Chien-Ling Liu: Thinking Genderhttp://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=967#p9329
THINKING GENDER 2015, UCLA Center for the Study of Women<br>Call for presentations: <strong>Power, Contested Knowledge, and Feminist Practices</strong><br><br>How have feminist approaches altered the existing understanding of scientific knowledge and practices? Celebrating the 25th Annual Graduate Student Research Conference at the UCLA Center for the Study of Women, Thinking Gender 2015 invites submissions for individual papers, pre-constituted panels, and posters on topics that focus on the participation and/or contribution of marginalized individuals or groups who have been historically excluded from knowledge production. We welcome papers and posters—across all disciplines and historical periods—that engage with the concept of the body as a contested site intersecting with gender, race, sexuality, and identity and how it is related to certain agencies in particular contexts. We invite scholarship engaging the following topics or others related to the conference theme of &quot;Power, Contested Knowledge, and Feminist Practices&quot;:<br><br>- The bodies of medicine<br>- Gender movement in contested spaces<br>- Construction and representations of bodies in the arts<br>- Faith and feminism<br>- Gender in conflict zones<br>- Technology and power<br>- Gender, cultures, and environmental crisis<br>- Consumerism in reproduction and maternal identities<br>- Gendered networks<br>- Gender disparities in sciences<br>- Language, communication, and gender<br>- Feminist epistemology<br><br>For submission guidelines, visit:<br>http://www.csw.ucla.edu/conferences/thinking-gender/thinking-gender-2015<br>Chien-Ling Liu2014-11-07http://philpapers.org/post/9329Philosophy of Gender, Race, and SexualitySamina Afridi: socialist feminism and essentialismhttp://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=964#p9230
Dear all, can anyone suggest me source material on anti-essentialism discussed from a socialist feminist perspective. I am trying to develop a framework incorporating anti-essentialist, socialist feminist approaches. &nbsp;Samina Afridi2014-10-22http://philpapers.org/post/9230Philosophy of Gender, Race, and SexualityNaomi Beecroft: Socially extended minds: gender, race and sexuality.http://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=945#p8658
<p>So I&#39;m currently writing my thesis, which Andy Clark is supervising, and all seems to be going well, but I was just wondering if people had any critical thoughts on the topic. My current abstract is below:<br><br></p><br><p>In The Extended Mind&nbsp;(1998, p18), Clark and Chalmers wrote that ‘‘As with any&nbsp;reconception&nbsp;of ourselves, [the extended mind] will have significant consequences. There are obvious consequences for philosophical views of the mind and for the methodology of research in cognitive science, but there will also be effects in the&nbsp;moral and social domains. It may be, for example, that interfering with someone’s environment will have the same moral significance as interfering with their person.’&nbsp;(my&nbsp;italics). Little has been done to explore the consequences in these so-called moral and social domains.&nbsp;Problematically, the Extended Mind&nbsp;literature tends to focus on the role of the immediate environment on cognition, typically demonstrating the crucial role that physical props, such as notebooks, Scrabble tiles, and computers play (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Kirsch 1995,&nbsp;Mclelland&nbsp;et al 1986, Kirsch and&nbsp;Maglio&nbsp;1994).&nbsp;</p><br><p>&nbsp;</p><br><p>&nbsp;</p><br><p>This paper intends to expand on the work of Shaun Gallagher&nbsp;(2013)&nbsp;and&nbsp;as such&nbsp;advocates&nbsp;for a socially extended mind&nbsp;in the hopes of resolving social and moral questions provoked by The Extended Mind Hypothesis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><br><p>&nbsp;</p><br><p>The Socially Extended Mind Hypothesis states that social affordances such as social norms and structures, not just the typically considered physical props,&nbsp;are constitutive of cognition. To justify a liberal interpretation of the Extended Mind Hypothesis I will, like Gallagher, tease apart Clark and Chalmers’ Parity Principle, allowing social affordances to pass a newly formed parity principle. The socially extended mind argues not simply that external tools are part of cognition, but that mental institutions are too.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><br><p>&nbsp;</p><br><p>A mental institution must:&nbsp;</p><br><ol><li><p>Includes cognitive practices that are produced in specific times and places.&nbsp;</p></li>
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<ol><li><p>Is activated in ways that extend our cognitive processes when we&nbsp;engage with them&nbsp;(that is, when we interact with, or are&nbsp;enactively&nbsp;coupled to them in the right way).&nbsp;</p></li>
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<p>(2013:p3)&nbsp;</p><br><p>&nbsp;</p><br><p>I hope to argue that patriarchal relations are such a mental institution, and that language is a key maintainer of these patriarchal relations. I will discuss exactly how language is&nbsp;used by patriarchy as a&nbsp;tool&nbsp;with which to subjugate women.&nbsp;Clark&nbsp;(2006)&nbsp;holds that by using language we create a cognitive niche&nbsp;(the materialization of thoughts via words that shapes our world and facilitates our existence); I intend to ask ‘who for?.&nbsp;I will discuss the ways in which language is gendered, and the&nbsp;consequences of this for women. I hold that the deeply misogynistic nature of language structures&nbsp;reduces a woman’s ability to be&nbsp;enactively&nbsp;coupled to her environment.&nbsp;Women are systematically disallowed and discouraged from effectively coupling themselves&nbsp;to&nbsp;the structures around them through the silencing and mocking&nbsp;of our linguistic contributions, and that these effects are exaggerated when considering women of colour, disabled women and queer women.&nbsp;If being coupled to one’s environment facilitates and augments cognition, then the decoupling effects of oppressively gendered language should be seen as an attack on women’s cognition, which, in turn, should be seen as an attack on one’s person.</p><br><br>Naomi Beecroft2014-08-18http://philpapers.org/post/8658Philosophy of Gender, Race, and SexualityStevan Harnad: EXISTENTIAL METRICShttp://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=920#p8166
<p>(1) That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace for those sentients existing and suffering today.</p>
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<p>(2) Whether it is better to have been or not to have been is a Cartesian koan I can ponder concrerning myself, but not one I have a right to decide concerning another sentient that is or has been; all the less right have I to create or support the creation of another sentient, out of nothing.</p>
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<p>(3) Pain and pleasure are incommensurable; only pain is pertinent to moral musings like these: No number of orgasms (for me) compensates for one fallen sparrow; and, again, the sparrow’s pains or solaces are not for me to weigh -- for the sparrow.</p>
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<p>(4) Christianity is particularly self-righteous and presumptuous on such questions, always ready to sanction temporal risk and suffering for the bodies of others for the salvation of their immaterial, immortal souls, <em>sub specie aeternitatis</em>.</p><br>Stevan Harnad2014-05-18http://philpapers.org/post/8166Dzung Nguyen: Postpatriarchyhttp://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=906#p8124
Abstract:<br><br>This article points out: “The combination of men and women in families
is irrational.” Men and women are two different “species.” They only
require sexual activities from each other, which are considered the less
time-consuming activities during their lives. Sex must be treated as an
enemy of marriage, due to its inferior and treacherous nature, and
should not be included in marriage. Men and women should not live
together in a family, since this institution must be understood as a
permanent place for all family members and is expected to have a solid
structure. The traditional family model is the result of men‟s
enslavement of women and the exaggeration of the role of sex. This model
creates an overwhelming advantage for men in selecting partners,
proposing marriage, and other family activities. This article indicates:
(i) The prominent family models existing between the group-marriage
period and now are sex-based family models. (ii) Technical and social
conditions nowadays require a new and sustainable base for a family. The
selected targets in this study are the consanguineous and sworn
relationships among same-sex people in case they choose to be
heterosexual, (and in turn, among opposite-sex persons when they engage
in homosexuality). For example, a family can consist of two blood
brothers (or sworn brothers or cousins) with their children, in case
they are heterosexual. This family model is named the non-sex based
family (NSBF) model, since the sexual needs will be met outside the
family. The article also outlines a post-patriarchal society with the
presence of NSBFs, and argues that the new model should be seen as an
essential development trend of society.
<br><br>Please read the full article here:<br><br>http://philpapers.org/rec/NGUP-2<br><br>Dzung Nguyen2014-03-20http://philpapers.org/post/8124Philosophy of Gender, Race, and SexualityTanuja Yelale: ethical problems in surrogacyhttp://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=777#p7298
Hi, am reading about surrogate motherhood. it seems to be a good option for those who are not able to give birth to their child for some or other reason. but is it really so. I think there are three parties&nbsp;involved in the issue. one is the couple who want a child,&nbsp;doctor and the woman who is ready to give birth to someone&nbsp;else&#39;s child. there are ethical relations between these three. which has to be taken into consideration. In India they call it surrogacy tourism or newly upcoming&nbsp;business. but I don&#39;t think so. giving birth to a baby cannot be business at any cost. I wont say that its a holy, pure&nbsp;religious act but this activity have some dignity and therefore cannot be looked at as money making business. but misuse&nbsp;&nbsp;of science have been an problem for long time and this is not an exception. As a student of philosophy can I look at the&nbsp;ethical aspects of the same. if yes from which perspective? is it&nbsp;OK&nbsp;if&nbsp;&nbsp;I use&nbsp;utilitarian theory to talk the positive side of the same.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Tanuja Yelale2012-09-24http://philpapers.org/post/7298Philosophy of Gender, Race, and SexualityGeraldina Gonzalez de la Vega: Repronormativity-http://philpapers.org/bbs/thread.pl?tId=718#p6484
I&#39;ve read recently Katherine M. Franke&#39;s paper, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism Law and Desire, in which she approaches the idea of repronormativity as a compulsory motherhood (parenthood actually, but she focuses on the feminist approach)&nbsp;In her paper Franke discusses how it is expected that women reproduce herselves and how this issue has been &quot;taken for granted&quot; in the femenist theory. She argues that not every woman actually wants to be a mother, and that this choice is actually like being heterosexual: social forces (heteronormativity) push women into motherhood.&nbsp;<br>A month ago the ECHR decided in a case&nbsp;<a href="http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=894729&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649">S.H.&amp;Others vs. Austria</a>&nbsp;that it is not against the European Convention on Human Rights to deny<strong>&nbsp;</strong>the use of ova of third person in In vitro fertilisation processes, the argument is that this could disrupt the &quot;normal&quot; development of the child because having two mothers can be specially awkward and it would pose many problems to establish kinship and parental rights.<br><br><br>This makes me wonder:<br>1) Should we continue to use the civil legal presumptions for motherhood or fatherhood?<br>The answer for this question can be no, if a person cannot naturally be a mother or a father then they should not be, there are lots of orphans that need parents.&nbsp;<br>This kind of thinking takes me to the repronormativity issue of Franke, but from the other side, it is expected that a woman can reproduce, if she can&#39;t then she should resign, for the benefit of the child.&nbsp;<br>And that takes me to the next question:<br>2) Is not this prohibition a kind of punishment for people that cannot reproduce themselves for not being naturally able to do it? Is it not an irrational fear of having to solve motherhood questions without a preconcieved rule like:&nbsp;<em>maxim mater est quam gestatio
demonstrat?&nbsp;</em><br><br>Is there really a problem?&nbsp;<br><em><br></em><br>I am still thinking about this question, but I find it quite interesting that more than 30 years after the first in vitro baby was born, we still have legal problems to solve and this particular issue is a problem where the IVF is actually regulated, in countries where IVF procedures are not regulated, the women are actually having children from ova of other women.&nbsp;<br>The problem is actually being just moved or postponed.<br><br><br>If you read spanish, I pose this question in a comment <a href="http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-treinta-y-siete-grados/2011/11/08/justiniano-vs-edwards/">HERE</a>&nbsp;<br><br><br><br>I&#39;d love to discuss it.&nbsp;<br>Geraldina Gonzalez de la Vega2011-12-04http://philpapers.org/post/6484Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality