David Riceman wrote:
>Yes, I just looked it up in Derech HaShem. RGS's proof, and my footnotes
>to it, are not implied by RMHL. He seems to be following the medieval
>Jewish philosophers quite closely.
I apologize because I have not had more than a minute to look at it
again. But IIRC, Ramchal does not give any explanation for why G-d's
existence is necessary. Like most of 1:1, he just states it without
explanation. But, towards the end of the chapter, as (I think) the only
proof in the chapter, he speaks at length about G-d's completeness. In
inferred from this that G-d's completeness was the reason for all, or
at least most, of his shorashim regarding G-d. That was the reasoning
behind my understanding that Ramchal derives G-d's existence from His
completeness.
I'll admit that I could have misread it. But in what way was he following
the "medieval Jewish philosophers"? The Rambam in Hilchos Yesodei ha-Torah
only seems to say that the universe could not exist without G-d but not
that G-d must inherently exist.
Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

I wrote:
>: The Rambam in Hilchos Yesodei ha-Torah
>: only seems to say that the universe could not exist without G-d but not
>: that G-d must inherently exist.
> YhT 1:3...
> Pretty clearly states that Hashem is ontologically unique because
> His existance is not contingent.
I should add that the Rambam's proof for G-d in the Moreh shows that
since contingent beings must have a cause (something that made the
contingency true), the Uncaused First Cause is necessarily necessary
(non-contingent). The notion that He must inherently exist is built into
the Rambam's argument in the first part of cheileq II.
-mi

Gil Student <gil_student@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Harry Maryles wrote:
>> IIRC, R. Aaron Soloveichik held that anyone
>> who Paskin's that killing Kinah on Shabbos is
>> Chaiv should be put into Cherem.
> I'll just point out that among those who pasken that it is assur to
> kill a kinah on Shabbos (not that you are necessarily chayav chatas but
> that it is assur) are the Pachad Yitzchak encyclopedia by R' Yitzchak
> Lampronti, Shu"t Shevet HaKehasi vol. 3 no. 126, Piskei Teshuvos
> 314:6
Now that you mention it, I think I actually recall R. Aaron mentioning
the Pachd Yitzchak by name in Shiur, and saying he would have put him
into Cherem for that Psak. But... it's been a long time so I can't really
be 100% sure.
HM

RMB has written several times that he believes that the rambam does not
believe that one would ever have to reinterprete mesora, and that the only
theoretical case he brings is the of ma'ase breshit - where chazal already
speak of the fact that ma'ase breshit can not be understood as pshat.
I think (as in previous discussions) that RMB's understanding of the
rambam is unique, and misunderstands the text - where the rambam, rather
than arguing the incontrovertibility of our neviim, argues that they are
superior to tales of philosophy, not true philosophy. Neither of us can
convince the other.
However, RMB does miss one area where the rambam specifically
reinterpretes our normal understanding of mesora to fit philosophy -
and is vigorously opposed by the ramban precisely for this reason -
and it is this area, rather than ma'ase breshit, that is cited by
RA Lichtenstein as permission for us for such reinterpretation. I am
talking about the rambam's view on malachim - where he holds that any
story in tanach involving a malach involved a prophetic vision rather
than a physical experience. The ramban (beginning of vayera) vigorously
criticizes him. I wonder how RMB fits this case into his understanding
of the rambam - I don't believe that there are any mekorot in hazal
that would view the appearance of the malachim to avraham, say, as a
prophetic vision rather than as real.
Meir Shinnar

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> the rambam's view on malachim - where he holds that any story in
> tanach involving a malach involved a prophetic vision rather than a physical
> experience. The ramban (beginning of vayera) vigorously criticizes him. I
> wonder how RMB fits this case into his understanding of the rambam - I don't
> believe that there are any mekorot in hazal that would view the appearance
> of the malachim to avraham, say, as a prophetic vision rather than as real.
I wrote about this for MmD recently, see
<http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/mishpatim.pdf>
See the Abarbanel on that Moreh. The Ramban assumes that the Rambam holds
as he does, that prophecy is communication through metaphor. However,
according to the Rambam, it's the ability to perceive higher reality. What
the Rambam said was that the event was real, but not perceived through
physical senses.
The Abarbanel's defence rests on the idea that this is within Chazal's
parameters in understanding the story.
-mi
--
Micha Berger You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org - Charles Buxton
Fax: (413) 403-9905

> What I'm really looking for (long shot, I know) is a meditation on
> the process of pesak, either a posek's description of his own thought
> processes or someone else's attempt to reconstruct what goes through
> the mind of a posek. I'm not talking about the kind of description
> that is given in a shu"t by the posek to explain his ruling (though
> perhaps someone with a broad or deep enough knowledge of shu"tim might
> be able to construct the sort of explanation I'm looking for on the
RMF's intro to ShuT IM is a good description of this part of the process.
[Email #2. -mi]
> What I would like to understand is where the posek
> makes the leap from having mastery of the material to knowing how to
> give psak. Why does he pick these precedents or mehalchim over others?
> What factors does he take into account in tailoring psak for different
> people? How much does it matter how the shaila is phrased? Why does one
> posek look for kulot (which types of kulot?) and another of the same
> caliber not? How conscious is the process? Does the posek know what
> he's going to say and then find material to back up his ruling, or does
Every Posek has a Mesorah . IOW, RMF and the Litvish , the CS and the
Hungarians , etc each have a series of basic Gdolim and Rishonim that
are part of their worldview. FI, many 20th Century Gdolim such as the CI,
RMF and RYBS were leary of using the Meiri because it was not discovered
until very late . RMF's teshuvot show a difference between Bnei Torah
and Shomrei Torah Umitzvot. A search for kulos may involve cases of shas
hadchak, as opposed to going out on a limb where it neither is called
for nor where there is a Mesorah to do so. I once heard RHS describe an
incident in which a KAJ member asked him a certain shelah. RHS answered
him as follows" I think that it is assur". The KAJ member wanted an
answer that left zero room for doubt. RHS explained that he learned from
RYBS that the proper style of answering a question was never to state it
in an absolute sense . OTOH, there are different styles in approaching
the same question. I once heard that RYBS was asked a certain question
and researched it from the Gemara thru the Rambam to the SA. OTOH,
the Tschebinner Rav was asked the same inquiry and reached the same
answer by starting with the KSA and working backwards to the Gemara.
Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

<<If you get a chance, could you tell me ... where S"A says that the wine
remains mutar where you see her pour from an open bottle into some keli,
without ever touching the wine itself.>>
The situation is more complicated than I initially realized. Here are
the mar'eh mekomos; CYCLOR of course.
Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah, 125:1 says specifically that if a nonJew
pours wine into a cup, although he never touches it/shakes (meshashshech)
it is assur, both the wine in the cup and that remaining in the bottle,
because of "kocho".
The Rema says that the bottle is OK, but one should be machmir except
in a case of hefsed merubah. The Mechaber continues by saying that if he
didn't know that it was wine, it's all mutar even to drink. That answers
your refrigerator door question.
The Shach says there (S"K 2) that since nonJews nowadays are not
ovdei A"Z (talk about cross threads!) it's mutar even behefsed mu'at.
His conclusion is that the Mechaber's din is only where we know that the
nonJews ARE ovdei A"Z; otherwise it's mutar even with a hefsed mu'at.
To me it seems that the poured wine is also in the heter, but, as above,
CYLOR.
Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

R"n Rena Freedenberg wrote <<< Actually, since email is such a distant
form of communication, it adds at least another step or two into the
process that would serve to further separate between people instead of
bringing them together. >>>
I hope this doesn't sound too pedantic, but the only way something can
"add a step to the process" is if the process already exists. And the
only way something can "further separate" them is if they are already
separated. Yes, email can do those things, if we're talking about two
people who used to communicate in person or by phone, and now they
communicate only by email.
I was thinking of a very different case, that of where the email is what
brought them together to begin with. For example, were it not for this
email list, I would not know any of the women posters at all. (Not the
men either, but that's another story.) Not only would I not know and
admire their learning, but I wouldn't even know they exist. But now I
do know these things.
RRF: <<< But I think that this is the real point. You are talking about
something which, no matter how little effort it would take to get into
trouble with, carries such a huge risk that very few [frum people]
would attempt it. Just remember, you are talking about an aveira that
carries very dire penalties for a frum Jew. >>>
I'm lost. Exactly which aveira are we talking about here?
Don't take it personally, because I have the same problem when I see a
sefer talking in vague terms about "that awful sin". I try to figure out
whether the author is trying to use a euphemism for (oh, how do I say
this?) something which would result in a penalty of karayss, or whether
the author is putting all sorts of male-female relationships into that
category. And then I decide that it doesn't really matter which one was
intended, because if one is not careful enough, the less-serious can
develop into the more-serious all too easily.
Again, I'm not trying to say that it is assur for men and women to speak
to each other, or to send emails to each other. All I'm suggesting is
that those who *do* forbid it are making an important point which the
rest of us should be mindful of.
Akiva Miller

R'n RF asks:
> I hesitate to mention the obvious, but it does strike me as a bit ironic
> that the poster is a woman asking a group of men whether or not it is
> problematic that she is speaking to them. If she really felt that it
> was problematic, why is she speaking to them in the first place?
and
RHM writes:
> Freindly e-mail discussions between the sexes on a religious forum
> like Areivim should not be subject to any greater restrictions than that.
Please re-read my original question. I never posited that men and women
can not engage in a public forum such as this one in an intellectual /
productive conversation. (And I *never* meant to question the motives of
the people - both women AND men - on this list or any like it... For the
record, I think this type of forum is a wonderful example of internet
l'shem shamayim.)
My question involved *private* interactions, and were more concerned with
*banter* than with work or otherwise tachlis oriented conversation -
i.e.: an online shul kiddush environment, but where there are only two
people present.
In fact, this aspect of my question, as some people pointed out, applies
in the actual world as well: To what extent can the genders be familiar
/ socialize appropriately / halakhically? Is there such a thing as a
one-on-one friendship (one that is more than a polite acquaintance-ship,
or professional, or strictly "tachlis") between the genders that is
halakically / hashkafically acceptable in any realm? That's the first
question that is inherent in the next question, that of e-tzniut.
The follow-up question is then whether online social interaction and
actual social interaction share halakhic qualities or not, or if every
problematic aspect of the latter, assuming these exist, is eclipsed when
there is no physical qirva. i.e.: What is the nature of gedarim? (...The
answer to this question, I imagine, extends beyond e-mail.) IIRC, only
RAM dealt with this angle head-on.
I believe that there are probably several permutations within a Torah
framework in answering the two parts of the whole question, and what
may be most interesting is the comparison or contrast between how one
answers each part.
R'n IS asks:
> Is this really such a new issue?
> Are there any halachic sources regarding the propriety of regular mail
> correspondence between men and women? Or phone conversations? Is email
> different in kind, or only in degree? If it is different in kind, what
> precisely is the difference?
I agree, it's probably not a new issue. Only difference is really
availability, rapidity of response in real time, and ability to be more
secretive if G-d forbid one goes in the wrong direction - ie: increased
yetzer hara opportunity, as RCS pointed out.
The best analogy is clearly letters, rather than phone. Has anyone seen
anything written on private letters between the genders? If this type of
shu"t (or literature) exists, I'd love to see it.
Shabbat Shalom
- SKE

I fail to see the rationale for discounting the leniencies based on
health considerations that Chazal have instituted in the face of important
mitzvot such as shemirat shabbat and brit milah on the 8th day. It would
be audacious for me to interject myself in the discussion about surgery
for a detached retina on shabbat in the face of the anecdotal views of
major poskim. The medical views of Dr. Josh Backon on the subject should
be sufficient, however, to induce anyone with such an emergency situation
(loss of vision in an eye) to seek medical treatment immediately. Besides
the possibility of a detached retina, the loss of vision in an eye could
be the precursor to a full-blown stroke.
I am puzzled, as well, to hear that some people will not delay the
brit of a jaundiced baby based on some medical opinion that the brit
will not endanger the baby. I am not a medical doctor, but I beg to
differ, nonetheless. It seems to me that jaundice is a sign of a not
fully functioning liver that has allowed bilirubin to accumulate in the
tissues. If there are complications from the brit such as infection,
then the taxed liver may fail. If my assumptions are correct then there
can be no question of relying on the word of some pediatrician who
is considering only the normal outcome of a brit rather than unusual
outcomes. Halacha, however, considers even unlikely events when it comes
to shemirat hanefesh. The story about R' Chaim Soloveitchik and his
feverish young grandson (the Rav) is well-known, but bears repeating.
R' Chaim told his son, R' Velvel, to bring the shabbat candles closer to
the bed so that the doctor would have more light. He was then asked by a
guest as to why he was being lenient on milechet shabbat (gram kibui).
He answered, " I am not being meikil on milechet shabbat, I am being
machmir on safek pikuach nefesh". That is a pesak that we should heed.
Yitzchok Zlochower

I fail to see the rationale for discounting the leniencies based on
health considerations that Chazal have instituted in the face of important
mitzvot such as shemirat shabbat and brit milah on the 8th day. It would
be audacious for me to interject myself in the discussion about surgery
for a detached retina on shabbat in the face of the anecdotal views of
major poskim. The medical views of Dr. Josh Backon on the subject should
be sufficient, however, to induce anyone with such an emergency situation
(loss of vision in an eye) to seek medical treatment immediately. Besides
the possibility of a detached retina, the loss of vision in an eye could
be the precursor to a full-blown stroke.
I am puzzled, as well, to hear that some people will not delay the
brit of a jaundiced baby based on some medical opinion that the brit
will not endanger the baby. I am not a medical doctor, but I beg to
differ, nonetheless. It seems to me that jaundice is a sign of a not
fully functioning liver that has allowed bilirubin to accumulate in the
tissues. If there are complications from the brit such as infection,
then the taxed liver may fail. If my assumptions are correct then there
can be no question of relying on the word of some pediatrician who
is considering only the normal outcome of a brit rather than unusual
outcomes. Halacha, however, considers even unlikely events when it comes
to shemirat hanefesh. The story about R' Chaim Soloveitchik and his
feverish young grandson (the Rav) is well-known, but bears repeating.
R' Chaim told his son, R' Velvel, to bring the shabbat candles closer to
the bed so that the doctor would have more light. He was then asked by a
guest as to why he was being lenient on milechet shabbat (gram kibui).
He answered, " I am not being meikil on milechet shabbat, I am being
machmir on safek pikuach nefesh". That is a pesak that we should heed.
Yitzchok Zlochower

On Wed, Feb 25, 2004 at 09:04:41PM +0200, Mishpachat Freedenberg wrote:
:> As far as I know, a yoledes is still considered a cholah she'yesh ba
:> sakana even if B"H the incidence of women dying in
:> childbirth is much less common.
: Without a doubt this is correct. I was only mentioning this fact to
: show that a rav may not be trying to show that there has been nishtanat
: hateva if he rules that things are not the same now as they used to be;
: rather medical knowledge and skill has improved over time and he may be
: trying to take this into account in his ruling...
Are you sure that isn't nishtanah hateva (NhT)?
During the course of this discussion I suggested three definitions of
NhT. It's unclear to me that the term means any one or two of them to
the exculsion of the other(s):
1- The laws of teva changed. This is the commonplace understanding, and
is necessary to explain something like the late emergence of rainbows
(as per the Ibn Ezra).
2- The metzi'us changed: such as the quality of medical care, or of
nutrition, or of breeding. (Either of which could account for changes
in egg size, one famous example of NhT.
In the previous two cases, asking to change the law is based on the
notion that the old pesaq was for a different situation than the
situation we're now facing.
3- Our understanding of the science has changed.
In this case, changing pesaq has to do with acknowledging error.
In all three cases one would have to deal with issues of undocumented
reasons, of takanos potentially being binding beyond their motivating
sevarah, etc...
I do not recommend having a conversaition about NhT without first
reading RGS's work on the subject. See "Halachic Responses To Scientific
Developments" at <http://www.aishdas.org/toratemet/science.html>.
:-)BBii
-mi
--
Micha Berger Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (413) 403-9905 - Albert Schweitzer

[RHM:]
> IIRC, R. Aaron Soloveichik held that anyone who Paskin's that killing
> Kinah on Shabbos is Chaiv should be put into Cherem.
The topic of Bugicide on Shabbos in the light of new scientific
knowledge was debated in the columns of R' Yitzchok Lamporonti's rabbinic
encyclopaedia, "Pachad Yitzchok" in the 18th century. Incidentally, this
monumental work, regarded by many today as outdated, has many Teshuvos
and essays which are still of strikingly contemporary interest.
Sorry I can't give the exact reference (more than 40 years since I saw
it) but nowadays it's probaly on the Bar Ilan or other disks.
Elozor Reich

Rn Simi Peters writes: <<But what is intriguing here is that there appears
to be some mahuti difference between textual analysis and pesika. Clearly
some of the same cognitive processes are in operation since there cannot
be pesika without mastery of the material, but something else is going
on as well. What is it?>>
Could it be that a great deal of Torah sheBa'al Peh is still ba'al peh?
Drachim in psak are transmitted from Rav to talmid.
Another of the "something else"s to which you refer might be the posek's
ability to perceive, with clarity and emes, the metzius of the case and
the situation of the questioner.
The texts are perhaps the tip of the proverbial iceberg, in the sense
that they are the portion most clearly visible to us non-Poskim.
(I periodically have to explain this to people who think that, because
they have acquired a few "textual skills," they are in a position to
develop chiddushim halacha l'ma'aseh.)
As usual, the discussions on avodah just happen to coincide with what
I am learning at the moment. This evening, I was reviewing the mishnah
in Niddah 58b, where Rabbi Akiva declares a woman tehorah based on what
seems a fairly remote possibility. The mishnah continues - Rabbi Akiva
"saw his students looking at each other...." and then he explains his
reasoning. I wonder if a study of these types of stories in the gemara
would shed some light on the nature of psak???
- Ilana

<The issues of authority ultimately come down to Reb Moshe's answer -
a posek is someone who people accept as a posek. >
The problem with this answer is that who people accept changes with
the generations.
R. Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor was "the" posek of his generation. I
get the impression that his piskei halacha carry less weight today.
The Mishna Berurah was accepted over the Arukh haShulchan among other
reasons because he is more machmir which is in vogue. I would not venture
a guess what may happen in years from now as fashions change.
<You also need to differentiate between a posek who knows the standard
answers that most authorities accept and the gadol who comes up with a
new answer for a new situation.>
I tend to agree but again this gives more weight to an innovative posek
like R. Moshe rather than more conservative poskim like R. Wosner or
Dayan Weisz.
My impression of CI is that if he was 100% sure of a kulah then he would
stand behind it no matter how innovative. However, if he was 99% dure
then he would bring down the kulah but later pasken against his kulah.
Also does new answers depend on chumrah versus kulah? i.e. the CI using
Boneh to prohibit electricity
--
Eli Turkel, turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 2/27/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

Eli Turkel wrote:
><The issues of authority ultimately come down to Reb Moshe's answer -
>a posek is someone who people accept as a posek. >
>The problem with this answer is that who people accept changes with
>the generations.
Why is that a problem?
Daniel Eidensohn

On Wed, Feb 25, 2004 at 10:50:18PM +0200, Simi Peters wrote:
: What I'm really looking for (long shot, I know) is a meditation on
: the process of pesak, either a posek's description of his own thought
: processes or someone else's attempt to reconstruct what goes through
: the mind of a posek...
RYGB once gave Avodah a list of factors he takes into account when
someone asks him a she'eilah. I couldn't find it on the search engine,
though. His name shows up throughout the archive, and we've had numerous
discussions about what is pesaq/pesak/psak: how binding is it, how it
works theologically, the historical processes of halachah, and even
threads along the lines of what you're asking.
Li nir'eh pesaq works though da'as Torah (in the classical sense of the
term). As RDE writes, it's not entirely a conscious process that someone
can layout the algorythm by which to pasqen. Much of it is preconscious,
the product of having intuition that is shaped by man-years of limud
Torah.
(I think that's why there's more consensus about how to react to
electricity on Shabbos than on the reason why.)
I also suggested in these "pages" in the past that this is related
to "nashim da'atan qalos" and why women aren't authorized to pasqen.
By and large (ie speaking of the middle of the bell curve) the binah
(deductive/creative) to da'as (shaped by exposurre and learning) ratio
is non-ideal.
:-)BBii
-mi
--
Micha Berger Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (413) 403-9905 - Albert Schweitzer

In Avodah V12 #105, addressing lots of topics in an interesting manner,
the Hakhel Bulletin wrote:
> Not a Two-Legged Animal. Why does man traverse on two legs, while
animals walk on "all fours"? The Orchos Tzadikim (Shaar Yiras Shomayim)
explains that all animals have only a nefesh behemis, and accordingly,
they always look down, for their whole life is dedicated to this world's
pursuits. Man, on the other hand, is blessed with a neshama which strives
for its source in the heavens. However, man faces sideways, and does
not naturally look up, because he always has the bechira chofshis as to
whether he will look down as an animal?or look up as an angel! <
The animal analogy doesn't seem to hold one way for all four-legged land
animals, such as giraffes (which, depending on their age, either look
up or sideways), or the other way for so many animals which, presumably,
don't possess a n'shamah but nevertheless don't have four legs, whether
(like a flightless bird) or not (like many fish) they're "looking down"
to the ground. (Not for nothing do we learn that the distinction between
man and animal is the power of speech, not the degree of head movement,
"va'anachnu n'voraich " hKbH for it. As this bulletin mentions later,
for a different purpose: "Tehillim concludes with the final posuk
[150:6] of 'Kol HaNeshoma Tehallel Ka'.") If I'm missing something,
I would appreciate an explanation of the above Hakhel item. Thanks.
> The next time somebody asks you, "Got a minute?" or "Can I take a
minute of your time?" perhaps your answer should be "I'm not so sure,"
for there are truly so many great things that one can accomplish in the
"few minutes" that others may simply throw away. <
OTOH, perhaps you were -not- using your time well enough when that someone
asked you for a minute, such that you improve your time utilization by
answering in the affirmative. It all depends on the situation.
> But what is the halacha concerning people asking for tzedaka who
come to you (i) during Pesukei Dezimrah, and (2) during Birchas K'rias
Shema and during K'riyas Shema itself? Are you permitted to disturb your
davening to take out your wallet, or change out of our pocket, or wait
as they make change for you? According to Rabbi Moshe Shternbuch, Shlita
(Teshuvos V'Hanhagos 3:287), while this may bepermitted during Pesukei
Dezimrah, it is forbidden during Birchas K'rias Shema and Shema itself,
because one is osek in the mitzvah of davening, and one is not permitted
to interrupt, even for the sake of performing another important mitzvah. <
I recall my late uncle a'h' taking out a bunch of change before "Bar'chu"
and leaving it where aniyim could take their measure during the subsequent
part of Shacharis without disturbing him.
> Two Brachos. If one hears the conclusion to two (2) brachos
simultaneously, he should answer "Amen V'Amen", having the appropriate
kavana for each one. (Mishne Berurah, Orach Chayim 124; seif katan 25). <
This stanza brings a latent question back into my mind: what's the point
of the triple "omain" after the Hadran's "Boruch..lamdaini chuqecha"?
Thanks.
> A Gadol recently remarked, "I don't understand some people. They come
to see me dressed in their finest Shabbos garments, and they say Kriyas
Shema Al Hamitah in their pajamas. Why don't they come to see me in
their pajamas?and say Kriyas Shema Al Hamitah in their Shabbos clothes?" <
I think I understand the nimshal; nevertheless, if there should be no
hefsaiq between KSaH and going to sleep (something which doesn't apply
to an audience with him or anyone else of import), I would like to know
how that Gadol says KSaH. Personally, I find the moments involved in
saying KSaH to be a wonderful, calming time, and I go to bed immediately
thereafter -- I wouldn't want to spend time afterwards undressing myself
from Shabbos or even weelday clothes, even if I could maintain a proper
frame of mind, much less avoid speaking.
Last and least:
> Additionally, the Mishne Berurah (Orach Chayim 141: seif katan 15)
writes that Kriyas HaTorah in shul is a special dugma of Kabolas HaTora,
as the gabbai is calling to study the Torah as Hakodush Borch Hu did,
the olah l'Torah is every member of K'lal Yisroel (who received the
Torah), and the ba'al koreh is the dugma of Moshe Rabbeinu who relayed
the Torah to each and every one of us. <
S'if qatan 16 in my edition.
All the best from
- Michael Poppers via RIM pager