01371cam a22002297 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100002000069245008600089260006600175490004100241500001500282520048400297530006100781538007200842538003600914710004200950830007600992856003701068856003601105w6084NBER20150802164413.0150802s1997 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aTornell, Aaron.10aRational Atrophyh[electronic resource]:bThe US Steel Industry /cAaron Tornell. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1997.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w6084 aJuly 1997.3 aDuring the seventies and eighties the US steel industry received trade protection. However, these rents were not used to improve competitiveness. Instead, they were reflected in higher wages and a greater share of profits invested in sectors not related to steel. Moreover, the steel industry failed to adopt technological innovations on a timely basis and was displaced by the minimills. We rationalize these puzzling outcomes using a dynamic game between workers and firms. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w6084.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w608441uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6084