Mr. Pascrell (for
himself, Mr. King of New York,
Mr. Thompson of Mississippi,
Mr. Daniel E. Lungren of California,
Ms. Clarke of New York,
Mr. Rogers of Alabama,
Ms. Richardson,
Mr. Bilirakis,
Mr. Clarke of Michigan,
Mrs. Miller of Michigan, and
Mr. Meehan) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Homeland
Security, and in addition to the Committees on
Energy and Commerce,
Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign
Affairs, and Select
Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
concerned

September 12, 2012

Reported from the
Committee on Homeland
Security with an amendment

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert
the part printed in italic

September 12, 2012

Referral to the Committees on
Energy and Commerce,
Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign
Affairs, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence extended for a period ending
not later than November 30, 2012

September 12, 2012

Referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology for a period ending not later than November 30,
2012, for consideration of such provisions of the bill and amendment as fall
within the jurisdiction of that committee pursuant to clause 1(p), rule X

November 30, 2012

The Committees on Energy and Commerce,
Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign
Affairs, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and
Science, Space, and
Technology discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as
introduced on June 24, 2011

A BILL

To enhance homeland security by improving
efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from an attack
with a weapon of mass destruction, and for other
purposes.

1.

Short title; table of
contents

(a)

Short
title

This Act may be cited
as the WMD Prevention and Preparedness
Act of 2012.

(b)

Table of
contents

The table of
contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of
contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Title I—A National Biodefense
Enterprise

Sec. 101. Special Assistant for
Biodefense.

Sec. 102. National Biodefense Plan.

Sec. 103. National Biosurveillance
Strategy.

Sec. 104. Comprehensive cross-cutting
biodefense budget analysis.

Title II—Intelligence Matters

Sec. 201. National Intelligence Strategy for
Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The term
appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and any committee of the
House of Representatives or the Senate having legislative jurisdiction under
the rules of the House of Representatives or Senate, respectively, over the
matter concerned.

(2)

The term Intelligence
Community has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(3)

The term national biosecurity and
biodefense stakeholders means officials from the Federal, State, local,
and tribal authorities and individuals and other persons from the private
sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from a biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious
health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or
infectious disease outbreaks.

I

A National Biodefense
Enterprise

101.

Special Assistant for
Biodefense

(a)

In
general

The President shall assign a member of the National
Security Council to serve as Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense,
who shall—

(1)

serve as the principal
advisor to the President regarding coordination of Federal biodefense policy
including prevention, protection, response, and recovery from biological
attacks or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the
United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease
outbreaks;

(2)

identify gaps,
duplication, and other inefficiencies in existing biodefense activities and the
actions necessary to overcome these obstacles;

(3)

lead the development of a
coordinated National Biodefense Plan, in accordance with section 102;

(4)

lead the development of a
coordinated National Biosurveillance Strategy, in accordance with section
103;

(5)

lead the development of a
coordinated national research and development strategy and implementation plan
for microbial forensics, the latter to be updated not less than once every 4
years;

(6)

oversee, in coordination
with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the development of a
comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis to inform prioritization
of resources and ensure that biodefense challenges are adequately addressed, in
accordance with section 104; and

(7)

conduct ongoing oversight
and evaluation of implementation of Federal biodefense activities by relevant
Government departments and agencies.

(b)

Access by
congress

The appointment of the Special Assistant to the
President for Biodefense shall not be construed as affecting access by Congress
or committees of either House of Congress to information, documents, and
studies in the possession of, or conducted by or at the direction of, the
Special Assistant.

102.

National Biodefense
Plan

The Special Assistant to
the President for Biodefense shall submit to the President a National
Biodefense Plan that—

(1)

defines the scope and
purpose of a national biodefense capability;

(2)

identifies biological
risks to the Nation to be addressed by the Plan, consistent with section 2102
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act;

(3)

delineates activities and
tasks to be performed, including prevention, protection, response, and recovery
activities, to address the risks identified under paragraph (2);

(4)

defines research and
development needs for improving the capacity for threat awareness and
prevention, protection, response, and recovery;

(5)

identifies biodefense
assets, interdependencies, capability gaps, and gaps in the integration of
capabilities;

(6)

provides goals,
activities, milestones, and performance measures;

(7)

identifies resource and
investment needs;

(8)

defines organizational
roles, responsibilities , and coordination of Federal, State, local, and tribal
authorities (as those terms are defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101 et seq.)) with respect to the activities and tasks delineated in
paragraph (3);

(9)

integrates and supports
the strategies outlined in Presidential Policy Directives 2 and 8 and Homeland
Security Presidential Directives 5, 9, 10, 18, 21, and their successors, the
National Biosurveillance Strategy published under section 103 of this Act, the
National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy developed under section
319F–5 of the Public Health Service Act, as amended by this Act, and other
strategy documents as appropriate;

(10)

is consistent with the
National Response Framework as published by the Secretary of Homeland Security
in January 2008, and any successors thereof;

describe how the Strategy
is integrated with related national strategies.

(b)

Matters for
consideration

In developing
the strategy required under subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall take
into consideration—

(1)

the state of
biosurveillance domestically and internationally;

(2)

material threat
assessments and determinations developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security
in accordance with the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–276) and
the amendments made by that Act;

(3)

risk assessments
consistent with section 2102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended
by this Act;

(4)

reports on global trends
produced by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence regarding the
biological threat;

(5)

Intelligence Community
needs as articulated in relevant intelligence strategies;

(6)

information available in
biosurveillance systems and changes to information technology including systems
used commercially to allow for the incorporation and integration of this
information; and

(7)

costs associated with
establishing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure to integrate
biosurveillance systems.

(c)

Implementation
plan

In addition to the strategy required under subsection (a),
the Special Assistant shall publish an implementation plan for such strategy
that includes benchmarks for measuring the success of the Strategy. The
implementation plan shall—

(1)

include a plan for
advancing situational awareness of biological threats, by rapid detection and
dissemination of biosurveillance information in real time, and through other
means;

(2)

include a plan for
fostering information sharing among national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders—

that addresses the type
of information to be shared and how it will be shared; and

(C)

that identifies critical
sensitivities to be protected; and

(3)

include a plan for
enhancing the capability of the Federal Government to rapidly identify,
characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern by
integrating and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant, food,
and environmental monitoring systems (both national and international).

(d)

Deadline; submission;
updates

The Special Assistant shall—

(1)

publish the strategy, and
submit it to the appropriate congressional committees, by not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this Act; and

(2)

publish an implementation
plan for such strategy not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of
this Act, and update the implementation plan at least once every 4
years.

104.

Comprehensive
cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis

(a)

In
general

In order to enhance strategic planning, eliminate
redundancies, identify capability gaps, and provide for greater transparency,
the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, in coordination with the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees, concurrent with the submission of the
President’s annual budget to the Congress, a comprehensive cross-cutting
biodefense budget analysis that delineates and integrates the biodefense
expenditure requests for the departments and agencies headed by the officials
listed in subsection (c).

(b)

Contents

(1)

In
general

The comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget
analysis shall provide a detailed, separate analysis, by budget function, by
department or agency, and by initiative area (as determined by the
Administration), for the prior fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the
fiscal years for which the budget is submitted, identifying the amounts of
gross and net appropriations or obligational authority and outlays that
contribute to biodefense, with separate displays for mandatory and
discretionary amounts, including—

(A)

summaries of the total
amount of such appropriations or obligational authority and outlays requested
for biodefense;

(B)

an estimate of the
current service levels of biodefense spending; and

(C)

an indication of how the
Federal activities or accounts covered by the analysis support the activities
delineated in the National Biodefense Plan under section 102(2).

(2)

Account-level
amounts

With respect to subparagraphs (A) through (C) of
paragraph (1), amounts shall be provided by account for each program, project,
and activity.

(c)

Coordination

(1)

Submission to special
assistant

Each official
listed in paragraph (2) shall, by not later than 30 days before submitting the
annual appropriations request for the agency under section 1108 of title 31,
United States Code, submit to the Special Assistant—

(A)

the proposed
appropriations request; and

(B)

a progress report on how
the department or agency under the official’s authority agency has met the
responsibilities of the official under the National Biodefense Plan under
section 102.

