The
Evanston woman who is the respondent here was hospitalized at Chicago-Read
Mental Health Center in 2011. A psychiatrist there filed a petition seeking a
court order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication. He made a diagnosis of “schizophrenia paranoid type” and requested
authorization to administer Risperidone for up to 90 days. The respondent was
represented by counsel at the hearing on the petition, at which she testified,
as did her 24-year-old son, who had lived with her. The son testified as to how
she conducted conversations with voices she heard in her head. The circuit
court of Cook County granted the petition for the involuntary administrative of
medication, and the respondent appealed, complaining that the circuit court had
failed to comply with the Mental Health Code’s requirement that findings of
fact be made on the record. The appellate court found that this statutory
commandment was mandatory and it reversed. The State appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court.

On
appeal, the State conceded that the statutory command had not been fully
complied with. That brought the question to the point at which it had to be
determined whether the statute was mandatory or directory. If a provision is
directory, failure to comply does not necessarily call for reversal.

In
this decision, the supreme court held that the statute was directory only. This
is what the law presumes, and although the presumption may be overcome, that
did not occur here. The statute contains no specific consequence for
noncompliance.

At
the hearing, the respondent could have requested specific findings of fact or
other clarification so that the complained-of defect could have been cured at
that time, but she did not do so. In this appeal, the respondent has not
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
treatment order. Neither did the respondent claim that the procedural
safeguards which were utilized in her case were compromised by reason of the
fact that the court expressed only its legal conclusion that the evidence
overwhelmingly supported the petition.

Although
involuntary medication orders such as this are good for only 90 days and the
particular order in question has long since expired, the supreme court
addressed the merits under the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine.

The
appellate court erred in finding the statutory provision at issue to be
mandatory rather than directory and in reversing on that basis. The circuit
court’s order was upheld and the appellate court was reversed.