Research on migration’s internal dynamics has focused on labour migration and drawn heavily on cumulative causation theory. It is often believed that pioneer labour migrants of middling socioeconomic selectivity facilitate the migration of others in their networks by reducing the costs and risks of migration through practical assistance. Expanding migrant networks can allow for labour migration to grow although macrostructural conditions change. For asylum migration in the context of armed conflict, the mechanisms whereby migration grows may very well differ. For one thing, pioneer asylum migrants in such contexts are often social elites. What is the relationship between the movement of these elites and that of subsequent asylum migrants? This article traces the evolution of Iraqi Kurdish asylum migration to Europe from its inception by elite pioneer migrants to its continuation by non-elites, during four decades of altered contextual conditions. The analysis is based on 106 semi-structured interviews with Iraqi Kurdish migrants. An evolving interplay between exogenous and endogenous dynamics is observed, and so are commonalities with the social processes that underpin labour migration. The basic principles of cumulative causation seem to be operating, yet there is little to indicate that established migrants functioned as ‘bridgeheads’ for newcomers. The empirical analysis feeds into a concluding conceptual discussion in which I argue that, compared to labour migration, asylum migration from conflict-affected areas may be relatively less driven by the interpersonal networks that reduce costs and risks, and relatively more driven by what the article coins ‘emulation’, the observational learning of migration.

This article deals with how return programmes for rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants construct and create vulnerabilities.Few studies have exploredthe role of assistance provided through such programmes for the sex worker returnees and victims of traffickingwho return through them. Even fewer holistically examine a return programme through data elicited in both destination and originlocations, before and after return. That is what we aim to do in this article. We first look at the legal-bureaucratic construction of vulnerability in a host state, Norway, and the systemic logic of its efforts to return victims of trafficking. We then look at how returnees narrate their experiences of and perspectives on vulnerabilityupon return to their country of origin, Nigeria. This study, together with the broader research within this field, indicates that flaws in programme implementation can in fact exacerbate vulnerabilities rather than help returnees overcome them.

This article examines how corruption affects reintegration. The literature on return and reintegration shows that return migrants often struggle to adjust and adapt to life in their place of origin because that environment can be very different from what they grew accustomed to abroad. One stark difference is the prevalence and meaning of corruption. In many sending countries that migrants come from and then return to, corruption is endemic. By contrast, in many receiving countries that migrants go to and return from, it is incidental. Yet, we know little about how the discrepancy affects reintegration. This study examines how corruption affects the psychosocial and economic reintegration of Iraqi Kurds returning to Iraqi Kurdistan from Norway and the United Kingdom. Interviews with returnees reveal that they consider corruption a major challenge for their own reintegration. Psychosocially, it alienates them from the ideology of the Kurdish nation-building project, challenges their identities, undermines a sense of belonging and creates insecurity. Economically, it shapes economic behaviour and outcomes by obstructing entrepreneurship, producing relative deprivation and conditioning their employability.

Studies of migrant transnationalism are dominated by qualitative case studies. To take the field further, there is a need for more quantitative studies and for connecting quantitative and qualitative studies through a reiterative feedback loop. In order to contribute to this, we take two refined and original quantitative studies, one by Snel et al. and one by Portes et al., as a vantage point, commenting on the authors’ organization of analytical categories and their operationalization of key concepts, in light of our own, qualitative data. These data come from a research project, EUMARGINS, where we analyze processes of inclusion and exclusion of young adult immigrants and descendants in seven European countries, using participant observation and life-story interviews in combination with statistical data. We conclude that the process whereby young migrants identify themselves in terms of ethnicity and belonging is context-specific, multidimensional, and hard to study quantitatively.

​This paper deals with both emigration and return, applying a systems approach on 'forced migrants'. ​Empirically based on more than 100 in-depth interviews and 7 focus group discussions with Iraqi Kurdish emigrants and returnees to/from the UK and Norway, this paper explores the evolution of an Iraqi Kurdish - European migration system through three time periods, 1975-1991, 1992-1998, and 1999 until today. The first wave, comprised of political elites, were often granted asylum by sympathetic host states in Europe. Through their existentially important remittances, transnational marriages and high-profile return visits these elites had a signalling effect triggering the emigration of a more mixed group of second-wave ‘economic refugees'. Second-wavers emulated the first-wavers in search of wealth and freedom but were also fleeing a complex of civil war, generalized insecurity and economic deprivation. The final third-wavers tend to be less wealthy and younger, and idealize Europe as a vehicle of social mobility in lieu of inaccessible patronage. Unprecedented though incomplete political stability and rapid though inequitable economic growth in Iraqi Kurdistan hence produces return and emigration simultaneously. It prompts the return of political and financial elites, well positioned to capitalize on investment opportunities and benefit from personal networks and any foreign-earned skills and education they might have acquired. It also produces third wavers who continue to emulate the elites by seeking asylum in Europe to accumulate wealth and enjoy social freedoms, but are poorly positioned to do so as increasingly restrictive asylum regimes and economic downturns in Europe combine to produce irregularization, marginalization, and unfavorable exchange rates vis-à-vis the booming Kurdish economy. When these third-wavers eventually return, often forcibly, they are largely empty-handed and face disappointed households and poor prospects in an increasingly specialized labor market. In other words, emigration to Europe has been democratized but return has not.

​​​In order to support the Iraqi Kurds against the blitzkrieg and brutality of the Islamic State (IS), some European states with EU backing are now following the example of the US in providing military support to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). But important questions remain about the KRG's political foundation. Given a dysfunctional Iraq, and a fully functioning terrorist organization with a transnational vision operating there, Western decision-makers have good reason to assess the stability of their new partner in the region. The KRG faces internal pressures as it seeks to fend off the IS and position itself for future independence.

Rejected asylum seekers often resist the legal obligation to return. Consequently, European policy makers tasked with migration management have turned to so-called 'Assisted voluntry Return and Reintegration programmes (AVRRs) to incentivize return to and support reintegration in the country of origin. AVRRs are described as less politically costly, simpler and cheaper than deportation. But with very limited monitoring and evaluation of AVRRs we know little about how well they work and whether the promised support is given. This policy brief outlines some of the compelling reasons to monitor and evaluate AVRRs.