The Weaponization Working Group was created by the Steering Committee of DOE's
Fundamental Classification Policy Review program and directed to evaluate DOE
classification policy guidance of the weaponization portions of DOE's nuclear weapon
program.

"Weaponization" is the term used to describe those features required to make a safe
nuclear weapon which will operate efficiently in its intended environment. They include
the nuclear assembly, warhead electrical and boosting systems, initiation and use
control components, features for hardening to countermeasures, and support
structures. Weaponization also includes nonnuclear testing and analysis needed to
develop these features, and the nuclear effects testing needed to certify weapon
hardness.

The Weaponization Working Group is chaired by Jim Wright of Sandia National
Laboratories, CA, and includes the following members:

In addition to the general principles and the nuclear weapons-specific principles
identified in Chapter 2 of the Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review,
the "rules" identified below were followed by the Weaponization Working Group during
their evaluations of DOE nuclear warhead weaponization classification policies and
classification guides:

Protect information that would assist potential proliferators or terrorists to
acquire, develop, improve, or use nuclear weapons.

Protect information that reveals nuclear weapon vulnerabilities, or that can be
used to develop countermeasures against nuclear weapons.

In addition, the Working Group Chair asked members to use a "contrarian" approach
(e.g., question the accepted) and to identify topics currently classified which can no
longer be protected. He also asked the Working Group to carefully consider the
following questions:

Has the "Born Classified" structure outlived its usefulness?

Is there a continuing need for the category of classified information called
"Formerly Restricted Data"?

During 50 years of identifying and protecting information associated with the design,
manufacture, and utilization of nuclear weapons by the DOE and its predecessor
agencies (ERDA and AEC), a number of operational classification practices evolved:

When in doubt, classify (per the "Born Classified" concept inferred from the
Atomic Energy Act).

Do not classify what is not protectable (e.g., visually observable design
features or operational information).

Systems information is generally classified at the SECRET level; component
information is generally classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level.

The above identified classification guides were assigned to individual members
of the Weaponization Working Group, based on their expertise. Each member
then created sub-working groups of recognized-subject experts to evaluate
existing policy for their assigned classification guides, and to make
recommendations to the Working Group Chairman.

Member assignments included:

Otis Brooks

TCG-SAFF-1, TCG-UC-2, TCG-WI-1

Lee MacLean

TCG-NAS-1, TCG-DS-1, TCG-WI-1

Dennis
Cummings

TCG-SAFF-1, TCG-UC-1

Ed Saunders

TCG-NNT-1, TCG-UC-2

Stan Gooch

TCG-SAFF-1, TCG-WPMU-1

A.B. (Butch) Cox

Military Characteristics (MCs)
& Stockpile-to-Target Sequence
(STS)

Tom Gonzales

TCG-NAS-1, TCG-DS-1, TCG-WI-1

Cook Story

CG-DR-1, Nuclear Warhead
Program Classification Guides

Jim Wright

CG-DR-1

Henry Hanser

TCG-BTS-1

Bill Nickell

TCG-V/H-1; DoD/DOE Radiation Hardened
Microelectronics

Corey Knapp

CG-DR-1

Some classification guides were assigned to multiple Working Group members
to obtain independent assessments. Several meetings were held by each of
the sub-working groups.

It was recognized early during the Working Group meetings that joint meetings
with the Weapon Design and Production Military Working Groups were
necessary to resolve some classification issues. These meetings were held per
coordination between the Working Group Leaders. Recommendations of the
sub-working groups were reported to the Weaponization Working Group during
Working Group meetings. However, not all sub-working group
recommendations were accepted by the full Working Group.

The Weaponization Working Group addressed three overarching issues of
the DOE Classification Program. These include: the "Born Classified"
concept, the classification category identified as Formerly Restricted Data
(FRD), and classification associations.

BORN CLASSIFIED

The Current Policy

In Chapter 2, Section 11.Y. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; "Restricted Data" is
defined as: "all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic
weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special
nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data
declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to Section
142."

Per Sections C and F of the introductory material to CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD
Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide, the Restricted Data definition
"--covers virtually all information on nuclear weapons, such information is said to
be 'born classified;' i.e., all information on nuclear weapons is classified unless
specific official action is taken to declassify it."

Findings

The "Born Classified" concept of the Restricted Data system for the identification
and control of nuclear weapon information was useful when the U.S. was seeking
first to maintain a monopoly and then a substantial lead over the Soviet Union in
nuclear weapons technology. Much has changed in the world since then,
however, and the "Born Classified" concept is too rigid in today's world of
"openness," where there is need for international cooperation on nuclear weapon
matters, desire for commercialization and technology transfer of some nuclear
weapon technologies and production processes, and environmental cleanup and
hazardous waste shipment concerns.

In addition, much information that was at one time protected as Restricted Data
has been declassified, and classification guidelines are available for DOE
programs. The "Born Classified" concept has outlived its usefulness and should
be eliminated in favor of positive determinations being required to classify
Restricted Data information.

Historical Perspective

The U.S. effort to develop an atomic bomb, which was carried out under the
Manhattan Project, was conducted under a mantle of military security wherein
essentially all information associated with that project was classified. However,
shortly after the end of World War II, the United States released to the public a
fairly detailed report of the Manhattan Project. While there was some adverse
reaction to releasing so much information that many still considered to be
sensitive, pressure continued for further declassifications of information
associated with the Project. Then in March 1946, in response to many requests
from scientists and contractors to declassify their wartime research and
development in Atomic Energy, the Tolman Committee published the first atomic
weapon declassification policy: the "Declassification Guide for Responsible
Reviewers." (This, in effect, became the first Atomic Energy Classification
Guide.) Thus, some information regarding atomic weapons had already been
declassified when the Atomic Energy Act was first created by legislative action in
July 1946.

Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 defined Restricted Data as: "All
data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production
of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of
power, but shall not include any data which the commission from time to time
determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense
and security."

The words "all data" in the Restricted Data definition have been consistently
interpreted by DOE and its predecessors to mean that any information that falls
within the definition of Restricted Data is classified when it is created; i.e., it is
"Born Classified," and no affirmative act of classification is necessary. But in fact,
the words "Born Classified" do not appear in the Atomic Energy Act.

A major revision of the Atomic Energy Act occurred in 1954, wherein much
Restricted Data was declassified to facilitate commercial applications of nuclear
power reactor technologies and nuclear fuel reprocessing. Another revision to
the Act removed information from Restricted Data that was primarily related to
military utilization of atomic weapons and put it under joint control of the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Department of Defense. This information became
known as "Formerly Restricted Data," although these words also are not found in
the Atomic Energy Act.

In addition to the above actions, much additional Restricted Data has been
declassified by specific action because of a desire for commercialization or
because of a determination that national security is not adversely affected. Thus,
while essentially all atomic energy information was protected under the Restricted
Data umbrella in the early days, today there remains only a relatively small
number of areas containing information protected as "Restricted Data."

As much atomic energy information was declassified over the past 50 years, a
large number of classification guides were developed to identify the classified and
unclassified information associated with DOE programs. Because of the many
declassifications and the large number of classification guides available, the
"Born Classified" concept is almost never needed today and, in fact, has lost most
of its meaning.

Discussion

The Atomic Energy Act creates the presumption that any information meeting the
Restricted Data definition is classified by virtue of its existence, without anyone
having to make a positive determination; and without some affirmative act, all
such information remains classified indefinitely. A positive action is not required
to classify information; only to declassify it. In fact, many in the public domain are
concerned that DOE has used the "Restricted Data" definition of the Atomic
Energy Act to improperly maintain secrecy of many of their activitiesthat there
has been much overuse and abuse.

While the "Born Classified" concept is conservative and safe in its approach, it is
too rigid in today's world of openness. Both the current administration and the
Secretary of Energy have given high priority to building public confidence. To the
extent possible, this goal should be reflected in DOE's classification policies; and
only atomic energy information that truly warrants protection in the interest of
national security should be classified. There is now strong desire for international
cooperation on some nuclear weapon technologies (e.g., safety and control). In
addition, commercial potential exists for some nuclear weapon developed
technologies, and there is a need to commercialize some nuclear weapon
production processes as the DOE nuclear weapon program consolidates. Finally,
there are mounting pressures for environmental cleanup of DOE facilities and full
disclosures during shipments of hazardous wastes.

In addition to the above, there are public pressures for openness in several
areas: (1) the effects of DOE activities on health, safety, and the environment;
(2) historical actions of DOE and its predecessors (AEC and ERDA); and (3)
dismantlement of surplus nuclear weapons and management of the resulting
hazardous materials.

Clearly a more flexible and responsive approach is needed. A system similar to
that used for National Security Information would be reasonable, wherein
categories of potentially classified information are defined in the Atomic Energy
Act (these categories are currently provided), and positive determinations are
required to classify the information based on potential damage to the national
security. Thus, the responsibility is placed on the classifier to justify that the
information needs to be classified. In fact, the real-world procedures for RD and
NSI classification determinations are quite similar: categorizing the information;
and determining its classification according to guide topics.

Under this proposed concept, atomic energy information may be classified only if
it meets the following criteria:

the information concerns:

(a)

the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons;

(b)

the production of special nuclear materials; or

(c)

the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.

the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of
the U.S. Government.

an Original Classification Authority determines that unauthorized
disclosure of the information could be expected to result in damage to the
national security, including nuclear weapon proliferation considerations.

Implementation of this proposed system would be straightforward. Since the
categories of RD information and many supporting classification guides already
exist, the Original "RD" Classification Authorities would basically review, justify,
and sign off on the guides. For developing technology areas not covered by
existing guides, the Original Classification Authorities would make classification
determinations and issue the appropriate guidance. Derivative Classifiers would
then use these classification guides to make program classification
determinations.

While this approach would shift the burden of proof to classifying information
rather than declassifying it (as in the current RD system), once a determination to
classify information has been made, automatic declassification schedules would
not be imposed. Rather, the information would remain classified until a positive
determination to declassify was made by an Original Declassification Authority.
This is because atomic energy information consists mostly of scientific and
technical information, and thus has long-term value to potential adversaries.

Also, as mentioned above, this approach would require the appointment of
Original Classifiers to make the initial classification determinations, similar to the
NSI classification system. These officials would, of course, be limited to federal
agency employees and would be few in number. Within DOE, they likely would
consist of the Director of the Office of Declassification, program managers, and a
limited number of DOE field managers or Classification Officers. If a person not
having Original Classification Authority believes information should be classified,
that information would be forwarded to an Original Classifier or the Director,
Office of Declassification, for a classification determination.

Recommendation

The Department of Energy should develop a system for the classification of
Restricted Data that shifts from the presumption of "Born Classified" to a
structure which places the burden of proof on the classifier that an item is
classified. Criteria for classifying atomic energy information should be
developed, per the above discussion, and Original Classification Authorities
should be appointed to make the initial classification determinations for
developing technology areas.

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Current Policy

In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 142.d, the category of classified
information that is known as Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) is described as
follows: The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such
data as the Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine relates
primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and which the Commission
and Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as
defense information: Provided, however, That no such data so removed from
the Restricted Data category shall be transmitted or otherwise made available to
any nation or regional defense organization, while such data remains defense
information, except pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in
accordance with subsection 144b.

FRD is also described in Section F introductory material of CG-W-5, the Joint
DOE/DoD Classification Policy Guide for Nuclear Weapons, as follows:
Information primarily of concern to the military pertaining to the utilization and
deployment of nuclear weapons, e.g.: Stockpile quantities and location,
command/control, including PAL and disablement, yields and effects,
vulnerability and hardening, programmatic and reliability information, delivery
and fuzing (when classified).

Findings

The nuclear weapon category of information called Formerly Restricted Data is
sometimes used improperly, is confusing to many users, has outlived its
usefulness, and should be eliminated. Elimination of FRD would remove an
ambiguous category of classified information, would increase the flexibility of the
RD system, and would simplify DoD operations with no penalty to national
security.

Discussion

The category of nuclear weapon information known as Formerly Restricted Data
was intended to identify classified nuclear weapon information that revealed little
about weapon designs but that was essential for military planners. This included
information such as yields, fuzing altitudes, stockpile numbers, weapon storage
locations, some use control information, and weapon reliabilities. The words
"Formerly Restricted Data," however, do not appear in the Atomic Energy Act.
These words were coined by the Atomic Energy Commission to describe certain
information that was removed from the Restricted Data category of information
control.

Prior to 1954, the category of information known as FRD was included in the
Restricted Data (RD) definition. This 1954 revision to the Atomic Energy Act,
i.e., removal of the military utilization information from the RD category, permitted
military planners and others with a "need-to-know" easier access to this
information. Prior to 1954, a "Q" clearance was required for access to this
information; after 1954, the clearance category of Defense Information (DI), now
known as National Security Information (NSI), at a comparable level of
classification, was adequate. (For communications with a foreign government,
however, FRD is treated as RD and can only be shared under formal
Agreements of Cooperation.)

While the creation of FRD reduced access requirements for this category of
information, and thus provided needed relief for military planners and others,
over the years of its use the FRD category has become a confusing and
misleading designator. The question is often asked: Is "Formerly Restricted
Data" information that is no longer classified, and thus no longer requires
security protection? In fact, when properly used, FRD is little different from NSI
except for the previously mentioned restriction on transmittal to a foreign nation.

As mentioned above, properly defined, FRD is information that reveals little
about weapons design, but is essential for military planners. However, during
the years of FRD's existence, some weapon design information has been
designated as FRD that should properly be identified as RD. A good example is
much nuclear weapon use control information and hardware as defined in TCG-UC-2, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Use
Control.

To resolve the ambiguities and inconsistencies and to reduce the number of
topics classified by joint DOE/DoD guidance, thereby removing DOE from
classification decisions on military utilization more properly made by DoD, the
FRD category should be eliminated. Nuclear weapon information currently
categorized as FRD should be evaluated for transclassification to NSI if it relates
primarily to the military utilization of nuclear weapons, and to RD if it does not.

Examples of information that should be RD include:

Nuclear (physics) design information

Firing system and subcomponents; complete Safing, Arming, Fuzing,
and Firing System descriptions/schematics

Most requirements, such as hardness, reliability, and lifetimes as
defined in the Military Characteristics

Weapon production information, such as rates, costs, and numbers.

Using the above guidance, nuclear weapon information currently identified as
FRD can be transclassified to NSI and RD, as appropriate.

Recommendation

Eliminate the category of classified information identified as Formerly Restricted
Data (FRD). Evaluate all classification guide topics currently designated FRD to
determine that information which should revert to RD (e.g., much Use Control
information) and which should be changed to NSI. (Recommended changes of
FRD topics in CG-W-5 to RD or NSI are identified in Annex D to this report, and
in Part II of Appendix C of the main report.) Coordinate proposals with DoD, and
revise existing classification guidelines as necessary.

Minority Opinion

Mr. Stan Gooch, the STRATCOM Weaponization Working Group member,
provided the following minority opinion: Retain the classification category of FRD
(Formerly Restricted Data) because it uniquely identifies that category of
information that is related primarily to the military utilization of nuclear weapons.

CLASSIFIED ASSOCIATIONS

Current Policy

Per Chapter IV, part B, paragraph 3 of DOE Order 5650.2B, "Certain
information which would otherwise be unclassified may require
classification when combined or associated with other unclassified or
classified information."

Per current nuclear weapon program classification guides and some joint
DOE/DoD topical classification guides (e.g., TCG-UC-2, topic 3281), the
association of some components with specific nuclear weapons is
classified because these associations may reveal certain operational
capabilities (e.g., active protection).

Findings

Classified associations are often difficult to implement and maintain,
sometimes ineffective, and costly; and they may give a false sense of
maintaining an operational capability.

Discussion

Information that is not by itself classified must sometimes be classified
because its association with other information explicitly or implicitly reveals
additional information that is classified. Occasionally the association of a
weapons component with a weapon system must be classified because an
operational capability is revealed, for instance. Classification of
associations is sometimes referred to as "protection-in-depth," "tiered
classification," or "classification in context." Additional related identifiers
include: "Keystone Concept" and "Compilations of Information."

The significance of information often depends upon its context.
Classification of information because of its association with other
information, for instance, occasionally occurs with respect to items of
hardware or materials used to fabricate classified hardware. While a
commercially available item or hardware can never be classified, its
association with a classified project may cause the hardware to be
classified. A chemical or other material may be unclassified, but if it is
associated with a classified process such that the association indicates a
classified use of the chemical or material, then the association is classified.

DOE classification guides or DOE-approved contractor classification guides
often require "protection-in-depth"; that is, second or third levels of
classification are often required to protect a system capability or design
feature. For instance, pressure transducers purchased for development or
operational testing may not be associated with specific weapons because
their pressure range specification may reveal the pressure of the gas boost
bottle or the final boosted pit pressure, which are classified values. In a
classic example, the association of an RTG (Radioisotopic Thermoelectric
Generator) with a specific weapon is classified because it implies or
reveals that the weapon has an active protection use control capability. In
some instance, travel by an expert in a specific technological area to a
specific facility may be classified, or "blind" budget arrangements may be
required to protect certain program information.

Classified associations can affect information that is not normally classified,
and thus they are sometimes difficult to control. In addition, because
classification by association is not always effective, a false sense of
protecting system or operational capability sometimes occurs. Finally,
"protection-in-depth," or classified associations, results in unavoidable
classification costs; thus it is important to classify only information or
associations that truly warrant protection and that can be kept from an
adversary.

Recommendation

DOE should discourage the use of classified associations to the extent
possible, as they are often costly to implement or do not provide effective
security protection.

Appendix F to theReport of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

Report of theWeaponization and Weapons Production and Military Use Working Group

Specific recommendations on declassification, continued protection,
downgrading, and transclassification of selected weaponization topics are
provided in this annex. A complete listing of these recommendations is provided
on the following page. A summary matrix of the recommendations is also
provided, followed by the complete presentations. A few of the
recommendations are not shared by all members of the Working Group. In
those instances, a minority opinion is provided at the conclusion of the
recommendation.

Much of the material addressed by the Weaponization Working Group is
currently in the Formerly Restricted Data category. Consistent with the previous
recommendation to eliminate FRD, and where applicable, we have included our
judgments on transclassification of FRD to NSI or RD, should the FRD category
be eliminated. These judgments are not applicable to Restricted Data, nor to
those topics approved for declassification as recommended, but would apply to
those topics not approved for declassification.

The rationale for our recommendations on certain topics can only be framed in
classified text to be meaningful. These topics are identified in the summary
matrix that follows and are presented in detail in the classified supplement,
Annex C.

Annex D provides transclassification recommendations for topics listed in CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide. More
specific transclassification recommendations on use control topics are given in
Appendix C of the main report.

Provided below is a summary matrix of the specific declassification recommendations of the Weaponization Working
Group of DOE's Fundamental Classification Policy Review. The matrix summarizes recommended declassifications.
The matrix also provides recommended transclassification actions for FRD topics should the declassification
recommendations not be approved. Transclassification is not applicable to Restricted Data, nor to those topics
approved for declassification as recommended.

Following the Summary Matrix are the complete evaluations pertaining to each recommendation presented in the
format requested by the Steering Group.

DOE issue updated guidance reaffirming that
information on radiological weapons and warfare is
classified at levels ranging from U-S, depending on
information revealed; and in the RD category for design
information, FRD for military use information

U-SNSI/RD

RD or NSI
as
appropriate

SAFING, ARMING, FUZING, & FIRING (SAFF) SYSTEM
RECOMMENDATIONS

The basic purpose or function of a nuclear weapon's safing,
arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) system, also referred to as the
warhead electrical system (WES), is twofold: (1) to assure that
the weapon will detonate at the intended time and place, and (2)
to assure that it will not detonate at any other time or place,
including adverse conditions such as accidents. These systems
typically consist of a highly integrated array of electronic and
electromechanical components, circuitry, and switching
networks that together are designed for the following purposes:
to provide warhead safing in both normal and abnormal
environments; to provide signal conditioning and amplification
for the fuzing and firing functions; to sense proper environments
over the target for fuzing; and to provide the high voltages and
large amounts of current necessary for firing the high-energy
warhead detonators. Because of the very complex
requirements of a modern SAFF system, its various functions
are usually controlled by microprocessor-controlled
programmers.

Findings

Nuclear weapon radar fuze transmission frequencies are revealed during
developmental and operational flight testing. Thus, they are not
protectable and should be declassified.

Discussion

A nuclear warhead is normally fuzed by components that sense a condition corresponding
to the intended place and time of detonation. Fuzes are usually classified as
radiating (e.g., radar) or passive (e.g., timer, baroswitch).

Consideration of possible countermeasures is the most critical single factor affecting the
classification of fuzing systems information. Thus, the transmitting
frequencies of radar fuzes used in U.S. nuclear weapons have historically
been classified because it was believed that knowing this information would
allow an enemy to premature or dud the weapon by employing electronic
countermeasures. Continued protection of these transmitting frequencies,
however, is not practical. The transmission frequencies can be determined
from an analysis of the transmitted spectrum that can be intercepted first
during development flight testing, and later during operational flight testing.
Also, declassification of the radar transmitting frequencies would eliminate the
need for continued protection of many piece parts and tooling at the
production agency and at commercial suppliers. This makes sense from an
economical viewpoint, and would declassify information that is basically not
protectable.

Knowing the radar fuze transmitting frequencies could conceivably make the weapon
system more susceptible to enemy attempts to premature or dud the radar's
fuzes. However, radar fuzes in modern nuclear weapons are designed to be
relatively insensitive to jamming and to deactivate in the event of severe
jamming, with an alternate non-radar fuzing method taking over. Thus, while
system accuracy may be degraded, the weapon would still function properly.

Recommendation

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special
Weapons Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member,
provided the following minority opinion: Non-concur with Group
recommendation to declassify radar fuze operating frequencies and related
design information. Non-concurrence is based on non-proliferation
considerations. The Working Group recommendation supposes that
adversaries have the electronic intelligence gathering means to intercept
electromagnetic spectrums during weapons development. This is too general
a supposition when applied to developing third world proliferants.
Classification here may not prevent, but certainly delay, a proliferant in gaining
the information.

Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequency-Related
Characteristics

Current
Policy

Per topic 3424.1 of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Safing,
Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (TCG-SAFF-1), it is classified CFRD that
techniques such as frequency agility, random phase modulation, and time-base jitter are used in specified radar fuzes to overcome enemy electronic
countermeasures (ECM).

Findings

The use of techniques such as frequency agility or time-base jitter that may be
used in specific radar fuzes can be determined from an analysis of the
spectrum of the radar transmission frequencies, which are revealed during
development and operational flight testing.

Discussion

Techniques such as frequency diversity and agility may be designed into radar
fuzes used in nuclear weapons to help prevent premature or dudding of the
weapons if subjected to enemy electronic countermeasures or jamming
environments. These methods have historically been classified to keep this
knowledge from enemies, thus preventing them from using this knowledge to
develop effective methods to countermeasure or jam the radar fuzes. The fact
that capabilities such as frequency diversity and agility are designed into radar
fuzes, however, can be determined from an analysis of the transmission
frequencies, which are not protectable (see Radar Fuzing Transmitting
Frequencies Recommendation). Since this information is not protectable, it
should be declassified.

Declassification of this information would also eliminate the need for continued
protection of many piece parts and related tooling at the production agencies
and commercial suppliers.

A knowledge that countermeasure techniques, such as frequency diversity
and agility, are used on specific radar fuzes might facilitate enemy attempts to
premature or dud the weapons. However, radar fuzes in modern nuclear
weapons are designed to be relatively insensitive to jamming and to
deactivate in the event of severe jamming, with an alternate non-radar fuzing
method taking over. Thus, while system accuracy may be degraded, the
weapon would still function properly.

Recommendation

Declassify the use of countermeasure techniques, such as frequency diversity
and agility, random phase modulations, or intentional time-base jitter, on
specific nuclear weapon radar fuzes. Continue to classify how these
countermeasure techniques are used, and related design and/or
manufacturing information.

Minority
Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special
Weapons Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member,
provided the following minority opinion: Non-concur with Group
recommendation to declassify counter-ECM or anti-jamming methods in radar
fuzes. Non-concurrence is based on non-proliferation considerations. The
Working Group recommendation supposes that adversaries have the
electronic intelligence gathering means to intercept electromagnetic spectrums
during weapons development. This is too general a supposition when applied
to developing third world proliferants. Classification here may not prevent, but
certainly delay, a proliferant in gaining the information.

CDU Firing Sets and Implosion Detonator Performance

Current
Policy

Topical section 210 of TCG-DS-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification
Guide for Detonation Systems, classifies as CRD the required and actual
performance of high-energy detonator systems used in the implosion systems
of nuclear weapons. Parameters classified include simultaneity and reliability,
energy requirements, and any hardening features. Topic 4220 of TCG-SAFF-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Safing, Arming,
Fuzing, and Firing, classifies as CRD complete design information on
Capacitor Discharge Unit (CDU) firing sets that are used to fire the high-energy detonators. Per topic 4230 of TCG-SAFF-1, the high voltage circuit
design (also known as an x-unit) of these firing sets is classified CRD as a
"keystone" element. Per topics 4240 and 4280 of TCG-SAFF-1, many CDU
design and operating characteristics are not classified, including the number
and type of capacitors, the operating voltage, the total electrical capacity, and
the low voltage circuitry.

Findings

Required and actual performance of nuclear weapon implosion detonators
have historically been classified and should continue to be protected.
Basically, all elements of CDU firing sets have been declassified. The high
voltage circuitry of CDU firing sets is classified in some designs as a
"keystone" element. However, this has not been an effective keystone, and
does not need to be classified to protect detonator system required or actual
performance.

Discussion

The primary function of CDU 1
firing sets is to provide sufficient energy to fire
the high-energy detonators in the high explosive assemblies of nuclear
weapon implosion systems. They also frequently initiate neutron generator
operation, and may perform other energy storing/triggering functions. CDU-type firing sets have been used in most nuclear weapons in the stockpile, and
will probably be used in future weapon developments unless size limitations
dictate otherwise.

Complete designs of these CDU firing sets are classified to protect the energy,
simultaneity, or precise timing requirements needed to fire the high-energy
detonators of a particular implosion system. In addition, firing sets may be
classified to conceal the number of detonators used in an implosion system, to
protect vulnerability and hardening information on a weapon, or for
proliferation considerations. The general design principles of CDU-type firing
sets, however, are well-known technology, and therefore are not protectable
by classification. In addition, most design and operating characteristics of
specific CDU firing sets are unclassified. These include the low voltage
circuitry, the number and types of energy-storage capacitors used, the
operating voltage, and the electrical capacity. Therefore, to assure that
complete designs of CDU firing sets are classified, in some designs the high
voltage circuitry has been classified as a "keystone" element.

However, classification of the high voltage circuitry of CDU firesets, while at
the same time treating specifics of capacitance and voltage as unclassified, is
not an effective keystone. Rather, protection of implosion detonator energy,
performance, and reliability parameters depends on protecting the number of
implosion detonators and the electrical load requirements on the fireset.
This requires that energy (current and voltage) waveforms from detonator-system/firing-system combinations need to continue to be classified; and it is
also necessary to continue to protect some combination of: number of cables
tied to the fireset, detonators per cable, or connection of cables.

Because the high voltage circuitry is not an effective keystone, and because
this keystone has not been consistently applied to all CDU firing sets, there
are no known reasons to continue to classify the CDU high voltage section or,
in fact, the complete CDU firing set design. Economic and production
advantages would result from declassifying CDU firing sets, and critical design
parameters of detonator systems would not be revealed.

Recommendation

Declassify the basic designs of CDU firing sets, including the "keystone" high
voltage sections. Continue to classify details of implosion detonator system
performance, including the number of detonators and electrical load present in
the cabling and detonator system.

Programmers for Bomb and Warhead Electrical Systems

Current
Policy

Topic 1730 and associated subtopics of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical
Classification Guide for Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (TCG-SAFF-1)
classifies, as CFRD, information associated with programmers that reveals all
major SAFF interrelations controlled by the programmer, vulnerability
reduction techniques, or system accuracies. Programmer parts and circuitry
not revealing the above information are Unclassified.

Findings

Though it is important and necessary to protect sensitive details concerning
precision of delivery, interrelationship of SAFF components as it relates to
weapon function, and the means of precluding countermeasures, SAFF
programmers do not provide enough information to impact these areas.
Programmers do not inherently contain classified information, and thus do not
warrant the CFRD classification.

Discussion

Safing, arming, fuzing, and firing systems of modern nuclear warheads include
a computerized programmer that controls all initial weapon commands through
the use of computer hardware and software, timers, and switch activators. A
programmer's ultimate purpose is to assure that weapon detonation will be
initiated at the proper time and altitude over a target. Thus, programmers
typically contain parts and circuitry that allow them to enable other SAFF
components, circumvention2
circuitry, and electronic clocks.

Though programmers are essentially at the center of a weapon's electronics
system and can enable other SAFF components (e.g., electrical arm, gas transfer) at
predetermined times according to specific inputs, programmers, in
themselves, do not reveal nuclear weapon operational details. Programmers,
even microprocessor driven programmers, are essentially warhead
sequencers which, upon enablement, actuate other SAFF components with
varying degrees of complexity. However, it is not practicable to derive
operational details from such a component. In addition, it is not practicable to
derive weapon system hardness through the inspection of circumvention
circuitry typically found in a programmer. Knowledge of such circuitry would
only negligibly benefit an adversary in impacting weapon system operational
effectiveness. Finally, it is not possible to determine weapon utility and
precision of delivery through knowledge of the accuracy of a programmer's
electronic clock; and, it is not possible to determine fuzing altitudes or boosting
times from knowledge of the time base itself, let alone the accuracy of the time
base.

Recommendation

Declassify all programmer-associated information. Continue to protect major
SAFF interrelations by the current practice of classifying system level block
diagrams, schematics, and detailed descriptions.

Active Protection

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-7 for Discussion)

Nuclear Assembly System
Related Recommendations

The Weaponization Working Group reviewed several classification issues
associated with a nuclear weapon's nuclear assembly system. Much
information about a nuclear weapon's nuclear assembly system should remain
classified. Some design details of even a primitive single-stage weapon could
be of great value to a determined proliferator. Thus, this information should
continue to be protected by classification. However, information about nuclear
assembly systems that is widely known from unclassified sources, or
information for which the continued protection imposes serious operational
restrictions but would provide little assistance to potential adversaries, should
not continue to be classified.

Neutron Generator Locations

Current Policy

Per topic 283.5 of CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification
Policy Guide, and per topic 425 of TCG-WI-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical
Classification Guide on Weapon Initiators, the fact that neutron generators are
located outside the physics package is unclassified, but their physical locations
within the nuclear weapon are classified CRD.

Findings

Revealing the physical locations of neutron generators within a nuclear weapon
provides little or no information with respect to a nuclear weapon's initiation
requirements. The location of a neutron generator could reveal the approximate
location of the nuclear weapon's primary, or fission, stage, but this information is
of limited value. The physical locations of neutron generators in a weapon should
be declassified.

Discussion

All nuclear weapons must have an "initiator" to supply a large pulse of high-energy neutrons at the proper time to begin the fission chain reaction. The two
types of initiators are internal (to the nuclear system), which generate neutrons as
part of the implosion process; and external, which use an ion-acceleration
principle to produce neutrons from D-D or D-T interactions.

The fact that neutron generators are located outside a nuclear weapon's physics
package is unclassified. Their physical locations within a warhead, however,
have always been classified CRD because it was felt that this information may
tend to reveal a weapon's initiation requirements. In addition, it was felt that
knowing the neutron generator locations could provide some information on the
location or orientation of the nuclear weapon primary, or fission, stage. (See
page F-B-33 for a discussion on physics package orientation.)

Knowing the neutron generator locations, however, appears to be of limited or no
value to an adversary. Components or materials located between the neutron
generators and a warhead primary reduce significantly any meaningful
calculations. Some relaxation on classification policy regarding neutron
generator locations was provided about 5 years ago, when it was determined that
the general locations of neutron generators in warhead sections (e.g., center
case) could be unclassified if the dimensional relationship between the nuclear
assembly system and the neutron generators could not be determined.

Overall, it appears that knowing the specific physical locations of neutron
generators within warheads provides no significant physics design information,
there are no other known national security impacts, and there may be cost
reductions and simplifications associated with assembly and maintenance
procedures and manuals.

Recommendation

Declassify the physical locations of neutron generators within nuclear weapons.

High Explosives Quantities in Nuclear Weapons

Current Policy

Per topic 232 of CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification
Policy Guide, and per topic 307 of TCG-NAS-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear
Assembly System Classification Guide, the quantity of high explosives used in
nuclear assembly systems of nuclear weapons is classified CRD.

Findings

While the specific amounts of high explosives (HE) used in nuclear weapons
should remain classified because this value reveals significant physics design
information, some unclassified agreed-to amount is needed to satisfy HE shipping
safety requirements.

Discussion

In an implosion weapon, the HE charge that surrounds the fissile material
supplies the large amount of energy necessary to compress the core and achieve
supercriticality. Electrically fired high-energy detonators initiate the HE to
produce the required uniform shock wave.

Historically, the amount of HE used in nuclear assembly systems has been
classified because it indicates the amount of energy required to drive the
implosion. However, Department of Transportation highway shipping
requirements are becoming more rigid, and some HE mass value is required to
be revealed during the shipment of nuclear weapons. Being able to provide, as
unclassified, some agreed-to amount of HE for nuclear weapon shipments that is
well above the design mass would satisfy the federal regulations. This value
should be determined by DOE, in conjunction with the nuclear weapon design
laboratories.

Recommendation

DOE and the nuclear design laboratories should jointly identify some unclassified
agreed-to amount of HE used in nuclear weapon assembly systems that can be
used to satisfy highway transportation shipping safety requirements. The amount
determined would be well above the actual masses of HE used in nuclear
weapons.

Pit Reuse

Current Policy

Per topical section 2200 of CG-DR-1, the DOE Classification Guide for Nuclear
Weapon Disassembly and Reuse, the fact that pit reuse is being considered or is
being done in unspecified weapons, or that a specified pit is being evaluated for
reuse, is unclassified. However, the fact that a specified pit from a specified
weapon willbe used in another specified weapon may be classified. Also, any pit
reuse information which reveals weapon production rates or stockpile quantities,
or which reveals other sensitive weapon design information, is classified at the
level and category of classified information revealed.

Findings

Current classification policy and topics associated with nuclear weapon pit reuse
are adequate and proper.

Discussion

Some nuclear weapon components/materials that have been retired from the
stockpile may be returned to the stockpile as part of another weapon. Reuse of
these components/materials may require modifying, treating, or reconfiguring
prior to their use on another weapon. The nuclear weapon pit, that component of
a nuclear assembly system that consists of the active fissile material, is a nuclear
weapon component that is being considered for reuse. The reuse of existing pits
for future nuclear weapon design is an important consideration because the
Rocky Flats production facility no longer produces these components.

Most information related to pit reuse is unclassified because no sensitive nuclear
weapon design information is revealed. Any pit reuse information, however, that
reveals weapon design information, nuclear weapon production rates, stockpile
quantities, or stockpile problems is classified.

It is appropriate and completely natural to consider the reuse of pits for different
weapons as the nuclear weapon complex consolidates and standardizes the use
of some weapon components. Thus, the existing classification guidance for pit
reuse appears to be adequate and proper and not overly conservative.

Recommendation

Maintain the current classification policy on pit reuse.

Physics Package Orientation

Current Policy

In some nuclear weapon program classification guides (e.g., topics 3015 and
3032 of the Sandia W88 Trident II Classification Guide), the orientation of the
physics package in the reentry vehicle or reentry body, i.e., primary forward or aft,
is classified CRD. (There is not consistency in this policy from system to system.)

Findings

Existing classification policy appears to be overly conservative. There is no
known reason for classifying this information, and orientation of physics packages
in RV/RBs should be declassified.

Discussion

There has been much speculation as to why there may be national security
implications regarding the orientation of a physics package in a RV/RB, but the
reasons appear to be lost in obscurity. Orientation of the physics package,
primary forward for instance, may reveal some size information or a design
capability of the primary to drive the secondary stage. Also, knowing the
orientation of the physics package may allow one to better estimate the warhead
yield, or could add value to attack scenarios for a ballistic missile defense system.
Finally, there is speculation that the physics package orientation may have
required protection when the fact of physical separation between the primary and
secondary was classified. These reasons are all speculative, however, and the
true reason for classifying the orientation of physics packages in RV/RBs is not
known. Also, any physics design information gleaned from a knowledge of the
physics package orientation would be "second or third order" information, and
would have limited value.

Recommendation

Declassify the orientation of physics packages, i.e., primary forward or aft, in RVs
or RBs.

Nuclear Weapon [Usage]

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-11 for Discussion)

Implosion Detonators and Thermally Stabilized PETN

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-15 for Discussion)

Boost Gas Quantity and Composition

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-17 for Discussion)

Gas Boost Reservoir Design Information

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-19 for Discussion)

[Classified Subject]

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-21 for Discussion)

VULNERABILITY AND
HARDENING RECOMMENDATIONS

The susceptibility of a nuclear weapon or its parts to damage or destruction
as the result of a defensive burst, usually an adversary's nuclear burst, is said
to be its vulnerability. Hardening is the term applied to intentional measures
taken to reduce that vulnerability; while "hardness" represents the resistance
of a weapon or its components to adverse environments, usually from the
effects of a defensive nuclear burst. Weapon hardness may result from
intrinsic hardness, from hardening measures, or from both. Nuclear burst
effects against which weapons may be hardened include hot and cold X rays,
neutrons, gammas, blast, and several forms of nuclear electromagnetic
pulses. Vulnerability to an enemy's nuclear defenses is of primary concern,
so hardening is more often required in long-range strategic weapons than in
tactical missiles, aircraft-delivered bombs, or battlefield weapons.

Nuclear Weapon Vulnerability and Hardening Requirements

Current Policy

"The principal reason for classifying vulnerability and hardening
information about nuclear weapons is to deny an adversary information
about a given weapon's vulnerability or hardness that might help defeat
that weapon." (Reasons for Classification, p. 16)

Per topic 1110 of TCG-V/H-1, required or actual system vulnerability, hardness,
or hardening levels for specified weapons are classified SFRD/SNSI for blast,
EMP, neutrons, gamma rays, X rays, or any other effects.

Findings

Hardness requirements of specific nuclear weapons reveal no design or
vulnerability information and thus should be declassified; however, actual
hardening achieved or vulnerabilities of specific weapons should remain
classified. Current classification policy regarding X-ray shielding technology may
be too conservative and should be thoroughly reviewed, with the intent of
declassifying that technology that no longer requires protection.

Discussion

It is important for national security considerations to maintain the effectiveness of
our nuclear weapons; therefore, any information regarding vulnerabilities or
actual or shortfalls in hardening levels achieved for the U.S. nuclear stockpile
should continue to be protected by classification. However, most generic
information about nuclear weapon radiation environments is well known and has
been widely published. Also, much information about the nature and physics of
hardening against radiation environments is well known from nonnuclear weapon
applications (e.g., satellite, reactor, medical, electrical system). This information
has long been declassified or was never classified.

In addition, scientific principles of X-ray shielding are well known and have been
frequently published in the open literature. However, the fabrication and
manufacturing techniques for applying these scientific principles to X-ray
hardening materials and constructs for U.S. nuclear weapons have required
significant knowledge, technology, and facilities; and thus have been historically
protected by classification to avoid making the information gratuitously available.

It is also logical to assume that nuclear weapons would be optimally hardened
against multiple nuclear environments, e.g., X rays and neutrons. This is also
known as "balanced hardening." In addition, it is well known that no weapon can
be made invulnerable to an arbitrarily severe threat (e.g., a nearby nuclear burst).
Finally, hardening limits may also be imposed by cost, technology, or space
requirements. With this in mind, and because nuclear weapon radiation
environments are reasonably known, a nuclear weapon's hardness requirements
can be reasonably deduced and thus should be declassified. (Per the above
discussion, actual hardening levels achieved and shortfalls in those hardness
levels should remain classified.)

Boron Components

Current Policy

Per topics 601, 602, and 1007 of TCG-WM-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical
Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Materials, and per topic 3110 of TCG-V/H-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Vulnerability and
Hardening, the use of boron, any isotope, for neutron hardening (shielding) in
unspecified nuclear weapons is not classified, but its use in specified weapons is
classified CFRD.

Findings

The use of boron as a material for shielding or hardening against neutrons is well
known, and its use for this purpose on unspecified weapons is unclassified.
Because it is unclassified that specified weapons are neutron hardened, there is
no reason to classify the use of boron on specified weapons to provide hardening
against neutron environments.

Discussion

Information about most of the materials and methodologies used to harden
nuclear weapons against defensive nuclear effects, other than x-ray hardening
materials, is not classified. This is true because materials and general shielding
methods of practical use against each nuclear burst effect can be deduced
directly from the unclassified physics. Many come from, or are, the technology
chosen for dealing with the same effects (namely, neutron radiation shielding) for
reactor and space-borne systems.

Neutron shielding materials tend to be low Z, for instance, to best moderate or
"thermalize" a neutron flux so that the neutrons can be absorbed efficiently. In
general, the physics (e.g., neutron cross sections) involved in hardening
candidates is unclassified. However, the engineering techniques, compromises,
and final selection of materials for use in weapons, including amounts of
materials used, locations, and some configurations, have usually been classified.
This information could help an adversary plan a defense against that weapon, or
could assist an emerging weapon nation in hardening their designs.

It is logical to assume that nuclear weapons are optimally hardened against
multiple nuclear environments. This is also known as "balanced hardening."
Neutrons entering a nuclear warhead can cause fissions in the fissile materials
which result in rapid heating, and they can also cause damage to nonnuclear
components.

The fact that boron is used for neutron hardening purposes in unspecified
weapons has long been unclassified, but its use in specified weapons is classified
to protect information about the hardness of specific weapons. However, the fact
that specified weapons are hardened against the effects of radiation is not
classified, and the specific effects (i.e., x-ray, neutron, etc.) against which these
weapons are hardened also is not classified. And since, per the above
discussion, it is well known that boron provides good screening against neutrons,
it is only logical to assume that boron would be used for neutron hardening
purposes in these weapons.

What should continue to remain classified, of course, is boron chemistry that may
reveal critical technologies, and the details of boron for radiation management
purposes. In addition, boron parts that reveal classified shapes, configurations,
etc., would remain classified.

Recommendation

Declassify the use of boron as a shielding material for neutron hardening
purposes on specified weapons. Continue to classify boron chemistry that may
reveal critical technologies. Classify boron parts if classified shapes,
configurations, etc., are revealed.

MILITARY USE
RECOMMENDATIONS

For this discussion, military use encompasses activities involved in a nuclear
weapon's Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS), including: shipping a weapon
to a storage site, removing it from storage, and assembling, testing,
transporting, and delivering it, when authorized, to detonate on target. It also
includes the logistical and employment concepts and related physical
environments a weapon encounters during its existence. The STS may also
define the logistical flow involved in moving nuclear weapons to and from
operational storage areas for quality assurance testing, modification and
retrofit, and the recycling of limited-life components.

Once a nuclear weapon has been produced and transferred to military
custody, the DoD becomes fully responsible for its accountability, possession,
support, and security until it is employed or returned to the DOE for testing,
modifying, or retirement.

Current Policy

Per topic 2121 of the DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon
Production and Military Use (TCG-WPMU-1), the storage locations (specific sites)
of nuclear weapons (presence of weapons confirmed) in the United States, its
territories, and at sea are classified CFRD; and confirmation of the specific types
of nuclear weapons stored at those locations is SFRD. (As an exception to this
policy, the locations of nuclear weapons at land-based strategic missile launch
sites and on board missile-launching submarines are not classified.) Per topic
2123, information revealing that an installation was formerly a storage site for
nuclear weapons is Unclassified.

Findings

The ability to protect the storage locations (specific sites) of nuclear weapons,
and the specific types of nuclear weapons at these locationsin the United States,
its territories, or at seais tenuous at best, is often not protected, and is often not
protectable. The DoD does not protect second-order associations that imply a
specific weapon is stored at a specific storage site, but the DOE does classify
these associations. Detailed information associated with former (obsolete)
nuclear weapon storage sites is often needed for environmental remediation
purposes, but existing classification guidelines for this information are
nonexistent.

Discussion

Nuclear bombs and warheads in the DoD custody are stored by the military
services in specially designed storage structures. The highly secure structures
are located at military installations throughout the United States, its territories,
and aboard ships at sea. The specific storage locations of nuclear weapons in
the United States, its territories, and at sea, and the types of weapons stored at
these sites, have historically been protected by classification. This information
has been classified to deny potential adversaries information that would allow
them to target, neutralize, seize, or destroy U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear
components. However, the fact that nuclear weapons are located at land-based
strategic missile launch sites and on board missile-launching submarines is not
classified.

This information, however, has been poorly protected in the past, and is basically
unprotectable. There are many indicators that provide second-order information
on nuclear weapon storage locations and types of weapons stored. Included are:
military convoys and other extreme security practices; bomber and other military
aircraft locations, and identification of the weapons those aircraft carry being
unclassified; "point-of-departure" of Joint Test Assembly flights; and travel of
military, DOE, and DOE contractor personnel to specific locations to conduct
specific operations. Also, nuclear weapon storage locations have often been
inconsistently protected by DoD, DOE, Congress, and local politicians. While the
DOE requires in-depth protection of nuclear weapon storage locations and type of
weapons stored at those locations, the DoD does not protect such second-order
associations; and these locations may be occasionally revealed to achieve some
national or local political objective.

Per existing classification guidelines, the identification of an installation as a
former storage site for nuclear weapons is unclassified, but the guidelines do not
specify what additional descriptive information about these sites can be released
as unclassified. Much information about these sites, however, no longer has any
sensitivity for national security purposes, and is often needed for environmental
restoration purposes. In addition, historians are often interested in obtaining
detailed information about these sites, including the old AEC nuclear weapon
storage sites known as "National Stockpile Sites," or "Operational Storage Sites."
Information that should be declassified and made publicly available includes: site
locations and designators (e.g., site Able); types and descriptions of building
construction and site layouts, etc.; and types of weapons stored at the sites.
Other information, such as numbers of weapons stored, and any site association
with current nuclear weapon storage sites, would remain classified.

Recommendation

While the locations of existing nuclear weapon storage sites may need to
continue to be classified, DOE should not classify second-order implications that
a specific site is storing or handling a specific nuclear weapon system, such as:
"point of departure" of JTA flights, or personnel travel to specific locations to
discuss specific weapon systems.

Much information regarding former nuclear weapon storage sites should be
declassified and made publicly available. This includes information on the old
AEC nuclear weapon storage sites. Any associations between the AEC nuclear
weapon storage sites and current nuclear weapon storage sites should remain
classified.

Warhead Service Life

Current Policy

Per topic 1214 of TCG-WPMU-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide
for Weapon Production and Military Use, the design goal for a nuclear weapon's
service life is Unclassified, but estimated remaining life based on facts available
at any given time is classified CFRD. Also, per topic 1213, the projected
retirement date from the stockpile for a nuclear weapon is CFRD. This
classification philosophy is often reflected in a nuclear weapon's Military
Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS) documents.

Findings

Continuing to classify any information related to a nuclear weapon's service
lifetime appears to be no longer warranted because, as weapon lifetimes are
extended, this information diminishes in its value to national security.

Discussion

The paramount reason for classifying U.S. nuclear weapon service life
information has been to protect estimates of U.S. national strengths and
capabilities. Also, this information could be of intelligence value to adversaries
because it may reveal weaknesses or deficiencies as well as actual or projected
strengths.

This national security philosophy may have been applicable to early nuclear
weapon programs, when expected service lifetimes may have been as short as a
few years, and as significant design improvements were being made to both the
nuclear and nonnuclear parts of nuclear weapons. However, the lifetimes of
modern nuclear weapons have been significantly extended through more efficient
designs and improved stockpile sampling and maintenance programs, and
through modernization programs.3
Also, with the end of the cold war and
resulting U.S./Russia agreements, fewer types of weapons are maintained in the
U.S. inventory, and no new nuclear weapons are currently being designed.
Therefore, in today's world, knowing the design or expected lifetime of a nuclear
weapon appears to have little or no national security value.

Recommendation

Declassify a nuclear weapon's expected or estimated service life.

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special Weapons
Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member, provided the
following minority opinion: Non-concur with the Group recommendation to
declassify specific warhead service life. This information indicates warhead
operational performance over time. This is of military operational importance.

Weapon Retirement Numbers and Rates

Current Policy

Per topic 1213 of TCG-WPMU-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide
Weapon Production and Military Use, the projected dates for nuclear weapon
retirements (Phase 7) are classified CFRD, pending announcement by the DoD.
Per topic 1221 of TCG-WPMU-1, the fact that a weapon is in a specific weapon
program phase (e.g., Phase 7 Retirement) is unclassified.

Per topic 1131 of CG-DR-1, the DOE Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon
Disassembly and Reuse, the total number of specified weapons to be retired in
any time frame is classified C/SFRD (SFRD if stockpile quantities revealed;
otherwise CFRD). Per topic 1140 of CG-DR-1, the retirement rate of nuclear
weapons is SFRD if stockpile quantities are revealed; and CFRD if the total
number of planned retirements of specified weapons is revealed, or if the number
of specified weapons retired to date is revealed.

Findings

In today's environment of international agreements and reduced nuclear weapon
stockpile numbers, it is no longer necessary to classify weapon retirement
numbers and rates.

Discussion

Retirement of a nuclear weapon begins when it is removed from the stockpile by
the DoD and made available for return to the DOE for eventual disassembly.
There are several reasons for retiring nuclear weapons, including arms control
treaties, force restructuring, aging, and modernization. After transfer to the DOE,
the weapons are transferred to the DOE Pantex disassembly facility where they
are disassembled. The retirement phase of a nuclear weapon can last several
years, and the quantity of weapons being retired can be established by arms
control treaties, Acts of Congress, Presidential Proclamation, or DoD directives.

Some aspects of nuclear weapon retirements and the subsequent processes
leading to final disposition may reveal sensitive nuclear weapon related
information, including weapon design, stockpile capabilities, or safeguards and
security. This information may be classified to avoid helping potential
proliferants, hostile nations, and potential adversaries to develop, improve, or use
nuclear weapons. The numbers and rates of specified weapons to be retired or
being retired has been classified in some instances because it was believed this
information could reveal a quantitative diminishment of the total stockpile or of a
specified weapon in the stockpile, or of a quantitative estimate of new
replacement weapons. In general, this information has been classified to help
protect U.S. national strengths and capabilities.

When the U.S. was retiring weapon systems and replacing their capability, it
seemed reasonable to classify the number of weapons retired and their rates. In
today's environment, however, when the U.S. is dismantling weapons to comply
with international agreements that limit nuclear warheads, and is not replacing
their capability, these reasons are not longer valid. The current and planned U.S.
nuclear stockpile bears no resemblance to past stockpile numbers. Also, as the
weapons are sequenced through subsequent stages toward final disposition in
the retirement and disassembly process, the numbers and process rates of
weapons and weapon components, for various operations, become further
removed from revealing any sensitive information relating to current stockpile
quantities or capabilities.

Thus, while the number and rates of nuclear weapons being retired may have
revealed sensitive information when the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile was
robust, this is not true in today's environment of international agreements and
significantly reduced nuclear weapon stockpile numbers. Knowledge of the
retirement numbers and rates of nuclear weapons being dismantled does not
provide assistance to proliferants or potential adversaries, and will not endanger
U.S. national security.

Recommendation

Declassify weapon retirement numbers and retirement rates for nuclear weapon
systems that are being dismantled.

Nuclear Weapon Quantitative Reliability Information

Current Policy

Topic 1510 of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide on Nuclear
Weapon Production and Military Use (TCG-WPMU-1) classifies numerical
nuclear weapon reliability requirements, assessments, or statements (favorable
or unfavorable) at SFRD.

Findings

There appear to be no known reasons to continue to protect numerical reliability
requirements for nuclear weapon systems; however, the reliability assessments
should continue to be protected.

Discussion

The reliability of a nuclear weapon is the probability that it will perform in
accordance with its design intent or requirements. Every nuclear weapon is
assigned a reliability goal or requirement, which may vary depending upon the
nature or purpose of the weapon. To help verify a nuclear weapon's reliability, a
great deal of testing is conducted throughout its lifetime. In addition, calculations
and statistical analyses are performed for every nuclear weapon part and
component, and their interactions upon each other. The result is a weapon's
assessed reliability figure.

Historically, all nuclear weapon quantitative reliability requirements or
assessments have been classified to protect a nuclear weapon's operational
capability. While this practice may have been valid during the early 1950s when
there were relatively few weapons in the stockpile and they required continuous
maintenance, it no longer appears to be so for the reliability requirement.
Today's nuclear weapons are designed to be highly reliable, and with the advent
of the "wooden bomb" concept in the late 1950s, the need for continuous
maintenance has disappeared. In fact, there may be political or other benefits to
be able to reveal, on an unclassified basis, a nuclear weapon's reliability
requirements.

The assessment of a nuclear weapon's reliability, however, should remain
classified. This numerical value does reveal a nuclear weapon system
operational capability, and the assessed reliability, for a variety of reasons, may
be different from the requirement.

Recommendation

Nuclear Weapon Size, Shape, and Mass Properties

Current Policy

Some nuclear weapon program classification guides require the size, shape, and
mass properties of nuclear weapons to be classified.

Findings

The DOE/DoD classification policy for nuclear weapon size, shape, and mass
properties appears to be inconsistently applied from system to system, these
parameters are often revealed during development and operational testing, and
they should be declassified.

Discussion

The size, shape, and mass properties of nuclear weapons are often classified per
program classification guidance requirements, although there are inconsistencies
between weapon programs. The classifications of these parameters range from
U to CFRD/RD to SFRD/RD. Historically, it was believed that these parameters
could reveal sensitive nuclear weapon design information, e.g., physical
separation between stages. However, design declassifications over the years
have voided these reasons for classification. In addition, it is believed that
reasonable size, shape, and mass property estimates can be determined during
system development flight testing. Therefore, these parameters appear to be
basically unprotectable.

Recommendation

Declassify nuclear weapon size, shape, and mass properties. (Classification of
these parameters may be appropriate for advanced developments prior to flight
testing.)

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special Weapons
Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member, provided the
following minority opinions: Non-concur with the Group recommendation to
declassify weapon size, shape, and mass properties. This information should
continue to be selectively reviewed. Complete weapon physical characteristics
indicate overall weapons system performance, e.g., missile throw-weight. This is
of military operational importance.

WH/RV Weapon System Loadouts

Current Policy

Paragraphs in the Military Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target
Sequence (STS) documents for several WH/RV systems related to
maximum/minimum system loadouts and flight range are identified (paragraph
marked) as containing classified information (SFRD in the W88 MCs). Current
WH/RV system classification guides also classify the actual number of RVs on a
specific missile, but the maximum number of RVs a specific missile can carry is
not classified.

Findings

Although the actual loadout (the actual number of RVs) on an operational missile
should perhaps remain classified, there doesn't seem to be a compelling reason
to classify the maximum and minimum numbers. In some cases, these numbers
have been declassified because they were revealed during development flight
testing, or because of treaty agreements.

Discussion

Historically, system loadout information associated with strategic ballistic missile
systems has been classified to protect operational system capabilities. Maximum
system loadouts for these systems, however, has not been classified because
this information cannot be protected once a development flight program has been
conducted. There appears to be no specific guidance regarding minimum RV
system loadout information. However, there also appears to be no rationale to
classify this information; and minimum system loadouts may very well be subject
to treaty agreements, and thus be required to be Unclassified. For instance,
minimum system loadouts are required to be verifiable under START II.

Rapidly-Selectable Yield Capability

Limited-Life Component Maximum Service Life & Exchange
Intervals

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-25 for Discussion)

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

Hazardous Materials in Warheads

Current Policy

Often it is necessary to classify the presence and/or quantities of non-SNM
hazardous materials in nuclear weapons because their use may reveal a
sensitive physics or other requirement. Topics 928, 929, and 933 of TCG-WM-1,
the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Materials, provide
examples of this policy. Classifications range from C-SRD/FRD, based on the
use or application of a specific material.

Findings

Revealing the presence and/or quantities of hazardous materials in nuclear
weapons is of little or no value to a sophisticated adversary or a proliferant. How
these materials are used may require protection; but their quantities and/or
presence should be declassified so they can be identified in highway
transportation manifests, or identified for environmental considerations at DOE
facilities.

Discussion

Non-SNM hazardous materials are sometimes used in nuclear weapons to
provide a specific design or use capability. Examples include: a material used
for hardening purposes, or the amount of a particular material used for a specific
function. It has been assumed that a knowledge of the presence of these
materials, or their quantities, in weapons may reveal their use to a sophisticated
adversary.

Transportation of these hazardous materials over our nation's highways,
however, without identifying the materials, is becoming increasingly difficult. The
Department of Energy has a transportation National Security Exemption that
applies to nuclear weapons, but not to weapon components, test assemblies, or
trainers.

In addition, environmental considerations at a DOE facility may require that a
listing of materials used at that facility be provided to environmental remediation
specialists. A solution to the Department of Transportation shipping restrictions,
and facility environmental concerns, would be to allow as unclassified the
association of non-SNM hazardous materials, or the identification of those
materials weighing less than xx pounds, with nuclear weapons or weapon
components. In addition, this revision of the current classification policy for
hazardous materials would help reduce weapon production costs and simplify
maintenance procedures.

Recommendation

DOE should declassify the presence of and some maximum amount of non-SNM
hazardous materials that are used in nuclear weapons or weapon components.
How or why these hazardous materials are used in nuclear weapons may need to
remain classified, as well as their use in specified weapons.

Findings

Because the outputs from a nuclear weapon simulator do not closely approximate
those from a nuclear weapon, significant advances in simulator technologies or
capabilities should not be automatically classified but should be evaluated before
making a classification determination.

Discussion

In the occasional instance when information about nonnuclear testing of a nuclear
weapon is classified, the rationale most often given is the coincidental revelation
of otherwise classified nuclear weapon design or performance information. Test
results can also be classified because they reveal vulnerability/hardness
limitations or levels, or because they disclose a problem or deficiency that does
or might degrade a current or imminent stockpile capability.

Test methodologies and equipment, including effects simulators, are not usually
classified because they employ widely known technology. However, specialized
test equipment that reveals classified information about the tested item must be
classified accordingly.

Simulation testing requirements, levels, and results are unclassified unless they
correspond to a system hardness level or result in or reveal serious degradation
of a weapon part. Simulators themselves, including their designs, performance
characteristics, and output capabilities, are unclassified. However, substantial
advances in simulator technology are required to be protected as classified until
their significance and sensitivity can be evaluated.

Nuclear weapon simulators, however, are designed to simulate a single
parameter of a nuclear weapon's output (e.g., x ray, neutron, EMP), and they do
not closely approximate that characteristic. In addition, they are designed to
provide the greatest output (e.g., current and voltage) based on current state-of-the-art pulsed power or pulsed reactor technologies. Therefore, since simulators
do not comprehensively simulate all aspects of a nuclear weapon's output,
advancements in simulator technology should not automatically be classified, but
their capabilities should be reviewed and a determination made whether the
output closely approximates that from a nuclear weapon.

Recommendation

Classify breakthroughs representing a substantial advance in simulator
technology or capabilities only when a determination is made that the output
characteristics closely approximate those of a nuclear weapon.

Radiological Weapons and Warfare

Current Policy

"AEC Classification Guide for Military Application of Atomic Energy," dated
January 17, 1951, defines most related information as RD. CG-SS-3, dated
August 1994, classifies the specified design of a credible Radiation Dispersal
Device (RDD) as U-SNSI, but notes that it might be RD. CG-WN-4, dated
September 1, 1994, specified that the DOE design analysis may be RD.

Findings

The overall classification level/category for U.S.-generated radiological weapon
and warfare information should be SRD and SFRD, respectively. There can, as
in guides for nuclear weapons, be a range of levels from U-SRD/FRD depending
on the information revealed.

Discussion

Radiological warfare can have serious consequences. Therefore, the design of
radiological weapons and the techniques of their use should be protected from
potential adversaries. A key question is: should radiological weapon
designsthat is, designs that produce radioactive contamination without a
nuclear explosionbe classified RD? From a strict interpretation of "use of
atomic energy" as a weapon, it can be concluded that radioactive materials
generate atomic energy when emitting energetic particles and rays. Therefore, a
weapon designed to dispense radioactive material appears to meet the RD
definition. Military use would fall in the FRD category. Once a DOE laboratory
has analyzed a design or device originated by sources other than the U.S.
Government and determined that it is, in fact, a radiological weapon, this
information and hardware should also be classified as RD. Nothing in this
discussion or the previous finding should be construed to mean that information
on the effects of radiation on humans or related human radiation experiments
should be classified.

Recommendation

That the DOE Office of Declassification issue updated guidance reaffirming that
information on radiological weapons and warfare is classified RD/FRD, at levels
ranging from U-S depending on the information revealed, and categories of RD
(design information) or FRD/NSI (military use information).

Appendix F to theReport of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

Report of theWeaponization and Weapons Production and Military Use Working Group

THIS ANNEX IS CLASSIFIED ANDCANNOT BE PROVIDED HERE

1 A capacitor discharge unit type firing set accumulates electrical energy from a low
voltage power supply, stores this energy in a high voltage capacitor bank and, upon receipt
of the proper fuzing signal, delivers the energy to the weapon detonators.

2 Circumvention provides a means of reducing an electronic system's susceptibility
to upset from ionizing nuclear radiation. A system's electronics are turned off when
encountering ionizing radiation and turned on again when the radiation is no longer present.

3 A classic example is the B61 bomb. Variants of this nuclear weapon have been in
the U.S. nuclear inventory since the mid-1960s, and its lifetime is expected to extend many
years into the future.