Authors:Bradley S.Pages: 639 - 661Abstract: ABSTRACTIn a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a view of scientific rationality gives a precise interpretation of what Thomas Kuhn thought. 1 Introduction2 Okasha’s Argument3 Rationality Can Be Silent4 Arrow Undermined5 The Informational-Basis Escape6 Theory Choice at the Level of the Individual Scientist7 Kuhn Vindicated8 Trade-offs and Partial Commensurability9 ConclusionPubDate: 2016-02-05DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv063Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Statham G.Pages: 663 - 688Abstract: ABSTRACTContrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, discussions of these accounts have neglected important questions, including how the context determines the contrasts (or defaults), and what shared knowledge is necessary for this to be possible. I address these questions, using organic chemistry as a case study. Focusing on one example—nucleophilic substitution—I show that the kinds of causal claims that can be made about an organic reaction depend on how the reaction is modelled, and argue that paying attention to the various ways that reactions are modelled has important implications for our understanding of causation. 1 Introduction2 General Contrastive Causal Claims in Organic Chemistry3 Deviant Causal Claims in Organic Chemistry4 Nucleophilic Substitution Reactions5 The Causal Modelling Tradition5.1 The type/token distinction6 Competing Reactions6.1 Type- and token-causal claims, variables, and values of variables7 Disambiguation of ‘Reaction’8 Reaction Kinds9 Specific Reactions9.1 Specific reactions and token-causal claims9.2 Specific reactions and type-causal claims10 Implications10.1 Kinds of causal claim10.2 Contrastive and deviant causal claims10.3 Model relativityPubDate: 2016-02-15DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv059Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Belot G.Pages: 689 - 702Abstract: ABSTRACTBayesians often assume, suppose, or conjecture that for any reasonable explication of the notion of simplicity a prior can be designed that will enforce a preference for hypotheses simpler in just that sense. But it is shown here that there are simplicity-driven approaches to curve-fitting problems that cannot be captured within the orthodox Bayesian framework. 1 Introduction2 A Curve-Fitting Problem3 No Bayesian Polly4 Prospects for a Generalized Bayesian Polly4.1 Imprecise credences4.2 Merely finitely additive probability measures4.3 Hierarchical Bayesianism4.4 Primitive conditional probabilities4.5 Infinitesimal-valued probability measures5 How Damaging'5.1 Who cares about Polly'5.2 Who cares about this curve-fitting problem'5.3 Who cares about curve-fitting'PubDate: 2016-02-05DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv061Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:van Fraassen BC; Halpern JY.Pages: 725 - 743Abstract: ABSTRACTFor changing opinion, represented by an assignment of probabilities to propositions, the criterion proposed is motivated by the requirement that the assignment should have, and maintain, the possibility of matching in some appropriate sense statistical proportions in a population. This ‘tracking’ criterion implies limitations on policies for updating in response to a wide range of types of new input. Satisfying the criterion is shown equivalent to the principle that the prior must be a convex combination of the possible posteriors. Furthermore, this is equivalent to the requirement that prior expected values must fall inside the range spanned by possible posterior expected values. The tracking criterion is liberal; it allows for, but does not require, a policy such as Bayesian conditionalization, and can be offered as a general constraint on policies for managing opinion over time. Examples are given of non-Bayesian policies, both ones that satisfy and ones that violate the criterion. 1 Introduction2 Alternative Updating Policies3 Modelling the Situation for Normal Updating4 Tracking: A Criterion for Updating Policies5 Tracking: Precise Formulation and Relation to Convexity6 The Spanning Criterion7 Non-Bayesian Policies that Satisfy the Spanning and Tracking Criteria8 Policies that Violate the Spanning and Tracking Criteria AppendixAppendix PubDate: 2016-02-15DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv027Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Kaiser MI; Krickel B.Pages: 745 - 779Abstract: ABSTRACTThe central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena (that is, of phenomena that are explained in constitutive mechanistic explanations). After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis of this notion, we will clarify what distinguishes constitutive mechanistic explanations from etiological ones. 1 Introduction2 Criteria of Adequacy2.1 Descriptive adequacy2.2 Constitutive–etiological distinction2.3 Constitution3 The Ontological Nature of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena3.1 Phenomena as input–output relations3.2 Phenomena as end states3.3 Phenomena as dispositions3.4 Phenomena as behaviours4 Phenomena as Object-Involving Occurrents4.1 What object-involving occurrents are and why we need them4.2 The object in the phenomenon4.3 The adequacy of option (5)5 ConclusionPubDate: 2016-02-19DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv058Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Jansson L; Tallant J.Pages: 781 - 803Abstract: ABSTRACTOur aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration. 1 Introduction2 Three Desiderata2.1 Limiting2.2 Robustness2.3 Breadth2.3.1 A limited success for Baker2.3.2 Rejecting Baker’s analysis2.4 The proposal3 Probabilistically Additive Hypotheses and a (Sort of) Bayesian Account: The Limpid Rationale Relativized and Reconsidered3.1 Neutrinos and beta decay3.2 Avogadro’s hypothesis3.3 Postulation of Neptune4 ConclusionPubDate: 2016-02-22DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv064Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Massin O.Pages: 805 - 846Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article defends a realist account of the composition of Newtonian forces, dubbed ‘residualism’. According to residualism, the resultant force acting on a body is identical to the component forces acting on it that do not prevent one another from bringing about the body's acceleration. Several reasons to favour residualism over alternative accounts of the composition of forces are advanced: (i) Residualism reconciles realism about component forces with realism about resultant forces, while avoiding any threat of causal over-determination. (ii) Residualism provides a systematic semantics for the term ‘force’ within Newtonian mechanics. (iii) Residualism allows us to precisely apportion the causal responsibility of each component force in the ensuing acceleration. (iv) Residualism handles special cases such as null forces, single forces, and antagonistic forces in a natural way. (v) Residualism provides a neat picture of the causal powers of forces. Each force essentially has two causal powers—the power to bring about accelerations (sometimes together with other co-directional forces) and the power to prevent other forces from doing so—exactly one of which is manifested at a time. (vi) Residualism avoids commitment to unobservable effects of forces, namely, forces cause either stresses (tensile or compressive) or accelerations. 1 Introduction2 Component Forces or Resultant Ones'2.1 Component forces versus resultant forces2.2 Two problems for generous realism3 Against Frugality (1): Semantic Unsystematicity3.1 The semantic problem for frugal resultant realism3.1.1 Do partial laws bear on resultant forces'3.1.2 Do partial laws bear on dispositions distinct from forces'3.2 The semantic problem for frugal component realism3.2.1 Does the second law bear on sets of component forces'3.2.2 Does the second law bear on individual component forces'4 Against Frugality (2): Causal Responsibility4.1 Apportioning causal responsibility4.2 Causal responsibility versus frugality5 Primivitism about Vectorial Composition5.1 Primitive vectorial composition5.2 First objection: causal responsibility5.3 Second objection: null forces6 Residualism6.1 Residualism introduced6.2 Residualism at work6.2.1 Antagonistic forces acting on a body6.2.2 Single force acting on a body6.2.3 Co-directional forces acting on a body6.2.4 Opposite forces acting on a body6.2.5 Two non-colinear forces acting on a body6.2.6 Three or more non-colinear forces acting on a body6.3 Residualism under stress6.3.1 Ad hoc'6.3.2 Circular'6.3.3 Inconsistent'6.3.4 Costly'7 ConclusionPubDate: 2016-02-17DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv048Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Shogenji T.Pages: 847 - 874Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article aims to achieve two things: to identify the conditions for transitivity in probabilistic support in various settings, and to uncover the components and structure of the mediated probabilistic relation. It is shown that when the probabilistic relation between the two propositions, x and z, is mediated by multiple layers of partitions of propositions, the impact x has on z consists of the purely indirect impact, the purely bypass impact, and the mixed impact. It is also shown that although mediated confirmation as a whole is not transitive, the indirect part of mediated confirmation is transitive. 1 Introduction2 The Structure of the Mediated Probabilistic Relation3 Transitivity and Anti-transitivity4 Bypass Disconfirmation5 Horizontal Generalization6 Coarse Screens7 Vertical Generalization8 ConclusionAppendix PubDate: 2016-01-29DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv053Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Martens J.Pages: 875 - 905Abstract: ABSTRACTIn social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own (expected) reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms ([1994], [1996]) and Elliott Sober ([1998]), who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, Savage’s model ([1954])—can actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences (due to manipulative behaviours) affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. 1 Introduction2 When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways3 A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms4 Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization5 Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs6 Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model6.1 Reciprocity and partner choice6.2 Coercion and manipulation7 ConclusionAppendix PubDate: 2016-06-27DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axw003Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Wüthrich C; Callender C.Pages: 907 - 925Abstract: ABSTRACTUnlike the relativity theory it seeks to replace, causal set theory (CST) has been interpreted to leave space for a substantive, though perhaps ‘localized’, form of ‘becoming’. The possibility of fundamental becoming is nourished by the fact that the analogue of Stein’s theorem from special relativity does not hold in CST. Despite this, we find that in many ways, the debate concerning becoming parallels the well-rehearsed lines it follows in the domain of relativity. We present, however, some new twists and challenges. In particular, we show that a novel and exotic notion of becoming is compatible with causal sets. In contrast to the localized becoming considered compatible with the dynamics of CST by its advocates, our novel kind of becoming, while not answering to the typical A-theoretic demands, is global and objective. 1 Introduction2 The Basics of Causal Set Theory3 Facing the Same Dilemma'4 Taking Growth Seriously5 ConclusionPubDate: 2016-02-10DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv040Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2016)

Authors:Sober E; Steel M.Pages: 617 - 638Abstract: ABSTRACTDarwin claims in the Origin that similarity is evidence for common ancestry, but that adaptive similarities are ‘almost valueless’ as evidence. This second claim seems reasonable for some adaptive similarities but not for others. Here we clarify and evaluate these and related matters by using the law of likelihood as an analytic tool and by considering mathematical models of three evolutionary processes: directional selection, stabilizing selection, and drift. Our results apply both to Darwin’s theory of evolution and to modern evolutionary biology. 1 Introduction2 The Likelihood Framework3 A Sufficient Condition for a Similarity to Favour Common Ancestry over Separate Ancestry4 The 1/p Criterion and Its Limitations5 Directional Selection versus Drift6 Stabilizing Selection versus Drift7 Going beyond Two Taxa8 ConclusionsAppendix PubDate: 2015-11-14DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv052Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2015)

Authors:Mitchell SD; Gronenborn AM.Pages: 703 - 723Abstract: ABSTRACTIt has long been held that the structure of a protein is determined solely by the interactions of the atoms in the sequence of amino acids of which it is composed, and thus the stable, biologically functional conformation should be predictable by ab initio or de novo methods. However, except for small proteins, ab initio predictions have not been successful. We explain why this is the case and argue that the relationship among the different methods, models, and representations of protein structure is one of integrative pluralism. Our defence appeals to specific features of the complexity of the functional protein structure and to the partial character of representation in general. We present examples of integrative strategies in protein science. 1. Introduction2. Partiality of Representation3. Protein Functional Complexity4. Modelling Protein Structure4.1 Integrating ab initio and experimental models4.2 Integrating multiple experimental models5. ConclusionPubDate: 2015-11-27DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axv051Issue No:Vol. 68, No. 3 (2015)