The seven chapters are titled as follows:
1. Key summary data on Soviet and German-fascist (sic) aviation. [Data on the Luftwaffe comes from Soviet military intelligence, whcih gives an interesting perspective].
2. Orders of battle of Soviet and German-fascist aviation.
3. Soviet aircraft inventory by type.
4. Delivery of aerial technical means (i.e. aircraft, engines and armament) to the VVS and their specifications.
5. Personnel training.
6. Combat summary.
7. The work of support services.

Many thanks to Yury Minkevich (who entered all the data into Excel by hand!) and Pyotr Andriyanov for their hard work.

There is a great amount of very interesting information in this digest, so it's definitely worth a look. It's in Russian, but if peopel are interested I could translate it into English.

Non-operational planes and overhauled ones no way could bring the number to 506. Perhaps trainer and such are counted in?

Rest of the FinnAF numbers in the table above seem more realistic EDIT Actually not. The number 100 given for both june 1st 1943 and june 1st 1944 looks like arbitrary one. In no period did the FinnAF aircraft park fluctuate so that the would be almost three times more planes in january than there was in june!

I cannot understand where the value of 506 airplanes for Finland (at Jun 22th, 1941) is pulled from.

Rest of the FinnAF numbers in the table above seem more realistic EDIT Actually not. The number 100 given for both june 1st 1943 and june 1st 1944 looks like arbitrary one. In no period did the FinnAF aircraft park fluctuate so that the would be almost three times more planes in january than there was in june!

Cheers,
Kari

Hello!
The source of most of the data is quoted as an item in the "special archive of the general staff", published in 1946 [Спецархив ГШ ВС, инв.№ 3570, с.5. «Германская армия во второй мировой войне (в цифрах)», М., Воениздат, 1946, с.39, 67-81]. To me, this indicates that this is the wartime assessment of the military intelligence directorate of the general staff (GRU GSh), most likely based on conjecture. You'll notice that most of the data on Axis forces is seriously flawed at best, so it's usefulness is in providing a glimpse into Soviet asessments, rather than the state of the Axis air forces.

Hello!
The source of most of the data is quoted as an item in the "special archive of the general staff", published in 1946 [Спецархив ГШ ВС, инв.№ 3570, с.5. «Германская армия во второй мировой войне (в цифрах)», М., Воениздат, 1946, с.39, 67-81]. To me, this indicates that this is the wartime assessment of the military intelligence directorate of the general staff (GRU GSh), most likely based on conjecture. You'll notice that most of the data on Axis forces is seriously flawed at best, so it's usefulness is in providing a glimpse into Soviet asessments, rather than the state of the Axis air forces.

Yours sincerely,

Jack Sanders

Hello!

Yes I noticed it is Soviet intelligence data. I was somehow in the belief that Soviets could spy everything they needed during the interim peace between Winter War (30.11.39-13.3.40) and Continuation War (25.6.41-5.9.44). Seems this was not the case after all.

That is just... ... ... what I searched for the last 2.5 years or so.
Thank you so much also from me to these two guys
- Yury Minkevich (who entered all the data into Excel by hand!) and
- Pyotr Andriyanov for their hard work and also you,
- Jack for sharing the link .
I personally don't need it to be translated, but a big part of the community would be much better informed I guess. Would help to get a lot of discussions on a more fact-based ground.
PS: This is the first time I use this yellow smiley...

Hello Jörg,
It is always good to read that one's posts are appreciated . I will get on with the translation ASAP, although I have not decided yet how to format it.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kari Lumppio

Hello!
Yes I noticed it is Soviet intelligence data. I was somehow in the belief that Soviets could spy everything they needed during the interim peace between Winter War (30.11.39-13.3.40) and Continuation War (25.6.41-5.9.44). Seems this was not the case after all.
A very good link still. Thanks again.
Kari

Hello Kari,
If you look more into this, you will find that the WW2-era GRU was a rather incompetent organisation which was over-reliant on espionage rather than reconnaisance. Therefore, in a country like Finland, where it was difficult to recruit high-quality agents, most of the GRU's assessments were pure guesswork.