Judge dismisses vendor motion

A St. Johns County judge recently upheld a city of St. Augustine ordinance prohibiting vendors on a particular section of St. George Street after a vendor filed a motion to challenge the ordinance.

Jane Marjory Cole, 70, filed the motion on grounds that the city's street vendor ordinance is vague and that another ordinance, which covers not only vendors but street performers, superseded it because it was more specific. The vendor law is separate from the street performer law.

The St. Augustine Police Department has issued a statement stating they would begin to re-emphasize enforcement of the vendor ordinance, created under city code 22-6 and which basically prohibits vendors from Orange Street to Cathedral Place.

On March 25, St. Augustine Police officer Barry Fox cited Cole for violating the ordinance by selling prints of paintings near 95 St. George St. Cole was allegedly warned five times before being cited.

Cole's attorney, Thomas Cushman, wrote in the motion challenging the ordinance that it does not define the terms ''goods, wares, merchandise, food stuffs, refreshments, or other kinds of property or services.''

Cushman also said the street performer ordinance -- which has not been enforced since Oct. 6 because of a court order -- supersedes the vendor ordinance. The street performer ordinance, created under section 22-9 of the city code, had outlawed the sale of ''visual art.''

''In this case, the specific inclusion in section 22-9 of artwork and drawings is clearly intended to take precedence over section 22-6, prohibiting the sale of general merchandise, goods, wares, etc.,'' Cushman wrote.

In the court ruling, County Court Judge Charles Tinlin said the vendor ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because ''it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.''

Tinlin further cited in his ruling that the street performer ordinance did not take precedence over the vendor ordinance because there was no ''hopeless inconsistency between the two statutes.''

''There is a presumption that laws are passed with knowledge of all prior laws already on the books,'' Tinlin wrote. ''Courts have a duty to adopt a scheme of statutory construction which harmonizes and reconciles two statutes and find a reasonable field of operation that will preserve the force and effect of each.''