The Iran Deal is the New Obamacare

Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said a while ago that an Iran deal would be the health-care bill of President Barack Obama’s second term, and he was right.

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Like Obamacare, the Iran deal represents an ideological fixation of the president’s; it is unpopular (a Quinnipiac poll had opposition running 2-to-1); the arguments mustered in favor of it are unconvincing; and it will get through Congress—or to be more exact, avoid disapproval by Congress—through sheer partisan force.

When Obama mounted a defense of the deal on Tuesday it was aimed less at public persuasion—never a strength of his during the Obamacare debate—than base mobilization as he seeks to hold the Democrats he will need for the one-third+1 of Congress necessary to sustain a veto of a resolution of disapproval.

How else to explain a speech that chastised opponents for their “strident” rhetoric at the same time it contended that Iranian hard-liners “are making common cause with the Republican caucus”? A juvenile little jab worthy of a DailyKos diarist, but not much more sophisticated than the president’s core argument: Accept this deal, or empower America’s hard-liners to go to war once again.

For years, we’ve heard Obama say that all options are on the table in forcing the Iranians to “end their nuclear program.” But he believed in having all options on the table about as much as he opposed gay marriage. Saying that he didn’t rule out military options was all about buying time until he could turn around and say, in effect, that a bad deal is better than all military options.

Not that anyone, especially the Iranians, ever took him very seriously. This deal is the result of coercive diplomacy absent coercion. In essence, it allows Iran to become a threshold nuclear power (preserving much of its nuclear infrastructure and continuing to enrich) in exchange for us not having to do anything to try to stop Iran from becoming a threshold nuclear power.

Another old line of Obama’s back when he was trying to convince people we would insist that Iran tear up its nuclear program was that no deal is better than a bad deal. This, too, has been discarded in favor of the argument that no deal would be an unspeakable catastrophe, so take this deal no matter what.

The president’s rebuttals of the critics of the agreement are wan and unpersuasive.

On inspections: “This access can be with as little as 24 hours notice.” Underline the word “can” in that sentence. As the president later acknowledged, if Iran wants to block inspectors from a suspicious site, the question goes to a dispute resolution process that takes up to 24 days.

First, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors request access; then, Iran can suggest alternatives to inspections; then, after 14 days, assuming no agreement between the IAEA and Iran, the matter is kicked to a joint commission of the P5+1 (France, Russia, China, Britain, Germany and the U.S. ), Iran and the European high representative for foreign affairs; the joint commission will then have seven days to come up with an agreement that five of its eight members can support; if the agreement is that the IAEA does indeed get to do its work, Iran has three days to comply.

What could go wrong?

It’s true that Iran can’t sanitize a major site in 24 days. But according to arms control expert David Albright, the three weeks would provide enough latitude for important Iranian cheating. It would be enough time to move and disguise high explosive testing related to nuclear weapons, small centrifuge manufacturing plants and a small plant using advanced centrifuges.

On the deal expiring: “It is true that some of the limitations regarding Iran’s peaceful program last only 15 years,” but the “prohibition on Iran having a nuclear weapon is permanent.” This is truly insipid. The whole point of the deal is to limit Iran’s “peaceful program” because no one believes that it is peaceful.

On sanctions relief: “An argument against sanctions relief is effectively an argument against any diplomatic resolution of this issue.” No. It’s an argument against sanctions relief that provides a huge windfall to the regime in exchange for an inadequate deal. Presumably, it’s possible to imagine a deal so weak that even Obama would oppose sanctions relief in exchange for it.

The president believes Iran will pour the tens of billions it will receive with the end of sanctions into things like “crumbling infrastructure,” as if shovel-ready projects have always been an animating priority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He concedes perhaps some will go to military activities, but says Iran has “engaged in these activities for decades”—which isn’t much of a case for giving it the resources to fund them more lavishly.

On a more stalwart note, the president says, “We need to check the behavior that we are concerned about directly.” This is rich coming from the president whose passivity and willful neglect have allowed Iran to sweep to enormous and growing influence in Iraq and Syria. Maybe he should pause to consider why the Assad regime is elated over the deal.

The crux of the president’s case is that there is no alternative except war to capitulating to Iran’s demands to keep its program intact and limit it for only a period of time. But the sanctions regime was biting. It could have been preserved and even tightened, and coupled with a credible threat of force, it might have forced something like an Iranian capitulation.

Obama compares his arms-control handiwork to that of Ronald Reagan. But Reagan undertook a concerted campaign of economic, military and moral pressure against the Soviet Union until he sensed a fundamental shift in the regime—and even then, he was willing to walk away from the table.

Obama has been palpably desperate for a deal, and desperate to bypass Congress. There will be a congressional vote, but on terms exactly reversed from what it takes to approve a treaty (it will take a two-thirds supermajority to block rather than approve). Even this is too much congressional interference for Obama. He went to the United Nations Security Council before Congress, and the international sanctions regime has already effectively been unraveled. The implicit message to Congress is, you are irrelevant and too late.

This means like Obamacare, the Iran deal, too, will carry a taint of illegitimacy. It, too, will become something that Republicans pledge to reverse. It, too, will have its ultimate standing decided by the 2016 election.

It, too, in sum, is supposed to be a great credit to the president’s legacy, when it is really a disgrace.