Present Russian military doctrine is based on a document
approved at a Security Council session on 2 November, 1993. On that same
day, the document, "Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of
the Russian Federation" ( PGMD) was officially legalized by Presidential
decree No. 1833 (1). Whatever the outcome of continuing work on its revised
version, there is reason to expect its main points will remain the same.

1. THE DOCTRINE

In the document of November 1993, alongside pledges of
allegiance to international law and disarmament agreements, the substantive
part had a number of peculiar points. The main points were: an emphasis
on rapid deployment of interventionist forces, to be used on post-Soviet
territory; a renewal of the traditional accent on offensive conventional
operations; legalization of stationing Russian forces abroad (in the CIS)
and - what was most striking - of their potential employment in domestic
situations. Not a single word mentioned civilian or Parliamentary control
over the armed forces and military policy (the President is the sole chief),
military reform, or further reductions of force levels(2).

The nuclear part included several notable innovations.
First, the document states unequivocally: "The goal of Russian Federation
policy regarding nuclear weapons is to remove the threat of nuclear war
by deterring its initiation against the Russian Federation and its allies."(3)
After several years of utopian concepts about substituting deterrence with
something different, this was a positive and realistic point, clearing the
issue and theoretically allowing a focus on real problems without confusion
or wishful thinking. Nonetheless, the concrete formula of deterrence was
much more dubious and controversial.

In particular, and this was the second point, the 1982
non-first-use (NFU) pledge was officially revoked. The PGMD elaborately
states that the Russian Federation would not employ nuclear weapons against
any other state-party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) which (1) is not a nuclear power, (2) is not an ally of a
nuclear power, (3) is not engaged in joint operations together with a nuclear
power in aggression against the Russian Federation, its territory, its allies
or its forces. To put it in a different way, Russia would feel free to use
nuclear weapons against any nuclear power; any non-nuclear ally of a nuclear
power; any non-nuclear non-aligned state, acting militarily together with
a nuclear power; and any non-nuclear, non-aligned state, not acting together
with a nuclear power, if that state is not a party to the NPT Treaty of
1968.

Third, there was more confusion, because from the text
of the PGMD it did not follow whether this highly permissive formula meant
first use/strike or second/retaliatory strike. However, further elaborations
from the highest officials of the Ministry of Defense and Security Council
made it clear that it was exactly a first strike (not first use), that was
the subject of this doctrinal part.(4)

Fourth, the strategic requirements were interpreted as
"maintaining the structure and state of strategic nuclear forces at
a level that will assure inflicting the designated damage on an aggressor
under any circumstances." Compared to traditional notions of "massive",
"crashing", or "maximum" retaliation, the new goal sounds
more limited and selective, which might indicate a recognition of previously
overstated damage requirements and of the prospects of deep force reduction
(under START-2, or even without it, because of weapons obsolescence and
curtailment of modernization programs).

Fifth, the technical requirements were stated as "maintaining
the entire complex of strategic weapons at a level that ensures the security
of the Russian Federation and its allies, deters nuclear and conventional
war, and maintains strategic stability as well as nuclear safety."(5)
This was yet another clear statement, assigning the strategic forces the
task of deterring conventional war, which implied first use/strike strategy.

The main arguments in favor of rejecting the 1982 Soviet
commitment, presented afterwards by military and civilian officials, as
well as by private experts, were as follows:

- The declaration of 1982 was purely propagandistic, and
its revocation means a realistic adaptation of declared doctrine and strategy
to practical strategy and force capabilities.

- Other "civilized" states (i.e. NATO states,
which impolitely implied that China was not quite "civilized")
had not followed the Soviet example and had not assumed a no-first-use posture.

- Russia's strategic forces and C3I (for economic reasons
and as a result of deep reductions either unilaterally or under START-2)
would be more vulnerable to counterforce nuclear strikes, making second
strike or launch-on-warning (LOW) less reliable for deterrence.

- Moscow's strategic forces would also become more vulnerable
to conventional precision-guided weapons, because of the latter's further
development in conjunction with strategic forces reduction and restructuring.

- Russian conventional forces are too weak, as a result
of the USSR's

disintegration, Russia's economic crisis and the transitional
nature of current military reforms. They have to be enhanced by higher reliance
on nuclear weapons, much like NATO had been doing during the Cold War to
counter Soviet and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) conventional superiority.

2. FIRST STRIKE CONCEPT.

The argument about degradation of Russia's conventional
forces is the most serious, and requires a detailed analysis. The principle
of making up for the lack of conventional forces by greater reliance on
nuclear weapons in deterrence strategy and operational planning alike, is
as old as the Dulles "Massive Retaliation" strategy of 1954. After
1967 and during the next quarter century, despite the shift to "flexible
response" and its various consecutive versions, NATO retained the first-use
option for its forward-based tactical nuclear forces in Western Europe,
trying to outweigh the almost triple aggregate numerical superiority of
the WTO in offensive conventional ground and air forces on the continent
(6).

Disintegration of the WTO, break up of the Soviet Union,
deep economic crises and high inflation in Russia, failure of conversion
and military reform in 1991-1993, political and administrative turmoil -
all these have greatly degraded the conventional forces, which were historically
the strongest Soviet/Russian point. However, the accepted notion of making
up for this unaccustomed weakness by increased reliance on nuclear weapons,
which was officially recognized in the new Russian military doctrine, is
quite dubious for at least two reasons.

The first is the strategic logic of a conventional-nuclear
trade-off, the second is the operational logic of a first strike/use concept.

In order for the nuclear first strike concept to work as
a reinforcement for inadequate conventional deterrence, several conditions
have to be met. First, there has to be a need for such reinforcement, i.e.
an opponent or opponents superior in conventional capabilities and capable
of threatening one's own interests by implementing successful conventional
offensive operations. Second, nuclear force employment should be credible
as a threat - that is, the subject's interests must be really vital to justify
nuclear warfare, and this act should not be purely suicidal for the initiating
party. Hence, the initiator should possess clear advantages in nuclear capabilities
in order to achieve military objectives, dominate escalation and prevent
an opponent's nuclear counteractions, which may deny these gains or inflict
overwhelming damage on one's own state.

Looking at potential military threats, which might face
Russia before and during the first decade after the year 2000 (when its
conventional forces may remain relatively weak), it is hard to find opponents
and contingencies corresponding to the two above conditions. All other former
Soviet republics have negligible armed forces compared to Russia, since
the factors affecting Russia have undercut them to an even greater degree.
Even Ukraine, without massive outside support, would not be able to challenge
Russia militarily.

Leaving aside any moral and ethical aspects of a nuclear
strike against Ukraine or the other neighboring republics (that have, incidentally,
25 million ethnic Russians on their territories), from a purely military
point of view a nuclear option would be absurd. These states would not under
any circumstances be capable of mobilizing victorious offensive conventional
operations against Russia, that might justify nuclear a response. On the
other hand, if Russia attacks them with conventional forces, it would be
senseless to use nuclear weapons against the territory and population, which
Russia hypothetically might want to occupy. In most cases if military conflict
occurs Moscow may face only guerrilla-type warfare, for which nuclear force
is neither required, nor effective.

Beyond the "near abroad," Russia will be facing
a number of states or alliances with considerable and growing armed forces.
In the West after the late 1990s, NATO will be at least three times superior
to Russia in the same categories of conventional forces in which WTO had
triple superiority till the late 1980s. But this overwhelming military power
will be separated from Russian borders by a double belt of East European
states and the Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Transcaucasus.
Preserving this "buffer zone" and developing good relations with
the West (7) would remove the danger of Russia's confronting a much superior
conventional power.

However, for a conservative military planner it is conceivable
that NATO will confront Russia, after accepting into its membership some
or all of the present "buffer states" and extending its forces
to the east; or that both NATO and Russia will tear this zone apart and
meet at some new watershed of military confrontation. Nonetheless, in this
hypothetical case the second condition of effective nuclear first-strike
deterrence still would not be satisfied. In addition to conventional superiority,
NATO will possess a clear-cut nuclear superiority over Russia both in tactical
and strategic nuclear forces. US tactical nuclear forces could be brought
back to Europe in mass and forward deployed in Eastern Europe, in the Baltics
and other neighboring states, thus densely covering targets deep in Russia's
heartland.

US strategic forces, together with the British and French,
may be as much as 50-70% larger (by warhead number) than Russian forces
under START-2 terms, and would be twice as large without START-2 after the
year 2003-2005. Without any limitations, the US alone would be capable of
achieving triple strategic superiority over Russia by the year 2003, due
to its economic and geostrategic advantages.

Hence, nuclear use would be suicidal for Russia. It would
not be able to achieve any military advantage by initiating nuclear warfare,
either to dominate in escalation or inflict larger damage than incurred
by itself. Moreover, in a crisis situation, Russia's first use posture might
provoke a preemptive strike by NATO, which could be quite effective due
to its conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear counterforce
superiority. Contemplating this possibility, Russia might decide to launch
its weapons first, with catastrophic consequences for itself as well as
for others.

This is different from past NATO first-use policies because,
at least theoretically, the US had the advantage of being immune to attacks
by tactical or theater nuclear weapons, in contrast to the USSR (as well
as Western and Central European states). Hence, the US theoretically could
credibly threaten nuclear first use, having an inherent geostrategic advantage
and escalation dominance at all levels, except the highest stage of massive
global counter-urban strike exchange.

In future, these dire scenarios are much less conceivable
than in the past. But the declared Russian first strike option is not designed
for friendly and routine situations. Within its own frame of reference this
strategy looks self-defeating and prone to catastrophic consequences for
Russia's own survival. If nuclear weapons are perceived, as was stated by
Moscow's political and military leaders, to be a means of policy, rather
than weapons of war (8), such policy should not be absurd, illogical or
dangerous for Russian security. If the threat of nuclear war is considered
purely hypothetical and absolutely remote, then the reasons for this conspicuous
doctrinal shift are all the more inconceivable.

In fact the change of doctrine in 1993 did not affect force
levels and structure, weapon programs, employment concepts and command-control
systems and procedures. First use was and now is still more (in view of
NATO's expansion plan) a political message to the West, lacking any material
substance or logical framework. It is perceived more like a "doomsday
machine" factor, rather than a credible deterrence strategy, even if
very few people in Moscow would be able to recognize the difference.

At the southern rim of instability Turkey, Iran, Pakistan
and Afghanistan may individually or in some combination present a security
problem for Russia. This threat, however, would not be direct, but would
come through their support of anti-Russian regimes in the Transcaucasus
and Central Asia. Another possibility is for these states to support guerrilla
fighting against the federal forces in Russia, or against Russia's client
regimes, as is now happening in Tajikistan.

However, even from a purely military point of view, nuclear
weapons would hardly be useful there either, because of the character of
warfare. Russia will retain a clear-cut conventional superiority over all
such opponents. If this superiority is not capable of achieving Russian
goals, then nuclear weapons would be even less effective, to say nothing
of the international political consequences of such a hypothetical action.
Besides, states like Iran and Afghanistan fit under Russian doctrinal definitions
as the few states "exempt" from nuclear strike: they are not nuclear
powers, neither allies of nuclear powers, and they are parties to the NPT.
As for Turkey, if it acts independently from NATO, it will not be a serious
challenge to Russia (especially taking into account the geography of the
Transcaucasus). If on the other hand, it is supported by NATO, then all
arguments relevant for NATO-Russian scenarios are applicable here.

In the Far East two powers, Japan and China, may present
a threat to Russia. In the case of Japan, the logic of Russia's hypothetical
confrontation with NATO is relevant with only one reservation: Japan's conventional
offensive capabilities against Russia will be quite limited at least during
the next10 years. An attempt to take the Kurile Islands or Sakhalin by force
is not conceivable, and initiating nuclear weapons use in this case would
not be a viable strategy.

China is a special matter. Its current crash military build-up,
geostrategic situation, and long history of territorial disputes with Russia
and the USSR might, in future, encourage Beijing's expansionist policies
towards Russia's Siberia and the Far East, or against Kazakstan and other
Central Asian allies of Moscow.

At the same time, China would fit the conditions for Russia's
first-use strategy to be effective. In time it may achieve conventional
offensive superiority along the Transbaikal and Maritime borders, and have
serious reinforcement advantages and the capability to interdict Russian
reinforcements from its western territory. On the other hand, China will
remain inferior to Russia in tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear
capabilities, giving Moscow a credible first-strike threat and escalation
dominance.

Still, there are some considerations against such a strategy.
First, China's conventional build-up greatly depends on massive imports
of weapons and technology from Russia. Thus, besides the nuclear first-use
threat, Moscow has an effective means of undercutting or at least seriously
slowing down the emergence of this hypothetical threat. Second, China is
now the only nuclear power which has officially adopted and is maintaining
a nuclear non-first-use commitment. A Russian nuclear threat might encourage
China do the same and revoke its pledge, all the more so since its strategic
nuclear forces and C3I system will remain vulnerable to counterforce strikes
for a long time yet. In that case, the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance in
the Far East would become highly unstable, and nuclear war would become
more possible. This cannot be a desired goal of any nuclear strategy.

