I argue that perceptual confidences (the analysis of perceptual experience in terms of incremental states like credences) are not motivated by phenomenal considerations, and that perceptual phenomenology may count against it. On the face of it, the analysis might seem to be better motivated by considerations about Bayesian perceptual processing, but I argue that any motivation in the vicinity comes from contentious bridge principles about the relationship between pre-conscious processing and perceptual experience, rather than considerations about processing itself.

2. The epistemology of perceptual inference

I identify two epistemic problems that can arise if inferences to perception make an epistemic impact on perceptual experience, and argue for a disjunction of solutions.

3. Inference without reckoning

What would inference have to be like, if perceptual experience could be conclusions of inference? I argue that it would have to occur without a conscious representation on the part of subject that the conclusion is supported by the premises, and without guaranteed awareness on the part of the subject of why she drawing the conclusion she reaches. I discuss the family of responses to information to which inference of this kind belongs