The informativity of a computational model of language acquisition is directly related to how closely it approximates the actual acquisition task, sometimes referred to as the model's cognitive plausibility. We suggest that though every computational model necessarily idealizes the modeled task, an informative language acquisition model can aim to be cognitively plausible in multiple ways. We discuss these cognitive plausibility checkpoints generally and then apply them to a case study in word segmentation, investigating a promising Bayesian segmentation strategy. We incorporate cognitive plausibility by using an age-appropriate unit of perceptual representation, evaluating the model output in terms of its utility, and incorporating cognitive constraints into the inference process. Our more cognitively plausible model shows a beneficial effect of cognitive constraints on segmentation performance. One interpretation of this effect is as a synergy between the naive theories of language structure that infants may have and the cognitive constraints that limit the fidelity of their inference processes, where less accurate inference approximations are better when the underlying assumptions about how words are generated are less accurate. More generally, these results highlight the utility of incorporating cognitive plausibility more fully into computational models of language acquisition.

]]>
The informativity of a computational model of language acquisition is directly related to how closely it approximates the actual acquisition task, sometimes referred to as the model's cognitive plausibility. We suggest that though every computational model necessarily idealizes the modeled task, an informative language acquisition model can aim to be cognitively plausible in multiple ways. We discuss these cognitive plausibility checkpoints generally and then apply them to a case study in word segmentation, investigating a promising Bayesian segmentation strategy. We incorporate cognitive plausibility by using an age-appropriate unit of perceptual representation, evaluating the model output in terms of its utility, and incorporating cognitive constraints into the inference process. Our more cognitively plausible model shows a beneficial effect of cognitive constraints on segmentation performance. One interpretation of this effect is as a synergy between the naive theories of language structure that infants may have and the cognitive constraints that limit the fidelity of their inference processes, where less accurate inference approximations are better when the underlying assumptions about how words are generated are less accurate. More generally, these results highlight the utility of incorporating cognitive plausibility more fully into computational models of language acquisition.
Processing of Numerical and Proportional Quantifiershttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12219Processing of Numerical and Proportional QuantifiersSailee Shikhare, Stefan Heim, Elise Klein, Stefan Huber, Klaus Willmes2015-01-29T07:07:46.783891-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12219John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12219http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12219Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Quantifier expressions like “many” and “at least” are part of a rich repository of words in language representing magnitude information. The role of numerical processing in comprehending quantifiers was studied in a semantic truth value judgment task, asking adults to quickly verify sentences about visual displays using numerical (at least seven, at least thirteen, at most seven, at most thirteen) or proportional (many, few) quantifiers. The visual displays were composed of systematically varied proportions of yellow and blue circles. The results demonstrated that numerical estimation and numerical reference information are fundamental in encoding the meaning of quantifiers in terms of response times and acceptability judgments. However, a difference emerges in the comparison strategies when a fixed external reference numerosity (seven or thirteen) is used for numerical quantifiers, whereas an internal numerical criterion is invoked for proportional quantifiers. Moreover, for both quantifier types, quantifier semantics and its polarity (positive vs. negative) biased the response direction (accept/reject). Overall, our results indicate that quantifier comprehension involves core numerical and lexical semantic properties, demonstrating integrated processing of language and numbers.

]]>
Quantifier expressions like “many” and “at least” are part of a rich repository of words in language representing magnitude information. The role of numerical processing in comprehending quantifiers was studied in a semantic truth value judgment task, asking adults to quickly verify sentences about visual displays using numerical (at least seven, at least thirteen, at most seven, at most thirteen) or proportional (many, few) quantifiers. The visual displays were composed of systematically varied proportions of yellow and blue circles. The results demonstrated that numerical estimation and numerical reference information are fundamental in encoding the meaning of quantifiers in terms of response times and acceptability judgments. However, a difference emerges in the comparison strategies when a fixed external reference numerosity (seven or thirteen) is used for numerical quantifiers, whereas an internal numerical criterion is invoked for proportional quantifiers. Moreover, for both quantifier types, quantifier semantics and its polarity (positive vs. negative) biased the response direction (accept/reject). Overall, our results indicate that quantifier comprehension involves core numerical and lexical semantic properties, demonstrating integrated processing of language and numbers.
Productivity of Noun Slots in Verb Frameshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12216Productivity of Noun Slots in Verb FramesAnna L. Theakston, Paul Ibbotson, Daniel Freudenthal, Elena V. M. Lieven, Michael Tomasello2015-01-21T04:12:55.054894-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12216John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12216http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12216Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Productivity is a central concept in the study of language and language acquisition. As a test case for exploring the notion of productivity, we focus on the noun slots of verb frames, such as __want__, __see__, and __get__. We develop a novel combination of measures designed to assess both the flexibility and creativity of use in these slots. We do so using a rigorously controlled sample of child speech and child directed speech from three English-speaking children between the ages of 2–3 years and their caregivers. We find different levels of creativity and flexibility between the adult and child samples for some measures, for some slots, and for some developmental periods. We discuss these differences in the context of verb frame semantics, conventionality versus creativity and child errors, and draw some tentative conclusions regarding developmental changes in children's early grammatical representations.

]]>
Productivity is a central concept in the study of language and language acquisition. As a test case for exploring the notion of productivity, we focus on the noun slots of verb frames, such as __want__, __see__, and __get__. We develop a novel combination of measures designed to assess both the flexibility and creativity of use in these slots. We do so using a rigorously controlled sample of child speech and child directed speech from three English-speaking children between the ages of 2–3 years and their caregivers. We find different levels of creativity and flexibility between the adult and child samples for some measures, for some slots, and for some developmental periods. We discuss these differences in the context of verb frame semantics, conventionality versus creativity and child errors, and draw some tentative conclusions regarding developmental changes in children's early grammatical representations.
Well-Hidden Regularities: Abstract Uses of in and on Retain an Aspect of Their Spatial Meaninghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12218Well-Hidden Regularities: Abstract Uses of in and on Retain an Aspect of Their Spatial MeaningAnja Jamrozik, Dedre Gentner2015-01-20T01:15:20.095569-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12218John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12218http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12218Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Prepositions name spatial relationships (e.g., book on a table). But they are also used to convey abstract, non-spatial relationships (e.g., Adrian is on a roll)—raising the question of how the abstract uses relate to the concrete spatial uses. Despite considerable success in delineating these relationships, no general account exists for the two most frequently extended prepositions: in and on. We test the proposal that what is preserved in abstract uses of these prepositions is the relative degree of control between the located object (the figure) and the reference object (the ground). Across four experiments, we find a continuum of greater figure control for on (e.g., Jordan is on a roll) and greater ground control for in (e.g., Casey is in a depression). These findings bear on accounts of semantic structure and language change, as well as on second language instruction.

]]>
Prepositions name spatial relationships (e.g., book on a table). But they are also used to convey abstract, non-spatial relationships (e.g., Adrian is on a roll)—raising the question of how the abstract uses relate to the concrete spatial uses. Despite considerable success in delineating these relationships, no general account exists for the two most frequently extended prepositions: in and on. We test the proposal that what is preserved in abstract uses of these prepositions is the relative degree of control between the located object (the figure) and the reference object (the ground). Across four experiments, we find a continuum of greater figure control for on (e.g., Jordan is on a roll) and greater ground control for in (e.g., Casey is in a depression). These findings bear on accounts of semantic structure and language change, as well as on second language instruction.
Hey Little Sister, Who's the Only One? Modulating Informativeness in the Resolution of Privative Ambiguityhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12212Hey Little Sister, Who's the Only One? Modulating Informativeness in the Resolution of Privative AmbiguityFrancesca Foppolo, Marco Marelli, Luisa Meroni, Andrea Gualmini2015-01-14T00:32:05.857207-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12212John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12212http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12212Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

We present two eye-tracking experiments on the interpretation of sentences like “The tall girl is (not) the only one that …,” which are ambiguous between the anaphoric (the only girl that …) and the exophoric interpretation (the only individual that …). These interpretations differ in informativeness: in a positive context, the exophoric (strong) reading entails the anaphoric (weak), while in a negative context the entailment pattern is reversed and the anaphoric reading is the strongest one. We tested whether adults rely on considerations about informativeness in solving the ambiguity. The results show that participants interpreted one exophorically in both positive and negative contexts. Given these findings, we cast doubts on the idea that Informativeness plays a role in ambiguity resolution and proposes a Principle of Maximal Exploitation: When a context is provided, adults extend their domain of evaluation to include the whole scenario, independently from truth-conditional considerations about informativity and strength.

]]>
We present two eye-tracking experiments on the interpretation of sentences like “The tall girl is (not) the only one that …,” which are ambiguous between the anaphoric (the only girl that …) and the exophoric interpretation (the only individual that …). These interpretations differ in informativeness: in a positive context, the exophoric (strong) reading entails the anaphoric (weak), while in a negative context the entailment pattern is reversed and the anaphoric reading is the strongest one. We tested whether adults rely on considerations about informativeness in solving the ambiguity. The results show that participants interpreted one exophorically in both positive and negative contexts. Given these findings, we cast doubts on the idea that Informativeness plays a role in ambiguity resolution and proposes a Principle of Maximal Exploitation: When a context is provided, adults extend their domain of evaluation to include the whole scenario, independently from truth-conditional considerations about informativity and strength.
Information Density and Syntactic Repetitionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12215Information Density and Syntactic RepetitionDavid Temperley, Daniel Gildea2015-01-04T23:21:56.198697-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12215John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12215http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12215Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

In noun phrase (NP) coordinate constructions (e.g., NP and NP), there is a strong tendency for the syntactic structure of the second conjunct to match that of the first; the second conjunct in such constructions is therefore low in syntactic information. The theory of uniform information density predicts that low-information syntactic constructions will be counterbalanced by high information in other aspects of that part of the sentence, and high-information constructions will be counterbalanced by other low-information components. Three predictions follow: (a) lexical probabilities (measured by N-gram probabilities and head-dependent probabilities) will be lower in second conjuncts than first conjuncts; (b) lexical probabilities will be lower in matching second conjuncts (those whose syntactic expansions match the first conjunct) than nonmatching ones; and (c) syntactic repetition should be especially common for low-frequency NP expansions. Corpus analysis provides support for all three of these predictions.

]]>
In noun phrase (NP) coordinate constructions (e.g., NP and NP), there is a strong tendency for the syntactic structure of the second conjunct to match that of the first; the second conjunct in such constructions is therefore low in syntactic information. The theory of uniform information density predicts that low-information syntactic constructions will be counterbalanced by high information in other aspects of that part of the sentence, and high-information constructions will be counterbalanced by other low-information components. Three predictions follow: (a) lexical probabilities (measured by N-gram probabilities and head-dependent probabilities) will be lower in second conjuncts than first conjuncts; (b) lexical probabilities will be lower in matching second conjuncts (those whose syntactic expansions match the first conjunct) than nonmatching ones; and (c) syntactic repetition should be especially common for low-frequency NP expansions. Corpus analysis provides support for all three of these predictions.
Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgmenthttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12213Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal JudgmentSamuel G. B. Johnson, Woo-kyoung Ahn2015-01-03T00:36:24.72949-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12213John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12213http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12213Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links (). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).

]]>
Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links (). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).
Memory Without Consolidation: Temporal Distinctiveness Explains Retroactive Interferencehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12214Memory Without Consolidation: Temporal Distinctiveness Explains Retroactive InterferenceUllrich K. H. Ecker, Gordon D. A. Brown, Stephan Lewandowsky2014-12-31T00:56:03.585104-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12214John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12214http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12214Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Is consolidation needed to account for retroactive interference in free recall? Interfering mental activity during the retention interval of a memory task impairs performance, in particular if the interference occurs in temporal proximity to the encoding of the to-be-remembered (TBR) information. There are at least two rival theoretical accounts of this temporal gradient of retroactive interference. The cognitive neuroscience literature has suggested neural consolidation is a pivotal factor determining item recall. According to this account, interfering activity interrupts consolidation processes that would otherwise stabilize the memory representations of TBR items post-encoding. Temporal distinctiveness theory, by contrast, proposes that the retrievability of items depends on their isolation in psychological time. According to this theory, information processed after the encoding of TBR material will reduce the temporal distinctiveness of the TBR information. To test between these accounts, implementations of consolidation were added to the SIMPLE model of memory and learning. We report data from two experiments utilizing a two-list free recall paradigm. Modeling results imply that SIMPLE was able to model the data and did not benefit from the addition of consolidation. It is concluded that the temporal gradient of retroactive interference cannot be taken as evidence for memory consolidation.

