Free trade critics say a $250-million damage suit being pursued as a result of Quebec's moratorium on fracking is proof Canada needs to be careful in negotiating trade pacts around the world.

That's because TPP and TAFTA/TTIP, as well as Canada's bilateral treaty with Europe, CETA, all have ISDS clauses in them -- at least as far we know, given the obsessive secrecy that surrounds their negotiation. Here's the key issue in this latest case involving Canada:

Quebec has yet to decide whether fracking -- a process to inject fluid into the ground at a high pressure in order to fracture shale rocks to release natural gas inside -- can be conducted safely under the St. Lawrence.

"If a government is not even allowed to take a time out to study the impact without having to compensate a corporation, it puts a tremendous chill on a governments' ability to regulate in the public interest," said Ilana Solomon, director of the Sierra Club's trade program in Washington, D.C.

That is, the company concerned is trying to pressure Quebec to lift its moratorium before the latter has had a chance to evaluate all the scientific evidence on fracking, and come to a reasoned decision. That seems to be a typical effect where ISDS clauses are in operation: with the threat of huge claims hanging over them, governments often choose to capitulate and give companies what they want, rather than risk losing before the secretive tribunals that are used to adjudicate such ISDS cases.

The fear is that both TPP and TAFTA/TTIP will cast a chill over policy making around the Pacific and across the Atlantic, as businesses take advantage of the punitive damages available to bully governments into scrapping existing or proposed regulations in key consumer areas like food, health, safety and the environment.

The present case is noteworthy for the following fact:

Lone Pine is a Calgary-based firm and would not have standing as a foreign entity to sue Canada under NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement], but [Lone Pine company president] Granger said it can do so because it is registered in Delaware.

The justification for ISDS is that it is designed to protect companies when they make investments in a country that is not their own, and which therefore may not offer all the protections they enjoy at home -- although that's plainly absurd when trade agreements are between nations like Canada, the US and the EU. But here we see ISDS being turned into yet another way for a local company to overturn decisions it doesn't like -- a clear perversion of the original intent of such measures.

from the incredible dept

A few years ago, we noted that Eli Lilly was facing some hard times, in large part because it had focused its entire business model around getting patents, and many of those patents were expiring, and very few new ones were in the pipeline. Even so, it was still rather surprising earlier this year to see Eli Lilly claim that Canada owed it $100 million for undermining the company's "expected future profits" by rejecting an Eli Lilly patent. The Canadian court reasonably felt that it shouldn't give Eli Lilly a patent on something that wasn't determined to be useful. Normally, if a country doesn't give you a patent, you move on. However, Eli Lilly used a questionable part of NAFTA, the so-called investor-state dispute resolution mechanism, to argue that Canada was "expropriating its property," and thus demanded compensation -- starting at $100 million, which it then raised to $500 million.

A few weeks ago, Eli Lilly's CEO wrote an op-ed piece, claiming that by not granting his company a monopoly, Canada was "suffocating life-saving innovation." That's wrong. And it's obnoxious. For years we've covered how the pharmaceutical industry has actually used patents to hold back life-saving innovations by locking them up, blocking advances, jacking up the price to absolutely insane rates, and by using a variety of other questionable practices (including patenting historical folk medicines). But, more importantly, every country gets to determine what is and what is not patentable. For Eli Lilly to use trade policies to effectively try to negate Canada's patent validity standards is a blatant attack on Canadian sovereignty.

Keep this in mind as we discuss the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and the upcoming EU-US trade agreement TTIP/TAFTA, because companies are asking for similar dispute resolution mechanisms, and this could become a big, big deal. Remember how New Zealand recently has put in a law that should mostly ban software patents? Imagine if Microsoft and others suddenly started trying to sue that country for "lost profits" because it won't give them patents on their software.

from the but-what-about-transparency? dept

One of the concerns about TAFTA/TTIP is that it would repeat the mistakes of ACTA and SOPA as far as intellectual monopolies were concerned. This led to a call by a group of public interest organizations for things like copyright and patents to be excluded from TAFTA (disclosure: I was involved in the drawing up of the text.) Needless to say, no notice was taken of that, and a couple of weeks ago the European Parliament duly passed a resolution on TAFTA that said:

the agreement should include strong protection of precisely and clearly defined areas of intellectual property rights (IPRs), including geographical indications, and should be consistent with existing international agreements;

The section dealing with intellectual monopolies confirms that they form part of the mandate, but is otherwise not very illuminating:

27. The Agreement shall cover issues related to intellectual property rights and should complement and build upon the TRIPS. The Agreement will reflect the high value placed by both Parties on intellectual property protection and build on the existing EU-US dialogue in this sphere.

28. Negotiations should, in particular, address areas most relevant for fostering the exchange of goods and services with IP content, with a view to supporting innovation. Negotiations should provide for enhanced protection of EU Geographical Indications through the Agreement. Both sides should explore opportunities to address other significant IPR issues.

It will be interesting to see how the attempt to protect EU Geographical Indications -- things like Parma ham -- goes given the US's long-standing dislike of them. But much more significant than this rather perfunctory section on intellectual monopolies is the one dealing with the increasingly-important area of investor-state dispute resolution:

Scope: the investment protection chapter of the Agreement should cover a broad range of investors and their investments, intellectual property rights included, whether the investment is made before or after the entry into force of the Agreement.

...

Enforcement: the Agreement should aim to provide for an effective and state-of-the-art investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism, providing for transparency, independence of arbitrators and predictability of the Agreement, including through the possibility of binding interpretation of the Agreement by the Parties. State-to-state dispute settlement should be included, but should not interfere with the right of investors to have recourse to the investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms.

One of the key phrases here is "intellectual property rights included". That's deeply troubling because it essentially legitimizes attempts to extend a mechanism originally designed to prevent rogue states expropriating physical property from investors to the realm of intellectual monopolies. That is the basis of the argument made by Eli Lilly in suing Canada for $100 million, claiming that its "investment" in developing a drug had been expropriated by the courts there by not granting a patent on it.

It's not hard to imagine a similar approach being taken in the computer world if European countries definitively throw out software patents, as Germany is contemplating. US companies might sue for what they would claim is an "expropriation" of their investment and future rents. Similarly, if the US ever reduces the term of copyright, as the Register of Copyright, Maria Pallante, has called for, European publishers might sue the US government for the "expropriation" of their monopoly rights. The winners here will be big companies and their lawyers; losers will be the public in both the EU and US, who will be forced to "compensate" companies for these supposed losses, and who will find their national laws overruled by secret tribunals.

It's worth reading the whole document, not least because you and I weren't supposed to -- it's marked "restricted". And talking of transparency, here's what the European Commission is instructing its negotiators to push for in this area:

The Agreement will address issues of transparency. To this end, it will include provisions on:

The commitment to consult stakeholders in advance of the introduction of measures with an impact on trade and investment;
The publication of general rules and measures with an impact on international trade and investment in goods and services;
Transparency as regards the application of measures having an impact on international trade and investment in goods or services.

That feeble list of non-measures is hardly what most of us think of as "transparency". But of course, the irony here is that even in the face of this failure to take openness seriously, a leak has already occurred, allowing anyone to read the supposedly confidential document. And judging by what has happened with ACTA and TPP in the past, further leaks of key texts will occur despite the best efforts of the negotiating parties to keep everything behind closed doors. So why not release all documents that have been tabled -- that is, those that are no longer secret? Being able to read them ought to be the right of citizens on both sides of the Atlantic; refusing to distribute them makes a mockery of the idea that the TAFTA/TTIP negotiations are being conducted in the public's name.

from the time-to-wake-up dept

A couple of weeks ago, we wrote about the growing importance of investor-state dispute resolution in so-called free trade agreements (FTAs). One of the most troubling aspects is how potentially it can be used to undo the hard-won gains for important areas like access to medicines. The US law professor Brook K. Baker, whose work we discussed last year, has written an excellent exploration of this under-appreciated risk. After an introduction running through the recent wins in the field of access to medicines -- a topic that we've covered extensively here on Techdirt -- he explains how big pharma could employ investor-state dispute resolution to thwart these and similar moves to protect health:

Using loose and imprecise standards addressing "minimum standards of treatment," "indirect expropriation," and "national treatment," multinational pharmaceuticals might claim that denying patents, granting oppositions, revoking patents, issuing compulsory licenses, and registering generics while referencing clinical data or doing so before patent expiration all violate their legitimate expectations for profit. Although the "minimum standards of treatment" clause [used to justify recourse to investor-state dispute resolution] was originally designed to prevent grossly abusive and discriminatory courtroom adjudications totally outside the bounds of normative due process, it has morphed to decisions with a much more lenient standard that rewards investors even when they have been given a full panoply of due process safeguards. The expropriation standard, originally adopted to deter nationalization of businesses and seizures of real property has similarly morphed to prevent indirect expropriations, what we call regulatory takings in the U.S., where changes in government regulations -- many designed to protect public health, environment, and other legitimate public interests -- are challenged as having diluted the investor's expectations of profit. Finally, the national treatment standard, though originally adopted to ensure that foreign investors are treated equivalently to domestic investors, is also morphing in new directions.

As this makes clear, what started out as a series of measures for a few special cases in order to protect Western companies in countries with weak legal systems and a high risk of tangible investments being expropriated by the state, has been twisted to an entirely different use: enabling deep-pocketed multinationals to circumvent any kind of legislation they don't like, even in countries with fair and independent judiciaries.

