Ethical
Issues in the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research

The use of animals in biomedical research has a lengthy history. Early Greek
writings (circa 500 B.C.), for example, describe the dissection of living
animals by physician-scientists interested in physiological processes. These
early vivisections appear to have been done mostly for exploratory purposes,
however, to describe the inner workings of animals. Later, Roman physicians--including
perhaps the single most influential figure in the emergence of the medical
sciences, the physician Galen--began to perform what we would now regard
as the first genuine experiments involving animals. Using vivisections to
test
specific hypotheses and explore competing explanations of biological phenomena,
these early physician-researcher were among the first advocates of the idea
that the use of animals in research was morally justifiable in light of the
potential health benefits associated with those experiments.

Beginning with Galen, animal vivisection quickly emerged as an important
tool for the study of anatomical structures and their functioning. Remarkably,
Galenís teachings on human anatomy, which were widely used by physicians
and scientists for nearly 1500 years, were derived from animal dissections
and external examinations of the human body--he conducted no human autopsies.
Later, as modern scientific principles were increasingly incorporated into
the study of human physiology, physician-researchers such as Andrea Vesalius
and William Harvey continued to employ animal vivisection in their investigations
of the functioning of various anatomical structures, particularly the heart
and lungs.

Throughout this historical period, few philosophical or moral objections
were voiced regarding the use of animals in biomedical studies. This is perhaps
surprising for two reasons. First, anesthetics were poorly understood and
rarely used in animal vivisections. Second, the medical benefits of using
animals in research were at best ambiguous during this period. Although both
of these considerations would appear to argue strongly against the use of
animals in research, there was clear moral consensus that the practice of
animal vivisection was not unethical.

A Changing Moral
Landscape

In the early and mid 19th century, this moral consensus becomes less clear.
The availability of general anesthetics and the increasingly popularity of
domestic pets (particularly in England), fueled anti-vivisection sentiments.
By 1865, these reformist sentiments had become strong enough to prompt a
response by the medical establishment. In his work, Introduction to the
Study of Experimental Medicine, Claude Bernard was among the first to
advance a moral argument in support of the use of animals in research. Arguing
that the sacrifice of animals lives was essential to the advancement of medicine,
and thus the relief of human suffering and extension of human life, Bernard
argued that animal experimentation was ethically acceptable.

Changes in moral philosophy around that time, however, made Bernardís argument
less compelling than it might have been were it introduced a generation earlier.
In the early modern period, prevailing metaphysical beliefs about non-human
animals included the Cartesian notion that animals were non-sentient automatons
incapable of experiencing pain or pleasure. Only human beings were endowed
with these special capacities, which they possessed in virtue of the fact
that they had souls (which animals lacked). However, the emergence of utilitarianism
as an influential moral paradigm called this perspective into question. Philosophers
like Jeremy Bentham questioned whether animals truly lacked the capacity
to experience pain or pleasure. In addition, Bentham argued that this capacity
was a defining feature of membership in the moral community. For him, all pain
and suffering was important in the assessment of the moral righteousness
of an action, including pain and suffering that might be experienced by animals.
If an action maximized good (pleasure) and minimized harm (pain), to the
fullest extent possible, then that action was morally correct. If not, then
the action was subject to moral disapproval.

As the Cartesian paradigm became more suspect and moral sentiments became
increasingly more concerned with the minimization of pain and promotion of
pleasure, including the minimization of animal suffering, defenders of animal
experimentation were increasingly more subject to public scrutiny. In 1875,
the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection emerged as
an important force in the anti-vivisection movement. In the following year,
the public reform campaign initiated by this organization was successful
in establishing the first regulations governing the use of animals in biomedical
research, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876. Although it did not prohibit
all animal vivisection, this Act did require the use of anesthetics for many
types of animal experimentation.

The passing of the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 was not altogether successful
in answering the concerns of advocates on behalf of animal interests. Further
support for the use of animals in research would come shortly thereafter,
however, with advances in immunology and the study of infectious disease.
The use of animals in the development of a vaccine for rabies and in the
treatment of diphtheria provided compelling evidence of the health benefits
associated with animal experimentation. These breakthrough accomplishments
demonstrated in a manner that had not been possible before that time, that
the use of animals in modern medical research could result in significant
improvements in human health. Animal experimentation was now seen in a much
less ambiguous way as a critically important tool in the war against human
(and animal) disease.

Contemporary
Themes

In the mid to late 20th century, other moral perspectives on the use of
animals in research have emerged. Critics of animal experimentation, for
example, increasingly stress the potential harms that might befall researchers
involved in performing such studies. These critics maintain that moral sentiments
can be deadened by persistent exposure to animal suffering. According to
these critics, it is but a short step from feeling morally comfortable with
the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering on a non-human animal to
being morally comfortable with the infliction of pain and suffering on another
human being.

Another argument that has emerged as increasingly more important to moral
assessments of the use of animals in research begins with recognition of
a sense of fraternity among all living things. It now appears that most animals
have a variety of psychological experiences, including experiences that might
be referred to as experiences of pain, pleasure, and other emotional states.
If comparable human psychological states are important for the assessment
of an actionís moral acceptability, then why is it the case that animal experiences
should be treated differently?

These considerations have been used to suggest that dismissing these animal
experiences as morally irrelevant, without providing a principled reason
for such differential treatment, amounts to a form of "speciesism". Like
racism or sexism, "speciesism" is intended to evoke the idea that it is morally
indefensible to treat members of an entire category differently solely because
they are members of that category. Rather, there must be some reason for
treating those individuals differently. Thus, the challenge put forward by
those critics of animal experimentation who appeal to speciesism is to provide
substantive criteria for regarding animals as less-than-full-fledged members
of the moral community. Lacking such substantive criteria, these critics
claim that the use of animals in medical research is morally indefensible.

The appeal to speciesism is different from many of the arguments discussed
above in an important way, namely, this new appeal is a rights-based argument.
The claim is that animals possess cognitive faculties generally associated
with membership in the moral community. Until it can be established that
there are certain capacities that animals lack, and that other members of
the moral community possess, animals should be treated as full-fledged members
of that moral community--and with membership comes various moral rights.

This perspective stands in contrast to utilitarian-based appeals which may
consider the experiences of animals in the assessment of the moral acceptability
of animal experimentation. Although utilitarian perspectives frequently maintain
that animal experiences are morally significant, and that animal pain and
suffering should be factored into our moral assessments, utilitarians typically
do not assert that animals have moral rights in the way envisioned by those
who appeal to speciesism. Put in a slightly different way, anti-speciesists
maintain that all animal experimentation is morally objectionable
because it violates the inherent rights of the animal subject; in contrast,
utilitarians maintain that some animal experimentation may be morally
permissible because, on balance, the potential benefits of the research in
question outweigh the potential harms to animal subjects (provided these
harms have been minimized to the full extent possible).

Looking Ahead

Although moral debate regarding the use of animals in medical research continues
to evolve, three main themes appear increasingly more prominent. First, the
rise of radical animal-rights organizations like the Animal Liberation Front
suggests that there is a small enclave of passionate individuals committed
to the idea that all animal research is inherently unethical. How
best to respond to those persons who are not persuaded by appeals to the
potential health benefits of animal experimentation has been, and will remain,
an important consideration for those research who advocate such practices.

Second, although detailed regulations governing the use of animals in research
have been in place for several decades (see How to Work With Your Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee),
many have expressed dissatisfaction regarding institutional commitments to
upholding these regulations. The extent to which outside community representatives
are adequately represented in institutional deliberations, for example, has
been the subject of some controversy. Others question whether researchers
pay enough attention to the justification of the increasing numbers of experimental
animals required to conduct biomedical studies. As more federal and private
funds are used to support medical research involving the use of animals,
this concern will likely become more salient to the lay public (many of whom
are unaware of the millions of animals sacrificed each year in animal experiments).

Finally, it is important
to remind ourselves that several decades worth of experience with current
regulations regarding the use of animals in biomedical
research has produced a strong moral consensus for these practices. Researchers
who fail to comply with those regulations should expect to be judged by their
peers as unprofessional, to be subject to various institutional sanctions,
and more generally, to face significant moral disapproval. Consequently,
a third emergent theme in the evolution of moral discussions regarding animal
experimentation will likely be the importance of increased regulatory vigilance
and attention to matters of institutional compliance.

Study Questions

1. Sharp mentions the
increasing popularity of domesticated pets as one factor in the emergence
of anti-vivisectionist sentiments in England. Do you think biomedical research
with cats and dogs should be held to higher ethical standards because these
animals are kept as pets? Why or why not?

2. Suppose you are a
member of an IACUC asked to review a study of the carcinogenic potential
of a widely used pesticide. In their application the investigators estimate
that approximately 1500 rodents will be required to produce definitive
results. Several members of the committee express concerns about the high
number of animals requested for the study. Apart from statistical considerations,
what other factors should be used to determine the number of experimental
animals that it is appropriate to use in biomedical research studies?

3. What types of people
do you think should serve on IACUC's? Should an effort be made to include
animal rights activists as members? What are some of the advantages and
problems with this approach?

4. Many pet owners/keepers
describe relationships with their pets in terms of "love", "friendship",
"loyalty", and so forth. Do you think the ability to love or befriend another
could be used to determine which types of animals can be used as (involuntary)
subjects of biomedical research?

5. Suppose it is discovered
that a graduate student is mistreating experimental mice by not euthanizing
them in a timely manner (and allowing those animals to experience an unacceptably
high level of pain). What would be appropriate punishment for this behavior?
How about for a second or third offense? Would it matter if the offender
was a university professor and not a graduate student? Why or why not?