DKA: You=20
started your career as a Fulbright Scholar.How did this happen?

=20

GB:I had been a co-op student at =
MIT=20
working for large companies where there were seas of engineering desks, =
and so I=20
was trying to delay going to work as an engineer. I visited Gordon =
Brown, the=20
MIT head of the EE Department, who was an Australian. And he said: =
=93Why don=92t=20
you go to the University of New South Wales?They just started a department =
at their=20
new eight year old university and they need somebody to teach computing =
and get=20
them started in research.=94 =
So Bob=20
Brigham, my roommate, and I went to Australia as Fulbright scholars, =
taught a=20
graduate course, and built a pretty impressive compiler for their =
computer. It=20
was the English Electric Deuce, a follow on to the NPL National Physical =
Laboratory Ace that Turing designed. =20
It was a very hard machine to program because its main memory was =
delay=20
lines with 192, 32-bit words and programs resided on an 8 K word =
drum.It had card input, and you =
signed up to=20
use the computer for short periods of time =96 it was used as a personal =
computer,=20
albeit one you could walk into. We wrote a compiler to optimize programs =
and=20
make it easier to use. =
It=92s 32=20
word, 32-bit memories could be displayed on a CRT, so you could interact =
with=20
it.

When I returned from Australia, my thesis =
advisor, Ken=20
Stevens head of the MIT Speech Lab hired me to the research staff. This =
allowed=20
me to take courses, and =
work toward=20
a PhD.I had little =
desire to=20
get a doctorate because I had really just wanted to be an engineer.I needed a job because I had =
just gotten=20
married and Gwen was finishing Harvard. =20
So I followed that path. The lab was doing really fundamental and =
interesting work in speech understanding and I thought I could write a =
program=20
to recognize speech.I =
wrote a=20
program called Analysis-by-Synthesis that was a way to attack speech =
recognition=20
or recognition of anything. Basically, you generate asynthetic signal from a model =
of speech=20
production and then tune and compare that with the input to impute what =
the=20
sound parameters might have been. The basic technique is still used for=20
analysis.The 1959 paper =
still gets=20
referenced. One of the students in the lab became a professorat Tokyo University is still =
pursuing=20
the path and continues using the technique.

The more important thing to me about the MIT =
experience=20
was the use of the TX-O, a machine that was designed by MIT=92s Lincoln =
laboratory=20
and one of the very first transistorized computers. It was fast with a=20
6-microsecond core memory. And it was designed for interaction, =
real-time, and=20
connecting things. We connected recorded speech through a bank of =
filters via an=20
a-to-d converter.So it =
was both a=20
real time and interactive machine. =20
It was a personal computer used by one person at a time. It was =
basically=20
a PC. It had only 16 kilobytes of memory and paper tape I/O. I designed =
a=20
magnetic tape control because it needed to handle more data.

=20

DKA:So you were really using =
personal=20
computers from the start.

GB: =
Also,=20
that=92s how I came to be a computer engineer. The tape control was =
designed from=20
modules from a 1957 startup, Digital Equipment Corporationin =20
nearby Maynard, MA. I looked at the small company in an old mill =
building=20
and everybody was designing and building things just like I had always =
imagined=20
engineering to be. Gee, this is how I thought engineering was! I can =
actually DO=20
design and build something if I join DEC! =20
They made products. My earlier co-op engineering assignments =
weren=92t very=20
interesting to me. So I joined DEC in the summer of 1960.

=20

DKA:Before we go into that, let me =
go back=20
and talk a little bit more about MIT. =20
I was curious as to whether you were interested in computing as a =
student=20
there or that that interest grew or what had you hoped to go into when =
you first=20
started working as an engineer?

GB: =
Okay, what=20
was computing like? I took all the computing courses MIT offered in =
1952-1957.=20
There wasn=92t even a computing option. =20
There was a course in digital design, courses in switching =
theory,=20
numerical analysis courses, and several courses in machine language =
programming.=20
I learned to program the IBM 650 and 704. MIT had a 704 or 709, and the =
7090=20
didn=92t appear till 1960. MIT=92s Whirlwind was the machine that was =
the progenitor=20
of real time, interactive, and air traffic control.I was fascinated with digital =
systems=20
design and computers.

DKA:Interactive computing and =
SAGE?

=20

GB: =
Yes, all of=20
that. So that was the fascination. And the TX-0 was the machine that was =
attractive to all of us. So when I saw DEC introducing the PDP-1 as a =
follow-on=20
to the TX-0, I wanted to be part of it.

DKA:But as a student had you had =
access to=20
the TX-0 wouldn=92t this have changed things?

GB:It wasn=92t on campus until =
1958.

=20

DKA:When you came back?

=20

GB: =
When I came=20
back from Australia in 59 the TX-0 =20
had just been installed. But no, there was not hands-on computing =
when I=20
was a student, although we could sign up for some time on the IBM =
650.It was only research =
associates or=20
graduate students that had access to the machines because they were for=20
research.The speech lab =
was a=20
prime user.

DKA: And yet=20
you knew that this was the area of engineering that you wanted to make =
your=20
life?

GB:Yeah, it was the same way that =
I think=20
of when everybody gets fascinated with computers. They are interactive =
and you=20
are creating a living entity. TX-0 had a debug program to write programs =
on=20
line, symbolically. And it was the fascination with the interaction that =
at=20
least I found exciting. Because as a student I had run programs on the =
IBM 650=20
and Whirlwind but they were usually batch processed where someone else =
runs your=20
programs and you get printouts, but it wasn=92t the same thing. Its =
conceivable I=20
wouldn=92t have gotten into computing if I hadn=92t had the interactive =
experience.=20

I=20
had online or personal experience when I was in Australia with the =
Deuce. And it=20
was really used as a large personal computer, one person at a time that =
you=20
signed up to use. That is the way machines were scheduled before batch=20
processing.

DKA:One last thing I want to ask =
you about=20
that you know that what seems like second nature to your experience on =
the TX-0=20
is a style of computing that is so far distant from what people think of =
now=20
when they think of computing. Maybe you can just briefly describe what =
it was=20
like to do something on the TX-0 with its oscilloscope and =
keyboard.Just what was it like to do =
something=20
with that machine?

GB: =
Well, in a=20
funny way I don=92t think it was that much different from today for =
programming.=20
You sat and wrote programs like you do today with paper and pencil or =
directly=20
into an editing program. =
I think=20
people still do that or they should at least.The great programmers I know =
like Dave=20
Cutler still writes programs, desk checks it, and then compiles and runs =
them in=20
a test environment. In that case the program was typed in using an =
off-line=20
Flexowriter to create a punch paper tape. The tape was translated using =
a=20
compiler or assembled and then loaded into the computer directly or via =
some=20
kind of loader together with a debugging program that let you look at =
the=20
program. The debug phase is virtually the same thing you have today but =
now it=92s=20
more of a single system. =
The nice=20
interpretive environments like Visual Basic are all-in-one environments =
for=20
creation and debugging.

DKA:Now you started to talk a few =
minutes=20
ago about the atmosphere at Digital when you first joined...

DKA: I am=20
interested in hearing why it was such an important company and is still =
such an=20
important company in the history of computing. You might want to talk a =
little=20
bit about that early phase and I=92m sure you met Ken Olsen at that time =
and some=20
of the other people there. Tell me about the atmosphere there.

=20

GB: =
My badge=20
number 80 when I joined. What really struck me was that it was a startup =
in this=20
mill building. In fact my office when I left DEC was still building 12, =
the=20
ground floor, of a 3-story building that was pretty much the =
headquarters=20
building.As a civil war =
woolen=20
mill it was totally open, and the offices were made into semi-private =
offices by=20
putting up partitions made with ordinary doors. It was quite open but =
yet=20
everyone had there own private space unlike what I would call the =
aircraft=20
company engineering offices of the 1960s with a sea of desks butted =
together=20
where you lookedat =
someone to your=20
right and left and across your desk. =20
Something about the seas of desks I guess bothered me about =
engineering,=20
and what was attractive about DEC was that I was the second computer=20
engineer.There were =
circuit=20
engineers, but I was the second one that came to build computers.

=20

DKA: But of=20
course Digital didn=92t start to build computers when they started in =
1957; they=20
built the modules and they had just, I guess, at this time made the =
decision=20
that they were in fact going to go further and build computers and =
that=92s why=20
they begin hiring people like you. Tell me about the discussions that =
you had=20
before you came on board.

GB:I don=92t exactly remember my =
first=20
visit.I don=92t think I =
made very=20
many visits, but I went out to buy modules and discuss a particular =
circuit that=20
I didn=92t quite understand and how it worked. It was a circuit that had =
been=20
invented at Lincoln labs. It did exactly what you wanted to do that =
solved a=20
nasty timing problem and nobody else had one that was anythinglike it.It was an integrating single =
shot.You needed something like that =
to build=20
tape units, or rather it made the design of my tape controller a lot =
easier to=20
do, so I went out to talk about that and their tape read/write circuits. =

I=20
met Ben Gurley who was head of computer engineering and came from =
Lincoln=20
Laboratory, like many of the early DEC employees.He had come a year before and =
had just=20
built the PDP-1. I met everybody, the whole team -- Ken, Harlan =
Anderson, Ben=20
and Dick Best, the chief engineer.

By the way, that is a title we have since =
lost. I think=20
it=92s a wonderful title that people should use. Now it=92s the chief =
technology=20
officer, but I think chief engineer is a wonderful and better title. I =
really=20
enjoyed interaction with Ben and the whole crew and in fact they very =
shortly=20
made me an offer and I immediately accepted it. DEC looked exactly like =
the=20
place engineers should be in and work. =20
The manufacturing was in the next building.

=

I=20
had grown up in a small town and had no idea what an engineer was other =
than in=20
my mind and had decided I wanted to be one at about age 10.I went straight from =
Kirksville,=20
Missouri, against the recommendation of a college math teacher friend of =
my=20
father=92s. He said you don=92t want to go to MIT, you=92ll be competing =
with all=20
these guys from eastern prep schools. Why they all have had calculus and =
all=20
you=92ve had is algebra. =
I went=20
anyway.

DKA:And so, but then you did not =
know what=20
an engineer was, but you did want to build things and Digital gave you=20
that=85

GB: =
Yes, so I=20
had it in my mind what an engineer was. =20
I did many different things, including writing floating-point=20
subroutines, designing tape controllers, and a drum controller for one =
of the=20
first time-sharing systems that Bolt, Bernanek, and Newman had =
ordered.The main thing was that as an =
engineer I=20
wasn=92t part of a huge hierarchy, but rather I had the responsibility =
for a=20
product.I also wrote a =
manual on=20
I/O control that I=92m still proud of because the techniques and =
philosophy of how=20
to do I/O using interrupts and direct memory access endured and =
influenced other=20
architectures. I also helped establish DECUS, the DEC user=92s group, =
patterned=20
after IBM=92s Share, to help get open and free software.

My first big project was the project engineer =
to make a=20
telegraph line switch to replace IT&T torn-tape switching centers =
with a=20
PDP-1.This gave me an =
appreciation=20
for communications and for reliable telegraphy.But what I am most proud of is =
inventing=20
the first UART or universal asynchronous receiver transmitter for =
bringing a=20
communication line into the computer.

DKA: So you had=20
some early experience with networking communications and computing=20
services.

GB:Yes, that fondness for =
communication=20
came right from the beginning.

DKA: Now you=92re=20
well known for some early work on the PDP-4. I wonder if you might want =
to talk=20
about the difference between the =934=94 and the =931=94 and why that =
was an important=20
machine at Digital.

GB:Well the =934=94 was also an =
18-bit computer=20
like the =931=94 but it was not compatible with it. It was the first =
computer I had=20
designed from scratch.I =
think I=20
wrote in Computer Engineering, a book about DEC=92s computers, the =
importance of=20
compatibility. The same thing could have been said about the PDP-1=92s =
lack of=20
compatibility with the TX-0. =
Like=20
virtually all hardware engineers, I didn=92t have an appreciation for =
software=20
investment and architectural compatibility.But one=92s ego takes over and =
we reason=20
that we can make a better order code or architecture.This is why there were so many =
early=20
computer architectures, and even now a large number of variants of =
digital=20
signal processing computers. The =934=94 was the progenitor of the =937, =
9, and=20
15=94. =

The PDP-5 was really the forerunner to the =
minicomputer.=20
It=92s successor, the PDP-8 was what we think of as the classic =
minicomputer.=20
Because of the way it was rack mounted, it was clearly a component to be =
incorporated with some other system. Other systems of the day were =
primarily=20
stand-alone.

DKA: Well, I=20
was going to ask you actually to contrast the series that came out of =
the =934=94=20
and the =938=94 and you=92ve begun to do that. You might want to be =
somewhat more=20
explicit about what that first line was targeted at, what were the =
innovations,=20
and contrast that to the line that led up to the =938=94, and of course =
we should=20
talk about the 11 and the VAX. But I think the way to do it is maybe =
just be=20
comparative about what were the objectives of each technical line and =
how those=20
were achieved.

GB:Well, the =934=94 became a =
line that was=20
designed to meet a couple of goals. One it was designed as a control =
computer=20
for the Foxboro Control Company and needed to be lower cost than the =
PDP-1.One application I remember was =
to=20
control a Nabisco baking factory. There was a lot of concern at the =
board=20
because we might be liable if the computer stopped or dumped flour into =
the=20
river. But the =934=94 used different circuits and we ran things slower =
and got=20
economy not using all transistors. =20
It used capacitor, diode, and transistor logic to run at a clock =
speed of=20
1 Mhz instead of the PDP-1=92s 5 Mhz. In retrospect we should have used =
the PDP-1=20
order code. By running the =934=94 slower we reduced the price from $120 =
to $60=20
thousand. We also used a Teletype for the console because I disliked the =
modified IBM Selectric typewriters because they were unreliable, unlike =
the old=20
fashioned, indestructible Teletypes. We were the first computer company =
to use=20
Teletypes.

DKA:So a lot of the purpose of =
that whole=20
line was to meet a market demand and the pricing.

GB: =
The =934=94 was=20
cost and aimed at process control and real time data. It had several =
innovative=20
features, for example any register could act as a counter and so it =
would allow=20
you to collect data directly from external sources. Although it didn=92t =
have=20
index registers, certain memory registers were automatically incremented =
or=20
decremented when accessed.

The =935=94 was an interesting story, too. One =
of the first=20
applications that we looked at for the =934=94 was to control a nuclear =
reactor at=20
Chalk River, Ontario. Ed DeCastro, a special systems engineer, and I =
went up=20
there in the dead of winter to talk to them about their system. The =
=934=94 was=20
doing the control and a special system that Ed was going to design was =
doing=20
data collection.It had a =
rack full=20
of counters, A-to-D converters and lots of buttons and switches. So I =
said:=20
=93Gee, why don=92t we make a tiny tiny computer to do data =
collection.=94 I think we=20
started out with maybe a 10-bit computer. I asked: =93What=92s the =
smallest computer=20
that can do the job?=94 =
It evolved=20
from 10 to 12 bits.The =
analog=20
conversion was done by using a D-to-A converter on the accumulator.That idea came from the LINC =
computer=20
that Wes Clark had designed at Lincoln Lab for laboratory use. Wes =
influenced my=20
thinking about architecture and I/O.

DKA:And the =935=94 led to the =
=938=94.Let=92s talk now about that =
transition=20
from the =935=94 to the =938=94 because the =938=94 was such an =
important product in=20
Digital=92s history. Maybe you want to talk both about its objectives =
and why it=20
became so successful.

GB: =
The =935=94 was=20
built as a control computer, but the machine that was very important was =
its=20
successor the PDP-8. The =935=94 occupied one or two cabinets whereas =
the =938=94 was=20
less than a half cabinet. =
The net=20
result is systems could be built that were significantly smaller.In many cases the =938=94 was =
put in other=20
manufacturer=92s packages. =20

Let me digress. The transition to make a PDP-8 =
really=20
occurred because of another machine -the PDP-6.After doing the PDP-4, I went =
to work on=20
thePDP-6 which was =
DEC=92s big=20
machine and the world=92s first timesharing computer.We didn=92t think it was that =
big, but it=20
turned out to be quite a large machine with a 36-bit word length. It was =
patterned after the standard word length of the day, the IBM 7090 that =
came out=20
in 1960. The PDP-6 was built using the original 5 Mhz and 10 Mhz modules =
that=20
were interconnected using a hand-wired backpanel in two bays or2 x 12 x 25 modules.Many women worked in the =
Maynard Mill to=20
do the wiring.On the =
PDP-6, we=20
found out that the many wires and corresponding wiring errors meant that =
it just=20
took too long to debug, making it quite costly. Now in retrospect we =
should have=20
never plugged modules in. It should have all been checked even with =
people=20
checking, but women did point to point wiring to build the machine. So I =
investigated buying a wiring machine from Gardner Denver.The original came from IBM, =
and Univac=20
also used it.The =
net result=20
was being able to produce PDP-8s in high volume and at lower cost. It =
allowed us=20
to introduce the PDP-8 with its 12 bit word, 4 Kw memory, and Teletype =
for=20
$18K.

DKA:And you began to really open =
new=20
markets.

GB: =
Yes. In=20
fact the idea of OEMs or Original Equipment Manufacturers came from the=20
=938=94.That is selling =
it to other=20
companies who would resell it as part of another larger system, whether =
it=92s a=20
controller for a cigarette making machine or factory or a test =
instrument. So=20
the =938=94 was really a transition to another way to market =
computers.Today, most of the adding on =
is software=20
as in the thousands of Independent Software Vendor companies.

=20

DKA: You might=20
want to talk a little bit about the computer market at that time the =
=938=94 was=20
introduced because it had gelled in a certain way and DEC was beginning =
to find=20
its position in the market. How did that look to you at the time?

=20

GB:We ought to look at the market =
in the=20
mid 60s. This is right at the time when integrated circuits were being=20
introduced in the mid 60s. =
The=20
million dollar or so mainframe market was described as Snow White and =
the 7=20
Dwarfs -- IBM and its competitorDKA:Burroughs, CDC or Control Data =
Corp, GE,=20
Honeywell, RCA, and UNIVAC. All targeting electronic data processing for =
large=20
corporations.

So the minicomputer was a totally different =
kind of=20
machine for a different market. The PDP-1 sold for $120,000. But it had =
only an=20
18-bit word.Who could =
use an=20
18-bit computer?Well, =
you can get=20
a 36-bit computer by just doubling it up and mostly it works. SDS, =
Scientific=20
Data Systems, was introducing 24-bit machines in the early 60s, but they =
were=20
also young. DEC and Computer Controls Corporation were contemporary =
startups. So=20
there were really only a few companies. First off, there were few =
competitors=20
because you had to design your own circuits.DEC=92s basis technology was =
circuit=20
design or as we would say now, barrier to entry.So a computer was just an =
assemblage of=20
the logic circuits, built to interpret an architecture, and the =
software.From where it was as a =
startup, all that=20
remained was to put the circuits together.

In those days, the software consisted of a =
bunch of=20
independent routines. There was nothing like an operating system to =
manage the=20
computer. When you ran a program you basically pulled together a bunch =
of=20
software components and ran them.

DKA: So you had=20
a core of innovative aspects to your company that nobody else really =
competed=20
against. As you say, it=92s a full service at a certain extent but also =
at a level=20
that was below in terms of complexity and price point what the other =
companies=20
were doing.

GB:Well no, I would say we were =
at the same=20
complexity level, but we were producing low cost, high volume machines =
and this=20
allowed them to be used in a number of different markets. And because =
DEC had=20
the modules, other companies could take the modules and build their own =
systems=20
and write the program for an application. =20

This was the beginning of an era where the =
idea of=20
standards was just beginning to happen. =20
In languages, people said COBOL 60 will solve that problem for =
commercial=20
computing andFORTRAN =
will solve=20
problems for the scientific market. But the scientific calculator market =
was one=20
based on wide words so you can=92t do science unless you have 36- or =
48-bit=20
word.Also, those =
scientific=20
machines were expensive with a memory of at least 32 K words.The PDP-1 with just a 4 K word =
memory=20
was rarely used for calculations -- it had a scope and was a machine you =
interacted with. =20

So early in the =9160s we said we=92ve got to =
have a large=20
word machine -- that=92s a REAL computer. =20
MIT was building a timesharing computer based on the IBM 7090 so =
it was=20
natural for us to look there. =20
You=92re not going to have a 300-500 thousand dollar machine just =
for one=20
user. So how are you going to do that? By timesharing one machine. So=20
timesharing came out of the same era.

I=20
feel so fortunate to be part of that period from 60 to 70 which is when=20
minicomputers were born, timesharing started, integrated circuits =
introduced,=20
and COBOL and FORTRAN. On the other hand, every decade I say: =93Oh my =
god, the=20
next decade is going to be much more exciting than what we=92ve lived =
through.=94=20
But in fact this was an exciting era.

Building a timesharing system meant lots of =
users on=20
line, no restarting, and it can=92t fail. And it was the first time we =
took=20
responsibility for significant software -- we=92re providing the =
software. Its not=20
coming from the university or the users don=92t sort of glue it =
together. So that=20
was our first operating system and it was introduced in 1965.

=20

DKA: So that=20
was really the beginning. DEC had achieved a maturity with the =938=94, =
and then I=20
guess the =9311=94 is the next big product that came out. You might want =
to talk=20
about that transition.

GB: =
Right. What=20
happened after this beginning was that in 1964 IBM introduced the =
System/360 and=20
then that changed all the word lengths to be modulo 8 bits.Computer Controls Corporation =
had come=20
out with the first 16-bit mini designed by Gardner Hendrie who I had =
known at=20
Foxboro.Then a year or =
so later=20
Honeywell bought them and promptly destroyed the company before they =
could=20
become a threat.If you =
can just=20
hang in there as a company, you=92ve got a good chance of making it =
because others=20
may self-destruct.For =
example, SDS=20
was doing pretty well into the early 70s until Xerox bought them. That =
was a=20
pure play for the founders --- gee, we=92re offered 900 million dollars =
for our=20
computer company that we=92re having trouble with in a very competitive =
market.=20
And so XDX was created and eventually written off.

=

So that era from 1965-75 was that transition =
to a 16-bit=20
world using Integrated Circuits. =
Almost 100 minicomputer companies formed and eventually died with =
only HP=20
surviving.

=

In a way, I can look back and say maybe I was =
burned out=20
when I went to Carnegie Tech as an associate professor in what became =
the=20
computer science department in 1966. I remained a consultant to the =
company. The=20
PDP-6[1] begot the =
PDP-10, so that=20
was going along nicely. The =935=94 and the =938=94 were established and =
growing, there=20
were PDP-4 follow-ons, and so the company was doing very well.I didn=92t see that I was =
essential to the=20
company.

Being a professor at Carnegie Tech that became =
CMU was a=20
wonderful experience. =
Students were=20
always there to question. =
Working=20
with Allen Newell on Computer Structures that included notations for =
describing=20
the behavior and structure of computers was simply great.

But there was this gnawing need within DEC, =
called the=20
16-bit computer and there was a group of people building and designing =
the=20
PDP-X, which was an architecture of an 8, 16, or 32-bit machine. I =
wasn=92t there=20
to catalyze it and what happened was the engineers and the management =
didn=92t get=20
along. The machine was posited by Ed Decastro and Henry Burkhardt -- the =
guys=20
who formed Data General. They put together a very nice proposal and =
management=20
didn=92t buy it. There were a lot of bruised egos and a whole bunch of =
reasons=20
that it didn=92t happen =96 maybe they tried to have it rejected. I =
probably=20
shouldn=92t comment on the decision, except to say I was a strong =
supporter of the=20
PDP-X. I said: =93Build the X. It=92s a fine machine. DEC ought to be =
building=20
this.=94 And I think it would have been a lot cheaper had they done it, =
but they=20
didn=92t.A team left and =
formed Data=20
General and built its NOVA, that had no relationship to the PDP-X.=20

When they left, a project was started to =
redefine the=20
PDP-X and it went through a long path of being defined and redefined and =
the guy=20
running it had no idea how to design a computer. One of guys on the team =
was=20
Harold McFarland, a student of mine from Carnegie who had worked at DEC =
in the=20
past summer. The machine ultimately that emerged was PDP-11. The team =
had put=20
together a machine proposal and then came to Carnegie to have it =
reviewed by=20
myself and Bill Wulf, a fellow professor who eventually became the =
President of=20
the National Academy of Engineering. We looked at it and we said: =
=93Yuck! We=20
don=92t like it, and Harold sort of pulled out another design from his =
notebook.=20
It was basically a design that Harold and I had worked on while he was a =
student. The idea was formulated while writing the book Computer =
Structures with=20
Allen Newell. The idea was an =93aha=94[2] for very =
general=20
registers and how they could operate as stack pointers, index registers, =
accumulators, and program counters. On the physical side it was centered =
around=20
another =93aha=94[3] or the idea of =
the=20
Unibus, another concept that came from Computer Structures. These two =
ideas were=20
really marketed by DEC against DG when it was introduced in 1970. Andy =
Knowles=20
drove the marketing.

DKA: And you=20
actually came back then to Digital.

GB:I=92d been at Carnegie and =
then came back=20
in 72 just as the next generation models were being planned. I was =
planning to=20
take on a visiting professorship in Australia, but Ken said: =93Come =
back and run=20
engineering. We=92ve got so much going on and nobody can control =
it.=94

=20

DKA:When you left to go to =
Carnegie did you=20
think that was the end of your time with Digital?

GB:No, I consulted for Digital =
and it=20
wasn=92t until 72 that I saw the necessity to return.

=

DKA:But did you want to spend the =
rest of=20
your career teaching and being academic?

GB:When I left DEC in 66, I knew =
that I was=20
tired of building computers and I wanted to think about them. If you =
look at it=20
historically, I sat out a dull period when small and medium scale ICs =
took over=20
for discrete circuits. =
The first=20
ICs weren=92t very big -- we were about the size of DEC=92s modules. But =
in =9171,=20
Intel=92s 4004 was introduced as the first microprocessor.And those weren=92t =
interesting to anyone=20
who built a computer. They were used to build calculators, scales, and =
traffic=20
controllers, but they were nowhere as powerful as a PDP-8.

=20

The Intel introduction was characteristic of =
what I=20
posited to be a Theory of Computer Evolution that is sort of a corollary =
to=20
Moore=92s Law in 1972-75. It=92s what happens when there are just enough =
transistors=20
on a chip to form a lower priced, new computer that can do something=20
useful.

=20

DKA:So you came back at a time =
when you=20
could make that kind of transition at Digital.

GB:Yeah. I came back exactly to =
do one-chip=20
computers or to do integrated circuit computers. Within a year, we were =
on a=20
path to build an integrated circuit computer.I remember my first trip to =
Silicon=20
Valley in the summer of 72. I met the Intel guyDKA: my first meeting with =
Bob Noyce=20
who invented the IC. I tried to get them to take the PDP-8:=93Please won=92t you build =
this PDP-8 on a=20
chip computer for us and make it a standard? We will buy chips and make =
systems=20
and you can sell the chips to others.=94

It turns out this was a constant battle I had =
within DEC=20
with Ken and most of the Operations Committee.I tried unsuccessfully to =
convince them=20
to get other chip manufacturers involved in building chips for us. The =
situation=20
occurred for all the computers, but eventually Intersil was allowed to =
build the=20
=938=94, and Harris was licensed to build a small =9311=94.However, we did get Western =
Digital to=20
build an =9311=94 that we sold. =20
Unfortunately, they were not licensed to sell it, so while the =
=9311=94 did=20
well, it failed to become a standard.

DKA: Now you=20
had seen innovation at Digital in many different stages. How would you =
describe=20
the culture and the approach that Digital brought to design the VAX =
computers=20
compared to the earlier phases of innovation? Was it just larger and =
more=20
complicated? Was it a different approach? How would you characterize the =
evolution of the company?

GB:While I was there, the company =
didn=92t=20
change very much, especially from a cultural standpoint. DEC was an =
incredibly=20
open company during those years with free communication throughout the =
company.=20
And so when we did VAX, and it didn=92t mean there weren=92t engineering =
camps and=20
wars and politics, it was still open and people kind of knew where =
everybody=20
stood. It wasn=92t a guarded environment or totally political. It =
wasn=92t=20
protected. You knew what was happening. You might not like a project, =
but you=20
knew what the other guys were doing.

There was a period of a year when we really =
stewed over=20
the question of whether to extend the PDP-10 architecture and use all =
its=20
software or build from the PDP-11. We actually built a small PDP-10. I =
let that=20
process go on for a year. It was a process of examining what we should =
do from=20
all angles, and especially talking to customers. At that point I ran all =
of=20
engineering. There were product lines, or marketing lines that sold =
computers=20
into various markets such as laboratories, education, industrial =
control,=20
commercial banking, telephone companies, and to OEMs. =

When I came back from CMU in June 1972 to run=20
engineering I didn=92t get this responsibility.Ken assigned me to run memory =
and power=20
supply engineering, probably the hardest jobs in the company. No one =
wanted to=20
do it, and I knew very little about either.I didn=92t know about power =
supplies, I=20
didn=92t know about memory, but I learned a lot more about circuits than =
I=20
probably ever wanted to.

I=20
had the title of VP of Engineering, and so I got involved in all the =
issues at=20
the staff level. Throughout the company every marketing group had its =
own=20
engineering, so what was happening was all these projects were getting =
formed=20
with no coherence =96 especially in software that was sometimes used to=20
differentiate the product lines. Then finally after about a year and a =
half I=20
said, =93Enough. I want all these engineers to report to me.=94 I =
proposed to make=20
it very simple. And that was the beginning of really pulling them =
together.=20

Our first strategic thing was to transition =
from the=20
PDP-11.It just didn=92t =
have the=20
addressing power to let us go on. We had built the 11/45 and the 11/70 =
and these=20
were fine machines, but you could not program them because of the =
addressing=20
limits. So the question became =93Should we extend the 11 or should we =
take the=20
PDP-10 which was already fine and use that as the base.=94 We stewed =
over that=20
question nearly a year in engineering. I don=92t remember what the =
catalyst was=20
but at one point I said enough. =20
We=92ve looked at all the facts in every possible way, we=92re =
going to=20
extend the 11 =96 not base it on the 10 =96 because all of our customers =
andour main line of business is =
11-based.=20
Just a few more than a thousand 10s were built. There=92s just not a =
good way to=20
do the same things we=92re doing with the =9311=94 using the =9310=94 =
and its software.=20

So on April 1, 1975 I pulled a group together =
we called=20
theVAX A group. VAX A was the mailing list and there were 6 of us. We =
took moved=20
together on the 3rd floor of Building 12, almost at the same =
spot I=20
had when I came to DEC in 1960. My main office was on the first floor =
with=20
Ken.

DKA:Of course the company is now =
at that=20
stage was much bigger =85

GB:I think roughly quarter of a =
billion of=20
revenue.

DKA: We can=20
just talk about now how you brought that VAX A group together and that=20
decision.

GB:So we determined we were going =
to extend=20
the =9311=94 and not work on the =9310=94. I brought these guys together =
and we started=20
doing the architecture work. Bill Strecker was the chief architect of =
VAX. He=20
had been working on the idea, and had outlined the alternatives -- how =
much of=20
the =9311=94 do you want and how close do you want it to be to an =
=9311=94?We called the resulting =
architecture=20
=93culturally compatible with PDP-11=94.

I=20
named the project VAX-11[4] or virtual =
address=20
extension to the =9311=94 to keep us on track. It was going to be an =
evolution on=20
the =9311=94. The way we dealt with compatibility was to put a PDP-11 in =
the=20
instruction set to run all the =20
RSX-11 software. This gave us a tremendous head start on software =
as well=20
as a base. VAX ran a lot of PDP software for a long time, including many =
compilers.This allowed =
us to get=20
all kinds of software done in another environment and then simply moved =
over=20
rather than having to do it all from scratch.

This story was repeated at Microsoft when Dave =
Cutler, a=20
member of VAX A, went to Microsoft to invent Microsoft=92s NT.He made that system also =
compatible with=20
the PC hardware and all the apps. In that case, it was nearly impossible =
because=20
of the lack of discipline and definition of the PC and the various =
interfaces=20
because of the way the PC evolved in a chaotic, free market. Microsoft =
was left=20
to make it all these loosely compatible components work!I claim nobody but Dave could =
have done=20
this. =

DKA:So that was a strategy that =
appropriate=20
for a company with an established base of customers, an established body =
of=20
software that was an enormous investment, and yet was beginning to take=20
advantage of the some of the new capabilities like the ICs and large =
scale=20
integration.

GB: =
Yeah.=20
Especially larger memories. Remember VAX had to be built because the 11 =
ran out=20
of address bits.RISC =
hadn=92t come=20
in yet. Dave Cutler asked me a few years ago: =93Why didn=92t we do =
RISC?=94 and I=20
said: =93Remember how much memory we had, how long it took for us to =
have enough=20
memory, and how long we would have had to wait before we could build a =
RISC type=20
machine because the RISC transition didn=92t occur until 1985. So we had =
a 10=20
years of =93What are we going to do for revenue?=94 problem.During this time, and RISC is =
really not=20
an architecture kind of question of =93Oh god, you are stupid not to =
build this=20
way!=94 but it=92s a question of what you can do in the compiler and the =
cost and=20
availability of a memory hierarchy. So it=92s not a religious or =
intellectual=20
debate, as much of the RISC advocates phrased it. It=92s a plain old =
engineering=20
question of memory cost and having large, fast memories for caches. To=20
fundamentally make RISC work you need to have big caches because you are =
fundamentally running microcode in an open fashion. It used more bits =
per=20
program. In fact,RISC =
versus CISC,=20
ignores the fact it took about twice as much memory to say the same =
thing. And=20
so I=92ll say VAX was the ultimate CISC machine.

I=20
maintained the goals and constraints of VAX and how it was going to be =
put=20
together in a document called the VAX Blue Book, and it contains this =
whole=20
question of micro programming =96 basically the idea was that we would =
put=20
everything we possibly could into microcode to run faster and take less =
bits=20
that the equivalent procedure calls. =20
So VAX had instructions to queue for the operating system, an =
elaborate=20
memory management system, and, of course, all the floating point =
routines. VAX=20
also had decimal arithmetic that COBOL needed.It was probably the best COBOL =
machine=20
every built, but the initial apps used it as a FORTRAN machine. A decade =
later,=20
you would not do it that way. You would do these as subroutines that are =
called=20
by ordinary programs.

DKA:So you really had a different =
kind of=20
team to do the VAX in terms of your integration of all the engineers =
from the=20
application areas and from a migration strategy. Let me ask you to put =
on your=20
hat as an entrepreneur again - how would you characterize the working of =
that=20
team in putting that machine together?

GB: =
It=92s the=20
way I recommend engineering projects be done in an entrepreneurial =
setting=20
--there were only 6 people in that group. We didn=92t want any more =
people. You=20
can=92t deal with any more at the beginning of a project. Every time =
that you are=20
doing something new and different, where you haven=92t defined it yet, =
the worst=20
thing you can have in a project is too many people at that critical =
startup=20
phase. You have to manage that very slowly. That=92s why we were limited =
to only=20
half a dozen people. We had NO marketing people.Every two weeks we had a group =
called=20
VAX B that was a room full of about 25 people. The six of us =
communicated with a=20
lot of other people, of course. But basically we worked together to =
define what=20
it was going to be, and then the 25 would comment and sort of oversee =
us. It had=20
only a couple of marketing people, and we used them to find out whether =
people=20
needed this or that. The only customer we talked to was Ken Thompson of =
Bell=20
Labs. He was hardly a customer, but rather a developer who was helpful =
in what=20
we needed in order to run UNIX.

VAX was in the same architectural style as the =
PDP-11=20
and distinct from the IBM architectures. And a lot of that comes from =
how IO is=20
done, and how to deal with multiple processors.A =20
program could reach out and do something directly with the =
periphery was=20
what made it powerful. And the 360 was the one where IO channels were =
always=20
working, lots of protocol, lots of overhead designed for throughput at =
the=20
expense of response time. =
My=20
philosophy of IO was totally different than IBM=92s.Ironically IBM is finally =
coming out of=20
all of this with the philosophy that DEC has always used, which is not =
having=20
specialized weird computers doing IO. Just one kind that does it all. =
And then=20
if you need more of those you put more of them in. It=92s much easier to =
do. But=20
the mainframe kind of mentality of cascading many weird computers with =
their own=20
instruction sets and software support is a pain in the ass. It=92s just =
not the=20
way to do it.

I=20
was consulting with Siemens three years ago about their minicomputer=20
architecture. I asked about an elaborate communications option: =93Well =
this is a=20
board to do all the communications and protocols.=94 I asked how much =
the board=20
cost: =93Well it cost 3000 dollars.=94 It had two or three computers, =
following the=20
old mainframe mentality of =93we=92re offloading the main =
microprocessor.=94 I said:=20
=93You realize that microprocessor is much more powerful than any one of =
these and=20
cost less. That, in fact, what its doing is delaying doing the =
communication=20
work. You=92ve got plenty of cycles in the main processors, and you=92re =
creating an=20
enormous number of bottlenecks and expenses, and the guys running the =
operating=20
system are just tearing their hair out because they can=92t get at the =
I/O.=94 I=20
think that war has been won for simple, direct I/O, and using multiple =
micros.=20
On the other hand, we are =
going=20
around the loop again as each device becomes an independent computer and =
the=20
entire system is now a network.

DKA: Now the=20
VAX was an enormously successful product for Digital. How would you look =
at that=20
phase in the history of computing and why that product reached out and =
was so=20
enormously successful.

GB: =
Okay, I=92m=20
going to tell you one other story about the VAX. We started April of =
=9175, and=20
first betas were introduced late =9177 early =9178. One or two of the =
first ones=20
went to John Pople[5] at Carnegie =
Mellon=20
University =96 for his work in computational chemistry to replace the =
Univac 1108=20
batch system that he was being limited by. I insisted that CMU get the =
first=20
ones as scientific users. =
Other=20
early machines went to Lawrence Laboratories, and the NY Institute of =
Technology=20
who had the leading graphics group. VAX was almost the first virtual =
memory=20
machine. Bill Poduska, who founded Prime, had extended the old DDP-16=20
architecture from 3Cs and Honeywell to have a 32-bit virtual memory, but =
ours=20
was a totally new architecture. And we found that all these users were =
just=20
floored by the machine. There were a couple of other 32-bit machines, =
but the=20
VAX really captured mind share of the technical community including =
computer=20
science departments.With =
paging=20
came the ability to run large programs, and it out performed every other =
machine=20
except the large IBM 360s and Cray 7600 on floating point. =93Give us =
more=94 was=20
the reaction.

I=20
made my first trip to Japan in the summer of 78 and talked about it. =
After that=20
trip, our family spent three weeks scuba diving in Tahiti. During that =
time I=20
conceived the VAX Strategy given in Figure 2, another =93aha=94[6] as a way =
to focus=20
all of our engineering effort on VAX and to reduce the plethora of =
computer=20
models.We had plans to =
build new=20
11s and 10s upward and downward to compete with VAX, and the =938=94 was =
still being=20
sold. I went back and said: =93Folks, I propose the VAX Strategy to =
replace all of=20
these efforts so that we end up with a single architecture.We will continue some of the =
machines=20
for which there=92s a commitment.=94 =20
=93We=92re going to make only VAXs. We=92re going to extend a =
couple of 11s=20
that are in process, but we=92re not going to do any more. We=92ll =
extend he one=20
chip =9311=94 downward we were doing =96 and use that as a controller. =
Let=92s get rid=20
of the PDP-11 that are aimed at competing with the VAX-11/780, let=92s =
get one or=20
more semiconductor company to take it over and make it a chip that =
anyone can=20
use.=94 The reaction waDKA: =93We can=92t=20
do that, the PDP-11 and architecture is the corporate jewel!=94 I said: =
=93We=92ve got=20
to get somebody else to invest. We can=92t afford everything. People =
still hadn=92t=20
come to grips with the notion of standards and the fact that the =
architecture=20
needed to be a standard to survive against the Intel and Motorola =
chips.=94

=20

In December =9178 I went to the board with one =
slide=20
describing how I envision this computing environment. I described how we =
can=20
attack IBM and offer different styles and range of computers. =
Ironically, in=20
1975 I had written another article on the Theory of the Evolution of =
Computers=20
that I just mentioned. Machines form in price bands and personal =
computers are=20
now forming.It was a =
three-tier=20
model: the corporate centralized mainframe we called glasshouse =
computing; the=20
departmental mini -- its put around in the various departments serving a =
department or single function -- and then all the computers for the =
desktop that=20
we now call personal computers or PCs. And all of those levels are =
connected=20
together by some magical interconnect -- which at that point wasn=92t =
Ethernet=20
because we hadn=92t put the Ethernet deal together, but I knew we needed =
Ethernet=20
and we had two or three alternatives internally.

Figure 1. VAX Strategy created in fall =
1978.

=20

We were also starting projects in cluster =
interconnect=20
for connecting machines together using a new interconnection bus, CI =
(Computer=20
Interconnect) in order to get more power similar to what Tandem =
introduced in=20
1975.Today, IBM has =
introduced its=20
Sysplex and the UNIX variant companies are trying to build clustered =
machines.=20
Again, 10 years after we had a good system!HP is still trying to =
introduce it and=20
Sun is talking about it. HHHHow do you connect =
multiple=20
independent computers? Well, DEC introduced that in =9180. I=92d say it =
was really=20
solid in the 84/85 timeframe. So here these guys are introduced them a =
year or=20
so ago, and it=92ll take them a good three or four years to get those =
products=20
working. It=92s nontrivial connecting a bunch of computers to behave as =
a single=20
computer.

So the big thing about VAX was really two =
thingDKA: One, was architecture. =
It was to=20
be compatible up and down the line. Nothing different. The 360 did the =
same=20
thingwith a range of =
different=20
powered models. The big difference was that VAX was aimed at different =
styles of=20
use. The 360s were aimed at all the glasshouseDKA: little glasshouses, big=20
glasshouses, and huge glasshouses. But it was still the same kind of =
batch and=20
remote job entry computing and with different operating systems.In the case of VAX, it was big =
glasshouses, closets, and desktops, and we wanted to be able to run the =
same=20
programimage. There=92s got to be one operating system. The 360 had =
different=20
operating systems. We said no, the value is in the software. Its going =
to be=20
one, we=92re going to run that image across that range so basically =
anyone can=20
compute anywhere depending on do I want response time, do I want =
throughput, or=20
do I want cross performance. And so that was the basic idea behind the =
VAX=20
Strategy, which is more of this is all going to be tied together, this =
is all=20
going to be a single unified architecture.

That whole thing lasted at DEC until the open =
system. In=20
fact the day I left DEC in 1973, I said: =93Look we=92ve got VAX now, =
we=92ve got=20
exactly what I envisioned, the clusters work, we=92ve got the one chip =
processors=20
coming down the pike. They=92re not here yet, but we know what they=92ll =
do.Now you=92ve got to get rid of =
it because=20
of the whole business of open architecture.=94 UNIX was there and that =
is a=20
different story. I don=92t believe UNIX is open! UNIX is just another =
name for=20
propriety operating system. But at least the threat was present, and DEC =
did it=20
all very well until the UNIX open myth was established by SUN -- I think =
that=20
was probably 89 or so. DEC was riding high in 88-89, and then it got =
into=20
trouble and this other factors set in. But it was simply that strategy. =
That=92s=20
what made it all work and basically there wasn=92t anything to do. The =
lovely=20
thing about the strategy was it was just one page with two or three =
pages of=20
implications such as what we need to develop or stop, the work on =
networking,=20
and a few pages on why it beats IBM and how it addresses the market =
issues. And=20
that was the basic model for it. And there were events that happened =
after the=20
first version in 1978 that had to be attended to -- the PC hit.=20

The Beginning of the End of Digital: PCs and =
other=20
fiascos

DKA: That was=20
the next question. People have said Digital misunderstood what was =
happening=20
with the PC =85 it missed the boat. Do you think that=92s =
legitimate?

GB:Well, one reason was we were =
focused on=20
VAX. During this period when we were doing VAX, Small Systems =
Engineering was=20
working on personal computers. They weren=92t working on VAX, they were =
working on=20
the PDP-11 extension, they were working on the Rainbow that was X86 =
CPM-based,=20
and a PDP-8 for word processing. So we had three personal computer =
projects. But=20
a strategy to have done a better job was exactly the same work that was =
needed=20
to make VAX so coherent. I did that work and winnowed it down and was =
working on=20
the VAX side. I ran the others and so you can blame me for the whole =
thing. But=20
I had a little bit of help.

Ken was really running Small Systems =
Engineering. And=20
Ken=92s big problem was that he really didn=92t understanding computing =
at a=20
visceral level, at an economic level, and he also didn=92t understand =
the industry=20
and what was happening. The industry was moving fast. I=92d say if I=92d =
been more=20
involved, I probably would have sensed what was happening and you can =
bet we=20
would have had an IBM compatible PC the day IBM had it running Microsoft =
MS DOS.=20
Exactly the same thing. So I=92ll say, sure, that=92s what happened. But =
after a=20
year, after two years, after three years the whole story was clear. I =
went back=20
to DEC a year or so after I left in 1983 and talked with the Operations=20
Committee, the half dozen people who ran the company and said: =93Look, =
the war is=20
over.You=92ve got to be =
the=20
strongest one in there. Get rid of all this shit. You can=92t support =
them. Be the=20
best PC company out there.=94 And that was totally compatible with VAX. =
The VAX=20
had nothing to do with it. DEC was a big company, they could run and =
have a=20
whole division. That is a great story of -- how do you allow =
entrepreneurial=20
stuff to exist in a large company? How do you support it? But they were =
still=20
fooling around with the Rainbow. I mean that should have been killed. A =
year=20
after the PC hit, it was so clear the game was over.And DEC never got it. They =
just didn=92t=20
get it. And I hate to say it, but anyone should have gotten it.=20

=20

Running the VAX and going to 10-12 billion =
dollars from=20
where we were when I left at 2 or 3 billion took zero thought. There was =
no=20
innovation at all in that evolution because it was all programmed, it =
was all=20
determined, it was all set down in this one-page memo -- this is what =
we=92re=20
doing. And personally the big reason that I left was because of the same =
reason=20
I left to go to Carnegie Tech, I was tired. It really was a joy running =
these=20
6000 engineers and I loved working with them, but it really was a =
conflict=20
between Ken and myself. And I thought my body was stronger but then I =
had a=20
heart attack in 83, and that=92s what made me say this is too much. =
It=92s too hard=20
for me to do things. Changing engineering and directing engineers =
wasn=92t hard,=20
but fighting someone about this is the way its going to be wasn=92t =
worth dying=20
for.

DKA:Too much stress. =

GB:It was too much stress. And it =
shouldn=92t=20
have been stressful at all. Who knows, Ken is an engineer too. He=92s =
just not a=20
COMPUTER engineer. He=92s a power supply engineer. He=92s a wonderful =
packaging=20
engineer. But he shouldn=92t have anything to do with computers.

DKA: Because of=20
the detail =85

GB: =
Because=20
there=92s this stuff called software. There=92s this thing called the =
industry - how=20
does the industry react, the understanding of the dynamics of it. He =
loves to=20
package things and he=92s great at packaging physical design. He=92s =
done some very=20
beautiful things, and he was successful before he personally got =
involved in=20
driving the PC. After he got involved in it, we went through five vice=20
presidents of the Small Systems Group designing the PC. At one point Ken =
said:=20
=93You=92ve got to run this and have these people report to you.=94 And =
I said: =93Ken,=20
I really want to get VAX stuff done. I can=92t really have six more =
people=20
reporting to me.=94 At the time I had at least 6 or 7 reports running =
the=20
different sized groups and we were doing very complicated stuff. We were =
doing=20
VSLI, we were trying to put a VAX on a chip, we were doing real hard =
engineering=20
not just plugging a goddamn 8086 on a board. And the marketing and PC =
marketing=20
stuff was in utter disaster during that time. It was legend. In fact, I =
can look=20
back and say maybe the best thing was that they were all preoccupied =
with=20
fooling around with the PC. The marketing guys that sat in the =
Operations=20
Committee were all arguing about who=92s going to be able to sell this =
or that,=20
who gets credit, and on and on. Meanwhile with Ken driving everything, =
they were=20
all looking for credit, for pricing, and DEC was opening stores and all =
kinds of=20
bullshit like that.

One of the things I remember was the Ethernet =
story and=20
going to the Operations Committee for approving the announcement. I had =
let=20
Ethernet go through and we were making the deal with Intel and Xerox. We =
went in=20
and said: =93Well, we=92re going to agree on a standard.=94 It was no =
big deal,=20
because I didn=92t want it to be a big deal. It was a big =
announcement.Bob Noyce, I and Dave Lidde =
from Xerox=20
introduced it in New York, Amsterdam, and London.

GB:By the way, on these =
interviews --how=20
much personality should come in?

DKA: Well I=20
think this issue is important and it=92s an issue that does tie to =
personality. I=20
think when it becomes significant in shaping=85 to a certain extent =
people want to=20
know about the people. =
But my goal=20
is to try to look at how personal preferences, personal decisions, =
strategic=20
decisions affect the flow of the history of the industry. And I think =
the issue=20
that you=92re talking about is clearly one where you had a company that =
took a=20
certain strategy toward the small systems that ultimately was shown to =
be a=20
failure, and its important to try to understand why that happened and =
how that=20
happened. At a certain point I think that what you say is right when the =
strategy ... there was a while when it wasn=92t clear how much a company =
like=20
Digital could control the market and could have its proprietary system, =
but as=20
you say =85

GB: =
Ken was a=20
fantastic CEO at one point but he changed, and I almost know the day he =
changed.=20
I can almost contribute it to a woman -- Julie Pita, a Business Week =
reporter,=20
who challenged him with, =93Well, do you think CEOs are real leaders or =
are just=20
sitting there?=94 And god damn it, he absolutely changed. He got a =
closeness and=20
involvement to the personal computing and small systems that was his =
downfall.=20
Prior to this time he really was effective, he managed the company. He =
tried to=20
manage engineering more than I ever wanted him to, but he was never in =
any of my=20
space. He didn=92t know anything about ICs or their design, or computer =
design. He=20
always focused on the physical stuff and he always focused on terminals =
and=20
things that you could see or touch. He never got near questions like =
what does a=20
program do, or what does a network do, or how to build them?But when it came to the =
package or the=20
appearance he had strong feelings and there was a constant pain in terms =
of=20
dealing with him.So =
trying to=20
manage in this environment was a constant string of brush fires.I was loath to tell him what =
he wanted=20
to hear and then do the opposite as the other VPs did. I was the only =
one who=20
told him =93no=94.

DKA: So that=20
could work when you had somebody that could make the right decisions =
down in the=20
organization, but when you had people that weren=92t strong enough to =
stand up to=20
him and he didn=92t trust them, =
bad=20
decisions could result?

GB: =
When I left=20
he was involved in all decisions and there were plenty of people to deal =
with.=20
People were constantly gaming Ken in terms of how you deal with this =
man. And=20
after I left there was sort of a triumvirate running DEC - the head of=20
engineering/manufacturing, Jack Smith, and Jack Shields running all the=20
marketing, sales, and service organizations. Ken had by all of his =
cunning ended=20
up having these two guys, both of whom were disasters, in their own =
ways, being=20
the team to lead DEC into a significant battle.

DKA:DEC=92s relationship to the =
PC. You talked=20
some about the fact that yes they had =85

GB:DEC had the three programs =
going - using=20
the PDP-8 for word processing, building a PDP-11 that would be a =
standard or be=20
its architecture, and then using the Intel architecture.The later was the favored one =
because=20
you could make the lowest cost machines. And in fact that was an era =
right after=20
we had been using the Z80 to make PCs running CPM. And then there was a=20
follow-on to it. Somebody favored using the Z80 or Z80 follow-on that =
was the=20
8088 -- and that was the Rainbow -- and we had the PDP-11 that was the =
main=20
line.

