Three PLAN Officers May Have Just Revealed What China Wants in the South China Sea

Earlier this year, Kyodo News published a tantalizing summary of a Chinese article that seemed to offer rare insights into Beijing’s intentions in the South China Sea.
Unfortunately, Kyodo’s report was too vague to be fully appreciated, or
long-remembered. We have tracked down the original. It is well worth a
closer look.
The article comes from a special class of periodical published by the
Chinese military for “internal distribution.” These are not classified
documents per se. Rather, they are teaching materials and scholarly
works written for a select audience. Due to this restricted access,
these works are both candid and extremely authoritative. As such, they
offer invaluable insights into the thinking of the Chinese military and
party-state.
This particular article was printed in a mid-2016 issue of Naval Studies (海军军事学术), one of the most important “internal distribution” periodicals on maritime affairs in
China. Run by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Naval Research
Institute, it is a bimonthly scholarly journal that delves into a range
of topics on naval strategy.
The article is titled “Military Crises in the South China Sea:
Analysis, Assessment, and Responses.” It was written by three Chinese
naval officers: Lt. Comm. Jin Jing, a researcher at the Naval Research
Institute, and Commanders Xu Hui and Wang Ning, both political officers
from the PLA Navy South Sea Fleet. We assume that analysis published by these three mid-level officers in this forum is orthodox, honest and very well-informed.
The article comprises three sections. Part one analyzes the current
situation in the South China Sea, providing context for discussion of
future military crises. Part two examines the likely characteristics of
any given crisis. The article concludes with policy recommendations.
Jin, Xu and Wang begin with strategic context. Similar to analyses
published in open sources, they blame the United States for much of the
tension in the South China Sea. Since 2015, the authors write, the U.S.
military has ramped up its provocative behavior near Chinese-occupied
features in the Spratly Archipelago—the large group of islands claimed
(either wholly or in part) by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Taiwan and Brunei. It has accompanied aircraft carrier, bomber and
submarine patrols with “public opinion offensives” (舆论攻势) to discredit
Beijing. Designed to “probe” (刺探) China’s red lines, these activities
have had a “baleful effect on the security situation in the South China
Sea.”
The authors write, the United States has long “stuck its nose in”
(插手) South China Sea affairs. But for years, it only intervened from
behind the scenes. It did not publicly declare a position on any of the
disputes themselves. American military operations in these waters were
always fairly restrained. However, since 2015, the “balance of
initiative” in the South China Sea has gradually “tilted towards China.”
As a result, the United States has grown “restless” (躁动), and become
more assertive.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has also agitated the Americans. Citing a book
published by the late Zbigniew Brzezinski, they claim that the primary
task of American strategy in the twenty-first century is to prevent the
rise of any state that might “challenge American hegemony on the
Eurasian continent.” As such, China’s Belt and Road Initiative—which
spreads PRC influence across Eurasia—is certain to “touch a raw nerve in
the American hegemon” (触摸到美国霸权的敏感神经). As an important but troubled
segment in the twenty-first century maritime Silk Road, the South China
Sea makes a fine target for American subversion.
In the future, China can expect tense interactions with the U.S.
military, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (whose direct involvement in
the South China Sea is “inevitable”), and Southeast Asian states. The
authors survey these developments and conclude that there is a “severe
possibility” of a maritime crisis in in the South China Sea. This point
is hardly controversial.
What is striking is that the authors are extremely sanguine about how
such a crisis might play out. In their view, the scale and intensity of
any future crisis could be kept under control, and the “possibility of a
crisis leading to a military conflict or a war is not at all large.”
The U.S.-China relationship will continue to be characterized by a
tendency to “struggle but not split” (斗而不破). The two countries maintain
strong ties and common interests in important areas: economics, politics
and global issues. These links will prevent crisis escalation. Also on
the plus side, the authors point out that in encounters at sea both
militaries are fairly restrained.
Neither side seeks a military conflict. For China’s part, it will
continue its strategy of balancing assertive rights-protection
activities with actions to maintain stability in its relations with
other states. It will not allow matters to get out of hand. After all,
China needs time to “digest and consolidate” (消化巩固) its recent gains in
the South China Sea. Chinese leaders have no desire to watch a military
crisis escalate into a war, which would imperil the current “period of
strategic opportunity” to focus on domestic affairs.
The authors reckon that the United States will remain neutral on the
South China Sea disputes. It merely seeks to ensure freedom of
navigation and maintain a deterrent posture. Moreover, the United States
is not yet in a position to pick a fight: its “Rebalance to Asia”
remains incomplete. Meanwhile, the small states rimming the South China
Sea have no appetite for military conflict. With newly constructed
facilities in the Spratly Islands, China has gained the strategic
initiative (战略主动权). This has resulted in “a certain deterrent effect on
other claimant states.” In sum, armed conflict in the South China Sea
can basically be ruled out.
Part two examines some of the specific scenarios China might face.
Any crisis could involve a number of possible countries. These include
both other claimants and extra-regional powers. Aside from the United
States and Japan, the authors believe that India and Australia might
also get involved (介入) in a crisis. These states would seize on the
opportunity to clamp down on (钳制), repress (阻遏), and contain (牵制) China.
In the last part of their paper, Jin, Xu and Wang outline a number of
steps China should take to strengthen its ability to handle future
crises. First, it should use political, economic and diplomatic means to
improve relations with Southeast Asian states, thereby “dividing and
disrupting” (分化瓦解) any potential alliances directed against China,
creating a favorable strategic environment, and reducing the incentives
(诱因) for crises. This is the soft edge of Chinese strategy. At the same
time, China should take steps to highlight its red lines (亮明底线), engage
in demonstrations of power (展示实力) and adopt other coercive measures to
deter military crises from taking place.
The authors readily acknowledge what Chinese leaders fiercely deny in
public: that “the struggle in the South China Sea is not just about
contention over rights and interests. More than that, it is a struggle
for dominance (主导权) in regional security affairs.” Given the stakes,
China should use all of the means at its disposal—political, economic,
diplomatic, legal, public opinion and military.
Jin, Xu and Wang endorse China’s current approach to handling
disputes in the South China Sea. They describe it as “being both
principled and flexible” (原则性与灵活性相统一). This expression they place in
quotes, suggesting a doctrinal origin. Actions to assert Chinese
prerogatives must remain in “dynamic balance” with those designed to
calm tensions. This is the great balancing act
that has long sat at the core of Chinese maritime dispute strategy, and
which explains the incongruities and pendular swings in Chinese
behavior.
China’s strategy must remain proactive. China should continue to
engage in what they call protracted war (持久战), according to the authors.
By this, they mean prosecuting a “long-term, patient and comprehensive
contest to master the strategic initiative” (掌握战略主动). The trends favor
China. In their view, “after the expansion of Chinese facilities in the
Spratlys, China gained a certain initiative in terms of military
security. As time goes on, the balance of power will tilt in China’s
favor.” This ensures the conditions for China to continue its current
strategy of placing fishing, oil/gas and law enforcement forces on the
front lines, which the authors pithily describe as “sending civilians
first, and following them with the military” (民进军随) and “concealing the
military among civilians” (以民掩军).
The article concludes by reminding readers how a future crisis, if
handled right, might actually present fresh opportunities. China’s
recent past teems with such examples. Jin, Xu, and Wang explain that the
struggles against Japan near the Senkaku Islands and the Philippines at
Scarborough Shoal “show that actively using crises and adroitly
exploiting crises, mastering crises and even proactively manufacturing
crises (主动制造危机), enable China to safeguard its interests. Only by taking
proactive measures can China achieve ultimate victory in this contest.”
Crises provide pretexts to punish other states, another benefit not
lost on the authors. Jin, Hui and Wang show no scruples about
recommending that their country “savagely strike others where it hurts”
(狠狠敲打其痛处). After all, they write, some claimants must be sacrificed to
teach lessons to others and discourage collusion, that is, “kill a
chicken to scare a monkey” (杀鸡骇猴).
Lastly, China should play an active role in regional nontraditional
security affairs and disaster relief efforts. The authors write, such
activities would serve to “shape a China-dominated (以我为主导) South China
Sea security situation and crisis response coordination mechanism.” In
the end, this too could help create conditions for the final resolution
of the South Chinese Sea problem.
Readers will draw their own conclusions from the above summary. For
us, this article confirms that Chinese strategy in the South China Sea
is expansionary in aim, incremental by design and realist in
orientation. It also validates the judgment that Beijing’s strategic
considerations are largely focused on the United States—the only other
state that can disrupt China’s plans or compete with it for the regional
influence it desires. This article offers little discussion about other
South China Sea claimants, presumably because China’s military and
economic strength already gives them few options.
With this article, we gain valuable insights into the strategic
rationale behind China’s decision to construct massive new facilities in
the Spratly Islands, a topic still rarely discussed in broader Chinese
discourse. To the extent that Jin, Hui and Wang reflect mainstream
thinking in the PLA Navy, their views suggest that the new bases were
always intended to alter the military balance in the South China
Sea—regardless of how Chinese diplomats prefer to highlight their
civilian character. Chinese decisionmakers probably believe that the
balance now tilts strongly in China’s favor, and this is unlikely to
change until American completes its great “pivot” to Asia, if it ever
does.
We take some comfort in the trio’s apparent desire to avoid armed
conflict in the South China Sea. However, their attitudes suggest that
the Chinese military may be too cocksure about its own ability to manage
a military crisis at sea. Particularly worrisome, America is the
assumed adversary, but never do the authors even mention the role
nuclear weapons might play in a crisis.
Though this article possesses a rare combination of candor and
authority, it does not close the book on our quest to understand Chinese
intentions in the South China Sea. It represents just one source of
information, Chinese intentions are evolving, and the PLA Navy is not
the only Chinese actor operating there. It does, however, offer a very
rare window into how the Chinese navy understands national objectives in
the South China Sea, frames its own strategy and evaluates future
options.Ryan Martinson is an assistant professor at the China Maritime
Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College. CAPT Katsuya Yamamoto
is the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Liaison Officer and
International Military Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. The
opinions expressed do not reflect the assessments of the U.S. Navy or
the JMSDF.

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ROLAND SAN JUAN was a researcher, management consultant, inventor, a part time radio broadcaster and a publishing director. He died last November 25, 2008 after suffering a stroke. His staff will continue his unfinished work to inform the world of the untold truths. Please read Erick San Juan's articles at: ericksanjuan.blogspot.com This blog is dedicated to the late Max Soliven, a FILIPINO PATRIOT.
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