Relativist” Ratzinger

The Italian Constitutional Court and Mgr. Gänswein have presented a volume on reason and law in Benedict XVI’s speeches to the President of the Italian Republic

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Pubblicato il
31/01/2014

Ultima modifica il 01/02/2014 alle ore 15:35

A secular, non fideistic approach that is light years away from any kind of fundamentalism. A sign of clear appreciation for liberal democratic tradition and a celebration of reason and of a healthy relativism in terms of worldly choices. This and much more is contained in the speeches of the theologian Joseph Ratzinger-turned Pope Benedict XVI, as emerges in the book “La legge di Re Salomone” (“The Law of King Solomon”) published by Italian publishing house BUR and edited by Marta Cartabia (a constitutional court judge) and Andrea Simoncini. The President of the Constitutional Court Gaetano Silvestri, the Prefect of the Papal Household Georg Gänswein and jurists Franco Viola and Francesco D’Agostino presented the book in the Quirinal Palace (the residence of the Italian President) yesterday afternoon.

It contains a preface by the President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, who recalls “the “similar inclination” they had “for calm, free and respectful dialogue” and the “generational similarities” between them given their first hand experience of the historical events of the 1900s. They also both identified with what constituted the foundation of European culture at the time: a politics enlightened by history and reason which did not wish to exclude religion from the public sphere. From the various essays contained in the book, emerges a big question mark concerning the basis of Western legal thought seen against other cultural and anthropological traditions and what sets Christians a part from other religions: For Christians there is no such thing as a revealed law, a legal system that derives from a revelation. Instead, they see nature and reason as the real sources of law.

As Benedict XVI said in his speech at Westminster Hall in September 2010, “the Catholic tradition maintains that the objective norms governing right action are accessible to reason, prescinding from the content of revelation. According to this understanding, the role of religion in political debate is not so much to supply these norms, as if they could not be known by non-believers – still less to propose concrete political solutions, which would lie altogether outside the competence of religion.”

In his book “Fede, verità e tolleranza” (“Faith, truth and tolerance”), the then Cardinal Ratzinger wrote: “Therefore, a liberal society would be a relativist society: Only with that condition could it continue to be free and open to the future. In the area of politics, this concept is considerably right. There is no one correct political opinion … However, with total relativism, everything in the political area cannot be achieved either. There are injustices that will never turn into just things (such as, for example, killing an innocent person, denying an individual or groups the right to their dignity or to life corresponding to that dignity) while, on the other hand, there are just things that can never be unjust.”

In “La legge di Re Salomone” these points are rediscovered or in some cases discovered for the first time given that this was not the cliché attached to the figure and teachings of Joseph Ratzinger – and this was partly due to the media’s tendency to simplify. The President of the Constitutional Court underlined this, speaking of the reciprocal “purifying” action going on between Catholic doctrine and lay thought. Silvestri focused on the basis of values, recalling that “principles cannot be rooted in authority, instead authority must be rooted in principles.” “Even if Italians voted unanimously in favour of the racial laws, it would not make them legitimate,” the president said, picking up on Ratzinger’s comments about the impossibility of making injustices just.

Archbishop Georg Gänswein explained that “the passionate defence of a return to natural law is at the heart of Benedict XVI’s thought.” Because of legal positivism, in the last half century natural law was seen as a Catholic doctrine when it is in fact a collective way of thinking that represents European legacy. “Reason needs religion but religion also needs the clarity of reason so as not to risk sectarianism or fundamentalism. Natural law is the ability to distinguish between good and evil and nature’s language is the language of reason that opens our eyes to God the Creator.

Professor Franco Viola, a legal philosopher, spoke of two “idols” existing in the post-Christian world: on the one hand there is “scientism” which is based on the “inert objectivity of facts”; on the other hand is “subjectivism, which is based on an indisputable conscience and complete subjectivity”. He stressed the originality of Ratzinger’s approach in the way he treats the relationship between reason and law. “The Christian faith is an option for the rational and Christianity’s real enemy is not atheism (which carries a positive seed against idols and overly human beliefs) but the elimination of the very idea of truth, the refusal of the very idea of taking care of the being,” nihilism in other words. Benedict XVI rejects the separation between critical reason and tradition and it should be stressed that critical reason is also being kept alive as long as the umbilical cord is not severed: reason alone does not mean only reason. Ratzinger “does not say legal positivism is wrong, he just says it’s partial,” the professor concluded.

Finally, Professor D’Agostino, President of the Italian Catholic Jurists, highlighted the importance and originality of the essay collection, focusing on one that was written by the Muslim, Wael Farouq. Farouq comments on Ratzinger’s speeches, presents natural law from an Islamic perspective. “The different and sometimes contrasting approaches that emerge in the book are indicative of the richness of Ratzinger’s thought,” D’Agostino said. Following on from what President Silvestrini said at the start, the professor said “fundamental principles” are “absolute” and are therefore not subject to majority voting: “law carries within it a vocation for the absolute.”