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The decision by Tunisian and Egyptian armies not to crush the pro-democracy movement may be having an effect in an unexpected place: Iran.

In a speech last Thursday in Tehran, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firuzabadi has said that pro-democracy uprisings in the Middle East should not be regarded as “shallow political agitations.”

“The people of the region are on the march for independence, freedom and Islamic democracy,” he said.

Addressing officer cadets, Firuzabadi said the task of the military is “to protect the frontiers of the country and defend its sovereignty” rather than the regime in place.

As an example of army chiefs who ran counter to the will of their people, Firuzabadi cited “the terrible fate of Saddam’s Hussein’s generals in Iraq.”

The official news agency IRNA gave a brief account of the speech but the rest of the state-owned media ignored it.

The general’s speech came days after Iran’s own pro-democracy movement staged marches in Tehran and several other cities.

For the first time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — the regime’s military backbone — did not intervene to secure Tehran. That task was given to the paramilitary Baseej (“Mobilization”).

The decision not to deploy the guard was taken after the publication on the Internet of a letter purportedly written by a number of mid-ranking officers to Revolutionary Guard Commander Maj. Gen. Muhammad-Ali Aziz Jaafari. In it, they call for “a clear distinction between the Baseej and the IRGC,” with the guard focusing on “defending the frontiers of the country.”

“We promise our people that we will not shoot or beat our brothers who are seeking to express legitimate protest against the policies and methods of the leaders,” the letter reads.

Referring to the “behavior of the Egyptian army and the Tunisian army before it,” the letter says that experiences in which the Guard was deployed to crush “peaceful demonstrations in our cities” should not be repeated.

None of the officers cited as signatories to the letter has denied it. Nor has the IRGC issued a denial.

Despite its equivocations, Firuzabadi’s speech echoes the letter, in part using the same phrases.

Some see the speech as Firuzabadi’s attempt to massage his image. The general is due to retire this summer after two decades as the regime’s No. 1 military figure. As a wealthy investor, he plans to devote his new life to his companies and businesses. The image of “the general who opposed killing people in the streets” would do him no harm. Since most IRGC chiefs double their military career with involvement in business ventures, the same is true for many others. In this, they’re no different from Tunisian and Egyptian generals who could also be described as “businessmen in uniform.”

Two other factors may have contributed to the apparent move by guard officers to distance themselves from tasks related to internal security. The first is the popularity of Iran’s regular army, which has maintained a professional and nonpartisan profile.

If regime change occurs in Iran, the army may well side with the people, casting the guard as the enemy of democracy. This is what happened in Tunisia when the army blamed all on President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s Presidential Guard, the Tunisian equivalent of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

A month after Ben Ali’s flight into exile, his guard had evaporated. To be sure, the Revolutionary Guard is bigger and wealthier. But it would be no match for Iran’s regular army backed by the Iranian people.

Another factor may be guard chiefs’ fear of being charged with crimes against humanity. A number of its commanders have already been cited in four UN Security Council resolutions as responsible for acts of terrorism and involvement in Tehran’s illegal nuclear program.

“No one knows for sure what is going on,” says Hamid Zomorrodi, an expert on Iran’s military and a former naval officer. “But one thing is certain: Tunisia and Egypt have given the IRGC chiefs a bad shake.”