1. To lawfully stop a moving vehicle for an investigatory detention, a law enforcement
officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on fact, that the person to
be stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

2. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is a fluid concept that requires an assessment
of probabilities in the particular factual context. Reasonable suspicion is something more
than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch but something less than the probable cause
required for an arrest.

3. Both the content of the information possessed by the law enforcement officer and its
degree of reliability, i.e., the quantity and quality of the information, must be
considered
in the context of the totality of the circumstances.

4. Any of the detaining officer's subjective reasons for stopping a moving vehicle which do
not pass the objective, reasonably-cautious-person test, must be excluded or discounted in
the totality of circumstances analysis.

5. A law enforcement officer may be reasonable in suspecting that the registered owner of a
vehicle is the driver of that vehicle, absent evidence to the contrary.

6. The rationality of any inferences to be drawn from an officer's knowledge that a registered
owner of a vehicle has a suspended driver's license or that the registered owner is the
subject of an active arrest warrant must be viewed in conjunction with all of the other
information available to the officer.

JOHNSON, J.: The State takes this interlocutory appeal from the prosecution of the drug
case against Judith A. Hamic (Judith), specifically challenging the suppression of evidence. The
district court found that the initial vehicle stop was unlawful. Finding that the totality of the
circumstances provided the arresting officer with legally sufficient justification to effect an
investigatory detention of the vehicle, we reverse and remand.

On January 20, 2005, while on early evening patrol in the City of Pratt, Officer Wayne
Cline passed a green Jeep Cherokee, which he believed might belong to Jena Hamic-Deutsch.
Hamic-Deutsch had been stopped twice in the preceding 2 months while driving a green Jeep
Cherokee, once by Officer Cline on December 19, 2004, and once by fellow officer, Robert
Walker, on November 17, 2004. On both occasions, Hamic-Deutsch was cited for driving on a
suspended driver's license and having no current proof of insurance. During Officer Cline's
previous stop, Hamic-Deutsch displayed an insurance card indicating an expiration date in
October 2004. Officer Cline also knew that Hamic-Deutsch was wanted on an active arrest
warrant for probation violation issued out of municipal court.

Officer Cline followed the Jeep and checked its license tag through dispatch, confirming
that the vehicle was registered to Hamic-Deutsch and her husband or ex-husband, Michael
Deutsch. Although the officer could not ascertain who was operating the Jeep, he then effected a
traffic stop. He discovered that the vehicle was being driven by Judith Hamic, the mother of
Hamic-Deutsch, and that Hamic-Deutsch was a passenger in the vehicle. Officer Cline was aware
that Judith did not have a valid driver's license, and he detected a strong odor of alcohol
emanating from the vehicle. Further investigation, which is not relevant to this opinion, resulted
in the arrest of Hamic-Deutsch on the outstanding warrant and the arrest of Judith on charges of
possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, obstruction of legal process, and no
proof of insurance. Subsequently, Hamic-Deutsch was also charged with having possessed the
drugs and paraphernalia.

Hamic-Deutsch's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop
was granted by a magistrate. On appeal by the State, the district court conducted a de novo
evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion. Therefore, in this case, the parties stipulated that
Judith's suppression motion would be submitted to the district court upon the transcript of
Hamic-Deutsch's suppression hearing, upon Officer Cline's affidavit describing the
circumstances leading to Judith's stop and eventual arrest, and upon a copy of Hamic-Deutsch's
outstanding arrest warrant.

In its memorandum decision, the district court found that "Officer Cline made a traffic
stop without having observed a traffic violation or having other public service or safety grounds
for the stop." The court opined that "[t]he fact that the officer knew the vehicle did not have
insurance in November and December of 2004 does not amount to reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle did not have insurance on January 20, 2005." Therefore, the court found that "the lack of
reasonable suspicion before the stop controls under the stipulated facts before the Court" and
granted the suppression motion.

On appeal, the State presents two issues, the gist of which we perceive to be that Officer
Cline had reasonable suspicion that the crimes of driving while suspended and operating a
vehicle without proof of insurance were being committed in the Jeep, and that, separately, the
outstanding warrant for Hamic-Deutsch's arrest justified an investigatory stop of the vehicle
owned by the fugitive.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As noted, the parties stipulated to the documents upon which the district court was to
decide the suppression motion, and we are unable to perceive any material dispute as to the
relevant facts contained within those documents. Therefore, our review of the suppression order
is a question of law subject to unlimited review. See State v. Ramirez, 278 Kan. 402,
404, 100
P.3d 94 (2004).

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." Ramirez, 278 Kan. at 404. The
stopping of a
moving vehicle by law enforcement is always considered a seizure. City of Norton v.
Stewart, 31
Kan. App. 2d 645, 647, 70 P.3d 707 (2003).

However, our courts consider a moving vehicle seizure to be an investigatory detention,
as originally defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968).
Kansas has codified the parameters of a permissible Terry stop in K.S.A.
22-2402(1), which
provides:

"Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public
place whom
such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and
may demand . . . the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's
actions."

To lawfully stop a moving vehicle under Terry and K.S.A. 22-2402(1), a law
enforcement
officer must "'have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on fact, that the person stopped
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.'" State v. DeMarco,
263 Kan. 727,
734, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998) (quoting State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 712, 703 P.2d
761 [1985]).
"Something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch must be articulated. United
States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)."
DeMarco, 263 Kan. at 735.
However, reasonable suspicion is something less than the probable cause required for an arrest.
State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 697, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999) (quoting Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S.
325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412 [1990]) ("'[r]easonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause'").

Both reasonable suspicion and probable cause are dependent upon the "'content of
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,'" and "'[b]oth factors--quantity and
quality--are considered in the "totality of circumstances,"'" i.e., one must evaluate the
whole
picture. Slater, 267 Kan. at 697 (quoting Alabama, 496 U.S. at 330).
Our Supreme Court has
cautioned against "evaluating each suspicious factor in isolation and asking whether there was an
innocent explanation for the activity." Ramirez, 278 Kan. at 406-07.

Thus, determining where a case fits onto the continuum from unparticularized hunch
through reasonable suspicion to probable cause appears to involve more art than science. The
analysis is not amenable to an easily applied mechanical test. Cf.State v.
Patten, 280 Kan. 385,
122 P.3d 350 (2005) (adopting a mechanical elements test for multiplicity without regard to the
factual scenario of the particular case in order to achieve ease of application and certainty). As
stated by the United States Supreme Court, cited with approval in Ramirez, 278 Kan.
at 407:

"'[P]robable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular
factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.' . . .

Obviously, the same fluidity and imprecise quantification of percentages applies to the
reasonable suspicion standard, as a lesser degree of probable cause. "Where one or two factors
may cause a reasonable suspicion, a combination of several factors may create probable cause."
Ramirez, 278 Kan. at 407.

LAWFULNESS OF VEHICLE STOP

We decline the State's invitation to consider whether Officer Cline's knowledge of
Hamic-Deutsch's outstanding arrest warrant provided a separate and independent lawful reason to
effect an investigatory detention of the Jeep. The outstanding warrant for Hamic-Deutsch's arrest
merely provided an additional reasonable suspicion that she "has committed" a crime,
supplementing the officer's belief that she was then committing another crime. Therefore, we will
look at the outstanding warrant factor as a sub-part of our totality of the circumstances
evaluation.

Prior to effecting the stop on January 20, 2005, the content, or quantity, of Officer Cline's
information was: (1) approximately 2 months previously, on November 17, 2004,
Hamic-Deutsch was driving a green Jeep Cherokee; (2) at that time, her driver's license was
suspended;
(3) at that time, she had no proof that the vehicle was covered with liability insurance; (4)
approximately a month later, on December 19, 2004, Hamic-Deutsch was driving a green Jeep
Cherokee; (5) at that time, her driver's license was still suspended; (6) at that time, she still did
not have proof of current insurance, but rather displayed proof that her insurance coverage had
lapsed in October 2004; (7) the municipal court had issued a warrant for Hamic-Deutsch's arrest
because of a probation violation; and (8) Hamic-Deutsch was a registered coowner of the moving
green Jeep Cherokee that Officer Cline was following. The content of the officer's information
did not include a visual confirmation of who was actually operating the green Jeep Cherokee.

The officer's information was of the highest quality, i.e., reliable. Knowledge
of the prior
two traffic stops was obtained either first-hand or from another police officer. See State v.
Campbell, 24 Kan. App. 2d 553, 555, 948 P.2d 684, rev. denied 263 Kan. 887
(1997) (finding
collective knowledge of police officers as to defendant's suspended driver's license to be reliable
information). Further, the existence of an active arrest warrant is reliable information supporting
the reasonable suspicion that the subject of the warrant has committed an offense justifying
detention.

Although we are not to isolate the individual factors for the purpose of inquiring into
possible innocent explanations, a discussion of those factors is necessary to put the totality of the
circumstances in context. One cannot get the whole picture without assessing the legitimacy of
the factors ostensibly relied upon by the detaining officer. Any of the officer's subjective reasons
for the stop which do not pass the objective test of a reasonably cautious person must be
excluded from or at least discounted in the totality of the circumstances analysis.

The district court opined that it was unreasonable for the officer to suspect that the Jeep
was being operated without insurance on January 20, 2005, just because the officer knew that it
was uninsured in November and December of 2004. We disagree, albeit not solely on a temporal
basis. Hamic-Deutsch was caught driving in November 2004 with insurance that had expired the
previous month. A month later, Hamic-Deutsch was again caught driving without having
rectified the October 2004 expiration of her automobile liability insurance. The knowledge that
Hamic-Deutsch had twice, in recent months, chosen to drive in violation of our mandatory
automobile liability insurance laws created an objectively reasonable suspicion that she is a
driving without proof of insurance recidivist. Further, one would surmise that most of us would
suspect that multiple arrests for driving on a suspended driver's license and driving without proof
of insurance would impair the culprit's ability to obtain affordable automobile liability insurance
coverage.

The district court did not address the officer's knowledge of Hamic-Deutsch's outstanding
arrest warrant or her multiple previous driving while suspended arrests. Perhaps the court did not
think that information was relevant, given the officer's admission that he had not visually
confirmed that Hamic-Deutsch was the driver of the green Jeep Cherokee. Nevertheless, that
information is part of the totality of the circumstances.

Again, we decline to suggest any temporal bright lines on the question of whether
knowledge that a driver had a suspended driver's license a month before creates an objectively
reasonable suspicion that the driver's license is currently suspended. Cf.Campbell, 24 Kan. App.
2d. at 555 (information obtained within the week before the vehicle stop considered sufficiently
reliable). Here, Officer Cline knew that Hamic-Deutsch had been cited for driving on a
suspended license but had nevertheless continued to drive while suspended. He certainly was not
required to ignore this individual's propensity to illegally operate a vehicle on a suspended
license, even after having been arrested for the offense. Likewise, he was free to consider that
driving while suspended convictions normally result in an extension of the violator's period of
suspension. Thus, Officer Cline was objectively reasonable in suspecting that Hamic-Deutsch
had not regained her driving privileges a month after her second driving while suspended arrest.

Judith contends that Officer Cline could not have reasonably suspected that a crime was
being committed without knowing that Hamic-Deutsch was the Jeep's driver and could not have
reasonably expected to serve the arrest warrant without confirming that Hamic-Deutsch was an
occupant of the vehicle. She points to the fact that the officer's check with dispatch informed him
that the Jeep was coowned by Michael Deutsch and contends that Officer Cline knew the
coowners were in the process of divorcing. Apparently, Judith is suggesting that a reasonable
person might suspect that Michael was in sole possession of the Jeep.

Kansas has no published case dealing directly with the question of whether a law
enforcement officer is justified in suspecting that the registered owner of a vehicle is the driver of
that vehicle. Other jurisdictions have opined that an officer may rationally infer that a vehicle
owner who has a suspended driver's license is likely to be driving his or her owned vehicle,
unless other evidence or circumstances put the officer on notice that the driver may not be the
suspended owner. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 146 Ohio App. 3d 335,
340-41, 766 N.E.2d 179
(2001); and State v. Panko, 101 Or. App. 6, 9, 788 P.2d 1026 (1990); see also
People v. Barnes,
152 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006, 505 N.E.2d 427 (1987) (when a car owner is known to possess a
suspended driver's license it is reasonable to infer that the owner is driving because the owner
does the vast amount of driving); State v. Mills, 458 N.W. 2d 395, 397 (Iowa App.
1990)
(reasonable to infer a vehicle is being driven by its owner absent evidence to the contrary).

Perhaps it is more a matter of common experience than a profound legal maxim to
declare that a law enforcement officer is reasonable in suspecting that the registered owner of a
vehicle is the driver of the owned vehicle, absent evidence to the contrary. One presumes that it
is common for a reasonably cautious citizen to honk or wave at a moving vehicle that is owned
by a friend without first having identified the vehicle's occupants, and in doing so, rationally
expect that the friend will receive the greeting. Further, the caveat, that the owner-is-the-driver
inference may lose its rationality where the officer possesses contrary information, is simply
another way of saying that we must look at the whole picture. Therefore, the rationality of any
inferences to be drawn from an officer's knowledge that a registered owner of a vehicle has a
suspended driver's license or that the registered owner is the subject of an arrest warrant must be
viewed in conjunction with all of the other information available to the officer. Such knowledge
is definitely a factor, but it will not always be determinative.

Here, all of the information that Officer Cline possessed when he stopped the Jeep
rationally supported the inference that Hamic-Deutsch was either the driver or an occupant of the
vehicle. The officer's knowledge that a divorcing husband was a coowner of the vehicle did not
contradict, destroy, or even mitigate the inference. The officer personally knew that
Hamic-Deutsch had been driving the Jeep on two separate occasions within the past 2 months,
supporting a reasonable presumption that Hamic-Deutsch was the Jeep's principal operator.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the facts and circumstances within Officer Cline's
knowledge were sufficient, both as to quantity and quality, to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that a crime was being committed by the Jeep's driver or that a crime had
been committed by a fugitive who was an occupant of the Jeep. Therefore, the initial vehicle stop
was a valid investigatory detention, and the district court's ruling to the contrary is reversed. The
matter is remanded for further proceedings.