Chapter V-5Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division

By the summer of 1946, the combat
efficiency of the 1st Marine Division
and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had
dropped far below wartime standards.
Neither organization was considered in
satisfactory shape to perform its normal
function in an amphibious operation.
The two units had become, in
effect, garrison forces with capabilities
geared to the missions which had been
theirs since the war's end.

The wing's troubles stemmed from
wholesale personnel turnover brought
on by rapid demobilization. General
Sanderson reported on 15 July: "Only
35% of the present enlisted strength of
the entire Wing can be considered to
have any qualifications other than
basic. . . ." He pointed out further that
MAG-24 had less than one experienced
mechanic for every four planes, and
that it was forced to operate at only
20 percent of aircraft availability. Progress
in correcting training deficiencies
was hampered by a lack of experienced
instructors.2

The division shared with the wing the
personnel problems brought on by demobilization. An extensive schooling
program begun by IIIAC to keep
abreast of the loss of specialists was
continued and expanded. Ranges were
opened near Peiping, Tientsin, Chinwangtao,
and Tsingtao to maintain
weapons proficiency and to qualify those
replacements who had missed range instruction
in boot camp. Squads and
platoons practiced tactics to the extent
that maneuver room was available in
the immediate vicinity of Marine posts,
but field training by larger formations
was not possible. By September, 1st
Division units were reporting military
efficiency levels of 25-35 percent,3
barely adequate to do the job at hand
and certainly far below acceptable
standards for amphibious troops.

Part of the solution to the combat
readiness problems of the division and
wing lay in a return to more normal
rates of personnel attrition. At the
direction of the Secretary of the Navy,
a target date of 1 October was set for
the discharge of all reserves and
draftees in the naval establishment, a
decision prompted by the limited postwar
funds available to operating
forces.4
From North China, all but a

--615--

handful of these men were on their way
home by mid-September. Replacements
scheduled to arrive during the fall
month% together with the regulars remaining,
promised stability in unit
rosters and therefore greater benefit
from training programs.

Substantial cuts in the strength of
Marine Forces, China, continued during
the summer, easing the replacement
problem appreciably, As a result
of the Communist threat to Tsingtao in
June, the Nationalist garrison had been
strengthened, and there seemed little
reason to station there any more Marines
than were necessary for the immediate
security and support of Seventh
Fleet shore installations. On 1 August,
the 1st Division issued an operation
order directing the reduction of Marine
Forces, Tsingtao, to the strength of a
reinforced infantry battalion. The 3d
Battalion, 4th Marines, augmented by
detachments from the regiment's supporting
units and with operational control
of VMO-6, was selected to remain.
Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II, was assigned
duty as Ics commander. The 12th
Service Battalion was directed to continue
supply functions for Navy and
Marine units in the Tsingtao area under
operational control of 7th Service Regiment.
The air units at Tsangkou Field,
except VMO-6, remained under the
wing's command.

All regulars in Tsingtao over the
number needed for the reinforced 3/4,
the 12th Service Battalion, and 1st
Wing detachments were transferred to
1st Division units in Hopeh. The reserves
and draftees eligible for discharge,
over 2,200 men, were transferred
to units returning to the United
States. In August, 3/12, the 3d Medical
Battalion, and headquarters, signal, and
service companies of the regimental
reinforcing elements sailed for the west
coast to form part of a new 3d Marine
Brigade organizing at Camp Pendleton.
On 3 September, the 4th Marines, less
3/4, embarked and sailed for Norfolk
to become a component of the 2d Marine
Division at Camp Lejeune. On the departure
of the regiment, the command
Marine Forces, Tsingtao, ceased to
exist, and Colonel Griffith reported to
the Commander, Naval Facilities,
Tsingtao, for operational control. At the
same time, the Marine air base at
Tsangkou came under the naval commander.
The division and wing retained
administrative control of their respective units.

The narrowing of the 1st Division's
operational responsibility to Hopeh was
made even more significant by a long-sought
change in Marine dispositions.
Sometime near the beginning of July,
General Marshall informed the Central
Government that he was going to order
the Marines off coal and rail guard duty
and bring an end to their exposure to
Communist attack. His decision forced
the Nationalists to begin relieving the
Marines without further delay.5
In July,
eight Marine bridge detachments were
replaced by troops of the 94th CNA,
which included four first-line divisions
equipped with American arms.

On 7 August, as the pace of reliefs
was accelerated, General Rockey reported
to Admiral Cooke the extent of
the Marine commitment along the railroad.
Over 4,700 officers and men, a

--616--

third of the actual strength of the 1st
Division,6
were stationed from Tangku
to Chinwangtao. Of that number, 873
Marines were on outpost duty, an assignment
that included the security of
20 bridges. Sixty men a day were detailed
to bridge guard on the coal trains
originating at Kuyeh; between 120 and
180 men were constantly employed in
this task. The close-in protection of the
KMA mines near Linsi was the responsibility
of three companies of the 5th
Marines. Intelligence indicated that
25,000 Communist troops, both regulars
and militia, were located within 15
miles of either side of the railroad in
the 1st Division zone of responsibility.
Nationalist forces in the same area, all
under the 94th CNA with headquarters
in Tientsin, totaled 35,898, but many of
these soldiers were former puppet
troops of dubious military worth.7

The Communists did not relax their
program of harassment while the Marines
were withdrawing from the railroad.
On 4 August a coal train headed
for Tientsin was ambushed and derailed
near Lutai. The four Marine
guards riding the caboose and Chinese
railroad police fought off the 50-man
ambush party; a relief train from
Tangku rescued the men. Sentries on
bridge and station outposts were often
sniped at, and occasionally a night-long
exchange of fire would occupy the Marines
and their elusive attackers.
Through August and September the
number of such incidents declined
steadily as the division's units became
less vulnerable. The Communists showed
no disposition toward attacks on the
main Marine positions, but such costly
attacks were unnecessary. The same
purpose of speeding the decision to
withdraw the Marines was accomplished
by harassing actions, and without the
risk of all-out retaliation.

In effecting a reorganization of its
positions, the division returned the battalions
of the 1st and 11th Marines in
Peiping to their parent units in Tientsin.
The 5th Marines (less 1/5) was
reassigned to Peiping and the command,
Peiping Marine Group, was dissolved.
The 1st Battalion, 5th, continued its
year-long association with Tangku and
remained responsible for the security
of the port and its warehouses and supply
dumps. In like manner, after pulling
in its outposts, the 7th Marines continued
to hold the American installations
in Peitaiho and Chinwangtao, a
job that had occupied the regiment
since the initial landings in China.

The last relief of Marine rail guards
by Nationalist troops took place on 30
September. The event also marked the
completion of moves which saw the concentration
of division units in three
main areas--Peiping, Tientsin-Tangku,
and Peitaiho-Chinwangtao. With the
ending of its responsibility for ensuring
coal delivery to Chinwangtao for shipment,
Marine Forces, China, had only
four residual missions: (1) to protect
U.S. property, installations, and personnel;
(2) to maintain such detachments
in port areas as were necessary
for its own support; (3) to guard only
those routes and means of communication

--617--

necessary for its own support; and
(4) to assist and provide logistical support
for U.S. Army activities of Executive
Headquarters.

While the ground elements of the
division were regrouping, the wing made
two changes that reflected the altered
nature of Marine operations in China.
On 22 September, the wing service
squadron, which had acted as a personnel
clearing center at Tsangkou Field
for almost a year, moved to Changkeichuang
Field outside Tientsin to
relieve headquarters squadron of maintenance,
housekeeping, and transportation
details. On 15 October, VMO-6
was detached from 3/4's command and
moved to Tientsin to provide additional
reconnaissance aircraft to cover supply
trains bridging the gaps between
Marine garrisons and to scout the immediate
vicinity of American defensive
positions. Both transfers were made
entirely by air.

During this period of change, the last
two general officers who had made the
original landing completed their China
duty. On 26 August, General Worton
was relieved as ADC by Brigadier General
Alfred H. Noble, and on 18 September,
Major General Samuel L. Howard
relieved General Rockey in command of
the division. Rockey's new post was
Commanding General, Department of
the Pacific, and Worton took command
of Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, in
succession to Noble.8
Howard, a China-duty
veteran who had commanded the
4th Marines in Shanghai in 1941, acted
quickly to forestall any thought by the
Chinese that a change of command
meant a change in Marine purpose. In a
public statement addressed to the people
of North China, he stated:

The U.S. Government's announced
policy is the promotion of peace and harmony
in China. General George C. Marshall
and the members of his Executive
Headquarters are working toward that end.

The U.S. Marines have no part in the
establishment of our nation's policy. We
are an organization whose traditional duty
is to support and uphold that policy and
to protect American lives and property in
any part of the globe. We are in China
to carry out the directives of our State
Department or those of General Marshall.
This we propose to do.9

The Communist attitude toward the
Marines did not soften in any way with
the withdrawal of the Americans from
railroad and mine outposts. General
Howard's assumption of command was
greeted with an incident as serious as
that at Anping in what it portended--a
well planned raid on the Division Ammunition
Supply Point at Hsin Ho six
miles northwest of Tangku. The supply
point was laid out along the edge of a
large oval almost two miles across on
its long axis and just over a mile wide
on the short; the area enclosed was
marshy ground. A barbed wire fence, a
motor road, and eight sentry towers
ringed the oval; the ammunition was
disposed in tented piles between the
towers. During the summer of 1946,
this ammunition supply seemed an
irresistible lure to many individuals and
small groups which attempted to steal
from it. Sentries were frequently fired

--618--

upon and their return fire drove off several
raiding parties bent on getting at
the contents of the tents inside the
barbed wire. The last such incident
happened on 4 September and then a
lull occurred which set the stage for a
determined effort by the Communists to
make a sizeable haul.

At about 2200 on 3 October, a sentry
at the ammunition point's Post 3, which
was nearly a quarter of a mile from the
guard house, discovered a large group
of Chinese just outside the perimeter
wire. When he approached to investigate,
he was fired upon and, after an
exchange of shots, ran to the sentry
tower to call in an alarm. While he was
phoning, a raiding group cut through
the wire, entered one of the tents, and
began carrying off ammunition boxes.
The sentry's rifle fire failed to stop the thieves.

A strong covering party of the
raiders, from positions in the fields adjoining
the ammunition point, opened a
heavy fire on a truck carrying men of
the guard to the aid of the sentry. Before
the Marines could reach Post 3,
they were forced to dismount, take
cover, and build up a firing line, while
the remainder of the guard, 52 men in
all, came up and joined the fight. Gradually
the firing from the fields died
away and when a reinforcement of 100
men of 1/5 from Tangku arrived at
2300 the Chinese had disappeared.
Machine guns and mortars were set up
and searching fire by flare light was
delivered for several hours to discourage
any repetition of the raid. At dawn
the nearby fields were thoroughly
searched; one dead and one wounded
Communist soldier were found and 11
cases of rifle ammunition and grenades
were recovered. An inventory showed
32 cases of pistol, carbine, and rifle ammunition
were missing. Papers on the
dead man and interrogation of the
prisoner identified the raiding group as
a 200-man company from the Road Protecting
Battalion of the 53d Communist
Regiment; the unit had come from an
area about 35 miles north of Tangku in
a day's hard marching.

The Communists withdrew as rapidly
and as secretly as they had come. Aerial
reconnaissance did not spot them or the
donkey carts they had brought with
them to carry away the ammunition.
The raid was well planned, well executed,
and but for the prompt reaction
of the Marine guards might have been
even more successful. The strengthened
security precautions taken at Hsin Ho
as a natural result of the raid did not
discourage the Communists from attempting
further attacks, but they
helped delay a return engagement until spring.

Almost as the last shots were dying
away at Hsin Ho, General Marshall was
reporting to President Truman that he
felt he could no longer be useful in China
as a mediator. Neither side was willing

--619--

to honor its truce agreement nor to
make any concessions which would materially
weaken its position. The fires of
hatred fanned by years of bitter civil
strife could not be quenched by negotiations.
An American reporter categorizing
the attitude of the Communists
and the Nationalists at this time aptly
summed up the situation: "Each side is
convinced of the insincerity of the other.
Each side is convinced that the enemy
aims only at its destruction. And each
side is right."11

Unwilling to admit failure whenever
the barest glimmer of hope for peace
remained, Marshall continued to try to
bring the two sides together during the
remainder of the year. His efforts were
fruitless. Finally, on 3 January 1947,
President Truman directed Marshall's
recall for consultation and on the 7th, as
the general was preparing to leave
China, announced Marshall's nomination
as the next Secretary of State. In evaluating
the Marshall mission, the President commented:

. . . it is important to bear in mind that
even before he left for China there already
existed a formal agreement in writing between
the Central Government and the
Communists to work toward national
unity. This is the agreement that was
brought about previously with the assistance
of Ambassador Hurley when he
headed our diplomatic mission to China,
and had this not already been in existence
I would not have sent Marshall to China.12

General Marshall issued a strongly
worded personal statement as he left
China which outlined his views on the
reason for failure of the negotiations
leading toward peace and coalition government.
On the Nationalist side he laid
most of the blame on a "dominant group
of reactionaries" in the Kuomintang
who believed "that cooperation by the
Chinese Communist Party in the government
was inconceivable and that only
a policy of force could definitely settle
the issue."13
While he recognized the
existence of an even more powerful and
doctrinaire group among the Communist
leaders who would not compromise their
views, Marshall stated that he considered
that there was "a definite liberal
group among the Communists, especially
of young men who have turned to the
Communists in disgust at the corruption
evident in the local governments--men
who could put the interests of the Chinese
people above ruthless measures to
establish a Communist idealogy in the
immediate future."14

The American representative recognized,
however, that many knowledgeable
people disagreed entirely with his
thesis, holding that Communist party
discipline was so rigid that it could not
condone the existence of divergent viewpoints.
Marshall advocated as a solution
to the China crisis the assumption of
leadership by liberals in the Central
Government and in independent minority
parties, In the context of his remarks,
it is apparent that he had few
illusions that what he recommended
would occur.

--620--

While American efforts to bring about
peace in China were reaching a final
peak of frustration and disappointment,
the role of the Marines was undergoing
a sharp reappraisal. The mission of assistance
and support to American-sponsored
activities of Executive Headquarters
was the prime reason for the
continued presence of the 1st Marine
Division in North China. As it became
increasingly apparent that a complete
collapse of truce negotiations was in
the offing, plans were laid for the withdrawal
of all Marine units from Hopeh.
Guam, which was being developed as the
principal forward base of FMFPac, was
originally designated the redeployment
point for the entire division, but later
plans provided for gradual reduction
of forces with some outfits slated for
Guam, others for the west coast, and a
few aviation units headed for Hawaii.
The first major move was ordered from
Washington and called for the return
of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) directly
to the States.15

A division operation plan incorporating
this decision was issued on 2 December.
All troops were scheduled to ship
out from Chinwangtao. Before the
month's end, the 7th Marines was
directed to disband the reinforcing companies
of the division service and support
battalions which had been attached
to it during most of the China tour of
duty. Those men eligible for return on
the basis of their time overseas were
incorporated in the regiment's ranks;
recent replacements were transferred
to units remaining in China. Two artillery
battalions, 3/11 and 4/11, and
VMO-6 were attached to the regiment
for the return voyage. A small rear
echelon was charged with the responsibility
for disposing of all U.S. property
in the Chinwangtao-Peitaiho area. To
provide security while American troops
and supplies were being shipped from
Chinwangtao, a guard detachment of
two companies from 1/1 was sent to the
KMA port town on 28 December. The 7th
Marines embarked and sailed on 5 January,
reporting to FMFPac for operational
and administrative control.

Sailing with the regiment but bound
for Ewa on Oahu was the ground echelon
of VMF(N)-533. In December, the
flight echelon of the squadron had flown
its night fighters to Guam via Shanghai,
Okinawa, and Iwo Jima; from Guam the
planes were shipped the rest of the way
to Ewa. Eleven days after the VMF-(N)-533 aircraft staged through Okinawa,
the Corsairs of VMF-115 were
flown to the island to pick up the carrier
Tarawa as a transport to Ewa. This cut
in MAG-24 strength was ordered on 23
December as a part of a further reduction
of Marine Forces, China, which saw
the departure of the remaining units of
the 11th Marines for Guam.

Heavy icing conditions at Taku Bar
and in the Hai River made it necessary
to use Chinwangtao as the shipping
point for troops ordered out on 23 December
also. The 1st Tank Battalion,
less Company B which remained attached
to the 1st Marines and Company
C which had been disbanded by the 7th
Marines, left for Guam with the division
artillery regiment on 18 January. The

--621--

ground echelon of VMF-115 sailed at
the same time for Ewa.

For a short while in December, Marine
combat units were leaving China
as Army dependents arrived. General
Marshall had approved the sending out
of the wives and children of personnel
attached to Executive Headquarters before
the truce reached its final stages
of disintegration. As a result, dependents
began arriving at Tangku in August
and were escorted to Peiping by
Marine train guards and covering flights
of OYs. A sizeable shipload arrived on
14 November, but the situation was such
that many of these people were sent
home on 23 December when another dependent
ship arrived. Thereafter the
civilian traffic was all one way--homebound.
Many dependents bound for Peiping
never got off the ships they arrived in.

Some Marine officers and senior NCOs
who were normally entitled to have their
dependents with them at peacetime
overseas stations were quite anxious to
have their families join them in China.
When the matter was first seriously considered
in the summer of 1946 after the
Navy had approved the idea in principle,16
General Rockey recommended
strongly against its adoption for forces
in Hopeh. Aside from the obvious danger
from Communist action, he felt that
the personnel and military situation was
too fluid, that suitable housing was not
available, and that there was a significant
danger to the health of women and
children exposed to a wealth of strange
diseases.17
Before he left China, however,
Rockey endorsed the idea of sending
Marine dependents to Tsingtao since
its geographic situation permitted quick
evacuation and close-in naval support,
while the health and housing picture was
considerably better than it was in Tientsin
and Peiping.18
On 29 November, the
Commandant wrote to General Howard
that he was ready to recommend to the
Secretary of the Navy that dependents
be sent out to China as soon as the
troop list was firm.19
Marine families
actually began arriving at Tsingtao in
late fall, following by several months
the arrival of the first dependents of
Navy men stationed at the port.

The Department of State made its
formal announcement of the end of
American participation in the activities
of Executive Headquarters on 29 January.
The stay of the 1st Division units
in Hopeh was tied to the evacuation of
American personnel and property from
Peiping. In a new operation order issued
on 3 February, the division was directed
to provide tactical and logistical support
to the Army's Peiping-based forces until
their withdrawal was completed and
at the same time to finish preparations
for its own departure from China. The
1st Marines in Tientsin and the 5th in
Peiping and Tangku were ordered to
provide train guards, rescue parties, and
motor convoys as needed in addition to
routine security detachments. One battalion
of the 1st Marines was to be ready
to fly to Shanghai on six hour's notice,
a requirement which reflected the fact

--622--

that the few Army and Navy units left
in the central Chinese city were not
organized or equipped to protect American
lives and property.

Training was the keynote of China
duty for the ground elements of General
Howard's command during the
waning months of the Marines' stay in
Hopeh. Between the fall of 1946 and the
spring of 1947, there was a steady but
slow rise in the reported combat efficiency
of the various elements of the
division, but the lack of opportunity for
large unit maneuvers and amphibious
practice put an effective ceiling on efficiency
ratings. By April only the
medical and motor transport battalions,
whose duties were roughly the same in
war and in peace, reported percentages
of combat efficiency as high as 75 percent;
the remainder of the division hovered
around the 50 percent mark and
the infantry regiments hung at 40 percent.20

The situation in the 1st Wing was
somewhat better since the pilots were
able to maintain flying proficiency. The
requirements for patrol flights were
sharply curtailed, however, by the fold-up of Executive Headquarters and the
consolidation of Marine positions. In
December, VMF-211 got in three weeks
of gunnery practice over the sea off
Tsingtao while it was temporarily based
at Tsangkou Field, but in general
fighter pilots had little opportunity for
combat training. As far as the crews of
VMR-153 were concerned, there was no
discernible letup in the heavy schedule of
operations that they had met since the
transport planes first reached North
China. In late February, at Seventh
Fleet order, the squadron began dropping
UNRRA supplies, mainly clothing
and medical items, in Communist territory
in western Hopeh.21
By 27 March
when this mission ended, three-quarters
of a million pounds of relief supplies
had been air dropped.

Marine transports were sent to
Tsinan on 3 March to evacuate 17
American and foreign civilians threatened
by fighting between CNA and Communist
troops. This particular type of
rescue mission was to become more and
more a part of the VMR-153 routine as
its stay in China continued and the civil
war situation grew less and less favorable
to the Nationalists. The decision as
to what aviation units were to remain
in China after the withdrawal of the
1st Marine Division (Reinforced) had
been made in Washington by March and
the ubiquitous transport squadron
headed the slim list of units scheduled to
base at Tsangkou where a new command,
Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force,
Western Pacific (AirFMFWesPac), was
to be organized.

Colonel John N. Hart, the chief of
staff of the wing, was assigned duties
as commanding officer of the new organization
which was to be a part of

--623--

the over-all Marine command to be activated
at Tsingtao--FMFWesPac. The
wing issued the operation order for the
withdrawal of its units on 25 March
as a preliminary part of the 1st Division's
similar inclusive plan which was
published on 1 April. In addition to VMR-
153, one fighter squadron (VMF-211),
a headquarters squadron (formed from
the wing service squadron), and the air
base detachment already at Tsangkou
were included in Hart's command. The
pilots of VMF-218 began flying their
ships to Shanghai via Tsingtao on 26
March and completed a further move to
Okinawa by the 30th. From Okinawa the
Corsairs picked up a carrier for transport
to Guam.

Guam was to be the next base for
the wing and for MAG-24, and the
planes and men of the headquarters and
service squadrons moved to the Marianas
in April. The advance CPs of the
wing and group opened on Guam on the
24th. The rear echelon of MAG-24
closed out all Marine facilities at South
Field by 9 May and headed for Guam;
with its departure all scheduled flights
to Peiping ceased. While the 1st Marine
Division remained in China, a few transports
of VMR-153 and six fighters of
VMF-211 remained at Changkeichuang
Field, which was serviced by an air base
detachment. Regular flight operations
from the field did not end until 19 June.

The final plan for the withdrawal of
the 1st Marine Division ground elements
was preceded by several minor
moves which anticipated the deployment
ordered on 1 April as had the 1st MAW
plan. On 10 March, Company B of the
1st Pioneer Battalion was sent to Guam
to assist in camp construction activities
for the 1st Brigade which was slated
to be based on the island. Brigadier General
Edward A. Craig, who had relieved
General Noble as ADC at the turn
of the year, was the commander designate
of the new unit.22
On the 17th,
Company E of 2/1 was ordered to
Tsingtao to augment 3/4 so that the
reinforced battalion could relieve all seamen
guards at naval installations. At
the same time the 1st Reconnaissance
Company was sent to Chinwangtao to
relieve the one 1st Marines company still
on duty with the guard detachment at
the port.

Essentially, the division's withdrawal
plan, which was to take effect on the departure
of the last elements of the
Army's headquarters group from Peiping,
divided the division into four detachments.
The Marine ground units
detailed to FMFWesPac included the 1st
Marines, less its Weapons Company and
1/1, and company-sized attachments
from the division's headquarters, service,
engineer, medical, and motor transport
battalions. Similar attachments of
division supporting troops were added to
the 5th Marines which was scheduled
for Guam as the infantry component of
the 1st Brigade. The headquarters companies
of FMFWesPac and of the 1st
Brigade were to be formed by redesignating
the Headquarters and Service
Companies of the 1st and 5th Marines. A
rear echelon consisting of the 7th Service
Regiment and 1/1 was directed to
dispose of all U.S. property in the area
occupied by Marines before withdrawing.
All remaining elements of the division

--624--

were ordered to Camp Pendleton to
join units then stationed there and to
rebuild others to form a new 1st Marine Division.

During this period when the division
withdrawal plan was just getting underway,
the Communists made their most
punishing attack against the Marines.
Again the ammunition point at Hsin Ho
was the target, and by all indications the
raiding force was the same one that had
hit the point in October.
(See Map 36.)
Ironically, the Marine guards were close
to the end of their task when the Communists
struck. The 7th Service Regiment
had nearly finished the process of
separating the serviceable ammunition
from the stocks and shipping it out of
China. Much of what remained was
useable but unstable or in poor condition.
Although no decision had been
made as yet to turn over this ammunition
residue to the Nationalists,23
the prospect that this might be done was
obvious and may have triggered the attack.

Following the October raid, the layout
of the supply point had been altered
from an oval to a more regular triangular
shape, with the long axis toward the
north. The ammunition was grouped in
eight dump areas along the triangle's
legs, a pair two miles in length and a
shorter side a little over a mile long. At
the northern apex, the point most
distant from the guardhouse, was a two-man
sentry post. Several other fixed
posts were placed at strategic points
along the perimeter and jeep patrols
checked the open stretches between. The
security system was adequate to discourage
thievery and to hold off the attacks
of small raiding groups until
reinforcements could arrive from
Tangku, but it was not designed to cope
with an attack by a force estimated at
350 well-armed men.

At about 0115 on 5 April, a bugle call
sounded from the fields adjacent to the
northernmost sentry post and a fusillade
of rifle and machine gun fire burst out of
the night directed at the Marines. The
two sentries returned the Communist
fire for about 10 minutes before they
were killed. Two separate bodies of raiders
then penetrated the northern dump,
their action evidently a diversion for
a stronger and heavier attack which
took place farther down the eastern side
of the ammunition point. The target of
this attack was a dump area containing
artillery and mortar ammunition and
fuzes. The Communist fire emptied a
patrol jeep, killing all three occupants,
and drove back the other sentries as
well as the men from the main guard
coming to their rescue. Eight more Marines
were wounded in the exchange of shots.

As soon as word was received in
Tangku that the Hsin Ho point was
under attack Company C of 1/5 was
dispatched to the scene. The Communists
were ready for them. At 0200, as the
self-propelled 105mm howitzer leading
the relief column reached a narrow point
in the road near Hsin Ho, it was disabled
by a land mine and blocked the
way. Immediately, the Marine vehicles
following, a jeep and two trucks crowded
with men, were subjected to an intense
fire coming from an irrigation ditch only
40 yards east of the road. Under cover of

--625--

Map 36: Attack on Hsin Ho Ammunition Supply Point, 5 April 1947

--626--

this fire, two waves of Communist soldiers
rushed forward and threw grenades
at the Marines who had taken
cover behind the trucks and were firing
back. The Communists, a group of 35-40
men, then pulled back to the ditch and
kept up a brisk exchange for another 15
minutes before they were driven off.
Eight more Marines were wounded in
this well-planned ambush.

By this time the main body of the
raiders was withdrawing, leaving behind
six dead and taking an estimated
20-30 wounded with them. Tracks
showed that six to eight carts and a
number of pack animals carried full
loads of ammunition out of the dump
but no accurate count of what was lost
could be taken since the Communists
blew up the remnants of the piles they
had stolen from. A rear guard composed
of the raiders who had hit the northern
dump area furnished covering fire until
0300 when the last of the Communists
drew off. Again, as in the first Hsin Ho
attack, the Communists got away undetected.

Heavy punitive columns from 1/5 and
planes from VMO-3 and VMF-211 were
on the trail at dawn but the only Communists
sighted were those who had died
in the attack. The raiders and their
booty, ammunition and fuzes which
could be made into mines, were able to
reach a ferry across the Chin Chung
River eight miles north of Hsin Ho and
disappear on the other side into a maze
of farming villages and fields.

The unsatisfactory ending of the second
Hsin Ho attack was a grim reminder
of the handicaps under which the Marines
operated in North China. The initiative
rested with the Communists, who
attacked when and where they pleased,
secure in the knowledge that once they
struck and ran they were safe from
effective reprisal hidden among the
thousands of villagers within a short
distance of any Marine post.

As a matter of expediency, before the
month of April was out the ammunition
point was being guarded by Nationalist
troops. The transfer had little element
of formality; "it was more a walking
away from the ammunition than a turnover."24
Only a small detachment from
7th Service Regiment which was cleaning
up the last stocks of serviceable ammunition
remained at Hsin Ho and these
men were withdrawn to Tientsin on 15
May.25
At virtually the same time in
Tsingtao, the Nationalists began acquiring
similar stocks of American ammunition
declared unserviceable by boards
of survey. The ammunition was dumped
in small quantities in revetments near
Tsangkou Field after the local CNA
commander was informed of the intention
to do so. Naturally enough, the ammunition
quickly disappeared.26

Marine activities in Hopeh gradually
shut down and centered in Tientsin as
the division withdrew on schedule. The
last motor convoy carrying 5th Marines
gear cleared Peiping on 12 May, and on

--627--

the same date the regiment (less 1/5)
sailed for Guam. On the 20th, the 1st Marines
departed for Tsingtao, leaving 1/1
as the guard force for the rear echelon.
The port of Tangku's garrison was secured
when 7th Service Regiment withdrew
its naval detachment, the successor
to GroPac-13, to Tientsin, and 1/5 followed
the rest of its regiment to Guam
on the 24th. For a few days, the only
Marines in Hopeh stationed outside of
Tientsin were at Chinwangtao, but Communist
attacks on the railroad at that
port soon prompted their withdrawal.

The Communist drive on Chinwangtao
was in sufficient strength to threaten
the CNA perimeter positions, and Nationalist
gunboats fired over the Marine
camp on one occasion to beat back attacks
on the railroad.27
Between 22-24 May, 79 U.S. and European civilians
were evacuated from Peitaiho by Marine
OYs and Navy landing craft. On the
26th, the Marine guard detachment, the
1st Pioneer Battalion which had taken
post in late April to relieve the reconnaissance
company, boarded LSMs and
left for Tientsin. The Communist attack
proved to be only the most serious of a
long series of attempts to disrupt rail
traffic in the vital corridor to Manchuria,
and the Nationalists were able to
retain their hold on Chinwangtao.

The remainder of the division shipped
out for the States and Guam during the
first weeks of June. The only threat to
the orderly withdrawal procedure was
a report received on the 18th that the
Communists intended to attack Tangku.
To counter this action, a rifle company
at Tsingtao was alerted for airlift to
Tientsin to reinforce 1/1. The threat
failed to materialize and the division
headquarters battalion and attached
units sailed for San Diego on 20 June.
At midnight on the 19th, Lieutenant
Colonel Frederick L. Wieseman, commanding
the division rear echelon, reported
by dispatch to the Commanding
General, FMFWesPac, for operational control.

The troop strength of Fleet Marine
Force, Western Pacific, was settled early
in 1947 at an interdepartmental conference
in Washington in line with the
State Department view "that the number
of United States armed forces ashore
in China should be maintained at the
minimum compatible with United States
interests."29
The command drew its
name from the altered title of Seventh
Fleet which had been redesignated
Naval Forces, Western Pacific in January.
Named to head FMFWesPac, which
was activated on 1 May, was Brigadier
General Omar T. Pfeiffer, who had
served under Admiral Cooke as Fleet
Marine and Planning Officer since January
1946.30

The basic organization of General
Pfeiffer's command included a force
headquarters and service battalion, two
infantry battalions, the 12th Service

--628--

Battalion, and AirFMFWesPac. Its
strength at the end of May after all its
elements had joined was 279 officers
and 3,747 enlisted men. Administratively,
the air elements remained a part
of 1st MAW with operational control
resting with General Pfeiffer. In the
case of the service battalion, the same
situation applied although the phrasing
vested "military command and coordination
control" in FMFWesPac and retained
"management and technical control"
in Service Command, FMFPac.31

In the absence of a regular artillery
unit, FMFWesPac was reinforced by
enough officers and men to form the nucleus
of a provisional artillery organization
with two six-gun 105mm howitzer
batteries. Five officers and 16 men were
added to the force as a tactical headquarters,
and one rifle company in each
infantry battalion was augmented by 3
officers and 22 artillerymen. These reinforced
companies were commanded by
artillery majors with infantry captains
as executive officers. The battalions were
commanded by colonels with lieutenant
colonels as executives.32

FMFWesPac was ordered to continue
the principal mission executed by 3/4
and its predecessors of furnishing security
for American naval installations.
In alternate months, each of the two
infantry battalions was to furnish all
the guard details needed for wharfs and
warehouses, barracks and headquarters,
and ammunition dumps and motor pools.
One company, initially E of 2/1, was
assigned to the air base guard for several months at a time. The force's lone
tank platoon was permanently stationed
at the field as part of its defenses.

In addition to its guard duties,
FMFWesPac had a mission of providing
emergency protection for American
lives and property in Tientsin, Nanking,
and Shanghai. The three cities contained
the majority of Americans in China on
government business, aside from the
sizeable contingent at Tsingtao. The protective
requirement was temporary in
nature as far as the 1,900-man division
rear echelon at Tientsin was concerned;
its planned departure date was set for
the end of August. At the Chinese
capitol of Nanking, there were 1,240
military and diplomatic personnel and
their dependents and at Shanghai were
another 1,700. Besides these official representatives,
more than 4,500 American
nationals were in China on private business
and the number was steadily increasing.

Airlift was the means of accomplishing
the quick reinforcement intended
by FMFWesPac orders. The infantry
company at Tsangkou had to have a
rifle platoon ready at all times for lift
on an hour's notice, One of VMR-153'S
R5C transports stood by on the same
alert. On six hour's warning, all of 2/1
had to be prepared to lift from Tsangkou
in the squadron's transports. In surprise
practice alerts undertaken during
the summer, the ready platoon was aloft
in half an hour and seven plane loads
of infantrymen were airborne in less
than an hour. On the departure of 2/1,
3/4 was to undertake all security commitments,
including those at the airfield,
assisted by bluejackets trained in
interior guard duty by the Marines.

--629--

The addition of a second infantry
battalion to the units at Tsingtao was
made in part so that a realistic program
of amphibious training could be scheduled.
By alternating months of guard
and training, both battalions were able
to increase combat efficiency appreciably.
All summer long, small unit practice
for amphibious exercises planned
for the fall was the daily routine of the
battalion in training. An important adjunct
of this improved program was the
instruction given ships' landing forces
in the tactics and techniques of land
combat. One or two ships of Admiral
Cooke's forces were detailed each month
for this training which was conducted
as a regular activity of FMFWesPac.

No amount of planning or training,
however, could overcome Tsingtao's
most serious deficiency as a site for amphibious
exercises. There was no safe
impact area for live firing in support
and execution of a landing, and no room
for maneuver ashore in the heavily cultivated
countryside. Fields used by the
Marines in cold weather for extended
order training were denied them as soon
as the spring thaws allowed crops to be
planted. The city's food supply was too
critical as a result of the Communist
economic blockade to permit the leasing
of arable land for troop use.

The problem of a suitable area for
training did not plague the fighter
squadron at Tsangkou as much as it did
the ground units it was to support. In
June, 17 pilots of VMF-211 went to
Guam for ten days training in naval
gunfire spotting techniques. While these
men were gone, a like number of VMF-218 pilots from Guam took their place
to maintain the state of readiness. The
sea off the port of Tsingtao was available
as a firing range, and in mid-August
VMF-211 was able to practice strafing
and dive and glide bombing in attacks
on a Japanese destroyer sailed to the
area as a target. Later in the month, the
squadron flew combat air patrol for fleet
units maneuvering off Tsingtao.

Heavy weather dogging these exercises
was responsible for the loss of
three Corsairs. The pilots of two were
recovered quickly, one from the sea and
another from a friendly sector of the
Tsingtao countryside; the third pilot
was taken by the Communists when he
landed out of gas on the south shore of
Shantung Peninsula. His plane was
sighted on 28 August, and a landing
party sent ashore to destroy it and find
the flyer exchanged fire with local Communists
as it withdrew. Fifteen days
later the pilot was returned unharmed,
but only after lengthy negotiations, the
submission of a letter explaining the incident
from Admiral Cooke, and the
payment of $1,000 plus medical supplies
as compensation for damages supposedly
sustained by the Communists.33

The status of VMR-153 as the odd-job
and workhorse squadron of Marine
air in China was not in any way changed
by its assignment to AirFMFWesPac.
Courier flights to Tientsin were made
twice weekly after 20 June to expedite
the withdrawal of the division rear
echelon; Changkeichuang Field was
manned by a liaison detail from 7th
Service Regiment during landing and
takeoff. Nanking and Shanghai were

--630--

stopping points in a regular schedule
of transport and cargo flights which
maintained physical contact between the
major American bases in China. The
squadron continued to perform chores
outside the common military pattern,
and on 28-29 August it flew 218 Germans
from Tsingtao, Canton, and Tientsin
to Shanghai where they boarded a
repatriation ship. The former enemy
nationals were not wanted in China by
the Central Government, and the U.S.
State Department cooperated in arranging
their transport.

August was the time of departure.
General Pfeiffer completed his tour of
overseas duty, having established
FMFWesPac as a flourishing command.
Brigadier General Gerald C. Thomas, the
former Director of Plans and Policies,
Headquarters Marine Corps, relieved
him.34
At the same time, Colonel Hart
relinquished command of AirFMFWesPac to Colonel Frank H. Lamson-Scribner.
The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at
Tientsin mounted out for the States on
27 August, its destination Camp Pendleton
and the 1st Marine Division. The
remainder of the rear echelon, its task
completed, boarded ship by 30 August
and sailed for Guam. On 12 September,
Lieutenant Colonel Wieseman reported
with 7th Service Regiment to the 1st
Brigade and at the end of the month
the regiment was officially disbanded.

The withdrawal of these Marine units
from Hopeh marked the end of 25
months of difficult, sometimes hectic
service. Tsingtao now became the focus
of attention, but duty in the Shantung
port continued to have a different aspect
than that which prevailed in the north.
In many senses, during the remainder
of its existence FMFWesPac repeated
Marine history. Its actions paralleled
those performed by the expeditionary
and garrison forces in the China of the
prewar era. As an arm of the fleet
ashore, it provided security for American
nationals in danger when the civil
war's tide turned overwhelmingly
against the Nationalists.

By the summer of 1947, the Communists
had their Nationalist opponents
dead in their sights. A mounting series
of offensives in Manchuria cut off and
annihilated or captured CNA outpost
garrisons. Lines of communication between
major cities were severed and
permanently blocked. In less than six
months the Nationalists were effectively
isolated in several large garrison areas.
In order to shake loose from Communist
nooses which were slowly tightening,
the Nationalists had either to reinforce
their armies strongly and take the offensive
or to consolidate positions quickly
to conserve men. They did neither.

The weak reinforcements sent were
dissipated ineffectually, and hundreds
of thousands of men were tied to the
defenses of cities whose retention added
little or nothing to Nationalist military
or economic strength. It was evident
that few leaders in Nanking appreciated

--631--

the truth of the Communist battle
philosophy espoused by one of Mao Tse-tung's
commanders: "When you keep
men and lose land, the land can be retaken;
If you keep land and lose
soldiers, you lose both."36

Vividly illustrative of the Communist
viewpoint was their reaction to a CNA
drive to capture the Red capital at
Yenan. Rather than tie themselves to
position defenses, Mao Tse-tung's forces
faded before the advance and let the
Nationalists take the remote Shensi city.
The victors then were exposed at the
end of a long and vulnerable supply line
and became besieged instead of besiegers.
Similarly, Nationalist advances
in Hopeh and Shantung, which included
the capture of Chefoo in October, were
hollow successes. The attack objectives
were cities, not soldiers, and the attacking
forces soon settled into a sit-tight
defensive pattern to protect their prizes
and withered as fighting units.

The deterioration of Nationalist
morale was compounded of many factors.
American military observers noted
a significant loss of popular support for
the Nationalists among the war-wearied
people, and Chiang's soldiers in return
evidenced little regard for the natives
of Manchuria and North China. Many
of the men in the CNA ranks were
from southern and central provinces
and had not seen their homes or families
for years; there was no rotation
plan for veterans. Inflation robbed the
soldier's meager pay of any value, and
an incredibly inept supply system often
left him on short rations, with ailing
equipment, and too little ammunition.
To top the dismal picture, the military
hierarchy in Nanking kept changing
senior field commanders; the rate of
turnover was high early in 1947 and
soared higher as reverses mounted. In
all save a few cases, proven combat
leadership was subordinated to political
considerations in making appointments.

The situation was so black that American
leaders were in a quandary as to
just what their future policy toward
China should be. In May 1946, General
Marshall had determined that the Communists
and Nationalists were not cooperating
to establish peace and a coalition
government as they had promised,
and he had been instrumental in imposing
an embargo on U.S. arms shipments
to the Central Government. This
cut-off of munitions supply to the
Nationalists lasted a year and the results
were felt sharply in the fighting
in the latter part of 1947. The 6,500
tons of ammunition turned over to the
CNA by the Marines at Hsin Ho and
Tsingtao between April and September
was a helpful measure, but little more
than a stopgap. The Communists, aided
by the huge quantities of Japanese
munitions handed over to them by the
Soviets and by their own increasing
captures of Nationalist weapons and
ammunition, fared better on the arms
supply front than their adversaries.

In July, at the request of President
Truman and Secretary Marshall, General
Wedemeyer headed a special mission
to China to investigate and report

--632--

on the situation as he found it.37
He was asked to advise on what aid measures
might be taken to bolster the Central
Government and what would be the consequences
if no assistance was given.
For a month members of the mission
visited China's major cities and talked
with many prominent persons both in
and out of Government. The report of
the detailed survey and its conclusions
were presented to the President on 19 September.

In his report, General Wedemeyer
severely criticized the Central Government
and its conduct of political, economic
and military affairs. He pointed
out, however, that the U.S. had little
choice but to support the Nationalists,
since the Chinese Communists were
furthering the aims of the Soviet Union
in the Far East, and these aims were
diametrically opposed to those of the
United States and jeopardized its strategic
security. Although Wedemeyer
made a number of specific recommendations
designed to remedy the situation,
including increased American
economic assistance and the institution
of a United Nations-sponsored trusteeship
of Manchuria, the crux of his feelings
was summed up in an extract from
the report's conclusions:

The only working basis on which national
Chinese resistance to Soviet aims
can be revitalized is through the presently
corrupt, reactionary and inefficient Chinese
National Government.

The National Government is incapable
of supporting an army of the size it now
has in the field.

In order to preclude defeat by Communist
forces, it is necessary to give the
National Government sufficient and prompt
military assistance under the supervision
of American advisors in specified military fields.

American military aid to China should
be moral, material, and advisory. It should
be an integrated part of our world wide
policy of military assistance to certain
nations.38

The Wedemeyer report was not made
public after its presentation and the tone
of urgency its recommendations contained
was not translated into immediate
action. Although Congress subsequently
increased American economic
and military aid and the military advisory
groups in China were strengthened,
the pace of this support did not
match that at which the Nationalist
fortunes declined.

The confused military picture at this
critical point in the civil war was best
explained by the man most responsible
for its being--Mao Tse-tung. In a
speech to his principal subordinates on
25 December 1947, the Communist
leader laid out a ten-point path of conquest,
a primer for the warfare that had
gone before and the battles to come:

(1). First strike scattered and isolated
groups of the enemy, and later strike concentrated,
powerful groups.

(2). First take the small and middle-sized
towns and cities and the broad
countryside, and later take big cities.

--633--

(3). The major objective is the annihilation
of the enemy fighting strength, and
not the holding or taking of cities and
places. The holding or taking of cities and
places is the result of the annihilation of
the enemies fighting strength, which often
has to be repeated many times before they
can be finally held or taken.

(4). In every battle, concentrate absolutely
superior forces--double, triple,
quadruple, and sometimes even five and
six times those of the enemy--to encircle
the enemy on all sides, and strive for his
annihilation, with none escaping from the
net. Under specific conditions, adopt the
method of dealing the enemy smashing
blows, that is, the concentration of all
forces to strike the enemy's center and one
or both of the enemy's flanks, aiming at
the destruction of a part of the enemy
and the routing of another part so that
our troops can swiftly transfer forces to
smash another enemy group. Avoid battle
of attrition in which gains are not sufficient
to make up for the losses, or in which
the gains merely balance the losses. Thus
we are inferior taken as a whole-numerically
speaking--but our absolute superiority
in every section and in every specific
campaign guarantees the victory of each
campaign. As time goes by we will become
superior, taken as a whole, until the enemy
is totally destroyed.

(5). Fight no unprepared engagements;
fight no engagements in which there is no
assurance of victory. Strive for victory
in every engagement; be sure of the relative
conditions of our forces and those
of the enemy.

(6). Promote and exemplify valor in
combat; fear no sacrifice or fatigue or continuous
action--that is, fighting several
engagements in succession within a short
period without respite.

(7). Strive to destroy the enemy while
in movement. At the same time emphasize
the tactics of attacking positions, wrestling strong
points and bases from the enemy.

(8). With regard to assaults on cities,
resolutely wrest from the enemy all strong
points and cities which are weakly defended.
At favorable opportunities, wrest
all enemy strong points and cities which
are defended to a medium degree and
where the circumstances permit. Wait
until the conditions mature, and then wrest
all enemy strong points and cities that are
powerfully defended,

(9). Replenish ourselves by the capture
of all enemy arms and most of his personnel.
The sources of men and material
for our army is mainly at the front.

(10). Skillfully utilize the intervals between
two campaigns for resting, regrouping
and training troops. The period of
rest and regrouping should be in general
not too long. As far as possible do not let
the enemy have breathing space.39

The complete Nationalist defeat presaged
by Mao's pronouncement was
more than a year and a half in the making.
During that time, the American
private and public stake in mainland
China was wiped out and the principal
concern of U.S. officials became the
safety of American nationals. The
primary mission of Naval Forces,
Western Pacific in support of national
policy eventually became the evacuation
and protection during evacuation of
Americans ordered from China.

21.
The Seventh Fleet commander noted that these supplies were arranged for by negotiations
at Nanking between Communist, Nationalist, and U.S. representatives. They were
intended for "relieving nonmilitary inhabitants, non-Communist inhabitants in dire straits."
Admiral Cooke stated that "it was later found that the Chinese Communist Army appropriated
and put to its own use all the medical supplies. . . ." Cooke ltr.

26.
ComNavWesPac ltr serial 0002640-07 to CNO, dtd 16Sep47, Subj: Rpt of Ammo dumped
by FMFWesPac at Tsingtao, China 19May-13Sep47 (ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech).
The decision to dump the ammunition in this fashion was recommended by Admiral Cooke,
and approved in Washington during a conference in early February 1947, which was
attended by Admiral Cooke and Secretary of State Marshall. Cooke ltr.

37.
When he was in Washington in February 1947, Admiral Cooke, in a meeting with President
Truman, had proposed that "a commission composed of eminent members of high prestige,
in the political field, the economic field, and the military field, be sent to China in the
immediate future, and thoroughly explore the situation and make recommendation to the
U.S. Government of what should be done." Cooke ltr.

39.
Mao Tse-tung, Turning Point in China (New York: New Century, 1948), p. 3,
quoted in Liu, Military History of China; Quoted from the original press release of 1Jan48
in Rigg, Red China's Hordes, pp. 180-181.
The two translations vary but not significantly; that in Liu has been used.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation