Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by
asking Mr. Johnson if he was ready to lay a program
before the group. Mr. Johnson said that he was not.

Then ensued a military photographic intelligence briefing on installations in
Cuba, presented by a CIA representative
(Arthur Lundahl). Following this,
Mr. McCone called on Mr. Cline to give the most recent intelligence
estimate conclusions of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Cline did so on the basis of three papers
which were distributed to the group.1 (As he started, Mr. Cline spoke of China by inadvertence instead of Cuba; a few
moments later this was called to his attention and corrected.)

Secretary Rusk then said he thought
there should be an exposition of the legal framework surrounding possible
military measures by the United States, turned to me, and seemed about to
call on me, when the Attorney General signalled and said “Mr. Katzenbach.” Secretary Rusk then called on the latter. Mr.
Katzenbach said he believed the
President had ample constitutional and statutory authority to take any
needed military measures. He considered a declaration of war unnecessary.
From [Page 117]the standpoint of
international law, Mr. Katzenbach
thought United States action could be justified on the principle of
self-defense.

I said that my analysis ran along much the same lines. I did not think a
declaration of war would improve our position, but indeed would impair it. I
said that a defensive quarantine of Cuba would involve a use of force, and
this had to be considered in relation to the United Nations Charter. The
Charter contained a general prohibition against the use of force except in
certain limited kinds of situation. One of these was “armed attack,” but the
situation in Cuba did not constitute armed attack on any country. Another
exception was collective action voted by the competent United Nations organ
to deal with a situation under Chapter VII of the Charter. Obviously, no
resolution could be obtained from the Security Council. And it seemed quite
problematical whether we could obtain a recommendation from the General
Assembly.

The Charter also contained Chapter VIII on regional arrangements. Article 52
provided that regional arrangements could deal with “such matters relating
to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate
for regional action”. Thus a case could be made under the Charter for the
use of force if it were sanctioned by the American Republics acting under
the Rio Treaty. The Organ of Consultation, pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of
that Treaty, could recommend measures, including the use of armed force, to
meet a situation endangering the peace of America. As to the prospects for
securing the necessary two-thirds vote in the Organ of Consultation, Mr.
Martin would have something to
say about that.

If the contention were advanced that a defensive quarantine voted under the
Rio Treaty constituted “enforcement action” under Article 53 of the United
Nations Charter, and therefore required the authorization of the Security
Council, we would be able to make a reasonably good argument to the
contrary. While our ability to persuade seven members of the Security
Council to vote with us on this issue might be uncertain, we would in any
event be able to prevent a vote going against our position.

Mr. Martin then gave as his estimate
that the United States could secure immediately a vote of 14 in the OAS. He thought the majority could be increased
within 24 hours to 17 or perhaps even 18 or 19. He was hopeful in regard to
Ecuador and Chile, and believed there was a good chance of getting Mexico.
The Attorney General said the President would be placed in an impossible
position if we went to the OAS and then
failed to get the necessary votes, or if there were a delay. He asked if we
could be perfectly sure of the outcome before seeking OAS concurrence. Mr. Martin said he hated to guarantee anything,
but he had a lot of confidence about this. You couldn't go to the American
Republics in advance without loss of security, but he felt that a
last-minute approach [Page 118]to heads of
state, laying the situation on the line, would produce the votes. The
Attorney General again expressed his great concern at the possibility of a
slip.

There followed a discussion covering the meeting held the night before with
the President.2 One participant looked back on the
meeting as having arrived at a tentative conclusion to institute a blockade,
and thought the President had been satisfied at the consensus by then
arrived at among his advisers. General Taylor quickly indicated that he had not concurred and that
the Joint Chiefs had reserved their position.

Mr. Bundy then said that he had
reflected a good deal upon the situation in the course of a sleepless night,
and he doubted whether the strategy group was serving the President as well
as it might, if it merely recommended a blockade. He had spoken with the
President this morning, and he felt there was further work to be done. A
blockade would not remove the missiles. Its effects were uncertain and in
any event would be slow to be felt. Something more would be needed to get
the missiles out of Cuba. This would be made more difficult by the prior
publicity of a blockade and the consequent pressures from the United Nations
for a negotiated settlement. An air strike would be quick and would take out
the bases in a clean surgical operation. He favored decisive action with its
advantages of surprises and confronting the world with a fait accompli.

Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Acheson for
his views. Mr. Acheson said that Khrushchev had presented the United States with a direct
challenge, we were involved in a test of wills, and the sooner we got to a
showdown the better. He favored cleaning the missile bases out decisively
with an air strike. There was something else to remember. This wasn't just
another instance of Soviet missiles aimed at the United States. Here they
were in the hands of a madman whose actions would be perfectly
irresponsible; the usual restraints operating on the Soviets would not
apply. We had better act, and act quickly. So far as questions of
international law might be involved, Mr. Acheson agreed with Mr. Katzenbach's position that self-defense was
an entirely sufficient justification. But if there were to be imported a
qualification or requirement of approval by the OAS, as apparently suggested by Mr. Meeker, he could not go
along with that.

Secretary Dillon said he agreed there
should be a quick air strike. Mr. McCone was of the same opinion.

General Taylor said that a decision
now to impose a blockade was a decision to abandon the possibility of an air
strike. A strike would be feasible for only a few more days; after that the
missiles would be operational. Thus it was now or never for an air strike.
He favored a strike. If it were to take place Sunday morning, a decision
would have to be made at [Page 119]once so
that the necessary preparations could be ordered. For a Monday morning
strike, a decision would have to be reached tomorrow. Forty-eight hours'
notice was required.

Secretary McNamara said that he would
give orders for the necessary military dispositions, so that if the decision
were for a strike the Air Force would be ready. He did not, however,
advocate an air strike, and favored the alternative of blockade.

Under Secretary Ball said that he was
a waverer between the two courses of action.

The Attorney General said with a grin that he too had had a talk with the
President, indeed very recently this morning. There seemed to be three main
possibilities as the Attorney General analyzed the situation: one was to do
nothing, and that would be unthinkable; another was an air strike; the third
was a blockade. He thought it would be very, very difficult indeed for the
President if the decision were to be for an air strike, with all the memory
of Pearl Harbor and with all the implications this would have for us in
whatever world there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that
kind of country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions. Thousands of
Cubans would be killed without warning, and a lot of Russians too. He
favored action, to make known unmistakably the seriousness of United States
determination to get the missiles out of Cuba, but he thought the action
should allow the Soviets some room for maneuver to pull back from their
over-extended position in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy, addressing himself to the
Attorney General, said this was very well but a blockade would not eliminate
the bases; an air strike would.

I asked at this point: who would be expected to be the government of Cuba
after an air strike? Would it be anyone other than
Castro? If not, would anything be solved, and would
we not be in a worse situation than before? After a pause, Mr. Martin replied that, of course, a good deal
might be different after a strike, and Castro might be
toppled in the aftermath. Others expressed the view that we might have to
proceed with invasion following a strike. Still another suggestion was that
US armed forces seize the base areas alone in order to eliminate the
missiles. Secretary McNamara thought
this a very unattractive kind of undertaking from the military point of
view.

Toward one o'clock Secretary Rusk said
he thought this group could not make the decision as to what was to be done;
that was for the President in consultation with his constitutional advisers.
The Secretary thought the group's duty was to present to the President, for
his consideration, fully staffed-out alternatives. Accordingly, two working
groups should be formed, one to work up the blockade alternative and the
other to work up air strike. Mr. Johnson was designated
to head the former, and Mr. Bundy the
latter. Mr. Johnson was to have with him Ambassador [Page 120]Thompson, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Martin, Mr. Nitze,
and Mr. Meeker. Mr. Bundy was to have
Secretary Dillon, Mr. Acheson, and
General Taylor. Mr. McCone, when asked to serve with the air
strike group, begged off on the ground that his position and duties on the
US Intelligence Board made it undesirable for him to participate in the
working group. Mr. Katzenbach was
detailed to the Johnson group, later visiting the
Bundy group to observe and
possibly serve as a devil's advocate.

Mr. Sorensen commented that he thought
he had absorbed enough to start on the draft of a speech for the
President.3 There was some
inconclusive discussion on the timing of such a speech, on the danger of
leaks before then, and on the proper time for meeting with the President
once more, in view of his current Western campaign trip.

Before the whole group dispersed, Ambassador Thompson said the Soviets attached importance to questions
of legality and we should be able to present a strong legal case. The
Attorney General, as he was about to leave the room, said he thought there
was ample legal basis for a blockade. I said: yes, that is so provided the
Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty adopted an appropriate
resolution. The Attorney General said: “That's all political; it's not
legal.” On leaving the room, he said to Mr. Katzenbach, half humorously: “Remember now, you're working
for me.”

The two groups met separately until four o'clock. They then reconvened and
were joined once more by the cabinet officers who had been away in the
earlier afternoon.

The Johnson group scenario, which was more nearly
complete and was ready earlier, was discussed first.4 Numerous criticisms
were advanced. Some were answered; others led to changes. There was again a
discussion of timing, now in relation to a Presidential radio address. Mr.
Martin thought Sunday might be
too early, as it would be virtually impossible to get to all the Latin
American heads of state on Sunday. Ambassador Thompson made the point that 24 hours must be allowed to
elapse between announcement of the blockade and enforcement, so as to give
the Soviet Government time to get instructions to their ship captains.

Approximately two hours were spent on the Johnson
scenario. About 6 o'clock the Bundy
approach5 was taken up, its author saying,
“It's been much more fun for us up to this point, since we've had a chance
to poke holes in the blockade plan; now the roles will be reversed.” Not
much more than half an hour was spent on the Bundy scenario.

More than once during the afternoon Secretary McNamara voiced the opinion that the US would have to pay a
price to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. He thought we would at least
have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey and would probably
have to pay more besides. At different times the possibility of nuclear
conflict breaking out was referred to. The point was made that, once the
Cuban missile installations were complete and operational, a new strategic
situation would exist, with the United States more directly and immediately
under the gun than ever before. A striking Soviet military push into the
Western Hemisphere would have succeeded and become effective. The clock
could not be turned back, and things would never be the same again. During
this discussion, the Attorney General said that in looking forward into the
future it would be better for our children and grandchildren if we decided
to face the Soviet threat, stand up to it, and eliminate it, now. The
circumstances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more
unfavorable, the risks would be greater, the chances of success less
good.

Secretary Rusk, toward the end of the
afternoon, stated his approach to the problem as follows: the US needed to
move in a way such that a planned action would be followed by a pause in
which the great powers could step back from the brink and have time to
consider and work out a solution rather than be drawn inexorably from one
action to another and escalate into general nuclear war. The implication of
his statement was that he favored blockade rather than strike.

In the course of the afternoon discussion, the military representatives,
especially Secretary McNamara, came
to expressing the view that an air strike could be made some time after the
blockade was instituted in the event the blockade did not produce results as
to the missile bases in Cuba. The Attorney General took particular note of
this shift, and toward the end of the day made clear that the firmly favored
blockade as the first [Page 122]step; other
steps subsequently were not precluded and could be considered; he thought it
was now pretty clear what the decision should be.

At about six-thirty Governor Stevenson came into the room. After a few minutes, Secretary
Rusk asked him if he had some
views on the question of what to do. He replied: “Yes, most emphatic views.”
When queried as to them, he said that in view of the course the discussion
was taking he didn't think it was necessary to express them then. When
asked: “But you are in favor of blockade, aren't you?”, he answered
affirmatively. He went on to say he thought we must look beyond the
particular immediate action of blockade; we need to develop a plan for
solution of the problem—elements for negotiation designed to settle the
current crisis in a stable and satisfactory way and enable us to move
forward on wider problems; he was working on some ideas for a settlement.
One possibility would be the demilitarization of Cuba under effective
international supervision, perhaps accompanied by neutralization of the
island under international guaranties and with UN observers to monitor compliance.

Once again there was discussion of when another meeting with the President
should be held. It was generally agreed that the President should continue
on his trip until Sunday morning. He would be reachable by telephone prior
to that time.

The meeting broke up about seven o'clock.

Source: Department of
State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba
“Week” Drafts. Secret. Drafted by Meeker. The meeting was held in
Ball's conference room.
McCone's handwritten notes
on this meeting are in the Supplement. Gilpatric's handwritten notes on the meeting, comprising
less than 1 page and dealing primarily with the Katzenbach-Meeker discussion of the
legal framework, are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330,
OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re
Cuba.↩

Early the
morning of October 19 McCone had
sent a memorandum to the members of the USIB reviewing the discussion among the principals on
October 18 and asking for guidance before the 11 a.m. meeting that day.
(Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files,
Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31
December 1962) Presumably these papers are the response to that request.
The papers have not been identified further, but McCone's memorandum is included in the
Supplement. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,
pp. 193-194.↩

Sorensen drafts of letters to Khrushchev, De Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan are in the Department of State, Central Files,
737.56361/10-2062, and the Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba,
respectively. No draft of the speech, dated this early has been found,
but an 11-paragraph synopsis of a speech for October 23 is attached to
the paper described in footnote 5 below.↩

A copy of this 6-page paper with the handwritten
notation “First Blockade Paper, Johnson” is in the
Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 7 A
2896, Historical, Cuba. After sketching the advantages and disadvantages
of a blockade, it presented a 5-day scenario and predicted the reaction
of U.S. allies, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Another paper “Second Draft,
10/19/62” on the blockade consisted of a detailed list of the elements
in a course of action. (Ibid., Cuba Drafts)↩

A preliminary 7-page draft of this
paper “Air Scenario, October 19, 1962” had sections on the military
program, the schedule of public statements, notice to Khrushchev and
Castro, and notice to friends. (Department of
State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-1862) Pre-sumably this is the draft
discussed. A second draft included the same sections but suggested two
different alternatives for notifying Khrushchev and Castro and included
three additional parts: II) a 3-page possible White House statement for
the evening of October 22, III) a 1-page paper dealing with an
announcement for the morning of October 23, and IV) a 2-page,
11-paragraph synopsis of the President's speech on October 23. (Kennedy
Library, Sorensen Papers,
Classified Subjects Files, Cuba)↩