Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Monroe Ace Setser appeals the district
court's imposition of a federal sentence that runs
consecutively to an undischarged state sentence. Because the
imposition of a consecutive sentence is fully within the
district court's authority, and because we conclude that the
sentence is otherwise reasonable and not illegal, we find no
error in the district court's sentencing of defendant.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Monroe Ace Setser pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding and
abetting. At the time he committed the instant offense, Setser
was still serving a five-year term of probation in state court
for a previous 2006 state offense. Additionally in 2007, Setser
had been charged in state court with possession with intent to
deliver a controlled substance — an offense that was
directly related to the instant federal offense of conviction.

Following Setser's entry of a guilty plea, the federal district
court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment. At the
time of sentencing, the district court stated that the 151
months were to be served consecutively to any sentence imposed
as a result of his 2006 state offense and concurrently with any
sentence imposed pursuant to his 2007 state offense. Setser
timely appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court's
sentence was illegal since 18 U.S.C. § 3584 does not grant
the district court the authority to impose a federal
[*130]
sentence consecutively to an undischarged state
sentence.

Subsequent to the district court's imposition of the federal
sentence, Setser's probation in his 2006 state case was revoked
by the state court, and he was sentenced to five years of
imprisonment. Additionally, Setser was convicted of possession
with intent to deliver a controlled substance in the 2007 state
charge, and as a result, he was sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment. The state court ordered that these two state
sentences would run concurrently to one another.

On April 12, 2010, the United States moved pursuant to
Fed.R.App.P. 10(e)(2)(C) & (e)(3) to supplement the record
with documents showing that the Texas prison system released
Setser and that he is now in the custody of the federal Bureau
of Prisons ("BOP"). Consequently, after serving only
two-and-a-half years in the state system on both of his 2006
and 2007 state sentences, Setser is now in BOP custody.
Setser's Texas parole documents show that he was released from
state custody on March 17, 2010. The BOP's "Public Information
Inmate [**2] Data" sheet indicates that Setser's federal sentence
began to run on March 17, 2010. The BOP did not award Setser
any credit for the two and-a-half years he spent in state
custody.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A sentence is ultimately reviewed for `unreasonableness.'"
United States v. Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 472 (5th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Smith,
440 F.3d 704, 705 (5th Cir. 2006)). "Under Booker, it is the
sentence itself, including its consecutive nature, that is
ultimately reviewed for reasonableness." Id. at 472-73
(quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261,
125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). Here, where the
Defendants Appellant is only challenging the imposition of a
consecutive sentence, and not the district court's application
or calculation of the Guidelines themselves, "the appellate
court should . . . consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard."
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586,
169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); see also Candia,
454 F.3d at 474 ("We have determined that unreasonableness is the standard
of review applicable to a consecutive sentence imposed both
within a properly calculated sentencing range and pursuant to
the applicable guidelines for imposition of a consecutive
sentence."). Accordingly, this Court reviews the reasonableness
of the district court's imposition of a consecutive sentence
for abuse of discretion.

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Setser contends that the district court erred by
relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3584 as authority to order his
sentence to run consecutively to his undischarged state
sentence in his 2006 state conviction. He acknowledges that
this argument is foreclosed by the Court's decision in
United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th
Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Candia,
454 F.3d at 472-73, where this Court held that "[w]hether a
sentence imposed should run consecutively or concurrently [to
an undischarged state sentence] is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court, subject to consideration of
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."

Setser offers several arguments as to why this Court should now
revisit its decision in Brown. First, Setser notes
that the circuits are split on this issue, [fn1] and he
[*131]
contends that Brown does not comport with the text
of 18 U.S.C. § 3584 or its legislative history. Finally,
Setser contends that the sentencing factors in § 3553(a)
and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 run contrary to Brown, as do
considerations of comity.

Even if we were to find Setser's arguments compelling, we are
bound by Brown's precedent as "[i]t is a firm rule of
this circuit that in the absence of an intervening contrary or
superseding decision by this court sitting en banc or by the
United States Supreme Court, a panel cannot overrule a prior
panel's decision." Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,
187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, there are only two ways in
which Brown's, posture as binding precedent in this
Court could change: 1) an intervening decision by the Supreme
Court or 2) a superseding decision by this Court sitting en
banc. The Supreme Court, to date, has issued no intervening
decision. Further, this Court has recently declined the
opportunity to reconsider Brown en banc.[fn2] Because
Brown is the law of this Court, we conclude that the
district court had the authority to-and therefore did not abuse
[**3] its discretion by — imposing a consecutive federal
[*132]
sentence to a yet imposed state sentence.

Despite the district court's authority to issue a consecutive
sentence, Setser argues that his consecutive sentence is
unreasonable because he asserts that his federal sentence is
now logically impossible to carry out — as a result of
the state court's decision to run his two state sentences
concurrently. Setser contends that either the consecutive or
the concurrent sentence must be given priority, and that it is
not clear from the record what the district court fully
intended. Initially, Setser asserted that once he was
transferred to federal custody, the BOP would not be able to
correctly calculate his sentence as a result of this inherent
ambiguity. Setser therefore requested that this Court declare
his consecutive sentence unreasonable and either reverse and
remand for re-sentencing, or strike the consecutive sentence
and order that his 151 months be served concurrently to both
state sentences. Finding no error in the district court's
sentence, we decline to reverse or remand for re-sentencing.

A sentence may be illegal if it is "`ambiguous with respect to
the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally
self-contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by
statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the statute or is
a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not
authorize.'" United States v. Dougherty,
106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991)).
"Criminal sentences must `reveal with fair certainty the intent
of the court to exclude any serious misapprehensions by those
who must execute them.'" United States v. Garza,
448 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363, 46 S.Ct. 156, 70 L.Ed. 309
(1926)). In the present case, however, there is nothing plainly
self-contradictory or uncertain about the sentence in and of
itself. Quite to the contrary, the federal sentence alone is
quite clear. Any ambiguity in the district court's sentence was
not introduced until after the state court ordered Setser's two
state sentences to run concurrently.

It is important to note that Setser's "contention that the
sentence is `impossible' to fulfill stems not from an inherent
flaw on the face of the court's sentencing papers, . . . but
from the very practical problems that arise in carrying out
over-lapping state and federal sentences in a dual
sovereignty." United States v. Cibrian,
[2010 BL 63910], 2010 WL 1141676, *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 24, 2010) (unpublished). That is, in
Cibrian, this Court noted that "[t]he
irreconcilability of [a defendant's] federal and state
sentences is a well-documented practicality of our system of
contemporaneous jurisdiction." Id. at *7. As a result
of this dual system of jurisdiction, in some instances —
as in here — it is "the federal sentence [that may be]
partially foiled, [and] in other cases, it is the state
sentence that suffers the intrusion." Id. A
subsequently issued state court sentence, therefore, does not
render an otherwise legal federal sentence illegal.

Furthermore, now that Setser is in the custody of the BOP, and
the BOP has determined that Setser is not [**4] entitled to any
credit for the time he spent in state custody, we are currently
without the power or the authority to order the BOP to
calculate Setser's sentence in any certain manner. Notably,
"the United States Supreme Court [has] held that § 3585(b)
does not authorize a . . . court to compute credit for time
spent in official detention at sentencing, but [rather,] credit
awards are to be made by the Attorney General, through the
Bureau of Prisons, after sententing."
[*133]United States v. Bowling, 962 F.2d 390, 393 (5th
Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Wilson,
503 U.S. 329, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992)). In the event that
a prisoner feels he has been improperly refused credit for time
he has served in state custody, the prisoner must first "seek
administrative review of the computations of [his] credit, and,
once [he has] exhausted [his] administrative remedies, [the]
prisone[r] may only then pursue judicial review of
these computations." Id. (citing Wilson,
503 U.S. at 335, 112 S.Ct. 1351; 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.16
(1990)) (internal citations omitted); see also Lundy v.Osborn, 555 F.2d 534, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[G]rievances
of prisoners concerning prison administration should be
presented to the Bureau [of Prisons] through the available
administrative channels. Only after such remedies are exhausted
will the court entertain the application for relief in an
appropriate case.").[fn3]

Thus, although his appeal began as a challenge to the ambiguity
regarding how the BOP might interpret and carry out the
district court's sentence, the BOP has subsequently interpreted
and carried out the sentence. The BOP's interpretation of
Setser's sentence, however, is not properly before this Court.
At this juncture, should Setser wish to contest the BOP's
denial of credit for the time he served in state custody,
Setser must first pursue his administrative remedies pursuant
to 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.16 (2002).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the district
court's imposition of a consecutive sentence was well within
the district court's authority pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3584, and as a result, the district court's sentence was not
illegal or unreasonable. Accordingly, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion, and we AFFIRM. All pending
motions are denied.

[fn1] The Eleventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Fifth Circuits have
held that § 3584 authorizes district courts to order a
federal sentence to run consecutively to an undischarged state
sentence. See United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502,
1507 (11th Cir. 1993) ("[A] district court [has] the authority
to impose a federal sentence consecutive to an unrelated,
un-imposed state sentence on pending charges."); UnitedStates v. Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2001)
("[T]he authority to impose such a federal sentence to be
served consecutively to a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence
falls within the broad discretion granted to the court.");
United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57, 59 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that "no language in section 3584(a) prohibit[s]
a district court from ordering that a federal sentence be
served consecutively to a state sentence that has not yet been
imposed."); United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212,
1216 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that "whether a sentence imposed
should run consecutively or concurrently is committed to the
sound discretion of the district court, subject to
consideration of the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."). In contrast, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits have held that a federal district court does
not have such discretion or authority. Cf. United States v.Donoso, 521 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2008) (determining "that
under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), the district court was not
authorized to direct that the federal sentence run
consecutively to [an undischarged] state sentence.");
United States v. Smith, All F.3d 222, 225 (4th
Cir. 2006) ("The plain language of this statute does not grant a
district court authority to order that its sentence run
consecutively to a future sentence."); Romandine v. UnitedStates, 206 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Neither
§ 3584(a) nor any other statute of which we are aware authorizes
a federal judge to declare that his sentence must run
consecutively to some sentence that may be imposed in the
future."); United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038,
1039-40 (6th Cir. 1998) ("We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)
does not authorize district courts to order a sentence to be
served consecutively to a notyet-imposed state sentence.");
United States v. Clayton, 927 F.2d 491, 492-93 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding "[t]hat a federal court may not direct a
federal sentence to be served consecutive to a state sentence
not yet imposed. . . .") .

[fn2] In United States v. Garcia-Espinoza,
325 Fed.Appx. 380, 380-82 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished), this Court
rejected a defendant's challenge to his consecutive sentence,
holding that his "challenge is foreclosed by our prior
precedent." However, in light of the circuit split concerning a
district court's discretion to order a federal sentence to run
consecutively to an undischarged state sentence. Judge Owen and
Judge Dennis, in their joint concurrence, recommended that the
Court revisit the Brown holding en banc. Id.
at 382. Yet when Garcia-Espinoza filed a motion for rehearing
en banc, "[n]o member of the panel nor judge in regular active
service on the court . . . requested that the court be polled"
on a rehearing en banc. As a result, the Court denied the
defendant-appellant's motion on April 13, 2009. Thus, given
this Court's recent refusal to reconsider Brown en
banc, any future reversal of the Court's decision in
Brown is best left to the discretion of our Supreme
Court.

[fn3] This Court has previously dismissed a prisoner's appeal
of the BOP's interpretation and calculation of his sentence if
the prisoner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
That is, once a prisoner has exhausted his administrative
remedies, he may "fil[e] a pro se petition for habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the BOP's computation
of his sentence. . . ." Dominguez v. Williamson,
251 F.3d 156, 2001 WL 300705, at *2 (5th Cir. 2001). However, "this
court has determined that a § 2241 petitioner must first
exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of
Prisons." Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir.
1993).