Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume
E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972

258. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Camp David, September 24, 1972, 11:37-11:52
a.m.12

Camp David, September 24,
1972, 11:37-11:52
a.m.

Kissinger: We have a problem in
Uganda and I--

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: The problem is this.
The British are very worried that there may be a massacre of 7,000--

Nixon: British?

Kissinger: --British they've got
there, and they're scattered all over the country.

Nixon: Of course.

Kissinger: And they would like to
have some secret talks with us about some logistics help.

Nixon: Sure. We'll have them.

Kissinger: They've tried it
earlier this week and State has turned them down--

Nixon: Screw State! State's
always on the side of the blacks. The hell with them!

Kissinger: Well, I--

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: I knew this would be
your reaction--

Nixon: Well, I just can't
understand why we haven't had them before. You know, like that thing on
Burundi.

Now I want State's ass reamed out on that for not--

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: --for not--Henry, in the
whole Burundi business--I've been watching it in, in the press. Did you
know, State has not sent one memorandum over to us on it?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: Or have they? Have
there--or have you had something that I haven't seen?

Kissinger: No, no. They have
not.

Nixon: Well, how do you feel
about it?

Kissinger: Well I--

Nixon: Don't you really feel--I
mean, and just be--let's be totally honest. Isn't a person a person
goddammit? You know, there are those that, you know, they talk about
Vietnam, these people far away that we don't know. And you remember that
poor old Chamberlain talk about the Czechs. That they were far away, and
“we don't know them very well.” Well now, goddammit, people are people
in my opinion.

Kissinger: Well, it's not only
that--

Nixon: I don't mean our national
interests gets involved. But every time, every time that anybody else
gets involved--you know, every time that--one other individual or us,
and you have a little pressure group here, State goes up the wall. But
I'm getting tired of this business of letting these Africans eat a
hundred thousand people and do nothing about it.

Kissinger: And it's--and when
they have--and all these, these bleeding hearts in this country who say
we like to kill yellow people--

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: We have--there hasn't
been as many killed in the eight years of the war as were killed in
three months in Burundi.

Nixon: Henry, the whole point
is--and also--well it's, it's the thing that Agnew stuck to [laughter],
stuck to McGovern where Agnew pointed out--now, now they're talking
about how many we have bombed in the North. And I've told your staff to
get the figures for me. How many, how many South Vietnamese or
anti-communist North Vietnamese have been killed by the North Vietnamese
government? Civilians--how many? It's unbelievable.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Nobody gives a damn.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: And, and that's what
it's--they, they're involved in. I know what the Uganda thing is. What
it is--it's just like Burundi. The State--Newsom's attitude--the
attitude of State is to be for whatever black government is in power. Is
my--right or wrong?

Kissinger: One hundred percent
right.

Nixon: And that was--and that,
basically Henry, was the problem on Nigeria. Now frankly, I was on the
side of the Biafras then. Not just--not because of Catholics. And you
were too. Not because of Catholics but-- State was on the side of the
Nigerian government. Why? Because they said, well, “all the other
governments would come apart.” Well frankly, I'm almost to the opinion
myself--and this is far down the road, we need a new African policy. But
first of all, we shouldn't have 42 ambassadors to these goddamn
countries. In the second place--I mean, you know, at the same level as
anybody else--in the second place, my own view is that some federations
down there are what are needed, or something. I don't know. But, but we
can talk about that later. But at the present time, looking at Uganda,
of course we've got to help those 7,000 people. I asked Rogers about this when we met with
Bush.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: You--were you there?

Kissinger: Yes, I was there.

Nixon: Well you remember, I said,
“what about this?” He said, “well we've got a plan to evacuate the
Americans.” Well now, that's a fine howdy do. What the hell are the damn
British going to do? 7,000 of them. They'll be murdered.

Kissinger: Well, what, the
way--

Nixon: Isn't that really the
problem or not?

Kissinger: That is exactly the
problem.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And, and the British
are in the bush. All of ours are in Entebbe. And actually, they haven't
turned against ours so much yet, but they--

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: --have turned against
the British.

Nixon: No. I understand.

