Friday, July 24, 2015

Over the
past two weeks the issue of Georgia’s so-called “border” with the
Russian-occupied breakaway region of South Ossetia has again garnered
attention. As reported by multiple sources and eyewitnesses, on July 10,
Russian troops placed border markers even further into Georgian territory,
again violating the country’s sovereignty (Civil Georgia, July
11). Reactions to this provocation have varied both nationally and
internationally, but one thing is clear: these activities are a part of a
broader Russian strategy of destabilizing Georgia from within.

The fact
that the border markers have been moved is not a new development. Since the
2008 Russo-Georgian War, there have been frequent reports of similar
activities, though they have not always caught the attention of the media. A
section of the Baku-Supsa pipeline falling under the Russian-occupied territory
is likewise not a novel development; since the 2008 war, it was approximated
that about a 1.4-kilometer section of the pipeline fell under occupied
territory, while the outcome of the recent border marking has resulted in around
1.6 kilometers of the pipeline becoming inaccessible to Tbilisi. For now,
Georgian Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze has stated that the pipeline has not had
any disruptions and continues to operate as usual. If any problems were to
arise, according to Kaladze, there is an alternative plan that could be put in
place immediately, which would bypass that section of the pipeline (Civil Georgia, July
12).

Yet
another cause of outrage, understandably, has been that the “border” is now
within eyesight of Georgia’s highly important East-West highway, which currently
passes less than a kilometer from the Russian checkpoints. This, indeed, has
truly daunting implications (see EDM,
July 20). But even before the most recent border-marking activities, if Russian
troops had wanted to cut off the highway, they could have done it with about as
much ease as they can now. According to eyewitness accounts including this
author’s, the administrative “border” could have been seen with the naked eye
from the East-West highway even before the most recent changes; the de facto
boundary is now about half a kilometer closer to the highway than it was before
(The
Fifth Column, July 22).

The
negative strategic, economic and psychological impact of the recent events on
Georgia are undeniable. According to some estimates, as much as 53 hectares
(130 acres) of Georgian territory has been newly swallowed up in recent weeks,
with devastating effects on those living in the area (Pirveli Arkhi/1TV, July
21). However, perhaps even more significant in a long-term context is the
internal strife that has come about as a result. In the week that followed the
Russian actions, a group of Georgian activists and journalists from Tbilisi
tore down a border sign and staged a small protest near the new administrative
border, which led to minor clashes with Georgian police and the subsequent
banning of access to non-locals to nearby towns in the name of security (Regional
Dialogue, July 21).

While on
a July 21 visit to Tbilisi and the administrative border region, European
Council President Donald Tusk reaffirmed the European Union’s commitment to
Georgia’s territorial integrity and praised Tbilisi’s “responsible” reaction to
the recent “provocations.” However, many Georgians have disapproved of their
government’s lackluster response (Interpressnews,
July 21). Just three days before Tusk’s visit, this disapproval was
demonstrated as thousands of protesters gathered in downtown Tbilisi. The
protest was mostly aimed against Russia’s actions, but those present were also
highly critical of the Georgian government, claiming that the government’s
reactions were inadequate and “cowardly” (Civil Georgia, July 18).
These reactions, indeed, have consisted of little more than countless
hollow-sounding statements.

Clearly,
the recent border-marking activities of Russian occupying troops have led to
frustration and internal divisiveness in Georgia. This is no accident on the
part of the large belligerent northern neighbor. One need not look further than
contemporary Russian military theory to see that the latest actions are a part
of Moscow’s broader war-making strategy. According to the concept of sixth
generation warfare, war does not stop, it occurs continuously in the form of
preparation for war with varying intensity and centers of gravity (V. A. Vinogradov,
“Trends in the Conduct of Operations in a Major War,” Military Thought, 2013 via Baltic Defence
College Journal on Baltic Security, 2015, p. 62). More specifically, in his
book General Theory of War, Russian
Major General Alexander Vladimirov describes the evolution from the formerly
clear distinction between peace and war, to the new, permanent war, where the
boundary between peace and war becomes a hazy transitional state of fear and
insecurity. He goes on to explain three aspects of the new eternal war: A shift
from war about territory to a war of an existential nature; a transition from
war to destroy and annihilate to the exertion of political, economic and
cultural influence; and the transition from a war of direct military
engagements to a contactless war (Alexander Vladimirov, “General Theory of War,”
2013 via Baltic
Defence College Journal on Baltic Security, 2015, p. 66). These features
can all be seen through Russia’s actions in Georgia prior to the outbreak of the
2008 war and ever since, as well as in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The
strategy, according to Vladimirov, becomes the use of indirect action with the
goals to create organized chaos, direct influence over an opponent, and
eventually, internal collapse.

