Chattanooga,
Lookout Mountain, And Missionary Ridge BattlesFromChapter XIV of "The Army Of The Cumberland"

These three detached
actions, fought by different portions of our troops, were parts of a series of operations
for securing our front and driving the enemy from his position, and are known properly as
the Battle of Chattanooga. Grant, late in October, ordered Sherman with the Fifteenth Army
Corps to press forward to the Tennessee River, cross at Bridgeport and push rapidly on to
Chattanooga. Early in November, learning that Bragg had weakened his forces on our front
by sending Longstreet's command into East Tennessee to attack Burnside, Grant was very
desirous of making an attack at once on the rebel forces on Lookout and Missionary Ridge,
but examining the strong position occupied by Bragg at these points and the length of his
lines, Grant became convinced that to successfully operate against the enemy it was
necessary to wait until Sherman with his command came up. While this force moved eastward,
Grant was maturing his plans for the engagement, lie directed Sherman to report in person,
which he did on the 15th, and on consultation with him and Thomas the general plan of
battle was submitted to them. The main attack was to be made on the 21st, at daylight, by
Sherman's troops, on the north end of Missionary Ridge. To accomplish this his command was
to be reinforced with one division of the Army of the Cumberland under Jeff C. Davis.
Sherman's troops--four divisions--were to move from Brown's Ferry through the woods to the
north of the town up to the Tennessee River, opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek,
where they were to cross on a pontoon bridge to be swung there under the supervision of W.
F. Smith, and the crossing of the troops to be protected by batteries under Brannan,
Thomas's Chief of Artillery. After crossing the river, Sherman was to move rapidly
forward, carrying the heights on the north end of Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel,
if possible, before the enemy could concentrate on his front, Thomas was to concentrate
all his troops in Chattanooga Valley on his left flank, leaving only the necessary force
to defend the fortifications on his right and centre and to hold a movable column of one
division to move wherever needed. This division was to make a show of threatening Bragg's
forces up the valley. Thomas was then to effect a junction with Sherman, co-operate with
him, advancing his left and moving forward as nearly simultaneously as possible, and
support him. Hooker on the right in Lookout Valley, was to hold that position with Geary's
division and two brigades under Cruft from the Fourth Army Corps, ordered to report to
him. Howard, on Friday, the 20th, was ordered with his corps to take position on the north
side of the Tennessee, opposite Chattanooga, near the pontoon bridge, and hold himself in
readiness to move to Thomas's front or to co-operate with Sherman as needed. Colonel Eli
Long with his brigade of cavalry was directed to report by noon on Saturday, the 21st, at
Chattanooga, to cover Sherman's left flank, and if not further required by Sherman he was
then to cross the Chickamauga, make a raid on the enemy's line of communication in the
rear, doing as much damage as he could.
Sherman made his movement with his troops from
Bridgeport through Whitesides. Sending his leading division under Ewing up Lookout Valley,
to make a feint on the left flank of the rebel army in the direction of Trenton, he
crossed his others at Brown's Ferry and marched up the north bank of the river to the
mouth of South Chickamauga Creek. Here they kept concealed in the woods from the enemy
until they were ready to effect their crossing. Owing to heavy rains and the state of the
roads, Sherman was able to have lint one division, under John E. Smith, in position by the
21st, and Grant delayed his plans of battle to give him additional time. Sherman on the
21st moved his second division under Morgan L. Smith over the bridge at Brown's Ferry, and
on the 23d, after many repairs to the bridge, rendered necessary by the swollen stream and
the raft of logs sent down the river by the rebels, Ewing's division also got safely
across. Sherman's fourth division under Osterhaus was not able on the 23d to cross, and
this division was then ordered, in the event of not being able to cross by eight A.M. the
24th, to report to Hooker on the south bank of the Tennessee. Davis had reported with his
division to Sherman, and on the 23d, the boats of the pontoon bridge were used to effect a
landing at the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek by Giles A. Smith's brigade, who captured
the rebel pickets at this place, landed his entire brigade, and then sent the boats back
for additional troops. By daylight of the 24th, Sherman with two divisions of some 8,000
men was intrenched on the east bank of the Tennessee. A pontoon bridge, 1,350 feet long,
was then built over this river, and another over Chickamauga Creek under the direction of
