Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany
9th August to 21st August 1946

Q. You talked to the Chiefs of Staff and other staff
officers from time to time, did you not?

A. I only met the other Commanders-in-Chief when there was a
conference with any of them at the OKH. Naturally I talked
to my officers. But this question of the SD never cropped
up, because as far as we were concerned it did not appear to
us to be an important question.

Q. Did you not ever ask your Chief of Staff or any staff
officer to keep you very carefully informed on what these
independent groups under Himmler were doing in your area?

A. No. One cannot speak of independent troops of Himmler,
for this Einsatzgruppe was comparatively small and never put
in an appearance. It only appeared when they supplied us
with troops for the partisan fights in the Crimea. I know
that my staff was negotiating with the SS leader about that.

Q. I have two or three documents dealing with this matter
which are already in evidence. I would like to show them to
you and ask you a question about it. The first one is the
Affidavit No. 12, which is already in evidence. It is
Exhibit USA 557. The first part of this affidavit concerns
matters which you probably do not know about directly. You
should know about the second paragraph

[Page 68]

certainly. This is an affidavit by Walter Schellenberg. I
would like to read the first two paragraphs. The Tribunal
will find this in the first document book on the General
Staff.

"In the middle of May, 1941, as far as I remember, the
Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA (SS Brigadefuehrer Muller),
in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS Gruppenfuehrer
Heydrich), held discussions with the
Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about
questions connected with the operations of the Sipo and
SD within the bounds of the Field Army during. the
imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no
agreement with Muller and therefore asked Heydrich to
send another representative. I was at that time Chief of
Section E in Amt IV of the RSHA under Chief of Amt
Muller, and because of my experience with protocols was
sent by Heydrich to Wagner for the purpose of drawing up
the final agreement. According to the, instructions given
to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement
would provide that the responsible headquarters in the
Army would be firmly bound to give complete support to
all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos
of the Sipo and SD. I discussed the problem of this
mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. After
this discussion I then presented him with the completed
draft of an agreement which met with his full approval.
This draft was the basis for a final discussion between
Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May, 1941.

The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember,
were substantially as follows: Its basis was the
Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the very beginning of the
agreement, that the Sipo and SD should operate within the
combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of
utterly smashing all resistance in conquered rear areas
of the front, as well as in conquered rear supply zones,
by every means and as quickly as possible. The various
areas were then set down to which the Sipo and SD were to
be assigned for operations. The individual Combat Groups
were then assigned to the army groups which were to take
part in the campaign, and the individual Combat Commandos
to the respective armies which were to take part in the
campaign.

The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in
detail

(1) In front-line areas: In complete subordination to
the Field Army, tactically, functionally and as regards
troop service.

(2) in rear of conquered areas: In subordination to the
Field Army only as regards troop service but under the
command and functional control of the RHSA.

(3) In rear army areas: The same arrangement as in (2).

(4) In areas of the civil administration in the East:
Same as in the Reich.

The tactical and functional authority and responsibility
of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the
Combat Commandos was not limited under the agreement and
therefore needed no further clarification."

THE PRESIDENT: This is already in evidence, so we do not
need the details.

GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR: It is in evidence. It was never read
before I have just one more paragraph I would like to read
with your permission.

THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.

GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR:

"The agreement made it clear that subordination as
regards troop services embraced not only disciplinary
subordination, but also the provisioning of rear
headquarters of the Field Army, the Combat Groups and
Combat Commandos being subordinated in matters of supply
(petrol, rations, etc. as well as in the use of the
communications network "

That is all that needs to be read, your Honour.

[Page 69]

BY GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR:

Q. Witness, is it not true that the Army made it possible
for these Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos to operate;
that you furnished them with the supplies and transports and
other things they had to have to carry out their mission?

A. Yes, certainly. We know that because of the economic
contribution the SS made to our army.

Q. Is it not also true that the commanding generals had to
keep track of what these units were doing, so that their
operations would not interfere with military operations?

A. No. Actually the commanding generals did not have to
bother with the Einsatzgruppen unless they appeared at the
front and caused disturbance. As I have told you, I, as
commanding general, did not meet any such Einsatzgruppe in
my zone.

Q. Are you telling the Tribunal it was only at the front
where military operations could be disturbed? Is it not also
true that rear areas are also important as regards the
securing of communications and pacifying the population.
Were you not concerned about the rear areas, too?

A. In the rear areas we were interested in securing our
lines of supply, that is the roads and railroads. Mostly we
did this ourselves. A disturbance could only have taken
place if, for instance, mass executions or some such thing -
as I have heard now did take place - caused difficulties and
unrest amongst the population. The commanders of the rear
areas would have heard about this, and they would have taken
action.

GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR:

Q. Your Honour, I would like next to read a short extract
from Document 447-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA 135. May I
call your attention to paragraph a, subdivision A, beginning
with "The area of operations." Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to read two paragraphs:

(a) "The area of operations, created through the advance
of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the
neighbouring countries, is to be limited in depth as far
as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the
right to exercise the executive power in this area, and
may transfer his authority to the commanders of the army
groups and armies.

(b) In the area of Army operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS
is entrusted on behalf of the Fuehrer with special tasks
for the preparation of the political administration,
tasks which result from the struggle which has to be
carried out between two opposing political systems.
Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS
shall act independently and under his own responsibility.
The executive power invested in the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army (OKW) and in agencies determined by him shall
not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the
Reichsfuehrer SS that military operations shall not be
disturbed through the execution of his tasks. Details
shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the
Reichsfuehrer SS."

BY GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR:

I am asking you again, witness, whether it was your
responsibility and that of your headquarters to make sure
that the operations of these groups did not interfere with
military operations and that you must have kept yourself
fully informed on what they were doing?

A. If there had been disturbance of military operations in
any form, naturally the commanders would have had to
intervene, but the fact that the political police supervised
an occupied area and, in that occupied area, investigated
the political reliability of people, is by no means reason
to assume that wrongs were committed or that there were mass
shootings or any shootings at all in this area. The
political supervision by political police is a phenomenon
which exists in every occupied territory.

[Page 70]

Q. I think you have already testified that you did not know
of any mass shootings in your area. Is that right? You did
not know of any?

A. No, I did not know of any.

Q. I wish to present Document 102, which is now in evidence
as Exhibit USA 470, and would like to read two paragraphs
from the last page of the translation. I think the two
paragraphs in question are marked in your copy. They are on
Pages 17 or 18. You will see the original report covering
the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in the USSR during the
month of October and it covers the activities of all four
Einsatzgruppen, including Group B, which was attached to
your army. The section beginning on Page 16 relates to the
activities of the Einsatzgruppen C and D, which were in the
Ukraine. Under that you will note paragraph B, which is
headed "Arrests and Executions of Communists and Officials."
Do you find that?

A. Yes.

Q. I quote:

"The search for leading Communists resulted in the arrest
of Kaminski, former GPU chief of Cherson. In the years
1919-21 he had carried out the liquidation of the Czarist
officers. The head of the prison workshops of the NKVD
was also caught.

In Kiev a number of NKVD officials and political
Commissars were rendered innocuous."

And the next sub-heading "Jews." The first two paragraphs
relate to cities outside your area, I believe. Then there is
a paragraph which deals with Cherson. Cherson is about 40
miles from Nikolajev. Would you say that 60 kilometres would
be right?
A. Yes, that must be right.
Q. I quote:

"In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of
retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area
east of the Dnieper, the solution of the Jewish question
has been taken up energetically by the Einsatzgruppen of
the Security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied
by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of
this action, 4,891 Jews were liquidated. At other places
the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it
possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for
urgent labour Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons."

Are you still telling the Tribunal that you knew nothing of
the operations of this Einsatzgruppe under your army?

A. If you mean the case of Cherson, then I have to tell you
that I never received a report about such incidents, nor did
I receive a report of the arrest of the GPU man, Kaminski. I
remained in Nikolajev only until about 24th September, then
I had my command post in the vicinity of Melitopol, which is
far to the east. As far as the liquidation of Jews east of
the Dnieper is concerned, I would point out that the
operational zone of my army at that time was the Nogai
Steppe, a steppe with very few settlements, and part of
these settlements, former German villages, were completely
evacuated and the inhabitants taken away by the Red Army.
Therefore, there could not have been any liquidation of Jews
worth mentioning as there were hardly any Jews there. These
4,000 Jews can only have come from the district east of the
Dnieper, that is, where the large operations of the Donetz
area started, and that was already the operational territory
of the First Panzer Army; it was not my territory any
longer.

Q. Did the commanding general on the Eastern Front submit
special instructions to the troops which support this
programme to liquidate the Jews and Commissars?

A. No, that is quite out of the question.

Q. Did General Reichenau issue such an instruction?

[Page 71]

A. No. I only know of one order of General Reichenau, which
has been brought up in Court, and in which he discusses the
fighting in the East. This order was sent to us on Hitler's
instructions as an example. I personally turned down the
order and did not apply it in any way in the orders I
issued, and I know of no other commander who used the order.

Q. That order of General Reichenau instructed troops to take
the most severe revenge on subhuman Jews and all elements of
Bolshevism, did it not? Have you seen the order?

A. No, I remember that I received an order from General von
Reichenau, but I do not remember that it demanded the
liquidation of the Jews, and I consider it entirely out of
the question that he did order that.

Q. What did you do yourself when it was suggested that you
issue an order like General Reichenau's order?

A. It was not suggested to me. It was sent to us as an order
of Hitler's as a model. I did nothing about it and I
considered such order as quite beside the point, because I
wanted to conduct the fight in a military manner and in no
other way.

Q. So you did not do anything about it?

A. No, what should I have done?

Q. I ask to be shown to the witness, as I said first, the
document by General Reichenau. It is Exhibit USA 556.

I will now ask that the witness be shown a new document,
4064-PS, Exhibit USA 927.

Will you look at this order, witness, and tell us if this is
not a document issued out of your headquarters and signed
with your facsimile signature on 20th November, 1941? It is
already in the record.

A. I must first read the document thoroughly. I do not
recollect this order.

Q. Is that your signature?

A. It looks like it, but I must first of all read the order
to see whether I gave it or not.

Q. The document, as indicated at the top of the page, states
XXX Corps IC Ref. IC. That is the intelligence office, is it
not?

A. Yes, that is the name of the office that dealt with enemy
intelligence and countering enemy espionage. It has nothing
to do with Secret Service as such.

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