Has Bush Learned the Lessons of Other War Presidents?

President George W. Bush's commemoration of the first anniversary of the launching
of the war against Iraq coincides with the beginning of his campaign for re-election
as a "war president." Not since 1944 has an incumbent president sought
re-election in the midst of a war. In 1952, the unpopularity of the war in Korea
reinforced Harry Truman's private resolve not to seek another term and in 1968,
the divisions within the country and his own party resulting from the Vietnam
War led Lyndon Johnson to withdraw from the presidential race. War continued in
Vietnam when Richard Nixon sought re-election in 1972, but Nixon ran not as a
"war president," but as a president who was fulfilling his 1968 promise
to end the war. As a "war president" in the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt
in 1944 or Abraham Lincoln in 1864, Bush, as his early re-election advertisements
underscore, is engaged in two wars: the multi-faceted campaign against international
terrorism and the ongoing military effort to suppress Iraqi insurgents. The war
against Iraq, as the most visible and personal conflict to Americans, will have
the most immediate political implications. It will also likely be seen in the
long run as the most significant action of the Bush presidency. The war against
terror was forced on the United States; the Iraq war was a war of choice.

Bush and his advisers might heed the "lessons" that can be derived
from the experiences of three predecessors who waged regional wars during the
last half of the twentieth century. Truman in Korea, Johnson in Vietnam, and
George H. W. Bush in the Persian Gulf each faced problems similar to those confronting
the current president. Studying their presidencies suggests that the outcome
of a war reflects in large part the quality of leadership in taking the country
to war. Prior to firing the first shot, the most important challenge for the
president is defining the necessity of war to various constituencies. At home,
he needs to build popular support and, as the Constitution mandates, to gain
congressional authorization. Internationally, he needs to work for the backing
of allies and the United Nations; this enhances the war's legitimacy and, of
course, assures that others will share its military and financial burdens. If
a president cannot convince both Congress and the United Nations that war is
justified, then, history suggests, he ought to reconsider where he is taking
the country.

During the prewar period, Bush could have drawn from the example of his father's
leadership in 1990-91 for Bush I accomplished the most successful building of
domestic and international support. His actions reflected "lessons"
drawn from the two previous wars. Truman gained United Nations backing for intervention
to repel North Korea's invasion, thus demonstrating--what to Truman was fundamental--the
capacity of the new organization to resist aggression. He was not as effective
at home. Although the decision to go to war was initially popular with the American
public, Truman's failure to secure congressional approval undermined his authority,
especially as the war became increasingly unpopular. Truman claimed that the
responsibilities of membership in the United Nations and his powers as commander
in chief provided a legal basis for waging a "presidential war."

Another factor that influenced Truman's ill-fated decision was concern that
congressional debate over a war resolution would be contentious and enable Republicans
to restate their familiar criticisms of East Asian policy. Ignored in the summer
of 1950 was the imperative of a demonstration of national resolve to reinforce
that of the United Nations. Fifteen years later, as he contemplated Americanizing
the war in Vietnam, Johnson was determined to avoid Truman's mistake. Johnson
skillfully used a shadowy incident in the Gulf of Tonkin in August l964 to gain
overwhelming congressional approval for a resolution granting him a "blank
check" to employ military power. Johnson, however, never gained meaningful
international support for intervening in Vietnam: the United States did not
take its claim of North Vietnamese "aggression" to the United Nations;
America's European allies (even the British) doubted the wisdom of U.S. action
(and none contributed troops). Aside from South Korea, America's Asian and Pacific
allies, despite Johnson's browbeating, provided nominal support. The Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, established a decade earlier to provide multilateral
resistance to communist aggression and subversion, was of no use. America's
isolation contributed to the frustration of its military effort and the erosion
of its international stature.

Among the ramifications of the contentious Vietnam War was a congressional effort
to limit presidential war making, which led to the War Powers Resolution , which
was passed over Nixon's veto in 1973. Intended to establish ground rules for protecting
the respective war making and commander in chief powers of the congress and president,
the War Powers Resolution accentuated differences between the two branches, marked
by presidential refusal to accept its constitutionality and claims of inherent
authority to wage war.

Hence, by 1990-91 when Bush I decided that the United States had to be prepared
to liberate Kuwait if Iraq failed to withdraw its forces, he initially dismissed
any constitutional role for congress. From August to November 1990, he built strong
international support for U.S. objectives. A series of U.N. Security Council resolutions
demanded Iraq's withdrawal, imposed economic sanctions, and, finally, established
a January 15, 1991 ultimatum. As that date approached, Bush I finally went to
congress asking for its "support," but not its "authorization."
He did so for political reasons as public opinion polls indicated that 60 percent
of Americans believed the president could not take the country to war without
congressional approval. Yet as he approached Congress, Bush I, who was determined
that the Iraqi aggression would not stand, stated that he was prepared to use
military power regardless of congressional action; his defiant stance represented
not just an assertion of presidential war making but also recognition of the possibility
that the congressional war resolution would fail, because most Democrats and a
number of Republicans were known to favor a continuation of sanctions. In the
end, Congress narrowly approved what it insisted was a war "authorizing"
resolution. This contributed to a remarkable sense of national unity when Bush
I ordered the launching of military operations to liberate Kuwait. Although he
was late in securing his domestic base, Bush went to war with a strong level of
support at home as well as internationally.

Like his father before him, Bush II sought congressional support for political
reasons, while refusing to acknowledge its constitutional necessity. Bush II could
not ignore the pressures from congressional leaders, including many Republicans,
demanding that Congress's constitutional role in war making be recognized. In
addition, public opinion polls in 2002 as in 1991 indicated that Americans by
substantial margins believed that congressional authorization was necessary.

In other ways, the circumstances differed, reflecting a significant change in
the U.S. relationship with the United Nations. While Bush I had built a solid
base of support in the United Nations before seeking congressional backing which
he saw as necessary to buttress his position within the United States, Bush II
went to Congress as a means of strengthening the U.S. position in trying to gain
U.N. support for the campaign against Iraq. In both cases, the President was able
to use the United Nations issue to his advantage; while the President in 1991
cited the impressive international support to press for congressional approval,
Bush II contended that congressional backing would help him bring a reluctant
United Nations into line. This consideration necessitated moving early; whereas Bush I went to Congress a week before the ultimatum, Bush II did
so five months before military operations were launched.

In dealing with Congress, Bush II, far more than Bush I, held the high cards.
He was able to exploit the Democratic Party's
vulnerability on national security. The party's leadership, which had opposed
the 1991 war, almost unanimously supported the 2002 war resolution. Having opposed
a popular and successful war in 1991 put the party on the defensive when it came
to another war in the Middle East. This accentuated an historic image of irresolution
on foreign policy which dated back to the charge that Truman had "lost"
China in 1949, the impressions that Truman and Johnson had been ineffective commanders
in chief during the unpopular Korean and Vietnam wars, the image of Jimmy Carter
as an inept leader during the Iranian hostage crisis, and, most recently, the
criticism of Bill Clinton's seeming indecisiveness in the Balkans and Africa.
So the advice from Al From, the chief executive of the centrist Democratic Leadership
Council, reflected political reality: "I hope the Democrats will support
the president - period."

Bush played his advantageous position shrewdly. First, he decided to request an
early war resolution vote, which forced Congress to take a stand on the issue
prior to the mid-term elections. Members of Congress, especially those who were
in tight re-election races, took enormous risks in opposing the administration
on an issue of national security; by mid-September Republican candidates in some
contests were already pressing their advantage. For that reason, Democratic leaders
had wanted to postpone the matter until after November, but they could not ignore
the White House claim that national security demanded immediate action. To defy
Bush on national security was difficult, for since the terrorist attacks a year
earlier, he enjoyed high approval ratings.

Second, once Bush took the offensive, particularly with his speeches to the American
public on the anniversary of 9-11 and the next day to the United Nations, he redefined
the debate on his terms. He shifted attention from the pre-emptive warfare doctrine
that had been of concern to many Democrats as well as some Republicans. He focused
instead on Iraq's record of violating the disarmament provisions of the agreement
ending the 1991 war. Underlining the administration's rationale for war was Iraq's
threat to U.S. national security, because of its non-compliance with U.N. weapons
inspections, its duplicitous development of weapons of mass destruction, and its
capacity to support terrorist groups in their anti-American campaigns.

Third, Bush benefited from the extent to which the public accepted the administration's
contention of a connection between Saddam Hussein's regime and international terrorism.
The assumption of a "link" was an often overlooked part of Bush's famed
denunciation of the "axis of evil" in his January 29, 2002 State of
the Union address; the President stated that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea "and
their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace
of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes constitute
a grave and growing danger." The claim of a "link" enabled the
White House and its congressional supporters to answer critics who contended that
pre-emptive war against Saddam Hussein would detract resources from the war on
terror. (The congressional resolution of September 14, 2001, passed with only
one dissenting vote, authorized Bush to undertake whatever action he deemed necessary
to defeat international terrorism.)

Finally, in response to those who argued that the United States should work through
the United Nations, Bush contended that a show of domestic resolve would enhance
the prospects for U.N. action against Iraq. Promising to make additional efforts
to gain the backing of the United Nations, Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell
provided a rationale for support of the resolution that was seized upon by a number
of Democrats, who regarded U.N. sanction as essential. Bush played on the United
Nations issue by stating repeatedly that it was time for the international organization
to demonstrate "backbone" and "relevance" or else the United
States would have to act unilaterally. So by supporting the administration through
a resolution, Congress, so it was argued, would be making an American war less
likely and strengthening the United Nations as well.

Operating from a position of strength, Bush had no need to assert presidential
war making prerogatives. The possibility that Congress might reject the 1991 resolution
had necessitated his father's unrelenting insistence that he could take the country
to war without congressional authorization. In 2002, however, the president, with
support his for the asking, could afford to adopt an accommodating stance. The
more that he compromised with the Democrats, the greater would be the level of
congressional support and the demonstration of national resolve. Working closely
with a number of Democratic Party leaders, the White House and congressional Republicans
modified the administration's draft resolution in ways that facilitated bipartisan
support. As a result, with prominent Democrats in the vanguard, Congress in early
October passed a war authorizing resolution by substantial majorities. (Only after
the resolution was passed did Bush issue a statement, virtually identical in wording
with that issued by his father under the same circumstance, that in signing the
resolution he was not compromising the president's authority to take the country
to war or accepting the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.)

Having achieved an impressive victory on the domestic front, Bush, however, was
unable to duplicate that success at the international level. He went to war in
a weaker position than his father, for he failed to secure the United Nations
backing of pre-emptive warfare. The case against Saddam Hussein's regime based
on the WMD, delivered most powerfully by Powell, did not overcome the opposition
of principal allies and other major countries (except for the British). Bush has
attempted to compensate for the lack of support by emphasizing the organization
of the "coalition of the willing." So the overthrow of Saddam Hussein
and subsequent occupation of Iraq is a war waged with less international authority
than those in the Korean and in Persian Gulf wars, but somewhat greater authority
than in Vietnam.

Once at war, the president faces a wide range of new challenges. He must define
the war's political objectives, work with the military leadership to coordinate
ends with means, sustain popular and congressional support, build international
support, and provide diplomatic direction. Unlike the three previous wars, the
American objective in Iraq was the unconditional defeat of the enemy. This was
no limited war as in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, where the objective
was to repel aggression. In Korea once the ill-fated effort to unify the country
led to China's intervention, Truman accepted the necessity of returning to the
initial limited objective of restoring of the prewar division of the country.
In Vietnam, Johnson, haunted by the memory of how Truman had provoked the Chinese,
made clear from the outset that American warfare had the limited objective of
repelling the North Vietnamese "aggressors." In the Persian Gulf War,
Bush I--much to the annoyance of many officials in his administration, some of whom
have become prominent in the Bush II presidency--refused to broaden the objective
beyond the liberation of Kuwait. He acknowledged the limitations of the authorization
given him by U.N. Security Council and Congress. He feared the ramifications,
both within Iraq and throughout the region, should the United States overthrow
Saddam Hussein and occupy the country. It was striking that Bush I's two closest
foreign policy advisers--former Secretary of State James Baker and former national
security policy adviser Brent Scowcroft--wrote lengthy essays in major newspapers
during the summer of 2002 questioning the doctrine of pre-emptive warfare.

As expected, the United States in 2003 achieved its military objective with little
difficulty. Ironically, the most decisive victory by America's armed forces since
World War II has led to a situation which parallels in some ways the intractable
problems of America's most frustrating war. Clearly Bush failed to insist that
his administration confront the postwar problems; "wishful thinking"
that the Americans would be welcomed as "liberators" and bureaucratic
fighting over Pentagon versus State Department responsibility undermined systematic
planning. Reportedly the State Department dusted off records of the occupations
of Japan and Germany as a guide, but those were vastly different countries politically
and economically. In any case, there was a dearth of preparation for the problems
that were bound to confront an occupying army as an agent of the "nation-building"
mission.

The occupation of Iraq has shifted warfare from high technology offensive operations
to counter-insurgency, which has resulted in five times more American casualties
than during the campaign to liberate the country. Bush's problems are reminiscent
of those Johnson faced in Vietnam nearly forty years ago. As in South Vietnam,
the United States is engaged in "nation-building" as it endeavors to
establish democratic institutions by cultivating native leaders and drafting a
constitution. The effort is threatened by attacks on Americans and Iraqis associated
with the occupation, reminiscent of the communist insurgency that undermined American
political objectives in South Vietnam.

More broadly, as with Johnson, Bush operates
from a position of international weakness; most notably, the United Nations, which
has a history of involvement in Iraq, keeps its distance from American operations. This reflects the inability thus far to repair the continuing antagonism resulting
from America's disregard of the United Nations in 2003. And like Johnson, Bush
faces the problem of sustaining domestic support. The failure to find weapons
of mass destruction undermined the principal rationale for pre-emptive warfare.
Charges of insufficient Bush administration attention to the specter of international
terrorism prior to 9-11 undermines the president's credibility on national security,
which public opinion polls continually underscore is his principal "strength"
in the view of Americans. While support for the war has dropped, most Americans
continue to believe that it was correct to overthrow Saddam Hussein and thus far
regard continuing loss of lives as an "acceptable" price for building
a democratic Iraq.

Despite certain similarities in the problems of Johnson and Bush, Iraq is not Vietnam. The staying power and objectives of the Iraqi insurgency
is much more problematic than in Vietnam, where the United States confronted a
well-organized and determined movement that represented the principal aspirations
of Vietnamese nationalism and that controlled most of the rural areas of South
Vietnam; whatever the tactical differences between North Vietnam and the communist
insurgents in the South, they shared a common heritage and vision of a unified
Vietnam. In addition, their war against the Americans drew upon the resources
of the principal communist powers; indeed the Soviet Union and China were drawn
into a competition to see which could provide the greater support to North Vietnam.
The strength of the enemy and the weakness of the South Vietnamese government,
which lacked nationalist legitimacy and did little to build popular support, foreshadowed
the quagmire. The limits of U.S. power were evident from the earliest days of
involvement in the country. As Johnson Americanized the war in 1965, a number
of advisers warned him that he could not win.

In Iraq, the American nation-building effort relies principally on exploiting
the widespread hostility to Saddam Hussein and in that sense, it has a stronger
base than in South Vietnam. In the interest of solidifying the position of the
Iraqi leadership which is to assume power after June 30, the United States has
devoted resources to rebuilding the nation's infrastructure. More difficult is
creating a unified nation in a political entity whose political boundaries were
drawn principally for imperial administrative convenience; it remains unclear
how the interests of the Shiite majority can be reconciled with the Sunni minority
and the Kurds who have become virtually autonomous in the northern part of the
country. Undermining America's protective presence and the credibility of Iraqis
collaborating with the occupying force are the objectives of the insurgents, which,
by a number of accounts, draws support from the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime,
young men drawn from other countries to fight the American "imperialists,"
and terrorist organizations.

The fulfillment of the promise to turn authority over to the Iraqis will be a
critical test of the Bush war in Iraq. It is assumed that American forces will
need to remain indefinitely, but on what terms will be significant in establishing
the credibility of a new Iraqi government; and to what extent they will continue
to be engaged militarily will be fundamental to the American public's tolerance
of nation-building. If Iraq breaks apart (which was a fear of the president's
father if he had sanctioned an invasion) with communal warfare, then America will
face another quagmire, and one potentially more explosive and more draining than
in Vietnam.

Besides similarities in their problems as wartime presidents, Bush II and Johnson
also share certain leadership traits. In taking the country to war, both chose
to listen to hawkish advisers and to ignore those officials and members of Congress
from within their own parties who urged patience and caution. Like Johnson, Bush
cannot comprehend good reasons for other nations' not following the United States
into war, although Johnson did not allow his administration to engage in the kind
of "ally bashing" of the last two years that has further undermined
American credibility in Europe. Like Johnson, Bush is a remarkably effective spokesman
for his war. While not as eloquent a speaker as his predecessor, Johnson spoke
with emotion and conviction about Vietnam's importance to the United States; this
was, he believed, a critical test of American credibility. And Bush, while also
lacking the eloquence of his predecessor, speaks persuasively about the war in
Iraq as a transforming moment in American and Middle Eastern history.

Yet in ways that may prove to be more significant than their similarities, Bush
is a very different leader from Johnson. From the beginning of his presidency,
Johnson knew that the Vietnam venture might fail and he searched for a way to
avoid war. His dramatic offer of a massive program of economic assistance to North
Vietnam in April l965 was an ill-fated effort to "buy-off" an enemy
that Johnson preferred not to fight on the battlefield. Although he did not heed
the advice of Senators Mike Mansfield and Richard Russell, Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, Under Secretary of State George Ball and others that he not entangle
America in a war it could not win, Johnson could not help but be impressed by
the arguments of men whom he respected. Johnson's doubts were evident during the
series of July 1965 White House meetings on whether to make an open-ended commitment
when he asked the tough questions: how many troops would ultimately be required?
could North Vietnam match American escalation? what would China and the Soviet
Union do? could Americans fight a successful war in the jungles of Asia? how could
the United States help a people who showed no willingness to help themselves?
To his discredit, Johnson did not force tough analyses of those fundamental issues.
Even as he went forward with escalation, Johnson persistently searched for a negotiated
end to the war.

From what is known of Bush, it is difficult to imagine that kind
of doubt, agony and questioning. By all accounts, September 11 convinced Bush
that history has ordained him to wage global war against America's enemies and
to rebuild the Middle East. That sense of mission leaves little time to consider
the opinions of other nations or to weigh seriously criticism at home or abroad.
Johnson too had a problem with France, named Charles DeGaulle, but Johnson tolerated
his pretensions and arrogance and did not allow his administration to indulge
in anti-French diatribes, recognizing that in the long run the common interests
of the two countries would overcome the irritations of the moment. The Bush administration's
intolerance of the views of other nations-the
unprecedented "if your not with us, you're against us" pronouncement--is part of the mindset of the unilateralists and pre-emptive warfare advocates
who dominate the national security apparatus.

So while Bush wages a war that is unique in many ways, he is not immune from the
problems that his predecessors faced. Whatever happens in Iraq after June 30,
it is difficult to imagine stability being established without some degree of
international supervision or peacekeeping. A United Nations presence would provide
greater legitimacy to an Iraqi government than a continuation of an American-dominated
"coalition of the willing" force. Cooperation with the United Nations
was fundamental to American success in the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars. That
"lesson" seems clear enough.

The "war president" running for re-election relies on the urgency of
the war to convince voters that the retention of proven leadership is imperative.
That argument, however, had greater salience as voters went to the polls in 1864
and 1944 in the last years of long and monumental wars that were at last finally
being won. In 2004 questions about both the necessity of the war in Iraq and its
consequences are part of the political culture. When a president seeks re-election,
it is basically a referendum on his record. To the extent that the election is
determined by national security, the outcome will be based on whatever emerges
as the public consensus of the quality of leadership that called upon Americans
to embrace a bold new strategic doctrine by taking arms to achieve a lofty objective.