Chickamauga
- The Great Battle of the WestBy
(1)Daniel H. Hill, Lieutenant-General, C.S.A.

ON the 13th of July, 1863, while in charge of the defenses
of Richmond and Petersburg and the Department of North Carolina, I received an unexpected
order to go West. I was seated in a yard of a house in the suburbs of Richmond (the house
belonging to Mr. Poe, a relative of the poet), when President Davis, dressed in a plain
suit of gray and attended by a small escort in brilliant uniform, galloped up and said :
" Rosecrans is about to advance upon Bragg; I have found it necessary to detail
Hardee to defend Mississippi and Alabama. His corps is without a commander. I wish you to
command it." " I cannot do that," I replied, " as General Stewart
ranks me." " I can cure that " answered Mr. Davis, " by making you a
lieutenant-general.
Your paper s will be ready to-morrow. When can you start ? " " In twenty-four
hours," was the reply. Mr. Davis gave his views on the subject, some directions in
regard to matters at Chattanooga, and then left in seemingly good spirits. (2)

(1) At the beginning of the Civil War I was asked
the question; " Who of the Federal officers are most to be feared ? " I replied
: " Sherman, Rosecrans, and McClellan. Sherman has genius and daring, and is full of
resources. Rosecrans has fine practical sense, and is of a tough, tenacious fiber.
McClellan is a man of talents, and his delight has always been in the study of military
history and the art and science of war." Grant was not once thought of. The light of
subsequent events thrown upon the careers of these three great soldiers has not changed my
estimate of them ; but I acquiesce in the verdict which has given greater renown to some
of their comrades. It was my lot to form a more intimate acquaintance with the three
illustrious officers who I fore- saw would play an important part in the war. I fought
against McClellan from Yorktown to Sharpsburg (Antietam), I encountered Rosecrans at
Chickamauga, and I surrendered to Sherman at Greensboro', N.. C.-each of the three
commanding an army.-D. H. H.

(2) His cheerfulness was a mystery to me. Within a
fortnight the Pennsylvania campaign had proved abortive. Vicksburg and Port Hudson had
fallen, and Federal gun-boats were now plying up and down the Mississippi, cutting our
communications between the east and west. The Confederacy was cut in two, and the South
could readily be beaten in detail by the concentration of Federal forces, first on one
side of the Mississippi and then on the other. The end of our glorious dream could not be
far off. But I was as cheerful at that interview as was Mr. Davis himself. The bitterness
of death had passed with me before our great reverses on the 4th of July. The Federals had
been stunned by the defeat at Chancellorsville, and probably would not have made a forward
movement for months. A corps could have been sent to General Joe Johnston, Grant could
have been crushed, and Vicksburg, " the heart of the Confederacy," could have
been saved. The drums that beat for the advance into Pennsylvania seemed to many of us to
be beating the funeral march of the dead Confederacy. Our thirty days of mourning were
over before the defeat of Lee and Pemberton. Duty; however, was to be done faithfully and
unflinchingly to the last. The calmness of our Confederate President may not have been the
calmness of despair, but it may have risen from the belief, then very prevalent, that
England and France would recognize the Confederacy at its last extremity, when the
Northern and Southern belligerents were both exhausted. should the North triumph, France
could not hope to retain her hold upon Mexico. Besides, the English aristocracy, as is
well known, were in full sympathy with the South.-D. H. H.

The condition of our railroads even in 1863 was wretched, so
bad that my staff and myself concluded to leave our horses in Virginia and resupply
ourselves in Atlanta. On the 19th of July I reported to General Bragg at Chattanooga. I
had not seen him since I had been the junior lieutenant in his battery of artillery at
Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1845. The other two lieutenants were George H. Thomas and John
F. Reynolds. We four had been in the same mess there. Reynolds had been killed at
Gettysburg twelve days before my new assignment. Thomas, the strongest and most pronounced
Southerner of the four, was now Rosecrans's lieutenant. It was a strange casting of lots
that three messmates of Corpus Christi should meet under such changed circumstances at
Chickamauga.
My interview with General Bragg at Chattanooga was not satisfactory. He
was silent and reserved and seemed gloomy and despondent. He had grown prematurely old
since I saw him last, and showed much nervousness. His relations with his next in command
(General Polk) and with some others of his subordinates were known not to be pleasant. His
many retreats, too, had alienated the rank and file from him, or at least had taken away
that enthusiasm which soldiers feel for the successful general, and which makes them obey
his orders without question, and thus wins for him other successes. The one thing that a
soldier never fails to understand is victory, and the commander who leads him to victory
will be adored by him whether that victory has been won by skill or by blundering, by the
masterly handling of a few troops against great odds, or by the awkward use of over
whelming numbers. Long before Stonewall Jackson had risen to the height of his great fame,
he had won the implicit confidence of his troops in all his movements. " Where are
you going ? " one inquired of the " foot cavalry" as they were making the
usual stealthy march to the enemy's rear. " We don't know but old Jack , does,"
was the laughing answer. This trust was the fruit of past victories, and it led to other
and greater achievements.
I was assigned to Hardee's old corps, consisting of Cleburne's and
Stewart's divisions, and made my headquarters at Tyner's Station, a few miles east of
Chattanooga on the Knoxville railroad. The Federals soon made their appearance at
Bridgeport, Alabama, and I made arrangements to guar d the crossings of the Tennessee
north of Chattanooga.(1) On Fast Day,

(1) A regiment was placed at
Sivley's Ford, another at Blythe's Ferry, farther north, and S. A.
M. Wood's brigade was quartered at Harrison, in supporting distance of
either point. The railroad upon which Rosecrans depended for his supplies ran south of
Chattanooga, and had he crossed the river above the town he would have been separated many
miles from his base and his depot. But he probably contemplated throwing a column across
the Tennessee to the north of the town to cut off Buckner at Knoxville from a Junction
with Bragg, and inclose him between that column and the forces of Burnside which were
pressing toward Knoxville.-D. H. H.

Buckner's division was promptly withdrawn south of
the Hiawassee.- EDITORS.

August 21st, while religious services were being held in
town, the enemy appeared on the opposite side of the river and began throwing shells into
the houses. (1) Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., of New Orleans, was
in the act of prayer i when a shell came hissing near the church. He went on calmly with
his petition to the Great Being " who rules in the armies of heaven and among the
inhabitants of earth," but at its close, the preacher, opening his eyes, noticed a
perceptible diminution of his congregation. Some women and children were killed and
wounded by the shelling. Our pickets and scouts had given no notice of the approach of the
enemy. On Sunday, August 30th, we learned through a citizen that McCook's corps had
crossed at Caperton's Ferry, some thirty-five miles below Chattanooga, the movement having
begun on the 29th. Thomas's corps was also crossing at or near the same point.
The want of information at General Bragg's headquarters was in striking
contrast with the minute knowledge General Lee always had of ever y operation in his
front, and I was most painfully impressed with the feeling that it was to be a haphazard
campaign on our part. (2) Rosecrans had effected the crossing
of the river (Thomas's corps} and had occupied Will's Valley, between Sand and Lookout
mountains, without opposition, and had established his

(1) Colonel J. T. Wilder, who led the
reconnoissance, says: "The enemy opened fire upon the command from their batteries,
which was replied to by Captain Lilly's 18th Indiana battery."-Editors.

(2) My sympathies had all been with
Bragg. I knew of the carping criticisms of his subordinates and the cold looks of his
soldiers, and knew that these were the natural results of reverses, whether the blame lay
with the commander or otherwise. I had felt, too, that this lack of confidence or lack of
enthusiasm, whichever it might be, was ominous of evil for the impending battle.
But ignorance of the enemy's movements seemed a still worse portent of
calamity.-D. H. H.

headquarters at Trenton. Lookout Mountain now interposed to screen all the
enemy's movements from our observation. (1) On the 7th of
September Rosecrans sent McCook to cross Lookout Mountain at Winston's Gap, forty-six
miles south of Chattanooga, and to occupy Alpine, east of the mountains. Thomas was
ordered to cross the mountain at Stevens's and Cooper's gaps, some twenty-five miles from
Chattanooga, and to occupy McLemore's Cove on the east, a narrow valley between Lookout
and Pigeon mountains. Pigeon Mountain is parallel to the former, not so high and rugged,
and does not extend so far north, ending eight miles south of Chattanooga. Crittenden was
left in Will's Valley to watch Chattanooga.
General Bragg had had some inclosed works constructed at Chattanooga,
and the place could have been held by a division against greatly superior forces. By
holding Chattanooga in that way, Crittenden's corps would have been neutralized, and a
union between Rosecrans and Burnside would have been impossible. Moreover, the town was
the objective point of the campaign, and to lose it was virtually to lose all east
Tennessee south of Knoxville. If Bragg knew at the time of the prospective help coming to
him from the Army of Northern Virginia, it was of still more importance to hold the town,
that he might be the more readily in communication with Longstreet on his arrival. Under
similar circumstances General Lee detached Early's division to hold the heights of
Fredericksburg, and neutralized Sedgwick's corps, while he marched to attack Hooker at
Chancellorsville. Bragg, however, may have felt too weak to spare even one division from
his command. Whatever may have been his motive, he completely abandoned the town by the
8th, and Crittenden took possession of it next day. My corps, (2)
consisting of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions, had led in the withdrawal, and was
halted at Lafayette, twenty-two miles from, and almost south of, Chattanooga, and east of
Pigeon Mountain, which separates it from McLemore's Cove, into which the columns of Thomas
began to pour on the 9th.
I placed Breckinridge in charge of the Reserve Artillery and the
wagon-train at Lafayette, while Cleburne was sent to hold the three gaps in Pigeon
Mountain, Catlett's on the north, Dug in the center, and Blue Bird on the south. Cleburne
pitched his tent by the road leading to the center gap. Notwithstanding the occupation of
Chattanooga, Rosecrans did not attempt to concentrate his forces there, but persisted in
pushing two of his corps to our left and rear.
As the failure of Bragg to beat Rosecrans in detail has been the
subject of much criticism, it may be well to look into the causes of the failure. So far
as the commanding general was concerned, the trouble with him was : first, lack of
knowledge of the situation; second, lack of personal supervision of the execution of his
orders. No general ever won a permanent fame who was

(1) General Bragg had said petulantly a few days
before the crossing into Will's Valley : "It is said to be easy to defend a
mountainous country, but mountains hide your foe from you, while they are full of gaps
through which he can pounce upon you at any time. A mountain is like the wall of a house
full of rat-holes. The rat lies hidden at his hole, ready to pop out when no one is
watching. who can tell what lies hidden behind that wall Q" said he, pointing to the
Cumberland range across the river.-D. H. H.

(2) Breckinridge's division of my corps had come
up from Mississippi and was substituted for Stewart's, sent to Knoxville to join Buckner.
D. H. H.

wanting in these and elements of success, knowledge of his own and his
enemy's condition, and personal superintendence of operations on the field. (1).
The failure to attack Negley's division in the cove on September 10th (2). was owing to Bragg's ignorance of the condition of the roads,
the obstructions at Dug Gap, and the position of the enemy. He attributed the failure to
make the attack on the same force on the 11th to the major-general [Hindman] who had it in
charge,-whether justly or unjustly, I do not know.(3) All day
of the 11th my signal corps and scouts at Blue Bird Gap reported the march of a heavy
column to our left and up the cove. These reports were forwarded to the commanding
general, but were not edited by him.
On the morning of the 13th I was notified that Polk was to attack
Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and the Reserve Artillery and baggage trains were
specially intrusted to my corps. Breckinridge guarded the roads leading south from
Lafayette, and Cleburne guarded the gaps in Pigeon Mountain.
The attack was not made at Lee and Gordon's Mills and this was the
second of the lost opportunities. Bragg in his official report, speaking of this failure,
quotes his first order to Polk to attack, dated 6 P. M. September 12th, Lafayette, Ga.:
"

GENERAL : I inclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a
fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of
it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then
turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover
your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success."

This order was twice repeated at short intervals, the last
dispatch being :

" The enemy is approaching from the south - and it is highly important
that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost."

The rest of the story is thus told by General Bragg : "

"At 11 P. M. a dispatch was received from the general [Polk] stating
that he had taken up a strong position for defense, and requesting that he should be
heavily reenforced. He was promptly ordered not, to defer his attack,- his force being al
ready numerically superior to the enemy, -and was reminded that his success depended upon
the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further informed that Buckner s corps
would be moved within supporting distance the next morning. Early on the 13th I proceeded
to the front, ahead of Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made upon the
enemy and that his forces [the enemy's] had formed a junction and recrossed the
Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and
limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the
Chickamauga threatening the enemy in front."

(1) Invidious critics have attributed many of
Stonewall Jackson's successes to lucky blunders, or at best to happy inspirations at the
moment of striking. Never was there a greater mistake. He studied carefully (shall I add
prayerfully ?) all his own and his adversary's movements. He knew the situation perfectly,
the geography and the topography of the country, the character of the officers opposed to
him, the number and material of his troops. He never joined battle without a thorough
personal reconnoissance of the field. That duty he trusted to no engineer officer. When
the time came for him to act, he was in the front to see that his orders were carried out,
or were modified to suit the ever-shifting scenes of battle.-D. H. H.

(2) Thomas's corps, after crossing at Bridgeport,
Shell Mound, and Caperton's Ferry, arrived, September 4th, near Trenton, in Will's Valley
(east of Sand Mountain). On the 6th Negley's division, with Baird's supporting, reached
Johnson's Crook, and on the 10th crossed Missionary Ridge into McLemore's Cove. On the
11th Negley and Baird retired to Stevens's Gap after feeling the enemy in front of Dug
Gap, in Pigeon Mountain. Meantime Davis's and Johnson's divisions of McCook's corps
crossing the Tennessee at Caperton's Ferry passed over Sand Mountain and seized Winston's
Gap, while Sheridan's division, moving via Trenton, was close at hand. On the 10th
McCook's three divisions were at Alpine. Crittenden's corps by September 4th was across
the Tennessee (at Bridgeport, Shell Mound, and Battle Creek). On the 9th Wood's division
occupied Chattanooga, and Palmer and Van Cleve marched to Rossville. On the 10th
Crittenden, leaving Wagner's brigade to occupy Chattanooga, pursued the enemy toward
Dalton and Ringgold. Wood reached Lee and Gordon's Mills on the 11th, and Crittenden was
now ordered to close up his whole force on Wood.- EDITORS.

(3) The Comte de Paris states that Bragg sent word
to Hindman, at 11 A. M. September 11th, to retire if he deemed it not prudent to
attack.-EDITORS.

During the active operations of a campaign the post of the
commander-in-chief should be in the center of his marching columns, that he may be able to
give prompt and efficient aid to whichever wing may be threatened. But whenever a great
battle is to be fought, the commander must be on the field to see that his orders are
executed and to take advantage of the ever-changing phases of the conflict. Jackson
leading a cavalry fight by night near Front Royal in the pursuit of Banks, Jackson at the
head of the column following McClellan in the retreat from Richmond to Malvern Hill,
presents a contrast to Bragg sending, from a distance of ten miles, four consecutive
orders for an attack at daylight, which he was never to witness.
Surely in the annals of warfare there is no parallel to the coolness
and nonchalance with which General Crittenden marched and counter-marched for a week with
a delightful unconsciousness that he was in the presence of a force of superior strength.
On the 11 we find him with two divisions (Van Cleve's and Palmer's) at Ringgold, twenty
miles from Chattanooga, and with his third (Thomas J. Wood's), ten miles from Ringgold, at
Lee and Gordon's Mills where it remained alone and unsupported, until late in the , day of
the 12th. Crittenden was at the mills with his whole corps on the 13th and morning of the
14th, moving back to Missionary Ridge during the 14th all his divisions except Wood's
which remained all that day. Crittenden seemed to think that so long as the bridge there
was held, there was no danger of the rebels passing to his r ear on the road toward
Chattanooga, though there were other bridges and several good fords over the Chickamauga
at other points. It was to the isolation of Wood that Bragg refers in his order dated
Lafayette, 6 P. M., on the 12th. Captain Polk (in the Southern Historical Society papers)
says :

" General Bragg, in his official report of the
battle of Chickamauga, charges General Polk with the failure to crush Crittenden's forces
in their isolated position at Ringgold. It will be noted, however, that General Polk was
ordered to take position at a particular spot,- Rock Spring,-thence, if not attacked, to
advance by daylight of the 13th of September, and assume the offensive against the
opposing forces, which were expected from the way of Ringgold. But Crittenden was at
Gordon's Mills behind the Chickamauga on the evening of the 12th.
The order was simply impracticable."

The concentration at Rock Spring, seven miles south-west
from Ringgold and four and a half miles south-east from Lee and Gordon's Mills, was
apparently to interpose between Crittenden's columns, and to strike in detail whichever
should present itself. But General Crittenden, unaware, apparently, of his danger, crossed
the Chickamauga at the mills, and united with Wood about nightfall on the 12th. General
Polk discovered that there was a large force in front of him on the night of the 12th, and
not a single division, and hence he thought only of a defensive attitude. It is probable
that, from his long experience of Bragg's ignorance of the situation, he was skeptical in
regard to the accuracy of the general's information on the present occasion.
Bragg certainly did not know of the union of Crittenden's forces in the
afternoon and night of the 12th. But, even with that knowledge, he would have acted wisely
in falling upon the combined forces on the 13th and 14th.
The truth is, General Bragg was bewildered by " the popping out of
the rats from so many holes." The wide dispersion of the Federal forces, and their
confrontal of him at so many points, perplexed him, instead of being a source of
congratulation that such grand opportunities were offered for crushing them one by one. He
seems to have had no well-organized system of independent scouts, such as Lee had, and
such as proved of inestimable service to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war. For
information in regard to the enemy, apparently he trusted alone to his very efficient
cavalry. But the Federal cavalry moved with infantry supports, which could not be brushed
aside by our cavalry. So General Bragg only learned that he was encircled by foes, without
knowing who they were, what was their strength, and what were their plans. His enemy had a
great advantage over him in this respect.
The negroes knew the country well, and by dividing the numbers given by
them by three, trustworthy in formation could be obtained. The waning fortunes of the
Confederacy were developing a vast amount of " latent unionism " in the breasts
of the original secessionists - those fiery zealots who in '61 proclaimed that " one
Southerner could whip three Yankees." The negroes and the fire-eaters with "
changed hearts " were now most excellent spies.
The 13th of September was a day of great anxiety to me at Lafayette, in
charge of the Reserve Artillery and the wagons trains, with only two weak divisions, less
than nine thousand strong, to protect them. During the 11th and 12th my signal corps on
Pigeon Mountain had been constantly reporting the march of a heavy column to our left and
rear. These reports were communicated by me to the commanding general, and were
discredited by him. At 8 A. M. on the 13th Lieutenant Baylor came to my camp with a note
from General Wharton, of the cavalry, vouching for the lieutenant's entire
trustworthiness. Lieutenant Baylor told me that McCook had encamped the night before at
Alpine, twenty miles from Lafayette, toward which his march was directed. Our cavalry
pickets had been driven in on the Alpine road the afternoon before, and had been replaced
by infantry. Soon after the report by Lieutenant Baylor, a brisk fire opened upon the
Alpine road, two miles from Lafayette. I said to my staff, as we galloped toward the
firing, " It is to be South Mountain over again." This referred to the defense,
on the 14th of September, 1862, of the passes of that mountain by my gallant division ,
reduced by fighting and marching to five thousand men: We learned, on reaching the Alpine
road, that General Daniel Adams's skirmishers had been attacked by two regiments of
cavalry, which were repulsed. General Adams said to me, " The boldness off the
cavalry advance convinces me that an infantry column is not far oft." Lucius Polk's
brigade was brought down from Pigeon Mountain, and every disposition was made to celebrate
appropriately the next day - the anniversary of South Mountain. But that was not to be.
General McCook (Federal) had been ordered to Summerville, eleven miles south of Lafayette
on the main road to Rome, Ga. But he had become cautious after hearing that Bragg was not
making the hot and hasty retreat that Rosecrans had supposed. He therefore ordered his
wagon-train back to the top of Lookout Mountain and remained all day of the 13th at ,
Alpine. His cavalry had taken some prisoners from General Adams, and he thus learned
certainly that Bragg had been reenforced. At midnight on the 13th McCook received the
order to hurry back to Join Thomas [in McLemore's Cove]. Then began the race of life and
death, the crossing back over Lookout Mountain, the rapid exhausting march north through
Lookout Valley, and the Junction at last at Stevens's Gap on the 17th. The contemporary
accounts represent McCook's march as one of fatigue and suffering.
General Bragg returned to Lafayette on the afternoon of the 13th, and I
communicated to him verbally that night the report of Lieutenant Baylor. He replied
excitedly, " Lieutenant Baylor lies. There is not an infantry soldier of the enemy
south of us." The next morning he called his four corps commanders, Polk, Buckner, W.
H. T. Walker, and myself, together, and told us that McCook was at Alpine, Crittenden at
Lee and Gordon's Mills and , Thomas in McLemore's Cove. McCook was at that very time
making that famous march, estimated by Rosecrans at fifty-seven miles, to join Thomas at
Stevens's Gap. But the Confederate commander did not know of this withdrawal, and possibly
the fear of an attack in his rear by McCook kept him from falling upon Thomas and
Crittenden in his front. The nightmare upon Bragg for the next three days was due,
doubtless, to his uncertainty about the movements of his enemy, and to the certainty that
there was not that mutual confidence between him and some of his subordinates that there
ought to be between a chief and his officer s to insure victory. Bragg's want of definite
and precise information had led him more than once to issue " impossible "
orders, and therefore those intrusted with their execution got in the way of disregarding
them. Another more serious trouble with him was the disposition to find a scapegoat for
every failure and disaster. This made his officers cautious about striking a blow when an
opportunity presented itself, unless they were protected by a positive order . (1)
In reference to the long intervals between battles in the West, I once
said to General Patton Anderson " When two armies confront each other in the East,
they get to work very soon ; but here you look at one another for days and weeks at a
time." He replied with a laugh, " Oh, we out her e have to crow and peck straws
awhile before we use our spurs." The crowing and pecking straws were now about over.
On the 13th Rosecrans awoke from his delusion that Bragg was making a disorderly retreat,
and issued his orders for the concentration of his army in McLemore's Cove. Granger's
corps came up from Bridgeport, occupied Rossville on the 14th, and remained there until
the battle of the 24th. Rossville is at the gap in Missionary Ridge through which runs the
road from Chattanooga to Lafayette and Rome, Ga. General. Rosecrans had felt it to be of
vital importance to hold this gap at all hazards, in case of a disaster to his arms. On
the 16th Rosecrans had his forces well in hand, extending from Lee and Gordon's Mills to

(1) General Lee sought for no vicarious victim to
atone for his one disaster. " I alone am to blame; the order for attack was mine
" said he after the repulse of the assault upon Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg. Lee and
Bragg were cast in different molds.- D. H. H.

Stevens's Gap, in a line running from east to south-west some eleven miles
long. On the same day Bragg, with headquarters still at Lafayette, held the gaps in Pigeon
Mountain, and the fords to Lee and Gordon's Mills. Each commander was in position, on the
17th, to turn the left flank of his adversary,-Bragg by crossing the Chickamauga at points
north off Lee and Gordon's Mills ; but by this he risked fighting with his back to the
river,- a hazardous situation in case of defeat. .He risked too, to some extent, his
trains, which had yet to be moved toward Ringgold and Dalton. His gain, in case of a
decided victory, would be the cutting off of Rosecrans from Chattanooga, and possibly the
recapture of that place. Rosecrans could have flanked Bragg by crossing at the Mills and
at the fords between that place and Catlett's. This would have cut off Bragg from Rome
certainly, and from Dalton in case of his advance upon Chattanooga, or else would have
compelled him to come out and fight upon ground selected by his antagonist. The risk to
Rosecrans was an insecure line of retreat in case of defeat, and possibly the loss off
Chattanooga. But he had Granger's corps to hold the fortifications of Chattanooga, and he
held also the gaps in Lookout Mountain. Bragg showed superior boldness by taking the
initiative. Rosecrans determined to act upon the defensive. He says that he knew on the
17th that Bragg would try to seize the Dry Valley and Rossville roads -the first on the
west and the second on the east of Missionary Ridge. He thus divined the plan of his enemy
twelve hour s before Bragg's order was issued. Therefore Rosecrans, on the afternoon of
the 17th, ordered McCook to take the place of Thomas at Pond Spring, Thomas to relieve the
two divisions of Crittenden at Crawfish Springs, and Crittenden to take these divisions
and extend them to the left of Wood at Lee and Gordon's, so as to protect the road to
Chattanooga. McCook's corps reached its position at dark Crittenden's near midnight.
Thomas marched all night uninterruptedly, and the head of his columns reached the Widow
Glenn's (Rosecrans's headquarters) at daylight on the 19th.
On the 18th Bragg issued, from Leet's tan-yard, his order for battle :

" 1. [Bushrod) Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near
Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the
Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mills.

" 2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move
and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

" 3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement to
the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's.

" 4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's
Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross will bear to the right and cross at
Dalton's Ford or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy
may be.

" 5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from
the cove, and, by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the enemy is reenforcing
at Lee and Gordon's Mills in , which event he will attack them in flank.

" 6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain and cover
our rear and left , , and bring up stragglers.

"7. All teams etc. not with troops should go toward Ringgold and
Dalton beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains ; rations when
cooked will be forwarded to the troops.

"8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness,
vigor, and persistence."

Had this order been issued on any of the four preceding
days, it would have found Rosecrans wholly unprepared for it, with but a single infantry
division (Wood's) guarding the crossings of the Chickamauga, and that at one point only,
Lee and Gordon's - the fords north of it being watched by cavalry . Even if the order had
been given twenty-four hours earlier, it must have been fatal to Rosecrans in the then
huddled and confused grouping of his forces.
All that was effected on the 18th was the sending over of Walker's
small corps of a little more than 5000 men near Alexander's Bridge, and Bushrod Johnson's
division of 3600 men at Reed's Bridge, farther north. These troops drove off Wilder's
mounted infantry from the crossings immediately south of them, so as to leave undisputed
passage for Bragg's infantry, except in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon's. On the night
of the 18th Bragg's troops were substantially as follows : Hill's corps on the extreme
left, with center at Glass's Mill ; Polk's at Lee and Gordon's ; Buckner's at Byram's Ford
; Hood's at Tedford's Ford. (1) During the night Cheatham's
division of Polk's corps was detached, moved down the Chickamauga, and crossed at Hunt's
Ford about 7 A. M. on the 19th. On that morning the Federal line of battle ran, in the
main, parallel to the Chattanooga road from Lee and Gordon's to beyond Kelly's farm, and
consisted of the divisions of Wood Van Cleve, and , Palmer of Crittenden's corps, and
Baird's and Brannan's of Thomas's corps, in the order named from right to left. Negley and
Reynolds, commander s under Thomas, had not come up at the opening of the battle of the
19th. The leading division (R. W. Johnson's) of McCook's corps reached Crawfish Springs at
an early hour that day, and the divisions of Davis and Sheridan soon followed. It is about
five miles from Crawfish Springs to Kelly's farm.
Soon after getting into position at Kelly's after his night march,
General Thomas was told by Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve
Corps, that there were no rebel troops west of the Chickamauga, except one brigade that
had crossed at Reed's Bridge the afternoon before and which could easily be captured, as
he (McCook) had burned the bridge behind the rebels. Thomas ordered Brannan to take two
brigades and make a reconnoissance on the road to Reed's Bridge, and place a third brigade
on the road to Alexander's Bridge. This order took the initiative away from Bragg, and put
it in the hands of Thomas with his two divisions in line to crush the small Confederate
force west of the river, and then with his supports, as they came, beat, in detail, the
Confederate supports, delayed, as they must be, by the crossings and the distances to
march. Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division met Forrest's cavalry on the Reed's Bridge
road, and drove it , back on the infantry-two small brigades under Ector and Wilson. These
advanced with the " rebel yell," pushed Croxton back and ran over his battery,
but were in turn beaten back by Brannan's and Baird's forces. Baird now began the
readjustment of his lines, and during the confusion of the movement Liddell's
(Confederate) division, two thousand strong, struck the brigades of Scribner and King, and
drove them in disorder, capturing Loomis's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Van Pelt.
Bush's Indiana battery was

(1) Hood's division about 5000, was the only part
of Longstreet's corps in the action of the 19th.-D. H. H.

captured at the same time. The defeat had become a panic, and Baird's and
Brannan's men were going pell-mell to the rear, when the victorious Liddell found himself
in the presence of a long line of Federal troops overlapping both flanks of his little
force. These were the troops of Brannan's reorganized division on his right, and of the
freshly arrived division of R. W. Johnson from McCook. Liddell extricated himself
skillfully, losing heavily, however, and being compelled to abandon his captured guns. It
was by Rosecrans's own order, at 10 : 15 A. M., that R. W. Johnson had been hurried
forward five miles from Crawfish Springs, just in time to save the Federal left from a
grave disaster. At 11 A. M. Bragg ordered Cheatham to the relief of Liddell, but he
reached the ground after Johnson-too late to drive Brannan as well as Baird off the field.
Cheatham's veteran division of seven thousand men advanced gallantly, drawing the enemy
before it, when it was in its turn hurled back by an attacking column which Thomas had
organized after the defeat of Liddell and the arrival of two fresh divisions, viz.,
Palmer's of Crittenden's corps and Reynolds of his own. corps.
Unfortunately for the Confederates, there was no general advance, as
there might have been along the whole line-an advance that must have given a more decisive
victory on the 19th than was gained on the 20th. It was desultory fighting from right to
left, without concert, and at inopportune times. It was the sparring of the amateur boxer,
and not the crushing blows of the trained pugilist. From daylight on the 19th until after
midday, there was a gap of two miles between Crittenden and Thomas, into which the
Confederates could have poured, turning to right or left, and attacking in flank whichever
commander was least prepared for the assault. As Cheatham was falling back, A. P.
Stewart's division of Buckner's corps, 3400 strong, attacked Palmer's division of
Crittenden's corps, which was flanking Cheatham drove it back , and marching forward met
Van Cleve's division of the same corps hastening to the assistance of Thomas, and hurled
it back also. Hood, with his own division and Bushrod Johnson's moved at 2 : 30 P. M., and
gained for a time a , most brilliant success, crushing the right center of the Federal
army, capturing artillery, and seizing the Chattanooga road. The three Confederate
divisions , after their first triumphs, had to encounter the four fresh divisions of Wood
, Davis, Sheridan, and Negley, and were in turn driven back to the east of the road.
Stewart had recaptured the battery lost by Cheatham's division, twelve
pieces of Federal artillery, over two hundred prisoners, and several hundred rifles. Hood
and Bushrod Johnson had met with a similar success at first, but, of course, three
divisions could not stand the combined attack of six.
On our extreme left a good deal of demonstrating had been done by the
Federals on the 17th and 18th ; infantry had been crossed over at Owen's Ford, and threats
made at Glass's Mill. On the 19th I ordered an attack at the latter place. Slocomb's
battery had a bloody artillery duel with one on the west of the river, and, under cover of
the artillery fire, Helm's brigade of Breckinridge's division was crossed over and
attacked Negley's infantry and , drove it off. Riding over the ground with Breckinridge, I
counted eleven dead horses at the Federal battery, and a number of dead infantrymen that
had not been removed. The clouds of dust rolling down the valley revealed the precipitate
retirement of the foe, not on account of our pressure upon him, but on account of the
urgency of the order to hurry to their left. This was the time to have relieved the strain
upon our right by attacking the Federal right at Lee and Gordon's. My veteran corps, under
its heroic division commanders Breckinridge and Cleburne, would have flanked the, enemy
out of his fortifications at this point, and would by their brilliant onset have
confounded Rosecrans in his purpose of massing upon his left; but Bragg had other plans. (1)
At 3 P. M. I received an order to report to the commander-in-chief at
Tedford's Ford, to set Cleburne's division in motion to the same point, and to relieve
Hindman at Gordon's with Breckinridge's division. Cleburne had six miles to march over a
road much obstructed with wagons, artillery, and details of soldiers. He got into position
on the extreme right after sundown. Thomas had, in the meanwhile, moved Brannan from his
left to his right, and was retiring Baird and W. W. Johnson to a better position, when

