Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency
has installed nuclear safeguard systems to monitor reactors. These systems,
while effective, lack certain attractive features: they cannot provide
real-time monitoring of reactor activities and some of them interfere with
reactor operations. Antineutrino detectors can provide a continuous,
real-time, and less intrusive method for monitoring reactors. This proposed
safeguards system, tested at reactors in Russia and the United States, spins
off from antineutrino experiments, many of which use reactors to produce
antineutrinos. Monitoring antineutrino flux can detect illicit activities in
reactors, such as the diversion of plutonium. Sensitivity to changes in
fissile content in a few months using only antineutrino data has been
demonstrated at the level of 70 kg of plutonium with $>$99{\%} confidence.
As part of the monitoring technique, it is useful to have accurate
predictions of the evolving antineutrino flux that results from reactor fuel
burnup. Simulations predicting the evolution are being developed and tested
in present antineutrino reactor experiments.

To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2011.APR.Q13.1