Incentive For More Terrorism

We Shouldn't Be Surprised When New Hostages Are Taken

Anyone who believes the release of the American hostages from Lebanon is representative of some broader shift in political behavior accompanying the revolution of a new world order is mistaken.

The practice of hostage-taking for political ends did not begin with the kidnappings in Beirut, nor will it end with the victims' release. The truth is, the means used to secure the hostages' release is an incentive for more terrorism.

It was never any secret that the kidnappers were under the control of Syria and Iran. The most obscene aspect of the entire hostage episode has been the Syrian choreography of the releases and the subsequent credit afforded Damascus.

Syria controls Lebanon, and therefore, its security forces had the capacity to gain the release of the Westerners at any time. After all, Syrian President Hafez Assad is the man who destroyed a Syrian city (Hama) and 20,000 of its people to prove he controlled the country.

So what changed Assad's mind? Clearly, it has been the shift in U.S. policy. The man who is frequently compared to Saddam Hussein has been repackaged by the State Department as a veritable prince of peace.

To enlist Assad's support in the Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration allowed him to swallow Lebanon. Although the State Department, under strong congressional pressure, refused the Syrian demand to be taken off the list of states sponsoring terrorism, the Pan Am 103 investigation, which absolved Syria of involvement, illustrated the administration's willingness to ignore Assad's complicity in terrorism. Syria also holds 4,000 Jews hostage, refusing to allow them to emigrate. Still, Secretary of State James Baker testified before Congress that the plight of Syrian Jews has improved.

The hostages represented one of the last blemishes on Assad's record as far as the administration was concerned. His ''help'' in gaining their release justifies the rehabilitation of Syria and may pave the way for closer relations. For Assad, this means the prospect of much-needed aid.

Whereas the Syrian connection to hostage-taking was indirect, the kidnappers made no secret of their allegiance to Iran. The Iranians understood the release of the hostages was a prerequisite to ending their isolation, but this has been true for the duration of the hostages' captivity. A catalyst for the recent releases has been the willingness to pay off the Iranians. The announcement that the United States was going to give Iran more than $200 million to settle outstanding claims for undelivered arms is probably just the tip of the iceberg.

The men who actually held the hostages have also gotten much of what they desired. They demanded the release of their compatriots from jails in various countries and, with a few exceptions, this has occurred.

The hostage-takers also succeeded in their objective of pinning the blame on Israel. Israel's holding of Lebanese prisoners, mostly men who had committed or attempted terrorist attacks, was portrayed as the cause of the Americans' captivity. The United States pressured Israel to make a deal, thereby being able to deny having made one itself. This meant Israel's own hostages - POWs held for years without the benefit of international concern - were all but forgotten. Although Israel succeeded in obtaining some information about its missing servicemen, it appears, even after releasing its prisoners, the Israelis will not be freed.

A number of lessons can be learned from this episode. One is that terrorists should not expect immediate gratification, but that patience will ultimately be rewarded. A second is that deals can and will be made to gain the release of hostages.

But is it necessary to capitulate to terrorists? And, if so, is it better to do it sooner than later?

The answer to the first question is a qualified no. If nations are prepared to abandon individuals to protect broader national interests, no deals with terrorists should be made. If, however, exchanges are going to be made, they surely could be negotiated early on to spare victims unnecessary suffering.

The Bush and Reagan administrations chose the worst course. They made the hostages agonize for years, and then paid off their captors. No one should be surprised when new hostages are taken and these mistakes are repeated.