The American military, mindful that Marines have spent most of their time in the deserts of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan since 2001, said the goal was “to revitalize, refine, and strengthen fundamental amphibious capabilities and reinforce the Navy and Marine Corps role as ‘fighters from the sea.'”

The lack of practice at a craft that is immensely complex (amphibious assault) and requires extensive planning and rehearsal has been a concern of the Marine Corps for most of the past decade. Many junior Officers and SNCOs have never been afloat, let alone had anything to do with amphibious operations. Landing plans, serial assignment tables, scheduled, on-call, and unscheduled waves are terms unfamiliar to most. Fire support planning in amphibious operations, challenging in the best of circumstances, must now be done in an environment of austere Naval surface fires.

The BOLD ALLIGATOR exercises, and the war games that reinforce them (EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR, etc.) will introduce those younger Marines to the art of projecting power ashore from the sea. Shortfalls in capabilities and capacity will be identified, new methods developed to leverage modern platforms, and assumptions either validated or proven incorrect. The bugaboo of every amphibious operation, the command relationship between CATF/CLF, will be examined anew.

The addition of our French allies in this exercise is crucial, as the interoperability of international forces in a coalition operation is always a challenge. Lessons on doctrine, equipment requirements and capabilities, as well as the personal command relationships between seniors, make for more lethal and efficient combat forces.

The landings in North Carolina and Virginia are not being conducted in a vacuum, either:

When asked by reporters last week, Harvey acknowledged that the exercise scenario was “certainly informed by recent history” and that it was “applicable” to the Strait of Hormuz, as well as other areas.

Harvey also said the exercise incorporated lessons from the 2006 Lebanon conflict, when Iran-backed Hezbollah forces hit an Israeli navy corvette with an anti-ship missile.

This event was important enough to have CNO Admiral Greenert in attendance, and highlights a significant shift in the Navy’s views regarding its role in the amphibious power projection mission. While always publicly supporting the Navy-Marine Corps team, the unofficial position of the Navy toward this mission seemed decidedly luke-warm and was at odds with the Marine Corps over requirements and resources. This is good news for Naval forces whose focus will be the western Pacific. One can bet a paycheck that the USN and USMC will be scribbling furiously, taking copious notes. Lessons will be learned, training will be invaluable.

And best of all, an entirely new generation of Marines will be introduced to the smell of paint, exhaust fumes, crude oil, salt water spray, and vomit that are indelibly etched on every Marine who has climbed down the cargo net, ridden the tuna boats off the well deck through the surf, or splashed ashore from the LCUs. The more things change, the more they remain the same.

“The bugaboo of every amphibious operation, the command relationship between CATF/CLF, will be examined anew”

It is interesting that in the Falklands Campaign, which Admiral Harvey picked as a useful historical study leading up to Bold Alligator, the UK command organization was confused but it worked because everyone worked together, kept their egos in check, and focused on the mission. On the other hand, the Argentine command structure, which was crystal clear on paper, failed miserably because of interservice issues.

The developing concepts of OMFTS/STOM and Distributed Operations promise a myriad of new and unique command structure challenges to be overcome in the future. Although the command relationships are, at least in theory, pretty straight forward and CATF, CLF, and their staffs are, at least in theory, composed of mature, educated adults with the mission as their primary goal, this always seems to be the biggest problem, doesn’t it. I am sure Bold Alligator will once again confirm that the right people at every level is still the most critical requirement.

On a different subject, I am surprised to see that they have not integrated MPS assets into the scenario given the size and scope of the exercise. Given the limited amphibious shipping even a 2.0 MEB footprint provides, it is virtually unthinkable that a MEB sized operation would be conducted without extensive utilization of MPS support. Maybe next time.

Diogenes of NJ

How much do you want to bet that they make the Marine Corps put the boldness on hold and get on board with this:

I think the limiting factor in not including MPS was $$$$. Which isn’t to say that they are not notionally employed for planning purposes. That much I don’t know. They may well be, but I think we will have to wait until an UNCLAS AAR comes out.

ADM J. C. Harvey, Jr USN

USNVO, one of the “boundary conditions” for BA 12 was that LT GEN Hejlik and I needed to work with the forces under our control and stay within our operating budgets. So while we couldn’t get MPS into the fight, we had quite a bit of our Military Sealift Command in the exercise with these very capable ships participating in all aspects of BA 12 in very significant ways – I’m sure it’ll be very interesting to read about when we get the AARs and lessons-learned on the streets, which I hope to do soon. All the best, JCHjr

Very interested in the French. Pondering the French footprint (Djibouti, the Med, West Africa, French Guiana, Clipperton, Polynesia, Noumea, Reunion, and the Kerguelens) and their capable and seasoned military.

http://CGBlog.org Chuck Hill

The French have the second largest EEZ, only slightly smaller than that of the US.