]]>
Is consolidation needed to account for retroactive interference in free recall? Interfering mental activity during the retention interval of a memory task impairs performance, in particular if the interference occurs in temporal proximity to the encoding of the to-be-remembered (TBR) information. There are at least two rival theoretical accounts of this temporal gradient of retroactive interference. The cognitive neuroscience literature has suggested neural consolidation is a pivotal factor determining item recall. According to this account, interfering activity interrupts consolidation processes that would otherwise stabilize the memory representations of TBR items post-encoding. Temporal distinctiveness theory, by contrast, proposes that the retrievability of items depends on their isolation in psychological time. According to this theory, information processed after the encoding of TBR material will reduce the temporal distinctiveness of the TBR information. To test between these accounts, implementations of consolidation were added to the SIMPLE model of memory and learning. We report data from two experiments utilizing a two-list free recall paradigm. Modeling results imply that SIMPLE was able to model the data and did not benefit from the addition of consolidation. It is concluded that the temporal gradient of retroactive interference cannot be taken as evidence for memory consolidation.
The Interaction of Language-Specific and Universal Factors During the Acquisition of Morphophonemic Alternations With Exceptionshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12209The Interaction of Language-Specific and Universal Factors During the Acquisition of Morphophonemic Alternations With ExceptionsDinah Baer-Henney, Frank Kügler, Ruben Vijver2014-12-26T00:36:15.553483-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12209John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12209http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12209Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Using the artificial language paradigm, we studied the acquisition of morphophonemic alternations with exceptions by 160 German adult learners. We tested the acquisition of two types of alternations in two regularity conditions while additionally varying length of training. In the first alternation, a vowel harmony, backness of the stem vowel determines backness of the suffix. This process is grounded in substance (phonetic motivation), and this universal phonetic factor bolsters learning a generalization. In the second alternation, tenseness of the stem vowel determines backness of the suffix vowel. This process is not based in substance, but it reflects a phonotactic property of German and our participants benefit from this language-specific factor. We found that learners use both cues, while substantive bias surfaces mainly in the most unstable situation. We show that language-specific and universal factors interact in learning.

]]>
Using the artificial language paradigm, we studied the acquisition of morphophonemic alternations with exceptions by 160 German adult learners. We tested the acquisition of two types of alternations in two regularity conditions while additionally varying length of training. In the first alternation, a vowel harmony, backness of the stem vowel determines backness of the suffix. This process is grounded in substance (phonetic motivation), and this universal phonetic factor bolsters learning a generalization. In the second alternation, tenseness of the stem vowel determines backness of the suffix vowel. This process is not based in substance, but it reflects a phonotactic property of German and our participants benefit from this language-specific factor. We found that learners use both cues, while substantive bias surfaces mainly in the most unstable situation. We show that language-specific and universal factors interact in learning.
Effects of Causal Structure on Decisions About Where to Intervene on Causal Systemshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12210Effects of Causal Structure on Decisions About Where to Intervene on Causal SystemsBrian J. Edwards, Russell C. Burnett, Frank C. Keil2014-12-22T01:53:50.809832-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12210John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12210http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12210Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

We investigated how people design interventions to affect the outcomes of causal systems. We propose that the abstract structural properties of a causal system, in addition to people's content and mechanism knowledge, influence decisions about how to intervene. In Experiment 1, participants preferred to intervene at specific locations (immediate causes, root causes) in a causal chain regardless of which content variables occupied those positions. In Experiment 2, participants were more likely to intervene on root causes versus immediate causes when they were presented with a long-term goal versus a short-term goal. These results show that the structural properties of a causal system can guide the design of interventions.

]]>
We investigated how people design interventions to affect the outcomes of causal systems. We propose that the abstract structural properties of a causal system, in addition to people's content and mechanism knowledge, influence decisions about how to intervene. In Experiment 1, participants preferred to intervene at specific locations (immediate causes, root causes) in a causal chain regardless of which content variables occupied those positions. In Experiment 2, participants were more likely to intervene on root causes versus immediate causes when they were presented with a long-term goal versus a short-term goal. These results show that the structural properties of a causal system can guide the design of interventions.
How the Eyes Tell Lies: Social Gaze During a Preference Taskhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12211How the Eyes Tell Lies: Social Gaze During a Preference TaskTom Foulsham, Maria Lock2014-12-22T01:53:35.033736-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12211John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12211http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12211Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception.

]]>
Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception.
Determinants of Scanpath Regularity in Readinghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12208Determinants of Scanpath Regularity in ReadingTitus Malsburg, Reinhold Kliegl, Shravan Vasishth2014-12-22T01:47:33.226013-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12208John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12208http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12208Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Scanpaths have played an important role in classic research on reading behavior. Nevertheless, they have largely been neglected in later research perhaps due to a lack of suitable analytical tools. Recently, von der Malsburg and Vasishth (2011) proposed a new measure for quantifying differences between scanpaths and demonstrated that this measure can recover effects that were missed with the traditional eyetracking measures. However, the sentences used in that study were difficult to process and scanpath effects accordingly strong. The purpose of the present study was to test the validity, sensitivity, and scope of applicability of the scanpath measure, using simple sentences that are typically read from left to right. We derived predictions for the regularity of scanpaths from the literature on oculomotor control, sentence processing, and cognitive aging and tested these predictions using the scanpath measure and a large database of eye movements. All predictions were confirmed: Sentences with short words and syntactically more difficult sentences elicited more irregular scanpaths. Also, older readers produced more irregular scanpaths than younger readers. In addition, we found an effect that was not reported earlier: Syntax had a smaller influence on the eye movements of older readers than on those of young readers. We discuss this interaction of syntactic parsing cost with age in terms of shifts in processing strategies and a decline of executive control as readers age. Overall, our results demonstrate the validity and sensitivity of the scanpath measure and thus establish it as a productive and versatile tool for reading research.

]]>
Scanpaths have played an important role in classic research on reading behavior. Nevertheless, they have largely been neglected in later research perhaps due to a lack of suitable analytical tools. Recently, von der Malsburg and Vasishth (2011) proposed a new measure for quantifying differences between scanpaths and demonstrated that this measure can recover effects that were missed with the traditional eyetracking measures. However, the sentences used in that study were difficult to process and scanpath effects accordingly strong. The purpose of the present study was to test the validity, sensitivity, and scope of applicability of the scanpath measure, using simple sentences that are typically read from left to right. We derived predictions for the regularity of scanpaths from the literature on oculomotor control, sentence processing, and cognitive aging and tested these predictions using the scanpath measure and a large database of eye movements. All predictions were confirmed: Sentences with short words and syntactically more difficult sentences elicited more irregular scanpaths. Also, older readers produced more irregular scanpaths than younger readers. In addition, we found an effect that was not reported earlier: Syntax had a smaller influence on the eye movements of older readers than on those of young readers. We discuss this interaction of syntactic parsing cost with age in terms of shifts in processing strategies and a decline of executive control as readers age. Overall, our results demonstrate the validity and sensitivity of the scanpath measure and thus establish it as a productive and versatile tool for reading research.
Interface of Linguistic and Visual Information During Audience Designhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12207Interface of Linguistic and Visual Information During Audience DesignKumiko Fukumura2014-12-05T00:50:42.682878-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12207John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12207http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12207Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Evidence suggests that speakers can take account of the addressee's needs when referring. However, what representations drive the speaker's audience design has been less clear. This study aims to go beyond previous studies by investigating the interplay between the visual and linguistic context during audience design. Speakers repeated subordinate descriptions (e.g., firefighter) given in the prior linguistic context less and used basic-level descriptions (e.g., man) more when the addressee did not hear the linguistic context than when s/he did. But crucially, this effect happened only when the referent lacked the visual attributes associated with the expressions (e.g., the referent was in plain clothes rather than in a firefighter uniform), so there was no other contextual cue available for the identification of the referent. This suggests that speakers flexibly use different contextual cues to help their addressee map the referring expression onto the intended referent. In addition, speakers used fewer pronouns when the addressee did not hear the linguistic antecedent than when s/he did. This suggests that although speakers may be egocentric during anaphoric reference (Fukumura & Van Gompel, 2012), they can cooperatively avoid pronouns when the linguistic antecedents were not shared with their addressee during initial reference.

]]>
Evidence suggests that speakers can take account of the addressee's needs when referring. However, what representations drive the speaker's audience design has been less clear. This study aims to go beyond previous studies by investigating the interplay between the visual and linguistic context during audience design. Speakers repeated subordinate descriptions (e.g., firefighter) given in the prior linguistic context less and used basic-level descriptions (e.g., man) more when the addressee did not hear the linguistic context than when s/he did. But crucially, this effect happened only when the referent lacked the visual attributes associated with the expressions (e.g., the referent was in plain clothes rather than in a firefighter uniform), so there was no other contextual cue available for the identification of the referent. This suggests that speakers flexibly use different contextual cues to help their addressee map the referring expression onto the intended referent. In addition, speakers used fewer pronouns when the addressee did not hear the linguistic antecedent than when s/he did. This suggests that although speakers may be egocentric during anaphoric reference (Fukumura & Van Gompel, 2012), they can cooperatively avoid pronouns when the linguistic antecedents were not shared with their addressee during initial reference.
How Cognitive Load Influences Speakers' Choice of Referring Expressionshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12205How Cognitive Load Influences Speakers' Choice of Referring ExpressionsJorrig Vogels, Emiel Krahmer, Alfons Maes2014-12-04T01:43:34.756477-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12205John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12205http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12205Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

We report on two experiments investigating the effect of an increased cognitive load for speakers on the choice of referring expressions. Speakers produced story continuations to addressees, in which they referred to characters that were either salient or non-salient in the discourse. In Experiment 1, referents that were salient for the speaker were non-salient for the addressee, and vice versa. In Experiment 2, all discourse information was shared between speaker and addressee. Cognitive load was manipulated by the presence or absence of a secondary task for the speaker. The results show that speakers under load are more likely to produce pronouns, at least when referring to less salient referents. We take this finding as evidence that speakers under load have more difficulties taking discourse salience into account, resulting in the use of expressions that are more economical for themselves.

]]>
We report on two experiments investigating the effect of an increased cognitive load for speakers on the choice of referring expressions. Speakers produced story continuations to addressees, in which they referred to characters that were either salient or non-salient in the discourse. In Experiment 1, referents that were salient for the speaker were non-salient for the addressee, and vice versa. In Experiment 2, all discourse information was shared between speaker and addressee. Cognitive load was manipulated by the presence or absence of a secondary task for the speaker. The results show that speakers under load are more likely to produce pronouns, at least when referring to less salient referents. We take this finding as evidence that speakers under load have more difficulties taking discourse salience into account, resulting in the use of expressions that are more economical for themselves.
The Identity-Location Binding Problemhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12204The Identity-Location Binding ProblemPiers D. L. Howe, Adam Ferguson2014-12-02T00:39:20.001643-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12204John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12204http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12204Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

The binding problem is fundamental to visual perception. It is the problem of associating an object's visual properties with itself and not with some other object. The problem is made particular difficult because different properties of an object, such as its color, shape, size, and motion, are often processed independently, sometimes in different cortical areas. The results of these separate analyses have to be combined before the object can be seen as a single coherent entity as opposed to a collection of unconnected features. Visual bindings are typically initiated and updated in a serial fashion, one object at a time. Here, we show that one type of binding, location-identity bindings, can be updated in parallel. We do this by using two complementary techniques, the simultaneous-sequential paradigm and systems factorial technology. These techniques make different assumptions and rely on different behavioral measures, yet both came to the same conclusion.

]]>
The binding problem is fundamental to visual perception. It is the problem of associating an object's visual properties with itself and not with some other object. The problem is made particular difficult because different properties of an object, such as its color, shape, size, and motion, are often processed independently, sometimes in different cortical areas. The results of these separate analyses have to be combined before the object can be seen as a single coherent entity as opposed to a collection of unconnected features. Visual bindings are typically initiated and updated in a serial fashion, one object at a time. Here, we show that one type of binding, location-identity bindings, can be updated in parallel. We do this by using two complementary techniques, the simultaneous-sequential paradigm and systems factorial technology. These techniques make different assumptions and rely on different behavioral measures, yet both came to the same conclusion.
Building Cognition: The Construction of Computational Representations for Scientific Discoveryhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12203Building Cognition: The Construction of Computational Representations for Scientific DiscoverySanjay Chandrasekharan, Nancy J. Nersessian2014-11-29T00:22:10.792158-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12203John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12203http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12203Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Novel computational representations, such as simulation models of complex systems and video games for scientific discovery (Foldit, EteRNA etc.), are dramatically changing the way discoveries emerge in science and engineering. The cognitive roles played by such computational representations in discovery are not well understood. We present a theoretical analysis of the cognitive roles such representations play, based on an ethnographic study of the building of computational models in a systems biology laboratory. Specifically, we focus on a case of model-building by an engineer that led to a remarkable discovery in basic bioscience. Accounting for such discoveries requires a distributed cognition (DC) analysis, as DC focuses on the roles played by external representations in cognitive processes. However, DC analyses by and large have not examined scientific discovery, and they mostly focus on memory offloading, particularly how the use of existing external representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks. In contrast, we study discovery processes and argue that discoveries emerge from the processes of building the computational representation. The building process integrates manipulations in imagination and in the representation, creating a coupled cognitive system of model and modeler, where the model is incorporated into the modeler's imagination. This account extends DC significantly, and we present some of the theoretical and application implications of this extended account.

]]>
Novel computational representations, such as simulation models of complex systems and video games for scientific discovery (Foldit, EteRNA etc.), are dramatically changing the way discoveries emerge in science and engineering. The cognitive roles played by such computational representations in discovery are not well understood. We present a theoretical analysis of the cognitive roles such representations play, based on an ethnographic study of the building of computational models in a systems biology laboratory. Specifically, we focus on a case of model-building by an engineer that led to a remarkable discovery in basic bioscience. Accounting for such discoveries requires a distributed cognition (DC) analysis, as DC focuses on the roles played by external representations in cognitive processes. However, DC analyses by and large have not examined scientific discovery, and they mostly focus on memory offloading, particularly how the use of existing external representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks. In contrast, we study discovery processes and argue that discoveries emerge from the processes of building the computational representation. The building process integrates manipulations in imagination and in the representation, creating a coupled cognitive system of model and modeler, where the model is incorporated into the modeler's imagination. This account extends DC significantly, and we present some of the theoretical and application implications of this extended account.
Salience Not Status: How Category Labels Influence Feature Inferencehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12206Salience Not Status: How Category Labels Influence Feature InferenceMark K. Johansen, Justin Savage, Nathalie Fouquet, David R. Shanks2014-11-28T00:27:32.458536-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12206John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12206http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12206Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Two main uses of categories are classification and feature inference, and category labels have been widely shown to play a dominant role in feature inference. However, the nature of this influence remains unclear, and we evaluate two contrasting hypotheses formalized as mathematical models: the label special-mechanism hypothesis and the label super-salience hypothesis. The special-mechanism hypothesis is that category labels, unlike other features, trigger inference decision making in reference to the category prototypes. This results in a tendency for prototype-compatible inferences because the labels trigger a special mechanism rather than because of any influences they have on similarity evaluation. The super-salience hypothesis assumes that the large label influence is due to their high salience and corresponding impact on similarity without any need for a special mechanism. Application of the two models to a feature inference task based on a family resemblance category structure yields strong support for the label super-salience hypothesis and in particular does not support the need for a special mechanism based on prototypes.

]]>
Two main uses of categories are classification and feature inference, and category labels have been widely shown to play a dominant role in feature inference. However, the nature of this influence remains unclear, and we evaluate two contrasting hypotheses formalized as mathematical models: the label special-mechanism hypothesis and the label super-salience hypothesis. The special-mechanism hypothesis is that category labels, unlike other features, trigger inference decision making in reference to the category prototypes. This results in a tendency for prototype-compatible inferences because the labels trigger a special mechanism rather than because of any influences they have on similarity evaluation. The super-salience hypothesis assumes that the large label influence is due to their high salience and corresponding impact on similarity without any need for a special mechanism. Application of the two models to a feature inference task based on a family resemblance category structure yields strong support for the label super-salience hypothesis and in particular does not support the need for a special mechanism based on prototypes.
An Evolutionary Analysis of Learned Attentionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12196An Evolutionary Analysis of Learned AttentionRichard A. Hullinger, John K. Kruschke, Peter M. Todd2014-11-25T01:42:30.789694-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12196John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12196http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12196Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Humans and many other species selectively attend to stimuli or stimulus dimensions—but why should an animal constrain information input in this way? To investigate the adaptive functions of attention, we used a genetic algorithm to evolve simple connectionist networks that had to make categorization decisions in a variety of environmental structures. The results of these simulations show that while learned attention is not universally adaptive, its benefit is not restricted to the reduction of input complexity in order to keep it within an organism's processing capacity limitations. Instead, being able to shift attention provides adaptive benefit by allowing faster learning with fewer errors in a range of ecologically plausible environments.

]]>
Humans and many other species selectively attend to stimuli or stimulus dimensions—but why should an animal constrain information input in this way? To investigate the adaptive functions of attention, we used a genetic algorithm to evolve simple connectionist networks that had to make categorization decisions in a variety of environmental structures. The results of these simulations show that while learned attention is not universally adaptive, its benefit is not restricted to the reduction of input complexity in order to keep it within an organism's processing capacity limitations. Instead, being able to shift attention provides adaptive benefit by allowing faster learning with fewer errors in a range of ecologically plausible environments.
Making Probabilistic Relational Categories Learnablehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12199Making Probabilistic Relational Categories LearnableWookyoung Jung, John E. Hummel2014-11-17T01:47:27.37768-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12199John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12199http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12199Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Theories of relational concept acquisition (e.g., schema induction) based on structured intersection discovery predict that relational concepts with a probabilistic (i.e., family resemblance) structure ought to be extremely difficult to learn. We report four experiments testing this prediction by investigating conditions hypothesized to facilitate the learning of such categories. Experiment 1 showed that changing the task from a category-learning task to choosing the “winning” object in each stimulus greatly facilitated participants' ability to learn probabilistic relational categories. Experiments 2 and 3 further investigated the mechanisms underlying this “who's winning” effect. Experiment 4 replicated and generalized the “who's winning” effect with more natural stimuli. Together, our findings suggest that people learn relational concepts by a process of intersection discovery akin to schema induction, and that any task that encourages people to discover a higher order relation that remains invariant over members of a category will facilitate the learning of putatively probabilistic relational concepts.

]]>
Theories of relational concept acquisition (e.g., schema induction) based on structured intersection discovery predict that relational concepts with a probabilistic (i.e., family resemblance) structure ought to be extremely difficult to learn. We report four experiments testing this prediction by investigating conditions hypothesized to facilitate the learning of such categories. Experiment 1 showed that changing the task from a category-learning task to choosing the “winning” object in each stimulus greatly facilitated participants' ability to learn probabilistic relational categories. Experiments 2 and 3 further investigated the mechanisms underlying this “who's winning” effect. Experiment 4 replicated and generalized the “who's winning” effect with more natural stimuli. Together, our findings suggest that people learn relational concepts by a process of intersection discovery akin to schema induction, and that any task that encourages people to discover a higher order relation that remains invariant over members of a category will facilitate the learning of putatively probabilistic relational concepts.
Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoninghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12194Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal ReasoningJonathan Phillips, Alex Shaw2014-11-09T23:02:06.589362-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12194John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12194http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12194Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third-party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third-party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent.

]]>
The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third-party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third-party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent.
The Need for Interdisciplinary Dialog in Evolution Education: A Comment on the Responses by Ware & Gelman and Shtulmanhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12200The Need for Interdisciplinary Dialog in Evolution Education: A Comment on the Responses by Ware & Gelman and ShtulmanKostas Kampourakis2014-11-07T01:23:10.930578-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12200John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12200http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12200Letter to the Editorn/an/aWhat Is More Informative in the History of Science, the Signal or the Noise?http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12202What Is More Informative in the History of Science, the Signal or the Noise?Andrew Shtulman2014-11-06T07:19:26.499835-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12202John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12202http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12202Letter to the Editorn/an/aDistorting the History of Evolutionary Thought in Conceptual Development Researchhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12198Distorting the History of Evolutionary Thought in Conceptual Development ResearchKostas Kampourakis2014-11-06T07:19:24.511828-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12198John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12198http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12198Letter to the Editorn/an/aThe Role of Surface Similarity in Analogical Retrieval: Bridging the Gap Between the Naturalistic and the Experimental Traditionshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12201The Role of Surface Similarity in Analogical Retrieval: Bridging the Gap Between the Naturalistic and the Experimental TraditionsMáximo Trench, Ricardo A. Minervino2014-11-06T07:19:19.237107-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12201John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12201http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12201Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) have claimed that when participants are allowed to draw on their own source analogs in the service of analogical argumentation, retrieval is less constrained by surface similarity than traditional experiments suggest. In two studies, we adapted this production paradigm to control for the potentially distorting effects of analogy fabrication and uneven availability of close and distant sources in memory. Experiment 1 assessed whether participants were reminded of central episodes from popular movies while generating analogies for superficially similar versus superficially dissimilar target situations. In Experiment 2, we modified this procedure to assess the retrieval of autobiographic memories, more familiar to participants than fictional episodes. Both studies revealed a strong effect of surface similarity on the retrieval of participants' own sources, thus suggesting that the superficial bias typically observed in experimental studies—and simulated by most computational models—does not originate in a lack of ecological validity.

]]>
Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) have claimed that when participants are allowed to draw on their own source analogs in the service of analogical argumentation, retrieval is less constrained by surface similarity than traditional experiments suggest. In two studies, we adapted this production paradigm to control for the potentially distorting effects of analogy fabrication and uneven availability of close and distant sources in memory. Experiment 1 assessed whether participants were reminded of central episodes from popular movies while generating analogies for superficially similar versus superficially dissimilar target situations. In Experiment 2, we modified this procedure to assess the retrieval of autobiographic memories, more familiar to participants than fictional episodes. Both studies revealed a strong effect of surface similarity on the retrieval of participants' own sources, thus suggesting that the superficial bias typically observed in experimental studies—and simulated by most computational models—does not originate in a lack of ecological validity.
The Importance of Clarifying Evolutionary Terminology Across Disciplines and in the Classroom: A Reply to Kampourakishttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12197The Importance of Clarifying Evolutionary Terminology Across Disciplines and in the Classroom: A Reply to KampourakisElizabeth A. Ware, Susan A. Gelman2014-11-06T07:12:16.631451-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12197John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12197http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12197Original Articlen/an/aNaive Probability: Model-Based Estimates of Unique Eventshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12193Naive Probability: Model-Based Estimates of Unique EventsSangeet S. Khemlani, Max Lotstein, Philip N. Johnson-Laird2014-11-03T04:16:28.801538-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12193John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12193http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12193Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

We describe a dual-process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non-numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, for conjunctions of events, and for inclusive disjunctions of events, by taking a primitive average of non-numerical probabilities. It computes conditional probabilities in a tractable way, treating the given event as evidence that may be relevant to the probability of the dependent event. A deliberative system 2 maps the resulting representations into numerical probabilities. With access to working memory, it carries out arithmetical operations in combining numerical estimates. Experiments corroborated the theory's predictions. Participants concurred in estimates of real possibilities. They violated the complete joint probability distribution in the predicted ways, when they made estimates about conjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A and B), disjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A or B or both), and conditional probabilities P(A), P(B), P(B|A). They were faster to estimate the probabilities of compound propositions when they had already estimated the probabilities of each of their components. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of probabilistic reasoning.

]]>
We describe a dual-process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non-numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, for conjunctions of events, and for inclusive disjunctions of events, by taking a primitive average of non-numerical probabilities. It computes conditional probabilities in a tractable way, treating the given event as evidence that may be relevant to the probability of the dependent event. A deliberative system 2 maps the resulting representations into numerical probabilities. With access to working memory, it carries out arithmetical operations in combining numerical estimates. Experiments corroborated the theory's predictions. Participants concurred in estimates of real possibilities. They violated the complete joint probability distribution in the predicted ways, when they made estimates about conjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A and B), disjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A or B or both), and conditional probabilities P(A), P(B), P(B|A). They were faster to estimate the probabilities of compound propositions when they had already estimated the probabilities of each of their components. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of probabilistic reasoning.
Role Asymmetry and Code Transmission in Signaling Games: An Experimental and Computational Investigationhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12191Role Asymmetry and Code Transmission in Signaling Games: An Experimental and Computational InvestigationMaggie Moreno, Giosuè Baggio2014-10-29T01:39:30.643188-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12191John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12191http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12191Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

In signaling games, a sender has private access to a state of affairs and uses a signal to inform a receiver about that state. If no common association of signals and states is initially available, sender and receiver must coordinate to develop one. How do players divide coordination labor? We show experimentally that, if players switch roles at each communication round, coordination labor is shared. However, in games with fixed roles, coordination labor is divided: Receivers adjust their mappings more frequently, whereas senders maintain the initial code, which is transmitted to receivers and becomes the common code. In a series of computer simulations, player and role asymmetry as observed experimentally were accounted for by a model in which the receiver in the first signaling round has a higher chance of adjusting its code than its partner. From this basic division of labor among players, certain properties of role asymmetry, in particular correlations with game complexity, are seen to follow.

]]>
In signaling games, a sender has private access to a state of affairs and uses a signal to inform a receiver about that state. If no common association of signals and states is initially available, sender and receiver must coordinate to develop one. How do players divide coordination labor? We show experimentally that, if players switch roles at each communication round, coordination labor is shared. However, in games with fixed roles, coordination labor is divided: Receivers adjust their mappings more frequently, whereas senders maintain the initial code, which is transmitted to receivers and becomes the common code. In a series of computer simulations, player and role asymmetry as observed experimentally were accounted for by a model in which the receiver in the first signaling round has a higher chance of adjusting its code than its partner. From this basic division of labor among players, certain properties of role asymmetry, in particular correlations with game complexity, are seen to follow.
Mechanisms for Robust Cognitionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12192Mechanisms for Robust CognitionMatthew M. Walsh, Kevin A. Gluck2014-10-29T01:39:12.873928-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12192John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12192http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12192Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

To function well in an unpredictable environment using unreliable components, a system must have a high degree of robustness. Robustness is fundamental to biological systems and is an objective in the design of engineered systems such as airplane engines and buildings. Cognitive systems, like biological and engineered systems, exist within variable environments. This raises the question, how do cognitive systems achieve similarly high degrees of robustness? The aim of this study was to identify a set of mechanisms that enhance robustness in cognitive systems. We identify three mechanisms that enhance robustness in biological and engineered systems: system control, redundancy, and adaptability. After surveying the psychological literature for evidence of these mechanisms, we provide simulations illustrating how each contributes to robust cognition in a different psychological domain: psychomotor vigilance, semantic memory, and strategy selection. These simulations highlight features of a mathematical approach for quantifying robustness, and they provide concrete examples of mechanisms for robust cognition.

]]>
To function well in an unpredictable environment using unreliable components, a system must have a high degree of robustness. Robustness is fundamental to biological systems and is an objective in the design of engineered systems such as airplane engines and buildings. Cognitive systems, like biological and engineered systems, exist within variable environments. This raises the question, how do cognitive systems achieve similarly high degrees of robustness? The aim of this study was to identify a set of mechanisms that enhance robustness in cognitive systems. We identify three mechanisms that enhance robustness in biological and engineered systems: system control, redundancy, and adaptability. After surveying the psychological literature for evidence of these mechanisms, we provide simulations illustrating how each contributes to robust cognition in a different psychological domain: psychomotor vigilance, semantic memory, and strategy selection. These simulations highlight features of a mathematical approach for quantifying robustness, and they provide concrete examples of mechanisms for robust cognition.
Iconic Prosody in Story Readinghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12190Iconic Prosody in Story ReadingMarcus Perlman, Nathaniel Clark, Marlene Johansson Falck2014-10-29T01:31:04.006109-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12190John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12190http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12190Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Recent experiments have shown that people iconically modulate their prosody corresponding with the meaning of their utterance (e.g., Shintel et al., 2006). This article reports findings from a story reading task that expands the investigation of iconic prosody to abstract meanings in addition to concrete ones. Participants read stories that contrasted along concrete and abstract semantic dimensions of speed (e.g., a fast drive, slow career progress) and size (e.g., a small grasshopper, an important contract). Participants read fast stories at a faster rate than slow stories, and big stories with a lower pitch than small stories. The effect of speed was distributed across the stories, including portions that were identical across stories, whereas the size effect was localized to size-related words. Overall, these findings enrich the documentation of iconicity in spoken language and bear on our understanding of the relationship between gesture and speech.

]]>
Recent experiments have shown that people iconically modulate their prosody corresponding with the meaning of their utterance (e.g., Shintel et al., 2006). This article reports findings from a story reading task that expands the investigation of iconic prosody to abstract meanings in addition to concrete ones. Participants read stories that contrasted along concrete and abstract semantic dimensions of speed (e.g., a fast drive, slow career progress) and size (e.g., a small grasshopper, an important contract). Participants read fast stories at a faster rate than slow stories, and big stories with a lower pitch than small stories. The effect of speed was distributed across the stories, including portions that were identical across stories, whereas the size effect was localized to size-related words. Overall, these findings enrich the documentation of iconicity in spoken language and bear on our understanding of the relationship between gesture and speech.
Embodiment Effects and Language Comprehension in Alzheimer's Diseasehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12187Embodiment Effects and Language Comprehension in Alzheimer's DiseaseMarika De Scalzi, Jennifer Rusted, Jane Oakhill2014-10-21T05:03:53.898052-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12187John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12187http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12187Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

It has been shown that when participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences that describe a transfer of an object toward or away from their body, they are faster to respond when the response requires a movement in the same direction as the transfer described in the sentence. This phenomenon is known as the action compatibility effect (ACE). This study investigates whether the ACE exists for volunteers with Alzheimer's disease (AD), whether the ACE can facilitate language comprehension, and also whether the ACE can still be produced if the order of the two events is inverted, that is, whether overt movement can prime comprehension of transfer sentences. In Study 1, participants with AD, younger, and older adults were tested on an adaptation of the ACE Paradigm. In Study 2, the same paradigm was modified to include an arm movement that participants had to perform prior to sentence exposure on screen. In Study 1, young, older adults, and individuals with AD were faster to respond when the direction of the response movement matched the directionality implied by the sentence (ACE). In Study 2, no traditional ACE was found; participants were faster when the direction of the movement immediately preceding the sentence matched the directionality of the sentence. It was found that compatibility effects generated a relative advantage, that transfer schemata are easier to process, and that an ACE-like effect can be the result of mutual priming between language and movement. Results suggested preservation in AD of the neural systems for action engaged during language comprehension, and conditions under which comprehension in AD can be facilitated in real life may be identified.

]]>
It has been shown that when participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences that describe a transfer of an object toward or away from their body, they are faster to respond when the response requires a movement in the same direction as the transfer described in the sentence. This phenomenon is known as the action compatibility effect (ACE). This study investigates whether the ACE exists for volunteers with Alzheimer's disease (AD), whether the ACE can facilitate language comprehension, and also whether the ACE can still be produced if the order of the two events is inverted, that is, whether overt movement can prime comprehension of transfer sentences. In Study 1, participants with AD, younger, and older adults were tested on an adaptation of the ACE Paradigm. In Study 2, the same paradigm was modified to include an arm movement that participants had to perform prior to sentence exposure on screen. In Study 1, young, older adults, and individuals with AD were faster to respond when the direction of the response movement matched the directionality implied by the sentence (ACE). In Study 2, no traditional ACE was found; participants were faster when the direction of the movement immediately preceding the sentence matched the directionality of the sentence. It was found that compatibility effects generated a relative advantage, that transfer schemata are easier to process, and that an ACE-like effect can be the result of mutual priming between language and movement. Results suggested preservation in AD of the neural systems for action engaged during language comprehension, and conditions under which comprehension in AD can be facilitated in real life may be identified.
The Simon Effect in Action: Planning and/or On-Line Control Effects?http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12188The Simon Effect in Action: Planning and/or On-Line Control Effects?Claudia Scorolli, Antonello Pellicano, Roberto Nicoletti, Sandro Rubichi, Umberto Castiello2014-10-21T05:02:46.610667-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12188John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12188http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12188Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Choice reaction tasks are performed faster when stimulus location corresponds to response location (Simon effect). This spatial stimulus–response compatibility effect affects performance at the level of action planning and execution. However, when response selection is completed before movement initiation, the Simon effect arises only at the planning level. The aim of this study was to ascertain whether when a precocious response selection is requested, the Simon effect can be detected on the kinematics characterizing the online control phase of a non-ballistic movement. Participants were presented with red or green colored squares, which could appear on the right, left, above, or below a central cross. Depending on the square's color, participants had to release one of two buttons (right/left), then reach toward and press a corresponding lateral pad. We found evidence of the Simon effect on both action planning and on-line control. Moreover, the investigation of response conflict at the level of previous trials (i.e., n−1), a factor that might determine interference at the level of the current response, revealed a conflict adaptation process across trials. Results are discussed in terms of current theories concerned with the Simon effect and the distinction between action planning and control.

]]>
Choice reaction tasks are performed faster when stimulus location corresponds to response location (Simon effect). This spatial stimulus–response compatibility effect affects performance at the level of action planning and execution. However, when response selection is completed before movement initiation, the Simon effect arises only at the planning level. The aim of this study was to ascertain whether when a precocious response selection is requested, the Simon effect can be detected on the kinematics characterizing the online control phase of a non-ballistic movement. Participants were presented with red or green colored squares, which could appear on the right, left, above, or below a central cross. Depending on the square's color, participants had to release one of two buttons (right/left), then reach toward and press a corresponding lateral pad. We found evidence of the Simon effect on both action planning and on-line control. Moreover, the investigation of response conflict at the level of previous trials (i.e., n−1), a factor that might determine interference at the level of the current response, revealed a conflict adaptation process across trials. Results are discussed in terms of current theories concerned with the Simon effect and the distinction between action planning and control.
Gavagai Is as Gavagai Does: Learning Nouns and Verbs From Cross-Situational Statisticshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12186Gavagai Is as Gavagai Does: Learning Nouns and Verbs From Cross-Situational StatisticsPadraic Monaghan, Karen Mattock, Robert A. I. Davies, Alastair C. Smith2014-10-18T04:58:26.859351-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12186John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12186http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12186Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Learning to map words onto their referents is difficult, because there are multiple possibilities for forming these mappings. Cross-situational learning studies have shown that word-object mappings can be learned across multiple situations, as can verbs when presented in a syntactic context. However, these previous studies have presented either nouns or verbs in ambiguous contexts and thus bypass much of the complexity of multiple grammatical categories in speech. We show that noun word learning in adults is robust when objects are moving, and that verbs can also be learned from similar scenes without additional syntactic information. Furthermore, we show that both nouns and verbs can be acquired simultaneously, thus resolving category-level as well as individual word-level ambiguity. However, nouns were learned more quickly than verbs, and we discuss this in light of previous studies investigating the noun advantage in word learning.

]]>
Learning to map words onto their referents is difficult, because there are multiple possibilities for forming these mappings. Cross-situational learning studies have shown that word-object mappings can be learned across multiple situations, as can verbs when presented in a syntactic context. However, these previous studies have presented either nouns or verbs in ambiguous contexts and thus bypass much of the complexity of multiple grammatical categories in speech. We show that noun word learning in adults is robust when objects are moving, and that verbs can also be learned from similar scenes without additional syntactic information. Furthermore, we show that both nouns and verbs can be acquired simultaneously, thus resolving category-level as well as individual word-level ambiguity. However, nouns were learned more quickly than verbs, and we discuss this in light of previous studies investigating the noun advantage in word learning.
Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categorieshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12189Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to CategoriesShelbie L. Sutherland, Andrei Cimpian, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Susan A. Gelman2014-10-18T04:58:22.697788-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12189John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12189http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12189Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N =449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable-versus-idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.

]]>
Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable-versus-idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.
Concurrent Movement Impairs Incidental But Not Intentional Statistical Learninghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12180Concurrent Movement Impairs Incidental But Not Intentional Statistical LearningDavid J. Stevens, Joanne Arciuli, David I. Anderson2014-10-12T22:49:53.37548-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12180John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12180http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12180Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

The effect of concurrent movement on incidental versus intentional statistical learning was examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants learned the statistical regularities embedded within familiarization stimuli implicitly, whereas in Experiment 2 they were made aware of the embedded regularities and were instructed explicitly to learn these regularities. Experiment 1 demonstrated that while the control group were able to learn the statistical regularities, the resistance-free cycling group and the exercise group did not demonstrate learning. This is in contrast with the findings of Experiment 2, where all three groups demonstrated significant levels of learning. The results suggest that the movement demands, rather than the physiological stress, interfered with statistical learning. We suggest movement activates the striatum, which is not only responsible for motor control but also plays a role in incidental learning.

]]>
The effect of concurrent movement on incidental versus intentional statistical learning was examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants learned the statistical regularities embedded within familiarization stimuli implicitly, whereas in Experiment 2 they were made aware of the embedded regularities and were instructed explicitly to learn these regularities. Experiment 1 demonstrated that while the control group were able to learn the statistical regularities, the resistance-free cycling group and the exercise group did not demonstrate learning. This is in contrast with the findings of Experiment 2, where all three groups demonstrated significant levels of learning. The results suggest that the movement demands, rather than the physiological stress, interfered with statistical learning. We suggest movement activates the striatum, which is not only responsible for motor control but also plays a role in incidental learning.
Do Lemmas Speak German? A Verb Position Effect in German Structural Priminghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12184Do Lemmas Speak German? A Verb Position Effect in German Structural PrimingFranklin Chang, Michael Baumann, Sandra Pappert, Hartmut Fitz2014-10-12T22:49:37.679544-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12184John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12184http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12184Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Lexicalized theories of syntax often assume that verb-structure regularities are mediated by lemmas, which abstract over variation in verb tense and aspect. German syntax seems to challenge this assumption, because verb position depends on tense and aspect. To examine how German speakers link these elements, a structural priming study was performed which varied syntactic structure, verb position (encoded by tense and aspect), and verb overlap. Abstract structural priming was found, both within and across verb position, but priming was larger when the verb position was the same between prime and target. Priming was boosted by verb overlap, but there was no interaction with verb position. The results can be explained by a lemma model where tense and aspect are linked to structural choices in German. Since the architecture of this lemma model is not consistent with results from English, a connectionist model was developed which could explain the cross-linguistic variation in the production system. Together, these findings support the view that language learning plays an important role in determining the nature of structural priming in different languages.

]]>
Lexicalized theories of syntax often assume that verb-structure regularities are mediated by lemmas, which abstract over variation in verb tense and aspect. German syntax seems to challenge this assumption, because verb position depends on tense and aspect. To examine how German speakers link these elements, a structural priming study was performed which varied syntactic structure, verb position (encoded by tense and aspect), and verb overlap. Abstract structural priming was found, both within and across verb position, but priming was larger when the verb position was the same between prime and target. Priming was boosted by verb overlap, but there was no interaction with verb position. The results can be explained by a lemma model where tense and aspect are linked to structural choices in German. Since the architecture of this lemma model is not consistent with results from English, a connectionist model was developed which could explain the cross-linguistic variation in the production system. Together, these findings support the view that language learning plays an important role in determining the nature of structural priming in different languages.
State-Trace Analysis: Dissociable Processes in a Connectionist Network?http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12185State-Trace Analysis: Dissociable Processes in a Connectionist Network?Fayme Yeates, Andy J. Wills, Fergal W. Jones, Ian P. L. McLaren2014-10-12T22:49:05.038701-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12185John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12185http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12185Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Some argue the common practice of inferring multiple processes or systems from a dissociation is flawed (Dunn, 2003). One proposed solution is state-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979), which involves plotting, across two or more conditions of interest, performance measured by either two dependent variables, or two conditions of the same dependent measure. The resulting analysis is considered to provide evidence that either (a) a single process underlies performance (one function is produced) or (b) there is evidence for more than one process (more than one function is produced). This article reports simulations using the simple recurrent network (SRN; Elman, 1990) in which changes to the learning rate produced state-trace plots with multiple functions. We also report simulations using a single-layer error-correcting network that generate plots with a single function. We argue that the presence of different functions on a state-trace plot does not necessarily support a dual-system account, at least as typically defined (e.g. two separate autonomous systems competing to control responding); it can also indicate variation in a single parameter within theories generally considered to be single-system accounts.

