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entitled 'Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives' which was released on October 20, 2005.
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2005:
Reserve Forces:
Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and
Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives:
GAO-06-111:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-111, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recent military operations have required that the Army rely extensively
on Army National Guard forces, which currently comprise over 30 percent
of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy deployments of Army National Guard
forces and their equipment, much of which has been left overseas for
follow-on forces, have raised questions about whether the Army National
Guard has the types and quantities of equipment it will need to
continue supporting ongoing operations and future missions.
GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard
has the equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army
can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO also
assessed the Army’s plans, cost estimates, and funding strategy for
equipping Guard units under its modular and rotational force
initiatives.
What GAO Found:
While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting
the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the
equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and threatens the
Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and
overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment
shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time
levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources
prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an
unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles.
To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National
Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its
nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the
Guard’s inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as
night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment
requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has
been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need
until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard
to transfer needed equipment quickly.
To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing
operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave
behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account
for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan
to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to
track equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement
plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates
that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than
$1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and
implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army
Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges
in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will
not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for
addressing the Guard’s equipping needs.
Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new
designs within the Army’s modular force by 2008, they are not expected
to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not
developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment
requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing
operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost
about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, but this
estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to
provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short
term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for
equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for
modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the Guard’s
equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD
and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability
and effectiveness of the Army’s plans.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop and submit to Congress plans and funding
strategies to address the Army National Guard’s equipment shortfalls,
accurately track and replace equipment its forces left overseas, and
complete planning to integrate the Army National Guard into its modular
and rotational force initiatives. DOD agreed with the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-111.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, 202-
512-4402, stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment
Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units:
Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National
Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to
Prepare and Train Units:
Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will
Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among
Nondeployed Army National Guard Units:
Figures:
Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under
Federal Command and Control:
Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting
Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 4, 2005:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the
subsequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National
Guard has been called upon to play a significant role in supporting
active Army forces overseas while, at the same time, taking on new
homeland defense missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure-
-all of which require that the Army National Guard have sufficient
quantities and types of equipment items. In addition, the Army National
Guard must use its allotted equipment to perform other domestic
responsibilities, including responding to natural emergencies or
incidents of civil unrest. Historically, the Army National Guard has
been structured as a follow-on force that supports the active Army in
overseas conflicts, and as such, Guard units have not been resourced
with all of the equipment and personnel they require for their
missions. Instead, it was assumed that there would be sufficient time
for units to obtain the remainder of their resources prior to
deployment. However, Army National Guard members now comprise 31
percent of the ground forces in Iraq. While Army officials anticipate
Guard involvement to decline somewhat in 2006, the tempo of operations
over the long term remains uncertain. The post-September 11 increase in
the Army National Guard's responsibilities, particularly its increased
involvement in overseas operations, raises concerns about whether the
Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to continue to support
operations in the future.
The Army recognizes that it needs to transform its forces, including
the National Guard, to better meet the emerging threats of the 21st
century and is undertaking two initiatives designed to enhance the
capability of active and reserve forces. One of the Army's key
initiatives--called the modular force initiative--is a multibillion
dollar effort to restructure the entire Army. It involves increasing
the flexibility and responsiveness of the force by converting from a
division-based structure to smaller brigade combat teams and increasing
the pool of units available for deployment. In addition, the Army is in
the process of developing a rotational force model in which active and
reserve forces would progress through a cycle of increasing readiness,
culminating in the availability of a specified number of units for
deployment if needed. The Army also hopes the model will increase
deployment predictability for Army National Guard soldiers, who have
been heavily involved in recent operations and must balance their
military duties with civilian careers.
The challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in managing its
reserve forces and allocating its resources across services and
programs are some of the many issues that we have highlighted to
Congress as the nation entered the 21st century.[Footnote 1] We have
previously reported on how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve
have been used in recent operations.[Footnote 2] In 2004, we reported
on the effect of the continuing high use of National Guard forces and
challenges to prepare the Guard for future overseas and domestic
missions.[Footnote 3] In addition, we recently testified on the Army's
plans to convert to a modular force.[Footnote 4] And, in August 2003
and September 2004, we reported on several reserve mobilization issues,
including the limited use of the individual ready reserve and long-term
availability issues.[Footnote 5]
In response to your request that we examine Army National Guard
equipment issues, the objectives of this report are to assess the
extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the types and
quantities of equipment needed to support the Global War on Terrorism
and (2) the Army can account for Army National Guard equipment that has
been transferred to the active component in theater and its plans for
replacing this equipment. We also examined the Army's plans for
converting the Army National Guard to a modular force and implementing
a rotational force model to determine how Army National Guard units
will be equipped for future missions and the estimated costs of the
conversion.
To address these objectives, we analyzed data on the types and
quantities of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in
support of the Global War on Terrorism and the equipment status of
nondeployed units; the extent to which Army National Guard equipment
has been retained overseas in the theater of operations; and the Army's
plans to create a modular force and its new rotational force model. We
interviewed officials in the DOD, the Department of the Army, and the
National Guard Bureau to obtain information on how equipment needs have
evolved, the extent to which equipment has been transferred to the
active component and the Army's plans for replacing it, and the Army's
plans to include the Army National Guard in the modular force
initiative and the rotational force model. We supplemented this
information with visits to Army commands and conducted a case study of
unit equipment experiences by visiting two units, the 30th Brigade
Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in February 2004, and the
48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which deployed in May 2005. We
selected these units because they allowed us to evaluate how the
process used to prepare units has changed with subsequent rotations to
Operation Iraqi Freedom. We conducted our review in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards between December 2004
and August 2005 and determined that the data used were sufficiently
reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our
review are described in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While Army National Guard units have deployed overseas with most of the
equipment they have needed to support current operations, the Guard is
experiencing growing equipment shortages which are decreasing the
ability of its nondeployed forces to be ready for future operations at
home and overseas. Equipment shortages have developed for two primary
reasons. First, the Army National Guard has been equipped at less than
war-time readiness levels under the assumption that there would be
sufficient time for its forces to obtain additional equipment prior to
deployment; in peacetime, units generally had only about 65 to 75
percent of the equipment they needed for their wartime missions. For
recent operations, theater commanders have generally required Army
National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment
that is needed for their missions and, in some cases, to obtain
different equipment, such as more modern communications systems, than
Army National Guard units are authorized in peacetime. Thus, to fully
equip its deploying units, as of July 2005 the Army National Guard had
transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeployed
units to prepare deploying units; an increase of 189 percent from the
35,000 equipment items that were transferred as of June 2004.[Footnote
6] Providing this equipment has depleted its inventories of more than
220 critical items and reduced inventories of other mission-essential
items[Footnote 7] to only 61 percent of requirements by May 2005.
Second, demand for some types of equipment, such as armored humvees and
night vision equipment, has increased across the Army, and equipment
requirements continue to evolve. This has made it very difficult for
the Army to communicate to deploying units what equipment is needed in
theater and further challenges the Army National Guard to identify and
transfer the right equipment. The continuing strategy of transferring
equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of nondeployed forces
to train for future missions. The Army has developed processes to
ensure that deploying active and reserve forces are provided the
equipment they need for their deployments through transferring
equipment between units and concentrating high-demand equipment in
theater. However, growing equipment shortages resulting from these
processes among the Army National Guard nondeployed force make it
unclear whether the Guard will be able to maintain acceptable levels of
equipment readiness for missions overseas or at home.
Compounding the problem of equipment transfers within the Guard, Army
National Guard units that have returned from overseas deployments have
left behind many equipment items for use by follow-on forces by
transferring equipment to active Army units. However, the Army does not
have a complete accounting of these items or a plan to replace the
equipment, as DOD policy requires. DOD Directive 1225.6, which
implements this policy, requires the services to develop a replacement
plan for equipment transferred from the reserve component to the active
component for more than 90 days. The Army National Guard estimates that
since 2003, it has transferred more than 64,000 pieces of equipment,
valued at more than $1.2 billion, to the Army to support Operation
Iraqi Freedom. However, the Army is only centrally tracking the portion
of the Guard's equipment that it expects will remain in the theater for
the duration of current operations such as those items purchased
specifically for units deploying to the theater or certain high-demand
items in short supply. Items that units transfer to other units may
also remain in theater for up to 3 years, but the Army does not have a
complete accounting of these items because they are not tracked
centrally. The Army expects that the items transferred from unit to
unit will eventually be returned to the Guard, although the Guard does
not know whether or when the items will be returned. Army officials
told us they did not track and develop plans to replace Guard equipment
because there were many other priorities in the early phases of the
war, and the strategy of having units leave some equipment was expected
to be a short-term measure. Yet, as operations continue, the amount of
Guard equipment overseas has increased and, without a centralized
process to account for all items that have been retained in theater, it
is not clear how the Army will be able to develop the replacement plans
required by the DOD directive. In May 2005, DOD expressed its concerns
about the magnitude of equipment Guard units have left overseas and
directed the Army to submit replacement plans for Guard equipment.
Until these plans are completed and replacement equipment provided,
Army National Guard units will face continuing equipment shortages
while challenged to train and prepare for future missions.
Although Army National Guard units are converting to new designs within
the Army's modular force by 2008 and entering the Army's new rotational
cycle, some units are not expected to be equipped for the new designs
until 2011. Further, the Army has not developed detailed equipping
plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements for each phase of
the rotational cycle. One of the Army's chief goals of its modular
force initiative is to create standardized unit designs in the active
and reserve forces with similar structures and equipment that are as
effective as current brigades. Under this initiative, the Army National
Guard's new units will need different types and quantities of equipment
for wartime missions and training. However, the Army is modifying the
preferred designs to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to
have based on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard
units will continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern
equipment to fill gaps until at least 2011, and not be comparably
equipped with their active duty counterparts. Our analysis of other DOD
initiatives has shown that detailed plans which outline the major
implementation tasks and identify realistic funding requirements are
needed to facilitate success and avoid unintended consequences, such as
differing assumptions among key leaders in DOD and Congress about
priorities or program performance. The Army has not completed detailed
plans or cost estimates for these initiatives because it is moving
quickly to implement them to better support continuing operations.
Until the Army fully identifies the requirements and associated costs
of these two initiatives and makes key implementation decisions, DOD
and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their
affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will face
uncertainty as it prepares to implement the restructuring efforts.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding
strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard
and a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard
into its rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD
agreed with our recommendations and cited actions the Army is taking to
posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by building a
rotational force and developing a resource priority plan for all Army
units. DOD stated that the details raised in our recommendations need
to be addressed in the Army's strategy for equipping Army National
Guard units to prepare for future state emergency response, homeland
defense, and federal missions. DOD also stated that the Army is taking
steps to implement stricter accountability over Guard equipment
currently left in theater and is working to develop replacement plans
for these items.
Background:
The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard
of the United States are two components of the armed forces Selected
Reserve.[Footnote 8] The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity
responsible for the administration of both the Army National Guard and
the Air National Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized
350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half of the Army's ground
combat forces and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military
police, transportation units). Army National Guard units are located at
more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S.
territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are employed
on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 2
weeks per year. However, after September 11, 2001, the President
authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years. As of July
2005, more than 70,000 Army National Guard personnel were activated
under this authority to support ongoing operations. The Guard also
employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in
administrative, training, and maintenance tasks.
Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under
three general statutory frameworks: Title 10 or 32 of the United States
Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title
10 status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under
federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by
being ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or under appropriate
circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32
status are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the
status in which National Guard personnel typically perform training for
their federal mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-
funded and under state command and control. Under state law, the
governor may order National Guard personnel to perform state active
duty to respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, and for other
reasons authorized by state law.
While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions,
the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions,
and these take priority over state missions. The Global War on
Terrorism, a federal mission, is a comprehensive effort to defeat
terrorism and protect and defend the homeland and includes military
operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. As we reported in our November 2004 report on
the National Guard, the Army National Guard's involvement in federal
operations has increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist
attacks, and Army National Guard members have participated in overseas
warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and homeland missions, such as guarding Air Force
bases. Figure 1 shows that while the number of activated Army National
Guard personnel has declined since its peak in December 2004 and
January 2005, it continues to provide a substantial number of personnel
to support current operations. As of July 2005, about 35,500 of the
113,000 soldiers, or nearly one-third of the soldiers serving in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, were Army National Guard members. In a June
30, 2005, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee the
Army's Chief of Staff said that the Army National Guard's participation
in overseas operations is expected to decrease somewhat in the near
future. Although the Army National Guard is expected to continue its
participation in ongoing operations, decisions as to the level of
participation have not been made.
Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under
Federal Command and Control:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Department of the Army is responsible for equipping the Army
National Guard. DOD policy requires that equipment be provided to units
according to their planned wartime mission, regardless of their
component. However, based on the Army's funding priorities, the most
modern equipment is usually provided to units that would deploy first.
Later deploying units, such as most Army National Guard units, are
equipped with older items from the Army's inventory as active forces
receive newer and more modern equipment. Army National Guard units are
responsible for conducting some maintenance of their equipment.
Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment
Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units:
While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting
the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the
equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and equipment
shortages threaten the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future
deployments. Among nondeployed National Guard units, the amount of
essential warfighting equipment on hand has continued to decrease since
we last reported on the Army National Guard in 2004. Equipment
shortages have developed because most Army National Guard units are
still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to
deploy. To ready deploying units for overseas missions, the Guard has
had to transfer large numbers of equipment items from nondeployed
units--a practice that has left nondeployed units with increasing
shortages of equipment and made it difficult to prepare units for
future missions and maintain readiness for any unplanned contingencies.
Moreover, the equipment requirements for deploying Army National Guard
units have evolved as the nature of current operations has changed.
This has meant that in some cases, the Army National Guard has had
little time to identify sources of equipment and transfer needed items
to deploying units. The Army is adapting some of its processes to help
units address the evolving equipment requirements.
The Army National Guard's Initial Equipment Shortages and the
Continuing Need for Fully Equipped Forces for Current Operations Have
Resulted in Critical Equipment Shortages:
Most Army National Guard units mobilized[Footnote 9] for recent
overseas operations had equipment shortages that had to be filled so
that the unit could meet the combatant commander's equipment
requirements for their mission. These shortages exist because the Army,
following DOD planning guidance, has historically equipped all Army
units, including the Army National Guard, according to a tiered
resourcing strategy. Under tiered resourcing, those units expected to
deploy overseas early in a conflict receive first priority for
equipment, and most Army National Guard units were expected to deploy
after the active component units to serve as follow-on forces. The Army
therefore accepted some operational risks by providing lower priority
Army National Guard units with less equipment than they would need for
their mission under the assumption that there would be time to provide
additional equipment to these units before they would be deployed. For
example, Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades[Footnote 10]
are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment they
require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which
comprise the majority of the Guard's combat forces, are supplied with
about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army
National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern
equipment, so much of the Guard's equipment is older and less modern
than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more
modern items.
However, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required Army
National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment
they are expected to need and with equipment that is compatible with
active Army units. As an increasing number of Army National Guard
forces have been needed to support current operations, the Army
National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units need to
meet combatant commander requirements by transferring equipment from
within the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard first tries to
identify the needed equipment within the same state as the deploying
unit. If the equipment cannot be found within the state, the National
Guard Bureau requests the equipment from Army National Guard units
across the United States. If the equipment is not available in the Army
National Guard, the Army National Guard notifies the Army that the
equipment is not available, and the Army takes over the task of
providing the equipment to the mobilized unit.
For example, although the 30th Brigade Combat Team needed about 8,810
night vision goggles to deploy, it only had about 40 percent of its
requirement on hand when it was alerted to prepare to deploy, so the
Army National Guard had to identify and transfer about 5,272 pairs of
goggles to fully equip the unit. In another case, the Army tasked the
National Guard to convert 40 nonmilitary police units, including field
artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected
military police missions in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. While a military
police company typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field
artillery companies have only about 3 humvees that are suitable for
this new mission. Therefore, the converted units had to obtain armored
humvees from other units already in Iraq because the Army National
Guard had depleted its inventory of armored humvees.
As current operations have continued, the pool of equipment from which
the Army National Guard can draw has been reduced because so many items
have been transferred to deploying units or left overseas. Shortages of
some equipment items have forced the Army National Guard to take
measures that have further exacerbated existing shortages in
nondeployed units to provide training equipment for deploying units.
For example, because the Army National Guard's supply of armored
humvees was depleted, the Army directed the Army National Guard to
transfer more than 500 humvees from nondeployed Guard units to create
training sets for units to use when preparing for deployment.
Significant numbers of equipment transfers have persisted as operations
overseas have continued. We previously reported that as of June 2004
the Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of
equipment to ready units for recent operations.[Footnote 11] By July
2005, the number of equipment items transferred among Army National
Guard units had grown to more than 101,000. As a result of these
transfers, the equipment readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard
units has declined. As figure 2 shows, the percentage of nondeployed
units that reported having the minimum amount of equipment they would
need to deploy[Footnote 12] dropped from 87 percent in October 2002 to
59 percent in May 2005. However, this estimate includes units that have
older, less modern equipment referred to as substitute equipment. While
these substitute items are useful for training purposes, commanders may
not allow these items in the theater of operations because they may not
be compatible with the equipment other units are using and cannot be
sustained logistically in theater. In addition, this estimate includes
units that have equipment that is undergoing maintenance after
returning from deployment or was left overseas, so these items are not
readily available for deployment. The National Guard Bureau estimates
that when substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and
equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its
nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of essential
warfighting equipment as of July 2005.
Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting
Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Units must have at least 80 percent of their mission-essential
equipment to meet minimum deployment criteria. Because data were not
available for all months between October 2002 and July 2004, some chart
points in this period were estimated based on trends.
[End of figure]
With respect to some equipment items, transfers of equipment to
deploying units have depleted the inventories of many key items in
nondeployed units. Table 1 shows selected items needed for current
mobilization for which inventory levels in nondeployed Guard units have
fallen below 20 percent of authorized levels.
Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among
Nondeployed Army National Guard Units:
Equipment for handling truck containers;
Number of items authorized: 25;
Number of items on hand: 4;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 16.
Machine guns;
Number of items authorized: 1,088;
Number of items on hand: 150;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 14.
Chemical decontamination equipment;
Number of items authorized: 514;
Number of items on hand: 73;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 14.
Armament carrier humvees;
Number of items authorized: 2,240;
Number of items on hand: 220;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 10.
Truck flatbed semitrailers;
Number of items authorized: 2,287;
Number of items on hand: 180;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 8.
Lightweight rifles;
Number of items authorized: 16,839;
Number of items on hand: 788;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 5.
Individual night vision goggles;
Number of items authorized: 127,000;
Number of items on hand: 1,000;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 1.
Weapon night vision sights;
Number of items authorized: 11,400;
Number of items on hand: 0;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 0.
Up-armored scout humvees;
Number of items authorized: 3,922;
Number of items on hand: 0;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 0.
Chemical agent monitoring equipment;
Number of items authorized: 7,200;
Number of items on hand: 0;
Percentage of authorized in inventory: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2005.
[End of table]
As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment
transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than
5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items.
Among these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios.
While the Army can supply deploying forces with additional equipment
after they are mobilized, nondeployed units will be challenged to
maintain readiness for future missions because they do not have the
equipment to train with or to use for other contingencies. The effect
of equipment shortages on nondeployed units' ability to perform
homeland defense missions is not known because, as we reported in 2004,
DOD has not developed requirements or preparedness standards and
measures for the homeland missions in which the Army National Guard is
expected to participate. However, as previously reported, some of these
items such as humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective
suits are useful for the Guard's domestic missions, such as responding
to potential terrorist threats.
Evolving Equipment Requirements Challenge Efforts to Equip Units for
the Global War on Terrorism:
As current military operations have evolved, equipment requirements for
the Global War on Terrorism have continued to change. This has
challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment
requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to
their deployment dates. Equipment that was not considered essential for
some units' expected missions has become important for ongoing
operations, and units have been required to have equipment that is
newer than or different from that on which they have been trained. For
example, the 30th Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina, which
deployed in the spring of 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team from
Georgia, which deployed in 2005, were directed to deploy as motorized
brigade combat teams with humvees instead of the heavy-tracked
equipment, such as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks, with which they
had trained for their expected missions. Overall, the combatant
commander required that the 30th Brigade deploy to Operation Iraqi
Freedom with more than 35 types of items that were previously not
authorized for the unit, including different radios and weapons.
Due to changing conditions in theater and a desire to tailor a unit's
equipment as closely as possible to its expected mission, the Army has
continued to modify equipment requirements after units are alerted.
These changes have resulted in requirements not being communicated to
some Army National Guard units in a timely manner so that the units
could be equipped as efficiently as possible for current operations or
be provided ample time for training. In some instances, Army National
Guard units have not known exactly what equipment they would require to
deploy and what they could expect to receive in theater until close to
their deployment dates, which has made it more difficult for Army
National Guard officials to gather the equipment deploying units need
to fill equipment shortages. For example, the 48th Brigade Combat Team,
which was preparing for deployment in May 2005, had still not received
a complete list of all of the equipment it would need at the time of
our visit in April 2005. Because officials did not know exactly what
they would need to take with them overseas, the brigade packed and
transported 180 different vehicles to be shipped to theater. When
officials learned that this equipment was already available in theater,
these vehicles had to be shipped back to the brigade's mobilization
station at Fort Stewart, Georgia.
In some cases, delays caused by the changing equipment requirements
reduced the amount of time units had to train with their new equipment.
For example, the 30th Brigade did not have a chemical agent
identification set to train with until its final exercise before
deploying, and it did not have access to a Blue Force Tracker, a
digital communications system that allows commanders to track friendly
forces across the battlefield in real time, for training until the unit
was in theater. In some cases, the 30th Brigade did not receive some
items until they could be transferred from nondeployed units or they
were provided in theater. For example, the unit received the 4,000
ceramic body armor inserts needed to protect soldiers from small arms
fire upon arrival in Kuwait. According to Army officials, in such
instances units may undergo training upon arrival in the theater of
operations to acquaint them with new equipment. However, we did not
evaluate the adequacy of the training units received in the theater of
operations.
Army Has Adapted Its Equipping Process to Better Address Critical
Equipment Shortages and Evolving Equipment Requirements for Ongoing
Operations:
To address critical equipment shortages and the evolving equipment
requirements for current operations, the Army has adapted its equipping
process in two ways. First, rather than having units bring all their
equipment to the theater of operations and take it back to their home
stations when they return home, the Army now requires units, in both
the active and reserve components, to leave certain essential equipment
that is in short supply in theater for follow-on units to use.[Footnote
13] This is intended to reduce the amount of equipment that has to be
transported from the United States to theater, to better enable units
to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks of essential
equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this equipping
approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has continued
the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to nondeployed
forces for unplanned contingencies and for training.
Second, the Army has instituted a process, known as a predeployment
site survey, to allow large[Footnote 14] units preparing to deploy to
send a team to the mission area to determine equipment needs. The team
generates a list of equipment, known as an operational needs statement,
which the unit will need in theater but was not previously authorized
and will need to obtain before deployment. Once the Army has approved
the items, the unit can obtain them through transfers from other units
or procurement. Over the course of current operations, the Army has
improved the operational needs statement process by pre-approving
packages of equipment that are in high-demand for current operations so
that deploying units do not have to request these items separately. For
example, more than 160 items, such as interceptor body armor; Javelin,
a medium antitank weapon system; kits to add armor to humvees; and
night vision goggles, among other items, are pre-approved. For example,
in 2003, the 30th Brigade Combat Team prepared about 35 lists of
additional equipment it would need to deploy in January 2004. By the
time the 48th Brigade was preparing for deployment in 2005, changes to
the process resulted in the unit preparing only one operational needs
statement.
In addition, an existing Army program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative,
has provided individual equipment to soldiers, including those in the
Army National Guard, more quickly than the standard acquisition process
by fielding commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The Army provides 49
items such as body armor, helmets, hydration systems, goggles,
kneepads, and elbow pads through this initiative to units preparing to
deploy at their home stations and in theater.
Filling shortages in deploying units has left nondeployed forces with
worsening equipment shortages and hampers their ability to train for
future missions. Growing shortages make it unclear whether the Guard
will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for
missions overseas or at home.
Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National
Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to
Prepare and Train Units:
The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more
than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to
support continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of
this equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required
under DOD policy. As a result, the Guard is challenged in its ability
to prepare and train for future missions. The policy reflected in DOD
Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005, requires
a replacement plan for reserve component equipment transferred to the
active component for more than 90 days.[Footnote 15] According to Army
officials, the Army did not initially track the Guard's equipment or
prepare replacement plans in the early phases of the war because the
practice was intended to be a short-term measure and there were other
priorities. In addition, the Army did not have a centralized process to
develop plans to replace the equipment Army National Guard units left
overseas and transfers of equipment between units were only documented
at the unit level in unit property records.
However, as operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment
retained in theater has increased, which has further exacerbated the
shortages in nondeployed Army National Guard units. For example, when
the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its
deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of
its pre-deployment inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use.
Similarly, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois
Army National Guard units were required to leave almost all of their
humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned from deployment. As a
result, the units could not conduct training to maintain the
proficiency they acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all,
the National Guard reports that 14 military police companies left over
600 humvees and other armored trucks which are expected to remain in
theater for the duration of operations. While the Army has now
instituted processes to account for certain high-demand equipment items
that are being left in theater for the duration of the conflict and
expects replacement plans for this equipment to be developed by August
2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans will account for
all items transferred to the active component because the Army has not
been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a centralized
manner.
In June 2004, six months after the first Army National Guard units left
equipment overseas when they returned from deployment, the Army tasked
the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained in
theater. However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the
Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain high-demand
equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored humvees and
other items designated to remain in theater for the duration of the
conflict. However, Guard units have also left behind equipment that was
not designated to stay for the duration of the conflict, but which may
remain in theater for up to three years, such as cargo trucks, rough
terrain fork lifts, and palletized load trucks, which the Army Materiel
Command does not plan to track. Of the over 64,000 equipment items the
Army National Guard estimates Guard units have left behind, the
National Guard Bureau estimates that as of July 2005, the Army Material
Command was only tracking about 45 percent of those items. Given the
lack of tracking of all Guard equipment left in theater, it is not
clear how the Army will develop replacement plans for these items as
required by DOD policy.
In May 2005 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
requested that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National
Guard equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. The Assistant
Secretary noted that while the exact amount of equipment transferred
between the reserve and active components is unknown, overall the
magnitude of these transfers has been significant and was an area of
concern. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
subsequently extended the date replacement plans were due to August 15,
2005. According to Army officials, the equipment tracked by individual
units may eventually be returned to the Guard. However, Army and Army
National Guard officials said that even if it is eventually returned,
equipment condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use during
current operations and some of it will likely need to be replaced. The
National Guard estimates it will cost at least $1.2 billion to replace
the equipment it has left in Iraq, if it is not returned or is not
useable. Until the Army develops plans to replace the equipment,
including identifying timetables and funding sources, the National
Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages which reduce
readiness for future missions.
Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will
Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces:
Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs
within the Army's modular force by 2008, but they are expected to
convert with the equipment they have on hand and will lack some
equipment for these designs until at least 2011. However, the Army is
modifying the designs it tested and found to be as effective as current
brigades to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to have
based on current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard units
will continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern
equipment to fill gaps until at least 2011 and will not be comparably
equipped with their active duty counterparts. While the Army estimated
in June 2005 that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of
the Guard's units, this estimate did not include all expected costs and
the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the
estimate. Further, it has not developed detailed equipping plans that
specify the Guard's equipment requirements as it progresses through the
new rotation cycle used to provide ready forces for ongoing operations.
The Army is quickly implementing its initiatives to transform its
forces into modular units and a rotational cycle of deployment without
detailed plans and cost estimates because it views these initiatives as
critical to sustaining current operations. In the short term, units
nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment,
which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed for
modular conversions. In 2004 and 2005, the Army published and
subsequently updated the Army Campaign Plan,[Footnote 16] to establish
the broad goals, assumptions, and time frames for converting to the
modular force and implementing the rotational force model. However, the
plan does not include detailed equipping plans, cost estimates, or
resources needed for implementing the modular and rotational deployment
initiatives. Our analysis of best practices in strategic planning has
shown that detailed plans, which describe how the objectives will be
achieved and identify resources, facilitate success and avoid
unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key
leaders in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance.
Until equipping requirements for implementing the modular designs and
the rotational model are specified, costs are better defined, and
funding is identified, the Guard faces risks as it prepares to
implement the Army's restructuring while supporting the high pace of
operations at home and overseas.
Army National Guard Units Will Continue to Face Equipment Shortfalls
That May Delay Transformation to Modular Designs and Hinder
Comparability with Active Forces:
The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and
capable of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in 2004,
the Army began to reorganize its forces from a structure organized
around divisions to one based on standardized, modular brigades that
can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander.
The Army is in the process of developing and approving detailed
designs,[Footnote 17] including equipment requirements, for
active[Footnote 18] and reserve combat units, support units, and
warfighting headquarters so that the first Guard units can begin their
scheduled conversions in September 2005. Among the goals of the new
structure are to maximize the flexibility and responsiveness of the
force by standardizing designs and equipment requirements for both
active and reserve units and maintaining reserve units at a higher
level of readiness than in the past. However, under current plans,
Guard units will continue to be equipped with items that may be older
than their active counterparts and less capable than the new modular
unit designs require. The Army's initial estimate for converting Guard
units to modular designs is about $15.6 billion through 2011, but this
estimate is incomplete because it does not include the costs for
converting all units to the new structure or the full costs of
equipping them for the design the Army tested and determined was as
effective as current brigades. Moreover, the Army has not developed
plans to equip Guard units to the tested modular unit design and
instead plans to equip them for a less modern design. Without a
detailed equipping plan that identifies funding priorities over time,
the Army National Guard is likely to continue to face challenges in its
ability to train and maintain ready forces in the future.
The Army expects that the new modular brigades, which will include
about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel,[Footnote 19] will be as capable as the
current brigades of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel through the use
of enhanced military intelligence capability, introduction of key
technology enablers, such as weapons and communications systems, and by
having support capabilities contained in the brigade itself instead of
at a higher echelon of command. The Army tested the new modular brigade
designs and found that they were as effective as current brigades.
However, the Army has modified the tested designs based on the
equipment it can reasonably expect to provide to units undergoing
conversion based on its current inventory of equipment, planned
procurement pipelines, and other factors, such as expected funding. At
the time of this report, the Army had not tested the modified designs
to determine whether they are as capable as the current brigades or the
tested design. The Army plans to equip modular Guard units for the
modified design by 2011. In the meantime, modular Guard units are
expected to continue the practice of using approved substitute
equipment and will initially lack some of the key enablers, such as
communications systems, which are the basis for the improved
effectiveness of modular units.
As of June 2005, the Army had approved modified designs for the 25 Army
National Guard brigade combat teams and 25 support brigades scheduled
to convert to the modular structure between 2005 and 2007, and all
eight warfighting headquarters converting between 2005 and 2008. Under
current plans, all the Army National Guard units will be converted to
the modular organizational structure by 2008 with the exception of 3
support brigades which will be converted in 2011. The Army expects to
complete modular designs for the remaining 9 brigade combat teams and
15 support brigades by September 2005. The Army had originally planned
to convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request
of the Army National Guard, accelerated the plan so that Guard units
would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active
component at least two years earlier, avoid training soldiers for the
previous skill mix, and better facilitate recruiting and retention
efforts.
However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will
exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls. There are significant
shortfalls in the Army's ability to equip Guard units for the modified
design in the short term for three key reasons. First, according to
current plans, the units are expected to convert to their new designs
with the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing
shortages and the large number of equipment items that deployed units
left in Iraq or that need repair or replacement due to heavy use, units
will not have the equipment needed to reach even the modified design.
For example, converted Guard units expect initially to be without some
equipment items, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel
ground and airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles that
provide the basis for the improved capability of the new brigades.
Second, the Army has not planned funding to provide equipment to the
additional Guard units converting to the modular structure on the
accelerated schedule. Although most Guard units are scheduled to be
reorganized by 2008, they are expected to receive equipment for their
new designs on a slower schedule, and in some cases are not expected to
receive their equipment until 2 to 3 years after they reorganize. The
lack of detailed plans for equipping Army National Guard units makes it
difficult to determine how the Army intends to transition Guard units
from the old to the new organizational structure effectively.
Finally, the Army's cost estimates for converting Guard units to the
modular structure are incomplete and likely to grow. The Army's current
cost estimate for converting all its active and reserve units to the
modular force is $48 billion, a 71 percent increase from its initial
rough order of magnitude estimate of $28 billion made in 2004. Of the
$48 billion, the Army estimated in June 2005 that Army National Guard
modular conversions would cost about $15.6 billion. This estimate
included costs to convert all eight of the Guard's warfighting
headquarters and 33 of the Guard's 34 combat units between 2005 and
2011. It also includes procurement of some high-demand equipment such
as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, humvees, and antitank guided-
missile systems. During our work, we obtained summary information on
the types of cost and key assumptions reflected in the Army's
estimates; however, we were unable to fully evaluate the estimate
because the Army did not have detailed supporting information.
Our work highlighted several limitations to the Army's cost estimate
for Army National Guard modular force conversions. First, the estimate
was based on a less modern design than both the modified design that
the Army plans to use in the near term and the tested design it intends
to evolve to over time. The estimate assumes that Guard units will
continue to use substitute equipment items that may be older and less
capable than that of active units and does not include costs for all
the technology enablers that are expected to provide additional
capability for modular units. As a result, the estimate does not
include costs for all the equipment Guard units would require to reach
the capabilities of the tested modular brigade design. Second, the
estimate does not include costs for 10 of the Guard's support units,
nor does it include military construction costs associated with the
Guard's 40 support units. According to the Army National Guard,
military construction costs for converted support units are expected to
near the $1.4 billion in military construction costs already included
for the Guard's warfighting headquarters and combat units. Furthermore,
current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment inventories will be
at prewar levels and available for modular conversions. However, this
may not be a reasonable assumption because, as discussed previously,
Army National Guard units have left large amounts of equipment overseas
- some of which will be retained indefinitely and the Army has not
provided plans for its replacement.
Further, the Army has currently identified funding sources for only
about 25 percent ($3.9 billion) of the current estimate--$3.1 billion
programmed in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program
and $.8 billion expected from fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding.
Approval for funding the remaining $11.7 billion is pending within DOD.
However, equipping priorities and the amount designated for equipment
have not been decided.
In the long term, according to the Army, the intent is to equip all
active and reserve component units to the tested design over time.
However, it will take until at least 2011 under current plans for the
Army National Guard units to receive the equipment they will need for
the modified designs which are still less modern than the one the Army
tested and found as effective as current brigades, and the pace of
operations may further delay equipping Guard units. Moreover, the Army
does not have detailed plans or cost estimates that identify the
funding required for equipping Guard units for the tested design.
Without detailed plans for when Guard units will get the equipment they
need for the tested design, it is unclear when the Army National Guard
will achieve the enhanced capabilities the Army needs to support
ongoing operations. Further, without more complete equipment
requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will not have all
the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the Army
National Guard's transition to the modular force.
Army Plans for Equipping Army National Guard Units Under Its Rotational
Force Model Are Not Complete:
The Army's initiative to transform into a rotational force, which is
intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing
readiness for potential mobilization once every 6 years, involves a
major change in the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and
has implications for the amount and types of equipment that Army
National Guard units will need over time. Historically, Army National
Guard units have been provided only a portion of the equipment they
needed to train for their wartime missions because they were generally
expected to deploy after active units. However, current military
operations have called for the Army National Guard to supply forces to
meet a continuing demand for fully equipped units, a demand the Army
National Guard met through transfers of equipment to deploying units
and which undermined the readiness of nondeployed units. Under the
rotational force concept, the Army would provide increasing amounts of
equipment to units as they move through training phases and near
readiness for potential deployment so they would be ready to respond
quickly with fully equipped forces if needed. However, the Army has not
yet finalized equipping requirements for Army National Guard units as
they progress through the rotational cycle. In addition, it is not
clear how the equipment needed to support units in the new rotational
cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available for
modular conversions and affect the pace of the Army National Guard's
transformation. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the
new modular structure and rotational force model and a plan that
integrates requirements, the Army and Army National Guard are not in
the best position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine
whether the modular and rotational initiatives are working together to
reach the goal of improving Army National Guard readiness.
While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units
according to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational
force model, it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items
required in each phase. Under this proposal the Army National Guard
will have three types of equipment sets: a baseline set, a training
set, and a deployment set. The baseline set would vary by unit type and
assigned mission and the equipment it includes could be significantly
reduced from the amount called for in the unit design, but plans call
for it to provide at least the equipment Guard units need for domestic
missions. Training sets would include more of the equipment units will
need to be ready for deployment, but units would share the equipment
that would be located at training sites throughout the country, so the
equipment would not be readily available for units' state or homeland
missions. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for
deployment including theater specific equipment, items provided through
operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned
stock. At the time of this report, the Army was still developing the
proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and
planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005.
Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in
operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular
conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will
continue to drain the Army National Guard's equipment resources and
affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed
units to transform to their new design. At the present time, it is not
clear how the equipment requirements associated with supporting
deployment under the new rotational readiness cycle will affect the
types and quantities of equipment available to convert the Army
National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for
the rotational force and long-term requirements for a modular force are
fully defined, the Army and Army National Guard will not be in a
position to prioritize funding to achieve readiness goals in the near
and long term. Further, although Army leaders have made it a priority
to ensure that Army National Guard units have the equipment they need
to continue to perform their domestic missions, it is not possible to
assess whether units will have the equipment they need until unit
designs and training set configurations are finalized and homeland
defense equipment requirements are known.
Conclusions:
Evolving equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have
challenged the Army National Guard in equipping its units for
deployment while trying to maintain the readiness of its nondeployed
force for training and future missions. While strategies such as
transferring needed equipment from nondeploying units to ready
deploying units, completing operational needs statements, and leaving
equipment overseas when Guard units return home have helped to equip
deploying units, these strategies may not be sustainable in the long
term, especially as the Guard's equipment inventories continue to
diminish. In the meantime, as the Army National Guard's equipment
stocks are depleted, risks to its ability to perform future overseas
and domestic missions increase.
The Army's lack of accountability over the Guard's equipment stocks
retained in theater has created a situation in which deploying Guard
units face considerable uncertainty about what equipment they need to
bring overseas and what equipment they will have for training when they
return from deployment. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires a plan to replace
reserve component equipment that is transferred to the active
component, but the Army has not prepared these plans. Without a
replacement plan, the Army National Guard faces depleted stocks of some
key equipment items needed to maintain readiness and is unable to plan
for how it will equip the force for future missions.
Supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National
Guard equipment inventories, which will likely delay the pace of its
transformation to a modular force. Further, current modular plans for
the Guard's conversion will not provide for equipping Guard units to
the less modern modified design and there are no plans to equip the
Guard for the design the Army found as capable as current brigades. As
a result, Guard units will continue to face equipment shortages and
have to use older equipment than their active counterparts. If units
are not comparable, the Army National Guard will have to continue its
current practice of transferring equipment to fill the shortfalls in
deploying units, thereby undermining the readiness of nondeployed
forces. With lower readiness of Guard forces, the nation faces
increased risk to future overseas operations, unplanned contingencies,
and the homeland missions the Guard may be called upon to support.
Recommendations:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that
addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global
War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from short-
term equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan
should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies
with existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment
readiness and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from
equipment transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan
for equipping the force for future missions.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective
integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model
and modular force initiatives. This plan should include:
* the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding
strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force
and the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of
equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units,
* an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will
need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and:
* how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if
full funding is not provided on the expected timeline.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with our
recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them. DOD's
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan and
funding strategy to Congress that addresses the equipment needs of the
Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism, specifically
addressing how the Army will transition from its short-term equipping
measures to long-term equipping solutions. In its comments, DOD said
that the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be
equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense
requirements as well as federal missions and include these requirements
in its resource priorities. DOD also said that the Army is working to
implement stricter accountability over equipment currently left in
theater and to comply with DOD guidelines which require replacement
plans for these items.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan to
Congress that details the effective integration of the Army National
Guard into the Army's rotational force model and modular force
initiatives. DOD said that the Army plans to develop resourcing
alternatives to mitigate potential risks should full funding for
transformation initiatives not be realized. DOD also agreed that
readiness goals for the Army National Guard in the 6-year rotational
model need to be established and that the Army's equipping strategy for
the Army National Guard must include the resources required to be
prepared to carry out both their federal and state missions.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to
the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief,
National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed
documentation and interviewed officials from the Army National Guard,
the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, and the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We
supplemented this information with visits to the United States Army
Forces Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the
First Army of the United States. We also developed case studies of two
units: the 30th Brigade Combat Team located in North Carolina and the
48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia. These states were chosen to
provide representative examples of how Army National Guard units were
prepared for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of the
Global War on Terrorism. The 30th Brigade Combat Team was one of the
first National Guard units to deploy for Operation Iraqi Freedom and
had just returned from deployment when we visited in March 2005. The
48th Brigade Combat Team was preparing for deployment to Operation
Iraqi Freedom at the time of our visit in April 2005. In both states we
met with unit logistics staff who had visibility over how the unit
prepared for deployment.
To examine the extent to which Army National Guard units have the
equipment needed for the Global War on Terrorism, we obtained and
analyzed data on critical shortages and the types and quantities of
equipment transferred from nondeployed units to deploying units from
the National Guard Bureau and our two case study states. Additionally,
we supplemented these data with interviews, briefings, and
documentation from officials at the National Guard Bureau, the
Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the
United States. We did not examine whether shortages of particular items
were the result of industrial base issues. To understand the processes
the Army adapted to equip units as equipment requirements evolved for
the Global War on Terrorism, we interviewed officials from and analyzed
data provided by the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, the
48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, the National Guard Bureau, the
Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition
Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United States.
To assess the Army National Guard equipment retained in theater, we
analyzed Army National Guard data and the Guard's estimate of the cost
to replace the equipment if it is not returned. Additionally, we
interviewed officials and reviewed documentation and data from the Army
National Guard, Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Army Forces Command, and
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command about the lack of reliable
data and whether any plans exist to replace the Guard's equipment. We
supplemented data on how much of the Army National Guard's equipment
has been left in theater with briefings and reviewed internal Army
messages regarding the accountability and visibility of this equipment.
To evaluate how the Army National Guard has been integrated into the
Army's plans for a modular structure and force generation model, we
interviewed officials at the Army National Guard, the Department of the
Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command. We reviewed documents such as the
Army Campaign Plan, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army's force
generation model, and numerous briefings on the Army's plans for a
modular force and the new force generation model. Additionally, we
interviewed Guard officials from both of our case study states about
the units' plans to convert to modular force given Army time frames and
cost estimates.
To assess the reliability of data used during the course of this
engagement, we interviewed data sources about how they ensured the
accuracy of their data and reviewed their data collection methods,
standard operating procedures, and other internal control measures. In
addition, we reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data reliability. We
determined that the data were sufficient to answer each of our
objectives.
We conducted our review between December 2004 and August 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Agency comments were made on GAO-05-954. This report number was
subsequently changed to GAO-06-111.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800:
SEP 15 2005:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "RESERVE FORCES: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives," dated August 18, 2005 (Code 350607/GAO-05-
954).
The Army Campaign Plan includes the Army Force Generation Model that is
designed to posture the Army National Guard for prolonged operations by
building a rotational force. The Army has also developed the Army
Resource Priority List that identifies the priority for providing
resources to all units in all components of the Army. As the Army moves
forward in the implementation of these initiatives, the details raised
in your recommendations need to be addressed in order to determine the
appropriate readiness levels for Army National Guard units at each
phase of the rotational model. The equipping strategy for the Guard
must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out their
state emergency response requirements, Homeland Defense missions, and
to be trained and equipped to mobilize under Title 10, U.S.C. In
today's environment where support to our deployed forces is paramount,
it is equally important that we do not lose sight of the readiness of
our Army National Guard forces at home.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. I concur
with the recommendations as stated, and will work to resolve the issues
addressed in this report. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations
and report are enclosed. The point of contact for this office is
Captain Scott Walton, OASD/RA (M&F), at 703-693-7485.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas F. Hall:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 18, 2005:
GAO CODE 350607/GAO-05-954:
"RESERVE FORCES: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard Into Army Force Transformation
Initiatives"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a
plan and funding strategy that addresses the equipment needs of the
Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism and addresses how
the Army will transition from the short-term equipping measures to long-
term equipping solutions. This plan should address the measures the
Army will take to ensure it complies with existing DoD directives to
safeguard reserve component equipment readiness and provide a plan to
replace depleted stocks resulting from equipment transferred to the
active Army, so that the Guard can plan for equipping the force for
future missions. (page 26/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army has developed the Army Resource Priority
List that identifies the priority for providing resources to all units
in all components of the Army. The Army must now determine how Army
National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state disaster response
and potential DoD Homeland Defense requirements and include them in
their resource priority list. In today's environment where support to
our deployed forces is paramount, it is equally important that we do
not lose sight of the readiness of our Army National Guard forces to
meet their traditional state emergency response requirements here at
home.
The Army has begun to implement stricter accountability of their assets
and is in the process of identifying Army Reserve and Army National
Guard equipment currently left in theater. As the report states, this
is a significant amount of equipment. The Army is working to comply
with the guidelines in DoD Directive 1225.6 to request future transfers
of equipment from the Reserve to the Active component and provide the
Secretary of Defense replacement plans prior to this equipment
transfer.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a
plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its
rotational force model and modular force initiatives. This plan should
include:
* The specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding
strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force
and the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of
equipment and equipment levels as the active modular units;
* An analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will
need for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle; and:
* How the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if
full funding is not provided on the expected timeline. (page 26/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) includes the Army
Force Generation Model that is designed to posture the Army National
Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational force. The
budget process has many entities competing for scarce resources and for
that reason, the Army must prepare a plan to manage implementation
risks if full funding is not realized in the expected timeline to meet
the requirements of the ACP. The cyclical construct of the Army Force
Generation Model was developed to ensure the reserve component units of
the Army returning from operations outside the Continental United
States reset and reorganize into modular formations and are placed on a
ramp to combat readiness over a six-year period. As the Army moves
forward in the implementation of these initiatives, the details
addressed in recommendation 2 need to be answered in order to determine
the appropriate readiness level for Army National Guard units at each
phase of the six year rotational model. The equipping strategy for the
Guard must include the resources required to be prepared to carry out
their state emergency response requirements, Homeland Defense missions,
and to be trained and equipped to mobilize under Title 10, U.S.C.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms;
Tina Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and
Suzanne Wren also made major contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).
[2] GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington,
D.C.: July 12, 2005).
[3] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
[4] GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
16, 2005).
[5] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-
term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and
Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).
[6] GAO-05-21.
[7] Mission-essential items are those items that are critical for
accomplishing missions, including principal weapon/mission systems and
equipment and critical mission support items.
[8] The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army
National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United
States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The
Selected Reserve consists of military members assigned to organized
reserve units and reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled
drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for
training of not less than 14 days during each year.
[9] Mobilization involves assembling and organizing personnel,
supplies, and materiel for active military service. Deployment is
defined as the relocation of forces, personnel or equipment from home
station to meet operational requirements.
[10] Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers
and are the Army National Guard's highest priority combat units. These
15 brigades received specialized training and higher priority than
other National Guard units for personnel and resources during
peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to
deploy overseas within 90 days. In October 2004, the Army stopped using
the enhanced separate brigade designation and now refers to these units
as brigade combat teams.
[11] GAO-05-21.
[12] To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at
least 80 percent of its mission-essential equipment items on hand.
[13] The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key
items currently in short supply such as armored vehicles, improvised
explosive device jammers, long-range surveillance systems, and
generator sets, remain in theater for the duration of operations.
[14] Units that are smaller than a brigade complete a virtual pre-
deployment site survey by communicating with units already in theater
to determine the equipment they need to request.
[15] Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not
required for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as
result of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process
decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense.
[16] The Army updated the plan in October 2004 and June 2005.
[17] Unit designs prescribe the unit's wartime mission, capabilities,
organizational structure, and mission-essential personnel and equipment
requirements.
[18] The Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions by the end of
fiscal year 2006, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular,
standardized brigade combat teams and creating new types of command
headquarters.
[19] The Army's plan calls for three variants of the modularized
brigade combat team. The infantry variant will have about 3,300
personnel, the armored variant 3,700 personnel, and the Stryker variant
4,000 personnel.
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