The two absolutes I want to present at the
moment are absolute euphoria and absolute
tension.1

Though I agree with the idea of trying to
describe the field of emotions, I would not be
inclined to assume absolutes but rather leave the
range open. Euphoria is a good term, but it has
the connotation of being a withdrawn stupor, or as
Sullivan says:

Absolute euphoria can be defined as a state
of utter well-being. The nearest approach to
anything like it that there is reason for
believing one can observe might occur in a
very young infant in a state of deep sleep.2

In the place of this rather limiting concept I
would like to propose the use of the Greek concept
of happiness as a description of one end of the
axis with the euphoria Sullivan describes as being
a form of happiness. The concept of tension is
also rather limited as Sullivan describes it:

Absolute tension might be defined as the
maximum possible deviation from absolute
euphoria. The nearest approach to absolute
tension that one observes is the rather
uncommon, and always relatively transient,
state of terror.3

Once again I would substitute another concept
for tension and call tension a subset of pain.
Despite the discomfort of the example described by
Sullivan as absolute tension, it is not hard to
imagine more painful circumstances (prolonged
torture quickly comes to mind). At any rate,
Sullivan goes on to say that:

These absolutes are approached at times,
but almost all living is perhaps rather near
the middle of the trail; that is, there is
some tension, and to that extent the level of
euphoria is not as high as it could be. While
euphoria need not trouble us very much,
tensions are a very important part of our
thinking.4

To start describing behavior by excluding half
of the emotional range in terms of being
behavioral determinants would seem to be a rather
self-defeating premise. It would seem to me that
the goal of the individual would not be
equilibrium but happiness, not simply the
homeostatic reduction of tension but to feel good.

However, describing emotions as a simple range
on a sort of see-saw type axis also seems to me to
be a rather useless if neat conceptual construct.
Emotions are a highly complex phenomenon, witness
man's lack of control over them "for all his great
mind". I prefer to think of emotions as a
multi-parametric field which one might call
E-space. I will make the not totally gratuitous
assumption that we do not have a firm grasp of
what defines an emotional state, else I would
assume that most people would choose to be happy.

I find this to be a serious objection in much
psychoanalytic theory in that, as Szasz puts it,
they hold "the premise that the behavior of
persons said to be mentally ill is meaningful and
goal-directed"5,
without an adequate concept of what these goals
might be other than generally setting a concept of
normality as a criterion for determining the
"validity" of any given action. Freud and Laing do
deal with this problem; however, on a rather
pessimistic level. As Laing puts it:

Thus, I would wish to emphasize that our
'normal, adjusted' state is too often the
abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our
true potentialities, that many of us are only
too successful in acquiring a false self to
adapt to a false reality.6

Or as Freud put it in Civilization and its
Discontents:

The programme of becoming happy, which the
pleasure principle imposes on us, cannot be
fulfilled; yet we must not--indeed
cannot--give up our effort to bring it nearer
to fulfillment by some means or other.7

We shall return to discuss this more fully
after considering the implications of a concept
from another source.

The basic premise of my discussion of this
problem stems from Homer and other Greek sources
where we find what is essentially an inversion of
our habit of defining the individual as a constant
and the emotions as variables, or as Karen Horney
stated:

Man in our culture feels strongly that his
own self is a separate entity, distinguished
from or opposite to the world outside.8

Rather we shall be holding the emotions to be
constants and their environmental expression as
the variable. From this our axiom will be that the
way an individual feels is the function of a
complex relationship with his environment. Some of
the more obvious corollaries of this axiom are
presented in the appendix.

In essence, any given feeling can be defined as
a complex but discrete system of parameters in
that field of phenomena which define feelings. It
follows quickly that a feeling by defining a
system synchronically also diachronically defines
a mode of conformity of implied actions
derived from the extension of that system over a
period of time. It also follows that the mode
of conformity defined by any given feeling may
or may not lie in concordant relationship with the
mode of conformity defined by any other
system (i.e., feeling)

As to what feeling the individual desires to
conform to in his behavior, we will take the Greek
view that what he seeks in happiness: that is,
living in such a way that he is consistently
happy. Aristotle wrote that we:

Feel bound to class happiness rather as
some form of activity. . . it has been well
said that the Good is that at which all things
aim . . . Happiness does not consist in
pastimes and amusements, but in activities in
accordance with virtue.9

It is clear that in this perspective man's
primary referent is his emotional state and that
his behavior is defined toward a mode of
conformity in correspondence with this goal.
Freud speaks of the "temporary endurance of 'pain'
on the long and circuitous road to pleasure."

Emotions are a complex phenomenon and
consequently conforming to them in a changing
environment is not a simple question. Thus we
arrive at what might be called the mode of
assertion in which an individual tries to
consciously parallel the mode of conformity
through the guidance of some model of behavior.
However, the cognitive model, or philosophical (in
a broad sense) system will not necessarily be in
concordant relationship with the feeling being
sought; that is, what one thinks one is doing may
not be what one is actually causing emotionally.

How does the individual go about maintaining
linkage between the cognitive overlay (what he
thinks is going on) and the felt reality that is
his base? We will call the means of changing
cognitive systems transformational patterns. Here
we might visualize our model by noticing its
parallel to a theoretical construct in
linguistics. The semantic of the system is defined
as the emotional goal, conformity with a good
feeling or as Aristotle or Plato would have stated
it more simply, the Good. The deep structure would
be the system derived from this goal, the surface
structure the cognitive position on the ways of
conforming with these goals and the
transformational patterns as those methods which
may be employed to maintain or reestablish linkage
between that which is desired emotionally and that
which is held cognitively at variance with the
deep structure.

Semantic

Happiness

Deep Structure

Mode of conformity

Transformations

Transformational Patterns

Surface Structure

Mode of assertion

With this brief introductory description of our
model in mind, let us examine some concepts in
contemporary psychoanalytic theory in this light.

The primary concern is the nature of the goal,
the semantic and of the deep structure. Since we
have set as the goal of our system a feeling
rather than homeostasis, the system is an actively
dynamic one in attempting to reach a concordant
relationship with that goal. Though there is much
to be said for viewing the body as a mechanism, we
do not face the problem inherent in that position.
Both sides of this approach are seen in Szasz's
statement:

To use a machine intelligently and
effectively--whether the machine be an
automobile, an electron microscope, or
oneself--it is clearly important to know what
the machine cannot do as well as to know what
it can do.10

Neither do we suffer from a problem which comes
out of this mechanistic/scientific outlook which
is well expressed in Sullivan:

This, in its way, is a definition of
tenderness-a very important conception, very
different indeed from the miscellaneous and,
in general, meaningless term love, which
confuses so many issues in this day and age.11

The tension of anxiety, when present in the
mothering one, induces anxiety in the infant.
The rationale of this induction -- that is,
how anxiety in the mother induces anxiety
in the infant is thoroughly obscure.12

He goes on to propose the term empathy to
describe this process and continues,

So that although empathy may sound
mysterious, remember that there is much that
sounds mysterious in the universe, only you
have got used to it; and perhaps you will get
used to empathy.13

I think this shows fairly well the result of
excluding emotions from a model of behavior
because they are not scientifically manageable.
Rather, what we are proposing in our model is a
process of adaptation, adjustment and change in
the relationship between the way an individual
feels and his emotional environment with a goal
system as the dynamic rather than a mechanical
process strictly internal to the organism.

However, given our model, we are faced with a
different problem in describing the nature and
source of the deep structure goals which one seeks
to actualize with the mode of conformity.
In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", Freud in
dealing with a similar problem postulates it to be
of instinctual origin.

The conservative organic instincts have
absorbed every one of these enforced
alterations in the course of life and have
stored them for repetition; they thus present
the delusive appearance of forces striving
after change and progress, while they are
merely endeavoring to reach an old goal by
ways both old and new. This final goal of all
striving can be stated too. It would be
counter to the conservative nature of instinct
if the goal of life were a state never
hitherto reached. It must rather be an ancient
starting point, which the living being left
long ago, and to which it harks back again by
all the circuitous paths of development.14

One can posit such biogenetic/instinctual
hypotheses. They have a kind of intuitive weight
which is present in much of Freud's work. However,
they are not very useful in the explanation of
behavior. One of the corollaries of the primary
axiom was that the mode of conformity
defined by any given feeling may or may not lie in
concordant relationship with the mode of
conformity of any other system (i.e.,
feeling). What would the result of having two or
more of these systems in expressive contradiction?
Before I deal with this question, I would like to
speculate a bit on the nature and origin of these
good feelings which the individual seeks to
actualize.

Given our axiom that the way an individual
feels is the function of a complex relationship
with his environment one could begin by breaking
down this environment into its possible components
and using a field theoretical approach this would
imply some kind of complex of parameters derived
from his biological-genetic, psychological,
sociological and cultural elements and the
physical setting in which they are contained. If
we look at this diachronically one might say that
a group of people adapt so as to maximise their
relationship with their environment not only in
the Herbert Spenser sense but also in the sense of
the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, they develop a
philosophy or general mode of assertion
most satisfactory for their environment
remembering that the emotional environment is
biological and internal as well as external. One
might then look at a group adaptation in terms of
a set of possible behaviors developed over a
period of time in association with an environment.

With this in mind one might visualize these
behaviors as a kind of bell curve of possible
behavioral alternatives with some being more
active than others and some being sanctioned and
some taboo. One might associate such curves of
behavior with subgroups in a society right down to
the individual level. However, the conflict
visible in intercultural differences is one
example of what might be more dramatically viewed
in overlaying two curves associated with cultures
coming from adaptation to different environments
over a long period of time with a dramatic lack of
overlap being potential between unrelated
traditions. This possible divergence of
perspective raises the obvious question as to what
the result would be of bringing two or more
specifically adapted groups into one environment
(which have been examined in anthropology as the
problems of the acculturation process). It would
seem that the answer to this would in many ways be
similar to the answer to the question of the
conflict of two feelings. Many variables would
enter into this such as the dominant culture, the
amount of genetic interaction, the amount of
cultural variation between the two groups, the
technological differential. One would expect this
to be a simultaneous adaptation in the cultures
involved, primarily on the philosophical language
level and working more slowly toward the genetic
characteristics over a period of time.

Thus, there would be conflict on all levels of
contention in that those who stand in the area
between the groups would feel the effects of
trying to conform to both standards at once, not
only on a surface structure cognitive level but
also on the deeper unconscious and semi-conscious
levels of the deep structure and transformational
modalities. They would be unable to truly trust
any tradition and with the added problem of
perhaps not being in touch with the heritage that
defines to a great extent their feelings. Karen
Horney uses the analogy of the state in saying
that:

If the whole neurotic picture were compared
to a state of political unrest in a nation,
the basic anxiety and basic hostility would be
similar to the underlying dissatisfactions
with and protests against the regime.15

I would agree with this kind of approach
because it shows the kind of intimate link between
a people's psychological environment and the
larger environmental factors that affect this
link. In trying to adapt to more than one culture
at a time, the individual unable to conform to all
the divergent systems at once would have two
obvious alternatives in changing either his
internal or his external environment, or both.
Thus, he will resolve the conflict he feels in
both areas through the transformation of the
conflicting elements in his emotional field.

Perhaps it is obvious, but I think it important
to stress that it is not simply a society that
changes, but the individual members of that
society. The number of members involved in a given
emotional field and the congruence of their
feeling for a situation might be described in
consistency with our axiom as a function of the
interaction of individual with environment and the
strength of the parametric determinants defining
consistent expression in any given individual.
However, though a situation may feel similar to
different members of a society, the reaction they
have to that feeling may differ significantly
depending on differences in their heritage. As
Wallace put it:

The meaning of standard stimuli vary from
group to group, depending on the nature and
degree of cultural definition.16

And it may take a significant amount of time
before the meaning is standardized in any
situation where a number of groups come together
from diverse backgrounds. Obviously, I am
implicitly stating that this describes
contemporary America and this it is one of the
reasons for "the neurotic personality of our
times" in asserting that the subgroups in this
society are far from integrated and that the
various different heritages still play a dynamic
role in defining behavioral conflict in this
society.

If one focuses on the concept of deviant
behavior as being part of what defines societal
change in that the individuals involved may hold
one value and feel another, then some of the
seemingly more irrational assertions in the
literature begin to make sense. Karen Horney says:

By its very irrationality, anxiety presents
an implicit admonition that something within
us is out of gear, and therefore it is a
challenge to overhaul something within
ourselves.17

She goes on to describe a patient who,

Instead of seeking and accepting a
challenge to change something in herself she
can go on shifting responsibility to the
outside world and thereby escape feeling her
own motivations.18

In an isolated individual this interpretation
is obvious; however, if one views such behavior as
an environmental complex, the displacement cannot
be viewed as totally irrational.

In essence, what I am saying is that mental
illness as it is described in this society could
be viewed as part of the transformational patterns
available to an individual in this society and
that they reflect a breakdown in the linkage
between the way a person feels and the ways of
interpreting his feelings available in his
culture. One would expect that if this is true the
longer a culture had been developing, the more
integrated these alternatives of behavior would
become in the behavioral range in recognizing the
role of such behavior in articulating the society
with its emotional environment. One might call on
the difference between the conception of mental
illness in the Nineteenth Century to that of today
as Szasz does in another perspective by
maintaining that mental illness is a myth.

According to this view, virtually every
human event--from personal unhappiness and
marital infidelity at one end of the spectrum
to political misbehavior and deviant moral
conviction at the other--is regarded as a
facet of the problem of mental illness.19

The development of social forms and concepts to
integrate or interpret such behavior into society
is visible in the attitudes toward artistic
creativity in this society and in the role of the
shaman in many primitive cultures.

I both agree and disagree with Szasz`s point in
that 'mental illness' does reflect a kind of
cultural apology for deviant behavior; but, it
also reflects an environment in which individuals
find it particularly hard to be happy and reflect
this in seeking to find happiness in personally
and socially destructive behavior.

Robert K. Merton20
describes the various alternative responses to a
society in a state of anomie. His model is
primarily concerned with the economic aspects of
social anomie; however, the model is still very
useful in viewing emotional anomie, i.e., a
society in which there are a lack of useful
alternatives for the realization of a satisfactory
emotional state.

Turning from these types of cultural
patterning, we find five logically possible,
alternative modes of adjustment or adaptation
by individuals within the culture bearing
society or group. These are schematically
presented in the following table, where (+)
signifies "acceptance", (-) signifies
"elimination" and (±) signifies "rejection
and substitution of new goals and standards".

Cultural Goals

Institutionalized Means

I Conformity

+

+

II Innovation

+

-

III Ritualism

-

+

IV Retreatism

-

-

V Rebellion

±

±

The process of cultural change in exploring old
behavioral modalities and the process of
introducing new ones when the old fail to bring
satisfactory behavioral guidance for the
realization of acceptable emotional states can be
seen rather clearly in this model as the
alternative responses to misery. My only
hesitation concerning this model is that it only
clarifies the obvious without showing any of the
more developed personal alternatives which in most
cases will be seen as some combination of these
compartments.

Part of the problem of relating such a
construct to modes of behavior is that the way
such behavior is viewed in this society precludes
seeing the nature of the phenomena as a continuum.
For example, would one classify schizophrenia as
retreatism, rebellion, innovation or ritualism?
Clearly, there are elements of each. I brought in
Merton's model to raise the question as to how one
should go about viewing "syndromes" coined to
describe complex behavior, when the names coined
preclude viewing them as a process; rather, they
are viewed as an illness isolated from the
environment they are a response to (using the term
environment again in our broadened sense).

This section must rest content, I fear, with
showing the problem and in asserting that much
work remains to be done in integrating the process
of mental illness into its proper place in our
cultural milieu, whether that place be the
mandatory sterilization of the mentally ill, the
breaking of new ground in behavioral alternatives,
the more primitive concept of communing with the
gods, the shaman's articulatory function or R.D.
Laing's contention:

This process could have a central
function in a truly sane society . . .
True enough, we all have a long, long
way to go back to contact the reality we
have all long lost contact with. And
because they are human and concerned,
and even love us, and are very
frightened, they will try to cure us.
They may succeed. But there is still
hope that they will fail.

Appendix

Axiom--The way an individual feels is the
function of a complex relationship with his/her
environment.

Corolary II: Any given feeling can be
synchronically described as an ordered system
based on a complex but discrete system of
parameters.

Corollary III: A feeling by defining a
system synchronically also defines a mode
of conformity diachronically of implied
actions derived from the maintenance of this
emotional position.

Corollary IV: Being systemic, emotions are
not necessarily isolates.

Corollary V: The number of members in a
given emotional situation and the congruence
of their emotional responses is a function of
the strength of the common parameters to which
the involved individuals are exposed defining
the degree of consistency in the emotional
responses.

Corollary VI: Language is functional in the
interpretation and manipulation of emotional
reality.

Corollary VII: Feelings may or may not have
adequate verbal representation.

Corollary VIII: The cognitive
interpretation of a mode of conformity
is defined as the conscious mode of
assertion of the causes of a given feeling
synchronically and diachronically.

Corollary IX: The mode of conformity
defined by a given feeling may contradict the
mode of conformity of any other
feeling.

Corollary X: The mode of assertion
defined by the cognitive interpretation of any
feeling may be in contradiction with either
the mode of conformity and/or the
mode of assertion of any other feeling.

Corollary XI: When the mode of assertion
falls out of correspondence with the mode
of conformity, transformational patters
are used to reestablish corresponence between
the desired feeling and the cognitive
appreciation thereof.

Corollary XII: The mode of conformity
and/or mode of assertion of one person
is not necessarily a satisfactory behavioral
model for any other person with the
correspondence of validity being defined by
similarity of characteristics in background
and emotional environment, i.e., goals and
heritage.