(First posted 4/16/2013. This post includessome excellent commentary and insight into the situation at Studebaker regarding the Sceptre and other plans during these final years from Studebaker historian Rob Moore. It is at the end of this post, below.)

If things had gone right, the Thunderbird “Flairbird” might have had a competitor from South Bend. In 1962, Brooks Stevens was given the commission to design several prototypes for the next generation of Studebakers. One of them is this sporty-personal coupe, named Sceptre, intended to replace Gran Turisimo Hawk. Except for a few details, like the big logo on the middle of the hood, it’s certainly a credible contender.

The electric-razor front end is a bit odd, but I could get used to it. I almost convinced myself that Stevens borrowed that windshield from a 1961 Continental, but on closer examination, I think not.

There aren’t many really good shots of its tail end, but this gives a pretty good view. It certainly is a clean break with Studebaker’s previous cars, and Stevens’ cars invariably have a light, airy and clean look to them.

The interior is clearly Thunderbird-inspired. The Sceptre prototype was built in Italy by Sibona-Bassano, and is now housed at the Studebaker National Museum.

The instrument panel is rather unique. Wonder how legible it would be in the sun?

And how successful would it have been, against the T-Bird , as well as the Riviera and Pontiac GP? We’ll have to leave that the realm of perpetual speculation.

By Rob Moore:
The Sceptre was the two door coupe to replace the aging Golden Hawk. They couldn’t afford the tooling and therefore Brooke Stevens did the Grand Turismo Hawk-which they could afford. That decision was one of the first made by Sherwood Egbert. Instead of doing the Sceptre, they did the Avanti. It was different and more performance oriented. It cost less to tool because it was fiberglass. It used a platform they already had—Lark convertible. Egbert got Stevens to do work ups and then money and reality would set in and the South Bend boys would have to back off. Stevens would then have to make the old look new. Avanti however was the Lowey team.

When Egbert came in the plan was to facelift the Lark instead of a new model. Get a two year run out of it and then introduce all new cars for ’64. (Remember we are talking December 60-Jan. 61, in the middle of the ’61 Lark model which was the 3rd model year. Churchill authorized a mild front end facelift. It took off in the second half of the model year). ’62 was the Brook Stevens update done on pennies. Brooke took elements of the Sceptre and birthed the Grand Turismo. The Avanti was to be a late 62 model. It was VERY late. The Stevens 62 Lark facelift was only supposed to be a 2 year car.

The 62 Lark was hurt by the Chevy II. The 1963 Lark without the dogleg did not sell well. The Senior BOP compacts that arrived that model year, along with all new Rambler models, hurt sales badly. The Avanti, despite great reviews, missed the wave crest where hoopla and available for sale should meet. In early 62, the board new they needed to move on beyond the continued warming of the old 53 Studebaker and 59 Lark. The cars pictured below were presented to the board. They approved both cars and put the Wagonaire into production for the 62-63 model year. In March 63, Egbert presented the cost proposals on the cars below and the Avanti II, a series of cars based on the Avanti (the 2 door, the 4 door, and the 2 door convertible). His second plan was a Brooke Stevens facelift of the Lark to look like these cars and Avanti II. His third plan was the below cars and the Avanti alone. His fourth plan was the Brooke Stevens facelift of the Lark and the Avanti and, then, if successful, put the cars pictured below into play as ‘65’s. His fifth plan was “Plan B” corporate liquidation.

In the presentation to the board, Egbert withdrew Avanti II (no one knows why). The board went for Plan 3. Egbert went to get the financing. Banks said they would only loan the money if Egbert put up the newly acquired subsidiaries as collateral. Egbert knew the Board was not THAT committed anymore to automotive manufacturing and declined. Plan 4 was then adopted. If the Lark facelifts to look like these cars below worked, the banks would then lend money to tool up for 1965’s. If not, Plan B was there.

On September 21, 1963, the Stevens facelifted 1964 Larks came on the market. By October’s board meeting they had 60 sales days’ worth of unsold cars. 1/3 of the work force was sent home and Egbert dropped down to less than 40 cars per day. It was over by the board meeting in November. The public was not buying the “new” 64 (even though everyone thought it the best looking Studebaker in years). Not much is known about the November 1963 board meeting but that Egbert went in and fought to continue manufacturing. Several items are believed to be argued by him: 1. An up tick in sales had happened but collapsed after President Kennedy was assassinated. Egbert asked that South Bend remain open at a lower operation rate through 1964. Second: Egbert knew both Chrysler and Ford were about to hit the youth market, which Egbert had positioned the new Lark convertible. Third. Studebaker was beginning to crack into the performance game.

NHRA Studebaker successes were beginning to draw attention. Bobby Unser and the Studebaker powered STP Special Novi were setting all kinds of Indy records. Egbert pleaded for time. But then in the meeting he had to announce that he was about to go into surgery for a second round of cancer treatments. All persons around at the time indicated he looked really bad. The guy that brought Egbert in as President was no longer chairman, having resigned in August 1963. The diversification program had worked. The board saved the company shareholders, and now could exit car manufacturing without much problem. With Egbert sick and a Chairman who believed it had been over for Studebaker since the failures of the 1953-1954 models, Egbert was put on “indefinite sick leave of absence.” Burlingame was put in as President. The board did do what Egbert had generally recommended—lowered operational levels. It just did it in Hamilton Ontario, not South Bend Indiana.

As you know I have studied this and as much as I don’t like second guessing, the Sceptre would have been a better deal than Avanti. I have seen it up close at the Studebaker Museum. Egbert wanted a signature vehicle with Corvette performance (not a fat man’s Thunderbird). The marketing guys at the time did not think the Sceptre would sell. Why—looked too much like a Ford at a Studebaker price way above what the Ford could be purchased for. The money that should have gone into tooling went into the “diversification” plan. The diversification plan worked. It saved the company—it did not save auto manufacturing. Churchill’s plan for the Lark worked (low cost development—few competitors in the market). He knew time was short. Egbert was right to move toward performance (because that was where the market was going) but he went upmarket. Churchill would have stayed down market and built a poor man’s rocket.

Sceptre looks great, and to me at least doesn’t look much like any other make of the period. It would have been a new direction for a healthy Studebaker. Ford used their T-Bird in ’83 to roll out a new look, Sceptre could have worked like that for Stude.

Concept cars nearly always have totally silly instruments. I do think the paired slide-rule speedo and tach is interesting. Did anyone ever put a slide-rule tach into production?

I think it was supposed to use a “light bar” like the Mercury Sable. It would have been such a clean break from the Hawk, but I always wondered how it might have been at cross purposes with The Avanti, unless it was like a mainstream “big” coupe like the Grand Prix.

I’ve also read that Sylvania developed a fluorescent light tube for the front end of this concept, but if it had been put into production, I doubt that feature would have made it.

After all, quad headlamps had been approved in the U.S. only five years earlier, and it took another dozen years for rectangular lamps to be approved. As I’ve commented in the past, U.S. lighting regs changed at a glacial pace.

….and still do. The rest of the world is now getting selectable matrix LED headlamps, which have a changeable beam shape created by dimming or illuminating typically from 50 to 125 individual elements each pointed in a slightly different direction. This design allows the beam to “follow” the road and shine brightly and far ahead for the driver without blinding oncoming drivers in the opposite lane. It does this using photosensors, radar, lidar, and/or GPS data. They are already available on some brands such as Audi….. except, of course, in America where they’re illegal and DOT and NHTSA are stuck on the old paradigm of “low beams” and “high beams” and no in-betweens are allowed.

I’m not to sure about the front grille but the rest of it is a real looker.Could it have saved Studebaker?I don’t know they were already in dire financial trouble and the Sceptre would have been an Avanti fighter,they weren’t exactly flying off the showroom floor into driveways and garages

They were two different cars; two different approaches; and although only a couple years apart, two wildly different times.

In the period 1959-63, the Studebaker board, which was really the Packard board that got duped in the purchase of Studebaker…it was hedging its bets. The Lark being, at first, wildly profitable, the board went on a buying binge – diversifying into lawn equipment, industrial generator builders, STP additives…anything that was for sale that wasn’t automotive. Apparently they weren’t yet sure which way they were going to go; but they wanted options.

By the time Sherwood Egbert was hired as CEO, the plan was pretty much cast. Which would explain why the Sceptre didn’t make it into production: The board hired an outsider to wind down the automotive operation.

Alas, Egbert caught the bug. The Avanti was rushed through…on a Lark frame. A Sceptre it was not. The effort with Lowey’s company was to hide its Lark roots well; and it so did – under copious fiberglass.

But the Sceptre was a serious investment in a new car. The Avanti was a patched-up halo car; for a car lineup which was doomed with the expiration of the UAW contract. That gave the board the excuse they wanted to pull the plug.

