U.S. Supreme Court
Lochner v. People of State of New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905)
JOSEPH LOCHNER, Plff. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK.
No. 292.
Argued February 23, 24, 1905. Decided April 17, 1905.
This is a writ of error to the county court of Oneida county, in the state
of New York (to which court the record had been remitted), to review
the judgment of the court of appeals of that state, affirming the judgment
of the supreme court, which itself affirmed the judgment of the county
court, convicting the defendant of a misdemeanor on an indictment under
a statute of that state, known, by its short title, as the labor [198 U.S. 45,
46] law. The section of the statute under which the indictment was found
is 110, and is reproduced in the margin (together with the other sections
of the labor law upon the subject of bakeries, being 111 to 115, both
inclusive).
The indictment averred that the defendant 'wrongfully and unlawfully
required and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit,
bread, and cake bakery and confectionery establishment, at the city of
Utica, in this county, to work more than sixty hours in one week,' after
having been theretofore convicted of a violation of the name act; and
therefore, as averred, he committed the crime of misdemeanor, second
offense. The plaintiff in error demurred to the indictment on several
grounds, one of which was that the facts stated did not
' 110, Hours of labor in bakeries and confectionery
establishments. — No employee shall be required or permitted to
work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or confectionery
establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more
than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a
shorter work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in
any one week than will make an average of ten hours per day for
the number of days during such week in which such employee
shall work.
' 111. Drainage and plumbing of buildings and rooms occupied by
bakeries. — All buildings or rooms occupied as biscuit, bread,
pie, or cake bakeries, shall be drained and plumbed in a manner
conducive to the proper and healthful sanitary condition thereof,
and shall be constructed with air shafts, windows, or ventilating
pipes, sufficient to insure ventilation. The factory inspector may
direct the proper drainage, plumbing, and ventilation of such
rooms or buildings. No cellar or basement, not now used for a
bakery, shall hereafter be so occupied or used, unless the
proprietor shall comply with the sanitary provisions of this article.
' 112. Requirements as to rooms, furniture, utensils, and
manufactured products. — Every room used for the manufacture
of flour or meal food products shall be at least 8 feet in height and
shall have, if deemed necessary by the factory inspector, an
impermeable floor constructed of cement, or of tiles laid in
cement, or an additional flooring of wood properly saturated with
linseed oil. The side walls of such rooms shall be plastered or
wainscoted. The factory inspector may require the side walls and
ceiling to be whitewashed at least once in three months. He may
also require the wood work of such walls to be painted. The
furniture and utensils shall be so arranged as to be readily cleansed
and not prevent the proper cleaning of any part of the room. The
manufactured flour or meal food products shall be kept in dry and
airy rooms, so arranged that the floors, shelves, and all other
facilities for storing the same can be properly cleaned. No
domestic animals, except cats, shall be allowed to remain in a
room used as a biscuit, bread, pie, or cake bakery, or any room
in such bakery where flour or meal products are stored.
' 113. Wash rooms and closets; sleeping places. — Every such
bakery shall be provided with a proper wash room and
water-closet, or water-closets, apart from the bake room, or
rooms where the manufacture of such food product is conducted,
and no water-closet, earth closet, privy, or ashpit shall be within,
or connected directly with, the bake room of any bakery, hotel, or
public restaurant. [198 U.S. 45, 47] constitute a crime. The demurrer
was overruled, and, the plaintiff in error having refused to plead
further, a plea of not guilty was entered by order of the court and
the trial commenced, and he was convicted of misdemeanor,
second offense, as indicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $ 50,
and to stand committed until paid, not to exceed fifty days in the
Oneida county jail. A certificate of reasonable doubt was granted
by the county judge of Oneida county, whereon an appeal was
taken to the appellate division of the supreme court, fourth
department, where the judgment of conviction was affirmed. 73
App. Div. 120, 76 N. Y. Supp. 396. A further appeal was then
taken to the court of appeals, where the judgment of conviction
was again affirmed. 177 N. Y. 145, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773, 69
N. E. 373.
Messrs. Frank Harvey Field and Henry Weismann (by special leave) for
plaintiff in error.
___ 'No person shall sleep in a room occupied as a bake room.
Sleeping places for the persons employed in the bakery shall be separate
from the rooms where flour or meal food products are manufactured or
stored. If the sleeping places are on the same floor where such products
are manufactured, stored, or sold, the factory inspector may inspect and
order them put in a proper sanitary condition.
' 114. Inspection of bakeries. — The factory inspector shall cause
all bakeries to be inspected. If it be found upon such inspection
that the bakeries so inspected are constructed and conducted in
compliance with the provisions of this chapter, the factory
inspector shall issue a certificate to the person owning or
conducting such bakeries.
' 115. Notice requiring alterations. — If, in the opinion of the
factory inspector, alterations are required in or upon premises
occupied and used as bakeries, in order to comply with the
provisions of this article, a written notice shall be served by him
upon the owner, agent, or lessee of such premises, either
personally or by mail, requiring such alterations to be made within
sixty days after such service, and such alterations shall be made
accordingly.' [N. Y. Laws 1897, chap 415.]
[198 U.S. 45, 50] Mr. Julius M. Mayer for defendant in error.
[198 U.S. 45, 52]
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement of the facts,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The indictment, it will be seen, charges that the plaintiff in error violated
the 110th section of article 8, chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known
as the labor law of the state of New York, in that he wrongfully and
unlawfully required and permitted an employee working for him to work
more than sixty hours in one week. There is nothing in any of the
opinions delivered in this case, either in the supreme court or the court of
appeals of the state, which construes the section, in using the word
'required,' as referring to any physical force being used to obtain the
labor of an employee. It is assumed that the word means nothing more
than the requirement arising from voluntary contract for such labor in
excess of the number of hours specified in the statute. There is no
pretense in any of the opinions that the statute was intended to meet a
case of involuntary labor in any form. All the opinions assume that there
is no real distinction, so far as this question is concerned, between the
words 'required' and 'permitted.' The mandate of the statute, that 'no
employee shall be required or permitted to work,' is the substantial
equivalent of an enactment that 'no employee shall contract or agree to
work,' more than ten hours per day; and, as there is no provision for
special emergencies, the statute is mandatory in all cases. It is not an act
merely fixing the number of hours which shall constitute a legal day's
work, but an absolute prohibition upon the employer permitting, under
any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to be done in his
establishment. The employee may desire to earn the extra money which
would arise from his working more than the prescribed [198 U.S. 45, 53]
time, but this statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee
to earn it.
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the
employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the
latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make
a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427.
Under that provision no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell
labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are
circumstances which exclude the right. There are, however, certain
powers, existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat
vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of
which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly
stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation,
relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.
Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may
be imposed by the governing power of the state in the exercise of those
powers, and with such conditions the 14th Amendment was not
designed to interfere. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205,
8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10
Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 34 L. ed.
620, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; Re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191.
The state, therefore, has power to prevent the individual from making
certain kinds of contracts, and in regard to them the Federal Constitution
offers no protection. If the contract be one which the state, in the
legitimate exercise of its police power, has the right to prohibit, it is not
prevented from prohibiting it by the 14th Amendment. Contracts in
violation of a statute, either of the Federal or state government, or a
contract to let one's property for immoral purposes, or to do any other
unlawful act, could obtain no protection from the Federal Constitution,
as coming under the liberty of [198 U.S. 45, 54] person or of free contract.
Therefore, when the state, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of
its police powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the right to
labor or the right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood
between persons who are sui juris (both employer and employee), it
becomes of great importance to determine which shall prevail, — the
right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose, or the
right of the state to prevent the individual from laboring, or from entering
into any contract to labor, beyond a certain time prescribed by the state.
This court has recognized the existence and upheld the exercise of the
police powers of the states in many cases which might fairly be
considered as border ones, and it has, in the course of its determination
of questions regarding the asserted invalidity of such statutes, on the
ground of their violation of the rights secured by the Federal
Constitution, been guided by rules of a very liberal nature, the
application of which has resulted, in numerous instances, in upholding the
validity of state statutes thus assailed. Among the later cases where the
state law has been upheld by this court is that of Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. A provision in the act
of the legislature of Utah was there under consideration, the act limiting
the employment of workmen in all underground mines or workings, to
eight hours per day, 'except in cases of emergency, where life or
property is in imminent danger.' It also limited the hours of labor in
smelting and other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or
metals to eight hours per day, except in like cases of emergency. The act
was held to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the state. A
review of many of the cases on the subject, decided by this and other
courts, is given in the opinion. It was held that the kind of employment,
mining, smelting, etc., and the character of the employees in such kinds
of labor, were such as to make it reasonable and proper for the state to
interfere to prevent the employees from being constrained by the rules
laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor. The following citation
[198 U.S. 45, 55] from the observations of the supreme court of Utah in that
case was made by the judge writing the opinion of this court, and
approved: 'The law in question is confined to the protection of that class
of people engaged in labor in underground mines, and in smelters and
other works wherein ores are reduced and refined. This law applies only
to the classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions
and effects attending underground mining and work in smelters, and
other works for the reduction and refining of ores. Therefore it is not
necessary to discuss or decide whether the legislature can fix the hours
of labor in other employments.'
It will be observed that, even with regard to that class of labor, the Utah
statute provided for cases of emergency wherein the provisions of the
statute would not apply. The statute now before this court has no
emergency clause in it, and, if the statute is valid, there are no
circumstances and no emergencies under which the slightest violation of
the provisions of the act would be innocent. There is nothing in Holden
v. Hardy which covers the case now before us. Nor does Atkin v.
Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 48 L. ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, touch the
case at bar. The Atkin Case was decided upon the right of the state to
control its municipal corporations, and to prescribe the conditions upon
which it will permit work of a public character to be done for a
municipality. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 46 L. ed.
55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, is equally far from an authority for this
legislation. The employees in that case were held to be at a disadvantage
with the employer in matters of wages, they being miners and coal
workers, and the act simply provided for the cashing of coal orders
when presented by the miner to the employer.
The latest case decided by this court, involving the police power, is that
of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, decided at this term and reported in 197
U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 49 L. ed. — . It related to compulsory
vaccination, and the law was held vaild as a proper exercise of the
police powers with reference to the public health. It was stated in the
opinion that it was a case 'of an adult who, for aught that appears, was
himself in perfect health and a fit [198 U.S. 45, 56] subject of vaccination,
and yet, while remaining in the community, refused to obey the statute
and the regulation, adopted in execution of its provisions, for the
protection of the public health and the public safety, confessedly
endangered by the presence of a dangerous disease.' That case is also
far from covering the one now before the court.
Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 44 L. ed. 716, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep.
666, was upheld as a proper exercise of the police power relating to the
observance of Sunday, and the case held that the legislature had the right
to declare that, as matter of law, keeping barber shops open on Sunday
was not a work of necessity or charity.
It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valied exercise
of the police power by the state. There is no dispute concerning this
general proposition. Otherwise the 14th Amendment would have no
efficacy and the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power,
and it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted
to conserve the morals, the health, or the safety of the people; such
legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation
the claim might be. The claim of the police power would be a mere
pretext, — become another and delusive name for the supreme
sovereignty of the state to be exercised free from constitutional restraint.
This is not contended for. In every case that comes before this court,
therefore, where legislation of this character is concerned, and where the
protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily
arises: Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family? Of
course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it.
The one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the [198 U.S. 45, 57]
court for that of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the state
it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed to
the enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain: Is it
within the police power of the state? and that question must be answered
by the court.
The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple,
may be dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable ground for
interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by
determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no
contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are
not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the
protecting arm of the state, interfering with their independence of
judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the state. Viewed
in the light of a purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the
question of health, we think that a law like the one before us involves
neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare, of the public, and that the
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.
The law must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to the health of the
individual engaged in the occupation of a baker. It does not affect any
other portion of the public than those who are engaged in that
occupation. Clean and wholesome bread does not depend upon
whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a
week. The limitation of the hours of labor does not come within the
police power on that ground.
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail, — the
power of the state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of
person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject
relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health, does not
necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct
relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate
and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes [198
U.S. 45, 58] with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
This case has caused much diversity of opinion in the state courts. In the
supreme court two of the five judges composing the court dissented
from the judgment affirming the validity of the act. In the court of appeals
three of the seven judges also dissented from the judgment upholding the
statute. Although found in what is called a labor law of the state, the
court of appeals has upheld the act as one relating to the public health,
— in other words, as a health law. One of the judges of the court of
appeals, in upholding the law, stated that, in his opinion, the regulation in
question could not be sustained unless they were able to say, from
common knowledge, that working in a bakery and candy factory was an
unhealthy employment. The judge held that, while the evidence was not
uniform, it still led him to the conclusion that the occupation of a baker or
confectioner was unhealthy and tended to result in diseases of the
respiratory organs. Three of the judges dissented from that view, and
they thought the occupation of a baker was not to such an extent
unhealthy as to warrant the interference of the legislature with the liberty
of the individual.
We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in
this case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding
this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the
public health, or the health of the individuals who are following the trade
of a baker. If this statute be valid, and if, therefore, a proper case is
made out in which to deny the right of an individual, sui juris, as
employer or employee, to make contracts for the labor of the latter
under the protection of the provisions of the Federal Constitution, there
would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature might not
go. The case differs widely, as we have already stated, from the
expressions of this court in regard to laws of this nature, as stated in
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383,
and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358,
49 L. ed. — . [198 U.S. 45, 59] We think that there can be no fair doubt
that the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one to that
degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to
labor, and with the right of free contract on the part of the individual,
either as employer or employee In looking through statistics regarding all
trades and occupations, it may be true that the trade of a baker does not
appear to be as healthy as some other trades, and is also vastly more
healthy than still others. To the common understanding the trade of a
baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one. Very likely
physicians would not recommend the exercise of that or of any other
trade as a remedy for ill health. Some occupations are more healthy than
others, but we think there are none which might not come under the
power of the legislature to supervise and control the hours of working
therein, if the mere fact that the occupation is not absolutely and
perfectly healthy is to confer that right upon the legislative department of
the government. It might be safely affirmed that almost all occupations
more or less affect the health. There must be more than the mere fact of
the possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant
legislative interference with liberty. It is unfortunately true that labor, even
in any department, may possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness.
But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative majorities? A
printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods
clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's, or a physician's clerk, or a clerk in almost
any kind of business, would all come under the power of the legislature,
on this assumption. No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's
living, could escape this all-pervading power, and the acts of the
legislature in limiting the hours of labor in all employments would be
valid, although such limitation might seriously cripple the ability of the
laborer to support himself and his family. In our large cities there are
many buildings into which the sun penetrates for but a short time in each
day, and these buildings are occupied by people carrying on the [198 U.S.
45, 60] business of bankers, brokers, lawyers, real estate, and many other
kinds of business, aided by many clerks, messengers, and other
employees. Upon the assumption of the validity of this act under review,
it is not possible to say that an act, prohibiting lawyers' or bank clerks,
or others, from contracting to labor for their employers more than eight
hours a day would be invalid. It might be said that it is unhealthy to work
more than that number of hours in an apartment lighted by artificial light
during the working hours of the day; that the occupation of the bank
clerk, the lawyer's clerk, the realestate clerk, or the broker's clerk, in
such offices is therefore unhealthy, and the legislature, in its paternal
wisdom, must, therefore, have the right to legislate on the subject of, and
to limit, the hours for such labor; and, if it exercises that power, and its
validity be questioned, it is sufficient to say, it has reference to the public
health; it has reference to the health of the employees condemned to
labor day after day in buildings where the sun never shines; it is a health
law, and therefore it is valid, and cannot be questioned by the courts.
It is also urged, pursuing the same line of argument, that it is to the
interest of the state that its population should be strong and robust, and
therefore any legislation which may be said to tend to make people
healthy must be valid as health laws, enacted under the police power. If
this be a valid argument and a justification for this kind of legislation, it
follows that the protection of the Federal Constitution from undue
interference with liberty of person and freedom of contract is visionary,
wherever the law is sought to be justified as a valid exercise of the police
power. Scarcely any law but might find shelter under such assumptions,
and conduct, properly so called, as well as contract, would come under
the restrictive sway of the legislature. Not only the hours of employees,
but the hours of employers, could be regulated, and doctors, lawyers,
scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be
forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of
exercise, lest the fighting strength [198 U.S. 45, 61] of the state be impaired.
We mention these extreme cases because the contention is extreme. We
do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law. On
the contrary, we think that such a law as this, although passed in the
assumed exercise of the police power, and as relating to the public
health, or the health of the employees named, is not within that power,
and is invalid. The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health
law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both
employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such
terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the
other parties to such contracts. Statutes of the nature of that under
review, limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor
to earn their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of
the individual, and they are not asved from condemnation by the claim
that they are passed in the exercise of the police power and upon the
subject of the health of the individual whose rights are interfered with,
unless there be some fair ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that
there is material danger to the public health, or to the health of the
employees, if the hours of labor are not curtailed. If this be not clearly
the case, the individuals whose rights are thus made the subject of
legislative interference are under the protection of the Federal
Constitution regarding their liberty of contract as well as of person; and
the legislature of the state has no power to limit their right as proposed in
this statute. All that it could properly do has been done by it with regard
to the conduct of bakeries, as provided for in the other sections of the
act, above set forth. These several sections provide for the inspection of
the premises where the bakery is carried on, with regard to furnishing
proper wash rooms and waterclosets, apart from the bake room, also
with regard to providing proper drainage, plumbing, and painting; the
sections, in addition, provide for the height of the ceiling, the cementing
or tiling of floors, where necessary in the opinion of the factory
inspector, and for other things of [198 U.S. 45, 62] that nature; alterations
are also provided for, and are to be made where necessary in the
opinion of the inspector, in order to comply with the provisions of the
statute. These various sections may be wise and valid regulations, and
they certainly go to the full extent of providing for the cleanliness and the
healthiness, so far as possible, of the quarters in which bakeries are to
be conducted. Adding to all these requirements a prohibition to enter
into any contract of labor in a bakery for more than a certain number of
hours a week is, in our judgment, so wholly beside the matter of a
proper, reasonable, and fair provision as to run counter to that liberty of
person and of free contract provided for in the Federal Constitution.
It was further urged on the argument that restricting the hours of labor in
the case of bakers was valid because it tended to cleanliness on the part
of the workers, as a man was more apt to be cleanly when not
overworked, and if cleanly then his 'output' was also more likely to be
so. What has already been said applies with equal force to this
contention. We do not admit the reasoning to be sufficient to justify the
claimed right of such interference. The state in that case would assume
the position of a supervisor, or pater familias, over every act of the
individual, and its right of governmental interference with his hours of
labor, his hours of exercise, the character thereof, and the extent to
which it shall be carried would be recognized and upheld. In our
judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the connection between the
number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful
quality of the bread made by the workman. The connection, if any exist,
is too shadowy and thin to build any argument for the interference of the
legislature. If the man works ten hours a day it is all right, but if ten and a
half or eleven his health is in danger and his bread may be unhealthy,
and, therefore, he shall not be permitted to do it. This, we think, is
unreasonable and entirely arbitrary. When assertions such as we have
adverted to become necessary in order to give, if possible, a plausible
foundation for the contention that the law is a 'health law,' [198 U.S. 45, 63]
it gives rise to at least a suspicion that there was some other motive
dominating the legislature than the purpose to subserve the public health
or welfare.
This interference on the part of the legislatures of the several states with
the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the
increase. In the supreme court of New York, in the case of People v.
Beattie, appellate division, first department, decided in 1904 (96 App.
Div. 383, 89 N. Y. Supp. 193), a statute regulating the trade of
horseshoeing, and requiring the person practising such trade to be
examined, and to obtain a certificate from a board of examiners and file
the same with the clerk of the county wherein the person proposes to
practise such trade, was held invalid, as an arbitrary interference with
personal liberty and private property without due process of law. The
attempt was made, unsuccessfully, to justify it as a health law.
The same kind of a statute was held invalid (Re Aubry) by the supreme
court of Washington in December, 1904. 78 Pac. 900. The court held
that the act deprived citizens of their liberty and property without due
process of law, and denied to them the equal protection of the laws. It
also held that the trade of a horseshoer is not a subject of regulation
under the police power of the state, as a business concerning and
directly affecting the health, welfare, or comfort of its inhabitants; and
that, therefore, a law which provided for the examination and registration
of horseshoers in certain cities was unconstitutional, as an illegitimate
exercise of the police power.
The supreme court of Illinois, in Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 56 L.
R. A. 558, 62 N. E. 215, also held that a law of the same nature,
providing for the regulation and licensing of horseshoers, was
unconstitutional as an illegal interference with the liberty of the individual
in adopting and pursuing such calling as he may choose, subject only to
the restraint necessary to secure the common welfare. See also
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437, 6 Atl. 354; Low v. Rees
Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 145, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670,
59 N. W. 362. In [198 U.S. 45, 64] these cases the courts upheld the right
of free contract and the right to purchase and sell labor upon such terms
as the parties may agree to.
It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws
of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police
power for the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in
reality, passed from other motives. We are justified in saying so when,
from the character of the law and the subject upon which it legislates, it
is apparent that the public health or welfare bears but the most remote
relation to the law. The purpose of a statute must be determined from
the natural and legal effect of the language employed; and whether it is or
is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be
determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into
operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose. Minnesota v. Barber,
136 U.S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 862; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 34 L. ed. 862, 3 Inters.
Com. Rep. 485, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213. The court looks beyond the
mere letter of the law in such cases. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064
It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for
in this section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and
the plaintiff in error convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such
substantial effect upon, the health of the employee, as to justify us in
regarding the section as really a health law. It seems to us that the real
object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between
the master and his employees (all being men, Sui juris), in a private
business, not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real and
substantial degree to the health of the employees. Under such
circumstances the freedom of master and employee to contract with
each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same,
cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal
Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, as well as that of
the Supreme Court and of the County Court of Oneida County, must be
reversed and the case remanded to [198 U.S. 45, 65] the County Court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED.