But,
before we get a sense experience, like sight, certain psychological impediments
hare to be removed. For instance, diversion of attention, and subjective
conditions like prejudice and bias, have to be minimised if we are to get a
correct sense experience. For instance, as I Vulcan says, for every sense
experience we have a mental set which determines a type of the specific sense
experience that we get.- This set may be inherited or acquired. This
psychological factor may be compared to the labdhi of the bhavend.
Yiya, which is the expression of the hormic force in the
specific form due to the partial destruction zind subsidence of the
knowledge-obscuring karmas relating to that sense.

The problem of the contact of the
sense organs with the object of stimulation is an important one in Indian
thought. It has a great psychological significance. Almost all the systems of
Indian thought were aware of this problem and have expressed themselves in one
form or another. The Nyaya Vaisesika, the Sariikhya,
the Mimamsaka and the
Vedanta schools of thought believe that all the sense organs get sensory
experience through direct contact of the object of stimulation with the
sense organ. This refers to the physical contact of the object of stimulation
with the sense organ and the sense organs having such contact are called
prapyakari. The sense organs in which there is no such physical contact with
the external stimulation’s are called aprapya kari. According to the orthodox
systems of Indian philosophy mentioned above, the sense organs are prapyakari
because there is physical contact with the stimulation. In fact, it is
maintained by them that the sense organs move out to the object in the form of
vrtti, or modification, and by taking in their form apprehend them. The Buddhists
believe that the visual sense organ and the auditory sense organ cognize their
objects without coming into direct contact with them. They are aprapyalrari.
For all of them, however, the mind is aprapyakerri, because it does not come in
direct contact with the object. The Jainas maintain that the visual organ, like
the mind, is apnipyakari, because it does not come in contact with the object.
For instance, we get visual experience of the moon and mountains alike.
According to the Jainas, the eye does not go round to the mountain and then fix
a point to form the vrtti, nor does it go round the stars and then fix on the
moon to get the experience. Such a movement of the eye round the objects of
stimulation is absurd, and it contradicts our experience. The Jainas say that
light and dark ness do not involve the eye going out ‘to see light. Moreover,
the eye is not an external organ, bahyendriya. The
Jainas maintain that it is not true to say that there is a physical contact
either of the nature of anugraha or upaghata for the eye. Seeing the blazing
sun is not upaghata, because the eye is the organ of light (tejasendriycr); and
matter of the same nature does not bring arrugraha and upaghata. But the eye is
not active while seeing the sun after the clouds have gone because there is
deficiency of light. The rays in the eyes are few compared to the abounding
rays of the sun. However, when we see the blazing sun our eyes do not ache.

The Samkhyayikas object to maintaining
that the eye alone, like the mind, is aprapyakari, and the other four sense
organs are prapyakari. If that were the case, we may as well argue, they say,
that all the sense organs are aprapyakart, because we, for instance, hear
distant sounds and smell the fragrance of a flower from a distance. But the
Jainas say that this objection is not convincing. They point out that even
those sense organs which are prapyakari do not go out to meet the objects for
getting experience; the objects themselves come in contact with the sense
organs and the sense organs remain where they were. It means that external
stimulation’s, like sound waves, affect the ears and as a result we hear.

The Buddhists say that even the ear
may be called aprapyakari, because we hear from a distance, and as there is no
direct contact of the object with the sense organ. It is aprapyakari because,
in any type of auditory experience there is no physical contact. For instance,
a new-born infant will give the same type of response to the stimulation of a
loud sound or of a pleasant sound. Even if there is thunder, auditory
experience may not be possible. But the Jainas say this is not a correct
explanation, because in the case of the infant the sense organs are not as yet
well adapted and developed. They have not sufficient capacity for grasping the
sound. The appropriateness of stimulation is one of the conditions of sensory
experience. In the case of hearing, the sound waves are received only when the
sense organ is suitably developed and also when other conditions are favorable.
That is why they go to the appropriate places, yogya desavasthita. For
instance, a low tone is not generally heard, but if the beloved speaks in a low
tone the lover quickly hears. This refers to the psychological factor of
interest which is a condition of specific sense experience. We may include this
in the labdhi of the bhavendriya. In the case of the auditory sense, the Jainas
point out that, although the ear is a prnpyakari and although some form of
physical contact is necessary for the auditory experience, it is not direct
physical contact with the stimulation as in the case of smell or taste. In the
case of taste specially, the stimulation is directly physical. The particles of
food, for instance, come actually in contact with the tongue. Such direct phsical
contact is called baddha sprsta.z The Jainas say that in the case of the
auditory sense organ the contact is there but it is indirect. Stimulation like
sound waves issuing from the object come in touch with the organ of hearing and
we get the auditory experience.

Modern physiologists describe the
process of audition in these terms. The sound waves are transmitted through the
external auditory meatus to beat against the tympanic membrane. As a result,
the tympanic membrane is caused to vibrate in harmony with the frequency of
sound waves. The movement of the tympanic membrane in response to sound waves
causes the auditory ossicles to move with it. Under normal conditions, sound
waves pass through the external auditory meatus and strike the ear-drum. This energy
is transmitted to the fluid of the inner ear and the hair cells in the organ of
corti are caused to move and initiate an auditory impulse. There are two
theories concerning the mechanism by which the movement of the hair cells gives
rise to impulses in the auditory nerve: (i) through a microphonic effect, and
(ii) through a chemical mediator. At present, evidence is not conclusive for
either theory.

Thus, the Jainas believe that the auditory, gustatory,
olfactory and tactual sense organs are prapyakari,
because the contact of the object with the sense organs is due to upaghata, a gross and subtle physical
contact. The touch of a blanket gives the experience of roughness, and contact
with the sandal paste gives a sense of coolness. Particles of camphor come in
contact with the olfactory sense organs and we experience a smell. Similarly,
soft sounds give a pleasant experience. But in the case of the eye there is no
contact between the sense organ and the object.

On the basis of the analysis of perception given in modern
science it is not possible to say that the Jaina view of the aprapyakari nature of the visual sense organ
is not understandable, because some kind of contact of the external object with
the sense organ is necessary ,even in this experience. But it should be
observed that light is only required to illuminate the object and not to serve
as a medium between the eye and the object, for the eye can observe the object
being itself untouched by the rays of light illumining the object.

However, the problem of the contact of the sense organ with
the abject was viewed differently by the ancient Indian philosophers. Their
problem was to explain the possibility of cognition to the sense organ. The
Jainas had a realistic approach, and they refused to believe that the sense
organ goes out to meet the object.

C. D. Broad says that hearing is projective in its
epistemological aspect, and is emanative in its physical aspect. We may say
that sight is ostensibly prpensive and not projective in its epistemological
aspect, but is emanative in its physical aspect. Touch is ostensibly prehensive
in its epistemological aspect, and is non-emanative in its physical aspect.o

The Jaina analysis of the prapyakaritva
of the sense organ of hearing and the aprapyakaritva
of the sense organ of sight may be compared to the analysis given by
Broad, although the epistemological and physical aspects of the problem were
not clear to the Jainas in that early stage of knowledge.

Considering the capacity of the sense organs, the Jainas
believe that the capacity of the eyes is greater. The eye perceives things like
mountains, which are at a distance, and things which are very near, like the
parts of the body. But it cannot see the dust in the eyelids. The capacity is
limited, because it cannot see things which are beyond a particular limit, like
the farthest and the nearest. The Vaisesikas say that it is a defect of the
eye. But the Jainas maintain that it is the nature, the svabhdva, of the sense organ. The auditory organ is of a similar
nature. But in the case of the ear there is a special power. It grasps sound
waves coming from as far as twelve yojauas if the wind is favourable and they are not
obstructed. It grasps the sound waves even inside the ear. It is subtler than
the sense organ of smell. It receives sound waves of various types, but it
grasps only those which are relevant, as the bird picks out milk from a mixture
of milk and water-the hamsakstra.

Modern
science recognizes that vision is the most important of all the senses. Blind
people learn to depend on other senses to a remarkable degree. But for the loss
of vision there is never anything like complete compensation. We rely or,
vision for protection, for equilibration, for co-ordination, for creation and
pleasure. Next comes audition. Then we have olfaction and other sense
functions. Audition ranks, perhaps, almost with vision. In the case of man,
olfactory acuity has been allowed to be atrophied. The lower animals are far
more dependent on their acute sense of smell than we are. Actual survival
hinges on the animal’s ability to find food and to avoid enemies. To some
extent this was also the case with primitive man. But as man advanced, the
olfactory sense began to get restricted in its use. Modern men use the olfactory
sense for pleasure. Audition, like vision, is important for protection, because
this sense warns us of danger in the environment. It also adds to our
enjoyment. Therefore, it is considered as a vital sense.

We may refer to the functions of the
senses on the different animal levels. According to the Jainas there are
gradations of animal life. At the lowest level, there are the one-sensed
organisms called ekendriyas. They may be earth-bodied,
water-bodied, air-bodied and fire-bodied. This level includes the vegetable
kingdom. Many of the organisms are minute or even microscopic. They pervade the
whole world. They are described as sakala loka vyapinah. Some of them may be gross-bodied, and visible.
These organisms possess only the sense of touch. No other sensory
discrimination has been developed in them. The amoebae, the paramecium and
other protozoan animals, similarly coelenterates and even flat-worms, may be
included in this list, although the Jainas have not mentioned any specific
animal species in this category. Modern comparative psychologists are not
agreed on the question of the sensory experience of lower animals. Some
maintain that they have a chemical sense. But some scientists like Stealer
think the reaction of these animals may be due to mechanical stimulation. Even
in food-seeking the sense of touch is predominant. Romances ascribed a certain
amount of discrimination among mechanical stimuli to the sea-anemones. In the
case of planaria maculate, a species of flatworms, Bardeen has suggested that auricular
appendages on the animal’s Also refer to Physiology of’ Man by Lanaley and Cheraskin, Chapter-Special
Functions.

back near the head end which
are specifically sensitive to the touch, may be delicate organs capable of
stimulation by slight currents in the water set up by minute organisms that
prey on the animal’s food, so that the primitive reaction when given to food
may be really a response to mechanical stimulation.

In the next stage are the two-sensed organisms called dvendriyas. They have the sense of touch and
taste, which is like the chemical sense, although the chemical sense signifies
a combined sense of both touch and taste. Comparative psychologists maintain
that rudimentary animals, specially the water-dwelling animals, have smell and taste
combined. They call it the chemical sense; for, in the aquatic animals smell
and taste are actually the same. Lloyd Morgan has proposed the term
‘talaesthetic taste’ for the chemical sense of aquatic animals. But it is said
that touch gives mechanical stimulation and is present in all animals. The
Jainas say that touch is the basic sense. They describe in detail animals
possessing the two senses. They give examples of animal species possessing the
two senses. For instance, the conch, candauaka,
kapardaka, jelukhi, golaka, and puttaraka,
belong to this class. These are the molluscan species. Among comparative
psychologists there is general agreement regarding the presence of the chemical
sense in the molluscan. animals. Nagel regarded the horn of the marine snails
as their most sensitive region. Pieron found that there are three modes of
chemical excitability in these animals: (i) an aerial distance excitability on
all parts of the body with predominance of the mouth, the anterior edge of the
foot, and the siphon; (ii) a contact sensibility in both air and water in the
horns in the mouth; and (iii) a delicate distance sensibility in water located
in the regions of the mouth, the horns, the anterior edge of the foot and the
osphradial region.

Three-sensed organisms possess a sense of touch, taste and
smell. Many examples have been quoted. The ants have three senses.. The
four-sensed organisms possess the sense of touch, smell, taste

and sight. The bhramara (the bee) has four senses. Many of
these belong to the species of insects. But comparative psychologists are not
agreed on the place of the sense of sight in insects. The homing of the bees
and their recognition of their nest-mates were the two interesting problems
which psychologists were faced with. Some scientists thought that vision is the
guiding factor in these cases. However, Be the thought that they were not
guided by sight. He said there was some unknown force which guided them to
their hives. Many scientists believe that smell plays an important part in this
case. Modern scientists have observed that even simple animals like the amoebae
give reaction to light stimulation. Schaeffer reports a curious fact that the amoebae can ‘sense’ a beam of light 20 microns to
120 microns distant moving towards it. Many jellyfish react to light. Romanes
says that they possess a visual sense; but there is no positive evidence. Some
of the molluscan species possess eyes of some degree of development, although
their reaction to light is very slow. The crustacean are provided with a
peculiar visual organ, the compound eye; and the chief function of this eye
seems to be that of responding to shadows and movements. As we go higher up in
the animal scale, we find that the structure of the eye becomes more complex,
and the compound eye gives rise to the simple eye with cones and rods. The
vertebrates, like fish (Matsuya), crocodile (niakara),
and man are five-sensed organisms.
Those possessing the five senses are divided into two groups: (i) those
possessing mind and intelligence; these are called sarhjninah; (ii) those who do not possess mind and intelligence, asarhjiainah. It is not possible to say whether the Jainas showed a qualitative
distinction between sense and reason. However, they maintained that among the
five sensed animals only some of them are samjititls. Human beings belong
to this class. They possess specific

mental
states like memory, imagination and intellection.. The asahijnins
do not possess such mental qualities. A further
psychological analysis of this group is made by the Jainas. They say that the saujnins
are further divided into those which are incomplete and
those which are complete. Incomplete species are those in which the sense
capacities do not work freely and are deficient in expression. Such deficiency
may be due to a defect of structure in the sense organ or in the mental
capacity to grasp the sense experience. This, in brief, is the classification
of animals having sense organs. Going higher in the scale of life, there are
those beings who are not fettered with the sense organs. They are called anindrivas.
They get pure and unalloyed experience, because sense
experience, according to the Jainas, is experience at a lower level. It is not
direct experience of the soul. It comes through the sense organs, which are a
limitation. Beings without sense organs come nearer to the realization of the
highest experience. Some of them are complete in mental equipment and capacity.
They are perfect beings. They are siddhas. Thus,
from the psychological analysis of the development of animal life we go to the
metaphysical nature of the soul found in the disembodied being. The embodiment
of the soul is a hindrance to the attainment of pure experience. Pure
experience is possible by removing the barrier of the senses. The present stage
of psychology cannot explain such a phenomenon as super-sensible experience,
although it is possible to approach this problem through studies in
para-psychology and extra-sensory experience. Research in this direction is
both possible and necessary. This problem will be referred to in a later
chapter in which extra-sensory perception will be discussed.

Sense qualities

Sense organs are instruments by means
of which sense experience is possible. The senses are capacities of experience,
and the sensible qualities which exist outside are objects of experience. For
instance, the common element between the eye and the object is colour, and the
common element in the case of hearing is sound. They are stimulation’s. The
Jainas have given a psychological analysis of the sense qualities emerging from
the experience of the various senses. As Radhakrishnan says, a good deal of
psychological analysis is discernible in the division of sense qualities.
According to the Jainas, the visual sense quality of colour is classed into
five types: black (krsna), blue (nila), yellow (pita), white (sukla),
and pink ( pedant).a Young
supposed that there exist three distinct sets of nerve fibers, one set
sensitive to red, one to green and the third to violet. This theory has been
expounded by Helmholtz. There are three primary colour excitations, and the
mixture of these three gives different colour experiences. All fibbers are
responsive, in some way, to all waves,_ though the red fibbers are excited by
the long waves: Green fibres respond to those of medium length. Violet fibres
are maximally stimulated by short waves. All colour experience results from
these three simultaneous excitations based on the relative strength of the
components in the stimulus of light. This is the Trichromatic theory. But
Herring and Franklin have objected to this theory. They maintain that yellow
and white are as primary as the three colour qualities mentioned by Helmholtz.
Herring supposed that the primaries are to be arranged in pairs. There are
three complex substances, one mediating white-black, another red-green, and the
third responsible for yellow-blue. The white-black material is more plentifully
supplied and is more readily excited than others. When activated, it gives
purely achromatic brilliance and can be depressed in direction by black only
through light adaptation and contrast. The other two substances behave
differently, having their activity either depressed or augmented. The red-green
substance yields red when ‘torn down’ by light, and green when built up. In the
yellow-blue substance, depression produces blue, whereas augmentation results
in yellow. The LaddFranklin theory represents, in a sense, a compromise between
the Trichromatic combination for mixture and the tetra-chromatic combination in
its existence. It points out that there are five primary colour qualities. In fact, Newton presented
his celebrated triangle for explaining the natural phenomenon of the spectrum
and the scope of the sense of sight. The triangle places green at the apex, red
and violet at the lower points, gray in the centre, and purple at the mid-base.
The figure is given in Table III. Instead of this triangle, Wound proposed a
circle. Titchner gives us a pyramid in which every possible chromatic or
achromatic variation finds its due place. Whatever may be the difference
between the views of the Jainas and of modern scientists, it may be said to the
credit of the Jainas that they were aware that the five sense qualities are
responsible for giving the variation in colour experience. Modern scientists
like Ladd and Franklin, and even Newton, have mentioned five primary qualities.
According to the Ladd-Franklin theory, there is a white-black whole and a
yellow-blue whole; similarly, it mentions the red-green whole. The Jainas did
not mention red-green as a specific sense quality.

TABLE III

Newton’s
Triangle of Spectrum

GREEN

GREY

FED PURPLEVIOLET

Regarding sense qualities like touch, taste and smell, the
Jainas give a detailed analysis of the different types of sense qualities.
Touch is of eight kinds, like hot (usna) and
cold (sita); rough (ruksa) and smooth (srzigdha); soft (komala) and
hard (kathora); light (laghu) and heavy (guru). Modern scientists have realized that skin has the
potentiality of yielding a greater diversity of sensations, because the skin
proves to be responsive to a wide range of stimuli, like mechanical, thermal,
electrical and chemical. Mechanical stimulation gives rise to sensation. of
touch, contact and pressure. Thermal stimulation produces the sense experience
of warm and cold in various degrees. Chemical stimuli have been worked to give
rise to pain. Chemicals and drugs have been of much interest for their quality
of reducing pain. Electrical stimulation of the skin seems capable of arousing all systems of sensibility. Kinaesthetic and
organic sensibilities of various types including hunger and organic pain belong
to the sense of touch.o The Jainas say that there are five types of taste:
pungent (tiktu), bitter (katu),
acid (umla), sweet (nzadhura) and
astringent (kasaya). Some scientists have accepted salt, sweet, bitter
and sour as the primary taste qualities. However, there is no complete
agreement on this point. In the Western thought, at the end of the sixteenth
century, there were n.ine basic taste qualities, like sweet, sour, sharp,
pungent, harsh, fatty, bitter, insipid and salty. By the middle of

TABLE IV

Henning’s
Taste-tetrahedron

the
eighteenth century, some of them were gradually dropped, because it was found
that they were merely mixtures of different taste qualities. Later, four
qualities were accepted as primary. Henning’s ‘taste-tetrahedron’ presents the
relation between the four primary taste qualities: saline, sweet, sour and
bitter. Various other taste qualities arise out of the inter-action of the
primary qualities. However, Henning views taste as one, and not four senses.
Henning’s tetrahedron is shown in Table IV.

The Jainas classified smell in only
two types, as good, (sugandha) and bad (durgandha).
No further distinction has been made,

In the
eighteenth century, in Europe, an odour system was devised. Henning has given a
scheme of odour prism which is shown in Table V. The Crocker Henderson system
posits four fundamental odours, like fragrant, acid, burnt, and caprylic. All
these classifications are partly based on experimental investigation and partly
on rational insight. But there are difficulties in the grouping of odours,
because, as Woodworth points out, in, the analysis of Henning’s classification
some odour qualities are not purely odour. They are mixed up with taste
qualities. Zwaardemaker classified the smell qualities as ethereal (as in

TABLE V

Henning’s
Smell Prism

FOWL

SPICY EESINOUS

fruit),
aromatic (as in spice), fragrant (as in flowers), ambrosial (as in musk),
alliaceous (as in onion), ampyreumatic (as in tar), hircine (as in cheese),
repulsive (as in laudanum), and nauseous (as in decaying flesh). This is a very
elaborate, even clumsy, classification. It does not mention the primary sense
qualities alone. The Jainas gave an analysis of the odour qualities, and in
fact of all sense qualities, on the basis of rational insight. They thought it
safer to analyse the smell sense qualities into two major categories, as good
and bad.

The traditional exposition of the seven fundamental sounds
(svara) mixing in various ways to form melodies of various types, has been
accepted by the Jainas. The seven sounds are: sadja, rsabha, gandhara,
madhyama, paiacama, dhaivata, and nisadha. In the Western sound system, we get
the following: Do, re, me, fa, sol,
la, and si. In all, there are twenty-seven main kinds which can be combined in
innumerable

Note: In rational beings, mind also assists
the senses in bringing knowledge to the soul.

ways. There are two
varieties of combination of tones: difference tones and summation tones. The
difference tones were discovered by the celebrated Italian violinist, Tartini.
Summation tones were discovered after the Helmholtz researches, in 1856 A.D. A difference tone has a pitch
determined by the difference between the frequencies of the two other tones.
The pitch of the summation tones results from the addition of frequencies. The
study of the combination of tones and beats has led to research in auditory
harmony. In the case of sound researches, Spearman says that a distinction has
been drawn between noise and tone.43
A detailed classification of the Jaina view of sense qualities is shown in
Table VI.

Thus, the analysis of sense qualities given by the ancient
Jainas has not been arbitrary. It has a great psychological significance,
although it has no basis in scientific and experimental research. However, it
can be said with confidence that the Jaina analysis of sense qualities shows a
good deal of psychological significance, and has shown very deep and clear
rational insight. The conclusions drawn by these philosophers may not be
adequate and not agree with the modern views of scientists who have worked out
the same problems through experimental research in laboratories. It may be
noted that there is not either much agreement among modern scientists as to the
detailed analysis of sense qualities like colour, sound, smell and taste,
although there is a fair agreement on the fundamentals. The same measure of
agreement can be found in the views of the Jaina philosophers. In fact, the
views presented by the Jaina philosophers on the problem of sense qualities
very much agree with the views of other Indian philosophers of ancient times.
We find this in a description of sense qualities given by the Naiyayikas. It is
needless to say that the psychological significance of the analysis of sense
qualities given by the Jainas purely through rational insight and not on the
basis of experimental research, cannot be ignored.

CHAPTER
V

THE JAINA THEORY OF SENSE
PERCEPTION

The Jainas have made a significant contribution to the
theory of sense perception. In order to understand the Jaina theory of sense
perception it is necessary to study their epistemology.

The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The
Upanisadic philosophers found the immutable
reality behind the world of experience. Goutama, the Buddha, denounced
everything as fleeting and full of sorrow. Mahavira stood on commonsense and
experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina
philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa
is the ultimate aim of life. It is realized by the three-fold path of
right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.’ Right knowledge is one of
the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina
theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jaina
thought. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in
response to the demands of time.

The Agarrta theory
of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the pre-Mahavira period. Jnana pravada formed a part of the Purvasruta which formed a part of the
ancient literature. Jinabhadra, in his Visesavasyakabhasya,
quotes a pirva gatha on jnaua. There seems to have been no
difference of opinion between the followers of ParSva and Mahavira regarding
the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of
knowledge. The Agamas have also
presented the five divisions of knowledge.

Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity.
of attitude arising out of the veil of karma,
we may get wrong knowledge, ajiTa;ta. Knowledge
is perfect when the veil of karma is
totally removed. It is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or
destruction of karma. The soul can get
perfect knowledge directly when the veil of karma
is removed. That is pratyaksa jnana. But
empirical knowledge, experience of this world, is possible with the help of the
sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called paroksa jnana. Matijrcana (sense experience), and srutajnana (knowledge due to verbal
communication), are paroksa jitana; while
avadhi (extra-sensory perception), muraahparvaya (telepathy), and kevala jn”ana (omniscience), were called pratyalcsa. But

[Please this table see file
name ‘wide table page no. 13,57,73’]

later,
in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of
other systems of Indian thought, they modified their conception of pratyaksa
and paroksa j0na. In the Anuyogadva’ra
Sictra, we find a change in terminology. Mati and sruta began to
be called pratyaksa as they were possible through
the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra calls the two samvyavalzara
prat,vaksa.e Alongside of jnana, we have
direct intuition of the object. It is darsana. Darsana has
similar subdivisions. In the same way, wrong knowledge is also possible in
those cases where the veil of karma is not
removed and where there is perversity of attitude. Thus, we have mati-ajrcana,
srcata-ajn”ana, and avadhi-ajnana. The
general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their
perversities, is shown in Table VII. This classification shows that the Jairlas
believed that the subsidence and destruction of the veil of karma is a
necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is
characterized as samsaya (doubt), viparyaya
(perversity), and anadhyava.saya (wrong
knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference). Owing to the lack of
discrimination between thereal and the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge,
like the lunatic, knows things according to its own whims. Perversity of
attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes
vitiated. It becomes ajilana.s

Pratyaksa

We may now consider sense perception or pratyaksa
jnana, as the Nandisutra calls
it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense organs and the manas. It was
called paroksa by Umasvati. Jinabdhara called it sarirvyavahara
pratyaksa. It is also called indriya pratyaksa.-IIn the Nandisutra,
a distinction is made within pratyaksa,
between perception (indriya prcrtyaksa), and
perception not due to the sense organs (unindriya prat yaksa).s Hemacandra
describes in the PramanamFmaritsa that pratyaksa
is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He
analyses the various definitions of pratyaksa of other
schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika definition of
perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the sense object contact
is not adequate. How can the sense object contact and the like, he asks, which
is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the
determination of the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of
perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is
not erroneous. But Hemacandra says that this definition is irrational since it has no
bearing on practical activity, It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines
perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon the actual
contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is also too wide,
since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt and illusions also occur as a result
of sense contact. The older exponents of the Samkhya school define perceptual cognition
to be modification of the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense
organs are devoid of consciousness; therefore, their modifications cannot be
conscious. If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient
character from its association with a conscious principle like the self; then
the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self:
T1-erefore, Hemacandra said, perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.9

It is not possible that sense perception, which is based
upon the stimulation present to the senses, is incapable of knowing the
cognitions that preceded and that follow. Even in the case of cognitions
arising out of the data present to the senses, the cognitions would be only
subjective. It would not be possible to determine their validity or invalidity
to the satisfaction of an outsider. It would be difficult to establish
objective validity; hence sense perception is one of the sources of knowledge,
and not the only source as the Carvakas would maintain.

In Plato’s dialogue, Theaetetus,
Socrates examines the doctrine that knowledge is through perception.
This is the position of the common notion that knowledge of the external world
comes to us through the senses. Socrates points out that the view of Theaetetus
is identical with the doctrine of Heraeleitus that all things are in motion,
and the Protagerean dictum, homo mensura. Socrates
in the end shows that the position adopted by Theaetetus is not acceptable
because it leads to an impossibility. Socrates said that, if knowledge and
perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a man who has
come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not
see it, and that would be a monstrous conclusion.Io

Pratyaksa is defined in the Pramanamirnamsa as that which is immediate
and lucid. These characteristics are applicable to both perceptual and
non-perceptual experience, experience through operation of the sense organs and
experience without the help of sense organs. We have seen that in the Nandisutra a distinction is made between pratyaksa as that which is due to the sense
organs, and that which does not need the mediation of the sense organs. They
are called indriya pratyaksa and unindriya pratyaksa, respectively. Indriya pratyaksa is cognition which is
immediate and direct and arises out of the operation of the five sense organs.
There are, therefore, five typesof sense perception-the visual, auditory, tactual,
olfactory and gustatory. The experience that does not need the sense organs and
is immediate may be called extra-sensory perception.. It is also pratyaksa, because
it is immediate and direct. This was called real (pratyaksa), by the followers of
Agama literature. It is of three types, avadhi, manah paryaya and kevala pratyaksa. In this chapter, discussion will be restricted to the sense experience, mdriva pratyaksa. It is also called, as was seen earlier, sarirvyavahara pratyaksa. Emperical
knowledge may be called sarimyavahara
prcrtyaksha. It is of two kinds, mati and sruta. Matijitana is a species of Samvyavahara
pratyak,scr. MatijUina is defined as
knowledge due to the sense organs and mind. Irtdriya pratyaksa may,
therefore, be regarded as a form of matijnana.
This may be called sense perception.
Sense perception may be regarded as rnatij~Ona,
as it is concerned with the contact of
the sense organs with the object. Sense perception of this type may be compared
with the definition of pratyaksa given by Gautama, the founder of Nyaya philosophy,
already referred to. Gautama defines pratyaksa
as knowledge which arises out of the
contact of sense organs with its object, inexpressible in words, unerring and
well-defined.]’- Gangesa says that this does not include intuitive perception,
which is also direct and without mediation of the senses.l The Jainas called
the type of perception defined by Gautama a form of matijnana. In
the Jaina Agamas, mati jiratra is also known as abhinibodhikay”nana. But the
term rnatijnana seems to be older than abhinibodhika-jYana, as matijt:ana is associated with the karma theory
which is very old. The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the
help of the five senses as well as the manas
may be called matijrlana. But in indriya pratyaksa they included knowledge born of the five sense
organs, as the mind is not for them exactly a sense organ. It is a quasi-sense
organ.

