Dedicated to Nigeria's History, Socio-Economic and Political issues

The convocation of the National
Political Reform Conference (NPRC) in Abuja was compelled by the need to
review the state of federalism in Nigeria. Though the NPRC was not the forum
demanded by the advocates of true federalism who had requested for a
Sovereign National Conference, the decision of President Olusegun Obasanjo
to convene the NPRC must be seen as a tactical shift from his initial
objection to the convocation of any form of a national body to review the
country*s federal structure. Even though a vast majority of the delegates to
the NPRC were appointed by President Obasanjo and the state governors, the
debates emanating from the conference have been very critical of the current
federal structure. It is significant to note that, the military was the
largest constituency at the NPRC given the number of former military
officers as delegates. The demand for restructuring Nigerian federalism, in
line with the fundamental tenets of federalism as obtained in pre January
1966 Nigeria was strongly echoed through the debates at the NPRC.

The Okpe Union of North America
has been following the debates at the NPRC with keen interest. Like other
ethnic groups in Nigeria, we are impacted by the deliberations and
resolutions of the NPRC. The choice of federalism as the preferred system of
government for Nigeria was not accidental. Given the heterogeneity of the
Nigerian polity, the founding fathers of Nigeria adopted the federal system
as the most viable option of protecting the core interests of the federating
units. This was demonstrated in the federal constitutions, especially in the
1963 Federal Republican Constitution, that clearly defined the jurisdictions
of the federating units. For example, each of the federating units had its
own constitution, one of the key properties of federalism. It should be
noted that, before the attainment of independence by Nigeria in 1960, the
federating units - Eastern Nigeria, Northern Nigeria, and Western Nigeria -
were, in all intents and purposes independent entities. That the three
federating units attained their independence in 1957 (Eastern and Western
Nigeria) and 1959 (Northern Nigeria) further buttressed their respective
sovereignty. If they had wanted, there was nothing preventing any of them to
go their separate ways as independent states in the international community
in 1957 and 1959 respectively. Thus, when some contemporary analysts of
Nigerian politics blame the British amalgamation of 1914 as the source of
Nigeria*s problems, they should be reminded of the lost opportunity
exhibited by Nigerian leaders to disengage from the forced amalgamation when
they had the choice in 1957. Like Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland was also a creation of British colonial rule. It is significant to
note that, unlike Nigeria, the constituent units of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland elected to go their separate ways by becoming the
independent states of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi respectively.

However, that the constituent
units of Nigerian federation opted to federate did not imply the
obliteration of their respective jurisdictions in key areas of their
relations with the central government. Nations elect to federate for one or
a combination of the following reasons: -

socio-economic;

political; and

security.

A nation decides to federate for
socio-economic reasons because it:

possesses shared values with
other independent federating units;

wants an access to a larger
domestic market;

desires a secured access to a
sea port;

seeks access to a higher
standard of living; and

would enhance its welfare
policies.

Politically, a nation decides to
federate in order to:

strengthen existing relations
with its co-federating units

possess a stronger voice
internationally.

Thirdly, a nation decides to
enter into a federation in order to be able to protect itself from real or
an imagined threat to its national security.

The above factors, in varying
degrees, persuaded the leaders of Eastern, Northern, and Western Nigeria to
federate after they had obtained their respective independence. These same
factors underlined the status of Midwest State, when it was created in
August 1963. The dynamism of Nigerian federalism manifested itself in the
social and economic policies of the federating units, as they pursued and
executed developmental strategies in congruity with their respective
capabilities. While the North managed its natural resources (hides & skins,
and groundnuts) without any intrusion from the federal government, the West
did the same with its cocoa and the East and Midwest with their palm oil,
etc. The various levels of government respected the basic tenets of
federalism. For example, none of the federating units was an administrative
arm nor a dependent of the federal government, and each had its respective
local police constabulary that complemented the efforts of the federal
Nigeria Police Force. Unfortunately, these positive virtues of federalism
were aborted when the military intruded in the governance of Nigeria on
January 15, 1966. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we will
examine the impact of military intrusion into the governance of Nigeria.
Second, we will argue for a renewed federalism, in order to strengthen the
base of Nigerian polity and to sustain the survivability of Nigeria.

Militaristic Federalism

Citing the series of political
disturbances that engulfed Nigeria in the 1963-1965 period * the rise and
fall of the federal coalition culminating in the controversy of the federal
elections of 1964, and the crisis of legitimacy in Western Nigeria and the
debacle of its regional election in 1965 * a group of mid-level career
military officers staged a military coup against the federal government of
Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on January 15, 1966. The prime
minister was killed, and so too was the federal minister of finance, Chief
Sam Okotie Eboh, as well as the regional premiers of Northern Nigeria and
Western Nigeria respectively, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello and Chief Samuel Akintola.
The fact that the organizers of the military coup were all ethnic Igbo, and
the politicians killed in the process were non Igbo, lent credence to the
notion that the coup was ethnically inspired. Though the military coup was
aborted, as the leaders were arrested, the leaders of the federal parliament
abdicated their power and invited General Aguiyi Ironsi, the GOC of the
Nigerian Army, to head a military government. This invitation has proved
costly for Nigeria, as it set in motion a process of the systematic
dismantlement of the structures of Nigerian federalism.

Once in office the military under
General Ironsi posited itself as the symbol of national unity. It initiated
the process of establishing its legitimacy as a viable alternative to
civilian rule. The Ironsi regime immediately recognized the conflicting
realities of governance in Nigeria. These were the realities of the
heterogeneity of Nigerian polity, which made federalism a necessity, and the
unitary command structure of the military, which rendered federalism
obsolete. In order to resolve this contradiction, General Ironsi abrogated
the federal system and proclaimed a unitary system of government in Nigeria.
This was a deft political move which recognized the incompatibility of
federalism under a military government. Thus, because of the command
structure of the military, it is incongruous to expect a military regime to
operate a federal system of government. General Ironsi was honest in his
articulation of a military government, unlike his military successors who
engaged in political deception by describing their respective regimes as the
"Federal Military Government of Nigeria." This deception began with Lt. Col
Yakubu Gowon, who succeeded General Ironsi as head of state, in the military
coup of July 29, 1966 in which General Ironsi was assassinated. In his first
decree as head of state, Lt. Col. Gowon promptly abolished Ironsi*s
unitarism and reinstated the federal system. By "reinstating" the federal
system, Lt. Col. Gowon was responding to the emotive sentiments of the
population*s preference for federalism, even though his regime was, in all
intents and purposes, a unitary regime. That this misconception subsequently
acquired legitimacy in Nigerian political discourse was the handiwork of
some academics who referred to the military regime as the "Federal Military
Government."

The erosion of Nigerian
federalism, which began with General Ironsi*s unitarism, attained
constitutional maturation with the systematic militarisation of federalism
in subsequent Nigerian governments. A review of the two civilian regimes
that succeeded military regimes (President Shehu Shagari*s regime of
1979-1983 and President Obasanjo*s regime 1999 - present) clearly shows the
debilitating effect of militarism in Nigerian federalism. The fact that
President Obasanjo, a retired military general, was the head of state of
Nigeria*s military regime in 1976-1979, has not advanced the concept of
federalism in Nigeria. Pre January 1966 federal institutions have been
replaced by unitary structures. For example, before the military intrusion
of January 1966, political parties were established to articulate the
specific needs of given regions, without being compelled to satisfy a
national test. Federalism recognizes the rights of individuals to establish
political parties to contest in either regional or federal elections. It was
on the basis of this federal principle that the Untied Middle Belt Congress
(UMBC), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), the Midwest
Democratic Front (MDF), the Niger Delta Congress (NDC), and even the Action
Group (AG) and the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) were established as
regional political parties. There was no law, as they could not be any, to
prevent any of those parties to exist in the Nigerian political space
because of their limited geographic coverage. Federalism recognizes the
distinctiveness of the federating units, hence the formation of political
parties to reflect those diversities. The imposition of criteria for the
establishment and registration of political parties in post January 1966, is
a product of militaristic federalism in Nigeria, a phenomenon which has
stifled the growth and dynamism of federalism in the polity.

Fashioned on the command system
of the military, contemporary Nigerian political parties have lost the
essence of federalism as the central committees of the respective parties
micro manage the parties at the state and local government levels. In fact,
the party exists at the state level because it enjoys the blessing of the
central committee, just as we had witnessed in the former Soviet federal
system. Similarly, the state governments, like their counterparts in the
former Soviet Union, are mere administrative organs of the central
government in Abuja. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
1999 clearly defines the dislocation of federalism in Nigeria, with the
usurpation of state jurisdictions by the central government. Let us
illustrate this with the case of resource control as depicted in the table
below.

It is interesting to note that,
the decline of the amount due each state of the federation coincided with
the growing significance of oil as the main stimulant of the Nigerian
economy. The current revenue allocation formula, as defined in Section 162
(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999,
discriminates against the minority ethnic groups whose oil producing areas
sustain the Nigerian economy.

We should recall that this
discriminatory policy, or usurpation of state jurisdiction by the central
government, was initiated by Lt.

Col Gowon as an expedient measure
to pursue the 1967-1970 civil war. Since then, the Niger Delta states have
been transformed into a beggar region pleading for its rightful share of its
own resources. It should be stressed that, the demand for resource control
by the Niger Delta states does not negate the right of other states to
exercise similar control over their respective natural resources, like
groundnuts, iron, solid minerals, etc. This is a key prerequisite of
federalism, and the denial of this tenet is injurious to federalism. A
federating unit, and not the central government, should exercise
jurisdiction over the resources in its territory, just as it was in pre
January 1966 Nigeria. Thus, the recent statement by Governor Ibrahim
Shekarau of Kano State requesting the states of the Niger Delta to "account
for their management of the 13 per cent derivations fund they are currently
receiving before demanding a raise to 50 per cent" is an assault on the
tenets of federalism. (See The Guardian, Lagos, Wednesday, June 01, 2005).
Such a position is made possible by the militaristic construct of Nigerian
politics, which has come to define the strategic position of most Northern
political leaders in their conceptualization of federalism.

In order to make federalism
functional in Nigeria, it is imperative that the jurisdiction of states over
natural resources (mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, and
natural gas, etc.), education, culture, labour and minimal wage, state and
local government election commissions, etc., be recognized. Areas of
concurrent federal-state jurisdictions could include police, and public
holidays. Each state, because of its distinctiveness, should exercise the
right to observe certain holidays relevant to its history and culture.

One other issue that has
contributed to the malfunctioning of federalism in Nigeria is the notion of
a unified national wage structure for federal and state civil service, and
the educational institutions. It is incongruous to impose a unified national
wage structure in a federal polity. In a normal federal polity, each
federating unit establishes its own salary structure based on its
capabilities. Similarly, each educational institution establishes its own
salary structure for its staff. We recall that in the winter of 1992-93, the
military government of General Ibrahim Babangida despatched a Nigerian
delegation overseas to study the salary structures of federal states. The
delegation visited Canada and the Untied States, where they met with
federal, state/provincial, and labour representatives to discuss the issue.
The perennial agitation for state creation is dictated by the dysfunctional
nature of Nigerian federalism, which is anchored on the false premise of the
exclusive federal jurisdiction over natural resources. Thus, the exponents
of state creation are not concerned about the economic survivability of
their new states, because they can rely on revenue allocation from the
central government, without caring for the source of the wealth.
Furthermore, the concept of balancing the population of states via state
creation is an illogical approach to good governance. The population or
territorial size of a state is not a prerequisite for membership in a
federal polity. For example, the states of North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming, Montana, Vermont in the United States have a respective population
of less than a million, compared to California and New York with more than
35 million and 19 million respectively. (2003 US Population estimates). It
is pertinent to argue that, if Nigeria were practicing true federalism,
i.e., a federalism where the federating units exercise jurisdictions over
their respective natural resources, we would not have had so many demands
for state creation. While it is common knowledge that very few of the
existing states in Nigeria possess the resources to sustain their economies,
a fact which demands the fusion of certain states in order to ensure their
survivability, it is ridiculous that the system continues to partition
itself into pauperizing states all in the name of equalizing regional and
ethnic-based states.

The view recently expressed by
Mr. John Austin Chikezie vividly illustrates this state of affairs, when he
alleged that the Igbo are "terribly shortchanged in the country in the area
of state creation." He declared: "We feel terribly shortchanged and
marginalised in the Nigerian project to the extent that the takings or what
space members of this umbrella called Nigeria get, is determined by how the
various infrastructure and the allocation are shared." He continued:
"Considering the units of sharing, be it at the local government, states or
federal, it now means that those who don*t have as much as others get less."
He concluded: "That is where we have been cheated for a very long time
because we are the only geo-political zone with five states as against the
popular six and seven which the NorthWest and other zones have." Mr.
Chikezie*s argument for the creation of an Aba State from the present Abia
State, like those of his counterparts in other regions of Nigeria, is based
on the concept of sharing the national cake a.k.a. revenue allocation.
According to him, the "South East has perpetually lost out in the area of
revenue sharing and distribution of infrastructure in the country because of
its disadvantage in states and local government creation." (See Daily
Independent, Tuesday, June 06, 2005.)

It is a sad commentary on
governance in Nigeria, if state creation is rationalized on the basis of how
an ethnic group can maximize its "share" of the national cake from the
centre, by balkanizing itself into insignificant political units with no
viable source of internal revenue generation. We recall that this was never
the case when the Midwest State was created in 1963. Unfortunately, the
rational for state creation since 1970 has been based on the notion of
splitting a region or an ethnic group into several political entities, so
that the citizens of that particular region or ethnicity can accumulate a
larger share of the national cake, even though they do not know how and
where the cake was baked. Since this position has become the determinant of
state creation in Nigeria, perhaps it would be proper and justifiable to
apply it to the Niger Delta states, by declaring each of the senatorial
districts in the Niger Delta as separate states. If any region deserves to
be split into states so that their indigenes can maximize the benefits of
"revenue sharing and distribution of infrastructure"as Mr. Chikezie argued
above for his Igbo ethnicity, none of the political zones in Nigeria is more
deserving than the South-South whose resources sustain the Nigerian economy,
and whose population and territories continue to suffer the ecological and
environmental damages from oil and gas explorations.

Renewed Federalism

As a system of government,
federalism allows for the division of sovereignty between the central
government and the federating units. The management of this dual sovereignty
makes federalism a complex political option. Thus, the two levels of
government * the federal and the state * are independent and coordinates. It
is vital that the division of powers between the federal government and the
federating units reflects the core interests of the respective federating
units, without compromising the abilities of the federal government to
effectively represent the federation.

Since a federal government exists
because of the consensus of the federating units to federate, the federating
units decide on how much power and authority they each would cede to the
federal government. While, for example, the federal government is
responsible for national defence, foreign policy, international trade,
currency, monetary and fiscal policies, citizenship, etc., the federating
units exercise exclusive jurisdiction in education, natural resources,
agriculture, culture, etc.

However, in certain areas of
exclusive state jurisdiction, a federating unit may elect to invite federal
involvement and assistance. For example, in some federal polities where the
federating units have their respective police force, any of the federating
units may opt out of this jurisdiction, if it could not afford to maintain
its own police force. Such a state can contract the services of the federal
police force, or that of a neighbouring state, to maintain law and order in
its territory.

It is essential that a balance be
maintained between centralising and decentralising tendencies, in order to
ensure harmony in the federation. While a highly centralised central
government is injurious to the federal polity as it could lead to a quasi
federal (or unitary) system, a highly decentralised federalism, on the other
hand, could destabilise the federal polity as it is capable of eroding the
powers of the central government and making the federating units too
powerful. The current Nigerian federal system is highly centralised, hence
its unitary characterisation as evidenced in the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

When the founding fathers of
Nigeria opted for a federal system of government in 1954, as opposed to a
unitary system, it was a conscious decision designed to protect the
diversities and identities of the federating units. They agreed to establish
a central government that units them, while simultaneously agreeing to
retain their independence in order to safeguard their respective
diversities. However, as we have argued above, the basic tenets of
federalism that defined the federal structure of Nigeria between 1954 and
January 1966 have been jettisoned in favour of a unitary structure robed in
federal colours. The challenge, therefore, is for Nigerians to return to the
principles of federalism. The status quo, as enshrined in the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, is not sustainable. While the
convocation of the NPRC was an important development, we do not expect that
its resolutions will address the vital issues necessary for the sustenance
of federalism in Nigeria. Let us identify some of the flaws in the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. It should be stressed
that, these flaws were injected into the government structure by the
military, where such practices/rules are considered as modus operandi. They
derived from the series of decrees enacted by the various military
dictatorships that had ruled Nigeria.

A Federal government has no
locus standi in determining the number of local government councils in
any of the federating units. This is an area of exclusive state
jurisdiction.

A federal constitution has no
locus standi to enumerate the number of local government councils and
the process of their creation, as this is an area of exclusive state
jurisdiction.

Federal revenue allocation to
states should not be based on the number of local government councils
and/or size of the state, but on the population of the given state.
Based on its revenue generation capabilities, and the imperative of good
governance and ethnic peculiarities, each state should be free to
determine its respective number of local government councils.

A federal constitution has no
locus standi to identify state capitals, as this an area of exclusive
state jurisdiction. And neither does the federal government possess the
authority to determine the capital of any state in the federation.

All references to local
government councils and state capitals should be expunged from the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Federal-State relations must
respect the independence of each jurisdiction, and the coordinating role
they both play in the polity. The federal government has no locus standi
to suspend and/or terminate any elected or appointed official of any
state.

It is incongruous to consider
any state Governor and/or his officials as representatives of the
President.

Though local government
creation is under the jurisdiction of a State Government, no state
government should have the authority to suspend/terminate any elected or
appointed official of a local government council. Just as the state
government is not an administrative organ of the federal government,
similarly, no local government council should be considered an
administrative organ of a state government.

A federal constitution has no
locus standi to determine the nomenclature of the appointed head of a
state government ministry/department. Thus, the reference to this should
be expunged from the federal constitution. State Governments should be
able to refer to the heads of their ministries as Ministers, and not as
"Commissioners" which was imposed on the system by the military.

There should be no limit to
the number of political parties in the system. Similarly, individuals
and groups should be free to establish political parties that articulate
their respective ideologies, without any constitutional requirements to
have members and/or chapters in any number of states or local
governments in the country. Thus, a political party does not need to be
"national" in scope to contest for elective offices in any state of the
federation.

The Legislative Powers need
to be revised to reflect the independence of the federating units. The
current arrangement severely limits the jurisdictions of state
governments and makes them almost totally impotent and dependent on the
federal government. Thus, areas of exclusive state jurisdiction should
include, inter alia, the following:-

1. Election to the office of
Governor and Deputy Governor and House of Assembly of a State, and local
government councils.

2. Insurance

3. Labour and salary structure of
state officials and institutions (Governor, Deputy Governor, House of
Assembly, local government councils, civil service, educational
institutions, etc)

7. The formation, annulment and
dissolution of marriages, including marriages under either Islamic and
Customary law and matrimonial causes relating to them.

8. Internal trade.

9. Education and culture.

Notwithstanding the above, a
federal government should have the powers to spend in any area of exclusive
state jurisdiction. For example, the federal government could establish and
operate scientific research institutions on agriculture and natural
resources.

Foreign and domestic companies
conducting business in any of the areas of exclusive state jurisdiction are
to be registered and licensed by the given state of their operations. These
companies should pay appropriate federal and state taxes. With regards to
the revenue accrued from their natural resources, for example gold, solid
minerals, cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil, oil and gas, etc., each state should
only be required to pay appropriate taxes to the Federal Government. While
the international marketing of the products of these natural resources is
under the jurisdiction of the federal government, the domestic marketing
remains an exclusive state jurisdiction. Thus, each state will manage the
sale of the products of its respective natural resources to other states of
the federation, just as is the practice in other federations, including
Canada and the Untied States.

Concluding Remarks

Nigerians prefer federalism as a
system of government. But if federalism is to be meaningful, it is
imperative that its fundamental tenets be recognized and respected. The
survivability of Nigeria demands a return to the tenets of federalism, a
federalism that underlines the independence of its federating units as was
envisaged by our founding fathers. To deviate from this premise would cause
irreparable harm to the Nigerian polity. The Okpe Union of North America
invites all Nigerians to engage in a reasoned debate on how best to renew
federalism in Nigeria, in the post NPRC era.

A renewed federal system,
anchored on fiscal federalism, will dissuade people from agitating for state
creation on the grounds articulated by Mr. Chikezie and his counterparts
across Nigeria. It is a bafflement that any one will advocate for the
splitting of impoverished states into more states, in order for them to
receive their "share" of the national cake. As an alternative to such
demands, it may be necessary for poor contiguous states to consider merging
into a more viable polity.