The next clause of the fourth proposition was taken into
consideration, and was as follows: "The freedom of speech
and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply
to the Government for redress of grievances, shall not be
infringed.

Mr. Sedgwick submitted to those gentlemen who had
contemplated the subject, what effect such an amendment
as this would have; he feared it would tend to make them
appear trifling in the eyes of their constituents; what, said
he, shall we secure the freedom of speech, and think it
necessary, at the same time, to allow the right of assembling?
If people freely converse together, they must assemble
for that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable
right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that
never would be called in question; it is derogatory to the
dignity of the House to descend to such minutiae; he
therefore moved to strike out "assemble and."

Mr. Benson.--The committee who framed this report
proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to
the people; they conceived them to be inherent; and all
that they meant to provide against was their being infringed
by the Government.

Mr. Sedgwick replied, that if the committee were governed
by that general principle, they might have gone into
a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might have declared
that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he
pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to
bed when he thought proper; but he would ask the gentleman
whether he thought it necessary to enter these trifles
in a declaration of rights, in a Government where none of
them were intended to be infringed.

Mr. Tucker hoped the words would not be struck out,
for he considered them of importance; besides, they were
recommended by the States of Virginia and North Carolina,
though he noticed that the most material part proposed
by those States was omitted, which was, a declaration
that the people should have a right to instruct their
representatives. He would move to have those words inserted
as soon as the motion for striking out was decided.

Mr. Gerry was also against the words being struck out,
because he conceived it to be an essential right; it was inserted
in the constitutions of several States; and though it
had been abused in the year 1786 in Massachusetts, yet
that abuse ought not to operate as an argument against the
use of it. The people ought to be secure in the peaceable
enjoyment of this privilege, and that can only be done by
making a declaration to that effect in the constitution.

Mr. Page.--The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr.
Sedgwick,) who made this motion, objects to the clause,
because the right is of so trivial a nature. He supposes it
no more essential than whether a man has a right to wear
his hat or not; but let me observe to him that such rights
have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to pull
off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority;
people have also been prevented from assembling together
on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to guard
against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege
in the declaration of rights. If the people could be
deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext
whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege
contained in the clause.

Mr. Vining said, if the thing was harmless, and it would
tend to gratify the States that had proposed amendments,
he should agree to it.

Mr. Hartley observed, that it had been asserted in the
convention of Pennsylvania, by the friends of the constitution,
that all the rights and powers that were not given
to the Government were retained by the States and the
people thereof. This was also his own opinion; but as four
or five States had required to be secured in those rights by
an express declaration in the constitution, he was disposed
to gratify them; he thought every thing that was not incompatible
with the general good ought to be granted, if
it would tend to obtain the confidence of the people in the
Government; and, upon the whole, he thought these
words were as necessary to be inserted in the declaration
of rights as most in the clause.

Mr. Gerry said, that his colleague contended for nothing,
if he supposed that the people had a right to consult
for the common good, because they could not consult unless
they met for the purpose.

Mr. Sedgwick replied that if they were understood or implied
in the word consult, they were utterly unnecessary,
and upon that ground he moved to have them struck out.

The question was now put upon Mr. Sedgwick's motion,
and lost by a considerable majority.

Mr. Tucker then moved to insert these words, "to instruct
their Representatives."

Mr. Hartley wished the motion had not been made,
for gentlemen acquainted with the circumstances of this
country, and the history of the country from which we
separated, differed exceedingly on this point. The members
of the House of Representatives, said he, are chosen
for two years, the members of the Senate for six.

According to the principles laid down in the Constitution,
it is presumable that the persons elected know the
interests and the circumstances of their constituents, and
being checked in their determinations by a division of the
Legislative power into two branches, there is little danger
of error. At least it ought to be supposed that they have
the confidence of the people during the period for which
they are elected; and if, by misconduct, they forfeit it,
their constituents have the power of leaving them out at
the expiration of that time--thus they are answerable for
the part they have taken in measures that may be contrary
to the general wish.

Representation is the principle of our Government; the
people ought to have confidence in the honor and integrity
of those they send forward to transact their business;
their right to instruct them is a problematical subject. We
have seen it attended with bad consequences, both in England
and America. When the passions of the people are
excited, instructions have been resorted to and obtained,
to answer party purposes; and although the public opinion
is generally respectable, yet at such moments it has been
known to be often wrong; and happy is that Government
composed of men of firmness and wisdom to discover, and
resist popular error.

If, in a small community, where the interests, habits, and
manners are neither so numerous or diversified, instructions
bind not, what shall we say of instructions to this
body? Can it be supposed that the inhabitants of a single
district in a State, are better informed with respect to the
general interests of the Union, than a select body assembled
from every part? Can it be supposed that a part will
be more desirous of promoting the good of the whole than
the whole will of the part? I apprehend, sir, that Congress
will be the best judges of proper measures, and that instructions
will never be resorted to but for party purposes,
when they will generally contain the prejudices and acrimony
of the party, rather than the dictates of honest reason
and sound policy.

In England, this question has been considerably agitated.
The representatives of some towns in Parliament
have acknowledged, and submitted to the binding force of
instructions, while the majority have thrown off the shackles
with disdain. I would not have this precedent influence
our decision; but let the doctrine be tried upon its own
merits, and stand or fall as it shall be found to deserve.

It appears to my mind, that the principle of representation
is distinct from an agency, which may require written
instructions. The great end of meeting is to consult for
the common good; but can the common good be discerned
without the object is reflected and shown in every light. A
local or partial view does not necessarily enable any man
to comprehend it clearly; this can only result from an inspection
into the aggregate. Instructions viewed in this
light will be found to embarrass the best and wisest men.
And were all the members to take their seats in order to
obey instructions, and those instructions were as various as
it is probable they would be, what possibility would there
exist of so accommodating each to the other as to produce
any act whatever? Perhaps a majority of the whole might
not be instructed to agree to any one point, and is it thus
the people of the United States propose to form a more
perfect union, provide for the common defence, and promote
the general welfare?

Sir, I have known within my own time so many inconveniences
and real evils arise from adopting the popular
opinions on the moment, that although I respect them as
much as any man, I hope this Government will particularly
guard against them, at least that they will not bind themselves
by a constitutional act, and by oath, to submit to
their influence; if they do, the great object which this Government
has been established to attain, will inevitably
elude our grasp on the uncertain and veering winds of
popular commotion.

Mr. Page.--The gentleman from Pennsylvania tells you,
that in England this principle is doubted; how far this is
consonant with the nature of the Government I will not
pretend to say; but I am not astonished to find that the
administrators of a monarchical Government are unassailable
by the weak voice of the people; but under a democracy,
whose great end is to form a code of laws congenial
with the public sentiment, the popular opinion ought to be
collected and attended to. Our present object is, I presume,
to secure to our constituents and to posterity these
inestimable rights. Our Government is derived from the
people, of consequence the people have a right to consult
for the common good; but to what end will this be done,
if they have not the power of instructing their representatives?
Instruction and representation in a republic appear
to me to be inseparably connected; but were I the
subject of a monarch, I should doubt whether the public
good did not depend more upon the prince's will than the
will of the people. I should dread a popular assembly consulting
for the public good, because, under its influence,
commotions and tumults might arise that would shake the
foundation of the monarch's throne, and make the empire
tremble in expectation. The people of England have submitted
the crown to the Hanover family, and have rejected
the Stuarts. If instructions upon such a revolution were
considered binding, it is difficult to know what would have
been the effects. It might be well, therefore, to have the
doctrine exploded from that kingdom; but it will not be
advanced as a substantial reason in favor of our treading
in the same steps.

The honorable gentleman has said, that when once the
people have chosen a representative, they must rely on his
integrity and judgment during the period for which he is
elected. I think, sir, to doubt the authority of the people
to instruct their representatives, will give them just cause
to be alarmed for their fate. I look upon it as a dangerous
doctrine, subversive of the great end for which the United
States have confederated. Every friend of mankind, every
well-wisher of his country, will be desirous of obtaining the
sense of the people on every occasion of magnitude; but
how can this be so well expressed as in instructions to their
representatives? I hope, therefore, that gentlemen will not
oppose the insertion of it in this part of the report.

Mr. Clymer.--I hope the amendment will not be
adopted; but if our constituents choose to instruct us, that
they may be left at liberty to do so. Do gentlemen foresee
the extent of these words? If they have a constitutional
right to instruct us, it infers that we are bound by those
instructions; and as we ought not to decide constitutional
questions by implication, I presume we shall be called
upon to go further, and expressly declare the members of
the Legislature bound by the instruction of their constituents.
This is a most dangerous principle, utterly destructive
of all ideas of an independent and deliberative body,
which are essential requisites in the Legislatures of free
Governments; they prevent men of abilities and experience
from rendering those services to the community that
are in their power, destroying the object contemplated by
establishing an efficient General Government, and rendering
Congress a mere passive machine.

Mr. Sherman.--It appears to me, that the words are calculated
to mislead the people, by conveying an idea that
they have a right to control the debates of the Legislature.
This cannot be admitted to be just, because it would destroy
the object of their meeting. I think, when the people
have chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet others
from the different parts of the Union, and consult, and
agree with them to such acts as are for the general benefit
of the whole community. If they were to be guided by instructions,
there would be no use in deliberation; all that a
man would have to do, would be to produce his instructions,
and lay them on the table, and let them speak for
him. From hence I think it may be fairly inferred, that the
right of the people to consult for the common good can
go no further than to petition the Legislature, or apply for
a redress of grievances. It is the duty of a good representative
to inquire what measures are most likely to promote
the general welfare, and, after he has discovered them, to
give them his support. Should his instructions, therefore,
coincide with his ideas on any measure, they would be unnecessary;
if they were contrary to the conviction of his
own mind, he must be bound by every principle of justice
to disregard them.

Mr. Jackson was in favor of the right of the people to
assemble and consult for the common good; it had been
used in this country as one of the best checks on the British
Legislature in their unjustifiable attempts to tax the
colonies without their consent. America had no representatives
in the British Parliament, therefore they could instruct
none, yet they exercised the power of consultation
to a good effect. He begged gentlemen to consider the
dangerous tendency of establishing such a doctrine; it
would necessarily drive the house into a number of factions.
There might be different instructions from every
State, and the representation from each State would be a
faction to support its own measures.

If we establish this as a right, we shall be bound by those
instructions; now, I am willing to leave both the people
and representatives to their own discretion on this subject.
Let the people consult and give their opinion; let the representative
judge of it; and if it is just, let him govern himself
by it as a good member ought to do; but if it is otherwise,
let him have it in his power to reject their advice.

What may be the consequence of binding a man to vote
in all cases according to the will of others? He is to decide
upon a constitutional point, and on this question his conscience
is bound by the obligation of a solemn oath; you
now involve him in a serious dilemma. If he votes according
to his conscience, he decides against his instructions;
but in deciding against his instructions, he commits a
breach of the constitution, by infringing the prerogative of
the people, secured to them by this declaration. In short,
it will give rise to such a variety of absurdities and inconsistencies,
as no prudent Legislature would wish to involve
themselves in.

Mr. Gerry.--By the checks provided in the constitution,
we have good grounds to believe that the very framers of
it conceived that the Government would be liable to maladministration,
and I presume that the gentlemen of this
House do not mean to arrogate to themselves more perfection
than human nature has as yet been found to be
capable of; if they do not, they will admit an additional
check against abuses which this, like every other Government,
is subject to. Instruction from the people will furnish
this in a considerable degree.

It has been said that the amendment proposed by the
honorable gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Tucker)
determines this point, "that the people can bind their representatives
to follow their instructions." I do not conceive
that this necessarily follows. I think the representative,
notwithstanding the insertion of these words, would be at
liberty to act as he pleased; if he declined to pursue such
measures as he was directed to attain, the people would
have a right to refuse him their suffrages at a future election.

Now, though I do not believe the amendment would
bind the representatives to obey the instructions, yet I
think the people have a right both to instruct and bind
them. Do gentlemen conceive that on any occasion instructions
would be so general as to proceed from all our constituents?
If they do, it is the sovereign will; for gentlemen
will not contend that the sovereign will resides in the Legislature.
The friends and patrons of this constitution have
always declared that the sovereignty resides in the people,
and that they do not part with it on any occasion; to say
the sovereignty vests in the people, and that they have not
a right to instruct and control their representatives, is absurd
to the last degree. They must either give up their
principle, or grant that the people have a right to exercise
their sovereignty to control the whole Government, as well
as this branch of it. But the amendment does not carry the
principle to such an extent, it only declares the right of
the people to send instructions; the representative will, if
he thinks proper, communicate his instructions to the
House, but how far they shall operate on his conduct, he
will judge for himself.

The honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Jackson)
supposes that instructions will tend to generate factions in
this House; but he did not see how it could have that effect,
any more than the freedom of debate had. If the representative
entertains the same opinion with his constituents,
he will decide with them in favor of the measure; if
other gentlemen, who are not instructed on this point, are
convinced by argument that the measure is proper, they
will also vote with them; consequently, the influence of debate
and of instruction is the same.

The gentleman says further, that the people have the
right of instructing their representatives; if so, why not declare
it? Does he mean that it shall lie dormant and never
be exercised? If so, it will be a right of no utility. But much
good may result from a declaration in the constitution that
they possess this privilege; the people will be encouraged
to come forward with their instructions, which will form a
fund of useful information for the Legislature. We cannot,
I apprehend, be too well informed of the true state, condition,
and sentiment of our constituents, and perhaps this
is the best mode in our power of obtaining information. I
hope we shall never shut our ears against that information
which is to be derived from the petitions and instructions
of our constituents. I hope we shall never presume to
think that all the wisdom of this country is concentred
within the walls of this House. Men, unambitious of distinctions
from their fellow-citizens, remain within their
own domestic walk, unheard of and unseen, possessing all
the advantages resulting from a watchful observance of
public men and public measures, whose voice, if we would
descend to listen to it, would give us knowledge superior
to what could be acquired amidst the cares and bustles of
a public life; let us then adopt the amendment, and encourage
the diffident to enrich our stock of knowledge
with the treasure of their remarks and observations.

Mr. Madison.--I think the committee acted prudently
in omitting to insert these words in the report they have
brought forward; if, unfortunately, the attempt of proposing
amendments should prove abortive, it will not arise
from the want of a disposition in the friends of the constitution
to do what is right with respect to securing the
rights and privileges of the people of America, but from
the difficulties arising from discussing and proposing abstract
propositions, of which the judgment may not be
convinced. I venture to say, that if we confine ourselves to
an enumeration of simple, acknowledged principles, the
ratification will meet with but little difficulty. Amendments
of a doubtful nature will have a tendency to prejudice the
whole system; the proposition now suggested partakes
highly of this nature. It is doubted by many gentlemen
here; it has been objected to in intelligent publications
throughout the Union; it is doubted by many members of
the State Legislatures. In one sense this declaration is true,
in many others it is certainly not true; in the sense in
which it is true, we have asserted the right sufficiently in
what we have done; if we mean nothing more than this,
that the people have a right to express and communicate
their sentiments and wishes, we have provided for it already.
The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty
of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the
reach of this Government; the people may therefore publicly
address their representatives, may privately advise
them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the whole
body; in all these ways they may communicate their will.
If gentlemen mean to go further, and to say that the people
have a right to instruct their representatives in such a
sense as that the delegates are obliged to conform to those
instructions, the declaration is not true. Suppose they instruct
a representative, by his vote, to violate the constitution;
is he at liberty to obey such instructions? Suppose he
is instructed to patronize certain measures, and from circumstances
known to him, but not to his constituents, he
is convinced that they will endanger the public good; is he
obliged to sacrifice his own judgment to them? Is he absolutely
bound to perform what he is instructed to do?
Suppose he refuses, will his vote be the less valid, or the
community be disengaged from that obedience which is
due to the laws of the Union? If his vote must inevitably
have the same effect, what sort of a right is this in the
constitution, to instruct a representative who has a right to
disregard the order, if he pleases? In this sense the right
does not exist, in the other sense it does exist, and is provided
largely for.

The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts asks if
the sovereignty is not with the people at large. Does he
infer that the people can, in detached bodies, contravene
an act established by the whole people? My idea of the
sovereignty of the people is, that the people can change
the constitution if they please; but while the constitution
exists, they must conform themselves to its dictates. But I
do not believe that the inhabitants of any district can speak
the voice of the people; so far from it, their ideas may
contradict the sense of the whole people; hence the consequence
that instructions are binding on the representative
is of a doubtful, if not of a dangerous nature. I do not
conceive, therefore, that it is necessary to agree to the
proposition now made; so far as any real good is to arise
from it, so far that real good is provided for; so far as it is
of a doubtful nature, so far it obliges us to run the risk of
losing the whole system.

Mr. Smith, of South Carolina.--I am opposed to this
motion, because I conceive it will operate as a partial inconvenience
to the more distant States. If every member is
to be bound by instructions how to vote, what are gentlemen
from the extremities of the continent to do? Members
from the neighboring States can obtain their instructions
earlier than those from the Southern ones, and I presume
that particular instructions will be necessary for particular
measures; of consequence, we vote perhaps against instructions
on their way to us, or we must decline voting at
all. But what is the necessity of having a numerous representation?
One member from a State can receive the instructions,
and by his vote answer all the purposes of
many, provided his vote is allowed to count for the proportion
the State ought to send; in this way the business
might be done at a less expense than having one or two
hundred members in the House, which had been strongly
contended for yesterday.

Mr. Stone.--I think the clause would change the Government
entirely; instead of being a Government founded
upon representation, it would be a democracy of singular
properties.

I differ from the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,)
if he thinks this clause would not bind the representative;
in my opinion, it would bind him effectually, and I
venture to assert, without diffidence, that any law passed
by the Legislature would be of no force, if a majority of
the members of this House were instructed to the contrary,
provided the amendment became part of the constitution.
What would follow from this? Instead of looking in
the code of laws passed by Congress, your Judiciary would
have to collect and examine the instructions from the various
parts of the Union. It follows very clearly from hence,
that the Government would be altered from a representative
one to a democracy, wherein all laws are made immediately
by the voice of the people.

This is a power not to be found in any part of the earth
except among the Swiss cantons; there the body of the
people vote upon the laws, and give instructions to their
delegates. But here we have a different form of Government;
the people at large are not authorized under it to
vote upon the law, nor did I ever hear that any man required
it. Why, then, are we called upon to propose
amendments subversive of the principles of the constitution,
which were never desired?

Several members now called for the question, and the
Chairman being about to put the same:

Mr. Gerry.--Gentlemen seem in a great hurry to get
this business through. I think, Mr. Chairman, it requires a
further discussion; for my part, I had rather do less business
and do it well, than precipitate measures before they
are fully understood.

The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison)
stated, that if the proposed amendments are defeated, it
will be by the delay attending the discussion of doubtful
propositions; and he declares this to partake of that quality.
It is natural, sir, for us to be fond of our own work. We
do not like to see it disfigured by other hands. That honorable
gentleman brought forward a string of propositions;
among them was the clause now proposed to be
amended: he is no doubt ready for the question, and determined
not to admit what we think an improvement.
The gentlemen who were on the committee, and brought
in the report, have considered the subject, and are also
ripe for a decision. But other gentlemen may crave a like
indulgence. Is not the report before us for deliberation
and discussion, and to obtain the sense of the House upon
it; and will not gentlemen allow us a day or two for these
purposes, after they have forced us to proceed upon them
at this time? I appeal to their candor and good sense on
the occasion, and am sure not to be refused; and I must
inform them now, that they may not be surprised hereafter,
that I wish all the amendments proposed by the respective
States to be considered. Gentlemen say it is necessary
to finish the subject, in order to reconcile a number
of our fellow-citizens to the Government. If this is their
principle, they ought to consider the wishes and intentions
which the convention has expressed for them; if they do
this, they will find that they expect and wish for the declaration
proposed by the honorable gentleman over the
way, (Mr. Tucker,) and, of consequence, they ought to
agree to it; and why it, with others recommended in the
same way, were not reported, I cannot pretend to say; the
committee know this best themselves.

The honorable gentleman near me (Mr. Stone) says,
that the laws passed contrary to instruction will be nugatory.
And other gentlemen ask, if their constituents instruct
them to violate the constitution, whether they must
do it, Sir, does not the constitution declare that all laws
passed by Congress are paramount to the laws and constitutions
of the several States; if our decrees are of such
force as to set aside the State laws and constitutions, certainly
they may be repugnant to any instructions whatever,
without being injured thereby. But can we conceive that
our constituents would be so absurd as to instruct us to
violate our oath, and act directly contrary to the principles
of a Government ordained by themselves? We must look
upon them to be absolutely abandoned and false to their
own interests, to suppose them capable of giving such instructions.

If this amendment is introduced into the constitution, I
do not think we shall be much troubled with instructions;
a knowledge of the right will operate to check a spirit that
would render instruction necessary.

The honorable gentleman from Virginia asked, will not
the affirmative of a member who votes repugnant to his
instructions bind the community as much as the votes of
those who conform? There is no doubt, sir, but it will; but
does this tend to show that the constituent has no right to
instruct? Surely not. I admit, sir, that instructions contrary
to the constitution ought not to bind, though the sovereignty
resides in the people. The honorable gentleman acknowledges
that the sovereignty vests there; if so, it may
exercise its will in any case not inconsistent with a previous
contract. The same gentleman asks if we are to give the
power to the people in detached bodies to contravene the
Government while it exists. Certainly not; nor does the
proposed proposition extend to that point; it is only intended
to open for them a convenient mode in which they
may convey their sense to their agents. The gentleman
therefore takes for granted what is inadmissible, that Congress
will always be doing illegal things, and make it necessary
for the sovereign to declare its pleasure.

He says the people have a right to alter the constitution,
but they have no right to oppose the Government. If,
while the Government exists, they have no right to control
it, it appears they have divested themselves of the sovereignty
over the constitution. Therefore, our language,
with our principles, must change, and we ought to say that
the sovereignty existed in the people previous to the establishment
of this Government. This will be ground for
alarm indeed, if it is true; but I trust, sir, too much to the
good sense of my fellow-citizens ever to believe that the
doctrine will generally obtain in this country of freedom.

Mr. Vining.--If, Mr. Chairman, there appears on one
side too great an urgency to despatch this business, there
appears on the other an unnecessary delay and procrastination
equally improper and unpardonable. I think this
business has been already well considered by the House,
and every gentleman in it; however, I am not for an unseemly
expedition.

The gentleman last up has insinuated a reflection upon
the committee for not reporting all the amendments proposed
by some of the State conventions. I can assign a reason
for this. The committee conceived some of them superfluous
or dangerous, and found many of them so
contradictory that it was impossible to make any thing of
them; and this is a circumstance the gentleman cannot
pretend ignorance of.

Is it not inconsistent in that honorable member to complain
of hurry, when he comes day after day reiterating
the same train of arguments, and demanding the attention
of this body by rising six or seven times on a question? I
wish, sir, this subject discussed coolly and dispassionately,
but hope we shall have no more reiterations or tedious
discussions; let gentlemen try to expedite public business,
and their arguments will be conducted in a laconic and
consistent manner. As to the business of instruction, I look
upon it inconsistent with the general good. Suppose our
constituents were to instruct us to make paper money; no
gentleman pretends to say it would be unconstitutional, yet
every honest mind must shudder at the thought. How can
we then assert that instructions ought to bind us in all
cases not contrary to the constitution?

Mr. Livermore was not very anxious whether the words
were inserted or not, but he had a great deal of doubt on
the meaning of this whole amendment; it provides that the
people may meet and consult for the common good. Does
this mean a part of the people in a township or district, or
does it mean the representatives in the State Legislatures?
If it means the latter, there is no occasion for a provision
that the Legislature may instruct the members of this
body.

In some States the representatives are chosen by districts.
In such case, perhaps, the instructions may be considered
as coming from the district; but in other States,
each representative is chosen by the whole people. In New
Hampshire it is the case; the instructions of any particular
place would have but little weight, but a legislative instruction
would have considerable influence upon each representative.
If, therefore, the words mean that the Legislature
may instruct, he presumed it would have considerable
effect, though he did not believe it binding. Indeed, he
was inclined to pay a deference to any information he
might receive from any number of gentlemen, even by a
private letter; but as for full binding force, no instructions
contained that quality. They could not, nor ought not to
have it, because different parties pursue different measures;
and it might be expedient, nay, absolutely necessary,
to sacrifice them in mutual concessions.

The doctrine of instructions would hold better in England
than here, because the boroughs and corporations
might have an interest to pursue totally immaterial to the
rest of the kingdom: in that case, it would be prudent to
instruct their members in Parliament.

Mr. Gerry wished the constitution amended without his
having any hand in it; but if he must interfere, he would
do his duty. The honorable gentleman from Delaware had
given him an example of moderation and laconic and consistent
debate that he meant to follow; and would just observe
to the worthy gentleman last up, that several States
had proposed the amendment, and among the rest New
Hampshire.

There was one remark which escaped him, when he was
up before. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Stone)
had said that the amendment would change the nature of
the Government, and make it a democracy. Now he had
always heard that it was a democracy; but perhaps he was
misled, and the honorable gentleman was right in distinguishing
it by some other appellation; perhaps an aristocracy
was a term better adapted to it.

Mr. Sedgwick opposed the idea of the gentleman from
New Hampshire, that the State Legislature had the power
of instructing the members of this House; he looked upon
it as a subornation of the rights of the people to admit
such an authority. We stand not here, said he, the representatives
of the State Legislatures, as under the former
Congress, but as the representatives of the great body of
the people. The sovereignty, the independence, and the
rights of the States are intended to be guarded by the Senate;
if we are to be viewed in any other light, the greatest
security the people have for their rights and privileges is
destroyed.

But with respect to instructions, it is well worthy of consideration
how they are to be procured. It is not the opinion
of an individual that is to control my conduct; I consider
myself as the representative of the whole Union. An
individual may give me information, but his sentiments
may be in opposition to the sense of the majority of the
people. If instructions are to be of any efficacy, they must
speak the sense of the majority of the people, at least of a
State. In a State so large as Massachusetts it will behoove
gentlemen to consider how the sense of the majority of the
freemen is to be obtained and communicated. Let us take
care to avoid the insertion of crude and indigested propositions,
more likely to produce acrimony than that spirit
of harmony which we ought to cultivate.

Mr. Livermore said that he did not understand the
honorable gentleman, or was not understood by him; he
did not presume peremptorily to say what degree of influence
the legislative instructions would have on a representative.
He knew it was not the thing in contemplation here;
and what he had said respected only the influence it would
have on his private judgment.

Mr. Ames said there would be a very great inconvenience
attending the establishment of the doctrine contended
for by his colleague. Those States which had selected
their members by districts would have no right to
give them instructions, consequently the members ought
to withdraw; in which case the House might be reduced
below a majority, and not be able, according to the constitution,
to do any business at all.

According to the doctrine of the gentleman from New
Hampshire, one part of the Government would be annihilated;
for of what avail is it that the people have the appointment
of a representative, if he is to pay obedience to
the dictates of another body?

Several members now rose, and called for the question.

Mr. Page was sorry to see gentlemen so impatient; the
more so, as he saw there was very little attention paid to
any thing that was said; but he would express his sentiments
if he was only heard by the Chair. He discovered
clearly, notwithstanding what had been observed by the
most ingenious supporters of the opposition, that there
was an absolute necessity for adopting the amendment. It
was strictly compatible with the spirit and the nature of the
Government; all power vests in the people of the United
States; it is, therefore, a Government of the people, a democracy.
If it were consistent with the peace and tranquillity
of the inhabitants, every freeman would have a right
to come and give his vote upon the law; but, inasmuch as
this cannot be done, by reason of the extent of territory,
and some other causes, the people have agreed that their
representatives shall exercise a part of their authority. To
pretend to refuse them the power of instructing their
agents, appears to me to deny them a right. One gentleman
asks how the instructions are to be collected. Many
parts of this country have been in the practice of instructing
their representatives; they found no difficulty in communicating
their sense. Another gentleman asks if they
were to instruct us to make paper money, what we would
do. I would tell them, said he, it was unconstitutional; alter
that, and we will consider on the point. Unless laws are
made satisfactory to the people, they will lose their support,
they will be abused or done away; this tends to destroy
the efficiency of the Government.

It is the sense of several of the conventions that this
amendment should take place; I think it my duty to support
it, and fear it will spread an alarm among our constituents
if we decline to do it.

Mr. Wadsworth.--Instructions have frequently been
given to the representatives of the United States; but the
people did not claim as a right that they should have any
obligation upon the representatives; it is not right that
they should. In troublesome times, designing men have
drawn the people to instruct the representatives to their
harm; the representatives have, on such occasions, refused
to comply with their instructions. I have known, myself,
that they have been disobeyed, and yet the representative
was not brought to account for it; on the contrary, he was
caressed and reelected, while those who have obeyed
them, contrary to their private sentiments, have ever after
been despised for it. Now, if people considered it an inherent
right in them to instruct their representatives, they
would have undoubtedly punished the violation of them. I
have no idea of instructions, unless they are obeyed; a discretional
power is incompatible with them.

The honorable gentleman who was up last says, if he
were instructed to make paper money, he would tell his
constituents it was unconstitutional. I believe that is not the
case, for this body would have a right to make paper
money; but if my constituents were to instruct me to vote
for such a measure, I would disobey them, let the consequence
be what it would.

Mr. Sumter.--The honorable gentlemen who are opposed
to the motion of my colleague, do not treat it fairly.
They suppose that it is meant to bind the representative to
conform to his instructions. The mover of this question, I
presume to say, has no such thing in idea. That they shall
notice them and obey them, as far as is consistent and
proper, may be very just; perhaps they ought to produce
them to the House, and let them have as much influence as
they deserve; nothing further, I believe, is contended for.

The Founders' Constitution
Volume 5, Amendment I (Petition and Assembly), Document 17http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_assemblys17.htmlThe University of Chicago Press

Annals of Congress. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States. "History of Congress." 42 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1834--56.