SK: I think that if we talk about the personal relations in thirties, the warmest relations my father was with Bulganin, because when my father was the Moscow Party Secretary, Bulganin was the mayor of Moscow and both of them climbed to the top, step by step, but in the parallel level. And they lived on the same store of the building, the doors ... two opposite doors, it was two apartments and even the Bulganin, he, how to say, he stored his Cognac in the Khrushchev's kitchen, because Bulganin son was hard drinker, so he thought, I don't want to have any alcohol in my house, so it will be in your house. It was very close relations between them. Until the last clash appeared and both of them, it was my father's fault, I think, because sometimes he was not enough polite with Bulganin, specially in his visit to Great Britain, he tried to... He was more active and he tried to defend his position and Bulganin, he was not real politician. He tried to make all this socially, to agree here and there, so my father tried to do this and other people pushed Bulganin, the members of Politburo, they told what you see, the Prime Minister and what Nikita doing with you. And I remember when it was their clash, it was on my wedding, it was wedding party just before the anti-party group, and all were there. All anti-party group, Malenko, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Molotov and some others. And my father begin to joke something with Bulganin and Bulganin was so nervous and he told, why you speaking in this manner with me, I am the Prime Minister and my father was surprised to hear Nikolaietz. But politically, my father has not high opinion of Bulganin. He thought that he is a weak politician, really not politician at all. So when we talk about all these relations, we must understand that they were not so simple. They were very long and they were different the different periods. For example, Kaganovich was the first my father... how to say, teaching the Revolution in 1916. He came to the impasse and he was there work with the shoe-maker and he was the representative of the Bolshevik Party and after that they has different relations for all these years, from the close relations to the... how to say, more complicated relations, when they really broke the relations at the end.

INT: Your father met Kennedy, that famous occasion in Vienna in 1961. What happened in that meeting and what was your father's opinion of Kennedy?

SK: When we talk about my father's opinion of Kennedy, especially the meeting in Vienna, it was different and contradictory, because the main, the strongest opinion was very positive, because when my father came and I asked him, he told that this President is young, but he is really the created his own policy. Because he told, we spoke with him for two days and he never asked for the break, he never asked any advice from anybody. Now we know that Kennedy specially prepared for this. From the other side, he told, no, it is young person, he think that he can manipulate us because he's American President. He's wrong, we is also a great country and we'll never give them this possibility to manipulate us, because we will defend our society, he's the premier his society, he is here to find the solution. Sometimes in the worst it's appeared that some people who heard my father only once and when he told, no, this young man try to do something, we'll never permit him to manipulate us and they thought, they tried to explain then that his feeling was that the Kennedy was weak. No he didn't, he never thought that he was weak politicians. And his opinion changed through all these short three years and the highest was after the Cuban Missiles Crisis, when he thought that in reality it is possible to deal with this President. He is strong, but we can find the solution how to establish the real peace co-existence. Even one week before Kennedy assassination, Kennedy spoke with the Soviet ambassador, Mr. Dubranin, and he once more returned to the idea of the join our force and the moon flight. First he spoke about this in Wien and my father told no, no, military's again, these we have our secrets, it is the same the military and so he refused. And then he just, we walk around the house in the evening walk, and he told, you know, Kennedy once more talk about this and I think we have talk... said this, and I told how can I said this, I was at the time in the military missiles in Gineening (inaudible) our secrets, he told these things that Americans need our secrets, they were a very developed country, they can design everything. But if we would join our force, it was not only saving the money, we will find many political achievements through this. But next week, Kennedy was assassinated and he never return to this, maybe, never return the conversation with me.

INT: Was the Cold War inevitable?

SK: When we talk about the Cold War, I only can tell you that the Cold War was the natural period in the relations among all the countries which solved their problems through the wars. And now, they face that it is impossible, because nuclear weapons will not give possibility to achieve your goals, because nobody who begin the war, even Hitler was crazy, he was very close to the winning over the Great Britain, he was two step to the taking over the Soviet Union and we don't know what will happen with the United States if he will win. So, we can tell it was crazy idea, it was mistake. But now, they faced that it is impossible, but they did not know how to solve this problem, we still don't know. So they have the same behaviour, preparing for the war only with one exception, not push the button. So from this case, I think that it was not inevitable, it was natural. Now, the Cold War is over, it doesn't mean that our life became easier and that we really know how to create the real order and democracy on the world. So... Cold War is over and maybe we will face the harder time.

INT: Were there any winners in the Cold War?

SK: I don't think that there were winners in the Cold War. I think that there were losers of the Cold War from the both side, because the military spending was so high, that Soviet Union ruined the economy, it was our own mistake really, it was not the consequences of the Cold War, it was the nature when the military industrial conference begin to control our decisions, because Khrushchev tried to lower this spending very much, even his idea was to reduce the army to the five hundred thousand, because he thought he will have the nuclear weapons, we will deploy about one, two hundred of them and we will prevent any possibility of the war. The United States also lost in their competition with Germany, with South Asia. So, if we're looking from superficially, yes United States the Cold War. In reality, both of the sides lost this Cold War and the cause of this reforms was not the defeat in the Cold War. It is very different idea, because we understood that when you have much more complicated economy, the centralised management are less effective, the debts centralised. In the simple economy, like in the nineteenth century, yes, we can think that centralised management can be more effective. In centralised like in big companies, you know, that all the big companies now, they're centralised. And so we decided to reform our society from less effective to more effective, it was not the results of the Cold War. There's another thing that we made so many mistake that we not reform our country, that we ruined it.

INT: And what was the worst moment in the Cold War for you personally?

SK: When you talk about the worst moment in the Cold War to me personally, I think it was the election the General Eisenhower and the American President, because we were so far from each other, we were so different, that for me, who was at that time in the first year in the university, it was the clear signal that Americans elected General as the President because they decided to begin the war.

INT: Was this a feeling shared generally throughout the Soviet Union?

SK: Yes, many of us it was no idea why Americans elected the General, because it was the same like you make this real and you try to hide Americans under the desk, as the... again the nuclear weapon is for the same our feeling. You have the General, so you understand that we're weaker, because we knew that you are much stronger, you had the nuclear weapons and you decided to use them. You know, and it was not very far, because the General made the time just suggested to do this to American government.

INT: Did you shed tears when Stalin died in March 1953?

SK: Yes, yes I was not shed tears. When my father came to our apartment, it was sometime in the late evening, and he told and he sit in the sofa and told Stalin died and I was begin to even to cry and then he told, I'm so tired, I will go to have a nap. And I was thought, how he could do this, that Stalin died and then next day I was organised all my group in the university to go to visit Stalin in the Column House, where he was put and we spent all the night in all this crowd in the worst place of Moscow in the Niglina and then even my father and mother, they called everywhere to the police and to the hospitals to find me. And then when they reached our destination and then... and early in the morning, next day, I came to my home and they told my father told you can go much easier there, I will take you with you and you will look if you want. So it was this... my feeling that my remorse of the Soviets at that time, I don't believe that many people now thought, oh we knew everything, Stalin was awful, we know it. Some of the people, yes, but I think it's very few, if we compare with all the population. And I have the same feeling like all the others that it is something like the end. I don't know, end of what, but end.