Syria, the last chance

The pace of events in Syria is reinforcing the case for western
military intervention. There is still - just - time for a Washington-led but inclusive diplomatic option to deliver an outcome that averts further great suffering.

The situation in Syria is dire. After twenty months of conflict, the
war has created a human and economic disaster. Around 40,000 people have
been killed, many more injured and hundreds of thousands displaced. At
the same time, media sources in late 2012 have reported
major rebel advances and the withdrawal of staff from Syria by the
United Nations and several diplomatic missions. All this, now reinforced
by concern over Syria's chemical weapons, is creating an upsurge in
support (especially in western Europe) for western military intervention, on the
grounds that the moment could become the "tipping-point" for Bashar al-Assad's
regime.

There is a clear need to assess the risks and probable
consequences of such a course, and to examine the prospects for any sort
of diplomatic solution. The context for both is the way the Syrian
conflict has evolved since spring 2011, when Damascus reacted with great
violence to the localised outbreaks of non-violent protest. Syria's
power-elite drew from Tunisia and Egypt the lesson that it had to be
ruthless in its repression and offer little in the way of concession.
But ever more force against the eruptions of dissent only hardened
the emerging opposition, and by mid-2012 a rebellion was developing. As this
intensified in the autumn, many analysts doubted that the regime could
survive the year.

It did survive, fortified by support from sections of the population,
and despite a number of defections from its core. The conflict was
evolving rapidly into a form of "double-proxy" war that, by involving
regional and global actors, hugely complicated the search for a peaceful
resolution. In the middle east, the rebels were increasingly encouraged
by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with the Saudis in particular determined to
see the regime fall. The Assad regime was strongly backed by Iran;
weapons and training resources flowed in, greatly aided by an "air
bridge" that transited Iraq (thanks to Nouri al-Maliki's government in
Baghdad, in an act dismaying to the United States) (see "Iraq, Iran, Syria: triangle of war", 9 August 2012).

In the global arena, Washington and its allies were on the side of
the rebels, while the Russians and to an extent the Chinese stood by
Damascus. A further complication was the growing presence of Islamist
paramilitaries, many of them travelling from elsewhere in the region.
They proved particularly effective thanks to their intense commitment
and motivation, but also because some had gained combat experience in
urban warfare in Iraq. They also benefited from persistent disunity
among the rebels, something only marginally less visible after the meeting in Doha in November 2012 which resulted in the formation of an inclusive coalition.

A new momentum

This double-proxy war has now reached a point where active western
involvement is looking ever more likely. So far, western powers have
confined themselves to channelling aid to "acceptable" rebels while
trying to prevent Islamist groups from acquiring weaponry. An extension
of this stance might initially take the form of supplying the rebels
with more effective arms and erecting a "no-fly zone". Both are feasible
short-term actions, although the latter could be made more difficult by
the presence of 2,000 Russian advisers in Syria (see Gideon Rachman,
"The perilous drift to intervention in Syria", Financial Times, 4
December 2012). In this context Nato's decision to ship long-range
Patriot missiles to Turkey is significant, not least because these could
be used to help enforce a no-fly-zone over much of northern Syria.

The supporters of intervention have two cogent arguments: that an
even worse humanitarian disaster must be prevented, and that a quick end
to Assad's regime will diminish the risk of Islamist influence in a
post-Assad Syria. They point to the evident increase in the number of
Islamist-linked paramilitiaries active in the conflict, with the Jabhat
al-Nusra group alone claiming (a probably overblown) 10,000 fighters
(see Samer Araabi, "Despite Growing Violence, Syrian Political Equation
Unchanged", IPS/TerraViva, 5 December 2012). In parallel, the
tactics of many rebels have become far harsher now that they have
deprived the regime of the near-monopoly of terror it enjoyed in the
conflict's early months; this has lost them support among some Syrians
with no love for the regime.

These two propositions are reasonable, but leave three other issues
out of consideration. First, any western military action will provoke
Tehran into increasing its support of Damascus (which Baghdad may facilitate). Second, the fall of Assad's regime may turn out to
be a prolonged process involving even greater loss of innocent life. The
power-base in Syria still has domestic support, and far more military
capability than Gaddafi's Libya (which survived six months of extensive
Nato action).

Third, the wider impact of yet another western intervention in the
middle east may be disastrous. Assad's regime may be hated across much
of the region, but it is still the government of a major Arab country.
After all, Saddam Hussein was despised when the coalition's war to
overthrow him began in March 2003; just a few months later, those who
expected to be garlanded as liberators were widely seen as occupiers and
even oppressors. This historical experience is usually ignored or its
relevance dismissed - but it is vital, and it has to be faced.

A different endgame

The predicament over Syria remains appalling. The
consequences of intervention could (as so often in the past) be
unexpected and counterproductive, but to do nothing may allow even more
bloodshed to be spilled. There is, though, one possibility that could
avert the worst outcomes: a decision by President Obama's administration
- hitherto very cautious about intervention - to make a very strong
effort to achieve negotiated regime change (see "Syria: war and diplomacy", 23 August 2012).

Such a course would require the full cooperation of Moscow, which is
not unimaginable: there are signs in recent days that Russia is
seriously concerned about the regime's viability and what might follow
its collapse (a sentiment that may even be shared in some quarters in
Tehran). Amid all the violence and bloodshed, this provides a small
window of opportunity; but it can be opened only if the United States
takes the lead in an intense diplomatic process that accepts the need
for substantial - and uncomfortable - compromise over the shape of a
post-Assad Syria.

The west, to put it bluntly, is not in a position to dictate what
form Syria's evolving governance might take. It has to recognise that
this must principally be decided within Syria - but that the
acquiescence of other states in the process will be essential: Russia
and Iran, but also Turkey and Egypt (independently of concerns over
President Morsi's domestic actions).

The lone hopeful element in this scenario is that Barack Obama's
re-election gives him room for action. Over Syria - as over Iran, and
Israel-Palestine - he could in principle follow a more considered
approach, avoid the risks of escalating conflict, and seek the best
possible solution available in difficult circumstances. Where Damascus
is concerned, there is still a chance of some kind of arranged regime
change - very tough though it would be to reach. Will that
chance be taken? The answer lies mainly in Washington, but not a little
too in Moscow and Tehran, and in Ankara and Cairo. The fate of Syria,
and more than Syria, is in the balance.

A lecture by Paul Rogers on sustainable security, delivered to the Quaker yearly meeting
on 3 August 2011, provides an overview of the analysis that underpins
his openDemocracy column. It is available in two parts and can be
accessed from here

This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 licence.
If you have any queries about republishing please contact us.
Please check individual images for licensing details.