Asch Harwood

Sunday, November 6, 2011

Reuters recently reported that Sudan’s government is unhappy with a blog post written by UK ambassador to Sudan Nicholas Kay calling attention to growing food insecurity in that country.
The episode is significant because it illustrates the use of a
relatively new diplomatic tool, social media, by the chief of mission of
a major state. Unlike press statements or on-the-record interviews,
blogging provides diplomats with an “informal” and individualized space
to reflect on issues. Recognizing the utility, the UK Foreign Office has
set up a series of blogs for use by its diplomatic staff.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, too, has been a supporter
of experimenting with social media. Many embassies have adopted twitter
to promote an exchange of ideas and dialogue with host-country
nationals as well as with government officials. For example, the U.S.
Embassy in Pretoria is an especially active tweeter and Facebook user. (Full disclosure: they regularly retweet my writings. Thanks!)

This brings me to my second point. The medium is not only always the
message. In this case, UK Ambassador to Sudan Kay’s point that raised
the ire of the Khartoum government, that it is “little wonder Khartoum
has seen protests in the last few weeks,” highlights the political
problems that food insecurity can cause, particularly in weak states
like Sudan.

It is unlikely that these pressures will let up any time soon. The World Bank’s Food Price Watch, in its November quarterly report
notes “Global food prices remain high and volatile…Domestic food prices
also remained volatile in the same period… But domestic price
volatility does not follow a clear pattern, making it difficult to
predict that direction of future domestic prices.”

Food insecurity is a clear threat to regimes, particularly ones
unaccustomed to accommodating their people. Rather than chastising
Ambassador Kay, Bashir should turn his attention to improving the food
supply.

This first appeared on Africa in Transition.
Over the last week, a number of papers have been published that will be useful to Nigeria watchers.
The Center for Global Development’s Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers initiative has published a piece by Aaron Sayne and Alexandra Gillies (pdf) that evaluates the potential of direct cash transfers
in the Niger Delta. The basic concept of the cash transfer system is
that money, if given directly to those who need it, will be more wisely
spent than by alternative recipients, such as government or development
organizations. Sayne and Gillies find that while such a system may in
fact improve the lot of its recipients, direct cash transfers are
unlikely to result in transformative economic development because of
factors such as lack of infrastructure and insecurity. Sayne and Gillies
make the point that a system of direct payments to individuals would
also promote the current, unhealthy focus on how to access state
largesse that could trigger competition for payments resulting in
insecurity. (An additional benefit of this paper is their clear break
down of the Nigerian government’s current revenue sharing model.)

The Fund for Peace, creator of the acclaimed Failed States Index, has published its latest installment
of incident reports compiled by its UNLock Nigeria early warning
network, from April –September 2011. (This includes reports from the
contentious 2011 elections.) The FFP methodology is expansive, capturing
a wide range of insecurity. What is unique is that this data is not
compiled from press reports, but from a network of trained civil society
organizations on the ground. While their reporting is country wide, it
is concentrated in the Niger Delta, much of which is off-limits to
Westerners, and where the extent of insecurity is significantly
underreported by the Nigerian press. Based on the authors’ analysis of
incidents, they find “With a significant youth bulge–over 40% of the
population is under the age of 15—a history of economic and social
imbalance between the North and South, religious and ethnic tensions,
and a fragile system of political power sharing, Nigeria faces
significant challenges over the next few years.” A fair assessment.

And finally, Elizabeth Donnelly at Chatham House has published “Tangible Tensions”
(pdf), a broad overview of the challenges Nigeria is facing. The key
takeaway, I think, is the differences between the pessimism of those who
focus on security issues (Boko Haram, ethnic conflict in Plateau,
low-level violence in the Delta, crime, etc.) and the optimism of the
business community, especially in Lagos.

Hopes are running high for Liberia's second presidential elections since
the end of its brutal civil war. The first round of polling appears to
be credible. And with former warlord and current senator Prince
Johnson's endorsement, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Africa's first
female head of state, is likely to win the run-off in November in what
has been so far a largely fair and peaceful election. However, recent
presidential elections in Ivory Coast and Nigeria risk overshadowing
Liberia's consolidating democracy, and they are much larger countries.
Both polls were historic: Ivory Coast's was the first since the end of
civil war, and Nigeria's “better” election followed its 2007
“election-like event.” Nevertheless, they illustrate, alongside the
polls in Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2008, the potential for violent
elections in profoundly divided countries. Twenty-seven African
countries will hold local and national elections by the end of 2011, and
at least seventeen more are expected next year. If elections are so
often violent and polarizing, even when they are deemed free and fair,
should the United States be promoting them? The answer is yes. Because
Africans want them.

This first appeared on Africa in Transition.
Electoral violence in a number of sub-Sahara countries has prompted
some Africa watchers to question whether the United States and other
Western countries should be prioritizing “free, fair and credible”
elections when the process so often polarizes a country rather than
unifying it around democratic institutions and practices. Nevertheless, I
believe the United States and other westerners should continue to do
what they can to support Africans working to build free, fair, and
peaceful democracies, not least because Africans themselves want
elections, and there are no good alternatives.

A few days ago, I blogged about Africa’s population growth,
based on research from a series of reports produced by Standard Bank
looking at “five trends powering Africa’s enduring allure.” The reports
are loaded with statistics and provide some food for thought (although
if you read the previous post, you know how I feel about the “benefits”
of population growth). The reports are not available publicly, but they
have been written about widely, so you can get the gist.

In this post, (apropos given today’s release of the new IPhone), I
wanted to turn your attention to “Trend 3: Leapfrogging Through
Technology.” In it, report author Simon Freemantle notes,
“In no area has the terrain altered more seismically than in mobile
telephony. Much of the importance of mobile phones in the African
context rests in the manner in which they allow Africans to sidestep
pervasive infrastructure constraints, share information more freely,
thus making markets more efficient, and stimulate and support
entrepreneurial verve.”

I wanted to include this point as another example of ‘African solutions to African problems,’ in this case, finding innovative solutions to challenges that often contribute to investor timidity, such as underdeveloped infrastructure and limited access to credit.

In Kenya, as Freemantle points out in a separate report on African
finance, “mobile banking…has introduced financial services to 70 percent
of the country’s adult population, up from less than 5 percent in
2006.” And the industry across Africa is predicated to be worth twenty-two billion dollars by 2015.
I won’t argue that mobile phones in Africa are a “silver bullet.” But they demonstrate the potential of simple and widespread technology–the most popular phone in Africa is the relatively unflashy Nokia 6300.

Events this year have raised questions about the effectiveness of the
African Union (AU). There was the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast,
(President Ouattara vociferously criticized the AU at an on-the-record meeting
last month at CFR); and the AU’s initial intransigence over recognizing
Libya’s new government. Then, too, there are the long-standing problems
associated with Zimbabwe, Somalia, and the Great Lakes region. On the
other hand, the African Union has been assiduous in countering overt
military coups and it has deployed peacekeepers in numerous trouble
spots.
In his new working paper on the Africa Union released by the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the CFR, author Paul Williams
analyzes both the achievements and the shortcomings of the
continent-wide organization. Notably, he does not measure the success or
failure of the organization by international expectations, but by the
explicit intentions of the African Union based on its founding
documents.
In Williams’ own words:

The AU faced major obstacles during its first decade: its
practical achievements fell short of its grandiose declarations of
intent; its small number of bureaucrats struggled to keep the
organization working effectively and efficiently; and its member states
were often divided over how to respond to Africa’s conflicts.
These deficiencies stem from three problems. First, the AU attempted to
refashion the continent’s peace and security architecture at a time when
crises and armed conflicts engulfed much of Africa. Local governments
and external donors were thus forced “to build a fire brigade while the
[neighborhood] burns.” Second, the AU took on formidable conflict
management challenges without possessing any big sticks or many tasty
carrots. It thus lacked sources of leverage crucial for resolving armed
conflicts. Third, AU reform efforts became entangled in broader debates
about the appropriate relationships between the United Nations and
regional organizations.

Ultimately, Williams’ sees the African Union as a potential partner,
and one that should be nurtured given the United States’ strategic and
moral imperatives on the continent.
On another note, the paper also does one of the best jobs I’ve seen
describing the various parts of the organization and their functions.
Read the report here.

Monday, October 3, 2011

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has warned
of escalating civil war in Sudan as fighting between opposition and
Khartoum forces continues to spread beyond the disputed territory of
Abyei into the states of South Kordofan and now Blue Nile on the
Ethiopian border. The first is territory disputed by South Sudan and
Khartoum. The latter two remained in Sudan following the secession, but
contain armed opposition groups formerly allied with Juba.

South Sudan’s secession has played a role in the escalating conflict.
As the ICG notes, parts of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) were
never addressed, including the integration of the armed factions of the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N), which formally
split from the Juba-based SPLM on September 8. Perhaps more notably, the
ICG argues that the South’s successful succession weakened Bashir’s
control over the National Congress Party, allowing hardliners to execute
a “soft-coup” within the NCP. They prefer the “military option” as
opposed to Bashir’s negotiations.

Analysts at the ICG suggest that fighting in Sudan’s center
constitutes civil war and fear that the various opposition groups
fighting Khartoum may be coalescing. This in turn could “trigger a wider
civil war for control of the country.”