This is an action for injunctive and declaratory relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only facts we have are those admitted by
the pleadings. The named plaintiffs are recipients of public
assistance in Illinois, each of whom had assistance terminated,
suspended, or reduced, without a prior hearing of any kind.

Plaintiff Clara Goliday, a recipient of public assistance since
1958, failed to receive her regular assistance grant of $251.00
in October, 1968. After a personal request and additional delay,
a check was issued to her for $166.00. The following month, she
received a check for $121.00. Upon inquiry into the reasons for
the two unexplained reductions, she was informed that the
department had information indicating that she was purchasing a
home. When confronted with this information, she filed an
intra-departmental appeal contesting the reduction. As of the
date of the filing of the complaint in this action,
January 14, 1969, no hearing had been held.

Plaintiff Carrie Reed and her three children had been receiving
assistance of approximately $250.00 per month when, in November
of 1968, instead of receiving the second of her bi-monthly
checks, she received a notice that her aid was being terminated.
She requested an explanation and was informed that her son,
Anthony, had been found to earn income the previous month in
excess of the monthly grant, thus rendering her ineligible for
further assistance. She was afforded no prior hearing on that
determination.

Plaintiff Vera Smith received emergency assistance of $143.00
in July, August, and September of 1968. In October, 1968, she
received no assistance. She was neither notified that the grant
had been terminated, nor of the right to appeal such termination.
Although she has requested an explanation for the termination on
several occasions, at the time of the filing of this suit, none
had been forthcoming.

The intervening plaintiff, Brenda Davidson, and her nine
children received public assistance until January, 1969, when her
aid was suspended without notice. She requested an explanation
and was told that her landlady had called the Department of
Public Aid and stated that Mrs. Davidson was not paying rent. The
department stated that she would not receive assistance until an
investigation was completed.

Plaintiffs all seek a declaratory judgment to the effect that
Sections 11-7 and 11-16 of the Illinois Public Aid Code,
Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, Ch. 23, § 11-7 and § 11-16, and the rules and
regulations implementing these sections, are unconstitutional.*fn1
They contend that these statutes and regulations provide that
public assistance may be terminated, reduced or withheld without
prior notice and a "fair hearing" to the public assistance
recipient and thereby, as enacted and as applied, deprive them of
due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

On January 20, 1969, the trial judge to whom this case was
assigned issued a temporary restraining order under
28 U.S.C. § 2284(3), restraining the defendants from refusing to pay each of
the named plaintiffs the public assistance each such plaintiff
received before the reduction, suspension, or termination, and
granted plaintiffs' application for the convening of a
three-judge court pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2281, to
determine whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution requires notice and an opportunity
to be heard before reduction, suspension, or termination, and, if
so, whether the provisions of Sections 11-7 and 11-16, and their
implementing regulations, meet that requirement.

Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., a state
receiving federal funds is required to provide a welfare
recipient a "fair hearing" at some time after it has denied his
application, or terminated or suspended his payments. "A State
plan * * * must * * * provide for granting an opportunity for a
fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose
claim for [aid or assistance under the plan] is denied or is not
acted upon with reasonable promptness." Sections 302(a)(4), 602
(a)(4), 1202(a)(4), 1352(a)(4), and 1382(a)(4) of 42 U.S.C.

Sections 11-8, Chapter 23, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1967,
meets this requirement by providing for an appeal by a recipient
at any time within 60 days after such a decision, or, if no
decision has been made, within 30 to 60 days after the filing of
the application. Defendants contend that this right to appeal
constitutes a complete remedy meeting all requirements of due
process.

"It has long been recognized that where harm to the public is
threatened, and the private interest infringed (by action of a
governmental agency) is reasonably deemed to be of less
importance, an official body can take summary action pending a
later hearing." R.A. Holman and Co. v. S.E.C., 112 U.S.App.D.C.
43, 299 F.2d 127, 131(1962). Such a departure from the general
rule that a hearing must take place before an administrative
order becomes operative will be justified, however, only when the
agency is able to show a peculiarly urgent governmental interest
such as national security or public health. North American Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53
L.Ed. 195 (1908); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950); Cafeteria and Restaurant
Workers, etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d
1230 (1961); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89
S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969).

The interest of the state in delaying a hearing until after
assistance has been discontinued is principally financial. At the
time of the filing of this case, the State of Illinois had
409,000 welfare recipients. Every month, there are a great number
of suspensions and terminations, a high percentage of which are
later found to have been fully justified. To provide expeditious
hearings prior to termination would require additional
administrative personnel, and the opportunity to recoup moneys
improvidently paid out is almost totally nonexistent. The total
costs of a program other than that being followed would be
substantial. Nevertheless, while the total cost may be
substantial and significant to an economic administration of the
program, it must be measured against the severity in cost and
deprivation to each of the recipients erroneously cut off from
welfare aid. Just as the cost to the public is multiplied by the
numbers involved, so also the total cost to erroneously suspended
or removed recipients, when measured by the injuries experienced
by them, is staggering. An appeal system which follows
termination does not reduce this kind of cost. Public Welfare:
The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 Yale L.J. 1234, 1242 (1967). It
is our considered opinion that the government's interest in its
welfare program in protecting its administrative costs against
losses is insufficient to justify a procedure of summary
termination, suspension, or reduction of a recipient's benefits
prior to notice and a hearing no matter how adequate an appeal
procedure may be.

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