Mariusz wrote:Sounds like the return to debated "object" issue: what one should identify, the actual object or lack of inherent existence of this object, to realize Sunyata?

Well personal experiences and intuition point in the direction of the latter. So it seems to me.

But I'd rather not choose. When the object and the emptiness of the object are seen as one and the same, maybe that is the goal.

But to identify lack of inherent existence of the unique object in front of one's own eyes is not easy. Look for example on interdependent connection between ordinary things on earth and the sun, galaxies... since beginningless time. Everything has influence. So, if it is the goal, good luck

For example ordinary atoms of the iron inside your body were made by the explosions of supernovas milliards years ego only. That is interdependent link when you lookin for example how is your hand, one among million other equally important links. So are you able to identify them? when you precious human time so short (for the goal) to be free from dukkha

to identify the unique object is also not the target of course. Becuase of this very identification, for example a hand, you suffer (dukkha), when you take your hand for example in fire and burned

Mariusz wrote:Sounds like the return to debated "object" issue: what one should identify, the actual object or lack of inherent existence of this object, to realize Sunyata?

yes but almost always the attackers dont really have a clue what inherent existence means.

even in your reply to catmoon you think dependent arising means production in dependence upon causes and conditions. the dalai lama however says:

"..it is only through our own process of labeling or designation that things are said to exist... . Except for the Prasangika school, all the other Buddhist schools of thought identify the existence of phenomena within the basis of designation; therefore, they maintain that there is some kind of objective existence . . . . Since the other schools of Buddhist thought all accept that things exist inherently, they assert some kind of objective existence, maintaining that things exist in their own right and from their own side. This is because they identify phenomena within the basis of designation. For the Prasangikas, if anything exists objectively and is identified within the basis of designation, then that is, in fact, equivalent to saying that it exists autonomously, that it has an independent nature and exists in its own right."

however, unless one has a solid foundation in earlier tenets (vaibhashika and mainly sautrantika) we will have a tough time understanding what HHDL is saying and may easily fall into nihilism. thats why the dalai lama qualifies what he said with:

"According to the explanation of Madhyamaka-Prasangika, external phenomena are not mere projections or creations of the mind. External phenomena have a distinct nature, which is different from the mind. The meaning of all phenomena being mere labels or designations is that they exist and acquire their identities by means of our denomination or designation of them. This does not mean that there is no phenomenon apart from the name, imputation, or label, but rather that if we analyze and search objectively for the essence of any phenomenon, it will be un-findable. Phenomena are unable to withstand such analysis; therefore, they do not exist objectively. Yet, since they exist, there should be some level of existence; therefore, it is only through our own process of labeling or designation that things are said to exist..."

5heaps wrote:yes but almost always the attackers dont really have a clue what inherent existence means.

even in your reply to catmoon you think dependent arising means production in dependence upon causes and conditions. the dalai lama however says:

"..it is only through our own process of labeling or designation that things are said to exist... . Except for the Prasangika school, all the other Buddhist schools of thought identify the existence of phenomena within the basis of designation; therefore, they maintain that there is some kind of objective existence . . . . Since the other schools of Buddhist thought all accept that things exist inherently, they assert some kind of objective existence, maintaining that things exist in their own right and from their own side. This is because they identify phenomena within the basis of designation. For the Prasangikas, if anything exists objectively and is identified within the basis of designation, then that is, in fact, equivalent to saying that it exists autonomously, that it has an independent nature and exists in its own right."

I choose only what I'm able to understand. So lets investigate what this quote says. Maybe the quotes are out of context. For me it says: only Prasangika does not assert some kind of objective existence.

-I agree. But for non-Tsongkhapa Svatantrika does it only from the perspective of others for the analysis of the debate with them to fully lead them to the freedom from all reference points, beyond whole the seeming, including functional seeming. Prasangika lead them also. Both are useful and mutually suportive styles of genuine Madhyamaka.

5heaps wrote:however, unless one has a solid foundation in earlier tenets (vaibhashika and mainly sautrantika) we will have a tough time understanding what HHDL is saying and may easily fall into nihilism. thats why the dalai lama qualifies what he said with:

"According to the explanation of Madhyamaka-Prasangika, external phenomena are not mere projections or creations of the mind. External phenomena have a distinct nature, which is different from the mind. The meaning of all phenomena being mere labels or designations is that they exist and acquire their identities by means of our denomination or designation of them. This does not mean that there is no phenomenon apart from the name, imputation, or label, but rather that if we analyze and search objectively for the essence of any phenomenon, it will be un-findable. Phenomena are unable to withstand such analysis; therefore, they do not exist objectively. Yet, since they exist, there should be some level of existence; therefore, it is only through our own process of labeling or designation that things are said to exist..."

Vaibhashika and sautrantika are useful of course as gradual tools. Phenomena are un-findable, do not exist objectively. Yet, since they exist - is it means: Phenomena exist subjectively? There should be some level of subjective existence?

Hmmm, where is this existence? Prasangika asserts it? I don't follow. Is it what I wrote as "hornlike" Prasangika? Could qoute HH more?

5heaps wrote:even in your reply to catmoon you think dependent arising means production in dependence upon causes and conditions.

Yes I do. For if things did not arise in dependence on causes and conditions, they would then have to be existing entirely on their own, which would be the same as inherent existence.

As for the rest of your post... I have not worked out the implications yet, but I suspect that the translation was done by someone who does not differentiate between objects, appearances and phenomena, and hence uses those terms indiscriminately and interchangeably, resulting in enormous confusion and self contradiction. But that's just a suspicion and I'm still working on it.

I do not believe the existence of objective objects implies inherency. I think objective things like a cup can exist apart from my mind, impermanently and dependent on causes and conditions. The appearance is what is mind-dependent. However, that just my current position, it's as far as I have gone so far, and I do not maintain there is nothing more to know!

catmoon wrote: I think objective things like a cup can exist apart from my mind, impermanently and dependent on causes and conditions. The appearance is what is mind-dependent. However, that just my current position, it's as far as I have gone so far, and I do not maintain there is nothing more to know!

So, you are Sautrantika I remember it from school or somewhere from "western" books: "Did the table existed if no one was aware of it?" Funny question, because nobody can answer it.

Mariusz wrote:So, you are Sautrantika I remember it from school or somewhere from "western" books: "Did the table existed if no one was aware of it?" Funny question, because nobody can answer it.

Well I suppose the shoe might fit. I don't know what else is part of the Sautantrika package so I really couldn't say if it fits or not. But I keep thinking. And I'd far rather be a well established Sautantrika than completely in the dark!

For instance, today I came up with a list of ten unproven assumptions that underlie the classic argument about searching for a self that is not found. Sigh, it's just how my mind works I guess.

catmoon wrote: I don't know what else is part of the Sautantrika package so I really couldn't say if it fits or not. But I keep thinking. And I'd far rather be a well established Sautantrika than completely in the dark!

Kogtrul the Great "Treasury" says for example:• Sautrāntikas believe that External referents (phyi don) are considered to be hidden. Because[external referents objects] are past [when a consciousness arises], theyare not what a consciousness sees. Thus, [Sautrāntikas posit] what iscalled “an image,” which is an appearance of consciousness that hasbeen cast by the referent. Although the referent has ceased, the imagethat is consciousness set by that [referent] is experienced as the likenessof the referent. This is designated as the experience [of the referent]. Aconsciousness apprehending an object perceives by means of an image[acting] as an intermediary (bar du chod pa).• Sautrāntikas state that percepts and their perceivers, as causes andresults, arise sequentially, not simultaneously. • Among the five bases (which are knowable objects), forms, mind, andeither two or three of the mental events—feelings, discriminations, and,[in some cases,] intentions—exist substantially. Everything else isasserted to be imputedly existent entities—meaning that they are designated[as entities simply] in relation to [having some] aspects [of entities]—or to be imputedly existent nonentities (dngos med).• They maintain that [the phenomena of] the three times are not substantiallyestablished, that they are mentally imputed entities.• As for forms, like [the Vaibhāṣhikas] above, they say that there are twotypes: minute particles, which are building blocks; and gross phenomena,which are constructed with those. Sautrāntikas, however, say thatminute particles circle [each other] and do not join, but they also haveno interstices between them. Hence, they are perceived as touching, like[the pages of] a bound book...

For me Tsongkhapa seems to very like Sautrāntikas because the seeming here is also untouch, also even when enlightenment, so this topic is often on the top.

Well isn't that interesting. A lot of it seems quite reasonable to me, though the atomic theory needs a little updating. And of course you never quite know when the philosopher types are using a word in a special, modified sense.

Mariusz wrote:For me Tsongkhapa seems to very like Sautrāntikas because the seeming here is also untouch, also even when enlightenment, so this topic is often on the top.

not quite, like i said Tsongkhapas system differs way before getting to emptiness.

Non-Gelug: [...] Therefore, although commonsense objects exist, they are merely metaphysical entities, not objectively real. They can be validly known only by the conceptual cognition that mentally constructs and imputes them on the individual items of which they are a mental synthesis.

for a gelug though, commonsense objects exist objectively. thus although in the next moment when the mind cognizes the object that instance of the object is in the past, the object is still cognized directly and therefore cannot be considered a hidden object.

the reason it can be said to have been cognized directly is because the real object casted its aspect to the mind, and that aspect is held in the mind in the following moment even though that instance of the object no longer exists in the present.

In general, the Buddhist teachings on valid cognition as systematized by Dignagaand Dharmakırti assert two types of valid cognition: perceptual valid cognitionand inferential valid cognition. They only serve as illusory remedies for illusory delusionsand in fact are not any different in nature from the delusions that they helpto overcome.

As Atısa’s Entrance into the Two Realities clearly says:

Perceptual and inferential cognition—These two are accepted by Buddhists.Only narrow-minded fools sayThat emptiness is realized by these two.

and

Perceptual and inferential cognition are useless.It is just for the sake of refuting non-Buddhist opponentsThat the learned ones have promoted them.The learned master Bhavya saidThat the scriptures are clear about[The ultimate] being realized neither throughConceptual nor nonconceptual consciousnesses.

Most Tibetan schools seem to distinguishbetween the first and third streams of Yogacara, that is, the systems ofMaitreya/Asanga (stream 1) and Dign›ga and Dharmakırti (stream 3). Particularly in the Gelugpa school, often streams 1 and 2 arecategorically referred to as Mere Mentalism or Mind Only. Stream 3 is regardedas the basis for both of the Gelugpa doxographical categories of “the Sutra FollowersFollowing Reasoning” and “the Mere Mentalists Following Reasoning.”Tsongkhapa’s version of Centrism attempts to incorporate this systeminto Candrakırti’s Consequentialism.

So Dharmakirti mainly according to Tsongkhapa (and his followers), if is a sautrantika, is so in order to Gelug Prasangika where the (functional dependent arisen) seeming is also untouch and the lack of inherent existence is really perceived until enlightenment. Without perceiving how precisely "they" are dependent arisen one can not accomplish the accumulation of merit to gain Rupakaya, and without perceiving the lack of inherent existence of "them" one can not accomplish the accumulation of wisdom to gain Dharmakaya.

Yogacara Dharmakirti is an another story. Very complicated indeed and need deep studies.

Mariusz wrote:As Atısa’s Entrance into the Two Realities clearly says:

Perceptual and inferential cognition—These two are accepted by Buddhists.Only narrow-minded fools sayThat emptiness is realized by these two.

and

Perceptual and inferential cognition are useless.It is just for the sake of refuting non-Buddhist opponentsThat the learned ones have promoted them.The learned master Bhavya saidThat the scriptures are clear about[The ultimate] being realized neither throughConceptual nor nonconceptual consciousnesses.

i dont think this is problematic because yogic direct cognizers work very differently than the mental consciousness, conceptual consciousness and sense consciousnesses. therefore i dont think yogic direct perceivers would fall under Atisha's usage of "Perceptual".

5heaps wrote:i dont think this is problematic because yogic direct cognizers work very differently than the mental consciousness, conceptual consciousness and sense consciousnesses. therefore i dont think yogic direct perceivers would fall under Atisha's usage of "Perceptual".

Yogic direct perceiving is the seeming only, the mere conventionality.

When we awaken from a dream [we see thatdream objects and waking objects] do not differ in theirperformance of functions.

Kongtrul the Great "Treasury": As is said, horses and elephants in dreams or illusions and actual horsesand elephants, as well as cows in drawings and actual cows, are equivalentin the way that they perform functions from a mistaken perspective.They are also equivalent in not performing [functions] from a rationalperspective. In terms of the things of worldly conventionality and yogicconventionality, [things are said] to be mistaken or correct; however, thatis not [Chandrakīrti’s] system.[739] His system asserts that there is nothingcorrect or mistaken in terms of yogic conventionality and, therefore, [yogicconventionality] is mere [conventionality].[740]

References:[739]: Yogic conventionality (rnal ’byor kun rdzob) is what isexperienced by Buddhist yogic practitioners, beginning with their initial stage ofslight analysis and conceptual understanding of emptiness, through the appearancesand realizations they experience as noble beings. These divisions of conventionalreality are discussed in Book Seven, Part Two "Treasury"[740]: Chandrakīrti differentiates between conventional reality (saṃvṛitisatya, kun rdzobbden pa) and mere conventionality (saṃvṛitimātra, kun rdzob tsam) in his auto-commentaryto Entrance to the Middle Way, Chapter 6, verse 28.

Moreover, it is explained more by "The Center of the Sunlit Sky" p.186:In terms of the path, ultimate reality or emptiness has to be realized in twostages: first conceptually and finally within nondual and nonconceptual meditativeequipoise. Thus, first one cultivates the particular conceptual consciousnessthat is based on Centrist reasoning and results from inferential reflection. Thisis called an “inferential valid cognition.”... Generally speaking,this is the cultivation of inferential valid cognition as the initial direct remedy forthe clinging to real existence. It is a series of conceptual cognitions that progressfrom eliminating more coarse superimpositions to negating very subtle ones.Finally, the nonimplicative negation of “nothing whatsoever” or “emptiness”—that is, no reference point at all

For me, where there is the division there is not buddhahood but only the seeming. No matter if you are using yogic or non-yogic "tools".Atisia:[The ultimate] being realized neither throughConceptual nor nonconceptual consciousnesses.

yogic conventionality doesnt have anything to do with yogic direct perception. yogic direct perception is on the level of vipashyana, and vipashyana has to do with emptiness beyond conceptuality.

Is your yogic direct perception not a direct perception?

remember that its a different system so cognition works a little differently, direct perception means something a little different, the definition of pramana is slightly different, etc.

in one sense we have never had a direct perception since everything we know is established through the power of thought and ignorance. in another sense we have "direct" perceptions, namely when objects are apprehended without the use of reasoning. this is an important point because logical signs therefore count as "direct" perceptions, since they are not lines of reasoning but can be incontrovertible and discerning mental images which realize their objects accurately and without delay, if they themselves are accurate enough.

yogic conventionalities are seen using the mental consciousness not with yogic direct perceivers. the clairvoyances for example are done with the mental consciousness (there is some debate about it), whereas yogic direct perception is used for ultimate truth. but, just like vipashyana, its not just for ultimate truth, it can also be for the 4 arya truths, dependent arising, etc.

although this may all seems technical it becomes easy once we understand basic pramana, since all this stuff is just extrapolation and refinement of the basics -- figuring out what is wrong with the basics.

remember that its a different system so cognition works a little differently, direct perception means something a little different, the definition of pramana is slightly different, etc.

in one sense we have never had a direct perception since everything we know is established through the power of thought and ignorance. in another sense we have "direct" perceptions, namely when objects are apprehended without the use of reasoning. this is an important point because logical signs therefore count as "direct" perceptions, since they are not lines of reasoning but can be incontrovertible and discerning mental images which realize their objects accurately and without delay, if they themselves are accurate enough.

yogic conventionalities are seen using the mental consciousness not with yogic direct perceivers. the clairvoyances for example are done with the mental consciousness (there is some debate about it), whereas yogic direct perception is used for ultimate truth. but, just like vipashyana, its not just for ultimate truth, it can also be for the 4 arya truths, dependent arising, etc.

although this may all seems technical it becomes easy once we understand basic pramana, since all this stuff is just extrapolation and refinement of the basics -- figuring out what is wrong with the basics.

What should I say. This is perhaps according to this above incorporation of Dignaga and Dharmakırti with Gelug Prasangika where yogic direct "perception" somehow is using the ultimate For me it is mystery or paradox because I'm not able to understand (my fault maybe, sorry ) For me yogic direct "perception" is useful until all perception collapse because of mental nonengagement. Let's come back to original Yogacara. Asanga "Maitreya’s Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being. with The Commentary by Mipham Jamyang Namgyal (1846-1912), transl. Jim Scott under the guidance of Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche ":

And one effect relates to appearances’ absence,Where duality, assumption and formulation,Faculties, objects, principles of awareness,And vessel-like worlds’ appearances are absent;So these correspond to there being no observation,No description, no ground and no appearances,No principles of awareness, and no place,Which is how the sutras express the traitsDefining original nonconceptual wisdom;

Mipham comments:And one effect relates to an attainment of nonconceptual wisdom whereappearances are completely absent, that is to say, where the following have inall aspects and in every way subsided:• What appears to the nonconceptual sensory faculty as a duality of perceivedand perceiver• The process of formulation conducted by the rational mind, which isconceptual and first makes the assumption that whatever appears to bea duality actually exists that way and then formulates it by assigning aspecific term; this is a process which is internal and equivalent to therational mind’s conceptualization of percept and perceiver• The inner faculties, that of the eye and so on• Outer objects, form and so on• The principles of awareness, the eye consciousness, and so on• Vessel-like worlds’ appearances experienced in common.Since these are all absent, suchness free of all these types of differentiationappears in its one taste. This is what is referred to as “the subsiding of dualisticappearance into emptiness.”...Hence, wisdom devoid of appearances is one which transcends the parametersdefining appearance as described above and is itself the clear light, allpervasiveas space. This is called “nonconceptual original wisdom free ofappearance.” It is essentially beyond consciousness and is thus not restrictedto any domain whatsoever, whether that of the composite, the non-compositeor any other. Since this means original wisdom itself does not fallinto the category of appearances, it is not something distinct from purebeing but is its intrinsic luminous clarity....Because it rests in suchness, the abiding nature free of overestimation and denial wherein thetwo truths are inseparable, it eliminates all wrong views, which fixate ontheoretical conclusions.

of course you can say this, you have rangrig which is there and sees nonengagement, and alaya.

if a system asserts neither you can imagine how this might effect the meaning of cognition. for example, valid cognitions dont need to be fresh (new), nor do such things as 'subsequent cognitions' exist, since all cognitions are fresh and newly realize their objects.

there is a bunch of exceptional material on berzinarchives about each tibetan system's version of nonconceptual cognition of voidness (eg. search for nonconceptual voidness meditation) in both sutra and tantra. its pretty amazing

Since these are all absent, suchness free of all these types of differentiationappears in its one taste. This is what is referred to as “the subsiding of dualisticappearance into emptiness.”...

everyone agrees that on the path of seeing all appearances beside emptiness cease. whats argued is what this means, how it happens, etc, and most importantly whether any one particular understanding of emptiness is the full understanding of emptiness or a partial understanding (of which various degrees are possible).

Mariusz wrote:]Since these are all absent, suchness free of all these types of differentiationappears in its one taste. This is what is referred to as “the subsiding of dualisticappearance into emptiness.”...

everyone agrees that on the path of seeing all appearances beside emptiness cease. whats argued is what this means, how it happens, etc, and most importantly whether any one particular understanding of emptiness is the full understanding of emptiness or a partial understanding (of which various degrees are possible).

No, I don't agree that on the path of seeing you don't experience anything except emptiness if that is what you mean. Emptiness and appearances are not mutually excluding experiences this firmly established in the heart sutra for example.

/magnus

We are all here to help each other go through this, whatever it is.~Kurt Vonnegut

"To reject practice by saying, 'it is conceptual!' is the path of fools. A tendency of the inexperienced and something to be avoided."- Longchenpa

"Even though you have recognized your essence, if you do not get accustomed to it,You will be carried away by the enemy of thoughts, like a small child in a battle field.So long as you are not free from the limitations of accepting and rejecting,That long will you not recognize the view of the innermost secret heart-essence."