After weeks of speculation, the deal really occurred today: the Utah Jazz officially traded Enes Kanter and Steve Novak to the Oklahoma City Thunder in exchange for a protected future 1st round pick from OKC[ref]More details on this later in the article.[/ref], a 2017 2nd round pick from the Detroit Pistons, Kendrick Perkins, the rights to FC Barcelona C Tibor Pleiss, and the rights to Tulsa 66ers F/C Grant Jerrett. Adrian Wojnarowski of Yahoo was the first to report the trade.

How the trade occurred

Just 8 days ago, Enes Kanter made his trade wishes known publicly for the first time after the Jazz’s loss to the Dallas Mavericks.[ref]I covered what led up to that situation in this article, so this piece will focus largely on the week leading up to the deadline and the breakdown of the trade itself.[/ref] While Utah was very much internally looking at the possibility of trading Kanter before his comments, going public pushed Utah into acting aggressively to find a deal. The Jazz front office insisted that Enes’ demands did not change what they were willing to accept in a trade, but the feeling was that his comments made a long-lasting positive relationship less likely.

As the Jazz shopped Kanter, they looked to teams who had expressed previous interest in Kanter, who had a clear need for a big man, or had assets the Jazz really wanted to acquire. Oklahoma City was on the list largely due to the first factor alone. Oklahoma City had expressed interest earlier in the year, but while Kanter’s a good young big man, the Thunder already have a pretty solid rotation of Serge Ibaka, Stephen Adams, Kendrick Perkins, Nick Collison, Mitch McGary, and Perry Jones. All 6 of those bigs but Collison and Perkins are young.

Furthermore, the Thunder have a hodgepodge of assets that don’t really fit the Jazz’s situation, as we discovered in the trade itself. The Jazz aren’t fans of Jeremy Lamb’s game or potential, especially defensively. Reggie Jackson was a malcontent expiring without a jump shot. If the Jazz were going to acquire him, then they’d almost certainly want to match any offers he received in free agency, and they weren’t willing to commit long term to a core of Jackson/Exum/Hayward/Favors/Gobert, of whom only one can shoot.

Undeterred by this asset mismatch, the Jazz put together an offer to Oklahoma City early in the week which was discussed back and forth until the very final moments of the trade deadline, including as OKC continued to explore a deal with Brooklyn for Brook Lopez. As Quin Snyder explained, “There wasn’t any kind of watershed moment.” It was clear that this was a possibility all along.

That doesn’t mean there weren’t other offers. The Jazz had the opportunity to join the PG trade wheel as well today as part of a Kanter trade, but ultimately chose to keep Trey Burke and move Kanter in this deal. They like Trey’s attitude, and note that young PGs sometimes take several seasons to develop. They also liked adding more flexibility for this year’s offseason through the trade that occurred, rather than removing flexibility in the other offers presented. Ultimately, Oklahoma City’s desire to add Kanter forced the match.

Breaking down the deal

So what was involved in this trade? Let’s break it down, piece by piece, in order of importance.

Enes Kanter out.

Ultimately, this deal never would have occurred without Enes Kanter’s impending restricted free agency. Just like with the Deron Williams trade 4 years ago, the Jazz sought the relative security of known assets over the possibility that an important player would leave without a return. As Dennis Lindsey explained today, “We concede Enes is a very significant player, and he’s going to get a great contract, deservedly so, given his talent and his work ethic. But there’s 20 teams potentially with $10 million or more in room, so there’s some economics there, some supply and demand there.”

The Jazz felt that with the great number of teams with a large amount of cap space, Enes Kanter was going to get a deal for 10 million or dollars more per season. Essentially, Lindsey concluded, “We can’t pay everybody 10 million plus. We had to look at some hard, cold facts.”

The Jazz have already given long-term contracts to Gordon Hayward, Derrick Favors, and even Alec Burks at that amount or more, but felt that Enes Kanter couldn’t be trusted at that dollar amount, due to a confluence of his poor defensive numbers, his poor work sharing the ball[ref]Even in Quin Snyder’s new passing oriented system, Kanter only had 26 assists on the season[/ref], and the inconsistent attitude of both Kanter and his agent, Max Ergul. There’s a sense that Utah might be better with Kanter off the floor than on it, given his rather unimpressive plus-minus numbers during the course of his career.

And unlike with Hayward, Favors, and Burks, Utah felt comfortable turning to the rest of the roster for support. Dennis Lindsey felt both Gobert and Favors had surprised him with their growth, saying “Certainly, Rudy’s exponential growth, we didn’t expect that, I didn’t expect that, but you’ve got to react to it and acknowledge it a little bit.” and “I didn’t expect Derrick developing the power forward skills that he has today.” It was time to reward their work with the positions and roles they deserved.

Oklahoma City’s 1st round pick in.

The short version: Oklahoma City will give the first-non lottery pick that comes at least 2 years after the Thunder fulfill their obligations to trade a 1st round pick to Philadelphia. If that doesn’t happen by 2020, the Jazz will receive 2 2nd round picks.

The long version: In the Dion Waiters trade, Oklahoma City gave a first round pick to Cleveland that was protected for selections 1-18 in 2015, 1-15 in 2016, and 1-15 in 2017, then turns into 2 2nd round picks after that. The Cavaliers then flipped that to Denver in the Timofey Mozgov deal. The Nuggets then flipped that to Philadelphia in the JaVale McGee deal today.

Because of the horrendous ruin Cavaliers owner Ted Stepien caused when trading batches of first round picks in the 80s, there’s now a rule that says teams can’t trade more than consecutive 1st round picks. So the Jazz will have to wait 2 years after the Thunder give this pick to Philly in order to receive theirs. The Thunder currently have the 17th worst record in the NBA, so as of today, they would not give a pick to the Sixers, and therefore not have to give a pick to the Jazz until 2018 at the earliest. However, if the Thunder improve in the last 25 or so games[ref]With everybody healthy and Enes Kanter in the fold, it might be likely.[/ref] and get to the 19th pick, then the Jazz would receive OKC’s 2017 1st round pick.

That is, unless the Thunder were in the lottery. Then, the Jazz would not acquire the pick until the next year that the Thunder made the playoffs. The Jazz feel confident enough in OKC’s management that, regardless of Kevin Durant’s future in OKC, the team will likely be in the playoffs between 2016-17 and by 2019-2020, before the 1st round pick would sadly fall into 2 2nds. [ref] The best-case scenario for the Jazz might be this: The Thunder improve enough to be a top-12 team this season. Kevin Durant leaves in 2016 to a Eastern Conference team, say, Washington. Westbrook and Ibaka remain under contract until 2016-17, which might make the Thunder good enough to make the playoffs but not good enough to be a top team. It’s complicated.[/ref]

It’s not a brilliant set of conditions, but it’s a 1st round pick. The going rate for those is about $10 million in salary, even with onerous conditions.[ref]Like the one used in today’s Javale McGee trade.[/ref]

Steve Novak out.

Steve Novak had had two good games in his last week in a Jazz uniform, which made this part of the deal tougher for Jazz fans. But the truth is that Novak has always been a negative asset during his time with the Jazz, as evidenced by the good 2nd round pick Toronto had to give up in order to dump his $3.5 million salary on Utah. Barely playing while Utah gave minutes to a rotating cast of D-League characters over him didn’t do his trade value any favors either.

Dumping Novak in this deal, then, saves the Jazz from having to spend a 2nd round pick in order to dump him in the offseason on another team as they chase after free agents. Agents don’t love negotiating with teams that only have money to spend conditional on a trade, so this might open up free agency negotiations a little bit more than had they not moved Novak today. Back of the envelope math shows that the Jazz could end up having up to $18 million to spend in this year’s free agency, with a Booker waive, maybe allowing them the upper hand in free agency negotiations. We’ll see.

Detroit’s 2017 2nd round pick in.

This one’s actually simple! The Jazz get Detroit’s 2017 2nd round pick. This gives the Jazz 4 second round picks in that draft[ref]New York’s from Novak trade, Golden State’s from the RJ trade, Detroit’s from this trade, and their own.[/ref] and up to 3 first round picks[ref]GSW’s 2017 unprotected from the RJ trade, OKC’s from this trade (maybe), and their own.[/ref]. Maybe we’ll see 7 picks traded for the #1?

Again, Dennis Lindsey explained: “”You pooh-pooh 2nd round picks until you hit on one… Those are great chips to go to the poker table and make swaps with as well.”

Tibor Pleiss in.

Tibor Pleiss is a 7’2” German big man who currently plays for FC Barcelona, backing up fellow Jazz prospect Ante Tomic[ref]By the way, I really don’t think Tomic’s ever coming to the NBA.[/ref], ironically enough. Dennis Lindsey has watched infinitely more film on Pleiss than I have, so I’ll let him give the scouting report: “He’s a large man, and he’s getting bigger, more developed. He still has some more strength and power work to do, especially as it relates to our league. He’s big, he has very good touch, good FT shooter. He scored big with his club last year, where he was a starter, then he moved over to Barcelona where he’s Ante Tomic’s backup. He’s mobile for a guy that size.” In other words, he is large.

But when asked if he could be a defensive player, Lindsey answered, “I’d say he’s more of an offensive player. But certainly when you’re 7’2”, by definition you’re a defensive presence.” While Pleiss may be literally present on the floor, we’ve certainly learned with a number of NBA big men that size does not always equal defensive effectiveness.

Oklahoma City tried to bring Pleiss over to the NBA this season, but the buyout amount on his contract with his former team, Laboral Vitoria, was apparently prohibitive. That being said, FC Barcelona was able to conduct the buyout for a reported $650,000, just over the $600,000 allowed without paying the remaining amount on the cap. Still, when that “penalty” was combined with Pleiss’ contract demands as the Thunder’s approached the luxury tax line, they ultimately decided against it. The two planned to reopen negotiations for his NBA move this upcoming summer.

Now, though, that’s up in the air, and will probably be determined after the Jazz make initial moves this offseason. Favors and Gobert are sure to remain on the team, but will Booker? Will the Jazz draft a big man in this year’s studded class, or will they give money to a free agent big? All of these questions determine whether or not there’s space for Pleiss to join the roster.

Grant Jerrett in.

Grant Jerrett was the 40th pick in the 2013 NBA Draft by the Thunder. Lindsey wrapped him up by saying, “He’s 21, he’s 6’10’, he’s mobile, he’s shooting 38% from 3 in the D-League, and we like shooting bigs and the spacing that provides.” In other words, this is another Malcolm Thomas/Erik Murphy play for the Jazz, and while those guys didn’t work out, they also never had a chance to play under Quin Snyder. Jerrett should make the Jazz’s NBA roster immediately, as without him, they only have 12 players on the roster. More info on Jerrett’s profile entering the draft is available on DraftExpress.

Kendrick Perkins will be waived. He’s in this deal to make the salaries work.

This summer

So, what do the Jazz do this summer, now with some additional flexibility after this deal? They could do nothing, make a pick, and forward cap space onto the summer of 2016, but given the rising salary cap, that seems like a bad idea: literally every team will have salary cap space that summer.

They could also chase one of the bigger free agents. The free agent market has a lot of role players who might fit nicely in Utah’s new system: Paul Millsap, Danny Green, Wesley Matthews, and Khris Middleton are all conceivable targets. Would a good player come to Utah? Dennis Lindsey thinks maybe: “If I’m a veteran, I can start to see the pieces, not only be significant, but starting fitting together.”

But perhaps the most intriguing possibility raised by Lindsey today was this one: “We can be a serious player during the draft to take in a veteran to speed up our timeline.” The Jazz could offer their own likely top 10 pick, and/or other future assets, to entirely absorb a big-money player for a team that wanted a fresh start.[ref]Some possibilities here, completely made up just by looking at long-term salaries around the league: Kemba Walker, Chandler Parsons, Mike Conley, Chris Bosh, Nikola Pekovic, Jrue Holiday, Carmelo Anthony, Nikola Vucevic, Eric Bledsoe, Nicolas Batum, Rudy Gay, DeMarcus Cousins, Tony Parker, Kyle Lowry, Marcin Gortat.[/ref] By doing this, the Jazz might acquire a better player than going through the traditional draft and free agency route.

All in all, though, it was a momentous deal. While none of the individual pieces is the tremendously valuable type that you’d hope in return for the former 3rd pick, having a multitude of assets gives the Jazz flexibility to make a big move, possibly this summer, to take the leap as a contending team. It may seem like the assets returned today only further push Utah’s contention timeline down the road, but in reality, it may give them freedom to make the moves needed to win as soon as next season. In the end, with Kanter’s return uncertain at best, the Jazz received significant assets with which to play.

The Utah Jazz have acquired Carrick Felix, a 2nd round pick, and $1 million in return for the non-guaranteed contracts of John Lucas III, Malcolm Thomas and Erik Murphy. Adrian Wojnarowski of Yahoo Sports was the first to report the trade.

From the Jazz’s perspective, there’s little-to-no cost in this trade. The best asset traded away here is Malcolm Thomas, who has impressed enough at the D-League [ref]Last season, Thomas put up 18.3 points and 10.4 rebounds per game in just under 34 minutes in his D-League time.[/ref] and Summer League levels to show that he deserves NBA minutes at this point in his career. That being said, those minutes were going to be hard to find on the Jazz’s PF-heavy roster: Favors, Kanter, Novak, Booker, and Evans can all play the position, and all would presumably be ahead of Thomas on the preliminary depth chart. Thomas can help an NBA team, and could even help a contender[ref]I suspect that he’s better than Ryan Hollins or what remains of Udonis Haslem.[/ref], but unfortunately, he doesn’t look like a great fit in Cleveland, given this:

Malcolm Thomas is pissed for being dealt to the Cavaliers. He played for David Blatt in Israel. Bad fit, got cut.

John Lucas III is the biggest name in the trade, after he played 591 minutes for the Jazz last season. Lucas had actually played far more effectively (and in more minutes) in his time with Toronto and Chicago in his previous two seasons, with a PER of 16.3 and 12.8 respectively, but disappointed with Utah to the tune of a 5.2 PER. Lucas was a beloved presence in the locker room, but clearly couldn’t be counted on to contribute during his minutes played. In fact, his early season performance was so disappointing that the team first re-signed an old Jamaal Tinsley to offset many of his minutes, then when that didn’t work out, found Diante Garrett in the season’s first D-League call-up. Lucas’s contract is unguaranteed, and at $1.6 million, it would be surprising to see him not cut by one team or another before January. That being said, it’s probably somewhat worthwhile for some team to find out whether his true current talent level is closer to his 2011-13 showing or his 2013-14 performance.

Erik Murphy was supposed to be a prototypical stretch 4, but both his shot release and his defensive movement have been slow enough at the NBA level to really disqualify him from NBA minutes. He’s disappointed once again at this year’s Las Vegas Summer League, and has $100,000 coming to him coming to him if he isn’t cut by August 1st. In my opinion, the only way he makes it past that deadline is if Cleveland is on the verge of a trade that would necessitate his contract.

The Jazz would have likely released all three of these guys anyway, due to either high competition (Thomas) or simply to save money and roster spots (Murphy, Lucas). That doesn’t mean they aren’t assets, but Utah probably used those assets to the best of their ability by sending them to a team that’s desperately seeking those non-guaranteed deals to use in a superstar-level trade.

It’s instructive that Ian Clark wasn’t included: while the Cavaliers could have used his contract, it appears that the Jazz would like to keep it, despite that his contract will become fully guaranteed by August 1st. While this might make him less valuable to the Cavs, Clark is also attending the Jazz’s state-of-Utah Junior Jazz tour after that date (August 11-14). It would seem cruel to cut Clark, then expect him to tour rural Utah for a week, though DeMarre Carroll traveled Utah last summer without a contract. The Jazz are thin on the wings, and Clark currently stands as only 4th SG/SF[ref]Or 5th, depending on how you feel about Dante Exum.[/ref] on the roster.

Carrick Felix would be the 5th wing, and there are significant indications that the Jazz like him. Perhaps the biggest public sign is Jazz radio play-by-play man David Locke’s article about Felix and the trade:

Felix is going to [be] a part of the Utah Jazz…. The Jazz scouts have had an eye on Felix and like his defensive mindset, his ability to rebound and believe he can shoot the three. He is not an offensive playmaker with the ball in his hands. This is an opportunity for the Jazz to add a player they like and believe has a chance to develop into a rotational piece.

With his role with the team, Locke often has insider-type knowledge on the thinking of the Jazz; on this issue, this is even further evidenced by that Locke’s 836-word article was posted just 12 minutes after Wojnarowski broke the news. Expect Carrick to stay on the team, for all of the reasons Locke mentioned.

At the NBA level, Carrick Felix is probably most likely to make it as a defensive specialist who’s capable of not embarrassing himself offensively. Personally, I think of him as most similar to Quinton Ross[ref]Who isn’t dead![/ref], another 6’6” guard who could defend extremely well and rebound really well, but was extremely poor with the ball in his hands. Ross couldn’t ever do enough offensively to stay on the floor or remain in the league, so it will be up to Felix to show more on that side of the ball than Ross did.

The 2015 2nd round pick the Jazz receive is likely Cleveland’s own. This is just a guess, but an educated one, as Cleveland only has rights to one other 2015 2nd round pick, Boston’s, and it is top-55 protected. While they could trade that pick instead, it would be meaningless to do so. Given that Cleveland recently signed a really good player, and will likely use these assets to acquire another really good one, the 2nd round pick isn’t likely to be excellent. The $1 million the Jazz receive is nice enough, and gives the Jazz free reign to repeat this process by taking a glance at another cheap prospect.[ref]Edit: Eric Pincus has since reported the total to be $1.3 million. My analysis stands.[/ref]

Overall, the Jazz spent roughly $2.2 million on Lucas, Thomas, and Murphy’s contracts over the last season, and got a goodish prospect and a bad 2nd round pick in return. Given the rapidly approaching decision date on two of the non-guaranteed prospects, it was a small chance for the Jazz to get something long-term for an immediately expiring asset. It’s not very impressive value, but it does continue the Jazz’s plan of using their cap space and money now to receive assets for the future.

It sounds obvious: if you can get both sides to win in a negotiation, it’s much easier to get a deal done.

That was the basis of one of the ten tenets of negotiation in a panel entitled “The Science of a Deal” at this year’s Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, presented by Deepak Malhotra (professor at the Harvard Business School and author of “Negotiation Genius”). Shouldn’t the 30 NBA general managers be experts at this? After all, they’re shepherding some of the world’s most high-profile negotiations.

But, if Rockets GM Daryl Morey and Warriors GM Bob Myers are to be believed, most teams don’t negotiate that way. Instead, they assert that most GMs are looking for such a bargain that they’ll consistently and dramatically offer far less than a player is worth. Worse, some GMs will try the used-car salesman approach, and explain to a team’s GM what the needs of his own team are! It’s a tactic that, in the estimation of Morey and Myers, has never worked.

In Friday’s panel, Myers took the audience through one deal in particular that featured a multitude of moving parts: the Warriors acquisition of Andre Iguodala. The deal was so complicated and difficult that co-panelist Morey thought that there was “no way” that it could get done. But somehow, everything came together.

It all began when Warriors owner Joe Lacob wanted more success after Golden State’s run into the second round last season. He wanted to take the next step, and to the notoriously forceful Lacob, that meant acquiring another big-name player in free agency. The Warriors approached Dwight Howard, even meeting with him and his team in person, but Howard decided to go elsewhere.

Andre Iguodala, though, was more amenable. Iguodala liked what the Warriors were building, and could see himself as a long-term resident of the Bay Area. He instructed his agent, Rob Pelinka, to pursue the Golden State possibility.

The problem, though, is that the Warriors didn’t have any money under the salary cap. In fact, they were nearly $12 million over the cap, burdened by the expensive (but expiring) contracts of Richard Jefferson and Andris Biedrins. Despite this, Myers went into negotiations with Pelinka anyway, trying to find a salary that both Iguodala and the team could agree to. Interestingly, absent in this negotiation was what the Warriors could afford to pay, after all, they could pay nothing. Instead, it was a multi-day discussion of Iguodala’s hypothetical worth to the Warriors.

Eventually, and because both sides wanted Iguodala in Golden State, the sides agreed to a deal, a 4 year, $48 million contract. If the impossible somehow were to occur, if miracles were to happen, Golden State would need to move $24 million dollars off their cap immediately: $12 million to get down to the cap level, and another $12 million to fit Iguodala’s contract into.

Myers, the attempted superhero achieving the physically impossible, went around the league. He called (or text messaged) each team’s GM: was there anybody willing to take on $24 million? Naturally, not many teams were: $24 million represents nearly half of a team’s salary cap. The team would have to be in a unique position to be even able to take on that much salary, especially in the forms of Andris Biedrins and Richard Jefferson, two players who gave the Warriors very little on the court.

Worse, the teams that were able to make a move became suspicious of Golden State’s intentions: were they doing this because they knew they could sign Dwight Howard? Myers pleaded innocent, promising that his team merely wanted Iguodala, but it was of little use. Teams demanded 4, even 5 1st round draft picks as compensation for the salary. GMs, again, thought they could fleece Myers in his time of desperation. It wouldn’t work.

But Myers was desperate. The Warriors’ brain trust had now mentally pictured Iguodala on their team, and correctly saw him as a perfect fit. Myers couldn’t sleep, the deal yet to be done floating in his head. Pelinka, with limited time for his free agent to work on the open market, set a deadline for noon the following day. If Myers couldn’t solve his cap problems by then, the deal was off.

Myers again scoured the league, calling the teams that had even shown vague interest at the time of his initial call. Utah had been one of those teams, but wasn’t seriously interested without more incentive. But on the morning before the deadline, Myers played his last card: adding the maximum $3.2 million in cash allowed by the CBA.

Surprisingly, the new extra bait worked: Utah had just sent $3.1 million dollars to Denver for the rights to Rudy Gobert, the #27 pick, and was eager to get its money back. Getting the maximum amount in cash was like adding another late 1st round pick, and meant something substantial to the Jazz: essentially, they felt confident that $3.2 million could be put to use effectively in a similar trade in the future. Beyond that, the Warriors offered two 1st round picks, two 2nd round picks, all in exchange for the bloated salaries of Richard Jefferson, Andris Biedrins, and (to a lesser extent) Brandon Rush.

It made sense for the Jazz to take on the salaries in a year in which they weren’t going to compete, and get additional assets for the future. The Jazz also negotiated the picks to work out most favorably for them. For example, the “Stepien Rule” prevents teams from trading consecutive 1st round picks. That means that if the Jazz were going to get a 2014 pick (which they wanted), the next first round pick couldn’t be traded until 2016. But the Jazz know, as does the rest of the league, that the 2017 draft class is highly-rated. Yes, they’re 9th graders, but at this moment in time, it looks like a particularly skilled class of 9th graders. Utah, therefore, asked Golden State to send its 2017 pick rather than its 2016 one. It may require more patience, but could be well worth it in the end. All of the draft picks Utah acquired in the deal are unprotected, meaning that there’s significant upside for Utah should Golden State encounter turbulence.

It seemed like a good solution for both sides: the Warriors would get Andre Iguodala, adding the defensive wing presence they wanted, and the Jazz would get significant long-term assets. But then, Myers applied the tenth and final of Malhotra’s negotiating tenets: “Never end a negotiation with a ‘Yes'”. Simply put, just because a deal is done, doesn’t mean that it can’t be improved upon.

In this case, with the Warriors having signed Iguodala, Denver faced the prospect of losing one of its best players for nothing. Rather than that, Denver chose to become involved in the deal to at least get a Traded Player Exception it could use later. The Nuggets also happened to be wrapping up negotiations with a former Jazz player, Randy Foye. In return, the Jazz would receive an additional second rounder. For Golden State’s part, structuring the deal as a sign-and-trade would allow them to structure Iguodala’s contract so that it declined in its final year, saving them money down the road. The pieces all fit: the complicated salary dump became a three-team trade, in which the Warriors received Iguodala, the Nuggets received Foye, and the Jazz acquired all of the expiring salary and 5 picks.

Both Morey and Myers consider the trade as a win for all sides. Sure, the Nuggets lost the best player, but he was gone anyway. At least the Nuggets got something to use in the future. For the Jazz, they began their rebuilding process in earnest, with 5 additional draft picks to put towards the process of becoming a contender. As Morey put it Friday, “it turned out to be a very good deal for Utah, especially when you look at [what happened at] the trade deadline.”

For the Warriors? They acquired one of the most important two-way players in the league, one that’s been absolutely critical to their success this season.

And it wouldn’t have come together but for the winning negotiation tactics of everyone involved. Congrats, GMs, you’ve passed Negotiations 101.

In a slowly announced trade Friday, the Jazz revealed part of their blueprint by taking on the contracts of Richard Jefferson, Andris Biedrins, Brandon Rush from the Golden State Warriors. The move frees up cap space for the Warriors to pursue Andre Iguodala. The Jazz also received Golden State’s 2014 and 2017 first round picks, both unprotected, as well as multiple second round picks. In return, the Jazz gave up Kevin Murphy to the Warriors.

I’m not sure there’s ever been a deal in which it was more clear that money is the driving factor in NBA trades. The Jazz are receiving 3 players (including 2 former stars in Richard Jefferson and Andris Biedrins) and at least 4 draft picks (including 2 unprotected firsts) in exchange for a second round pick with an unguaranteed contract (Murphy) who scored a total of 15 points last season. In terms of words used and names named, this deal seems really one-sided.

But, no, Richard Jefferson and Andris Biedrins have devolved into complete shells of their former selves. Both hardly played in Golden State last season, and the skills that made them intriguing are gone. Brandon Rush has had just 1 good season, 2 years ago, but will be recovering from a ACL tear that he suffered in 2012-13’s second game. On the other hand, their underwhelming games are outrageously compensated: Jefferson will make over 11 million dollars for his efforts next season, and Biedrins will ply his 7.7 PER skills for $9 million. Overall, however, the Jazz will have to pay over $20 million in salary for next season for those two players.

That’s not the end of the costs, however. In order to create the cap room for these contracts to make the trade legal by the collective bargaining agreement, the Jazz had to renounce some of their cap holds, the temporary placeholders that prevent teams from cheating salary cap rules. In particular, the Jazz had to renounce all but $6 million of their cap holds, meaning that Utah can no longer use Bird rights on Al Jefferson, Paul Millsap, Mo Williams, or Greg Ostertag. Al Jefferson was a known loss, after signing an expensive deal with Charlotte on Thursday, and Greg Ostertag is no longer relevant, but Millsap and Williams cannot be re-signed for anything more than the roughly $6 million dollars in cap space the Jazz have remaining. That might be in Williams’ salary range, but Millsap will surely go for a higher dollar amount. Millsap has spent 7 seasons with the franchise, and is nearly universally beloved by Jazz fans. Both his numbers (which were impressive, especially looking at some advanced stats) and his character were exemplary, and whichever team picks him up will be lucky to have him.

Finally, the deal also postpones the Jazz’s much-vaunted flexibility for another season. This means that the Jazz are officially out of the race for any big name free agents, as their cap space simply won’t allow signing anyone with a large salary. Even Kyle Korver’s deal of 4 years, $24 million would likely be too much for the Jazz to afford with this move. Furthermore, this is it for these sorts of trades: the Jazz can’t take on much more salary in return for assets until next summer, when these deals — along with Marvin Williams’ $7.5 million contract — come off the books. The Jazz had refused many trades in order to preserve this summer’s flexibility and they used that bullet on today’s trade. They do not get it back until next year.

This is all to say: the costs of this move are rather great for Utah. What they receive in return, then, also has to be great. Jefferson and Biedrins are not that, so the outcome of this deal balances on Brandon Rush and how the picks turn out.

Let’s start with Rush. Rush was drafted out of the league when he was already 22 with the 13th pick by Indiana. The Pacers expected someone to play right away, but were ultimately disappointed with his play, playing nearly 30 MPG and putting up under 10 PER over his three seasons before being traded to Golden State in the Jarrett Jack deal. In Golden State, however, he took far fewer mid-range shots, and focused on taking shots at the rim and making 45% of his threes. Rush was also pretty good defensively, acting as GSW’s primary backcourt defender and holding opponents to a 13.1 PER against, according to 82games. If he plays like 2011-12, he’s exactly the kind of 3&D wing player that you absolutely need to succeed in today’s NBA, and his acquisition is a good one. However, his contract is only for this upcoming year, making it less clear that he will help the next good Jazz team. He also doesn’t have more upside beyond what he displayed 2 years ago, as he turns 28 on Sunday, and he may take away minutes from the younger Burks and Hayward. The best case scenario here may be that Rush spends the first half of the season showing that he’s recovered from the ACL tear and still has lots of value as a excellent role player, at which point he’s traded to a contending team willing to give up even more value, perhaps yet another 2014 first rounder.

The picks are much more difficult to place an exact value on. Utah received the 2014 and 2017 1st round picks of GSW unprotected and two yet-to-be-announced second rounders (my guess: GSW’s 2015 and 2016 2nd round picks). The 2014 1st round pick is really the only one we can analyze, given our limited information. If you assume Golden State would earn about the 21st pick again (a fair assumption on the aggregate: I think it’s likely the Warriors are better this season than last, but also think that it’s likely they’re not so lucky with injuries given their roster), and using this research from basketball-reference, the 21st pick is likely to give about 7.3 Win Shares over the initial, salary protected, portion of their career. Given an estimated value of $1.7 million per win (which is the result of dividing total NBA salary by total NBA wins), the 21st pick is worth about 12.4 million dollars. Given that the 21st pick is paid roughly $5 million over the course of their first 4 years, you end up with a $7 million dollar surplus value. Not bad. Given the talent of the 2014 draft, I think it’s also fair to bump that number by a few notches, completely unscientifically, to about $10 million.

The 2017 pick is nearly impossible to analyze, there’s just too much noise in the system. The Warriors have only Steph Curry under contract for that season. We also have no idea about the current 9th graders likely to be involved in that draft. There may be another lockout or strike, as either side can opt out of the CBA after the 2016-17 season. Pegging it at roughly the same value of the 2014 pick seems fair, but with such huge levels of variance that the guess is ultimately meaningless. Without knowledge of what 2nd rounders the Jazz received, those too are impossible to analyze, even more so than the typical boom-or-likely-bust scenario that 2nd round picks usually represent.

Still, you can make a case for the deal as roughly fair for both sides: the Jazz get picks that probably have a cumulative value in the low 8 figures and an above-neutral asset in Brandon Rush, in return for the responsibility of paying Jefferson and Biedrins $20 million dollars combined in a year in which the opportunity cost is relatively low. Given that neither team fleeced the other in terms of value, the trade had much more to do with enacting Dennis Lindsey’s future plan for the Utah Jazz.

In particular, because the flexibility is gone, this trade largely locks in the 12 players currently under contract for the 2013-14 season. Any other future moves done by the Jazz will be done around the fringes: adding a DeMarre Carroll here, a backup point guard there. The roster is talented (probably too talented to be in the bottom 5 of the lottery next season), but very young, and doesn’t look like it’s in a position for contending for a playoff spot in the Western Conference unless 2 or 3 of Favors, Hayward, Kanter, Burks, or Burke massively surprise. The team is moving to its youth, as most Jazz fans wanted all along, but the trade makes next season likely to be a sub-.500 one.

But the future beyond that is bright. The season should allow the young quintet a chance to develop, and the two picks in 2014’s legendary draft should help add talent to further a young core. The team will have roughly $35 million in salary cap room, which can be used on the extensions of Hayward and Favors, plus perhaps adding a marquee free agent. The next contending Jazz team could come as early as 2014-15. Make no mistake: the rebuild is underway.