All 2 entries tagged <em>Hitler</em>Mark Harrisonhttps://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/tag/hitler/?atom=atomWarwick Blogs, University of Warwick(C) 2020 Mark Harrison2020-06-07T09:56:11ZWhen Central and Eastern Europe Led the World by Mark HarrisonMark Harrisonhttps://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/entry/when_central_and/2016-07-07T17:01:40Z2016-06-02T07:00:51Z<p class="answer">Writing about web page <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view" title="Related external link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view">https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view</a></p>
<p>Last week I spent a few days in Regensburg, a pretty town in Bavaria. The subject of our conference was the economic history of central, eastern, and southeastern Europe since 1800. The meeting was convened by the excellent Matthias Morys of the University of York; Matthias is <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view">editing a book on this theme for Routledge</a>. The general standard of the chapters is going to be exceptional. (I&rsquo;m not an author; I went along to hear and discuss.)</p>
<p>An important theme of the book will be how central and eastern Europe lagged behind western Europe in productivity and social well-being, and the varying successes and (mostly) failures of the region in closing the gap. This raised a question: Should central and eastern Europe always be judged against western European countries, as though we (the West) set the only standards that count? Shouldn&rsquo;t everyone try to understand that region in its own terms, without negative preconceptions?</p>
<p>We had reached the interwar period of 1918 to 1939 when a commentator raised this question sharply. It&rsquo;s a good question, and it brings us in a surprising direction. Think about it: what were the standards that the nation states and regimes of Central and Eastern Europe set themselves, whether in the interwar period or over the last two centuries? Often enough, the answer turns out to be, the goal that they set was to catch up with Western Europe.</p>
<p>At first sight this takes us back to where we started, to the standards of productivity and social well-being set in Western Europe. But this would not be strictly accurate. When the states and rulers of central and eastern Europe set out to catch up, it was not so much in average incomes or welfare, which were not even measured systematically until the middle of the twentieth century. The dimension in which they aimed to catch up was that of national power.</p>
<p>As it turns out, the first decades of the twentieth century were a time of great success for two of the countries of central and eastern Europe in the race to catch up and overtake western Europe in national power. These countries were Germany and the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>National power can be measured, although imperfectly. The scholars of the Correlates of War project set out to measure the global distribution of national power with a &ldquo;composite index of national capability&rdquo; (CINC) designed to capture &ldquo;the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence.&rdquo; A country&rsquo;s CINC score combines six indicators of its relative weight in the international system, year by year: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. On this measure, in 1871, the Russian and German Empires together accounted for one fifth of the total of power in the world (12 percent for Germany and 8 percent for Russia). By 1914, through industrialization and rearmament, they had pushed up their combined weight to more than one quarter (14 percent to Germany, 12 percent to Russia). And by 1940, after more expansion and more rearmament, when Hitler&rsquo;s and Stalin&rsquo;s regimes were temporarily in alliance, their share had risen to nearly one third (17 percent to Germany, 14 percent to the Soviet Union).</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">(<a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/283-2016_harrison.pdf">For data sources and more context, look at Table 1 of this paper</a>.)</p>
<p>Within 70 years, in summary, the two great powers of central and eastern Europe transferred more than one tenth of global power into their own hands. This was a dramatic shift in the balance of power, and a stunning achievement.</p>
<p>Thinking about this, I said in the conference: You want us to celebrate the aspects in which the countries of eentral and eastern Europe led the world at the time? OK, let&rsquo;s hear it for autocracy, aggression, and mass killing. I was trying to be ironic, but I wasn&rsquo;t sure if something got lost in translation.</p>
<p>Of course, you could be central or east European and be happy. Anywhere in the region, most of the time, you could live, love, carry on a trade, make a family, make art, make science, teach, and build. You could try to lead a good life, a life no worse than the lives led by anyone to the West. Bad things might happen to interrupt these efforts anywhere in Europe, west or east. For centuries, however, if you lived to the east of the Rhine, the probability that your efforts would be cruelly ended by young men in uniform under orders from above was much, much greater.</p>
<p>To understand why is the challenge for Matthias and his co-authors..</p><p class="answer">Writing about web page <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view" title="Related external link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view">https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view</a></p>
<p>Last week I spent a few days in Regensburg, a pretty town in Bavaria. The subject of our conference was the economic history of central, eastern, and southeastern Europe since 1800. The meeting was convened by the excellent Matthias Morys of the University of York; Matthias is <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7VJ1wykdp_YdXBiT3ZCT3FKNGM/view">editing a book on this theme for Routledge</a>. The general standard of the chapters is going to be exceptional. (I&rsquo;m not an author; I went along to hear and discuss.)</p>
<p>An important theme of the book will be how central and eastern Europe lagged behind western Europe in productivity and social well-being, and the varying successes and (mostly) failures of the region in closing the gap. This raised a question: Should central and eastern Europe always be judged against western European countries, as though we (the West) set the only standards that count? Shouldn&rsquo;t everyone try to understand that region in its own terms, without negative preconceptions?</p>
<p>We had reached the interwar period of 1918 to 1939 when a commentator raised this question sharply. It&rsquo;s a good question, and it brings us in a surprising direction. Think about it: what were the standards that the nation states and regimes of Central and Eastern Europe set themselves, whether in the interwar period or over the last two centuries? Often enough, the answer turns out to be, the goal that they set was to catch up with Western Europe.</p>
<p>At first sight this takes us back to where we started, to the standards of productivity and social well-being set in Western Europe. But this would not be strictly accurate. When the states and rulers of central and eastern Europe set out to catch up, it was not so much in average incomes or welfare, which were not even measured systematically until the middle of the twentieth century. The dimension in which they aimed to catch up was that of national power.</p>
<p>As it turns out, the first decades of the twentieth century were a time of great success for two of the countries of central and eastern Europe in the race to catch up and overtake western Europe in national power. These countries were Germany and the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>National power can be measured, although imperfectly. The scholars of the Correlates of War project set out to measure the global distribution of national power with a &ldquo;composite index of national capability&rdquo; (CINC) designed to capture &ldquo;the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence.&rdquo; A country&rsquo;s CINC score combines six indicators of its relative weight in the international system, year by year: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. On this measure, in 1871, the Russian and German Empires together accounted for one fifth of the total of power in the world (12 percent for Germany and 8 percent for Russia). By 1914, through industrialization and rearmament, they had pushed up their combined weight to more than one quarter (14 percent to Germany, 12 percent to Russia). And by 1940, after more expansion and more rearmament, when Hitler&rsquo;s and Stalin&rsquo;s regimes were temporarily in alliance, their share had risen to nearly one third (17 percent to Germany, 14 percent to the Soviet Union).</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">(<a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/283-2016_harrison.pdf">For data sources and more context, look at Table 1 of this paper</a>.)</p>
<p>Within 70 years, in summary, the two great powers of central and eastern Europe transferred more than one tenth of global power into their own hands. This was a dramatic shift in the balance of power, and a stunning achievement.</p>
<p>Thinking about this, I said in the conference: You want us to celebrate the aspects in which the countries of eentral and eastern Europe led the world at the time? OK, let&rsquo;s hear it for autocracy, aggression, and mass killing. I was trying to be ironic, but I wasn&rsquo;t sure if something got lost in translation.</p>
<p>Of course, you could be central or east European and be happy. Anywhere in the region, most of the time, you could live, love, carry on a trade, make a family, make art, make science, teach, and build. You could try to lead a good life, a life no worse than the lives led by anyone to the West. Bad things might happen to interrupt these efforts anywhere in Europe, west or east. For centuries, however, if you lived to the east of the Rhine, the probability that your efforts would be cruelly ended by young men in uniform under orders from above was much, much greater.</p>
<p>To understand why is the challenge for Matthias and his co-authors..</p>Mark Harrison's bloghttps://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/(C) 2020 Mark Harrison2016-07-07T17:01:40Z0Political Costs of the Great Recession by Mark HarrisonMark Harrisonhttps://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/entry/political_costs_of/2012-04-26T02:32:22Z2012-04-24T21:04:34Z<p class="answer">Writing about web page <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT" title="Related external link: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT">Monday's Financial Times</a> recorded the dismal showing of Nicolas Sarkozy in the French Presidential first-round election, the record vote for France's far-right National Front, and the openings to the right of Sarkozy and Fran&ccedil;ois Hollande, who remain in the contest, as they compete to sweep up the votes of the eliminated candidates.</p>
<p>It reminded me of a recent NBER working paper by Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen, and Kevin O'Rourke on <a href="http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/17871.html">Right-wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression</a>. (There's a<a href="http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7660"> non-technical summary on VOXeu</a>.) What these authors show is that the rise of right wing extremism in the Great Depression was not just a German phenomenon. They define extremist parties as those that campaigned to change not just policy but the system of government. They look at 171 elections in 28 countries spread across Europe, the Americas, and Australasia between 1919 and 1939. They find that a swing to right-wing &quot;anti-system&quot; parties was more likely where the depression was more prolonged, where there was a shorter history of democracy, and where fascist parties were already represented in the national parliament. In short, de Bromhead and co-authors conclude, the Depression was &quot;good for fascists.&quot; </p>
<p>I don't mean to imply that either Sarkozy or Hollande are fascists. They aren't. Neither of them wants to replace electoral democracy by authoritarian rule. But they are responding to the protest vote in their own country by proposing &quot;solutions&quot; to the problems of the already weakened French market economy that will weaken it further by increasing government entitlement spending, government regulation, and tax rates. </p>
<p>Where does the protest vote come from? There is anger and pessimism. There is a search for alternatives to free-market capitalism and representative democracy. The problem is that all the alternatives are worse. But none of the candidates (perhaps with the exception of Fran&ccedil;ois Bayrou, who did badly) has been willing to say this.</p>
<p> How do we know that all the alternatives are worse? We know it from history. </p>
<p>The chart below shows the total real GDPs of twelve major market economies from 1870 to 2008 (the countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States; data are by the late Angus Maddison at <a href="http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/">http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/</a>). The vertical scale is logarithmic, so the slope of the line measures its rate of growth.</p>
<p><br />
</p>
<p><img src="http://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/images/markharrison/2012/04/24/great_depression.png?maxWidth=500" alt="140 years of economic growth" border="0" /></p>
<p><br />
</p>
<p>You can see two things. One is the steadiness of economic growth in the West over 140 years up to the recent financial crisis. The other is that two World Wars and the Great Depression were no more than temporary deviations. They are just blips in the data. For many people they were hell to live through (and sometimes these were the lucky ones), but in the long run the economic consequences went away. In fact, <a href="http://yalepress.yale.edu/book.asp?isbn=9780300151091">recent work by the economic historian Alexander J. Field</a> has shown that the depressed 1930s were technologically the most dynamic period of American history.</p>
<p>One conclusion might be that the economic consequences of the current recession are not the ones that we should fear most. I don't mean that the economic losses arising from reduced incomes and unemployment are trivial; life today is unexpectedly hard for millions of people, young and old. Young people, even if they will not be a &quot;lost&quot; generation, will suffer and be scarred by the experience. If you're old enough, you could be dead before better times come round again. At the same time, the kind of pessimism that says that our children will be never be as well off as we were is groundless. The economic losses associated with the recession will eventually evaporate, just as the economic losses of the Great Depression went away in the long run.</p>
<p>We should be more afraid of the lasting political consequences. The effects of the Great Depression on politics were very deep and very persistent. World War I ended with the breakup of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires. In the 1920s, most of the new countries that were formed became democracies. Then, we had the Great Depression. Across Europe there was anger, pessimism, and a search for alternatives to free-market capitalism and representative democracy. By the end of the 1930s Europe had recovered economically from the depression but most of the new democracies had fallen under dictators. That led to World War II, in which as many as 60 million people were killed. Fascism was defeated, but then Europe was divided by communism and that led to the Cold War. </p>
<p>It took until 1989 for the average of democracy scores of European countries (measured from the Polity IV database) to return to the previous high point, which was in 1919.</p>
<p>In short, the Great Depression stimulated a search for alternatives to liberal capitalism. This search was extremely costly and completely pointless. For a while in various quarters there was admiration for Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin, their great public works, their capacity to inspire and to mobilize, and their rebuilding of the nation. But both fascism and communism turned out to be terrible mistakes. </p>
<p>Memories are short. Today's politicians want your vote. And many voters want to hear that some radical politician or authority figure has a quick fix for capitalism. It seems like we may have to learn from our mistakes all over again. Let's hope that the lesson is less costly this time round.</p><p class="answer">Writing about web page <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT" title="Related external link: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT">http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b1b5556-8d1d-11e1-9798-00144feab49a.html#axzz1styV0LMT">Monday's Financial Times</a> recorded the dismal showing of Nicolas Sarkozy in the French Presidential first-round election, the record vote for France's far-right National Front, and the openings to the right of Sarkozy and Fran&ccedil;ois Hollande, who remain in the contest, as they compete to sweep up the votes of the eliminated candidates.</p>
<p>It reminded me of a recent NBER working paper by Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen, and Kevin O'Rourke on <a href="http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/17871.html">Right-wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression</a>. (There's a<a href="http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7660"> non-technical summary on VOXeu</a>.) What these authors show is that the rise of right wing extremism in the Great Depression was not just a German phenomenon. They define extremist parties as those that campaigned to change not just policy but the system of government. They look at 171 elections in 28 countries spread across Europe, the Americas, and Australasia between 1919 and 1939. They find that a swing to right-wing &quot;anti-system&quot; parties was more likely where the depression was more prolonged, where there was a shorter history of democracy, and where fascist parties were already represented in the national parliament. In short, de Bromhead and co-authors conclude, the Depression was &quot;good for fascists.&quot; </p>
<p>I don't mean to imply that either Sarkozy or Hollande are fascists. They aren't. Neither of them wants to replace electoral democracy by authoritarian rule. But they are responding to the protest vote in their own country by proposing &quot;solutions&quot; to the problems of the already weakened French market economy that will weaken it further by increasing government entitlement spending, government regulation, and tax rates. </p>
<p>Where does the protest vote come from? There is anger and pessimism. There is a search for alternatives to free-market capitalism and representative democracy. The problem is that all the alternatives are worse. But none of the candidates (perhaps with the exception of Fran&ccedil;ois Bayrou, who did badly) has been willing to say this.</p>
<p> How do we know that all the alternatives are worse? We know it from history. </p>
<p>The chart below shows the total real GDPs of twelve major market economies from 1870 to 2008 (the countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States; data are by the late Angus Maddison at <a href="http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/">http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/</a>). The vertical scale is logarithmic, so the slope of the line measures its rate of growth.</p>
<p><br />
</p>
<p><img src="http://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/images/markharrison/2012/04/24/great_depression.png?maxWidth=500" alt="140 years of economic growth" border="0" /></p>
<p><br />
</p>
<p>You can see two things. One is the steadiness of economic growth in the West over 140 years up to the recent financial crisis. The other is that two World Wars and the Great Depression were no more than temporary deviations. They are just blips in the data. For many people they were hell to live through (and sometimes these were the lucky ones), but in the long run the economic consequences went away. In fact, <a href="http://yalepress.yale.edu/book.asp?isbn=9780300151091">recent work by the economic historian Alexander J. Field</a> has shown that the depressed 1930s were technologically the most dynamic period of American history.</p>
<p>One conclusion might be that the economic consequences of the current recession are not the ones that we should fear most. I don't mean that the economic losses arising from reduced incomes and unemployment are trivial; life today is unexpectedly hard for millions of people, young and old. Young people, even if they will not be a &quot;lost&quot; generation, will suffer and be scarred by the experience. If you're old enough, you could be dead before better times come round again. At the same time, the kind of pessimism that says that our children will be never be as well off as we were is groundless. The economic losses associated with the recession will eventually evaporate, just as the economic losses of the Great Depression went away in the long run.</p>
<p>We should be more afraid of the lasting political consequences. The effects of the Great Depression on politics were very deep and very persistent. World War I ended with the breakup of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires. In the 1920s, most of the new countries that were formed became democracies. Then, we had the Great Depression. Across Europe there was anger, pessimism, and a search for alternatives to free-market capitalism and representative democracy. By the end of the 1930s Europe had recovered economically from the depression but most of the new democracies had fallen under dictators. That led to World War II, in which as many as 60 million people were killed. Fascism was defeated, but then Europe was divided by communism and that led to the Cold War. </p>
<p>It took until 1989 for the average of democracy scores of European countries (measured from the Polity IV database) to return to the previous high point, which was in 1919.</p>
<p>In short, the Great Depression stimulated a search for alternatives to liberal capitalism. This search was extremely costly and completely pointless. For a while in various quarters there was admiration for Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin, their great public works, their capacity to inspire and to mobilize, and their rebuilding of the nation. But both fascism and communism turned out to be terrible mistakes. </p>
<p>Memories are short. Today's politicians want your vote. And many voters want to hear that some radical politician or authority figure has a quick fix for capitalism. It seems like we may have to learn from our mistakes all over again. Let's hope that the lesson is less costly this time round.</p>Mark Harrison's bloghttps://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/(C) 2020 Mark Harrison2012-04-26T02:32:22Z1