The results of several previous research projects
in this area have been incorporated in a security-enhanced Linux
system. This version of Linux has a strong, flexible mandatory access
control architecture incorporated into the major subsystems of the
kernel. The system provides a mechanism to enforce the separation of
information based on confidentiality and integrity requirements. This
allows threats of tampering and bypassing of application security
mechanisms to be addressed and enables the confinement of damage that
can be caused by malicious or flawed applications.

It seems obvious that any OS that is supposed to be secure should have
the security features built in to the kernel. The implication
is that add-ons to the OS cannot provide the same level of security as
you can get from building the security features right into the core of
the system. Even so, the NSA is not yet completely confident
in SE Linux:

There is still much work needed to develop a complete
security solution. Nonetheless, we feel we have presented a good
starting point to bring valuable security features to Linux. We are
looking forward to building upon this work with the Linux community.
Security-enhanced Linux is being released under the same terms and
conditions as the original sources. The release includes documentation
and source code for both the system and some system utilities that were
modified to make use of the new features. Participation with comments,
constructive criticism, and/or improvements is welcome.

Note that the NSA -- the world's best code-breaking agency -- feels
that the best way to develop a secure computer system is to use
open-source software. By releasing the details of the inner
workings of the system to the entire community of programmers, hackers,
and crackers, it is more likely that any security holes will be found,
and subsequently fixed.

This does not make sense. Diebold, the manufacturers
of the
infamous "black box" voting machines -- the ones that leave no paper
trail -- use software that is not open-source. How is it that
the taxpayers have already paid for the NSA to
develop what they
believe is the most secure operating system in the world, yet they pay
again for Diebold machines that use a lower quality OS?

Needless to say, secure voting is the cornerstone of Democracy.
Obviously, we could not tolerate having the NSA develop our
voting machines. But if they have developed a pretty secure
OS, and that OS has withstood the slings and arrows of the open-source
community, it really would make sense for us to use that technology.
It might prevent embarrassments
such as this:

BREAKING: Due to contractual non-performance and
security design issues, Leon County (Florida) supervisor of elections
Ion Sancho told Black Box Voting that he will never again use Diebold
in an election. He has requested funds to replace the Diebold system
from the county. He will issue a formal announcement to this effect
shortly.
Finnish security expert Harri Hursti proved that Diebold lied to
Secretaries of State across the nation when Diebold claimed votes could
not be changed on the memory card.

With SE Linux, an election worker would have to enter a password to
"mount" or "unmount" a memory card. Thus, it would be
possible to keep track of exactly who mounted the card, and keep a
record of the event; to have the system verify the absence of votes on
a newly-inserted memory card; and to encrypt what is written to the
card in such a way that the results could not be tampered with
undetectably after the fact. Every step of the process would
be auditable.

Diebold’s Walden W. O’Dell has
abruptly resigned his positions as chairman and chief executive officer
with Thomas W. Swidarski, currently the firm’s president and
chief operating officer, named to take over as chief executive officer.
Diebold, a manufacturer of ATM, security, and voting machines, made the
announcement late Monday. The company has faced questions about the
software used in some of its voting machines.

The link below goes to a dummy account that automatically forwards email to the Federal Trade Commission's spam reporting service. Don't use it unless
you are a robot. Instead, act like a human and figure out the real address from this: joseph/dot/j7uy5/at-sign/gmail/dot/com

The Corpus Callosum is an occasional journal of armchair musings, by an Ann Arbor reality-based, slightly-left-of-center regular guy who reserves the right to be highly irregular at times.
Topics: social commentary, neuroscience, politics, science news.
Mission: to develop connections between hard science and social science, using linear thinking and intuition; and to explore the relative merits of spontaneity vs. strategy.