Mr Chan described this year’s APPSMO theme as ambitious
because it was difficult to predict the future. The only thing

With regards to race and religion, while the region has

that could be predicted with certainty was that history

unquestionably progressed economically, Mr Chan

would not end, and thus there would be no end to war

cautioned that ethnic and religious concerns could

too. While the week’s discussions could be inconclusive,

still be present regardless of the degree of economic

the process of examining the factors that would affect

development. He cited the example of the fall of Suharto

what the future of war and warfare would be, and how

and the civil unrest along racial and religious lines that

they were constantly evolving, would be important.

ensued despite the great economic progress Indonesia
had made since independence. This reaction was visceral

Mr Chan suggested if one were to examine the types of

and could not be logically explained because it was

conflicts within the region over the past century, these

perpetrated by people who adhered to a centuries-old

factors could be classified by 3 ‘R’s - resources, race and

tradition of primarily identifying themselves by race and

religion, and rights. On resources, he noted that such

religion. He pointed out that many people still continued

contests would become more acute, in particular when

to do so, and that constructive and amicable mechanisms

there was an imbalance in their allocation, especially

were needed for people to resolve any tension along

amongst countries that have them and those countries

racial and religious lines before they erupt into full-blown
conflict.
4

Elaborating on rights, Mr Chan separated them into two

Owing to the dynamic nature of war and warfare, Mr Chan

types – the right to national sovereignty of land and

then highlighted the importance of training that increased

space, and rights to a particular system of governance

the adaptability of personnel. Besides training, agility in

in a particular country. He argued that wars had long

mind and spirit, he argued, was what the contemporary

been fought for these two reasons, and were not likely to

operating environment demanded. In his view, future

disappear with future generations. He observed that there

contests could be won not by those who had the best

was perhaps more similarity than difference between

technical training, but by those who could adapt to

conflicts then and now. He hoped future generations

change, and therefore had the ability to stay the course.

would develop mechanisms to address such tensions
before they escalated into war.

Additionally, society at large, and not just the military,
had to learn to be adaptable amidst such challenges. Mr

Mr Chan then examined how, and if, war had changed in

Chan cited Singapore’s concept of Total Defence as one

the terms used for war. The dichotomy of “conventional”

instrument of fostering such adaptability by assigning the

and “unconventional” warfare familiar to those trained in

responsibility of defence on multiple aspects of society

the Western school of military thought, was artificial, he

as a whole, and not just on the military. In that way, he

argued. War was still war, and was simply a clash of wills,

observed, Singapore had greater flexibility in responding

in which, to many the dichotomy did not exist. Similarly,

to contemporary threats.

the notion of the “front-line,” one that separated an
environment into two distinct realms, one at war, and the

Additionally, Mr Chan stressed that technology merely

other at peace, did not exist anymore. Mr Chan concluded

complemented the human spirit but could not fully

that war in the present affected all of society.

replace it in war. In his opinion, there was too much
focus on technology and its impact on future wars. While

Turning to the non-tangible aspects of war, Mr Chan

acknowledging technology’s increasing importance in

suggested that a nuanced appreciation of new spheres

armed conflict, he advocated equal attention to be paid

of war and warfare, for instance, the cyber, informational

to the human dimension in such contests. At its root, he

and psychological dimensions, was needed. He argued

noted, conflict was still a contest of wills and resilience,

that success in conflict had increasingly less to do with

characteristics that were arguably timeless. As such, in

the tangible aspects of conventional weapons military

returning to this year’s APPSMO theme, Mr Chan posited

platforms, and more to do with victory in those other

that amidst all this change, the underlying elements of

domains.

war and warfare might not have actually changed at all.

The third characteristic of warfare that has changed, Mr

In conclusion, Mr Chan hoped that the participants

Chan noted, was whether war existed as a distinct phase,

would build bonds and foster relationships that would

or a long drawn-out contest. Even classic conflicts like the

hopefully lead to greater trust in the region. Mr Chan

Napoleonic and American Civil Wars did not start and end

noted that defence diplomacy has always been central to

neatly. Instead, they were arguably a simmering struggle

the region, and just as their predecessors had utilised the

of competition between ideas and forces. As such, wars

institutions and forums of their time to form meaningful

should be seen on a spectrum from the high intensity to

relationships and deepen their mutual understanding, so

the prolonged and sustained.

too must current and future generations. The creation of
trust based on personal and professional relationships,
Mr Chan believed, would greatly help to resolve many of
the security challenges in the region.
5

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH TALK

LESSONS LEARNED FROM STABILITY AND
SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
Dr Wayne Mapp
Commissioner, New Zealand Law Commission;
Former Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Dr Wayne Mapp began his presentation by first

therefore guided by national interest. Dr Mapp said that

highlighting the growing involvement of Asia Pacific

as far as the NZDF is concerned, participation in stability

militaries in stability and security operations, and used

and security operations serves the immediate security

the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) as an example.

interests of New Zealand, especially in the immediate

He noted that the challenges that confronted the NZDF

environment of the South Pacific. By collaborating closely

in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake were

with its Australian counterpart, the NZDF could showcase

daunting, and would not have been easily surmountable

its ability to work together with its allies and partners in

without the assistance rendered by external partners. The

safeguarding regional stability. Consequently, Dr Mapp

NZDF’s stability and security operations worldwide, which

argued that the NZDF’s involvement in stability and

ranged from the South Pacific to Bosnia, had generally

security operations in the Asia Pacific played an important

been successful, but there have also been notable failures.

role in preserving external partners’ confidence in peace

The question was whether the NZDF’s experience over the

and prosperity in the region.

past 25 years would provide a useful guide for stability
and security operations in the foreseeable future.

The NZDF has learnt useful lessons from participating in
stability and security operations. The first lesson learnt was

Dr Mapp pointed out that militaries were primarily

that such operations often take a long time to bear fruits.

configured for conventional warfighting operations.

Dr Mapp cited the case of Timor-Leste as an example of

Their involvement in stability and security operations is

how newly sovereign states required considerable amount

6

of time to regain stability after a conflict. The second

deemed a remote possibility, due in no small part to the

lesson learnt was that there are usually no quick fixes to

nuclear weapon balance in the region, Dr Mapp suggested

local problems encountered as a result of local societal,

that stability and security operations in the region could

political and ethnic complexities. The NZDF had frequently

instead take the form of humanitarian and disaster relief

encountered such problems not just in Timor-Leste, but

(HADR) operations, as well as other constabulary missions,

in numerous other stability and security operations it had

for instance, in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism.

undertaken in the South Pacific, such as in Bougainville
Finally, Dr Mapp stressed the need for continued

and the Solomon Islands.

dialogue to build a climate of interstate trust and mutual
Dr Mapp outlined the various phases of such operations,

understanding in the Asia Pacific. He suggested that

starting with the insertion of forces into the theatre of

potential avenues for such dialogue and practical security

operations, followed by the second phase of restoring

cooperation in the region included the ASEAN Defence

peace and order by dealing directly with the security

Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) that comprised Expert

threats within the theatre. Thereafter, stability and security

Working Groups focused on specific areas such as HADR

operations transit into the third phase of building local

and maritime security. He concluded that small states

institutionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; capacities, such as law enforcement. This

such as New Zealand would not only have to closely

leads to the final phase of withdrawal of foreign forces

follow the ever-evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Asia

from the theatre. The NZDFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participation in stability and

Pacific neighbourhood, but also constantly seek avenues

security operations in Afghanistan illuminated further

where they can help build peace and stability in both the

useful lessons. For instance, the second phase of restoring

regional and international milieu.

law and order might not yield the desired results as quickly
as planned and could require more time than what was
allocated. As operations drag on, participating countries
may begin to lose focus, affecting efforts to build the
host countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s institutional capacities that could also be
hindered by challenging local conditions.
Dr Mapp noted that while it is hard for militaries to prepare
themselves for every type of conceivable operation
scenario, the ability to anticipate likely theatres where
stability and security operations may occur will help
militaries prepare themselves to better cope with any
contingencies. The Asia Pacific has so far enjoyed relative
stability compared to other regions such as the Middle
East. With a major armed conflict in the Asia Pacific being

7

DISTINGUISHED DINNER TALK

WIELDING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
IN COMPLEX OPERATIONS
General (Ret.) John Allen

On information operations, GEN Allen highlighted

Distinguished Fellow of Foreign Policy,
The Brookings Institution;
Former Commander, International
Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces
- Afghanistan

five key principles: (i) all effective leaders are effective
communicators; (ii) leaders owe their organisations a clear
vision and focused mission statements; (iii) leaders have to
understand the information space in which they operate;
(iv) organisations with the best strategic communications
are organised for speed and agility; and (v) leaders of
complex organisations must give their subordinates access
to information.
GEN Allen also spoke on the importance of understanding
one’s audience as part of ensuring success in information
operations. Citing examples from his experience in
Afghanistan, he emphasised that the presentation of
information would need to account for differences in
the manner the same information would be perceived
by different recipients. Stressing the need to “be first with
the truth and the truth always”, he noted that strategic
communications was all the more necessary, especially in a

General (GEN) (Retired) John Allen began his talk by

theatre like Afghanistan, where the war was winding down.

noting the importance of the U.S.-Singapore bilateral
relationship, citing the example of his experiences working

GEN Allen subsequently narrated the use of strategic

with soldiers from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)

communications in times of opportunities, crisis and

during the aftermath of the 2004 South Asia Tsunami

emergencies. All three instances required the need for

and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. He also expressed his

strong leadership in coordinating multi-agency responses

appreciation to Singaporean soldiers who had served

to a rapidly evolving situation. There was also a need to

alongside the International Security Assistance Force

manage the information space, particularly the media, so

(ISAF) in Afghanistan.

that false information would not be propagated.

On strategic communications, GEN Allen said it existed in a

Reiterating the need for strong and responsible leadership,

wide spectrum of activities that ranged from public affairs

GEN Allen added that the need to own the narrative in

and diplomacy, to cyber security. Noting the increased

information operations was extremely important. Four

complexity and sophistication of military operations, he

principles – immediacy, proximity, voice and composition

added that there was extensive reliance on information,

– were critical in ensuring the success of information

and dominating these spaces was essential to the success

operations. The best leaders, he said, understood the

of these operations.

information space. The truth cannot be compromised in
the quest for speed.

8

Session 1

Dimensions of War and Strategy
Professor Pascal Vennesson

globalisation nor the global society negated or replaced

Professor, RSIS

anarchy, defined as the absence of central authority to
enforce order. Globalisation has not resulted in a greater
acceptance of the rule of law, or respect of central
authorities. Transnational processes are still taking place
within an international environment of anarchy.
In essence, by using the expression “war in the Global
Village,” Prof Vennesson suggested political and military
leaders now face a complex and confusing world
populated by a large cast of old and new characters guided
by both old and new ideas. War and warfare now defy
easy characterisation, and have become multi-faceted.
For example, the “Naming and Shaming” campaigns by
transnational actors such as Human Rights Watch, Green

Professor Pascal Vennesson began with his thesis that

Peace, and other NGOs, could now be construed as a

warfare in the 21st century had to take into consideration

weapon against larger forces.

the “Global Village,” a community that provides the key
constraints and enablers on the use of force. He stated

Prof Vennesson said political and military leaders could

that this “Global Village” does not affect every aspect of

respond to the challenges of conducting operations in

warfare, but rather the general freedom of action in war.

the “Global Village,” by applying the principles of war to

Such freedom has increasingly been reshaped by the

the ever-changing conditions which surround the forces.

rising presence of transnational actors, ideas, norms, and

Doing so would allow the principal actors involved to

practices that are distinct yet not always immediately

transform, assist, or resist these conditions in such a way

visible. This could lead to an under-appreciation of their

that would turn them into advantageous positions.

influence on the way wars are planned, fought, and

In closing, Prof Vennesson reminded the audience of

justified.

Clausewitz’s famous maxim that “every age has had its
own peculiar forms of war, its own restrictive conditions,

Prof Vennesson suggested that rather than being abrupt

and its own prejudices.” Similarly, he argued that the

and discontinuous, the changes in the character of war

“Global Village” too has its own peculiar forms of war, its

often result in gradual and incremental adjustments in

restrictive conditions and its prejudices. Ultimately, the

the logic of military action, forming distinctive patterns

character of war is likely to continue to be shaped not

where both transformation and continuity are intertwined.

only by a system of rival states but by forces outside the

Furthermore, he added that in his own conceptualisation,

state-centric systems.

and contrary to many globalisation theories, neither

9

Session 2

Defining War in the 21st Century
Dr Beatrice Heuser

pointed out war has not consistently existed across human

Professor, Department of Politics and
International Relations,
School of Politics & International Relations
University of Reading

history, and only gained significance after the agriculture
revolution. This, she posited, could indicate that profound
cultural and social change can increase the occurrence of
war. Conversely, war could decrease if humans organised
themselves and interacted with each other differently.
Prof Heuser noted there are indeed factors of war that
do appear eternal, pointing to individual psyche, learned
inhibitions and learned aggressiveness. These factors, she
noted, are more closely associated with the behavioural
elements of war. For instance, human leadership and
authority largely influences the occurrence of war and
guides interactions between combatants and noncombatants. Other factors such as numeric superiority,
the element of surprise, morale, perseverance and initiative
also fall under the category of continuities of war. Although
these factors may be dynamic in nature, they are still

Professor Beatrice Heuser argued that the definition

important determinants of the occurrence of war, and

of war as being conflict between two states within a

are hence eternal.

defined period of time no longer holds true as war can
continue well past its officially declared end. Furthermore,

On the other hand, Prof Heuser outlined how war has

she noted war could now include the unilateral use of

changed. Apart from social structures, other drivers of

violence by a dominant party against a subordinate one,

change include values, the economic context as well as

such as genocide.

the political aims of war. More importantly, technology
has also largely affected tactics and the very idea of war.

Examining the ways some have tried to predict war, she

To some extent, Prof Heuser argued, the qualities looked

noted different possible futures, and even the possibility

for in a soldier have also evolved through the years.

of predicting unexpected â&#x20AC;&#x153;Black Swanâ&#x20AC;? events. However,
the details of these events cannot be precisely determined.

Prof Heuser also observed that amidst change in the

One way to mitigate this uncertainty is to engage in

factors of war there are still continuity in its causes. Prof

scenario and contingency planning.

Heuser agreed with Minister Chan that conflict would
continue to be caused by tensions over rights, resources,

Prof Heuser cited Clausewitzâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s division of the factors of

and race and religion. She noted these timeless causes

war into the eternal and changing, and noted that many

would remain important frames of reference for describing

often point to human and collective aggressiveness,

war in the future. Rights pertain to the perceived injustice

leading to warfare, as an eternal factor of war. She, however,

or inequality that motivates people to take up arms.

10

Associate Professor Bernard Loo

Resources refer to a struggle for scarce resources which

Associate Professor, RSIS

could worsen with population growth. Race and religion,
Prof Heuser highlighted, was open to interpretation. Fully
appreciating the basis of each interpretation, especially
differing ones, was crucial to understanding conflict and
war.
Given the complexity of war in the 21st century, Prof Heuser
suggested Robert Cooper’s mental model of the three
categories of states and polities that coexist in the world
today could help one make sense of it. The first category
Cooper described comprises “Titans,” states who resort
to war to settle disputes and conflicts. The second,“Mars,”
claim the right to engage in wars for state sovereignty.
The final category,“Venus,” is made up of entities such as
the European Union that believe conflicts and disputes

Associate Professor Bernard Loo highlighted the

can be settled peacefully rather than by unilateral violent

importance of definitions in understanding the

acts. The challenge is that three types of states coexist in

relationship between strategy, victory and narratives in

the world today. While “Venus” states may seek to avoid

the twenty-first century. He argued that the Clausewitzian

war, they coexist with others that may resort to force to

definition of war was still a useful reference point – war is

achieve their goals.

the clash of wills between two opposing forces, a dynamic
entity of two competing end states. The real objective

Reflecting on Europe’s experience with war, Prof Heuser

is therefore not battlefield victory per se, but success in

observed Europe has transformed over many centuries

breaking the enemy’s will. Assoc Prof Loo then explored

from being a continent that has suffered much hardship

Colin Gray’s definition of strategy, the bridge that relates

and destruction from war to one that has experienced

power to political purpose. Here, strategy is the application

much peace and prosperity in recent times. This, she

of concrete actions or operations to target the enemy’s

suggested, was largely the result of the embracing of

centre of gravity, undermining its will to fight. This centre

new social and cultural values that promoted peace and

of gravity, according to Gray, could simply be its military

economic growth. In comparison, many other parts of

power, or lie in the more complex combination of moral

the world have not experienced this transformation. Prof

and psychological dimensions. Assoc Prof Loo opined that

Heuser therefore wondered if other countries have a

the success of an attack of an opponent’s centre of gravity

choice of becoming a “Venus” like Europe, or remain as

largely depends on the success of the articulation of one’s

“Mars” or the “Titans.” More importantly, she asked, could

narrative of victory. In that regard, victory, or for that matter,

the European model be replicated elsewhere, especially

defeat, is more heavily dependent on the perception of

in Asia?

11

Session 3

Warfare in New
Domains: The Future
of Asymmetric
Operations and
Information Warfare

it, rather than raw facts alone. The interpretation of the
state of conflict, expressed through a strategic narrative,
is of critical importance.

Associate Professor
Ahmed Hashim

Assoc Prof Loo observed information is an enabler that
allows one to plan a strategy to dominate an opponent

Associate Professor, RSIS

through carefully crafted narratives. He defined narratives
as a coherent system of interrelated and sequentially
organised stories. He argued that war can present itself
as two competing narratives, with each party trying to
impose their version on the other. He also pointed out
that narratives do not necessarily have to be textual in
form, but have historically also been conveyed through
the use of items such as uniform, armour and war paint.
Assoc Prof Loo concluded that war in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s context is
mostly about the application of emotional, psychological
and moral forces against oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s opponent, rather than raw
military power. This is partly the result of other trends,
such as globalisation, that have resulted in an amorphous
enemy where separating the combatant from the non-

Associate Professor Ahmed Hashim began with a

combatant is difficult, making the traditional application of

discussion on the pitfalls of predicting human activities

military power in the first place difficult. Above all, if war is

or events such as war. He cited two historical anecdotes:

a battle of narratives, advances in information technology

first when French General Ferdinand Foch had prior to

resulting in lower barriers of entry have allowed individuals

World War One observed, aviation as an instrument of

to enter the fray and become strategic actors in war. War

war, was worthless, but its utility as a military platform

is therefore no longer the activity of competing states, as

was unequivocally proven during the conflict, and

historically understood, and this must now factor into a

France emerged from the war at the forefront of military

stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strategic calculus.

aviation. Second, when an Italian general had asserted with
certainty that aerial warfare would be the most important

12

element in future wars. Assoc Prof Hashim noted both

Assoc Prof Hashim suggested one way of understanding

generals had made predictions they thought were right,

asymmetric war and warfare was by first understanding

but hindsight had proven them wrong.

what symmetric war and warfare are. He defined
symmetrical war and warfare as conflict between two

Sharing another example of the difficulty in crystal ball

warring parties that is conducted similarly by both.

gazing, Assoc Prof Hashim cited Håvard Hegre’s statistical

Symmetrical war is thus a force-on-force match where

model using historical data that suggested war was on

opponents with similar technologies, capabilities and

the decline. The model predicted a steady fall in the

vulnerabilities contest each other. Assoc Prof Hashim

number of conflicts in the next four decades, specifically

observed that in essence, opponents engaged in such

arguing that the number will fall to 7 per cent by 2015

wars are military equals. He argued that although such

due to higher education, lower infant mortality rates and

mirror-imaging is plausible in theory, actual wars have

other factors. Yet recent data suggests that even in 2010,

never been truly symmetric, where warring parties were

approximately 15 to 20 per cent of the world’s countries

identical in form and function. As such, Assoc Prof Hashim

were still involved in armed conflict, hardly the decline the

suggested that conventional war, which many have

mathematical model had suggested. Assoc Prof Hashim

equated with symmetric war, has historically included

argued this example showed that even more scientific

many asymmetric elements in tactics, organisation and

approaches to prediction could still be wrong, or at the

technology. Furthermore, asymmetry is assured when a

very least, inaccurate. Predicting asymmetric warfare

conventional superpower like the United States goes to

was described by a strategist Colin Gray as an “awesome

war because it is the world’s strongest conventional power

problem” because war comprised too many variables

that does not have a peer competitor yet. Asymmetry in

to make any significant prediction based on statistics

war and warfare, Assoc Prof Hashim concluded, can thus

alone. However, even Gray could not resist making his

be defined as the methods and techniques adopted to

own prediction that war would eventually disappear in

address this inherent inequity in military capabilities

a world of emerging global values, or because of the rise

between opponents. He argued that in such instances,

of a hegemonic world power, such as the United States.

strategy is primarily about exploiting one’s strengths

Assoc Prof Hashim argued that if predictions had to be

and exposing the enemies’ weaknesses. For example,

made, those that reference the past are generally sounder

in asymmetric warfare, the weaker side recognises the

than those based on mere statistics alone, as war is the

military superiority of its enemy and will avoid open

unfortunate product of tensions in competing ideological

confrontation while seeking instead to attain victory by

belief systems.

adopting novel compensatory methods.

13

Dr Michael Raska

Assoc Prof Hashim explored asymmetric war in the context

Research Fellow, RSIS

of three types of conflict – terrorism, insurgencies and
conventional war - all of which asymmetric warfare
dominates. Terrorism was fundamentally asymmetric
warfare because it was a systematic and structured
deviation from the established law, suggesting both
opponents are inherently not mirror-images of each other.
Terrorists do not adhere to the same rules and norms.
Instead, they seek to dismantle and dissect the social or
democratic infrastructure that is in place.
Assoc Prof Hashim used the American invasion of Iraq as
an example of insurgency as a form of asymmetric war.
He argued that when a small state is powerless against a
larger, more powerful and technologically superior state
occupying them, they often resort to unconventional,

Dr Michael Raska began his presentation with the

asymmetric means of warfare known as ‘area denial’. The

observation that information and cyber warfare, typically

objective is to impede or disrupt the U.S. military’s ability

characterised as cyber threats, cyber attacks, cyber

to operate in a theatre far from U.S. territory. Although this

terrorism, cyber weapons, and cyber espionage, is now

may be applied by conventional forces, such asymmetrical

the subject of considerable attention worldwide in both

warfare was largely carried out by insurgents in Iraq.

the popular media and policy realms. He noted this interest
is sustained by the numerous manifestations of such

Assoc Prof Hashim concluded with four general

warfare, offering examples ranging from limited hacker

observations about how weaker entities could undertake

incursions by politically motivated “hacktivists,” corporate

asymmetric war and warfare in the face of a stronger

and military intelligence agencies, organised crime

opponent. First, asymmetry in conflict must now also

and terrorist groups, to advanced information warfare

include robust defence diplomacy to undermine the

programs of nation-states. Collectively, he surmised, cyber

stronger powers’ alliances, as well as the development of an

and information warfare is changing the character of

effective strategic narrative that the weaker power can use

conflicts because it is so multi-faceted.

against the stronger one. Second, smaller entities would
do well to avoid direct confrontation with the stronger

Nevertheless Dr Raska argued that for many, information

forces and instead seek to exploit their vulnerabilities

warfare is still an enigma. He suggested this is due to the

through access or area denial. Third, the weaker power

multidimensional character of the on-going information

needs to seize the initiative early to prevent the stronger

revolution that is constantly evolving, developing

power from destroying its system of systems—a hybrid

advanced information and communications technologies

of conventional and irregular warfare—that is in place.

whose dual-use blurs distinctions between the civil and

Finally, the weaker side must achieve military surprise
before the stronger side has a chance to apply the full
strength of its power in the conflict.
14

military domains. In this regard, information warfare

system such as drones or even aircrafts and manipulate

comprises a disparate range of conflict, targets, modes

the intended motives. Even if cyber technology is not

and magnitude of attacks that defies easy categorisation.

used to interfere with the operations of conventional

He gave several examples of cyber warfare to illustrate this

platforms, it can be used to gather intelligence about

difficulty – attacks on aircraft navigation system, spoofing

them. Furthermore, given the networked nature of cyber

air traffic control system, and attacks on specialised digital

warfare, he observed tracking and pin-pointing a cyber

devices that control electrical power and dam floodgates.

perpetrator is extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible.

More general attacks included denial-of-service attacks,

Above all, given the global reliance on technology, no

and worm and logic bombs inserted into information

country is immune to cyber attacks.

systems. Adding to the difficulty in classifying cyber attacks
was the non-specificity of some of them. He cited the

Dr Raska thus concluded that technology, in particular,

example of the Terra AM-1 and Landsat-7 satellites that

information technology, will simultaneously become

were “interfered with” in 2007 and 2008, and attacks on

both the target of attack, as well as a principal weapon to

the General Positioning Satellites (GPS).

attack with. He predicted future technology would be used
to control an opponent through strategic information

Despite this difficulty in determining what constitutes

dominance – controlling its understanding of the situation,

an attack, Dr Raska said that many countries are acutely

ideally without his awareness.

aware of the damage they can cause, and are earnestly
developing their cyber security policies and integrating

Dr Raska also noted because cyber warfare is continuously

them into defence strategies, command structures, and

evolving and the difficulty of identifying its threat,

operational plans.

formulating a one-size-fits-all response or countermeasure
is difficult. Different priorities in the development of cyber

Dr Raska observed that understanding the strategic

warfare capabilities, as well as perceived threats from them,

significance of information and cyber warfare is a key

may lead to new balances of power between nation-states

preoccupation of military organisations. The answers, he

and non-state actors.

said, lie largely in recognising the nature of contemporary
warfare, and how cyber warfare can affect it. He posited

behind Singapore’s deployment to New Zealand. He noted
the importance of the “whole-of-government” approach
that the SAF adopted. Although the SAF took the lead in
the operation, its success rested on the successful quick
and effective coordination of resources that other agencies
also contributed.
He then explored the tactical and operational conduct
of the SAF’s relief mission. COL Ong noted that as civilmilitary relations were already excellent between the
NZDF and its civilian counterparts, the SAF decided to
work within that effective structure and attach itself to a
NZDF unit on the ground, the Third Land Force Group. By
leveraging on existing coordinating structures in place,
and not creating a new separate chain of command, the

Colonel (COL) Melvyn Ong began by describing the

SAF contingent could therefore focus all its energies

Singaporean Armed Forces’ (SAF) earthquake relief

exclusively on actual relief efforts.

operation in Christchurch, New Zealand in February 2011.
He noted that the SAF contingent’s working relationship

COL Ong also shared some of the operational lessons

with its New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) counterpart

from the SAF’s relief efforts in Christchurch. First, he noted

before the earthquake allowed the SAF to contribute its

that although it may not happen all the time, a clear

assistance quickly and effectively.

mandate is crucial, i.e. agreement by all that a country
should participate in the mission in the first place. Second,

COL Ong outlined the challenges faced during this

it is essential to respect the host nation and its requests,

particular relief operation, and SAF’s previous ones. In

and not make unilateral decisions. According to COL

Christchurch, one challenge was geographical - Singapore

Ong, the host nation is in a better position to understand

and New Zealand are far apart, and have different climates.

and assess its needs in the aftermath of natural disasters

The SAF also had to operate in an urban terrain with a

like the earthquake in Christchurch. A third lesson is the

well-developed urban infrastructure and society, which the

importance of building and maintaining inter-agency

SAF had not experienced in its previous relief operations.

cooperation within the government. This should be

This, however, was an advantage as New Zealand’s well-

routine. COL Ong noted the NZDF’s liaison officers were

developed urban infrastructure, as well as its efficient

so efficient in working with their civilian counterparts

bureaucracy and government institutions, allowed for a

that the groundwork had already been laid prior to the

more efficient deployment, more so than during previous

crisis. A fourth lesson was the importance of keeping the

Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations.

mission objective simple for the troops on the ground.

18

Mr Larry Maybee

Above all, basic core values had to guide the behaviour and

Delegate to Armed and Security Forces;
Southeast Asia and the Pacific
International Committee of the Red Cross

actions of the relief force. COL Ong said the SAF’s mission
in Christchurch was guided by the values of “discipline”,
“humility” and “professionalism”, and that these principles
stood the contingent in good stead despite the numerous
different challenges faced. Related to this, a fifth lesson
COL Ong noted was that how Singapore acts in such
missions could be interpreted at many levels: by acting
promptly and professionally, HADR missions not only bring
quick relief to human suffering, but also act as a conduit
for defence diplomacy. While of secondary importance,
one cannot ignore the symbolic value of these missions
as they will inevitably acquire them.
COL Ong concluded his presentation by reiterating the
importance of decisively establishing clarity in the mission,
and the importance of good civil-military relations in
HADR. A large part of the SAF’s success in Christchurch

Mr Larry Maybee from the International Committee of

was a result of it doing both well.

the Red Cross (ICRC) addressed the topic of civil-military
cooperation from the other side of the partnership. He
focused on his observations gleaned from his experience
in the ICRC working with coalition partners, including the
military, in contested environments. He stressed that it is
essential for militaries around the world to understand
and respect how international humanitarian organisations
operate in such contested environments.
In the last few decades, Mr Maybee noted that civilmilitary cooperation has increased in prominence due
to developments and trends in international relief
operations. He further argued that it has become an
important component of military training, even for
conventional operations. The humanitarian aspect of
war-fighting cannot be a secondary consideration for
military commanders. In his view, the humanitarian
consequences of armed conflicts or crises are real, and

Mr Maybee argued civil-military cooperation is a product of
political-military objectives. Be that as it may, humanitarian

According to Mr Maybee, the danger is that humanitarian

organisations often do not share the same culture or

actions undertaken by humanitarian organisations will

organisational principles, and therefore often interpret

become politicised. More importantly, humanitarian

these objectives, or the means to achieve them, differently.

actions will be subordinated to political and military

For example, the principles of humanitarian groups,

objectives. If this continues, he argued that humanitarian

particularly those of the ICRC, are humanity, impartiality

groups will face difficulty in obtaining access to conflict

and neutrality. Militaries may not always be able to adhere

areas. If perceptions of the military are unfavourable,

to these principles, or agree to a common interpretation

humanitarian organisations will be tarred by the same

of them. Compounding the challenge of civil-military

brush and be deemed guilty by association, with the

cooperation is the need for humanitarian organisations

perception that their efforts are no longer altruistic but

to at times, intentionally distance themselves from the

part of a wider political or military objective. Humanitarian

military so as to maintain their neutrality and ensure

groups therefore are no longer seen as impartial

they are seen as working for humanitarian reasons above

organisations that relieve the hardship caused by political

any other.

violence, but a party to that violence in the first place.
Thus, it is absolutely critical for humanitarian groups to

As such, what humanitarian groups ultimately look for in

uphold and preserve the ideas of humanity, impartiality

their engagements with militaries around the world is less

and neutrality.

complete integration, but more an understanding of how
they operate by military organisations, and what it will be

Mr Maybee concluded with some key recommendations.

doing on the ground. The emphasis is on obtaining access,

First, it is essential for both militaries and humanitarian

possibly through the military, to do their work, and an

organisations to understand and respect each other’s

acceptance by the military of the work they do. Achieving

roles, needs and capacities. Second, there should be

such awareness requires humanitarian organisations to

a clear separation between the aims, activities and

engage their military counterparts at every level.

objectives of militaries and those of humanitarian actors.
Finally, humanitarian objectives cannot be subordinate

Unfortunately, Mr Maybee pointed out that humanitarian

to political-objectives. To that end, both sides must

organisations are often threatened in the field. An

continuously engage each other in order to carefully

obvious manifestation of this is the risk aid workers face

coordinate their efforts and prevent duplication or worse

on the ground. A less obvious but increasing threat is

still, misconstruance of the intentions of humanitarian

the encroachment of aid work done by humanitarian

organisations.
20

Session 5

Modern Challenges to the Military Profession
and Sino-U.S. Nuclear Policy
Dr John Nagl

Dr Nagl referred to Richard Downey’s Learning from Conflict

Headmaster, The Haverford School

on how a military should learn. It does so by adjusting
its norms, doctrine and standard operating procedures
through a benchmarking process, learning from history
and institutionalising the lessons learnt. He explained
the characteristics of a learning institution are its ability
to accept bottom-up input and the ability to think and
question critically in an unfolding situation and uncertain
environment.
Adapting the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action
(OODA) loop first developed by John Boyd in the context
of winning air-to-air combat, Dr Nagl proposed an
organisation learning cycle through similar steps: firstly,
observing situational change; secondly, giving it attention

Dr John Nagl began his lecture by stating that military

leading to action; thirdly, orientating organisational

organisations have always faced the challenge of being

performance accordingly; fourthly, searching for an

more adaptive to unpredictable changes in the security

alternative; fifthly, sustaining consensus for alternative

environment. These unpredictable changes, such as the

action, and; lastly, transmitting interpretation and

collapse of the Berlin War in 1989 and Iraq’s invasion

establishing new doctrine.

of Kuwait in 1990, caught the world unprepared and
taught the military that adapting its organisation to such

Dr Nagl illustrated this with the U.S. Army’s response to its

unexpected events was like “teaching dinosaurs how to

dismal performance in COIN. He noted that the U.S. Army

dance”.

and Marine Corps have produced a “Counterinsurgency
Field Manual” in 2006, containing six effective information

He noted that the military struggles with being adaptable

operations. Those operations involved combat and civil

because it is a conservative institution that is typically

security operations, host-nation security forces, essential

resistant to change. He presented the example of the U.S.

services, governance, as well as economic development.

Army in 2007 where the then Secretary of Defence, Robert

He explained that success in these information operations

Gates, observed it was unprepared for counter-insurgency

influenced the attitude of the local population to support

(COIN) wars taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite

U.S. forces in COIN.

having fought in Vietnam three decades earlier. That
war, a COIN campaign in its own right, should have

Dr Nagl then explained how U.S. forces built a learning

offered numerous useful lessons for the Army’s present

organisation in Iraq. It first adopted a bottom-up feedback

involvement in the Middle East, but the Army had not

system, making individual input matter. Secondly, it

absorbed them.

21

Major General (MG) Yao Yunzhu

focused on security and intelligence. Thirdly, it provided

Director, Center for China-Amercian
Defense Relations
Academy of Military Science
People’s Liberation Army

the stakeholders what they needed to achieve success.
Fourthly, it ensured everyone bought into the overall aims
and objectives, and were all on the same page. Finally,
it mastered the strategic narrative. He reiterated the
importance for the military to be proficient in strategic
communication. This is because human society has been
dramatically affected by the information revolution, much
like how it was by the earlier agricultural and industrial
revolutions. This has complicated the character of conflict
in the present age. Other factors include more countries
pursuing nuclear weapons, challenges to U.S. conventional
military superiority by rising powers, as well as other trends
in globalisation and urbanisation that have made the
character of war less conventional. Dr Nagl predicted the
numerous instances of violence witnessed in the present
age would make peace unlikely. While these instances
would probably not escalate to the extent of general
war, insurgencies, and therefore the need for effective

Major General (MG) Yao Yunzhu spoke on Sino-U.S.

COIN tactics and strategies, would become increasingly

nuclear policy. She began by explaining the differences

important.

between China’s and the United States’ nuclear weapon
policies. She noted that militaries continuously think

Dr Nagl concluded that a military organisation can be

about war as a matter of defence policy, and that includes

a true learning institution if it is aware of the changing

thinking about nuclear war for those countries that

environment and respects individual input that allows

have such weapons. A country’s nuclear policy is always

it to adapt. As an organisation engaged in the risky and

determined well before the actual use of the weapon.

costly business of war, the military must effectively and

For example when the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on

quickly adapt to the changes it encounters, with a sincere

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the country’s nuclear policy had

and honest commitment to a balanced analysis of them.

already been well-established. Therefore, it is important to
study countries’ existing nuclear policies to predict how
countries might act when threatened.
MG Yao explained China’s commitment to the NonProliferation Treaty and the country’s pledge of No First
Use (NFU) nuclear policy announced in August 1964.
The pledge states China’s position of not using nuclear

22

weapons in a pre-emptive first strike. It is also against using

it sought weapons of greater penetrability. On the other

nuclear weapons in chemical and biological warfare, as

hand, the U.S. nuclear arsenal had 30,000 weapons at its

well as using them against non-nuclear weapon states.

peak, but it has since substantially reduced it to a third.

For China, nuclear weapons are merely a political and

She applauded President Obama’s recent announcement

strategic instrument of deterrence that will dissuade

to further cut the number to 1,550 warheads and 700

aggressors from attacking it.

delivery systems by 2018.

MG Yao reiterated that China will only use nuclear weapons

Regarding disarmament, MG Yao believed that the process

if there is a tactical necessity in a counter-attack. That

should be done through complete elimination. She

being said, the use of nuclear weapons is always a last

gave the example of the Korean peninsula disarmament

resort as China does not believe that nuclear war will

approach, where ideally the region should be nuclear-free

ever produce an overall winner because of its high cost.

with a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. However,

She acknowledged that China has been criticised for

she was aware that the U.S. might not be willing to do so.

not being transparent enough in publishing its nuclear

She acknowledged that there was some uncertainty over

weapon capability. However, she again stressed China‘s

the intentions of China’s nuclear policy because it was less

nuclear arsenal is for defence only, and China will never

open than that of the U.S.’. The U.S. approached nuclear

launch a first strike.

diplomacy by being transparent about the number of
weapons in its possession, forcing a potential enemy to

Mr Larry Maybee
Delegate to Armed and Security Forces
Southeast Asia and the Pacific
International Committee of the Red Cross

Chairperson:
Associate Professor Tan See Seng
Associate Professor, Deputy Director
Head of Research
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
Head
Centre for Multilateralism Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Beatrice Heuser
Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations
School of Politics & International Relations
University of Reading
Dr Bernard Loo Fook Weng
Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Commissioner, Law Commission;
Former Minister of Defence, New Zealand

UNITED KINGDOM
Air Commodore Nick Bray CBE
MA
Air Commodore
Head of International Policy and
Plans (Military)
Ministry of Defence
Brigadier Duncan Francis OBE
Brigadier
Defence AttachĂŠ
British Embassy in Beijing

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
Brigadier General Michael
Compton
Brigadier General
Deputy Director for Strategic
Planning and Policy
U.S. Pacific Command
Brigadier General Richard
Simcock
Brigadier General
Deputy Commanding General
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

31

About the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is a key research component of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS). It focuses on security research to serve national needs. IDSS’ faculty and research staff
conduct both academic and policy-oriented research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast
Asia and the Asia Pacific. Its research agenda presently comprises the following programmes: Military Transformation,
Military Studies, Maritime Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Contemporary Islam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
South Asia and the United States.
Visit www.rsis.edu.sg/idss for more information.

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts
at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate teaching and
networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies,
Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS’ activities are aimed at
assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and
stability in the Asia Pacific.
For more information about RSIS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg