[fn*] Together with No. 10-239, McComish et al. v. Bennett,Secretary of State of Arizona, et al., also on certiorari to the
same court.
[**667][*2808]

The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act created a public
financing system to fund the primary and general election campaigns
of candidates for state office. Candidates who opt to participate,
and who accept certain campaign restrictions and obligations, are
granted an initial outlay of public funds to conduct their campaign.
They are also granted additional matching funds if a privately
financed candidate's expenditures, combined with the [*2809] expenditures of
independent groups made in support of the privately financed
candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed candidate, exceed
the publicly financed candidate's initial state allotment. Once
matching funds are triggered, a publicly financed candidate receives
roughly one dollar for every dollar raised or spent by the privately
financed candidate — including any money of his own that a privately
financed candidate spends on his campaign — and for every dollar
spent by independent groups that support the privately financed
candidate. When there are multiple publicly financed candidates in a
race, each one receives matching funds as a result of the spending
of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups.
Matching funds top out at two times the initial grant to the
publicly financed candidate.

Petitioners, past and future Arizona candidates and two
independent expenditure groups that spend money to support and
oppose Arizona candidates, challenged the constitutionality of the
matching
funds provision, arguing that it unconstitutionally penalizes their
speech and burdens their ability to fully exercise their
First Amendment rights. The District Court entered a permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the matching funds provision. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the provision imposed only a
minimal burden and that the burden was justified by Arizona's
interest in reducing quid pro quo political corruption.

Held: Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens
political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling
interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny. Pp. 8-30.

(1) Petitioners contend that their political speech is
substantially burdened in the same way that speech [**668] was burdened by
the so-called "Millionaire's Amendment" of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, which was invalidated in Davis v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. 724. That law — which
permitted the opponent of a candidate who spent over $350,000 of his
personal funds to collect triple the normal contribution amount,
while the candidate who spent the personal funds remained subject to
the original contribution cap — unconstitutionally forced a
candidate "to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in
unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminatory
fundraising limitations." Id., at 739. This "unprecedented
penalty" "impose[d] a substantial burden on the exercise of the
First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech"
that was not justified by a compelling government interest.
Id., at 739-740. Pp. 8-10.

(2) The logic of Davis largely controls here. Once a
privately financed candidate has raised or spent more than the
State's initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each
personal dollar the privately financed candidate spends results in
an award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent. The
privately financed candidate must "shoulder a special and
potentially significant burden" when choosing to exercise his
First Amendment right to spend funds on his own candidacy.
554 U. S., at 739. If the law at issue in Davis imposed a burden on
candidate speech, the Arizona law unquestionably does so as well.

The differences between the matching funds provision and the law
struck down in [*2810]Davis make the Arizona law more
constitutionally problematic, not less. First, the penalty in
Davis consisted of raising the contribution limits for one
candidate, who would still have to raise the additional funds. Here,
the direct and automatic release of public money to a publicly
financed candidate imposes a far heavier
burden. Second, in elections where there are multiple publicly
financed candidates — a frequent occurrence in Arizona — the
matching funds provision can create a multiplier effect. Each dollar
spent by the privately funded candidate results in an additional
dollar of funding to each of that candidate's publicly financed
opponents. Third, unlike the law in Davis, all of this is to
some extent out of the privately financed candidate's hands.
Spending by independent expenditure groups to promote a privately
financed candidate's election triggers matching funds, regardless
whether such support is welcome or helpful. Those funds go directly
to the publicly funded candidate to use as he sees fit.
That disparity in control — giving money directly to a publicly
financed candidate, in response to independent expenditures
that cannot be coordinated with the privately funded
candidate — is a substantial advantage for the publicly funded
candidate.

The burdens that matching funds impose on independent expenditure
groups are akin to those imposed on the privately financed
candidates themselves. The more money spent on behalf of a privately
financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate,
the more money the publicly funded candidate receives from the
State. The effect of a dollar spent on election speech is a
guaranteed financial payout to the [**669] publicly funded candidate the
group opposes, and spending one dollar can result in the flow of
dollars to multiple candidates. In some ways, the burdens imposed on
independent groups by matching funds are more severe than the
burdens imposed on privately financed candidates. Independent
groups, of course, are not eligible for public financing. As a
result, those groups can only avoid matching funds by changing their
message or choosing not to speak altogether. Presenting independent
expenditure groups with such a choice — trigger matching funds,
change your message, or do not speak — makes the matching funds
provision particularly burdensome to those groups and certainly
contravenes "the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of
his own message." Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian andBisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573. Pp. 10-14.

(3) The arguments of Arizona, the Clean Elections Institute, and
amicus United States attempting to explain away the existence
or significance of any burden imposed by matching funds are
unpersuasive.

Arizona correctly points out that its law is different from the
law invalidated in Davis, but there is no doubt that the burden
on speech is significantly greater here than in Davis. Arizona
argues that the provision actually creates more speech. But even if
that were the case, only the speech of publicly financed candidates
is increased by
the state law. And burdening the speech of some — here privately
financed candidates and independent expenditure groups — to increase
the speech of others is a concept "wholly foreign to the
First Amendment," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 48-49; cf.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U. S. 241, 244, 258. That no candidate or group is forced to
express a particular message does not mean that the matching funds
provision does not burden their [*2811] speech, especially since the direct
result of that speech is a state-provided monetary subsidy to a
political rival. And precedents upholding government subsidies
against First Amendment challenge provide no support for matching
funds; none of the subsidies at issue in those cases were granted in
response to the speech of another.

The burden on privately financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups also cannot be analogized to the burden placed on
speakers by the disclosure and disclaimer requirements upheld in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. ___. A
political candidate's disclosure of his funding resources does not
result in a cash windfall to his opponent, or affect their
respective disclosure obligations.

The burden imposed by the matching funds provision is evident and
inherent in the choice that confronts privately financed candidates
and independent expenditure groups. Indeed every court to have
considered the question after Davis has concluded that a
candidate or independent group might not spend money if the direct
result of that spending is additional funding to political
adversaries. Arizona is correct that the candidates do not complain
that providing a lump sum payment equivalent to the maximum state
financing that a candidate could obtain through [**670] matching funds would
be impermissible. But it is not the amount of funding that the State
provides that is constitutionally problematic. It is the manner in
which that funding is provided — in direct response to the political
speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups. Pp. 14-22.

(b) Arizona's matching funds provision is not "`justified by a
compelling state interest,'" Davis, supra, at 740. Pp. 22-28.

(1) There is ample support for the argument that the purpose of
the matching funds provision is to "level the playing field" in
terms of candidate resources. The clearest evidence is that the
provision operates to ensure that campaign funding is equal, up to
three times the initial public funding allotment. The text of the
Arizona Act confirms this purpose. The provision setting up the
matching funds regime is titled "Equal funding of candidates,"
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-952; and the Act and regulations refer to
the funds as "equalizing funds," e.g., § 16-952(C)(4). This
Court has repeatedly rejected
the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in
"leveling the playing field" that can justify undue burdens on
political speech, see, e.g., Citizens United,
supra, at ___, and the burdens imposed by matching funds cannot
be justified by the pursuit of such an interest. Pp. 22-25.

(2) Even if the objective of the matching funds provision is to
combat corruption — and not "level the playing field" — the burdens
that the matching funds provision imposes on protected political
speech are not justified. Burdening a candidate's expenditure of his
own funds on his own campaign does not further the State's
anticorruption interest. Indeed, "reliance on personal funds
reduces the threat of corruption." Davis,
supra, at 740-741; see Buckley, supra, at 53. The
burden on independent expenditures also cannot be supported by the
anticorruption interest. Such expenditures are "political speech
. . . not coordinated with a candidate." Citizens United,
558 U. S., at ___. That separation negates the possibility that the
expenditures will result in the sort of quid pro quo corruption
with which this Court's case law is concerned. See e.g.,id., at ___-___. [*2812] Moreover, "[t]he interest in alleviating the
corrupting influence of large contributions is served by . . .
contribution limitations." Buckley, supra, at 55. Given
Arizona's contribution limits, some of the most austere in the
Nation, its strict disclosure requirements, and the general
availability of public funding, it is hard to imagine what marginal
corruption deterrence could be generated by the matching funds
provision.

The State and the Clean Elections Institute contend that even if
the matching funds provision does not directly serve the
anticorruption interest, it indirectly does so by ensuring
that enough candidates participate in the State's public funding
system, which in turn helps combat corruption. But the fact
that burdening constitutionally protected speech might indirectly
serve the State's anticorruption interest, by encouraging candidates
to take public financing, does not establish the constitutionality
[**671] of the matching funds provision. The matching funds provision
substantially burdens speech, to an even greater extent than the law
invalidated in Davis. Those burdens cannot be justified by a
desire to "level the playing field," and much of the speech burdened
by the matching funds provision does not pose a danger of
corruption. The fact that the State may feel that the matching funds
provision is necessary to allow it to calibrate its public funding
system to achieve its desired level of participation — without an
undue drain on public resources — is not a sufficient justification
for the burden.

The flaw in the State's argument is apparent in what its reasoning
would allow. By the State's logic it could award publicly financed
candidates five dollars for every dollar spent by a privately
financed candidate, or force candidates who wish to run on private
funds to pay a $10,000 fine, in order to encourage participation in
the public funding regime. Such measures might well promote such
participation, but would clearly suppress or unacceptably alter
political speech. How the State chooses to encourage participation
in its public funding system matters, and the Court has never held
that a State may burden political speech — to the extent the
matching funds provision does — to ensure adequate participation in
a public funding system. Pp. 25-28.

(c) Evaluating the wisdom of public financing as a means of
funding political candidacy is not the Court's business. But
determining whether laws governing campaign finance violate the
First Amendment is. The government "may engage in public financing
of election campaigns," and doing so can further "significant
governmental interest[s]." Buckley,
424 U. S., at 57, n. 65, 92-93, 96. But the goal of creating a viable
public financing scheme can only be pursued in a manner consistent
with the First Amendment. Arizona's program gives money to a
candidate in direct response to the campaign speech of an opposing
candidate or an independent group. It does this when the opposing
candidate has chosen not to accept public financing, and has engaged
in political speech above a level set by the State. This goes too
far; Arizona's matching funds provision substantially burdens the
speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups without serving a compelling state interest. Pp. 28-30.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
joined.
[*2813]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under Arizona law, candidates for state office who accept public
financing can receive additional money from the State in direct
response to the campaign activities of privately financed candidates
and independent expenditure groups. Once a set spending limit is
exceeded, a publicly financed candidate receives roughly one dollar
for every dollar spent by an opposing privately financed candidate.
The publicly financed candidate [**672] also receives roughly one dollar for
every dollar spent by independent expenditure groups to support the
privately financed candidate, or to oppose the publicly financed
candidate.
We hold that Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens
protected political speech without serving a compelling state
interest and therefore violates the First Amendment.

I

A

The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, passed by initiative
in 1998, created a voluntary public financing system to fund the
primary and general election campaigns of candidates for state
office. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-940et seq.
(West 2006 and Supp. 2010). All eligible candidates for Governor,
secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, superintendent of
public instruction, the corporation commission, mine inspector, and
the state legislature (both the House and Senate) may opt to receive
public funding. § 16-950(D) (West Supp. 2010). Eligibility is
contingent on the collection of a specified number of five-dollar
contributions from Arizona voters, §§ 16-946(B) (West 2006),
16-950 (West Supp. 2010),[fn1] and the [*2814] acceptance of certain
campaign restrictions and obligations. Publicly funded candidates
must agree, among other things, to limit their expenditure of
personal funds to $500, § 16-941(A)(2) (West Supp. 2010);
participate in at least one public debate, § 16-956(A)(2); adhere to
an overall expenditure cap, § 16-941(A); and return all unspent
public moneys to the State, § 16-953.

In exchange for accepting these conditions, participating
candidates are granted public funds to conduct their campaigns.[fn2]
In many cases, this initial allotment may be the
whole of the State's financial backing of a publicly funded
candidate. But when certain conditions are met, publicly funded
candidates are granted additional "equalizing" or matching
funds. §§ 16-952(A), (B), and (C)(4)-(5) (providing for "[e]qual
funding of candidates").

Matching funds are available in both primary and general
elections. In a primary, matching funds are triggered when a
privately financed candidate's expenditures, combined with the
expenditures of independent groups made in support of the privately
financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed
candidate, exceed the primary election allotment of state funds [***2] to
the publicly financed candidate. §§ 16-952(A), (C). During the
general election, matching funds are triggered when the amount of
money a privately financed candidate receives in contributions,
combined with the expenditures of independent groups made in support
of the privately financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly
financed candidate, exceed the general election allotment of state
funds to the publicly financed candidate. § 16-952(B). A privately
financed candidate's expenditures of his personal funds are counted
as [**673] contributions for purposes of calculating matching funds during a
general election. See ibid.; Citizens Clean Elections
Commission, Ariz. Admin. Rule R2-20-113(B)(1)(f) (Sept. 2009).

Once matching funds are triggered, each additional dollar that a
privately financed candidate spends during the primary results in
one dollar in additional state funding to his publicly financed
opponent (less a 6% reduction meant to account for fundraising
expenses). § 16-952(A). During a general election, every dollar
that a candidate receives in contributions — which includes any
money of his own that a candidate spends on his
campaign — results in roughly one dollar in additional state funding
to his
publicly financed opponent. In an election where a privately funded
candidate faces multiple publicly financed candidates, one dollar
raised or spent by the privately financed candidate results in an
almost one dollar increase in public funding to each of the publicly
financed candidates.

Once the public financing cap is exceeded, additional expenditures
by independent groups can result in dollar-for-dollar matching funds
as well. Spending by independent groups on behalf of a privately
funded candidate, or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate,
results in matching funds. § 16-952(C). Independent expenditures
made in support of a publicly financed candidate can result in
matching funds for other publicly financed candidates in a race.
Ibid. The matching funds provision is not activated, however,
when independent expenditures are made in opposition to a privately
financed candidate. Matching funds top out at two times the initial
authorized grant of public funding [*2815] to the publicly financed
candidate. § 16-952(E).

Under Arizona law, a privately financed candidate may raise and
spend unlimited funds, subject to state-imposed contribution limits
and disclosure requirements. Contributions to candidates for
statewide office are limited to $840 per contributor per election
cycle and contributions to legislative candidates are limited to
$410 per contributor per election cycle. See §§ 16-905(A)(1),
16-941(B)(1); Ariz. Dept. of State, Office of the Secretary of
State, 2009-2010 Contribution Limits (rev. Aug. 14, 2009),
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/
Info/Campaign_Contribution_Limits_2010.htm
(all Internet materials as visited June 24, 2011, and available in
Clerk of Court's case file).

An example may help clarify how the Arizona matching funds
provision operates. Arizona is divided into 30 districts for
purposes of electing members to the State's House of
Representatives. Each district elects two [***3] representatives
to the House biannually. In the last general election, the number of
candidates competing for the two available seats in each district
ranged from two to seven. See State of Arizona Official Canvass,
2010 General Election Report
(compiled and issued by the Arizona secretary of state). Arizona's
Fourth District had three candidates for its two available House
seats. Two of those candidates opted to accept public funding; one
candidate chose to operate his campaign with private funds.

In that election, if the total funds contributed to the privately
funded candidate, added to that candidate's expenditure of personal
funds and the expenditures of supportive independent groups,
exceeded $21,479 — the allocation of public funds for the general
election in a contested State [**674] House race — the matching funds
provision would be triggered. See Citizens Clean Elections
Commission, Participating Candidate Guide
2010 Election Cycle 30 (Aug. 10, 2010). At that point, a number of
different political activities could result in the distribution of
matching funds. For example:

• If the privately funded candidate spent
$1,000 of his own money to conduct a direct
mailing, each of his publicly funded opponents
would receive $940 ($1,000 less the 6% offset).

• If the privately funded candidate held a
fundraiser that generated $1,000 in
contributions, each of his publicly funded
opponents would receive $940.

• If an independent expenditure group spent
$1,000 on a brochure expressing its support for
the privately financed candidate, each of the
publicly financed candidates would receive
$940 directly.

• If an independent expenditure group spent
$1,000 on a brochure opposing one of the publicly
financed candidates, but saying nothing about the
privately
financed candidate, the publicly financed
candidates would receive $940 directly.

• If an independent expenditure group spent
$1,000 on a brochure supporting one of the
publicly financed candidates, the other publicly
financed candidate would receive $940 directly,
but the privately financed candidate would
receive nothing.

• If an independent expenditure group spent
$1,000 on a brochure opposing the privately
financed candidate, no matching funds would be
issued.

A publicly financed candidate would continue to receive additional
state money in response to fundraising and spending by the privately
financed candidate and independent [*2816] expenditure groups until
that publicly financed candidate received a total of $64,437 in
state funds (three times the initial allocation for a State House
race).[fn3]

B

Petitioners in this case, plaintiffs below, are five past and
future candidates for Arizona state office — four members of the
House of Representatives and the Arizona state treasurer — and two
independent groups that spend money to support and oppose Arizona
candidates. They filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the
matching funds provision. The candidates and independent expenditure
groups argued that the matching funds provision unconstitutionally
[***4]
penalized their speech and burdened their ability to fully exercise
their First Amendment rights.

The District Court agreed that this provision "constitute[d] a
substantial burden" on the speech of privately financed candidates
because it "[**675] award[s] funds to a [privately financed] candidate's
opponent" based on the privately financed candidate's
speech. App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 10-239, p. 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). That court
further held that "no compelling interest [was] served by the"
provision that might justify the burden imposed.
Id., at 69, 71. The District Court entered a permanent
injunction against the enforcement of the matching funds provision,
but stayed implementation of that injunction to allow the State to
file an appeal. Id., at 76-81.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the District
Court's injunction pending appeal. Id., at 84-85.[fn4] After
hearing the case on the merits, the Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the matching
funds provision "imposes only a minimal burden on First Amendment
rights" because it "does not actually prevent anyone from speaking
in the first place or cap campaign expenditures."
611 F. 3d 510, 513, 525 (2010). In that court's view, any burden
imposed by the matching funds provision was justified because the
provision "bears a substantial relation to the State's important
interest in reducing quid pro quo political corruption."
Id., at 513.[fn5]

We stayed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated the stay of the
District Court's injunction, see 560 U. S. ___ (2010), and later
granted certiorari, 562 U. S. ___ (2010).

At the same time, we have subjected strictures on campaign-related
speech that we have found less onerous to a lower level of scrutiny
and upheld those restrictions. [***5] For example, after finding that the
restriction at issue was "closely drawn" to serve a "sufficiently
important interest," see, e.g., McConnell v. Federal ElectionComm'n, 540 U. S. 93, 136 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
528 U. S. 377, 387-388 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), we
have upheld government-imposed limits on contributions to
candidates, Buckley, supra, at 23-35, caps on coordinated
party expenditures, Federal Election Comm'n v. ColoradoRepublican Federal Campaign Comm.,
533 U. S. 431, 437 (2001) (Colorado II), and requirements
that political funding sources disclose their identities,
Citizens United, supra, at ___-___ (slip op., at 55-56).

Although the speech of the candidates and independent expenditure
groups that brought this suit is not directly capped by Arizona's
matching funds provision, those parties contend that their political
speech is substantially burdened by the state law in the same way
that speech was burdened by the law we recently found invalid in
Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. 724 (2008). In
Davis, we considered a First Amendment challenge to the
so-called "Millionaire's Amendment" of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a). Under that Amendment, if
a candidate for the United States House of Representatives spent
more than $350,000 of his personal funds, "a new, asymmetrical
regulatory scheme [came] into play." 554 U. S., at 729. The opponent
of the candidate who exceeded that limit was permitted to collect
individual contributions up to $6,900 per contributor — three times
the normal contribution limit of $2,300. See ibid. The
candidate who spent more than the [*2818] personal funds limit remained
subject to
the original contribution cap. Davis argued that this scheme
"burden[ed] his exercise of his First Amendment right to make
unlimited expenditures of his personal funds because" doing so had
"the effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money and to use
that money to finance speech that counteract[ed] and thus
diminishe[d] the effectiveness of Davis' own speech."
Id., at 736.

In addressing the constitutionality of the Millionaire's
Amendment, we acknowledged that the provision did not impose an
outright cap on a candidate's personal expenditures.
Id., at 738-739. We nonetheless concluded that the Amendment
was unconstitutional [**677] because it forced a candidate "to choose
between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered political
speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations."
Id., at 739. Any candidate who chose to spend more than
$350,000 of his own money was forced to "shoulder a special and
potentially significant burden" because that choice gave
fund-raising advantages to the candidate's adversary. Ibid. We
determined that this constituted an "unprecedented penalty" and
"impose[d] a substantial burden on the exercise of the
First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech," and
concluded that the Government had failed to advance any compelling
interest that would justify such a burden. Id., at 739-740.

A

1

The logic of Davis largely controls our approach to this
case. Much like the burden placed on speech in Davis, the
matching funds provision "imposes an unprecedented penalty on any
candidate who robustly [***6] exercises [his] First Amendment right[s]."
Id., at 739. Under that provision, "the vigorous exercise of
the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech" leads to
"advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral
politics."
Ibid.

Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more than
the State's initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each
personal dollar spent by the privately financed candidate results in
an award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent.
That plainly forces the privately financed candidate to "shoulder a
special and potentially significant burden" when choosing to
exercise his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his
candidacy. Ibid. If the law at issue in Davis imposed a
burden on candidate speech, the Arizona law unquestionably does so
as well.

The penalty imposed by Arizona's matching funds provision is
different in some respects from the penalty imposed by the law we
struck down in Davis. But those differences make the Arizona
law more constitutionally problematic, not less. See GreenParty of Conn. v. Garfield,
616 F. 3d 213, 244-245 (CA2 2010). First, the penalty in
Davis consisted of raising the contribution limits for one of
the candidates. The candidate who benefited from the increased
limits still had to go out and raise the funds. He may or may not
have been able to do so. The other candidate, therefore, faced
merely the possibility that his opponent would be able to raise
additional funds, through contribution limits that remained subject
to a cap. And still the Court held that this was an "unprecedented
penalty," a "special and potentially significant burden" that had to
be justified by a compelling state interest — a rigorous
First Amendment hurdle. 554 U. S., at 739-740. Here the benefit to the
publicly financed candidate is the [*2819] direct and automatic release of
public money. That is a far heavier burden than in Davis.

Second, depending on the specifics of the election at issue, the
matching funds provision can create a multiplier effect. In the
Arizona Fourth District House election previously discussed, see
supra, at 4-6, [**678] if the spending cap
were exceeded, each dollar spent by the privately funded candidate
would result in an additional dollar of campaign funding to each of
that candidate's publicly financed opponents. In such a situation,
the matching funds provision forces privately funded candidates to
fight a political hydra of sorts. Each dollar they spend generates
two adversarial dollars in response. Again, a markedly more
significant burden than in Davis.

Third, unlike the law at issue in Davis, all of this is to
some extent out of the privately financed candidate's hands. Even if
that candidate opted to spend less than the initial public financing
cap, any spending by independent expenditure groups to promote the
privately financed candidate's election — regardless whether such
support was welcome or helpful — could trigger matching funds.
What is more, that state money would go directly to the publicly
funded candidate to use as he saw fit. That disparity in
control — giving money directly to a publicly financed candidate, in
[***7] response to independent expenditures that cannot be coordinated with
the privately funded candidate — is a substantial advantage for the
publicly funded candidate. That candidate can allocate the money
according to his own campaign strategy, which the privately financed
candidate could not do with the independent group expenditures
that triggered the matching funds. Cf. Citizens United,
558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 41) ("`The absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . .
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate'" (quoting
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47)).

The burdens that this regime places on independent expenditure
groups are akin to those imposed on the privately financed
candidates themselves. Just as with the candidate the independent
group supports, the more money spent on that candidate's behalf or
in opposition to a publicly funded candidate, the more money the
publicly
funded candidate receives from the State. And just as with the
privately financed candidate, the effect of a dollar spent on
election speech is a guaranteed financial payout to the publicly
funded candidate the group opposes. Moreover, spending one dollar
can result in the flow of dollars to multiple candidates the group
disapproves of, dollars directly controlled by the publicly funded
candidate or candidates.

In some ways, the burden the Arizona law imposes on independent
expenditure groups is worse than the burden it imposes on privately
financed candidates, and thus substantially worse than the burden we
found constitutionally impermissible in Davis. If a candidate
contemplating an electoral run in Arizona surveys the campaign
landscape and decides that the burdens imposed by the matching funds
regime make a privately funded campaign unattractive, he at least
has the option of taking public financing. Independent expenditure
groups, of course, do not.

Once the spending cap is reached, an independent expenditure group
that wants to support a particular candidate — because of
that candidate's stand on an issue of concern to [**679] the
group — can only avoid triggering matching funds in one of two ways.
The group can either opt to change its message from one addressing
the merits of the candidates to one addressing [*2820] the merits of an
issue, or refrain from speaking altogether. Presenting independent
expenditure groups with such a choice makes the matching funds
provision particularly burdensome to those groups. And forcing
that choice — trigger matching funds, change your message, or do not
speak — certainly contravenes "the fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose
the content of his own message." Hurley v. Irish-AmericanGay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995); cf. Citizens United,
supra, at ___ (slip op.,
at 24) ("the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor
certain subjects or viewpoints"); Federal Election Comm'n v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U. S. 449, 477, n. 9 (2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (the
argument that speakers can avoid the burdens of a law "by changing
what they say" does [***8] not mean the law complies with the
First Amendment).[fn6]

2

Arizona, the Clean Elections Institute, and the United States
offer several arguments attempting to explain away the existence or
significance of any burden imposed by matching funds. None is
persuasive.

Arizona contends that the matching funds provision is
distinguishable from the law we invalidated in Davis. The State
correctly points out that our decision in Davis focused on the
asymmetrical contribution limits imposed by the Millionaire's
Amendment. See 554 U. S., at 729. But that is not because — as the
State asserts — the reach of that opinion is limited to asymmetrical
contribution limits. Brief for State Respondents 26-32. It is
because that was the particular burden on candidate speech we faced
in Davis. And whatever the significance of the distinction in
general, there can be no doubt that the burden on speech is
significantly greater in this case than in Davis: That means
that the law here — like the one in Davis — must be justified
by a compelling state interest.

The State argues that the matching funds provision actually
results in more speech by "increas[ing] debate about issues of
public concern" in Arizona elections and "promot[ing] the free and
open debate that the First Amendment was intended to foster." Brief
for State Respondents 41; see Brief for Respondent Clean Elections
Institute 55. In the State's view, this promotion of First Amendment
ideals offsets any burden the law might impose on some speakers.

Not so. Any increase in speech resulting from the Arizona law is
of one [**680] kind and one kind only — that of publicly financed
candidates. The burden imposed on privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups reduces their speech; "restriction[s]
on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression." Buckley, 424 U. S., at 19. [*2821] Thus, even if the
matching funds provision did result in more speech by publicly
financed candidates and more speech in general, it would do
so at the expense of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) the
speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups. This sort of "beggar thy neighbor" approach to free speech
— "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others" — is "wholly foreign to the
First Amendment." Id., at 48-49.[fn7]

We have rejected government efforts to increase the speech of
some at the expense of others outside the campaign finance context.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U. S. 241, 244, 258 (1974), we held unconstitutional a Florida
law that required any newspaper assailing a political candidate's
character to allow that candidate to print a reply. We have
explained that while the statute in that case "purported to advance
free discussion, . . . its effect was to deter newspapers from
speaking out in the first instance" because it "penalized the
newspaper's own expression." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U. S. 1, 10 (1986) (plurality opinion). Such a penalty, we
concluded, could not survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Arizona
law imposes a similar penalty: The State [***9] grants funds to publicly
financed candidates as a direct result of the speech of privately
financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. The argument
that this sort of burden promotes free and robust discussion is no
more persuasive here than it was in Tornillo.[fn8]

Arizona asserts that no "candidate or independent expenditure
group is `obliged personally to express a message [**681] he disagrees
with'" or "`required by the government to subsidize a message he
disagrees with.'" Brief for State
Respondents 32 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock MarketingAssn., 544 U. S. 550, 557 (2005)). True enough. But that does not
mean that the matching funds provision does not burden speech. The
direct result of the speech of privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups is a state-provided monetary subsidy
to a political rival. That cash subsidy, conferred in response to
political speech, penalizes speech to a greater extent [*2822] and more
directly than the Millionaire's Amendment in Davis. The fact
that this may result in more speech by the other candidates is no
more adequate a justification here than it was in Davis. See
554 U. S., at 741-742.

In disagreeing with our conclusion, the dissent relies on cases in
which we have upheld government subsidies against First Amendment
challenge, and asserts that "[w]e have never, not once, understood a
viewpoint-neutral subsidy given to one speaker to constitute a
First Amendment burden on another." Post, at 16. But none of those
cases — not one — involved a subsidy given in direct response to the
political speech of another, to allow the recipient to counter
that speech. And nothing in the analysis we employed in those cases
suggests that the challenged subsidies would have survived
First Amendment scrutiny if they were triggered by someone else's
political speech.[fn9]

The State also argues, and the Court of Appeals concluded,
that any burden on privately financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups is more analogous to
the burden placed on speakers by the disclosure and disclaimer
requirements we recently upheld in Citizens United than to
direct restrictions on candidate and independent expenditures. See
611 F. 3d, at 525; Brief for State Respondents 21, 35; Brief for
Respondent Clean Elections Institute 16-17. This analogy is not even
close. A political candidate's disclosure of his funding resources
does not result in a cash windfall to his opponent, or affect their
respective disclosure obligations.

The State and the Clean Elections Institute assert that the
candidates and independent expenditure groups have failed to "cite
specific instances in which they decided not to raise or spend
funds," Brief for State Respondents 11; see
id., at 11-12, and have "failed to present any reliable
evidence that Arizona's triggered matching funds deter their
speech," Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 6; see
id., at 6-8. The record in this case, which we must review in
its entirety, does not support those assertions. See BoseCorp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984).

The State contends that if the matching funds provision truly
burdened the speech of privately financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups, spending on behalf of privately financed
candidates would cluster just below the triggering level, but no
such phenomenon has been observed. Brief for State Respondents 39;
Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 18-19. That should
come as no surprise. The hypothesis presupposes a privately funded
candidate who would spend his own money just up to the matching
funds threshold, when he could have simply taken matching funds in
the first place.

Furthermore, the Arizona law takes into account all manner of
uncoordinated political activity in awarding matching funds. If a
privately funded candidate wanted to hover just below the triggering
level, he would have to make guesses about how much he will receive
in the form of contributions and supportive independent
expenditures. He might well guess wrong.

In addition, some candidates may be willing to bear the burden of
spending above the cap. That a candidate is willing to do so does
not make the law any less burdensome. See Davis,
554 U. S., at 739 (that candidates may choose to make "personal
expenditures to support their campaigns" despite the burdens imposed
by the Millionaire's Amendment does not change the fact that "they
must shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they
make that choice"). If the State made privately funded candidates
pay a $500 fine to run as such, the fact that candidates might
choose to pay it does not make the fine any less burdensome.

While there is evidence to support the contention of the
candidates and independent expenditure groups that the matching
funds provision burdens their speech, "it is never easy to prove a
negative" — here, that candidates and groups did not speak or
limited their speech because of the Arizona law. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960). In any event, the
burden imposed by the matching funds provision is evident [***11] and
inherent in the choice that confronts privately financed candidates
and independent expenditure groups. Cf. Davis,
554 U. S., at 738-740[**683] . Indeed even candidates who sign up for public
funding recognize the burden matching funds impose on private
speech, stating that they participate in the program because
"matching funds . . . discourage[] opponents, special interest
groups, and lobbyists from campaigning against" them. GAO, Campaign
Finance Reform: Experiences of Two States that Offered Full Public
Funding for Political Candidates 27 (GAO-10-390, 2010). As in
Davis, we do not need empirical evidence to determine that the
law at issue is burdensome. See 554 U. S., at 738-740 (requiring no
evidence of a burden whatsoever).

It is clear not only to us but to every other court to have
considered the question after Davis that a candidate or
independent group might not spend money if the direct result of
that spending is additional funding to political adversaries. See,
e.g., Green Party of Conn., 616 F. 3d, at 242 (matching funds
impose "a substantial burden on the exercise of First Amendment
rights" (internal quotation marks omitted)); McComish v.
Bennett, 611 F. 3d, at 524 (matching funds create "potential
chilling effects" and "impose [*2824] some First Amendment burden");
Scott v. Roberts, 612 F. 3d 1279, 1290 (CA11 2010) ("we
think it is obvious that the [matching funds] subsidy imposes a
burden on [privately financed] candidates");
id., at 1291 ("we know of no court that doubts that a [matching
funds] subsidy like the one at issue here burdens" the speech of
privately
financed candidates); see also Day v. Holahan,
34 F. 3d 1356, 1360 (CA8 1994) (it is "clear" that matching funds
provisions infringe on "protected speech because of the chilling
effect" they have "on the political speech of the person or group
making the [triggering] expenditure" (cited in Davis,
supra, at 739)). The dissent's disagreement is little more than
disagreement with Davis.

The State correctly asserts that the candidates and independent
expenditure groups "do not . . . claim that a single lump sum
payment to publicly funded candidates," equivalent to the maximum
amount of state financing that a candidate can obtain through
matching funds, would impermissibly burden their speech. Brief for
State Respondents 56; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. The State reasons
that if providing all the money up front would not burden speech,
providing it piecemeal does not do so either. And the State further
argues that such incremental administration is necessary to ensure
that public funding is not under-or over-distributed. See Brief for
State Respondents 56-57.

These arguments miss the point. It is not the amount of funding
that the State provides to publicly financed candidates that is
constitutionally problematic in this case. It is the manner in which
that funding is provided — in direct response to the political
speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups. And the fact that the State's matching mechanism may be more
efficient than other alternatives — that it may help the State in
"finding the sweet-spot" or "fine-tuning" its financing system to
avoid a drain on public resources,
post, at 26 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) — is of no moment; "the
First Amendment does not permit the [***12] State to sacrifice speech for
efficiency." Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C.,Inc.[**684], 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988).

The United States as amicus contends that "[p]roviding
additional funds to petitioners' opponents does not make
petitioners' own speech any less effective" and thus does not
substantially burden speech. Brief for United States 27. Of course
it does. One does not have to subscribe to the view that electoral
debate is zero sum, see AFEC Brief 30, to see the flaws in the
United States' perspective. All else being equal, an advertisement
supporting the election of a candidate that goes without a response
is often more effective than an advertisement that is directly
controverted. And even if the publicly funded candidate decides to
use his new money to address a different issue altogether, the end
goal of that spending is to claim electoral victory over the
opponent that triggered the additional state funding. See
Davis, 554 U. S., at 736.

B

Because the Arizona matching funds provision imposes a substantial
burden on the speech of privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups, "that provision cannot stand unless
it is `justified by a compelling state interest,'"
id., at 740 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
479 U. S., at 256).

There is a debate between the parties in this case as to
what state interest is served by the matching funds provision. The
privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups
contend that the [*2825] provision works to "level[] electoral
opportunities" by equalizing candidate "resources and influence."
Brief for Petitioner McComish et al. 64; see AFEC Brief 23. The
State and the Clean Elections Institute counter that the provision
"furthers Arizona's interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption." Brief for State Respondents 42; Brief for
Respondent Clean Elections Institute 47.

1

There is ample support for the argument that the matching funds
provision seeks to "level the playing field"
in terms of candidate resources. The clearest evidence is of course
the very operation of the provision: It ensures that campaign
funding is equal, up to three times the initial public funding
allotment. The text of the Citizens Clean Elections Act itself
confirms this purpose. The statutory provision setting up the
matching funds regime is titled "Equal funding of candidates."
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-952 (West Supp. 2010). The Act refers to
the funds doled out after the Act's matching mechanism is triggered
as "equalizing funds." See §§ 16-952(C)(4), (5). And the regulations
implementing the matching funds provision refer to those funds as
"equalizing funds" as well. See Citizens Clean Elections Commission,
Ariz. Admin. Rule R2-20-113.

Other features of the Arizona law reinforce this understanding of
the matching funds provision. If the Citizens Clean Election
Commission cannot provide publicly financed candidates with the
moneys that the matching funds provision envisions because of a
shortage of funds, the statute allows a publicly financed candidate
to "accept private contributions to bring the total monies received
by the candidate" up to the [***13][**685] matching funds
amount. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-954(F) (West 2006). Limiting
contributions, of course, is the primary means we have upheld to
combat corruption. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 23-35, 46-47. Indeed
the State argues that one of the principal ways that the matching
funds provision combats corruption is by eliminating the possibility
of any quid pro quo between private interests and publicly
funded candidates by eliminating contributions to those candidates
altogether. See Brief for State Respondents 45-46. But when
confronted with a choice between fighting corruption and equalizing
speech, the drafters of the matching funds provision chose the
latter. That significantly undermines any notion that the "Equal
funding of candidates" provision is meant to serve some interest
other than an interest in equalizing
funds.[fn10]

We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a
compelling state interest in "leveling the playing field" that can
justify undue burdens on political speech. See, e.g., CitizensUnited, 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 34). In Davis, we
stated that discriminatory contribution limits meant to "level
electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth"
did not serve "a legitimate government objective," let alone a
compelling one. 554 U. S., at 741 (internal quotation marks
omitted). [*2826] And in Buckley, we held that limits on overall
campaign expenditures could not be justified by a purported
government "interest in equalizing the financial resources of
candidates." 424 U. S., at 56; see id., at 56-57. After all,
equalizing campaign resources "might serve not to equalize the
opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who
lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before
the start of the campaign." Id., at 57.

"Leveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing
judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to
the outcome of an election," Davis, supra, at 742 — a dangerous
enterprise and one that cannot justify burdening protected speech.
The dissent essentially dismisses this concern, see
post, at 27-29, but it needs to be taken seriously; we have, as
noted, held that it is not legitimate for the government to attempt
to equalize electoral opportunities in this manner. And such basic
intrusion by the government into the debate over who should govern
goes to the heart of First Amendment values.

"Leveling the playing field" can sound like a good thing. But in a
democracy, campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically
important form of speech. The First Amendment embodies our choice as
a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle
is freedom — the "unfettered interchange of ideas" — not [**686] whatever
the State may view as fair. Buckley,
supra, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2

As already noted, the State and the Clean Elections Institute
disavow any interest in "leveling the playing field." They instead
assert that the "Equal funding of candidates" provision,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-952 (West Supp. 2010), serves the State's
compelling interest in combating corruption and the appearance of
corruption. See, e.g., Davis, supra, at 740; WisconsinRight to Life, 551 U. S., at 478-479 (opinion of [***14] ROBERTS, C. J.).
But even if the ultimate objective of the matching funds provision
is to combat corruption — and not "level the playing
field" — the burdens that the matching funds provision imposes on
protected political speech are not justified.

Burdening a candidate's expenditure of his own funds on his own
campaign does not further the State's anticorruption
interest. Indeed, we have said that "reliance on personal funds
reduces the threat of corruption" and that "discouraging [the]
use of personal funds[] disserves the anticorruption interest."
Davis, supra, at 740-741. That is because "the use of
personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside
contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures
and attendant risks of abuse" of money in politics.
Buckley, supra, at 53. The matching funds provision counts
a candidate's expenditures
of his own money on his own campaign as contributions, and to
that extent cannot be supported by any anti-corruption interest.

We have also held that "independent expenditures . . . do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption." CitizensUnited, 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 42). "By definition, an
independent expenditure is political speech presented to the
electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate."
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 44). The candidate-funding circuit is
broken. The separation between candidates and independent
expenditure groups negates the possibility that independent
expenditures will result in the [*2827] sort of quid pro quo corruption
with which our case law is concerned. See
id., at ___-___ (slip op., at 42-45); cf. Buckley,
424 U. S., at 46. Including independent expenditures in the matching funds
provision cannot be supported by any anticorruption interest.

We have observed in the past that "[t]he interest in alleviating
the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by . . .
contribution limitations." Id., at 55. Arizona already has some
of the most austere contribution limits in the United States. See
Randall v. Sorrell,
548 U. S. 230, 250-251 (2006) (plurality opinion). Contributions to
statewide candidates are limited to $840 per contributor per
election cycle and contributions to legislative candidates are
limited to $410 per contributor per election cycle. See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-905(A)(1), 941(B)(1); Ariz. Dept. of
State, Office of the Secretary of State, 2009-2010 Contribution
Limits, see supra, at 4. Arizona also has stringent fundraising
disclosure requirements. In the face of such ascetic contribution
limits, [**687] strict disclosure requirements, and the general availability
of public funding, it is hard to imagine what marginal corruption
deterrence could be generated by the matching funds provision.

Perhaps recognizing that the burdens the matching
funds provision places on speech cannot be justified in and of
themselves, either as a means of leveling the playing field or
directly fighting corruption, the State and the Clean Elections
Institute offer another argument: They contend that the provision
indirectly serves the anticorruption interest, by ensuring
that enough candidates participate in the State's public funding
system, which [***15] in turn helps combat corruption.[fn11] See Brief for
State Respondents 46-47; Brief for Respondent Clean Elections
Institute 47-49. We have said that a voluntary system of "public
financing as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large
private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest."
Buckley, supra, at 96. But the fact that burdening
constitutionally protected speech might indirectly serve the State's
anticorruption interest, by encouraging candidates to take public
financing, does not establish the constitutionality of the matching
funds provision.

We have explained that the matching funds provision substantially
burdens the speech of privately financed candidates and independent
groups. It does so to an even greater extent than the law we
invalidated in Davis. We have explained that those burdens
cannot be justified by a desire to "level the playing field." We
have also explained that much of the speech burdened by the matching
funds provision does not, under our precedents, pose a danger of
corruption. In light of the foregoing analysis, the fact that the
State may feel that the matching funds provision is
necessary to allow it to "find[] the sweet-spot" and "fine-tun[e]"
its public funding system,
post, at 26 (KAGAN, J., dissenting), to achieve its desired
level of participation without an undue drain on public resources,
is not a sufficient justification for the burden.
[*2828]

The flaw in the State's argument is apparent in what its reasoning
would allow. By the State's logic it could grant a publicly funded
candidate five dollars in matching funds for every dollar his
privately financed opponent spent, or force candidates who wish to
run on private funds to pay a $10,000 fine in order to encourage
participation in the public funding regime. Such measures might well
promote participation in public financing, but would clearly
suppress or unacceptably alter political speech. How the State
chooses to encourage participation in its public funding system
matters, and we have never held that a State may burden political
speech — to the extent the matching funds provision does — to ensure
adequate participation in a public funding system. Here the State's
chosen method is unduly burdensome and not sufficiently [**688] justified to
survive First Amendment scrutiny.

III

We do not today call into question the wisdom of public financing
as a means of funding political candidacy. That is not our business.
But determining whether laws governing campaign finance violate the
First Amendment is very much our business. In carrying out
that responsibility over the past 35 years, we have upheld some
restrictions on speech and struck down others. See, e.g., Buckley,supra, at 35-38, 51-54 (upholding contribution limits and
striking down expenditure limits); Colorado I,
518 U. S., at 608 (opinion of BREYER, J.) (invalidating ban on independent
expenditures for electioneering communication); Colorado II,
533 U. S., at 437 (upholding caps on coordinated party
expenditures); Davis, 554 U. S., at 736 (in-validating
asymmetrical contribution limits triggered by candidate spending).

We have said that governments "may engage in [***16] public financing of
election campaigns" and that doing so can further "significant
governmental interest[s]," such as the state interest in preventing
corruption. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 57, n. 65, 92-93, 96. But
the goal of creating a viable public financing scheme can only be
pursued in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. The dissent
criticizes the Court for standing in the way of what the people of
Arizona want. Post, at 2-3, 31-32. But the whole point of the
First Amendment is to protect speakers against unjustified
government restrictions on speech, even when those restrictions
reflect the will of the majority. When it comes to protected speech,
the speaker is sovereign.

Arizona's program gives money to a candidate in direct response to
the campaign speech of an opposing candidate or an independent
group. It does this when the opposing candidate has chosen not to
accept public financing, and has engaged in political speech above a
level set by the State. The professed purpose of the state law is to
cause a sufficient number of candidates to sign up for public
financing, see post, at 5, which subjects them to the various
restrictions on speech that go along with that program. This goes
too far; Arizona's matching funds provision substantially burdens
the speech of privately financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups without serving a compelling state interest.

"[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of" the First Amendment "was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs," "includ[ing] discussions of candidates."
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted;
second alteration in original). That agreement "reflects our
`profound national commitment [*2829] to the principle that debate on public
issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" Ibid. (quoting NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964)). True
when we said it and true today. Laws like Arizona's matching funds
provision that inhibit robust and wide-open political debate without
sufficient justification cannot stand.
[**689]

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
reversed.

It is so ordered.

[fn1] The number of qualifying contributions ranges from 200 for a
candidate for the state legislature to 4,000 for a candidate for
Governor. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-950(D) (West Supp. 2010).

[fn2] Publicly financed candidates who run unopposed, or who run as
the representative of a party that does not have a primary, may
receive less funding than candidates running in contested elections.
See §§ 16-51(A)(2)-(3) and (D) (West 2006).

[fn4] Judge Bea dissented from the stay of the District Court's
injunction, stating that the Arizona public financing system
unconstitutionally prefers publicly financed candidates and
that under the matching funds scheme "it makes no more sense for [a
privately financed candidate or independent expenditure group] to
spend money now than for a poker player to make a bet if he knows
the house is going to match his bet for his opponent." App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 10-239, p. 87; see id., at 89.

[fn5] One judge concurred, relying primarily on his view that "the
Arizona public financing scheme imposes no limitations whatsoever on
a candidate's speech." 611 F. 3d, at 527 (Kleinfeld, J.).

[fn6] The dissent sees "chutzpah" in candidates exercising
their right not to participate in the public financing scheme, while
objecting that the system violates their First Amendment rights. See
post, at 12 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). The charge is unjustified,
but, in any event, it certainly cannot be leveled against the
independent expenditure groups. The dissent barely mentions such
groups in its analysis, and fails to address not only the
distinctive burdens imposed on these groups — as set forth
above — but also the way in which privately financed candidates are
particularly burdened when matching funds are triggered by
independent group speech.

[fn7] The dissent also repeatedly argues that the Arizona matching
funds regime results in "more political speech,"
post, at 9 (emphasis in original); see
post, at 2, 10, 13, 16, 32, but — given the logic of the
dissent's position — that is only as a step to less speech. If
the matching funds provision achieves its professed goal and causes
candidates to switch to public financing,
post, at 25, 30, there will be less speech: no spending above
the initial state-set amount by formerly privately financed
candidates, and no associated matching funds for anyone. Not only
that, the level of speech will depend on the State's judgment of the
desirable amount, an amount tethered to available (and often scarce)
state resources.

[fn8] Along the same lines, we have invalidated government mandates
that a speaker "help disseminate hostile views" opposing
that speaker's message. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U. S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality opinion). In Pacific Gas, we
found a public utility commission order forcing a utility company to
disseminate in its billing envelopes views that the company opposed
ran afoul of the First Amendment. That case is of course
distinguishable from the instant case on its facts, but the central
concern — that an individual should not be compelled to "help
disseminate hostile views" — is implicated here as well.
Ibid. If a candidate uses his own money to engage in speech
above the initial public funding threshold, he is forced to "help
disseminate hostile views" in a most direct way — his own speech
triggers the release of state money to his opponent.

[fn9] The dissent cites Buckley in response, see
post, at 12, n. 3, but the funding in Buckley was of
course not triggered by the speech of a publicly funded candidate's
political opponent, or the speech of anyone else for that matter.
See 424 U. S., at 91-95. Whether Arizona's matching funds provision
comports with the First Amendment is not simply a question of
whether the State can give a subsidy to a candidate to fund
that candidate's election, but whether that subsidy can be triggered
by the speech of another candidate or independent group.

[fn10] Prior to oral argument in this case, the Citizens Clean
Elections Commission's Web site stated that "`The Citizens Clean
Elections Act was passed by the people of Arizona in 1998 to level
the playing field when it comes to running for office.'" AFEC
Brief 10, n. 3 (quoting
http://www.azcleanelections.gov/about-us/get-involved.aspx); Tr. of
Oral Arg. 48. The Web site now says that "The Citizens Clean
Elections Act was passed by the people of Arizona in 1998 to restore
citizen participation and confidence in our political system."

