Polish analysts focus on the results of the recent parliamentary elections and their consequences for Belarus. Experts also take a closer look at the opposition and its performance before and during the elections.

Since the economic indicators provide some worrisome...

Polish analysts focus on the results of the recent parliamentary elections and their consequences for Belarus. Experts also take a closer look at the opposition and its performance before and during the elections.

Since the economic indicators provide some worrisome trends, analysts also examine Belarus's economic position in the aftermath of Russia’s entry into the WTO.

In New Eastern Europe Kamil Klysinski describes negative tendencies that appeared recently in the Belarusian financial market. At the same time, the analyst argues that Minsk does not respond to these increasing difficulties with adequate reforms. He indicates an increase in the amount of money in the market turnover of 21 per cent.

Another factor relates to a significant increase in demand for foreign currency when compared to supply. According to the analyst, the increasing rates of income in the state sector explains the present tendencies. The analyst notes that it is related to the September parliamentary elections. Moreover, the possible dissatisfaction of the state-owned company workers might lead to protests.

In another text for the Centre for Eastern Studies Kamil Klysinski elaborates on the current economic situation of Belarus. He comments on the loss of an important source of income from exports. This is caused by Moscow, which decided to block the re-export of Russian oil products to the EU countries without export duties. The author argues that because of such practices Minsk could have earned $2.5bn.

The expert notes that Russia has tolerated these duty free exports since the beginning of 2011. However, due to the lack of proper concessions for the privatisation of strategic Belarusian companies, Moscow decided to sharpen its stance and cut Minsk practises. In conclusion, Klysinski suggests that the economic situation of Belarus is going to deteriorate within the next few months. The Belarusian authorities can decide to devaluate the Belarusian ruble and at the same time, seek more subsidies from Moscow.

Failed Elections Campaigning?

In a Bulletin issued by the Polish Institute of International Affairs Anna Maria Dyner analyses the pre-election situation in Belarus. According to her, the whole campaign had only marginal importance. She notes that because of the repressive regime imposed by the state, a dialogue between the authorities and society did not happen. Thus, the limited airtime given to the candidates, but also lack of interest in the issue among the state media, determined the pre-election mood in the society. Moreover, the analyst argues that no serious discussion concerning the situation of Belarus was carried out in public.

Dyner takes a closer look at the opposition’s problems. Among the most burning issues she raises is a lack of united action, but also limited financial resources to run a campaign. The analyst critically evaluates internal divisions within the opposition and their inability to reach out to the Belarusian electorate. At the same time, the opposition parties did not manage to prepare a comprehensive political programme.

She recommends that Poland and the EU prepare a consistent and long–term programme of support for Belarus. So far temporary and short-term actions undertaken by Brussels have failed to bring about any changes. At the same time, she underlines that support for Belarusian society should remain on the EU’s agenda.

The opposition’s performance in the elections often appears in other comments. In a commentary prepared for the Centre for Eastern Studies Kamil Klysinski argues that the elections proved not the opposition’s only weakness, but also its inability to work out a unified position had a detrimental effect as well. Moreover, the analyst concludes that since the election results have not been recognized internationally, it might lead to further isolation of Belarus and its closer cooperation with Russia.

Fragmented Opposition

In the Korespondent Wschodni Wojciech Borodzicz-Smolinski analyses the Belarusian opposition. He notes that one of the factors that helps Lukashenka stay in power is the lack of a political alternatives for society. According to him, the divisions within the opposition have two sides.

First of all, they are due to ideological factors. Nonetheless, more important are the apparent private animosities which hinder the integration process of the opposition. Borodzicz-Smolinski highlights the particular moments when the Belarusian opposition attempted to unite. One of the most crucial moments was before the December 2010 presidential elections. The analyst notes that the EU and the West still have to wait for a serious partner from those among the opposition with whom to discuss the future of Belarus.

WTO, Russia and Belarus

Kamil Klysinki also discusses, for the Centre for Eastern Studies, the consequences of Russia’s entry into the WTO in August 2012. Minsk will have to decrease the level of import tariffs which in consequence may require a larger opening for foreign goods. At the same time, the Russian market will have to be more open for imports from the WTO member states. Thus it will become more competitive for the Belarusian companies. The analyst notes that all of that does not make Belarus an attractive country for investment and may delay Belarus's entry into the WTO.

The author concludes that Lukashenka argues that there have been high costs from Russia’s entry into the WTO for the Belarusian economy, in order to gain more financial aid from Moscow. Minsk can also aim to export more to non-European markets, which appears as the short-term and temporary solution. Klysinki emphasises that the Belarusian regime has to urgently implement economic reforms.

Over the last decade, Russian companies became the most desired place of employment for many Belarusian top ex-officials. They offer huge salaries compared to those in Belarusian public service. While some Belarusians settle in Moscow, others become local representatives of Russian interests.

Belarusian officials can offer extensive contacts within the Belarusian establishment and effective lobbying of business interests. This growing group, closely affiliated with Russian elites may become an important factor in Belarusian politics. Potentially, Russia can use them to press its interests and even change the current Belarusian regime.

New Times – Old Friends

On October 15, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, Siarhei Martynau was appointed a special representative of the Russian oil company “Russneft” in Belarus. Martynau has recently resigned from Belarusian diplomatic service, where he held a minister position since 2003.

As company press-release says, “Siarhei Martynau has a considerable authority among political and business groups of Belarus and other countries. His appointment proves to be of strategic interest to“Russneft” in developing external trade relations and extending the geography of business…”

Martynau presents just one case of pathway which became quite popular for Belarus officials in recent decade. Often, senior bureaucrats take this path after Lukashenka loses confidence in them or fires then for some sort of misdeed, like corruption or a policy failure. Big Russian business becomes an attractive place to continue their careers for several reasons.

First, Belarus officials have close ties with their Russian colleagues, often since Soviet times. They graduated from the same Communist Party or KGB schools, worked in bilateral projects and bodies of government, share a common language and post-Soviet culture. Second, big Russian corporations offer salaries which are indeed huge compared to salaries in Belarusian public service which amount to only a few hundred dollars a month. Last but not least, western careers of Belarusian officials are considerably restricted by various factors such as absence of ties, lack of understanding of the western world, or merely a language barrier.

Belarusian Siloviki in Petrostate Management

Here are most notable cases of Belarusians who work in Russian companies.

Person

Current Employment in Russia

Last Position in Belarusian Government

1

Paval Kallaur

Vnesheconombank

Deputy Head of National Bank

2

Uladzimir Yarmoshyn

Vnesheconombank

Prime-Minister

3

Vasil Dauhaliou

Gazprom

Ambassador of Belarus to Russia

4

Faryd Cancerau

Gazprom

Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, KGB general

5

Valer Kez

Gazprom

Deputy Chair of Security Council, KGB general

6

Viktar Rakhmanka

Gazprom

Head of Belarusian Railways

7

Uladzimir Navumau

Rostekhnologii

Minister of Internal Affairs

8

Leanid Yeryn

Russian Railways

Head of KGB of Belarus

11

Vasil Maciusheuski

BPS-Sberbank

Deputy Head of National Bank

12

Uladzimir Matskevich

Sovkomflot

Head of KGB

13

Valer Kokarau

Lukoil

Deputy Prime-minister

14

Uladzimir Muliak

Lukoil

Head of “Belarusneft”

15

Ural Latypau

MTZ Rubin

Head of President Administartion

As this small list shows, “siloviki”, or representatives of security agencies, make the largest group of high-ranking labour migrants. It is a widely known fact that most people that occupy high positions in the Belarusian security services were born and educated outside of Belarus.

They belong to a “post-Soviet” rather than national security class. Having no national sentiments and devotions, they can easily change their sphere of interest from Belarusian security to Russian natural gas. No surprise that of the whole Belarusian elite, these people are probably the closest friends of Putin’s clan which rules Russia.

The rest of Belarusian top migrants come from economic and financial management. They mostly descend from Belarus, but equally have connections in the Russian establishment and receive high-income positions in corporations.

Most popular among Belarus officials are state owned companies (so called “state corporations”) and companies where the state is a major shareholder (like Gazprom). Of course, it is easier for Belarusians to occupy a position in a state company than in private company due to their contacts and management experience. Managing a half-socialist economy is not a big skill in a highly competitive market environment.

Business Managers or People of Kremlin?

Thus, hospitable Russians offer generous rewards for people disregarded or dismissed by Lukashenka. For Russian companies which work in Belarus employing a representative of local establishment is an important part of business strategy. In non-democratic regimes where informal rules and connections play a crucial role in politics and economy, intra-elite links play a major role. But does business only matter here? The fact that most Belarusian ex-officials work in Russian state corporations proves this may not be true.

Over the last decade, Russia considerably expanded its economic presence in Belarus. It bought “Beltransgaz” (Belarusian gas transportation system) and two big state banks. Belarus is negotiating selling its major oil assets – Navapolatsk and Mazyr refineries, and the creation of the truck holding Belarusian MAZ with Russian Kamaz, to mention only the biggest deals. Also, Russians are buying a lot of property in Belarusian cities and in the countryside.

Growing economic influence means growing leverage on Belarusian politics. Russia is known for the use of economic tools, especially in energy sector, to achieve its political goals in its neighborhood and beyond. Having half of the Belarusian economy in their pockets, Russians will be able to set the agenda inside Belarus.

Ex-officials and other Belarusian bureaucrats connected to Russian business serve as potential allies in taking over the Belarusian economy. Later they can even form a political group with a Russian orientation to balance some pro-western groups that are likely to emerge after Lukashenka. In any case, Belarusian politicians should take these high-flying migrants seriously.

Lukashenka himself probably feels that his control over bureaucracy decreases as they switch to Russian salaries. A recent initiative to cut the number of bureaucrats and thus to increase wages in public sector may slightly improve the problem. However, it cannot fully resolve the problem in the current political regime.