Taxpayer owns real property consisting of land and
improvements in Washington County. Earlier, taxpayer appealed
the assessed value of its property for the 1994-95, 1995-96, and
1996-97 tax years. Eventually taxpayer and the county stipulated
to 1995-96 real market values as follows: land-$455,000,
improvements-$3,267,820, total-$3,722,820. Based on that
stipulation, the tax roll was corrected and the amounts indicated
were placed on the 1995-96 tax roll.

For the 1998-99 tax year, taxpayer's property was
assessed as follows: land-$691,130, improvements-$2,080,030,
total-$2,771,160. Apparently the value of the land increased,
but the value of the improvements had significantly declined.
The assessor believed that the assessed value of the land could
be increased up to its real market value so long as the total
assessed value of the land and improvements did not exceed the
total maximum assessed value from the prior year plus 3 percent.
Taxpayer alleges that the county erred by calculating the maximum
assessed value for the subject property based upon the total
value of land and improvements. Taxpayer asserts that the
maximum assessed value for the land should be separately
calculated. If it is separately calculated, the maximum assessed
value for the land for 1998-99 was $421,785.

ISSUE

Does Article XI, section 11(1)(a) of the Oregon
Constitution require maximum assessed value to be separately
calculated for land and improvements?

ANALYSIS

1. This same issue was previously considered in Taylor v.
Clackamas County Assessor, 14 OTR 504 (1999) and on
reconsideration in 14 OTR 581 (1999). Based upon the stipulation
of the parties in that case and at their request, the court
withdrew its opinions after they were published. Although the
court withdrew its opinions in Taylor, its analysis and
conclusions as set forth therein have not been repudiated. In
this present appeal, the department seeks to persuade the court
to change its views. The department contends that it is
unnecessary to construe the Oregon Constitution and if the court
must construe it, then the court should not insert words or find
an intent that is not present.

After considering the written and oral arguments of the
parties here, the court finds that its opinions in Taylor remain
reflective of its analysis and conclusions. Therefore, the court
adopts those opinions (to the extent applicable) here as an
explanation of its decision in this case. In addition, the court
will respond to some of the county's and the department's
arguments made here.

The department asserts that in ascertaining the intent
of the voters who adopted Measure 50, the court must be careful not to equate "taxpayers" with "voters" or to force an intent
where one did not exist. The department asserts that because Measure 50 was a tax limitation measure, the voters who adopted
it thought in terms of taxes. The department therefore concludes
that because taxes are assessed on parcels that include both land
and improvements combined, "unit of property" must mean the
taxable unit.

The court acknowledges that Measure 50 was intended to
limit property taxes and replaced Measure 47, a property-tax
limitation. However, this does not eliminate the distinctions
that must be made. Measure 47 limited property taxes directly.
In contrast, Measure 50 limits the assessments that may be
imposed on property and the tax rates that may be used by tax-levying bodies. The department acknowledges that generic terms
such as "unit of property" or "the property" can have different
meanings when used in different contexts or for different
purposes.

2. Article XI, section 11(1) of the Oregon Constitution
limits the assessments on "each unit of property." In asserting
that this means taxable unit, the department ignores the fact
that property is not assessed on a taxable-unit basis. The focus
of the constitutional provision is on assessment, not taxation.
Citizens can examine the assessor's records, the assessment roll,
or their tax statements to determine the assessed value of their
property. For many years all of these records have reflected
separate assessments for land and improvements. The court will
not presume that the public was ignorant of the taxing system
that section 11(1) addresses. When the public approved limiting
the assessed value of property, it must have intended that
limitation be imposed upon that measure or unit of property upon
which assessments are made.

If the court were to construe "unit of property" to
mean a taxable unit, it would be in effect inserting a word into
the Oregon Constitution. On the other hand, the constitution's
use of the word "assessment" dictates that the limitation apply
to the assessable unit.

In summary, terms such as "the property" or "unit of
property" can have different meanings depending upon their
context or purposes for which they are used. In this case, "unit
of property" is used as the object of a limitation on assessed
value. It would be inconsistent to treat that object as a
different measure based upon a different function such as
imposing taxes or tax liens. Now, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motions for
summary judgment are denied. Costs to neither party.

1. It appears both were named as Defendants because the county
appraised the land and the department appraised the industrial-plant improvements. See ORS 305.560(1)(c)(A).