Ahmad:
Fair enough. Let me re-phrase my preliminary comment: The NRC greatly
exaggerated both the significance of the engineering flaws in the device
and Louisiana's culpability.
The reason for doing so was to deflect criticism from the NRC itself.
Clayton J. Bradt
Principal Radiophysicist
NYS Dept. of Health
Biggs Laboratory, Room D486A
Empire State Plaza
Albany, NY 12201-0509
518-474-1993
Ahmad Al-Ani
<ahmadalanimail at y
ahoo.com> To
Clayton J Bradt
04/04/2012 03:29 <CJB01 at health.state.ny.us>,
PM "radsafe at health.phys.iit.edu"
<radsafe at health.phys.iit.edu>
cc
Please respond to "doctorbill34 at gmail.com"
Ahmad Al-Ani <doctorbill34 at gmail.com>
<ahmadalanimail at y Subject
ahoo.com> Re: lessons learned (was:
Radiography Incident)
The lessons learned were not wrong Clayton, perhaps the root cause analysis
were. The facilities were understaffed, and safety procedures were
simplistic. When the NRC allowed the HDR procedures again, all the points
you mentioned were enacted upon, and the pre and post treatment QA
procedure was quite rigorous and redundant.
I however still do not understand why the design then did not include a
radiation detector to confirm complete returning of the source to the safe.
I read somewhere that the laser welding method estimated that even if you
keep the wire running in and out for the three months, it would still be a
small fractions of the cycles necessary to break the source off.
This is still the case with the industrial radiography devices.
Ahmad