Professor of Political Science at Hampton
University, at Hampton, Virginia.

Recent discourse on Islam in Western academic and media
circles has raised serious doubts about the compatibility of Islam and
democracy.(1)

In this regard, Islamic revivalist movements have been
found especially lacking in their commitment to the ideals of democratic
pluralism.(2)

Our purpose in this essay is to examine the relationship
between Islam and democracy more closely by focusing our discussion on three
pertinent questions: How do Islamists view democracy? What has been their
actual conduct in relation to democratic institutions and processes?
Finally, under what circumstances would Islamists find democratic political
process acceptable, and under what conditions would they deem it uncongenial
for their Islamic goals?

In view of the divergent theories and practices within
Islamic movements and regimes in regard to the issues of Islam, democracy
and the state, it is difficult to formulate a consensus Islamic position on
the specifics of an Islamic polity. We will therefore focus our remarks
primarily on the ideas of those Islamists who represent mainstream Islamic
movements and are regarded as major theoreticians of contemporary Islamic
resurgence. Included in this group are Abul Ala Maududi (d. 1979), the
founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan; Hasan al Bana (d. 1949), the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and other Middle Eastern
countries; Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria; Rachid
Ghannoushi of the al-Nahda Movement of Tunis; and Dr. Hasan al-Turabi of the
Islamic National Front of Sudan.(3)

In the interest of brevity, what is presented here is a
condensed and synthesized version of their views on the relationship between
Islam and democratic practices.

The Islamist's view of politics and state rests on their
fundamental premise that Islam is not a "religion" in the sense in which we
speak of Christianity and Hinduism today, i.e., a code of religious beliefs
and doctrines, a mode of spiritual orientation, or a set of some outward
rituals. Islam is a complete way of life; it covers the entire spectrum of
human activities. Islam means total commitment and subordination of all
aspects of life - individual, social, economic, political, international -
to God. Hence, Islam is both religion and politics, church and state, joined
in a single goal of serving God and implementing His commandments.

Thus, unlike the 'ulama, who have accepted effective
separation between religious authority and the secular power of the state,
the Islamists reject this duality as un-Islamic and want to reinstate the
pristine unity of religion and politics by reviving the Prophetic model of
the Islamic state. They believe that Islam cannot be implemented in a
comprehensive manner without the power of the state; the Qur'anic obligation
for all Muslims to "promote good and eliminate evil" cannot be realized
without the coercive resources of the state. Hence, according to Islamists,
establishment of an Islamic state is not something recommendatory or
optional; it is a fundamental obligation for all Muslims.(4)

There seems to have emerged a general agreement among
mainstream Islamists that democracy is the spirit of the Islamic
governmental system, even though they reject the philosophical assumption of
Western democracy that sovereignty rests with the people. They maintain that
the majority's voice can constitute the basis for legitimate exercise of
political authority in an Islamic state only if it recognizes and remains
within the perimeters of God's political and legal sovereignty. God's
sovereignty is understood to have been represented in the Shari`ah, a
systematic code of moral-legal imperatives derived from the Qur'an and the
teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Islamists also argue that since the
Qur'an commands Muslims to conduct their collective affairs through mutual
consultation (shura) and grants the privilege of God's vicegerency (khalifa)
to the entire Muslim community rather than to a single individual or a
specific group or class of people, the selection of a Muslim ruler must be
based on the free will of the Muslim masses.(5)

Several conclusions can be drawn from this formulation of
Islamists. First, in congruence with their concept of popular vicegerency,
Islamists reject the institution of kingship and monarchy as un-Islamic.
Maududi's Caliphate and Monarchy and Khomeini's Islamic Government
constitute the most devastating critiques and condemnations of monarchic and
absolutist rule from an Islamic perspective in modern Islam.(6)

Their rejection of the hereditary and absolutist rule has
become more vocal and aggressive since the Iranian revolution. Their
anti-monarchical position was further strengthened during the 1991 Gulf War
when Muslim monarchs and emirs were seen collaborating with the Western
powers to decimate a fellow Muslim country.(7)

Second, Islamists, and especially the mainstream Sunni
Islamic movements, do not also approve theocracy or rule by the clergy, who
would exercise political power on behalf of God. In Sunni Islam, no one can
speak for God; it is the consensus of the community at large as reflected in
freely expressed public opinion that will determine what the will of God is
in a specific case. Maududi describes the Islamic government as
"theodemocracy" and "nomocracy," or the rule of law, rather than as a rule
of self-appointed spokesman of God. The Shi'ite political theory, on the
other hand, can be considered closer to theocracy. According to Khomeini,
Islamic leadership is crystallized and embodied in infallible apostles and
imams (religiopolitical guides) who are appointed by God. He further
maintains that during the occultation of the twelfth imam, religiopolitical
leadership of the Muslim community will be exercised by qualified jurists.
This he describes as Vilayat-Faqih (governance by Jurists). In both
religious and sociopolitical affairs, the relations of the people with the
jurists are defined by the concept of taqlid (imitation), that is, following
the infallible imam appointed by God. It is on the basis of this formulation
that in the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic of Iran a committee of five
jurists who, collectively, represent the hidden imam, can overrule any
government policy or law legislated by the elected parliament if they deem
it un-Islamic.(8)

In Sunni Islam, on the other hand, it is the consensus of
the community that is the final arbiter in public affairs, and the concept
of a veto power exercised by the clergy has no theological and legal basis.(9)

Third, Islamists are also of the view that it is not the
structure of an Islamic state that should constitute the focal point in
constructing an Islamic polity; what really matters is the question of its
functions, goals and objectives. The specific structural arrangements and
institutional features of one Islamic state may differ from another due to
differences in material conditions, but their guiding principles and values
must reflect those enunciated in the Qur'an and the traditions of the
Prophet.(10)

Hence, an Islamic state can be unitary or federal,
parliamentary or presidential, unicameral or bicameral, depending on the
specific needs and circumstances of a given Islamic society.

Fourth, although the Islamists' concept of an Islamic
state remains all-encompassing - some would describe it as absolutist since
the state seeks to govern and control all aspects of social life - they also
emphasize that the methods of governance of the state should not be
authoritarian and arbitrary. Islamists suggest several institutional and
procedural mechanisms to ensure popular participation, accountability of
rulers, protection of civil liberties and the rule of law. The head of the
state and government would be elected for a fixed term through free
elections based on universal adult franchise. Similarly, members of the
Shura (parliament) would also be elected by the people. The Islamic state
would be based on the principle of the distribution of power among the three
branches of the state: the executive, legislature, and judiciary. The
Islamic state would ensure the functioning of an independent judiciary and
no one, including the head of the state, would be above law.(11)

The leaders of the Islamic movements in Pakistan,
Malaysia, and North Africa (especially Rachid Ghannoushi of the Tunisian
Al-Nahda Movement) define the governmental structure of an Islamic state in
terms no different from a Westminster-type parliamentary democracy:
universal adult franchise, periodic elections, guaranteed human rights,
civil liberties, equal political and religious rights of minorities, an
independent judiciary, the rule of law, procedural justice, and multiple
political parties. This pluralistic and democratic vision of an Islamic
polity has recently found an explicit and profound articulation in the
writings and speeches of Rachid Ghannoushi of Tunisia, Professor Khurshid
Ahmad of Pakistan Najmuddin Erbakan of Turkey, and Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy
Prime Minister of Malaysia.(12)

We have already mentioned a fundamental difference
between the Western Islamist's concept of democracy: the sovereignty of the
people vs. the sovereignty of God or the Shari`ah. Another philosophical
difference relates to the question of the ends of politics. The predominant
position in Western thought is that of liberal individualism, according to
which politics is the prototype of a free market process - a kind of
political version of the "economic man" model. As David Schuman has noted,
the Western democratic model considers all outcomes of political struggles
as equally legitimate; the definition of "good" keeps changing and whatever
comes out of the free clash of competing interests and ideas is good and
legitimate.

The Islamists obviously cannot and do not subscribe to
this view of politics and political process. Since Islamists define their
mission in terms of resacralization of polity, economy and society, politics
for them is a means to establish a just social order as defined by the
Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet. Hence, all outcomes are not
equally legitimate; only those outcomes are legitimate which conform to and
are sanctioned by Shari`ah or are shown to serve the cause of the Shari`ah.

The Islamists have not only wrestled with the theoretical
questions of the role and place of democracy within the framework of
Shari`ah, they have also incorporated democratic practices and institutions
in their policies, demands and praxis. The Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish,
Malaysian, Egyptian, Jordanian, Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan Islamists
have already accepted the Islamic legitimacy of popular elections, the
electoral process, the multiplicity of political parties and even the
authority of the popularly-elected parliament to legislate not only on
socio-economic matters but also on Islamic doctrinal issues. Islamists in
Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey and Malaysia have been actively
participating in the electoral processes of their respective countries and
through their presence in legislative bodies have been pushing their Islamic
agenda through coalition-building.(13)

Even on the issue of a woman holding political office in
an Islamic government, Islamists seem to have revised their earlier
position. The Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan endorsed the candidacy of Miss
Fatima Jinnah in the 1964 presidential election and accepted Ms. Benazir
Bhutto's Premiership in 1988 and 1993 "in good faith." The Jamaat-i-Islami
of Bangladesh also endorsed the Prime Ministership of Begum Khalida Zia,
thus accepting the Islamic legitimacy of a woman ruler of a Muslim state.

Despite the Islamist's acceptance of modern democratic
practices and institutions, however, a crucial question remains: is their
acceptance of democracy substantive or instrumental? If the establishment of
an Islamic state or the enforcement of the Shari`ah is the ultimate and the
only legitimate goal of their political activities, can we then say that
democracy is only one way to achieve power and implement this ultimate goal
and that other (non-democratic) ways and means are equally legitimate and
acceptable? The answer of the Pakistani, Malaysian, Tunisian and Egyptian
mainstream Islamists of today is an emphatic no. According to Maududi, whose
writings have had great impact on the hearts and minds of Muslim youth in
countries of South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa,
Islamic movements must operate within the legal and constitutional
frameworks of their respective societies and should use only peaceful and
democratic means to educate, mobilize and prepare people for an Islamic
change. He denounced the change of political leadership through agitational
politics, coups d'etat, revolutions and assassinations; he described these
violent means not only as unjustifiable in Islamic terms but also as
detrimental to the prospects for a lasting Islamic change. To quote Maududi:
"Both the ends and means must be clean, commendable and based on majority
consensus in order that a healthy, peaceful and harmonious Islamic order can
take shape."(14)

A case in point is the Islamic movement of Turkey, the
Refah Party of Najmuddin Erbakan which recently formed the first ever
Islamic government since the end of the Caliphate. The Refah Party has been
a target of state oppression since the 1970's. As a prime manifestation of
"political Islam" in Turkey, Refah has changed its name many times during
the past thirty years because of periodic bans on its activities.
Established as the Milli Nizam Party in 1970 by Najmuddin Erbakan, it was
banned in 1971 following the military intervention in March 1971 on the
ground that it wanted to restore theocratic order in Turkey. In 1972,
Erbakan revived it under the name of the National Salvation Party (Milli
Selamat Party). It was banned once again following another military
take-over in September 1980. Erbakan and other party leaders were tried in a
military court for having conspired against the secular state and were given
prison terms.

Before it was declared illegal in 1980, the Milli Selamat
Party took part in 1973 and 1977 parliamentary elections and obtained 11.8
percent and 8.6 percent of the popular votes with 48 and 24 parliamentary
seats, respectively. In 1973 elections, it emerged as the third largest
parliamentary group. It is also important to note that because of the
peculiar parliamentary arithmetic of the 1970ís, the Milli Selamat Party
played a key role in all coalition governments during the decade.(15)

In 1991 elections, the Refah Party - the successor to the
Milli Selamat Party - polled 17 percent of the popular vote and secured 62
seats in parliament. When the Refah Party won a plurality in 1995 elections
with more than 21 percent of the popular vote, one could hear the alarm
bells in Western capitals as if a new and totally unknown dark force had
descended on Ankara. The Western media conveniently ignored the fact that
Erbakan had been the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey in the past and that
his party had played an important role in earlier coalition governments
ranging from center-left to center-right parties.

The Refah Party has accepted and operated within a
secular constitutional framework and pluralist democratic process, trying at
the same time to increase the influence of Islam in Turkish society and
public policies.(16)

The Refah and its predecessors have been in the forefront
of the struggle to "pressure the democratic consensus" and the competitive
party system in Turkey. Even the harshest critics of Erbakan have
acknowledged the fact that when Turkey was embroiled in vicious political
violence and terrorist activities during the late 1970's, "it goes to the
credit of NSP [National Salvation Party] that it did not take part in
political violence." In fact, Najmuddin Erbakan "kept channels of
communication and dialogue open with other parties when such dialogue
between the two major parties was almost non-existent."(17)

The Refah Party of Turkey thus represents a prime example
of an Islamic movement which has accepted and practiced democratic methods,
demonstrated clearly its ability to govern in a pluralistic context, join
coalitions with other parties, form political alliances, make compromises,
accept defeat and act as a "loyal opposition," and act responsibly in
victory.

In conclusion, it may also be pointed out that if
democracy has to take roots in Muslim Societies, it will have to seek
legitimacy from Islam, otherwise it will remain an alien idea. Democratic
movements in Muslim societies that are based primarily on secular liberalism
will have little, if any, prospects of reaching the Muslim masses. The
West's fascination with secular elites in the Muslim world - perhaps as a
counter force to check the Islamists - is based on two false assumptions:
the popular support base of secular liberals, and their commitment to the
ideals and practices of democracy and liberalism.

Developments in the Islamic world since the Iranian
revolution of 1979 have clearly demonstrated that secularism has no future
as far as the Muslim masses are concerned. As for the commitment of the
Muslim secular elites to democracy, liberalism, and pluralism, one has only
to look at the recent performance of the three most important segments of
secular elites in the Muslim world: (1) the military and the higher
bureaucracy, (2) the institutional intellectuals, and (3) the emerging
Muslim bourgeoisie. We all know the military's commitment to democracy and
liberalism from the experience of Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia,
and more recently, of Algeria. Secondly, majority of the institutional
intellectuals - the Pan-Arab secular nationalists of yesteryears - were the
ones who were closely associated with, and apologists for, socialist
dictators of various colors. Until very recently, these intellectuals were
an integral part of the oppressive state apparatus in all its versions(18)-
Arab nationalist, Nasserist, Ba'athist, socialist. They may have converted
to the doctrine of free market and capitalist economy after the collapse of
socialism in the Soviet Union but their political alternatives are far from
liberalism, democracy and pluralism.

As for the emerging bourgeoisie and the MUMPS (Muslim
Upwardly Mobile Professionals) - the product of infitah (openness) in Egypt
and elsewhere - their modernism remains essentially what Marshall Hodgson
once described as "technicalist"(19):

it is consumeristic - capitalist type of modernism with
its fascination with modern technological gadgets and toys. As Professor
Leonard Binder has suggested, without a "vigorous Islamic liberalism,"
political liberalism will not succeed in the Middle East, despite the
emergence of bourgeois states.(20)

It is obvious, therefore, that Islamists are the only
important segment of Muslim societies who are agitating for openness of
their respective political systems, and for democratization.