The PC was different than other machines =
because it was=20
the first time a standard got established outside of the company, and =
you did=20
have a single architecture as opposed to the traditional past of a =
vertically=20
integrated industry. You have the software, the hardware, the chips, and =
you=20
have the whole line and then you dominate the industry. The PC =
wouldn=92t have=20
taken off without the standardization and stratification of horizontal =
levels of=20
integration. If there had been IBM and then if DEC had been successful =
with=20
either MicroVAX or PDP-11 and that had all been stable, the PC industry =
would be=20
nothing today. Because you wouldn=92t have had the volume that you have =
and the=20
single standard that you have that Microsoft defined for software. =
Microsoft and=20
Intel. Forget IBM in the whole thing, they were just the catalyst. In =
fact=20
everything that IBM did since the first PC has been rejected - the =
micro-channel=20
and OS2 is no competitor.

Just looking at the variants of UNIX tells us =
that=20
proprietariness doesn't work =85 one of the things Ken got right in the =
mid 80s=20
was to declare =93UNIX is Snake Oil=94. =20
With unique variants the manufacturers keep high prices, but they =
get no=20
applications market, and customers have to do their own thing on =
variants.Unfortunately, people bought =
snake=20
oil.

DKA: But DEC=20
had been successful by as you say having a vertical domination, and the =
notion=20
initially to maybe extend this to the PC market wasn=92t crazy =85 but =
never=20
realizing when the game was over =85

GB: =
The game=20
was over a year after IBM announced and everybody started making IBM =
compatible=20
PCs. There was a compatible industry, the whole market went sort of =
straight up,=20
and software was forming around it. The game was over and anybody could =
see=20
that. But these guys didn=92t see it. In fact they still had the ego to =
say; =93Oh,=20
we can come back in there.=94 And everything they said was always wrong. =
I told=20
them we might have a chance if we got a better bus, we got a better=20
interconnect, make that all standard and make that all available. Their =
attitude=20
waDKA: =93Nope, that=92s =
ours. How do we=20
charge for that?=94 And the irony is that we taught IBM how to do all of =
this with=20
the Unibus. It was a standard, others connected peripherals to it and we =
had no=20
compulsion at all to inhibit them because the market grew accordingly. =
But yet=20
with the PC or the PRO, we didn't said: =93Hey lets make that standard =
and let=20
anybody who wants to make peripherals.=94 But rather: =93No, that=92s =
ours!=94 It was a=20
control issue, a proprietary issue.

When we were just about to announce Ethernet =
the=20
Operations Committee looked at the announcement and said: =93Wait! Why =
are we=20
giving this to the world?=94 And I said first off we weren=92t giving it =
to the=20
world. We got it from Xerox, we participated in the evolution of it, =
Xerox owns=20
the Ethernet patent, and we evolved the standard beyond that. We were =
just part=20
of it, it was not our ownership, and second is we wanted this to be a =
standard.=20
If everyone is out there is connecting using different kind of wires, =
how are=20
they things ever going to play together or get others to spend money to =
install=20
the wiring in the first place? They said: =93Well, we want only our =
computers on=20
it.=94 I said: No, you don=92t want only your computers on it because =
everyone=92s got=20
their own telephone system. They are all different.Is was this whole paradox of =
standards=20
being a double-edged sword. You=92ve got to have them and yet you want =
control.=20
You can=92t have it both ways. =
Unless=20
its de facto ala IBM mainframe software and Microsoft. Microsoft does it =
totally=20
by market dominance. And that=92s the ideal. Because from a standards =
standpoint=20
the worst thing going is having a standard that=92s just a =93government =
standard=94=20
that really isn=92t good. It gets there by a big committee process. It =
doesn=92t=20
hold at all and its very hard to maintain the standards. But de facto =
with a=20
single vendor driving the standard is ideal, because than you can drive =
it as=20
fast as you can and that vendor determines it together with the market =
placing=20
their demands to improve things. I personally think the Microsoft =
standard is=20
the best way to evolve computing. The PC wouldn=92t have happened =
without that=20
interface layer - every application guy puts his software to that =
standard. And=20
then similarly that=92s why we have a thousand or so PC vendors.=20

DKA: You had=20
had - you Digital - had not quite the same clout, but a significant =
clout with=20
your minicomputer line =85

GB: =
We had a de=20
facto standard. Yes, VAX was a standard. A whole software industry had =
strung up=20
around the VAX, the AS400, IBM=92s MVS. That was the day a single =
hardware company=20
could set a standard and that would become the de facto standard for an=20
industry. But in the case of VAX there were no competitors, no =
alternative=20
suppliers. In the case of IBM mainframes, there were Amdahl, Futjisu, =
and=20
Hitachi, - they were all alternative suppliers for platforms. They all =
had to=20
use IBM operating system software, of course. Because that=92s the =
interface=20
layer, just like Microsoft sets the interface layer for the PC. But what =
has=20
made the computer evolve so fast is when you can establish these =
interface=20
layers.

DKA:So again asking you to put on =
your hat=20
as somebody who looks at entrepreneurialship. This critical time when =
Digital=20
should have been going through a change in approach to the market and =
yet failed=20
to maybe see the opportunities that it should have seen. How does that =
look as=20
you look back on it? What were the critical errors and mistakes that =
were made,=20
when seeds were laid for the kind of trouble the company got into years=20
later?

GB: =
Okay, there=20
was the whole PC question. That=92s one that should have been very, very =
clear=20
because you had Compaq forming, you had the system guys like HP out =
there, and=20
the standards were absolutely established. The industry was set and DEC =
should=20
have been the dominant PC supplier. =20
That=92s what I can never come to grips with it =96 why that =
didn=92t happen?=20
And DEC is now getting to be strong in PCs. I mean they=92ve gone up and =
down with=20
it. When I was at NSF, Ken sent me a particular PC and I said this =
doesn=92t look=20
like a PC. Well you=92ve got to do this and that. And I said wait a =
second, I=20
gotta do nothing. I get software from these floppies and you=92re either =
a=20
standard, you=92re compatible or you=92re not . If you have to tell me =
about you CAN=20
do this, forget it, I don=92t want it. I=92m not going to do anything =
except turn it=20
on. You=92ve got to enter into a market where it=92s all the same.=20

DKA:So that was one error, but =
there were=20
others things =85

GB:That was one error, but the =
big error,=20
the big thing that happened to DEC subsequently was failing to deal with =
UNIX.=20
We had a very strong UNIX group, but allowing UNIX to compete across the =
board=20
with VAX/VMS, wasn=92t allowed. =
There=20
wasn=92t a way to do that. UNIX was sold as a last resort.And that could have been a =
reasonable=20
strategy. But DEC was always very paranoid about that. About whether =
they wanted=20
those things out there or not.

Next, I think what really got DEC into the =
most=20
significant trouble was the way it dealt with the transition from to =
RISC and to=20
a 64-bit address. Dave Cutler had an architecture called Prism that he =
had=20
designed at the Seattle lab. That was all done, the manuals were done, =
people=20
were working on chips, and the program was going along well. Meanwhile, =
MIPS=20
came to DEC and said: =93Gee, you=92re not there with RISC or your one =
chip VAXen,=20
you need a RISC machine for your workstations. Why don=92t you build a =
workstation=20
on RISC?=94 And DEC did, introduced it, and said: =93Oh well, we=92ll =
stay with MIPS.=94=20
Then they killed the Prism project and Mr. Cutler left. They killed it, =
but Ken=20
didn=92t know that it wasn=92t dead. It was still alive in the =
semiconductor group=20
and it sprung up as Alpha. And so that came back several years later. =
Meanwhile=20
other people within the company were looking at building a fast MIPS=20
architecture machine including a group in Palo Alto which built =
something called=20
BIPS =96 a billion instructions per second processor. In fact they have =
one. They=20
had one about three years ago. So all of those projects never came to =
market.=20

And that=92s why I said when I left the =
company that=20
you=92ve got to get rid of VAX, you=92ve got to go open. The companies =
that I then=20
started and worked with were open systems companies. They were all UNIX. =
But it=20
was deciding to go to Alpha or deciding to do Prism, then killing Prism =
and=20
going to MIPS, and then coming back to Alpha and killing MIPS again. DEC =
could=20
have survived any of those decisions. It could have stayed with Prism, =
got it=20
out there a year earlier, and been significant in the marketplace. It =
could have=20
switched to MIPS, and I think that would have probably been the best =
strategy.=20
But coming in late, having to build these very fancy FAB facilities to =
get the=20
performance was really costly.

And today, there is no way I see that DEC can =
afford to=20
be a semiconductor supplier or microprocessor supplier when they have to =
build=20
their own, use their own, FAB facilities. So that was a significant =
error in=20
judgment and decision making. =
On=20
the other hand, the world is better off because Dave Cutler went to =
Microsoft=20
and built NT for a much larger market.

=20

Another error in judgment was building the =
last=20
ECL-based machine - the 9000 - that was introduced. The machine was =
really late,=20
and the transition from ECL and CMOS had already taken place. The 9000 =
should=20
never had been started, even though I have to admit being responsible =
for=20
signing the original development agreement with Trilogy, Gene Amdahl's =
follow-on=20
company. It was a big, hot, package mega-engineering project that was =
really=20
going after the IBM kind of SLT technology, a very difficult technology =
that=20
came out of Gene Amdahl=92s project. But again that was one that should =
have been=20
stopped because the company burned a lot of money and a lot of resources =
that=20
didn=92t get them anywhere. And it also got them thinking of big =
mainframe like=20
structures as opposed to moving into multiprocessors. Cray Research and =
Cray=20
Computer also failed to make the CMOS transition and it cost them their =
lives as=20
the premier supercomputer company. =20
In 2000, three Japanese vendors supply vector supercomputers to =
the=20
world.

But multiprocessors were my favorites, too-- =
since the=20
first PDP-6. When I left, we had an advanced development project to put =
64=20
Microvax chips in a single, multiprocessor computer.It then went from an "AD" to =
being a=20
development project and then back again. =20
If I=92d stayed[7] ...

GB: =
Yeah. That=20
would have been the way to go because if you want to be in the mainframe =
business then that=92s the way to go mainframe because that=92s the =
model we have=20
today. In thecompany =
that I left=20
DEC to start =96 Encore =96 we introduced one of the first "multi". That =
is a=20
20-processor VAX-like architecture machine that ran UNIX. And it ran circles around any =
of the UNIX=20
boxes or nearly every other computer. Today what you see is the =
downsizing=20
market -- Sequent uses 20 processors, DEC has a 6 or 8 processor Alpha, =
Sun with=20
20 processors and HP with 12. You hear IBM saying they=92re going to =
introduce=20
one. We did that. Our first product at Encore came out ten years ago =96 =
we made=20
our first delivery in 1985. I wrote an article in Science in 1985 and =
declared=20
that multiple microprocessor, shared memory computers is the only way to =
build a=20
computer. This was completely prophetic. But the irony is that we had =
that=20
project going before I left DEC and it never saw the light of day. It =
wasn=92t=20
pushed. People didn=92t understand the commercial marketplace as opposed =
to the=20
uniprocessor. Because transaction processing and databases all work fine =
with=20
that multiprocessor structure.

DKA:Tell me about that =85

=20

GB: So there was another =
missed=20
opportunity that would have solved all their problems. It would have =
cost=20
peanuts compared to the 9000 and it would have gotten DEC as the =
dominant=20
downsizing supplier instead of SUN and HP.

DKA:Well tell me about this =
transition. You=20
left. You had had a physical problem with your heart attack. You had =
been under=20
stress and you were ready to try something new. You wanted to go back to =
doing=20
something entrepreneurial? Is that what you expected when you left or =
you didn=92t=20
know? =

=20

GB:I didn=92t know. Ken Fisher =
said come and=20
join Encore. Henry Burkhardt the founder of DG said: =93Yeah, lets do =
something=20
fun - we=92ll get some money and we=92ll go start companies. Or people =
will come to=20
us and we=92ll start companies.=94 I asked what my responsibilities were =
and Ken=20
said: =93You have no responsibilities. I don=92t care if I ever see =
you.=94 That=20
sounded fine by me. There was a plan, however, for what Encore was going =
to be,=20
and Ken wanted me to look over the technical part of that plan. Aside =
from that=20
I wasn=92t doing a line engineering job. Anyway, that plan didn=92t =
work. The next=20
two or three plans didn=92t work. But what finally worked was we =
acquired a group=20
=96 from DEC =96 building a 20 processor system called the Multimax and =
that was=20
introduced in =9185. It was a smaller version of the 64 processor. It =
wasn=92t from=20
the AD group doing the 64 processor so it didn=92t take anything =
intellectually=20
from DEC, but being in the DEC engineering environment the guys probably =
knew=20
about it. This group designed the Multimax. We founded several other =
companies=20
as part of Encore.

DKA: And what=20
happened to that machine? I don=92t know the history.