The
Georgian public’s deep frustration with Russian actions and with the inability of
the Georgian government and international community to prevent the loss of more
Georgian territories is certainly understandable. However, protestors, members
of the media, and opposition party members have a vital responsibility to voice
their displeasure in a productive way, and not to engage in destructive
behavior that will cause internal divisiveness and disunity. The government, in
turn, is overdue in reviewing its strategy for how it approaches the issue. It
would be beneficial for the authorities, together with opposition parties, to work
energetically to form a comprehensive and cohesive plan on how to avoid any
further territorial losses. Above all, Georgians will have to keep in mind that
the Russian strategy is to destabilize their country from the inside out, and
this must be avoided at all costs.

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

Russians are waking up to the fact that
Vladimir Putin’s much-ballyhooed “turn” to China is not bringing Russia the
benefits he promised or that they expected. Not only has Beijing refused to tow
Moscow’s line on a variety of international issues at the United Nations and
elsewhere, but Chinese direct investment in the Russian economy fell by 25
percent over the last year, a reflection of problems in the Chinese economy as
well as in the Russian one (Kommersant,
July 21).

Some Russian analysts are dismissing these
trends as short-term issues and argue that Russia will ultimately benefit both
politically and economically from its rapprochement with China. But other
Moscow analysts suggest that China’s economic prospects are not nearly as rosy
as many in Russia assume and that that country’s rapidly aging population faces
a period of ever-slower growth. This negative trend will affect Beijing’s
ability to invest in other countries, including the Russian Federation. And
their conclusions suggest that Moscow under Vladimir Putin has picked the wrong
horse on which to try to ride into the future.

In a detailed two-part, 40-page study published in Moscow’s
“Demoscope Weekly,” Yevgeny Andreyev, a senior scholar at the Institute of
Demography of Russia’s Higher School of Economics, says that “the economy of
China depends on demography.” His report points out, in particular, that
Beijing’s “one child” policy” is leading to a rapid aging of the population and
that the expenses of dealing with an ever older population will suppress that
country’s economic growth in the decades to come (Demoscope.ru, April 6–19,
April 20–May 3;
summarized at Opec.ru,
July 13).

Indeed, Andreyev says, despite China’s lack of natural
resources, this East Asian giant has vaulted to the status of the world’s
second-largest economy (after the United States). But by the beginning of the
2030s, China may find its growth slowing significantly because of the burdens
imposed on its workforce by an aging population and the demands for higher
wages by its increasingly educated workforce. The combination of those two
trends undercuts the low-wage, high workforce participation that have been the
source of China’s growth in recent times.

Over the next 15 years, the aging of the Chinese population
means that the number of pensioners that those working must support will
approach the levels prevalent in Western Europe and the United States. And at
the same time, the costs of supporting the elderly will continue to rise with
advances in medicine. As a result, the Moscow scholar concludes, China will
lose the demographic advantages it has enjoyed for decades—and its economic
advantages will be at risk as well.

Beyond any doubt, Andreyev continues, Beijing will have to
devote more attention to and spend more money on this demographic shift. But
related to it are two other demographic problems with a likely negative
economic impact: China’s one-child policy has not only reduced the rate of
population growth but created a serious gender imbalance, and it has undermined
the traditional relationship between children and their parents. The first of
these means that Beijing will be under pressure to find wives for these extra
men; and the second means that the state has to assume burdens that families
had assumed earlier.

Friday, July 17, 2015

Given
Vladimir Putin’s aggressive rhetoric about the Baltic countries, Moscow and
Tallinn do not maintain warm relations. Despite that, Estonia has close and
growing ties with the 70 Estonians of Kabardino-Balkaria, a community that
descends from ethnic Estonians who came to the North Caucasus in pre-Soviet
times and that has maintained its language and ethnic identity.

Indeed,
an increasing number of the members of that community are taking Estonian
citizenship, either to be able to more easily visit the graves of their
ancestors in their homeland or to travel abroad—Estonia, as a member of the
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has visa-free
travel with more than 130 countries, far more than the Russian Federation does.
They are sending their children to camps and universities in Estonia. And they
maintain a cultural center where many work to both recover or improve their
Estonian and display their cultural heritage to other nations.

Such
small diaspora communities exist in many parts of Russia, although the Estonian
ones in the North Caucasus are among the most active. They seldom attract much
attention—the only exception to the media silence about the Estonians in that
region was in the early 1990s, when 170 Estonians were evacuated from Abkhazia
during the fighting there. That makes any report on them especially valuable,
particularly if it is as detailed as the article by Yuliya Bernikovskaya in the
current issue of “Sovershenno-Sekretno” (Sovsekretno.ru, July 9).

The
Russian journalist attributes the vitality of this small community to five
things: 1) the importance of the Estonian language for Estonians, 2) the
programs Estonia has put in place for its compatriots abroad, 3) the efforts of
the Estonian embassy in Moscow, 4) the tolerance, even support, of officials in
Kabardino-Balkaria who have not opposed all these activities as their
counterparts in other republics and regions of the Russian Federation might
have done, and 5) the passionate commitment of a single Estonian woman:

·Compared
to other nations, Estonians ascribe particular importance to their language,
and they work to maintain it even when, as in the North Caucasus, there are no
schools or other government institutions that support it. Former Estonian
President Lennart Meri used to refer to his national language as “a secret code,”
which had allowed Estonians to survive.

·The
Estonian Republic has responded to this ethnic imperative with programs that
offer summer language camps and free tuition to Estonians from Russia and other
countries. It pays many travel expenses. And since the 1990s, it has offered
dual citizenship to Estonians in Russia so that they can travel more freely to
Estonia and the wider world.

·These
efforts have been promoted by officers of the Estonian embassy in Moscow who
regularly travel to Kabardino-Balkaria to make sure Estonians, citizens and
non-citizens alike, know about these programs and can take advantage of them.

·Because
the community is small, all this activity has been tolerated, even welcomed, by
the Kabardino-Balkaria leadership as well as other peoples who view efforts by
a small nation to maintain itself as something they can only benefit from.

·But
none of these factors might have mattered had it not been for the remarkable
efforts of one ethnic Estonian woman, Bernikovskaya suggests. Maret Romani, on
her own, used newspaper advertisements to convince Estonians living there to
declare themselves, create a cultural center, and link up with Estonia.

As
a result, a group that might have been expected to assimilate is now a proud
diaspora community—although given its size, Tallinn’s welcoming attitude and
opportunities, and Moscow’s hostility, ever more of its members may choose not
only to take Estonian citizenship but to move back to their homeland.

Thursday, July 2, 2015

As it has done in Central Asia, Moscow
is urging Georgia and other countries in the South Caucasus to return to closer
cooperation with Russia in order to counter the threat from the Islamic State
(IS). And some defense officials in Tbilisi seem receptive to the idea that, as
one Georgian journalist put it, “Georgia must deepen its cooperation with the
Russian Federation as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran, both of which have
no small experience in opposing terrorist groups” (Kavpolit.com,
July 1).

If Moscow succeeds in using the Islamic
State threat to restore some of its dominance over these countries, it will
indicate, at a minimum, that the Russian authorities are cleverly making use of
IS attacks in the Middle East and Europe while assuring everyone that no such
attacks are imminent in Russia. And it may indicate that the Russian security
services are playing a role in structuring IS operations, at least with regard
to the post-Soviet space (see EDM,
June 30). But regardless of which of these interpretations is correct, it
points to the ugly possibility that the Kremlin plans to use the threat of
terrorism to achieve its goals across the post-Soviet space just as Vladimir
Putin has done within the Russian Federation itself.

According to Vasily Papava, who
identifies himself as “an independent Georgian journalist,” Tbilisi has become
more worried about the IS threat to its national security since leaders of the
Islamic State declared that they had founded a new administrative unit in the
North Caucasus and leaders of Islamic fighters in that region declared their
loyalty to it. Major General Vakhtang Kapanadze, the chief of the Georgian General
Staff, and Tina Khidasheli, the country’s defense minister, both said that IS
was now a threat that Tbilisi would work to counter. At the same time, however,
Khidasheli said that Russia should be more focused on this threat in the North
Caucasus than in assuming it has a right to intervene in neighboring countries
on whatever pretext (Kavpolit.com,
July 1).

But Georgians have been worried about
this for more than a year, Papava says, noting that the statement by Matthew
Bryza, a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, that “if no one stops
ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—former name for IS], it in the end
will launch a strike through Georgia,” had attracted a great deal of attention.

Now things are coming to a head, the
journalist says, and Tbilisi is considering what it must do and what resources
it can bring to bear. Obviously, many in the Georgian capital would like to
rely on their own resources or those from the West; but increasingly, he
suggests, they recognize that neither of these is going to be sufficient. As a
result, he projects, “in the near future, there will arise among the Georgian
leadership the necessity of revising its former stereotypes in thinking on
issues of its foreign policy preferences.”

Papava argues that “while preserving partnership
relations with Western countries, Georgia should deepen its cooperation with
those regional states that have a great deal of experience in opposing
terrorist groups. In the first instance, these are the Russian Federation and
the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Given that Georgia has virtually no security
ties with Tehran, that means, he implies, the only choice is to turn to Russia (Kavpolit.com, July 1)—something Moscow would very much like.

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