73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India, 1992 – Summary

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The Amendment Act has added part IX to the Constitution of India entitled as ‘Panchayats’. The part consists of provisions from Article 243 to 243-0. A new schedule called as Eleventh Schedule lists 29 functional items that panchayats are supposed to deal with under Article 243-G. The basic provisions of the Act are divisible into compulsory provisions and voluntary arrangements.

The provisions which the state statutes will have to provide for are:

(1) Creation of a State Elections Commission to conduct elections to PRIs,

(2) In order to review the financial position of the PRIs, each state to set up a State Finance Commission for five years.

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(3) Tenure of PRIs fixed at five years and, if dissolved earlier, fresh elections to be held within six months,

(4) Creation of a three-tier Panchayati Raj structure at the zila, block and village levels,

(5) The minimum age for contesting elections to PRIs to be 18 years,

(6) Reservation for women in panchayats (chairman and members) up to one-third seats,

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(7) Reservation of seats for SC/ST in panchayats (chairman and members) in proportion to their population,

(8) Indirect elections to the post of chairman at the intermediate and apex tiers,

(9) All posts at all levels (with two exceptions) to be filled by direct elections, and

(10) Organisation of gram sabhas.

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As local self-government is an item in the State List, the state governments have been given a reasonable discretion to take decisions in the following areas.

These voluntary provisions vary from state to state:

(1) Voting rights to MPs and MLAs in these bodies,

(2) Reservation for backward classes,

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(3) Financial powers,

(4) Autonomy of the panchayats, and

(5) Devolution of powers to perform functions of the Eleventh Schedule and planning.

The Eleventh Schedule of the Act enumerates 29 subjects which fall in the purview of the panchayats. The Act has refrained from putting those into the Seventh Schedule of three lists for the simple reason that states are free to determine the Panchayati Raj activities and adjust this Eleventh Schedule as per situations and resources. The Schedule is quiet flexible and exhaustive.

The PRI can make rules, regulations and administer them by creating services and charging tax, cess, octroi, etc., in lieu of these functional services. The Tenth Finance Commission suggested grants-in-aid for the local bodies from state exchequers to supplement their efforts. The panchayati institutions can take policy decisions in the areas like land reform, ecology preservation, rural industries and farming. The PR institutions have been accepted as the implementing agency of the state governments.

The Eleventh Schedule lists the following 29 subjects:

Eleventh Schedule:

(1) Agriculture including agricultural extension.

(2) Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conser­vation.

(26) Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded.

(27) Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

(28) Public distribution system.

(29) Maintenance of community assets.

The pre-1992 situation about PRIs was chaotic. Most of the states did not bother about any uniform pattern. The partisan character of the state governments viewed Panchayati Raj politics in terms of their support structures or destabilising factors. In either case, they were apprehensive of Union governments intervention or opposition parties taking over Panchayati Raj bodies.

The votaries of Panchayati Raj were states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat and Kerala. While other states like Rajasthan, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab became lukewarm and less enthusiastic about panchayat elections. States like Bihar, Haryana, Orissa and Jammu and Kashmir viewed the change with scepticism. Hence the Union government has to proceed with caution and the amendment was designed to develop and keep the consensus in basic areas of panchayati gover­nance.

The salient features of the 73rd Amendment can be presented as under:

The Gram Sabha:

The act provides that a gram sabha will consist of persons registered in the electoral rolls of a village within the area of a panchayat at the village level. Thus, it is a village assembly consisting of all the registered voters in the area of the panchayat. It exercises such powers and performs such functions at the village level as the legislature of a state determines.

The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee made no formal mention of the gram sabha but the gram sabha was existing as a statutory body in almost all the states. In states like Bihar, Orissa and Rajasthan, all the adult residents of a village or a group of villages are its members. The membership of a gram sabha ranges from 250 to 5,000 and it meets twice in a year. The sabha elects from among its members an executive committee and the sarpanch presides over the meetings. The budget, plans and programmes, audit reports and progress reports of panchayats are placed before this popular body.

