Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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The formation of a collapse crater by undergroundnuclear explosions is described. Safety problems associated with the re-entry of undergroundnuclear explosion areas include cavity collapse, toxic gases, explosive gases, radioactive gases, radioactive core, and hazards from the movement of heavy equipment on unstable ground. Data irom television, geophones, and telemetered radiation detectors determine when radiation and toxic material surveys of the area can be made and drills can be used to obtain samples of the bubble crust for analysis. Hazards to persornel engaged in obtaining weapon debris samples are reviewed. Data are presented on the radiation dose received by personnel at the Nevada Test Site engaged in this work during 1962. (C.H.)

The proliferation of nuclearweapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclearweapons and nuclear power plants are described.

The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclearweapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclearweapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclearweapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

Ground motion generated by a magnitude 4.3 earthquake at Massachusetts Mountain on the Nevada Test Site was measured at the control point and compared with ground motion generated at about the same distance by four undergroundnuclearweapons tests. The depth of the earthquake was between 4 and 4.6 km. The resulting signal at the distance considered was almost entirely body-wave components and had little or no contribution from the surface wave. The motion from the relatively shallower weapons tests had a signal with a pronounced surface-wave component. Comparison of the Pseudo Relative Response Velocity (PSRV) plots shows the earthquake signal richer in high frequencies and the weapons-test signals richer in low frequencies. If relationship between ground motion from the two sources can be confirmed for other earthquakes, weapons test ground motion could be used to estimate earthquake ground motion for magnitudes for which probability of occurrence in a given montoring period would be very small.

A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclearweapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclearweapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

Will our nuclearweapons work? Will our nuclearweapons work? National Security Science magazine Latest Issue:April 2013 All Issues Â» submit Supercomputers are essential for assessing the health of the U.S. nuclear stockpile Supercomputers provide assurance by simulating nuclearweapons performance March 25, 2013 Graphic of a missile being tested through computer simulation Los Alamos uses supercomputers to make high-resolution 3D simulations that help to assess the health of nuclearweapons like this B-61 bomb. Contact Managing Editor Clay Dillingham Email The nuclearweapons in the U.S. stockpile were designed and built to be replaced with new designs and builds every 10 to 15 years. These weapons have lived beyond their expected lifespans. Supercomputers provide the high-resolution 3D simulations needed for

Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

The danger that fissile isotopes may be diverted from nuclear power production to the construction of nuclearweapons would be aggravated by a switch to the plutonium breeder: but future uranium supplies are uncertain.

Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the NuclearWeapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future NuclearWeapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable NuclearWeapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclearweapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

Since the last edition of ''The Effects of NuclearWeapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclearweapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

US nuclearweapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclearweapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclearweapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclearweapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclearweapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclearweapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

Nuclearweapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling ...

Concern over the risk of nuclear proliferation has led to extensive reexamination of the technical, economic, and political assumptions underlying both national and international nuclear policies. An attempt is made in the present article to clarify the basic technical and political issues. The connections between various fuel cycles and their possible proliferation risks are discussed. As the resolution of the existing differing views on proliferation risks will be largely a political process, solutions to the problem are not proposed. (JSR)

18: Proposed NuclearWeapons Nonproliferation Policy 18: Proposed NuclearWeapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed NuclearWeapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel SUMMARY This study analyzes the potential environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the study examines the comparative impacts of several alternative approaches to managing the spent fuel. The analysis demonstrates that the impacts on the environmental, workers and the general public of implementing any of the alternative management approaches would be small and within applicable Federal and state regulator limits. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort.

This report briefly presents the advantages and disadvantages of two timed sources of neutrons that can be used with the source-driven noise analysis method: (1) {sup 252}Cf in an ionization chamber and (2) an associated-particle sealed tube neutron generator (APSTNG). These sources can be used with frequency and time analysis methods for nuclearweapons identification, quality assurance in production, special nuclear materials assay, criticality safety, and provision of measured data for verification of neutron and gamma ray transport calculational methods. The advantages of {sup 252}Cf for a nuclear materials identification system are that it is simple, reliable, and small and that all source events are detected. The disadvantages are that it cannot be turned off, leads to small radiation doses in handling, and produces more than one neutron per fission event. The advantages of APSTNG are that it is directional, can be turned off, and has one particle per deuterium-tritium reaction. The disadvantages are that it is large and complicated compared to {sup 252}Cf.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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This brief will familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing NuclearWeapons-Related Information.

In February of 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclearweapons test. Speculations are that this test was conducted to further develop a warhead small enough to fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile. This test ...

This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of NuclearWeapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

The battle over deficits and defense has focused attention on the costs of nuclearweapons. Estimates of the full costs of nuclearweapons-related activities are hotly debated, but there is no question that they will reach hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade. At a time of tight budgets, there is a real possibility that some of the systems and facilities described so far could be reduced, delayed, or cancelled outright. For example, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright noted in July 2011, “The challenge here is that we have to re-capitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don’t have the money to do it. ” That same month, General Robert Kehler, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, asserted, “We’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today.” This report provides a profile of the nuclearweapons lobby, noting along the way that in a constrained budgetary environment different parts of the lobby may either collaborate to promote higher nuclearweapons spending or compete for their share of a shrinking pie. An Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN), slated to be replaced by a Next Generation Sub.

A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies ... Keywords: CPM, defense, foreign policy, government, integer, linear, military, programming, project management, targeting

Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY "To prevent accidents and inadvertent or unauthorized use of U.S. nuclearweapons and nuclear explosives. In conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD), to protect the public health and safety by providing dual-agency judgment and responsibility for the safety, security, and use control (surety) of nuclearweapons. To establish nuclear explosive surety standards and nuclearweapon design surety requirements. To address surety vulnerabilities during all phases of the nuclearweapon life cycle and to upgrade surety during weapon stockpile refurbishments and/or new weapon

The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing NuclearWeapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclearweapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclearweapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former NuclearWeapons National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former NuclearWeapons Program Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former NuclearWeapons Program Workers October 28, 2013 - 3:11pm Addthis Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Al Tseu | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Al Tseu | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health Safety and Security Officer | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013

This letter is for the purpose of supplying the information that you requested at the meeting of the sub-committee on Project Vela. It is divided into three parts: (1) Radiations from nuclearweapons; (2) Backgrounds for Vela Signal Detectors; (3) Discussion of the NASA program.

U.S. nuclearweapons force structure accounts for the number and types of strategic and nonstrategic weapon systems in various locations that comprise the nuclear arsenal. While exact numbers, locations, and detailed designs ...

With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclearweapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE`s Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories.

Calls for an End to NuclearWeapons | National Nuclear Calls for an End to NuclearWeapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > President Obama Calls for an End to ... President Obama Calls for an End to NuclearWeapons April 05, 2009 Prague, Czech Republic President Obama Calls for an End to NuclearWeapons

This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclearweapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclearweapons or that relate to nuclearweapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a manipulator workcell to load and unload nuclearweapon pit assemblies from a cart. To develop this workcell, PNL procured a commercially available manipulator, equipped it with force-sensing and vision equipment, and developed manipulator control software. Manipulator workcell development demonstrated that commercially available manipulator systems can successfully perform this task if the appropriate manipulator is selected and the manipulator workcell tooling and software are carefully designed.

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclearweapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclearweapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclearweapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclearweapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclearweapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclearweapons treaty?

Over the next decade, the US Department of Energy (DOE) must retire and dismantle many nuclearweapon systems. In support of this effort, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed the Hazard Separation System (HSS). The HSS combines abrasive waterjet cutting technology and real-time radiography. Using the HSS, operators determine the exact location of interior, hazardous sub-components and remove them through precision cutting. The system minimizes waste and maximizes the recovery of recyclable materials. During 1994, the HSS was completed and demonstrated. Weapon components processed during the demonstration period included arming, fusing, and firing units; preflight control units; neutron generator subassemblies; and x-units. Hazards removed included radioactive krytron tubes and gap tubes, thermal batteries, neutron generator tubes, and oil-filled capacitors. Currently, the HSS is being operated at SNL in a research and development mode to facilitate the transfer of the technology to other DOE facilities for support of their dismantlement operations.

A nuclear reactor for generating electricity is disposed underground at the bottom of a vertical hole that can be drilled using conventional drilling technology. The primary coolant of the reactor core is the working fluid in a plurality of thermodynamically coupled heat pipes emplaced in the hole between the heat source at the bottom of the hole and heat exchange means near the surface of the earth. Additionally, the primary coolant (consisting of the working flud in the heat pipes in the reactor core) moderates neutrons and regulates their reactivity, thus keeping the power of the reactor substantially constant. At the end of its useful life, the reactor core may be abandoned in place. Isolation from the atmosphere in case of accident or for abandonment is provided by the operation of explosive closures and mechanical valves emplaced along the hole. This invention combines technology developed and tested for small, highly efficient, space-based nuclear electric power plants with the technology of fast-acting closure mechanisms developed and used for underground testing of nuclearweapons. This invention provides a nuclear power installation which is safe from the worst conceivable reactor accident, namely, the explosion of a nuclearweapon near the ground surface of a nuclear power reactor.

A nuclear reactor for generating electricity is disposed underground at the bottom of a vertical hole that can be drilled using conventional drilling technology. The primary coolant of the reactor core is the working fluid in a plurality of thermodynamically coupled heat pipes emplaced in the hole between the heat source at the bottom of the hole and heat exchange means near the surface of the earth. Additionally, the primary coolant (consisting of the working fluid in the heat pipes in the reactor core) moderates neutrons and regulates their reactivity, thus keeping the power of the reactor substantially constant. At the end of its useful life, the reactor core may be abandoned in place. Isolation from the atmosphere in case of accident or for abandonment is provided by the operation of explosive closures and mechanical valves emplaced along the hole. This invention combines technology developed and tested for small, highly efficient, space-based nuclear electric power plants with the technology of fast- acting closure mechanisms developed and used for underground testing of nuclearweapons. This invention provides a nuclear power installation which is safe from the worst conceivable reactor accident, namely, the explosion of a nuclearweapon near the ground surface of a nuclear power reactor. 5 figs.

NuclearWeapons and Global Security Data Analysis NuclearWeapons and Global Security Data Analysis Physics Division applies advanced imaging techniques to many applications, from brain imaging to neutron imaging in inertial fusion to threat detection from airborne cameras. A particular strength is the quantitative analysis of penetrating radiography using techniques such as the Bayesian Inference Engine (BIE). An example from the Nuclear Event Analysis Team shows a test object (Figure 1) that is subsequently radiographed using the Dual-Axis Radiography Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility. Figures 2 and 3 show the radiograph and the inferred density of the object using the BIE, which can be compared to the known object to determine accurate error estimation. Test object Figure 1. The test object consists of a 1 cm-radius cavity void surrounded by a 4.5 cm radius surrogate fissile material of tungsten, tantalum, or depleted uranium. This sphere is surrounded by a 6.5 cm-radius copper sphere. At is thickest point, the tantalum test object has an areal density of 180 g/cm2, equivalent to 9" of steel.

The end of the Cold War changed the missions of facilities in the US nuclearweapons complex. They ceased production of new weapons and focused on dismantling old weapons and maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of those remaining. The Pantex ... Keywords: Government--programs, Production/scheduling--planning

NuclearWeapons Strategy Delivered to Congress NuclearWeapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. NuclearWeapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman joined the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State in sending to Congress the Bush Administration's nuclearweapons strategy. This document not only describes the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but reinforces how deterrence applies to present and future security threats, and what a nuclear stockpile of the 21st century will need to look like in order to meet those threats. The strategy emphasizes President Bush's goal of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclearweapons. It is consistent with the Moscow Treaty that sets U.S. and Russian

U.S. NuclearWeapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. NuclearWeapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. NuclearWeapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman joined the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State in sending to Congress the Bush Administration's nuclearweapons strategy. This document not only describes the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but reinforces how deterrence applies to present and future security threats, and what a nuclear stockpile of the 21st century will need to look like in order to meet those threats. The strategy emphasizes President Bush's goal of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclearweapons. It is consistent with the Moscow Treaty that sets U.S. and Russian

The NuclearWeapons Guidance Team is an interagency committee led by Earl Whiteman, DOE that chartered the generation of EP40100, Concurrent Qualification and its successor EP401099, Concurrent Engineering and Qualification. As this new philosophy of concurrent operations has evolved and as implementation has been initiated, conflicts and insufficiencies in the remaining Engineering Procedures (EPs) have become more apparent. At the Guidance Team meeting in November 1995, this issue was explored and several approaches were considered. It was concluded at this meeting, that a smaller set of interagency EPs described in a hierarchical system could provide the necessary interagency direction to support complex-wide implementation. This set consolidates many existing EP processes where consistency and commonality are critical to success of the extended enterprise. The Guidance Team subsequently chartered an interagency team to initiate development activity associated with the envisioned new EP set. This team had participation from seven NuclearWeapons Complex (NWC) sites as well as DOE/AL and DP-14 (team members are acknowledged later in this report). Per the Guidance Team, this team, referred to as the Architecture Subcommittee, was to map out and define an EP Architecture for the interagency EPs, make recommendations regarding a more agile process for EP approval and suggest an aggressive timeline to develop the combined EPs. The Architecture Subcommittee was asked to brief their output at the February Guidance Team meeting. This SAND report documents the results of the Architecture Subcommittee`s recommendations.

The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclearweapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclearweapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From NuclearWeapons Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From NuclearWeapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From NuclearWeapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclearweapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclearweapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From NuclearWeapons U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From NuclearWeapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From NuclearWeapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclearweapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclearweapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

o Updates the responsibilities to reflect the fact that the Army no longer has custody of nuclearweapons or nuclearweapons delivery systems (para 1-4). o Designates the DCSOPS (DAMO-SS) as approval authority for waivers and exceptions to policy requirements and reclamas to nuclear surety inspections o Deletes the requirement that commanders with nuclear surety missions establish a nuclear surety board, making it an optional requirement as determined by the commander; and retains guidance on the functioning of a surety board to assist commanders who want to establish one (para 1-6). o Deletes guidance on Physical Security and Survivability. AR 190-54 now covers applicable physical security requirements at Army nuclear reactor facilities (chap 2). o Reorganizes the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), to more closely follow the sequence of events in certifying an individual into and out of the PRP

Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclearweapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclearweapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclearweapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclearweapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclearweapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclearweapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclearweapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclearweapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclearweapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclearweapons production and disposition cycle.

Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclearweapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclearweapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

A comparative quantitative assessment is made of the nuclearweapons proliferation risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic method. The work presented details quantified proliferation ...

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Undergroundnuclear power plant parks have been projected to be economically feasible compared to above ground instalIations. This paper includes a thorough cost analysis of the savings, compared to above ground facilities, resulting from in-place entombment (decommissioning) of facilities at the end of their life. reduced costs of security for the lifetime of the various facilities in the underground park. reduced transportation costs. and reduced costs in the operation of the waste storage complex (also underground). compared to the fair share of the costs of operating a national waste repository.

The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation NuclearWeapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclearweapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped-charge jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclearweapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclearweapons and fissile material aboard cargo containerships is proposed. The ship-based approach removes the constraints of current thinking by addressing the threat of ...

The electronic components business within the NuclearWeapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the NuclearWeapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclearweapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclearweapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of potential proliferants.

70th anniversary lecture 70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclearweapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclearweapons during the Cold War period will be discussed by Byron Ristvet of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. September 5, 2013 This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. Contact Steve Sandoval Communications Office (505) 665-9206 Email "Los Alamos National Laboratory's role in conjunction with the Department of Defense in meeting this challenge with new nuclearweapon

As the nuclearweapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the NuclearWeapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National NuclearWeapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current NuclearWeapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the NuclearWeapons complex.

Nuclearweapons require the periodic replacement of tritium, a radioactive gas that decays at approximately 5.5 percent per year. Currently no tritium-supply facility exists in the US, and due to the decay, the tritium inventory will fall below the required ... Keywords: Decision Analysis-Multiple Criteria, Government-Defense

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Evaluating the Effects of UndergroundNuclear Testing Below the Water Table on Groundwater, using FEHM, evaluate perturbed groundwater behavior associated with undergroundnuclear tests to an instantaneous pressurization event caused by a nuclear test when different permeability and porosity

accordance with the authority in DoDD 5134.01 (Reference (b)) to establish policy, update responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for DoD transportation of U.S. nuclearweapons, including logistic transportation, operational transport, and emergency logistic movement as defined in the Glossary. b. Incorporates and cancels DoD 4540.5-M (Reference (c)). c. Authorizes the establishment of the Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG).

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) have reached agreement on a corrective action strategy applicable to address the extent and potential impact of radionuclide contamination of groundwater at undergroundnuclear test locations. This strategy is described in detail in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 2000). As part of the corrective action strategy, the nuclear detonations that occurred underground were identified as geographically distinct corrective action units (CAUs). The strategic objective for each CAU is to estimate over a 1,000-yr time period, with uncertainty quantified, the three-dimensional extent of groundwater contamination that would be considered unsafe for domestic and municipal use. Two types of boundaries (contaminant and compliance) are discussed in the FFACO that will map the three-dimensional extent of radionuclide contamination. The contaminant boundary will identify the region wi th 95 percent certainty that contaminants do not exist above a threshold value. It will be prepared by the DOE and presented to NDEP. The compliance boundary will be produced as a result of negotiation between the DOE and NDEP, and can be coincident with, or differ from, the contaminant boundary. Two different thresholds are considered for the contaminant boundary. One is based on the enforceable National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for radionuclides, which were developed as a requirement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The other is a risk-based threshold considering applicable lifetime excess cancer-risk-based criteria The contaminant boundary for the Faultless undergroundnuclear test at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) is calculated using a newly developed groundwater flow and radionuclide transport model that incorporates aspects of both the original three-dimensional model (Pohlmann et al., 1999) and the two-dimensional model developed for the Faultless data decision analysis (DDA) (Pohll and Mihevc, 2000). This new model includes the uncertainty in the three-dimensional spatial distribution of lithology and hydraulic conductivity from the 1999 model as well as the uncertainty in the other flow and transport parameters from the 2000 DDA model. Additionally, the new model focuses on a much smaller region than was included in the earlier models, that is, the subsurface within the UC-1 land withdrawal area where the 1999 model predicted radionuclide transport will occur over the next 1,000 years. The purpose of this unclassified document is to present the modifications to the CNTA groundwater flow and transport model, to present the methodology used to calculate contaminant boundaries, and to present the Safe Drinking Water Act and risk-derived contaminant boundaries for the Faultless undergroundnuclear test CAU.

(a)), this Instruction: a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the DoD response to U.S. nuclearweapon incidents in accordance with DoDD 3150.08 (Reference (b)). b. Authorizes DoD support for the NuclearWeapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee (NWAIRS) to the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) Committee of Principals (CoP) to address the Federal Government response to U.S. nuclearweapon incidents. 2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands,

Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing. June 8, 2012 Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling is expected to save several million dollars per year and requires no underground testing. "We're continually innovating and working to improve the way we do business, and NDLGS is a big step for us," said National Nuclear Security Administration Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook. New weapons assessment technology engineered: nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing Valveless Laser Processing

Oversight and Investigations Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's NuclearWeapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 10:00 AM September 12, 2012 1 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your request to testify on matters relating to the Department of Energy's oversight of the nuclearweapons complex. 1 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy. This action was intended to allow NNSA to concentrate on its defense-related mission, free from other Departmental operations. Its creation was, in large measure, a reaction to highly

The advantages, disadvantages, and cost of constructing a auclear power reactor underground are outlinedData on underground construction of hydroelectric plants, other structures, and underground reactor projects in Norway and Sweden are reviewed. A hypothetical underground Experimental Boiling Water Reactor design and sketch are given with cost estimates(T.R.H.)

A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclearweapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclearweapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclearweapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

5091 5091 Friday May 17, 1996 Part IV Department of Energy Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed NuclearWeapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Notice 25092 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed NuclearWeapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Record of decision. SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed

or military use. Â­ It is a major component of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has the goal acquisition of a nuclearweapon by an adversary could have a dev- astating influence on US security and non-proliferation. Enhancing nuclearweapons material security in Russia. 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 5. Other

This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ``pipe`` containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclearweapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclearweapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ``swords into plowshare`` success story.

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclearweapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclearweapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.

The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclearweapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclearweapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

We carried out a demonstration analysis of the value of developing and implementing enhanced safety features for nuclearweapons in the US stockpile. We modified an approach that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed in response to a congressional directive that NRC assess the ``value-impact`` of regulatory actions for commercial nuclear power plants. Because improving weapon safety shares some basic objectives with NRC regulations, i.e., protecting public health and safety from the effects of accidents involving radioactive materials, we believe the NRC approach to be appropriate for evaluating weapons-safety cost-benefit issues. Impact analysis includes not only direct costs associated with retrofitting the weapon system, but also the expected costs (or economic risks) that are avoided by the action, i.e., the benefits.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington

An algorithm was developed that uses measured isotopic ratios from fission product residue following the detonation of a high-enriched uranium nuclearweapon to compute the original attributes of the material used in the device. The specific attributes assessed are the uranium isotopics (considering 234U, 235U, 236U, and 238U) and the enrichment process used to create the material (e.g., gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, etc.). Using the original attributes of the weapon significantly increases the probability of identifying the perpetrator of the attack. In this study, research was conducted to perform sensitivity analysis of the calculated values, analyze alternate enrichment methods, determine the source (uranium mine) from which the feed material was taken and assess potential “spoofing” techniques. The purpose of this research was to verify that the analytical method developed would remain valid for a multitude of variations that could be used to disguise the origin of the nuclear material in the device. It is envisioned that this methodology could serve as a preprocessing step to a more computationally intensive and more accurate system in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack.

This letter report documents the results of a computer model to quantify the travel time of tritium (radioactive hydrogen) from an undergroundnuclear detonation in 1969 toward a proposed producing gas well located 1,500 feet (457 meters) away.

The authors examine the transient residual thermal signal resulting from an undergroundnuclear test (buried below the water table) and its potential to affect local groundwater flow and radionuclide migration in a saturated, fractured, volcanic aquifer system. Thermal profiles measured in a drillback hole between 154 days and 6.5 years after the test have been used to calibrate a non-isothermal model of fluid flow. In this process, they have estimated the magnitude and relative changes in permeability, porosity and fracture density between different portions of the disturbed and undisturbed geologic medium surrounding the test location. The relative impacts of buoyancy forces (arising from the thermal residual of the test and the background geothermal gradient) and horizontal pressure gradients on the post-test flow system are better understood. A transient particle/streamline model of contaminant transport is used to visualize streamlines and streaklines of the flow field and to examine the migration of non-reactive radionuclides. Sensitivity analyses are performed to understand the effects of local and sub-regional geologic features, and the effects of fractured zones on the movement of groundwater and thermal energy. Conclusions regarding the overall effect of the thermal regime on the residence times and fluxes of radionuclides out of the system are drawn, and implications for more complicated, reactive contaminant transport are discussed.

The nuclear power industry committed to the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) and the Underground Piping and Tanks Initiative (UPTI) to improve the management of soil and groundwater contamination, and the management of underground piping and tanks. These two Initiatives, while they have different objectives, are closely aligned in the area of preventing leaks and spills of licensed materials. The results of this Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) work will provide nuclear power plant sites w...

This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclearweapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEARWEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data (RD and FRD) June 2012 2 3 Purpose To familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing that information as required by ï‚§ The Atomic Energy Act and ï‚§ 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 1045, Nuclear Classification and Declassification Â§1045.35 4 Not the Purpose This briefing does not authorize you to classify or declassify documents containing RD or FRD. Additional training is required to classify documents containing RD or FRD or identify RD or FRD within a document for redaction. Only authorized DOE

We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclearweapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

This thesis addresses the threat of chemical and biological armed ballistic missiles and their neutralization by nuclear methods. The objective of this effort is twofold. The first objective is to develop a justification for using nuclear interceptors in neutralizing chemical and biological weapons (CBW) based on the current CBW threat to the U.S. The second objective is to reproduce a computer model developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in 1992 to estimate the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear interceptors to neutralize biological or chemical tactical ballistic missile warheads and to extend the model for high-energy neutrons (20 MeV) to explore the effect of increasing neutron energies. The original model was developed using TARTNP. MCNP4C was the code used to reproduce the model. At least 27 countries now possess - or are in the process of acquiring and developing - ballistic missiles. Furthermore, more than a dozen states are pursuing offensive CBW capabilities, and some have exhibited a willingness to employ them. One particular method of neutralizing biological and chemical ballistic warheads, which has previously been investigated, is by means of nuclear interceptors, i.e., using a low-yield nuclear device to neutralize the weapon by bombarding it with high-energy particles and rendering it ineffective. To investigate the ability of nuclear interceptors to neutralize CBW missiles, a MCNP model was created based on the LLNL data. The results from the new model were compared to the sterilization requirements suggested by LLNL and to the LLNL results. Although there were differences between the two, the MCNP model produced data with the same trend as the LLNL data and all submunitions were given sufficient energy to exceed the sterilization requirements. Finally, a comparison was made of the neutralization capabilities of a fission device, a fusion device, and an advanced neutron source. It was shown that the advanced neutron source, with its 20 MeV neutrons, delivered on average 12 times as much energy per particle to the Sarin as the fission device and 1.6 times as much energy per particle to the Sarin as the fusion device.

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclearweapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclearweapons proliferation status, and fo...

To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclearweapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

In 2004, a borehole was drilled into the 1983 Chancellor undergroundnuclear test cavity to investigate the distribution of radionuclides within the cavity. Sidewall core samples were collected from a range of depths within the re-entry hole and two sidetrack holes. Upon completion of drilling, casing was installed and a submersible pump was used to collect groundwater samples. Test debris and groundwater samples were analyzed for a variety of radionuclides including the fission products {sup 99}Tc, {sup 125}Sb, {sup 129}I, {sup 137}Cs, and {sup 155}Eu, the activation products {sup 60}Co, {sup 152}Eu, and {sup 154}Eu, and the actinides U, Pu, and Am. In addition, the physical and bulk chemical properties of the test debris were characterized using Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Electron Microprobe measurements. Analytical results were used to evaluate the partitioning of radionuclides between the melt glass, rubble, and groundwater phases in the Chancellor test cavity. Three comparative approaches were used to calculate partitioning values, though each method could not be applied to every nuclide. These approaches are based on: (1) the average Area 19 inventory from Bowen et al. (2001); (2) melt glass, rubble, and groundwater mass estimates from Zhao et al. (2008); and (3) fission product mass yield data from England and Rider (1994). The U and Pu analyses of the test debris are classified and partitioning estimates for these elements were calculated directly from the classified Miller et al. (2002) inventory for the Chancellor test. The partitioning results from this study were compared to partitioning data that were previously published by the IAEA (1998). Predictions of radionuclide distributions from the two studies are in agreement for a majority of the nuclides under consideration. Substantial differences were noted in the partitioning values for {sup 99}Tc, {sup 125}Sb, {sup 129}I, and uranium. These differences are attributable to two factors: chemical volatility effects that occur during the initial plasma condensation, and groundwater remobilization that occurs over a much longer time frame. Fission product partitioning is very sensitive to the early cooling history of the test cavity because the decay of short-lived (t{sub 1/2} data to update the range in partitioning values for contaminant transport models at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site).

In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats NuclearWeapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats NuclearWeapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) undergroundnuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done to support several different programs that desire access to the ground surface above expended undergroundnuclear tests. The programs include: the Borehole Management Program, the Environmental Restoration Program, and the National Center for Nuclear Security Gas-Migration Experiment. Safety decisions must be made before a crater area, or potential crater area, can be reentered for any work. Evaluation of cavity collapse and crater formation is input into the safety decisions. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who participated in weapons testing activities perform these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, ground motion, and radiological release information. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. The evaluations do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory UndergroundNuclear Tests - 2011 was published on March 2, 2011. This report, considered Part 2 of work undertaken in calendar year 2011, compiles evaluations requested after the March report. The following unclassified summary statements describe collapse evolution and crater stability in response to a recent request to review 6 LLNL test locations in Yucca Flat, Rainier Mesa, and Pahute Mesa. They include: Baneberry in U8d; Clearwater in U12q; Wineskin in U12r, Buteo in U20a and Duryea in nearby U20a1; and Barnwell in U20az.

CONTINUING TRAINING SELF- CONTINUING TRAINING SELF- STUDY PROGRAM DOE O 452.1D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM DOE O 452.2D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY DOE O 452.1D and DOE O 452.2D Familiar Level June 2011 1 DOE O 452.1D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM DOE O 452.2D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY FAMILIAR LEVEL OBJECTIVES Given the familiar level of this module and the resources listed below, you will be able to answer the following questions: 1. What are the objectives of implementing U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1D? 2. Define the following terms as they apply to this Order: Abnormal environment High explosive detonation 3. What are the objectives of implementing DOE O 452.2D? 4. What are the general requirements of DOE O 452.2D?

An underground reinforced-concrete family shelter designed for six persons was tested at three anticipated nuclear blast overpressures: 30, 48, and 65 psi. The structures were calculated to sustain a 30-psi long-duration overpressure. Postshot examination of all shelters lndicated there was little or no deflection in the reinforced-concrete members. Although the actual blast load was of short duration, the natural period for the structures was also shortp therefore it is felt that the structures would withstand similar overpressures from long-duration blast loadings. The average attenuation factor for gamma radiation varied from 3000 to 4500. Permanent damage was confined to the exposed portions of the ventilation pipes, which were bent to a nearly horizontal position. The steel-plate door at the 65-psi level was dished inward about 1 1/4 in., but it opened and closed easily. (authl

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) undergroundnuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done at the request of Navarro-Interra LLC, and supports environmental restoration efforts by the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration for the Nevada Site Office. Safety decisions must be made before a surface crater area, or potential surface crater area, can be reentered for any work. Our statements on cavity collapse and surface crater formation are input into their safety decisions. These statements do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the surface collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who had been active in weapons testing activities performed these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, and ground motion. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty.

In 2004, a borehole was drilled into the 1983 Chancellor undergroundnuclear test cavity to investigate the distribution of radionuclides within the cavity. Sidewall core samples were collected from a range of depths within the re-entry hole and two sidetrack holes. Upon completion of drilling, casing was installed and a submersible pump was used to collect groundwater samples. Test debris and groundwater samples were analyzed for a variety of radionuclides including the fission products {sup 99}Tc, {sup 125}Sb, {sup 129}I, {sup 137}Cs, and {sup 155}Eu, the activation products {sup 60}Co, {sup 152}Eu, and {sup 154}Eu, and the actinides U, Pu, and Am. In addition, the physical and bulk chemical properties of the test debris were characterized using Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Electron Microprobe measurements. Analytical results were used to evaluate the partitioning of radionuclides between the melt glass, rubble, and groundwater phases in the Chancellor test cavity. Three comparative approaches were used to calculate partitioning values, though each method could not be applied to every nuclide. These approaches are based on: (1) the average Area 19 inventory from Bowen et al. (2001); (2) melt glass, rubble, and groundwater mass estimates from Zhao et al. (2008); and (3) fission product mass yield data from England and Rider (1994). The U and Pu analyses of the test debris are classified and partitioning estimates for these elements were calculated directly from the classified Miller et al. (2002) inventory for the Chancellor test. The partitioning results from this study were compared to partitioning data that were previously published by the IAEA (1998). Predictions of radionuclide distributions from the two studies are in agreement for a majority of the nuclides under consideration. Substantial differences were noted in the partitioning values for {sup 99}Tc, {sup 125}Sb, {sup 129}I, and uranium. These differences are attributable to two factors: chemical volatility effects that occur during the initial plasma condensation, and groundwater remobilization that occurs over a much longer time frame. Fission product partitioning is very sensitive to the early cooling history of the test cavity because the decay of short-lived (t{sub 1/2} < 1 hour) fission-chain precursors occurs on the same time scale as melt glass condensation. Fission product chains that include both volatile and refractory elements, like the mass 99, 125, and 129 chains, can show large variations in partitioning behavior depending on the cooling history of the cavity. Uranium exhibits similar behavior, though the chemical processes are poorly understood. The water temperature within the Chancellor cavity remains elevated (75 C) more than two decades after the test. Under hydrothermal conditions, high solubility chemical species such as {sup 125}Sb and {sup 129}I are readily dissolved and transported in solution. SEM analyses of melt glass samples show clear evidence of glass dissolution and secondary hydrothermal mineral deposition. Remobilization of {sup 99}Tc is also expected during hydrothermal activity, but moderately reducing conditions within the Chancellor cavity appear to limit the transport of {sup 99}Tc. It is recommended that the results from this study should be used together with the IAEA data to update the range in partitioning values for contaminant transport models at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site).

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by undergroundnuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site.

It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclearweapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclearweapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

The purpose of this work is to characterize groundwater flow and contaminant transport at the Shoal undergroundnuclear test through numerical modeling using site-specific hydrologic data. The ultimate objective is the development of a contaminant boundary, a model-predicted perimeter defining the extent of radionuclide-contaminated groundwater from the underground test throughout 1,000 years at a prescribed level of confidence. This boundary will be developed using the numerical models described here, after they are approved for that purpose by DOE and NDEP.

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of “points ” highlighting the strategic-political and militarytechnical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclearweapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclearweapons proliferation status, and foster further nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The safety and environmental problems related to the operation of largescale fusion facilities such as ITER (which contain massive amounts of hazardous and/or radioactive materials such as tritium, lithium, and beryllium, as well as neutron-activated structural materials) are not addressed in this paper.

This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclearweapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former ...

1. Purpose. This ETL provides criteria for munitions and nuclearweapons-capable maintenance and storage facilities (munitions storage areas [MSA] and weapons storage areas [WSA]) which are existing, under design, or under contract, and located in the continental United States (CONUS). It addresses requirements for reviewing and updating record drawings and requirements for as-built drawings for projects under design or under contract. Future project requirements will be addressed in a revision of Air Force instruction (AFI) 32-1065, Grounding Systems. 2. Application: Air Force installations with munitions and nuclearweapons-capable maintenance and storage facilities. The requirements in this ETL are mandatory.

The extent of remobilization of uranium from contaminated soils adjacent to a nuclearweapons processing facility during episodic rain events was investigated. In addition, information on the solid phase associations of U in floodplain and suspended sediments was assessed by an eight-step sequential extraction procedure to gauge U chemical lability and its propensity for transport. Comparisons were drawn between the easily dispersible, or water dispersible clay fraction (WDC) of the floodplain sediments to the stream suspended sediments transported during storms. Mass flux estimates determined from base flow measurements potentially underestimate the amount of U transported from contaminated terrestrial sources to surface water systems. During the storm events measured, approximately 145 7 to 2 8 3 8 % more U was mobilized to Upper Three Runs Creek (UTRC) relative to base flow calculations. The suspended sediment load transports the bulk of U in labile forms predominantly as acid soluble (specifically adsorbed), MnO2 occluded and organically bound phases. This implies that U may be available to the environment under a range of changing conditions (e.g., Eh and pH). Sequential extractions of the floodplain sediments demonstrated the presence of chemically labile forms, but in different proportions to the suspended sediments. More U was associated with the organically bound phases in the floodplain sediments, while the easily dispersible fraction of floodplain sediments correlated with the suspended sediments. A strong relationship exists between the suspended sediments and the WDC fraction, suggesting that fine particles are eroded from the floodplain and transported in labile forms. This study demonstrates the need to revise current monitoring schemes to include mass transport evaluation during storms. In addition, sequential extraction studies provide knowledge of U chemical lability in contaminated sediments, which may suggest environmentally sound and more cost effective remediation techniques than ones currently in use.

Since 1962, all United States nuclear tests have been conducted underground. A consequence of this testing has been the deposition of large amounts of radioactive materials in the subsurface, sometimes in direct contact with groundwater. The majority of this testing occurred on the Nevada Test Site, but a limited number of experiments were conducted in other locations. One of these is the subject of this report, the Project Shoal Area (PSA), located about 50 km southeast of Fallon, Nevada. The Shoal test consisted of a 12-kiloton-yield nuclear detonation which occurred on October 26, 1963. Project Shoal was part of studies to enhance seismic detection of undergroundnuclear tests, in particular, in active earthquake areas. Characterization of groundwater contamination at the Project Shoal Area is being conducted by the US Department of Energy (DOE) under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) with the State of Nevada Department of Environmental Protection and the US Department of Defense (DOD). This order prescribes a Corrective Action Strategy (Appendix VI), which, as applied to undergroundnuclear tests, involves preparing a Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP), Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD), Corrective Action Plan, and Closure Report. The scope of the CAIP is flow and transport modeling to establish contaminant boundaries that are protective of human health and the environment. This interim report describes the current status of the flow and transport modeling for the PSA.

UndergroundNuclear Explosions and the Control of Earthquakes Author(s): Cesare Emiliani- ground nuclear explosions has been ex- plored in some detail during the past 2 years. In an examination with under- ground nuclear explosions has been ex- plored in some detail during the past 2 years

An experimental concept has been developed to collect data to aid in the refinement of simulation programs designed to predict the fallout effects arising from surface and shallowly buried nuclearweapon detonations. These experiments, called the Condensation Debris Experiments (CDE), are intended to study the condensation/fractionation of material that is liberated following an initial deposition of laser energy onto a small, characterized target. The CDE effort also encompasses target development and material studies as well as supporting computational efforts studying radiation hydrodynamics, computational fluid dynamics, and relevant neutron activation processes (not discussed here).

Estimating effects due to an urban IND (improvised nuclear device) on underground structures and underground utilities is a challenging task. Nuclear effects tests performed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) during the era of nuclearweapons testing provides much information on how underground military structures respond. Transferring this knowledge to answer questions about the urban civilian environment is needed to help plan responses to IND scenarios. Explosions just above the ground surface can only couple a small fraction of the blast energy into an underground shock. The various forms of nuclear radiation have limited penetration into the ground. While the shock transmitted into the ground carries only a small fraction of the blast energy, peak stresses are generally higher and peak ground displacement is lower than in the air blast. While underground military structures are often designed to resist stresses substantially higher than due to the overlying rocks and soils (overburden), civilian structures such as subways and tunnels would generally only need to resist overburden conditions with a suitable safety factor. Just as we expect the buildings themselves to channel and shield air blast above ground, basements and other underground openings as well as changes of geology will channel and shield the underground shock wave. While a weaker shock is expected in an urban environment, small displacements on very close-by faults, and more likely, soils being displaced past building foundations where utility lines enter could readily damaged or disable these services. Immediately near an explosion, the blast can 'liquefy' a saturated soil creating a quicksand-like condition for a period of time. We extrapolate the nuclear effects experience to a Chicago-based scenario. We consider the TARP (Tunnel and Reservoir Project) and subway system and the underground lifeline (electric, gas, water, etc) system and provide guidance for planning this scenario.

Underground collocation of nuclear power reactors and the nuclear waste management facilities supporting those reactors, termed an undergroundnuclear park (UNP), appears to have several advantages compared to the conventional approach to siting reactors and waste management facilities. These advantages include the potential to lower reactor capital and operating cost, lower nuclear waste management cost, and increase margins of physical security and safety. Envirorunental impacts related to worker health, facility accidents, waste transportation, and sabotage and terrorism appear to be lower for UNPs compared to the current approach. In-place decommissioning ofUNP reactors appears to have cost, safety, envirorunental and waste disposal advantages. The UNP approach has the potential to lead to greater public acceptance for the deployment of new power reactors. Use of the UNP during the post-nuclear renaissance time frame has the potential to enable a greater expansion of U.S. nuclear power generation than might otherwise result. Technical and economic aspects of the UNP concept need more study to determine the viability of the concept.

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared NuclearWeapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five NuclearWeapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared NuclearWeapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to NuclearWeapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

Groundwater flow and radionuclide transport at the Shoal undergroundnuclear test are characterized using three-dimensional numerical models, based on site-specific hydrologic data. The objective of this modeling is to provide the flow and transport models needed to develop a contaminant boundary defining the extent of radionuclide-contaminated groundwater at the site throughout 1,000 years at a prescribed level of confidence. This boundary will then be used to manage the Project Shoal Area for the protection of the public and the environment.

Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclearweapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
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to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Investigation of the effects of a nuclear device exploded in a urban environment such as the Chicago studied for this particular report have shown the importance on the effects from the urban canyons so typical of today's urban environment as compared to nuclear test event effects observed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the Pacific Testing Area on which many of the typical legacy empirical codes are based on. This report first looks at the some of the data from nuclear testing that can give an indication of the damage levels that might be experienced due to a nuclear event. While it is well known that a above ground blast, even a ground burst, very poorly transmits energy into the ground ( < 1%) and the experimental results discussed here are for fully coupled detonations, these results do indicate a useful measure of the damage that might be expected. The second part of the report looks at effects of layering of different materials that typically would make up the near ground below surface environment that a shock would propagate through. As these simulations support and is widely known in the community, the effects of different material compositions in these layers modify the shock behavior and especially modify the energy dispersal and coupling into the basement structures. The third part of the report looks at the modification of the underground shock effects from a surface burst 1 KT device due to the presence of basements under the Chicago buildings. Without direct knowledge of the basement structure, a simulated footprint of a uniform 20m depth was assumed underneath each of the NGI defined buildings in the above ground environment. In the above ground case, the underground basement structures channel the energy along the line of site streets keeping the shock levels from falling off as rapidly as has been observed in unobstructed detonations. These simulations indicate a falloff of factors of 2 per scaled length as compared to 10 for the unobstructed case. Again, as in the above ground case, the basements create significant shielding causing the shock profile to become more square and reducing the potential for damage diagonal to the line of sight streets. The results for a 1KT device is that the heavily damaged zone (complete destruction) will extend out to 50m from the detonation ({approx}100m for 10KT). The heavily to moderately damaged zone will extend out to 100m ({approx}200m for 10KT). Since the destruction will depend on geometric angle from the detonation and also the variability of response for various critical infrastructure, for planning purposes the area out to 100m from the detonation should be assumed to be non-operational. Specifically for subway tunnels, while not operational, they could be human passable for human egress in the moderately damaged area. The results of the simulations presented in this report indicate only the general underground infrastructure impact. Simulations done with the actual basement geometry would be an important improvement. Equally as important or even more so, knowing the actual underground material configurations and material composition would be critical information to refine the calculations. Coupling of the shock data into structural codes would help inform the emergency planning and first response communities on the impact to underground structures and the state of buildings after the detonation.

Concerns about terrorists smuggling nuclear bombs into the United States in container freight have led to demands for 100% inspection at either U.S. or foreign ports. However, under some circumstances, it may be possible to deter nuclear smuggling attempts ... Keywords: applications, decision analysis, game theory, military, public policy, risk analysis, terrorism

From symposium on noble gases; Las Vegas, Nevada, USA (24 Sep 1973). The Livermore Gas Diagnostics Program employs a number of rare gas isotopes, both stable and radioactive, in its investigations of the phenomenology of undergroundnuclear detonations. Radioactive gases in a sample are radiochemically purified by elution chromatography, and the separated gases are radioassayed by gamma-ray spectrometry and by internal or thin-window beta proportional counting. Concentrations of the stable gases are determined by mass-spectrometry, following chemical removal of the reactive gases in the sample. The most general application of the noble gases is as device fraction indicators to provide a basis for estimating totals of chimney-gas components. All of the stable rare gases except argon have been used as tracers, as have /sup 127/Xe and /sup 85/Kr. /sup 37/Ar and /sup 85/Kr have proven to be of particular value in the absence of a good tracer material as reference species for studies of chimney-gas chemistry. The rate of mixing of chimney gases and the degree to which the sampled gas truly represents the underground gas mixture can be studied with the aid of the fission- product gases. /sup 222/Ra and He are released to the cavity from the surrounding rock and are therefore useful in studies of the interaction of the detonation with the surrounding medium. (auth)

>From conference on the environmental effects of explosives and explosions; White Oak, Maryland, USA (30 May 1973). The biological effects of the Longshot, Milrow, and Cannikin undergroundnuclear tests at Amchitka lsland, Alaska, on marine mammals, fishes, and birds are summarized. The biological effects observed were related to the water-borne shock waves produced by the explosions. (CH)

With the end of the Cold War and subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need (Quirck et al., 1993). To compensate for this excess, an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, the cur-rent dismantlement and inventory procedures may not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits, To control these exposures, alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory procedures may need to be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. Then a cost-benefit comparison was performed to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate.

With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need. To compensate for this excess an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy`s Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, it is estimated that current dismantlement and inventory procedures will not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits. To control these exposures alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory must be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. A cost-benefit comparison was then performed in order to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is operating an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close non-Nevada Test Site locations that were used for nuclear testing. Evaluation of radionuclide transport by groundwater from these sites is an important part of the preliminary site risk analysis. These evaluations are undertaken to allow prioritization of the test areas in terms of risk, provide a quantitative basis for discussions with regulators and the public about future work at the sites, and provide a framework for assessing data needs to be filled by site characterization. The Gnome site in southeastern New Mexico was the location of an underground detonation of a 3.5-kiloton nuclear device in 1961, and a hydrologic tracer test using radionuclides in 1963. The tracer test involved the injection of tritium, {sup 90}Sr, and {sup 137}Cs directly into the Culebra Dolomite, a nine to ten-meter-thick aquifer located approximately 150 in below land surface. The Gnome nuclear test was carried out in the Salado Formation, a thick salt deposit located 200 in below the Culebra. Because salt behaves plastically, the cavity created by the explosion is expected to close, and although there is no evidence that migration has actually occurred, it is assumed that radionuclides from the cavity are released into the overlying Culebra Dolomite during this closure process. Transport calculations were performed using the solute flux method, with input based on the limited data available for the site. Model results suggest that radionuclides may be present in concentrations exceeding drinking water regulations outside the drilling exclusion boundary established by DOE. Calculated mean tritium concentrations peak at values exceeding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standard of 20,000 pCi/L at distances of up to almost eight kilometers west of the nuclear test.

When it comes to the nuclearweapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is operating an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close non-Nevada Test Site locations that were used for nuclear testing. Evaluation of radionuclide transport by groundwater from these sites is an important part of the preliminary risk analysis. These evaluations are undertaken to allow prioritization of the test areas in terms of risk, provide a quantitative basis for discussions with regulators and the public about future work at the sites, and provide a framework for assessing data needs to be filled by site characterization. The Rulison site in west-central Colorado was the location of an underground detonation of a 40-kiloton nuclear device in 1969. The test took place 2,568 m below ground surface in the Mesaverde Formation. Though located below the regional water table, none of the bedrock formations at the site yielded water during hydraulic tests, indicating extremely low permeability conditions. The scenario evaluated was the migration of radionuclides from the blast-created cavity through the Mesaverde Formation. Transport calculations were performed using the solute flux method, with input based on the limited data available for the site. Model results suggest that radionuclides from the test are contained entirely within the area currently administered by DOE. The transport calculations are most sensitive to changes in the mean groundwater velocity and the correlation scale of hydraulic conductivity, with transport of strontium and cesium also sensitive to the sorption coefficient.

National Security, Weapons Science National Security, Weapons Science /science-innovation/_assets/images/icon-science.jpg National Security, Weapons Science National security depends on science and technology. The United States relies on Los Alamos National Laboratory for the best of both. No place on Earth pursues a broader array of world-class scientific endeavors. Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at LANL is part of the DOE's stockpile stewardship program. It uses two large X-ray machines to record three-dimensional interior images of materials. In most experiments, materials (including plutonium) undergo hydrodynamic shock to simulate the implosion process in nuclear bombs and/or the effects of severe hydrodynamic stress. The tests are described as "full-scale mockups

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclearweapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclearweapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical processing canyons.

IlONITORING REPORT FOR THE NEVADA TEST SITE IlONITORING REPORT FOR THE NEVADA TEST SITE AND OTHER TEST AREAS USED FOR UNDERGROUNDNUCLEAR DETONATIONS January through December 1975 Nonitoring Operations Division Environmental Monitoring and Support Laboratory U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 APRIL 1976 This work performed under a Memorandum of Understanding No. AT(26-1)-539 for the U . S . ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION EMSL-LV-5 39-4 May 1976 ENVIRONMENTAL 14ONITORING REPORT FOR THE NEVADA TEST SITE AND OTHER TEST AREAS USED FOR UNDERGROUNDNUCLEAR DETONATIONS January through December I975 Monitoring Operations Division Environmental Monitoring and Support Laboratory U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 APRIL 1976 This work performed under a Memorandum of

Recent field studies have led to the discovery of trace quantities of plutonium originating from the BENHAM undergroundnuclear test in two groundwater observation wells on Pahute Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. These observation wells are located 1.3 km from the BENHAM undergroundnuclear test and approximately 300 m from the TYBO undergroundnuclear test. In addition to plutonium, several other conservative (e.g. tritium) and reactive (e.g. cesium) radionuclides were found in both observation wells. The highest radionuclide concentrations were found in a well sampling a welded tuff aquifer more than 500m above the BENHAM emplacement depth. These measurements have prompted additional investigations to ascertain the mechanisms, processes, and conditions affecting subsurface radionuclide transport in Pahute Mesa groundwater. This report describes an integrated modeling approach used to simulate groundwater flow, radionuclide source release, and radionuclide transport near the BENHAM and TYBO undergroundnuclear tests on Pahute Mesa. The components of the model include a flow model at a scale large enough to encompass many wells for calibration, a source-term model capable of predicting radionuclide releases to aquifers following complex processes associated with nonisothermal flow and glass dissolution, and site-scale transport models that consider migration of solutes and colloids in fractured volcanic rock. Although multiple modeling components contribute to the methodology presented in this report, they are coupled and yield results consistent with laboratory and field observations. Additionally, sensitivity analyses are conducted to provide insight into the relative importance of uncertainty ranges in the transport parameters.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is operating an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close non-Nevada Test Site locations that were used for nuclear testing. Evaluation of radionuclide transport by groundwater from these sites is an important part of the preliminary risk analysis. These evaluations are undertaken to allow prioritization of the test areas in terms of risk, provide a quantitative basis for discussions with regulators and the public about future work at the sites, and provide a framework for assessing data needs to be filled by site characterization. The Gasbuggy site in northwestern New Mexico was the location of an underground detonation of a 29-kiloton nuclear device in 1967. The test took place in the Lewis Shale, approximately 182 m below the Ojo Alamo Sandstone, which is the aquifer closest to the detonation horizon. The conservative assumption was made that tritium was injected from the blast-created cavity into the Ojo Alamo Sandstone by the force of the explosion, via fractures created by the shot. Model results suggest that if radionuclides produced by the shot entered the Ojo Alamo, they are most likely contained within the area currently administered by DOE. The transport calculations are most sensitive to changes in the mean groundwater velocity, followed by the variance in hydraulic conductivity, the correlation scale of hydraulic conductivity, the transverse hydrodynamic dispersion coefficient, and uncertainty in the source size. This modeling was performed to investigate how the uncertainty in various physical parameters affects calculations of radionuclide transport at the Gasbuggy site, and to serve as a starting point for discussion regarding further investigation at the site; it was not intended to be a definitive simulation of migration pathways or radionuclide concentration values.

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weapons developments in Pakistan are primarily, if not exclusively, influenced by nuclear developments of nuclear capability by sub-national states and the security of WMD weapons, materials, and technology so for the foreseeable future. WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but also

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclearweapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclearweapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

A radionuclide tracer test was conducted in 1963 by the U.S. Geological Survey at the Project Gnome undergroundnuclear test site, approximately 40 km southeast of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The tracer study was carried out under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to study the transport behavior of radionuclides in fractured rock aquifers. The Culebra Dolomite was chosen for the test because it was considered to be a reasonable analogue of the fractured carbonate aquifer at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the principal location of U.S. undergroundnuclear tests. Project Gnome was one of a small number of undergroundnuclear tests conducted by the AEC at sites distant from the NTS. The Gnome device was detonated on December 10, 1961 in an evaporate unit at a depth of 360 m below ground surface. Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) implemented an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close these offsite nuclear test areas. An early step in this process is performance of a preliminary risk analysis of the hazard posed by each site. The Desert Research Institute has performed preliminary hydrologic risk evaluations for the groundwater transport pathway at Gnome. That evaluation included the radioactive tracer test as a possible source because the test introduced radionuclides directly into the Culebra Dolomite, which is the only aquifer at the site. This report presents a preliminary evaluation of the radionuclide tracer test as a source for radionuclide migration in the Culebra Dolomite. The results of this study will assist in planning site characterization activities and refining estimates of the radionuclide source for comprehensive models of groundwater transport st the Gnome site.

A lecture intended to provide a general background in weapons effects is presented. Specific areas of nuclear explosion phenomena pertinent to the design of hardened systems discussed include nuclear radiation and shielding, fireball growth and effects, thermal radiation, air blast, cratering and throwout, ground shock effects, fallout, and afterwinds. (J.R.D.)

As part of the structural response research program being conducted for ERDA, the response behavior of high-rise buildings in Las Vegas, Nevada, due to ground motion caused by undergroundnuclear explosions (UNEs) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) has been measured for the past 12 years. Results obtained include variation in dynamic response properties as a function of amplitude of motion, influence of nonstructural partitions in the building response, and comparison of calculated and measured response. These data for three reinforced concrete high- rise buildings, all designed as moment-resisting space frames are presented. (auth)

There is an interest in discovering the various peace time uses of nuclear explosives. One of the proposals is the building of harbors. There are several ports along the west coast of South America where lighterage is necessary. This implies a need for expanded harbor facilities. The problem is to find a good location for creating a harbor, and the feasibility of accomplishing this with the use of nuclear force. Feasibility includes blast effects, radiation hazards, the number of weapons needed, and economic considerations. Economic considerations include the cost of treating a harbor of sufficient depth and area, the building of harbor facilities, and the estimated savings and advantages of the new harbor. Several meetings were held with naval personnel of the Military Liaison group at UCRL to discuss the general problems of harbors. Thirty-three different ports were given a preliminary investigation.

D D E P A R T M E N T O F E N E R G Y U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEARWEAPON COMPONENTS DOE/EIS-0225/SA-03 United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex Site Operations P.O. Box 30030 Amarillo, Texas 79120-0030 February 2003 i Summary The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Procedures at 10 CFR 1021.330(d) require evaluation of its site-wide environmental impact statements (EISs) at least every 5 years by preparation of a supplement analysis (SA), as provided in 10 CFR 1021.314. Based on the SA, a determination is made as to whether the existing EIS remains

This is Volume 2 of two unclassified volumes of a meeting of workers at all levels in the science and technology of containment. Papers on containment and related geological, geophysical, engineering, chemical, and computational topics were included. Particular topics in this volume include: Low-yield test beds, modeling and residual stress, material properties, collapse phenomena and shock diagnostics, stemming practices and performance, geophysics, and geosciences and weapons destruction. Individual papers are indexed separately on the data base.

Investigations performed in the last few years by the State Science Center of the Russian Federation - Academician A. N. Krylov Central Scientific-Research Institute, together with specialized enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Sudprom, and other agencies of Russia, have shown the promise of marine nuclear power plants for producing undergroundnuclear power plants with a higher degree of protection from external and internal actions of different intensity. The concept was developed on the basis of an analysis of the energy supply in different regions of Russia and the near-abroad using fossil fuels (lignite, oil, natural gas). The change in the international environment, which makes it possible to convert the military technology, frees the industrial potential and skilled workers in Russia for development of products for the national economy. Stricter international standards and rules for increased safety and protection of nuclear power plants made it necessary to develop a new generation of reactors for ground-based power plants, which under the modern economic conditions cannot be implemented within the time periods acceptable for economics for most of the countries surrounding Russia. In the development of a new generation of ground-based nuclear power plants, the intense improvement of the aviation and space technology must be taken into account. This is connected with the increase in the catastrophes and the threat they present to the safety of unprotected power plants. This article is an abstract of the entire report.

component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) responsive infrastructure, supports NNSA an important component of the scientific and technical understanding required to assess the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclearweapons without nuclear testing. The program provides this capability

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Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low [239]Pu/[235]U (0.62-0.78) and [240]Pu/[239]Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence ({micro}-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 {micro}m sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy ({micro}-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO[2] with the presence ofU[3][8]) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (V)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s.

Public perceptions of risk have proven to be a critical barrier to the federal government`s extensive, decade-long, technical and scientific effort to site facilities for the interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The negative imagery, fear, and anxiety that are linked to ``nuclear`` and ``radioactive`` technologies, activities, and facilities by the public originate from the personal realities and experiences of individuals and the information they receive. These perceptions continue to be a perplexing problem for those responsible for making decisions about federal nuclear waste management policies and programs. The problem of understanding and addressing public perceptions is made even more difficult because there are decidedly different opinions about HLW held by the public and nuclear industry and radiation health experts.

About six to eight minutes after an underground test, an acoustic wave reaches the E and F layers of the ionosphere. Recent radiosonde experiments and propagation calculations verify that a detectable disturbance results therefrom. Next, the authors are investigating whether or not the interaction of that acoustic motion with the Earth`s magnetic field might result in a detectable magnetic disturbance at the surface. There are several interaction concepts by which they might estimate this signal: (1) the ionospheric plasma displacement interacts such that a transverse current is induced in it via v x B, that volume current may be represented as a current dipole moment, by which to estimate the magnetic field change at the Earth`s surface below; (2) the displaced free electrons bend in the Earth`s field, collectively, this cyclotron spiraling gives rise to an equivalent magnetic dipole moment; (3) the conducting ionosphere behaves as a diamagnetic layer, which drags the magnetic field with it as it moves. That might be observed downstream, at the axial intercept.

The Deactivation and Decommissioning Focus Area's (DDFA's) mission is to develop, demonstrate, and deploy improved deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) technologies. This mission requires that emphasis be continually placed on identifying technologies currently employed or under development in other nuclear as well as nonnuclear industries and government agencies. In support of DDFA efforts to clean up the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) radiologically contaminated surplus facilities using technologies that improve worker safety, reduce costs, and accelerate cleanup schedules, a study was conducted to identify innovative technologies developed for use in nonnuclear arenas that are appropriate for D&D applications.

CH2M HILL is executing a performance-based contract with the United States Department of Energy to accelerate the safe closure of the nuclear facilities at the former Mound plant in Miamisburg, Ohio. The contract started in January 2003 with a target completion date of March 31, 2006. Our accelerated baseline targets completion of the project 2 years ahead of the previous baseline schedule, by spring 2006, and for $200 million less than previous estimates. This unique decommissioning and remediation project is located within the City of Miamisburg proper and is designed for transfer of the property to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse. The project is being performed with the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation and their tenants co-located on the site creating significant logistical, safety and stakeholder challenges. The project is also being performed in conjunction with the United States Department of Energy, United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency under the Mound 2000 regulatory cleanup process. The project is currently over 95% complete. To achieve cleanup and closure of the Mound site, CH2M HILL's scope includes: - Demolition of 64 nuclear, radiological and commercial facilities - Preparation for Transfer of 9 facilities (including a Category 2 nuclear facility) to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse - Removal of all above ground utility structures and components, and preparation for transfer of 9 utility systems to Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation - Investigation, remediation, closure, and documentation of all known Potential Release Sites contaminated with radiological and chemical contamination (73 identified in original contract) - Storage, characterization, processing, packaging and shipment of all waste and excess nuclear materials - Preparation for Transfer of the 306 acre site to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse In the first two and a half years the project has successfully completed more demolition work, more environmental remediation work and more waste shipping than any other period in site history while improving the safety statistics of the site significantly. CH2M HILL Mound established a safety culture to promote line management safety responsibility and continues to place a high emphasis on safety performance even in an accelerated closure environment. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Time Restricted Case (TRC) and Days Away and Restricted Time (DART) rates improved 76% and 90%, respectively, since contract start from 2002 to 2005. These rates are the lowest the site has ever seen. The site has also gone over 1 million hours without a Lost Workday Case accident. Covered below are the key strategies for safety improvement and project delivery that have been successful at the Miamisburg Closure Project are presented. (authors)

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the state-of-the-art in numerical simulations of nuclear explosion phenomenology with applications to test ban monitoring. We focused on the uniqueness of model fits to data, the measurement and characterization of material response models, advanced modeling techniques, and applications of modeling to monitoring problems. The second goal of the symposium was to establish a dialogue between seismologists and explosion-source code calculators. The meeting was divided into five main sessions: explosion source phenomenology, material response modeling, numerical simulations, the seismic source, and phenomenology from near source to far field. We feel the symposium reached many of its goals. Individual papers submitted at the conference are indexed separately on the data base.

DOE is operating an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close non-Nevada Test Site locations used for nuclear testing. Evaluation of radionuclide transport by groundwater is part of preliminary risk analysis. These evaluations allow prioritization of test areas in terms of risk, provide a basis for discussions with regulators and the public about future work, and provide a framework for assessing site characterization data needs. The Rio Blanco site in Colorado was the location of the simultaneous detonation of three 30-kiloton nuclear devices. The devices were located 1780, 1899, and 2039 below ground surface in the Fort Union and Mesaverde formations. Although all the bedrock formations at the site are thought to contain water, those below the Green River Formation (below 1000 in depth) are also gas-bearing, and have very low permeabilities. The transport scenario evaluated was the migration of radionuclides from the blast-created cavity through the Fort Union Formation. Transport calculations were performed using the solute flux method, with input based on the limited data available for the site. Model results suggest that radionuclides from the test are contained entirely within the area currently administered by DOE. This modeling was performed to investigate how the uncertainty in various physical parameters affect radionuclide transport at the site, and to serve as a starting point for discussion regarding further investigation; it was not intended to be a definitive simulation of migration pathways or radionuclide concentration values. Given the sparse data, the modeling results may differ significantly from reality. Confidence in transport predictions can be increased by obtaining more site data, including the amount of radionuclides which would have been available for transport (i.e., not trapped in melt glass or vented during gas flow testing), and the hydraulic properties of the formation. 38 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab.

In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclearweapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclearweapons.

Three undergroundnuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island, Alaska, in 1965, 1969, and 1971. The effects of the Long Shot, Milrow, and Cannikin tests on the environment were extensively investigated during and following the detonations, and the area continues to be monitored today. This report is intended to document the basis for the Amchitka UndergroundNuclear Test Sites: Long Shot, Milrow, and Cannikin (hereafter referred to as ''Amchitka Site'') subsurface completion recommendation of No Further Remedial Action Planned with Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance, and define the long-term surveillance and maintenance strategy for the subsurface. A number of factors were considered in evaluating and selecting this recommendation for the Amchitka Site. Historical studies and monitoring data, ongoing monitoring data, the results of groundwater modeling, and the results of an independent stakeholder-guided scientific investigation were also considered in deciding the completion action. Water sampling during and following the testing showed no indication that radionuclides were released to the near surface, or marine environment with the exception of tritium, krypton-85, and iodine-131 found in the immediate vicinity of Long Shot surface ground zero. One year after Long Shot, only tritium was detectable (Merritt and Fuller, 1977). These tritium levels, which were routinely monitored and have continued to decline since the test, are above background levels but well below the current safe drinking water standard. There are currently no feasible means to contain or remove radionuclides in or around the test cavities beneath the sites. Surface remediation was conducted in 2001. Eleven drilling mud pits associated with the Long Shot, Milrow and Cannikin sites were remediated. Ten pits were remediated by stabilizing the contaminants and constructing an impermeable cap over each pit. One pit was remediated by removing all of the contaminated mud for consolidation in another pit. In addition to the mud pits, the hot mix plant was also remediated. Ongoing monitoring data does not indicate that radionuclides are currently seeping into the marine environment. Additionally, the groundwater modeling results indicate no seepage is expected for tens to thousands of years. If seepage does occur in the future, however, the rich, diverse ecosystems around the island could be at risk, as well as people eating foods from the area. An independent science study was conducted by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) in accordance with the Amchitka Independent Science Plan (2003). The study report was published on August 1, 2005. The CRESP study states ''our geophysical and biological analyses did not find evidence of risk from radionuclides from the consumption of marine foods, nor indication of any current radionuclide contaminated migration into the marine environment from the Amchitka test shots''. The study also found evidence supporting the groundwater modeling conclusions of very slow contaminant transport (CRESP, 2005). While no further action is recommended for the subsurface of the Amchitka Site, long-term stewardship of Amchitka Island will be instituted and will continue into the future. This will include institutional controls management and enforcement, post-completion monitoring, performance of five-year reviews, public participation, and records management. Long-term stewardship will be the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management. The Department of Energy is recommending completion of the investigation phase of the Amchitka Sites. The recommended remedy for the Amchitka Site is No Further Action with Long-Term Monitoring and Surveillance. The future long-term stewardship actions will be governed by a Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan. This Plan is currently being developed with input from the State, landowner, and other interested or affected stakeholders.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo undergroundnuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific undergroundnuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

A comprehensive literature assessment has been conducted to determine the nature and scope of technical information available to characterize the seismic performance of an underground repository and associated facilities. Significant deficiencies were identified in current practices for prediction of seismic response of underground excavations in jointed rock. Conventional analytical methods are based on a continuum representation of the host rock mass. Field observations and laboratory experiments indicate that, in jointed rock, the behavior of the joints controls the overall performance of underground excavations. Further, under repetitive seismic loading, shear displacement develops progressively at block boundaries. Field observations correlating seismicity and groundwater conditions have provided significant information on hydrological response to seismic events. However, lack of a comprehensive model of geohydrological response to seismicity has limited the transportability conclusions from field observations. Based on the literature study, matters requiring further research in relation to the Yucca Mountain repository are identified. The report focuses on understanding seismic processes in fractured tuff, and provides a basis for work on the geohydrologic response of a seismically disturbed rock mass. 220 refs., 43 figs., 11 tabs.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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The material presented in this article attempts to clarify the basic technical and political issues that are being debated in the contest between breeder reactors to insure abundant energy with possible resulting proliferation and the questionable continuation of uranium-fueled reactors with possible future availability of uranium. The connection between various fuel cycles and their possibility for proliferation are discussed. (BLM)

Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory New leadership position will allow for greater integration in the planning and execution of the stockpile stewardship program. August 18, 2009 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy

Since the dawn of the nuclearweapons era, political, military, and scientific leaders around the world have been working to contain the proliferation of Special Nuclear Material and explosively fissile material. This paper ...

Sandia`s mission to explore technology that enhances US nuclearweapons capabilities has been the primary impetus for the development of a class of inertial measurement units not available commercially. The newest member of the family is the Ring Laser Gyro Assembly. The product of a five-year joint effort by Sandia and Honeywell`s Space and Strategic Systems Operation, the RLGA is a small, one-nautical-mile-per-hour-class inertial measurement unit that consumes only 16 watts - attributes that are important to a guidance and control capability for new or existing weapons. These same attributes led the Central Inertial Guidance Test Facility at Holloman Air Force Base to select the RLGA for their newest test instrumentation pod. The RLGA sensor assembly is composed of three Honeywell ring laser gyroscopes and three Sundstrand Data Control accelerometers that are selected from three types according to the user`s acceleration range and accuracy needs.

This paper addresses the problems posed by running out of oil and gas supplies and the environmental problems that are due to greenhouse gases by suggesting the use of the energy available in the resource thorium, which is much more plentiful than the conventional nuclear fuel uranium. We propose the burning of this thorium dissolved as a fluoride in molten salt in the minimum viscosity mixture of LiF and BeF{sub 2} together with a small amount of {sup 235}U or plutonium fluoride to initiate the process to be located at least 10 m underground. The fission products could be stored at the same underground location. With graphite replacement or new cores and with the liquid fuel transferred to the new cores periodically, the power plant could operate for up to 200 yr with no transport of fissile material to the reactor or of wastes from the reactor during this period. Advantages that include utilization of an abundant fuel, inaccessibility of that fuel to terrorists or for diversion to weapons use, together with good economics and safety features such as an underground location will diminish public concerns. We call for the construction of a small prototype thorium-burning reactor.

At the request of Jerry Sweeney, the LLNL Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Salut undergroundnuclear test in U20ak to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Review of the Salut site is complicated because the test experienced a subsurface, rather than surface, collapse. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Salut detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeologogy due to the nuclear detonation. Sweeney's proposal requires physical access at or near the ground surface of specific undergroundnuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site), and focuses on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow, and deep geophysical surveys.

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclearweapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge July 12, 2007 - 2:54pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the transfer of nearly 4,000 acres of its former Rocky Flats nuclearweapons production site to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for use as a National Wildlife Refuge. After more than a decade of environmental cleanup work, the transfer creates the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge, 16 miles northwest of Denver, Colorado, and marks completion of the regulatory milestones to transform a formerly contaminated site into an environmental asset. "The Department of Energy's environmental cleanup of the Rocky Flats

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. (South Africa abandoned its nuclearweapons in 1991. Libya in building a weapon once they had the fissile mate- rial. The science behind nuclear bombs is well known The coming expansion of nuclear power can be a security as well as an environmental blessing, but only

The Russia-US joint program on the safe management of nuclear materials was initiated to address common technical issues confronting the US and Russia in the management of excess weapons grade nuclear materials. The program was initiated after the 1993 Tomsk-7 accident. This paper provides an update on program activities since 1996. The Fourth US Russia Nuclear Materials Safety Management Workshop was conducted in March 1997. In addition, a number of contracts with Russian Institutes have been placed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). These contracts support research related to the safe disposition of excess plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Topics investigated by Russian scientists under contracts with SNL and LLNL include accident consequence studies, the safety of anion exchange processes, underground isolation of nuclear materials, and the development of materials for the immobilization of excess weapons Pu.

The purpose of this analysis was to develop an underground layout to support the license application (LA) design effort. In addition, the analysis will be used as the technical basis for the underground layout general arrangement drawings.

A method of making vitrified underground structures in which 1) the vitrification process is started underground, and 2) a thickness dimension is controlled to produce substantially planar vertical and horizontal vitrified underground structures. Structures may be placed around a contaminated waste site to isolate the site or may be used as aquifer dikes.

The purpose of this report is to quantify the differences between mixed oxide (MOX) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and to assess in reasonable detail the potential impacts of MOX fuel use in VVER-1000 nuclear power plants in Russia. This report is a generic tool to assist in the identification of plant modifications that may be required to accommodate receiving, storing, handling, irradiating, and disposing of MOX fuel in VVER-1000 reactors. The report is based on information from work performed by Russian and U.S. institutions. The report quantifies each issue, and the differences between LEU and MOX fuels are described as accurately as possible, given the current sources of data.

Airborne equipment was designed for determining the location and yield of a nuclear detonation. This equipment determines yield from a measurement of the interval between the time of the burst and the time of the second peak in the thermal-radiation intensity curve. Flush-mounted ferrite-core magnetic loop antennas for use in detecting the electromagnetic signal and thus fixing the time of the burst, performed successfully during Operation Redwing. Two kinds of photocubes for detecting the second thermal peak were tested and were found about equally satisfactory. The method selected for yield determination gave results accurate + or - 16% for five shots. Detailed study of the data showed that the electromagnetic signal, consisting of a direct pulse followed by a series of ionosphere-reflected sky waves, could be used in many waves to give information concerning the detonation and the ionsphere. From the time intervals between the ground wave and sky waves, it was foun possible to compute both the distance between and receiver and the height of the reflecting ionosphere layer.

This paper describes new research being performed to improve understanding of seismic waves generated by undergroundnuclear explosions (UNE) by using full waveform simulation, high-performance computing and three-dimensional (3D) earth models. The goal of this effort is to develop an end-to-end modeling capability to cover the range of wave propagation required for nuclear explosion monitoring (NEM) from the buried nuclear device to the seismic sensor. The goal of this work is to improve understanding of the physical basis and prediction capabilities of seismic observables for NEM including source and path-propagation effects. We are pursuing research along three main thrusts. Firstly, we are modeling the non-linear hydrodynamic response of geologic materials to underground explosions in order to better understand how source emplacement conditions impact the seismic waves that emerge from the source region and are ultimately observed hundreds or thousands of kilometers away. Empirical evidence shows that the amplitudes and frequency content of seismic waves at all distances are strongly impacted by the physical properties of the source region (e.g. density, strength, porosity). To model the near-source shock-wave motions of an UNE, we use GEODYN, an Eulerian Godunov (finite volume) code incorporating thermodynamically consistent non-linear constitutive relations, including cavity formation, yielding, porous compaction, tensile failure, bulking and damage. In order to propagate motions to seismic distances we are developing a one-way coupling method to pass motions to WPP (a Cartesian anelastic finite difference code). Preliminary investigations of UNE's in canonical materials (granite, tuff and alluvium) confirm that emplacement conditions have a strong effect on seismic amplitudes and the generation of shear waves. Specifically, we find that motions from an explosion in high-strength, low-porosity granite have high compressional wave amplitudes and weak shear waves, while an explosion in low strength, high-porosity alluvium results in much weaker compressional waves and low-frequency compressional and shear waves of nearly equal amplitude. Further work will attempt to model available near-field seismic data from explosions conducted at NTS, where we have accurate characterization of the sub-surface from the wealth of geological and geophysical data from the former nuclear test program. Secondly, we are modeling seismic wave propagation with free-surface topography in WPP. We have model the October 9, 2006 and May 25, 2009 North Korean nuclear tests to investigate the impact of rugged topography on seismic waves. Preliminary results indicate that the topographic relief causes complexity in the direct P-waves that leads to azimuthally dependent behavior and the topographic gradient to the northeast, east and southeast of the presumed test locations generate stronger shear-waves, although each test gives a different pattern. Thirdly, we are modeling intermediate period motions (10-50 seconds) from earthquakes and explosions at regional distances. For these simulations we run SPECFEM3D{_}GLOBE (a spherical geometry spectral element code). We modeled broadband waveforms from well-characterized and well-observed events in the Middle East and central Asia, as well as the North Korean nuclear tests. For the recent North Korean test we found that the one-dimensional iasp91 model predicts the observed waveforms quite well in the band 20-50 seconds, while waveform fits for available 3D earth models are generally poor, with some exceptions. Interestingly 3D models can predict energy on the transverse component for an isotropic source presumably due to surface wave mode conversion and/or multipathing.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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This paper discusses the future of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) located in Livermore, CA, amid criticisms about whether it can achieve its stated scientific goals and whether such a money-draining project was really necessary in the first place. ...

In compliance with international agreements on nuclearweapons limitation, the French ground-based nuclear arsenal has been decommissioned in its totality. One of its former underground missile control centers, located in Rustrel, 60 km east of Avignon (Provence) has been converted into the ``Laboratoire Souterrain \\`a Bas Bruit de Rustrel-Pays d'Apt'' (LSBB). The deepest experimental hall (500 m of calcite rock overburden) includes a 100 m$^{2}$ area of sturdy flooring suspended by and resting on shock absorbers, entirely enclosed in a 28 m-long, 8 m-diameter, 1 cm-thick steel Faraday cage. This results in an unparalleled combination of shielding against cosmic rays, acoustic, seismic and electromagnetic noise, which can be exploited for rare event searches using ultra low-temperature and superconducting detectors. The first characterization measurements in this unique civilian site are reported. For more info see http://home.cern.ch/collar/RUSTREL/rustrel.html

In compliance with international agreements on nuclearweapons limitation, the French ground-based nuclear arsenal has been decommissioned in its totality. One of its former underground missile control centers, located in Rustrel, 60 km east of Avignon (Provence) has been converted into the ``Laboratoire Souterrain à Bas Bruit de Rustrel-Pays d'Apt'' (LSBB). The deepest experimental hall (500 m of calcite rock overburden) includes a 100 m$^{2}$ area of sturdy flooring suspended by and resting on shock absorbers, entirely enclosed in a 28 m-long, 8 m-diameter, 1 cm-thick steel Faraday cage. This results in an unparalleled combination of shielding against cosmic rays, acoustic, seismic and electromagnetic noise, which can be exploited for rare event searches using ultra low-temperature and superconducting detectors. The first characterization measurements in this unique civilian site are reported. http://www.gps.jussieu.fr/RUSTREL/rustrel.html

Underground pumped hydroelectric energy storage was conceived as a modification of surface pumped storage to eliminate dependence upon fortuitous topography, provide higher hydraulic heads, and reduce environmental concerns. A UPHS plant offers substantial savings in investment cost over coal-fired cycling plants and savings in system production costs over gas turbines. Potential location near load centers lowers transmission costs and line losses. Environmental impact is less than that for a coal-fired cycling plant. The inherent benefits include those of all pumped storage (i.e., rapid load response, emergency capacity, improvement in efficiency as pumps improve, and capacity for voltage regulation). A UPHS plant would be powered by either a coal-fired or nuclear baseload plant. The economic capacity of a UPHS plant would be in the range of 1000 to 3000 MW. This storage level is compatible with the load-leveling requirements of a greater metropolitan area with population of 1 million or more. The technical feasibility of UPHS depends upon excavation of a subterranean powerhouse cavern and reservoir caverns within a competent, impervious rock formation, and upon selection of reliable and efficient turbomachinery - pump-turbines and motor-generators - all remotely operable.

A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.

States, International Partners Remove Last Remaining States, International Partners Remove Last Remaining Weapons-Usable Highly Enriched Uranium from Hungary, Set Nuclear Security Milestone United States, International Partners Remove Last Remaining Weapons-Usable Highly Enriched Uranium from Hungary, Set Nuclear Security Milestone November 4, 2013 - 2:09pm Addthis NEWS MEDIA CONTACT (202) 586-4940 WASHINGTON - The U.S. Department of Energy today announced under a multi-year international effort coordinated between Hungary, the United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the successful removal of all remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Hungary. This makes Hungary the twelfth country to completely eliminate HEU from its borders since President Obama's 2009 announcement

and establishes requirements and procedures for the implementation of the PRP to select and maintain only the most reliable people to perform duties associated with nuclearweapons. Nuclearweapons require special consideration because of their policy implications and military importance, their destructive power, and the political consequences of an accident, loss of a weapon, or an unauthorized act. The safety, security, control, and effectiveness of nuclearweapons are of paramount importance to the security of the United States.

This report covers different materials and chemistry research projects carried out a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory during 1995 in support of nuclearweapons programs and other programs. There are 16 papers supporting weapons research and 12 papers supporting laboratory directed research.

The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) provides both a diversion resistant closed fuel cycle for commercial power generation and a means of addressing safeguards concerns related to excess nuclearweapons material. Little head-end processing and handling of dismantled warhead materials is required to convert excess weapons plutonium (Pu) to IFR fuel and a modest degree of proliferation protection is available immediately by alloying weapons Pu to an IFR fuel composition. Denaturing similar to that of spent fuel is obtained by short cycle (e.g. 45 day) use in an IFR reactor, by mixing which IFR recycle fuel, or by alloying with other spent fuel constituents. Any of these permanent denaturings could be implemented as soon as an operating IFR and/or an IFR recycle capability of reasonable scale is available. The initial Pu charge generated from weapons excess Pu can then be used as a permanent denatured catalyst, enabling the IFR to efficiently and economically generate power with only a natural or depleted uranium feed. The Pu is thereafter permanently safeguarded until consumed, with essentially none going to a waste repository.

Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium U.S. and Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium July 13, 2006 - 3:05pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman and Sergey Kiriyenko, the director of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, have signed a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium by irradiation in nuclear reactors. "This statement is a clear sign of our mutual commitment to keeping dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists. We look forward to working together with the Russians to ensure that this important nonproliferation project moves forward in both Russia and the United States," Secretary Bodman said.

Nuclear Proliferation is a complex problem that has plagued national security strategists since the advent of the first nuclearweapons. As the cost to produce nuclearweapons has continued to decline and the availability ...

As pointed out by several speakers, the level of violence and destruction in terrorist attacks has increased significantly during the past decade. Fortunately, few have involved weapons of mass destruction, and none have achieved mass casualties. The Aum Shinrikyo release of lethal nerve agent, sarin, in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995 clearly broke new ground by crossing the threshold in attempting mass casualties with chemical weapons. However, of all weapons of mass destruction, nuclearweapons still represent the most frightening threat to humankind. Nuclearweapons possess an enormous destructive force. The immediacy and scale of destruction are unmatched. In addition to destruction, terrorism also aims to create fear among the public and governments. Here also, nuclearweapons are unmatched. The public's fear of nuclearweapons or, for that matter, of all radioactivity is intense. To some extent, this fear arises from a sense of unlimited vulnerability. That is, radioactivity is seen as unbounded in three dimensions - distance, it is viewed as having unlimited reach; quantity, it is viewed as having deadly consequences in the smallest doses (the public is often told - incorrectly, of course - that one atom of plutonium will kill); and time, if it does not kill you immediately, then it will cause cancer decades hence.

The fallacy of zero nuclearweapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclearweapons is not verifiable, nuclearweapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclearweapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclearweapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclearweapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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The Hanford site is one of several U.S. Department of Energy locations that has transuranic radioactive Waste in storage, resulting from nuclearweapons material production. Transuranic waste has extremely long-lived radionuclides requiring great care in management; such waste is slated for eventual disposal in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. Most of this waste is stored in 208-{ell} (55-gal) drums below ground. At the Hanford site 37 641 drums are stored in several trenches. The drums were stacked up to five high with plywood sheeting between the layers and on top of the stacks. Plastic tarps were used to cover the drums and the plywood, with several feet of earth backfilled on top of the plastic. A fraction of the drums ({approximately}20%) were covered only with earth, not with plywood and plastic. The drums are either painted low-carbon steel or galvanized low-carbon steel. They have been placed in storage from 1970 to 1988, resulting in between 7 and 25 yr of storage. The environment is either soil or air atmosphere. The air atmosphere environment also includes, for some drum surfaces, contact with the underside of the tarp. The temperature of the air atmosphere is relatively uniform. Year-round measurements have not been taken, but available data suggest that the temperature span should be from {approximately} 10 to 30{degrees}C (50 to 86{degrees}F). Humidity in underground storage module mock-ups has been measured at nearly 90% during testing in the summer months. Subsequent tests have shown that the humidity probably drops to 50 to 60% during other seasons. This report describes results of a project to inspect the condition of the waste drums.

??This dissertation consists of two principal sections. The first portion explores the relationship between nuclear energy and nuclearweapons. Building on the "technological momentum" hypothesis,… (more)

Fiscal year 1988 has been a significant, rewarding, and exciting period for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's nuclear testing program. It was significant in that the Laboratory's new director chose to focus strongly on the program's activities and to commit to a revitalized emphasis on testing and the experimental science that underlies it. It was rewarding in that revolutionary new measurement techniques were fielded on recent important and highly complicated undergroundnuclear tests with truly incredible results. And it was exciting in that the sophisticated and fundamental problems of weapons science that are now being addressed experimentally are yielding new challenges and understanding in ways that stimulate and reward the brightest and best of scientists. During FY88 the program was reorganized to emphasize our commitment to experimental science. The name of the program was changed to reflect this commitment, becoming the Nuclear Test-Experimental Science (NTES) Program.

4 4 For immediate release: 06/10/2013 | NR-13-06-04 Weapons testing data determines brain makes new neurons into adulthood Anne M Stark, LLNL, (925) 422-9799, stark8@llnl.gov Image courtesy of National Institutes of Health. LIVERMORE, Calif. -- Using data derived from nuclearweapons testing of the 1950s and '60s, Lawrence Livermore scientists have found that a small portion of the human brain involved in memory makes new neurons well into adulthood. The research may have profound impacts on human behavior and mental health. The study supports the importance of investigating the therapeutic potential of applying adult neurogenesis to the treatment of age-related cognitive disorders. Neurogenesis is the process by which neurons are generated from neural stem

A method based on the use of a high temperature fluidized bed for rapidly oxidizing, homogenizing and down-blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclearweapons is presented. This technology directly addresses many of the most important issues that inhibit progress in international commerce in HEU; viz., transaction verification, materials accountability, transportation and environmental safety. The equipment used to carry out the oxidation and blending is simple, inexpensive and highly portable. Mobile facilities to be used for point-of-sale blending and analysis of the product material are presented along with a phased implementation plan that addresses the conversion of HEU derived from domestic weapons and related waste streams as well as material from possible foreign sources such as South Africa or the former Soviet Union.

2, 2005 2, 2005 Dr. Michael R. Anastasio Director Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory P.O. Box 808, L-001 Livermore, CA 94550 Subject: Enforcement Letter - Quality Assurance Deficiencies Related to Weapon Activities Dear Dr. Anastasio: This letter is to inform you of the Department of Energy's (DOE) concern regarding several quality assurance-related deficiencies involving actions by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) personnel. These deficiencies were associated with a cracked explosive event that occurred at the Pantex site in January 2004. The timing of this letter is intended to coincide with a DOE enforcement action stemming from this event. During the dismantlement of a retired nuclearweapon, for which LLNL was the design

The Bureau of Mines has investigated vibration levels produced by blasting at four underground sites to establish how such factors as type of explosive, delay blasting, charge weight, and geology affect amplitudes of ground motion. A summary of the work is presented and the results of further analysis of the data are discussed. Square root scaling was found applicable to two of the underground sites and could be applied with minor error to all the sites. Comparison of empirical propagation equations in the different rock types indicates that although the site effect is apparent, the combined data may be used as a basis for engineering estimates of vibration amplitudes from subsurface blasting in many different rock types. Recommendations for predicting and minimizing vibration amplitudes from underground blasts are given.

The diverse and complex geology of the Nevada Test Site region makes for a challenging environment for identifying and characterizing hydrogeologic units penetrated by wells drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Underground Test Area (UGTA) Environmental Restoration Sub-Project. Fortunately, UGTA geoscientists have access to large and robust sets of subsurface geologic data, as well as a large historical knowledge base of subsurface geological analyses acquired mainly during the undergroundnuclearweapons testing program. Of particular importance to the accurate identification and characterization of hydrogeologic units in UGTA boreholes are the data and interpretation principles associated with geophysical well logs. Although most UGTA participants and stakeholders are probably familiar with drill hole data such as drill core and cuttings, they may be less familiar with the use of geophysical logs; this document is meant to serve as a primer on the use of geophysical logs in the UGTA project. Standard geophysical logging tools used in the UGTA project to identify and characterize hydrogeologic units are described, and basic interpretation principles and techniques are explained. Numerous examples of geophysical log data from a variety of hydrogeologic units encountered in UGTA wells are presented to highlight the use and value of geophysical logs in the accurate hydrogeologic characterization of UGTA wells.

McMillan to Lead Weapons Program McMillan to Lead Weapons Program Charles McMillan to lead Los Alamos National Laboratory's Weapons Program He will provide oversight and direction for the nuclearweapons program at Los Alamos to accomplish the Laboratory's core mission. July 28, 2009 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials.

Animals that Hide Underground Animals that Hide Underground Nature Bulletin No. 733 November 23, 1963 Forest Preserve District of Cook County Seymour Simon, President David H. Thompson, Senior Naturalist ANIMALS THAT HIDE UNDERGROUND A hole in the ground has an air of mystery about it that rouses our curiosity. No matter whether it is so small that only a worm could squeeze into it, or large enough for a fox den, our questions are much the same. What animal dug the hole? Is it down there now? What is it doing? When will it come out? An underground burrow has several advantages for an animal. In it, many kinds find safety from enemies for themselves and their young. For others, it is an air-conditioned escape from the burning sun of summer and a snug retreat away from the winds and cold of winter. The moist atmosphere of a subterranean home allows the prolonged survival of a wide variety of lower animals which, above the surface, would soon perish from drying.

), although experts agree that Israel, Pakistan and South Africa also have a nuclearweapons capabilityThe New Nuclear Threat John Deutch FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 71 Â· Number 4 Foreign AffairsThe contents. Deutch THE NEW NUCLEAR THREAT he threat of nuclearweapons spread across the world has displaced the fear

The only military application in which present-day depleted-uranium (DU) alloys out-perform tungsten alloys is long-rod penetration into a main battle-tank's armor. However, this advantage is only on the order of 10% and disappearing when the comparison is made in terms of actual lethality of complete anti-tank systems instead of laboratory-type steel penetration capability. Therefore, new micro- and nano-engineered tungsten alloys may soon out-perform existing DU alloys, enabling the production of tungsten munition which will be better than uranium munition, and whose overall life-cycle cost will be less due to the absence of the problems related to the radioactivity of uranium. The reasons why DU weapons have been introduced and used are analysed from the perspective that their radioactivity must have played an important role in the decision making process. It is found that DU weapons belong to the diffuse category of low-radiological-impact nuclearweapons to which emerging types of low-yield, i.e., fourth...

Buried targets, such as hardened missile silos, that are resistant to the effects of air blast from above-ground or surface-burst explosions may be vulnerable to the effects of ground motion produced by nearby underground explosions. An earth penetrating weapon (EPW) is being developed to exploit this phenomena. To design the EPW system, loads on the weapon due to the penetration event must be determined. This paper presents the methodology for performing Lagrangian finite-element analysis of the penetration event in two and three dimensions. In order to describe the methodology, results from analyses done for a particular EPW impacting a particular target medium are presented. The results for impacts with nonzero angles of incidence and nonzero angles of attack show the importance of being able to calculate three dimensional penetration loads. 62 figs.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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The American system of nuclearweapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclearweapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclearweapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclearweapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclearweapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor.

Disclosed is an underground waste barrier structure that consists of waste material, a first container formed of activated carbonaceous material enclosing the waste material, a second container formed of zeolite enclosing the first container, and clay covering the second container. The underground waste barrier structure is constructed by forming a recessed area within the earth, lining the recessed area with a layer of clay, lining the clay with a layer of zeolite, lining the zeolite with a layer of activated carbonaceous material, placing the waste material within the lined recessed area, forming a ceiling over the waste material of a layer of activated carbonaceous material, a layer of zeolite, and a layer of clay, the layers in the ceiling cojoining with the respective layers forming the walls of the structure, and finally, covering the ceiling with earth.

Rising costs of new infrastructure, increasing demand, and a declining number of available workers will drive utilities to operate as efficiently as possible. The practice of overbuilding infrastructure to improve or maintain reliability will be viewed as cost-inefficient. Utilities will be forced to operate distribution systems more dynamically and efficiently. Distribution sensors will help provide the needed information to utilities to achieve the goal of dynamic efficiency. The Underground Distributi...

Many who speak of the end of the Cold War emphasize the improvement in international relations when they speak of the momentous consequences of this event. According to this image, the half century since Trinity has been a period of sparse international communication during which the Eastern and Western blocs hibernated in their isolated dens of security alliances. The emphasis in the phrase ``Cold War`` was on the word ``cold,`` and relations with the former Communist regimes are now ``warm`` by comparison. It is equally valid to consider what has happened to the word ``was` in this highly descriptive phrase. While meaningful international dialogue was in a state of relative lethargy during much of the last fifty years, the military establishments of the Great Powers were actively engaged in using as much force as possible in their efforts to control world affairs, short of triggering a nuclear holocaust. Out of these military postures a tense peace ironically emerged, but the terms by which decisions were made about controlling weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) were the terms of war. The thesis of this paper is that the end of the Cold War marks a shift away from reliance on military might toward an international commitment to controlling weapons,of mass destruction through the ``rule of law.`` Rawls wrote that ``legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation. The regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system.`` Inparticular, Rawls identifies as part of this system of public rules those laws that aim to prevent free riders on the economic system and those that aim to correct such externalities as environmental pollution.``

Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production-related atomic projects in the USA and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950s account for a large fraction of the historical releases from US weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early years of nuclearweapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major US Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, USA) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for {sup 137}Cs at the three facilities that were part of the US nuclearweapons complex.

Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production related atomic projects in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950's account for a large fraction of the historical releases from U.S. weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early ,years of nuclearweapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major U.S. Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early -years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for r37Cs at the three facilities that were part of the U.S. nuclearweapons complex.

This report describes Phase I of a two-phase project to assess industry practices and standards for grounding and bonding of medium-voltage underground residential distribution (URD) and underground commercial distribution (UCD) circuits and worker safety in worksites with these systems.The report includes an overview of the issues and concerns associated with underground distribution systems safety and, in particular, worker safety in worksites. It identifies the industry and utility ...

Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear Deterrence LANL's mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve other emerging national security and energy challenges. April 12, 2012 A B-2 Spirit bomber refuels from a KC-135 Stratotanker A B-2 Spirit bomber refuels from a KC-135 Stratotanker. Contact Operator Los Alamos National Laboratory (505) 667-5061 Charlie McMillan, Director: "For the last 70 years there has not been a world war, and I have to think that our strong deterrent has something to do with that fact." Mission nuclearweapons Charlie McMillan, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory 1:06 Director McMillan on nuclear deterrence While the role and prominence of nuclearweapons in U.S. security policy

The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

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The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

Animals placed in open underground shelters at the Nevada Test Site during an atomic weapon test suffered skin burns of an unknown origin. From a study of the burns it was concluded that the causative agent entered the shelter from outside. the causative agent was subject to rectilinear propagation near the entrance. and the causative agent required a relatively unobstructed opening to effect entrance. The two most likely agents for such burns are hot winds and/or hot wind-borne dust that are forced into the shelter as the shock front from the weapon passes the shelter entrances and radiant energy from the fireball that is scattered into the shelter. A study was made to evaluate the contribution made by radiant energy and, if this contributioo proved to be significant, to suggest means of eliminating it. Extensive measurements were made in the laboratory on a scale model of the shelter and direct measurements were made on an actual shelter to ensure the validity of the laboraiory results. A Photronic cell and a MacBeth Illuminometer were used to measure the entryway transmission of total radiant energy. The consistency of the results with extended and point sources for the model shelter and the agreement of these results with those from a point source and sunlight for the underground shelter at the Nevada Test Site lead to considerable confidence in the ability to predict the amount of radiant energy that would reach the animals from a weapon of known size. The energy calculated on the basis of these static measurements is about 1/200 of that required to produce the burns. Although transient effects caused by the rapid heating of the entryway walls could have resulted in a considerable increase in the entyway transmission. It is felt thai radiant important causative agent in producing burns within the shelters. Hot winds and/or hot wind-borne dust are now considered to be the most likely agents. (auth)

In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty implementing issues, showing how various States Parties have enacted measures that are responsive to CWC obligations. It is intended to highlight the issues that States Parties must address and to identify trends among States Parties that might be useful to States that have not yet made crucial decisions as to how to resolve key matters. At various points in the text, country names are listed in parenthesis to identify pieces of national legislation that demonstrate the point in the text. It should not be inferred that nations not listed have not addressed the point or have taken a different position. In some cases, a nation's position is explained in somewhat more depth to give specific detail to an assertion in the text. Attached to this paper is a chart which illustrates how States Parties in the Central European region as well as the United States respond to the issues raised. Obviously, in preparing such a chart, many subtle provisions in national legislation must be simplified. The point of the chart is to portray, on a few pages, the major trends of legislation.

From conference on the environmental effects of explosives and explosions; White Oak, Maryland, USA (30 May 1973). The potential mechanisms of biological damage to fish resulting from a nuclear-induced shock wave appear to involve mechanical damage from bottom acceleration and rockspall; the synergistic effect of compression to decompression producing the mechanical expansion of gas spaces within the organism; effects of cavitation; and possibly the alteration of blood constituents. The indirect effects of the shock wave should also be considered in a truly ecological approach. Loss of fish or other marine organisms may reduce food resources for other species and place an unusual stress upon the community's food web and increased predation created by the influx of a formerly minor constituent may also be a real consideration. The determinants of biological damage involve the anatomical morphology, the ecological characteristics of the various members of the fish community, and the physical characteristics of the environment as produced by the introduced shock wave. (auth)

This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclearweapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclearweapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.

A method of storage of missiles deep underground in a protected environment capable of withstanding nuclear blasts while allowing access for maintenance and rapid egress when necessary-- even after exposure to severe environments due to an explosion at or near the surface of the earth. To accomplish this, the objects to be stored are contained in a closed container of positive buoyancy in quicksand. A shaft is excavated in the earth and filled with sand. The water content of the sand backfill is controlled and maintained at that percentage of saturation which will provide the best compromise between rapidity and ease of container egress on one hand and resistance to hostile surface environments on the other. Means for the introduction of additional water at the bottom of the sand-filled shaft are provided. When the sand column is fluidized by the injection of water at the bottom thereof, quicksand is formed in the shaft and the container can be drawn to the bottom by a tether line. When water injection is stopped, the sand returns to its normal solid condition and provides a protective layer for the buried container while restraining it in its deep buried position. The sand, in its normal tightly packed solid condition also acts to preserve the egress path to the surface by preventing the entry of dislodged earth material in the attack environment. To access the container for maintenance or for use of the contents, the shaft is again fluidized allowing the container to float to the surface.

Argon is a powerful scintillator and an excellent medium for detection of ionization. Its high discrimination power against minimum ionization tracks, in favor of selection of nuclear recoils, makes it an attractive medium for direct detection of WIMP dark matter. However, cosmogenic {sup 39}Ar contamination in atmospheric argon limits the size of liquid argon dark matter detectors due to pile-up. The cosmic ray shielding by the earth means that Argon from deep underground is depleted in {sup 39}Ar. In Cortez Colorado a CO{sub 2} well has been discovered to contain approximately 500ppm of argon as a contamination in the CO{sub 2}. In order to produce argon for dark matter detectors we first concentrate the argon locally to 3-5% in an Ar, N{sub 2}, and He mixture, from the CO{sub 2} through chromatographic gas separation. The N{sub 2} and He will be removed by continuous cryogenic distillation in the Cryogenic Distillation Column recently built at Fermilab. In this talk we will discuss the entire extraction and purification process; with emphasis on the recent commissioning and initial performance of the cryogenic distillation column purification.

Focus Article Nuclear winter Alan Robock Nuclear winter is the term for a theory describing the climatic effects of nuclear war. Smoke from the fires started by nuclearweapons, especially the black, sooty smoke from cities and industrial facilities, would be heated by the Sun, lofted into the upper

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The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclearweapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile {sup 235}U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile {sup 235}U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel.

Nuclear Proliferation and the Deterrence of Conventional War: A Proposal Justin Pollard April 2009) Introduction It seems counterintuitive to think that the spread of nuclearweapons could make the world a safer of ubiquitous nuclear armament is a more dangerous and unstable one. Certainly, a weapon of the nuclear

Huge potential of natural resources, including oil, has determined that the Russian Federation (by reserves, production and export) to occupy a dominant position in the global energy economy. Following the implosion of communism and the difficult economic ... Keywords: "geopolitical weapon", energy resources, oil, regions, russia

.The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons creates a loophole that allows a non-nuclear-weapon country to avoid international safeguards governing fissile materials if it claims that the materials will be used ...

Interim results of a study being conducted with respect to the technological aspects of the costs and benefits of undergroundnuclear power plant construction in direct support of the California Energy Commission's legislative mandate in this area are presented. The program was directed towards problem scoping, methodology evaluation, program definition and planning for subsequent, more detailed investigations of underground facility designs and their potential advantages and disadvantages. The material presented describes the results of (a) systems analyses which were conducted to determine logical requirements for determination of those elements of a nuclear power plant which should be constructed underground; (b) bounding estimates of incremental plant costs for a variety of underground concepts; (c) applicable prior experience in underground facility design and construction which could be used to identify potential sources of strength and weaknessees of undergroundnuclear power plants; (d) estimates of seismic environments for underground construction in California; (e) preliminary descriptions of underground reactor accident scenarios; (f) bounding estimates of the consequences of such accidents, in terms of comparisons of relative emissions of radioactivity with respect to similar accidents for surface-sited nuclear power plants and (g) results of analyses of several other important technological aspects of the problem. A description is also provided of the program development work performed to provide planning and criteria for subsequent investigations to determine: (a) definitive undergroundnuclear power plant designs and costs, and (b) estimates of accident consequences in undergroundnuclear power plants.

Utilities must consider a number of factors when evaluating uprating and upgrading options for underground transmission cables. This comprehensive guidebook documents the state-of-science for increasing power flow capacities of underground transmission cables. It provides an overview of underground transmission cable ratings and uprating techniques so that the maximum utilization can be obtained from the existing underground transmission infrastructure.

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) endorses the rapid application of mixed uraniumplutonium oxide (MOX) fuel technology to accomplish the timely disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The end of the Cold War has led to universal recognition that both the United States and Russia possess stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium that far exceed their defense requirements. In 1994 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) stated the following: “The existence of this material [surplus weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium] constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security. 1 ” Russia and the United States have held extensive discussions on plutonium disposition, culminating in a September 2000 agreement 2 to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weaponsgrade plutonium in each country. The U.S. Department of Energy has completed two major Environmental Impact Statements on surplus plutonium disposition. 3,4 Implementation of the associated Records of Decision 5,6 has resulted in an ongoing program to dispose of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium by fabricating the material into MOX fuel and using the fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. As with the blend-down of highly enriched uranium, a

The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclearweapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

This thesis presents a study of the permissible groundwater infiltration rates in underground structures, the consequences of this leakage and the effectiveness of mitigation measures. Design guides and codes do not restrict, ...

A variety of different sensors are needed for underground distribution applications. These include sensors for temperature monitoring to track possible overload issues and other issues that can cause heating in underground systems (for example, arcing), sensors for fault detection and characterization, and sensors for voltage and current monitoring to support a wide range of applications (for example, SCADA, volt/var control, and load flow management). In 2008, EPRI evaluated the present state of medium-...

The international security environment, characterized by the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclearweapons and technology holds manifold implications for India. In fact, it is the emergence of offensive nuclear attitudes of other states reflected in their doctrines which are open to the first use of nuclearweapons and even towards use against non-nuclearweapon states, which galvanized Indian efforts towards a military nuclear programme. The May 1998 tests gave to India an unalterable new identity- of a de facto nuclearweapons state- for which India sought international diplomatic recognition. A doctrine which would justify India’s nuclear status and policies was an important step in this

Weapon Quality Assurance Weapon Quality Assurance FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance A key element for the Department's Technical Qualification Programs is a set of common Functional Area Qualification Standards (FAQS) and associated Job Task Analyses (JTA). These standards are developed for various functional areas of responsibility in the Department, including oversight of safety management programs identified as hazard controls in Documented Safety Analyses (DSA). For each functional area, the FAQS identify the minimum technical competencies and supporting knowledge and skills for a typical qualified individual working in the area. FAQC-WeaponQualityAssurance.docx Description Weapon Quality Assurance Qualification Card More Documents & Publications DOE-STD-1025-2008

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

The long-term objective of this work is to develop a transformational energy production technology by insitu thermal treatment of a coal seam for the production of substitute natural gas (SNG) while leaving much of the coalâ??s carbon in the ground. This process converts coal to a high-efficiency, low-GHG emitting gas fuel. It holds the potential of providing environmentally acceptable access to previously unusable coal resources. This topical report discusses the development of experimental capabilities, the collection of available data, and the development of simulation tools to obtain process thermo-chemical and geo-thermal parameters in preparation for the eventual demonstration in a coal seam. It also includes experimental and modeling studies of CO{sub 2} sequestration. Efforts focused on: â?¢ Constructing a suite of three different coal pyrolysis reactors. These reactors offer the ability to gather heat transfer, mass transfer and kinetic data during coal pyrolysis under conditions that mimic in situ conditions (Subtask 6.1). â?¢ Studying the operational parameters for various underground thermal treatment processes for oil shale and coal and completing a design matrix analysis for the underground coal thermal treatment (UCTT). This analysis yielded recommendations for terms of targeted coal rank, well orientation, rubblization, presence of oxygen, temperature, pressure, and heating sources (Subtask 6.2). â?¢ Developing capabilities for simulating UCTT, including modifying the geometry as well as the solution algorithm to achieve long simulation times in a rubblized coal bed by resolving the convective channels occurring in the representative domain (Subtask 6.3). â?¢ Studying the reactive behavior of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) with limestone, sandstone, arkose (a more complex sandstone) and peridotite, including mineralogical changes and brine chemistry for the different initial rock compositions (Subtask 6.4). Arkose exhibited the highest tendency of participating in mineral reactions, which can be attributed to the geochemical complexity of its initial mineral assemblage. In experiments with limestone, continuous dissolution was observed with the release of CO{sub 2} gas, indicated by the increasing pressure in the reactor (formation of a gas chamber). This occurred due to the lack of any source of alkali to buffer the solution. Arkose has the geochemical complexity for permanent sequestration of CO{sub 2} as carbonates and is also relatively abundant. The effect of including NH{sub 3} in the injected gas stream was also investigated in this study. Precipitation of calcite and trace amounts of ammonium zeolites was observed. A batch geochemical model was developed using Geochemists Workbench (GWB). Degassing effect in the experiments was corrected using the sliding fugacity model in GWB. Experimental and simulation results were compared and a reasonable agreement between the two was observed.

This research project was conceived as a multi-year plan to study the use of mixed plutonium oxide-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in existing nuclear reactors. Four areas of investigation were originally proposed: (1) study reactor physics including evaluation of control rod worth and power distribution during normal operation and transients; (2) evaluate accidents focusing upon the reduced control rod worth and reduced physical properties of PuO{sub 2}; (3) assess the safeguards required during fabrication and use of plutonium bearing fuel assemblies; and (4) study public acceptance issues associated with using material recovered from weapons to fuel a nuclear reactor. First year accomplishments are described. Appendices contain 2 reports entitled: development and validation of advanced computational capability for MOX fueled ALWR assembly designs; and long-term criticality safety concerns associated with weapons plutonium disposition.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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Given the devastating consequences of nuclear war, it is appropriate to look at current and planned uses of computers in nuclearweapons command and control systems, and to examine whether these systems can fulfill their intended roles.

This paper presents an assessment of the safety issues and implications of fabricating mixed oxide (MOX) fuel using surplus weapons plutonium. The basis for this assessment is the research done at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in identifying and resolving the technical issues surrounding the production of PuO{sub 2} feed, removal of gallium from the PuO{sub 2} feed, the fabrication of test fuel, and the work done at the LANL plutonium processing facility. The use of plutonium in MOX fuel has been successfully demonstrated in Europe, where the experience has been almost exclusively with plutonium separated from commercial spent nuclear fuel. This experience in safely operating MOX fuel fabrication facilities directly applies to the fabrication and irradiation of MOX fuel made from surplus weapons plutonium. Consequently, this paper focuses on the technical difference between plutonium from surplus weapons, and light-water reactor recycled plutonium. Preliminary assessments and research lead to the conclusion that no new process or product safety concerns will arise from using surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel.

This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclearweaponsPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Plan to dismantle US arsenal and eliminate nuclearweapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

This dissertation explores how states can use positive inducements and negative sanctions to successfully bargain with nuclear proliferators and prevent the spread of nuclearweapons. It seeks to answer the following ...

The purpose of this Project was to design, build, install and demonstrate the technical feasibility of an underground high temperature superconducting (HTS) power cable installed between two utility substations. In the first phase two HTS cables, 320 m and 30 m in length, were constructed using 1st generation BSCCO wire. The two 34.5 kV, 800 Arms, 48 MVA sections were connected together using a superconducting joint in an underground vault. In the second phase the 30 m BSCCO cable was replaced by one constructed with 2nd generation YBCO wire. 2nd generation wire is needed for commercialization because of inherent cost and performance benefits. Primary objectives of the Project were to build and operate an HTS cable system which demonstrates significant progress towards commercial progress and addresses real world utility concerns such as installation, maintenance, reliability and compatibility with the existing grid. Four key technical areas addressed were the HTS cable and terminations (where the cable connects to the grid), cryogenic refrigeration system, underground cable-to-cable joint (needed for replacement of cable sections) and cost-effective 2nd generation HTS wire. This was the world’s first installation and operation of an HTS cable underground, between two utility substations as well as the first to demonstrate a cable-to-cable joint, remote monitoring system and 2nd generation HTS.

The Underground Transmission Systems Reference Book covers all stages of cable system design and operation, from initial planning studies to failure analysis. It contains contributions from many of the industry's experts and represents practices from all parts of the United States.

137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support 137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri SUMMARY This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to renovate an existing building at the U.S. Department of Energy Kansas City Plant to accommodate equipment, security and environmental controls, and building restoration upon project completion, including disposal of equipment and wastes. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES None available at this time. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD December 21, 1995 EA-1137: Finding of No Significant Impact Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas

One of the legacies of the nuclearweapon and nuclear power cycles has been the generation of large quantities of nuclear waste and fissile materials. As citizens of this planet, it is everyone's responsibility to provide for safe, secure, transparent, disposal of these waste nuclear materials. The Sandia Cooperative Monitoring Center sponsored a Transparency Monitoring Workshop where the use of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was identified as a possible transparency demonstration test bed. Three experiments were conceived as jumpstart activities to showcase the effective use of the WIPP infrastructure as a Transparency Demonstration Test Bed. The three experiments were successfully completed and demonstrated at the International Atomic Energy Association sponsored International Conference on Geological Repositories held in Denver Colorado November 1999. The design and coordination of these efforts is the subject of this paper.

After the end of World War II, the world entered an even more turbulent period as it faced the beginnings of the Cold War, during which the prospect of mutually assured destruction between the world's largest nuclearweapon ...

B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Video Gallery > B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement The elimination of the B53 by Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is consistent with the goal President Obama announced in his April 2009 Prague speech to reduce the number of nuclearweapons. The President said, "We will reduce the role of nuclearweapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." The dismantlement of the last remaining B53 ensures that the system will never again be part of the U.S. nuclearweapons stockpile. As a key part of its national security mission, NNSA is actively responsible for safely dismantling weapons that are no longer needed, and disposing of the excess material and components.

Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons production being shipped to WIPP LANL Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons production being shipped to WIPP May 31, 2011 - 12:00pm Addthis Media Contact Fred deSousa 505-665-3430 fdesousa@lanl.gov LOS ALAMOS, New Mexico - Los Alamos National Laboratory has reached an important milestone in its campaign to ship transuranic (TRU) waste from Cold War-era nuclear operations to the U.S. Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. This month, the Lab surpassed 100,000 plutonium-equivalent curies of TRU waste shipped to WIPP, about one-third of the Lab's total. The waste, sent from LANL to WIPP in more than 750 shipments since 1999,

Workshop to Explore Use of WIPP Workshop to Explore Use of WIPP As 'Next Generation' Underground Laboratory CARLSBAD, N.M., June 9, 2000 - The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Carlsbad Area Office is sponsoring the "Workshop on the Next Generation U.S. Underground Science Facility" June 12-14 at the Pecos River Village Conference Center, 711 Muscatel, in Carlsbad. The purpose of the workshop is to explore the potential use of the DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) underground as a next generation laboratory for conducting nuclear and particle astrophysics and other basic science research, and how that might be accomplished. "WIPP's underground environment represents one of only a few choices open to the research community for siting experiments that require shielding from cosmic rays," said Dr.

This is the final report of a one-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In an effort to address the problems of long term storage and nuclear waste minimization, zircon has been proposed as a host medium for plutonium and other actinides recovered from dismantled nuclearweapons. The objective of this work is to investigate the feasibility of large scale fabrication of Pu-bearing zircon. Since PuO{sub 2} is thermodynamically less stable than ZrO{sub 2}, it is expected that the process parameters determined for synthesizing ZrSiO{sub 4} (zircon) would be applicable to those for PuSiO{sub 4} (Pu-zircon). Furthermore, since the foremost concern in plutonium processing is the potential for contamination release, this work emphasizes the development of process parameters, using zircon first, to anticipate potential material problems in the containment system for reaction mixtures during processing. Stoichiometric mixtures of ZrO{sub 2} and SiO{sub 2}, in hundred-gram batches, have been subjected to hot isostatic pressing (HIP) at temperatures near 1,500 C and pressures approximately 10,000 psi. The product materials have been analyzed by x-ray powder diffraction, and are found to consist of zircon after approximately two hours of reaction time. From this work, it is clear that the fabrication of large quantities of Pu-zircon is feasible. The most notable result of this work is evidence for the existence of container problems. This result, in turn, suggests potential solutions to these problems. Experiments with the quartz inner container, the glass sealant, a sacrificial metal barrier, and a metal outer container are being investigated to mitigate these potential hazards.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

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of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. NuclearWeapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test BanPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. NuclearWeapons

Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. NuclearWeapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. TestingPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. NuclearWeapons

. Some Bits of History. 2. NuclearWeapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing The TestPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. NuclearWeapons

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclearweapon tests and declare themselves as nuclearweapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

It is suggested that weapons grade plutonium could be processed through a transmutation facility to build up sufficient actinide and fission product inventories to serve as a deterrent to diversion or theft, pending eventual use as nuclear reactor fuel. A transmutation facility consisting of a fusion neutron source surrounded by fuel assemblies containing the weapons grade plutonium in the form of PuO2 pebbles in a lithium slurry was investigated and found to be technically feasible. A design concept/operation scenario was developed for a facility which would be able to transmute the world's estimated inventory of weapons grade plutonium to 11% Pu-240 concentration in about 25 years. The fusion neutron source would be based on tokamak plasma operating conditions and magnet technology being qualified in ongoing R D programs, and the plutonium fuel would be based on existing technology. A new R D program would be required to qualify a refractory metal alloy structural material needed to handle the high heat fluxes. Extensions of existing technologies and acceleration of existing R D programs would seem to be adequate to qualify other technologies required for the facility.

It is suggested that weapons-grade plutonium could be processed through a transmutation facility to build up sufficient actinide and fission product inventories to serve as a deterrent to diversion or theft during subsequent storage, pending eventual use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. A transmutation facility consisting of a tokamak fusion neutron source surrounded by fuel assemblies containing the weapons-grade plutonium in the form of PuO{sub 2} pebbles in a lithium slurry is investigated. A design concept/operation scenario is developed for a facility that would be able to transmute the world`s estimated surplus inventory of weapons-grade plutonium to 11% {sup 240}Pu concentration in nearly 25 yr. The fusion neutron source would be based on plasma physics and plasma support technology being qualified in ongoing research and development (R&D) programs, and the plutonium fuel would be based on existing technology. A new R&D program would be required to qualify a refractory metal alloy structural material that would be needed to handle the high heat fluxes; otherwise, extensions of existing technologies and acceleration of existing R&D programs would seem to be adequate to qualify all required technologies. Such a facility might feasibly be deployed in 20 to 30 yr, or sooner with a crash program. 49 refs., 5 figs., 13 tabs.

Underground power lines require inspection and maintenance to ensure long-term performance and reliable operation. In addition to terminations at both ends of the underground lines, access to the lines for inspection and maintenance is obtained through underground vaults or manholes. General practices require utility personnel to enter the vaults for visual inspection and to make the necessary measurements using portable instruments.The Electric Power Research Institute has developed the ...

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex has a surplus of classified legacy weapon components generated over the years with no direct path for disposal. The majority of the components have been held for uncertainty of future use or no identified method of sanitization or disposal. As more weapons are retired, there is an increasing need to reduce the amount of components currently in storage or on hold. A process is currently underway to disposition and dispose of the legacy/retired weapons components across the DOE complex.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Sample records for underground nuclear weapons from the National Library of Energy Beta (NLEBeta)

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "underground nuclear weapons" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.

Nuclear conflict and ozone depletion Quick summary o Regional nuclear war could cause global which traps pollutants o Nuclearweapons cause explosions, which then causes things around the vicinity to start burning, which in turn releases black carbon; it is not the nuclear material or fallout causing

Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, has stated that one of the nuclear waste legacy issues is ``The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring the safe use of nuclear power.'' Waste management (i.e., the back end) is a domestic and international issue that must be addressed. A key tool in gaining acceptance of nuclear waste repository technologies is transparency. Transparency provides information to outside parties for independent assessment of safety, security, and legitimate use of materials. Transparency is a combination of technologies and processes that apply to all elements of the development, operation, and closure of a repository system. A test bed for nuclear repository transparency technologies has been proposed to develop a broad-based set of concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle. WIPP is the world's first complete geologic repository system for nuclear materials at the back end of the cycle. While it is understood that WIPP does not currently require this type of transparency, this repository has been proposed as realistic demonstration site to generate and test ideas, methods, and technologies about what transparency may entail at the back end of the nuclear materials cycle, and which could be applicable to other international repository developments. An integrated set of transparency demonstrations was developed and deployed during the summer, and fall of 1999 as a proof-of-concept of the repository transparency technology concept. These demonstrations also provided valuable experience and insight into the implementation of future transparency technology development and application. These demonstrations included: Container Monitoring Rocky Flats to WIPP; Underground Container Monitoring; Real-Time Radiation and Environmental Monitoring; Integrated level of confidence in the system and information provided. As the world's only operating deep geologic repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) offers a unique opportunity to serve as an international cooperative test bed for developing and demonstrating technologies and processes in a fully operational repository system setting. To address the substantial national security implications for the US resulting from the lack of integrated, transparent management and disposition of nuclear materials at the back-end of the nuclear fuel and weapons cycles, it is proposed that WIPP be used as a test bed to develop and demonstrate technologies that will enable the transparent and proliferation-resistant geologic isolation of nuclear materials. The objectives of this initiative are to: (1) enhance public confidence in safe, secure geologic isolation of nuclear materials; (2) develop, test, and demonstrate transparency measures and technologies for the back-end of nuclear fuel cycle; and (3) foster international collaborations leading to workable, effective, globally-accepted standards for the transparent monitoring of geological repositories for nuclear materials. Test-bed activities include: development and testing of monitoring measures and technologies; international demonstration experiments; transparency workshops; visiting scientist exchanges; and educational outreach. These activities are proposed to be managed by the Department of Energy/Carlsbad Area Office (DOE/CAO) as part of The Center for Applied Repository and Underground Studies (CARUS).

Weapons procurement decisions are extremely complex, with an unmanageable quantity of variables to take into account. The human brain, unable to process such a complex problem in a strictly rational way, seeks mechanisms ...

The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

7: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support 7: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri SUMMARY This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to renovate an existing building at the U.S. Department of Energy Kansas City Plant to accommodate equipment, security and environmental controls, and building restoration upon project completion, including disposal of equipment and wastes. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES None available at this time. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD December 21, 1995 EA-1137: Finding of No Significant Impact Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri

Activities and infrastructure that support nuclearweapons are facing significant challenges. Despite an admirable record and firm commitment to make safety a primary criterion in weapons design, production, handling, and deployment - there is growing apprehension about terrorist acquiring weapons or nuclear material. At the NES Workshop in May 2012, Scott Sagan, who is a proponent of the normal accident cycle, presented. Whether a proponent of the normal accident cycle or High Reliability Organizations - we have to be diligent about our safety record. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain our admirable safety record and commitment to Nuclear Explosive Safety.

The Underground Storage Tank (UST) Management Program at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant was established to locate UST systems in operation at the facility, to ensure that all operating UST systems are free of leaks, and to establish a program for the removal of unnecessary UST systems and upgrade of UST systems that continue to be needed. The program implements an integrated approach to the management of UST systems, with each system evaluated against the same requirements and regulations. A common approach is employed, in accordance with Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regulations and guidance, when corrective action is mandated. This Management Plan outlines the compliance issues that must be addressed by the UST Management Program, reviews the current UST inventory and compliance approach, and presents the status and planned activities associated with each UST system. The UST Management Plan provides guidance for implementing TDEC regulations and guidelines for petroleum UST systems. (There are no underground radioactive waste UST systems located at Y-12.) The plan is divided into four major sections: (1) regulatory requirements, (2) implementation requirements, (3) Y-12 Plant UST Program inventory sites, and (4) UST waste management practices. These sections describe in detail the applicable regulatory drivers, the UST sites addressed under the Management Program, and the procedures and guidance used for compliance with applicable regulations.

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclearweapons and reducing the salience of nuclearweapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclearweapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world less safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclearweapons, reduce the salience of nuclearweapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclearweapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.

The vertical sea-level muon spectrum at energies above 1 GeV and the underground/underwater muon intensities at depths up to 18 km w.e. are calculated. The results are particularly collated with a great body of the ground-level, underground, and underwater muon data. In the hadron-cascade calculations, the growth with energy of inelastic cross sections and pion, kaon, and nucleon generation in pion-nucleus collisions are taken into account. For evaluating the prompt muon contribution to the muon flux, we apply two phenomenological approaches to the charm production problem: the recombination quark-parton model and the quark-gluon string model. To solve the muon transport equation at large depths of homogeneous medium, a semi-analytical method is used. The simple fitting formulas describing our numerical results are given. Our analysis shows that, at depths up to 6-7 km w. e., essentially all underground data on the muon intensity correlate with each other and with predicted depth-intensity relation for conventional muons to within 10%. However, the high-energy sea-level data as well as the data at large depths are contradictory and cannot be quantitatively decribed by a single nuclear-cascade model.

Construction of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL's) Underground Research Laboratory (URL) began in 1982. The URL was designed to address the needs of the Canadian nuclear fuel waste management program. Over the years, a comprehensive program of geologic characterization and underground hydrogeologic, geotechnical and geomechanical projects have been performed, many of which are ongoing. The scientific work at the URL has evolved through a number of different phases to meet the changing needs of Canada's waste management program. The various phases of the URL have included siting, site evaluation, construction and operation. Collaboration with international organizations is encouraged at the URL, with the facility being a centre of excellence in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) network of underground facilities. One of AECL's major achievements of the past 20 year program has been the preparation and public defense of a ten-volume Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a conceptual deep geologic repository. Completion of this dissertation on the characterization, construction and performance modeling of a conceptual repository in the granite rock of the Canadian Shield was largely based on work conducted at the URL. Work conducted over the seven years since public defense of the EIS has been directed towards developing those engineering and performance assessment tools that would be required for implementation of a deep geologic repository. The URL continues to be a very active facility with ongoing experiments and demonstrations performed for a variety of Canadian and international radioactive waste management organizations.