05/08/03: (Information
Clearing House) Those who have hoped that a U.S. military victory
in Iraq would somehow bring about a more peaceful world are in for a
rude awakening. The final resolution of this war and the U.S.
occupation of Iraq will likely not be the end, rather, only the
prelude to a succession of future crises: in Kashmir, Syria, North
Korea, and Iran. This article will focus primarily on the latter case.

In the coming months the United States and its ally Israel will
either accede to the existence of an Iranian nuclear power program, or
take steps to prevent it. At the eye of the storm is Iranís
nuclear power plant at Bushehr, on the Gulf coast, currently under
construction. The reactor is scheduled for completion later this year.
Its nuclear fuel rods will then be delivered. By June 2004 it should
be fully operational. The controversial project has been in the works
for more than a quarter century. As it nears completion, tensions
between Iran and the U.S./Israel are sure to rise. Iran is a signatory
of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which affirms the right of
states in good standing to develop nuclear power for peaceful use.
Although there is no evidence Iran has yet violated the NPT, the U.S.
and Israel believe that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. This is the
crux of the problem. And two recently discovered Iranian nuclear
sites, at Arak and at Natanz,
have only heightened suspicions.

It is very possible--some would say probable--that the U.S.,
possibly in conjunction with Israel, will launch a
"preventive" raid and destroy the Bushehr reactor before it
goes on line. Such a raid would be fateful for the region and the
world. It would trigger another Mideast war, and possibly a
confrontation with Russia, with effects that are difficult to predict.
A war with Iran might bring about the collapse of the NPT, lead to a
new arms race, and plunge the world into nuclear chaos. Such a crisis
holds the potential to bring the world to the nuclear brink. This
article will review the background, and provide an analysis. I will
discuss the reactor at Bushehr first, then the other suspect sites.

The Reactor at Bushehr

The Bushehr nuclear plant has a long history. Launched in 1974, the
project was the showcase of the late Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. The
original plan called for the construction of two 1200-1300 megawatt
reactors on the southern Iran coast, side by side. The contractor was
the Siemens company, a well-known German firm. The project was 85%
finished at the time of the 1979 Iranian revolution, when work was
halted. During Iranís subsequent war with Iraq the unfinished
reactors were bombed repeatedly, and severely damaged. After the war
Iran attempted to persuade Siemens to finish the project, without
success, due to increased proliferation concerns and heavy U.S.
pressure on Germany.

U.S. support for the Shahís dictatorial regime undoubtedly set
the stage for the 1979 Islamic revolution, when radical students,
backed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, seized the U.S. embassy and held
American diplomats hostage for 444 days. The resulting break in
U.S.-Iran relations has never healed. During the 1981-1988 Iran-Iraq
war the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein, who was perceived as a bulwark
against revolutionary Shiíism, just as Hitler, many years before,
was mistakenly perceived by some in the West as a bulwark against
Soviet communism. Nevertheless, the U.S. supplied both sides with
arms. During the war, the U.S. policy was: let them destroy each
other--a policy that was unworthy of a Christian nation.

At the start of the Bush Presidency there were signs that relations
with Tehran might improve. Positive statements by Secretary of State
Colin Powell were reciprocated by Iranís foreign minister Kamal
Kharrazi. Then came Bushís "axis of evil" speech, which
dashed hopes of a thaw. The current U.S. policy of vilification has
been attributed to Pentagon hawks and to Israeli PM Ariel Sharonís
supporters in the Bush administration. Last November, Sharon called
upon the U.S. to bring about regime change in Tehran, after first
dealing with Iraq. (Mansour Farhang, "A
Triangle of Realpolitik" The Nation, March 17, 2003) And
similar statements have been made by rightist commentators in the U.S.
press.

The U.S. blocked several attempts by Iran to enlist a contractor to
complete the Bushehr reactor; until, finally, in 1995, after ten years
of shopping, Iran signed a $800 million deal with Victor Mikhailov,
chief of Minatom, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. The Russians
agreed to finish reactor-1, and have been on site ever since. The
project has been plagued by technical problems and repeated delays.
The Russian engineers were compelled to modify the original German
design. But, apparently, all of the problems have now been overcome,
and reactor-1, slightly downsized to 1000 Megawatts, is finally
nearing completion. It will go on line as early as December 2003. But
reactor-1 is only the beginning. Iran envisions as many as five
additional 1000 megawatt reactors. Iran has received nuclear
technology from China, Russia, and several other nations. But Russia
has been the principal supplier since the mid-90s .

The Russians have stubbornly resisted U.S. pressure to cancel the
project. Russia, perennially strapped for cash, desperately needs the
foreign exchange. One Minatom official claimed that the project had
already generated 20,000 Russian jobs, with the promise of more to
come. The Russians foresee an expanding nuclear relationship, and have
rejected U.S. enticements. Moscow clearly regards its commerce with
Iran as a matter of national pride/prestige.

Russia has also refused the U.S. demand for special inspections.
The Russians point out that the reactor will be subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. The IAEA visited
Bushehr and other suspect sites after the first Gulf War, and as
recently as February 2003, with no violations reported. Washington
remains unconvinced, however. While all of Iranís nuclear facilities
are subject to IAEA oversight, Iran has refused, thus far, to accept
the new safeguards introduced in 1993 to overcome past failings. The
strengthened protocols are "capable of detecting future Iraqs,"
according to Khidhir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist. Iranís
refusal has undermined confidence. (Khidhir Hamza, "Inside
Saddam's secret nuclear program," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, September/October 1998)

Russia did agree to drop the most objectionable part of the deal,
the transfer of gas centrifuge technology. The light water reactor
will be fueled with low enriched uranium (LEU) supplied by Russia. LEU
fuel is not suitable for bombs. Moscow also made another concession:
it agreed to return the reactorís spent fuel to Russia for storage.
This will greatly reduce the risk of a diversion of plutonium. To
allow for this the Russian government had to modify existing Russian
law. (Christine Kucia, "Russia, Iran Finalize Spent Fuel
Agreement," Arms Control Today, January/February 2003)

After failing to block the deal outright, President Clinton imposed
sweeping sanctions on Iran to prevent the sale of dual-use
technologies. Some of Iranís procurement activities had raised
eyebrows in Washington. The U.S. also lobbied others to join in the
embargo, with only limited success. Germany and France took umbrage at
the policy.

The Iranian government has flatly denied the charges of
proliferation. The Iranians have also protested the punitive U.S.
treatment, which they regard as a violation of their right under
article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop nuclear
power for peaceful use. In May 1995 Iranian President Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani told ABC News that Iran was not seeking nuclear
weapons. Rafsanjani challenged the critics to produce evidence of a
secret bomb program. As recently as December 2002 the current Iranian
president Mohammad Khatami stated that his countryís willingness to
return the spent fuel to Russia shows good faith, and demonstrates
that his country has no intention of developing nuclear weapons.
Iranian officials have stressed that the Bushehr reactor is urgently
needed to fill a shortfall of electric-generating capacity. Iran, like
other countries, needs electricity for development.

Israel and the U.S. have not been mollified. Israeli officials
questioned why Iran, blessed with an abundance of oil, needs reactors
for electrical generation. And recent statements by Secretary of State
Colin Powell echoed this theme. The point is well taken. Iranís
leaders are badly informed if they believe nuclear power is the
long-term solution to their energy needs. Nuclear power is
inappropriate for Iran for the same reasons that it is inappropriate
for any state, including the U.S. The reasons include the grave risks
of nuclear accidents and terrorism, as well as the unresolved waste
disposal problemónot to mention the diabolical possibility, however
remote, that spent fuel might be diverted for reprocessing and
bombmaking. The Iranians need to understand that such a diversion
would ultimately threaten them.

The U.S. Record

Nevertheless, the critics, especially those in the U.S., have
conveniently forgotten the central role the U.S. played over many
years in touting the "many peaceful applications of nuclear
energy." The critics need to be reminded that it was the U.S., no
one else, who, beginning in the 1950s, aggressively promoted the
miracle of cheap and inexhaustible nuclear energy for world economic
development. That "vision" was conceived in Washington, not
Tehran. Are we now to hold the Iranians responsible because the failed
U.S. policy succeeded too well? Are the Iranians to blame because they
internalized the false values that Washington strove mightily to
inculcate worldwide? The Iranians are not alone. In recent years China
and India have also purchased reactors from Russia. And China has even
begun exporting reactor technology. China and Russia are both driven
by the need for foreign exchange. In this they mirror past policy
decisions born in the U.S.A.

We must be honest about this. Despite the optimistic forecasts of
the early years, and the promises of an end to world poverty, the U.S.
Atoms for Peace program was not motivated by altruism. From the
outset, Washingtonís atomic program was driven by self-interest. The
U.S. nuclear industry figured to cash in on the "vision."
The export of safe and clean nuclear technology was to become a major
growth industry. Little or no thought, until much later, was given to
the dark underside, the grave risks and many hidden costs. No one
thought to ask whether the nuclear path itself might be the problem.
In the words of Amory Lovins, "Atoms for Peace was one of the
stupidest ideas of our time, conceived in a spirit of political
daydreaming, commercial euphoria, and scientific amnesia." In our
enthusiasm to promote nuclear we happily supplied know-how, including
research reactors, all with indirect military utility, to just about
anyone, including Israel, the Shah, and many others. If the "hard
path" still radiates prestige in world capitols, we in the U.S.
have only ourselves to blame. The heady promises of cheap, clean and
unlimited electricity for economic development have become sand in an
hourglass that is about to run out.

Had we in the U.S. wisely acknowledged that our commitment to
nuclear was a mistake, had we renounced the nuclear path, had we
launched a Manhattan Project, urgently needed, to convert the U.S.
economy to run on clean hydrogen fuel and other renewables, we would
now be in a position of world leadership. Unfortunately, it never
happened. One searches the U.S. record in vain for moral high ground.
The half-life of President Clintonís 1994 decision to supply North
Korea with two light-water reactors will haunt Washington for years to
come. Clintonís reactor deal with Pyongyang made a mockery of his
opposition to Russiaís similar assistance to Iran. Clintonís
policy position that Russian light-water reactors are dangerous, while
ours are safe, was laid to rest by a 1999 Congressional study which
revealed that the spent fuel from the reactors planned for North Korea
would not be as "proliferation resistant" as claimed.
Sufficient plutonium for as much as fifty bombs/year could be
extracted from the waste. Despite the report, construction of the
North Korean reactors started last year, and continues, though it is a
safe bet they will never be completed.

The Bush-Cheney White House likes to blame Clinton. But the
Bush-Cheney record is no better. During the run-up to the last
presidential election V.P. candidate Dick Cheney vigorously touted the
benefits of nuclear power. As late as May 2001 Cheney was promoting
the next generation of nuclear reactors as safe, and also good for the
environment, since they emit few greenhouse gases. I should add: the
V.P. made a point of explicitly rejecting conservation and renewable
alternatives. Then came 911, and the slow dawning realization of the
true risks of nuclear terrorism. As my friend Harvey Wasserman at
Greenpeace likes to point out, had the two planes hit the Indian Point
nuclear reactor located just a few miles north of Manhattan instead of
the World Trade Towers, most of New England today would be a toxic
wasteland, rendered uninhabitable for thousands of years. This is the
plain truth, no exaggeration. Unfortunately, reality is in short
supply at the White House. The facts have not yet penetrated what
Seymour Hersh calls the advisory "cocoon" around the
president. The Bush policy is: never speak ill of industry. Despite
911, there has been no retreat from nuclear by the U.S., here where it
counts most, however well-advised such a retreat might be.

Regarding nuclear weapons, the U.S. record is just as bleak. In
February 2003 there was a White House leak--probably intended--that
next summer President Bush will convene a conference of experts to
discuss the next generation of U.S. nuclear weapons. (Julian Borger,
"U.S. Plan For New Nuclear Arsenal: Secret Talks May Lead to
Breaking Treaties," The Guardian UK, February 19, 2003) The leak
was no surprise, given the change in U.S. military doctrine announced
last September to a policy of preemptive attack. That change paved the
way for the "preventive" invasion of Iraq, which has
effectively frozen further U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions. The
shift in military doctrine was unprecedented, yet stirred hardly a
ripple in the U.S. media. Most Americans probably do not even know
that it happened, or do not understand the significance. The fact that
the U.S. government has embraced a first-strike nuclear posture is
Americaís best-kept open secret. No doubt, the next generation of
U.S. nukes will be smarter and leaner, designed not for deterrence but
for actual use. And, no doubt, we will be told that their purpose is
defensive, i.e., to save the lives of U.S. servicemen and women. Tell
a small lie and you only make people suspicious. Tell a whopper and
they fall at your feet.

Arak and Natanz

Events took a dangerous turn in August 2002 when an Iranian
opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),
staged a press conference in Washington DC and reported the existence
of two previously unknown nuclear facilities in Iran. The first,
located at Arak, 150 kilometers south of Tehran, is believed to be a
plant for manufacturing heavy-water. The other, at Natanz, about 100
kilometers north of Esfahan, is probably a uranium-enrichment
facility. Neither is operational yet--both are under construction.
Satellite photoanalysis of the Natanz site shows that part of the
facility is being constructed below ground, and hardened with thick
concrete walls. (Click here
for photos and commentary)

Days later, Iranian officials acknowledged the sites. They also
announced long-range plans for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The
Iranians, in other words, intend to develop their own fuel processing
capability. The country has an abundance of uranium ore. In March 2003
Iranian officials announced the completion of a fuel fabrication plant
near Esfahan that will soon start production. (Paul Kerr, "IAEA
ĎTaken Abackí By Speed Of Iranís Nuclear Program," Arms
Control Today April 2003)

All of this raises troubling questions about Iranís nuclear
intentions. Heavy-water is used as a moderator in some reactors. The
problem is that this type of reactor lends itself to the production of
plutonium for bombs. Israel is known to have made the plutonium for
its nuclear arsenal in a reactor of this kind. The reactor at Bushehr
was specifically designed to use light-water to make recovery of
plutonium more difficult. Why, then, do the Iranians need heavy-water,
when light-water reactors could supply the needed electricity with
greater transparency? A heavy-water plant implies a heavy-water
reactor. As of yet, however, its location remains unknown.

Also: Why does Iran need a uranium-enrichment plant, given that
Russia will provide LEU fuel for the Bushehr reactor, and could do the
same for future reactors? Why are buildings at Natanz being
constructed underground? Why are they being hardened? The fact that
Iran is building a uranium-enrichment facility means that Iran already
has gas centrifuge technology. Who supplied it?

While there is no evidence that Iran has violated the NPT--yet--the
facts are alarming. The NPT stipulates that each signatory must work
out a safeguards arrangement with the IAEA. Both of the recently
disclosed nuclear sites will be subject to IAEA inspections. However,
Iranís agreement does not require inspections of a new facility
until six months prior to the first arrival of nuclear material. The
facilities at Arak and Natanz appear to be considerably more than six
months from completion; hence, no violation. Still, questions remain.
Why did Iran inform the IAEA about these plants only after the
NCRI forced the issue? The fact that Iran intends to make its own LEU
will make transparency more problematic. Even if Natanz is inspected
regularly, what would stop Iran from enriching uranium to
weapons-grade, i.e., 90%+, at a hidden facility? Clearly, Iranís
leaders are playing a dangerous game, staying within the letter of the
NPT, yet building up a nuclear infrastructure that could be used to
make bombs in the future.

Israelís record

The Israelis have charged that Russiaís nuclear commerce with
Iran is politically motivated: aimed at the U.S. presence in the Gulf.
While there is probably some truth to this, the same criticism could
be leveled at Israel. During the Apartheid years Israel engaged in
massive nuclear commerce with Pretoria, with effects that were felt
throughout southern Africa. The alliance included trade in uranium,
transfers of weapons technology, and cooperation in staging at least
one joint nuclear test--for which Israel has never been held
accountable. (See my book Dimona the Third Temple, 1989, chapters four
and five) The relationship flourished for more than a decade. And
though it did not survive the dissolution of Apartheid, the Israeli
government simply shifted venues. India became the latest partner of
convenience. By the year 2000 Israelís nuclear commerce with India
reportedly reached $500 million per year. (Yossi Melman, "India's
Visiting strongman Wants to Expand Nuclear Cooperation with
Israel," Ha'aretz, June 16, 2000)

The relationship with India has continued to expand, and is surely
causing grave concerns in Islamabad. If the recent reports are correct
that Pakistan supplied gas centrifuge technology to North Korea in
exchange for missiles, this means an arms race is currently raging out
of control in southern Asia. ("U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology
to North Korea," The New York Times, Oct. 18, 2002) Such a move
by Pakistan smacks of desperation. The prospect of future transfers of
Pakistani gas centrifuge technology is frightening. But Israelís
role in all of this, making a bad situation worse, has never been
discussed, or even mentioned, in American discourse, insofar as I
know. It is simply assumed that Israel can do as it pleases. Israelís
nuclear trade with India raises serious questions, not the least of
which is whether Israel could be destabilizing the Indian
sub-continent.

I should add: the U.S. record in South Asia is no better. U.S.
nonproliferation policy vis-a-vis Pakistan over many years has been a
model of inconsistency and short-term expedience. The facts are
disgraceful, and reveal Washingtonís total lack of seriousness about
limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

U.S. policy has been more consistent in the case of Iran,
probably because there is no official relationship. Under U.S.
pressure, Russia agreed to drop several missile technology deals with
Tehran in the late 1990s, a positive move. (Scott Peterson, "Russian
nuclear know-how pours into Iran," Christian Science Monitor,June
21, 2002)Still, the Israelis complain that Russian assistance,
including missile guidance technology, has continued. Especially
troubling is the specter of "loose" Russian scientists,
which prompted the Clinton administration to slap sanctions on several
Russian scientific institutions/companies. (Aluf Benn, "The
RussianĖIranian Connection," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
January/February 2001) While the slow and halting development of an
Iranian intermediate range missile is cause for concern, given Israelís
tiny size, hence its unique vulnerability, similar charges, again,
could be leveled at Israel, which acquired French missile technology
as early as 1963. Israelís Jericho missile makes Iranís efforts
look primitive. Israel even has a space program, and has been
launching satellites since 1988.

The U.S. has sought to thwart the transfer of Russian missile
technology to Iran. But did the U.S. similarly try to block Israelís
acquisition from Germany a few years ago of three Dolphin-class
submarines capable of launching conventional and nuclear-tipped cruise
missiles? Did the U.S. even complain? Of course not. As Iíve
observed, it is assumed that Israel can do as it pleases. The
1,720-ton diesel-electric submarines are among the most technically
advanced subs of their kind in the world. Each can be equipped with
four cruise missiles, which Israel reportedly tested in the Indian
Ocean in 1999. (Uzi Mahnaimi and Matthew Campbell, "Israel Makes
Nuclear Waves with Submarine Missile Test," London Sunday Times,
June 18, 2000) The subs will cruise the Mediterranean, the Red Sea,
and, ominously, the Persian Gulf--which tends to confirm the views of
the late Israeli scholar, Israel Shahak, a leading dissident, who
argued that Israelís strategic goal is hegemony from Morocco to
Pakistan. (See Israel Shahak, Open Secrets, 1997, chapters four and
eight)

The prospect of nuclear-armed Israeli subs patrolling the coasts of
Iran and Pakistan is disturbing. The forward deployment of Israeli
nukes is unprecedented, and dangerous. It can only inflame tensions in
the region. As early as 1983 a U.S. Naval commander, E.V. Ortlieb,
warned against the forward deployment of nukes, which can put a naval
officer in the unenviable position of having to use his weapons, or
face losing them. (E.V. Ortlieb, "Forward Deployments: Deterrent,
or Temptation?", Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, December,
1983)

Even if Israel makes a determined effort to avoid a confrontation
on the high seas, the Israeli patrols could still trigger a crisis.
Accidents do happen, as we know from two recent incidents: the
unfortunate collision near Pearl Harbor of a U.S. Navy submarine with
a Japanese fishing boat, and the mid-air encounter of a U.S. spy plane
with a Chinese fighter while on patrol off the coast of China. If such
snafus can happen to the U.S., they can certainly happen to Israel,
and in circumstances that are far from congenial. Has the U.S.
protested Israelís forward deployment of nukes on the high seas? Of
course not. Washington does not protest weapons that (officially) do
not exist. The U.S. government has never acknowledged that Israel
possesses nuclear weapons, even though the world knows otherwise,
thanks to the whistleblower, Mordechai Vanunu. (London Sunday Times,
Oct. 5, 1986) The continuing policy of denial can only hinder efforts
to "rein in" Israel in the event of a nuclear crisis. One
could hardly imagine a more explosive mix.

Israelís decision to patrol Persian Gulf waters with
nuclear-armed subs seems perversely calculated to strengthen Iranian
fundamentalists while undermining moderates who would prefer to
denuclearize the Middle East and pursue a less costly and much less
risky path of negotiations and military disengagement. Of course,
President Bushís decision to invade neighboring Iraq, and the
continuing presence of the nuclear-armed U.S. fleet in the Gulf have,
no doubt, produced the same effect, probably magnified several times.

Current U.S/Israeli policies have all the earmarks of a
self-fulfilling prophecy. President Bush lied to Congress when he
presented forged documents about Iraqís alleged nuclear weapons
program. (Seymour Hersh, "Who Lied to Whom?", The New
Yorker, March 20, 2003) The documents were phony. But that didnít
matter. The president got his sanction for war. Bush went on to invade
a nation that did NOT have nukes (Iraq), while studiously ignoring the
provocations of North Korea, which included nuclear taunts. The men
around Bush were determined to follow their Iraqi playbook.North
Korean leader Kim Jong-ilspoiled everything by inconveniently
rearing his ugly head out of turn. Consider the resounding signal that
Bushís war sent like a shot Ďround the world. We were told that
the warís purpose was to roll back Iraqi WMD (none of which have so
far been found). But the actual message was different. Indeed, as the
U.N. chief inspector Hans Blix pointed out, Bush sent precisely the wrong
signal. The actual message is that the U.S. only attacks countries
that cannot defend themselves. Under the circumstances, who could
blame Iranís leaders if they should take the actual message to
heart, and decide tomorrow to withdraw from the NPT, as North Korea
has done, and openly develop nuclear weapons? Who could blame them for
concluding that their best chance to avert U.S. aggression is to arm
themselves with nukes as soon as possible?

At this juncture it seems unlikely that Iran can allay the current
high level of distrust and avoid a confrontation simply by agreeing to
the strengthened IAEA protocols. Inspections anywhere, anytime are
certainly needed, and a step in the right direction. But this will
probably not be enough. What would stop Iran in the future from
bolting the NPT, and building bombs?

A Sane Solution to the Current Crisis

The cases of Iran and North Korea reveal the fundamental weakness
of the NPT. If the nonproliferation regime is to survive, sweeping
reforms must be introduced. The sane path would be for the U.S. to
immediately convene an international conference, at which all of the
signatories would sit down (in concert with the U.N.) and hammer out a
resolution of the impasse. This might be achieved by: 1. Revoking the
withdrawal clause (under article X); and 2. Providing a robust
mechanism for common security. Drastic action would be needed, because
the only effective way to provide for common security would be to
replace the U.N. Security Council veto with a simple 2/3 majority vote
in the event of an overt nuclear threat/attack. This would enable the
Security Council to swiftly come to the assistance of a member state.
The absence of such a provision has long plagued the U.N., and
probably explains why India and Israel refused to sign the NPT in
1968. In the absence of credible security guarantees, both opted to
provide for their own security needs. And Pakistan was compelled to
follow suit simply to match rival India. The key to a new global
security framework would depend upon success in persuading the current
non-signatories to realize the many benefits of common security at a
tiny fraction of the immense costs and risks of building and
maintaining a nuclear deterrent. (Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb,
1998, pp. 123-7, 287-9; also see William Epstein, The Last Chance,
1976, p. 222)

The two reforms would work together in synergy. The revocation of
the withdrawal clause is also essential, because the commitment to
non-proliferation must be made irreversible. Locking states into the
NPT would create strong incentives to remain honest. The threat of
U.N. sanctions would be a powerful deterrent. Of course, to win the
support of member states like Iran for such reform, Israel, Pakistan
and India would have to enter into the discussions, agree to sign a
strengthened treaty, open their nuclear sites to inspection, and begin
to deconstruct their nuclear arsenals. If this sounds like fantasy,
the alternative future, i.e., nuclear terrorism, is positively
surreal.

The above proposal--I recognize--is no substitute for global
conversion to clean hydrogen fuel and renewable wind and solar. But it
would have the salutary effect of buying time for the NPT: it would
create a breathing space in which a transition to clean energy might
proceed. Such a proposal is reasonable. Yes, and for this reason it
probably has no chance of gaining serious consideration in the Bush
White House. The men around the president have already demonstrated
their contempt for international treaties and for the hard work of
negotiations. Diplomacy? Thatís for wimps and hand wringers. The
administration has already rejected out of hand the Kyoto protocols
for climate change, and has refused to participate in the
International War Crimes Tribunal. It has scrapped its own ABM treaty,
and shredded the U.N. Charter. So it is probably too much to expect
that Bush would attempt, at this date, to strengthen the NPT through
existing legal frameworks. Nor is it likely, in any event, that the
U.S. would voluntarily surrender its U.N. veto, even to prevent
nuclear war. The U.S.--recall--has itself refused to rule out nuclear
first use. How ironic that the Bush administration would view a robust
mechanism for global security as a hindrance to unilateralism! The
only remaining question is: what treaty will Bush trash next? The NPT?

Tensions in the Gulf will mount in the coming months. The reactor
at Bushehr could be the flash-point. Israeli officials have warned
that they will not tolerate their enemies to develop nuclear power,
even for peaceful use. The shock waves of a raid on Bushehr would be
felt far beyond the Mideast.

Ramifications

The precedent for such a raid occurred on June 7, 1981, when
Israeli PM Menachem Begin ordered an attack on the Osirak nuclear
plant near Baghdad. Within hours a squadron of Israeli F-15s and F-16s
reduced Osirak to smoking rubble. The reactor was scheduled to go on
line within days or weeks. Much of the world responded by condemning
Israel. The reactor had been under French contract, and, like Bushehr,
was also subject to IAEA inspections. Most believed, at the time, that
Iraq was in full compliance with the NPT. While there is no evidence
Iraq planned to secretly divert plutonium from the reactor for
reprocessing and weapons, after the 1991 Gulf War U.N. Special
Committee (UNSCOM) inspectors discovered massive evidence of a
clandestine Iraqi uranium-enrichment program, involving calutrons
(cyclotrons). At which point, many observers dropped their former
criticism and began to praise the Israeli logic of preemption. Today,
those "lessons" have become official U.S. military doctrine.

The problem is that the evidence does not support the conclusion.
The discovery by UNSCOM of the secret Iraqi bomb program showed the
efficacy NOT of preemption but of inspections. Although U.S.
intelligence agencies may have been aware that the Saudis were
secretly funding an Iraqi bomb program, the calutrons appear to have
escaped detection by U.S. surveillance. Saddamís uranium-enrichment
program was completely untouched during the war, despite massive U.S.
bombing. The calutrons were found and destroyed because the
international community, i.e., the U.N., made a firm commitment to
inspections. And this success story, which remains untold and largely
unknown in the U.S., happened despite the Clinton policy of
regime change, which often conflicted with the U.N.ís stated mission
of disarming Iraq. (Milan Rai,War Plan Iraq, 2002) Israelís 1981
raid may even have prodded Saddam Hussein to launch (or accelerate)
his clandestine bomb program. Certainly the raid did not prevent an
Iraqi bomb. For similar reasons, a solo raid on Bushehr would not
block Iran from developing nukes, and might even provoke a decision in
Tehran to do so.

A raid on Bushehr would likely be the opening salvo in another
"preventive" war: a series of air attacks aimed at Iranís
nuclear infrastructure. Israel could not mount such a campaign by
itself, for geographic and logistical reasons. It would require full
U.S. involvement. Not surprisingly, Israelís hard-line supporters
have sought for many years to persuade Washington of the need for just
such a military solution to the Iranian "problem." No sooner
did the dust settle following the first Gulf War than the lobbying
began in earnest. And many of those who led the charge currently hold
high positions in the Bush government. Need I mention that such a war
would only confirm to the world what many in the region have long
believed: that U.S. Mideast policy is not only about oil. It is also
about serving the narrow interests of a recalcitrant Israel. (Israel
Shahak, Open Secrets, 1997, chapters four and eight)

Such an air war would be launched from bases in neighboring Iraq,
and from carriers in the Gulf. Israel might join in the attacks. U.S-Israeli
military cooperation increased after 911. Since 1997 the Israeli Air
Force has conducted annual training exercises in Turkey, presumably to
prepare for just such a war. Turkey has rugged terrain similar to Iranís.
According to Noam Chomsky, before the current conflict some 10% of the
Israeli Air Force was permanently based in Turkey. (personal
communication, April 16, 2003)

Would such an air war succeed? Yes, perhaps, then again, maybe not.
In their current state of hubris the men around the president
obviously believe they can accomplish anything with U.S. military
power, now supreme on the planet. However, our leaders are not
infallible. For every action there is a reaction, and, all too often,
unintended consequences. Such a war would undoubtedly be perceived by
the world as a serious escalation, and would likely produce a new
anti-U.S coalition. Various states, in defiance of U.S. threats, might
even come to Iranís assistance. The common border shared by Russia
and Iran raises the stakes. To understand why, we need only consider
how the U.S. would respond to a foreign attack on, say, Mexico. The
Russians might supply Iran with advanced military arms, ground-to-air
missiles, etc.

Pakistani strong-man Pervez Musharraf would face growing pressure
at home to assist a fellow Islamic state. With assistance from Russia
and/or Pakistan, the Iranians might reconstitute their nuclear program
in deep tunnels carved out of the countryís rugged mountains,
impervious to bombardment. To insure military success, the U.S. might
be compelled to launch commando assaults with special forces, or even
invade and occupy the country. Notice, this implies regime change,
precisely what Ariel Sharon has advocated. Such a path--I hasten to
add--would be insane, for reasons that should be apparent to anyone
who can find Iran on a map. Iran is not Iraq! Iran is five times
larger, a rugged mountainous country of sixty-five million people.

What if invading U.S. forces should meet return fire, in kind? One
shudders at the reaction in Washington should the Iranians turn on
U.S. troops the same depleted uranium weapons that the U.S. has been
using with such horrible effect on others. That would bring George W.
Bush eyeball-to-eyeball with Vladimir Putin, the obvious supplier, and
who knows, possibly with Pervez Musharraf. Lest we forget, both are
nuclear-armed (unlike Saddam Hussein) and capable of defending
themselves. The assumption that Putin will back down in a crisis on
his own border could be a serious miscalculation. If U.S. hawks insist
on victory, and escalate, events could spin out of control...

To prevent such a catastrophe we must all work together. We must
stop Bushís next war BEFORE it starts.

*******

Mark Gaffney is a researcher, writer, poet, environmentalist,
anti-nuclear activist, and organic gardener. Mark was the principal
organizer of the first Earth Day in April 1970 at Colorado State
University. Markís first book was a pioneering 1989 study of the
Israeli nuke program: DIMONA THE THIRD TEMPLE. From 1989-1993 Mark
helped National Audubon Society inventory and map Oregonís remaining
old growth forests. Markís forthcoming book is a radical study of
early Christianity: SECRETS OF THE NAASSENE SERMON. Mark can be
reached for comment at mhgaffney@aol.com