US Iraq intelligence summary classified SECRET on Iranian infiltration, Al-Sadr, Mahdi army, COA Scimitar, SCIRI and BADR corps, weapons and money laundering, etc. and dated June 23, 2006. The report has been privately verified by Wikileaks. Two small redactions were viewed as necessary to protect intelligence sources.

Typed up version follows:

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI

REO AL HILLAH, IRAQ

2006 JUNE 23

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

COA Scimitar continues to be heavily influenced by Iranian entities, particularly SCIRI and BADR Corps. Iranian sympathizers and proponents from the SCIRI Governor Salim Salih Mahdi Al Muslimawi and many of his cabinet members continue to perpetuate sectarian policy and steer gubernatorial decisions. This present political climate proves tenuous for neutral, non-sectarian leadership such as GEN Qais Hamza Abood Al-Mamori, the Babil provincial chief of police. The riot which ensued in Qasim left the governor in a politically undermining position considering the fact that Gen. Qais and part of his Hillah SWAT unit had to bring calm to the situation. Additionally, as ISF take the lead in securing Babil Province; armed groups such as Mahdi Militia compete with them, desiring to become a legitimate Alternative for the public. As the coalition force footprint has decreased significantly in southern Babil, AIF freedom of movement will be more prevalent unless IA and IP forces’ patrolling and operations are significantly improved. Recent kinetic strikes against insurgent groups which have led to the capture of key leaders have been met with retaliatory attacks throughout the AO. Al Kifil armed group members continue to plan ambushes against CF patrols, while several IED/EFP members have migrated to Al Hillah within the past three days. Expect calculated, low risk attacks against CF/ISF patrols to continue in southern Babil until either key leadership is neutralized, or due to intense disruption and pressure from CF operations, these groups decide to operate elsewhere.

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING:

(U) diir-4id-35-809-06-156

(S//NF) Iraqi police general for Babil province, Qais Hamza ((Abud)) Al-Mamouri is receiving direct support from Muqtada ((Al-Sadr)) and the Mahdi militia. In February 2006, general Qais received $200, 000 u.s. dollars from Shayik Shakur ((Hammud)) Al-Mamouri. (Source comment- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX). During Qais’s conflict with Saleh ((Mehdi)), the governor of Babil. Qais approached Shayik Kareem ((Al-Khabi)), who is a Mahdi militia brigade commander in al Kifl //MGRSCOORD: 38SMA412661//, IZ. Through Al-Khabi, Qais arranged to meet with Al-Sadr and request support. Al-Sadr agreed to support general Qais by providing him with money and public support.

(S//NF) In exchange for support from Al-Sadr, Qais agreed to supply weapons and ammunition, which had been provided by American forces, directly to Mahdi militia members, only accept Mahdi militia members to attend the Babil police academy //CNA// in Al Hilla //MGRSCOORD: 38SMA453935//, IZ. Qais also agreed to inform the Mahdi militia about any pending Coalition operation directed against them. Al-Sadr instructed Qais to inform him of any pending coalition operations and to accompany the Americans on the operation to ensure they did not hit certain targets. (Field comment—general Qais has been Adamant about being informed of all U.S. operations going on in Babil province). Following a June 14, 2006 raid by coalition forces in Al Kifl, Qais met with Al-Khabi to discuss a better communication system for informing Mahdi militia about pending Coalition raids.

(S//NF) under the direct orders of Al-Sadr, Qais has been targeting Iraqi citizens who provide information to American intelligence officials. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Quas has ordered uniformed Iraqi police officers to kidnap Iraqis suspected of providing information to U.S. forces. Qais has been collecting information on U.S. Army Officials that he meets with and providing dossiers to Mahdi militia. NFI.

COMMENT:

(S//NF) General Qais has received popular support from the local populace of the Babil province due to his neutrality involving the insurgency and sectarian civil strife. This has caused the governor of the Babil province Salim Salih Mahdi Al Muslimawi much distress as his organization is deeply penetrated by Iranian intelligence and SCIRI. This report sheds a potentially disturbing light on Qais’s credibility and may be the reason that Qais and the governor have so much friction as Qais is unwilling to support the governor but willing to work for from MAS.