Materials of an International Seminar
Civil society and social development

Jean
MARICHEZ
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS KEY ROLE IN SETTLING CONFLICTS

Civil society plays an increasingly important role in armed conflicts. It
employs various techniques, with resistance to violence being one of them.
The 20th century has witnessed peoples resort to acts of resistance 'without
weapons' as a means to achieve positive results.

Such was
the case with Germany. In 1923, French and Belgian forces occupied the entire
Ruhr industrial region. Officially, the Ruhr region was used as guarantee of
Germany’s paying the reparations provided for by the 1918 Agreement. As a
matter of fact, the Allies tried to prevent Germany from restoring its might
by separating the Ruhr from the rest of the country. The population protested
the occupation of the Ruhr and began fighting against the occupiers, with all
the events taking place against the background of a severe economic recession.
Attempts were made to disrupt the deliveries of coal, steel and other products,
which interfered with the occupiers’ activities. Trade unions and the
government bolstered the strategy and took an active role in organising a
broad resistance movement. This sponsored numerous acts of sabotage, refusals
to collaborate and mass civil disobedience. The
railroads, mines and factories ground to a halt. Mined coal went to
‘the wrong shop’ or was not shipped at all. Railroad tracks were taken up.
The occupiers could not buy goods they needed in the shops. Oversight,
inadvertence and negligence tended to dominate.Leaflets, posters and forbidden newspapers called for resistance. Riots
and demonstrations never ceased. The police sided with the population. The
occupiers were held up to mockery.

The
occupational troops, in their turn, responded with acts of violence,
never-ending arrests, severe punishments and high fines. The administration
introduced a great number of instructions and rules, enforced strict
censorship and carried out all sorts of inspections. The occupational
authorities issued a special order declaring a state of siege, imposing a
curfew and restricting the freedom of movement. Courts and prisons were
overcrowded. However, it was impossible to send everyone to prison. To solve
the problem the authorities freed thieves and murderers. Grassing, feuding and
libel became regular practice and made the region a place impossible to live
in. There was a growing deficit in food. The region was torn by famine,
inflation, unemployment, poverty and disease. In late September, the German
government took a decision to put an end to the resistance movement. The
French and Belgians condemned their military. As a result of painstaking
negotiations, Germany’s debt was restructured and the occupiers began
withdrawing their forces from the occupied region. There were no victors in
the conflict. France’s aim to separate the Ruhr region from Germany was
never achieved. It was a remarkable event for the Germans who, thus, regained
their freedom from foreign control.

The 1988
Intifada in Israel is yet another example of civil resistance. As is common
knowledge an intifada is an uprising, with skirmishes, clashes and rock
throwing being the main forms of resistance. In actual fact, however, it is
much more than that. An intifada has two major goals to achieve – resistance
to occupation through civil disobedience and the establishment of power
institutions of its own. For these goals to be attained, the Palestinians
resorted to various forms of non-violent resistance, such as general strikes,
demonstrations and marches, prayers and fast, collective refusals to pay taxes,
boycotting Israeli goods, ceremonies of the colours, petitions, slogans, open
violation of the curfew, expulsion of traitors and the like. Such conditions
present, communal life turned out to be rather difficult to live. The Israelis
responded with harsh reprisals, which backfired after all: every-day
inspections on transport and at work stirred up profound anger and
strengthened the Palestinians’ determination to continue fighting. They
started seeking ways to avoid pressure on the part of the Israelis, which led
to the development of the so-called home economy (gardening, farming, poultry
breeding, bread-making, handicraft, etc.), which gave a sense of greater
independence and freedom. Clubs, churches and mosques housed local schools,
where children for the first time had an opportunity to sit at the desk. The
whole of the educational system, as a basis of the new autonomy, was revised.

The above
actions were well planned and had a strategy of their own. Before the acts of
civil disobedience began, the world regarded the Palestinians as terrorists.
Their bloody terrorist acts were bitterly condemned by the international
community. Six years of civil resistance and bitter, if unarmed, struggle
changed the situation and produced the Washington agreements in September
1993. Thus, the Palestinians certainly strengthened their position and could
negotiate on better terms.

To win a
war does not imply annihilating the opposing party, but achieving the goals
set. That is exactly what happened as a result of the intifada. The
Palestinians joined the negotiations process and were presented with an
opportunity to participate in them from the position of strength. They even
managed to attain more than that. The Palestinian people became aware of its
unity and closed the ranks. This led to the establishment of unprecedented
relations between the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and the
Israeli Palestinians. This also put an end to the continuing annexation
process and prompted the development of the Palestinian economic
infrastructure. At the same time, Jordan had to give up attempts on its part
to represent Palestine at negotiations. The role of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO), as a lawful representative of the Palestinian people,
increased. It should also be noted that the events highlighted the violent
nature of the actions undertaken by the Israelis, graphically illustrated the
goals of the Palestinian side, which had been overshadowed by terrorism and
war before, helped improve their image, and strengthened their determination
to act.

As far as
Kosovo is concerned, the nine years that preceded the 1999 war saw strong
resistance on the part of the Kosovo Albanians. Few people know what actually
caused the conflict. Having risen to power and seeking to ensure his
legitimacy, Milosevic waved high the flag of Great Serbia, which certainly
flattered the population. The government circles and mass media echoed the
motto, which was forbidden during the Tito rule, and tried hard to promote it.
In 1990, under the influence of the mass media the Serbian population was
split into two polar groups. The Slovenians, Croats and Kosovans got scared
and responded by fanning the flames of their own nationalism. This having led
to mass protests, Milosevic had no scruples about dissolving the parliament
and curbing the autonomy of the province. This, in turn, prompted non-violent
resistance. The Serbs forbade to use the Albanian language at schools.
Children stopped going to schools and had classes at home. The police mainly
manned by the Serbs easily resorted to blackmail and intimidation and those
participating in the resistance movement were threatened with dismissal.
During this period, the Albanians accounting for 90 percent of Kosovo’s
population were subjected to mass dismissals. Ibrahim Rugova having entered
the political arena, resistance without violence still intensified. The
Albanian deputies were forced to resign from their posts in the local
authorities. Having fallen victim to blackmail and administrative cleansing
and suffering arrests, torture and killings, the Albanian civil population
maintained their dignity and reacted by establishing parallel structures and
organising parallel actions whenever the Serbian administrations forced them
to do so. Thus, though unofficially, an overwhelming majority of the Kosovo
population elected Rugova their leader.

The
Kosovo civil opposition did not have enough time to reach their goals as their
armed counterparts (UCK) came over to them and launched an offensive in 1998.
Since then, there has been no potential for a peaceful solution to the crisis
and the violence has spread all over the region. However it was the peaceful
opposition that manifested the evident fault of the Serbs in escalating the
conflict, turning the tide towards the NATO invasion and Serbia’s backdown.

Sometimes,
the civil opposition protests were crowned with success, sometimes not. There
were a plenty of researchers studying them. They analysed such facts including
the roots of both the successes and defeats. They made a unanimous conclusion:
peaceful civilians have all the potential to beat a strong, well-organised,
well-armed enemy poised for action. They even can reach their main goal, which
sometimes is quite easier, and start the settlement process.

It
has worked in a range of countries with different systems and not only in the
industrialised ones. The researchers, US Jean Sharp as an example, explained
how this amazing process worked, the process that can effectively influence
the authorities. In some instances, the process can be started when people of
a certain country are in desperation, when they are set to act and the process
seems to be the last resort in averting an armed conflict and inevitable
violence escalation.

There
are a lot of reasons that can lead to a failure as regards civil society
activities, but often it is inappropriate preparation, not thoroughly planned
and extempore actions and lack of experience. As we have already seen, despite
the non-violent nature of civil opposition, the process is a power game with
all ensuing consequences. The rivals can respond by use of force sometimes
tackling below the belt that can result in multiple deaths.

In
the success list we can include the quality of the civil society structure,
its dynamism, involvement of the state and/or lawful authority, which is
sometimes of critical importance, expertise, good organisation, communications,
educational level, support from the outside. It is of crucial importance also
to maintain the non-violence status, which requires complete professionalism.
The civil opposition is not a military organisation or process. However to
face all threats and challenges it needs its own headquarters or a control
body, reconnaissance, tactics, and assets. The major components of civil
opposition strategy are to be aware of the enemy’s aims, undermine his power,
having found what it is rooted from, oppose collaborators, ensure
survivability of the civil population, be engaged in the creativity work,
deliever information, etc.

Operations
should be carried out though a series of small-scale actions reminiscent of a
hornet's nest or an ant hill… To understand the basics of the civil
opposition we often refer to the terms of the ‘war with the help of civil
actions’ or ‘non-violent war’.

To
our perspective, ‘civil actions’ are strikes, riots, sit-ins, the
so-called ‘dead day’ etc. There are 200 types of civil actions defined,
though we do not close the list.

‘Civil
opposition’, as we see it, is a collective non-armed struggle, a combination
of ‘civil actions’ with a common goal and conducted during a certain
period of time. The civil opposition is usually a spontaneous and improperly
prepared action.

We
call the civil opposition prepared if it involves the state participation (or
sometimes the actions are headed by the state) and a ‘defensive accompanied
by civil actions’. If the civil opposition, some experts say, is a success
without any particular preparation and the state support, it is doomed to
success with a thorough preparation and the state backing.

The
whole range of civil opposition strategies may also include some military
components that can turn out to be absolutely necessary in some situations.
Those cover not only duties to guard the borders of a country from the acts of
aggression from abroad or to protect the country from a threat of domestic
dictatorship, but also involvement into conflicts bearing no direct influence.
In some instances, such conflicts need involvement from the outside. For
example, we must recognise that the conflict in Bosnia was rooted in
disinformation received by the population that resulted in international
dissention. The conflict could have been easily averted by coordinated
information efforts on the part of European organisations. Millions of radio
receivers tuned to international stations and linked to satellites could have
been dropped in the region. The strategy can be called ‘interference with
the use of civil actions’. There are a good many potentials to employ such
strategies: Kosovo, Timor, Tibet, etc. If used or at least properly studied,
it would be possible to prevent a range of armed conflicts.

To
get a better understanding of a peaceful civil opposition, it is necessary to
appreciate the fact that mentality has greatly changed recently. Nowadays, if
treated with aggression, society organises mass demonstrations. The political
authorities are fully aware of the fact, and they ought to take the court of
public opinion into consideration. The population should be properly informed,
and the authorities must be interested in it as the population has a great
potential. Civil society is able to tackle difficult issues and the political
authorities need to take a closer look. The state cannot do without civil
society assistance especially now, when the state faces new threats (various
forms of extremism, corruption, terrorism, IT threats, biological and chemical
threats etc.), global challenges, and the rapidly changing situation. This
range of issues can be treated by the state only when backed by civil society,
ensuring balance and unrestricted functioning. It is this point that accounts
for the power of the modern society. But it is vital to know how to use it. It
requires new expertise levels that already exist but need further development.

Our
association ‘Civil Action and Defensive’ has made significant progress in
France. The military are interested in our projects with the state reasonably
participating in them. Efforts made by the association make it possible to
understand when to intervene, with our specific approach pushing ahead with
appropriate pragmatism and logicality.

Our
association issues recommendations for the state authorities to develop the
above areas. It is necessary to warn all the people and organisations
concerned as well as to command full knowledge about them. It is the R&D
effort that matters during preparatory work in peacetime.

I
do not think it is possible to tell you about many other things to remain
within the time limits. I would like to stress that the way we are going is a
way of peace. However, it is not a kind of plaster for all sores, it is one of
the many preventive approaches to conflicts. On the other hand, one must not
ignore it, as a war is inevitable when all preventive efforts failed and
negotiations are in a deadlock. The civil opposition approach appears to be
the last resort here.