German Chancellor Angela Merkel has emerged with the largest party in Germany’s national election but has lost well over a million voters as the anti-mass migration Alternative for Germany (AfD) has come a solid third in the race, beating previous expectations.
Ms Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) were always expected to win this year’s German national election but few predicted that the CDU would have its worst electoral showing since 1949. Merkel herself expressed disappointment at the result but vowed to continue to govern Germany, likely with new coalition partners.
The Social Democrats (SPD) under former European Union parliament president Martin Schulz did even worse, scoring only 20 percent of the vote according to exit polls from German public broadcaster ARD. The result is the worst in the party’s history since the Second World War.

Martin Schulz, who many saw as lacklustre during his televised debate with Merkel, has vowed to stay on and fight “right-wing extremism” in the German Bundestag. Schulz also announced that he would not seek to renew the “grand coalition” between the SPD and the CDU claiming that he did not want to see the populist anti-mass migration Alternative for Germany (AfD) become the biggest opposition party.

The only party enjoying a decisive improvement in fortunes in the election is the AfD who entered parliament for the first time with a projected 13.5 percent or around 88 seats in the Bundestag.

Why Europeans Oppose the Russia Sanctions Bill

7/17/17

from The Wall Street Journal,

7/16/17:

It imperils the Continent’s energy security and would end up benefiting Moscow.

The U.S. Senate was almost unanimous—98-2—when it passed a bill updating and expanding the sanctions regime against Russia. Congress has every right to make a strong statement on Russia’s alleged interference in last year’s presidential election. But this bill, which is awaiting a vote in the House, will not achieve its objectives and will instead cause new problems. Unless it undergoes significant revision, it would compromise European energy security and damage U.S. relations with Europe. The beneficiary of such an outcome would be Russia.
At risk is the joint stance the U.S. and Europe have maintained against Russia since it annexed Crimea in 2014. Every sanctions measure was assessed by American and European partners before enactment. Europe and the U.S. moved hand in hand to ensure that neither would exploit markets or business opportunities previously held by the other. This trans-Atlantic approach is now jeopardized by the Senate’s desire to impose additional sanctions unilaterally, without consultation and against the explicit will of the European Commission and key U.S. allies including Germany, France and Italy.
Even worse, the bill’s language suggests that it aims to advance U.S. commercial interests at Europe’s expense. Section 257 prioritizes “the export of United States energy resources to create American jobs”—which sounds to Europeans like an unfriendly political attempt to promote U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas to Europe.

One target of the bill is the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, involving both Russian and European companies. There are good arguments why Europe should diversify its gas supply, but the dependency fears around NS2 are exaggerated. Europe has taken decisive measures to boost supply security: constructing additional interconnectors and LNG terminals, employing reverse flow capabilities, and eliminating restrictive clauses on ultimate destinations. These measures make it difficult for Russia even to consider using energy as a weapon against Europe.
There is a vibrant debate in Europe about NS2 and the best way forward. Strong arguments, both pro and con, are being exchanged. The Polish and Ukrainian governments are concerned that the pipeline will compete against Russian gas flowing through pipelines in their territories. Some, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, propose to welcome all additional sources and supply routes of energy to Europe, including American LNG. Ideally, the market would decide the best course.

This is not a question that should be decided in Washington. It is a European issue, to be decided by Europeans based on European law and regulation. How would the U.S. react if Europe were to pass legislation on the merits of the Keystone XL pipeline, especially if it was perceived to benefit European business?

Our joint U.S.-European experience with sanctions affirms two longstanding lessons. First, sanctions work best when they are multilateral. Second, sanctions alone rarely achieve a national-security outcome. Ideally, they create leverage. They almost always presume a negotiation, where adjusting the sanctions can be part of a strategy for achieving a desired goal.

If the bill becomes law in its current form, it would alienate America’s important European allies, complicating our alliance at a critical moment. A better approach would be to revise the bill in line with realities and recommit to a joint trans-Atlantic approach.