Journalists
and historians have often referred to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s “list” as if it
were a precisely defined entity.It was
not, however.Certainly one would put
his “numbered” list of eighty-one cases, given in a Senate speech of February
20, 1950, as the prime candidate for being McCarthy’s “list.”But McCarthy himself quickly added several
dozen more names to this list in communications to a subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (commonly referred to in the press as the “Tydings
Committee” from its chairman, Senator Millard Tydings).The Tydings subcommittee in its “State
Department Employee Loyalty Investigation” inquired into Senator McCarthy’s
charges.

Most
but not all of Senator McCarthy’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List”
or “108 list” of unresolved DOS security cases compiled by the investigators
for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised
preparation of the list.The Tydings
subcommittee also obtained this list.The Lee list, also using numbers rather than names, was published in the
proceeding of the subcommittee.[1]

Senator
McCarthy furnished the Tydings Committee the real names attached to his
numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to
the Lee list as well.[2]Over the years that followed all of the
names became public one way or another.

Additionally,
in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies,
security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.Below these various lists are recapitulated.
Only those he named from 1950 through 1952 (prior to become chairman of the
Senate Governmental Operations Committee) will be considered here.(All lists will be alphabetical.)

Senator McCarthy in 1950, 1951 and 1952 identified
other persons in speeches in the Senate and else where.For the date and place of Senator McCarthy’s
naming of these persons, see appendix D of William F. Buckley and L. Brent
Bozell, McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning (Chicago:
H. Regnery Co., 1954).

Real Name: Venona status; Non-Venona Evidence of
Espionage

*****************************************************************

Brunauer, Stephen:Not identified in Venona

Clubb, Oliver Edmund:Not identified in Venona

Currie, Lauchlin: Identified in Venona as a Soviet
Espionage Source;[19]First Identified as a Soviet Source by
Elizabeth Bentley in her 1945 FBI statement.[20]

Davies, John Paton: Not identified in Venona

Duran, Gustavo:Not identified in Venona

Geiger, Theodore:Not identified in Venona

Glasser, Harold: Identified in Venon as a Soviet
Espionage Source;[21]First Identified as a Soviet Source by
Elizabeth Bentley in her 1945 FBI statement.[22]

Hanson, Haldore:Not identified in Venona

Keeney, Mary Jane:Identified in Venona as a Soviet Espionage Source[23]

Kenyon, Dorothy:Not identified in Venona

Kerserling, Mary:Not identified in Venona

Keyserling, Leon:Not identified in Venona

Lattimore, Owen:Not identified in Venona

Nash, Philleo:Not identified in Venona

Schuman, Frederick:Not identified in Venona

Service, John Stewart:Not identified in Venona.Identified by FBI bugging in 1945 as having deliberately leaked DOS
information to the pro-Communist journal Amerasia.[24]

Senator McCarthy in a speech before the Senate on June
14, 1951, described, “a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any
previous such venture in the history of man.A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals
shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.”[25]The chief targets of the speech were Dean
Acheson, President Truman’s secretary of state, and George Marshall, Army chief
of staff under President Roosevelt and secretary of state and secretary of
defense under Truman.General Marshall
was also the focus of Senator McCarthy’s book America’s Retreat from
Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall:[26]

Of the 159 persons listed above, there is substantial
evidence that nine assisted Soviet espionage against the United States:
Lauchlin Currie, Harold Glasser, Gerald Graze, Standley Graze, Many Jane
Keeney, David Karr, Robert T. Miller, Franz Neumann, and William Remington.
David Zablodowsky is a tenth ambiguous case.

Some of the others were security risks.To say that someone was a security risk is
not to say that that person is a proven or even most likely a Soviet espionage
source.It is only to say that in
matters of national security “better safe than sorry” is a principle.Risks should be minimized by excluding those
persons from employment in positions where they would have access to sensitive
information.

Risk factors vary from the purely personal to the
ideological.Entirely patriotic and
loyal persons may have risk factors that make them a security risk.Someone with a history of financial
irresponsibility (chronic gambling, bankruptcy) may be tempted by financial
gain to betray secret without regard to their patriotism.Someone with close relatives living in a
hostile foreign nation may be vulnerable to blackmail due to coercive threats
against those family members.

And, of course, someone with ideological sympathy for
a hostile foreign power may be tempted to betray by appeals to that
ideology.Obviously, in the Cold War
between the Communist bloc and the West, persons with Communist or
pro-Communist ideological sympathies were security risks due to the possibility
of ideological recruitment by Communist intelligence officers.Indeed, the great majority of American,
several hundred, now known to have assisted Soviet espionage in the United
States in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s were motivated by ideology and many were
secret members of the CPUSA.[54]

Many, but certainly not all, of those in the above lists
had in their background some ideological security risk factors.A few were established as having been
members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) or the Young Communist League.Many had belonged to a number of special
purpose organizations, some closely, some not so closely, aligned with the
CPUSA, were know to former co-workers as pro-Soviet, or had other signs of
Communist sympathies.In some cases
those affiliations were recent or ongoing.Frederick Schuman, for example, had a long and enduring history of
intense Communist sympathies.With
others, however, their affiliation with the Communist left were youthful and a
decade or more in the past, and the person may have abandoned those views.Stephen Brunauer, for example, had been in
the Young Communist League in the late 1920s but appears to have abandoned the
movement by the early 1940s and in 1946 the U.S. government sent him to Hungary
(he was Hungarian born) to assist in the escape of Hungarian scientists from
Communist Hungary.There were also
cases were some association legitimately raised security risk concerns but on
inspection, the association appears to have been coincidental.For example McCarthy number case # 1 (Lee
list # 51) Herbert Fierst, socialized with and was associated at work with
several persons known to be linked to Soviet intelligence.But on examination, Fierst’s association
appeared to have been no more than that: social and related to his official
duties.Among other points, he was a
firm supporter of Zionism, an ideological attribute not merely distrusted but
hated by Soviet intelligence.[55]

It would take an extensive review of each person
separately to come to a firm view on each case, and in a number of cases the
passage of time might make reaching a firm conclusion impossible.My own view is that a number of those on the
lists above, perhaps a majority, likely were security risks, but others, a
minority but a significant one, likely were not, and some, Drew Pearson, Dean
Acheson, and George Marshall for example, certainly were not.

[4]. A Soviet spy in the U.S. Army, Ilya Elliott
Wolston, was a student in the Russian section of the U.S. Army intelligence
school and provided the KGB with a list of his fellow students and
instructors.Nelson Chipchin was one of
those. There is nothing adverse about Chipchin in the reference to him in the
two messages in which his name appears.Venona 777-781 KGB New York to Moscow, 26 May 1943; Venona 893 KGB New
York to Moscow, 10 June 1943.On
Wolston work for the KGB, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona:
Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press
[Nota Bene], 2000), 275–76.

[5]. Gerald Graze was not identified in Venona under
his own name.Venona does contain a
cryptonym, Arena, that FBI/NSA identified as that of Mary Price.Based on the 1948 Gorsky memo, likely this
was in error and Arena was Gerald Graze. Anatoly Gorsky, “Failures in the
U.S.A. (1938–1948),” memo, December 1948:
<http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page48.html> in Alexander Vassiliev’s
Notes from the KGB Archive.Gerald
Graze is the brother of Stanley Graze.

[8]. Although Hans Lansberg was case #28 on the
McCarthy list given to the Tydings committee, the description that McCarthy
gave of case #28 fits Leander Lovell (Lee list #22) and appears the listing of
Lansberg was a clerical error.

[9]. Arnold Margolin is cited by both Lee and
McCarthy as an anti-Communist denied DOS employment.

[10]. Robert T. Miller is not identified in Venona
under that name.However, Venona has a
crytonym, Mirage, that is unidentified.The Gorsky memo identifies Mirage as Robert Miller. Gorsky, “Failures in
the U.S.A. (1938–1948)”.Miller is
discussed in Haynes and Klehr, Venona [2000], 207, 228–29.

[14]. Bentley, “Bentley Deposition”.Remington in 1951 was convicted of perjury
related to Bentley’s charges and was murdered in prison.Also identified as a Soviet source in
Gorsky, “Failures in the U.S.A. (1938–1948)”.

[16]. Venona 1668 KGB New York to Moscow, 29 November
1944 is part three of a longer message, but the earlier parts were not
deciphered at all and only part of this message was decoded. Walter Rudlin is referred to as the source of
information about the relationship of the office he headed, the Economic
Intelligence Section of the Foreign Economic Administration, with the DOS.However, from the contents of the cited
remarks and the partial nature of the message it is not possible to determine
if Rudlin is a direct KGB source or if an unidentified Soviet spy was simply
passing along information the unidentified KGB source heard from Rudlin in a
benign legitimate context.Rudlin’s
name is given in the clear without a cryptonym.While the KGB sometimes used real names for sources in Venona,
more often cryptonyms were used.

[18]. David Zablodowsky was a college associate of
Chambers and admitted that in 1936 Chambers arranged for him to act as a mail
drop between Joseph Peters, head of the CPUSA underground, and an unknown
party.Zablodowsky claimed this was a
single incident and that he was anti-fascist rather than Communist.However, during the Nazi-Soviet Pact period
he worked actively with Communist fronts that had abandoned anti-fascism. U.S.
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Activities of United States Citizens
Employed by the United Nations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1952), Part 1, 154.

[19]. On Currie’s assistance to the KGB, see Haynes
and Klehr, Venona [2000], 145–49.

[23]. Many Jane Keeney and her husband Philip O.
Keeney are identified as agents first of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence)
and latter for the KGB.See Haynes and
Klehr, Venona [2000], 178–80.

[24]. On Service’s role see: Harvey Klehr and Ronald
Radosh, The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996).Service was engaged in certainly unethical and probably illegal leaking
of sensitive American diplomatic information to Amerasia in order to
promote his preferred policy positions and undercut the policies of superiors
in the Department of State and the White House who were pursuing policies he
opposed.There is no indication that he
believed he was in contact with Soviet intelligence or that Amerasia was
a conduit for Soviet intelligence.

[27]. As a senior State Department official,
Assistant Secretary of Sate in 1945, Acheson was mentioned in several Venona
messages, but all were reports about him, not by him, and none indicated any
relationship with Soviet intelligence.

[28]. As Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall was
mentioned a number of times in Venona messages, but all were reports about him,
not by him, and none indicated any relationship with Soviet intelligence.

[31]. Pearson is identified in Venona as David Karr’s
employer and simply as a prominent American journalist.There is no indication of any Pearson
cooperation with Soviet intelligence.See Haynes and Klehr, Venona [2000], 244–45.

[32]. As a senior State Department official,
Assistant Secretary of Sate in 1945, Acheson was mentioned in several Venona
messages, but all were reports about him, not by him, and none indicated any
relationship with Soviet intelligence.

[33]. A Soviet spy in the U.S. Army, Ilya Elliott
Wolston, was a student in the Russian section of the U.S. Army intelligence
school and provided the KGB with a list of his fellow students and
instructors.Nelson Chipchin was one of
those. There is nothing adverse about Chipchin in the reference to him in the
two messages in which his name appears.Venona 777-781 KGB New York to Moscow, 26 May 1943; Venona 893 KGB New
York to Moscow, 10 June 1943.On
Wolston work for the KGB, see Haynes and Klehr, Venona [2000], 275–76.

[34]. On Currie’s assistance to the KGB, see Haynes
and Klehr, Venona [2000], 145–49.

[38]. Gerald Graze was not identified in Venona under
his own name.Venona does contain a
cryptonym, Arena, that FBI/NSA identified as that of Mary Price.Based on the 1948 Gorsky memo, likely this
was in error and Arena was Gerald Graze. Gorsky, “Failures in the U.S.A.
(1938–1948)”.Gerald Graze is the
brother of Stanley Graze.

[42]. Many Jane Keeney and her husband Philip O.
Keeney are identified as agents first of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence)
and latter for the KGB.See Haynes and
Klehr, Venona [2000], 178–80.

[43]. Arnold Margolin is cited by both Lee and
McCarthy as an anti-Communist who was denied DOS employment.

[44]. As Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall was
mentioned a number of times in Venona messages, but all were reports about him,
not by him, and none indicated any relationship with Soviet intelligence.

[45]. Robert T. Miller is not identified in Venona
under that name.However, Venona has a
crytonym, Mirage, that is unidentified.The Gorsky memo identifies Mirage as Robert Miller. Gorsky, “Failures in
the U.S.A. (1938–1948)”.Miller is
discussed in Haynes and Klehr, Venona [2000], 207, 228–29.

[47]. Franz Neumann was not identified by FBI/NSA in
Venona.However, Venona has an
unidentified cryptonym, Ruff.Ruff is
identified as Neumann in Gorsky, “Failures in the U.S.A. (1938–1948)”; and
Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood.Neumann is discussed in Haynes and Klehr, Venona [2000], 194–95,
220.

[49]. Pearson is identified in Venona as David Karr’s
employer and simply as a prominent American journalist.There is no indication of any Pearson
cooperation with Soviet intelligence.See Haynes and Klehr, Venona [2000], 244–45.

[50]. Bentley, “Bentley 1945 Deposition”.Remington in 1951 was convicted of perjury
related to Bentley’s charges and was murdered in prison.Also identified as a Soviet source in
Gorsky, “Failures in the U.S.A. (1938–1948)”.

[51]. Venona 1668 KGB New York to Moscow, 29 November
1944 is part three of a longer message, but the earlier messages were not
deciphered at all and only part of this message was decoded.Walter Rudlin is referred to as the source
of information about relationship of the office he headed, the Economic
Intelligence Section of the Foreign Economic Administration, with the DOS.However, from the contents of the cited
remarks and the partial nature of the message it is not possible to determine
if Rudlin is a direct KGB source or if an unidentified Soviet spy is simply
passing along information the unidentified KGB source heard from Rudlin in a
benign legitimate context.Rudlin’s
name is given in the clear without a cryptonym.While the KGB sometimes used real names for sources in Venona,
more often cryptonyms were used.

[52]. On Service’s role see: Klehr and Radosh, Amerasia
Spy Case.Service was engaged in
unethical and possibly illegal leaking of information to Amerasia in
order to promote his preferred policy positions and undercut the position of
superiors in the Department of State and the White House who were pursuing
policies he opposed.There is no
indication that he believed he was in contact with Soviet intelligence or that Amerasia
was a conduit for Soviet intelligence.

[53]. David Zablodowsky was a college associate of
Chambers and in 1936 Chambers arranged for him to act as a mail drop between
Joseph Peters, head of the CPUSA underground, and an unknown party. U.S. Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee, Activities of United States Citizens
Employed by the United Nations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1952), Part 1, 154.

[54]. The Communist affiliations of most of those
identified as assisting Soviet espionage in Venona are discussed in Haynes and
Klehr, Venona [2000].