At a minimum, to effectively deter China's conventional
offensive superiority in those theaters, Russia might rely on the option
of employing a few tactical nuclear weapons in the border areas to thwart
its enemy's offensive operations, while deterring China's nuclear response
at the strategic level with superior (counterforce and countervalue) strategic
retaliatory capabilities. Then Russia's deterrence would be credible: its
nuclear capabilities would be sufficient to deny China's alleged military
gains in the theater, but would not threaten China's national survival,
and thus would not provoke strategic nuclear preemption. At the same time,
China's preemption would be deterred by Russia's superior strategic retaliatory
potential. This would be very similar to NATO's deterrence strategy towards
the WTO from the 1960s to the1980s.

The problem is that Russia's highest military command and
strategists do not think in these seemingly rational terms. The former head
of the General Staff, General M. Kolesnikov, put it with a rare clarity:
"The questions of nuclear (operational) planning and strategic forces
employment are not affected at all by the state of other arms and armed
services. As for tactical nuclear weapons use plans, they are essentially
non-existent. The General Staff is not doing any planning for tactical nuclear
weapons employment at all. That's why these weapons are called tactical,
aren't they? We cannot foresee all the nuances of conceivable offensive
or defensive operations. As soon as a situation occurs, we'll start the
planning process. As for the new military doctrine, it refers only to circumstances
for the particular potential use of strategic nuclear forces." (9)

The above statement raises many questions about the attitude
of the Russian military towards nuclear-conventional trade-offs, and centralized
control over and preparations for tactical nuclear weapons employment. It
is also quite revealing as to the peculiarities of Soviet/Russian strategic
nuclear thinking. In particular, nuclear weapons employment strategy (i.e.,
first/second strike, counterforce/countervalue targeting, retaliation/damage
limitation missions etc.) is not seen as closely related to force levels,
structure, posture and systems characteristics. Force employment plans are
not perceived as affecting the probability of war, encouraging or provoking
first nuclear strike/use from one or the other opponent. Any declaration
on the need to compensate Russian conventional weakness with nuclear strength
is predominantly a general political argument, not a reflection of a consistent
strategic analysis, assessment of contingencies or planning of defense policy
options.

Moreover, the problem of nuclear weapons employment is
addressed in terms of operational convenience, not strategic goals or a
rationale of particular options (10). Hence, arms control agreements, the
philosophy of strategic stability, force development planning, and force
employment strategies are only remotely and in a very general way associated
with the state of political and military, particularly nuclear, relationships
between Russia and the US, as well as other nuclear powers. These deficiencies
have always plagued and still are undercutting Moscow's strategic policy
efficiency. They are most vividly demonstrated in designing a first strike
doctrine to deter NATO, but they are also undermining Russia's deterrence
strategy towards China, where there is a clear case for such a strategy
and where it may be badly needed in the not so distant future.

3. FORCE PROJECTIONS - NINE SCENARIOS.

The shift in Soviet/Russian nuclear doctrine has not changed
anything regarding operational planning or weapons programs. As before,
declaratory doctrine lives quite independently from practical strategy and
forces. And as before, several principle strike plans are operational without
much attention to their validity at the level of "grand strategy"
or national survival.

All projections of Russian strategic force evolution are
affected by (1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its nuclear arms
development/production complex; (2) the deep economic and financial crisis
in Russia, as a result of the failed "reforms" of 1992-1996; and
(3) disarray in Moscow's decision-making system on strategic programs and
arms control talks, which has led to confused priorities in defense policy
and a wide divergence between force planning, budgeting and arms control
agreements.

All of the following projections should not be construed
as representing actual Russian force planning. They are more just an illustration
of the logic of major hypothetical options, based on open information on
existing forces and weapon programs, as well as on simplified financial
data and commonly known patterns of weapons deployment and withdrawal.

First scenario: By
the year 2003 (deadline of START-2 implementation) the natural decommissioning
of technically obsolete weapons would probably bring these forces down to
40 SS-18s, 120 SS-19s, 46 SS-24s and 220 SS-25 ICBMs. Submarine force, for
lack of maintenance and overhaul, would probably be drawn down to 3 Typhoon,
7 Delta-4 and 3 Delta-3 SSBNs. The bomber force may be expected to comprise
no more than 20 airplanes (of which 8 are Tu-160s). Thus, the present level
of funding, insufficient for adequate maintenance, timely overhaul or life-extension
measures would bring the baseline force to 666 launchers and 3216 warheads.

By the year 2010 the baseline force under the same conditions
would go down to 50 SS-25 ICBMs, 1 Typhoon SSBN, 3 Delta-4 boats and zero
bombers. Altogether, 118 launchers and 442 warheads.

Second scenario:
Continuation of the present rate for procurement and deployment of SS-25s
and in a few years of their follow-on SS-26 ICBMs (RT-2UTTH Topol-M) would
add to the baseline force about 70 missiles and warheads by the year 2003
and 150 by the year 2010, correspondingly up to totals of 3286 and 592 warheads.

Third scenario: Better
maintenance, overhaul and service life-extension programs with increased
funding (by about 50% for strategic forces yearly) by the year 2003 might
add to the above baseline-plus-new-deployment force (BPNDF) 50 SS-25 ICBMs,
2 Typhoon SSBNs and 15 Tu-95 bombers: up to 3906 warheads.

By the year 2010, with the same maintenance measures, BPNDF
could have 70 more SS-25 missiles, 2 additional Typhoon and 4 Delta-4 boats,
plus 8 Tu-160 bombers. These would add up to 1446 warheads.

However, the projection may be different if strategic forces
are given much higher political priority in the years to come, increasing
their yearly share even within the same defense budget by 100%. Another
possibility is increasing the whole defense budget from the present 3.8%
to 5-6% of GNP (i.e. from 20% to 30% of the federal budget), as proposed
by the Ministry of Defense and its partisans in the State Duma. Finally,
it is conceivable that the Russian economy could start to grow in 1998-1999
and budget revenues go up, which would permit higher spending on defense
without increasing its share of the federal budget or GNP.

Fourth scenario:
One of these alternatives or some combination of them might lead to a higher
procurement rate for SS-26 ICBMs and to the introduction of a new SSBN class
(which may be called Delta-5) starting in the year 2000, at a rate of 2
boats every three years (like Typhoon deployment rate in the 1980s). This
would add to the year 2003 force about 100 SS-25/26 missiles, and about
240 SS-26 ICBMs by the year 2010. Deployment of Delta-5 SSBNs would add
240 SLBM warheads in the year 2003 and 840 in the year 2010, bringing the
total warhead numbers correspondingly to 4246 and 2526 warheads.

Fifth scenario: If,
for whatever reason (like the US deciding to deploy a nation-wide ABM system),
the decision is taken to equip SS-26s with MIRVed warheads, then by the
year 2010 the total Russian enhanced force may comprise around 4100 warheads.

As may be seen, the array of five alternatives, defined
by various assumptions about funding and technical strategy, spans a 25%
difference in aggregate warhead numbers by the year 2003 (from 3200 to 4250),
and an order of magnitude by the year 2010 (ranging from 442 to 4100 warheads).
Overimposing an arms control framework on the above projections complicates
the picture still more and multiplies the number of feasible alternatives.

Assuming that the START-1 Treaty is observed by both sides,
the greatest difference will be made by the presence or absence of START-2
and its follow-on START-3. If the START-2 treaty is not ratified by Russia
and nothing is created as a substitute, Russian strategic force would most
probably evolve along the third scenario. Since US forces in this case would
most probably stay at START-1 levels, Russian forces, while naturally degrading,
would be turning more and more vulnerable each year. This vulnerability
would transform the first strike emphasis of Moscow's new military doctrine
from a purely political posture into the real and only available employment
option, which would be highly detrimental to strategic stability. This is
all the more so when further degradation of Russia's command-control, early
warning and monitoring systems are taken into account.

At some point the US may opt for nation-wide strategic
ABM deployment. Then, Russia's response could follow the fifth scenario
(revival of a MIRVed ICBM system and crash modernization effort). All this
would imply quite dire consequences for strategic stability, arms control
and political relations between Russia and the West.

Sixth scenario: Matching
START-2 to a quite probable, but highly inefficient, policy which is a direct
extrapolation of the course of the last five years (i.e. the second scenario),
would bring Russian strategic forces down to 1806 warheads, since 1475 warheads
would have to be removed through dismantling and downloading MIRVed ICBMs
several years ahead of the end of their service lifetime. The US at this
same time would easily maintain about 3500 warheads, i.e. acquiring a double
superiority just through implementation of the START-2 treaty.

Besides this, implementing the treaty in five years (1998-2002)
instead of ten - which was initially planned when it was signed in January
1993 - would overtax limited Russian financial resources and technical capabilities.
Even with greater maintenance efforts (third scenario), which would be seriously
hampered by a crash reduction program, Russian force levels would be as
high as 2431 warheads - 30% lower than American levels. To reach at least
the lower bracket of START-2's warhead ceiling (3000-3500), Russia would
need to deploy 570 additional warheads. Under the circumstances, the only
way to do that would be by deploying more SS-25/26 ICBMs at a rate of 110
missiles per year. This is about eight-ten times greater than the current
rate and totally infeasible.

Political factors aside (like NATO expansion), this may
explain why there exists such strong opposition to START-2 in Russia. Even
the treaty's supporters predicate their position on extending its implementation
schedule by 3-5 years. This would be much less expensive and technically
complicated for Russia and besides, it would bring dismantling more in line
with the weapons' natural service lifetime expiration.

Thus, assuming a 5-year extension agreement (seventh
scenario), which would provide for better maintenance, a smooth
dismantling schedule and easy current deployment rate, by the year 2008
Russian strategic force could consist of 300 SS-25/26 ICBMs, 3 Typhoon and
7 Delta-4 SSBNs and about 20 Tu-95/160 bombers. In total this would come
to 1668 warheads. A relaxed Delta-5 construction schedule may provide 480
additional warheads to the aggregate level of 2148 warheads.

This would still fall 30% short of the START-2 lower bracket
and 40% short of the US force level, if it is maintained at the permitted
maximum of 3500 warheads. If Russian doctrine insists on closer parity with
US forces, which is quite plausible, there are two ways of closing this
gap. One would be to go for higher ICBM and SSBN deployment rates, and reach
the year 2008 with a force of about 2500 warheads (eighth scenario).

The other option (ninth scenario) would
be to reach a START-3 treaty instead, to save resources for both the US
and Russia, and reduce the aggregate ceiling to 1500-2000 warheads. This
would relieve Russia from larger expenditures on higher deployment rates
and undercut the arguments of those in Moscow, who call for the revival
of MIRVed ICBMs, as the only feasible way to match US force levels. The
US could easily fit under the 1500 ceiling with 8 Trident SSBNs, 200 Minuteman-3
ICBMs and 300 bomber weapons or any other chosen forces mix.

4. FORCE PROJECTION - TENTH SCENARIO.

Interestingly enough, for Russia the peculiarity of START-3,
in contrast to START-2 and all other preceding strategic arms control treaties,
is that it will be not about any force reduction, but almost exclusively
about the scale of maintenance efforts, as well as the rate and system types
of new deployment programs. For the US it would be mostly a matter of maintaining
a larger or smaller portion of its existing force.

Provided a benign political environment, Russia and the
US could agree on much more radical force reductions under START-3 or START-4
treaties. To achieve much greater Russian savings on maintenance and modernization
and US savings on maintenance, after the year 2010 the parties could go
down to a level as low as 1000 or even 500 nuclear warheads. Actually, for
Russia, decommissioning forces to a level of 500 warheads would altogether
remove the need for greater maintenance or even the current low deployment
rate, virtually matching arms control prospects to the first scenario of
natural force degradation.

If only the US would agree to go along with Russia to 500
warheads after the year 2010, both sides might then agree to de-alert and
de-activate the remaining forces. This would be as close to a general and
comprehensive nuclear disarmament as may be imagined without departing completely
from technical and strategic reality.

However, going in this direction would require reaching
a US-Russian agreement on its desirability and feasibility within the next
two-three years. This is due to the fact that within this time-span Moscow
will have to make important long-term decisions on its future nuclear doctrine
and strategy, funding level, and maintenance and modernization directions
and rates. Also, resolution of the START-2 deadlock would be of utmost long-term
importance for arms control and force projections.

Finally, radical further strategic arms reductions would
imply addressing many other issues of mind-boggling complexity. Among them
are: third nuclear weapon states' forces; strategic and theater defenses;
tactical nuclear weapons; conventional force balances and capabilities,
including the counterforce potential of precision-guided systems; nuclear,
chemical and missile proliferation in the world at large. All of that would
finally boil down to devising a qualitatively new organization of nations
for dealing with world security problems. These concerns go far beyond the
scope of this paper or the ability of its author to imagine.