While the general argument that it is easier and more cost-effective to prevent conflicts before the outbreak of violence has considerable attraction, a rigorous approach to estimating the cost and benefits of this policy is still lacking. The objective of this study is to contribute to the development of such an approach. The project involves six case studies, three retrospective (the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, and Rwanda) and three prospective (Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and southern Sudan). Its main conclusion is that targeted programmes of conflict prevention are (or would have been) significantly cheaper than cure.

¿Part 1: The congestion of humanitarian space¿, assesses what affect the rapid proliferation
of the international aid community¿s presence in Sri Lanka has had on local level
relationships and emergency response capacities. It contends that the burgeoning presence
of aid agencies resulted in humanitarian assistance becoming a hotly contested and
competitive activity. It goes on to identify the possible factors that have contributed to the
rapid congestion of this space in suggesting an explanation of why the humanitarian
communities¿ normative standards appear to have failed.

This article reports on original research designed to track the impact on student learning and development of fundamental pedagogical changes - from tradition to critical pedagogy - in undergraduate conflict resolution teaching in the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. Using grounded theory methodology, the authors researched the transformative learning potential of the pedagogy. They found broad support for the pedagogy on student learning and development grounds in relation to the praxeological challenges of peacebuilding and conflict resolution work many of their students will expect to do after graduation. Out of the data emerged four clusters of learning experience that support transformative learning theory, particularly the role of disruption in learning and the importance of critical reflection, but that also, in a preliminary way, suggest some gaps in our current levels of understanding of transformative learning as praxis.

Throughout much of the 25-year Sri Lankan conflict, attention has focused on the confrontation between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. The views of the country¿s Muslims, who are 8 per cent of the population and see themselves as a separate ethnic group, have largely been ignored. Understanding their role in the conflict and addressing their political aspirations are vital if there is to be a lasting peace settlement. Muslims need to be part of any renewed peace process but with both the government and LTTE intent on continuing the conflict, more immediate steps should be taken to ensure their security and political involvement. These include control of the Karuna faction, more responsive local and national government, improved human rights mechanisms and a serious political strategy that recognises minority concerns in the east.
At least one third of Muslims live in the conflict-affected north and east and thus have a significant interest in the outcome of the war. They have often suffered serious hardship, particularly at the hands of the Tamil rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since 1990 Muslims have been the victims of ethnic cleansing, massacres and forced displacement by the insurgents.
The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was a disappointment to many Muslims. They had no independent representation at the peace talks, and many feared that any agreement that gave the LTTE exclusive control of the north and east, even in a federal arrangement, would be seriously detrimental to their own interests. Despite talks between Muslim leaders and the LTTE, they continued to suffer violent attacks. Since the resumption of large-scale military action in mid-2006, Muslims have again been caught up in the fighting in the east. Dozens have been killed and thousands displaced. They have also come into conflict with a new, pro-government Tamil paramilitary group, the Karuna faction. Memories of LTTE oppression are still fresh, and rancorous disputes with Tamils over land and resources remain potent in the east.
Muslim political leaders have often been divided, representing different historical experiences and geographical realities as well as personal and political differences. Muslims in the east and north ¿ who have been fundamentally affected by the conflict ¿ often have very different views from those who live in the south among the Sinhalese. Nevertheless, there is consensus on some key issues and a desire to develop a more united approach to the conflict.
Muslims have never resorted to armed rebellion to assert their political position, although some have worked with the security forces, and a few were members of early Tamil militant groups. Fears of an armed movement emerging among Muslims, perhaps with a facade of Islamist ideology, have been present since the early 1990s, but most have remained committed to channelling their frustrations through the political process and negotiating with the government and Tamil militants at different times.
There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists.
There is increasing interest among some Muslims in more fundamentalist versions of Islam, and there have been violent clashes between ultra-orthodox and Sufi movements. This kind of violence remains limited and most Muslims show considerable tolerance to other sects and other faiths. Nevertheless, the conflict is at least partly responsible for some Muslims channelling their frustrations and identity issues into religious disputes.
Muslim peace proposals have tended to be reactive, dependent on the politics of the major Tamil and Sinhalese parties. Muslim autonomous areas in the east are being pursued but seem unlikely to be accepted by the present government. Muslims are concerned about Colombo¿s plans for development and governance in the east, which have not involved meaningful consultation with ethnic minorities and do not seem to include significant devolution of powers to local communities.
In the longer term, only a full political settlement of the conflict can allow historical injustices against the Muslims to be addressed and begin a process of reconciliation. The LTTE, in particular, needs to revisit the history of its dealings with the Muslims if it is to gain any credibility in a future peace process in which the Muslims are involved. Only an equitable settlement, in which Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim community concerns are adequately addressed, can really contain the growing disillusionment among a new generation of Sri Lankan Muslims.

Since the election of Hugo Chávez Frías to the Venezuelan presidency in 1998 on a platform of `revolutionary¿ change, the country has been wracked by political turmoil and violence between pro- and anti-government groups. While the political crisis has been reported and portrayed as a new phenomenon that has emerged as a result of Chávez's policy programme and style of government, this article argues that the conflict has deep historical roots and that it has been shaped by the legacy of political organisation in the pre-Chávez period.

This paper seeks to examine the underlying factors that will influence international security in
the coming decades. In contrast to the Cold War era, it will be argued that two fundamental
issues will largely determine the evolution of conflict - the widening socio-economic
polarisation and problems of environmental constraints. Taken together with the proliferation
of military technologies, the paper argues that attempts to maintain the present world order in
the interests of a minority elite are unlikely to succeed and will, instead, enhance the risks of
conflict. A radical re-thinking of western perceptions of security is necessary that will
embrace a willingness to address the core causes of insecurity at their roots.

The concern of this article is with the legacies that war economies and the
discourses surrounding war economies leave for peacebuilding after conflict.
In particular, it will be suggested that the concentration on certain pariah actors
and certain goods serves to obscure both the breadth of actors and the underlying
structures that drive war economies.

The key questions to be addressed in this study are:
¿ with the benefit of hindsight, what conflict prevention `packages¿ could the international community have designed in order to minimise the probability of the conflicts that actually took place?
¿ how much would have been saved if these packages had been implemented, given reasonable estimates about their costs, compared with the actual cost of conflict and post-conflict intervention.
The first section provides a background to the conflicts. This is followed by an assessment of the levels of resources that the international community has committed to the Western Balkans since 1991. The third part of the study provides two hypothetical scenarios for CP interventions that might have restrained conflict from breaking out. These CP packages are then costed and an assessment of their probability of success is made.

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