Reclaiming “Occupied Spain” (& “No to Islamophobia”)

August 29, 2017

On Saturday, half a million Spaniards marched in Barcelona in solidarity with 16 victims killed in the recent attacks by carrying signs reading “No to Islamophobia”. There were almost no signs that said “No to terror” or “No to Islamist extremism”.

(A 16th victim, a 51-year-old German woman, died of her injuries on Sunday.)

THE ATTACKS IN CATALONIA

[Note by Tom Gross]

I attach three articles below, with extracts first for those who don’t have time to read them in full. There is also a link to a video.

The level of denial about Islamist terrorism runs so deep among some in the West, that the leader of Wales’ biggest party blamed “far right terrorists” for the Barcelona attack.

With each new Islamist-fueled terror attack on European soil, at least two things can be certain: that the intended devastation was to be much worse, and that it won’t be long before the next assault occurs…

Spain as a terror target may have come as a surprise to some, but it shouldn’t have. For 700 years, the territory of al-Andalus, which included what is today modern Spain, remained under Muslim rule. It wasn’t until the Reconquista of 1492 that the Islamic Empire lost its prized territory in the European heartland and began its slow decline.

In the Islamic world, this loss has lingered as a point of contention, with Osama bin Laden justifying the deadly 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people, by saying “this is only part of the settlement of old scores with Crusader Spain.” As recently as last year Islamic State warned Spain: “We will recover our land from the invaders.” …

At present, 700 suspected terrorists have been arrested, 120 imprisoned and a further 259 investigated by courts, all while Spanish police are monitoring more than 1,000 high-risk individuals…

“NO SOLUTIONS IN SIGHT”

Bernard-Henri Lévy:

Two cars used as rams. One, in Charlottesville, Va., was driven by a neo-Nazi into a crowd of antiracist counterprotesters. The other, driven by a Moroccan-born radical Islamist, careened blindly around Barcelona, killing 15 and injuring 126…

Responses to the Charlottesville tragedy are imaginable. We know, for example, that laws prohibiting the public expression of opinions that are in themselves offenses – even though the American Constitution makes such prohibitions legally impossible for now – would help mitigate this threat.

In the case of Barcelona, one faces the dizzying unknown. Except for tears and grief, no solutions are in sight to deal with the stealthy, sprawling army for which a driver’s license is a license to kill, and which decides at random where and when to strike – any city, provided it has open spaces with pedestrians and a whiff of life’s sweetness…

The Islamic extremists of Barcelona are the byproducts of a more recently formed and expanding nebula, the course of which no one can predict or fix. In just two decades we have had thousands of deaths world-wide – and a black book that, from Pakistan to the Philippines, from the African deserts to European suburbs and great American cities, shows no sign of closing.

The Charlottesville attack was clearly and unequivocally condemned around the world… After the horror of Barcelona, on the other hand, reactions in Europe and the world were far too vague, confused and sometimes even obscene… Did the killers of 7-year-old Julian Cadman have a difficult childhood? Did they come from underprivileged backgrounds? Is this a psychiatric matter? Was it not our Islamophobia that ultimately radicalized the killers? …

PARIS, BRUSSELS, BARCELONA: ALL ATTACKED BY MOROCCAN MEN

Sarah Feuer and David Pollock:

The recent terrorist attacks in Spain and Finland have been linked almost exclusively to young men of Moroccan origin, sparking concern that the kingdom has become a breeding ground for jihadists...

Moroccan networks were also implicated in at least three high-profile terrorist strikes across Europe in the past two years, including the November 2015 attack in Paris, the March 2016 attack in Brussels, and the failed attack at the Brussels Central Station in May of this year...

AL ANDALUS AND THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO SPAIN’S TERROR TROUBLES

You may also want to watch this video, or at least the opening minutes of it, which include a clip from Isis’ Spanish-language video justifying this month’s terror attacks in Spain. Islamic State warns Spain: “We will recover our land from the invaders.”

How Spain Became a Terror Target
Madrid is effective at thwarting many potential plots, but now must counter Islamist ideology.
By Haras Rafiq and Muna Adil
Wall Street Journal
Aug. 22, 2017

With each new Islamist-fueled terror attack on European soil, at least two things can be certain: that the intended devastation was to be much worse, and that it won’t be long before the next assault occurs.

Authorities investigating last week’s van attack in Barcelona, which left 13 [Now 15 -- TG] people dead and scores more injured, believe it was the work of a 12-person terror cell. All 12 have now been either arrested or killed, including the final member, who was shot dead Monday just west of the city. Authorities believe the group had been planning a bigger, deadlier attack involving gas explosives.

As Islamic State continues to lose territory in Syria and struggles to maintain its relevance, there has been a rise in such low-tech, high-impact attacks on soft targets. Western governments have been doing a good job of adapting security systems to these attacks, helping to mitigate the damage. Yet there’s a difference between responding to and preventing acts of terrorism.

Spain as a terror target may have come as a surprise to some, but it shouldn’t have. For 700 years, the territory of al-Andalus, which included what is today modern Spain, remained under Muslim rule. It wasn’t until the Reconquista of 1492 that the Islamic Empire lost its prized territory in the European heartland and began its slow decline.

In the Islamic world, this loss has lingered as a point of contention, with Osama bin Laden justifying the deadly 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people, by saying “this is only part of the settlement of old scores with Crusader Spain.” As recently as last year Islamic State warned Spain: “We will recover our land from the invaders.”

On a practical level, experts have long considered the country a terrorist hub linking Europe to Iraq and Syria, not least because of its geographical location. Though physically distant from the main fighting in Iraq and Syria, its proximity to North Africa and easy links to Western Europe make it an ideal center for jihadist activity. It’s also a major finance hub for terror networks in Iraq and Syria.

Since the 2004 Madrid bombing, Spain’s security apparatus has been intensifying its efforts to uproot and disrupt the underground networks operating on its soil, and to a large extent it has been successful.

In February 2016, authorities arrested seven members of a cell responsible for sending goods to fighters in Iraq and Syria. In April this year, Spanish police arrested nine people with possible ties to the recent attacks in Belgium and France. A day later, police arrested two men suspected of recruiting for Islamic State and helping fighters travel back into Europe.

At present, 700 suspected terrorists have been arrested, 120 imprisoned and a further 259 investigated by courts, all while Spanish police are monitoring more than 1,000 high-risk individuals. Close to 500 phones are being tapped. Between 1996 and 2013, nearly 29% of people sentenced for jihadist-related terrorism offenses were arrested in the province of Barcelona.

Perhaps in response to Spain’s crackdown, earlier this year jihadists warned they would be intensifying their campaign of terror in major areas of the Mediterranean. The CIA warned Spanish police two months ago that Barcelona was a potential target, even highlighting Las Ramblas, the street where last week’s attack occurred, as a particularly vulnerable location.

But it’s not enough just to prepare for the next terror attack and minimize the death toll. More must be done to tackle the root of the problem and challenge the Islamist Salafi ideology that has been behind the recent spate of senseless violence. Salafism is arguably the most puritanical brand of Islam, with adherents adopting the most fundamentalist reading of the Quran. These are the fanatics who populate al Qaeda and Islamic State.

To undermine this ideology, we first must address the myopic political correctness that appears to tolerate views contrary to everything the Western liberal world stands for, all for the sake of protecting minorities. The West must realize that it commits a grave injustice to mainstream Muslims when it fails to name and shame and challenge this Islamist ideology and refuses to isolate the extremists in their midst.

The Muslim community in Spain is among the most well-integrated in Europe and has some of the lowest rates of radicalization on the Continent. Not only have Muslim communities lauded Spanish authorities’ efforts to eradicate the terror networks in the country, but they insist on more being done.

According to Laarbi Mateis, the secretary of the Islamic Commission in the Spanish city of Ceuta, “The police are doing things well, with recruitment slowing down. But all of the efforts are related to security and not to education. We need social measures.”

Mr. Mateis is right. Until we address and debilitate the fundamentalist ideology that is the root cause of Islamist extremism, we cannot hope to be safe from terror on our streets, no matter how exceptional our intelligence and security apparatus.

(Mr. Rafiq is the CEO of Quilliam International, where Ms. Adil is a researcher.)

THE DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO TRAGEDIES

The Distance Between Two Tragedies
Response to the neo-Nazis in Charlottesville was swift and clear. Not so for the horror in Barcelona.
By Bernard-Henri Lévy
Wall Street Journal
Aug. 25, 2017

Two cars used as rams.

One, in Charlottesville, Va., was driven by a neo-Nazi into a crowd of antiracist counterprotesters.

Excluding the similar modus operandi and the fresh proof that all forms of fascism eventually resemble one another, the two events differ in nearly every respect.

In Charlottesville, there were not two “sides,” as Donald Trump claimed, but rather two opposing camps, two visions of society and the world.

In Barcelona, by contrast, there was but one camp, that of nihilism and indiscriminate death: the whole world, every political leaning, every nationality, every religion (including Islam) jumbled together on the sidewalks of a city hated because it was full of people strolling in blissful innocence, enjoying the pleasure of each other’s company.

The ringleaders of Charlottesville are well known from television and social media: David Duke, Richard Spencer, “Baked Alaska” and the others who fomented the crowd.

The perpetrators of the slaughter in Barcelona were masked – faceless and nameless – up until the moment of action, and the instant renown it brought. It was nigh impossible to foresee; and, as for those who gave the orders, they are hunkered down between Iraq and Syria in what remains of the Islamic State, ready, when the time is right, to move their portable headquarters to more congenial climes. They will remain invisible and elusive for some time.

Responses to the Charlottesville tragedy are imaginable. We know, for example, that laws prohibiting the public expression of opinions that are in themselves offenses – even though the American Constitution makes such prohibitions legally impossible for now – would help mitigate this threat.

In the case of Barcelona, one faces the dizzying unknown. Except for tears and grief, no solutions are in sight to deal with the stealthy, sprawling army for which a driver’s license is a license to kill, and which decides at random where and when to strike – any city, provided it has open spaces with pedestrians and a whiff of life’s sweetness.

The Charlottesville mob convened to defend a statue honoring Robert E. Lee, who fought to preserve slavery. The members of that mob are nostalgic for a past that refuses to pass away, despite clearly being obsolete. The reappearance of what had been repressed, the re-emergence of the racists from the sewers into which 50 years of struggle for civil rights had swept them, imparts nothing new about their squalid ideology.

The Islamic extremists of Barcelona, by contrast, are the byproducts of a more recently formed and expanding nebula, the course of which no one can predict or fix. In just two decades we have had thousands of deaths world-wide – and a black book that, from Pakistan to the Philippines, from the African deserts to European suburbs and great American cities, shows no sign of closing.

The Charlottesville attack was clearly and unequivocally condemned around the world. In the U.S., the resurgence of Nazism behind the attack collided with a democracy that mounted a fierce resistance to the proponents of white supremacy.

After the horror of Barcelona, on the other hand, reactions in Europe and the world were far too vague, confused and sometimes even obscene. Are we dealing with fascism, commentators asked, or something other than fascism? Is this Islam or not Islam? Did the killers of 7-year-old Julian Cadman have a difficult childhood? Did they come from underprivileged backgrounds? Is this a psychiatric matter? Was it not our Islamophobia that ultimately radicalized the killers?

The idea that the cowls of the Ku Klux Klan, its torches and lynchings, continue to tempt a nonnegligible and possibly growing fringe in the U.S. is no doubt fearsome.

Unprecedented, too, is the stupefaction engendered by an American president refusing to name the crime and the criminals, thereby fraying still further the foundational compact of contemporary America.

Especially as the darkness of the time plays with our perception, we must beware of false symmetries. Humanity has a duty to confront with equal determination both heads of the beast. But the fact remains – in the U.S. as in Europe, it is necrophiliac Islamo-fascism, as shown in Barcelona, that holds life, death, and the future in its clutches.

(Translated from French by Steven B. Kennedy.)

TERRORISM IN EUROPE: THE MOROCCAN CONNECTION

Terrorism in Europe: the Moroccan connection
By Sarah Feuer and David Pollock
Washington Institute
August 24, 2017

The prominence of Moroccan expatriates among the perpetrators of high-profile attacks contrasts with the kingdom’s relative success in containing its own domestic jihadism threat.

***

The recent terrorist attacks in Spain and Finland have been linked almost exclusively to young men of Moroccan origin, sparking concern that the kingdom has become a breeding ground for jihadists. Of the twelve suspected accomplices in the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks that killed fifteen people on August 17, all but one were Moroccan-born or Spanish citizens of Moroccan descent, and the outlier was born in Melilla, one of Spain’s two tiny enclaves on Morocco’s northern coast. Similarly, of the five individuals arrested for suspected involvement in the stabbing attack that killed two Finnish citizens on August 18, all were of Moroccan origin, and a sixth Moroccan national is being sought in connection with that incident. Moroccan networks were also implicated in at least three high-profile terrorist strikes across Europe in the past two years, including the November 2015 attack in Paris, the March 2016 attack in Brussels, and the failed attack at the Brussels Central Station in May of this year.

In some of these instances, the radicalized individuals came from economically and socially marginalized backgrounds, leading certain analysts to focus on the possible links between terrorism and immigrants’ poor integration into European society. This appears to have been the case in the Turku incident in Finland, in which the group comprised largely underemployed, transient, unsuccessful asylum seekers or petty criminals. But in the Barcelona attack, most of the perpetrators were relatively well integrated into their Spanish communities and did not suffer from any demonstrable economic hardships.

Rather, ideology seems to have been the dominant fuel for that attack, given that the terrorists were reportedly inspired by a local Moroccan-born imam who had developed ties to the Islamic State (IS) while maintaining regular contact with Morocco and with Moroccans abroad. IS propaganda, including Spanish-language websites and social media, had recently intensified its focus on “al-Andalus,” as Islamic extremists call Spain in reference to its long history under various Muslim rulers (711-1492). After the attacks, IS claimed its perpetrators as “soldiers” and “mujahedin.”

Some Barcelona attackers, however, had a record of drug offenses – apparently including the imam, Abdullah al-Saadi. He, like many others, appears to have been radicalized while in prison for such an offense by a fellow terrorist inmate, also of Moroccan origin and linked to the deadly 2004 Madrid train bombings. Some likewise maintained close contact with family still in their ancestral country, reportedly including a recent trip there by the cell’s imam.

Reactions inside Morocco to these incidents have been mixed. King Mohammed VI immediately called Spain’s King Felipe to offer condolences, an interaction featured in the mainstream Moroccan press, which has since largely dropped the whole story. Opposition media, by contrast, such as the well-known website Lakome, continue to dwell on all angles of this episode, from personal profiles of the attackers and their Moroccan extended families to speculation about what the tragedy implies about “the failure of Morocco’s Islamic reform.”

ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN MOROCCO

If Moroccans in Europe have garnered growing attention for their involvement in attacks such as the one in Barcelona, Morocco itself has largely managed to contain its domestic terrorism problem in the last decade and a half. In 2003, in multiple, coordinated attacks targeting Jewish and European sites, twelve suicide bombers killed thirty-three individuals in Casablanca. Since then, the monarchy has devoted considerable resources to countering extremism at home, implementing a mix of robust – at times controversial – security measures and educational initiatives aimed at pushing back against violent Islamism.

At the popular level, Pew Research Center polls show a dramatic decline in sympathy for al-Qaeda, down to single digits, after the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The most recent surveys indicate about the same level of lingering affinity for IS, measured at 8 percent in 2015 – a bit higher than in other Arab countries polled, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt.

On the security front, a 2003 antiterrorism law passed in the wake of the Casablanca bombings significantly expanded the state’s security and domestic intelligence-gathering apparatuses, all of which operate under the palace’s direct supervision. (Affairs falling outside the foreign policy, security, and religious realms are generally left to a popularly elected legislature, whose largest element is the Justice and Development Party, a moderately Islamist party that pledges loyalty to the monarchy.) The 2003 law drew criticism from human rights groups for broadening the definition of terrorism to include all actions deemed a threat to public order, imposing the death penalty for convicted terrorists, and increasing to ten the number of days for which security officials can detain a terrorism suspect before providing access to a lawyer. Such concerns notwithstanding, Morocco’s domestic-monitoring and intelligence-gathering tools have evidently permitted the crown to routinely uncover terrorist cells in the kingdom and, more recently, to track citizens joining jihadist groups abroad.

Indeed, according to unofficial Western expert estimates, between 2012 and 2014 some 1,122 Moroccans left the kingdom to join IS in Syria and Iraq, with an additional 300 believed to have joined the jihadist group’s self-proclaimed province in Libya. Seeking to stem the outward tide of these fighters, the government in 2014 amended the antiterrorism law to impose fines of up to 500,000 Moroccan dirhams ($60,000) and prison terms of five to fifteen years for citizens seeking to join armed organizations inside the kingdom or in foreign theaters of conflict. Still, recent estimates of Moroccans fighting for IS hover around 1,500 and jump to 2,500 when accounting for Europeans of Moroccan origin. Concerns over the prospect of these battle-hardened individuals returning home via Libya and Algeria prompted the monarchy to reinforce Morocco’s military presence along the Algerian border, deploying heavy weapons, antiaircraft guns, and rocket launchers in an effort to deter possible attacks.

Ironically, in the months before the Barcelona and Turku incidents, the Moroccan police presence in the northern coastal region was visibly reinforced – not so much to stop terrorists but to monitor political protest activity centered in the port city of al-Hoceima. Such steps are generally effective in Morocco, though naturally not foolproof. The terrorist imam Saadi apparently traveled back and forth between Spain and Morocco unimpeded, and if Moroccan authorities warned their Spanish counterparts about him, it had no effect.

Alongside the crown’s security measures, Morocco has pursued a series of reforms in the religious realm aimed at reducing the influence of extremist ideologies. These reforms have brought greater state control over religious institutions, including several hundred Quranic schools dotting Morocco’s landscape and its roughly 50,000 mosques. School curricula have been altered to promote Islamic teachings compatible with notions of human rights and religious tolerance. Additionally, the monarchy has imposed new training regulations for imams and others wishing to teach Islam. Beginning in 2005, for example, the state began training a corps of imam supervisors, including women, to regularly meet with prayer leaders and ensure that the religious discourse being disseminated in mosques reflected “moderate Islam,” as termed by the leadership. Since 2014, a royal decree has prohibited imams from engaging in political or union-related activity while in the mosques, and in 2015 the monarchy injected $20 million into a new training facility to accommodate not only Moroccan imams and imam supervisors but also a growing number of aspiring imams from West Africa and even Europe.

A principal goal of such programs is to counter the more rigid ideological strains of Islamism affiliated with ultraconservative, or Salafi, Islam. Salafism itself is tolerated in the kingdom so long as it does not promote violence or reject the monarchical framework, and in recent years prominent Salafi clerics imprisoned following the 2003 Casablanca attack have been granted amnesty in exchange for softening their public discourse and disavowing jihadist groups such as IS and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The most prominent Moroccan group opposed to the monarchy remains al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence), an Islamic movement whose founder and chief ideologue, Abdessalam Yassine, died in 2012. Though the movement is formally banned, the government tolerates al-Adl wal-Ihsan as long as it remains nonviolent, preserving more aggressive tactics for groups espousing violence.

The long-term effects of such measures remain to be seen, but the substantial involvement of jihadists with Moroccan links in European terrorist attacks suggests the policies fostering relative stability at home have not sufficiently undermined the ideological sources of extremism for Moroccan nationals living abroad. Still, the kingdom appears intent to continue positioning itself as a regional model of religious reform.

MOROCCANS IN EUROPE

The Moroccan diaspora in Europe is extensive, numbering several million, compared with a home-country population of around 36 million; but precise numbers, or even definitions of Moroccans by immigration status, vary considerably. Most live in Francophone countries such as France or Belgium, with scattered communities elsewhere across the continent. The overwhelming majority are settled, law-abiding, employed, and official immigrants.

Spain is a special case because of its geographic proximity to Morocco, and its status as Morocco’s other former colonial power – besides France – controlling the northern third of the country under a protectorate for much of the first half of the twentieth century. Tangier is just a half-hour by ferry from the Spanish ports of Tarifa, Cadiz, or Algeciras, and a one-way ticket costs less than $50. Many Moroccans in that northern coastal region also speak at least basic Spanish, in addition to French and Arabic – and sometimes also Tamazight, the northern Berber dialect. Out of a total Spanish population of approximately 32 million, nearly 800,000 are registered first- or second-generation Moroccan immigrants. About one-quarter of them reside in Catalonia, mostly in or near Barcelona. The number of additional, illegal Moroccan migrants in Spain is unknown.

An unusual aspect of the Moroccan diaspora is its comparatively close institutional connectivity. For example, a European Council of Moroccan Ulema (Islamic clerics) works to coordinate communication, charity, and other aspects of community life. And the kingdom itself maintains a relatively strong interest in Moroccans abroad. In late July, to cite but one instance, the prestigious Asilah cultural festival hosted a three-day conference on “Muslims in the West,” featuring presentations by several young European imams of Moroccan origin, as well as experts from as far afield as the United States and Argentina.

Given this background, the recent prominence of Moroccan expatriates in jihadist terrorism appears to reflect not the prevalence of fundamentalist extremism in their country of origin but the opposite: Morocco remains relatively inhospitable to such violence for a combination of cultural and security reasons. As a result, the small proportion of Moroccans inclined in that direction have evidently sought sanctuary abroad; others may have become radicalized in their adopted European homes, rather than importing the ideology from Morocco.

LESSONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Two broad suggestions emerge from the preceding analysis with respect to Moroccans’ involvement in terrorism abroad. First, the United States should encourage even closer intelligence and security cooperation between Morocco and all Washington’s European allies. Filling the empty ambassadorial post in Rabat, the Moroccan capital, would help facilitate such an approach. Second, U.S., European, and Moroccan experts should seek to draw lessons from Morocco’s overarching success at preventing jihadist terrorism at home. For example, to the extent Morocco’s efforts to enlist former Salafi-jihadists in countering extremist ideologies has reduced the appeal of violent Islamism at home, the kingdom’s experience may offer potential antidotes to extremism exportable beyond Morocco’s borders.