Summary of
the monitoring of demonstrations at the G8 summit
Grundrechtekomitee (Committee for Fundamental Rights and Democracy)
10.06.07

Between 2 and 8 June 2007, critics of the policies
of the G8 states met in Rostock and around Heiligendamm. International
in nature, and with particularly strong representation from youth
movements, they demanded radically different, democratic, humane,
environmentally friendly and sustainable politics. They protested
against the policies enforced by the rich and powerful states
that dominate the world today, which are ruthlessly exploiting
people and the environment and are responsible for war and instability
and build barriers against those who want to flee this misery.
These diverse movements differ in detail, but there is great
unity in their orientation towards - and struggles for - a democratic
system that respects human rights.

The Committee for Fundamental Rights and Democracy provided
30 observers to monitor the protests.

We tried to be present at numerous locations, both big and
small assemblies, and monitor the treatment of the protesters
by the police. Unfortunately, it was not possible to be comprehensive
and many reports still have to be collected. However, we are
able to draw some preliminary conclusions.

From the planning of the protests the police have responded
with escalation and by criminalisation. In a revealing statement
they announced that demonstrations will no longer be "given
a long leash". At the same time, demonstrators made clear
that the right to assembly and freedom of expression had to be
defended and supported. Infringements of this right are unconstitutional.
They have to be understood as fundamental rights and protected
as such.

- The criminalisation of protesters started early - police
and authorities issued public warnings about terrorist attacks,
criminal acts and violent demonstrators with media effective
methods.

When questioned about the evidence for these claims, the police
had to admit that they did not have any. However, this tactic
provided the police room to manoeuvre. Moreover, it spread fear
amongst the population of Rostock and Heiligendamm and undermined
the protest. Only with much time and contact between the protesting
youth and the local population, were activists able to diffuse
these prejudices.

- Using this background of criminalisation, the local authority
was able to pass a general decree aiming to suspend the fundamental
rights of assembly and freedom of expression. Democratic rights
were suspended not just within the immediate vicinity of Heiligendamm
(which was fenced-off by a 12 km long razor-wire 'technical barrier')
protests were banned throughout the wider area around the red
zone. This ban was widely criticised, even by the established
parties - from the Green Party to the Liberal Party and the Social
Democrats.

- Such a broad decree (which was first overturned by the regional
administrative court but then supported by the Admistrative High
Court of the Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) was only granted in
final instance by the Federal Constitutional Court because the
demonstration of 2 June saw violent clashes between the police
and - considering the size of the demonstration - a small minority
of protesters, who were eager for confrontation with them. Some
demonstrators threw stones and bottles from within the group
of protesters and thereby threatened the safety of others - not
only through their missiles that often hit other demonstrators,
but also by way of the police response. The police took the conflict
into the midst of the demonstration.

In particular, the "arrest and evidence-gathering teams"
- and in a similar fashion the various regional state police
teams - repeatedly entered the demonstration to arrest individuals
or film those who threw stones. They ruthlessly beat bystanders
who were in their way during these actions. When individuals
are violently snatched from such a large heterogeneous protest
- which was able to march peacefully and without police intervention
until that point - it has to be expected that such provocation
is met with protest and outrage. The mood is fuelled by anger.
Furthermore, this strategy contradicts the police's claim that
they were following a strategy of de-escalation. Inserting police
into a march to prosecute possible criminals is a negligent act;
inserting them into a march to merely film stone-throwers in
order to arrest them at a later stage is in itself a threat to
public order and security.

- The opening demonstration and rally took place on Saturday,
2 June 2007, and was followed by action days of the themes of
"Global agriculture", "Flight and Migration"
and "Against Militarism, War and Torture - Block the G8,
Stop Wars". A broad and entertaining protest developed that
publicised the themes through organised actions at symbolic locations.
It became evident that the demonstrators had developed a broad
and diverse form of de-escalation tactics and actions. Many of
these had been applied on Saturday, but remained in the background
due to the escalation between a small group of demonstrators
dressed in black with balaclavas and a group of police, also
with balaclavas and black clothing, predominantly interested
in prosecutions and identification of offenders. Groups of clowns
and a "clown's army" ensured entertainment and diffused
tense situations.

Throughout the week of protest, drums, samba bands and music
floats contributed to a relaxed atmosphere, entertainment and
movement. Sound trucks provided information. On Monday, during
the "Flight and Migration" action day in particular,
the protesters' patience was tested by police attempts to misinform
and destabilise the demonstration. Most people had already become
accustomed to the regular bag checks on arriving at assembly
points - in this case the rally in front of the Satowerstraße
refugee camp. Some of the larger groups were even successful
in demanding uncontrolled entry. Even the continued arrests of
people from the larger groups, which repeatedly took place after
the Saturday demonstration, did not lead to escalation on the
part of the demonstrators. It did, however, create anger and
fear amongst those arrested as many were convinced that neither
they, nor friends who were arrested, had not committed any crime.

- Police escalation tactics: when on Monday, 4 June 2007,
the demonstration (which had received permission from the authorities)
started forming, with several thousand participants preparing
to walk from the refugee camp to the centre of town; they were
stopped by an armada of heavily-armed police and five water cannons.
For more than an hour the demonstration was refused permission
to leave. Information - let alone justification - was rarely
provided by police and when it was it was contradictory. None
of the reasons given would have passed legal scrutiny - in one
instance, the police claimed that 500 demonstrators had not been
searched, then they conjured up an external threat or they claimed
thousands of violent offenders were suspected to be part of the
peaceful demonstration. Despite these bullying tactics and the
consequent tensions, the demonstrators created a relaxed atmosphere
with entertainment and information. After more than an hour of
waiting, the march was allowed to walk along a section of the
planned route. Because the police had refused to let the activists
walk the final part of the demonstration towards the city centre,
and failed to offer an alternative route, the organisers had
to officially call an end to the protest. The main explanation
offered by police for its stalling tactic was that the demonstration
was larger than the expected number given by the organisers.
They said that 10,000 people - an exceptionally rare example
of the police exaggerating upwards the numbers participating
in a demonstration - could not be allowed into the city. Police
told some journalists that the demonstration was harbouring large
numbers of potentially violent offenders. Despite police threats
to carry out checks and arrests, a small spontaneous demonstration
formed to finish the march peacefully at the final rally in Rostock
harbour.

- Citizens exercise their right to assembly: Wednesday and
Thursday (6 and 7 June 2007) were blockade days and demonstrated
the discipline, conviction and determination that the protests
were able to muster. People entered the designated zone where
demonstrations had been banned, but they stopped at the fence.
The aim appeared not to be its destruction but a visible protest
at a publicly inaccessible zone. Through physically demanding
routes through fields and forests, police barriers were avoided
by groups of people who constantly split up and reformed. Police
repeatedly used water cannon and even tear gas against these
demonstrators, who had nothing to defend themselves with except
their bodies and minds. Dogs were also introduced into the fields.
When they reached the streets they were often able to block them
by sitting down - these protests were sometimes intercepted by
unannounced and menacing police interventions.

- Bans, intervention with force or toleration, depending on
the police's discretion: the police allowed two blockades to
take place on Thursday and it was possible to reach them without
interference. Access roads and the security fence were secured
by only a small number of police. This showed how small a police
force was necessary when demonstrations were permitted. In contrast,
the police at the West Gate prepared for armed conflict. They
had occupied the streets forcing demonstrators to stand in an
adjacent field. Without warning nine water canons were used against
the 1,000 demonstrators, causing a series of injuries. The police
announcement that came after repeated water cannon charges: "Stay
calm, we are only making a bit of space" is cynical. The
fact that people responded to this by throwing bottles - predominantly
plastic - towards the police, was again to justify videotaping
activists so as to be able to snatch them out of the crowd at
a later state. The result, further escalation.

- The police sometimes treated journalists according to their
profession. At least in calmer situations they were able to do
their job without interference. In other scenarios, however,
they covered their lenses and stopped filming. During the day
of action on global agriculture on Sunday, 3 June 2007, a journalist
who took a picture during a small protest action that the police
thought could be used as evidence was asked to hand it over to
them. This could only be prevented by strong protests against
the confiscation. On Thursday, media representatives who were
present on the field next to the West Gate were asked to leave
the area. The police announced they had one last chance to leave
through police cordons, otherwise they would endanger themselves
and the police's work! Such a blatant threat - which borders
on coercion - towards journalists who want to carry out their
job of reporting highlights how openly and the police attempted
to prevent any public scrutiny of their actions.

Many more observations will be collected in the coming weeks
in order to present a more detailed picture of the events of
the week. Much still has to be researched, e.g. the police operation
on Saturday and especially the deployment of armed forces inland,
which is unconstitutional in peace times. The research will have
to focus in particular on the precise nature of rights violations
and injuries, the nature of the charges against those arrested
and how these charges are backed up by evidence. On the basis
of these insights we will present a more comprehensive report.

Already, it can be observed that police behaviour stimulated
escalation, which received little response only because of the
restrained behaviour of the majority of peaceful protesters.

With the Federal Crime Police and interior security service
the police force is increasingly acting on its own accord, a
frightening development considering the constitution, the legally
protected fundamental rights and the rule of democracy. By spreading
false information and carrying out operations in violation of
fundamental rights, the police are creating a situation in which
they declare an emergency in order to be able to act according
to emergency rules - e.g. on one hand deciding independently
to allow blockades at one point and violently attacking assemblies
with water cannons without warning at another. Any control over
the police executive authority threatens to be lost in such emergency
situations. The precondition for these "emergencies"
is media spin that diffuses certain police or secret service
claims without requiring the evidence to verify them. Such an
example is the media coverage of 10 severely injured policemen
after the riots of Saturday, 2 June 2007. Only later, after the
Federal Constitutional Court had confirmed the ban of the 7 June
demonstration, were these claims retracted when official sources
revealed that only two police officers were 'severely injured',
meaning that they required hospital treatment - they were released
from hospital after two days.

This type of media reporting creates - we were able to confirm
this in many talks we had with police officers - an atmosphere
within police circles which increases the willingness of individual
officers to use violence. Moreover, the public is systematically
lied to when, for example, it is reported that the "Flight
and Migration" day rally included violent activists. Also
the claim that the Clown's Army had mixed acid with water in
its water pistols could only be revoked by research: two police
officers had had allergic reactions to the soap bubbles the clowns
blew over police lines. This misinformation is paralleled by
a lack of information when it comes to communicating with the
demonstrators. The latter were often not informed about police
demands and measures, but were faced with silent, choreographed
violence of which one never knew if and when it would be put
into operation. When a blockade is asked to let police vans stuck
in it through with the announcement: "please stay calm,
we are not planning to carry out actions against you" (Thursday,
7 June 2007 on the road between the West Gate and Steffenshagen),
and if this willingness to cooperate is then exploited by attacking
the blockade in return, one should not be surprised if the youth
then learns only one thing: if the police communicate with you,
do not trust them.

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