Quick-Look

Emergent Capability

Influence Operations and the Strategic Airman

Lt Col Shaun Copelin, USAF
Lt Col Andre Provoncha, USAF, Retired

In just over 30 days, the US armed forces swiftly and
skillfully defeated a proven threat to the Middle East and US national
interests.1 Operation Iraqi Freedom validated the doctrine and
methods of conventional modern warfare. Yet, senior military officers observe
that although the campaign showcased brilliant technological capabilities,
crisis-action planning did not adequately address the need to engage the people
of Iraq in the postconflict phase. Additionally, campaign planners failed to
draw upon unconventional doctrine and methods in support of US interests.2Deliberate planning also fell short of fulfilling the national military
strategy of fostering an environment for long-term stability in the region.
Recent official reports and media stories from the field comment on the severe
lack of resourcing for planning efforts aimed at postcombat activities, most of
which included information operations, civil affairs, cultural awareness, and
intelligence. These reports suggest that establishing cultural relevancy at the
strategic through tactical levels of planning and applying it across the
spectrum of conflict are key to engaging and advancing objectives within a given
targeted group. Current operations, however, might have little effect on
realizing long-term objectives because of the lack of trained, experienced,
culturally relevant planners. Challenges facing the Air Force in building its
future force include acquiring a wider understanding of influence operations,
learning the nature of these operations, placing Airmen at the center of
successful operations, and providing the tools of war necessary for victory.

Understanding Air Force
Influence Operations

The largely democratic and capitalistic systems that emerged
in Europe following World War II do not owe their existence to the defeat of
Germany alone. Instead, they benefited greatly from the Marshall Plan, a noble
and ambitious program invested heavily in engaging local, national, and
international entities—all influenced by American leadership. Military forces
exerted much of that influence. Does the Air Force have the capabilities to
produce the same effect today?

Current Air Force information-operations doctrine captures
the influence-operationscapabilities needed to meet the challenge of
cultural aspects in warfare.3 Both joint and service doctrine define
and codify information operations, which complement air, land, sea, and space
power. Although these operations address a range of activities, influence
operations, for the Air Force, constitute a principal subset of battlespace
effects in the cognitive domain. Influence operations employ capabilities that
affect behaviors, force the adversary to misallocate forces, protect operations,
communicate the commander’s intent, and project accurate information to
achieve desired effects across the battlespace. Furthermore, they involve the
integrated planning, employment, and assessment of psychological operations,
military deception, counterintelligence, counterpropaganda, public affairs, and
operations security to gain superiority over the adversary’s decision process
and disrupt his control of his forces. After developing target sets that affect
key decision makers, influence planners then pair Air Force capabilities with
those sets to change the behavior of the intended receiver. Photos of bomb
craters and destroyed targets do not represent victory—capitulation of the
adversary does. In the lexicon of influence operations, a change in observed
behavior defines victory—not well-crafted messages or delivered information.

The Nature of
Influence Operations

When the US military engages in force-on-force operations,
combat victory is a virtual certainty. Nevertheless, wars are not won solely by
placing bombs on target but by achieving national and strategic objectives
during all phases of the campaign. Many military members believe that combat
operations end with a cessation of hostilities. However, the lion’s share of
achieving national objectives involves operations by agencies other than the
Department of Defense (DOD). Few would dispute the military’s critical role in
creating an environment for successful postcombat operations, and the DOD does
indeed remain a vital participant following hostilities. Yet, the focus at this
time must shift to civil affairs. Although the restoration of infrastructure
plays an important role in fulfilling campaign objectives, investment in
engaging cultures provides long-term stability and growth. It is culture that
binds victor to vanquished. People whose political and economic systems have
undergone forcible alteration require guidance, dedicated support, and outside
resources. The victors have an obligation to supply culturally relevant
guidance, dedicated support, and resources. Less certain, however, is the extent
to which the military contributes to precombat operations designed to shape an
environment conducive to achieving national goals. Traditionally, it has focused
on operations during and following combat.

One finds the best example of the application of influence
operations in a report entitled Towards a Free and Democratic Iraq, which
recommends methods of achieving a growing economy and democratic political
system in that country. Citing the lack of trained and experienced personnel to
apply relevant capabilities, the report notes that “[DOD] influence operations
. . . have not succeeded in convincing the Iraqi people of the true purpose and
character of American efforts . . . in [Iraqi Freedom].”4 By
contrast, insurgents have had a significant influence on US audiences, as noted
during a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia in
April 2002.5 Jihadists have learned that culturally relevant
propaganda can erode US public support for operations in Iraq.

The stark contrast between the effects of combat operations
and those of influence operations became evident during the Abu Ghraib prison
debacle in Iraq. That scandal, as well as the growing number of noncombatant
deaths recorded by the media worldwide, causes both the “Arab Street” and
some US citizens to believe there is little distinction between coalition policy
and criminal acts committed by rogue military members. How could trained and
experienced influence-operations planners and practitioners anticipate—even
preempt—certain audiences’ misperceptions of events as related to intended
effects or objectives?

Strategic Airmen

What is the link between pursuing national objectives and
influencing a targeted group? Moreover, what is the nature of the relationship
between US military personnel and strategic impact? We may find the answer in
the concept of the “strategic Airman.” All Air Force members should
understand that the messages they communicate and the actions they take lead to
strategic, operational, and tactical effects. Even actions by relatively junior
military personnel can have a long-term, significant impact. As Gen Matthew B.
Ridgway, US Army, stated during the Korean War, “The soldier is the statesman’s
junior partner.”6Actions taken by operators at the tactical
level of war represent the entire American military and are extensions of US
foreign policy. Ultimately, however, the influence-operations planner, working
for the combatant commander, is responsible forbuilding and executing a
culturally relevant plan that enhances and contributes to the achievement of
national objectives in any given theater. Ideally, well-crafted and
well-coordinated efforts of Airmen at all levels and during all phases of
operations should contribute to the achievement of national objectives. The more
realistic approach would require the Air Force to employ deliberate and
crisis-action planners as well as tactical-execution units that engage in
culturally relevant operations. Operational planners who engage all target sets
must have a clear understanding of the cultural terrain, just as tactical units
must understand the linkage among objectives, operations, and cultural effects.
Consistent and accurate cultural training is essential in the modern
influence-operations battlespace.

Tools of War

The DOD needs to invest in operational planners and
intelligence analysts who have in-depth training in the cultures in which
operations occur. The Air Force must build a force capable of planning for and
conducting culturally relevant activities at all levels and during all phases of
theater operations. Currently the Air Force conducts influence operations geared
toward such relevance. Yet, the information-warfare flights that include these
planners are neither fully trained for nor-actively engaged in their assigned
cultures. Furthermore, the Air Force, as well as the other services and joint
staff, does not have adequate resources to build and sustain an
influence-operations force. Services lack a single, consistent, accurate, and
responsive cultural-awareness training program that would assure successful
influence operations. Although several joint and service courses exist, the
training reaches only a small segment of the total force and emphasizes
predeployment scenarios. Does the Air Force have a stated need for such
training? The vetted information--operations requirements for cultural-awareness
training found in the prioritized-needs summary of the Air Force’s Information
Operations Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2008 include the following:
integrating training in information-operations awareness into initial accession
training at all levels; developing research in human vulnerabilities to support
Air Force operations; producing culturally relevant communication and
interaction tools to research the public-information environment as well as
cultures in the joint-operation area to best support public-affairs operations;
and creating an expert cadre of agents to support assessments of human
vulnerability.

Successful prosecution of the global war on terrorism demands
that we maintain a culturally aware fighting force. The Air Force, therefore,
faces a fundamental challenge in successfully conducting the combatant commander’s
influence operations in a particular theater because it must provide trained
experts who understand and continuously apply the social and cultural norms that
define the target audience’s mind-set. Creating the proper mind-set for the
strategic Airman, then, depends upon linking requirements with a rigorous,
dynamic training program that includes cultural scholars, experienced
interagency officials, and officers from sister services who have experience
in-theater.

Even though criticism from academics and others may lead to an understanding
of the complexity of the modern combat environment, we should remember Pres.
Theodore Roosevelt’s comment that “credit goes to the man in the arena.”7
People with experience in the combat arena believe that winning wars requires an
understanding of cultural relevancy. The responsibility for applying that
relevancy to any conflict rests with well-trained and experienced influence
operators. Thus, an influence-operations force composed of strategic Airmen must
become an essential element of future joint operations, and creating those
Airmen will make influence operations a reality for the United States Air Force.

Notes

1. Major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 20 March
2003 when coalition forces invaded Iraq and concluded on 1 May 2003 with an
announcement from Pres. George W. Bush on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln.
Pres. George W. Bush, “President Bush Announces Combat Operations in Iraq Have
Ended” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1
May 2003), http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/20203.htm.

5. Words Have Consequences: The Impact of Incitement and
Anti-American and Anti-Semitic Propaganda on American Interests in the Middle
East. A Hearing before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
of the Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 18
April 2002.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University