Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States

Introduction.

The
U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and
Security Studies, along with
its National Security Studies Program, cosponsored a conference in Washington,
DC on September 21, 2000, to examine the issues that will shape future American
defense policy. Discussion panels were structured to identify the
questions, issues, and schisms likely to shape the upcoming Quadrennial Defense
Review. Among the 160 attendees registered for the conference were
representatives from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) offices for all the
Services and the Joint Staff, as well as defense experts from other government
agencies, private industry, and
academia.

The
conference was divided into four panels. The first
session discussed what the
focus should be for U.S. defense
planners for the next 10 to 20
years. The second looked at
the issues involved in
transforming the military and
Department of Defense (DoD)
for that future. The third
panel debated how the
near-term U.S. defense budget
span>should be allocated for force
structure, manpower, and modernization. The last analyzed what the
next National Military Strategy should be. This report summarizes the
presentations of the main speakers and highlights the myriad issues they
illuminated about formulating a future American national security
strategy.

Conclusions.

Concerning
the focus of future planning, there appeared
to be general agreement at the
conference that the
possibility of two MTWs has
decreased, that there will be more small scale contingencies in the future, and
that the United States will retain its advantage in technology and
emphasis on minimal casualties
for quite a while. There was much less consensus on the next step. Some
supported retaining the ability to fight two MTWs despite their
reduced probability of occurrence, simply because that represents the most
dangerous threat or would cause the worst consequences. Others argued for a
restructuring to meet more likely missions, or advocated reducing forces because
there is no viable threat to U.S.
interests.

Similarly,
almost all attendees concurred that there is a need for the American military to
change and adapt, and many
supported a broad transformation. There was also agreement that even
with modest budget increases, continuing fiscal constraints will demand hard
choices to establish priorities for defense spending. The closeness of the
recent election and precarious balance in Congress portend that there will be no
major increases in defense spending during the next administration. Attendees
also generally believed the future military strategy will probably remain some
form of the current “shape, respond, prepare” construct. But
opinions varied widely as to the direction and pace transformation should take,
exactly how the defense budget should be spent, and what the proper emphasis for
each of the three elements of the new security strategy should
be.

While
the conference did not achieve anything near
consensus on the future course
of American military strategy,
it did effectively highlight key issues that must be resolved to
keep it on the right path. General Zinni’s two questions frame
important elements of the debate, looking at threats and military capabilities
in a very uncertain future. Concerning “Ready for what?” the
process of balancing ends, ways, and means in the next decade will be complex
and confrontational, involving sincere proponents of a wide range of views. Once
decisionmakers have determined the goals they want military forces to
accomplish, they must be willing to commit the resources to fund the required
capabilities and structure, or else to set global priorities that will prevent
overcommitment. Economizing alone will not be enough. Hard choices may have to
be made between a focus on shaping or responding, between major wars or
peacekeeping, and between a commitment to new technology or maintaining current
equipment. As for “What needs to change?” the services face
the challenge of achieving meaningful transformation that truly increases
capabilities for future missions without raising risk, is within resource
constraints, and invests in those technologies that offer the most potential for
revolutionary change. In this quest for a new strategy, the costs of failure in
either the political or military arena could be catastrophic, resulting in
unacceptable risk to the nation and its interests, and the loss of an
opportunity to create a “New World Order” reflecting
liberal-democratic
ideals.