The Solicitors' Journal, Volume 25

what was to them a more valuable return out of their estates by covering them with a dependent and submissive tenantry, the certainty o£ whose votes more than compensated for the precariousness of their rents, than from the system of extensive grazing farms which had been introduced in the earlier part of the century. And the old plan of giving leases for lives, which had been gradually dying out, afforded a means of effecting readily the double object, of making the tenant a free' holder in law, and keeping his actual right of occupancy as precarious as before. The result, acting on the natural bias of the people already pointed out, was to cover the country, particularly in its poorer districts, with a teeming population, nominally owners of freeholds (i.e., leases pur autre vie) of values kept as near the magic forty shillings aa the power of sub-division could attain to, who were, uuder tho most prosperous circumstances, barely able to maintain life on the lowest scale compatible with any settled existence at all, and who were, on the occurrence of the slightest misfortune (the accidental death of a cow, or the failure of an oat crop), reduced to a condition of absolute pauperism, and dependent, not merely for continued occupation, but for the very means of subsistence, on the forbearance or liberality of the landlord. He, in his turn, considered himself repaid for rents in arrear, often remitted altogether, nay, even for occasional substantial assistance in food or money, by the unswerving fidelity with which he was served at the polls. Tho Union with Grent Britain, which swept away two-thirds of the members of the Irish House of Commons, left the sixty-four county members intact, and thus rather increased than alleviated the state of things described. Then: were, we believe, many parts of tho country where the average holding did not in the year 1820 exceed five acres (at an average rent of ten to fifteen shillings an acre), and we can speak from personal knowledge of a district in which the sub-division was carried further yet, and a whole country side was cut up into plots not really larger than good-sized potato-gardens. In this case, however, agriculture was only apart of the tenant's occupation, and the livelihood they could not have made as farmers they eked out as weavers.

The first shock to this system was given by the celebrated "Clare Election," when the tenantry of Mr. Vesty Fitzgerald and his Friends, for the first time in the history of the island, voted against a deservedly-popular landlord, and in favour of a comparative stranger, on the ground of "public politics." The Emancipation Act of 1829, which immediately followed, disfranchised the forty-shillings freeholders, and substituted a £50 ocoupation franchise (which has since been lowered to £12), and thenceforth the efforts of the landowners have been mainly directed to getting rid of the evil effects of the excessive sub-division which they had, until then, encouraged.

In the meantime, the "Customs of Ulster"—so much talked about, so little understood outside the limits of the province—had been growing up. The population of that proviuce were mainly the descendants of the settlers uuder James the First's "Plantation," and, although comparatively few of them retained their original holdings, they had never ceased to feel themselves entitled to a more permanent interest in the soil than was recognized by the law. There was no way in which the landowners could more readily ingratiate themselves with the tenantry—and this was, as we have seen, an object of importance with them— than by permitting the transfer of this interest, which by-and-bye came to be generally recognized under the name of "goodwill." Moreover, it was soon perceived that this "goodwill" might be so used as to constitute a valuable additional security for the payment of rent, and it very soon became the practice on a very large number of estates to require all sales of the goodwill to be made "in the office," the money being paid to the agent, who deducted therefrom the arrears of rent before handing

the balance to the outgoing tenant. The decision of the court against the legal validity of the custom left the incoming tenant wholly at the mercy of the landlord, who might evict him at any time without permitting a sale of the goodwill, but, nevertheless, so firmly rooted was the custom, and so undoubting the tru-t of the people in the honour of the landowners, that we have frequently known the goodwill of a tenancy from year to year, comprising no legal right to anything beyond occupation at a full rent till the then next 1st of November, sold for a larger price than could have been got for the fee-simple of the farm.

When, by the operation of the Incumbered Estates Court (established by Lord John Russell's Government after, aud iu consequence of, the famine of 1816—7), a new race of owners was introduced, who knew nothing of the history of their estates, and had eujoyed none of the benefits, pecuniary or otherwise, which this system had secured to their predecessors iu title, it was not long before some of them were fouud ready to insist upon the legal rights for which they had paid their money, and disinclined to listen to any counter-claims founded on considerations to which they were utter strangers. The action of these men, and notably of one, who had purchased in 1818 a considerable propeny in the most flourishing part of Ulster, near to the great estates of the Hills and Stewarts, where the customary rights of the tenants had always been looked upon ns sacred—though not only perfectly legal, but the natuml result of the conditions under which they had acquired their property—inevitably caused great dissatisfaction, not only to the tenants immediately affected, but to ah who felt that the insecure nature of their owu tenure was, if not aggravated, at least exposed. It was a common saying at the time, "a single bad case takes away the confidence of a whole country side." Out of this feeling grew the "tenant-right agitation," organized by the late Mr. Sbarmau Crawfoid, which was indeed itself confined to Ulster, but which may be said to have been the nucleus of all the subsequent movement. The result of this movement, after several abortive attempts at settlement, was the Laud Act of 1870, which though looked upon at the time as a daring invasion of the rights of property, it is now the fashion to call, from the tenants' point of view. • failure. So far, however, as Ulster is concerned, that Act, so far from being a failure, has been as successful as any measure, upon its lines, could possibly have been. By legalizing the Ulster customs, wherever they existed, and in all their varied forms, it secured to the tenantry absolutely, not ouly all they were entitled to, but all they ever wished to claim: aud if the Act had stopped short at the end of the first section, it would have done for Ulster all that law could do in that direction. It did not, however, take long to show, first, that this legal recognition of the tenant's position entailed, even in Ulster, disadvantages which ho had not foreseen; and, secondly, that in the rest of the island these disadvantages were produced in an intensified form, and without the countervailing benefit derived in the north from the legalization of the custom.

Upon a due appreciation of these disadvantages will depend the success or the contrary of auy attempt to amend the shortcomings of the existing Act. But the subject runs too much into details to be entered upon at the fag end of an article.

Mr. E. E. Harrison, of 46, St. Martin's-lane, writes :— "It will interest your readers to learn that the sculpture gallery of the Royal Academy contains a very excellent portrait bust of Mr. John Iliffe, of 2, Bedford-row, by T. Eral Harrison, wrongly described in the catalogue (No. 1,569) as Mr. John Stiffe."

CORRESPONDENCE.

PROSECUTIONS FOR PERJURY. [To the Editor of the Solicitor*' Journal.'] Sir,—It is surprising that attention has not been called to the astonishing nature of the proceedings which attend the prosecutions for perjury which so frequently fellow some notorious case at the Central Criminal Court or assizes.

The theory of the English law is that the prisoner's testimony concerning himself is not worthy of credit. At a trial, therefore, for a misdemeanor or felony, his mouth is shut and the prosecution witnesses can say what they please without danger of being contradicted by him. Well! owing to the promptness of a jury to believe a plausible story in the affirmative, while the negative (especially in the absence of knowledge before the trial as to what facts will be alleged) is so hard to establish, we will suppose a man unjustly convicted. An appeal 13 made to the Home Secretary to review the sentence, and release a man from the horrors of perhaps undeserved slavery in penal servitude.

"Want does the Home Secretary do? He cannot direct a new trial, and he declines to take on himself the reversal of the sentence in the conflict of evidence, but he offers, if the principal witnesses for the prosecution axe convicted of perj ury, to advise the Crown to grant a free pardon.

Another criminal trial is the result; but this time the situation of the parties is reversed. The convicted defendant of the last trial and his witnesses get up their case, they work up corroborative evidence, rake up everything that tells in their favour, and the principal witness—perhaps the prosecutor iu the last trial—takes his seat in turn in the dock, and in turn finds out the difficulty on the spur of the moment in rebutting, by evidence, positive or negative, the plausible case made hy the prisoner who is now prosecuting him. The jury perhaps see that there is, to say the least, a great likelihood that justice has miscarried, and that the previous prisoner is suffering on unjust sentence. Their feelings are worked on by the prisoner's counsel, and after an incisive summing up by the judge they convict the prosecutor ■or principal witness of perjury. He is sent off to serve his sentence, the former defendant is released. But the issue of the whole depends on this fact, that the former prisoner may have been unfairly convicted, while the witness against him may not have committed perjury at all. His story may have been true, or he may be bond fide mistaken. These proceedings are a scandal to our law. J. R. Hall.

Broughton-in-Furness, May 9.

DORMANT FUNDS IN CHANCERY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—A notice given by Mr. Findlater, M.P., for a return respecting unclaimed funds in the Court of Chancery (Ireland), embodies suggestions from time to time made by me for the improvement in form of the English list of dormant funds in chancery. It therefore seems a convenient opportunity to draw attention to the great delay in the issuing of the lists. By the rules under the Chancery Funds Act, 1872, it is provided that as soon as conveniently may be after the 1st of October, 1873, and after the same day in every succeeding third year, a list of fuuds undealt with for fifteen years or upwards shall be published in the London Gazette. As a matter of fact one list only has been issued since the passing of the Act of 1872—namely, on the lstof March, 1877—so that triennial publication is out of the question. If the lists were issued promptly in an improved form, and published in newspapers likely to be seen by the parties interested, there is no reason why the great bulk of these

funds should not be transferred out of court to the rightful owners.

Edward Pbestow. 1, Great College-street, Westminster, May 11.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

Bankruptcy — Examination As To Property or Bankrupt—Production Op Documents—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 96.—In a case of Ex parte Tatton, before the Court of Appeal on the 5th inst., a qiieauon arose as to the right to compel production of document* by a person examined under section 96 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, respecting the property and dealings of a bankrupt. Section 96 provides that "the conrt may, on the application of the trustee, summon before it any person known or suspected to have in his possession any of the estate or effects belonging to the bankrupt, or supposed to be indebted to the bankrupt, or any person whom the court may deem capable of giving information respecting the bankrupt, his trade dealings or property, and the court may require any such person to produce any documents in his custody or power relating to the bankrupt, his dealings, or property." The wife of a bankrupt was, before her marriage, possessed of a polioy of insurance on her own life, and had assigned it by way of mortgage. After the marriage the mortgage debt was paid off, and the mortgagee, by a deed to whioh both husband and wife were parties, assigned the policy to trustees on trust for the wife as part of her separate property. There had been no ante-nuptial agreement for a settlement. <Vfter the adjudication of bankruptcy, but before the bankrupt had obtained his discharge, the wife died. She had not made any disposition of the policy. The trustee in the bankruptcy summoned for examination, under section 96, a solioitor who had formerly acted for the wife. From his examination it appeared that the policy was in bis possession; that after the assignment to the trustees the husband and wife bad joinedjin a deed by which it was mortgaged to another person ; that by a subsequent deed this mortgage was transferred to the solicitor j and that by a third deed the wife had assigned the equity of redemption to him. The second and third deeds were exeouted after the bankruptcy. The trustee's counsel asked for production of these three deeds; the solicitor objeoted to produce them. The registrar held that they must be produced. On the appeal it was objected that the deeds related to the separate estate of the wife. The court (james, Baogallay, and Lush, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of the registrar. James, L.J., said that on the marriage the polioy became the husband's property, subject to the wife's equity to a settlement ;primd facie, therefore, it was bis property. It was attempted to make it the wife's separate property by a post-nuptial deed. If it were the wife's separate property, it would pass to the husband as survivor, and would vest in his trustee. The trustee had, therefore, a right to see all the three deeds.—Solicitors, )Y. Tatton; Lumley <£• Lumley.

Proof In Bankruptcy—Interest Subsequent To Date Op Adjudication—Proof On Separate Estates Of Two Partners.—In a case of Ex parte Findlay, before the Court of Appeal on the 5th inst., a question arose as to the right of a creditor proving a debt in bankruptcy to interest on the debt subsequently to the date of the adjudication. A creditor, to whom two partners iu trade owed a debt which they had contracted fraudulently, elected to prove against tbe separate estate of each partner. One of the separate estates paid dividends to the amount of fourteen shillings and threepence in the pound; the other paid dividends to tbe amount of twelve shillings and elevenpence in the pound. The creditor received ten shillings in the poDnd from eaoh estate. The joint estate had paid only one shilling and sixpence in the pound. The creditor claimed to retain the benefit of his proofs against the separate estates until he had received interest on his debt up to the time of payment. It was contended on his behalf that eaoh proof was a distinct security, and that the principle of the decisions of Lord Justice Gtiffard in the cases of the Warrant Finance Company (18 W. B. 102, 154, L. K. 5 Ch. 86, 88) applied. The creditor, it was contended, was entitled to the benefit of each proof,

independently of the other, end might apply it as he pleased until his debt was fully paid with interest. The oonrt James, Baggallay, and Lush, L.JJ.) refused to admit the claim. James, L.J., said that the rule in bankruptcy was clear. There was ODly one administration of joint and separate estate, though for convenience of administration the creditors were divided into two classes. When a creditor was competing with other creditors he could not prove for interest accrued due after the adjudication. Of course, if he held a security his right was different. Otherwise be could not have interest after the adjudication until all the other creditors, joint and separate, had been satisfied the principal of their debts.—Solicitors, Murray, Hutchins, d; Stirling; Travels, Smith, $ Braithwaile.

Bankruptcy — Protected Transaction — Secured Creditor— Garnishee Order—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 94 (sub-section 3), s. 95 (sub-section 3).—In a case of Ex parte Fillers, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., tbe question arose wbcther an attachment of a debt by a garnishee order is within the protection of either section 94 (sub-section 3) or section 95 (sub-section 3) of tbe Bankruptcy Act, 1869. Section 94 provides that nothing in the Act shall render invalid {inter alia) (3) "any contractor dealing with any bankrupt, made in good faith and for valuable consideration, before the date of the order of adjudication, by a person not having, at the time of making such contract or dealing, notice of any act of bankruptcy committed by tbe bankrupt, and available against him for adjudication. And section 95 provides that " the following transactions by and in relation to the property of a bankrupt shall be valid, notwithstanding any prior act of bankruptcy" {inter alia):—(3) "Any execution or attachment against the [goods of any bankrupt, executed in good faith by seizure and sale before the date of the order of adjudication, if the person on whose account such execution or attachment was issued had not at the time of the same being executed by seizure and sale notice of any act of bankruptcy committed by the bankrupt and available against him for adjudication." The question arose in this way: on the 14th of August one Curtoys committed an act of bankruptcy. On the 30th of August a judgment was recovered against bim for £167. On the 1st of September tbe judgment creditor issued a garnishee order nisi against one King, attaching all moneys due from him to Curtoys, to answer tbe judgment debt, and this order was served ou King on the 2nd of September. The order was made absolute on the 15th of September. Tbe judgment creditor bad no notice of any act of bankruptcy committed by Curtoys. On the 25th of September Curtoys was adjudicated a bankrupt upon the act of bankruptcy of the 14th of August. The trustee in the bankruptcy alleged that the attachment was invalid as against bim. The judge of tbe county court held that the obtaining the garnishee order was a "dealing with the bankrupt" within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 94, and was protected by it, as tbe garnishor hnd bad no notice of tbe act of bankruptcy. The Chief Judge held that the order was an attachment against the "goods" of tbe bankrupt within subsection 3 of section 95, and that, as the attached debts were not capable of being|sold, and tbe judgment creditor had done all that he could to obtain possession of them, the attachment was within the protection and was valid as against the trustee. Upon the appeal reliance was placed upon Ex parte Joselyne (26 W. K. 645, L. B. 8 Ch. D. 327), in whioh James, L.J., said: "Tbe property in the debt was transferred, and there was a complete and perfect security the moment the order of attachment was served." The court (james, Baqoallat, and Lush, L.JJ.) held that the attachment waa not protected, and that it was iovalid as against the trustee. James, L.J., said that he could not agree either with the county court judge or with the Chief Judge. In order that tbe transaction might be protected it must be within the words or the reasonable meaning of sub-section 3 of section 95. The sub-section said that the attachment must have been perfected by seizure and sale before tbe adjudication. A debt attached under a garnishee order was not capable of being sold, and therefore such an attachment was not within the words. Without giving a final opinion, his lordship's strong impression was that the word "goods" meant "goods and chattels" capable of being sold. At first he doubted whether there wai anything of that kind capable of being

"attached." But the words occurred in the Bankruptcy Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 81, and be thought the Legislature had then in view the process of equitable execution in the Court of Chancery, whereby goods sequestrated for nonpayment of money, ordered by a decree to be paid, could ultimately be sold and the proceeds of sale applied in payment of the money. There was, therefore when the words were first used in a Bankinptcy Act, something in the nature of an attachment on goods to which they could be applied, and this was sufficient to satisfy the words. But, if tbe words applied to the present case, the only equivalent to a sale of goods would be a realization of tbe attachment by actual payment of the attached debt to the garnishor. So long as it remained in fieri, so long as the debt was unrealized, an attachment could not be put higher than a mere seizure of goods by tbe sheriff, without any sale. Bagoallay, L.J., said that it was immaterial whether the debt was or was not to be considered as part of tbe goods of the bankrupt. If it was, the attachment in order to be protected must have been executed by seizure and sale ; if it was not, it was not within the protection at all. But he agreed with James, L.J., that the debt was not" goods " of the bankrupt. At the time when the words were first used in a Bankruptcy Act there was no such thing in existence as an attachment of a debt by a garnishee order in existence. Lush, L.J., agreed that it was unnecessary to decide whether sub-section 3 of seotiou 95 did or did not apply to an attachment under a garnishee order. Bat he could not belp thinking that, whatever might hare been the meaning of the words in former Bankruptcy Acts, they most, in the present Act, be taken to include an attachment by a garnishee order, a process which bad been created by the Common Law Procedure Act and was well known at the time. Sub-section 2 of section 95 dealt with attachments against land of a bankrupt, and then sub-section 3 dealt with attachments against his " goods," not "goods and chattels." He thought it was intended to deal with all kinds of property which would pass to the trustee. Tbe word "goods" might include debts, and he thought it must be taken as including them. Assuming that it did, the object of the prevision was to protect creditors who, after the commission of a secret act of bankruptcy, had pursued their remedies against their debtor, but they were to be proteoted upon certain conditions. Goods, in the ordinary sense of the word, must have been, not only seized, but sold before the adjudication, and this showed that the intention was that, so long as the execution remained only a security, it should not be protected. There must bave been an actual conversion of it into money. What was the equivalent in the case of an attachment by a garnishee order? Tbe security must have been realized before there could be any proteotion, and the attachment could only be realized by obtaining payment of the debt from the garnishee, either voluntarily or by means of an execution upon his goods. Till that bad been done there was to be no protection. The words "seizure and sale" bad no application to such an attachment, but they showed what was the meaning of the Legislature clearly enough to enable the court to apply the principle. There must have been an actual receipt of the attached debt by the garnishor, and till then the garnishee order was only a security, and there was no protection. Jam Es, L.J., said that, if the case shonld ever arise of an actual receipt of the attached debt by the garnishor before the adjudication, it was entirely unprejudiced by the present decision. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was asked for, but was refused.—Solicitors, Whitakers d; Woolbert; B. S. Fai» Tromp.

Practice—Costs—Third-party Notice — Ohd. |16, Rr. 17, 21.—In a case of Witham v. Vane, before tbe Court of Appeal on the 9th inst., a question arose as to the payment of the costs of some third and fourth parties. Tin original defendants had served a third-party notice, in pursuance of an order giving tbem liberty so to do, npon some persons from whom they claimed an indemnity in case of relief being given to the plaintiffs, and the third parties in the same way served a notice on some fourth parties against whom they claimed a similar indemnity. At the trial Fry, J., held that the plaintiffs were entitled to only a small part of the relief which they claimed, and he ordered them to pay the costa of the third and fourth parties (24 Solicitors' Journal, 612). The Court of Appeal (james, Baooallat,. and Lush, L.JJ.) held that the plaintiffs were not entitledto any relief at all, and they ordered them to pay the coats of the defendants, and left the third and fourth parties to bear their own costs. The court also expressed an opinion "that there was no jurisdiction to make the plaintiffs pay the costs of the third and fourth parties.—Solicitous, Markby, Wilde, is Burra; Parkin, Pagden, $ Woodhouse; Eogerson <Sc Ford; Morns <fc Murray; Benn. Davis.

Bankruptcy—Reputed Ownership—Custom—Noto-' TiiETY—Hieing Furniturb.—Id a case of Crawcourv. Salter, before the Court of Appeal on the 9th inst., a question arose as to the effect of the custom of letting furniture on lire in excluding the operation of the doctrine of reputed ownership. Furniture had been sold to a hotel-keeper upon an agreement that it should be paid for by monthly instalments, and that, until all the instalments had been paid in fall, it should remain the property of the vendor. The purchaser became bankrupt before all the instalments had ■been paid, and the trustee in the bankruptcy olaimed the fur•nitnre under the reputed ownership clause. The Court of Appeal (james, Baogallay, and Lush, L.JJ.), affirming the decision of Malin?, V.C., held that the custom of letting furniture on hire is now so notorious that the court is bound to take judicial notice of it, and that no one, especially an hotel-keeper, can now gain false credit from the fact that be is in possession of furniture. In coming to this conclusion the court wont further in favour of the existence of the custom than they did in Ex parte Powell (24 W. R. 378, L. R. 1 Ch. D. SOI, 20 Solicitors' Journal, 137), and they were to a great extent influenced by the fact that in that case the trnstee in the bankruptcy declined to have an issue tried as to the existence and notoriety of the the custom.—Solicitors, Dixon, Ward, % Co.; C. F. York*; Kynas'on cfc Qasqutt.

Ancient Lights — Alteration — Erection Of Sew Building—Obstruction—Evidence.—In a case of Fowlers v. Walkers, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., a qnestion arose as to the evidence of obstruction to ancient lights. The plaintiffs had erected some warehouses on the site of some old cottages which they had pulled down. The defendants were erecting new buildings so as to obstruct the act'P-s of light to the plaintiffs' warehouses, and the action "was brought to restrain the interference. Bacon, V.C., held that, as the plaintiffs had not proved in what part of the old cottages the windows, which were the foundation of their claim to ancient lights, were situated, they were not entitled to any relief. He said that, when ancient lights bad been altered, it was essential for the person who claimed in respect of them to prove exaotly the position and extent of the ancient lights. The Court of Appeal (james, Baggallay, and Lush, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision, on the ground that the plaintiffs were bound to show that some part at least of tbeir new windows was coincident with some part of the old ones, and that they had failed to do this.— Solicitors, J. B. Lydall; Field, Roscoe, Co.

Appeal—Locus Standi—Appeal By One Op Two CoPlaintiffs.—In a case of Beckett v. Attwood, before the Court of Appeal on the 10th inst., an appeal was brought by one of two trustees who were co-plaintiffs. The other co-plaintiff had not appealed. It was objected that one coplaintiff could not appeal without the other. The court {james, Uaggallay, and Lush, L.JJ.) overruled the objection. James, L.J., said it was no answer to a person who complained that he was injured by a judgment to say that there was someone else who was also injured by it who did not choose to appeal. The defendants were in no worse position than if one of the co-plaintiffs had died.—SoliciTors, E. Letchworth; Lamb; E. H. Barlee; Dixon, Ward, * Co.

Practice—Conduct Of Action—Infant Next Friend A Defendant—Formal Party.—In a case of Rt Taylor, Taylor v. laylor, before the Master of the Rolls on the 6th inst., a motion was made on behalf of oertain infants who had liberty to attend the proceedings that they might have the conduct of the action. An objection was taken on behalf of the defendants that the next friend of the infants was a defendant, and was, on that ground, an improper person to be so appointed. The next friend had been made

a formal defendant as his wife was suing. The property the subject-matter of the action had been given to the wife for life for her separate use, with remainder to the infants moving. Jessel, M.R., in overruling the objection said that, as a rule, no doubt, a next friend should not be a defendant, but where, as in the present case, he might be said to be a formal or what had been called an ornamental defendant, there was no real objection to his acting as next friend. The real objection to a person acting as next friend was where he had an adverse interest and could not serve two masters. Therefore, without laying down any absolute rule, but relying upon what Lord Cranworth said in Elliot v. Ince (7 D. M. & G. 475), and upon Lewis v. Nobbs (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 591), he should, in the present case, hold that the defendant might act as next friend. On the merits his lordship gave the conduct to the infants', and made costs costs in the action. —Solicitors, J. Burn; H. G. Gedney; Johnson Weatheralls.

Companies Acts—Rectification Of Register—CanCelling AND Re-issue OF ALL SHARES— FORM OF ORDER.— In a motion before Vice-Chancellor Hall on the 12th inst., in lie The Nassau Tea Company {Limited), a short point of practice arose to the form of order for the rectification of the register of shareholders. The application was made undar the Companies Act, 1862, s. 35, on behalf of all the shareholders, for an order to direct the rectification of the register by striking oat the names of all of them, and the re-issue of the shares after due registration of a contract under the Companies Act, 1867, s. 25. The facts were briefly as follows :—Eight persons, formerly trading as partners in India, had formed themselves into a limited company under the above name, to carry on their former business, and they wfra the signatories of the memorandum of association to the full extent of all the shares in the company, which were expressed to be issued as fully paid up. No contract, however, had been registered, as required by section 25 of the Act of 1867, and, the omission having now been discovered, it was, with the consent of the company, sought to set the matter right. As, however, by the order asked there would be created an interval during which there would remain no members of the company on the register, his lordship ordered that the register should now be altered by striking out the shares of every shareholder except one share in each case, and that the shares should then be reissued to the same members after registration of a proper contract. The order would be expressed to be without prejudice to a subsequent application to strike out and re-issue the one share remaining against the name of each shareholder.—Solicitors, Wade § Lyall.

Practice—Motion For Judgment—Consent Briefs— Rectification Of Settlement.—A short point of formal practice was raised by the registrar of the day on the 7th inst. in an action of Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald before Hall, V.C. The action was for the rectification of a marriage settlement, and was brought on as a short oause upon motion for judgment. The husband, who was made a defendant to the aotion, appeared to give consent, being represented by separate solicitors, who, however, had briefed the plaintiff's counsel to give formal consent. The registrar drew the attention of the conrt to this, saying that the j augment oould not be drawn np upon the briefs so held, and Hall, V.C, accordingly direoted that the brief for the husband should be withdrawn, and judgment should go against him as in default of pleading. His lordship also directedth at the judgment should be taken in the form of the declaration given in Seton on Decrees, p. 1232 (Braini v. Hull, Deo. 16, 1876).—Solicitors, Freshftelds <fc WUliims; Humphreys Son; Bowlings, Foyer, ds Co.

Administration Action—Insolvent Estate—Rules In Bankruptcy—Judicature Act, 1875, s. 10.—In a case of Hipkins v. Hildick, before Fry, J., on the 6th inst., the action was brought by a creditor for the administration of the real and personal estates of a testator, whose personal estate was insufficient for the payment of his debts. Fry, J., said that, having regard to the possibility that the whole estate might prove insufficient to pay the debts, it would be advisable to insert in the judgment for administration a direction that, in case the estate should prove insufficient for
the payment in full of the testator's debts and liabilities, the bankruptcy rules, with regard to the administration of the estates of persons adjudicated bankrupt, should be applied. This would call attention to the provision! o( the Act, and might save trouble in working out the judgment.—SoliciTors, Indermaur $ Co.; Emmet, Son, § Stubbs ; S. Whitehead.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS.

(Before Air. Registrar Murray, acting as Chief Judge.)

May 7.—Ex parte Spain, re Barclay, Gray, # Co.

Tbe Court of Bankruptcy has no jurisdiction to try the question of tbe trastec's right to money deposited by debtor* in liquidation with their solicitor previously to the presentation of the liquidation petition, the money being also claimed by a third person who objects to the jurisdiction.

This was an application on behalf of Henry Spain, the trustee or the estate of Barclay, Gray, & Co., debtors in liquidation, for an order that Mr. W. B. 8tyer, solicitor, should, within four days after the heariDg of the application, pay to the applicant the sum of £917 Os. 7d., cash in his hands.

In the month of Febrnary, 1880, the Eastern Agency (Limited) commenoed an action against the debtors to recover damages for the non-acceptance of a cargo of rice, purchased by them under a contract in writing. The action was referred to arbitration pursuant to tbe terms of the contract, and on the 22nd of December, 1880, the arbitrator made his award, whereby he awarded the sum of £919 Os. 7d., to be paid by the debtors to tbe Eastern Agency (Limited).

On the 26th of January, 1881, the award was made a rnle of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, and, on the 16th of February, an order was obtained for payment of the amount to the Eastern Agency (Limited).

Tbe dettors, on tbe 1st of March, obtained an order to stay execution under the order pending an appeal by Tamvaco & Co. (who had been brought in as third parties pursuant to the provisions of the Judicature Act) on payment of the sum of £919 0s. 7d. into court to abide the result of the appeal.

On the 2nd of March the debtors handed the, sum of £919 Os. 7il. in cash to Mr. Styer, tbeir solicitor, and on the 3rd, and before the money conld be paid into court, they presented a petition for liquidation.

On the same day (tbe plaintiffs' solicitors being unaware that tbe debtors had paid tbe money) Mr. Styer was served with a summons to set aside the order of the 1st of March, and, on the 4th of March, an order was made setting it aside.

The trustee claimed to have the £919 in tbe hands of Mr. Styer paid to him as part of the estate of the debtors, and the Eastern Agency (Limited) also olaimed the money.

Finlay Knight, in support of the applioation.

R. T. Jteid, and J. Linklnter, for the Eastern Agency Company.—The court has no jurisdiction to try this question. It has no jurisdiction against a third party unless by consent: Ex parte Vicken, Re Pollard (27 W. R. 731, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 884) ; Ex parte Brown, Re Yates (L. R. 11 Ch. D. 148). The trustee can bave no higher right to the money than the debtor Las, and he ought to be left to his action.

C. Hall, for Styer.—I am a stakeholder merely, and desire to get rid of the money.

Knight, in reply.—The company is a creditor claiming to hold security, and is not a stranger to the proceedings. This is not a mere money demand by the trustee, it is a question whether the fund claimed by the oompany lias been specifically appropriated to the payment of the company's debt.

Mr. Registrar Murray said that, having regard to the case of Ex parte Dicken, Re Pollard, and the principles there laid down by the Master of the Roll?, he did not consider that be had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under the 72nd section. Tho remarks made by Lord Justice James in that case applied here, and he did not think it expedient that he should exercise jurisdiction. He did not see that the trnstee had any higher right th in the debtors had, and if they had bronght an action against the solicitor to recover the money paid to him, it would have been bis duty to inter

plead. It was impossible for him to assume jurisdiction in such a case, and he must refuse the motion, with costs.

This action was brought by a late articled clerk to a solicitor against his master to recover damages for a breach of covenant that the defendant would use all his endeavours to promote the admission of the plaintiff as a solicitor of the Supreme Court. The plaintiff had been some years in tbe defendant's employ before the articles were signed, on May 24, 1876, for three years, and under these the plaintiff duly served the defendant. But when the plaintiff presented himself to the Law Institution for examination certain questions were put to the defendant as to whether the plaintiff had faithfully, honestly, and diligently served him, and the defendant refused to certify to that effect, whereby the plaintiff alleges he has been debarred and delayed from being admitted and practising in his profession. The defence set up is that the defendant honestly and bona fide believed certain statements as to the character and honesty of the plaintiff made to him by a Mrs. Stanley, since dead, with whom the plaintiff was at one time living. These related to a fee of £2 4s. 6d. for professional work due to Mr. D. Straight (now a judge in India), which the plaintiff alleges that barrister's clerk returned to him as a present for extra trouble taken in the case. Mr. Straight, however, denied ever having given this authority, and has written saying he would come over from India, if necessary, to prove it, and this denial is now admitted. This transaction, bowever, took place some fourteen months before the articles were signed, in March, 1875. Further, there was a charge of tampering with the stamps on certain bankruptcy proceedings, and with making away with the papers connected therewith in 1874-5. These papers were put in tbe plaintiff's room in the defendant's office in January, 1875, and Mrs. Stanley's story was that the plaintiff had taken the papers home and removed the stamps over the steam of a kettle. She further said the plaintiff admitted to her having taken £1 from bis employer, on suspicion of which another clerk had been dismissed. The defendant, in January, 1S79, addressed a long memorandum to the Law Institution at their request, setting out all these misdoings, and Mrs. Stanley's letters as his reason for refusing to certify, and on this the plaintiff has commenced a further action of libel against the defendant. In the present action, the plaintiff also claimed damages for a slander for the defendant's having said of the plaintiff to a Mr. Crump, about March, 1874, when he was investigating the plaintiff's accounts, "I have some suspicion he is robbing rae; I may want you tooverhaul his accounts."

At the conclusion of the evidence the learned Judge summed up and pointed out that this was not an action of libel, but, in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Appeal, the question was whether the defendant used his honest endeavotrs to promote the plaintiff's admission. They were not to try the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff, or the truth or falsehood of tbe accusations, but (1) whether the defendant honestly and bond fide believed them. It was to bo observed that the defendant in June, 1879, after the expiration of the articles, entered into some negotiations with the plaintiff as to re-engaging him. This tbe defendant explained as owing to a desire that the plaintiffshould finish np two or three cases of which he was cognizant and the defendant ignorant, and to save ajonrney to tbe Maidstone Assizes. As to the slander, did the defendant (2) mean to impute a felony to the

[ plaintiff in what he said to Crump? Thirdly, was he actuated therein by actual malice? If they found a verdict for the

'plaintiff, they would award bim damages on both beads.

ISir H. Giffard said he had uot touched on tbe question, of slander, as the Lord Chief Justice, on a former trial,.