In Jaina literature various synonyms
for matijnana have been mentioned. Tattvarthasutra
mentions mcrti, smrti (recollection),
cinta (thought), and abhinibodha (perceptual cognition),
as synonyms. Bhadrabahu mentions iha associative integration, apoha,
vimarsa, margana, gavesanU, sarirj’ra and smrti as
synonyms? Nandisutra follows Badrabhu. The mention of all these synonyms does not mean that they identified the various forms
of cognition mentioned in the synonyms as sense perception, because Bhadrabahu
and Umasvati, for instance, would not in the least have meant that smrti is
identical with sense perception; nor cinta
identical with matijizana. However,
what they meant was that, in empirical experience, we find matijnana and such experience as
recollection and thought. In this sense, matijizana
may be said to include sense experience due to the operation of the five
senses and experience through the manas, as
the Jaina philosophers following the Agamic literature
maintained. In the PramanamFmarirsa, empirical
perception is described as perception due to the ~ senses and mind. In the
commentary of the same stanza it is said that the phrase ‘due to the sense and
mind’, (indriya manonimittam), has
both collective and distributive meaning. But matijnana,
in the sense of experience due to the five sense organs, is a form of pratyaksa. It is indriya pratyaksa. Umasvati also includes experience due to the
mind in matijhana. He defines matijMna as knowledge caused by the senses
and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense, no-indriya.The commentator Siddhasenaganin
mentions three types of mati: (i) knowledge
born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii) knowledge
due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind. However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra we find that matijiaarra
can be distinguished into four types, as (i) knowledge due to sense
organs, like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only, like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the joint
activity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in matijhana. Akalanka says that memory,
recognition and discursive thought are cases of matijitana so long as they are not associated with language. As
soon as they are associated with words they become srutaynana, although very few philosophers have supported Akalanka
in this respect. However, if matijnana were
to include cognition due to the joint activity of the sense organs and the
mind, memory and recognition may well be included in matijiiana. In the fourth stage of matijiana, cognitions without the help of the sense organs and the
mind are included. For instance, the vague and primitive awareness of the plant
life and the instinctive awareness of the lower organisms which have not yet
developed sense organs, may be said to be cognition of this type. These are
direct forms of awareness. Sense perception (indriya-pratyaksa),
as a species of matijnana is of
five types based on the nature and function of the five sense organs. The five
senses possess the capacity of sense experience because the cognition of the
stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The sense is the
mark which denotes that cognition of the object has been generated by the self.
We get a similar description of sense perception in the Nyaya Sutra. The five types of sense perception are based on the
special characteristics of knowledge, (buddhi
laksana), visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual. The senses
consist of elements endowed with a special quality, and so they are able to
perceive the respective objects and not themselves. For instance, the eye sees
the external object and not itself. In sense perception, it was seen in the last
chapter, the sense of touch is fundamental. Similarly, the sense of sight is
vital for human life. Price says that the experiences of seeing and touching
are primary, other modes of sense experiences, like hearing and smelling, are
only auxiliary. ‘If we possessed them but did not possess either sight or touch
we should have no belief about the material world at all, and should lack even
the very conception of it’. It was also seen in the last chapter that,
according to the Jainas, the sense of sight is of a fundamentally different
nature, in that the other sense organs are based on the contact of the sense
organs with the object, while the sense of sight does not need any contact with
the object.

The nature of sense perception will now be analysed. The
task here is to give a psychological analysis of the experience, if possible.
It may aptly be said that the Jaina analysis of sense perception has a great
psychological significance, although perception was a logical and metaphysical
problem for the Jainas as for other Indian philosophers. In fact, even in the
West, philosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical
analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology
as a sceience, philosophers have realized that perception is more prohlcm far
psychology. Pretend Russell says that, ‘the problem of perception has troubled
philosophers from a very early date. My owl belief is that the problem is
scientific, not philosophical, or, rather, no longer philosophical’.

Conditions of Perception

Sense organs are a condition of sense perception. are the
instruments by which we get sensory experience. The senses are the marks of the
self, and they afford proof of the
existence of the self. The senses are
instruments like the carpenter’s axe, by which experience is obtained by the
sslf. The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of
perception as mentioned by the Naiyayikas, although, according to the Jainas,
such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual experience. According to
the Nyaya definition, perception involves defferent factors, viz., (i) sense
organs, (ii) their objects, (iii) the contact of the sense organs with the
object, and (iv) the cognition produced by them. It is sometimes maintained
that the description given by the Jainas of sense experience as cognition due
to the senses and the mind is inadequate. Visual perception, for instance, has
the additional condition of the presence of light. But it has been pointed out
by Hemacandra that objects and light are not conditions of experience, because
of lack of concomitance between the two. But it is not denied that they are
remote conditions, like time and space, which subserve the subsidence and
destruction of the knowledge-obscuring karrnas.
They are indirectly useful to the visual organs, like collyrium. The
inadequacy of the view that the object and light are conditions of perception
can be seen from the fact that illusive perception of water takes place in a
mirage. Cats and owls perceive in the dark, where the stimulation of light is
absent.g This is meant to show that the Nyaya emphasis on the object as a
condition of perception is not acceptable. Perception of a particular object
is, in fact, according to the Jainas, due to the destruction and subsidence of
the relevant knowledge-obscuring karrnas, jihnavaraniya
karma. This implies a psychological factor. An appropriate psychical
condition in the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma is a
necessary factor in the perceptual experience. It also depends on the
competency of the appropriate psychical factor. For instance, even when the
object is present we may not see it when our attention is elsewhere engaged. In
the Samayasara we read that the presence of stimuli in the external environment
and even their coming into contact with the sense organs may not be effective
to produce the relevant experience. For instance, we may not see an unpleasant
visual foam, even though the stimulation may reach the eyes. The psychic factor
of selective attention is needed before we get the sense experience. This is
possible when all psychic impediments are partially or wholly removed through
the destruction and subsidence of knowledge-obscuring karma. We have described
such a psychic factor as a mental set which is necessary for the perceptual
experience. Emphasis on the mental factor in perception has been mentioned in
the Ilpanisads also. This was referred
to in the earlier chapter. We here have the dictum that when the mind is
elsewhere we do not see. ‘I was absent in mind, I did not hear’. In Western
thought, Aristotle was clearly aware that perception is not possible merely
through the sense organs. For him, perception consists in being moved and
affected. Sense perception does not arise from the senses themselves, as organs
of sense perception are potentiality and not actuality. Lock writes that,
whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever
impressions are made in the outward part, if they are not taken notice of
within, there is no perception. For we may burn our body with no other effect
than it does a billet unless the motion be continued to the brain; and there
the sense of hurt or idea of pain be produced in the mind, wherein consists
actual perception. In modern psychology, Prof. Woodworth gives a formula
‘W-S-O-R-W’ for explaining the fascinating problem of how an individual
perceives an objective fact. At any given moment

a man is set for the present
situation. He might be listening to a low hum just as a smooth tone. But if he
tries to make out what the sound can be, he is more likely to perceive it as
the hum of an aeroplane.

Thus we find that the analysis of perceptual experience
shows that the sense organs and the contact of the sense organs with the
stimulation’s of objects are no doubt conditions of perception. But that alone
is not sufficient. A psychological condition is necessary for the experience.
This psychological factor consists, negatively, in the removal of the psychic
impediments to perception. This may be likened to the subsidence and
destruction of the knowledge-obscuring karmas
of the Jainas. On the positive side, the psychic condition is selective
attention and the ‘mental set’.

Stages of Sense Perception

According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed
into four stages as (i) Avagraha, (ii) Ihu,
(iii) Avaya, and (iv) Dharana. These
stages of sense experience arise
through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. In the PramanamJmarizsa we get a description of the four stages of sense experience, salrivyavahara pratyaksa. The four stages
mentioned above have been usually described as the four subdivisions of sense
experience. In the Narrdi Sutra, they
are mentioned as four types, caturvidha. But
it would be more appropriate to say that they are the four stages of sense experience, because,
psychologically analysed, they express the four stages of perceptual cognition,
although perception, in our view, is a concrete psychosis. The correctness of
this interpretation can be seen from the fact that in the commentary on sutra of the Pramanamirnarrisa it is stated that the earlier form, like avagraha, develops into the subsequent
forms, and all of them partake of the same essential nature. Thus, in the Jaina
thought, four stages of matijnana, as
mentioned above, have been described. Avczgraha refers to the first simple and
primitive stage of experience. This may be said to be merely the stage of
sensation. Next comes iha. In this stage there is a mental element, and it refers
to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage, we get a clear and
decisive cognition of the object. This is avaya.
It implies the presence of the inferential element in perception. Dharanii is retention of what is already
experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact, it is not actually a stage of
perceptual experience although it is included in perceptual experience.

Psychologists
point out that perception is not a simple process nor is it merely the
sense-datum. It consists in the organization and interpretation of sensations.
It is ‘knowledge about’ and not merely ‘knowledge of acquaintance’, as William
James said. Perception involves certain psychological factors like association,
discrimination, integration, assimilation and recognition. Perception also
involves inference. We perceive a table, and when we perceive the object as a
table we recognize it and we get a defined picture of the object.