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Saturday, June 05, 2004

A resolution was recently introduced at the SBC urging Christian parents to withdraw their children from the public schools.

What is of interest is the hostile reaction that this is provoking from some putatively conservative Christian quarters. So far I’ve tallied the following objections:

1. It runs counter to the Baptist belief in freedom of conscience.

2. It is divisive.

3. It will be ineffectual, like the Disney boycott.

4. Fundamentalists are busybodies.

5. It is hypocritical. We need to put our own house in order.

6. Public schools are only symptomatic of the problem, not its source.

7. It would dilute our public witness.

Let us weigh the worth of these objections.

1.

i) This sidesteps the question of the child’s welfare in the interest of some abstract principle of freedom. But what is more important—to be a good Baptist, or to be a good parent?

ii) Since the resolution, even if it were to pass, would be a nonbinding resolution, it is hard to see how this infringes on individual conscience.

If a conscientious objection such a hothouse flower that it will wilt under a little heat, then it lacks much moral or intellectual substance.

2. Taking a stand on anything is divisive. Not to take a stand is also divisive. So the only relevant question is whether a given issue is important enough to risk division over. Surely the moral formation of our youth ought to be a high priority.

3.

i) It is hard to see how the same stand can be both divisive and ineffectual. It can only be divisive if it enjoys some measure of popular support, in which case it should enjoy some measure of popular success.

Of course, everyone will not go along with it, but since when is unanimity a condition of moral action?

The pertinent question is whether it would do more good than hard.

ii) The objection is circular. I won’t take a stand since taking a stand is ineffectual. I won’t make a move until you make the first move. Obviously, though, its degree of success is in direct proportion to the number of those who act on it.

iii) In any event, this objection is another red-herring. Parents are primarily responsible for what they do with their own kids, and not what other parents do.

4. Even if true, this ad hominem attack is not germane to the issue.

5. The fact that the SBC has a problematic attendance record and retention rate is hardly an argument against the resolution. If anything, this is designed to counter complacency and get parents more involved.

6.

i) This is a half-truth. Public schools are both a source and symptom of the problem. The NEA is well to the left of the general culture, and is trying to recruit the next generation.

ii) This is an all-or-nothing argument. But you do what you can. You don’t do nothing because you can’t do everything. And the only way of doing the most you can is to attack the problem on several fronts at once or over time.

7.

i) Even if this were so, it is not the duty of a child to be an evangelist—any more than to be a boy soldier. In the nature of the case, a child is imitative and impressionable. You corrupt a child by putting him in a corrupt environment.

There are, of course, exceptions, depending on the child’s maturity and strength of character. But this is not a general argument for placing Christian children in the public school system. Rather, the reverse. Make no mistake, this is spiritual warfare, and the battlefield is no place of kids.

ii) The best method of child-to-child evangelism is to raise Christian children, and then let them freely relate with the other kids in the neighborhood. Tossing your kids in a snake pit is a way of losing your own kids rather than saving any others. The way to save a snake-bit victim is not to for me to get bitten as well, but for me to stay healthy so that I can suck the poison from his wound.

What, exactly, are the best arguments for abortion, and how should a Christian respond? Jonah Engle has gleaned seven "talking points" for "freedom of choice," from NARAL, Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, and the National Abortion Federation.
Cf. http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030519&s=engle

Let's run through each of these and evaluate them one-by-one. For ease of reference, her numbered points will be put in quotation marks.

"1) Reproductive Freedoms Are a Fundamental Human Right
It is a fundamental right of each individual to manage his or her fertility. Such reproductive rights are an integral part of women's social, economic and political rights, and have been affirmed in numerous international treaties and conventions including CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women) and the Program of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development."

i) Note here, and throughout her talking-points, the studied use of abstract nouns and generic designations. "Woman." "Abortion." "Procedure." But abortion is a "procedure" applied to "pregnant" women. A pregnant woman is a mother. So why not discuss abortion in relation to motherhood? Wouldn't that be more accurate? And an expression like "prenatal infanticide" would be more transparent and accurate than an opaque term like "abortion" or an antiseptic term like "procedure."

But, of course, the reason for the choice of such words is—on the one hand—to dehumanize the object of abortion (the baby), while—on the other hand—to distance the subject of abortion (the mother, abortionist) from moral complicity. Clear communication would weaken rather than strengthen the argument for abortion, so Engle resorts to vague euphemisms.

