Analysis of the Results of
a Questionnaire on Corruption in the Regime's Apparatus, State
Institutions, and People's Organizations in Libya, 2006

Jointly by Departments of Research and Studies of Organization for
Transparency Libya, Libya Human and Political Development Forum,
March. 2007

* Republished for study and transperency reasons
- December 2013

Naturally there are a variety
of definitions for corruption, all of which agree that it consists
of a breach in the law and order, by either misusing their absence,
or, lacking of commitment to them, with the purpose of gaining some
personal or group interests in political, economic, or social
fields. It is also rational to view the phenomenon of corruption as
a behavior that violates the official duties of a public office
with the purpose of achieving personal (material or moral) gains.
Therefore, in this report, corruption is dealt with as an illegal
act as defined by Transparency International: "Any act that
involves abuse of a public office with the purpose of gaining some
personal interest for the abuser or his/her group." Corruption may
sometimes cause damage (material or moral) to public interest.
Furthermore, it is an immoral and non-patriotic act.

The overall concept of managerial and financial corruption
encompasses all illegal acts that may violate the state laws and
regulations. They include all acts that sustain the purpose of
achieving personal gains to the detriment of public interest. Some
examples include the misuse of public property, the acceptance of
bribes, gifts, or grant, regard of favoritism or nepotism, and
disregard of competence and equal opportunities, in employing as
well as the embezzlement of millions in the form of commissions,
deals, contracts, and large financial agreements.

First, a note should be made of the extreme difficulty we faced in
observing events to reach the facts and positions hidden behind
them, not to mention acquiring documented statistics from Libyan
official sources. Based on our complete conviction that the right
to know and the right to have access to information are among the
basic rights guaranteed by all international pacts and charters, we
have designed a questionnaire on corruption in Libya with the
intention to publish our results on our sites and via all means of
electronic dissemination. The World Proclamation of Human Rights
and the International Pact on civil and political rights (Article
19 of both the Proclamation and the Pact), emphasize these rights.
Because freedom of opinion and the right to have access to
information and to publish them are interrelated, our questionnaire
was the best ‘available’ alternative. It should be admitted that
the electronic questionnaire cannot be equal to a scientific
questionnaire with all its requirements. Nonetheless, we found it
to be sufficient for us to complete our report, with some extent of
objectivity, based on documented statistics, numbers, and
analyses.

The Libyan authorities ' policies have always consisted of imposing
absolute control of information, especially the various forms of
media. For the past three decades, the media has been characterized
by a total lack of independence, competence and transparency,
completely absent of what we may call 'free press.' It is true that
a number of websites have appeared inside Libya and timidly
revealed some aspects of corruption. Yet, despite the fact that
Libya has the professional efficacies needed to handle these issues
with a great deal of courage and investigational spirit, these
websites seem to have been serving some private agendas. Moreover,
the lack of any legal guarantees makes the opening of certain files
seem like some sort of insanity. In view of all these aspects, the
initiative to design and disseminate this questionnaire seems like
a rational and practical procedure. The questionnaire has been
designed in a manner that suits the purpose and nature of the data
needed. The facility of data entry and electronic preparation has
also been taken into consideration.

The questionnaire has been
disseminated via email. Then, it was published on the main pages of
www.transparency-libya.com , www.libyaforum.org ,
www.akhbar-libya.com , www.justice4libya.com and other Libyan
websites have also published the link to participate in the
questionnaire for various periods of time.

The initial reading, which
encompassed 500 respondents, included the following basic
information about the respondents: sex, age, social status, number
of family members, residency region, educational level, and
profession/craft.

The results of the personal
information came as follows:

As expected, men's participation
was 90.02 percent; women. 9.98 percent, less than the percentage
targeted.

The age category 36-43 had the
most respondents (37.40 percent); followed by the category 26-35
(35.6 percent); then came the category 46-55 (16.06 percent); then,
the category 16-25 (7.32 percent); and finally, the category above
55 years of age (0.7 percent).

Most of the respondents were
married (62.20 percent); then, singles (33.13 percent); then,
divorcees (3.25 percent); and finally the widowed (1.42
percent).

The greater part of the
respondents (43.94 percent) belonged to middle-size families (3-5
members); followed by (36.15 percent) of larger-size families (more
than 5 members); followed by (19.91 percent) of small-size families
(less than 5 members).

Within the Category of the
residency region, the greater proportion was from the western
region (50.52 percent); then the eastern region (32.51 percent);
then, the central region (11.18 percent), then, the southern region
(4.35 percent), then the oases region (4.35 percent).

The respondents' educational
level displayed a link between participation in the questionnaire
and access to computers and the Internet. So, the category of
educated persons came first and foremost. The proportion of those
with university degrees and higher was the highest (44.44 percent);
followed by those in higher education (38.27 percent); then those
with high school degrees (13.99 percent); then those with a
pre-high school education (3.92 percent).

The category of
profession/specialty/craft represented the structure of the Libyan
society. Public sector (or government) employees came first (43.12
percent); then private sector employees (23.48 percent); then
retirees and the unemployed (16.19 percent), which is close to the
unemployment rate in Libya; then foreign company employees (12.73
percent); then, students and trainees (3.64 percent); while
People's organizations' employees came last (0.81
percent).

The preliminary reading of the
results encompasses 500 respondents representing a 'random' sample
of Libyan citizens with access to the Internet. However, the
results were in proportion to the structure of the Libyan society,
except the rate of women compared to that of men, which we hoped to
be higher.

The questionnaire included
specific questions on the following aspects of
corruption:

The most widespread fields of
corruption in the state's and society's institutions;

The most corruption-practicing
elements of power;

The rate of increase or decrease
of corruption in various forms in various
institutions;

The criteria and norms by which
members of inspection committees, public control, financial and
bureaucratic accounting in the state's institutions, are
chosen;

The criteria and norms by which
heads and members of the committees assigned to revise and examine
the forms of transparency presented by the state's officials, are
chosen;

The role the institutions of the
state, government, and society play in exposing and combating
corruption;

The role the institutions of the
state, government, and society play in backing, protecting, or
cajoling the symbols of corruption;

The spread of corruption in the
state's institutions, public and private sectors, firms, people's
organizations, foreign companies, and international agencies
working in Libya;

The impact of the varied forms
of corruption on the government's efficacy in running the state's
and society's affairs, and on various economic, trade,
environmental, educational, cultural, intellectual, and social
activities;

How serious and capable the
ruling authorities are to combat corruption and put an end to the
mafias of corruption in the country;

The necessity to have a
wide-range alliance of civil society organizations to fight
corruption, expose the 'mafias' of corruption, and prosecuting them
with all possible means inside the country and abroad.

Results of
the Questionnaire on Corruption

The
Major Fields of Financial and Bureaucratic Corruption in
Libya:

The forms of corruption have
remarkably increased over the year 2006, especially after the
relative opening to the world abroad. Qaddafi was able to eliminate
the major issues with the West. As a result, Libya signed hundreds
of contracts and economic agreements with U.S., western, and
eastern companies in the fields of exploring, producing, and
marketing oil. Agreements have been held to reconstruct the country
in all aspects of public life, which meant billions needed to
remedy the chronic crises suffered by the country infrastructure.
This also resulted in thousands of businessmen and companies coming
to benefit from the newly-emerging investment opportunities. All
this made the opportunities of corruption grow faster. This remark
has been supported by the questionnaire's results.

Upon
asking the respondents: To what extent the rate of corruption of
all forms increased or decreased within the institution they work
at or deal with in 2006, the answer were as
follows:

45.03 percent responded
that the rate of corruption increased to a great
extent;

26.64 percent responded
that they had no chance to determine;

18.18 percent responded
that the rate of corruption increased to some
extent;

8.46 percent responded
that the rate of corruption decreased to some
extent;

1.69 percent responded
that the rate of corruption decreased to a great
extent.

The
questionnaire concluded that the areas of corruption in Libya,
especially in 2006, vary and spread in convergent rates. This
proves that corruption of all forms spread unchecked in the state's
institutions and in society in the following
order:

Direct and indirect
stealing and embezzlement of public money (11.68
percent);

Nepotism and favoritism
in employment with no regard to competence and equal opportunities
(11.28 percent);

On revising the most widespread
and effective cycles of corruption in state's institutions and in
society, these may be rearranged as follows:

1.
Stealing Oil Revenues

Oil revenues
and the state's destinies in general have long been deemed lawful
to steal by the ruling elite, including members of the Leader's
family, close friends, and the politically, Revolutionary,
economically, and tribally influential figures. This is a fertile
field of corruption that can hardly be estimated or confined. There
is no way for any observer of this phenomenon to determine the
amounts of money being stolen by Colonel Qaddafi, nor the
properties and money at the disposal of his sons and daughters
(including Hanaa, the adopted one), nor the areas of land the
Colonel's wife, Safiyya Firkash, has been well-known to have
seized. Some of the information that leaks here and there about
this ruling dynasty's manipulation of the state's fate may
represent only the tip of the iceberg whose depth and size can
hardly be measured. This extends to include all close associates of
tribesmen, military and security elite, People's Committees'
leaderships, and local investment companies.

On
surveying opinions about the most corrupt elements in power (where
respondents can choose more than one option), the results came as
follows:

This means
laying hands on the state's institutions' allocations and acting
freely with them under various names. Despite all that is being
claimed about standing up against the "Fat Cats", i.e., the symbols
of corruption in Libya, the influential figures in Libyan
government institutions (ministries of the People's Committees,
secretariats of the People's Congresses, heads of government
projects, army officers, etc) still carry on abusing offices and
public positions to gain personal privileges (cars, telephones,
tremendous amounts of illegal money, contracts, agencies,
commissions, etc), especially when it comes to infrastructure
projects.

Means of public
money pillage vary, each according to their position, courage,
connections, and the institutions they run or work at. This
includes, for example, the ministers and executives who use for
personal and family purposes the cars allocated to the ministries
or the projects they run. Others tamper with the 'odds and ends',
which are usually settled by forged bills. As a result, the
original value of a bill is paid in double by the public budget,
and the settlement goes to the executive or one of his aids.
Tremendous amounts of money are distributed to the influential
figures in form of training courses and or duties abroad. The
higher the office, the more costly the benefits are. Thus, training
courses and duties abroad represent a major field of pillage with
almost no avail to the public authority being
pillaged.

Among the major
results of the Questionnaire was that the various practices of
corruption have prevailed in all apparatus of the regime and
institutions of the state. The distribution of opinions seems
convergent among most institutions so that the differences display
no major statistical significant difference. The distinction of
various institutions in regards to the prevalence of corruption was
displayed in the following question:

Suppose
you learned in a direct or an indirect way, or from some trustful
source, or forced to practice any of the forms of corruption listed
above, at which apparatus, institution, or organization, did this
occur? The answer was as follows:

1- People's Committees:
Public People's Committees, the municipal People's Committees, and
the rest of the People's Committees (7.09
percent);

Although the difference among various
institutions is null, the order of institutions as far as
corruption is concerned came out similar to what any observer of
financial and bureaucratic corruption in Libya might notice. The
People's Committees, the Revolutionary Committees, security
apparatus, public companies, and government enterprises came first,
while the institutions of the private sector, public organizations,
and media institutions came last.

Although companies and private
sector institutions come last as far as corruption is concerned,
this does not mean that corruption is totally nonexistent. No doubt
business relations between some employees and their partners or
producers in foreign countries use illegal means to provide
services to foreign companies, gain privileges and monopolies at
the local market, or sell bad goods inside Libya.

The rate that came against all
expectations was at the apparatus controlled by the leadership and
the institutions and companies owned by Qaddafi's sons. The reason
for this may lie in the fact that these institutions being
unavailable to deal with common citizens. Rather, they deal
exclusively with big state officials and major companies executing
gigantic projects in the country. Moreover, corruption on this
level – of sons and aids – is not to be measured only by quantity,
but also by quality. A single commission to sign up a project
contract worth tens of millions surely equals tens or even hundreds
of bribes acquired by minor employees in state
institutions.

3. Bribes and
Commissions

These include acquiring cash or any
other benefits in return for executing or abstaining from executing
an act that violates regulations. Bribery has recently become
widespread in all transactions of citizens with the state
institutions, and in all bureaucratic transactions between public
and private sector institutions, most notably tax and custom
exemptions, business or construction contracts, licenses to
unqualified persons or companies in return for cash. This denies
the public treasury some of its major resources. Bribes sometimes
come in the form of extortion through which some public officials
acquire money from some party in return for a favor or an interest
related to the person who practices corruption.

4. Nepotism and
Favoritism

This includes any kind of
intervention on the part of a public employee or authority to the
advantage of an individual or a group of people that goes against
the regulations. Nepotism gets clearer in appointing someone to a
position for reasons based on kinship or tribal affiliation and
despite incompetence, disqualification, or lack of eligibility.
These also apply to an official who gives away certain material
benefits on family or tribal bases, with disregard to the
ineligibility that exists. For example, when a small technician or
engineer becomes a secretary of a Public People's Committee of a
multi-million-dollar-budget institution by nepotism, such a
secretary is often ready to practice all types of financial,
bureaucratic, and moral pillage and corruption.

Favoritism extends to include favors
to the advantage of some individual or some authority to which one
belongs, like the family, tribe, authority, region, etc, without
being eligible for it. The best example for this is probably what
happens in People's Committees when government tenders are
announced. Tenders usually are illegally given to specific
companies or partnerships with some connections with officials,
their family members, or tribes, via illegal deals between the
parties concerned and in absolute absence of integrity and
transparency. Sometimes tenders are given to specific companies
against the legal procedures required. Under this category also
there the kind of favoritism by which some particular authority
gets illegally favored to attain certain services.

By comparing the areas of
corruption, they could be combined in three major
types:

1. Theft, commissions,
bribes, and money laundry, with millions and tens of millions of
dollars being involved.

2. Nepotism and favoritism,
with thousands and tens of thousands of dollars being
involved.

3. Privileges and
exploitation of public resources, with thousands of dollars being
involved.

One may safely claim, as the diagram
shows, that the rates in all three types are convergent, which
emphasizes that the aspects of corruption may vary and cannot be
thoroughly listed. They vary according to the authority in
question, and to the interest being sought.

Corruption may be practiced by an
individual, a group of people, a private institution, an official,
or a non-government authority. It may seek some material benefit,
political gain, or social privilege. Corruption can be individually
practiced with a personal initiative and without coordination with
other individuals or authorities. It may also be practiced by a
group of people in an organized and coordinated way. The latter is
the most dangerous type of corruption, since it permeates in the
political, economic, and social structure of society.

However, a distinction should be
made between the material weights of various types of corruption.
Favoritism and nepotism are confined to thousands of dollars.
Acquiring privileges may cost the public budget tens of thousands;
while bribes, thefts, and money laundry practiced by major figures
of corruption may amount to millions, and even tens and hundreds of
millions of dollars.

All evidence indicates that
corruption is rampant in both state and society in Libya, and
includes minor and marginal types practiced by small public
servants. So, any transaction or bureaucratic procedure, no matter
how minor, requires a bribe for the top official of that authority,
and sometimes for a whole team of public servants, who coordinate
to facilitate the procedures of corruption.

It also includes major types of
corruption practiced by major officials on issues larger than daily
bureaucratic transactions, with the purpose of gaining privileges
much bigger than just a small bribe. This is to say that corruption
in Libya is rife horizontally, vertically, and in all
directions.

Factors of Aggravating
Corruption Phenomenon in Society

The major factors that led
to the aggravation of corruption in Libyan society during the year
in question were as follows:

1. Lack of real propensity
on the part of the political leadership to combat
corruption:

A recent project has been
announced recently by the regime requiring government officials to
fill forms called 'transparency declaration' with a deadline at the
end of December 2006, extended to March 2007. When asked about
whether the regime was serious in fighting corruption, the
respondents' answers came as follows:

- No, 78.06
percent;

- Yes, 7.10
percent;

- I don't know, 14.84
percent.

These results are concordant with
any minor revision of the Libyan regime's anti-corruption record.
Colonel Qaddafi never took serious precautionary procedures against
the elements of corruption. This reluctance is due to several
reasons. First of all, he has always employed the issue of
corruption to racketeer absolute loyalty to his own regime. Qaddafi
is known to have taken punitive procedures in several cases against
state officials for charges of financial corruption. In more than
one case, however, he allowed these same officials to come back to
higher and even more sensitive positions with bigger chances of
corruption. This inspired many that Colonel Qaddafi personally
manipulates symbols of corruption for a special agenda of his own
that gives top priority to their loyalty to his
regime.

It may be useful in this context to
point out how Libyan citizens received Qaddafi's speech on August
31, 2006, in which he attacked the Revolutionary leaderships
entangled in corruption, giving them a grace period to repent and
fill 'transparency declarations'. The citizens' response was
skeptical of the authority's seriousness in this regard. There were
many evidences that the 'transparency declaration' program was, to
a great extent, similar to the so-called 'Revolutionary Caravans'
or 'Purging Campaigns' launched late in 1996 by the Revolutionary
Committees through the steering of Colonel Qaddafi. Many wonder
about the difference between this procedure and any previous one in
the past.

The prevalent sense in intellectual
circles is that Colonel Qaddafi can launch a program to reform the
internal affairs and fight corruption within months. However he has
no intention to do anything to curb these ‘Fat Cats', simply
because of their loyalty to his person and because of the favors
they have done his regime.

On surveying public opinion about
this issue, the Questionnaire's results came to emphasize these
same convictions.

To the question: Do you
think the regime is capable – if they want – to fight corruption
and put an end to the mafias of corruption in both state and
society?

The respondents' opinions
came as follows:

- Yes, 54.70
percent;

- No, 35.47
percent;

- I don't know, 9.83
percent.

Then, the problem lies in the
political leadership's lack of will to fight corruption in the
country.

Regarding what is to be expected
from the 'transparency declaration' program, the following question
was asked: What result is to be expected from the 'transparency
declaration' program after the grace period, turning in the Forms,
and their revision?

The opinions came in the following
order:

- 22.04 percent, revealing
the identity of some individuals on television, just like previous
purge campaigns.

- 18.60 percent for
Qaddafi's announcement of a campaign against corruption during the
'General People's Congresses', but without any real procedures
against the corrupt.

- 18.11 percent for a
cabinet change to get rid of some elements as
scapegoats.

- 12.88 percent for closing
the door by exonerating everybody from the charge of
corruption.

-12.40 percent for delaying
the whole issue to a later time.

- 11.64 percent for
restoring some amounts of money from some figures of corruption in
return for amnesty.

- 4.34 percent for bringing
elements of corruption to transparent and integral justice without
interference on the part of the authorities.

One may conclude that the
'transparency declaration' program will end up, at best, reducing
the phenomenon of corruption by bringing a few scapegoats to
justice. Thus, closing the whole issue in preparation for another
round of manipulation in the future is in favor of the regime's
proper agenda.

Within the context of future
expectations under the 'best scenarios', the respondents were
asked: Suppose that the regime's purpose of this whole campaign was
achieved, what do you expect in regard to the spread of corruption
in state and society in the next years?

The answers came to reflect
pessimism and despair concerning the possibility to end corruption
in Libya:

- 36.27 percent for "no
change in regards to the spread of
corruption";

- 26.62 percent for "a
relative decrease in the spread of
corruption";

- 22.43 percent for "a
relative increase in the spread of
corruption";

- 14.68 percent for "I don't
know".

Among the other evidence that
reflects the leadership's reluctance to combat corruption in their
insistence to hold on to a number of figures at sensitive executive
positions for long periods of time. This takes place despite their
proven incompetence and being formerly indicted in
corruption-related lawsuits. The political leadership's connivance
of the corrupt even enabled these elements to permeate and widen
their overlapping interest connections.

Asked about the criteria by
virtue of which heads and members of the committees assigned to
check and revise the 'transparency declarations' filled by state
officials, the answers came as follows:

- 32.76 percent for
"Appointed by the 'Communication Bureau' of the Revolutionary
Committees";

- 30.71 percent for
"Personal interest with those in charge of each
institution";

- 27.14 percent for "Tribal,
family, and interest links".

The least rate of opinions
came for the norms of integrity, competence, and public nomination
at People's Conferences:

2. Impotent and Dependent
Apparatus of Control of the State and Civil Society
Organizations

Among the major defects of the
“People's Authority System is the lack of commitment to the
principle of balanced separation of powers, the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of power. In the Libyan
political system, there is a great overlapping among the three
powers. The power of 'Revolutionary Legitimacy' overwhelms all
powers, which causes some drawbacks to the principle of mutual
control. The impotence, lack of independence and integrity of the
judicial apparatus is one of the major factors of encouraging
corruption.

Asked about the criteria by which
secretaries and members of the inspection, public control,
bureaucratic and financial auditing committees in the state's
institutions, the answers came as follows

- 31.30 percent for
"recommendation and direct appointment by the Communication Bureau
of the Revolutionary Committees";

- 30.71 percent for "Tribal,
family and region kinship";

- 28.79 percent for
"Personal interest with those in charge of the
institution".

The results were not
surprising when the least percentage was given to "competence,
integrity, and profession". They also give no credit to the process
of public nomination at People's Congresses, which may be viewed as
an indictment of the entire experience of 'People's
Authority':

- 6.11 percent for "Public
nomination at People's Congresses"

- 3.10 percent for
"Competence, integrity, and profession".

It may be noted from the results
that the traditional links based on the tribe, clan, kinship, and
affinity play a major role in taking the top positions in executive
institutions, regardless of competence, integrity, and profession.
The Libyan society is a tribal one ruled by tribal and clan
kinships. Individuals always have strong motives to acquire gains
for the tribe or the clan, though this may be at the expense of the
law and the values of society. Some tribes even vehemently vie for
some vested rights in the municipalities to which they
belong.

Among the other defects of the
totalitarian revolutionary system in Libya, despite all allegations
and slogans, is the absence of any apparatus for bureaucratic or
financial surveillance and auditing. Chaos, inadvertence, and lack
of any control at all levels are the overwhelming characteristics
of the Libyan State's institutions, save security. In time, this
resulted in more chances for corruption, especially at the present
while the country undergoes major political, economic, and social
transformations.

Chaos and bureaucratic inadvertence,
which are direct results of the totalitarian revolutionary system,
curb the state's need to go on with the institutional construction
and the legal framework, which may provide the right milieu for
curbing the schemes of the corrupt. The opposite has happened.
Chaos and bureaucratic inadvertence prevalent in all state
institutions provided the proper environment for the corrupt, which
profited from the powerless control system in the
state.

The prevalent sense in
public circles is that corruption has broken out in state
institutions and society for two reasons:

1. The authorities, state
institutions and society's inability to expose and fight
corruption.

2. The authorities'
suspicious role in backing and protecting the
corrupt.

Both questions were raised to the
respondents in this questionnaire. Regarding the various
institutions' role in exposing and fighting corruption, the
respondents had the options to describe this role as 'positive',
'negative', 'neutral', or 'helpless'. The results came as
follows:

Institution

helpless

negative

neutral

positive

Justice, surveillance, security

49.05%

43.58%

4.63%

2.74%

Trade unions and leagues

52.78%

38.68%

6.84%

1.71%

Official media

47.97%

43.68%

5.35%

3.00%

The
results displayed how helpless and negative state institutions and
official media organizations are in exposing and combating
corruption. Civil society organizations, if found in the first
place, are always marginalized and besieged by the regime. However,
their results proved encouraging compared to those of the
authorities' instruments. The rate of helplessness in these civil
society organizations was relatively close to those in state
institutions. Yet, the rate of positive roles was relatively higher
in the following order: Libyan opposition abroad, private media,
and finally civil society organizations.

Organization

negative

neutral

positive

helpless

Private media

48.52%

29.84%

5.24%

16.40%

Civil society organizations

56.61%

25.77%

9.91%

7.71%

Libyan opposition Abroad

16.45%

2.38%

55.84%

25.32%

.

The
relatively higher rate of the positive role given to the Libyan
opposition abroad is distinguished from other tribunes because of
the efforts of some websites abroad to expose corruption practices
with documented and highly objective reports akhbar-libya.com and
transparency-libya.com had a greater role in this
respect.

Objectively
considering the results of the Questionnaire, under the current
circumstances, there is no chance to practice any kind of control.
The possibility to work on combating bureaucratic and financial
corruption, by any objective and neutral authority over the
performance of both public and private sectors is also not
plausible.

The negative
idea prevailing in public circles is that whoever tries to expose
corruption or stand up against its figures would be making
themselves susceptible to oppression and intimidation by the 'Fat
Cats' benefiting from the regime and the forces that back them with
support and protection.

3. Absence of Free Media and Lack of Access
to Public Information and Records

The Jamahiriya
system has totally marginalized the controlling role of the fourth
power, which has eventually turned into a propagandist tool for the
head of the regime. As private, independent press is absent, the
official press is not expected to expose violations and corruption.
Although some newspapers have published a few reports criticizing a
few aspects of corruption, such moves have always been counted
among the revolutionary liquidation of the so-called
"anti-Revolution reactionary forces".

The lack of
anti-corruption legislations that impose real penalties on those
involved and secures guarantees for media reporters against
persecution and oppression by the corrupt and figures of corruption
has contributed to a great extent to marginalizing the role of the
media.

4. Low Levels of Public Wages and
Services

The low
payments of public servants, who represent the majority of the
working force in Libya, in addition to the ever-increasing
standards of living, has created a proper environment for
corruption to thrive in both state and society. Thus, every
citizen's priority has become how to secure additional financial
resources by any means, including bribery.

Meanwhile, the
low-level (or complete absence) of public utilities and services
that naturally secure citizens' interests, by virtue of the rights
of citizenship, has forced citizens to seek illegal means of
competition to get their rights and interest. This environment has
encouraged the development of bribery, nepotism, and favoritism in
public sector institutions.

For example,
one of the means a public servant may use to obtain more income is
to keep at home the stamps and seals of his employer government
institution so that they may illegally use them in return for cash
commissions from those who may need them. Customers, company
agents, or store owners thus wind up with two options: either pay
large amounts of money in taxes, or bribe public servants for
getting the government authority's seal on official documents. Some
houses even turned into dens for forged documents, including tax
forms, contracts, deeds, official receipts, and many other forms of
illegal transactions.

Impacts of
Corruption

Corruption has
so many costly effects on all political, economic, social,
intellectual and educational aspects of life. The slogan we have
adopted on our website, transparencylibya.com, (shown below) may
show how comprehensive the impacts of corruption are in state and
society.

The major negative effects of corruption are
summarized in the following table, which was part of the
Questionnaire. Respondents have 3 choices: 'major effect', 'limited
effect', or 'no effect'. The results came as
follows:

Inability of
the economic system to stop the indigenous funds smuggled to
foreign countries or to attract foreign investments to the country.
Financial and bureaucratic corruption is inconsistent with free,
competitive environment, which is an essential precondition of
encouraging local and attracting foreign investments.

Lack of, or
weak, development projects yields an overall weak job opportunities
for the young working class and, meanwhile, exacerbates
unemployment and poverty.

Waste of public
resources because of the higher financial cost on public
treasury.

Drain of
scientific, academic, and technical brains, because of nepotism and
favoritism in public offices.

Frail
performance of government and political system.

b. Effects of Corruption on the performance
of government and political system

Financial and
Bureaucratic corruption has deep, negative effects over a
government and the political system as a whole, especially its
legitimacy, stability, and reputation. This is due to the fact
that:

Corruption
causes deficient democratic practice and disrespect of the basic
rights of citizens, notably the right to equal opportunities and
free access to information.

Corruption
causes paralysis to the system, especially when fatal political
decisions are needed on the basis of national interest rather than
of the private interest of the political leadership and the corrupt
junta.

Corruption
drags the system and society into fatal conflicts between certain
social groups when the private interests of those groups
collide.

Under
corruption, political hypocrisy thrives as a result of buying out
tribal and political loyalties.

Corruption
weakens public institutions as well as civil society
organizations.

Corruption
harms the political regime's reputation and foreign relations,
especially with the countries and companies that may want to invest
in national economy.

Finally,
corruption weakens political participation as a result of
distrustful public institutions and accountability
mechanisms.

c. Effects of Corruption on the Educational
and Social Aspects

Financial
corruption causes moral values to unfasten (moral corruption), and
leads citizens to frustration, carelessness, and negativity. In a
tribal community, it causes fanaticism and extremism against state
and social institutions. More dangerously, it causes individual as
well as organized crime to thrive in reaction to the collapse of
values and unequal opportunities among individuals.

d. Effects of Corruption on Profession and
the Values of Public Action

Corruption
leads to a lack of profession in duty fulfillment, loss of the
value of work, and regress of interest in the public
right.The sense of
injustice, inequity, and inequality of participation in the
national wealth by the majority of the individuals of society
results in social congestion, malevolence among classes, more
poverty, more deprived and marginalized categories, especially
women, children, youth, and those of special needs.

Is There Some Standardized Strategy Against
Corruption?

At the end of
the Questionnaire, the following question was listed: Is there a
need to have a wide-range alliance of civil society organizations
to fight corruption and to expose and pursue the mafias with all
means possible, inside the country and abroad? An
overwhelming majority of answers (82.33 percent) were for such a
wide-range alliance; while only a minority was against or neutral
(9.36 percent and 8.32 percent).

No doubt that
the fight against corruption and standing up against its symbols in
state and society is not an easy job, especially when corruption is
so widespread like the case in our countries. This is not something
to be done by statements, political threats, rhetoric festivals, or
even by forms of financial statements to be filled out after a
grace period during which the corrupt may arrange their situations,
paperwork, and statements. Rather, this may be done by an overall
strategy based on comprehensiveness and closely linked to an
overall national prospect for economic, human development, and
political reform.

Finally, to
conclude this primary reading of the results of the Questionnaire
on corruption, we may emphasize that standing up against corruption
is linked to a variety of intertwined concepts. We view them as
principal elements in any strategy to stop this phenomenon in all
its financial, bureaucratic, political, social, and developmental
aspects. These concepts include transparency, accountability,
integrity, and effective media. The bulk of these concepts
constitute what one might call "culture of transparency and
reform".

Transparency:
This term means clarity of bureaucratic and financial transaction
done by any institution, organization, company, municipality,
conference, bank, college, brigade, etc, especially in connection
with citizens and clients, who seek to benefit from their services
and bureaucratic and financial procedures. Here it should be
asserted that some certain overt culture must prevail in all ends,
goals, means, and procedures in all institutions. Citizens, public
servants, and officials should not feel any obscurity concerning
the rights, duties, and roles of each one of them. This point is
most related to citizens' right to know and to have access to
information, as ensured by international treaties and charters.
This also means that the concepts of freedom of expression, the
right to have access and to publish information must be ensured.
This should go for all transactions of government and
non-government organizations, agencies and institutions.

Integrity: This is a
synonym of transparency. Integrity is concerned with the moral
aspects of the concept of transparency, and is linked to the set of
values related to honesty, uprightness, loyalty, devotion, and
profession at work. Transparency has to do with the practical and
procedural aspects; integrity deals with the moral values. Thus,
both are two faces of the same coin. Neither of them may exist
without the other. In the absence of integrity, no practical
bureaucratic procedures, no matter how transparent these may be,
can stop public servants from accepting a bribe. In the absence of
any deterring bureaucratic and legal regulations and procedures, a
public servant's integrity cannot stop others from practicing
corruption

.

Accountability: This
is the duty of young public servants to their superiors. To be more
specific, it is the duty of the officials, be they appointed,
escalated, or elected, to the public. Each and every official is
required to give periodical reports on their work and how
successful they are in executing it. Each and every citizen has the
right to get the information needed on the transactions of public
administrations so that one may make sure that they are doing their
jobs. Accountability is closely related to the right to ask and
inquire. This is a legitimate right of every citizen. Here comes
the role of the media, government as well privates, in practicing
accountability with a fact-finding mind to ensure that the
officials are doing their jobs and tasks as regulated by the law.
This should form the basis for continuing to acquire legal
legitimacy, and remaining in their positions.

The spread and penetration of corruption in all aspects of
bureaucratic, economic, and political life requires the adoption of
a strategy that is based on the following necessities:

Supportive, clear
political will: Any anti-corruption strategy can
achieve success only when the political leadership has the will to
combat corruption. Only this can mobilize all efforts of state and
society to back up such a strategy, or at least ensure that any
anti-corruption approach does not collide with the political
power.

Deterrent
regulations and legislations: The
major props of such a strategy lie in bringing about deterrent,
enforceable legislations and anti-corruption regulations at all
levels. Such legislations should include codes for transparent
financial position of top officials, illicit gain, the right to
have access to information, and severe penalties in the code of
criminal procedure against bribery, favoritism, and misuse of
public office.

Pressing rule of
law: In stable democracies, the constitution
ensures the principle of separation of powers and the rule of law,
and that all citizens are equal before the law. The Libyan
system of governance, however, is so far from the values of
democracy that the rule of law has become a far-fetched matter.
Consequently, the potentials of this rule of law depend on the
political will. Therefore, public, institutional, and media
pressure becomes inevitable for more transparency and
accountability.

Courageous
independent judiciary: Among the most important
factors for the anti-corruption strategy to succeed is to have an
independent, powerful, and just judiciary that is free from all
influences that might weaken its deterrent role. Only then it
becomes impossible for the mafias of big wheels to corrupt the
judges, attorney general, or lawyers, and the executive power will
abide by the judicial rules.

Liable
bureaucratic and financial control: Financial
control and bureaucratic accountability must be given a role over
the legislative institutions through the available tools. Public
accountability of cabinet members, officials, and secretaries must
be deepened. All significant matters should be subjected to public
debate. Investigations and interpellation of officials must be
overt and civilized seeking nothing but transparency. In the case
of Libya, who claims to apply the 'rule of the people',
surveillance of this sort becomes rational and in accord with such
an allegation.

Daring public
surveillance: The public surveillance that depends
on the civil society institutions and tribunes contributes
significantly to the role of official surveillance agencies, like
the Accounting Council and Bureaucratic Control Apparatus. Public
surveillance bureaus can unveil – through the press, magazines, and
websites – cases of mismanagement and negligence in government
institutions, arbitrary use of power, bureaucratic and financial
fraud, and absence of transparency in the procedures of public
office practices. There are many examples of media initiatives in
which the private reporters unveiled certain legal violations and
helped justice and surveillance authorities bring violating
officials to justice.

Dauntless
scrutiny press: The press has such a major role to
play in extracting significant rights, including the right to have
access to information. This role requires that the forth power
should be given the immunity needed to publish information, and do
the inquiries required to unveil cases of corruption at any
bureaucratic and political level.

Reverberant
non-government and civil tribunes:
Among the more important tasks of non-government tribunes – mosques
and religious groups – and civil society organizations – clubs,
societies and NGOs – is to focus on the moral dimension in their
anti-corruption efforts in both public and private sectors. It is
also important to mobilize their adherents to stop being negative
and careless and stand up against corruption in society.

Development/edification
programs: Public enlightenment is
a necessary tool in fighting corruption. Edification programs can
spread information on this epidemic and increase public
awareness of its dangers and high costs to citizens and the country
as a whole. A cultural revival is needed to show the political,
economic, and social dangers of corruption. To combat corruption,
field action requires an active, aware public opinion that pursues
events, cares to unveil cases of corruption, and punish the corrupt
by denying them the public support they need in the political
system at local levels.

The starting point on the road to form a
wide-range alliance of civil society organizations against
corruption is to collect information on the phenomenon by pursuing
big wheels of corruption like:

Bank accounts and deposits at home and abroad;

Names and addresses of the companies that acquired privileges to
execute various projects;

Names and addresses of the foreign companies that deal with the
indigenous symbols of corruption, and the names of the
intermediaries in between.

Documents and data on the fortunes of each one of them inside and
outside Libya, including photographs, diagrams, video tapes,
cellular phone snapshots, etc.

Documents of public areas (camps, woods, parks) illegally granted
to the regime's aids, including names, dates, the bribes paid,
etc.

Documents of the value of intermediary commissions paid for illegal
deals, oil sales, and various projects (the Great River, arms
deals, agricultural projects, etc).

Documents on the expenditure of the Colonel's sons, ministers,
investment company executives at home and abroad.

Documents on commissions paid for purchases of military
manufacturing, medications, appliances, and equipments for
hospitals, universities, research centers, etc.

Documents on the number and photos of the rest houses, palaces,
ranches, diamond mines, and night clubs owned by top officials
abroad, and the hospitals, private clinics, and luxury cars
purchased from the state treasury at home.

Replicas of forged college qualifications and the names of the
universities where they obtained their higher education
certificates.

Information on the agricultural and animal projects, and those who
benefit from their seasonal production.

Information on the private yachts anchored at ports in
Europe, their Arabian horses in racetracks in England and Emirates,
and the private ocean islands and estates they own in Africa and
East Asia.[NOTE by AlGaddafi.org:::::
Today - 2013, Still - there is no evidence on this
informaion!]

Information on drug smugglers and their high-ranking police officer
accomplices.

Information on how goods get cleared at seaports and airports and
how custom taxes are evaded.

Our main goal should be to make the Libyan people aware of the
crimes committed against their oil revenues, and of corruption,
which has reigned in the alleged "state of the masses" under the
rule of a corrupt and corrupter junta. [NOTE by
AlGaddafi.org::::: Today - 2013, are the same criminals on power,
in Libya, who committed all this crimes against theoil
revenues of the Libyan people! The same power gready RATS, who
blocked and opposed Muammar Al Gaddafi`s proposal, to give all oil
revenue DIRECTLY to all of the people of Libya (2009)
!]

Conclusion

We may conclude this reading with a word to the entire Libyan
people, and especially to the public work activists. Ever since our
website – * transparency-libya.com – started
in December 2005, specifically for the issues of transparency and
against corruption in Libya, our main objective has been to
mobilize all anti-corruption efforts, and put an end to corruption
mafias.

We were encouraged by the Tobruq Proclamation for the establishment
of the 'Libyan Anti-Corruption Society' in June 2006. The
Proclamation contained 53 signatures of teachers, engineers,
businessmen, craftsmen, and hotel employees between 38 and 55 years
of age, who belong to a variety of regions and native tribes from
all over the country.

We also saw as a good omen what some websites abroad have reported
about talks to establish a "Non-government Organization for
Transparency and Against Corruption" in Benghazi. Efforts took
place in Tripoli and Missrata in the same direction among a number
of those interested in public issues.

We were even happier to hear about "reform websites" inside Libya,
which would play a major role in breaking the barrier of fear among
the masses. We still hope that dialogue and communication will
start between those inside and outside over a package of national
issues, especially those of reform and corruption.

By displaying this humble effort of ours for more consideration and
analysis, we appeal to you all to do similar field questionnaires
with the simple masses at the heart of Libyan towns and villages
for a better future for our children and grandchildren.

March 1, 2007

[NOTE by AlGaddafi.org:::: The publishing
* website, is now offline since 2011, October.... as the purpose
was mainly, to just destabliize the Jamahiryan system of Libya.
Libya is now, at the end of 2013, the No 3 World Ranking
country, regarding
corruption!