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Contents 4 Executive Summary 31 The right to due process 4 The Bahá’í Question: Cultural Cleansing 32 The right to own property in Iran 35 The right to livelihood 7 Chained to a tree and doused with 36 9 April 2007 letter restricting Bahá’í gasoline businesses 8 The Bahá’í Faith: A global community 37 The right to housing 37 The right to education 10 Chapter 1 38 The Bahá’í Institute for Higher The Current Situation Education 11 Text of the 29 October 2005 letter to police and other agencies in Iran 40 Chapter 3 13 The arrests of Bahá’í leaders Why Does the Islamic Republic of 14 Jailed for trying to help children Iran Persecute Bahá’ís? 16 Sowing hatred in the media 41 The Bahá’í Faith in Iranian history 16 Anti-Bahá’í articles published 41 Eyewitness to early persecution in Kayhan, 2001-2007 43 The 1979 revolution 17 An upsurge in violence 44 “To cut off the head...” 18 While the government seeks to inspire 46 Hanged for teaching “Sunday school” hatred, the people often offer their 48 Explaining the animosity against Bahá’ís support 51 No recourse for Bahá’ís 19 One family’s recent trials 20 The targeting of schoolchildren 52 Chapter 4 20 The Bahá’í Question secret memorandum The International Response 21 Cell phones as an instrument of harassment 53 UN human rights monitors have offered an independent view 22 The 1991 secret memorandum on the Bahá’í Question 54 The Bahá’í community of Iran speaks for itself2 4 Chapter 2 56 How the Islamic Republic of Iran has justified the persecution The Bahá’í Case and Human Rights 25 Freedom of religion 58 Chapter 5 26 The right to life, liberty and security Conclusion and Summary 27 Bahá’ís killed in Iran since 1978 28 The threat of execution 60 Appendix I: Bahá’ís Killed Since 1978 29 Imprisonment and the right to liberty 64 Appendix II: The United Nations’ Response 29 Torture 74 Appendix III: Related Documents 29 Number of Iranian Bahá’ís arrested, 2004 through mid-2008 91 Appendix IV: Further Reading 31 “Cause of death will be known later…”

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Executive Summary The Bah á’í QuesTion: CuLTuR aL CLeansinG in iR an S INCE 1979, IRANIAN Bahá’ís have faced a government-sponsored, systematicInternational campaign of religious persecution in their homeland. In its early stages,experts on ethnic, more than 200 Bahá’ís were killed and at least 1,000 were imprisoned,racial or religious solely because of their religious beliefs. In the early 1990s, the government shifted its focus to social, economiccleansing have and cultural restrictions aimed at blocking the development of Iran’s Bahá’í com-identified a number munity. Such measures included efforts to deprive Bahá’ís of their livelihood, toof warning destroy their cultural heritage, and to prevent their young people from obtainingsigns that often higher education.foreshadow Over the last several years, however, there has been a resurgence of more extremewidespread purges. forms of persecution directed at the 300,000-member Bahá’í community of Iran, that country’s largest religious minority. This upsurge has alarmed human rights monitors, who fear not only for those Bahá’ís affected by the government’s renewed campaign but also that such attacks portend something far worse. International experts on ethnic, racial or religious cleansing have identified a number of warning signs that often foreshadow widespread purges. These include the “classification” of minority groups into categories of “us versus them,” efforts to “dehumanize” them in the media and other venues, the organization of hate groups, and “preparation” for extermination — a category that starts with the “identification” of individual members of the group. Ominously, a number of recent events in Iran fit into these categories:  The emergence of documents that clearly spell out a secret government plan to identify and monitor Bahá’ís and their activities. The best example of this occurred in March 2006 with the public disclosure by a United Nations official of a 29 October 2005 letter from Iranian military headquarters instructing state intelligence services, police units, and the Revolutionary Guard to make a “com- prehensive and complete report of all activities” of Bahá’ís “for the purpose of identifying all individuals” of this “misguided” sect. 4| THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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In March and May 2008, seven Bahá’í leaders who see to the minimum needs of Iran’s 300,000-member Bahá’í community were arrested in ominous sweeps similar to episodes in the 1980s when many Bahá’í leaders were rounded up and killed. As of publication, they were being held in Tehran’s notorious Evin prison on false charges that they had “confessed” to “illegal” activities. They are, seated from left, Behrouz Tavakkoli and Saeid Rezaie, and, standing, Fariba The arrest and imprisonment of national-level Bahá’í leaders in March and May Kamalabadi, Vahid 2008 in a manner that was grimly similar to episodes in the 1980s when scores Tizfahm, Jamaloddin of Iranian Bahá’í leaders were rounded up and killed. That, along with a marked Khanjani, Afif Naeimi, upsurge in arrests and imprisonments. and Mahvash Sabet. A vigorous campaign in the state-run news media to vilify and defame Bahá’ís. Since 2005, for example, the Kayhan newspaper has run more than 200 false or misleading articles about Bahá’í teachings, history and activities — an effort that has been echoed on television and radio. The targeting of Bahá’í children for harassment and abuse by teachers and administrators at elementary and secondary schools throughout the country, with the clear aim of forcing Bahá’í children to give up their faith. During a 30-day period from mid-January to mid-February 2007, for example, some 150 incidents of insults, mistreatment, and even physical violence by school authori- ties against Bahá’í students were reported in at least 10 Iranian cities. A general upsurge in violence against Bahá’ís and their properties, often by anony­ ous individuals. In the summer of 2007, for example, unknown ­ndividuals m i bulldozed Bahá’í cemeteries in two cities (apparently as part of a coordinated effort, since virtually every Bahá’í cemetery in Iran has recently been vandalized or dese­ rated), sent threatening letters to 30 Bahá’í families in Najafabad, and c scrawled hateful graffiti on Bahá’í homes and shops in Abadeh. Executive Summary | 5

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The government’s long term strategy to destroy the Bahá’í community without attracting undue interna- tional attention was cruelly outlined in a secret 1991 memorandum that aimed at establishing a policy regarding “the Bahá’í question.” Drafted by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and signed by Supreme leader Ali Khamenei, the document calls for a series of restrictions on the access of Bahá’ís to education and livelihood that is nothing less than a blueprint for the strangulation of the Bahá’í community. Most significantly, it lays out unequivocally the government’s overall objective — to ensure that the “progress and development” of the Bahá’í community are “blocked.” The recent upsurge in state-sponsored violence against Bahá’ís and their properties, coupled with the ongoing denial of higher education to Bahá’í youth, continuing measures aimed at depriving Bahá’ís of their rightful property and livelihood, and ongoing attempts to destroy the cultural heritage of Iranian Bahá’ís, all indicate that the government’s secret plan is still very much in effect. Such incidents and trends, moreover, are well docu- mented not only by human rights groups but also UN investigators and others — which flatly contradicts theOn 8 September 2007, an intimidating and government’s oft-repeated contention that it has nooffensive letter was distributed to approximately campaign of persecution against the Bahá’ís.30 Bahá’í homes in the village of Vilashahr, outside The fact is that the Bahá’ís of Iran remain in a pre-Najafabad. The letter, denouncing Bahá’ís as traitors carious state. They are denied the right to practice theirand agents of colonialism, threatens them with faith freely, guaranteed under international humanretribution, in the absence of decisive government rights instruments such as the International Bill ofaction against them. At about the same time, hostile Human Rights, to which Iran is a party. The adminis-and insulting graffiti was sprayed on the walls trative institutions of their faith have been dismantledof these homes. Such graffiti included: “Unclean in accordance with a government edict. They live eachBahá’ís and agents of Israel,” “Bahá’ís: enemies of day knowing that their government seeks to eradicateGod,”and “Bahá’ís: traitors to their country.” their community as a viable entity in the country, andFor a full-size version, see page 75, Appendix III that even slight infractions can result in the deprivation of their livelihood, imprisonment or worse. Bahá’ís recognize that there are many other oppressed groups in Iran, including academics, women’s rights activists, students, and journalists. The situation of Iranian Bahá’ís, however, offers a special case, inasmuch as they are persecuted solely because of their religious belief, remain committed to nonviolence and nonpartisanship and seek only to contribute to the development of their homeland. 6| THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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Chained to a tree and doused with gasolineT he story of a middle-aged businessman saw a woman in a black Bahá’í businessman living in chador sitting in the passenger seat and Shiraz, Iran, tells much about so, reassured, he allowed the man tolife for Iranian Bahá’ís today, who are siphon four liters of gasoline from histargets of a state-sponsored campaign own car.to incite hatred against them. W hen that was done, however, The owner of a small manufacturing the man put the container down and Two attackersfirm, the businessman came to work one grabbed the Bahá’í firmly from behind, chained a Bahá’í today to find an anti-Bahá’í slogan defac- placing one hand over his mouth. a tree and douseding the walls of his shop. He lodged a Another person, who appeared to be him with gasoline.complaint with the police and they had a passer-by, came forward and helped Then they beganmembers of the local Basij Resistance carry the Bahá’í to a nearby tree. began strikingForce come and clean the wall. Then they chained him to the tree A few days later, the man received and doused him with gasoline. matches and tossingan anonymous letter, which openly The second individual began strik- them at him.denounced the Bahá’í Faith as a false ing matches and tossing them at thereligion and threatened his life. fuel-drenched man. Fortunately, the “[S]o that future generations may first did not light. A second matchknow that Islam and Muslims are vigi- went out immediately after it was lit.lant and will never be deceived by the A third match ignited but was extin-agents and spies of Israel and will not guished when it hit the man’s clothing.allow the followers of the pure reli- Finally, a fourth match flared but fellgion of Muhammad to be deceived harmlessly on the ground and the manby impostors like you…you and eight was able to put it out. At that point,other evil ones are sentenced to a revo- apparently worried about the approachlutionary execution, which will soon be of others, the assailants gave up andcarried out in public. O ye followers of sped away. People in the neighborhoodthe false prophets, Bahá’u’lláh and the ran to assist the man, freed him, andBáb, if They are truly of the Truth, then notified the local police.ask Them to prevent the execution of Sadly, the story does not end hap-this verdict…” pily there. In late July 2008, the same Two days after he received the businessman was arrested and driventhreatening letter, the businessman was to Tehran, where he was accused ofwalking towards his car when an indi- fabricating the story about his threat-vidual approached him with an empty ened burning as a way of defaming thegasoline container and asked for fuel. Islamic regime. He refused to “confess”The man claimed that his family was and so was beaten, hung by his arms forin the car and he needed some fuel to hours, and burned with cigarettes beforeget to the nearest gasoline station. The being released on 3 August 2008. Executive Summary | 7

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The Bahá’í Faith: The Faith’s Founder is Bahá’u’lláh, a Persian nobleman from Tehran who, in A global community the mid-nineteenth century, left a life of princely comfort and security and, in the face of intense persecution and F ounded a century and a half deprivation, brought to humanity a stir- ago in Iran, the Bahá’í Faith is ring new message of peace and unity. today among the fastest-growing Bahá’u’lláh claimed to be nothing less of the world’s religions. With more than than a new and independent Messenger five million followers, who reside in vir- from God. His life, work, and influ- tually every nation on earth, it is the ence parallel that of Abraham, Krishna, second-most widespread independent Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ, and world religion, surpassing every faith Muhammad. Bahá’ís view Bahá’u’lláh but Christianity in its geographic reach. as the most recent in this succession ofPeople of every Bahá’ís reside in more than 100,000 divine Messengers.nationality, race, ethnic localities around the world, an expan- The essential message of Bahá’u’lláhgroup, and religious sion that reflects their dedication to the is that of unity. He taught that therebackground have ideal of world citizenship. is only one God, that there is onlydeclared their belief The Bahá’í Faith’s global scope is one human race, and that each of thein the Bahá’í Faith. mirrored in the composition of its world’s religions represent stages in theShown here is a group membership. Representing a cross sec- revelation of God’s will and purpose forof people from around tion of humanity, Bahá’ís come from humanity. In this day, Bahá’u’lláh said,the world who have virtually every nation, ethnic group, cul- humanity has collectively come of age.volunteered to serve ture, profession, and social or economic As foretold in all of the world’s scrip-at the Bahá’í World class. More than 2,100 different ethnic tures, the time has arrived for the unit-Centre in Haifa, Israel. and tribal groups are represented. ing of all peoples into a peaceful and 8| The Bahá’í Question

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Above: Entrance to the Shrine ofBahá’u’lláh, near Acre, Israel.Right: Glowing terraces surround theShrine of the Báb on Mount Carmel. Bahá’ís reside in more than 100,000integrated global society. “The earth isbut one country, and mankind its citi- localities around thezens,” He wrote. world, an expansion For a global society to flourish, that reflects theirBahá’u’lláh said, it must be based on dedication to thecertain fundamental principles. They ideal of worldinclude the elimination of all forms citizenship.of prejudice; full equality between thesexes; recognition of the essential one-ness of the world’s great religions; theelimination of extremes of poverty andwealth; universal education; the har-mony of science and religion; a sus-tainable balance between nature andtechnology; and the establishment of aworld federal system, based on collectivesecurity and the oneness of humanity. Executive Summary | 9

