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Regional Security Problems

The Persian Gulf is a relatively constricted geographic
area
of great existing or potential volatility. The smaller
states of
the gulf are particularly vulnerable, having limited
indigenous
populations and, in most cases, armed forces with little
more
than symbolic value to defend their countries against
aggression.
All of them lack strategic depth, and their economies and
oil
industries depend on access to the sea. Conflicts
involving the
air forces and navies of the larger gulf powers inevitably
endanger their critical transportation links. Closure of
the
Strait of Hormuz--which was threatened but which never
actually
occurred during the Iran-Iraq War--would have a
catastrophic
effect on regular ship movements.

The oil drilling, processing, and loading facilities of
the
gulf states, some of them on offshore platforms, are vital
to
their economies. In an era of highly accurate missiles and
highperformance aircraft, the protection of these exposed
resources
against surprise attack presents enormous difficulties.
Even
those states that can afford the sophisticated weaponry to
defend
their installations can ensure their effectiveness only
through
proper training, manning, and maintenance.

Most of the Arab gulf states, although vulnerable by
air and
by sea, are relatively immune from ground attack. Because
of
their geographic position on the Arabian Peninsula, they
are
exposed on their landward side only to vast desert tracts
controlled by Saudi Arabia, with which they are linked by
security treaties. Potential aggressors in the region,
although
heavily armed, lack the equipment or experience to project
their
forces over long distances. The only realistic possibility
of
overland attack seems to be in the north, where Kuwait has
no
natural line of defense and its oil facilities are near
both Iran
and Iraq. In early 1992, Kuwaiti officials disclosed plans
to
construct an electronic fence stretching more than 200
kilometers
along the Kuwait-Iraq border. Although some obstacles
might be
emplaced to obstruct an Iraqi crossing, the main purpose
of the
fence is to prevent infiltration. Border guards of
Kuwait's
Ministry of Interior are to patrol the fence area.

In the south, reunited Yemen had inherited large stocks
of
military equipment from the Soviet Union's earlier support
of the
PDRY. The PDRY's political support of Iraq in the Kuwaiti
crisis
caused the GCC states to regard it as a potentially
hostile
neighbor. Although offensive operations against Oman or
Saudi
Arabia, with which it shared long, undefined borders, seem
unlikely, the encouragement of border infiltration by all
three
countries cannot be ruled out.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 introduced a new threat
to
stability in the gulf. Shia form a majority of the
population of
Bahrain and an important part of the foreign labor force
in
Kuwait and are considered potential dissidents in any
future
hostilities. Numerous terrorist actions in Kuwait during
the
1980s were attributed to domestic Shia instigated by Iran
(see Kuwait: Internal Security
, this ch.). Iran is one of the
strongest military powers of the region and has
historically
sought to extend its influence to the Arab shore of the
gulf.
Nevertheless, fears of military confrontation subsided
after the
Iran-Iraq War ended. The influence of the more extremist
elements
within the Iranian government appears to have declined;
Iran also
had opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

In spite of Iraq's defeat in 1991, Kuwait remains the
most
vulnerable of the gulf states. Despite the crippling of
Iraq's
offensive military capabilities, it continues to be a
formidable
military power in the region. Its postwar manpower
strength is
estimated at 380,000, including at least three intact
divisions
of the elite Republican Guard, as well as large stocks of
armor,
artillery, and combat aircraft. Only with the assurance of
outside support can the GCC states be confident that they
can
successfully resist renewed Iraqi aggression.

The gulf Arabs believe that a settlement of the
Arab-Israeli
conflict will enhance gulf security. Direct conflict with
Israel
was a remote contingency in early 1993, although Israel's
doctrine of preemptive attack and its demonstrated ability
to hit
distant targets must be reckoned with in their strategic
planning. Because the northwestern areas of Saudi Arabia
are well
within range of Israeli attack, air defense units that
would
otherwise be available to the GCC for gulf defense must be
positioned there. Efforts of the Arab gulf states to
upgrade
their air defense systems have often been viewed by the
United
States Congress and by the public as hostile to Israeli
interests.

In early 1993, one year after Saddam Husayn's defeat in
the
Persian Gulf War, the region's security appeared more
stable than
in many years. The fear of a communist encroachment or of
a
superpower confrontation has evaporated. Iran seems to be
seeking
greater accommodation with its gulf neighbors, although
the
Tehran government is continuing its military buildup and
insists
that it has a role in regional mutual security. Iraq,
although
still hostile, does not present a significant military
threat.
The United States and other Western powers have indicated
that
they will act against any new instability in the gulf that
endangers their interests.