A mediaevalist trying to be a philosopher and a philosopher trying to be a mediaevalist write about theology, philosophy, scholarship, books, the middle ages, and especially the life, times, and thought of the Doctor Subtilis, the Blessed John Duns Scotus.

"Nevertheless it is true that in the sacrament of Baptism the merit of the faith of the Church Militant profits the children [i.e. the ones baptised], which [faith], although it can fail in some persons specially [as individuals], nevertheless never generally fails nor will fail, as that statement in the last chapter of Matthew says, verse 20, "Behold I am with you even until the consummation of the age." Whence just as the species in always preserved in any one of [its] individuals, so is the faith [preserved] in any one of the faithful, and this by the working of divine providence. Nor ever, since the Church began, has there failed to be someone who pleased God, as also there never will be."

--St Bonaventure, IV Sent., dist. 4 pars 1 dub.2.

Protestants love the idea of a remnant Church holding out against the tide of the unfaithful. Of course they also like to imagine that they themselves are the remnant Church, and that the remnant of the faithful across the ages were just like them, rather than being faithful Catholics. They certainly do not like the idea of the merits of the faithful remnant helping to remit the sins of others, nor of their faith serving for infants in making their baptism valid, if their parents are faithless. All in all an interesting passage.

Monday, June 23, 2008

In the fourteenth century, at least. This is for Michael, a quote from Petrus Thomae's Quodlibetq.3 from a question about whether items such as truth, good, etc. as they are attributes of being are absolute or relative. It is on p.54 of the edition of Peter Thomae. I don't think he goes back to this later or comments much on it. But it shows Gonsalvus Hispanus had some influence in the 1320's.

Brother Gonsalvus argues to the same, the foundation of which argument is that those two powers, namely the intellect and will, are of equal range, because whatever can be attained by one, can likewise be attained by the other; nor is there some concept that can be attained by one that cannot be attained by the other. therefore it seems that there cannot be posited diverse formal concepts of them.

Saturday, June 21, 2008

The following 'addition of uncertain authorship' on the essential unity of spiritual and corporeal matter is appended to Distinction III in some manuscripts of St Bonaventure's Sentences commentary and is printed there in the Quaracchi edition. The editors are not sure whether it is an addition of Bonaventure's own long after the composition of the original work or whether it was added by a later reader. I incline to the latter view, in light of the author's uncertainty about fully embracing Bonaventure's doctrine, and in light of the reference to Avicebron, whose name never appears in Bonaventure's works. Here is the passage, followed by a pretty literal translation:

"But these things are said of the unity of spiritual and corporeal matter according to its naked and absolute essence; for according to its being it has to be diversified in diverse things, not only according to accidental being, but also according to substantial being. Whence things which are diverse according to substance are diversified substantially, as will be clear in the following article of the question. But although it may not happen that one finds in nature the essence of matter denuded of all forms and dispositions, nevertheless one can truly understand it and truly attribute something to it, as Augusine teaches clearly enough in XII Confessionum, and in his book De vera religione he says that [matter] is as it were a medium between something and nothing, and the Philosopher, the first book of De generatione, says that it is as simple as a point. Just as, therefore, one can truly understand matter through its simple essence to be [present] in composite and extended corporeal things, although according to the being of nature it is impossible for the matter of coporeal things to be separated from extension, as Augustine says in many places, especially in his book De immortalitate animae, and Super Genesim ad litteram: so one can also understand matter through its indistinct and unnumbered essence [to be present] in diverse and and distinct and numbered things, and so [one may understand it to be], by a certain kind of number, one through the privation of all enumeration and distinction, as was said before. And the Commentor expressly says this, in Super I Metaphysicae, in the chapter ‘Quoniam autem in fundamento’, where he assigns the difference between the unity of genus and [the unity of] matter; he expressly says the same thing in Super XII, where he gives the way how it can be understood that there can be numerically one matter for diverse things, showing that this is said privatively rather than positively. The author of the Fons vitae says the same thing in the first part of his book and expressly proves in [X]IV that the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is essentially one. And he proves it this way: every diversity is from form; and this way: if spiritual and corporeal things did not have matter which was essentially one, it would be impossible for them to have anything univocal, for diversity in the roots prevents in the branches. I omit the authorities of others for the sake of brevity. –And on account of these and similar considerations it was said from the beginning that this way of speaking is philosophical, although nothing prohibits it from also being catholic and theological, so long as it is rightly understood. For this way of speaking in no way detracts from the dignity of a spiritual substance, nor from the distance between it and a corporeal [substance], nor from the creation of spirits. For one need not because of this [doctrine] posit that a spirit is made from previously-existing matter, because matter, clothed in corporeal form, cannot be robbed of it; nor does God act against what he has established from the beginning, and therefore when a spiritual substance is created, it is necessary for its matter to be cocreated with it. And just as the creation of spirits does not take from them [their] essential agreement in the unity of [their] specific form, neither also does the unity of matter through its naked and absolute essence take [it from them], because, as was said, this unity is of a greater extent than the unity of genus or species; and furthermore matter is not created nor was ever created without some form under which it is diversified, as was said above. If therefore anyone is able to understand the essence of naked matter, he will see that it can with sufficient probability be called privatively numerically one. And these [words] suffice about this position. But there is another way of speaking here, [by saying namely that] the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is not essentially one, howsoever it may be understood to be stripped of form and superadded dispositions, but rather [that the two matters are] still essentially distinguished from one another. For as the primary genera of things are distinguished from one another, and [as] the essence of form is by itself distinguished from the essence of matter, and the essence of matter from God on account of simplicity; so the essence of matter by itself is distinguished from the essence of [the other kind of] matter. And according to this position, if God through the infinity of his power were to make a spirit out of a body, nothing common would remain [between them], but the whole would pass into the whole. –And if it were objected against this position, that all diversity is from form, and that act alone divides, and similar [things were said]; briefly according to this position one would respond that this is true of complete distinction and diversity. For as the essence of matter, abstracted from all form, is incomplete with respect to distinction . . . [lacuna?] And in this way all the arguments for the opposite [side] can be determined, as is clear to anyone who works through it. And therefore one need not be delayed by this matter any longer. –But both of these positions can be harmonized in this one, that the matter of spiritual and of corporeal things is one with the unity of analogy. But whether this is sufficient to preserve the unity of genus—since the principles of substances and of accidents are the same by analogy, as the Philosopher has it, nor nevertheless do they have one common genus—and also whether [this position would seem] sufficient for indistinction, is difficult to see [even] for one who considers and understands [the matter] well. And therefore it is saner to stick to one of these positions together with due respect for the other side, rather than to throw oneself headlong altogether into one opinion; especially since masters and esteemed clerics say each."

Monday, June 16, 2008

A while back I posted the following excerpt from Chaucer, with comment:

To Colcos comen is this duc Jasoun,That is of love devourer and dragoun.As mater apetiteth form alweyAnd from forme into forme it passen may,Or as a welle that were botomles,Right so can false Jason have no pes.For to desyren thourgh his apetitTo don with gentil women his delyt,This is his lust and his felicite.

--Chaucer, The Legend of Good Women, "The Legend of Medea"

It turns out that Chaucer was being less imaginative and more learned than I suspected. Today I came across much the same metaphor in none other than John Quidort:

Rather than translate verbatim, I'll just include the note I wrote on this passage for my dissertation this afternoon:

"None of the ancients positing matter in all creatures went so far as to posit matters of different kinds or characters [specierum vel rationum]. The diversity of things comes not from a diversity of matters but from a diversity of superior and inferior forms, since no one form exhausts or expresses [terminat vel capit] the whole extent of matter’s potency to natural forms. Like a slut who is never satisfied with her husband, matter informed with with an inferior form is never satisfied with it, but always desires to replace it with another. On the other hand, John claims, the form of a heavenly body or of one of the Intelligences which moves the universe virtually contains every form to which prime matter is in potency (he does not explain in what sense this is true). Therefore such a form exhausts the whole desire of matter for form, and so matter informed with a superior form in not in potency to something else. These sorts of substances, then, are not entangled in the offense of corruption through the desire of some other form and the corruption of the form possessed, and so the matter of these higher substances is like a chaste woman."

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

I have in mind the constitution Benedictus Deus issued by Benedict XII in 1336. According to the recent book by Avery Cardinal Dulles, this decree is one of the view such from the Medieval period that theologians hold to be clearly infallible. Trottmann takes it as the end-point of his massive tome on the beatific vision, which I think may be the source of my information. I was having an argument with a Thomist about this, as I think I remember Trottmann claiming that this doctrine endorsed the Scotist position on the beatific vision, as being an example of intuitive cognition. I quote the relevant passage, from Denzinger 67:

Now the point of all this was to resolve whether the dead see God after death or not, and the document does define that the blessed dead enjoy intuitive cognition of the divine essence (sorry, seventh-day adventists, you lose). By saying this may be a "Scotist" dogma I am not saying that it is necessarily opposed to Thomism. Thomas if I recall my recent exam question correctly, thinks that the divine essence becomes a form for the intellect; so it is also direct. But Thomas does not use the term "intuitive" which, while not coined by Scotus, did historically seem to explode in the extent of its usage due to his employment of it. By this I mean that after Scotus, discussions of intuitive and abstractive cognition became standard fare in the prologues to Sentence commenaries, though he does not talk about intuitive cognition at all in the prologue to his Parisian Reportatio, instead develops a complicated and controversial usage of abstractive cognition. Essentially, Scotus thinks intuitive cognition is the direct cognition of something qua existing in the here and now. Abstractive cognition "abstracts" from the here and now, and is mediated by an intelligible species. Returning to Benedictus Deus, then, Benedict XII is using a technical term known have been developed in its "modern", 14th century sense by Scotus.

Of course, this does not exactly constitute a dogma...the dogma is that there is a vision of God after death that is intuitively immediate. The Scotistic part is the manner of the vision. The tricky part of all this is that intuitive cognition is a mode of cognition naturally had by the intellect (its manner of functioning in this life is unclear in Scotus and highly disputed by scholars). While this may be logically distinct from his notion of being as the object of the intellect, in that context he denies the existence of the lumen gloriae, which if you, gentle readers, recall from an earlier post, apparently is dogma [though as the affirmation of it was directed against the Beghards and not a scholastic, and as I read an article the other day saying certain other parts of the council of Vienne weren't considered dogma, I am entirely unsure of the status of that bit on the lumen gloriae]; but, all is not lost, for he says that God is maximally intelligible, and maximally light, and so therefore does seem to shine on the intellect (this bit is from Ord. III where he talks about the knowledge of Christ). But the whole point of the lumen gloriae is that the intellect of itself can't see God and needs to be elevated by the divine light [I am reminded of a recent entry on energetic processions in which Perry I think lamented some intellectual propterty issues he was having...in the area of Scotistic studies and 14th century philosophy, the field is so wide open that I gladly here give the status questionis of an article someone could write]. Such are my rambling thoughts of the day. Now its time for bed so I'll sign off now. enjoy

Sunday, June 8, 2008

I'm pleased to post the link to Kristellers Latin Manuscript Books Before 1600: A List of the Printed Cataogues and Unpublished Inventories of Extant Collections, which is the first place to look when researching manuscripts. It is searchable, and contains the volume of updates as well.

I just finished watching, for the first time in many years, the super-awesome Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, as part of a complicated scheme to get my father to pay for movie tickets to the one now in theaters. Anyway, the experience was interesting, since the movie is as enjoyable as ever, and yet, as a much better scholar and amateur medievalist than I was the last time I saw it, a number of things stuck out.

On the one hand, I could follow all the German spoken by the Nazis in the movie, which was encouraging, as well as the snippets of Latin etc. On the other, it's much more clear now how much of the movie isn't based on anything at all. Fourth-century catacombs underneath Venice? "The Chronicles of St Anselm"? The medieval Latin name for God is Iehovah? Hmm . . . . Also, that seven-hundred-year-old knight speaks surprisingly modern English.

Saturday, June 7, 2008

Here's a bit from Gregory of Rimini, a little comment he makes before he begins to argue against Scotus. It is from his Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum (1343-1344), edited by Trapp. et al. It's kind of a gem of quote, illustrating the problem one has in interpretating Scotus' various remarks on the formal distinction.

In diverse places that doctor spoke variously about that formal distinction from the nature of the thing, sometimes naming it a virtual distinction, sometimes a qualified distinction [secundum quid], sometimes formal non-identity, and sometimes saying that 'from the side of the thing' is some plurality and distinction of formal reasons and quiddities, of which one is not the other, for example, that the formality or quidditative reason of wisdom existing outside of the soul in God is not the formality of goodness, but that they are distinct from the nature of the thing; sometimes however he said that wisdom is not formally or quidditatively goodness and this 'wisdom is goodness' is not formal and quidditative in the first mode of per se predication-from which some of his followers said that it was not the intention of this doctor to posit some multitude or plurality of formalities or of quidditative reasons outside the soul distinct in God from the nature of the thing, but only to deny that one is predicated formally of the other, so that the term 'formally' is rather a determination of composition in the proposition than the extremes, and a syncategorematic term, and that arguing against him in the first sense proceeds from ignorance of his opinion-therefore I will show according to his own words that he was able and consequently had to posit a certain multitude of entities, which he called formalities and quidditative reasons, from the nature of the thing actually distinct outside the soul, of which one is not the other.

Tuesday, June 3, 2008

This is mainly a note for Michael, a propos our conversations at various times about Scotus and the "lumen gloriae". I was reading in an article by Nielsen today where he mentioned a number of people at Paris all disputed about this and were incensed by the decree by the counil of Vienne "ad nostrum qui", which while directed against the Beghards and other such groups does contain implications for scholastic theology. Specifically, it does seem to affirm the necessity of the lumen gloriae:

Sunday, June 1, 2008

Here's a bit of Descartes on the scholastics that I came across, again from the objections and replies (GB 31 p.169):

"For more credence should be attached to what one man ... says, if he alleges that he has seen or learned something, than one should give to a thousand others who deny it, for the mere reason that it was imossible for them to see it or become aware of it. Thus at the discovery of the Antipodes the report of a few sailors who had circumnavigated the earth was believed rather than the thousands of philosophers who had not believed the earth to be round. Further, though they here cite as confirmation the Elements of Euclid, saying that everyone finds them easy to apprehend, I beg my critics to consider that among those men who are counted the most learned in the Philosophy of the Schools, there is not one in a hundred who understands them, and that there is not one in ten thosand who understands all the demonstrations of Apollonius or Archimedes, though they are as evident and as certain as those of Euclid."

I didn't realize the idea that until the so-called age of discovery everyone, especially intellectuals, thought the world was flat actually goes back this far. Just to mention, Scotus, in a passage I didn't bother posting he used the roundness of the world in an example comparing the certainty of demonstrations when comparing sciences like astronomy and astrology. The jab about geometry is interesting as well; I remember Albert the Great did a commentary on Euclid, but have no idea how it was taught later and in Descartes day, or if his criticism is justified.