AFTER THE COUP; Gorbachev's Speech to Russians: 'A Major Regrouping of Political Forces'

Following is a transcript of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's speech and question-and-answer session today at the Parliament of the Russian republic, as translated by CNN. President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia contributed to the presentation and took part in the session that followed.

Let me start by saying what I've been trying to say these days, making sense of what has happened, and evaluating who did what these days and giving due, giving its due to the position of the Russian Federation. That's why I would like to start because first of all, it was the Russians, in their enormous mass, expressed through the Supreme Soviet, expressing the interests and will of the Russians. The Government joined together and barred the road to the plotters. I want to make specific mention of this, and this is my evaluation, which is based upon the realities of what has happened.

I want to call particular attention to the outstanding role of the President of Russia in these events, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

I was always convinced, when they submitted an ultimatum to me, to convey my powers as President to the Vice President or to announce my resignation in order to save the fatherland, that this adventure would not succeed and that these adventurists would be defeated and would end as criminals who are pushing the country into a terrible direction, catastrophe.

Nonetheless, thank God that things turned out the way they did because the intent, their intent was very far-reaching. They wanted to strike a blow at the vanguard of democracy, which bears responsibility for the democratic transformation of the country despite all of our difficulties and complications. This was their main intent.

An element of this pressure on the President of the country was their telling me, or it was their communication that the President had been arrested -- the President of Russia -- I'm talking about the President of Russia, that Yeltsin was arrested or had been or was to be arrested. That was how I understood it.

Now, their words, that was their intent, to isolate the President of the country if he would refuse to cooperate with these forces of reaction, and isolate the President of the Russian Federation.

Their miscalculation was mainly as follows. Despite the fact that we are going through terrible difficulties in the country and I think that the majority of our people feel that way, we still feel that our society nonetheless has been changed, it is different, and it unified its forces and coordinated its actions in order to overcome these difficulties and emerge onto the broad path of transformation of society. Plotters' Mistakes

They thought that the union was on the verge of catastrophe, of collapse, that there would be a national calamity and that the people would support them. That was their main miscalculation of the organizers of this plot.

The people did not support them. The army would not go with them, although they were pushed. And so the forces upon whom they were counting, the special forces for combatting terrorism, they were sent to strike a blow at the leadership of this democratic process, but people refused to follow orders. The armed forces, even those who went out or were ordered into the streets in contacting the workers, took a position of principle, almost every one of them, to the last man, soldiers and officers, the overwhelming majority.

Therefore their miscalculation or their calculation that they would be supported and that the difficulties of the country would help them in carrying out their plans were not justified, and that was the main reason for their defeat. The reasons, because we have reached such a stage in the development of our society when it has only become clear that everything has got to change -- the authority, the federation, the economy, our attitude, our relationship with property, and the position of the individual.

And we are already a different society, where there is no place for those reactionary forces. And that is why this was the last adventurous attempt to try to exact revenge and stop this process and seize power.

When I was told that a committee was being created, I asked what kind of committee is this. Who set this committee up? Who created it? And I will tell you.

You want me to repeat what I said yesterday. You weren't listening to me yesterday! Changes at the Top

I think further that, without altering the direction we have taken, we should go further along it. In the second place of order, that we should do this successfully, we need a major regrouping of political forces. We need a reliable governmental authority and a disposition of personnel in our forces in order to provide this support. We've already started, these last hours today along the lines where there might be some danger. Decisions have been taken. Boris Nikolayevich mentioned, this, in connection with certain events -- I said that Boris Nikolayevich was particularly distinguished because of these events in Moscow. We've just had some contacts with him and have worked out an approach to these questions.

We've decided the question of the Ministry of Defense: We have confirmed the former commanding officer of the air force, [ Yevgeny ] Shaposhnikov. We have resolved the question of appointing the president of the K.G.B., Vadim Bakatin. We have confirmed the [ Interior ] minister of the U.S.S.R., Comrade [ Viktor ] Baranikov, your minister.

We have taken a number of decisions on readjusting certain forces which are supposed to stand side-by-side with the President of the country -- the President of the Russian Federation -- and with the leadership, which is so committed to continuing our democratic transformations.

The decrees have been issued and a mechanism has been taken -- this is a result, lesson, from our present situation -- taking the decision that if it turns out that it is impossible to issue some directions or some orders at some point, automatically these rights and these obligations will pass on to a different individual.

Now we have to resolve some matters connected with the functioning of the U.S.S.R. Cabinet of Ministers. My opinion is that in its majority the makeup of this Cabinet somehow or other, in some form or another -- I only know two cases now where there's no doubt about one, and there are some doubts about the other -- when people refused to carry out the orders of the plotters.

The Minister of Culture has resigned -- [ Nikolai N. ] Gubenko -- and has refused to cooperate with the committee, and he spoke in the Cabinet against this line as I was told, but this is something I still have to confirm because most recently I've got information to the effect that this is not quite the way it was. Nonetheless, for the time being, one way or another, he did take a critical position, namely, Shcherbakov, Vladimir Ivanovich [ First Deputy Prime Minister ] . No? Well, Boris Nikolayevich. Okay. In a minute. Bessmertnykh Removed

Boris Nikolayevich, when we just met, gave me a short account of the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers. I haven't had a chance to read it yet.

We're reminded that Comrade Primakov, I was told did express his position quite clearly and forcibly with respect to the decision of the committee, this is -- and Chairman -- Vice President Vorontsov [ Nikolai N., chairman of the State Committee for Environment ] . That's a record of the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of the union, on the 19th, at 5 in the afternoon, just at a time when the building of the Soviets was to be attacked. I will do this. I'll read it. Let me finish.

I still haven't read it, I have to admit.

I had information of various types about the behavior of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This morning I got further information to the effect that at least either he was trying to maneuver, and I -- or worse, and I have now relieved him of his responsibilities.

I'm talking about Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh.

That's, I think that we will have a correct approach, this Government, and this whole Government has got to resign.

And we must today, when the nine of us were exchanging opinions, we had particularly to take, to pay particular attention to the formation of the Cabinet, to take into consideration both the competence and the devotion, the political position, adherence to democracy and attitude towards the democratic [ inaudible ] of the Government and, in particular, of the governments of the republics, so that this be a Cabinet which is both representative and also is going to be active.

Because we have a lot of work to do together, you and I, and today, and in particular tomorrow, we're going to have to decide these questions more rapidly because the people are expecting us to do that. But I'll deal with that in a moment. Let me finish the first part, what I have to say. Let me read this.

Therefore -- first of all, let me read it, and then I know you'll have questions. The Union Treaty

Therefore, we agreed and after exchanging views to work out proposals for forming a unified approach to this, as Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev [ the former Gorbachev adviser ] , said yesterday. So that we wouldn't have a repetition of what happened.

Thus, first of all, we have to work for these transformations and the appropriate structure, the political structures have to be created which are capable of taking on themselves the responsibility for that. That is the major guarantee we will have.

In the second place, we have to work more rapidly for the union treaty. On the whole, the signing of the new union treaty, despite the criticisms of it from various sides, was ready and we even had a time determined, and it was what incited these reactionary forces to undertake their approach because they knew about this new treaty and they knew what the consequences would be.

Now, when we -- we agreed that the opinions of the republics are particularly important, that we must be all together in this difficult time as we were, and we can criticize the slowness of the process. We know that there are some -- it is slow, and we know that there's a lot of -- the mechanism is not yet in place, we realize that, people want different things. We need such a mechanism and we're on the right path, and if we were not able to achieve this we would be a defenseless, would have been defenseless in this very dramatic moment.

Therefore all the republics, all the leaders of the republics, they were all there, have said that we must work and interact together within the framework of a unified union and, in particular, this concerns socioeconomic issues, and in particular with respect to the tasks connected with the present crisis. We have the problem of, a real problem of survival.

Look what this so-called committee started with, and what they started with, namely, the working out of a food program in order to survive until the next harvest.

And how to stabilize the finances so as to open the path for more rapid economic transformation. All of this is under examination, and on the 21st there is to be a meeting of the Council of the Federation. Courage and Stringency

This is all very difficult. We knew that we were going to have to take some very unpopular moves on the 21st, and this is something which we had to do. But all the leaders of the republics are for this.

But to conclude my thought on structures, I think that we will have in the Supreme Soviet, which is to meet to carry through the necessary changes so that the Supreme Soviet of the union, I mean, will be able to follow the path as this has become clear in these decisive and days of such tragic events.

I think that -- and I tried to say this yesterday and I will say it today -- we must act in such a way as to distinguish ourselves from the plotters, and demonstrate to the public that we have the courage to examine ourselves with all stringency.

We agreed with this today, with Boris Nikolayevich, and this has been agreed by the republics. We're going to establish a unified investigation body and this body is going to investigate, all of them, under the guidance of two procurators.

And they are going to report on this, and we will then be -- we are going to inform you and the Supreme Soviet of the country how the process is going on, the theme, the approach. Don't make my task more -- my situation right now is hard enough. Don't make it more difficult for me.

I think that in demonstrating this approach we must show our maturity and what we have achieved, what we have already done, you will say that they raised their hand against us, wanted to turn us into meat, they wanted to annihilate us. That is all entirely true, it's clear, and for that they must bear the most severe responsibility, those who raised their hands against the constitutional order, against the constitutional bodies, against the people.

There can be no deviations here, but it has to be done according to the law, and so that we all together will be balanced and responsible, and so that nobody should raise some sort of demand that we, or no one should be able to reproach us for carrying out a witch hunt. We know who started this and we know what happened. Judging the Supreme Soviet

We, you and I, have got to follow this path firmly, and we will manage to solve these issues, and we'll take decisions such as the circumstances demand, according to the law. I think that you will agree with this.

If you are not in agreement, I'm sure you understand me.

As for me, some issues are perfectly clear to me. All right. Calm down, calm down. Don't be in a hurry. We will get to questions later. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is meeting on the 26th.

I think that many of you will at least delegate several of your members for participation and all the leaders will be there, but it's not my prerogative to determine this, but the leaders of the republics will be there and the Supreme Soviet will examine the situation and all the lessons to be drawn from it and we will then be able to judge what the Supreme Soviet has done.

The Supreme Soviet of the country are the same kind of deputies as you. They've been elected by the people and I think that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. will be up to its responsibilities and will take the necessary decision. I'm sure that any differences, I'm convinced there will be no differences in the decisions taken. The fact that today the Supreme Soviet is somewhere -- everything was done to prevent it from coming here and I think that many of them, in fact, are here and you know who is here.

In any case, do not be in a hurry to judge the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. There are some people who will have to answer for themselves but you will manifest necessary maturity and it will be clear. It's going to be meeting in two days.

My third thought now, when Boris Nikolayevich was absent a moment ago the comrades were asking me, all the republics, in these anxious days did all the republics occupy a firm position and support Russia?

I think that Russia took a firm and clear position in bringing to everyone's attention what was going on in Moscow, changed the whole situation, altered the whole situation and the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium took this position and this is confirmed by Boris Nikolayevich. And today, after emerging from this crisis, the Russians must act together with all the other supreme soviets of the other republics and the peoples of the other republics. Otherwise they would not be Russians.

I will tell you what I think. I'm telling you what I think. Do I have that right? Do I have that right or not? What else do you want? And you, I hope, will accept what I say. Persuading the People

Today in particular we have enormous opportunities for Russia's unifying mission for the Supreme Soviet of Russia, the Government and the whole people of Russia. This mission we Russians have got to discharge. Let me finish. Let me finish.

You think that this is all I have to say. Let us not simplify things. We still have the greatest difficulties ahead in the next couple of months. We've got to convince people that their lives are changing to their benefit.

Therefore, let me tell you and I want you to think. I know what's in your eyes and in your hearts, but believe me, the person standing before you is also a human being and [ inaudible ] head of that list.

Were there 8 or 10 on that list? I think that we will get what we need from the investigation.

We see now how the Central Committee and the rest of them raised their heads and we stood firm and did not give any -- did not yield. They panicked and if they had more sense, they wouldn't have taken this course in the first place. They are people who lost their heads, lost all sense of responsibility. You can even call them traitors.

Yesterday and today, looking you in the eyes, I have to say that this is a very heavy drama for me. This was a very severe trial. Because they brought me an ultimatum. The chief of the President's staff, [ Valery I. ] Boldin, the deputy chief of the President's staff -- a man who I totally trusted -- totally, [ Oleg S. ] Shenin, C.C. secretary, member of the politburo, [ Oleg D. ] Baklanov, my deputy in the defense counsel, former secretary of the Central Committee. The fourth was [ Valentin I. ] Varennikov, general of the army, Varennikov.

He is a man far from me, but this is the man who after me, went to the Ukraine and submitted an ultimatum, etcetera: Kravchuk [ Leonid M., President of the Ukraine ] .

By the way, and when I say that when we should not use their methods but have to show that we are true democrats and what kind of people we really are, we have to separate those who participate -- who were preparing things in the beginning, and who joined them afterwards, who signed telegrams -- sent telegrams, who joined committees. But we should never say that some party worker or peasant or intellectual -- that some -- we should attack them and declare them all guilty.

Thus, I welcome the position of Comrade [ Anatoly ] Sobchak [ Mayor of Leningrad ] , who said that we should take the most severe methods permitted by law against those who prepared this putsch, but we should not permit any kind of anti-Communist hysteria, because that would be again, be used against the people. Who Backed the Coup

This -- we have to deliberate over all of this together. Perhaps this is as far as I will go. I think that we will take all the decisions which are necessary and I will start to read this, and the main thing is I am sure this, once again, even though I reached this same conclusion before, that the major danger -- I said this before, I've written it, and now I say it once again before you, and this has to be said -- the greatest gift which we could give to the conservatives or the reactionaries, or to anyone who wants to push the country backward would be if the democrats lose their unity.

There are differences and nuances among the different types of democrats, we know that, but the democratic forces have got to be unified, in particular these last events have, call us to do this, and I also urge you all to bear this in mind. Let me answer questions, then -- and then I will read what Boris Nikolayevich has handed me.

