said he,
“that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the
kindred arts.” “Understand then,” said I,
“that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which
the reasonλόγος here suggests bot the objective personified argument
and the subjective faculty. itself lays hold of by the power of
dialectics,Cf. 533
A.Phileb. 57 E. treating its assumptions not as
absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,τῷ ὄντι emphasized the
etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς
ἀληθῶς in 551 E, Phaedo 80 D,
Phileb. 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek
Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the
context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact
that it is the starting-point—ἀπχή—of the inquiry. underpinnings,
footings,Cf. Symp. 211
Cὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις,
“like steps of a stair.” and springboards so
to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is
the starting-point of all,παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support
to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But
in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the
παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual
equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the
Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is
reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on
510 B, p. 110, note a. and after attaining to that again taking
hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the
conclusion,