"Mother" is a very loaded word. Motherhood implies a relationship in a way that "womanhood" does not. What is more, motherhood implies a responsible relationship. Consider the difference between saying that "a woman has a right to an abortion" and "a mother has a right to kill her own child"? Obviously it's easier to sell the first formulation than the second. Yet the second is formulation is what we're really talking about.

ii) Note, also, the euphemism of "reproductive rights." Are prolifers denying women the right to reproduce? If Engle believes in abortion, why is she afraid to say what she means?

iii) To say that abortion is a fundamental human right begs the whole question. This is a tendentious assertion rather than a reasoned argument.

iv) But, assuming, for the sake of argument, that abortion is a human right, then why appeal to international law? A political entity cannot confer a human right, but only a civil right. So either abortion is a human right, in which case international law is irrelevant; or else abortion is a civil right, in which case it is not a human right, and is revocable by the same political process that conferred it in the first place.

v) The appeal to international law is viciously circular. To the extent that abortion is a civil right under international law, that is only because the abortion industry has lobbied to make it so.

vi) We might add that the whole notion of having rights is, itself, a cultural construct of the Enlightenment. So how, then, can this framework achieve the force of a universal norm? Why does Engle canonize the ethical scheme of dead white European males?

vii) Why the abrupt introduction of the male pronoun into the discussion—"his or her fertility." I thought we were talking about abortion. Do men have abortions?

"2) The Denial of Safe, Legal and Affordable Abortions Threatens Women's Health
In rare cases, carrying a pregnancy to term can pose a serious health risk to a pregnant woman. Whether or not abortion is safe, legal or affordable, women still have recourse to it. When abortion is illegal they are forced into having underground and often unsafe operations. This greatly compromises the health and well-being of pregnant women. Each year at least 78,000 women die around the world due to complications from unsafe abortions (13 percent of maternal deaths), and hundreds of thousands more suffer short- and long-term disability. Legalizing abortion helps prevent this tragedy--within five years of legalization, abortion-related deaths decreased 85 percent in the United States."

i) A life of crime can also pose a serious health risk. A sniper may be shot. A terrorist may blow himself up. Are we entitled to do wrong with impunity?

ii) How are mothers "forced" into abortion? The only example I know of are boyfriends who resent the prospect of paying child support. Is feminism siding with the boyfriend? Doesn't sound like women's rights to me.

iii) When I was growing up, which was not so very long ago (I was born in 1959), a defining feature of familial love and duty was that a husband would give his life to save his wife, while a mother would give her life to save her child. But now we've come to the point where the child should die to save the mother—even if the mother's life is not in danger. I would only remark that children tutored in the abortion ethic are more than likely to round out the logical by euthanizing their elderly parents. It is a very short, logical step from aborticide to parricide.

iv) Another unspoken assumption which underlies this argument is that no one should ever be called upon to do the right thing if it entails a personal hardship. But this, once again, illustrates the moral inversion of abortion ethics. For the acid test of virtue is doing the right thing when it does cost you something, when it does entail a sacrifice of your own well-being in the interests of another.

"3) Legalizing Abortion Does Not Increase its Incidence
Statistics show that women worldwide, when faced with an unwanted pregnancy, seek abortions regardless of the legality of the procedure, and whether or not safe services are available. Countries as diverse as Canada, Tunisia and Turkey liberalized their abortion laws without an increase in the abortion rate. Holland, though it has a non-restrictive abortion law and free abortions, has one of the lowest abortion rates in the world, far lower than many countries where abortion is illegal (e.g., Chile and Brazil)."

i) Statistics also show that wife-beaters worldwide, when faced with an unwanted wife, seek to batter or murder their spouse regardless of the legality of the procedure. So should we legalized uxoricide? There are, in fact, cultures in which wife-killing is socially condoned.

ii) Suppose we were to substitute "unwanted blacks" or "unwanted Jews" for "unwanted pregnancies." Is the value of my life contingent on the valuation of a second-party? Many genocidal tyrants would appreciate Engle's ethical calculus.

"4) Medical Abortion Is a Very Safe Procedure, Especially in the First Trimester (When 88 Percent of Abortions Take Place)
The health risks from an abortion are minimal.
- Less than 1 percent of women experience a major complication.
- The risk of death associated with childbirth is eleven times greater than the risk of death from an abortion."

i) The abortionist is hardly a disinterested source of information. Malpractice suits are bad for business.

iii) Assuming for the sake of argument that the stats are true, so what? Is murder supposed to be safe?

iv) Were it not for childbirth, there would be no abortionists. The radical feminist comes into the world the same way as the prolifer. The only difference is that the prolifer is grateful for the process whereas the abortionist wants to slam the door on those who come after.

v) Statistics show that 100% of everyone born will die one day. Pretty high risk! Should we outlaw childbirth?

"5) When Women Are Not Free to Choose, Children Risk Coming into the World With Parents Who Are Not in a Position to Properly Look After Them"

i) "Free to choose"? Another euphemism. Isn't "to choose" the sort of verb that ordinarily takes a direct object? You'd think we were talking about a woman's right to choose a dress or order an entrée.

ii) Except for victims of rape and incest, most pregnant women have already made a choice. They chose to engage in procreation. That is what sex is. "Sex" is short for sexual reproduction. Pregnancy is the natural outcome of sexual intercourse.

iii) Either Engle believes that women are moral agents, in which case they're responsible for the consequences of their life-style choices; or else she believes that they are like little children who must be placed under the authority of a guardian. If the latter, they don't have the right to make their own decisions, for they are in a condition of diminished responsibility; if the former, then they don't have the right to demand that government protect them from the consequences of their life-style choices.

iv) The child is already in the world. It has been conceived. The child is in its mother's womb, and the mother is in the world. So this would not be an argument for abortion, but—at most—contraception. Abortion does more than put a child at risk—it kills him in the womb.

v) A child is not like a sales' item you can return to the store if you change your mind.

vi) If women were truly autonomous, why would they seek intimacy with members of the other sex. Why not go the lesbian route? Why are there so many unwanted pregnancies unless women need men because they're emotionally dependent on men, just as men need women for the same reason? What the argument for abortion presupposes is not autonomy, but codependency; but, of course, that's an argument against a "woman's" right to an abortion.

"6) Though Abortion Remains Legal, Restricting Access to Abortion Penalizes the Poor, Who Are Less Able to Pay for Such Operations
Despite the fact that abortion is legal in the United States, access is decreasing as numerous barriers have been set up. These include consent forms, extended waiting periods and, most notably, the Hyde Amendment, passed into law in 1977. The legislation denies federal funding for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest or when a pregnant woman's life is endangered) for poor women who rely on Medicaid, disabled women who rely on Medicare and Native American women who rely on the Indian Health Service for healthcare. In addition to these women, federal legislation denies access to abortions for Peace Corps volunteers, women in federal prison, women in the military, teenagers who participate in the State Children's Health Insurance Plan, patients of Title X family-planning clinics, residents of the District of Columbia and federal employees and their families. Only fifteen states make state Medicaid monies available for nondiscriminatory funding of abortion. Abortions in the first trimester without complications start at $250-$350, and can run into the high hundreds or thousands of dollars. Without Medicaid funding, low-income women do not have equal access to a vital and legal medical procedure. Furthermore, welfare laws discourage states from providing assistance for abortions as well as to unwed mothers, placing low-income women in a double bind."

i) A well-heeled Mafia Don can better afford to hire a hit-man than a guy flipping hamburgers for a living. Does that mean that the government should provide hit-men free of charge for those who cannot afford one?

ii) Where is the father in this equation? Doesn't a man have some contribution to make in this process? How does a pregnant woman become impregnated in the first place?

Why does feminism place all the burden on the mother? Why does feminism let the guy off the hook? To listen to Engle, you'd think that every birth was a virgin birth.

Obviously a man shares equal responsibility. But Engle can't bring herself to make that elementary point, for as soon as she concedes that a man has some input in getting a woman pregnant, then—as the father—he ought to have some input in whether to terminate the pregnancy.

But that would spoil the argument for the feminine autonomy. In order for the woman to be an autonomous agent, she must be held solely responsible; in order for her to be held solely responsible, the man must not be held responsible for his actions. This is a paradox of feminism. It "empowers" women by absolving men of any blame, for men cannot be blameworthy unless they're responsible, and they cannot be responsible unless they share responsibility with the woman they impregnate. Isn't it obvious that promiscuous men get the better of this deal?

iii) If there is a moral disparity in play, it is that children of the well-to-do are at higher risk of being murdered in the womb than the children of the poor. If we outlaw abortion, then that will level out the injustice. Abortion penalizes the innocent child.

iv) Is Engle afraid that we have too many American Indian babies? Is she advocating genocide? Would she like to keep them a permanent and infinitesimal minority? Is she disappointed that more dumpsters aren't overflowing with aborted Indian babies? Seems rather racist to me.

v) There is, of course, a financial correlation between poor mothers and unwed mothers. Once again, lifestyle choices have economic consequences. Whose responsibility is that?

vi) In what sense is abortion a "vital medical procedure." Pregnancy is not a life-threatening disease.

vii) I suppose you can call abortion a "medical procedure," just as you could call the gas chambers a medical procedure.

viii) "Teenagers"? "Parental consent"? Well, yes. Even if you believe in abortion for grown women, is Engle such a fanatic that she would insist on privacy laws which prevent the prosecution of statutory rape because it can't be reported to the authorities?

ix) Why should a school counselor or stranger at an abortion clinic—a stranger with a vested business interest—have more input on the decision than the girl's mother or father? For what other major medical "procedure" would Engel leave the decision-making up to an underage girl and her handlers, then bandage her up and dump her back on the doorstep of her own home—without ever notifying a parent of potential complications or emotional trauma? What if the abortion is botched?

It tells you a lot about the level of moral desperation when the "right" of teenage access to abortion comes at the cost of immunity to medical malpractice and statutory rape. With the teenage "right" to an abortion comes the right to be raped and butchered. Feminism is a beautiful thing, ain't it though?

x) If we have too many unwanted pregnancies in the military, that's an argument, not for abortion, but for abolishing a coed military.

xi) Engle overlooks the obvious correlation between the welfare state and a culture of poverty and dependency. But this is only too typical of left-wing social policy. When one entitlement fails, it demands yet another entitlement to prop up the first.

xii) "Complications"? Whoa! I thought Engle had just assured us, under point #4, that abortion was a very safe "procedure." Now, however, she's warning us about the medical complications. In order to make a therapeutic argument for abortion, she must play down the health risk; but in order to make a fiscal argument, she must play up the risk.

"7) The Most Effective Way to Reduce Abortions Is to Reduce Unintended Pregnancies
Western and Eastern Europe have similar abortion laws but the West has far greater access to effective contraception. They also have, respectively, the lowest and highest abortion rates in the world. The Bush Administration's decision to end contributions to the UN Population Fund, which funds family-planning projects in 142 countries, will perversely result in approximately 2 million unwanted pregnancies, 800,000 abortions, 4,700 maternal deaths and 77,000 infant and child deaths."

i) I have no objection to contraction, although some so-called contraceptives are really abortifacients in disguise (e.g. the morning-after pill).

ii) Engle is deliberately confounding abortion with contraception.

iii) Why does Engle suppose that American wage-earners, who work hard to feed and clothe their own kids, are responsible for funding birth-control measures around the world? Isn't that pretty paternalistic?

iv) Of course, the only "effective" form of contraception is abstinence. So Engle should be advocating abstinence programs instead.

v) Hasn't Engle ever heard of private charity? If feminism is really that compassionate about the plight of poor mothers around the world, why don't Engle and her coterie chip in and start their own fund for the free distribution of prophylactics? They seem to be very generous with everyone's money but their own.

vi) For that matter, if Engle and her coterie feel that tender-hearted about the plight of the poor, why don't they sell their domiciles in Malibu and Manhattan, go live with the poor, role up their sleeves, and apply their social theories about the root-causes of poverty in situ? Or would such a move put a crimp in their standard of living?

Friday, June 04, 2004

Fideism is a common phenomenon in Christendom. And it is generally used as a term of abuse. Hence, it is important for us to define our terms and sort out the varieties and various motives giving rise to fideism.

I. Exposition:

In the nature of the case, fideism tends to be anti-intellectual. Hence, it is somewhat elusive of definition, for it amounts to a rather fuzzy, nugatory position. In general, fideism opposes faith to reason, and places faith above reason. But this is so vague that it could mean almost anything, so let us break the question down into different answers given by different schools of fideism.

1. Pragmatic fideism.

Many believers are too unsophisticated to know how to answer objections to the faith. They become flustered and intimidated when confronted with such objections. A class case is the Christian college student who comes out of a reflexive and unreflective Christian environment, and is suddenly thrown into a social environment hostile to his hereditary and unquestioning faith.

Having no ready-made answers or mental discipline, one reaction is to retreat into the citadel of his fideistic will-power. He has faith in faith. The act of faith becomes a self-validating exercise.

This form of fideism is basically a defense mechanism or default-setting, in the absence of a positive counteroffensive.

2. Dogmatic fideism.

Many believers are committed to a theological tradition or another which assigns a large role to mystery. God is believed to be almost ineffable. We know not what he is, but what he is not. Or else, it is said that the relation between various articles of the faith presents the mind with evident and irreconcilable antinomies. So these teachings must be held in a state of tension, affirming them separately without attempting to relate them. Indeed, any effort at harmonization is deemed to be downright impious.

So (2) has a theological basis, unlike (1). Yet someone raised in (2) will fall back very easily on (1).

3. Liberal fideism.

Some professing believers have divided intellectual loyalties. They believe that precritical faith is simply incredible. But they still wish to retain a foot in the church.

So they compartmentalize faith and reason and devise insulating strategies to safe-guard a little corner for faith. They redefine the scope of faith, relegating it to the confines of an airtight, climate-controlled hothouse where it can flourish on its own, shielded from direct and deadly contact with the outside elements.

Traditional terms and categories are retained, but redefined, as a code language, with a different set of truth-conditions.

These range along the left-hand of the theological continuum from mediating theologians—who continue to honor some remnants of traditional orthodoxy—to Christian-coated infidels—who don’t believe in God at all.

II. Evaluation

1.

i) One problem with this maneuver is that those who resort to it the most are least equipped to shoulder the burden. They repair to faith because their faith has been shaken by reason, or what appears to be reason. So they’re making more demands on their faith at the very time in which their faith is overtaxed. To fall back on faith during a crisis of faith is like trying to clamber one's way out of a gravel pit.

ii) Faith without reason is only as strong as we happen to feel at any given moment. And our feelings are calibrated to our physical and emotional well-being. Putting faith in faith is a form of self-cannibalism that repays ever-diminishing returns. It places a boulder on the wobbly shoulders of a weak-kneed believer who is least able to bear up under the personal pressure.

A few ounces of solid reason are worth a ton of will-power. Uncovering the rational foundations of faith lays a solid foundation for intellectual security, not insecurity. Paving over the fault-lines does not forestall an earthquake. If you suffer from intellectual doubts and impediments to faith, then the best remedy is to answer your doubts and remove your impediments.

This doesn’t mean that you have to have the answers to everything. But, again, one benefit of knowing why you believe is that it helps you to discriminate between what answers you can and cannot live without by teaching you what questions are important and answerable.

iii) Often, too, the proper object of faith is lost sight of in fideism. Faith is not self-referential. Faith does not supply its own object. This is not, or ought not to be, a question of my will-power, of my will to believe—as if faith were a mirror or human monument. Faith is not about me and my will, but about God and God’s will.

iv) A beleaguered believer needs to remind himself that, in the church, different members have different gifts and callings. The fact that he may not feel cut out to do apologetics doesn’t mean that he should turn against sanctified reason. Rather, it means that he should delegate the task of defending the faith to a fellow believer who does have a vocation in apologetics.

v) At the same time, it is easy for a Christian to sell himself short. He may have more intellectual aptitude that he is aware of.

vi) It is often said that Scripture assumes rather than proves the existence of God. But this is a half-truth. It is true that Scripture never treats the existence of God as an open question. God is the foundation for everything else.

On the other hand, most of Scripture is addressed to the community of faith, so there is rarely occasion even to raise the issue. When, however, the Bible is addressed the unbeliever, as in Isaiah’s indictment of idolatry (Isa 40-48), or Paul’s speech before the Areopagus, it does make a case for faith.

vii)

2.

i) This argument is only as good as the argument for the theological tradition that underwrites it. So it only pushes the problem back a step. Why believe that God is ineffable? Why believe in dialectical theology?

ii) "Faith" means more than one thing. "Faith" can mean conviction, a conviction founded on trustworthy testimony or self-evident intuition.

Or faith can mean "taking on faith" something you don’t know to be true. You hope it’s true, and you act as thought it’s true.

Now certainly there are cases in Scripture where a believer simply takes God’s word for it, without any corroborative evidence, or even in the teeth of apparently contrary evidence.

So you might say that he’s taking something on faith, and yet he’s not taking everything on faith. He believes in the promise of God because he knows that God has given him this promise.

iii) It is licit to invoke mystery as a result of exegesis; it is illicit to invoke mystery as an exegetical short-cut.

iv) One of the problems with dogmatic fideism is that it lacks a principled criterion for telling when and when not to apply the harmonistic principle. For example, universalism, conditional immortality, and everlasting punishment have all found proponents who cite Scripture in defense of their doctrine.

Yet conservative churches otherwise amenable to irreconcilable tensions in theology are quick to reconcile the Biblical data to the exclusion of one or more rival views on the afterlife.

v) These churches almost make it an article of faith that certain articles of faith are paradoxical. But the Bible itself never says that. This is, at most, a subjective impression that some readers receive when they study Scripture and do systematic theology.

And this impression is often generated by certain preconceived notions they bring to the study of Scripture, such as the one-over-many relation, or relation between time and eternity, or conditions of moral incumbency.

Yet we should never canonize our extra-canonical preconceptions, according them a dogmatic status, and then appeal to that as justification to disdain apologetics. Ironically, to do so is—itself—a tacit appeal to rationalism in defense of fideism.

vi) The conventional terms of the debate tend to prejudice our expectations and options. When you talk about the relation between faith and reason, this treats faith as one thing and reason as another. But, of course, that is one of the very points at issue.

Is this the best way to frame the contrast? Could we not recast the issue as a contrast between divine and human reason? And even though finite reason is naturally subordinate to infinite reason, there is, in this, a reasonable, and not unreasonable, submission of lower reason to higher reason.

vii) There is also the question of whether we have a right to divide the spoils of God’s kingdom, ceding the high ground of reason to the Devil while we reserve the low road of faith for ourselves. Does the devil really have a monopoly on reason? Doesn’t Scripture present infidelity as irrational—even insane?

viii) It is frequently felt that reason is a threat to faith. And it often works out that way, does it not? But if reason can incline to infidelity, ignorance can incline to heresy. So fideism is as much a threat to the faith as unbridled reason.

3.

i) Liberal fideism is a transparent exercise in damage control, and one wonders just who the liberal fideist thinks he’s kidding. He isn’t fooling the outright atheist; he isn’t fooling the conservative. Is he fooling himself? If so, this evinces an unhealthy and insatiable appetite for self-delusion. But oftentimes the exercise is so calculated that it’s hard to think there isn’t an element of willful deception as well. It is, however, psychologically possible to be both a deceiver and self-deceived, to varying degrees.

ii) There is a basic duplicity to liberal fideism. On the one hand, it seems to demote reason, holding reason in low esteem. On the other hand, this is a last-ditch maneuver. It really believes that reason got the better of the argument, that science or philosophy or higher criticism has invalidated precritical faith. Hence, the resort to faith, which appears to promote faith over reason, really assumes a very low view of faith and a very high view of reason. So the paeans to pious faith and existential authenticity are a fairly conspicuous and clumsy charade.

iii) The Christian faith claims to be both true and obligatory because it is a revealed religion, predicated on certain historic events, reflecting the direct intervention of God in time and space. But unless the Christian faith is true on these grounds, it cannot be validated on any other grounds; and unless it is credible on these grounds, it cannot be rendered credible on any other grounds.

iv) Liberal fideism often lays stress on non-cognitive knowledge, on an ineffable, existential encounter with God. But this surrogate is false on two grounds:

a) In this life, we know Christ by description, and not by acquaintance. As John often explains, authentic faith is a matter of knowing and doing the truth. We enter into a personal relationship with Christ by exercising faith in propositions about the person and work of Christ.

b) Unless God is, in some measure, an object of reason, there is no cause for supposing that an existential encounter, however defined, is an encounter with God rather than an undigested apple dumpling.

