Prepared for the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons

Lawyers Committee
on Nuclear Policy

Table of Contents

1. Summary

2. Recommendations

3. The Emperor has no Clothes: Conditionality and Article VI

4. Nuclear Weapons States: Rearmament is Disarmament

5. Idealism or Realism: The Tide Moves

6. 2000 Review: Fireworks or Fizzle

7. Making it happen

"Each of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control." - Article VI,
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

1. Summary

Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obliges States parties
to negotiate in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. Currently most
nuclear weapon States (NWS) say that they are ultimately in favor of nuclear disarmament
but they currently refuse to enter into negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the
Conference on Disarmament or any other multi-lateral forum. Instead certain NWS are
continuing their research, testing, development, production and deployment of nuclear
weapons systems.

A convergence of international developments indicates that the
possibility of total nuclear disarmament has moved from a pipe dream to an achievable
goal.

States parties of the NPT should use the opportunity of the
strengthened review process to make greater progress towards the fulfillment of the
Article VI obligation for nuclear disarmament.

2. Recommendations

States parties should:

Call for negotiations to begin in 1998 leading to the conclusion of a nuclear
weapons convention, which would provide for the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons under international verification and control.

2. Non-nuclear States should remind the nuclear weapon States that if progress is not
made towards complete nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation regime is likely to
unravel.

3. Conditionality and Article VI

The specific obligation of the NWS to pursue negotiations leading to
the elimination of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed in the Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament which were adopted by consensus at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of July 1996, reaffirmed this
obligation, and noted that this required the conclusion of negotiations on nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects.

a) Conditionality excuse

Some NWS seek to make the fulfillment of this obligation conditional upon other
factors. The United States, for example, has linked this obligation with the obligation to
achieve general and complete disarmament and implies that the former is not possible
without the latter. In explaining its opposition to the U.N. draft resolution on the ICJ
advisory opinion the U.S. referred to "the mischaracterization of NPT Article VI
and the NPT Principles and Objectives decision document, which are selectively quoted ...
by omitting crucial references to general and complete disarmament."( United States explanation of vote on United Nations draft resolution A/C.1/L.37,
November 10, 1997)

The Chairmans Working Paper for the NPT Preparatory Committee
contains language proposed by NWS that "The States parties... recognize that
nuclear disarmament can only take place in a stable international security
environment," i.e. an environment that is not likely to exist within the lifetime
of anyone alive today.

The NWS are correct in asserting that nuclear disarmament, general and
complete disarmament, and international security are related, but they have the
relationship reversed. Nuclear disarmament is a part of general and complete disarmament,
and its achievement will assist and preceed the achievement of general and complete
disarmament, not the other way around. The elimination of nuclear weapons will
drastically reduce the need for conventional weapons which many States now rely upon to
deter or counter nuclear weapons. In addition, the achievement of nuclear disarmament will
allow greater attention to be focused on next steps towards general and complete
disarmament.

Similarly the achievement of nuclear disarmament will contribute
tremendously to global security, not only as a consequence of the reduced threat resulting
from the elimination of nuclear weapons, but also from the adoption of confidence building
and security measures which will inevitably be adopted as part of a nuclear disarmament
regime.

Thus, even if, as some NWS assert, nuclear disarmament is conditional
on progress towards general and complete disarmament and on an improvement in
international security, this is no reason not to commence nuclear disarmament
negotiations, but rather an additional reason to start such negotiations.

The conditionality advanced by some NWS becomes fallacious when one
considers that the barrier to nuclear disarmament cited by them, i.e. the lack of progress
on general and complete disarmament, is in fact caused largely by these very same States,
which are the largest conventional arms producers and exporters in the world.

b) The Emperor has no clothes

The conditionality excuse evaporates completely under examination of
the NPT, which makes no such conditions. This is evident from:

i) The formulation of Article VI which, while noting obligations for
nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, makes no mention of
conditionality, but includes a clear division, in the form of a comma, between these two
obligations.

ii) The ninth preambular paragraph of the NPT which declares the
intention of States parties "to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and
to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" without
any mention of conditionality with respect to general and complete disarmament or
international security.

iii) The fourth preambular paragraph of UN General Assembly Resolution
2373 (June 12, 1968), which welcomed the conclusion of the NPT and expressed the
conviction that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear
weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament..." Again no mention is made of any
link to general and complete disarmament or international security.

In addition, The International Court of Justice reaffirmed unanimously
that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects," without mentioning any
such conditionality.

4. Nuclear Weapons States: Rearmament is Disarmament?

While not committing itself to nuclear abolition, the United States
argues that they are implementing their Article VI obligations in a step-by-step manner,
and cites the achievement of the START, INF and CTBT treaties, withdrawal of tactical
nuclear weapons from surface ships, adherence to nuclear free zones and pursuance of
negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty.

While States deserve recognition for the progress and hard work done to
achieve such steps, even a cursory look will reveal that they are limited achievements
towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, very little progress on any of the above
has been made since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The START and INF treaties, while reducing the total number of delivery
systems, do not require destruction of nuclear warheads. Some reduction of nuclear warhead
numbers has taken place. However the lowest number envisaged, even if START III were to be
negotiated, remains in the thousands of mostly strategic weapons, still well above the
number which could destroy not only entire countries but possibly all life on earth.

The CTBT, while prohibiting testing by nuclear explosions, does not
prohibit other forms of testing. For that reason it is viewed by many as discriminatory,
restraining only those countries that do not have the technology to do non-explosive
testing. In addition, it is unlikely to enter into force in the foreseeable future because
of the lack of fulfillment of entry-into-force requirements.

Adherence by the NWS to nuclear weapon free zones has been reluctant at
best. The U.S. ended its military cooperation with New Zealand in 1984 in retaliation for
New Zealand declaring itself a nuclear weapon free zone. The U.S. also opposed
Palaus attempt to establish itself as a nuclear weapon free zone. In addition, three
of the NWS opposed United Nations General Assembly Resolution 52/38 N (December 9, 1997)
which called for the NWS to ratify the appropriate protocols of the regional nuclear
weapon free zones.

The fissile material cutoff treaty, as proposed by the NWS, is more of
a non-proliferation measure than a disarmament measure. An FMCT which only prohibits
production would affect the ability of the "have-nots" to develop nuclear
weapons, but would not affect the ability of the NWS to maintain or even enhance their
nuclear weapons stockpiles as they all have more than adequate stockpiles of fissile
material.

Thus the "disarmament measures" cited by the NWS
hardly qualify for the term. At the same time, the NWS, particularly the U.S., are rearming
through a continuation of research, testing, development, deployment and production of
nuclear weapons systems, often under the guise of innocuous Orwellian sounding names such
as Stockpile Stewardship and Management.

Current programs include:

* Production of plutonium triggers for hydrogen bombs. These
triggers are small nuclear weapons in themselves, used in hydrogen bombs to initiate the
fusion reaction. Los Alamos National Laboratory is preparing to produce these for the
first time in almost 40 years.

* The U.S. has conducted three sub-criticaltests in
Nevada since the signing of the CTBT. These are explosive tests of nuclear weapons
which do not reach criticality.

* The U.S. has developed a new warhead, a modification of the
B61, which has been designed as a low-yield counter-proliferation weapon. In addition the
US has continued to build delivery systems, particularly Trident submarines and
Trident II missiles. The U.K. is modernizing its nuclear force by replacing its existing
nuclear armed submarine fleet with Trident systems.

* The U.S. is planning to resume production of tritium, a
neutron provider in nuclear weapons, despite the fact that existing stocks of tritium
would suffice for existing weapons stockpiles for 20 years and for a smaller stockpile
until the end of the 21st century. These plans indicate that the U.S. has no intention of
making deep reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles anytime before the 22nd century.

* The National Ignition
Facility, one of the new facilities being built in the U.S. as part of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program, will enable fusion experiments to enhance designs of
thermonuclear weapons and possibly even to enable the design of a fusion weapon which
would not require fissile material.

"The fuel for
hydrogen fusion is relatively easy to obtain and a pure hydrogen bomb, if perfected, could
in theory be very cheap to build."  New York Times, May 27, 1997.

In addition the NWS maintain their nuclear weapons on alert status and,
with the exception of China, maintain policies of first use of nuclear weapons. The U.S.
recently reaffirmed its policy not only of first use of nuclear weapons, but also a policy
of flexible use including use against non-nuclear threats.

Finally, the NWS, with the exception of China, refuse to commence
negotiations which would lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons under a nuclear
weapons convention, as called for in United Nations Resolution 52/38 O, and also refuse to
allow the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on
Disarmament.

5. Idealism or Realism: The Tide Moves.

Recent developments betoken a groundswell of expert and grassroots
opinion in favor of nuclear abolition. International Court of Justice President Bedjaoui
has noted that "the goal is no longer utopian and that it is the duty of all to
seek to attain it more actively than ever. The destiny of man depends on the will to enter
into this commitment..."

Other key developments indicating the desirability and practicality of
complete nuclear disarmament include:

* On December 5, 1996, 60 retired Generals and Admirals, including
General George Lee Butler, former Head of the U.S. Strategic Command which controlls all
nuclear weapons, released a statement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

* On December 10, 1996 and again on December 9, 1997, the U.N. General
Assembly called for the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to the conclusion
of a nuclear weapons convention.

* On March 13, 1997, the European Parliament called on all members to
support negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

* On November 17, 1997, the United Nations distributed a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (A/C.1/52/7) submitted
by Costa Rica. The model convention outlines a practical regime for the elimination of
nuclear weapons and deals with the legal, technical and political issues that would need
to be addressed.

* On February 2, 1998, 117 Civil Leaders including 47
past or present heads of State released a statement calling for the abolition of nuclear
weapons and the implementation of steps towards that goal.

* Over 1000 citizens organizations have joined Abolition 2000, an
international network calling for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention.

* On February 2, The Nation published as a special issue a long
article entitled "The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,"
containing pro-abolition interviews with such world leaders as Helmut Schmidt, Robert
McNamara, Senator Alan Cranston, Mikhail Gorbachev and Gen. Charles Horner.

* Public opinion polls indicate support for a nuclear weapons
convention in the U.S. and U.K. at over 80%, and Canada at over 90%.

" the long sought prospect of a world free of the apocalyptic
threat of nuclear weapons is suddenly within reach This is an extraordinary
moment But it is also perishable: the specter of nuclear proliferation cannot be
indefinitely contained." Statement by International
Civilian Leaders

The NWS continue to resist the call for the elimination of nuclear
weapons, but this can be overcome by political pressure and momentum generated by other
governments and the public. The recent success of the landmines campaign, which also
focussed on the complete ban on an inhumane and indiscriminate weapons system despite the
resistance of many States, demonstrates this.

6. 2000 Review: Fireworks or Fizzle?

The 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation treaty has the potential to
produce significant measures to complete the process of the prohibition and elimination of
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it could produce "a tale full of sound and
fury, signifying nothing."

States parties should not accept tokenism or deception from the NWS.
The first steps should be taken immediately so that the 2000 Review Conference can set the
scene for the full implementation of the Article VI nuclear disarmament obligation through
the rapid conclusion of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

States parties should call now for the immediate implementation of
steps which have been proposed by the United Nations, Canberra Commission on the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Group of 21 Program of Action for the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons, the Generals and Admirals Statement and the Civil Leaders Statement These
include

* Commencing negotiations which would lead to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons
convention

* Taking all nuclear forces off alert

* Ending deployment of all nuclear weapons

* Removing warheads from delivery vehicles

* Negotiating further reductions in nuclear stockpiles

* Concluding agreements on no-first-use or no-use of nuclear weapons or non-use against
non-nuclear weapons States

* Closure or conversion of all nuclear test sites

* Ending of all nuclear weapons modernization and research, excepting research
necessary for the destruction of nuclear weapons and the verification of arms control
agreements

* Ending the production of nuclear warheads, their components and nuclear weapons
delivery systems

* Establishing a registry of nuclear weapons and fissile material

* Placing all fissile material under international control

Those steps that have not been implemented by the year
2000 should be listed in the final document of the NPT 2000 Review as the next steps to be
concluded.

7. Making it happen

Over the past two years the Conference on Disarmament has been unable
to make progress, having failed to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
The Review process of the NPT offers an alternative complementary path to stimulate
progress and to lay some of the groundwork for negotiations.

The proposal in the Chairmans working paper to establish an
intersessional working group to assist in the achievement of a nuclear weapons convention
should be supported.

"Negotiations, as a matter of some urgency, on a nuclear-weapons
convention should commence,.. This could be assisted through the establishment of an
intersessional working group."  NPT Chairmans working paper
(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.32/Corr.1)

While negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention itself would achieve
little without the agreement of the NWS, an intersessional working group could pave the
way for such negotiations through considering the legal, political and technical measures
necessary for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

It should be made clear to the NWS that if they move rapidly towards
the implementation of their NPT obligations, it would assist in achieving the aim of universality
while, at the same time, improving security globally. The NWS should also be told in no
uncertain terms that if on the other hand they persist in non-implementation of their
obligations, universality is impossible, and other States parties may start to reassess
their participation in the treaty.

" we need to remind the nuclear weapon States that if
progress is not made towards the goal of elimination, then we fear that the whole system
of non-proliferation might be at risk." -Marshall Islands, 11 April 1997
(NPT/CONF.2000/pc.1/11)