SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FEBRUARY 26, 1997

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity
to represent the Department of Defense in this hearing on U.S. policy
toward the Korean Peninsula.

I would begin any statement with recognition of a fundamental point --
the forty-three-year-old U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea has
been a profound success and continues to serve as the foundation for a
broad, solid bilateral relationship. The peace and stability fostered
by our close security ties have greatly benefited both countries and
contributed to the economic prosperity and democratic development of
South Korea and the entire Asia-Pacific region.

South Korea has risen from the devastation of the Korean War to become
a regional and global model. In economic terms, the ROK has built the
eleventh largest economy in the world. Politically, the South has made
impressive progress in instituting democratic practices across the
spectrum of government, from the local to the national level. While
the lion's share of credit rightfully goes to the ROK population in
achieving these political and economic milestones, the U.S. security
shield has no doubt been indispensable in providing South Korea the
breathing space to pursue its impressive development course.

The security relationship has by no means been a one-way street. The
U.S.-ROK alliance has significantly bolstered U.S. strategic aims in
promoting regional stability and economic prosperity as well as
reassuring all countries that the U.S. is committed to an active
engagement policy toward Asia. In deterring aggression from an often
unpredictable and highly-militarized North Korea, the U.S. has helped
create an environment in which developing Asian states could pursue a
political and economic course compatible with American values and
beliefs.

This is particularly true in the case of South Korea. As a result, the
security alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea is more
than a treaty commitment -- it is a close, mutually-beneficial
partnership built on a shared stake in democracy and free markets. Our
alliance is an essential element of the strategy for achieving our
longstanding security goal -- a non-nuclear, peacefully reunified
Korean Peninsula. Even after the North Korean threat passes, the U.S.
intends to maintain a strong defense alliance with the ROK, in the
interest of regional security.

The need for a combined U.S.-ROK military command and force structure
to protect our common values is more compelling than ever. Today the
United States and South Korea confront twin security challenges on the
Korean Peninsula -- deterrence of armed conflict and preparation for
crises short of war.

On the first challenge, North Korea's large conventional military
forces continue to threaten the security of the Republic of Korea.
Two-thirds of its 1.1 million military personnel are positioned within
100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone, with a substantial artillery
force capable of striking Seoul with little advance notice. In
addition, North Korea possesses missile and other weapons programs
that heighten concern over its intentions. The U.S. and ROK continue
to focus their security cooperation on deterring the use of this
military capability, whether in an all-out attack on South Korea or in
a more limited military provocation. Let there be no doubt that
deterrence is our first priority. Should deterrence fail, we will
prevail militarily on the Peninsula.

At the same time, deteriorating economic conditions within North Korea
and the recent defection of a senior DPRK official raise questions
about future developments in the North. Therefore, it is only prudent
for the U.S. and ROK to consult closely and be prepared for a range of
contingencies that may occur on the Korean Peninsula.

Without a close defense alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, we
would not be able to respond effectively to these challenges to our
security interests. It is also important in a time of transition and
uncertainty that we give no signals to North Korea that the calculus
of the U.S.-ROK security relationship, which has served us so well, is
changing. We must strongly counter any perception in Pyongyang that it
can drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK on security issues.

U.S.-ROK combined forces are better-equipped and more ready now than
at any time in the history of the alliance. But maintaining capable
and ready forces is a constant process. The U.S. is engaged in ongoing
efforts to modernize its Peninsular force of about 37,000 military
personnel with the latest military equipment, including AH-64
helicopters, Bradley Fighting vehicles, Global Positioning System
receivers, frequency hopping radios, and a pre-positioned heavy
brigade set. These measures have been complemented by ROK efforts to
outfit its military with the most modern tanks, armored personnel
carriers, self-propelled howitzers, and fighter aircraft. The ROK
commitment of resources to defense has been impressive, with over 21
percent of the most recent government budget devoted to the military.
The ROK maintains 670,000 personnel in uniform and has pledged more
than $1 billion in cost-sharing support for U.S. military forces on
the Peninsula from 1996-1998.

Our security objectives in Korea have been greatly aided by diplomatic
breakthroughs during the past several years. In particular, the
engagement process begun by the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which
froze the North's nuclear program and its destabilizing potential, has
defused the most immediate source of tension and deflected what could
have been a military confrontation with North Korea. With the
agreement and our underlying security commitment, we have preserved
stability on the Peninsula and created an opening to pursue other
issues of concern, the most important of which, North-South dialogue,
is the foundation for a stable, long-term peace on the Peninsula.
Other bilateral issues that we have pursued include missile
proliferation and the recovery of Korean War remains. The Agreed
Framework has also provided greater access to North Korea and some
North-South contacts.

The Defense Department is making a three-pronged approach to North
Korea to account for those missing from the Korean War. First, we have
made progress in recovering remains from the Korean War, completing
one joint operation in July 1996 that yielded the remains of a U.S.
serviceman who was positively identified and buried by his family.
Second, we hope to conduct archival research in North Korean records
before undertaking additional remains recovery operations later this
year. Third, we continue to seek answers from North Korea and other
sources on any reports of live Americans detained in North Korea.
Please be assured that the Defense Department is committed to pursuing
this issue vigorously with the North.

Permanent peace on the Peninsula will be accomplished only through
diplomatic/political means, and the Agreed Framework begins that
process by laying a groundwork for uncoerced reconciliation between
South and North Korea. We must recognize, however, that this agreement
is an initial step in a long and difficult course. Our desire for a
long-term, stable peace on the Peninsula will not be realized
overnight, but that reality does not diminish the value of current
initiatives toward North Korea. The alternative could very well be
direct conflict with the North, which would take a devastating toll in
lives and resources. For this reason, it is important for the U.S. to
back the Agreed Framework, and the international consortium that
implements its provisions, with the resources that will permit it to
succeed.

Until North and South Korea find a peaceful solution to their
differences, we remain committed to the terms of the 44-year-old
Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement and its mechanisms must
remain until an appropriate arrangement supersedes them. Only South
and North Korea can resolve the division of Korea; therefore,
replacement of the Armistice by an appropriate agreement can come
about only through direct dialogue between South and North Korea. The
U.S., while addressing near-term security concerns, has worked hard to
promote such a dialogue.