitable Treatment of All Sides

A key principle in peace negotiations is that personnel in the
warring factions, whether participants in the negotiations or
soldiers in the bush, should perceive that all sides are being
treated equitably. Without that perception the entire peace process
can be placed at risk.

During the Rwanda negotiations, for example, whenever one party
requested a document, such as a copy of a peace agreement from
another conflict or an analysis of a third country's demobilization
program in light of the situation in Rwanda, a copy of the document
was automatically provided to the other faction as well.

It should be carefully explained to all the warring factions that
during the implementation phase the peacekeepers will be prepared
to take action against any offender, not just against insurgents.
Government officials should not be able to hide behind "national
sovereignty" to avoid full implementation of the agreement.

Conclusion

The transition from war to peace, a complex and expensive process,
is neither automatic nor easy. A skilled military professional
who is aware of the political-military and political-economic
variables affecting the conflict in question can increase significantly
the chances of a successful transition to peace. He or she can
do this by helping the warring factions recognize and address--or
agree to address--the myriad issues involved in ending their conflict.

The peace accord needs to establish a holistic process with realistic
timelines that proceeds smoothly from cease-fire through the encampment
of forces, integration of a new military, and disarmament and
demobilization of excess military personnel. A skilled military
participant can help the mediator and the warring factions to
craft such an agreement. By drawing on the strengths of past peace
accords, while avoiding their flaws, the military negotiator can
help the warring factions craft an accord that is right for them
in their situation. In this process the military member of the
team can use past experience to identify and call attention to
loopholes that plagued other peace settlements.

Experience demonstrates that the devil is in the details of a
peace agreement. The military negotiator can facilitate the transition
from war to peace by helping to translate the political desire
for peace into mission statements that the opposing militaries
can understand and carry out. By becoming aware of the factions'
security concerns, the military negotiator can help design safeguards
and confidence-building measures that can be incorporated into
the peace accord.

While a well-crafted peace accord can enhance the chances of ending
a war, it is important to recognize that the most important requirement
for a successful peace process is the political will of the parties
concerned. History shows that delays in the schedule will occur,
accidents will happen, and tempers will rise. If political will
exists, and if the parties truly want to end the war and work
for peace, they can solve whatever problems may arise. If the
goodwill is lacking, however, even the best-designed peace accord
will end in failure.

2. Frederick Fleitz, "Comparison of Peacekeeping Operations
By Success and Limiting Factors," Unclassified Central Intelligence
Agency study, 29 July 1992. The six operations are Namibia, Cyprus,
Western Sahara, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia.

3. The most important study on military demobilization to date
is Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in
Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies, a Discussion
Paper published by The World Bank, Washington, D.C., October 1993.

4. The major work on the subject is Hidden Killers: The Global
Landmine Crisis, the "1994 Report to the U.S. Congress
on the Problem of Uncleared Landmines and the United States Strategy
for Demining and Landmine Control," published by the US Department
of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, December 1994.

5. Interview with US Ambassador to Mozambique Dennis Jett, 11
January 1995, at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D. Marley (USA, Ret.) is a private
consultant on African political-military matters and teaches a
graduate course at Webster University in St. Louis. Before his
retirement, Lieutenant Colonel Marley had been assigned as the
Political-Military Advisor in the Bureau of African Affairs in
the US Department of State. He also was assigned as a Political-Military
Officer in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for African Affairs in the Pentagon. In these two assignments,
he participated in peace negotiations pertaining to conflicts
in Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, and worked with UN officials
attempting to create a demobilization program in Liberia. He was
a Foreign Area Officer and is a graduate of the Cameroon Command
and Staff College and the Naval Postgraduate School.