Impartial Examiner V

18 June 1788

by

When a change, so momentous in it's nature, as that of new
modelling a plan of government, becomes the object of any people's
meditation, every citizen, whose mind is duly impressed with a regard
for the welfare of his country, will consider himself under an
indispensible obligation to make some such enquiries, as the
following.—Whence flows the necessity of a change?—Does it proceed
from certain vicious properties, which reside in the old system and
form the essential parts of it?—Or will such a measure become
eligible, because evils have arisen from the feeble texture of the
plan, or a loose exercise of government, which could not well be
avoided?—What are the evils complained of? and what will be their
correspondent remedies?—Are the evils radical, and not be removed but
by a general reform throughout the constitution?—Or do they result
from a defect in some particular branch only? and may an adequate
remedy be effected by introducing a new regulation merely as to that
branch?

If investigations like these are seriously and dispassionately
pursued, and it should be found that the present confederation of the
American states contains vicious properties, which are inherent,
fundamental, and tending to produce a general corruption, the
necessity of a change must then be manifest. This discovery will lead
to another enquiry; and that is—Do such properties pervade the whole
system and contaminate all the parts of it? If so—then a thorough
change will appear to be expedient, and it may be necessary to new
model the system.

If, on the other hand, evils are found existing, which proceed,
not so much from any internal corrupt qualities, as from the feeble
texture of any parts of the system, or a laxity in the exercise of
it's powers, it should seem adviseable to make alterations so far as
to add a due degree of strength to the weak parts, and thereby insure
efficacy in the government.

Should it appear, after a proper enquiry into the nature of the
evils, that they are radical, and strike at the vital principles of
the constitution—then to apply a correspondent remedy, an
institution, which would produce a general reform, might with great
propriety be deemed requisite.

If the defects are of a trivial nature, and subsist merely in
some particular department or branch of the system—then amendments in
the defective branch, tending to give energy where it had hitherto
been wanting, would be amply sufficient for removing the evils and
forming a competent remedy.

In order to discover how far the present system is vicious, or
inadequate to the purposes of this great confederated society, for
which it was established, a retrospect of the original design of the
confederacy itself may afford no small degree of assistance.—Let it
be recollected, then, that the primary object was to form a perfect
union. This is manifested by the very "stile of the
confederacy."—That it was intended to promote justice equally between
all the states cannot be doubted; because it is an institution,
calculated to unite a number of independent republics under a firm
league of amity, and to provide that contributions of every kind,
which had been, or might be, necessary towards supporting their
general government, should be furnished in due proportions—whilst it
was stipulated that a mutual intercourse and reciprocal privileges and
immunities should subsist between the citizens of all the several
states. Again, to ensure domestic tranquility must have been another
important object with the framers of this confederation: for union,
harmony and justice cannot fail to promote tranquility; and whenever a
contract is formed for the purpose of procuring the three first, it
follows, as a regular consequence, that the other should partake of
the intention.—This great association is expressly declared to be
entered into between the states "for their common defence, the
security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare,
binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to,
or attacks made upon, them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever."

The objects herein recited do certainly form the chief design of
the present confederation; and the same are declared to be the great
ends of the proposed plan of government. So far then do they agree. A
subject of much contention, however, and with which the minds of
different citizens are variously agitated, has arose.

It has been said that some of these advantages, and of high
import too, cannot be obtained under the present system. It is the
opinion of some citizens that the constitution proposed to us will
secure all these objects and form a complete remedy for every evil now
subsisting; whilst it is asserted by others that amendments might be
introduced in the former, which would be competent to every good
purpose, and promote some of very great consequence, that might be
endangered by an adoption of the latter. Thus it is inferred that this
system extends too far—and, like many human institutions, flits by a
rapid progress from one extreme to another.

Those, who cannot approve of this plan, have very strong
objections to it, because they apprehend that no security for their
liberties will remain after it's adoption: and although some of the
ends proposed might be obtained thereby; yet they think the sacrifice
will be too great for the benefit to be received. To enjoy a competent
degree of liberty they consider as the greatest of human
blessings—for the loss of which no acquisitions whatsoever can
compensate. They esteem this (and deservedly too) as the soul of all
political happiness.

It seems to be agreed on all sides that in the present system of
union the Congress are not invested with sufficient powers for
regulating commerce, and procuring the requisite contributions for all
expences, that may be incurred for the common defence or general
welfare. Hence arise the principal defects;—and it is presumed that
the evils resulting from these weak branches in the foederal
government might be adequately remedied by making due amendments
merely therein.

It is thought by some that the powers of making and enforcing
the observance of treaties are not ample enough at present. If
so—cannot these be enlarged so as to answer every desirable purpose
of that branch in the foederal institution? Thus, while many citizens
cannot think that the confederation is fundamentally vicious, but that
all the evils now complained of do rather proceed from a weakness in
some of its parts, they apprehend no necessity for an innovation
further than strengthening those parts. If such measures were
effectually established, they conceive that all the great ends of the
general government might be promoted.—No contention, therefore,
subsists about supporting a union, but only concerning the mode; and
as well those, who disapprove of the proposed plan, as those, who
approve of it, consider the existence of a union as essential to their
happiness.