Did America Abandon Vietnam War P.O.W.'s? Part 2

A closer look at an ugly issue

One such offer was apparently made in the early days of the Reagan
administration in 1981. A Treasury Department agent, John Syphrit, was on
Secret Service duty then in the White House, where he overheard a conversation
about a proposal from Hanoi to turn over a number of live POWs for $4 billion.
Four people were involved in that conversation  President Reagan, Vice
President Bush, C.I.A. director William Casey, and national security adviser
Richard Allen.

Details

Reportedly, they had just emerged, with others, from a meeting on national
security issues in the Oval Office, where the ransom offer had apparently come
up, and the four stepped across the hall into the Roosevelt Room to discuss it
further. Syphrit and a colleague were in the room, installing some technical
equipment. They could hear the ensuing discussion.

Apparently, the president and his men believed the Hanoi offer to be genuine. It
was reportedly conveyed by the North Vietnamese through a Canadian diplomat.
Several of Reagan's advisers opposed the idea of paying for prisoners, calling it
blackmail. Casey was holding some kind of message in his hand and referring to
it as he spoke, asking for instructions on how to proceed. He was cool to the
offer. Bush called it a "lost cause." Allen, however, urged that it be pursued.
Reagan then told Casey and Allen to look into it further.

It seems the nay-sayers prevailed, because no evidence has ever surfaced that
the offer was seriously explored.

Syphrit, however, was a veteran of the Vietnam War. He could not rest holding a
secret that could shatter the claim made by both Hanoi and Washington  that all
the prisoners were returned in 1973. So he told Senator Smith, and in 1992 the
Senate POW committee contacted him.

Testimony thwarted

Syphrit, no longer a Secret Service agent but still working for the Treasury
Department in another capacity, told them he was willing to testify. He said,
though, that the committee would have to subpoena him, because he feared
reprisal from Treasury if he came forward voluntarily. The subpoena was issued.
Immediately, the White House and Treasury began lobbying strenuously against
allowing Syphrit to testify, arguing that this would violate the trust between the
Secret Service and those it protects.

Twice Syphrit, now stationed in Chicago, traveled to Washington, expecting to
appear. And twice the committee put him off, still undecided as to what to do.
Finally, a vote was set on whether to call him to testify. It was seven to four 
against. Once again the committee had decided to sweep crucial information
under its rug.

But the committee did take testimony from one of the participants in the ransom
discussion witnessed by Syphrit. It was Richard Allen, national security adviser.

Closed-door testimony

In lengthy, closed-door testimony under oath to committee investigators on June
23, 1992, he generally confirmed Hanoi's 1981 offer, but he seemed hesitant
about giving details. His testimony has never been released, but San Diego
Union-Tribune reporter Robert Caldwell obtained the section relating to the offer
and wrote about it.

Allen was asked by a committee staffer, "Soon after taking office, did the Reagan
administration become involved in an offer made by the Vietnamese government
for the return of live prisoners of war, if you can recall?"

He responded, "This $4 billion figure sticks in my mind, and I remember writing
something  I don't know whether it was during a meeting with the president or to
him  saying that it would be worth the president's going along and let's have the
negotiation..."

Then Allen was asked, "Do you recall whether the $4 billion was for live American
prisoners? To which he replied, "Yes, I do if it was $4 billion, it was indeed for live
prisoners." (Some sources say the number of men was 56 or 57).

Believed POWs held

Allen told the committee that, based on "waves of information," both he and
Reagan believed in 1981 that American servicemen were still being held in
Indochina. Asked how many he believed were there, he said, "Dozens,
hundreds."

Unfortunately and mysteriously, nearly a month after giving his deposition  and
two weeks after his testimony confirming the ransom offer had been revealed in
The Washington Times  Allen wrote a strange letter to the committee, recanting
what he had said about the 1981 offer. This retraction, however, unlike his
testimony, was not given under oath. In the letter, he said his memory had played
tricks on him. Yes, he had heard something about such an offer, but it had come
years later from POW activists, who asked him about it at a meeting with him in
1986, when he was no longer in government. "It appears there never was a 1981
meeting about the return of POW/MIAs for $4 billion," he wrote.

The committee, in its final report, echoed Allen's recantation, saying that the
inquiry into the Syphrit matter "failed to disclose any evidence of this offer." In
fact, it went further and said that it found "no convincing evidence" that Vietnam
or Laos had ever offered, in 1981 or at any time, live prisoners for money. This
was rather surprising in view of the statement made at a committee hearing by its
vice-chairman, Senator Smith, a dissenter who had fought hard for a more
aggressive investigation. Smith said that the committee had received "information
that, on at least four occasions, the Vietnamese reportedly indicated to the United
States, through third parties and third countries, that there were live American
servicemen in Vietnam and Laos who could be returned through negotiations with
the United States."