"Agency" means each state or county
board, commission, department, or officer authorized by law to make rules or to
adjudicate contested cases, except those in the legislative or judicial
branches.

"Agency hearing" refers only to such
hearing held by an agency immediately prior to a judicial review of a contested
case as provided in section 91-14.

"Contested case" means a proceeding
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing.

"Party" means each person named or
admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be
admitted as a party, in any court or agency proceeding.

"Persons" includes individuals,
partnerships, corporations, associations, agencies, or public or private
organizations.

"Rule" means each agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect that implements,
interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of any agency. The term does not include
regulations concerning only the internal management of an agency and not
affecting private rights of or procedures available to the public, nor does the
term include declaratory rulings issued pursuant to section 91-8, nor
intra-agency memoranda. [L 1961, c 103, §1; Supp, §6C-1; HRS §91-1; am L 2017,
c 110, §1]

County of Hawai`i department of finance was an
"agency" within the meaning of chapter 91, and was not a
"person" entitled to appeal under §91-14 (prior to 1993 amendment).
77 H. 396 (App.), 885 P.2d 1137.

Hearing before zoning board of appeals was properly
denominated as the "agency hearing", as contemplated by the
definition of "contested case" in paragraph (5), where appellant
temple was permitted to introduce relevant evidence and cross-examine
witnesses. 87 H. 217, 953 P.2d 1315.

Where a hearing on a petition for a declaratory order before
the public utilities commission was discretionary and not required by law, the
dismissal order was not a contested case under paragraph (5); therefore, as a
direct appeal to the intermediate appellate court (ICA) under §91-14(b) and
§269-15.5 only applied to contested cases, appellant power company was not
entitled to appeal the dismissal order directly to the ICA; thus, the ICA
lacked jurisdiction over appellant's appeal. 126 H. 242 (App.), 269 P.3d 777.

Contested case.

Generally. 55 H. 538, 524 P.2d 84.

A hearing "required by law" includes those required
by due process. 55 H. 478, 522 P.2d 1255.

Granting of special management area permit did not involve a
"contested case". 69 H. 81, 734 P.2d 161.

Because the subject matter of the underlying hearing did not
involve the homestead lessees' property interests, the Hawaiian homes
commission hearing that transpired was not required by law and therefore was
not a contested case as defined by paragraph (5). 76 H. 128, 870 P.2d 1272.

In the context of parole hearings, the Hawaii paroling
authority does not "adjudicate contested cases" because a Hawaii paroling authority parole proceeding is not a "contested case" as defined
under this chapter. 93 H. 298 (App.), 1 P.3d 768.

Rules.

Generally. 55 H. 538, 524 P.2d 84.

Defendant's approval of use of wood preservative for treating
structural lumber in Hawaii, together with defendant's conditions of approval,
would appear to be rulemaking. 939 F. Supp. 746.

Contract in which board of land and natural resources rented
excess transmission capacity in Molokai Irrigation System is not a rule.
Concerned only internal management because it dealt with a matter within the
custodial management of the board. 62 H. 546, 617 P.2d 1208.

Circular was sent only to other state agencies and did not
command or prohibit any action by any member of the public or any public
employee; by the clear language of paragraph (4), therefore, Hawaii
administrative procedure act did not apply, and conclusion of law stating that
circular was not a rule or regulation, but was merely a guideline and was not
subject to provisions of Hawaii administrative procedure act was not wrong. 76
H. 332, 876 P.2d 1300.

Water resource management commission's distinctive treatment
of "nonagricultural uses", such as golf course irrigation, in its
water use permit and policy decision did not constitute "illegal
rulemaking" where commission did not propose any general rules automatically
applicable in all circumstances, but instead devised a principled solution to a
specific dispute based on "facts applied to rules that have already been
promulgated by the legislature". 94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

Planning and permitting department's policy of refusing to
publicly disclose developer's engineering reports prior to their approval
constituted a "rule"; as this policy was not "published or made
available for public inspection" nor did plaintiff have actual knowledge
of the policy prior to its initial request for the reports, department did not
comply with this chapter and was proscribed from invoking this policy; thus,
department violated this chapter by refusing to publicly disclose any
unaccepted engineering reports and written comments, and all of its files,
including developer's file, were public records that could be examined upon
request. 119 H. 90, 194 P.3d 531.

Agency's decision not a "rule" where it was made in
a contested hearing that was accusatory in nature; distinction between rulemaking
and adjudication discussed. 4 H. App. 463, 667 P.2d 850.

Where Kauai police department's general order establishing
authority and procedures at sobriety checkpoints concerned only the internal
management of an agency and did not affect the private rights of or procedures
available to the public, the general order was not required to be promulgated
pursuant to this chapter. 111 H. 59 (App.), 137 P.3d 373.