(1) The great commander is he who makes his
assumes that he is superior to his enemy, either antagonist keep step with him. Thomas,
like the in numbers or in courage, and therefore carries grand soldier he was, by
attacking first, made Bragg with him to the assault all the moral advantage of keep step
with him. He who begins the attack his assumed superiority.- D. H. H.

Cleburne, with Cheatham upon his left, moved upon them " in the
gloaming" in magnificent style, capturing three pieces of artillery, a number of
caissons, two stand of colors, and three hundred prisoners. The contest was obstinate, for
a time, on our left, where log breastworks were encountered; and here that fine soldier,
Brigadier-General Preston Smith, of Cheatham's division, lost his life. Discovering that
our right extended beyond the enemy, I threw two batteries in advance of our fighting line
and almost abreast of that of the enemy. These caused a hasty abandonment of the
breastworks and a falling back of some half a mile. This ended the contest for the day.
General Rosecrans made a very natural mistake about our overwhelming
numbers. But it was a big mistake. The South, from patriotic pride, still kept up its old
military organizations, for how could it merge together divisions and brigades around
which clustered such glorious memories ? But the waste of war had reduced them to mere
skeleton divisions and brigades. My corps at Chickamauga was but little more than
one-third of the size of my division at Yorktown, and so it was through the whole Southern
army. Captain W. M. Polk, from data furnished him by General Marcus J. Wright, has given
an estimate of the numbers in the respective corps and divisions of the two armies; he
concludes that the Federals had 45,855 and the Confederates 33,897 in the battle of the
19th.
I witnessed some of the heaviest fighting on the afternoon of the 19th,
and never saw so little straggling from the field. I saw but one deserter from Hood's
ranks, and not one from Cleburne's. The divisions of Hindman , Breckinridge, and Preston
had not been put into the fight, and two brigades of McLaws's (Kershaw's and Humphreys's)
were expected next day. Rosecrans had put in all but two of his brigades. The outlook
seemed hopeful for the Confederates: Longstreet arrived at 11 P. M. on the 19th. (1)
Soon after, General Bragg called together some of his officers and
ventured upon that hazardous experiment, a change of organization in face of the enemy. He
divided his army into two wings; he gave to Polk the right wing, consisting of the corps
of Hill and Walker, and the division of Cheatham,- comprising in all 18,794 infantry and
artillery, with 3500 cavalry under Forrest ; to Longstreet he gave the left wing,
consisting of the corps of Buckner and Hood, and the division of Hindman,- 22,849 infantry
and artillery, with 4000 cavalry under Wheeler. That night Bragg announced his purpose of
adhering to his plan of the 19th for the 20th, viz., successive attacks from right to
left, and he gave his wing commanders orders to begin at daylight. I left Cleburne, after
his fight, at 11 P. M., and rode with Captains Coleman and Reid five miles to Tedford's
Ford where the orders for the

(1) While lying on the Rapidan in August, after
disastrous day at Gettysburg, Longstreet had suggested to General Lee the reenforcing of
Bragg. The general went to Richmond, and after a time got the consent of the Confederate
authorities to send Longstreet, without artillery or cavalry, with the much reduced
divisions of McLaws and Hood. Lee followed Longstreet to his horse to see him off, and as
he was mounting said, "General, you must beat those people." (Lee always called
the that Federals " those people.") Longstreet said, " General, if you will
give your orders that the enemy, when beaten, shall be destroyed, I will promise to give
you victory, if I live ; but I would not give the life of a single soldier of mine for a
barren victory." Lee replied, " The order has been given and will be
repeated."-D. H. H.

day announced that Bragg's headquarters would be, that I might get instructions
for the next day. On the way I learned from some soldiers that Breckinridge was coming up
from Lee and Gordon's. I sent Captain Reid to him to conduct him to Cleburne's right.
General Polk, however, as wing commander gave General Breckinridge permission to rest his
weary men, and took him to his own headquarters. It was after 2 o'clock when General
Breckinridge moved off under the guidance of Captain Reid, and his division did not get
into position until after sunrise. Captain Coleman and myself reached the ford after
midnight, only to learn that Bragg was not there. Some time after the unsuccessful search,
my other staff-officers came up, and my chief-of-staff gave me a message from General Polk
that my corps had been put under his command, and that he wished to see me at Alexander's
Bridge. He said not a word to any of them about an attack at daylight, nor did he to
General Breckinridge, who occupied the same room with him that night. I have by me written
statements from General Breckinridge and the whole of my staff to that effect. General
Polk had issued an order for an attack at daylight, and had sent a courier with a copy,
but he had failed to find me. I saw the order for the first time nineteen years afterward
in Captain Polk's letter to the Southern Historical Society. At 3 A. M. on the 20th I went
to Alexander's Bridge, but not finding the courier who was to be posted there to conduct
me to General Polk, I sent Lieutenant Morrison, aide-de-camp, to hunt him up and tell him
I could be found on the line of battle, which I reached just after daylight, before
Breckinridge had got into position. Neither of my division commanders had heard anything
of the early attack; and cooked rations were being distributed to our men, many of whom
had not eaten anything for twenty-four hours. At 7: 25 an order was shown me from General
Polk, directed to my major-generals, to begin the attack. I sent a note to him that I was
adjusting my line, and that my men were getting their rations.
Polk soon after came up, and assented to the delay. Still nothing was
said of the daylight attack. Bragg rode up at 8 A. M. and inquired of me why I had not
begun the attack at daylight. I told him that I was hearing then for the first time that
such an order had been issued and had not known whether we were to be the assailants or
the assailed. He said angrily, " I found Polk after sunrise sitting down reading a
newspaper at Alexander's Bridge, two miles from the line of battle, where he ought to have
been fighting." However, the essential preparations for battle had not been made up
to this hour and, in fact, could not be made without the presence of the
commander-in-chief. The position of the enemy had not been reconnoitered, our line of
battle had not been adjusted, and par t of it was at right angles with the rest; there was
no cavalry on our flanks, and no order had fixed the strength or position of the reserves.
My corps had been aligned north and south, to be parallel to the position of the enemy.
Cheatham's division was at right angles to my line, and when adjusted was found to be
exactly behind Stewart's, and had therefore to be taken out after the battle was begun and
placed in reserve. Kershaw's brigade of Longstreet's corps was also out of place, and was
put in reserve.
Rosecrans in person made a careful alignment of his whole line in the
morning, arranging it so as to cover the Rossville (Chattanooga) and the Dry Valley roads.
It began tour hundred yards east of the Rossville road, on a crest which was occupied from
left to right by Baird's division (Thomas's corps), R. W. Johnson's division (McCook's),
Palmer's division (Crittenden's), and Reynolds's division {Thomas's). These four divisions
became isolated during the day, and the interest of the battle centers largely in them.
They lay behind substantial breastworks of logs,(1) in a line
running due south and bending back toward the road at each wing. " Next on the right
of Reynolds," says a Federal newspaper account, "was Brannan's division of
Thomas's corps, then Negley's of the same corps, its right making a crotchet to the rear.
The line across the Chattanooga road toward Missionary Ridge was completed by Sheridan's
and Davis's divisions of McCook's corps : Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions of Crittenden's
corps were in reserve at a proper distance." The line from Reynolds extended in a
south-westerly direction. Minty's cavalry covered the left and rear at Missionary Mills ;
Mitchell's and , Wilder's cavalry covered the extreme right. Rosecrans's headquarters were
at Widow Glenn's house.

(1) The ringing of axes in our front could be
heard all night: D. H. H.
These breastworks were described as follows by William F. G. Shanks, war correspondent of
the " New York Herald" :

" General Thomas had wisely taken the
precaution to make rude works about breast-high along his whole front, using rails and
logs for the purpose. The logs and rails ran at right angles to each other, the logs
keeping parallel to the proposed line of battle and lying, upon the rails until the proper
height was reached. The spaces between these logs were filled with rails, which served to
add to their security and strength. The spade had not been used." EDITORS.

The Confederate line ran at the outset from north to south,
Hill's corps on the right, next Stewart's division, Hood in reserve, then Bushrod
Johnson's then Hindman's on the extreme left, Preston's in reserve. After the fighting had
actually begun, Walker's and Cheatham's divisions and Kershaw's brigade were taken out and
put in reserve. Wheeler's cavalry covered our left, and Forrest had been sent, at my
request, to our right. The Confederates were confronted with eight Federal divisions
protected generally by breastworks. The battle can be described in a few words. The
Confederate attack on the right was mainly unsuccessful because of the breastworks, but
was so gallant and persistent that Thomas called loudly for reenforcements, which were
promptly sent, weakening the Federal right, until finally a gap was left.
This gap Longstreet entered. Discovering, with the true instinct of a
soldier that he could do more by turning to the right, he disregarded the order to wheel
to the left and wheeled the other way, striking the corps of Crittenden and McCook in
flank, driving them with their commanders and the commanding general off the field. (1) Thomas, however, still held his ground, and, though ordered to
retreat, strongly refused to do so until nightfall, thus saving the Federals from a great
disaster. Longstreet, then, was the organizer of victory on the Confederate side, and
Thomas the savior of the army on the other side.
Longstreet did not advance until noon, nor did he attack the
breastworks on the Federal left (Thomas's position) at all, though Federal writers at the
time supposed that he did. Those assaults were made first by the divisions of Breckinridge
and Cleburne of Hill's corps, and then by the brigades of Gist Walthall, Govan, and others
sent to their assistance. Stewart began his brilliant advance at 11 A. M., and before that
time Thomas began his appeals for help.
Breckinridge moved at 9: 30 A. M., and Cleburne fifteen minutes later,
according to the order for attack. Forrest dismounted Armstrong's division of cavalry to
keep abreast of Breckinridge, and held Pegram's division in reserve. Breckinridge's two
right brigades, under Adams and Stovall, met but little opposition, but the left of Helm's
brigade encountered the left of the breastworks, and was badly cut up. The heroic Helm was
killed, and his command repulsed. His brigade, now under the command of that able officer,
Colonel J. H. Lewis, was withdrawn. The simultaneous advance of Cleburne's troops would
have greatly relieved Helm, as he was exposed to a flank as . well as a direct fire.
General Breckinridge suggested, and I cordially approved the suggestion, that he should
wheel his two brigades to the left, and get in rear of the breastworks. These brigades had
reached the Chattanooga road, and their skirmishers had pressed past Cloud's house, where

(1) General Bushrod Johnson was the first to enter
the gap with his division and, with the coolness and judgment for which he was always
distinguished, took in the situation at a glance and began the flank movement to the
right. General Longstreet adopted the plan of his lieutenant, and made his other troops
conform to Bushrod John son's movement.-D. H. H.

there was a Federal field-hospital. The wheeling movement enabled Stovall to
gain a point beyond the retired flank of the breastworks, and Breckinridge says in his
report, "Adams had advanced still farther, being actually in rear of his
intrenchments. A good supporting line to my division at this moment would probably have
produced decisive results." Federal reenforcements had, however, come up. Adams was
badly wounded and fell into the enemy's hands, and the two brigades were hurled back.
Beatty's brigade of Negley's division had been the first to come to Baird's assistance.
General Thomas says :

" Beatty, meeting with greatly superior numbers, was compelled to fall
back until relieved by the fire of several regiments of Palmer's reserve which I had
ordered to the support of the left, being placed in position by General Baird, and which,
with the cooperation of Van Derveer's brigade (1) of
Brannan's division, and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, drove the
enemy entirely from Baird's left and rear."

Here was quite a sensation made by Breckinridge's two
thousand men. American troops cannot stand flank and rear attacks. While Breckinridge was
thus alarming Thomas for his left, Cleburne was having a bloody fight with the forces
behind the breastworks. From want of alignment before the battle, Deshler's brigade had to
be taken out that it might not overlap Stewart. L. E. Polk's brigade soon encountered the
enemy behind his logs, and after an obstinate contest was driven back. Wood's
(Confederate) brigade on the left had almost reached Poe's house (the burning house) on
the Chattanooga road, when he was subjected to a heavy enfilading and direct fire, and
driven back with great loss. Cleburne withdrew his division four hundred yards behind the
crest of a hill. The gallant young brigadier Deshler was killed while executing the
movement, and his brigade then fell into the able hands of Colonel R. Q. Mills. The fierce
fight on our right lasted until 10: 30 A. M. It was an unequal contest of two small
divisions against four full ones behind fortifications. Surely, there were never nobler
leaders than Breckinridge and Cleburne, and surely never were nobler troops led on a more
desperate "forlorn-hope "-against odds in numbers and superiority in position
and equipment. But their unsurpassed and unsurpassable valor was not thrown away. Before a
single Confederate soldier had come to their relief, Rosecrans ordered up other troops to
the aid of Thomas, in addition to those already mentioned. At 10:10 A. NT. he ordered
McCook to be ready at 10:30; Sheridan's division to support Thomas.

(1) General Adams Was captured by Van Derveer's
men.-D. H. H.

General McCook says that he executed the order and marched
the men at double-quick. This weakening of his right by Rosecrans to support his left was
destined soon to be his ruin. So determined had been the assaults of Breckinridge and
Cleburne, that, though repulsed and badly punished, they were not pursued by the enemy,
who did not venture outside of his works.
At 11 A. M. Stewart's division advanced under an immediate order from
Bragg. His three brigades under Brown, Clayton, and Bate advanced with Wood of Cleburne's
division, and, as General Stewart says, " pressed on past the corn-field in front of
the burnt house, two or three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the enemy
within his line of intrenchments. . . . Here they encountered a fresh artillery fire on
front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, and had to retire." This was the
celebrated attack upon Reynolds and Brannan which led directly to the Federal disaster. In
the meantime our right was preparing to renew the attack. I proposed to the wing
commander, Polk, to make a second advance, provided fresh troops were sent forward,
requesting that the gap in Breckinridge's left, made by the withdrawal of Helm, should be
filled by another brigade. General J. K. Jackson's was sent for that purpose, but
unfortunately took its position too far in rear to engage the attention of the enemy in
front, and every advance on our right during the remainder of the day was met with flank
and cross fire from that quarter. Gist's brigade and Liddell's division of Walker's corps
reported to me. Gist immediately attacked with great vigor the log-works which had
repulsed Helm so disastrously, and he in turn was driven back. Liddell might have made as
great an impression by moving on the Chattanooga road as Breckinridge had done , but his
strong brigade (Walthall s) was detached, and he advanced with Govan's alone, seized the
road for the second time that day, and was moving behind the breastworks, when, a column
of the enemy appearing on his flank and rear, he was compelled to retreat.
This was simultaneous with the advance of Stewart. The heavy pressure
on Thomas caused Rosecrans to support him by sending the divisions of Negley and Van Cleve
and Brannan's reserve brigade. In the course of these changes, an order to Wood, which
Rosecrans claims was misinterpreted, led to a gap being left into which Longstreet stepped
with the eight brigades (Bushrod Johnson's original brigade and McNair's, Gregg's,
Kershaw's Law's, , Humphreys s, Banning's, and Robertson's) which he had arranged in three
lines to constitute his grand column of attack. Davis's two brigades, one of Van Cleve's,
and Sheridan's entire division were caught in front and flank and driven from the field.
Disregarding the order of the day, Longstreet now gave the order to wheel to the right
instead of the left, and thus take in reverse the strong position of the enemy. Five of
McCook's brigades were speedily driven off the field. He estimates their loss at forty per
cent. Certainly that flank march was a bloody one. I have never seen the Federal dead lie
so thickly on the ground, save in front of the sunken wall at Fredericksburg.
But that indomitable Virginia soldier, George H. Thomas, (1) was there and was destined to save the Union army from total
rout and ruin, by confronting with invincible pluck the forces of his friend and captain
in the Mexican war. Thomas had ridden to his right to hurry up reenforcements, when he
discovered a line advancing, which he thought at first was the expected succor from
Sheridan, but he soon heard that it was a rebel column marching upon him. He chose a
strong position on a spur of Missionary Ridge, running east and west, placed upon it
Brannan's division with portions of two brigades of Negley's ; Wood's division
(Crittenden's) was placed on Brannan's left. These troops, with such as could be rallied
from the two broken corps, were all he had to confront the forces of Longstreet, until
Steedman's division of Granger's corps came to his relief about 3 P. M. Well and nobly did
Thomas and his gallant troops hold their own against foes flushed with past victory and
confident of future success. His new line was nearly at right angles with the line of
log-works on the west side of the Rossville road, his right being an almost impregnable
wall-like hill, his left nearly an inclosed fortification. Our only hope of success was to
get in his rear by moving far to our right, which overlapped the Federal left.
Bushrod Johnson's three brigades in Longstreet's center were the first
to fill the gap left by Wood's withdrawal from the Federal right; but the other five
brigades under Hindman and Kershaw. moved promptly into line as soon as space could be
found for them, wheeled to the right, and engaged in the murderous flank attack. On they
rushed, shouting, yelling, running over batteries, capturing trains, taking prisoners,
seizing the headquarters of the Federal commander, at the Widow Glenn's, until they found
themselves facing the new Federal line on Snodgrass .Hill. Hindman had advanced a little
later than the center, and had met great and immediate success. The brigades of Deas and
Manigault charged the breastworks at double-quick, rushed over them, drove Laiboldt's
Federal brigade of Sheridan's division off the field down the Rossville road ; then
General Patton Anderson's brigade of Hindman, having come into line, attacked and beat
back the forces of Davis, Sheridan, and Wilder (2) in their
front, killed the hero and poet General Lytle,

(1) Bragg had great respect and affection for the
first lieutenant of his battery. The tones of tenderness with Which he spoke of " Old
Tom" are still remembered by me.-D. H. H.

"Wilder's brigade, with Colonel T. J.
Harrison's 39th Indiana Mounted Infantry regiment, Which was ordered to report to Colonel
Wilder about 9 o'clock A. M. of the 20th of September, was stationed on a hill about
one-third of a mile in the rear of the line of battle, the 39th on the left of the
brigade. A few minutes after 11 o'clock A. M. the brigade was ordered to advance across
the valley where the ammunition train was stationed, and up the hill to the support of
Captain Lilly's battery, and to hold the hill at all hazards until the train was got out
of the way. My company, ` A,' 39th Indiana, was in advance, and on reaching the brow of
the hill Major Evans gave tho commands, `39th Indiana on left into line' ; `Fire at will.'
At a distance of less than fifty yards six solid lines of gray were coming with their hats
down, their bayonets at a charge, and the old familiar rebel yell. Our first volley did
not check their advance, but as volley after volley from our Spencer rifles followed, with
scarce a second's intermission, and regiment after regiment came on left into line on our
right, and poured the same steady, deadly fire into their fast-thinning ranks, they broke
and fled.

"Colonel Wilder and Colonel Harrison rode
along our lines, directing that if they charged us again, no shot must be fired until the
word of command was given. In a few moments those lines of gray once more emerged from the
sheltering timber on the opposite side of the field, and steadily, as if on parade, they
advanced to the charge till the line had reached to the point at which they broke before,
when the command ` Fire' was given, and again they broke and fled in wild confusion. Three
times more did those brave men advance at a charge, and each time were they hurled back. A
lieutenant of the 17th Indiana went down with a few men under cover of the fire of the
brigade, and brought in the flag of an Alabama regiment. We then received orders to move
off, remount and guard the ammunition train to Chattanooga, which we did
successfully."

took 1100 prisoners, 27 pieces of artillery, commissary and ordnance trains,
etc. Finding no more resistance on his front and left, Hindman wheeled to the right to
assist the forces of the center. The divisions of Stewart, Hood, Bushrod Johnson, and
Hindman came together in front of the new stronghold of the Federals.
It was now 2:30 P. M. Longstreet, with his staff, was lunching on sweet
potatoes. A message came just then that the commanding general wished to see him. He found
Bragg in rear of his lines, told him of the steady and satisfactory progress of the
battle, that sixty pieces of artillery had been reported captured (though probably the
number was over-estimated), that many prisoners and stores had been taken, and that all
was going well. He then asked for additional troops to hold the ground gained, while he
pursued the two broken corps down the Dry Valley road and cut oft the retreat of Thomas.
Bragg replied that there was no more fight in the troops of Polk's wing, that he could
give Longstreet no reenforcements, and that his headquarters would be at Reed's Bridge. He
seems not to have known that Cheatham's division and part of Liddell's had not been in
action that day.(1)
Some of the severest fighting had yet to be done after 3 P. M. It probably
never happened before for a great battle to be fought to its bloody conclusion with the
commanders of each side away from the field of conflict. But the Federals were in the
hands of the indomitable Thomas, and the Confederates were under their two heroic wing
commanders Longstreet and Polk. In the lull of the strife I went with a staff-officer to
examine the ground on our left.
One of Helm's wounded men had been overlooked, and was lying alone in
the woods, his head partly supported by a tree. He was shockingly injured.(2)

(1) General Longstreet wrote to me in July, 1884 :

"It is my opinion that Bragg thought at 3 P.
M. that the battle was lost, though he did not say so positively, I asked him at that time
to reenforce me with a few troops that had not been so severely engaged as mine, and to
allow me to go down the Dry Valley road, so as to interpose behind Thomas and cut off his
retreat to Chattanooga, at the same time pursuing the troops that I had beaten back from
my front. His reply, as well as I can remember, was that he had no troops except my own
that had any fight left in them, and that I should remain in the position in which I then
was. After telling me this, he left me, saying, ' General, if anything happens,
communicate with me at Reed's Bridge.' In reading Bragg's report, I was struck with his
remark that the morning after the battle `he found the ever-vigilant General Liddell
feeling his way to find the enemy.' Inasmuch as every one in his army was supposed to know
on the night of the battle that we had won a complete victory, it seemed to me quite
ludicrous that an officer should be commended for his vigilance the next morning in
looking for the enemy in his immediate presence. I know that I was then laying a plan by
which we might overhaul the enemy at Chattanooga or between that point and Nashville. It
did not occur to me on the night of the 20th to send Bragg word of our complete success. I
thought that the loud huzzas that spread over the field just at dark were a sufficient
assurance and notice to any one within five miles of us. . . . Rosecrans speaks
particularly of his apprehension that I would move down the Dry Valley road." D. H.
H.

(2) He belonged to Von Zinken's regiment, of New
Orleans, composed of French, Germans, and Irish. I said to him : " My poor fellow,
you are badly hurt. what regiment do you belong to f " He replied : " The Fifth
Confederit, and a dommed good regiment it is." The answer, though almost ludicrous,
touched me as illustrating the esprit de corps of the soldier-his pride in and his
affection for his command. Colonel Von Zinken told me afterward that one of his
desperately wounded Irishmen cried out to his comrades, " Charge them, boys; they
have chaase (cheese) in their haversacks." Poor Pat, he has fought courageously in
every land in quarrels not his own.- D. H. H.

Hindman and Bushrod Johnson organized a column of attack
upon the front and rear of the stronghold of Thomas. It consisted of the brigades of Deas,
Manigault, Gregg, Patton, Anderson, and McNair. Three of the brigades, Johnson says, had
each but five hundred men, and the other two were not strong. Deas was on the north side
of the gorge through which the Crawfish road crosses, Manigault across the gorge and
south, on the crest parallel to the Snodgrass Hill, where Thomas was. The other three
brigades extended along the crest with their faces north, while the first two faced east.
Kershaw, with his own and Humphreys's brigade, was on the right of Anderson and was to
cooperate in the movement. It began at 3:30 P. M. A terrific contest ensued. The bayonet
was used, and men were killed and wounded with clubbed muskets. A little after 4, the
enemy was reenforced, and advanced, but was repulsed by Anderson and Kershaw.
General Bushrod Johnson claims that his men were surely, if slowly,
gaining ground at all points, which must have made untenable the stronghold of Thomas.
Relief was, however, to come to our men, so hotly engaged on the left, by the advance of
the right. At 3 P. M. Forrest reported to me that a strong column was approaching from
Rossville, which he was delaying all he could.
From prisoners we soon learned that it was Granger's corps. We were
apprehensive that a flank attack, by fresh troops, upon our exhausted and shattered ranks
might prove fatal. Major-General Walker strongly advised falling back to the position of
Cleburne, but to this I would not consent, believing that it would invite attack, as we
were in full view. (1) Cheatham's fine division was sent to
my assistance by the wing commander. But Granger, who had gallantly marched without orders
to the relief of Thomas, moved on " to the sound of the firing, attacked with vigor
and broke

(1) Major-General Walker claims that he proposed
to me to make an advance movement with his whole corps, and complains that his command was
disintegrated by sending it in by brigades.

General Walker did propose, as he says, to fall
back and align upon Cleburne, when we saw Granger's corps approaching on our right, and I
did refuse to permit this, believing that a withdrawal in full view of Granger would
invite an attack upon our flank, and this might be fatal to troops more or less
demoralized by the bloody repulse which they had sustained. The proposal to advance with
his whole corps was never heard by me, and was, at best, impossible, as two of his five
brigades had been detached, the one by Polk and the other by myself, to fill gaps in the
line: D. H. H.

our line." (1) Rosecrans thus describes the
timely help afforded by Granger to the sorely beset Thomas :
" Arrived in sight, Granger discovered at once the peril and the
point of danger - the gap - and quick as thought he directed his advance brigade upon the
enemy. General Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the charge
and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand of our brave men killed
and wounded paid for its possession." Longstreet was determined to send Preston with
his division of three brigades under Gracie, Trigg, and Kelly, aided by Robertson's
brigade of Hood's division, to carry the heights - the main point of defense. His troops
were of the best material and had been in reserve all day ; but brave, fresh, and strong
as they were, it was with them alternate advance and retreat, until success was assured by
a renewal of the fight on the right. At 3:30 P. M. General Polk sent an order to me to
assume command of the attacking forces on the right and renew the assault. Owing to a
delay in the adjustment of our lines, the advance did not begin until 4 o'clock. The men
sprang to their arms with the utmost alacrity, though they had not heard of Longstreet's
success, and they showed by their cheerfulness that there was plenty of " fight in
them." Cleburne ran forward his batteries, some by hand, to within three hundred
yards of the enemy's breastworks, pushed forward his infantry, and carried them. General
J. K. Jackson, of' Cheatham's division, had a bloody struggle with the fortifications in
his front, but had entered them when Cheatham with two more of his brigades, Maney's and
Wright's, came up. Breckinridge and Walker met with but little opposition until the
Chattanooga road was passed, when their right was unable to overcome the forces covering
the enemy's retreat. As we passed into the woods west of the road, it was reported to me
that a line was advancing at right angles to ours. I rode to the left to ascertain whether
they were foes or friends, and soon recognized General Buckner. The cheers that went up
when the two wings met were such as I had never heard before, and shall never hear again.
Preston gained the heights a half hour later, capturing 1000 prisoners
and 4500 stand of arms. But neither right nor left is entitled to the laurels of a
complete triumph. It was the combined attack which, by weakening the enthusiasm of the
brave warriors who had stood on the defense so long and so obstinately, won the day.
Thomas had received orders after Granger's arrival to retreat to
Rossville, but, stout soldier as he was, he resolved to hold his ground until nightfall.
An hour more of daylight would have insured his capture. Thomas had under him all the
Federal army, except the six brigades which had been driven off by the left wing.(2)

(1) According to the official returns the entire
loss during the afternoon in Steedman's two brigades [including 613 captured or missing]
was 1787. A Federal writer says that of the eight staff-officers of Brig.-Gen. Whitaker
" three were killed, three wounded, and one killed or captured."- D. H. H.

(2) In regard to the relative strength of the two
armies, Colonel Archer Anderson says:

"From an examination of the original returns
in the war Department, I reckon, in round numbers, the Federal infantry and artillery on
the field at 59,000, and the Confederate infantry and artillery at 55,000. The Federal
cavalry, about 10,000 strong, was outnumbered by the Confederates by 1000 men. Thus speak
the returns. Perhaps a deduction of 5000 men from the reported strength of each army would
more nearly represent the actual strength of the combatants. But in any case it is, I
think, certain that Rosecrans was stronger in infantry and artillery than Bragg by at
least 4000 men." The Federal estimate of their loss, in captured or missing, is below
the mark by 1000, if the Confederate claim of the capture of 6500 prisoners is correct.
The Confederates also claim to have taken 51 pieces of artillery, 15,000 stand of arms,
and a large amount of ordnance stores, camp-equipage, etc.-D. H. H.

Whatever blunders each of us in authority committed before
the battles of the 19th and 20th, and during their progress, the great blunder of all was
that of not pursuing the enemy on the 21st. The day was spent in burying the dead and
gathering up captured stores. Forrest, with his usual promptness, was early in the saddle,
and saw that the retreat was a rout. Disorganized masses of men were hurrying to the rear
; batteries of artillery were inextricably mixed with trains of wagons ; disorder and
confusion pervaded the broken ranks struggling to get on. Forrest sent back word to Bragg
that " every hour was worth a thousand men." But the commander-in-chief did not
know of the victory until the morning of the 21st, and then he did not order a pursuit.
Rosecrans spent the day and the night of the 21st in hurrying his trains out of town. A
breathing-space was allowed him ; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga -
the objective point of the campaign-was held. There was no more splendid fighting in '61,
when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody
days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never
seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever.
He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all
his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what
had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the
failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent
South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of
despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.
That " barren victory" sealed the fate of the Southern
Confederacy. Source: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War