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But Jesk, then why the little arrows? Why the uncoloured BIG arrow against Minsk with a "?" marked? In Gehlen analysis of 13 June, he simply don't know the far-reaching objective of Soviet attack. Compare the BIG RED arrows against Ukraine.

But Jesk, then why the little arrows? Why the uncoloured BIG arrow against Minsk with a "?" marked? In Gehlen analysis of 13 June, he simply don't know the far-reaching objective of Soviet attack. Compare the BIG RED arrows against Ukraine.

Small arrows because the Russians had no reserves for the development of success. Such forces assume a stiffening operation. Attack on a wide front. Gehlen did not know that with such forces spread out over the squares one can succeed. The Germans were mistaken only for one army. They counted 14, there is so much them. Plus 5 tank army in reserve.

The Russians did not expect such success on the flanks. The decisive importance was attached to the Mogilev operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front. The scheme of Gehlen absolutely exactly coincided with the plans of the Russians.

Preparation for the operation to defeat the Germans in Belarus began on Stalin's order in April 1944. At the same time, the General Staff began to concentrate troops and material assets on the appropriate sector of the front. The original plan "Bagration" was proposed by General Alexei Antonov. In late May, he prepared a draft operation ..

The military plan "Bagration", adopted by the Stavka, stated that the Mogilev operation was to be a decisive blow to the positions of the Wehrmacht. In this direction the German forces were somewhat less than on other sectors of the front. Nevertheless, the Soviet offensive here was very important, since it cut off the enemy's way to retreat.

In the Mogilev area, German troops had a well-trained defense system. Each small settlement, located near the main roads, was turned into a main one. Eastern approaches to Mogilev covered with several defensive contours. Hitler, in his public speeches, declared that this city must be kept at all costs. Leave it now was allowed only with the personal consent of the Fuhrer.

Post-war source. Given that there are plenty of surviving primary sources it is quite worthless to quote a memoir. There is the KTB H.Gr. Mitte. There are also KTBs of individual armies in the Center. Plus telegrams, memoranda, etc,etc,etc,etc.

It is very strange that both Ziemke/Frieser (notoriously anti-Hitler) doesn't quote any such source for the 14 June meeting. So where is it?

Post-war source. Given that there are plenty of surviving primary sources it is quite worthless to quote a memoir. There is the KTB H.Gr. Mitte. There are also KTBs of individual armies in the Center. Plus telegrams, memoranda, etc,etc,etc,etc.

It is very strange that both Ziemke/Frieser (notoriously anti-Hitler) doesn't quote any such source for the 14 June meeting. So where is it?

There is a reference of the 14.6. conference on p. 321, but says nothing of a withdrawal suggestion from any of the three armies exposed. At least not on this meeting: a mention of an early retreat plan for 4. Armee behind the Dnieper is mentioned on the same page.

During the day the army group and the Operations Branch, OKH, concluded that the offensive against Army Group Center was more ambitious than they had previously assumed and probably was aimed at retaking Minsk, but the OKH believed a more powerful blow might yet be expected against Army Group North Ukraine.

Just the Germans did not expect such consequences of defense in the fortresses. Hitler is to blame and only.

THE COMMANDING TROOPS OF THE 2nd BELORUSSIAN FRONT AT THE DEATH OF THE MOGILEV GROUP OF THE OPPONENT

May 31, 1944
The Supreme High Command orders:
1. Prepare and carry out an operation in order to defeat, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front, the Mogilev grouping of the enemy and exit to the river. Berezina, for which by forces of at least 11-12 rifle divisions with the means of strengthening to break through the defense of the enemy, causing one general blow from the area of ​​Dribin, Dednya, Ryasna in the general direction to Mogilev and Belynichi.The immediate task is to reach the river. Dnepr and seize the bridgehead on its western shore. In the future, force r. Dnepr main forces, to seize Mogilev and develop an offensive in the general direction on Berezino, Smilovichi.
2. To establish, from 24.00 on 10.06.1944, the following dividing lines: with the 3rd Belorussian Front to Zubov - the former, then Krucha, Ozdichići, Smolevichi, Minsk (all points for the 3rd Byelorussian Front inclusive); with the 1st Byelorussian Front to Chyhyrynka - the former and further Svisloch, Pukhovichi (both points for the 1st Belorussian Front inclusive).
3. The commander of the 1st Byelorussian Front is responsible for ensuring the junction with the 1st Belorussian Front.
4. The deadline and the beginning of the offensive - according to the instructions of Marshal Zhukov.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. STALIN
G. ZHUKOV

DIRECTIVE
from May 31, 1944 No. 220115

THE COMMANDER OF THE 3rd BELORUSSIAN FRONT AT THE FIGHT AGAINST THE VITEBSK-ORSHA GROUP OF THE OPPONENT

May 31, 1944
The Supreme High Command orders:
1. Prepare and conduct an operation in order to defeat the Vitebsk-Orsha grouping of the enemy in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Byelorussian Front, Berezina, for which to break through the enemy's defense, inflicting two blows:
a) one strike by forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno in the general direction to Bogushevskoe, Senno; part of the forces of this group advancing in the north-western direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the south-west, with the aim, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front, to smash the Vitebsk enemy grouping and seize the city of Vitebsk;
b) another blow by the forces of the 11th Guards. and the 31st armies along the Minsk motorway in the general direction to Borisov; part of the forces of this grouping by a blow from the north to seize the city of Orsha.
2. The immediate task of the front forces is to seize the border of Senno, Orsha. Further develop the offensive against Borisov with the task in cooperation with the 2nd Byelorussian Front to defeat the Borisov grouping of the enemy and to reach the western bank of the river. Berezina in the Borisov area.
3. Mobile troops (cavalry, tanks) used to develop success after a breakthrough in the general direction of Borisov.
4. Establish, from 24.00 on 10.06.1944, the following dividing lines: with the 1st Baltic Front to Vitebsk - the former, then Chashniki, Begoml, Dolginov (all points for the First Baltic Front inclusive); with the 2nd Byelorussian Front to Zubov - the former, further Krucha, Ozdiatchi, Smolevichi, Minsk (all points for the 3rd Belorussian Front inclusive).
5. The responsibility for securing the joints with the neighboring fronts remains the same.
6. Readiness and the beginning of the offensive - according to the instructions of Marshal Vasilevsky.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. STALIN
G. ZHUKOV

But Jesk, then why the little arrows? Why the uncoloured BIG arrow against Minsk with a "?" marked? In Gehlen analysis of 13 June, he simply don't know the far-reaching objective of Soviet attack. Compare the BIG RED arrows against Ukraine.

Gehlen did not know that 3 German corps would be destroyed within 3 days, and the Russians would have an opportunity to implement far-reaching plans.

Post-war source. Given that there are plenty of surviving primary sources it is quite worthless to quote a memoir. There is the KTB H.Gr. Mitte. There are also KTBs of individual armies in the Center. Plus telegrams, memoranda, etc,etc,etc,etc.

It is very strange that both Ziemke/Frieser (notoriously anti-Hitler) doesn't quote any such source for the 14 June meeting. So where is it?

There is no question. Only trust in Tippelskirch. Required documents, sources can be missing in google.

Why yes indeed, when you see the entire map rather than a snippet it becomes so obvious the Germans were expecting the major operation would be directed against HG-Mitte...

It's like wondering what came before, an egg or a chicken? You can choose any option and you will be right and wrong at the same time. "The main" blow in Ukraine, but the Russians obviously helped in the defeat of the Germans "fortresses" Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk. Reserves were almost nonexistent and the Germans could not even withdraw troops from not attacked sections along the perimeter of the fortresses.

No. I think a talk on the main blow distract from a subject. How to ask a question whether the flash has affected the Sun on defeat of Germans? "Fortresses" have provided fast defeat of Germans for several days.