* The UN Security Council held a briefing session on Myanmar on 16 December
2005. This was not a formal Security Council meeting, but a “consultation
of the whole” at which the exchange of views is informal and no decisions
are reached. The Council President for December 2005, Sir Emyr Jones Parry of
the UK, described the briefing by UN Undersecretary-General Ibrahim Gambari
as “very good and very welcome”, and he noted that “there
is a very good consensus in favour of action”.
* But there is in fact no consensus at all on what kind of action. The US favours
sanctions - trade, investment and financial - as well as the curtailment of
humanitarian aid unless strict criteria are met. The US urges other Western
countries, particularly the EU, to act tough.
* The EU and other Western countries on the other hand are not in favour of
the "nothing but sanctions" approach of the US, and generally support
a balanced policy of “targeted” sanctions (difficult though to identify
and apply effectively), continuing humanitarian assistance and quiet diplomacy
designed to promote contact and dialogue with the increasingly reclusive regime.
* The Security Council briefing was not the preferred US option. US policy has
for some time sought to get Myanmar on to the Council's formal agenda. The prospects
for effective action through the Council however are poor. It is not that the
necessary number of votes (9 out of 15) needed to put Burma on the agenda would
be difficult to obtain, only that China and Russia will resist what they see
as an attempt to manipulate the Council to the detriment of long established
agreements on Council competence.
* The release on 20 September 2005 of the report commissioned by Vaclav Havel
and Bishop Desmond Tutu recommending that the Council adopt a “threat
to the peace” Resolution under Article VII of the UN Charter, backed by
enforcement measures in the event of non-compliance, may not have helped the
US. It might initially have aroused Chinese and Russian suspicions of possible
US collusion with the American authors of the report. Later, they will have
realised that this was not the case.
* The US Congress and the US administration implicitly support the Havel-Tutu
view that the situation in Burma is a “threat to the peace” in the
region and indeed internationally. However, this view is not shared by other
governments, including all of Burma’s neighbours.
* Even so, an “Early Day Motion” in the UK House of Commons in favour
of the Havel-Tutu recommendations already has the support of 205 members. The
British Government has made no comment, except to say that it has read the Havel-Tutu
report. UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Professor Sergio Pinheiro told
a press conference in Bangkok on 18 November 2005 that he saw “no reason
to protest” about the report.
* Sir Emyr Jones Parry noted after the Council briefing session: “There
is an issue for the Security Council which is simple: is this [the situation
in Myanmar] a threat to international peace and security? A number of colleagues
in the Council argued, I thought persuasively, that the issues we are addressing
actually touch outside the borders of Myanmar. Others don't believe that.”
* This off-the-cuff assessment may be too simplistic. Governments in the UN
(including China and Russia) acknowledge that there are serious transnational
(cross-border) issues, including the flow of refugees, HIV/Aids and narcotics,
which need to be tackled by international action and cooperation and which if
left unattended may have destabilizing effects on society. It is the definition
of these issues as a "threat to the peace” meriting action under
Article VII of the UN Charter which a number of Council members at the briefing
are unwilling to accept.
* Detailed Council examination of these cross-border issues would be unwelcome
to countries like China and Thailand. It could prove a veritable Pandora's Box.
Thailand has been sharply criticised for its harsh and discriminatory treatment
of Burmese workers. Chinese and Thai criminal gangs are mainly responsible for
the provision of chemical precursors and finance for synthetic amphetamine production
from convenient safe-havens in Myanmar. Amphetamines are mainly sold in China
and Thailand.
* The Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar is due to visit
Burma this month on behalf of ASEAN which is increasingly impatient with the
slow pace of the constitutional process in Burma. The UN Secretary-General may
also pay a visit, in the hope of securing the return to Burma of his Special
Representative and the Human Rights Rapporteur. Neither Syed Hamid nor Kofi
Annan will wish to go unless there are real prospects of progress towards democratic
rule.
* The US will continue to press during 2006 for the situation in Burma to be
put on the Security Council agenda, but Chinese and Russian opposition to any
sanctions-oriented Resolution will remain. Other options could be open for the
Council to put Myanmar on their agenda without needing to resort to contentious
Resolutions, but these may not appeal to the US. The impasse could continue.
* The US has recently said that its relations with other countries in the region
may henceforth be governed by the attitude of these countries to the situation
in Burma. What this “test case” approach effectively means is that
countries in the region are now being quietly pressurized to adopt US values
and standards in dealing with Burma. China and India have probably already concluded
that the US are not all that serious.
* It would however seem that another front is now opening over Burma in South
East Asia. Burma is not held in Washington to have any serious intrinsic value
for US interests. Accordingly the US decision to mount a diplomatic offensive
may be seen in terms of the US commitment to make human rights a cornerstone
of US foreign policy generally and thus recover the moral high ground forfeited
because of reports in 2004 and 2005 of human rights abuses in Iraq, at Guantanamo
and elsewhere. At the end of the day, China's substantial interests in Burma
will prevail over current US ideology.
* The basic problem over Myanmar remains that serious human rights abuses should
ideally be dealt with by the UN Human Rights Commission, which unfortunately
lacks the necessary powers and whose replacement by the UN Human Rights Council
has strong international support. The Security Council has the clout to address
these issues, but it is proving very difficult to adapt existing precedents
and procedures to the situation in Burma.
* The better course may well lie through direct influence applied from Beijing,
New Delhi and ASEAN. Writes US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill
in the Wall Street Journal today: "It will take a concerted, coordinated
effort by the international community.......to persuade Burma's rulers to begin
and sustain a process of credible and full national reconciliation that the
country so desperately needs." Now if this is US policy, I would hope we
can all endorse it.