02107cam a22002537 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100002500069245014900094260006600243490004100309500001900350520096100369530006101330538007201391538003601463690006901499690009401568710004201662830007601704856003701780856003601817w8664NBER20150802205718.0150802s2001 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aPrendergast, Canice.10aSelection and Oversight in the Public Sector, With the Los Angeles Police Department as an Exampleh[electronic resource] /cCanice Prendergast. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc2001.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w8664 aDecember 2001.3 aI offer theoretical and empirical observations on the oversight of public sector employees. I argue that it is unreasonable to expect that the solutions typically considered in the literature will be effective with public sector employees, because bureaucrats are especially difficult to monitor. To offset this weakness, agencies tend to hire bureaucrats who are biased against consumers, where such bias increases incentives. I then address how bureaucrats should be overseen and offer a choice between internal monitoring of public agencies, with overseers who are biased against consumers, or external monitoring, where bureaucrats become excessively worried about the prospect of an investigation and may change their behavior to attain that goal. I provide evidence from the Los Angeles Police Department to show that officers appear to have responded to increased oversight by reducing crime-fighting activities in an attempt to avoid investigation. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web. 7aH8 - Miscellaneous Issues2Journal of Economic Literature class. 7aL3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise2Journal of Economic Literature class.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w8664.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w866441uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8664