Selected Correspondence:
Letter 36 (23) Spinoza to Blyenbergh.

[Spinoza replies, that there is a difference
between the theological and the philosophical
way of speaking of
God and things divine. He
proceeds to discuss Blyenbergh's questions.
(Voorburg, 13th March, 1665.)]

Friend and Sir, --I have received two letters from you
this week; the second, dated 9th March, only served to
inform me of the first written on February 19th, and sent to me
at Schiedam. In the former I see that you complain of my
saying, that "demonstration carried no weight with you," as
though I had spoken of my own arguments, which had failed to
convince you. Such was far from my intention. I was referring
to your own words, which ran as follows: --"And if after long
investigation it comes to pass, that my natural knowledge
appears either to be at variance with the word (of Scripture), or
not sufficiently well, &c.; the word has so great authority with
me, that I would rather doubt of the conceptions, which I think
I clearly perceive," &c. You see I merely repeat in brief your
own phrase, so that I cannot think you have any cause for
anger against me, especially as I merely quoted in order to
show the great difference between our standpoints.

Again, as you wrote at the end of your letter that your only
hope and wish is to continue in faith and hope, and that all else,
which we may become convinced of through our natural
faculties, is indifferent to you; I reflected, as I still continue to
do, that my letters could be of no use to you, and that I should
best consult my own interests by ceasing to neglect my pursuits
(which I am compelled while writing to you to interrupt) for the
sake of things which could bring no possible benefit. Nor is this
contrary to the spirit of my former letter, for in that I looked
upon you as simply a philosopher, who (like not a few who call
themselves Christians) possesses no touchstone of truth save
his natural understanding,
and not as a theologian. However,
you have taught me to know better, and have also shown me
that the foundation, on which I was minded to build up our
friendship, has not, as I imagined, been laid.

As for the rest, such are the general accompaniments of
controversy, so that I would not on that account transgress the
limits of courtesy: I will, therefore, pass over in your second
letter, and in this, these and similar expressions, as though
they had never been observed. So much for your taking offense;
to show you that I have given you no just cause, and, also, that
I am quite willing to brook contradiction. I now turn a second
time to answering your objections.

I maintain, in the first place, that
God is absolutely and
really the cause of all things which have
essence,
whatsoever they may be. If you can demonstrate that
evil, error, crime, &c., have any positive existence,
which expresses essence,
I will fully grant you that
God
is the cause of crime, evil, error, &c., I believe myself to
have sufficiently shown, that that which constitutes the
reality of evil, error, crime, &c., does not consist in
anything, which expresses
essence, and therefore we
cannot say that God is its cause. For instance,
Nero's matricide, in so far as it comprehended anything
positive, was not a crime; the same outward act was
perpetrated, and the same matricidal intention was
entertained by Orestes; who, nevertheless, is not
blamed-at any rate, not so much as Nero. Wherein,
then, did Nero's crime consist? In nothing else, but that
by his deed he showed himself to be ungrateful,
unmerciful, and disobedient. Certainly none of these
qualities express aught of
essence, therefore
God was
not the cause of them, though He was the cause of
Nero's act and intention.

Further, I would have you observe, that, while we
speak philosophically,
we ought not to employ
theological phrases. For, since
theology frequently, and
not unwisely, represents
God as a perfect man, it is
often expedient in
theology to say, that God desires a
given thing, that He is angry at the actions of the wicked,
and delights in those of the good. But in
philosophy,
when we clearly perceive that the attributes which make
men perfect can as ill be ascribed and assigned to
God,
as the attributes which go to make perfect the elephant
and the ass can be ascribed to man; here I say these
and similar phrases have no place, nor can we employ
them without causing extreme confusion in our
conceptions. Hence, in the language of
philosophy, it
cannot be said that
God desires anything of any man, or
that anything is displeasing or pleasing to Him: all these
are human qualities and have no place in God.

I would have it observed, that although the actions of
the good (that is of those who have a clear idea of
God,
whereby all their actions and their thoughts are
determined) and of the wicked (that is of those who do
not possess the idea of
God, but only the ideas of
earthly things, whereby their actions and thoughts are determined),
and, in fact, of all things that are, necessarily flow from God's
eternal laws and decrees; yet they do not differ from one
another in degree only, but also in
essence. A mouse no less
than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy depend on
God; yet a
mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow a kind of joy. I
think I have thus answered your objections, if I rightly
understand them, for I sometimes doubt, whether the
conclusions which you deduce are not foreign to the
proposition you are undertaking to prove.

However, this will appear more clearly, if I answer the
questions you proposed on these principles. First, Whether
murder is as acceptable to
God as alms-giving? Secondly,
Whether stealing is as good in relation to
God as honesty?
Thirdly and lastly, Whether if there be a mind so framed, that
it would agree with, rather than be repugnant to its
proper nature, to give way to lust, and to commit crimes,
whether, I repeat, there can be any reason given, why such a
mind should do good and eschew evil?

To your first question, I answer, that I do not know,
speaking as a philosopher,
what you mean by the words
"acceptable to God." If you ask, whether
God does not hate the
wicked, and love the good? whether
God does not regard the
former with dislike, and the latter with favour? I answer, No.
If the meaning of your question is: Are murderers and
almsgivers equally good and perfect? my answer is again in the
negative. To your second question, I reply: If, by "good in
relation to God,"
you mean that the honest man confers a
favour on God,
and the thief does Him an injury, I answer that
neither the honest man nor the thief can cause
God any
pleasure or displeasure. If you mean to ask, whether the actions
of each, in so far as they posssess reality, and are caused by
God,
are equally perfect? I reply that, if we merely regard the
actions and the manner of their execution, both may be
equally perfect. If you, therefore, inquire whether the thief and
the honest man are equally perfect and blessed? I answer, No.
For, by an honest man, I mean one who always desires, that
everyone should possess that which is his. This desire, as I
prove in my Ethics (as yet unpublished),
necessarily derives its origin in the pious from the clear
knowledge which they possess, of
God and of themselves. As a
thief has no desire of the kind, he is necessarily without the
knowledge of God
and of himself-in other words, without the
chief element of our blessedness. If you further ask, What
causes you to perform a given action, which I call virtuous,
rather than another? I reply, that I cannot know which
method, out of the infinite methods at His disposal,
God
employs to determine you to the said action. It may be, that
God
has impressed you with a clear idea of Himself, so that you
forget the world for love of Him, and love your fellow-men as
yourself; it is plain that such a disposition is at variance with
those dispositions which are called bad, and, therefore, could
not co-exist with them in the same man.

However, this is not the place to expound all the foundations
of my Ethics, or to prove all that I have advanced; I am now
only concerned in answering your questions, and defending
myself against them.

Lastly, as to your third question, it assumes a contradiction,
and seems to me to be, as though one asked: If it agreed better
with a man's nature that he should hang himself, could any
reasons be given for his not hanging himself? Can such a
nature possibly exist? If so, I maintain (whether I do or do not
grant free will),
that such an one, if he sees that he can live
more conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own table,
would act most foolishly, if he did not hang himself. So anyone
who clearly saw that, by committing crimes, he would enjoy a
really more perfect and better life and existence, than he could
attain by the practice of virtue,
would be foolish if he did not act
on his convictions. For, with such a perverse human nature as
his, crime would become virtue.

As to the other question, which you add in your postscript,
seeing that one might ask a hundred such in an hour, without
arriving at a conclusion about any, and seeing that you yourself
do not press for an answer, I will send none.