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Performance and Accountability Series:
January 2003:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of State:
GAO-03-107:
A Glance at the Agency Covered in This Report
To carry out U.S. foreign policy, the Department of State
* formulates U.S. policy on numerous international issues and
influences other
countries to adopt policies and practices consistent with U.S.
interests;
* conducts negotiations and concludes international agreements and
treaties;
* leads interagency coordination and supports the international
activities of other
U.S. agencies;
* issues passports and visas and provides services to U.S. citizens
living and
traveling abroad;
* operates and provides security for embassy and consular facilities;
and
* provides funding for international organizations and peacekeeping
activities,
the Andean counterdrug initiative, international narcotics control
and law
enforcement, and migration and refugee assistance.
The Department of State’s Budgetary and Staff Resources:
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[A] Budgetary resources include new budget authority (BA) and
unobligated balances
of previous BA.
[B] Budget and staff resources are actuals for FY 1998-2001.
FY 2002 are estimates
from the FY 2003 budget, which are the latest publicly available
figures on a
consistent basis as of January 2003. Actuals for FY 2002 will be
contained in the
President’s FY 2004 budget to be released in February 2003.
[C] U.S. foreign service national employees are included.
[End of Figure]
This Series
This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued
in 1999 and updated in
2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability Series:
Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003 Performance and
Accountability Series
contains separate reports covering each cabinet department,
most major
independent agencies, and the U.S. Postal Service. The
series also includes a
governmentwide perspective on transforming the way the
government does
business in order to meet 21st century challenges and
address long-term fiscal
needs. The companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An Update
identifies areas at high risk
due to either their greater vulnerabilities to waste,
fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement or major challenges associated with their
economy, efficiency, or
effectiveness. A list of all of the reports in this
series is included at the end of
this report.
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-107, a report to
Congress included as part of GAO’s
Performance and Accountability Series
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SERIES
Department of State
Why GAO Did This Study:
In its 2001 performance and accountability report on
the Department of State, GAO
identified important issues concerning the security
of U.S. facilities and personnel
overseas, visa issuance, illicit drugs entering the
United States, information
security, and other issues facing the department.
The information GAO presents in
this report is intended to sustain congressional
attention and a departmental focus
on continuing to make progress in addressing these
challenges and ultimately
overcoming them. This report is part of a special
series of reports on governmentwide
and agency-specific issues.
What GAO Found:
In carrying out its missions of forming,
representing, and implementing U.S.
foreign policy, the State Department faces complex
challenges, some of
which have intensified since the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001.
State has made progress in addressing its
management challenges over the
last 2 years, but further improvements are needed
in the following areas:
• Improving the security and maintenance of U.S.
facilities
overseas. State has enhanced security at
existing facilities but needs to
continue to replace many embassies and consulates
that are not set back
far enough from busy city streets and/or are
not sufficiently blast
resistant.
• Strengthening the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool. Visa
policy and procedures are inconsistent among
overseas consular posts,
and staff at many posts are inadequately
trained. Eliminating the Visa
Waiver Program could require increased overseas
staffing and facilities.
• Continuing to rightsize embassy staffing
levels. Assessing staffing
needs is essential for State to ensure the
security and effectiveness of
overseas missions and determine the
appropriate size and cost of new
facilities. To help achieve a rightsized
overseas presence, State and the
Office of Management and Budget are using
a framework proposed by
GAO that addresses the mission, security,
and costs of overseas posts as
well as staffing alternatives.
• Better managing human capital. Although
State has made progress in
recruiting new hires, providing leadership
and management skills
training, planning its workforce needs,
correcting foreign language
shortfalls, and staffing hardship posts,
further improvements are needed.
• Help to reduce illegal drugs entering
the United States.
Despite arrests of drug traffickers and
seizures of large amounts of
drugs, the availability of illicit drugs
in the United States has not been
materially reduced.
• Addressing additional challenges to
building a highperforming
organization. State has worked to enhance
information
technology and security, strengthen
financial management, and improve
performance planning. However, challenges
remain.
What Remains to Be Done:
GAO believes that State should
• continue to improve security
at overseas posts, primarily by
replacing about 180 facilities
where security is inadequate;
• strengthen the visa process by,
among other things, developing
clear guidance and policy;
• address staffing shortages at
hardship posts; and
• continue to work on other
challenges involving rightsizing
the U.S. presence overseas, U.S.
drug eradication assistance,
financial management,
information technology and
performance planning.
To view the full report, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
Contents:
Transmittal Letter:
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
GAO Contacts:
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not
subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be
reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO.
It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials.
Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish
to reproduce
copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.
Transmittal Letter January 2003:
The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives:
This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks
facing the Department of State as it works to carry out its multiple
and highly diverse missions. The report discusses the actions State has
taken and that are under way to address the challenges GAO identified
in its Performance and Accountability Series 2 years ago, and major
events that have occurred that significantly influence the environment
in which the department carries out its mission. Also, GAO summarizes
the challenges that remain and further actions that GAO believes are
needed.
This analysis should help the new Congress and the administration carry
out their responsibilities and improve government for the benefit of
the American people. For additional information about this report,
please contact Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
at
(202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
David M. Walker
Comptroller General
of the United States:
Signed by David M. Walker:
[End of section]
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
In our January 2001 report,[Footnote 1] we reported that the Department
of State faced three major performance and accountability challenges:
(1) enhancing embassy security, (2) providing expeditious visa
processing while preventing the entry of those who threaten U.S.
security or who are likely to remain in the United States illegally,
and (3) helping reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United
States. We also reported that State was facing a number of additional
challenges that hamper its ability to become a high-performing
organization. Specifically, State needed to better use the Government
Performance and Results Act (Results Act) process to help fulfill the
agency’s overall mission, policy, and operational objectives; enhance
its communications and information technology and computer systems
security; improve financial management capabilities; address human
capital issues such as workforce planning; and determine the optimal
size and composition of overseas posts (a process known as
rightsizing).
Since our January 2001 report, one major event occurred--the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks--that affected the conduct of State’s
multiple functions and activities. The September 11 attacks and the
subsequent attacks and threats against U.S. facilities overseas have
had an impact on such areas as the visa issuance process, the security
provided to U.S. facilities and personnel overseas, and the language
training offered State Department officials. Because all 19 of the
September 11 terrorist hijackers had been issued visas, State and other
agencies have introduced changes to strengthen the visa process,
including adding to its name-check system more names and information on
persons who should not receive a visa. State also has increased its
worldwide efforts to keep its facilities and personnel safe from
terrorist attack and has increased efforts to improve staff skills in
languages such as Arabic.
Furthermore, since our January 2001 report, State has taken other steps
to address some of the specific performance and management challenges
that we previously reported. For example, State has developed a long-
range overseas building plan to guide its effort to replace about 180
facilities overseas that have inadequate security. State also has
begun, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a
process to rightsize the U.S. presence overseas, particularly at its
new facilities. While this report does not include new management
challenges, it does address important major issues with the challenges
we previously identified. Specifically, the performance and
accountability challenges that State continues to face are as follows:
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Improve the Security and Maintenance of U.S. Facilities Overseas:
Protecting U.S. embassies and consulates, especially the employees and
their families, from terrorist attacks continues to be a critical
management issue; as we reported in 2001, it may be the most important
management issue that State faces. The August 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, followed by
the September 11 attacks and subsequent threats to U.S. interests
overseas, have brought into focus the seriousness of this continuing
security challenge. Shortly after the 1998 embassy bombings, State
determined that it needed not only to enhance security at all existing
facilities but, in the long term, that it needed to replace more than
180 embassies and consulates to improve security, a program it has
begun. State also has better identified its facility maintenance
requirements and has begun to address these needs.
Security Enhancements:
State has continued its efforts, begun immediately after the 1998
embassy bombings, to upgrade security at U.S. embassies and consulates
around the world. Actions to improve security have included additional
guards, hostile surveillance detection programs, the use of bomb
detection equipment and metal detectors, enhanced camera surveillance,
fully armored vehicles, improved computer technology, and in-country
security training. In addition, a number of perimeter security
enhancements have been installed, including antiram exterior walls that
are designed to prevent vehicle penetration, compound access and public
access control facilities at the perimeter wall and building entrance,
bollards, shatter-resistant window film, forced-entry doors and
windows, and exterior lighting. Figure 1 shows perimeter security
enhancements built since the 1998 bombings at the U.S. Embassy in the
Republic of Djibouti. The entrance building, where visitors are
admitted; the vehicle gate; and the concrete barriers were all added as
part of this program.
Figure 1: Security Enhancements at the Front Entrance to the U.S.
Embassy in the Republic of Djibouti:
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Although State has made these improvements and is continually seeking
new ways to enhance security, fundamental challenges remain. The major
challenge is that many diplomatic facilities do not provide sufficient
setback from busy city streets and/or are not sufficiently blast-
resistant. Therefore, they do not meet U.S. government security
standards. State’s Inspector General has determined that at most of the
overseas embassies it has inspected since September 11, security could
easily become a problem. In many cases, the only option for providing
adequate security is to replace the facilities. This will require
significant additional resources and successful implementation of key
management initiatives.
Embassy and Consulate Construction:
Since the 1998 embassy bombings, State has embarked on the largest
overseas embassy construction program in its history. State estimated
that $16 billion or more might eventually be needed for facility
replacement projects.
To guide decision-making and implementation of this building program,
State prepared a long-range overseas building plan in mid-2001 and
issued an updated plan in 2002 that covers the first part of this
replacement program.[Footnote 2] State is using the plan, which covers
fiscal years 2002-07, as a tool to inform those involved in the budget
decision-making process. According to State, the plan provides the
department’s most comprehensive listing of the U.S. government’s most
urgent overseas diplomatic and consular facility needs. The plan
encompasses more than 70 security capital projects, valued at more than
$6.2 billion, and other regular capital, rehabilitation, and
maintenance and repair needs totaling more than $2.5 billion. Each year
the plan will be rolled forward to reflect changes in requirements.
