Lend Momentum to Hong Kong's Democratization

Lend Momentum to Hong Kong's Democratization

In the
aftermath of a half-million-strong popular protest against strict
new anti-sedition laws, the resignation of two senior Hong Kong
cabinet officials on July 16 provides convincing evidence that Hong
Kong's political culture has the potential to withstand dictates
from China's leadership. Although, to date, the Bush Administration
and Congress have performed admirably in supporting Hong Kong's
pursuit of democratic ideals, the momentum of such a grassroots
movement towards democracy must be maintained. To this end, the
Administration and Congress should:

Support
democratization in Hong Kong through speeches and public
commentaries to educate the American public on the issue, lend
moral support to Hong Kong's citizens, and boost any reformist
sentiments that exist among China's leaders;

Encourage
Hong Kong democratic figures to visit the United States by
continuing to offer International Visitor Program (IVP) grants and
providing these leaders with top-level access to the Administration
and on Capitol Hill.

Highlighting
Hong Kong's democratization as a touchstone of U.S-China relations,
give expressions of hope for Hong Kong's pursuit of the ultimate
aim of universal suffrage, as promised in its Basic
Law.

Emerging
Discontent in Hong Kong
The present governing crisis in the Hong Kong "Special
Administrative Region" (SAR) of China came to a head on July 1 when
over a half-million of the SAR's 6 million citizens marched in
protest against strict new anti-sedition laws, the "Article 23"
legislation. The magnitude of the public outcry was a shock to
Beijing, which has not experienced such a grassroots rebellion
since China's budding democracy movement was brutally suppressed in
Tiananmen Square in June 1989 by Chinese People's Liberation
Army.

While no one would have expected the authoritarian regime in
Beijing to be sensitive to the political aspirations of Hong Kong's
people, it would seem that Hong Kong's own government should have
been aware of rising public discontent. Yet, Hong Kong's
Beijing-appointed chief executive, Mr. C.H. Tung, was deaf to the
demands of his own people, and this may ultimately lead to his
downfall. Following the removal of his two top aides, Mr. Tung
himself will make a "duty visit" to Beijing on July 19-20 to brief
the Chinese leadership about recent events.

Mixed Signals from Beijing
Within a week of the massive July 1 demonstration, continuing
protests gave a number of pro-Beijing members of Hong Kong's
legislative council reason to worry that their own political
legitimacy was in peril. One such politician flew to Beijing for
orders two days after the protest, only to be faced with a
political contest within China's own leadership. Chinese officials,
apparently loyal to China's new president Hu Jintao and new premier
Wen Jiabao-both considered "reformists" of a sort-said the Chinese
government had no particular interest in either the "content or the
timing" of the new Article 23 legislation. Meanwhile, Beijing's
propaganda ministry, which controls China's official state-run
media and whose loyalty appears to be to former president Jiang
Zemin, demanded that the anti-sedition legislation be passed as
written "on schedule."

With mixed signals from Beijing, Hong Kong's pro-China politicians
were in disarray. Several abandoned the government's attempts to
pass the controversial anti-sedition legislation, and one even
resigned from Chief Executive C.H. Tung's cabinet. With that
resignation and retreat, the bill faced certain defeat in the
legislature. Finally, on July 7, after a weekend of desperate but
fruitless negotiations with pro-Beijing politicians, Tung announced
that he would withdraw the legislation from consideration.

This was unprecedented. Never before in the SAR's six-year
history, had a government bill ever been halted by a public outcry.
In Beijing, the Communist Party Propaganda Department was aghast.
Immediately, the New China News Agency (Xinhua) exhorted Hong
Kong's lawmakers to ignore the demonstrations and "throw their
weight behind Tung's administration so that it could complete this
unshirkable historic mission in a timely fashion."

On July 12, Hong Kong newspapers reported that several Beijing
"observers" had been dispatched to the city to determine if
"outside forces'' may have helped mobilize the rallies on July 1 to
oppose the anti-sedition bill. On July 14, Beijing's official
China Daily published a commentary entitled "Conspiracy to
Subvert," which blasted the organizers of the July 1 march and, in
fevered rhetoric, declared that the demonstration has only
"alienated [the organizers] further from the masses," proclaiming
that "their popularity has been on the decline.'' In addition, the
official paper accused the SAR's democracy advocates of trying to
transplant "Western political systems to Hong Kong.'' But Beijing's
hot breath on Hong Kong's neck only further incensed the populace
and, on July 13, more demonstrations took place in the city. While
only 50,000 participated in these protests, the demonstrations were
still an impressive display of public outrage.

On July 16, Hong Kong's security secretary, Ms. Regina Ip,
resigned. Ms. Ip had led the campaign to pass the reviled
legislation and was, herself, much reviled in the Hong Kong's
still-free press, becoming a major liability to the chief
executive. Shortly after Ms. Ip's departure, another Tung
appointee, financial secretary Antony Leung, announced his
resignation, amid rumors that he was under investigation for
misusing his office for personal gain. Leung reportedly purchased a
luxury car just weeks before he ordered a hike in auto taxes. While
Leung's resignation was not directly related to the Article 23
controversy, it was evidence of deeper problems in Hong Kong's
executive branch: C.H. Tung's entire cabinet appeared to be
answerable only to Mr. Tung and not to the people.

U.S. Position on Hong Kong
The United States can take some credit for lending moral support to
the people of Hong Kong in their quest for democratization. In
1992, Congress passed the Hong Kong Policy Act, which grants Hong
Kong special trading status separate from China, exempts Hong Kong
from certain export controls that apply to China, and requires the
State Department to report regularly on Hong Kong's continued
separate identity from China under an arrangement that Beijing
calls "one country, two systems."

When the anti-sedition law was first bruited in 2002, the U.S.
government reacted swiftly through speeches by senior State
Department officials and confidential demarches to the Chinese
government. On July 16, the White House issued a strongly worded
statement, declaring flatly that "The United States opposes . . .
the current version of Article 23 legislation," and said "Like
Article 23, universal suffrage is enshrined in the Basic Law, and
Hong Kong's leaders should now pursue it with equal
industry."

In addition to the Administration's response, the U.S. Congress
has also been an active and important defender of Hong Kong's
liberties, passing the 1992 trade legislation and issuing several
subsequent expressions of concern, including stern resolutions on
June 16. While it may be undiplomatic for U.S. officials to
encourage the people of Hong Kong to continue their demonstrations
as the only effective method of making their voices heard, there
are other effective ways of conveying support for Hong Kong's quest
for democracy.

Commentary in the July 10 Wall Street Journal signed by
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, James A.
Kelly, "The Streets of Hong Kong," is a case in point. In this
commentary, Mr. Kelly stated, " Common sense suggests that people
should not have to take the extraordinary step of going into the
streets to convey their views to the government." Declaring that
the most effective means of implementing the will of the people is
"through the institutions of democracy," he observed that the July
1 demonstrations were proof of the "importance of acting now to
begin to move toward greater democracy in Hong Kong."

What the Administration and Congress Should Do

To support Hong Kong's grassroots movement towards democracy, the
Administration and Congress should take the following
steps:

Support
early democratization in Hong KongThrough speeches and public commentaries, senior Administration
officials, including the President, Vice President and Secretary of
State, must maintain the momentum behind U.S. policy, as
articulated by the State Department in its November 2002 statement
that a "democratically-elected government, answerable to the will
of the people, is the best way to ensure the protection of
fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong." Such a campaign would educate
the American public on the issue, lend moral support to Hong Kong's
citizens, and boost any reformist sentiments that may exist among
China's leaders.

Encourage
Hong Kong democratic figures to visit the United StatesThe United States should continue to provide International
Visitor Program (IVP) grants to Hong Kong's democratic figures, and
these leaders should be given top-level access to the
Administration and on Capitol Hill.

Highlight
Hong Kong's democratization as a touchstone of U.S-China
relations. Given that Beijing promulgated Hong Kong's "Basic
Law," it is clearly appropriate for U.S. leaders to express to
their Chinese counterparts the hope that Hong Kong will move
quickly toward the "ultimate aim" of "universal suffrage" that the
Law promises. The State Department and U.S. policymakers must
vocally oppose China's attempts to intimidate Hong Kong's
politicians through allegations that the movement toward democracy
was instigated through "foreign contacts" or "conspiracies to
subvert."