Europe – Global Politicshttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp
An International Affairs MagazineSat, 05 Aug 2017 07:38:12 +0000en-UShourly1The Economics of Catalan Secession From Spainhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/08/04/economics-catalan-secession-spain/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/08/04/economics-catalan-secession-spain/#respondFri, 04 Aug 2017 18:04:38 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=3196Image by David Tubau (Energético) One year on from the Brexit vote, Europe’s economy faces yet another monumental challenge in the shape of the Catalan independence referendum. There are doubts as to whether the referendum will go ahead; a referendum on independence was held in 2014, but after the Spanish constitutional court annulled it, the […]

One year on from the Brexit vote, Europe’s economy faces yet another monumental challenge in the shape of the Catalan independence referendum. There are doubts as to whether the referendum will go ahead; a referendum on independence was held in 2014, but after the Spanish constitutional court annulled it, the referendum went ahead as a non-binding plebiscite. The Spanish government has pledged again to do all it can to block the vote.

In the event of a Catalan secession there would undoubtedly be much to worry about economically for both Catalonia and Spain, as well as for the member states of the European Union. Catalonia is the main driving force of the Spanish economy and accounts for around 20% of Spanish GDP. Such a loss in production would represent an insurmountable challenge for the Spanish economy to face. Hence the national government’s resolute opposition to a binding referendum on the issue. Furthermore, Catalonia accounts for 25% of total exports from Spain while the capital of Madrid only makes up 11% of that total. These figures stand as firm evidence of the economic muscle that Catalonia has in its hands, and as a stark reminder to the Spanish government of what they may lose if a secession were to proceed.

The main economic argument used by pro-independence advocates is that Catalonia is fiscally mistreated by the Spanish government. Year on year, Catalonia suffers from a fiscal deficit – the Spanish government redistributes Catalan tax revenues to all the autonomous regions of Spain, in a system whereby Catalonia receives less in funding from the government than what it contributes in tax payments. Moreover, the level of public funding per capita in Catalonia is lower than in many of the other autonomous regions, despite the fact that Catalonia is the biggest fiscal net-contributor of all the regions.

A crucial element of secession talks would concern the Catalan portion of national debt. The Catalan debt to GDP ratio currently sits at 35.4%; however, it is often argued by those in favour of independence that such levels of debt have accumulated due to the lack of funding Catalonia receives from the national government each year. In 2016, Catalonia received 10.7% of the allocation of territorial funding by the Spanish government, a relatively low figure considering the population makes up 16% of the entirety of the country’s populace, and that Catalonia contributes towards 20% of Spanish GDP. Therefore, it is logical to see how debt may accrue in the case of under-funding, leaving the Catalan government with no option but to borrow in order to fund public services. An independent Catalonia with complete fiscal autonomy would be able to use the totality of its tax revenue to reinvest in its economy and society.

Probably the most vital component of Catalan independence negotiations would come with the discussions of its currency. In the event that Catalonia secedes from Spain, it would be imperative for the region to remain in the euro zone. An expulsion from the euro area would leave the Catalan government with a multitude of obstacles to face. These problems would be linked to the prohibitive access Catalonia would have to the European Central Bank. It is possible that the region could keep the euro as its de facto currency. However, its inability to receive financing from the ECB would likely lead to an increase in debt, consequently placing significant strain on the economy.

The intention of remaining in the euro zone will go hand in hand with Catalonia’s plan to maintain its position as a member of the European Union. Anti-independence proponents argue that Catalonia’s transition back into the EU would be an arduous effort, as it could take several years to negotiate and ratify, which would be detrimental to the Catalan economy. Joining the EU requires ratification from all existing member states, and just one veto would see its membership attempt rejected. Worryingly for Catalonia, Spain could be the EU member state to use its veto against the region which left it. Other countries such as Turkey and Macedonia have been in contention for accession to the European Union for several years to no avail.

Notwithstanding the opposition to Catalan independence from the EU and Spain, it would still make rational economic sense for all parties involved to maintain a customs union. Catalonia is an important infrastructural region for trade – it is the biggest Mediterranean port in terms of goods volume. In 2016, exports for Catalonia grew by 2%, a figure considerably greater than that of the Euro area (0.7%), Spain (1.7%), and Germany (1.2%). France and Germany are two of the main destinations for Catalan exports, along with other regions in Spain. This could continue post-secession, but would depend entirely upon the nature of negotiations. In the event of independence, Catalonia would have the opportunity to become a more prominent force in the international realm, allowing it to forge closer relations with other states such as France, Italy, and Germany. Again, this would rely upon the nature of secession, specifically with regard to the Catalan position in the EU.

The most pertinent question many will ask in the economic context of Catalan independence is this: Would an independent Catalonia be economically viable? The simple answer to this question is yes. Catalonia’s GDP in 2016 was 223 billion euros. To put this in perspective, the total GDP of Portugal in the same year was significantly less at around 180 billion euros. Moreover, GDP per capita in Catalonia was around 29 thousand euros in 2015, more than that of Italy, which was approximately 26 thousand euros. Thus, the Catalan economy certainly seems capable of being able to sustain an independent Catalan state.

Despite the impressive economic power of the Catalan region, the most critical question surrounding the debate does not concern the economic feasibility of Catalan independence, but rather the nature of the secession process. If Catalonia can maintain peaceful and progressive negotiations with both Spain and the EU, while securing the advantageous position of gaining quick access to the single market and the euro zone, then there is no reason to assume that the Catalan economy could not hold its own as an independent state. However, the people of Catalonia should be very aware of the detrimental economic consequences of an acrimonious secession.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/08/04/economics-catalan-secession-spain/feed/0From Terror to Deliberationhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/23/from-terror-to-deliberation/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/23/from-terror-to-deliberation/#respondFri, 23 Jun 2017 12:42:03 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=3096The United Kingdom has been shaken by four terror attacks in three months. Three were carried out by ISIS supporters and the latest was the result of anti-Muslim sentiments. These attacks follow a number of jihadi attacks in other European countries: France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. The recurrence of these events (and often their low-tech […]

The United Kingdom has been shaken by four terror attacks in three months. Three were carried out by ISIS supporters and the latest was the result of anti-Muslim sentiments. These attacks follow a number of jihadi attacks in other European countries: France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. The recurrence of these events (and often their low-tech dimension) is worrying and it has become clear that intelligence and military-based responses to the jihadi phenomenon are insufficient. On the other hand, far-right political solutions to the problem are usually simplistic and contradict democratic and liberal values. Here, I propose a deliberative approach to the problem.

