78 Tiger-Tiger, hand-screened cotton. Papaya or strawberry, 8-16, $30. Lord & Taylor, Marshall Field, Gene Burton, Pasadena, other fine stores t -:J . ... \ DESIG i,Þ--( {AI " . .. J'ð- k6 New York office-I East 53rd, N.Y. 10022 A Completely Different Hawaii Vacation Resort t lLLllG- ?) ,. Sophisticated visitors have discovered this unique restored native Polynesian village on the fabled . Ii '1111 11 11 Kona coast of the big < f island of Hawaii. Modern I hotel accommodations in II LL thatched-roof cottages. Traditional Long Houses for dining, cocktails, relaxation.. Private beach; lava pool; sailing, fishing, hunting; historic lava fields, etc. Now no extra airfare from your city to Kailua-Kona Airport-consult your Travel Agent or our represen- tatives, Robert F. "Varner Inc in East, Glen W. Fawcett in vVest. For I8-page color brochure and rates write now to Kona Village P. O. Box 366N, Kailua-Kona, Hawaii 96740. many rural communities as possible and Install administrative machinery com- posed of local "people's cadres," partly as a screen for the activities of covert agents. Be goes on to Sd) that between the signing of a cease-fire agreement and the date it goes into effect-a perI- od of three or four months, probably- CommunIst agents in government-con- trolled areas, including the cities, win pose as hoodlums and petty criminals, and will denounce or pick 6gh ts with nationalists who preach patriotism and order. In an effort to gag the bon(;l- fide nationalists, some will be labelled pro- \Vestern stooges and others pro- Communists, and still others ma, be quietly murdered. When the cease-fire goes into effect, Be warns, Comrnunist agents will begin a subtle process of accommodation with government offi- cials, seeking to win their confidence by entertaining and flattering thelTI while producing "proof" that they are anti-Communist. Meanwhile, the agents provocateurs will continue to harass and intimidate the non-Com- munist nationalists, who will become more and more afraid to speak their minds.. Many of thern will leave the cities and towns to return in fear and disgust to their rural homes, only to find Communist workers already in- stalled there, who will denounce thelTI for their "crimes against the people." Since many ordinary people suffered during the war at the hands of the government soldiers and police, and met with discrimination from officIals, this campaign of denunciation will get a ready popular response. The Comrnunist agents in the villages will also de- mand heavy compensation from the government for injuries done to the people and their property, and since the government will almost certainly be unable to meet all these demands, lTIOre dis- content and dissension will be sown. The situation will be further aggr a- vated if, as Be fears, non-Commu- nist Inembers of the N.L.F. who LlY down their arms and return to govern- rnent areas to live are kept under po- lice surveillance and treated as out- casts, despite government promIses to reaccept them into society. Some of theIn, and also some members of the people's cadres the Communists set up in the villages, will inevitably be denounced as Communists. If the gov- ernment does not allow such people to take part in an open dnd legitimate po- litical struggle, wluch would enable them to gain elective offices and jobs, ., . c::.d they will become the nucleus of yet another separatist resistance movement guided by the Cornmunists, and, in Be's words, "thus will the cruel cycle b . " egIn anew. rrhis perhaps unnecess(;lrily dire prophecy has already been partly borne out by the CommunIsts' use of violence, including murder, against nationalists in Saigon and other cities, not only during the perIod of the rr et attacks last year but ever since. Their current carnpaign to flood the hamlets and vil- lages with both overt and covert work- ers is another indication that Be's anal- ysis has at least some validity. One way to block the Communists, he suggests, is to Inove in quickly on the people's cadres. If these overt leaders can be careful1y investigated, and either re- habilitated or removed frorn office, the Communists will be forced to work completely underground, which means less effectively. Similarly, the agents provocateurs in the cities must be ap- prehended and unmasked. A legitimate People's Self-I)efense Militia should be established in as rnany places as possible, Be maintains. Other Vietnamese are also ponder- ing the question of how to deal with the Communists during negotiations and after some sort of settlement is reached. A compromise of one kind or another IS inevitable at Paris, they agree. Most likely, despite the protes- tations of Thieu and othel government officials, the .L.F . either will become part of a new coalition or will be al- lowed to function as a political par- ty-although it has been suggested thdt the Front be perlTIitted to operate openly only if it identifies itself as a CornmunIst organization. But most Vietnarnese fear that even if the Commu- n ists sh 0 uld be fo rced in to the open, they would grad- uallv succeed in taking over the coun- try. The first stage in the take-over, it is thought, rnight be a liberal democra- cy, like the F rench Third or Fourth Republic. A period of conflict would ensue, leading to a Communist-domi- nated coalition. Such a coalition would be neutralist in its foreign policy, and its internal policy would remain anti-Comrnunist on the surface but would in fact he COll1munist-controlled.. ..L-1.ll1erican disengagernen t would create rising anti-American feeling, and only non- \,Vestern foreign .lid, mostly from the Communist bloc, would be ac- cepted. Finall), as the government lost the support of the \\1 est and came to depend lTIOre and lTIOre on Communist J / < .. , >.