Illustration of Socratic (Q&A) Method of Division and
Classification (of creating binary or dichotomous categories for
advancing/constraining discussion -- also the Dialectic method of
inquiry)

Illustration of the problem and process of definition

Issues:
What is the nature and function of rhetoric? Can rhetoric
properly be called an "art?" Does rhetoric impart knowledge or merely
belief, and thereby constitute a false, or at best an insincere, way of
knowing?

Gor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.

Soc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call
me that which, in Homeric language, "I boast myself to be."

***

Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician,
and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask
with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of
garments?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of
melodies?

Gor. It is.

Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about
rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

Gor. With discourse.

Soc. What sort of discourse,Gorgias?-such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get
well?

Gor. No.

Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of
discourse?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And to understand that about which they speak?

Gor. Of course.

Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just
now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?

Gor. Just so.

Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse
concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of
the other arts:-all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects
with which they severally have to do.

Gor. Clearly.

Soc.Then why, if you call
rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do
you not call them arts of rhetoric?

Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge
of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but
there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through
the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of
discourse.

Soc. I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I
dare say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:-you would allow that
there are arts?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part
concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and
many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you would say
that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.

Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

Soc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the
medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts
of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of these
speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element
is greater-they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your
meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?

Gor. Exactly.

Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call
any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, thatrhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of
discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, "And so,
Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric." But I do not think that you really call
arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.

Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of
my meaning.

Soc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:-seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of
words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in
words with which rhetoric is concerned:-Suppose that a person asks me about some of
the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, "Socrates, what is
arithmetic?" and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one
of those arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask:
"Words about what?" and I should reply, Words about and even numbers, and how
many there are of each. And if he asked again: "What is the art of calculation?"
I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he
further said, "Concerned with what?" I should say, like the clerks in the
assembly, "as aforesaid" of arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference
being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even
numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. And suppose,
again, I were to say that astronomy is only word-he would ask, "Words about what,
Socrates?" and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the
stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.

Gor. You would be quite right, Socrates.

Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about
rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always
and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?

Gor. True.

Soc. Words which do what? I should ask.
To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and
the best of human things.

Soc. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the
dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard
men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of
life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty
obtained.

Gor. Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?

Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things
which the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the
money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: "O Socrates,
Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not
his." And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, "I am a physician." What
do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good?
"Certainly," he will answer, "for is not health the greatest good? What
greater good can men have, Socrates?" And after him the trainer will come and say,
"I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art
than I can show of mine." To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and
what is your business? "I am a trainer," he will reply, "and my business is
to make men beautiful and strong in body." When I have done with the trainer, there
arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, utterly despise them all. "Consider
Socrates," he will say, "whether Gorgias or any one-else can produce any greater
good than wealth." Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth?
"Yes," he replies. And who are you? "A money-maker." And do you
consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? "Of course," will be his reply.
And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater
good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, "What good? Let Gorgias
answer." Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by
them and by me;

Gor. What is there greater than the
word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the
citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?-if you have the power of
uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave,
and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself,
but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

***

Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you
have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you
mean to say, if I am not mistaken, thatrhetoric is the
artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her
crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing
persuasion?

Gor. No: the definition seems to me
very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of
rhetoric.

Soc. Now I was it to know about rhetoric in the same
way;-is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same
effect? I mean to say-Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches
or not?

Gor. He persuades, Socrates,-there can be no mistake about
that.

Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now
speaking:-do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the
properties of number?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And therefore persuade us of them?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of
persuasion?

Gor. Clearly.

Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and
about what,-we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we
shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are
artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only
artificer of persuasion?

Gor. True.

Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by
persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has
arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is
rhetoric the artificer, and about what?-is not that a fair way of putting the
question?

Gor. I think so.

Soc. Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is
the answer?

Gor. I answer, Socrates, that
rhetoric
is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying,
and about the just and unjust.

Soc. Then let me raise another question; there is such a
thing as "having learned"?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And there is also "having believed"?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And is the "having learned" the same
"having believed," and are learning and belief the same things?

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in
this way:-If a person were to say to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well
as a true?" -you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a
true?

Gor. No.

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and
belief differ.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who
have believed are persuaded?

Gor. Just so.

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts
of persuasion,-one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of
knowledge?

Gor. By all means.

Soc.
And which sort of
persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other
assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which
gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the
artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no
instruction about them?

Gor. True.

Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of
law or other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them;
for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a
short time?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about
rhetoric; for I do not know that my own meaning is as yet.

****

Gor. A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how
rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a
striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or
some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give
him medicine, or apply a knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me
what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that
if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to
argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected
state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be
chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician
more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more
persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and
power of the art of rhetoric. And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any
other competitive art, not against everybody-the rhetorician ought
not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master
of fence; because he has powers which are more than a match either
for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.
Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer-he in the
fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or
friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in
detestation or banished from the city-surely not. For they taught their art for a good
purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and
others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and
skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad
in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And
the same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can
speak against all men and upon any subject-in short, he can persuade the multitude better
than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to
defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the
power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers.
And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his
strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in
detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his
instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in
detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

Soc. Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in
your words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have understood your
meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears
of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?

Gor. Quite so.

Soc. You were saying, in fact, that
the rhetorician will have, greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a
matter of health?

Gor.
Yes, with the
multitude-that is.

Soc. You mean to say,
with the
ignorant; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of
persuasion.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. But if he is to have more power
of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Although he is not a physician:-is he?

Gor: No.

Soc. Then, when the rhetorician is
more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than
he who has knowledge?-is not that the inference?

Gor. In the case supposed:-Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all
the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about
things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more
knowledge than those who know?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?-not to
have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way
inferior to the professors of them?

***

Soc. In my opinion then, Gorgias, the
whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready
wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word
"flattery";

***

Pol. Then what, in your opinion, is
rhetoric?

Soc. I should say a sort of
experience.

Pol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?

Soc. That is my view, but you may be of another mind.

Pol. An experience in what?

Soc.
An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.

***

Soc. And now I will endeavour to explain to you more
clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them:
there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body,
of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of
them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which
answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another,
justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same
subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts,
two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery
knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or
simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends
to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is ever
making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of
the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to
know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter
into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than
children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the
physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort,
Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any
thought of the best.An art I do not call it, but only
an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its
own applications.And I do not call any
irrational thing an art;but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to
argue in defence of them. Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form
of medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic,
and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and
colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect
of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.

As cookery [is to] medicine
-- rhetoric [is to]
justice.And this, I say, is the natural difference
between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are
apt to be jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do
other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were
not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between
cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment
was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word
with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide:
"Chaos" would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an
indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric,
which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body.