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According to Frege, truth is at best a very strange kind of property. I expound Frege's redundancy/omnipresence thesis according to which the two sides of an instance of the Denominalization Schema express the same proposition, argue that this thesis is compatible with the assumption of truth‐value gaps, and begin to raise (Bolzanian) doubts about it. According to truth‐theoretical nihilism, truth isn’t a property even in the most liberal sense of this word. I explain that sense and give a detailed critical exposition of several versions of nihilism including the so‐called performative theory...

According to Frege, truth is at best a very strange kind of property. I expound Frege's redundancy/omnipresence thesis according to which the two sides of an instance of the Denominalization Schema express the same proposition, argue that this thesis is compatible with the assumption of truth‐value gaps, and begin to raise (Bolzanian) doubts about it. According to truth‐theoretical nihilism, truth isn’t a property even in the most liberal sense of this word. I explain that sense and give a detailed critical exposition of several versions of nihilism including the so‐called performative theory and three prosentential theories. The fact that some truth‐candidates have names plays a key role in my argument against nihilism.