Press Briefings

Summary:

Why have repeated efforts to improve the resilience of global banking failed? A new study by Catherine Schenk, to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference, reveals that even in the globalising financial markets of the 1970s, entrenched interests were able to ensure that banks were governed based on norms and standards that had been established a century earlier.

Summary:

Comparing HS2 with Victorian investment suggests that local benefits may be impaired by concentrating traffic on a single station in Birmingham that will have no connections with the local rail network.

That is one of the conclusions of a study of railways and local population growth in the Birmingham region in the nineteenth century. The research by Professor Mark Casson and colleagues will be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference.

Summary:

While politicians and commentators continue to focus attention on the growth rate and Britain’s position in league tables of GDP per head, the historical evidence shows that changes in the country’s economic wellbeing over the last 50 years owe more to de-industrialisation than variations in the growth rate. That is the conclusion of research by Professor Jim Tomlinson to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference.

Summary:

The institutions that now govern the world economy were produced in response to the Great Depression and the disasters of the Second World War. It was a time of radical thinking about the future shape of the world economy and distributive justice, before options were closed down.

Delivering this year’s Tawney Lecture at the Economic History Society’s annual conference, Martin Daunton will argue that now is the time to open them up again, and to face new challenges, above all climate change where ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ policies threaten the future of the planet.

Summary:

Many times since annual publication of official GDP numbers began in 1948, there have been major subsequent revisions, which in a sense are rewriting history. That is the finding of new research by Enrico Berkes and Samuel Williamson to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference. Their study does three things:

Summary:

Germany’s current obsession with inflation has little to do with the so-called ‘national trauma’ of the 1922-3 hyperinflation. Rather, its origins can be traced to a post-war clash of interests between the West German central bank and government concerning the monetary authority’s independence.

That is the central finding of research by Simon Mee to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference. He writes:

Summary:

Countries that defaulted on their public debt during the Great Depression of the 1930s had lower rather than higher debt-to-GDP ratios, according to research by Andrea Papadia to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference. What’s more, countries that relied more on foreign borrowing were less likely to default than those relying more on internal sources of finance.

Summary:

Americans exposed to the 1930s Dust Bowl in early life suffered permanent and meaningful damage to their health and human capital, according to research by Vellore Arthi to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference. The study finds that people exposed in the earliest developmental stages, particularly in utero, were the most sensitive to the Dust Bowl’s negative effects on health – and they have suffered the worst outcomes as adults.

Summary:

Far from creating homogenous high streets, many big British retailers have played an important role in conservation, according to research by Jessica Gray to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference. Indeed, she argues, popular narratives of ‘clone towns’ obscure the role of retailers in cultivating greater diversity and nuance in Britain’s towns and high streets.

Summary:

The 1772-3 credit crisis is historically notable for being one of the earliest purely financial crises, with neither government policy nor European war lying at its root. It also seems to be one of the first times that the Bank of England responded to fears of financial contagion, taking forceful action to deal with the systemically important players whose failure might exacerbate the crisis.

In research to be presented at the Economic History Society’s 2015 annual conference, Paul Kosmetatos describes the breadth of scope, rapidity and size of the Bank of England’s intervention, acting as de facto ‘lender of last resort’ (LLR) to the financial system 30 years before the idea was first articulated.