26 JUN 2009
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*Inquiry to Focus on Flights’ Sensor Malfunctions
*NTSB Is Examining A330 Airspeed Discrepancies
*The importance of Flight 447's missing black boxes
*Qantas cancels orders for 15 Boeing 787s
*Study, FAA disagree over minimum chopper altitude
*NBAA Attempts to Block FOIA Request, Foiled by FAA
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Inquiry to Focus on Flights’ Sensor Malfunctions
By MATTHEW L. WALD
WASHINGTON — The National Transportation Safety Board said Thursday evening
that it had begun an investigation into two recent incidents involving
Airbus A330s, the same kind of plane as the one operated by Air France that
crashed over the Atlantic Ocean on June 1.
Times Topics: Air France Flight 447In both cases, the system for sensing
speed through the air malfunctioned, a problem that apparently occurred on
the Air France plane shortly before it crashed.
The safety board said one incident to be investigated took place on a TAM
Airlines flight from Miami to São Paulo, Brazil, on May 21, and the other on
a Northwest Airlines flight between Hong Kong and Tokyo on June 23. Both
planes landed at their destinations without injuries or damage.
The pilots of the TAM flight lost information on speed and altitude in
cruise flight. The autopilot and auto throttle also disconnected.
In the case of Air France Flight 447, automated messages from the plane to a
maintenance base indicated a loss of speed information and a switching off
of the autopilot and auto throttle.
The National Transportation Safety Board said in a brief statement that the
problem on the Northwest plane was “possibly similar,” but it did not
provide details.
French and American naval ships are searching the Atlantic for the “black
boxes” from the Air France flight, but for now the automated messages appear
to be the major source of information on the cause of the crash.
The plane went down early on June 1 about 620 miles off the coast of
northern Brazil with 228 people on board.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/world/americas/26france.html?ref=global-ho
me
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NTSB Is Examining A330 Airspeed Discrepancies
Two Flights Reported Difficulty With Speed And Altitude Information
The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating two recent
incidents in which airspeed and altitude indications in the cockpits of
Airbus A-330 aircraft may have malfunctioned.
The first incident occurred May 21, 2009, when TAM Airlines flight 8091
(Brazilian registration PT-MVB) flying from Miami, Florida to Sao Paulo,
Brazil, experienced a loss of primary speed and altitude information while
in cruise flight. Initial reports indicate that the flight crew noted an
abrupt drop in indicated outside air temperature, followed by the loss of
the Air Data Reference System and disconnections of the autopilot and
autothrust, along with the loss of speed and altitude information.
The flight crew used backup instruments and primary data was restored in
about 5 minutes. The flight landed at Sao Paulo with no further incident
and there were no injuries or damage.
The Safety Board has become aware of another possibly similar incident that
occurred on June 23 on a Northwest Airlines A-330 (registration unknown)
flying between Hong Kong and Tokyo. The aircraft landed safely in Tokyo; no
injuries or damage was reported. Data recorder information, Aircraft
Condition Monitoring System messages, crew statements and weather
information are being collected by NTSB investigators.
Further information on both incidents will be released when it becomes
available.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
aero-news.net
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The importance of Flight 447's missing black boxes
Black box data can provide key clues to how the crash happened, information
that's vital for future airline safety and design.
If the flight data recorders from Air France Flight 447 are never recovered
– as seems increasingly possible – their absence will make it difficult to
figure out what caused the accident and to apply any lessons for improving
future air safety, say some aviation analysts.
The so-called black boxes, which are actually bright orange, contain
recording equipment that hold keys to understanding what happened in the
last minutes aboard the Airbus 330-200 aircraft before it apparently broke
up over the Atlantic Ocean June 1.
The Airbus was on a routine flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris with 228
people aboard. There were no survivors. The flight captain and the steward
were among the 50 bodies recovered so far, according to Air France.
Black box data include recordings of the pilots' last words in the cockpit,
as well as a computerized record of how key parts of the plane were
functioning. Combined with physical information gleaned from the wreckage,
the data help investigators piece together what happened – and, from that,
to recommend changes either to aircraft design or pilot training to improve
future aviation safety.
Without that data or more recovered wreckage, aviation analysts say, there's
little to go on other than speculation.
"That would probably cast a cloud over a number of things that conceivably
could be cleared up with greater information and physical evidence – which
may be unfair," says Robert Mann, president of R.W. Mann & Co., an aviation
consulting firm in Port Washington, N.Y. "It may also be insufficient to
really force more fundamental changes" to improve safety, he says. "In the
absence of either more physical evidence or the data recorders, we're going
to miss the opportunity to do both of those things."
The Airbus 330-200 has design and material features that are increasingly
used in other new aircraft, making it especially important to find out what
happened.
Some analysts have looked at the possibility that on-board computer problems
contributed to the accident. The Airbus is a fly-by-wire aircraft, which
means the flight controls are electronically controlled. The system's
computer is designed in such a way that, if a pilot makes an error or an
unusually strong wind gust throws the plane off course, the computer will
automatically right it, overriding the manual controls. Several Airbus
planes have had problems with what are called "uncommanded movements,"
initiated by the computer.
Another concern has to do with the parts of the Airbus 330-200 made of
composite materials, including the rudders and the tail fins known as the
vertical stabilizers. These materials, engineered from spun fabric and
resins, are believed to be as strong if not stronger than some metals. But
they are also more difficult to test for potential problems and can
delaminate internally, weakening the materials.
New generations of planes are being made with more sophisticated computers
and more composite materials than in the past. So understanding what
happened to Air France Flight 447 could be vital to future aviation safety,
analysts say.
"Given the quantum leaps we're making in becoming more reliant on
[computer-controlled] aircraft that cannot revert to manual control, and a
predominance of composite structures [in aircraft construction,] the [Air
France Flight 447] data would be an important one to have to tell us it's OK
to continue to move in those directions," says Mr. Mann, "or that maybe
we've already moved too far and the certification standards haven't kept
up."
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0625/p02s14-usgn.html
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Qantas cancels orders for 15 Boeing 787s
SYDNEY, Australia (AP) — Qantas Airways Ltd. said Friday it had canceled
orders for 15 Boeing 787s and delayed the delivery of a further 15 aircraft
due to turbulent market conditions.
Qantas Chief Executive Alan Joyce said the decision had not been influenced
by Boeing's announcement earlier this week of a design issue in the 787 and
further delay to the aircraft's first flight. He said discussions with
Boeing about the order had started some months ago.
Qantas said it had reached a mutual agreement with Chicago-based Boeing Co.
to defer the delivery of 15 Boeing 787-8 aircraft by four years and cancel
orders for 15 Boeing 787-9s (which are slightly larger) scheduled for
delivery in 2014 and 2015.
Joyce said Qantas remained committed to the 787 as the right choice for the
international expansion of Jetstar, its low-cost subsidiary, and as an
eventual replacement for Qantas' Boeing 767 fleet.
The 787 is the first commercial jet made mostly of light, sturdy
carbon-fiber composites instead of aluminum. Large parts of the plane, such
as the fuselage sections and wings, are made in factories around the world
and flown in a huge modified 747 to Boeing's widebody plant in the Seattle
area, where they are essentially snapped together.
Boeing said Tuesday that it needed to reinforce small areas near the
connection of the wings and fuselage before conducting a test flight of the
jet.
The cancellation of orders for 15 787-9s would reduce the group's aircraft
capital expenditure by $3 billion based on current list prices, Joyce said.
He said Qantas announced its original 787 order in 2005 and the "operating
environment for the world's airlines has clearly changed dramatically since
then."
"Delaying delivery, and reducing overall B787 capacity, is prudent, while
still enabling Qantas and Jetstar to take advantage of growth opportunities
and market demands, both domestically and internationally," he said in a
statement.
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Study, FAA disagree over minimum chopper altitude
HONOLULU (AP)—There have been fewer tourist helicopter crashes in Hawaii
since a 1994 emergency rule set a new minimum altitude for flying, but those
that have occurred have been deadlier, according to researchers from the
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health's Center for Injury Research
and Policy.
They found the rule change issued by the Federal Aviation Administration led
to an increase in crashes attributed to poor visibility encountered by
pilots using visual flight rules who fly into bad weather, called instrument
meteorological conditions. They are called VFR-IMC crashes.
"Our data suggest the FAA should reconsider the rule's clause that
established a minimum flying altitude of 1,500 feet, as we know higher
altitudes are associated with more cloud cover," Susan P. Baker, director of
the study's research and professor with the injury center, said in a news
release.
FAA spokesman Ian Gregor defended the altitude minimum, which applies only
to Hawaii sightseeing helicopters, saying the agency reviewed the
requirement just two years ago.
"The review showed that there is no causal link between the 1,500-foot rule
and pilots flying into bad weather," he said. "In other words, the rule is
not responsible for pilots flying into bad weather."
The minimum altitude was one of a number of regulations included in the rule
directed at Hawaii helicopter tour operations in the wake of an escalation
in the number of fatal crashes.
The study used information from the National Transportation Safety Board's
aviation accident database to compare tour helicopter crashes that occurred
in Hawaii during the 14 years before and 14 years after the rule went into
effect in late 1994. The year had seen crashes involving 10 of 97 Hawaii
tour helicopters operating at the time, the researchers said.
Hawaii Sightseeing helicopter tours are popular with vacationers who want to
get an unhurried aerial view of towering mountains, inaccessible sea cliffs,
lush valleys, waterfalls, an erupting volcanoes and lava flows.
Helicopter tours also fly over the Grand Canyon, Las Vegas, the San
Francisco Bay area and other scenic spots, but the study covered only
Hawaii, which has more helicopter operators and accidents than other tourist
spots.
The most recent fatal tour crashes in Hawaii were in March 2007 when five
people were killed in two crashes on Kauai within four days of each other.
From 1981 through 1994, there were 37 tour helicopter crashes in the
islands, compared with 22 from 1995 through 2008, a decrease of 41 percent,
said the study published in the July issue of Aviation, Space, and
Environmental Medicine.
However, the number of crashes attributed to poor visibility, or VFR-IMC
crashes, increased from two in the 14 years before the rule was imposed to
seven after it went into effect, or from 5 percent of the 37 crashes to 32
percent of the 22 crashes, according to the study.
Seven of the nine VFR-IMC crashes occurred after 1994. Seven of those (78
percent) were fatal, compared with 10 of the 50 crashes (20 percent) that
were not VFR-IMC, the study said.
There were eight fatal crashes before the rule went into effect and eight
after, but the study said, "The proportion of crashes that were fatal
increased due to the increase in VFR-IMC crashes, which have a high fatality
rate."
"Our finding that VFR-IMC crashes increased in numbers and from 5 percent to
32 percent of helicopter air tour crashes suggests this is a growing problem
and supports the conclusion that the 1,500-foot AGL (above ground level)
minimum altitude may influence helicopter pilots to fly at altitudes where
clouds in Hawaii are more likely," it said.
The FAA's review looked at crashes during the 12 years before and after the
rule was imposed.
"The review showed that there is no causal link between the 1,500-foot rule
and pilots flying into bad weather," FAA spokesman Gregor said.
"In other words, the rule is not responsible for pilots flying into bad
weather," he said.
Gregor also said pilots are allowed to dip below 1,500 feet to escape bad
weather if they inadvertently fly into it.
"If pilots take this action for safety reasons, we do not take enforcement
action against them," he said.
Gregor also said the National Transportation Safety Board did not identify
the 1,500-foot rule as a contributing factor in weather-related crashes.
http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_12693379
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NBAA Attempts to Block FOIA Request, Foiled by FAA
Following last fall's bad publicity surrounding the Big Three's bailout
request, major carmaker GM was prompted to prevent the public from tracking
its planes in databases compiled by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Shortly thereafter in December, investigative journalism group ProPublica
filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain a complete
listing of companies who requested to have their tail numbers excised by the
FAA. Earlier this month, the FAA deemed the information public, and planned
to release the list on June 16.
That is until the National Business Aviation Association filed a motion for
a temporary restraining order on Monday in federal district court in
Washington, D.C. The group, which learned of the request from the FAA,
argues that the records should be exempt from disclosure, citing that they
contain confidential commercial information that was submitted voluntarily.
Releasing the list would also generate a higher level of interest in the
companies that had tried to block public knowledge of their aircrafts'
movements, it said.
"Upon learning that a specific aircraft tail number is included in the
[blocked] list, a member of the public could readily track down the identity
of the owner (through the FAA's public aircraft registry database) and
attempt to investigate the reason the owner seeks blocking of the aircraft
data," Steven Brown, the association's senior vice president wrote in a
March letter objecting to the FOIA request.
However, The FAA reviewed the association's objections to ProPublica's FOIA
request and ultimately determined on that the information did not qualify
for an exemption.
In response to the failed attempt, the NBAA reiterated that it supports the
Blocked Aircraft Registry Request (BARR) Program, which allows information
to be kept hidden to protect the security of executives and to prevent
disclosure of business trips.
"The Blocked Aircraft Registry Request (BARR) Program was established over a
decade ago in response to recognized security concerns and competitive
considerations," spokesman Dan Hubbard said in a statement. "NBAA has long
supported the BARR program and believes the reasons for its creation remain
relevant today, given that access to information about certain flights can
be used to inappropriately impact the competitive landscape."
http://www.charterx.com/resources/article.aspx?id=4413
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Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP
CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC