Hamid Karzai's fits of pique play into the hands of the faint hearts within
the Nato coalition in Afghanistan, writes Con Coughlin.

Hamid Karzai is more likely to find himself treated as an unwelcome gatecrasher than the guest of honour when he arrives in Lisbon today for the Nato summit.

At a time when the alliance has upwards of 100,000 troops daily risking their lives in defence of his government, the Afghan president's attendance was initially regarded as crucial to deciding how best to prosecute the war. But after his latest intemperate outburst, in which he publicly condemned Nato's decapitation policy against the Taliban, the mission's commanders are no longer so sure. To be blunt, they want to know whose side he's really on.

Mr Karzai's rant this week, in which he berated General David Petraeus for the success of his "kill or capture" strategy, has raised fresh questions about his commitment to the Nato cause. On one level, he understands that without its support and the billions of dollars he receives from Washington, his government would collapse and he would be forced to flee into exile.

But then there is another side to Mr Karzai's somewhat schizophrenic temperament that resents the West's ability to influence policy in his country. It is no doubt for this reason that he saw nothing wrong in allowing Iran to "donate" millions of dollars in aid to his government, even though Tehran makes no secret of the fact that it is desperate for the Nato mission to fail.

Yet it is the timing of Mr Karzai's latest outburst that has really riled Nato's leadership, especially Gen Petraeus, who devotes every waking hour to making sure the mission achieves its goals. The high command is furious that Mr Karzai made his comments just as the new counter-insurgency strategy that was implemented at the start of this year is beginning to pay dividends. American officials have reported that 339 mid-level Taliban commanders and 949 soldiers have been assassinated by coalition forces over the past three months. As a result, the average age of Taliban commanders in Afghanistan has fallen from 35 to 25.

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"Harvesting insurgents" – to use the phraseology favoured by British Special Forces – is just one element, though, of a far broader strategy for stabilising the country. Another important objective is to persuade the Taliban to lay down its arms and negotiate a settlement.

The Nato calculation is that the more military pressure you put on the Taliban, the more likely it is to embrace political reconciliation. And to judge by the recent peace overtures made by some of the group's leaders, the strategy appears to be working. All the more reason, then, to maintain the current tempo of operations. Just as happened to the IRA in Northern Ireland, at some point the insurgents will wake up to the fact that they can never achieve their goals through acts of terrorism.

For Mr Karzai to demand publicly that Gen Petraeus call a halt to operations against the Taliban completely undermines one of the central planks of the strategy, and explains why America's most successful military commander is now talking about the partnership becoming "untenable".

More than that, Mr Karzai's constant fits of pique simply play into the hands of the faint hearts within the Nato coalition – including, I fear, our own Prime Minister – who appear more interested in talking about withdrawal timetables than about how they actually intend to win the conflict.

David Cameron claimed this week that the end was in sight for Britain's involvement in Afghanistan, a Panglossian assessment that makes sense only if your goal is to withdraw our troops at the earliest available opportunity, rather than when the mission has been accomplished. And if that happens, Mr Karzai will have only himself to blame.