The articles and essays in this blog range from the short to the long. Many of the posts are also introductory (i.e., educational) in nature; though, even when introductory, they still include additional commentary. Older material (dating back mainly to 2005) is being added to this blog over time.

Wednesday, 3 June 2015

Umberto Eco as Philosophical Realist?

It's strange (at least to me) that a fashionable Continental
philosopher should advance what can be deemed to be a commonsensical
philosophical position.

The
point is that regardless of the literary and philosophical flamboyances of Continental, relativist, postmodern, poststructuralist, etc. philosophers, even they believe that there's a “independent and real world out
there” (as it's often put). Sure, that may not be to say much; though Umberto Eco does
come close to saying what this position amounts to.

Is
it "metaphysical realism"? I don't really know. It depends.

In
any case, it all boils down to there being a “red object out
there”; as Eco puts it. Or, alternatively, even when relativists
(for example) talk about the “silver circle”, they know “that's
the moon” (not, say, the sun) that they're “talking about”.

And
to demonstrate that point, Umberto Eco says:

“Had
Ptolemy pointed instead at a silver circle the other would have said,
'No, that's the moon, we're talking about that object over there.'..."

Of
course Eco's opponent may (or no doubt will) simply say: Yes;
but what do you mean by “the same thing”? The problem is this
same thing is at the very heart of the issue. Indeed, in a
certain sense, to say we're “talking about the same thing” is to
say very little (philosophically). Though, when talking
commonsensically, it's to say a lot.

What
Eco appears to do (at least at a prima facie level) is fuse
some kind of anti-realism (or constructivism)
with good-old-fashioned metaphysical realism. Though because this
anti-realism vs. realism debate is so ancient and shopworn
(as well as strewn with jargon), then perhaps we simply shouldn't get
too bogged down with technical terms and just (as it were) go with the
flow of everyday words... at least for now. (For example, most/all
constructivists, unlike idealists, accept that there's “an
independent world”.... though, again, what does that amount to?)

“I
hold that there can be no truth which is not the result of people
interpreting reality, and hence resulting from a social contract.”

And
then comes the realist angle. Eco says:

“But
when we come across those lines of resistance that prevent us from
making certain statements, that is the closest we can get to truth.
There is something in reality that decrees: 'No, you cannot say
this.'”

Of
course it can now be asked what it is, exactly, which allows us to
say “you cannot say this”. (Eco doesn't really specify at this
point.) However, in his commonsensical example given earlier, that
“silver circle” was clearly the moon and not the sun. (It certainly wasn't a flying teapot.)

In
any case, what Eco seems to be saying is that it's easier to
establish what we can't say is the case (or true) than it is to say
what is the case (or true). For example, we can't say is that
it's a flying teapot or even the sun; though perhaps in this - and many
other examples - what we can say is the case (or true) is open
to discussion. (It's not the sun or a flying teapot, maybe; though
what about another planet, an optical illusion or the
product of our "linguistic scheme”?)

Following
on from this, Eco himself says that “[n]egation is the closest
thing to truth”. That appears to be something a little like Karl
Popper's falsificationismin that it's easier (according to Popper) to disprove (or prove
false) a theory than it is to prove it (or show it to be true). Or,
if we reject the notion of proof as being applicable to
science, we can say that falsification is more conclusive than
confirmation or corroboration.

In
terms of simple statements or propositions, it's easier (or even more
conclusive) to show that p is false that it is to show that
p is true. That doesn't automatically mean that if we don't show
that p is false, then p must be true. p may have
neither truth-value at a particular moment in time. Nonetheless,
negation, according to Eco, takes p out of the picture (as it
were). Or, in Eco's own words, it's the case that “we cannot say
[that p] because it crosses the limits”. (Thus saying that
the moon is the sun/teacup “crosses the limits”.)

Common
Sense

Umberto
Eco boils all this down to common sense. In full, he says:

“I
believe that much of the contemporary philosophy of language has
rather forgotten that, in the end, they are all talking about the
same thing.”

It's
interesting that Eco singles out the philosophy of language here.
After all, in 20th century French philosophy (which he
refers to later) there hasn't really been a strong tradition which
can be categorised as “the philosophy of language”; though there
has been such a tradition in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. So
it's a shame that Eco names no names when it comes to what he
calls the philosophy of language.

Eco
elaborates on the importance of common sense. He tells us “that the
basic tool in philosophical thinking is common sense”. What's more,
Eco thinks that “for the past thirty or forty years French
philosophy has forgotten common sense”. He continues:

“I
think it's high time that common sense, so fundamental to the history
of philosophy, was reintroduced to the scene. Aristotle was, above
all, a man of extraordinary common sense, as was Aquinas.”

It's
also interesting that Eco singles out French philosophy. Here
again he names no names; though it's fairly easy to work out who he's
talking about.

Remaining
on the theme of common sense. Eco's fealty to common sense isn't some
blind or reactionary adherence to something that can sometimes (even
oftentimes) prove to be disastrously wrong. What he's saying is
perhaps similar to what Hume, Thomas Reid,
G.E. Moore and the late Wittgenstein believed. (Wittgenstein
didn't speak that much about “common sense”; he referred more to
“everyday language”.) So common sense must provide the grounding
of one's philosophy (even of obscure metaphysical speculations). And
because it's only a grounding (rather than a constricting chain), Eco
also says:

“Philosophy
goes beyond common sense in that philosophers question facts or ideas
that others take for granted. But to go beyond does not necessarily
mean to reject. Nor does it mean to go against.”

And
here we have the notion of grounding again. Eco says:

“What
it does mean is that the philosopher continues to use common sense in
order to tackle problems that everyday life does not raise.”

So it's fairly hard to decide if Umberto Eco's position is
realism or some kind of (mitigated) anti-realism. Regardless, it does
seem rather commonsensical... if in a philosophical kind of way. **************************************************