State Department's Holum on Steps to Keeping Arms Control Relevant

Address of John D. Holum
Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security

International Institute for Strategic Studies:
London, England
October 24, 2000

Introduction

I'm delighted to be here. I have the highest regard for the IISS, so
this is a special opportunity to talk a bit about where arms control
is headed.

With my tenure in office winding down, it's time to indulge in a bit
of reflection. I've thought about the arms control and
non-proliferation record of the past few years, and I think we've
accomplished some good things. 1) The dismantlement of thousands of
strategic nuclear weapons; 2) confirming the non-nuclear status of
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan; 3) the withdrawal from Western Europe
of almost all of our tactical nuclear weapons; 4) the successful 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference; 5) strengthened IAEA safeguards;
6) the CTBT negotiations; 7) CWC entry into force; 8) our on-going
efforts to control nuclear weapons and material in the former Soviet
Union, including the plutonium disposition agreement - all help bring
about a more stable international environment.

But by nature I prefer to look forward, not back, and what I see is
that arms control faces some serious challenges. Many critics were
more than happy to pounce on the Senate's CTBT vote as the "end of
arms control." Internationally, some suggest that our National Missile
Defense efforts mean the U.S. has lost interest in working with others
to advance arms control, and prefers to go it alone.

But the emerging threat environment is diverse and rife with
instabilities. WMD and missile technologies are increasingly
accessible and to some, apparently irresistible. In such an
environment, arms control will remain vital to international security
and stability. But it will have to evolve somewhat - or at least, how
we think about arms control will have to evolve. That's what I'd like
to discuss a bit today by offering ten observations.

Thoughts, Observations, and Lessons

First, arms control must have as its preeminent objective
strengthening security.

Like the U.K., the U.S. pursues arms control because it promotes our
security by limiting threats to our territory, our people, and our
interests. We'd like to think that others approach arms control in the
same way.

But we know this is not always the case. Sometimes counties set
unrealistic expectations of what can be attained. Multilateral arms
control in particular is too often treated by some as a "zero sum"
struggle among competing interests, instead of a "plus sum" endeavor
in which all gain security.

Negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention are
dragging in part because some non-aligned states insist that in
exchange for a stronger BWC, we should be prepared to weaken export
controls and the Australia Group. That's not a good bargain.

No country will negotiate agreements that go beyond its national
interest. But if states truly seek the benefits of collective security
measures, then they ought at least to try to find the convergence of
collective and sovereign interests.

This happened just a few months ago in New York. The NPT Review
conference was held in a strained environment. Yet Conference
participants produced a final document that commanded consensus.

The skill of the Conference negotiators, Russian START II and CTBT
ratification on the eve of the Conference - all helped bring about
this outcome. But the Conference succeeded because NPT parties
recognized how profoundly the Treaty was in their security interests.
No one had an interest in bending it out of shape, for example by
misusing the review process to try to pry from the nuclear weapon
states speedier disarmament than circumstances permit.

Second, build coalitions with your friends.

During the CTBT and CWC negotiations, the NPT Review and Extension
Conference, and many other times, the U.S. worked closely with the
U.K., France and our other allies and friends to find common ground.
Working together, we increase incentives for others to negotiate more
seriously.

Sometimes, of course, agreement is too much to hope for, particularly
when we're also seeking consensus with Russia and China. As our
current efforts on the BWC attest, it's hard enough to find common
ground among Western states, or other aggregates of like-minded
countries. The sovereign right to decide one's own self-interest
generally will prevail over mutual security, where those are not one
and the same. But if we can't always agree, we need at least to
consult and to work closely. The U.S. and U.K. have a strong tradition
of doing this, which serves us both.

Third, reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons should remain the
centerpiece of our arms control efforts.

The answer is that we don't want to depend on something we earnestly
hope is temporary--Russia's economic distress--for long-term
stability. So we should continue to pursue formal, negotiated
agreements as the best vehicle for locking in deep cuts, regardless of
the direction of U.S.-Russian relations or the state of Russia's'
economy. And we want effective verification, best achieved through
formal agreements.

There will be times when opportunities present themselves even when
the formal START process is proceeding slower than we'd like. We've
got to seize those opportunities. The 1991 and 1992 Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives are good examples. Beginning in 1994, we and
Russia stopped targeting each other with our nuclear forces.

But at the same time, we seek as much formality and verifiability as
we can, and in a host of new areas - shared early warning, safeguards
and controls on Russia's nuclear materials and technology, steps to
prevent Russian nuclear scientists from selling their expertise to the
highest bidder, regardless of how unsavory. Cooperative Threat
Reduction, plutonium disposition, the HEU agreement, incentives to
curtail WMD and missile cooperation with Iran -- such programs make up
an increasingly broad, and unmistakably essential, agenda to deal with
the arsenals and the residue of the Cold War.

Fourth, we need to pay greater attention to arms control
implementation.

Signing a Treaty is only one step in the long, arduous process of
realizing its promise. It's not until implementation that weapons are
actually limited or finally taken down. Implementation is where arms
control does its heavy lifting.

As more treaties come into force, implementation will require greater
financial, technical, and intelligence resources. Under CTBT, states
parties must monitor for nuclear explosions conducted anywhere on
earth. Under CWC, states need to be sure that none of the parties has
produced, stored or used chemical weapons. To support the NPT, the
IAEA must have an effective safeguards system to deter additional
states from acquiring nuclear weapons. These are immense challenges
and significant responsibilities.

In the U.S., our budget requests come under detailed scrutiny by a
skeptical Congress. Arms control is beginning to produce "sticker
shock." Nonetheless, just as we must be prepared to spend billions to
deter or answer threats, we should be prepared to spend millions to
avoid them.

Fifth, we need to be realistic about verification.

Verification is a sine qua non of real arms control - how we know that
our Treaty partners are keeping their word.

But verification will never be perfect, and we should resist efforts
by some to insist on that standard. Few would suggest that we should
withdraw from the Biological Weapons Convention, for example, because
it is difficult to ensure compliance; rather, we should improve it.
But, given the nature of the technology, even a strengthened
compliance regime, with mandatory declarations and on-site challenge
inspections, will not give us full confidence that cheaters can be
caught.

During last October's CTBT debate, tough questions about verification
were asked. Unfortunately, we never really had the opportunity to
answer them. And of course, some of the answers are quite complex -
not that we could detect any violation, but that we were confident
that we could detect in a timely manner violations that could damage
our security.

Each treaty will have its own, uniquely tailored verification regime,
and in each case we need to consider a number of questions: How can
national technical means best contribute? Does the treaty regime
supply "value added" to our ability to monitor relevant events, which
we need to do even without the treaty? At what point is our security
at risk, if a treaty violation occurs and is not detected? Does the
treaty regime create sufficient probability of detection, so that a
potential violator will be deterred in the first place?

If we can satisfactorily answer these and other such questions, we
should be able to support the regime.

Sixth, the hard proliferation cases need special approaches.

Generally speaking, states that join treaty regimes comply with them.
But some key states, as recent experience with India and Pakistan
tells us, do not join, and others cheat.

I cannot offer a guaranteed formula for success. That's why these are
called the "hard cases," to distinguish them from "easy" things like
the test ban, the BWC negotiations, and our efforts with Russia to
adapt the ABM Treaty. But I am skeptical of "one size fits all"
concepts that would gather all the problem countries in a room and
offer the same bargain to them all - which could, for example, have us
either promoting light water reactors in Iran, or not supporting them
for North Korea.

Dealing with these hard cases is best accomplished on a case-by-case
basis. Concerted strategies need to focus on the specific
circumstances and unique incentives and disincentives that may help to
foster a solution.

Seventh, once negotiated, arms control agreements should not be
considered immune from re-examination.

This is not a new idea. We agreed, for example, that Europe's sharply
altered political and security landscape warranted adjustments to the
CFE Treaty, replacing bloc limits with national ceilings and affording
Russia greater flexibility in the disposition of its forces.

Now this issue has reared its head with respect to the ABM Treaty. The
spread of missile technology, and the apparent ambitions of some
states for ICBM capabilities, is creating a new security environment
that cannot be wished away. Defenses may help address these
challenges.

The ABM Treaty should be preserved as a cornerstone of strategic
stability. But it will be more viable for the long term if it is also
updated to account for threats that were not contemplated when it was
negotiated nearly 30 years ago. The President's September 1
postponement of an NMD deployment decision gave us more time, but the
issue will not go away.

Eighth, arms control should seek out and incorporate technological
advances.

Science has become an arms control enabler. The IAEA's Strengthened
Safeguards Protocol makes the case. Building on technological advances
such as highly sensitive environmental sampling, the Protocol will
give the Agency more capability, with broadened access, to detect
activities at undeclared sites.

There is abundant potential to be plumbed. Remote, unattended sensors
for monitoring; highly sophisticated data fusion and analysis
techniques, to help manage and assess mountains of data; more rugged,
portable and user-friendly verification equipment, all may play a
role. I recall a few years ago being impressed by gas
chromatograph-mass spectrometers shrunk from laboratory to briefcase
size, so they could be taken to suspected chemical weapon sites. Now
they are as small as cell phones.

Arms control can build on advances in basic sciences: smaller and more
efficient power sources for unattended sensors; expanded
interoperability between systems; comprehensive signature libraries
and phenomenology studies.

All this is but the tip of the iceberg, but the point is clear -- we
need to keep strengthening the nexus between arms control and
technology. That was the aim of the interagency Nonproliferation and
Arms Control Technology Working Group that ACDA pushed to create; I'm
pleased that it has carried over into State.

Ninth, arms control will have to deal with non-governmental
organizations and non-traditional tools.

Governments will need increasingly to account for the views of
business, the NGO community, and others. Businesses are particularly
affected, for example, as treaties such as the CWC expand inspection
rights. The BWC protocol negotiations are dealing with this issue now.

NGOs have been forceful arms control advocates for many years. But I
don't think the "Ottawa process" is likely to be repeated. In that
case, NGOs took the lead in international efforts against
anti-personnel landmines, and would accept nothing less than a
complete ban. As a result, the Convention excludes many of the major
producers and users of landmines. Absolutes don't fit well with the
give-and-take needed to achieve arms control objectives.

But non-traditional tools for achieving traditional arms control
objectives can prove useful. In some parts of the world, small arms
have become weapons of mass destruction. Surely, there are creative
measures to help us address instabilities caused by their
accumulation.

We want to conclude a Firearms Protocol to the UN Transnational
Organized Crime Convention, to harmonize global export and import
policies and help stem the flow of illicit small arms and light
weapons trafficking. We're also providing assistance to ensure the
safe storage or destruction of surplus stockpiles of these weapons.
These steps won't solve the problems, but they'll help.

Finally, a tenth observation, which reflects my own experience but may
have some resonance with others: Arms control practitioners need to
stay in close touch with legislators and the public.

In the United States, we had assumed that the traditional bipartisan
consensus for arms control was intact. The CTBT vote showed that we
have some work to do. Railing against the Senate is not the answer.
They raised legitimate questions. That is why, aided by former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, we
are trying to work quietly with Senators on CTBT ratification. We hope
this effort will set the stage for resumed Senate consideration at a
later date, with a different outcome.

The Senate's new National Security Working Group, which will help
establish a better arms control dialog, is also a good step. Strobe
Talbott and I have gone up frequently to describe our discussions with
Russian counterparts on ABM Treaty issues. It's a tough audience. But
I'd much rather we be challenged during negotiations, than almost
reflexively opposed during ratification.

The bottom line is clear: if the U.S. is going to pursue an extensive
arms control agenda, we'll have to do better at home.

Conclusion

I remain enthusiastic about the contribution arms control can make to
international security. But it does have to - and will -- evolve. As
it does, we'll all be more secure and better off for it.

It's a challenge, and one I'm confident that the international
community will meet.

Again, let me thank you for having me here today, and I hope I've left
enough time for some questions.