Tayeb Hyderally is an expert in matters concerning employment law. He shares his expertise with employers and employees across the nation who wish to become informed on various aspects of employment law. Mr. Hyderally works closely with those on the corporate level to help them establish anti-discriminatory policies and procedures. As a NY lawyer, he is knowledgeable of employment law cases and how they affect local and national laws and works diligently to inform both employees and employers of their rights and responsibilities to maintain a safe environment in the workplace. In this case, a bank was in violation of federal laws because of discriminating against an individual based on her age as well as her disability.

EEOC vs. Regions Bank

Regions Financial Corporation does business as Regions Bank. According to the EEOC, the bank refused to make reasonable accommodations for an employee with a disability and fired her because of her age. The employee had worked for the bank’s predecessor for over 30 years and since 2005 had been working for Regions Bank in Memphis, Tennessee. The employee suffered from hyperthyroidism and asked for what were reasonable accommodations for her disability. The disease causes debilitating fatigue as well as heightened anxiety. The bank did not engage the interactive process needed to accommodate the manager. The employee alleges that younger managers are treated more favorably than she was and that the bank fired her because of her age. She is 61. Continue Reading

This blog was written by Ty Hyderally. Tayeb Hyderally is an employment attorney in NJ.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted by Congress on November 21, 1991. The act was addressing Supreme Court decisions that seemed to be giving businesses a loop hole whereby they could avoid penalties for acts of discrimination by disguising them as other “business practices.” The business would not be liable in such cases and the plaintiff would have to try to prove differently although they were allegedly the one discriminated against.

Before the enactment of this act in 1991 jury trials were not undertaken unless the case fell under EPA or ADEA guidelines. With the passing of this 1991 Ace compensation could be made in lawsuits where there was deliberate discrimination. Those discriminated against are now allowed jury trials. The Act also capped the amount of damages a business would have to pay in restitution for punitive damages as well as pain and suffering. This cap was based solely on the size of the employer and their financial capabilities. For employers with over 500 employees the maximum compensation for damages could be $300,000.

The Act of 1991 also made some additions to Title VII. Under this provision, employers were liable to pay attorney’s fees and court costs in cases where the plaintiff proves that discrimination was indeed the motivation for the employer’s decision. This is the case even if the employer can prove that the decision would have remained the same for the business even without the motive of discrimination. The 1991 Act also broadened the scope of protection against employment discrimination to include employees of Congress and most political appointees involved in higher level politics. The coverage included in Title VII and ADA made American employers abroad liable by these same standards.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is in place to protect employees and employers. Employees are to be free from discriminatory practices in the workplace. But an employee should not have financial ruin because of an isolated incident.

As with any other contract, the terms of an employment contract must be definite enough that the courts can tell reasonably certainly what each party has promised to do under the contract. Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956). These terms should include, at a minimum, the length of employment and the circumstances under which it can be terminated.

Where there is an employment contract for a fixed period of time, and that period has passed, the courts will not find that the contract has become a year-to-year contract, unless the intent to do so is clearly stated in the contract. Craffey v. Bergen County Util.¸315 N.J. Super. 345, 352 (App.Div. 1998), certif.. denied, 158 N.J. 74 (1999).