Toward an Index of the 9/11 Commission Report

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Originally published September 2004.

[The government report is admirably lucid and bears a formidable textual apparatus, including 115 pages of endnotes. But it lacks an index. The result is a volume that repeats the very compartmentalization it’s been charged with analyzing. To remedy this, and following the cue of n+1 friend Caleb Crain, we have assembled a team of indexers. Our approach has varied—sometimes tending toward the “zone defense” style of the CIA, elsewhere favoring the “man-to-man” coverage practiced by the FBI.]

and Cole investigation
— 11/11/00: expresses belief to Clinton that CIA’s case against Bin Laden is strong, 194
— 11/25/00: writes Clinton that CIA investigation will soon conclude Al Qaeda behind attack, 194
— but also urges patience and restraint, 201-202
— urges Cheney to demand what CIA needs to know before declaring Al Qaeda responsible, 202
— 9/4/01: “The fact that the USS Cole was attacked during the last Administration does not absolve us of responding for the attack,” 212
— vents, “One might have thought with a $250m hole in a destroyer and 17 dead sailors the Pentagon might have wanted to respond,” 212-213

dire warnings by
— asks, “Is there a threat to civilian aircraft?” 179
— says US has “not put too much of a dent” in al Qaeda and calls for “markedly different tempo,” 182
— 12/4/99: “We need to make some decisions NOW,” 176
— 12/22/00: “Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are in the US and attacks in the US are likely,” 179
— 1/25/01: Al Qaeda “not some narrow, little terrorist issue,” 201
— 3/23/01: warns of attacks on White House, 204
— spring 2001: says delay will lead to final victory of Taliban over Northern Alliance, 206
— 5/29/01: says Bin Ladin can only be eliminated, not deterred, 204
— 5/29/01: “when these attacks occur, as they likely will, we will wonder what more we could have done to stop them,” 256
— 6/28/01: tells Condoleeza Rice al Qaeda activity “has reached a crescendo,” 257
— 7/27/01: tells Rice intelligence spike has stopped, 260
— 9/4/01: “are we serious about dealing with Al-Qida threat? Is al Qida a bid deal?… Decision makers should imagine themselves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qida attacks and hundred of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the US… What would those decision makers wish that they had done earlier?” 212

and Iraq
— doubts Bin Ladin would trust Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qadhafi, 125, 127
— sees Khartoum chemical operation as “probably a direct result of the Iraq-al Qida agreement,” 128
— becomes nervous Bin Ladin might escape, possibly to Iraq, 134
— fears it would be “virtually impossible” to find Bin Ladin if he served Saddam Hussein, 134
— asked by Bush, “See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way,” 334
— writes skeptical report, asserting there is no “compelling case” for link with Iraq, but does pass along Czech report, 334

and Pentagon
— calls the military “very, very, very reluctant,” 137
— complains that Pentagon thinks there is “nothing worth hitting in Afghanistan” and that “cruise missiles cost more than jungle gyms and mud huts,” 213
— fails to understand “why we continue to allow the existence of large scale al Qida bases where we know people are being trained to kill Americans,” 213

excellence
— of English spoken by one American 11 hijacker, 6
— of FBI investigation of WTC1, 72, 329
— of Justice Department investigation of WTC1, 72
— unfortunate consequences of, 72
— of example of state-sponsored terrorism at 1986 Berlin disco bombing by Lybia, 97-98
— of Mohamed Atta”s command of the German language, 160
— of 1941 intelligence that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was coming, 344

chickening out of
— nixes kidnapping plan after becoming concerned that it might accidentally kill Bin Ladin, 113-114
— told by field agent to “Hit him tonight— we may not get another chance,” doubts reliability of source, spends some time discussing it with top officials, then complains intelligence is hours old. Field operative “Mike” characterizes hesitation as “worry that some stray shrapnel might hit the Habash mosque and ‘offend’ Muslims,” 130
— calls off desert camp strike plan to avoid upsetting UAE by possibly killing one of their princes, 138
— backs off Kandahar strikes in May 1999— partly in wake of criticism over bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 140-141
— claims not to make policy, 402

— commission’s patent lack of regard for, 105-106, 357, 358, 402

confusion of
— insists that al Shifa plant in Sudan produced nerve gas, 118
— thinks it’s only OK to kill Bin Ladin in context of capture op, 133
— surprised that Clinton wanted definitive conclusion on who was responsible for USS Cole attack, 196
— after receiving briefing on late-August arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui(“Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly”), discusses it with no one of import, 275
— fails to see connection of Moussaoui arrest to extremely high level of threat warning, 275
— tells President-elect Bush that killing Bin Ladin would have an effect, but would not end the threat, 199

escapes, narrow, of
— eludes by a few hours US bombing of his camps in 1998, possibly thanks to Pakistani intelligence, 117
— CIA drops plan to strike him despite agent “Mike” saying, “Hit him tonight—we may not get another chance,” 130
— angry, agent “Mike” characterizes hesitation as “worry that some stray shrapnel might hit the Habash mosque and ‘offend’ Muslims,” 130
— CIA drops plan to strike him for fear of killing his Emirati hunting buddies, 138
— CIA drops plan to strike him in Kandahar in May 1999, an opportunity called “a fat pitch, a home run” by the Pentagon, 140
— from Pakistani army’s encroachments on the Afghan border, 368

fatwas of
— to kill all Americans in 1998, 47, 69
— to just get Americans out of Saudi Arabia in 1996, 48

friendships of
— with Mullah Omar, tense but with a deep and personal foundation, 125
— with Emiratis from the UAE, his hunting buddies, 137-138
— with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, reunited in Tora Bora in 1996,

taunts of
— tells ABC-TV interviewer that US left Mogadishu “carrying disappointment, defeat, and your dead with you,” 48
— wants “Hiroshima” of 10,000 casualties, 116, 380
— tugs beard and says emotionally, “By Allah, by God, the Americans will be amazed. The so-called United States will suffer the same fate as the Russians. Their state will collapse, too,” 123
— says, “I will make it happen even if I do it by myself,” 250

travels of
— to Afghanistan in 1980 to take up jihad, earn celebrity and respect, 55
— to Saudi Arabia to be silenced and stripped of his passport, 57
— to Sudan in 1991 to fight African Christians and build roads, 57
— to Afghanistan with Pakistan’s approval, 63-64
— still at large, 338

underestimations of
— by Congress, 104
— by the Pentagon, who thought of his training camps as so many “rope ladders” and “jungle gyms,” 120
— by American public, who did not consider him a major issue in the 2000 presidential election, 341
— by 1997 national intelligence estimate, which tucked him into a clause with Iran, 342
— by Bush, Clinton, and their top advisers, admittedly, 342
— by New York Times, 343

cabdrivers
— Raed Hijazi, working in Boston, sent money back to fellow plotters in Jordan, 175
— Qualid Benomrane, working in LA, may have taken two hijackers to Sea World, 515

Clancy, Tom
— his novels more useful than the intelligence community in anticipating terror attacks, 347

Costco
— membership card presented by Millennium plotter Ahmed Ressam as ID to Customs official, resulting in pat-down, from which plotter tried to run away, leading to his arrest, 178

cough drops
— used to salve sore throats by Ressam and friends during bomb preparation, 177

dolls
— weaponization of in Manila plot, 488

girlfriends
— in Greifswald, Germany, Aysel Senguen becomes intimate with hijacker Ziad Jarrah, 163
— he tells her of a childhood interest in aviation, 163
— she enrolls in dental school, 163
— he condemns her provocative dress, 163
— her refusal to become more religious embarrasses him, 163
— he confesses to her his plan to wage jihad, 163
— after training in Afghanistan he acts more like he did when they first met, 167
— relationship causes him to have doubts about jihad, 168
— their trip to Paris, 224
— their hundreds of phone calls and frequent emails, 225
— she visits him in Florida, tags along to flight training school, 227
— in summer 2001, buys him one-way ticket back to Germany! 246
— but jihadist friend meets Jarrah at airport, and he returns to States, 246
— his sentimental September 10 farewell letter to her, 249

misunderstandings
— blamed immediately and mistakenly by George W. “See if Saddam did this” Bush for 9/11, 334
— target of Rumsfeld’s post-9/11 instinct, 335
— viewed by Wolfowitz as 9/11 mastermind at more than 10 percent chance, 335-336
— feared to be making moves against his internal enemies by General Tommy Franks at CENTCOM, whose request to strike him after 9/11 is denied, 336

summary, by Commission
—”to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States,” 66 —”we have seen no evidence that any foreign government—or foreign government official—supplied any funding,” to 9/11 hijackers, 172

Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade
— discredits CIA at time of last, best opportunity to target Bin Ladin with missiles, 141

myths, debunked
— Saudi hijackers were chosen because they could more easily obtain visas, not because al Qaeda wished to destabilize American-Saudi relations, 156
— Bin Ladin did not receive a $300 million inheritance, 170
— hijackers never used fake social security numbers to open bank accounts; they simply used their actual names, 237
— the majority of the hijackers were not wealthy alienated university graduates, 245
— no NYPD helicopter predicted the collapse of the WTC towers, 321
— flights carrying Saudi nationals out of the country did not take off until after national airspace was reopened, 329
— no banks filed Suspicious Activity Reports about the hijackers before 9/11, 528

ninjas, black
— Clinton says in 1999 to General Hugh Shelton, “You know, it would scare the shit out of al-Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of a helicopter into the middle of their camp,” 189

*—Correction: This edition initially included, under myths, debunked (following, we are sad to say, the lead of the New York Times) the famous “Let’s roll,” writing that the Report replaces it with “Roll it!” In fact, as has been pointed out to us by an alert indexer, while Todd Beamer was heard to say, “Let’s roll,” as the passengers prepared to storm the cockpit, the “Roll it!” is heard later, as the passengers are trying to break down the cockpit door. The Report does not mention the conversation between Beamer and his wife, and there is no reason to doubt Lisa Beamer’s account of it. The Report does however include one other, in our opinion more moving, bit of conversation, from a woman calling home. As the assault began, she ended her call so she could join it: “Everyone’s running up to first class. I’ve got to go. Bye.” (p. 13)

Camp David
— meeting place of Bush “war council,” 332
— development there of Afghanistan attack plan, 333
— discussion there of attacking Iraq, if anything, 335
— Paul Wolfowitz’s pressing there to hit Iraq during “this round” of the war on terrorism, 335
— settling there on three prime targets: al Qaeda, Taliban, Iraq, 335

Bill Clinton’s obsession with
— his repeated mentions of, 176
— his idea to “scare the shit out of al Qaeda” by suddenly having “a bunch of black ninjas rappel out of helicopters into the middle of their camps,” 189

questionnaire upon entering
— What brought you to Afghanistan? How did you hear about us? What attracted you to the cause? What is your educational background? Are you prepared to serve in suicide missions? 234

deposits
— $400, deposit on van used for 1993 WTC bombing, demanded returned by Mohammed Salameh, a complaint that leads to his arrest, 72-73
— $9,900, deposit used to open a bank account by hijackers Hazmi and Kahlid al Mihdhar, 219— $650, deposit Mihdhar forfeited on an apartment he refused to move into because he found it “too messy,” 219
— $30,000, deposit made in UAE bank accounts by a hijacker in June 2001, 237

email
— newfangled system regarded with deep suspicion by US intelligence after Cold War, 92
— 31 flight schools emailed by hijacker Mohamed Atta, 168
— contact maintained between hijackers in US and coordinators in Afghanistan, 222
— frequent communication of hijacker Ziad Jarrah and girlfriend Aysel Senguen, 225
— instant messaging in the final days before the attacks, 249
— from Richard Clarke, to Condoleezza Rice, insisting the FAA knew there was a hijacking threat, 264
— as medium of bureaucratic inertia among the intelligence community, 270-271
— need for more funding for email in the FBI, 427

fortunes of, ironic
— jailed in Yemen in a case of mistaken identity; they were looking for a different terrorist, 155
— bailed out by Bin Ladin, 156

handicap of
— loses leg in battle with Northern Alliance at age 18, 155
— attempts to get US visa under cover of getting himself a better prosthetic leg, 155
— denied US visa, 155
— gets new leg in Kuala Lumpur, Bin Ladin chipping in for the bill, 158
— difficulty of maintaining
anonymity with a fake leg, 192
— rumor that leg was really lost in an accidental explosion at a training camp, 192

Malaysia
— its airport security’s openness to Islamist jihadists, 158

Newton, Massachusetts
— three of the muscle hijackers spend their last night in hotel in, 253

travels and contacts
— arranges meetings with Iraqis that do not result in collaboration, 66
— meets US-educated anthrax doctor Yazid Sufaat, 151
— fearing US strike in retaliation for USS Cole bombing, ungallantly leaves Bin Ladin’s side for Kabul to avoid being killed with him; no US strike comes, 191
— US demands the Taliban hand him over, 332
— believed to be still at large, 338

Day Four: Clinton/Bush; KSM; rejecting protocol

Britani, Issa al (also, Abu Issa al Hindi; suspected author of the detailed al Qaeda surveillance photos whose recent seizure in Pakistan formed the basis for a heightened threat alert)
— sent by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) to case potential economic and “Jewish” targets in New York in early 2001, 150

careers— in FBI, helped by arrests and convictions, not counterterrorism, 74
— in CIA, thought to be damaged by counterterrorism work, 90
— in CIA, advanced by accumulating (classified) publications, 90

Clinton vs. Bushattitude toward Bin Ladin
— as of 1998, Clinton wants him dead, 133
— in early 2001, Clinton tells Bush he’s sorry he “didn’t get him for you, because I tried,” 199
— in 2004, Bush does not recall Clinton saying that, 199
— in 2001, Bushies not “serious about al Qaeda,” according to Richard Clarke, 205

distractions of
— in 1998, as al Qaeda carries out embassy bombings in Africa, Clinton fights impeachment, 118, 348
— in 2000-2001, vital transition period cut in half for Bush due to his not having actually won the election, 198

Iraq and
— in 1993, after intelligence reports of assassination plot against Bush Sr., Clinton orders targeted strike of Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. Building is destroyed. Commission: “No further intelligence came in about terrorist acts planned in Iraq,” 99
— on 9/12, in the face of overwhelming evidence about al Qaeda involvement, Bush nonetheless tells Clarke, “See if Saddam did this,” 334

probable lies before the Commission of
— Bush fabricates 9/11 conversation in which he gives Cheney order to tell fighter jets to shoot down commercial airliners. Commission: “there is no documentary evidence for this call,” 41
— Clinton claims to have said to Bush: “One of the great regrets of my presidency is that I didn’t get him [Bin Ladin] for you, because I tried to,” 199

tough talk of
— Bush to Cheney: “somebody’s going to pay,” 39
— Clinton to General Hugh Shelton: “scare the shit out of al Qaeda,” 189

drugs, war on— soaks up twice as many FBI agents as does counterterrorism, 77
— raison d’etre of the 4,500 agents of the DEA, who once in a while passed counterterrorism leads to the FBI, 80
— not a significant source of income for al Qaeda, 171
— but a major source of income for the Taliban, 171
— and for the Northen Alliance, 139
— what customs agents thought Millennium plotter Ahmed Ressam was up to until they discovered the white powder in his trunk could explode, 179
— vast flows of US currency generated by, 186

failure— to respond, by American Flight 11, a sign of hijacking, 18
— to find a primary radar return on Flight 77, 25
— of any one layer of security, not fatal unless all the others fail too, which in this case they did, 83
— to foresee the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, by US intelligence, 91
— of Khowst camp strikes in 1998 and their cumulative effect on future decisions not to take action, 118
— by Pakistan, to take action against Bin Ladin and the Taliban, 126
— chance of, too great to strike when CIA agent “Mike” said “Hit [Bin Ladin] tonight-we may not get another chance,” 131
— chance of, high, for a commando raid against Bin Ladin during Clinton administration, 136
— structural, of World Trade Center, not thought to be imminent by FDNY chiefs on 9/11, 291
— technical, of FDNY radios, 323
— of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management, by the US government, 339
— to gain entry to the US, by some al Qaeda operatives, 354
— risk of, for terrorists, created by government defenses, 364
— odds of, for an attacker; the greater they are, the more likely he is to discard his plan, 383

Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh (KSM)—inventor and organizer of 9/11 plotbiography of
— growing up in Pakistan, learned jihad at desert youth camp, 147
— came to the US and studied mechanical engineering in North Carolina, 148
— looks like Arab John Belushi, 148
— went to Afghanistan after college to fight Soviets, 149
— traveled to China, the Philipines, Pakistan, Bosnia (twice), Brazil, Sudan, and Malaysia, looking for jihad, 488 n. 5
— in 1996, offered Bin Ladin several options for terrorist acts, including using planes as weapons, 149
— in late 1998, joined al Qaeda. 154
— shortly thereafter, received approval for “planes operation,” 156

clear sociopathic tendencies of
— says inspired to become globetrotting jihadist lunatic by American foreign policy, not anything he saw in actual US, 147
— brags to interrogators about inspiring Malaysian terrorists to target US, 151
— fantasy of self as superterrorist, killing all adult males on airplane and then giving big televised speech, 154
— plans for “second wave” of attacks, including shoe bombs, 156, 247, 527 n. 10, 531 n. 161,
— in mid-2000, gives future hijacker Hazmi permission to search internet for a wife, 222
— promises $700 monthly stipend if he finds her (not clear if payments were to continue after Hazmi’s death in mission), 518, n. 40
— lack of attention to other people evident, 493

fastidiousness of
— furious about hijacker Mihdhar’s departure from US in summer 2000, worried US intelligence will pick him up (overestimate), 222, 237
— original plan had four to six hijackers per plane, just in case, 235
— email addresses on a need-to-know basis only, 244
— all really vital communications done face-to-face, 245
— disapproves of careless Zacarias Moussaoui (with good reason), 247
— urged by Bin Ladin to move dates up in response to events in Israel, even if it means just crashing planes into the ground, KSM resists, 250; urged again in 2001, again resists, 250
— concerned about Bin Ladin’s lack of discretion viz plot, 532, n. 180

as father figure for hijackers, most of whom broke with their families upon becoming jihadists
— collects American aviation magazines, telephone directories, school brochures for his hijackers, 157
— purchases Hollywood movies about hijackings for them, 157
— teaches Hamburg pilots about life in the US, 167
— explains that careless Mihdhar bored in San Diego, 222
— teaches muscle hijackers some English phrases, 510, n. 108
— nephew Ali Adbul Aziz Ali allowed to help out with facilitating for 9/11, 168; then even allowed to volunteer for suicide mission (but denied visa to US), 527, n. 112

propensity for boasting turns him into cooperative witness
— explains plot in great detail, 226, 232, 233, 234, 236, and ff.
— explains al Qaeda internal relations, 251-252
— says it was well known in summer 2001 that he was planning attack in US, 251
— admits lying to al Jazeera interviewer to expand scariness of 9/11 attacks, 492, n. 40
— claims he considered assassinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when latter lectured at Greensboro in 1980s, 488 n. 3
— explains that he assigned Hanjour, most experienced of the pilots, to target Pentagon, 530, n. 148

and US intelligence
— before 9/11, seen as just another freelance terrorist, not tied to al Qaeda, 276
— in April 2001, CIA learns that a senior al Qaeda figure named “Mukhtar” is planning attack, 277
— in June 2001, CIA learns that KSM (freelance terrorist) is recruiting people from Afghanistan to travel to US for attack, 277
— in late June, CIA asks whether the “real” KSM is meant, 533, n.12
— summer 2001, KSM overestimates US intelligence coordination, worries, 269
— in late July, source replies that yes, the “real” KSM is meant, 533, n. 12
— on August 28, CIA learns that Mukhtar is KSM, too late, 277

weird inadvertent humanization of by Report authors
—”concedes” superterrorist idea received lukewarm response from al Qaeda bigwigs, 154
— “explains” that careless hijacker Mihdhar was bored in San Diego, 222
— gives the “less than satisfactory explanation” that zip codes found in his notebook were to be used to open new email accounts, 514, n. 4

as perfect example of intelligence breakdown— carelessness of disapproved by KSM, 247
— August 13, 2001, begins flying course in Minnesota, 273
— acts funny, says he only wishes to learn how to “take off and land,” and tells school he wants training as an “ego boosting thing,” 273
— unexplained $32,000 in the bank, 273
— arrested, 273
— August 22, with help of French intelligence, he is connected to Chechen rebel leader with al Qaeda ties, 274
— Minneapolis FBI agent demands immediate action; is rebuffed by headquarters; says angrily that he is “trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center,” 275
— condescending reply from headquaters that this would not happen, 275
— FBI drops ball, 275
— George Tenet drops ball after “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly” briefing, 275
— Commission’s judgment: “publicity about Moussaoui’s arrest and a possible hijacking threat might have derailed the plot,” 276

newspapers— Bin Ladin fatwa faxed to Arabic-language newspaper, Al Quds al Arabi, in 1998, 46, 47, 69
— leak to right-wing rag Washington Times tips al Qaeda off to surveillance, 127
— pre-millennial Jordanian al Qaeda arrests only make page 13 of New York Times, 359
— lack of attention to terrorism leading up to September 11, 359-360
— New York Times doubts Bin Ladin is real terrorist leader, April 1999, 343

protocol, departing from— hand-wanding at Dulles Airport on 9/11 “marginal at best,” 3
— American 11 flight attendant Betty Ong almost immediately makes call to American Airlines to tell them about hijacking, 5
— passenger Daniel Lewin, former Israeli army officer, attempts to stop hijackers on American 11, is stabbed in the back, 5
— Secret Service agent in effect orders non-NORAD fighter planes to defend White House by any means necessary, 44
— FBI agent investigating Cole bombing learns that Mihdhar, a Cole suspect, is in the US, asks for information from agent “Jane,” 277 (he is rebuffed)
— some 911 operators tell North Tower callers to evacuate building, break windows if necessary (this saves lives), 287
— South Tower deputy fire director tells people they should stay in their offices, 288
— fire chiefs did not yell “Mayday! Mayday!” over radio when ordering evacuation of North Tower, 307
— however, one fire chief went from floor to floor with a bullhorn yelling, “All FDNY, get the fuck out!” 307
— despite these orders, some firefighters refused to leave the building while there were still firefighters inside, 308
— and refused again when ordered to by police, 308

We began this index as a stunt. Here was a much-discussed, even much-reviewed, book of history that had been published without a necessary textual aid. DidnÌt this very useful book want to be of use? We would supply the aid, and, within the boundaries of some not terribly severe formal constraints, steal an opportunity to interpret the contents. We found that the language of the report, rightly or wrongly, turns the terrorists into imaginative technicians. We found that Paul Wolfowitz only appears in the text to beat the drums of the Iraqi war (also, at one point, to castigate his colleagues for lack of “imagination”). And we found that Richard ClarkeÌs dire warnings, arranged all together, took on a kind of hypnotic, even lulling effect: is this how it felt to those around him, too.

But the index is a minor genre, and it can only begin to indicate the strangeness, and the strange power, of the Report. Constructed like a novel, it can acknowledge othersÌ ideology (al Qaeda has a twisted, murderous one) but not its own, and has no truck with psychology, and only an occasional interest in politics. At times the scars of its bipartisan consensus become visible, as do the exact points where the Report stops short. Even leaving aside the invasion of Iraq, there is the fact that al Qaeda witnesses, sworn enemies of the United States, are cooperating so volubly with their interrogators. What is being done to them? Where are they even being kept?

Some conclusions are possible. The cumulative amount of information available to the FBI and CIA in the summer of 2001 was astonishing. Over and over again, agents passed leads onto their superiors; over and over again, these were abandoned somewhere in the chain of command. After the Clinton AdministrationÌs frenetic and somewhat uneven attempts to deal with al Qaeda, the Bush people appear merely uninterested. None of the concern felt by agents in the field was communicated to the public. For the media, Bin Ladin was allowed to become a celebrity terrorist, and capturing his threats on camera became a great journalistic coup.

Now we have threat levels, like a mood ring, but otherwise an administration obsessed with secrecy. As indexer Caleb Crain puts it on his blog, Steamboats are Ruining Everything:

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