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NATO - Jennifer Medcalf

nato

a beginner’s guide

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contents

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgements

List of abbreviations

introduction

The origins of NATO

NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation

Continental drift?

Aims and objectives of this book

basic information

one: nato in a new strategic context

Introduction

1989 and the end of the Cold War

The 1991 Gulf War

Conflict in the Balkans

The terrorist attacks of 9/11

The significance of developments in the post-Cold War environment

Changes in the post-Cold War security environment

Conclusion

two: missions redefined: nato’s post-cold war operations

Introduction

Historical context

Toward an out-of-area role in the post-Cold War context

An out-of-area role in the Euro-Atlantic area

An out-of-area problem in the post-Cold War environment

Toward a ‘global’ NATO

The 1999 Strategic Concept

Changed perceptions of NATO’s out-of-area role post 9/11

Challenges for NATO’s future operations

Future policy options

Conclusion

three: the alliance rebalanced? equipping nato for its missions

Introduction

The capabilities gap

The origins of the European security conundrum

Post-Cold War moves toward an enhanced European role in European security

Toward an EU ‘solution’

The impact of 9/11: toward real improvements in capabilities?

Future prospects

Conclusion

four: an alliance challenged: nato and ‘new’ security threats

Introduction

Historical context

The 1991 Persian Gulf War

The evolution of NATO’s WMD initiatives

Discussion of the terrorist threat in the 1990s

The 1999 Strategic Concept

Explaining NATO’s response to WMD and terrorism

The impact of 9/11 on the WMD and international terrorism debates

Terrorism initiatives resulting from the Prague Summit

WMD initiatives resulting from the Prague Summit

Initiatives from the 2004 Istanbul Summit

Key influences on post-9/11 discussions of NATO’s response to WMD and international terrorism

Future challenges

A low-profile role for NATO in combating WMD and international terrorism?

Conclusion

five: an expanding alliance: nato’s post-cold war enlargement process

Introduction

The post-Cold War enlargement process in context

The beginnings of the enlargement debate

The first round of enlargement

Toward a second round of enlargement

Toward the Prague Summit

Future developments in NATO’s enlargement process

Explaining NATO enlargement

The problems and pitfalls of NATO enlargement

Conclusion

six: outreach and partnership: nato’s relations with its neighbours

Introduction

The origins of NATO’s partnership and outreach initiatives

Outreach and partnership to the East

The political and military benefits of outreach to and partnership with East

NATO–Ukraine and NATO–Russia relations

The Mediterranean Dialogue

Toward a revitalized Mediterranean Dialogue

The 2004 Istanbul Summit

The problems and pitfalls of NATO’s partnership and outreach initiatives

Conclusion

conclusion: an alliance revitalized? future challenges for nato

The future of NATO

The challenges facing NATO

Conclusion

The North Atlantic Treaty

Chronology of key events

Member profiles

Glossary

Notes

Bibliography

Index

illustrations

diagrams

Organigram of the structure of the international staff

Allied Command Transformation

Allied Command Operations

Mutually reinforcing institutions

maps

NATO members

NATO members and partners

acknowledgements

Writing a book is a daunting prospect and I could not have begun this endeavour, let alone have completed it, without the support of colleagues, friends and family. Their contribution to the writing of this book and the set of circumstances that went with it has been invaluable and more than deserves recognition.

I would like to thank Victoria Roddam of Oneworld for giving me the opportunity to write this book and for her encouragement and guidance as it progressed. Roger Eatwell provided the initial introduction to Oneworld and continues to be a constant source of support and good advice. Three anonymous reviewers provided helpful suggestions on the initial concept of this book and on the draft version. Their comments and input were greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank Ann Grand for editing the final manuscript.

I would like to thank Christopher Bennett and Alison Smith at NATO HQ for organizing a very productive visit there. I am also grateful to the NATO officials that agreed to be interviewed and took time out of their schedules to answer my questions. The maps and illustrations used in this book are adapted from the NATO website. Figures for defence expenditure and information presented in ‘Member Profiles’ are adapted from The Military Balance 2003–04, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

I am grateful to my friends and colleagues at the University of Bath who have contributed in different ways to this project. Jill O’Brien and Ann Burge deserve particular thanks for continuing to be a cheerful presence ‘next door’ and I am very grateful to them for always being ready to help in whatever way they can. I would also like to thank Kara Bosworth for her willingness to share her knowledge of NATO–Russia relations.

I count myself very lucky to have a group of friends who distracted me from this project when I needed distracting and helped me knuckle down when I needed to. Pete and Chris Barton, Luke and Maxine Harty, Andy Price and Helen Whitnell deserve particular thanks in this respect.

Special thanks go to my family for their support, encouragement and enthusiasm for this project, which kept me going when I thought I could not do it and to Pappy who operated his own ‘open door’ policy and welcomed me whenever I needed a break.

This book is for Pappy with my love and affection.

abbreviations

introduction

Europe¹ and North America have been linked for centuries. A combination of cultural, demographic, economic, military and political components has produced a unique relationship that is not found in other regions of the world. The dynamic of these components is both one-way – historically from Europe to North America – and two-way – increasingly, in recent decades, from North America to Europe. To these, the identification of a significant number of common interests can be added. Two elements – a combination of diverse integrative forces and a coincidence of interests – have therefore traditionally underpinned the transatlantic relationship and have shaped and consolidated a comprehensive bilateral relationship between North America and Europe.

The origins of the contemporary transatlantic relationship are found in two strategic objectives: the need to integrate Western Europe politically and economically after the Second World War to prevent further conflict, hence the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the need for collective defence against the Soviet threat during forty years of Cold War, hence the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. These two strategic objectives illustrate two elements that have constituted the foundation of the transatlantic relationship: the importance of Europe to the United States and European recognition of the necessity of American involvement to ensure the security of the European continent.²

the origins of nato

Of all the areas of transatlantic interaction, NATO is the instrument through which the relationship has found greatest expression and meaning. It is therefore in the realms of security and defence that the transatlantic link is most profound.

NATO was formed in April 1949, though its origins can be found as early as December 1947 when the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, privately commented to the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, that ‘the Soviet Union will not deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future [...] the salvation of the West depends upon the formation of some sort of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe, backed by the United States and the Dominions – such a mobilisation of moral and material force will inspire confidence and energy within, and respect elsewhere’.³ However, in spite of a growing threat from the East, negotiations over the founding of a transatlantic military alliance did not begin until 6 July 1948. A key reason for this delay was the United States’ wariness of becoming embroiled in future European conflicts. There was clearly support for temporary military and economic assistance for the Europeans, yet there was also strong opposition, particularly in the State Department and the Department of Defense, to the concept of forging a formal military alliance in a time of peace.⁴

The parameters of the debate changed over the course of 1948, due to the seizure of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union on 25 February, the perceived Soviet threat to Norway and the beginning of the Berlin blockade in June. Moreover, the perceived inadequacies of the Western European Union (WEU), which was composed of European powers only, for the defence of Western Europe, made arguments for the full participation of the United States compelling. These influences, in conjunction with pressure exerted by Britain and Canada on the United States, paved the way for the forging of a military alliance between North American and West European allies. These negotiations eventually resulted in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, which brought NATO into being.

nato’s cold war functions

The need for a credible defence against the Soviet Union during forty years of Cold War cemented the relationship between the Allies. NATO’s primary function of collective defence was expressed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

From its very beginning, NATO was not simply about defending the Allies against the Soviet threat. NATO also became the institutionalization of the relationship between North America and Western Europe and served to provide a framework within which West Germany could be safely reconstructed and eventually re-armed without risking a resurgence of its power. This last function was reassuring for West Europe as a whole but in particular for France and the Low Countries. For these three reasons, the role of NATO during the Cold War was, in the words of Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, to keep ‘the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’.

