Corruption is an important issue, which poses a special threat to the democratic institutions and integrity of the United States. The purpose of campaign finance regulation is to reduce or eliminate corruption. Congress has enacted substantial legislation for this purpose, yet corruption flourishes. This paper suggests that the campaign finance laws fail to take into account the actual decision-making process of a legislator contemplating a corrupt act. By diagramming that process, this paper demonstrates that the legislation, which focuses on limiting the size of individual campaign contributions, actually increases the likelihood of corruption. An understanding of the decision-making process points to other directions for meaningful regulation of campaign finance.

In this article, Melanie D. Reed analyzes a legislative trend in which states are increasingly enacting broad contribution restrictions on state contractors, known as “pay-to-play” laws, in response to corruption allegations against elected officials. Reed asserts that these laws may actually go overboard, restricting individuals’ constitutionally protected First Amendment right to participate in the political system. Her article challenges the perception that broad restrictions will accomplish their intended goal of reducing corruption in the bidding process on government contracts. She concludes by suggesting that, “states passing pay-to-play laws should tailor the reach of such laws to focus on those contributors and recipients closely related to state contracts.” According to Reed, it is important that legislation focus on increasing the competitiveness of the contract bidding process, which should result in increased public confidence in government.

Twenty-four states provide citizens the ability to make laws directly through ballot measures. However, these states also strictly restrict the First Amendment rights of citizens to speak out about these ballot measures. As such, various disclosure requirements result in complex registration and reporting requirements that are difficult for even the most highly educated citizens to decipher. In an effort to prove this, the author used an innovative experiment, where a sample of 255 citizens was asked to complete actual disclosure forms. Unsurprisingly, not one person completed the forms correctly. Using these findings, the author argues that these disclosure laws are both unnecessary and an obstacle to the free speech guaranteed to all.