Largely unnoticed among the publicity splash produced by the release of
the Defence White Paper, another significant parliamentary report recently
entered the public domain. The Senate committee inquiry into Australia's
East Timor diplomacy presented its final report, a history of a dark
episode in our foreign policy.

Commissioned in late 1998, the inquiry was extended after the
post-ballot violence that engulfed East Timor in September 1999. Its
report records how successive Australian governments appeased Indonesia at
the expense of East Timor's peace and independence.

Among its most interesting findings, the committee reports:

Gough Whitlam believes that only after the 1991 Dili massacre did it
become apparent that "the Indonesian military had overplayed their
hand" in East Timor. Remarkably, he seems unaware that the killings
between 1975 and 1978 constitute the worst massacres as a proportion of a
population since the Holocaust. Or he is aware but doesn't think this
signifies the Indonesian military "overplaying" its hand.

The committee couldn't understand why Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade deputy secretary John Dauth told it in May 1999 that the militias in
East Timor were armed and organised by local commanders outside the
Indonesia military's chain of command, when, according to Professor Des
Ball, "from the end of 1998, intelligence intercepts produced by the
Defence Signals Directorate were providing a very accurate, precise and
detailed picture of the relationship between particular commanders of the
Indonesian Army and militia leaders in East Timor". Dauth's plea that
DFAT was too overwhelmed by reports at the time to arrive at such a
conclusion, failed to convince the committee, which was angry with DFAT's
reluctance to provide it with more definitive information.

John Howard's letter to President Habibie in December 1998 suggesting a
new dispensation for East Timor was prompted by a survey of elite Timorese
opinion that, unsurprisingly, found overwhelming support for independence.
The results of the survey, by DFAT, were shared with Jakarta but have been
withheld from the Australian people, including the Senate committee.

Former foreign minister Gareth Evans' argument that there was no
foundation to the claim that the Whitlam government had known from the
outset - via intelligence sources - that five journalists had been
murdered at Balibo in 1975 has been discredited by the research of Ball
and Hamish McDonald. Whitlam, who had tried to reconcile the East Timorese
right to self-determination with his preference for the territory's
incorporation into Indonesia, left the clear impression, in the
committee's words, that "the outcome was more important than the
process".

Former ambassador Tony Kevin told the committee that Canberra was
largely responsible for the referendum and its aftermath, and had no right
to put at risk the lives of so many East Timorese. In reply, the committee
said Kevin ascribed "too much responsibility to the Australian
government and its advisers in the process". Nor did any Timorese
witnesses raise these concerns with the committee. Even after InterFET
troops arrived in East Timor it was "impossible to find a single
person there who wished the ballot had never happened".

Overall, the committee was critical that "since the mid-1970s,
there has been a thread running through East Timor policies of Australian
governments of all political persuasions: that greater emphasis be placed
on relations with Indonesia at the expense of East Timor".

The committee found that "until the latter part of 1999, all
governments have publicly played down reports of human rights abuses in
the territory. They were prepared to accept Indonesian Government
assurances and explanations, and support them, even in the face of other
contradictory evidence".

When the prospect of violence was reported before the independence
ballot, "the Australian Government, at least publicly, did not
associate the (Indonesian military), other than `rogue elements', with the
militias, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, including the
government's own intelligence information".

In summary, "despite the disingenuous approach taken by Australia
towards East Timor over the period of the Indonesian occupation, it
remained a thorn in the side of successive Australian governments".

It was a thorn well deserved.

Dan Flitton is an associate lecturer in international relations at
Deakin University. E-mail: flitton@deakin.edu.au

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