Thursday, June 30, 2011

In its April 2011 report to Congress, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted that $6.6 billion in Iraqi funds that were used by the Coalition Provisional Authority was unaccounted for. In June, the story hit the media when the Inspector General Stuart Bowen talked to the Los Angeles Times about it. It was immediately misinterpreted, and repeated again and again that most of this money could have been stolen when in fact, it was simply lost in poor record keeping. Since then, Iraqi officials have revealed that even more money is missing.

Speaker Nujafi said that $18.7 bil was missing from Iraq's reconstruction funds

How thorough this investigation will be is a matter of concern. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is still looking into the matter. It went to the New York Federal Reserve Bank where Iraq’s oil revenues have been held since the 1990s when the United Nations’ Oil For Food Program was created. SIGIR could not get access to the files because Baghdad would not give them permission. The Inspector General Bowen said that he was frustrated with the Iraqi government for stepping in his way. With such a large amount of money involved, Baghdad should be asking for as much help as possible to find out where it went. The SIGIR was also the first group to find that the money was unaccounted for. Instead, Iraq is blocking its inquiry.

Baghdad has also threatened to sue the United States for the $18.7 billion. In 2003, the United Nations passed a resolution giving the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) legal authority over Iraq’s oil revenue. Since the money went missing under its watch, it is legally responsible for it. Inspector General Bowen said that he expects a lawsuit soon as a result. This plays on the theme that the funds have been stolen or misappropriated, when in reality it was mostly spent in Iraq to pay for salaries and pensions of public workers, and went to reconstruction projects, which was the CPA’s main priority at that time. Why the money can’t be found is because the CPA had little to no oversight over its spending. This was made worse by the fact that it was in crisis mode and flew in billions of dollars in cash from the New York Federal Reserve into Baghdad, which was then handed out, usually with little paperwork and oversight.

More money could very well come up missing in the future. In July 2010, a SIGIR audit found that the Pentagon kept so few records of how it spent Iraqi funds that it could not account for $8.7 billion. In March 2011, Speaker Nujafi announced that $38-$40 billion in reconstructions funds was missing from Iraq’s books. Again, most of this money was expended, but American and Iraqi officials did not keep track of it. None of this will likely be found since the paper record is so poor. When Iraq fell apart after the 2003 invasion, the United States went into crisis mode and tried to keep everything running using Iraq’s oil money without the necessary oversight. When the CPA disbanded in 2004, and the Pentagon took control, things did not get better as it did not have the personnel or capacity to handle such a large amount of money, and didn’t follow its own accounting rules. Finally, the Iraqi government has proven to be just as incompetent, and doesn’t know what its done with a large chunk of its revenues either. The root cause of all these problems was the fact that the U.S. went into Iraq with no real post-war plans. It had a rosy vision of what Iraq would be like, and when reality did not meet those expectations it tried to throw money at the problem. Iraq on the other hand, had to rebuild all of its institutions with the fall of Saddam Hussein, and still lacks the capacity to handle its funds. It is this lack of bookkeeping not theft, which is the real story.

SOURCES

Ali, Ghassan, “A ministerial committee to recover the lost money and property,” Radio Free Iraq, 6/23/11

Shiite Special Groups have been behind all of the casualties in June. Hezbollah Brigades took responsibility for a rocket attack upon Camp Loyalty in Baghdad on June 6 that led to six deaths. Two days later another soldier died from an IED in Najaf. Then on June 13, two more were killed by another IED attack in Wasit. Because those attacks were in the south, Shiite militants probably carried them out. Hezbollah Brigades posts monthly videos of their operations on its website, which then get posted on Western sites such as Youtube. Iraq’s Sotaliraq reported on June 22, that the League of the Righteous was trying to recruit fighters in Basra, Najaf, and Qadisiyah, had lots of money to offer including a monthly salary, housing, and cash for every successful attack upon American forces. (1) The paper reported that a liaison officer from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards was traveling around southern Iraq to meet with League leaders, and coordinate their operations. Then on June 27, Sadrists told Alsumaria TV that its Promised Day Brigades was behind ten mortar and rocket attacks upon U.S. bases in Baghdad, Ninewa, Diyala, Tamim, Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna, which they claimed killed and wounded both American and Iraqi soldiers from June 21 to 26. They could have been referring to the June 26 attack in Diyala that led to two American casualties. As reported before, Special Groups have been dramatically increasing their operations this year as the deadline for the U.S. withdrawal at the end of the year draws nearer. That’s because both they and their Iranian sponsors want to take responsibility for the Americans leaving the country.

