This is a dispute over entitlement to workers' compensation death benefits and
the computation of the deceased employee's average weekly wage.

William Eugene Johnson, III ("employee") died on 11 February 1993 as a result
of a workplace accident that occurred while he was working for defendant
Barnhill Contracting Company ("Barnhill"). Prior to working for Barnhill, he
worked for Outer Banks Contractors ("OBC") as a construction supervisor from 2
May 1988 until his discharge on 2 October 1992. While at OBC he earned a
weekly wage of $865 except for a period of time during which he earned a lower
weekly wage. His job was terminated at OBC due to that company's financial
difficulties and subsequent bankruptcy. While at OBC, he was the supervisor
for a Department of Transportation ("DOT") project in Williamston, North
Carolina, and for other DOT projects held by OBC. Barnhill bought some of
OBC's assets and hired employee Johnson along with other OBC employees to
complete the DOT project in Williamston. Employee accepted a position as
foreman with Barnhill, but for less pay than he received at OBC. He worked in
this position on the Williamston DOT project and, subsequently, on another DOT
job for Barnhill in Manteo, for an average weekly wage of $584.36 from 12
October 1992 until his death on 11 February 1993. At the time of his death,
employee and his wife, Deborah Johnson, were living separately. She had moved
out of their home in Kill Devil Hills on 4 November 1991. Before she moved
out, he was living in Williamston during the work week, and coming home on
weekends.

Employee's wife, stepson, and two sons filed workers' compensation claims.
Defendants and employee's sons requested that the claim be assigned for hearing
for a determination of entitlement to the death benefits. The matter was heard
by Deputy Commissioner Lawrence B. Shuping, Jr. on 20 July 1993. In opinion
first filed 3 September 1993 and amended 10 September 1993, Deputy Commissioner
Shuping awarded compensation to employee's sons, Jonathan Daniel Phillips
Johnson, and William Eugene Johnson, IV ("employee's sons"), and denied
compensation to his wife, Deborah Johnson, and step-son, Jeremy D. Dobbins.
The compensation awarded was based solely on the average weekly wage earned by
employee at Barnhill. Employee's wife and sons appealed to the full Commission
which substantially adopted the opinion and award of Deputy Commissioner
Shuping in its Opinion and Award filed 20 May 1994 and Amended Opinion and
Award filed 31 May 1994. Employee's sons and wife appeal.

Employee's sons contend that the Commission erred (1) by failing to consider
evidence of employee's earnings from his prior employment at OBC during the
year preceding his death and (2) by refusing to find that the circumstances of
his prior employment constituted an exceptional reason to consider his weekly
wages during this prior employment in addition to his weekly wages while at
Barnhill. We agree.

N.C.G.S. section 97-2(5) sets forth alternative methods for determining an
employee's average weekly wage. The Commission applied the second of these
which provides:

. . . Where the employment prior to the injury extended over a period of less
than 52 weeks, the method of dividing the earnings during that period by the
number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee earned wages shall
be followed; provided, results fair and just to both parties will be thereby
obtained.

N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5) (1994 Cum. Supp.). Since employee worked less than
52 weeks for Barnhill, use of the above method would ordinarily be appropriate.
However, section 97-2(5) sets forth an alternative method which may be used for
"exceptional reasons," to wit:

But where for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either to
the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages
may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured
employee would be earning were it not for the injury.

Id.

Employee's sons request that the weekly wages earned by employee at OBC during
the year prior to his death be considered in determining his average weekly
wage as an alternative method "for exceptional reasons." They assert that the
following unusual circumstances prior to his death are "exceptional reasons:"
the bankruptcy of OBC, the assumption by Barnhill of the Williamston DOT
project at which employee Johnson was construction supervisor for OBC, the
assumption of other OBC DOT projects by Barnhill, and Barnhill's purchase of
certain OBC assets and retention of other OBC employees. They contend that
these circumstances demonstrate a continuity between his employment with OBC
and Barnhill that justifies consideration of his weekly wages at OBC.

This continuity of employment is similar to that in Honeycutt v. Carolina
Asbestos Co., 235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952). The employee in
Honeycutt worked at the same plant, but successively for two different
employers, in different positions, and for different wages, during the
fifty-two weeks prior to becoming disabled. Id. at 477, 70 S.E.2d at
430. The employee was paid less wages by the second employer. Our Supreme
Court held that the Commission properly considered the higher wages the
employee earned with his previous employer at the same plant because it would
have been unfair to do otherwise.

It is similarly unfair to employee's sons not to consider his wages at OBC.
The Commission found and concluded that "fair and just results can be obtained"
by calculating employee's average weekly wage using only his earnings during
the four months he worked for Barnhill. The evidence does not support this
finding and conclusion. The purpose of the average weekly wage computation is
to "`measure . . . the injured employee's earning capacity.'" Holloway v.
T. A. Mebane, Inc., 111 N.C. App. 194, 198, 431 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1993)
(quoting Derebery v. Pitt County Fire Marshall, 318 N.C. 192, 197, 347
S.E.2d 814, 817 (1986)). Further, as Professor Larson has emphasized, the
purpose of having an alternative method is to prevent unfairness and to make
sure that the computation reflects what the employee would have earned absent
the injury. SeeHolloway, 111 N.C. App. at 198, 431 S.E.2d at
884 (quoting Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 60.31(c) (1993)).

Here, as a result of the bankruptcy of OBC, employee's wages at Barnhill were
depressed. He was faced with having to accept less pay with Barnhill in order
to stay in the area and continue working on the Williamston project and other
DOT projects assumed by Barnhill from OBC. The Commission found, based on
competent evidence, that he was qualified to perform significantly higher
paying positions like the one he held with OBC. Including the higher wages
employee earned at OBC in addition to his wages at Barnhill is fair to both
employer and employee.

Accordingly, we hold that the Commission erred by failing to consider evidence
of employee's wages at OBC during the fifty-two (52) weeks preceding his death.
We reverse the Commission's finding and conclusion that fair and just results
to both employer and employee can be obtained by using only employee's earnings
at Barnhill during the fifty-two weeks preceding his death. On remand, the
Commission should calculate employee's average weekly wages in a manner which
takes account of his earnings at OBC during the fifty-two weeks preceding his
death as well as his earnings at Barnhill. Except for the inclusion of his OBC
earnings, this method should mirror the method of computation set forth in the
first sentence of N.C.G.S. section 97-2(5) as closely as possible.

Employee's wife appeals the Commission's denial of her claim for death
benefits. Under N.C.G.S. section 97-2(14), a widow is defined as:

only the decedent's wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the
time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his
desertion at such time.

N.C.G.S. [section] 97-2(14)(Cum. Supp. 1994). If a "widow" under this statute,
an employee's wife is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support
on the deceased employee, N.C.G.S. section 97-39 (1991), and thus entitled to
receive compensation under N.C.G.S. section 97-38 (1991). Mrs. Johnson does
not assert that she qualifies as a "widow" by "living with" or being "dependent
for support" on the deceased employee at the time of his death. Rather, she
argues that she was "living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his
desertion."

She first assigns error to the Commission's finding that employee did not
abandon or desert her. The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive on
appeal if supported by competent evidence; its legal conclusions and decision
are reviewable for legal error and for a determination of whether they are
justified by the findings. Roberts v. ABR Assocs., Inc. 101 N.C. App.
135, 138, 398 S.E.2d 917, 918 (1990).

Here, there is competent evidence to support the Commission's finding that
employee did not abandon or desert his wife. To the extent that this "finding"
is also a legal conclusion, it is justified by the findings of fact. The
findings and competent evidence show that employee lived in Williamston during
the week because he worked there, that he lived at home with his wife on
weekends, and that his wife was the one who chose to move out of the marital
residence.

Mrs. Johnson contends that the evidence shows she was "constructively
abandoned" by employee, and urges us to apply "constructive abandonment" theory
in the workers' compensation context. However, we will not consider
constructive abandonment because the Commission found the wife's evidence on
this issue not credible. She assigns error to this credibility determination.
However, credibility is a matter for the Commission, not for this Court.
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993). Accordingly we affirm the Commission's finding on the
credibility of her evidence. We also affirm its determination that employee
Johnson did not abandon or desert his wife.

Mrs. Johnson further contends that the Commission applied the wrong legal
standard in determining whether she was living apart from her husband for
justifiable cause or because of abandonment. She asserts that the Commission
failed to apply the "totality of circumstances" analysis set forth in Rogers
v. University Motor Inn, 103 N.C. App. 456, 405 S.E.2d 770, disc. review
denied, 330 N.C. 120, 409 S.E.2d 600 (1991). In its Opinion and Award, the
Commission distinguished Rogers, concluding that there was no credible
evidence of a drinking problem or abusive conduct that would constitute
justifiable cause for her to live apart from her husband. As stated above, the
Commission dismissed the evidence presented by her on this issue as not
credible. By so evaluating her evidence, the Commission has demonstrated that
it considered the totality of the circumstances presented by the evidence,
found her evidence lacking, and so reached its final determination. We find no
error in the Commission's application of Rogers.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the Commission's denial of compensation to
employee's wife, reverse its determination of his average weekly wage, and
remand for calculation of average weekly wage in a manner consistent with this
opinion.