from the acta's-back dept

A few months ago, we quoted the EU trade commissioner Karel De Gucht, who is responsible for handling the TAFTA/TTIP negotiations on the European side, as saying:

"ACTA, one of the nails in my coffin. I'm not going to reopen that discussion. Really, I mean, I am not a masochist. I'm not planning to do that.

If the Commission advances new basic legislation, which I think she should, we will revisit the question, but I'm not going to do this by the back door".

Well, either that was just more misdirection, or he's not in control of his staff. Because we learn from a stunning report of a little-publicized meeting between corporate lobbyists and the EU's negotiator on intellectual monopolies, Pedro Velasco Martins, that putting many of the worst features of ACTA into TAFTA/TTIP is precisely what the European Commission has planned.
Here's the background:

Taking place at the American Chamber of Commerce offices in Brussels, the purpose of the two hour exchange was to strategize between businesses and the Commission in order to make sure that the maximum level of new IP restrictions will be written into the treaty. Present at the meeting were representatives from a range of the very largest multinational corporations. Among these were TimeWarner, Microsoft, Ford, Eli Lilly, AbbVie (pharmaceutical, formerly Abbott) and the luxury conglomerate LMVH. The participant list also included representatives from Nike, Dow, Pfizer, GE, BSA and Disney - among others. Also present
was Patrice Pellegrino from OHIM [Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market], the EU/Commission agency responsible for trade marks in the EU.

As you will notice, most of those companies are from the US. Nothing wrong that, of course, except when you consider the following:

Controversially, the supposedly neutral Commission negotiator and the OHIM representative not only defined themselves as allies with the businesses lobbyists. They went far beyond this and started to instruct the representatives in detail on how they should campaign to "educate" the public in order to maximise their outcome in terms of industry monopoly rights. In particular, concerns from elected representatives, such as the European Parliament -- as well as civil society criticisms about ever increasing intellectual property rights -- were to be kept out of the public debate.

Here's what the European Commission really wants to see in TAFTA/TTIP:

Commission negotiator Velasco Martins revealed the existence of a secret list of corporate demands for new intellectual property rights in the transatlantic treaty. Previously -- towards the public and the Parliament -- the Commission has created the impression that intellectual property rights will be downplayed. The only IP right mentioned has been geographical indications, a minor issue which few are concerned about. In reality, the Commission now revealed that they have received "quite a Christmas list of items" on IP from corporate lobbyists and that they are working to implement this list. The list has already been discussed with the US in several meetings, in person as well as online.

The Christmas list covers almost every major intellectual property right. On patents, industry had shown "quite an interest" especially on the procedures around the granting of new patents. On copyrights the industry wants to have the "same level of protection" in the US and EU; in reality this always means harmonization up which results in more restrictions for the general public. On plant variety rights the pharma sector has lobbied for "higher levels" of protection. On trademarks the corporate lobbyists had made classification-related requests to the Commission. Additionally there had been a lot of interest in trade secrets.

There's also stuff from our old friend ACTA -- stricter enforcement:

According to the negotiator, the most repeated request on the Christmas list was in "enforcement". Concerning this, companies had made requests to "improve and formalize" as well as for the authorities to "make statements". The Commission negotiator said that although joint 'enforcement statements' do not constitute "classical trade agreement language" -- a euphemism for things that do not belong in trade agreements -- the Commission still looks forward to "working in this area".

Since the beginning of the TTIP negotiating process, it is very clear that the eventual agreement on intellectual property rights will not include elements that were controversial in the context of ACTA. For example, the ACTA provisions on IPR enforcement in the digital environment (ACTA articles 27.2 to 27.4) will not be part of the negotiations. Neither will ACTA's provisions on criminal sanctions.

The report of the meeting contains many other fascinating insights into the real thinking of the European Commission. For example, apparently there is some relief that people are focusing on the horrors of corporate sovereignty, since that has allowed work on the "corporate Christmas list" to proceed unnoticed. There was also a warning that it is probably only a matter of time before details get out:

"Lots of people are waiting for the first slip, the first leak"

In the wake of the good things that have already flowed from Edward Snowden's leaks, and the enhanced status of whistleblowers today, that seems increasingly likely to happen. Finally, there was a useful hint of how the European Commission is going to attempt to justify bringing back ACTA in TAFTA/TTIP:

A recurring theme was that the public needs to be re-educated to understand the value of industry monopoly rights.

According to Pellegrino, the key to doing this is a number of pro-IP reports that will or have been released by OHIM.

One recent report was highlighted. It claims that every fourth job in the EU only exists because of intellectual property regulations.

Techdirt wrote about this back in October, where we pointed out that it obtains these unrealistically high figures by including a whole range of industries that use things like copyright and patents only in the most limited and tangential way. Expect to see more of these exaggerated claims, based on similarly shoddy methodologies, appearing in the next few months.

That OHIM is putting out such propaganda isn't perhaps too surprising -- it's just a form marketing for its activities. But what is shocking is that an OHIM representative, along with the most senior EU negotiator for intellectual monopolies, should be offering detailed advice to US companies on how to subvert the TAFTA/TTIP negotiations by trying to keep the dissenting views of Members of the European Parliament and EU civic groups out of the debate. That's a direct assault on fair and open discourse, and ultimately undermines European democracy at a time when many are calling into question the entire idea of the European Union.

At the very least, the European Commission should set up a formal inquiry into what happened at this meeting, to make sure such blatant favoritism is avoided in future. If it doesn't, we'll know definitively that not only is it happy to see corporates on both sides of the Atlantic given preferential treatment during TAFTA/TTIP, but that it really doesn't care who knows. Meanwhile, those who took to the streets of Europe to fight off ACTA last year may want to start getting their boots ready.

from the bad-taste-in-the-mouth dept

Recently we wrote about how pharmaceutical companies use "evergreening" to extend their control over drugs as the patents expire. But this is also an issue for the world of agribusiness: a number of key patents, particularly for traits of genetically-engineered (GE) organisms, will be entering the public domain soon, and leading companies like Bayer, BASF, Dow, DuPont, Monsanto and Syngenta are naturally coming up with their own "evergreening" methods.

Making its position quite clear, ETC calls the approach "philanthrogopoly" -- a "charity" cartel that is designed to assuage fears that they represent an anticompetitive oligopoly, while simultaneously ensuring that real control remains with the agribusiness companies even after key patents have expired:

The Gene Giants know their market dominance looks conspicuously like an anticompetitive oligopoly, so they’re launching a series of initiatives -- including the false promise of cheap, post-patent GE seeds -- to mollify antitrust regulators and soften opposition to transgenics while advancing their collective market control.

Here's the problem that "philanthrogopoly" claims to address:

The looming crisis, according to the Gene Giants, is that when patents on biotech traits expire, the breeders who want to use these generic traits must have biosafety approval from the government authorities where they plan to export the GE commodity or cultivate the GE seeds. If biosafety authorizations are not kept up-to-date -- even for tiny traces of expired traits -- entire barges of transgenic beans, containers of biotech cotton or maize risk being rejected in Rotterdam, Dalian, or Yokohama. For US and other farmers who depend on exports of GE commodity crops, the presence of unauthorized generic traits could be devastating, according to industry. For example, one quarter of all US soybeans are
exported to China, and 95% of those beans are genetically engineered. An estimated 93% of GE soybeans in the United States contain a Monsanto trait that goes off-patent in 2014.

The complexity, however, is not just the biosafety review process; it's also the fact that re-registration requires legal access to the proprietary safety testing data initially submitted by one of the Gene Giants to government regulators. (For the Gene Giants, safety data are considered "confidential business information" and a protected trade secret -- it's not something they're accustomed to sharing, especially with competitors.) Without access to the proprietary information, the cost of bringing generic biotech crops to market would be prohibitive.

So what do the top players here propose in order to address this issue? They have come up with what they call, rather dramatically, "the Accord", which includes an option for patent holders to continue to oversee biosafety approval for their GE seeds, either alone, or working with other companies. As ETC points out, this is likely to lead to even closer cooperation among the leading agribusiness giants, which already have extensive cross-licensing agreements with each other.

One thing that the Accord will not lead to is a flood of low-cost seeds produced by generics companies, as has already happened in the world of pharma, with huge knock-on benefits for the world's poor. For that to happen, the key safety testing data held by the agribusiness giants would need to be available. And despite the reasonableness of requiring companies to do that -- after all, if they want people to eat their products, they should be prepared to release the scientific evidence it is safe to do so -- that's not likely to happen unless they are forced to by governments.

Another factor making it extremely unlikely that we will see many seed generics is the dense web of patents that now envelope GE varieties, as ETC explains:

In the words of Randy Schlatter, DuPont Pioneer's senior manager of intellectual property: "What growers may not realize is that even though the trait patent expires, there are a host of other intellectual property patents on those varieties that are just as strong." In an interview with DTN/Progressive Farmer, Schlatter observed: "If there is a [first generation genetically engineered] soybean in the market today that is truly generic and not protected by a patent of some sort, I've not been able to find it." DuPont Pioneer, the world's second biggest seed company, has more than 225 patents covering its portfolio of soybean seeds -- not just on transgenic traits -- but on breeding technologies, germplasm and conventional ("native") traits. Even if a single transgenic trait goes off patent, the maize or soybean variety that contains the trait is likely the subject of a complex web of intellectual property. The two dozen patents on biotech seed traits that will expire over the next decade are dwarfed by the thousands of existing patents on traits, seeds and varieties

This is similar to some of the approaches to evergreening in the pharma industry -- adding extra, patented features to older technologies as the latter enter the public domain. The net result is the same for both drugs and crops: the patent "bargain" with society, that a time-limited, government-backed monopoly is granted in return for allowing anyone to use the invention freely at the end of the patent term, is not being kept fully. Once more, the public is shortchanged.