In addition to performing these three crucial functions, NATO was also widely regarded as a community of like-minded nations that shared common values as well as facing a common threat. This was demonstrated by part of the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, which states:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

NATO can therefore be distinguished from other military alliances, as it embodies the concept of a transatlantic community based on shared values. Sloan comments, in this respect, ‘because NATO included a much narrower, more like-minded, mostly democratic set of nations than did the United Nations, it was possible to see the [transatlantic security] relationship as some sort of community of common values as well as shared interests – more than just an alliance’.⁵ During the Cold War, this concept was compromized by the imposition of martial law in Turkey and the existence of non-democratic regimes in Portugal and Greece, yet NATO was still seen to be part of a wider attempt to create an environment in which common values and co-operative institutions could thrive.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO played an irreplaceable and unrivalled role in Western Europe’s security architecture. However, the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the period from 1989 to 1991 called into question NATO’s future role and even its continued existence. The end of the Cold War was a double-edged sword for NATO: it had clearly ‘won’ it, by outliving the Warsaw Pact, yet at the same time, the disappearance of its raison d’être called into question its future relevance in the post-Cold War world. The realization that the Cold War status quo was not sustainable in the post-Cold War context therefore provided the impetus for the Allies to reform NATO, the results of which can be seen in the process of adaptation that NATO has undergone since the early 1990s.

nato’s post-cold war adaptation

NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation has been multi-dimensional. The first change that NATO has undergone is functional, which has enabled it to perform non-Article 5 crisis management, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, initially under the authority of the United Nations (UN) but eventually as a self-authorizing force. The second change is geographic, illustrated by the execution of non-Article 5 missions outside the territory of NATO’s members (as defined by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty). This functional and geographic change therefore illustrates how NATO has made the transition from being a defensive alliance focused on Western Europe, to one that contributes to global security whilst retaining a defensive role. The third concerns internal adaptation, which can be demonstrated by the emergence and consolidation of the European ‘pillar’ through the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), a measure that was designed to increase the role and capabilities of the European NATO Allies. Since the ESDI programme was introduced in the mid-1990s, NATO has also initiated and concluded a set of agreements with the European Union (EU) in order to facilitate co-operation between NATO and the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The fourth is the emergence and consolidation of outreach programmes to NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) initiative, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and initiatives involving countries to the south of NATO, through the Mediterranean Dialogue. Special partnership agreements with Russia and Ukraine have also featured in this area of NATO reform. The fifth is the enlargement of NATO’s membership. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999 and there was agreement at NATO’s November 2002 Prague Summit to issue invitations to seven more Central and East European countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania. This resulted in the growth of NATO’s membership to twenty-six on 29 March 2004. The last and most recent change is NATO’s response to the ‘new’ threats of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which increased dramatically in importance after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington, DC.⁶ This area of reform is currently the most pressing and prominent of all NATO’s activities.

The implications of 9/11 have caused NATO to re-examine, and in some cases give added momentum to, each of the areas of post-Cold War adaptation outlined above. The decisions subsequently reached at the Prague Summit, which was heralded as a ‘transformation’ summit, as well as at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, therefore ensure that NATO will continue to evolve in order to attempt to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 strategic environment.

nato’s ongoing military strengths

In addition to the rapid adaptation of NATO to the post-Cold War environment, one of the main reasons NATO endured after the end of the Cold War was the comparative advantage it continued to possess as a military alliance. NATO, Roper comments,

brings together virtually all the Western countries who collectively possess an overwhelming preponderance of military, economic and political power. In particular, it builds on the traditional patterns of military cooperation between the United States, Canada and Western European countries [...] If force has to be used and our armed forces have to be placed in harm’s way, countries want to know that the risks to them will be minimised because the command and control systems are tried and trusted. This, NATO, with its half century of experience of cooperation, provides in a way which no other international military structure does.⁷

NATO has an additional military role that directly relates to the patterns of military co-operation described above. NATO is not only the institutionalization of the transatlantic security and defence relationship; it can also provide the military framework for coalition operations involving NATO Allies. Operation Desert Storm, for instance, was clearly not a NATO operation. None the less, US-led coalition forces utilized NATO structures and procedures in a way that enhanced the coalition’s ability to bring the conflict to a swift end. These structures and procedures can therefore be employed in non-NATO operations, enabling NATO to exist in a military sense, even when it is not involved politically. This kind of ‘virtual’ operation demonstrates that two kinds of NATO can be identified: a formal NATO that institutionalizes the transatlantic security relationship and an informal NATO that facilitates coalition operations involving both NATO and non-NATO Allies. Fear of losing the benefits of NATO’s formal and informal roles has therefore been a key factor in ensuring its survival.

The comprehensive agenda of adaptation that NATO initiated at the end of the Cold War, in conjunction with its ongoing military strengths, has ensured that in the absence of a threat that justifies a purely collective defence posture, NATO has become an organization whose diverse activities relate mainly to political or military issues occurring in or emanating from beyond its members’ borders. At the same time, NATO has continued to institutionalize the transatlantic security and defence relationship and embody a community of like-minded nations. These achievements have taken place even in the absence of NATO’s raison d’être and principal unifying force, the Soviet Union. In view of NATO’s adaptation and expansion and the sustained benefits of half a century of transatlantic co-operation, it is not hard to see why NATO has been termed ‘the pre-eminent security organization for 21st century Europe’⁸ and the most successful military alliance in history.

continental drift?

Unquestionably, NATO has been remarkably successful in many areas. However, in the early part of the 21st century, there is evidence to suggest that the transatlantic relationship – in all its different forms – is increasingly showing signs of strain. Although it is a contested thesis, many analysts have pointed to a process of ‘continental drift’ – a divergence between the United States and European states – that can be demonstrated in each of the areas that have traditionally served as unifying forces.⁹ Culturally, for example, some consider that a values gap is emerging, as differences between the United States and European states become increasingly profound. Politically, many argue the significance of, and attention accorded to, developments in Europe by America’s political élite is decreasing, whilst members of NATO that are also members of the EU have focused on the process of European integration rather than the enhancement of transatlantic relations. In addition to divergence in areas such as culture and politics, a whole host of geographic, generational and demographic factors that have traditionally strengthened the transatlantic link are seen by some to be losing significance and to have arguably weakened ties. NATO has also shown signs of strain, partly as a result of these broader changes in the transatlantic relationship, but also because of influences unique to the security and defence context. In the post-Cold War environment, NATO has been exposed to two areas of change – one external and one internal – that emerged as a result of the end of bipolar confrontation. These areas of change have challenged NATO and presented a test for its future vitality.

internal change: the nature of the nato relationship

The debate about the transatlantic relationship institutionalized in NATO has traditionally concentrated on two inter-related aspects: the extent, durability, and reliability of American involvement in European security and the specific relationship between the United States and the NATO Allies, that is, their relative roles and weight in foreign policy and security issues in Europe.¹⁰ In the first instance, the commitment of the United States and its willingness to intervene in European security during the Cold War was not in doubt, even though isolationist forces in the United States periodically sought to question the rationale for, and degree of, American commitment to Europe. In the second instance, the Cold War NATO relationship was a ‘partnership of unequals’ between the United States as senior and the remaining NATO Allies as junior partners, which was reflected in the relative weight of the Allies in NATO’s decision-making processes. During the Cold War, significant divergence from the norms of these two inter-related aspects was largely prevented by the constraints of bipolarity. The durable, yet asymmetric, nature of NATO was consequently maintained. The end of bipolar rivalry, however, presented the NATO Allies with a far wider range of options and brought the Cold War status quo into question.

The outbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia was the first indication that the role of the United States in European security could no longer be guaranteed in the same way that it had been during the Cold War. The initial reluctance of the United States to intervene gave the remaining NATO Allies sufficient grounds to question the extent, durability and reliability of the United States’ post-Cold War commitment to European security. For some, the United States’ ambivalence about intervening in situations in which there were no vital American interests demonstrated that the commonality of interests which had traditionally underpinned NATO had been undermined. The former US Secretary of State, James Baker’s, comment, with respect to Bosnia, that ‘we don’t have a dog in this fight’ perhaps best illustrates the changed context of NATO’s debate in the early part of the 1990s. Doubts about American commitment to European security underscored the need for the European Allies to be able to take a more coherent and assertive role in the management of European security, an objective that had been prevented by the imperatives of bipolar confrontation.

In terms of the specific relationships between the NATO Allies, the conflict in the Balkans soured things considerably. This does not presuppose that during the Cold War there was always transatlantic consensus, as the Allies clashed over the best way to deal with