HONG
KONG In the end, and thanks to the issue's coincidence with the G-8
summit meeting, China and Russia signed up to a compromise UN Security Council
resolution condemning North Korea's missile tests.

But there is more
rhetoric than substance in the sanctions against Pyongyang. The episode has left
China looking responsible and winning brownie points in Washington. But Japan's
leading role in pushing for much stronger action has irritated neighbors and
done nothing to advance the cause of its membership of the Security
Council.

The tough line is likely to further delay resumption of the
six-party talks on the more important issue of North Korea's nuclear
developments. It has made China more suspicious of Japanese policy and increased
the already wide gap with South Korean perceptions of how to deal with the
North.

There has been a worrying element of hyperbole in Japan's recent
reaction to the missile tests. It is little comfort that these have been driven
by domestic politics as hawkish Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe seeks to
consolidate his front-running position in the race to succeed Junichiro Koizumi
as prime minister in September.

It is of particular concern at a time
when there are so many other issues raising mutual suspicions in Northeast Asia.
Abe's reference, immediately following the North's missile tests, to Japan's
self-defense right to a pre-emptive strike against a planned attack, may in
theory have been justifiable. But the timing was clearly designed for publicity
seeking and had the inevitable effect of provoking China.

Japan has long
suffered, often in silence, from endless Chinese, and to a lesser degree, South
Korean baiting on history textbooks and past sins that have clearly been aimed
at their domestic audiences. Japan also runs a close second to the United States
in North Korean demonology. But quasi-pacifist Japan's admirable unwillingness
to be provoked seems to have run its course - and not just in the understandable
but undiplomatic visits of Koizumi to the Yasakuni shrine of war
dead.

One might perhaps argue that if Japan, like China, needs one enemy
to be the butt of its national frustrations it is better to focus on North Korea
than a more important country.

There is a strong basis in North Korea's
refusal to make amends for the kidnap of Japanese citizens. But the
configuration of interests in Northeast Asia is now such that Tokyo's unilateral
targeting of Pyongyang, however undeserving of sympathy it is, can only damage
relations with all three neighbors - China, South Korea and Russia.

Those
who want stability in Northeast Asia must accept that a corollary is that at
best the regime in North Korea will change gradually and in a way that is not
contrary to the interests of either Beijing or Seoul.

China's
embarrassment over its failure to deter North Korea from missile tests and over
the North's swift rejection of the Security Council resolution does not mean
that it will desert Pyongyang.

To both Moscow and Beijing, Pyongyang is
more a minor difficulty than a danger and is a useful card when dealing with
Washington. Anything that increases Chinese-Japanese suspicions can only help
hardliners in North Korea who want to see a cold war between the two regional
powers.

Meanwhile disagreements over how to deal with Pyongyang are
encouraging nationalists in the South to stir up the issue of the disputed
Takeshima/Tokdo islands.

It is not even certain that a Japanese hard line
is helpful to the U.S. administration. China suspects that Japan's position is
partly to win favor in Washington as well as an excuse for its own military
build-up.

But the United States seems in two minds over how best to
handle North Korea. For it, the nuclear issue is far more important than the
missiles. The North already has scores of missiles that can hit Japan, just as
it has thousands of artillery pieces and missiles that can hit the
South.

Both countries rely on the U.S. umbrella as well their own
conventional weapons to deter attack which could only be suicidal - which Kim
Jong Il is not. On their own, longer range rockets, even if they eventually
work, change little for nearby Japan.

Japan has legitimate reasons to
build up its defenses in light of China's naval and missile build-up. Likewise
there is a strong case for cooperating with the United States on a missile
shield.

But Tokyo would do well to be upfront about these issues rather
than use North Korean missiles as a pretext.

Japan deserves a larger say
in global affairs, including a Security Council seat. But this is not the way to
go about it.