09TBILISI447, GEORGIA: MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN ABKHAZIA AND

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000447
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019
TAGS: PGOVPRELPHUMMOPSRSGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN ABKHAZIA AND
SOUTH OSSETIA
REF: A. TBILISI 358
¶B. MOSCOW 488
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment. International monitors continue
to report to us their observations of significant military
assets and movements inside the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
administrative boundaries, including tanks, artillery, and
personnel. The assets observed exceed the limits the
Georgians have voluntarily and unilaterally placed upon
themselves on the south side of the boundaries. Although
UNOMIG determined that recent reports of Russian border
guards near the Abkhaz boundary were unfounded, Russian
military forces remain in place, and none of the monitoring
organizations has sufficient access to determine the full
strength of Russian, Abkhaz or South Ossetian forces near the
boundaries. Russian allegations of a significant buildup on
the Georgian side -- and a resulting increase in tension --
have not only been refuted by the monitoring organizations,
but seem designed to deflect attention from the military
activities on the northern side of the boundaries. Such
misdirection could be a dangerous effort to lay the
groundwork for blaming Georgia for any provocations or
escalation. End summary and comment.
ABKHAZIA
¶2. (C) In a February 26 summary of "Heavy Armament in the
Zone of Conflict" (which excluded the Kodori Valley), UNOMIG
reported the following totals of equipment confirmed to be
held by the various sides in areas adjacent to the
administrative boundary. (Note: These numbers reflect
confirmed observations, not exhaustive totals. UNOMIG has
been restricted in its freedom of movement on the Abkhaz side
of the boundary in recent months, but not restricted at all
on the Georgian-controlled side; it is therefore likely that
the figures given for the Russian/Abkhaz side are
underestimates, and those given for the Georgian-controlled
side are closer to the actual totals. Post is not aware that
this summary has been reported to UN headquarters through
official channels. End note.)
-- Russian Federation Forces: 10 T-72 tanks, 6 2S3 152mm
self-propelled artillery pieces (howitzers), 1 lightly
armored multi-purpose vehicle (MT-LB), and 32 armored
personnel carriers (BTRs). Three of the tanks may have since
moved out (see paragraph 5).
-- Abkhaz forces: 7 T-55 tanks, 3 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft
cannon, 3 MT-LBs, and 3 BTRs.
-- Georgian Interior Ministry forces: 22 COBRA Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), 2 JLTVs with machine guns, 2
armored ambulance JLTVs.
¶3. (C) One of the provisions of the Georgian government's
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM) is a ban on artillery bigger than 120mm in
caliber within 15 kilometers of the Abkhaz administrative
boundary; this provision includes all tanks. None of the 17
tanks and 6 howitzers counted by UNOMIG on the Russian/Abkhaz
side of the boundary would therefore be allowed under the
MOU.
¶4. (C) The Russians have been harshly critical of the COBRAs
used by the Georgian side to move Interior Ministry forces
around the area adjacent to the boundary, calling them
inherently destabilizing; although UNOMIG has observed only
two vehicles armed with a machine gun, any of them could
potentially be armed with one. International monitors told
us that even when armed with a machine gun, it was impossible
to call these "offensive" military equipment. The Georgians
Qto call these "offensive" military equipment. The Georgians
counter that 11 individuals have been killed since the August
war, many of them by sniper fire, and their personnel
therefore need the protection. Although the EUMM has
questioned the need for the COBRAs, they are allowed under
the MOU, and the EUMM itself uses very similar vehicles for
its own personnel. (The British Ambassador recently
commented in a western Ambassadors' meeting that it was
pretty hard to criticize the Georgian COBRA deployments when
European nations will not send their own monitors up to the
boundary areas unless they are in such armored vehicles.)
Furthermore, compared to the 26 COBRAs, UNOMIG has counted 32
BTRs on the Russian/Abkhaz side, which can transport more
personnel and support more lethal weaponry. The MOU allows
no more than 5 armored vehicles with a gun between 60mm and
120mm in caiber.
¶5. (C) On February 25, UNOMIG monitors determined that
TBILISI 00000447 002 OF 003
reports from the press that Russia had introduced 180 border
guards to the area along the administrative boundary were
incorrect. Russian forces remain a prominent presence in the
conflict zone, however; the press stories may have been a
corruption of a series of what looked to UNOMIG like troop
rotations. On February 28, UNOMIG
monitors compiled
information about a series of movements in the previous days
involving 25 BTRs, 39 trucks and 3 tanks moving north and 20
BTRs and 25 trucks moving south. On February 13, Abkhaz de
facto presidential representative in Gali Ruslan Kishmaria
told visiting U.S. officials that Abkhaz forces had taken
control along the boundary, and Russian forces had backed
away but remained in positions somewhat behind the Abkhaz.
With limited access, however, it remains difficult for UNOMIG
to determine the total number of Russian and Abkhaz forces
arrayed in Abkhazia, or their position, with any precision.
¶6. (C) Russia has alleged that Georgia has deployed 2,000
forces along the areas adjacent to both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. After EUMM Head of Mission Hansjoerg Haber
forcefully rejected these allegations when they were made in
Geneva on February 17, the EUMM, as well as UNOMIG, also
conducted a series of unannounced inspections of the Georgian
side of the boundaries the week of Feb. 17 to doublecheck.
Both organizations determined that the allegations were
unfounded (ref A).
SOUTH OSSETIA
¶7. (C) The EUMM certification of Georgia's compliance with
its MOU applied to the area outside South Ossetia as well.
The OSCE also confirmed in a summary report for the period
February 16 - March 1 that it had not observed any visible
presence of Georgian armed forces in areas adjacent to South
Ossetia. No international monitoring organization has
regular access to South Ossetia, so information about
military movements inside the administrative boundary is
extremely limited and based primarily on what can be observed
from the Georgian-controlled side of the boundary. Even
these limited observations indicate, however, that there is a
significant military presence within a short distance of the
boundary. In the same summary report, the OSCE noted a large
Russian armed forces encampment northwest of Tskhinvali and
supplementary posts to the east of the city.
¶8. (C) On February 20, OSCE monitors observed what it
eventually determined to be a battery of 5 self-propelled
howitzers in the area of Dvani, just inside the
administrative boundary, southwest of Tskhinvali. It also
observed a Fire Direction Center vehicle (which enables
targeting), communications equipment, and ammunition. The
OSCE asked Colonel Tarasov, the Russian commander of South
Ossetia, about the equipment on February 20; he claimed the
equipment was Ossetian, but he seemed to the OSCE to be
flustered by the question. By February 25 monitors
determined the artillery was gone from that location,
although the supporting equipment remained, which suggested
to the OSCE that there might be an interest in being able to
restore the battery on short notice. On March 2 the OSCE
reported four of the artillery pieces were back in the same
location. Although unable to establish the nature of the
artillery with 100% accuracy, OSCE believes them to be either
140mm 2S4s or 152mmm 2S5s (with a slight possibility of
2SMs), both of which would exceed the limits of Georgia's MOU.
¶9. (C) EUMM and OSCE monitors regularly observe tanks, BTRs,
Q9. (C) EUMM and OSCE monitors regularly observe tanks, BTRs,
and armored infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs) just inside the
administrative boundary. In some recent examples, OSCE
monitors observed three BMPs at a Russian/Ossetian position
south of Orchosani on March 1. This position is within a few
hundred meters of the administrative boundary at the point
where the boundary itself is within a few hundred meters of
the main east-west highway, and the position is clearly
visible from the highway itself. OSCE monitors also observed
four Russian battle tanks moving between Tbeti (just inside
the administrative boundary, west of Tskhinvali) and
Tamarasheni on February 24. On February 28, the OSCE
observed Georgian Interior Ministry forces fortifying their
observation post in Odzisi, and on March 5 the EUMM reported
the Georgian forces moved the post 100 meters closer to the
joint Russian/Ossetian post to the north. The Georgians
explained to the OSCE the change was in response to a buildup
of Russian forces in the area of Akhmaji in the Akhalgori
Valley, just inside the administrative boundary and across a
narrow river from Odzisi. The Georgians reported seeing
multiple rocket launchers, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons,
and artillery deployed in recent days and 12 tanks moving
north of Odzisi. OSCE monitors themselves observed 5 BMPs,
all armed with a 30mm automatic gun, and one T-72 tank, at
the Russian position north of Akhmaji. At the joint
TBILISI 00000447 003 OF 003
Russian/Ossetian position north of Odzisi, the monitors
observed three BMPs and one T-72.
COMMENT: Don't Throw Stones at Glass Houses
¶10. (C) Despite the monitoring organizations' repeated
findings of no military buildup by Georgia, Russia has
repeated such allegations since February meetings in Geneva
(ref B). It has even accused Georgia of having specific
elements -- tanks and rocket launchers -- that Georgia does
not have near the boundaries, but Russia does. The
allegations could be perceived as an effort both to direct
the international community's attention away from Russia's
own activities north of the boundaries and to keep open the
possibility of blaming provocations or escalations on the
Georgians. Combined with Russian unwillingness to schedule
another round of Geneva talks before June, as well as with
the possibly expiry of the OSCE and UNOMIG mandates in June,
the overall effort could be laying the groundwork for Russia
to keep its options open in the occupied territories this
spring -- including the military option. In our effort to
encourage Georgia's transparency and restraint, we need to
continue to push for full transparency and restraint
throughout the entire territory of Georgia. Even though
international monitors have limited access to Abkhazia and no
access to South Ossetia (a reminder of the importance of
renewing the monitors' mandates), they have still been able
to provide solid evidence refuting Russia's claims. In our
view, allowing those claims to go unchallenged could lead
Russia to believe it has available a pretext for renewed
military action.
TEFFT

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Georgia) database..

We wish to express our gratitude to Julian Assange and his team for making this data available as it is an important public record.

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