Interviews and other source material, cited in the footnotes by letter symbols (e.g. M31), are listed below. The interviews and excerpts from official records are deposited in the Historical Section, Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

CHAPTER I -THE SITUATION

1. This information is from the European Theater of Operations Historical File of interviews with high-ranking German commanders. It comes from interviews with Colonel General Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, and is confirmed by all subordinate commanders interviewed.
2. The entire chapter, except as indicated in the note just above, is based on After Action Report, VIII Corps, December 1944.

CHAPTER 2-THE CONCENTRATION ON BASTOGNE

1A. From the file on the conversations of Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff of SHAEF and Major General Harold R. Bull with historians on September 20, 1945.
1B. S71, December 16, 1944.
2. M41 and S64. Orders to pass initial point were as of 171215 December but the actual passing was at 1320.
3. AB21, Narrative, page 1; M32; records XVIII Corps. The time of 0800 in the Kinnard interview is an obvious error for 2000.
4. M46.
5. This is the essence of the summary given in the 12th Army Group After Action Report for December 1944, Paragraph 13.
6. S64, M41.
7A. M32. Information from Colonels Moore and Kinnard, records XVIII Airborne Corps.
7B. Information from Colonels Moore and Kinnard, records XVIII Airborne Corps.
8. M32; 9A M32; 9B S72, S74; 10 M32; 11 M32, AB21; 12 M32, AB21. Records XVIII Airborne Corps, information from Colonels Moore and Kinnard. M32, in error, gives General McAuliffe's objective as Bastogne. AB21 correctly explains the situation as it is described here. The facts concerning traffic in M32 agree with the known situation of AB21.
13. S64, V41; 14. S64, M41; 15. M42; 16. Historian's observation; 17A. M42; 17B. S73; 18. M33.
19.S62; AB4, Narrative, page 1; AB I. In the Strength Report for December 18, 1944, the Effective Strength of the 101st Division is listed as 805 officers and 11,035 enlisted men, a total of 11,840. The exact number who moved forward is not known as this total includes those not yet returned from pass and those who remained in Mourmelon to maintain the base camp.
20. S62, AB4. G-4's estimate of 2000 as the departure time is supported by the 327th After Action Report.
21. M32; 22M31.

1. All the material from which this narrative is produced is based on the interview with the members of Team Cherry. The records of Team Cherry were completely destroyed during the Christmas Eve bombings of Bastogne and consequently there is no official record of the operation of Colonel Cherry's force other than the interview and what Colonel Roberts, commanding officer, Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, could say of Team Cherry's operation.

CHAPTER 4-FIRST MEETING WITH THE ENEMY

1. M35. Colonel Ewell told Colonel Marshall about this during their conversation. The two men had a close acquaintanceship extending back to the Normandy campaign. However, Colonel Ewell was rated this way by all of his fellows. He mentioned his visit to Bastogne as a matter only of passing interest. It seems likely that this remarkable coincidence would never have been brought to light except that Ewell had to explain how he knew his own troops were on the wrong road initially. Colonel Ewell was badly wounded a few hours after the interview.
2. AB3, M32. The order of march directed by General McAuliffe was: 501st, 506th, 502d, 327th, with 81st Antiaircraft Battalion following the 501st and 326th Engineers following the 506th.
3. M32; 4. M32, M35 ; 5. M32.
6. M31, M32. The paragraph that follows this is from the Ewell interview.
7. M35. Colonel Ewell was asked whether he told them and he said no.
8. M32. This was the situation as Colonel Kinnard understood it to be and as he made note of it at the time. But it was not precisely the situation as it existed.
9. M31.
10. M31. The discrepancy between this and the preceding paragraph is a difference in Kinnard's and McAuliffe's understanding of the situation of the roadblocks. In any case it is inconsequential.
11. M31. McAuliffe in his interview stated this very positively.
12. M31. His exact words.
13. M31, M35. Ewell felt that McAuliffe was looking for a general solution. McAuliffe used the phrase "good old Leavenworth solution" in talking to Marshall.
14A. All of the interviews make this point obvious.
14B. From letter to Colonel Marshall by General Middleton, July 1, 1945.
15. M35; 16. M35; 17. M35. Quoting Ewell exactly.
18. M35.
19. M31. McAuliffe's words were put down exactly as he said them.

204

20. M31; 21. M31; 22. M31; 23. M37; 24. M31, M35; 25. M35; 26. AB7; 27. AB7 ; 28. M31; 29. M37; 30. M35.
31. M35. The Historian's examination of the terrain verified this.
32. M35, AB7; 33. M35, AB7; 34. AB13, M37; 35. AB13, M37; 36. AB7, M35.
37. From the Historian's observation of the country.
38. M35; 39. M35; 40. M35. Ewell's words are quoted exactly; 41. M35.
42. M35. This was Colonel Ewell's impression of what happened and it was supported by his conversation with prisoners of war.
43. On the day of the interview the building was hit and shelled repeatedly. In the Nunnery yards that morning a truck loaded with 200 mines was blown up. Not one particle of the bodies of the 12 men who were loading it could be found. Whether the truck had been hit by a shell was never determined.

1. M43.
2. As this is identical with Major Bottomly's estimate to Colonel Ewell it seems probable that men coming through gave Bottomly his information.
3. Since the chateau was west of the German roadblock and the west wall faced toward Major Bottomly, this may have been American fire.
4. There were supposed to be two Engineer roadblocks in the vicinity, one between Bastogne and Neffe and the other at Mont. Colonel Ewell says that he found no engineer group on the Longvilly road. The Mont block was intact when Griswold got there. The group that came to the chateau may have been driven off the Longvilly road by the German fire and after going to the chateau decided to rejoin the other group. The Historian was not able to establish the fact.
5. The work of this party was not known to Colonel Ewell and does not appear in the battalion journal. It appears in the Combat Command B Journal and the Team Cherry interview, and is confirmed in the interview with Colonel Kinnard.
6. Such is the confusion of battle that 101st Division command post had the impression that Team Cherry had burned the chateau before withdrawing in order to keep it from falling into enemy hands.
7. S64.

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CHAPTER 7-TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE

1. M35. Colonel Roberts also expressed this view on the 28th Division to Westover, but it was not placed in the interview.
2. M45, S64, S73; 3A. M45, S64; S73; 3B. S72, S73; 3C. S73.
4. M31, S72. McAiiliffe likewise says that LaPrade was sent to Noville because of Desobry's predicament.
5. M45, S57; 6. M31; 7. S57, S64.
8. M45. This is not the construction placed upon the advance by the Journal of the 506th Parachute Infantry which says that General McAuliffe told LaPrade to take command. The latter must be in error because General McAuliffe says nothing of the kind and the facts are that he didn't give authority to put LaPrade in command.
9. S57; 10. M45.
11. M45, S64. It is an interesting fact that the Journal of the 506th has almost nothing to say about this conspicuous service done the regiment by Rice although the journal does make reference to their acute supply situation. However, this is somewhat characteristic of forces acting injuncture.

CHAPTER 8-ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL

1. M45, S57, S64; 2. M45, S57, S64; 3. M45, S57, S64; 4. S57; 5. M45, S57, S64.
6. From S57, backed by statements made to Westover in an interview with battalion officers on March 13, 1945.
7. There is a time discrepancy between the M45 and S64 with S57 at this point but darkness came early because of the bad visibility.
8. 506th Parachute Infantry claims that five of these tanks were destroyed but the statement is considered insufficient because proofs were lacking and in view of the conditions already described.
9. M45; 10. M45.
11. From statement by Harwick to Marshall. This statement was never committed to writing because it was made in answer to a question prior to an interview which was to be held at a later hour. Before the interview could be held Harwick was hit.
12. S57, S64; 13. S57, S64, S72; 14. S57; 15. From Harwick.
16. S57, S64; 17. M45; 18. M45, S57; 19. M31; 20. M31; 21. M31, M36, S57.
22. S72; 23. 72; 24. S73.

CHAPTER 9-DOUBTS AND DECISIONS

1. Exmination of the assembly area overlay alongside of how the battle developed makes this fact self-evident. However there was considerable discussion between General McAuliffe and the Historian which is not included in the notes. General McAuliffe said that when the siege was over he felt that his choice of the assembly area was one of his most fortunate decisions and that he would not have altered it in any way looking at bat-tle retrospectively. He said that he had not given a great deal of thought to the situation before making his decision but that he "felt" that the area selected was the right place.
2. M31.

206

3. M31, M32, and letter to Colonel Marshall from General Middleton, July 1, 1945.
4. M33; 5. M32, S61; 6. M32; 7. M33; 8. M33; 9. M33; 10. M32.
11. M33 and confirmed by the statements of many other witnesses to the historians.
12. M41; 13. M41; 14. S64; 15. M41, S64; 16. M41, S64.
17. After Action Report, 73d Armored Field Artillery, for December 1944.
18. After Action Report, 58th Armored Field Artillery, for December 1944.
19. When the newspaper correspondents at last reached Bastogne this battalion received more attention than all of the other artillery combined.
20. S41; 21. S41; 22. S41.
23. S41. After Action Report, VIII Corps, for December 1944, After Action Report, 4th Armored Division, for December 1944.
24. M41; 25. M41.
26. M41. Colonel Roberts said he was very sorry to see these men go.
27. M37. The substitute ammunition proved quite satisfactory. According to Nelson its close-up position enabled Baker Battery to make more effective use of the M2 ammunition. The observers had remained with the forward platoons and this was true of most of the Bastogne operation with the result that casualties among forward observers ran very high. Nelson lost four observers killed. Many of the missions therefore had to be adjusted by infantry observers and Nelson said that the results were generally excellent. Due to atmospheric conditions the greater part of the adjustments had to be made by sound. When observation permitted time fire was used with good results.
28. M37, but sustained by researches at all other points. Most of the supply points listed in VIII Corps' Administrative Orders Nos. 39 and 40 of December 18 and December 19 were either in enemy hands or had been moved to the rear by the hour the orders were received. VIII Corps radioed G-4 one time that there were 7,000 or more rounds of 75mm. howitzer ammunition in the abandoned ammunition supply point No. 128. G-4 asked where that depot was located but never received a reply. On December 20, Captain Salve H. Matheson, S-4 of the 506th Parachute Infantry, drove to St. Hubert and to Bellauz in a fruitless search for small-arms ammunition. Major William C. Young, 101st Division Artillery S-4, reported that both the ammunition officer and the artillery officer of Corps said that the nearest ammunition supply point which had 105mm. M3 ammunition was Audun le Roman, which is in the south of Luxembourg. The 101st Division also received the slightly ironic information that a train loaded with ammunition of all the types desired by the 101st was being unloaded at Bertrix.
29. M33; 30. M33; 31. M33; 32. M33; 33 M41.

CHAPTER 10—THE REPULSE

1. M35. However, the Historian talked to perhaps a dozen of Colonel Ewell's officers to gather their general impression of how the stragglers

207

acted and how the combat force reacted and all statements were to the same point.
2. M35; 3. M52, M53 ; 4. M52, M53.
5. M52, M53. This disagrees with Colonel Ewell's statement of force engaged but Ewell said he was uncertain of the facts.
6. AB2; 7. M52, M53; 8. M35; 9. M35.
10. M52, M53. The 501st Parachute Infantry had no record of when action ended.
11. M35; 12. M35, S60; 13. M35.
14. The Historian checked up on the location of these tanks.
15. M35.
16. From the Historian's examination of situation.
17. Ewell was convinced that the presence of the tank destroyers made this change.
18. M52, M53; 19. M35; 20. M52, M53; 21. M35, M52, M53, S60; 22. M52, M53.
23. M52, M53. S60 has no entry on this fact.
24. M35, M52, M53.
25. M35. The Historian's observation of the terrain verifies this.
26. M32.
27. M36.
28. Because Of the fog, this action was especially "confused" and neither regiment had any clear idea of what had happened or how the killing ground had been established. To clarify the story, Colonel Marshall held a series of company and patrol after-battle interviews. The story was put together with the aid mainly of the enlisted participants. This episode and the action at the Longvilly block were at first regarded as minor incidents in the general battle. As additional facts came to light—particularly the enemy story—their pivotal nature was revealed. General Higgins was of the opinion that had both regiments seen and exploited this opportunity more promptly and strongly, it would have produced one of the sharpest defeats to the enemy during the Bastogne battle. (Interview with Marshall February 5, 1946.)

CHAPTER 11—RUNNING BATTLE

1. M45, S57.
2. This is shown by his conversation with Chappuis as reported in M36.
3. The Historian had several discussions with Colonels Sink, Ewell, Kinnard and others concerning the nature of the Noville position at the time when the 101st Division attacked toward it in early January, and this was the estimate which all concerned placed upon it.
4. M36; 5. M36; 6. M45; 7. S57; 8. M55; 9. M55; 10. M55.
11. M45, M55, S57; 12. M55; 13. M45.
14. Harwick witnessed this incident and gave this detail during his informal interview with Colonel Marshall which was not committed to writing.
15. M45. Confirmed by Harwick's description to Marshall though Harwick also thought that a tank destroyer came from the other direction and fired on the German tanks. In this he appears to have been mistaken.

