Considered
and decided by Klaphake,
Presiding Judge, Minge,
Judge, and Wright,
Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

MINGE, Judge

Appellant appeals the district court
order sustaining the revocation of his driving privileges. Appellant argues that the district court
erred by finding that an identified informant’s tip that he was a possibly
impaired driver was sufficient for the police to conduct an investigatory
stop. Because the report to the police
regarding his driving was sufficient for an investigatory stop, we affirm.

FACTS

On
November 16, 2001, at 7:34 p.m., a person, who gave his name and phone number
and identified himself as a Hopkins firefighter, called Plymouth police
dispatch and reported that he was following a vehicle with a possibly impaired
driver and specifically identified the vehicle. While the firefighter remained on the telephone with the
dispatcher and continued to follow the vehicle, the dispatcher forwarded a
notice of a possibly impaired driver to Plymouth Police Officer Robin Way. Officer Way received the notice over his
Mobile Display Terminal (MDT) in his squad car. Officer Way received the firefighter’s name and phone number, a
description of the suspected vehicle and license plate, and information as to
the location of the vehicle. Officer
Way was informed this was a possibly impaired driver, but he was not given any
details regarding appellant’s driving.

Officer
Way located the vehicle in the left lane of travel and followed it. As the vehicle entered the left turn lane, Officer
Way turned on his emergency lights.
Appellant, John Willard Vogelgesang, turned left onto a side road. The speed limit in the area is 40 miles an
hour; Officer Way noted the suspect vehicle was traveling at approximately
20–25 miles per hour, but observed no traffic violation. Officer Way did testify that he thought
appellant’s slower driving was “a little unusual” based on the usual speeds
driven on that portion of the road.

When Officer Way
approached appellant, he observed indicia of intoxication, including a moderate
odor of alcohol. Based on field
sobriety tests, Officer Way determined that appellant was under the influence
of alcohol, placed him under arrest, and transported him to the Plymouth Police
Department.

After being read
the implied consent advisory, appellant decided to contact his attorney prior
to deciding whether to be tested.
Before he made any telephone calls to his attorney, appellant stated he
would probably be unable to get in contact with his attorney due to the late
hour. Appellant was provided with a
telephone and several telephone books, but only made one unsuccessful telephone
call. For approximately 20 minutes,
appellant made no further efforts to contact an attorney. He did not use a phone book or make any
additional telephone calls. At the end of approximately 20 minutes, Officer Way
again questioned him regarding taking the breath test. Appellant refused to take the test. Appellant’s driving privileges were
immediately revoked because he refused to take the breath test.

Later, after
Officer Way had arrested and booked appellant, Officer Way contacted the
firefighter/informant and learned the exact details of what the firefighter had
observed when watching appellant’s driving.
The firefighter told the officer that the driver was traveling at speeds
up to 70–75 miles per hour, that he had gone over the centerline, and that he
was unable to stay within the lines for his lane.

Appellant requested a hearing on the revocation of
his driver’s license and the impoundment of his license plates. After a hearing was held in Hennepin County
District Court, the court issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law
and sustained the revocation of driving privileges. But twice the court incorrectly referred to appellant as Barry
Wilson rather than John Vogelgesang.
The court later realized its error and amended the order on April 15,
2002, inserting John Vogelgesang as the correct name. Vogelgesang appealed.

D
E C I S I O N

I.

The
facts in this case are not disputed.
When an appellate court reviews a stop based on given facts, the test is
not whether the district court’s decision is clearly erroneous, but whether as
a matter of law, the basis for the stop was adequate. Berge v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety,374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985).

Conclusions of law will be
overturned only upon a determination that the trial court has erroneously
construed and applied the law to the facts of the case.

A stop by a police
officer is justified if the police officer has a specific and articulable
suspicion of a violation. Marben v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn.
1980). If the stop was “not the product
of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity,” it will be upheld. Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he factual basis for stopping a
vehicle need not arise from the officer’s personal observation, but may be
supplied by information acquired from another person.” Id. (citation omitted).

To determine if an
informant’s tip is reliable, Minnesota law focuses on two factors. The first factor is the identifying information
provided by the informant; the second factor is the facts supporting the
tipster’s assertion about the driver. Rose v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 637 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App.
2001) (citing Jobe v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 609 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.
App. 2000)). Neither factor alone is
dispositive; an analysis of both is required in a totality-of-the-circumstances
determination. Id.

Identifying Information Provided by Informant

For
a police officer to determine that the informant is reliable, the informant
must supply sufficient information for the police officer to locate the
informant and hold him accountable for the truthfulness of the
information. Rose, 637 N.W.2d at
328. A private citizen giving a tip to
police officers is presumed to be reliable.
Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 699.
Here, the police officer knew the informant’s name, phone number, and
that he was a firefighter for the city of Hopkins. Because the informant was identified, his information is deemed
reliable. As a public safety officer of
a nearby municipality, the informant’s reliability was enhanced.

Facts Supporting the Tipster’s
Assertion

We
next consider if the police officer had a reasonable, articulable basis for a
stop based on the information provided by the informant. This court has long found that the “factual
basis required to support a stop for a routine traffic check is minimal.” Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 699 (quotation
omitted). The requirement is only that
the stop is “not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Id. (quotation omitted). That requirement is met as long as the stop
“is based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’” Id.
(quoting People v. Ingle, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44 (N.Y. 1975)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))) (alteration
in original). In addition, tips from an identified citizen
are deemed more reliable and need less detail to provide a sufficient basis to
conduct a stop. Jobe, 609 N.W.2d
at 921-22.

Here,
the police officer knew a public safety officer was continuing to actually
follow and observe a driver whom the informant believed to be impaired. The police officer knew the location of the
vehicle, the direction the vehicle was traveling, the color of the vehicle, and
the vehicle license plate number.
Appellant argues that the police officer did not have a reasonable,
articulable basis for the stop because he did not observe any traffic
violations, and he was not aware of the traffic violations observed by the
firefighter/informant. We do not agree
that the police officer did not have a reasonable, articulable basis for the
stop. Courts of this state have
concluded that if a reliable informant based his report on a personal
observation of one’s driving, the officer was provided a reasonable,
articulable basis for a stop. See
City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. 1988) (upholding
a stop because the informant had personally seen the driver in the gas station
where the informant was employed); State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d 179 (Minn.
1986) (upholding a stop because the informant had personally seen a driver run
a red light); Marben, 294 N.W.2d 697 (upholding police officer’s stop
because informant was in the same geographic area and in close proximity to the
subject car); Playle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747 (Minn.
App. 1989) (upholding a stop because the informant had personally seen the
driver in a Burger King drive-through where the informant was employed).

Most
importantly, this court considers the totality of the circumstances. Here, the dispatcher maintained ongoing
contact with the firefighter as he continued to follow appellant. The firefighter had observed appellant’s
speeding and inability to stay within his lane and concluded that appellant
appeared to be impaired. Officer Way
was aware the informant was a firefighter.
In addition, as noted in Playle

it is in the interests of the public that citizens are
encouraged to report suspected drunk drivers to authorities, so that they may
be apprehended before an accident occurs.
A layperson is qualified to give an opinion as to whether a person is
under the influence, based upon the observations of that person. If the tip is sufficient, officers are
encouraged to investigate the suspect immediately, rather than to allow the
suspect to drive so that the officer may observe the driving. Otherwise, the risk that the suspect will be
involved in an accident increases, which is not in the public’s interest.

Playle, 439 N.W.2d at 749
(citation omitted). Considering all the
circumstances, we find the police officer had a reasonable, articulable basis
to subject appellant to an investigatory stop.

II.

Drivers
have a right to counsel prior to deciding if they wish to submit to alcohol
testing under the implied consent law. Friedman
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991). A
police officer must inform the driver of the right to counsel and must also assist
in vindicating the right. Gergen v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 548 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. App. 1996), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996).

The right to counsel will be considered vindicated if the
person is provided with a telephone prior to testing and given a reasonable
time to contact and talk with counsel.

Kuhn v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 488 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Oct.
20, 1992). There is no definitive
amount of time that constitutes a reasonable amount of time. Kuhn, 488 N.W.2d at 842. A relevant inquiry into a reasonable amount
of time focuses “both on the police officer’s duties in vindicating the right
to counsel and the defendant’s diligent exercise of the right.” Id.
“[A]s a threshold matter the driver must make a good faith and sincere
effort to reach an attorney.” Id. In determining whether a driver has been
given a reasonable amount of time, this court considers three factors: the
time of day, the length of time the driver has been under arrest, and whether
the driver made a good faith and sincere effort to contact counsel. Id.

Here, appellant argues
he was not allowed a sufficient amount of time to reach his attorney. After the police officer read appellant the
implied consent advisory, appellant expressed concern that he might not be able
to reach his attorney because of the time of day. Appellant then made one attempt to contact his attorney. Within ten minutes of hearing the implied
consent advisory, appellant stated that he could not reach his attorney. Appellant made no additional efforts to
reach another attorney.

There is a discrepancy
as to whether appellant was given 21 or 31 minutes to reach an attorney. But the amount of time appellant was given
is not the determinative factor. Here,
appellant did nothing beyond make one phone call. After making that initial call, appellant simply sat. In this situation he was not making a “good
faith sincere effort” to contact an attorney.
He did not request any assistance.
He did not indicate what he would do with more time. He was given a reasonable opportunity. He was not rushed. We find the district court did not err in determining appellant
had a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.

III.

Appellant argues that
the revocation of his license should be reversed because the order stated it
was revoking the license of “petitioner, Barry Wilson.” Appellant argues that the commissioner
should have made a motion within 30 days of the district court order to correct
the order.

Appellant’s argument for
reversal of the order based on the use of an incorrect name is not
persuasive. The error was promptly
corrected by the district court on the court’s own initiative. The error was harmless, and appellant
suffered no prejudice because of it. Furthermore,
appellant cites no legal authority to support his position. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &
Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971)
(arguments to appellate courts without citation to legal authority are
waived). We reject appellant’s argument
on this issue.