Dreben, Burton. "Cohen's
Carnap, or Subjectivity is in the Eye of the Beholder," in: Science,
Politics, and Social Practice: Essays on Marxism and Science,
Philosophy of Culture and the Social Sciences: In Honor of Robert S.
Cohen, edited by Kostas
Gavroglu, John Stachel, Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 27-42. (Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science; v. 164)

This essay presents a fascinating thesis:
the overlooked influence of lebensphilosophie on Carnap. The author
examines the neglected role of Carnap's teacher Herman Nohl, a student
of Dilthey. The influence of lebensphilosophie can be found in Carnap's
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (1928)
and "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language"
(1931). The politics and philosophical positions competing in the
German youth movement are outlined. Nohl got from Dilthey the notion
that metaphysics = scientific weltanshauung. Carnap
(1931) deems metaphysics as an
historical substitute for theology. In this he follows the neo-Kantian
F.A. Lange. Metaphysics is viewed not as cognitively valuable but
expressive or emotive. Carnap credits Nietzsche for the notion of
philosophy as poetry. Heidegger and Carnap draw on the same tension
between neo-Kantianism and lebensphilosophie to reach opposite
positions (p. 12). (Note Carnap on music.) Note the enmity of Carnap
for Heidegger through Carnap's friendship with Wilhelm Flitner. Note
also the religious nature and mystical leanings of Carnap's family.

The "left" Vienna Circle is said to be
comprised of Hans Hahn, P. Frank, Neurath, and Carnap. There is a vague
correlation, not to be taken too literally, between the scientific and
political positions of the "Left" wing of the Vienna Circle, even
termed as such in Carnap's correspondence. The author explores the
limitations, equivocations, and contradictions in the anti-realist,
anti-correspondence views of Carnap and the others. He also places
Carnap's concerns in the context of the intellectual politics of his
milieu. He was compelled to oppose the old "school" metaphysics
including prevalent views about science, by means of a scientific
philosophy and defense of Enlightenment. The relationship of the Vienna
Circle to American pragmatism is also brought up, including a limited
engagement with Dewey.

Note the influence of F.A. Lange's notion
of conceptual poetry on Nietzsche (28). Note Carnap's moral and
political concerns (35). [Note: Carnap's last photograph was taken with
activists in the U.S. civil rights movement.] Carnap's non-cognitivism
(and theory-practice dualism) regarding the above is said to be
symptomatic of his uncompromising, extremist, either-or character (36).

Neurath, Otto. Empiricism
and Sociology, edited by Marie
Neurath and Robert S. Cohen; translations from the German by Paul
Foulkes and Marie Neurath; with a selection of biographical and
autobiographical sketches. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973. Includes abridged
translations of two books, Anti-Spengler
and Empiricism and Sociology.

Abstract: This article continues a detailed
examination of the relationship between critical theory and logical
positivism, and provides an account of the philosophical interventions
in the debate concerning positivism within German sociology during the
1960's.

Abstract: Almost all leading members of the
logical empiricist movement in Germany and Austria left those countries
after 1933 (Germany) and 1934 (Austria). They did that to escape ethnic
and political persecution. Despite that, in 1937 logical empiricism was
accused by Max Horkheimer of holding a world view not only compatible
with but even supporting and preparing national socialism. The article
discusses that charge and rejects it.

Abstract: Against dialectical and Lukacsian
interpretations of Horkheimer's critical theory in the early thirties
the author stresses Horkheimer's conception of social research, that
has to falsify and or verify philosophical and other theoretical
insights. His critique of the concept of totality and other
metaphysical constructs and bring him in the neighborhood of the Vienna
Circle. His application of the concepts 'essence' and 'phenomena',
however, contradicts his positivistic stance, because the 'essence'
can't be tested by empirical research.

Howard,
Don. "Two Left Turns Make a Right: On the Curious Political Career of
North American Philosophy of Science at Midcentury," in: Logical
Empiricism in North America, ed.
Gary L. Hardcastle & Alan W. Richardson (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), Chapter 2.

Hudelson,
Richard; Evans, Robert . "McCarthyism and Philosophy in the United
States," Philosophy of the
Social Sciences, vol. 33, no. 2,
June 2003, pp. 242-260. [Link
inactive]

Cornforth, Maurice. Marxism
and the
Linguistic Philosophy.
2nd ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1967 (orig. 1965). (Note:
Cornforth softened his dogmatism following the Stalin era, hence this
and his work on Popper are most representative of his late views.)

Cornforth, Maurice.
Communism and Human Values.
New York: International Publishers, 1972. Reproduces with slight
changes three chapters from Marxism
and the Linguistic Philosophy.
See Chapter 8, Science and
Evaluation,
pp. 41-47.

Kolakowski, Leszek; Guterman,
Norbert, trans. The Alienation
of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 202-206,
207-219. This extract
comprises the end of chapter 8, "Logical Empiricism: A Scientistic
Defense of Threatened Civilization," and the concluding chapter. This
book was originally published in Polish in 1966. Revised and
republished as Positivist
Philosophy from Hume to the Vienna Circle,
1972.

In his short article “Lenin and
Popper," Colletti recalls how, in a private letter from 1970, first
published in Die Zeit,
Popper effectively wrote: “Lenin’s book on
empiriocriticism is, in my opinion, truly excellent." — Slavoj
Žižek

Cornforth, M. The
Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr. Karl Popper's
Refutations of Marxism. New
York: International Publishers, 1968.

ABSTRACT: Karl Popper is widely
regarded as a
critic of Marxism. In particular, he is commonly viewed as an opponent
of Marx's methodology. Popper, it is said, viewed Marxism as a
pseudoscience, on par with astrology and religious prophecy. This view
of Popper's critique of Marxism, I argue, is a gross distortion. To be
sure, Popper was highly critical of certain aspects of Marx's approach
to social inquiry, and, of course, he emphatically rejected the utopian
and collectivist social reforms inspired by Marx. But Popper also
viewed Marx as an exemplary and groundbreaking social scientist.
Moreover, Popper's encounter with Marx's methodology, especially that
found in Capital, deeply influenced Popper's own ideas about social
inquiry. My proposed essay explores Marx's influence on Popper in three
sections. In the first section, I review Popper's criticisms of
Marxism. The main target of Popper's criticism, I show, was not Marx,
but Marx's followers, whom Popper accused of immunizing Marx's
predictions from falsification. However, there is no reason to suppose
that Popper viewed Marx's predictions as inherently unfalsifiable and
thus nonscientific. In his Open Society, Popper faulted Marx's
predictions of capitalism's downfall and socialist revolution. But
Popper charged Marx with succumbing to wishful thinking and ignoring
the power of politics to counter economic trends, not with
falsification evasion. In the second section, I contend that Popper's
most noteworthy contribution to social science— situational
analysis —bears an unmistakably Marxian imprint. The same is
true for Popper's doctrine of methodological individualism and his
claim that the primary task of the social sciences is to trace the
unintended consequences of human action and lay bare hidden social
relationships. In the final section of my essay, I argue that Popper's
interpretation of Marx's methodology, as well as Popper's
recommendations for social inquiry, is essentially the same as that of
so-called analytical Marxists, such as Jon Elster and Daniel Little.
Popper and the analytical Marxists both reject the Hegelian and
dialectical elements in Marx's thought as unscientific, even
nonsensical. And both claim that the real value of Marx's explanations
lies in untangling the complex web of interaction generated by
individuals acting rationally in structured situations. I also argue
that Popper's "rationality principle" bears a strong resemblance to the
"broadened practical rationality" advocated by Little and other
analytical Marxists. By tracing Marx's influence on Popper, and by
exploring the similarities between Popperian social science and
analytical Marxism, a richer and more refined understanding of Popper's
concept of situational analysis emerges.

Abstract: I have argued elsewhere (in Karl
Marx: The Burden of Reason) that the bent of Marx's social and
political thought (especially his exclusion of politics and the market
from his vision of a future socialism) needs to be seen as arising from
the conception of scientific rationality to which he adhered. Marx
placed a high value on necessity, universality, and predictivity, and
judged as irrational institutions and activities that could not be
understood in terms of these criteria. For Marx, the fact that one
cannot reliably predict the rise and fall of market prices or the
vicissitudes of political debate and action was a marker of the
ultimate irrationality of the market and of politics. Marx the
rationalist philosopher thus determined Marx the social theorist. To be
sure, my thesis as to Marx's rationalism will be controversial, and in
this paper I cannot give it either adequate defense or the limiting
qualifications that it needs. I therefore ask that, for the sake of the
argument, it be accepted as a postulate. The question then becomes:
what light is cast on Popper's thinking when he is brought into
proximity with a rationalist Marx? There is a large literature on the
Popper-Marx relation, beginning with Popper's own statements in "The
Poverty of Historicism," "What is Dialectic?," and The Open Society and
Its Enemies and ranging through to Marxian polemics against Popper's
view of Marx. At this late date it is clear that Popper's critique of
Marx had more to do with a certain kind of Marxism than with Marx,
especially when Popper attacked Marx for being a historical determinist
and believer in predictive historical laws. Still, when one
de-polemicizes Popper one finds that in other respects he is on the
mark— for example, in his recognition that Marx was committed
to "rational methods." More interesting than Popper's statements about
Marx are the strong affinities— and, within the context of
those affinities, important differences— between the two
thinkers. Most important is the fact that both Marx and Popper were
Enlightenment, even hyper-Enlightenment, thinkers. Both believed
fundamentally in science. Both believed that the distinction between
science and nonscience is extremely important. Both believed that the
progress of knowledge is the primary motor of human advance (a
surprising statement, I know, insofar as Marx is concerned, but note
the postulate above). Yet there is a crucial difference between the
two, for Marx had a much "tighter," much more rigid conception of
science than did Popper. Popper's insistence that our grasp on
scientific truth is contingent and potentially only temporary sharply
distinguishes him from Marx, and makes his perspective more friendly to
the disturbing rough and tumble of democratic politics.

Abstract: Karl Popper is widely regarded as
the twentieth century's greatest critic of Marxism. This article, based
upon his 1942-47 correspondence with Rudolf Carnap, shows that Popper's
critique of scientific socialism had less to do with Marx's social
goals than with the attitudes that Marxists adopted toward their means
of achieving them. It also reveals how Carnap, who tried to keep his
politics separate from his epistemology, managed to mix the two when
refusing to give Popper his wholehearted support in finding both
publisher for The Open Society
and Its Enemies and a position
that would give him greater opportunities for research.

Abstract: Tracing the interplay between
theory and practice in the dynamics of philosophical argument, this
paper represents philosophy as an open, critical discipline, which
keeps asking the same fundamental questions about knowledge, reality,
justice, freedom, harmony and truth under changing historical
conditions. In the light of this, the present impasse of human thought
which manifests itself in the confrontation between totalitarian
functionalism in the west on the one hand and totalitarian ideologism
in the east on the other, the need for a reversal of thinking becomes
evident. The present deadlock of human thought and the confrontation
between west and east resulting from it can be broken only if one-sided
functional practice is replaced by fully-fledged human practice. This
requires moving beyond Popper's one-dimensional 'critical' rationalism
and Marxism-Leninism's 'scientific' dialectical materialism to a
critical humanism, based on man's contingent experience of reality.

Ryerson,
Stanley B. The Open Society:
Paradox and Challenge. New York:
International Publishers, 1965. [Only the opening section
of chapter 1, "Tomorrow, Today, and Yesterday", pp. 9-11, mentions
Popper directly; the book is about the misuse of the concept by
capitalist propagandists and politicians.].

Shaw,
William H. Marx's Theory of
History. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1978. See pp. 149-168: on Popper, Lakatos,
falsifiability, research programs.

Abstract: Karl Popper's recent
hermeneutical turn on the basis of critical thinking has raised new
interest in the methodological debate between hermeneuticians and
dialectical criticists. In continental philosophy the school of
'verstehen' (Gadamer) and neo-marxism (Habermas) was engaged in this
controversy. I claim that the problem of theory and practice is really
at issue in what seems to be a methodological discussion. The
shortcomings of crucial concepts such as reflection and interest are
considered. Systematical consequences are to be drawn in the framework
of a theory of action.

Overend, Tronn. "Interests,
Objectivity and "The Positivist Dispute" in Social Theory," Social
Praxis, 6, 1979, 69-91.

Abstract: Stemming from critical theory and
critical rationalism's "joint" dismissal of empiricism and subscription
to relativism and monism, the positivist dispute in sociology, and the
Albert/Habermas polemic in particular, exemplifies the inadequacy of a
Popperian defence of objectivity. Accordingly, a social realist
explication, then refutation, is made of "knowledge-constitutive
interests"—the foundation to Habermas' theory of science,
following the elucidation of "ontological" difficulties, in the form of
an "ad hominem" refutation, "epistemological" errors associated with
knowledge—constitutive interests are elaborated along the
dimensions of: (a) the epistemic function, (b) the meaning and, (c)
degenerative problem shifts. Finally, "substantive" arguments against
the concept include its pseudo-scientific and relativistic status.

Popper, Karl R. "The
Logic of the Social Sciences,"
in The Positivist Dispute in
German Sociology, translated by
Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 87-104.

Ray, L.J. "Critical Theory and
Positivism: Popper and the Frankfurt School," Philosophy
of the Social Sciences, Vol. 9,
Issue 2, June 1979, 149-173.

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to
clarify some issues in recent conflicts between critical theorists and
Popperians. It tentatively poses the question: whether either of these
approaches provide an adequate methodology for sociology. The
discussion focuses on four areas of dispute: unity of scientific
method; separation of fact and value; rationality; and the concept of
totality. These issues are considered in the context of competing
definitions of positivism and truth, which are related to political
goals and judgments. It is suggested that although Popperians point to
serious weaknesses in critical theory, inconsistencies undermine
Popper's own position.

Abstract: H.T. Wilson's 'Response to Ray' .
. . addresses six issues which he identifies in an article of mine
concerning the dispute between Popper and Habermas. . . These concern
issues of a convergence between Popper and Habermas, goals of truth and
success, natural and social science, technology and society, and social
interests. It is argued that on each of these, Wilson misunderstands
Ray, and on some points misunderstands Popper and Habermas.

Abstract: The article discusses a recent
book by J. F. Malherbe, La
Philosophie de Karl Popper et le Positivisme Logique
(Paris, P.U.F.), which offers a critical introduction to Popper's
thought from the vantage point of Kuhn's philosophy of science and
Habermas' critical theory. It shows that Popper's "autonomist"
conception of science, contrary to Malherbe's view, is perfectly
compatible both with Kuhn's analysis of the dynamics of scientific
revolutions and with Habermas' theory of knowledge-leading interests.

Wilson, H.
T. "Critical Theory's Critique of Social Science: Episodes in a
Changing Problematic From Adorno To Habermas, Part I.", History
of European Ideas, 7 (1986):
127-147.

Abstract: Critical theory's critique of the
social sciences took the form of an attack on their joint commitment to
traditional theory and empirical method. Theory and method in these
disciplines work hand in hand with one another to simultaneously seek
the elimination of reflexivity and the reconstitution of practice in a
form better suited to the ascendancy of society as a culturally and
historically specific form of collective life rather than a synonym for
such life and living. This article analyzes the sense and significance
of this critique in the contemporary setting of advanced industrial
societies.

Wilson, H.
T. "Response to Ray's "Critical Theory and Positivism: Popper and the
Frankfurt School", Philosophy
of the Social Sciences, 11,
March 1981, 45-48.

ABSTRACT: Paraconsistent logic was
introduced in order to provide the framework for inconsistent but
nontrivial theories. It was initiated by J. Lukasiewicz (1910) in
Poland and, independently, by N. A. Vasilev (1911-13) in Russia, but
only in 1948 the first paraconsistent formal system was designed. Since
then thousands of papers have been published in this field.
Paraconsistency became one of the fastest growing branches of logic,
due to its fruitful applications to computer science, information
theory, and artificial intelligence. K. R.
Popper touched on the problem in his
paper „What is Dialectic?” (1940). Although only
mentioned, his basic idea of the possibility of a formal system of such
a logic was fresh and original. Another attempt of exploring the logic
of contradiction, this time as a dual to intuitionistic logic, was made
by Popper in his paper „On the Theory of Deduction I and
II” (1948). The same idea was formalized by N. D. Goodman
(1981) and developed by D. Miller (1993) under a label „Logic
for Falsificationists”. Popper`s
contribution to the subject of
paraconsistent logic has not been properly recognized so far. Since
Lukasiewicz`s and Vasilev`s works were still not translated into any
West European languages in the 1940s, he should be undoubtedly regarded
as an independent forerunner of paraconsistency. On the other hand, it
seems tempting to adapt some of Popper`s other ideas for the theory of
paraconsistent logic (the way it was done with Vasilev`s very general
concepts) and, especially, for the theory of artificial intelligence.

ABSTRACT: Ever since Karl Popper introduced
his new ontological doctrine of three worlds in 1967, his views have
been attacked by critics on various grounds. With some justification,
Popper's expositions of his theory of World 3 have been accused to be
sketchy and incoherent. In this paper, I attempt to give a critical
defence of what I take to be the rational core of Popper's argument:
the thesis of the existence of World 3 entities is an ontological
hypothesis which gives the most plausible account of culture in terms
of emergent materialism. Already our natural language involves
ontological commitments to cultural and social entities like artifacts,
works of art, languages, norms, social institutions, and numbers. More
generally, human mind, culture, and society are complex products of
evolution, created and reproduced by men, but also capable of
influencing the growth and development of new human individuals in
their culture-producing activities. For these reasons, the traditional
dichotomy of materialism and idealism is clearly perplexing in the case
of culture. As culture is, per definitionem, something "cultivated" by
human beings, it is mind-dependent or mind-.involving. But to say that
culture is only "in our heads" is not at all convincing. Equally
artificial are the attempts of materialist philosophers to reduce
cultural entities to merely physical objects. The ontological theory of
World 3 should avoid the problematic features of reductionist
materialism, but at the same time help us to understand the peculiar
"super-individual" character of cultural formations without idealist or
supernaturalist assumptions. The paper contrast the Popperian notion of
World 3 with three reductionist strategies: idealist reduction to
objective mind (Hegel), phenomenalist reduction to experiences
(Carnap's Aufbau), and materialist reduction to individual practical
activities (Bunge). Parallels to Popper's thought are sought in
Durkheim's sociology and Ilyenkov's Marxist concept of the ideal.
Replies to some critics (Bloor, Carr, Cohen, Currie, O'Hear) are also
given.

Popper, Karl. R. Objective
Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.
Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press,
1979. [Orig. 1972.] See chapter 3, "Epistemology Without a Knowing
Subject, " address given at The First International Congress on Logic,
Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science, August 1967.