While Shiites have been behind most of the attacks this year, insurgents have also played a role. In January there were five U.S. soldiers killed in hostile actions, four of which were done by Sunni militants in northern Iraq. Since then, Special Groups have been targeting the Americans much more. Out of the 13 incidents in 2011, eight were probably done by Special Groups, two by insurgents, and three in Baghdad, which could be by either group. In total, 33 Americans have died this year in Iraq, with 16 killed by Shiites, 4 by Sunnis, and four of unknown origins, with the rest in non-hostile incidents.

U.S. forces are due to withdraw by December 31, 2011 unless Baghdad gives them an extension. Whether that will happen is still a hot topic of debate within Iraq’s political establishment. What is much more sure is that Shiite militants, their Iranian backers, and to a lesser extent, Sunni insurgents, will continue to target American soldiers until they leave the country. The Special Groups especially have dramatically increased their operations in Baghdad and Southern Iraq, launching weekly attacks upon U.S. bases and patrols. Only a fraction of these incidents are ever reported in the press. That rise in activity is the reason why casualties have gone up this year, and that trend is likely to continue because all of Iraq's militants want to claim that they were the reason why the Americans withdrew.

Date

No. Of Casualties

Cause

City

Province

Likely Culprits

1/2/11

2

IED

Taji

Salahaddin

Insurgents

1/15/11

2

Small arms fire

Mosul

Ninewa

Insurgents

1/15/11

1

RPG

Baghdad

Baghdad

Unknown

1/17/11

1

Non-hostile

Tikrit

Salahaddin

N/A

Jan. 11

5 Total

3 Hostile,

1 Non-Hostile

4 Cities

3 Provinces

2 Insurgents

1 Unknown

2/15/11

1

Non-hostile

Baghdad

Baghdad

N/A

2/17/11

1

Non-hostile

Al Asad Air Base

Anbar

N/A

Feb. 11

2 Total

2 Non-Hostile

2 Cities

2 Provinces

N/A

3/20/11

1

IED

Samawa

Muthanna

Special Group

Mar. 11

1 Total

1 Hostile

1 City

1 Province

1 Special Group

4/2/11

1

Indirect fire

?

Babil

Special Group

4/2/11

1

Indirect fire

Baghdad

Baghdad

Unknown

4/3/11

1

Non-hostile

Mosul

Ninewa

N/A

4/4/11

1

Non-hostile

Baghdad

Baghdad

N/A

4/4/11

1

Non-hostile

Mosul

Ninewa

N/A

4/10/11

1

Non-hostile

Kirkuk

Tamim

N/A

4/19/11

1

Non-hostile

?

?

N/A

4/22/11

2

IED

Numaniya

Maysan

Special Group

4/27/11

1

Non-hostile

?

Babil

N/A

4/29/11

1

RPG

?

Qadisiyah

Special Group

Apr. 11

11 Total

4 Hostile,

6 Non-Hostile

4+ Cities

7 Provinces

3 Special Groups

1 Unknown

5/22/11

2

IED

Baghdad

Baghdad

Unknown

May 11

2 Total

1 Hostile

1 City

1 Province

1 Unknown

6/6/11,

6/18/11

6

Rocket

Baghdad

Baghdad

Hezbollah Brigades

6/8/11

1

IED

Najaf

Najaf

Special Group

6/13/11

2

IED

?

Wasit

Special Group

6/26/11

2

Grenade, Hostile fire

?

Diyala

Promised Day Brigades

6/26/11

1

Non-hostile

?

Wasit

N/A

6/1-26/11

12 Total

4 Hostile,

1 Non-Hostile

2+ Cities

4 Provinces

4 Special Groups

Total 2011

33 Total

13 Hostile,

10 Non-Hostile

9+ Cities

11 Provinces

2 Insurgents

8 Special Groups

3 Unknown

FOOTNOTES

1. Sotaliraq, “League of the Righteous in Iraq, giving their followers the amount of two million dinars for every military operation, and news on the financing of Iranian,” 6/22/11

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Mehdi Army Promised Day Brigade claims responsibility for missile attacks on US bases,” 6/27/11

Arango, Tim, “Spike in U.S. Deaths in Iraq Raises Worries,” New York Times, 6/26/11

Icasualties, “Iraq Coalition Casualties: Military Fatalities”

Sotaliraq, “League of the Righteous in Iraq, giving their followers the amount of two million dinars for every military operation, and news on the financing of Iranian,” 6/22/11

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com