‘We can go back to normal now,” says Amr Moussa, the elder statesman of the Egyptian establishment who supervised the drafting of a new constitution. “What we now need is a good president.”

The draft was put to the vote at a referendum spread over two days last week, with the subtext that approval would amount to a popular endorsement of the military coup that removed Egypt’s first freely elected president from power last summer.

Interior Ministry spokesmen say turnout was high, but refuse to provide precise figures. Unofficial estimates put the ballots cast at just over 27 million, out of 55 million eligible voters. But those who did vote apparently revived the old tradition of elections during Egypt’s 60 years of military rule by massively voting “yes.” The elections commission announced Saturday that the “yes” vote was 98.1 percent.

One might question key aspects of the exercise, notably the fact that the “no” campaign was shut out of state-controlled media. Yet there’s little doubt that a majority of those who voted did wish to approve the coup that kicked the Muslim Brotherhood out of power.

Put simply, the new constitution is a slightly modified version of the one in force under President Hosni Mubarak. It allows the military to retain its central position in the government with a veto on key aspects of foreign and security policies. It also restricts some freedoms of expression and association Egyptians thought they’d won in the Arab Spring, and allows civilian dissidents to be tried in military courts.

So strong was the desire of a substantial segment of Egyptian society to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood that they opted to rush back to the disgraced generals as saviors.

It’s too soon to say if they jumped from the frying pan into the fire. What is certain is that the military is determined to roll back the Arab Spring and restore its hold on power. This will be the main theme of Egyptian politics for the rest of the year.

In one scenario, army chief Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Sissi would become president with the traditional 90 percent vote claimed by dictators from Gamal Abdul-Nasser to Mubarak. Moussa, a former apparatchik of the Nasserist regime, is already peddling that scenario. “Gen. al-Sissi is the best man for Egypt right now,” he said last week.

In another scenario, the military would field an old technocrat (e.g., the octogenarian Moussa) as president, keeping the reins of power in its own hands behind the scenes. The new constitution stipulates that for the next eight years the Defense Minister will be appointed by the military, not whoever is elected president. Thus, Sissi could remain minister and exercise real power as he does now.

As usual, the Obama administration has tried to hedge its bets by supporting the coup behind the scenes while subjecting it to some criticism in public, backed by a cut in military aid. It has thus squandered much of the influence that America had with virtually all players in Egyptian politics.

The Brotherhood, which had forged close ties with Washington thanks to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s efforts, is reverting to its traditional anti-American posture. The military now regard the United States as a fickle friend who can stab you in the back in your hour of need. And pro-democracy groups are unhappy about Obama’s failure, or unwillingness, to adopt a clear stance in support of genuine social and political reforms.

Contrary to Moussa’s hope that Egypt will now return to normal (whatever normal means in a society gripped by revolutionary tensions), the new constitution could well mark the start of a new chapter in instability and violence. Shut out of the political game, the Brotherhood could well fall under the control of more radical Jihadist elements that have never believed in constitutions and elections.

Meanwhile, the military may be forced into offering more concessions to radical Islamists (notably the Salafi groups) in order to isolate the Brotherhood. Pro-democracy groups could end up as all-round losers, their dream of a pluralist system fading further.

The military had best not to think that the Arab Spring genie can easily be pushed back into the bottle. Al-Sissi might not want to admit it, but something has changed in Egypt. Many Egyptians (certainly not a majority) now regard him as the hero who slew the Islamist dragon. But things could quickly change when, as looks certain, Egyptians witness the return of the equally vicious dragon of military despotism.