Baker concludes by offering some advice for nations involved in FTA negotiations with clauses that that call for investor-state dispute resolution to be put in place:

India and other trade negotiators should heed the entreaties of trade, IP, and health activists who are warning against the inclusion of an Investment Clause in the EU-India FTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and in the many other trade agreements that are underway or soon-to-be initiated. Preferably, investment chapters will be rejected in their entirety, as they are becoming a corporate sword of Damocles that hangs over the head of rich and poor governments alike. At the very least, IP should be totally defined out of "investments" and no investor claims whatsoever should be available for alleged frustration of IP-based expectations. IP right holders already have multiple forms of enforcement including private lawsuits, border seizures, criminal prosecution, and state-state dispute resolution. Enough is enough. Expanded and unbound investment rights for Big Pharma under the cover of underscrutinized investment chapters is a grave threat -- a threat with deadly consequences to millions of patients who rely on governments' rights to regulate IPRs and to use any and all TRIPS-compliant flexibilities to ensure affordable access to medicines for all.

Worrying, few are even aware that the investor-state dispute resolution option exists, let alone its unprecedented power to circumvent government policy and override judicial decisions. That makes it all-too easy for negotiators to agree to its inclusion in trade agreements as an apparently minor concession that can be used as a bargaining chip to obtain measures they care more about. Let's hope that Baker's excellent contribution to the debate will alert people to this crucial area, and encourage others to speak up about the very real danger investor-state dispute resolution represents to a wide range of public interest issues.

from the be-very-afraid dept

We wrote recently about how multilateral trade agreements have become a convenient way to circumvent democratic decision making. One of the important features of such treaties is the inclusion of an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism, which Techdirt discussed last year. The Huffington Post has a great article about how this measure is almost certain to be part of the imminent TAFTA negotiations, as it already is for TPP, and why that is deeply problematic:

Investor-state resolution has been a common component of U.S.-negotiated pacts with individual nations since the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. But such resolution is not currently permitted in disputes with the U.S. and EU, which are governed by the WTO. All trade deals feature some kind of international resolution for disputes, but the direct empowerment of corporations to unilaterally bring trade cases against sovereign countries is not part of WTO treaties. Under WTO rules, a company must persuade a sovereign nation that it has been wronged, leaving the decision to bring a trade case before the WTO in the hands of elected governments.

Traditionally, this proposed political empowerment for corporations has been defended as a way to protect companies from arbitrary governments or weakened court systems in developing countries. But the expansion of the practice to first-world relations exposes that rationale as disingenuous. Rule of law in the U.S. and EU is considered strong; the court systems are among the most sophisticated and expert in the world. Most cases brought against the United States under NAFTA have been dismissed or abandoned before an international court issued a ruling.

As this rightly points out, investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms were brought in for agreements with countries where the rule of law could not be depended upon. That makes no sense in the case of the US and EU, both of whose legal systems are highly developed (some might say overly so.) The Huffington Post article quotes Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, who explains what she thinks is really going on here:

"The dirty little secret about [the negotiation] is that it is not mainly about trade, but rather would target for elimination the strongest consumer, health, safety, privacy, environmental and other public interest policies on either side of the Atlantic," said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. "The starkest evidence ... is the plan for it to include the infamous investor-state system that empowers individual corporations and investors to skirt domestic courts and laws and drag signatory governments to foreign tribunals."

One recent example of the kind of thing that might become increasingly common if investor-state dispute resolution is included in TAFTA and TPP is provided by Eli Lilly and Company. As Techdirt reported earlier this year, the pharma giant is demanding $100 million as compensation for what it calls "expropriation" by Canada, simply because the latter's courts refused to grant Eli Lilly a drug patent on the grounds that it didn't satisfy the conditions set down in law for doing so.

The Issues Note reveals that 62 new cases were initiated in 2012, which constitutes the highest number of known ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] claims ever filed in one year and confirms that foreign investors are increasingly resorting to investor-State arbitration.

…

By the end of 2012, the total number of known cases reached 518, and the total number of countries that have responded to one or more ISDS claims increased to 95. The overall number of concluded cases reached 244. Out of these, approximately 42 per cent were decided in favour of the State and 31 per cent in favour of the investor. Approximately 27 per cent of the cases were settled.

Although that suggests that states are winning more often than investors, the cost of doing so is a drain on public finances, and ignores cases that never come to arbitration because governments simply give in. And when states lose, the fines can be enormous: the report notes that 2012 saw the highest monetary award in the history of investor-state dispute resolution: $1.77 billion to Occidental, in a dispute with Ecuador.

amplif[ies] the need for public debate about the efficacy of the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism and ways to reform it

Unfortunately, against a background of almost total lack of awareness by the public that supra-national structures are being put in place that allow their governments to be overruled, and their laws to be ignored, it is highly unlikely we will get that debate.