Concept

Concept, in the Analytic school of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy, which philosophers of the Analytic school hold to be concerned with the salient features of the language in which people speak of concepts at issue. Concepts are thus logical, not mental, entities. A typical instance of the use of concept is in The Concept of Mind (1949) by Gilbert Ryle, an Oxford Analyst, which implies that the purpose of the author is not to investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e., by the methods of psychology) about the mind itself but to investigate its “logical geography.” Similarly, investigation of the logical features of discourse about pleasure or duty or remembering is concerned with the concepts of pleasure or duty or memory. To be able to use these linguistic expressions is to apply, or possess, the concepts.

Learn More in these related articles:

...introduced interesting variations of his own. One point in his case that is especially important is his distinction between sensibility as a faculty of intuitions and understanding as a faculty of concepts. According to Kant, knowledge demanded both that there be acquaintance with particulars and that these be brought under general descriptions. Acquaintance with particulars was always a...

...experience, whereas metaphysical theories cannot. Eschewing this conception of philosophy as impossible, the critic of metaphysics believes that philosophy should confine itself to the analysis of concepts, which is a strictly second-order activity independent of science and which need involve no metaphysical commitment.