W. F. Smith.
Thomas, learning that Sherman's movements
across Lookout Valley had been discovered by Bragg, on Sunday, the 22d, directed Howard to
cross into Chattanooga to give Bragg the idea that these were Sherman's troops coming to
reinforce Chattanooga. Howard made the crossing on Sunday and took position in rear of our
front line in full view of the enemy. On the 20th, Bragg notified Grant that it would be
well for him to withdraw all non-combatants from Chattanooga. This the latter regarded as
a cover for Bragg's withdrawal of his own command, which he was confirmed in by deserters
and spies reporting a large number of q troops as marching to the north. These were two
divisions of Buckner's corps sent to strengthen Longstreet in East Tennessee; that last
sent, however, was recalled. To determine the truth of these reports, early on the morning
of the 23d, Grant directed Thomas to develop the enemy's lines, driving in his pickets,
and determine if he still held his force on our front. Thomas ordered Granger in command
of the Fourth Corps to form with Sheridan's and Wood's divisions--Sheridan on the right,
Wood on the left--with his left extended nearly to Citico Creek, and advance directly in
front of Fort Wood, and make this movement. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps with
Baird's division refused, was to support Granger's right and was to hold Johnson's
division under arms in the intrenchments in readiness to move as occasion might require.
The troops were all in position at 2 P.M. They moved out on the plain as if on parade, and
in plain sight of Bragg and his army on Lookout and Missionary, Ridge, formed their lines
as if in review and moved forward to attack the enemy. Rapidly advancing "in the most
gallant style" our troops steadily pushed in the rebel line. They first struck the
pickets, drove these on the reserve and then sweeping everything before them they hurled
the rebels out of their first line of rifle-pits and sent them on the full run in retreat
to the rear, except over two hundred of them captured. Here Granger's troops made
themselves secure by throwing up temporary breastworks, while he sent a strong picket line
to the front to protect his new line. In this charge Granger's line secured "Orchard
Knob" which was then occupied by Bridges' battery. Howard's corps was placed in
position on the left of the line to Granger's left and also ordered to throw up
breastworks.
Sherman after crossing the river on the 23d,
about 1 P.M., placed his command in three columns, following in his advance the general
direction of Chickamauga Creek, with his left under Morgan L. Smith resting on the creek.
His centre was under John E. Smith and his right under Ewing, all under the command of
Frank P. Blair, Corps Commander. In support of these, Davis's division also moved to the
attack. Grant and Sherman had supposed that Missionary Ridge was one prolonged even range.
When Sherman left the river he passed over the foothills and then pressed up what he
supposed was the main portion of the ridge. When he reached the top of this, after a
lively skirmish with the rebel pickets, he found a deep depression intervening between
this hill and the next, which was the one the tunnel ran through, where the rebels were
heavily intrenched, and which he had been ordered to take. On the top of this first hill,
finding he could not take the hill beyond where the tunnel ran through, he threw up
intrenchments and prepared to hold the ground he had thus far gained. Here about 4 P.M. he
had a heavy engagement. The enemy's advance with sharp artillery and musketry fire was
gallantly met and repulsed. Sherman then made preparations for the night, posting his
command to hold all positions. Howard had reported with three regiments to him, as he
crossed the bridge which connected him with the main Army of the Cumberland. Howard
leaving these troops with Sherman, then returned to his corps. When his command was placed
on the front to Granger's left in the afternoon, he connected with Sherman's right. Here
Sherman rested all night, and about midnight received orders from Grant to "attack
the enemy at dawn of day," "that General Thomas would attack in force early
in the lay."
While the main attack was progressing under
Sherman on the left, Hooker on the right had been pressing the enemy. On the 23d,
Osterhaus, finding that he could not cross the Tennessee in time to engage in the movement
with Sherman, reported with his division to Hooker, who was then ordered to take these
troops, with Geary's division and Whittaker's and Grose's brigades of the First Division
of the Fourth Corps under Cruft, and make a strong demonstration on the northern slope of
Lookout Mountain, drawing Bragg's attention to this point and away from Sherman while
crossing the river and getting into position. Thomas instructed Hooker if he found he was
able to carry the enemy's position here, to do so.
At 4 A.M. of the 24th, Hooker reported his
troops in readiness to begin the movement. As he advanced he found Lookout Creek so
swollen with recent rains that he could not cross without building a temporary bridge at
the main road. He then sent Geary with two divisions and Whittaker's brigade of Cruft's
command up the creek to effect a crossing at Wauhatchie. Geary was then to sweep down the
right bank, driving the rebels before him. The enemy, watching the construction of the
bridge under Hooker, failed to observe the movement of the troops under Geary, by reason
of a heavy mist which overhung the mountain, until he was on their flank and threatening
their rear. The enemy's force here and on the top of the mountain was under Stevenson,
with a command of six brigades posted mainly on the Northern slope midway between the
Palisades and the Tennessee River, on a belt of cultivated land. A continuous line of
earthworks had been constructed, with redoubts, redans, and lilts, lower down the slope,
with reference to an assault from the direction of the river. On each flank were
rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries, walls of stone and abattis, as against attack from
either Chattanooga or Lookout Valley. In these valleys were still more extensive,
earthworks.
As Geary moved down on the right bank of the
creek, he soon encountered the enemy's pickets. These gave the alarm at once, when their
troops formed in the breastworks and rifle-pits. All these positions were soon covered by
artillery planted by Hooker's orders. He then sent Wood's brigade of Osterhaus's division
about eight hundred yards up the creek to build another bridge, and directed Cruft to
leave a small command at the first bridge, to attract the attention of the enemy, and
ordered the rest of Grose's brigade to cross with Wood's. This bridge was completed at 11
o'clock, when the troops under Wood and Grose crossed, and joined Geary on the right bank,
who had driven the enemy up to this point. Under cover of the heavy artillery fire, the
entire line advanced, pressing the enemy steadily back. At noon Geary's advance drove the
rebels around the peak of the mountain, Here Geary was ordered to halt and reform his
command, lint having the rebels on the run he pressed forward and drove them in a fleeing,
panic-stricken crowd. Cobham's and Ireland's brigades on the high ground on the right,
near the Palisades, pressed on, rolling their line up on the flank, closely supported by
Whittaker's and Creighton's brigades. The enemy had been reinforced, but he was not able
to resist the sweep of Hooker's troops as they rounded the crest of the mountain at
Craven's house, where the enemy made his last stand, and from here, with his line all
broken and in rout, he was driven over the rocks and precipices into Chattanooga Valley.
At this time the mist that had been hanging round the mountain all the day settled still
lower down. It was now about 2 o'clock, and Hooker in the mist, unable to see beyond his
immediate front, placed his troops in position, threw up temporary breastworks, with his
line on the east side of the mountain, the right resting at the Palisades and the left
near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. He then reported to Thomas, who ordered Carlin with
his brigade to report to him, when he was placed on the extreme right, relieving Geary's
troops. During the night the rebels opened a heavy fire on our right as if intending to
break our lines. This was handsomely repulsed, Carlin's brigade taking an active part.
Early in the morning, before daylight, several parties were sent up the mountain, in
anticipation of the retreat of the enemy during the night, to scale the heights. One from
the Eighth Kentucky was the first that reached the summit, and here at sunrise the stars
and stripes were unfurled at the extreme point amid the cheers of the entire army. During
the night Stevenson abandoned the top of the mountain, while the Summertown road remained
open, leaving his camp and garrison equipage. This gave to our army full possession and
control of the river and railroad up to Chattanooga.
The mist still clung to the mountain in heavy
folds early on the 25th, when Hooker was ordered to press forward on the road to
Rossville, carry the pass, and operate on Bragg's left and rear. Advancing down into the
valley, he found the rebel pickets still holding the right bank of Chattanooga Creek.
Arriving at the creek at about ten o'clock he found the bridges on the Rossville road
destroyed. Here Hooker was delayed for some three hours, when Osterhaus in the advance
crossed the infantry on the stringers and pressed forward, driving the enemy's pickets
over to Rossville. Hooker found the rebels at this place loading up their stores. Leaving
a force on their front, he sent Wood's brigade to take the ridge on the right, and
William-son's on the left. After a severe skirmish the enemy hastily retreated, abandoning
large quantities of stores, wagons, and ambulances. The gap now being under our control,
Hooker ordered the advance of our entire line, Osterhaus with his division on the east of
the ridge, Cruft on the ridge, and Geary in the valley west of the ridge. This line
advancing soon encountered the rebels under Stewart, occupying the line of breastworks
thrown up by our troops after Chickamauga. Cruft charged on them, drove them in all
directions out of these works in full retreat. Part of them ran into Osterhaus's men and
were captured. Others were captured by Geary in the valley. The mass of them fell back to
their second line, from which they were likewise speedily driven, when the fight became a
running one, continuing until sunset. Part of the enemy in their endeavors to escape ran
into Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps, thrown forward to join the pursuit, and
were captured. Hooker's command then went into camp.
Early on the morning of the 25th Sherman made
his disposition for his main attack. Holding his centre with three brigades, he was then
to move along the east and west base of Missionary Ridge with his right and left flanks.
Corse advancing from the right centre moved forward, supported by Lightburn on the left
and Morgan L. Smith on his right, and occupied a crest in the woods about eighty yards
from the intrenched line of the enemy. From this point Corse assaulted the main rebel
line, and for over an hour maintained a heavy contest, driving the enemy and at times
being driven back, but still holding his crest as first secured. Here Corse, Loomis, and
Morgan L. Smith fought the rebels under Hardee with Cleburne's, Gist's, Cheatham's, and
Stevenson's divisions in a stubborn struggle all day up to three o'clock, holding their
own, lint making little headway. About two o'clock John E. Smith's two brigades, while
moving to the support of Ewing, were driven in some disorder by a charge of the enemy,
heavily massed. They were quickly reformed and, aided by Corse's troops taking the rebels
in the flank with a hot musketry first, the enemy was soon driven back into his line of
works.
Here Sherman was fighting the heavy column of
the enemy on our left, and the main part of the battle had been his share. Grant was
waiting for Hooker to reach the rebel left at Rossville, in the hope that this would
afford some relief to the stubborn fighting Sherman had encountered. Finding that Hooker
had been delayed by the destruction of the bridge longer than was anticipated, and that
the diversion was not to come front that quarter, Grant ordered Thomas to move out the
four divisions constituting the centre--Baird on the left, then Wood with Sheridan on his
right, and Johnson on the extreme right of the line--with a double line of skirmishers to
the front, supported by the entire force, press forward to carry the first line of
rifle-pits and there halt and await orders, the movement to commence at three o'clock, at
a signal of six guns fired in rapid succession from Orchard Knob.
There was some little delay attending the
preliminaries of the movement, and it was not until after half past three that the
commands having moved out and taken the alignment were in position for the advance, when
the guns sounded one, two, three, four, five, six. With this the troops, impatient all the
day with being kept in the breastworks while Sherman's men were hard at work, eagerly
pressed onward, divisions, brigades, and regiments striving each with the other for the
advance. With the first movement Bragg at once hurried reinforcements from his right and
left to strengthen his troops in his works to resist the advance on his centre. Here his
line was under the command of Breckinridge, who had his own division under Lewis,
Stewart's division, and part of those of Buckner and Hindman under Patton Anderson. The
enemy had originally four lines of breastworks. The first one on our front was captured by
Thomas on the 23d, when Orchard Knob was taken. This left three lines of rifle-pits
remaining. The second one was about half a mile to the rear of the first, near the foot of
the ridge. From here to the top was a steep ascent of some five hundred yards, covered
with large rocks and fallen timber. About half way up the ridge a small line of works had
been thrown up. On the crest of the hill Bragg's men had constructed their heaviest
breastworks, protected on our front by some fifty pieces of artillery in position. As our
troops advanced, each command cheering and answering back the cheer of the others, the men
broke into a double-quick, all striving to be the first to reach the rifle-pits at the
foot of the ridge, held by a strong line of the enemy's troops. The rebels opened fire
with shot and shell from their batteries, as our troops advanced, changing it soon to
grape and canister, which with the fire from the infantry made it terrifically hot.
Dashing through this over the open plain, the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland swept
on, driving the enemy's skirmishers, charging down on the line of works at the foot of the
ridge, capturing it at the point of the bayonet, and routing the rebels, sending them at
full speed up the ridge, killing and capturing them in large numbers. These rifle-pits
were reached nearly simultaneously by the several commands, when the troops, in compliance
with their instructions, laid down at the foot of the ridge awaiting further orders. Here
they were under a hot, plunging, galling fire from the enemy in their works on the crest
of the ridge. Without further waiting, and under no orders from their officers, first one
regiment, then another started with its colors up the ascent, until with loud hurrahs the
entire line, cheered by their officers, advanced over and around rocks, under and through
the fallen timber, charged up the ridge, each determined to reach the summit first. The
centre part of Sheridan's division reached the top first, as they were the nearest to the
crest, and crossed it to the right of Bragg's headquarters. The rest of the line was soon
up, and almost simultaneously the ridge was carried in six places. Here the enemy making a
fight for a short time was routed from the last of his lines, and his centre,
panic-stricken, broke in full retreat, Regiments were captured almost entire, battery
after battery along the ridge was taken. In some cases the rebels were bayonetted at their
guns, and the cannon that but a moment before was firing on our troops, were by them
captured, turned, and used against the rebels as they were driven in masses to the rear.
The charge occupied about one hour from the time of the firing of the guns on Orchard Knob
until the troops occupied the rebel lines on the ridge. Sheridan's division reached the
ridge a few minutes too late to capture Bragg, Breckinridge, and a number of the rebel
generals, who left Bragg's headquarters on the charge of our men up the ridge.
Sheridan advanced with his division,
skirmishing with the enemy's rear-guard, but driving them steadily for about a mile on the
Chickamauga station road. Here this road runs over a high ridge on which the enemy had
posted eight pieces of artillery supported by a strong force to cover their retreat. At
this point Sheridan, with Harker's and Wagner's brigades, had an engagement with these
troops, but after a movement flanking the rebel's right and left, they hurriedly
retreated, leaving two pieces of artillery and a large number of wagons. After this ridge
was captured, Sheridan's troops went into bivouac. During the night the full moon flooded
the surrounding country with its bright light. At midnight, on Granger's suggestion,
Sheridan in the advance was again ordered with his division to press the enemy. He at once
advanced his command to Chickamauga Creek, capturing a large number of prisoners and
quantities of material and stores.
Wood, on reaching the top of the ridge, with
Baird on his left, met with heavy opposition. The enemy was supported by a division from
Hardee on the right, advancing just as Baird was getting into position. Here these two
divisions were engaged in a sharp contest until after dark. Turchin, with his brigade,
which was the left wing of Baird, had taken possession of a small work constructed by the
enemy on the ridge when he was attacked by the rebels in a most furious charge, lint
gallantly repulsed them, when they drew off in the direction of Tunnel Hill. Missionary
Ridge was now entirely within our control, with the exception of the point, where
Sherman's advance had been so stoutly resisted. During the night, Bragg drew off Hardee's
troops from the front of Sherman, where the latter at once placed his command in position
for the pursuit the next day.
During the night of the 25th, Thomas was
directed to send Granger with his corps, and additional troops to make his command up to
20,000, to march to Burnside's relief at Knoxville, and the other portion of Thomas's
command with Sherman's troops to pursue the enemy on the 26th. The latter, on the morning
of that day advanced by the road through Chickamauga Station, while Thomas ordered the
command under Hooker and Palmer to push on by way of the Greysville and Ringgold road. At
the former place the rearguard of the rebels was surprised after night, and three cannon
and a large number of prisoners Captured. On the next clay another piece of artillery was
captured at Greysville, and later in the day Hooker's advance again struck the enemy,
strongly posted in a pass in Taylor's Ridge. Here, after a heavy fight of over an hour,
they were driven from the pass with considerable loss on both sides. The pursuit was
discontinued on the 28th. Hooker remained for a few days at Ringgold, while Palmer
returned to his camp at Chattanooga.
Sherman's troops, with Davis's division in the
advance, pressed through Chickamauga Station, and at about dark struck the rear of the
enemy's column, and had a sharp fight. After leaving Greysville, Sherman turned his
command to the left, to strike the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland. Howard was sent
to destroy this road, which he did in a most thorough manner. On the following day the
Fifteenth Corps destroyed the Atlanta Railroad from below Greysville back to the State
line. On the 28th, Sherman was ordered to make a reconnoissance to the Hiawassee with his
own corps, together with Davis's and Howard's troops of Thomas's command. On reaching
Charleston, Sherman received orders to take command of Granger's column, moving to
Burnside's relief, and to press forward with all the troops under him in all haste to
Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant. Advancing rapidly with his command, Sherman reached
Knoxville on the 6th. Longstreet, however, retreated on the 4th of December to Virginia.
Leaving Granger's corps to aid in the pursuit of Longstreet, Sherman by easy marches
returned to Chattanooga on the 16th of the month, where he ordered Howard and Davis to
report with their commands, while he marched west with his own corps to Northern Alabama
and placed them in winter quarters.
Sherman with his two days' fighting reports the
losses of his command, including Howard's command, but not that of Davis, whose loss he
says was small, at 295 killed, 1,402 wounded, and 292 missing--making a total of 1,989.
This, however, includes the losses in his first division--Osterhaus's, which fought under
Hooker on the right--of 87 killed, 344 wounded, and 66 missing, making 497 to be deducted,
which leaves Sherman's loss proper, 208 killed, 1,058 wounded, and 226 missing--a total of
1,492. Thomas's loss in the part taken by his troops, also including Howard's command and
not including Davis's division, was 529 killed, 2,281 wounded, and 141 missing--an
aggregate of 3,951. The large bulk of the losses under Thomas were in Sheridan's and
Wood's divisions. That of the former was 135 killed, 1,151 wounded, missing,
none--aggregate 1,256; that of the latter, 150 killed, 851 wounded, missing,
none--aggregate 1,001. These two divisions in their one hour's work storming Missionary
Ridge met with a loss of 2,287 men, showing hot work. There was captured by the army of
the Cumberland 40 pieces of artillery, 58 artillery carriages and caissons, 6,175 stand of
small arms, principally English Enfield, and 5,471 prisoners.
During the winter there were nothing but minor
movements of the troops. The railroads up to Chattanooga were repaired, and the first
"cracker train" that entered the place was greeted with many hearty cheers by
our troops in the town, as the shrill scream of its whistle woke the echoes among the
surrounding mountains, so long silent to this music. The roads into and through East
Tennessee were repaired to Knoxville and beyond.
In the early spring the organization of the
Army of the Cumberland was changed by Granger being relieved of the command of the Fourth
Corps, when Howard was assigned to that command. Palmer was retained in command of the
Fourteenth Corps, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated into the Twentieth
Corps, with Hooker in command. The cavalry was organized in four divisions, under the
command of W. L. Elliott. The army in the field consisted of 60,773 effective men.
General Thomas ordered the Fourth Corps to
Cleveland. The Fourteenth Corps in front of Chattanooga was well thrown forward toward the
enemy's front at Dalton, preparatory to the spring campaign to Atlanta, under General
Sherman. The Twentieth Corps was stationed in Lookout Valley.
In the general engagement Grant's plan of
battle had been for Sherman with five divisions to make the main attack, sweep everything
before him down the ridge, and when he had the rebels in full retreat, the Army of the
Cumberland was then to aid in the pursuit, after patiently waiting until the fighting was
over. Hooker, under Grant's original plan, was to simply hold Lookout Valley secure, and
when the enemy was driven by Sherman, he too was to join in the pursuit. All the fighting
of the battle was to be done by Sherman and all the glory thereof was to be his. In
Sherman's memoirs we are favored with Grant's views of the Army of the Cumberland when
Sherman first reported in person to Grant at Chattanooga, to learn of his plan and the
part he, Sherman, was to take. Sherman says that Grant told him "that the men of
Thomas's army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they
could not be got out of their trenches to assume the often-sire," and that "the
Army of the Cumberland had so long been in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry
up to take the offensive first, after which he had no doubt the Cumberland Army
would fight well." So, under Grant's plan, the Army of the Cumberland was to stand by
and be taught a grand object lesson how to fight, as given by Sherman. During the course
of the engagement the plan was modified twice. Under the original plan, Sherman was to
make a demonstration up Lookout Valley, in the expectation that Bragg would strengthen his
left at the expense of his right, thereby making Sherman's part of the plan so much the
lighter as the line on his battle front was weakened. To carry this out Hugh Ewing's
division was sent to Trenton, but this accomplished nothing. Grant fearing that Bragg's
right might be too strong for Sherman to give his lesson to the Army of the Cumberland
properly, finding Osterhaus's division cut off from Sherman, ordered it to report to
Hooker, who was directed to take it and Geary's division with Cruft's division of the
Fourth Corps and make a demonstration on the rebel left at Lookout Mountain, to attract
the attention of Bragg while Sherman gas getting into position to take "the end of
Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel." Hooker, on the day previous, learning that
Howard's corps was going into Chattanooga, and probably into the fight, asked to be
allowed his right to be with his troops under fire. Under his original order he was simply
to hold Lookout Valley, which he did not relish if part of his command should engage the
enemy. When his orders came to "make a demonstration" he determined he would
take Lookout Mountain and drive Bragg's left out of his works. With less than ten thousand
troops, over two-thirds of whom were the Army of the Cumberland, Hooker fought his
"Battle above the Clouds," that will last in history forever, and grow in fancy
and song as the years roll on. Hooker took Lookout Mountain and drove the rebel left to
Rossville, over five miles, before Sherman reached the tunnel. He made Sherman's task none
the easier, however, because Bragg then threw the two divisions Hooker had whipped upon
Sherman's front.
Then, when Sherman had been fighting for nearly
two days, and had failed to make the headway Grant's plan contemplated, the plan underwent
another modification. On the 25th, Grant ordered Thomas to move out his troops from the
centre, to make another "demonstration" in Sherman's behalf, so he could take
the tunnel in accordance with the original plan. Thomas was ordered to take the first line
of rifle-pits and hold his command there, while Bragg was expected to draw off part of his
troops from Sherman's front and strengthen his line in front of the
"demonstration." Thomas's orders to his corps and division generals were given
in accordance with Grant's instructions, and as the orders reached the brigade and
regimental commanders, as far as the officers were concerned the movement was only to be a
"demonstration." When the troops reached the rebel line, captured it, and then
found themselves under the heavy fire from the enemy's lines on the heights above, without
orders, and even against orders, the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, who were
"so demoralized that they would not fight," pressed up the face of the ridge
under the deadly musketry fire that greeted them, with cannon in front, to the right and
the left, raking with converging fire, and won for General Grant the battle of Missionary
Ridge, driving Bragg away from Sherman's front and thus enabling him to take the tunnel as
ordered. Whenever the victory of Missionary Ridge shall be narrated on history's page,
this gallant charge of the brave men of Wood's and Sheridan's divisions, with those of
Baird and Johnson on their left and right, will always be the prominent feature of the
engagement as told in the coming years, and will be the last to lose its glory and renown.
No wonder that General Grant failed to
appreciate this movement at the time, not understanding the troops wile had it in charge.
When he found these commands ascending the ridge to capture it when he ordered a
"demonstration" to be made to the foot of the hill and there to wait, he turned
sharply to General Thomas and asked, "By whose orders are those troops going up the
hill?" General Thomas, taking in the situation at once, suggested that it was
probably by their own. General Grant remarked that "it was all right if it turned out
all right," and added, "if not, some one would suffer." But it turned out
"all right," and Grant in his official report compliments the troops for
"following closely the retreating enemy without further orders." General Thomas,
in his official report, after narrating the events of the 23d, 24th, and 25th of November,
quietly says: "It will be seen by the above report that the original plan of
operations was somewhat modified to meet and take the best advantage of emergencies which
necessitated material modifications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the
original plan had it been carried out could not possibly have led to more successful
results." Source: "The Army Of The
Cumberland" By Henry M. Cist, Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. V.; A. A. G. On The
Staff Of Major General Rosecrans, And The Staff Of Major-General Thomas.