In post-revolutionary Iran the month of February has a
lot of symbolic significance for the state. Every year the ten fateful days in
February which resulted in the victory of the revolution in 1979, are
commemorated as Dahe Fajr, ‘the Ten
Days of Dawn’. However, this year ‘Dawn’ is celebrated at a time when the sun
is unlikely to rise over the Iranian political horizon.

This year the regime celebrates its anniversary at a
point when ideological fatigue overshadows its revolutionary zeal and when
internal factionalism is eroding its foundations. As the Islamic Republic is
celebrating its 34th birthday, it is facing some fundamental challenges. The main
instability is not caused by the ongoing economic crisis nor is it caused by
international pressure and the looming threat of war. The root of instability
lies in the very corridors of power in Tehran.

Over the last year or so there have been many discussions
about the impact of sanctions and the ways in which they are supposed to
destabilize the Iranian regime. It is not a secret that the tightening of
existing US-led sanctions against Iran has already begun to affect the economy.

Useless sanctions?

It is reported that Iranian oil revenues have fallen
around 45 percent in the last twelve months because of sanctions. Since October
2012 the country has been facing a backbreaking currency crisis. In a
remarkably short period of time, the Iranian Rial has lost over 70 percent of
its value and the crisis is getting worse by the day. At the same time the IMF
has confirmed that Iran’s economy has gone into recession for the first time in
two decades.

This hyperinflation has been making everyday life
insufferable for the weaker segments of society. Iranian consumer prices are
rising at over 70 percent a month and many households can no longer cope with
it. More long-term problems such as youth unemployment, corruption, extreme
class division and nepotism are worsening in the economic downturn.

Nevertheless, the question is whether the current
economic conditions will be an existential threat for a regime which has proved
itself to be exceptionally resilient. The short answer is no. Despite the fact
that the ongoing economic crisis will add to the workload of the security
apparatus and the controlling mechanisms of the state, the bad economy alone
cannot threaten the continuity of the Islamic Republic. Just in the same way
that North Korea and Zimbabwe are surviving sanctions and embargoes, the
Islamic Republic will also find a way.

After all, despite all restrictions, the country sits
on about $10 trillion of oil reserves and another $3.5 trillion of gas
reserves. Hence, in a world of ever-increasing demand for oil, the state will
generate enough resources, be it through the black-market, to feed its
essential bureaucracy and security apparatus - and to prevent any forceful
political transition.

Although the economic crisis weakens the regime, its
importance is overstated. Just in the same way that the sanctions that created
an economic crisis in Iraq did not lead to the disintegration of the repressive
regime of Saddam Hussein, so the Iranian regime will survive.

The threat of the war is not existential for the
regime either. Despite pressure from Israel, Washington is still reluctant to
consider military intervention. Even if they were to go ahead with it this year,
the possibility of a ground invasion is totally out of the picture. Indeed, the
regime’s continuity is not going to be threatened by a tactical airstrike upon
a few nuclear sites up and down the country.

The threat of internal divisions

However, what keeps the Supreme Leader awake at night
on the eve of the 34th anniversary of the revolution is the extreme
factionalism, which is disintegrating the core of the establishment. Exhausting
factionalism now more than anything threatens the stability of the regime.

Internal political divisions are far more dangerous to the regime than either economic crisis or external intervention. Over the last few years
political rivalry between many powerful factions of the regime has gradually
eroded the very foundations of the state.

Although division and competition are necessary for
democracies, they can be lethal for authoritarian states. After all many
authoritarian states have crumbled due to internal disintegration. Today, the
authoritarian political structures in Iran are overshadowed by a clash of
interests, but the antagonistic rivalries are no longer between the so-called
‘reformist‘ and ‘conservative‘ camps. Indeed, the presidential election in
2009 was the last nail in the coffin of the reform project. Since then the
influential reform leaders have either ended up on house arrest and
imprisonment or effectively become paralyzed.

In 2009, the Supreme Leader put all his eggs in the
same basket by explicitly backing Ahmadinejad who claimed victory in one of
the most controversial elections of the Islamic state. The vast majority of the
conservative camp were united in supporting Ahmadinejad as well. However,
shortly after the election, the sharp divisions between the various factions of
the conservative camp started to unfold.

Fraternal hatred

Over the last three years a multidimensional battle
has been launched among various factions of the conservative camp. These
bitter clashes have had some serious casualties for some of the most high
profile people in the system, the main rivals have been the Majlis (The Islamic
Parliament) and the government.

The current Majlis, which is primarily made-up of
conservatives, has been making life difficult for the government. The Majlis
has kept putting pressure on the president by blocking the government’s
projects and impeaching nine cabinet ministers.

Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, has never hesitated to
provoke and humiliate his powerful opponents. Some of these clashes have become
very personal. The leading figures of the Islamic Republic, who according to
the state’s discourse are selfless servants of Islam, keep publicly accusing
one and other of corruption, deviation, venality and payola. People around
these figures, such as family members and political allies, are not immune from
these attacks.

In early February, before the Majles impeached one of Ahmadinejad’s
ministers, he attended the Majles with a ‘secret tape’ publicly shedding light
on the corrupt activities of the Speaker’s brother. This paved the way for a furious
personal clash between Ahmadinejad and the Speaker Ali Larijani, who is a
member of one of the most powerful families in the Islamic Republic. Only a few
days after this controversy, the supporters of the president in the city of Qom
attacked Ali Rarijani while he was about to make a public speech on the
anniversary of the revolution. These ongoing conflicts are disheartening for
the constituency of people who still believe in the moral and ideological
supremacy of the Islamic state.

As international pressure is increasing upon Iran, the
Supreme Leader keeps calling upon the leading figures of the Islamic state to
unify. He even publicly labeled as ‘traitors’ those officials who undermined
the show of political stability. Yet, the situation is getting worse by the day
and as the next presidential election looms, more clashes are
threatened.

Silent crumbling

In the current situation, there are two significant factors worth highlighting. The first is the inability of the
Supreme Leader to exert control. The Supreme Leader, who is supposed to have the
monopoly of power, seems to have no capability to sufficiently address the
problem. This is exactly where the danger lies.

Although political divisions always existed in the
Islamic Republic, it has never reached this level. While Ayatollah Khomeini was
alive he always had the final say and despite the fact that his successor
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei never had his charisma and credentials, he managed to
control the political divisions until recently. Now the regime is in
uncharted waters.

The second factor is the emerging ideological fatigue
in the Islamic Republic. The current political situation portrays the fact that
ideology, in its classical sense, no longer works to unite and mobilize the
rulers and the ruled for the common good of the Islamic State. The
revolutionary ideology, which is partly about collective morality and political
unity, is now giving its place to its own antithesis.

The Iranian political system is no longer about the
supremacy of a top-down ideology. Indeed, extreme factionalism is exhausting the
standardizing, unifying and mobilizing properties of the state’s ideology. The
ideology is no longer compelling enough to homogenize even the leading figures
of the state, let alone convince the masses to sacrifice even more for the ambitious
policies of the state. Should political factionalism be contagious, there will
be some grave consequences for the regime.

Should factionalism reach the security apparatus of
the regime, in particular the Revolutionary Guards, then the Islamic Republic
is facing an existential threat. The Islamic Republic can survive the economic
crisis and international pressure as long as its core political and security
establishment is not fragmented. Otherwise, the regime may get lost in the fog
of its own instability.

About the author

Afshin Shahi is a lecturer in Middle East Politics and International Relations at the University of Bradford. He tweets @AfshinShahi

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