The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany
2nd May to 13th May, 1946

DR. KRAZNBUHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I would
like to submit my remaining documents, and then call Admiral
Wagner as my first witness.

The next document I come to is Donitz 37. It is an extract
from the documents on the German policy in the Altmark case.
I do not propose to read it. It concerns a report of the
Captain of the Altmark, which shows how the sailors of the
Altmark were shot at while trying to escape by water and
across the ice. There were seven dead. It can be found, Mr.
President, on Page 78 of Volume No. 2. From Page 79, it can
be seen that this action on the whole found full recognition
in spite of the bloody incidents which no doubt were
regretted by the Admiralty.

The next document, Donitz 39, has partly been read by Sir
David Maxwell Fyfe during cross-examination. It can be found
on Page 81 and the following pages. It deals with the
question of reprisals following a report received regarding
the shooting of survivors of the German minelayer Ulm.

On Page 83 there is a summary regarding the incidents which
had been reported to the Naval War Staff at that time, and
which contained examples dealing with cases where survivors
were shot at by Allied Naval Forces. I am not so much
interested in these twelve actual cases as in the attitude
adopted by the Naval War Staff, while transmitting this
information to the OKW.

It is so important that I would like to read the three
sentences. They are on Page 83, at the top.

"The following accounts deal with incidents which have
already been reported, and in making use of them it must
also be considered, that:

"(a) Some of these incidents occurred while fighting
still was going on.

"(b) Shipwrecked persons swimming about in the water
easily think that shots which missed their real target
are directed against them.

"(c) So far, no evidence has been found whatsoever that a
written or oral order for the shooting of shipwrecked
persons has been issued."

The idea of reprisals did not only occur to the Command, but
it also occurred to the personnel serving on the ships at
sea.

Now, we come to Document Donitz 41, which is on Page 87, and
it deals with a conversation between Admiral Donitz and a
Commander. The conversation took place in June, 1943, and it
is dealt with in an affidavit made by Lt.-Commander Witt.
After following descriptions of attacks made by British
airmen on shipwrecked German submarines the opinion was
expressed by the crews that, in reprisal, the survivors of
enemy ships should also be shot at.

The affidavit also says in the third paragraph:

"The Admiral sharply turned down the idea of attacking an
enemy rendered defenceless in combat; it was incompatible
with our way of waging war."

In connection with the prosecution's Exhibit GB 205, I shall
submit a document of my own, which deals with the question
of terroristic actions. It is an extract from Exhibit GB 194
of the prosecution, and it can be found on Page 91. It deals
with the question of whether the crews of scuttled German
ships should be rescued or not. The French Press tends to
the opinion that they should not in view of the pressing
need of the Allies for freight space. The same entry
contains

[Page 335]

a report according to which British warships have also had
special instructions to prevent further scuttling of German
ships.

I now shall try to prove that the principle according to
which no Commander undertakes rescue actions if he thereby
endangers a valuable ship, is justified. For that purpose I
refer to Document Donitz 90, which is in the fourth volume
of the Document Book, Page 258. It is an affidavit of the
retired Vice Admiral Rogge.

He is reporting that in November, 1941, his auxiliary
cruiser was sunk at long range by a British cruiser and that
the survivors had taken to the boats. They were towed away
by a German submarine to a German supply ship and this
supply ship, too, a few days later, was sunk at long range
by a British cruiser. Once again the survivors took to the
boats and to floats. The affidavit closes with the words:

"At both sinkings no attempt was made, possibly due to
danger involved to the British cruiser, to save even
individual members of the crew."

The principle that a valuable ship must not be risked to
save even members of its own crew is expressed with
classical clarity and severity in the British Admiralty
Orders, which I have already submitted as Donitz 67. The
extract is printed on Page 96. There it says:

"Aid to ships attacked by submarines:

" No British ocean-going merchant ship should aid a ship
attacked by U-boats."

THE PRESIDENT: Where are you reading now?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: Document Book, Volume 2, Page 96, Mr.
President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: "No British ocean-going merchant ship
should aid a ship attacked by U-boats. Small coastal ships,
fishing steamers and other small ships with little draught
should give all possible aid."

The next document I am submitting is Donitz 44, which is on
Page 97. It is a questionnaire for Vice-Admiral Kreisch, who
according to a decision by the Tribunal was interrogated in
a British camp for prisoners of war. From January, 1942 to
January, 1944 he was the officer in charge of submarines in
Italy, which means that he was responsible for the submarine
warfare in the Mediterranean. According to his statements he
knows of no order or no suggestions regarding the killing of
survivors. He advised his commanders that rescue measures
must not endanger the work or safety of their own ships.

In connection with the question whether Admiral Donitz was a
member of the Reich Government I should like to ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Armed Forces
Laws of 1935 which can be found on Page 105 of Volume 2 of
my document books. Paragraph 3 will show that there was only
one minister for the German Armed Forces and that was the
Reich Minister for War.

On the following page, in Paragraph 37, it is shown that
this one minister was assigned the right to issue
legislative orders.

On Page 107 I have again the decree which has been submitted
to the Tribunal as Document 1915-PS and in which decree,
dated 4th February, the post of the Reich Minister for War
is abolished and the tasks of his ministry are transferred
to the supreme commander of the OKW. No new ministry for the
army or the navy was established.

The prosecution has described Admiral Donitz as a fanatical
follower of the Nazi Party. The first document to prove this
statement is dated 17th December, 1943; it is Exhibit GB
185. To save time, I shall refrain from reading a few
sentences from it to show that anything that Admiral Donitz
may have said about political questions was said from the
point of view of the unity and strength of his sailors. May
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document,
which again appears on Pages 103 and 104.

[Page 336]

THE PRESIDENT: Volume 2?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: Volume 2, Pages 103 and 104. I only want to
draw your attention to the last paragraph on Page 104. It
deals with the handing over of Navy shipyards to the
Ministry of Armament in the autumn of 1943. It is an
important question, important for the responsibility
regarding the use of labour in the shipyards, and has been
touched upon repeatedly in this Courtroom. This sole
tendency towards unity becomes clear from yet another
document of the prosecution from which I propose to read one
sentence. It is Exhibit GB 186. In the British trial brief
it is on Page 7. I shall only read the second and third
sentences.

"As officers we have the duty to be guardians of this
unity of our people. Any disunity would also affect our
troops."

The following sentence deals with the same thought at
greater length.

THE PRESIDENT: British trial brief Page 7? Mine has only
five pages. You mean the document book?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: It is the British Document Book, not the
trial brief, the second and third sentences on Page 7, which
I have read, Mr. President.

The fact that Admiral Donitz was not a fanatical follower of
the Party but that on the contrary he fought against a
political influence exercised upon the armed forces by the
Party is shown in my following document Donitz 91. It is on
Page 260 of the Document Book 4. It is an affidavit from the
chief of the legal department in the Supreme Command of the
Navy, Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. The Soviet Prosecution has
already used this document during its cross-examination. I
should like to give a brief summary of the contents:

In the summer of 1943 Reichsleiter Bormann made an attempt
through the Reich Minister of Justice to deprive the Armed
Forces courts of their jurisdiction in so-called political
cases. They were to be transferred to the People's Court and
other courts. The attempt, however, failed. It failed
because of a report which Admiral Donitz made verbally to
the Fuehrer on this subject, and during which he violently
opposed the intentions of the Party. After the assassination
attempt of 20th July, Bormann renewed his attempt. Again
Admiral Donitz opposed it, but this time without success. A
decree was issued on 20th September, 1944 which deprived the
Armed Forces courts of their jurisdiction regarding so-
called political perpetrations. This decree, which was
signed by Adolf Hitler, was by explicit order of the Supreme
Commander of the Navy not carried out in the Navy.

I shall read the last but one paragraph of the affidavit,
which says:

"In consequence of his attitude the Navy was the only
branch of the Armed Forces which, until the end of the
war, did not have to transfer to the People's Court or to
a special court any criminal procedures of a political
nature."

On Page 113 in Volume 2 of my document book I have included
a lengthy extract from Exhibit GB 211, a document of the
prosecution, and this is an application of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Navy, addressed to the Fuehrer, asking for
supplies for the construction and repair of naval and
merchant ships. During the interrogation and cross-
examination of Admiral Donitz this document has already been
referred to. I should merely like to point out that this is
a memorandum containing more than twenty pages; the
prosecution took up two points contained therein.

The origin of the document is dealt with in Document 46,
Page 117 and the following pages. This is an affidavit from
the officer who had drafted this memorandum. I can summarize
the contents. The memorandum is concerned with measures
which did not actually come within the sphere of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It arose on the basis of a
discussion which took place between all departments taking
part in the construction and repair of war and merchant
vessels. All these measures are summarised in this
memorandum.

[Page 337]

The point objected to in particular by the prosecution, as
to a suggestion regarding punitive measures against sabotage
in shipyards, is dealt with in detail on Page 119. I should
like to point out particularly that at that time seven out
of eight ships under construction were destroyed by
sabotage.