Much of the buying binge was a tax consequence. Studebaker had been racking up losses since 1954, Under the tax laws at that time, the company could carry those losses forward for deduction against profits for only so many years, or they would vanish. Studebaker was able to use those tax losses much like currency, buying companies so that they could then offset the profits with the tax losses from prior years. Quite effective, really, in that it kept the larger company in business.

From all I’ve read, it seemed that the magic of the Loewy name along with the ‘crack team’ of designers sequestered at Loewy’s Palm Springs home gave the Avanti the catchet and attention over the Sceptre – which is a shame, but again, we’re looking at this in hindsight and with Egbert out sick, Burlingame was a tool of the stockholders’ desires, who wanted to get out of car manufacturing as soon as feasibly possible. Shifting all production to Hamilton in hindsight was ridiculously sad, never mind Boss Grundy’s success in making things work with a break-even output of 20,000 cars; The boardmembers knew that there would be no forthcoming development funds for the ’64 facelifted cars and that time and resources would peter out. They did.

Would the Sceptre have been successful? We may look at it with 21st Century eyes and say, perhaps it might have been a modest success. It could’ve worked if the Studebaker board wanted to roger up for automotive development. However, if I had to put myself in the shoes of the board members and looking at how the S-P subsidiaries were actually gaining market share (and protifable to boot), I might have come to the same decision to axe automobiles. It’s too bad that Stude couldn’t have contracted to build other companies cars – much like AMC did assembling M bodied Chryslers for awhile. Hindsight . . .

This was one of three concepts Stevens designed for Studebaker. The other two were a sedan and station wagon, intended as 1965 Larks. They were built by Sibona-Bassano, a Turin-based coachbuilder. All three cars survive today. I think the Sceptre coupe was the best of the bunch, but all three looked good.

Interestingly, Loewy designed some Stude prototypes at about the same time. They were very Avanti-like and built by Pichon-Parat in France as a two-door on one side and a four-door on the other. These cars languished for years but have been restored in the last few years (pic below from Hemmings) and are now in the Studebaker museum. More info can be found at here on the Hemmings blog: http://blog.hemmings.com/index.php/2010/09/21/avanti-sedan-prototypes-make-first-public-showing/

I’ve been meaning to visit the Stude museum someday, maybe this is the year!

I’m not enthused about the dash, but otherwise a beautiful car – very trim and sporting compared to the Detroit offerings of the time. I’m curious about what would be under the hood – the supercharged Avanti 289 plant, or maybe a borrowed Chevy 283? They would have had to make do with an existing engine even with the new body.

An attractive car, and it’s truly one of those ‘what might have been’ automotive moments. Studebaker’s dire economic situation meant they could not afford to put both the Sceptre and what is now considered one of the greatest automotive objects d’art ever built Avanti into production, so they went with the latter.

But could a cheaper, more accessable (and still damn good looking) Sceptre have done more than the Avanti to keep Studebaker alive?

I doubt it, though. Part of Studebaker’s problem was that there was the growing perception (which really dated back to the mid-50s) that the company was not long for the world.

It’s an interesting effort, and as he consistently did, Stevens managed impressive things with what I presume was a budget that would’ve made Jack Benny wince, but if it had made it to production, I suspect cost considerations would have forced it to be yet another rehash of the elderly Studebaker platform. It’s hard to see them having the money for (or being willing to spend it on) a completely new chassis and an all-new body shell at that point.

Studebakers were used in a few of the police forces, and some of the Bathurst entries were driven by police officers. The Studebakers were fast up and down the hill, but after 3-5 laps their brakes were shot and that was effectively the end for their race. There were also instances of wheel centres pulling out of rims.

At the risk of sounding like a history nerd, could I offer a few additional facts? According to Richard Langworth, before Churchill was ousted he had invested millions in a significantly redesigned Lark for 1962 that was to include a junior model on a 100-inch wheelbase (with a horizontally-opposed, four-cylinder engine, no less).

Shortly after Egbert arrived in February, 1961 he unplugged that redesign in favor of facelifts for the Lark and Hawk. Langworth states that only after Brook Stevens completed those facelifts did he turn his attention to a more substantial redesign slated for 1964-66.

The resulting wagon, sedan and coupe were placed on a 116-inch wheelbase in order to compete in the mid-sized class. The new design would have carried over the existing Studebaker chassis, so like the Avanti it would have suffered from a lack of “step down.” I imagine that interior accommodations would have been somewhat cramped.

The Sceptre was slated for introduction in 1966. I think it was far and away the most “modern” of the trio. Whereas the sedan and wagon had an awkward and boxy look because of Stevens’ trademark interchangeable front and rear doors, the Sceptre was an early adopter of the “wedge” look. That was partly necessitated because the coupe shared the same tall windshield used in the sedan and wagon.

The Avanti II program seemed to be more advanced than Stevens’ one-off concept cars because it had a variety of test mules running around South Bend. However, I suspect that the Avanti II lost momentum due to the Avanti being outsold even by the aging Hawk.

I’m skeptical that the Sceptre should be compared to the T-Bird or Grand Prix. Certainly in “show car” trim it would likely have had a fairly high price tag, but typically most design gimmicks don’t make it to production. In addition, the Sceptre’s left side had fancy exterior trim whereas the right side was stripped down. That suggests a full range of models.

Hi Paul, as promised, here’s an excellent rear shot (and two others) of the Sceptre, scanned from my August 1988 copy of Collectible Automobile. Looks like the same background as some of the ones you’ve posted, so I’m assuming they were taken at the same time:

was the prototype ever sold to a private individual at a sale of Studebaker assets? Was it recorded how much and to who? What year was the auction? I presume that person later donated it to the Museum. Was the car fully drivable or only a “pushmobile” maybe with just a battery and electric motor to get it up onstage at an auto show.

I think studebaker would have changed alsorts as they went along… if only they kept going.. the cars from 1963 on right though to today would of kept up with the times…by 1970 the cars would have been great and very stable and faster still…at least by 1979 the studebaker car would of been the best around.. just think by 1966 the R5 would have been a normal 200 mph car to buy as in 1963 they were getting up there in speed .. look at the 337 land speed records from the 6 to the 289 and 304.5 cu.in,, r3.. r4 and r5 still great cars as they are

If Studebaker were still making cars today they would of been more power full with the 21st century Avanti motor like the R2 289, R3 304.5 supercharger and the R4 304.5 non supercharger also be more power full today,the R5 304.5 twin supercharger would of been way too power full.Studebaker made very nice very sharp and very fast cars in the early 60s,a R3 Avanti did a top speed of 178.5mph and an R3 Superlark Daytona convertible did a flying mile of an average speed of 156.14mph and would of easy do over 160mph and the R5 Avanti would of easy do 200mph plus back in 63,if they were still making cars today would of been up there with the other cars and would of been more faster and a head of its time look at the 337 land speed record they broke back in 1963 Studebaker was too far a head of its time and very fast.

The more I learn about Studebaker (thanks in no small part to this great website), the better it gets. This one is really a whopper. I wish they’d have built those rather than the Avanti. Not sure about the instrument panel though, a bit too over the top. But the rest is very, very interesting.

A very striking car and it is reminiscent of the ’62 Thunderbird. Lose the Remington shaver grille or mount it a bit lower, give it a more conventional dashboard, and it could have done well in the personal luxury coupe market.

At first, I wasn’t quite sure about the front end, but it grew on me. Overall, this is a very attractive, forward looking car. I really love the interior, though……..the lines are nice and curved and softened from many of the interiors of that time.

If the Sceptre went into production, they likely would have had to soften the front end’s sharper razor shaver looking lines, because my feeling is that it would have been too polarizing to really sell lots of cars. Something like the first gen Riviera has an aggressive and unique front grille/ front area (aggressiveness and uniqueness being something that I think that Studebaker were after with this styling), and in my opinion, the Riviera would have absolutely killed the Sceptre in terms of styling, popularity and sales, in that upscale personal luxury market.

Is it wrong for me to say I would rather this have been made instead of the Avanti? I am somewhat familiar with Studebaker, but none of their cars have excited me in anyway, I’ve always thought of them as “meh”. But, this is a really good design, I like how this looks. But, I’m not sure if it would’ve been successful. If what Rob Moore is saying is correct, then maybe this car would’ve been too expensive and considered poor value. I’ll also admit, the electric razor grille is a very polarizing design element, and I can see it creating a huge divide in the consumer market and hurting it’s sales. But, I still think this car looks superb, in contrast to the Avanti which I always found overrated.

Although, relating to Ryan’s point above, I have to ask the question. How would the Spectre have done when the Buick Riviera hit the scene in 63? Considering how the Riviera more or less redefined the Personal Luxury Coupe segment with its looks, I have to wonder if Studebaker would’ve kept the design as is and hope for the best, or if they would’ve done something to make it seem more contemporary (Which, considering they were hemorrhaging money by that point, I’m not sure would’ve happened)

I loved Studebaker even if they weren’t like AMC, Chrysler or GM. But the Sceptre was very sexy, in a Mercedes-meets-Citroen-meets-Prince-meets-Mercury sort of way. I’d certainly get one in a heartbeat if Studebaker lasted into the 1970’s.

Speaking of the Stude, there are rumours that they might bring Studebaker back, and do it in a “Lexus-Audi-Buick fighter”. Avanti, Sceptre,and Lark are considered, plus three new names Regent, Io, and Glory. They want to make Studebaker a 100% Canadian car company, as well as taking the Saturn facilities in Delaware and Tennessee. In the event that It would, I made sketches of the 2018 Studebakers when they resurrected the Avanti, and made a few “Studebaker” Truck and SUV concepts. I fell in love! I still have the sketches, plus some 1969-1977 Sceptres and Larks. I never gave them to the Studebaker Museum, but I would do so if asked. I also loved to show them to Collectible Automobile, too.

It’s sad that the 21st Century Avantis never took off, seeing that they were built in Georgia and Yucatan, Mexico. I myself tried to get a Orange convertible, but I never got a call back. But who knows? They’re bringing Borgward back and China’s chafing at the bit for one, and it might happen for Studebaker, and if they linked up with Nissan-Renault, and work with Daimler, they’d be a good success!

I have no interest in bringing back in-name-only resurrections of classic marques. Obviously someone with enough money can buy the rights to name their automobiles Duesenberg or Packard or Studebaker or, well, Borgward, but the resulting cars would have no other connection with the original marque other than the name and logo. I’d only make exceptions if the new company was significantly rooted in the old company. Say, some old employees buy the old factory and start a new company with the old name, with descendants of the old company’s founder or major executive at the helm. In Studebaker’s case, this could be one of those diversification companies that was spun off from, or descended from, Studebaker (i.e. Federal Mogul).

Outside of the automotive field I can think of a few companies that successfully managed to do this to an extent that people regard the new and old companies to be almost one and the same.

So what exactly do you dislike so much about the New GM? I’ve been meaning to ask for some time now.

FWIW, I don’t see them acting much like the Old GM very much at all. Not exactly my favorite company, but their execution in products, their moves into mobility/autonomy, and their financial performance have been quite good. The stock market sure thinks so; GM is up some 30% this year, Ford is flat to down.

I don’t dislike the New GM, and agree that their products have been much, much better than those from the tail end of the Old GM. Perhaps I’m just in a surly mood today but every once in awhile I am reminded that New GM might as well be called Dynamic Motors or Fine Cars By Mary because it is no more General Motors than my own office is. It was a new company formed to pick the carcass of GM (the real one) during its death in bankruptcy court. The part that irritated me the most was the blatant effort for the successor company to glomb onto all of the heritage of GM and whatever goodwill might have been left while distancing itself from all the problems of GM by resting on its status as an independent successor. They can’t be “the same GM” and “not the same GM” at the same time, but that’s what they have tried to do (and done very successfully, particularly to the benefit of upper management.) Maybe I should try to start the convention of referring to GM I and GM II. GM Jr. maybe? 🙂

Isn’t that what just about every company that goes through a restructuring does? Think of all the airlines; every US major has been through bankruptcy once, twice, or more. And it’s not like they changed their names, logos, heritage references, colors, etc.

Back in the day, car companies (and others) used to go through receivership quite commonly.

Airlines and other companies that “restructure” typically do a Chapter 11 in which they are allowed to shed some debt and fix some basic operational problems. Once things have been steadied they are allowed to leave bankruptcy protection. The other kind is a Chapter 7 liquidation where the business closes and assets are sold off at auction to pay off creditors according to their type (secured, priority or general). The old state receivership laws operated a lot like a Chapter 11.

GM’s bankruptcy was not like these. It was a highly politicized Chapter 11 that was theoretically a reorganization but which was did not follow the normal reorganization rules. Instead, assets were packaged and sold (almost immediately) in a “prepackaged sale” – in other words a liquidation. But not a sale open to anyone, just the insiders who (along with the Government) formed “New GM”. “New GM” got to cherry pick what it wanted without the inconvenience of allowing others a chance to buy. It also got to stiff creditors who would normally have been paid while keeping pensions for upper managers, all of whom kept their jobs. Basically those in charge were allowed to create a stew of reorganization and liquidation remedies completely on the fly and completely without a real basis in the Bankruptcy code (at least not without a very creative reading.)

I get that there was a lot of political pressure to prevent a lot of employees from getting laid off so as is said in legal circles “hard cases make bad law.” The GM bankruptcy was not conducted according to Hoyle. Instead it was a “heads I win tails you lose” done to benefit the insiders of the company and to insulate the government from the exposures that a real bankruptcy would have involved. Maybe this is the kind of thing that would only irritate an attorney. And it is not just this context. “Start with the result you want then reason backwards until you can get there” is an all too common thing in the law anymore. From where I sit this is not a good thing.

I see. You’re obviously not the only one who probably sees it this way. It’s a very polarizing/politicized issue.

I read too much of PCH101’s excellent commentary at TTAC to be able to see it in this way. He really knew the technical and legal ins and outs of it, and was a source of deeper understanding, given the acute lack of options at the time.

Without rehashing it in detail, nobody except the govt. could function in the role they did, given the economic/financial crisis at the time. And nobody wanted the ugly parts. An auction would have killed GM. Maybe that’s what you would have preferred to see as an outcome (certainly many others did), but obviously that wasn’t what the administration wanted.

A conventional bankruptcy was simply impossible under the varying circumstances. I won’t rehash those details either, but I’ve quite convinced myself of that based on the circumstances.

But I’m most surprised about your comment about “insiders” benefiting. Other than (some of them) preserving their jobs, I didn’t see insiders benefiting in any particular way. They didn’t exactly get chunks of ownership/stock or such, right? And the biggest insider (Waggoner) was duly sent packing.

But let’s let it be. It’s too old and boring to debate again now; I went through that era too vividly the first time around. And debated it with my son too many times. ?

Ultimately, I don’t quite see how the New GM and its current management (who are almost all new since then) gets any residual blame, though. The administration’s auto task force controlled how it went down, and they’re all scattered to the winds. I judge the New GM for what they do now, not the method by which they were delivered (forced caesarean).

The contrarian view: had the Sceptre come to market for 1963-‘64 in the $4,500 segment versus Thunderbird and Riviera, it would have flopped miserably on the order of the Rambler Marlin. Compared to the concurrent Thunderbird and Riviera, its styling is nothing exceptional, nothing more than a mediocre two door hardtop of ordinary proportions and details, not Brooks Stevens best work. The full-width headlights, polarized glass C-pillar windows and over-the-quarters-opening decklid are gimmicks. The interior is the best area of the design, though clearly Thunderbird derived. The styling themes seen on the four door hardtop and wagon concepts employed to update the 1964 Lark-type lines were much more inspired.

Even if they had fielded the Sceptre against the $3,500-$4,000 Grand Prix and Starfire, it would have required a completely new platform. Those both were trim and equipment variations on volume models, as such were simply plus volume for little additional expense. South Bend had nothing viable to base this car, the K-body Hawk platform was still largely 1953 engineering.

The public had lost faith in Studebaker as a viable automaker, would have bypassed the Sceptre en masse for the better choice of an established personal luxury car with high resale value in the Thunderbird or the exciting new Riviera by an automaker they had faith in, knew their products and had no fear would exit the auto business soon.

What Studebaker needed far worse than a peripheral personal luxury coupe was a completely new core product line: an up-to-date uni-body compact with all-new engines of the latest technology as well as chassis components. This simply wasn’t a commitment of resources the corporate board was willing to make anymore to keep Studebaker in auto-making, regardless of what Brooks Stevens or any other designer presented.

I have to agree with you. As a Stude homer I love it, of course. But I have to admit that the public was buying what GM and Ford were serving up then and this car, attractive as it might be in concept, was not that. Stude fans are in love with the Avanti, a car that was executed quite well with a class-competitive interior. It didn’t sell despite some genuine performance cred. Without a new chassis the car would not have worked.

We have to be realistic and recognize that 1966 when Studebaker finally ended all vehicle production was right on the eve of the regulatory state that was going to occupy a lot of the auto industry’s time henceforth. Would Studebaker’s ancient engines have passed smog regs, even the early ones? 1967 safety standards would have required dollars thrown into the cars that Studebaker didn’t have (or didn’t want to spend). Look at both IH consumer vehicle business and AMC by 1980 – either dead or on life support, and AMC would not have lasted nearly as long without Jeep generating cash. Even Chrysler was a mess by 1975. Studebaker got out right before things got hard.