[fn11] The State claims that the Citizens Clean Elections Act was
passed in response to rampant corruption in Arizona
politics — elected officials "literally taking duffle bags full of
cash in exchange for sponsoring legislation." Brief for State
Respondents 45. That may be. But, as the candidates and independent
expenditure groups point out, the corruption that plagued Arizona
politics is largely unaddressed by the matching funds regime. AFEC
Brief 11, n. 4. Public financing does nothing to prevent politicians
from accepting bribes in exchange for their votes.

Imagine two States, each plagued by a corrupt political system. In
both States, candidates for public office accept large campaign
contributions in exchange for the promise that, after assuming
office, they will rank the donors' interests ahead of all others. As
a result of these bargains, politicians ignore the public interest,
sound public policy languishes, and the citizens lose confidence in
their government.

Recognizing the cancerous effect of this corruption, voters of the
first State, acting through referendum, enact several campaign
finance measures previously approved by this Court. They cap
campaign contributions; require disclosure of substantial donations;
and create an optional
public financing program that gives candidates a fixed public
subsidy if they refrain from private fundraising. But these measures
do not work. Individuals who "bundle" campaign contributions become
indispensable to candidates in need of money. Simple disclosure
fails to prevent shady dealing. [***17] And candidates choose not to
participate in the public financing system because the sums provided
do not make them competitive with their privately financed
opponents. So the State remains afflicted with corruption.

Voters of the second State, having witnessed this failure, take an
ever-so-slightly different tack to cleaning up their political
system. They too enact contribution limits and disclosure
requirements. But they believe that the greatest hope of eliminating
corruption lies in creating an effective public financing program,
which will break candidates' dependence on large donors and
bundlers. These voters realize, based on the first State's
experience, that such a program will not work unless candidates
agree to participate in it. And candidates will participate only if
they know that they will receive sufficient funding to run
competitive races. So the voters enact a program that carefully
adjusts the money given to would-be officeholders, through the use
of a matching funds mechanism, in order to provide this assurance.
The program does not discriminate against any candidate or point of
view, and it does not restrict any person's ability to speak. In
fact, by providing resources to many candidates, the program creates
more speech and thereby broadens public debate. And just as the
voters had hoped, the program accomplishes its mission of restoring
integrity to the political system. The second State rids itself of
corruption.

A person familiar with our country's core values — our devotion to
democratic self-governance, as well as to "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964) — might expect
this Court to celebrate, or at least not to interfere with, the
second State's success. But today, the majority holds that the
second State's system — the system that produces honest government,
[**690] working on behalf of all the people — clashes with our Constitution.
The First Amendment, the majority insists, requires [*2830] us all to rely
on the measures employed in the first State, even when they have
failed to break the stranglehold of special interests on elected
officials.

I disagree. The First Amendment's core purpose is to foster a
healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and
debate. Nothing in Arizona's anti-corruption statute, the Arizona
Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional
protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values underlying
both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing
the "opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people."
Id., at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). I therefore
respectfully dissent.

I

A

Campaign finance reform over the last century has focused on one
key question: how to prevent massive pools of private money from
corrupting our political system. If an officeholder owes his
election to wealthy contributors, he may act for their benefit
alone, rather than on behalf of all the people. As we recognized in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26 (1976) (percuriam), our seminal campaign finance case, [***18] large private
contributions may result in "political quid pro quo[s]," which
undermine the integrity of our democracy. And even if these
contributions are not converted into corrupt bargains, they still
may weaken confidence in our political system because the public
perceives "the opportunities for abuse[s]." Id., at 27. To
prevent both corruption and the appearance of corruption — and so to
protect our democratic system of governance — citizens have
implemented reforms designed to curb the power of special interests.

Among these measures, public financing of elections has emerged as
a potentially potent mechanism to preserve elected officials'
independence. President Theodore Roosevelt proposed the reform as
early as 1907 in his State of the Union address. "The need for
collecting large campaign funds would vanish," he said, if the
government "provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate
expenses" of running a campaign, on the condition that a "party
receiving campaign funds from the Treasury" would forgo private
fundraising. 42 Cong. Rec. 78 (1907). The idea was — and
remains — straightforward. Candidates who rely on public, rather
than private, moneys are "beholden [to] no person and, if elected,
should feel no postelection obligation toward any contributor."
Republican Nat. Comm. v. FEC,
487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (SDNY), aff d 445 U. S. 955 (1980). By
supplanting private cash in elections, public financing eliminates
the source of political corruption.

For this reason, public financing systems today dot the national
landscape. Almost one-third of the States have adopted some form of
public financing, and so too has the Federal Government for
presidential elections. See R. Garrett, Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, Public Financing of Congressional
Campaigns: Overview and Analysis 2, 32 (2009). The federal
[**691] program — which offers presidential candidates a fixed public
subsidy if they abstain from private fundraising — originated in the
campaign finance law that Congress enacted in 1974 on the heels of
the Watergate scandal. Congress explained at the time that the
"potentia[l] for abuse" inherent in privately funded elections was
"all too clear." S. Rep. No. 93-689, p. 4 (1974). In Congress's
view, public financing represented the "only way . . . [to]
eliminate reliance [*2831] on large private contributions" and its attendant
danger of corruption, while still ensuring that a wide range of
candidates had access to the ballot.
Id., at 5 (emphasis deleted).

We declared the presidential public financing system
constitutional in Buckley v. Valeo. Congress, we stated,
had created the program "for the `general welfare' — to reduce the
deleterious influence of large contributions on our political
process," as well as to "facilitate communication by candidates with
the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of
fundraising." 424 U. S., at 91. We reiterated "that public financing
as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large private
contributions furthers a significant governmental interest."
Id., at 96. And finally, in rejecting a challenge based on the
First Amendment, we held that the program did not "restrict[] or
censor [***19] speech, but rather . . . use[d] public money to facilitate
and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral
process." Id., at 92-93. We declared this result "vital to a
self-governing people," and so concluded that the program
"further[ed], not abridge[d], pertinent First Amendment values."
Id., at 93. We thus gave state and municipal governments the
green light to adopt public financing systems along the presidential
model.

But this model, which distributes a lump-sum grant at the
beginning of an election cycle, has a significant weakness: It lacks
a mechanism for setting the subsidy at a level that will give
candidates sufficient incentive to participate, while also
conserving public resources. Public financing can achieve its goals
only if a meaningful number of candidates receive the state subsidy,
rather than raise private funds. See 611 F. 3d 510, 527 (CA9 2010)
("A public financing system with no participants does nothing to
reduce the existence or appearance of quid pro quo
corruption"). But a public funding program must be voluntary
to pass constitutional muster, because of its restrictions on
contributions and expenditures. See Buckley,
424 U. S., at 57, n. 65, 95. And candidates will choose to sign up only if
the subsidy provided enables them to run competitive races. If the
grant is pegged too low, it puts the participating candidate at a
disadvantage: Because he has agreed to spend no more than the amount
of the subsidy, he will lack the means to respond if his privately
funded opponent spends over that threshold. So when lump-sum grants
do not keep up with campaign expenditures, more and more candidates
will choose not to participate.[fn1] But if the subsidy is set too
high, it may impose an unsustainable burden on the public fisc. See
611 F. 3d, at 527 (noting that large subsidies [**692] would make public
funding "prohibitively expensive and spell its doom"). At the least,
hefty grants will waste public resources in the many state [*2832] races
where lack of competition makes such funding unnecessary.

The difficulty, then, is in finding the Goldilocks
solution — not too large, not too small, but just right. And this in
a world of countless variables — where the amount of money needed to
run a viable campaign against a privately
funded candidate depends on, among other things, the district, the
office, and the election cycle. A state may set lump-sum grants
district-by-district, based on spending in past elections; but even
that approach leaves out many factors — including the resources of
the privately funded candidate — that alter the competitiveness of a
seat from one election to the next. See App. 714-716 (record
evidence chronicling the history of variation in campaign spending
levels in Arizona's legislative districts). In short, the dynamic
nature of our electoral system makes ex ante predictions about
campaign expenditures almost impossible. And that creates a chronic
problem for lump-sum public financing programs, because inaccurate
estimates produce subsidies that either dissuade candidates from
participating or waste taxpayer money. And so States have made
adjustments to the lump-sum scheme that [***20] we approved in
Buckley, in attempts to more effectively reduce corruption.

B

The people of Arizona had every reason to try to develop effective
anti-corruption measures. Before turning to public financing,
Arizonans voted by referendum to establish campaign contribution
limits. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-905 (West Supp. 2010). But
that effort to abate corruption, standing alone, proved
unsuccessful. Five years after the enactment of these limits, the
State suffered "the worst public corruption scandal in its history."
Brief for State Respondents 1. In that scandal, known as "AzScam,"
nearly 10% of the State's legislators were caught accepting campaign
contributions or bribes in exchange for supporting a piece of
legislation. Following that incident, the voters of Arizona decided
that further reform was necessary. Acting once again by referendum,
they adopted the public funding system at issue here.

The hallmark of Arizona's program is its inventive
approach to the challenge that bedevils all public financing
schemes: fixing the amount of the subsidy. For each electoral
contest, the system calibrates the size of the grant automatically
to provide sufficient — but no more than sufficient — funds to
induce voluntary participation. In effect, the program's designers
found the Goldilocks solution, which produces the "just right" grant
to ensure that a participant in the system has the funds needed to
run a competitive race.
[**693]

As the Court explains, Arizona's matching funds arrangement
responds to the shortcoming of the lump-sum model by adjusting the
public subsidy in each race to reflect the expenditures of a
privately financed candidate and the independent groups that support
him. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-940et seq.
(West 2006 and West Supp. 2010). A publicly financed candidate in
Arizona receives an initial lump-sum to get his campaign off the
ground. See § 16-951 (West 2006). But for every dollar his privately
funded opponent (or the opponent's supporters) spends over the
initial subsidy, the publicly funded candidate will — to a
point — get an additional 94 cents.
See § 16-952 (West Supp. 2010). Once the publicly financed candidate
has received three times the amount of the initial disbursement, he
gets no further public funding, see ibid., and remains barred
from receiving private contributions, no matter how much more his
[*2833] privately funded opponent spends, see § 16-941(A).

This arrangement, like the lump-sum model, makes use of a pre-set
amount to provide financial support to participants. For example,
all publicly funded legislative candidates collect an initial grant
of $21,479 for a general election race. And they can in no
circumstances receive more than three times that amount ($64,437);
after that, their privately funded competitors hold a marked
advantage. But the Arizona system improves on the lump-sum model in
a crucial respect. By tying public funding to private
spending, the State can afford to set a more generous upper
limit — because it knows that in each campaign it will only have to
disburse what is necessary to keep a participating candidate
reasonably competitive. [***21] Arizona can therefore assure candidates
that, if they accept public funds, they will have the resources to
run a viable race against those who rely on private money.
And at the same time, Arizona avoids wasting taxpayers' dollars. In
this way, the Clean Elections Act creates an effective and
sustainable public financing system.

The question here is whether this modest adjustment to the public
financing program that we approved in Buckley makes the Arizona
law unconstitutional. The majority contends that the matching funds
provision "substantially burdens protected political speech" and
does not "serv[e] a compelling state interest." Ante, at 2. But
the Court is wrong on both counts.

II

Arizona's statute does not impose a "restriction,"
ante, at 15, or "substantia[l] burde[n],"
ante, at 2, on expression. The law has quite the opposite
effect: It subsidizes and so produces more political speech. We
recognized in Buckley that, for this reason, public financing
of elections "facilitate[s] and enlarge[s] public discussion," in
support of First Amendment values. 424 U. S., at 92-93. And what we
said then is just as true today. Except in a world gone topsy-turvy,
additional campaign speech and electoral competition is not a
First Amendment injury.

A

At every turn, the majority tries to convey the impression
that Arizona's matching fund statute is of a piece with laws
prohibiting electoral speech. The majority invokes the language [**694] of
"limits," "bar[s]," and "restraints." Ante, at 8-9. It equates
the law to a "restrictio[n] on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign."
Ante, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). It insists
that the statute "restrict[s] the speech of some elements of our
society" to enhance the speech of others. Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). And it concludes by reminding us that the
point of the First Amendment is to protect "against unjustified
government restrictions on speech." Ante, at 29.

There is just one problem. Arizona's matching funds provision does
not restrict, but instead subsidizes, speech. The law "impose[s] no
ceiling on [speech] and do[es] not prevent anyone from speaking."
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n,
558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 51) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see Buckley,
424 U. S., at 92 (holding that a public financing law does not "abridge,
restrict, or censor" expression). The statute does not tell
candidates or their supporters how much money they can spend to
convey their message, when they can spend it, or what they can spend
it on. Rather, the Arizona law, like the [*2834] public financing statute in
Buckley, provides funding for political speech, thus
"facilitating] communication by candidates with the electorate."
Id., at 91. By enabling participating candidates to respond to
their opponents' expression, the statute expands public debate, in
adherence to "our tradition that more speech, not less, is the
governing rule." Citizens United, 558 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 45). What the law does — all the law does — is fund more
speech.[fn2]

And under the First Amendment, that makes all the
difference. In case after case, year upon year, we have
distinguished between speech restrictions and speech subsidies.
"`[***22] There is a basic difference,'" we have held, "`between direct
state interference with [First Amendment] protected activity and
state encouragement'" of other expression. Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 193 (1991) (quoting Maher v.
Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 475 (1977)); see also, e.g., FederalElection Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U. S. 238, 256, n. 9 (1986); Regan v. Taxation WithRepresentation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 550 (1983); NationalEndowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569, 587-588 (1998);
id., at 599 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the
"fundamental divide" between "`abridging' speech and funding it").
Government subsidies of speech, designed "to stimulate . . .
expression[,] . . . [are] consistent with the First Amendment," so
long as they do not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 234[**695] (2000); see, e.g.,
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U. S. 819, 834 (1995); Finley, 524 U. S., at 587-588.
That is because subsidies, by definition and contra the majority, do
not restrict any speech.

No one can claim that Arizona's law discriminates against
particular ideas, and so violates the First Amendment's sole
limitation on speech subsidies. The State throws open the doors of
its public financing program to all candidates who meet minimal
eligibility requirements and agree not to raise private funds.
Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals may
participate; so too, the law applies equally to independent
expenditure groups across the political spectrum. Arizona disburses
funds based not on a candidate's (or supporter's) ideas, but on the
candidate's decision to sign up for public funding. So under our
precedent, Arizona's subsidy statute should
easily survive First Amendment scrutiny.[fn3]

[*2835] This suit, in fact, may merit less attention than any challenge to
a speech subsidy ever seen in this Court. In the usual
First Amendment subsidy case, a person complains that the government
declined to finance his speech, while bankrolling someone else's; we
must then decide whether the government differentiated between these
speakers on a prohibited basis — because it preferred one speaker's
ideas to another's. See, e.g., id., at 577-578; Regan,
461 U. S., at 543-545. But the candidates bringing this challenge do
not make that claim — because they were never denied a
subsidy. Arizona, remember, offers to support any person running for
state office. Petitioners here refused that assistance. So they
are making a novel argument: that Arizona violated theirFirst Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even
though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the same
financial assistance. Some people might call that chutzpah.

Indeed, what petitioners demand is essentially a right to
quash others' speech through the prohibition of
a (universally available) subsidy program. Petitioners are able to
convey their ideas without public financing — and they would prefer
the field to themselves, so that they can speak free from response.
To attain that goal, they ask this Court to prevent [**696] Arizona from
funding electoral speech — even though that assistance is offered to
every state candidate, on the same (entirely unobjectionable) basis.
And this Court gladly obliges.

If an ordinary citizen, without the hindrance of a law degree,
thought this result an upending of First Amendment values, [***23] he would
be correct. That Amendment protects no person's, nor any
candidate's, "right to be free from vigorous debate." PacificGas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U. S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality opinion). Indeed, the Amendment
exists so that this debate can occur — robust, forceful, and
contested. It is the theory of the Free Speech Clause
that "falsehood and fallacies" are exposed through "discussion,"
"education," and "more speech." Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Or once again
from Citizens United: "[M]ore speech, not less, is the
governing rule." 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 45). And this is no
place more true than in elections, where voters' ability to choose
the best representatives depends on debate — on charge and
countercharge, call and response. So to invalidate a statute
that restricts no one's speech and discriminates against no
idea — that only provides more voices, wider discussion, and greater
competition in elections — is to undermine, rather than to enforce,
the First Amendment.[fn4]

[*2836] We said all this in Buckley, when we upheld the presidential
public financing system — a ruling this Court has never since
questioned. The principal challenge to that system came from
minor-party candidates not eligible for benefits — surely more
compelling plaintiffs than petitioners, who could have received
funding but refused it. Yet we rejected that attack in part because
we understood the federal program as supporting, rather than
interfering with, expression. See 424 U. S., at 90-108; see also
Regan, 461 U. S., at 549 (relying on Buckley to hold
that selective subsidies of expression comport with the
First Amendment if they are viewpoint neutral). Buckley rejected any
idea, along the lines the majority proposes, that a subsidy of
electoral speech was in truth a restraint. And more:
Buckley recognized that public financing of elections
fostersFirst Amendment principles. "[T]he central purpose of
the Speech and Press Clauses," we explained, "was to assure a
society in which `uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' public debate
concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such
a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish."
424 U. S., at 93, n. 127 (quoting New York Times, 376 U. S., at 270).
And we continued: "[L]aws providing financial assistance to the
exercise of free speech" — including the campaign finance
statute at issue — "enhance these First Amendment values."
424 U. S., at 93, n. 127. [**697] We should be saying the same today.

B

The majority has one, and only one, way of separating this case
from Buckley and our other, many precedents
involving speech subsidies. According to the Court, the special
problem here lies in Arizona's matching funds mechanism, which the
majority claims imposes a "substantia[l] burde[n]" on a privately
funded candidate's speech. Ante, at 2. Sometimes, the majority
suggests that this "burden" lies in the way the mechanism
"`diminish[es] the effectiveness'" of the privately funded
candidate's expression by enabling his opponent to respond.
Ante, at 10 (quoting Davis v. Federal ElectionComm'n, 554 U. S. 724, 736 (2008)); see
ante, at 21-22. At other times, the majority indicates that the
"burden" resides in the deterrent effect of the mechanism: The
privately funded candidate "might not spend money" because doing so
will [***24] trigger matching funds. Ante, at 20. Either way, the
majority is wrong to see a substantial burden on expression.[fn5]

Most important, and as just suggested, the very notion
that additional speech constitutes a "burden" is odd and unsettling.
Here is a simple fact: Arizona imposes nothing remotely resembling a
coercive penalty on privately funded candidates. The State does not
jail them, fine them, or subject them to any kind of lesser
disability. ([*2837] So the majority's analogies to a fine on speech,
ante, at 19, 28, are inapposite.) The only "burden" in this
case comes from the grant of a subsidy to another person, and the
opportunity that subsidy allows for responsive speech. But that
means the majority cannot get out from under our subsidy precedents.
Once again: We have never, not once, understood a viewpoint-neutral
subsidy given to one speaker to constitute a First Amendment burden
on another. (And that is so even when the subsidy is not open to
all, as it is here.) Yet in this case, the majority says that the
prospect of more speech — responsive speech, competitive speech, the
kind of speech that drives public debate — counts as a
constitutional injury. That concept, for all the reasons previously
given, is "wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Buckley,
424 U. S., at 49.

But put to one side this most fundamental objection to the
majority's argument; even then, has the majority shown that the
burden resulting from the Arizona statute is "substantial"? See
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U. S. 581, 592 (2005) (holding
that stringent judicial review is "appropriate only if the burden is
severe"). I will not quarrel with the majority's assertion
that responsive speech by one [**698] candidate may make another candidate's
speech less effective, see ante, at 21-22; that, after all, is
the whole idea of the First Amendment, and a benefit of having
more responsive speech. See Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes., J., dissenting) ("[T]he best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market"). And I will assume that the
operation of this statute may on occasion deter a privately funded
candidate from spending money, and conveying ideas by
that means.[fn6] My guess is that this does
not happen often: Most political candidates, I suspect, have enough
faith in the power of their ideas to prefer speech on both sides of
an issue to speech on neither. But I will take on faith that the
matching funds provision may lead one or another privately funded
candidate to stop spending at one or another moment in an
election. Still, does that effect count as a severe burden on
expression? By the measure of our prior decisions — which have
upheld campaign reforms with an equal or greater impact on
speech — the answer is no.

Number one: Any system of public financing, including the
lump-sum model upheld in Buckley, imposes a similar burden on
privately funded candidates. Suppose Arizona were to do what all
parties agree it could under Buckley — provide a single [*2838] upfront
payment (say, $150,000) to a participating candidate, rather than an
initial payment (of $50,000) plus 94% of whatever his privately
funded opponent spent, up to a ceiling (the same $150,000).
That system would "diminis[[***25] h] the effectiveness" of a privately
funded candidate's speech at least as much, and in the same way: It
would give his opponent, who presumably would not be able to raise
that sum on his own, more money to spend. And so too, a lump-sum
system may deter speech. A person relying on private resources might
well choose not to enter a race at all, because he knows he will
face an adequately funded opponent. And even if he
decides to run, he likely will choose to speak in different
ways — for example, by eschewing dubious, easy-to-answer
charges — because his opponent has the ability to respond. Indeed,
privately funded candidates may well find the lump-sum system
more burdensome than Arizona's
(assuming the lump is big enough). Pretend you are financing your
campaign through private donations. Would you prefer that your
opponent receive a guaranteed, upfront payment of $150,000, or
that he receive only $50,000, with the
[**699]possibility — a possibility that you mostly get to
control — of collecting another $100,000 somewhere down the road?
Me too. That's the first reason the burden on speech cannot command
a different result in this case than in Buckley.

Number two: Our decisions about disclosure and disclaimer
requirements show the Court is wrong. Starting in Buckley and
continuing through last Term, the Court has repeatedly declined to
view these requirements as a substantial First Amendment burden,
even though they discourage some campaign speech. "It is undoubtedly
true," we stated in Buckley, that public disclosure obligations
"will deter some individuals" from engaging in expressive
activity. 424 U. S., at 68; see Davis, 554 U. S., at 744. Yet
we had no difficulty upholding these requirements there. And much
more recently, in Citizens United and Doe v.
Reed, 561 U. S. ___ (2010), we followed that precedent.
"`Disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak," we
reasoned, but they "do not prevent anyone from speaking.'"
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Citizens United,
558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 51)). So too here. Like a disclosure
rule, the matching funds provision may occasionally deter, but
"impose[s] no ceiling" on electoral expression.
Id., at (slip op., at 51).

The majority breezily dismisses this comparison, labeling the
analogy "not even close" because disclosure requirements result in
no payment of money to a speaker's
opponent. Ante, at 18. That is indeed the factual distinction:
A matching fund provision, we can all agree, is not a disclosure
rule. But the majority does not tell us why this difference matters.
Nor could it. The majority strikes down the matching funds provision
because of its ostensible effect — most notably, that it may
deter a person from spending money in an election. But this Court
has acknowledged time and again that disclosure obligations have the
selfsame effect. If that consequence does not trigger the most
stringent judicial review in the one case, it should not do so in
the other.

Number three: Any burden that the Arizona law imposes does not
exceed the burden associated with contribution limits, which we have
also repeatedly upheld. Contribution limits, we have stated, "impose
direct quantity restrictions on political [***26] communication and
association," Buckley, 424 U. S., at 18 (emphasis added), thus
"`significant[ly] interfer[ing]'" with First Amendment interests,
[*2839] Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
528 U. S. 377, 387 (2000) (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25).
Rather than potentially deterring or "`diminish[ing] the
effectiveness'" of expressive activity,
ante, at 10 (quoting Davis, 554 U. S., at 736), these
limits stop it cold. Yet we have never subjected these restrictions
to the most stringent review. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 29-38.
I doubt I have to reiterate that the Arizona statute imposes no
restraints on any expressive activity. So the majority once again
has no reason here to reach a different result.

In this way, our campaign finance [**700] cases join our speech subsidy
cases in supporting the constitutionality of Arizona's law. Both
sets of precedents are in accord that a statute funding electoral
speech in the way Arizona's does imposes no First Amendment injury.

C

The majority thinks it has one case on its side — Davis v.
Federal Election Comm'n,
554 U. S. 724 — and it pegs everything on that decision. See
ante, at 9-12. But Davis relies on principles that fit
securely within our First Amendment law and tradition — most unlike
today's opinion.

As the majority recounts, Davis addressed the
constitutionality of federal legislation known as the Millionaire's
Amendment. Under that provision (which applied in elections not
involving public financing), a candidate's expenditure of more than
$350,000 of his own money activated a change in applicable
contribution limits. Before, each candidate in the race could accept
$2,300 from any donor; but now, the opponent of the self-financing
candidate could accept three times that much, or up to $6,900 per
contributor. So one candidate's expenditure of personal funds on
campaign speech triggered discriminatory contribution restrictions
favoring that candidate's opponent.

Under the First Amendment, the similarity between Davis and
this case matters far less than the differences. Here is the
similarity: In both cases, one candidate's campaign expenditure
triggered . . . something. Now here are the differences: In
Davis, the candidate's expenditure triggered a discriminatory
speech restriction, which Congress could not otherwise have imposed
consistent with the First Amendment; by contrast, in this case, the
candidate's expenditure triggers a non-discriminatory speech
subsidy, which all parties agree Arizona could have provided in the
first instance. In First Amendment law, that difference makes a
difference — indeed, it makes all the difference. As I have
indicated before, two great fault lines run through our
First Amendment doctrine: one, between speech restrictions and speech
subsidies, and the other, between discriminatory and neutral
government action. See supra, at 10-11. The Millionaire's
Amendment fell on the disfavored side of both divides: To reiterate,
it imposed a discriminatory speech restriction. The
Arizona Clean Elections Act lands on the opposite side of both: It
grants a non-discriminatory speech subsidy.[fn7] So to say
that Davis "largely controls" [*2840] this case,
ante, at 10, is to decline to take our First Amendment doctrine
seriously.

And let me be clear: This is not my own idiosyncratic or posthoc view of Davis; it is the Davis Court's
self-[***27] expressed, contemporaneous view. That decision began,
continued, and [**701] ended by focusing on the Millionaire Amendment's
"discriminatory contribution limits." 554 U. S., at 740. We made
that clear in the very first sentence of the opinion, where we
summarized the question presented. Id., at 728 ("In this
appeal, we consider the constitutionality of federal election law
provisions that . . . impose different campaign contribution limits
on candidates"). And our focus on the law's discriminatory
restrictions was evident again when we examined how the Court's
prior holdings informed the case. Id., at 738 ("We have never
upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different
contribution limits for candidates"). And then again, when we
concluded that the Millionaire's Amendment could not stand.
Id., at 740 (explaining that the "the activation of a scheme of
discriminatory contribution limits" burdens speech). Our decision
left no doubt (because we repeated the point many times over, see
also id., at 729, 730, 739, 740, n. 7, 741, 744): The
constitutional problem with the Millionaire's Amendment lay in its
use of discriminatory speech restrictions.

But what of the trigger mechanism — in Davis, as here, a
candidate's campaign expenditures? That, after all, is the only
thing that this case and Davis share. If Davis had held
that the trigger mechanism itself violated the First Amendment, then
the case would support today's holding. But Davis said nothing
of the kind. It made clear that the trigger mechanism could not
rescue the discriminatory contribution limits from
constitutional invalidity; that the limits went into effect only
after a candidate spent substantial personal resources rendered them
no more permissible under the First Amendment. See
id., at 739. But Davis did not call into question the
trigger mechanism itself. Indeed, Davis explained that Congress
could have used that mechanism to activate a non-discriminatory(i.e., across-the-board) increase in contribution limits; in
that case, the Court stated, "Davis' argument would plainly fail."
Id., at 737.[fn8] The constitutional infirmity in
Davis was not the trigger mechanism, but rather what lay on the
other side of it — a discriminatory speech restriction.

The Court's response to these points is difficult to fathom. The
majority concedes that "our decision in Davis focused on the
asymmetrical contribution limits imposed by the Millionaire's
Amendment." Ante, at 14. That was because, the majority
explains, Davis presented only that issue. See
ante, at 14. And yet, the majority insists
(without explaining how this can be true), the reach of
Davis is not so limited. And in any event, the majority claims,
the burden on speech is "greater in this case than in
Davis."
Ante, at 14. But for reasons already stated, [**702] that is not so.
The burden on speech in Davis — the penalty [*2841] that campaign
spending triggered — was the discriminatory contribution
restriction, which Congress could not otherwise have imposed. By
contrast, the thing triggered here is a non-discriminatory subsidy,
of a kind this Court has approved for almost four decades. Maybe the
majority is saying today that it had something like this case in
mind all the time. But nothing [***28] in the logic of Davis controls
this decision.[fn9]

III

For all these reasons, the Court errs in holding that the
government action in this case substantially burdens speech and so
requires the State to offer a compelling interest. But in any event,
Arizona has come forward with just such an interest, explaining
that the Clean Elections Act attacks corruption and the appearance
of corruption in the State's political system. The majority's
denigration of this interest — the suggestion that it either is not
real or does not matter — wrongly prevents Arizona from protecting
the strength and integrity of its democracy.

A

Our campaign finance precedents leave no doubt: Preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption is a
compelling government interest. See, e.g., Davis,
554 U. S., at 741; Federal Election Comm'n v. National ConservativePolitical Action Comm.,
470 U. S. 480, 496-497 (1985) (NCPAC). And so too, these
precedents are clear: Public financing of elections serves this
interest. See supra, at 4-5. As Buckley recognized, and as
I earlier described, public financing "reduce[s] the deleterious
influence of large contributions on our political process."
424 U. S., at 91; see id., at 96. When private contributions fuel the
political system, candidates may make corrupt bargains to gain the
money needed to win election. See NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 497. And
voters, seeing the dependence of candidates on large contributors
(or on bundlers of smaller contributions), may lose faith that their
representatives will serve the public's interest. See ShrinkMissouri, 528 U. S., at 390 (the "assumption that large donors
call the tune [may] jeopardize the willingness of voters to take
part in democratic governance"). Public financing addresses these
dangers by minimizing the importance of private donors in elections.
Even the majority appears to agree with this premise. See
ante, at 27 ("We have said that . . . `public financing as a
means of eliminating the improper [**703] influence of large private
contributions furthers a significant governmental interest'").

This compelling interest appears on the very face of Arizona's
public financing statute. Start with the title: The Citizens Clean
Elections Act. Then proceed to the statute's formal findings. The
public financing program, the findings state, was "inten[ded] to
create a clean elections system that will improve the integrity of
Arizona state government by diminishing the [*2842] influence of
special-interest money." § 16-940(A) (West 2006). That measure was
needed because the prior system of private fundrais-ing had
"[u]ndermine[d] public confidence in the integrity of public
officials;" allowed those officials "to accept large campaign
contributions from private interests over which
they [had] governmental jurisdiction;" favored "a small number of
wealthy special interests" over "the vast majority of Arizona
citizens;" and "[c]os[t] average taxpayers millions of dollars in
the form of subsidies and special privileges for campaign
contributors." § 16-940(B).[fn10] The State, appearing before us,
has reiterated its important anti-corruption interest. The Clean
Elections Act, the State avers, "deters quid pro quo corruption
and the appearance [***29] of corruption by providing Arizona candidates
with an option to run for office without depending on outside
contributions." Brief for State Respondents 19. And so Arizona, like
many state and local governments, has implemented public financing
on the theory (which this Court has previously approved, see
supra, at 5), that the way to reduce political corruption is to
diminish the role of private donors in campaigns.[fn11]

And that interest justifies the matching funds provision
at issue because it is a critical facet of Arizona's public
financing program. The provision is no more than a disbursement
mechanism; but it is also the thing that makes the whole Clean
Elections Act work. As described earlier, see
supra, at 5-6, public financing has an Achilles
heel — the difficulty of setting the subsidy at the right amount.
Too small, and the grant will not attract candidates to the program;
and with no participating candidates, the program can hardly
decrease corruption. Too large, and the system becomes
unsustainable, or at the least an unnecessary drain on public
resources. [**704] But finding the sweet-spot is near impossible because of
variation, across districts and over time, in the political system.
Enter the matching funds provision, which takes an ordinary lump-sum
amount, divides it into thirds, and disburses the last two of these
(to the extent necessary) via a self-calibrating mechanism.
That provision is just a fine-tuning of the lump-sum program
approved in Buckley — a fine-tuning, it bears repeating,
that prevents no one from speaking and discriminates against no
message. But that fine-tuning can make the difference between a
wholly ineffectual program and one that removes corruption from the
[*2843] political system.[fn12] If public financing furthers a compelling
interest — and according to this Court, it does — then so too does
the disbursement formula that Arizona uses to make public financing
effective. The one conclusion follows directly from the other.

Except in this Court, where the inescapable logic of the State's
position is . . . virtually ignored. The Court, to be sure,
repeatedly asserts that the State's interest in preventing
corruption does not "sufficiently justif[y]" the mechanism it has
chosen to disburse public moneys. Ante, at 28; see
ante, at 27. Only one thing is missing from the Court's
response: any reasoning to support this conclusion. Nowhere does the
majority dispute the State's view that the success of its public
financing system depends on the matching funds mechanism; and
nowhere does the majority contest that, if this mechanism indeed
spells the difference between success and failure, the State's
interest in preventing corruption justifies its use. And so the
majority dismisses, but does not actually answer the State's
contention — even though that contention is the linchpin of the
entire case. Assuming (against reason and precedent) that the
matching funds provision substantially burdens speech, the question
becomes whether the State has offered a sufficient justification for
imposing that burden. Arizona has made a [***30] forceful argument on this
score, based on the need to establish an effective public financing
system. The majority does not even engage that reasoning.

B

The majority instead devotes most of its energy to trying to show
that "level[ing] the playing field," not fighting corruption, was
the State's real goal.
Ante, at 22-23 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
ante, at 22-24. But the majority's distaste for "leveling"
provides no excuse for striking down Arizona's law.

1

For starters, the Court has no basis to question the sincerity of
the State's interest in rooting out political corruption. As I have
just explained, that is the interest
the State has asserted in this Court; it is the interest
predominantly [**705] expressed in the "findings and
declarations" section of the statute; and it is the interest
universally understood (stretching back to Teddy Roosevelt's time)
to support public financing of elections. See
supra, at 4, 23-24. As against all this, the majority claims to
have found three smoking guns that reveal the State's
true (and nefarious) intention to level the playing field. But the
only smoke here is the majority's, and it is the kind that goes with
mirrors.

The majority first observes that the matching funds provision is
titled "`Equal funding of candidates'" and that it refers to
matching grants as "`equalizing funds.'"
Ante, at 23 (quoting § 16-952). Well, yes. The statute provides
for matching funds (above and below certain thresholds); a synonym
for "match" is "equal"; and so the statute uses that term. In sum,
the statute describes what the statute does. But the relevant
question here (according [*2844] to the majority's own analysis) is
why the statute does that thing — otherwise said, what interest
the statute serves. The State explains that its goal is to prevent
corruption, and nothing in the Act's descriptive terms suggests any
other objective.

Next, the majority notes that the Act allows participating
candidates to accept private contributions if (but only if) the
State cannot provide the funds it has promised (for example, because
of a budget crisis). Ante, at 23 (citing § 16-954(F)).
That provision, the majority argues, shows that when push comes to
shove, the State cares more about "leveling" than about fighting
corruption. Ante, at 23. But this is a plain misreading of the
law. All the statute does is assure participating candidates
that they will not be left in the lurch if public funds suddenly
become unavailable. That guarantee helps persuade candidates to
enter the program by removing the risk of a state default. And so
the provision directly advances the Act's
goal of combating corruption.

Finally, the Court remarks in a footnote that the Clean Elections
Commission's website once stated that the "`Act was passed by the
people of Arizona . . . to level the playing field.'"
Ante, at 24, n. 10. I can understand why the majority does not
place much emphasis on this point. Some members of the majority have
ridiculed the practice of relying on subsequent statements by
legislators to demonstrate an earlier Congress's intent in enacting
a statute. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
496 U. S. 617, 631-632 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring [***31] in part);
United States v. Hayes,
555 U. S. 415, 434-435 (2009) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). Yet here
the majority makes a much stranger claim: that a statement appearing
on a government website in 2011 (written by who-knows-whom?) reveals
what hundreds of thousands of Arizona's voters sought to do in
1998 when they enacted the Clean Elections Act by referendum. Just
to state that proposition is to know it is wrong.

So the majority has no evidence — zero, none — that the objective
of the Act is anything other than the interest that the State
asserts, the Act proclaims, and the history of public financing
supports: fighting corruption.

2

But suppose the majority had come [**706] up with some evidence showing
that Arizona had sought to "equalize electoral opportunities."
Ante, at 24. Would that discovery matter? Our precedent says
no, so long as Arizona had a compelling interest in eliminating
political corruption (which it clearly did). In these circumstances,
any interest of the State in "leveling" should be irrelevant.
That interest could not support Arizona's law (assuming the law
burdened speech), but neither would the interest invalidate the
legislation.

To see the point, consider how the matter might arise.
Assume a State has two reasons to pass a statute affecting speech.
It wants to reduce corruption. But in addition, it wishes to "level
the playing field." Under our First Amendment law, the interest in
preventing corruption is compelling and may justify restraints on
speech. But the interest in "leveling the playing field," according
to well-established precedent, cannot support such
legislation.[fn13] So would this statute
(assuming [*2845] it met all other constitutional standards) violate the
First Amendment?

The answer must be no. This Court, after all, has never said
that a law restricting speech (or any other constitutional right)
demands two compelling interests. One is enough. And this statute
has one: preventing corruption. So it does not matter
that equalizing campaign speech is an insufficient interest. The
statute could violate the First Amendment only if "equalizing"
qualified as a forbidden motive — a motive that itself could annul
an otherwise constitutional law. But we have never held that to be
so. And that should not be surprising: It is a "fundamental
principle of constitutional adjudication," from which we have
deviated only in exceptional cases, "that this Court will not strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit legislative motive." United States v. O'Brien,
391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968); see id., at 384 (declining to
invalidate a statute when "Congress had the undoubted power to
enact" it without the suspect motive); accord, Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 652 (1994);
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U. S. 41, 47-48 (1986). When a law is otherwise
constitutional — when it either does not restrict speech or rests on
an interest sufficient to justify any such
restriction — that is the end of the story.

That proposition disposes of this case, even if Arizona had an
adjunct interest here in equalizing electoral opportunities.
No special rule of automatic invalidation applies to statutes having
some connection to equality; like [***32] any other laws, they pass muster
when supported by an important enough government interest. Here,
Arizona has demonstrated in detail how the matching funds provision
is [**707] necessary to serve a compelling interest in combating corruption.
So the hunt for evidence of "leveling" is a waste of time; Arizona's
law survives constitutional scrutiny no matter what that search
would uncover.

IV

This case arose because Arizonans wanted their government to work
on behalf of all the State's people. On the heels of a political
scandal involving the near-routine purchase of legislators' votes,
Arizonans passed a law designed to sever political candidates'
dependence on large contributors. They wished, as many of their
fellow Americans wish, to stop corrupt dealing — to ensure
that their representatives serve the public, and not just the
wealthy donors who helped put them in office. The legislation
that Arizona's voters enacted was the product of deep thought and
care. It put into effect a public financing system that attracted
large numbers of candidates at a sustainable cost to the State's
taxpayers. The system discriminated against no ideas and prevented
no speech. Indeed, by increasing electoral competition and enabling
a wide range of candidates to express their views, the system
"further[ed] . . . First Amendment values." Buckley,
424 U. S., at 93 (citing New York Times, 376 U. S., at 270).
Less corruption, more speech. Robust campaigns leading to the
election of representatives not beholden to the few, but accountable
to the many. The people of [*2846] Arizona might have expected a decent
respect for those objectives.

Today, they do not get it. The Court invalidates Arizonans'
efforts to ensure that in their State, "`[t]he people . . . possess
the absolute sovereignty.'" Id., at 274 (quoting James Madison
in 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 569-570 (1876)).
No precedent compels the Court to take this step; to the contrary,
today's decision is in tension with broad swaths of our
First Amendment doctrine. No fundamental principle of our Constitution
backs the Court's ruling; to the contrary, it is the law struck down
today that fostered both the vigorous competition of ideas and its
ultimate object — a government responsive to the will of the people.
Arizonans deserve better. Like citizens across this country,
Arizonans deserve a government that represents and serves them all.
And no less, Arizonans deserve the chance to reform their electoral
system so as to attain that most American of goals.

Truly, democracy is not a game. See ante, at 25. I
respectfully dissent.

[fn1] The problem is apparent in the federal system. In recent
years, the number of presidential candidates opting to receive
public financing has declined because the subsidy has not kept pace
with spending by privately financed candidates. See Corrado, Public
Funding of Presidential Campaigns, in The New Campaign Finance
Sourcebook 180, 200 (A. Corrado, T. Mann, D. Ortiz, & T. Potter
eds. 2005). The last election cycle offers a stark example:
Then-candidate Barack Obama raised $745.7 million in private funds
in 2008, Federal Election Commission, 2008 Presidential Campaign
Financial Activity
Summarized, June 8, 2009, online
at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml,
in contrast with the $105.4 million he could have received in public
funds, see Federal Election Commission, Presidential Election
Campaign Fund, online at http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml
(all Internet materials as visited June 24, 2011, and available in
Clerk of Court's case file).

[fn2] And the law appears to do that job well. Between
1998 (when the statute was enacted) and 2006, overall candidate
expenditures increased between 29% and 67%; overall independent
expenditures rose by a whopping 253%; and average candidate
expenditures grew by 12% to 40%. App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 10-239, pp. 284-285; App. 916-917.

[fn3] The majority claims that none of our subsidy cases involved
the funding of "respons[ive]" expression. See ante, at 17. But
the majority does not explain why this distinction, created to fit
the facts of this case, should matter so long as the government is
not discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. Indeed, the difference
the majority highlights should cut in the opposite direction,
because facilitating responsive speech fosters "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" public debate. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). In any event, the majority
is wrong to say that we have never approved funding to "allow the
recipient to counter" someone else's political speech.
Ante, at 17. That is exactly what we approved in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
See supra, at 5. The majority notes that the public financing
scheme in Buckley lacked the trigger mechanism used in the
Arizona law. See ante, at 17, n. 9. But again, that is just to
describe a difference, not to say why it matters. As I will show,
the trigger is constitutionally irrelevant — as we made clear in the
very case (Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n,
554 U. S. 724 (2008)) on which the majority principally relies. See
infra, at 17-19, 21-22.

[fn4] The majority argues that more speech will quickly become "less
speech," as candidates switch to public funding.
Ante, at 15, n. 7. But that claim misunderstands how a
voluntary public financing system works. Candidates with significant
financial resources will likely decline public funds, so that they
can spend in excess of the system's expenditure caps. Other
candidates accept public financing because they believe it will
enhance their communication with voters. So the system continually
pushes toward more speech. That is exactly what has happened in
Arizona, see n. 2, supra, and the majority offers no
counter-examples.

[fn5] The majority's error on this score extends both to candidates
and to independent expenditure groups. Contrary to the majority's
suggestion, see ante, at 14, n. 6, nearly all of my arguments
showing that the Clean Elections Act does not impose a substantial
burden apply to both sets of speakers (and apply regardless of
whether independent or candidate expenditures trigger the matching
funds). That is also true of every one of my arguments demonstrating
the State's compelling interest in this legislation. See
infra, at 22-26. But perhaps the best response to the
majority's view that the Act inhibits independent expenditure groups
lies in an empirical fact already noted: Expenditures by these
groups have risen by 253% since Arizona's law was enacted.
See n. 2, supra.

[fn6] I will note, however, that the record evidence of this effect
is spotty at best. The majority finds anecdotal evidence supporting
its argument on just 6 pages of a 4500-page summary judgment record.
See ante, at 18-19. (The majority also cites sections of
petitioners' briefs, which cite the same 6 pages in the record. See
ante, at 19.) That is consistent with the assessment of the
District Court Judge who presided over the proceedings in this case:
He stated that petitioners had presented only "vague" and
"scattered" evidence of the law's deterrent impact. App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 10-239, p. 54. The appellate court discerned even less
evidence of any deterrent effect. Id., at 30 ("No Plaintiff
. . . has pointed to any specific instance in which she or he has
declined a contribution or failed to make an expenditure for fear of
triggering matching funds"); see also id., at 28, 31, 34. I
understand the majority to essentially concede this point (" `it is
never easy to prove a negative,'" ante, at 20) and to say it
does not matter ("we do not need empirical evidence,"
ibid.). So I will not belabor the issue by detailing the
substantial testimony (much more than 6 pages worth) that the
matching funds provision has not put a dent in privately funded
candidates' spending.

[fn7] Of course, only publicly funded candidates receive the
subsidy. But that is because only those candidates have agreed to
abide by stringent spending caps (which privately funded candidates
can exceed by any amount). And Buckley specifically approved
that exchange as consistent with the First Amendment. See
424 U. S., at 57, n. 65, 95. By contrast, Davis involved a scheme in
which one candidate in a race received concrete fundraising
advantages, in the form of asymmetrical contribution limits, just
because his opponent had spent a certain amount of his own
money.

[fn8] Notably, the Court found this conclusion obvious even though
an across-the-board increase in contribution limits works to the
comparative advantage of the non-self-financing
candidate — that is, the candidate who actually depends on
contributions. Such a system puts the self-financing candidate to a
choice: Do I stop spending, or do I allow the higher contribution
limits (which will help my opponent) to kick in? That strategic
choice parallels the one that the Arizona statute forces. See
supra, at 15.

[fn9] The majority also briefly relies on Miami Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), but that case is
still wider of the mark. There, we invalidated a law compelling
newspapers (by threat of criminal sanction) to print a candidate's
rejoinder to critical commentary. That law, we explained, overrode
the newspaper's own editorial judgment and forced the paper both to
pay for and to convey a message with which it disagreed. See
id., at 256-258. An analogy might be if Arizona forced
privately funded candidates to purchase their opponents' posters,
and then to display those posters in their own campaign offices. But
that is very far from this case. The Arizona statute does not
require petitioners to disseminate or fund any opposing speech; nor
does it in any way associate petitioners with that speech.

[fn10] The legislative findings also echo what the Buckley
Court found true of public financing — that it "encourage[s] citizen
participation in the political process" and "promote[s] freedom of
speech" by enhancing the ability of candidates to "communicat[e] to
voters." §§ 16-940(A), (B).

[fn11] The majority briefly suggests that the State's "austere
contribution limits" lessen the need for public financing, see
ante, at 26, but provides no support for that dubious claim. As
Arizona and other jurisdictions have discovered, contribution limits
may not eliminate the risk of corrupt dealing between candidates and
donors, especially given the widespread practice of bundling small
contributions into large packages. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 31. For much this reason, Buckley upheld
both limits on contributions to federal candidates and
public financing of presidential campaigns. See
424 U. S., at 23-38, 90-108. Arizona, like Congress, was "surely entitled
to conclude" that contribution limits were only a "partial measure,"
id., at 28, and that a functional public financing system was
also necessary to eliminate political corruption. In stating
otherwise, the Court substitutes its judgment for that of Arizona's
voters, contrary to our practice of declining to "second-guess a
. . . determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where
corruption is the evil feared." Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 210 (1982).

[fn12] For this reason, the majority is quite wrong to say that the
State's interest in combating corruption does not support the
matching fund provision's application to a candidate's expenditure
of his own money or to an independent expenditure.
Ante, at 25-26. The point is not that these expenditures
themselves corrupt the political process. Rather, Arizona includes
these, as well as all other, expenditures in the program to ensure
that participating candidates receive the funds necessary to run
competitive races — and so to attract those candidates in the first
instance. That is in direct service of the State's anti-corruption
interest.

[fn13] I note that this principle relates only to actions
restricting speech. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48-49 (rejecting
the notion "that government may restrict the speech of some . . . to
enhance the relative voice of others"). As previously explained,
speech subsidies stand on a different constitutional footing, see
supra, at 10-11; so long as the government remains neutral
among viewpoints, it may choose to assist the speech of persons who
might not otherwise be heard. But here I am assuming for the sake of
argument that the Clean Elections Act imposes the kind of restraint
on expression requiring that the State show a compelling
interest.