In the aftermath of the third Jihadi attack Theresa May argued that this recent wave of attacks shows that Britain has been too tolerant of extremism. I ostensibly agreed with May. For decades Britain and other European countries have turned a blind eye to (and to a certain extent helped) the establishment of Salafi ideology in Europe. Salafism (or Wahhabism) is the intolerant radical Sunni theological school of thought which informs current terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda. The close economic and militaryrelationship between Western powers and Saudi Arabia (where Wahhabism is the state religion) is one of the reasons behind this tolerance of Salafism. Saudi Arabia has a huge influence on Sunni Muslim communities worldwide and is responsible for the training of a majority of Salafi clerics and the propagation of Salafi-oriented educational material in the West.

While recognising that Europe has been too complacent with certain extremist strands of Islam is a step in the right direction, it creates a number of epistemic and strategic issues. Here, I will only focus on two questions. First, how do we define and then recognise extremist ideas rooted in certain Islamic schools of thought? Second, once extremist views have been identified, what can be done about them? I believe that deliberative democracy can be a tool for answering these questions.

According to Jane Mansbridge et al., deliberative democracy performs three functions: epistemic, ethical, and democratic. The epistemic function relates to the importance of seeking a better understanding of political conflicts through the exchange of facts, justifications, and reasoned arguments. The ethical dimension relates to the requirement of mutual respect and recognition between the participants engaged in the deliberative process. Finally, the democratic function underlines the egalitarian and participatory dimension of the process: the capacity to argue and offer justifications determines the political power of the participants, not their wealth and status.

A deliberative approach to the problem of extremism would offer answers to the aforementioned questions and would create a climate of mutual discovery. It would allow non-Muslim communities to learn from Muslim communities who the extremists are and what their theological, social, and psychological motivations are. This would allow the non-Muslim public to differentiate between common Muslims and extremists and to, thus, avoid generalisations. A better understanding of the plurality of thoughts amongst Muslims would also allow authorities to better target their policies against extremism as some literature and speech patterns would reveal potential Salafi influences in mosques and community centres.

At a theological and ideological level this approach could create beneficial debates within Islamic communities, forcing members to engage with their scriptures to provide arguments and justifications (from within their own normative framework). The debates would highlight whether or not some Islamic texts are ethically and politically problematic, and whether or not these texts are a) historically and theologically sound and/or b) open to socio-historical contextualisation. Given that Islam is a religion with social and political dimensions, these theological debates would have a socio-political impact. This approach would represent an important step in fighting the ideological power of jihadi organisations.

At a socio-political level, deliberative approaches would also benefit non-Salafi Muslim communities (in particular the minority communities who suffer from Jihadism even more than non-Muslims) as these communities would be treated as equals and as partners in the political process. Their agency would be enhanced as they could further clarify aspects of their religion to the broader public and be recognised as valuable members of society with a rich, sophisticated tradition while clearly establishing the differences between their Islamic worldviews and the Salafi version of it. This approach is, in fact, not alien to Islamic doctrines as some school of thoughts emphasise the importance of the use of reason and value argumentation.

Deliberative practices would therefore answer both questions. They would help define the problem, and this process of definition through deliberation would in itself be a first step towards solving the problem. Indeed, these democratic practices would generate an increased feeling of mutual trust and respect between communities, helping to mitigate against the social isolationism and stereotypes that can lead to radicalism. It would also help in creating prevention policies developed from the bottom-up which would likely be more effective than a-posteriori initiatives focused on “de-radicalisation”. Finally, deliberative democracy and its emphasis on facts, justifications, and argumentation would offer an epistemically robust alternative to the simplistic political explanations and conceptual caricatures of both islamophobes and islamophiles.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/23/from-terror-to-deliberation/feed/0The End of Truthhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/08/the-end-of-truth/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/08/the-end-of-truth/#respondThu, 08 Jun 2017 16:11:14 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=3059Truth and Democracy have always had a troubled relationship, but perhaps never as troubled as now. From Plato’s Noble Lie to Kellyanne Conway’s Alternative Facts, there has always been a tension between the presentation of an objective truth and the exercise of political power. Michael Ignatieff, himself an academic turned not particularly successful politician, mused […]

Truth and Democracy have always had a troubled relationship, but perhaps never as troubled as now. From Plato’s Noble Lie to Kellyanne Conway’s Alternative Facts, there has always been a tension between the presentation of an objective truth and the exercise of political power. Michael Ignatieff, himself an academic turned not particularly successful politician, mused that this is why academics generally make such poor political operators. Nevertheless, there is a cruel irony in the fact that at a time when knowledge is more abundant than ever before, the truth is such a contested issue.

The forces behind this are nearly impossible to untangle as they reinforce and amplify each other. The partisan nature of many media outlets hardly needs to be mentioned. This has generally been prevalent on the right, with Fox News and the Daily Mail having mastered the selective use of facts. The Daily Mail splashes the front page with stories of benefit cheats and jihadis while relegating the murder of a sitting MP by a white nationalist to page 30 while Fox News has long abandoned the appearance of impartiality expected of TV news networks.

In the midst of liberal handwringing over the election of Donald Trump, American liberals have also begun to indulge in some of the fake news promoting and conspiracy theorising for which they have long mocked the right. Desperate to believe the worst about Trump, people are turning to talk show hosts like Rachel Maddow and Twitter celebrities like Louise Mensch for comforting stories which seem to show the President’s impending impeachment. Although the current scandals swirling around the administration may well bring down Trump, at this stage many on the left look like Glen Beck with his chalk board. This is perhaps an understandable instinctual response, but it is not a helpful one.

Counter-intuitive as it may be, as the plurality of potential news sources increases the public’s exposure to alternative ideas seems to decrease. Social Media algorithms, the availability of like-minded communities and the wide availability of partisan alternative news sources have conspired to create echo chambers in which dissenting voices can be blocked out. This allows organisations like Breitbart to safely muddy the truth or tell outright lies.It has long been understood that people seek out news which confirms rather than contradicts their previously held notions. This may explain why people who no longer believe the word of the FBI or Justice Department are willing to believe Steve Bannon or John Oliver. In the internet age, this building of echo chambers is easier than ever. Indeed, as Eli Pariser has persuasively argued in ‘The Filter Bubble’, it is almost impossible to avoid.

Another driving force behind the contested nature of the truth is the division of society along a variety of identity-based lines, which works with our polarised media landscape to reinforce the vicious cycle of adversarialism sweeping across much of the democratic world. LGBT rights activists willing, perhaps with good cause, to believe the worst of the Trump administration have been caught out by fake news. However, it is from the other side of the political divide that the most worrying examples come from. Although many people have been keen to focus on the economic factors involved in the Trump election, it is undeniable that racial identity played a role with white voters at all income levels voting for Trump. This is not a new factor in US elections, but a newer and more ominous development is the fact that issues of racial and religious identity skewed the public’s understanding of basic facts. Philip Klinker’s analysis of the American National Election Study has shown that the single best indicator of whether someone is a Trump voter is a positive answer to the question ‘Is Barack Obama a Muslim?’ combined with the fact that they are white. Various other polls have shown strong correlations between support for Trump and explicitly anti-black views, including the belief that non-whites are less evolved than whites. This does not just show the twisting of the truth through the prism of party politics, but the much more sinister role of religious and racial resentment in how people view the world. These kinds of splits between identity groups are anathema to the functioning of multicultural societies. Furthermore, this harms everyone, as in-group/out-group thinking can drive violence on both local and national levels.

The truth itself may be an abstract concept, something which always has and always will be slippery. But the current approach to facts, both within the media and the public at large, is a fundamental threat to the functioning of democracy. Thomas Jefferson believed that ‘Whenever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government.’ Yet despite the preponderance of knowledge in the world, can a society lacking in an agreed standard for truth really be considered a functioning democracy?

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/08/the-end-of-truth/feed/0Macron’s New Cabinet Heralds Revival of a European Defencehttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/22/macrons-new-cabinet-heralds-revival-european-defence/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/22/macrons-new-cabinet-heralds-revival-european-defence/#respondMon, 22 May 2017 20:58:01 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2991With the recent nomination of his government, President Macron takes a chance to rejuvenate the idea of a European defence, an ambitious plan that collapsed when it failed to obtain the ratification in the French Parliament back in 1954. The European Defence Community emerged from the Pleven plan, proposed in 1950 by the French Prime […]

With the recent nomination of his government, President Macron takes a chance to rejuvenate the idea of a European defence, an ambitious plan that collapsed when it failed to obtain the ratification in the French Parliament back in 1954.

The European Defence Community emerged from the Pleven plan, proposed in 1950 by the French Prime Minister René Pleven. This proposed six-nation integrated European army constituted one of the first attempts to create a purely European multinational military capability. The plan collapsed when it failed to obtain ratification in the French Parliament in August 1954. The reasons behind the failed ratification of the Treaty were twofold and concerned major changes in the international scene with the end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin, as well as domestic problems of the French Fourth Republic.

Since then, new initiatives have been launched but today the European Union still does not have a defence as such. The main defense-related European agency is the EDA, a Common Foreign and Security Policy body established in 2004 and aimed at fostering European defense cooperation which reports to the Council of the European Union. Despite the existence of this Brussels-based agency, the main military alliance in Europe remains NATO. Here, France had a historical military strategy of independence from the North Atlantic Alliance from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s.

The current unstable international situation has led to new discussions about cooperation in defence and security issues within the European Union, which recently celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties. The Trump presidency represents a paradox for Europe. On the one hand, it threatens many postwar structures that have helped in defining the European continent and restoring peace. On the other hand, his political impact on Europe could provide the stimulus the continent needs to redefine itself, since its existing relationships with the United States and Russia have tended to weaken Europe’s ability to manage and defend itself.

The election of Emmanuel Macron on May 7, whose strong European vision is best evidenced through the use of “Ode to Joy” – the anthem of Europe – as the musical background to his long victory march, could give extra momentum to the development of a Union which has been beset by various challenges and crises in recent years. The names of the different ministries chosen by Emmanuel Macron and his Prime Minister Edouard Philippe are also not hollow; Europe is at the heart of Macron’s Left-Right government. Indeed, the choice of a Ministry of “Europe and Foreign Affairs” is an important symbol given that his second round opponent, Marine Le Pen, was a eurosceptic far-right candidate ready to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. In addition to Jean-Yves le Drian, the socialist politician who served as Minister of Defense during the five-year mandate of President Hollande and who recently inherited the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Marielle de Sarnez, the vice-chair of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), was nominated as the Minister for European affairs. De Sarnez, whose field of expertise covers the inner workings of the Union, will be in charge of the matching ministerial portfolio.

In the nomination of the Cabinet, another announcement came as a surprise. President Macron appointed Sylvie Goulard at the “Armed Forces” Ministry, a meaningful designation that had fallen into disuse since 1974. Goulard, who becomes the second female minister in charge of the French army, is known as the ALDE group coordinator and as a centrist MEP where she has been elected twice in a row since 2009. Having participated in the creation of the federalist inter-parliamentary Spinelli Group and worked as a political advisor to Romano Prodi when he was the President of the European Commission, she is an assumed europhile. Goulard, a polyglot, arranged a highly publicized meeting between Macron and the German Chancellor during the presidential campaign. Her nomination is another gauge of the newly elected President’s declared European aspirations as well as his desire not to succumb to the hegemonic dominance of NATO.

Macron, who met with Angela Merkel in Berlin the day after his inauguration, seems to be taking his new role as a European leader seriously. The Armed Forces Minister Sylvie Goulard, who already knows her female German counterpart very well, will have to demonstrate tenacity and leadership in order to allow the renaissance of the spirit of Jean Monnet. The stakes are multiple and Europe will have to bounce back from the recent terrorist attacks within and beyond its borders.

In the upcoming months, the French government will be expecting a less hesitant approach from its European partners regarding several burning issues, one of them being the resolution of the Malian conflict, where assistance from its European counterparts is still limited. Since the launch of the Serval operation in January 2013, followed in July 2014 by the Barkhane regional operation, France has been working in a solitary fashion, often bemoaning the lack of support from other European countries. Speaking with a single voice in the international arena, creating a clear roadmap, and defining the outlines of a united stance on defence and foreign policy issues will be essential to the shaping of the European Union as a global power.

In light of the outcomes of the recent Austrian, Dutch and French elections, the European project seems to be on a significant upward trajectory. The populist deviations have been temporarily averted, but the hurdles to be overcome are many. With Macron’s new pro-European cabinet in position, the Franco-German alliance will have to move forward in tandem to chart the contours of a common defence project as one element of the broader project of securing the future of Europe.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/22/macrons-new-cabinet-heralds-revival-european-defence/feed/0America’s Allies in Eurasia Face a Common Foe in Russiahttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/12/americas-allies-eurasia-face-common-foe-russia/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/12/americas-allies-eurasia-face-common-foe-russia/#respondFri, 12 May 2017 12:46:53 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2941By Eugen Iladi It’s no secret that Russia is using military means and disinformation to try to reassemble its Soviet Union footprint. Ukraine has drawn the most headlines in this effort. But the Kremlin has long been working its land-grab plan in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Russia’s economic failure and social challenges in the 21st […]

It’s no secret that Russia is using military means and disinformation to try to reassemble its Soviet Union footprint. Ukraine has drawn the most headlines in this effort. But the Kremlin has long been working its land-grab plan in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.

Russia’s economic failure and social challenges in the 21st century have forced it to look backward. The Kremlin has engaged in territory seizure, proxy wars and propaganda campaigns all around its borders designed to return Russia to its former glory as a superpower.

This has forced Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan to fight back in common cause.

In Ukraine, the government of President Petro Poroshenko has been working since its election in 2014 to break the country’s culture of corruption and implement wide-ranging reforms. Progress is being made despite the constant onslaught of the Kremlin’s two-front war on Ukraine – in Crimea, now annexed after the Russian covert military intervention of 2014, and in Eastern Ukraine, which has turned into a major battlefield between Russian-backed local militias and Ukrainian armed forces.

Similarly, Georgia is being punished for its pro-Western policies. Its territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been annexed by Russia and separatist forces have been integrated into the Russian military. Another former Soviet state, Moldova, is struggling with Russia’s control of its Trans-Dniestr region.

Azerbaijan is dealing with its own loss of territory – its western region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was illegally seized by Armenia, a close Russian ally, during the 1991-94 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The legacy of the Soviet meddling in its member republics, and the arbitrary granting of autonomy and territorial swaps to various ethnic groups in an attempt to curry favors and rule, are at the root of the problem dating back to 1988. While the majority of the population in this enclave is of Armenian origin and about 230,000 Armenians were displaced during the height of the conflict, the level of ethnic cleansing and land grab against Azerbaijan surpassed that by far: more than 800,000 Azeris became internal refugees and large portions of Azerbaijan’s territory remain even now under the de facto control of Armenian forces.

Russia continues to back the Armenian aggression. Armenia hosts several Russian bases and has become the Kremlin’s launching pad against Western interests in the region. Over the past several months, Russia has supplied Armenia with military jets, moving several MiG-29 fighters to its base in Armenia. In addition, Russia and Armenia established a joint air defense pact.

Most troubling, Russia gave Armenia an Iskander missile system. The Iskanders are short-range ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Armenia is the only nation that has received permission from Moscow to get the Russian missiles, which can reach as far as the Azerbaijan capital of Baku. Notably, while selling arms to other nations, Russia supplies Armenia essentially for free through loan financing, cementing its proxy status and fueling Armenia’s bellicose stance and refusal to return to negotiations seeking a diplomatic solution to the long standing territorial dispute with Azerbaijan.

The multi-front Russian-backed aggression has strengthened ties between Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Ukrainian ambassador to Azerbaijan Alexander Mischchenko said his nation supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, noting that the Armenian-seized region of Nagorno-Karabakh amounts to 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory.

“It is impossible to completely understand the difficulties Azerbaijan faced until one gets in a similar situation,” Mischchenko said, referencing Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea.

Azerbaijan President Ilhan Aliyev met with Poroshenko earlier this year and the two leaders underscored their commitment to each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and agreed to work together in several international bodies. “We will continue to deepen our cooperation in these organizations, in particular the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other organizations,” President Aliyev has said. Azerbaijan and Ukraine also cooperate in a key pro-Western endeavor: Supplying Caspian Sea oil and gas to Europe to increase the West’s energy security and reduce overreliance on Russia’s Gazprom supplies, often used as leverage in Kremlin’s geopolitical chess with Europe and the West.

Ukraine and Georgia have refused to recognize the illegal and so-called “constitutional referendum” that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh earlier this year, which would have the effect of further sucking the region into Armenia’s, and Russia’s, control. It’s also worth remembering that, as the world condemned Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea, predictably, Armenia supported it, cynically calling the military takeover a Crimean exercise in “self-determination.”

At the same time, Azerbaijan has agreed not to import any goods made in the Donbass region or any other Russian-occupied part of Ukraine and Georgia, and Ukraine has agreed to block imports from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine are the front lines in the resistance against restoring the USSR. The Soviet Union, like all autocracies, was a bad idea doomed to fail. But that hasn’t stopped Moscow from trying again. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine’s Western allies should work together to make certain the horrors of the Soviet era are not repeated.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/12/americas-allies-eurasia-face-common-foe-russia/feed/0The Problem with Pollinghttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/09/the-problem-with-polling/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/09/the-problem-with-polling/#respondTue, 09 May 2017 10:23:24 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2920By Daniel Shaw and Claire Elliott Political polls are making a fast comeback after failing to correctly predict either Brexit or the election of Donald Trump. Following the highpoint of Nate Silver’s flawless prediction of Obama’s 2008 victory, these embarrassing failures blew up in the face of both polling companies and liberal orthodoxy. These failures were […]

Political polls are making a fast comeback after failing to correctly predict either Brexit or the election of Donald Trump. Following the highpoint of Nate Silver’s flawless prediction of Obama’s 2008 victory, these embarrassing failures blew up in the face of both polling companies and liberal orthodoxy. These failures were caused by several problems; unrepresentative samples, wide margins of error, an increasing over-reliance on internet based polls and the possible tendency of people to lie about voting for extreme or populist candidates. Despite the money spent on polling and the sophistication of the methods used, the end results are still often unreliable and inaccurate.

These problems with political polling have become more than just an embarrassment for pollsters themselves, they have started to affect politics in a number of deeply damaging and corrosive ways.

When voters’ faith in polls is let down, it can have huge consequences for not only domestic politics but also for international organisations and alliances. Although the margin of error has to be taken into account, there is evidence that enough Brexit voters regret their vote to swing the result of 2016’s referendum. Polls in the long run-up to the vote showed a comfortable lead for the Remain campaign, although this lead did begin to close closer to referendum day. Analysis from the British Election Survey shows that the less a Leave voter expected the Leave campaign to actually win, the more likely they were to regret their vote. This indicates that at least a proportion of these Leave votes were motivated by the belief that it was a safe protest vote. When looking at an election which appears to be a foregone conclusion many voters might feel safe in casting an anti-establishment protest vote, without fully buying into the consequences of that position or candidate emerging victorious. There is something worrying and almost undemocratic about the votes of the electorate becoming divorced from the consequences of those votes. The fault for this does not entirely rest on the polls. The readiness of voters to use their votes in this way shows a sharp disconnect between mainstream parties and the people they purport to represent. There is not enough evidence to suggest conclusively that this is the cause of the Brexit vote. Indeed, the vast majority of Leave voters both knew what they were voting for and believed in it. However, this does indicate a serious problem with the often blind faith placed in polls by the public and the media.

Beyond the sharp example of the fraught EU referendum, there is a long-running issue with politicians’ use of opinion polls. As Gerald Ford’s advisor Douglas Bailey famously complained;

“It’s no longer necessary for a political candidate to guess what an audience thinks. He can [find out] with a nightly tracking poll. So it’s no longer likely that political leaders are going to lead. Instead, they’re going to follow.”

It might not seem like the worst thing in the world to have an elite which is often seen as unresponsive and unconcerned actually respond to the desires of their constituents. However, this runs up against the aforementioned problems with the accuracy and reliability of polls. Furthermore, if this is to be the way in which politics is conducted it would surely be better to have it codified into a robust system of direct democracy, rather than an ad-hoc system based on chasing tracker polls. This natural desire to be listened to always contrasts with the desire for a strong and principled government which makes decisions based on evidence and long-term planning. These contrasting desires represent a paradox at the heart of representative government which has been exacerbated, but not caused, by the desire of politicians to follow fleeting and often deceptive polls. New Labour was well known for using both polls and focus groups to inform political decisions, and this tendency formed a large part of what has come to be known as ‘spin’. While this was hugely successful at the time, it has arguably contributed to a more cynical relationship between politicians and the electorate.

The downsides of excessive polling, and excessive faith in the power of polls, has been crystallised in the current UK general election campaign. Prime Minister Theresa May has called a snap election, after promising not to, a decision surely due in large part to her and her party’s dominant position in the polls. The strong Conservative poll position relative to Labour means that the Tory party has been playing it safe so far, revealing little about their future plans and providing only cliches such as “strong and stable leadership” and “Brexit means Brexit”. May is currently producing what is likely to be a policy light manifesto, allowing her future government to govern based on polling and convenience rather than promises. Faced with an election full of trite tautologies the British press has instead gleefully fallen upon the polls as their best source of a story, with papers pouring over Opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn’s atrocious poll ratings and any signs of a comeback as if these were stories in and of themselves. A look at Britain’s newspapers during this election will see a myopic focus on the destruction of Labour and UKIP overshadowing policy announcements and speeches. This may change with the publication of party manifestos, but that remains to be seen. This has left substantive talk of either policy or principle to the wayside, and this can only be bad for democracy.

This is not to say that polls are useless. They are a valuable tool for political scientists, politicians and the public. However, the current focus on polls reveals that they are not a tool being used to improve democracy. Rather, they are a misused and misunderstood crutch for the media and political leaders.

With an overwhelming majority of 408 votes against 254, the European Parliament recently approved the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. This came only three weeks after Donald Trump’s formal withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a deal involving 12 nations around the Pacific Ocean. As trade is silently shaking world politics to the core, there’s a pressing need for voters to think about its real implications.

The Triumph of the CETA

Negotiations on the CETA began in 2008. Right from the start, the aim of the agreement was to stimulate growth and speed up economic recovery, creating a friendlier environment for business. According to the European Commission, firms will gain from a 98% reduction of customs duties, the removal of barriers to investment, and new opportunity to bid for public contracts overseas. Another key clause that would greatly favour business is the ‘infamous’ Investor-state Dispute Settlement, which would allow firms to sue the governments involved for alleged discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the ISDS has attracted the most criticism and raised serious concerns over national sovereignty throughout Europe.

It’s the ‘Lexus’ against the ‘olive tree’, in Thomas Friedman’s jargon. On the one hand, free trade feeds employment, growth and innovation, benefiting all consumers and most producers and workers. The result of this is efficiency (the ‘Lexus’). On the other hand, globalised markets are making the world ‘flatter’ by ‘eroding’ national traditions (the ‘olive trees’); not only cultural – as Friedman would say –, but also political and economic. As a free-trade agreement, the CETA could threaten local environments, food safety and workers’ rights. The ISDS, for its part, will essentially challenge governments’ attempts to protect, and regulate in, areas involved in the agreement.

How large a piece of our olive tree are we willing to give away for more efficiency? After all, it’s hard to attract business if it’s going to face the costs of different national regulatory systems; hence the ISDS. Unlike its American cousin (the TTIP), the CETA will still allow governments to legislate on the environment and forbid the sale of hormone-treated beef in Europe, while still offering some new opportunities to business and prospects of economic growth. However, demand for, and understanding of, economic efficiency among citizens seems worryingly low. Despite these promises, some think lower barriers and the ISDS will take too many ‘olives’ from their ‘trees’.

This view matters a lot for the future of the EU. Rising nationalism is already posing a great threat to the union, driving more and more people against it. After the British referendum, right-wing populist parties in Europe are gaining strength on the way to the upcoming national elections. These parties are playing precisely with the fears that citizens have regarding the CETA, urging to protect the nation from ‘foreign evil’. Surely, passing the deal amidst strong opposition was a questionable move – one likely to widen support for populism and endanger the survival of the union. That, however, is also another reason why those who oppose it should perhaps reconsider its benefits.

The Death of the TPP

In the opposite corner of the globe, the fate of the TPP is reshaping the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to the same economic benefits offered by the CETA, the TPP was also conceived politically to reinforce the bonds between the US and its Asian allies. In an article published on April 20, 2016, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) emphasises the geopolitical stakes of the agreement. Along with military power, it is argued, trade has historically played a key role in maintaining a ‘rules-based’ order in the region. In the face of Asia’s increasing overdependence on China, the deal would have kept US influence in the area.

In its current form, the TPP has no future. The withdrawal of the US has caused irreparable damage to the agreement. Admittedly, the other 11 countries involved have mixed views on the subject. Several members, including Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Peru, seem interested in pursuing a ‘TPP 12 minus one’ – without the United States. Others, such as Canada and Japan, appear reluctant to go ahead without their most powerful ally. In any case, the deal legally requires ratification by at least six countries representing at least 85% of the GDP of the original twelve members. With the US out, there’s no way the remaining parties can meet such requirement.

The strategic consequences of this depend on other economic agreements taking shape in Asia, none of which involve the US. As reported by the CSIS, these groupings include the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and an on-going trilateral agreement among China, Japan and South Korea. This means that Trump’s decision will likely increase Chinese authority to set the terms of trade in the region, thus creating strategic opportunities for Beijing. Stronger Chinese trade relationships with traditional US partners could legitimise China’s weapons build-up in the South China Sea and put an end to the liberal ‘rules-based’ order in the area.

One thing we can learn from this is that understanding the political and economic effects of trade is both our right and our duty as citizens. In doing that, EU citizens could change the result of key upcoming national elections, the future of the CETA itself and of the EU for the better. As for the TPP, the regional deals that are replacing it may, in the long term, seriously harm American workers. Despite Trump’s unexpected shifts in foreign military policy lately, let’s not forget about the consequences of his stance on trade. In a competitive globalised world, making the wrong decisions can be very costly.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/04/17/why-understanding-trade-matters-politically/feed/0Martin McGuinness and the Not So Uncommon Transition From Terrorist to Statesmanhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/03/25/martin-mcguinness-not-uncommon-transition-terrorist-statesman/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/03/25/martin-mcguinness-not-uncommon-transition-terrorist-statesman/#respondSat, 25 Mar 2017 16:31:51 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2857With the death of Martin McGuinness, the former Provisional IRA senior commander turned peace-maker and Deputy First Minister, one is struck that such a transition was simultaneously, impressive and outrageous. I had the opportunity of meeting McGuinness last January when I interviewed him. I was struck by his warmth and generosity in taking time out […]

With the death of Martin McGuinness, the former Provisional IRA senior commander turned peace-maker and Deputy First Minister, one is struck that such a transition was simultaneously, impressive and outrageous. I had the opportunity of meeting McGuinness last January when I interviewed him. I was struck by his warmth and generosity in taking time out of his schedule to help a student write his undergraduate dissertation. Colin Parry, whose 12 year-old son was killed by the IRA in 1993, spoke of how Martin McGuinness ‘was an easy man to talk to’. Parry then pointed out that “history is littered with former terrorists who become statesmen” such as Nelson Mandela and those who have made up the Israeli government. This raises the question of how such transitions from violence to political leadership occur?

The first point is that: Terrorists are in many regards politicians from day one. In wresting with the question “Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” Boaz Ganor observes that, “Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians to achieve political ends.”[1] To paraphrase Clausewitz, it can be said that, terrorism “is the purist of the policy of a party, inside a country, by [violent] means”[2], indeed terrorists are inherently politically motivated. Their use of violence is often to change the status quo, to impact how politics takes place and to gain public recognition for their cause.

Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman’s book “Anonymous Soldiers” considers how the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, led by Yitzhak Shamir, succeeded in achieving an independent state in 1948. He notes: “terrorism, can in the right conditions and with the appropriate strategy and tactics, succeed in attaining at least some of its practitioners’ fundamental aims.”[3] Nelson Mandela’s struggle was to change the repressive race class and privilege system in South Africa. Leading scholar Richard English identifies that, McGuinness’s use of violence was a response to the “structural biases in Northern Ireland during the 1921-72 period towards unionists and against nationalists which made the unionist hold on public life almost absolute.”[4] This is not to condone the use of violence; it is simply to highlight that terrorists are often far more rational than we often first assume. If (and when) the opportunity arises for public office, this rationality manifests itself in the idea that one can be more useful in bringing about lasting legislative and administrative change inside the system rather than outside. Although McGuinness never succeeded in creating a united Ireland during his lifetime, his influence inside the Northern Irish Assembly brought greater cross community change and representation across the sectarian divide.

Secondly, a dose of realism is useful: Reality sets in. As terrorist campaigns progress and indigenous calls for peace are made, transitions away from violence can ensue. It has often been said that the 1987 Enniskillen bombing was the moment when IRA leaders such as McGuinness realised that the campaign had gone too far and marked the beginning of his transition towards peace. Michael Smith adds that by 1989, senior Sinn Féin members began ‘criticising the PIRA over civilian deaths’.[5] On the British side, Historian John Newsinger adds that, “British counter-terrorism approaches had grown stronger since their calibration after their mistakes in fuelling the bloody period between 1971-1974”.[6] These elements combined with the political and civilian fatigue at the costs of the Troubles, provided fertile ground and opportunities for the conversation (known as ‘the link’) between the PIRA and the British government to be explored. Other similar examples exist. Gustavo Petro, the former Mayor of Bogotá was also able to negotiate amnesty with the Columbian government, despite his involvement with the brutal M-19 group, demonstrating that the drive for peace often negates turbulent pasts. Government’s that are willing to negotiate and local popular support allow those who once bore arms to become democratically elected.

Thirdly, life as a terrorist is a hard and stressful one. Fear of imprisonment and being on the run is hard to sustain for long periods of time. If opportunities for negotiation present themselves in favourable ways, a seat in public office can be an attractive option. It is often the case that when terrorists are brought to the negotiating table, people are reminded that they are normal people, who have similar interests and desires, who can also laugh and cry.

Tony Blair and Jonathan Powell’s meeting with republican leaders in 1997 paved the way for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the monumental power sharing between the two former antagonists Ian Paisley and McGuinness in 2007, who became known as the “chuckle brothers” due to the friendship that developed between them. A similar transition can be seen in then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1987 proclamation against Nelson Mandela’s party:

Regardless, as the Independent recorded in 1990, “the spectacle of her almost falling over herself to meet Mandela in 1990 showed very clearly there is no such thing as an absolute in politics”.[7] As such, people can change and we must acknowledge that people’s firmly held beliefs can evolve over time. The transition from a stressful life in the shadows into a more stable life in public view and a career in public office has been a path many former terrorist leaders have followed.

Such a transition from terrorism to mainstream politics, from war to peace,comes at a cost. Peter McLoughlin has noted that

When peace is pursued, compromise must take place and difficult decisions have to be made. Personal inhibitions and bloodied pasts must be set aside to make room for the enemy to sit at the table.

Sinn Féin’s Gerry Kelly has noted that if absolute defeat for one side or the other is not possible “negotiations are a part of where you go.” Risks must be taken and uncomfortable lines crossed for both parties involved. Such symbols of peace were seen with McGuinness’s handshake with the Queen in 2012 – a big step for an Irish republican and for the Queen, whose cousin Lord Mountbatten had been killed by the IRA in 1979. Forgiveness and grace must be expressed and while differences inevitably endure a productive way forward incorporates working together with former enemies to build a peaceful and progressive future.

Although the Troubles present unique circumstances, what we can see in the life of Martin McGuinness is a familiar story, a journey that many other terrorists turned statesmen across the world have also made. The transition from violence to peaceful politics is not an easy one, yet in many regards when there is a stalemate the conversion is less unusual than one might expect. Through the ballot box Martin McGuinness was able to represent the opinions of citizens whose voices had been ignored before the 1970s. Although his terrorist past must not be forgotten, his commitment to the shared future for Northern Ireland must be remembered and commemorated.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/03/25/martin-mcguinness-not-uncommon-transition-terrorist-statesman/feed/0In Retreathttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/02/10/in-retreat/
Fri, 10 Feb 2017 15:42:20 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2831 Brexit, Donald Trump and the growing nationalism wave sweeping across the Western world represent a new political backlash against globalisation, which might seriously threaten the world liberal economic order and global security. In her much-anticipated speech on 17 January, UK Prime Minister Theresa May announced her plans for a “Hard Brexit”, which will end […]

Brexit, Donald Trump and the growing nationalism wave sweeping across the Western world represent a new political backlash against globalisation, which might seriously threaten the world liberal economic order and global security.

In her much-anticipated speech on 17 January, UK Prime Minister Theresa May announced her plans for a “Hard Brexit”, which will end Britain’s membership in the EU and the European Single Market. The rhetoric of closed borders that had driven the campaign could no longer be ignored. Nationalism is back, and has gained ground outside the UK. Indeed, both “Brexit” and Donald Trump may be the first symptoms of globalisation’s retreat.

To begin with, the whole Brexit campaign was a successful call for a less “global” UK. That meant ending the country’s openness to immigrants, its membership in a regional union and its adherence to shared laws and institutions. Not without logic, European newspapers ridiculed May’s newly envisioned “Global Britain”, which they dubbed “Little Britain”. Although freer movement of goods, services, capital and persons brings economic efficiency, globalisation also brings vulnerability and risks. The vivid memory of the recent global financial crisis, global migration and transnational terrorism made “Little Britain” appealing to many voters.

Financial markets promptly reacted to Britain’s decision. In the wake of the referendum, investors scrambled to sell sterling, causing the British pound to hit a 31-year low against the dollar. Moreover, Theresa May’s announcement to leave the single market further raised concerns over reduced trade and investment flows with the Old Continent, increased non-tariff barriers and the unknown future of the City of London. Certainly, new bilateral agreements could restore confidence in the long run, but these might not offset Britain’s lost privileged relationship with the world’s largest market. For now, investors panic as the UK shuts its back door to the global political economy.

On the other side of the Atlantic, President Trump based its campaign on a similar nationalist rhetoric, although the economy here was at the very centre of the debate. For Trump, Mexican undocumented workers are guilty of “stealing” low-skilled jobs in the US and, to stop them, he has insisted on building a wall along the southern border. Trump has also accused China of being a “currency manipulator”, thus of keeping the yuan cheap to encourage Chinese exports and make US products less competitive on the market. Similarly, American companies that employ cheap labour abroad should fear new tariffs to sell back in the US. As in Britain, terrorism, security and immigration were key themes in Trump’s campaign.

The message behind this is that a less globalised America will make it “great again”. Yet few were able to predict that Trump’s powerful statements would lead him to the White House, and that, once in office, he would follow through on them. Indeed, in the wake of the election results, stock markets closed slightly positive, with investors betting on Trump’s promises to spur growth and a likely revision of his anti-trade rhetoric. Yet no revision occurred. “Beginning today, the United States of America gets back control of its borders”, he reasserted right away as President, after signing his first executive order withdrawing the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—as promised.

Economics seems to have failed us again. Neither Donald Trump’s foreign policy approach nor Britain’s idea of leaving the EU made much economic sense. Yet precisely for this reason, experts failed to foresee either. In both cases, the majority of voters (or at least many in the US) were less concerned about the economic inefficiency of raising barriers than about national identity and security at a time of serious global risks. Even the TPP and the TTIP (deals aimed at further reducing barriers to trade and investment with Asia and Europe) were economically reasonable proposals, though the fear of losing domestic jobs and national sovereignty prevailed. Sometimes, political analysis is crucial for anticipating dramatic events that are economic by nature.

What’s Next?

Needless to say, the extent and implications of globalisation’s retreat remain unclear. As for the scale of the phenomenon, much will depend on Trump’s foreign policy, on whether his enemies (especially China) will retaliate, and on how many more will turn to populist politics the world over.

Free trade areas and economic unions, like NAFTA and the EU, are particularly in danger. Trump has already announced that he plans to re-negotiate NAFTA, and imposing a 20% tax on Mexican imports to pay for the wall is not exactly in line with the terms of the agreement. In Europe, populist parties are threatening the future of the union, while some experts warn the Italian banking system might be harbouring a new, fatal Eurozone crisis.

The implications for the world order are also scary. Indeed, governance and cooperation on areas such as the environment and international finance (to name but two) could be particularly hurt, especially in light of Trump’s greater support for oil drilling and financial deregulation. One problem with this is that the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the 2008 financial crisis, two of the most catastrophic events of the last nine years, are more likely to repeat themselves.

Yet America’s unwillingness to maintain its role as a global leader will not only threaten multilateral institutions, but also geopolitical relations, security and stability. A question that matters here is whether China is going to take on that role—a question that has divided Chinese domestic interest groups for years. So far, the powerful state-owned enterprises and the governors of the wealthy coastal provinces have benefited from China’s bilateral approach to international trade and finance, and have opposed the internationalisation (and appreciation) of the currency. However, President Xi Jinping’s recent pro-globalisation speech at the World Economic Forum might highlight a change.

Certainly, the 70-year-old, US-led liberal economic order has begun to falter, and only time will tell whether it will stand or fall.

]]>In Defence of Belgian Counterterror Policyhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/01/21/defense-belgian-counterterrorism-policy/
Sat, 21 Jan 2017 00:12:50 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2798On March 22nd 2016 the two consecutive bombings at the Brussels’ Zaventem airport and the Maalbeek metro station brought Belgian counterterrorism policy under heavy scrutiny. With the Paris attacks foreshadowing an impending threat, the Belgian security alert had been raised to critical levels since November 2015. Yet in spite of warnings from numerous countries, the […]

On March 22nd 2016 the two consecutive bombings at the Brussels’ Zaventem airport and the Maalbeek metro station brought Belgian counterterrorism policy under heavy scrutiny. With the Paris attacks foreshadowing an impending threat, the Belgian security alert had been raised to critical levels since November 2015. Yet in spite of warnings from numerous countries, the Belgian counterterrorism strategy failed to deter a predicted ISIL attack. Now, ten months after the last terrorist attack on Belgian soil, police and army personnel are still routinely stationed throughout the capital’s busy shopping streets and tourist attractions. Belgium’s counterterrorism policy remains highly criticized, both internationally, as well as domestically. Are these regular accusations of Belgian incompetence justified?

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon to Belgium. Having fallen victim to a range of different types of political violence in the past two centuries – from left wing to anarchist to religious terrorism—, Belgium has continuously faced the many challenges of developing a functioning counter-terrorism strategy. The expansion of ISIL in Syria and Iraq in the recent years has complicated past Belgian strategies profoundly. With Syrian refugees fleeing to the European continent, and aspirant European fighters traveling to Syrian training camps, the Schengen system has stretched to breaking point Belgium’s capacity to regulate the movement of people at its borders. Further compounding the issue, the BBC reports more Belgian Islamists going to fight for ISIS per capita than any other European country. With so many Belgian citizens traveling to Syria, the issue of returning foreign fighters becomes a problem particularly pertinent to Belgian counterterrorism policy.

To add to these challenges, Brussels holds important symbolic value. Serving as the headquarters of the EU and NATO, the Belgian capital is particularly vulnerable as a target for anti-Western terrorism. Budgetary constraints further worsen Belgium’s ability to reconcile its small size with its accessibility as a target. The culmination of these factors makes the creation of an effective counterterrorism policy especially difficult, particularly if it involves the safeguarding of liberal principles and the rule of law.

Prior to the March 22nd bombings, Belgium had shown a clear policy of building criminal cases against domestic terrorist networks: bringing its members to court, and carrying out trials in accordance with existing legal frameworks. With the 2003 Terrorist Offence Act criminalizing participation in terrorist activities, Belgium has taken a cautious approach to its conceptualization of terrorism, remaining wary of the potential implications of framing terrorism as a Manichean battle against an irreconcilable opponent. In honoring the criminal justice system, Belgian policy sets a precedent that excludes particular practices, such as indefinite detention without trial or unethical interrogation methods. Doing so allows the Belgian government to draw legitimacy from its actions, and thereby evade some of the ethical pitfalls of “the war on terror”.

The current heavy presence of police forces throughout Brussels falls within this criminal justice model. With the typical pattern of ISIL-related attacks on soft targets – Christmas markets, beach promenades, cafés –, the current presence of police and security personnel should make Belgian targets more resistant. This, combined with Belgium’s existing preventative and reactive counterterrorism policies, as established by the EU’s “prevent, protect, pursue and respond” policy, is likely to serve as an appropriate response to the current threat. Further security measures would arguably only alienate the Belgian population rather than deter future attacks. Indeed, Belgium has looked to the historical tendency of hard, coercive methods propelling potential-recruits straight into the arms of violent organizations. For this reason, then, it is more important in the long run for Belgium to protect the rule of law in order to protect its values as a liberal democracy than to respond harshly.

Based on this understanding of the mechanisms of terrorist recruitment, Belgium has developed multi-layered frameworks that evenly balance proactive and reactive approaches. Going beyond purely reactive law enforcement strategies, Belgium has developed several anti-radicalization programs. Such policies policy are aimed at countering both “bottom-up” as well as “top-down” recruitment specifically tailored to the Belgian domestic situation. These strategies also involve bilateral partnerships with various European countries such as France and Turkey.

This being said, Belgian security and intelligence services have not shown “incompetence” or made fundamental “errors” as has been commonly suggested. This is not to say that improvements cannot be made. Indeed, the Belgian security and intelligence service are overwhelmed and lack the capacity to deal with the sheer extent of information flow. They also often fail to coordinate with one another, particularly between municipalities. Similarly, the overarching European counterterrorism structure needs to be reworked to create a unified, functioning framework. Yet these shortcomings demonstrate institutional and practical flaws rather than fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the threat itself, or strategies through which these threats should be deterred.

In the short-term, the current Belgian counterterrorism policy is unlikely to deter all future attacks. In spite of popular narratives or rhetoric suggesting otherwise, terrorism will never disappear entirely. There is no ‘quick fix’ policy, and Europe will inevitably face more security challenges in the future. However, the direction that European nations choose to follow when confronted with these threats is vital. Belgium has demonstrated a course that honors the openness of European society and the fundamental freedoms of its citizens. Looking forward, Belgian policy should aim to continue in this direction: developing policy that minimizes illegal weapons trading and prohibiting Belgian citizens from joining foreign militant groups in Syria, while simultaneously upholding and respecting the rights of its citizens.

Ultimately, despite accusations of a fragmented and institutionally flawed approach, Belgium’s counterterrorism policy evenly balances domestically tailored strategies with international partnerships and institutional policy frameworks. While such an approach does not guarantee immunity to future attacks, it sets a precedent for upholding democratic values and civil liberties. The Belgian model serves as an example of a long-term strategy that responds proportionally to the security threat without excessively compromising its liberal values.