It was not a question of terror measures but of punitive
measures entailing the deprivation of certain advantages
and, if necessary, concentration of workers in camps
adjoining the shipyards, so as to cut them off from any
sabotage agents.

Following the Exhibit GB 209 of the prosecution, which deals
with the alleged renunciation of the Geneva Convention, I
submit Donitz 48, which is on Page 122 and the following
pages. It will show the model treatment afforded Allied
prisoners of war in the only prisoner of war camp which was
under the jurisdiction of Admiral Donitz as the Supreme
Commander of the Navy.

To begin with, the document contains an affidavit from two
officers who dealt with prisoner of war affairs in the
Supreme Command of the Navy. This statement is to the effect
that all the suggestions of the International Red Cross
regarding these camps were followed.

The next extract is the report from the last Commandant of
that camp, Lieutenant Commander Rogge, and I should like to
read the second paragraph from that report.

"In the camp Westertinke there were housed at my time
about 5,500-7,000, at the end 8,000 prisoners of war and
internees of different nations, mainly members of the
British Navy. The camp had a good reputation as was
generally known. It was the best in Germany. This was
expressly stated at a congress of British and other
prisoner-of-war physicians of all German camps, which
took place in Schwanenwerder near Berlin at the Villa of
Goebbels about December, 1944. This statement was
confirmed by the British Chief Camp-Physician in
Westertinke, Major Harvey, Royal Army Medical Corps,"
whom I am naming as a witness.

I shall also read the last paragraph on Page 126:

"As I was Deputy Commandant I stayed at the camp up to
the capitulation and handed it over in the regular way to
British troops, who were very satisfied with the
transfer. Squadron-Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter
confirming this. I enclose a photostat of this letter."

This photostat copy appears on the following page and it
says:

"Lieutenant Commander W. Rogge was for ten months Chief
Lager Officer at the Marlag Camp at Westertinke. Without
exception all the prisoners of war in that camp have
reported that he treated them with fairness and
consideration."

Then follows another affidavit from the Intelligence Officer
in that camp. I should like to point out that this officer
was born in February, 1865 and that his age alone would, I
think, bar the use of any terror measures. I shall read from
Page 129, the third from the last paragraph:

"No pressure of any type was applied. If a man lied, then
he was sent back to his bunk and he wasn't questioned
again until one or two days later. I believe I can say
that during the entire time no blow was struck in Dulag
Nord."

I should now like to briefly refer to the accusation raised
against the defendant according to which he, as "a fanatical
Nazi," prolonged a hopeless war. I submit Donitz 50, which
contains statements made by Admiral Darlan, Mr. Chamberlain
and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be found on Pages 132
and 133 of the document book and they will show that the
aforementioned persons also considered it expedient that in
a critical situation the people of a nation should be called
upon to resist to the utmost, sometimes successfully and
sometimes, unsuccessfully.

During his examination Admiral Donitz gave as reason for his
views that he wanted to save German nationals in the East.
As evidence for this I draw your attention to Exhibit GB
212, which can be found on Page 73 of the British Docu-

[Page 338]

ment Book. It is a decree of 11th April, 1945, and I shall
read two sentences under (1):

"Capitulation certainly means the occupation of the whole
of Germany by the Allies along the lines of partition
discussed by them at Yalta. It also means, therefore, the
ceding to Russia of further considerable parts of Germany
west of the River Oder. Does anyone think that at that
stage the Anglo-Saxons will not keep to their agreements
and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes
into Germany with armed forces and will begin a war with
Russia for our sake? The reasoning: 'Let the Anglo-Saxons
into the country; then at least the Russians will not
come,' is faulty, too."

I shall also quote from the Exhibit GB 188, which is on Page
10 of the prosecution's document book. No 1 on Page 11. It
is an order to the German Armed Forces, dated 1st May, 1945.
I shall quote the second paragraph:

"The Fuehrer has designated me to be his successor as
Head of State and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all
branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to
carry on the struggle against the Bolshevists until the
fighting forces and hundreds of thousands of families of
the German Eastern areas have been saved from slavery and
destruction."

This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence.

Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of
Captain Rosig and the other of Commander Suhren. Furthermore
- and this is something I particularly regret - the
interrogatory from the Commander-in-Chief of the American
Navy, Admiral Nimitz, has still not yet been received. I
will submit these documents as soon as I have received them.

And now, with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like
to call my witness, Admiral Wagner.

This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.

As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.