No One Should Have Sole Authority to Launch a Nuclear Attack

In just five minutes an American
president could put all of humanity in jeopardy. Most nuclear security
experts believe that's how long it would take for as many as 400
land-based nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal to be loosed on enemy
targets after an initial “go” order. Ten minutes later a battalion of
underwater nukes could join them.

That unbridled power is a frightening prospect no matter who is
president. Donald Trump, the current occupant of the Oval Office,
highlights this point. He said he aspires to be “unpredictable” in how
he might use nuclear weapons. There is no way to recall these missiles
when they have launched, and there is no self-destruct switch. The act
would likely set off a lethal cascade of retaliatory attacks, which is
why strategists call this scenario mutually assured destruction.

With the exception of the president, every link in the U.S. nuclear
decision chain has protections against poor judgments, deliberate misuse
or accidental deployment. The “two-person rule,” in place since World
War II, requires that the actual order to launch be sent to two separate
people. Each one has to decode and authenticate the message before
taking action. In addition, anyone with nuclear weapons duties, in any
branch of service, must routinely pass a Pentagon-mandated evaluation
called the Personnel Reliability Program—a battery of tests that assess
several areas, including mental fitness, financial history, and physical
and emotional well-being.

There is no comparable restraint on the president. He or she can
decide to trigger a thermonuclear Armageddon without consulting anyone
at all and never has to demonstrate mental fitness. This must change. We
need to ensure at least some deliberation before the chief executive
can act. And there are ways to do this without weakening our military
responses or national security.

This is not just a reaction to current politics. Calls for a bulwark
against unilateral action go back more than 30 years. During the Reagan
administration, the late Jeremy Stone, then president of the Federation
of American Scientists, proposed that the president should not be able
to order a first nuclear strike without consulting with high-ranking
members of Congress. Such a buffer would ensure that actions that could
escalate into world-destroying counterattacks would not be taken
lightly. Democratic legislators recently introduced a law that would
require not just consultation but congressional support for a preemptive
nuclear attack. Whether or not that seems like the best check on
presidential nuclear power is a matter for Congress.

We already know that second-check plans would not compromise American
safety. Security experts used to worry that a hair-trigger launch was
needed to deter a first strike by an enemy: our instant reactions would
ensure that our opponent would feel catastrophic consequences of
aggression. In the modern world, that is no longer the case. The U.S.
has enough nukes in enough locations—including, crucially, our roving,
nuclear-armed submarines—that nuclear strategists now agree it would not
be possible to take out all of the nation's weapons with a first
strike. The Pentagon, in a 2012 security assessment, said the same
thing. It noted that even in the unlikely event that Russia launched a
preemptive attack on the U.S.—and had more nuclear capability than
current international agreements allow for—it “would have little to no
effect on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities.” That conclusion
suggests that we will have ample firepower even if two or more people
discuss how to use it.

We have come close to nuclear war in the past because of
misidentified threats, including an incident in 1979 in which computers
at a military command center in Colorado Springs wrongly reported the
start of a major Soviet nuclear offensive. Ballistic and nuclear bomber
crews immediately sprang into action. Crisis was averted only after
satellite data could not corroborate the warning, and American forces
finally stood down. In our March issue, Scientific American called for taking the U.S. nuclear arsenal off high alert because of this and other such near misses.

Taking the arsenal off high alert is an important step. But putting
another check into the system—removing one person's unfettered ability
to destroy the world—will create another essential, lasting safeguard
for the U.S. and the planet.

This article was originally published with the title "Nuclear War Should Require a Second Opinion"

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About Me

This is a blog about what interests me. Here you will find stories on animals, including animal rights material, cute stuff, and random informative posts about weird, beautiful and interesting creatures. Horses, Spotted Hyenas, and Border Collies will make regular appearances.
Also prominently featured will be posts about the Arts. Animation, photography, and the traditional forms, plus "outsider art," film and books.
Other things that will surface here are Japan & the Japanese, John Oliver, surfing, skateboarding and My Little Pony: Friendship Is Magic, interesting places and structures,and my own art, writing and photography.
There will be rants. It's an election year, and I am beginning to have a political dimension to my personality. I am also horrified at the level of injustice and violence visited upon people here in the US and elsewhere - particularly against people of color, immigrants, and the LGBT community. Some of these stories will be very hard to read, but I believe we must read them to keep ourselves mindful of the racist and vicious things that happen every day, to speak out when we see discrimination, and root out its evil from ourselves.