Somalia: Reflections On An Intervention

Q&A

May 16, 1993|By John C. Bersia of The Sentinel Staff

Q: What's your most compelling memory from the U.S.-led phase of the intervention in Somalia?

A: When we got there last year, there was nobody on the streets. No schools were open. No shops were open. People were scared to move around. Not too many people were in the fields, minding their crops. No animals were being sent to the markets. In March 1993, we had several dozen schools open. Kids played in the streets. Lots of small shops were open. That was to me a big, big difference. In addition, people weren't dying of starvation and disease in large numbers. There was no major clan warfare, only sporadic incidents of small-scale clan confrontation. There was a lot of armed banditry, but no massacres.

Q: Are you satisfied with the way the intervention was conducted?

A: Yes, because we did what we said we were going to do. Also, as former President Bush had worked it out in the beginning, we provided a lot of support for the next phase of the operation, involving the United Nations (which is) undertaking nation-building tasks that were not part of our mission. Our job was to get the fighting stopped and get medical and food aid delivered, thereby creating a climate so that the United Nations could do its job.

Q: How much much official guidance did you receive before leaving for Somalia?

A: Not much. Actually, we didn't need it. We were given the general parameters and told to get with it.

Q: Did you have special concerns initially in the operation?

A: There were two problems. One was the relationship between the military and the relief organizations. Within a week or two, that had pretty well sorted itself out. They were nervous about the military's coming in. When the military didn't get to everywhere in the country at the same time, they remained nervous. But they also were unhappy that some Somali groups and individuals with arms were taking advantage of looting as much as they could before the military arrived. Later, there was a big change of attitude. Relief workers were delighted.

Q: And the other problem?

A: The second problem was getting the Somalis more involved - making decisions, participating in relief activities, discussing security issues. Getting them involved took a bit longer, and it happened more up-country than it did in Mogadishu. In Baidoa, within a week after the Marines arrived, they had set up a Somali version of a New England town council. Numbering about 200, it included women, tribal leaders, religious leaders, professionals, teachers, etc. They became the local authority, consulting with the Marines on all matters, consulting with the relief groups.

Q: Some observers believe the United States shouldered too much of the burden in this crisis. Your thoughts?

A: The United States did what it had to do in order to make the intervention work. Otherwise, it wouldn't have worked. Nobody else had the capability to get two divisions into the country within two weeks. Also, the United States has a top military reputation among many countries. And the United States is probably more flexible and adaptable than other military establishments in working without a detailed plan. Marines, in particular, had been doing this in Bangladesh and northern Iraq, and could pick up the work quickly.

Q: Why was the state of affairs in Somalia allowed to deteriorate to the point that this intervention was necessary?

A: One reason is the traditional reluctance of the United Nations to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states, combined with the usual approach to peacekeeping. That is, going in with as few men as possible, trying to show that you're friendly, asking permission of the local authorities. Thus Pakistani peace forces were sent in. But they were met not with friendship, but with ridicule. In effect, they became hostages, unable to do anything.

Q: Could other African countries have done more earlier on?

A: Remember that a lot of African countries are in tough shape. In addition, despite the intervention by Africans in Liberia, the Organization of African Unity is not actively interventionist. However, they will have a study soon on OAU peacekeeping. African countries could be more active, as they were in the 1960s, but they must work with the United Nations. They're not capable of doing it alone. Nor are other regional organizations, as we've seen in Europe in dealing with former Yugoslavia.

Q: Was there any aspect of the intervention that you found disappointing?

A: The biggest disappointment was that we didn't have a parallel U.N. operation. We could have gotten further with disarming and demobilizing militias, retraining and reintegrating them into society, finding jobs and so forth. This is a very important area. The United Nations did this reasonably well, for example, in El Salvador and in Namibia. But not in Somalia. The United Nations was inactive; it stood aside as we went in. They weren't ready, although they are now.