By Tridivesh Singh Maini

India-Pakistan Relations: Beyond the Security Narrative

In recent
weeks, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan on
October 24, 2017 and his visit to New Delhi visit on October 25, and Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to New Delhi on October 24, have drawn
significant attention to South Asia’s geo-political situation.

If one were
to look beyond these visits, a number of other interesting developments have
taken place recently in the context of India-Pakistan ties which have been
frosty for some time. Since the Pathankot attacks in January 2016, the
bilateral relationship has witnessed a clear downward spiral.

A few
interesting developments have taken place in recent weeks:

First, India’s
Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj, who has exhibited dexterity in handling a
number of complex foreign policy issues with distinction, made an
announcement that all deserving Pakistani citizens will be granted visas.
Tweeted the Indian Foreign Minister: “On
the auspicious occasion of Deepawali, India will grant medical Visa in all
deserving cases pending today.”

Sushma
Swaraj also met with the Pakistani envoy to India, Sohail Mahmood, on October 21. The Pakistan foreign office dubbed this as a routine call by the recently
appointed envoy.

New Delhi
also appointed Dineshwar Sharma to Jammu and Kashmir, as an interlocutor to reach out to the myriad of stakeholders.
Sharma had served as head of the Intelligence Bureau from December
2014-2016. Sharma’s appointment order stated: “The President is pleased to appoint Shri
Dineswar Sharma, former director of the Intelligence Bureau, as the
representative of the government of India to initiate and carry forward a
dialogue with elected representatives, various organisations and concerned
individuals in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.”

The key
question on many people’s minds is if these developments were driven by a nudge
from Washington, given that all the above developments took place around the
time of Tillerson’s visits. If so, is it driven by the fact that it wants to help
Pakistan save face given that it has been extremely tough on Islamabad in
recent months, and would not like to shut down communication? In August 2017,
days after Trump’s dressing down of Pakistan, the US State Department spokesman stated: “I think one of the things that we
would do is ask or encourage India and Pakistan to sit down together and engage in direct dialogue that is aimed at reducing tensions between both of those
countries.”

Over the
past few months, Pakistan has received stern warnings from the Trump
Administration. President Donald Trump, Defense Secretary James Mattis,
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and the US envoy to the UN Nikki Haley have all
sent an unequivocal message that Pakistan should stop lending support to terrorist
groups. The Trump administration has warned about withdrawing non-NATO
status from Pakistan and spoken about reduction of military aid, but
functionaries have also said that they are willing to give one last chance to Pakistan. On the eve of his visit to India and Pakistan, Tillerson said:
“We are concerned about future stability of Pakistan as much as Afghanistan.
Pakistan needs to take a clear-eyed view of the situation they are confronted
with.” During his visit to Pakistan, Tillerson again reiterated the point that
Pakistan needs to take action against terrorist groups.

It is tough
to argue whether there is any US influence, but New Delhi realizes that
Washington will not dump Pakistan all of a sudden. After Pakistan helped secure
the release of a North American family (Caitlan Coleman, a US citizen, and her
Canadian husband Joshua Boyle) who were held hostage by the Haqqani Network,
the US President was quick to praise Pakistan.

Given all
these factors, New Delhi may at some stage think about giving one final chance
of peace to Pakistan. The key question is: Beyond terrorism, what are the substantive issues in which New Delhi can
engage with Islamabad?

The Trump
Administration has been unpredictable vis-à-vis Iran, and has spoken about
scrapping the Nuclear Agreement signed in 2015. On more than one occasion, this
has caused some discontent in New Delhi, given that India is investing heavily
in the Chabahar Port project, which will provide India with access to both
Afghanistan and Central Asia. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s
visit to Iran in May 2016,
not only did New Delhi sign an agreement for development of the Port, but also a
Trilateral Agreement on the Establishment of International
Transport and Transit Corridor.

For even more effective bilateral trade,
Pakistan needs to grant India Most Favored Nation status, which it has
continuously dithered and is unlikely to happen over the next few months.

Significantly,
on October 29, India sent its first consignment of wheat to Afghanistan via Chabahar
Port, a clear reiteration of the fact
that India gives high priority to this project, and both New Delhi and Tehran
have categorically affirmed their commitment to early completion of the
project. The shipment was flagged off from Kandla Port in Gujarat. Indian
Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj and her Afghan counterpart Salahuddin Rabbani joined the ceremony through video
conferencing. Over the next few months, six
more shipments of wheat are likely to be sent to Afghanistan.

Chabahar
Port is important for India because Pakistan has kept India out of the Afghanistan
and Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, much to Afghanistan’s discomfort. According
to this agreement, Afghan goods can be sold to India, but trucks are not
allowed to enter Indian territory or unload at the Wagah border. Kabul had
pitched for New Delhi to be part of this agreement on repeated occasions, and even
threatened to stop the entry of Pakistan trucks into Afghanistan. It is only
recently that Afghanistan has banned the entry of Pakistani trucks. The Afghan Transport Ministry Spokesman said:

“The
Afghanistan and Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) has expired. Before
this Pakistan did not allow Afghan trucks to enter its territory. So we do the
same and after this Pakistani trucks will be unloaded at borders and Afghan
trucks will carry the goods to Hairatan and Shir Khan ports.”

In a lecture
delivered at New Delhi, the Afghan President categorically reiterated that if
Pakistan did not provide transit access to Wagah and Attari for trade with
India via Pakistan, then Kabul would be compelled to restrict Islamabad’s
access to Central Asia. President Ghani also spoke about the potential for
Afghanistan to emerge as an important hub: “We are clear, we want to be what we
call an Asian roundabout. This is important for integration of the Asian
economy.”

During a
meeting with President Ghani in Kabul on October 1, the Pakistani army chief,
Qamar Jawad Bajwa told Ghani that Pakistan was ready to talk to India regarding transit issues. Ghani
conveyed this to India through its embassy in Afghanistan, but the offer was
turned down, with India stating that Islamabad’s offer was not genuine and that
New Delhi had no role to play given that this was a bilateral treaty. Given the
Pakistan establishment’s zero-sum approach towards bilateral ties with India,
New Delhi is likely to focus on the Chabahar Project. A change of mindset from
the Pakistani side and Indian flexibility would be a win-win and could reduce
tensions in the region.

The second
possibility is giving a further fillip to economic ties especially through the
Wagah-Attari trade route. Given the increasing resentment with China in
sections of Pakistan’s business community, this could be an effective
way of reaching out to certain lobbies in Pakistan which are opposed to
Chinese domination. For even more effective bilateral trade, Pakistan needs to
grant India Most Favored Nation status, which it has continuously dithered and is
unlikely to happen over the next few months.

In addition,
goodwill gestures like granting visas to ordinary Pakistani citizens are always
welcome for lowering the temperature. Apart from medical visas for Pakistani
citizens, people-to-people exchanges through religious tourism must be given a
further push and exchanges between common people must continue.

New Delhi
should not be totally averse to engagement with Pakistan. Yet, India needs to
be categorical, and revival of engagement with Pakistan should not just be a symbolic
act with an eye on the West (especially the US) or for merely saving face to
Pakistan’s civilian government. The first test for Pakistan would be whether or
not it can genuinely change its behavior towards terrorist groups targeting
India. So far, the action on the ground has been minimal, and in fact terrorist
groups have been mainstreamed with the Milli Muslim League (MML), a front for Lashkar-e-Tayyeba.

Lastly,
Pakistan needs to show pragmatism and exhibit greater self-confidence in the
economic context and emerge as an interface between India, Afghanistan, and Central
Asia. It would do well to learn from other neighbors like Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka. Bangladesh, which has kept robust ties with China while improving ties
with India, has emerged as an important economic player in South Asia and is
positioning itself as a connector between South Asia and Southeast Asia. Pakistan
has a golden opportunity to emerge as an important transit hub in South Asia, but
it remains to be seen whether it will be willing to shed its zero-sum approach,
as well as whether external powers, especially US and China, can play a role in
convincing Islamabad to focus on more robust ties and connectivity with its South
Asian neighbors.