January 2010

January 31, 2010

In his blog from Davos Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator of the Financial Times, notes: 'I am listening to Lawrence Summers as I write. He has emphasised that
we cannot maintain global integration if it is seen as a source of
domestic disintegration. This tension - that between the global economy
and domestic politics - is a central challenge of our time. It affects
everything we try to do.'

Martin Wolf is a very strong supporter of global economic integration for reasons he set out in Why Globalisation Works
and numerous other writings. The danger he warns against is that
popular backlashes in favour of protectionism will undermine the
process of global economic integration. In the US and a number of
European countries popular sentiment in favour of protectionism has
increased - although its effect on those who make economic policy, as
regards the most important issues, is as yet far more limited.

For
slightly different reasons to Martin Wolf this blog is also strongly in
favour of the process of global economic integration and against
protectionism. The reason for this is that division of labour, followed
by investment, is the most powerful force in economic growth
and in the modern era participation in increasing division of labour is
necessarily international in scope. Preventing popular, indeed any,
backlashes in favour of protectionism is therefore an important
question.

In dealing with this issue Martin Wolf could reflect on
the difference in sentiment between India and China on the one hand and
the US and Europe on the other. In India a government pledged to take
the country down the strategic path of integration in the international
economy was re-elected with a convincing mandate. In China, as anyone
who visits the country knows, popular support for the 'opening up
process' (official terminology for the country's orientation towards
globalisation) remains high. The contrast in popular mood between India
and China on the one hand and the US and Europe on the other is
therefore striking.

Part of this difference is, of course, the
much more rapid growth of India's and China's economies compared to
Europe and the US. However, simply rapid growth is not sufficient to
maintain popular support for international economic integration - and
while the US and European economies have been expanding less rapidly
than India and China they were, prior to the current recession, still
growing.

The former BJP government in India achieved rapid
economic growth but was tossed out of office by the electorate.
Entirely rationally the population will not support globalisation if
this merely yields higher GDP figures recorded in statistical works,.
They will support globalisation only if it delivers better living
standards for them. The majority of India's population considered the
BJP's rapid economic growth had not delivered for them and therefore
voted against the government.

The strategic concept of the new
Congress government under Manmohan Singh was, and remains, 'inclusive
growth'. It aimed at rapid growth, using global economic integration as
a key means to achieve this, but did not rely on 'trickle down' to make
sure the mass of the population shared in its benefits. Conscious
programmes of redistribution of resources to rural areas, and less well
off sections of the population, were part of the bedrock of 'inclusive
growth'.

It is also notable in China that Hu Jintao's
'harmonious society' has included direct measures to redistribute the
benefits of growth to those who were not previously perceived as having
gained sufficiently. In China's stimulus package to confront the
international financial crises, price reductions on consumer durables
were targeted on rural areas, the government has reintroduced free
education, a major expansion of the health care system is taking place,
large scale investment is taking place in the less well off inland
provinces etc.

In short, both India and China have abandoned
'trickle down' as the method of ensuring all share in the growth
produced by international economic integration.

In the US and
Europe, on the contrary, the movement has been towards greater reliance
on unfettered free markets. The evidence shows, however, that
unfettered operation of the market increases inequality sharply. The
most notable result of this is that median wages in the US have
relatively stagnated for two decades at the same time as relatively
sustained economic growth occurred - it is necessary to look no further
than this to understand populist backlashes in the US. In the US the
gap in income and wealth between the bottom and top of society has
widened greatly, as it has in Britain. The US and Britain by relying on
'trickle down', by the operation of the free market, have therefore
sharply increased inequality - and, in the case of the US,
deterioration of the economic situation for significant layers of the
population has occurred.

India and China, in short, have
abandoned 'tickle down' while the US and Europe have embraced it. In
India and China support for strategic global economic integration
remains high. In the US and Europe a backlash against it has developed.

Martin Wolf, in his entirely justified argument against the US
and Europe embarking on protectionism, can therefore consider the
contrast in the popular mood in India and China. It may indicate why,
to maintain popular support for globalisation, the US and Europe also
need to abandon reliance on 'trickle down'.

January 29, 2010

One of the favourite comparisons of those who predict economic
failure in China is to make analogies with the situation of Japan in
the 1990s. The news
that Japan's consumer price index has fallen for the 13th consecutive
month in the year to December, by 1.3%, shows the falsity of this
analogy.

Japan in the 1990s, after the bursting of the bubble economy, is one of the classic illustrations of Irving Fisher's
analysis of economic depression as due to deflation/debt. Fisher noted
how under conditions of deflation, which has existed repeatedly in
Japan since the 1990s, the real value of debt increases - trapping the
economy in depression. The latest figures illustrate that Japan remains
in that deflationary situation.

In China, on the contrary,
inflation remains the risk. Deflation did occur in China for a short
period during the early part of 2009, under the impact of the world
financial crisis, but was rapidly overcome. China's CPI rose by 1.9% in
December - a higher than expected level and with an accelerating trend.

This
difference clearly illustrates the differences between China and Japan.
There are more underlying causes which create this situation - Japan is
one of the most closed major economies in the world while China is one
of the most open, investment in Japan has persistently fallen whereas
in China it has risen etc - but the radical difference in price trends
between inflationary China and deflationary Japan by itself shows the
falsity of the entire attempt to make analogies between the present
situation in China and that of Japan in the 1990s.

January 24, 2010

Relatively widespread coverage in economic media has
been given to an important new analysis published by Goldman Sachs
pointing to the inflationary consequences of major capacity constraints
emerging in the Chinese economy. As Geoff Dyer noted in the Financial Times
on 22 January: 'According to Yu Song and Helen Qiao... the most extreme example is in the auto sector, where extra shifts mean
factories are running at above capacity. They also see emerging
bottlenecks in electricity, coal and even in aluminium and steel which
only a few months back seemed to be suffering from chronic overcapacity.

'"The
capacity overhang has been quickly whittled down in major industrial
sectors," they wrote... The apparent rebound in
Chinese exports, which grew 17 per cent in December compared to the
year before, has reinforced the impression that the output gap is
shrinking.

'Inflationary pressures could also come from the
labour market. Before the crisis, which led to millions of migrant
workers losing jobs, wages were rising quickly as the labour supply
started to slow. Surveys of job centres suggest employment is returning
to pre-crisis levels.'

This analysis, which is confirmed not
simply by the individual sectoral studies carried out by Yu Song and
Helen Qiao but by macro-economic analysis, is intrinsically important
for analysing China's current economic situation. But it also refutes
the bad, and inaccurate, piece of economics produced last
year by the European Chamber of Commerce in China
which suggested overcapacity was the key issue in this regard in China
- unfortunately this report was picked up in an editorial the Financial Times. To show the report's errors were evident not only after the event I cite my letter in the Financial Times in reply:

'The basis of the report is an alleged clash between a "rising savings
rate in the United States", supposed to account for a decline in the US
trade deficit, and China's economic policy. Factually no "rising
savings rate" in the US savings rate has occurred. Since the second
quarter of 2008 US savings have declined from 12.7 per cent of GDP to
10.4 per cent of GDP.

'In any country, including China, it is
evidently possible to point to individual industries suffering from
overcapacity, as well as those with insufficient capacity – a
statistical measure necessarily means cases below and above average.

'Simply
citing particular cases, as the report does, therefore establishes no
general case of "overcapacity" as regards China's economy. This same
mistake applies within individual industries. For example, in the
Chinese chemical sector the report notes 50 per cent of the industry is
in a balanced state of supply and demand, 30 per cent of products are
in short supply, and 20 per cent have overcapacity problems – a normal
market situation.'

Hopefully this new analysis by Goldman
Sachs will put an end to erroneous claims overcapacity is the key issue
in China. On the contrary it confirms clearly that capacity
constraints, that is undercapacity and not overcapacity, is the
dominant issue facing the Chinese economy in this field.

January 09, 2010

China has achieved a dramatic expansion of
its domestic demand in 2009. It is likely that GDP figures will show
that China's domestic demand rose by around 11% last year while
China's trade surplus fell by over thirty percent. These estimates are
made using conservative assumptions and it is probable the eventual out
turns will be even higher - although they will not alter the essential
picture, This article looks at this remaking of the pattern of China's
demand.

* * *

The full data for China's trade in 2009 will be published next
week. Data for GDP will be published later. These will give a more fine
grained picture of China's economic development in 2009. However data
for the first 11 months of China's trade this year have already been
issued and there is no doubt that the official 8.0% target for GDP
growth will be met and exceeded. These already published figures therefore allow a clear picture to be formed.

To take first the ballpark numbers, and using conservative
assumptions, China's trade surplus, that is its net exports, will have
declined in 2009 by around or slightly over
$100 billion - over thirty percent.
China's GDP will have increased by over $350 billion if growth in
2009 was 8.0% and by approaching $400 billion on the assumption that
growth was
8.5%. Detailed figures are given in Table 1. Assumptions used to
calculate these are given in Note 1.

Taking first trade, in 2008 China's exports were $1.431 trillion and imports
$1.333 trillion. China's trade surplus was $298 billion. In the first 11 months of 2009 China's exports were $1.071 trillion - a fall of $248 billion, or 18.8% compared to the same period in 2008. China's
imports in the same period were $0.891 trillion - a fall of $167
billion, or 15.8%. China's trade
surplus dropped from $261 billion in the first 11 months of 2008 to $180 billion in the same period of 2009 - a decline of 31%.

To give a projection for 2009 as a whole, if
the 31% fall in the trade surplus was maintained for the entire year
then China's trade surplus in 2009 would be $206 billion - a decline of
$92 billion. In reality the drop is likely to be greater as China's
trade surplus in December 2008 was an exceptionally high $39 billion.
The actual decline in China's trade surplus for 2009 is therefore
likely to be at least $100 billion - another way of stating
that China in 2009 added a net $100 billion to international demand.
The excellent export figures in the rest of Asia at the end of 2009 in significant part reflect this boost in demand from China.

In
order to estimate the effect of the decline in the trade surplus on the
structure of
China's demand it is useful to translate trade figures into GDP
percentages. This involves taking into account service sector trade,
and various relatively small statistical adjustments, which lead to
China's total surplus of exports over imports in 2008 being $353
billion in national accounting terms. As China's net export situation
is dominated by trade in goods it is assume for simplicity below that
the national account trade position also falls by 31%.

China's GDP in 2008 was recently revised
upwards to 31.405 trillion yuan or $4.6 trillion at the official
exchange rate. No change in the figure for net exports has however been
published. As the trade position is easier to measure than GDP, where
the upward shift was accounted for primarily by
a previous underestimate of output in the small service sector, the
figure for China's net exports is unlikely to change greatly. This
upward GDP revision changes downwards slightly China's export surplus
in 2008 as a percentage of GDP - from the previously publishes 7.9% of
GDP to 7.7%. This figure is used in Table 1.

Turning to 2009, the official GDP growth projection for the year was
8.0%. However it is clear from the first three quarters results that
the eventual figure for growth will not only be achieved but almost
certainly exceeded. As the aim in this article is to use conservative
assumptions, and therefore take figures which are least favourable for
the position presented, it will be assumed for calculation that GDP
growth in 2009 was 8.0%. A higher GDP growth rate, given that trade
figures are unlikely to change greatly, would imply a higher growth of
domestic demand than that indicated in Table 1 below.

Assuming an 8.0% growth rate, the increase in China's GDP in 2009
would imply an increase in GDP of approximately $368 billion - the
exact figure depending primarily on the assumption made on the
inflation rate to translate an 8.0% increase in constant price terms
into current prices.

Taking the assumption of a $109 billion decline in the export
surplus, that is 31%, and a $368 billion increase in GDP implies that
China's domestic demand in 2009 rose by $477 billion, or 11.2%. This
would be one of the highest increases in domestic demand in a single
year ever achieved by any country in history.

On this data
China's export surplus will have fallen from 7.7% of GDP in 2008 to
4.9% of GDP in 2009, or by 2.8% of GDP. China's domestic demand,
conversely, will have risen from 92.3% of GDP to 95.1%. Detailed
revision of these figures will be given as final trade and GDP data for
2009 is published. They will, however, not alter the fundamental
picture.

Table 1

The implications of such data are clear. China did not require a
surge in its trade surplus for its economy to undergo rapid growth in
2009 - as some argued.
China successfully shifted demand into its domestic economy. An
approximately $100 billion decline in net external demand was more than
cancelled by a more than $450 billion increase in domestic demand.
This must be counted, in light of the extremely negative
external economic situation, as one of history's most successful and skilful pieces
of macro-economic management. Simultaneously with rapid domestic economic China's trade surplus declined - easing global
imbalances and particularly boosting exports from other Asian economies.

Given this dramatic increase in
China's domestic demand why did a number of commentators fail to
foresee this and therefore greatly underestimate
the potential for China's economic performance in 2009? In a number of
cases it was because they committed an elementary economic error. They
reduced the potential for China's growth in domestic demand to its
increase in domestic consumption. However domestic demand is composed
not simply of domestic consumption but also of domestic investment.
China's domestic investment rose rapidly in 2009 as well as its
domestic consumption - the combination of the two producing the rapid
increase in domestic demand.(2)

In conclusion the fundamental trend
is clear. China succeeded in 2009 in achieving an extremely high rate
of increase of both domestic investment and domestic consumption -
enabling it to overcome, in terms of GDP growth, the negative shock of
the fall in exports and the decline in the trade surplus. Sceptics on
the ability of China to raise domestic demand were shown to be wrong.
China's stimulus package, which produced the results, was shown to be
an extremely impressive piece of macro-economic management.

Addition 10 January

The publication
of China's trade data for 2009 confirms the points made above. The new
data shows China's trade surplus in 2009, on a foreign trade and not a
national accounts basis, was $196 billion compared to $298 billion in
2008 - a fall of $102 billion or 34%. An equivalent percentage decline
in China's net exports on a national accounts basis would mean a
decline in its surplus of $120 billion compared to the $109 billion
projected in this article for calculating the increase in China's domestic demand.
This reaffirms that the trade assumptions made for calculations in the
article above were conservative.

Notes

1. All data, unless otherwise stated, is taken from China Statistical Yearbook 2009.
The assumption made for China's export surplus in 2009 is set out in
the body of the article. To calculate the changes in GDP in current
prices it is necessary to make an assumption on inflation/deflation
rates. In 2009 these will be relatively minor, therefore for simplicity
they have been assumed to be zero. There is likely to be net deflation
in 2009, which would revise the figure for the current price increase
in GDP given in Table 1 downwards, however it is also likely that GDP
growth will exceed 8.0% which would revise the figure upwards.Therefore
Table 1 is given as a qualitative initial projection. Revisions will be
given as detailed figures are published.

An earlier article
noted that the US has been overtaken as
the world's greatest source of finance for investment (i.e.
savings/capital) by China. This represents a major turning point in
world economic history.

This article adds data for three further major economies - Japan,
Germany and India. The calculations are made in dollars at current
exchange rates for the latest year for which annual data are available
- i.e. 2008.(1) The results are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Analysing
the results in detail, China's lead in generation of investible finance
flows from the combination of the large size of its economy, $4.399
trillion in 2008, and its high savings rate of around 54% of GDP.
China's savings in 2008 were $2.381 trillion. Recent further upward revision of China's GDP data indicates that the savings figure given for China here is probably slightly conservative. (2)

The position of the US as the world's second largest source of
investible finance is determined exclusively by the large size of its
economy. As is well known the US savings rate is extremely low.
Contrary to some claims to the contrary in the media, the US savings
rate has fallen further and not risen during the financial crisis. The
calculated US savings rate in 2008 was 13.3% of GDP, and the measured
rate 12.6%. US calculated savings were $1.926 trillion and measured
savings $1.824 trillion.

Japan, despite the well known severe problems of its economy in the
last two decades, still occupies third place in terms of generation of
capital due to the large size of its economy and a relatively high,
26,7% of GDP, savings rate. Japan's generation of capital in 2008 was
$1.310 trillion.

In order to illustrate the drastic changes in the relative positions
of China, the US, and Japan in terms of generation of capital Figure 2
shows the total savings in dollars for each country since 1975. As may
be seen Japan temporarily overtook the US in the late 1980s and early
1990s before the collapse of its 'bubble economy'. Total savings in
Japan then fell precipitately and have never regained their 1995 level
in absolute terms. This sharp fall in Japan's savings accompanied the
well known stagnation of its economy. The extremely rapid rise of China
to overtake both the US and Japan is evident.

Figure 2

Turning to other states, Germany occupies fourth place in terms of
generation of capital with a savings rate of 26.0% of GDP and savings
of $0.946 trillion.

Due to the rapid growth of its economy a calculation for India is
given. India's savings rate is high, 35.7% of GDP, but its total
savings remain lower than that of other major countries due to its
smaller economy - particularly when expressed at official exchange
rates. India's total savings in 2008 were $482 billion. This means
China's total savings, that is finance available for investment, were
almost five times those of India in 2008.

Notes

1. The US publishes data for measured
total savings as part of its quarterly GDP data. Most countries do not.
However savings are, by accounting definition, equal to gross domestic
fixed capital formation, plus inventories, plus the balance of payments
surplus/deficit. As data for these latter figures are published for all
countries concerned it is a simple matter to calculate savings. To
ensure relative uniformity of sources in all cases data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics
is used. Use of national sources of data yields figures differing in
detail from the results here but in no case do these alter the
qualitative picture outlined. Cross checking with countries for which
measured savings data is published shows, as would be expected, minor
differences between measured and calculated savings. This disparity,
however, is not sufficient to alter the rankings or essential
dimensions of savings given above. To illustrate this point the graph
below shows measured and calculated savings rates for the US expressed
as a percentage of GDP.

2. China's 2008 GDP has recently been revised
upwards to $4,600 trillion. It is likely that this will show China's
savings to be above the level calculated here. However no breakdown of
the new data which would allow a calculation of the savings rate has
been published yet. Therefore the former, that is more conservative,
figures are used here to avoid any suggestion of exaggeration. The
difference will however almost certainly be marginal.

January 06, 2010

India was one of a number of countries that experienced major
currency devaluation against the dollar during and after the
international currency crisis. As the comparison to China, which
pursued a policy of stabilising the RMB's exchange rate against the
dollar after the outbreak of the financial crisis, is particularly
interesting the movements of the RMB and the Indian Rupee against the
dollar since 2000 are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

As may be seen the Rupee from 2000 up to September 2007 had a
tendency to a weaker exchange rate than the RMB. But the difference was
not extreme and in September 2007 the two currencies were essentially
at parity in terms of exchange rate shifts with a roughly ten percent
upward movement in exchange rate against the dollar compared to 2000.

After September 2007, however, a marked divergence between the
exchange rate of the RMB and the Rupee began. The RMB first continued
to rise and then stabilised, without falling, when the financial crisis
began. The exchange rate of the Rupee, in contrast, start falling from
September 2007 onwards and this accelerated as the financial crisis
developed. The specific trends since the start of the financial crisis
are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Taking these movements together, between September 2007 and January
2010 the RMB rose by over 10% against the dollar while the Rupee fell
by over 20% between September 2007 and its low point in March 2009.
Even after recovery of the Rupee, at the beginning of January 2010 it
was still more than 12% below its September 2007 level. As the RMB went
up against the dollar in the same period this means that the Rupee has
carried out an effective twenty per cent devaluation against the RMB
since September 2007.

Given that India runs, relative to the size of its economy, a
containable balance of payments deficit, which in 2008 was 2.7% of GDP,
no substantive internationally destabilising consequences flow from the
devaluation of the Rupee against either the dollar or the RMB. What
will be significant however will be to see whether this clear
devaluation of the Rupee against the RMB alters the relative dynamics
of India's and China's economies.

As this blog has noted on a number of occasions the
long term effect of India's economic reforms has been to shift it
decisively towards the 'Asian growth model' - that is to a very strong
increase in savings and investment rates. Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh has consciously supported this policy.

The decline of the exchange rate of the Rupee moves India further
towards adoption of the 'Asian growth model'. This is because for
countries such as South Korea and China a second component of their
economic strategy, alongside high rates of savings and investment, was
to maintain a low exchange rate in order to boost exports.

Contrary
to accusations to the contrary this did not necessarily mean running a
large trade surplus, as this depended on developments such as the rate
of growth of the economy which helped determine whether imports rose
equally - for example China's large trade surplus appeared only in 2005
and is now declining, while South Korea at various times has run large
trade deficits. The low exchange rate policy, however, did ensure a
rapid development of the share of exports in the economy, allowing
economies of scale from production for the international market and
other benefits to be achieved. The fact that India was more cut off
from the international division of labour compared to is east Asian
competitors, that is its share of exports and imports in the economy
was relatively low, was an achilles heel.

Having achieved a level of savings and investment which is currently
higher than South Korea and the other former East Asian tigers, and is
not far behind China, the logical next step for India is to adopt a low
exchange rate policy to stimulate exports still further. The changes in
the Rupees exchange rate in the last period give the opportunity to
achieve this. It remains to be seen whether they will be consolidated.

In addition to the importance for India itself there is an
international significance of India's further shift towards a policy
of a high savings and high investment coupled with a low exchange rate
to stimulate exports. For this, as noted, is precisely the 'Asian
growth model'. The fact that the world's second most populous country,
soon to become its first, is moving with success further towards such a
model has clear implications. Far from the 'Asian growth model' moving
to its end after the financial crisis, as some commentators have claimed, it is spreading further.

Watching the exchange rate of the Rupee, and its effect on India's
economic performance, is becoming a highly important international
issue.

January 05, 2010

It is by now well known that the two countries which have
come most strongly through the financial crisis are China
and India. China’s year on year growth
to the third quarter of 2009 was 8.9%. India’s was 7.9%.

Such
a result of course has many economic lessons. But one
is to decisively refute the myth that high levels of investment are a
cause of economic crisis and underperformance.
On the contrary China and India have the highest levels of investment
of any
major economies - as shown in Figure 1 (a comparison to the US is
given). The percentage of China’s GDP devoted to gross
domestic capital formation (fixed investment) in 2008 was 41.4%.(1)
India's was 34.8%.(2) In 2008 China generated 9.6% annual growth and
India 6.7%.

Figure 1

It is, of course, possible to have inefficient investment –
i.e. high levels of investment that fail to generate high levels of economic
growth. Classic examples of this are countries pursuing inward facing import
substitution strategies whether of a market (Argentina) or non-market (the
former USSR) type.However medium and long term trends econometric studies
clearly demonstrate investment is the single most important source of
economic growth after increasing participation in the national and
international division of labour.

For the G7 economies as a whole, and the US economy, econometric studies
show that more than 50% of economic growth, that is the majority of
growth, is accounted for by investment. In consequence these economies
cannot grow at more than twice their rate of investment - i.e. the rate
of increase in investment determines the rate of increase of GDP. But,
far from being inefficient, recent studies
show China has among the highest rates of growth of total factor
productivity in the world, showing the efficiency of its investment,
while Dale Jorgenson and Khuong Vu also found India has a high rate of growth of total factor productivity.

China
and India, however, also demonstrate something about the short term and
the business cycle. Their very high investment levels were not only the
main determinants of their rapid economic growth but also clearly allow
them to most adequately confront the cyclical economic downturn.

The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
has repeatedly stressed that the key to growth for both India and China
is their very high levels of savings and investment. He has been shown
to be entirely right. The two major countries with the highest level of
investment in GDP have both the fastest growth rates and have most
successfully dealt with the financial crisis.

Those
who claim there is a problem of 'overinvestment' should simply look at
China and India. They confirm on the practical field what is shown by
econometric studies to follow from economic theory. They bury the
theory of 'overinvestment'.

January 03, 2010

Economic analysis should be judged by its accordance with facts. The data is now in which allows a judgement on China's economic growth in 2009. The statistical issue on this is how much above the official growth forecast of 8.0% GDP expansion, made at the beginning of 2009, China will achieve.

This blog has repeatedly analysed that China's economic stimulus package would be successful and that, therefore, China would experience high growth in 2009. This follows from a long term analysis of the success of China's economy. However this blog evidently made no claim to be unique in this forecast and pointed to others who came to the same conclusion including Jim O'Neill, chief economist of Goldman Sachs, Professor Danny Quah of the London School of Economics, Mark Weisbrot of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research, and Yan Wang of BCA Research. If these are among those who made essentially correct forecasts of the success of China's economic performance in 2009 it is also legitimate, and necessary from the point of view of evaluating future analysis, to register those who clearly got it wrong on China's economy. And to ask whether they have changed their analysis which led to these wrong predictions?

First was the International Monetary Fund. In January 2009 the IMF predicted 6.7% GDP growth in China in 2009. In April 2009, by which time China's economy was already accelerating, the IMF revised downwards its forecast for China's economic growth to 6.5%.

In March the World Bank similarly revised down its prediction for China's 2009 GDP growth to 6.5%.

In March 2009 the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria stated that the organisation might revise its forecast for China's GDP growth down to as low as 6.0%.

Turning to private financial institutions, and other economic forecasters, it is practically impossible to follow all of these but it is worth making a non-exhaustive list of some of the more striking or widely quoted. One school was, of course, the 'catastrophists' on China. Leading among these were Gordon Chang, who continued to express the thesis expressed in his book with the self-explanatory title The Coming Collapse of China,which in 2002 declared: 'A half-decade ago the leaders of the People's Republic had real choices. Today they do not. They have no exit. They have run out of time.' (pxxiii). This prediction was made as China was about to experience seven years of the most rapid economic growth in the world. In a similar category comes Societe Generale analyst Dylan Grice,who declares that China is the biggest economic bubble in world history.

Turning to less catastrophist forecasters, prior to 23 April 2009 Morgan Stanley's prediction for China's 2009 GDP growth was only 5.5%. On 23 April it raised this to 7.0% - still an underestimate. Goldman Sach's at the beginning of 2009, despite Jim O'Neill's overall positive assessment, projected 6.0% growth in China in 2009 before raising it in April to 8.3%. UBS at the beginning of 2009 projected China's GDP growth to be 6.5% - raising it in April to 7.0-7.5%. This was despite the fact that in November 2008 Tao Wang,
head of China economic research for UBS, predicted 7.5% China
economic growth in 2009.

Standard Chartered in the first half of 2009 made a 6.8% prediction for China's GDP growth. Ben Simpfendorfer of the Royal Bank of Scotland in December 2008 was projecting China's GDP growth in 2009 to be 5%. Michael Pettis of Beijing University did not give a quantitative growth prediction but made the qualitative judgement that: ''I continue to stand by my comment… that the US would be the first major economy out of the crisis and China one of the last.' In July Stephen Roach, Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, declared his view that he was ceasing to be an optimist on China's economy.

China's actual economic out turn in 2009, with GDP growth that will come in even above the official prediction of 8.0%, shows clearly who was right and who wrong regarding China's economic performance in 2009. Those who believed in the strength of China's economy were right. Those who believed either in 'catastrophe' or significant economic slowdown were wrong.

This is not merely an historical question looking backwards. In most cases there is no evidence that those who made wrong projections, which greatly underestimated the strength of China's economy, have corrected analyses which led to these errors. Such analyses, which have been, refuted by facts, therefore cannot be considered reliable for future projections regarding China's economic performance.

China's State
Council Development Research Centre predicted on 1 January that
China's GDP will expand by 9.5 percent in 2010. iStockAnalyst
also carries a readily available and useful summary of some predictions regarding
China’s GDP growth in 2010. These include forecasts from the China’s State Information
Centre - about 8.5% GDP growth, the World Bank - 8.7%, Asian Development Bank - 8.9%, the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences - 9.0%, International Monetary Fund - 9.0%,
Morgan Stanley - 10.0%, CITIC Securities 10.1%, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development - 10.2%, Goldman Sachs - 11.4%.

What is notable about these figures is not the exact forecasts, as no-one can in fact scientifically predict GDP growth accurately to a tenth of a percent, but that all these numbers are high. Those who believed that China’s GDP growth will be low have apparently given up the battle – or more accurately retreated from the battlefield to lick their wounds.
This makes an extremely interesting contrast to the predictions for and actual results of China’s economy in 2009 - which are dealt with in another post.