Thomas v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 21, 2018

THOMASv.THE STATE.

Blackwell, Justice.

Maurice
Thomas was tried by an Emanuel County jury and convicted of
murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting
of Eugene Grier. Thomas appeals, contending that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer
opened the door and failed to object to evidence of a
statement made by his codefendant, which, Thomas says,
violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88
S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476) (1968).[1] We affirm.[2]

1.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence shows that Grier and his girlfriend, Janice Wadley,
operated a small club known as "Janice's
Place." Early on the morning of August 29, 2010, Grier
and Wadley were working at the club and preparing to close
when a group of young people came in and ordered food. Grier
and Wadley prepared the order in the kitchen and then came
out to the front counter with the food. As Grier stood there,
Thomas approached the counter and shot him in the head,
causing him to fall to the floor. Thomas then walked up to
Wadley, pointed a gun to her face, and said, "I'm
fixing to kill you." Thomas attempted to fire the gun,
but he was unable to do so for some reason (perhaps because
the gun jammed). Thomas was enraged, but his sister pulled on
his shirt and implored him not to shoot, and he left the club
soon thereafter.

Wadley
testified at trial that she had known Thomas since he was a
little boy, and she identified him in the courtroom as the
shooter. Two other eyewitnesses also testified that Thomas
was the shooter. One of these eyewitnesses had known Thomas
and his codefendant (and cousin) Carlton for many years.
Before the shooting, she said, Thomas was outside the club,
angry and searching for a gun. After Thomas entered the club,
this eyewitness saw Carlton pass a handgun to Thomas, she
watched Thomas shoot Grier, and she then observed Thomas
returning the gun to Carlton. This eyewitness admitted that
she was a crack cocaine addict at the time and stole items
from the club in the chaos that followed the shooting. The
second eyewitness testified that he too saw Thomas shoot
Grier, and he identified Thomas in the courtroom as the
shooter. The second eyewitness admitted that he was a drug
user as well, and he conceded that Grier was his friend and
mentor, explaining that he did odd jobs for Grier and Wadley
for food and rent.

Thomas
does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
his convictions. But consistent with our usual practice in
murder cases, we independently have reviewed the record to
assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Thomas was guilty of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560)
(1979).

2. In
his sole enumeration of error, Thomas contends that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial
lawyer allowed a GBI agent to testify without objection about
a statement made by his codefendant, which incriminated
Thomas. The GBI agent was a witness for the State, and she
testified about her investigation of the murder. The State
did not ask her on direct examination about any statements
made by the codefendant. But on cross-examination,
Thomas's attorney asked what she had discovered during
her investigation about the motive for the murder. The GBI
agent responded that she had learned "from a couple of
people" that, a week or two before the shooting, Thomas
and Grier had a disagreement about a small amount of
marijuana and that Grier had "pulled a gun on
[Thomas]." On re-direct examination, the prosecutor
asked, "Now you were asked on cross examination about a
prior incident that occurred between [Thomas] and [Grier].
Did [the codefendant] say anything to you about that
incident?" The GBI agent responded:

Yes, he did. . . . He told me that Mr. Grier and [Thomas] had
an altercation a few weeks ago at a place called Cool Breeze,
which is right up the street from where this incident took
place, that he was not present but that [Thomas] had told him
about it. He said that it was maybe over some marijuana,
somebody maybe shorted some marijuana, that Mr. Grier had
pointed a gun, and it does say in his face, had pointed a gun
in [Thomas]'s face. And then there was some resolution to
that, and that he also told me that [Thomas] had - that it
had messed him up and that he had been thinking about it a
lot and was going to get him back, or that [Thomas] was going
to get [Grier] back, and that it was to the point where he
was actually dreaming about it.

Thomas's
lawyer did not object to this testimony.

To
obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show both that his lawyer's
performance was deficient and that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674)
(1984). An attorney performs deficiently under
Strickland if he does so in an "objectively
unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the
light of prevailing professional norms." Jessie v.
State, 294 Ga. 375, 377 (2) (754 S.E.2d 46) (2014)
(citation and punctuation omitted)). Prejudice is shown by
demonstrating "a reasonable probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome that, but for
counsel's alleged unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Miller v.
State, 285 Ga. 285, 286 (676 S.E.2d 173) (2009)
(citation omitted). "If the defendant fails to satisfy
either the 'deficient performance' or the
'prejudice' prong of the Strickland test,
this Court is not required to examine the other."
Jessie, 294 Ga. at 377 (2). See also Jones v.
State, 290 Ga. 576, 578 (3) (722 S.E.2d 853) (2012).

Assuming
that Thomas's lawyer performed deficiently, we cannot say
that, even if the GBI agent's testimony had been
excluded, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of Thomas's trial would have been different. First, the
GBI agent's testimony was not the only evidence of
motive; similar evidence was also introduced through a
jailhouse informant, who testified that the codefendant told
him that, "a couple of days" before the shooting,

[Thomas] had a[n] altercation with a fellow about quantity of
some drugs or something, and the fellow actually had pulled a
gun on him. And then a couple of days later, I don't know
if they were riding to find him or however it went, but, you
know, they come across him and he had a gun and they had
another altercation and he said [Thomas] shot him.

See Battle v. State, 301 Ga. 694, 700 (4) (804
S.E.2d 46) (2017) ("A Bruton violation may not
be prejudicial when the complained-of statements are
substantially similar to evidence properly admitted at
trial."). Thomas does not claim that the jailhouse
informant's testimony was inadmissible, and in fact, the
codefendant's statements to the informant were not
precluded under Bruton because they were not
testimonial. See Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99, 104
(4) (745 S.E.2d 583) (2013) (Bruton "does not
apply to non-testimonial out-of-court statements
made by [non-testifying] codefendant" (emphasis in
original)).[3]

Moreover,
the evidence against Thomas was very strong, as three
eyewitnesses - Wadley and two others - testified
unequivocally that they saw him shoot Grier, and their
testimonies were largely consistent as to how the shooting
occurred. While Thomas contends that the eyewitnesses
suffered from credibility issues, it is highly unlikely that
the jury would have completely discredited all three but for
the more detailed evidence of motive provided by the GBI
agent. After all, there was no other suspect in the shooting
- to the extent the codefendant was involved at all (he was
acquitted), no one suggested that he was the triggerman. It
was undisputed that the killing occurred in the presence of
multiple eyewitnesses. And the defense has not presented any
theories as to why those eyewitnesses would want to blame
Thomas for the murder while concealing the real killer's
identity. In sum, there is no reasonable probability that any
Bruton error affected the outcome of the trial, so
Thomas has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Battle v. State, 301 Ga. at 700 (4)
("[R]eversal of a defendant's convictions for [a
Bruton] violation in the context of a claim of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel is not warranted if given
the strength of the evidence against the defendant, there is
no reasonable probability that the outcome of the
defendant's trial would have been more favorable had
defense counsel made a Bruton objection which was
sustained.").

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