What's so wrong with giving peace a chance?

September 13, 2010|By Ron Grossman

Perhaps never before has a bit of diplomatic theater received such ho-hum reviews as when Mahmoud Abbas and Benjamin Netanyahu had dinner at the White House earlier this month, unless the record belongs to a previous sit-down between Palestinian and Israeli leaders.

And yet . . .

The Middle East is the land of "and yet." It's been the sign-off phrase for myriad attempts to end decades of stalemate and violence.

In politics, as in fortune telling, it's tempting to see the future in heavenly alignments. Granted astrology's track record isn't inspiring, but consider the present constellation of peace-process players:

President Barack Obama is one gutsy fellow. His first year in office was devoted to a bruising battle for national health care. And, instead of taking a breather, he jumped into the middle of a long-running struggle in the Middle East.

And yet, there is political logic to Obama's hosting the kickoff of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations scheduled to resume in mid-September. He's caught in the middle of a parallel, domestic struggle. Liberals feel Israel has been given too easy a pass by U.S. policymakers, while Christian conservatives fervently support the Jewish state. So a peace treaty could stave off defections among Democrats and slow down a Republican resurgence.

Past failures curiously give the principals a present advantage. Israelis and Palestinians are like a couple caught up in a long-running divorce. They've been trading insults and accusations for so long, each knows the other's deal breakers. If the Palestinians say "right of return," the Israelis walk. If Israelis say "no settlement freeze" Palestinians leave the table. That allows both parties to concentrate on potential dealmakers.

One such was provided by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who, along with Jordan's King Abdullah II, joined Abbas and Netanyahu in Washington.

Mubarak suggested an outside military force be posted to the West Bank, thus dampening Israel's fear that an independent Palestine could be a launching pad for rocket attacks on its cities. But Mubarak's proposal also gives Abbas a new inducement to strike a deal. As a nationalist, Abbas obviously wants sovereignty — and an end to Israeli checkpoints that are not only an affront to Palestinians' dignity but an impediment to their economic development.

And yet, looking in the rear-view mirror, Abbas has to be concerned about his future. When the Israelis withdrew from Gaza, Hamas easily won a bloody confrontation with the Palestinian Authority. Would a treaty lead to a rerun in the West Bank? Mubarak's proposal might convince Abbas that he wouldn't be the first casualty of peace.

Like Obama, Netanyahu is flanked by opponents with strongly held positions. To the left are peaceniks more than willing to give up the West Bank. To the right are religious Zionists unwilling to shed even a square foot. Netanyahu based his political career on courting the right, but that doesn't mean that he couldn't be the Israeli leader to finally sign on the dotted line.

Whatever their feelings about war or peace with the Palestinians, a lot of Israelis are even more concerned about Iran getting the atom bomb. To the Israeli media and politicians of all stripes, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's twin hobby horses — insistence that Iran will be a nuclear power and that Israel has no right to exist — pose an "existential threat."

Israel previously eliminated nuclear programs in Saddam Hussein's Iraq and, three years ago, in Syria. Striking at Iran's atomic facilities would be a big plus for Netanyahu. Politically, he could probably trade giving up much of the West Bank for getting the U.S. to give him a free hand with Iran.

So the pieces are there of what statesmen used to call a Grand Strategy — the bundling together of several problems in an overarching proposal:

Abbas gets to be the father of his country; Netanyahu swaps an intractable problem, the occupied territories, for a tacit OK of a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear threat. Obama comes out with two big wins — making peace in the Middle East, a goal that has eluded other American presidents, and handing off the Iranian problem to the Israelis.

Of course, in politics no less than a bad marriage, long-squabbling partners sometimes prefer to continue the fight rather than sign divorce papers or a peace treaty.