The Sadiq Ali Committee which reported about gram sabhas in Rajasthan in 1964, pointed out the following weaknesses in their working:

(1) Poor attendance, particularly of women.

(2) Absence of secretarial assistance, and

(3) Its meetings were not duly publicised.

(4) The illiteracy of villagers.

(5) The sarpanch avoided calling a meeting for fear of being questioned.

(6) Meetings were held during the harvest season.

The apathy and non-attendance of villagers in gram sabha meeting has been a major issue of criticism of PRIs. The Rajasthan state constituted G.L. Vyas Committee in 1973 to rectify this dysfunctionalism of the grass roots institution. The Vyas Committee suggested:

(1) Compulsory attendance for the sarpanch in meetings.

(2) Statutory recognition of gram sabha.

(3) The tehsildar, the naib tehsildaar and the village school teachers should encourage villagers to ask questions.

(4) The time of meetings to be May-June and January-December.

(5) Compulsory attendance of the patwari and VLW.

The activisation of gram sabha is a problem in all the states. Officials attribute it to the apathy of rural folks while villagers complain that meetings are manipulated and decisions are neither publically arrived at nor accountability is fixed.

The 73rd Amendment has addressed itself to this ailment and has provided the following for activisation of this core institution:

(1) Public problems of the village will be discussed and beneficiaries of welfare programmes would be identified.

(2) The panchayat secretary will be the secretary of the sabha also.

(3) Two compulsory meetings otherwise the sarpanch will be asked to quit.

(4) The quorum of meetings will be one-tenth of the total.

(5) Assistance to panchayat in the execution of rural development schemes.

(6) Vigilance committee of the sabha will keep an eye on the panchayats.

(7) The budget and programmes of the panchayat will keep the suggestions of the sabha in view.

(8) A constitutional status to gram sabhas.

All this has improved the situation considerably. The research indicates that it is not the apathy, but the feeling that their will is being ignored, makes them absent in the meetings. Now as National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme comes into operation, the panchayat/gram sabha secretary cannot afford to take grama sabha meetings lightly.

The community has to identify and certify the list of beneficiaries and this will generate sustained interest in the working of the gram sabha. Government aid for national disasters like floods, famine, quakes, etc., need rural support and people increasingly realised the relevance and importance of grama sabha participation.

The Three-Tier System:

The Union government has prescribed a uniform three-tier system of panchayati institutions for a period of five years.

The B.R. Mehta model remains the basic frame and the Act defined the institu­tions as under:

(2) Village means a village specified by the governor by public notification to be a village for the purpose, and includes a group of villages so specified.

(3) Intermediate level means a level between the village and district levels specified by the gover­nor’s public notification for this purpose.

(4) District means a district in a state.

Thus, the Act brings about uniformity in the structure of Panchayati Raj throughout the country. However a state having a population not exceeding 20 lakhs may not constitute panchayats at the intermediate level. All the panchayati institutions are to be elected on the basis on adult suffrage but the chairpersons at all the three levels should be elected indirectly by and from among the elected members. But the state legislatures are free to revise this indirect election pattern.

The Act provides for the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every panchayat (i.e., at all the three levels) in proportion of their population to the total population in the panchayat area. Further, the state legislature provides for the reservation of offices of chairpersons in the panchayat at the village or any other level for the SCs and STs.

It further provides for the reservation of not less than one-third of the total number of seats for women (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging the SCs and STs). Further, not less than one-third of the total numbers of offices of chairpersons in the panchayats at each level are to be reserved for women.

The Act also authorises the legislature of a state to make any provision for reservation of seats in any panchayat or offices of chairperson in the panchayat at any level in favour of backward classes. The term of office is five years but a panchayat can be dissolved before the completion of its term.

Further fresh election to constitute a panchayat should be completed:

(i) Before the expiry of its duration of five years; or

(ii) In case of dissolution before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution. The Amendment Act prescribes the qualifications and disqualifica­tions of members subject to revision by state legislatures.

The Act says that person shall be disqualified for being chosen as for being a member of panchayat if he is so disqualified:

(i) Under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the legislature of the state concerned, or

(ii) Under any law made by the state legislature. However, no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than 25 years of age if he has attained the age of 21 years. All questions of disqualifications are referred to such authority as the state legislature determines.

The Two Commissions:

The Parliament knew it for sure that elections will be the real arena of discord and problems may lead to crises and an early collapse of the system. The Act envisions an election commission in every state to ensure free and fair panchayati elections periodically. It was quite a challenging job to get elections conducted at the grass-roots level.

The Election Commission of India could not be involved in it but a similar and uniform model on the lines of Election Commission of India should be workable over a period of time. The amendment is extra conscious of the sensitivities of the states and to keep them in good humour even the powers and the functions of these institutions have been envisaged in a vague manner with enough leeway for the state legislations to fill up the blank functions and powers.

The state legislature may endow the panchayats, with such authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government.

Such a scheme may maintain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon panchayats at the appropriate level with respect to:

(i) The preparation of plans; and

(ii) The implementation of schemes for economic devel­opment and social justice as may be entrusted to them, including those in relation to the 29 matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.

(ii) Assign to a panchayat taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the state government;

(iii) Provide for making grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state; and

(iv) Provide for constitution of funds for crediting all moneys of the panchayats.

The reformers were quite sanguine to the fact that states will be unenthusiastic to endow panchayati institutions with adequate resources and the experiment may crash in the want of funds. Political partisaness apart the development work in rural areas may keep these institutions starving for a long time and the local leadership may get exhausted and frustrated in the process of procuring resources.

The Constitution provides for a finance commission for distribution of resources between the Centre and states. Here the resources were to be distributed between states and panchayati institutions with a possibility of federal grants-in-aid system. So the amendment makes a statutory provision for the state Finance Commission.

The governor of a state shall, after every five years, constitute a Finance Commission to review the financial position of the panchayats.

It shall make the following recommendations to the governor:

(1) The principles which should govern:

i. The distribution between the state and the panchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied by the state.

ii. The determination of taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to the panchayats.

iii. The grant-in-aid to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state.

(2) The measures needed to improve the financial position of the panchayats.

(3) Any other matter referred to the Finance Commission by the governor in the interests of sound finance of the panchayats.

The state legislature may provide for the composition of the commission, the required qualifi­cations of the members and the manner of their selection. The governor shall place the recommendations of the commission along with the action taken report before the state legislature. The Central Finance Commissioner shall also suggest the measures to augment the Consolidated Fund of a state to supplement the resources of the panchayats in the states.

The state legislature has to make provisions with respect to the maintenance of accounts by the panchayats and the auditing of such accounts. The 73rd Amendment applies on union territories also, subject to exceptions specified by the President of India. But it does not apply to the states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Jammu & Kashmir for their special status and tribal council situations already in existence.

The Panchayat Tier:

Although almost all states of the Indian Union have passed necessary Panchayat Acts, still the suggestion of ARC of having one panchayat for one village of about 2,000 residents is far from being implemented. Adult suffrage with social justice reservations is a great step forward yet the wide variety of patterns in the spectrum raise many eyebrows. The reservation of women in some states and disqualifying panchayat leaders on the birth of a third child or absence of supercession disso­lution rules stand in the working of panchayats in their initial years of gestation.

Some of these frailties are obvious and can be identified as under:

(1) An unhealthy electoral environment.

(2) Lack of proper state guidance specially that of the revenue and police authorities.

(3) Sarpanchs and especially husbands of female Sarpanchs dominate.

(4) Rules and procedures.

(5) Slow action against defaulters.

(6) Weak secretarial assistance.

(7) Poor financial resources.

The need, therefore, is to augment the resources and establish ‘Gram Sachivalayas’ as suggested by Shiv Charan Mathur panel of Administrative Reforms in Rajasthan. The district secre­tariats will give PRI a distinct identity and clarity of rules and procedures will make the institutions affective.

