The Rise of State-Level Coordination of
Postsecondary Education .... ....................... 1
The Community Colleges and Coordination ............. 12
The Concern over Institutional Autonomy ............. 26

K RESPONSES OF DELPHI PANELISTS, BY ROLE LEVEL AND BY
SYSTEM GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, FOR NONISSUES .......... 344

REFERENCES ...................................... ............... 355

REFERENCE NOTES ...................................... .......... 366

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ............................................ 367

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Page

TABLE

1 Number of States by Type of State-Level Postsecondary-
Education Coordinating Structure ....................... 11

2 Number of States by Type and Functional Role of State-
Level Community College Coordinating Board ............ 25

3 Number of Delphi Panelists Preferring a Governance
Activity Be Exercised at the Specified Level ......... 192

4 For Each Issue, the Number of Delphi Panelists, by Role
Level, Preferring a Governance Activity Be Exercised
at the Specified Level and the Calculated Between-
Levels U ................................................ 200

5 For Each Issue, the Number of Delphi Panelists, by System
Governance Structure, Preferring a Governance Activity
Be Exercised at the Specified Level and the Calculated
Among-Structures H ................................... 207

6 Levels at Which Nonissue Governance Activities Should Be
Exercised According to Bureaucratic Theory, Panel
Consensus, and Collegial Theory ....................... 229

7 For Each Nonissue, the Number of Delphi Panelists, by
Role Level and by System Governance Structure,
Preferring a Governance Activity Be Exercised at
the Specified Level .................................. 345

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate
Council of the University of Florida in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADMINISTRATIVE
THEORY TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN STATE COMMUNITY
COLLEGE SYSTEMS

By

Fred E. Kiehle, III

June, 1979

Chairman: James L. Wattenbarger
Major Department: Educational Administration and Supervision

The purpose of this study was to investigate the desirable allocation

of governance power to state-level boards/agencies and colleges/districts

in state community college systems. First, the growth of state

coordination and governance and the factors impelling this growth were

noted. Likewise, calls for the maintenance of traditional institutional

autonomy and the evidence supporting these calls were examined. It was

concluded that these sometimes conflicting ideas, coordination and autonomy,

were both indeed requirements for effective and efficient state systems.

Therefore, balancing these requirements constituted a real, complex, and

controversial problem.

This problem was examined by first identifying the issues and nonissue

in the allocation of governance power in terms of the opinions of chief

executives of state-level staffs for community colleges and of college

chief executives. Representing approximately equal samples from each

group, 36 Delphi panelists were asked to indicate at which of five levels,

solely state to solely college, each of 55 governance activities should

preferably be exercised. A majority agreed on the preferred placement

levels for 34 activities; therefore, these activities were identified as

nonissues. The other 21 activities were identified as issues. The

panelists' opinions regarding the placement of the issues were analyzed,

and it was found that panelist role level, state or college, appeared to be

a factor contributing to disagreement over the preferred placement of eight

issue governance activities. On the other hand, no significant difference

was found among the opinions of chief executives grouped by type of state

board for community colleges--governing, coordinating-governing, or

coordinating--in the state where each worked. Consequently, it was

concluded that this factor apparently did not contribute to disagreement.

Finally, the preferred placements of the nonissues were compared to

placements hypothesized on the basis of the prescriptive tenets of

bureaucratic and of collegial administrative theory. The nonissue place-

ments were found to be significantly congruent with the theoretical

collegial placements. Therefore, it was concluded that collegial theory

appeared to underlie, whether consciously or unconsciously, the thinking

of the chief executives regarding the placement of nonissue governance

activities.

Next, the implications of the study's results for the desirable

allocation of governance power in state systems were discussed. The

nonissue placements were compared to opinions previously expressed in the

vii

literature and to the ideas of collegial theory, and typically, general

agreement was found. Accordingly, 33 of the 34 nonissue placements were

recommended as guidelines for practice. Each of the 21 issues was then

discussed in terms of the distribution of panelist placement opinions,

opinions from the literature, and theorized collegial placements. For

most activities, this evidence strongly implied that no more than two,

and sometimes one, placement levels were desirable alternatives. For each

issue governance activity, then, these alternatives were recommended as

guidelines.

Among the more general conclusions in the study, it was suggested

that professional opinion, as represented by the panelists' responses and

these same reasons, and Weathersby (1971, pp. 74-75) and Leslie (1975,

p. 28) saw these reasons as coming under a single term, accountability.

In addition, Smart (1970, pp. 365-368) noted that the campus violence

of the later 1960's further encouraged public, and thus state, scrutiny

of higher education. Finally, the establishment of state planning as

a prerequisite for Federal funding and the emergence of more

sophisticated planning methods and especially the use of computers

also, according to Halstead (1974, p. 5), added impetus to the devel-

opment of coordination.

Perhaps J. L. Miller (1972) stated the need for state coordi-

nation most succinctly:

Since the state is the area to be served, only an
agency with statewide responsibilities can identify new
needs of a statewide nature, identify geographic or pro-
grammatic gaps in the system of state service, and initiate
action to fill these needs. Only a statewide agency can
speak knowledgeably and nonparochially to the state legis-
lature, governor, and budget office concerning higher
education's needs--both its continuing needs and its newly
emerging ones. Only this agency can determine the present
and projected total demand for postsecondary education in
the state and rationally allocate among the state's insti-
tutions responsibilities for meeting these several needs.
(p. 242)

primary forms. One was the avoidance of unnecessary overlap in programs

offered in a state system (Cohen & Evans, 1968, p. 32), the importance

of which was largely an outgrowth of expansion. The second form that

efficiency took was the desire for a general economy in the provision

of all services by community colleges (Richardson, Blocker, & Bender,

1972, p. 23). As Gleazer (1973, pp. 129-131) noted, this desire often

manifested itself in close observation and possible regulation of some

of the detailed factors of cost. He specifically reported increasing

legislative concern with items like contact hours, salaries, and facili-

ties; and he used the term accountability to describe these and broader

concerns in the area of efficiency. An obvious impetus for this emerg-

ence of state-level concern with efficiency, as well as in large measure

for all aspects of state coordination of community colleges, was the

rise in the percentage of their funding from state-level sources, as

specifically pointed out by Cohen and Evans (1968, p. 32) and Richardson

et al. (1972, p. 25).

Thus, when all these factors and concerns are taken into account,

the strength of the forces compelling the emergence of state-level

coordination for community colleges becomes readily evident. Stuckman

(1969b) summarized this viewpoint, emphasizing the growth aspect

especially, when he concluded:

If the state's educational and occupational needs are
to be met, if each citizen of the state is to be provided
an equal educational opportunity beyond the high school no
matter where he resides, and if the junior colleges are to
develop in an orderly, planned manner, a statewide coordin-
ating agency for junior colleges appears to be a necessity.
(p. 7)

And Gleazer (1973), reflecting more directly concerns in the area of

efficiency noted:

An agency is needed at the state level...to address
itself to statewide interests in the light of statewide
resources to meet statewide needs. This "quality control"
agency can take a dispassionate view of the capacity of
institutions to fulfill their state goals with reasonable
cost and effectiveness. (p. 194)

These statements were representative of a consensus and were

reflected in, or perhaps themselves reflected, the actual state of

affairs. In 1970, as reported by Wattenbarger and Sakaguchi (1971),

45 states had some form of state-level board exercising a degree of

control, whether governing or coordinating, over the community colleges

in their states. They saw the legal form of these boards as divided

into four classes. A state board serving only community colleges

existed in 13 states. In 12 states, a board of higher education

included the community colleges within its field of responsibility.

In 5 states a state-university-system board had jurisdiction over the

community colleges. Finally, 15 states placed these colleges under

the responsibility of a state board of education, which also exercised

K-12 responsibility. This form was the most common, but, as noted

earlier (Martorana, 1968, p. 25), even this number had declined sub-

stantially from earlier years. Singer and Grande (1971, p. 39)

suggested the trend in board form was to the first class above, state

boards solely serving community colleges, and reported that, from

1965 to 1969, 7 of the 10 states enacting legislation dealing with

state-level coordination for community colleges created boards of that

type. Further, they pointed out that about 50% of all community

colleges nationwide came under the jurisdiction of such boards. Singer

and Grande (1971, p. 42) concluded that the emergence of this particular

kind of board signaled a growth in state-level power relative to commu-

nity colleges. However, it seems fair to say that, regardless of

specific board form, state-level influence in the affairs of this

segment of postsecondary education had risen; at the very least, it

was fact that, as the period of expansion for higher education began

to draw to a close, virtually every state with community colleges had

a state-level board assuming some degree of control over them.

It was pointed out earlier that in the early 1970's postsecondary

education entered an era of slow- or no-growth and that community

colleges, though feeling the effects later and less severely, also saw

their growth rate decline and their funding become more dear. During

this steady-state period the factors impelling state-level coordination

or higher education as a whole have been perceived as even more pres-

sing, and the trend toward further centralization of coordinating

responsibilities has continued. Again, as they had in the past,

developments in the community college arena paralleled those in the

general postsecondary-education field.

Consequently, concern over the need for strong coordination of

community college systems has, if anything, become greater during the

last few years. Various factors enter into this concern. First of

all, Glenny (1974, p. 54) pointed out that the community colleges have

become more subject to sharing with all of postsecondary education the

effects of trends in the general environment. This condition has been

an outgrowth of the colleges becoming and being perceived as a full

and significant partner in the overall postsecondary-education system,

resulting initially from their enormous growth in the 1960's and now

being added to by their continued growth, relative to the entire

system, in the 1970's. From this viewpoint, Glenny saw four specific

conditions that would further strengthen the perceived necessity of

state-level community college coordination: "(1) new program develop-

ments, (2) shifts in student distribution among postsecondary schools

and among the colleges themselves, (3) leveling of state funding for

higher institutions, and (4) the commitment of states to stronger

coordination encompassing all of postsecondary education" (p. 54).

Thus, Glenny saw the apparent need for state-level coordination of

community colleges as increasing because of their fuller identification

as a part of higher education; however, the opinions of Wattenbarger

and Hansen (1975, p. 11) suggest the relationship between the colleges

and other segments of education may be even more complex. They noted

that the colleges activities overlap and interrelate not only with

those of traditional institutions of higher education but also with

those of schools, at the secondary or postsecondary level, who offer

programs in adult, continuing, or vocational-technical education. In

the past, however, coordinated planning of these overlapping activities

had not existed, yet concern from state and federal sources over

duplication and fiscal efficiency has begun demanding it. Therefore,

a new reason for greater coordination has arisen. Overall, then, the

community colleges' expanding interrelationships with other educational

institutions are, indirectly and directly, resulting in a greater

requirement for coordination of their activities by the state.

One of the most significant of the indirect effects, trends that

community colleges are sharing with all or postsecondary education, is

the stabilization of funding noted by Glenny above. Matorana and Kuhns

(1977, p. 50) reported that after increases throughout the 1960's and

up through 1971, the percentage of state revenues allotted to higher

education began to drop, and the 1977 funding level represented an

absolute drop in dollars from the previous year. Certainly, therefore,

community colleges have found themselves in a situation where competi-

result, then, the change in the distribution of state-board structures

clearly seems to point up an increase in coordinating power over

community colleges at the state level.

A second obvious shift came in the distribution of boards identi-

fied as coordinating versus governing. In 1970 a clear majority were

26

coordinating; in 1974 and 1978, the reverse was true. Saying that this

shift represented an increase in state-board power needs no explanation.

Overall, then, the current trend in coordination of community

colleges is readily apparent--expanding responsibility increasingly

centralized at the state level. The consensus of a number of observers

is that this is the case, and they have revealed the factors which

have led up to and continue to support this trend. Moreover, their

contention has been unequivocally supported by the actual trend in

state-level board structures and powers. Of course, the general rule

does not apply in the case of every state. The community colleges of

Nebraska, for example, successfully fought in the legislature in 1975

and then in the state courts in 1976 to be returned to nearly full

local-board control (Paradise, 1976). Even in that case, the legisla-

ture has continued to discuss means of reinstituting state-level coor-

dination (Jacobson, 1978; Paradise, 1978). Thus, the evidence nation-

wide compels one to conclude that the significant rise of state-level

boards exercising a good deal of power over community colleges is not

likely to subside.

The Concern over Institutional Autonomy

Introduction

In the previous sections, the course of higher education and

state-level coordination of it has been charted. The phenomenal

growth of institutions since World War II, peaking in the 1960's,

resulted in a rise of concern at the state level for insuring that

this expansion served state interests, effectively through appropriate

diversity of opportunity and efficiently through avoidance of unneces-

sary duplication of effort. This concern found expression in the

establishment, in nearly every state, of some board or agency to

oversee and coordinate the activities of higher education institutions.

When the era of expansion ended in the early 1970's, the perceived

need by the states for coordination of higher education did not;

instead, concern for continued system effectiveness, coupled with an

even more pronounced desire for efficiency in resource utilization,

resulted in a continuance, and often an increase, in the coordination

function at the state level.

Developments in the community college field generally paralleled

those in higher education as a whole, as also explained previously.

Through the early 1970's, these colleges grew at an even more rapid

pace than their partners in higher education; consequently, they too

saw state-level oversight over their operations grow. Since the end

of the boom in higher education, the community colleges have continued

to grow at a healthy if reduced rate; however, they have avoided the

full brunt of the slow-growth era to a lesser degree in other areas.

Like the other segments of higher education, they have seen their

funding become more dear, and they too have been subject to an increas-

ing level of state-board control in the name of accountability.

Autonomy and Coordination in Postsecondary Education Generally

As one would expect, this movement toward greater control at the

state level has caused some consternation at the institutional level

within all segments of higher education. Perhaps a statement by a

proponent of voluntary consortia (Quehl, 1972) revealed the depth of

feeling that the issue can evoke:

Originally established because they made good social,
educational, and fiscal sense, many [centralized state
systems of higher learning] have grown to deny basic
autonomy to individual campuses and erode public confidence,
often leaving individual colleges and state agencies in

adversary positions. Too often the result has been a
monolithic system that has routinized and dehumanized
education, has stimulated the rise of unionism among
faculty members, and has helped to push many states to
the brink of bankruptcy. (p. 257)

Quehl failed to support his evaluation with specific examples, and

it seems likely to be undeservably harsh; nonetheless, it indicates the

degree of the concern that has arisen.

Leslie (1975) suggested that the root of the institution/state-

board conflict is the clash of similar claims to power that, indeed,

are often legitimate and sometimes actually delegated, implicitly or

even explicitly, to both sides by state government. He stated:

On the one hand, statewide coordinating bodies demand--
legitimately--that institutions be more responsive or
accountable to the needs of society. On the other hand--
and equally legitimately--the institutions insist that they
must be left alone if they are to satisfy such purposes as
the critical evaluation of society and the transmission and
advancement of learning and wisdom. (p. 39)

Thus, Leslie and even, if one looks closely, Quehl identified the

inherent dilemma behind the conflict--the fact that state coordination

is a two-edged sword, fully capable of slaying dragons but also capable,

if it is not wielded carefully, of inadvertently beheading the damsel

in distress on the backswing. Corson (1971) described the dilemma in

more specific terms:

The surveillance [by state governments] has done much
to avoid duplication of facilities and to husband scarce
resources; but it also has curtailed the administrative
autonomy of the individual institution. It has markedly
limited the freedom with which institutional administrators
and faculties can hire personnel, build buildings, revise
curricula, and even define their own purposes. (p. 435)

Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, and Paltridge (1971) defined the problem from

that institutional administrators and faculty in a strongly coordinated

system can, perceiving themselves as relegated to implementing the

wishes of others, experience "feelings of powerlessness" (p. 32). The

ultimate irony and danger inherent in this situation was noted by

Perkins (1975, p. 193) when he pointed out that, if reduced autonomy

does impair the ability of the campus administration to operate its

institution efficiently, the likely result is increased external

control--exacerbating the original unsatisfactory situation and thus

initiating, perhaps, a spiraling deterioration. Overall, then, it

seems a reasonable foundation does exist for concern regarding the

maintenance of college autonomy in the face of state coordination.

At the same time, however, the necessity--or, at the very least,

the inevitability--of state coordination has been established previ-

ously here; and furthermore, a number of experts have argued convincing-

ly that, in some ways, state coordination may be essential in preserv-

ing institutional autonomy. For example, Mautz (1975b, p. 173)

expressed this view, noting that some centralization of power in a

state board can insure, to some extent, institutional autonomy from

undue interference by the legislature or governor. This concern over

state-government intervention was repeated by Millard (1975), saying,

"The real danger [for autonomy] is that responsibility for planning and

coordination of postsecondary education will pass out of the hands of

state agencies created for this purpose and move into the hands of

general state planning agencies, for whom education does not constitute

the first priority, or directly into executive or legislative control"

(p. 206).

Especially in his reference to the executive, Millard was reflect-

ing a worry stated earlier by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Educa-

tion (1971). They noted that, in light of increased public attention

to and growing public expenditures for higher education, governors

could and, in some cases, had become controlling forces. Though they

admitted the effect was not uniformly bad, they generally felt "that

governors should not be the dominant forces in higher education" (p. 2).

That the governors have been concerned and that their concern has

grown during the steady-state period of the last few years seems

readily apparent from previous sections on the rise of state coordina-

tion. Their attitude is forcefully illustrated by comments reported

by Magarell (1976). He quoted Gov. Sherman W. Tribbit of Delaware as

saying, "Even the most cursory glance shows that some of the funds for

higher education are ill-spent. For example, in a state as compact as

Delaware, we have six nursing programs in the institutions of higher

learning. That strikes me as extremely wasteful of our limited

resources" (p. 11). Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr. of California stated

(well before Proposition 13), "We are entering an era of limits. It's

now a question of reordering priorities and choosing one program over

another, based on a rigorous standard of equity and common sense" (p.

1). Obviously, the question Mautz and others have spotlighted is who

will get to define what represents "equity and common sense." Only a

partial answer is certain: It will not be defined unilaterally by the

institutions. Consequently, higher education has been left with the

admonition of Glenny and Hurst (1971):

The choice of institutions is not between coordination
and no coordination but, rather, between effective coordina-
tion by an agency which stands in the no man's land between
the institutions and the state government and the ingestion
of coordinative powers into the executive branch of the
government. (p. 38)

might be protected from attack. Internal planning could be facilitated

by the availability of state-wide data from the board and the stability

resulting from the master plan. Finally, subject to the public effec-

tiveness of its leadership, a state agency could have a positive effect

on the public perception of higher education. Taken as a whole, these

possible state-board contributions represent a stabilizing influence

on the extra-institutional environment that could aid in the preserva-

tion of essential autonomy. In addition to these possible advantages,

Johnson (1975) and Goodall (1974, pp. 226-227) suggested that the

colleges and universities may specifically welcome one aspect of state-

level coordination during the no-growth era: That is the review of

existing programs. Johnson stated that administrators "privately . .

will admit that the state-level reviews may give them more latitude

and power to eliminate weak programs that sap their funds" (p. 49). To

this, Goodall also added that legislators too may prefer to have such

potentially unpopular decisions made elsewhere. Again, therefore, the

result of state-board activity can be an indirect strengthening of

institutional autonomy.

The consensus of many observers, then, is basically represented

by a statement by the Education Commission of the States' Task Force

on Coordination, Governance and Structure of Postsecondary Education

(1973): "The task force believes that the most effective means of

preserving and enhancing the functional autonomy or reasonable inde-

pendence of institutions lies in effective planning and cooperation

with the appropriate state agencies" (p. 74).

A review of the foregoing thus reveals agreement that state-level

coordination of postsecondary education plays an important role in the

process of insuring that the needs of state government and the public

it serves are met. Accordingly, coordination is probably necessary and

certainly inevitable. Moreover, effective state boards can provide

valuable service for individual colleges and universities and can also

help protect a degree of institutional autonomy. At the same time,

however, state boards do represent a possible source of harm to post-

secondary institutions if these boards act so as to reduce institutional

autonomy to a level below that necessary to allow for the flexibility

required for effective and efficient operation. This minimum level

may have been reached in some instances; whether it has or not, the

possibility of doing so exists. During the current no- or slow-growth

era, widely expected to continue for the rest of the century, the impact

of state-level coordination on institutional autonomy will, if anything,

grow, according to Berdahl (1975, p. 1) and Ketter (1975, p. 80). In

the words of Glenny (1972), "Greater state intervention and less

institutional autonomy is a trend which will accelerate" (p. 48).

Furthermore, this trend, even if it is slowable or stoppable, can

hardly be reversed because of the significant pressures, documented

previously here, that impel coordination. In 1977, for example

Jacobson reported the ruling, on the basis of the state constitution,

of the supreme court of Nebraska protecting the power of the Regents

of the University of Nebraska to manage the school free from state-

government interference. Nonetheless, the university administrators

admitted that they had to continue to act so as to maintain harmony

with the state and its basic desires, since the legislature represented

its major source of funds. Consequently, the present environment

necessitates some coordination and an attendant decrease in autonomy,

regardless of tradition and legal structures.

Therefore, the issue of coordination versus autonomy continues to

evoke concern and will likely continue to do so. Coughlin (1977) has

provided witness to this fact of life for postsecondary education,

reporting the completion of one study in the area and the commencement

of another. The former, a Federally sponsored report, predictably

recommended additional cooperation between the Federal government, the

state governments, and the colleges "because the allocation of scarce

resources requires greater 'efficiency and coordination to prevent

overlap and costly duplication'" (p. 9). The latter was a study, to

be concluded in 1979, funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation on these

same Federal, state, and local relationships with, among other ques-

tions, specific regard for "how a university can reconcile its finan-

cial dependence on the Federal and state governments with its tradi-

tional autonomy and academic freedom" (p. 9).

The situation is, then, that state-level coordination is inevita-

ble, necessary, desirable, and potentially harmful. The ultimate

problem remains that stated, in representative fashion, by Martorana

(1975): "The task is to find ways to preserve the creativity and

diversity of services in postsecondary education which flow from

institutional autonomy and freedom while assuring that these advantages

36
do not generate a wasteful and vicious competition among the institu-

tions and systems involved" (p. 203).

The Autonomy and Coordination of Community Colleges

This same problem confronts the community colleges in particular.

It has been seen that these colleges have paralleled higher education

as a whole in terms of their growth and the growth of state-level

power to coordinate them. Likewise, concern has arisen within these

colleges over a perceived diminution of their autonomy. This concern,

of course, has similar roots to that discussed above, but in some

cases, it is further heightened by the traditional local orientation

of most community colleges.

This significant factor in the community college response to

coordination was pinpointed by Stuckman (1969b):

The concept of coordination is not compatible with
the traditional philosophy of the locally-governed commu-
nity college. In attempting to meet the educational and
occupational needs of its service community, each institu-
tion has paid little or no regard to the activities of its
neighboring institutions. Commensurate with the pattern
of local autonomy, each institution has traditionally de-
veloped its own philosophy, educational programs, and
areas of interest. (pp. 2-3)

Clearly, this attitude in part produced the need for state coordination

of the colleges; at the same time, it also explains the strong feelings

of concern over their lessened autonomy that necessarily flowed from

this coordination.

Singer and Grande (1971) expressed this concern when they indi-

cated their belief "that the one factor which, if continued, could

create the greatest change in the future direction of the community

colleges is the increased role by the state in either coordinating or

governirii institutions which historically has been played by local

agencies" (p. 38). Gleazer (1973) emphasized in more specific terms

this local/state conflict peculiar to the question of autonomy in

community colleges:

There will be more state-level boards. . Local
boards are apprehensive that this may mean decreasing
community orientation and the capacity to respond easily
and quickly to local needs. Where local boards exist,
often there is a strong sense of community loyalty and
faith in the merits of localism. (p. 137)

He added that, in systems lacking local boards, concern was growing

over the ability of the colleges to respond to local needs.

That this potential threat has concerned the local leadership of

many colleges has been revealed by surveys. For example, G. L. Hall

(1974, p. 6) noted a 1972 survey of community college trustees by Peter

K. Mills for the Association of Governing Boards. It indicated that

more than 60% of the trustees felt institutional independence to be

in danger, with 42% believing increased centralization of decision

making to be a cause. More recently, a 1975 poll of board chairman of

colleges and universities cited by Martorana and Kuhns (1977, p. 44)

revealed that 64% believed that institutional planning in the academic

realm was facing increasing intervention by the state. Moreover, this

belief was even more prevalent, at 82%, among the chairman of community

Harris' report, developed from meetings with over 80 community college

presidents nationwide in 1973 and 1974, that these administrators

considered the impact of state coordination to be a major concern of

their colleges.

In evaluating the 1965 reorganization of community colleges in

Illinois into a state-coordinated system, which he strongly favored,

Erickson (1968) listed a sampling of specific questions that had or

could arise in his state over the state/college relationship:

Is the Statement of Standards and Criteria for the
Evaluation on Recognition of Illinois Public Junior Colleges
too prescriptive? Will procedures for state approval of
proposals to add new curriculums diminish local creativity
and initiative? Do procedures for approving detailed
vocational-technical curriculums and qualifications of
teachers by the State Board of Vocational Education reduce
the autonomy of local faculties for curricular development
and staffing? Are policies and procedures for state approval
of capital projects for shared funding flexible enough to
permit development of adequate campuses for truly compre-
hensive programs? (p. 26)

Obviously, the specific issues that arise will vary from state to

state, yet these questions provide an inkling of the sorts of problems

that can exist and that result in concern at the institutional level.

The initial period of growth for significant state-level coordina-

tion of community colleges was just ending when Wattenbarger (1968, p.

11) predicted, correctly it seems, that the trend in that direction was

irreversible. He then proceeded to identify the central problem that

emerged from the trend--the necessity of preserving the most significant

Board of Governors of Community Colleges, the state-level coordinating

board, was the only agency that would "be able to modify it [the effect

of the 1202 commission], attenuate it, and channel it in the right

directions" (p. 95) and thus maintain the extant autonomy enjoyed by

the colleges.

In the final analysis, then, one sees in the community college

arena, as was true of postsecondary education generally, an unavoidable

conflict of desires--the state government's desire for coordination,

with its goals of meeting the public's educational requirements within

the standards of efficiency also demanded by the public, and the commu-

nity college's desire for the autonomy necessary to effect its goals,

quickly responding to local educational needs effectively and with

efficient use of not only the state's but also the local district's

resources. Obviously, both desires are legitimate; therefore, the

resolution of the conflict is not and cannot be simple, a win-or-lose

affair; rather, it must be balanced and equitable, serving to maximize

the goals of both parties.

Kerr (1975) succinctly set forth both the importance and the

difficulty of reaching such a resolution:

The basic dangers of centralized control are institu-
tional homogeneity and loss of institutional flexibility.
States can be urged to prevent these consequences by
insisting only on such controls as are absolutely necessary
and giving to institutions the greatest amount of autonomy
possible. But that is easy to say and there are no obvious
structural mechanisms to propose to guarantee such a result.
(p. 10)

The purpose of this study was not, unfortunately perhaps but

realistically, to discover and set out those ideal structural mechanisms

that have eluded Kerr. It was, however, its purpose to aid in that

search, with particular reference to community college systems.

CHAPTER TWO
THE STUDY

Introduction

In Chapter One, the rise of state-level coordination of post-

secondary education was traced. It was seen that after World War II

the student population of postsecondary education began growing rapidly,

and this growth continued at an increasing rate, finally reaching its

peak during the 1960's. As well as growing in size, the colleges and

universities also grew in number. Likewise, the expenditures of higher

education grew and, partially because of the greater sophistication of

programs and the required facilities, grew at a rate higher than that

of the student increase. Accordingly, government revenues dedicated

to higher education also grew absolutely and in percentage of total

budgets. In response to this growth and to other factors, state

governments began to decide that this state activity now required

greater oversight. As explained by McConnell (1962, p. 136), their

goals were primarily to insure a diversity of opportunity sufficient

to meet the educational needs of the states' citizens and to do so in

a fiscally efficient manner, so that maximum quality and quantitity

could be obtained with the finite resources available. The result of

this concern was the creation of state-level boards to coordinate and/

or govern the activities of the institutions of higher education.

In the early 1970's, the growth of the traditional college-age

population suddenly began a sharp decline. This fact, coupled with a

46

47
downturn in the economy, quickly effected a drastic slowdown in post-

secondary education's growth, ushering in an era widely termed steady

state. This situation produced not a lessening in the states' desire

to coordinate higher education, but a heightening of that desire. For

now these governments realized the harmful effects of inefficiency in

the system were even greater; and additionally, because of a slowing

growth of revenues and rising requests for services by the public, the

states' desire for operational economy increased. The result was and

has been since that time the placing of even more demands and responsi-

bilities on the shoulders of the state-level coordinating process. The

number and power of these boards has therefore continued to grow.

Within the community college field, events have generally paral-

leled those of postsecondary education as a whole. These colleges grew,

both in number of units and total number of students served, at a rate

even greater than that for postsecondary education as a whole. As a

result of this growth, the community colleges became a very significant

partner in the higher education systems of most states. Thus, they came

increasingly under the eye of the public and, therefore, of the state

governments. Prior to this era of expansion, the colleges had typically

functioned under the coordinating oversight, often insignificant, of

state boards of education. Now, however, the state governments realized,

as they did for higher education as a whole, that the maintenance of

effectiveness and efficiency, from a state-wide perspective, of

community colleges required more active state-level coordination.

Consequently, in many cases the colleges were placed under the purview

of a separate state-level board or agency or set under the oversight of

a higher education board, where they would presumably receive more

48

attention than they had previously. In cases in which no change in the

coordinating structure occurred, the process itself often became more

aggressive.

Since the early 1970's, the community colleges, like other seg-

ments of higher education, have seen their growth rate slow. They have

not, however, shared in the deleterious direct effects of the steady-

state era to the same degree as their partners have. Yet, largely

because of their new full-partner status, the colleges have fully felt

one of the indirect effects of the recent times. Just as has been true

for postsecondary education as a whole, the community colleges, overall,

have continued to come under increasing control by state-level coordin-

ating boards and agencies.

In Chapter One the reasons behind the rise of state-level coordina-

tion of both higher education generally and the community colleges

specifically were reviewed. It seemed apparent, after the views of a

number of observers were considered, that state coordination was clearly

valuable, probably necessary, and undoubtedly inevitable in most

instances. Moreover, the conditions of the current steady-state period

have only underscored these characteristics. Indeed, several commenta-

results not only for the state in reaching its system-wide goals but the

institutions as well in maintaining their operational integrity, espe-

cially relative to the effects of the alternatives to state-level post-

secondary education boards and/or system boards.

Regardless of these attributes, however, individual colleges and

universities have typically viewed the trend to more active state

coordination with concern. Furthermore, from the review in Chapter One,

it appeared that, like the concerns prompting the swelling state-level

role in decision making, these counter concerns are also basically

legitimate. This legitimacy seemed especially compelling in the case

of the community colleges. These colleges inherently exist to meet a

significant portion of the postsecondary-education needs of a relatively

small local area. Their organizational health, as well as their value

to the state-wide system, heavily depends upon fulfilling this function;

consequently, they require that autonomy necessary to respond effec-

tively to local demands. And, as Knoell (1976) pointed out, these local

demands are often unique to one or a small number of community colleges

within a state system and, additionally, are constantly shifting. As a

result, the decisions a college must make cannot, in many cases, be

made effectively at the state level. At the same time, however, this

desirable and necessary local orientation of a community college rein-

forces the need for a state board to insure that local operations

correspond to the requirements of system-wide effectiveness and effi-

ciency. Martorana (1968) stated the inherent contrast well:

Local institutional boards and administrative staffs
necessarily are most concerned and best able to handle
matters that directly and specifically affect their own
institutions. They cannot and should not be expected to
give attention and meaningful direction to the broader
statewide and large regional issues and interests touching
upon community junior colleges even though the well-being
or the success of their institution may be affected seri-
ously. (p. 28)

It seems clear, then, that the situation facing postsecondary

education generally and the community colleges in particular is a

complex one. Simple solutions cannot satisfy both state and college

concerns. Effective state coordination of the institutions is vital;

likewise, some degree of college autonomy is equally vital. And overly

extensive amounts of either can seriously debilitate the functioning

of the other--to, it seems, the ultimate benefit of neither. Thus, as

Moody (1978) stated, "The reality of control of the public two-year

institutions is that control is a balance between decision making at the

state level and decision making at the institutional level. . An

intriguing challenge is the continuing search for an optimal balance

between central coordination and institutional autonomy" (p. 70).

As was stated at the conclusion of Chapter One, the purpose of

this study was not to find and present this "optimal balance." It was,

rather, to develop and provide information that will help to refine the

questions surrounding the development of more effective, if not ideal,

combinations of state-level-board and local-college roles in decision

making for community colleges and that will help in finding viable

answers to these questions. At the same time, as a part of this

process, preliminary recommendations are made.

The Problem

Statement of the Problem

The problem, therefore, of this study was to identify the issues

and nonissues in the division of governance power between the state-

level community college boards (and their staffs) and the individual

community colleges (to include local boards) and then to investigate

these identified issues and nonissues from three selected aspects.

These issues and nonissues were delineated in terms of 55 specific

governance activities and were developed from the professional opinions

of chief executives of state-level staffs and chief executives of

community colleges regarding the preferred placement, at the state or

local level or somewhere in between, of these governance activities.

Specifically, the following questions were answered.

1. For which of 55 specific governance activities did a Delphi

panel consisting of chief executives of state-level staffs and chief

executives of community colleges reach consensus, thus identifying a

nonissue, or fail to reach consensus, thus identifying an issue, on

the preferred level (from among five levels, solely state to solely

local) at which the activity should be exercised?

2. For which of the issues identified above were the differences

in professional opinion regarding the preferred placement of the govern-

in professional opinion regarding the preferred placement of the govern-

ance activity related significantly to the type of state-level govern-

ance structure for community colleges (governing, coordinating-

governing, or coordinating board) within which the Delphi panelists

worked?

4. Did the general pattern of preferred placements of nonissue

governance activities, those for which the panel reached consensus,

tend to congruence with a pattern of governance-activity placements

hypothesized on the basis of bureaucratic administrative theory, with a

pattern based on collegial theory, or with neither pattern?

Delimitations

1. The study dealt only with the community college segment of

postsecondary education.

2. The study dealt with the professional opinions of community

college educators at the administrative level only, specifically (1)

chief executives of state-level staffs serving state boards or agencies

engaged indirect coordination or governance of community colleges and

(2) chief executives of community colleges.

3. The data were obtained from a 36 member Delphi panel composed

of state-level chief executives and institutional chief executives,

questioned during 1975 and 1976.

Limitations

1. The random selection of the respondents from among the two

populations was limited by the fact that after selection a selectee

had to agree to be a member of the Delphi panel. The consequences of

this selection bias were impossible to identify.

2. The random selection of the respondents from among the popula-

tion of community college chief executives was limited by the fact that,

for each selected state-level chief executive, one community college

chief executive was randomly selected from the population of only the

state represented by that state-level chief executive. In other words,

the sample of community college chief executives was not randomly

selected from the entire population, and this selection bias limits

the generalizability of that sample's responses. It should be remem-

bered, however, that the bias was diminished somewhat by the fact that

the selection of the states to be represented was random, since the

selection of the state-level chief executives was random within the

limitation noted in 1 above. The reason for this departure from random

selection is explained in the later section "Sample Selection."

3. The desire for equal role (state and college) representation

on the panel dictated a sample size for community college chief execu-

tives so small relative to the population that generalizing their

opinions to the population may be unwarranted. The reason for equal

role representation is explained in the later section "Sample

Selection."

Justification

In Chapter One and again briefly in the introduction to this

chapter, the growth, reaching an apex in the 1960's, of postsecondary

education as a whole and of the community college segment in particular

was noted, along with the corollary development of state-level boards

and agencies to coordinate this growth and maximize system effectiveness

in terms of meeting state postsecondary-education needs and utilizing

state financial resources most efficiently. The 1970's brought a decline

in this growth, ushering in the steady-state era, predicted to last

perhaps until the end of the century. This period of slow or no growth

in postsecondary education did not, however, bring any relief from the

trend to centralization of power in the hands of state boards. In

fact, for reasons explained previously, the trend escalated.

The development and strengthening of these boards in turn precipi-

tated concern over the effect the state-level role in coordination and

governance of postsecondary education might have upon traditional

institutional autonomy. The studies of Moos and Rourke and of Glenny

in 1959 generally marked the surfacing of this issue as one of major

significance. Moos and Rourke (1959) defended the importance of

institutional autonomy. Glenny (1959), on the other hand, suggested

that necessary state coordination and adequate institutional autonomy

were not mutually exclusive; but he agreed that the issue was critical,

saying, "The greatest single problem of coordination is how to

achieve . its] objectives without destroying the initiative, flexi-

bility, and diversity of the public institutions" (p. 263). This

issue was reviewed in some detail in Chapter One and one conclusion

seemed clear: The problem is real and, furthermore, is complex. It

was evident that a degree of state-level power is probably necessary

and, in any case, inevitable. At the same time, the case for a degree

of institutional autonomy was also convincing. For community colleges

specifically, the contradictory nature of the issue was even more

glaring. Because of the local orientation of their mission, these

colleges clearly require the autonomy necessary to allow effective

response to shifting educational needs, sometimes unique to their

service areas. Yet this inherently requisite local orientation makes

it more difficult for these colleges to consider adequately state-wide

concerns in planning or operating; as a result, this necessary autonomy

must be balanced by state-level oversight. As many observers have

noted, striking this balance, while undoubtedly vital, is an extremely

complex and delicate task.

One approach to this task is to attempt to specify in concrete

terms the roles in governance and decision making that each level

should play. In 1963, in one of the earlier statements of guidelines

for state-level activity, Brumbaugh implied the usefulness of this

approach when he recommended that a state agency should limit itself

to planning and coordinating, vice getting involved in managing insti-

tutions. Yet, in order to do so, he noted, the agency needed a clear

understanding of exactly what constituted the appropriate planning and

coordinating activities.

Nonetheless, by 1974, Halstead, in an excellent restatement of

the fundamental problem, revealed that no real answer had been reached.

He stated:

The debate regarding centralized versus decentralized
authority in higher education has progressed beyond arguing
the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. Discus-
sion of the pros and cons of both central coordination and
institutional autonomy has resulted in considerable agree-
ment among educators about the relative merits of both
practices. The evidence also reveals--and herein lies the
crux of the controversy--that a winning combination is a
yet unidentified balance which would retain most of the
advantages of central control with a minimal sacrifice of
institutional sovereignty. What persists as a continu-
ing and intriguing challenge--and an issue of no little
disagreement--is the search for a compromise between cen-
tral coordination and autonomy that would create an optimal
balance. (p. 11)

Thus, Halstead felt that no balanced allocation of roles had been

made, despite the fact that the need had been expressed earlier.

Moreover, this lack of concrete recommendations existed even though

a recognition of their desirability was clearly widespread, as pointed

out in Chapter One of this study, and a direct recognition of their

usefulness had been expressed by a task force of the Education

Commission of the States. That body's Task Force on Coordination,

Governance and Structure of Postsecondary Education (1973) had stated

that the "clarification of levels of administrative responsibility" was

one of the prime questions facing state planners. They went on to say,

"Each state should delineate levels of authority of coordination and

governance and develop state plans that suggest levels of decision

making consistent with these authorities" (p. 71).

The value in specifying state and college governance and decision-

making roles has also been recognized relative to community college

systems in particular, and again this recognition has been longstanding.

Wattenbarger (1968, p. 11), for example, pointed out that in 1965 B.

Lamar Johnson noted the necessity of clearly defining and assigning

the authority and duties of both the state and local elements in a

community college system; and Schultz and Wattenbarger (1968, p. 27)

reemphasized this point. At about this same time, Martorana (1968, p.

26) too underscored its importance, suggesting that clarifying the

state/college relationship was among the three major tasks facing any

state-level community college agency. Moreover, he believed it to be

"the most delicate and critical issue" of the three (p. 27). Likewise,

In order to clarify areas of decision-making authority
and responsibility, state agencies and multicampus colleges,
in cooperation with local colleges and the communities they
serve, should develop a taxonomy of decision specifying to
the extent possible those areas of authority which will be
reserved to the local college to give it adequate freedom
to respond to the needs of its own constituency. (p. 8)

Since that time concern over more adequate and concrete role

clarification has continued to exist. For example, in 1974, G. L. Hall

reported a survey of chairmen of state-level boards overseeing community

colleges, and 47% of the respondents indicated that such boards needed

a clearer definition of their specific role (pp. 18, 36). Additionally,

Martorana and McGuire (1976) noted that, in a survey of legislative

activity in 26 states and Puerto Rico from 1973 to 1975, over two-thirds

of the states acted on bills related to state-wide coordination, and

many of these represented attempts to clarify state-level-board roles

(pp. 8-9). They concluded that "the issue of how best to balance the

state-level and local-level control to achieve a statewide system of

postsecondary education is not yet effectively resolved" (p. 17).

From the discussion in the first chapter, then, one can conclude

that widespread and legitimate concern does exist regarding state-

level versus local-college decision-making roles, for postsecondary

education in general and the community colleges in particular. As

noted above, a number of observers have suggested that concretely

clarifying the appropriate powers for each level would be a very

useful response to this concern over roles. The fact that the desire

for this clarification continues to be stated indicates that no satis-

factory response has been made. The literature on state-level coor-

dination and governance has grown rapidly in recent years, but no

clear and detailed statements of state and local decision-making roles

exist. Many of the studies are primarily descriptive, focusing on the

governance structures and operational procedures of a single state or

of selected states. Some are comparative and evaluative, but the

prescriptive suggestions that have resulted have generally been broadly

conceptual in nature. Consequently, in light of the concerns voiced

previously and the dearth of adequate responses to these concerns in

the literature, especially for the community college field, a study

dealing in specific terms with the division of decision-making powers

between state-level boards and the individual community colleges

seemed valuable.

As was pointed out in the statement of the problem, the purpose of

this study was not to provide a definitive answer to these concerns, a

concrete and all-encompassing list of what should be done by whom.

Rather, it was to provide information that would significantly aid

in the ultimate development of detailed taxonomies such as recommended

earlier by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges.

To this end, four tasks were undertaken: the concrete delineation of

decisions that must be made, the identification of the areas of agree-

ment and controversy regarding the level at which the delineated

decisions should be made, the determination of the relationship of

selected factors to areas of controversy, and finally the investigation

of the applicability of two basic administrative theories to defining

state and local roles in decision making.

First, then, 55 decisions were delineated that, in most states,

must be made at some level, state or local. A lack of comprehensive-

ness and concreteness has characterized past studies, a fact which is

reflected in the previously cited calls for clarification of the roles

of the elements in state systems. This concrete delineation of

required decisions may provide a more adequate base for future studies

in this area.

Second, the identification of the areas of agreement and disagree-

ment among professional community college administrators from the state

and local-college levels regarding the preferred division of specific

decision-making powers between the state boards and the local colleges

more precisely clarified the actual issues within the general contro-

versy. This clarification may help future researchers concentrate

their focus on the most important aspects of the problem. Thus, they

will be able to narrow themselves to examining those specific decision

areas where actual controversy remains, consequently enhancing their

efficiency and effectiveness. At the same time, a compilation of the

decision areas where agreement does exist regarding the level at which

59

they should be made can immediately begin to serve as a recommendation

to be considered in the allocation of powers within state community

college systems.

Third, the relationship of two factors--respondent role level (state

or local college) and respondent governance-structure environment

(whether the state-level board had governing, coordinating-governing,

or coordinating-only authority)--to the existence of disagreement over

collegial theory, or neither theory appeared to explain the pattern of

decision-making-power assignments for which agreement existed. This

facet of the study contributes to the establishment of a theoretical

foundation for the design of coordinating and governing structures for

state systems of community colleges and, as a result, can again aid in

the resolution of governance-power conflicts between state-level boards

and the individual colleges. The application of basic administrative

theory to the coordination-autonomy issue in postsecondary education has

been touched upon only briefly in the literature, even though the poten-

tial value of doing so has been noted.

For example, in 1968 Schultz and Wattenbarger recommended the

development of "clearly stated principles which may be used to determine

those decisions that should be made at the institution level and those

that should be made at the state level" (p. 27). Similarly, Stuckman

60

(1969a), at the conclusion of his study on the administrative imple-

mentation, and its institution-level effects, of selected functions

by two state-level-agency staffs for community colleges, stated:

Responsibilities . inherent in the coordinating
process beg for definition ana delineation as regards
who, i.e., the state coordinating agency staff or the
local governing board of a junior college and institu-
tional administrators and teaching faculty, should make
which decisions. It is recommended that a study be con-
ducted with the purpose being to formulate principles which
could serve as guides to state coordinating agency staff
members who must daily tread the thin line between insti-
tutional autonomy and institutional accountability to the
state. (p. 115)

Certainly, it would seem that the most adequate approach to the

derivation of broadly meaningful principles to guide the appropriate

assignment of decision-making powers is through the application of

administrative theory to the design of state postsecondary-education

system structures and practices. The assumption is that theoretically

derived principles can prove more universally useful and more mutually

consistent than principles derived solely from opinion and experience.

One objection that might be raised regarding the use of traditional

administrative theory in examining and prescribing college/state-

system relationships is that these theories typically focus on the

functioning of humans within an organization, vice organizations within

larger organizations. Yet the characteristics of human organizations

fundamentally reflect the characteristics of their members; thus,

similar theoretical concepts would likely exist for both. In this

vein, Halstead (1974) saw a college "as an entity with a character

that must be achieved through the pursuit of goals" (p. 224) and

requiring management from above basically corresponding to that

61

required to encourage human productivity. The application of existing

theory would consequently appear valuable.

While others have called for principles, Martorana (1975) appeared

to state the utility of a theoretical approach more directly. He

stated:

If planning and coordination were more carefully defined
and refined in their functions and were buttressed by a
sounder knowledge based on their philosophies as well as
their techniques, . .the evils that now seem inherent
in the coordinating organizations [he had specified
stultifying centralization of control] can perhaps be
avoided at the same time that the promises they also seem
to hold could be enhanced. (p. 203)

using a nonparametric statistic, the Spearman rank correlation coeffi-

cient (Siegel, 1956, pp. 202-213). The formula appropriate for use

with ties was the one used to figure the coefficient. Next, the sig-

nificance of the resulting coefficient was calculated. Since only a

positive correlation corresponds to congruence, a one-tailed test was

used; and the level of significance was set at .025. Finally, then,

if no significant difference in medians and a significant correlation

were found, the null hypothesis, no significant congruence, was re-

jected.

Organization of the Report

The remainder of this report consists of a review of selected

pertinent literature, the report of the results of the data analyses, a

discussion of the implications of the analyses, and a summary of the

78

study and its possible usefulness. Chapter Three contains the review

of related literature. First, selected writings on state-level coor-

dination of higher education generally and of community colleges in

particular are reviewed, with emphasis on opinions and recommendations

regarding system governance structure and the division of governance

responsibilities between the state and the institutions. Next, a brief

review of administrative theory and its application to higher education

and state coordination of higher education is provided, primarily to

present some background in this area as it relates to the study. Last

is a discussion of the Delphi technique, its structure and use.

Chapter Four contains the results of the study, the data analyses for

each of the four questions in the statement of the problem. In

Chapter Five these results are examined for their implications regard-

ing the assignment of governance responsibilities to state-level boards

and to institutions. The nonissues and then the issues are discussed,

governance activity by governance activity. Finally, Chapter Six

contains a summary of the study, comments on its broader implications,

and suggestions for further research on the controversies surrounding

state coordination of community colleges and of higher education

institutions generally.

CHAPTER THREE
A SELECTIVE Ei'.'IEW OF RELATED
LITERATURE

Introduction

In Chapter One the background of the controversy over state

coordination of postsecondary education and its impact on the autonomy

of institutions was examined. Reviewed in this chapter is material

more directly related to the exact topic explored by the study, the

division of governance power between state-level boards and individual

colleges and the applicability of administrative theory to this process.

Additionally, background information on the research method used in

the study, the Delphi technique, is presented.

Accordingly, first are reported a number of works containing

information, opinions, and/or guidelines regarding the allocation

of decision-making responsibilities to the states and the colleges.

This portion of the chapter is divided into two sections, one on

higher education generally and one reporting studies on community

colleges in particular. Next, a background for the theoretical

aspect of the study is presented. The bureaucratic and collegial

administrative theories are briefly explained, and then some studies

suggesting their applications to the administration of postsecondary

institutions and systems are reviewed. Finally the methodology and

uses of the Delphi technique are reviewed.

State Coordination and Higher Education

In this section materials dealing with state coordination and

higher education as a whole are examined. The review is primarily

limited to identifying the information presented by past observers

relative to the division of governance powers between state-level

boards and individual institutions. Descriptive studies are not

included; that past and current practice is not entirely satisfactory

is indicated in Chapter One. Rather, the intent is to present pro-

fessional thought on what should be done. The review is basically

organized chronologically, except that multiple writings by an author

are usually grouped together. Published works of the current decade

are represented most thoroughly, but some of the most significant

earlier contributions in the field are also reviewed briefly.

Two of these early studies appeared in 1959. Moos and Rourke

studied the effect of several facets of state government, including

state coordination agencies, upon the autonomy of public institutions

granting at least the baccalaureate degree. The study surveyed and

reported the existence of state-government agencies affecting the

activities of colleges and summarized generally anecdotal reports of

the impact of these agencies upon the institutions. However, no

attempt was made to identify systematically specific state actions

which were considered to have a clearly adverse effect upon the

colleges.

At the same time, a book by Glenny (1959) dealt specifically and

primarily with state coordination of higher education. He traced its

historical development, identified and evaluated three forms of state-

coordination structures, and delineated and examined four major

state-agency functions. These were (1) planning and policy making,

(2) function and program allocation, (3) budgeting institutional

operations, and (4) budgeting capital outlay projects.

Since that study, Glenny has commented several times on state

coordination. Among these, in 1971 he and Hurst updated the basic

information in the 1959 work. Again, he saw three major types of

state boards: voluntary boards, single governing boards, and

coordinating boards. He and Hurst suggested that at first glance

single boards seemed to have the greatest potential because of the

power they wield; yet, they said, research had revealed that coordinat-

ing boards performed nearly all functions as satisfactorily as single

boards and that coordinating boards were superior in long-range

planning, a function they considered paramount. Consequently, they

recommended the coordinating structure over a state-level governing

board. Generally following Glenny's 1959 classification, they saw

several powers as necessary for an effective state-level board.

Master planning for the system was identified as the central activity

of the board, but they did note that the trend in this area was to

carry out this function so as to require public and system-element

input, often by assigning the planning responsibility to standing or

ad hoc committees rather than solely to the board staff. Additionally,

they said, effective master planning required evaluation of the plan's

implementation; and accordingly, boards had to have the power to

collect data from the institutions. The other powers they considered

vital were the "authority to approve or disapprove all new programs

and new campuses; to review operating and capital budgets; [and] to

set certain admission standards, tuition, and fees" (p. 25). The

first two largely represented functions necessary to the implementa-

tion of master planning. The third also fell into this category,

but they did not clarify what certain meant. Finally, they suggested

that a steady-state era (just approaching at that time) might

necessitate board approval power over existing, as well as new,

programs.

In this same year, Glenny was senior author of one of the most

complete sets of guidelines for state-level-board operations. In

this work (Glenny, Berdahl, Palola, & Paltridge, 1971), the authors

again expressed a preference for coordinating vice governing boards

at the state level because of their flexibility and their strength

in the planning area. They repeated all the necessary board powers

delineated by Glenny and Hurst but added a few. Short-range planning

was specifically included in the planning function. Without reserva-

tion, they recommended approval power over existing institutional

programs and also recommended that the entire range of approval

powers be exercised over private colleges in cases where state funding

was significant. They added one completely new power, that the

board "administer directly or have under its coordinative powers

all state scholarship and grant programs to students, grant programs

to nonpublic institutions, and all state-administered federal grant

and aid programs" (p. 7). At the same time, in nearly every case

they suggested that these functions be carried out in a manner formally

providing for college-level input.

In addition the study specified areas where decision making

should be reserved for the institutions. Briefly, these areas

included (1) student affairs, except for master-plan mandates in

general admission standards and enrollment ceilings and mixes;

(2) faculty affairs, including salaries and negotiations except as

affected by funding levels; (3) hiring and appointment, including

college-level chief executives and board members; (4) staff travel

approval; (5) content and methods of programs, courses, and

research; (6) college-level contractual relationships; and (7)

maintenance of campus law and order. They also felt that colleges

should be free of most state procedural controls (often emanating

from state agencies other than the board) such as pre-audits, central

purchasing, or central staff-personnel procurement. Finally, and

perhaps interestingly, the authors believed that both the state

board and individual institutions should be able to present and

defend their own budget recommendations before the legislature.

A 1972 article by Glenny added little to the above, except that

he emphasized that steady state would heighten the impact of state-

level-board activities on the colleges. One contrast did exist; he

now foresaw the possibility of professional negotiations gravitating

to the state level to the degree that funding-level decisions were

made at that level.

Another of the early significant studies appeared in 1962.

McConnell in this book presented what its title named, A General

Pattern for American Public Higher Education. In doing so, he

provided a clear, thorough, and convincing foundation on which the

concept of the state system could be firmly placed. Having laid this

base, he went on to discuss the state-level structure required of such

a system and examined the values and the weaknesses of state-level

coordination. He added little, however, in terms of concrete

solutions to the controversies surrounding the delineation of state-

level powers, primarily reiterating the functions identified by

Glenny before him as the basic activities that should be exercised

by a state board.

In 1963, Brumbaugh set forth one of the earliest sets of guide-

lines for effective state-level functioning. In terms of specific

state-board powers, however, he did not contribute much to what had

come before. As others had done, he emphasized the central nature of

planning and plan implementation to state-board activities.

A. D. Henderson examined the control of higher education in 1969,

examining the exercise of authority both within institutions and over

institutions by the state. On the latter topic, he tried to identify

the fundamental characteristic separating appropriate state versus

institutional powers. Curiously perhaps, though he had introduced

administrative theory into his discussion of intrainstitutional

management, he did not use this approach in his discussion of a

system's management. At this level he suggested that state-board

powers revolved around political, or public-policy, questions, while

describing legitimate institutional questions as being educational.

Taking this avenue of analysis, he ended up with the familiar maxims

of the state role centering around planning and coordination of the

state system and the institutional role in governance centering on

operations.

By 1970, articles and books dealing with state coordination of

higher education began to appear much more frequently, especially in

terms of works going beyond merely describing the practice, and

perhaps the thinking behind it, in one particular state. In one such

article with this broader perspective, Morton (1970) saw state-level

boards as occupying a position between state government and higher

education and saw their effectiveness as necessitating the "middle-

man" role. Becoming too closely identified with either side would,

he believed, decrease their effectiveness. Morton perceived the four

fundamental functions of state boards to be (1) the development of

state higher-education goals, (2) the assessment of existing insti-

tutions in light of these goals, (3) the assignment of institutional

role and scope, and (4) the evaluation of financial resources availa-

ble and necessary to meet the goals set. Like others, then, he saw

state-board activities as centering on master planning and its

implementation and on budget review, especially as it related to

planning.

Smart (1970) examined state board activities relative to the

crises that surrounded the Vietnam-War-era campuses and state-capitol

reactions to these crises. While his focus was limited, Smart's

suggestions probably apply generally to the action-reaction relation-

ship that often exists between state governments and higher education.

He believed that state boards had failed to address this problem and

recommended that they prepare, in effect, opinion papers attempting

to balance the public interest and institutional welfare on such

topics as "academic freedom, free speech on the campus, student

behavior in the community and academic jeopardy, student and faculty

rights and responsibilities, and maintenance of order on campus" (pp.

375-376). He did not state that a state-level board should unilater-

ally set college policy in these areas but rather exercise some

leadership for these campus-level decisions and be ready with a

framework on which to base, at short notice, fully considered advice

to state governments reacting to a sudden crisis. Smart, therefore,

was saying that state boards should assume a leadership role even in

areas where a direct role in decision making was inappropriate.

A major work appearing in 1970 and 1971 was a three-year study

of state-wide planning in higher education and its institutional

effects. The research consisted of in-depth case studies of four

states with a history of state-level planning: California, Florida,

Illinois, and New York. It was reported in two books, one on state-

level planning (Palola, Lehmann, & Blischke, 1970) and a second on

college-level planning (Palola & Padgett, 1971). In the first, the

authors concluded that state planning had typically improved both

institutional performance and autonomy, though noting that the formal

(specifically granted) autonomy of the colleges had been restricted.

Additionally, they suggested that a slowing of system growth (at that

time just beginning to loom on the horizon) could cause further

restriction of both formal and actual autonomy. They considered

program formulation the prime function of educational planning and

broadly defined a division of labor in this area. The state-wide

agency would delineate the basic missions and roles of the higher-

education segments of the state, such as the community colleges, the

regional universities, and the state universities. Where existing,

segmental boards or agencies would do the same for the institutions

under them; and the institutions would decide upon their own program

needs. The second report, while primarily focusing on college-level

planning and processes, reiterated this division of labor and

recommended that the colleges, within their assigned role, be given

wide latitude in developing their programs and curriculum.

In addition to the second report from the above study, 1971 saw

the appearance of other significant works investigating state coor-

dination of higher education. Two of these, coauthored by Glenny,

were described earlier. Another important contribution was by

Berdahl. This book reported his study of 19 state-level coordinating

agencies. On the basis of his study, Berdahl suggested that state-

level-board activities should primarily be in substantive vice

procedural areas. These proper areas were basically those often

mentioned previously: planning, program review and approval, budget

review, and capital outlay review. Procedural controls, on the other

hand, he saw as more deleterious to education than valuable to

efficiency. Thus, he decried overly binding line-item budgets,

preaudits, central purchasing and personnel arrangements, and other

intrusions into internal institutional management. He did consider

necessary, however, state-board actions affecting procedure when they

were required in support of the substantive functions above, for

example, postaudits, the setting of budget format, and defining

standard measures for data reporting.

In the same year, Hefferlin (1971) took another approach to

reach similar ends. He suggested that the concept of professional-

ism could serve as a basis for determining the proper governance role

of state-level boards, and especially their staffs, relative to the

governance role to be reserved to the institutions. From the viewpoint

of professionalism, laymen decide upon the results the professionals

should produce while the professionals then figure out how to reach

these results. However, exactly how state-level staff and board

members fit into this concept is not clear. As Hefferlin pointed

out:

On the one hand, to the legislator and the governor
they are professionals. As such, they must recommend
policies for adoption; but decisions about these
policies rest with elected officials while alternatives
for implementing them remain with the board. On the
other hand, in dealing with individual institutions,
the planner and the board are not professionals,
knowledgeable about separate campuses and their opera-
tion; they are laymen, and they must leave the means of
attaining results up to campus experts. (p. 58)

From this point of view, the state-board/institution relationship

again leaves, as suggested by Berdahl, the state board making

substantive decisions and the colleges making procedural ones. But

Hefferlin's analysis revealed a sticking point. From the state

government's perspective, state boards are assigned responsibility

for results and are delegated the authority as professionals to

exercise this responsibility; yet, when applied to the state-board/

institution relationship, the professionalism concept, at least at

first glance, largely robs the state board and its staff of the

authority required by their responsibility. Thus, Hefferlin's

article added little to contemporary recommendations regarding

state-board versus college governance roles, but perhaps it did

contribute, without fully recognizing it, to an appreciation of

the complexity of the dilemma.

Balderston (1971) looked first at the advantages and disadvan-

tages state coordination held for institutions and then from this

base commented on a proper state-level role. Chapter One contained

Balderston's stated advantages and disadvantages, but very briefly,

he saw state coordination as bringing a desirable stability to the

environment in which colleges must operate through its master planning

and budget-review functions, as serving as an efficient distributor

of state-wide data it has gathered and of funds (especially Federal),

and as having the potential to present effectively higher education's

case to the public and the government; however, he felt state boards

could easily upset institutional efficiency by interfering with

internal management and lessening internal morale, especially through

their program-review function. Basically Balderston recommended that

the state-board function in the same general areas suggested by

others; he strongly recommended, however, that in all of its activi-

ties a state board should be required to include strong institutional

participation in decision making. State-board powers, he felt, should

be clearly defined and limited.

Also in 1971, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education looked

at, as its study's subtitle stated, State Responsibility for Postsec-

ondary Education. Put very simply, they concluded that the state was

responsible for it but should not interfere with it. In this view,

the Commission suggested that the state board should act solely in

the areas of long-range planning and consulting, the latter apparently

being defined as giving advice to the colleges and the state govern-

ment. Fortunately, the Commission took a closer look at state-board

functions in 1973, and this time they came up with one of the more

concrete sets of guidelines that exist.

In this 1973 statement, the Commission acknowledged both the

importance and inexorable growth of state power over institutions of

higher education and even shied away, unnecessarily it seemed, from

using the word autonomy in reference to the state/institution

relationship. They suggested that the connotations of autonomy were

too strong and instead preferred to talk in terms of institutional

independence in certain areas, specifically citing aspects of

"intellectual conduct," "academic affairs," and "administrative

arrangements" (p. 18). Briefly, this independence amounted to

preserving traditional academic freedom, providing the schools wide

latitude in the design of program and course content and methodology,

and allowing college administrations considerable internal freedom

in fiscal and personnel management. Based upon this foundation, the

Commission then tabulated, matched in comprehensiveness and concrete-

ness only by the guidelines of Glenny et al. (1971), responsibilities

falling to the state and its board and to the institutions and their

boards. They suggested the state should have rather strong power in

some of the traditional areas within master planning, especially

relative to size and growth. Thus they recommended state-level

decisions regarding subsystem and institutional role and scope, the

establishment of new campuses and major program areas (such as a new

college within a university), and size controls directly and through

control of the total number of admissions, student mix by level, and

subsystem admission standards. They recommended institutional

independence in individual admissions, faculty selection, and course

content and academic standards for courses and programs. In

contrast to Glenny and most others noted earlier, they also suggested

that institutions be free to develop new programs falling within

assigned role and scope. In a similar view, they felt innovation by

the colleges should be encouraged, but not mandated, by the state-

level board through advice, grants, and funding incentives; however,

decisions on the actual implementation of these innovations should

still be made by the institutions. Regarding budgetary and fiscal

concerns, the Commission made recommendations that again followed the

pattern set above. They considered state-level responsibilities to

be determining the level of institutional appropriations and evaluat-

ing the effectiveness of institutional use of these funds. Accordingly,

they recommended funding in both the operational- and capital-budget

areas primarily on the basis of formulas. On the other hand, intra-

institutional budgeting was seen as a role of the campus administra-

tion. Likewise, the assignment and use of personnel and the design

and utilization of facilities were considered institutional responsi-

bilities. State-level evaluation of these campus decisions was seen

as appropriate on a postaudit, vice a preaudit, basis. In order to

carry out this evaluative function, the state would set the standards

to be used and the accounting methods required. The Commission departed

from these basic guidelines only to recommend state control over the

general level of salaries, but again, deciding upon individual

salaries was considered a campus activity. In short, the commission

discouraged state budget review on a line-item basis other than in

postaudits. Overall, then, the Commission recommended state-level

powers in terms of setting the basic parameters within which the

campus leadership would be free to operate in the manner it considered

most satisfactory.

Meanwhile, in 1972 J. L. Miller had suggested what might be

seen as a "federal" approach to the allocation of power in higher

education. In his view, state-level boards should be granted only

those responsibilities that can be effectively exercised only by an

organization with a state-wide outlook, and all other powers should

be reserved for the institutions. While this concept is noteworthy,

its application resulted in a division of powers basically correspond-

ing to those set forth previously. Thus, he saw necessary state-level

activities to be centered around long-range planning and the oversight

of the implementation of such planning. Specific powers required to

carry out the above included making institutional role assignments

and reviewing and recommending to the state government college operating

budgets and, to a degree, capital budgets. Unlike the Carnegie

Commission but like most other observers, he believed the state-level

board needed the authority to review new programs in the colleges.

His opinion regarding the review of existing college programs was

more tentative. He felt it often unduly antagonized the institutions

yet suggested it was very probably necessary in order to complement

and insure the integrity of the board's authority for new-program

review. Reflecting the ideas of Hefferlin (1971) and others, he

considered institutional power to be characterized as deciding upon

the most appropriate means by which to fulfill the objectives assigned