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10. We have next
to speak of the number and quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms
are constructed which have for their object accusation and defence.
[2]
Three things have to be considered; first, the nature
and the number of the motives which lead men to act unjustly; secondly, what is
the state of mind of those who so act; thirdly, the character and dispositions
of those who are exposed to injustice.
[3]
We will
discuss these questions in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly.

Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the
law. Now, the law is particular or general. By particular, I mean the written
law in accordance with which a state is administered; by general, the unwritten
regulations which appear to be universally recognized. Men act voluntarily when
they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done
voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is done with
premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he
does with a purpose.1
[4]
The motives which lead men to do injury and
commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more
vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust; for
example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily
pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,2 the coward in regard to dangers, for fright
makes him desert his comrades in peril;the ambitious in
his desire for honor, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer
in his desire for victory, the rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the
foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, the shameless from
his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind
is unjust in regard to his special weakness.

[5]
This will be perfectly clear, partly from what
has already been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about
the emotions. It remains to state the motives and character of those who do
wrong and of those who suffer from it.
[6]
First,
then, let us decide what those who set about doing wrong long for or avoid; for
it is evident that the accuser must examine the number and nature of the motives
which are to be found in his opponent; the defendant, which of them are not to
be found in him.
[7]
Now, all human actions are
either the result of man's efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance,
others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to
compulsion, others to nature, so that the things which men do not do of
themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. As for those
which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause, some are the result of habit, others of
longing, and of the latter some are due to rational, others to irrational
longing.
[8]
Now wish is a
[rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything
unless he thinks it is good; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all
the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature,
compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

[9]
But it is superfluous to establish further
distinctions of men's acts based upon age, moral habits, or anything else. For
if the young happen to be3
irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not because of their youth
that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of
wealth or poverty; but the poor happen to desire wealth because of their lack of
it, and the rich desire unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure
them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or poverty, but desire, that
will be the mainspring of their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and
all the others who are said to act in accordance with their moral habits, will
act from the same causes, either from reason or emotion, but some from good
characters and emotions, and others from the opposite.
[10]
Not but that it does happenthat such and
such moral habits are followed by such and such consequences; for it may be that
from the outset the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate man good
opinions and desires in the matter of pleasant things, in the intemperate man
the contrary.
[11]
Therefore we must leave these
distinctions on one side, but we must examine what are the usual consequences of
certain conditions. For, if a man is fair or dark, tall or short, there is no
rule that any such consequences should follow, but if he is young or old, just
or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word, it will be necessary to take
account of all the circumstances that make men's characters different; for
instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate, it
will make a difference. We will, however, discuss this later4; let us now speak of what remains to be
said here.

[12]
Things which are the result of chance are all
those of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen without any end in
view, and that neither always, nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of
chance will make this clear.
[13]
Things which are
the result of nature are all those of which the cause is in themselves and
regular; for they turn out
always, or generally, in the same way. As for those which happen contrary to
nature there is no need to investigate minutely whether their occurrence is due
to a certain force of nature or some other cause
[14]
（it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to
chance）. Those things are the result of compulsion which are done by
the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation.
[15]
Things are the result of habit, when they are done
because they have often been done.
[16]
Things are
the result of calculation which are done because, of the goods already
mentioned, they appear to be expedient either as an end or means to an end,
provided they are done by reason of their being expedient; for even the
intemperate do certain things that are expedient, for the sake, not of
expediency, but of pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts of
revenge.
[17]
But there is a difference between
revenge and punishment; the latter is inflicted in the interest of the sufferer,
the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain
satisfaction.
[18]
We will define anger when we
come to speak of the emotions.5 Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently
pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed
are among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not
naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them.

In short, all things that men do of themselves either are, or seem,good or pleasant; and since men do voluntarily what they
do of themselves, and involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all that
men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is
or seems pleasant. For I reckon among good things the removal of that which is
evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a greater evil for a less, because these
two things are in a way desirable; in like manner, I reckon among pleasant
things the removal of that which is or appears painful, and the exchange of a
greater pain for a less. We must therefore make ourselves acquainted with the
number and quality of expedient and pleasant things.
[19]
We have already spoken of the expedient when discussing deliberative
rhetoric6; let
us now speak of the pleasant. And we must regard our definitions as sufficient
in each case, provided they are neither obscure nor too precise.

1προαίρεσις （premeditation, deliberate or moral
choice） is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not
premeditated; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. Choice is a
voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, including the use of reason
and knowledge. In Aristot. Nic. Eth.
11 Aristotle defines προαίρεσις as “a deliberate appetition of
（longing for, ὄρεξις）
things in our power,” as to which we should necessarily be
well-informed.

3 In the cases of the
young, the poor, and the rich, their youth etc. are only
“accidents,” accidental not real causes. Aristotle
defines τὸσυμβεβηκός （Aristot. Met. 4.30） as
“that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it
as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for instance, if a man,
when digging a hole for a plant, finds a treasure.” The color of a
man's eyes is an “inseparable” accident, the fact that a
man is a lawyer is a “separabIe” accident.

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