The Panchayat Samiti Tier:

The panchayat samiti or the block level institution has been in great debate in the two Mehta Reports. As a key functionary, the BDO has been the centre of controversies. The variations in power role and even in nomenclature demanded a consensus.

In pre-1994 situation, the panchayat samiti was known as:

(1) Mandal Panchayat in Karnataka

(2) Janpad Panchayat in Madhya Pradesh

(3) Panchayat Sangh in Tamil Nadu

(4) Taluka Panchayat in Gujarat

(5) Anchal Samiti in Arunachal Pradesh

(6) Kshetriya Samiti in J&K

The ARC suggested that the area of the block should be coterminous with that of a tehsil or a sub-division. The 73rd Amendment has introduced the necessary uniformity.

(2) Developmental functions which may include execution of development programmes, seeds and fertilizers distribution, conservation of soil, credit for agricultural purposes, irrigation facilities, forests, cattle and fodder improvement, cottage and small scale industries, etc.

To discharge these functions, the panchayat samiti can seek people’s cooperation through functional committees. The BDO who is equivalent to the position of a SDO serves as the executive secretary of the samiti administration. The samiti can levy taxes, but the scarcity of resources is a perennial grievance.

The Zila Parishad Tier:

Like panchayat samiti, the institution of zila parishad had variation as strong and weak zila parishads. Some status accepted it as the major unit of rural development. Others like Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa have underrated its importance and have even tried to abolish it. The names of the institution explain the nature of the models.

(1) Assam Mahakama Parishad

(2) Tamil Nadu District Development Council

(3) Andhra Pradesh Zila Praja Parishad

(4) Gujarat District Panchayat

Ending the diversity in composition which caused variations in roles, the new dispensation makes it a directly elected body of the people with a tenure of five years. Its functions and roles have been delineated by the act in specific terms.

According to the statute, the zila parishads will:

(1) Advise state government on matters relating to development in the district,

(2) Co-ordinate development plans prepared by the panchayat samitis,

(3) Co-ordinate the work of panchayat samitis, and

(4) Advise the state government on the allocation of work to Panchayati Raj institutions.

(5) Examine and approve the budget of panchayat samitis,

(6) Distribute funds to various panchayat samitis,

(7) Issue directions to panchayat samitis for efficient performance of their duties,

(8) Inform the divisional commissioner and the district collector about irregularities in PRIs,

The chairman of the ZP, called as Zila Pramukh is an indirectly elected functionary but happens to be a member of the parishad. He is accountable to the zila parishad which can remove him by a vote of no-confidence. It is around this pivot that the future pattern of Panchayati Raj will revolve in the states.

The role of the collector vis-a-vis zila parishad is the key issue and his relationship with the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) has already heralded the change. The Administrative Reforms Commission, in its report on state administration has recom­mended that “the developmental function should be transferred from the collector to the zila parishad and a whole-time senior officer be appointed as the chief executive officer of the zila parishad.

This officer be designated as the district development officer and he should exercise super­visory control over the district level officers of various development departments and the technical and non-technical staff of the zila parishad. The district development officer should work under the leadership and guidance of the zila pramukh.”

The 73rd Amendment enables the legislatures of the states to enclow panchayat bodies with the powers and responsibility to prepare plans for economic development and social justice. It will cause a steady increase in the developmental powers and functions of this apex body.

The Services without a Sachivalaya:

The existing personnel system in Panchayati Raj administration is a mixed and open one which can be called a transitional arrangement till regular cadres of PR bodies are recruited by some qualified recruiting agency. The state officials who are working on deputation or whose services have been loaned cannot run the autonomous local government institutions and what has happened thus far is a story of continuous conflict between strong bureaucracy and weak democracy.

The district collector and his team of SDOs or BDOs has to be kept out of the Panchayati Raj institution because their very presence as managers of development or captains of extensions officers team or administrative secretaries of elected bodies destroys the very spirit of democratic decentralisation.

The experience of practically all the states of the country denotes that state level officers have their prejudices and even a petty village level worker treats the panchayat as a pocket borough for his depredations. Secretarial assistance or some sort of a gram sachivalaya is a necessity and the deputation arrangement should soon has to replaced by a regular cadre of Panchayati Raj adminis­trators at every level.

Naturally, the state level civil servants do not like this change and the solution lies in asking the State Public Service Commissions to screen state official for final absorption in Panchayati Raj service cadres – senior as well as junior.

The Financial Management of Panchayats:

Presently the financial administration of all PR bodies is also run by state official on deputation. The VLW, the BDO and the secretary, zila parishads are acting as finance officers responsible for maintaining accounts books, records and registrars. The ARC anticipated a situation when panchayati institutions will be financially autonomous and viable.

An independent system of panchayati accounting and panchayati audit is a precondition to run the system. The half-heartedness of state officials and lack of political will on the part of state leaders have created an anomalous situation because of which the inbuilt control of state officials over PRIs has rendered them ineffective. The present arrangement of personnel and budget management cannot be tenable and all kinds of controls through state bureaucracy have to be replaced by a new system of account­ability and democratic working.

The institutional, administrative, financial and technical control of state government over Panchayati Raj bodies is inimical to the spirit of the 73 rd Amendment. Even coordination by state authorities or institution will be far from the intention of the reformers. Like the 1919 dyarchy, the reserved half of district government is making a bid to foil the democratic working of the trans­ferred half in the name of coordination through structural arrangements and common work procedures.

The Gestation Period:

It is too early to evaluate the working of Panchayati Raj in India. A decade is hardly a time to appre­ciate the potentialities of the institutions suffering from teething troubles. The legacies of community development administration are not healthy. The district administration presents the entire experiment with a jaundiced eye.

The prejudices have been rationalised to the extent that failures have been declared much before the launching of the reform. Research indicates that state level political leaders are the real villains of peace. They talk from housetops about the inevitability of decentralisation, but are extremely suspicious and nervous in parting with power.

They see the erosion of their roots in panchayati elections. Once these institutions get roots the parachuting of state and national leaders will become difficult. So they keep talking about district development councils and the alibis that go with district developmental planning.

The 73rd Amendment offers a big opportunity to create the third tier of parliamentary government in India’s Federal Scheme, but the obstacles in place of being removed are being created by:

(1) MPs and MLAs of the states,

(2) Cabinet ministers in the states,

(3) Civil servants at each level, and

(4) Village leaders of caste, class and community who see threat to their established position in the change.

The Frailties of the System:

Although panchayati elections in almost all the states have been a phenomenal operation and PR institutions have settled down to normal working without adequate resources and much-needed infrastructure.

Still, the problem areas of the frail structure and their working can be identified as under:

(1) Poor local leadership based on narrow sectarian considerations of caste without much vision and far sight. The social justice class arising from reservations of varieties tends to push the real deserving outside the pale of power in the rat race for scrambles.

(2) Financial crunch, partly because of the lack of state support and partly because of unwill­ingness of newly elected leaders to tax their voters.

(3) Women leadership through reservation at the grass-roots level, where their husbands and kins play a pernicious role because of the male dominant joint family system.

(4) Apathy of district administration to prove their indispensability and convince the common villager that their own local leaders are no match to urban educated outsiders.

(5) Partisan character of local elections which are neither factional nor programme based. The electoral system of higher bodies has criminalised local politics and politicised the petty crime.

(6) The malpractices in panchayat working go unpunished because of the lack of procedures and arbitrary punishment system has become operative in the discretionary pockets in the absence of traditions and clear-cut rules.

(7) Practically all the schemes of development and social welfare are routed to panchayati institu­tions through the district administration. It makes the former a second fiddle and the legitimacy of panchayati institutions has suffered in the process.

