It has been an old custom for authors to offer to their Princes the
fruits of their studies in belles letters, from a persuasion that no work
can be published with propriety but under the auspices of the Emperor,
and that the knowledge of a Prince should be more general, and of the most
important kind, as its influence is felt so keenly by all his subjects.
We have many instances of the favorable reception which Augustus and his
illustrious successors conferred on the works presented to them; and this
encouragement of the Sovereign made the sciences flourish. The consideration
of Your Majesty's superior indulgence for attempts of this sort, induced
me to follow this example, and makes me at the same time almost forget
my own inability when compared with the ancient writers. One advantage,
however, I derive from the nature of this work, as it requires no elegance
of expression, or extraordinary share of genius, but only great care and
fidelity in collecting and explaining, for public use, the instructions
and observations of our old historians of military affairs, or those who
wrote expressly concerning them.

My design in this treatise is to exhibit in some order the peculiar
customs and usages of the ancients in the choice and discipline of their
new levies. Nor do I presume to offer this work.to Your Majesty from a
supposition that you are not acquainted with every part of its contents;
but that you may see that the same salutary dispositions and regulations
which your own wisdom prompts You to establish for the happiness of the
Empire, were formerly observed by the founders thereof; and that Your Majesty
may find with ease in this abridgement whatever is most useful on so necessary
and important a subject.

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BOOK I: The Selection and Training of New Levies
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THE ROMAN DISCIPLINE THE CAUSE OF THEIR GREATNESS

Victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage;
only skill and discipline will insure it. We find that the Romans owed
the conquest of the world to no other cause than continual military training,
exact observance of discipline in their camps and unwearied cultivation
of the other arts of war. Without these, what chance would the inconsiderable
numbers of the Roman armies have had against the multitudes of the Gauls?
Or with what success would their small size have been opposed to the prodigious
stature of the Germans? The Spaniards surpassed us not only in numbers,
but in physical strength. We were always inferior to the Africans in wealth
and unequal to them in deception and stratagem. And the Greeks, indisputably,
were far superior to us in skill in arts and all kinds of knowledge.

But to all these advantages the Romans opposed unusual care in the choice
of their levies and in their military training. They thoroughly understood
the importance of hardening them by continual practice, and of training
them to every maneuver that might happen in the line and in action. Nor
were they less strict in punishing idleness and sloth. The courage of a
soldier is heightened by his knowledge of his profession, and he only wants
an opportunity to execute what he is convinced he has been perfectly taught.
A handful of men, inured to war, proceed to certain victory, while on the
contrary numerous armies of raw and undisciplined troops are but multitudes
of men dragged to slaughter.

THE SELECTION OF RECRUITS

To treat our subject with some method, we shall first examine what provinces
or nations are to be preferred for supplying the armies with recruits.
It is certain that every country produces both brave men and cowards; but
it is equally as certain that some nations are naturally more warlike than
others, and that courage, as well as strength of body, depends greatly
upon the influence of the different climates.

We shall next examine whether the city or the country produces the best
and most capable soldiers. No one, I imagine, can doubt that the peasants
are the most fit to carry arms for they from their infancy have been exposed
to all kinds of weather and have been brought up to the hardest labor.
They are able to endure the greatest heat of the sun, are unacquainted
with the use of baths, and are strangers to the other luxuries of life.
They are simple, content with little, inured to all kinds of fatigue, and
prepared in some measure for a military life by their continual employment
in their country-work, in handling the spade, digging trenches and carrying
burdens. In cases of necessity, however, they are sometimes obliged to
make levies in the cities. And these men, as soon as enlisted, should be
taught to work on entrenchments, to march in ranks, to carry heavy burdens,
and to bear the sun and dust. Their meals should be coarse and moderate;
they should be accustomed to lie sometimes in the open air and sometimes
in tents. After this, they should be instructed in the use of their arms.
And if any long expedition is planned, they should be encamped as far as
possible from the temptations of the city. By these precautions their minds,
as well as their bodies, will properly be prepared for the service.

I realize that in the first ages of the Republic, the Romans always
raised their armies in the city itself, but this was at a time when there
were no pleasures, no luxuries to enervate them. The Tiber was then their
only bath, and in it they refreshed themselves after their exercises and
fatigues in the field by swimming. In those days the same man was both
soldier and farmer, but a farmer who, when occasion arose, laid aside his
tools and put on the sword. The truth of this is confirmed by the instance
of Quintius Cincinnatus, who was following the plow when they came to offer
him the dictatorship. The chief strength of our armies, then, should be
recruited from the country. For it is certain that the less a man is acquainted
with the sweets of life, the less reason he has to be afraid of death.

THE PROPER AGE FOR RECRUITS

If we follow the ancient practice, the proper time for enlisting youth
into the army is at their entrance into the age of puberty. At this time
instructions of every kind are more quickly imbibed and more lastingly
imprinted on the mind. Besides this, the indispensable military exercises
of running and leaping must be acquired before the limbs are too much stiffened
by age. For it is activity, improved by continual practice, which forms
the useful and good soldier. Formerly, says Sallust, the Roman youth, as
soon as they were of an age to carry arms, were trained in the Strictest
manner in their camps to all the fatigues and exercises of war. For it
is certainly better that a soldier, perfectly disciplined, should, through
emulation, repine at his not being yet arrived at a proper age for action,
than have the mortification of knowing it is past. A sufficient time is
also required for his instruction in the different branches of the service.
It is no easy matter to train the horse or foot archer, or to form the
legionary soldier to every part of the drill, to teach him not to quit
his post, to keep ranks, to take a proper aim and throw his missile weapons
with force, to dig trenches, to plant palisades, how to manage his shield,
glance off the blows of the enemy, and how to parry a stroke with dexterity.
A soldier, thus perfect in his business, so far from showing any backwardness
to engage, will be eager for an opportunity of signaling himself.

THEIR SIZE

We find the ancients very fond of procuring the tallest men they could
for the service, since the standard for the cavalry of the wings and for
the infantry of the first legionary cohorts was fixed at six feet, or at
least five feet ten inches. These requirements might easily be kept up
in those times when such numbers followed the profession of arms and before
it was the fashion for the flower of Roman youth to devote themselves to
the civil offices of state. But when necessity requires it, the height
of a man is not to be regarded so much as his strength; and for this we
have the authority of Homer, who tells us that the deficiency of stature
in Tydeus was amply compensated by his vigor and courage.

SIGNS OF DESIRABLE QUALITIES

Those employed to superintend new levies should be particularly careful
in examining the features of their faces, their eyes, and the make of their
limbs, to enable them to form a true judgment and choose such as are most
likely to prove good soldiers. For experience assures us that there are
in men, as well as in horses and dogs, certain signs by which their virtues
may be discovered. The young soldier, therefore, ought to have a lively
eye, should carry his head erect, his chest should be broad, his shoulders
muscular and brawny, his fingers long, his arms strong, his waist small,
his shape easy, his legs and feet rather nervous than fleshy. When all
these marks are found in a recruit, a little height may be dispensed with,
since it is of much more importance that a soldier should be strong than
tall.

TRADES PROPER FOR NEW LEVIES

In choosing recruits regard should be given to their trade. Fishermen,
fowlers, confectioners, weavers, and in general all whose professions more
properly belong to women should, in my opinion, by no means be admitted
into the service. On the contrary, smiths, carpenters, butchers, and huntsmen
are the most proper to be taken into it. On the careful choice of soldiers
depends the welfare of the Republic, and the very essence of the Roman
Empire and its power is so inseparably connected with this charge, that
it is of the highest importance not to be intrusted indiscriminately, but
only to persons whose fidelity can be relied on. The ancients considered
Sertorius' care in this point as one of the most eminent of his military
qualifications. The soldiery to whom the defense of the Empire is consigned
and in whose hands is the fortune of war, should, if possible, be of reputable
families and unexceptionable in their manners. Such sentiments as may be
expected in these men will make good soldiers. A sense of honor, by preventing
them from behaving ill, will make them victorious.

But what good can be expected from a man by nature a coward, though
ever so well disciplined or though he has served ever so many campaigns?
An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was
never yet made good by length of time; and we are now convinced by fatal
experience that this is the source of all our misfortunes. So many defeats
can only be imputed to the effects of a long peace which has made us negligent
and careless in the choice of our levies and to the inclination so prevalent
among the better sort in preferring the civil posts of the government to
the profession of arms and to the shameful conduct of the superintendents,
who, through interest or connivance, accept many men which those who are
obliged to furnish substitutes for the army choose to send, and admit such
men into the service as the masters themselves would not even keep for
servants. Thus it appears that a trust of such importance should be committed
to none but men of merit and integrity.

THE MILITARY MARK

The recruit, however, should not receive the military mark* as soon
as enlisted. He must first be tried if fit for service; whether he has
sufficient activity and strength; if he has capacity to learn his duty;
and whether he has the proper degree of military courage. For many, though
promising enough in appearance, are found very unfit upon trial. These
are to be rejected and replaced by better men; for it is not numbers, but
bravery which carries the day.

After their examination, the recruits should then receive the military
mark, and be taught the use of their arms by constant and daily exercise.
But this essential custom has been abolished by the relaxation introduced
by a long peace. We cannot now expect to find a man to teach what he never
learned himself. The only method, therefore, that remains of recovering
the ancient customs is by books, and by consulting the old historians.
But they are of little service to us in this respect, as they only relate
the exploits and events of wars, and take no notice of the objects of our
present enquiries, which they considered as universally known.

INITIAL TRAINING

The first thing the soldiers are to be taught is the military step,
which can only be acquired by constant practice of marching quick and together.
Nor is anything of more consequence either on the march or in the line
than that they should keep their ranks with the greatest exactness. For
troops who march in an irregular and disorderly manner are always in great
danger of being defeated. They should march with the common military step
twenty miles in five summer-hours, and with the full step, which is quicker,
twenty-four miles in the same number of hours. If they exceed this pace,
they no longer march but run, and no certain rate can be assigned.

But the young recruits in particular must be exercised in running, in
order to charge the enemy with great vigor; occupy, on occasion, an advantageous
post with greater expedition, and prevent the enemy in their designs upon
the same; that they may, when sent to reconnoiter, advance with speed,
return with greater celerity and more easily come up with the enemy in
a pursuit.

Leaping is another very necessary exercise, to enable them to pass ditches
or embarrassing eminences of any kind without trouble or difficulty. There
is also another very material advantage to be derived from these exercises
in time of action; for a soldier who advances with his javelin,.running
and leaping, dazzles the eyes of his adversary, strikes him with terror,
and gives him the fatal stroke before he has time to put himself on his
defense. Sallust, speaking of the excellence of Pompey the Great in these
particulars, tells us that he disputed the superiority in leaping with
the most active, in running with the most swift, and in exercises of strength
with the most robust. Nor would he ever have been able to have opposed
Serrorius with success, if he had not prepared both himself and his soldiers
for action by continual exercises of this sort.

TO LEARN TO SWIM

Every young soldier, without exception, should in the summer months
be taught to swim; for it is sometimes impossible to pass rivers on bridges,
but the flying and pursuing army both are often obliged to swim over them.
A sudden melting of snow or fall of rain often makes them overflow their
banks, and in such a situation, the danger is as great from ignorance in
swimming as from the enemy. The ancient Romans, therefore, perfected in
every branch of the military art by a continued series of wars and perils,
chose the Field of Mars as the most commodious for their exercises on account
of its vicinity to the Tiber, that the youth might therein wash off the
sweat and dust, and refresh themselves after their fatigues by swimming.
The cavalry also as well as the infantry, and even the horses and the servants
of the army should be accustomed to this exercise, as they are all equally
liable to the same accidents.

THE POST EXERCISE

We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other
exercises, they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers
woven with willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden
swords double the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these
at the post both morning and afternoon.

This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to soldiers, but
also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished himself
in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of exercise.
Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the
height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit
was exercised with the above mentioned arms, as it were with the common
shield and sword, sometimes aiming At the head or face, sometimes at the
sides, at others endeavoring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed
in what manner to advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage
of his adversary; but was thus above all particularly cautioned not to
lay himself open to his antagonist while aiming his stroke at him.

NOT TO CUT, BUT TO THRUST WITH THE SWORD

They were likewise taught not to cut but to thrust with their swords.
For the Romans not only made a jest of those who fought with the edge of
that weapon, but always found them an easy conquest. A stroke with the
edges, though made with ever so much force, seldom kills, as the vital
parts of the body are defended both by the bones and armor. On the contrary,
a stab, though it penetrates but two inches, is generally fatal. Besides
in the attitude of striking, it is impossible to avoid exposing the right
arm and side; but on the other hand, the body is covered while a thrust
is given, and the adversary receives the point before he sees the sword.
This was the method of fighting principally used by the Romans, and their
reason for exercising recruits with arms of such a weight at first was,
that when they came to carry the common ones so much lighter, the greater
difference might enable them to act with greater security and alacrity
in time of action.

THE DRILL CALLED ARMATURA

The new levies also should be taught by the masters at arms the system
of drill called armatura, as it is still partly kept up among us. Experience
even at this time convinces us that soldiers, perfect therein, are of the
most service in engagements. And they afford certain proofs of the importance
and effects of discipline in the difference we see between those properly
trained in this branch of drill and the other troops. The old Romans were
so conscious of its usefulness that they rewarded the masters at arms with
a double allowance of provision. The soldiers who were backward in this
drill were punished by having their allowance in barley. Nor did they receive
it as usual, in wheat, until they had, in the presence of the prefect,
tribunes, or other principal officers of the legion, showed sufficient
proofs of their knowledge of every part of their study.

No state can either be happy or secure that is remiss and negligent
in the discipline of its troops. For it is not profusion of riches or excess
of luxury that can influence our enemies to court or respect us. This can
only be effected by the terror of our arms. It is an observation of Cato
that. misconduct in the common affairs of life may be retrieved, but that
it is quite otherwise in war, where errors are fatal and without remedy,
and are followed by immediate punishment. For the consequences of engaging
an enemy, without skill or courage, is that part of the army is left on
the field of battle, and those who remain receive such an impression from
their defeat that they dare not afterwards look the enemy in the face.

THE USE OF MISSILE WEAPONS

Besides the aforementioned exercise of the recruits at the post, they
were furnished with javelins of greater weight than common, which they
were taught to throw at the same post. And the masters at arms were very
careful to instruct them how to cast them with a proper aim and force.
This practice strengthens the arm and makes the soldier a good marksman.

THE USE OF THE BOW

A third or fourth of the youngest and fittest soldiers should also be
exercised at the post with bows and arrows made for that purpose only.
The masters for this branch must be chosen with care and must apply themselves
diligently to teach the men to hold the bow in a proper position, to bend
it with strength, to keep the left hand steady. to draw the right with
skill, to direct both the attention and the eye to the object, and to take
their aim with equal certainty either on foot or on horseback. But this
is not to be acquired without great application, nor to be retained without
daily exercise and practice.

The utility of good archers in action is evidently demonstrated by Cato
in his treatise on military discipline. To the institution of a body of
troops of this sort Claudius owed his victory over an enemy who, till that
time, had constantly been superior to him. Scipio Africanus, before his
battle with the Numantines, who had made a Roman army ignominiously pass
under the yoke, thought he could have no likelihood of success except by
mingling a number of select archers with every century.

THE SLING

Recruits are to be taught the art of throwing stones both with the hand
and sling. The inhabitants of the Balearic Islands are said to have been
the inventors of slings, and to have managed them with surprising dexterity,
owing to the manner of bringing up their children. The children were not
allowed to have their food by their mothers till they had first struck
it with their sling. Soldiers, notwithstanding their defensive armor, are
often more annoyed by the round stones from the sling than by all the arrows
of the enemy. Stones kill without mangling the body, and the contusion
is mortal without loss of blood. It is universally known the ancients employed
slingers in all their engagements. There is the greater reason for instructing
all troops, without exception, in this exercise, as the sling cannot be
reckoned any incumbrance, and often is of the greatest service, especially
when they are obliged to engage in stony places, to defend a mountain or
an eminence, or to repulse an enemy at the attack of a castle or city.

THE LOADED JAVELIN

The exercise of the loaded javelins, called martiobarbuli, must not
be omitted. We formerly had two legions in lllyricum, consisting of six
thousand men each, which from their extraordinary dexterity and skill in
the use of these weapons were discingui.shed by the same appellation. They
supported for a long time the weight of all the wars and distinguished
themselves so remarkably that the Emperors Diocletian and Maximian on their
accession honored them with the titles of Jovian and Herculean and preferred
them before all the other legions. Every soldier carries five of these
javelins in the hollow of his shield. And thus the legionary soldiers seem
to supply the place of archers, for they wound both the men and horses
of the enemy before they come within reach of the common missile weapons.

TO BE TAUGHT TO VAULT

The ancients strictly obliged both the veteran soldiers and recruits
to a constant practice of vaulting. It has indeed reached our cimes, although
little regard is paid to it at present. They had wooden horses for that
purpose placed in winter under cover and in summer in the field. The young
soldiers were taught to vault on them at first without arms, afterwards
completely armed. And such was their attention to this exercise that they
were accustomed to mount and dismount on either side indifferently, with
their drawn swords or lances in their hands. By assiduous practice in the
leisure of peace, their cavalry was brought to such perfection of discipline
that they mounted their horses in an instant even amidst the confusion
of sudden and unexpected alarms.

AND TO CARRY BURDENS

To accustom soldiers to carry burdens is also an essential part of discipline.
Recruits in particular should be obliged frequently to carry a weight of
not less than sixty pounds (exclusive of their arms), and to march with
it in the ranks. This is because on difficult expeditions they often find
themselves under the necessity of carrying their provisions as well as
their arms. Nor will they find this troublesome when inured to it by custom,
which makes everything easy. Our troops in ancient times were a proof of
this, and Virgil has remarked it in the following lines:

The Roman soldiers, bred in war's alarms,
Bending with unjust loads and heavy arms,
Cheerful their toilsome marches undergo,
And pitch their sudden camp before the foe.

THE ARMS OF THE ANCIENTS

The manner of arming the troops comes next under consideration. But
the method of the ancients no longer is followed. For though after the
example of the Goths, the Alans and the Huns, we have made some improvements
in the arms of the cavalry, yet it is plain the infantry are entirely defenseless.
From the foundation of the city till the reign of the Emperor Gratian,
the foot wore cuirasses and helmets. But negligence and sloth having by
degrees introduced a total relaxation of discipline, the soldiers began
to think their armor too heavy, as they seldom put it on. They first requested
leave from the Emperor to lay aside the cuirass and afterwards the helmet.
In consequence of this, our troops in their engagements with the Goths
were often overwhelmed with their showers of arrows. Nor was the necessity
of obliging the infantry to resume their cuirasses and helmets discovered,
notwithstanding such repeated defeats, which brought on the destruction
of so many great cities.

Troops, defenseless and exposed to all the weapons of the enemy, are
more disposed to fly than fight. What can be expected from a foot-archer
without cuirass or helmet, who cannot hold at once his bow and shield;
or from the ensigns whose bodies are naked, and who cannot at the same
time carry a shield and the colors? The foot soldier finds the weight of
a cuirass and even of a helmet intolerable. This is because he is so seldom
exercised and rarely puts them on.

But the case would be quite different, were they even heavier than they
are, if by constant practice he had been accustomed to wear them. But it
seems these very men, who cannot support the weight of the ancient armor,
think nothing of exposing themselves without defense to wounds and death,
or, which is worse, to the shame of being made prisoners, or of betraying
their country by flight; and thus to avoid an inconsiderable share of exercise
and fatigue, suffer themselves ignominiously to be cut in pieces. With
what propriety could the ancients call the infantry a wall, but that in
some measure they resembled it by the complete armor of the legionary soldiers
who had shields, helmets, cuirasses, and greaves of iron on the right leg;
and the archers who had gauntlets on the left arm. These were the defensive
arms of the legionary soldiers. Those who fought in the first line of their
respective legions were called principes, in the second hastati, and in
third triarii.

The triarii, according to their method of discipline, rested in time
of action on one knee, under cover of their shields, so that in this position
they might be less exposed to the darts of the enemy than if they stood
upright; and also, when there was a necessity for bringing them up, that
they might be fresh, in full vigor and charge with the greater impetuosity.
There have been many instances of their gaining a complete victory after
the entire defeat of both the principes and hastati.

The ancients had likewise a body of light infantry, slingers, and ferentarii
(the light troops), who were generally posted on the wings and began the
engagement. The most active and best disciplined men were selected for
this service; and as their number was not very great, they easily retired
in case of a repulse through the intervals of the legion, without thus
occasioning the least disorder in the line.

The Pamonian leather caps worn by our soldiers were formerly introduced
with a different design. The ancients obliged the men to wear them at all
times so that being constantly accustomed to have the head covered they
might be less sensible of the weight of the helmet.

As to the missile weapons of the infantry, they were javelins headed
with a triangular sharp iron, eleven inches or a foot long, and were called
piles. When once fixed in the shield it was impossible to draw them out,
and when thrown with force and skill, they penetrated the cuirass without
difficulty. At present they are seldom used by us, but are the principal
weapon of the barbarian heavy-armed foot. They are called bebrae, and every
man carries two or three of them to battle.

It must be observed that when the soldiers engage with the javelin,
the left foot should be advanced, for, by this attitude the force required
to throw it is considerably increased. On the contrary, when they are close
enough to use their piles and swords, the right foot should be advanced,
so that the body may present less aim to the enemy, and the right arm be
nearer and in a more advantageous position for striking. Hence it appears
that it is as necessary to provide soldiers with defensive arms of every
kind as to instruct them in the use of offensive ones. For it is certain
a man will fight with greater courage and confidence when he finds himself
properly armed for defense.

ENTRENCHED CAMPS

Recruits are to be instructed in the manner of entrenching camps, there
being no part of discipline so necessary and useful as this. For in a camp,
well chosen and entrenched, the troops both day and night lie secure within
their works, even though in view of the enemy. It seems to resemble a fortified
city which they can build for their safety wherever they please. But this
valuable art is now entirely lost, for it is long since any of our camps
have been fortified either with trenches or palisades. By this neglect
our forces have been often surprised by day and night by the enemy's cavalry
and suffered very severe losses. The importance of this custom appears
not only from the danger to which troops are perpetually exposed who encamp
without such precautions, but from the distressful situation of an army
that, after receiving a check in the field, finds itself without retreat
and consequently at the mercy of the enemy. A camp, especially in the neighborhood
of an enemy, must be chosen with great care. Its situation should be strong
by nature, and there should be plenty of wood, forage and water. If the
army is to continue in it any considerable time, attention must be had
to the salubrity of the place. The camp must not be commanded by any higher
grounds from whence it might be insulted or annoyed by the enemy, nor must
the location be liable to floods which would expose the army to great danger.
The dimensions of the camps must be determined by the number of troops
and quantity of baggage, that a large army may have room enough, and that
a small one may not be obliged to extend itself beyond its proper ground.
The form of the camps must be determined by the site of the country, in
conformity to which they must be square, triangular or oval. The Praetorian
gate should either front the east or the enemy. In a temporary camp it
should face the route by which the army is to march. Within this gate the
tents of the first centuries or cohorts are pitched, and the dragons* and
other ensigns planted.

The Decumane gate is directly opposite to the Praetorian in the rear
of the camp, and through this the soldiers are conducted to the place appointed
for punishment or execution.

There are two methods of entrenching a camp. When the danger is not
imminent, they carry a slight ditch round the whole circuit, only nine
feet broad and seven deep. With the turf taken from this they make a kind
of wall or breastwork three feet high on the inner side of the ditch. But
where there is reason to be apprehensive of attempts of the enemy, the
camp must be surrounded with a regular ditch twelve feet broad and nine
feet deep perpendicular from the surface of the ground. A parapet is then
raised on the side next the camp, of the height of four feet, with hurdles
and fascines properly covered and secured by the earth taken out of the
ditch. From these dimensions the interior height of the intrenchment will
be found to be thirteen feet, and the breadth of the ditch twelve. On the
top of the whole are planted strong palisades which the soldiers carry
constantly with them for this purpose. A sufficient number of spades, pickaxes,
wicker baskets and tools of all kinds are to be provided for these works.

There is no difficulty in carrying on the fortifications of a camp when
no enemy is in sight. But if the enemy is near, all the cavalry and half
the infantry are to be drawn up in order of battle to cover the rest of
the troops at work on the entrenchments and be ready to receive the enemy
if they offer to attack. The centuries are employed by turns on the work
and are regularly called to the relief by a crier till the whole is completed.
It is then inspected and measured by the centurions, who punish such as
have been indolent or negligent. This is a very important point in the
discipline of young soldiers, who when properly trained to it will be able
in an emergency to fortify their camp with skill and expedition.

EVOLUTIONS

No part of drill is more essential in action than for soldiers to keep
their ranks with the greatest exactness, without opening or closing too
much. Troops too much crowded can never fight as they ought, and only embarrass
one another. If their order is too open and loose, they give the enemy
an opportunity of penetrating. Whenever this happens and they are attacked
in the rear, universal disorder and confusion are inevitable. Recruits
should therefore be constantly in the field, drawn up by the roll and formed
at first into a single rank. They should learn to dress in a straight line
and to keep an equal and just distance between man and man. They must then
be ordered to double the rank, which they must perform very quickly, and
instantly cover their file leaders. In the next place, they are to double
again and form four deep. And then the triangle or, as it is commonly called,
the wedge, a disposition found very serviceable in action. They must be
taught to form the circle or orb; for well-disciplined troops, after being
broken by the enemy, have thrown themselves into this position and have
thereby prevented the total rout of the army. These evolutions, often practiced
in the field of exercise, will be found easy in execution on actual service.

MONTHLY MARCHES

It was a constant custom among the old Romans, confirmed by the Ordinances
of Augustus and Hadrian, to exercise both cavalry and infantry three times
in a month by marches of a certain length. The foot were obliged to march
completely armed the distance of ten miles from the camp and return, in
the most exact order and with the military step which they changed and
quickened on some part of the march. Their cavalry likewise, in troops
and properly armed, performed the same marches and were exercised at the
same time in their peculiar movement and evolutions; sometimes, as if pursuing
the enemy, sometimes retreating and returning again with greater impetuosity
to the charge. They made these marches not in plain and even ground only,
but both cavalry and infantry were ordered into difficult and uneven places
and to ascend or descend mountains, to prepare them for all kinds of accidents
and familiarize them with the different maneuvers that the various situations
of a country may require.

CONCLUSION

These military maxims and instructions, invincible Emperor, as a proof
of my devotion and zeal for your service, I have carefully collected from
the works of all the ancient authors on the subject. My design herein is
to point out the certain method of forming good and serviceable armies,
which can only be accomplished by an exact imitation of the ancients in
their care in the choice and discipline of their levies. Men are not degenerated
in point of courage, nor are the countries that produced the Lacedaemonians,
the Athenians, the Marsians, the Samnites, the Peligni and even the Romans
themselves, yet exhausted. Did not the Epirots acquire in former times
a great reputation in war? Did not the Macedonians and Thessalians, after
conquering the Persians, penetrate even into India? And it is well known
that the warlike dispositions of the Dacians, Moesians and Thracians gave
rise to the fable that Mars was born among them.

To pretend to enumerate the different nations so formidable of old,
all which now are subject to the Romans, would be tedious. But the security
established by long peace has altered their dispositions, drawn them off
from military to civil pursuits and infused into them a love of idleness
and ease. Hence a relaxation of military discipline insensibly ensued,
then a neglect of it, and it sunk at last into entire oblivion. Now will
it appear surprising that this alteration should have happened in latter
times, if we consider that the peace, which lasted about twenty years or
somewhat more after the first Punic war, enervated the Romans, before everywhere
victorious, by idleness and neglect of discipline to such a degree, that
in the second Punic war they were not able to keep the field against Hannibal.
At last, after the defeat of many consuls and the loss of many officers
and armies, they were convinced that the revival of discipline was the
only road to victory and thereby recovered their superiority. The necessity,
therefore, of discipline cannot be too often inculcated, as well as the
strict attention requisite in the choice and training of new levies. It
is also certain that it is a much less expense to a State to train its
own subjects to arms than to take foreigners into its pay.

* This mark was imprinted on the hands of the soldiers, either with
a hot iron, or in some other manner. It was indelible.

* The dragon was the particular ensign of each cohort.
=================
PREFACE TO BOOK II
=================
To the Emperor Valentinian

Such a continued series of victories and triumphs proved incontestably
Your Majesty's full and perfect knowledge of the military discipline of
the ancients. Success in any profession is the most certain mark of skill
in it. By a greatness of mind. above human comprehension Your Majesty condescends
to seek instruction from the ancients, notwithstanding your own recent
exploits surpass antiquity itself. On receiving Your Majesty's orders to
continue this abridgement, not so much for your instruction as convenience,
I knew not how to reconcile my devotion to Your commands with the respect
due to Your Majesty. Would it not be the greatest height of presumption
to pretend to mention the art of war to the Lord and Master of the world
and the Conqueror of all the barbarous nations, unless it were to describe
his own actions? But disobedience to the will of so great a Prince would
be both highly criminal and dangerous. My obedience, therefore, made me
presumptuous, from the apprehensions of appearing more so by a contrary
conduct. And in this I was not a little encouraged by the late instance
of Your Majesty's indulgence. My treatise on the choice and discipline
of new levies met with a favorable reception from Your Majesty, and since
a work succeeded so well, composed of my own accord, I can have no fears
for one undertaken by your own express commands.

=============================
BOOK II: The Organization of the Legion
=============================

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

The military establishment consists of three parts, the cavalry, infantry
and marine. The wings of cavalry were so called from their similitude to
wings in their extension on both sides of the main body for its protection.
They are now called vexillations from the kind of standards peculiar to
them. The legionary horse are bodies particularly annexed to each legion,
and of a different kind; and on their model were organized the cavalry
called Ocreati, from the light boots they wear. The fleet consists of two
divisions, the one of men of war called Liburnae, and the other of armed
sloops. The cavalry are designed for plains. Fleets are employed for the
protection of seas and rivers. The infantry are proper for the defense
of eminences, for the garrisons of cities and are equally serviceable in
plain and in uneven ground. The latter, therefore, from their facility
of acting everywhere, are certainly the most useful and necessary troops
to a state exclusively of the consideration of their being maintained at
a less expense. The infantry are divided into two corps, the legions and
auxiliaries, the latter of which are furnished by allies or confederates.
The peculiar strength of the Romans always consisted in the excellent organization
of their legions. They were so denominated ab eligendo, from the care and
exactness used in the choice of the soldiers. The number of legionary troops
in an army is generally much more considerable than that of the auxiliaries.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LEGIONS AND AUXILIARIES

The Macedonians, the Greeks and the Dardanians formed their troops into
phalanxes of eight thousand men each. The Gauls, Celtiberians and many
other barbarous nations divided their armies into bodies of six thousand
each. The Romans have their legions usually six thousand strong, sometImes
more.

We shall now explain the difference between the legions and the auxiliaries.
The latter are hired corps of foreigners assembled from different parts
of the Empire, made up of different numbers, without knowledge of one another
or any tie of affection. Each nation has its own peculiar discipline, customs
and manner of fighting. Little can be expected from forces so dissimilar
in every respect, since it is one of the most essential points in military
undertakings that the whole army should be put in motion and governed by
one and the same order. But it is almost impossible for men to act in concert
under such varying and unsettled circumstances. They are, however, when
properly trained and disciplined, of material service and are always joined
as light troops with the legions in the line. And though the legions do
not place their principal dependence on them, yet they look on them as
a very considerable addition to their strength.

But the complete Roman legion, in its own peculiar cohorts, contains
within itself the heavy-armed foot, that is: the principes, hastati, triarii,
and antefignani, the lightarmed foot, consisting of the ferentarii, archers,
slingers, and balistarii, together with the legionary cavalry incorporated
with it. These bodies, all actuated with the same spirit, are united inseparably
in their various dispositions for forming, encamping and fighting. Thus
the legion is compact and perfect in all its parts and, without any foreign
assistance, has always been superior to any force that could be brought
against it. The Roman greatness is a proof of the excellence of their legions,
for with them they always defeated whatever numbers of the enemy they thought
fit, or their circumstances gave them an opportunIty to engage.

CAUSES OF DECAY OF THE LEGION

The name of the legion remains indeed to this day in our armies, but
its strength and substance are gone, since by the neglect of our predecessors,
honors and preferments, which were formerly the recompenses of merit and
long services, were to be attained only by interest and favor. Care is
no longer taken to replace the soldiers, who after serving their full time,
have received their discharges. The vacancies continually happening by
sickness, discharges, desertion and various other casualties, if not supplied
every year or even every month, must in time disable the most numerous
army. Another cause of the weakness of our legions is that in them the
soldiers find the duty hard, the arms heavy, the rewards distant and the
discipline severe. To avoid these inconveniences, the young men enlist
in the auxiliaries, where the service is less laborious and they have reason
to expect more speedy recompenses.

Cato the Elder, who was often Consul and always victorious at the head
of the armies, believed he should do his country more essential service
by writing on military affairs, than by all his exploits in the field.
For the consequences of brave actions are only temporary, while whatever
is committed to writing for public good is of lasting benefit. Several
others have followed his example, particularly Frontinus, whose elaborate
works on this subject were so well received by the Emperor Trajan. These
are the authors whose maxims and institutions I have undertaken to abridge
in the most faithful and conclse manner.

The expense of keeping up good or bad troops is the same; but it depends
wholly on You, most August Emperor, to recover the excellent discipline
of the ancients and to correct the abuses of later times. This is a reformation
the advantages of which will be equally felt by ourselves and our posterity.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGION

All our writers agree that never more than two legions, besides auxiliaries,
were sent under the command of each consul against the most numerous armies
of the enemies. Such was the dependence on their discipline and resolution
that this number was thought sufficient for any war they were engaged in.
I shall therefore explain the organization of the ancient legion according
to the military constitution. But if the description appear obscure or
imperfect, it is not to be imputed to me, but to the difficulty of the
subject itself, which is therefore to be examined with the greater attention.
A prince, skilled himself in military affairs, has it in his power to make
himself invincible by keeping up whatever number of well disciplined forces
he thinks proper.

The recruits having thus been carefully chosen with proper attention
to their persons and dispositions, and having been daily exercised for
the space of four months at least, the legion is formed by the command
and under the auspices of the Emperor. The military mark, which is indelible,
is first imprinted on the hands of the new levies, and as their names are
inserted in the roll of the legions they take the usual oath, called the
military oath. They swear by God, by Christ and by the Holy Ghost; and
by the Majesty of the Emperor who, after God, should be the chief object
of the love and veneration of mankind. For when he has once received the
title of August, his subjects are bound to pay him the most sincere devotion
and homage, as the representative of God on earth. And every man, whether
in a private or military station, serves God in serving him faithfully
who reigns by His authority. The soldiers, therefore, swear they will obey
the Emperor willingly and implicitly in all his commands, that they will
never desert and will always be ready to sacrifice their lives for the
Roman Empire.

The legion should consist of ten cohorts, the first of which exceeds
the others both in number and quality of its soldiers, who are selected
to serve in it as men of some family and education. This cohort has the
care of the eagle, the chief ensign in the Roman armies and the standard
of the whole legion, as well as of the images of the emperors which are
always considered as sacred. It consists of eleven hundred and five foot
and one hundred and thirty-two horse cuirassiers, and is distinguished
by the name of the Millarian Cohort. It is the head of the legion and is
always first formed on the right of the first line when the legion draws
up in order of battle.

The second cohort contains five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six
horse, and is called the Quingentarian Cohort. The third is composed of
five hundred and fiftyfive foot and sixty-six horse, generally chosen men,
on account of its situation in the center of the first line. The fourth
consists of the same number of five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six
horse. The fifth has likewise five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six
horse, which should be some of the best men, being posted on the left flank
as the first cohort is on the right. These five cohorts compose the first
line.

The sixth includes five hundred and fifty-five foot and sixty-six horse,
which should be the flower of the young soldiers as it draws up in the
rear of the eagle and the images of the emperors, and on the right of the
second line. The seventh contains five hundred and fifty-five foot and
sixty-six horse. The eighth is composed of five hundred and fifty-five
foot and sixty-six horse, all selected troops, as it occupies the center
of the second line. The ninth has five hundred and fifty-five foot and
sixty-six horse. The tenth consists of the same number of five hundred
and fifty-five foot and sixty-six horse and requires good men, as it closes
the left flank of the second line. These ten cohorts form the complete
legions, consisting in the whole of six thousand one hundred foot and seven
hundred and twenty-six horses. A legion should never be composed of a less
number of men, but it is sometimes stronger by the addition of other Millarian
Cohorts.

THE OFFICERS OF THE LEGION

Having shown the ancient establishment of the legion, we shall now explain
the names of the principal soldiers or, to use the proper term, the officers,
and their ranks according to the present rolls of the legions. The first
tribune is appointed by the express commission and choice of the Emperor.
The second tribune rises to that rank by length of service. The tribunes
are so called from their command over the soldiers, who were at first levied
by Romulus out of the different tribes. The officers who in action commanded
the orders or divisions are called Ordinarii. The Augustales were added
by Augustus to the Ordinarii; and the Flaviales were appointed by Flavius
Vespasian to double the number of the Augustales. The eagle-bearers and
the image-bearers are those who carry the eagles and images of the Emperors.
The Optiones are subaltern officers, so denominated from their being selected
by the option of their superior officers, to do their duty as their substitutes
or lieutenants in case of sickness or other accident. The ensign-bearers
carry the ensigns and are called Draconarii. The Tesserarii deliver the
parole and the orders of the general to the different messes of the soldiers.
The Campignei or Antefignani are those whose duty it is to keep the proper
exercises and discipline among the troops. The Metatores are ordered before
the army to fix on the ground for its encampments. The Beneficiarii are
so named from their owing their promotion to the benefit or interest of
the Tribunes. The Librarii keep the legionary accounts. The Tubicines,
Cornicines, and Buccinatores derive their appellations from blowing the
trumpet, cornet, and buccina. Those who, expert in their exercises, receive
a double allowance of provisions, are called Armaturae Duplares, and those
who have but a single portion, Simplares. The Mensores mark out the ground
by measure for the tents in an encampment, and assign the troops their
respective quarters in garrison. The Torquati, so denominated from the
gold collars given them in reward for their bravery, had besides this honor
different allowances. Those who received double were called Torquati Duplares,
and those who had only single, Simplares. There were, for the same reason,
Candidatii Duplares, and Candidatii Simplares. These are the principal
soldiers or officers distinguished by their rank and privileges thereto
annexed. The rest are called Munifices, or working soldiers, from their
being obliged to every kind of military work without exception. Formerly
it was the rule that the first Princeps of the legion should be promoted
regularly to the rank of Centurion of the Primiple. He not only was entrusted
with the eagle but commanded four centuries, that is, four hundred men
in the first line. As head of the legion he had appointments of great honor
and profit. The first Hastatus had the command of two centuries or two
hundred men in the second line, and is now called Ducenarius. The Princeps
of the first cohort commanded a century and a half, that is, one hundred
and fifty men, and kept in a great measure the general detail of the legion.
The second Hastatus had likewise a century and a half, or one hundred and
fifty men. The first Triarius had the command of one hundred men. Thus
the ten centuries of the first cohort were commanded by five Ordinarii,
who by the ancient establishment enjoyed great honors and emoluments that
were annexed to this rank in order to inspire the soldiers of the legions
with emulation to attain such ample and considerable rewards. They had
also Centurions appointed to each century, now called Centenarii and Decani,
who commanded ten men, now called heads of messes. The second cohort had
five Centurions; and all the rest to the tenth inclusively the same number.
In the whole legion there were fiftyfive.

Lieutenants of consular dignity were formerly sent to command in the
armies under the general, and their authority extended over both the legions
and auxiliaries in peace and war. Instead of these officers, persons of
high rank are now substituted with the title of Masters of the Forces.
They are not limited to the command of two legions only, but have often
a greater number. But the peculiar officer of the legion was the Praefect,
who was always a count of the first order. On him the chief command devolved
in the absence of the lieutenant. The Tribunes, Centurions, and all the
soldiers in general were under his orders: He gave out the parole and order
for the march and for the guards. And if a soldier committed a crime, by
his authority the Tribune adjudged him to punishment. He had charge of
the arms, horses, clothing and provisions. It was also his duty to keep
both the legionary horse and foot in daily exercise and to maintain the
strictest discipline. He ought to be a careful and diligent officer, as
the sole charge of forming the legion to regularity and obedience depended
on him and the excellence of the soldiers redounded entirely to his own
honor and credit.

The Praefect of the camp, though inferior in rank to the former, had
a post of no small importance. The position of the camp, the direction
of the entrenchments, the inspection of the tents or huts of the soldiers
and the baggage were comprehended in his province. His authority extended
over the sick, and the physicians who had the care of them; and he regulated
the expenses relative thereto. He had the charge of providing carriages,
bathorses and the proper tools for sawing and cutting wood, digging trenches,
raising parapets, sinking wells and bringing water into the camp. He likewise
had the care of furnishing the troops with wood and straw, as well as the
rams, onagri, balistae and all the other engines of war under his direction.
This post was always conferred on an officer of great skill, experience
and long service, and who consequently was capable of instructing others
in those branches of the profession in which he had distinguished himself.

THE PRAEFECT OF THE WORKMEN

The legion had a train of joiners, masons, carpenters, smiths, painters,
and workmen of every kind for the construction of barracks in the winter-camps
and for making or repairing the wooden towers, arms, carriages and the
various sorts of machines and engines for the attack or defense of places.
They had also traveling workshops in which they made shields, cuirasses,
helmets, bows, arrows, javelins and offensive and defensive arms of all
kinds. The ancients made it their chief care to have every thing for the
service of the army within the camp. They even had a body of miners who,
by working under ground and piercing the foundations of walls, according
to the practice of the Beffi, penetrated into the body of a place. All
these were under the direction of the officer called the praefect of the
workmen.

THE TRIBUNE OF THE SOLDIERS

We have observed that the legions had ten cohorts, the first of which,
called the Millarian Cohort, was composed of men selected on account of
their circumstances, birth, education, person and bravery. The tribune
who commanded them was likewise distinguished for his skill in his exercises,
for the advantages of his person and the integrity of his manners. The
other cohorts were commanded, according to the Emperor's pleasure, either
by tribunes or other officers commissioned for that purpose. In former
times the discipline was so strict that the tribunes or officers abovementioned
not only caused the troops under their command to be exercised daily in
their presence, but were themselves so perfect in their military exercises
as to set them the example. Nothing does so much honor to the abilities
or application of the tribune as the appearance and discipline of the soldiers,
when their apparel is neat and clean, their arms bright and in good order
and when they perform their exercises and evolutions with dexterity.

CENTURIES AND ENSIGNS OF THE FOOT

The chief ensign of the whole legion is the eagle and is carried by
the eagle-bearer. Each cohort has also its own peculiar ensign, the Dragon,
carried by the Draconarius. The ancients, knowing the ranks were easily
disordered in the confusion of action, divided the cohorts into centuries
and gave each century an ensign inscribed with the number both of the cohort
and century so that the men keeping it in sight might be prevented from
separating from their comrades in the greatest tumults. Besides the centurions,
now called centenarii, were distinguished by different crests on their
helmets, to be more easily known by the soldiers of their respective centuries.
These precautions prevented any mistake, as every century was guided not
only by its own ensign but likewise by the peculiar form of the helmet
of its commanding officers. The centuries were also subdivided into messes
of ten men each who lay in the same tent and were under orders and inspection
of a Decanus or head of the mess. These messes were also called Maniples
from their constant custom of fighting together in the same company or
division.

LEGIONARY TROOPS OF HORSE

As the divisions of the infantry are called centuries, so those of the
cavalry are called troops. A troop consists of thirty-two men and is commanded
by a Decurion. Every century has its ensign and every troop its Standard.
The centurion in the infantry is chosen for his size, strength and deXterity
in throwing his missile weapons and for his skill in the use of his sword
and shield; in short for his expertness in all the exercises. He is to
be vigilant, temperate, accive and readier to execute the orders he receives
than to talk; Strict in exercising and keeping up proper discipline among
his soldiers, in obliging them to appear clean and well-dressed and to
have their arms constantly rubbed and bright. In like manner the Decurion
is to be preferred to the command of a troop for his activity and address
in mounting his horse completely armed; for his skill in riding and in
the use of the lance and bow; for his attencion in forming his men to all
the evolutions of the cavaIry; and for his care in obliging them to keep
their cuirasses, lances and helmets always bright and in good order. The
splendor of the arms has no inconsiderable effect in striking terror into
an enemy. Can that man be reckoned a good soldier who through negligence
suffers his arms to be spoiled by dirt and rust? In short, it is the duty
of the Decurion to be attentive to whatever concerns the health or discipline
of the men or horses in his troop.

DRAWING UP A LEGION IN ORDER OF BATTLE

We shall exemplify the manner of drawing up an army in order of battle
in the instance of one legion, which may serve for any number. The cavalry
are posted on the wings. The infantry begin to form on a line with the
:first cohort on the right. The second cohort draws up on the left of the
first; the third occupies the center; the fourth is posted next; and the
fifth closes the left flank. The ordinarii, the other officers and the
soldiers of the first line, ranged before and round the ensigns, were called
the principes. They were all heavy armed troops and had helmets, cuirasses,
greaves, and shields. Their offensive weapons were large swords, called
spathae, and smaller ones called semispathae together with five loaded
javelins in the concavity of the shield, which they threw at the first
charge. They had likewise two other javelins, the largest of which was
composed of a staff five feet and a half long and a triangular head of
iron nine inches long. This was formerly called the pilum, but now it is
known by the name of spiculum. The soldiers were particularly exercised
in the use of this weapon, because when thrown with force and skill it
often penetrated the shields of the foot and the cuirasses of the horse.
The other javelin was of smaller size; its triangular point was only five
inches long and the staff three feet and one half. It was anciently called
verriculum but now verutum.

The first line, as I said before, was composed of the principes; the
hastati formed the second and were armed in the same manner. In the second
line the sixth cohort was posted on the right flank, with the seventh on
its left; the eighth drew up in the center; the ninth was the next; and
the tenth always closed the left flank. In the rear of these two lines
were the ferentarii, light infantry and the troops armed with shields,
loaded javelins, swords and common missile weapons, much in the same manner
as our modern soldiers. This was also the post of the archers who had helmets,
cuirasses, swords, bows and arrows; of the slingers who threw stones with
the common sling or with the fustibalus; and of the tragularii who annoyed
the enemy with arrows from the manubalistae or arcubalistae.

In the rear of all the lines, the triarii, completely armed, were drawn
up. They had shields, cuirasses, helmets, greaves, swords, daggers, loaded
javelins, and two of the common missile weapons. They rested during the
acnon on one knee, so that if the first lines were obliged to give way,
they might be fresh when brought up to the charge, and thereby retrieve
what was lost and recover the victory. All the ensigns though, of the infantry,
wore cuirasses of a smaller sort and covered their helmets with the shaggy
skins of beasts to make themselves appear more terrible to the enemy. But
the centurions had complete cuirasses, shields, and helmets of iron, the
crest of which, placed transversely thereon, were ornamented with silver
that they might be more easily distinguished by their respective soldiers.

The following disposition deserves the greatest attention. In the beginning
of an engagement, the first and second lines remained immovable on their
ground, and the trairii in their usual positions. The light-armed

troops, composed as above mentioned, advanced in the front of the line,
and attacked the enemy. If they could make them give way, they pursued
them; but if they were repulsed by superior bravery or numbers, they retired
behind their own heavy armed infantry, which appeared like a wall of iron
and renewed the action, at first with their missile weapons, then sword
in hand. If they broke the enemy they never pursued them, least they should
break their ranks or throw the line into confusion, and lest the enemy,
taking advantage of their disorder, should return to the attack and destroy
them without difficulty. The pursuit therefore was entirely left to the
light-armed troops and the cavalry. By these precautions and dispositions
the legion was victorious without danger, or if the contrary happened,
was preserved without any considerable loss, for as it is not calculated
for pursuit, it is likewise not easily thrown into disorder.

NAMES OF SOLDIERS INSCRIBED ON THEIR SHIELDS

Lest the soldiers in the confusion of battle should be separated from
their comrades, every cohort had its shields painted in a manner peculiar
to itself. The name of each soldier was also written on his shield, together
with the number of the cohort and century to which he belonged. From this
description we may compare the legion, when in proper order, to a well
fortified city as containing within itself every thing requisite in war,
wherever it moved. It was secure from any sudden attempt or surprise of
an enemy by its expeditious method of entrenching its camp even in the
open plains and it was always provided with troops and arms of every kind.
To be victorious, therefore, over our enemies in the field, we must unanimously
supplicate heaven to dispose the Emperor to reform the abuses in raising
our levies and to recruit our legions after the method of the ancients.
The same care in choosing and instructing our young soldiers in all military
exercises and drills will soon make them equal to the old Roman troops
who subdued the whole world. Nor let this alteration and loss of ancient
discipline in any way affect Your Majesty, since it is a happiness reserved
for You alone both to restore the ancient ordinances and establish new
ones for the public welfare. Every work before the attempt carries in it
an appearance of difficulty; but in this case, if the levies are made by
careful and experienced officers, an army may be raised, disciplined and
rendered fit for service in a very short time; for the necessary expenses
once provided, diligence soon effects whatever it undertakes.

RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS

Several posts in the legion requiring men of some education, the superintendents
of the levies should select some recruits for their skill in writing and
accounts, besides the qualification to be attended to in general, such
as size, strength and proper disposition for the service. For the whole
detail of the legion, including the lists of the soldiers exempted from
duty on private accounts, the rosters for their tour of military duties
and their pay lists, is daily entered in the legionary books and kept we
may almost say, with greater exactness than the regulations of provisions
or other civil matters in the registers of the police. The daily guards
in time of peace, the advanced guards and outposts in time of war, which
are mounted regularly by the centuries and messes in their turns, are likewise
punctually kept in rolls for that purpose, with the name of each soldier
whose tour is past, that no one may have injustice done him or be excused
from his duty by favor.

They are also exact in entering the time and limitation of furloughs,
which formerly were never granted without difficulty and only on real and
urgent business. They then never suffered the soldiers to attend on any
private person or to concern themselves in private occupations, thinking
it absurd and improper that the Emperor's soldiers, clothed and subsisted
at the public expense, should follow any other profession. Some soldiers,
however, were allowed for the service of the praefects, tribunes and even
of the other officers, our of the number of the accensi or such as were
raised after the legion was complete. These latter are now called supernumeraries.
The regular troops were obliged to carry their wood, hay, water and straw
into the camp themselves. From such kind of services they were called munifices.

SOLDIER'S DEPOSITS

The institution of the ancients which obliged the soldiers to deposit
half of every donative they received at the colors was wise and judicious;
the intent was to preserve it for their use so that they might not squander
it in extravagance or idle expense. For most men, particularly the poorer
sort, soon spend whatever they can get. A reserve of this kind therefore
is evidently of the greatest service to the soldiers themselves; since
they are maintained at the public expense, their military stock by this
method is continually increasing. The soldier who knows all his fortune
is deposited at his colors, entertains no thoughts of desertion, conceives
a greater affection for them and fights with greater intrepidity in their
defense. He is also prompted thereto by interest, the most prevailing consideration
among men. This money was contained in ten bags, one for each cohort. There
was an eleventh bag also for a small contribution from the whole legion,
as a common fund to defray the expense of burial of any of their deceased
comrades. These collections were kept in baskets in the custody of the
ensigns, chosen for their integrity and capacity, and answerable for the
trust and obliged to account with every man for his own proportion.

PROMOTION IN THE LEGION

Heaven certainly inspired the Romans with the organization of the legion,
so superior does it seem to human invention. Such is the arrangement and
disposition of the ten cohorts that compose it, as to appear one perfect
body and form one complete whole. A soldier, as he advances in rank, proceeds
as it were by rotation through the different degrees of the several cohorts
in such a manner that one who is promoted passes from the first cohort
to the tenth, and returns again regularly through all the others with a
continual increase of rank and pay to the first. Thus the centurion of
the primiple, after having commanded in the different ranks of every cohort,
attains that great dignity in the first with infinite advantages from the
whole legion. The chief praefect of the Praetorian Guards rises by the
same method of rotation to that lucrative and honorable rank. Thus the
legionary horse contract an affection for the foot of their own cohorts,
notwithstanding the natural antipathy existing between the two corps. And
this connection establishes a reciprocal attachment and union between all
the cohorts and the cavalry and infantry of the legion.

LEGIONARY MUSIC

The music of the legion consists of trumpets, cornets and buccinae.
The trumpet sounds the charge and the retreat. The cornets are used only
to regulate the motions of the colors; the trumpets serve when the soldiers
are ordered out to any work without the colors; but in time of action,
the trumpets and cornets sound together. The classicum, which is a particular
sound of the buccina or horn, is appropriated to the commander-in-chief
and is used in the presence of the general, or at the execution of a soldier,
as a mark of its being done by his authority. The ordinary guards and outposts
are always mounted and relieved by the sound of trumpet, which also directs
the motions of the soldiers on working parties and on field days. The cornets
sound whenever the colors are to be struck or planted. These rules must
be punctually observed in all exercises and reviews so that the soldiers
may be ready to obey them in action without hesitation according to the
general's orders either to charge or halt, to pursue the enemy or to retire.
F or reason will convince us that what is necessary to be performed in
the heat of action should constantly be practiced in the leisure of peace.

THE DRILLING OF THE TROOPS

The organization of the legion being thus explained, let us return to
the drills. The younger soldiers and recruits went through their drills
of every kind every morning and afternoon and the veterans and most expert
regularly once a day. Length of service or age alone will never form a
military man, for after serving many years an undisciplined soldier is
still a novice in his profession. Not only those under the masters at arms,
but all the soldiers in general, were formerly trained incessantly in those
drills which now are only exhibited as shows in the circus for particular
solemnities. By practice only can be acquired agility of body and the skill
requisite to engage an enemy with advantage, especially in close fight.
But the most essential point of all is to teach soldiers to keep their
ranks and never abandon their colors in the most difficult evolutions.
Men thus trained are never at a loss amidst the greatest confusion of numbers.

The recruits likewise are to be exercised with wooden swords at the
post, to be taught to attack this imaginary antagonist on all sides and
to aim at the sides, feet or head, both with the point and edge of the
sword. They must be instructed how to spring forward to give the blow,
to rise with a bound above the shield and then to sink down and shelter
themselves under cover of it, and how to advance and retire. They must
also throw their javelins at the post from a considerable distance in order
to acquire a good aim and strengthen the arm.

The archers and slingers set up bundles of twigs or straw for marks,
and generally strike them with arrows and with stones from the fustiablus
at the distance of six hundred feet. They acquired coolness and exactness
in acnon from familiar custom and exercise in the field. The slingers should
be taught to whirl the sling but once about the head before they cast the
stone. Formerlyall soldiers were trained to the praccice of throwing stones
of a pound weight with the hand, as this was thought a readier method since
it did not require a sling. The use of the common missile weapons and loaded
javelins was another part of the drill strictly attended to.

To continue this drill without interruption during the winter, they
erected for the cavalry porticos or riding halls covered with tiles or
shingles, and if they were not to be procured, with reeds, rushes or thatch.
Large open halls were likewise constructed in the same manner for the use
of the infantry. By these means the troops were provided with places of
drill sheltered from bad weather. But even in winter, if it did not rain
or snow, they were obliged to perform their drills in the field, lest an
intermission of discipline should affect both the courage and constitution
of the soldier. In short, both legionary and auxiliary troops should continually
be drilled in cutting wood, carrying burdens, passing ditches, swimming
in the sea or in rivers, marching in the full step and even running with
their arms and baggage, so that, inured to labor in peace, they may find
no difficulty in war. For, as the well trained soldier is eager for action,
so does the untaught fear it. In war discipline is superior to strength;
but if that discipline is neglected, there is no longer any difference
between the soldier and the peasant. The old maxim is certain that the
very essence of an art consists in constant practice.

MACHINES AND TOOLS OF THE LEGION

The legion owes its success to its arms and machines, as well as to
the number and bravery of its soldiers. In the first place every century
has a balista mounted on a carriage drawn by mules and served by a mess,
that is by ten men from the century to which it belongs. The larger these
engines are, the greater distance they carry and with the greater force.
They are used not only to defend the entrenchments of camps, but are also
placed in the field in the rear of the heavy armed infantry. And such is
the violence with which they throw the darts that neither the cuirasses
of the horse nor shields of the foot can resist them. The number of these
engines in a legion is fiftyfive. Besides these are ten onagri, one for
each cohort; they are drawn ready armed on carriages by oxen; in case of
an attack, they defend the works of the camp by throwing stones as the
balistae do darts.

The legion carries with it a number of small boats, each hollowed out
of a single piece of timber, with long cables and sometimes iron chains
to fasten them together. These boats, joined and covered with planks, serve
as bridges over unfordable rivers, on which both cavalry and infantry pass
without danger. The legion is provided with iron hooks, called wolves,
and iron scythes fixed to the ends of long poles; and with forks, spades,
shovels, pickaxes, wheelbarrows and baskets for digging and transporting
earth; together with hatchets, axes and saws for cutting wood. Besides
which, a train of workmen attend on it furnished with all instruments necessary
for the construction of tortoises, musculi, rams, vines, moving towers
and other machines for the attack of places. As the enumeration of all
the particulars of this sort would be too tedious, I shall only observe
that the legion should carry with it wherever it moves, whatever is necessary
for every kind of service so that the encampments may have all the strength
and conveniences of a fortified city.

==============
Preface to Book III
==============

To the Emperor Valentinian

The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were masters of Greece before the Macedonians,
as history informs us. The Athenians excelled not only in war but in other
arts and sciences. The Lacedaemonians made war their chief study. They
are affirmed to be the first who reasoned on the events of battles and
committed their observations thereon to writing with such success as to
reduce the military art, before considered as totally dependent on courage
or fortune, to certain rules and fixed principles. As a consequence they
established schools of tactics for the instruction of youth in all the
maneuvers of war. How worthy of admiration are these people for particularly
applying themselves to the study of an art, without which no other art
can possibly exist. The Romans followed their example, and both practiced
their institutions in their armies and preserved them in their writings.
These are the maxims and instructions dispersed through the works of different
authors, which Your Majesty has ordered me to abridge, since the perusal
of the whole would be too tedious, and the authority of only a part unsatisfactory.
The effect of the Lacedaemonian skill in dispositions for general actions
appears evidently in the single instance of Xantippus, who assisted the
Carthaginians after the repeated ruin of their armies. And merely superior
skill and conduct defeated Attilius Regulus at the head of a Roman army,
till that time always victorious. Xantippus took him prisoner and thus
terminated the war by a single action. Hannibal, also, before he set out
on his expedition into Italy, chose a Lacedaemonian for his counsellor
in military operations; and by his advice, though inferior to the Romans
both in number and strength, overthrew so many consuls and such mighty
legions. He, therefore, who desires peace, should prepare for war. He who
aspires to victory, should spare no pains to form his soldiers. And he
who hopes for success, should fight on principle, not chance. No one dares
to offend or insult a power of known superiority in action.

The first book treats of the choice and exercises of new levies; the
second explains the establishment of the legion and the method of discipline;
and the third contains the dispositions for action. By this methodical
progression, the following instructions on general actions and means of
victory will be better understood and of greater use. By an army is meant
a number of troops, legions and auxiliaries, cavalry and infantry, assembled
to make war. This number is limited by judges of the profession. The defeats
of Xerxes, Darius, Mithridates and other monarchs who brought innumerable
multitudes into the field, plainly show that the destruction of such prodigious
armies is owing more to their own numbers than to the bravery of their
enemies. An army too numerous is subject to many dangers and inconveniences.
Its bulk makes it slow and unwieldy in its motions; and as it is obliged
to march in columns of great length, it is exposed to the risk of being
continually harassed and insulted by inconsiderable parties of the enemy.
The incumbrance of the baggage is often an occasion of its being surprised
in its passage through difficult places or over rivers. The difficulty
of providing forage for such numbers of horses and other beasts of burden
is very great. Besides, scarcity of provisions, which is to be carefully
guarded against in all expeditions, soon ruins such large armies where
the consumption is so prodigious, that notwithstanding the greatest care
in filling the magazines they must begin to fail in a short time. And sometimes
they unavoidably will be distressed for want of water. But, if unfortunately
this immense army should be defeated, the numbers lost must necessarily
be very great, and the remainder, who save themselves by flight, too much
dispirited to be brought again to action.

The ancients, taught by experience, preferred discipline to numbers.
In wars of lesser importance they thought one legion with auxiliaries,
that is, ten thousand foot and two thousand horse, sufficient. And they
often gave the command to a praeter as to a general of the second rank.
When the preparations of the enemy were formidable, they sent a general
of consular dignity with twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse.
In our times this command was given to a count of the first order. But
when there happened any dangerous insurrection supported by infinite multitudes
of fierce and barbarous nations, on such emergencies they took the field
with two armies under two consuls, who were charged, both singly and jointly,
to take care to preserve the Republic from danger. In short, by this management,
the Romans, almost continually engaged in war with different nations in
different parts of the world, found themselves able to oppose them in every
quarter. The excellence of their discipline made their small armies sufficient
to encounter all their enemies with success. But it was an invariable rule
in their armies that the number of allies or auxiliaries should never exceed
that of the Roman citizens.

MEANS OF PRESERVING IT IN HEALTH

The next article is of the greatest importance: the means of preserving
the health of the troops. This depends on the choice of situation and water,
on the season of the year, medicine, and exercise. As to the situation,
the army should never continue in the neighborhood of unwholesome marshes
any length of time, or on dry plains or eminences without some sort of
shade or shelter. In the summer, the troops should never encamp without
tents. And their marches, in that season of the year when the heat is excessive,
should begin by break of day so that they may arrive at the place of destination
in good time. Otherwise they will contract diseases from the heat of the
weather and the fatigue of the march. In severe winter they should never
march in the night in frost and snow, or be exposed to want of wood or
clothes. A soldier, starved with cold, can neither be healthy nor fit for
service. The water must be wholesome and not marshy. Bad water is a kind
of poison and the cause of epidemic distempers.

It is the duty of the officers of the legion, of the tribunes, and even
of the commander-in-chief himself, to take care that the sick soldiers
are supplied with proper diet and diligently attended by the physicians.
For little can be expected from men who have both the enemy and diseases
to struggle with. However, the best judges of the service have always been
of the opinion that daily practice of the military exercises is much more
efficacious towards the health of an army than all the art of medicine.
For this reason they exercised their infantry without intermission. If
it rained or snowed, they performed under cover; and il1 fine weather,
in the field. They also were assiduous in exercising their cavalry, not
only in plains, but also on uneven ground, broken and cut with ditches.
The horses as well as the men were thus trained, both on the above mentioned
account and to prepare them for action. Hence we may perceive the importance
and necessity of a strict observance of the military exercises in an army,
since health in the camp and victory in the field depend on them. If a
numerous army continues long in one place in the summer or in the autumn,
the waters become corrupt and the air infected. Malignant and fatal distempers
proceed from this and can be avoided only by frequent changes of encampments.

CARE TO PROVIDE FORAGE AND PROVISIONS

Famine makes greater havoc in an army than the enemy, and is more terrible
than the sword. Time and opportunity may help to retrieve other misfortunes,
but where forage and provisions have not been carefully provided, the evil
is without remedy. The main and principal point in war is to secure plenty
of provisions and to destroy tIle enemy by famine. An exact calculation
must therefore be made before the commencement of the war as to the number
of troops and the expenses incident thereto, so that the provinces may
in plenty of time furnish the forage, corn, and all other kinds of provisions
demanded of them to be transported. They must be in more than sufficient
quantity, and gathered into the strongest and most convenient cities before
the opening of the campaign. If the provinces cannot raise their quotas
in kind, they must commute for them in money to be employed in procuring
all things requisite for the service. For the possessions of the subjects
cannot be kept secure otherwise than by the defense of arms.

These precautions often become doubly necessary as a siege is sometimes
protracted beyond expectation, the besiegers resolving to suffer themselves
all the inconveniences of want sooner than raise the siege, if they have
any hopes of reducing the place by famine. Edicts should be issued out
requiring the country people to convey their cattle, grain, wine and all
kinds of provisions that may be of service to the enemy, into garrisoned
fortresses or into the safest cities. And if they do not comply with the
order, proper officers are to appointed to compel them to do it. The inhabitants
of the province must likewise be obliged to retire with their effects into
some fortified place before the irruption of the enemy. The fortifications
and all the machines of different kinds must also be examined and repaired
in time. For if you are once surprised by the enemy before you are in a
proper posture of defense, you are thrown into irrecoverable confusion,
and you can no longer draw any assistance from the neighboring places,
all communication with them being cut off. But a faithful management of
the magazines and a frugal distribution of the provisions, with proper
precautions taken at first, will insure sufficient plenty. When provisions
once begin to fail, parsimony is ill-timed and comes too late.

On difficult expeditions the ancients distributed the provisions at
a fixed allowance to each man without distinction of rank; and when the
emergency was past, the government accounted for the full proportions.
The troops should never want wood and forage in winter or water in summer.
They should have corn, wine, vinegar, and even salt, in plenty at all times.
Cities and fortresses are garrisoned by such mcn as are least fit for thc
service of the field. They arc provided with all sorts of arnms, arrows,
fustibali, slings, stones, onagri and balistae for their defense. Great
caution is requisite that the unsuspecting simplicity of the inhabitants
be not imposed on by the treachery or perjury of the enemy, for pretended
conferences and deceitful appearance of truces have often been more fatal
than force. By observing the foregoing precautions, the besieged may have
it in their power to ruin the enemy by famine, if he keeps his troops together,
and if he divides.them, by frequent sallies and surprises.

METHODS TO PREVENT MUTINY IN AN ARMY

An army drawn together from different parts sometimes is disposed to
mutiny. And the troops, though not inclined to fight, pretend to be angry
at not being led against the enemy. Such seditious dispositions principally
show themselves in those who have lived in their quarters in idleness and
effeminacy. These men, unaccustomed to the necessary fatigue of the field,
are disgusted at its severity. Their ignorance of discipline makes them
afraid of action and inspires them with insolence.

There are several remedies for this evil. While the troops are yet separated
and each corps continues in its respective quarters, let the tribunes,
their lieutenants and the officers in genera4 make it their business to
keep up so strict a discipline as to leave them no room to harbor any thoughts
but of submission and obedience. Let them be constantly employed either
in field days or in the inspection of their arms. They should not be allowed
to be absent on furlough. They should be frequently called by roll and
trained to be exact in the observance of every signal. Let them be exercised
in the use of the bow, in throwing missile weapons and stones, both with
the hand and sling, and with the wooden sword at the post; let all this
be continually repeated and let them be often kept under arms till they
are tired. Let them be exercised in running and leaping to facilitate the
passing of ditches. And if their quarters are near the sea or a river,
let them all, without exception, be obliged in the summer to have the frequent
practice of swimming. Let them be accustomed to march through thickets,
inclosures and broken grounds, to fell trees and cut out timber, to break
ground and to defend a post against their comrades who are to endeavor
to dispossess them; and in the encounter each party should use their shields
to dislodge and bear down their antagonists. All the different kinds of
troops thus trained and exercised in their quarters will find themselves
inspired with emulation for glory and eagerness for action when they come
to take the field. In short, a soldier who has proper confidence in his
own skill and strength, entertains no thought of mutiny.

A general should be attentive to discover the turbulent and seditious
soldiers in the army, legions or auxiliaries, cavalry or infantry. He should
endeavor to procure his intelligence not from informers, but from the tribunes,
their lieutenants and other officers of undoubted veracity. It would then
be prudent in him to separate them from the rest under pretence of some
service agreeable to them, or detach them to garrison cities or castles,
but with such address that though he wants to get rid of them, they may
think themselves employed by preference and favor. A multitude never broke
out into open sedition at once and with unanimous consent. They are prepared
and excited by some few mutineers, who hope to secure impunity for their
crimes by the number of their associates. But if the height of the mutiny
requires violent remedies, it will be most advisable, after the manner
of the ancients, to punish the ring-leaders only in order that, though
few suffer, all may be terrified by the example. But it is much more to
the credit of a general to form his troops to submission and obedience
by habit and discipline than to be obliged to force them to their duty
by the terror of punishment.

MARCHES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE ENEMY

It is asserted by those who have made the profession their study that
an army is exposed to more danger on marches than in battles. In an engagement
the men are properly armed, they see their enemies before them and come
prepared to fight. But on a march the soldier is less on his guard, has
not his arms always ready and is thrown into disorder by a sudden attack
or ambuscade. A general, therefore, cannot be too careful and diligent
in taking necessary precautions to prevent a surprise on the march and
in making proper dispositions to repulse the enemy, in case of such accident,
without loss.

In the first place, he should have an exact description of the country
that is. the seat of war, in which the distances of places specified by
the number of miles, the nature of the roads, the shortest routes, by-roads,
mountains and rivers, should be correctly inserted. We are told that the
greatest generals have carried their precautions on this head so far that,
not satisfied with the simple description of the country wherein they were
engaged, they caused plans to be taken of it on the spot, that they might
regulate their marches by the eye with greater safety. A general should
also inform himself of all these particulars from persons of sense and
reputation well acquainted with the country by examining them separately
at first, and then comparing their accounts in order to come at the truth
with certainty.

If any difficulty arises about the choice of roads, he should procure
proper and skillful guides. He should put them under a guard and spare
neither promises nor threat to induce them to be faithful. They will acquit
themselves well when they know it is impossible to escape and are certain
of being rewarded for their fidelity or punished for their perfidy. He
must be sure of their capacity and experience, that the whole army be not
brought into danger by the errors of two or three persons. For sometimes
the common sort of people imagine they know what they really do not, and
through ignorance promise more than they can perform.

But of all precautions the most important is to keep entirely secret
which way or by what route the army is to march. For the security of an
expedition depends on the concealment of all motions from the enemy. The
figure of the Minotaur was anciently among the legionary ensigns, signifying
that this monster, according to the fable, was concealed in the most secret
recesses and windings of the labyrinth, just as the designs of a general
should always be impenetrable. When the enemy has no intimation of a march,
it is made with security; but as sometimes the scouts either suspect or
discover the decampment, or traitors or deserters give intelligence thereof,
it will be proper to mention the method of acting in case of an attack
on the march.

The general, before he puts his troops in motion, should send out detachments
of trusty and experienced soldiers well mounted, to reconnoiter the places
through which he is to march, in front, in rear, and on the right and left,
lest he should fall into ambuscades. The night is safer and more advantageous
for your spies to do their business in than day, for if they are taken
prisoners, you have, as it were, betrayed yourself. After this, the cavalry
should march off first, then the infantry; the baggage, bat horses, servants
and carriages follow in the center; and part of the best cavalry and infantry
come in the rear, since it is oftener attacked on a march than the front.
The flanks of the baggage, exposed to frequent ambuscades, must also be
covered with a sufficient guard to secure them. But above all, the part
where the enemy is most expected must be reinforced with some of the best
cavalry, light infantry and foot archers.

If surrounded on all sides by the enemy, you must make dispositions
to receive them wherever they come, and the soldiers should be cautioned
beforehand to keep their arms in their hands, and to be ready in order
to prevent the bad effects of a sudden attack. Men are frightened and thrown
into disorder by sudden accidents and surprises of no consequence when
foreseen. The ancients were very careful that the servants or followers
of the army, if wounded or frightened by the noise of the action, might
not disorder the troops while engaged, and also to prevent their either
straggling or crowding one another too much, which might incommode their
own men and give advantage to the enemy. They ranged the baggage, therefore,
in the same manner as the regular troops under particular ensigns. They
selected from among the servants the most proper and experienced and gave
them the command of a number of servants and boys, not exceeding two hundred,
and their ensigns directed them where to assemble the baggage. Proper intervals
should always be kept between the baggage and the troops, that the latter
may not be embarrassed for want of room in case of an attack during the
march. The manner and disposition of defense must be varied according to
the difference of ground. In an open country you are more liable to be
attacked by horse than foot. But in a woody, mountainous or marshy situation,
the danger to be apprehended is from foot. Some of the divisions being
apt through negligence to move too fast, and others too slow, great care
is to be taken to prevent the army from being broken or from running into
too great a length, as the enemy would instantly take advantage of the
neglect and penetrate without difficulty.

The tribunes, their lieutenants or the masters at arms of most experience,
must therefore be posted at proper distances, in order to halt those who
advance too fast and quicken such as move too slow. The men at too great
a distance in the front, on the appearance of an enemy, are more disposed
to fly than to join their comrades. And those too far behind, destitute
of assistance, fall a sacrifice to the enemy and their own despair. The
enemy, it may be concluded, will either plant ambuscades or make his attack
by open force, according to the advantage of the ground. Circumspection
in examining every place will be a security against concealed danger; and
an ambuscade, if discovered and promptly surrounded, will return the intended
mischief with interest.

If the enemy prepare to fall upon you by open force in a mountainous
country, detachments must be sent forward to occupy the highest eminences,
so that on their arrival they may not dare to attack you under such a disadvantage
of ground, your troops being posted so much above theIr and presenting
a front ready for their reception. It is better to send men forward with
hatchets and other tools in order to open ways that are narrow but safe,
without regard to the labor, rather than to run any risk in the finest
roads. It is necessary to be well acquainted whether the enemy usually
make their attempts in the night, at break of day or in the hours of refreshment
or rest; and by knowledge of their customs to guard against what we find
their general practice. We must also inform ourselves whether they are
strongest in infantry or cavalry; whether their cavalry is chiefly armed
with lances or with bows; and whether their principal strength consists
in their numbers or the excellence of their arms. All of this will enable
us to take the most proper measures to distress them and for our advantage.
When we have a design in view, we must consider whether it will be most
advisable to begin the march by day or by night; we must calculate the
distance of the places we want to reach; and take such precautions that
in summer the troops may not suffer for want of water on their march, nor
be obstructed in winter by impassable morasses or torrents, as these would
expose the army to great danger before it could arrive at the place of
its destination. As it highly concerns us to guard against these inconveniences
with prudence, so it would be inexcusible not to take advantage of an enemy
that fell into them through ignorance or negligence. Our spies should be
constantly abroad; we should spare no pains in tampering with their men,
and give all manner of encouragement to deserters. By these means we may
get intelligence of their present or future designs. And we should constantly
keep in readiness some detachments of cavalry and light infantry, to fall
upon them when they least expect it, either on the march, or when foraging
or marauding.

PASSAGES OF RIVERS

The passages of rivers are very dangerous without great precaution.
In crossing broad or rapid streams, the baggage, servants, and sometimes
the most indolent soldiers are in danger of being lost. Having first sounded
the ford, two lines of the best mounted cavalry are ranged at a convenient
distance entirely across the river, so that the infantry and baggage may
pass between them. The line above the ford breaks the violence of the stream,
and the line below recovers and transports the men carried away by the
current. When the river is too deep to be forded either by the cavalry
or infantry, the water is drawn off, if it runs in a plain, by cutting
a great number of trenches, and thus it is passed with ease.

Navigable rivers are passed by means of piles driven into the bottom
and floored with planks; or in a sudden emergency by fastening together
a number of empty casks and covering them with boards. The cavalry, throwing
off their accoutrements, make small floats of dry reeds or rushes on which
they lay their rams and cuirasses to preserve them from being wet. They
themselves swim their horses across the river and draw the floats after
them by a leather thong.

But the most commodious invention is that of the small boats hollowed
out of one piece of timber and very light both by their make and the quality
of the wood. The army always has a number of these boats upon carriages,
together with a sufficient quantity of planks and iron nails. Thus with
the help of cables to lash the boats together, a bridge is instantly constructed,
which for the time has the solidity of a bridge of stone.

As the enemy generally endeavor to fall upon an army at the passage
of a river either by surprise or ambuscade, it is necessary to secure both
sides thereof by strong detachments so that the troops may not be attacked
and defeated while separated by the channel of the river. But it is still
safer to palisade both the posts, since this will enable you to sustain
any attempt without much loss. If the bridge is wanted, not only for the
present transportation of the troops but also for their return and for
convoys, it will be proper to throw up works with large ditches to cover
each head of the bridge, with a sufficient number of men to defend them
as long as the circumstances of affairs require.

RULES FOR ENCAMPING AN ARMY

An army on the march cannot expect always to find walled cities for
quarters, and it is very imprudent and dangerous to encamp in a straggling
manner without some sort of entrenchment. It is an easy matter to surprise
troops while refreshing themselves or dispersed in the different occupations
of the service. The darkness of night, the necessity of sleep and the dispersion
of the horses at pasture afford opportunities of surprise. A good situation
for a camp is not sufficient; we must choose the very best that can be
found lest, having failed to occupy a more advantageous post the enemy
should get possession of it to our great detriment.

An army should not encamp in summer near bad waters or far from good
ones, nor in winter in a situation without plenty of forage and wood. The
camp should not be liable to sudden inundations. The avenues should not
be too steep and narrow lest, if invested, the troops should find it difficult
to make their retreat; nor should it be commanded by any eminences from
which it may be annoyed by the enemy's weapons. After these precautions,
the camp is formed square, round, triangular or oblong, according to the
nature of the ground. For the form of a camp does not constitute its goodness.
Those camps, however, are thought best where the length is one third more
than the depth. The dimensions must be exactly computed by the engineers,
so that the size of the camp may be proportioned to the number of troops.
A camp which is too confined will not permit the troops to perform their
movements with freedom, and one which is too extensive divides them too
much. There are three methods of entrenching a camp. The first is for the
case when the army is on the march and will continue in the camp for only
one night. They then throw up a slight parapet of turf and plant it with
a row of palisades or caltrops* of wood. The sods are cut with iron instruments.
If the earth is held strongly together by the roots of the grass, they
are cut in the form of a brick a foot and one half high, a foot broad and
a foot and one half long. If the earth is so loose that the turf cannot
be cut in this form, they run a slight trench round the camp, five feet
broad and three feet deep. The earth taken from the trench forms a parapet
on the inside and this secures the army from danger. This is the second
method.

But permanent camps, either for summer or winter, in the neighborhood
of an enemy, are fortified with greater care and regularity. After the
ground is marked out by the proper officers, each century receives a certain
number of feet to entrench. They then range their shields and baggage in
a circle about their own colors and, with. out other arms than their swords,
open a trench nine, eleven or thirteen feet broad. Or, if they are under
great apprehensions of the enemy, they enlarge it to seventeen feet (it
being a general rule to observe odd numbers). Within this they construct
a rampart with fascines or branches of trees well fastened together with
pickets, so that the earth may be better supported. Upon this rampart they
raise a parapet with battlements as in the fortifications of a city. The
centurions measure the work with rods ten feet long and examine whether
every one has properly completed the proportion assigned to him. The tribunes
likewise inspect the work and should not leave the place till the whole
is finished. And that the workmen may not be suddenly interrupted by the
enemy, all the cavalry and that part of the infantry exempted by the privilege
of their rank from working, remain in order of battle before the entrenchment
to be ready to repel any assault.

The first thing to be done after entrenching the camp, is to plant the
ensigns, held by the soldiers in the highest veneration and respect, in
their proper places. After this the praetorium is prepared for the general
and his lieutenants, and the tents pitched for the tribunes, who have soldiers
particularly appointed for that service and to fetch their water, wood,
and forage. Then the legions and auxiliaries, cavalry and infantry, have
the ground distributed to them to pitch their tents according to the rank
of the several corps. Four foot-soldiers of each century and four troopers
of each troop are on guard every night. As it seemed impossible for a sentinel
to remain a whole night on his post, the watches were divided by the hourglass
into four parts, that each man might stand only three hours. All guards
are mounted by the sound of trumpet and relieved by the sound of cornet.
The tribunes choose proper and trusty men to visit the different posts
and report to them whatever they find amiss. This is now a military office
and the persons appointed to it are called officers of the rounds.

The cavalry furnish the grand guards at night and the outposts by day.
They are relieved every morning and afternoon because of the fatigue of
the men and horses. It is particularly incumbent upon the general to provide
for the protection of the pastures and.of the convoys of grain and other
provisions either in camp or garrison, and to secure wood, water and forage
against the incursions of the enemy. This can only be effected by posting
detachments advantageously in the cines or walled castles on the roads
along which the convoys advance. And if no ancient fortifications are to
be met with, small forts must be built in proper situations, surrounded
with large ditches, for the reception of detachments of horse and foot,
so that the convoys will be effectually protected. For an enemy will hardly
venture far into a country where he knows his adversary's troops are so
disposed as to be ready to encompass him on all sides.

MOTIVES FOR THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS OF A CAMPAIGN

Readers of this military abridgement will perhaps be impatient for instructions
relative to general engagements. But they should considerthat a battle
is commonly decided in two or three hours, after which no further hopes
are left for the worsted army. Every plan, therefore, is to be considered,
every expedient tried and every method taken before matters are brought
to this last extremity. Good officers decline general engagements where
the danger is common, and prefer the employment of stratagem and finesse
to destroy the enemy as much as possible in detail and intimidate them
without exposing our own forces.

I shall insert some necessary instructions on this head collected from
the ancients. It is the duty and interest of the general frequently to
assemble the most prudent and experienced officers of the different corps
of. the army and consult with them on the state both of his own and the
enemy's forces. All overconfidence, as most pernicious in its consequences,
must be banished from the deliberations. He must examine which has the
superiority in numbers, whether his or the adversary's troops are best
armed, which are in the best condition, best disciplined and most resolute
in emergencies. The state of the cavalry of both armies must be inquired
into, but more especially that of the infantry, for the main strength of
an army consists of the latter. With respect to the cavalry, he must endeavor
to find out in which are the greatest numbers of archers or of troopers
armed with lances, which has the most cuirassiers and which the best horses.
Lastly he must consider the field of battle and to judge whether the ground
is more advantageous for him or his enemy. If strongest in cavalry, we
should prefer plains and open ground; if superior in infantry, we should
choose a situation full of enclosures, ditches, morasses and woods, and
sometimes mountainous. Plenty or scarcity in either army are considerations
of no small importance, for famine, according to the common proverb, is
an internal enemy that makes more havoc than the sword. But the most material
article is to determine whether it is most proper to temporize or to bring
the affair to a speedy decision by action. The enemy sometimes expect an
expedition will soon be over; and if it is protracted to any length, his
troops are either consumed by want,. induced to return home by the desire
of seeing their families or, having done nothing considerable in the field,
disperse themselves from despair of success. Thus numbers, tired out with
fatigue and disgusted with the service, desert, others betray them and
many surrender themselves. Fidelity is seldom found in troops disheartened
by misfortunes. And in such case an army which was numerous on taking the
field insensibly dwindles away to nothing.

It is essential to know the character of the enemy and of their principal
officers-whether they be. rash or cautious, enterprising or timid, whether
they fight on principle or from chance and whether the nations they have
been engaged with were brave or cowardly.

We must know how far to depend upon the fidelity and strength of auxiliaries,
how the enemy's troops and our own are affected and which appear most confident
of success, a consideration of great effect in raising or depressing the
courage of an army. A harangue from the general, especially if he seems
under no apprehension himself, may reanimate the soldiers if dejected.
Their spirits revive if any considerable advantage is gained either by
stratagem or otherwise, if the fortune of the enemy begins to change or
if you can contrive to beat some of their weak or poorly-armed detachments.

But you must by no means venture to lead an irresolute or diffident
army to a general engagement. The difference is great whether your troops
are raw or veterans, whether inured to war by recent service or for some
years unemployed. For soldiers unused to fighting for a length of time
must be considered in the same light as recruits. As soon as the legions,
auxiliaries and cavalry are assembled from their several quarters, it is
the duty of a good general to have every corps instructed separately in
every part of the drill by tribunes of known capacity chosen for that purpose.
He should afterwards form them into one body and train them in all the
maneuvers of the line as for a general action. He must frequently drill
them himself to try their skill and strength, and to see whether they perform
their evolutions with proper regularity and are sufficiently attentive
to the sound of the trumpets, the motions of the colors and to his own
orders and signals. If deficient in any of these particulars, they must
be instructed and exercised till perfect.

But though thoroughly disciplined and complete in their field exercises,
in the use of the bow and javelin, and in the evolutions of the line, it
is not advisable to lead them rashly or immediately to battle. A favorable
opportunity must be watched for, and they must first be prepared by frequent
skirmishes and slight encounters. Thus a vigilant and prudent general will
carefully weigh in his council the state of his own forces and of those
of the enemy, just as a civil magistrate judging between two contending
parties. If he finds himself in many respects superior to his adversary,
he must by no means defer bringing on an engagement. But if he knows himself
inferior, he must avoid general actions and endeavor to succeed by surprises,
ambuscades and stratagems. These, when skillfully managed by good generals,
have often given them the victory over enemies superior both in numbers
and strength.

HOW TO MANAGE RAW AND UNDISCIPLINED TROOPS

All arts and trades whatever are brought to perfection by continual
practice. How much more should this maxim, true in inconsiderable matters,
be observed in affairs of importance! And how much superior to all others
is the art of war, by which our liberties are preserved, our dignities
perpetuated and the provinces and the whole Empire itself exist. The Lacedaemonians,
and after them the Romans, were so aware of this truth that to this science
they sacrificed all others. And the barbarous nations even at this day
think only this art worth attention, believing it includes or confers everything
else. In short, it is indispensably necessary for those engaged in war
not only to instruct them in the means of preserving their own lives, but
how to gain the victory over their enemies.

A commander-in-chief therefore, whose power and dignity are so great
and to whose fidelity and bravery the fortunes of his countrymen, the defense
of their cities, the lives of the soldiers, and the glory of the state,
are entrusted, should not only consult the good of the army in general,
but extend his care to every private soldier in it. For when any misfortunes
happen to those under his command, they are considered as public losses
and imputed entirely to his misconduct. If therefore he finds his army
composed of raw troops or if they have long been unaccustomed to fighting,
he must carefully study the strength, the spirit, the manners of each particular
legion, and of each body of auxiliaries, cavalry and infantry. He must
know, if possible, the name and capacity of every count, tribune, subaltern
and soldier. He must assume the most respectable authority and maintain
it by severity. He must punish all military crimes with the greatest rigor
of the laws. He must have the character of being inexorable towards offenders
and endeavor to give public examples thereof in different places and on
different occasions.

Having once firmly established these regulations, he must watch the
opportunity when the enemy, dispersed in search of plunder, think themselves
in security, and attack them with detachments of tried cavalry or infantry,
intermingled with young soldiers, or such as are under the military age.
The veterans will acquire fresh experience and the others will be inspired
with courage by the advantages such opportunities will give him. He should
form ambuscades with the greatest secrecy to surprise the enemy at the
passages of rivers, in the rugged passes of mountains, in defiles in woods
and when embarrassed by morasses or difficult roads. He should regulate
his march so as to fall upon them while taking their refreshments or sleeping,
or at a time when they suspect no dangers and are dispersed, unarmed and
their horses unsaddled. He should continue these kinds of encounters till
his soldiers have imbibed a proper confidence in themselves. For troops
that have never been in action or have not for some time been used to such
spectacles, are greatly shocked at the sight of the wounded and dying;
and the impressions of fear they receive dispose them rather to fly than
fight.

If the enemy makes excursions or expeditions, the general should attack
him after the fatigue of a long march, fall upon him unexpectedly, or harass
his rear. He should detach parties to endeavor to carry off by surprise
any quarters established at a distance from the hostile army for the convenience
of forage or provisions. F or such measures should be pursued at first
as can produce no very bad effects if they should happen to miscarry, but
would be of great advantage if attended with success. A prudent general
will also try to sow dissention among his adversaries, for no nation, though
ever so weak in itself can be completely ruined by its enemies unless its
fall be facilitated by its own distraction. In civil dissensions men are
so intent on the destruction of their private enemies that they are entirely
regardless of the public safety.

One maxim must be remembered throughout this work: that no one should
ever despair of effecting what has been already performed. It may be said
that our troops for many years past have not even fortified their permanent
camps with ditches, ramparts or palisades. The answer is plain. If those
precautions had been taken, our armies would never have suffered by surprises
of the enemy both by day and night. The Persians, after the example of
the old Romans, surround their camps with ditches and, as the ground in
their country is generally sandy, they always carry with them empty bags
to fill with the sand taken out of the trenches and raise a parapet by
piling them one on the other. All the barbarous nations range their carriages
round them in a circle, a method which bears some resemblance to a fortified
camp. They thus pass their nights secure from surprise.

Are we afraid of not being able to learn from others what they before
have learned from us? At present all this is to be found in books only,
although formerly constantly practiced. Inquiries are now no longer made
about customs that have been so long neglected, because in the midst of
peace, war is looked upon as an object too distant to merit consideration.
But former instances will convince us that the reestablishment of ancient
discipline is by no means impossible, although now so totally lost.

In former ages the art of war, often neglected and forgotten, was as
often recovered from books and reestablished by the authority and attention
of our generals. Our armies in Spain, when Scipio Africanus took the command,
were in bad order and had often been beaten under preceding generals. He
soon reformed them by severe discipline and obliged them to undergo the
greatest fatigue in the different military works, reproaching them that
since they would not wet their hands with the blood of their enemies, they
should soil them with the mud of the trenches. In short, with these very
troops he afterwards took the city of Numantia and burned it to the ground
with such destruction of its inhabitants that not one escaped. In Africa
an army, which under the command of Albinus had been forced to pass under
the yoke, was by Metellus brought into such order and discipline, by forming
it on the ancient model, that they afterwards vanquished those very enemies
who had subjected them to that ignominious treatment. The Cimbri defeated
the legions of Caepio, Manilus and Silanus in Gaul, but Marius collected
their shattered remnants and disciplined them so effectually that he destroyed
an innumerable multitude of the Cimbri, Teutones and Ambrones in one general
engagement. Nevertheless it is easier to form young soldiers and inspire
them with proper notions of honor than to reanimate troops who have been
once disheartened.

PREPARATIONS FOR A GENERAL ENGAGEMENT

Having explained the less considerable branches of the art of war, the
order of military affairs naturally leads us to the general engagement.
This is a conjuncture full of uncertainty and fatal to kingdoms and nations,
for in the decision of a pitched battle consists the fulness of victory.
This eventuality above all others requires the exertion of all the abilities
of a general, as his good conduct on such an occasion gains him greater
glory, or his dangers expose him to greater danger and disgrace. This is
the moment in which his talents, skill and experience show themselves in
their fullest extent.

Formerly to enable the soldiers to charge with greater vigor, it was
customary to order them a moderate refreshment of food before an engagement,
so that their strength might be the better supported during a long conflict.
When the army is to march out of a camp or city in the presence of their
enemies drawn up and ready for action, great precaution must be observed
lest they should be attacked as they defile from the gates and be cut to
pieces in detail. Proper measures must therefore be taken so that the whole
army may be clear of the gates and form in order of battle before the enemy's
approach. If they are ready before you can have quitted the place, your
design of marching out must either be deferred till another opportunity
or at least dissembled, so that when they begin to insult you on the supposition
that you dare not appear, or think of nothing but plundering or returning
and no longer keep their ranks, you may sally out and fall upon them while
in confusion and surprise. Troops must never be engaged in a general action
immediately after a long march, when the men are fatigued and the horses
tired. The strength required for action is spent in the toil of the march.
What can a soldier do who charges when out of breath? The ancients carefully
avoided this inconvenience, but in later times some of our Roman generals,
to say nothing more, have lost their armies by unskillfully neglecting
this precaution. Two armies, one tired and spent, the other fresh and in
full vigor, are by no means an equal match.

THE SENTIMENTS OF THE TROOPS SHOULD BE DETERMINED BEFORE BATTLE

It is necessary to know the sentiments of the soldiers on the day of
an engagement. Their confidence or apprehensions are easily discovered
by their looks, their words, their actions and their motions. No great
dependence is to be placed on the eagerness of young soldiers for action,
for fighting has something agreeable in the idea to those who are strangers
to it. On the other hand, it would be wrong to hazard an engagement, if
the old experienced soldiers testify to a disinclination to fight. A general,
however, may encourage and animate his troops by proper exhortations and
harangues, especially if by his account of the approaching action he can
persuade them into the belief of an easy victory. With this view, he should
lay before them the cowardice or unskillfulness of their enemies and remind
them of any former advantages they may have gained over them. He should
employ every argument capable of exciting rage, hatred and indignation
against the adversaries in the minds of his soldiers.

It is natural for men in general to be affected with some sensations
of fear at the beginning of an engagement, but there are without doubt
some of a more timorous disposition who are disordered by the very sight
of the enemy. To diminish these apprehensions before you venture on action,
draw up your army frequently in order of battle in some safe situation,
so that your men may be accustomed to the sight and appearance of the enemy.
When opportunity offers, they should be sent to fall upon them and endeavor
to put them to flight or kill some of their men. Thus they will become
acquainted with their customs, arms and horses. And the objects with which
we are once familiarized are no longer capable of inspiring us with terror.

CHOICE OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE

Good generals are acutely aware that victory depends much on the nature
of the field of battle. When you intend therefore to engage, endeavor to
draw the chief advantage from your situation. The highest ground is reckoned
the best. Weapons thrown from a height strike with greater force; and the
party above their antagonists can repulse and bear them down with greater
impetuosity, while they who struggle with the ascent have both the ground
and the enemy to contend with. There is, however, this difference with
regard to place: if you depend on your foot against the enemy's horse,
you must choose a rough, unequal and mountainous situation. But if, on
the contrary, you expect your cavalry to act with advantage against the
enemy's infantry, your ground must indeed be higher, but plain and open,
without any obstructions of woods or morasses.

ORDER OF BATTLE

In drawing up an army in order of battle, three things are to be considered:
the sun, the dust and the wind. The sun in your face dazzles the sight:
if the wind is against you, it turns aside and blunts the force of your
weapons, while it assists those of your adversary; and the dust driving
in your front fills the eyes of your men and blinds them. Even the most
unskillful endeavor to avoid these inconveniences in the moment of making
their dispositions; but a prudent general should extend his views beyond
the present; he should talke such measures as not to be incommoded in the
course of the day by different aspects of the sun or by contrary winds
which often rise at a certain hour and might be detrimental during action.
Our troops should be so disposed as to have these inconveniences behind
them, while they are directly in the enemy's front.

PROPER DISTANCES AND INTERVALS

Having explained the general disposition of the lines, we now come to
the distances and dimensions. One thousand paces contain a single rank
of one thousand six hundred and fifty-six foot soldiers, each man being
allowed three feet. Six ranks drawn up on the same extent of ground will
require nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-six men. To form only three
ranks of the same number will take up two thousand paces, but it is much
better to increase the number of ranks than to make your front too extensive.
We have before observed the distance between each rank should be six feet,
one foot of which is taken up by the men. Thus if you form a body of ten
thousand men into six ranks they will occupy thirty-six feet. in depth
and a thousand paces in front. By this calculation it is easy to compute
the extent of ground required for twenty or thirty thousand men to form
upon. Nor can a general be mistaken when thus he knows the proportion of
ground for any fixed number of men.

But if the field of battle is not spacious enough or your troops are
very numerous, you may form them into nine ranks or even more, for it is
more advantageous to engage in close order that to extend your line too
much. An army that takes up too much ground in front and too little in
depth, is quickly penetrated by the enemy's first onset. After this there
is no remedy. As to the post of the different corps in the right or left
wing or in the center, it is the general rule to draw them up according
to their respective ranks or to distribute them as circumstances or the
dispositions of the enemy may require.

DISPOSITION OF THE CAVALRY

The line of infantry being formed, the cavalry are drawn up in the wings.
The heavy horse, that is, the cuirassiers and troopers armed with lances,
should join the infantry. The light cavalry, consisting of the archers
and those who have no cuirasses, should be placed at a greater distance.
The best and heaviest horse are to cover the flanks of the foot, and the
light horse are posted as abovementioned to surround and disorder the enemy's
wings. A general should know what part of his own cavalry is most proper
to oppose any particular squadrons or troops of the enemy. For from some
causes not to be accounted for some particular corps fight better against
others, and those who have defeated superior enemies are often overcome
by an inferior force.

If your cavalry is not equal to the enemy's it is proper, after the
ancient custom, to intermingle it with light infantry armed with small
shields and trained to this kind of service. By observing this method,
even though the flower of the enemy's cavalry should attack you, they will
never be able to cope with this mixed disposition. This was the only resource
of the old generals to supply the defects of their cavalry, and they intermingled
the men, used to running and armed for this purpose with light shields,
swords and darts, among the horse, placing one of them between two troopers.

RESERVES

The method of having bodies of reserves in rear of the army, composed
of choice infantry and cavalry, commanded by the supernumerary lieutenant
generals, counts and tribunes, is very judicious and of great consequence
towards the gaining of a battle. Some should be posted in rear of the wings
and some near the center, to be ready to fly immediately to the assistance
of any part of the line which is hard pressed, to prevent its being pierced,
to supply the vacancies made therein during the action and thereby to keep
up the courage of their fellow soldiers and check the impetuosity of the
enemy. This was an invention of the Lacedaemonians, in which they were
imitated by the Carthaginians. The Romans have since observed it, and indeed
no better disposition can be found.

The line is solely designed to repulse, or if possible, break the enemy.
If it is necessary to form the wedge or the pincers, it must be done by
the supernumerary troops stationed in the rear for that purpose. If the
saw is to be formed, it must also be done from the reserves, for if once
you begin to draw off men from the line you throw all into confusion. If
any flying platoon of the enemy should fall upon your wing or any other
part of your army, and you have no supernumerary troops to oppose it or
if you pretend to detach either horse or foot from your line for that service
by endeavoring to protect one part, you will expose the other to greater
danger. In armies not very numerous, it is much better to contract the
front, and to have strong reserves. In short, you must have a reserve of
good and well-armed infantry near the center to form the wedge and thereby
pierce the enemy's line; and also bodies of cavalry armed with lances and
cuirasses, with light infantry, near the wings, to surround the flanks
of the enemy.

THE POST OF THE GENERAL AND OF THE SECOND AND THIRD IN COMMAND

The post of the commander-in-chief is generally on the right between
the cavalry and infantry. For from this place he can best direct the motions
of the whole army and move elements with the greatest ease wherever he
finds it necessary. It is also the most convenient spot to give his orders
to both horse and foot and to animate them equally by his presence. It
is his duty to surround the enemy's left wing opposed to him with his reserve
of horse and light infantry, and attack it in the flank and rear. The second
in command is posted in the center of the infantry to encourage and support
them. A reserve of good and well-armed infantry is near him and under his
orders. With this reserve he either forms the wedge to pierce the enemy's
line or, if they form the wedge first, prepares the pincers for its reception.
The post of the third in command is on the left. He should be a careful
and intrepid officer, this part of the army being difficult to manage and
defective, as it were, from its situation in the line. He should therefore
have a reserve of good cavalry and active infantry to enable him always
to extend his left in such a manner as to prevent its being surrounded.

The war shout should not be begun till both armies have joined, for
it is a mark of ignorance or cowardice to give it at a distance. The effect
is much greater on the enemy when they find themselves struck at the same
instant with the horror of the noise and the points of the weapons.

You must always endeavor to get the start of your enemy in drawing up
in order of battle, as you will then have it in your power to make your
proper dispositions without obstruction. This will increase the courage
of your own troops and intimidate your adversaries. For a superiority of
courage seems to be implied on the side of an army that offers battle,
whereas troops begin to be fearful who see their enemies ready to attack
them. You will also secure another great advantage, that of marching up
in order and falling upon them while forming and still in confusion. For
part of the victory consists in throwing the enemy into disorder before
you engage them.

MANEUVERS IN ACTION

An able general never loses a favorable opportunity of surprising the
enemy either when tired on the march, divided in the passage of a river,
embarrassed in morasses, struggling with the declivities of mountains,
when dispersed over the country they think themselves in security or are
sleeping in their quarters. In all these cases the adversaries are surprised
and destroyed before they have time to put themselves on their guard. But
if they are too cautious to give you an opportunity of surprising or ensnaring
them, you are then obliged to engage openly and on equal terms. This at
present is foreign to the subject. However military skill is no less necessary
in general actions than in carrying on war by subtlety and stratagem.

Your first care is to secure your left wing from being surrounded by
the enemy's numbers or attacked in flank or rear by flying platoons, a
misfortune that often happens. Nor is your right to be neglected, though
less frequently in danger. There is only one remedy for this: to wheel
back your wing and throw it into a circular position. By this evolution
your soldiers meet the enemy on the quarter attacked and defend the rear
of their comrades. But your best men should be posted on the angles of
the flanks, since it is against them the enemy make their principal efforts.

There is also a method of resisting the wedge when formed by the enemy.
The wedge is a disposition of a body of infantry widening gradually towards
the base and terminating in a point towards the front. It pierces the enemy's
line by a multitude of darts directed to one particular place. The soldiers
call it the swine's head. To oppose this disposition, they make use af
another called the pincers, resembling the letter V, composed of a body
of men in close order. It receives the wedge, inclosing it on both sides,
and thereby prevents it from penetrating the line.

The saw is another disposition formed of resolute soldiers drawn up
in a straight line advanced into the front against the enemy, to repair
any disorder. The platoon is a body of men separated from the line, to
hover on every side and attack the enemy wherever they find opportunity.
And against this is to be detached a stronger and more numerous platoon.

Above all, a general must never attempt to alter his dispositions or
break his order of battle during the time of action, for such an alteration
would immediately Occasion disorder and confusion which the enemy would
not fail to improve to their advantage.

VARIOUS FORMATIONS FOR BATTLE

An army may be drawn up for a general engagement in seven different
formations. The first formation is an oblong square of a large front, of
common use both in ancient and modern times, although not thought the best
by various judges of the service, because an even and level plain of an
extent sufficient to contain its front cannot always be found, and if there
should be any irregularity or hollow in the line, it is often pierced in
that part. Besides, an enemy superior in number may surround either your
right or left wing, the consequence of which will be dangerous, unless
you have a reserve ready to advance and sustain his attack. A general should
make use of this disposition only when his forces are better and more numerous
than the enemy's, it being thereby in his power to attack both the flanks
and surround them on every side.

The second and best disposition is the oblique. For although your army
consists of few troops, yet good and advantageously posted, it will greatly
contribute to your obtaining the victory, notwithstanding the numbers and
bravery of the enemy. It is as follows: as the armies are marching up to
the attack, your left wing must be kept back at such a distance from the
enemy's right as to be out of reach of their darts and arrows. Your right
wing must advance obliquely upon the enemy's left, and begin the engagement.
And you must endeavor with your best cavalry and infantry to surround the
wing with which you are engaged, make it give way and fall upon the enemy
in the rear. If they once give ground and the attack is properly seconded,
you will undoubtedly gain the victory, while your left wing, which continued
at a distance, will remain untouched. An army drawn up in this manner bears
some resemblance to the letter A or a mason's level. If the enemy should
be beforehand with you in this evolution, recourse must be had to the supernumerary
horse and foot posted as a reserve in the rear, as I mentioned before.
They must be ordered to support your left wing. This will enable you to
make a vigorous resistance against the artifice of the enemy.

The third formation is like the second, but not so good, as it obliges
you to begin the attack with your left wing on the enemy's right. The efforts
of soldiers on the left are weak and imperfect from their exposed and defective
situation in the line. I will explain this formation more clearly. Although
your left wing should be much better than your right, yet it must be reinforced
with some of the best horse and foot and ordered to commence the acnon
with the enemy's right in order to disorder and surround it as expeditiously
as possible. And the other part of your army, composed of the worst troops,
should remain at such a distance from the enemy's left as not to be annoyed
by their darts or in danger of being attacked sword in hand. In this oblique
formation care must be taken to prevent the line being penetrated by the
wedges of the enemy, and it is to be employed only when the enemy's right
wing is weak and your greatest strength is on your left.

The fourth formation is this: as your army is marching to the attack
in order of battle and you come within four or five hundred paces of the
enemy, both your wings must be ordered unexpectedly to quicken their pace
and advance with celerity upon them. When they find themselves attacked
on both wings at the same time, the sudden surprise may so disconcert them
as to give you an easy victory. But although this method, if your troops
are very resolute and expert, may ruin the enemy at once, yet it is hazardous.
The general who attempts it is obliged to abandon and expose his center
and to divide his army into three parts. If the enemy are not routed at
the first charge, they have a fair opportunity of attacking the wings which
are separated from each other and the center which is destitute of assistance.

The fifth formation resembles the fourth but with this addition: the
light infantry and the archers are formed before the center to cover it
from the attempts of the enemy. With this precaution the general may safely
follow the above mentioned method and attack the enemy's left wing with
his right, and their right with his left. If he puts them to flight, he
gains an immediate victory, and if he fails of success his center is in
no danger, being protected by the light infantry and archers.

The sixth formation is very good and almost like the second. It is used
when the general cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops.
If made with judgment, notwithstanding his inferiority, he has often a
good chance for victory. As your line approaches the enemy, advance your
right wing against their left and begin the attack with your best cavalry
and infantry. At the same time keep the rest of the army at a great distance
from the enemy's right, extended in a direct line like a javelin. Thus
if you can surround their left and attack it in flank and rear, you must
inevitably defeat them. It is impossible for the enemy to draw off reinforcements
from their right or from their center to sustain their left in this emergency,
since the remaining part of your army is extended and at a great distance
from them in the form of the letter L. It is a formation often used in
an action on a march.

The seventh formation owes its advantages to the nature of the ground
and will enable you to oppose an enemy with an army inferior both in numbers
and goodness, provided one of your flanks can be covered either with an
eminence, the sea, a river, a lake, a city, a morass or broken ground inaccessible
to the enemy. The rest of the army must be formed, as usual, in a straight
line and the unsecured flank must be protected by your light troops and
all your cavalry. Sufficiently defended on one side by the nature of the
ground and on the other by a double support of cavalry, you may then safely
venture on action.

One excellent and general rule must be observed. If you intend to engage
with your right wing only, it must be composed of your best troops. And
the same method must be taken with respect to the left. Or if you intend
to penetrate the enemy's line, the wedges which you form for that purpose
before your center, must consist of the best disciplined soldiers. Victory
in general is gained by a small number of men. Therefore the wisdom of
a general appears in nothing more than in such choice of disposition of
his men as is most consonant with reason and service.

THE FLIGHT OF AN ENEMY SHOULD NOT BE PREVENTED, BUT FACILITATED

Generals unskilled in war think a victory incomplete unless the enemy
are so straightened in their ground or so entirely surrounded by numbers
as to have no possibility of escape. But in such situation, where no hopes
remain, fear itself will arm an enemy and despair inspires courage. When
men find they must inevitably perish, they willingly resolve to die with
their comrades and with their arms in their hands. The maxim of Scipio,
that a golden bridge should be made for a flying enemy, has much been commended.
For when they have free room to escape they think of nothing but how to
save themselves by flight, and the confusion becoming general, great numbers
are cut to pieces. The pursuers can be in no danger when the vanquished
have thrown away their arms for greater haste. In this case the greater
the number of the flying army, the greater the slaughter. Numbers are of
no signification where troops once thrown into consternation are equally
terrified at the sight of the enemy as at their weapons. But on the contrary,
men when shut up, although weak and few in number, become a match for the
enemy from this very reflection, that they have no resource but in despair.

"The conquer'd's safety is, to hope for none."

MANNER OF CONDUCTING A RETREAT

Having gone through the various particulars relative to general actions,
it remains at present to explain the manner of retreating in presence of
the enemy. This is an operation, which, in the judgment of men of greatest
skill and experience, is attended with the utmost hazard. A general certainly
discourages his own troops and animates his enemies by retiring out of
the field without fighting. Yet as this must sometimes necessarily happen,
it will be proper to consider how to perform it with safety.

In the first place your men must not imagine that you retire to decline
an action, but believe your retreat an artifice to draw the enemy into
an ambuscade or more advantageous position where you may easier defeat
them in case they follow you. For troops who perceive their general despairs
of success are prone to flight. You must be cautious lest the enemy should
discover your retreat and immediately fall upon you. To avoid this danger
the cavalry are generally posted in the front of the infantry to conceal
their motions and retreat from the enemy. The first divisions are drawn
off first, the others following in their turns. The last maintain their
ground till the rest have marched off, and then file off themselves and
join them in a leisurely and regular succession. Some generals have judged
it best to make their retreat in the night after reconnoitering their routes,
and thus gain so much ground that the enemy, not discovering their departure
till daybreak, were not able to come up with them. The light infantry was
also sent forward to possess the eminences under which the army might instantly
retire with safety; and the enemy, in case they pursued, be exposed to
the light infantry, masters of the heights, seconded by the cavalry.

A rash and inconsiderate pursuit exposes an army to the greatest danger
possible, that of falling into ambuscades and the hands of troops ready
for their reception. For as the temerity of an army is increased and their
caution lessened by the pursuit of a flying enemy, this is the most favorable
opportunity for such snares. The greater the security, the greater the
danger. Troops, when unprepared, at their meals, fatigued after a march,
when their horses are feeding, and in short, when they believe themselves
most secure, are generally most liable to a surprise. All risks of this
sort are to be carefully avoided and all opportunities taken of distressing
the enemy by such methods. Neither numbers nor courage avail in misfortunes
of this nature.

A general who has been defeated in a pitched battle, although skill
and conduct have the greatest share in the decision, may in his defense
throw the blame on fortune. But if he has suffered himself to be surprised
or drawn into the snares of his enemy, he has no excuse for his fault,
because he might have avoided such a misfortune by taking proper precautions
and employing spies on whose intelligence he could depend.

When the enemy pursue a retreating foe, the following snare is usually
laid. A small body of cavalry is ordered to pursue them on the direct road.
At the same time a strong detachment is secretly sent another way to conceal
itself on their route. When the cavalry have overtaken the enemy, they
make some feint attacks and retire. The enemy, imagining the danger past,
and that they have escaped the snare, neglect their order and march without
regularity. Then the detachment sent to intercept them, seizing the opportunity,
falls upon them unexpectedly and destroys them with ease.

Many generals when obliged to retreat through woods send forward parties
to seize the defiles and difficult passes, to avoid ambuscades and block
the roads with barricades of felled trees to secure themselves from being
pursued and attacked in the rear. In short both sides have equal opportunities
of surprising or laying ambuscades on th1e march. The army which retreats
leaves troops behind for that purpose posted in convenient valleys or mountains
covered with woods, and if the enemy falls into the snare, it returns immediately
to their assistance. The army that pursues detaches different parties of
light troops to march ahead through by-roads and intercepts the enemy,
who are thus surrounded and attacked at once in front and rear. The flying
army may return and fall on the enemy while asleep in the night. And the
pursuing army may, even though the distance is great, surprise the adversary
by forced marches. The former endeavor may be at the crossing of a river
in order to destroy such part of the enemy's army as has already crossed.
The pursuers hasten their march to fall upon those bodies of the enemy
that have not yet crossed.

ARMED CHARIOTS AND ELEPHANTS

The armed chariots used in war by Antiochus and Mithridates at first
terrified the Romans, but they afterwards made a jest of them. As a chariot
of this sort does not always meet with plain and level ground, the least
obstruction stops it. And if one of the horses be either killed or wounded,
it falls into the enemy's hands. The Roman soldiers rendered them useless
chiefly by the following contrivance: at the instant the engagement began,
they strewed the field of battle with caltrops, and the horses that drew
the chariots, running full speed on them, were infallibly destroyed. A
caltrop is a machine composed of four spikes or points arranged so that
in whatever manner it is thrown on the ground, it rests on three and presents
the fourth upright.

Elephants by their vast size, horrible noise and the novelty of their
form are at first very terrible both to men and horses. Pyrrhus first used
them against the Romans in Lucania. And afterwards Hannibal brought them
into the field in Africa. Antiochus in the east and Jugurtha in Numidia
had great numbers. Many expedients have been used against them. In Lucania
a centurion cut off the trunk of one with his sword. Two soldiers armed
from head to foot in a chariot drawn by two horses, also covered with armor,
attacked these beasts with lances of great length. They were secured by
their armor from the archers on the elephants and avoided the fury of the
animals by the swiftness of their horses. F oot soldiers completely armored,
with the addition of long iron spikes fixed on their arms, shoulders and
helmets, to prevent the elephant from seizing them with his trunk, were
also employed against them.

But among the ancients, the velites usually engaged them. They were
young soldiers, lightly armed, active and very expert in throwing their
missile weapons on horseback. These troops kept hovering round the elephants
continually and killed them with large lances and javelins. Afterwards,
the soldiers, as their apprehensions decreased, attacked them in a body
and, throwing their javelins together, destroyed them by the multitude
of wounds. Slingers with round stones from the fustibalus and sling killed
both the men who guided the elephants and the soldiers who fought in the
towers on their backs. This was found by experience to be the best and
safest expedient. At other times on the approach of these beasts, the soldiers
opened their ranks and let them pass through. When they got into the midst
of the troops, who surrounded them on all sides, they were captured with
their guards unhurt.

Large balistae, drawn on carriages by two horses or mules, should be
placed in the rear of the line, so that when the elephants come within
reach they may be transfixed with the darts. The balistae should be larger
and the heads of the darts stronger and broader than usual, so that the
darts may be thrown farther, with greater force and the wounds be proportioned
to the bodies of the beasts. It was proper to describe these several methods
and contrivances employed against elephants, so that it may be known on
occasion in what manner to oppose those prodigious animals.

RESOURCES IN CASE OF DEFEAT

If while one part of your army is victorious the other should be defeated,
you are by no means to despair, since even in this extremity the constancy
and resolution of a general may recover a complete victory. There are innumerable
instances where the party that gave least way to despair was esteemed the
conqueror. For where losses and advantages seem nearly equal, he is reputed
to have the superiority who bears up against his misfortunes with greatest
resolution. He is therefore to be first, if possible, to seize the spoils
of the slain and to make rejoicings for the victory. Such marks of confidence
dispirit the enemy and redouble your own courage.

Yet notwithstanding an entire defeat, all possible remedies must be
attempted, since many generals have been fortunate enough to repair such
a loss. A prudent officer will never risk a general action without taking
such precautions as will secure him from any considerable loss in case
of a defeat, for the uncertainty of war and the nature of things may render
such a misfortune unavoidable. The neighborhood of a mountain, a fortified
post in the rear or a resolute stand made by a good body of troops to cover
the retreat, may be the means of saving the army.

An army after a defeat has sometimes rallied, returned on the enemy,
dispersed him by pursuing in order and destroyed him without difficulty.
Nor can men be in a more dangerous situation than, when in the midst of
joy after victory, their exultation is suddenly converted into terror.
Whatever be the event, the remains of the army must be immediately assembled,
reanimated by suitable exhortations and furnished with fresh supplies of
arms. New levies should immediately be made and new reinforcements provided.
And it is of much the greatest consequence that proper opportunities should
be taken to surprise the victorious enemies, to draw them into snares and
ambuscades and by this means to recover the drooping spirits of your men.
Nor will it be difficult to meet with such opportunities, as the nature
of the human mind is apt to be too much elated and to act with too little
caution in prosperity. If anyone should imagine no resource is left after
the loss of a battle, let him reflect on what has happened in similar cases
and he will find that they who were victorious in the end were often unsuccessful
in the beginning.

GENERAL MAXIMS

It is the nature of war that what is beneficial to you is detrimental
to the enemy and what is of service to him always hurts you. It is therefore
a maxim never to do, or to omit doing, anything as a consequence of his
actions, but to consult invariably your own interest only. And you depart
from this interest whenever you imitate such measures as he pursues for
his benefit. For the same reason it would be wrong for him to follow such
steps as you take for your advantage.

The more your troops have been accustomed to camp duties on frontier
stations and the more carefully they have been disciplined, the less danger
they will be exposed to in the field.

Men must be sufficiently tried before they are led against the enemy.

It is much better to overcome the enemy by famine, surprise or terror
than by general actions, for in the latter instance fortune has often a
greater share than valor. Those designs are best which the enemy are entirely
ignorant of till the moment of execution. Opportunity in war is often more
to be depended on than courage.

To debauch the enemy's soldiers and encourage them when sincere in surrendering
themselves, is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion
than by slaughter.

It is better to have several bodies of reserves than to extend your
front too much.

A general is not easily overcome who can form a true judgment of his
own and the enemy's forces.

Valor is superior to numbers.

The nature of the ground is often of nmore consequence than courage.

Few men are born brave; many become so through care and force of discipline.

An army is strengthened by labor and enervated by idleness.

Troops are not to be led to battle unless confident of success.

Novelty and surprise throw an enemy into consternation; but common incidents
have no effect.

He who rashly pursues a flying enemy with troops in disorder, seems
inclined to resign that victory which he had before obtained.

An army unsupplied with grain and other necessary provisions will be
vanquished without striking a blow.

A general whose troops are superior both in number and bravery should
engage in the oblong square, which is the first formation.

He who judges himself inferior should advance his right wing obliquely
against the enemy's left. This is the second formation.

If your left wing is strongest, you must attack the enemy's right according
to the third formation.

The general who can depend on the discipline of his men should begin
the engagement by attacking both the enemy's wings at once, the fourth
formation.

He whose light infantry is good should cover his center by forming them
in its front and charge both the enemy's wings at once. This is the fifth
formation.

He who cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops,
if obliged to engage, should begin the action with his right and endeavor
to break the enemy's left, the rest of his army remaining formed in a line
perpendicular to the front and extended to the rear like a javelin. This
is the sixth formation.

If your forces are few and weak in comparison to the enemy, you must
make use of the seventh formation and cover one of your flanks either with
an eminence, a city, the sea, a river or some protection of that kind.

A general who trusts to his cavalry should choose the proper ground
for them and employ them principally in the action.

He who depends on his infantry should choose a situation most proper
for them and make most use of their service.

When an enemy's spy lurks in the camp, order all your soldiers in the
day time to their tents, and he will instantly be apprehended.

On finding the enemy has notice of your designs, you must immediately
alter your plan of operations.

Consult with many on proper measures to be taken, but communicate the
plans you intend to put in execution to few, and those only of the most
assured fidelity; or rather trust no one but yourself.

Punishment, and fear thereof, are necessary to keep soldiers in order
in quarters; but in the field they are more influenced by hope and rewards.

Good officers never engage in general actions unless induced by opportunity
or obliged by necessity.

To distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate
skill.

Many instructions might be given with regard to the cavalry. But as
this branch of the service has been brought to perfection since the ancient
writers and considerable improvements have been made in their drills and
maneuvers, their arms, and the quality and management of their horses,
nothing can be collected from their works. Our present mode of discipline
is sufficient.

Dispositions for action must be carefully concealed from the enemy,
lest they should counteract them and defeat your plans by proper expedients.

This abridgment of the most eminent military writers, invincible Emperor,
contains the maxims and instructions they have left us, approved by different
ages and confirmed by repeated experience. The Persians admire your skill
in archery; the Huns and Alans endeavor in vain to imitate your dexterity
in horsemanship; the Saracens and Indians cannot equal your activity in
the hunt; and even the masters at arms pique themselves on only part of
that knowledge and expertness of which you give so many instances in their
own profession. How glorious it is therefore for Your Majesty with all
these qualifications to unite the science of war and the art of conquest,
and to convince the world that by Your conduct and courage You are equally
capable of performing the duties of the soldier and the general!

* An instrument with four points so designed that when any three of
them are on the ground the fourth projects upward. These are extensively
used today for antitank barriers.

End of Etext The Military Institutions of the Romans (De Re Militari)
By Flavius Vegetius Renatus