1. The case originated in an application (no.
36042/97) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
lodged with the European Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”)
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British national,
Mr Kevin David Willis (“the applicant”), on 24 April 1997.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr S. Wright,
a legal officer with the Child Poverty Action Group, London. The United
Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, Mr C. Whomersley.

3. The applicant alleged that British social-security
legislation discriminated against him and his late wife on grounds of
sex, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.

4. The application was allocated to the Third
Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that
Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of
the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5. By a decision of 11 May 1999 the Chamber declared
the application admissible [Note by the Registry. The Court's decision is obtainable from
the Registry].

6. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections. This case was assigned to the newly composed Fourth
Section (Rule 52 § 1). Within that Section, the Chamber that would
consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted
as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

7. The applicant is a British national born in
1956 and living in Bristol.

8. In December 1984 the applicant married Marlene
Willis. They had two children: Natasha Uma, born on 24 March 1989, and
Ross Amal, born on 2 August 1990. Mrs Willis died of cancer on 7 June
1996, at the age of 39. The applicant is the administrator of his late
wife's estate.

9. Mrs Willis had been employed as a local authority
housing officer. For the greater part of her married life, she was the
primary breadwinner. She had paid full social-security contributions
as an employed earner until 1994, and was subsequently entitled to contribution
credits as a person unfit for work. On 3 November 1995 the applicant
gave up work to nurse his wife and care for their children. Following
his wife's death, he worked part time between 2 September 1996 and 6
November 1996, for an annual salary of 4,393 pounds sterling (GBP),
but since this proved uneconomic he stopped working to care full time
for the children.

10. On 4 November 1996 the applicant applied to
the Benefits Agency for the payment of social-security benefits. He
applied for benefits equivalent to those which a widow whose husband
had died in similar circumstances to those of Mrs Willis would have
been entitled, namely a widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance,
payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992.

11. By a letter dated 18 November 1996, the Benefits
Agency informed the applicant that the benefits he had claimed did not
exist for widowers, and that his claim accordingly could not be accepted
as valid. The letter continued:

“I am afraid I can only explain that the Government
says that it has no plans to introduce a widowers' pension on the same
line as the existing widows' benefits.

It may help if I explain the current policy underlying
widows' benefits was established at a time when married women rarely
worked. It is based on the assumption that women are more likely than
men to have been financially dependent on their spouse's earnings and
therefore more likely on widowhood to face greater financial hardship.
The benefits themselves are concentrated on those widows who are perceived
to have the greatest problems, those with children and older women who
may have been out of the labour market for many years.

It is accepted that social patterns have changed
considerably since the provisions were first introduced. However, it
is still broadly the case that on bereavement, women are more likely
than men to be in financial need. For instance, most widowers of working
age will have been in employment before the death of their wives. They
will not therefore have the same degree of difficulty in supporting
themselves as widows who may have been out of the labour market for
some time and may find it difficult to obtain paid work. Women on average
earn less than men. So even for women who have been working, the financial
loss on widowhood is likely to be significantly more than for men.

Widows' benefits are not means tested and are
paid regardless of the level of the widows' earnings. The Government
says that the extension of the benefits on the same basis to widowers
would mean substantial extra expenditure in paying maintenance benefit
to men who are likely to be already maintaining themselves by their
earnings, and in some cases, very high earnings indeed. To make existing
widows' benefits provisions available to widowers would add an estimated
GBP 490 million to the annual Social Security budget. The Government
is of the opinion that at a time when all areas of public expenditure
are having to be carefully considered, this is simply not a best use
of scarce resources.

In making these points, the Government says that
it is in no way minimising the sad problems faced by widowers, in particular
those left with small children to care for. For them there are already
available benefits such as Child Benefit and One Parent Benefit, together
with the range of income-related benefits, for example, Income Support
for those not in full time work and Family Credit for low paid workers.
In the Government's view this remains the fairest way of providing benefits
to meet specific need rather than an extension of widows' benefits along
the lines suggested. ...”

12. The applicant lodged a statutory appeal against
this decision on 17 February 1997. The Social Security Appeal Tribunal
declined jurisdiction on the basis that no appealable decision had been
made.

13. The applicant currently receives child benefit
and, in respect of his son Ross, received a disability living allowance
and an invalid care allowance for a period following his wife's death.
He is also in receipt of a widower's pension under Mrs Willis's occupational
pension scheme. The applicant has capital, much of which is derived
from a joint endowment policy (for which he and Mrs Willis had paid
premiums) which matured on Mrs Willis's death, from which he obtains
a further income of about GBP 150 per month. Because of his savings,
the applicant does not qualify for means-tested benefits such as income
support or family credit. All the social-security benefits he receives
would also be received by a widow, who would in addition be paid a widow's
payment and a widowed mother's allowance.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

14. Under United Kingdom law, certain social-security
benefits, including widow's payment, widowed mother's allowance and
widow's pension, are paid for out of the National Insurance Fund. By
section 1 of the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992 (“the 1992
Act”), the funds required for paying such benefits are to be provided
by means of contributions payable to the Secretary of State for Social
Security by earners, employers and others, together with certain additions
made to the Fund by Parliament.

15. Male and female earners are obliged to pay
the same social-security contributions in accordance with their status
as employed earners or self-employed earners.

Widow's payment

16. Under section 36 of the 1992 Act, a woman
who has been widowed is entitled to a widow's payment (a lump sum payment
of GBP 1,000) if:

(i) she is under pensionable age at the time when
her husband died, or he was not then entitled to a Category A retirement
pension; and

(ii) her husband satisfied certain specified social-security
contribution conditions set out in a schedule to the 1992 Act.

Widowed mother's allowance

17. Under the relevant part of section 37 of the
1992 Act, a woman who has been widowed (and who has not remarried) is
entitled to a mother's allowance on certain conditions, the following
being the conditions relevant to the circumstance of the present case:

(i) her husband satisfied the contribution conditions
set out in a schedule to the Act; and

(ii) she is entitled to receive child benefit
in relation to a son or daughter of herself and her late husband.

The widowed mother's allowance currently amounts
to GBP 72.50 per week, with an extra GBP 9.70 per week in respect of
the eldest eligible child, and a further GBP 11.35 per week in respect
of other children.

Widow's pension

18. Under section 38 of the 1992 Act, a woman
who has been widowed (and who is not remarried) is entitled to a widow's
pension if her husband satisfied the contribution conditions set out
in a schedule to the Act; and

(i) at the date of her husband's death she was
over the age of 45 but under the age of 65; or

(ii) she ceased to be entitled to a widowed mother's
allowance at the time she was over the age of 45 but under the age of
65.

If the applicant were a woman, he could look
forward to entitlement to a widow's pension at some stage between 2006
and 2009, depending on when his youngest child ceased to be a dependant,
at which time he would no longer be entitled to the widowed mother's
allowance.

Time-limit for applications for benefits

19. Section 1(1) of the 1992 Act, which applies
to the applicant, provides that no entitlement to a benefit arises unless
a claim for the benefit is made in the prescribed manner and within
the prescribed time.

At the relevant time, the time-limits for claiming
a widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance were set out in the
Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987 (Statutory Instrument
1987/1968), Regulation 19 of which provided:

“(6) The prescribed time for claiming benefits
not specified in column (1) of Schedule 4 shall be –

...

(b) twelve months in the case of ... widow's benefit
...

(7) The periods of six and twelve months prescribed
by paragraph (6) are calculated from any day on which, apart from satisfying
the condition of making a claim, the claimant is entitled to the benefit
concerned.”

In addition, section 1(2) of the Social Security
Administration Act 1992 provides, in relation to claims for a widow's
payment:

“Where under subsection (1) above a person
is required to make a claim or to be treated as making a claim for a
benefit in order to be entitled to it –

(a) if the benefit is a widow's payment, she shall
not be entitled to it in respect of a death occurring more than 12 months
before the date on which the claim is made or treated as made ... ”

The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999

20. The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 (“the
1999 Act”) introduces two new social-security benefits, the widowed
parent's allowance and the bereavement allowance. The widowed parent's
allowance replaces the widowed mother's allowance. The bereavement allowance
replaces the widow's pension. Both are payable to men and women who
meet the relevant qualifying conditions. The 1999 Act also introduces
a new social-security payment, called a bereavement payment, payable
both to men and women in place of the widow's payment.

