[1]Of course the greatest military power of Greece had been
Sparta
until 371 B.C., when the battle of Leuctra made
Thebes temporarily
"the first land power."

[2]Thus if 3000 men were called out, the average "taxis" would be
300 strong, but if 6000, then 600.

[3]The hoplite's panoply (see description later) was sufficiently
expensive to imply that its owner was at least a man in tolerable
circumstances.

[4]Greeks could seldom have been brought to imitate the reckless
medieval cavaliers. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ was more
commended than imitated. Outside of Sparta at least, few Greeks would
have hesitated to flee from a battlefield, when the day (despite their
proper exertions) had been wholly lost.

[5]Especially the Athenian general Iphicrates was able to cut to
pieces a "mora" (brigade) of Spartan hoplites, in 392 B.C., by
skillful use of a force of peltasts.

[6]Possibly fifty or more—we have no correct means for an exact
estimate. [A note from Brett: Looking at web sites where
reconstruction of the armor has been done and estimates made (ca.
1999) there seems to be a consistent top end of 70 pounds. Scholarly
circles (e.g. Rudolph Storch of the University of Maryland) seem to
lock the estimate more tightly, with the consensus saying that a fully
armored Hoplite carried between 60 and 70 pounds. Most of this weight
seems to be in the cuirass, which in some cases was linen and weighed
only 10-15 pounds (the actual thickness is unknown, so the broad range
of weight estimate covers the minimum to maximum reasonable
thickness). For reference, a modern (2000) soldier is generally
limited to 50 pounds of gear when fighting and 70 pounds when
marching.]

[7]The "Corinthian" type of helmets came more closely over the
face, and the cheek protectors were not movable; these helmets were
much like the closed helms of the medieval knights. The Spartans, in
their contempt for danger, wore plain pointed steel caps which gave
relatively little protection.

[8]Earlier Greek shields seem to have been very large and
correspondingly heavy. These had only a single handle; and to aid in
shifting them they were swung on straps passed over the left shoulder.

[9]This last is a matter of safe inference rather than of positive
information.

[10]The object would be to give each man just enough distance to
let him make fair use of his lance, and yet have his shield overlap
that of his neighbor.

[11]The "phalanx" is sometimes spoken of as a Macedonian invention,
but Philip and
Alexander simply improved upon an old Greek military
formation.

[12]It may be suspected that it was very seldom the omens were
allowed to be unfavorable when the general was really resolved on
battle.

[13]Any sudden attempt to extend your line beyond the foe's,
so as to outflank him, would probably have produced so much confusion
in your own phalanx as to promise certain disaster. Of course for an
inferior force to accept battle by thinning its line, to be able by
extending to meet the long lines of the enemy, would involve the
greatest risk of being broken through at the center. The best remedy
for inferior numbers was manifestly to decline a decisive battle.

[14]In siege warfare Oriental kings had a great advantage over
Greek commanders. The former could sacrifice as many of their "slaves"
as they pleased, in desperate assaults. The latter had always to bear
in mind their accountability at home for any desperate and costly
attack.

[15]As in the siege of
Potidea (432-429 B.C.), when if Athens had
failed to take the place, her hold upon her whole empire would have
been jeopardized.