Libya: The general's reality check

It's not hard to fathom why the defence chief has shifted position on regime change in Libya

The Typhoon, in use over Libya, isn't as effective as Harriers jumpjets, which were dumped in the defence review. Photograph: Sipa Press / Rex Features Sipa Press / Rex Features/Sipa Press / Rex Features

When David Cameron, egged on by an enthusiastic Nicolas Sarkozy, placed Britain in the vanguard of military action against Muammar Gaddafi's forces, defence chiefs were less than thrilled. It is a mistake to believe that military commanders are always gung-ho to go to war, especially when there is no clear exit strategy.

General Sir David Richards, chief of defence staff, has made clear he is increasingly impatient with the lack of progress towards any political solution in Afghanistan. But there at least Cameron has clearly endorsed a military endgame – the end of British combat troops by 2015. In Libya, there is no end in sight to a campaign which is not succeeding in its UN-sanctioned aim to protect civilians. From the start, Richards and his staff were concerned that in the rush to war, the aims of military action had not been properly thought out. They were concerned in particular about suggestions that Gaddafi himself was a target.

While ministers expressed the hope that Gaddafi would flee, they were simultaneously saying he should be arraigned before the international criminal court – and yesterday, the ICC confirmed that it was seeking the arrest of Gaddafi and others for "widespread and systematic attacks" on civilians.

Nearly two months ago Liam Fox, the defence secretary, and William Hague, the foreign secretary, said Gaddafi was a "legitimate target". Intercepted by a BBC reporter after a meeting at No 10, Richards insisted Gaddafi was "absolutely not" a target for military action. He added: "It's not allowed under the UN resolution and it's not something I want to discuss any further." Downing Street "sources" were quickly quoted as saying that Richards was "simply wrong" to suggest a UN resolution would not allow Gaddafi to be targeted.

What explains his apparent shift? Britain's defence chiefs, under the shadows of Iraq and Afghanistan, are deeply worried they will be asked difficult questions about the campaign in Libya and its significance for the future.

What is the point in maintaining squadrons of Tornado jets and investing in Typhoons if two months and 300 bombs (the figure given by the MoD), have had no decisive impact? Richards must know that more useful in providing humanitarian relief was the frigate HMS Cumberland – which is being scrapped, a victim of the defence review. And that the Ark Royal and her Harrier jets, casualties of the same review, would have provided an effective and cheaper alternative to Tornados and Typhoons. Meanwhile the Obama administration, leaving the military operation to the Europeans, finds they are not up to it. No wonder Richards is frustrated.

Above all, the bombing of Libya demonstrates the limits of air power in what Gen Sir Rupert Smith, the former UN commander in Bosnia, calls "war amongst the people". In his book, The Utility of Force, Smith wrote of "the reality in which the people ... are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere, with civilians around, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets … as much as an opposing force."

Richards knows all too well that this is closer to the reality in Libya than the cold war battlefields which Tornados and Typhoons were designed for.