Guidance and Navigation

Guidance and navigation was the most difficult of all the lander's
subsystems to develop, both technically and managerially. Development
started off simply enough but turned into a complicated tangle. MIT and
Houston officials wanted to use the basic command module arrangement in
the lander to avoid developing an entirely new system. After Grumman was
selected in November 1962, the contractor, the center, and MIT had tried
to work out a configuration for the lander. In the middle of 1963,
Houston asked Headquarters for permission to to procure lunar module
guidance through existing agreements with MIT, AC Spark Plug, Kollsman,
Raytheon, and Sperry. When Washington refused, time was lost in
negotiating new contracts.36

The biggest delay came from a dispute over whether to use the MIT unit
in the lunar module. Grumman's refusal to accept MIT's word about the
reliability of its system sparked the controversy. Lunar module manager
James L. Decker in Houston shared this skepticism and asked Grumman to
look into a more advanced system than the three-gimbal platform (pitch,
yaw, and roll referencing system) MIT used. Meanwhile, David W. Gilbert,
in charge of navigation and guidance in Shea's office, insisted on
getting the MIT unit into the lunar module. Grumman was caught between
the two opposing factions. Neither of the Houston officials could get
the other to change his mind - and the chasm deepened. Top management in
Houston and in Washington then stepped in. Bellcomm would study the
options, consult with all parties to the argument, and recommend a
solution. In due time, NASA decided to stick with MIT and announced its
decision, based on Bellcomm's findings, on 18 October 1963.

But the announcement did not completely clear the air, and some rather
strained feelings developed between Grumman and MIT. Early in 1964,
however, the contractors recognized the necessity of working together on
the areas where development progress affected both the lunar module and
its guidance system. Set down in formal Interface Control Documents,
agreements on these points would govern all future actions by both
parties. At the end of February, Rector reported 29 meetings between the
contractors (with 200 more to go, at this rate, he said) and 55
documents drafted, but almost no concessions by either party. In April,
Manned Spacecraft Center managers realized that they would have to
intervene to break up the logjam. At a two-day meeting in Bethpage on 25
and 26 June, Shea did just that. After scrutinizing the documents, he
mediated the differences and forced the contractors to cooperate.37