tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/anzus-18614/articlesANZUS – The Conversation2017-08-11T07:16:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823822017-08-11T07:16:25Z2017-08-11T07:16:25ZOn North Korea, Turnbull locks Australia into the unpredictability of unpredictable players<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181758/original/file-20170811-1225-1kk348g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump&#39;s presidency is unlike any of its modern predecessors. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Reynolds/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A week ago, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/politics/australia-mexico-transcripts/">leaked transcript</a> of the January telephone call between Malcolm Turnbull and Donald Trump revealed Turnbull had told the president, “You can count on me. I will be there again and again.”</p>
<p>Now, as the US-North Korea verbal war intensifies, with fears it could run into a military conflict, Turnbull has made specific that general pledge.</p>
<p>In extended comments on Melbourne’s <a href="http://www.3aw.com.au/podcast/neil-mitchell-speaks-with-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull/">3AW on Friday</a>, Turnbull declared: “Be under no misapprehension – in terms of defence we [Australia and US] are joined at the hip”.</p>
<p>“Let’s be very clear … If there is an attack on the United States by North Korea, then the ANZUS treaty will be invoked and Australia will come to the aid of the United States, just as if there was an attack on Australia, the United States would come to our aid.”</p>
<p>Asked what would happen in the event of an attack on the US territory of Guam, Turnbull said: “We would come to the aid of the United States. Now, how that manifests itself will obviously depend on the circumstances and the consultations with our allies.”</p>
<p>North Korea is threatening to launch missiles not at Guam itself but in the ocean nearby.</p>
<p>Ahead of a Friday briefing from military chiefs and intelligence and foreign policy experts, Turnbull underlined his point: “We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States”. The worsening crisis was among topics discussed in a Thursday night telephone conversation between Turnbull and US vice-president Mike Pence.</p>
<p>The 1951 ANZUS treaty says: “The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific”. (Article III)</p>
<p>“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” (Article IV)</p>
<p>Despite the tight alliance, only once has ANZUS been invoked – by John Howard after the September 11 2001 attacksv</p>
<p>Mostly, when Australia has stood with the US militarily, the treaty has been not relevant or not needed.</p>
<p>Nor has ANZUS or the wider American alliance meant the US automatically supports Australia. Australian efforts to get America involved in regional clashes, notably Indonesia’s claims to West New Guinea, and the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation of the 1960s, were met with resistance.</p>
<p>Geoffrey Barker wrote in 2015, “In fact the US commitment to ANZUS has never been as strong as the Australian commitment”.</p>
<p>While Turnbull has trumpeted the message that Australia would support the US in a conflict with North Korea Hugh White, professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, believes he has given a narrow, literal interpretation of the treaty and gone further than he had to.</p>
<p>“He’s missed the point that we have the right to judge our interests”, White says.
“Under article IV there is an obligation to act – there’s no obligation to act by contributing military forces. It’s always acknowledged that each side has the right to make a judgement about the kind of response it makes.”</p>
<p>The judgement, White argues, would depend on the particular circumstances. He outlines four scenarios of military conflict.</p>
<p>… an attack by the United States on North Korea, which some believed Trump building up to in his words earlier this week, when he said continued threats to the US “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen”;</p>
<p>… an attack by North Korea on the US;</p>
<p>… North Korea firing its missiles to near Guam, but not on Guam;</p>
<p>… A pre-emptive strike by the US to prevent North Korea completing the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.</p>
<p>White says that Turnbull has walked past the complexities of what might happen, and asks: “Is it in Australia’s interests to encourage the US by saying we’d support it unconditionally ?</p>
<p>Foreign minister Julie Bishop had been more circumspect. When it was put to her this week that we would be in the fight, if it came to that, given both ANZUS and Australia’s being a party to the Korean War ceasefire, she said: "In fact we were not a party in the legal sense to the armistice so there is no automatic trigger for Australia to be involved. As far as the ANZUS alliance is concerned, that is an obligation to consult. But of course we have been in constant discussion with our friends in the United States”.</p>
<p>Bishop carefully kept options open.</p>
<p>It is worth noting, however, that Kim Beazley a former defence minister, has a different view of the ceasefire agreement. He wrote in The Strategist: “At the signing of the armistice in Korea in 1953 we agreed, with South Korea’s allies, that we would defend the South in the event of an attack by the North.”</p>
<p>If Australia became involved in a military conflict, it would a limited contribution. It would be presence, rather than capability, that (as usual) would be important to the Americans.</p>
<p>As has become evident, Trump’s presidency presents Australia with serious management challenges in the alliance relationship, which is built into the foundations of Australian security policy.</p>
<p>This presidency is unlike any of its modern predecessors, and judging how to handle it is extremely difficult for the government. It’s interesting to note the new administration hasn’t yet even posted an ambassador to Australia.</p>
<p>Turnbull, with his personalised style of operating, has chosen to try to get up close and personal, talking as one businessman to another. Hence the “you can count on me” sort of line.</p>
<p>Turnbull may later nuance his Friday comments, but as they stand, they lock Australia into the unpredictability of unpredictable players. They also reflect, unvarnished, the reality that Australia always answers America’s call.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82382/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A week ago, the leaked transcript of the January telephone call between Malcolm Turnbull and Donald Trump revealed Turnbull had told the president, “You can count on me. I will be there again and again…Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/653542016-09-20T19:54:33Z2016-09-20T19:54:33ZCostly choices: how well will Trump or Clinton manage the Australia-US alliance?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137694/original/image-20160914-4980-169t9js.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Should Hillary Clinton win the White House the long evolution of Australia-US alliance should continue as normal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Trade and security in the Asia-Pacific, including Australia, is at a crossroads. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/what-might-a-hillary-clinton-presidency-mean-for-asia/">represents continuity</a> with more than 25 years of American regional engagement. But Republican nominee Donald Trump places the very foundation of the US security guarantee <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/donald-trumps-asia-policy-would-be-a-disaster/">under threat</a>.</p>
<p>So, if elected president, how well will either of these candidates manage the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook44p/AustUSDefence">Australia-US alliance</a>?</p>
<p>US presidents over the past 25 years have had varying views of the alliance. While none have questioned its value, commitment has not been even across the board.</p>
<h2>George H.W. Bush</h2>
<p>George H.W. Bush, arguably, is most responsible for the character of today’s alliance. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=354">second world war veteran</a>, Bush shared many personal experiences with Australians serving in the Pacific. He also had <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=EuqFg5dUmgQC&amp;pg=PA161&amp;lpg=PA161#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">close relationships</a> with Australian leaders, especially Bob Hawke. </p>
<p>When Bush’s Australia visit was first planned, Hawke was still prime minister. In the intervening months Paul Keating replaced Hawke. What was to be a reunion between two close friends did not quite work as intended.</p>
<p>Bush set the benchmark for Australian-US alliance. In 1992 <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=CUjVAwAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA17&amp;lpg=PA17#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">he said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not abandon the special responsibility we have to help further stability in this region.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vtOTxHKkmzM?wmode=transparent&amp;start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Bob Hawke visits the White House in 1989.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bill Clinton</h2>
<p>Before becoming president, former Arkansas governor Bill Clinton was a foreign policy amateur. </p>
<p>In 1993, the Australian-inspired Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46137">became a way</a> of bridging Clinton’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It%27s_the_economy,_stupid">economic focus</a> with international trade. Later, his 1996 visit to Australia met with tremendous success, aligning Australian and American visions for the Asia-Pacific. </p>
<p>Clinton’s relationship with the Keating government was mostly positive, but his relationship with the Howard government was less so. </p>
<p>In 1999 the Howard government <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100923201217/http://www.abc.net.au/news/howardyears/content/s2422684.htm">fumbled its handling</a> of calling on the US to send troops into East Timor alongside Australia’s. The US made significant contributions to the Australian-led efforts, providing essential logistical and communication support. </p>
<p>By the end of his administration Clinton had built on the efforts of his predecessor and continued to strengthen the alliance.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ES8p4ozUcbM?wmode=transparent&amp;start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Bill Clinton addresses federal parliament in 1996.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>George W. Bush</h2>
<p>It is hard to say what George W. Bush’s handling of the Australia-US alliance would have been like if the September 11 terror attacks had not happened. Would his father’s Australian experience have coloured his view? </p>
<p>There can be no doubt that, after September 11, Australia’s support of US-led conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq signalled the continuing deepening of the alliance. </p>
<p>Despite Bush’s unpopularity in Australia, his administration continued to see Australia as an important ally. Adding to the depth of the alliance was agreement on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia%E2%80%93United_States_Free_Trade_Agreement">Australia-US Free Trade Agreement</a> and creation of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-3_visa">E3 visa</a> category for Australians. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=417&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=417&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=417&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=524&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=524&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=524&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Bush administration saw Australia as an important ally.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kevin Dietsch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Barack Obama</h2>
<p>America’s first truly Asia-Pacific president is Barack Obama. </p>
<p>Obama was born in Hawaii and <a href="http://millercenter.org/president/biography/obama-life-before-the-presidency">lived in Indonesia</a> in his youth. The Obama-led “pivot” to Asia acknowledged the importance of the Asia-Pacific, both in economic and security terms, as he described in a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament">speech to the Australian parliament</a> in 2011. </p>
<p>Australia has a central place in the pivot. The George W. Bush-negotiated <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ustradetreaty/aboutthetreaty.asp">Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty</a> between the US and Australia was finally passed in the US Senate and signed into law by Obama in 2013. </p>
<p>Obama has built on the foundations in the alliance laid by his predecessors.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Barack Obama addresses federal parliament in 2011.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What might 2016 mean?</h2>
<p>Should Hillary Clinton win the White House the long evolution of alliance should continue as it has done since Bush senior’s presidency. </p>
<p>One of her most-trusted advisers, Kurt Campbell – <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/04/Book-review-The-Pivot-The-Future-of-American-Statecraft-in-Asia-by-Kurt-Campbell.aspx">the pivot’s architect</a> – might well become <a href="http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/hillary-clintons-tough-on-china-strategy-will-demand-more-of-australia-20160904-gr8mqe">secretary of state</a>. Under Clinton Australians would be in no doubt about the US position on the alliance in particular and America’s broader commitment to the Asia-Pacific.</p>
<p>A Trump victory signals ambiguity and insecurity. He has already <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/us-china-trade-reform">telegraphed his intention</a> to use trade tariffs against China in his campaign to protect American manufacturing. </p>
<p>His commitment to American security alliances is predicated upon each ally’s financial commitment to the particular alliance. Australia’s defence spending might protect it against a Trump presidency’s ire. But, then again, it might not. </p>
<p>Finally, Trump has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-02/donald-trump-nuclear-fallout-analysis/7294358">expressed an indifferent view</a> on the continued growth of nuclear weapons in northeast Asia.</p>
<p>Unlike previous Republican candidates, Trump does not have a stable of ready political appointees to take up positions of responsibility. Even if he did, his congressional relations will be anything but cordial if the Democrats win the Senate. </p>
<p>Given the long experience of Republican congressional obstinacy to pass legislation, the Democrats might feel it is their time for payback. Should the Democrats win the Senate, which is distinctly possible, one can expect Trump nominees to have a very long and slow confirmation process. </p>
<p>A Trump presidency will likely seem to Australians like a very long four years. Under Clinton, time will pass at its normal pace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Tidwell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US presidents over the past 25 years have had varying views of the alliance with Australia. While none have questioned its value, commitment has not been even across the board.Alan Tidwell, Director, Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/534832016-01-20T22:37:31Z2016-01-20T22:37:31ZPresident Trump and the ANZUS alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108801/original/image-20160120-26125-1jh2v0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Nick Oxford</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One thing Malcolm Turnbull didn’t talk about on his recent visit to the US was the possibility of Donald Trump becoming president. Perhaps he thinks of it as too unlikely to worry about. The conventional wisdom is that despite being the most popular candidate, Trump won’t be the Republican nominee. Even if he is, Hillary Clinton will trounce him in the only poll that matters.</p>
<p>I’m far from being the only person hoping the pundits are right. A number of world leaders, like UK Prime Minister David Cameron, have taken the unusual step of interfering in the electoral contest to criticise Trump. Many others must be praying that America’s grumpy old white men and xenophobes don’t carry the day. But what if they do?</p>
<p>No-one quite knows what goes on in other people’s heads in the privacy of the voting booth, so we can’t be certain of the outcome. Extremism is making a comeback around the world. In some places it never entirely disappeared, and that’s part of the problem. </p>
<p>The question in Australia is whether our policymakers, particularly in defence and national security, have actually thought about the unthinkable – the ascendancy of president Trump.</p>
<p>Given that our national security is ostensibly guaranteed by the US, the possible advent of a Trump presidency is especially consequential for Australians. If anyone doubts just how much of a difference an individual president can actually make, we need only recall the disastrous administration of George W. Bush.</p>
<p>Not only did the Bush era fundamentally undermine the US’s own security position – in both its conventional military and, equally importantly, economic forms – but it also led to a number of its allies embarking on monumentally misguided and, in Australia’s case, unnecessary military adventures.</p>
<p>The point to emphasise is that any country that relies too heavily on another for its security is potentially hostage to its protector’s policies – no matter how ill-conceived, dangerous or inappropriate they may be. That possibility was realised in entirely predictable and disastrous fashion when Bush was president. A Trump administration threatens to be even more catastrophic on a number of levels.</p>
<p>We may hope that much of Trump’s rhetoric is bluster and simply playing to the prejudices of his core supporters. But threatening to use America’s still formidable and decisive military might to “solve” problems in the Middle East has the potential to make the conflicts in Iraq look like a relatively minor precursor to the main event.</p>
<p>Given Australian policymakers’ track record of always supporting the US in whatever conflict it may find itself involved, no matter how remote geographically or distant from vital Australian interests it may have been, one wonders if a similar blank cheque will be offered to a potential Trump regime. </p>
<p>If a Trump administration threatened to use the ANZUS alliance and its supposedly vital security benefits as a bargaining chip, would any Australian government feel compelled to support the US no matter what the policy was or its possible consequences?</p>
<p>Given that Trump thinks that standing up to China economically and militarily is vital for America’s national interests, any administration he led might hasten the proverbial nightmare scenario in which Australia is forced to make a painful choice between its principal strategic and economic partners.</p>
<p>Such a dilemma might have been avoided altogether if Australia had a more independent, non-aligned foreign policy in the first place. Supporters of the alliance, who bang on endlessly about the supposed cost-saving and intelligence advantages it provides, conveniently overlook the amount of treasure and – more significantly – blood that’s actually been expended in its maintenance.</p>
<p>Equally significant is the idea that Australia enjoys the proverbial “special relationship” with the US, in which its wise counsel is actively sought and taken into account in the formulation of American foreign policies, would be put to a searching examination in any Trump administration. It’s difficult to imagine Trump listening to advice from within the US, let alone some peripheral vassal state.</p>
<p>Hopefully, it won’t come to this. Surely our American cousins aren’t that misguided and irresponsible, are they? Probably not. </p>
<p>But, at a time when the stability and effectiveness of America’s democracy is increasing called into question and even held up to ridicule, the possibility of a Trump presidency can’t be entirely discounted. If it does happen, the policy implications for friend and foe alike will be profound. We must hope such a possibility is at least being considered in Canberra, even if history suggests that the outcome of such conjectures is all too predictable.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>An earlier version of this article appeared in <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/president-trump-and-the-anzus-alliance/">The Strategist</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
One thing Malcolm Turnbull didn’t talk about on his recent visit to the US was the possibility of Donald Trump becoming president. Perhaps he thinks of it as too unlikely to worry about. The conventional…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/445542015-07-13T00:20:17Z2015-07-13T00:20:17ZThe ANZUS ascendancy (continued)<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/88125/original/image-20150711-17439-8sv2vm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ian Waldie</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What J.K. Galbraith famously called the conventional wisdom is a powerful thing to behold. There are few better local examples than the belief that the military alliance with the US is vital for the security of Australia and the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>Given that this idea is also overwhelming supported by both the general public and – more predictably – the defence establishment in Australia, one would have thought it needed little reinforcing. And yet there is a veritable army of commentators and analysts who continually fret about the health of the ANZUS alliance and the possibility that it might be neglected or in disrepair. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2323%20Web.pdf">latest example</a> of the ANZUS-boosting genre has been jointly produced by the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. </p>
<p>The series editor – Andrew Carr – promises the reader that the report will reflect “the different viewpoints of the authors”. If it does, then I’m afraid I missed it. The most striking feature of this review – like so many others before it – is the remarkable uniformity of opinion.</p>
<p>The ostensible rationale for this “candid audit” is the rise of China. At least the authors are not mealy mouthed about actually saying so. And no doubt there <em>is</em> something to fret about in this context. China’s recent behaviour has been alarming, especially for its smaller Southeast Asian neighbours. The question, as ever, is what is to be done?</p>
<p>Predictably enough, the authors are in no doubt. Australia is still what Des Ball called a suitable piece of real estate, and not just as a spy base. Now Australia’s great strategic significance is as a:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… sanctuary from China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Equally predictably, playing the part of a creditable alliance partner will involve spending vast amounts of money on new hardware to facilitate “interoperability”. This is apparently vital in the event that we need to do our bit again in far-off places – or “combined expeditionary operations”, as we apparently call them these days. </p>
<p>The authors are clearly scandalised that Australia has recently:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… behaved fairly openly as a free-rider in the relationship. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>What is more surprising and remarkable, perhaps, is that the authors are also clearly aghast at the idea that people such as the late Malcolm Fraser should have the temerity to question the value of the alliance:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… in no other US-allied capital do former leaders engage in such blatant questioning of the alliance with the United States. What are Americans to make of such statements, and how can Washington and Canberra align their China strategies?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The possibility that Australians might actually want to have a debate about, or even have a different, independent position on some of these issues is not one that is entertained in the report.</p>
<p>On the contrary, “it is only natural” that the thinking of the US and Australia on key issues will converge, and so it should, the authors clearly believe. The key here is developing “coherent and sustainable China strategies” and ignoring the “accommodational mutterings” (sic) of public figures who are not on message. </p>
<p>One assumes the authors have Hugh White in mind as he has provided some of the most sophisticated – and plausible – alternatives to the sort of quasi-containment strategies outlined here. Given that the authors claim to favour an open debate, it might have been useful to directly engage with some of White’s ideas, if only to demonstrate why they think we shouldn’t take them seriously.</p>
<p>As it is, this report contains few surprises for anyone who has been taking even the vaguest interest in defence issues of late. All of the usual justifications for the alliance are trotted out including the inherently implausible idea that Australia exerts a major influence over strategic thinking in the US. We are assured that the Americans are now apparently worried about “abandonment by Canberra”.</p>
<p>One of the most potentially novel, important but underdeveloped aspects of the report was the idea that the US and Australia as “staunch defenders of the neoliberal order” ought to try and “shape China’s expectations”. Perhaps so. At the very least, it is implicit recognition that the economic and ideational aspects of relations with China are potentially as, if not more, important than the more traditional strategic considerations that predominate here. </p>
<p>In the absence of war geoeconomics will arguably be the main game. In the presence of war between the US and China not only will Australia’s military contribution be entirely redundant, but so too will all the carefully calibrated calculations and strategising that underpin this document.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
What J.K. Galbraith famously called the conventional wisdom is a powerful thing to behold. There are few better local examples than the belief that the military alliance with the US is vital for the security…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.