I will put my money on nothing to do with an engine failure but possibly more to do with control locks.

This Is not impossible, that is a very early very aggressive rotation into a steep nose up attitude with a possible stall spin scenario also. However you should soon see from the wreckage if both engines were delivering power or not.

The pilot should have been familiar with the runway, I am told he had a hangar there. I was there last night and saw him start to depart, I had just finished flying. I was leaving and stopped about where the red dot is on the picture because I heard a plane getting ready to depart and like most pilots stop and watch. I rolled down my window to watch, he was on the brakes and brought the engines up and then started his roll. He lifted off about 1,000' down and as he lifted off I rolled my window back up and started to drive away. As I turned the corner at the end of the hangars was when I saw the fireball out of the corner of my eye. The impact was on Taxiway A right by E, about 1,600' from where he started his roll.

There was a twin and a single in the runup area that probably saw the whole thing as well, you can see the twin facing the runway and the single facing the crash site in the picture below. It also occurred directly in front of the tower. A mechanic that I talked with this morning said that the pilot was in the run-up area for 30-40 minutes before departing cycling one of the props and engines. Not sure what he was working on but he must have felt that whatever it was he had cleared it up and could depart. All of it is very sad and my heart and prayers go out to his family. I called my wife right away to let her know I was safe as she knew I had been flying.

The pilot should have been familiar with the runway, I am told he had a hangar there. I was there last night and saw him start to depart, I had just finished flying. I was leaving and stopped about where the red dot is on the picture because I heard a plane getting ready to depart and like most pilots stop and watch. I rolled down my window to watch, he was on the brakes and brought the engines up and then started his roll. He lifted off about 1,000' down and as he lifted off I rolled my window back up and started to drive away. As I turned the corner at the end of the hangars was when I saw the fireball out of the corner of my eye. The impact was on Taxiway A right by E, about 1,600' from where he started his roll.

There was a twin and a single in the runup area that probably saw the whole thing as well, you can see the twin facing the runway and the single facing the crash site in the picture below. It also occurred directly in front of the tower. A mechanic that I talked with this morning said that the pilot was in the run-up area for 30-40 minutes before departing cycling one of the props and engines. Not sure what he was working on but he must have felt that whatever it was he had cleared it up and could depart. All of it is very sad and my heart and prayers go out to his family. I called my wife right away to let her know I was safe as she knew I had been flying.

End quote

JK

This points heavily towards an impending engine failure, but having said that, it is amazing how a scenario like the above causes distraction in the cockpit and omission of checklist items such as control locks!

I think the runway eyewitness accounts are going to be key obviously along with examination of the props and engines.

My 2cents regarding the pitch up after take off, I haven't flown a Duke, but I remember the Seneca being very sensitive on the elevator as well as trim and you could easily get yourself into a high angle of attack and plenty of drag behind you situation by just being a bit over excited on the rotation. Give a man a runway that's already on the Dukes limit of performance and a sudden power loss and possibly back firing, all adding to a new situation a pilot has never had to deal with before..probably took off of that runway hundreds of times before, knew where to rotate and what to expect...now suddenly you are faced with so many other unexpected factors that you could not possibly have seen coming except when a DE is flying with you.Still thinking of bills that needs to be payed and clients that needs to be attended to before deadlines..just quickly jump into your way home, that for him happened to be a broken Duke om the day.(Assuming it was a engine failure)The problem with repetitive actions is complacency .I Challenge you all to stone me if you have never ended up being complacent, whether it's driving a car or doing circuits with students as instructor or flying the same route on 121...I know we all believe we are immune to that trap, but we are all going to pay the man at some stage.

My next question is regarding a comment someone made about V1 speeds on a light twin..I haven't flown a piston twin in a while(mabey it has changed) but as far as I remember you cannot have a V1 speed on a aircraft that at the best of times doesn't performance comply..meaning it wil be more of a risk taking off with one engine than aborting the take-off and over running the runway and deal with what ever evil awaits you other side of the threshold .(As long as you are on the ground)..The moment you are airborne and have runway left to land back on,when the donkey go's, chances are you won't be pointing down the runway anymore.(My opinion) close the other throttle and land under control, within the airport boundaries(fire and rescue don't have to cut fences and break down walls to get to the crash) if you are airborne and at 200+ feet or simply out of runway then point the thing towards the horizon and hold on.(Many of my old instructors have told stories about light twins flying on one engine at 4000+ feet airfields) get the prop feathered in the most professional and accurate way possible in that situation and fly at safety speed, hoping it climbs..I have my doubts about light twins, as even some turbo prop twin aircraft sometimes battle to perform single engine at Mtow at altitude.

This is a tragic accident that could have possibly been avoided had he prepared for a test flight and briefed about it for hours.But when flying under part 91 and there is very little structure to when and where and how, you might end up always having accident like this..In my opinion the more experienced a private pilot becomes (even those who hold a blue book, like that's going to make any difference, except that now we take on terrible weather as well) become more and more dangerous as time go's by..It's that sense of not ever have something go wrong, and it probably won't.(your Instructor's was clearly paranoid about EFATO)

A young person who just got their driving license will probably not drive over a red robot while daydreaming.But a business man with 10 hours of work behind him might just make that mistake..now put that same business man in a high performance (performance lacking) twin piston machine and have something small go wrong,then you have a melted puddle of aluminum somewhere with some danger tape around it.

Use the example of flight and duty..rest periods all of those are there to make sure we are ready for action, should the situation call for it.

Please guys I know there is allot more to flying piston twins and handling engine failures and the procedures that go with them before correcting everything that I have said..I know there is guys with logbooks where the total hours look like telephone numbers, please follow what the training says but be smart about the situation, not every twin performs like the manufacturer intended it 50 years ago. If the instructor can personally guarantee you the machine will fly on one engine and he has experienced it himself(real engine out), then fair enough..trust that. But doing a zero thrust vmca demo and "single engine flight" in the GF at 8000ft doesn't convince me.I would rather be surprised that the thing is flying than be surprised it isn't.

I don't know if any of you read Thomas Turner's Mastru of Flight emails - but he had an interesting theory that asymmetric flap extension/retraction could have caused this - liftoff, abnormal roll misidentified as an engine failure, a good engine mistakenly idled and bingo, there you go.

It's a theory... And until we See the NTSB all we can do is theories..

First, I cannot see that asymmetric flap retraction would have any relevance here: no one in their right mind plays around with flaps at <that> moment!???

Secondly, I don't see that that initial <moment> of climb (that's all it was) was particularly a <steep> RoC...but shifting cargo <might> be of significance, although we understand that the aircraft was used for commuting.

Thirdly, HJK is spot-on with his comment about the Duke being a road-runner! It is so! Although it is fast and powerful (and the gas-guzzler that others have pointed out), it is, in some ways, a <nasty> little aeroplane, in my opinion (I would never want <to own> one!) People seem to love them for their lovely looks; but don't let a pretty face deceive you.

I think the <apparent> comment (second-hand) from some mechanic who said the aircraft spent 30-40mins. running-up engines very strange: <who> spends so much time deciding whether their donkeys are healthy or not? If there is any doubt, a sensible person taxis back to their base and technical assistance -- I would think? All very suspicious-sounding. Perhaps the late hour had something to do with this last consideration?

I am guessing this will turn out to be engine failure and lack of proper response from the pilot...shame!

First, I cannot see that asymmetric flap retraction would have any relevance here: no one in their right mind plays around with flaps at <that> moment!???

I think the point he was trying to make is that you'd drop the flaps for the preflight then retract them / set them For takeoff once in the aircraft. He references another Duke accident where the flaps didn't reposition equally and makes the point that in an aircraft like the Duke where you can't see the right wing flaps from the pilot seat that one should position the flaps for takeoff prior to startup and then not move them until retraction on climbout.

It may be taurus-coprology but Turner has been looking at and writing about Beech accidents for a very long time....

The airplane crashed into the terminal building following a loss of control on takeoff initial climb from runway 25. Witnesses reported that shortly after takeoff, the airplane banked sharply to the left, then it seemed to momentarily stabilize and commence a climb before beginning to roll to the left again. The airplane rolled to an inverted position, entered a dive, collided with the airport terminal building and exploded on impact. The entire airplane sustained severe fire and impact damage. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of any discrepancies that would preclude normal operation. All the propeller blades displayed signatures indicative of high rotational energy at the time of impact, indicating that both propellers were rotating, not feathered, and the engines were operating at high power at the time of impact. Components of the autopilot system, specifically the pitch servo assembly and a portion of the roll servo assembly, were identified in the wreckage. The portion of the roll servo assembly found remained attached to a piece of skin torn from the airframe and consisted of the mounting bracket for the roll servo with the capstan bolted to the bracket, clearly indicating that this component had been reinstalled and strongly suggesting that the pilot reinstalled/reactivated all of the removed autopilot components the day before the accident. Maintenance personnel started an annual inspection on the airplane the month prior to the accident and found an autopilot installed in the airplane without the proper paperwork. The pilot explained to them that he designed and built the autopilot and was in the process of getting the proper paperwork for the installation of the system in his airplane. During the inspection, a mechanic found the aileron cable rubbing on the autopilot's roll servo capstan so the mechanic removed the roll servo along with the capstan. Additionally, mechanics disabled the autopilot's pitch servo and removed the autopilot control head. They were in the process of completing the inspection when the pilot asked for the airplane stating that he needed it for a trip. The pilot also asked that the airplane be returned to him without the interior installed. Two days before the accident, the airplane was returned to the pilot with the annual inspection incomplete. The autopilot control head, roll servo and capstan were returned to the pilot in a cardboard box on this date. A friend of the pilot reported that the day before the accident, the pilot completed reinstalling the seats and "other things" in order to fly the airplane the next day. It is possible that improper installation or malfunction of the autopilot resulted in the loss of control; however, the extent of damage and fragmentation of the entire airplane wreckage precluded detailed examination of the flight control and autopilot systems and hence a conclusive determination of the reason for the loss of control.
Probable Cause: The loss of control for an undetermined reason.