Along with Frege, Russell maintained an absolutist stance regarding the subject matter of mathematics, revealed rather than imposed, or proposed, by logical analysis. The Fregean deﬁnition of cardinal number, for example, is viewed as (essentially) correct, not merely adequate for mathematics. And Dedekind’s “structuralist” views come in for criticism in the Principles. But, on reﬂection, Russell also ﬂirted with views very close to a (diﬀerent) version of structuralism. Main varieties of modern structuralism and their challenges are reviewed, taking account of Russell’s insights. Problems of absolutism plague some versions, and, interestingly, Russell’s critique of Dedekind can be extended to one of them, ante rem structuralism. This leaves modal-structuralism and a category theoretic approach as remaining non-absolutist options. It is suggested that these should be combined.