(2)

Covered
official

The officials referred to in paragraph (1) are—

(A)

the Secretary of
Agriculture;

(B)

the Secretary of
Commerce;

(C)

the Secretary of
Defense;

(D)

the Secretary of
Energy;

(E)

the Secretary of Health
and Human Services;

(F)

the Secretary of Homeland
Security;

(G)

the Secretary of
State;

(H)

the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs;

(I)

the Attorney
General;

(J)

the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency;

(K)

the Director of the
National Science Foundation;

(L)

the Postmaster General of
the United States; and

(M)

heads of other Federal
departments and agencies as considered appropriate by the Special
Assistant.

(d)

Consultation with
Congress

Periodically, but at least annually, the Special
Assistant for Biodefense shall consult with the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Budget Committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, the Appropriations Committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and the Congressional Budget Office.

II

Intelligence
Matters

201.

National Intelligence
Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction

(a)

Strategy

(1)

Development

The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and
implement—

(A)

a strategy designed to
improve the capabilities of the United States to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence related to weapons of mass destruction; and

(B)

a plan to implement such
strategy.

(2)

Title

The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall be known as the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the
Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction.

include methods for the
recruitment, training, and retention of a workforce with expertise in the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to all types of
weapons of mass destruction and science and technology related to weapons of
mass destruction, as well as expertise in science and technology relating to
risks posed by weapons of mass destruction; and

(3)

include methods for
information sharing and collaboration, as appropriate, with non-Federal
national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.

(c)

Implementation
plan

The plan for implementing the strategy required under
subsection (a) shall include—

(1)

actions necessary to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence on weapons of mass
destruction throughout the Intelligence Community and with other Federal
partners, including a description of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical,
security, or other barriers that impede such sharing, and, as appropriate, the
development of uniform standards across the Intelligence Community for such
sharing;

(2)

methods to disseminate intelligence
products to national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders in classified and
unclassified formats to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the
sharing of information;

specific objectives to be
accomplished, with corresponding schedule, for each year of the 5-year period
that begins on the date on which the strategy is submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees under subsection (e) and tasks to accomplish such
objectives, including—

(A)

a list prioritizing such
objectives and such tasks; and

(B)

a schedule for meeting
such objectives and carrying out such tasks;

(5)

assignments of roles and
responsibilities to elements of the Intelligence Community to implement the
strategy; and

(6)

a schedule for assessment
of the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy, including metrics, and a
description of the components of the assessment.

(d)

Coordination

The
Director of National Intelligence shall coordinate with State, local, and
tribal government authorities, the private sector, and nongovernmental
organizations in the development of the National Intelligence Strategy for
Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(e)

Deadline for
Submission

Not later than 6
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
strategy and plan required under subsection (a). The submission shall be in
unclassified form but with a classified annex, as appropriate.

(f)

Updates

The
Director of National Intelligence shall update the implementation plan at least
once every 4 years.

202.

National Intelligence
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats

(a)

Strategy

(1)

Development

The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Special Assistant to the
President for Biodefense, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, shall develop and implement a strategy and a plan for
implementing the strategy that is integrated into the National Intelligence
Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, as
required under this title.

(2)

Title

The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall be known as the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats.

include a plan for
establishing in the Intelligence Community a cadre of collectors and analysts
in all relevant agencies in the Intelligence Community that are familiar with
biological threats, biological science, and biotechnology, including—

(A)

biological scientists;

(B)

biotechnologists;
and

(C)

experts with knowledge of
the current state of technologies that could be used to develop a weapon of
mass destruction;

(3)

include a plan for
defining the functions, capabilities, and gaps in the Intelligence Community
workforce with respect to assessing the biological threat;

(4)

include methods for
collaboration—

(A)

with non-Intelligence Community technical
experts within Federal departments and agencies; and

(B)

as appropriate, with individuals with
expertise described in paragraph (2) who are not employed by the Federal
Government, in particular with State and local biodefense stakeholders;

(5)

include a plan for
defining, integrating, focusing, and enhancing existing capabilities in the
Intelligence Community dedicated to current and strategic biological threats;
and

(6)

include a plan for
ensuring the prioritization and sustained commitment of intelligence personnel
and resources to address biological threats.

(c)

Implementation
plan

The implementation plan for the strategy required under
subsection (a) shall—

(1)

include actions necessary
to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence
throughout the Intelligence Community on biological weapons and organisms that
could be used for biological terrorism, including a description of statutory,
regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other barriers that prevent such
sharing, and, as appropriate, the development of uniform standards across the
Intelligence Community for such sharing;

identify specific
objectives to be accomplished during each year of the 5-year period that begins
on the date on which the strategy is submitted to the appropriate congressional
committees under subsection (d) and tasks to accomplish such objectives,
including—

(A)

a list prioritizing such
objectives and such tasks; and

(B)

a schedule for meeting
such objectives and carrying out such tasks;

(4)

assign roles and
responsibilities to elements of the Intelligence Community to implement the
strategy;

(5)

a schedule for assessment
of the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy, including metrics;
and

(6)

a schedule for evaluating
on a regular basis the efforts of the Intelligence Community and progress on
understanding and countering biological threats.

(d)

Report

Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required under
subsection (a). The report shall be in unclassified form but with a classified
annex, as appropriate.

(e)

Updates

The
Director of National Intelligence shall update the implementation plan at least
once every 4 years.

203.

State, local, and
tribal defined

In this title,
the term State, local, and tribal has the same meaning that term
has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.).

III

Homeland Security
Matters

301.

Weapons of mass
destruction prevention and preparedness

(a)

In
general

The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new title:

XXI

WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

A

Prevention

2101.

Weapons of mass
destruction intelligence and information sharing

(a)

In
general

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department
shall—

(1)

conduct intelligence and
information sharing activities consistent with the National Intelligence
Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction under
section 201 of the WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2012 and the National Intelligence Strategy
for Countering Biological Threats under section 202 of that Act;

(2)

support homeland security-focused
intelligence analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to
conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
materials against the Nation;

support homeland
security-focused risk analysis and risk assessments of the homeland security
hazards described in paragraphs (2) and (3), by providing relevant quantitative
and nonquantitative threat information;

(5)

leverage existing and
emerging homeland security capabilities and structures, including fusion
centers established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance prevention,
protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack;

(6)

share information and
provide tailored analytical support on these threats to State, local, and
tribal authorities as well as other national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders; and

(7)

perform other
responsibilities, as assigned by the Secretary.

(b)

Coordination

Where appropriate, the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant Department
components, others in the Intelligence Community, including the National
Counter Proliferation Center, and other Federal, State, local, and tribal
authorities, including officials from high-threat areas, and enable such
entities to provide recommendations on optimal information sharing mechanisms,
including expeditious sharing of classified information, and on how they can
provide information to the Department.

(c)

Report

(1)

In
general

Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the
Secretary shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on—

(A)

the intelligence and
information sharing activities under subsection (a) and of all relevant
entities within the Department to counter the threat from weapons of mass
destruction; and

(B)

the Department’s
activities in accordance with relevant intelligence strategies, including the
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass
Destruction and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats.

(2)

Assessment of
implementation

The report shall include—

(A)

a description of methods
established to assess progress of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in
implementing this section; and

(B)

such assessment.

2102.

Risk
assessments

(a)

In
general

The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, shall, in coordination with relevant Department
components and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies—

(1)

produce and update
periodically a terrorism risk assessment of chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear threats; and

(2)

produce and update
periodically an integrated terrorism risk assessment that assesses all of those
threats and compares them against one another according to their relative
risk.

(b)

Methodology

(1)

In
general

The Secretary
shall—

(A)

convene an interagency
task force of relevant subject matter experts to assess the proposed
methodology to be used for assessments required under subsection (a), and to
provide recommendations to the Secretary as to the adequacy of such
methodology;

(B)

conduct sensitivity
analysis on each assessment to identify and prioritize research activities to
close knowledge gaps; and

(C)

consider the evolving
threat from an intelligent adversary.

(2)

Inclusion in
assessment

Each assessment under subsection (a) shall include a
description of the methodology used for the assessment.

(c)

Usage

The
assessments required under subsection (a) shall be used to inform and guide
risk management decisions, including—

(1)

the threat assessments
and determinations by the Secretary regarding agents and toxins pursuant to
section 319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act;

(2)

allocation of resources
for research and development for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear attack prevention, protection, response, and recovery;

(3)

prioritization of medical
countermeasure research, development, acquisition, and distribution activities
and other national strategic biodefense research;

(4)

tailored risk assessments
and risk mitigation studies, as appropriate, on topics such as radiological
materials security or the economic risks of a biological attack; and

(5)

other homeland security
activities as determined appropriate by the Secretary and the heads of other
agencies.

(d)

Input and
sharing

The Secretary shall, for each assessment required under
subsection (a)—

(1)

seek input from national
biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, and other Federal, State, local, and
tribal officials involved in efforts to prevent, protect, respond to, and
recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats;

(2)

ensure that written
procedures are in place to guide the interagency development of the
assessments, including for input, review, and implementation purposes, among
relevant Federal partners;

(3)

share the risk
assessments with Federal, State, local and tribal officials with appropriate
security clearances and a need for the information in the classified version;
and

(4)

to the maximum extent
practicable, make available an unclassified version for Federal, State, local,
and tribal officials involved in prevention and preparedness for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear events.

(e)

Written
procedures

The Secretary
shall establish written procedures for appropriate usage of the assessments
required under subsection (a), including—

(1)

a description of the types of departmental
activities for which the assessments should be considered;

(2)

the extent to which the
findings of the assessments should play a role in such activities;

(3)

the point in planning
processes at which the assessments should be considered; and

(4)

how users can access
expertise within the Department to aid in interpretation of the results of the
assessments.

2103.

National Export
Enforcement Coordination

(a)

Establishment

There
shall be maintained in the Department the Export Enforcement Coordination
Center, with capability for national export enforcement coordination that is
managed by the Secretary and coordinates the export enforcement activities
among the Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department
of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the
Intelligence Community, and other Federal agencies as appropriate.

(b)

Responsibilities

The
Center shall—

(1)

enhance Federal
coordination for law enforcement counterproliferation investigations, including
coordination and deconfliction with intelligence counterproliferation
activities;

The Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
recommended that the Federal Government should practice greater openness
of public information so that citizens better understand the threat and the
risk this threat poses to them.

(2)

There are unique
challenges for community preparedness for attacks from weapons of mass
destruction.

(b)

Communications
plan

(1)

In
general

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency shall develop a communications plan designed to provide information to
the public related to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks;

(2)

Consultation

As
appropriate, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall
consult with State, local, and tribal authorities and coordinate with other
Federal departments and agencies in developing the communications plans under
paragraph (1).

(3)

Pre-scripted messages
and message templates

(A)

In
general

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency shall develop and disseminate, through an alerts and warnings system,
pre-scripted messages and message templates for State, local, and tribal
authorities so that those authorities can quickly and rapidly disseminate
critical information to the public in anticipation of, during, or in the
immediate aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
attack, and to be included in the Department of Homeland Security’s lessons
learned information sharing system.

(B)

Development and
design

The pre-scripted messages or message templates
shall—

(i)

be developed in
consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and in coordination with
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies;

(ii)

be designed to provide
accurate, essential, and appropriate information and instructions to the
population directly affected by an incident, including information regarding an
evacuation, sheltering in place, hospital surge operations, health, and
safety;

(iii)

be designed to provide
accurate, essential, and appropriate information and instructions to children
and other special needs populations within the population directly affected by
an incident;

(iv)

be designed to provide
accurate, essential, and appropriate information and instructions to emergency
response providers and medical personnel responding to an incident; and

(v)

include direction for the
coordination of Federal, State, local, and tribal communications teams.

(C)

Communications
formats

The Administrator shall develop pre-scripted messages or
message templates under this paragraph in multiple formats to ensure
delivery—

(i)

in cases where the usual
communications infrastructure is unusable;

(ii)

to individuals with
disabilities or other special needs and individuals with limited English
proficiency; and

The Administrator shall ensure that all
pre-scripted messages and message templates developed under this paragraph are
made available to State, local, and tribal authorities so that those
authorities may incorporate them, as appropriate, into their emergency plans.
The Administrator shall also make available relevant technical assistance to
those authorities to support communications planning.

(E)

Exercises

To
ensure that the pre-scripted messages or message templates developed under this
paragraph can be effectively utilized in a disaster or incident, the
Administrator shall incorporate Federal, State, local, and tribal
communications teams that deliver such pre-scripted messages or message
templates into exercises, including those conducted under the National Exercise
Program.

(4)

Report

Not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the communications plans required to be
developed under this subsection, including pre-scripted messages or message
templates developed in conjunction with the plans and a description of the
means that will be used to deliver these messages during such incidents.

(c)

Terrorism threat
awareness

(1)

Terrorism threat
awareness

The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney
General and heads of appropriate Federal agencies, shall for purposes of
preparedness and collective response to terrorism and for other
purposes—

(A)

ensure that homeland
security information concerning terrorist threats is provided to State, local,
and tribal authorities and the public within the United States, as appropriate;
and

(B)

establish a process to
optimize opportunities for qualified heads of State, local, and tribal
government entities to obtain appropriate security clearances so that they may
receive classified threat information when appropriate.

(2)

Threat
bulletins

(A)

In
general

Consistent with the requirements of paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall, on a timely basis, prepare unclassified threat bulletins on
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.

(B)

Requirements

Each
assessment required under subparagraph (A) shall—

(i)

include guidance to the
public for preventing and responding to acts of terrorism arising from such
threats; and

(ii)

be made available on the
Internet Web site of the Department and other publicly accessible Internet Web
sites, communication systems, and information networks.

(3)

Guidance to State,
local, and tribal authorities

The Secretary, using information provided
by the terrorism risk assessments under section 2102 and material threat
assessments and determinations under the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public
Law 108–276) and the amendments made by that Act—

(A)

shall provide to State, local, and tribal
authorities written guidance on communicating terrorism-related threats and
risks to the public within their jurisdictions; and

(B)

shall identify and
articulate the governmental rationale for identifying particular communities as
being at heightened risk of exploitation.

(4)

Use of existing
resources

The Secretary shall
use Internet Web sites, communication systems, and information networks in
operation on the date of an assessment under this subsection, and shall
coordinate with other heads of Federal departments and agencies to provide
information through existing channels to satisfy the requirements of paragraph
(2)(B)(ii). The Secretary shall provide guidance on how State, local, tribal,
and private entities can partner with public television stations to disseminate
information provided by the Department and shall provide information on best
practices on disseminating information to residents of local communities,
including leveraging public television stations.

2105.

Individual and
community preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
attacks

(a)

In
general

The Secretary, acting through the Administrator for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall assist State, local, and tribal
authorities in improving and promoting individual and community preparedness
and collective response to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials against the United States by—

(1)

developing guidance and
checklists of recommended actions for individual and community prevention and
preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance and checklists to
communities and individuals;

(2)

updating new and existing
guidance and checklists as appropriate;

(3)

disseminating to
communities and individuals the guidance developed under section 2131, as
appropriate;

(4)

providing information and
training materials in support of individual and community preparedness
efforts;

(5)

conducting individual and
community preparedness outreach efforts; and

(6)

such other actions as the
Secretary determines appropriate.

(b)

Coordination

The Secretary shall coordinate with Federal
departments and agencies and with private sector and nongovernmental
organizations to promote individual and community preparedness and collective
response to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear materials against the United States.

(c)

Best
practices

In compiling guidance for individual and community
preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(4), the Secretary shall give
due regard to best practices based on the experience of other agencies and
countries and the expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental
organizations.

B

Protection

2121.

Detection of
biological attacks

(a)

Program

The
Secretary shall carry out a program to detect a biological attack or event that
poses a high risk to homeland security. Through such program, the Secretary
shall—

(1)

deploy detection
capabilities to areas, based on high risks identified by Department
assessments, to indicate the presence of biological agents;

(2)

consider multiple
deployment strategies including surge capability;

(3)

provide information to
participating laboratories and programs for their use in monitoring public
health, and biological material or other data from those detectors to
participating laboratories and programs for testing and evaluation;

(4)

regularly communicate
with, and provide information about the presence of biological agents to,
appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for public health,
law enforcement, and emergency services, in a manner that ensures transparency
with the governments served by such personnel;

provide technical
assistance to jurisdictions hosting the program to improve their ability to
respond to a detected pathogen.

(b)

Program
requirements

Under the program required under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall—

(1)

enter into memoranda of
agreement or interagency agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C.
1535 et seq.) with the Director of the Centers of Disease Control and
Prevention and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, setting forth roles and
responsibilities, including with respect to validating performance and
developing testing protocols for participating laboratories and coordination
with appropriate State, local, and tribal agencies;

(2)

establish criteria for
determining whether plans for biological detector capabilities and coverage
sufficiently protect the United States population, and make such determinations
on an annual basis;

(3)

acting through the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, and in consultation with the Director of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, implement a process for establishing assay
performance standards and evaluation for equivalency for biological threat
assays, that—

(A)

evaluates biological
threat detection assays, their protocols for use, and their associated response
algorithms for confirmation of biological threat agents, taking performance
measures and concepts of operation into consideration;

(B)

develops interagency
peer-reviewed assay performance and equivalency standards based on the findings
of the evaluation under subparagraph (A);

(C)

requires implementation
of the standards developed under subparagraph (B) for all Department biological
detection programs;

(D)

promotes use of such
standards among all other Federal biological detection programs and makes them
available to the private sector and other end-users as appropriate; and

(E)

is updated as
necessary;

(4)

prior to obligating funds
to acquire biodetection systems for purposes of operational testing and
evaluation, require—

(A)

a determination of the
sensitivity and specificity of the currently deployed biodetection
system;

(B)

an assessment of the
sensitivity and specificity of the next generation biodetection system or
systems under consideration for acquisition and whether it meets established
operational requirements;

(C)

provision of all raw data
to the Science and Technology Directorate to enable the Under Secretary
to—

(i)

conduct a trade-off study
comparing the results of subparagraphs (A) and (B); and

(ii)

perform a technical
readiness assessment in accordance with section 308(b); and

(D)

that the findings under
subparagraph (C) inform the cost-benefit analysis under paragraph (5)(A) and
any Departmental acquisition review board decision regarding the biodetection
system or systems under consideration; and

(5)

prior to acquiring and
deploying biodetection technology, require—

(A)

a cost-benefit analysis,
including an analysis of alternatives, that shall be informed by the terrorism
risk assessments under section 2102;

(B)

operational testing and
evaluation;

(C)

operational assessment by
the end users of the technology; and

(D)

the Department, other
relevant executive agencies, and local jurisdictions intended to host the
systems to agree on concepts of operations for resolving alarms.

(c)

Contract
authority

The Secretary may enter into contracts with
participating laboratories and programs for—

(1)

the provision of
laboratory services or other biosurveillance activities as appropriate for
purposes of this section on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other
similar basis; and

(2)

administrative and other
costs related to hosting program personnel and equipment in these laboratories
or programs.

(d)

Definitions

In
this section:

(1)

The term
participating laboratory means a laboratory that has been accepted
as a member of the Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism
that—

(A)

is fully equipped to
detect and respond quickly to acts of biological terrorism;

(B)

provides biocontainment and microbiological
analysis in support of the Department and relevant law enforcement agencies
with responsibilities for investigating biological incidents; and

(C)

supports assay
evaluation, research and development.

(2)

The term
assay means any scientific test that is designed to detect the
presence of a biological threat agent that is of a type selected under criteria
established by the Secretary.

2122.

Rapid biological
threat detection and identification at ports of entry

(a)

In
general

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall require the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in consultation with the heads of
other relevant operational components of the Department of Homeland Security,
to assess whether the development of technological screening capabilities for
biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious diseases should be
undertaken by the Directorate of Science and Technology to support entry and
exit screening at ports of entry and for other homeland security
purposes.

(b)

Development of
methods

If the Under Secretary determines that the development of
such screening capabilities should be undertaken, the Secretary shall, to the
extent possible, initiate development of safe and effective methods to—

(1)

rapidly screen incoming
persons at ports of entry for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other
infectious diseases; and

(2)

obtain results of such
screening near the point of entry.

2123.

Evaluating detection
technology

To inform the
purchase of detection technology, the Secretary, in coordination with the
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, may carry out a
program to—

(1)

establish near-term
minimum performance metrics to support public safety actionable activities,
based to the greatest extent practicable on voluntary consensus standards, to
evaluate the effectiveness of detection technology for high-priority biological
agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents;

(2)

establish a process for
voluntary testing and evaluation of technology by an accredited laboratory to
demonstrate conformance to such consensus standards, or performance metrics if
standards do not exist, for the effective detection of high-priority biological
agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents, including incentivization
for the program through potential cost sharing with technology manufacturers
and for SAFETY Act certification or placement on the authorized equipment list,
or both; and

(3)

with permission from the
detection technology manufacturer, make available to Federal departments and
agencies, State, territorial, local, and tribal entities, and the private
sector the results of detection system testing and evaluation under paragraph
(2).

2124.

Domestic
implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

(a)

Securing the
cities

The Director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office shall establish and maintain a multilayered
system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance
the Nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in
high-risk United States cities, as determined by the Secretary.

(b)

Surge
capabilities

The Director shall develop a surge capability for
radiological and nuclear detection systems that can be deployed within the
United States rapidly in response to actionable intelligence or warnings, and
includes procurement of appropriate technology, training, and exercises.

(c)

Integration

The
programs under subsections (a) and (b) shall be integrated into the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture and shall inform architecture studies,
technology gaps, and research activities of the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney General, and the heads of
other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall—

(1)

develop for police, fire, emergency medical
services, emergency management, and medical and public health personnel,
voluntary guidance for responding to a release of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear material;

(2)

make such guidance
available to State, local, and tribal authorities, including primary and
secondary schools and other educational institutions, nongovernmental
organizations, the private sector, and the public; and

(3)

in developing the
guidance under paragraph (1)—

(A)

review the experiences of
other countries and the expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental
organizations; and

(B)

consider the unique needs
of children and other vulnerable populations.

(b)

Contents

The
guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) shall be voluntary, risk-based
guidance that shall include—

(1)

protective action
guidance for ensuring the security, health, and safety of emergency response
providers and their families and household contacts;

(2)

specific information
regarding the effects of the chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
material on those exposed to the agent; and

review the guidance
developed under subsection (a)(1) at least once every 2 years;

(2)

make revisions to the
guidance as appropriate; and

(3)

make any revised guidance
available to State, local, and tribal authorities, nongovernmental
organizations, the private sector, and the public.

(d)

Procedures for
developing and revising guidance

In carrying out the requirements
of this section, the Secretary shall establish procedures to—

(1)

enable members of the
first responder and first provider community to submit recommendations of areas
in which guidance is needed and could be developed under subsection
(a)(1);

(2)

determine which entities
should be consulted in developing or revising the guidance;

(3)

prioritize, on a regular
basis, guidance that should be developed or revised; and

(4)

develop and disseminate
the guidance in accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (3).

2132.

Integrated plume
modeling for collective response

(a)

Development

(1)

In
general

The Secretary shall acquire, use, and disseminate the
best available integrated plume models to enable rapid response activities
following a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack or
event.

(2)

Scope

The
Secretary shall—

(A)

identify Federal, State,
and local needs regarding plume models and ensure the rapid development and
distribution of integrated plume models that meet those needs to appropriate
officials of the Federal Government and State, local, and tribal authorities to
enable immediate response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
attack or event;

(B)

establish mechanisms for
dissemination by appropriate emergency response officials of the integrated
plume models described in paragraph (1) to nongovernmental organizations and
the public to enable appropriate collective response activities;

(C)

ensure that guidance and
training in how to appropriately use such models are provided; and

(D)

ensure that lessons
learned from assessing the development and dissemination of integrated plume
models during exercises administered by the Department are put into the lessons
learned information sharing system maintained by the Department.

(b)

Definitions

For
purposes of this section:

(1)

The term plume
model means the assessment of the location and prediction of the spread
of agents following a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or
event.

(2)

The term
integrated plume model means a plume model that integrates
protective action guidance and other information as the Secretary determines
appropriate.

2133.

Establishment of the
system assessment and validation for emergency responders (SAVER)
program

The Secretary shall
carry out a program for system assessment and validation of emergency response
equipment at the Department, to be known as the SAVER Program.
The Secretary shall ensure that such program—

shares such information
nationally with the emergency response provider community.

2134.

Payment for
laboratory response services

In carrying out their functions,
responsibilities, authorities, and duties to counter biological terrorism, the
Secretary, the Attorney General, and the heads of other participating Federal
agencies are authorized, subject to the availability of appropriations, to
enter into contracts with laboratories that comprise the Laboratory Response
Network for Biological Terrorism and other federally networked laboratories
that agree to participate in such a contract, for the provision of laboratory
testing services on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other similar
basis. Prior to entering into such a contract with any laboratory in the
Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism, the Secretary, the
Attorney General, or the head of any other participating Federal agency shall
inform the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

2135.

Bioforensics
capabilities

(a)

Bioforensics analysis
center

There is authorized in the Department a bioforensics
analysis center to provide support for law enforcement and intelligence-related
investigations and actions to—

(1)

provide definitive
bioforensics analysis in support of the executive agencies with primary
responsibilities for preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and
recovering from biological attacks; and

(2)

undertake other related
bioforensics activities.

(b)

Payment for
services

The center shall charge and retain fees to reimburse the
cost of any service provided to an executive agency that requested such
service.

(c)

Detailee
program

Subject to the availability of appropriations, the
Secretary may implement a program under which executive agencies as considered
appropriate by the Secretary provide personnel, on a reimbursable basis, to the
center for the purpose of—

(1)

providing training and
other educational benefits for such stakeholders to help them to better
understand the policies, procedures, and laws governing national bioforensics
activities; and

(2)

bolstering the
capabilities and information sharing activities of the bioforensics analysis
center authorized under subsection (a) with national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholders.

2136.

Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program

(a)

In
General

The Secretary shall conduct a Metropolitan Medical
Response System Program, that shall assist State and local governments in
preparing for and responding to public health and mass casualty incidents
resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-made
disasters.

(b)

Financial
Assistance

(1)

Authorization of
grants

(A)

In
general

The Secretary,
through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may make
grants under this section to State and local governments to assist in preparing
for and responding to mass casualty incidents resulting from acts of terrorism,
natural disasters, and other man-made disasters.

(B)

Consultation

In
developing guidance for grants authorized under this section, the Administrator
shall consult with the Chief Medical Officer.

(2)

Use of
funds

A grant made under this
section may be used to support the integration of emergency management, health,
and medical systems into a coordinated response to mass casualty incidents
caused by any hazard, including—

(A)

to strengthen medical
surge capacity;

(B)

to strengthen mass prophylaxis capabilities
including development and maintenance of an initial pharmaceutical stockpile
sufficient to protect first responders, their families, and immediate victims
from a chemical or biological event, including the procurement of home medical
kits that are approved pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.),
as applicable;

to develop and maintain
mass triage and pre-hospital treatment plans and capabilities;

(E)

for planning;

(F)

to support efforts to
strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities of regional,
State, and urban areas in support of public health and medical
preparedness;

(G)

for medical supplies
management and distribution;

(H)

for training and
exercises;

(I)

for integration and coordination of the
activities and capabilities of public health personnel and medical care
providers with those of other emergency response providers as well as other
Federal agencies, the private sector, and nonprofit organizations, for the
forward movement of patients; and

(J)

for such other activities
as the Administrator provides.

(3)

Eligibility

(A)

In
general

Except as provided in subparagraph (C), any jurisdiction
that received funds through the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program in
fiscal year 2009 shall be eligible to receive a grant under this
section.

(B)

Additional
jurisdictions

(i)

Unrepresented
states

(I)

In
general

Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Administrator
may make grants under this section to the metropolitan statistical area with
the largest population in any State in which no jurisdiction received funds
through the Metropolitan Medical Response Program in fiscal year 2009, or in
which funding was received only through another State.

(II)

Limitation

For
each of fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no jurisdiction that would otherwise be
eligible to receive grants under subclause (I) shall receive a grant under this
section if it would result in any jurisdiction under subparagraph (A) receiving
less funding than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year 2009.

(ii)

Other
jurisdictions

(I)

In
general

Subject to subparagraph (C), the Administrator may
determine that additional jurisdictions are eligible to receive grants under
this section.

(II)

Limitation

For
each of fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the eligibility of any additional
jurisdiction to receive grants under this section is subject to the
availability of appropriations beyond that necessary to—

(aa)

ensure that each
jurisdiction eligible to receive a grant under subparagraph (A) does not
receive less funding than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year 2009;
and

(bb)

provide grants to
jurisdictions eligible under clause (i).

(C)

Performance requirement
after fiscal year 2012

A jurisdiction shall not be eligible for a
grant under this subsection from funds available after fiscal year 2012 unless
the Secretary determines that the jurisdiction maintains a sufficient measured
degree of capability in accordance with the performance measures issued under
subsection (c).

(4)

Distribution of
funds

(A)

In
general

The Administrator shall distribute grant funds under this
section to the State in which the jurisdiction receiving a grant under this
section is located.

(B)

Pass
through

Subject to subparagraph (C), not later than 45 days after
the date on which a State receives grant funds under subparagraph (A), the
State shall provide the jurisdiction receiving the grant 100 percent of the
grant funds, and not later than 45 days after the State releases the funds, all
fiscal agents shall make the grant funds available for expenditure.

(C)

Exception

The
Administrator may permit a State to provide to a jurisdiction receiving a grant
under this section 97 percent of the grant funds awarded if doing so would not
result in any jurisdiction eligible for a grant under paragraph (3)(A)
receiving less funding than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year
2009.

(5)

Regional
coordination

The Administrator shall ensure that each
jurisdiction that receives a grant under this section, as a condition of
receiving such grant, is actively coordinating its preparedness efforts with
surrounding jurisdictions, with the official with primary responsibility for
homeland security (other than the Governor) of the government of the State in
which the jurisdiction is located, and with emergency response providers from
all relevant disciplines, as determined by the Administrator, to effectively
enhance regional preparedness.

(c)

Performance
measures

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, in coordination with the Chief Medical Officer, and the National
Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group, shall issue performance
measures within 1 year after the date of enactment of this section that enable
objective evaluation of the performance and effective use of funds provided
under this section in any jurisdiction.

(d)

Metropolitan Medical
Response System Working Group defined

In this section, the term National
Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group means—

(1)

10 Metropolitan Medical
Response System Program grant managers, who shall—

(A)

include 1 such grant
manager from each region of the Agency;

(B)

comprise a
population-based cross section of jurisdictions that are receiving grant funds
under the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program; and

(C)

include—

(i)

3 selected by the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and

(ii)

3 selected by the Chief Medical Officer;
and

(2)

3 State officials who are responsible for
administration of State programs that are carried out with grants under this
section, who shall be selected by the Administrator.

(e)

Authorization of
appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated $42,000,000
to carry out the program for each of fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

D

Recovery

2141.

Identifying and
addressing gaps in recovery capabilities

(a)

Risk
assessment

(1)

Tailored risk
assessment

The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology and in coordination with the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, shall conduct tailored risk assessments to
inform prioritization of national recovery activities for chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear incidents, to be updated as necessary.

(2)

Considerations

In
conducting the risk assessments under paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall—

(A)

consult with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of the Interior, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies;

(B)

consider recovery of both
indoor areas and outdoor environments; and

(C)

consider relevant studies
previously prepared by other Federal agencies, or other appropriate
stakeholders.

(3)

Collaboration

Upon
completion of the risk assessments required by this section, the Secretary
shall provide the findings to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency and heads of other relevant Federal agencies in order to inform ongoing
and future work, including research and guidance development, undertaken by
those agencies in recovery and remediation from chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear incidents.

(b)

Research

The
results of the risk assessment under this section shall inform appropriate
Federal research to address the high-risk capability gaps uncovered by each
assessment.

(c)

Submission to
Congress

The results of each risk assessment shall be submitted
to the appropriate congressional committees within 30 days after completion of
the assessment.

2142.

Recovery from a
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack or incident

(a)

Establishment of
guidance

The Secretary shall develop and issue guidance for
clean-up and restoration of indoor and outdoor areas, including subways and
other mass transportation facilities, that have been exposed to chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. The Secretary shall develop and
issue the guidance, within 24 months after the date of enactment of this
section, in consultation with—

(1)

the Secretary of
Agriculture;

(2)

the Secretary of
Commerce;

(3)

the Secretary of
Education;

(4)

the Secretary of the
Interior;

(5)

the Attorney
General;

(6)

the Secretary of
Labor;

(7)

the Secretary of
Transportation;

(8)

the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development;

(9)

the Secretary of Health
and Human Services;

(10)

the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs;

(11)

the Secretary of the
Treasury;

(12)

the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; and

(13)

the Administrator of the
Small Business Administration.

(b)

Contents

The
guidance developed under subsection (a) shall clarify Federal roles and
responsibilities for assisting State, local, and tribal authorities and include
risk-based recommendations for—

(1)

standards for effective
decontamination of affected sites;

(2)

standards for safe
post-event occupancy of affected sites, including for vulnerable populations
such as children and individuals with health concerns;

(3)

requirements to ensure
that the decontamination procedures for responding organizations do not
conflict;

(4)

requirements that each
responding organization uses a uniform system for tracking costs and
performance of clean-up contractors;

(5)

maintenance of negative
air pressure in buildings;

(6)

standards for proper selection and use of
personal protective equipment;

(7)

air sampling
procedures;

(8)

development of
occupational health and safety plans that are appropriate for the specific risk
to responder health; and

(9)

waste disposal.

(c)

Review and revision of
guidance

The Secretary shall—

(1)

not less frequently than
once every 2 years, review the guidance developed under subsection (a);

(2)

make revisions to the
guidance as appropriate; and

(3)

make the revised guidance
available to the Federal Government, State, local, and tribal authorities,
nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the public.

(d)

Procedures for
developing and revising guidance

In carrying out the requirements
of this section, the Secretary shall establish procedures to—

(1)

prioritize issuance of
guidance based on the results of the risk assessment under section 2131;

(2)

inventory existing
relevant guidance;

(3)

enable the public to
submit recommendations of areas in which guidance is needed;

(4)

determine which entities
should be consulted in developing or revising the guidance;

(5)

prioritize, on a regular
basis, guidance that should be developed or revised; and

(6)

develop and disseminate
the guidance in accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (5).

(e)

Consultations

The
Secretary shall develop and revise the guidance developed under subsection (a),
and the procedures required under subsection (d), in consultation with—

(1)

the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies that are not required to be consulted under
subsection (a), as the Secretary considers appropriate;

(2)

State, local, and tribal
authorities; and

(3)

nongovernmental
organizations and private industry.

(f)

Report

Not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary shall provide appropriate congressional committees
with—

(1)

a description of the
procedures established under subsection (d);

(2)

any guidance in effect on
the date of the report;

(3)

a list of entities to
which the guidance described in paragraph (2) was disseminated;

(4)

a plan for reviewing the
guidance described in paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);

(5)

the prioritized list of
the guidance required under subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by the
Secretary for such prioritization; and

(6)

a plan for developing,
revising, and disseminating the guidance.

2143.

Exercises

(a)

In
general

To facilitate
recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or other
incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and
to foster collective response to terrorism, the Secretary shall develop
exercises in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and other
appropriate Federal agencies, and, as appropriate, in collaboration with
national level exercises, including exercises that address, to the best
knowledge available at the time, analysis, indoor environmental cleanup
methods, and decontamination standards, including those published in the
guidance issued under section 2142.

(b)

Lessons learned for
national level exercises

The
Secretary shall provide electronically, to the maximum extent practicable,
lessons learned reports to each designated representative of State, local, and
tribal jurisdictions and private sector entities that participate in National
Level Exercises of the Department. Each lessons learned report shall be
tailored to convey information on that exercise that could be leveraged to
enhance preparedness and
response.

.

(b)

Clerical
amendment

The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is
amended by adding at the end the following new items:

Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system
assessment and validation for emergency responders (SAVER) program.

Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response
services.

Sec. 2135. Bioforensics
capabilities.

Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System
Program.

Subtitle D—Recovery

Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in
recovery capabilities.

Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear attack or incident.

Sec. 2143. Exercises.

.

(c)

Conforming
amendment

Section 316 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 195b), and the item relating to such section in section 1(b) of such
Act, are repealed.

(d)

Metropolitan Medical
Response Program review

(1)

In
general

The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, and
the National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group shall conduct a
review of the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program authorized under
section 2136 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by this section,
including an examination of—

(A)

the extent to which the
program goals and objectives are being met;

(B)

the performance metrics
that can best help assess whether the Metropolitan Medical Response System
Program is succeeding;

(C)

how the Metropolitan
Medical Response System Program can be improved;

(D)

how the Metropolitan Medical Response
System Program complements and enhances other preparedness programs supported
by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human
Services;

(E)

the degree to which the
strategic goals, objectives, and capabilities of the Metropolitan Medical
Response System Program are incorporated in State and local homeland security
plans;

(F)

how eligibility for financial assistance,
and the allocation of financial assistance, under the Metropolitan Medical
Response System Program should be determined, including how allocation of
assistance could be based on risk;

(G)

implications for the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program if it were managed as a
contractual agreement; and

(H)

the resource requirements
of the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.

(2)

Report

Not
later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator
and the Chief Medical Officer shall submit to the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the results of the review
under this section.

(3)

Consultation

The
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall consult with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services in the implementation of paragraph
(1)(E).

(4)

Definition

In
this subsection the term National Metropolitan Medical Response System
Working Group has the meaning that term has in section 2136 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by this section.

302.

Enhancing laboratory
biosecurity

(a)

Federal Experts
Security Advisory Panel

(1)

Panel

(A)

Establishment

The
President shall establish a permanent advisory panel to be known as the Federal
Experts Security Advisory Panel to make technical and substantive
recommendations on biological agent and toxin security.

(B)

Membership

The
members of the Panel—

(i)

shall consist of the
voting members appointed under subparagraph (D) and the nonvoting members
appointed under subparagraph (E); and

(ii)

except as provided in
subparagraph (E), shall each be an official or employee of the Federal
Government.

(C)

Co-Chairs

The
voting members of the Panel appointed under clauses (i), (v), and (vi) of
subparagraph (D) shall serve jointly as the Co-Chairs of the Panel.

(D)

Voting
members

The voting members of the Panel shall consist of 1 voting
representative of each of the following Government entities, appointed (except
with respect to the National Security Council) by the head of the respective
entity:

(i)

The Department of
Agriculture.

(ii)

The Department of
Commerce.

(iii)

The Department of
Defense.

(iv)

The Department of
Energy.

(v)

The Department of Health
and Human Services.

(vi)

The Department of
Homeland Security.

(vii)

The Department of
Justice.

(viii)

The Department of
Labor.

(ix)

The Department of
State.

(x)

The Department of
Transportation.

(xi)

The Department of
Veterans Affairs.

(xii)

The Environmental
Protection Agency.

(xiii)

The National Security
Council, which shall be represented by the Special Assistant to the President
for Biodefense.

(xiv)

The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.

(xv)

Any other department or
agency designated by the Co-Chairs.

(E)

Nonvoting
members

The nonvoting members of the Panel shall consist
of—

(i)

such additional
representatives of the Government entities listed in subparagraph (D) as may be
appointed by the heads of the respective entities; and

(ii)

a representative of the public health
laboratory community or biological laboratory community (or both).

(F)

Administrative
support

The Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall provide to the Panel such facilities, staff,
and support services as may be necessary for the Panel to carry out its
responsibilities under paragraph (2).

(2)

Responsibilities

Not
later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this section, the Panel
shall, with respect to biological agent and toxin security, deliver to the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security
plurality recommendations, including any statements of dissent,
concerning—

(A)

the designation as
highest risk of that subset of biological agents and toxins listed pursuant to
section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(a)(1)) that
presents the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with significant potential for
mass casualties or devastating effects to the economy, informed by—

(i)

any biological or
bioterrorism risk assessments conducted by the Department of Homeland Security
and relevant assessments by other agencies; and

(ii)

determinations made by
the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to section 319F–2(c)(2)(A) of such
Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(c)(2)(A));

(B)

the development of a set
of minimum risk-based prescriptive laboratory security performance standards
based on the risk at the lowest level, allowing for enhancements as risk
increases;

(C)

the establishment of
appropriate standards and practices to improve vetting and monitoring of, and
ensure reliability of, personnel with access to highest risk biological agents
and toxins at facilities registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(d));

(D)

the establishment of
appropriate practices for physical security and cyber security for facilities
that possess highest risk biological agents or toxins;

(E)

standards for training of
laboratory personnel in security measures;

(F)

other emerging policy
issues relevant to the security of biological agents and toxins;

(G)

adequacy of information
sharing protocols with biodefense and biosecurity stakeholders; and

(H)

any other security
standards determined necessary.

(b)

Revision of rules and
regulations

(1)

Proposed
rules

The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and
Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, no later
than 1 year after the date of receipt of recommendations under subsection
(a)(2), shall, as appropriate, propose rules under section 351A of the Public
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a) establishing security standards and
procedures that are specific to highest risk biological agents and
toxins.

(2)

Final
rules

The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and
Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, no later
than 24 months after the date of the enactment of this section, shall
promulgate final rules described in paragraph (1).

(c)

Coordination of Federal
oversight

To ensure that the Federal Government provides for
comprehensive and effective oversight of biological agents and toxins security,
the heads of the Government entities listed in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall for
facilities in which the entity supports biological agent or toxin laboratory
activities and by no later than 6 months after the submission of
recommendations under subsection (a)(2), develop and implement a plan for the
coordination of biological agents and toxins security oversight that—

(1)

articulates a mechanism
for coordinated inspections of and harmonized administrative practices for
facilities registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health Service Act
(42 U.S.C. 262a(d)), pursuant to subsection (d) of this section; and

(2)

ensures consistent and
timely identification and resolution of biological agents and toxins security
and compliance issues.

(d)

Common inspection
procedures

The heads of the entities listed in subsection
(a)(1)(D) shall coordinate or consolidate laboratory inspections and ensure
that such inspections are conducted using a common set of inspection procedures
across such entities in order to minimize the administrative burden on such
laboratory.

(e)

Inspection
reports

Any inspection report resulting from an inspection
described in paragraph (1) shall be available to—

(1)

each Federal agency that
supports biological agent or toxin laboratory activities at the laboratory that
is the subject of the inspection report; and

(2)

the laboratories that are
the object of inspection.

(f)

Laboratory biosecurity
information sharing

(1)

Federal
sharing

The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and
Agriculture shall—

(A)

develop a process for
sharing of information pertaining to biological agents and toxins with agencies
that support biological agent or toxin laboratory activities, that identifies
the purpose for sharing, and a mechanism for securing, such information;

(B)

share relevant
information pertaining to biological agents and toxins, including
identification of laboratories possessing highest risk biological agents and
toxins, and compliance issues with the Secretary of Homeland Security;
and

(C)

share relevant
information pertaining to biological agents and toxins, including
identification of laboratories possessing highest risk biological agents and
toxins, with appropriate State, local, and tribal government authorities,
including law enforcement authorities and emergency response providers.

(2)

Classified and
sensitive information

The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health
and Human Services shall ensure that any information disseminated under this
section is handled consistently with—

(A)

the authority of the
Director of National Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods
under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related
procedures or similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive
law enforcement information;

(B)

section 552a of title 5,
United States Code (commonly referred to as the Privacy Act of
1974); and

(C)

other relevant
laws.

(g)

Definitions

In
this section:

(1)

The terms biological agent
and toxin refer to a biological agent or toxin, respectively,
listed pursuant to section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 262(a)(1)).

(2)

The term highest risk means,
with respect to a biological agent or toxin, designated as highest risk as
described in subsection (a)(2)(A).

(3)

The term Panel means the
Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel under subsection (a).

(4)

The term State,
local, and tribal has the same meaning that term has in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.).

303.

Definitions

Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraphs:

(19)

The term Intelligence
Community has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

(20)

The term national biosecurity and
biodefense stakeholders means officials from the Federal, State, local,
and tribal authorities and individuals from the private sector who are involved
in efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a
biological attack or other biological incidents that may have serious health or
economic consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or
infectious disease
outbreaks.

.

304.

Dual-use terrorist
risks from synthetic biology

(a)

Sense of
Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the field of synthetic
biology has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in fundamental
discovery, public health, and biotechnological applications, but that it also
presents inherent dual-use homeland security risks that must be managed.

(b)

Assessment of
risk

Not less frequently than once every two years, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, shall undertake a risk assessment of the dual-use and other risks
associated with synthetic biology.

(c)

Establishment of
guidance

Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and provide to the heads of
all departments and agencies that fund life sciences research, guidance on
compliance with United States laws, arms control agreements to which the United
States is a party or signatory, and individual department and agency policy,
including consideration of—

(1)

best practices for establishing a
department or agency process that achieves compliance for department or agency
research, development, or acquisition projects in the life sciences;

(2)

the types of projects
that should be assessed;

(3)

at what stage or stages
such projects should be assessed; and

(4)

means for preventing the
release of homeland or national security information.

(d)

Research and
development

Based upon the findings of the risk assessment
undertaken in accordance with subsection (b), the Under Secretary may conduct
research into the risks and ways to mitigate such risks of synthetic biology,
including—

(1)

determining the current
capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers to effectively differentiate a
legitimate customer from a potential terrorist or other malicious actor;

(2)

determining the current
capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers to effectively screen orders for
sequences of homeland security concern; and

(3)

making recommendations
regarding screening software, protocols, and other remaining capability gaps
uncovered by such risk assessment.

305.

Dissemination of
information analyzed by the Department to State, local, tribal, and private
entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security

Section 201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)(8)) is amended by striking and to agencies
of State and all that follows and inserting to State, local,
tribal, and private entities with such responsibilities, and, as appropriate,
to the public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to
acts of terrorism against the United States..

10 years after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 7 years after enactment of the
Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–276), coordination among Federal
agencies involved in activities relating to researching, developing, and
acquiring medical countermeasures still needs improvement; and

(2)

aggressive action should
be taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (in particular, the
heads of the National Institutes of Health, the Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and
the Food and Drug Administration), the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Defense to foster greater coordination with respect to such
activities, including adoption of an interagency agreement that sets forth the
relative areas of responsibility with respect to establishing medical
countermeasure requirements and researching, developing, and acquiring medical
countermeasures to meet those requirements.

402.

National Medical
Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy

Title III of the Public Health Service Act
is amended by inserting after section 319F–4 (42 U.S.C. 247d–6e) the
following:

319F–5.

National Medical
Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy

(a)

Definitions

In
this section—

(1)

the term
dispense means to provide medical countermeasures to an affected
population in response to a threat or incident; and

(2)

the term medical
countermeasure means a qualified countermeasure (as defined in section
319F–1(a)(2)).

(b)

Strategy

(1)

In
general

The Secretary, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
Agriculture, and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop, implement,
and, as appropriate, periodically update a National Medical Countermeasure
Dispensing Strategy to enhance preparedness and collective response to a
terrorist attack on humans or animals with any chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear material, that delineates Federal, State, and local
responsibilities.

(2)

Considerations

The
strategy shall be sufficiently flexible to meet the unique needs of different
communities, including first responders, and shall consider—

(A)

a variety of options for dispensing medical
countermeasures, including to individuals, schools, universities, hospitals,
and elderly care facilities;

(B)

post-incident
requirements for emergency use authorizations before countermeasures can be
distributed legally;

(C)

the inclusion of locally
held caches of countermeasures in event-specific authorizations covering
federally held countermeasures of the same type; and

(D)

distribution to the
public of home medical kits for personal stockpiling purposes, within 30 days
after a domestic or international bioterrorist attack resulting in human
infection.

(c)

Coordination

The
Secretary shall coordinate with the Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, State, local, and tribal authorities, representatives from
the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations on the National Medical
Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy.

(d)

Report

Not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the
Secretary shall submit the National Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy
to the appropriate congressional
committees.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall review the adequacy of domestic vaccination and
antimicrobial dispensing policy, guidance, and information provided to the
public in light of any known terrorist risk of a biological attack or other
phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States,
including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks including
outbreaks associated with the avian flu. In carrying out the review under this
section, the Secretary shall consider—

(1)

terrorism risk
assessments under section 2102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended
by this Act, and material threat assessments and determinations under the
Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–276) and the amendments made by
that Act;

(2)

reports on global trends
and intelligence produced by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Intelligence Community regarding biological
threats;

(3)

the availability of federally provided
vaccines and antimicrobials to dispense to first responders and the public, on
a voluntary basis, in anticipation of a biological attack;

(4)

applicability of Federal shelf-life
extension programs to locally held stockpiles of medical countermeasures, to
the extent that information on local stockpiles is available;

(5)

making expiring products
available to appropriate international organizations or foreign partners once
the requests of domestic stakeholders have been fulfilled;

(6)

the implications of
pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing to livestock; and

(7)

mechanisms to increase
coordination between the Strategic National Stockpile established under section
319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247D–6b) and the National
Veterinary Stockpile that would enhance vaccination and dispensing
capabilities.

(b)

Report

Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall report
to the appropriate congressional committees on the review required by
subsection (a), together with any recommendations relating to the availability
of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials for disbursing to the public and
voluntary immunization by first responders.

404.

Management of short
shelf life vaccine and antimicrobial stockpiles

The Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall make available surplus vaccines and antimicrobials, and vaccines and
antimicrobials with short shelf lives, from the strategic national stockpile
under section 319F–2(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(a))
to State, local, and tribal first responders, including health care responders,
for administration to such responders who voluntarily consent to such
administration, and shall—

(1)

establish any necessary
logistical and tracking systems to facilitate making such vaccines and
antimicrobials so available; and

(2)

distribute disclosures
regarding associated risks to end users.

405.

Material threat
determinations reviews

Section
319F–2(c)(2)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. Sec
247d-6b(c)(2)(A)) is amended—

(1)

in clause (i), by
striking and at the end;

(2)

by redesignating clause
(ii) as clause (iii);

(3)

by inserting after clause
(i) the following:

(ii)

establish criteria for the issuance of a
material threat
determination;

;

(4)

in clause (iii), as so
redesignated, by striking the period at the end and inserting ;
and; and

(5)

by adding at the end the
following:

(iv)

review and reassess
determinations under clause (iii) to determine whether agents continue to
present a material threat against the United States population sufficient to
affect national security and homeland
security.

.

406.

Background
checks

Section 351A(e)(3)(A)
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(e)(3)(A)) is amended by adding
at the end the following: In identifying whether an individual is within
a category specified in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the Attorney General shall
consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretary of State to determine whether these officials possess any
information relevant to the identification of such an individual by the
Attorney General..

407.

State, local, and
tribal defined

In this title,
the term State, local, and tribal has the same meaning that term
has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.).

V

Foreign Relations
Matters

501.

International
engagement to enhance biodefense and laboratory biosecurity

The Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, and the heads of
appropriate Federal agencies, shall, as appropriate—

(1)

support efforts of other
countries to establish and build capacity to effectively implement legislation
criminalizing the development or use of biological weapons or acts of
bioterrorism;

(2)

engage other countries
and international nongovernmental entities to develop and establish common
standards, guidance, and best practices for actions relevant to preventing acts
of bioterrorism and the illicit use of life sciences;

(3)

support the efforts of other countries to
enhance biosecurity and safety practices at laboratories and other facilities
with materials that could be used in biological weapons or in an act of
bioterrorism;

(4)

promote the development
and adoption of international guidance for the safety and security of high-risk
pathogens and toxins; and

(5)

promote information sharing relating to
threats and best practices between the intelligence community, Federal law
enforcement, and international law enforcement and security officials.

502.

International
collaboration and information sharing relating to biosecurity

The Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
agencies, shall, as appropriate—

(1)

support efforts in other
countries and regions to develop mechanisms and capabilities for reporting to
United Nations organizations validated data on biological attacks or other
phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States,
including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks;

(2)

engage other Federal and nongovernmental
entities and other countries to advance awareness and understanding of the risk
posed by information derived from the life sciences that has the potential for
misuse to cause harm, and advance recommendations on how best to address such
risk;

(3)

engage such entities and
countries to promote greater awareness and understanding of the global
availability of and access to life science technologies and materials;
and

(4)

promote the development
and use of mechanisms for reporting, preserving, and sharing data on Federal
programs and investments in international scientific, agricultural, medical,
and public health collaborations in support of efforts to enhance global
biosecurity.

503.

Interagency task force
on best practices for global biopreparedness

(a)

Sense of
Congress

It is the sense of
Congress that preparedness for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
incident must be undertaken not only domestically but also internationally.
Specifically, there is a need for a global preparedness architecture for such
an event. Congress supports efforts to provide an international forum for
discussion of key health security policies with international dimensions, and
the establishment of a formal United States interagency task force to develop
best practices and recommendations for implementation of a global preparedness
architecture could enhance global preparedness.

(b)

Establishment of task
force

The Secretary of State
shall convene and lead an interagency task force to examine—

(1)

the state of global
biopreparedness for a major biological event;

(2)

necessary components of a
global biopreparedness architecture that would advance international health
security, including considerations of—

preservation of the
stockpile through effective detection and diagnosis, shelf life extension
programs, and other means;

(iii)

delivery planning;
and

(iv)

legal considerations for
implementing such an architecture;

(E)

response and
attribution;

(F)

other elements that should be a component
of such an architecture; and

(G)

obstacles to implementing
such an architecture;

(3)

best practices for preparedness based on
lessons learned from domestic efforts to address the above issues, and that may
be applicable internationally;

(4)

activities undertaken
through the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
developed under section 202 and the International Health Regulations 2005, as
well as other activities deemed relevant by the task force; and

(5)

the utility of working
through existing international forums as a mechanism for distributing this
information to the international community.

(c)

Membership

Members of the task force shall include
representatives from—

(1)

the Department of
Homeland Security;

(2)

the Department of Health
and Human Services, including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention;

(3)

the Department of
Agriculture;

(4)

the Department of
Defense;

(5)

the Department of
Justice;

(6)

the Department of
State;

(7)

the Director of National
Intelligence;

(8)

other Federal departments
and agencies, as determined appropriate by the Secretary; and

(9)

national biosecurity and biodefense
stakeholder community, including from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries, and the diagnostic laboratory community, as determined by the
Secretary.

(d)

Report

Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the findings of the task force established
under this section.

504.

Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention

The
Secretary of State shall—

(1)

promote confidence in effective
implementation of and compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly referred to as the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) by the States party to
the Convention by promoting transparency with respect to legitimate activities
and pursuing compliance diplomatically to address concerns;

(2)

promote universal
membership in the Convention;

(3)

develop an action plan for increasing
international adherence to the Convention; and

(4)

ensure that United States
participation in Convention meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of
relevant Federal departments and agencies.

November 30, 2012

The Committees on Energy and Commerce,
Transportation and
Infrastructure, Foreign
Affairs, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and
Science, Space, and
Technology discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed