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THE PRINCIPAL FILIPINAS LIFE INSURANCE Vs. PEDROSO
Teresita Pedroso, a policyholder of a life insurance issued by Filipinas Life Assurance Co. Pedroso claims Renato Valle was her insurance agent since 1972 and Valle collected her monthly premiums. In the first week of January 1977, Valle told her that the Filipinas Life Escolta Office was holding a promotional investment program for policyholders. Enticed, she initially invested and issued a post-dated check for P10,000. In return, Valle issued Pedroso his personal check forP800 for the 8% prepaid interest and a Filipinas Life Agent receipt. Pedroso called the Escolta office and talked to Francisco Alcantara, the administrative assistant, who referred her to the branch manager, Angel Apetrior. Pedroso inquired about the promotional investment and Apetrior confirmed that there was such a promotion. She was even told she could push through with the check she issued. From the records, the check, with the endorsement of Alcantara at the back, was deposited in the account of Filipinas Life with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, Escolta Branch. Relying on the representations made by Filipinas
Life’s
duly authorized representatives Apetrior and Alcantara, as well as having known agent Valle for quite some time, Pedroso waited for the maturity of her initial investment. A month after, her investment of P10,000 was returned to her after she made a written request for its refund. To collect the amount, Pedroso personally went to the Escoltabranch where Alcantara gave her the P10,000 in cash. After a second investment, she made 7 to 8more investments in varying amounts, totaling P37,000 but at a lower rate of 5% prepaid interest a month. Upon maturity of
Pedroso’s
subsequent investments, Valle would take back from Pedroso the corresponding
agent’s
receipt he issued to the latter. Pedroso told respondent Jennifer Palacio, also a Filipinas Life insurance policyholder, about theinvestment plan. Palacio made a total investment of P49,550 but at only 5% prepaid interest. However, when Pedroso tried to withdraw her investment, Valle did not want to return some P17,000worth of it. Palacio also tried to withdraw hers, but Filipinas Life, despite demands, refused to return her money. WON Filipinas Life is jointly and severally liable with Apetrior and Alcantara on the claim of Pedroso and Palacio or WON its agent Renato Valle is solely liable to Pedroso and Palacio Filipinas Life, as the principal, is liable for obligations contracted by its agent Valle. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The general rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of its agent done within the scope of its authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. When the agent exceeds his authority, the agent becomespersonally liable for the damage. But even when the agent exceeds his authority, the principal is still solidarily liable together with the agent if the principal allowed the agent to act as though the agent had full powers. The acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the principal ratifies them, expressly or impliedly. Ratification, adoption or confirmation by one person of an act performed on his behalf by another without
authority. Even if Valle’s representations were beyond his au
thority as a debit/insurance agent, Filipinas Life thru
Alcantara and Apetrior expressly and knowingly ratified Valle’s acts. Filipinas Life benefited from the investments
deposited by Valle in the account of Filipinas Life.
Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs Linsangan
Facts: Florencia Baluyot is authorized by the Manila Memorial Park Inc. (MMPI) to sell burial lots to those interested in purchasing. Herein respondent Atty. Linsangan was approached by Florencia with an offer to sell to the former a lot that she alleges to have already been previously sold but the owner thereof has cancelled and thus, Atty. Linsangan shall only continue the payment thereof amounting to P95,000, Atty. Linsangan agreed and payed an initial P35, 000. Thereafter, Florencia advised Atty. Linsangan that there were changes in the contract and that she needed him to sign a new contract stipulating the total price of P132, 000 but Florencia assured Atty. Linsangan that he would only pay the agreed P95, 000. In the new contract, Atty. Linsangan acceded that he has read and understood all the stipulations therein. The payment was made in installments for two years which Atty. Linsangan completed, however, after two years, Florencia informed Linsangan that their contract was cancelled and offered a different lot, Atty. Linsangan refused the offer and filed a suit for breach of contract against MMPI
and Florencia. MMPI avers that Florencia acted beyond the scope of her authority as MMPI’s agent since the latter
did not allow her to renegotiate existing contracts but only to sell new contracts. Atty. Lnsangan on the other hand argues that MMPI should be liable for the acts of its agents. Issue: Whether or not MMPI is liable for the acts of Florencia Held: No. The SC ruled that Florencia acted outside the scope of her authority as agent of MMPI and Atty. Linsangan failed to ascertain the authority given to Florencia especially that their agreement on the second contract had a different stipulation than what he and Florencia agreed upon. M
oreover, Atty. Linsangan’s
signature over the new contract signifies his agreement thereto and serves as a form of ratification for the acts of Florencia which were outside the authority given her. As such, the SC ruled that the principal cannot be held liable for actions of agents outside the scope of their authority when such acts are ratified by the principal himself. On
the part of MMPI, they did not ratify Florencia’s acts, nor did they know of such actions.
Woodchild v. Roxas Electric and Construction Inc.
Facts: Roxas Electric (RECCI) authorized its President to sell a property near Sumulong Highway. In turn, said President was able to contract with Woodchild, they agreed that RECCI would give Woodchild a right of way to Sumulong Highway. The latter constructed a warehouse thereon and leased it to another company. However, vehicles of RECCI were blocking the path from said warehouse to Sumulong Highway. Due this, Woodchild reiterated their contract with the President. The latter then promised to look after the matter. However, the president died soon thereafter. Woodchild then informed RECCI about the easement. RECCI in turn argued that they have no obligation to give such easement. They said that the president exceeded its authority since the power of attorney only authorizes said president to sell said land and not to encumber other properties of the RECCI. Woodchild counter-argued that by executing a contract of sale and by accepting their payment, RECCI gave the President apparent authority. Issue: WON the contention of Woodchild is tenable Held:No. the contention of woodchild is untenable. Well-settled is the rule that without estoppel or ratification, apparent authority cannot remedy the lack of the written power required under the statement of frauds. Moreover, for the principle of apparent authority to apply, the Woodchild should prove the following: (a) the acts of the principal justifying belief in the agency by third persons; (b) knowledge thereof by the principal which is sought to be held; and, (c) reliance thereon by the third person consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In this case, there is no evidence on record of specific acts made by RECCI showing or indicating that it had full knowledge of any representations made by the president to Woodchild.
Rural Bank of Milaor vs Ocfemia
Facts: Respondents initiated the present proceedings, so that they could transfer to their names the subject five parcels of land; and subsequently, to mortgage said lots and to use the loan proceeds for the medical expenses of their ailing mother. For the property to be transferred in their names, however, the register of deeds required the submission of a board resolution from the bank confirming both the Deed of Sale and the authority of the bank manager, Fe S. Tena, to enter into such transaction. Petitioner refused. After being given the runaround by the bank, respondents sued in exasperation.
Issue: May the board of directors of a rural banking corporation be compelled to confirm a deed of absolute sale of real property owned by the corporation which deed of sale was executed by the bank manager without prior authority of the board of directors of the rural banking corporation? Held: In failing to file its answer, within the reglementary period, specifically denying under oath the Deed of Sale, the bank admitted the due execution of the said contract. Such admission means that it acknowledged that Tena was authorized to sign the Deed of Sale on its behalf. Thus, defenses that are inconsistent with the due execution and the genuineness of the written instrument are cut off by an admission implied from a failure to make a verified specific denial. A bank is liable to innocent third persons where representation is made in the course of its normal business by an agent like Manager Tena, even though such agent is abusing her authority. Clearly, persons dealing with her could not be blamed for believing that she was authorized to transact business for and on behalf of the bank. Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general practice, custom, and policy, the general manager may bind the company without formal authorization of the board of directors. In varying language, existence of such authority is established, by proof of the course of business, the usages and practices of the company and by the knowledge which the board of directors has, or must be presumed to have, of acts and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs of the corporation. The authority to act for and bind a corporation may be presumed from acts of recognition in other instances where the power was in fact exercised.Thus, when, in the usual course of business of a corporation, an officer has been allowed in his official capacity to manage its affairs, his authority to represent the corporation may be implied from the manner in which he has been permitted by the directors to manage its business. The bank failed to categorically declare that Tena had no authority. As already observed, it is familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority; and where it is said if the corporation permits this means the same as if the thing is permitted by the directing power of the corporation. In this light, the bank is estopped from questioning the authority of the bank manager to enter into the contract of sale. If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds the agent out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts; thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agent's authority.
Cuison vs. CA/Valiant Investment Associates
Cuison is an owner of a junk shop. His employee placed an order for various paper products with Valiant, to be delivered to LT Trading. Tan, owner of LT, paid the merchandise to the employee with checks; in turn, the employee also paid Valiant with checks which were later dishonored. After several demands made by Valiant were refused, saying the employee did not have the proper authority to enter into said transactions, the latter filed for collection with Cuison. RTC dismissed the petition but CA reversed it. Was there a contract of agency? Can the principal be held liable? Under the law, one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be. In the case at bar, the employee is well-
known to the Valiant’s manager, to Tan, and to the community as the manager of Cuison and has been regarded as a “kinakapatid” of the la
tter. Cuison is liable for the transactions entered into his behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers. Although it may appear that the employee defrauded his principal in not turning over the proceeds of the transaction to the latter, such fact cannot in any way relieve or exonerate the Cuison of his liability to Valiant. For it is an equitable maxim that as between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.
De Castro Vs. Court Of Appeals And Francisco Artigo
Facts: De castro were co-owners of four (4) lots. In a letter, Artigo was authorized by appellants to act as real estate broker in the sale of these properties and five percent(5%) of which will be given to the agent as commission. It was appellee who first found Times Transit Corporation, who bought 2 lots. Artigo felt short of his commission. Hence, he sued below to collect the balance. De castros then moved for the dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners as indispensable parties. The De Castros claim that Artigo always knew that the two lots were co-owned with their other siblings and failure to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the four co-owners, would be paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners. Issue: WON the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners as indispensable parties Ruling: Devoid of merit. Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the agency. The rule in this article applies even when the appointments were made by the principals in separate acts, provided that they are for the same transaction. The solidarity arises from the common interest of the principals, and not from the act of constituting the agency. By virtue of this solidarity, the agent can recover from any principal the whole compensation and indemnity owing to him by the others. The parties, however, may, by express agreement, negate this solidary responsibility. The solidarity does not disappear by the mere partition effected by the principals after the accomplishment of the agency. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation.The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case.
PNB vs AGUDELO
FACTS:
SPA’s were issued in favor of Garrucho by his sister and his aunt. SPA is sufficien
tly broad in scope to enable him to sell, alienate and mortgage all real estate properties of his sister and aunt. Garrucho mortgaged the
Principal’s parcels of land, under his own signature, in favor of PNB to secure payment of his loans.
Issue: WON the principals are liable for loans obtained by the agent from PNB. Held ART. 1717. When an agent acts in his own name, the principal shall have no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted, or such persons against the principal. In such case, the agent is directly liable to the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own. Cases involving things belonging to the principal are excepted. The special power of attorney, does not authorize Mauro A. Garrucho to constitute a mortgage on the real estate of his principal to secure his personal obligations. Therefore, in doing so he exceeded the scope if his authority and his principal is not liable for his acts.
He executed the promissory notes evidencing the aforesaid loans, under his own signature, without authority from his principal and, therefore, were not binding upon the latter. Neither is there anything to show that he executed the promissory notes in question for the account, and at the request, of his respective principals. When an agent negotiates a loan in his personal capacity and executes a promissory note under his own signature, without express authority from his principal, giving as security therefor real estate belonging to the letter, also in his own name and not in the name and representation of the said principal, the obligation do constructed by him is personal and does not bind his aforesaid principal.
Gold Star Mining vs Lim Jimena
Lincallo bound himself in writing to turn to Jimena 1/2 of the proceeds from all mining claims that he would purchase with the money to be advanced by Jimena. Lincallo, in his own name, assigned mining rights over part of the claims to Gold Starr. Gold star failed to give the interest due to Jimena. Jimena filed a complaint against Gold Star. Issue: WON Jimena has locus standi to file such complaint. Held: YES Art. 1883. principal can sue the person with whom his agent dealt with in agent's own name, when the transaction involves things belonging to the principal.
THIRD PARTY DEALING Harry E. Keeler Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez Facts
:

Plaintiff is Harry E. Keeler Electric Co., a domestic corporation based in Manila engaged in the electrical business, and among other things in the sale of what is known as the Matthews electric plant.

Defendant is Domingo Rodriguez a resident of Talisay, Occidental Negros

Montelibano, a resident of Iloilo, went to Keeler Electric and made arrangement with the latter wherein:
o
He claimed that he could find purchaser for the Matthews plant
o
Keeler Electric told Montelibano that for any plant that he could sell or any customer that he could find
he would be paid a commission of 10%
for his services, if the sale was consummated.

Through Montelibano’s efforts, Keeler was able to sell to Rod
riguez one of the Matthews plants

Rodriguez paid Montelibano (the purchase price of P2,513.55), after the installation of the plant and without the knowledge of Keeler Electric,

Keeler Electric filed an action against Rodriguez for the payment of the purchase price.

Rodriguez: Claimed that he already paid the price of the plant. In addition, he alleged that:
o
Montelibano sold and delivered the plant to him, and was the one who ordered the installation of that electrical plant
o
There were evidences: a statement and receipt which Montelibano signed to whom he paid the money.
o
He paid Montelibano because the latter was the one who sold, delivered, and installed the electrical plant, and he presented to him the account, and assured him that he was duly authorized to collect the value of the electrical plant

Witness (Juan Cenar):
o
Cenar was sent by Keeler Electric to install the plant in Rodriguez’s premises in Iloilo
o
He brought with him a statement of account for Rodriguez but the latter said that he would pay in Manila.

***Lower Court: In favor of Rodriguez. It held that:
o
Keeler Electric had held out Montelibano to Rodriguez as an agent authorized to collect
o
Payment to Montelibano would discharge the debt of Rodriguez
o
The bill was given to Montelibano for collection purposes

Keeler Electric appealed. It alleged that:
o
Montelibano had no authority to receive the money.
o
His services were confined to the finding of purchasers for the Matthews plant
o
Montelibano was not an electrician, could not install the plant and did not know anything about its mechanism.
Issues:
WON Keeler Electric authorized Montelibano to receive or receipt for money in its behalf WON Rodriguez had a right to assume by any act or deed of Keeler Electric that Montelibano was authorized to receive the money
Held/Ratio:
1.
NO, Montelibano was not authorized.
The plant was sold by Keeler Electric to Rodriguez and was consigned to Iloilo where it was installed by Cenar, acting for, and representing, Keeler Electric, whose expense for the trip is included in, and made a part of, the bill which was receipted by Montelibano.
a.
Montelibano was not an agent of Keeler Electric
o
Outside of the fact that Montelibano received the money and signed this receipt, there is no evidence that he had any authority, real or apparent, to receive or receipt for the money.
o
Neither is there any evidence that Keeler Electric ever delivered the statement to Montelibano. b.
It was Juan Cenar, and not Montelibano who sold the plant to Rodiguez
o
The evidence is in direct conflict with Rodriguez’s own pleadings and the receipt statement
which he offered in evidence. This claim must be for the expenses of Cenar in going to Iloilo from Manila and return, to install the plant, and is strong evidence that it was Cenar and not Montelibano who installed the plant. 2.
NO. a.
Relevant laws:
−
Article 1162 CC: Payment must be made to the persons in whose favor the obligation is constituted, or to another authorized to receive it in his name.
−
Article 1727 CC: The principal shall be liable as to matters with respect to which the agent has exceeded his authority only when he ratifies the same expressly or by implication.
−
Ormachea Tin-Conco vs. Trillana
: The repayment of a debt must be made to the person in whose favor the obligation is constituted, or to another expressly authorized to receive the payment in his name. b.
On whether an assumed authority exist
–
o
Persons dealing with an assumed agent, whether the assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but the nature and extent of the authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it. Judgment of the lower court is REVERSED. Rodriguez should pay Keeler Electric the purchase price of the plant.
Tuazon vs. Ramos
Heirs of Bartolome Ramos alleged that spouses Leonilo and Maria Tuazon purchased cavans of rice from ramos. In payment therefor, the spouses Tuazon issued several Traders Royal Bank checks. But when these checks were encashed, all of the checks bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Santos denied having purchased the rice and alleged that it was Magdalena Ramos, wife of said deceased, who owned and traded the merchandise and Maria Tuazon was merely her agent. They argued that it was Evangeline Santos who was the buyer of the rice and issued the checks to Maria Tuazon as payments therefor. In good faith the checks were received from Evangeline Santos and turned over to Ramos without knowing that these were not funded. ISSUE: WON there is a contract of agency.
HELD: No. In a contract of agency, one binds oneself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the latter's consent or authority. The following are the elements of agency: (1) the parties'
consent
, express or implied, to establish the relationship; (2)
the object
, which is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the
representation
, by which the one who acts as an agent does so, not for oneself, but as a representative; (4) the
limitation that the agent acts within the scope of his or her authority
. As the basis of agency is representation, there must be, on the part of the principal, an
actual intention
to appoint, an intention naturally inferable from the principal's words or actions. In the same manner, there must be an
intention on the part of the agent to accept the appointment and act upon it
. Absent such mutual intent, there is generally no agency. Petitioners were the rice buyers themselves; they were not mere agents of respondents in their rice dealership. Petitioners, on their own behalf, sued Evangeline Santos for collection of the amounts represented by the bounced checks, in a separate civil case that they sought to be consolidated with the current one. Their filing a suit against her in their own names negates their claim that they acted as mere agents in selling the rice obtained from Bartolome Ramos.
Yu Eng Cho Vs. Pan Am
Facts: Yung eng cho and his family booked a flight with Claudia Tagunicar, who is a supposed agent of a travel agency. They were to fly to Japan and soon after, to America for a business trip. Having confirmed their flights, they traveled to Tokyo, Japan and, after staying there for about a week and before going to the airport to board their flight to the US, they called up Pan-Am, which was the airline booked, and learned that their names were not listed in the flight manifest. The Yu eng cho family then returned to the Philippines since they could not secure a flight with pan am to America. The family then sued their travel agent Claudia and impleaded both the travel agency and pan am. Issue: Yu eng cho contended that the travel agency was an agent of pan am and that Claudia was, in fact, the sub agent of the travel agency. Hence, the three parties should thus be held liable for the acts of their agents. Held: No, there was no contact of agency between pan am and the travel agency and as between Claudia and the travel agency. It was found that Claudia merely bought tickets from said agency and sold them to the plaintiffs at a higher price. The was no intent to create an agency. She simply deducted her commissions upon paying for the ticket. In this regard, there was merely a contract of sale. Claudia is solely liable for misrepresenting herself as an agent where she had no actual authority. Moreover, the plaintiff's motives were suspect because it was found that they impleaded pan am airlines knowing that Claudia cannot pay for the civil action they instituted. Their target for the suit was the air line all along.
BA Finance Corp v CA and Traders Royal Bank
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA which reversed the ruling of RTC dismissing the case against the petitioner. Facts: Gaytano spouses obtained a loan with respondent Traders Royal Bank, and Philip Wong as a credit administrator of BA Finance Corporation for and in behalf of the latter undertook to guarantee the loan of the Gaytano spouses evidencing by a letter. Gaytano spouses after partial payment of the loan refused to pay their obligation. Respondent bank filed a complaint against the spouses including the petitioner corporation as an alternative defendant. Petitioner raised the defense of lack of authority of its credit administrator to bind the corporation. Wong was only authorized to approve loans even up to P350,00.00 but not the power to issue guarantees. RTC held dismissing the case against the defendant. CA modify the judgment including the petitioner to pay bank. Issue: WON BA Finance Corp can be held liable as a guarantor due to the acts of its employee? Held: NO. It is a settled rule that persons dealing with an assumed agent, whether the assumed agency be a general or special one are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it. Hence, the burden is on respondent bank to satisfactorily prove that the credit administrator with whom they transacted acted within the authority given to him by his principal, petitioner corporation. The representation of one who acts as agent cannot by itself serve as proof of his authority to act as agent or of the extent of his authority as agent agent (Velasco v. La Urbana, 58 Phil. 681) The rule is clear that an agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for damages (National Power Corporation v. National Merchandising Corporation, Nos. L-33819 and L-33897, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 789).
NPC v. NAMERCO
FACTS On October 17, 1956, NPC and Namerco of 3111 Nagtahan Street, Manila, as the representative of the International Commodities Corporation of 11 Mercer Street, New York City executed in Manila a contract for the purchase by the NPC from the New York firm of four thousand long tons of crude sulfur for its Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant in Iligan City at a total price of P450,716 On that same date, a performance bond in the sum of P90,143.20 was executed by the Domestic Insurance
Company in favor of the NPC to guarantee the seller’s obligations.
It was stipulated in the contract of sale that the seller would deliver the sulfur at Iligan City within sixty days from notice of the establishment in its favor of a letter of credit for $212,120 and that failure to effect delivery would subject the seller and its surety to the payment of liquidated damages at the rate of 2/5 of 1% of the full contract price for the first thirty days of default and 4/5 of 1% for every day thereafter until complete delivery is made. Letter 11/12/1956 - the NPC advised John Z. Sycip, the president of Namerco, of the opening on November 8 of a letter of credit for $212,120 in favor of International Commodities Corporation which would expire on January 31, 1957. Notice of that letter of credit was received by cable by the New York firm on November 15, 1956. Thus, the deadline for the delivery of the sulfur was January 15, 1957. The New York supplier was not able to deliver the sulfur due to its inability to secure shipping space. During the period from January 20 to 26, 1957 there was a shut
down of the NPC’s fertilizer plant because there was no sulfur.
No fertilizer was produced. Letter O2/27/1957 - the general manager of the NPC advised Namerco and the Domestic Insurance Company that
under Article 9 of the contract of sale “nonavailability of bottom or vessel” was not a fortuitous event that would
excuse nonperformance and that the NPC would resort to legal remedies to enforce its rights. The Government Corporate Counsel in his letter to Sycip dated May 8, 1957 rescinded the contract of sale due to
the New York supplier’s nonperformance of its obligations. The same counsel in his letter of June 8, 1957
demanded from Namerco the payment of P360,572.80 as liquidated damages. He explained that time was of the essence of the contract. A similar demand was made upon the surety. The liquidated damages were computed on the basis of the 115-day period between January 15, 1957, the deadline for the delivery of the sulfur at Iligan City, and May 9, 1957 when Namerco was notified of the rescission of the contract, or P54,085.92 for the first thirty days and P306,486.88 for the remaining eighty-five days. Total: P360,572.80. ISSUES: W/N Namerco acted within the scope of its authority as agent in signing the contract of sale
–
NO RATIO: It is true that the New York corporation in its cable to Namerco dated August 9, 1956 stated that the sale was subject to availability of a steamer. However, Namerco did not disclose that cable to the NPC and, contrary to

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