A short account of the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. on the 19th, that is to say, the day itself. Ivan Stepanovich, were you there?

It was a closed session and no record was kept. So some member, some participant took a record himself.

Took notes at 6 P.M., [ Prime Minister Valentin S. ] Pavlov was in charge, and it was an expanded membership, how we are going to work -- I'm just reading it out to you now, all right? I'm reading it for the first time. Maybe I won't do it perfectly accurately. How we are going to act in connection with the state of emergency.

Are you ready to take the country out of its crisis? All decisions taken before will not be carried out. Do you agree, or not, to support the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the union treaty? That means, that is to say, a statement of [ Anatoly ] Lukyanov here.

What do you think about the enterprises and the industrial branches? Do you support this position of the V.K.Ch.P., the Emergency Committee?

First, Katyushev [ Konstantin F., chairman of the Foreing Economic Commission ] spoke, the ministers, to date, nine to one, examined the situation and totally support the committee. We gave guidelines for the foreign press on how this policy is to be implemented.

Secondly, [ Vladimir Y. ] Orlov. Ministry of Finances.

The work is to be organized in a special way. We have -- we are for, that together with the banks, Gerashchenko [ Viktor V., chairman of the State Bank ] has sent the necessary telegrams to the various banks to support the committee. Sichov from Gosstandart [ State Committee for Standards ] actively supports the committee, and proposed his services in implementing its policies.

Fourth, Khadzhiyev, [ Salambek N., Minister of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry ] Nefkhimprom, were all for the committee together, all of us together for the committee.

Fifth, Davletov spoke -- it's hard to say what he was saying, he didn't say one thing or the other -- asked for assistance to restore industry.

And the sixth, [ Vladimir ] Gusev [ chairman, State Committee for Chemistry and Biotechnology ] actively supported and urged that if we do not prevail with the committee it will be the collapse of all of us. We will struggle.

[ Boris Y. ] Panyukov, [ Minister of Civil Aviation ] . He went one way and the other, but finally he supported, hemmed and hawed, and then finally supported -- hemmed and hawed and then finally supported.

I didn't want to attach this to personalities, but it's hard -- but thank you very much for helping me out of this situation. When we heard the BBC for the first time through the old radio, which my guards set up and we got information -- I think the correspondent was right here, even in this very building, as I understand -- within this very building. On Vorontsov's Role

Which Pravda are we talking about now? This one or the other one? There is only one Pravda, of course. Panyukov said [ Genrikh B. ] Stroganov [ chairman, State Committee for Machine Building ] actively supported the committee and reported that his staff is calling the machine factories and urging them to support.

The Ministry of Energy wasn't quite sure whether he supported or not -- asked for more information. [ Mikhail ] Timoshishin [ chairman, State Committee for Procurement of Food Resources ] was for. Eleven M.P.S. Ministry was for, said we need further guards -- further protection.

Vorontsov, [ Nikolai N., chairman of the State Committee for Environment ] as the deputy of [ inaudible ] stated at the proceeding of the [ inaudible ] that the acts of this committee are unconstitutional and urged to be -- said he would be the go-between with the leadership of the Russian Republic. This proposal was rejected.

Tizyakov [ Aleksandr I., president of an association of state industries ] was for -- 14th, Shcherbakov. The economy has got to function. There will be an embargo for three or four days. We have to work through things and how to use our reserves.

We'll not have anything to import with. We have to use our internal resources. The decision of the committee has not yet been formulated because opinions are changing during the course of the day. I still cannot say what my position is.

But like Tizyakov and Starodubtsev [ Vasily A., chairman of the Farmer's Union ] , I do not expect anything good from them. So there is something there in Shcherbakov's favor. Well, let's look into that. Let's look into that further.

Fifteenth -- Maslyukov [ Yuri D., Deputy Prime Minister ] . What's published will not give us any way of getting out of the crisis. He submitted five pictures. He got into a fight with Pavlov, and his position finally remained undetermined.

Gubenko. Tomorrow, I have to meet with the intellectuals. They will not understand. The committee did not express a clear position. But after that, they say he resigned.

Nineteen. [ Mikhail I. ] Shchadov [ Minister of the Coal Industry ] actively for, demanded immediate introduction of a state of emergency in the city of Kemerovo.

Twenty. [ Nikolai D. ] Laverov [ chairman, State Committee for Science and Technology ] hemmed and hawed, and finally ended up saying neither one or the other. Laverov.

Notes. Very unusual, but none of, nobody from the military-industrial complex spoke, or participated in the discussion, and Pavlov did not compel them to. Account of Pavlov's Role

Pavlov had a special secret session with them, and that is why they didn't have to express their views at this one. Let me say I'm still learning these three or four days I didn't have any idea what was going on. Boris Nikolayevich this morning sent me a package of decisions which you have taken and I have leafed through them, and yesterday when I was asked, I said whether -- these laws are not -- are they decrees? I said in the situation which the country was in, the Russian leadership did not have any other way of acting, and everything which it did, the president and the Supreme Soviet, and the government of Russia were compelled by circumstances, and are legitimate and appropriate.

YELTSIN: I have asked that the President of the country put these last words in the form of a decree.

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GORBACHEV: We have agreed, haven't we, we weren't going to give out all the secrets? That's no secret. That's serious. Indeed, Comrades, Boris Nikolayevich and I have had a real exchange of views on this. Why? Because indeed these decrees were at, in the time and at the appropriate situation, and this is something we have to recognize them as lawful for the situation in which they were issued. That is our task and we agreed that the President has got to issue such a decree confirming these even though post facto, but confirming them legally.

YELTSIN: A whole notebook has been prepared. Mikhail Sergeyevich, a whole series of decrees issued by the house of -- the Supreme Soviet when it was under siege. You will get it.

GORBACHEV: Now let me read, go through the questions rapidly, maybe there's something I should answer. Quickly, quickly. Here some mention is made of the Supreme Soviet. I have expressed my views on that. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. I have already said what I thought.

What? I've got to give some answers now.

You decide. What you want to do, I'll do it any way you want. Here is a proposal by Comrade Stepashin, Kobets, Lyukin and Stepashin -- about the armed forces. I've already said what I thought.

We have relieved [ Acting Defense Minister Mikhail A. ] Moiseyev and appointed [ Vladimir ] Lobov. We are going to make [ Pavel ] Grachev [ chairman of the Russian Defense Committee ] to be the First Deputy Minister of Defense -- Grachev.

YELTSIN: [ Yevgeny ] Shaposhnikov [ commander of the air force ] is going to be First Deputy Minister of Defense. Grachev -- the one who defended us -- he is going to be the first deputy minister of defense of the Union. He is the chairman of the Russian Committee on Defense Questions.

GORBACHEV: I'm not going to go ----

YELTSIN: I have just said this because I thought you might forget.

GORBACHEV: Look, there's a lot of decisions. I'm not going to read them all out. We will be issuing in the next day or two a couple of new proposals on this.

Don't get upset now. Have we agreed on everything? I give the President of the country a statement to the effect that Kobets -- Konstantin Kobets is going to be promoted to general of the army. The President of the country gave his agreement. I submitted a decree making Colonel Rutskoy a major general. The President of the country agreed to this.

Comrades -- a lot of questions like this -- practical questions -- are going to be dealt with in the future. Clearly not all members of the Emergency Committee should bear identical responsibility. As far as I know, [ Vasily A. ] Starodubtsev [ one of the eight members of the coup committee ] was told at 10 in the morning on the 19th -- have you gotten a letter from Starodubtsev, and what is your attitude toward him. I haven't gotten anything from him and I know nothing about him. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. . . . As the non-party faction in the R.S.F.S.R. thinks, that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be declared a criminal enterprise.

A. A question has been asked in such a clear way that I can only answer equally clearly and definitely. If you set yourselves the task before the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Russian Federation and even before other supreme soviets of driving secessionism from the territory of the Soviet Union, we will not ever succeed in accomplishing such a task because this is just another way of carrying on a crusade or religious war at the present time.

Socialism, as I understand it, is a type of conviction which people have and we are not the only ones who have it but it exists in other countries, not only today but at other times. And we have declared here freedom of conviction, freedom of belief, and if we start to do what I say -- I am answering as sharply as you asked the question. No, no, no, no. You just listen to what I have to say. You listen. You asked the question. Let me answer it the way I think. Therefore, do not ask such questions that make me make a speech in answering them.

The task of driving socialism from the territory of the Soviet Union, nobody has the right to ask such a question or make such a demand. It's another type of utopia. It's the same kind of witch hunt that I've been talking about. Let the people find their own positions vis-a-vis the party or vis-a-vis any other parties.

First. Second part of the question, when you say that the party should be prohibited, I cannot agree with that because in this party there are people, there are currents of opinion which were indeed involved in this process of the Committee of Emergency. They have to bear their responsibilities, legally and politically. But I never will say that we have to drive out all your workers and peasants who happen to be Communists. No, no, no, I can't go along with that.

You say it should be called a criminal enterprise, a criminal organization. I will answer to you. There are people who, in the Central Committee, who did not have enough courage even to defend their own Secretary General and there are committees also which took decisions to act in such a way as to help the so-called committee. These people have to answer for their responsibilities. But this, to declare millions of people, workers and peasants, criminals, that I will never go along with, even more, since the program which is now under discussion contains goals which you would have difficulty even competing with if this program is accepted and those who support this program will be democrats who will work together with you.

Second microphone. Purging the Communists

Q. District No. 34. Mr. President, please formulate your position vis-a-vis the position of the group of Russian deputies who feel that immediately we have to adopt measures to prevent, to eliminate the preconditions for such another putsch.

First of all, eliminate party structures from the administration of the country. The central organization of the party has got to be dissolved and all individual party committees in the army, in the Ministry of Interior, in the K.G.B., we have to deprive it of financial resources, in particular, its foreign currency. And it's got to be put under the control of the deputies. It's got to be removed from the security bodies at all levels and the troops have got to be made subordinate directly to the President.

A. In appointing Comrade Bakatin as Minister of Security, we have dealt with this first issue. As far as the other issues are concerned, they have all to be examined very soon. These thoughts more or less as you have presented them, by the way, and dealing with the themes which you have raised, were in fact raised and discussed at this meeting that I've had with the heads of the republics.

Therefore, all of these issues are going to be examined immediately and measures that we're dealing with are going to be worked out, but we have to do this legally. New Prime Minister

Q. Mikhail Sergeyevich, I would like you to express your opinion on a very important issue. You have told us today some very good appointments to major governmental positions but the key appointment is the Prime Minister. Do you not think, and I'm sure my colleagues would agree, that that it should not be the President of Russia. I would say that we have a very good candidate, a good professional, and that would be Ivan Silayev. Is it possible that he might agree to that? I would like to know what your opinion would be on this point.

A. I do not understand quite what I'm being asked.

Q. About the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. should be from the R.F.S.F.R. and I propose Silayev.

A. I understand now.

YELTSIN: Mikhail Sergeyevich, the first part of the question was how do you feel, whether it's correct that the Prime Minister of the union should be from the R.F.S.F.R. Should we present a candidate?

GORBACHEV: Boris Nikolayevich knows my position. When we, in December, formulated it, I said that I feel that the President of the country and the Prime Minister should be representing Russia. The Vice President, in my opinion, was -- my opinion was that he should represent the republics, perhaps best of all, from Central Asia.

Wait, hold on, hold on. I'm telling you what we discussed, sitting down at the time when the republican leaders at the Council of the Federation was meeting. Therefore, this position remains the same today. The second part of your question now is something else. We discussed in connection with the fact that the situation with the Cabinet of Ministers was particularly difficult, and we agreed that in the next two or three days everyone has got to think over who their leaders are to be and work out a unified approach.

The comrades from the republics have all said that there should be a coalition, and we should take into consideration the due representation of the republics.

I am sure that this is absolutely a correct a priori decision and even an intelligent one. The Party's Property

Q. Mikhail Sergeyevich, I'm a political worker so to speak, I'm a teacher, and I'm working to educate our, the younger generation that was guarding our White House. Now you say there's a sort of anti-Communist hysteria.

I'm a political worker as a teacher and I know that anti-Communism emerges as a result in reaction to Communism, just as anti-fascism arises as a response to fascism, as a deviation from -- and standard. There's various types of history -- anti-fascist or anti-Communist.

Thus such an organization as the C.P.S.U. was first based on nonlegal principles, it was a party of state treachery.

Therefore, I ask you what prevents you, as President, from issuing a decree that everything which that organization belongs should be taken away from it?

It has enormous sums of money, enormous money in accounts, including foreign currency. I think this has got to be dealt with immediately. This has got to be taken away from the party.

A. I answered this question in principle already. The practical questions deal, related to it will be decided in the days to come.

I'm not going to start giving you the benefit of all my thinking at this moment as to, with the information that I've gotten, Comrade Burbulis had a question to the effect that something is going on in the building of the Central Committee, and that -- which has to be stopped, and asked the soldiers to take measures. I took a decision to this effect. The building of the party Central Committee has now been sealed.

Q. My question is like that asked by another deputy. Those who defended the Russian White House all have the opinion that -- that you knew ahead of time what was going to happen, and [ Anatoly I. ] Lukyanov's interview on the 19th confirms this. He said he agreed with you and agreed on the personnel in this group of plotters. The only thing you couldn't agree on was whether this should be agreed by the Supreme Soviet or not.

I'd like to know what your position on this was. In either case you would have been on the horse, you would have, the putschists, if they had prevailed, would have left you as President. If they lost, you can now, can become a national hero, martyr, so to speak.

So that's my first question.

A. Stop, otherwise I'll forget your questions. I think that comrades are going to try now by -- think everything they possibly can about those forces which have now been defeated.

This is a very crude attempt to throw some shadows because people, they could not get anything out, I mean they couldn't get a single document, a single statement from me. And it'll come out, very soon I think, that after I heard, or after they told me and I heard over the radio that I was in such a condition that I was in a bad state of health and couldn't function, I understood that very soon an attempt is going to be made to make my state of health in line with what they said in the statements.

So these were all premeditated measures. They strengthened the guard. The orders had already been given, and they were already starting to live in a state of siege, and with a psychology of a state of siege, and therefore I think that this is all being done in order to -- simply because they did not succeed.

They did not succeed in breaking me down -- physically. In the first place, I haven't seen any such statement, and haven't heard any such statement. If he says this, he's a criminal. Just for that alone, because I never even talked with Lukyanov. I didn't talk with anybody. Gorbachev's Rescuers

Q. Vice President Rutskoy was trying to talk to you for three hours. He said that we don't need you but you need us. And today it's clear that the only support you ever had was the Parliament of Russia. Do you understand that?

A. I understand that we need each other, since we are all devoted to democratic transformations, and we cannot permit any division between us. If we did this, it would condemn our course to failure. I say that here. It's nothing new.

But I want to say it here again, in view of everything we've been through together. No forces will ever -- when I was told that a mission had come, which I had never heard of before, and I decided to take the telephone and find out what the mission was and I realized that everything was cut off and blocked, at that time I knew it was a question of life or death.

My family, in hearing me, all said should we live together -- we'll either live as we've been living or we'll die together. That was our position. And I have to say that things are not all that easy in my family now. We need one another. Practical Measures

Q. Mikhail Sergeyevich, yesterday at the press conference, as today, you devoted, in my opinion, more attention -- maybe I'm being subjective -- more attention to how they dealt with you in the Crimea and your granddaughter and your daughter, etcetera. But we haven't heard about any practical measures. We've heard -- other than some new appointments -- we haven't heard anything about the question of property, unfortunately. I don't want you to make a whole report on this, but there are a couple of other questions for you of a personal nature.

A. You're going to go onto personal questions, and then you say I didn't answer your first questions and then you say I didn't answer your first question. First of all, I do not agree with you. I said that the whole point was that at this stage, we now directly realize what goals we have to pursue to reach a new life. We have to sign the union treaty. We have to have an anti-crisis program, a food program, a fuel program. The finances have to be stabilized. We have to do all of these things.

In order to do this we must have a major regrouping of forces, a new legislative and executive, which will take on themselves responsibility, which would have confidence and would solve all these problems. Therefore, I have to say that knowing -- I should have perhaps yesterday said to them, what did you come for.

I refused to treat with them, but when the President -- if I had treated with them they would have started deluding the whole country, and that would have been the end of the constitutional authority. So I understand what has to be done. We have to continue what we have started here -- carrying out the concrete tasks that we have set ourselves already.

So I cannot in any way agree with you. Yeltsin's Decrees

Q. The question of property was raised. I'd like to remind you that we, during these events, have agreed that if you do not take a decision on conveying the property on the territory of Russia to the Russian jurisdiction, that the President of Russia would do that by issuing a decree to that effect.

YELTSIN: I, on the 20th of this month, did sign such a decree. All property on the territory of the Russian Federation, other than what belongs to the union, is in the property of the peoples of Russia -- the property of Russia. But you, today, said that you would sign a decree confirming all of my decrees issued during that period.

GORBACHEV: I do not think that you have tried to put me in a trap by bringing me here. No, I don't think that. Let me confirm once again that the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the President and its government in this extremely difficult situation acted the way they did and what they did was dictated by the situation, and therefore, has the force of law, and has to be confirmed by the President, even post facto.

Everything that concerns the questions of tearing out the union treaty or implementing the union treaty, as we have discussed this with Boris Nikolayevich -- and I hereby confirm this -- after the signing of the union treaty, a decree has got to issue -- the President has got to issue a decree on property, which will cover all of the republics, and this will start the process of implementing this idea. It's a very major task, and we have got to solve it in such a way that it does not worsen the functioning of the economy.

I will issue such a decree after signing the treaty. This decree is under preparation now.

YELTSIN: Comrades, how about the decree on cessation of activity of the Russian Communist Party?

The decree is hereby signed.

GORBACHEV: I think you'll be -- I don't know what you have been signing there, what it's called. But if it is as Boris Nikolayevich has said, then the Supreme Soviet, which has done so much and still has so much to do, in that case would hardly support President Boris Nikolayevich, whom I respect -- wait a minute -- not the whole Communist Party of Russia participated in this plot and supported it.

Therefore, if it is determined that the Russian committee or some other provincial committees were in solidarity with this committee, then I would support this, such a decree.

But to prohibit the Communist Party, I have to tell you, would be a mistake for such a democratic Supreme Soviet, for such a democratic President of Russia.

YELTSIN: It's not a prohibition. It is a decree on cessation of the activities of the Communist Party and so this can be dealt with by the courts. It's the law.

And not be registered any longer in Russia. We will remain democrats to the end, remain democrats to the end, and then everybody will be with you. All true democrats and all people who, right-thinking people.

Q. I'm also -- it's my turn to ask the question now, as a present to Valentina Aleksandrova, I'll let her ask a question for.

Q. Comrades, Mikhail Sergeyevich, let me ask you the following question. I want to ask you the following question. Have you got the necessary determination to give a true evaluation of all the individuals and all the persons in the state committees?

And secondly, on the events which just have occurred, we all know very well that a lot of people were silent, are nonetheless traitors. We don't have to mention any names. Now as far as this decree on ceasing the activity of the party's concerned, can you give an appropriate evaluation of all local party secretaries from top to bottom, the whole structure of the party, at the provincial and local levels to the Central Committee?

What kind of steps are going to be taken?

You have said that you know that they didn't all act the same way. I'm not talking about the rank and file, but I'm talking about the apparat which did not support you and did not support, in all honesty, the Russian government in this crisis.

What are your actions going to be in this connection? People are expecting from you definite, determined steps, and can you act with the necessary determination?

GORBACHEV: Comrades, where the most determination is required, and this situation that we're in now is, from which we are drawing very difficult lessons, I, on the basis of conferring with all of you -- I will confer with all of you -- I will take measures of utmost determination.

Therefore, I am ready, morally and politically, for this, but I'm going to insist, to the end, that if we divide our society, if we do not strive to have everybody unified around the democratic movement, then it's going to be a fight in society, and this is something we have to avoid. The people would not accept that.

Note to David. Sometimes people say let us have Brezhnev or Stalin back, at least we'll have order. So there are people who think that way and we have to show that we can solve things in a legal and democratic way. This is something I will insist on to the end. But this does not mean that I will not manifest determination.

YELTSIN: I can confirm this morning's meeting one on one. Mikhail Sergeyevich said it very clearly that all of those who participated directly or indirectly in this coup d'etat are going to be dealt with by the law. There was not to be any mercy manifested toward them.

Distinguished delegates, the President has been here for an hour and a half and now -- hold on a minute, hold on. No, no, at 6 o'clock there's a meeting of the nine and we have got, the President and I, to be there and continue a discussion of issues of principle relating to the economy and personnel.

Therefore, I note I would urge you therefore -- all right. Anybody has some comments, including Khadzhiyev -- Mikhail Sergeyevich, please sit down for a moment. Mike No. 5. Telegram and a Decree

Q. Mikhail Sergeyevich and Boris Nikolayevich, everybody has read the read on the 19th. I was not at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers. Although I was away, I came on the 19th back to Moscow in the evening. On the 20th I was at the Collegium and I said that I will not work with these eight. If they prevail at the session I will resign.

I have a telegram from my colleagues, said it has to be subject to a decision of the Supreme Soviet. On the 20th Comrade Ansov and I wrote a decree. It'll only take three seconds.

"We remain faithful to the laws of the U.S.S.R. and the President. We feel that the creation of this Emergency Committee is illegal and illegal by virtue of decree issued by the President of the U.S.S.R. Thus we subordinate ourselves to the President of the R.S.F.S.R. and we urge other colleagues to do the same thing and to observe the legal authority of the country."

This is on the 21st of this month. I and other colleagues signed it. Therefore I would urge you that that, by name, be mentioned, that the scoundrels mentioned by name be dealt with appropriately.

GORBACHEV: We will take note of what you have said but we have to continue. We have to investigate this particular fact. In the third place, tomorrow Izvestia is going to publish this record -- please do not interrupt me -- so that everything there will correspond with what actually happened. If a couple of names get there in the wrong way, that would be a shame if that were to happen. Therefore, let us do this now. Let us get to Izvestia and ask them to delay a day or two maybe. That would be better than publishing it wrong.

YELTSIN: I've got everything. All questions, all the written questions Mikhail Sergeyevich has taken with him. Let us please display more self-respect. It's the first time that the President of the country has ever been here to our Supreme Soviet.

Now, I know some of his questions might not be entirely complete but in an hour and a half he's maybe gotten tired. We have to thank the President for his speech, for his answers, and we will consider that this will now be a traditional measure, that the President will come here.

Now it's starting all over again, no?

Q. Your position should be the same as that of Yakovlev.

GORBACHEV: My position is unchanged. Everybody knows what it is.

Q. I don't know what your position is.

A. You don't know it? Well, I know what it is. Shevardnadze and Yakovlev have shared the same fate as I have since 1985. We all participated in our search for ways out of our difficulties and also they participated in some of the mistakes which we made. This is also on their account.

But the main thing that we achieved was that we selected a correct course. I'm against -- I was against their resignations in both cases but I could not compel them to stay if they didn't want to.

Thank you very much. Goodbye.

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A version of this article appears in print on August 24, 1991, on Page 1001006 of the National edition with the headline: AFTER THE COUP; Gorbachev's Speech to Russians: 'A Major Regrouping of Political Forces'. Order Reprints|Today's Paper|Subscribe