Kissinger: Now--

Nixon: Well, who--

Kissinger: --I would recommend,
Mr. President--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: --that in order to
keep this thing from turning into a, a huge leak, is that--

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: --to send a Defense
Department man over--a civilian, not a military guy.

Nixon: Well, we've got anybody we
can trust?

Kissinger: Well, that can even
leak, if necessary, and say all he's empowered to discuss is the
logistics -

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: --in--if there has to
be a joint evacuation. Now, no one can blame us for that. Then we can
tell the British we can use that as a base. If they have further
requests, to take them up here in Washington.

Nixon: --and put it at a--I don't
care whether it's at a high level. You mean you'd--they'd start killing,
is that it?

Kissinger: One is, they might
start killing. Second, we might get a tremendous uproar that we are
planning a military campaign.

Nixon: Okay. Okay.

Kissinger: While we can achieve
most of it by using--in fact, we can achieve all of it--and we can alert
Goodpastor to start looking to his assets. That we can do on an
independent--

Nixon: Well, I think you should
take--tell Goodpastor--look, NATO's sitting over there on its ass doing
nothing anyway. Why don't we tell Goodpastor to, to get all the assets
for the purpose of evacuation that we can have? Right?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: In other words, NATO
assets. Let's let the NATO countries do it.

Kissinger: I think that's a good
idea. We can get Goodpastor to pay a visit. He--it's--

Nixon: I just kind of feel that's
a good idea.

Kissinger: Well, he can pay it a
NATO visit.

Nixon: A NATO visit. Right. And
then tell him in confidence that I want him to discuss this matter of
assets with him. You know, Goodpastor will love having something to do.
How's that sound to you?

Kissinger: Well, somebody out of
Nutter's [unclear]. I thought
we, we would pick a low-key guy. Just to get the facts. Right now we
don't even have the facts--

Nixon: Could we get--how about
somebody--well, why don't we--better still, why don't we just have
somebody from your office go over who knows these people.

Kissinger: Well, I'm--

Nixon: You're afraid that
we'll--that I'll get in it then, huh?

Kissinger: No, I'm afraid
in--with the campaign going on--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I think the major
thing now is to get information, but Goodpastor's an excellent idea.

Nixon: No reason why he can't,
can--is there?

Kissinger: No. That's an
excellent thought.

Nixon: You see, the problem is
that if we, that--I agree, that if we get in it they'll say we're trying
to get it. But, on the other hand, we have got to, we've got to be
prepared to help the British. We can't have a British slaughter down
there. The British have got enough problems.

Kissinger: Absolutely, and it's
a--it would be a disgrace anyway.

Nixon: Have they asked
[unclear]?

Kissinger: Well, they sent a
personal message to you at midnight last night because they--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: --were stonewalled by
the State Department all week--

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Kissinger: --asking whether we
could start some secret technical talks in London.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And that's what I
think we should respond to. I like this Goodpastor idea.

Nixon: Yeah, why don't you, why
don't you on our private channel get a hold of them and say that
Goodpastor will be paying a NATO visit, but that he has private
instructions from me to discuss on a secret basis what the hell we can
do. How's that sound to you?

Kissinger: That sounds
excellent.

Nixon: And, and then you call
Andy and you say, “Now Andy, you've got to deny this. This conversation
never took place. But by god, we--we're not going to let these people be
destroyed by these people.” Let's do that. That'll reassure the British.
They just want to know privately what we're--

Kissinger: Actually, I could meet
Andy in Paris and give it to him orally. That would--

Nixon: Very good. Very good. But
you could let--you should let the British know that we've talked about
it, and that Goodpastor thing. And then you--if you want to send the
defense guy, you can. Only thing is--

Kissinger: I think you should
send somebody overt.

Nixon: Yeah. All right.

Kissinger: Because then
we--that's the--

Nixon: Overt we'll say for the
purpose of evacuating Americans and British.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nixon: Isn't it awful though what
these--that this Goddamn guy at the head of Uganda, Henry, is an
ape.

Kissinger: He's an ape without
education.

Nixon: That's probably no
disadvantage. I mean that--

Kissinger: [laughter]

Nixon: I mean, you figure that
that asshole that was the head of Ghana had a brilliant education in the
United States.

Nixon: But, but the same with
Burundi. But can--I really, really got to shake up the Africa--while all
the departments--but the Africa department at State, Henry, is a
disgrace.

Kissinger: Oh, the whole--

Nixon: When I receive those--you
know, I receive ambassadors. All I receive is Africa--three out of four
every time are African ambassadors. They're nice little guys, and so
forth and so on, but they don't add anything.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I mean, it--and, and State
just treats them--I mean, what, what do you think they're up to? What is
our African policy? Will you tell me?

Kissinger: Our African policy--I
just took a paragraph out of a speech--Rogers was happy to accept this, no disrespect to
Rogers. But this guy
Patterson had two paragraphs in the--in Roger's U.N. speech--

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: --which was an all-out
attack on South Africa--

Nixon: No sir.

Kissinger: --on Mozambique--

Nixon: Never. Never.

Kissinger: --and they are
anti-white in Africa. They are, they are obsessively liberal. But you
don't hear them say a peep --you, you know, when one of these
governments is, is not fully democratic that they don't like, they
scream. But when they murder people in Burundi, when there's--get a
fellow in, in Uganda has a reign of terror, you don't ever get a
protest.

Nixon: Yeah. Now, on, on Burundi,
State underestimated, and I know that your people were using it. Do you
use the figure 100,000? I understand it's 200,000. Now I want the
Belgian ambassador--do you know him? Here in Washington.

Kissinger: I, I've met him, I
don't know--

Nixon: He's a decent fellow?

Kissinger: He's a decent guy.
Yeah.

Nixon: All right. I want you
or--you're the one to do it. You call him in, and--it'd be a very nice
touch anyway--and just say, “on a private basis, we'd like to note your
estimate of what the hell's happened in Burundi.” I really want to know.
I don't mean there's anything we're going to do about it. Nothing is
going to come out of it.

Kissinger: But we ought to know
it.

Nixon: But, but you know, let's
get it from the Belgians. Don't you agree?

Kissinger: I agree
completely.

Nixon: I mean, the--on this one,
though--now that you mention Patterson, he's one that's going to go the
day after the election. That son-of-a-bitch has done things in--I mean
he's--

Kissinger: It's an intolerable
situation. Every time we want to do something we have to worry how we
can finagle it --

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: --so that it doesn't
leak. Now we've got another month where we've got to put up with it.

Nixon: That's all. Well you'll do
this then--

Kissinger: Immediately.

Nixon: And don't you think
that--who, who will you call? You'll call Burke Trend or?

Kissinger: I'll first call
Cromer.

Nixon: Cromer. Oh yeah. Okay.
Well he's--he'll keep it.

Kissinger: He'll keep it.
Absolutely.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: Because he delivered
the message.

Nixon: Call Cromer. That's the
better way to do it anyway. Tell him to pass it to the - that I'm
outraged by the whole damn thing. That naturally we've got to handle it
in a very discreet way. And that we're going to do it two ways. We're
going to send Andy over on a, on a official visit, and that the British
should - for discussion of NATO problems. And that we're going to send a
defense guy over overtly. Right?

Kissinger: Right.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Africa]

Nixon: But anyway, this is good.
I'm glad--I think it's good to let the British know we're going to help.
Then, you might give the Belgian ambassador a call and say, “Don't,
don't report this but that the president wants to know what the hell
went on and for him--set it up for when, for Wednesday or Thursday of
next week. Would you do it?

Kissinger: I shall certainly do
it.

Nixon: I want to know what
happened in Burundi. And I want the real cold-cock on that. Just, just
you know, for future reference.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: Because in these African
governments and the rest, the idea that we're going to stand still on
the ground that any African government that was--overthrew a colonial
power thereby becomes lily white by our, by our standards and thereby
beyond criticism is ridiculous. This damn double standard is just
unbelievable.

Kissinger: Out of the
question.

National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Camp David Secretary's
Table, Conversation No. 154-7. This transcript was prepared in the
Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. No
classification marking.↩

In their lengthy
conversation on Uganda and Burundi, Nixon and Kissinger discussed possible actions to evacuate
American and British citizens from Uganda.↩