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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 France has very few fossil resources lCoal: extraction ended in April 2004 lGas: production is less than 1.2 Mtoe p.a. and declines lOil: production is less than 1.5 Mtoe p.a. and declines Primary energy production in France (Mtoe):

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 French concept of electricity SoS lSoS is part of the French “Public Service” for electricity, as defined in Art. 1 of the Electricity Act of 10 February 2000 (modified):  The “public electricity service” gives concrete expression to the right of all to electricity, a primary need, by respecting principles of equality, continuity and adaptability  Its purpose is intended to guarantee electricity supply across the whole country, in the national interest:  Independence and security of supply  Air quality and reduction in the greenhouse effect  Optimal management and development of national resources  Energy efficiency  Competitiveness of economic activity  Facilitate best technological choices  Social cohesion (right to electricity for all, contributing to social inclusion, careful land development, respect for the environment, etc.)

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 Two aspects to distinguish lThe consumers’ individual choice, through a lot of tools:  Technical tools, such as:  electric inverters, as a protection against brown-outs or voltage drops  for those who have the resources, auto-production, often using co-generation facilities  Commercial tools, such as:  spot markets on electricity trading floors (Powernext in France)  interruptible contracts  long-term contracts, such as those which allowed the Finnish paper manufacturers to fund construction of a nuclear power plant lWhat the Government considers to be the socially and economically necessary level of electricity SoS, which justifies its intervention, in particular as regards the 2000 Electricity Act  3 management tools:  Call to tender (article 8)  Request for authorization (article 9)  Obligation to purchase + feed-in tariffs (article 10)

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 3 main technical tools implemen- ted by the French Government lTwo time scales:  Short term: to prevent and to repair  Medium and long term: to plan future needs and to implement, as far as possible, an optimal supply structure lOrganisation of crisis tests lMulti-year contractual objectives lLegislation and regulations  RTE “multi-year electricity balance” and PPI lPotential EU level: see draft EU Directive COM(2003)740

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 Example of a major hazard: the 1999 storms in France l25-26 December 1999 (North West) and December 1999 (Centre West)  one hundred deaths and a lot of damages  electricity cut to more than 10 million people lEDF mobilized considerable resources to restore power and received massive help from its French industrial partners and from 17 of its foreign counterparts lAround 5,300 generator sets, with a total power of 400 MW, had to be brought into service lMore than 18,000 people were mobilized across the country, and normal service was restored around 10 January 2000 lIn most of the affected areas, the Government put the ORSEC plan into action, implementing optimal co-operation among public authorities, civil security agencies, the Army and EDF lCatalyst for action on SoS, along with the heat wave of Summer 2003

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 Energy outlook for France is key for SoS lGovernmental vision: the market should not be let alone to guide proper investment choices lA “PPI” order was signed on 7 March 2003 setting targets for development of the installed electrical production system in France. lThis system of crisis preparedness applies in brief as follows:  below a minimum threshold (“authorizing”, “tendering”)  above a maximum threshold (suspension of “authorizations”, etc.)  between the two limits is the normal case lThe French Government wants to have warning mechanisms and risk prevention resources in place relating to shortfalls or loss of quality in electricity supply. lThis is the context in which to consider the Government’s decision to keep the nuclear option open, by deciding to build a new type of reactor, the EPR, at Flamanville, to be brought into service by 2012.

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 Energy outlook for France to 2030: “what will happen if no new measure…?” lPeriodic exercise to set up a « BAU and Reference » scenario, in liaison with IEA In-Depth Reviews, e.g.:  DGEMP-OE(2000)  DGEMP-OE(2004) lPreparation of a draft « Steering Law on Energy » ( ) lPresentation to the international Workshop MINEFI-DGEMP of 30 June 2004 on energy outlook in France and in Europe  more than 300 people attended, mainly from companies and academics (acts available on  scenario to 2030 as a “consensus” one in this logic  “work in progress”, first step is a “factor 4” scenario to 2050

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Direction Générale de l’Énergie et des Matières Premières Observatoire de l’Énergie 24/5/ /17 Main BAU assumptions for electricity lReference costs for power generation: as contained in the 2003 DGEMP study lElectricity export balance calculated for according to a European optimization model developed by RTE and 0 in 2030! lNuclear:  average plant availability rate rises to 85% between 2003 and 2010  Eurodif is replaced by ultracentrifuge technology from 2015  nuclear power plants are assumed to be shut down after 40 years in use  nuclear power plants will not be replaced systematically but as follows over :  commissioning of a “demonstrator” EPR plant in 2013  start-up of two new EPR reactors each year starting 2020 lConstraints:  Environmental:  21% of electricity of “renewable” origin in consumption achieved by 2010  the large combustion plants directive (LCP) EU Directive applies fully to electricity plants  Gas Infrastructures: limitations for gas-fired electricity generation in lGiving a total installed nuclear capacity of 51 GW at the end of the period (versus 63 GW in 2003), the remainder of France’s electricity generating capacity is calculated using the RTE optimisation model, with the aforementioned constraints.