Peirce, Searle, and the Chinese Room Argument

Abstract

Whether human thinking can be formalized and whether machines can think in a human sense are questions that have been addressed since the Renaissance. I will employ arguments from both a modern critic, John Searle, and from one present at the inception of the field, Charles Peirce, and another inductive argument, all of which conclude that digital computers cannot achieve human-like understanding. Searle approaches the problem from the standpoint of traditional analytic philosophy. Peirce would have radically disagreed with Searles analysis, but he ultimately arrives at the same conclusion. Given this diversity of arguments against the Artificial Intelligence (AI) project, it would seem its ultimate goal is futile, despite the computers amazing achievements. However, I will show that those arguments themselves imply a direction for AI research which seems fruitful and which is in fact being pursued, although it is not in the mainstream of that field.

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