Wednesday, September 19, 2012

Genoa - Strange Relationship

It’s fair to say that last season was not particularly
enjoyable for Genoa. They only just managed to avoid relegation, while their
defence was the worst in Serie
A, conceding a horrific 69 goals. Matters came to a head when a
group of their fans staged a protest during the 4-1 home defeat to Siena,
throwing flares and demanding that the players gave them their shirts, leading
to a 45 minute suspension of the match.

That evening Genoa’s volatile president Enrico Preziosi
sacked the coach Alberto Malesani, replacing him with Luigi De Canio, who will
be hoping to get the fans back on board this season with his own brand of
attacking football. Of course, he may not be helped by the huge amount of
player movements (in and out), which has become the normal state of affairs at
the Luigi Ferraris.

In particular, Genoa sold their leading scorer, the
Argentine striker Rodrigo Palacio, to Inter, while they also let Alberto
Gilardino move to Bologna on loan. In their place, they brought in last
season’s Serie B
top scorer, the unfortunately named Ciro Immobile, from Pescara and former
striker Marco Borriello, who has strutted his stuff with limited success for
numerous clubs, but in fairness did net an impressive 19 goals for Genoa in the
2007/08 season.

"Borriello - return of the prodigal son"

More positively, this is Genoa’s sixth consecutive season in
Italy’s top flight, which represents a major improvement after all the time
spent in the lower leagues in the preceding years and is virtually
unprecedented post-war. Although Genoa have a glorious past, winning the
Italian title no fewer than nine times, the last of these victories came in
1924, so it’s somewhat ancient history.

Preziosi took over the club in 2003, just after the club had
been relegated to Serie
C1, though Genoa were saved by the Italian Football Federation’s
controversial decision to expand Serie
B to 24 teams after the infamous Caso
Catania. Two years later Genoa became Serie
B champions, but were demoted to C1
after they were found guilty of match fixing the vital final game against
Venezia. Despite being given a three-point penalty, Genoa finished as
runners-up the next season, securing an immediate return to Serie B after
winning a play-off against Monza.

The following season Genoa achieved a second successive
promotion, reaching Serie
A in 2007, a testament to Preziosi’s support during this turbulent
period. Until the last troubled season, Genoa have been comfortable in the top
tier, finishing in the top half of the table four years in a row, including a
memorable fifth place in 2008/09, when they narrowly missed out on Champions
League qualification, largely thanks to the efforts of two players brought in
from the Spanish league, the prolific Diego Milito and a rejuvenated Thiago
Motta.

"Preziosi - buy or sell?"

However, Preziosi is a man who divides opinion. The former
Como owner is a successful businessman, making his money from one of the
world’s largest toymakers, and it is clear that he has calmed the waters at
Genoa while providing substantial financial support. Indeed, he acquired the
club from the liquidator of Genoa’s parent company after they had suffered from
having three different owners in the previous six years.

On the other hand, he has been involved in countless clashes
with the authorities. Only last week he was banned from attending football
stadiums for six months as a much-delayed punishment for the 2005 match fixing
case.

Preziosi’s Genoa have also been heavily involved in the “bilanciopoli” case,
a false accounting scandal whereby football clubs inflated the value of their
players in order to improve the balance sheet. In particular, the fiscal
authorities targeted Genoa’s 2004 and 2005 accounts, resulting in fines and
bans, though a few years later the club was half-cleared with the tribunal
ruling that there were no false invoices, but that the accounts were
manipulated in some way.

Hence, the raised eyebrows at Genoa’s frenetic transfer
activity. Since 2008 the club’s net spend in the transfer market is only €8
million, but this disguises a key point, namely the enormous turnover of
players coming in and out. So that net €8 million actually represents a barely
credible €272 million of purchases and €264 million of sales in just five
seasons.

Not for nothing is Preziosi known as the “king of the
transfer market”, though he has pointed out that it does not matter how the
club performs on paper and he should be judged by displays on the pitch.
Clearly, such a massive movement of players each season makes it difficult for
the squad to gel, but this business model is imperative for the club’s
fortunes. In short every player is for sale at the right price with most of the
funds reinvested in cheaper alternatives that are (hopefully) then sold for a
fat profit at a later date.

The club has been trading players like stocks or commodities
for the last few years, but there has been a modification in their approach
recently. After the promotion to Serie
A, Preziosi splashed the cash with a net outlay of €57 million in
three seasons, but the last two seasons Genoa have looked to sell more players,
the latest big money departures being Miguel Veloso to Dynamo Kiev and Mattia
Destro to Roma (a paid loan with option to buy). In fact, in that period only
Udinese, the acknowledged masters of player trading in Italy, have higher net
sales proceeds than Genoa’s €49 million.

The harsh reality is that Genoa simply do not have the
financial resources to hang on to their star players, as can be seen by looking
at their profit and loss account. At first glance, it does not seem too bad
with the club just about breaking even and actually making a pre-tax profit of
€1.8 million in 2011 (though they made a hefty loss of €17 million the previous
year), but this is heavily impacted by player trading through player sales and
co-ownership deals.

Excluding player trading, the club makes massive operating
losses: a frightening €156 million in the last three years, including €67
million in 2011 alone. This includes non-cash expenses such as player
amortisation and depreciation, but even EBITDA (Earnings before Interest,
Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation) is strongly negative, e.g. €23 million
in 2011.

It should be noted that Genoa changed their accounting close
in 2008 from 30 June to 31 December, so the accounting year now straddles two
seasons, e.g. 2011 includes the second half of the 2010/11 season and the first
half of 2011/12. This is a somewhat bizarre feature of a few Italian clubs,
though is sometimes done to be in line with the parent company’s reporting
timetable.

Regardless of the accounting close, the impact of player
trading on Genoa’s accounts is undeniable. In fact, the club would have reported
a loss of €73 million in 2011 without the money made from player sales (€58.8
million) and co-ownership deals (€13.8 million).

Profit from player sales is simple enough, being the
difference between sales proceeds and the remaining value of the players sold
in the accounts, though the slight twist is that the €58.8 million comprised
€62.2 million of plusvalenze
(profitable sales) less €3.8 million of minusvalenze(loss-making sales including settlement
of player contracts, such as Anthony Vandenborre €1.5 million).

Co-ownership deals are a little more complex, though such
arrangements are very common in Italy, whereby two (or more) clubs share the
ownership of a player’s rights. This is regarded as a good way to lower costs
and reduce risk when purchasing a player, though the practice is banned in
England and France. Astonishingly, Genoa had 24 co-ownership deals on their
books in 2011.

"Granqvist - handy Andy"

When such a joint ownership agreement is terminated, any
payment higher than the amount on the balance sheet is treated as a gain (“un provento”),
while any lower payment is shown as an expense (“un
onere”). In Genoa’s 2011 accounts, this produced a net gain of €13.8
million, made up of a €17m gain, mainly Andrea Ranocchia (Inter) €6 million,
Bosko Jankovic (Palermo) €3.5 million, Giuseppe Sculli (Lazio) €3 million,
Raffaele Palladino (Juventus) €2 million and Kevin-Prince Boateng (Milan) €1.75
million, less €3.2 million expenses.

The sums involved in player trading were not quite as high
in earlier years, but they were still significant with profit on player sales
of €38 million in both 2009 and 2010 plus gains from co-ownership deals of €3.2
million in 2009 and €7.1 million in 2010.

Genoa also received €3.7 million of revenue from player
loans in 2011, largely from Robert Acquafresca going to Cagliari (€1 million)
and Mattia Destro to Siena (€750,000). This was one of the highest loan
revenues in Serie A,
which should not be too surprising, given the large number of players Genoa
have out on loan to other clubs (26 for the 2012/13 season). On the other hand,
they paid out €2.5 million on inward player loans (mainly Antonio Floro Flores
from Udinese €1.5 million) and €2.1 million on player development costs.

Despite these vast sums from player trading, Genoa have
struggled to balance the books, reporting only one profit in the last 41 years
(€1.5 million in 2008). In particular, they spent big when they were in Serie C1 and Serie B in a
(successful) attempt to get promoted, leading to large losses in both 2005 (€14
million) and 2006 (€11.5 million). Since their return to Serie A, they have
basically managed to keep their losses under control via their expert use of
player trading with the exception of 2010’s sizeable deficit.

That 2010 loss of €17 million was used in the Serie A profit
league presented by La
Gazzetta dello Sport earlier this year for the 2010/11 season and
was only surpassed by the “big four” clubs who reported enormous losses, as has
been the case in Italy for many years: Juventus €95 million, Inter €87 million,
Milan €70 million and Roma €31 million. In fairness to the rossoblu, only 8
clubs in Serie A
managed to make money that season, and they did substantially improve their
position to a tiny loss in 2011.

We also need to recognise that Genoa have done well with
their finances if we take into consideration their relatively low recurring
revenue streams (match day, television and commercial income). Their annual
revenue of €48 million is only the 11th highest in Italy and a long way behind
the leading clubs. The two Milanese clubs generate more than four times as much
(Milan €220 million, Inter €211 million), while Juventus (€154 million), Roma
(€144 million) earn three times as much, while Napoli (€115 million) have to be
content with twice as much.

Even Lazio, Fiorentina and Palermo all receive at least €20
million more a season than Genoa. Interestingly, the club that is closest to
Genoa in revenue terms is Udinese, who have also focused on player trading as a
way to generate funds.

In this way, Genoa’s plusvalenze
represent a hefty chunk of the club’s revenue. In 2010 the €38.9 million was
equivalent to 68% of the club’s revenue, a proportion bettered only by Parma
81% and Udinese 77%. In 2011, Genoa’s plusvalenze
was worth an amazing 110% of their revenue.

The above analysis also highlights the differences between
how revenue is reported in Italy and other European countries. The European
definition used by Deloitte in their annual money league amounts to €48.1
million for Genoa in 2011, while the club itself announced record revenues of
€118.8 million. The €70.7 million difference is due to: (a) player loans €3.7
million; (b) gate receipts given to visiting clubs €0.1 million; (c) increase
in asset values €4.7 million; (d) profit from player sales (plusvalenze only)
€62.2 million.

Taking a closer look at the plusvalenze
Genoa has reported over the last few years reveals that much of this has come
from sales to Inter and Milan. In 2011, of the total €62 million, nearly €32.7
million was from Milan (on sales proceeds of €57.9 million), while a further
€12.8 million was from Inter (for Juraj Kucka on sales proceeds of €16
million). The sales to Milan involved no fewer than eight players contributing
profits as follows: (deep breath) Stephen El Shaarawy €19.8 million, Matteo
Chinellato €3.5 million, Alberto Paloschi €2.3 million, Gianmarco Zigoni €1.8
million, Tuncara Pele €1.7 million, Nnamdi Oduamadi €1.6 million, Rodney
Strasser €1.1 million and Marco Amelia €0.9 million.

In 2010 Genoa also made €16.8 million from Milan (Sokratis
Papastathoupolus €12 million and Kevin-Prince Boateng €4.8 million) and €11.3
million from Inter (Andrea Ranocchia), while 2009 featured €28.6 million from
Inter (Diego Milito €18.5 million and Thiago Motta €10.1 million).

Genoa’s relationship with the rossoneri
in particular has been mutually beneficial with Milan’s profit and loss account
similarly being boosted by profit on sales of players to Genoa to the tune of
€24.4 million in 2010 and €17 million in 2011. In particular, Milan sold a 50%
share in several youngsters (Oduamadi, Beretta, Zigoni and Strasser) to Genoa
in 2010, realising a handy profit in their books, only to buy all of them back
(with the exception of Beretta) the following season.

Preziosi has been quoted as saying, “Our club must have good
relations with the big clubs”, but this very close relationship does seem a bit
strange, exemplified by Genoa buying Kevin-Prince Boateng from Portsmouth on 18
August 2010 and loaning him to Milan on the very same day. The contract was
later switched to co-ownership before Milan purchased Boateng’s full economic
rights in May 2011.

Those of a cynical nature might wonder about all the money
earned from plusvalenze
on both sides, especially after the many investigations in the past into
manipulated accounts, but it may just be the case that there are few clubs that
Genoa can sell to in Italy. As sporting director Stefano Capozucca said, “There
are only two clubs, three at the most, who can afford to spend (these days).”

The importance of player trading to Genoa’s business can be
seen once again in the above graph with profit on player sales and gains from
co-ownership deals providing the only “revenue” growth in the last three years.
The last time that ongoing revenue grew meaningfully was in 2008 after the
promotion to Serie A,
when it virtually doubled from €22 million to €38 million, but since 2009 it
has been effectively flat at around the €50 million level.

Of the traditional revenue streams, television is by far the
most important with €32 million in 2011, compared to €10.4 million of
commercial income and just €5.7 million of match day revenue.

Genoa’s TV revenue of €32 million is far lower than the
leading Italian clubs with Juventus, Inter and Milan all earning around €80
million, while other Italian clubs also receive a fair but more, e.g. Napoli
and Roma get around €60 million; Lazio about €50 million; and Fiorentina,
Palermo and Udinese around €40 million.

It is anticipated that the new collective agreement that
started in the 2010/11 season, but was only half reflected in Genoa’s 2011
accounts, should produce a small increase of €3-4 million, as the allocation
benefits the mid-tier clubs to a certain extent. Under the new methodology, 40%
is divided equally among the Serie
A clubs; 30% is based on past results (5% last season, 15% last 5
years, 10% from 1946 to the sixth season before last); and 30% is based on the
population of the club’s city (5%) and the number of fans (25%).

The improvement also reflects the fact that the total money
negotiated in the new deal is approximately 20% higher than before at almost €1
billion a year. This cemented Italy’s position as the second highest TV rights
deal in Europe, only behind the Premier League, which continues to sign ever
more lucrative contracts, but significantly ahead of the other major leagues,
despite the Bundesliga
increasing its rights by over 50% for the next four-year deal.

That’s particularly impressive, given how little is received
for foreign rights (at least compared to the Premier League), though it was
recently announced that the incumbent rights holder, MP & Silva, will pay
an additional 30% for these rights for the three years starting from the
2012/13 season (up from €90 million a year to €115-120 million). Domestic
rights are now worth €829 million a season, with €561 million from Sky Italia
and €268 million from Mediaset.

Of course, Genoa could really grow their television revenue
if they were to somehow qualify for the Champions League. This might seem a bit
of a pipe dream, especially now that Italy have lost a place to Germany after
their deteriorating UEFA co-efficients, but as recently as 2009 they finished
fifth, only just missing out on a seat at Europe’s top table because Fiorentina
had a better head-to-head record.

They did manage to qualify for the 2009/10 Europa League,
the first time they had reached Europe in 17 years, and earned €1.6 million
from the central TV distribution in the process, but this is peanuts compared
to the riches available from Europe’s flagship tournament, e.g. in 2011/12 the
Italian representatives earned an average of €33 million (Milan €39.9 million,
Inter €31.6 million and Napoli €27.7 million). In addition, they would benefit
from higher gate receipts (a €2 million increase in 2009) and improved
sponsorship terms.

Like all Italian clubs, Genoa’s match day income is on the
low side at around €6 million. In 2010/11 only six clubs in Serie A took in more
than €10 million a season: Inter €33 million, Milan €30 million, Napoli €22
million, Roma €18 million and Juventus €12 million. That’s considerably more
than Genoa, but pales into insignificance compared to the top European clubs
like Real Madrid €124 million and Manchester United €120 million.

Genoa’s average attendance of 21,995 in 2011/12 was the
eighth highest in Italy, utilising around 60% of the stadium capacity, just
behind Fiorentina 23,402 and ahead of Palermo 20,945. Crowds rose in line with
their ascent through the leagues, but have dipped alarmingly in the past two
seasons since the peak of 26,802 in 2009/10. Part of this decline can be
attributed to the poor economic environment, but it is likely that some is also
due to the supporters’ unhappiness with Genoa continually selling their best
players.

In the past few years there have been many initiatives to
improve the stadium. The Stadio Luigi Ferraris is shared with Sampdoria and is
located in a heavily built-up area, leading to initial thoughts that a new
stadium would have to be constructed elsewhere with a site at the marina di
Sestri Ponente being tentatively identified as one possibility. However, this
was rejected by the council, so the idea of renovating the current stadium once
again took shape with plans presented by the Fondazione Genoa 1893 in late
2009.

The aim was to transform the old ground into a modern
stadium that could generate revenue seven days out of seven, emphasising the
commercial possibilities and installing premium seats including 28 “skyboxes”.
The capacity would be reduced from 36,600 to 33,000, but the revenue would be
considerably higher. The project would cost less than €50 million.

However, the plans were not supported by the Italian
football federation, so were once again put on the back burner. Last summer,
another initiative was raised, whereby Genoa and Sampdoria would take over the
management of the stadium from the council, leaving a specialist company to
handle the commercial aspects. However, despite Preziosi’s admiration for
Juventus’ new stadium, yet again these plans fizzled out, though last month the
stadium management was taken over by a new consortium of four Italian companies,
so perhaps all is not yet lost.

There is also room for growth in the club’s commercial
revenue, which actually slightly decreased in 2011 to €10.4 million from €11.5
million. This is understandably a lot lower than the big boys (Milan €80
million, Inter and Juventus both €54 million), but is also less than clubs like
Palermo €18 million and (more painfully) local rivals Sampdoria €15 million.

Genoa earned €1.8 million from their shirt sponsorship deal
with Iziplay, a betting company, in 2011, which was around double the €0.9
million they received the previous year. This is a lot less than many other
Italian clubs: Milan – Emirates €12 million, Inter – Pirelli €12 million,
Juventus – BetClic €8 million, Roma – Wind €7 million, Napoli – Acqua Lete €5.5
million and Fiorentina – Mazda €4 million.

Genoa will be hoping that their six-year arrangement with
Infront will boost their commercial income. They have already brokered the
higher sponsorship deal with Iziplay and this summer signed a new four-year
deal with Lotto Sports running until June 2016 to replace Asics as kit
supplier. Infront’s president, Marco Bogarelli, said, “Our principal objective
will be to contribute towards a better balance in the revenue, which is
currently over-reliant on television.”

Something needs to be done to improve revenue, as Genoa are
facing a real battle to contain their staff costs. Although their wages were
more or less unchanged from the previous year at €52 million in 2011, they have
risen 87% (€24 million) since they returned to Serie
A in 2007/08, while revenue has only grown by 32% (€12 million) in
the same period. Genoa’s annual report explained that the significant increase
in costs in 2010 was due to “an important investment in players, both
youngsters with potential and more experienced internationals.”

Using the standard definition of revenue, i.e. excluding
profit from player trading, the wages to turnover ratio has been a worrying
109% for the last two years, up from 86% in 2009. As sporting director
Capozucca acknowledged, “Nobody is denying that errors have been made at the
management level. We have spent more than we should.”

The wages to turnover ratio is the worst in Serie A, even higher
than Milan, Inter and Juventus, who all hover around the 90% mark, and way
above UEFA’s recommended upper limit of 70%. That said, Genoa’s wage bill of
€52 million is considerably lower than the leading clubs: Milan (€193 million)
and Inter (€190 million) pay almost four times as much as Genoa, while Juventus
(€140 million) are nearly three times as much and Roma (€107 million) are more
than €50 million higher. On the other hand, Genoa’s wage bill is about the same
as Napoli and nearly twice as much as Udinese, who both qualified for the
Champions League that season, so they have arguably under-performed.

As per the 2011 accounts, the €52.3 million wage bill
included the following: player salaries €38.8 million, coaches and technical
staff salaries €4.9 million (probably including sacked coaches on gardening
leave), bonus payments €2 million, other staffs €3.8 million and social
security €2.9 million.

"Kucka - Slovakian steel"

According to the annual salary survey published by La Gazzetta dello Sport,
the wage bill for Genoa’s first team squad has been cut from €36 million last
season to €29 million for the 2012/13 season, so it looks like Preziosi has
finally decided enough is enough (though the newspaper figures come with a
health warning regarding accuracy). The same report stated that only four
players at Genoa earn more than €1 million a season: Borriello €1.4 million,
Frey €1.3 million, Vargas €1.2 million and Tozser €1 million.

The other element of staff costs impacted by Genoa’s player
trading strategy, especially the very large roster of players, is player
amortisation. This is the way that a club’s accounts reflect transfer
purchases, i.e. by not expensing the full cost immediately, but instead writing
it off over the length of a player’s contract. As an example, defender Luca
Antonelli was signed for €7.35 million on a 4½-year contract, but his transfer was
only reflected in the profit and loss account via amortisation, booked evenly
over the life of his contract, i.e. €1.6 million a year (€7.35 million divided
by 4½ years).

Genoa’s player amortisation has surged from just €4 million
in 2007 to €41 million in 2011, a figure only surpassed in Italy by Milan €52
million, Inter €50 million and Juventus €47 million. Perhaps a better
comparative is Udinese, who have much the same revenue as Genoa and also focus
on player trading, but their player amortisation is only €17 million.
Admittedly, this is not a cash expense, but it does reflect the cash outlay on
player purchases.

This has been reflected in ever-increasing liabilities,
which have shot up from €35 million in 2007 to €285 million in 2011, including
a 38% increase in the last 12 months alone. Furthermore, since 2007 financial
debt has surged from €7 million to €109 million, comprising €22 million of bank
debt with Banca Unicredit and Banca Cariga, €59 million owed to factoring
companies (Banca Cariga and l’Istituto per il Credito Sportivo) based on future
income plus €28 million of shareholder loans.

Of course, Genoa are not unique in facing growing debts in
Italy, as the last football federation report noted, with the total liabilities
in Serie A
growing 40% since the 2007/08 season, notably bank debt, commercial debt and
outstanding transfer fees.

As might be expected, the latter factor is significant for
Genoa, who owed €98 million to other football clubs for transfer fees in 2011,
though this is more than offset by the €119 million owed to Genoa by other
clubs.

The balance sheet has net assets of €1 million, one of the
weakest in Serie A,
with net current liabilities rising from €119 million in 2010 to €153 million
in 2011. Once again, it is dominated by the effects of player trading with the
assets including an incredible €123 million for player registrations. To put
that into context, it is not much less than Inter €143 million and Milan €136
million, but is much more than Juventus €71 million and Roma €37 million. The
other experts of the “buy low, sell high” game, Udinese, are also much lower at
€48 million.

Genoa’s assets also include €31 million for co-ownership,
which is equivalent to half the value of players transferred in co-ownership
deals. This includes three players sold to Milan (Stephen El Shaarawy €10
million, Matteo Chinellato €1.75 million and Tuncara Pele €0.95 million), Juraj
Kucka to Inter (€8 million), Federico Rodriguez to Bologna (€3 million) and
Francesco Acerbi to Chievo (€2 million).

Nevertheless, Preziosi has needed to provide a great deal of
financial support to the club with the amount of money he has put in over the
years approaching €70 million. He summed up his approach last year, “With me
Genoa will always be in Serie
A and if that is not enough for some fans, they should look for a
Qatari sheikh. I will try to strengthen the squad, but I must also look at
balancing the books, otherwise there is no future.”

"Antonelli - his name is Luca"

The president has hinted on many occasions that he might
sell the club with rumours of a few possible buyers circulating in recent
months, including the inevitable representatives from the Middle East and (more
plausibly) the industrialist Vittorio Malacalza, with a potential takeover
price of €40 million.

However, Preziosi has seemed reinvigorated this season. It
had looked like he would take a step back when he hired Pietro Lo Monaco from
Catania in the summer as general manager to handle all aspects of the club’s
activities – with the important exception of transfers. However, after some
disagreements over, you’ve guessed it, the transfer market, Lo Monaco exited
stage left after just two months, leaving Preziosi as once again indisputably
the main man.

A few months ago, Preziosi suggested that there would be
less buying and selling of players in the future, “The fans will be happy, as
there will no longer be such a whirlwind of trading and less (player)
turnover.” Of course, that would require two things: (a) a leopard (that would
be Preziosi) to change its spots; (b) a serious improvement in the club’s
operating losses, meaning an increase in revenue or (more likely) a reduction
in costs. Whether these are possible, only time will tell.

European qualification would obviously help, though only the
Champions League would make a real difference to the club’s finances, but that
now requires clubs to meet the criteria of UEFA’s new Financial Fair Play (FFP)
regulations, which will ultimately exclude from European competitions clubs
that continue to make losses.

However, Genoa look to be in pretty good shape, assuming
that they continue to make good profits from player trading, as wealthy owners
will be allowed to absorb aggregate losses (“acceptable deviations”) of €45
million, initially over two years and then over a three-year monitoring period,
as long as they are willing to cover the deficit by making equity
contributions.

To be more sustainable, they would need to deliver on their
plans to grow commercial revenue, increase gate receipts from a refurbished (or
new) stadium and lower their wage bill, which is out of proportion for a club
of their size.

"Jankovic - spreads his wings"

The awful dilemma for Genoa is that the only thing that
keeps the club relatively stable financially is their frenetic player trading,
which is also the thing that hurts their chances of progressing on the pitch.
Given their financial weaknesses, it is certainly understandable that they have
chosen to go down this path, but the question is how do they find their way
back to a more “normal” strategy and reduce their reliance on player sales
(mainly to Milan)?

As sporting director Capozucca conceded this month, “We
cannot think of developing a great Genoa team… when we don’t have the economic
resources to do so.” That comment may be harsh, but, after looking at the
club’s finances, it’s also very fair.

13 comments:

great blog fella, it must take you ages to research and then present it. its much appreciated anyway, well done. Interesting as well, as this on one Genoa is not something i know much about so its a little different than the norm, the Italian match fixing just goes on and on. We tend to hear about the bigger names in England . Anyway keep up the good work.

I wonder what the FFP implications will be on teams like Genoa that depend on selling players for a profit. If Inter, AC and Juventus tighten their belts, doesn't that mean less money for Genoa? Teams that don't buy or sell will be better off (Udinese won't be going up against teams willing to lose $100m a year) but the selling teams are going to have to change their strategy. They won't be able to just keep the players they normally sell because they need to sell them to not lose money. It's not like they only leave because of a buyout clause.

Well Inter and Ac Milan are cutting back quite severely, and still they're up to all sorts of transfer deals with Genoa. Ultimately they're trying to replace old, highly paid players, with relatively young players on lower wages, and it seems that genoa is their favourite shopping ground. I'm astonished to see that milan paid €20 million for al-sharawy. That seems like an extraordinary amount of money. I don't think we'll be seeing anything like that for another while.

I'm very interested for the source of the broadcasting graph... I need these values for my thesis! I did find the numbers for the premier leagues, but not for the others.. can somebody help me out? I would be very grateful! Please send me an email piekie_peterson1@hotmail.com if you have some information.

Praise for The Swiss Ramble

"Blogger of the Year 2013 - It’s testament to the effect that Kieron has had on the blogosphere that so many fans take his word as gospel. Putting to use his career in the world of finance, his insights into balance sheets and simple explanations of complex ideas appeal to the hardcore financial whizz and casual fan alike." - The Football Supporters' Federation