1. The case originated in an application (no.
18944/02) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mihai Corsacov (“the
applicant”), on 6 August 2001.

2. The applicant was represented by Ms Doina
Straisteanu, acting initially on behalf of the “Moldovan Helsinki
Committee of Human Rights”, a non-governmental organisation based
in Chişinău, and later on her own. The Moldovan Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Vitalie Pârlog.

3. The applicant alleged that he had been subjected
to severe police brutality and that the authorities had failed to carry
out an adequate investigation into the incident, in breach of Article
3. He also complained under Article 13 of the Convention.

4. The application
was allocated to the Fourth Section. On 22 June 2004 a Chamber of that
Section decided to communicate the application to the Government.

5. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly
composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).

6. By a decision of 13 September 2005 the Court
declared the application admissible.

7. The applicants and the Government each filed
observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

8. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in
Cărpineni, Moldova.

9. On 9 July 1998 the applicant, who was seventeen
years old, was arrested on charges of theft. On the way to the police
car he made an attempt to throw away a pocket-knife. After being alerted
by a passer-by, the police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac threw the
applicant to the ground. According to the applicant, they also punched
him in the face and handcuffed him. They also allegedly assaulted him
all the way to the police station.

10. At the police station the police officers
allegedly continued beating the applicant during questioning. They kicked
him, punched him and beat him with batons all over his body and on the
soles of his feet in order to obtain a confession. During the beatings
he was handcuffed. He was also allegedly suspended on a metal bar for
a long period of time. The Government deny these allegations.

11. On 10 July 1998 the applicant claims to have
been taken by the arresting police officers to a forest for the reconstruction
of the crime. He was allegedly beaten up on the way to the forest. In
the forest, one of the officers allegedly put a gun to the applicant’s
head and threatened to shoot him if he did not confess. He was released
from detention in the evening. It appears from the documents submitted
by the parties that the applicant confessed to having committed the
theft. However, later the criminal proceedings against him were discontinued
on grounds of lack of “constitutive elements” of an offence.

12. According to the Government, the applicant
could not have been threatened with a gun by the police officers because
they did not accompany him to the woods. He was taken to the woods for
investigation purposes, but not for a reconstruction of the crime.

13. On 11 July 1998, the applicant’s state of
health worsened and his mother took him to a doctor who established
that he had suffered a head trauma and cerebral post-concussion syndrome.

14. On 13 July 1998 a forensic doctor examined
the applicant and established that he had grey-yellowish bruises of
3 x 2 cm and of 6 x 5 cm around his right eye, right ear, lips and on
the sole of his left foot. The soft tissue on his head and his teeth
on the right side were painful when touched. The doctor concluded that
the injuries could have been inflicted by blows with a blunt object,
possibly in the conditions described by the applicant, and corresponded
to the category of light corporal injuries.

15. On 13 July 1998 the applicant’s mother lodged
a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office of Hânceşti County,
asking it to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers
who had allegedly ill-treated her son and threatened him with death.

16. On 14 July 1998 an ear, nose and throat specialist
examined the applicant and concluded that he was suffering from hyperaemia
and had a central perforation of the right tympanic membrane.

17. On 28 July 1998 another specialist concluded
that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic acute otitis media
on the right side and agnogenic otitis on the left side with perceptive
deafness.

18. Between 14 and 25 July, 30 July and 22 August,
2 and 17 September and 14 October and 3 November 1998, the applicant was
hospitalised with the diagnosis of head trauma and sudden deafness (surditate de
percepţie brusc instalată).

19. On 3 August 1998 the applicant’s mother
was informed by the Hânceşti Prosecutor’s Office that her complaint
had been dismissed on grounds of lack of “constitutive elements”
of an offence. She appealed against that decision to a hierarchically
superior prosecutor.

20. On 21 August 1998 the applicant’s mother
received a letter from a hierarchically superior prosecutor of the Hânceşti
Prosecutor’s Office informing her that her appeal had been dismissed.
She appealed against that decision to the Hânceşti District Court.

21. On 16 November 1998 the Hânceşti District
Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision to dismiss the applicant’s
complaint about ill-treatment and ordered that an additional investigation
be carried out. It found inter alia that it was undisputed that the applicant had sustained
his injuries on 9 July 1998 either at the police station or on the way
there; however, the circumstances were not clear. The court also found
that the Hânceşti Prosecutor’s Office had not paid sufficient attention
to the fact that since 9 July 1998 the applicant had been permanently
undergoing medical treatment in hospital and had thus been prevented
from attending school.

22. On 15 January 1999 the Hânceşti Prosecutor’s
Office issued a new decision by which it again refused to institute
criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated
the applicant. In the decision it was stated inter alia that the injuries sustained by the applicant had
been caused by his fall on 9 July 1998, when the police officers had
to throw him to the ground in order to counter his attack with a knife
on one of them. The decision relied on a medical report dated 14 January
1999 which stated that the injuries could have been inflicted either
by a blunt object or by a fall. The applicant’s mother appealed to
the Prosecutor General’s Office.

23. On 25 February 1999 the Prosecutor General’s
Office quashed the decision of 15 January 1999 for being “premature”
and the file was remitted to the Prosecutor’s Office of Hânceşti
County for “additional review”. The Prosecutor’s Office considered inter alia
that the investigation had failed to elucidate the circumstances of
the alleged attack with a knife committed by the applicant on one of
the police officers.

24. On 15 March 1999 the Prosecutor’s Office of
Hânceşti County issued a new decision by which it refused to institute
criminal proceedings against the police officers on the ground that
their actions did not disclose any signs of an offence.

25. On 25 March 1999 the hierarchically superior
prosecutor quashed the decision of 15 March 1999 on the ground that
the applicant’s alleged attack with a knife on the police officers
had not been properly investigated.

26. On 9 April 1999 the Prosecutor’s Office
of Hânceşti County issued a new decision by which it again refused
to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers, because
their actions were justified. At the same time the Prosecutor’s Office
found that the applicant did not attack the police officers with a knife,
but rather the police officers thought that there was a risk of his
attacking them. The applicant’s mother appealed to the hierarchically
superior prosecutor.

27. On 1 May 1999 the hierarchically superior
prosecutor quashed the decision of 9 April 1999 and ordered the institution
of criminal proceedings against the two police officers.

28. On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged
a complaint with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

29. On 14 June 1999 the Ministry of Internal Affairs
informed the applicant that disciplinary sanctions would be imposed
on police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac only to the extent that they
were found guilty in the criminal proceedings.

30. On 20 September 1999 the Hânceşti Prosecutor’s
Office issued a decision dismissing the criminal investigation. The
decision found inter alia that the applicant had had a knife in his hand but
that he had not tried to attack the police officers with it. The applicant’s
mother appealed against the decision.

31. On 18 November 1999 the hierarchically superior
prosecutor of the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the appeal.
In the decision it was stated inter alia that the injuries sustained by the applicant had
been caused by his fall on 9 July 1998, when the applicant had made
an attempt to throw away a knife but the police officers had thought
that he was going to use it against them and had thrown him to the ground.
The applicant’s state of health was “normal” and none of the witnesses
had seen the police beating him. The applicant’s mother appealed.

32. On 10 February 2000 the Prosecutor General’s
Office upheld the applicant’s appeal and ordered the re-opening of
the criminal investigation. It stated inter alia that the investigation had been conducted “in
an extremely superficial manner”. It instructed the investigators inter alia
to re-hear the witnesses and the parties to the case and to investigate
whether the police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac had fired a gun
in the woods. It also ordered the conduct of a medical investigation
of the applicant and pointed to several contradictory statements of
the witnesses and to procedural irregularities.

33. On 28 February 2000, at the request of investigator
V.B. from the Hânceşti Prosecutor’s Office, an independent medical
commission of four experienced forensic doctors performed a thorough
medical investigation. On the basis of earlier medical certificates
and of its own investigation the commission drafted a report which stated inter alia
that:

“At the forensic examination
it was found that [the applicant] had bruises around his right eye,
right ear, on his lips and on the sole of his left foot.

From [the applicant]’s records
it appears that at the age of eight months... he suffered purulent otitis
in his left ear.

On 11 July 1998 a neurologist
found that [the applicant] had suffered an acute head trauma with cerebrostenic
syndrome.

On 14 July 1998 an ear, nose
and throat specialist found that [the applicant] had suffered from tympanic
hyperaemia and had a central perforation of the right tympanic membrane
as a result of a barotrauma [an injury caused by rapid and extreme changes
in pressure] of 9 July 1998.

On 14 July 1998, [the applicant]
did not appear to have any injury to his teeth.

On 28 July 1998 an ear, nose
and throat specialist found that [the applicant] had suffered post-traumatic
acute otitis media on the right side and agnogenic otitis on the left
side. He suffered from sudden deafness (surditate de percepţie brusc instalată).

On 9 October 1998 a neurologist
found that as a consequence of the head trauma [the applicant] was suffering
intracranial hypertension with signs of epilepsy.

On 20 April 2000 [the applicant]
was examined by an otolaryngologist who found that he was suffering
from post-traumatic bilateral hypoacusis [slightly diminished auditory
sensitivity, with hearing threshold levels above normal]. Hospitalisation
was recommended.

...

1. On the basis of the above,
the commission comes to the conclusion that M. Corsacov suffered injuries
in the form of bruises on his face (right eye, right ear and lips) and
the sole of his left foot; head trauma and concussion; post-traumatic
acute otitis media on the right side and agnogenic otitis on the left
side with bilateral hypoacusis.

... The applicant’s injuries
necessitated medical treatment of a long duration and could be qualified
as moderately serious (mai puţin grave).

...

3. The commission does not have
any objective grounds to believe that the injuries could have been sustained
by the applicant prior to 9 July 1998.

4. The injuries were inflicted
by blows with blunt objects (aceste leziuni au fost cauzate prin acţiunea corpurilor contondente
(lovire)), possibly in the circumstances described by the applicant
and they could not have been sustained as a result of a fall (n-au putut fi produse prin cădere).

5. ...Currently Mr Corsacov’s
state of health is relatively satisfactory and he suffers of posttraumatic
bilateral hypoacusis...”

34. On 10 June 2000 the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s
Office issued a decision dismissing the criminal investigation. The
decision found inter alia that the applicant had had a knife in his hand but
that he had not tried to attack the police officers with it. The applicant’s
mother appealed against the decision.

35. On 12 July 2000 the Prosecutor General’s
Office quashed the decision of 10 June 2000 and ordered that an additional
investigation be carried out. It found inter alia that the quashed decision was illegal and had a
tendentious character. It stated inter alia:

“Contrary to the conclusion
of the medical commission, which clearly found that Corsacov’s injuries
were inflicted by blows with a blunt object, possibly in the circumstances
described by the applicant and that they could not have been sustained
as a result of a fall, investigator V.B. indicated in his decision that
the injuries were caused by the applicant’s fall...”

36. On 30 August 2000 the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s
Office issued a decision by which it dismissed the criminal investigation
against the applicant for the alleged attack with a knife on the police
officers on 9 July 1998. It found that there were no grounds to believe
that the applicant intended to use the knife against the police officers.

37. On 31 August 2000 the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s
Office issued a decision by which the criminal proceedings against the
police officers were also dismissed. It stated inter alia that the applicant had had a knife in his hand and
that the police officers had interpreted that as a threat and had thrown
him to the ground. Accordingly, the applicant had sustained his injuries
by hitting the ground with his head while the police officers had been
acting in legitimate defence. The applicant appealed against this decision.

38. On 21 January 2001 the decision of 26 August
2000 was quashed by the Prosecutor General’s Office and the criminal
proceedings were re-opened.

39. On 28 February 2001 the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s
Office again dismissed the criminal investigation against the police
officers. The applicant appealed.

40. On 20 March 2001 the hierarchically superior
prosecutor from the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision
of 28 February 2001 and ordered the re-opening of the investigation.

41. On 20 June 2001 the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s
Office issued a decision by which it dismissed the applicant’s complaint.
It stated inter alia that:

“... According to the medical
certificate of 15 January 1998, Corsacov had bruises around his right
eye, right ear, and consequences of a barotrauma, head trauma, which
could have been caused by a fall and which fell in the category of light
corporal injuries.

According to the conclusion
of the Commission [the medical report of 28 February 2000], Corsacov’s
teeth were not injured and it was discovered that he was suffering from
post-traumatic acute otitis media on the right side and agnogenic otitis
on the left side with bilateral hypoacusis, which could also have been
caused by blows.

It is not disputed that the
applicant was injured; however, his injuries were inflicted within the
limits of the law. As to the agnogenic otitis on the left side, the
applicant was suspected of having suffered from it since his childhood...
According to doctor A.M., the agnogenic otitis on the left side is not
connected with the otitis on the right side and could have been caused
by a cold or an infection but not by a blow.

Deafness can have a multitude
of causes, and in order to know its origin it is important to determine
the moment of its appearance. In the present case it is impossible to
establish the exact moment of commencement of the applicant’s deafness;
more so since, in his first declaration, Corsacov stated that only after
receiving the blows did he start to experience ringing in his right
ear, but he did not say anything about the pain and the deafness in
his left ear.

The police officers [A. Tulbu
and V. Dubceac] and the witness C. stated that on 9 July 1998, on the
way to the police station, no physical force was used against the applicant
except when he was relieved of a knife that he had in his hand. Then,
by means of a special technique, the applicant was thrown to the ground,
which he hit with his head...

Corsacov admitted having had
a knife and explained that he had been trying to throw it away in order
to avoid trouble at the police station.

The police officers M.I and
D.I. who were present at the police station on 9 July 1998 stated that
nobody used physical force against the applicant in their presence,
no handcuffs were used and that he was not beaten with a baton...

The applicant’s mother stated
that in the evening of 9 July 1998 she saw her son at the police station
and he did not have any injuries... The applicant’s uncle B.V. also
stated that he had seen the applicant in the police station on 10 July
1998 between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. and that he did not have any sign of injury...
and the applicant did not complain to him about having been assaulted.

...

The injuries sustained by Corsacov
were caused by his hitting the ground with his head when police officers
A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac faced a real threat of injury. The officers
acted within the limits of Articles 14 and 15 of the Law on Police while
relieving him of his knife.”

42. The decision did not include any reference
to the applicant’s allegation that on 10 July 1998 he was taken to
the woods and threatened with death. The applicant appealed.

43. After 20 June 2001 the investigation was re-opened
and closed on several occasions. The final decision closing the investigation
was that of 10 January 2002 of the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s Office.

44. After the case was declared admissible by
the Court, on 7 November 2005, the Prosecutor General’s Office ordered
the re-opening of the investigation. The re-opened investigation is
still pending. According to the Government the re-opening was prompted
by the Prosecutor General’s concern that the injuries sustained by
the applicant in July 1998 had deteriorated into invalidity of the second
degree which under Moldovan law is equivalent to a loss of working capacity
of 50-75%, and that the applicant needed permanent medical treatment.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

45. The Code of Criminal Procedure in force between
24 March 1961 and 12 June 2003 provides:

“Section 193. Written complaints
concerning acts of the criminal investigation organs or concerning acts
of the criminal investigator shall be addressed to the prosecutor.

Section 194. The prosecutor
shall examine the complaint and communicate his decision to the interested
person within three days of its receipt. If the complaint is dismissed,
the prosecutor shall give reasons for his decision.

Section 195/1. The decisions
of the criminal investigation organs and of the prosecutor may be challenged
in court by an accused, a lawyer, a victim ....

The persons specified in the
first paragraph have the right to challenge in court ...decisions regarding
the suspension and dismissal of criminal proceedings ...

A complaint shall be addressed
to the competent District Court within ten days of the date on which
the interested person learns about the decision.

Section 195/3. A person whose
rights have been infringed by a refusal to institute criminal proceedings
may challenge in court the decision regarding the dismissal of criminal
proceedings within ten days of the date on which he learns about the
decision.

Section 195/4. ... The competent
court shall examine the reasons for the refusal to institute criminal
proceedings and their conformity with procedural law. Following the
examination, the court can adopt one of the following decisions:

1) to quash the decision to
refuse to initiate criminal proceedings;

2) to modify the reasons given
for the refusal while upholding the refusal;

3) to dismiss the complaint....”

46. The old Criminal Code in force between 24
March 1961 and 12 June 2003 states:

“Section 185. ... An abuse
of power accompanied by acts of violence, by use of arms or by acts
of torture and humiliation is sanctioned with imprisonment of three
to ten years and with a prohibition on carrying out certain activities
for a period of up to five years. ...”

47. The old Civil Code in force until 12 June
2003 states:

“Section 475. Any damage
caused to a person or to his or her goods... shall be entirely redressed
by the person who caused it...

No duty of restitution shall
arise in respect of damage caused by legitimate actions, except in the
cases provided for by law.”

48. The Law on Police of 18 December 1990 states:

“Section 14. Conditions and
limits of the use of force, special techniques and fire-arms

Police officers have the right
to use force, special techniques and fire-arms in the cases and in the
manner provided for in the present law. The use of force, of special
techniques and of fire-arms shall be preceded by a warning about the
intention to use them, and sufficient time shall be allowed for reaction,
except in cases in which a delayed use of force... may generate a direct
threat to the life and health of citizens or police officers or may
lead to serious consequences.

...

In any case, when the use of
force cannot be avoided, police officers are obliged to do their best
in order to cause the least harm possible to the health, honour, dignity
and goods of citizens, as well as to ensure medical assistance is provided
to victims.

In case of injury or death
caused as a result of use of force... the police officer shall report
it to his direct superior, in order that the latter may inform a prosecutor.

The abuse of the power to use
force... shall be punished in accordance with the law.

Section 15. The use of physical
force

Police officers are entitled
to use force and special fight techniques for the purpose of ending
criminal activities and for neutralising resistance to legal demands,
only in cases in which non-violent methods are not sufficient for the
discharging of their obligations.”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3
OF THE CONVENTION

49. The applicant alleged a violation of Article
3 of the Convention, which states as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

50. The Court notes that this complaint refers
both to the ill-treatment suffered by the applicant and to the authorities’
investigation in respect of that ill-treatment.

A. The submissions of the parties

51. According to the applicant, the salaries and
career prospects enjoyed by Moldovan police officers depend on the number
of detected offences. This favours the practice of ill-treating suspects
in order to obtain confessions from them.

52. He submitted that he was threatened with death
and severely beaten up by the police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac.
He relied in particular on the medical report of 28 February 2000, issued
by an independent commission of forensic doctors appointed by the Prosecutor’s
Office (see paragraph 33 above), which, according to him, confirmed
the gravity of his injuries. As a result of the beatings he became deaf
and incapable of working while still being a minor. According to the
applicant the treatment applied to him amounted to torture.

53. In their observations on the admissibility
and merits of the case of September 2004, the Government reiterated
the arguments from the decision of the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s Office
of 20 June 2001 (see paragraph 41 above). In their supplementary observations
on the merits of November 2005 the Government argued that the applicant’s
submissions were groundless and that in any event the treatment did
not go beyond the threshold set by Article 3 of the Convention. They
referred to the findings of the Lăpuşna Prosecutor’s Office in its
decision of 20 June 2001 and argued that all the injuries sustained
by the applicant were caused by his fall. According to them, the police
officers acted within the limits of the law. The Government argued that
the applicant had not been able to prove a causal link between the actions
of the police officers and his invalidity. According to them, the deterioration
of the applicant’s health could have been a result of the fact that
his health was particularly vulnerable or of an inadequate medical treatment,
such as an inadequate medication. The throwing of the applicant to the
ground caused him light injuries but not invalidity of the second degree.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. Concerning the alleged ill-treatment

54. As the Court has stated on many occasions,
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic
societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight
against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute
terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike
most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos.
1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation
from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a
public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V, and
the Assenov
and Others v. Bulgaria judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 93).

55. The Court recalls that where a person is injured
while in detention or otherwise under the control of the police, any
such injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the person was
subjected to ill-treatment (see Bursuc v. Romania, no. 42066/98, § 80, 12 October 2004). It
is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how
the injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article
3 of the Convention (Selmouni v. France,§ 87). It is not sufficient for the State to refer merely
to the acquittal of the accused police officers in the course of a criminal
prosecution, and consequently, the acquittal of officers on a charge
of having assaulted an individual will not discharge the burden of proof
on the State under Article 3 of the Convention to show that the injuries
suffered by that individual whilst under police control were not caused
by the police officers (Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A
no. 336, §§ 34, 38).

(a) The Court’s finding of facts

56. It is undisputed that between his arrest on
9 July 1998 and the evening of 10 July 1998 the applicant was under the
control of the police. It is also undisputed that the applicant sustained
his injuries during that period of time.

57. The core of the Government’s submissions
is that the applicant’s injuries were sustained when he was thrown
to the ground on 9 July 1998 on the way to the police station (see paragraph
53 above).

58. The Court is not convinced by the reasons
given by the Government and considers that they have failed to provide
a plausible explanation as to how the applicant’s injuries were caused.
It notes that a medical report of 28 February 2000 drafted by an independent
commission of four experienced forensic doctors, appointed by the Prosecutor’s
Office, clearly stated that the applicant’s injuries could not have
been caused by a fall but only by blows with blunt objects (see paragraph
33 above). It also notes that the conclusions of the medical commission
were not challenged by the parties to the domestic proceedings and the
Government have not submitted any evidence to the Court which would
undermine the medical commission’s clear conclusions. The Court therefore
considers this report to have strong probative value as to the way in
which the applicant’s injuries were caused.

59. In addition to the finding that the applicant’s
head injuries were inflicted by blows with blunt objects and could not
have been caused by a fall, it is also to be noted that in the report
of the medical commission of 28 February 2000, there is a clear finding
to the effect that the applicant had bruises on the sole of his left
foot, which again could have been inflicted only by blows with a blunt
object. This finding is consistent with the applicant’s complaint
about being beaten with a baton on the soles of his feet in order to
induce him to confess. However, the domestic authorities disregarded
the findings of the medical commission and reached a general conclusion
that all the applicant’s injuries resulted from his hitting the ground
with his head, a conclusion which the Court considers to be lacking
in credibility.

60. On the basis of all the material placed before
it, the Court concludes that the Government have not satisfied the burden
on them to persuade it that the applicant’s injuries were caused otherwise
than by the ill-treatment he underwent while in police custody.

61. The medical evidence shows that the applicant
was beaten with blunt objects about the head and on the sole of his
left foot. It appears that as a result of the beatings he suffered an
acute head trauma and a concussion; he had numerous bruises on his face,
around his right ear and on the sole of his left foot; he had a perforation
of a tympanic membrane as a result of a injury (see paragraph 33) and
suffered sudden deafness which later led to diminished hearing (ibid.).
It appears that more recently the applicant’s injuries have deteriorated
into invalidity of the second degree, which under Moldovan law corresponds
to a loss of working capacity of 50-75%.

62. In view of the fact that the applicant’s
allegation about being threatened with a gun is disputed by the parties
and that no evidence has been adduced by the applicant, the Court finds
itself incapable of reaching any conclusion in that respect.

(b) The characterisation of the treatment under
Article 3

63. The Court shall further determine the form
of ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant. In determining whether
a particular form of ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, consideration
must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this
notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous
cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should,
by means of this distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25,
pp. 66-67, § 167). The fact that pain or suffering was deliberately
inflicted for the purpose of obtaining a confession is a further factor
to be taken into account in deciding whether ill-treatment amounted
to torture (Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, § 64; Salman v. Turkey, [GC], no. 21986/93, § 114, ECHR 2000-VII).

64. In the present case the Court notes in particular
the intensity of the blows inflicted to the applicant, as a result of
which he suffered very serious injuries (see paragraph 61 above). As
a result of these injuries, the applicant spent approximately 70 days
in hospital at different periods between July and November 1998 (see
paragraph 18 above). An important element to be taken into consideration
is the consequences which the ill-treatment had on the applicant’s
health (see paragraph 61 above). The Court also attaches great importance
to his young age (seventeen at the time of the events) which made him
particularly vulnerable in front of his aggressors.

65. However, the decisive element in determining
the form of ill-treatment is the practice of falaka (beating of the soles) to which the applicant was subjected.
This is a particularly reprehensible form of ill-treatment which presupposes
an intention to obtain information, inflict punishment or intimidate.
The Court recalls that in the case of Salman v. Turkey, cited above, § 115) it found that the practice of falaka,
accompanied by a blow to the chest, amounted to torture.

66. In such circumstances, the Court considers
that the violence inflicted upon the applicant was of a particularly
serious nature, capable of provoking severe pain and cruel suffering
which fall to be treated as acts of torture for the purpose of Article
3 of the Convention.

67. In the light of the above, the Court concludes
that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

2. Concerning the alleged inadequacy of
the investigation

68. The Court recalls that where an individual
makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing
Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the
State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general
duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”,
requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation.
As with an investigation under Article 2, such investigation should
be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those
responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental
importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some
cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their
control with virtual impunity (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000-IV).

69. The investigation must also be effective in
the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether
the force used by the police was or was not justified in the circumstances
(see Kaya
v. Turkey judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, § 87).

The investigation into serious allegations of
ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must
always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not
rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation
or as the basis of their decisions (see the Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria judgment cited above, § 103
et seq.). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure
the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see, Tanrıkulu v. Turkey
[GC], no. 23763/94, ECHR 1999-IV, § 104 et seq. and Gül v. Turkey, no. 22676/93, § 89, 14 December 2000). Any deficiency
in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause
of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling
foul of this standard.

70. Finally, the investigation must be expeditious.
In cases under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the effectiveness
of the official investigation was at issue, the Court often assessed
whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant
time (see Labita v. Italy cited above, § 133).

71. The Court notes that the investigation lasted
for more than three years, during which period it was closed and re-opened
at least twelve times. All the decisions which dismissed the complaints
reached the same conclusion: that the sole cause of the applicant’s
injuries was his hitting the ground with his head when thrown by the
police officers in order to relieve him of his knife. They also stated
that the police officers had been entitled to use force since the applicant’s
knife presented a threat to their lives and health and that they acted
within the limits of the law.

72. The Court further notes that the domestic
authorities did not give an explanation of the discrepancy between the
conclusions in the report of the medical commission of 28 February 2000,
which clearly stated that the injuries could only have been sustained
as a result of beating, and the version of the facts presented by police
officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac.

73. It is also to be noted that the investigation
did not attempt to give a logical explanation of the origin of bruises
on the sole of the applicant’s foot and ignored them.

74. The Court also notes that the domestic authorities
did not react in any way to the applicant’s complaint about the threat
to shoot him in the head on 10 July 1998 despite the applicant’s very
clear allegation in that respect.

75. In the light of the above, the Court considers
that the investigation was characterised by a number of serious and
unexplained omissions. It ended with decisions which contained inconsistencies
and conclusions unsupported by a careful analysis of the facts. The
authorities ignored certain facts and omitted reference in their decisions
to troubling facts.

76. In these circumstances the Court holds that
there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect
also.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

77. The applicant argues that he did not have
an effective remedy before a national authority in respect of the breaches
of Articles 3 of the Convention and alleges a violation of Article 13,
which provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority ....”

A. The submissions of the parties

78. The applicant submitted inter alia that due to the outcome of the criminal investigation
in respect of his ill-treatment, he was prevented from bringing a civil
action for damages against the police officers.

79. According to the Government, in order to afford
the applicant an effective remedy, on 7 November 2005 the Prosecutor General’s
Office ordered the re-opening of the criminal investigation concerning
his alleged ill-treatment by police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac.
They submit that there has been no violation of Article 13.

B. The Court’s assessment

80. As found above, the applicant’s right not
to be subjected to torture and to benefit from an effective investigation
of his complaints about torture were breached by the State. The applicant’s
complaints in this regard were therefore “arguable” for the purposes
of Article 13 (see the Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988,
Series A no. 131, p. 23, § 52).

81. According to the Moldovan Civil Code in force
at the material time (see paragraph 47 above), the applicant could have
claimed compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, only
if the damage was caused by illegal acts. Since the criminal investigation,
conducted by the domestic authorities, concluded that the actions of
police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac were legal, any civil action
against them would have been ineffective.

82. In such circumstances, the Court concludes
that the applicant did not have an effective remedy under domestic law
to claim compensation for his ill-treatment and accordingly there has
been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention as regards the complaint
under Article 3.

III. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

83. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Non-pecuniary damage

84. The applicant claimed EUR 20,000 for non-pecuniary
damage suffered as a result of the torture and of the failure of the
authorities properly to investigate his case. He argued that he suffered
pain, anguish, distress, and fear for his life. He became disabled after
being subjected to torture and unfit to work. He received medical treatment
for more than one year in hospitals and continues to be dependent on
medication.

85. The Government argued inter alia that in view of the fact that the applicant was
not subjected to any form of treatment contrary to Article 3, he was
not entitled to any compensation. The applicant’s injuries which were
initially characterised as light evolved into invalidity of the second
degree, and the applicant’s state of health deteriorated. That was
currently a matter of concern of the Prosecutor General’s Office,
which had re-opened the investigation. However, the re-opening of the
investigation did not mean that police officers A. Tulbu and V. Dubceac
were guilty. It would only contribute to a correct determination of
the way in which the injuries were caused, as well as to discovering
whether the permanent medical treatment needed by Mr Corsacov was a
result of the beatings by the police officers or of other circumstances.
The Government concluded that the applicant had failed to show the existence
of a causal link between the harm alleged by him and the alleged violation
of the Convention. In any event, if the Court were to find a violation,
such finding would be sufficient just satisfaction.

86. The Court notes in the first place the extreme
gravity of the violations suffered by the applicant. It also notes that,
before being assaulted by the police, the applicant was a teenager with
no particular health problems. After the assault he spent a long time
in hospital receiving medical treatment and partially lost his hearing.
Later his health appears to have seriously deteriorated. Particular
importance should be attached to the manner in which the domestic authorities
conducted the investigation of the applicant’s allegations of torture
and to the fact that as a result of that investigation, the applicant
was prevented from seeking compensation in civil courts.

87. In these circumstances, the Court considers
that the applicant’s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated
for by a mere finding of a violation as suggested by the Government.
Having regard to its previous case-law in respect of Article 3 (see
in particular Selmouni v. France, cited above; Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869/92, ECHR 2000-VIII; Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, ECHR 2005-... (extracts)) and making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the entire amount
claimed by the applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable on it.

B. Costs and expenses

88. The applicant’s lawyer claimed EUR 5,042.67
for costs and expenses. She claimed that this amount covered the secretarial
expenses, the translation fees and the costs of representation. She
submitted a detailed list of all the expenses according to which she
spent 39 hours on the case at two different rates of EUR 50 and 150.

89. The Government did not agree with the amount
claimed, stating inter alia that the applicant had failed to prove the alleged
representation expenses. According to them, the amount claimed was too
high in the light of the average monthly wage in Moldova.

90. The Court recalls that in order for costs
and expenses to be included in an award under Article 41, it must be
established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, § 62,
ECHR 1999-VIII).

91. In the present case, regard being had to the
itemised list submitted by the applicant, the above criteria and the
performance of the lawyer, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000 for
costs and expenses.

C. Default interest

92. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
on the grounds of the treatment inflicted on the applicant;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
in respect of the failure to conduct an effective investigation into
the applicant’s complaints about being ill-treated by police;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention
on account of the lack of effective remedies in respect of the ill-treatment
complained of;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR
20,000 (twenty thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and
EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to
be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 4 April 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.