]]>
Some argue the common practice of inferring multiple processes or systems from a dissociation is flawed (Dunn, 2003). One proposed solution is state-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979), which involves plotting, across two or more conditions of interest, performance measured by either two dependent variables, or two conditions of the same dependent measure. The resulting analysis is considered to provide evidence that either (a) a single process underlies performance (one function is produced) or (b) there is evidence for more than one process (more than one function is produced). This article reports simulations using the simple recurrent network (SRN; Elman, 1990) in which changes to the learning rate produced state-trace plots with multiple functions. We also report simulations using a single-layer error-correcting network that generate plots with a single function. We argue that the presence of different functions on a state-trace plot does not necessarily support a dual-system account, at least as typically defined (e.g. two separate autonomous systems competing to control responding); it can also indicate variation in a single parameter within theories generally considered to be single-system accounts.
Parsing Heuristic and Forward Search in First-Graders' Game-Play Behaviorhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12181Parsing Heuristic and Forward Search in First-Graders' Game-Play BehaviorLuciano Paz, Andrea P. Goldin, Carlos Diuk, Mariano Sigman2014-10-10T05:56:44.89928-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12181John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12181http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12181Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Seventy-three children between 6 and 7 years of age were presented with a problem having ambiguous subgoal ordering. Performance in this task showed reliable fingerprints: (a) a non-monotonic dependence of performance as a function of the distance between the beginning and the end-states of the problem, (b) very high levels of performance when the first move was correct, and (c) states in which accuracy of the first move was significantly below chance. These features are consistent with a non-Markov planning agent, with an inherently inertial decision process, and that uses heuristics and partial problem knowledge to plan its actions. We applied a statistical framework to fit and test the quality of a proposed planning model (Monte Carlo Tree Search). Our framework allows us to parse out independent contributions to problem-solving based on the construction of the value function and on general mechanisms of the search process in the tree of solutions. We show that the latter are correlated with children's performance on an independent measure of planning, while the former is highly domain specific.

]]>
Seventy-three children between 6 and 7 years of age were presented with a problem having ambiguous subgoal ordering. Performance in this task showed reliable fingerprints: (a) a non-monotonic dependence of performance as a function of the distance between the beginning and the end-states of the problem, (b) very high levels of performance when the first move was correct, and (c) states in which accuracy of the first move was significantly below chance. These features are consistent with a non-Markov planning agent, with an inherently inertial decision process, and that uses heuristics and partial problem knowledge to plan its actions. We applied a statistical framework to fit and test the quality of a proposed planning model (Monte Carlo Tree Search). Our framework allows us to parse out independent contributions to problem-solving based on the construction of the value function and on general mechanisms of the search process in the tree of solutions. We show that the latter are correlated with children's performance on an independent measure of planning, while the former is highly domain specific.
Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statementshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12176Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified StatementsAmanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Jenna Hedglen2014-10-09T02:33:42.118863-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12176John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12176http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12176Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7- to 11-year-olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most-quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.

]]>
Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7- to 11-year-olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most-quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.
Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12182Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman, John Turri2014-10-09T02:33:17.985966-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12182John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12182http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12182Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).

]]>
We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).
Musical Training, Bilingualism, and Executive Function: A Closer Look at Task Switching and Dual-Task Performancehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12183Musical Training, Bilingualism, and Executive Function: A Closer Look at Task Switching and Dual-Task PerformanceLinda Moradzadeh, Galit Blumenthal, Melody Wiseheart2014-10-07T05:52:25.209343-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12183John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12183http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12183Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

This study investigated whether musical training and bilingualism are associated with enhancements in specific components of executive function, namely, task switching and dual-task performance. Participants (n = 153) belonging to one of four groups (monolingual musician, bilingual musician, bilingual non-musician, or monolingual non-musician) were matched on age and socioeconomic status and administered task switching and dual-task paradigms. Results demonstrated reduced global and local switch costs in musicians compared with non-musicians, suggesting that musical training can contribute to increased efficiency in the ability to shift flexibly between mental sets. On dual-task performance, musicians also outperformed non-musicians. There was neither a cognitive advantage for bilinguals relative to monolinguals, nor an interaction between music and language to suggest additive effects of both types of experience. These findings demonstrate that long-term musical training is associated with improvements in task switching and dual-task performance.

]]>
This study investigated whether musical training and bilingualism are associated with enhancements in specific components of executive function, namely, task switching and dual-task performance. Participants (n = 153) belonging to one of four groups (monolingual musician, bilingual musician, bilingual non-musician, or monolingual non-musician) were matched on age and socioeconomic status and administered task switching and dual-task paradigms. Results demonstrated reduced global and local switch costs in musicians compared with non-musicians, suggesting that musical training can contribute to increased efficiency in the ability to shift flexibly between mental sets. On dual-task performance, musicians also outperformed non-musicians. There was neither a cognitive advantage for bilinguals relative to monolinguals, nor an interaction between music and language to suggest additive effects of both types of experience. These findings demonstrate that long-term musical training is associated with improvements in task switching and dual-task performance.
Processing Scalar Implicature: A Constraint-Based Approachhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12171Processing Scalar Implicature: A Constraint-Based ApproachJudith Degen, Michael K. Tanenhaus2014-09-30T00:34:28.164571-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12171John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12171http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12171Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Three experiments investigated the processing of the implicature associated with some using a “gumball paradigm.” On each trial, participants saw an image of a gumball machine with an upper chamber with 13 gumballs and an empty lower chamber. Gumballs then dropped to the lower chamber and participants evaluated statements, such as “You got some of the gumballs.” Experiment 1 established that some is less natural for reference to small sets (1, 2, and 3 of the 13 gumballs) and unpartitioned sets (all 13 gumballs) compared to intermediate sets (6–8). Partitive some of was less natural than simple some when used with the unpartitioned set. In Experiment 2, including exact number descriptions lowered naturalness ratings for some with small sets but not for intermediate size sets and the unpartitioned set. In Experiment 3, the naturalness ratings from Experiment 2 predicted response times. The results are interpreted as evidence for a Constraint-Based account of scalar implicature processing and against both two-stage, Literal-First models and pragmatic Default models.

]]>
Three experiments investigated the processing of the implicature associated with some using a “gumball paradigm.” On each trial, participants saw an image of a gumball machine with an upper chamber with 13 gumballs and an empty lower chamber. Gumballs then dropped to the lower chamber and participants evaluated statements, such as “You got some of the gumballs.” Experiment 1 established that some is less natural for reference to small sets (1, 2, and 3 of the 13 gumballs) and unpartitioned sets (all 13 gumballs) compared to intermediate sets (6–8). Partitive some of was less natural than simple some when used with the unpartitioned set. In Experiment 2, including exact number descriptions lowered naturalness ratings for some with small sets but not for intermediate size sets and the unpartitioned set. In Experiment 3, the naturalness ratings from Experiment 2 predicted response times. The results are interpreted as evidence for a Constraint-Based account of scalar implicature processing and against both two-stage, Literal-First models and pragmatic Default models.
Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward Animalshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12175Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Toward AnimalsGeoffrey P. Goodwin, Adam Benforado2014-09-25T04:16:13.682831-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12175John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12175http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12175Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of separating retributive and general deterrence motives when studying human offenders (Study 1). We isolate retribution by investigating judgments about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence from consideration. Studies 2 and 3 document a “victim identity” effect, such that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack, the greater the belief that the culprit deserves to be killed. Study 3 documents a “targeted punishment” effect, such that the responsive killing of the actual “guilty” culprit is seen as more deserved than the killing of an almost identical yet “innocent” animal from the same species. Studies 4 and 5 extend both effects to participants' acceptance of inflicting pain and suffering on the offending animal at the time of its death, and show that both effects are mediated by measures of retributive sentiment, and not by consequentialist concerns.

]]>
Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of separating retributive and general deterrence motives when studying human offenders (Study 1). We isolate retribution by investigating judgments about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence from consideration. Studies 2 and 3 document a “victim identity” effect, such that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack, the greater the belief that the culprit deserves to be killed. Study 3 documents a “targeted punishment” effect, such that the responsive killing of the actual “guilty” culprit is seen as more deserved than the killing of an almost identical yet “innocent” animal from the same species. Studies 4 and 5 extend both effects to participants' acceptance of inflicting pain and suffering on the offending animal at the time of its death, and show that both effects are mediated by measures of retributive sentiment, and not by consequentialist concerns.
Syntactic Complexity Effects in Sentence Productionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12168Syntactic Complexity Effects in Sentence ProductionGregory Scontras, William Badecker, Lisa Shank, Eunice Lim, Evelina Fedorenko2014-09-25T03:47:32.108273-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12168John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12168http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12168Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Syntactic complexity effects have been investigated extensively with respect to comprehension (e.g., Demberg & Keller, 2008; Gibson, 1998, 2000; Gordon et al., 2001, 2004; Grodner & Gibson, 2005; King & Just, 1991; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006; McElree et al., 2003; Wanner & Maratsos, 1978). According to one prominent class of accounts (experience-based accounts; e.g., Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008; Gennari & MacDonald, 2008, 2009; Wells et al., 2009), certain structures cause comprehension difficulty due to their scarcity in the language. But why are some structures less frequent than others? In two elicited-production experiments we investigated syntactic complexity effects in relative clauses (Experiment 1) and wh-questions (Experiment 2) varying in whether or not they contained non-local dependencies. In both experiments, we found reliable durational differences between subject-extracted structures (which only contain local dependencies) and object-extracted structures (which contain nonlocal dependencies): Participants took longer to begin and produce object-extractions. Furthermore, participants were more likely to be disfluent in the object-extracted constructions. These results suggest that there is a cost associated with planning and uttering the more syntactically complex, object-extracted structures, and that this cost manifests in the form of longer durations and disfluencies. Although the precise nature of this cost remains to be determined, these effects provide one plausible explanation for the relative rarity of object-extractions: They are more costly to produce.

]]>
Syntactic complexity effects have been investigated extensively with respect to comprehension (e.g., Demberg & Keller, 2008; Gibson, 1998, 2000; Gordon et al., 2001, 2004; Grodner & Gibson, 2005; King & Just, 1991; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006; McElree et al., 2003; Wanner & Maratsos, 1978). According to one prominent class of accounts (experience-based accounts; e.g., Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008; Gennari & MacDonald, 2008, 2009; Wells et al., 2009), certain structures cause comprehension difficulty due to their scarcity in the language. But why are some structures less frequent than others? In two elicited-production experiments we investigated syntactic complexity effects in relative clauses (Experiment 1) and wh-questions (Experiment 2) varying in whether or not they contained non-local dependencies. In both experiments, we found reliable durational differences between subject-extracted structures (which only contain local dependencies) and object-extracted structures (which contain nonlocal dependencies): Participants took longer to begin and produce object-extractions. Furthermore, participants were more likely to be disfluent in the object-extracted constructions. These results suggest that there is a cost associated with planning and uttering the more syntactically complex, object-extracted structures, and that this cost manifests in the form of longer durations and disfluencies. Although the precise nature of this cost remains to be determined, these effects provide one plausible explanation for the relative rarity of object-extractions: They are more costly to produce.
Can Culture Influence Body-Specific Associations Between Space and Valence?http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12177Can Culture Influence Body-Specific Associations Between Space and Valence?Juanma Fuente, Daniel Casasanto, Antonio Román, Julio Santiago2014-09-23T06:55:56.504224-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12177John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12177http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12177Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

People implicitly associate positive ideas with their dominant side of space and negative ideas with their non-dominant side. Right-handers tend to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left,” but left-handers associate “bad” with “right” and “good” with “left.” Whereas right-handers' implicit associations align with idioms in language and culture that link “good” with “right,” left-handers' implicit associations go against them. Can cultural conventions modulate the body-specific association between valence and left-right space? Here, we compared people from Spanish and Moroccan cultures, which differ in the strength of taboos against the use of the left hand, and therefore in their preference for the right. Results showed stronger explicit associations between space and valence in Moroccan participants than in Spaniards, but they did not show any increased tendency for right-handed Moroccans to associate “good” with “right” implicitly. Despite differences in cultural conventions between Spaniards and Moroccans, we find no evidence for a cross-cultural difference in the implicit association between space and valence, which appears to depend on patterns of bodily experience.

]]>
People implicitly associate positive ideas with their dominant side of space and negative ideas with their non-dominant side. Right-handers tend to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left,” but left-handers associate “bad” with “right” and “good” with “left.” Whereas right-handers' implicit associations align with idioms in language and culture that link “good” with “right,” left-handers' implicit associations go against them. Can cultural conventions modulate the body-specific association between valence and left-right space? Here, we compared people from Spanish and Moroccan cultures, which differ in the strength of taboos against the use of the left hand, and therefore in their preference for the right. Results showed stronger explicit associations between space and valence in Moroccan participants than in Spaniards, but they did not show any increased tendency for right-handed Moroccans to associate “good” with “right” implicitly. Despite differences in cultural conventions between Spaniards and Moroccans, we find no evidence for a cross-cultural difference in the implicit association between space and valence, which appears to depend on patterns of bodily experience.
A Cognitive Model of Dynamic Cooperation With Varied Interdependency Informationhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12170A Cognitive Model of Dynamic Cooperation With Varied Interdependency InformationCleotilde Gonzalez, Noam Ben-Asher, Jolie M. Martin, Varun Dutt2014-09-23T06:54:21.364744-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12170John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12170http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12170Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

We analyze the dynamics of repeated interaction of two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) under various levels of interdependency information and propose an instance-based learning cognitive model (IBL-PD) to explain how cooperation emerges over time. Six hypotheses are tested regarding how a player accounts for an opponent's outcomes: the selfish hypothesis suggests ignoring information about the opponent and utilizing only the player's own outcomes; the extreme fairness hypothesis weighs the player's own and the opponent's outcomes equally; the moderate fairness hypothesis weighs the opponent's outcomes less than the player's own outcomes to various extents; the linear increasing hypothesis increasingly weighs the opponent's outcomes at a constant rate with repeated interactions; the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis increasingly and nonlinearly weighs the opponent's outcomes over time; and the dynamic expectations hypothesis dynamically adjusts the weight a player gives to the opponent's outcomes, according to the gap between the expected and the actual outcomes in each interaction. When players lack explicit feedback about their opponent's choices and outcomes, results are consistent with the selfish hypothesis; however, when this information is made explicit, the best predictions result from the dynamic expectations hypothesis.

]]>
We analyze the dynamics of repeated interaction of two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) under various levels of interdependency information and propose an instance-based learning cognitive model (IBL-PD) to explain how cooperation emerges over time. Six hypotheses are tested regarding how a player accounts for an opponent's outcomes: the selfish hypothesis suggests ignoring information about the opponent and utilizing only the player's own outcomes; the extreme fairness hypothesis weighs the player's own and the opponent's outcomes equally; the moderate fairness hypothesis weighs the opponent's outcomes less than the player's own outcomes to various extents; the linear increasing hypothesis increasingly weighs the opponent's outcomes at a constant rate with repeated interactions; the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis increasingly and nonlinearly weighs the opponent's outcomes over time; and the dynamic expectations hypothesis dynamically adjusts the weight a player gives to the opponent's outcomes, according to the gap between the expected and the actual outcomes in each interaction. When players lack explicit feedback about their opponent's choices and outcomes, results are consistent with the selfish hypothesis; however, when this information is made explicit, the best predictions result from the dynamic expectations hypothesis.
How Do Groups Work? Age Differences in Performance and the Social Outcomes of Peer Collaborationhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12172How Do Groups Work? Age Differences in Performance and the Social Outcomes of Peer CollaborationPatrick J. Leman2014-09-23T06:53:55.577906-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12172John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12172http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12172Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Do children derive different benefits from group collaboration at different ages? In the present study, 183 children from two age groups (8.8 and 13.4 years) took part in a class quiz as members of a group, or individually. In some groups, cohesiveness was made salient by awarding prizes to the top performing groups. In other groups, prizes were awarded to the best performing individuals. Findings, both in terms of social outcomes and performance in the quiz, indicated that the 8-year olds viewed the benefits of group membership in terms of the opportunities to receive information from other members. The 13-year olds, in contrast, viewed group collaboration as a constructive process where success was connected with group cohesiveness.

]]>
Do children derive different benefits from group collaboration at different ages? In the present study, 183 children from two age groups (8.8 and 13.4 years) took part in a class quiz as members of a group, or individually. In some groups, cohesiveness was made salient by awarding prizes to the top performing groups. In other groups, prizes were awarded to the best performing individuals. Findings, both in terms of social outcomes and performance in the quiz, indicated that the 8-year olds viewed the benefits of group membership in terms of the opportunities to receive information from other members. The 13-year olds, in contrast, viewed group collaboration as a constructive process where success was connected with group cohesiveness.
Perceptual Fluency and Judgments of Vocal Aesthetics and Stereotypicalityhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12179Perceptual Fluency and Judgments of Vocal Aesthetics and StereotypicalityMolly Babel, Grant McGuire2014-09-22T00:46:09.732983-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12179John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12179http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12179Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Research has shown that processing dynamics on the perceiver's end determine aesthetic pleasure. Specifically, typical objects, which are processed more fluently, are perceived as more attractive. We extend this notion of perceptual fluency to judgments of vocal aesthetics. Vocal attractiveness has traditionally been examined with respect to sexual dimorphism and the apparent size of a talker, as reconstructed from the acoustic signal, despite evidence that gender-specific speech patterns are learned social behaviors. In this study, we report on a series of three experiments using 60 voices (30 females) to compare the relationship between judgments of vocal attractiveness, stereotypicality, and gender categorization fluency. Our results indicate that attractiveness and stereotypicality are highly correlated for female and male voices. Stereotypicality and categorization fluency were also correlated for male voices, but not female voices. Crucially, stereotypicality and categorization fluency interacted to predict attractiveness, suggesting the role of perceptual fluency is present, but nuanced, in judgments of human voices.

]]>
Research has shown that processing dynamics on the perceiver's end determine aesthetic pleasure. Specifically, typical objects, which are processed more fluently, are perceived as more attractive. We extend this notion of perceptual fluency to judgments of vocal aesthetics. Vocal attractiveness has traditionally been examined with respect to sexual dimorphism and the apparent size of a talker, as reconstructed from the acoustic signal, despite evidence that gender-specific speech patterns are learned social behaviors. In this study, we report on a series of three experiments using 60 voices (30 females) to compare the relationship between judgments of vocal attractiveness, stereotypicality, and gender categorization fluency. Our results indicate that attractiveness and stereotypicality are highly correlated for female and male voices. Stereotypicality and categorization fluency were also correlated for male voices, but not female voices. Crucially, stereotypicality and categorization fluency interacted to predict attractiveness, suggesting the role of perceptual fluency is present, but nuanced, in judgments of human voices.
The Interplay of Cross-Situational Word Learning and Sentence-Level Constraintshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12178The Interplay of Cross-Situational Word Learning and Sentence-Level ConstraintsJudith Koehne, Matthew W. Crocker2014-09-22T00:44:46.37597-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12178John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12178http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12178Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

A variety of mechanisms contribute to word learning. Learners can track co-occurring words and referents across situations in a bottom-up manner (cross-situational word learning, CSWL). Equally, they can exploit sentential contexts, relying on top–down information such as verb–argument relations and world knowledge, offering immediate constraints on meaning (word learning based on sentence-level constraints, SLCL). When combined, CSWL and SLCL potentially modulate each other's influence, revealing how word learners deal with multiple mechanisms simultaneously: Do they use all mechanisms? Prefer one? Is their strategy context dependent? Three experiments conducted with adult learners reveal that learners prioritize SLCL over CSWL. CSWL is applied in addition to SLCL only if SLCL is not perfectly disambiguating, thereby complementing or competing with it. These studies demonstrate the importance of investigating word-learning mechanisms simultaneously, revealing important characteristics of their interaction in more naturalistic learning environments.

]]>
A variety of mechanisms contribute to word learning. Learners can track co-occurring words and referents across situations in a bottom-up manner (cross-situational word learning, CSWL). Equally, they can exploit sentential contexts, relying on top–down information such as verb–argument relations and world knowledge, offering immediate constraints on meaning (word learning based on sentence-level constraints, SLCL). When combined, CSWL and SLCL potentially modulate each other's influence, revealing how word learners deal with multiple mechanisms simultaneously: Do they use all mechanisms? Prefer one? Is their strategy context dependent? Three experiments conducted with adult learners reveal that learners prioritize SLCL over CSWL. CSWL is applied in addition to SLCL only if SLCL is not perfectly disambiguating, thereby complementing or competing with it. These studies demonstrate the importance of investigating word-learning mechanisms simultaneously, revealing important characteristics of their interaction in more naturalistic learning environments.
Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context-Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effectshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12174Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context-Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency EffectsLauren A. M. Lebois, Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall, Lawrence W. Barsalou2014-09-22T00:43:00.199773-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12174John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12174http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12174Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory-motor features activate sensory-motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.

]]>
According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory-motor features activate sensory-motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.
Social and Representational Cues Jointly Influence Spatial Perspective-Takinghttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12173Social and Representational Cues Jointly Influence Spatial Perspective-TakingAlexia Galati, Marios N. Avraamides2014-09-22T00:42:14.559067-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12173John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12173http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12173Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

We examined how social cues (the conversational partner's viewpoint) and representational ones (the intrinsic structure of a spatial layout) jointly shape people's spatial memory representations and their subsequent descriptions. In 24 pairs, Directors studied an array with a symmetrical structure while either knowing their Matcher's subsequent viewpoint or not. During the subsequent description of the array, the array's intrinsic structure was aligned with the Director, the Matcher, or neither partner. According to memory tests preceding descriptions, Directors who had studied the array while aligned with its structure were more likely to use its orientation as an organizing direction. Directors who had studied the array while misaligned with its structure used its orientation more frequently as an organizing orientation when knowing that the Matcher would be aligned with it, but used their own viewpoint more frequently as an organizing direction when not knowing the Matcher's viewpoint. Directors also adapted their descriptions strategically, using more egocentric expressions when aligned with the intrinsic structure and more partner-centered expressions when their Matchers were the ones aligned with the structure, even when this information wasn't available in advance. These findings suggest that speakers are guided by converging social and representational cues to adapt flexibly the organization of their memories and the perspectives of their descriptions.

]]>
We examined how social cues (the conversational partner's viewpoint) and representational ones (the intrinsic structure of a spatial layout) jointly shape people's spatial memory representations and their subsequent descriptions. In 24 pairs, Directors studied an array with a symmetrical structure while either knowing their Matcher's subsequent viewpoint or not. During the subsequent description of the array, the array's intrinsic structure was aligned with the Director, the Matcher, or neither partner. According to memory tests preceding descriptions, Directors who had studied the array while aligned with its structure were more likely to use its orientation as an organizing direction. Directors who had studied the array while misaligned with its structure used its orientation more frequently as an organizing orientation when knowing that the Matcher would be aligned with it, but used their own viewpoint more frequently as an organizing direction when not knowing the Matcher's viewpoint. Directors also adapted their descriptions strategically, using more egocentric expressions when aligned with the intrinsic structure and more partner-centered expressions when their Matchers were the ones aligned with the structure, even when this information wasn't available in advance. These findings suggest that speakers are guided by converging social and representational cues to adapt flexibly the organization of their memories and the perspectives of their descriptions.
The Probability of Iterated Conditionalshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12169The Probability of Iterated ConditionalsJanneke Wijnbergen-Huitink, Shira Elqayam, David E. Over2014-09-19T06:06:37.166301-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12169John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12169http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12169Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth-table task, and taking into account qualitative individual differences. This allows us to critically contrast philosophical and psychological approaches that make diverging predictions regarding the interpretation of these forms. The results strongly support the probabilistic Adams conditional and the “new paradigm” that takes this conditional as a starting point.

]]>
Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth-table task, and taking into account qualitative individual differences. This allows us to critically contrast philosophical and psychological approaches that make diverging predictions regarding the interpretation of these forms. The results strongly support the probabilistic Adams conditional and the “new paradigm” that takes this conditional as a starting point.
Patterns of Response Times and Response Choices to Science Questions: The Influence of Relative Processing Timehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12166Patterns of Response Times and Response Choices to Science Questions: The Influence of Relative Processing TimeAndrew F. Heckler, Thomas M. Scaife2014-09-18T01:09:10.877492-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12166John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12166http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12166Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

We report on five experiments investigating response choices and response times to simple science questions that evoke student “misconceptions,” and we construct a simple model to explain the patterns of response choices. Physics students were asked to compare a physical quantity represented by the slope, such as speed, on simple physics graphs. We found that response times of incorrect answers, resulting from comparing heights, were faster than response times of correct answers comparing slopes. This result alone might be explained by the fact that height was typically processed faster than slope for this kind of task, which we confirmed in a separate experiment. However, we hypothesize that the difference in response time is an indicator of the cause (rather than the result) of the response choice. To support this, we found that imposing a 3-s delay in responding increased the number of students comparing slopes (answering correctly) on the task. Additionally a significant proportion of students recognized the correct written rule (compare slope), but on the graph task they incorrectly compared heights. Finally, training either with repetitive examples or providing a general rule both improved scores, but only repetitive examples had a large effect on response times, thus providing evidence of dual paths or processes to a solution. Considering models of heuristics, information accumulation models, and models relevant to the Stroop effect, we construct a simple relative processing time model that could be viewed as a kind of fluency heuristic. The results suggest that misconception-like patterns of answers to some science questions commonly found on tests may be explained in part by automatic processes that involve the relative processing time of considered dimensions and a priority to answer quickly.

]]>
We report on five experiments investigating response choices and response times to simple science questions that evoke student “misconceptions,” and we construct a simple model to explain the patterns of response choices. Physics students were asked to compare a physical quantity represented by the slope, such as speed, on simple physics graphs. We found that response times of incorrect answers, resulting from comparing heights, were faster than response times of correct answers comparing slopes. This result alone might be explained by the fact that height was typically processed faster than slope for this kind of task, which we confirmed in a separate experiment. However, we hypothesize that the difference in response time is an indicator of the cause (rather than the result) of the response choice. To support this, we found that imposing a 3-s delay in responding increased the number of students comparing slopes (answering correctly) on the task. Additionally a significant proportion of students recognized the correct written rule (compare slope), but on the graph task they incorrectly compared heights. Finally, training either with repetitive examples or providing a general rule both improved scores, but only repetitive examples had a large effect on response times, thus providing evidence of dual paths or processes to a solution. Considering models of heuristics, information accumulation models, and models relevant to the Stroop effect, we construct a simple relative processing time model that could be viewed as a kind of fluency heuristic. The results suggest that misconception-like patterns of answers to some science questions commonly found on tests may be explained in part by automatic processes that involve the relative processing time of considered dimensions and a priority to answer quickly.
Learning General Phonological Rules From Distributional Information: A Computational Modelhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12167Learning General Phonological Rules From Distributional Information: A Computational ModelShira Calamaro, Gaja Jarosz2014-09-16T07:43:06.149118-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12167John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12167http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12167Brief Reportn/an/aAbstract

Phonological rules create alternations in the phonetic realizations of related words. These rules must be learned by infants in order to identify the phonological inventory, the morphological structure, and the lexicon of a language. Recent work proposes a computational model for the learning of one kind of phonological alternation, allophony (Peperkamp, Le Calvez, Nadal, & Dupoux, 2006). This paper extends the model to account for learning of a broader set of phonological alternations and the formalization of these alternations as general rules. In Experiment 1, we apply the original model to new data in Dutch and demonstrate its limitations in learning nonallophonic rules. In Experiment 2, we extend the model to allow it to learn general rules for alternations that apply to a class of segments. In Experiment 3, the model is further extended to allow for generalization by context; we argue that this generalization must be constrained by linguistic principles.

]]>
Phonological rules create alternations in the phonetic realizations of related words. These rules must be learned by infants in order to identify the phonological inventory, the morphological structure, and the lexicon of a language. Recent work proposes a computational model for the learning of one kind of phonological alternation, allophony (Peperkamp, Le Calvez, Nadal, & Dupoux, 2006). This paper extends the model to account for learning of a broader set of phonological alternations and the formalization of these alternations as general rules. In Experiment 1, we apply the original model to new data in Dutch and demonstrate its limitations in learning nonallophonic rules. In Experiment 2, we extend the model to allow it to learn general rules for alternations that apply to a class of segments. In Experiment 3, the model is further extended to allow for generalization by context; we argue that this generalization must be constrained by linguistic principles.
Inferring Learners' Knowledge From Their Actionshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12157Inferring Learners' Knowledge From Their ActionsAnna N. Rafferty, Michelle M. LaMar, Thomas L. Griffiths2014-08-25T04:34:15.987689-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12157John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12157http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12157Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Watching another person take actions to complete a goal and making inferences about that person's knowledge is a relatively natural task for people. This ability can be especially important in educational settings, where the inferences can be used for assessment, diagnosing misconceptions, and providing informative feedback. In this paper, we develop a general framework for automatically making such inferences based on observed actions; this framework is particularly relevant for inferring student knowledge in educational games and other interactive virtual environments. Our approach relies on modeling action planning: We formalize the problem as a Markov decision process in which one must choose what actions to take to complete a goal, where choices will be dependent on one's beliefs about how actions affect the environment. We use a variation of inverse reinforcement learning to infer these beliefs. Through two lab experiments, we show that this model can recover people's beliefs in a simple environment, with accuracy comparable to that of human observers. We then demonstrate that the model can be used to provide real-time feedback and to model data from an existing educational game.

]]>
Watching another person take actions to complete a goal and making inferences about that person's knowledge is a relatively natural task for people. This ability can be especially important in educational settings, where the inferences can be used for assessment, diagnosing misconceptions, and providing informative feedback. In this paper, we develop a general framework for automatically making such inferences based on observed actions; this framework is particularly relevant for inferring student knowledge in educational games and other interactive virtual environments. Our approach relies on modeling action planning: We formalize the problem as a Markov decision process in which one must choose what actions to take to complete a goal, where choices will be dependent on one's beliefs about how actions affect the environment. We use a variation of inverse reinforcement learning to infer these beliefs. Through two lab experiments, we show that this model can recover people's beliefs in a simple environment, with accuracy comparable to that of human observers. We then demonstrate that the model can be used to provide real-time feedback and to model data from an existing educational game.
Interaction Between Phonological and Semantic Representations: Time Mattershttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12156Interaction Between Phonological and Semantic Representations: Time MattersQi Chen, Daniel Mirman2014-08-23T01:48:37.258137-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12156John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12156http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12156Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Computational modeling and eye-tracking were used to investigate how phonological and semantic information interact to influence the time course of spoken word recognition. We extended our recent models (Chen & Mirman, 2012; Mirman, Britt, & Chen, 2013) to account for new evidence that competition among phonological neighbors influences activation of semantically related concepts during spoken word recognition (Apfelbaum, Blumstein, & McMurray, 2011). The model made a novel prediction: Semantic input modulates the effect of phonological neighbors on target word processing, producing an approximately inverted-U-shaped pattern with a high phonological density advantage at an intermediate level of semantic input—in contrast to the typical disadvantage for high phonological density words in spoken word recognition. This prediction was confirmed with a new analysis of the Apfelbaum et al. data and in a visual world paradigm experiment with preview duration serving as a manipulation of strength of semantic input. These results are consistent with our previous claim that strongly active neighbors produce net inhibitory effects and weakly active neighbors produce net facilitative effects.

]]>
Computational modeling and eye-tracking were used to investigate how phonological and semantic information interact to influence the time course of spoken word recognition. We extended our recent models (Chen & Mirman, 2012; Mirman, Britt, & Chen, 2013) to account for new evidence that competition among phonological neighbors influences activation of semantically related concepts during spoken word recognition (Apfelbaum, Blumstein, & McMurray, 2011). The model made a novel prediction: Semantic input modulates the effect of phonological neighbors on target word processing, producing an approximately inverted-U-shaped pattern with a high phonological density advantage at an intermediate level of semantic input—in contrast to the typical disadvantage for high phonological density words in spoken word recognition. This prediction was confirmed with a new analysis of the Apfelbaum et al. data and in a visual world paradigm experiment with preview duration serving as a manipulation of strength of semantic input. These results are consistent with our previous claim that strongly active neighbors produce net inhibitory effects and weakly active neighbors produce net facilitative effects.
Skeptical Appeal: The Source-Content Bias http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12153Skeptical Appeal: The Source-Content Bias John Turri2014-08-02T00:21:07.139539-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12153John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12153http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12153Regular Articlen/an/aAbstract

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.

]]>
Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.
Re-Presentations of Space in Hollywood Movies: An Event-Indexing Analysishttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12151Re-Presentations of Space in Hollywood Movies: An Event-Indexing AnalysisJames Cutting, Catalina Iricinschi2014-08-01T07:27:10.10404-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12151John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12151http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12151Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Popular movies present chunk-like events (scenes and subscenes) that promote episodic, serial updating of viewers’ representations of the ongoing narrative. Event-indexing theory would suggest that the beginnings of new scenes trigger these updates, which in turn require more cognitive processing. Typically, a new movie event is signaled by an establishing shot, one providing more background information and a longer look than the average shot. Our analysis of 24 films reconfirms this. More important, we show that, when returning to a previously shown location, the re-establishing shot reduces both context and duration while remaining greater than the average shot. In general, location shifts dominate character and time shifts in event segmentation of movies. In addition, over the last 70 years re-establishing shots have become more like the noninitial shots of a scene. Establishing shots have also approached noninitial shot scales, but not their durations. Such results suggest that film form is evolving, perhaps to suit more rapid encoding of narrative events.

]]>
Popular movies present chunk-like events (scenes and subscenes) that promote episodic, serial updating of viewers’ representations of the ongoing narrative. Event-indexing theory would suggest that the beginnings of new scenes trigger these updates, which in turn require more cognitive processing. Typically, a new movie event is signaled by an establishing shot, one providing more background information and a longer look than the average shot. Our analysis of 24 films reconfirms this. More important, we show that, when returning to a previously shown location, the re-establishing shot reduces both context and duration while remaining greater than the average shot. In general, location shifts dominate character and time shifts in event segmentation of movies. In addition, over the last 70 years re-establishing shots have become more like the noninitial shots of a scene. Establishing shots have also approached noninitial shot scales, but not their durations. Such results suggest that film form is evolving, perhaps to suit more rapid encoding of narrative events.
Peer Assessment of Aviation Performance: Inconsistent for Good Reasonshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12152Peer Assessment of Aviation Performance: Inconsistent for Good ReasonsWolff-Michael Roth, Timothy J. Mavin2014-07-23T05:45:31.848276-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12152John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12152http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12152Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

Research into expertise is relatively common in cognitive science concerning expertise existing across many domains. However, much less research has examined how experts within the same domain assess the performance of their peer experts. We report the results of a modified think-aloud study conducted with 18 pilots (6 first officers, 6 captains, and 6 flight examiners). Pairs of same-ranked pilots were asked to rate the performance of a captain flying in a critical pre-recorded simulator scenario. Findings reveal (a) considerable variance within performance categories, (b) differences in the process used as evidence in support of a performance rating, (c) different numbers and types of facts (cues) identified, and (d) differences in how specific performance events affect choice of performance category and gravity of performance assessment. Such variance is consistent with low inter-rater reliability. Because raters exhibited good, albeit imprecise, reasons and facts, a fuzzy mathematical model of performance rating was developed. The model provides good agreement with observed variations.

]]>
Research into expertise is relatively common in cognitive science concerning expertise existing across many domains. However, much less research has examined how experts within the same domain assess the performance of their peer experts. We report the results of a modified think-aloud study conducted with 18 pilots (6 first officers, 6 captains, and 6 flight examiners). Pairs of same-ranked pilots were asked to rate the performance of a captain flying in a critical pre-recorded simulator scenario. Findings reveal (a) considerable variance within performance categories, (b) differences in the process used as evidence in support of a performance rating, (c) different numbers and types of facts (cues) identified, and (d) differences in how specific performance events affect choice of performance category and gravity of performance assessment. Such variance is consistent with low inter-rater reliability. Because raters exhibited good, albeit imprecise, reasons and facts, a fuzzy mathematical model of performance rating was developed. The model provides good agreement with observed variations.
Development of Different Forms of Skill Learning Throughout the Lifespanhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12143Development of Different Forms of Skill Learning Throughout the LifespanÁgnes Lukács, Ferenc Kemény2014-07-06T23:46:19.532134-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12143John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12143http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12143Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

The acquisition of complex motor, cognitive, and social skills, like playing a musical instrument or mastering sports or a language, is generally associated with implicit skill learning (SL). Although it is a general view that SL is most effective in childhood, and such skills are best acquired if learning starts early, this idea has rarely been tested by systematic empirical studies on the developmental pathways of SL from childhood to old age. In this paper, we challenge the view that childhood and early school years are the prime time for skill learning by tracking age-related changes in performance in three different paradigms of SL. We collected data from participants between 7 and 87 years for (1) a Serial Reaction Time Task (SRT) testing the learning of motor sequences, (2) an Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task testing the extraction of regularities from auditory sequences, and (3) Probabilistic Category Learning in the Weather Prediction task (WP), a non-sequential categorization task. Results on all three tasks show that adolescence and adulthood are the most efficient periods for skill learning, since instead of becoming less and less effective with age, SL improves from childhood into adulthood and then later declines with aging.

]]>
The acquisition of complex motor, cognitive, and social skills, like playing a musical instrument or mastering sports or a language, is generally associated with implicit skill learning (SL). Although it is a general view that SL is most effective in childhood, and such skills are best acquired if learning starts early, this idea has rarely been tested by systematic empirical studies on the developmental pathways of SL from childhood to old age. In this paper, we challenge the view that childhood and early school years are the prime time for skill learning by tracking age-related changes in performance in three different paradigms of SL. We collected data from participants between 7 and 87 years for (1) a Serial Reaction Time Task (SRT) testing the learning of motor sequences, (2) an Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task testing the extraction of regularities from auditory sequences, and (3) Probabilistic Category Learning in the Weather Prediction task (WP), a non-sequential categorization task. Results on all three tasks show that adolescence and adulthood are the most efficient periods for skill learning, since instead of becoming less and less effective with age, SL improves from childhood into adulthood and then later declines with aging.
Judgments About Fact and Fiction by Children From Religious and Nonreligious Backgroundshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12138Judgments About Fact and Fiction by Children From Religious and Nonreligious BackgroundsKathleen H. Corriveau, Eva E. Chen, Paul L. Harris2014-07-03T23:32:33.102917-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12138John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12138http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12138Original Articlen/an/aAbstract

In two studies, 5- and 6-year-old children were questioned about the status of the protagonist embedded in three different types of stories. In realistic stories that only included ordinary events, all children, irrespective of family background and schooling, claimed that the protagonist was a real person. In religious stories that included ordinarily impossible events brought about by divine intervention, claims about the status of the protagonist varied sharply with exposure to religion. Children who went to church or were enrolled in a parochial school, or both, judged the protagonist in religious stories to be a real person, whereas secular children with no such exposure to religion judged the protagonist in religious stories to be fictional. Children's upbringing was also related to their judgment about the protagonist in fantastical stories that included ordinarily impossible events whether brought about by magic (Study 1) or without reference to magic (Study 2). Secular children were more likely than religious children to judge the protagonist in such fantastical stories to be fictional. The results suggest that exposure to religious ideas has a powerful impact on children's differentiation between reality and fiction, not just for religious stories but also for fantastical stories.

]]>
In two studies, 5- and 6-year-old children were questioned about the status of the protagonist embedded in three different types of stories. In realistic stories that only included ordinary events, all children, irrespective of family background and schooling, claimed that the protagonist was a real person. In religious stories that included ordinarily impossible events brought about by divine intervention, claims about the status of the protagonist varied sharply with exposure to religion. Children who went to church or were enrolled in a parochial school, or both, judged the protagonist in religious stories to be a real person, whereas secular children with no such exposure to religion judged the protagonist in religious stories to be fictional. Children's upbringing was also related to their judgment about the protagonist in fantastical stories that included ordinarily impossible events whether brought about by magic (Study 1) or without reference to magic (Study 2). Secular children were more likely than religious children to judge the protagonist in such fantastical stories to be fictional. The results suggest that exposure to religious ideas has a powerful impact on children's differentiation between reality and fiction, not just for religious stories but also for fantastical stories.
Issue Informationhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12158Issue Information2015-01-24T01:12:34.06969-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12158John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12158http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12158Issue InformationiiiiInformation Processing and Dynamics in Minimally Cognitive Agentshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12142Information Processing and Dynamics in Minimally Cognitive AgentsRandall D. Beer, Paul L. Williams2014-07-06T23:37:38.125958-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12142John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12142http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12142Original Article138Abstract

There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information-theoretic analysis reveals how task-relevant information flows through the system to be combined into a categorization decision. Dynamical analysis reveals the key geometrical and temporal interrelationships underlying the categorization decision. Finally, we propose a framework for directly relating these two different styles of explanation and discuss the possible implications of our analysis for some of the ongoing debates in cognitive science.

]]>
There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information-theoretic analysis reveals how task-relevant information flows through the system to be combined into a categorization decision. Dynamical analysis reveals the key geometrical and temporal interrelationships underlying the categorization decision. Finally, we propose a framework for directly relating these two different styles of explanation and discuss the possible implications of our analysis for some of the ongoing debates in cognitive science.
Learning to Manipulate and Categorize in Human and Artificial Agentshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12130Learning to Manipulate and Categorize in Human and Artificial AgentsGiuseppe Morlino, Claudia Gianelli, Anna M. Borghi, Stefano Nolfi2014-07-17T00:28:43.861096-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12130John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12130http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12130Original Article3964Abstract

This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two-dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment interaction, the relation between category and action development, and the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge.

]]>
This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two-dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment interaction, the relation between category and action development, and the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge.
Agents and Causes: Dispositional Intuitions As a Guide to Causal Structurehttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12132Agents and Causes: Dispositional Intuitions As a Guide to Causal StructureRalf Mayrhofer, Michael R. Waldmann2014-05-16T06:09:36.05431-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12132John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12132http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12132Original Article6595Abstract

Currently, two frameworks of causal reasoning compete: Whereas dependency theories focus on dependencies between causes and effects, dispositional theories model causation as an interaction between agents and patients endowed with intrinsic dispositions. One important finding providing a bridge between these two frameworks is that failures of causes to generate their effects tend to be differentially attributed to agents and patients regardless of their location on either the cause or the effect side. To model different types of error attribution, we augmented a causal Bayes net model with separate error sources for causes and effects. In several experiments, we tested this new model using the size of Markov violations as the empirical indicator of differential assumptions about the sources of error. As predicted by the model, the size of Markov violations was influenced by the location of the agents and was moderated by the causal structure and the type of causal variables.

]]>
Currently, two frameworks of causal reasoning compete: Whereas dependency theories focus on dependencies between causes and effects, dispositional theories model causation as an interaction between agents and patients endowed with intrinsic dispositions. One important finding providing a bridge between these two frameworks is that failures of causes to generate their effects tend to be differentially attributed to agents and patients regardless of their location on either the cause or the effect side. To model different types of error attribution, we augmented a causal Bayes net model with separate error sources for causes and effects. In several experiments, we tested this new model using the size of Markov violations as the empirical indicator of differential assumptions about the sources of error. As predicted by the model, the size of Markov violations was influenced by the location of the agents and was moderated by the causal structure and the type of causal variables.
Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgmenthttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12134Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral JudgmentGeorge E. Newman, Julian De Freitas, Joshua Knobe2014-07-17T00:17:47.291841-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12134John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12134http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12134Original Article96125Abstract

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non-moral in nature.

]]>
Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non-moral in nature.
The Impact of Analogies on Creative Concept Generation: Lessons From an In Vivo Study in Engineering Designhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12127The Impact of Analogies on Creative Concept Generation: Lessons From an In Vivo Study in Engineering DesignJoel Chan, Christian Schunn2014-05-16T06:05:39.158789-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12127John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12127http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12127Original Article126155Abstract

Research on innovation often highlights analogies from sources outside the current problem domain as a major source of novel concepts; however, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well understood. We analyzed the temporal interplay between far analogy use and creative concept generation in a professional design team's brainstorming conversations, investigating the hypothesis that far analogies lead directly to very novel concepts via large steps in conceptual spaces (jumps). Surprisingly, we found that concepts were more similar to their preceding concepts after far analogy use compared to baseline situations (i.e., without far analogy use). Yet far analogies increased the team's concept generation rate compared to baseline conditions. Overall, these results challenge the view that far analogies primarily lead to novel concepts via jumps in conceptual spaces and suggest alternative pathways from far analogies to novel concepts (e.g., iterative, deep exploration within a functional space).

]]>
Research on innovation often highlights analogies from sources outside the current problem domain as a major source of novel concepts; however, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well understood. We analyzed the temporal interplay between far analogy use and creative concept generation in a professional design team's brainstorming conversations, investigating the hypothesis that far analogies lead directly to very novel concepts via large steps in conceptual spaces (jumps). Surprisingly, we found that concepts were more similar to their preceding concepts after far analogy use compared to baseline situations (i.e., without far analogy use). Yet far analogies increased the team's concept generation rate compared to baseline conditions. Overall, these results challenge the view that far analogies primarily lead to novel concepts via jumps in conceptual spaces and suggest alternative pathways from far analogies to novel concepts (e.g., iterative, deep exploration within a functional space).
Comparing Data Sets: Implicit Summaries of the Statistical Properties of Number Setshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12141Comparing Data Sets: Implicit Summaries of the Statistical Properties of Number SetsBradley J. Morris, Amy M. Masnick2014-07-06T23:45:01.858202-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12141John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12141http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12141Original Article156170Abstract

Comparing datasets, that is, sets of numbers in context, is a critical skill in higher order cognition. Although much is known about how people compare single numbers, little is known about how number sets are represented and compared. We investigated how subjects compared datasets that varied in their statistical properties, including ratio of means, coefficient of variation, and number of observations, by measuring eye fixations, accuracy, and confidence when assessing differences between number sets. Results indicated that participants implicitly create and compare approximate summary values that include information about mean and variance, with no evidence of explicit calculation. Accuracy and confidence increased, while the number of fixations decreased as sets became more distinct (i.e., as mean ratios increase and variance decreases), demonstrating that the statistical properties of datasets were highly related to comparisons. The discussion includes a model proposing how reasoners summarize and compare datasets within the architecture for approximate number representation.

]]>
Comparing datasets, that is, sets of numbers in context, is a critical skill in higher order cognition. Although much is known about how people compare single numbers, little is known about how number sets are represented and compared. We investigated how subjects compared datasets that varied in their statistical properties, including ratio of means, coefficient of variation, and number of observations, by measuring eye fixations, accuracy, and confidence when assessing differences between number sets. Results indicated that participants implicitly create and compare approximate summary values that include information about mean and variance, with no evidence of explicit calculation. Accuracy and confidence increased, while the number of fixations decreased as sets became more distinct (i.e., as mean ratios increase and variance decreases), demonstrating that the statistical properties of datasets were highly related to comparisons. The discussion includes a model proposing how reasoners summarize and compare datasets within the architecture for approximate number representation.
Culture: Copying, Compression, and Conventionalityhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12144Culture: Copying, Compression, and ConventionalityMónica Tamariz, Simon Kirby2014-07-11T00:44:46.686835-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12144John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12144http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12144Original Article171183Abstract

Through cultural transmission, repeated learning by new individuals transforms cultural information, which tends to become increasingly compressible (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, ; Smith, Tamariz, & Kirby, ). Existing diffusion chain studies include in their design two processes that could be responsible for this tendency: learning (storing patterns in memory) and reproducing (producing the patterns again). This paper manipulates the presence of learning in a simple iterated drawing design experiment. We find that learning seems to be the causal factor behind the increase in compressibility observed in the transmitted information, while reproducing is a source of random heritable innovations. Only a theory invoking these two aspects of cultural learning will be able to explain human culture's fundamental balance between stability and innovation.

]]>
Through cultural transmission, repeated learning by new individuals transforms cultural information, which tends to become increasingly compressible (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, ; Smith, Tamariz, & Kirby, ). Existing diffusion chain studies include in their design two processes that could be responsible for this tendency: learning (storing patterns in memory) and reproducing (producing the patterns again). This paper manipulates the presence of learning in a simple iterated drawing design experiment. We find that learning seems to be the causal factor behind the increase in compressibility observed in the transmitted information, while reproducing is a source of random heritable innovations. Only a theory invoking these two aspects of cultural learning will be able to explain human culture's fundamental balance between stability and innovation.
Parallels in Preschoolers' and Adults' Judgments About Ownership Rights and Bodily Rightshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12154Parallels in Preschoolers' and Adults' Judgments About Ownership Rights and Bodily RightsJulia W. Van de Vondervoort, Ori Friedman2014-07-26T02:01:19.033528-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12154John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12154http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12154Original Article184198Abstract

Understanding ownership rights is necessary for socially appropriate behavior. We provide evidence that preschoolers' and adults' judgments of ownership rights are related to their judgments of bodily rights. Four-year-olds (n = 70) and adults (n = 89) evaluated the acceptability of harmless actions targeting owned property and body parts. At both ages, evaluations did not vary for owned property or body parts. Instead, evaluations were influenced by two other manipulations—whether the target belonged to the agent or another person, and whether that other person approved of the action. Moreover, these manipulations influenced judgments for owned objects and body parts in the same way: When the other person approved of the action, participants' judgments were positive regardless of who the target belonged to. In contrast, when that person disapproved, judgments depended on who the target belonged to. These findings show that young children grasp the importance of approval or consent for ownership rights and bodily rights, and likewise suggest that people's notions of ownership rights are related to their appreciation of bodily rights.

]]>
Understanding ownership rights is necessary for socially appropriate behavior. We provide evidence that preschoolers' and adults' judgments of ownership rights are related to their judgments of bodily rights. Four-year-olds (n = 70) and adults (n = 89) evaluated the acceptability of harmless actions targeting owned property and body parts. At both ages, evaluations did not vary for owned property or body parts. Instead, evaluations were influenced by two other manipulations—whether the target belonged to the agent or another person, and whether that other person approved of the action. Moreover, these manipulations influenced judgments for owned objects and body parts in the same way: When the other person approved of the action, participants' judgments were positive regardless of who the target belonged to. In contrast, when that person disapproved, judgments depended on who the target belonged to. These findings show that young children grasp the importance of approval or consent for ownership rights and bodily rights, and likewise suggest that people's notions of ownership rights are related to their appreciation of bodily rights.
An Indecent Proposal: The Dual Functions of Indirect Speechhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12145An Indecent Proposal: The Dual Functions of Indirect SpeechAleksandr Chakroff, Kyle A. Thomas, Omar S. Haque, Liane Young2014-07-30T23:45:27.591969-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12145John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12145http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12145Original Article199211Abstract

People often use indirect speech, for example, when trying to bribe a police officer by asking whether there might be “a way to take care of things without all the paperwork.” Recent game theoretic accounts suggest that a speaker uses indirect speech to reduce public accountability for socially risky behaviors. The present studies examine a secondary function of indirect speech use: increasing the perceived moral permissibility of an action. Participants report that indirect speech is associated with reduced accountability for unethical behavior, as well as increased moral permissibility and increased likelihood of unethical behavior. Importantly, moral permissibility was a stronger mediator of the effect of indirect speech on likelihood of action, for judgments of one's own versus others' unethical action. In sum, the motorist who bribes the police officer with winks and nudges may not only avoid public punishment but also maintain the sense that his actions are morally permissible.

]]>
People often use indirect speech, for example, when trying to bribe a police officer by asking whether there might be “a way to take care of things without all the paperwork.” Recent game theoretic accounts suggest that a speaker uses indirect speech to reduce public accountability for socially risky behaviors. The present studies examine a secondary function of indirect speech use: increasing the perceived moral permissibility of an action. Participants report that indirect speech is associated with reduced accountability for unethical behavior, as well as increased moral permissibility and increased likelihood of unethical behavior. Importantly, moral permissibility was a stronger mediator of the effect of indirect speech on likelihood of action, for judgments of one's own versus others' unethical action. In sum, the motorist who bribes the police officer with winks and nudges may not only avoid public punishment but also maintain the sense that his actions are morally permissible.
Word Meanings Evolve to Selectively Preserve Distinctions on Salient Dimensionshttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12150Word Meanings Evolve to Selectively Preserve Distinctions on Salient DimensionsCatriona Silvey, Simon Kirby, Kenny Smith2014-07-26T01:58:16.079059-05:00doi:10.1111/cogs.12150John Wiley & Sons, Inc.10.1111/cogs.12150http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fcogs.12150Brief Report212226Abstract

Words refer to objects in the world, but this correspondence is not one-to-one: Each word has a range of referents that share features on some dimensions but differ on others. This property of language is called underspecification. Parts of the lexicon have characteristic patterns of underspecification; for example, artifact nouns tend to specify shape, but not color, whereas substance nouns specify material but not shape. These regularities in the lexicon enable learners to generalize new words appropriately. How does the lexicon come to have these helpful regularities? We test the hypothesis that systematic backgrounding of some dimensions during learning and use causes language to gradually change, over repeated episodes of transmission, to produce a lexicon with strong patterns of underspecification across these less salient dimensions. This offers a cultural evolutionary mechanism linking individual word learning and generalization to the origin of regularities in the lexicon that help learners generalize words appropriately.

]]>
Words refer to objects in the world, but this correspondence is not one-to-one: Each word has a range of referents that share features on some dimensions but differ on others. This property of language is called underspecification. Parts of the lexicon have characteristic patterns of underspecification; for example, artifact nouns tend to specify shape, but not color, whereas substance nouns specify material but not shape. These regularities in the lexicon enable learners to generalize new words appropriately. How does the lexicon come to have these helpful regularities? We test the hypothesis that systematic backgrounding of some dimensions during learning and use causes language to gradually change, over repeated episodes of transmission, to produce a lexicon with strong patterns of underspecification across these less salient dimensions. This offers a cultural evolutionary mechanism linking individual word learning and generalization to the origin of regularities in the lexicon that help learners generalize words appropriately.