Abstract

Between September 1945 and November 1946, up to 35,000 surrendered Japanese troops were assimilated into Lord Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command in the Netherlands East Indies. Although under the ultimate control of British officers, the Japanese retained their wartime unit structures, were led by their own officers and remained armed. As a measure of their acceptance by the British, one of them was recommended for the Distinguished Service Order in November 1945, only three months after the war's end. The Japanese fought alongside the British despite the anger felt against them as the perpetrators of wartime atrocities and as a former enemy. These sentiments, however, did not prevent senior military personnel and politicians from using the Japanese to assist in the restoration of pre-war European empires in Asia. Crucially, the United States government tacitly supported the use of the Japanese. Aware of the sensitivity of using former enemy troops, the British and Americans tried to conceal the extent of Japanese involvement. Their success in achieving this hid not just their own hypocrisy but also the important part played by the Japanese in securing Allied post-war aims in Asia.