Another duplicitous feature of fideism, and this is something it shares in common with its principled and liberal forms alike, is that the astute fideist devotes a lot of time and ingenuity to devising a sophisticated case for fideism. But why come up subtle arguments to prove that there’s no need of proof? Why not spend the same time devising subtle arguments to make a positive case for faith?

Instead of rendering a rational justification for the subject of faith—the believer—why not render a rational justification for the object of faith—God and God’s word?

*New Testament Commentary series by W. Hendriksen and S. Kistemaker). A very readable series in the Dutch-Reformed tradition. Nothing unpredictable, but sound and sober-minded.

Apocrypha/Pseudepigrapha

Tobit

Fitzmyer

Wisdom of Solomon

Winston

Daniel/Esther/Jeremiah

Carey

XVI. Reference Works

Augustine Through the AgesBaker Theological Dictionary of the BibleBlackwell Dictionary of Eastern ChristianityBiographical Dictionary of EvangelicalsBlackwell Companions to PhilosophyBlackwell Dictionary of Evangelical BiographyBlackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian ThoughtCalvin's CommentariesCambridge Companions (series)Concise Dictionary of Christian Theology (M. Erickson)Dictionary of Biblical ImageryDictionary of Biblical InterpretationDictionary of Biblical Tradition in English LiteratureDictionary of Christian BiographyDictionary of Evangelical BiographyDictionary of Judaism in the Biblical PeriodDictionary of New Testament BackgroundDictionary of Scottish Church History and TheologyDictionary of the Ancient Near EastDictionary of the Old Testament: PentateuchDictionary of the Old Testament: Historical Books

Encyclopedia of ApocalypticismEncyclopedia of Archaeology of Ancient EgyptEncyclopedia of ChristianityEncyclopedia of Cults, Sects & New ReligionsEncyclopedia of Early ChristianityEncyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy & ReligionEncyclopedia of EvangelicalismEncyclopedia of PostmodernismEncyclopedia of ReligionEncyclopedia of the Dead Sea ScrollsEncyclopedia of the EnlightenmentEncyclopedia of the Middle AgesEncyclopedia of ProtestantismEncyclopedia of the Reformed FaithEncyclopedia of the RenaissanceEncyclopedia of the Roman EmpireEvangelical Dictionary of Biblical TheologyEvangelical Dictionary of TheologyExegetical Dictionary of the New TestamentHandbook of Metaphysics & OntologyHistorical Dictionary of the Orthodox ChurchIllustrated Bible DictionaryInternational Standard Bible EncyclopediaIVP Bible Background Commentary: New TestamentIVP New Testament Dictionary SetNew Bible DictionaryNew Catholic EncyclopediaNew Dictionary of Biblical TheologyNew Dictionary of TheologyNew International Dictionary of New Testament TheologyNew International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology & ExegesisOxford Dictionary of ByzantiumOxford Dictionary of PopesOxford Dictionary of World ReligionsOxford Dictionary of the Christian ChurchOxford Companion to Christian ThoughtOxford Encyclopedia of Ancient EgyptPocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of Religion (C. Evans)Routledge Encyclopedia of PhilosophyThe Papacy: an encyclopediaZondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Bible

_Beckwith, R. The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church (Eerdmans 1986). The standard-bearer._Bruce, F. The Canon of Scripture (IVP 1988)_Desilva, D. Introducingn the Apocrypha (2004)._Ellis, E. The Making of the New Testament Documents (Leiden: Brill 1999). _____, The Old Testament in Early Christianity: Canon and Interpretation in Light of Modern Research (Baker 1992)._Gamble, H. Books & Readers in the Early Church (Yale 1995)._Hengel, M. The Septuagint as Christian Scripture (2002)._Jobes, K & M. Silva, Invitation to the Septuagint (2005)._Metzger, B. An Introduction to the Apocrypha (1977)._____, The Canon of the New Testament (Oxford 1987)_Roberts, J. & Du Toit, A. Gude to the New Testament, Vol. I (Pretoria, 1989)._Sailhamer, J. Introduction to Old Testament Theology: A Canonical Approach (Zondervan 1995)._Trobisch, D. Paul’s Letter Collection (QWP 2001)._____, The First Edition of the New Testament (Oxford 2000).

_Philo, Therapeutae_Josephus, Jewish War_____, Antiquities of the Jews_Luke, Book of Acts_Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History_Isidore, Chronica Majora_Jerome, On Illustrious Men_Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English People_Pilgrimage of Etheria_Socrates, The Ecclesiastical History of Socrates_Sozomenus, The Ecclesiastical History of Sozomen_The Bordeaux Pilgrim_Anna Comnena, The Alexiad_Theodoret, The Ecclesiastical History of Theodoret_Michael Psellus, Chronographia _John Zonarus, Epitome of History_Beza, Life of Calvin_Knox, Reformation of the Scottish Church_William Bradford , Old Plymouth Plantation (1620-1647)_Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana_John Witherspoon (Works)

2. Secondary sources:

_Aland, K. A History of Christianity (Fortress 1986)_Berkouwer, G. A Half Century of Theology (Eerdmans 1977)_Bratt, J. Dutch Calvinism in Modern America (Eerdmans 1984)_Brown, C. Christianity & Western Thought (IVP 1990)_Bruce, F. New Testament History (Doubleday 1980)_____, The Spreading Flame (Eerdmans 1995)_Cairns, E. Christianity Through the Centuries, (Zondervan, 1996). _Cameron, N. Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defense of Infallibilism in Nineteenth Century Britain (Lewiston, 1987)._Chadwick, H. The Church in Ancient Society (Oxford 2001)_Chadwick, W. The Victorian Church (London 1966-70)._Cunningham, W. The Reformers & the Theology of the Reformation (Banner of Truth 1967)._Ferguson, E. Backgrounds of Early Christianity (Eerdmans 2003)_Gonzalez, J. The Story of Christianity: The Early Church to the Present Day (Hendricksen , 2001). _Himmelfarb, G. The Demoralization of Society (Knopf, 1995). _Hughes, P. Theology of the English Reformers (Eerdmans 1965)._Kelly, J. Early Christian Creeds (Longman 1989)_____, Early Christian Doctrines (A. C. Black 1977)_Kroner, R. Speculation & Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy (Westminster 1959)_____, Speculation & Revelation in Modern Philosophy (Westminster 1961)_Landow, G. Victorian Types, Victorian Shadows (RKP 1980)._Latourette, K A History of Christianity (Prince Press 2000). _____, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age (Longdon 1959-63)_Marsden, G. Fundamentalism & American Culture (Oxford 1993)_____, Reforming Fundamentalism (Eerdmans 1987)_____, The Soul of the American University (Oxford 1996)_Murray, I., Evangelicalism Divided (Banner of Truth 2000)._Noll, M. The Old Religion in a New World (Eerdmans 2001)_____, The Rise of Evangelicalism (IVP 2004-)_____, America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Oxford 2002)_____, American Evangelical Christianity (Blackwell 2000)._Schaff, P. History of the Christian Church (Eerdmans,1979). _Sell, A. Defending and Declaring the Faith: Some Scottish Examples (1860-1920),(Exeter, 1987)._____. Dissenting Thought and the Life of the Church (Mellen, 1991)._Sheldon, H. History of the Christian Church, (Hendrickson 1996)._Shelley, B. Church History in Plain Language. (Word, 1995). Topical rather than chronological. _Schlossberg, H. The Silent Revolution & the Making of Victorian England (Ohio, 2000)._Toon, P. Evangelical Theology, 1833-1856: A Response to Tracterianism (Knox, 1979)._Torrance, T. Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeon Campbell (T&T Clark, 1996)._Verduin, L. The Anatomy of a Hybrid: A Study in Church-State Relationships (Eerdmans 1976). _Wells, D. Reformed Theology in America (Eerdmans 1985)_White, H. Southern Presbyterian Leaders 1683–1911 (Banner of Truth 2000)._Wiles, M. & M. Santer, Documents in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge 1979)_Yamauchi, E. Pre-Christian Gnosticism (Baker 1983)

Half the time spent on study lies in finding out who's worth reading, and the other half in reading him. This reading list consists of a number of entry-level works, along with some intermediate and advanced works. Most selections fall within the Reformed or Evangelical ambit. I'd like to thank John Frame, Randy Broberg, and Daniel Wright for some helpful input.