(8) In spite of all provisions of constitutional amendments, the states have been authorised to transfer powers, finance and responsibilities to the panchayats. The constitutional amendment leaves everything to the self-thinking of the states. But, the bitter truth is that the indifferent attitude of the states has been responsible for not giving a chance to develop democracy at the local level.

Therefore, the success of the constitutional amendment depends on the fact that how far the Centre and the states inspired by the public spirits, implement honestly the provisions.

(9) It is still feared that as the narrow politics of the vote has made the biggest democratic institu­tions of the country useless and bonded to rule, least the Panchayati Raj institutions should meet the same fate.

(10) Some critics are of the opinion that the new panchayat system is the same weak effort as was done to revive the panchayats by adding one directive to the Principle Directives of the Consti­tution. As per the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, the states have framed different rules to implement it. These provisions, perhaps, would make it obligatory for the states to hold panchayat elections and the economic basis of the panchayats would comparatively be more clear but these provisions would not give a much needed lease of life to the panchayats.

(11) There is no provision to establish “Nyaya Panchayats” or “Gram Nyayalayas” in the amendment. Giving concessions as per differences of the local groups of the state, the consti­tution and the jurisdiction of these village courts should have been clarified.

The Innovative Approach for 2020:

The cumulative impact of all this has rendered the PRIs lame and defunct. They are begging for their due before the officials of the state. The coalition experiments at the Centre and the different political parties ruling the states, have created problems of hung legislatures, wherein panchayati pockets are seen with suspicion and scepticism. In the meantime, the rural world is metamor­phosing under the impact of liberalisation and globalisation.

The literacy rate has touched an all time high and connectivity revolution of mobile phones and computer internet is the rural market of the future. The mass media has already made in roads and the rural urban distinctions are disap­pearing fast in terms of development facilitations. The vested interests in status quo cannot fight this inevitability of change.

But its speed can be accelerated if Panchayati Raj institutions are revamped with a vision. Innovative bold approach to rural governance can rebuild a ‘Developed India’ by 2020, if the following amendments or reforms are expedited in the panchayati experiment:

1. The federal government initiates a massive programme of central aid to three selected districts from each state every year on a rational basis merging the MP and MLA funds in the federal aid programmes. If it is done, the scenario will be visibly changed by 2020.

2. All district development planning is handed over to zila parishad committee co-opting experts and local participants which should involve private sector philanthropists and entrepreneurs to take up individual projects on BOOT or BOLT basis under the co-ordinational supervision of zila parishads. The district administration should totally be withdrawn from development projects.

3. The financial resource allocation, though a responsibility of state finance commission, but it should be linked with National Finance Commission and one of the expert members from the National Finance Commission should take care of the quantum of grants-in-aid from the state.

4. The state development service for PRIs should soon be constituted and the ‘Gram Sachivalaya’ on the pattern of state secretariat be created at district level to formulate and implement policies of zila parishads with a feedback from below.

5. An office called as Panchayati Lokpal may be created in each state to hear complaints and ensure an objective implementation of rules and regulations including the suspension and super cession of elected bodies of Panchayati Raj. If it is deemed as expensive, the district and sessions judges may perform this job as an additional charge.

6. A Gram Nayalaya as recommended in the Desai report of Law Commission may be estab­lished at panchayat samiti headquarters to take care of panchayati litigation with a right to appeal to the district and session judge and the High Court.

7. Panchayati training programmes should be organised at district level and below. Trainers may go to panchayat headquarters and the state should look after ‘Trainers’ Training’ and ‘Research and Reform’ on the basis of feedback reports from the trainees. Practical aspects of training on the spot should be emphasised.

8. The state government along with experts from Union government should evaluate the achievements of PR institutions every fifth year after elections and instalmentally transfer more and more regulatory functions from the district administration.

9. The experiment of district development committee with collector as secretary should be tried in those border areas where integrated development of the district includes the efforts of rural and urban local bodies.

Towards Panchayat Parliamentarianism:

Needless to mention that panchayati experiments needs goodwill, courage and optimism on the part of all involved. In 1950, India did not deserve democracy but given the opportunity the countrymen have proved worthy of it. Rural India needs a second war of Indian independence against her own urban elites. The policies of liberalisation and privatisation have started creating the rural infrastructure.

Now, there are only three alternatives left for rural governance:

(1) A district level three-tier of panchayati parliamentary democracy with a zila pramukh as a sort of district CM, alongwith a cabinet but without a governor. The modalities may differ and change with the passage of time.

(2) A merger model of district administration in Panchayati Raj governance in coming fifteen years as was envisaged in Digvijay Singh Model for Madhya Pradesh.

(3) Continuation of dyarchy and parallelism of regulatory and developmental governments with clearer demarcations of jurisdictions.

A serious effort in this direction was made in 1999 when the Congress government of Chief Minister Digvijay Singh took the initiative and made a declaration for the adoption of district government in Madhya Pradesh. From district administration to district government was hailed as a big leap and a detailed legal plan of action was announced to introduce district government by expanding the District Committee System of 74th Amendment.

It assigned a new role to the collector and one cabinet minister in charge of the district government to take the district government closer to the people. Originating from the Kanha Plan, the concept was debated at various levels and the institutional shape was envisaged through extended delegation of tasks, powers and responsibilities to the district committees and various kinds of sub-committees in different spheres of administrative activities at the level of the district and below.

The idea was to make the dyarchy workable and push the transitional charge towards a positive institutionalisation of democracy at the grass roots. The Digvijay Singh Model as it is called, clarified relationships and exhibited confidence in the capability of the people, whose problems were to be resolved without shuttling between district headquarters and the state secretariat in the capital.

The midway approach tried to satisfy all by reconciling the conflicting claims of panchayati leaders, district level bureaucracy and the people down below the line at the grass roots. The purpose was to create conditions conducive for change and the scheme was launched with usual fanfare and honest commitment.

But then, it was a political decision and each political party viewed the entire transi­tional arrangement in terms of its own perspective and political spoils. The BJP government of Uma Bharti felt terribly concerned and even alarmed. She decided to abrogate. The Act and the whole talk of district government vanished with a whimper. The change of district government has to have political repercussions, but the political leaders of all political parties have to sit down to work out details under the leadership of the Union government.

The dyarchy that is being practised today is faulty in principle, faulty in planning and faulty in practice. It is unnatural, artificial and betrays confidence in people. At best it can be justified as a transitional measure, because the rural folks, who can take decisions about development cannot be called incompetent to control their policyless and the revenue administration of the collectorate.

The second alternative of merging the district administration into panchayati democracy is being debated and several modalities are emerging. The collector can be the chief secretary of the district ruling set up. The elected political leaders may be trained for some time but the district bureaucracy should know it for sure that their days are numbered.

There is no point in lengthening the travails of transition and creating bad blood or bitterness in the process. The parliamentary system of the third lowest tier should not be a copy of the central or state tiers. It will be a grass roots democracy with a difference at the district and then again at block and village levels.

From gram sabha to Lok Sabha was a Jai Prakash model and Indianising India’s rural democracy requires an optimistic dent in the district system. Debureaucratising rural governance and vesting popular representatives with power to shape their own destiny by 2020 will be the triumph of the second war of Indian Independence which aims to liberate rural India and replace district bureaucracy by parliamentary democracy.

Urban Local Self-Government in the District:

The Patliputra of Mauryan age may be a romantic lore of Indian history but urbanisation as a phenomenon of social and political living is a legacy of the British Raj. Having settled down at sea ports, the East India Company unconsciously developed the rim land and the port towns for their sea faring commercial ventures. Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were the direct outcome of this policy.

The spells of urbanisation and later industrialisation gave birth to urban centre, like Ahmedabad, Surat, Bhadonch, Coimbatore, Madurai and Paradweep. After independence, almost 30 per cent of country’s population has migrated to big cities like Kanpur, Chandigarh, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Ranchi and Bhopal. The former cities have become metropolitan towns and new megalopolises are developing around as satellite metro centres of Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai.