21. The relevant parts of the Act came into force
on 9 April 2001 and allow any man whose wife dies before, on or after
that date, or any woman whose husband dies on or after that date, to
apply for the widowed parent's allowance. It also allows any man whose
wife dies on or after that date to apply for the bereavement payment
or the bereavement allowance in exactly the same way as a woman whose
husband dies on or after that date.

22. The transitional provisions of the 1999 Act
preserve the entitlements of women under the 1992 Act whose husbands
died before 9 April 2001. Such women thus continue to be entitled to
the widow's payment, the widowed mother's allowance and the widow's
pension where the relevant qualifying conditions are met.

Thomas John Hooper and Others v. Secretary of State for the Department
of Work and Pensions ([2002] High Court, Administrative Court
(England and Wales) 191)

23. On 14 February 2002 Mr Justice Moses delivered
judgment in the High Court in a case brought by four claimants, all
of whom were widowers claiming, inter alia, that their ineligibility for widows' benefits under
the 1992 Act was discriminatory contrary to Article 14 of the Convention
taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article
1 of Protocol No. 1. Three of the claimants had been left with dependent
children, with the result that the benefits at issue in their cases
were the widow's payment and the widowed mother's allowance. The fourth
claimant (Mr Naylor) had been left without dependent children, with
the result that the benefits at issue in his case were the widow's payment
and the widow's pension.

24. The defendant government department conceded
before the High Court that there had been discrimination under Article
14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 in relation
to non-payment of the widowed mother's allowance. As regards the question
of whether the claimants' complaints, in so far as they related to the
widow's payment and the widow's pension, fell within the ambit of Article
8, Mr Justice Moses commented as follows:

“In my view, the availability of pecuniary
support afforded by Widow's Payment and Widow's Pension does have a
significant effect on the relationship of a family prior to the death
of the spouse. They form a significant part of a family's plans for
a secure future. ...

Financial planning seems to me to be a significant
aspect of family life and the benefits play some part in allaying fears
for the future of a surviving spouse. ...

Moreover, Widow's Payments and Widow's Pensions
form part of a congeries of provisions, all of which are designed to
provide support to a surviving spouse at different stages of her life.
Widow's Payments ... are one-off payments made immediately on bereavement.
Widowed Mother's Allowances are paid whilst she looks after dependent
children and Widow's Pension payable in the longer term between the
ages of 45-65 when she has finished bringing up her children. Viewed
as part of a package, the payments and pensions payable to a widow are
bound to be of concern to the family before the death of the husband.

Accordingly, for those reasons I conclude that
the failure to make Widow's Payment and Widow's Pension available to
a surviving widower falls within the ambit of Article 8(1). Thus Article
14 is itself engaged.”

25. In dismissing the claimants' arguments that
the same complaints fell also within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, Mr Justice Moses commented:

“... In order to establish that the benefits
in issue are their possessions, the claimants must establish a pecuniary
right based upon their contributions. Absent such contributions, they
have no possession within the meaning of Article 1 of the First Protocol.
There is no hint, in any of the cases that the [Strasbourg] Court intended
to depart from the fundamental principle that to come within the ambit
of Article 1 of the First Protocol, a property right must be established.
...

... A deceased widow's entitlement to benefits
depends upon the contributions of the deceased husband. ... A widower
has no entitlement under domestic legislation arising from the contributions
of his deceased spouse. He thus has no entitlement and consequently
no possession within the meaning of Article 1 of the First Protocol.”

26. Prior to his examination of whether there
was objective justification for non-payment of the widow's pension to
widowers, Mr Justice Moses observed:

“Only Mr Naylor's case raises the issue of
Widow's Pension. Although other claimants, in their written argument,
raised the issue of future entitlement to Widow's Pension, such a claim
is hypothetical, since they are too young to claim it now and may never
become entitled should they re-marry, ... or should they co-habit ...”

Mr Justice Moses concluded that there was objective
justification for the difference in treatment between widows and widowers
as regards entitlement to a widow's pension under the 1992 Act.

COMPLAINTS

27. The applicant complained that the United Kingdom
authorities' refusal to pay him the social-security benefits to which
he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position,
namely a widowed mother's allowance and a widow's payment, constituted
discrimination against him and his wife on grounds of sex contrary to
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with each of Article
8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He made an identical
complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a widow's pension.
He complained also of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

28. The applicant complained that the United Kingdom
authorities' refusal to pay him the social-security benefits to which
he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position,
namely a widowed mother's allowance and a widow's payment, constituted
discrimination against him and his wife on grounds of sex contrary to
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. He made an identical complaint as regards his future
non-entitlement to a widow's pension.

Article 14 of the Convention provides:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides:

“1. Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law.

2. The preceding provisions shall not, however,
in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”

A. Widow's payment and widowed mother's allowance

1. Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

29. The Court notes that, according to its established
case-law, Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive
provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent
existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although
the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those
provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be
no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the
ambit of one or more of them (see, among other authorities, Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reportsof Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1141, § 36).

30. The applicant argued that the widow's payment
and the widowed mother's allowance come within the ambit of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 because they are both pecuniary rights payable on
the satisfaction of the legislative conditions. He highlighted the fact
that the right to receive the benefits in question is conditional upon
the payment of contributions to the National Insurance Fund. As the
contributions were clearly within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, so must be the ensuing benefits.

31. The Government did not make any submissions
on the applicability of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to these aspects of the
complaint, other than to argue that the conclusions reached by Mr Justice
Moses in the High Court in Hooper (see paragraph 25 above) were correct.

32. The Court notes that in Gaygusuz (cited above, pp. 1141-42, §§ 39-41) it considered
that the right to emergency assistance, entitlement to which was linked
to the payment of contributions to the unemployment insurance fund,
constituted a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. Similarly, the Commission has previously assimilated the right
to social-security benefits to a property right within the meaning of
that Article where a person has made contributions to a social-security
system from which he will later derive the benefits concerned (see,
for example, Müller v. Austria, no. 5849/72, Commission's report of 1 October
1975, Decisions and Reports (DR) 3, p. 25, and G. v. Austria, no. 10094/82, Commission decision of 14 May
1984, DR 38, p. 84).

33. The Court notes that at the material time
the widow's payment and the widowed mother's allowance were paid to
women who had been widowed and who satisfied the various statutory conditions
laid down in the 1992 Act (see paragraphs 16and 17 above). Both these social-security benefits were paid
out of the National Insurance Fund, into which male and female earners
were obliged to pay contributions in accordance with their status as
employed or self-employed earners.

34. In the instant case, it has not been argued
that the applicant did not satisfy the various statutory conditions
for payment of a widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance. The
refusal to recognise the applicant as being entitled to those benefits
was based exclusively on his male sex. A female in the same position
as the applicant would have had a right, enforceable under domestic
law, to receive a widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance.

35. The Court does not consider it significant
that the statutory condition requiring payment of contributions into
the National Insurance Fund required the contributions to have been
made, not by the applicant, but by his late wife. It is not therefore
necessary for the Court to address in this case the question of whether
a social-security benefit must be contributory in nature in order for
it to constitute a “possession” for the purposes of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.

36. The Court therefore considers that the right
to a widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance – in so far
as provided for in the applicable legislation – is a sufficiently
pecuniary right to fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.

The Court considers further that, as the applicant
was denied the right to a widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance
on the ground of a distinction covered by Article 14 of the Convention,
namely sex, that provision must also be applicable to this aspect of
his complaint (see, among other authorities, Gaygusuz, cited above, p. 1142, § 41).

2. Compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

37. The applicant argued that the difference in
treatment between men and women as regards entitlement to a widow's
payment and a widowed mother's allowance was not based on any objective
and reasonable justification. In particular, it was based upon gender-stereotyping
and broad generalisations which were no longer an accurate reflection
of social conditions in the United Kingdom. The fact that widows' benefits
were not means-tested meant that high-earning women in a position similar
to that of the applicant would benefit, while the applicant and other
men would be denied such benefits regardless of their need. The fact
that resources were finite did not justify concentrating all the resources
which were available on the protection of bereaved women to the detriment
of widowed men. Indeed, the applicant highlighted the fact that working
women in his wife's position were required to pay the same proportion
of their earnings to the National Insurance Fund as men, notwithstanding
the more limited benefits offered to their surviving relatives in the
event of their death. He pointed out the less discriminatory approaches
taken by the majority of the other member States of the Council of Europe
in the context of survivors' benefits.

38. The Government did not make any submissions
on the compliance with Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, of the decision to refuse the applicant
the widow's payment and the widowed mother's allowance.

39. According to the Court's case-law, a difference
of treatment is discriminatory for the purposes of Article 14 of the
Convention if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”,
that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is
not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised”. The Contracting States
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what
extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different
treatment. However, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively
on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention (see, among other
authorities, Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports
1997-I, p. 186, § 39).

40. The Court notes that the applicant's wife
worked throughout the best part of her marriage to the applicant and
during that time paid full social-security contributions as an employed
earner in exactly the same way as a man in her position would have done.
It notes also that the applicant gave up work to nurse his wife and
care for their children on 3 November 1995 and that, being a relatively
low earner, it proved uneconomic for him to return to work on a part-time
basis following his wife's death. Despite all this, the applicant was
entitled to significantly fewer financial benefits upon his wife's death
than he would have been if he were a woman and she had been a man.

41. The Court observes also that the authorities'
refusal to grant the applicant a widow's payment and a widowed mother's
allowance was based exclusively on the fact that he was a man. It has
not been argued that the applicant failed to satisfy any of the other
statutory conditions for the award of those benefits and he was accordingly
in a like situation to women as regards his entitlement to them.

42. The Court considers that the difference in
treatment between men and women as regards entitlement to the widow's
payment and widowed mother's allowance, of which the applicant was a
victim, was not based on any “objective and reasonable justification”.

43. There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.

B. Widow's pension

44. The applicant stated that he faced a very
significant risk that he would, within the next few years, be deprived
on the grounds of his sex of a widow's pension to which he would otherwise
have been entitled. He argued that he was already suffering detriment
due to his being deprived of the possibility of ever applying for a
widow's pension.

45. The applicant maintained that a widow's pension
constituted a “possession” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. He pointed to the fact that it was a pecuniary social benefit,
entitlement to which was linked to the satisfaction of statutory conditions,
including the payment of national insurance contributions. He submitted
that the conditions applying to eligibility to a widow's pension were
discriminatory against him and that his case was thus indistinguishable
from Gaygusuz
(cited above).

46. The Government pointed out that a widow in
the applicant's position would not be entitled to a widow's pension
until at least 2006, and possibly not until 2009, which is the latest
date on which the applicant's youngest child will cease to be regarded
as being dependent. They stated that a woman in the applicant's position
might never qualify for a widow's pension because she might not, at
the time of her future claim, meet the relevant statutory criteria.
The Government thus considered this aspect of the complaint hypothetical
and speculative.

47. The Government argued that, in any event,
a widow's pension did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 since it did not constitute a “possession” for the purposes
of that Article. They highlighted the fact that entitlement to a widow's
pension was dependent on the national insurance contributions of the
deceased spouse of the claimant. They indicated that Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 did not entitle a person to any particular benefit of any particular
amount, nor did it entitle a person to payment of a social-security
benefit unless that person had satisfied the conditions laid down by
domestic law. They drew support for their submissions from the judgment
of the High Court in Hooper (see paragraph 25 above).

48. The Court reiterates that Article 14 of the
Convention affords protection against discrimination, that is treating
differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons
in relevantly similar situations (see, for example, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 18 February 1991, Series
A no. 192, p. 19, § 60).

49. In the present case, even if the applicant
were a woman and the discrimination of which he complains was thus removed,
he would not currently qualify for a widow's pension under the conditions
set out in the 1992 Act. Indeed, a widow in the applicant's position
would not qualify for the pension until at least 2006 and might never
so qualify due to the effect of other statutory conditions requiring,
for example, that a claimant does not re-marry before the date on which
her entitlement would otherwise crystallise. Three of the four claimants
in Hooper
(cited above) were in an equivalent position to the applicant in this
respect, leading Mr Justice Moses to comment that their claims to the
pension were “hypothetical” (see paragraph 26 above).

50. The Court thus concludes that, since the applicant
has not been treated differently from a woman in an analogous situation,
no issue of discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention
arises as regards entitlement to a widow's pension on the facts of this
case.

It follows that it is unnecessary for the Court
to consider whether the applicant's complaints in this context fall
within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8

51. The applicant also complained that the United
Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the widow's payment and widowed
mother's allowance to which he would have been entitled had he been
a woman in a similar position constituted discrimination on grounds
of sex contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 8. He made an identical complaint as regards his future
non-entitlement to a widow's pension.

52. The relevant part of Article 8 of the Convention
provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life ...

2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of ... the economic well-being of the country ...”

A. Widowed mother's allowance and widow's payment

53. The Court, having concluded that there has
been a breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as regards the applicant's non-entitlement
to the widowed mother's allowance and the widow's payment, does not
consider it necessary to examine his complaints in that regard under
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.

B. Widow's pension

54. The applicant argued that the provision of
a widow's pension to a surviving spouse was clearly intended to promote
family life. He maintained that a widow's pension was paid to, among
others, a widow who had dependent children at the date of her husband's
death once she was no longer in receipt of child benefits. He submitted
that the provision of the pension to a surviving spouse was intended
to recognise and promote the family relationship between spouses and
that entitlement to it affected the way in which married partners arranged
their financial affairs. He thus submitted that his complaint as regards
future non-entitlement to a widow's pension fell within the ambit of
Article 8 of the Convention.

55. The Government, at the outset, submitted that
the widow's pension did not fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the
Convention because it was payable following bereavement and, in contrast
to the widowed mother's allowance, was not aimed at enhancing family
or private life. However, later in the proceedings before the Court
the Government accepted the applicant's argument that the widow's pension
fell within the ambit of that Article.

56. The Court has already concluded (see paragraph
50 above) that no issue of discrimination contrary to Article 14 arises
as regards entitlement to a widow's pension on the facts of this case.

It follows that it is unnecessary for the Court
to consider whether the applicant's complaints in the context of the
widow's pension fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION SUFFERED
BY THE APPLICANT'S LATE WIFE

57. The applicant complained also about discrimination
suffered by his late wife in respect of the decision to refuse him a
widow's payment and a widowed mother's allowance, and in respect of
his future non-entitlement to a widow's pension, notwithstanding the
social-security contributions made by her during her lifetime. The Court
considers that this aspect of the complaint does not raise any issues
separate from those raised in respect of the discrimination alleged
to have been suffered by the applicant himself. In the light of the
conclusions reached above, the Court does not consider it necessary
to consider this aspect of the complaint.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

58. The applicant also complained that he had
no effective remedy before a national authority because the discrimination
of which he complained was contained within unambiguous primary legislation.

59. Article 13 of the Convention provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

60. The applicant argued that, because the discrimination
of which he complained was contained in unambiguous primary legislation,
and because the Convention had not at the relevant time been incorporated
into domestic law, there were no means by which he could challenge the
refusal of benefits before the domestic courts or other authorities.

61. The Government did not submit any observations
on the merits of the applicant's complaints.

62. The Court reiterates that Article 13 does
not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State's
primary legislation to be challenged before a national authority on
grounds that it is contrary to the Convention (see James and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February
1986, Series A no. 98, p. 47, § 85). It is therefore unable to accept
the applicant's argument.

63. The facts of the present case therefore disclose
no violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION

64. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Pecuniary damage

65. In respect of pecuniary damage, the applicant
claimed:

(i) 21,804.07 pounds sterling (GBP) in respect
of loss of the widow's payment (GBP 1,000) and the widowed mother's
allowance up to 9 April 2001, less deductions in respect of the invalid
care allowance and the one-parent benefit paid to him over that period
(GBP 20,804.07);

(ii) widowed mother's allowance payments in respect
of an ongoing period after 9 April 2001;

(iii) widow's pension payments once his entitlement
to the widowed parent's allowance ceased; and

(iv) interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the
arrears of all widows' benefits found owing to him from 7 June 1996
until the date of judgment.

66. The Government accepted the applicant's calculation
in respect of the widow's payment and the widowed mother's allowance
payable up to 9 April 2001. It opposed the applicant's claim for interest
on the basis that social-security benefits are not generally paid for
investment purposes.

The Government thus concluded that the applicant
was entitled to GBP 21,804.07 in respect of pecuniary damage.

67. The Court notes that the applicant's calculations
as to the amount of the widow's payment and the widowed mother's allowance
payable after deductions until implementation of the new scheme created
by the 1999 Act on 9 April 2001 is not disputed by the Government.

68. The Court further observes that, from 10 April
2001, the applicant has been entitled to claim the widowed parent's
allowance in exactly the same way as he could, had he been a woman,
have claimed the widowed mother's allowance under the 1992 Act.

69. The Court considers that interest can be claimed
from the dates on which each recoverable element of past pecuniary damage
accrued (see, among other authorities, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction),
nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 24, ECHR 2000-IX).

70. In these circumstances, and making an award
on an equitable basis, the Court awards compensation to the applicant
in the sum of GBP 25,000 in respect of the refusal to grant him the
widow's payment and the loss of the widowed mother's allowance up to
9 April 2001.

B. Costs and expenses

71. The applicant also claimed GBP 19,142.94 in
respect of costs and expenses, inclusive of value-added tax (VAT). This
included the fees of the applicant's solicitors and counsel together
with fees for liaison with other non-governmental organisations in connection
with the case and the fees of an expert social economist.

72. The Government did not dispute the base hourly
rates claimed by the applicant's solicitors, but submitted that a 100%
uplift on those fees was unjustified. They stated that the hourly rate
charged by the applicant's counsel was also excessive. They argued that
sums in respect of liaison with other non-governmental organisations
should not be recoverable and maintained that, if their preliminary
objections as to the applicant's complaint relating to non-entitlement
to the widow's pension was upheld by the Court, the applicant should
not be entitled to that part of his costs and expenses connected to
that complaint. The Government suggested that a reasonable sum in respect
of costs and expenses would be GBP 3,000 inclusive of VAT.

73. The Court reiterates that only legal costs
and expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and
which are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under Article 41
of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 79, ECHR 1999-II).

74. The Court does not consider that its conclusions
in respect of the applicant's complaint about non-entitlement to a widow's
pension imply that the associated legal costs and expenses were unnecessarily
incurred or were unreasonable as to quantum (see Smith and Grady (just satisfaction), cited above, § 30, and Jordan v. the
United Kingdom (no. 1), no. 30280/96, § 42, 14 March 2000).
However, it does consider that the uplift included in the solicitor's
fees was unwarranted and that the counsel's fees were excessive.

In light of the above, the Court awards the global
sum of GBP 12,500 for legal costs and expenses, inclusive of VAT.

C. Default interest

75. According to the information available to
the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom
at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 7.5% per annum.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to the applicant's complaint
concerning non-entitlement to the widow's payment and the widowed mother's
allowance;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in
connection with that complaint;

3. Holds that it is not necessary to consider that complaint under
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8;

4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention or
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in connection with the applicant's complaint
concerning non-entitlement to a widow's pension;

5. Holds that it is not therefore necessary to consider whether
Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 are applicable
to the applicant's complaint concerning non-entitlement to a widow's
pension;

6. Holds that it is not necessary to consider the case under Article
14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention
or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in connection with the complaint about
discrimination allegedly suffered by the applicant's late wife;

7. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 13 of the
Convention;

8. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention: