1.(S) Summary: This cable analyzes Mali's approach tosecurity in the Sahel in advance of the interagency missionto Algiers. Mali is a committed ally in the war on terror,but its position as one of the poorest nations in the worldlimits its capacity to counter the presence of AQIM in thecountry's far north. Moreover, the mantra of Mali'sleadership is that AQIM is an Algerian problem, and that theincipient Tuareg rebellion in the north presents a greaterthreat to Mali's stability and sovereignty than the terroristpresence. Since the GSPC re-branded itself as al Qaeda, wehave made headway in sensitizing President Amadou ToumaniToure (ATT) to the danger posed by AQIM to both Mali andwestern interests in the region, but work remains in thisregard. Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)programming in Mali reflects these generally congruent, butat times conflicting, realities by balancing targetedmilitary assistance with a broad range of development,humanitarian and public diplomacy initiatives designed toreinforce the link between security and development. SinceTSCTP's inception, Mali has regarded U.S. military assistanceas a vehicle for addressing a variety of security concernsranging from AQIM to bandits and narco-traffickers to Tuaregrebels. At the same time, ATT recognizes that his country'spoverty and geographic position force him to consider theequities of powerful regional players. We do not believethat Libya is Mali's preferred dance partner on regionalsecurity issues, particularly on Tuareg questions, butQaddafi's deep pockets mean that ATT cannot resist if the"frere guide" decides to engage (or meddle, depending onone's point of view). Algeria, however, remains for Mali itspreferred diplomatic partner on trans-Saharan issues, andwhile ATT can be by turns bitter and frustrated with theAlgerians, he recognizes Algiers holds the key to a peacefulresolution of Mali's Tuareg insurgency. We believe thatPresident Toure is committed to a negotiated solution withthe Tuaregs, but there are many internal politicalconstraints that play into his handling of the crisis. ForATT, the Algiers Accords remain the central basis fornegotiation with the insurgency, but application of aspectsof the agreement -- particularly the so-called "specialunits" -- are politically delicate, but not impossible, toachieve.

2. (S) Summary continued: Mali remains a good partner onsecurity issues, and it is not impossible to reconcile Mali'sneed for tranquillity in the north with what we understand tobe Algeria's goals, in order to advance U.S. peace, securityand counter-terrorism objectives in northern Mali. It is,however, important to act quickly, as the situation in thenorth is unraveling as we write. We hope the inter-agencymission to Algeria will reassure the Algerians that ourmilitary engagement with Mali is one part of a larger,holistic program, and that our mil-mil training programs areintended to build capacity to address the range of securitythreats in the north, and not to launch the Malian militaryin some quixotic anti-Tuareg campaign. It is important thatthe Algerians understand that the Tuareg insurgency hererepresents a threat to the security and stability of ademocratic and moderate regional ally, and that thedevelopment we all seek for northern Mali is endangered byongoing acts of rebellion and banditry. Moreover, the Malianmilitary has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguardMali's territorial integrity and protect civilian populationsin the north (most of whom recognize that acts of rebellionimpede development). As for Mali, we need to continue toengage with ATT in support of a peaceful resolution to thenorthern crisis, to encourage him to more effectivelyarticulate his northern strategy (both to his northerncompatriots and to his majority and increasingly resentfulsouthern electorate), and to take the politically risky (butnecessary) steps toward involving northerners in the securityforces active in the northern zone. Key to this effort willbe our continued support for decentralization in Mali whichwill answer the demand made by Northern populations for moreautonomy and control of their resources and future. In theend, ATT needs to find a Malian solution to this internal(and interminable) problem, but he needs an assist from"Bouteflika the Malian", and the U.S. can play a helpful

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supporting role. Restoring the Algiers Accords process bybringing the rebellion in from its mountain redoubt in theSahara will advance U.S. counter-terrorism goals by returningthe focus to the threat of AQIM in the Trans-Sahara regionand fostering conditions that help deny space to terroristsactive in northern Mali. End Summary.

------------------------------------------TSCTP in Mali: No Security, No Development------------------------------------------

3.(S) As one of the poorest nations in the world, Mali lacksthe ability to effectively combat terrorism or counterterrorist influences. TSCTP programming in Mali takes thisreality into account by dividing TSCTP actives into twocategories: counter-terrorism and counter-extremism.Counter-terrorism programs cover the "hard" side of TSCTP,meaning direct military to military assistance. Thisassistance is designed to bolster Mali's ability to providethe level of security and stability, particularly in northernMali, upon which development depends. The primary vehiclesfor this assistance are Joint Combined Exchange Trainingevents (JCETs). JCETs are not designed to help the Malianmilitary counter Tuareg insurgents. They are intended,rather, to boost selected Malian military units' capacity tocontrol borders and respond to a broad range of securitythreats ranging from terrorist activity to drug smuggling andarms trafficking. Over the past year we have held successfulJCETs in Bamako, Tessalit and Kidal, and Malian units thathave participated in JCETs have shown a marked increase inprofessionalism and operational capacity.

4.(S) The "soft" side of TSCTP in Mali includes Departmentof Defense sponsored humanitarian assistance, USAIDdevelopment programs and public diplomacy outreach. Ourcounter-extremism component of TSCTP is designed not only toencourage the traditional tolerant nature of Malian Islam butto also effectively address the critical interplay betweendevelopment and security. This effort is particularly key innorthern Mali where we are able to reach out to importantnorthern communities in ways that demonstrate USG friendshipand support. The DOD's humanitarian assistance and CivilMilitary Support Element (CMSE) play a crucial role inhelping us meet this goal by building and rehabilitatingwells, schools and health clinics throughout Mali. Medicaland Veterinary Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP and VETCAP) thatnormally accompany JCETs are also extremely well received andenable local communities to derive benefits from militarytraining that would otherwise not extend beyond the perimeterof military installations.

5.(U) USAID/Mali considers the northern region of Mali animportant area and has undertaken activities there in aconcerted effort since 1999. USAID/Mali implementedapproximately $3.7 million worth of activities in the northduring FY07, including support to 35 rural health centers,the construction and reinforcement of 17 community radiostations, the establishment of six community telecentersoffering Internet access, the conduct of conflict-mitigationactivities, support to rice and horticultural commodities,the expansion of access to financial services, the provisionof scholarships and mentoring to 6,500 girls under theAmbassador's Girls Scholarship Fund, and the creation ofteacher training and radio-based instruction for children ofnomadic populations. USAID/Mali received an additional $9.5million in TSCTP funds and the majority of these resourceshave been earmarked for activities in the North that aim toexpand economic opportunities for youth, construct additionalcommunity radio stations, build capacity for localgovernment, and support madersas throughout the country. Onthe Public Affairs side, we have used cultural preservationgrants to help Mali honor its Islamic heritage by protectingthousands of ancient Islamic manuscripts in Djenne andTimbuktu and helping to preserve an ancient mosque in Gao.Additionally we recently celebrated the year anniversary ofthe only American Corner in Mali. Located in Gao, it hasallowed us to quadruple our outreach to key contacts in theregion and to further promote mutual understanding betweenMalians and Americans.

-----------------------------------------Malian View of the Situation in the North

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6.(S) Malians generally regarded the GSPC as an Algerianextremist group composed of Algerian Salafists dedicated tooverthrowing the Algerian government. The GSPC was thereforeseen as an Algerian problem that posed a risk not to Maliansbut to Algerians and the occasional western tourist naiveenough to venture deep into the Sahara. The GSPC-AQ mergerto form AQIM altered this perspective only slightly until theDecember 2007 murders of the French tourists in Mauritaniaand, to a lesser extent, the kidnapping of the Austrianhostages in Tunisia, brought the dangers of terrorism in theSahel home to the Malian government.

7.(S) The brewing rebellion in northern Mali, however, hasdisplaced all other security concerns. President Toure hasmade a concerted effort to handle the recent attacks byTuareg rebels (and the resultant deaths and capture of Maliansoldiers) through dialogue and restraint, but he is underincreasing pressure from the military, which is composedpredominantly of southern Malians, to respond with force andseverity. President Toure faces the very difficult challengeof finding a way to sit down at a negotiating table withrebels who have killed Malian soldiers, stolen governmentarms, laid mines, disrupted badly-needed economic developmentand still hold perhaps as many as 90 Malian soldiers as"prisoners of war." President Toure's decision not torespond militarily to such aggressions are increasinglyinterpreted as signs of weakness by the media and the widerMalian public. His recent decision to circumvent the regulararmy by supporting ethnic Imghad Tuareg paramilitary groupsagainst Ibrahim Bahanga and the Alliance for Democracy andChange (ADC) suggest President Toure's resolve for dialoguehas begun to wear thin.

8.(S) Mali recognizes that Algeria is the only crediblemediator for the Tuareg crisis. Yet President Toure isclearly frustrated with President Bouteflika and Algeria'soff-again on-again mediation efforts. Algerian allegations,whether leveled by the Algerian press or through thediplomatic rumor mill, that Mali is somehow intransigent inthe war on terror or willingly harboring terrorists have notpassed unnoticed in Bamako. President Toure is alsoconvinced that members of the Algerian security services insouthern Algeria are actively facilitating Tuareg rebels andhas told us on several occasions that he does not believePresident Bouteflika controls, or is even aware, of what hissecurity services are doing along the Mali-Algeria border.Malians also posit that, if Algeria is serious aboutcombating AQIM, they should do so by controlling their ownborders instead of relying on unreliable and self-interestedTuareg proxies.

9.(S) President Toure still respects President Bouteflika(who bore the sobriquet of "the Malian" during his sojourn inGao at the time of the Algerian war for independence) andseems to give him the benefit of the doubt by assuming thathis Algerian counterpart is unaware of what his own securityservices are up to. President Toure would prefer to seegreater Algerian control of its borders and more Algerianresources aimed at AQIM operatives coming from North Africathan the arming of Malian Tuaregs who can easily turn suchtraining and equipment against the central Malian government.

----------------------What this Means to Us----------------------

10.(S) Deepening levels of impunity in northern Mali arerapidly reducing our ability to advance key peace andsecurity goals. The only groups likely to benefit from anorthern Mali free-for-all akin to the one that occurredduring Mali's 1991-1996 rebellion are well-armed bandits andAQIM. The humanitarian and political impacts of a thirdrebellion in northern Mali will be enormous. Those who willsuffer most are not the minority of Tuareg rebels who havetaken up arms against the central government but the vastmajority of ethnic Tuareg and Arab northern Malians whosimply want to send their children to school and supportteir families. We have already begun to curtail cetainUSAID and DOD activities in the north due t a lack ofsecurity and our sensitivity to beingperceived as taking

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sides in the conflict underway between Tuareg bandits and theMalian military.

11.(S) The similarities between the start of the lastnorthern rebellion in 1991 and today are sobering. InJanuary 1991 Algeria brokered a peace agreement, theTamanrasset Accords, between Mali and northern rebel groupsled by Iyad ag Ghali that was never implemented. As securityin the north deteriorated, an alphabet soup of armed rebelmilitias (the MFA, MFUA, FIAA, ARLA and FPLA among others)representing disparate ethnic groups and Tuareg fractionsfilled the void. A similar dynamic appears to be unfoldingnow with the appearance of competing Tuareg rebel andgovernment sponsored militias and the 2006 Algiers Accords -also negotiated by Algeria and Iyad ag Ghali - teetering onthe brink of collapse.

12.(S) In regards to our CT efforts in the region, we havemade some progress in convincing President Toure of the needto zero in on AQIM by focusing on the changing nature of AQIMand the fact that Mali, like neighboring Mauritania, is notimmune to AQIM attacks on its soil. We have also been moreaggressive on the intel side in terms of information sharing. The Malians are significantly more open interlocutors nowthan a few years ago, even though President Toure still seesaction against AQIM as counter to fundamental nationalinterests due to the inherent risks of further stirring uptrouble in the north. A third Tuareg rebellion will greatlydiminish our ability to discuss counter-terrorism with theMalians and their willingness to listen.

13.(S) The Algiers Accords remain the only, and best, way toprevent further unrest and provide an environment conduciveto stopping AQIM activity in the Sahel. President Toure'scommitment to a peaceful settlement to the ongoing rebellionand Algeria's recent agreement to resume its mediationrepresent two positive steps in getting the negotiations backon track. That said, domestic political constraints andopposition within the Malian military will pose significantroadblocks and further deepen President Toure's frustrationof having to dedicate so much time, money and materialresources to Mali's most sparsely populated region.Implementation will require more concessions and morediplomatic pressure, but we remain confident that progresscan be mad if the potential road blocks can be overcome:

-- The absence of a point person on either the Malian orTuareg side. In July 2006 Minister of TerritorialAdministration, General Kafougouna Kone, negotiated theAlgiers Accords on Mali's behalf. Alliance for Democracy andChange (ADC) leader Iyad ag Ghali and his deputy Ahmada agBibi represented the Tuareg rebels. Two years later, GeneralKone has faded from view and Iyad ag Ghali has moved to SaudiArabia. President Toure could re-energize the peace processand significantly alter the dynamics of the current crisis byappointing a lead interlocutor. General Kone is the mostobvious choice. Fifteen years of democratic success in Malihas, however, produced two other leaders - former PresidentAlpha Oumar Konare and former Prime Minister and oppositionleader Ibrahim Boubacar Keita - who were central figuresduring the second northern rebellion of the 1990s and couldlend a needed sense of gravitas to peace negotiations.Nominating either Konare or Keita as his special envoy to thenorth would require a significant amount of political courageon President Toure's part given that his relations with bothmen are not the best. On the Tuareg side there is no onecapable of replacing ag Ghali. While there are a number ofwell-respected Tuareg politicians, none of these have theability to control, or even influence, current rebel leaders.

-- Juxtaposed with the absence of Malian and Tuareginterlocutors is a multiplicity of mediators. PresidentToure apparently turned to Libya not to send a signal toAlgiers but in hopes of securing the release of the militaryhostages still held by Bahanga. Re-introducing Libyan cashand influence to northern Mali was clearly ill-advised.Mali's request for Algeria to return as the key facilitatoron this issue indicates President Toure's recognition thatAlgiers holds the key to a peaceful resolution of Mali's

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Tuareg insurgency.

-- The reduction of Malian military's footprint in northernMali during an ongoing period of hostilities. Thesignatories of the Algiers Accords pledged to facilitate areturn to pre-2006 troop levels in northern Mali. This hassubsequently been interpreted by some Tuareg rebels as acomplete withdrawal of the Malian military from northernMali. The Malians would like to reduce their troop numbersin northern Mali, both to respect the Accords and reducecosts, but this is ultimately a question of nationalsovereignty and one cannot reasonably expect the Malians towithdraw from a zone of instability. Rather than reducingtroop levels in the north, Mali is in the process ofaugmenting its security presence, and will continue to do soas long as Tuaregs rebels continue to attack military basesand convoys and hold Malian soldiers hostage.

-- The relocation of military bases. Both the 1991Tamanrasset Accords and 1992 National Pact called formilitary bases located within urban areas to be relocated toless inhabited areas. Fifteen years later, Mali still lacksthe financial resources to construct new military posts inorder to fulfill this requirement.

-- Economic development for the north. The Algiers Accordsoutline an extensive, yet vague, plan for the development ofnorthern Mali. The only portion of this agenda so farimplemented was the March 2007 Kidal Forum. The Forum wasintended as a pledge-a-thon for northern Mali but served asan accounting of all the projects and initiatives for thenorth already undertaken by the Malian government andinternational donor community. Many of the specificdevelopment projects identified in the Algiers Accords - suchas paving the road to Kidal, repairing the airports in Kidaland Tessalit, extending electrical grids and providing Kidalwith access to national television and radio - are feasibleyet well beyond the financial means of the Malian governmentor any single international donor. Banditry and Tuaregunrest further complicate any development efforts in thenorth as most foreign development partners are unable to workin such a hostile and unstable environment.

-- The creation of special military units. This is the mostimportant aspect of the Accords for Tuareg rebels and the onewhere Mali may have to make the most concessions. We havespent the last 18 months pushing for Mali to make these unitsoperational and integrate them into security operations inthe north. Were Mali to agree, we could likely incorporatethe special units into our JCET program. President Toure andother Malian leaders maintain that Mali already created theseunits and that they were subsequently sabotaged by Tuaregdesertions. There is some truth to this as the Maliangovernment did make a substantial concession by agreeing toappoint Hassan Fagaga as the commander of the special unit inKidal. On the other hand, there is some substance to theTuareg argument that the units existed on paper only andnever received equipment, vehicles, fuel or other requiredsupplies. Explanations for continued Malian foot-dragging onthis issue include: fierce opposition within the Malianmilitary to the reintegration of Tuareg deserters responsiblefor attacking and killing fellow Malian soldiers; concernthat Tuareg special unit members would simply turn thetraining and equipment provided to them against the regulararmy; suspicion that Algeria intends to use the special unitsto advance Algerian rather than Malian interests. There isalso the unresolved question of the fate of chronic deserterslike Bahanga and Fagaga. Minister of Internal Security,General Sadio Gassama, is vehemently opposed to the conceptof special units. Since the units would fall under theSecurity Ministry's purview, this is a problem. In short,President Toure could stand up these units, but has hesitateddue to internal political constraints.

-- Outstanding questions on the April 10 execution of twoTuareg members of the ADC. In addition to demands for amilitary withdrawal from northern Mali and the creation ofspecial units, Tuareg rebels are also demanding a crediblemurder inquiry into this event. We will probably never knowwho committed these killings or why. In October 2007 aMalian army unit arrested and executed a Tuareg gendarmewithin the confines of the military base in Gao. Thesoldiers responsible for the Gao murder are known to the

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Malian military, yet no legal proceedings are underway.Given this precedent, chances for a credible and transparentinquiry into the April 10 executions are grim.

14.(S) Encouraging Mali and Algeria to overcome the evidentdistrust that divides them will pose a serious challenge. Onthe Algerian side, we need to impress on Algeria the dangersof using Tuareg rebel groups as surrogates against AQIM asthey did in 2006 by providing funds and fuel. By bankrollingthe ADC, Algeria provided support to a group that hadattacked a democratically elected government, circumventedthe sovereignty of the Malian state by attempting to create alocal militia, and further destabilized the north. Reftel'sdescription of Algeria's understanding of the special units -Tuareg militias charged with eradicating AQIM - issignificantly different from the Malian reading of theAlgiers accords, which outlines a clear command structurewith defined missions assigned by Malian military leadership.

15.(S) Algerian concern that the United States is arming theGOM to take on the Tuaregs is yet another indication of amisunderstanding between neighbors - although this trackswith statements made by Tuareg contacts. The nature of U.S.military assistance to Mali has been constant for severalyears and focuses on peace and security writ large. It isalso worth noting that the Malians have, up to this point,launched only one operation against the Tuaregs and thisoperation relied not on U.S. training but Bulgarian attackhelicopters and Ukrainian pilots. This offensive militaryoperation was done in response to Bahanga's blockade of thevital, and only, road between Gao and Kidal.

--------------------------Conclusion: What We Can Do--------------------------

16.(S) USG counter-terrorism and development efforts in Malirequire a secure and stable northern region. Northern Mali'sslide into unrest and rebellion will seriously affect ourability to advance key peace and security goals. We see theneed to use our good offices in both countries to encouragedeeper understanding and trust between the Algerians and theMalians at the same time that we encourage movement forwardon the Algiers Accords. Because Malian, Algerian and Americansecurity interests are not incompatible, there are ways forthe U.S. to work within the Algiers Accords framework withoutchallenging Algeria's role as primary mediator. It isimportant that the Algerians understand that the Tuareginsurgency here represents a threat to the security andstability of a democratic and moderate regional ally, andthat the development we all seek for northern Mali isendangered by ongoing acts of rebellion and banditry.Moreover, the Malian military has a responsibility and anobligation to safeguard Mali's territorial integrity andprotect civilian populations in the north (most of whomrecognize that acts of rebellion impede development).Although Mali's confidence in Algeria's ability to controlTuareg rebels is likely exaggerated, Algeria does have someleverage with Tuareg rebel leaders and we need Algeria to usethis influence to, at the very least, secure a generalcease-fire. Mali will only be able to consider itsobligations regarding a return to pre-2006 troop levels inthe north once the fighting has stopped and Bahanga and theADC have released the prisoners they continue to hold.

17.(S) On the Malian side, we must convince President Toureof the need to stand up special units despite the inherentrisks they pose to the Malian military. There are enoughloyalist Tuareg and Arab soldiers within the Malian army tofill out one or two of these units and counter-balance anyless trustworthy former Tuareg rebel elements that also mustbe included in the plan. If the Malians agree to stand upone or two of these units, we could incorporate them intoJCET events. We are also pressuring President Toure toformulate a public relations strategy for the north in orderto recapture the rhetorical battlefield from Ibrahim Bahangaand the like and to assure the populations in the North thatthe Malian government is actively finding ways to answer

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their developmental needs. We are also committed tocontinuing our active and wide-ranging USAID program in theNorth of Mali with a goal of helping Mali fulfill at leastsome of the development components of the Algiers Accords.Development in the North, including greater decentralizationwhich would place more local autonomy and control overresources, is a critial component of responding to Bahanga'sgrievancs at the same time that we create a stable and morsecure environment that will be less hospitable o AQIMactivity.MCCULLEYhttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/da/cuenta/dudas/Mali/Argelia/controla/frontera/elpepuint/20101206elpepuint_22/Tes