Monday, October 26, 2015

The agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, which
Tehran reached with the P5+1 powers (the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, China, Russia and Germany) on July 14, has provided new perspectives for
Iran’s wider engagement in the South Caucasus—especially with Armenia, the only
state in the region that actively promotes a close partnership with the Islamic
Republic.

In August 2015, Iran and Armenia had already
signed an agreement on the construction of the third high-voltage electricity
transmission line connecting the two countries. This new planned electricity
link will cost an estimated $120 million (Azatutyun.am, August 13). The Iranian
nuclear agreement and the promised gradual lifting of sanctions apparently
increased mutual interest in maintaining a more active political dialogue and
reinforcing economic cooperation between Iran and Armenia. These issues were
discussed during last month’s (September 17) meeting between Armenian Ambassador
to Tehran Artashes Tumanyan and Iranian Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh (Armenpress.am, September 18). The energy aspect of
bilateral relations was discussed on October 3–5, when the Armenian delegation,
headed by Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Ervand Zakharyan, visited
Iran and held talks with the co-chair of the Armenian-Iranian Intergovernmental
Commission, Hamid Chitchian, Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zangane, and the
chairman of Iran’s Export Development Bank, Ali Salehabadi (Minenergy.am, October
5).

The next and, in fact, the most important recent event
(after the nuclear deal) for bilateral Iranian-Armenian relations was the
official visit to Yerevan of the First Vice President of Iran Eshaq Jahangiri (October
14–15). After Iranian then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit in 2011, this
is the highest-level visit to Armenia by an Iranian official. At the airport, Jahangiri
was welcomed by Armenian Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan, along with the ministers
of energy and natural resources, culture, and transport and communications, as
well as the deputy minister of foreign affairs. Clearly, the Armenian
authorities attached great importance to this official visit and expect positive
developments in bilateral relations (Armenpress.am, October 14).

On October 15, Jahangiri and Abrahamyan took part
in the Armenia-Iran Business Forum, which was attended by nearly 300 Armenian
and 80 Iranian businessmen. Commenting on the importance of boosting trade
relations, the Iranian vice president stated that “it is important for us to
sign a number of memorandums of understanding, including a preferential tariff
agreement” (Gov.am, October 15). As to Armenia’s transit role in Iran’s foreign
policy, he underlined that “Armenia is the only country to provide a gateway
for exporting Iranian goods toward the Eurasian Economic Union. Besides,
Armenia has an important role to play as a transit zone. We have the North–South
Transport Corridor; we should settle the railroad issue, which is of regional
significance”. Vice Presdent Jahangiri also held meetings with Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan and the president of the Armenian National Assembly (parliament),
Galust Sahakyan.

Certainly, the realization of joint economic plans
highly depends on completing large-scale transport projects to more fully
connect the two states. The North–South Road Corridor is already under
construction; but the Iran-Armenia railway project faces financial challenges. In
his interview to Azatutyun, Iranian
Minister of Transport Abbas Ahmad Akhoundi said that Iran is ready to start the
construction of the Iranian part of the railroad as soon as Armenia covers at
least one third of the estimated cost of $3 billion for this project (Azatutyun.am, October
15). Indeed, the railway may have regional and even interregional importance;
therefore, Armenia aims to attract large investments from abroad. Back in June
2015, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) had
expressed interest in this project. During the Armenian prime minister’s recent
visit to China (in September), the issue of the possible engagement of Chinese
companies was discussed with the premier of China’s State Council, Li Keqiang,
and the chairman of the CCECC, Wu Wanliang (Panarmenian.net, September 22).

So far, no practical agreement has been reached on
the Iran-Armenia railway project. Yet, following the breakthrough of the
Iranian nuclear program accord, the chances of realizing this project have
increased, at least in the political realm. Thus, the appeal of large-scale investments
in bilateral projects will continue to grow over the coming months for both
Armenia and Iran.

Monday, October 19, 2015

The victims of almost 50 years of
Soviet occupation themselves, Estonians are now preparing to help the Crimean
Tatars, who have again come under Russian occupation. At a press conference in
Kyiv, Mart Nutt, a member of the Estonian parliament, and Oliver Loode, the
Estonian vice president of the United Nations forum on indigenous peoples,
outline what they hope to do in cooperation with Mustafa Cemilev, the longtime
leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement, Serhi Kostinsky, a Verkhovna
Rada deputy who oversees television and radio policy, and the project’s Crimean
Tatar producer Emine Dzheppar (Qha.com.ua,
October 6).

The Estonians, Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars said that the project was being launched because the international
community is too little informed about the problems of the Crimean Tatars under
occupation and is not focused on the important reality that the Crimean Tatars
are the indigenous population of the Ukrainian peninsula, a status which under
international law gives them certain exclusive rights. They added that the
three sides had agreed over the course of the next several months to develop a
media strategy, one that will involve both several members of the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis (de facto representative body of the Crimean Tatars), representatives of
the media, and Estonian experts.

Emine
Dzheppar said that “the goal of this group is the formulation of a strategy on
the basis of which the project will be carried out over the next two years, one
that will become a so-called road map for its realization.” The project will
organize photographic exhibits in various countries around the world and at the
United Nations. In addition, it will produce video materials, including both
films and clips, about key problems that the Crimean Tatars now face.

The
Estonians have one key advantage over the Crimean Tatars, and it may prove to
be something from which the Crimean Tatars can profit from. Estonia was an
independent state at the time of the beginning of the Soviet occupation, and
the West, led by the United States, came up with its non-recognition policy
based on the Stimson Doctrine that the international community cannot recognize
any border changes achieved by force alone. As a result, the Estonians, like
their two Baltic neighbors, have insisted that their states continued de jure
throughout the occupation and that in 1991, they recovered their independence
de facto rather than creating new states.

Unfortunately,
the international community has not articulated the same policy with regard to
Russian-occupied Crimea. While Western governments have said they will not end
sanctions until Russia gives Crimea back, the reality is that at some point the
sanctions regime will be lifted and Crimea will not have any legal support.
Western non-recognition policy by articulating a principle allowed for
variations in Western relations with Moscow but did not allow for any change
concerning the West’s view of the continuing legal status of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania.

It is
extremely likely that the Estonian involvement in this joint project will lead
the Crimean Tatars to appreciate the importance of a Western declaration of
non-recognition of the Russian occupation of Crimea and press their friends and
supporters to take a step equal in its legal standing to the 1940 declaration
by Sumner Welles. If that happens, this small joint project will have a
profound impact on international relations for years to come.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Last week, on the sidelines of the 70th annual
session of the United Nations General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov met with his Estonian counterpart, Marina Kaljurand, at her request.
Among other topics, the two discussed the outlook for Russia and Estonia
reaching a political settlement on a border dispute that has persisted since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has,
thus far, been unable to settle an official border agreement with Russia since
gaining its independence in 1991.

During their meeting, Kaljurand told Lavrov that the
Estonian Parliament is prepared to review and ratify an agreement officially
recognizing the borders that has de factobeen used since Estonian independence. Lavrov, in turn, said that the
Russian State Duma is prepared to consider the agreement for ratification (Postimees.ee,
September 28). The resolution of this border dispute would no doubt be welcomed
by Estonians, who, like the citizens of many of Russia’s neighboring states,
have been anxious about preserving their territorial integrity since Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 (see Jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com,
February 26).

However, what are the chances that this dispute will be
resolved in the near future? While Estonia may be keen on formalizing its
borders with Russia vis-à-vis a bilateral agreement, Estonia’s other efforts to
secure its borders could actually serve as an excuse for Moscow to stymie this
process.

In late August, Estonia announced a plan to completely seal
off its land border with Russia using fencing, high-tech surveillance systems
and aerial drones (Kommersant,
September 1). This project, estimated to cost €71 million ($80 million) and set
to begin construction in 2018 (Vz.ru, August 25), has
largely been interpreted as a response to the fear of Russian incursions into
Estonian territory. Estonians’ territorial insecurities were accentuated last
year by the highly publicized case of Estonian security officer Eston Kohver.
According to Estonian officials, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)
abducted Kohver on September 5, 2014, while on Estonian territory, and
imprisoned him in Russia on false charges. Kohver was convicted of espionage in
early September 2015, and Estonian officials were able to secure his return
home in a spy swap with the Russians by the end of the month.

Russian officials have been vocal in their responses to
Estonia’s announced border strengthening plan. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
released a statement labeling Estonia’s plan as “politicized” and declared that
unilateral action to enforce the border between Estonia and Russia is legally
unfounded, as Russia and Estonia have yet to ratify an agreement defining their
shared border (Kommersant, September 1). Meanwhile, Irina
Yarovaya, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for Security and
Anti-Corruption, has mocked the plan, stating that it looked as though Estonia
was trying to build an “Indian reservation” for its citizens (Gazeta.ru,
August 25).

Of most concern, however, are comments by Alexei Pushkov, the
head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs. Pushkov claimed that
poor bilateral relations with Estonia, undoubtedly shaken by Estonia’s
announced plan to fence off its border with Russia, promise to slow the Russian
ratification process of any border agreement (Vz.ru, September 1).
In an effort to quell the Russian reaction, Estonian Foreign Minister Marina
Kaljurand gave a statement emphasizing that the Estonian government is only
discussing possible future options for securing its border (Kommersant, September 6).

The effectiveness of Estonian efforts to assuage Russian
officials’ stated anxiety about Estonia’s proposed border security plan will be
seen when the Russian Duma formally discusses the ratification of the proposed
border agreement. Although Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that the Duma is
prepared do discuss and ratify the agreement, Pushkov’s statements raise doubts
concerning the likelihood of this happening.

Beyond poor bilateral relations, it is conceivable that
Russian officials may not view ratifying a border agreement with Estonia as in
their strategic interest. Estonia is not the only EU member state with concerns
about its border with Russia. Latvian officials have echoed their Estonian
neighbors, saying that Latvia may also need to consider erecting a fence along
its shared border with Russia (Baltic Course,
August 28); and Finland’s Defense MinisterJussi Niinistö has publicly considered
laying new landmines along the Finnish-Russian frontier (EER,
September 3).

Whether or not these
statements result in concrete actions, they are obviously an expression of the
tense security situation across the region. Meanwhile, judging by their vocal
criticism, Russian officials may fear that Russia will be unable to easily defeat
these increased security measures taken by all of the countries on its border.
Therefore it is entirely probable that Moscow will view not ratifying a border
agreement with Estonia as strategically advantageous: giving it the grounds to
further oppose Estonian border reinforcements and maintaining a legal gray area
in which Russia prefers to operate.

About The Jamestown Foundation

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism.