tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post282346361777233432..comments2015-07-28T19:30:42.550-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Beliefs and ValuesAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger14125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-44472894844972954402007-08-15T02:00:00.000-06:002007-08-15T02:00:00.000-06:00Values are the kinds of desires that result from a...<I>Values are the kinds of desires that result from appreciate the inherent worth of the goal.</I> Lets us call these goal-values to differentiate them from relational-values? What is required to "appreciate the inherent worth" that result in goal-values. You also seem to implying some sort of intrinsic value to these goals?<BR/><BR/><I>Hence, if you change your belief about the worthiness of some goal, you thereby change the degree to which you value-desire it.</I> So are you changing beliefs about your goals or beliefs about the "worthiness" of your goals or changing the intrinsic value of these goals?<BR/><BR/><I>You just re-assert Alonzo's old "theory of value", which my compulsion example demonstrates is inadequate.</I>Yes and I don't see how your compulsion argument makes Alonzo's theory (relational-value) inadequate.<BR/><BR/><I>I gave examples of the two different kinds of "desire", and specified some of the noteworthy differences.</I> I don't deny there is difference but relational-value can handle this whereas yours is more limited in scope (as I think you want to argue - to exclude urge-desires from value)<BR/><BR/><I>The main difference is in the pro-attitude: a value is something you judge to be good or worth pursuing;</I> So where does this good or worth come from. What is the basis for its evaluation?<BR/><BR/><I>a craving is just something you do (compulsively) pursue -- possibly without any kind of positive appraisal at all!</I> Never said there needed to be a "positive appraisal". Yes it is something you - just- do and it has value because of that. Any relation between a mental state and a state of affairs has a value, whether it <B>should</B> be valued - to be pursued or suppressed - is the question at hand. <BR/><BR/><I>I'm hoping this distinction is intuitively obvious.</I>It is and I was trying to show, poorly probably, that your argument for goal-values is circular. Alonzo has answered this far better, indeed he has answered my question to you "Now what is it that distinguishes proper-desires from urge-desires?... So what is it that distinguishes the two categories of desire?"martinohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-25278375859599999562007-08-15T01:47:00.000-06:002007-08-15T01:47:00.000-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.martinohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-12318888972176805572007-08-14T21:17:00.000-06:002007-08-14T21:17:00.000-06:00Your quote is from the comment after mine. But I d...Your quote is from the comment after mine. But I do agree that values operate under consistency constraints.<BR/><BR/>Values are the kinds of desires that result from appreciate the inherent <I>worth</I> of the goal. Hence, if you change your belief about the worthiness of some goal, you thereby change the degree to which you value-desire it. (My linked comment suggests one way to understand this: as rational agents, we essentially have a desire to <I>pursue worthwhile goals</I>.)<BR/><BR/>On to your "actual" response: How am I equivocating? In fact, I don't see how anything you've written there engages with my previous comment. You just re-assert Alonzo's old "theory of value", which my compulsion example demonstrates is inadequate. I gave examples of the two different kinds of "desire", and specified some of the noteworthy differences. The main difference is in the pro-attitude: a value is something you judge to be <I>good</I> or <I>worth</I> pursuing; a craving is just something you <I>do</I> (compulsively) pursue -- possibly without any kind of positive appraisal at all!<BR/><BR/>I'm hoping this distinction is intuitively obvious. If not, there's really nothing more I can say.Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-19664823726499059192007-08-14T07:34:00.000-06:002007-08-14T07:34:00.000-06:00Hi Richard. First let me quote from the link you p...Hi Richard. First let me quote from the link you provided<BR/><BR/><I>The error, I think, is that proper desires are, contra Hume, amenable to reason. If I realize that I can't achieve both of two proper desires I have, in my experience, one of those desires has been extinguished or, at least, de-emphasized. Consistency is one feature of rationality; so, in these sorts of cases, inconsistency alters proper desires. Indeed, if it doesn't, it's hard to figure out why people don't try to achieve incompatible things all the time</I> <BR/>So, if I understand you, you are now arguing that desires (not urges) are amenable to reason and hence operate under consistency constraints. <BR/>1. You are asserting that these non-urge desires are amenable to reason but how does one go about "extinguishing or de-emphasizing" a desire using just reason?<BR/>2. Why should desires be consistent? Logically it is, of course, appealing that they could be but practically we often deal with incommensurate desires and there is no possibility of equating them. Alonzo's argument for desires to be in harmony seems to deal with this.<BR/><BR/>Now to your actual answer here<BR/><BR/>You are trying to make a crave/value distinction here in classifying desires. Lets avoid equivocation here. Cravings do have value or disvalue (even if not desired! - this is a coherent statement). This is due to the theory of value being applied here: (generic) value being the relation between a mental state and a state of affairs. Many of our desires, not normally considered cravings, also do not have a "conscious pro-attitude". The burden is on you to make a clear distinction between these desires. Lets us call them urge-desires and proper-desires.<BR/> <BR/>Now what is it that distinguishes proper-desires from urge-desires? It cannot be beliefs because we are talking about desire-as-ends not desire-as-means (where beliefs can alter those). So what is it that distinguishes the two categories of desire?martinohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-34282112472383091002007-08-14T03:04:00.000-06:002007-08-14T03:04:00.000-06:00Martino -- On the question of how evaluative belie...Martino -- On the question of how evaluative beliefs can be motivating, see my comment <A HREF="http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2007/08/arationality-of-desires.html#comment-27508005321263698" REL="nofollow">here</A>. For now, let me try to convince you to take the craving/value distinction more seriously.<BR/><BR/>Suppose you just feel a compulsive drive to smoke; you do not have any conscious pro-attitude towards it, and you do not "want" it in the sense of feeling happy in anticipation of smoking. It wouldn't even give you any pleasure to smoke. You are simply under a compulsion.<BR/><BR/>A BDI theorist can model and predict your behaviour by calling this compulsion a "desire". But it has no ethical relevance. The desire has no value to you -- even if asked, you would say that you do not wish it to be fulfilled, you can gain no satisfaction from it at all. You don't consider smoking to be a 'goal' or an end of yours. But you just can't fight the compulsion; it is as though you are possessed.<BR/><BR/>Suppose that you are also drawn to academic inquiry. Unlike the smoking compulsion, you have a conscious pro-attitude towards philosophy. You enjoy it, judge it to be a worthwhile activity, and encourage others to take it up too. It is something you wholeheartedly endorse (value).<BR/><BR/>I claim that there is no relevant commonality besides these two "desires". Sure, they both causally influence your behaviour, but why should <I>that</I> matter? The former is mere compulsion -- no more a value to you than is a gun to your head. It is coercion from the inside.<BR/><BR/>Further evidence of the difference, I suggested, is that "We are generally just as happy to remove a craving as to satisfy it." Indeed, in the above scenario you would explicitly <I>prefer</I> to lose the compulsion than to fulfill it! Compare your desire for philosophy (or whatever else you value): would you be just as happy for me to wipe that out of your head? Surely not!<BR/><BR/>Do you see the difference (and its significance)?Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-55951370754747798422007-08-13T14:13:00.000-06:002007-08-13T14:13:00.000-06:00Interesting, please note I am trying this approach...Interesting, please note I am trying this approach for size. Lets proceed<BR/><I>The addict merely craves their drug; if they are a reluctant addict, then they do not really value it.</I> <BR/>Craving is decomposable using BDI theory like any intentional state. It is a form of desire that is related to a state of affairs - smoking a cigarette, it does have (relational) value.<BR/><BR/><BR/><I>This illustrates the distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of desires,</I> Yes but they are both desire and so do both have value.<BR/><BR/><I> for clearly there is a difference between feeling driven to some end vs. feeling drawn to something you perceive to be genuinely worthwhile.</I> Yes these are different reasons for action but both are still desire-dependant - is there anything else that can cause a reason for action?<BR/><BR/><I> I am talking about the latter kind of desires, i.e. values</I> This is our key disagreement. Considered this way there not two types of desire when it comes to values.<BR/><BR/><I>those that aspire to ideality, and thus admit of mistakes.</I> Not sure what you mean by "ideality" but you seem to be implying that some desires are norming. Do you mean every desire specifies its conditions of fulfilment? Failing to fulfil these conditions means the desire is thwarted but where is the mistake? The creation of the desire in the first place? Bu then such desires are not mistaken they are good or bad as in Alonzo's formulation.<BR/><BR/><I>(Your cigarette statement is strictly senseless, since it is a category error to call a craving 'mistaken'. There is no ideal for craving against which it might fall short.) </I> And nor for any other desire! Alternatively the only way I can make sense of this is that beliefs can be false and so mistaken, and so we can say we have mistaken desires - given those mistaken beliefs. It was a mistake to start smoking, which was the result of false beliefs. Even if directly due to recklessness, in which case it was a mistake to believe one would not crave cigarettes and so on.<BR/><BR/><I>Even in the cigarette case, if you believe that your addiction to cigarettes is a bad thing, i.e. worth getting rid of, (i.e. you believe that you would desire to overcome the addiction if ideally rational), then this again commits one to the value-desire to overcome the addiction.</I> Not sure I follow this. I now have two desires, the desire to smoke and the desire to stop. The desire to stop is predicated on the belief that the desire to smoke is a mistake. Otherwise surely there is no need for the desire to stop? <BR/><BR/><I>It's worth noting that there is also rational pressure to reduce disharmony within one's desire set. <BR/>So one's normative belief that a craving-desire should be got rid of, by entailing the corresponding value-desire, thereby presses one to overcome the addiction.</I> <BR/>Hmm your explanation looks, if I Understand you correctly, like you are saying you have a desire-independent reason for action driven by your normative belief - how is that possible?<BR/><BR/><I>(It's also worth noting that craving-desires only last as long as the craving feeling itself; value-desires seem rather more enduring. We are generally just as happy to remove a craving as to satisfy it. The same is not true of values!) </I> Cravings can long lasting but not active all the time. Don't see the difference you are trying to make here.martinohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79156295057177192532007-08-12T19:44:00.000-06:002007-08-12T19:44:00.000-06:00Martino - "I want a cigarette but I think I am mis...Martino - "<I>I want a cigarette but I think I am mistaken to do so.</I>"<BR/><BR/>The addict merely <I>craves</I> their drug; if they are a reluctant addict, then they do not really <I>value</I> it.<BR/><BR/>This illustrates the distinction between two fundamentally different <I>kinds</I> of desires, for clearly there is a difference between feeling <I>driven</I> to some end vs. feeling <I>drawn</I> to something you perceive to be genuinely worthwhile. I am talking about the latter kind of desires, i.e. values -- those that aspire to ideality, and thus admit of mistakes. (Your cigarette statement is strictly senseless, since it is a category error to call a craving 'mistaken'. There is no ideal for craving against which it might fall short.) <BR/><BR/>Even in the cigarette case, if you believe that your addiction to cigarettes is a bad thing, i.e. <I>worth getting rid of</I>, (i.e. you believe that you <I>would</I> desire to overcome the addiction if ideally rational), then this again commits one to the value-desire to overcome the addiction.<BR/><BR/>It's worth noting that there is also rational pressure to reduce disharmony within one's desire set. So one's normative belief that a craving-desire should be got rid of, by entailing the corresponding value-desire, thereby presses one to overcome the addiction. (It's also worth noting that craving-desires only last as long as the craving feeling itself; value-desires seem rather more enduring. We are generally just as happy to remove a craving as to satisfy it. The same is not true of values!)Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-32171658612920111012007-08-12T06:19:00.000-06:002007-08-12T06:19:00.000-06:00Richard:The agent who asserts my (3) is effectivel...Richard:<I>The agent who asserts my (3) is effectively saying, "I value X but I think I'm mistaken to do so." Clearly this is incoherent: you are endorsing something that is a mistake by your own lights.</I><BR/>I want a cigarette but I think I am mistaken to do so. <BR/><BR/>Could it be your apparent incoherence comes from applying formal reasoning (propositional logic) to desires but desires are not propositions? My version of your statment is not harmonious - there is a clash of desires (yes some unstated) - but it is coherent to express. When it comes to desires one seeks harmony, coherence may be a fortuitous consequence but not a necessary condition.martinohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-29191152620228987842007-08-12T04:53:00.000-06:002007-08-12T04:53:00.000-06:00Martino - no, you've missed the point. Even though...Martino - no, you've missed the point. Even though we are not in fact ideally rational, still our present attitudes necessarily aspire to be ideal. Just like you can't knowingly believe something <I>false</I> (though we do so unknowingly all the time), similarly you can't knowingly endorse something <I>that you'd reject if ideally rational</I> (even though we aren't ideally rational, and so often unknowingly fall short).<BR/><BR/>The agent who asserts my (3) is effectively saying, "I value X but I think I'm mistaken to do so." Clearly this is incoherent: you are endorsing something that is a mistake <I>by your own lights</I>.Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-32763586871097273472007-08-12T00:47:00.000-06:002007-08-12T00:47:00.000-06:00Richard: That is, I claim that the BELIEF that one...Richard: <I>That is, I claim that the BELIEF that one would desire P <B>if one was ideally rational</B>, rationally necessitates the agent (on pain of incoherence) to DESIRE that P</I><BR/><BR/>The point here is one is not "ideally rational" so the "rationally necessitates" fails. There is no incoherence, to argue that there is, is surely question-begging?martinohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-10416876574342896752007-08-10T23:39:00.000-06:002007-08-10T23:39:00.000-06:00Alonzo - '"I believe that I would desire X if I we...Alonzo - '<I>"I believe that I would desire X if I were more rational" is compatible with "I would desire X if I were more rational" being false.</I>'<BR/><BR/>Of course. My claim is that the belief rationally forces one to have the desire; not that the belief is necessarily true!<BR/><BR/>Compare these Moore-paradoxical assertions: <BR/>(1) P is true, but I don't believe it.<BR/><BR/>(2) I would believe P if I were ideally rational; but I don't currently believe that P.<BR/><BR/>(3) I would desire that P if I were ideally rational, but I don't currently desire that P.<BR/><BR/>My claim is that the agent who asserts (3) suffers from a rational incoherence, a kind of (almost) contradiction, the same as in (1) and (2).<BR/><BR/>That is, I claim that the BELIEF that one would desire P if one was ideally rational, rationally necessitates the agent (on pain of incoherence) to DESIRE that P.Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-29876272838563238992007-08-10T08:25:00.000-06:002007-08-10T08:25:00.000-06:00You see Atheists really do not exist. :-) EVOLUTIO...You see Atheists really do not exist. :-) <BR/><BR/><A HREF="http://evolutionfacts.blogspot.com" REL="nofollow">EVOLUTION and ATHEISM: UNSCIENTIFIC & MYTHICAL</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-34364581884141532322007-08-10T05:28:00.000-06:002007-08-10T05:28:00.000-06:00RichardNo."I believe that I would desire X if I we...<B>Richard</B><BR/><BR/>No.<BR/><BR/>"I believe that I would desire X if I were more rational" is compatible with "I would desire X if I were more rational" being false.<BR/><BR/>Just as "I believe that a god exists" is compatible with "a god exists" being false.<BR/><BR/>If you think that this belief entails a desire, I need some more explanation as to how this is the case.Alonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-84229261580613414072007-08-10T02:56:00.000-06:002007-08-10T02:56:00.000-06:00"No belief entails a desires-as-end."What about th..."<I>No belief entails a desires-as-end.</I>"<BR/><BR/>What about the belief that you <I>would</I> desire X if only you were more rational? (See <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2007/08/values-and-factual-beliefs.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>.)Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.com