Markus Haller, Rationality without morality, RThPh 2001/II, p. 149-165.
According to David Hume, our reason cannot indicate us the ends that we are to pursue. The “Anti-Humeans” among philosophers try to refute him and to propose a conception of rationality based on practical values one could not fail to take account of without contradiction. The “Neo-Humeans” try instead to supplement his conception of rationality in order for it to be compatible with our commmon intuitions. The present paper is written in defence of the “Neo-Humean” position. In a first step, it shows that on the two most significant “Anti-Humean” positions, standards of rationality and standards of morality cannot be distinguished. In a second step, it explains why and how the criterion of the consistency of preferences supplements the Humean position in the appropriate way and allows the proper development of a conception of rationality without morality.