208

16 M45.
17. Colonel Roberts told Westover about this but Westover did not make note of it at the time.
18. Harwick reported this to Colonel Marshall and at the same time he was telling Colonel Sink about it and was expressing his regrets that he had lost some good men. He even named the men. However, the tankers did not report to Westover that they used any paratroopers at this time, and therefore the facts are not confirmed by the armored units. It is notable all the way through these reports that both forces minimize the help received from the other group. Often that is not an oversight on their part; they simply lacked the information.
19. Members of the armored units reported these impressions to Westover but he did not write them down in his report. The facts are confirmed by S57.
20. M45; 21. M45; 22. M45, S57; 23. S57; 24. S57.
25. M45. S57 reports that the tank destroyers did engage the German armor but there was no confirmation of this from members of the tank destroyer units in connection with the opening fight at Foy.
26. S57; 27. M36; 28. M45, S57; 29. M45, S57; 30. M45, S57.
31. S57. In M45 the locations of the paratroop companies are identified in a different order. All of the 506th statements, however, are to the point that Company C led the column.
32. S57.
33. M45. This differs by a few minutes from S57.
34. M45; 35. M45; 36. M45; 37. M45; 38. M45; 39. M45.
40. M45. The S57 report of this whole episode is vague and confused. It is to be noted that both the infantry and the tank destroyer units reported that there was a German roadblock at Foy and that this was what checked the column. These forces were not up front and were not in position to see. The assumption was a natural one in view of the circumstances.
41. M45; 42. M45; 43. M45; 44. M45; 45. M45.
46. M45. Duncan was not in the jeep at the time and no one was injured.
47. M45; 48. M45; 49. M45; 50. M45; 51. M55; 52. M55; 53. M45.
54. M55; 55. M45; 56. M45; 57. M45; 58. M45; 59. M55; 60. M45; 61. S57.
62. Members of the armored units put a lower estimate on the damage done to enemy armor than the paratroopers did and the figures given here are a compromise of the two. It is obvious that the battle was such that an accurate count could not be made.
63. As to the identification of enemy units in the Neville action, the G-2 report shows that by the night of December 20 six prisoners captured in the Foy-Recogne area had been identified as coming from 2d Panzer Division.
64. Conclusion of the historians after studying the entire Noville fight.

1. This is perhaps an over-simplification. There were fairly heavy attacks against the north on December 21 and one running engagement in the southwest, but the failure of the enemy to press a general attack against the Bastogne defenses during the two days is conspicuous.
2. The movement of the forces is outlined in the G-2 overlays.
3. M31. The precise hours of the cutting of the Neufchâteau road is not known and the statement on which this paragraph is based is taken from the interview with General McAuliffe.
4. M31. Quoted directly. According to an interview with Colonel Walter C. Stanton, Deputy Chief of Staff, VIII Corps, General Middleton never weakened in his desire to hold Bastogne. On the 19th, however, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., commanding general, Third Army, ordered a withdrawal. Colonel Stanton believed this order was possibly influenced by the weak showing of First Army. The VIII Corps order appeared on December 20. Interview by Captain L. B. Clark, 3d Information and Historical Service, and Captain K. W. Hechler, 2d Information and Historical Service, January 16, 1945, vicinity Assenois, Belgium.
5. M31; 6. M31.
7. M31, but confirmed by other members of the staff who were present. This exchange of words, however, does not appear in the Westover interview with Colonel Roberts.
8. The conversations of the historical officers with members of both commands indicated this to be the case.
9. M32; 10. M31; 11. M41; 12. M41, S64.
13. This conclusion is supported by the proof that air resupply of the Bastogne position immediately became a foremost concern of VIII Corps, and that VIII Corps Headquarters labored throughout December 21 to make the operation possible.
14. M31.
15. M31. General McAuliffe says specifically that from the moment he reached Bastogne he expected to get cut off because there seemed to be nothing in front of him that would prevent it.
16. It is notable that December 22 was the least active day on the Bastogne front.
17. AB2; 18. AB2; 19. AB2.
20. This detail is almost overlooked in all the journals.
21. AB2.

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22 Kinnard and Danahy both stated to Marshall that from their examination of Corps' situation maps upon reaching Bastogne they learned practically nothing of the enemy situation and decided they would have to build from the ground up.
23. AB2, M32.
24. This message was received by Colonel Kinnard and appears in the interview with him. The exact reason for it being sent, however, is not known.
25. AB2, M32. Danahy was convinced that while using every stratagem possible the enemy was trying to keep within the appearance of acting according to the laws of war for the purpose of protecting their men. He said that the prisoners taken in American uniforms said they had put on this extra clothing to keep from freezing.
26. AB2; 27. AB2; 28. AB2; 29. M41; 30. M41; 31. M41.
32. Westover's estimate of the position covered.
33. AB2.

1. M34, S61.
2. M34, S64. On the afternoon of December 20 a small task force under 1st Lieutenant Richard C. Gilliland was sent to support 327th along the line covering the main highway. It was called Charlie 16 and included three tanks—two 75mm. and one 76mm. It remained away from the main group for a week, lost the 76mm. tank from a rocket, engaged in 15 skirmishes and destroyed much enemy equipment.
3. S60, S61; 4. S60; 5. M34, S60, S64; 6. M34; 7. M44, S64; 8. M34, S61.
9. This is not the Historian's conclusion but is based on the interview with Colonel Harper and on statements by Major Templeton and Colonel Harper's battalion commanders. Colonel Harper said, "Most of the time when our troops were under shell fire the German gunners were in position to lay directly on the target."
10. M34. The battalion commander was present while these facts were reconstructed.
11. M34; 12. M44; 13. M34, S61.
14. M44. Colonel Harper later had this to say of what happened to Morrison, "I'll never again put infantry on a forward slope unless I have tank destroyers or tanks where I can protect them. I lost two platoons separately in defense of the perimeter by making this mistake. In each case they were overrun when there were no tank destroyers to defend them."
15. M44; 16. M44.
17. This incident was related during the interview with Colonel Harper and supported by the battalion commander. It was not brought to light, however, during Westover's conversations with Colonel O'Hara's force.

1. M31. General McAuliffe says that December 23 was the day of crisis. In this he appears to be mistaken. The artillery commanders all said that it was on the afternoon of the 22d that they were most worried about their supply. This checks with the fact that resupply began to arrive fairly early the next morning.
2. M31.
3. From Colonel Marshall's interviews with Lieutenant Colonel John T. Cooper, Jr., and Colonel Nelson, and from General McAuliffe's statement on the employment of his artillery.
4. M36. Also interview with Colonel Sink and others.
5. From the Cooper interview.
6. M31; 7. M31, S74.
8. M31. General McAuliffe recollected this as happening on December 23. Colonel Kinnard said it happened on December 22. The 22d appears to be correct inasmuch as resupply became assured on the morning of December 23. There is no doubt, however, about the validity of this quotation. Kinnard and Danahy both heard it, and when his memory was refreshed General McAuliffe recalled that he had said it.
9. M32, S61.
10. Westover was impressed by this difference in how the little units looked at the operation as compared with the 101st Division Headquarters viewpoint. The observation was made on the basis of Westover's findings as contrasted with Marshall's.
11. M31.
12. This comes from the statement of many of the officers through Westover.
13. M31; 14. M33; 15. M33; 16. M33; 17. M33; 18. M33; 19. M33.

212

CHAPTER 17-SUPPLIES ARRIVE

1. M33 is the source of this material.

CHAPTER 18-THE SITUATION IMPROVES

1. This conclusion is based upon all of the evidence from the Noville, Marvie and Neffe engagements.
2. M38; 3. Facts speak for themselves.
4. M38; 5. S57; 6. S57.
7. This conclusion is drawn from numerous conversations the historians had with front line troops.
8. M42; 9. M42; 10. M42; 11. M31, M41.
12. M31, M41; 13. M31, M41; 14. M31, M41; 15. M41; 16. M41.
17. From General McAuliffe, Colonel Roberts and all others who were interviewed; however, the affirming statements are found in the interviews of the two commanders.
18. M42; 19. M42; 20. M42; 21. M32; 22. M32, M41.
23. This note is added by the Historian. He was present on a number of occasions when officers in these different organizations discussed this matter quite seriously.
24. M42; 25. M42; 26. M42; 27. M42; 28. M42; 29. M42.
30. This happened at Champs among other places.
31. The historical officer makes this as a personal observation as he was present at a number of conferences where Major Templeton was taking a strong position.
32. This is also an observation made by the historical officer as an eyewitness.
33. M42; 34. M42; 35. M38.
36. M31. As for the extent of the enemy build-up in the northwest, Colonel Chappuis says in the 502d Parachute Infantry interview that the most trying thing in those days on his troops was that they had to look out every day and see enemy trucks and men swarming up and down the roads all around them. He said, "We could have murdered those Germans. The road intersections in front of us looked like 42d and Broadway after a football game. Most of the traffic seemed to be moving to the west. They were in easy reach and were quite contemptuous about it. But we could do nothing about it because we did not have the artillery ammunition."
37. M38; 38. M35; 39. M38: 40. M38; 41. M38; 42. M38; 43. M38; 44. M41; 45. M31; 46. M31.

1. AB2. Danahy did this because he thought it would boost morale. It proved so popular with the commanders that many additional copies were printed to obtain a more general distribution.
2. This document is in the historical file.

213

2A. S63, S64.
2B. Colonel Ewell, among other commanders, commented on this in the second interview. Many of the men spoke of how fearful they felt on Christmas Eve.
3. M36; 4. M36; 5. M36; 6. AB8; 7. AB8; 8. AB8; 9. M36; 10. AB8.
11. M36; 12. AB8; 13. M36; 14. M36; 15. AB8, M36; 16. M36; 17. M36; 18. M36.
19. From the historical officer's observation of the ground.
20. M36; 21. M36; 22. M36; 23. M36; 24. M36; 25. AB2, M34. (This identification by American G-2 is incorrect. The 77th Regiment was engaging at Champs. See the enemy story.)
26. M34, M39; 27. M34; 28. M34; 29. M34; 30. M34; 31. M34; 32. M36.
33. M49, M50, M56; 34. M49, M50, M56; 35. M34, M36, M49, M50, M56.
36. M36, M49, M50, M56; 37. M49, M50, M56; 38. M49, M50, M56.
39. M36; 40. M36; 41. M36; 42. M36; 43. M36; 44. M36; 45. M36.
46. M36. Colonels Chappuis and Cassidy were in a position to observe the relationship in time of the tank destroyer fire to the rest of the action.
47. M36. The tank destroyer account of this episode is not well rounded out but the crew were not in position to see the action clearly.
48. M36. This is 502d Parachute Infantry's report of the detail. The tank destroyers themselves claim credit for a greater number of hits.
49. M36; 50. M36; 51. M36; 52. M49, M50, M56; 53. AB8.
54. M34; 55. M34; 56. M34, M39.
57. M34. All hands agreed that this was the case.
58. AB8; 59. M36; 60. M36; 61. M36, S64.
62 Copy of Field Order is in historical file.
63. M36. This was the high tide of the German attack against the 502d Parachute Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 502d, was again attacked and on December 27 was driven off the hill briefly. By that time Division had been joined by the force from the south. During December 26, the 502d continued to maintain an all-around defense of the position. Six prisoners were taken near Champs.

CHAPTER 21-THE RELIEF

1. These extracts are made from the comprehensive narrative on 4th Armored Division's operation done by Captain L. B. Clark and based upon the Journals of that organization.
2. The casualties of the 101st Airborne Division up to January 6, 1945, in the Bastogne operation were as follows:

Officers

Enlisted Men

Killed

29

312

Wounded

103

1,588

Missing

34

482

166

2,382

The Artillery losses were extremely light except among forward observers. The Engineer Battalion lost 26 enlisted men and one officer killed

214

and 84 enlisted men wounded up to January 6. Owing to the capture of the hospital, the 326th Medical Company showed the largest number of missing of any unit at Bastogne with 125 gone. There was a surprisingly even distribution of losses among the Infantry regiments:

327th

501st

502d

506th

Off

EM

Off

EM

Off

EM

Off

EM

Killed

2

60

9

68

8

66

5

67

Wounded

13

279

29

477

22

246

28

359

The total of German prisoners taken was 98 1. The estimated number of enemy killed is 7,000.
3. From the narrative by Clark.
4. From the 12th Army Group After Action Report for December 1944.