=

GB: =
Encore is=20
still selling it, ten years later. And Encore still exists.[8] They=92re not a =
large=20
company, and they go in and out of profitability. The irony is that we =
built a=20
complete entire computer company at Encore. We had Multimax as the =
server, and=20
it was scalable from 1 to 20 so it covered all of DEC=92s lines, except =
the low=20
end, and then we built a concentrator for bringing terminals into the=20
environment, and we also built a CRT terminal that allowed you to have =
multiple=20
windows - it was a 21-inch terminal, like today=92s modern X terminals. =
We built X=20
terminals three to five years before X terminals, before there was an X =
protocol=20
in fact.From Multimax, =
we[9] proposed =
Ultramax, a=20
1,000 processor shared memory multiprocessor consisting of an =
interconnected=20
hierarchy of Multimaxes as part of DARPA=92s Strategic Computing =
Initiative.I don=92t know whether =
Ultramax ever=20
worked. =

But the tragedy was that the marketing people =
within=20
Encore didn=92t know how to deal with any of the products. The first =
thing I said=20
was this terminal has got to be an OEM terminal, we=92ve got to get it =
out in=20
volume. We had established a small entrepreneurial group, a few guys =
designed=20
and set upa production =
line for=20
the terminal. It was a beautiful terminal, probably the best terminal =
that=92s=20
ever been built.It never =
got=20
anywhere because the guys that we had in sales from Encore had come out =
of a=20
Prime field sales force and they only knew how to sell big boxes.

So this began my era of serious questioning of =
anybody=20
who has the title of marketing or sales. And that=92s why I wrote so =
much about=20
them in my book and the seriousness of marketing and selling. These =
people=20
didn=92t have a clue about how to market or sell products. That was one =
problem,=20
but there=92s a more difficult one of people in organizations. There are =
people=20
who can deal with the whole birthing process of starting something new, =
but the=20
vastness of large organizations is the creation of a steady state. =
Someone once=20
mis-quoted that programmers were like light bulbs =96 you unscrew one =
and put=20
another one in.

As far as I=92m concerned, modern =
corporations, are just=20
filled mostly with light bulbs. You know -- I need a bigger one, I need =
a new=20
manager, do I have a 100 watt manager? I unscrew one over here and put a =
new one=20
in, and this one burns out and you throw it away, or you get rid of them =
or you=20
move them into the dead light bulb box. Because the company is in steady =
state.=20
We=92ve got to change the process a little bit it because it isn=92t =
working very=20
well, and mostly in engineering its =93I=92ve got to get rid of some =
cost.=94 We do=20
something and sure enough the processes are all broken, usually based on =
what=20
you can do with computers. You find out there=92s a better way of doing =
the=20
process. But the vast part of the organization is steady state. It=92s =
there=20
forever. You can take away the input or output and it=92ll still be =
there. These=20
people will still come in and be in the offices.

Being an entrepreneur, starting something from =
scratch,=20
is totally different. And people just can=92t, just don=92t like to do =
that. And=20
when we started Encore we brought these very expensive, light bulbs in =
and they=20
wanted to sell stuff to the people they already knew in big companies.=20
Basically, you hire a salesperson and their address book or contacts. =
Well we=20
didn=92t have anything to sell the big companies. Or what we had to =
sell, they=20
hadn=92t seen before. That=92s just as bad. =93Gee, I=92ve got to have =
something that=20
competes with this.=94 Well we don=92t have anything, this is better, =
this is=20
different. =93Well it=92s not a competitive.=94

This problem is addressed in my book, High =
Tech=20
Ventures. Most of these products are new, you=92ve never seen this =
product before.=20
What do you do? How do you do something when it=92s never existed. How =
do you=20
build an organization that=92s never existed? How do you build a product =
that=92s=20
never existed? How do you get this all to happen? And it=92s very, very =
tricky. I=20
know how to do it outside of large companies. Doing it inside an =
existing=20
company is very hard and a problem that I have given up on.=20

GB:3M is the only one that seems =
to be able=20
to create totally new products and divisions.However, we should look about =
whether=20
they create new products that sell to new customers or new markets.

=

GB:We were talking about =
entrepreneuring at=20
Siemens, and how you do it. They=92ve got a new CEO and he=92s gone =
through and=20
tried to change things. And they=92ve got 50 or so divisions or business =
unit=92s=20
that have started, and these guys are director level - one level down - =
and are=20
supposed to be the change agents that try to do it. But it=92s unclear =
to me that=20
a companyvastly more =
bureaucratic=20
than any U.S. company, can change.

This was at a time when Jim Gray and I were =
talking=20
about scalable computers that can be made from PCDKA: =93Look, computing is =
going to be=20
vastly different and you=92re not going to maintain the margins that you =
have=20
today.=94 After our meeting they are deciding to write a manifesto to =
the=20
president and say this is not going to make it, there=92s too much =
change, we=92ve=20
been steadily unprofitable and we are not going to be able to get out of =
that. I=20
told them: =93Look, two more ratchets on Moore=92s Law or six years and =
you=92re out=20
of it, you=92ll be so far out of it that it=92s not going to do you any =
good.You can=92t compete. Here=92s =
the way the=20
world is now. You just don=92t get it. It=92s not the old style of =
business where=20
you can control everything from the government, technology, to your =
customers.=20
Why do you need a 1000 people working on UNIX? Why? They=92re not adding =
value,=20
they are just adding cost, and down stream it=92s costing your customers =
an=20
enormous amount.=94

DKA: So really,=20
taking and dealing with those evolutionary changes in your product lines =
particularly in this field becomes enormously difficult.

=

GB:. Yes.=20
The best news would be if the person running the company understands the =
whole=20
thing.He understands, I =
suspect,=20
viscerally that something is happening. I don=92t know what the guys =
beneath him=20
know, how old they are, what they think. There=92s tremendous denial. =
Every time I=20
look at what=92s going to happen in the future, I can=92t believe it=92s =
going to be=20
this way. What=92s the implication? The implications are vast. And the =
cost=20
structure has changed so much. And that=92s what cost DEC so much =
because they=20
evolved to have a very big cost structure. Their numbers or rather =
ratios had=20
totally gotten out of control. =20
Anybody should have been able to see them because they had the =
lowest=20
productivity in the industry. Every part of the company got bloated when =
VAX was=20
going well and now there was just no way to off load the costs.=20

The irony is I was just talking with another =
DEC alumnus=20
at InternetWorld, and the president and founder of the company and said: =
=93I have=20
stock in your company, Ascend, from a venture fund investment.=94 He =
said, =93You=20
know, I used to work for you.=94 =
And=20
I said that=92s wonderful. I am so proud of the people who came out of =
engineering=20
that have started companies. =20
The number of people who came from DEC marketing and started =
companies I=20
think is nil. Especially the one=92s that have been successful. I =
can=92t think of a=20
soul, because I think the difference was the way the DEC marketing =
organization=20
had to operate as integrators across the company. Really what it trained =
was=20
politicians. Those poor guys had to go around and lobby with me to get =
their=20
product, they had to lobby with manufacturing to get resources or the =
right=20
people, and they had to lobby with sales to get sales time. So what have =
you=20
got? You don=92t have entrepreneurs, you=92ve got politicians.Lobbyists. And that=92s why =
they=92ve done=20
so poorly after they left DEC.

=20

DKA: Now you=20
went from Encore to a very different kind of position going to =
Washington. And I=20
guess that was looking at entrepreneurship or looking at new ideas and =
trying to=20
drive it. Tell us what you were trying to do at that position.

=20

GB: =
I look at=20
it as another startup. Eric Bloch was the director of NSF and had come =
from=20
IBM.He had been =
responsible for=20
manufacturing the IBM 360. =
I had=20
met him when he was the catalyst from IBM, with Bob Noyce, to establish =
the SRC=20
(Semiconductor Research Consortium). His charter to me: =93Pull all of =
these=20
various parts of NSF that do computing researc together and create the=20
directorate for computing =96 we=92ll call it CISE for Computer and =
Information=20
Science and Engineering.=94 That was a tremendously exciting thing to =
do. I loved=20
it. It was a nice size group =96 about 50. Our budget was $120 - 130 =
million. I=20
don=92t know what the budget is today, probably $2 or $3 hundred =
million. That was=20
just a great time, -- to get the various divisions in place and to =
establish=20
their direction and =20
priorities. =20

DKA: But the=20
culture was a very different culture. You worked in private industry and =
now you=20
were working in government=85

GB: =
I don=92t=20
know what it=92s like now. And I don=92t think I could have dealt with =
NSF under=20
anybody but Bloch. He had already been there for two or three years and =
changed=20
NSF already. He really had influenced that organization enormously, in=20
delegating responsibilities, cutting through bureaucracy, everything. =
NSF=20
doesn=92t have a departmental boss, it isn=92t under the Department of =
Commerce, so=20
we didn=92t have a lot of hierarchy. There was no hierarchy above us. It =
had a=20
board of directors, the National Science Board. So in a sense, it was =
only a=20
thousand person organization. So it was really quite small. And I=92d =
say=20
entrepreneurial, too, at that time, even though every congressman and =
senator=20
tried to influence the outcome for their constituents.

=

DKA: But your=20
goal was to define an area but also to define a strategy or help come up =
with a=20
strategy. Why don=92t you talk about what that was and why you thought =
that was an=20
appropriate strategy for computing at this time.

GB: =
Right. In=20
fact I had a lot of push back on it. The first thing was just get the=20
organization in place. The supercomputing centers were part of that, =
thank=20
goodness, and one of the goals was to integrate supercomputing into =
computer=20
science, which to a certain extent I totally failed at along with every=20
successor running CISE. =
But I did=20
influence supercomputing and spent a lot of time just working on the =
program,=20
pulling it together, and building a strategy:=93Folks, we=92re all going to =
run UNIX. We=20
need standardization because it is a question of programs. To use =
supercomputers=20
you=92ve got to have a vast array of applications. I want to integrate =
that into=20
the computer science community where the folks all speak some dialect of =
UNIX=94=20
They had been running a homegrown DOE operating system at the San Diego =
and=20
Illinois centers. First off, we are not spending any money evolving and=20
maintaining a piece of code that the Department of Energy maintains. =
It=92s=20
stupid. Get rid of it. There was a lot of resistance. I said I want=20
compatibility up and down the line so I can take a program from an SGI =
or a Sun=20
and run it on a super or minisuper from Convex. Another thing I asked =
for: =93I=20
want you to support a whole set of new and diverse kinds of computing=20
facilities. We need to get into massive parallelism. This is after =
we=92ve got=20
stability.=94 I wrote a lot of policy papers about the future and the =
need for=20
flexibility.

The supercomputer guys told me initially =
thatI was the guy who destroyed=20
supercomputing with VAX because everyone bought their own. =93You =
didn=92t provide=20
enough capacity. We=92ve got to have supercomputers.=94 So they got this =
pile of=20
money together. I said, but people liked those computers. Now don=92t =
you think=20
you should tolerate smaller computers such as the Convex instead of only =
large=20
centers because people really didn=92t like going to the centers. And =
there was=20
that whole dilemma of how is it going to be funded, all the politics. I =
got into=20
a lot of those issues, but couldn=92t get at all of them because of the =
politics.=20
When I came to NSF, the guy that had been putting the supercomputing =
centers in=20
place was still trying to start new ones. I said we don=92t know =
anything about=20
capacity. We don=92t know what the demand is. Why do we need to do all =
of that?=20
Let=92s wait for this to build. Besides, for supercomputing, it is =
better to have=20
more resources in one place if you really want a supercomputer, rather =
than lots=20
of little ones.

But he was playing the Washington trick -- the =
way you=20
get power is through budget, the way you get budget is to get a program =
started.=20
The reason we=92ve got such a horribly unbalanced budget is because of =
the=20
bureaucrats, who in fact get something funded, then their constituents =
say:=20
=93Hey, you can=92t cut this, I=92m dependent upon this.=94 But the =
demand for=20
supercomputing has fallen off, continues to drop, so there is a smaller =
number=20
of users than when I was running it, in part because smaller computers =
get=20
faster, more rapidly than larger ones.[10]

=

I=20
also tried to deal with the question of who is going to pay for all of=20
this.I wanted the =
scientists to=20
pay for use. I don=92t believe that computing ought to be like air. =
It=92s not free.=20
You=92ve got to pay some token amount for use. And if you=92re not =
willing to pay=20
something, then what=92s wrong? There=92s something wrong if you won=92t =
take some of=20
your budget money, or if you have budget money, you might rather buy a=20
workstation. I wanted a lot more flexibility in terms of getting an =
economic=20
model of supply and demand to work.

The other thing was the John Von Neumann =
Center at=20
Princeton had been established and to use the new ETA 10. It should be =
noted=20
that at the five super computer centers three had Crays, one had an IBM, =
and one=20
was to be an ETA (CDC owned company). =20
I refused to approve their budgeted expenditure because ETA =
didn=92t=20
deliver its machine. And this was a totally novel concept within the =
government.=20
How can you cut a center=92s budget? =20
Congressmen, senators, staffers were all calling my office. I =
said: =93This=20
is not a grant, this is a contract. You have no machine so why would do =
we pay?=94=20
Well CDC needs the money. Ok, when CDC can deliver the machine, they get =
the=20
money. CDC never delivered. And Erich backed me up.

=

DKA: It=92s=20
certainly not like the government way of doing business.

The main thing I did that I think was really =
important=20
concerned the NSFNet and how it became NREN or the Internet we have =
today. The=20
net was established as part of and reported to the person who ran the=20
supercomputer centers division. I came in and said: =93Networking is =
going to=20
report directly to me as a new division and not to the supercomputer =
division.=20
The network is independent and distinct from the supercomputer =
centers=94=20

This was based on my experience at DEC.The other part of the VAX =
Strategy was=20
that we had built super networking technology called DECnet, by having a =
network=20
group. It wasn=92t part of the computer guys who said: =93We=92ll simply =
put UARTs in=20
our computers and connect them to each other =96 we=92ll do the =
networking.=94 Where=20
is the network and why do we need a group to make links? Well the =
network is all=20
of those lines and links, and it=92s especially all the code that makes =
the=20
collection of computers work as one. So I did the same thing and said: =
=93NSF=20
needs a strong, independent networking group. We=92re going to build a=20
network.We=92re starting =
all of=20
that.=94

And so I=92d say I am most comfortable with my =
Washington=20
experience leading networking. We said we were going to take a lead =
position,=20
the Gore Bill came out in 1986, and NSF was given the charter to lead =
the group=20
on networking across all the government agencies. And then again I would =
like to=20
say that NREN (for National Research and Education Network) is the only =
thing I=20
can cite as inter-agencies ever doing together and agreeing on. We got =
everybody=20
together from all government agencies, industry, and academe and put a =
plan=20
forward in February of 1987, that was a three-phase plan to provide=20
bandwidth.And why this =
is really=20
fresh is I gave a keynote talk at InternetWorld =9195 in April.=20

It=92s the role of serendipity. Most everyone =
think that=20
the Internet just happened overnight. But it didn=92t. We had a =
three-day workshop=20
of 500 people in San Diego talking about networking. We had industry - =
what=92s=20
bandwidth going to be like? All the government agencies - what are the =
needs? To=20
the academics - what can you do?

On the final morning, after listening to the =
previous=20
two days, another =93aha=94 occurred that was fundamentally the NREN =
plan.I drew it on a single overhead =
that=20
everyone understood.

Figure 2. =20
Plan for NREN created at the February 1987, San Diego NSF =
sponsored=20
meeting.

I=20
basically said: =93Here=92s the plan. We=92re really have nothing =
now.Our networks are overloaded =
and really=20
don=92t work very well. Phase Zero: We get ourselves together. We make =
the network=20
solid. So without a system running no one is going to believe you about =
the=20
future. Then we=92re going to go from 56 kilobit=92s today in the =
backbone to 1.5=20
megabit=92s in 1990 using T1 and then we go immediately to 45 Mbits. In =
96-97=20
we=92ll start to field test the first gigabit nets. The later stage is =
research,=20
the earlier network is strictly engineering.=94

I=20
called them Internet 1, 2, and 3 in a recent talk that I keynoted at=20
InternetWorld 1995. One is ARPAnet, running 56-kilobit prototype for =
email. Two=20
is what we=92ve got today, which was really mail as a reliable delivery, =
the=20
worldwide web and a prototype for three. And here=92s what three iDKA: telephony, audio, video, =
and video=20
conferencing. It can=92t be ubiquitous without fiber optic speeds, =
there=92s not=20
enough capacity. And that=92s three to five years down the pike. =
Meanwhile we can=20
have a lot of fun with what we=92re doing with Internet 2. =

Interestingly, the goal of ARPAnet was not =
mail, mail=20
was not even conceived of. It was remote log in to other systems and =
sharing=20
files. The plan didn=92t say anything about the application in our =
goals, we=20
didn=92t say anything about worldwide web. We had no idea. It was =
proposed to be=20
used for supercomputing. Well, all the networkers knew it wasn=92t =
supercomputers.=20
There was no demand. We knew that supercomputers needed bandwidth, they =
needed=20
to communicate, but when you really force people to use them they would =
prefer=20
their own machines. I talked to various folks at DOE about this dilemma. =
If you=20
really want to get a lot of power together why don=92t you have Los =
Alamos run all=20
your computers. You=92ve got plenty of power, you have it together. The =
networking=20
is just fine. In supercomputing there is no reason to have more than one =
computer in the center of the earth. In fact there is every reason not =
to except=20
for the de-attachment you get. You get some attachment of these people =
coming=20
together. Leading the NREN effort across all the agencies that created =
the=20
network plan was the other thing I did at NSF I=92m proud of.=20

And then in the computer science area I =
proposed: =93We=20
are going to focus on parallelism. So what is the challenge? We=92ve got =
to get=20
out from under our thinking about computing and we=92ve got to go =
parallel.=94 I put=20
forth a taxonomy and it hasn=92t changed. The irony is I had advocated =
the=20
computer science department=92s working on networks and workstations. =
That=92s where=20
all the power is, so why don=92t you guys exploit that? Well they =
didn=92t even hear=20
any of that. And now Berkeley and Wisconsin have nice research efforts =
aimed=20
this way.

DKA: So it=92s=20
slowly coming back.

GB:Yes, slower than I would have =
liked, but=20
in fact people are going the right way at least. So I think the push to=20
parallelism and saying this is going to be the dominant focus of the =
work which=20
in some sense was complementing what ARPA was doing by funding all those =
parallel machines.

DKA: Gordon,=20
when you were receiving an award this year for innovation, and we=92ve =
talked for=20
quite awhile now about the astonishing career you=92ve had in various =
aspects of=20
that innovation as down at the bench level making innovations, at the =
management=20
level overseeing innovation, in the academic sector studying innovation, =
writing=20
about innovation, in the policy arena funding innovation, trying to pick =
directions, I wonder as you sort of survey that what concluding thoughts =
you=20
have or what thoughts you have on the future of this innovation and =
particularly=20
this industry =96 how it should be conducted, where it should be =
conducted, what=20
your experience tells you about where the industry should be going and =
how it=20
should inter-relate to government and to other bodies that work =
together.It=92s a big question and you =
can sort of=20
take it in any direction, but it=92s remarkable when you think about the =
various=20
perspectives that you=92ve had and it=92s hard to think of anybody whose =
seen it --=20
not just seen it but participated.

GB: =
Seeing is=20
one thing, but being in it is the other. And that=92s what I=92ve =
enjoyed. I=92ve=20
really enjoyed every one of the environments. When I was at Carnegie I =
thought=20
boy this is really great, and then running engineering at DEC was =
wonderful,=20
NSF, and now dealing with entrepreneurs. It=92s the stimulation or =
encouragement=20
of people doing that. I=92ve been very critical about certain government =
aspects=20
of the way they encourage it, which is really more a reflection -- at =
least in=20
my view -- of human nature than anything else.

I=92m strongly anti big programs like the =
Advanced=20
Technology Program of the Department of Commerce. I=92m willing to spend =
the=20
money, but it=92s the way it=92s couched. I would put it out as a loan. =
I would even=20
let the government invest in some way in venture kinds of things, =
earmarked in a=20
certain way to support work coming out of universities. One paper I =
wrote=20
focused on this question of what policies have worked for funding =
innovation=20
when applied to supercomputing system. And the only two good heuristics =
that I=20
can cite are: university research begets ideas and companies and its =
great to=20
fund research as such; and universities, government labs, government =
need to be=20
purchasers NOT developers of innovative equipment. Those are the only =
two things=20
that will work. I=92m really against funding companies and especially =
large=20
companies for building things that are going to be the next whatever it =
is.=20
Because so many times those programs end up as programs that the =
companies don=92t=20
have the nerve to cut out themselves and that there=92s no way to =
commercialize.=20
So I would almost require a way of commercialization. I always worry =
about=20
commercialization, about why are we doing this.

You know, I have a very different view about =
science=20
than most every policy maker in the U.S. I said this once in Erich =
Bloch=92s staff=20
meeting and he thought it was off the wall, sarcastic and almost =
anti-research=20
funding. Ed Davis once said I was getting cynical, but I say: =93No =
don=92t take it=20
that way. I=92m giving you a model of human nature and don=92t think of =
it in those=20
terms.Just understand =
how people=20
behave within the bounds you set.=94

Some times I think that scientists are like a =
bunch of=20
gold miners. If you=92re in a new field, a new gold field, and you put =
these gold=20
miners out in it and they=92re digging up gold all the time and =
they=92ve been at=20
work for a year or so and you walk out there and all that=92s laying =
there is just=20
this gold. And the problem is nobody really wants the gold, they want it =
refined=20
and made into something. It has no intrinsic value as gold. And the way =
we fund=20
science very often is: =93Oh we=20
have to fund science because we=92ve got to find new gold.=94 =

I=20
also worry about the economic future of the country. And I=92m so =
different about=20
what I think what=92s wrong with it. I look at the price of the yen and =
it=92s=20
heading toward 80. I remember when I was in Japan in 1978 it was 200 yen =
per=20
dollar or even more and then 100 when I was there a year ago and it was =
exactly=20
a spot on 100. Then a year before that I think it was 135. I can=92t see =
any way=20
to have the current system work with massive trade imbalance. I don=92t =
think this=20
country works if we so gullible to the issue of wanting free trade but =
yet=20
nobody plays by free trade rules. I mean all the deals that we have in =
free=20
trade. I=92d almost rather say: =93Well here, just take our money and go =
deal with=20
it.=94 And I don=92t know if there is any other way. And economists seem =
not to=20
understand this. I read something in Business Week recently that it=92s =
the=20
government, it=92s a balanced budget problem. Turns out a balanced =
budget problem=20
is only half of it because we blow a couple hundred billion there. But =
the other=20
thing is this trade thing is so serious, and our economy goes up, and =
the=20
economists can=92t figure out why the trade is getting so bad. Well, it =
turns out=20
the economy is good, we have more money to buy things, and what do we =
buy? What=20
do we make that nobody else can make right now? And the only thing I can =
think=20
of are Intel PC chips. Everything else is made offshore as a fundamental =
thing.=20
I mean, the whole car issue has sort of stabilized in a funny way, the =
car guys=20
are happy because they=92re making a lot of money, the Japanese are =
happy because=20
their cars are more expensive and they=92ve made deals with the American =
auto=20
makers and you probably can never figure it out anyway because of the=20
onshore/offshore.But if =
you worry=20
about ownership it turns out that we have lost so much here, and it=92s =
a funny=20
thing, but science may be to blame.

DKA: Because we=20
funded science but we lost innovation.

GB:We=92ve placed so much =
emphasis on=20
science, and so much of Washington is controlled by it. Basically =
science is=20
good.How can you be =
against=20
science? Well I may be when it is unbalanced. Because how are you going =
to=20
convert that into gold? How are you going to convert that into commerce? =
Because=20
if all you do is mine the gold and leave it on the ground, then somebody =
else is=20
going to make the jewelry. The Japanese are extraordinary at making=20
jewelry.

DKA: So we have=20
the gold but . . .

GB: =
So we=92ve=20
got the gold, but then a couple of these miners go in their cabins at =
night and=20
they make little trinkets and things and they say: =93Hmmm, that=92s =
pretty good=20
stuff!=94 And because they don=92t really have an avenue for making lots =
of=20
trinkets, they have to show off their trinkets to earn respect. They =
only get=20
points, by the way, if they show it off to everybody, because scientists =
only=20
get points for the mining of knowledge not the utilization of knowledge. =
So they=20
say: =93Hmmm, that=92s pretty good!=94 and the Japanese say: =93Yeah, =
that=92s pretty=20
good. Mind if I make a few million of those?=94 Then its off and running =
and we=20
miss the whole market thing. Our balance of trade is just =
extraordinarily bad=20
and I don=92t see any way to turn it around.

DKA: I just=20
wonder if that=92s why you now are working with individual =
entrepreneurs.

=20

GB: =
Yeah it=92s=20
that. I only work in environments that I can influence, can affect, that =
I can=20
bring something to the party about. So why I=92m working with individual =
startups=20
is because we can see these ideas and we know how to do it. I want to =
see it=20
come in, and I want to see it be an enterprise so that this thing gets =
revenue=20
and we=92ll affect the balance of trade. That=92s fundamentally why I do =
it. Because=20
in a large company it=92s very hard to. I can go back to work in a large =
company=20
and influence and do it, but it=92s more fun this way. In a sense I=92m =
not changing=20
very much of what I did at DEC. At DEC I had this universe of 6000 =
engineers and=20
somebody would say: =93Hey, I=92ve got this new idea to make a mail =
system or word=20
processor or new interconnect to make all our software connect and work=20
together.=94 Those things were all done in a sense as encouraging =
entrepreneurial=20
efforts.

The more I=92ve gotten away from large =
organizations, the=20
more I feel that this organizational hierarchy has to be totally =
supportive up=20
and down. It starts with the CEO and it goes down from there. Why am I =
such a=20
fan of Microsoft?Look at =
Gates,=20
Allchin, Maritz =85 go down the line of people running the company.Everyone link in the =
management chains=20
is filled with great people. Why I like them is they=92re smart, they =
know their=20
business, they know technology and they know what they=92re doing and =
they=92ve got=20
this mission of creating this industry and wanting to put it out there. =
And I=20
haven=92t seen that at other companies. Until Microsoft, I though DEC =
had the=20
greatest engineering organization, but Microsoft is substantially =
better.

=20

DEC is doing a lot of interesting Internet =
technology=20
and products right now[11] and they an =
advanced=20
development group in the bay area, but it is managed by an incompetent. =
I don=92t=20
see that they are going to figure out how to do it as a business. My =
partner=20
Heidi Mason and I offered to help. We=92ll look at those things and help =
put a=20
process in place so you can make this thing entrepreneurial and test =
them. We=20
may try, if they take us up on it, but they may not want to hear what we =
say. I=20
just like to see ideas come into existence.

I=20
guess everything that I=92m working is like that.

Have you heard of our other little project to =
produce=20
some historical videos?

DKA: No.

=20

GB: =
Ah, they=20
are fun, too. It=92s turning out to be entrepreneurial. We have videos =
from the=20
Computer Museum=92s film and video library and some from the =
Smithsonian. Anyway,=20
we have put the first one together -- it=92s a four-tape series on the =
first=20
computers. The first one is on the first four computers - Zuse, =
Atanasoff,=20
Stibitz and Aiken. The next one is on ENIAC, EDVAC, and that line. The =
third is=20
on the MIT, IBM and early DEC machines. The final one is the English =
machines.=20
Four one-hour videos get us up to 1955 or so. I funded the first one, =
and it=92s=20
all using original material. I=92m the narrator gluing the pieces =
together. The=20
ACM has come in as a partner. And then we=92re going to try to get some =
other=20
folks. We=92ve got the Los Alamos MANIAC film which is a really =
excellent one=20
explaining what computing is all about, the four boxes, all the classic =
stuff.=20
They did a very good job of making color and 16-millimeter sound.

=20

DKA: Before we=20
wrap this up, I wonder if there is anything else that you want to... any =
final=20
reflections or regrets or anything that you want to =85 we=92ve sort of =
gone through=20
the whole thing and we=92ve heard a lot of information, but just =
wondered if there=20
is anything else that you want to close with.

GB: =
I guess I=20
really just get a kick out of seeing new uses for computers =96 seeing =
our=20
machines reach their potential and helping the people, especially =
entrepreneurs=20
who are driving the new applications. I don=92t have to take it all the =
way to the=20
end. In a sense I looked at the Internet and web -- it was flashy, neat =
and all=20
of that, but I rarely see any surprises. Well did you know this or that? =
Well I=20
didn=92t think about it that way. Once you=92ve got the infrastructure, =
anybody can=20
generate =96 well not anybody - you can generate most of what follows. =
The network=20
was one that was like that. I like to put things in place and let things =
take=20
off, given the infrastructure. So I guess that=92s what I enjoy. How do =
you do=20
things that can then enable other people to do a lot with it, whether =
it=92s a=20
component to use as a minicomputer, or a network to use to build this or =
that.=20

I=92ve started working with Jim Gray who I =
just met six=20
months ago, and we=92re having a wonderful time. We=92re talking about =
an=20
architecture we call SNAP =96 Scalable Networks and Platforms -which is a dream of how to =
build=20
world-scale computers out of an ATM or worldwide network and a collected =
set of=20
computers[12]. The ideas are =
gradually=20
unfolding. We=92re giving our talk and content to anybody who wants =
it.And so we=92re using that as a =
vehicle to=20
say we=92re in the architecture business, we=92re building this great =
computer, only=20
we=92re not doing it at all. We=92re just coming out of our heads and =
having other=20
people say: =93Gee, these are good ideas!=94 And then somebody takes an =
idea here=20
and there, and this is really a platform -- how does this all work.

=

In switching to clusters, I gave up my 30 year =
belief in=20
multiprocessors. They are just too hard and too expensive to build in a =
scalable=20
fashion.There are too =
many reasons=20
why we just can=92t get there with them starting with they take too long =
to build=20
and are likely to obsolete when introduced. Furthermore, unlike =
clusters, with=20
every change in model, the whole system has to be re-designed.Clusters can evolve and accept =
nodes=20
over a period ofseveral =
technology=20
generations.

DKA: That=92s the=20
next dream.

GB: =
Yeah, it=92s=20
a dream, but we=92re already influencing others. We went off and =
determined that=20
we needed a switch =96 a System Area Network switch to interconnect =
things. Well,=20
we went to Tandem and said: =93Hey, you=92ve got a pretty good =
switch!=94 But then=20
Intel=92s got theirs and somebody else has one. And we say: =93Wait, to =
build the=20
kind of computer we need, you guys have got to standardize this. You =
can=92t hold=20
it to yourself. How are you going to make this a standard?=94 And so =
we=92re off=20
trying to get this switch in place so that anybody can build these =
computers in=20
a wild way. We=92re having a lot of fun with that. =

DKA: Well=20
that=92s great. That=92s a good place to stop. Great, this has been very =
interesting. Thank you for taking the time to do this.Let=92s look at the plan you =
promised on=20
your computer.

Set up camera in front of computer in =
office.

=20

GB: =
(At=20
computer talking about the slide on screen) Yeah, this is slide (given =
in Figure=20
2 above). This is the network plan to go from what I call Internet one =
which is=20
ARPAnet to what we=92ve got today and what I say is the factor of a 1000 =
really=20
makes a big difference. And the thousand is we went from 56 Kilobits to =
45=20
Megabits and that=92s the plan, we were right on the plan.It=92s an amazing piece of =
luck.

I=20
feel fortunate in being able to create two strategies that were =
successful plans=20
for implementing technologies and products over a 15 year time =
scale.Ironically, the VAX Strategy =
may have=20
been a reason for Digital=92s demise because it let them not think about =
the=20
market while they were busily implementing new VAXen and selling =
them.

=20

The NREN Bandwidth plan was equally useful. It =
is=20
interesting to look at the original figure from the first report because =
of its=20
simplicity and usefulness as a strategy and plan.

Everyone always talks about strategies, but =
rarely do=20
you see one that actually works that you are able to learn from.

=93aha=92s=94

I=20
have been fortunate to create more than one significant =93aha=94 in my=20
lifetime.I recall the =
first small=20
one was the invention of patented switching circuit used for the memory =
cycle of=20
PDP-4 that was a generalization of the flip-flop made by cross-coupling =
n-NAND=20
gates to make an n-state device. =
This allowed me to understand and feel exactly what an =93aha=94 =
was.

=20

Two =93aha=92s=94 came from writing Computer =
Structures with=20
Allen Newell: the general registers idea and the Unibus.Although they were inventions, =
the ISP=20
and PMS notations for computer structures were also important, but the =
=93aha=94=20
cannot be recalled.

The VAX Strategy was another =93aha=94 that =
occurred=20
while vacationing in Tahitii.

The NREN Plan came out of the very stimulating =
meeting=20
at San Diego in February 1987 at an interagency workshop organized to =
explore=20
the technologies and needs for an NREN in order to respond to the =
=93Gore Bill=94=20
for an information superhighway for supercomputing.

In 1987 while at NSF, I agreed to give Gordon =
Bell=20
prizes of $2,500 per year for advances in application parallelism. =
ARPA=92s=20
Strategic Computing Initiative was starting to bear fruit, but =
applications were=20
significantly lagging. =
The first=20
prize given in 1987 was to three researchers at Sandia National Labs for =
applications of a 1,024 node Ncube computer.The lab publicized the award =
of the=20
prize to call attention to their very significant accomplishment.Since the first prize achieved =
a=20
performance level approaching about =BD Gflops, performance has =
increased to over=20
1 Tflops in 1999 using up to 10,000 processors.The annual prize of $5,000 =
will be given=20
at least until 2007.

In May 2000, Jim Gray and I began awarding =
$10,000=20
prizes for network performance to understand and stimulate this area =
that is the=20
basis of large scale distributed computing.The first prize was awarded =
for two=20
Windows 2000 PCs transferring data at 770 Gigabits per second.They operated between Virginia =
and=20
Washington, passing through one dozen nodes that are part of the =
Internet 2=20
Backbone.

From this experience, I strongly advocate the =
use of=20
prizes to mark and stimulate technological development.Unlike awards and medals that =
are given=20
a posteri, prizes stimulate effort and mark progress.

Bets to Mark Technology Progress

=20

I=20
enjoy betting with technologists about future progress.Currently I have a perfect win =
record.=20
The secret is to bet against optimist, but use knowledge of the =
marketplace and=20
other factors to insure a win. =20

Previous Wins

In 1990, I bet Danny Hillis, the founder of =
Thinking=20
Machines that by December 1995, the majority of technical computing =
measured in=20
floating-point operations per month and costing more than a million =
dollars=20
would NOT be done on computers with more than 1,000 processing =
elements.I relied on the fact that =
traditional=20
supers would supply much of the capacity or that because of cost, there =
would=20
only be a few 1,000 node computers and that lower priced machines would =
carry=20
out the bulk of the computation. =
The loser was required to write a paper.Danny has yet to write the =
paper.

=20

At the 1995 InternetWorld, I bet DEC=92s VP of =
Marketing=20
for Internet products $100, that SUN would be the dominant supplier =
within a=20
year and that DEC=92s position would be nil. =20
The VP reneged, but was still with the company 3 years later in =
the same=20
position.

At one point, mega-manager Bob Allen, CEO of =
AT&T=20
decided that his company had to buy the computer company NCR.A friend of mine, Rob Wilmot, =
former=20
Chairman and CEO of the English computer company, ICL volunteered that =
he had=20
played a role in the acquisition.I=20
criticized him for playing fast and loose with our national assets by =
getting=20
them tied up with such a losing deal. =20
I bet just $100 that within 3 years the deal would have gone bad =
and=20
AT&Twould have to =
divest the=20
company. Rob paid.

October 1993 several members of the Microsoft =
TAB bet=20
the ultimate optimist, Raj Reddy and Professor Ed Lazowska that there =
would not=20
be significant video on demand in service by 1996. Raj bought =
dinners.

=20

Bets I Expect to Win

=

Raj Reddy made two other bets in 1993 (decided =
in=20
2003).In 10 years, there =
will be=20
production model cars that drive themselves.In 10 years, we agree that AI=20
(Artificial Intelligence) has made more of an impact on society than the =
transistor or IC.

On March 1997, Raj Reddy Jim Gray, and Dan =
Ling believe=20
that at least 10K Workstations, located in at least 10 sites, in at =
least 3=20
states will be able to communicate with one another over an end to end =
path=20
operating at least at a 1 Gigabit per second rate.

=

On November 1997, two bets were made with =
Nicholas=20
Negroponte:

1. $1000 even odds.That by December 31, 2000 =
there will NOT=20
be 1 billion web users.2. $1000 5:1 odds.That by =
December 31,=20
2001, there will NOT be 1 billion web users.This is measured by =
people with=20
one or more addresses that can access Internet, but only one user is =
counted no=20
matter how many addresses each has. Intranet users who do not have the =
ability=20
to access the web aren't counted. =20
IP addresses aren't counted. =20

April 1996: I optimistically bet with Jim Gray =
that half=20
of the PCs will ship with videophone capability by April 2001.In an April 2000 talk, Bill =
Gates said=20
he expected all future PCs to have cameras.

=20

[1] Only 20 =
=936=92s=94 were made=20
due the difficulty of manufacturing previously described that prompted =
the=20
wire-wrap process.It =
used=20
expensive Germanium transistors and was heat sensitive with one day mean =
time to=20
failure.PDP-10 added one =
instruction and used two base registers for program and data relocation =
and=20
sharing.

[2] This =93aha=94 =
occurred when=20
I was describing general registers to Alan Perlis, the department head, =
and a=20
computer pioneer in programming languages and who had worked on =
Algol.

[3] This =93aha=94 =
occurred when=20
I was describing a model for switching to E.F. Codd of IBM who was =
visiting=20
Carnegie Tech.

[4] The project =
name, VAX was=20
used until the introduction when the press started to hear of it and =
speculate=20
about its existence. =
Given this=20
early publicity, we decided to just keep the name.

[7] If I=92d =
stayed, I believe=20
DEC would have prospered. =
I would=20
not have let it: flip-flop in architecture, build the ECL 9000, =
or fail=20
to be a PC supplier. =
Not=20
capitalizing on its technology to: be a network equipment supplier, be =
the=20
dominant platform supplier of web servers, or exploit AltaVista are =
equal=20
boners.

[8] Encore was sold =
to Sun=20
Microsystems in 1998 for about $150 Million. This included the patents =
and other=20
Intellectual Property.

[9] In January 1986 =
I left=20
the company.In =
late 1985,=20
Henry Burkhardt left and formed Kendall Square Research to build a =
scalable=20
multiprocessor. The KSR-1 operated and several large scale machines were =
built,=20
but the company was ultimately closed down because of the way it =
recognized=20
revenue for machines that had been shipped, but not paid for.

[10] The original =
centers=20
included: the University of Minnesota, UC/San Diego, University of =
Illinois, the=20
Pittsburgh Center, Princeton, and Cornell. =20
In 2000 there were two at UC/San Diego and Illinois.

[11] DEC Research =
created=20
AltaVista but failed to capitalize on it. After DEC was acquired by =
Compaq in=20
1998, AltaVista was sold at a price of =20
$2.4 billion.

[12] IN 2000, =
Beowulfs, or=20
clusters of Personal Computers forming single, high performance systems, =
are=20
being built throughout the world with a few dozen to a thousand =
computers. In=20
1997, GRID was initiated as an effort to couple geographically dispersed =
computers.Both embodies =
our=20
dream.ATM was not the =
critical=20
technology and failed to be ubiquitous. The Internet served the=20
role.