This NEWSLETTER is edited by Scott Bamber and published in the Department of
Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies; printed at Central Printery;
the masthead is by Susan Wigham of Graphic Design (all of The Australian
National University). The logo is from a water colour, 'Tai women fishing' by
Kang Huo

Material in this NEWSLETTER may be freely reproduced with due acknowledgement.
Correspondence is welcome and contributions will be given sympathetic
consideration. (All correspondence to The Editor, Department of Anthropology,
Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.)

This issue of the Newsletter is largely devoted to the papers delivered at the
seminar. The attendance included both academics with an interest in Burma1 and
Southeast Asia and members of the public, particularly representing the Burmese
community in Canberra and Sydney. We have reason to believe that the exchange of
ideas was mutually profitable. Many of the Burmese who attended are members of
the Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma and there was open and
healthy discussion between those who held that the only issue of substance was
the defeat of SLORC and those who attempted to analyze contemporary developments
(some of which are working to the benefit of SLORC) and consequences for the
future.

There were a number of crucial issues discussed at the seminar, but here I would
like to draw brief attention to three on which disagreement was expressed.

The first arose out of the distinction that Ananda Rajah drew between 'conflict
resolution' and 'conflict management' strategies. The view was expressed that
SLORC appears on occasion to be more conciliatory than the Karen National Union
and the Democratic Alliance of Burma, and sometimes effective in establishing
agreement with opponents, as they successfully did with many of the factions of
the imploded Communist Party of Burma. This view was contested, mainly by
representatives of the CRDB, who among other things pointed out that the Karen
and the DAB have called for negotiations with SLORC - the only conditions being
that they be held under UN supervision and outside Burma.

The second point relates to some scepticism expressed about the
possibility of a federal solution for Burma's ethnic problems once the fighting
ends. Again, the Burmese representatives at the seminar did not share this
pessimism. In fact, Dr Raymond Tint Way had made two important points in the
CRDB Australia News and Views (No. 9, Nov./Dec. 1992) made available at the
seminar. He writes.

the discussions have usually been clouded by an assumption that regional
autonomy is only a step on the road towards secession of the regions and
disintegration of the nation. This notion was cleverly planted by General Ne Win
in order to justify his ruthless dictatorial control Unfortunately, it was
accepted uncritically by most Burmese so that even today some otherwise
thoughtful, progressive and committed people are prone to believe it and to
state it as part of their own hesitancy about autonomy for the regions and the
ethnic minorities. leaders of all the main opposition groups have signed
the 11-point agreement of 1988 in which they guarantee not to attempt to secede
from the Union. They have also signed the Manerplaw Agreement of July 1992 on
the establishment of a Federal Union of Burma in which all indigenous groups are
guaranteed equal rights of self-determination and no group would receive special
privileges.

The third issue has to do with UN aid to Burma under SLORC. Readers are referred
to Doug Porter's paper in Number 18 which describes and discusses the UN Border
Area Program. The arguments against UN aid are essentially those against any
foreign dealing with or aid to SLORC. The UN argues that it only operates in
areas in which fighting has ceased. But this still gives legitimacy to SLORC
control. Even more dangerous for the future is that it reinforces the movement
of Southeast Asian capital into these areas. In the future the Thai government
could argue, as it now does in Cambodia, that trade is an individual matter and
Thai citizens and their interests need to be protected. Even more dangerous is
the probablity that Singapore too would take this view, and, with Thailand,
resist the overthrow of SLORC.

In 1960 Edmund Leach published a paper entitled 'The frontiers of "Burma"'2
which had a great influence on Southeast Asian anthropology at least, and
perhaps on a much wider audience. It was provocative in many ways - not least in
its definition of 'Burma' - which he deliberately placed in quotes. He wrote 'By
the "Burma" of my title I wish to imply the whole of the wide imprecisely
defined frontier region lying between India and China and having modern
political Burma as its core.' The ambiguity I am sure was deliberate - Leach's
own experience was in Burma, now the Union of Burma, and mostly in the highlands
of Burma. Therefore it is of this region he writes. Nevertheless, there is the
clear suggestion he is also talking of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. He
writes that his basic distinction of 'hill people' and 'valley people' goes back
at least to the 13th Century account of Angkhor by Chou Ta-Kuan.

The paper argues that notions of frontiers and nation-states are the
product of Western colonial expansion. 'The whole of '"Burma"' he writes, 'is a
frontier region continuously subject to influences from both India and China and
so also the frontiers which separated the petty political units within "Burma"
were not clearly defined lines but zones of mutual interest.' Real traditional
frontiers in pre-colonial times were ecological boundaries which separated the
hill people, who had Chinese notions of kinship, chiefship, religion, marriage
and the importance of trade from the valley peoples who had Indian notions of
these matters. In each case the ecological base being the type of agriculture -
intensive wet-rice cultivation in the plains and swidden agriculture in the
mountains - with the important exception that some parts of the hills developed
intensive terrace agriculture.

In more recent years a widely influential book on related themes has
been Benedict Anderson's account of nationalism - Imagined Communities, in which
he argues that national consciousness is the product of the growth of 'print
capitalism' and the efforts of politically active, educated elites to create the
stage for their own achievements a process which he interestingly links to
'pilgrimage'. It is very significant that both Leach and Anderson attack the
notion that language is inherently tied to nation. Leach attacks the historical
linguistic view that genetic relations between languages give any historical
evidence of migrations or connections between people. Anderson suggests that
languages could be learned by anybody and it is only time that prevents all
humans speaking all languages. In the latest edition of Anderson's book3 he has
used the work of Thongchai Winichakul4 on 'mapping' to bolster his case.
Thongchai, argues, as have many others that the 'nation-state' is an European
product purveyed to the rest of the world though colonialism. To talk of the
traditional frontiers of Thailand is an anachronism because until the modern
technology of mapping such a notion was not in fact possible. Anderson sees the
technology of mapping as a fitting handmaiden to 'print capitalism'.

There are a number of theoretical issues that arise out of the Leach and
Anderson points of view, but for this seminar I wish to take up only a few,
particularly insofar as they relate to contemporary Burma.

First of all I think one needs to have some idea about the confusions
that inhere in the use of the terms 'nation' and 'ethnicity'. I will here follow
a recent paper by Hobsbawm.5

Hobsbawm points out the very important difference between a 19th Century
view of 'nation' and a current 20th Century one - the latter conflating notions
of ethnicity with that of nation. In the 19th Century, particularly if we take
the United States of America as paradigmatic, the nation was a superordinate
entity within which minorities and ethnicities would merge their identities. It
was this notion that was embraced by anti-colonial movements which created the
nation-states of India, Ghana, Nigeria and Ceylon, among others. Burma too, was
the product of this view of the nation-state. In the communist world nation and
nationality were used in a different sense. In both the Soviet Union and the
Peoples Republic of China the words translated as 'nation' and 'nationality'
referred to politically recognized ethnic groups. The political recognition was
important, because this brought the proliferation of theoretically independent
(autonomous) national republics, provinces, prefectures etc. It should be also
mentioned that this echoed a rather different American use of the word 'nation'
where it was used to refer to Indian political groups such as the Iroquois and
Cherokee nations.

These last mentioned groups are in some ways prototypes of the
politicized ethnicities which are emerging as one of the major political
problems of the late 20th Century - particularly in central and eastern Europe.

The post-colonial states have been remarkably stable as far as
boundaries are concerned, for a number of reasons. Most important, the
post-colonial ideology insisted that borders were for them, the post-colonial
states, to decide - thus the often arbitrary borders imposed by colonial powers
were declared, if not sacrosanct, inviolable except by decision of the states
concerned themselves. One major exception has been the independence of
Bangladesh from Pakistan - which overturned what may have been the stupidest of
the post-colonial arrangements. Post-colonial borders were also reinforced by
the Cold War. These were part of the stand-off between the great powers. Another
notable exception, to the extent that borders were redrawn, was the Ne Win-Chou
Enlai agreement which settled disputes on the Burma-Chinese border. In a sense -
it is not an exception, but an example of the principle that it was for the
post-colonial states to re-negotiate their borders if necessary. The problem is
complicated because there are such examples as Timor and Goa, but the general
point that needs to be emphasized is that borders were the entire responsibility
of the emergent states and this principle was generally re-inforced by the
exigencies of the Cold War.

'Ethnic groups', in the Hobsbawm treatment, as opposed to 'nationalism'
which is a 'political programme', is 'a readily definable way of expressing a
real sense of group identity which links the members of "we" because it
emphasizes their differences from "them"'. Very often what links the 'we' is
language or religion - or both. The sociological reality of this cannot be
questioned - Leach and others would contest the necessary historical reality
which putatively binds the ancestors of the people claiming such unity. Arising
out of the Andersonian thesis is the suggestion that it is elites, particularly
political elites, that create such 'ethnicity' where consciousness of it had not
existed before. This is a point of view criticized by Ranajit Guha in his
review6 of the first edition of the book. Not only elites, but peasants could
have a view of ethnicity or nationhood, and fight for it. Guha also points out
that the central notion of 'imagined' in Anderson's work is so obvious that it
loses any explanatory power.

A strain that runs through the Anderson-Thongchai view, and found in the
writings of many others, for example Geoffrey Benjamin (The Unseen Presence: a
theory of the nation state and its mystifications), is the suggestion that
ethnic identity, politicized ethnic identity, is a confidence trick perpetrated
on an innocent population by its leaders. The other side of this particular coin
is revealed by Anderson who at the end of the book accepts post-colonial
nationalism and ethnic identity as essentially benevolent, without the
vilification and violence that characterizes colonial racism. This is to ignore
the nauseating violence and hatred that accompanied the partition of British
India, the Sri Lankan conflict, Malaysian race riots and a multitude of other
recent historical events.

To return to Leach, one should keep clear that he was fighting battles
on many fronts. He was objecting to the idea that there was some fixed,
recoverable territorial frontier which defined traditional Burma. He was here
recognizing, but then discarding, the validity of British efforts over a century
to demarcate the boundaries of what they considered theirs. He was by
implication questioning the rights of the government in Rangoon to the
territories it claimed - ignoring the realities of the post-colonial world.
Traditional Burma may have no frontiers of the kind drawn on maps and customs
and immigration control - but modern Burma did. The only valid point, it seems
to me, here is that there is a historical discontinuity in traditional views of
political units and modern ones. I, among others, have argued that traditional
notions of frontiers in mainland Southeast Asia had to do with the political
recognition of river valleys as units and watersheds as boundaries. When
colonial boundaries were drawn the occupying powers both recognized this fact
and ignored it to suit their convenience - hence the distorted boundaries of the
post-colonial states.

Another battle he was fighting was that against the historical linguists
- whom he accused of confusing the use of language and the historical relation
between languages with the movement of peoples and the ancestry of living
populations. Here one need not jump to the defence of linguists who are quite
able to defend themselves, but Leach was again distracting attention from one of
the important phenomena which were beginning to shape modern Burmese history -
what we may perhaps call 'linguistic nationalism'. It may be that Karennic
nationalism whereby the Kayah and Pa-O have become associated as allies of the
Karen National Union, is partly the creation of linguists identifying these
languages as related, but it is also partly the recognition of similarity by the
peoples themselves, and, most important, the political fact cannot now be
disputed. Hobsbawm recognizes the phenomenon and writes that he speaks as 'part
of my subject. For historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan
[he could as well have said Burma] are to heroin-addicts; we supply the
essential raw material for the market.'

The third battle is only implicit - and it could be quite unfair to
raise it at all. Leach was concerned with history and the error of projecting
the modern on to the historical. But as with Anderson and Thongchai there seems
to be a clear suggestion that an understanding of the past will create a
different program for the present and future. To recognize that the frontiers of
historical Burma are illusory is perhaps to recognize that some other view
should be taken of the frontiers of modern Burma. In Thongchai's case there are
clear statements that indicate his argument about the 'geo-body of Siam' is an
attack on Thai chauvinism. Though the implied criticisms I will now make may be
unfair, perhaps some good may come of it.

When Leach's paper appeared in 1960 the Karen rebellion was already well
over ten years old. In 1949 part of the Kachin forces who had served under the
British went into rebellion led by Naw Seng, but he did not carry the bulk of
his fellow Kachin and he went into exile in China.7 It was not till 1958-9,
while Leach's paper was in press that the Kachin Independence Organization went
into revolt. In the previous year the Shan had begun their revolution. At the
time the paper went into print the people with whom Leach was most familiar, the
Kachin or Jingpo, were expressing their ethnic identity as a political fact -
they were no longer a cultural-ecological category.

But, to go back to Leach's paper, I should make it clear that Leach had
a pretty good understanding of the political-ecological situation. He understood
very well the nature of the valley state and the valley princes. His main
concern was the relation of these states, particularly when they comprised more
than one valley, with the hill peoples that lived on the borders between
valleys. He writes that the control princes could exercise over them 'was seldom
more than marginal'. He also writes that language and ethnic identity were
determined by place of residence and agricultural practice. Thus a Kachin who
moved into the valley and cultivated irrigated rice became a Shan, became a
Buddhist, and could marry a woman from among his neighbours. A Burmese (or Shan)
Buddhist, he says, cannot marry a non-Buddhist. In contrast, Chinese traders
very often established a network of connections throughout the hills by marrying
local women. This is very neat, but it is not I think entirely accurate. Robert
Taylor, for instance, writes of the Restored Toungoo and Konbaung states Further
from the king's supervision lay the third zone, that of the tributaries. Here
immediate authority was exercised by hereditary rulers from a variety of
cultural and ethnic backgrounds. These rulers, Shan Sawbwas, Kachin Duwas,
Karenni Sawbwas, Karen and Chin chiefs etc., paid allegiance to the central
court through tribute missions, marriage alliances, military forces and similar
non-permanent, non-bureaucratic displays of obligation8.

It seems, intuitively, a mistake to attribute such a view of marriage to
Theravada Buddhists. In terms of agriculture it is quite clear that from
pre-colonial times the Karen spanned a range of ecological niches, though one
should also remember that the extensive rice-growing of the delta is a colonial
phenomenon. As Ananda Rajah has shown us rice ecology and ethnic identity have
comeplex relationships. The Karen with whom he worked cultivated irrigated rice
on fields originally established by Hmong, a hill-tribe of non-local origin, but
reserved their mystical connections with agriculture, for their swiddens. Leach,
in his book on the Kachin, does give examples of individuals that changed their
identity when they changed their agricultural way of life, but this does not
prove that many others did not practice wet-rice agriculture and remain Kachin.
Though it is not a conclusive argument, in Thailand there are many Hmong and Yao
who cultivate wet rice for part of the year and return to their hill villages at
the end of the season. Leach has argued that traditional systems are no longer
recoverable - and this may well be true (though Martin Smith, while agreeing
with Leach, also says this is disputed by KIO leaders), but we need to approach
these assertions with some scepticism.

Leach's experience was of the particular Kachin/Shan divide and he
attempted to generalize it, not only to modern Burma, but to the greater region
itself. When we try to see what lessons his theory has for the modern conflicts
of Burma, the brief discussion above seems to suggest - very little. Ethnicity
for Leach was an epiphenomenon of ecological boundaries. It would be foolish to
deny its reality today. As Martin Smith eloquently points out, a full
understanding of Burma's linguistic divisions is still beyond our grasp. The
divisions and sectional loyalties are couched in memories of history that go
back long before the colonial period. He writes that in Tavoy-Mergui districts
in CPB controlled areas, Burmese speakers refer to fellow Burmans as 'Pagans',
harking back 'to an age long ago'. The Karen, despite continuing political
differences, have given to the outside world an illusion of unity, embracing
such distinct, though Karennic-speaking, groups as the Kayah (Karenni) and Pa-O.
In fact large groups of mostly Pwo-speaking hill Karen have almost nothing to do
with the insurrection and in the delta many Karen are opposed to the
insurrection and fight on the side of SLORC.

Clearly what is required is a framework for understanding the relations
of these groups - among themselves, with each other and with Burmans - a theory,
so to speak, which replaces the neat formulation of Leach and which recognizes
the reality of ethnicity. Language and religion are important - though the
importance can vary and convictions of ethnic identity may exist though both
language and religion are lost. Chao Tsang Yawnghwe - son of the first president
of Burma and a leader of the Shan rebellion describes his frustration during the
early days of the rebellion, sitting with Shan and not having the language to
express his disagreement or expound his views.9

Such a theory is not merely an academic exercise. One of the major
political activities of the Democratic Alliance of Burma is to revive the old
call for a federal constitution to face the difficulties that must arise at the
end of SLORC. A search for principles to describe the on-the-ground reality of
ethnicity in modern Burma is essential if the DAB constitution is not to
flounder in uncertainty and wishful thinking. As a start I will go very quickly
through the major groups that occupy the borders of Burma and try to bring out
some of the issues that are most prominent in the situation as it is in the
final decade of the 20th Century.

Mon

Christian Bauer writes of the Mon that they themselves tend to equate
ethnic identity with language and, 'In spite of reports over the past century
that Mon is a dying language, there is no evidence to suggest that its use is
declining in Burma'10. Bauer arrives at a tentative population of Mon in Burma
as 1 million. As comparison Smith reports that 'leaders of the main ethnic
minority communities estimate the Shan and Mon populations at approximately four
million each All figures, particularly the Mon, need treating with great
circumspection, being projections based largely on ancestral records or regions
of habitation ' (1991: 30). On Bauer's discussion the ceiling on Mon-speakers
in Thailand (as opposed to those who might claim Mon ethnicity) is about 50,000.
These communities were probably established in the 18th Century after the fall
of Pegu (1757). Though the Mon insurrection has been of some importance in lower
Burma, particularly in the region of the Three Pagodas Pass, it has been
relatively small . From a theoretical point of view, it seems unlikely that
there is any ecological detrmination of Mon ethnicity - nor a religious one, the
Mon being Theravada Buddhist as are Burman and Thai. Mon ethnicity is linguistic
first and foremost, though, as noted by Smith, the phenomenon of ethnic
identity connected only to a historical name is also a Mon characteristic.

Karen

Smith writes of modern population figures 'No reliable figures have been
collected or released since independence and those that are published appear
deliberately to play down ethnic minority numbers'. He provides the estimate of
three to four million, with another 200,000 in Thailand. The KNU estimate their
population , including Pa-O, Kayan and Kayah (Karenni) as 'some seven million'.
It should be noted that whatever the true figure this includes a very diverse
population - even in ethnic terms. It is of course in the interests of the KNU
to accept a single ethnic identity. We may briefly mention that there is a large
Buddhist population, some Burmese-speaking, in the Delta, and older Buddhist
chiefdoms such as the Pa-O, a Christian population from, which the KNU
leadership is largely drawn, and many hill Karen who are probably only now being
drawn into the insurrection and military conflict. Leach's ecological divisions
may be informative at some points, but are certainly inadequate to deal with the
general situation. Were a true Karen ethnicity to emerge it would be a created
ethnicity, though this is not to deny the nationalist fervour which has
maintained the insurrection for nearly half a century.

Shan

The Shan are among those who claim that they were betrayed by the
British grant of independence. The Shan states were not, they claim,
administered as part of lowland Burma and should not have been handed to
Rangoon. Claims are made that even in 1942 Shan State, as the agglomeration of
small chiefdoms had become, was not considered part of Burma. These views are
criticized by Chao Tsang Yawnghwe who writes that the 'tales sprang more from
wishful thinking than facts'. Essentially the Shan, who are Tai-speakers, fit
part of Leach's model very well - they were after all one factor in his model.
The Shan rebellion did not begin till 1958-9 and was, it appears, directly a
result of the Kuomintang invasion of Burmese territory. Apart from a short
period in the 80s, they have been faction ridden, reft by alliance and
opposition to the communists, by the opium trade and by their ethnic relations
with Thailand. The heavy-handed occupation of Kengtung by the Siamese during the
war, probably ruled out a major option of Shan insurrection - a demand for
unification with Thailand.

The current position of the Shan insurrection is difficult to guage.
Some groups have made their peace with Rangoon and others are part of the DAB.
The major player, however, is still Khun Sa, who trades opium, is said to have
an agreement with Rangoon, is at war with the Wa and has strong informal
relations with Tai Jai i.e. Shan, in Thailand. Despite any agreement with
Rangoon, earlier this year Rangoon seems to have been supporting, militarily,
the Wa, and certainly until the events of May in Thailand this year, the Shan
were also coming under attack from the Thai air force. When the Shan groups were
last in a position to make a statement of policy, they clearly chose
independence and rejected the Union of Burma.

Wa

Smith gives the insurrectionists estimate of Wa population at two
million, but this figure probably includes much of the population in China. The
Wa began to make an impact on the insurrection in their own right with the
self-destruction of the Communist Party of Burma. The CPB was well-known as
having a Burman leadership and minority, particularly Wa, fighters - at least in
upper Burma. Smith reports that Wa themselves say that it was not the Shan, not
the Burmese, not the British, not the Chinese who intruded into their tribal
life - but the Communist Party of Burma.

The Wa have embraced the opium trade and certainly until recently have
been in fierce dispute with the forces of Khun Sa. There is no clear indication
of their political demands, though it seems they do aim for territorial
independence.

As we have looked at the border groups against the Leach model, I may
just say that the Wa, like the Naga and the Chin, do demonstrate an aspect of
the model with which I have not dealt here, but may briefly mention - a dual
chiefly/democratic social structure with movement between the two poles. The
evidence, except for the Kachin, is not extensive.

Kachin

These people were of course the core of Leach's theoretical model.
Smith's figures for the Kachin are one and a half million. There are a number of
questions that need to be asked about the Kachin. Leach claimed that the term
Kachin was not an ethnic, but a political term. The Jingpo-speakers made up the
majority, but the Kachin chiefdoms and the egalitarian communities were made up
of speakers of a number of different languages. In China the word Jingpo is used
and the application of the word Kachin is unclear. Nevertheless these are
related communities - the national border sometimes bisects villages. Movement
is free across the border, and though, at least since the demise of the CPB,
China supports SLORC, Jingpo are allowed to support their kinsmen across the
border, though officially not allowed to provide arms. The KIO leader Bran Seng
is a welcome visitor in Beijing, and I was told that KIO leaders find it much
easier to visit their headquarters via Beijing than through Burmese territory.

The Kachin are said by some to have more fighters in the field than the
KNU. On the other hand Bran Seng has on occasion upset his DAB allies by
negotiating with SLORC. Early this year it was said that there was now an
agreement in place among the DAB leadership that such unilateral talks would not
take place.

Chin

The Chin in fact comprise a large number of different groups (whose
names for themselves usually has the word zo as part) who have on the whole been
supportive of the Rangoon government. There are, however, groups representing
the Chin in the DAB.

Baas Terwiel recently visited the Mizo on the Indian border and reports
that they have established their headquarters on the Indian side and largely
manage their own affairs, even though there was an Indian government
reprentative stationed there.

Arakan

The majority of the population of Arakan are Buddhist Rakhine whose
numbers are given as two and a half million. Smith gives a figure of 'one to two
million' Muslim Arakanese or Rohingyas. He says 'many of whom are now living in
exile'. The Arakan was a major centre of communist activity and the main area of
operation of the 'Red Flag' communists. Smith writes, 'It is certainly no
coincidence that since the fall of the CPB's Pegu Yoma base areas, the CPB's
only remaining footholds in predominantly Burmese-speaking areas have been in
the Rakhine State (where determined separatist movements remain active).

Conclusion

This presentation must be considered a preliminary reconsideration of
Leach's theory and its application over all Burma's borders and into the
contemporary situation. Burma's frontiers were never all like the Kachin-Shan
boundaries, and many of the elaborations of theory may be questioned.
Nevertheless, it still remains to be considered how much the ecological factors
behind Leach's theories continue and influence contemporary developments.

Material for the distribution of ethnic groups is based on Frank M.
Lebar et. al. 1964.11 A major point needs to be made. The maps of this book show
no Burman populations on Burma's borders - except in Arakan. These groups are
probably Rakhine. This term is not used in the book and Arakanese are subsumed
under Burmese. The term Rohingya does not occur.

Introduction
Recent developments in Burma and Kawthoolei, the Karen separatist state
on the borders of Burma and Thailand, indicate that the Karen now have a greater
role to play in internal political developments in Burma than they have had
before. The current, larger role of the Karen in relation to political
developments within Burma has come about, paradoxically, because of developments
in Burma itself rather than through any direct initiatives on the part of the
Karen, at least on a concerted basis (see also Wijeyewardene 1992). These
developments are now well known and do not need extensive discussion; but it is
worth recapitulating some of these developments in the course of this
exploratory paper because of their relevance for an understanding of the role of
the Karen in relation to conflict resolution and conflict management. In
conflict studies, the difference between resolution and management is an
important one both conceptually and in policy or practical terms. Whereas
resolution is seen as a process resulting in long term elimination of conflict,
management implies shorter term goals in the reduction or containment of
conflict (Ben-Dor and Dewitt 1987b). In situations of protracted social
conflict, conflict management approaches are considered more feasible or
realistic than conflict resolution approaches. The reason is that conflict
resolution approaches tend to focus on issues of fundamental differences and
sources of conflict which are generally intractable while conflict management
approaches seek to address discrete instances of conflict, the containment of
which may set the preconditions for longer term solutions. In this paper, I want
to suggest that the Karen approach, for a long time, has been largely oriented
towards conflict resolution while recent developments suggest the emergence of
conflict management strategies in Burma. This orientation, I further suggest,
has in some ways precluded the Karen from giving sufficient attention to these
strategies, the consequences of which may be detrimental to their role in
reducing the conflict in Burma.

Developments in Kawthoolei

The Karen have been engaged in a long, drawn-out struggle with the
Burmese. The larger historical and political circumstances and conditions for
this do not need rehearsing here. However, we may note that in the 1970s, a
succession of political cum military fronts consisting of various ethnic
separatist organisations including the Karen National Union (KNU), were formed.
These fronts were a response to disillusionment with working with ethnic Burman
opposition parties, the 1973 referendum in Burma and the 1974 Constitution in
Burma which established a one-party state and Burma Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP) rule. One front, the Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance (RNA) was
formed in 1973 at Kawmoorah a Karen stronghold. The aim of the RNA was the
overthrow of the Ne Win regime and the establishment of 'a genuine federal union
of independent national states based on the principle of equality and national
self-determination' (Smith 1991:294). This is one of the earlier indications of
the Karen position with regard to conflict resolution in Burma, namely the goal
of establishing a federal system. However, that the Karen position on these
matters has not always been consistent, at least as far as appearances go, as I
discuss later. The RNA and other fronts were eventually replaced by the National
Democratic Front (NDF) which was formed in 1976 at Manerplaw, the KNU's new
general headquarters (Smith 1991:294). The principal purpose of this alliance
was, again, to form a united front consisting of ethnic minority separatist
organisations and to develop greater co-ordination, political and military, in
their confrontation with the Burmese government and its armed forces. As Smith
points out, the NDF came to have a significant impact on the conflict in Burma
but was initially plagued by differences over numerous issues including
federalism, the right of secession, and so forth. These differences took a long
time to resolve. Here again, we see federalism as a goal in conflict resolution.
An inherent problem in the past in these fronts and their concern with
federalism as a goal and means of resolving the conflict in Burma is that they
did not include any Burman party. This, of course, has since changed.

As a result of the 1988 democracy uprising and the SLORC crackdown,
several Burman opposition groups sought refuge in Kawthoolei where the Karen now
play host to the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB),
the National League for Democracy-Liberated Area (NLD-LA), the All Burma
Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) and representatives of the Committee for the
Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB) among others, all of which enjoy the
protection and relative security of Kawthoolei. These groups established the
Democratic Alliance of Burma in November 1988. It would seem that the DAB is not
entirely as cohesive as it may appear. Smith (1991:408) reports that had
General Bo Mya, President of the KNU and Commander-in-Chief of the Karen
National Liberation Army (KNLA), not been elected as Chairman of the DAB, he
would not have co-operated with the DAB. Furthermore, some democracy activists
who participated in the uprising in Rangoon were apparently unhappy over the
appointment of two Burman representatives from the then Peoples Patriotic Party
(PPP) and from the CRDB to the DAB Central Executive Committee. Be that as it
may, the alliance of Burman opposition groups with the ethnically-based
separatist movements on Burma's borders -- an outcome of the SLORC crackdown --
is none the less significant. It is significant not because Burman and
non-Burman opponents to the military regime in Burma have finally recognised
that they have something in common but because the Burman opposition groups have
recognised this common interest and have finally sought out a working
relationship with the ethnically-based insurgents, though admittedly by force of
their own circumstances in Burma. Were it not for these circumstances, it is
unlikely that these groups would have actively sought out a modus vivendi with
the ethnic insurgents amongst whom the Karen (and Kachin) enjoy a certain
pre-eminence. It may be noted that with these developments, the Karen have been
concerned to consolidate their pre-eminence. Not only is General Bo Mya Chairman
of the DAB; he is also President of the National Council of the Union of Burma
(NCUB) which was established on 4 August 1992 by the DAB, NLD, and NCGUB (News
and Views, September/October 1992, p. 7). An important feature of this modus
vivendi is the explicit reecognition of the rights of the various ethnic groups
and parity of their political status. I think it fair to say that the Burman
opposition groups have, in principle, recognised these rights but their main
concern, until the formation of the DAB, was opposition to the military regime.
The in-principle recognition, in other words, has not hitherto had any practical
political significance. The recognition of these rights in current circumstances
does, however, have practical political consequences as the recently signed
Manerplaw Agreement indicates.

There is another consequence of SLORC's crackdown on opposition groups
in Burma which is of some significance, namely, the fragmentation or division of
these groups. The designation National League for Democracy-Liberated Area, for
instance, is a deliberate one intended to distinguish its members from the NLD
in Burma which, under pressure from SLORC, expelled various members including
Aung San Suu Kyi. These divisions in the Burman opposition groups and the
association of some factions with the ethnic separatists have implications for
conflict resolution in Burma.

These and other related developments have had yet another consequence.
The alliance of Burman opposition groups with the ethnic separatists in the NDF
in general and the KNU and KNLA in particular have made the destruction of
Kawthoolei a high priority as far as SLORC is concerned. This has, in part, been
made possible by the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and
accommodations between the Burmese regime and splinter factions of the CPB
amongst others (to be discussed later) which has allowed SLORC to devote greater
military resources in its operations against the Karen in Kawthoolei.

The Manerplaw Agreement of 31 July 1992

In July 1992, an agreement to establish a Federal Union of Burma, known
as the Manerplaw Agreement was signed by several opposition groups. The
signatories to the agreement are: the National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma (NCGUB), the National League for Democracy-Liberated Area (NLD-LA), the
Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), and the National Democratic Front (NDF).

Where the Karen are concerned, the Manerplaw Agreement, is a significant
development in terms of Kawthoolei's political position in relation to the
Burmese state and the other separatist movements. We have seen that as a member
of the various fronts of ethnic minority organisations, the KNU has indicated
that it would like to see some sort of federal system in place in Burma. At
other times, however, the Karen have expressed other desires. More than twenty
years ago, for instance, when Peter Hinton conducted his fieldwork in northern
Thailand, the Karen separatists were reluctant to indicate that they were
concerned with political restructuring in the form of a larger federal system
(Hinton, personal communication). Ten years ago, I was told by a Karen
missionary closely connected with the KNU that the Karen were not
'revolutionaries' but 'rebels', the vague implication being that the Karen were
concerned with secession rather than overthrowing the Burmese regime under
General Ne Win, or the political reconfiguration of Burma in which the Karen
would have a part to play in one capacity or another. And, on 19 August 1984, Bo
Mya announced the independence of the 'Republic of Kawthoolei' (Smith 1991:478,
Chapter 19, note 3). Two months later, however, the NDF stated that it intended
to 'establish a unified Federal Union with all the ethnic races including the
Burmese' (Smith 1991:386). This entailed rescinding any demands on the part of
NDF members, including the KNU, for the right to secede. Smith notes that the
NDF decision to establish a Federal Union represented a considerable compromise
on the part of the Karen. It would appear that the Karen position on conflict
resolution has thus been somewhat inconsistent.

The inconsistency can be explained away (but only in part) if we
consider more closely what kind of federal system the NDF and therefore the KNU
have in mind. Recall that when the KNU was part of the RNA, their stated aim
was to form 'a genuine federal union of independent national states based on the
principle of equality and national self-determination'. The operative words are
'independent national states' and 'national self-determination'. Thus when the
KNU (and other members of the NDF) talk of a Federal Union, they are none the
less equally concerned to retain a high degree of sovereignty within their own
states. This, of course, raises the question as to how viable such a federal
system would be if it were to be put in place. Here, I share Wijeyewardene's
pessimism (1992) over the viability of the Federal Union proposals contained in
the Manerplaw Agreement which is the latest expression of federalist intentions.
The agreement is an important one none the less because Burman opposition groups
are among the signatories unlike previous agreements, proposals, and
declarations by the NDF and its predecessor fronts. For this reason, the
agreement deserves close scrutiny in relation to the role of the Karen in
conflict resolution in Burma, both at present and in the future.

The agreement states, among other things, that the signatories would
'draw up a true Federal Union constitution in accordance with the desires of
indigenous nationalities and all peoples' and that they will 'follow the
principles that no nationality shall have special privileges and no restrictions
will be imposed on the basic rights of any nationality or minority in the
Union'. Article Five of the agreement is perhaps the most interesting because it
reveals something of the basic structure of the Federal Union as the signatories
see it. The Union would incorporate the Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Chin, Mon,
Burman, Arakan, and Shan peoples, each of which would have 'national states';
these national states would 'assign certain powers to the Federal Union and the
remaining powers will be exercised by the National States including legislative,
administrative and judicial powers' (emphasis added); the Federal Union will
consist of two Houses of Parliament: The National Assembly (Upper House) and the
People's Assembly (Lower House). Furthermore, 'In accordance with the principle
of civilian supremacy over the military the Federal Union and State armies will
be put under the direct supervision of the elected Governments', 'The
legislative, administrative and judicial branches of the Federal Union
Government will be checked and balanced in power, and the judiciary will be
independent', and 'The Constitution will be designed to prevent any re-emergence
of chauvinism and fascist dictatorship in the future'.

There are four points in the agreement which are worth noting. The
first point, a conceptual one, is that the agreement is unquestionably oriented
towards conflict resolution as all previous proposals on federalism have been.
The second point which is closely related to the first, is that the agreement is
concerned with the removal of SLORC. In this sense, it is not unlike, for
example, the RNA declaration referred to earlier. Third, it is concerned with
the parity of the political status of the various ethnic groups where Burmans
are not in any way privileged, a long-standing concern of the NDF. Fourth, it is
evident that the signatories and the 'national states' that they represent are
concerned to preserve their autonomy and sovereignty as much as possible. The
federal government will only have powers assigned to it by the governments of
the constituent national states. This, of course, raises the thorny question of
what would constitute a Burman state in the Federal Union.

Conflict Resolution: Dilemmas and Realities

Recent work in the area of conflict studies in the Middle East,
especially in terms of the concept of protracted social conflict (see, for
example, Azar and Marlin 1987) suggest that conflict resolution approaches
adopted by participants and analysts with inputs into policy formulation do not
in fact lead to the resolution of conflict. The prima facie evidence for this is
the indisputable fact that conflicts have not been resolved in the Middle East
and that they are protracted. The theoretical reasons are that conflict
resolution approaches tend to address issues of fundamental differences, which
of course underlie the sources of conflict, and are therefore not amenable to
compromise or bargaining. The conflict resolution approach embodied in the
Manerplaw Agreement and in the KNU position provides a comparable example
illustrating the kinds of problems encountered with such an approach.

Given the current situation in Burma, it is one thing for Burman
opposition groups to agree to a federal system in which a large amount of
sovereignty is conceded to ethnic 'national states'. It is quite another matter
when these opposition groups and ethnic minority organisations seek to resolve
the conflict where their principal adversary is the military regime, a regime
which is unwilling to surrender power. Conflict resolution in these
circumstances requires the removal of the existing regime. It is a demand that
is non-negotiable on either side. From this and other related issues arise
several obstacles, of a practical nature, to conflict resolution in Burma, of
which I shall discuss only two.

Subordination of the Military to Civilian Government

One major issue is the subordination of the military -- or more precisely the
various armies and militias -- to civilian government in the proposed Union and
its constituent 'national states'. The various insurrectionist movements, which
are all ethnically based, are run by organisations where political and military
leadership are identical or coterminous. There is no indication of how the
military will be brought under civilian control. It seems more realistic to
assume that if such a Federal Union were indeed to come into being, the
ethnically-based 'national states' would see the separation of military
leadership from civilian governments only in a nominal sense, if at all.

Where the Karen are concerned, it is highly unlikely that Bo Mya would
want to relinquish his hold over the KNLA or, on the other hand, to retain
control over an army responsible to a civilian government in which he had no
part to play. There is no reason to suppose that this would not also be the case
with the other insurrectionists in their 'national states' such as the Kachin,
Karenni, Mon, and so forth.

As for Burma, one must surely raise the question as to how it would be
possible or practicable for any coalition government to bring the Tatmadaw (the
Burmese armed forces) under its control. The removal of SLORC, a necessary
precondition for any civilian government to assume power in the Federal Union,
would have to entail not merely the removal of the current incumbents of SLORC.
It would have to require the removal of several layers in the upper echelons of
the Tatmadaw down to at least divisional commander level. The reasons for this
are obvious. Divisional commanders have been responsible for, if not
formulating, then most certainly executing not simply SLORC policies but general
Tatmadaw policies (which go a long way back) of involving civilians in their war
with the various insurgent forces. This includes the internment of not only
Karen and other ethnic civilian populations and using them as porters up to the
front lines (Smith 1991:259-260), but Burman civilians as well (Testimony of
porters escaped from the SLORC army 1992). In short, it is difficult to see how
a large number of senior Tatmadaw officers could be removed let alone how the
entire Tatmadaw could be brought under civilian control. The fact that there is
no indication that there may be some senior serving Tatmadaw officers who
disagree with SLORC policies or support the current opposition in Burma and who
could therefore be relied upon to subordinate the Tatmadaw to a civilian
government makes the prospect of civilian control of the army even more
unlikely.

Borders and Frontiers, Contingent Sovereignty and Effective Control

I have argued elsewhere (1990), following Buzan (1983), that the political
relations and the conflict between the Burmese state and the Karen imply that
the Burmese state is a 'weak state', the criterion being that the institutions
of the state are contested to the point of violence. The argument may, of
course, be extended to include the relations between the Burmese state and the
other ethnically-based insurgent movements. The fact that the Burmese state is
engaged in a protracted conflict with numerous ethnic insurgent movements on its
internationally recognised, historically demarcated borders (but see below)
implies that the sovereignty of the Burmese state is limited by the existence of
these movements. In other words, the sovereignty of the Burmese state does not
in fact extend to the extremities of its borders. Accordingly, it seems more
accurate to take the view that there are frontier zones separating those parts
of Burma over which the Burmese state has contingent sovereignty and territories
which insurgent groups such as the Karen, Kachin, Karenni, and so forth, have
effective control.

These realities are at variance as much with official Burmese maps
indicating the boundaries of the various states in the Union of Myanmar as they
are with similar maps drawn up by the NDF. Needless to say, there are some
differences between NDF maps and official Burmese maps. The demarcation of the
boundaries of the 'national states' in NDF maps, to some extent, reflects the
recognition of the effective control over areas which its constituent members
exercise as well as their larger claims to territory. The only similarity which
may be said to exist between Burmese and NDF maps (and therefore the 'formal'
political positions of the Burmese regime and the NDF) is the principle that the
constituent or national states should encompass what are thought to be the areas
predominantly inhabited by specific ethnic groups. The application of this
principle, however, would raise formidable problems of state boundary
delimitation and demarcation in a Federal Union, which are inevitable
entailments of the conflict resolution approach of the NDF and DAB, for two
reasons. First, there would have to be agreement on the distribution of the
various ethnic groups in relation to the 'national states'. Where, for example,
would the sizeable Karen population in the delta area of Burma stand in relation
to Kawthoolei given that they would then be in a Burman 'national state'?
Second, the territories under the effective control of the insurgent movements
in most cases do not match the extent of the areas inhabited by the ethnic
groups which they claim to represent. The territory controlled by the KNU and
KNLA, for instance, is much less than the area considered to be inhabited by
Karen populations whether in the Karen State of official Burmese maps or the
Kawthoolei of NDF maps. Would the delimitation and demarcation of the boundaries
of the 'national states' in the proposed Federal Union reflect the geographical
distribution of ethnic groups -- or territories under effective control of the
various insurgent movements?

The problems of boundary delimitation and demarcation associated with
the Federal Union proposals are not, however, confined to internal boundaries in
Burma. Although Tenasserim was annexed by the British following the first
Anglo-Burmese war and although the border between Burma and Siam was stabilised
through negotiations between Thailand and Henry Burney, the ambassador of the
East India Company in 1826 (Lamb 1968:161-163), ambiguities exist with regard to
Three Pagodas Pass at Kanchanaburi Province (Smith 1991:396). Little is known of
Burmese and Thai attempts to resolve the dispute but there can be no doubt that
the presence of the Mon insurgents (the New Mon State Party) has complicated the
situation. The Mon were in effective control of Three Pagodas Pass until
early1990 when Burmese troops overran their positions. Nevertheless, current NDF
maps depict Three Pagodas Pass as part of Mon State. Recent tensions between
Burma and Thailand (over the abduction of Thai villagers and officials by
Burmese troops further north along the border) have resulted in a statement by a
senior Thai military official which is, perhaps, revealing of Thai attitudes, at
least in certain institutional contexts, and the ramifications of boundary
disputes and the presence of ethnic insurgents on the borders of Thailand and
Burma. In a surprisingly candid speech to the Association of Women Territorial
Defence Volunteers in Thailand, Lieutenant-General Chetta Tanajaro, Commander of
the First Army Region, was reported to have said that the existence of ethnic
rebels on the border with Burma was of benefit to Thailand, whilst denying Thai
support for the ethnic insurgents (The Nation, 23 October 1992). Citing the
Three Pagodas Pass as an example, the general said that demarcation problems at
the Thai-Burmese border could have escalated into major bilateral conflicts had
it not been for the minority groups acting as 'buffers' and that 'if the
[minority problem] is settled, the situation might turn dangerous'. Although it
may be inferred that Thai foreign policy with regard to border issues has always
come under the purview of the Thai military (whilst other foreign policies may
well come under that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proper), it is not known
to what extent Lieutenant-General Chetta's opinions reflect current Thai foreign
policy, or at any rate the present military establishment's position with regard
to this particular border issue. Nevertheless, these remarks are sufficient
indication of the complex, bilateral (or multilateral?) implications of the
delimitation and demarcation of boundaries related to the Federal Union
proposals.

If a post-SLORC period were to eventuate and if such a Union were to
come into being, would the determination of the boundary at Three Pagodas Pass
be a matter for the Union (with its 'assigned' powers?) and Thailand to
negotiate -- or for the Mon and Thailand to negotiate? Answers to questions such
as this can only be speculative. Whatever transpires, it seems reasonable to
assume that in assessments of future internal developments in Burma, the
possible role of Thailand cannot be discounted. Such assessments would also
need to recognise the past record of Thailand, namely, the pursuit of Thailand's
national interests (as defined by various groups, including the military,
associated with various governments of the day) in response to the political
realities in Burma and through the maintenance of official bilateral relations
with Burma whilst simultaneously managing in situ accommodations with (as
against providing support for) the various ethnically based movements along the
Thai-Burmese border.

The Emergence of Conflict Management in Burma?

Although the Tatmadaw and the KNLA along with other insurrectionist
armies or militias are engaged in an unceasing confrontation, there are
indications that some form of conflict management has emerged in some areas,
namely, Shan State. In Shan State, a complex series of events (see Smith
1991:355-373), including the revolt by Kokang and Wa elements within the CPB
against the CPB's central administration, resulted in the collapse of the CPB in
1989. Only a week after the Kokang revolt, SLORC representatives went to the
area to open negotiations. According to Porter, The terms of the agreement are
not widely known. They are said to provide for SLORC's extension of national
sovereignty, the eradication of poppy, and the disassociation of the various
militias from dissident activities. In return, SLORC acknowledges the
administrative pre-eminence of local commands, promises unrestricted commercial
activities and government investment in infrastructure and services. On the
ground, the accords are quite fluid and, even within areas controlled by the
same militia, are applied in different ways (1992:3-4).

The agreement covers areas held by the Kokang and Mong Ko units of the CPB, the
United Wa States Army (UWSA), the Burma (Eastern Shan State) National Democratic
Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Porter notes
that soon after the agreement, infrastructural projects commenced, the total
estimated expenditure being in the region of 275 million kyats in a period of
eighteen months.

Although not much is known about the terms of agreement, the little that
Porter describes is sufficiently revealing. SLORC and the various ex-CPB
factions have developed a form of conflict management which has resulted in a
cessation of hostilities, even if a somewhat uneasy one. As Porter goes on to
say, this has allowed UN development activities to proceed resulting in the
assurance of some measure of peace and a positive economic impact in these areas
(1992:8). Despite the claim by Porter's informants that the agreement provides
for SLORC's extension of sovereignty and the undertaking on the part of the
local armies not to engage in dissident activities, the other aspects of the
agreement indicate that SLORC's sovereignty is by no means absolute in these
areas. The 'administrative pre-eminence of local commands' is a clear indication
of this. The recognition of the claim to sovereignty which SLORC may have
extracted from the ex-CPB elements hardly reflects the political and military
realities on the ground. The point to note, however, is that these realities are
actually recognised in the conflict management strategy.

The strategy also entails specific mechanisms intended to contain the
outbreak of hostilities such as 'open channels of communication'. Tatmadaw,
Kokang and Wa units have, for example, established signals communications down
to platoon level to ensure that hostilities do not break out during the passage
of troops (Doug Porter, personal communication). It is possible that other
mechanisms may also exist. What has emerged is, in effect, a local, limited
security regime which is given some degree of stability because of the presence
of UN agencies and their activities. The security regime is not the result of
security-building measures on the part of the UN agencies since these agencies
are not involved, in any direct sense, in implementing these measures. However,
their presence contributes to emerging confidence-building measures. The
activities of these agencies provide some measure of stability to the limited
security regime because both SLORC, the Kokang and Wa have a vested interest in
the economic benefits which may be derived from such activities. The benefits
include profits from heroin production and trafficking on the part of the
Kokangese and, allegedly, soldiers of the Tatmadaw's 99th Light Infantry
Division (Smith 1991:379; 478, Chapter 18, note 18).

These and other ceasefires have been documented by Smith (see also
Palaung Statements 1992). Smith notes that soon after the formation of the DAB,

In a fast moving game of political chess, SLORC immediately strove to break up
the new political alliance by stepping up its offers of a ceasefire to selected
NDF members, guaranteeing for the first time their right to hold weapons and
control territory. SLORC's strategy met with immediate success when, running
desperately short of ammunition since the CPB collapse, leaders of the KIO
[Kachin Independence Organisation] 4th brigade in January 1991, the PNO [Pao
National Organisation] in March and the PSLP in April, took unilateral advantage
of the offer to give their troops a respite (Smith 1991:419, emphases added).

Smith goes on to discuss SLORC's proposed National Convention which the CPB
defectors and ex-Burma Socialist Party Programme members would be allowed to
attend, and rumours that these other erstwhile foes of the Tatmadaw would
likewise be allowed to be present. This appears to be part of SLORC's larger
strategy of eventually declaring a 'civilian administration' whilst real power
would none the less remain with the Tatmadaw. These moves have been strongly
denounced by the DAB (Central Executive Committee, Democratic Alliance of Burma
1992).

The central issue in these developments is the inability of the Tatmadaw
and the armies of the NDF to resolve the conflicts decisively by military means.
SLORC and the various parties which have accepted the ceasefire offer have thus
been forced to a conflict management strategy, whatever SLORC's political
cosmetics may be. The emergence of these endogenous conflict management
strategies, though relatively small in scope, raise a paradoxical consideration
in relation to the Federal Union proposals espoused by the NDF and DAB. The
arrangements on the ground between SLORC, the ex-CPB factions, the PSLP and so
forth reflect the relative autonomy of these various forces in the areas which
they control. Although this does not approximate the kind of 'national state'
envisaged in the Federal Union proposals, for all practical purposes it comes as
close as can be expected in current circumstances. Admittedly, a true Federal
Union of the kind that the NDF and DAB would like to see in place undoubtedly
would not have Tatmadaw troops stationed in any of the constituent 'national
states' -- and there are, of course, other complex political issues and
differences as well. However, as I have suggested, the realisation of such a
Federal Union seems unlikely. The arrangements which reflect the practical
military and political realities in the conflict management approach, on the
other hand, offer some scope for moving towards a solution which might in the
end resemble the Federal Union proposals.

The Karen: Limited Options?

The Karen stand vis-a-vis the Burmese regime under General Ne Win and
now under SLORC has largely been an intransigent one. It is an intransigence
which, quite arguably, has been reinforced by the alliance of Burman opposition
groups with the NDF and the establishment of these groups in Kawthoolei which
has given the Karen something of a pivotal role in the DAB and NCUB. It could,
of course, be argued that the SLORC position has also been equally intransigent
but as we have seen above, SLORC appears to be willing to enter into localised
conflict management arrangements. Given the entrenchment of SLORC, its
unwillingness to surrender power, the 'balance of forces', as it were, in Burma
and recent developments, a resolution to the conflict appears unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

In early October 1992, it was reported that U Ohn Gyaw, foreign minister
of the junta in Burma, announced the suspension of all offensive operations in
'Kayin' (Karen) State and other parts of the country 'to consolidate national
solidarity and unity' (The Nation, 14 October 1992). The same report added that
SLORC had called off its military offensive against the Karen in April 1992
though it had mounted an offensive against the Kachin at the same time. It is
possible that this may have been part of the conflict management strategy on the
part of SLORC, but it is also probably evidence that SLORC's military resources
are inadequate for the simultaneous conduct of two major offensives, at least in
the present. The Karen, however, have claimed that fighting did not abate in
October. Indeed, there have since been reports of further fighting around
Manerplaw, suggesting that the Tatmadaw are aiming to destroy the Karen general
headquarters. It is possible that the conflict management strategy in Shan
State and elsewhere has thus enabled the Tatmadaw to devote more military
resources in an effort to eliminate the Karen and Burman opposition groups in
Kawthoolei. In these circumstances, it would seem that the Karen have few
options. Should Manerplaw fall, it has been suggested by some Karen that the
KNLA would continue its confrontation with the Tatmadaw employing a
full-fledged, guerilla warfare strategy (Wijeyewardene, personal communication).
While this would seem to be the only option open to the Karen, the fall of
Manerplaw would also mean that the ability of the Karen leadership to coordinate
various KNLA forces and the various opposition groups would be severely limited.
On the other hand, if the Karen are able to hold Manerplaw, it would only be a
matter of time before the Tatmadaw renews its offensive and thus the cycle of
protracted conflict.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank The Australian National University for a Visiting
Fellowship in the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, The Faculties,
which enabled me to undertake work for this paper. I am also very grateful
indeed to Gehan Wijeyewardene for making available otherwise unobtainable papers
and documents from Manerplaw.

References

Azar, Edward E. and Renee E. Marlin. 'The costs of protracted social conflict
in the Middle East: the case of Lebanon.' In Conflict management in the Middle
East, edited by Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, pp. 29-44. Lexington,
Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987.

Central Executive Committee, Democratic Alliance of Burma. Statement of the
Democratic Alliance of Burma regarding the National Convention to be convened by
the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Manerplaw, 22 June 1922.

Lamb, Alastair. Asian frontiers: studies in a continuing problem. Melbourne:
F.W. Cheshire for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.

News and Views (a publication of the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in
Burma, Australia), no. 8. September/October 1992.

Rajah, Ananda. 'Ethnicity, nationalism, and the nation-state: the Karen in
Burma and Thailand'. In Ethnic groups across national boundaries in mainland
Southeast Asia, edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1990.

The speed of economic change in eastern and southern China since the mid-1980s
has helped to transform cross-border trade with Burma and Laos, in both volume
and diversity. Published references to this trade focus particularly on illegal
movements of heroin from border areas of Burma to Kunming and beyond, and on
China's imports of logs, notably from Laos, but these are merely two components
in a two-way flow which has grown quickly from a trickle to a torrent, extending
well beyond the near-border areas. And as Yunnan's trans-border trading area
expands, it is increasingly enmeshed with Thailand's trans-border trade reaching
northwards from Mae Sai through Kengtung to the Yunnan border at Daluo, and from
Chiang Khong-Ban Houei Sai on the Mekong to Mengla County (Map).

Our concern in this paper is to view cross-border trade between Burma
and China mainly from the Yunnan side of the border and in the context of what
we see as the fast-emerging 'Mekong Corridor' between southern Yunnan, northern
and perhaps northeastern Thailand. Much of our information and awareness of
recent developments was acquired during a long field reconnaissance in Mekong
river counties of Yunnan in January-February 1992, as a first step in an
on-going 'Upper and Middle Mekong Research Project' (Hinton, n.d.); this was
supplemented by subsequent work on Dehong Prefecture (Tan) and previous
experience in northern Thailand (Chapman and Hinton).

Historical perspective After 1949 and in the 1950s, with the US embargo on trade
with China, the Yunnan border was virtually closed for three decades. It is well
to remember however, that for centuries in the past this far southern corner of
China was a cross-roads for trade, commerce and cultural exchange. It was at
once the south-western gateway to China and the route to India. Direct access
to mainland Southeast Asia, particularly Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, was
gained along its valleys and its ridges. It is, as a consequence, a region of
great historical significance and is crisscrossed with 'roads': caravan routes
for silk, cotton and tea, the Burma Road of World War 11 (from Lashio in upper
Burma through what is now Dehong Prefecture to Kunming) and the Mekong River
itself, 'the River Road to China' in Osborne's phrase (Osborne, 1975).

It was the French of the colonial era who hoped to pioneer a route to
Yunnan along the Mekong River. They envisaged the opening up of trade between
Vietnam and China using the 'back-door' of Yunnan, as the British had
established a lien on coastal ports like Canton and Shanghai. In the 1860s the
French expedition led by Commander Doudart de Lagree travelled up the Mekong
from its delta in Vietnam, through Laos and Burma and then into Yunnan as far as
the ancient city of Dali (ibid.). Their arduous journey failed in its primary
object - to find a navigable route to China along the Mekong - owing to the
frequency of rapids along the river's course. The Frenchmen did, however,
establish beyond doubt that southern China was rich in the resources they
coveted, and was the site of considerable commercial activity. But the area was
chronically unstable - among other conflicts there was a long-standing revolt by
the Muslim minority in western Yunnan - and the rugged terrain made travel and
transport extremely difficult. The valley of the Red River, in contrast, offered
an easier route for French trade through Hanoi to Kunming. As British control in
Burma extended in the 1880s and early 1890s, with the Salween as the effective
border between Upper Burma and China, but the frontier not well defined (Hall,
1968), the borderland between the Salween and the Mekong lapsed into a state of
anarchy with Shan, Kachin and Chinese warloads in competition, for much of the
time leading up to World War II.

The emerging Mekong Corridor In the past 30 years China has built a
well-articulated road system in the southwest quarter of Yunnan, where formerly
there were mostly tracks and caravan trails. The road network is centred, of
course, on Kunming. It was certainly not built with cross-border trade as a main
consideration, but nonetheless the road network now links the few border towns,
many near-border towns and designated border market-places to the province as a
whole. At much the same time as main roads were being built in Yunnan, Thailand
acquired its highway system, in the 1960s and 1970s, as an integral part of the
spectacular economic growth then beginning in the northern provinces. As a
consequence, for about a decade now it has been possible to travel 800 km from
Kunming to Daluo on a bitumen-sealed, two-lane highway; and from the Thai border
town of Mae Sai, 800 km on a bitumen-sealed highway to Bangkok. Thailand and
Yunnan are both experiencing rapid economic growth, but the physical gap which
separates them (between Daluo and Mae Sai) is approximately 250 km of bad roads.
In 1990 travel between Mae Sai and Kengtung was said to require 8 1/2 hours
non-stop on a motor-cycle, but improvements are now under way, as part of
SLORC's Border Area Development Program (Porter, 1992). The prospect of an
'Asian Highway' through the Mekong Corridor, linking Kunming with Bangkok and
peninsular Southeast Asia is clearly coming closer to reality.

The emerging Mekong Corridor?

But before considering likely future effects of the Mekong Corridor, we
might well ask why Yunnan's border trade and expansion of its trans-border
trading area increased dramatically only after 1985. A useful indicator is the
growth of 'semi-official trade' through Dehong Prefecture, the most important
administrative area for Yunnan's trade with Burma : between 1985 and 1991 the
gross value of semi-official trade through Dehong Prefecture increased from 11
million yuan to 132 million yuan (1100 per cent!), with exports of consumer
goods such as textiles, clothing, 'daily necessities', chemicals, bicycles,
petrol and building materials comprising 66 per cent of exports in 1991 (Tan,
1992).

In answering the question about the recency of change, we can identify a
number of factors which have radically affected cross-border trade and the
expansion of Yunnan's trading area, including its expansion through Laos and
Eastern Shan State towards northern Thailand.

Development in the Yunnan periphery. Following establishment of the People's
Republic in 1949 there was a continuing southwards migration of Han Chinese,
into farming areas previously dominated by Tai (Dai) and other minorities, and
into towns and cities for employment. Road construction was closely linked with
this growth in population and production which clearly served both economic and
political objectives, notably in helping to secure the provincial periphery.
State-owned industries played an important part in some areas: rubber, for
example, was successfully established on State farms in the 1970s, particularly
in Xishuangbanna (Chapman, 1991).

Liberalization of the Chinese economy. Beginning in 1978 when China introduced
the `household responsibility system' in rural areas, a succession of reforms
affected first the rural economy, and then industrial and administrative
activities. These decisive moves allowed a great deal of scope for development
of local enterprise. Greater autonomy was granted to provincial, prefectural and
county governments and after 1984 there was greater autonomy for
state-controlled enterprises (Blecher, 1991). At the same time township and
village enterprises were encouraged and, following further fiscal reforms in
1988 there was a marked strengthening of financial incentives for township and
county governments to sponsor local industries (Hong Xiaoyuan, 1992) and - in
border localities - to foster cross-border trade as a source of taxation
revenue.

Relaxation of controls on border trade From the early 1950s until the Cultural
Revolution began in 1965-66, most border trade in China was subject to the
control of state-run commercial agencies; and then for more than a decade
(1965-78) most trade was cut off. Even local trade, for example in markets in
border areas, was closely restricted before 1984. Controls on local trade were
progressively relaxed and 'semi-official trade' was allowed to operate under
fewer controls. This had special benefit for township and county enterprises
seeking to expand production and so to increase their income from taxes and
fees.

Events in Burma and Laos

While rapid economic changes were occurring in
southwest Yunnan in the later 1980s, the economy of Laos made little progress
and Burma continued to suffer turmoil and strife until 1989, when the Communist
Party of Burma collapsed. Shortly thereafter SLORC announced its Border Area
Development Program and in the next three years welcomed an expansion of
cross-border trade, for the provision of consumer goods and normal customs
revenue, and to improve its tarnished international image (Porter, 1992). With
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Laos has lost its once-powerful ally, and so
both Laos and Eastern Shan State are now more vulnerable to the economic
expansion of China and Thailand in and through the emerging Mekong Corridor.

Observations in three border localities, 1992

In February 1992 two of the authors (Hinton and Tan) visited the main locations
for cross-border trade in Xishuangbanna, at Daluo in Menghai County, on the
Burmese frontier, and at Maw Haw on the border with Laos, about 75 km southwest
of Mengla (Map). Jingrong Tan also obtained information on Dehong Prefecture
which controls about four-fifths of Yunnan's cross-border trade, in gross value.
There are then marked differences in the importance of the three locations, but
officials at each were equally keen to retain and if possible increase the trade
they handled, because of its immediate importance for local revenues.

Dehong Prefecture had a population of 920,280 at the 1990 Census and,
with Xishuangbanna, was the fastest-growing prefecture in Yunnan Province
between 1982 and 1990 (Population Census Office of Yunnan Province, 1990). In
1992 there were 10 roads connecting the four counties to Burma, but most of the
border trade was handled by Riuli (about half) and Wanding city; 65 per cent of
exports came from beyond Yunnan; about 70 per cent of exports were then shipped
to destinations in northeast Burma and another 20 per cent to Lower Burma and
Rangoon. Most of the exports at Dehong were consumer goods, as stated before,
and imports were overwhelmingly agricultural products, teak and other timber,
hides, rubber and precious stones (diamonds, jade). In 1990 more than 3 million
individuals crossed the border (Tan, 1992). But perhaps the most exciting
feature of all was the rapid growth at Dehong of manufacturing and service
industry, including commercial agencies acting for other prefectures anxious to
develop their cross-border trade.

Daluo, on the other hand, had a total revenue from border trade
amounting to only a small fraction of that at Dehong, but again there was
evidence of rapid growth and high expectations. In Daluo town itself there were
crowded markets along the main street, with goods for sale that were not easily
obtained elsewhere in China: they included cigarettes, cosmetics, agricultural
chemicals and clothes with fake designer labels, available at bargain prices.
Many of these had originated in Thailand. Side streets were lined with new and
elaborate apartment blocks, privately owned and bought with profits from
cross-border trade dealings.

Local officials at Daluo decried the occupation by the Burmese Communist
Party (BCP) of the adjacent area of Burma, as the BCP army levied an additional
tax on goods passing through its territory (4 per cent paid to the Burma
Government; 4 per cent paid to the BCP). Officials feared that trade would
consequently be diverted to border towns which were not affected in this way.
Without exception, they saw border trade as being a key to the future prosperity
of their county, and regarded other counties to the north as being in direct
competition.

At the border itself, 3-4 km from Daluo town, there was a festive
atmosphere. Stalls sold food to Chinese tourists from Kunming and even further
afield, who photographed one another on either side of the border post which was
inscribed in Chinese on one side, Burmese on the other. The barracks of a BCP
contingent overlooked the border post and khaki-clad BCP soldiers mingled with
the crowd, along with watchful soldiers from the Chinese PLA.

Shang Yong, the third location, is a border post near Maw Haw, about 75
km southwest of Mengla, the county bordering Laos. It was a contrast to Daluo in
one main respect: whereas the cross-border trade at Daluo was established and
flourishing, at Shang Hong it was still being promoted and built up by
officials, for the now familiar reason that increased customs revenue would
benefit the county. Already a considerable volume of raw materials flowed into
Menghai County from Laos, including logs, minerals and scrap metal (debris from
the Indochina War). But these items were not enough: Shang Yong was to be the
site of a trade fair (late February, 1992), a promotion conducted by county
officials in collaboration with local private interests.

From Shang Yong, or from Maw Haw, it is about 325 km through Laos to the
border town of Ban Houei Sai, on the Mekong opposite the Thai town of Chiang
Khong. This is currently the most direct and favoured route from Xishuangbanna
to Thailand, but the road through Laos was said to be so poor that less direct
routes were often used. These entailed the use of both land and river transport:
one route reached the Mekong above Ban Houei Sai and led to the Thai town of
Chiang Saen; another involved water transport down a tributary of the Mekong to
Ban Houei Sai/ Chiang Khong.

These are only three localities, among the small legion of official and
unofficial crossing-points between Yunnan, Burma and Laos, but for us they
helped to highlight some aspects of China's current practices in handling border
trade. Essentially, the legal trade is conducted on China's terms: business
transactions negotiated in Burma or Yunnan still require government approval in
Yunnan ('semi-official trade') before goods can cross the border. Burmese
businessmen and traders are often delayed at border points while formalities are
completed. Furthermore, after more than 30 years when Yunnan's borders were
virtually closed to foreign trade, border counties and even border towns within
the same county are now in active competition to attract cross-border trade. In
some instances county towns send envoys to centres in the hinterland of Yunnan
to promote their towns as good market-places; at the same time many enterprises
located well away from the border maintain commercial offices in border towns
(Ruili and Wanding are the outstanding examples), or use commercial agencies
located there. Remarkable as these practices might seem to be, they are wholly
consistent with the 'managerial responsibility system' introduced in 1984
(Blecher, 1991; Hong Xiaoyuan, 1992). Managers of township or county enterprises
(and the actual on-the-spot administration of border trade is effectively a
county and prefectural responsibility) are likely to hold their positions only
if they are successful in maintaining and increasing revenue for the local
governments concerned. Their success in turn provides increased revenue for
further county or prefectural investment, perhaps in new industries which may be
located at or near the border towns where tax advantages can be offered, as the
situation in Dehong now illustrates.

Prospects:

Turning back to the map, we may well ask whether the boldly-printed
border separating Yunnan and Laos is now any real hindrance to Chinese economic
domination of northeastern Burma and of the lands sandwiched between
Xishuangbanna and northern Thailand. Until 1949 the actual frontier with Burma
was of no real significance; then the border was virtually closed until the
early 1980s, but during the intervening decades the tide of economic development
from central Yunnan swelled to the peripheries of the province; and now, in the
few years since China's economic reforms, the tide of China's economic growth is
extending rapidly into trans-border areas. Again in the last few years, as
Thailand's economic boom has continued, the tide of Thai economic interests has
flowed ever more strongly from northern Thailand into Burma and Laos, most
notably in respect to the logging trade, but as well in the search for
additional markets for Thai manufactured goods, including markets in Yunnan.

Taking these developments into account, is the 'Mekong Corridor' likely
to become concrete reality in the near future and, if so, what economic and
cultural effects may follow? Our view is that even leaving aside recent changes
in Burma's borderland centred on Kengtung - and the maintenance of peaceful
conditions there will be of immense significance - modern roads southwards from
Yunnan, linking Thailand and Yunnan, are virtual necessities for the two
'economic giants' (China and Thailand) in the region. China may well choose to
develop another major route to Lower Burma and the Indian Ocean, as recent
reports have suggested, but good roads through the Mekong Corridor will provide
China with direct access to Thailand and peninsular Southeast Asia.

Whether the Burmese or the Laotian route between China and Thailand becomes of
greater significance in the next 10 years or so remains uncertain, for although
the Burmese route is more direct, the potential for political instability and
disruption of trade in upper Burma is arguably greater than in Laos, which seems
destined to be a minor player in regional politics. At the same time the power
of Chinese businessmen and warlords, residents in upper Burma for generations,
cannot be discounted. Their connections and interests, which are embedded deeply
in the Thai and Chinese systems, would undoubtedly be best served by an on-going
peace.

Last, but not least, there will be an increasing interpenetration of the
national cultures of the Thai, and of the Chinese, whether or not it is possible
to travel by a bitumen-sealed highway from Bangkok to Kunming by the Year 2000,
or a decade later. Han Chinese culture has expanded rapidly in the southwest
quarter of Yunnan and beyond in the the past 50 years, both as a consequence of
official policy and following spontaneous transmission. Thai culture - primarily
now Bangkok Thai culture, mediated by the Thai version of consumerism - is
transmitted, on the other hand, by ever more sophisticated electronic media, as
well as by personal contacts. The increasing presence of Thai tourists in
Xishuangbanna (Sip Song Panna), widely regarded by Thais as the cradle of their
civilization, is one significant manifestation of the regionalization of
culture. The result of the meeting of these two very assertive 'cultures' will
be fascinating to watch.

References

Blecher, M. 1991 'Sounds of silence and distant thunder: the crisis of economic
and political administration' in Goodman, D.S.G. and Segal, G. China in the
nineties, 35-63.

Hinton, Peter n.d. 'Travelling through Yunnan, China: 1862 and 1992', The
Australian Journal of Anthropology (forthcoming).

Hong Xiaoyuan, 1992 'Relationships between rural enterprises, township
communities and township governments in China: a study in Guanghan County of
Sichuan Province' unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Australian National University.

Osborne, Milton 1975 River road to China: the Mekong river expedition
1866-1873.

Population Census Office Of Yunnan Province, 1990 Major figures of manual
tabulation on 1990 Population Census of Yunnan Province.

George Lombard
Legal Officer, Canberra Regional Office
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Nature of the current emergency and UNHCR role.

On the hierarchy of human needs, survival is paramount and for the 250-300,000
Burmese Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, survival is certainly the only issue.
UNHCR was invited by the Bangladeshi government to assist with the emergency
about mid-February 1992, though the situation was clearly developing since June
of 1991. I was asked, as a lawyer working for the UNHCR office in Canberra, to
go to Bangladesh on the Monday, having been up to Mt Kosciosko on the Sunday,
and on the Thursday I was in Bangladesh ...

It was very much a piece of field research. We were there to find out
exactly what was causing these people to flee. The problem being that reports in
the press that these people were being killed and raped in large numbers were
not being believed, largely because we were talking about a group of Islamic
people and it is not regarded as usual for Islamic societies to report the
incidence of rape. They asked us to go in to apply, you may well say culturally
inappropriate, forensic techniques - but forensic techniques nevertheless - to
try and establish to some degree of certainty whether or not this incidence of
rape was taking place.

The situation I found there has potential to continue to develop into a
major humanitarian emergency through the stasis and inability of the governments
of Bangladesh and Burma and the inability of the UNHCR to effect a reasonable
compromise. We now have something like 300,000 Burmese refugees, people from
Arakan, who are Rohingyas a group to be defined in terms of race, religion and
language. Official figures say 250,000, but my information suggets that another
50,000 are not in a camp situation and are therefore not being counted. They
speak a dialect of Bengali, strictly speaking a sub-dialect of the Chittagonian
version of Bengali. They are distinctively Indian in racial type apart from the
results of some incidence of inter-marriage. They are quite distinct in religion
and culture and live in a well defined area of the northern end of Arakan state,
most refugess coming from the township areas of Buthidaung and Maungdaw.

The normal means of escape for these people is to travel westwards
across the Naaf River or north to parts of Bangladesh adjoining Arakan province.
Over the past six months something like 2000 refugees have died, primary causes
have been diarrhoea, malnutrition, malaria and cholera. The root aetiology for
this mortality includes poor sanitation, poor water supply, lack of shelter,
insufficient medical attention and the ignorance of the refugees themselves. In
short, a desperate situation has been forced on one of the poorest countries of
the world in order to allow these people to survive.

Those familiar with the UN system would know that we, UNHCR, have to
basically mount an appeal for funds before any long term program can be
underway. The final appeal was for 27 million dollars of which 20 million has
been raised. The shortfall has the effect of diminishing the quality of care in
the long term and, of course, the equivalent amount of 27 million dollars is
needed starting in about March next year when the cycle of annual funding has to
repeat itself. For all that a lot has been done - almost all the refugees are
under some form of plastic or shelter.We have a comprehensive food assistance
program done in conjunction with WFP and a variety of NGOs, there are lots of
refugees with UNHCR plastic above their heads. You can see the blue water-trucks
and the blue godowns everywhere - indications that, in conjunction with others,
we are working.

These people face a most despicable situation which must, in my view, be
far worse than a lot of the failure of economic initiatives in other parts of
Burma which have been discussed today. We are talking about people who are
really at the lowest rank of development, people who in leaving Burma have
effectively been deprived of their land and if they go back, will be forced to
work in a sort of subsistence existence without security at all. It is my view
that if we are to look at long term security there has to be a way to get the
SLORC to agree to make land available. Land which was taken away from these
people to give to Rakhine and also Burman people living in Arakan state.
Restoring the land to the Rohingyas of course is going to be a particularly
difficult process.

Causes

Much of what our survey found has been released in one form or another,
internationally. I was there from the 5th of March to the 7th of April. Our
survey shows the population is almost entirely Muslim with a small minority of
Hindus. Almost all of the people are of Bengali ethnicity - perhaps 1% may be
Burmans or Rakhine people who have converted to Islam through marriage or for
some other reason. Almost all are poor, rural, illiterate and if they are
educated at all they are normally only educated in Madrashas, i.e. Islamic
schools. Even then they have no more than an average of one or two years of
schooling which means they may understand the mechanics of writing but they
certainly cannot write themselves, whether in Urdu or English or Arabic or
whatever.

The folklore of the people that I interviewed, and I interviewed,
personally, over three hundred, once again on a forensic basis, suggests the
cause of the problem is the 1990 elections. It appears that in this area of
Arakan the elections were carried out with meticulous orthodoxy. No one was
denied the opportunity to register and every vote was duly recorded. It seems a
relatively simple process to access the voting records for each booth and then
create a little map of where pockets of resistance and opposition are. It seems
to me that the solution being proposed for Cambodia where the election is to
take place on a regional basis, rather than on a local, is a much safer solution
when it comes to protecting people. These people told us that almost universally
they voted for what they called the 'Kari Party'. In other words they voted for
the party with the symbol of the car. The car was the symbol of the party
suporting Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy.

After 1990, particularly from the middle of 1991 to early 1992 there was
an increase in forced labour, which they talk about incidentally, reflecting the
British tradition, as 'coolie' labour. This basically involved building military
camps in these two northern areas, building roads and cutting bamboo. In one
case where they talked to us about building a road that was a hundred feet wide,
I suspect they were actually building some sort of airstrip which they did not
recognize. The people are so culturally isolated that when they got to
Bangladesh, some of them seeing vehicles on the road, asked, in all honesty,
what sort of rice went into those things and where it was put in. The bottom
line here is that the roads were being built from south to north, linking up
towards the border areas.

We recorded a lower incidence of forced labour among the women than has
been recorded for the Karen and other similar studies elsewhere. We discovered
that after this initial onslaught of forced labour there was an intensification,
starting I think in about December to about February 1992, involving attacks on
the women. Most would agree that it is very hard to get people, women of any
race or religion, to talk about these things with complete strangers.
Nevertheless 46% of the women we talked to said they had been raped. This
represents something like over 50% of women of child-bearing age. The rapes took
place among women as young as 12, women as old as 50. The rapes were not
isolated incidents undertaken by individual soldiers on their own. There were
many pack rapes. Often the military would go to a village, go to a house,
looking for forced labour. If the men had run away they would rape the women.
You also had a pattern of women being taken back to the military camps and pack
raped there, working virtually in a field brothel. There were of course many
deaths reported through the rape of these women. It is my view that these rapes
were really the mechanism, the catalyst for the exodus. While any amount of
forced labour could be undertaken, while any amount of taxation, deprivatiuon of
property could be endured, when the attacks on the women started, people moved
to Bangladesh. Looking back through my material it seems that it was generally
no more than a lag of one or two weeks between the rape and the departure to
Bangladesh.

Operation Naga Min

It is going to be hard for these people to get back. Even if all other
conditions are favourable, many of them will have no papers and many of them
will have no land. UNHCR wants them to go back, but we also need to think about
what sort of development activities we can undertake. In a situation where it is
unclear whether the Burmese government, the SLORC, will allow a major UN
presence in this area I am really at a loss to say how we can promote this
process of repatriation. This has all happened once before. In 1978 under
operation Naga Min which is referred to in some of the literature, but not in
great detail, 200,000 refugees were forced to flee Arakan to Bangladesh. I was
able to do some research and I found some articles from the newspapers dating
from that era. What I find interesting is that these articles could just as
easily have been written about what is happening today. To an extent I guess
there is hope because it suggests we can adopt the same methods in getting these
people back into Burma. But there is also despair because, obviously, unless we
work much harder at finding a way to get these people back in conditions of
safety and dignity the same patterns, the same cycle, will recur once again.

Prospects for repatriation

When I suggest there is no hope for repatriation that is not entirely true. As
early as April there were talks about repatriation and Burmese and Bangladeshi
governments reached an agreement, a set of conditions for voluntary return. The
only thing that stalled the immediate repatriation of those people was that the
refugees did not want to go and that there was no agreement that the
international community should be involved, meaning either UNHCR or NGOs.

On 24 October 1992 Reuter reported the following

Bangladesh reported a policy change by Burma on Saturday, quoting Burmese
officials as saying Rangoon would consider allowing the United Nations to
oversee repatriation of Moslem refugees.

A Bangladeshi offical said that the Burmese side gave this assurance during
talks between Burmese and Bangladeshi delegations in [Chittagong].

'Burmese officials told us they would actively allow United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees to oversee the return of refugees to their homes in
Burma', Omar Farouk the leader of the Bangladeshi team, said. 'There is
clearly a welcome change of heart in Burma', Farouk said of Saturday's meeting.
Farouk said that he was convinced the Rohingyas who had returned to Burma were
well treated by the authorities in Arakan. Most had got back their homes and
other property.

He said the Burmese officials agreed to let Bangladeshi journalists visit the
resettlement area in Maungdaw township in Arakan.

Now against that I have a situation report put out by my organization on 17
November, this week, which makes no mention of any repatriation movement
voluntary or otherwise. It is not clear to me what is happening and I don't want
to give you the impression that there is no hope. On the other hand I don't
think I can give you the impression that the Burmese governmenmt has relaxed its
stand entirely.

For their part, the Burmese officials must be aware of the increasing
politicization of the refugees. Given that there has been a significant
involvement of various Islamic organizations, Iranian, Iraqi, with the refugees.
There has been some talk of a Medecins sans Frontiers hospital being boycotted
by the refugees under the influence of Islamic relief organizations, because MSF
people are European Christians. There is a lot of potential tension for both
governments - the Bangladeshi, because there is the potential for the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism - but also for the Burmese, because ostensibly the
activities against these people have been carried out because the two
organizations the RF and the RSO were allegedly waging border campaigns against
the Burmese military. It has never been established that there were ever any
more than 500 or so fighters in both organizations combined. What is happening,
it seems to me, is that the Burmese government has in fact created a situation
where there are many more guerilla fighters ready to fight, many more people who
have been politicized by this operation than would otherwise have been. So
perhaps, with an eye to that, the Burmese government realizes that it has to
slow down the process of politicization.

Certainly the Bangladeshi government is quite willing to get rid of
them. They, the refugees, have received assistance - sometimes I guess, in
advance of what the local people may expect to receive. There has been a lot of
bitterness about the use of firewood, the use of water. There has been a lot of
bitterness about the way the international workers have influenced the local
economy. But the mechanics of getting them home is going to be very difficult -
and obviously only those who are in camps, who are registered in camps, have any
hope of being returned. Those who have gone into the general Bangladeshi
community will find it impossible to go back. For so many of them who have had
their papers taken away from them, it is quite clear that the Bangladeshi
government is going to have a very difficult negotiation process to establish
their bona fides. The Burmese nationality law is drafted in such a way that no
Rohingya can ever become a citizen of Burma. That too is going to have to be
negotiated if these people are going to return.

Regarding the environment and particularly the forest resource two quite
different developments are of interest in the border area of Thailand and Burma.
They are different in that one deals with resource exploitation and resulting
environ-mental degradation - this is happening in Burma and I have to rely on
newspaper articles as a source of information - whereas the other one deals with
resource conservation as a measure to prevent environmental degradation - here I
am relying on my own research conducted in 1990/91 in Northern Mae Hong Son
Province. Both developments originate from the concern for the environment in
Thailand and particularly for deforestation which has been and still is 'a
never-ending problem of the nation' which 'has reached alarming dimensions' to
quote two descriptions of the problem on the Thai side of the border.

In 1913 the percentage of total area under forest was estimated to be
about 75 % but is now down to perhaps 25 %. The causes of deforestation are
manifold but the common perception about the main actors involved is not.
Officially it is the forest encroachment by rural people and in the northern
border areas particularly hilltribe shifting cultivators who are blamed for the
destruction of the forests.

Thailand's forest laws have been constantly amended during the past 50
years mainly in reaction to perceived and real problems. The most dramatic
amendment to the Forest Act was introduced in reaction to catastrophic flash
floods in two southern provinces in November 1988. For the first time logging
was officially blamed for causing a catastrophe which resulted in the death of
350 people. As a result logging was banned.

The pledge to halt logging by the then Prime Minister Chatichai serves
as an entry point to my presentation. The declaration of the logging ban was
celebrated as a significant victory by environmentalists but caused
consternation to the timber industry. But not for long. Already in mid-December,
Thai army commander General Chaovalit flew to Rangoon to secure exploitation
rights to Burma's resources amongst them timber. As a result, Thailand got
access to the much needed teak and other hardwoods and Burma's empty state
coffers were filled with the much needed hard currencies.

Just two months later, 20 concession areas of which 16 were in
rebel-held territory, had been contracted along the Thai-Burma border and the
Burmese government's Timber Corporation estimated revenues of US$112
million/year from logging alone.

There had always been logging by Thai companies on the Burmese side of
the border in close cooperation with ethnic minorities. Karen rebels rewarded in
April 1989 more 'official' concessions to five Thai companies. The Karens had
depended on the forests to pay for their war and therefore carefully stuck to
the British devised 'Burma Selection System' for logging which ensured that the
supply of trees did not run out.

By July 1989 already 40 concessions had been granted mostly to Thai
companies and the granting of new licences was halted by the Burmese. Though
faced with numerous problems, Thai companies were able to import large
quantities of teak which dwarfed Thailand's own production before the logging
ban. Up to 40 checkpoints were opened to facilitate the transport. Imports rose
dramatically and Thai companies considered re-export of logs. Logging also took
place in Laos and Cambodia and Thai businessmen toasted 'the last tree in Laos,
Cambodia or Burma'.

Though the Burmese authorities stressed that no depletion and
environmental adverse effects would occur, it appears that the opposite happened
and criticism by Thai and international environmentalists grew.

But even careless and destructive techniques did not automatically
result in large profit margins. The logging companies were faced with numerous
problems. During the dry season, Burmese government forces stepped up the war
against the ethnic minorities with severely disrupted logging. During the wet
season transport was difficult. Protection fees had to be paid to the ethnic
minorities and commanders of Burmese army divisions. Safety for workers could
not be ensured and trucks were in short supply. Loggers were frequently arrested
by Burmese troops and because of the continual fighting, logging operations had
to be suspended for several months.

In March 1990, most firms claimed to operate at a loss because of the
disruptions and the lack of coordination among Burmese authorities. These
difficulties led to even more indiscriminate and illegal cutting on the Thai
side. Foreign relief agency officials said that the Thai companies were logging
the timber wealth as fast as they could. Consequently environmental activists
called for a complete halt of logging in Burma. International pressure on
Thailand, mainly from the US grew and a New York Democrat claimed 'Every teak
log from Burma is being extracted by the Thais at the cost of a human life' and
'the Thai military is profiting from the desperation of the Burmese regime'.

The ultimate losers of what could be termed 'logging rampage' were the
ethnic minorities and the environment. In June 1990, experts claimed that the
long-term damage to Burma's economic and ecological future could be severe, and
the destruction was being ranked as among the world's great environmental
tragedies by the United Nations. Karen villagers watching the rape of their
ancient homeland said their tolerance was running out. Thai loggers were accused
of leaving felled trees to rot and in October 1990 logging was banned in two of
the six districts under Karen control, even though the Karens profited from the
logging in the same way as the Burmese authorities.

Laos banned logging at the end of 1991 and in early 1992 the then Thai
Prime Minister Anand said his government had decided to discourage the private
sector from logging in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. Vietnam banned log
exports in May 1992.

Not much information is available about what has happened since then.
The Thai timber industry still needs logs and it appears that the Thais have
changed their strategy when the Forest Industry Organization proposed in Burma
and Laos.

In summary, it can be noted that Thai companies were on a rampage in
Burmese forests for at least two years. Virtually all of the firms involved in
the logging had financial links with senior members of the military and the Thai
Government. This indicates that the Thais have no hesitation in exporting
environmental degradation - not to talk about financially supporting the war in
the border areas - whereas on their own soil they are intensifying efforts to
preserve forests especially in environmentally critical areas such as the
watersheds in Northern Thailand.

This takes me to the second part of my presentation or 'the other side
of the coin'. Until the early 1950s there was little government concern for the
highlands and its inhabitants. While the concern for border security was the
basis for early government interventions some 40 years ago, the main concerns
today are the low economic level of most tribal people, opium production and
narcotic trafficking, soil erosion and forest destruction in the northern
watersheds.

Attempts to link sustainable development with drug control are more than
30 years old but the earlier approach of opium crop replacement was broadened
during the 1980s to agricultural and social development. Originally, the
principal agencies involved in highland development were the Office of Narcotics
Control Board and he Department of Public Welfare. The growing concern for the
deterioration of the watersheds increased the power of the Royal Forest
Department which is now the executing agency of the two UN-funded projects,
initiated in 1987.

Today, numerous development projects located in Northern Thailand
combine opium suppression with socio-economic development and conservation.
Independent of the main agency involved the project strategies are very similar
and all projects include some form of watershed management, soil and water
conservation and alternative cash crop component.

The financial resources contributing to nine projects in Northern
Thailand initiated between 1981 and 1987 are in the order of US$75 million. This
indicates how serious the government and the funding agencies are in solving
real and perceived problems.

Attempts to reduce forest encroachment and opium production basically
focus on the introduction of so-called 'sustainable farming technologies',
designed to replace shifting cultivation, and new cash crops designed to replace
opium as an income generating crop.

The introduction of alternative cash crops faces numerous problems and
many crops appear to go through boom and bust periods. Coffee, for example, once
viewed as very promising suffers from very intensive management requirements and
falling prices. Other perennial crops such as fruits have been locally
successful even without any outside assistance. Cabbage on the other hand has
been so successful in some areas that it lead to more deforestation, not less.

The objective of the recommended soil and water conservation
technologies is to maintain soil fertility and productivity by reducing soil
erosion. The basic concept of this technology consists of alternating grass or
perennial strips with crops planted parallel to the contour line. Crop choice is
left to villagers and in Northern Mae Hong Son villagers planted rice and corn
in the wet season and red kidney bean in the dry season.

While countless research projects have shown that the recommended
technologies reduce soil erosion and run-off drastically, the technologies do
very little in alleviating the need for shifting crop production (especially
rice) after one to three years. About 95 % of the villagers I interviewed said
that shifting cultivation was necessary because of massive weed infestations.
The soil and water conservation technologies rather increase weed pressure than
reduce it. This automatically requires increased labor inputs during the wet
season when labor is traditionally in short supply. Most project participants
reported that production on their conservation fields declined in the same way
as it did on the traditional fields. While most were maintaining one or even two
conservation fields, they did so only because of the incentives they received
and because they felt they had to since their village was included in a
development project. Many villagers including the so-called 'non-adopters'
rejected the technology as a good idea. One villager described best the general
feeling of most people when he said: Now there are too many people and the
government does not allow us to cut any more trees to make new fields. Life was
much easier for the older generation. But grass - referring to the recommended
grass strips - is certainly not the solution to the problems we are facing at
present.

The analysis of these two recent developments indicates that the growing concern
for Thailands natural resources and particularly forests led to two distinct
strategies which were both not in the interest of the people who live in the
border areas in Northern Thailand and Burma; and it is also doubtful whether
they have done anything towards 'solving the never-ending problem of the
nation'.

The export of deforestation to Burma has not only resulted in
environmental degradation but also increased human suffering because the price
for the exploitation rights provided the Burmese authorities with the much
needed capital to step up their war against the ethnic minorities. The
introduction of inappropriate agricultural technologies on the Thai side of the
border on the other hand has done nothing to reduce the pressure on the forests
in the long-term. If anything at all, at least in my study area, many people are
worse off now then they were before the development project started. It should
not be surprising, therefore, that many respondents claimed that in the near
future they would have to step up opium production again and clear more forests.

These negative developments call for a concerted effort by all parties
involved and the first step in the right direction would be realistic land-use
plans which consider that some areas which are gazetted 'Reserve Forest' are in
actual fact inhabited and suitable for farming. Local people should be allowed
to participate in forest management and initial steps have been taken to
introduce community forestry. The whole logging industry needs to be overhauled
and sustainable forest management techniques developed. And the introduction of
agricultural innovations need to be accompanied by a close communication and
cooperation between farmers and concerned agencies. While these recommendations
are not sufficient to guarantee a more equitable distribution of costs and
benefits and to prevent further encroachment on the still forested areas they
are necessary first steps in the right direction.

A previous article (Newsletter Number 18, September 1992) outlined the events
leading to the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma, the subsequent accords
between SLORC and remnants of the CPB, and the involvement of various United
Nations agencies in the Border Area Development Program. The accords, alongside
economic liberalisation in China and increasing dependence on imported
commodities in Burma, have led to a boom in cross border trade linking the Shan
border areas with Yunnan and northern Thailand. This article looks at aspects of
narcotics production and trade and, closely related, the potential spread and
impacts of HIV/AIDS.

Narcotics Production and Trafficking

Local leaders, reported to be heavily involved in poppy and heroin refining
(some since 1968 as CPB leaders) routinely disavow this and claim they are ready
and willing to participate in UN drug control activities. Clearly, by signing
regional agreements with China, Thailand and Lao, the government of Myanmar has
agreed to the three aims of the UN Drug Control Program, namely:

- to eliminate trafficking in narcotic drugs and chemicals used in
refining of narcotic drugs across the border;

- to eliminate poppy cultivation in the areas adjacent to the border
through economic and social development programmes; and

- to eliminate the demand for and local consumption of narcotic drugs in
border areas.12

The obstacles to achieving these aims are well documented and few UN
officials expect poppy production to be eliminated within the SLORC-announced
period of six years in the Kokang and ten years in the Wa areas. Under
incomparably more positive conditions, almost thirty years effort and around
US$25,000 per capita was expended toward this effort in northern Thailand. This
required a massive effort in infrastructure development, and not least important
the emergence of urban centres (such as Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai) based on
tourism and industry, to provide markets, and hence improved prices, for
agricultural products introduced to compete with poppy.

Comparisons with the north Thailand experience however, fail to take
into account questions regarding SLORC and local command involvement in opium
and heroin production and trafficking, about which there are numerous reports.
Indeed, observers have pointed to the 1989 accords as the principal explanation
for reported three-fold increases in opium production in the 1989 to 1991 period
- in the order of 2,000 tonnes is reputed to have been produced in the bumper
year 1991-92.

Yet whilst the accords may have eased surveillance on the trafficking of
poppy and provided more secure havens for investment of ill-gotten gains, they
do not account for the already steady increases in production prior to the CPB
collapse. It is known that China's economic liberalisation fostered trading
ventures on the Burma side of the border, thus creating markets for local
products such as rice, pulses and other staples, well prior to the legalisation
of black market trading. Moreover, between 1989 and 1991, the value of the kyat
depreciated by more than 100 per cent, thus contributing to high levels of local
inflation in prices at times of food scarcity.

These events had important implications for upland farming communities
in the border areas. Recent research indicates that around 90 per cent of
households are not achieving self-sufficiency in grain and having, on average,
only some 6.3 months of grain supplies per year. In these circumstances and
given the inflationary effects of cross border trading on staple prices,
especially during the food deficit months, it is evident why poppy production
has escalated and how the upland farmers have become increasingly dependent on
this product. Poppy has great advantages (low bulk, high value, easy transport)
over other crops in the present circumstances. Important also, for households
short of labour and distant from markets, the added benefit of poppy is that the
market, the trader, comes to the village, whereas other crops must be carted to
the market centres. In short, recent changes in the regional economy,
contributing to inflation in the price of staples, goes some way to explaining
rapid increases in production - it is open to speculation how much of this
increase may also be attributed to the favourable political conditions created
by the SLORC-militia accords and improved links with Thailand.

In light of Thai experience, the levels of resources available to poppy
replacement activities in the BADP are clearly inadequate. And regardless of
whether one accepts SLORC and militia assurances of their good intentions on
poppy, the involvement of the diplomatic community in the quite farcical, yet
well publicised, ritual destruction of opium stockpiles and heroin refineries
clearly diverts attention from other important issues.13 Moreover, for agencies
sponsoring alternate, humanitarian activities, the association of the UN and
diplomatic community with ritual publicity events gives quite confusing signals
to local people outside the militia-SLORC circles. Indeed, given the
significance of poppy to the survival of a surprisingly large number of upland
people, as well as the other competing worthwhile activities on which
development assistance could be expended, a vigorous eradication program should
be opposed on humanitarian grounds.

Prostitution and HIV/AIDS

The links between narcotics and the HIV/AIDS pandemic are well known. It is
reported that of 10,000 drug addicts HIV tested in Yangon by the government
health department, 85% of them were seropositive. It is estimated there are now
160,000 heroin users in Myanmar.

There is a growing demand for Myanmar and Chinese girls in Thailand,
reflecting the fact that they cost less than Thais. Border area minorities are
disproportionately affected by this escalating trade. Of some 40,000 prostitutes
from Myanmar's ethnic minorities in Thailand overall, there are reported to be
10,000 Shan prostitutes in Chiang Mai alone. Around 20 per cent of local Shan
prostitutes returning from northern Thailand are reported to be HIV infected.14
At the regional level, there is great potential for rapid escalation of the
HIV-AIDS problem from Thailand into Yunnan and Myanmar, both currently
considered low HIV risk areas.

Particular trends in the prostitution industry may be accentuated by the
economic development of the Shan border areas. There is little evidence that
knowledge of HIV/AIDS amongst clients, brothel owners and traffickers reduces
the demand for services. However, the pattern of demand is said to change, where
informed clients begin to insist on very young girls, which in turn fosters a
higher turnover of girls. It is reported that brothel owners now recruit a new
batch of girls every six months in order to reduce the likelihood of their being
infected. Consequently, traffickers now travel further afield in search of
novices, always homing in on the poorest, most isolated and uneducated
communities.15 A trafficking route now extends from southern Yunnan, through to
Keng Tung, on to northern Thailand, and the brothels of Bangkok or Malaysia.

The policies of all three governments are unusually conducive to the
rapid and unfettered penetration of trucking operations. Myanmar-Thai trade is
reported to have nearly doubled between 1989 and 1990, and Myanmar-China trade
is exceeds US$1.5 billion per year.16 Both Chinese and Thai authorities are
keenly facilitating the construction of all-weather, 10-wheel truck roads
through Myanmar territory; the former to take advantage of Thai port facilities
for Yunnanese agricultural exports, just as Thai traders are enthusiastic to
connect with Yunnan's burgeoning consumer market. The links between Thailand and
Yunnan will be the Thai truckers. Already Thai Toyota Hiluxes, always the
advance guard, are found trading as far north as the Kokang. The trucking
industry is associated with the highest concentration of AIDS in Thailand, and
the lowest concentration of treatment facilities. Approximately 3-5 per cent of
Thai truckers are HIV infected, this is expected to climb to 10-29 per cent by
the year 2000.17

Also important is the fact that the Thai trucking industry is growing
faster than the general economy, there is already a shortage of truck drivers,
and one might expect great increase in employment opportunities for young Shan,
Kokang and Wa males - who in turn will doubtless accelerate the spread of HIV
infection beyond prostitution and service circles. Furthermore the rapidly
growing transport sector in Myanmar will itself require a parallel service
industry. According to Thai research, more than 70 per cent of the cheaper
prostitutes, those found in local truck service points, were found to be
infected with HIV, compared with less than 20 per cent infection rates in those
working the top end of the market.

The potential impact of the HIV/AIDS virus on the border areas could
prove disastrous. It now seems a truism that 'poverty, discrimination, political
disempowerment, economic marginalisation, and hopelessness' are all linked with
increased speed and diffusion of the virus. The following points provide a
glimpse of how this may work in the upland areas.

The poorest amongst these households, roughly 50 percent of the upland
population, suffer appalling conditions. Families tend to be small (4 as an
average) and very frequently female headed, as a result of the twin ravages of
war (upland households provided much cannon fodder for the previous conflict)
and chronic ill-health. There is a shortage of active labour (2.2 for landless,
1.7 for semi-landless and 1.6 for female headed households), a high dependency
ratio (51%), no draught power, very few or no small stock and the already noted
chronic food deficit.18 Wage labour, sales of non-timber forest products and
growing of opium poppy are survival strategies.

Morbidity and death rates are difficult to determine, but infant
mortality rates in some upland villages of northern Wa and the Mekong district
are between 300/1000 and 470/1000. In the order of 25-40 per cent of household
labour time is lost through partially or wholly debilitating illnesses -
including the usual preventable malarial, gastro-diarrhoeal and respiratory
tract ailments, exacerbated by protein/vitamin A deficiencies.

One side effect of these conditions (as well as the insecurities caused
by the prolonged conflict) is that the environmental resources available to the
bulk of the population are often in poor repair. Adult labour is required to
prepare and maintain water control and soil conservation structures (and
sometimes this is culturally required to be male labour) as well as to clear
land in the shifting system that predominates. Existing gardens are often
overused, fallow periods are frequently too short, and yields steadily decline -
all reflecting the shortage of healthy adult labour for land clearance and
weeding.

To overlay the potential impacts of HIV/AIDS on this situation is
perverse and inevitably speculative. There is an urgent need to develop
responses for the agricultural sector which are in advance of the worst impact
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. These responses would include labour saving devices in
agricultural production (such as improved draught animal power, improved small
scale irrigation) and associated works, such as household water supply which
substitute domestic labour time, so releasing it for agricultural activities.
One would expect that the worst effects will be felt by the smaller families,
especially those on poorer soils, with smaller areas of land available, and who
lack viable cash crops or access to off-farm employment opportunities.

Amongst the plethora of reports and recommended actions for UN activity
in the border areas, it is alarming how little attention has been given to this
potential crisis.19 A rapid escalation in the HIV/AIDS pandemic, combined with
the inordinantly difficult task of mounting effective treatment, prevention and
education programmes in such remote localities, could dramatically effect all
aspects of the society, economy and environment. Yet pre-emptive programmes
could reasonably become the most cost effective and prominent feature of UN
agency activities.

Kevin Heppner points out that the Burmese defence budget for 1993 is $1.26
billion and not $20 billion as we printed in the last Newsletter. Also the UN
Human Right Commission Special Rapporteur on Burma is Dr Yozo Yokota. We regret
the errors.

We have had two responses to the Porter article 'A note on United Nations
involvement in the border area development program' (Number 18) from Kevin
Heppner and Chao Tzang Yawnghwe. These will be published in Number 20. Part 2 of
the 1964 UN report on opium in Burma has also been held over to the next issue.

*

The editor of this issue has received a card of greetings from Dr Tu Ja Manam,
General Secretary of the Democratic Alliance of Burma and Deputy to Bran Seng,
leader of the Kachin Independence Organization, dated 16 December 1992. Dr Tu Ja
writes:

I joined the NCGUB/DAB [National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma/
Democratic Alliance of Burma] UN lobby team. We stayed in the USA about one and
a half months. I feel that our trip was quite successful. More nations including
some ASEAN nations showed their support. Our resolution sponsored by the Swedish
mission was passed by the 3rd Committee of UN. It would be passed by the UNGA
too.

Mr Yozo Yokota is visiting Burma. NCG/DAB leaders met him in Bangkok on his way
to Rangoon. Now he is visiting Bangladesh. From there he will come back to
Thailand and visit the Thai-Burma border to see refugee camps

An update on the information in an article by Josef KolmO(a,)s in the same
journal ['China's minority nationalities (some statistical observations' 48 no.
1 1980: 1-21)]. Contains much useful statistical data. Some of the Yunnan
information is reproduced below.

The National Thai Studies Centre has made a grant to the Newsletter for its
continued publication. With funding from the Department of Anthropology this
assures the publication of the Newsletter in 1993 and 1994. We are extremely
grateful for these sources of support.

*

Scott Bamber is currently on fieldwork in Thailand and this issue of the
Newsletter is edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene. Dr Bamber returns at the end of
January. Correspondence may be sent either to him at CHRTU, University of
Western Australia or to Gehan Wijeyewardene, Department of Anthropology, RSPacS,
ANU, Canberra ACT 0200. Please note new ANU address.

The e-mail address for correspondence is gew400@coombs.anu.edu.au.

***

1 The Newsletter writes the name of the country in this fashion, but there has
been no editorial interference with authors who prefer to use 'Myanmar'.

12. Statement by Police Major General San Thein, Director General of People's
Force and Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, at the
ceremony for the signing of the Project Documents on Subregional Cooperation
between Myanmar, China, Thailand and the UNDCP, Yangon, 12 June 1992.

13. Which include not just movement on national political issues and recognition
that the current SLORC-local militia accords do not provide a viable model for
resolution of narcotics issues. Required also is is a less expedient focus away
from impoverished upland farmers toward the increasingly sophisticated Chinese
sydicates and international cartels, and not least the culpability of officials
in neighbouring countries.

17. Yothin Sawaengdee and Pimonpan Isarapakdee 1991: Ethnographic Study of Long
Haul Truck Drivers For Risk of HIV Infection, Institute for Population and
Social Research, Mahidol University, mimeo.

18. This contrasts with upper stratum households (around 15%) of the population
who live mostly in lowland areas (about 10% of the total population) with more
labour (between 6.3 and 4.1), a lower dependency ratio (around 35%), access to
irrigated land and producing a slight food surplus.

19. It should be noted that recently this has been rectified in UNDP interest in
the border areas. The UNDP Program on HIV/AIDS and Development has expressed a
particular interest in this area. The HIV/AIDS issue has been explicitly
mentioned in the NCGUB-DAB Position Paper to the UN. (National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma and the Democratic Alliance of Burma, Position
Paper of Delegation to the UN General Assembly, 1992).