By the articles of confederation the common treasury was
to be supplied by the several states, according to the value
of the lands, with the houses and improvements thereon,
within the respective states. From the difficulty in making
this valuation, the old congress were unable to apportion
the requisitions for the supply of the general treasury, and
were obliged to propose to the states an alteration of the
articles of confederation, by which the whole number of
free persons, with three-fifths of the slaves contained in
the respective states, should become the rule of such apportionment
of the taxes. A majority of the states approved
of this alteration, but some of them disagreed to
the same; and for want of a practicable rule of apportionment,
the whole of the requisitions of taxes made by congress
during the revolutionary war, and afterwards, up to
the establishment of the constitution of the United States,
were merely provisional, and subject to the revision and
correction as soon as such rules should be adopted. The
several states were credited for their supplies, and charged
for the advances made to them by congress; but no settlement
of their accounts could be made for the want of a
rule of [apportionment], until the establishment of the
constitution.

When the general convention that formed the constitution
took this subject into their consideration, the whole
question was once more examined, and while it was agreed
that all contributions to the common treasury should be
made according to the ability of the several states, to furnish
the same, the old difficulty recurred in agreeing upon
a rule whereby such ability should be ascertained, there
being no simple standard by which the ability of individuals
to pay taxes, can be ascertained. A diversity in the selection
of taxes has been deemed requisite to their equalization:
between communities, this difficulty is less
considerable, and although the rule of relative numbers
would not accurately measure the relative wealth of nations,
in states, in the circumstances of the United States,
whose institutions, laws and employments are so much
alike, the rule of number is probably as nearly equal as any
other simple and practical rule can be expected to be,
(though between the old and new states its equity is defective,)
these considerations, added to the approbation which
had already been given to the rule, by a majority of the
states, induced the convention to agree, that direct taxes
should be apportioned among the states, according to the
whole number of free persons, and three-fifths of the
slaves which they might respectively contain.

. . . The present House of Representatives consists of
181 members, which are apportioned among the states in
a ratio of one representative for every thirty-five thousand
federal numbers, which are ascertained by adding to the
whole number of free persons, three-fifths of the slaves.
. . . Thus while 35,000 free persons are requisite to elect
one representative in a state where slavery is prohibited,
25,559 free persons in Virginia may and do elect a representative--so
that five free persons in Virginia have as
much power in the choice of representatives to Congress,
and in the appointment of presidential electors, as seven
free persons in any of the states in which slavery does not
exist.

This inequality in the appointment of representatives
was not misunderstood at the adoption of the constitution;
but as no one anticipated the fact that the whole of the
revenue of the United States would be derived from indirect
taxes (which cannot be supposed to spread themselves
over the several states according to the rule for the apportionment
of direct taxes), but it was believed that a part of
the contribution to the common treasury would be apportioned
among the states by the rule for the apportionment
of representatives--the states in which slavery is prohibited,
ultimately, though with reluctance, acquiesced in the
disproportionate number of representatives and electors
that was secured to the slave-holding states. The concession
was, at the time, believed to be a great one, and has
proved to have been the greatest which was made to secure
the adoption of the constitution.

Great, however, as this concession was, it was definite,
and its full extent was comprehended. It was a settlement
between the original thirteen states. The considerations
arising out of their actual condition, their past connection,
and the obligation which all felt to promote a reformation
in the federal government, were peculiar to the time and
to the parties; and are not applicable to the new states
which congress may now be willing to admit into the
Union.

The equality of rights, which includes an equality of
burdens, is a vital principle in our theory of government,
and its jealous preservation is the best security of public
and individual freedom; the departure from this principle
in the disproportionate power and influence allowed to the
slave-holding states, was a necessary sacrifice to the establishment
of the constitution. The effect of this concession
has been obvious in the preponderance which it has given
to the slave-holding states, over the other states. Nevertheless,
it is an ancient settlement, and faith and honor stand
pledged not to disturb it. But the extension of this disproportionate
power to the new states would be unjust and
odious. The states whose power would be abridged, and
whose burdens would be increased by the measure, cannot
be expected to consent to it; and we may hope that the
other states are too magnanimous to insist on it.