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Chapter 1 The CuRRen T siTuaTion F OR HUMAN RIGHTS groups around the world, it was the equivalent of a “yellow alert” — a stepRecent events and trends prove or two down from the highest level of alarm —that the Islamic Republic of in March 2006 when a United Nations officialIran continues to actively pursue announced she had come into possession of aefforts to carry out the plan confidential letter from Iranian military headquarters, datedoutlined by the 1991 “Bahá’í 29 October 2005, asking various intelligence agencies, policeQuestion” memorandum, and organizations and the Revolutionary Guard “to identifythat since late 2005 these efforts persons who adhere to the Bahá’í Faith and monitor their activities.”have increased dramatically. Asma Jahangir, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, warned that “such monitoring consti- tutes an impermissible and unacceptable interference with the rights of members of religious minorities.” Within weeks, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) said it “fears that the identification and monitoring of the Bahá’ís combined with the cur- rent hatred propaganda in the media could lead to increased discrimination in their regards and calls upon the Iranian authorities to abide by their international human rights commitments.” Governments, too, responded. A spokesman for the President of the United States called on “the regime in Iran to respect the religious freedom of all its minori- ties, and to ensure that these minorities are free to practice their religious beliefs without discrimination or fear.” The Council of the European Union expressed “deep concern” over the human rights situation in Iran in a 15 May 2006 resolution, specifically mentioning the situation of the Bahá’ís, while the then French Foreign Affairs Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said in an April 2006 interview that “[w]e are deeply worried about the harassment of the Bahá’í and Sufi minorities who are highly discriminated against.” Perhaps most tellingly, the Anti-Defamation league issued a press release in April 2006 saying that the orders issued in the 29 October letter were “reminiscent 10 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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The 2 October 200 letter to policeand other agencies in IranI N MARCH 200, Asma Jahangir, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, issued a statement regarding a secret letter from the Iranian military headquarters to variousRevolutionary Guard, police, and other forces instructing them to“identify” and “monitor” Bahá’ís around the country. News of the letter, dated 29 October 2005, stirred alarm amonginternational human rights groups. Ms. Jahangir expressed concernthat “the information gained as a result of such monitoring will beused as a basis for the increased persecution of, and discriminationagainst, members of the Bahá’í Faith.” On 24 July 2006, the london-based human rights group AmnestyInternational made the letter public. Originally in Persian, the letterwas signed by the Chairman of the Command Headquarters of theArmed Forces, Basij Major General Dr. Seyyeed Hossein Firuzabad. For a full-size version, seeIt was stamped “highly confidential.” It read: page 77, Appendix IIIWith salutations and praise to Muhammad and his descendants (S) [Maythe Blessing of God be Upon Him and His Descendants], while we express our deepest sympathy on the occasion of themartyrdom of the Lord of believers in divine unity [Amir-al-Momenin] and the Commander of the faithful(MPBUH) [May Peace be Upon Him], and wishing for the acceptance of [our] obligations and worships, further to thereports received concerning the secret activities and meetings of the misguided sects of Bahaism and Babism, in Tehranand other cities in the country, and according to the instructions of the Exalted Rank of the Supreme Leader, HisHoliness Ayatollah Khamenei (may his exalted shadow be extended), the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forceshas been given the mission to acquire a comprehensive and complete report of all the activities of these sects (includingpolitical, economic, social and cultural) for the purpose of identifying all the individuals of these misguided sects.Therefore, we request that you convey to relevant authorities to, in a highly confidential manner, collect any and allinformation about the above-mentioned activities of these individuals and report it to this Command Headquarters. This [either this information, or the reports to be received] will be submitted for the blessed consideration of theExalted Rank of the Supreme Leader, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (may his exalted shadow beextended).The letter listed the following recipients: The Ministry of Information of the Islamic Republic of Iran The Belief-Political [organization] of [the office of ] the Commander in Chief The Commander of the [Revolutionary] Guard The Commander of the Basij Resistance Forces of the [Revolutionary] Guard The Commander of the Police Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran The Deputy of the Intelligence Branch of the Police Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran The Representative of the Jurist Cleric [Ayatollah Khamanei] in the [Revolutionary] Guard The Chairman of the Belief-Political Organization of the Police Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran The Chief Commander of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran CHAPTER 1: The Current Situation | 11

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of the steps taken against Jews in Europe and a dangerous step toward the institu- tion of Nuremberg-type laws.” As experts on ethnic, racial or religious cleansing know well, the “identification” of a minority group is one of the early warning signs of an impending crisis. Since the 29 October 2005 letter, moreover, other documentary evidence has emerged that tells of Iran’s extraordinary secret effort to track down, identify, and monitor its Bahá’í citizens.  In a letter dated 19 August 2006, Iran’s Ministry of the Interior ordered officials throughout the country to step up the surveillance of Bahá’ís, focusing in partic- ular on their community activities. Among other things, the Ministry requested provincial officials to complete a detailed questionnaire about the circumstances and activities of local Bahá’ís, including their “financial status,” “social interac- tions,” and “association with foreign assemblies.” 28 Murdád 1385 [19 August 2006]19 August 2006 letter Islamic Republic of Iranordering police to Number: 70878/43step up surveillance Ministry of the Interiorof Bahá’ís. In the Name of God To the honourable political-security deputies of the offices of the Governors-General of the country Greetings, Respectfully, we have received reports that some of the elements of the perverse sect of Bahaism are attempting to teach and spread the ideology of Bahaism, under the cover of social and economic activities. In view of the fact that this sect is illegal and that it is exploited by international and Zionist organizations against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we therefore ask you to order the relevant offices to cautiouslyFor a full-size version, and carefully monitor and manage their [the Bahá’ís’] social activities. Insee page 79, Appendix III addition, complete the requested information on the enclosed form and forward it to this office for its use by 15 Shahrívar [6 September 2006]. Seyyed Mohammad-Reza Mavvalizadeh Director of the Political Office  Another letter, dated 2 May 2006, showed the degree to which the government has sought to implement such surveillance at the local level. That letter, from the Trades, Production, and Technical Services Society of Kermanshah to the Iranian Union of Battery Manufacturers, asked the Union to provide a list of members of “the Bahá’í sect” in their membership. To read the full letter in English and Persian, see page 80, Appendix III. Unfortunately, the intent and prejudice that lie behind such orders are also play- ing out on the ground in a manner that is all too real. 12 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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The arrests of Bahá’í leadersPerhaps the most worrisome development has been the arrest and imprisonment ofnational-level Bahá’í leaders in March and May 2008. Six members of a coordinatinggroup that helped see to the minimum needs of Bahá’ís in Iran were arrested on 14May 2008 when government intelligence agents entered their homes in Tehran in theearly morning and spent up to five hours searching through their possessions, beforetaking the people away. The seventh member of the group had been arrested in early March 2008 inMashhad after being summoned by the Ministry of Information office there. The manner and fact of their arrests aroused extreme concern among humanrights groups, given the early history of the Islamic Republic’s persecution againstBahá’ís, when the leadership of the Bahá’í community was summarily rounded upand killed. On 21 August 1980, all nine members of the National Spiritual Assembly of theBahá’ís of Iran were abducted and disappeared without a trace. They are presumeddead. The arrest of seven Bahá’í leaders in March and May 2008 was ominously reminiscent of episodes in the early 1980s when Iranian authorities rounded up and later killed Bahá’í leaders. In August 1980, for example, the national Bahá’í governing council, shown here, was apparently kidnapped. They are presumed to have been executed. Then on 27 December 1981, the recently re-elected national Bahá’í assembly wasagain ravaged by the execution of eight of its members. And, in 1984, four moremembers of the same assembly, which had been courageously re-established throughfresh elections, were executed — although by then a government decree had forcedthe institution to disband and the individuals held no official position in the Bahá’ícommunity. The 2008 arrests, moreover, have not come in isolation. Since 2005, the govern-ment has increasingly used short-term arrests and detentions as a way to keep theBahá’í community off balance. Chapter 1: The Current Situation | 13

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At the time this publication was prepared, there were some 30 Bahá’ís in prison in Iran. Another 70 or more were awaiting possible prison time pending appeal or a summons to serve their sentence. And at least 70 other Bahá’ís were out on bail and awaiting trial on various charges, all related to their religious belief. The details of these arrests and imprisonments include the sweeping arrest of more than 50 mostly young Bahá’ís in Shiraz in May 2006 as they were engaged in a humanitarian project. Many of those arrested have held ad hoc leadership positions at the local level.Jailed for trying to help childrenF or a group of Bahá’ís in the city of Shiraz, the idea was to help poor children, not land in jail. But prison time was the result for threeBahá’ís, who helped start social service projects forunderprivileged children and youth in 2005. Haleh Rouhi, 29, Raha Sabet, 33, and Sasan Taqva,32, were each sentenced to four years in prison and then Haleh Rouhi, Sasan Taqva and Raha Sabet weresuddenly taken into custody on 19 November 2007. taken into custody in November 2007. They are serving The charge, according to a government official, was a four-year sentence on charges connected entirely“propaganda against the regime.” That’s what judiciary with their belief in and practice of the Bahá’í Faith.spokesman Ali Reza Jamshidi told the Agence FrancePresse at a press briefing in Tehran on 29 January 2008. instituted to help schoolchildren in Katsbas, a pov- Accounts that have emerged f rom Iran tell a erty-stricken suburb of Shiraz. The project aimed spe-far different story. In fact, the three were engaged cifically at tutoring children to help them prepare forin a project that most governments would praise: a their end-of-term school examinations.humanitarian program aimed at helping underprivi- Those that served as tutors, who included Muslims,leged young people in the region. met with the children every Friday morning for four The projects were launched in 2004 by a group hours. In the project’s infancy, the tutors would layof Bahá’ís — including Ms. Rouhi, Ms. Sabet, and out rugs in front of the houses of the parents so thatMr. Taqva — who were concerned about low literacy the families could see that their only intention was torates and other problems facing poor children in and serve the children. The mothers would stand nearbyaround Shiraz. to observe the lessons and exercises the tutors were They began discussing what kinds of social action delivering. Many expressed interest in learning theirthey could take, eager to act on the humanitarian methods.impulse found not only in the Bahá’í Faith but in all The tutors started working with 20 children, butreligions. the number quickly swelled to 120. At the end of the In fact, it was a Muslim friend of one member school term, the parents of the children asked whetherof the group who suggested that the program be the activities could continue. At that point the group 14 | The Bahá’í Question

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When arrested, Bahá’ís have increasingly faced violence and harsh treatment bytheir captors. In November 2007, Mr. Diyanat Haghighat, who was arrested aftera three-hour search of his home, was then physically assaulted at an IntelligenceMinistry detention center in Shiraz before his interrogation. Also in the fall of 2007, ayoung Bahá’í was physically assaulted by agents of the Intelligence Ministry after theyhad raided the office where he worked and taken him into custody in Shiraz. And inKermanshah, a 70-year-old man was sentenced to 70 lashes and a year in prison for“propagating and spreading Bahaism and the defamation of the pure Imams.” Class in Katsbas, outside Shiraz, Iran. for a year until it was halted because of the arrest of the Bahá’ís. During that same period, members of the group made regular visits to orphanages and facilities for physically and mentally challenged children. All of these projects came to a halt on 19 May 2006 when tutors and project leaders in six locations were simultaneously arrested by the police. In all, 54 Bahá’ís and about 10 Muslims were taken into custody. The Muslims (and one Bahá’í) were released immediately; the remaining 53 Bahá’ís were releaseddecided to extend its services to include the fostering over the course of the next few days and weeks. Ms.of social and moral skills so that the children them- Rouhi, Ms. Sabet, and Mr. Taqva were held for nearlyselves could become the agents of advancement in a month.their own lives and in the society. In August 2006, the 53 were notified by a local By summer 2005, the number of children involved court that they had been convicted of “offenses relat-in the program had increased so significantly that it was ing to state security.” Statements made in court alsonecessary to divide them into two groups, each group seemed to indicate that their real offense was “teach-comprising more than 100 students and 30 tutors. ing the Bahá’í Faith.” At the same time, at the suggestion of a Mus­ This is a charge that Bahá’ís have often faced,lim friend, a similar project was started in another despite the fact that Iran has signed internationallocality, Sahlabad, where children and their families had human rights covenants that protect the right tovoiced keen interest in such an undertaking. That proj- “teach” one’s religion.ect involved 100 children, also tutored by both Bahá’ís Yet, while teaching the Bahá’í Faith cannot beand Muslims. Another initiative serving 100 children considered a crime of any sort, given that freedom ofand young teens was undertaken in Sahlabad. religion is protected by international law, the fact is In additon, the group organized a weekly program that the Bahá’ís arrested were not working to spreadoffering art classes to young cancer patients at a hos- Bahá’í teachings — rather their goal was merely to actpital in Shiraz. This program, which had been enthu- on those principles of their faith that encourage themsiastically received by the head of the hospital, also ran to serve humanity. Chapter 1: The Current Situation | 15

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Sowing hatred in the media The demonization of minori- ties has long been understood as a precursor to ethnic or reli- gious cleansing. And for more than 150 years, Bahá’ís have been portrayed falsely from the pulpit, in the press, and more recently on radio, television, and even in scholarly publications. This campaign of demoniza- tion, however, has been stepped up recently. Kayhan is one of Iran’s most inﬂuential newspapers. Since 2005, for example, the Published directly under the supervision of the semi-official Kayhan newspaper Office of the Supreme Leader, it closely reﬂects the has run more than 200 false, government’s official ideology. Since 2005, it has misleading or incendiary articles run more than 200 false or misleading articles about Bahá’í teachings, history about Bahá’í teachings, history, and activities. and activities — an effort that has been echoed on television and radio. An organ of Iran’s ultra-conservative hard- liners in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kayhan has a large circulation and its managing editor is appointed by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. The Kayhan articles engage in a deliberate distortion of history, make use of fakeAnti-Bahá’í historical documents, and falsely describe Bahá’í moral principles in a manner thatarticles published would be offensive to Muslims.in Kayhan, A 27 October 2005 article titled “Understanding the Roots of Bahaism,” for200-200 example, attempts to incite public sentiment by raising time-worn, utterly false alle- gations that the Bábí and Bahá’í Faiths were the creation of colonial powers. “Babism and 2001 1 Bahaism are [merely] notions and are among the religious sects that were created by colo- 2002 4 nialists to corrupt the noble and pure Islamic 2003 0 ideas…,” the article said. 2004 2 The media campaign against Bahá’ís 2005 36 extends to the Internet. On 26 May 2008, 2006 108 for example, Kayhan reported that a new Internet site dedicated to the “fight against 2007 50 Bahaism” will soon be launched by an “orga- nization of the people.” The article quotes the late Ayatollah Khomeini as saying that it was his duty to warn Iran and all the Muslims in the world to free the country from the control of Zionism, which has appeared in Iran as the “Bahaist sect.” 16 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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An upsurge in violenceAnother troubling sign is the general upsurge in violence against Bahá’ís and theirproperties. This violence is often undertaken by anonymous individuals, as exempli-fied by the story of the Bahá’í businessman in Shiraz who was doused with gasolineby unknown assailants, as described on page 7. Other incidents that reflect this trend of anonymous violence or threats againstBahá’ís include: a number of cases of arson directed against Bahá’í homes; the bull- Arson has recentlydozing of two Bahá’í cemeteries in Yazd and Najafabad in mid-2007; the receipt of emerged as a meansthreatening letters by 30 Bahá’í families, also in Najafabad during that period; and of violence againstthe scrawling of hateful graffiti on Bahá’í homes or properties. Bahá’ís. The home of All of this violence comes with the clear blessing of the government. As noted the family Mehranabove, the government has sought to incite hatred against Bahá’ís through the news Shaaker of Kerman,media. Moreover, a number of incidents point to a kind of institutionalized “plain- Iran, was gutted by fireclothes” violence by government agents or their proxies. on 18 July 2008. Family In December 2007, for example, four men abducted Mr. Sepehr Sharifi while he members had receivedwas out walking. They forced him into a car, covered his head and took him to an threatening phoneunknown place for interrogation. After three hours of interrogation, he was set free calls, and their car hadoutside the city. Prior to this incident, Mr. Sharifi had received a number of anony- been the target of amous phone calls threatening him with serious bodily harm and even death. recent arson attempt. To cite another recent example of such violence, reports were receivedin late July 2008 that three Bahá’ís in Mashhad had received telephonethreats and were later run over by a car, apparently on purpose. Two ofthem were killed and the third was hospitalized with serious injuries. Such “plainclothes” violence, whether stirred directly by governmentagents or by the atmosphere of hatred the government has cultivated, allowIranian authorities to distance themselves from attacks on Bahá’ís, as if tosay it cannot be helped if ordinary people feel prejudice against them. The Mousavi family of Fars province narrowly escaped injury when an arsonist poured gasoline and caused an explosion and fire that destroyed a hut near where the family was sleeping outside their home. Chapter 1: The Current Situation | 17

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While the government seeks to inspire hatred, the people often offer their support W HIlE THE GOVERNMENT the right of citizenship and should be has sought to incite hatred treated with “Islamic compassion,” even and prejudice against if not recognized as an official religious Bahá’ís, many ordinary Iranians — along minority, as Christians and Jews are. with a few lower-level officials and even And although Bahá’ís have generally some high-level clerics — have in vari- been treated unfairly in Iranian courts ous ways given support to their Bahá’í since the revolution, several courts have neighbors and fellow citizens. recently upheld their rights — once Among the best recent examples was again indicating a reservoir of support the story of how neighbors rallied around for Bahá’ís among some elements of the a family in Abadeh (see facing page). population. There have been a number of inci- On 15 March 2008, for example, dents in Iranian schools, as well, where the appeals court of the Province of other students, and even teachers and Hamadan overturned the guilty verdicts parents, have come to the defense of against four Bahá’ís from that city who Bahá’í children who have had been arrested and then found guilty been harassed by school by a lower court on charges of “teaching administrators or misguided against the regime.” The appeals court, teachers. however, ruled that not only are Bahá’ís In Kerman recently, a not against the government, but they Bahá’í student at a university are also absolutely obedient to it; teach- preparatory college was given ing the Bahá’í Faith cannot be regarded an ultimatum: choose your as “teaching against the regime.” education or your faith. She Similarly, on 26 September 2007 the told education department Semnan Court of Appeals overturned officials she would not give the conviction of a Bahá’í who had beenOn 14 May 2008, up her faith for anything. When the sentenced to four months’ imprison-Ayatollah Montazeri school headmaster then told her force- ment on the charge that he had engagedissued a fatwa saying fully to leave the school, 800 students in anti-regime activity by distributingthat Bahá’ís have the caused a commotion in protest. the 15 November 2004 letter from theright of citizenship An example of the kind of high-level Bahá’í community of Iran to the thenand should be support given to Bahá’ís can be found President Mohammad Khatami. Thetreated with “Islamic in the 2008 statement issued by Grand Court of Appeal found that the lettercompassion,” offering Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one “was in fact a way of petitioning andthe government a of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution conveying an expression of the situation“theological” rationale in Iran who was for a time the desig- and treatment of the Bahá’ís, and asfor ending persecution nated successor to the former Supreme there had been no intention to protestof the Bahá’ís. For a leader Ayatollah Khomeini. against or defame the regime,” it there-full-size version, see Ayatollah Montazeri issued a decree fore endorsed the man’s appeal and setpage 82, Appendix III on 14 May 2008 saying that Bahá’ís have aside the guilty verdict. 18 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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One family’s recent trialsA mong the examples of “plainclothes” violence unleashed against Bahá’ís recently is this story of a family in the town ofAbadeh. On 27 January 2008, members of the Basij,a revolutionary paramilitary group, closed theentrance leading to the house of the family anddrove a bulldozer into it, demolishing a wall.Then, 20 Basij personnel, whose faces were cov-ered, raided the home. The women and children who were in thehouse fled in terror, taking refuge in the homes ofneighbors. The male head of the household arrivedhome during the attack and was handcuffed andheld in his car while the Basijis completed thedemolition of the wall. They ransacked the house,collecting all the books and other Bahá’í materialsthey could carry. A threatening letter was droppedinto the house during the night following theseevents. It said: As Bahaism is a perverse sect, it is our duty to purge Abadeh of your presence; inform your Bahá’í friends that we will also attend to them! Last night was your first warning! Out of respect for your family, we restrained ourselves in this first endeavor. If you value your family you have two weeks to leave this town, other- wise, the lovers of Imam Husayn will consider it their duty to totally destroy your home. Of note, while government officials are doing The wall to this house, owned by a Bahá’í familymuch to stir up the general population against in Abadeh, was partially destroyed by membersBahá’ís, the Bahá’í family in Abadeh received of the Basij Resistance Force using a bulldozersupport from some local officials and friends, in an incident in early 2008. Later, friends andwho denounced the attackers. A staff member in neighbors gave support and sympathy to the family.the office of the governor told the family: “Weare embarrassed; the matter is so complicated home, expressing sympathy and even offering tothat the government authorities are also worried.” compensate the family for the damage that hadNeighbors and other townspeople also visited the been caused. Chapter 1: The Current Situation | 19

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The targeting of schoolchildren As an example of how low Iranian authorities will go to eradicate the Bahá’í Faith as a religious entity, there is likely no better example than the growing harassment and abuse of Bahá’í children at elementary and secondary schools, with the clear aim of forcing them to give up their faith. The effort, which is distinct from the long-running government endeavor to deny Bahá’í university-age students from obtaining higher education, is particularly reprehensible because it has engaged the very people who should protect young people — teachers and school administrators — in attacks on their vulnerable charges. News of the effort first emerged in early 2007 when it was learned, by compiling reports from Iran, that some 150 incidents of insults, mistreatment, and even physical violence by school authorities against Bahá’í children had occurred in at least 10 Iranian cities during a 30-day period from mid-January to mid-February 2007. Among other things, those reports indicated that students were being pressured to convert to Islam, required to endure slander of their faith by religious instructors, and being taught and tested on ‘Iranian history’ in authorized texts that denigrate, distort, and brazenly falsifyIn 2007, Bahá’ís Bahá’í religious heritage. They were also being repeatedly told that they are not todiscovered that attempt to “teach” or discuss their religion with other students.individuals were handing One report said that Bahá’í children in Kermanshah were called to the front ofout a glossy printed the classroom and required to listen to insults against their Faith.card that advertised an On 18 May 2008, on the last day in school in Shiraz, every primary school childanti-Bahá’í Web site. received a sealed envelope as a “gift” from a publishing company, containing a 12-page color children’s booklet that provided an erroneous and misleading life story of the Báb, the Herald of the Bahá’í Faith, presented in a mocking and degrading manner. As with any situation involving human rights, full and comprehensive reports about persecution and abuse are difficult to obtain — and Bahá’ís believe that the problems are likely to be much more widespread. The Bahá’í Question secret memorandum All of these trends — official efforts to identify and monitor Bahá’ís, the govern- ment-inspired propaganda against them, the reprehensible treatment of Bahá’í schoolchildren, and institutionalized plainclothes violence — come against a larger backdrop of ongoing persecution against Bahá’ís that has in recent years clearly sought to drive the followers of this religion from Iran and to destroy their cultural and community life. Such measures include ongoing efforts to prevent Bahá’ís from receiving higher education, to deny them the means of economic livelihood, and to deprive them of the inspiration provided by their sacred and historic sites. These efforts and others were, in fact, spelled out in a secret government memorandum, obtained by the United Nations in 1993, that was a virtual blueprint for the quiet elimination of the 20 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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Iranian Bahá’í community as a viable entity. Drawn up by the Iranian Supreme RevolutionaryCultural Council (ISRCC) in 1991 and stamped “confidential,” Cell phones asthe document was prepared at the request of the Leader of an instrument ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and harassmentthe then President of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Akbar HashemiRafsanjani. The memorandum was signed by Hujjatu’l Islam ISeyyed Mohammad Golpaygani, Secretary of the Council, n recent years, many Iranianand approved by Mr. Khamenei, who added his signature Bahá’ís have received anonymous,to the document. provocative text messages on their cell The memorandum came to light in the 1993 report by UN phones, apparently in an effort to scareSpecial Representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl. According them. Such messages have included:to Mr. Galindo Pohl, the document came as “reliable  Those who respond rudely, we willinformation” just as the annual report on Iran to the UN ignore, as such responses are indica-Commission on Human Rights was being completed. tive of the real Bahá’í morals. Those The memorandum specifically calls for Iran’s Bahá’ís to who respond politely, we will soonbe treated in such a way “that their progress and develop- meet in person.ment are blocked,” providing conclusive evidence that the  Bahá’ís, do you know that yourcampaign against the Bahá’ís is centrally directed by the cooperation with America makesgovernment. the Muslims hate you and that they The document indicates, for example, that the govern- will take their revenge on you?ment aims to keep the Bahá’ís illiterate and uneducated, liv-ing only at a subsistence level, and fearful at every momentthat even the tiniest infraction will bring the threat of imprisonment or worse. Although some of its provisions appear to grant a measure of protection toBahá’ís, its overall impact is to create an environment where the Bahá’í communityof Iran will be quietly eliminated. The memorandum The memorandum says, for example, that all Bahá’ís should be expelled from specifically callsuniversities; that they shall be denied “positions of influence,” and instead only be for Iran’s Bahá’ísallowed to earn “a modest livelihood as is available to the general population”; and to be treated ineven that they are to be denied “employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís.” such a way “that The provisions regarding arrest, imprisonment and punishment can be read in their progress andtwo ways. The document says that in regard to the “general status of the Bahá’íswithin the country’s system”: development are blocked,” providing 1. They will not be expelled from the country without reason. conclusive evidence 2. They will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason. 3. The government’s dealings with them must be in such a way that their that the campaign progress and development are blocked. against the Bahá’ís is centrally directed At first glance, it might seem that the term “without reason” is a move towards by the government.greater justice, inasmuch as virtually all of the detentions, arrests and imprison-ments of Bahá’ís in the past have been without cause. However, when the entirememo is understood in the context of what to do about “the Bahá’í question,” itis clear that the directive is merely instructing officials to be sure that they justify Chapter 1: The Current Situation | 21

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The  secret memorandum on the Bahá’í Question [Translation from Persian] [Text in square brackets added by translator] In the Name of God! The Islamic Republic of Iran The Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council Number: 1327/.... Date: 6/12/69 [25 February 1991] Enclosure: NoneCONFIDENTIAlDr. Seyyed Mohammad GolpayganiHead of the Office of the Esteemed leader [Khamenei]Greetings! To see the originalAfter greetings, with reference to the letter #1/783 dated 10/10/69 document in Persian, see[31 December 1990], concerning the instructions of the Esteemed leader page 85, Appendix IIIwhich had been conveyed to the Respected President regarding the Bahá’íquestion, we inform you that, since the respected President and the Head ofthe Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council had referred this question to this Council for considerationand study, it was placed on the Council’s agenda of session #128 on 16/11/69 [5 February 1991] and session#119 of 2/11/69 [22 January 1991]. In addition to the above, and further to the [results of the] discussions heldin this regard in session #112 of 2/5/66 [24 July 1987] presided over by the Esteemed leader (head and mem-ber of the Supreme Council), the recent views and directives given by the Esteemed leader regarding theBahá’í question were conveyed to the Supreme Council. In consideration of the contents of the Constitutionof the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the religious and civil laws and general policies of the country,these matters were carefully studied and decisions pronounced.In arriving at the decisions and proposing reasonable ways to counter the above question, due considerationwas given to the wishes of the Esteemed leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Khamenei], namely,that “in this regard a specific policy should be devised in such a way that everyone will understand whatshould or should not be done.” Consequently, the following proposals and recommendations resulted fromthese discussions.The respected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the Head of the Supreme RevolutionaryCultural Council, while approving these recommendations, instructed us to convey them to the Esteemedleader [Khamenei] so that appropriate action may be taken according to his guidance. their actions before they make any moves against a Bahá’í. It in no way promises any sort of protection. The memorandum also belies its underlying intentions when it says that Bahá’ís will be allowed to go to school only if they do not identify themselves as Bahá’ís, and that they should be sent to schools “with a strong religious ideology.” The aim here, obviously, is to wrest Bahá’í children from their faith. Ominously, the memorandum says that “A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country.” That Iran would like to reach outside its borders to stamp out the Bahá’í Faith makes clear the degree of blind animosity felt by the government towards Bahá’ís. 22 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONA. General status of the Bahá’ís within the country’s system 1. They will not be expelled from the country without reason. 2. ey will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason. Th 3. e government’s dealings with them must be in such a way that their progress and development are Th blocked.B. Educational and cultural status 1. They can be enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as Bahá’ís. 2. Preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong and imposing religious ideology. 3. They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís. 4. Their political (espionage) activities must be dealt with according to appropriate government laws and policies, and their religious and propaganda activities should be answered by giving them religious and cultural responses, as well as propaganda. 5. Propaganda institutions (such as the Islamic Propaganda Organization) must establish an independent section to counter the propaganda and religious activities of the Bahá’ís. 6. A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country.C. Legal and social status 1. Permit them a modest livelihood as is available to the general population. 2. To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Bahá’ís, it is permissible to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc. 3. Deny them employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís. 4. Deny them any position of influence, such as in the educational sector, etc. Wishing you divine confirmations, Secretary of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani [Signature] [Note in the handwriting of Mr. Khamenei] In the Name of God! The decision of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council seems sufficient. I thank you gentlemen for your attention and efforts. [signed:] Ali Khamenei In the years since the memorandum was written, the Bahá’í community has expe-rienced persecution in all of the areas outlined by it: Bahá’ís have been detained,imprisoned, and falsely charged with “spying”; they have been denied access to edu-cation and sources of livelihood; they have been stripped of all influence in Iraniansociety and deprived of their right to religious freedom. Indeed, a careful reading of the events and trends outlined above — as well asthose in the next chapter — proves that the government continues to actively pursueefforts to carry out the plan outlined by the “Bahá’í Question” memorandum, andthat since late 2005 these efforts have increased dramatically. Chapter 1: The Current Situation | 23

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Chapter 2 The Bah á’í Case anD huM an RiGhTs B Y MANY ACCOUNTS, one of humanity’s greatest collective achievements is the widespread recognition of human rights. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called human rights the “common language of humanity.” His predecessor, Boutros Boutros- Ghali, called them “the quintessential values through which we affirm together that we are a single human community.” And before that, Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the UN from 1953-1961, referred to human rights “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, coupled with the InternationalIn the face of Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,international Social and Cultural Rights, stand today as humanity’s collective vision for how gov-condemnation, the ernments everywhere must treat their citizens.government shifted Yet, for more than 30 years, Iranian Bahá’ís have faced a ferocious, hateful, andits tactics in the ultimately unjust persecution by the government.1990s, focusing on Between 1978 and 1998, more than 200 Bahá’ís were executed by Iranian authori- ties. Hundreds more Bahá’ís were imprisoned and tortured, and tens of thousandsefforts to block the were deprived of jobs, pensions, businesses, and educational opportunities.development of the In the face of international condemnation, the government shifted its tactics inBahá’í community the 1990s, focusing on efforts to block the development of the Bahá’í community inin a way that would a way that would attract less notice from international human rights organizations.attract less notice Among other things, the government banned Bahá’í youth from attending uni-from international versity, undertook an effort to destroy Bahá’í historic and cultural sites, and wagedhuman rights economic warfare against Bahá’í businesses and employees — all the while keeping the harassment of individual Bahá’ís at a low boil through revolving door arrests andorganizations. detentions. In other words, the persecution of Iranian Bahá’ís has over the course of time violated virtually all of the rights that are now recognized everywhere as the birth- right of every human being. 24 | THE BAHá’í QUESTION

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In this regard, the systematic persecution of Iranian Bahá’ís for nearly 30 yearshas in many ways been the ultimate test case for the monitoring and enforcement ofinternational human rights, for a variety of reasons: Bahá’ís in Iran are persecuted solely for their religious beliefs. Prejudices regard- ing ethnicity, race, or national origin are not factors. Bahá’ís in Iran are committed to nonviolence and noninvolvement in partisan politics, as fundamental principles of their faith, and pose no political threat to the government. Yet the government animosity directed against them has been systematic, bigoted, and intense. Iran is a signatory to the main international instruments of human rights. Indeed, in its posture to the outside world, Iran claims to defend human rights. The Bahá’í case offers a litmus test of Iran’s sincerity and reliability as an inter- The systematic national partner. persecution of Of special concern is the manner in which the Iranian government has sought to Iranian Bahá’ís for subvert the international human rights regime by shifting tactics in its persecu- nearly 30 years has tion of Bahá’ís so as to evade the notice of monitors. in many ways been the ultimate test caseFreedom of religion for the monitoringThe first two articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state that “all and enforcementhuman beings” are born free and in equal dignity, and that everyone is entitled to of internationalsuch rights “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, reli- human rights . . .gion, political or other opinion…” The right to freedom of religion is more clearly outlined in Article 18 — and fullycodified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran hassigned. The Covenant states, for example, that everyone has the right to “to manifesthis religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.” At its heart, the persecution of Iranian Bahá’ís is about the persecution of individ-uals solely because of their religious beliefs — and as such touches the core of nearlyevery fundamental right outlined in the Declaration and following documents. That Bahá’ís are persecuted solely for their religious beliefs is demonstrated by thefact that in numerous cases, Bahá’ís who have been faced with prison or worse havebeen given the option of converting to Islam, with the promise that such a conversionwould lead to their instant freedom. It is an option that few Bahá’ís have taken. Persecution on the basis of religion is further evidenced by the fact that, in docu-ment after document, whether in the courts, in letters to police or other agencies, orin newspaper articles, the government or their proxies refer to the Bahá’í Faith withderision, calling it a “misguided sect” or “perverse sect” and stating the Bahá’ís are“infidels” or even “apostates.” Moreover, Iranian Bahá’ís come from every ethno-linguistic group within Iran,including Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmen, Armenians, and Georgians.They also come from every religious background within Iranian society, includingChristian, Jewish, Muslim and Zoroastrian. Chapter 2: The Bahá’í Case and Human Rights | 25

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Bahá’ís are not distinguished by their skin color, manner of dress, accent or names. The only distinguishing characteristic is their faith. This, of course, is one reason the current government effort to “identify” Bahá’ís is significant and ominous. There is no other way to identify Bahá’ís. As a case of religious persecution, the government effort to eliminate the Bahá’í Faith as a viable religious community in Iran is sweeping and all-encompassing. All manner of rights to religious freedom, worship and assembly have been taken away from Bahá’ís. Since 1983, the Bahá’í community in Iran has been denied both the right to assemble officially and the right to maintain its sacred institutions. In other coun-Since 1983, the tries, democratically elected Bahá’í governing bodies organize and administer the religious activities of the community. The Bahá’í Faith has no clergy. Its institutionsBahá’í community perform many of the functions reserved to clergy in other religions and are the foun-in Iran has been dational element of Bahá’í community life. In Iran, they continue to be banned.denied both the Iranian Bahá’ís gradually made arrangements to worship in small groups, con-right to assemble duct classes for children, and take care of other community needs in their homes.officially and the Authorities continued to harass them by disrupting meetings, arresting teachers ofright to maintain its children’s classes, and giving Bahá’ís suspended sentences to be carried out shouldsacred institutions. they again commit the “crime” of attending religious instruction in a private home. The authorities have long attempted to prevent Iranian Bahá’ís from participat-In other countries, ing in monthly religious gatherings and other group activities. In 2004, the authori-democratically ties intensified their pressure on the community (in ways that included threateningelected Bahá’í individual believers) and ordered the Bahá’ís to suspend all social, educational andgoverning bodies community-related activities — in other words, all activities that went beyond theorganize and individual observance of religious obligations. For Bahá’ís, however, many of theseadminister the activities are an integral part of their religious practice.religious activities Moreover, the community was told that its members would face the government’s withdrawal of protection if they did not ban all collective activities. The officialsof the community. stated that the most compassionate act of the Islamic Republic had been to establish laws that protect the Bahá’ís from the people of Iran, who might otherwise take the law into their own hands and “follow the dictates of their Islamic sentiments.” Beginning in 2005, human rights violations against members of the community began to increase. As reported in other sections of this document, their situation has been gradually but steadily worsening ever since. The right to life, liberty and security The second article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly spells out the right to “life, liberty and security of person.” And, of course, protections for such rights undergird all other human rights: if one is threatened with death, imprison- ment, or the likelihood of physical assault as one tries to practice his or her religion and exercise freedom of speech, those freedoms are essentially nonexistent. And since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the threat of death, imprisonment or physical assault have been a matter of daily concern for Iranian Bahá’ís. 26 | The Bahá’í Question

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Bahá’ís killed in Iran since 8 7 9 36 48 32 29 30 7 7 5 3 2 1 3 1 1 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2000 2003 2004 2005 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, virtually the entire leadership of the Bahá’ícommunity was arrested and executed or disappeared. In all, more than 200 Bahá’íshave been killed or executed since the Islamic Republic’s founding. A full list of theirnames can be found in Appendix I. In recent years the government has sharply reduced its killing rate although itcontinued occasionally to execute Bahá’ís through the late 1990s. The most recentexecution of a Bahá’í in Iran was in July 1998, when Ruhu’llah Rawhani was hangedin Mashhad. Nevertheless, the threat of execution or imminent death still looms large forIranian Bahá’ís, who remain without recognized legal status in Iran. In December 2005, for example, a Bahá’í who was wrongly jailed for 10 years diedin his prison cell of unknown causes. Mr. Dhabihu’llah Mahrami, 59, was held in a Ruhu’llah Rawhani,government prison in Yazd under harsh physical conditions at the time of his death. who was hangedMr. Mahrami had originally been arrested in 1995 on charges of apostasy — and was in Mashhad byinitially sentenced to death. That sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment government authoritiesafter an international outcry and widespread media attention. on 21 July 1998. CHAPTER 2: The Bahá’í Case and Human Rights | 27

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The threat of executionF or Iranian Bahá’ís, the threat of execution is never far from mind. More than 200 Bahá’ís were executed or killed in the early 1980s, and the most recent execution occurred in 1998. Ruhu’llah Rawhani, a father of four and an active Bahá’í during his entire life, sufferedthrough the indignities of religious persecution throughout much of Iran’s recent history. In 1984, Mr.Rawhani was arrested and imprisoned for more than a year, during which he was tortured, accordingto relatives. He was subsequently released but then was arrested a second time in the mid-1990s. Thecharge was apparently related to his volunteer work at purely religious activities, such as prayer meet-ings and children’s classes. He was released after 24 hours. In September 1997, however, the medical supplies salesman was arrested for a third time, andplaced in solitary confinement in Mashhad. Mr. Rawhani had been accused of “converting” a womanfrom Islam to the Bahá’í Faith. The woman, however, denied that she had converted; she explainedthat her mother was a Bahá’í and that she herself had been raised as a Bahá’í. She was not arrested. Mr. Rawhani was kept incommunicado for the duration of his imprisonment and no informationis available regarding his treatment in prison. There is no evidence that he was accorded any legal pro-cess, and no sentence was announced. It appears certain that he was not allowed access to a lawyer. On 20 July 1998, someone from the Iranian Intelligence Department telephoned a Bahá’í inMashhad stating that Mr. Rawhani was to be executed the next day. Initially, this statement wasnot believed, as Bahá’ís in Iran had received similar calls previously in apparent attempts to frightenthem. The next morning, the family was called, told to come to the prison to collect Mr. Rawhani’s body,and given an hour to bury him. Rope marks on his neck indicated he had been hanged. More recently, Bahá’ís have died under mysterious circumstances. In February 2007, Mrs. Shah Beygom Dehghani was lured out of her house in the middle of the night and savagely attacked with a lawn rake. She suffered broken hands and ribs, head inju- ries, and critical damage to her liver and kidneys. Her screams caused the attacker to flee, and she crawled to the home of her neighbor for help. Despite medical attention, her wounds proved fatal. She died on 7 March 2007, 18 days after the attack. Even if government-sponsored executions have halted, the threat of death or execution remains very real for Iranian Bahá’ís. Bahá’ís are often referred to as “apos- tates” in the media or even by officials — and under some interpretations of Islamic law, the crime of apostasy requires the death penalty. Indeed, in early 2008, it emerged that the Iranian Parliament, in considering legislation designed to overhaul its penal code, included wording that would explic- itly fix the death penalty as the punishment for apostasy, and also spell out the conditions under which an individual could be considered an apostate. Although that legislation has not yet passed, its terms and definitions pose a great danger for Iranian Bahá’ís. 28 | The Bahá’í Question