These urban centres are a part of the district system of government, yet their distinc­tiveness exits because of population, modes of employment, need of community services and facilitation infrastructures. They are absolutely different from the rural areas.

Traditionally, a village has been defined as:

(1) A cluster of houses with a population of 10,000 or less.

(2) A social habitation where most of the people make their living by producing from the farms. The Blurring Divide

In fact, an urban area is marked by the state government under law. Traditionally it is a poor place where most of the people live like a village family, sharing a common culture and traditional life patterns. As the concept of rural development alleviates rural poverty and means of communication provide connectivity and mobility, the rural urban divide is becoming blurred and untenable.

The big and sprawling villages are emerging as towns and perhaps after a decade or two, the town culture will take over the rural culture. To arrest this mass migration from Agraria to Industria is one of the biggest challenges of development. The transitional phase is being cut short by programmes of mass literacy, rural electrification and women’s empowerment.

Naturally, the divide will remain for some time and a further divide may follow between metro cities and urban centres. The legacy of the British Raj in this field will provide the base but a new urban India in contrast to a panchayati rural India will develop on different lines.

The Historical Perspective:

The 74th Amendment Act, 1992 represents the culmination of efforts that were going on in British India since 1687. The company and later on the Crown’s government made some abortive attempts to streamline the urban system as it obtained under their rule.

Lord Ripon, the father of local staff government gave the Magna Carta of local self-government

1909:

Hobhouse Commission on decentralisation brought local bodies in the limelight

1919:

Local bodies were handed over to a responsible Indian minister under the dyarchical reforms in the provinces

1924:

The British government got the Cantonment Act passed by central legislature

1935:

Local self-government declared as a provincial subject under provincial autonomy

All this could not help urban local bodies to get their due. Except in metropolitan towns of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, the municipalities and other urban local bodies were only notional in their working. The Constituent Assembly did not show any concern to local problems – rural as well as urban.

It was as late as 1985 that the ministry of urban development was created. Even today, the defence ministry and home ministry are the nodal agencies that deal with cantonment boards, and the urban bodies in union territories respectively.

Some of the landmarks of post-independence era reflect the casual concerns of Union government which appointed the following committees and commissions to examine urban local problems:

(8) Sahay Study Group on Constitution, Powers and Laws of Urban Local Bodies and Corpora­tions 1982

(9) Correa National Commission on Urbanisation 1988

Today, legally speaking when India’s urban population stands in the neighbourhood of 35 crores, i.e., around 33 per cent and above it is obligatory on every government to manage this trans­formation from rural to urban settlements. Several task forces on planning and development of towns and cities (1975), strategies of urban development (1982) and housing and urban development (1983) have made their recommendations.

The concern of these study groups in varied areas has resulted in the creation of National Commission on Urbanisation (NCU). The commission examines issue and problems pertaining to urban management, spatial planning, resource allocation, urban housing, conservation, urban poverty, legal frameworks and information systems.

The commission has recommended that: every town with a population of more than 50,000 be provided with an urban community development department, for the processing of development programmes. A National Urbanisation Council should be set up to formulate and implement urbanisation policies. For this the Ministry of Urban Development will have to be restructured and made a nodal ministry.

An Indian Council for Citizen’s Action can encourage citizens through voluntary effort. Consequently, the Ministry of Urban Development was set up in the Union government and urban development was shifted to the ministry of works and housing which was later renamed as the ministry of works, housing and urban development. Urban development was again shifted to the ministry of planning, works, housing and urban development in 1967 and a separate Ministry of Urban Development started functioning under a cabinet minister of Union government since 1985.

The 65th Amendment systematised the urban local reforms but it was lost in the Rajya Sabha. However, the basic provisions enshrined in this amendment were taken up by Narsimha Rao Government in 1992. The two houses of the Parliament and the requisite number of vidhan sabhas approved it and the President of India gave his assent to this 74th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 and it was placed on the statute book on June 1st 1993.