State further noted that it has instituted fundamental reforms and
operational changes in its construction program, including cutting
costs of planned construction projects, using standard designs, and
reducing construction duration through a “fast track” process. For
example, State’s cost-cutting efforts in 4 of its initial projects
allowed it to avoid about $90 million in costs. In addition, State has
established an industry advisory panel to assist in planning and
designing new diplomatic facilities. Industries represented on the
panel include construction, architecture and engineering, facilities
operations and maintenance, and environmental management.
As of December 2002, State had completed 3 embassy security
construction projects. Two more, in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, which were the targets of the 1998 bombings, are scheduled to
be opened in January 2003 with one additional embassy and one consulate
scheduled to open in April 2003. State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations (OBO) has awarded design/build contracts for 14 additional
projects. Figure 2 shows the new embassy in Doha, Qatar. Figure 3 shows
the embassy, in Tunis, Tunisia, which was opened in November 2002, and
figure 4 shows the consulate building in Istanbul, Turkey, which is
under construction.
Figure 2: New U.S. Embassy Building in Doha, Qatar:
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Figure 3: Recently Completed Embassy Building in Tunis, Tunisia:
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Figure 4: Consulate Building under Construction in Istanbul, Turkey:
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State will face three continuing challenges throughout the life of this
construction program. These challenges are determining the appropriate
size of each new facility, meeting construction schedules within
estimated costs, and ensuring that State has the internal capacity to
manage a large number of projects.
Facility Maintenance:
Our work, as well as that of State’s Inspector General, has shown that
facility maintenance has presented a long-standing infrastructure
challenge for the department. In the early 1990s, we put State’s
management of overseas real property on the high-risk list, partly
because facilities had not been sufficiently maintained. The principal
causes of these problems were lack of funding, lack of professional
attention to maintenance needs at the post level, and lack of programs
for maintenance and repair. We removed this function from the high-risk
list in 1995 because State had surveyed maintenance conditions overseas
and made some improvements. The Inspector General had stated in 1999
that funding was part of the problem, but it also reported that the
department needed to do more to address its maintenance and repair
problems as a management concern.
OBO has made a concerted effort over the last 2 years to identify and
reduce the maintenance backlog. To identify its maintenance
requirements, State is performing global condition surveys (conducted
about every 5 years); annual facility inspections conducted by each
post; and fire safety, roof, environmental health and safety, and other
specialized inspections as well as considering recommendations made by
the posts. In addition, State is using a computerized database that
tracks maintenance requirements by post, the type of work needed, and
projected funding.
As of May 2002, OBO had identified a backlog of more than $735 million
in maintenance and repair requirements. OBO has begun funding more than
$184 million in projects to reduce this backlog (the projects included
electrical upgrades, roof replacements, and fire safety improvements
such as sprinkler installation and fire alarm system installation),
leaving more than $550 million in unfunded requirements. About 55
percent of the backlog is for general maintenance and repair
requirements, and 35 percent is for fire prevention and safety
requirements; the remainder is for energy retrofitting, installing
generators and providing uninterrupted power sources, and other
projects. Given the deteriorated condition of many of its facilities,
reducing the maintenance backlog will be a continuing challenge. OBO
hopes to receive sufficient funding over the next several years to
eliminate the backlog.
Strengthen the Visa Process as an Antiterrorism Tool:
Because all 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were
issued visas, strengthening the visa function as an antiterrorism tool
has taken on great significance. In deciding who should and should not
receive a visa,[Footnote 3] State must balance the need to facilitate
legitimate travel with the need to protect the United States against
potential terrorists and to deter others whose entry is considered
likely to threaten U.S. national interests.[Footnote 4] Prior to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, State’s visa operations focused
primarily on screening applicants to determine whether they intended to
work or reside illegally in the United States. Consular officers were
encouraged to facilitate legitimate travel and, at some posts, faced
pressures to issue visas. State acknowledges the need to strengthen the
visa process.
Since the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government has introduced some
changes to strengthen the visa process. For example, State has, with
the help of other agencies, almost doubled the names and information on
persons in the lookout system.[Footnote 5] In addition, State began
seeking new or additional interagency clearances on selected applicants
to screen out terrorists, although checks were not always being
completed in a thorough or timely manner. Although these actions have
strengthened the visa process, opinions and practices among and within
overseas posts continue to diverge regarding the authority of consular
officers to deny questionable applicants a visa and the role of the
visa process in ensuring national security. Similarly, opinions and
practices differ regarding the appropriate changes to individual posts’
visa policies and procedures that need to be made given the need for
heightened border security. Figure 5 shows an example of a U.S. visa.
Figure 5: Example of a U.S. Visa:
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Although we recognize in our October 2002 report[Footnote 6] that the
establishment of the proposed Department of Homeland Security could
affect the roles and responsibilities of various entities involved in
visa processing, we recommended that State take actions to strengthen
this process because it is currently responsible for visa operations.
These recommendations focus on urgent and fundamental operational
issues. We recommended that the Secretary (1) develop a clear policy on
the priority attached to addressing national security concerns
connected with the visa process, (2) develop more comprehensive
guidance on how posts should use the visa process to screen against
potential terrorists, (3) assess staffing requirements for visa
operations, and (4) expand consular training. To address visa issues
requiring coordination and actions across several agencies, we also
recommended that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
coordinate with State and other appropriate agencies to (1) establish a
governmentwide policy on the level of evidence needed to deny a visa on
terrorism grounds, (2) reassess the various agency security checks on
visa applicants performed at their headquarters to verify that all are
necessary and are carried out promptly, (3) reexamine visa operations
on a regular basis to ensure that the operations are effectively
contributing to the overall national strategy for homeland security,
(4) ensure that intelligence and law enforcement agencies share
information with State on persons who should not receive visas, and (5)
consider reassessing previously issued visas for selected categories of
applicants who may pose security risks. State indicated that it would
use our recommendations as a roadmap for improvement within the Bureau
of Consular Affairs as well as in consular sections around the world.
It stated it has taken steps to implement a number of these
recommendations, including the first two addressed to the Secretary of
State, and plans to work closely with the Department of Homeland
Security, once established, and other security agencies to implement
other recommendations. For example, State is preparing new guidance for
visa processing that the department believes will provide greater
worldwide uniformity in the visa process. In addition, State said it
added new consular positions in fiscal year 2002 and has improved its
consular officer training by adding components on counter-terrorism
trends and visa fraud and malfeasance.
As part of its efforts to strengthen the visa process, the
administration is reviewing the use of the Visa Waiver Program[Footnote
7] because some have expressed concern that terrorists or other
criminals may exploit it to enter the United States. If countries are
removed from this program or if it is terminated, State would face a
number of management challenges concerning how to handle the increased
visa processing workload. State estimated that if the program were
eliminated, it could take 2 to 4 years to put the necessary people in
place to handle the increased workload. We estimated that the initial
costs of this effort would likely range between $739 million and $1.28
billion, depending on the percentage of the visa applicants
interviewed.[Footnote 8] Furthermore, the decision to eliminate the
program could negatively effect U.S. relations with participating
countries and U.S. tourism and business.
Continue and Enhance the Process of Rightsizing Embassy Staffing
Levels:
Since the 1998 terrorist bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa,
which resulted in more than 220 deaths and 4,000 injuries, there have
been recurring calls to rightsize the number and location of staff at
U.S. diplomatic facilities. The administration showed its support for
such efforts in the August 2001 President’s Management Agenda by
directing all agencies overseas to rightsize their presence. OMB and
State, in coordination with other U.S. agencies operating overseas, are
working to develop a process for the rightsizing of U.S. embassies.
Given the high costs of maintaining more than 60,000 Americans and
foreign nationals overseas and the continuing security vulnerabilities
of Americans worldwide, the administration’s rightsizing initiatives
aim to reconfigure U.S. overseas staff to the minimum number necessary
to meet U.S. foreign policy goals.
In July 2002, we issued a report[Footnote 9] recommending the adoption
of a general framework for rightsizing that addresses security, agency
mission, and cost considerations, and we have recommended that this
framework be used in formulating the government’s approach to
rightsizing (see fig. 6). Our framework provides a systematic approach
for assessing overseas workforce size and identifying rightsizing
options at the embassy level and for making related decisions
worldwide. By systematically developing information on security, agency
mission, and cost factors at embassies and consulates, decision-makers
could then better determine if rightsizing actions are needed either to
add or reduce staff or to change the staff mix at an embassy or
consulate.
Figure 6: Framework for Embassy Rightsizing:
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Options for reducing staff overseas could include relocating functions
to the United States or to regional centers and outsourcing functions.
Our analysis of the U.S. embassy in Paris demonstrated the framework’s
viability by highlighting security concerns that may warrant staff
reductions and by identifying options for relocating some staff to the
United States and other locations in Europe.
Rightsizing is directly related to embassy security and construction.
If there are opportunities to reduce the number of people stationed
overseas in vulnerable facilities, the number of people at risk can be
reduced. Rightsizing also affects the size and cost of new, secure
diplomatic facilities to be constructed. Therefore, it is critical that
State and other agencies comprehensively consider rightsizing elements
and options in determining overseas staffing requirements.
State and OMB testified in May 2002 that they support the development
of a rightsizing framework, and they outlined their plans to proceed
with the rightsizing initiative. Both agencies are working together to
establish a rightsized, regional presence in Frankfurt. In addition,
the agencies are undertaking an examination of overseas posts in Europe
and Eurasia. To aid both efforts, OMB, in coordination with State,
recently sent questionnaires to all chiefs of mission and agency heads
at posts within this bureau to obtain information on each post’s
mission priorities and requirements, operational costs, mission
security, and real estate. OMB’s questionnaire reflects the use of our
framework.
Better Manage Human Capital:
In January 2001, we designated strategic human capital management as a
governmentwide high-risk area. We stated that this area needs urgent
attention to ensure that our national government functions in the most
economical, efficient, and effective manner possible to ensure maximum
performance and accountability for the benefit of the American public.
Since January 2001, State has directed significant attention to
managing its human capital in an effort to address the workforce and
staffing issues that have been noted in numerous reports and studies.
State’s human capital efforts have focused on three main areas:
recruitment, training in leadership and management skills, and
workforce planning. In addition, in response to management challenges
that we and State’s Inspector General identified, State has begun to
address the staffing shortages at hardship posts and correct foreign
language shortfalls. However, State’s objective to effectively manage
its human capital remains a significant challenge.
In June 2002, we reported[Footnote 10] that because State is
understaffed relative to its permanent positions, it is difficult for
the department to ensure that it has the right people in the right
place at the right time. Moreover, State’s assignment system is not
effectively meeting the staffing needs of hardship posts, including
some of strategic importance to the United States. Because few
employees bid on positions at some hardship posts, State has difficulty
filling these positions. As a result, diplomatic programs and
management controls at hardship posts could be vulnerable and posts’
ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy objectives effectively could
be weakened. We recommended that the Secretary of State improve State’s
human resources data, determine staffing priorities, consider a
targeted hiring strategy, and develop incentives and implement actions
to steer Foreign Service employees toward serving in hardship posts.
Figure 7 identifies the countries for which the most and fewest
employees bid on assignments.
Figure 7: Countries with the Most and Fewest Bids on Assignments:
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Note: GAO analysis of State Department data.
State believes that the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative--a plan to hire
1,158 people above attrition over 3 years, which is a major thrust of
State’s human capital efforts--will address the department’s staffing
shortfalls. Underpinning the 3-year initiative is a workforce planning
system that estimates State’s staffing requirements.[Footnote 11] In
the first year of the initiative, the department met its hiring goals,
doubling the number of junior officers that it had hired the previous
year. Handling the influx of newly hired Foreign Service officers could
pose assignment, training, and mentoring challenges as State seeks to
offer these employees challenging, rewarding careers while meeting
critical service needs. State also has placed increased emphasis on
developing the leadership and management skills of its workforce,
producing a comprehensive curriculum to develop these skills throughout
a typical career.
In addition, State has begun to take actions--along the lines that we
recommended in our June 2002 report--that focus on meeting the staffing
needs of hardship posts. These actions include revising its assignment
system in an effort to ensure adequate staffing at hardship posts. The
revised system will assign employees to hardship posts first,
effectively prioritizing those posts by ensuring that most nonhardship
posts and domestic offices will not be able to compete with hardship
posts for employees. Moreover, the department continues to see positive
results from its Service Need Differential Program, which provides a
financial incentive for longer tours of service at hardship posts. More
than half of the eligible positions are filled with employees who
signed up for a 3-year tour, rather than the minimum 2-year tour. The
department also is exploring other incentives to entice more employees
to bid on assignments at hardship posts.
In a January 2002 report,[Footnote 12] we described State’s need to
better address current and projected shortages in foreign language
skills. To address its foreign language shortfalls, State plans to
provide more opportunities for language training as it hires more
people. According to State, language training hours rose about 12
percent, reflecting efforts since the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, to develop staff language skills, particularly in Arabic,
Pashtu, Farsi, and Urdu. Currently, more than 400 employees receive
language incentive pay through a program designed to encourage
employees to acquire, maintain, and use language skills that are in
short supply. In previous reports, we noted that State had difficulty
generating a consistent global aggregate measure of its actual language
shortfalls because of inadequate departmentwide data on the number of
positions filled with qualified staff. State is in the process of
correcting this deficiency.
Help to Reduce Illegal Drugs Entering the United States:
Illicit drugs, primarily cocaine and heroin, continue to threaten the
health and well-being of American citizens. The principal source of
cocaine and heroin entering the United States is South America--
especially Colombia. In 1993, the United States developed a policy
designed to reduce the production of illicit drugs in South America and
stem the flow of drugs through Central America and the Caribbean before
they reach the United States. Our work has shown that the billions of
dollars invested by the United States and foreign countries to carry
out this policy have resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers
and the seizure of large amounts of drugs. However, the availability of
drugs in the United States has not been materially reduced.
To continue to attack this problem, in July 2000, the United States
agreed to provide about $860 million to Colombia for fiscal years 2000-
01. This amount includes more than $640 million, largely administered
by the State Department, for helicopters and other equipment and for
training Colombia’s military and national police. Figure 8 shows one of
the helicopters operating in Colombia that was provided by the U.S.
government.
Figure 8: Helicopter provided to Colombia by the U.S. Government:
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State’s Office of Aviation oversees the department’s contract to
provide support services for State’s counternarcotics program in the
Andean region. Although the Office of Aviation ensured that its
contractor-run aviation program operates safely and is physically
secure, we reported that it can do more.[Footnote 13] We noted several
matters of concern that had not been resolved, including forward
operating locations in Colombia do not have emergency vehicles; manuals
for certain eradication aircraft do not reflect modifications to the
aircraft; and the airfield at one forward operating location and the
Office of Aviation’s headquarters office in Colombia were not secure.
To improve the safety and security of its aviation program, we
recommended that the Secretary of State ensure that the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs follows up on the
concerns identified in recent reviews and either complete action to
address them or document why it should not.
In a closely allied effort, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) has provided assistance to help growers of illicit
crops find legal means of earning a living. In recent years, these
activities--termed alternative development--together with U.S.-
supported interdiction and eradication programs greatly reduced the
amount of coca grown in Bolivia and Peru. Meanwhile, coca cultivation
and cocaine production increased substantially in Colombia, making it
the world’s leader in both areas. USAID began targeting Colombia’s
poppy-growing areas in 2000 and expanded its program to include coca-
growing areas in 2001. However, we reported that USAID faced serious
obstacles to achieving progress in Colombia, and the experiences in
Bolivia and Peru strongly suggested that alternative development in
Colombia would not succeed unless the obstacles are overcome.[Footnote
14] Among them, the Colombian government does not control many coca-
growing areas, it has limited capacity to carry out sustained
interdiction operations, and its ability to effectively coordinate
eradication and alternative development activities remains uncertain.
Because of these serious obstacles, we recommended that the
Administrator, USAID, update USAID’s alternative development project
plans and spending proposals for Colombia to take into the account the
extreme difficulty of gaining access to the coca-growing regions. Since
then, USAID has revamped its alternative development in coordination
with State, the Bogotá Embassy, and the Colombian government to focus
its efforts on smaller communities and areas of the country that are
more accessible.
Although most of this assistance has been delivered, illicit narcotics
production and trafficking continue largely unabated. In addition,
insurgents and paramilitary groups continue to control large parts of
Colombia. In fiscal year 2002, it received more than $380 million in
U.S. assistance for counternarcotics. For fiscal year 2003, the
administration has requested from Congress more than $530 million in
additional assistance--which State will continue to oversee--to address
many of these same purposes. In recent years, we have reported that
State has had difficulty effectively managing this assistance and
demonstrating measurable progress in reducing illicit drug activities
in Colombia. We also have continued to note that a sustained long-term
commitment will be necessary to notably reduce the level of illicit
drugs entering the United States.
Address Additional Challenges to Building a High-Performing
Organization:
Because State’s management functions provide the foundation of support
for U.S. government operations around the world, it is incumbent on the
department to strive to become a high-performing organization. To do
so, it needs to choose the best strategies for integrating its
organizational components, activities, core processes, and resources to
support mission priorities. In response to concerns that we and the
Inspector General have raised over the years, State has taken steps to
(1) enhance its communications and information technology and security,
including developing a common communications and knowledge-sharing
system; (2) improve its financial management systems; and (3) better
utilize its performance planning and reporting in accordance with the
Results Act.
Enhance Overseas Communication, Information Technology, and
Information Systems Security:
While State continues to upgrade its information technology
infrastructure and improve its system capabilities, it lacks the
ability to share information among agencies at overseas locations.
Adding to this challenge are computer security concerns identified by
us and by the independent auditor who reviewed State’s financial
statements.
To improve communications and knowledge management[Footnote 15] and
sharing among agencies overseas, State has developed a long-term plan
to acquire and deploy a common knowledge management system that is
intended to get the right information to the right people at the right
time. As part of the early phase of this program, State deployed a
pilot interagency collaboration system to all U.S. diplomatic posts in
Mexico. It has completed pilot testing this system and will now
evaluate the results to determine how well the system supports day-to-
day operations and to identify needed modifications. State expects to
begin acquiring, deploying, and implementing an operational system
worldwide when additional funding is available.
In November 2001, we reported[Footnote 16] that State’s informal
management controls would not be sufficient for acquiring and deploying
the operational system that will perform mission-critical functions. We
therefore recommended that State establish more rigorous management
controls, such as a multiagency process for acquiring and deploying the
operational system. State has not yet implemented our recommendations,
but it indicated that it plans to do so after completing the pilot and
before acquiring and deploying the system worldwide. Such controls are
necessary to ensure that the operational system will deliver needed
capabilities on time and within budget.
We reported departmentwide computer security as a management challenge
in 2001[Footnote 17] because information systems security problems that
we identified in 1998, including access control and security program
management weaknesses, persisted and posed significant challenges for
the department. State’s fiscal year 2001 independent auditor’s
report,[Footnote 18] completed in early 2002, stated that information
systems security was a material weakness that could be exploited,
possibly compromising the information State uses to prepare its
financial statements. The auditor’s report identified significant
information system security weaknesses that made the department’s
systems networks for domestic operations vulnerable to unauthorized
access. It added that although State had implemented the
recommendations we made in 1998 in fiscal year 2000, this did not
demonstrate that the material weakness in this area had necessarily
been corrected.
State subsequently performed additional access control tests that also
identified significant weaknesses. State also has initiated a program
to assess its information systems security on a comprehensive basis.
However, the independent auditor noted in its fiscal year 2001 report
that State had not tested the systems access control sufficiently
before completing its work to ensure that this weakness no longer
existed. Given the auditor’s opinion and the weaknesses that State
identified, we continue to regard information systems security as a
management challenge that State must continue to address.
Improve Financial Management Capabilities:
State continued to make progress toward resolving its long-standing
problems caused by the absence of an effective financial management
system that can assist managers in making “cost-based” decisions. Since
fiscal year 1997, State has received unqualified opinions on its
financial statements. State has steadily improved the timeliness of its
reporting and, starting with the fiscal year 2000 statements, has met
the mandated deadlines for submitting its annual financial statements.
Having also resolved a number of its internal control weaknesses, State
is proceeding with planned efforts to improve the systems and processes
it needs to protect its assets and routinely produce timely and
reliable financial information.
State needs to continue to bring its systems into full compliance with
federal financial systems requirements. To enhance the ability of its
officials to make sound decisions that promote effective and efficient
use of federal funds, State also needs to resolve internal control
weaknesses to ensure the availability of timely and reliable financial
information. According to the independent auditor’s report attached to
State’s Accountability Report for fiscal year 2001, State’s financial
management systems do not comply with certain laws and regulations,
including the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. The act requires
the development and maintenance of an integrated accounting and
financial management system. According to the act, the system should
provide complete, reliable, and timely information that meets the
financial information needs of an agency’s management, and it should
provide a systematic measurement of performance.
Better Utilize Performance Planning and Reporting:
The Results Act provides a framework for resolving management
challenges and for providing greater accountability of State’s programs
and operations. As required by the Results Act, State has clearly
articulated its strategic and diplomatic readiness goals of regional
security, economic growth, and more. Our review of State’s performance
plan for 2002 showed a significant improvement over its plan for the
previous fiscal year. However, State’s annual performance report for
fiscal year 2000 showed many of the weaknesses that we noted in our
review of State’s 1999 performance report, particularly a failure to
show clear progress toward accomplishing performance goals.
State’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan was a significant improvement
over previous Results Act products. For the 2002 plan, State developed
a unified, agencywide approach to replace the regional focus it had
used in the previous year’s plan. This approach resulted in more
clarity and the elimination of redundant material, and the report more
clearly linked the various desired outcomes, performance goals,
strategies, and performance indicators. However, some weaknesses
remain, such as the output (rather than outcome) orientation of many
indicators, vague performance targets, and a lack of clear descriptions
of how State’s efforts relate to the efforts of other agencies and of
where interagency activity is taking place. State Department officials
commented that they are making further improvements to the performance
planning process, including making the performance indicators more
outcome-oriented and the targets more explicit and outlining the
resources the department anticipates spending on each strategic goal.
Some of these improvements are reflected in a recently issued
performance plan for fiscal year 2003. State said it would be making
additional improvements in a performance plan and report to be issued
in early 2003.
From our analysis of State’s fiscal year 2000 performance report, it
was difficult to determine the level of progress toward accomplishing
performance goals. Because of a lack of linkages between activity-based
performance indicators and desired outcomes, the 2000 performance
report did not always clearly describe what State sought to accomplish.
Also, as in past years, it failed to report on many indicators
prescribed by the performance plan for 2000. However, the department
stated that in the 2002 performance report it would report on every
indicator. Furthermore, the report did not adequately explain why it
did not address certain indicators, why expectations were not met on
others, and what strategies would be used to achieve the unmet and
unreported targets. As a result, we recommended[Footnote 19] that in
future years, State report on all performance goals and indicators
outlined in corresponding performance plans, explain clearly and
specifically why it did not achieve goals and targets, and discuss
actions that it will take to achieve the unmet goals.
State agreed with our assessment and has since made strides in
addressing our recommendation. For its 2001 performance report, State
made a greater effort to report on all indicators for the performance
goals outlined in its 2001 performance plan. In addition, State made a
greater effort to discuss the reasons why it did not meet some
performance targets and the strategies it would use to reach these
goals. Probably because of the vague performance goals and targets set
in the performance plan for 2001, the information that State reported
for some targets is still insufficient to assess its progress toward
achieving its goals.
[End of section]
GAO Contacts:
Subject(s) covered in this report: Improve the security and maintenance
of U.S. facilities overseas; ; Strengthen the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool; ; Continue and enhance the process of rightsizing
embassy staffing levels; ; Better manage human capital; ; Help reduce
illegal drugs entering the United States; ; Better utilize performance
planning and reporting; Contact person: Jess T. Ford, Director;
International Affairs and Trade; (202) 512-4268; fordj@gao.gov.
Subject(s) covered in this report: Enhance overseas communication and
information technology; Contact person: Joel C. Willemssen, Managing
Director; Information Technology; (202) 512-6408; willemssenj@gao.gov.
Subject(s) covered in this report: Enhance information systems
security; Contact person: Robert F. Dacey, Director; Information
Technology; (202) 512-3317; dacey@gao.gov.
Subject(s) covered in this report: Improve financial management
capabilities; Contact person: Gregory D. Kutz, Director; Financial
Management and Assurance; (202) 512-9095; kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Overseas Security, Presence, and Facilities:
Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can
Support Rightsizing Initiatives. GAO-02-780. Washington, D.C.: July 26,
2002.
Current Law Limits the State Department’s Authority to Manage Certain
Overseas Properties Cost Effectively. GAO-02-790R. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2002.
State Department: Sale of Unneeded Overseas Property Has Increased, but
Further Improvements Are Necessary. GAO-02-590. Washington, D.C.: June
11, 2002.
Overseas Presence: Observations on a Rightsizing Framework.
GAO-02-659T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2002.
Overseas Presence: More Work Needed on Embassy Rightsizing.
GAO-02-143. Washington, D.C.: November 27, 2001.
State Department: Decision to Retain Embassy Parking Lot in Paris,
France, Should Be Revisited. GAO-01-477. Washington, D.C.: April 13,
2001.
Embassy Construction: Better Long-Term Planning Will Enhance Program
Decision-making. GAO-01-11. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2001.
State Department: Overseas Emergency Security Program Progressing, but
Costs Are Increasing. GAO/NSIAD-00-83. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000.
Visa Issuance:
Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program.
GAO-03-38. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.
Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2002.
Visa Issuance: Observations on the Issuance of Visas for Religious
Workers. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-207. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2000.
Drug Control:
Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit
Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles.
GAO-02-291. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2002.
Drug Control: State Department Provides Required Aviation Program
Oversight, but Safety and Security Should Be Enhanced. GAO-01-1021.
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2001.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce
Results. GAO-01-26. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2000.
Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia. GAO-01-76T.
Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2000.
Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. GAO/
NSIAD-00-90R. Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2000.
Human Capital Management:
State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts. GAO-02-626.
Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002.
Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing
and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2002.
Information Management:
Information Technology: State Department Led Overseas Modernization
Program Faces Management Challenges. GAO-02-41. Washington, D.C.:
November 16, 2001.
Electronic Signature: Sanction of the Department of State’s System.
GAO/AIMD-00-227R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2000.
Foreign Affairs: Effort to Upgrade Information Technology Overseas
Faces Formidable Challenges. GAO/T-AIMD/NSIAD-00-214. Washington,
D.C.: June 22, 2000.
Strategic and Performance Planning and Foreign Affairs Management:
Department of State: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing
Major Management Challenges. GAO-02-42. Washington, D.C.: December 7,
2001.
Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks, Department of State. GAO-01-252. Washington, D.C.:
January 2001.
Observations on the Department of State’s Fiscal Year 1999 Performance
Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan. GAO/NSIAD-00-189R.
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2000.
[End of section]
Performance and Accountability and High-Risk Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-03-95.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Agriculture. GAO-03-96.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce.
GAO-03-97.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education.
GAO-03-99.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy.
GAO-03-100.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services. GAO-03-101.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing
and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-03-104.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice.
GAO-03-105.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor.
GAO-03-106.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State.
GAO-03-107.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-03-108.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Treasury. GAO-03-109.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs. GAO-03-110.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for
International Development. GAO-03-111.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency. GAO-03-112.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency. GAO-03-113.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. GAO-03-114.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel
Management. GAO-03-115.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business
Administration. GAO-03-116.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration. GAO-03-117.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service.
GAO-03-118.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-121.
High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of State, GAO-01-252 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001).
[2] State expects to release the next updated plan in February 2003.
[3] State issued 7.6 million nonimmigrant visas in fiscal year 2001;
another 1.1 million people were granted immigrant status. In addition,
during each of the last 3 fiscal years, there were more than 16 million
admissions (this figure does not include Canada) into the United States
of citizens from visa waiver countries for which a visa was not
required.
[4] A primary role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is to
determine at the port of entry whether the visa holder is to be
admitted to the United States and, if so, how long he or she may remain
in the country.
[5] In deciding who should receive a visa, State relies on its consular
“lookout” system, a name-check system that incorporates information
from many agencies, as the primary basis for identifying potential
terrorists.
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process
Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[7] Under the Visa Waiver Program, citizens of 28 countries are not
required to obtain a visa to enter the United States for visits of less
than 90 days.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Implications of
Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
22, 2002).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Framework for
Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives,
GAO-02-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Staffing
Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic
Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2002).
[11] This workforce planning system, developed by State, includes an
overseas staffing model (already in use) to predict post staffing
requirements and a domestic staffing model that is nearing completion.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital
Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-
375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: State Department
Provides Required Aviation Program Oversight, but Safety and Security
Should Be Enhanced, GAO-01-1021 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2001).
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Efforts to Develop
Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little
Progress and Face Serious Challenges, GAO-02-291 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 8, 2002).
[15] Knowledge management involves the use of business processes and
intellectual and technological assets to promote and provide for
collaboration and information exchange.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: State
Department Led Overseas Modernization Program Faces Management
Challenges, GAO-02-41 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001).
[17] GAO-01-252.
[18] U.S. Department of State, Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2001
(Washington, D.C.: February 2002). The independent auditor’s report is
included in State’s Accountability Report.
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of State: Status of
Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges, GAO-
02-42 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 7, 2001).
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