Author: busong

Senior Director of Research Institute of Tripartaka Koreana ——————————————————————————– The Reflection On The Metaphysical Presuppositions Of The Korean Buddhism ——————————————————————————–

I

Is the Korean Buddhism Metaphysically oriented?

To speak conclusively, the answer is ‘yes,’ if we have to select one alternative between metaphysical and non-metaphysical. Although there have been different point of views among the Chinese Ch’an schools, they all interpreted the teachings of the Buddha to represent metaphysical worldview. Even the concepts such as Causality (Prat?tyasa?utp?da) and Emptiness (??nyat?), which are central terms of the Buddhism in general, have been understood in the frame of metaphysical thoughts: The former, which is the structure of the existences, has been understood by at least East Asian Buddhists as referring to the phenomenal world in the dualistic idea of noumenon and phenomena; The latter also has gained the idea of the primordial essence of the universe. The concept of the Enlightenment (悟) in the Ch’an Buddhism also presupposes metaphysical entity in the logical structure of substance (體) and function (用).

In the Buddhist thought, the origin of the metaphysical thought may be traced back to the Treatise of the Buddha-nature (佛性論) and the Tath?g?tagarbha thought (如來藏 思想) which were introduced into China in the relatively early stage. In addition to these thoughts, the metaphysical trends of the Taoist philosophy exerted critical impact on the formation of the Chinese Buddhist thought. Consequently, so called the domesticated Chinese Buddhism, such as Ch’an, T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen etc., has been evolved in the direction of metaphysical inclinations. In this circumstance, the Buddhists of the East Asia, that is, China, Korea, Japan, have interpreted the Buddhist Scriptures and Treatises under the light of metaphysically oriented system of thought. In the same manner, the mind also came to assume the role of the creator of the world.

The limit or discrepancy of the metaphysical notion in the Buddhism played far-reaching influence on the doctrinal system of the Buddhism.

Human being bears numerous suppositions, as the basis of his activities, such as instinct, scientific evidence, divine nature, or ideology: Human being has primarily instinctive proclivity. He selects an object according to his desire and acts in accordance with the instinctive disposition. Yet very often he is not allowed to do so. Again, although he is subject to an object or the rule of nature, he is not totally destined by the law of cause and effect. Finally, even though the divine nature and an ideology may serve the ground on which he find the meaning of life or he select his action, they sometimes distort the life as it really is. All the objects of the external world, though they sometimes provide with guiding principle, mostly disguise the reality of the world from us. Thy oblige us to have dualistic viewpoint, and to make slavery life.

The metaphysical system of thought which presuppose immutable reality is non-Buddhist. This fallible viewpoint is stemmed from the illusive attachment to a criterion which regulates our way of living. According to the attitude whether one takes the metaphysical substance or not, result is quite various as to the interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine especially of one of the key terms of the early Buddhism, Causality; At least in the early Buddhism, the Ultimate Reality, or Permanent Substance whatsoever were basically denied. This standpoint, however, altered with the historical evolution of the Buddhism in which the Causality also has been understood and interpreted under the influence of this trends.

Even these days, the apparition of the Permanent view does not seem to have been completely wipe out. As long as the interpretative presupposition still throw the shade on the Buddhist thought, the metaphysical speculations would not come into an end. In other words, if we should not give up those ontological basis, the Buddhism will not escape from the pitfalls; it may either reinforce the theistic leaning, or assume mystical veil.

Hopefully, if we turn the ontological understanding into the epistemological understanding of the concepts of the Causality or Emptiness, or if we could draw the non-substantial picture of the Buddhist doctrine, the question of discrepancy embraced in East-Asian Buddhism would be resolved.

II

Despite the conviction that the Son (禪) implies excellent methodology, it is often doubted that the Son, which seems to assume the metaphysical trends, follows the right path the historical Buddha showed. This doubt is not solely concerned with the Son Buddhism, rather it is the question of all the sects of the Buddhist thought. When it comes to the question of the Ching-t’u (淨土, the Pure Land) school, it is more or less admittable for the school accept the metaphysical presupposition as an expedient. The case of the Son, however, it is not necessarily required.

The Causality, meaning dependently co-origination, designate the idea of relativity and interdependence. As all the existences are, as causes and conditions one another, inter- dependently woven, there is no independent, ever lasting entity apart from the relation itself.

Nonetheless, an age-old ideation that there should be the permanent existence or the primordial substance have dominated the thought of the human beings. As a result, we came to have the idea of the Absolute divine or pantheist doctrine, which gave birth to many entailed realistic categories of dualism such as the divine and man, subject and object, nature and form, substance and function, and so forth.

The Causality has also been interpreted in the frame of thought; even if the phenomena are ephemeral, it is believed, there are ever lasting, immutable essence behind them. One of the Three Marks of the Truth, impermanence (anitya 無常) signifies the truth of phenomena which is in flux, for all the existences are just transient combination of causes and conditions. The truth of non-self (an?tman 無我), by the same logical inference, denies the invariable subjectivity or essence of each phenomena; Each the existences is lacking of its own being (自性).

The crucial point lies in the concept of nirv?na (涅槃). Although the concept originally indicates the state where the kle?a is blown out, it came to point out the noumenon, the realm of the ever-lasting, primordial substance (本體界). In this context, the concept of an?tman is altered into the capitalized ?tman that is in absolute peace in that realm. In short, while the Causality indicates the phenomenal world, the concept of nirv?na points out the world of the absolutist, primordial, substance. We are accustomed to this sort of dualistic concept of dharma.

The concept of Emptiness designates neither nothingness (無), the opposite term of existence (有), nor non-existence (非有), the contradictory concept of existence (有). It denies the reification of the world of existence which is always changing without any essence within themselves. The concept of the Emptiness recognize the world of transformation as it is being never hindered by verbal expression or deep-seated disposition for the permanent existence.

If one reifies the world of relation that is in flux, the Buddhism will end up with another form of realism. At best, it may require the existence of the omniscient being who is planning the relation and controls the organizations of the universe. This distorted view of the Emptiness, no doubt, will render to be the solid ontology of the Buddhism; the concept of the Emptiness may, as a matter of course, be superseded by the Ultimate Reality or the Primordial essence of all the existences.

In the dictum, ‘in true Emptiness is mysterious existence (眞空妙有),’ the true Emptiness means both the Emptiness in existence and ,in its Emptiness, the creative power producing all beings in the universe. The Emptiness is equivalent to the Causality and to the Middle Path in terms of epistemological point of view, but not of ontologically.

In the Nirv??a S?tra (涅槃經), which discourses the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings (一切衆生 悉有佛性), the four doctrines of the early Buddhism, i. e., impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self, are transformed to the Four Qualities of the Nirv??a (涅槃四德) which are permanence, joy, self, and purity on the ground of the Two Truths (二諦). In the level of the Conventional Truth, this world of transmigration is full of agony, ephemeral, non-self, and empty, where as, in the level of the Supreme Truth, the Buddha-body as the Dharma-body (法身) enjoys permanent, joyful, realm of the Self. This transform by the Nirv??a S?tra typically shows us the initiative stage of the evolution leading to the metaphysical standpoint.

When demarcating the Buddhist philosophy into ontology and epistemology, the teaching of the Buddha ??kyamuni is assigned to latter with the empirical tendency. Yet the mind in the dictum, ‘directly points out the mind of the human being (直指人心), and the nature in the dictum, ‘makes him see the nature and realize the Buddhahood (見性成佛), are identified with the metaphysical Reality. The Tao, which is eternal dharma, presupposes the Principle (理), on the other hand, the Enlightenment presupposes the nature. However, the original nature of both of the concepts, it is insisted, is empty (of its own being). The truth that the emptiness is, along with the phenomena, also empty of its own being may only be realized by endless negation of absolute negation or transcendence of the argument. Even so, the negation or transcendence can not elude the realm of metaphysical structure. We, therefore, take into account the very frame of the metaphysical speculation itself.

III

The religious attitude of the human beings may be divided into extroversive and introversive one. Of them, the Son methodology belongs to the latter. These two attitudes differentiate the answer to certain religious questions in terms of religious ideal, the method to lead the ideal and psychological apparatus.

The extroversive attitude lays its religious purport on the divine city. The idea of devas and the pure land may belong to this case. On the contrary, the introversive one sets up the realm of nirv??a where the divine being is no more necessary as in the case of the divine city. This is the main difference between theism and atheism.

In accordance with the form of faith or the object of faith, there are also two different types of the Absolute (being). They are personified and non-personified being. In the former case, the deliverance solely depends on the revelation and the grace of God. In the latter case, to the contrary, one has to find the path leading to the deliverance by himself. The difference between the personified and the non-personified give rise to the different attitudes of the ‘other-power’ and the ‘self-power.’

The theistic religion based on the other power, in spite of severe criticisms on it, has been prosperous even up to these days. Although the Buddhism belongs to atheistic religion, the Buddhas in the Mah?y?na Buddhism and the Bodhisattvas in the Pure Land school stand for the standpoint akin to the theism.

By the psychological attitude, religion may be also divided into the religion of pathos and that of ethos. The former, we may name the Islam and the Christianity in this category, depends on emotions and the latter, the Hinduism and the Buddhism belong to this category, on reason and intuition.

These all diversities of religious attitudes make the methodological difference of practice. There are, according to the methodology, three types of practice; petition, invocation and contemplation: The petition makes use of the method of ritual and incantation in order to get the supernatural power; The invocation is a form of faith for the the revelation and the grace of the divine being to get the deliverance by forming the relation with the transcendental divine and the human being; The contemplation stand for the introversive religion of ethos in which one wishes to attain the truth through meditation and insight.

Although the contemplative meditation or insight seems to pursue the sam?dhi (定, concentration), it entertains speculative contents as the object of the contemplation. The object of insight serves a means to get concentration. The meditation is a method to get the divine being or cosmic truth by pondering over the reality or the truth. Through the practice of insight, one does not cognize the contents of the object. It is a means of integration of man and the Ultimate Reality through the practicing the concentration of the mind and thereby eliminating delusive mind.

There is the Ku-an which is the object of the Son practice. Nevertheless, the Ko-an is not the meditative object, nor the contents of idea. Though the Ko-an sometimes implies the contents of idea, it does not conceives the contents of idea as the meditative method does. On the contrary, the Ko-an method functions to rule out the conceptual reasoning or logical inference. It is true that meditative practice also eliminates the delusive mind by concentrating on the object of the meditation. However, the Ko-an method, in addition to the function of elimination of delusive mind by concentration on the Ko-an, gives rise to doubts within the mind. In other words, denying all object, either internal idea or external things and events, the Ko-an Son practice develops only the function of doubt.

The difference between the Son practice and other system of practice seems to lie in the distinction whether a practitioner has the object of worship or the truth as the object of ideation. Thus, in this sense, it seems that only the Son methodology is able to remove the idol worship, and, even more importantly, the fallacy of the Absolutism.

In the Ko-an practice, in the first place, the conscious of doubt becomes the mass of doubt, and then both the subject that conceives the object and the object that is conceived by the object will fade away. By annihilating dualism of subject and object, which is the fundamental discrepancy of the human beings, one comes to experience radical transformation. To be oneness without being attracted by pantheism is final goal of the Son Buddhism, which is the experience of the Enlightenment.

The two typical forms of the Son practice are the Son of Calm Reflection (默照禪) and the Son of View of Hwa-du (看話禪). The difference between the two may be detected in the relation of sam?dhi (定) and the Enlightenment (悟). In the Son of Calm Reflection, the sam?dhi functions as the cause of the Enlightenment. On the other hand, in the Son of View of Hwa-du, the relation of the two is ignored. The function of the Ko-an intends the alertness of consciousness, while the sam?dhi that the Son of Calm Reflection pursues is the settling down of the mind. The purpose of the sam?dhi of the practice is the manifestation of the inherent nature on the calm mind.

Although the practice of the Ko-an partly aims at the exclusion of delusive mind or outer stimuli, the main function of the Ko-an practice is the enforcement of the mass of doubt; it is intensive function of the mind. Mere sam?dhi is no more than the serene state of the mind. But the awakened consciousness reacts every momentary stimuli as they really are in the full awareness.

IV

The basic standpoint of the Buddhism represents atheism and not the religion of faith as the term is generally understood. The religion of the ‘other-power,’ which shows the attitude of self-annihilation, is much different from the Buddhism which seeks for the enlightenment through self-awakening. Faith oriented Buddhism, which shows the feature of the ‘other power’ religion, is in a sense not Buddhist. Religions have been evolved with the shift of time and space. So it is difficult to tell which element is Buddhist or non-Buddhist.

It is true that faith oriented Buddhism has contributed the evolution of the Buddhism, but from the viewpoint of the Son which criticizes even some of the early Buddhist doctrine, it is non-Buddhist. It is uncertain whether faith oriented Buddhism played affirmative role or not. At any rate, the faith oriented Buddhism altered the fundamental aspects of the Buddhism and contributed to the adoption of the factors of other religious thought into the Buddhist rite. This is the basis on which the Korean Buddhism is called the Buddhism of integration. In general, it is estimated by some scholars that the faith oriented Buddhism has been more or less the origin of confusion in the idea of the Buddhism.

Among the cultured religions, such as the Judaism, the Christianity, the Zoroastrianism, the Hinduism, and the Buddhism, only the Buddhism is atheistic religion. The Mah?y?na Buddhism, different from the early Buddhism which primarily emphasized individual practice to achieve the enlightenment, emphasizes the Bodhisattva practice. In this circumstance, the sentient beings, just like in the theistic religions, depends their deliverance upon the vow or compassion of the Bodhisattvas.

Faith oriented Buddhism not only creates feud between emotion and reason, but brings about difference of the worldview. From the Buddhist point of view, there are neither the will of the divine beings nor definite law of the universe. Although Einstein, claiming that the God would not play at dice, believed in the will of the God and in the order of universe controlled by the God. However, according to the principle of uncertainty, the motion of a particle is random. It is the same as the case of the biological evolution. The evolution of living creatures is largely influenced by contingency or by mutations.

Korea looks like a exhibition of religions from the shamanism to the so-called world religion. If a religion is the system of symbol representing varying religious experiences, the realm of experience exerts absolute meaning to whoever experienced it. On the contrary, either the system of symbol or institution of the church is the result of historical transformation, and so it has only relative importance. Nevertheless the religion of today makes much of the institution and its system of symbol at the cost of the value of individual experience.

In the modern times, we have nothing that is sacred. Everything is buried under the insignificance of the mundane daily life. What is sacred transcends beyond unawakened life and the manifestation of the transcendental. There is no holy being in the early Buddhism. So is in the Son Buddhism. If any, the sacred of the Son Buddhism lies in the all activities of everyday life, that is in the speech, silence, motion, and stillness. There is no such thing as the Reality in the name of the divinity or the transcendental.

In the personified religion, the sacred is revealed through the manifestation of the divinity, myth, and through sanctified place. On the other hand, in the non-personified religion such as the Buddhism, cosmic principle or immutable substance is immanent within concrete things and events.

For example, the post-modernism is neither mythical nor ontological, rather it is functional. If we interpret the teaching of the Buddha in terms of the Causality, the post-modernism and neo-science can be discussed within the territory of the Buddhism. The future is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. The most important thing we have to deal with is the question of metaphysical viewpoint. We are to find the sacred in this very life and in this very moment rather than to attach to the metaphysical presuppositions which do not belong to this time in this place.

Seoul National University ——————————————————————————–The Linchi-lu and the Korean seon Buddhist Tradition ——————————————————————————–

1. Preliminary Remarks

What does it mean to re-establish the traditional Korean seon Buddhism of the Patriarchs(祖師禪)? Is it really possible to re-establish tradition? If possible, in what manner? Plethora of questions pop up in our mind. We do not dare to answer all the questions. This is a limited attempt to show that the Linchi Ch’an is closely connected with Korean Patriarch seon Buddhism throughout history, and is still alive in Korea deserving our attention as an important tradition. In this paper we evaluate the recent Imje style Son movement through historical reflection.

Tradition is alive as long as it is held as valuable but questioned and put to critical evaluation for possible uses. Keeping in mind that tradition can play either a positive or a negative role, we can approach the current Ch’am Saram (True Human) Society Movement led by Rev. S?-ong at the Paekyang-sa Monastery.

Tradition is a process of selection. What does Rev. S?-ong select among the many strands of Son Buddhism? what is left unselected? and what is added? In every epoch-making selection, tradition is transformed. Tradition is, therefore, a continuous transformation. Whether the transforming process is continuous or discontinuous is difficult to decide. It may not be an exclusively disjunctive choice.

In the case of Lin-chi Ch’an (Imje seon in Korean) tradition in Korea, we can trace a fairly well formulated tradition-line being upheld as orthodox continuously since the time of its first introduction from China to this peninsula. At every turn of historical event, the Imje seon was utilized by Korean seon masters and patriarchs to the needs of society, secular or sacred: at times of trouble to bolster its authority and sustain its experiential authenticity over against other sects or religions and most times usually to instruct aspiring students of high capacity in the seon to immediate enlightenment. Those many uses of Korean Imje seon tradition bespeak its tremendous influence on Korean seon Buddhism.

In short, Imje seon is a living tradition in Korean Buddhism. It is still alive in the dharma talks of masters; offering rare opportunities of enlightenment to students, giving credentials to those who are awakened and providing both lay people and monks with some possible remedy to the modern malaise such as loss of humanity and even environmental hazard. It is a task for us to evaluate those awesome claims. But one thing is definite and clear: the Imje seon tradition is live in Korea, not in a sectarian sense, but in its claim to the universality, comprising two notions; one, the spirit of independence or freedom from all kinds of slavery in the conspicuous Imje style and another, that of infinite compassion in the general Buddhist tradition.

Idiosyncratic of Korean seon Buddhism, however, is the fact that, in spite of its overall influence, the Imje seon has never established itself as a sect as is the case of Japan nor has its sectarian name been used as the representative of Korean seon Buddhism. It is all the more strange that the Linchi-lu, the record of the life and sayings of Chinese Ch’an Master Linchi I-xuan (d.866), has never been published nor studied as an independent text in Korea, though parts of it were included in Son anthology, up until Korean Chogye Order ex-Patriarch S?-ong(西翁)’s Imjerok S?ong Y?n?i (臨濟錄 西翁 演義 an extended commentary of the Linchi-lu by Old Man from the West) in Han’g?l, a vernacular Korean language was published fairly recently in 1974. Hence this attempt to trace some uses of the Imje seon tradition in Korean Buddhist history and the role the Linchi-lu has played in the process of conscious selection within that tradition.

We will illustrate five uses of the Imje seon thus far, including the current Ch’am Saram Movement. By so doing we try to carve out the characteristic feature and significance of this revival and retrieval movement called “Ch’am Saram Ky?lsa Undong (True Human Society Movement). We hope we can confirm the contemporary relevancy of Imje seon and its universal appeal to human kind in stark contrast to the sectarian and ultra-nationalistic bent of the Japanese Rinzai sect.

2. Korean Imje seon Tradition and Transformations

Seeing is believing. Seeing the Buddha nature is the key to becoming a Buddha. Thus declare the famous motto of Son Buddhism. But any kind of seeing can be subjective. To guarantee the authenticity or veracity of seeing experience, inter-subjective recognition by the teacher of the student’s seeing the Buddha nature i. e., enlightenment is provided in the Son Buddhist tradition. Through the teacher’s recognition the holy pedigree of transmission lineage is established in Son Buddhism, supposedly uninterrupted from the Buddha Shakyamuni through Bodhidharma, Huineng and Linchi down to the present Korean Chogye Son Buddhist Order Patriarch. Hence the sacred authenticity and orthodoxy of the Korean Son Patriarchs belonging to the Chogye Son Buddhist Order as the representative of Korean Son Buddhism. This seems to be the popular understanding about the Korean Son Buddhist tradition among the Korean Buddhist populace.

We will contend, however, in the following that the Korean Son Buddhist tradition has been consciously formed by selective acceptance of the transmission lineage from China during the Koryo period, and consolidated during the Choson period in Korea. In the process Imje Son and implicitly the Linchi-lu play important roles to establish that Korean Son Buddhist tradition. The formation of Korean Son Buddhist tradition was thus completed during the Koryo period and further consolidated consciously during the Choson period. Perhaps we can call this process the formation of the Korean Son Buddhist paradigm.

Of special note is the emphasis laid upon the Dharma lineage by Korean Son Buddhists. In order to emphasize the importance of teacher’s recognition and direct transmission from the teacher to the student in the seon lineage, the first generation Korean Son Buddhists belonging to the Nine Mountains schools concocted even the story of Chingwi Chosa(眞歸祖師), who supposedly recognizes and gives sanction to the historical Gautama Siddharta Buddha Shakyamuni. The secular family ties seem to be copied and confirmed repeatedly even in the sacred family tree in the Son tradition. <Give citation and note. Ch’?nchaek’s seonmun pojang-nok>

Another surprising fact about Korean Son Buddhism is that Chinul (1158-1210), the actual founder of the current Chogye Son Buddhist Order, has never been approved by any teacher at all for his enlightenment experience but he self-taught himself arduously through careful reading of books related to Ch’an and even Hwaom Buddhist scriptures. For Chinul, books are the teachers. It is a strange feat for a Son monk, whose tradition, being separate from the doctrinal Buddhism, avowedly eschews any scriptural adherence by claiming non-dependence on words and letters. How could this strange feat happen and yet how on earth Chinul is still considered by some as the founder of Chogye Son Buddhist Order in Korea? This is a topic for our immediate concern. And in what connection to Chinul, does Imje Son play any role in establishing Korean Chogye Son Buddhist tradition?

2.1. Chinul’s Appropriation of Ta-hui’s Records -Taxonomy of seon Practice according to the Three Dark Gates of Linchi

The hallmark of the Korean Son Buddhist practice since the time of Chinul’s immediate disciple Chingak (1178-1234) is the hawdu(話頭) or kongan(公案) meditation, a uniquely Son Buddhist technique of “looking critical phrase” (看話) in the story-telling book of Son transmission lineage, for the sake of inducing enlightenment. Chinul is the one who first introduced this technique to Korea without having any direct contact with Chinese masters but indirectly through reading Ta-hui’s(1089-1163) Records(大慧語錄) on the occasion of his third and final awakening experience. His culminating experience was so striking and radical, according to his biographer, that he accepted and approved this special technique as the most effective short-cut (徑截門) for the superlative capacities to enlightenment, although he provided lower capacity students with two other approaches; one, simultaneous cultivation of meditation and wisdom (惺寂等持門) based upon the teachings in the Platform Sutra (六祖檀經), and another, all round and sudden approach by faith and understanding (圓頓信解門) based on the Li Tung-xuan’s interpretation of the Huayen Sutra (李通玄, 華嚴新論), thus completing his comprehensive three-way approaches to becoming a Buddha basically following Chinese Huayen-Ch’an monk-scholar Tsungmi.

Imje style practice, modified by Tahui and Linchi sect in China, was only a part; one third of the Pojo Chinul’s triple approaches to Buddhahood or true humanity. But for Chinul’s followers thereafter accepted, among the three approaches, the hwadu meditation to be the exclusive, effective method for cleansing conceptual adherence to letters and words and thus attaining the ultimate enlightenment.

A partial adaptation of Imje Son is further witnessed by Chinul’s utilization of Imje’s various instructional devices. Chinul uses specifically the so-called three mysteries of dark gates (三玄門) and four processes of liberation from subjectivity and objectivity (四料簡) as instructional devices as presented in the Linchi-lu. The former was utilized by Chinul to analyze and classify entire Buddhist scriptures including Son writings, while the latter was included in the ten kinds of No-mind practice.

…In Son there are three mysteries(dark gates): first, the mystery in the essence; second, the mystery in the word; third, the mystery in the mystery. The mystery in the essence (體中玄) is the approach to dharma which demonstrates the unimpeded interpenetration of all phenomena and involves such statements as “throughout boundless world systems, oneself and others are not seperated by as much as the tip of a hair; the ten time periods of past and present, from beginning to end, are not separate from the present thought-moment.” It is a preliminary approach for inducing an awakening in those of beginning potential.

Since this approach has not yet abandoned understanding based on the verbal teachings, the mystery in the word (句中玄) is employed. These words have no traces, are ordinary, have a cleansing effect, and eliminate grasping so that students can suddenly forget their conceptual understanding and knowledge of the Buddha-dharma.

But since this approach also involves cleansing knowledge and vision and cleansing words and phrases, the mystery in the mystery (玄中玄) – the use of pauses, silence, the staff, and the Son shout – is also employed in training. When this last approach is used, one can suddenly forget the cleansing knowledge and vision and the cleansing words and phrase of the second mysterious gate. As it is said, “When we get the meaning and forget the words, the path is near at hand.” This is called the sudden realization for the dharmadhatu. For inferior men of beginning capacity, the Son school points out that there is a sublime mind, pure in nature, which follows along with the stream of falsity and pollution; this enables such men to understand easily and enter into faith. After they have entered in faith and forgotten their understanding, they can achieve personal realization. But if they do not forget their understanding, they will ait??? in the deep pit of liberation unable to use their bodies freely in displaying the manifold supplementary practices belonging to the approach of conditioned arising. (Buswell’s translation; The Collected Works of Chinul, pp.214-215 Complete and Sudden Attainment of Buddhahood 圓頓成佛論)

An initial attempt to classify all the Buddhist writings can be gleaned in the above. In the Straight Talk on the True Mind (眞心直說), Chinul’s most comprehensive guide for Son practice, he quotes Imje’s Four stages of liberating from both subjectivity and objectivity without directly pointing to the name of Imje. For Chinul, Imje was one of the Chinese Ch’an masters who shed light on the “sublime path of the patriarchs.” In the synopsis of ten different techniques for extinguishing delusions concerning the true mind, Chinul quotes Imje as one of the ancients (sic ancient patriarchs in China):

…Three: efface the mind but preserve objects. This means that when we are practicing, we extinguish deluded thoughts and do not concern ourselves with the external sense-spheres. We are only concerned with extinguishing the mind, for when the deluded mind is extinguished, what danger can sensual object present? This is the teaching advocated by the ancients” “take away the man but leave the object.”

…Four, efface objects but preserve the mind. This means that when we are practicing, we contemplate all internal and external sense-spheres as being void and calm. We preserve only the one mind, signaling solitarily and standing alone….If the mind is attached to the sense-spheres it becomes deluded. But if there are no sense-spheres, what delusion can there be? The true mind shines alone and is unobstructed in regard to the path. This is what the ancients called “take away the objects but leave the man.”…

…Five: efface both mind and objects. This means that when we are practicing, we initially make the external sense-objects void and calm and then annihilate the internal – the mind. Since internal and external are both calmed, where can delusion arise?…This is the patriarchs’ teaching of “take away of both man and objects.”…

…Six: preserve both mind and objects. This means that when we are practicing, mind remains in its place and objects remain in their place. If there is a time when the mind and the objects come in contact with each other, then the mind does not grasp at the objects and the objects do not intrude upon the mind. If neither of them contacts the other, then, naturally, deluded thoughts will not arise and there will be no obstacles to the path…. This is the patriarchs’ teaching of “take away neither the man nor the objects.”…(Buswell’s translation pp. 170-171)

We have observed two specific uses of Imje’s teaching as part of the Chinese patriarchs’ instruction as to the methods of eliminating delusions. Hence Chinul’s use of Imje was not a total acceptance but a partial application of some of his instructional devices. Imje, according to Chinul, in terms of Chinese Ch’an lineage, was only one of the patriarchs in Chinese Ch’an Buddhism belonging to Matsu-Hungchou line, never the originator of Linchi branch/sect in distinction to other sects like Fayen, Yunmen, Tsaotung, and Kueiyang, forming the so-called five families of late Chinese Ch’an lineage. In passing, we can also note that Chinul uses t’i-yung category in two combinations as expedient means of explaining methods of eliminating delusions.

This picture of Imje Son has been dramatically changed : Imje Son became the only orthodox line of Son in Korea immediately after Chinul’s demise, for his direct disciple Hyesim Chingak(edited all the available Son stories in an anthology, which later became the standard text for kongan meditation for all Korean Son monks. Chinul’s round about way of dealing with the problem of Son-Kyo controversy by striking a balance between the two tilted towards an extreme and exclusive practice of kongan meditation.

This exclusive tendency was strengthened when T’aego Pou (1301-1382) went to Yuan China and got a seal of recognition from the Linchi line Chinese master Shi-wu Ching-kung(1270-1352): T’aego emphasized the hwadu meditation as the only method of attaining Buddhahood. Out of the three masters in the same Koryo period, namely Naong Hyegun (1320-1377) and Paeku Kyonghan (1299-1375) included, who had any connection to the Chinese Linchi lineage, T’aego was selected and his line of transmission became consolidated during the Choson period by the followers of Sosan Hyujong(1520-1604) specifically by Chunggwan Haean(1567- ?) who repudiated the nativistic Ho Kyun (1569-1618)’s claim to include Chinul and Naong to be the legitimate heir to Chinese Ch’an lineage. Under the severe oppression of Buddhism in the Confucianism dominated Choson society, it is understandable to uphold the legitimate lineage of Son Budhist tradition to safeguard its authority by connecting it to the then East Asian universal frame of reference, i. e., the only living Chinese Linchi line.

Even in contemporary Korea there still is a lively discussion as to who deserves to be the founder or sectarian head patriarch (宗祖) of the Korean Chogye Son Buddhist Order. Conservative and universalism-oriented elements tend toward Ta’ego while nativistic and progressive, toward Chinul. Six out of 28 registered Korean Buddhist denominations list incidentally T’aego as their founding father. To put an end to the controversial matter, Chogye Order statute lists Toui, the first importer of Chinese Ch’an to Korea during the Unified Silla period as the founding father.

At the impending downfall of the Choson dynasty, Paekp’a Kungson (1767-1852) tried to reestablish the Son Buddhist tradition through careful analysis of the whole scriptures of Son. Korean Son Buddhist taxonomy of triadic Son is firmly put into place in the minds of Korean people. The current usage of the Patriarch Son seems to stem from Paekp’a and his followers’s prolonged discussion extending well over one hundred and fifty years: a similar feat can be found in the Korean Confucian debate over four beginnings and seven emotions during the first half of the Choson period. Some may criticize the overly metaphysical paraphernalia and pedantic bickering of the debate. But the focal point of the discussion rests firmly on what kind can be the legitimate heir to the true spirit of Son. The Patriarch Son(祖師禪) is the highest, because it refers to the state of enlightenment of true emptiness and subtle beings (namely, manifold phenomena) comparable to the Buddha mind, while Tathagata Son(如來禪) is concerned only with the One Mind, hence put to the second level. The third and lowest is the intellectually ratiocinating Son (義理禪) where discrimination of phenomena and essence exists, existence and emptiness co-exist and spoken of. Throughout two centuries of discussion nobody challenges the supreme orthodoxy and authority of the Patriarch Son. Hence, the establishment of Korean Patriarch Son by multitudes of scholar-monks starting from Paekp’a, confronted by Ch’oui Uisun (1786-1866), conjoind by Udam Honggi (1832-1881), and Soldu Yuhyong(1824-1889), rebutted finally by Ch’ugwon Chinha (1861-1926). All of this discussion was ignited and refueled by the three phrases in the Imje-rok. Criticized as an empty talk, it still bears grave importance of the Linchi’s influence over the Korean Son Buddhist tradition.

The history of Buddhism in Korea during the past and present century is riddled with problems like unification of the many strands of Buddhism, how to deal with colonial authority and its edicts and questions of reform and revival of the Buddhist order. Manhae Ha Yongun(1879-1944), opposing to the Japanese political move to merge Korean Son Buddhism to one of the Japanese Soto sect, proposed and created a counter-order/sect, the Imje-chong in 1911 but soon aborted by the Japanese colonial government. We are reminded of the famous diction in the Story of the Three Countries: Dead Kongmyon is better than the living Chungdal. The name Imje had such an appeal to Korean Patriarch Son Buddhists.

3. Concluding Remarks: The Linchi-lu and the Korean Patriarch seon – The significance of the Ch’am Saram Society Movement

Now we are ready to put the Ch’am Saram Movement in perspective. As the fifth and the final transformation of Korean Son Buddhism, this movement is significant and epoch-making in the sense that it tries to cope with the Western civilizational challenges. The previous transformations were made within the East Asian Buddhist framework of reference. Ven Seo-ong’s attempt to retrieve and revive the Imje Son spirit is a colossal venture to radically transform the Korean Son Buddhism, and by the same token, the Buddhist tradition itself in the upcoming age of global civilization.

When any tradition is secured and established, something is selected and accepted while another is left unselected. Thus the tradition is transformed. When Rev. So-ong tries to re-establish the Imje Son tradition, he selects the Linchi-lu as a whole and commented it in its entirety. But the focus of his selection rests securely on the single idea of ch’am saram, the True Human Without Rank in the Linchi-lu. He brush aside all the historical ramifications in one stroke as nothing but a heap of puppets: the three mysteries and concomitant taxonomical classifications, claim to the orthodox lineage requiring us sectarian fidelity are puffed at by him. He selects the true humanity ideal for the sake of coping with the new age of globalization.

Ven. Seo-ong’s approach to the traditional patriarchs’ Son including Imje is epitomized in the Three Vows of the True Humanity:

“Firstly, let us awaken ourselves to the true self of no form and non-abiding and put it to practice by compassionate living [together with all other beings].

Secondly, unobstructed, unbound by any thing, being free from everything, let us create [a new] history where all human kind can live in peace and with equal [right].

Thirdly, being aware of the fact that our individual selves, human kind, and the universe are both eternal and solitary living entity, and yet keeping their own identity, let us respect each other, help each other without grasping [anything as absolute] and practice [our enlightened awareness] in the truthful and right manner so that we can construct a world where beauty is appreciated.”

We take note of two factors in the above vows. It is to be remarked first, that Ven. Seo-ong does not fall into a trap of ontological commitment. In the descriptive explanation at the beginning of his extended commentary on the Imje-rok, he explicitly denies Son to be connected or even compared with either of the Western metaphysical category of both mysticism and pan-theism. His method of ‘infinite break through (無限透過)’ seems to connote this attitude of non-commitment, which is reminiscent of the historical Buddha’s positive and yet anti-metaphysical stance. Incidentally the so-called Critical Buddhist charge of substantialism, associating the Buddha nature to the idea similar to Atman does not seem to apply to Son Buddhism, including Ven. Seo-ong’s recommendation of True Humanity movement.

Ven. Seo-ong also emphasizes the key idea only i. e., that of Ch’am Saram, a rarified universal model of true humanity, in the Imje-rok without labeling it as the Imje-chong sectarian tenet. Hence, he effectively disengages himself with any sectarian or nationalistic/nativistic implication of his proposal to revive Korean Son Buddhist tradition to cope with the globally human problem.

By logical extension, Ven Seo-ong tries to universalize the basic and only aim of Son practice: to become a truly human being. To forge a radical transformation out of ordinary, sense-enslaved man to the universally true humanity in a socially engaged network of world system is an extremely sophisticated and yet very laudable endeavor.

We have no qualm over the first claim. In the universalization process just mentioned in this period of paradigmatic change, however, we are supposed to invent many mediatory steps to fill the wide gap between the rarified universal model of true humanity and the concrete social problems like justice, human rights, environmental hazard, and furthermore construction of world peace. Internally within the Buddhist tradition, the Patriarch Son Buddhist is required to deal with other alternative meditation techniques by critically repudiating them and thus re-confirm the uniqueness as well as the supremacy of the idiosyncratic hwadu meditation. Externally the general idea of religious freedom must find its way and channeled into the socio-political dimension. Without aping a Buddhist type of liberation theology, how could we find the crucial link between the Son idea of unbounded, unobstructed freedom and the concrete social proposal of reform or revolution of the whole world? It is all the more necessary for any Son Buddhist to critically aware of the unbridgeable gap between the spiritual manifesto and the concrete social transaction. But the first gigantic step toward building a brave new world in the radical spirit of Imje’s universal freedom has already taken by Ven. Seo-ong. It is up to the present gathering of practicing monks and intellectual scholars to make up the mediatory steps to fulfill his grand design.

Eshin Nishimura (西村惠信)Professor of Department of BuddhismHanazono University——————————————————————————–PRACTICAL PRINCIPLE OF HAKUIN ZENEXAMINED IN THE TEXT BY HIS DISCIPLE TOUREI-ENJI

Introduction

1. Historical Root of Hakuin Zen Tradition

2. Self-confidence and its Practice

3. Evil state of illusion

4. Definite awareness of the Reality

5. Passing through the Patriarchal gates

6. Non-attachment to the ultimate

7. How to live the ordinary life

8. Succession of Buddha-Dharma

9. Breeding of the Seed of Buddha

——————————————————————————–Introduction

Tourie-Enji(東嶺圓慈 1721-1792) is one of the greatest disciples under Hakuin-Ekaku 白隱慧鶴(1685-1768), a restorer of Japanese Rinzai Zen Buddhism in Tokugawa era. He was especially respected among Hakuin’s disciples as Delicate Tourei(微細の東嶺 misai-no-Tourei) for his carefulness in his Koan study(公案工夫 Kouan-kuhuu). Maybe it is because of Tourei’s inborn intelligence.

According to the Tourei’s biography, upon arriving at Shouin-ji 松蔭寺 for the first time, great master Hakuin asked Tourei to help his preparation for the discourse upon Kidouroku(虛堂錄, Record of Hsu-t’ang chih-yu 虛堂智愚 1185-1269) for coming new semester, since Hakuin knew that Tourei had already learned almost all of Patriarchal records such as personal history, life episode, dialogue and so on, by heart at his age of twenty-three.

Five years later, twenty-eight years old, Torei’s weak body got a heavy disease from too much private meditation at some layman’s house in Kyoto. He came to know that his life is comming to an end within three to five years, so he wrote down two volumes of manuscript entitled “The Theory of Unestinguished Lamp of Zen Buddhism(宗門無盡정論 Shuumon-mujintou-ron: for short, TULZ is used in this paper”) taking only thirty days. Recovering from disease, Tourei intended to burn up his manuscript, but Hakuin who thought this would be a kind enough guidance for Zen student under Koan Zen study put a stop it.

“TULZ” was published in 1800 that is eight years after Tourei’s death, though Tourei himself had prohibited his disciples to open his manuscript to the public. It is our good fortune, however, to have this kind of rare systematic text book of Koan study published by his lay disciple after Torei’s passing away, so that Hakuin’s creative method of Koan Zen study is still at hand today in its original form, so that unestinguished lamp of Zen tradition is still living even in our days.

TULZ is not an ordinary record of Patriarchal teaching done from the standpoint of the truth of the first principle[第一議諦 or daiichigitai in Jp.] like other texts, but the text described by Tourei’s own hand for future use. Therefore it is written from standpoint of the truth of second principle[第二議諦 or dainigital in Jp.]. He arranges various kinds of Patriarchal episodes along with the procedure of Zen study from the entrance to the final attainment of Reality, so that Rinzai Zen students might be able to go along same path as the Patriarchs took for their deepening of Zen mind.

1. Historical Root of Hakuin Zen Tradition

The first chapter of “TULZ” is entitled “ Root of Zen Transmission”(宗由 shuuyuu in Jp.) in which Tourei describes general history that is a transmission tree of Rinzai Zen tradition starting with Buddha and end up with his own master hakuin-ekaku.

Like other religions, Rinzai Zen takes importance upon its traditional history as well as its teaching. Or it might be better to say that history of Zen transmission itself is nothing but the essence of Zen Buddhism. Because Zen transmission has been only achieved through the indirect transmission of existential essence of Zen from master to his disciples, as existential philosopher Soren Kierkegaard ever pointed out by saying that the direct transmission is impossible in the case of transmission of the Truth. Therefore the discontinued continuity is only the form of transmission of the Buddha’s Lamp. This means that there is no so-called continual history in Zen tradition but the series of each personal experience.

When Tourei entitles the first chapter “The Reason of Zen tradition”(or 宗由 shuyu in Jp.), “Reason” here means the historical base on which Zen Buddhism stands. Though this chapter is the historical description of Rinzai Zen transmission, it is still not a mere history of Rinzai Zen, but a ground on which Rinzai Zen is surely based. In fact, Tourei’s way of description is not historical but simple arrangement of episodes in the life of Patriarchs. In this specific reason, a history of Rinzai Zen tradition is what is beyond the history itself

The specific reason why historical description could still be super-historical is because it is not a simple document of the Patriarchs, but the records of particular situations in which each Patriarch came to realization of Reality, and therefore they are called “Ancient Samples and Episodes” 古則話頭 that is so-called Koan(公案). Each Kouan(episode) is what has happened once in history and yet it happened as a full manifestation of Reality in each case. Therefore, Shuyu(宗由 or Root of tradition) does not mean mere origin of Rinzai Zen history, but the “Root” where the essence of Zen is manifested through the individual experience.

Therefore, what Tourei tries to describe in the first Chapter is not a simple introduction of this text, but the presentation of the essence of this text in which all other following chapters are also based upon.

In the very beginning of this chapter, Tourei admires Buddha’s declaration of the nobility of his individual existence right after his birth as follows;

Stop talking! Your saying already betrays this Matter too much. Master Yun-men Wan-yen ever criticized you saying; “If I were there with you at that moment, I would club him and give it to dog to eat. I wish you kept this world in peace”. (Eshin Nishimura Text published from The Institute for Zen Studies, 1992, page24)

In this way, Tourei demonstrates his admiration of Buddgha’s birth in the negative way of saying to stress the significance of Buddha’s coming into this world. All these way of saying shows Tourei’s subjective standpoint, which is free from the tradition within the definite framework of Zen tradition. Here we may see the unique attitude of Rinzai Zen Buddhist monk to go beyond their own tradition for the purpose of going down to deep horizon where they can really meet with all patriarchs of history.

2. Self-confidence and its Practice

Second chapter of TULZ is entitled the self-confidence and its practice [信修 sinshu in Jp.] where Tourei discusses the inevitable preparation for Zen student intending to begin Koan Zen study.

Here I dare to translate this particular Chinese term 信 not belief of faith as ordinarily done, because in Zen study the term 信 (sin) does not mean so-called religious act done toward some outer Being beyond man, but somehow means self-confidence for the Reality which is hopefully realized at the end of his way of Koan Zen study course. Torei writes as follows;

If a man wishes to achieve his path of Zen, in the very beginning, he has to have great root of self-confidence(大信根 Dai-shin-kon). Then what is this confidence? A confidence about the existence of the same inborn nature and infinite Wisdom as all Buddhas ever had. A confidence of the fact that there is neither big nor small in each individual’s religious ability(根 kon, “root”), neither wise nor fool in each individual daily religious capacity(幾 ki), so that all those who go this way should achieve the goal without exception. A confidence that along with the deepening procedure of meditation, there easily happens various kinds of evil delusions, and if a man took it as the ideal sate of the way(悟りSatori), he would suddenly fall down to the second or non-Buddhist level of the goal. A confidence that when time has come and man’s effort has fully devoted, Buddha-nature is revealed by itself, so that man does not need to use his intellectual judgement anymore. A confidence that no matter how buddha-nature is suddenly revealed, unless a man has a chance to see a Zen master to pass the Gates set by ancient Patriarchs, he would walk through the wrong way of life. A confidence that there is still one more small step(些子向上の一著子 sasi-koujyouno-ichijyakusu) remains even after you finish passing through all those patriarchal gates. A confidence that no matter how man attains this special step, there is deep delicacy in the daily activity following each individual different personality. A confidence that a matter of Zen transmission has most important significance so that man should transmit the lamp to the disciples and not monopolize it for himself. A confidence that each part of daily life is nothing but retraining of his Dharma, and carry on that daily training with him so that Dharma might not be extinguished in the future.(Nishimura’s Text, page41)

In this way, Tourei encourages us to have confidence as a fundamental condition of whole series of Zen study, therefore this second Chapter is not a part of TULZ anymore, but covers whole system of the text. Here we may see the characteristic of this text, which should be called unsystematic system of Koan Zen study. And this kind of structure can be seen in each Chapter of TULZ.

In this second Chapter Tourei put stress also upon the importance of Vows of Bodhisattva(菩薩の警願 bosatu-no-seigan) as the fundamental condition for the beginner of Zen study. Needless to say, Vows of Boddhisattva is most indispensable to Zen study as Mahayana Buddhist practice, otherwise Zen study comes to be merely the self-centered. He writes as follows;

After the above confidence firmly settled, student must make Vows to himself not to abandon his study until he finally arrives at the achievement of his study. Not to have any idle mind from his study, no matter how long his journey of suffering would continue. Not to be controlled by other Buddhist teaching even though he might fall into hell because of his deed. Not to fall into non-Buddhist view by being satisfied with easy realization of Satori experience which is mere evil state of delusion. To practice Bodhisattva deed after once he achieved his study, and so on. (Nishimura’s Text, page42)

3. Evil state of illusion

In this chapter, Tourei talks about the danger of the evil state, which appears along with the way of koan study. This dangerous state of mind called Genkyou(現境 or literally translated the appearing state) is already taught as devil state(魔境 or makyon in Jp.) in the Buddhist canons or texts such as the 40th Chapter. of Part one of Maha-prajna-sutra(大般苦經), the 10th volume of Surangama-stura(首楞嚴經) and the 8th volume of Mo-ho-chih-kuan(摩訶止觀)

Among various kinds of evil state of mind, Tourei calls our attention more to the good state(善境界) or zenkyoukai in Jp.) than the evil, because man can easily guard himself from the unpleasant condition of his feeling, while he enjoys himself whenever he feels to be comfortable with the good feeling even though it is nothing but the illusion. Therefore, pleasant illusion which Zazen meditation brings into man is thought to be very dangerous.

Some examples of good state of mind are taken out by Tourei himself such as the view that the existing beings are all empty(法空の見), view that everything is equal(一味平等の見), view that the Reality is being manifested throughout the universe(現成底の見), view that this body is perfect by itself(當體卽是の見), and so on. All these states of view are only possible through deep meditation practice, therefore we should say this is the disturbance, or the necessary evil, which is happen on the way to the real goal of Zen way.

Medieval Japanese Zen Master Musou-soseki(夢窓疎石 1275-1351) is also talking about Madou(魔道 or Evil-path) in his Text “Muchuu-mondou” (夢中問答 or A Dialogue in Dream) as follows;

There are two kinds of Evil that are inner evil and outer evil. Outer evil means the Evil king(魔王 or Maou) and his people(魔民) who are coming from outside the Buddhist student and disturb him. The Evil king is called 天魔(天魔 or Tenma) since he is staying in the sixth Heaven(第六天) and so-called 天狗(Tengu or long-nosed goblin) are his people. That Evil king thinks all sentient being as his relatives, therefore he intends to disturb the sentient being who makes effort to enter the Buddha’s way….. Even if there were no such disturbance from outside, in such a case as Buddhist student has delusion in his mind, or has attachment with incorrect view, or has self-pride of his achieved state, or sinks into meditation, or is proud of wisdom, or hopes to be released from suffering only for himself in the idea of his Arahat, or falls to the second level of compassion to the other(愛見の慈悲), and so on. All these belong to the inner evil since they are all disturbances for the ultimate Bodhi(or 無上菩提 or Mujyou-bodai in Jp.). (Nishimura’s translation and comment of Muchuu-mondou published NHK Press, 1998, page29) All these inner and outer evils are what might usually happen also in the process of Christian mysticism as is called “The dark night of the soul” by Mystics. Zen students also have to go once through this dangerous state.

4. Definite awareness of the Reality

An anthentic evidence (or 實證 jisshou in Jp.) of existence of Reality realized as a whole bodily experience is needless to say a core of whole procedure of koan Zen Practice, and that would happen when hard discipline under the Koan study reaches climax. A well-known phrase: “A great awareness(or 大悟 taigo in Jp.)” is only possible amid great darkness or mass of doubt(or 大疑 taigi in Jp.)” is a principle of Koan study Zen(or 看話禪 Kanna Zen) demonstrated by Ta-hui Tuang-kao (大慧宗高 1089-1163) in Sung dynasty China, and Japanese Koan Zen which was re-systematized by Hakuin-ekaku is direct descendant of this tradition.

In particular, Tourei is putting emphasis upon the necessity of visit with an authentic Zen master(明師 meisi or 正師 shousi in Jp.) whenever a student arrives at this experience of Self-realization, otherwise he will fall into the tremendously dangerous cave of self satisfaction. Tourei writes as follows;

Upon attaining a realization of Self Nature(見性 kenshou in Jp.), Zen student has to visit an authentic master in order to remove the delusion of self-awareness(悟中迷 gochuu-no-mei). In old day, Huang-lung Szu-hsin(黃龍死心 1043-1114) told that when you meet one delusion, you mast gain one awareness. After you attain an awareness, you have to be aware of both delusion in awareness(悟中迷 gochuu-no-mei) and awareness in delusion(迷中悟 meichuu-no-go). Therefore you should know that the time to visit an authentic master or the time to start to study in more authentic way. (Nishimura’s Text, page67) Reading above quotation, we might know that even though the self-realization of Reality which is known as Satori(悟り) in Japanese seems to be a core of Koan Zen practice, it is merely one stage which happens half way of the whole process of Rinzai Zen study where the more important Zen study really begins.

5. Passing through the Patriarchal gates

This Chapter called “Toukan”(透關) is so to speak the checking upon the attained state of awareness(悟り Satori in Jp.) by reflection on the mirror of Buddha’s or Patriarchal paradigm. As well-known among people today, to deepen one’s awareness of Reality through following the foot prints which Buddha or Patriarchs have ever marked is called Kouan Zen practice(公案禪修行) and this is no other than the proper method which Rinzai Zen tradition started from Sung dynasty China and still practices today in Japanese Rinzai Zen.

In fact, Japanese Rinzai Zen has been able to maintain its traditional Lamp of Dharma only because of this somehow artificial looking method which was systematized by Hakuin-ekaku who was so much worried about declining of Japanese Rinzai Zen as he violently criticized Bankei-youkaku’s unique “Unborn Zen”(盤珪永琢の不生禪 Hushou Zen), Ungo-kuyou’s “Meditating on Buddha Zen (雲居希膺の念佛禪 Nembutu Zen) or Eihei-Dougen’s Meditation-only Zen(永平道元の只管打坐 Sikan-taza) calling them “a modern blind priest living in nothingness only(近代斷無の해僧 Kindai danmu no kassou)” or “the evil party of silent meditation(默照の邪黨 Mokushou no jyatou)” and so on.

Tourei writes in this Chapter as follows;

Today, we easily see Zen brothers who misunderstand Zen as the Wisdom which transcends the rational understanding(沒意智 motuichi), and assert that since Zen Buddhism has been transmitted outside scriptures, it does not need to use any Buddhist scripture. Those people do not realize that if Zen were transmission outside Scripture, it should also accept inside. If “outside Scripture” could not accept inside Scripture, that Outside would also not be true. Why is it so? Because when a mirror is bright enough, it reflects any object whatever it might be. So in the case when object does not appear in the mirror, it means that mirror is not bright. Nonetheless, you sometime refuse the object to hide the darkness of the mirror. This is never the view of great path of Buddhism. In the same way, in the Scripture, there is contained deep teaching of Buddha or Patriarchs, which often points at the disturbance of your path of Zen study. But only because your awareness of Reality is not yet clear, you ignore the Golden words of Buddha and are unable to research the deepest meaning of Scripture. What I mean here is not take Scriptures as the main object of study, but take them as bright mirror. It is important to reflect Self-nature upon the Teaching of Buddha and Patriarchs and also to reflect the Teaching upon the Self-nature. In so doing, both Self-nature and Teaching should be most clear. (Nishimura’s Text, page81) The attitude of Zen student toward Koan should be same as Tourei talks about Buddhist scripture as above quoted. This particular Chapter of TULZ commands us to reflect the state of awareness of Self-nature (Reality) upon the Koan so that Self-nature is examined if it is clear enough. But as Tourei writes to study Koan is not the final purpose of Zen study but to reflect the Koan upon the Self-nature to examine if Self-nature is clear enough.

For the purpose of bringing student to the ultimate attainment of self realization of Reality(大悟徹底), Hakuin systematized traditional paradigmatic episodes(古則話頭) into the more effective order(公案體系). Koan system itself is, however not opened in any document form, but secretly transmitted through Nissitu-sanzen(入室參禪) or private interview of student with Roshi(老師) in small room of the monastery. And contents of so-called seventeen hundred Koans(千七百則の公案) are told to be different each other according to the two main branches, that is to say Inzan-branch(隱山系) and Takujyu-branch(卓州系), that were separated under Gasan-jitou(峨山慈棹 1727-1797) who is the one of Hakuin’s Greatest disciple.

However, both branches are at least keeping the fundamental Koan system which Hakuin set for his students. Or it would be better to say that Hakuin confirmed Koan system which had already been developed by the Japanese Rinzai Zen patriarchs in early days of Japanese Zen such as En’ni-ben’nen(圓爾辨圓 1202-1280) or Nampo-jyoumain(南浦紹明 1235-1308). These Patriarchs divided Chinese Koans into three groups according to their function, namely Richi(理致 or Ultimate of Truth), Kikan(機關 or Skillful Method) and koujyon(向上 or Non-attachment).

“Richi” is the group of words, which show the True Reality and most of them are extracted from Buddhist scripture and Patriarchal record. All Koan of Richi are the theoretical expression of Buddhist theology or State of Zen mind, so students practice Zazen meditation(坐禪) reflecting his mind upon the Koan so that he will realize authentic meaning of each phrase through his bodily experience of awareness(Satori 悟り or Kenshou 見性 in Jp.)

“Kikan” is the group of the episodes by which student knows how the Patriarchs of early days of China came to self realization of Reality, and by refelcting upon those stories through Practice of Zazen meditation, he might attain the living mind of the Patriarch or Kassoi(活祖意) which is called Satori.

“Koujyou” is the group of Koan through which student wipes the dust which he get by above two groups koan. In other words, student has to remove so called the attachment of Buddha-view(Bukken 佛見 in Jp.) or Dharma-view (Hokken 法見) or his Pride of Ultimate attainment of Reality so that he might return to what Buddha or Patriarchs really taught which is nothing but original Ordinariness(Heijyoutei 平常底).

Hakuin opened these three divisions into the five, that is to say Hossin(法身 or dharma-kaya), Kikan(機關 or Skill), Gonsen(言詮 or Word expression), Nantou(難透 or difficult to pass through) and Koujyou(向上 or Non-attachment).

6. Non-attachment to the ultimate

As I already mentioned above, the qualitatively different path still remained for the student as a final part of his Zen study jhourney and it is called Kojyon(向上). A well-known phrase: “This particular path of Koujyou has never been transmitted by any past Saint” (向上之一路, 千聖不傳). This path is specially called “Smallness of Koujyou”(向上之些子) which means that this path is the entirely different from the preceding path where student has passed, or it would be better to be said that this path is the total negation of what has been experienced before. Therefore student should not continue his quantitative progress of path walked but jump into the entirely different realm of quality. Chinese Patriarchs teach this jump by saying: “Have one more step at the top of hundred feet pole!” Here Tourei writes as follows;

Here is a path of non-attachment. This is called the One which even patriarchs never transmitted before. ….. This is what all Patriarchs ever transmitted from one to the other. (Nishimura’s Text, page92) What Tourei mentions here seems to be somehow paradoxical, but this is the essence of Zen transmission. However, as a matter of fact, such Self realization of Reality is never able to be transmitted from man to man directly but only transmitted through indirectly transmitted as an existential philosopher Soeren Kierkegaard ever pointed out. Therefore, we may realize that Koan system itself is not the object of study as it is mere foot-prints of Patriarchs and not the Reality of Patriarch himself. Student should not follow such a shadow of the Reality. Instead, he should jump out of traditional transmission after all. This might be the deep significance of the small path of non-attachment.

7. How to live the ordinary life

Next chapter of TULZ is entitled Rikiyuu(力用 or daily Use) in which Torei talks about the way of living daily life for the student who achieved his Zen study. A student who came to be free from tradition and returned to his own self has to live his daily life authentically(履踐分明 risen-hunmyou in Jp.) His ordinary daily life has to be the continuity of Right meditation(正念相續 Shounen-souzoku in Jp.).

As Bodhi-Dharma says, There are many who attain the Buddha’s Way, but very few who are practicing it. And, moreover, this practice should have no traces(沒종跡 Mosshouseki in Jp.). Torei calls this kind of daily use “Wisdom-use beyond scale(格外の知用 kakugai no chiyuu)” because nobody knows his Saint-ness.

8. Succession of Buddha-Dharma

In this Chapter of Succession, Tourei discusses the Importance of Succession of Buddhas Lamp. Succession (師承 Shijyou in Jp.) means to succeed to the Wisdom-life of Buddha(佛の慧命 Butu-no-emyou in Jp.) from certain Zen master who is supposed to be a carrier of Zen Buddhist tradition. For this very reason, student who lives his life in the daily use of attained Reality has to go out of his home for searching authentic Zen master. If student kept staying within his enjoyment of Awareness of Reality, he would remain inside of the mere self-satisfaction. Such a self-satisfaction is called the “Heresy of Selfish awareness without Master”(無師獨悟の外道 musidokugo-no-gedou in Jp.). Tourei writes upon this danger as follows;

A matter of Succession is the most central. Ancient Zen student who arrives at the source of Self-awareness and passes a certain numbers of Patriarchal gates, used to travel throughout the country without any doubt about Reality and have a discussion or fix to the prices of commodities after discussion(問答商量 Mondou-shouryou in Jp.) with any person he meet. But sometime later on, he happened to meet Great Zen master who has Great eyes of Dharma(大眼目 daiganmoku in Jp.), and was compelled to realize the essence of Zen existing in completely different realm that is called Non-attachment, from the Reality he had held until that time. Then he quits his travelling and begins his sincere study under the Great master. In this way, he arrives at Unmovable confidence of his reality. This is the time of Succession(師承). Since that time, he lives with unforgettable thanks to the master about the kindness he received. Such a student should be called “Dharma-successor”(法嗣 Hassu in Jp.). the Patriarchs of Zen tradition all the same have transmitted Fruit of Zen in this way. (Nishmura’s Text, page 119) From above quotation, we may know that the horizon where succession of Patriarchal lamp become possible is even under the bottom of egoistic self where individual personality is broken into the universal Non-self which is common with master’s Non-self. This is what Wu-men Hui-kai(無門慧開 1183-1150) writes in his “We-men-kuan” (無門開 Mumonkan in Jp.) like “To walk hand in hand with the traditional Patriarchs, and to see the things with same eyes of Patriarch’s and to listen with same ears”.

In other word, Succession is not possible so far as the master and the student stand in opposition to each other, but only possible when student comes down to the transcendentally deep level where he may touch directly with transcendental Non-self of the Master. As we already studied in the above Chapter, this transcendence is only possible with one important step beyond the ultimate self realization of the Reality which was called Koujyou or Non-attachment. However to arrive at such complete level of Non-attachment is so hard that even Wu-tsu Fa-yen(五祖法演 ?-1104) says; “I have studied Zen for twenty years, and now I feel the shame to know my incompleteness(我參二十年, 今方職羞).

9. Breeding of the Seed of Buddha

In this chapter entitled “Chouyon 長養” or Breeding of the seed of Buddha, Torei talks about importance of cultivation of Buddha-seed which student sowed deep in his body through his long Zen meditation. He writes as follows;

Yuan-wu Ko-chin(환悟克勤 1063-1135) says; “Ancient Masters used to live their lives in the humble hermitage or stone cave and take poor meals prepared in broken pans, after he attained Buddha-way(佛道). They never hoped to be known in the world and occasionally spew a word to switchover student’s mind to transmit Buddha’s Dharma”. Therefore, what Zen student has to do is only to breed the Buddha-seed through many years. Do not like to build a monastery for the purpose of accepting more students. (Nishimura’s Text, page127) Torei is then taking a number of examples of ancient Patriarchs who hid themselves in the deep mountain or amid the secular world for many years such as the six Patriarch Hui-nung(六祖慧能638-713)’s fifteen years in the South countryside, Nan-yang Hui-chung(南陽慧忠 ?-775)’s forty years, Ta-mei Fa-chang(大梅法常 752-839)’s thirty years, and so on.

10. Currency

The final Chapter of TULZ is the conclusion or the End of long Path of Zen study. Or we should say that it was the ultimate purpose to begin study of Zen when a student was standing at the gate of Zen Path. Since Zen Buddhism is based upon the Mahayana Buddhist thought, no matter how this particular branch is hoping to realize a Reality in his own-self and therefore it might be called the religious way of Self-inquiry(己事究明の行道) lasting throughout a whole life, it should be done for the salvation of all sentient Beings. Here the title of this Chapter “Currency” (流通 Ruzuu in Jp.) means the spread of the Buddha Dharma all over this earth.

However Currency of Buddha Dharma might not be the same as so-called religious Mission or social service done under the name of religion. For Tourei, “currency” actually means transmission of Unextinguished Lamp of Zen (in fact, this was the title of his work) to only a few students. Torei writes as follows;

Yen-tou chuan-huo(巖頭全豁 828-887) says’ “Whenever you intend to demonstrate Great teaching of Buddha, you have to let it issue from your own heart each by each, so that it fills the whole heaven and earth for the sake of all other beings. “I hope that Buddha’s Dharma would last forever by the currency that is possible in a way of gaining of an authentic Seed of Dharma. What I worry is the Buddha Dharma is now in danger like the eggs been piled up! I really do not hope that Buddha Dharma extinguish so easily in future. Situation is like the case that the several persons are traveling through the stormy field. And the all lanterns are almost going to be blown out by the storm. However, if there were one person in the party gives his effort only to concentrate his mind upon a lantern not to extinguish, all other people would be saved by that one lantan. (Nishimura’s Text, page131) As Tourei teaches here in its most impressive example, “Currency” does not mean to scatter Zen to the masses of world, but maintain the fruit and its seed within deep individual person so that his existence itself could naturally be a shining Lamp for the world of Darkness. This is nothing but what Zen Patriarchs have taught as “The Great Compassion of Non-object”(無緣の大悲 Muen no daihi) which is entirely different from ordinary Compassion occasionally given to a particular Object(衆生緣の慈悲 Shujyouen no jihi). And Tourei here stresses the importance of this specific sort of Compassion as an Ultimate purpose of Zen study.

It cannot be denied that the tradition of dhyaana(Ch’an, Sn, Zen) has its origin in pre-Buddhist Indian philosophy,
because it seems quite definite, according to Buddhist
scriptures, that the Buddha has practiced dhyaana and
asceticism before the enlightenment(bodhi).(1)

When dhyaana theory, or Zen thought, was introduced into
Buddhism, it is most probable that the theory was modified
from the standpoint of Buddhist philosophy. Therefore, if
we try to understand the original or genuine form of Zen
thought, we are obliged to clarify the meanings of Zen
thought in its pre-Buddhist stage.

Then, what were the essential characters of pre-Buddhist
Zen thought? The essence of Zen thought in those days, I
think, lied in its idea of "cessation of thinking"(2)and its
inseparable connection with aatman(self) theory. It seems
certain that the goal of dhyaana theory then was "cessation
of thinking", because we can find, in the early Buddhist
scriptures, the various theories of dhyaana or samaadhi,
the goals of which can be construed as "cessation of
thinking."

For example, the word "sa^n^naa-vedayita-nirodha"(想受滅)
of the sa^n^naa-vedayitanirodha-samaapatti seems to
mean "cessation of thinking and sensation." We can also
understand that, it is "sa.mj^naa"(sa^n^naa 想)," the
thinking faculty, that was denied by the
nevasa^n^naanaasa^n^naa-aayatana-samaadhi(非想非非想處定).
Moreover, because the term "nimitta"(相) of the animitto
ceto-samaadhi(無相心定) means the object of "sa.mj^naa."
Thus, we can understand that, in this samaadhi also,
"cessation of thinking" seems to be aimed at as its goal.(3)

However, against the argument above, it may be objected
that the dhyaana theories above mentioned are not those
practiced in pre-Buddhist stage, because they are found in
Buddhist scriptures. But we cannot assume that all the
theories found in Buddhist scriptures are of Buddhist
origins. As for the dhyaana theories mentioned above, it
seems that they have their origins in pre-Buddhist stage of
Indian philosophy. In those days of India, the practices of
asceticism(苦行) and dhyaana were quite popular among
ascetics(^sramana 沙門), as is shown by the fact that
asceticism and dhyaana were two chief virtues practiced in
Jainism, which I think was the typical example of
pre-Buddhist ascetic philosophy.

According to Buddhist scriptures, the Buddha himself
practiced dhyaana and asceticism for six years before his
enlightenment. It is stated that he studied the
aaki^nca^n^na-aayatana-samaadhi(無所有處定) from the
master AA.laara kaalaama, and studied the
nevasa^n^naanaasa^n^naa-aayatana-samaadhi from the
master Uddaka Raamaputta. So if we rely on this scriptural
statement, we can conclude that the
nevasa^n^naa-naasa^n^naa-aayatana-samaadhi, which was
counted as the last of the four formless dhyaanas(四無色定)
in the early Buddhist classification of dhyaanas, was of
pre-Buddhist and non-Buddhist origin.

It goes without saying that we cannot entirely rely on the
scriptural statements concerning the two masters of the
Buddha in question. But I think it is most probable that the
dhyaana theories, which the Buddha studied before his
enlightenment, had as their goals "cessation of thinking."

In the case of the theory of the four dhyaanas in the
material world(四禪) also, I think the leading idea was
nothing other than "cessation of thinking and sensation,"
because, in the theory, the process of gradually calming and
suspending all mental functions including "thinking and
sensation" is explicitly stated. In fact, in the
Majjhima-Nikaaya(MN), it is stated as follows:

Having separated myself from desires(kaama)
and evil properties, I have accomplished the first
dhyaana, i.e. the joy and happiness(piiti-sukha),
which[still] possesses "vitakka" and "vicaara."

Then, owing to the extinction of "vitakka" and
"vicaara," I have accomplished the second
dhyaana, i.e. the joy and happiness born from
samaadhi, inwardly pure and concentrated, which
no longer possesses "vitakka" and "vicaara."

Then, owing to the separation from joy, having
become indifferent and composed, rightly
conscious, I have enjoyed happiness by my
body(kaaya).

Namely, I have accomplished the third dhyaana,
of which the sacred(aarya) explained "[one
becomes] indifferent and composed, abiding in
happiness."

Then, owing to the abandonment of both
happiness and pain(dukkha), and owing to the
former extinction of joy and sorrow, I have
accomplished the fourth dhyaana, which is
purified by indifference and composure, without
pain and happiness.

(MN,I,pp.21-22)

In this passage, I think "vitakka" and "vicaara," which are
made extinct in the second dhyaana, both mean the faculty
of conceptual thinking(4), while pain and happiness,
abandoned in the fourth dhyaana, are the variaties of
sensation(vedanaa). So we can understand that, by the
theory of four dhyaanas of the material world expressed in
the passage above, "cessation of thinking and sensation" is
definitely meant as its goal.

Moreover, I think Fujita Ktatsu is right when he claims
that the theory in question as well as the theory of the four
formless dhyaanas was of non-Buddhist origin. Further,
according to Fujita, the sa^n^naavedayitanirodha or the
nirodha-samaapatti(滅盡定) could not have significance
from the original standpoint of early Buddhism, because we
can distinguish it from mere death only because it still has
life(aayu), bodily heat(usmaa) and clarity of sense
faculties.(5)

Thus, we may have the conclusion that the leading idea of
the original form of Zen thought was "cessation of thinking
and sensation," aimed at as the goal of the various dhyaana
theories of non-Buddhist origin.

Later, in the fifth century A.D., it was stated in the
Yogasuutra as follows:

Yoga is the cessation of mental
functions(citta-v.rtti-nirodha).

(YS,I,2)

This definition of "yoga," I think, shows clearly the
fundamental idea of the whole Zen thought, namely,
"cessation of all mental functions including thinking and
sensation." However, it should be noted that "cessation or
denial of thinking" especially has played the central role in
the whole history of Zen thought. In other words, we can
say that "thinking" has been regarded as something like
"original evil" in the history of Zen thought.

For instance, we can read the strongest aversion to
"sa.m^naa"(想) in the whole of the A.t.thakavagga chapter of
the Suttanipaata(Sn). A typical example is found in the
following verse of the chapter:

For him whose "sa.mj^naa" is
abandoned(sa^n^naa-viratta)(6), there are no
bondages.

(Sn,v.847a)

It seems undeniable that the main theme of the chapter was
"cessation or denial of thinking."

In the texts of Chinese Ch’an Buddhism we can find many
passages where "cessation or denial of thinking" is
preached. For example, by the passages in the Ratification
of True Principles(正理決), we can understand that
Mo-ho-yen摩訶衍, who is considered to have participated
in the well-known bSam yas debate held at the end of the
eighth century in Tibet, taught that one can attain
Buddhahood merely by abandoning "sa.mj^naa." In fact, in
the Ratification of True Principles it is stated as follows:

If one becomes separated from false
"sa.mj^naa"(妄想) without giving rise to false
mind, the true nature, originally existent, and the
omniscience [of the Buddha] will be naturally
manifested [to him].(7)

Mo-ho-yen’s rejection of "sa.mj^naa" was based on the
following two passages of the Diamond Sutra:

[A] Some people, if they become separated from
"marks"(相),are called Buddhas.

[離一切諸相, 則名諸佛]

(Taisho, 8,750b)

[B] All "marks"(相) are false.

[凡所有相, 皆是虛妄]

(Taisho,8,749a)

Here the original Sanskrit for "mark" in Passage[A] is
"sa.mj^naa," while that for "mark" in Passage[B] is
"lak.sa.na." However, because Mo-ho-yen, when he quoted
these two passages in the Ratification of True Principles,
altered "mark"(相) into "sa.mj^naa"(想), he was able to mark
the passages the scriptural basis for his theory of
"separation from sa.mj^naa."(8)

Here we must remember the fact that "nimitta"(相, mark)
was held to be the object of "sa.mj^naa"(想) in the Northern
Abhidharma treatises.(9) So we have good reasons to
consider that the Chinese words "hsiang"(相) and
"hsiang"(想) are sometimes interchangeable in the texts of
Chinese Buddhism in general. Thus, although Mo-ho-yen
was wrong in understanding the original meaning or the
Sanskrit meaning of Passage[B], his interpretation of
"separation from sa.mj^naa" was quite consistent
concerning the Chinese translations of the two passages in
question.

As to Mo-ho-yen’s understanding of "sa.mj^naa," it must
be noted that all "sa.mj^naa" are, according to him, totally
false without exception. In other words, he did not accept
the difference between true "sa.mj^naa" and false
"sa.mj^naa." This theory seems to contradict with our
common sense ideas, because we ordinarily think that there
are two kinds of judgement, i.e. wrong judgement and right
judgement. But Mo-ho-yen thought otherwise. Every
judgement or every thought is wrong without exception,
according to him.(10) So for him "thinking" or "sa.mj^naa"
was something like "original evil," as is known from the
following passage:

[Question] What is the defect of "sa.mj^naa"?

[Answer] The defect of "sa.mj^naa" is that it
covers the omniscience which sentient
beings(sattva) possess originally and makes
them reborn in the three evil destinations so that
they have everlasting transmigrations.(11)

It seems noteworthy that Mo-ho-yen rejected, as
something like "original evil," not only "sa.mj^naa"(想) but
also "kuan"(觀) in the Ratification of True Principles. So he
was famous for his advocation of "pu-kuan"(不觀).(12) Then,
what was the meaning of "kuan," which he rejected so
vigorously? His theory of "pu-kuan" also was based on a
passage of a sutra. It was the following passage from
Kumaarajiiva’s translation of the
Vimalakiitrinirde^sa-suutra:

[C] "pu-kuan"(不觀) is enlightenment(bodhi)
[不觀是菩提], because it is separated from
"yüan"(緣) [i.e. aalambana-pratyaya].

"pu-hsing(不行) is enlightenment, because it is
"Wu-i-nien"(無憶念).

(Taisho,14,542b)

Mo-ho-yen quoted the phrase "pu-kuan is enlightenment"
in the Ratification of True Principles.(13) But because the
original Sanskrit text of the sutra is not available, it is very
difficult to ascertain the original Sanskrit words for
"kuan"(觀) of "pu-kuan" and for "i-nien"(憶念) of "wu-i-nien"
in Passage[C].(14) However, according to Hsüan-tsang’s
translation(15) and Tibetan translation,(16) it seems certain
that the original Sanskrit for "i-nien" is "manasikaara," while
that for "kuan" seems "samaaropa," according to Tibetan
translation, because the Tibetan word corresponding to
"i-nien" is "sgro btags pa."(17) But my opinion at present is
that we cannot deny the possibility that the original Sanskrit
for "kuan" was also "manasikaara," because it seems
improbable that Kumaarajiiva translated "samaaropa" by the
word "kuan."(18)

Anyway, I think we can assume that Mo-ho-yen meant, by
advocation "pu-kuan," the rejection of "manasikaara." In
fact, it might be an indirect evidence that kamala^siila’s
opponent in the third Bhaavanaakrama, who is generally
considered to be Mo-ho-yen, advocated "amanasikaara" and
"asm.rti" there.

Thus, it seems evident that not only "sa.mj^naa" but also
"manasikaara" was rejected as "original evil" by Mo-ho-yen.
Then what is the meaning of "manasikaara"? It is needless
to say that this term has been quite important from the
beginning of Buddhist tradition, because it is stated in the
Mahaavagga chapter of the Vinaya that the Buddha did
"manasikaara"(manasaakaasi) on
Dependent-arising(pratiityasamutpaada) in regular and
reverse orders at the first portion of the night of his
enlightenment.(19) So if we can rely on this scriptural
statement concerning the Buddha’s enlightenment, we may
conclude that the Buddha’s enlightenment was nothing
other than "manasikaara" of Dependent-arising. It goes
without saying that we cannot accept the scriptural
statement in question as expressing literally the historical
facts. But at least we can understand that the compilers of
the Mahaavagga chapter of the Vinaya seem to have been
of the intention to express the interpretation that the
Buddha’s enlightenment lied in "manasikaara" of
Dependent-arising.

Anyway, at least we can say that "manasikaara" has been an
important technical term from the beginning of Buddhist
tradition. However, the Abhidharma definition of
"manasikaara" as "cetasa aabhoga" (directing mind [to
objects])(20) seems insufficient. In Japanese Buddhist
studies, "manasikaara" is generally translated by Chinese
word "tso-i"(作意), and sometimes translated by English
word "attention." But I cannot approve these translations.
As to the Chinese word "ts-i," although it is well-known for
being used by Hsüan-tsang for translating the term
"manasikaara," it is just a word-for-word translation of
"manasikaara," and besides is not the sole Chinese
translation of the term. The following is a list of examles of
Chinese translations by diffrent translators for
"manasikaara"(21):

Kumaarajiiva: 念·憶念

Paramaartha: 思惟·思量·觀

Hsüan-tsang: 作意·思惟·觀

Among the examples shown above, "ssu-wei"(思惟) seems
to be the most appropriate for translating "manasikaara,"
because I think "manasikaara" primarily means "thinking,"
like "sa.mj^naa." If we consider that the meaning of
"manasikaara" is merely "attention," we cannot exactly
understand the meanings of Mo-ho-yen’s denial of
"manasikaara" and Kamala^siila’s vindication fo
"manasikaara." Thus we can reach the conclusion that
Mo-ho-yen advocated "separation from thinking," and
rejected "sa.mj^naa" and "manasikaara" as the terms
meaning "thinking."

It is quite noteworthy that Mo-ho-yen’s denial of
"sa.mj^naa" and "manasikaara" was evidently under the
influence of Shen-hui 神會(684-78)(22), the famous
advocator of the so-called "Southern School." He quoted, in
his Platform Speech 壇語, Passage[A] of the Diamond
sutra(23) and the underlined parts(不觀是菩提無憶念故) of
Passage[C] of the Vimalakiirti-suutra.(24) Moreover, he
stated in the Platform Speech as follows:

The mere "pu-tso-i"(不作意, amanasikaara),
without mind rising, is the true "we-nien"(無念).
— All sentient beings are originally
markless(wu-hsiang, 無相). All marks(相) are
false minds(妄心).

If mind becomes markless(無相), it is
immediately the Buddha’s mind.(25)

We must remember here the interchangeability of
"hsiang"(相) and "hsiang"(想) in Chinese Buddhist texts. In
other words, the word "hsiang"(相) used in the passage
above must be interpreted as "hsiang"(想) which means
"sa.mj^naa." According to this interpretation, it is quite
clear that Shen-hui’s message in the passage above is
totally based on Passage[A] and Passage[B] of the
Diamond Sutra, because "all marks are false
minds"(今言相者,幷是妄心) in the passage above is merely a
modification of Passage[B] (凡所有相,皆是虛妄), and
because "if mind becomes markless, it is immediately the
Buddha’s mind" there is simply an alter ation of
Passage[A] (離一切諸相. 則名諸佛).(26)

Thus it is clear that Shen-hui, like Mo-ho-yen, denied
"sa.mj^naa" and asserted that one can attain Buddhahood
only by abandoning "sa.mj^naa," based on Passages[A] and
[B] of the Diamond Sutra. Moreover, shen-hui also stated,
in the passage above quoted, the denial of "manasikaara,"
i.e. "amanasikaara," by the word "pu-tso-i"(不作意). But it
shoud be noted that the word "wu-nien"(無念) used there
also means "amanasikaara," because it seems improbable
that Shen-hui was not aware that there had been some
cases where the term "manasikaara" was translated by
Chinese word "nien"(念). Therefore, we may conclude that,
for Shen-hui, the terms "pu-tso-i" (不作意) and
"wu-nien"(無念) are synonymous, both meaning
"amanasikaara."

To sum up, Shen-hui’s theory of "no thinking" was
expressed by three words, i.e. "wu-hsiang"(無相) meaning
"a-sa.mj^naa," and "pu-tso-i"(不作意) and "wu-nien"(無念)
both meaning "amanasikaara." This theory of "no thinking"
was, needless to say, representing Shen-hui’s central
position, because he stated in the Platform Speech that he
erected "wu-nien" as his central thesis(立無念爲宗).(27)

The influence of Shen-hui’s theory of "no thinking" is to be
found almost everywhere in Ch’an texts later than
Shen-hui. We have already seen an example in the
Ratification of True Principles. But Mo-ho-yen, because he
belonged to the so-called "Northern School," did not use the
term "wu-nien,"(28) The direct influence can be found in the
Li-tai fa-pao-chi歷代法寶記(774). According to the text,
Wu-chu無住 (714-774) stated as follows:

Moreover, in the text, Wu-chu is described as the person
who have "exclusively stopped thinking"(一向絶思斷慮).(30) It
goes without saying that Shen-hui’s influence was found in
the Platform Sutra 六祖壇經(Yampolsky ed.), according to
which it is stated by Hui-neng慧能(638-713) as follows:

In Japanese Zen Buddhism also, the theory of "no thinking"
or "cessation of thinking" has been the central idea. For
example, Dogen道元(1200-1253), stated in his earliest work
Fukan-zazen-gi 普勸坐禪儀 (1227), as follows:

Here the terms "nien" and "kuan" must be interpreted as the
translations of "manasikaara," while the word "hsiang" is to
be construed as that of "sa.mj^naa." It is clear that Dogen
meant here the cessation of all mental function, especially
"cessation of thinking."

Thus it is now clearly known that Zen thought, from the
pre-Buddhist stage to Dogen, has rejected "thinking" as
something like "original evil" and has advocated "cessation
of thinking." But why was "thinking" rejected so ardently?
My opinion is the following. It is undeniable that the essence
of Zen thought lies in its idea of "concentration," or "cittasya
eka-agrataa"(one-pointedness of mind),(33) to use the
Abhidharma definition of "samaadhi." It is quite noteworthy
that the word "eka"(one) is used here. The term seems to
indicate that the idea of "concentration" cannot be
established without conceiving the existence of something
one(eka). In other words, the theory of "concentraion," or
Zen thought, presupposes the existence of something which
is ontologically one(eka) and equal(sama) without
distinction(nirvikalpa). In this sense, it is also to be noted
that the word "sama"(34) (equal) is found in both terms
"samaadhi" and "samaapatti."

Thus, to state rather extremely, it seems evident that Zen
thought is possible only when it is based on monism. And
this is why Zen thought has been inseparably connected
with aatman theory. Then why is "thinking" rejected in
monism? It is because both "thinking" and "language," which
makes "thinking" possible, have the function of
dichotomizing or differentiating objects. Thus, roughly
speaking, "thinking" and "language" are antagonistic to
monism. Zen thought, based on monism, denies "thinking"
and "language."

It is generally considered that the connection of Zen
thought with aatman theory or monism is not fully evident.
In fact, Jainism, the chief representative of pre-Buddhist
ascetic philosophy, and the Yoga school, whose definition of
"yoga" as "cessation of mental functions" has been discussed
above, are based on dualism. However, it is undeniable that
both Jainism and the Yoga school have evidently admitted
aatman theory. Especially, Jain theory of asceticism is
theoretically not possible without accepting the difference
of impure body(B) and pure mind(A), i.e. aatman. This
theory is indeed dualistic. But I believe that this is the
simplest or the most general form of aatman theory in
India. The monistic aatman theory of ^Sa^nkara, although
held to be the most orthodox theory, cannot be considered
to be the general idea in India. Without accepting two
mutually opposing existences, i.e. (A) and (B), even the
theory of "liberaton"(35)(mok.sa) cannot have been
established in India, because "liberation" was conceived
there primarily as that of aatman(A) from impure body(B).
Jain asceticism was nothing other than the endeavor to
reduce impure body(B) to nothing and to liberate aatman(A)
from the body.

Then, what is the meaning of "thinking" in this dualistic
aatman theory? In the theory, it is evident that "thinking"
and "aatman" are considered to be opposed to each other,
because the former is dichotomizing function, while the
latter is one and the same ontological existence(eka, sama).
So it is doubtless that, among two principles, "thinking" was
regarded as Principle(B), impure, false and to be reduced to
nothing. Here lied the logical ground for establishing the
Zen theory of "cessation of thinking."

The connection of Zen thought with aatman theory is also
found in the A.t.thakavagga chapter of the Suttanipaata. We
have already discussed the rejection of "sa.mj^naa" in the
chapter(Sn,v.847). Besides, in the chapter, there are many
passages where the existence of "aatman" is positively
admitted.(36) For example, the following expression are
found there:

"the abode aatman" (bhavanam attano)
[Sn,v.937]

"the nirvana of aatman" (nibbaanam attano)
[Sn,v.940]

"the stain of aatman" (malam attano) [Sn,v.962]

"possessing aatman uncovered" (abhinibbutatta)
[Sn,v.783]

The strong aversion to "thinking"(B) and the positive
acceptance of "aatman"(A) are not mutually incompatible in
the chapter, because the leading idea there was the dualistic
aatman theory explained above. Thus it goes without saying
that we cannot directly reconstruct the fundamental ideas
of the earliest form of Buddhism, simply relying on the
accounts of A.t.thakavagga or the Suttanipaata, which
principally was but a Buddhist version of the ascetic
literature quite popular and prevalent in those days of
India.(37)

Moreover, as for the two masters, from whom the Buddha
studied two kinds of dhyaana, the accounts in the twelfth
chapter of the Buddhacarita are not to be ignored. In fact,
the master AA.laara, who taught
aaki^nca^n^na-aayatana-samaadhi, was there described as
a Saa.mkhya phlosopher, and the master Uddaka also was
there stated to have admitted the existence of "aatman." It
goes without saying that we cannot simply accept the
accounts in the Buddhacarita as representing historical
facts. But I think they are improtant because they seem to
indicate that the two samaadhis in question were of
non-Buddhist origin. It is also to be noted that Saa.mkhya
philosophy was the basis for the fundamental ideas of the
Yoga school. Moreover, "aaki^nca^n^na"
(possessionlessness, 無所有) was one of the five chief
virtues of Jainism, and theoretically presupposed the
distinction between "aatman"(A) and "non-aatman"(B),
because "aaki^nca^n^na" was the theory enjoining people
from possessing and adhering to "non-aatman," being
impure and transient.

In early Buddhism, "dhyaana" was placed at the second level
of "three studies" (tisso sikkhaa, 三學). In other words,
"dhyaana" was merely the means to attain "praj^naa"(right
cognition). The final goal of Buddhism was considered to be
"praj^naa," or the right cognition of Buddhist philosophy. It
seems clear that this evaluation of "dhyaana" contradicts the
general "dhyaana" theory of "cessation of thinking," because
right cognitions cannot be produced from "cessation of
thinking." However, I do not think that the "dhyaana" theory
of "cessation of thinking" has never been preached in the
whole history of Buddhism. On the contrary, the theory has
been taught quite often within Buddhism, as is shown by
the arguments above.

Then, why was Buddhist evaluation of "dhyaana" as the
means to attain "praj^naa" altered into the general theory of
"cessation of thinking"? I think it was due to the influence of
monism or "aatman" theory. For instance, is is generally
believed that Buddha’s cognition(j^naana) is "distinctionless
congnition"(nirvikalpa-j^naana 無分別智).(38) But the
concept of "distinctionless cognition" is not so old in
Buddhist philosophy. I do not think that the term
"distinctionless cognition" (nirvikalpa-j^naana) was used
before the rise of Mahaayaana Buddhism. At the second
century A.D., when the oldest form of the
A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj^naapaaramitaa-suutra was
translated into Chinese for the first time(179), it seems that
the term "distinctionless"(nirvikalpa) was found in the text,
and not the term "distinctionless
cognition"(nirvikalpa-j^naana). The same can be said about
the Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa of Naagaarjuna(c.150-250),
where only one example of the term "distinctionless" can be
found(ⅩⅧ,9). However, the Yogaacara philosophers of the
fifth century used the term "distinctionless cognition"
(nirvikalpa-j^naana) quite often. These facts seems to
indicate that the concept of "distinctionless cognition" was
preceded by the concept of "distinctionless" in Buddhist
tradition, and that the term "nirvikalpa-j^naana"
(distinctionless cognition) originally meant "the cognition of
what is distinctionless." It goes without saying that what is
distinctionless means the single substance or the highest
reality, postulated by monism.

Thus we can understand how the concept of "distinctionless
cognition" was formed under the influence of Hindu monism.
At around the latter half of the fourth century A.D., the
theory of Buddha-nature(buddha-dhaatu) was formed in
the Mahaa-parinirvaa.na-suutra. The sutra is well known
for its accpting "aatman" theory openly. The following
statement is found in the first Chinese translation(418):

According to my understanding, the theory of
Buddha-nature or the theory of Tathaagatagarbha was
nothing other than a Buddhist version of "aatman" theory in
Hinduism. When the theory of Buddha-nature was
introduced into China, there were some cases where the
theory was modified under the influence of Taoist
philosophy. Thus, two types of Buddha-nature theory(40)
was formed in China.

One is Buddha-nature Immanence theory 佛性內在論, and
the other is Buddha-nature Manifestation theory
佛性顯在論. the former is the original type, or Indian type,
according to which Buddha-nature is considered to exist in
one’s body, like "aatman." In fact, it is stated in the
Mahaaparinirvaa.na-suutra as follows:

All sentient beings possess Buddha-nature,
which is in their bodies.

[一切衆生皆有佛性, 在於身中.]

(Taisho,12,881b)

The latter, Buddha-nature Manifestation theory, is the
developed or the extreme type, according to which
Buddha-nature is wholly manifested on all phenomenal
existences, including insentient beings such as trees and
stones. In other words, the phenomenal things(事), as such,
are regarded as Buddha-nature itself, and thus absolutized
totally, according to the theory.

Without correctly making distinction between these two
theories of Buddha-nature, it seems difficult to understand
the philosophical meaning of Ch’an Buddhism. Of these two
theories, we will at first discuss Buddha-nature Immanence
theory in Ch’an Buddhism. This theory is found in the
writings or the analects of Tao-hsin道信, Hung-jen弘忍,
Shen-hsiu神秀, Hui-neng慧能, Shen-hui神會, Ma-tsu馬祖,
Pai-chang百丈, Ta-chu大珠, Huang-po黃檗, Lin-chi臨濟,
Tsung-mi宗密 and so on.(41) For example, the Hsiu-hsin
yao-lun 修心要論(42) and the Kuan-hsin lun 觀心論(43) have
the following passage:

Sentient beings have diamond-like
Buddha-nature in their bodies.

[衆生身中, 有金剛佛性]

It is clear that Hui-neng’s central position was
Buddha-nature Immanence theory, because he stated in his
commentary on the Diamond Sutra, i.e. the Chin-kang
ching chieh-i 金剛經解義,(44) as follows:

As is stated above, Buddha-nature Immanence theory is
not other than Indian Tathaagatagarbha theory, which in
turn is a Buddhist version of "aatman" theory in Hinduism.
So, because the theoretical structure of Buddha-nature
Immanence theory is nothing other than "aatman" theory,
Hui-neng’s identification of Buddha-nature with "aatman"
was correct.

It is needless to say that Buddha-nature Immanence theory
is stated in the following passage of Shen-hui’s Platform
Speech:

The connection of Buddha-nature Immanence theory with
"aatman" theory seems evident in the case of Lin-chi. In the
Lin-chi lu 臨濟錄, his famous teaching is found as follows:

On your lump of red flesh, there is a true man of
no rank, always going in and out of the face-gate
of every one of you.(48)

[赤肉團上, 有一無位眞人, 常從汝等諸人面門出入]

As I argued before,(49) I consider the word "lump of red
flesh"(赤肉團), or the corresponding word "heart of
flesh-lump"(肉團心) in the Sung version of the Ching-te
ch’uan-teng lu景德傳燈錄, to mean "heart"(h.rdaya) and
think that the "true man of no rank" means "aatman,"
because, in Indian "aatman" theory from the times of the
Atharva Veda, it has been considered that "aatman" exists
in "heart" (h.rdaya). Moreover, ^Sa^nkara(c.700-750), the
chief representative of the Vedaanta school, explained the
word "heart" found in the B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad as
follows:

The term "heart" (h.rdaya) means a lump of flesh
(maa.msa-pi.n.da) possessing the shape of
lotus(pu.n.dariika).(50)

The Sanskrit word "maa.msa-pi.n.da" (lump of flesh) was
translated by Hsüan-tsang as "jou-t’uan"(肉團). So it is
clear that the "lump of red flesh"(赤肉團) means "heart"
(h.rdaya) and that "true man"(眞人) means "aatman."

It does not seem so inappropriate to say that the
mainstream of Chinese Ch’an Buddhism has lied in
Buddha-nature Immanence theory. But if we ignore the fact
that the other stream of Buddha-nature manifestation
theory(51) was definitely found in the history of Ch’an
Buddhism, we cannot reach the correct understandings.

The theoretical founder of Buddha-nature Manifestation
theory may have been Chi-tsang 吉藏 (549-623), because
he admitted, in his Ta-ch’eng hsüan-lun 大乘玄論
(taisho,45,40b) that grasses and trees also have
Buddha-nature, and that they can attain Buddhahood.(52)
The attainment of Buddhahood by grasses and
trees(草木成佛) thereafter had become the central tenet of
Buddha-nature Manifestation theory, because the
attainment of Buddhahood by insentient beings cannot be
established in Buddha-nature Immanence theory.

In Ch’an Buddhaism the attainment of Buddhahood by
grasses and trees was admitted in Chüeh-kuan lun 絶觀論
as follows:

Not only human beings but also grasses and
trees have been predicted [by the Buddha to
attain Buddhahood(53)].

[非獨記人, 赤記草木]

However, the most confident advocator of Buddha-nature
manifestation theory was Hui-chung 慧忠 ( -776), because
he not only advocated the theory but also denied
Buddha-nature Immanence theory. In the Tsu-t’ang chi
祖堂集, he stated as follows:

The insentient things such as walls and tiles are
the mind of the old Buddha.(54)

[牆壁凡礫, 無情之物, 普是古佛心]

Here "the mind of the old Buddha" means Buddha-nature or
something regarded as absolute. Therefore, because
phenomenal things including insentient beings are here
considered to be Huddha-nature, it is evident that
Buddha-nature manifestation theory is stated here.
Moreover, in the same text Hui-chung stated as follows:

My [theory of] Buddha-nature is that body and
soul are identical —, while the southern [theory
of] Buddha-nature is that body is impermanent
and that soul is permanent.(55)

[我之佛性, 身心一如, 南方佛性, 身是無常,
心性是常]

Here the second theory is Buddha-nature Immanence
theory, because in the theory the dualistic contraposition
between Buddha-nature(A) and body(B) is indispensable.
For instance, it is considered that Buddha-nature(A) is
permanent and pure, while body(B) is impermanent and
impure. Moreover, it goes without saying that, according to
the theory, Buddha-nature is considered to be pure mind or
soul, because Buddha-nature is but a Buddhist version of
"aatman." Therefore, it is quite evident that Hui-chung
criticised Buddha-nature Immanence theory in the passage
above.

It is to be noted that Buddha-nature Immanence theory is
obliged to have the dualistic structure, like the general idea
of "aatman" theory which we have discussed above. On the
contrary, Buddha-nature Manifestation theory has the
structure of extreme monism, where all distinctions,
including that between body and soul, are not admitte.
Because phenomenal existences or things are, as such,
absolutized by the theory, it seems clear that the theory is
an ultimate form or an extremity of the theory of "affirming
the realities"(56)(現實肯定).

Anyway, after Hui-ching, the advocators of Buddha-nature
Manifestation theory repeatedly criticised Buddha-nature
Immanence theory. For example, it is well known that the
criticism on Lin-chi’s theory by Hsüan-sha 玄沙 (835-908)
is found in the Ching-te ch’uan-teng lu(Taisho,51.345a).
But it is not correctly recognized that Hsüan-sha’s
phiolsophical standpoint was Buddhapnature Manifestation
theory, In the Hsüan-sha kuang-lu 玄沙廣錄, he states as
follows:

Mountain is mountain. River is River.—

There is no place, in the whole world of ten
quarters, that is not true.(57)

[山是山, 水是水…盡十方世界, 未有不是處]

Here every phenomenal existence, especially insentient
being, is affirmed as absolute.(58)So it is doubtless that
Buddha-nature Manifestation theory is stated here.

In Japanese Zen Buddhism, Dogen, before his visit to
Kamakura(1247-1248), was an ardent advocator of
Buddha-nature Manifestation theory. Based on the theory,
he criticised Buddha-nature Immanence theory in his
Bendwa(59) 弁道話 (1231). It is evident that his criticism
there was strongly influenced by Hui-chung’s criticism on
Buddha-nature Immanence theory, because Dogen
mentioned there Hui-chung as his authority and expressed
his own position by the words "body and soul are
identical"(身心一如). But of course Dogen’s criticism was
not actually directed to the upholders of Buddha-nature
Immanence theory in China. His criticism there, the
criticism of the so-called "shin-j s-metsu"(心常相滅)
theory, was directed to the followers of the
Nihon-daruma-shuu 日本達磨宗, because its position was
Buddha-nature Immanence theory.(60)

Therefore, because Dogen’s own position in the Bendwa
was Buddha-nature manifestation theory, the extreme type
of Buddha-nature theory, I cannot approve of Hakamaya
Noriaki’s interpretation that Dogen criticised "original
enlightenment thought" (本覺思想) in the Bendwa.(61) I am
rather sceptical of the validity of the term "original
enlightenment." Hakamaya’s definition of the term seems
indistinct. My opinion is the following. If we do not make
distinction between thetwo types of Buddha-nature theory,
and if we do not recognize that Dogen’s own position in his
early days was also one type of Buddha-nature theory, we
cannot stop praising Dogen as the excellent philosopher
who denied the general interpretation of Buddha-nature as
something substantial and permanent.(62)

It is quite noteworthy that Dogen criticiced his former
position, i.e. Buddha-nature Manifestation theory, after his
return from Kamakura. In fact, in the Shizen-biku 四禪比丘
volume of the Twelve-fascicle Shbgenz 十二卷本
正法眼藏, he criticised Buddha-nature manifestation theory
as follows:

Some people say that —–to see mountains
and rivers is to see Tathaagatas.

I do not think that Dogen’s criticism here is not fully
logical. Nevertheless, it is evident that he tried to criticise
Buddha-nature manifestation theory without declaring that
the object of his criticism was nothing other than his own
position in his former period.(64)

In the Twelve-fascicle Shbgenz, the word "bussh"
(佛性) was never used. On the contrary, he stressed the
theory of "inga"(因果), meaning Dependent-arising,
according to my interpretation. Although it goes without
saying that Dogen was not freed from the way of thinking
influenced by Tathaagatagrabha thought, it can not be
denied that his philosophical position was gradually changed
from Tathaagatagarbha thought to the theory of
Dependent-arising(pratiityasamutpaada), which I consider
to be the essence of Buddhism.

According to the Eiheikroku 永乎廣錄, Dogen stated in a
"jd"(上堂) [No,437] in 1251 as follows:

Ordinary people(凡夫) and non-Buddhists (外道)
also practice Zazen (坐禪). —– If one’s
understanding(解會) is identical with that of
non-Buddhists, it is useless [to practice Zazen]
even if he troubles his mind and body [by
practicing Zazen].(65)

I think this message of Dogen is most important. It seems
that Zen practice is to be directed to attaining correct
understanding of Buddhist philosophy.

(31) On the formation of the Platform Sutra, I have two
main perspectives. The first is that the Platform Sutra was
formed on the basis of Hui-neng’s commentary on the
Diamond Sutra, i.e. Chin-kang-ching chieh-i, and the
second is that rather strong aversion to Shen-hui is found
in the Platform Sutra. On this problem, cf.CZ,chap.Ⅱ. In
this respect, it seems that the phrase "立無念無宗"(p.6.1.14)
at the beginning of the seventeenth chapter of the Platform
Sutra of the Tun Huang manuscript must not be altered into
"立無念無宗" by the Kshji edition, because the passage "if
there is not yu-nien (有念), wu-nien (無念) also can not be
established"(p.7,1.8) in the chapter can be interpreted as the
message which rejected Shen-hui’s thesis. On this problem,
cf. CZ,pp.223-224.

(51) It seems that Buddha-nature Manifestation theory has
been dominant among the Ch’an masters belonging to the
lineage of Ch’ing-yüan 靑原 (673-741). I think the position
of Tung-shan 洞山 (807-869) also was Buddha-nature
Manifestation theory, because he affirmed
"Dharma-preaching by insentient beings" (無情說法) On this
problem, cf.CZ,pp.102-103,p.198,n.55.

(56) I consider the philosophical position of the so called
"Tendan Hongaku Hmon" in Japan to be Buddha-nature
Manifestation theory. Cf. Matsumoto, "Dogen and
Tathaagatagarbha Thought"(Dgen to nyoraiz shis),
Komazawa Daigaku Bukkygakubu Kenkyuukiy,No.56,pp.136-160.

Prof. Matsumoto Shiro, who has already presented for us at this
conference, and his colleague, Prof. Hakamaya Noriaki, have together
produced a number of lengthy essays on a theme called hihan bukkyo
(批判佛敎), in English, "Critical Buddhism."(1) Under this broad title, they
have written on a wide range of issues, including those that are sociological,
historical, philological as well as philosophical in nature. At the core of their
project is the conviction that the concepts of tathaagatagarbha and innate
enlightenment (本覺思想) are alien to Buddhism, due to the fact that those
concepts imply a belief in a hypostasized self–a type of atman, which
Buddhism originally and distinctively sought to refute through the
conceptual framework of pratiitya-samutpaada (dependent origination).

They claim, therefore, that the only texts to be considered as authentically
Buddhist are works from the early Pali tradition and from Maadhyamika
that limit themselves to apprehensions of the Buddhist reality that (1) can
be treated in and through language, and (2) can be treated in and through
the language of a strictly delimited model of dependent origination. Any
discourse that extends to the treatment of an "other" beyond the two
aforementioned frameworks is regarded as non-Buddhist. Under this
interpretation, most of the schools of Buddhism that developed in East
Asia, most importantly Ch’an and Hua-yen, cannot be considered Buddhist,
as it is in these schools where the conception of innate enlightenment was
prioritized, serving as the basis for the "faith" that empowers practice. Since
Ch’an and its descendant schools in Korea and Japan are understood as
having centered their teachings on a kind of mindlessness that ignores or
disparages the role of language in religious cultivation, these schools are
especially singled out as epitomizing the aberrant tendencies of East Asian
false Buddhist schools.

Prof. Hakamaya takes the incorporation of emphasis on the
trans-conceptual in East Asian Buddhism to be in great part the result of
influence from Chuang-Lao Taoism, which, according to him, is
representative of a "topical" philosophy that prioritizes subjective religious
experience over objective rational inquiry. This topical philosophy, in the
Buddhist context, is said to support a belief in dhaatus, or inherently
existent entities, a belief that is foreign to Buddhism, but that, according to
Hakamaya, is characteristic of Taoism. Prof. Hakamaya sees the Taoist
tendency to focus on a mysterious, experiential, unnamable Tao as having
infected East Asian Buddhism, and especially Ch’an, which thenceforth
produced literature that mimicked the dhaatu-vadistic tendency of Taoism.

The Critical Buddhist project has a markedly Japanese orientation, which is
understandable, as it originated in the course of an effort to identify the
source of ideology within the Japanese Soto Zen establishment that has led
the leaders of that sect to condone government policies that are socially
discriminatory, and to search out possible Buddhist-related causes for
attitudes of indifference on these matters on the part of the Japanese
Buddhist intellectual establishment. Most notorious here are leading
exponents of the Kyoto school such as Nishida Kitaro and Nishitani Keiji,
whose topically-oriented writings have provided much support to Japanese
theories of cultural superiority.

The vast majority of Japanese Buddhist scholars during the past century
have devoted their energies to issues of philology and have not engaged in
any sort of serious inquiry into the role and policies of the modern
Buddhist establishment in the history of Japan since the Meiji Restoration.
In this context, the protagonists of the Critical Buddhist movement, who
are themselves part of the Tokyo Buddhist academic circle, should be
accorded due praise, being the first in a long time to step outside of the
Japanese Buddhist monolithic scholarly establishment and dare to call to
task its lack of critical attitude.

Unfortunately however, the insularly Japanese context of their argument
has limited the exposure of the work of the Critical Buddhists to the
confines of the Japanese Buddhological academy, and a handful of foreign
scholars who have enough awareness of their situation and their work to
take an interest. Also limiting, however, are constraints derived from their
distinctive way of reading of the texts of East Asian Buddhism in particular,
and their way of understanding East Asian philosophy in general. There is a
significant degree to which their conceptions of innate enlightenment and
Zen doctrine as a whole are distinctively Japanese interpretations–and
more narrowly, Soto-based interpretations. This is approach can be
accepted if it is clearly indicated that the critique is being made only against
Japanese Zen. But the fact is that the critique is being made toward the
East Asian meditative schools in general, with no acknowledgment being
made regarding the significant differences observable in the character of
the various streams of Ch’an/Son/Zen in China, Korea and Japan.

A prominent example of the kind of problem that can be created by this
non-discriminating approach will be obvious to those with a background in
Korean Buddhism. With the strongly pon’gak sasang oriented content of
the writings of such influential figures as Wonhyo, Chinul and Kihwa,
Korean Buddhism can be argued to have been even more profoundly
imbued by the notion of innate enlightenment than Japanese Buddhism. Yet
the philosophical character of Korean Buddhism, and its conduct in regard
to support of questionable government policies has been radically different
from that of Japan, demonstrating almost none of the negative "original
enlightenment"-influenced effects identified by the Critical Buddhists in its
Japanese manifestation. The Korean Son tradition has also not shown the
aversion to critical philosophical discourse that is characteristic of the
Japanese Zen as understood by the Critical Buddhists. Korean Son scholars
have been extremely sensitive to the matter of the relationship between the
worded and wordless aspects of the Buddhist doctrine, such that the
exposition of this issue has often constituted a segment of their writings.
Are such differences the result of a distance between the Japanese and
Korean interpretations of innate enlightenment? Or are they derived from
differences between Japanese and Korean indigenous thought? Or some
combination of both?

In treating the interpretations made by the Critical Buddhists of East Asian
philosophical texts, I will focus on a few main, overlapping arguments. First,
I will question the characterization of innate enlightenment thought as being
"topical," along with the assertion that it is equivalent to a topicalized Taoist
perception of reality. My main theme in this discussion will be the
importance of the recognition of the central place of the essence-function
paradigm in East Asian religious thought. I will then question the Critical
Buddhist’s understanding of the Ch’an usage of the concept of "innate
enlightenment" through the examination of one of the most prominent of
the "innate enlightenment" Ch’an texts, to show the extent to which the
Ch’an authors tried to avoid referring to innate enlightenment in a
hypostasized manner. I will argue the misunderstanding derives from
reading Buddhist texts from a perspective that assumes a purpose of mere
ontological and metaphysical description, rather than the performative
soteriological intent with which they were actually written. The next part of
my argument will be an examination of the concept of "no-thought," which
Prof. Matsumoto takes, as the basis of Zen, to mean "absence of thinking."
I will assert here that there is no major Ch’an text in which no-thought, or
no-mind, is defined as absence of thought, but that instead, the concept
means "non-attached thought." I will refer, in this argument, to seminal
passages in both the Platform Sutra and Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment.
Finally, I will give some examples of how the most influential thinkers in
Korean Son were deeply involved in the exposition of the paradoxical
relationship between the worded and wordless teachings, and how they
attempted to resolve this paradox.

I would like to start by drawing attention to two perspicuous responses to
Critical Buddhism already crafted by two leading specialists in East Asiantathaagatagarbha/original enlightenment thought, that did much to help me
orient my point of departure for this essay: Sallie King and Peter Gregory.
Dr. King, in her article "Buddha-Nature is Impeccably Buddhist" has
argued, based on a close reading of the Buddha-Nature Treatise, that a
major point of that seminal treatise is to demonstrate that the term
"Buddha-nature" is nothing but another way of expressing the meaning of
"thusness," which is, she argues, rather than being an ontological category,
an ecstatic, experiential apprehension of reality as-it-is. She says:
"[Thusness] is not an ontological theory; [it] is an experience. And if there
is an ontological theory implicit in this experience, it is certainly not
monism."(2) She believes that it is erroneous to read Buddhist texts as
attempting solely to establish epistemological or ontological positions. Such
texts need, instead, to be seen in their role as soteriological devices. This
approach is corroborated by the allusions made throughout the Buddhist
corpus, such as the parable of the raft, or of the arrow, which, as Peter
Gregory points out, clearly "imply a pragmatic approach to truth according
to which doctrines only have provisional status."(3)

In terms of a general understanding of Chinese philosophy, there are
serious problems with the analysis of East Asian philosophical thought
provided by Prof. Hakamaya, especially regarding his characterizations of
Confucianism and Chuang-Lao Taoism, of which the latter stands accused
as the major corrupter of the imported Buddhist religion in East Asia. This
is, as Hakamaya understands, because the Tao of the Tao te ching
"precludes conventional naming and denies language."(4) The first problem
with this assessment, is that it is made based only on a couple of isolated
passages from the Tao te ching and Chuang tzu. If we examine these two
texts thoroughly and in a manner that takes into account their overall
message, we can see that in almost every chapter, the authors have stayed
far from projecting a simple monistic worldview, attempting instead to
demonstrate the inseparability of the Tao from the world of phenomena and
discursive thought.

Prof. Hakamaya makes this characterization of Taoism by citing only the
first four lines of the first chapter of the Tao te ching, which Jamie
Hubbard has translated for us as:

The ways that can be walked are not the eternal Way;

The names that can be named are not the eternal name.

The nameless is the origin of the myriad creatures;

The named is the mother of the myriad creatures.

Putting aside for the moment the matter of whether Prof. Hakamaya’s
interpretation warrants the positing of the Tao as a kind of atman, or
whether or not the rest of the eighty-one chapters of the text corroborate
such an interpretation, if we merely go down to the bottom of the same
chapter we read:

These two are the same–

When they appear they are named differently.

Their sameness is the mystery,

Mystery within mystery;

The door to all marvels.

If there is a distinction being made between the worded and the wordless,
why are they, immediately below, declared to be the same? And how can
someone who is making such an assertion ignore the immediately following
passage of such a short chapter?

One might want to maintain here that this sameness is indicative of
monism. But it is not so simple, as the the two are also named differently,
and the mode of their sameness is mysterious. Furthermore, anyone whodoes want to argue for monism here should be aware that there is an
extensive tradition of Chinese scholarship that will argue against such an
interpretation. The named and the nameless do have a well-defined
relationship in the context of neither sameness nor difference, which I will
now explain.

Rather than being examples of a simple monism, the Tao te ching andChuang tzu conduct a wide variety of articulations of the indigenous East
Asian concept of essence-function (t’i-yung), among which, that of the
first chapter of the Tao te ching is quintessential. T’i體 originally means
body or substance, and refers to the more internal, more essential, hidden,
important aspects of a thing. Yung 用 refers to the more external,
superficial, obvious, functional aspects of something. But these must be
clearly understood to be aspects–ways of seeing a single thing, and not
two separate existences. Therefore, the essence-function construction is
always relative in its usage, and t’i is not the Chinese analog of atman, ordhaatu.(5) In properly understood t’i-yung logic, a dichotomized or
polarized notion of the pair is impossible. T’i can only be seen,
apprehended, expressed, and indeed–exist, through the presence of yung.
In other words, t’i is dependently arisen from yung, and yung is
dependently arisen from t’i.

The t’i-yung principle, which has its origins deep in the recesses of early
Chou thought in such seminal texts as the Book of Odes, Analects, I ching
and Tao te ching, became formally defined and used with regularity in the
exegetical writings of Confucian/Neo-Taoist scholars of the Latter Han and
afterward. Scholars of the pre-Buddhist Chinese classics had utilizedt’i-yung and its earlier equivalents, such as pen-mo (本末 "roots and
branches") in Confucianism and hei-pai (黑白 "black and white") of Taoism
to explain the relationship of inherent human goodness and spiritual
harmony with its not-always-manifest permutations. The Confucian
concept of inherent goodness is intimated in the early Chou works, and
fully articulated in the Analects and the Mencius. Of central importance in
these texts is the basic human quality of jen (仁 "humanity," "benevolence")
that expresses itself in various "functions" such as propriety (li 禮 ) and filial
piety (hsiao孝).

Although Confucianism and Taoism differ in terms of the respective
emphases of their discourses, with Taoism taking a more naturalistic
approach to human cultivation and Confucianism advocating a more
rules-oriented stance, in terms of basic worldview, there is great overlap
and deep connection between them, most importantly in terms of their
sharing in the same t’i-yung paradigm. In view of the depth of this
sharedness, when it comes to making the kind of hard and fast distinction
between the two traditions that Prof. Hakamaya wants to make, categorizing
one as "critical" and the other as "topical" it cannot be permissible to do so
based only on a couple of fragmentary citations from the Analects, Tao te
ching and Chuang tzu, while giving almost no consideration to the way that
these texts are understood in their entirety by specialists in the area. The
only Confucian specialist to whom Hakamaya refers is Ito Jinsai.(6) But
even when we read the Ito citation, there is nothing said about the Analects
other than that it contains "clear argumentation" and "sound reasoning."
There is nothing whatsoever in the passage to offer any support to
Confucian-as-critical/Taoist-as-topical distinction.

The Buddhist religion, as it was exported from India, did not contain a
sustained and overt discussion of the concept of innate Buddhahood. But
East Asians perceived within the Buddhist doctrine the potentiality for
human perfection, which they naturally described in their native framework
of t’i-yung. However, with innate and actualized enlightenment as
manifestations of the essence-function model, innate enlightenment was not
hypostasized as a "locus" but was instead understood as an experiential and
enhanceable potentiality. In terms of basic constitution, in the process of
enlightenment, the the human mind and body have nothing added or
subtracted. This is a basic premise taught in innate enlightenment texts
such as the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment (Yan cheh ching 圓覺經 )and
the Awakening of Faith (Ta-sheng ch’i-hsin lun大乘起信論), where innate
and actualized enlightenment are described not as static ontological
categories, but as a way of looking at existence that allows for a workable
prescription toward practice.(7)

In most of the private discussions that I have had with my colleagues who
specialize in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, I have been told that that East
Asian Buddhism shows virtually no new philosophical insights beyond the
articulation of the theories of pratiitya-samutpaada and uunyataa that are
contained in Maadhyamika and Yogaacaara. I understand why they believe
this, since the East Asian concepts of emptiness (k’ung空 ) and mutual
interpenetration of phenomena (shih-shih wu-ai事事無碍) are indeed
deeply informed by their Indian predecessors. But from here, there is one
sense in which the critical Buddhists and I are in agreement in perceiving
that there certainly is some sort of significant philosophical transformation
that occurs in the Buddhist doctrine once it is assimilated in East Asia. The
difference between us, however, is that where the Critical Buddhists would
characterize this transformation as a corruption by the reification of the
concept of buddha-nature, I would regard the major Chinese
reinterpretation of Buddhism to be first and foremost that of the recasting
of the doctrine in terms of essence-function, which, rather than bringing
harm, was highly beneficial in the degree to which it helped to more deeply
bind the philosophical dimension of the buddhadharma with the practical
aspect.

Beyond this philosophical development, the most important contributions
made by the Ch’an movement are, rather than doctrinal, of a practical
nature, in that the Ch’an masters showed a special level of sensitivity to the
tendency of the human mind to become enmeshed in conceptual positions.
For them, the main obstruction to the attainment of enlightenment had
nothing to do with either a lack, or excess of knowledge of the doctrine, the
problem being that of the propensity of the mind to become conditioned
and attached to concepts. Regardless of the extent of one’s doctrinal
mastery, such expertise, if not handled properly, will soon turn into an
impediment. Therefore Ch’an masters to this day are cautious as to their
wording when they discuss the matter of enlightenment, knowing how easy
it is for students to get stuck on words, especially the terminology usually
associated with awakening.

But since human beings must inevitably discuss things in the course of
teaching and learning, concepts will be established, reified, and clung to.
Therefore the need of methods to break such attachments. One of the
primary remedies used in this work, is to subject such concepts to an
analysis that shows them, just like all the objects to which they refer, to be
dependently-originated, and therefore, lacking in self-nature. For the
scholar, this view of dependent origination is noted, and categorized as a
seminal aspect of the Buddhist doctrine. For the Buddhist meditator, the
purpose is quite different. The merely learning of such a metaphysical
theory in itself will do little to help him in his fundamental task of
overcoming his habituated, mistaken perception of reality. Therefore he
engages himself in the practice of meditation, where the observation of the
dependently-originated nature of things is sustained for long periods of
time, is deepened and enhanced, such that it begins to affect his worldview
and actions even while not engaged in formal sitting meditation. Buddhist
texts tell us that the result of such a sustained contemplation can be, if the
power of the contemplation is strong enough, a major rupture of the
habituated discursive process, which allows the disclosure of deeper aspects
of the consciousness.

When the Critical Buddhists discuss the analysis of dependent origination,
they seem to assume that its point is only a matter for the development of
metaphysical positions within the domain of circumscribed by language. If a
meditator wanted to participate in such an understanding, she would have to
halt her pratiitya-samutpaada-based vipayanaa (observing meditation) with
an intellectual grasp of anatman, and desist from going on to focus the
same meditative tool on the conceptual objects, or "dharmas." If this kind of
limitation is enforced, it cannot but end up privileging the status of
language, as the meditator is denied recourse to the analysis of linguistic
constructs. However, the so-called "emptiness of dharmas," one of the
cornerstones of Mahayana doctrine, includes the fact that all linguistic
constructs are dependently originated, and therefore any conceptually
grounded insights, while of use in certain applications, cannot be seen to be
outside the purview of the analysis of dependent origination. While certain
Buddhist thinkers according to the situation may relax on the thoroughness
of this contemplation in order to allow for the creation of introductory-level
instruction, or for the purposes of construction of a coherent system, the
usage of this analysis in the formal exercise of meditation is quite another
matter.

Therefore the guided contemplation exercises contained in Ch’an sutras,
while often starting out by alluding to the existence of an originary mode of
enlightenment, invariably conclude such discussions by refuting the same
concepts on the basis on the lack of inherent nature in linguistic
formulations. The Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment contains numerous
examples of this kind of practice, as although apparently-ontological
statements are offered concerning the presence of something called innate
(or "perfect") enlightenment, this is done only for the purpose of creating a
provisional object of faith, such that practitioners may confirm their will to
practice in the face of the strong negative aspects of the
emptiness-oriented Mahayana doctrine. The perfect enlightenment being
described is not intended to be posited as one’s etern>

Transfer interrupted!

apacity for total awareness, unobstructed by prejudices and misconceptions
derived from one’s misunderstanding of the existence of self and objects.
The Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment is especially suitable for examination
of this problem, since it is considered to be a quintessential "innate
enlightenment" scripture–a foundational text of the Ch’an school that
remains influential in the Chinese and Korean meditative traditions to the
present day.

Let us look at a well-known passage from the second chapter of the sutra:

Good sons, all sentient beings’ various illusions are born from
the perfectly enlightened marvelous mind of the Tathaagata, just
like the sky-flowers come to exist in the sky. Even though the
illusory flowers vanish, the nature of the sky is indestructible.
The illusory mind of sentient beings also vanishes based on
illusion, and while all illusions are utterly erased, the enlightened
mind is unchanged. The use of illusion to speak of enlightenment
is also called illusion. If you say there is enlightenment, you are
not yet free from illusion. If you say there is no enlightenment,
this is the same thing. Therefore, the cessation of illusion is
called ‘unchanging.’(8)

The first line, which says "all sentient beings’ various illusions are born
from the perfectly enlightened marvelous mind of the Tathaagata," is typical
of the characterizations of the "perfect enlightenment" found in this sutra.
The fact that it is a "source" from which "all illusions" arise could well lead to
the assumption that some sort of dhaatu is being hypostasized. But,
interestingly, while we might expect, in a dhaatu-vadistic framework, for
perfect enlightenment to be the source for manifest enlightenment, it is
instead the source of "all illusions," which immediately problematizes the
"topical" interpretation. This is of course is a characteristic implementation
of the t’i-yung framework. T’i, as the basic enlightened aspect of the
human mind may manifest itself poorly (as delusion) or correctly (as
manifest enlightenment), within the same individual, depending on the
circumstances, and depending on the perceiver.

The "perfectly enlightened marvelous mind of the Tathaagata" is best not
interpreted as either an ontological or epistemological category: it is a
description of an experiential condition of the mind unfettered by mistaken
views and attachments/aversions. It is a psychological state that sentient
beings have the potential to experience, according to their basic
constitution. In the case of the Buddha, this harmonious condition appears
naturally, and is called "enlightenment." In the case of sentient beings, it
does not appear naturally, and is called "illusion" or "enlightenment"
according to its degree of actualization.

The next line of the sutra says "The illusory mind of sentient beings also
vanishes based on illusion, and while all illusions are utterly erased, the
enlightened mind is unchanged." Here, the illusory mind does not disappear
based upon its "source," but as the result of (dependently arisen) causes and
conditions. Despite the disappearance of illusion, nothing has actually
changed–nothing has been added or subtracted. Aware of thesvabhaava-taste of this description ("the enlightened mind is unchanged")
the author immediately adds: "The use of illusion to speak of enlightenment
is also called illusion. If you say there is enlightenment, you are not yet free
from illusion." This tells us that the prior hypostasized notion of
enlightenment has no constant validity–that it is a dependently arisen
notion–a provisional device to orient the practice of contemplation. The
object being abided in and the subjective abiding are both overturned.
Finally, the natural tendency that most people have–that once a position is
negated, to assume its opposite to be true–is also cut off directly with the
next phrase, that states "If you say there is no enlightenment, this is the
same thing."

What has been described above is a basic motif found in all major
Ch’an/Son/Zen canonical texts: the teaching of the method of avoidance of
abiding in set thought patterns. Although this practice is commonly
referred to as no-thought (wu-hsin, wu-nien無心 無念 ), it is a serious
mistake to understand Zen to refer merely to the "denial" or "cessation" of
"conceptual thinking."(9) Even if the etymology of the Sanskrit termdhyaana can be shown to have no-thought connotations, we cannot ignore
all the semantic development undergone by the Chinese term ch’an in the
course of the production of the Ch’an texts in East Asia. Rather than
referring to an absence of thought, no-mind refers to the condition of
not being trapped in thoughts, not adhering to a certain conceptual habit
or position.

The error of interpretation made by many scholars (and by Zen
practitioners as well) is in taking this term to refer to an ongoing absence of
thought. Yet while this assumption is routinely made, it is impossible to
corroborate it in the Ch’an canon. If we study the seminal texts carefully,
we do find a description of the experience of the severing of thought that
occurs in the course of a thoroughgoing pursuit of a Buddhist meditative
exercise. But nowhere in the Platform Sutra, Sutra of Perfect
Enlightenment, Diamond Sutra, or any other major Ch’an text, is the term
"no-mind" explained to be a permanent incapacitation of the thinking
faculty or the permanent cessation of all conceptual activity. It is rather
the case that the interruption of the discursive process at a sufficiently
deep level allows for an experiential vision of a different aspect of the mind.
The view of one’s self and world through this other aspect is radically
different from the former. It is not that thought no longer occurs. The
conceptualizing faculty still functions quite well–in fact, even better than
before, since, now, under the influence of the deeper dimension of the mind
it no longer has to operate in a rigid, constricted, and clinging manner. It is
now possible to see things as they really are, unfiltered by one’s own
massive depository of presuppositions. This is what is meant by the term
"suchness."

When the Ch’an texts talk about no-thought, or no-mind, it is this state of
non-clinging or freedom from mistaken conceptualization to which they are
referring, rather than the permanent cessation of thinking that some
imagine. The deeper, immeasurably more clear aspect of the mind that they
experience in the course of this irruption of the discursive flow, they call
"enlightenment." Realizing now, that this potential of the mind was always
with them, they call it "innate."

The locus classicus for the concept of no-thought is the Platform Sutra,
which says:

"No-thought" means "no-thought within thought." Non-abiding is
man’s original nature. Thoughts do not stop from moment to
moment. The prior thought is succeeded in each moment by the
subsequent thought, and thoughts continue one after another
without cease. If, for one thought-moment, there is a break, the
dharma-body separates from the physical body, and in the midst
of successive thoughts there will be no attachment to any kind of
matter. If, for one thought-moment, there is abiding, then there
will be abiding in all successive thoughts, and this is called
clinging. If, in regard to all matters there is no abiding from
thought-moment to thought-moment, then there is no clinging.
Non-abiding is the basis.(10)

Nowhere is there a mention of any kind of disappearance of, or absence of
thought. "No-thought" refers distinctly to an absence of abiding, or
clinging. According to this explanation of the concept, any reading ofwu-nien as an "absence of thought" is a misinterpretation.

Returning to the Sutra of the Perfect Enlightenment, we should make it
clear that the first passage that we cited from that text is by no means
some odd exception to an otherwise svabhaava-centric discourse. The
pattern repeats itself over and over: the initial reference to an intrinsic
capacity for enlightenment based on a t’i-yung model, followed by an
exercise in the practice of non-abiding in conceptions–a combination of
basic Mahayana doctrinal grounding, which is further invariably followed
with an effacement of provisionally-established conceptual structures.
Again, in a subsequent passage of the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment we
read:

Good sons, all bodhisattvas and sentient beings of the
degenerate age should separate from all illusory and false
realms. By firmly abiding in separation from thought, you also
separate from the thought of ‘illusion.’ As this separation
becomes illusion, you again separate from it. You again separate
from this separation from separation from illusion, until you
reach "nothing to be separated from," which is the removal of all
illusion. It is like making a fire with two sticks. The fire blazes
and the wood is consumed; the ashes fly away and the smoke
vanishes. Using illusion to remedy illusion is exactly like this. Yet
even though all illusions are extinguished, you do not enter into
nothingness. Good sons, awareness of illusion is none other than
freedom [from it], without devising expedient means. Freedom
from illusion is none other than enlightenment, and there are no
stages.(11)

Again, this is an instruction on, and a guided exercise through, the
non-abiding in conceptual constructs, where the point is for the practitioner
to learn that illusion is none other than the habit of adherence to reified
thought constructs. The metaphor, as we can see, is pratiitya-samutpaada
through and through. We can also see the author’s distaste for attaching a
baggage-laden name, such as "enlightenment" to the resultant state. But he
nonetheless wants to add a note of encouragement to make it clear that the
resulting state is not a void. Where, from this kind of passage, do we get
the message that the individual is henceforth incapable of thought? And
where is enlightenment hypostasized?

Good sons, since the illusory body of this sentient being vanishes, the
illusory mind also vanishes. Since the illusory mind vanishes, illusory
objects also vanish. Since illusory objects vanish, illusory vanishing also
vanishes. Since illusory vanishing vanishes, non-illusion does not vanish. It
is like polishing a mirror: when the filth is gone, its brightness naturally
appears. Good sons, you should understand both body and mind to be
illusory filth. When the defiled aspects are permanently extinguished, the
entire universe becomes pure.(12)

Here we have a movement of negation that proceeds from the subjective
body and mind, out to the objects. In terms of standard Mahayana doctrine,
that is, in itself, a sufficient descriptive account of the enlightened
condition. However, the author is not content to offer only a doctrinal
description. He also wants the reader to be repeatedly removed from the
concept of vanishing. The result is an experiential condition of the mind of
the practitioner unfettered by illusion. When defilement is extirpated, the
purity of the entire universe is visible. Nowhere is it stated that the
attainment of enlightenment implies the loss of the ability to think.

Critical Buddhist arguments against innate enlightenment and no-thought
are unlikely to gain a great deal of currency within Korean Buddhist
scholarship. But this is not because the argument would be seen as foreign
or difficult to identify with. Rather, because the question of the relationship
of innate and actualized enlightenment, and the relationship between the
wordless and the worded expressions of the buddhadharma have already
received sustained, extensive and sophisticated treatment by the most
prominent thinkers in the Korean tradition. The dialog on this topic was
already well-developed as early as in the twelfth century, and continued for
several centuries. Any modern scholar who can read literary Chinese, and
wants to investigate the treatment of this topic can readily find more than
enough material in the writings of such figures as Wonhyo (元曉 617-686),
Chinul (知訥 1158-1210), Kihwa (己和 1376-1433) or Hyujong (休靜
1520-1604). All four of these men wrote extensively on the matter of the
relationship between innate and actualized enlightenment, and the latter
three delved deeply into the relationship between the doctrinal (linguistic)
transmission and the so-called "mind-to-mind" transmission. The
predominant unifying factor in the Korean Son discourse on these topics is
that is it thoroughly essence-function oriented, and is based mainly on the
content of the formational Ch’an texts: the Platform Sutra, Sutra of
Perfect Enlightenment, Awakening of Faith, Diamond Sutra,Vajrasamaadhi-suutra, etc.

The first major Son figure to take up the matter of the relationship between
the worded and wordless teachings as major project was Chinul. Aided by
the analysis of the Hua-yen ching provided by the Li T’ung-hsan (李通玄
635-730),(13) Chinul utilized Hua-yen philosophy to support Son
soteriological views. In discussing this matter in his commentary on Li’s
work, Chinul utilized the essence-function construction to explain the
relationship of the Hua-yen theory of interpenetration to the Son awakening
experience, saying:

The diligent practitioner who is cultivating his mind should first, by means
of the path of the patriarchs, become cognizant of the fact that the
fundamental subtlety of his own mind cannot be defined in words and
letters. Then, using the texts, he should discern that the essence and
function of his mind are none other than the nature and characteristics of
the realm of reality (dharmadhaatu). Then the virtuous power of [the
actualization of] the interpenetration of phenomena with phenomena, and
the efficacious function of the wisdom and compassion [that are gained
from an awareness of] the sameness in essence [of all things] will no
longer be external concerns (i.e., merely conceptual theories).(14)

While the trans-conceptual aspect of the teaching is obviously prioritized,
Chinul is quick to follow up by pointing out the need to re-integrate this
experience with the world of conceptual understanding.

The matter of the relationship between these aspects is discussed in the
writings of many of Chinul’s descendants, but the most extensive work is
done on the topic about two centuries after Chinul, by the monk Kihwa.(15)
Kihwa addressed in his writings a wide variety of Buddhist and
non-Buddhist religious themes, but one of his favorite topics was the
renewal of Chinul’s argument for the essence-function relationship of Son
and Kyo, which he did primarily within the context of the Kumgang
panyaparamilgyongo ka hae sorui (Combined Commentaries of Five
Masters on the Diamond Sutra 金剛般若波羅蜜經五家解說誼 )(16) and his
commentary on the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment, (Won’gakkyong hae
sorui 圓覺經解說誼 ).

Since the Diamond Sutra is a text that deals directly with the problems of
the relationship of language to reality, it was the perfect vehicle through
which Kihwa could express his understanding of this intrinsic unity as
reflected in the two opposite movements of: (1) the necessity of the
practice of meditation for a proper realization of that which to which the
scriptures refer, and (2) the viability of scriptural study as a means towards
the attainment of the Son goal of enlightenment. While Kihwa was clearly in
favor of an informed usage of scriptural study in Buddhist cultivation, he at
the same time upheld Ch’an’s strict admonition regarding the possible
pitfalls of language. He says early in the O ka hae:

An ancient said: "The Three Vehicles and Twelve Divisions of the Teaching
embody the principle and grasp the mystery." This being the case, what is
the special significance of the ancestral teacher’s coming from the West?
And the separately transmitted teaching should also not be found outside of
the scriptures. But since that which is contained in the worded teaching has
remained hidden and undisclosed, now the patriarchs reveal and spread its
truth, and not only is the meaning of the doctrine made clear, but the
"separately transmitted teaching" is also fully disclosed. Since there has
been something designated as "the transmission of direct pointing," how
could this be something that is contained in the doctrinal teaching? If we
merely reflect on the story of Ts’ao-chi of Huang-mei,(17) this can readily
be seen!(18)

We should make sure, here, to understand that in the context of our above
meeting with the Platform Sutra, that we do not take its "formless"
teaching, to be some sort of blankness, or nothingness, but as the teaching
of non-abiding in constructs. Here, although Kihwa first intimates that the
Ch’an of the patriarchs and the sermons of the Buddha manifest the same
reality, and that one cannot stick to an "anti-language" position, he
subsequently places a strong emphasis on the privilege of the wordless
transmission. Below, he offers a view of the issue that tends in the other
direction, pointing out the usefulness of the worded teaching, while at the
same time maintaining his warning against attachment to it:

The dharma that the Buddha has taught is absolute and is relative. Since it
is relative, liberation is none other than written language. Since what was
taught in the east and taught in the west for forty-nine years(19) is
absolute, written language is none other than liberation;(20) yet in over
three hundred sermons, ^Saakyamuni never explained a single word. If you
are attached to the words, then you see branches of the stream but miss
their source. If you do away with words, you observe the source but are
ignorant of its branching streams. When you are confused about neither the
source nor its streams, then you enter the ocean of the dharma-nature.
Having entered the ocean of the dharma-nature, the no-thought wisdom is
directly manifested. The no-thought wisdom being directly manifested,
whatever is faced is no impediment, and you penetrate wherever you
touch.(21)

Although one should not be attached to words, words also are not to be
denied. Here, the essence-function framework can be seen in the
source-streams simile. Kihwa first counsels regarding the serious pitfall
which has been warned against throughout the Buddhist tradition, and
which became a main concern of the Ch’an tradition–that an imbalanced
attachment to words (yung) can lead to an obstruction of the very essence
(t’i) of Buddhist practice. Yet to forget words and become absorbed in the
wordless is to forget the phenomenal world and be attached to the essence.
According to Kihwa, this is also not an acceptable Buddhist position. What
remains is the "middle path," which means continuous avoidance of abiding
in exclusivist views. This is "entering the ocean of the dharma-nature,"
which results in the manifestation of no-thought wisdom. No-thought
wisdom penetrates everything with which it comes in contact.

Below, in a related passage, Kihwa makes the same point in a slightly
different way. The Buddha is speaking to Subhuuti, the arhat-interlocutor
of the Diamond Sutra:

"Subhuuti, what do you think? Does the Tathaagata have a dharma to be
explained or not?"

Subhuuti answered the Buddha, saying, "World-honored one, the
Tathaagata has no dharma to be explained."(22)

Tao-ch’uan, (one of the five commentators) says: "Quietly, quietly."

Kihwa adds: "The Buddha has nothing to explain; this is definitely true. But
‘saying nothing’ is also not the Buddha’s original intention. That is why
Tao-ch’uan says ‘quietly, quietly.’ One should not claim one-sidedly that
there is ‘nothing to be said.’"

A bit further on he adds: ". . . therefore it is said, ‘even though you do not
rely on the path of verbal teaching, you should also not be attached to the
position which fully rejects verbal explanation.’"(23)

Kihwa considers the Diamond Sutra to be so valuable exactly because he
understands "non-abiding" to be the key of all Buddhist practices. Again
relying on the essence-function framework, he says:

"Non-abiding is the great essence of the myriad practices, and the myriad
practices are all the great function of non-abiding. The teaching of the
compassionate saint [the Buddha] takes non-abiding as its abode. With the
great essence shining, one cannot but be aware of the great function.(24)

Concerning the relationship of the Diamond Sutra with the practice of
non-abiding, Kihwa says:

Praj~naa‘s divine source is vast, lacking all kinds of characteristics. It is
extensive, yet lacks an abode. It is empty and not existing; it is profound
and unknown. Now this single sutra takes this as its core teaching and as
its essence. Although there is no awareness, there is nothing that it does
not know. Although there is no abiding, there is no place where it does not
abide. Although lacking characteristics, it does not obstruct any
characteristics. This is the function of marvelous existence. What all
buddhas have realized is exactly the realization of this. What all the
patriarchs have transmitted is exactly the transmission of this. Their means
of awakening people is also exactly through this.(25)

In the Diamond Sutra, non-abiding is equated with the lack of attachment
to any characteristic (hsiang/sang 相 ). Therefore, the Diamond Sutra’s
teaching of No-Aspects (wu-hsiang/musang 無相 ) is synonymous with
non-abiding. The Diamond Sutra’s discussion, as is the case with the other
texts of the praj~naapaaramitaa genre, carries out a systematic refutation
of the abiding in characteristics, and most importantly, the abiding in
characteristics of selfhood and thinghood. The same then, applies for
abiding in either of the positions of "words" or "wordlessness."

In summary, Kihwa is strongly opposed to exclusivist positions either for or
against the role of written language in the cultivation of the dharma. But
since his articulation of the polarity is through essence and function, we can
say that while Kihwa accepts the validity of both approaches, it is clear that
the "wordless" teaching, being the essence, has priority, and the textual
approach is secondary. But once again, "primary" and "secondary" in this
sense cannot be understood in an either-or manner. The secondary is just
as necessary to the primary as is the primary to the secondary. You can’t
have one without the other. We find both Chinul’s and Kihwa’s positions
reiterated throughout the subsequent Korean tradition, in subtle detail. The
leading Son master of the later Choson, Hyujong, also discussed this matter
at great length in his writings.(26)

By contrast, we have seen the Diamond Sutra cited in the Critical Buddhist
project in an attempt to support the thesis that Ch’an materials advocate
"no-thought" understood as a kind of mental blankness, together with
selected citations from Mo-ho-yen, who, although well-known to scholars
of Tibetan Buddhism for his defeat in the famous sudden-gradual debate, is
a decidedly minor figure in the history of the development of Ch’an. Here
Mo-ho-yen is cited as stating that "conceptualizing is a defect," supported
by a quote from the Diamond Sutra to the effect that: "The Diamond Sutra
says, ‘One who is free from all conceptions is called Buddha.’"(27) Based
on our above discussion, however, we can know that this phrase "free from
all conception," should be taken, rather than referring to some sort of
permanent incapacitation of the faculty of thought, to mean exactly what it
says: namely "freedom from conceptions," which is none other than the
ability to be unattached to one’s concepts, to be able to stand away from
the never-ending flow of discursive consciousness. This line from theDiamond Sutra is in perfect agreement with what we have seen above in theSutra of Perfect Enlightenment and Platform Sutra. I would further point
out that the Diamond Sutra, as a text whose theme is nothing but the
investigation of, and countering of, the tendency to reify and attach to
conceptual constructs has no line in it that asserts, that "conceptualizing"
[in itself] "is a defect."(28)

Although it does seem that the art of instruction on methods of
engagement into the practice of non-abiding may have reached a new peak
in the birth of Ch’an, I see neither a firm basis nor a special need to claim
that the notion of unattached thought is the unique creation of the Ch’an
movement. On the contrary, I would hold that even the earliest Indian
forms of contemplation on pratiitya-samutpaada had a similar purpose, as
they sought to sever attachment to the notion of the ego, which they
conceived to be a basic cause in the production of du.hkha. Indeed, from
the time of the earliest origins of Indian Buddhism, the concept of
dependent origination was not merely a philosophical argument to be used
against the non-Buddhist sects. Dependent origination was the object of
vipa^syanaa, "observing" meditation, the point of which was the attainment
of a permanent freedom from entitative thinking, characterized at that time
by atman-ism. We should not be determined to confine Buddhism strictly
within the domain of philosophical-linguistic discourse, and ignore the fact
of its primary purpose as a soteriological system aimed at bringing about
liberation.

If we accept dependent origination as a basic strategy to be used in
meditation, which is aimed at liberation, how can it be permissible to set
limits to the extent of that meditation, and say "it is OK to use
pratiitya-samutpaada to deconstruct atma-vaada, but you should stop
there, and not proceed to the deconstruction of the dhaatu of thought
constructs." According to the bulk of the materials presented in the
Buddhist tradition, this is the key to the attainment of wisdom. And once
we come to this point, how can it be impermissible to speak of the
enlightenment experience? Or to speak of what quality it is that sentient
beings possess that makes the enlightenment experience possible?

1) Western access to this debate has been greatly
enhanced by the recent publication of the book Pruning
the Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism,
edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson (University
of Hawaii Press, 1998). This book contains English
translations of several of the most important essays by
Profs. Hakamaya and Matsumoto, along with several
other articles by Japanese and non-Japanese scholars
that argue for various positions within the context of
this debate. Most of the citations in this article have
been made from this extremely valuable work.

5) For a more thorough discussion of the meaning and
usage of the t’i-yung framework, see my articles
entitled "The Composition of Self-Transformation
Thought in Classical East Asian Philosophy and
Religion" (Toyo Gakuen Kiyo, vol. 4 (March, 1996), pp.
141-152.) and "East Asia’s Unexplored Pivot of
Metaphysics and Hermeneutics:
Essence-Function/Interpenetration" (paper presented at
the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of
Religion, available on the WWWeb athttp://www.human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp/~acmuller/articles/

indigenoushermeneutics.htm. The latter work is a revised
expansion of the former.

7) It is true that one can isolate phrases and passages in
such works as the Awakening of Faith, Sutra of
Perfect Enlightenment and Platform Sutra (Liu-tsu
Tan-ching六祖壇經 ) that seem to refer to a hypostatic,
atman-like enlightenment, as there are passages in
these works which suggest innate, or perfect
enlightenment as the "source" for manifest events, such
as actualized enlightenment, or the myriad phenomena.
But we should consider the Chinese concept used to
denote this concept of "source," is that of a spring (yan源) that is integrally connected to its branch streams–a
direct analog of t’i.

Nature and Buddha-nature: The Ecological Dimensions of East Asian Buddhism Critically Considered.

The Engaged Buddhist view

The Critical Buddhist view

Criticising the Critical Buddhist view

Buddhism, values and society

The problem of Buddhist environmentalism.

Buddhism, nature, causality and interdependence.

Spiritual and biological hierarchies and the issue of discrimination.

The Contribution of Son Buddhism

Conclusion

Notes

References

Much of this paper is concerned with the contrast between two very different kinds of arguments on the issue of Buddhism in relation to environmental concerns.The first reflects an Engaged Buddhist perspective and stresses the urgent relevance of Buddhist practice to environmental issues. The second is the Critical Buddhist perspective, which regards the concern with environmental issues as not a legitimate Buddhist concern, and further argues that the supposed Buddhological basis for much reflection on Buddhism and the environment is based on a misinterpretation of Buddhism.

The Engaged Buddhist view

“…to be a Buddhist today is a geo-political act for the obvious reason that every one of our acts now adds to or subtracts from the load of human affairs which burdens the earth. It is also a geopolitical act because, given the continuing devotion to consumerism, one of the most radical acts we can perform in our society is to consume less, to sit quietly meditating in a room, or try and think clearly about who we are trying to be. And finally, being a Buddhist is a geopolitical act because it provides us with a working space within which to stand back from our aggressive culture and consider alternatives.” (Batchelor and Brown eds. 1992 p. 75)

The above sounds like a radically challenging expression of an engaged Buddhist environmental perspective. But a the same time it could be argued that it reflects a very traditional approach to teaching Dharma. Taking the issue that immediatedly concerns the listener, and subtly turning that concern into a direct reflection on their own meditative experience. Stephen Batchelor takes a very similar approach

“So the ecological crisis we witness today is, from a Buddhist perspective, a rather predictable outcome of the kinds of deluded behaviour the Buddha described 2,500 years ago. Greed hate and stupidity, the three poisons the Buddha spoke of, have now spilled beyond the confines of the human mind and village politics to poison quite literally the seas , the air and the earth itself. And the fire the Buddha spoke of as metaphorically engulfing the world and its inhabitants in flames is now horribly visible in nuclear explosions and smouldering rain forests, and psychologically apparent in the rampant consumerism of our times.

Perhaps we need these disasters to prompt us to consider more deeply what the Buddha was saying all along. For ecological crisis is at root a spiritual crisis of self-centred greed, aided and abetted by ingenious technologies run amok”.

(Batchelor in Batchelor and Brown 1992 p33.)

It is interesting to note that Batchelor and many other contributors who see Buddhism as a positive resource for environmental attitudes and actions, frequently cite the Hua Yen teaching of interdependence and mutual entailment of dharmas, and Ch’an teachings on Buddha nature, in support of Buddhist ecological thinking (1). Martine Batchelor’s use of a poem by Uisang and some lines from Dogen are typical examples:

Since Dharma nature is round and interpenetrating, it is without any sign of duality.All dharmas (phenomenon) are unmoving and originally calm.No name , no form; all (distinctions) are abolished.It is known through the wisdom of enlightenment, not by any other level. The true-nature is extremely profound, exceedingly subtle and sublime. It does not attach to self nature, but takes form following (causal ) conditions.

In one is all in many is one. One is identical to all, many is identical to one. In one particle of dust are contained the ten directionsAnd so it is with all particles of dust. (ibid p.11)Not only is ther water in the world, there is a world of water with a world in it. this is not just true for water, but for all material things – there are animate worlds in clouds, wind fire, earth, Dharma worlds, one blade of grass and a staff. Where there is an animate world ther is a world of Buddhas and Patriarchs.Study this principle well. (Dogen, Shobogenzo – Sansuikyo Mountains and Water Sutras trans.Nishiyama 1988, p226)

The Critical Buddhist view

It is one of the ironies of the contemporary debate that the teachings which are frequently cited in support of a Buddhist ecological world view and basis for environmental action, namely the Hua Yen notion of interdependence of Dharmas, and the developed Chinese Mahayana notions of Buddha-nature and the Japanese interpretation of the teaching of original enlightenment, are precisely those which Hakamaya Noriaki condemns as non Buddhist. Further more he sees the supposed Japanese value of harmony with nature as based on such notions, as simply a retreat into quietism and a justification for inaction and ethical stagnation. He regards the uncritical conflation of “Buddhist” teachings of Original Enlightenment with an undifferentiated Tao, and Chinese concepts of nature and spontaneity as having undermined the distinctive character of Buddhist causal analysis (pratitya samutpada) (2).

In India the indigenous way of thinking was, as taught in the Upanisads, to posit a fundamenatal basis or substance such as brahman or atman.Buddhism arose in response to this way of thinking. It denied a spatial and unchanging single topos, and instead that the only truth is a temporal process of conditioned arising (paticccasumppada/pratitya samutpada)…. when Buddhism was transmitted to China as a “foreign religion” its central teaching was overturned… and as a result not even a smidgen left of the distinctive features of Buddhism – the Buddhist concepts of conditioned arising and causality have been eliminated in favour of teh indigenous Chinese concept of “nature” or “spontaneity” (Jpn,shizen) (Hakamaya in Hubbard 1997 p 95)

He argues that true Buddhism should be based on a correct understanding of the teaching of no-self and its ethical implications. Notions of original enlightenment, the Buddha-nature of natural phenomena and the interpenetration of dharmas are in fact not Buddhist at all, according to Hakayama. Hakayama’a position is based on a radical re-interpretation of Buddhist doctrinal tradition, for him prajna is not illuminating insight or non-conceptual awareness, it is discriminatory knowledge with regard to what is not self, and is causally conditioned. He appears to regard every expression of Buddha-nature and original enlightenment as tainted by substantivism (dhatu vada)and as contradicting the teaching of no-self and as therefore unBuddhist.He argues that the substantivism of the notion of original enlightenment teaching and the traditional valuing of harmony, between teachings (Taoism, Shinto and Buddhism) has led to ethical inertia and quietism and has allowed the power elite of Japanese society and their apologists to subtly replace true Buddhism with a deeply ethnocentric, Shinto influence, ideology, which priveleges the Japanese version of the harmonising vision, and in effect eliminates the individual in favour of the whole . He is particularly critical of Prince Shotoku’s Constitution, written in the Sixth century CE. He sees Shotoku’s embracing of the value of harmony and Ekayana Buddhism, as a strategy for maintaining bureaucratic control and conformity. He regards the teaching of no-self and the correct understanding of pratitya-samutpada (dependent origination)as true Buddhism, and believes that Buddhist ethical practice is central and should express the teaching of no-self. Such teaching and practice, he argues, is at variance with the dominant patterns of conformity for the sake of harmony and lack of commitment to social equality and to ethical action which has plagued Japanese history. He sees virtually all Japanese Buddhist interpretations of the Lotus Sutra as tainted by dhatuvada if correctly understood as a text critical of wrong views and which embraces the use of skilfull means. This is an important admission to which I shall return in discussing Hakamaya’s position in relation to Dogen.

Many of Hakayama’s claims are too broad in their range to be systematically discussed here (2). It should be noted that he rejects the suggestion that harmony with nature is a Buddhist value, and argues that this is derived from Taoism and Shinto. He is therefore strikingly at odds with Engaged Buddhist perspective. He sees the embracing of notions of original enlightenment and the identification of Buddha nature with natural phenomena, as leaving no grounds for traditional Buddhist ethical teaching and conduct. Again it is ironic that it is these perspectives which are the ones cited by Engaged Buddhists as providing the basis for a Buddhist environmental outlook. The same Buddhological concepts are being cited by one group as the basis for ethically engaged action, are being criticised by another as the basis for ethical inaction as well as political conformity. Unfortunately while condemning Japanese ethnocentrism, conformism and quietism and praising a critical Buddhist perspecti

ve such as that found in the Lotus Sutra, Hakamaya gives us no details as to what form a Critical Buddhist programme of moral action might take, either in relation to environmental concerns or any other. Still less does he offer a social programme or the possibilities of one which does rest on true Buddhist teachings. One reason for this might be that he regards the early moral teachings of the Buddhism as already providing the basis for such a programme and that it is uneccessary to re-invent it.

It appears more likely that his view of the early Buddhist radical challenge to subtantivism, and its eloborating of the causal determined nature of the human condition, is more of a challenge at the individual, rather than the collective level.

Criticising the Critical Buddhist view

One of the difficulties with Hakamaya’s position is that while rejecting the dominant ethical,social and political ethos of Japanese society, and lays much of the blame for this at the substantivist interpretations of Buddhism, he is unclear on the issue of whether “true” Buddhism could support any particular social or political system, or as to what sort of a system might reflect, or be in accord with Buddhist ethics and values.

I believe that he exaggerates the role of the specific ideas of original enlightenment, in shaping Japanese ideology and ethical values. He isolates them from a wider context and ignores the very complex politcally and ideological processes. The dominant state ideology of Japan since the time of Prince Shotoku (6 th century CE) until the Meiji restoration, has not been Buddhism, Taoism or Shinto but Confucian. It was a Confucian idea of harmony and conformity which was effectively employed by the bureaucracy. One of the advantages of that Confucian ideology was that it was neutral with regard to the specific claims of rival Buddhist sects or Shinto beliefs, and therefore could provide an over riding official value system for state and public life. Much as it had done in China.

Hakayama’s claim that all teachings of Buddha-nature, tathagatha-garbha and Hua Yen Dharma theory are substantivist, needs to be critically examined, given the extensive qualifications offered in the texts themselves. For example, the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana sutra, one of the core texts expounding Buddha-nature, repeatedly warns against interpreting Buddha-nature as a self or atman.

“Good sons! If someone maintains that all sentient beings definately possess the Buddha-nature which is eternal, blissful, personal and pure, (and further maintains that the Buddh-nature) is neither produced nor born,but is not percieved by sentient beings due to the presence of defilements, it should be understood that he has slandered the Buddha, Dharma and the Sangha”(T 12, p.580c)

Here Buddha-nature is specifically the means of referring to the potential of all beings to be Enlightened and attain Buddhahood. The use of the expression must be understood as metaphoric.This seems to be precisely the way Chinul uses them in his writings as we shall see later in this paper. Another way of saying this is that many expressions of Buddha-nature are skilful evocations of the potential for enlightenment. As such they need not be seen as substantivist or essentialist. Dogen is frequently cited by Hakamaya as one who stood out against the universalising, substantivist tendencies of Tendai, as well as a critic of the easy tendencey to harmonise Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. He castigates those who misread Dogen as an exponent of Original Enlightenemnt and as one who rejects confronting the realities of karma, cause and effect, in favour of an easy universalism and subtantivism. The problem for Hakayama is that while it is clear that Dogen rejects formulations of the Ori

ginal Enlightenment teaching which suggest belief in an eternal mental nature or lead to quietism, his Shobogenzo is full of phrases and passages which are derived form hongaku literature (see: Grosnick 1979 pp248-256). Hongaku teachings can of course give rise to quietism or belief that if beings are already Enlightened by virtue of their possession of Buddha-nature, then there is no need for Buddhist practice. This is of course not the view of the major writings of the Tendai school. Dogen is aware of this danger and insists on the necessity for practice. What Dogen does is appropriate elements of hongaku teaching derived from his Tendai background and scholastic training, and use them to emphaise his own teaching on the undivided nature of practice and enlightenment. A passage from his Shobogenzo makes this clear:

“The Patriarchs adamantly asserted that one must practice diligently, not allowing the realization that is inseperable from practice to be defiled by klesas. If one undertakes this profound practice, original realization overflows in one’s hands. If one puts forth the body of original realization, profound proctice is completely carried out” (trans Grosnick 1979 p256).

Dogen clearly rejects the notion of an eternal mental nature which is inherently pure and innately Enlightened. He labels as heretical any teaching which suggest such notions, usually dismissing them as forms of the Senika or naturalistic heresy. At the same time he virtually paraphrases Tendai hongaku expressions in order to make his point about the need for practice.

“Everyone possesses the Buddha-mind but if they fail to practice the true Way it will remain dormant. We have, however the example of Buddhist practice to follow and if we persevere, our Buddha-mind will manifest itself and we can receive the seal of transmission…..

Remember, however that land is not always soil, earth although very great is not always fruitful; similarly everyone has the Buddha-nature but if not manifested in practice it will not bear fruit. Symbolically there is the land of the heart and the land of the treasure. Yet all these land are based on the experience of enlightenment. Mountains , water and earth have their origin in “emptiness” and are manifestations of “form is emptiness(Shobogenzo – 4 Shinjingakudo “Learning through Body and Mind”).

The crucial issue for Dogen is not one of correct doctrine, but correct intention and above all, correct practice. Hakamaya is greatly puzzled as to why Dogen is cited as a supporter of the notion of the Buddhahood of mountains, rivers, grasses and trees, when in Hakamaya’s view he vigorously opposes it. The question which emerges is. “why does Dogen appear to speak with two voices on this issue?”

The answer it seems to me is that if such expressions of Buddhanature lead to or are products of spiritual complacency and quietism, then Dogen rejects them. Where they are expressed in terms of the urgent task of expressing the inherent Buddhahood of things in practice and experience, then he supports them. Underlying Dogen’s aruments is an insistence on the reality of karmic conditions, that is accepting and confronting the realities and consequences of our own actions. This brings us to the issue of skilful means. The apparently contradictory statements to be found in Dogen with regard to Buddha-nature, are due to the fact that as a Buddhist teacher he is not trying to make statements which are objectively true, so much as statements who are spiritually appropriate. If a listener understands Buddha-nature as a basis for ethical and spiritual inaction then Dogen will tell that person that there is no Buddha-nature. If another person understands Buddha-nature as the urgent requirement

follow the practice and conduct of a Buddha then Dogen will give them the teaching of Buddha-nature. What counts is how beings respond to what is said, which depends on their prior orientation and state of mind. This is of course perfectly consistent with methods of skillful means. Examples of this kind of usage abound in the writings of Dogen. The following passage from the Buddha-nature chapter of Shobogenzo makes will be sufficient to illustrate this.

When scholars hear the word “Buddha-nature,” they think it is a kind of “eternal self,” like that expounded by the non-believer Senika. This is because thy have never met a man of the Way, nor clarified their self, nor met a master. They mistake the wild movements of their minds for the enlightened wisdom of Buddha- nature

Some say that Buddha-nature is similar to the seed of a plant; when it receives the nourishing rain of the Dharma, it naturally sprouts – leaves, flowers and fruit appear, and the fruit contains its own seeds. This is the view of ordinary, unenelightened people. Those holding such a view should learn that the seed, flowers, and fruit each and at the same time have the pure mind. Within the fruit there are seeds. Although the seeds are not visible, still the root, stem, and the rest grow. Without outside assistance the branches multiply and a large tree appears. This procedure is not insiode or outside; it is true for any time of the past or present. Therefore, even though we have an unenlightened view, the root, stem , branches, and leaves all live, die, “totally possess,” and become and are Buddha-nature simultaneously.

“Sentient beings do not possess Buddhanature.” To a man who has just encountered a Buddha and heard the Dharma for the very first time, this is the most incomprehensible, most taxing statement of all. Later, whether through having followed a good master or through having studied the sutras, this statement is the most joy giving of all. If we do not totally feel the truth of “sentient beings do not possess Buddha-nature,” then we have not yet experienced Buddha-nature.Shobogenzo – Bussho (Buddha-nature)

Dogen is using the contradictory statements themselves to challenge listeners and bring them to higher levels of understanding. The apparent contradictions are nothing more than Dogen’s skill, teaching on a level appropriate to the understanding of those hearing and bringing them to a higher level. This is why Dogen both asserts and denies the identity of beings and Buddha-nature. Assertions about the possession or non possession of buddhanature are secondary to the demonstration of Buddha-nature in the practice of the Buddhist. His radically immanenetist assertion of the identity of Buddhahood and natural phenomena, is his way of re-articulating the fundamental Mahayana understanding of the non-differentiation of Samsara and Nirvana. To Dogen this confirms rather than undermines the need for practice. At the same time he rejects the separation of practice from enlightenment. So that one does not follow the precepts, meditate and purify oneself in order to become a Buddha, one does those things to express the Buddhahood already apparent. But it only really becomes apparent when the practice of the Buddha is achieved. Significantly and problematically for Hakayama, Dogen is happy to express the necessity for practice in radically immanentist and universalist language and is perfectly comfortable with Tendai sounding assertions of the indivisiblity of practice, Enlightenment and natural phenomena,

Practice is conducted together with the mountains, rivers and the great earth…. How should we understand the identity of the Buddha and ourselves? We must first understand the practice of the Buddha. The practice of the Buddha is conducted together with the whole great earth and with all beings. were it not all encompassing, it would not yet be Buddha-practice(Shobogenzo – 92 Yuibutsu Yobutsu “Only a Buddha transmits a Budda”)

When we add to these statements Dogen’s use of the notion of the preaching of the non-sentient (mujo seppo), then a fare more positive attitude to natural phenomena emerge, than that described by Hakamaya. For Dogen the identification of all phenomena with Buddha-nature, means that natural phenomena can have a particular value in disclosing Dharma to the practitioner. Admittedly this is only apparent to one already engaged in practice. He quotes the Chinese poet Su Dongpo to this effect:

The sounds from the valley stream are the mouth of the Buddha,The forms of the mountains are his pure body,The eighty-four thousand verses heard during the night,How should I tell them to the people the next day? (T 82, 2582:38c)

These statements are important for the elucidation of Dogen’s position on the necessity for practice , and the indivisbility of practice and Enlightenment.They are clear expressions of his teaching of radical immanence and nonduality. They are statements about higher practice and should be understood in terms of their soteriological intent. They are not they are in themselves expounding a systematic ecological position. Fortunately we have examples elsewhere in Dogen’s writings where he does directly relate the soteriological issue of the need for practice, to the role of compassion and attitudes to nature. Here he is in agreement with Mahayana teachings, that the highest form of compassionate action is selfless and dispassionate, in other words it is non-attached action carried out for its own sake because it is the nature of Buddha-dharma.

“A long time ago, during the Shin era in China, there was a man named Koyu who, on seeing a fisherman catch a turtle bought it and released it on the river.In the Gokan period, there was a man called Yoho who as a boy saved a sparrow at the foot of Mount Kain. when these people saw the turtle and the sparrow, they simply felt sorry; they did not expect any special merit. They could not help themselves from helping their benevolent minds simply caused them to do so”. (Shobogenzo – Bodaisatta Shishobo, The Bodhisattva’s Four Ways of Helping Beings).

What is reflected here is not an instrumentalist view of nature. The animals are not saved from any motive of self interest or in the pursuit of merit or because they are may be of value economically. They are helped because they are there, and as such are seen as objects of the Bodhisattva’s compassion. They are valued intrinsically, rather than instrumentally. I would argue that such an attitude come closest to a Deep Ecological position, in which the intrinsic worth of nature is acknolwdged, and given priority over what specific benefit it may offer to humans. Unsurprisingly, Buddhism does not speak with a single voice on this issue. Other texts and rituals suggest a more pragmatic and instrumentalist view more consistent with a humanistc eclogical position, sometimes designated “shallow ecology”. Here the environmental attitudes are much more closely related to Buddhist social and political teachings and practices.

Non of these are systematically addressed by Hakamaya, despite his concern for the social implications of Buddhist teachings. It is the engaged Buddhist who offer much more in the way of constructive debate and evidence on these issues.

Buddhism, values and society

As we have seen, the endorsement of the Buddhahood of natural phenomena does in itself constitute an environmental value. Though the passages from the Shobogenzo chapter on the Four Ways the Bodhisattva Benefits Beings, provides many suggestions which could easily provide the basis for an environmental ethic. It is interesting to note that while Hakamaya is critical of the social and political values of much of Japanese society, and rejects any suggestion that it expresses anything resembling true Buddhism, he is not forthcoming on what values and policies in a society might be consistent his account of Buddhism. His focus is of course on Buddhism as a textually based soteriology, concerned with the understanding of karma, moral cause and effect and the pursuit of the path. But given his insistence on the centrality of karma, and relationship between intention, action and result, then the way these processes relate to society and the environment might have been considered. Not surp risingly it is the Engaged Buddhists who actually address these issues in relation to text and practice.

One example is provided by Christipher Titmuss in the Green Buddha. He extensively cites the Kutadanta-sutta, Cakkavati Sihanada-sutta and Agganna-sutta to support the view that “the social conscience of the Buddha was an integral part of his teaching” (Titmus 1995 p 213). He regards the injunctions on kings to relieve the suffering of the poor, as an expression of loving kindness in action. Despite the mythic context, he regards the Buddha’s analysis of the causes of suffering, violence and social collapse, as related to socio-economic as well as karmic factors as an intentional expression of Dharma. He interprets such injunctions as placing rulers under a serious obligation to reduce poverty and restore peace and justice as a legitimate exprssion of Buddhist teaching (1995 p 211). In the Kutadanta sutta (Digha Nikaya vol. 1, Ling 1981 pp 91-100)) the Buddha in a former life as religious advisor to a great king, that he can restore peace and order in his kingdom not by performing the traditional animal sacrifice,or by applying severe punishments to wrongdoers, but by ensuring that all those working in his kingdom are properly rewarded for their labours. The king is advised to supply traders and businessmen with capital, to help them prosper, and that wealthy brahmans, ksatriyas and householders should be encouraged to establish charitable foundations in all directions, to support the poor,and the wandering mendicants and wise teachers.The Buddha declares that after has done all this he can perform a non-violent sacrifice.

As Richard Gombrich points out, the story is told to a Brahmin not a king, and it it seems to be more concerned with the nature of sacrifice, than be a practical outline of policy (Gombrich 1988 p 83). Such policies would have been unthinkable to the real kings at the time of the Buddha. But their very articulation does represent something of a criticism of despotic and punitive rulers, and does offer radical alternative that might cause a more sympathetic ruler to re-consider his priorities. If the rulers of the kingdoms of north India were as despotic and pragmatic as Gombrich suggests, then it would have been unthinkable for the Buddha to offer such radical advice on the use of charity and the re-distribution of wealth. Then it becomes more credible that such ideas would be taught in the form of highly mythic and fantastic accounts. In other words, the Buddha or early Buddhists are using indirect means on tactical and expedient grounds to present some radical and challenging ideas.

The influential Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta (Digha Nikaya 111, Ling ed. 1981 pp 115-128) is another text frequently quoted for its ethical and social content. Gombrich suggests that its lack of a context, unlike most suttas in the Digha Nikaya, and its exaggerated mythological content, make it unlikely to be the word of the Buddha. The text is however regarded as such by tradition, and its content must therefore be taken seriously. It describes a succession of strong and righteous rulers in ancient times whose merit and success was marked by a Celestial Wheel in the the sky, and by the great longevity of them and their subjects.The average lifespan being forty thousand years. Periodically the wheel would slip, but provided the ruler at the time took counsel from the wisest hermit in the kingdom and acted accordingly, it was restored. Then one ruler began governing according to his own ideas, and ignoring the example of the previous rulers, and not taking counsel from the hermit. When a man was brought before him for stealing, the king gave him money to support his family. Other subject heard of this and they also stole. The king realised that by rewarding theft, he was encouraging it, so he had the next offender executed. People by now had habituated to stealing, so that rather than stop, they armed themselves to prevent capture. When some were captured they lied about their crimes, and so society degenerated. Lying and stealing were rife and people become progressively coarser and shorter lived. Eventually society and values collapsed, people were killing their own families to eat,and the human lifespan dwindled to ten years. Then a small group resolved to abstain from violence and live cooperatively, and in doing so gradually improved the human condition and the lifespan, so once again people began to prosper and live in harmony, villages and towns developed all over India. Eventually a wise and righteous Universal Monarch (Cakkavatti) emerged and during his reign Metteya (Maitreya) the next Buddha will appear, to teach Dharma throughout the world.

Buddhist scholarship tends to examine historical and textual accounts for an understanding of the relationship between Buddhism, monarchy and socio-political issues during the early devlopment of Buddhism. Gombrich doubts whether many canonical passages dealing with kingship and politics were meant to be normative or offer practical policies intended for rulers. He argues that many of the passages are intentionally mythological, and are dealing with “fantasy” kings, not practical guidlines for real kings. He suspects the “authenticity” of the famous Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta ( Gombrich 1988 pp81-82,Digha Nikaya 111, Ling ed. 1981 pp 115-128). He suggests that its lack of a context, unlike most suttas in the Digha Nikaya, and its exaggerated mythological content, make it unlikely to be the word of the Buddha. Even if we accept Gombrich’s point about the inappropriate time-frame of the story and its undoubted mythic style, it does establish an important connection between the human condu ct and Dharmic or ethical orientation, and human health, wealth and happiness, on material, ethical and spiritual levels. It appears to make a point about the importance of exemplary rulers and thir need to listen to wise counsel. Though not a technical treatise, the story establishes that moral cause and effect or the working of karma are not merely individual processes, but have important social and cosmic dimensions. The story clearly emphasises the role of the righteous ruler in improving the social and moral environment in which virtue is rewarded and wrongdoing punished. And significantly, establishing the conditions in which Dhamma can operate.

We have seen that Buddhist textual and scholars and Engaged Buddhists tend to use Buddhist texts in quite different ways. Christoper Titmus, an Engaged Buddhist and Environmental campaigner, cites the Kutadanta-sutta, Cakkavati Sihanada-sutta and Agganna-sutta to support the view that “the social conscience of the Buddha was an integral part of his teaching” (Titmus 1995 p 213). He regards the injunctions on kings to relieve the suffering of the poor, as an expression of loving kindness in action. Despite the mythic context, he regards the Buddha’s analysis of the causes of suffering, violence and social collapse, as related to socio-economic as well as karmic factors as an intentional expression of Dharma. He interprets such injunctions as placing rulers under a serious obligation to reduce poverty and restore peace and justice as a legitimate expression of Buddhist teaching (1995 p 211). Protecting the environment is therefore seen as a part of the wider socio-economic project, in that the natural support system for human sustenance must be maintained.

Even if Buddhism is seen as a pure soteriology concerned with the path to the cessation of suffering, pursued by spiritually heroic individuals, then the presence of a biological support system for their efforts, which is not threatened by pollution or total destruction, is a minimal requirement.One that basis it would appear that the Engaged Buddhist approach the environment has an advantage over the Critical Buddhist approach. Even if the Critical Buddhist position is taken and Buddhism is a pure soteriology concerned with pursuit of the path to Enlightenment, Critical Buddhist theory does not account for the need for a material support system for the practice of the Sangha. One of the messages to be drawn from the early Enlightenment accounts of Sakyamuni was that it was necessary to take food and sustain himself before he could make the necesssary meditative effort to achieve awakening. The fact that according to traditional accounts he was fed by a village woman who thought he was a tree spirit, reflects the fact that the the conflation or interaction of Buddhism and animism was an early occurrence, and largely in my view, a non problematic one. This again contrast strongly with Hakamaya’s view, which is that the identification Buddhas and Bodhisattvas with the kami in Kamakura Japan, was highly damaging to the purity of Buddha-dharma.

The problem of Buddhist environmentalism.

My friend Ian Harris has taken up many of the issues in this debate and broadly come down in agreement with the position of Critical Buddhism, that the notion of Buddhist environmentalism cannot be sustained. He argues that environmental concerns are not at the heart of the Buddhist tradition, and that when people speak of “Buddhist environmentalism” they are really addressing a series of secular concerns which can be happily assented by contemporary Buddhists. He further suggests that what is claimed as “Buddhist environmentalism” is in fact a unconscious adoption of Christian stewardship traditions and liberal values, subtly eroding traditional Buddhist values, aided by interfaith dialogue and increased exchange of ideas. Having admitted that historical scholarship may reveal that early Buddhists did live in harmony with their environment, and that even if their “doctrinal position” did contribute to that harmony we still would not be justified in describing them as environment alists. He makes this claim by the simple device of defining environmentalism in such a way as it must inevitably exclude traditional Buddhists. “If we accept that environmentalism is the conscious attempt to critically appraise the adverse by-products of the scientific enterprise…” (Harris 1991 p. 111). Harris is simply dealing in anachronisms here. He sets up a scientifically informed western environmental view and suggests that traditional Buddhists did not have it. They did not have the scientific method and theory to develop such a view, and they were not the main perpretators of environmental destruction. What the authors of Buddhism & Ecology and the Buddhist section of the Assisi Declarations are saying is that there was an indigenous understanding in Buddhism of the value of living harmoniously with nature and not surrendering to unwarranted exploiting and plundering of natural resources. To put this another way, surrender to greed, hate and ignorance have practical, environmental, as well as karmic and spiritual consequences. They are suggesting that modern Buddhists and environmentalists are in a position to draw on psycho-spiritaul insights and training, as well as that indigenous understanding of the importance of valuing the environment. Their work is concerned with changing values and raising consciousness as an important part of attempting to lead a more ecologically harmonious lifestyle. They are also involved in implementing and supporting practical environmental programmes of action in several countries. I shall return to the role of activists in later discussions.

Buddhism, nature, causality and interdependence.

Returning to the more theoretical debate, Harris’ suggestion that the early Buddhist mode of dealing with the natural world was essentially traditional and non-reflective is not supported by the evidence provided by the texts. They were apparently aware of the subtle and vital interdependence of the natural and the human world, and were furthermore aware of humanity actual and potential impact upon it. This is to be expected of an agriculturally based society. The important development in early Buddhism is that the that knowledge and understanding present was informed by psychological, ethical and spiritual considerations. It is these which are primarily addressed by the contributors to Batchelor & Brown. It is noticeable that even where there is historical evidence for traditional Buddhist attempts to live in harmony with nature and to protect habitats and species from destruction, Harris ignores it. After conquering many of the states of North India, king Ashoka (268-233 BC) renounced war and introduced edicts which banned hunting, protected forests, planted trees, particularly medicinal and fruit trees, greatly reduced meat eating at court, and banned animal sacrifices by Brahmins and others (see: Ling 1973 ch 9, De Bary 1958 pp142-150). Ling’s perspective on this material is interesting because he tries to understand the role of Buddhism in shaping significant phases of Asian history and civilisations. He employs textual and historical evidence to do this

Harris’ suggestion that the failure to have a clear concept of nature as separate from humanity militates against a Buddhist environmental ethic/theory is problematic (Harris 1991 p 104). Such a failure only militates against a Christian dualistic stewardship type model. Hakayama goes even further and regards it as strength of true Buddhism as a pure soteriology that it should have no clear concept of or position on “nature”. The point about the engaged Buddhist treatment of pratityasamutpada (conditioned co-production)as pivotal to a Buddhist attitude to the environment, is that it highlights the complexity of relationship between consciousness, mental states, physical action and their consequences. The point about pratyasamutpada and teachings on karma in general is not as Harris claims that actions have unpredictable results, but that actions not informed by Dhamma, and actions dominated by craving, grasping, hatred and ignorance have disastrous results. In other words, along broad parameters, results are quite predictable. What the accounts of the operation of karma, and the moral fables or “folk tales” of the Jataka, which are recounted in Batchelor and Brown, seem be saying is the level of interdependence between human realms and natural realms, that action on one level has consequences on the other. If anything they suggest a continuity between human and natural which is such that an arbitrary separation between “human” and “natural” becomes difficult to sustain. This holistic notion of continuity and interdependence is developed theoretically and experientially in the Mahayana traditions, particularly those of T’ien T’ai and Hua Yen (see Batchelor and Brown 1992 pp10-12). It is notable that it was in the practice traditions of Chinese and Korean Buddhism, one manifestation of this sense of interdependence and continuity was the strict observance of vegetarianism for monks and nuns, and strong support of it among devout lay Buddhists. The tales of extreme altruism and self sacrifice by Bodhisattvas which are found in the Jataka (eg the monkey king story) were taken seriously in the Chinese tradition as exemplary moral tales, and they also illustrate the kind of continuity and interdependence between humanity and nature which is celebrated in East Asian Buddhist traditions. The forceful case for vegetarianism found in the Lankavatara sutra (chapter 8)and compassion to animals in the Brahmajala sutta again reflect such notions of continuity and interdependence (see Batchelor & Brown 1992 pp6-7 & Williams 1997 p150). The mistake that scholars such as Harris make is to interpret the folk sounding advice in the Lankavatara sutra and Bodhisattva precepts, and the extreme morality tales in the Jataka, on only one level. The idea we should not eat meat because we and our parents have in the past been just about every species of animal, so to kill and eat them is like killing and eating our own relatives, is a rhetorical device, designed to shock people into confronting their actions when they eat meat. The point about the differentiated and developmental teaching of Buddhism is that, the reasons for engaging in an action can subtly change. As the understanding and the practice deepens what was done selfishly or out of fear for the consequences, may later be done out of genuine good will or fellow feeling, and later still might be done spontaneously, out of the loving kindness and compassion of the Bodhisattva.

Spiritual and biological hierarchies and the issue of discrimination.

While agreeing with Hakamaya that Buddhism does not support social discrimination and ethnic or racial prejudice, it is undoubtedly the case that Buddhist texts and authorities from all schools and traditions except models of spiritual understanding and moral attainment which are both developmental and hierarchical. Such models are implicit in the notion of “Path” itself. This means that beings at different levels of understanding and attainment are taught in ways and at levels appropriate to their understanding and attainment. The Buddha’s and any enlightened teacher’s skill in teaching consists in their capacity to identify and adapt to the level of those being taught. This explains why the Buddha’s response to what appear to be the same questions could vary according to the situation and understanding of the questioner.One way of articulating this kind of differentiation is through the concepts of conventional truth(samvrti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramartha-satya).This distinction is usually associated with Mahayana Buddhism, particularly the philosophical tradition of Madhyamika. Steven Collins has shown convincingly how it is equally appropriate to the Pali texts and the Theravada tradition. He applies it specifically to the various levels and types of discourse developed around the notions of person (anatman/anatta), and relates these levels to the social categories in Theravada Buddhist societies and to the distinction between ‘Kammatic Buddhism’ and ‘Nibbanic Buddhism’ (Collins 1982: ch. 5). Given the variety of levels of discourse and the process of accommodation to different levels of attainment which are evident in Buddhist texts and teachings, it is apparent that definitive statements and generalisations about the nature of Buddhist ethics are extremely problematic. The tendency to evaluate generalised statements about Buddhist ethics, according to the standards of western ethical theories and assumptions is one which should be resisted. Buddhist ethics cannot be reduced to classical western ethical theory, but Buddhist ethical insights can illumine western notions of ethics, in both theoretical and practical ways. The importance of control and understanding of the mind is an important dimension of Buddhist ethical understanding from which all moral reformers can learn. The extent to which Japanese nationalistic attitudes were supported by ideas of Original Enlightenement and ethnocentric State Shinto, or by Confucian notions during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is to be condemned, but we should not assume that such abuses in the service of militaristic or nationalistic interest were inevitable outcome of Original Enlightenment and dhatu-vada teachings.

The Contribution of Son Buddhism

It is quite clear that the teaching of Original Enlightenment are is not neccessarily substantivist, quietist or antinomian. Dogen clearly uses elements of those teachings yet avoids the pitfalls of all such tendencies. The intention behind the teaching of Original Enlightenment was to emphasise the universal and immediate availability of Complete Awakening. In other words it expresses the potential of all beings to be Awakened. Given that such an awakening consists of the eradication of suffering through the overcoming of craving and grasping, then the tendency towards quietism and antinomianism is obviously a mistake . The T’ien T’ai and Hua Yen formulations of the teaching endorse the traditional Buddhist view, which is in turn endorsed by both Dogen and Chinul; that the causes of suffering are fundamentally produced in the mind, and that greed, hate and ignorance are mental products. Their approach is to abolish them at their source, by calming or dissolving them as soon as they arise, by seeing them as insubstantial or empty. In his great work “Excerpts from the Dharma Collection” Chinul makes it clear that eradicating unwholesome actions requires seeing the source of such actions in the mind, and calming the mind from where they issue. While quoting the Avatamska Sutra and commentaries, that in the Dharmadhatu beings are already Buddhas, Buddhahood is not achieved until all defilements are eradicated,

“If defilements are not yet eradicated, it cannot be said that Buddhahood has been achieved; but once the defilements are utterly eradicated and merit and wisdom are brought to perfection, it is called the achievement of Buddhahood since of old”( Chinul trans Buswell 1983 p.326)

It appears to me that the Son traditions, as systematised and expounded by Chinul is in a particularly strong position to counter some of the critique offered by Hakamaya. Chinul is deeply familiar with, and draws on the Chinese Mahayana textual tradition including the Lotus sutra, Avatamsaka, Awakening of Faith and Chinese Brahma jala (Fan Wang Ching) as well as the Ch’an /Son transmission texts and Kungan/ Hwado collections. It is a practice tradition which he consciously sought to distance from state and court affairs and less prone to the kind of political conformity, presented as other worldliness that Hakayama so condemns in institutionalised Japanese Zen monasticism. Finally it attempts to establish a balance between textual understanding and meditative practice. Hakayama and some apologists for Buddhists environmental ethics completely ignore the realities of daily monastic practice in their understanding of Buddhism. This is unfortunate because it is often in such a context where the textual teachings begin to emerge as experiental rater than propositional realities. To provide a simple example. The verses in Son mealtime ceremonial clearly make reference to the reality of human dependence both on nature and the efforts of others, and stress the need to respond with gratitude and selflessness. In a sense the ceremony of meal taking in the monastery emphasises the interdependence of Dharma and material sustenance, which was first expressed in the story of Sakyamuni’s Awakening, when he needed to eat a meal offered by a village woman, in order to gain the strength to resume his meditative practice. The wording of the ceremony intentionally evokes that incident, and vividly exemplifies the the notions of dependence on natural resources and human labour. Both of which are necessary if the Buddha-Dharma is to be practiced.

The Buddha was born in Kapilavastu, Enlightened in Magadha, Taught the Dharma in Benares.

Spreading these bowls of the Tathagata, Which respond according to our needs, We pray that the food given, those who give and the those who eat shall be universally empty and calm.

The pure Dharma body, Vairocana Buddha,The consumate reward body, Rocana Buddha,The myriad transformation bodies, Sakyamuni Buddha,The Buddha who is to come Maitreya Buddha,All the Buddhas in the ten direstion and in the three periods,All the dharmas of the ten directions and three periods, He of great wisdom Manjushri Bodhisattva,He of great practice, Samantabhadra Bodhisattva,He of great compassion, Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva,All the venerable bodhisattva-mahasattvas.

Receiving food, We now vow that all sentient beings, Will have the joy of meditation as their food, And be sated by the bliss of Dharma,

Thinking of the effort which went into preparing this food,we contemplate from where it has come.May we try to make ourselves worthy of this offering.Our task is to guard the mind and leave behind faults such as craving.We take this food lest we become thin and die,We eat this food so we may become enlightened.

Conclusion

It is clear that there is a wide divergence between the Critical Buddhist and the engaged Buddhist view on the nature of Buddhism and the role it has in formulating a view of nature or a response to environmental crisis. The divergence is interesting because bth are significantly locating the basis for their views in the same textual material; specifically that concerned with notions of Buddha-nature and Original Enlightenment. It is also significant that both perspectives argue that Buddhism should fundamental challenge, rather than support conservative and socially divisive political systems. The Engaged Buddhists maintain that the social and political challenge to an entrenched and destructive predominantly capitalist value system, derives naturally from its analysis of the human condition. The Buddhist understanding of causality and interdependence means that the individual spiritual crisis directly relates to the social, economic and environmental disasters that we face. The Engaged Buddhist perspective looks to Buddhism not only it’s diagnosis of the human condition and it’s global implications, but looks to Budddhism directly to provide the resources to meet that crisis. Critical Buddhism accepts that Buddhism radically challenges conventional substantivist assumptions about human nature and the human condition, and asserts the centrality of understanding the causal process, but resist any kind of translation of that analysis into any kind of socio-political or ecological agenda or response. For Critical Buddhism, the relationship between what are regarded as core, normative teachings and practical action in a contemporary context, even on a central issue as social equality, appears problematic. Historical and textual analysis and reframing of the problems, do not in themselves constitute the basis for a solution.

It appears to me that the Korean Son tradition as articulated by Chinul, while drawing on a rich textual tradition, which again is full of expositions of Buddha-nature and Original Enlightenment, does not fall into the trap of substantivism or quietism. Neither are Buddhis teachings invoked in support of the existing social and political order. The emphasis like that in Dogen’s life and writing, is one which focusses on the need for practice. Here the analysis of the human condition in terms of the causal conditions which give rise to suffering are not arrived at as propositions or doctrines, but are directly experienced. The challenge then is to identify the ways in which the individual’s understanding of the causes of suffering, conflict and discrimination can be translated socially aor even globally. It appears to me that the Engaged Buddhists, do acknowledge the reality of that challenge, whereas Critical Buddhists are reluctant to accept the challenge as relevant to their situation.

Stewart McFarlane – Lancaster University

Notes

1) A more detailed exposition of the interdependence as an environmental concept can be found in Francis Cook “The Jewel Net of Indra” in Callicott, J.B.& Ames, R.T (eds)Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought SUNY Press 1989, pp213-229.

2) The most accessible source in English for Hakamaya’s thought in English is: Hubbard, Jamie (ed) Pruning The Bodi Tree. The Storm Over Critical BuddhismUniversity of Hawaii, 1997. This contains two long essays by Hakamaya himself as well as several critical essays. For Hakamaya’s specific views on nature and the environemnt see:

Grosnick W.H. 1979 The Zen master Dogen’s Understanding of the Buddha-nature in the light of the development of the Buddha-nature concept in India, China and Japan UMI Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

In order to understand the ideas on the self and on
meditation in early Buddhism and in some other
contemporary Indian religions, one has to take into
consideration the doctrine of karma as it existed at that
time. This doctrine is older than Buddhism, and
constitutes the background for other religious
movements of ancient India besides Buddhism. There
are few records describing the doctrine of karma in its
earliest form, but the evidence we have supports the
following presentation.

Deeds constitute the decisive factor that cause rebirth
to take place and that determine what the new life will
be like: good deeds lead to a good rebirth, bad deeds to
a bad one. The religious movements of ancient India
that accepted this fundamental belief shared in
common that their highest aspiration was not to obtain
a good rebirth, but to avoid any rebirth whatsoever.
How could this aspiration be realised? Moral behaviour
would obviously not be of any help, given that good
deeds were thought to lead to rebirth, even a good one.
What, if not deeds of some kind, could prevent rebirth
from taking place?

Two solutions presented themselves. The first one is
as simple as it is straightforward. If deeds bring about
rebirth, one will have to abstain from all activities
whatsoever if one wants to prevent rebirth from taking
place. This solution requires people aspiring for
liberation to engage in ascetic practices in which
motionlessness of body and mind plays a central role.
Indeed, perfect liberation will be obtained by the ascetic
who manages to immobilise his body and mind
completely right until death. Death will be hastened by
the fact that the ascetic abstains from eating and,
during the last minutes of his life, from breathing.
There is certainly the added complication that deeds
carried out before the ascetic enters his immobile
life-style will still carry fruit. These deeds, however,
were believed to reach fruition in the painful
experiences which the ascetic evokes by his difficult
life-style. The store of earlier deeds having been
exhausted, the ascetic can concentrate on his death,
which he invites through fasting and the interruption of
breathing, as I said above. The moment of death is, for
the successful ascetic, also his moment of liberation.

A different solution was accepted by others. If the
deeds of persons bring about their rebirth, it becomes
important to know which deeds really belong to a
person and which don’t. This entails the question: what
exactly is the person? A number of thinkers answered
that the real self of a person is different from all that
acts. The real self is different from the body to begin
with, but also different from the mind, and from
whatever else that acts for that matter. The self is by
its very nature immobile, motionless and actionless.
Once one realises this, one distantiates oneself
automatically from all parts of the personality that act,
and therefore from one’s deeds. More precisely, one
realises that no deeds whatsoever belong to the
person, i.e., to oneself. Those who have this insight
know that in reality they never act, and that they
cannot therefore be reborn as a result of their deeds.
The knowledge that they ― in deepest reality ― never
act, and that there are therefore no deeds that belong
to them that could bring about a new birth, liberates
those who have this knowledge once and for all. The
nature of this solution, unlike the first one, is such that
liberation can be reached before death. Insight is
obtained while alive, so people who have definitely
reached it will be alive for at least some time after the
event.

The first of the two solutions which I have presented
finds its clearest and least watered down expression in
the texts of early Jainism. These texts celebrate the
motionless ascetic and the conscious choice of death
through starvation. They describe the ever increasing
control of body and mind, until nothing moves any
longer in the ascetic, neither in his body nor in his
mind. These same texts also point out how the
culmination of this life-style, i.e. voluntary death
through starvation, is accompanied by the suppression
of breathing. But the Jaina texts are not the only ones
that glorify the immobilisation of body and mind. Early
Hindu texts, such as certain Vedic Suutras and
portions of the Mahaabhaarata, present a very similar
picture, although it is usually less detailed.

The idea of an inactive self, knowledge of which is a
precondition for liberation, is an almost omnipresent
theme of classical Hinduism. It makes its appearance in
the early Upani.sads (which may have borrowed it from
others). It is a recurring theme in the Mahaabhaarata,
and it is the very basis of many subsequent
developments of Hinduism, including in particular all
the Brahmanical schools of philosophy.

The doctrine of karma as I have described it existed
already at the time of the Buddha, as did the two
solutions which I have mentioned. It seems certain that
the Buddha did not accept the doctrine in this form.
For him it is not deeds, i.e. physical and mental
movements, which determine one’s fate, but what is
behind deeds. The early Buddhist texts speak again and
again of thirst or desire (t.r.s.naa) as the root problem,
rather than mere deeds. On some rare occasions they
identify deeds with intention (cetanaa)(2). A deed that
was not carried out in spite of strong desire would
nevertheless leave its karmic traces, and a deed that
was carried out without intention ― perhaps by
mistake ― would not. In other words, the doctrine of
karma accepted by the Buddha was in one fundamental
respect quite different from that accepted by other
religious movements of his time.(3) This had an
unmistakable consequence. The two solutions current
among the other movements could not possibly be
acceptable to the Buddha. Immobilisation of the body
would have no effect as long as desire had not yet been
removed. Much the same could be said about insight
into the true nature of an inactive self. Deeds were for
the Buddha less important than the psychological
states that might, or might not, bring them about. The
challenge faced by the Buddha was not, therefore, to
stop deeds, but to deal with the psychology of the
person concerned.

It follows from what precedes that the solution offered
by the Buddha had to be different from the two
described earlier. His solution had to be different, and
it had to be psychological. Indeed, unlike the other
religious movements of his day, the Buddha taught a
form of meditation with the aim of bringing about a
radical change in the psychological makeup of its
practitioners. This radical change could be brought
about during the life-time of the person concerned, so
it was believed, and the Buddha himself presented
himself as someone in whom it had taken place.(4)

I have so far used the words self and meditation a few
times. The self ― and more in particular the conviction
that the self, by its very nature, does not act ― played
an essential role in one solution to the problem
resulting from the conviction that physical and mental
deeds are responsible for rebirth. Since the Buddha did
not recognise the problem, he rejected the solution.
Knowledge of the self plays no role on his path to
liberation. Because the Buddha did not accept that
deeds themselves are responsible for rebirth, his
method was, and had to be, psychological. Part of his
method was a certain kind of meditation which
supposedly allowed its practitioner to bring about the
requisite psychological changes. It will now be clear
that the items that figure in the title of this lecture ―
self and meditation ― have something to do with each
other. The Buddha introduced a psychological method
of which meditation was part, because he rejected
knowledge of the self as a way toward liberation.

At this point I may have to clarify some points. To
begin with, the early texts are not so clear as to
whether the existence of a self is rejected or not by the
Buddha. Much has been written about this issue,
without a clear and unambiguous solution in sight so
far. Most convincing is probably Claus Oetke(5) who,
at the end of a long and painstaking enquiry, arrives at
the conclusions that the early texts neither accept nor
reject the self. Fortunately we do not have to take
position in this debate. Whether or not the Buddha
accepted the existence of a self, it is certain that he
did not preach knowledge of the self as an essential
element of the path to liberation. His path was
different, and meditation had an important role to play
in it.

A further point to be dealt with concerns meditation in
early Jainism. I have argued that the path of early
Jainism consisted in the immobilisation of body and
mind. The early Jaina texts do sometimes use the termdhyaana, which is often translated ‘meditation’. A
closer inspection reveals however that this term is
used precisely for the mental immobilisation which is
part of the total immobilisation of body and mind
typical of Jainism and parallel movements. ‘Meditation’
may not be a very appropriate translation for dhyaana
in this context, and the difference with the Buddhist
use of the term is beyond doubt.

It should be clear, then, that the attitude of the Buddha
with regard to self and meditation had much to do with
his understanding of the doctrine of karma. Yet there
are indications that his psychological understanding of
this doctrine caused confusion and misunderstanding
among his followers. At least some of the early
Buddhists, many of whom may have been recruited
from surroundings where the other understanding of
the doctrine of karma held sway, appear to have
somehow missed this important feature of the
Buddha’s teaching. They held on to the view that deeds
themselves (rather than the desires that inspire them)
lead to rebirth, and consequently they felt attracted to
the two solutions described above. Already the old
Suutras describe some practices and beliefs that fit the
physical interpretation of the doctrine of karma much
better than the psychological one. We find feats of
immobilisation glorified, and mental exercises which
appear to have had no other aim than to immobilise the
mind. What is more, we find the view that insight into
the true nature of the self leads to liberation
reintroduced, but in a modified form. Let us consider
this last point first.

As pointed out above, knowledge of the true nature of
the self was believed (by certain non-Buddhists) to lead
to liberation because it implied distantiation from all
that is active in body and mind. Such a liberating
knowledge, as we have seen, was not recognised by the
Buddha. Now listen to the following passage from the
second sermon attributed to the Buddha:(6)

Then the Lord addressed the group of five
monks, saying: "Matter (ruupa), monks, is
not self. Now were this matter self, monks,
this matter would not tend to sickness, and
one might get the chance of saying in regard
to matter, ‘Let matter become thus for me,
let matter not become thus for me’. But
inasmuch, monks, as matter is not self,
therefore matter tends to sickness, and one
does not get the chance of saying in regard
to matter, ‘Let matter become thus for me,
let matter not become thus for me’." The
same words are then repeated with regard
to the remaining four constituents of the
person (skandha), viz. feeling (vedanaa),
ideation (sa.mj~naa), the habitual
tendencies (sa.mskaara), consciousness
(vij~naana). The Buddha then continues:

"What do you think about this, monks? Is
matter permanent or impermanent?"

"Impermanent, Lord."

"But is that which is impermanent suffering
or bliss?"

"Painful, Lord."

"But is it fit to consider that which is
impermanent, painful, of a nature to change,
as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?"

"It is not, Lord."

The same words are then repeated, this time in
connection with the remaining four constituents
(skandha) of the person.

In order to correctly appreciate this passage, recall
that matter (ruupa), feeling (vedanaa), ideation
(sa.mj~naa), the habitual tendencies (sa.mskaara),
and consciousness (vij~naana) are the five
constituents (skandha) of a person. Together they
constitute the person’s body and mind. This passage
points out that with regard to none of these one can
say ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’. Scholars
have often wondered what this teaches us about the
acceptance or otherwise of the self by the Buddha, but
this question does not interest us at present. The
passage primarily states that one is not identical with
any of these constituents. This, in its turn, implies that
one should not identify with one’s body and mind. And
this is precisely what knowledge of the true and
inactive nature of the self was supposed to bring about
among those who accepted that as a path to liberation.

This conclusion is confirmed by the sequel of the
sermon, which reads:

Seeing in this way, monks, the instructed
disciple of the ariyans turns away from
matter and he turns away from feeling and
he turns away from ideation and he turns
away from the habitual tendencies and he
turns away from consciousness; turning
away he is dispassionate; through dispassion
he is freed; in the freed one the knowledge
comes to be: ‘I am freed’, and he knows:
Birth has been destroyed, the pure life has
been lived, what was to be done has been
done, so that there is no more return here.

It is easy to see that the liberating insight into the true
nature of the self has here been replaced by another
liberating insight, that of non-self. The monks who
have heard this sermon and obtained this insight reach
immediate liberation:

Thus spoke the Lord; delighted, the group
of five monks rejoiced in what the Lord had
said. Moreover while this discourse was
being uttered (imasmi~n ca pana
veyyaakara.nasmi.m bha~n~namaane),
the minds of the group of five monks were
freed from the intoxicants without grasping.
At that time there were six perfected ones
(arhat) in the world.

The mere fact of hearing this wisdom proclaimed was
apparently enough for the five monks to reach instant
liberation.

I hope it becomes clear that, and why, the idea of
knowledge of the true nature of the self as a
precondition for liberation exerted an attraction already
on the early Buddhists, among them the composer, or
redactor, of this part of the Buddha’s first sermon.
However, at this early period knowledge of the self
could not be accepted as liberating insight in
Buddhism. We may assume that the rejection by the
Buddha of this particular solution was still in the minds
of his followers. As a result they introduced this
solution through a backdoor: they introduced
knowledge of non-self rather than knowledge of self as
liberating insight.

The idea of an inactive self continued to exert an
attraction on the Buddhists. It finds expression in the
so-called tathaagatagarbha doctrine of Mahaayaana
Buddhism. The similarity between thetathaagatagarbha of certain Buddhists and the self of
certain non-Buddhists was so striking that one
Buddhist text comments upon it. The following passage
occurs in the La^nkaavataara Suutra. The
Bodhisattva Mahaamati addresses the following
question to the Buddha:(7)

You describe the tathaagatagarbha as
brilliant by nature and pure by its purity
etc., possessing the thirty-two signs [of
excellence], and present in the bodies of all
beings; it is enveloped in a garment ofskandhas, dhaatus and aayatanas, like a
gem of great value which is enveloped in a
dirty garment; it is soiled with passion,
hatred, confusion and false imagination, and
described by the venerable one as eternal,
stable, auspicious and without change. Why
is this doctrine of the tathaagatagarbha not
identical with the doctrine of the aatman of
the non-Buddhists? Also the
non-Buddhists preach a doctrine of the
aatman which is eternal, non-active, without
attributes, omnipresent and imperishable.

The Buddha’s answer does not interest us at present.
An attempt is made to show that there is, after all, a
difference between the tathaagatagarbha of the
Buddhists and the aatman of the non-Buddhists. The
main point is that the two were so close that even
Buddhists started wondering what the difference was.
Clearly, the idea of an inactive self had maintained its
attraction for the Buddhists of this later period.

At this point something has to be said about thepudgala, the notion of the person or self that came to
be accepted by the so-called Pudgalavaadins. Thepudgala is to be distinguished from the self I have
talked about so far. The pudgala was not believed to be
inactive; knowledge of the true nature of the pudgala
could not therefore guarantee or be a precondition for
liberation. Quite on the contrary, the pudgala was
thought of as neither identical with nor different from
the skandhas, the constituents of the person. It
appears to have been conceived of as the whole of
those constituents. Many other Buddhists, especially
those belonging to the Abhidharma schools, had such a
concept of the person. They certainly rejected this
concept, whereas the Pudgalavaadins accepted it. It
must however be recalled that what these Buddhists
rejected, and what the Pudgalavaadins accepted, was
something quite different from the notion of an
inactive self which we have been discussing so far. The
Buddha had rejected knowledge of the inactive self as
an essential step on the road to liberation, and later
Buddhists reintroduced this notion, first through a
back-door (as knowledge of the non-self), then in the
form of the tathaagatagarbha. The notion of thepudgala was not yet important at the time of the
Buddha, and may indeed not have evolved until much
later, when Abhidharma systematically analysed the
person and everything else there is. The rejection by
these Buddhists of the pudgala should not therefore be
confused with the rejection of the inactive self.

After these reflections about the self let us now turn to
meditation. It has already been pointed out that in the
way preached by the Buddha meditation played a
central role. The most important part is constituted by
the so-called Four Dhyaanas, which follow a long series
of preparatory exercises in which mindfulness (sm.rti)
plays an important role. The Four Dhyaanas are
described as follows in the Mahaasaccaka Suutra:(8)

Then indeed, Aggivessana, having taken
ample food, and having recovered strength,
being separated from desires, separated
from bad things, I reached the First
Dhyaana, which is accompanied by thought
and reflection, born from separation, and
consists of joy and bliss, and resided
[there]. …

As a result of appeasing thought and
reflection I reached the Second Dhyaana,
which is an inner tranquillisation, a
unification of the mind, free from thought
and reflection, consisting of joy and bliss
that is born from concentration
(samaadhija), and resided [there]. …

As a result of detachment from joy, I
remained indifferent, attentive and mindful.
I experienced with my body the bliss which
the noble ones describe [in these terms]:
‘indifferent, with attentiveness, residing in
bliss’; thus I reached the Third Dhyaana and
resided [there]. …

As a result of abandoning bliss, and
abandoning pain, as a result of the earlier
disappearance of cheerfulness and dejection,
I reached the Fourth Dhyaana, which is free
from pain and bliss, the complete purity of
equanimity and attentiveness, and resided
[there]. ….

It is important to remember that these meditative
states are not presented as aims in themselves. The
aim, as always in the early Buddhist texts, is liberation;
this in its turn is the result of a psychological
transformation that can only take place in meditative
trance, in the Fourth Dhyaana to be precise. This
psychological transformation, which is the result of a
liberating insight, is described as follows: (9)

Because he knows this and sees this, his
mind is liberated from the taints (three
kinds of taints are enumerated, which I leave
out, JB). Once [his mind] is freed, the
insight arises in him: "I am freed". "Rebirth
is destroyed, the sacred life has been lived,
what had to be done has been done, so that I
will not return here." This is what he knows.

It will be clear that liberation here is not the result of
meditation itself, but of a psychological transformation
which the meditator brings about in this meditative
state. This implies that this meditative state, and the
Four Dhyaanas in general, are not totally devoid of
mental activity. This is exactly what we would expect,
for immobilisation of the mind was no aim of the
Buddha. His answer to rebirth as a result of action was
not inaction, but psychological transformation. This
psychological transformation takes place as the result
of an important insight. Regarding the nature of this
insight the text offer many different answers. There is
indeed reason to believe that the earliest tradition had
no precise information as to its content. This, in its
turn, is not very surprising if we take into account that
this insight was obtained and brought about its effect,
liberation, in a state which nowadays would be called an
"altered state of consciousness".

However, many contemporaries of the Buddha did not
agree with the idea of psychological transformation as
precondition for liberation, as we have seen. Nor did
some of his early followers. They were tempted by that
other understanding of the doctrine of karma in which
karma is activity, and liberation from its effects takes
place as a result of inaction. Practices relating to that
other understanding of the doctrine of karma were
therefore introduced into Buddhism, and among these
there are meditational practices of a different kind.

Let us first consider some physical practices.
Non-Buddhist ascetics cultivated total control of the
senses, so much so that their functioning could be
completely suppressed. No such suppression was
advocated by the Buddha, and indeed, at least one
Buddhist Suutra (the Indriyabhaavanaa Sutta of the
Paali canon and its parallel in Chinese translation)
ridicules the kind of so-called ‘cultivation of the
senses’ which leads to their non-functioning; the
Buddha is here reported to say that if this is cultivation
of the senses, the blind and deaf would be cultivators
of the senses. And yet, in the Mahaaparinirvaa.na
Suutra, in its various recensions, where a discussion
with someone called Putkasa (in Sanskrit) or Pukkusa
(in Paali) is recorded, the Buddha is presented as
boasting that once, in a violent thunderstorm when
lightning killed two farmers and four oxen nearby him,
he did not notice it. We must assume that this
apocryphal story reflects the admiration that, in spite
of the Buddha, certain Buddhists felt for these kinds of
abilities.

Clearer, and even more surprising, is the fact that
sometimes the Buddha himself is credited with
practices which we can recognise as being typical of
early Jainism, and which certain Buddhist text indeed
ascribe to Jainas and criticise as such. For example, a
Suutra of the Majjhima Nikaaya (the
Cuu.ladukkhakkhandha Sutta) and its parallels in
Chinese translation describe and criticise the Jainas as
practising ‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’
and ‘non-performing of new actions’. This is an
accurate description of the practices of the Jainas. But
several other Suutras of the Buddhist canon put
almost the same words in the mouth of the Buddha,
who here approves of these practices. We conclude
from this contradiction that non-Buddhist practices ―
this time it clearly concerns Jaina practices ― had
come to be accepted by at least some Buddhists, and
ascribed to the Buddha himself.

The appeal of these practices remained strong, even
centuries later. As late a text as the third
Bhaavanaakrama of Kamala^siila (8th century C.E.)
criticises the following opinion: (10)

A certain [teacher] has the following
opinion: "It is because of the force of good
and bad deeds (^subhaa^subhakarman),
produced through mental construction
(cittavikalpa), that sentient beings (sattva)
revolve in the round of existences
(sa.msaara), experiencing the fruits of
deeds (karmaphala) such as heaven
(svargaadi). Those who on the contrary
neither think on anything (na ki.mcic
cintayanti) nor perform any deed whatever
are completely freed (parimuc-) from the
round of existences. Therefore nothing is to
be thought on (na ki.mcic cintayitavyam),
nor is salutary conduct (ku^salacaryaa)
consisting in generosity and the like
(daanaadi) to be practised. It is only in
respect to foolish people (muurkhajana) that
salutary conduct consisting in generosity
and the like has been indicated (nirdi.s.taa)."

The same opinion is further characterised in these
words: "No deed whatever, salutary or otherwise, is to
be performed" (na ki.mcit ku^salaadikarma
kartavyam).

We have seen that non-Buddhists practised asceticism
in order to evoke painful experiences which were taken
to be the fruition of earlier deeds. The Buddha had
rejected this notion as well as the need for painful
asceticism. However, the traditional biography of the
Buddha before his enlightenment, i.e., when he was still
Bodhisattva, includes a long period of severe
asceticism. It has been pointed out, most recently by
Minoru Hara,(11) that a number of accounts of the life
of the Buddha depict his pre-enlightenment asceticism
as a way to deliver him from defilement incurred in an
earlier existence.

The practices which were introduced, or attempted to
be introduced, into Buddhism did not only concern
suppression of bodily action and of the senses.
Suppression of mental activity, too, is prominent.
Consider first the following.

The Vitakkasanthaana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya
and its parallels in Chinese translation recommend the
practising monk to ‘restrain his thought with his mind,
to coerce and torment it’. Exactly the same words are
used elsewhere in the Paali canon (in the Mahaasaccaka
Sutta, Bodhiraajakumaara Sutta and Sa^ngaarava
Sutta) in order to describe the futile attempts of the
Buddha before his enlightenment to reach liberation
after the manner of the Jainas. The passage from the
third Bhaavanaakrama just cited states, similarly, that
"nothing is to be thought on" (na ki.mcic
cintayitavyam). Other indications show that
suppression of mental activity, though rejected by the
Buddha, came to characterise much that became
known as Buddhist meditation.

Let us first look at the so-called eight Liberations
(vimok.sa / vimokkha). They are the following:

1) Having visible shape, one sees visible
shapes

2) Having no ideation of visible shape in
oneself, one sees visible shapes outside
[oneself]

3) One becomes intent on what is beautiful

4) By completely going beyond ideations of
visible shape and the coming to an end of
ideations of aversion, by not fixing one’s
mind on different ideations, [thinking]
‘space is infinite’, he reaches the Stage of
Infinity of Space
(aakaa^saanantyaayatana /
aakaasaana~ncaayatana) and remains
there

5) Having completely gone beyond the Stage
of Infinity of Space, [thinking] ‘knowledge
is infinite’, one reaches the Stage of Infinity
of Perception (vij~naanaanantyaayatana /
vi~n~naa.na~ncaayatana) and remains
there

6) Having completely gone beyond the Stage
of Infinity of Perception [thinking] ‘there is
nothing’ one reaches the Stage of
Nothingness (aaki~ncanyaayatana /
aaki~nca~n~naayatana)and remains
there

7) Having completely gone beyond the Stage
of Nothingness, one reaches the Stage of
Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
(naivasa.m-j~naanaasa.mj~naayatana /
nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana) and
remains there

It is difficult to understand fully what exactly is meant
by this series of stages, but there can be no doubt that
it is a list of graded exercises by which the practitioner
gradually puts an end to all ideations. In the Stage of
Nothingness the most ethereal of ideations alone
remain, described as "there is nothing". In the following
two states even this ideation disappears. Mental
activity is in this way completely suppressed.

The Stage of Infinity of Space
(aakaa^saanantyaayatana /
aakaasaana~ncaayatana), the Stage of Infinity of
Perception (vij~naanaanantyaayatana /
vi~n~naa.na~ncaayatana), the Stage of Nothingness
(aaki~ncanyaayatana / aaki~nca~n~naayatana)and
the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation
(naivasa.mj~naanaasa.mj~naayatana /
nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana) often occur
together in the Buddhist Suutras, also in other
contexts. They are known by the name aaruupya
"Formless States". Independent evidence, from early
Abhidharma this time, confirms that neither these
Formless States nor the Cessation of Ideations and
Feelings (sa.m-j~naavedayitanirodha /
sa~n~naavedayitanirodha) were part of the Buddha’s
original teaching.(12) And yet they came to be looked
upon as central to Buddhist meditation.

What can we conclude from the above observations? It
is clear that the development of Buddhism, already in
India and already in the early centuries following the
death of its founder, cannot be looked upon as the
simple preservation of the teachings of the historical
Buddha. Elements that had not been taught by him and
even some that had been explicitly rejected by him
found their way into the practices and theoretical
positions of Buddhism. Other important developments,
such as Abhidharma and perhaps also certain
philosophical developments associated with
Mahaayaana, came about as a result of attempts to
order and systematise the Buddhist teachings. These
and other factors have to be taken into account if one
wishes to understand Buddhism in its historical
development.

Similar reflection can be made when it comes to self
and meditation in Buddhism. It seems certain that the
Buddha never preached knowledge of the self as
essential for reaching liberation. Yet his followers
introduced this notion, first in a roundabout way, later
directly in such forms as the tathaagatagarbha. With
regard to meditation we can be sure that the Buddha
taught some kind of meditation ― the four Dhyaanas
to be precise ― as preliminary stages to the
psychological transformation that constituted the aim
of his teachings. His followers, once again, introduced
other forms of meditation which had little to do with
this psychological transformation, and much more with
the originally non-Buddhist aim of immobilising the
mind.

3) Richard Gombrich ("The Buddhist attitude to
thaumaturgy," Bauddhavidyaasudhaakara.h: Studies in
Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th
Birthday, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann,
Swisttal-Odendorf 1997 (IndTib 30), pp. 165-184) is right in
emphasising the revolutionary nature of the Buddha’s
theory of karma, but no doubt wrong in suggesting that
before his time primarily ritual acts were believed to be
responsible for continual rebirth (p. 171). See also the
chapter "Kamma as a reaction to Brahminism" in
Gombrich’s book How Buddhism Began: The conditioned
genesis of the early teachings (London & Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Athlone, 1996 (Jordan Lectures 1994), pp.
27-64).

4) Some scholars seem to have missed this point. Oskar v.
Hinüber ("Old age and old monks in Paali Buddhism,"Aging, Asian Concepts and Experiences, Past and
Present, ed. Susanne Formanek and Sepp Linhart, Wien:
ÖAW, 1997 (SAWW 643), pp. 65-78), for example, writes (p. 67) that
"the Buddha … spent half a century striving for
enlightenment and teaching before he finally enterednirvaa.na at the age of 80".

7) La^nkaav(V) 2.137, p. 33 l. 10 ff. The word kartaa at the
end of Mahaamati’s question has been corrected intoakartaa ‘non-active’; only this reading makes sense; it is
moreover confirmed by the Tibetan translation (Taipei
edition vol. 10, folio 86a), as I have been informed by T.
Tillemans.

10) MBT III, pp. 13-14; tr. David Seyfort Ruegg,Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a
Comparative Perspective: On the transmission and
reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet, London: School
of Oriental and African Studies, 1989 (Jordan Lectures
1987), p. 93.

I should begin by warning you that my title, fixed several
months before I actually imagined this paper, is somewhat
deceiving, particularly before it comes to its colon. This is
not a paper primarily about Buddhist doctrine and practice,
and only partly a paper about the Shbgenz Instead, I
want simply to talk here about three books that I have been
reading recently. One of them is indeed the book that I
mention in the title: the collection of essays by the famed
thirteenth-century Japanese Zen master Dgen. I have been
reading the Shbgenz, recently because I have become
involved in a project, sponsored by the Stsh
Administrative Headquarters, to translate and annotate the
entire collection. Given this technical task set by the
project, my way of reading the book has been narrowly
philological; and I have rarely looked up from the text, and
the piles of sources and reference works I need to make my
way through it, to ask what it might mean as philosophical
or religious teaching. The Shbgenz, of course, is one of
the most famous works of philosophical and religious
teaching in the history of Zen, or indeed I suppose in the
history of Japanese Buddhism more broadly; but for me it
has been largely a set of textual and linguistic puzzles.

Two other books, however, have recently nudged me from
my philological slumbers and prodded me to reflect a bit on
the sort of book I am translating. Being one of the most
famous books of Zen as well as the primary scriptural basis
of the Stsh, the Shbgenz has been the focus of a
long tradition of scholarly and religious study a tradition
beginning in the early Edo period with the first modern
editions of the work, gathering momentum in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the
development of modern St scholarship and the
dissemination of the book to the general public, and swelling
in the postwar period to what is now a major intellectual
industry. As you know, in recent years this industry has
been rocked by the movement known as "critical
Buddhism", which has, among other items on its
wide-ranging agenda, raised a set of questions about theShbgenz, both the nature of the book itself in its
various redactions and the interpretation of the book by St tradition.

Unlike other products of postwar Japanese industry, most
study of the Shbgenz has been produced for and
consumed by the domestic market. In an important sense,
this seems particularly true of the products of critical
Buddhism, both the writings of the movement itself and the
responses prompted by those writings. The "movement"(if
we can in fact call it that) is, after all, almost entirely the
work of two professors, both formerly at Komazawa
University, whose agenda, while wide ranging, has as its
primary focus the reform of Stsh doctrine and social
practice. Thus, while the recent debates over the Shbgenz have cast up several significant new issues for the
study of the text, much of the work, even at the most basic
textual level, gets its force from and speaks most
powerfully to the politics of the contemporary Japanese
Buddhist especially St Buddhist scene. Given my own
work with the Stsh Administrative Headquarters, I have
naturally been exposed to various opinions about such
politics, but given the philological nature of my work, I have
taken them more as interesting church gossip than serious
intellectual, let alone religious, challenge.

Recently, however, I was asked to review the new volume
by Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson entitled Pruning the
Bodhi Tree: The Storm Over Critical Buddhism. This
book, as I am sure many of you know, collects several
articles by Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shiro, the
prime advocates of critical Buddhism, together with various
responses to their work by Japanese and American
scholars. Most of the arguments in the book, I had
encountered here and there in earlier reading and had put
down to the passing passions of sectarian squabble. Still, to
see the arguments thus collected in one volume drove home
to me just how odd and confusing the debates over critical
Buddhism are; and as I read through the arguments, I
found myself becoming both more interested and more
troubled than I had expected interested, perhaps not so
much by the content as by the fact of the volume itself;
troubled, by both the content and the fact. That learned
American scholars from several different fields of Buddhist
studies should have felt moved to contribute to and
produce such a volume made me realize that there may be
more to the "storm" over critical Buddhism than what I had
taken as St church gossip; that an American academic
publishing house (the University of Hawaii Press) should
have brought out the volume suggested to me that it
assumed there to be an international audience for what I
had assumed was largely a matter of religious politics
specific to Japan.

Except for the excellent piece by Steven Heine summarizing
the debates over the twelve-fascicle Shbgenz, little of
the material in Pruning the Bodhi Tree speaks directly to
Dgen’s text. Yet in much of the material, including some
that is critical of critical Buddhism, we find an approach to
reading Buddhist texts that does not bode well for a book
like the Shbgenz or for the Stsh hope that the
book’s translation will foster an appreciation for St
religion. We might call this approach to reading
"philosophical reductionism". I shall return at the end of my
talk to my forebodings about this approach, but first I want
to introduce my third book, which I see standing, as it were,
on the opposite side of the Shbgenz from critical
Buddhism and offering us therefore a quite different
perspective on the religious possibilities of the text.

My third book is entitled Mountains and Rivers Without
End, a long poem by the American author Gary Snyder. I
have been reading this book recently because one of my
graduate students, Mark Gonnerman, who is writing his
dissertation on Snyder, organized a faculty seminar on the
text last year at my university. Snyder is a poet, not a
buddhologist; his book is a work of art, not of Buddhist
studies. Unless you happen to be interested in American
literature, probably few of you know Snyder’s work, and
even those who might be interested in American literature
would hardly think to look there for a guide to reading theShbgenz. I myself never thought to do so. Why, then,
do I introduce this third book here?

The publication of Mountains and Rivers Without End in
1996 marked the completion of a project that had occupied
fully forty years of its author’s life. When Snyder came to
read his poem to our university seminar last year, he
mentioned to me, perhaps only partly in jest, that his
reading, in the early 1970s, of my translation of one fascicle
of the Shbgenz had delayed his work on the project by
a decade a decade spent in brooding over the meaning of
the fascicle and its implications for the vision of his own
poem. Gary Snyder is not a buddhologist, but he is a
lifelong student of Buddhism, both of its texts and its
practices. Whether or not we want to label him a "Buddhist"
poet, the fact that he would want to brood at length over a
Zen text and seek to incorporate its vision into his own
should hardly come as a surprise to anyone familiar with his
life and work.

Mountains and Rivers Without End is a difficult text,
bringing together in a complex structure many shorter
pieces written over the long period of its creation. At first
glance, I suppose, the poem might be seen as a celebration
of the natural world of mountains and rivers, especially the
wilderness of the American west through which Snyder has
wandered for years. But in fact, like Snyder himself, the
poem wanders not only among the high peaks of the Sierras
and desolate canyons of the Great Basin but along old U.S.
Highway 99 and down into the basement of the Good Will
store on Howard Street in San Francisco (as well as many
other spots around the globe). In wandering thus through
town and country, the poem becomes an extended
meditation on the intimate intertwining of the worlds of
nature and culture, a song about the land to be sure, but
also about how we inhabit the land and build it up, not only
with our roads and settlements but with our dreams and
memories, our art and song. The title of the work refers at
once to the mountains and rivers of the natural world and
to an anonymous Sung landscape painting (known asCh’i-shan wu-chin, in the Cleveland Museum) that
re-presents that world and re-creates it as cultural artifact.
The work may be seen as coming to its climax, in a poem
(based on the Noh drama Yamamba) entitled "The Mountain
Spirit" in which the spirit of the mountain, having challenged
the poet from the city to speak of real "minerals and stone",
accepts his poem with the whisper, "All art and song / is
sacred to the real, / As such."

If I understand it, then, Snyder’s poem suggests two related
points or perhaps one point viewed from two angles. First,
the natural world is cultural. It is not a given, not simply the
raw stuff of objective reality: the stuff is always already
cooked, the world already mapped as human landscape. We
cannot, as it were, get out of town into the unexplored
wilderness; someone has always been there before us,
leaving a beer can at the campsite. Or to put the point in
traditional Buddhist terms, we might say that pratyak.sa is
always shot through with anumaana, and even thedharmakaaya preaches the dharma. Second, the cultural
world is natural. The beer can belongs to the land; it is just
as wild as the rock it rests on. The wilderness is
everywhere, in our rooms, in our computers, in our words
on the computer. At some epistemological level, all our
experience is raw, all our anumana is shot through withpratyak.sa; scripture is itself a separate transmission, not
dependent on words or letters.

Snyder signals this intimate intertwining of the natural and
cultural in his epigraph for the poem, which quotes Dgen’s
mysterious comments on the famous Zen metaphor of the
painted rice cake that cannot satisfy hunger.

If you say the painting is not real, then the
material phenomenal world is not real, the
Dharma is not real. Unsurpassed enlightenment
is a painting. The entire phenomenal universe
and the empty sky are nothing but a painting.
Since this is so, there is no remedy for satisfying
hunger other than a painted rice cake.

These comments come from the Gaby畵餠 ("Painted Rice
Cake") fascicle of the Shbgenz. But the fascicle that so
preoccupied Snyder during his writing of Mountains and
Rivers Without End is the Sansuiky 山水經 ("Mountains
and Waters Sutra"). This is hardly surprising when we
remember that this fascicle is itself explicitly concerned
with the theme of the intertwining of the buddha dharma
and the natural world. The very title of the text expresses
this theme. As Dgen explains in his opening line, "The
mountains and rivers of the present are the realization of
the way (or the "Words"; d genj 道現成) of the ancient
buddhas." The text is not to be understood, then, simple as
a suutra on mountains and rivers: the landscape is itself a
suutra, teaching us the meaning of the dharma. The natural
world around us is somehow, it seems, a subjectivity,
expressing, and even, as we shall see, itself pursuing the
spiritual life.

While reading Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers Without
End, I went back to Dgen’s Sansuikyto try to see what
the poet saw in the text’s vision of the natural world that so
preoccupied him. I cannot say that I have fully understood
either Snyder or Dgen, but here I want to suggest three
layers of reading the Zen master’s text that might make it a
rich source for the poet. The first of these, we can call the
"metaphysical" layer.

There is a haunting refrain running through Mountains and
Rivers Without End: "Walking on walking, / under foot
earth turns / Streams and mountains never stay the same".
Here the natural world becomes a kind of walking,
"underneath" the walking human foot. The mind leaps
immediately to the words of Fu-jung Tao-ka’i 芙蓉道楷
quoted at the start of the Sansuiky: "The blue mountains
are constantly walking." Dgen goes on to comment at
length on this saying, playing with the famous Buddhist
doctrine of impermanence, in which the seemingly solid
mountain is reduced to a stream of momentary mountain
dharmas. He then extends this kind of metaphysical analysis
to the human sphere, to the life of the individual and the
history of the buddha dharma, both of which are constantly
"walking" with the mountain.

In the final poem of Mountains and Rivers Without End,
entitled "Finding the Space in the Heart", Snyder has a little
passage immediately familiar to anyone familiar with
Buddhist texts.

Sound swallowed away,

no waters, no mountains, no

bush no grass and

because no grass

no shade but your shadow.

No flatness because no not-flatness.

No loss, no gain. So

nothing in the way!

No mountains and rivers remain in the space cleared by theHeart Suutra. Like Dgen in the Sansuiky, the poet
clearly senses the emptiness implied in his constant
walking. As the Zen master puts it in his usual literary
style, walking has been going on "since the very time before
any subtle sign, since the age of the King of Emptiness (k nahan 空王那伴)." Or again, in his opening lines,
mountains and rivers are "living in the present" because
they are "the state prior to the kalpa of emptiness (kk
空劫)"; they are liberated because they are "the self before
the germination of any subtle sign." Or more simply, later
on, mountains are "constant" because they are constantly
"walking".

For the poet, the Zen master’s logic of impermanence and
emptiness opens up images of nature at once restless and
still, a dynamic world always recreating itself in time
through the constant thrust and erosion of peaks and
gorges, and yet a world at peace in the present, stretching
itself on space as the vast, vacant expanse of the landscape.
There is opportunity here for language to play with the
sharp consonants and smooth vowels of such a world. But,
as we know, the same logic of impermanence and emptiness
has dangers for language. It can empty the words of their
referents and render them merely "conventional". It can cut
off the poet’s art and song from the Mountain Spirit’s "real
as such". It can end in the Zen master’s silence, or perhaps
in a shrug and a muttered "thus".

Here the poet finds a friend in Dgen. As we know from his
comments in the Gaby fascicle, the walking world is a
world of art as well as of nature. As we know from the title
of the Sansuiky, it is a talking world, speaking the
language of scripture. Indeed, in this latter text (and
elsewhere in the Shbgenz) Dgen goes out of his way to
chastise those Zen types who hold that language does not
get at nature and that a saying like Yun-men Wen-yen’s
雲門文偃 "The East Mountain moves over the water" does
not really describe the mountain. These types, says Dgen,
are not Buddhists, they are not even human, they are
dumber even than animals. In fact, he concludes in a turn
on the "liar’s paradox", if they claim language is false, they
falsify their own claim. Rather, we should realize that
Yun-men’s saying is the very "bones and marrow of the
buddhas and patriarchs". The mountains do indeed "walk
across the waters", and "the tips of their feet set the waters
dancing". For those with eyes to see them, the mountains
actually "mount the clouds and stride through the heavens".

With what eyes should we see mountains "striding through
the heavens"? To the artist, such language may appear as
elegant image of towering ranges on the horizon; to the
philosopher, it can be a coded signal that the temporal
stream of mountain dharmas has a transcendental status, in
the emptiness beyond our earthly categories of
understanding. But to those with an eye for Buddhist
cosmology, it can also be a reminder that mountains walk
not only back and forth in time but also up and down
through the hierarchies of the dharma realm. This is true
not only of mountains. Indeed, such movement "up and
down" is particularly clear in the Sansuiky‘s treatment of
water. Water, Dgen says, does not just flow down from
the mountains: it flows across the sky; it reaches
everywhere throughout the dharma realm, from the highest
heavens to the deepest hells. Water extends into every
buddha land, and "countless buddha lands appear in a single
drop of water".

In language like this, we are moving toward my second layer
of the Shbgenz text, what I shall call, with some
trepidation, the "mystical" reading. By "mystical" I mean
here a view of the natural world that sees it not simply as
empty dharmas but as the expression, or embodiment of a
sacred order, that sees the mountains and rivers of this
apparent world as participating in, or communicating with,
higher realms hidden from view, in the heavens and beyond.
Here, the dharmas come together in a cosmic whole; here,
emptiness comes alive as Vairocana, whose body, speech,
and thought generate and enliven all things. As conscious
processes of the living cosmic body, the walking and talking
of mountains and rivers become more than metaphors, and
"grasses and trees become buddhas". As Dgen says in theSansuiky, the mountains do not merely walk; they have
their own "way of life" (kakkei 活計). Their way of life is
their "investigation" of their own walking, their study of
themselves. In studying themselves, "mountains become
buddhas and patriarchs." "Mountains and rivers become
wise men and sages."

Through this vision of mountains and rivers as conscious
being engaged in spiritual activity, Dgen brings the Sung
Ch’an nostalgia for the natural landscape into conversation
with the mystical hierarchies of his Heian Japanese esoteric
Buddhism. In the process, he brings his religion out of the
cloistered world of philosophy into the imagination of the
gods. He creates a space for the Mountain Spirit, a realm of
archaic meanings from which she appears to the poet to
demand a song, a realm that makes the song not merely
pretty or true but "sacred to the real as such". The poet
sings her a Zen song.

Mountains will be Buddhas then

when bristlecone needles are green!

Scarlet penstemon

flowers are red!

The color is familiar in China, Korea or Japan, where
buddhas see that bamboos are green; but the bristlecone
pine grows only in the New World. The heavens of hidden
meanings stretch all around the globe, as gods come and go
at will; but the range of this Mountain Spirit is the White
Mountains of the Great Basin. She seeks a song about her
own range, her own buddhahood; and the poet, camped in
her range, responds. This is the way the dharma travels, by
converting the gods in their own range and addressing the
people where they actually live. The sophisticated systems
of the sastras circle back to the ancient patterns of the
people; the ma.n.dalas migrate and settle down in sites long
sacred to local lore pools and falls, caves and crags, groves
of pine and crytomeria.

The ideal of local lore brings me to my final layer of theSansuiky, what I shall call the "mythic". By the mythic, I
mean an approach that reads the landscape through the
historical narratives of a community, that sees the
countryside as the storied sites of song and legend, the
places where memories take place. The world of Mountains
and Rivers Without End is such a storied place,
crisscrossed by the myths of many peoples. In one central
poem, we find the ancient native American cultural hero
Kokop’ele, the hump-backed flute player, travelling with,
perhaps travelling as, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsuan
Tsang across a landscape that is at once the Great Basin of
the American west and the Tarim Basin of Central Asia.
"Logicians of emptiness" at Naalandaa join in the ghost
dance that liberates the land and returns it to its
inhabitants. Later, the poet sings to the Mountain Spirit.

Ghosts of lost landscapes

herds and flocks,

towns and clans,

great teachers from all lands

tucked in Wovoka’s empty hat,

stored in Baby Krishna’s mouth,

kneeling for tea

in Vimalakirti’s one small room.

In practice, of course, what I am calling the mythic and the
mystic often intersect, as gods descend into human form
and heroes pass into the pantheon. But Dgen, as a Zen
missionary seeking to convert his countrymen from their
esoteric ways, was likely loath to over-populate his
landscape with the familiar divinities of the Mahaayaana
mystical pantheon. Rather, like the Chinese Ch’an literary
tradition he sought to introduce to Japan, he favored the
mythic powers of the patriarchs and historical legends of
the masters. The very title of the Shbgenz, of course,
refers to the tradition of these patriarchs and masters,
whose legends and sayings provide the inspiration for most
of the essays in the book. The mountains and rivers of theSansuiky are the haunts of the ancients, from the
historical Buddha ^Saakyamuni himself, through the sages
of early Taoist lore, to the Ch’an master Ch’uan-tzu
Te-cheng 船子德誠, who live as a boatman on, and one day
disappeared into, the Hua-t’ing River. Indeed, such is the
intimacy between sage and mountain in the text that at one
point their relationship is described in effect as a mating:
the mountains are said to love their masters, and therefore
the sages enter the mountains, charming the trees, rocks,
birds and beasts, and giving the mountains delight.

Such, then, are my three layers of the Sansuiky. If you
can grant me for the moment something like these three
possibilities for the text, the question remains how they are
related. I have been using here the metaphor of "layers", but
in my own mind the disparate readings are more like
"seams" of meaning running through the text, twisting and
crossing each other along the way. In my mind, Dgen’s
mountains are not built up from a bedrock of metaphysics,
overlaid with the sedimentary deposits of mysticism and
mythology. I do not have, and would tend to resist, a
cosmogony of the text that posits a pure philosophy
preceding the appearance of the gods and the time of the
heroes. For me, the legends of the masters who practiced in
the mountains are as important for understanding the
meaning of these mountains as any abstract analysis of
their being. This way of reading puts me at odds, I suppose,
with almost everyone with the St tradition that would
ground the text in the doctrine of the universal Buddha
nature, as well as with the critics of the tradition who would
dig out the original Indian emptiness buried beneath the
rubble of East Asian cultural accretion. Being thus at odds,
I want to come back to my other book, Pruning the Bodhi
Tree, and say just a few words in closing about the vexed
subject of critical Buddhism.

The subject of critical Buddhism is both vexed and vexing
in part because it covers such a wide range of issues and is
argued from so many angles. The editors of Pruning the
Bodhi Tree, have made a noble effort to organize their
material into three loosely coherent categories, dealing with
broad themes of methodology, substantive debates over
Buddhist texts and doctrines, and social issues; but in fact
the arguments are such that they often bounce back and
forth between and beyond such categories, and the effect
on the reader is rather like trying to watch several different
games simultaneously games of philosophy, philology,
history, ethics, religion, politics, and more. Rather than
blunder into all these games, I want here only to raise a
question about the one troubling feature of critical
Buddhism I introduced at the start of my talk: its tendency
toward what I called there "philosophical reductionism".

There is an argument appearing in the writings of both
Profs. Hakamaya and Matsumoto that goes something like
this. "We are Buddhists. As Buddhists, we must take a
stand on the essential teaching of the religion and reject all
that violates such teaching as not true Buddhism." Both
authors, as we know, take their Buddhist stand on the
teachings of pratiitya-samutpaada and ^suunyataa and
from that stand reject all forms of "topical Buddhism" orhongaku shis or dhaatuvada, as expressions of the
"indigenous thought" of Asian cultures Hinduism, Taoism,
Shint and the like that has found its way from the outside
into the Buddhist tradition. On these grounds, it seems, not
only Snyder’s poem (which is clearly dedicated to mixing
the dharma with various traditions of indigenous thought),
but also Dgen’s essay (at least large parts as I am reading
them) must be rejected. They will be in good company, in a
pile along with most texts of the tradition.

I do not want to argue about whether and why Buddhists
should take pratiitya-samutpaada and ^suunyataa as the
essential teachings of their religion, let alone whether and
why these particular teachings are likely to be more
conducive than other alternatives to the social reform
sought by the professors of critical Buddhism. Much more
could be, and has been, said on these issues than appears inPruning the Bodhi Tree. But my own question here is
more simple-minded: Why, as Buddhists, must we start by
taking our stand in an essential teaching and rejecting most
texts of the tradition? To be sure, there is plenty of
historical precedent for this way of being a Buddhist,
especially perhaps in the so-called "selective"(senchaku
選擇) styles of Japanese Buddhism often associated with
some reformers (including Dgen) in the Kamakura period.
But since most people, even in the Kamakura period, have
not been Buddhists of this sort, clearly we cannot stand the
argument on precedent.

One of the nasty corollaries of the argument for taking a
stand on orthodox doctrine is that those who do not are not
Buddhists. Thus, "objective historians", who rest on mere
precedent and accept as Buddhism whatever Buddhists
have actually said and done, are dismissed as outsiders,
non-believers uncommitted to the dharma. But what about
the rest of us, Buddhists who may not know what the
essential teachings are, let alone what to do about them,
and search the tradition in faith for guidance? What about
those of us, perhaps like Gary Snyder, who may be
struggling to make the dharma come alive in our own
historical situations and who look to the tradition for the
ways that Buddhists like Dgen have done this in the past,
in their own situations?

In fact, perhaps not surprisingly, there is much in critical
Buddhism that reminds us of Dgen, in his emphasis on the
need to read Buddhist texts with the "eye of the way"(Dgen
道眼) and his slashing attacks, like those we have seen in
the Sansuiky, on everyone who lacked this eye. But the
eye of the way was not for Dgen a natural gift, either of
reason or intuition; it was a gift of the tradition itself. Dgen could be sure that he himself had the eye in large
measure because of his faith in the historical lineage of the
buddhas and patriarchs; it was first of all the historical fact
of his membership in this lineage that gave him the
confidence to judge the tradition, and it was through
participation in this lineage in its historical forms as he had
received them that he sought to bring the dharma alive in
his community. In this sense, for Dgen, history came first
and philosophy second.

Faith in a particular version of sacred history was a
common starting point for many Buddhists in Dgen’s day.
It is not so common today and is surely not the starting
point for the professors of critical Buddhism. Although
they must of necessity sometimes argue for their vision of
orthodoxy from the historical precedents of particular
texts, their selection and interpretation of the texts rests
less on faith in the dharma as an historical tradition than on
belief in the dharma as a philosophical system. Where does
this belief come from? Surely some of it comes from the
fact the professors are specialists in doctrinal texts rather
than, say, texts of ritual, history or literature that
themselves seek to define the dharma as an intellectual
system. But I suspect that the professors’ belief (and likely
their choice of specialization) is more deeply rooted in the
modern need to define Buddhism as a coherent system of
beliefs, so that it could take its rightful place among the
religions (thus defined) of the world. In Japan, this need has
been felt since the Meiji period, when Buddhists there first
came into contact with the new "science of religion" and the
nascent western buddhology already at work on such a
definition.

As you might guess by now, I am not myself drawn to such
work, what we might call the "Protestantization" of the
dharma that weeds out the rich overgrowth of art and
literature, myth and ritual, and in the process cuts off most
possibilities for being Buddhist. But my larger point here is
not to condemn this work so much as to remind the
professors that their call to take a stand on orthodox
doctrine and reject the rest, whatever value it may have in
challenging and reforming the Stsh belongs to a
particular historical context and is but one more example of
how Buddhists must always struggle to bring the dharma
alive in their own situations to remind them of this and to
suggest that, if they look around for other Buddhists in
other situations, both in the past and the present, they may
find more friends than they think, even among those who
take refuge in the buddha nature or sing at night to the
Mountain Spirit.

Sometime during the seventh and eighth centuries a new doctrine gained currency
among Chinese Buddhist exegetes, an doctrine that came to be known as "the
buddha-nature of the insentient" (wu-ch’ing fo-hsing 無情佛性, hereafter
"BNI"). According to this teaching, not only do all sentient beings possess the
inherent nature of buddhahood, but so do plants and trees, stones and tiles, and even
particles of dust. Of course, stated in this manner, it might appear as simply another
expression of the familiar Mahaayaana teaching Jof non-duality: since everything is
dependently originated and thus devoid of an abiding essence or "self-nature" (svabhaava),
everything is inherently pure, empty, and quiescent. From this perspective, there is no
ultimate distinction between the absolute on the one hand (be it styled dharmakaaya,tathataa, nirvaana, ^suunyataa, original mind, buddha, or what have
you), and the multifarious world of lived experience on the other.

Nevertheless, the claim that insentient objects possess buddha-nature would have
initially sounded odd, if not preposterous, to a medieval Buddhist scholiast. As early
critics were quick to point out, the doctrine contravened well-known passages in
authoritative Mahaayaana scriptures that explicitly restricted buddha-nature to sentient
beings. Moreover, there were no scriptural precedents for insentient objects actually
attaining bodhi; nor had anyone ever witnessed such an occurrence. In response,
proponents of BNI appealed to the doctrines of skillful means (upaaya) and the
"division of the teachings" (p’an-chiao 判敎) to defend their position:
they dismissed scriptural passages that contravened their position as provisional
teachings for those of limited capacity. While the debate would continue throughout the
medieval period, by the Sung Dynasty the BNI doctrine appears to have gained wide
acceptance in both T’ien-t’ai and Ch’an circles, and it was embraced by many eminent
Japanese monks as well, including the founders of the Shingon, Tendai, S?t?, and Nichiren
schools.

The notion that insentient objects–objects that we might consider part of the
natural or physical world–possess buddha-nature has attracted the attention of a number
of contemporary scholars. For those interested in the issue of "sinification" (a
widespread passion among specialists in Chinese Buddhism), the notion is especially
intriguing. Scholars have surmised that concern with inherent buddha-nature (fo-hsing
佛性) gained prominence in China in part due to the indigenous Chinese preoccupation
with humankind’s hsing 性 or "inherent nature," a philosophical theme
that dates back to the Warring States period. This issue was eventually decided in favor
of the Mencian view that humankind’s nature is inherently good, a position that resonated
with the Mahaayaana claim that all beings possess the nature of buddhahood. While the
theory of buddha-nature itself can be traced back to Indian sources (it is closely
associated with tathaagatagarbha thought),1)

the extension of buddha-nature to the insentient was a distinctively
Chinese innovation. It is, in short, a conveniently discrete and perhaps paradigmatic
specimen of "sinification." One might then interpret the BNI doctrine as an
attempt by Buddhists to appropriate the discourse concerning hsing from the Juists
and to trump them at the same time; in contrast to the expansive Mahaayaana vision of
universal buddha-nature, extending even to walls and roof-tiles, the Juist discourse on hsing
appears relatively mundane and parochial.

The East Asian Buddhist controversy concerning inherent buddha-nature endured
through the centuries, and has emerged once again in a recent Japanese debate over what is
and what is not "authentically Buddhist." In short, the two Japanese proponents
of "critical Buddhism" (hihan bukky? 批判佛敎), Matsumoto Shir?
松本史郞 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭, insist that metaphysical absolutes such as
"buddha-nature" are not only antithetical to the original teachings of
?aakyamuni, but are also responsible for the moral failings of the Japanese Buddhist
priesthood.2) (The dogma that ultimately
all distinctions are illusory–that all beings are essentially equal from the perspective
of their shared buddha-nature–is inherently reactionary in so far as it obviates the need
for genuine equality, social justice, and political engagement.) From the perspective of
Matsumoto and Hakamaya’s "critical Buddhism," the extension of buddha-nature to
insentient objects only exemplifies the exegetical excess, and the intellectual and moral
bankruptcy, that is occasioned by the wanton reification of the absolute.

While the BNI doctrine promises to reveal something about what makes Chinese
Buddhism Chinese (and perhaps what makes Japanese Buddhism Japanese), this is by no means
the sole reason for contemporary interest in the topic. Of equal if not greater
significance is the assumption that the doctrine pertains to native Buddhist conceptions
of nature and attitudes toward environmental and ecological issues. On the surface, the
BNI doctrine appears to both valorize the world of nature, and to affirm our place within,
rather than apart from, the material world in which we find ourselves. 3)

This is a now familiar theme; one repeatedly reads that the Chinese and Japanese
view themselves as one with nature, in marked contradistinction to Occidentals who
position themselves outside the natural world, as its lord and master. This is due, we are
told, to very different sets of metaphysical presuppositions resulting from divergent
cultural legacies. The Western belief in an ontological rift between the human realm and
the world of nature is supposedly tied to Judeo-Christian monotheism, which postulates an
enduring divide between the creator and his creation, a divide that is replicated in the
later Cartesian bifurcation of the immaterial world of spirit and the physical world of
extended matter. In contrast, indigenous East Asian traditions such as Taoism and Shinto
do not envisage a gap between the contingent realm of human experience and the realm of
truth. Chinese and Japanese religious thought exalts the world of nature as the locus of
spiritual insight, freedom, and liberation. The BNI doctrine would seem to be an
unambiguous, if metaphorical, expression of this Chinese vision of the "unity of man
and nature."

Of course, if it is true that our metaphysical intuitions are constructed by our
specific linguistic, intellectual, and cultural legacies, and that the legacy of the
"East" is fundamentally different from that of the "West," then it
follows that the Chinese may not simply differ from us in their attitude toward
nature; rather, their view of the world might not include anything that quite corresponds
to our concept of "nature" in the first place. Which makes one wonder: in the
absence of a shared epistemic referent–a trans-cultural, trans-linguistic,
trans-historical signified to which the signifier "nature" corresponds–is there
any sound intellectual basis for such grandiose cross-cultural comparisons? Are efforts at
this level of generality necessarily vacuous? Or worse, do they lie in the service of a
more nefarious ideological agenda? 4)

I intend to avoid these murky hermeneutic waters below. My own sense is that the
early sources pertaining to the buddha-nature of the insentient actually reveal little
about native Chinese views of "nature," and have even less to say with respect
to contemporary ecological concerns. As we shall see, the sources tend to be implacably
scholastic–they are wedded to a gordian doctrinal system that is predicated on the
authority of a host of institutionally sanctioned Indian and Chinese texts. The fact that
the doctrines espoused by these texts were frequently at odds with each other only fueled
the development of increasingly convoluted and abstruse interpretative strategies.

While most scholars will readily acknowledge the scholastic nature of much
medieval Buddhist thought, Ch’an is often presented as an exception. Ch’an is viewed as
one school that explicitly eschewed scholastic pursuits, in favor of rigorous meditative
practice leading to transformative insight. The literary form most distinctive of Ch’an,
the kung-an 公案("public case"), is accordingly presented as an attempt
to foil the discursive impulse that is essential to the scholastic enterprise. But a
careful reconstruction of the debate over BNI gives a very different view of Ch’an: not
only were Ch’an masters active and passionate participants in this quintessentially
discursive controversy, but, as we will see, the BNI doctrine was the immediate context
for the most famous kung-an of all, "Chao-chou’s dog."

My first task will be to review the early development of the BNI doctrine. As
the relevant materials have been the subject of a number of detailed historical and
doctrinal studies, my review will be brief. 5)
I will, however, pay somewhat more attention to early Ch’an sources than I do to San-lun,
Hua-yen, or T’ien-t’ai materials as the Ch’an involvement in the debate has heretofore
received relatively little notice in Western studies.

The fifth-century monk Tao-sheng 道生(360-434) appears to have been the first
to advance the theory that all sentient beings, including icchantika, possess
buddha-nature. 6) The claim was
contentious in its day, for according to the six-fascicle version of the Nirvaa?a-suutra
translated by Fa-hsien and Buddhabhadra, buddha-nature is eternal but icchantika do
not possess it. 7) Tao-sheng
disagreed, insisting that icchantika too possess the seeds of buddha-nature, and
will one day attain buddhahood.

Tao-sheng’s position was vindicated with the appearance of Dharmaksema’s
(385-433 or 436) translation of the sutra in 421. 8)
This recension, which became known as the "northern tradition,"9) actually waffles on the topic of the icchantika:
the sutra first excludes icchantika from those who possess buddha-nature (T.374:
12.404c4-21); but later it tempers the doctrine, saying that one should direct one’s
compassion equally to all, including icchantika, with the desire that they may be
enlightened (454a6ff., 456a24ff.); that the Buddha preaches to the icchantika
because at least some of them possess the faculties necessary for enlightenment
(482b3-12); that all icchantika possess buddha nature and thus are capable of
attaining enlightenment (493b20 ff.); and that all, including the icchantika, will
attain supreme enlightenment once they abandon their original defilements (505c14-15).10)

Dharmak?ema’s translation of the Nirvaa?a-suutra served as the earliest
and most important canonical statement of the universality of buddha-nature in China.
However, the text unambiguously restricts the possession of buddha-nature to sentient
beings: "’Non-buddha-nature’ refers to insentient things such as walls and fences,
tiles and stones. Everything apart from insentient things such as these is called
‘buddha-nature.’" 非佛性者 所謂一切障壁瓦石無情之物,
離如是等無情之物是名佛性.11) This
was indeed the prevailing view throughout the Northern and Southern Dynasties, a period in
which the Nirvaa?a-suutra played a prominent role in scholastic exegesis, and
served as the subject of numerous commentaries.12)

The developments that would lay the ground for the BNI position did not begin
until over a century after the authoritative translations of the Nirvaa?a-suutra
gained currency. This development is usually traced to the six-century monk Ching-ying
Hui-yüan 淨影慧遠(523-592), a Ti-lun exegete interested in the relationship
between the buddha-nature of the Nirvaa?a-suutra, and "originally pure
mind." In his Ta-ch’eng i-chang, 大乘義章 Hui-yüan makes a pivotal
distinction between the "buddha-nature that knows" 能知性, and the
"buddha-nature that is known" 所知性(T.1851: 44.472c). The former is
described as the "mind of true consciousness" 眞識心 that is capable of
awakening to buddha-nature through the elimination of ignorance. The text explains that
"this nature is situated in sentient beings, and does not extend to the
insentient" 局在衆生 不通非情 (472c18-19). Thus when the Nirvaa?a-suutra
says that buddha-nature is present only in sentient beings, it is referring to the
"buddha-nature that knows." The latter, the "nature that is known, is like
the dharma-nature, the apex of reality, the mark of reality, the dharma-realm, the supreme
meaning of the teachings and the sutras which is emptiness, ultimate truth, and so
on" 所知性者 謂如法性實際實相法界法經第一義空一實諦等
(472c22-23). When the scriptures call the highest teaching "buddha-nature," or
when they call the middle-way "buddha-nature," they are referring to the
"nature that is known." Hui-yüan explicitly says that this aspect of
buddha-nature penetrates everywhere, both within and without (472c25-26), the implication
being that it extends to insentient as well as to sentient things.

Hui-yüan’s bifurcation of buddha-nature is in some respects structurally
analogous to our distinction between epistemology and ontology, in so far as it
distinguishes between buddha-nature as the "content" of a rarefied and
non-dualistic mode of cognition, and buddha-nature as the ground of being that makes such
a cognition possible. This conceptual structure will find its way into much of the
subsequent theorizing on the subject.

While Hui-yüan has all the pieces in place, he never actually states that
insentient objects possess buddha-nature. The first to do so appears to have been the
San-lun commentator Chi-tsang 吉藏 (549-623). Chi-tsang takes a somewhat different
approach to the issue than does Hui-yüan: rather than beginning with a bifurcation of
buddha-nature into two aspects, one of which is coterminous with the insentient and one of
which is not, Chi-tsang argues that the distinction between sentient and insentient is
itself ultimately empty.13)

Thus if you are going to deny buddha-nature to something, then not only are
grass and trees devoid of buddha-nature, but living beings are also devoid of
buddha-nature. But if you hold to the existence of buddha-nature, then it is not only
living beings that have buddha-nature, but grass and trees must also have
buddha-nature…. Since there is no duality between the dependent and the true, if
sentient beings possess buddha-nature, grass and trees must also possess buddha-nature.
For this reason we maintain that it is not only sentient beings that possess
buddha-nature, but grass and trees also possess buddha-nature. If we understand that all
dharmas are equal and do not view the two marks of the dependent and the true, then in
reality there are no marks of attainment or non-attainment. Since there is no
non-attainment, we provisionally speak of attaining buddhahood. Thus at the moment when
sentient beings attain buddhahood, all grass and trees also attain buddhahood.14)

For Chi-tsang, the rubric of buddha-nature is merely another way of affirming
emptiness, dependent origination, and the middle way, from which vantage point all
distinctions, including that between sentient and insentient, must be relinquished.
Buddha-nature is not a something that could be possessed by, or reside in, sentient, much
less insentient, things.

Nonetheless, Chi-tsang immediately goes on to qualify his thesis, conceding that
his analysis proceeds from the perspective of "pervasiveness" 通門, wherein
all distinctions fall away. From the perspective of "difference" 別門,
however, one can indeed distinguish between sentient and insentient:

Because sentient beings have mental delusions, they can attain the truth of
awakening. Grass and trees have no mind, and thus they have no delusion. What would it
mean for them to obtain awakening? It is like waking from a dream: if you are not
dreaming, then you cannot waken from it. Therefore it is said [in the Nirvaa?a-suutra]
that since sentient beings possess buddha-nature they can attain buddhahood, but since
grass and trees are devoid of buddha-nature they cannot attain buddhahood.15)

Thus while Chi-tsang is willing to come out and declare, perhaps for the first
time, that insentient objects possess buddha-nature, he attempts to stay within the
confines of the Nirvaa?a-suutra teachings, and readily concedes that the attainment
of enlightenment is only possible for sentient beings. 16)

Both Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang were primarily interested in emphasizing, in
the scholastic idiom of their day, the message of the universality of the buddha-nature.
They had no choice but to deal with the sentient/insentient distinction, as it occurs in
the very passage of the Nirvaanaa-suutra that served as the locus classicus for the
doctrine. On the whole, one gets the impression that the sentient/insentient issue was
somewhat inconsequential to their larger projects, and it is difficult to imagine what
practical ramifications might have been entailed in one’s defense or rejection of the BNI
thesis.

By the early T’ang the doctrine of universal buddha-nature, or the ultimate
identity of the buddha and all beings, had become a hallmark of orthodoxy among many
Chinese Buddhist commentators. The idea appears in diverse formulations, many of which
simply fudge the distinction between sentient and insentient. Typical is the following
passage in the apocryphal, but highly influential, Yüan-chüeh ching
圓覺經, likely composed in China sometime during the second half of the seventh
century.

Wisdom and foolishness interfuse as praj~naa. The teachings accomplished
by both bodhisattvas and heretics are equally bodhi. The realms of ignorance and true
suchness are not different. Morality, meditation, wisdom, and greed, anger, and delusion
are all noble practices. All the worlds of sentient beings share the same dharma-nature;
the hells and the heavens are all pure lands. Those with and those without [buddha-]nature
all attain the buddha way. The defilements are all ultimate liberation. The dharmadhaatu‘s
ocean of wisdom illuminates all phenomena as if it were empty space.

I suspect that the figurative claim that all beings are destined for buddhahood,
irrespective of their possession of buddha-nature, was intended to subsume the category of
the insentient along with the sentient, without saying so explicitly. (To do so might have
raised suspicions concerning the provenance of the scripture.) 17) The exegetical challenge of the day was to be as
conceptually inclusive and comprehensive as possible.

But the urge toward increasingly comprehensive and expansive rhetorical
formulations would inevitably run up against the scripturally sanctioned dichotomy between
the sentient and the insentient. Exegetes were thus forced to reproduce the hermeneutic
strategies pioneered by Hui-yüan and Chi-tsang. Witness, for example, the manner in
which the Hua-yen exegete Fa-tsang (643-712) handles the issue: in a discussion of the
meaning of "dharma-nature" (fa-hsing 法性) in the Ta-ch’eng ch’i
hsin lun i-chi 大乘起信論義記, Fa-tsang explains that "true suchness
眞如 pervades both the defiled and the pure, the sentient and the insentient."
Citing an unnamed treatise he goes on to say that, with regard to sentient beings,
suchness is called buddha-nature, and with regard to non-sentient beings it is called
dharma-nature. 18) He makes
much the same point in his Hua-yen ching t’an hsüan chi 華嚴經探玄記,
where he writes that "while the nature of true suchness taught by the three vehicles
permeates both the sentient and the insentient, only sentient beings can awakening to
buddha-nature." 19) Fa-tsang,
much like Hui-yüan, appeals to a distinction between epistemology and ontology in
order to assert the buddha-nature of the insentient without contravening the letter of theNirvaanaa-suutra. And Chi-tsang’s distinction between the absolute and the
contingent (the non-dualistic perspective of the absolute versus the perspective of
contingent experience), amounts to much the same thing. In all three cases there is a
reluctance to challenge scriptural authority.

The full development of the doctrine that insentient things have buddha-nature
is usually associated with the T’ien-t’ai school, particularly with the work of Chan-jan
湛然 (711-782). We will see below that this is somewhat misleading: Chan-jan was likely
following the lead of certain prominent Ch’an masters of his day. Be that as it may,
Chan-jan is the first on record to directly challenge the authority of the Nirvaanaa-suutra
on the issue.

As the self-conscious architect of T’ien-t’ai orthodoxy, Chan-jan denies the
originality of his position, claiming to find precedent in the Mo-ho chih-kuan
摩訶止觀. Specifically, Chan-jan refers to a passage from Kuan-ting’s 灌頂 (561-632)
preface to the work that was considered by the later tradition to represent the very
essence of T’ien-t’ai teaching. 20) Speaking
of the "perfect and sudden" 圓頓 practice Kuan-ting writes: "When [the
mind] is fixed on the dharma-realm–when [each] moment of thought [is one with] the
dharma-realm–then there is not a single form nor a single smell that is not the middle
way" 繫緣法界 一念法界 一色一香 無非中道 (T.1911: 46.1c24-25). In hisChih-kuan fu-hsing ch’uan hung chüeh, 止觀輔行傳弘決, Chan-jan explains
that this reference to the single form and the single smell refers to the universality of
buddha-nature, even among insentient things:

Based on the principle of identity [the Mo-ho chih kuan] here says that
"each and every color and scent is the middle way." "Colors" and
"scents" are unanimously considered insentient. However, to accept that color
and scent is the middle way [is to accept that] insentient things [possess] buddha-nature.
[This] jars the ear and boggles the mind.21)

In fact, neither Chih-i nor Kuan-ting explicitly countenance the buddha-nature
of the insentient. On the contrary, in his commentary on the Nirvaanaa-suutra,
Kuan-ting unambiguously states that insentient beings do not possess buddha nature:
"While there is buddha-nature in sentient beings, there is no buddha-nature in grass
and trees; rather, they have the nature of grass, trees, etc." 22) In order to bring his own doctrine into line with the
writings of his predecessors, Chan-jan plays the upaaya card: he insists that
Kuan-ting fully understood the buddha-nature of the insentient, but that he hesitated to
say so as the times were not yet fitting.

But there is evidence that Chan-jan did recognize the novelty of his own
position, at least within the T’ien-t’ai fold. The tacit acknowledgment is found in the
opening of his Chin-kang pei 金剛?, a short work written around 780, not long
before his death, that is devoted exclusively to the defense and clarification of the BNI
doctrine.23) The text opens with an
autobiographical statement of how the text came into being: it seems that one quiet night
Chan-jan found himself contemplating the sublime and interwoven T’ien-t’ai teachings
concerning the centrality of buddha-nature, the unity of all oppositions, the existence of
all realms in a single instant of thought, and so on. Chan-jan reports that in the midst
of his reverie he "fell into a trance-induced sleep. From my subconscious, I
proclaimed ‘insentient things possess [buddha-]nature.’" 24) The rest of the text is presented as a transcript of the
ensuing conversation with interlocutors that appear in his dream. The treatise closes
abruptly with the following: "I suddenly awoke from my dream. The questioner, the
respondent, the questions and answers, all were ungraspable."25)

This would seem to be a remarkable admission: on the one hand Chan-jan presents
his position on BNI as emerging from reflection on cardinal T’ien-t’ai principles. On the
other hand, the fact that the doctrine occurs to him in the midst of an inspired dream
would seem to concede the originality of his thought.

The thrust of Chan-jan’s position is quite simple: Mahaayaana doctrine (1)
insists on the universality of buddha-nature, and (2) will not ultimately brook a
distinction between sentient and insentient things:

The individual of the perfect [teaching] knows, from beginning to end, that the
absolute principle is non-dual, and that there are no objects apart from mind. Who then is
sentient? What then is insentient? Within the Assembly of the Lotus there is no
discrimination. What difference is there between the [three types of medicinal] herbs and
the [two types of] trees, and the soil [in which they grow], or between the four elements
[of which they are comprised]?

According to Chan-jan, statements to the contrary, such as the notorious passage
in the Nirvaanaa-suutra denying buddha-nature to the insentient, must be understood
as pratipak?a–they are intended as expedient antidotes to particular
misconceptions and thus must not be taken at face value.27)

Chan-jan’s approach to the BNI doctrine shows the influence of his predecessors:
his willingness to invoke absolutes such as "principle" or "mind"
recalls the Ti-lun exegesis advanced by Hui-yüan, while his critique of the
sentient-insentient dichotomy is reminiscent of Chi-tsang. But there are differences:
first, Chan-jan is willing to dismiss certain passages in the Nirvaanaa-suutra as
expedient or provisional teachings. Second, there is Chan-jan’s use of the imagery of the
Lotus assembly, which seems to move the discussion away from the somewhat arid
abstractions of earlier Nirvaanaa-suutra commentators, to a more poetic vision of
the phenomenal world as the very locus of awakening. In other words, for Chan-jan, to
claim that the insentient possess buddha-nature is not merely to grant inanimate objects
an inherent potential that will never be realized; nor is it a purely metaphysical theory
predicated on the perspective of absolute truth. Rather, Chan-jan seems to be saying that
the very colors and smells of the world around us constitute the Assembly of the Lotus;
they are the immediate and undefiled expression of buddhahood.

Chan-jan was the first to devote an entire treatise to the defense of BNI. The
fact that the Chin-kang pei was the only treatise he ever wrote (the remainder of
his corpus consists largely of commentaries), and that it was written near the end of his
life, suggests that the doctrine was of particular significance to him. Why would he have
devoted so much energy to this single and somewhat idiosyncratic scholastic concern? While
the available sources may be insufficient to provide a definitive answer, there is
evidence that the BNI doctrine had emerged as a pressing and controversial issue in
eighth-century Buddhist circles. It seems that the immediate pretext for Chan-jan’s work
was not the scholastic arguments advanced by earlier generations of Ti-lun, San-lun, and
Hua-yen commentators, so much as the unorthodox positions touted by certain of Chan-jan’s
contemporaries, contemporaries associated with the nascent Ch’an tradition.

The Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzu chi 楞伽師資記, a text recovered from
Tun-huang and associated with the "Northern-school" of Ch’an, is attributed to
Ching-chueh 淨覺 (683-ca. 750), and is believed to date from the early part of the
Kai-yuan period (713-742).28) The issue
of the buddha-nature of the insentient is first mentioned in the record of the
fourth-patriarch Tao-hsin 道信 (580-651): "The Nirvaanaa-suutra says: ‘All
beings have buddha-nature.’ If you say that walls, fences, tiles, and stones do not have
buddha-nature, then how could they preach the dharma?"29) And in the biography of the fifth-patriarch Hung-jen 弘忍
(601-674) that immediately follows we find the following:

[Hung-jen] said: "The Buddha has thirty-two marks. Do jars also have the
thirty-two marks or not? Do pillars have the thirty-two marks or not? Proceeding in the
same way we ask if earth, trees, tiles and stones have the thirty-two marks or
not?"… He also said: "At the moment when you are in the temple sitting in
meditation, is your body also sitting in meditation beneath the trees of the mountain
forests or not? Are earth, trees, tiles, and stones also able to sit in meditation or not?
Are earth, trees, tiles, and stones able to see forms and hear sounds, wear a robe and
carry a bowl, or not? When the La?kaavataara-suutra speaks of the dharma-body of
the realm of objects 境界法身, it [refers to] just this.30)

Both Tao-hsin and Hung-jen allude to the non-duality of the subjective and
objective worlds, as well as to the doctrine that "all is mind" that is closely
associated with the La?kaavataara. This appears to lead to their inference that
even the inanimate objects of our perception possess buddha-nature and "preach the
dharma."

It is impossible to know whether this accurately depicts the teachings of either
Tao-hsin or Hung-jen, or whether it rather represents the thought of the editor (or
editors) of the Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzu chi. As we will see below, other texts,
notably the Platform Sutra, depict Hung-jen as rejecting rather than espousing the
BNI position. Nonetheless, the passages attest to an interest in the issue among Ch’an
teachers in the early part of the eighth century, just as Chan-jan was beginning his
career.

The Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzu chi is not an isolated example. The Chüeh-kuan
lun 絶觀論, or "Treatise on the Extinction of Contemplation," is a short
text associated with the Ox-head lineage (Niu-t’ou tsung 牛頭宗), six manuscript copies
of which were recovered from Tun-huang. While the text has been attributed to Bodhidharma,
Ho-tse Shen-hui 荷澤神會 (684-758), and Niu-t’ou Fa-jung 牛頭法融 (594-657), among
others, it was likely composed by a later Ox-head teacher sometime during the third
quarter of the eighth century, i.e., just around the time that Chan-jan was formulating
his own position on BNI.31)

The text takes the form of a conversation between a teacher, named
"Attainment" (ju-li 入理), and his disciple "Gateway" (yüan-men
緣門). About a third of the way into the text we find the following exchange:

Gateway asks, "Is the Way found only in embodied spiritual entities, or
does it reside in grass and trees as well?" Attainment says, "There is no place
the Way does not pervade." [Gateway] asks, "If the Way is pervasive, why is it a
crime to kill a man, whereas it is not a crime to kill grass and trees?" [Attainment]
answered, "Talk of whether it is a crime or not is a matter related to sentience, and
is thus not the true Way. It is only because worldly people have not attained the truth of
the Way, and falsely believe in a personal self, that their murder entails mental
[intent]. This intent bears karmic fruit, and thus we speak of it as a crime. Grass and
trees have no sentience, and are thus originally in accord with the Way. As they are free
of a self, there is no calculation involved in killing them, and thus we do not argue over
whether it is a crime or not.

Now one who is free of a self and is in accord with the Way looks at his own
body as he would at grass or at trees. He bears the cutting of his own body as do trees in
a forest. Therefore, when Ma~nju^sr? held a sword toward Gautama [Buddha], or when
Angulimalya held out a knife at ?aakyamuni, they were both in accord with the Way.32) Both realized non-origination, and completely
comprehended the emptiness and nonexistence of illusory transformations. That is why we do
not argue about whether it was a crime or not."

[Gateway] asks, "If grass and trees have long been in accord with the Way,
why do the sutras not record instances of grass or trees becoming buddhas, but only of
persons [becoming buddhas]?" [Attainment] answers, "They do not only record
persons, but record grass and trees [becoming buddhas] as well. A sutra says, ‘A single
mote of dust contains all dharmas.’ Another says, ‘All dharmas are suchness; all sentient
beings are also suchness.’33) Suchness is
devoid of any duality or discrimination."

This work represents a significant departure from the arguments advanced by the
San-lun, Hua-yen, and T’ien-t’ai authors mentioned above. On the one hand, the Chüeh-kuan
lun accepts that, from a worldly perspective, grass and trees are indeed insentient.
But precisely because they lack mind and sentience, and thus have no thought of
"me" or "mine," grass and trees are "in accord with the
Way." The treatise goes so far as to claim scriptural support for the view that
insentient things actually become buddhas (ch’eng fo). The way to buddhahood is the
way of insentience: one must put an end to discernment (chüeh-kuan 絶觀) and
become mindless (wu-hsin 無心). Then, like the grass and trees, you will be one
with the Way, and utterly unconcerned with death.

The BNI doctrine also finds support in the Pao-tsang lun 法藏論, a
text traditionally attributed to Seng-chao 僧肇 (374-414), but which is believed to date
to the late eighth century.35) This text
is loosely associated with early Ch’an in general, and the Ox-head line in particular, a
finding that is consistent with the brief passage on BNI in chapter three:

The scripture says: "Buddha-nature is uniform, expansive, and difficult to
fathom." There is no duality between an ordinary person and a sage: [buddha-nature]
fills everything, wholly suffusing the grass and trees, fully pervading the ants, reaching
even to the tiniest mote of dust, and the very tip of a strand of hair–there is nothing
that exists and yet does not embody the One. 咸備草木周遍庵蟻
乃至微塵毛髮莫不含一而有.36)

The rare mention of "ants" in conjunction with the BNI thesis is
significant, as it likely alludes to a passage from the Chuang-tzu that may have been
influential in the development of this doctrine (see below).

A similar pro-BNI position is also attributed to the Northern Ch’an master
Shen-hsiu 神秀 (605?-706) in the Tsung-ching lu 宗鏡錄, a text compiled by
Yen-shou 永明延壽 (904-975) and published in 961. Shen-hsiu teaches that "when
sentient beings cultivate realization, insentient beings also cultivate realization."
卽有情修證 是非情修證. There is ultimately no distinction between self and
other, or consciousness and its objects.37) While
the Tsung-ching lu is relatively late and thus unreliable as a window on
Shen-hsiu’s original teachings, it is nevertheless significant that Yen-shou’s sources
associated this venerable "Northern Ch’an" figure with the BNI doctrine.

This admittedly fragmentary evidence suggests an interest among some early Ch’an
teachers in a somewhat radical version of the BNI doctrine. These texts depict the BNI not
merely as a universal metaphysical ground, nor do they reduce the argument to the
non-duality of the sentient and the insentient. Rather, these Northern Ch’an texts all
suggest that insentient objects actually "cultivate realization" and
"become buddhas."

However, not all of the early Ch’an leaders agreed: some prominent figures found
the BNI position utterly untenable. One of the more strident rejections of the BNI
doctrine is found in the record of Shen-hui, in which he debates an Ox-head opponent on
the subject:

Now why do you say that [buddha-nature] only permeates sentient things, and does
not permeate insentient things?" [Shen-hui] answered: "Surely you do not mean
that the merit of lush groves of emerald bamboos equals that of the dharma-body, or that
the wisdom of luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums is the same as praj~naa? If the
groves of bamboos and chrysanthemums are equal to the dharma-body and to praj~naa,
then in which sutra does the Tathagata record a case of an emerald bamboo or a
chrysanthemum attaining bodhi? The notion that emerald bamboos and chrysanthemums
are the same as the dharma-body and praj~naa is a heterodox doctrine. Why so?
Because the Nirvaanaa-suutra says: ‘That which lacks buddha-nature is deemed an
insentient thing.’"39)

This exchange, as well as others to be discussed below, attest to the
controversial status of the BNI thesis in the mid-eighth century. Moreover, there is
reason to believe that Shen-hui and his followers flagged the BNI thesis as a means to
distinguish themselves from their Northern Ch’an rivals: while the Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzu
chi depicts the fifth-patriarch Hung-jen as a supporter of BNI, the Platform Sutra
has Hung-jen espousing the very opposite. In a list of "transmission verses"
near the end of the Tun-huang version of the text, Hung-jen’s verse is given as follows:

The doctrinal purport of the verse is not as clear as it might be, and it is not
surprising that later versions of the verse found in the Tsu-t’ang chi 祖堂集,41) the Ching-te ch’uan-teng lu
景德傳燈錄,42) and the
"vulgate" edition of the Platform Sutra published in 1291,43) modify the wording in such as way as to
highlight Hung-jen’s opposition to BNI:

Sentient beings come and lay down seeds,

From the earth fruit is produced.

Without sentiency and without seeds,

There is no [buddha-]nature and nothing is produced.

有情來下種, 因地果還生. 無情卽無種, 無性亦無生.

Not only is the wording altered, but in the later texts the verse has been
incorporated into Hui-neng’s autobiographical narrative: the verse figures in the secret
transmission ceremony in which Hui-neng receives the dharma. A transmission verse
presumably exemplified the very essence of a master’s wisdom, as well as his distinctive
"teaching style" (feng 風). It is thus significant that Hung-jen’s verse
is a refutation of the BNI thesis. Shen-hui and his followers evidently saw the BNI
doctrine as a "wedge issue" with which to distinguish themselves from their
Northern rivals; in the process they depicted Hung-jen as espousing precisely the opposite
position to that ascribed to him in the Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzu chi.

As the Southern school gained ascendancy in the mid-T’ang other masters would
reiterate Shen-hui’s opposition to BNI, including Ta-chu Hui-hai 大珠慧海 (d.u.), a
disciple of Ma-tsu Tao-i 馬祖道一 (709-788). Hui-hai is the purported author of the Tun-wu
ju-tao yao-men lun 頓悟入道要門論, a text that addresses the BNI issue at some
length.44) The second fascicle of the Tun-wu
yao-men contains the following three exchanges on the issue:

Deluded people do not know that the dharma-body has no appearance, but manifests
form in response to things. Thus they say that, "Lush groves of emerald bamboos are
wholly the dharma-body; luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums, nothing is not praj~naa."
But if chrysanthemums were praj~naa, praj~naa would be the same as the
insentient, and if emerald bamboos were the dharma-body, then the dharma-body would be the
same as grass and trees. Then when people munch on bamboo shoots, they must be munching on
the dharma-body…

Master Chih, a lecturer on the Hua-yen scripture, asked: "Why do you not
agree with the aphorism: ‘Lush groves of emerald bamboos are wholly the dharma-body;
luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums, nothing is not praj~naa‘"? The Master
said: "The dharma-body is devoid of appearance, but takes form in response to emerald
bamboos. Praj~naa is without knowing, but manifests in response to chrysanthemums.
It is not that those chrysanthemums or emerald bamboos themselves possess praj~naa
or the dharma-body. Therefore a scripture says: ‘The true dharma-body of the buddha is
like empty space; it assumes form in response to things, like the moon reflected on
water.’"…

A master who lectured on the Hua-yen scripture asked: "Does the Ch’an
Master believe that insentient things are the buddha or not?" The Master said:
"I don’t believe it. For if insentient things were the buddha, then living people
would be inferior to the dead. Even dead donkeys and dead dogs would be superior to a
living person. A scripture says: ‘The buddha-body is precisely the dharma-body; it is born
of the precepts, meditation, and wisdom; it is born from the three wisdoms and the six
supernormal powers; it is born from all the excellent dharmas.’ If you claim that
insentient things are the buddha, then were you, venerable one, to die right now, you
would make a buddha."45)

Note that Hui-hai is responding to the same aphorism that appears in Shen-hui’s
work, and advances somewhat similar arguments to dismiss the BNI doctrine as simply
absurd.

Huang-po Hsi-yüan 黃檗希運 (d. ca. 850) is another influential figure
who, while he does not directly address the BNI issue, seems to limit buddha-nature to the
sentient. In his record we read:

The Master ascended the hall and said: "This very mind is buddha. It
reaches upward to all the buddhas, and downwards to things that slither on the ground; everything
that contains spirit possesses buddha-nature, and is equal with respect to the
substance of the one mind. The reason that Bodhidharma came from India was only to
transmit the dharma of one mind, and to directly point to the fact that all beings are
originally buddha." 皆有佛性同一心體.
所以達摩從西天來唯傳一心法直指一切衆生本來是佛.46)

Huang-po’s logic, stripped to the bone, is simple: since buddha is mind, only
things that possess mind are buddha. Ironically, the identification of buddha and mind is
the center of the most eloquent and influential statement in support of BNI, that
by the Ch’an master Nan-yang Hui-chung 南陽慧忠 (675-775).

Hui-chung, a contemporary of Shen-hui, is credited by the later Ch’an tradition
with the teaching that insentient things not only possess buddha-nature, but actually
"preach the dharma." 無情說法.47) We
have already seen that, according to the Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzu chi, the fourth
patriarch beat him to it by a century or so. Nevertheless, Hui-chung’s position on the
subject is perhaps the most developed in the history of the debate, and I will,
accordingly, quote at length from his long disquisition on the topic:

A Ch’an student asked: "What is the meaning of the saying ‘the mind of an
old buddha.’" The Master said: "Insentient things such as walls, fences, tiles,
and stones are all the mind of an old buddha." The Ch’an student said: "But this
is at odds with the scriptures. The Nirvaanaa-suutra says: ‘Everything apart from
insentient things such as walls, fences, tiles and stones is called buddha-nature.’ Now
you say that all insentient things are the mind of buddha, but you have yet to consider
the relationship between ‘mind’ and ‘nature.’ Are they different or not?" The Master
said, "To the deluded they are different; to the enlightened they are not
different." The Ch’an student said, "But this also contradicts the scriptures.
It is said in a scripture: ‘Good son, mind is not buddha-nature. Buddha-nature is eternal,
while mind is not eternal.’ Now you say that they are not different. How do you intend to
explain yourself?" The Master said: "You rely on the words, rather than on the
meaning. It is like a cold winter night, when water is bound up as ice. When warm weather
comes, the ice melts back into water. When sentient beings are deluded, their nature is
bound up as mind, but when they become enlightened, their minds are released again as
[buddha-]nature. If you still maintain that insentient things are without buddha nature,
then the scriptures ought not to say that the triple realm is only mind, and that the
myriad dharmas are only consciousness. Therefore the Hua-yen suutra says that all
the dharmas of the triple realm are produced by mind. Now I ask you, do insentient things
exist within the triple realm, or do they exist outside the triple realm? Are they mind,
or are they not mind? If they are not mind, the scriptures ought not to say that the
triple realm is only mind. If they are mind, [the scriptures] ought not to say that
insentient things lack buddha-nature. It is you who contravene the scriptures, not
I."

The Ch’an student asked: "If the insentient actually possess mind, can they
preach the dharma or not?" The Master said: "They preach magnificently, they
preach continually, and they preach eternally without a moment’s pause." The Chan
student asked: "Then why is it that I do not hear it?" The Master said:
"Just because you yourself do not hear it, it does not mean that others do not hear
it." [The Ch’an student] continued: "Then who can hear it?" The Master
said: "All the sages hear it."…48)

The student asked: "Within the teachings of the scriptures one only sees
sentient beings receiving the prophecy of future perfect enlightenment, and then, at some
future time, becoming a buddha named so-and-so. One never sees an insentient being
receiving the prophecy of future perfect enlightenment and becoming a buddha. Among the
thousand buddhas of the current Bhadra kalpa, if there is a single case of an
insentient object becoming buddha, please show it to me." The Master said: "I
now ask you, imagine a prince at the time of his coronation as king. Does the person of
the prince receive the kingship [all at once], or must every territory in the kingdom be
individually bestowed upon him?" [The student] replied: "When the prince is
crowned king, everything in the kingdom becomes his. What need is there for him to receive
anything else?" The Master said: "The present case is just the same: at the
moment when sentient beings receive the prophecy of their future buddhahood, all the lands
of the three-thousand great-thousand worlds are completely subsumed within the body of
Vairocana Buddha. Beyond the body of the buddha, could there still be some insentient
object to receive the prophecy?"49) .
. .

[The student] asked: "A venerable elder has said:

Lush groves of emerald bamboos,

Are wholly suchness.

Luxuriant clusters of chrysanthemums,

Nothing is not praj~naa.

靑靑翠竹 盡是眞如 鬱鬱黃花 無非般若

Some people do not accept this teaching, while others believe in it. The words
are inconceivable, and I do not know what to make of it." The Master said: "This
pertains to the realms of great beings such as Samantabhadra and Manjusri; it is not
something that lesser men are able to believe and accept. This teaching is fully in accord
with the intent of the superlative scriptures of the Mahaayaana. Thus the Hua-yen
suutra says: ‘The buddha-body fills the dharma-realm and manifests itself before all
beings. It responds in accord with conditions, extending everywhere, yet it remains
constantly ensconced on the seat of bodhi.’50)
As emerald bamboos do not lie beyond the dharma-realm, are they not the
dharma-body? Moreover, the Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-suutra says: ‘Since matter is
boundless, praj~naa is also boundless.’51)
As chrysanthemums are but matter, are they not praj~naa?"52)

The last passage suggests that the aphorism about the bamboos and chrysanthemums
was a focal point for the BNI controversy, and Hui-chung may well have been responding to
the teachings of Shen-hui (or vice versa). In many respects, Hui-chung’s eloquent if
intellectually diffuse position represents a logical terminus for the BNI position; it is
difficult to know where one might go after invoking the notion that the universe itself is
the body of Vairocana, and that insentient things are constantly preaching the dharma.
While others would weigh in on the issue throughout the latter years of the T’ang dynasty,
no one seems to have contributed much new to the arguments on either side of the issue.53)

Before leaving the T’ang Ch’an controversy over BNI, I would note that there was
a Taoist version of the BNI doctrine circulating at around the same time. The Tao-chiao
i-shu 道敎義樞, an influential Taoist expository work dating to the early seventh
century, is associated with a form of Taoist exegesis known as ch’ung-hsüan
重玄–a literary tradition strongly influenced by Buddhist thought in general, and
San-lun argumentation in particular.54) Chapter
29 of this text, entitled "The Nature of the Tao" (tao-hsing 道性), is
an extended argument in support of the universality of the "tao-nature":
"Everything that bears consciousness, down to and including animals, fruit, trees,
and stones, possesses the nature of the Tao."
一切含識乃至畜生果木石者皆有道性也.55)
While the Tao-chiao i-shu testifies to the currency of the BNI thesis among
at least some segments of the literati, it is also possible that the Taoist appropriation
of the idea contributed to the sectarian passion seen in the Buddhist debates of the
period.

By the close of the T’ang Dynasty advocates of the BNI position appear to have
emerged on top, and, in China at least, the controversy fades into the background. The
same is not true of Japan, where the doctrine took on a life of its own. Innovative
discussions of the BNI doctrine can be found in the writings of numerous Japanese monks,
including K?kai 公海 (774-835), Saich? 最澄 (767-822), Annen 安然 (d. 889), Enchin
圓珍 (814-891), Ry?gen 良源 (912-985), Ch?jin 忠尋 (1065-1138), D?gen 道元
(1200-1253), and Nichiren 日蓮 (1222-1282), and, as mentioned above (n.17), the topic
was the focus of one of a series of spirited Hoss?-Tendai debates held under imperial
auspices in 963. Nor was the Japanese interest in BNI limited to exegetical works; it
finds its way into Japanese literature and performance arts as well.56)

One might argue that, at least in Japan, the BNI doctrine did indeed promote the
Buddhist valorization of "nature": Japanese advocates of BNI do tend to focus on
insentient phenomena that are part of what we would consider the "natural world"
(plants and trees, mountains and streams), as opposed to physical objects that are
products of human artifice (roof-tiles, walls, jars, etcetera). And at least one Tendai
master, Chujin, argued that plants are buddhas by virtue of their very planthood–their
possession of roots, stems, branches, and so on–and thus there is no need for them to
manifest the thirty-two marks. The evidence suggests a somewhat different attitude toward
the BNI doctrine than we found in China. But I will resist pursuing the Japanese sources
here, and focus instead on the significance of the debate for our understanding of Chinese
Buddhism in general, and Ch’an in particular.

In the case of China, rather than beginning with our rather hazy and
historically contingent notion of "nature," it might be more productive to turn
to the holistic conception of the cosmos that many sinologists believe is characteristic
of early Chinese thought. I am referring to what Joseph Needham has called the
"organismic" view of the world–the notion that the universe constitutes a
single, organically connected and interdependent whole. The early Chinese held that the
cosmos is comprised entirely of multiple "ethers" (chi 氣), the
transformations of which can be analyzed in terms of the five phases (wu-hsing
五行), the principle of "sympathetic resonance" (kan-ying 感應), and
so on. Such a world-view does not privilege the sorts of ontological distinctions that are
characteristic of Western thought, such as that between mind and matter, the sentient and
the insentient, the immanent and the transcendent, or between man and nature. This
enduring cosmological scheme was pivotal in the Chinese appropriation and elucidation of
Indian Buddhist philosophy.57)

Many of the strategies used to argue for the BNI position were derived, of
course, from Indian Buddhism in general, and Yogacara and tathaagatagarbha doctrine
in particular. (If all is mind, and mind is buddha-nature, then nothing is devoid of
buddha-nature.) While Indian texts such as the Avata.msaka-suutra do sometimes
depict the cosmos as a single interconnected and resplendent whole, the rhetoric tends
toward the abstract or transcendental–the perspective of the buddha rather than that of
ordinary folk. One looks in vain for an Indian reference to mundane objects like
roof-tiles and stones actually becoming buddhas and preaching the dharma.

The eminent scholar of Chinese Buddhism Kamata Shigeo 鎌田無雄 has argued
that BNI represents a synthesis of the Indian Buddhist notion that all things are mind,
and the Chinese holistic view of all things as constituting a single body (ittaikan
一體觀), particularly as articulated in certain early Taoist works.58) There is certainly no shortage of early Chinese
precursors or analogues to the BNI doctrine. Perhaps the most striking is the following
passage in chapter 22 of the Chuang-tzu:

Master Tung-kuo asked Chuang Tzu, "This thing called the Way–where does it
exist?"

Chuang Tzu said, "There’s no place it doesn’t exist."

"Come," said Master Tung-kuo, "you must be more specific."

"It is in the ant 庵蟻."

"As low a thing as that?"

"It is in the panic grass."

"But that’s lower still!"

"It is in the tiles and shards."

"How can it be so low?"

"It is in the piss and shit!"

Master Tung-kuo made no reply.

Chuang Tzu said, "Sir, your questions simply don’t get at the substance of
the matter. When Inspector Huo asked the superintendent of the market how to test the
fatness of a pig by pressing it with the foot, he was told that the lower down on the pig
you press, the nearer you come to the truth. But you must not expect to find the Way in
any particular place–there is no thing that escapes its presence! Such is the Perfect
Way, and so too are the truly great words. ‘Complete,’ ‘universal,’ ‘all-inclusive’–these
three are different words with the same meaning. All point to a single reality."59)

The T’ang court, whose ruling Li family traced their lineal descent back to
Lao-tzu, actively promoted Taoism as the legitimizing ideology of the dynasty.60) Emperor Hsuan-tsung (r.712-756), whose reign
coincided with the flurry of interest in the BNI doctrine chronicled above, was
particularly unrestrained in his support of Taoist thought. While the Tao-te ching
had been on the state examinations curriculum since 678 (it was removed by Empress Wu
during the years of 693-705), Hsuan-tsung elevated the status of this Taoist classic until
it came to dominate the course of study for aspiring officials. In 741 the emperor founded
the Ch’ung-hsuan hsueh 崇玄學 ("Academy of the Revered Mystery") In order to
educate young scholars in the Taoist classics, and at the same time instituted the Tao-chü
道擧 ("Examination on Taoism"), in an attempt to establish a Taoist
counterpart to the system of imperially sponsored Confucian schools and examinations. It
seems reasonable to assume that the promotion of Taoist study among the literate classes
would have contributed to the development and acceptance of the BNI doctrine among the
Buddhist elite.

Kamata is surely correct to draw attention to the parallels between aspects of
Taoist thought and the Buddhist BNI doctrine. I would, however, make two observations: (1)
while Kamata views the "holistic" tendencies in Taoism as valorizing
"nature," Chuang-tzu, like the Buddhist exegetes examined above, does not
distinguish between the products of civilization (tiles and shards) and the phenomena of
the natural world (ants, grass, piss and shit); (2) while the BNI idea may well have been
inspired by the holistic Chinese cosmological conception of the world, the doctrine was
initially articulated in the language of San-lun, Hua-yen, and T’ien-t’ai scholasticism.
The primary concern of these early advocates of BNI, as best as we can make out, lay in
the coherent and consistent explication of the Indian materials at their disposal. These
materials presented a host of hermeneutical issues, including the seemingly intractable
problem of how to harmonize tathaagatagarbha ontology with Maadhyamika dialectic.
The somewhat pliable rhetoric of buddha-nature was to play a central role in their
struggle with such issues. In the process these inveterate scholiasts generated
innumerable and increasingly rarefied conceptual superstructures.

The Ch’an appropriation of the BNI idea is, at first sight, less obviously
scholastic. To the early Northern and Ox-head masters, the BNI doctrine was logically and
ideologically consonant with their emphasis on "no-mind," "extinguishing
thought," and so on. In other words, the conceptual context of the doctrine was not
so much scriptural exegesis as meditative praxis. Thus the BNI idea was used not merely to
express the radical nonduality of subject and object, but also to evoke a state of perfect
inner and outer quiescence, wherein one is indistinguishable from a tree or a wall.

Northern support for the controversial BNI position presented Shen-hui with a
ready target for his polemical attacks. Surely, the idea that an insentient object could
become a walking, talking buddha is not only contrary to scripture, but patently absurd.
From Shen-hui’s point of view, the doctrine was more than merely wrong-headed; it was
potentially dangerous. The identification of the physical world around us–the world of
emerald bamboos and chrysanthemums–with the world of enlightenment, would mitigate the
need for rigorous monastic practice leading to bodhi. Shen-hui’s critique, in other
words, has much in common with the later attacks by the Sung master Ta-hui Tsung-kao
大慧宗?(1089-1163) against the "silent illumination Ch’an" (mo-chao ch’an
默照禪) of his Ts’ao-tung 曹洞 lineage rivals. (It also resonates with the concerns
of contemporary exponents of hihan bukkyo: just as BNI mitigates the need for
personal realization, it mitigates the desire to work for the collective social,
political, or environmental good.)

It is possible that Shen-hui’s attack was primarily motivated by worldly
ambition; he may simply have been exploiting the BNI issue in order to advance his own
career. It is also possible that Shen-hui was sincerely troubled by the ethical and
doctrinal ramifications of BNI. Most likely it was bit of both. But putting the possible
ethical or practical consequences aside, I would note that the arguments presented on both
sides of the BNI debate are eminently "discursive": Shen-hui and his cohorts
cite the authority of scripture, appeal to reason, logic, and common sense, make liberal
(and sometimes questionable) use of analogy, and so on. And once you look beyond the
distinctively Ch’annish literary and stylistic peculiarities, you find that the underlying
conceptual strategies are of a kind with their San-lun, Hua-yen, and T’ien-t’ai
counterparts. Take Hui-chung’s famous dictum that "insentient objects preach the
dharma" for example. On the surface the notion seems hyperbolic, potentially
antinomian, and somewhat "Ch’annish." But when Hui-chung is asked why, if
insentient things are continually preaching the dharma we can’t hear it, he responds that
only enlightened sages can hear them. Thus like Hui-yüan, Chi-tsang, Fa-tsang, and
other eminent scholiasts, Hui-chung is forced to "save appearances" by
reintroducing the slippery hermeneutic device of the two-truths.

At first all of this might seem a far cry from the kung-an literature of
Ch’an. Contemporary scholars have presented kung-ans as artful devices to subvert
discursive thought, not to mention scholastic analysis. Kung-an are presumed to
capture the immediacy and clarity of a master’s enlightenment, and thus they can have no
doctrinal, or even conceptual, content. Thus it may come as a surprise to discover that
the most famous kung-an of all, Chao-chou’s dog, was originally set in the arcane
intellectual context of the BNI controversy.

The "dog" kung-an has become notorious as the first case of theCh’an-tsung wu-men kuan, 禪宗無門關, an influential kung-an collection
compiled in 1228 by Wu-men Hui-k’ai 無門慧海 (1183-1260). Wu-men himself regarded thiskung-an as the most important of the collection, and it is often the first k?an
assigned to novice Japanese Rinzai monks. Wu-men culled this kung-an from the
recorded sayings of the eminent T’ang master Chao-chou Ts’ung-shen 趙州從梅(778-897).61) The full exchange, as found in Chao-chou’s
record, reads as follows:

[A student] asked: "Does a dog also have buddha-nature or not?" The
Master said: "It does not." The student said: "Everything has
buddha-nature, from the buddhas above, to the ants below. Why does a dog not have
it?" The Master said: "Because he has the nature of karmically conditioned
consciousness.

It might not be immediately evident that the unstated context of this repartee
was the BNI controversy. But look now at another exchange found later in the collection:

[A student] asked: "Does an oak tree also have buddha-nature or not?"
The Master said: "It has." [The student] said: "Then when will it become a
buddha?" The Master said: "When the sky falls to the earth." [The student]
said: "When will the sky fall to the earth?" The Master said: "When the oak
tree becomes a buddha."

Finally, note a third exchange in the same text, in which Chao-chou is asked
once again about the buddha-nature of dogs:

"[A student] asked: "Does a dog also have buddha-nature or not?"
The Master said: "The [road] in front of every house leads to Ch’ang-an" 問,
狗子還有佛性也無. 師云, 家家門前通長安.64)

Chao-chou’s response to the second question suggests that he will accept, at
least provisionally, the buddha-nature of insentient things such as trees. And in the
third exchange, he has no trouble conceding buddha-nature to dogs as well. So why does he
deny it to dogs the first time around?

The first questioner is fully aware, of course, that according to Buddhist
teachings all sentient life has buddha-nature; no educated priest would mistake the
interlocutor’s question as an expression of ignorance. In fact the question only makes
sense in the light of the BNI controversy: it is a challenge to Chao-chou to articulate
his understanding of the vexed buddha-nature issue in such a manner that he remains true
to Ch’an principles. Thus Chao-chou must respond in a fashion that does not reify, or
express attachment to, the notion of buddha-nature, whether of the sentient or the
insentient. Chao-chou’s response–his unapologetic denial of buddha-nature to
dogs–denotes his freedom from attachment to doctrine (i.e., his acknowledgment that no
conventional formulation is ultimate), and his refusal to attempt to articulate a medial
or transcendental position. In short, he artfully dodges the issue.

Wu-men was, of course, familiar with the BNI context of these exchanges, as is
evident in his commentary to the kung-an:

Wu-men said: "To study Ch’an you must pass through the barrier of the
patriarchal masters; to gain marvelous enlightenment you must completely sever the way of
mind. If you have not passed through the barrier of the patriarchs, and not severed the
way of mind, then you are no more than the phantom spirit that haunts the grasses and the
trees.

Chao-chou’s emphatic insistence that dogs’ do not have buddha-nature would, one
would think, make it even less likely that grasses and trees, which are insentient (devoid
of spirit or ling), possess buddha-nature. But in a characteristic twist, Wu-men
declares that if you do not grasp the import of Chao-chou’s statement, denying
buddha-nature to dogs, then you are that very spirit (ling) that dwells in the
grass and trees!

References to texts in the Taish? edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Taish?
daiz?ky? 大正大藏經) are indicated by the text number("T.") followed by
the volume, page, register(a, b, or c), and, when appropriate, the line number(s).

References to texts in the Dai nihon zokuz?ky? 大日本續藏經("ZZ.")
are indicated by Chung-kuo fo-chiao hui 中國佛敎會), followed by the page,
register(a, b, c, or d), and, when appropriate, the line number(s).

References to the Tsu-t’ang chi 祖堂集 are to the Korean edition found
in Yanagida ed. 1984, and are cited using the concordance format (section.folio.line).

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1984 "The Problem of the Icchantika in the Mahaayaana Mahaparinirvaana-suutra."Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 7 (1): 57-81.

1985 "The Yogaacaara and Madhyamika Interpretataions of the Buddha-nature
Concept in Chinese Buddhism." Philosophy East and West 35 (2).

1989 "The Early Development of the Buddha-Nature Doctrine in China." Journal
of Chinese philosophy 16 (1): 1-36.

1994 Madhyamaka Thought in China. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

McRae, John Robert.

1983 "The Ox-head School of Chinese Ch’an Buddhism: From Early Ch’an to the
Golden Age." In Studies in Ch;an and Hua-yen, Kuroda Institute Studies in East
Asian Buddhism Series, no. 1), edited by Robert M. Gimello and Peter N. Gregory, pp.
169-252. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

1986 The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism.
Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism Series, no. 3. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press.

1989 Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative
Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet. Jordan
Lectures in Comparative Religion no. 13 (1987). London: School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London.

1960 "On the ‘Attainment of Buddhahood’ by Trees and Plants." In Proceedings
of the IXth International Congress for the History of Religions (1958), 415-422.
Tokyo: Maruzen.

Schmithausen, Lambert

1991a Buddhism and Nature: The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO
1990; An Enlarged Version with Notes. Studia Philologica Buddhica Occasional Paper
Series no. 7. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhism Studies.

1991b The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism. Studia
Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series no. 6. Tokyo: The International Institute for
Buddhism Studies.

Sharf, Robert H.

1991 "The Treasure Store Treatise (Pao-tsang lun) and the
Sinification of Buddhism in Eighth-Century China." Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan.

Shiveley, Donald H.

1957 "Buddhahood for the Nonsentient: A Theme in No Plays." Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies 20: 135-161.

1) There is a considerable literature on the evolution of the
notion of buddha-nature in India; see, for example, Brown 1991; Demiéville and May
eds., 1929: 1.185-187; Hookham 1991; Ruegg 1989; and Tokiwa 1973.

3) See, for example, Nakamura Hajime’s influential Ways of
Thinking of Eastern Peoples: "the T’ien-t’ai sect taught the theory that ‘all
existences and even grass, trees, and earth can attain Buddhahood.’ That is to say, een
physical matter existing in nature can realize enlightenment and become Buddha. Generally
speaking, the tendency was to regard nature as the most beautiful and highest existence,
with man on an equal plane" (1964: 279). See also LaFleur 1973: 110; and Schmithausen
1991: 22.

4) Here I am referring, of course, to phenomena such as nihonjinron
日本人論 (theories concerning the [unique characteristics of the] Japanese) – a
psudo-scientific discourse about cultural difference than is often little more than a
thinly veiled display of cultural and racial chauvinism.

5) The Japanese literature on the subject is indeed vast, see
esp. Kamata 1962 and 1965: 434-474; Miyamoto 1961; Sakamoto 1959; Yoshizu 1973. In Western
languages see Koseki 1977: 217-231 and 1980; Penkower 1993 and 1998.

17) This scripture was indeed interpreted as supporting BNI by
the Japanese Tendai monk Ry?gen 良源 (912-985), who refers to it in a debate on the
subject with the Hoss? monk Ch?zan 仲算 (935-076), held in 963; see Miyamoto 1961:
675-676; LaFleur 1973: 101.

18) T. 1846: 44.247c12-14. For a detailed discussion of
Fa-tsang’s position, as well at that of other early Hua-yen exegetes including
Ch’eng-kuan, see Kamata 1965: 443-455. Note that there is considerable speculation about
the role that either Fa-tsang or Ch’eng-kuan may have played as the unnamed foil in Chin-kang
pei; see Penkower 1993: 467-481, n. 128; and 1998: 47-48, n. 101.

33) The first quotation may come from the Avatamsaka-suutra
(T. 278 and 279), which contains numerous statements to the same effect. The second
quotation is a slightly modified version of a sentence from the Vimalak?rti (T.
475: 14.542b12-13).

38) I have not been able to identify the source of this verse,
although it appears repeatedly in discussions of the BNI position; see, for example, the Tsu-t’ang
chi records for Nan-yang Hui-chung 南陽慧忠 (1.125.13), Tung-shan Liang-chieh
洞山良介 (2.65.3), and Ta-chu Hui-hai 大珠慧海 (4.47.6), all of whom will be
discussed below.

53) The important master Tung-shan Liang-chieh (807-869) was
also a noted advocate of BNI; see the Jui-chou tung-shan liang-chieh ch’an-shih yü-lu
瑞州洞山良价禪師語錄, T. 1986: 47.519b29 ff. (While this work was compiled in
1630, the earlier Tsu-t’ang chi corroborates Tung-shan’s interest in the topic
[2.65.3].) Much of the section on BNI in Tung-shan’s record is virtually identical to
passages found in the record of Hui-chung.

61) The record, Chao-chou chen-chi ch’an-shih yü-lu
趙州眞際禪師語錄, is believed to have been in circulation by the end of the tenth
century. The earliest extant recension is that preserved as fascicle 13 of in the Ku-tsun-su
yü-lu 古尊宿語錄, published in 1144.

I think we all agree that the current International
Conference on Korean Son Buddhism is an extremely
important event. It provides a rare opportunity to
gather together many thinkers of diverse backgrounds
and points of view. Some are scholars and some are
monks, some are Koreans and some are non-Koreans.
What this diverse group holds in common is the desire
to clarify the meanings of Josason, or "Son of the
Awakened Masters", and Ch’am Saram, or "a true
human being," an ancient model of self-cultivation
currently championed by Great Master Seo-Ong.

In the following paper, I will explore the idea of "true
humanness" in reference to the Buddhist concept of
karuna, or compassion. Though I am a Buddhist scholar
and my point of view is essentially Buddhist, my
approach is comparative: I will draw on Christianity’s
model of ideal human behavior to make connections
between karuna and the Christian ethic of love.
Ultimately, I hope to reveal both how Christians and
Buddhists share a common goal to become "truly
human" and how similar their conceptions of "true
humanness" proves to be, despite apparently vast
differences in doctrine and world-view. My endeavor is
thus ecumenical in spirit; I place great value on
open-mindedness and intellectual freedom and hope to
avoid narrow-minded, religious partisanship. In the
course of my presentation, I also hope to demonstrate
how much we, Buddhists, can learn from other religious
traditions in our quest to become "true human beings."

As we all know, karuna, which is generally translated as
"love" or "compassion," is a key concept in Buddhist
thought. Simply put, karuna is the compassion that the
Buddha gives to all sentient beings. It is karuna that
motivates bodhisattvas to postpone immediate entry
into the final stage of nirvana and stay in our world to
help all sentient beings toward liberation from suffering.
Ordinary practitioners likewise struggle to exercise this
deep compassion for others in their own lives. Without a
doubt, karuna is one of the most essential elements in
the Buddhist view of what it means to be truly human.

Widening our view, I think we can say that love or
compassion is a fundamental concept in all of the
world’s religions. In Christianity, for example, love is
brought up again and again. We hear about God’s love
for humanity, and Jesus’ love for all people, and the
need for everyone to exercise this kind of divinely
inspired love in their own lives. The injunctions to "love
thy enemy" and to "love thy neighbor as thyself" are
famous.

However, the practice of love is not easy. Everyone
knows how difficult it is to love one’s neighbor, let alone
one’s enemy. More often than not, the injunction to
love others defeats us and we end up experiencing it in
the distorted form of guilt, a sense that we are not
living up to our own convictions. Sometimes we manage
through sheer force of will to pantomime the outer form
of love. We offer up apparently kind words and deeds,
trying to be "good" and "nice" to those we instinctively
find distasteful. But despite such efforts we often find
that we continue to harbor deep within our hearts a
concealed well of resentment and antipathy that we are
helpless to remove. We end up acting lovingly toward
our enemies while in reality we hate them. This of
course is sheer hypocrisy, and a poor foundation on
which to practice karuna. Any act of so-called
compassion that conceals suppressed feelings of hatred
or resentment will quickly break down and create
suffering both for oneself and others.

The kind of inner conflict that I have just described is
quite common, in fact, universal in the world of
unenlightened sinners. Exercising genuine compassion
is so difficult that it begs the question: Is it really
possible for me to be compassionate? When we ask
such a question, we are really asking: Can I become a
true human being?

Both Buddhism and Christianity answer, "Yes," to that
question. A comparative look at the practice of love in
these two traditions reveals significant points of
agreement between Buddhism and Christianity on the
subject of being truly human. Here, at the meeting point
of these two traditions, we might find a way for each of
to love both honestly and unconditionally.

To begin, consider the mechanics of compassionate
behavior, in other words, how compassion works in the
real world. When we look at traditional interpretations of
compassion–those of Buddhism and Christianity
included–we distinguish two divergent approaches.

The first view of compassion rests on seemingly
reasonable assumptions regarding the relationship
between self and other and appears to be corroborated
by our living experience. Put simply, the first
interpretation runs something like this: "I am I, and you
are you. We are separate people, and in order to feel
compassion for you, I must overcome the gulf or
barrier of our separateness. That is why compassion is
so hard, because it requires that I leap over the barrier
of our difference."

It is probably safe to say that this is the way most of us
actually experience our attempts at practicing
compassion: Very strenuous attempts at bridging the
gap between ourselves and other people.

The second model of compassions holds opposing
presumptions about the connection between self and
other and requires a depth of engagement with others
that most of us do not experience often. Thus, upon
hearing of it for the first time many find it
counter-intuitive. The operative principle of the second
interpretation of compassion is what Buddhists call the
non-difference or non-duality of all beings. It is also
called the mutual interpenetration of all things. A
practitioner of this non-duality model of compassion
would say something like this: "I am contained in you,
and you are contained in me. We are not different from
each other. For that reason, compassion is simple and
natural, a human reflex as fundamental as breathing. I
love you just as I love myself."

This automatic love for others is not something we
experience much in daily life. The closest example we
can point to is probably the love of a mother for her
child–a love so absolute and instinctual that it often
transcends the boundaries of individual identity. It is
quite common for a mother to put the interests of her
child before her own, feeling that "What is good for my
child is good for me." The automatic, unthinking identity
of interests between two different people–the instinct
that says "What’s good for him or her is good for
me"–is the essence of non-duality-based compassion.

Obviously there are striking differences between these
two models of compassion. The first, which I will now
refer to as the duality-based model, accords with our
common-sense view of the world and seems like the
right way to go about it. But we know that, more often
than not, it simply doesn’t work. In the duality-based
model, compassion or universal love is difficult and
confusing. We engage it as an abstract moral principle
and find that we honor it more often in the breach than
in practice. Often enough, it leaves us feeling like
hypocrites and failures.

In contrast, the non-duality-based model is
counter-intuitive: Most of us do not experience mutual
interpenetration with other beings in daily life. The
reason for this, expressed in Buddhist terminology, is
that unenlightened beings cannot perceive the reality of
mutual interpenetration without the practice of
self-cultivation. To an untrained person, we all seem
separate and distinct. Thus, the proposition that I am
contained in you, and you are contained in me, is hard
to accept. And the idea that one person might love
another with the same unthinking devotion that he feels
for himself seems the stuff of legends and children’s
tales.

However, though the non-duality-based model of
compassion is counter-intuitive, it has the distinct
advantage of working. It makes perfect sense to say
that if you and I are a single being, I should guard your
interests with the same zealous regard I have for my
own, because these interests are, in fact, identical. In
other words, the Awakened person continues to
exercise the same self-Love that we all practice, but
because he or she can see beyond the apparent confines
of the physical body, and thus knows that his body
includes all bodies, his self-love extends outward to
include all sentient beings. Love for others thus
becomes a direct and natural expression of self-love,
the same automatic, unthinking self-love that makes me
eat when I am hungry and put on a sweater when I am
cold. Thus, in the non-duality-based model, love for
others is not construed as an abstract moral principle,
something we try to force ourselves to follow; it is a
fundamental aspect of our nature, a reflex as instinctual
as breathing or blinking.

Of course, I am aware of the many real differences
between Buddhism, a non-theistic religion, and
Christianity, a theistic one. But in discussing the topic
of compassion, I want to deemphasize these differences
as much as possible and focus instead on the many
striking points of agreement. Most importantly, I am
firmly convinced that both Buddhism and Christianity
agree on the subject of karuna: Both religions propose
a non-duality-based model of love. They ask us to
move upward from the straight-forward,
commonsensical commandment of "love thy neighbor"
to the counter-intuitive dictum of "love thy neighbor as
thyself."

This fact can be hard to discern because of the
differences in both emphasis and terminology between
the two religions. Buddhists are accustomed to thinking
overtly about non-duality and interpenetration, and
have, over the centuries, developed a specialized
vocabulary to describe these ideas. Christianity, in
contrast, has focused on other issues and non-duality
has not occupied a similarly prominent position in
Christian intellectual discourse. The concept of
non-duality, however, is implicit to the Christian notion
of love. If it is difficult for a Buddhist to pick up on the
non-dual implications of this Christian concept, it is
only because the language in which that concept is
couched is so very different from the one Buddhists are
used to.

Take, for example, Jesus’ famous dictum in Matthew
19:19, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." On
the face of it, this deceptively simple statement
commands us to love other people in exactly the same
way we love ourselves. It tells us to love them as if they
are us. But going beyond appearances, we can we might
consider that perhaps Jesus is presenting a kind of
dialectical process, one that synthesizes two different
types of love to create a new form of love that is both
more expansive and inclusive. On the one hand, there is
ordinary neighbor-love, which, though noble in intent,
lacks immediacy and naturalness. On the other hand,
there is self-love, which is instinctual and unconditional,
but limited to the confines of the psycho-physical self.
Drawing on the best qualities of each and discarding the
negative features creates a vision of self-love that
extends outward to include others, thus transcending
the limitations of the two other forms of love on which
it is based. "You shall love your neighbor as yourself"
clearly implies that neighbor-love comes out of
self-love, in other words, that true love for others is an
extension of the love you feel for yourself.

This hidden correspondence between self-love and
other-love in Jesus’ famous declaration can be further
clarified by a return to the Buddhist perspective.
Traditionally, East Asian thought has described the
relationship between such distinct but non-different
pairs through what I like to call the mom-momchit, or
body-gesture construction. Some may know this
hermeneutic device better by its original Chinese
formulation, the t’i-yung or essence-function
construction.

Basically, mom, or t’i, refers to t>

Transfer interrupted!

corresponds to the uses of the body, its functions. All
human gestures and expressions, whether physical,
verbal, or mental, are included in the realm of
mom-chit. Mom, on the other hand, refers to the base
or root from which all mom-chit becomes possible. The
most important aspect of the relation between the two
is that they are inseparable. Wherever there is mom,
there is mom-chit; correspondingly, wherever
mom-chit occurs, mom abides. These two qualities
cannot be separated from each other. Mom-chit can be
compared to the branches and leaves of a tree, visible
to all. Mom is then understood as the hidden roots of
that tree, invisible but necessary for the branches and
leaves or mom-chit to exist. When we consider Jesus’
dictum about loving one’s neighbor as oneself in these
terms, self-love is the root-body, or mom, from which
the branch-extensions, or mom-chit, of neighbor-love
emerge.

At this point the character of self- or mom-love must
be defined more precisely to avoid misunderstanding. I
have already claimed earlier that it is as natural and
reflexive as breathing. I would like to elaborate here by
saying that it is also both absolute and permanent.
After all, do you love yourself one day and not the
next? Of course not. And do you love yourself simply
because you are intelligent or handsome or wealthy or
successful? Obviously not. You love yourself for the
sole reason that you are you. You forgive your lapses
and faults, and accept your shortcomings, simply
because they are yours. The love you bear yourself is
thus unchanging, unquestioning, and completely
unconditional. No matter what happens, it will never be
withdrawn.

Compare this to the love we usually extend to others in
our daily life. In contrast to our mom-love, this other-
or momchit-love is both highly conditional and
mercurial. We care for others for many reasons:
Because they are kind to us, humorous, intelligent,
attractive, wealthy, etc. It doesn’t matter whether the
reasons are laudable or shallow. The point is that there
are reasons; in other words, our love for others is
conditional and subject to withdrawal. If any of the
qualities that we love in another should change or
disappear, then our love for that person would
accordingly adjust or vanish.

Given the all too obvious differences between these two
forms of love, we can see the astonishing depth of
committment that is necessary to apply Jesus’
command to love our neighbors as we love ourselves.
Essentially, he tells us to extend our mom-love to
include other people. In other words, our love for others
must be reflexive, absolute and unconditional. We must
love the ugly as well as the beautiful, the bad as well as
the good, the cruel as well as the kind. We must love
without qualification or change, just as we love
ourselves.

When we can do that, we will be exercising karuna, the
unconditional compassion that the Buddha feels for all
sentient beings. To a Buddha, the bodies of all sentient
beings are his or her own body. We ordinary,
unenlightened people, trapped within a limited form of
self-love, naturally care most for ourselves and our
children, because these are all that we recognize as our
bodies and the extensions of our bodies. But a Buddha
cares for all sentient beings because he experiences
directly the reality that everyone is part of his body.

Where Buddhism and Christianity seem to diverge,
however, is on the question of how we learn to extend
our mom-love to other people. Buddhist teaching
demands that we attain Awakening. It is assumed that
when we are enlightened we will perceive directly that
other people are really part of ourselves. Seeing others
as one with ourselves is the real meaning of Josason, or
Son of the Awakened Masters, and it is the full and final
realization of the concept of Ch’am Saram, "the true
human being", described by Great Master Seo-Ong.
With this deeper understanding, what Buddhists call
wisdom or prajna, mom-love becomes completely
natural: We love others because they are ourselves.

Jesus takes a different approach. He states that the
unconditional love we feel for ourselves is a mirror
image of the unconditional love God feels for all
humanity. In his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus points out
the absolute and impartial quality of God’s love for man
through a metaphor of nature: "God makes his sun rise
on the evil and on the good and rain on the just and on
the unjust." (Matthew 5:45) He then exhorts his listeners
to be like God: "You, therefore, must be perfect, as
your heavenly father is perfect." (Matthew 5:48) For
Jesus, God’s unconditional love for humanity is the
model that all people must emulate in their own lives.

At this point, we need to consider another question: If
mom-love exists in us from the moment we are born, in
the form of self-love, how is it that we’ve gotten lost,
so to speak, in the changeable and conditional world of
momchit-love? Why can’t we simply extend our
mom-love to others automatically, since mom-love is
inside of us already? These are rephrasings of the most
fundamental questions in Buddhism: If we all have the
Buddha-nature, or mom, why is it that we can only see
the world of duality and discrimination–the momchit
world?

The answer to this question is extremely complex, and
can only be touched upon here. Christians explain our
current state of delusion or sin through the story of
man’s fall from grace in the garden of Eden. Buddhists
rely on the concept of karma, the law of causation.
Because of karma, the Buddhist argument goes, we
look outside of ourselves for self-knowledge, trying to
construct self-identity from the array of our external
attributes. Asked the question, "Who are you?", we
almost invariably list "objective" qualities, a curriculum
vitae that contains, among other things, nationality,
religion, education, and profession. We unconsciously
feel that, because they are seemingly "objective," these
qualities are somehow "truer" or more stable than other
characteristics we might mention. The irony, of course,
is that all of these qualities have less to do with us than
with karmic forces outside of us, historical, political,
cultural, and so on.

This tendency to "objectify" ourselves is exacerbated by
the role of language in our self-understanding. As we all
know, language is not only the medium by which we
communicate with others, it is also the primary tool we
use to communicate with ourselves. We think in words,
and words therefore determine the shape and direction
of our thoughts. If the right word or combination of
words doesn’t exist, then it becomes almost impossible
for us to envision the thought. We bump up against the
limits of our conceptual capabilities. This means that, in
the course of our lives, what we can know is basically
determined by what we can say in words, through
language.

The implications of this fact are extremely important.
We do not learn words in a methodical, logical way.
They are inserted into us at a very early age as the
primary substantive content, hodge-podge and chaotic,
of our historical and cultural legacy. They are
prefabricated units of meaning, defined by cultural and
historical forces–karmic forces. And they shape us
because they determine not only what we can and
cannot say to others, but what we can and cannot think
about ourselves. The end result is thus inevitable: Since
we know ourselves by way of our thoughts, and our
thoughts are delimited by language, our self-knowledge
comes to us filtered through the karmic forces of
culture and history–in other words, through the world
of momchit.

How, then, can we break free of the confines of
language, the momchit world, to realize the world of
mom that already exists inside of us. Both Buddhism
and Christianity focus a great deal of attention on this
problem. For Buddhism, the answer involves meditative
practice directed toward Awakening. Practice, it is
believed, turns the eye inward and allows us to observe
mom, free of the distorting prism of language.
Christians, too, emphasize breaking away from
ordinary, mundane life, in order to participate in the
perfect mom-love of God. Jesus tells his prospective
followers:

If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and
give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven;
and come, follow me. (Matthew 19:21)

And everyone who has left houses or brothers or
sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my
name’s sake, will receive a hundredfold, and inherit
eternal life. (Matthew 19:29)

Jesus is as sensitive to the distorting influences of
language and culture as Buddhist thinkers are. He, too,
feels the need to strip away mental and physical
possessions to reach the eternal soul–the world of
mom–inside the temporal self. He announces:

Let the children come to me; do not hinder them; for to
such belong the kingdom of God. Truly, I say to you,
whoever does not receive the kingdom of god like a
child shall not enter it. (Mark 10:14-15)

What does Jesus mean when he says that "whoever does
not receive the kingdom of God like a child shall not
enter it?" In my view he is pointing to the layers of
momchit-knowledge–language, education and
culture–that must be stripped away if one is to reach
the mom of God. If you would know God, he seems to
be positing, you must be as natural and unthinking as a
child, free of culturally conditioned presuppositions and
biases and the normative restrictions of society. Only
then can you exercise the pure, reflexive mom-love
inside of you.

But how does a fully developed adult become a child
again? How do we, firmly entrenched in the world of
momchit, break free and enter the world of mom?

Both Christianity and Buddhism propose a faith-based
model of self-transformation. In Christianity, the
believer places his faith in the mom-love of God, and in
the example of mom-love set by Jesus Christ. In
Buddhism, the practitioner must believe in his teachers
and in the Awakened masters who came before them;
the seeker believes, in other words, that it is possible to
realize his Buddha-nature because others have done so
in the past.

Both the Buddhist and Christian traditions also posit a
startlingly counter-intuitive view of the relation between
practice and attainment: They hold that
self-transformation must precede practice. This is a
paradoxical conceptual twist that has caused a great
confusion and debate in the Buddhist world over the
centuries.

For the sake of clarity it is best to consider the
Christian view first. Jesus insists that one must become
like a child before receiving the kingdom of God. If one
is not already like a child, meaning free of the world of
momchit, one will be unable to "receive the kingdom of
God" and follow Jesus. The stripping away of momchit,
and the realization of mom, must take place before one
can exercise mom-love, and thus live the life of a true
Christian.

Similar reasoning is deployed in the Buddhist
understanding of the relation between practice and
Awakening. Enlightenment must be present for true
practice to begin. In the Four-fold Hua-yen theory of
practice faith is depicted as the first step toward
understanding or enlightenment; an initial Awakening
allows the possibility of correct practice; and this
practice ultimately takes the seeker to what is called
"proof," or the certification of the authenticity and final
perfection of one’s original Awakening.

The Four Noble Truths, the central credo of Buddhism,
also assume the need for transformation to precede
practice. Briefly stated, the first of the Four Noble
Truths is dukkha, or suffering, which refers to the fact
that for the unenlightened every moment of life is
accompanied by suffering. The Second Noble Truth is
samutpada, or co-arising, and it posits that we
ourselves are the cause of our own suffering. The Third
Noble Truth is nirodha, meaning cessation, a reference
to the cessation of suffering that comes with
Awakening. Only after achieving enlightenment do we
arrive at the Fourth Noble Truth of marga, or the
Eight-fold Path of Buddhist practice. Nirodha, the end
of suffering that comes with enlightenment, is a
prerequisite for marga, the true practice of Buddhism.

How can it be that enlightenment precedes practice?
The answer resides in the distinctive meaning ascribed
to the word "practice." The "practice" of the Eight-fold
Path is not to be understood as steady progress toward
a future goal or polishing a set of skills. We do not
practice Buddhism in the way that we practice tennis or
golf to improve our performance. Rather, we "practice"
Buddhism because we are already fully enlightened
Buddhas, and cannot help doing otherwise. Practice, in
this sense, is the "gesture" or "expression"–momchit–
that arises automatically and directly from our mom,
our Buddha-nature. It is not a deliberate act of will, but
an activity wholly characteristic of our essential self, as
reflexive as the body’s inclination to breathe.

Here a powerful similarity with the Christian view is
visible. Jesus states that, before we can receive the
kingdom of God, we must make ourselves like children
again. We must return to an originally pure nature
comparable to, if not identical with, the simplicity of a
child’s mind. Only then can we love others with the
unconditional mom-love that God shows to all
humanity. Similarly, the Buddhist tradition claims that
before we can truly practice Buddhism, we must return
to our original nature as fully enlightened Buddhas.
Once this is achieved, Karuna, or Mom-love towards
others, becomes as automatic as sleeping or eating. The
teachings of both religions agree in the assumption that
we are already truly human, capable of selfless
compassion towards others and lacking only in the
understanding of what it means to be truly human.

I will conclude by touching on a subject that is of central
importance to both religions: The reality of suffering. In
Christianity, Jesus’s willingness to suffer on behalf of
all mankind is essential to understand of his teaching. In
Buddhism, duhkha, or suffering, is the first of the Four
Noble Truths, the starting point for the Buddhist
journey of self-discovery.

Traditionally, suffering is seen in Buddhism as a tool in
the struggle to realize enlightenment. Buddhist
practitioners are taught to utilize their personal
suffering as a lever or oar for moving themselves closer
to the goal of Awakening. Similarly, they are taught to
regard the suffering of others as call to practice karuna,
the compassion of the Buddha. Both of these responses
to suffering are essential for the Buddhist seeker to
become human.

Unfortunately, in modern times the Korean Buddhist
monastic system has veered away from communicating
and learning the teachings of duhkha and karuna in the
context of Buddhist quest. I don’t think I need to
remind anyone that Korea is, at present, enveloped in
an economic crisis that is causing real suffering to
ordinary citizens. The economy is contracting,
businesses are going bankrupt, and decent, hardworking
people are losing their jobs. I doubt there is a single
family in the entire country that has not, to some
extent, been affected. And yet Korean monks continue
to live, relatively speaking, quiet, comfortable lives in
their monasteries. They are effectively insulated from
the anxiety and torment which color the lives of
everyone outside of their monastery walls. The duhkha
of ordinary citizens is barely seen or heard from within
these confines. Thus, they miss the call and opportunity
to practice karuna. This is a terrible loss for everyone,
laypeople and monks alike. This national economic crisis
highlights the deficiencies of the current system of
interpreting and applying the Buddha’s teaching.
Despite the central importance of compassion in
Buddhist doctrine, most Korean monks feel no
inclination to leave the safety of their monasteries to
assuage the suffering of the people.

I am not implying that monasteries should not exist or
that monasteries do not serve an important function. I
am merely pointing out within monastic walls one often
becomes habituated to considering the monastery a
haven from the world and not a haven for the world.
The Protestant thinker Calvin berated the Christians of
his day for becoming so attached to the external
structures of the Church–ritual, dogma and
property–that they had forgotten what he called the
invisible church, the living spirit of Christianity to be
found within one’s heart. Similarly, Buddhists might
recall that the invisible monastery, the glowing
sanctuary within that shines upon and pervades the
entire universe, is more important than the structures
which house the monks.

I want to stress, however, that it is not just Buddhists
who are negligent when it comes to meeting duhkha with
karuna, and not just Koreans in Korea. I am equally
saddened by the attitude displayed by many members
of the Korean Christian community in the United
States. Surrounded by American affluence, they seemed
to have turned their attention to commerce,
consumerism, and pursuit of "the good life," forgetting
the important creative role of suffering in their own
religious tradition. They forget, for example, that it was
the suffering of the Israelites in Egypt that led to the
creation of the Old Testament, the spiritual seed from
which the entire Judeo-Christian tradition grew.

Without an awareness of the dynamic, creative role of
suffering, any religion becomes spiritually enervated
and self-serving. The willingness to embrace suffering
is, in fact, the flip-side of mom-love, and an essential
element of compassion. If one sees beyond the
boundaries of the physical body and realize that each
body includes all bodies, then true neighborly love
begins. This love intensifies as it transforms the nature
of personal suffering. Since my body is my neighbor’s
body, my mom his mom, his suffering becomes my
suffering. Without properly recognizing the relation
between love and suffering, the depth of the Buddha’s
boundless compassion and Jesus Christ’s absolute love
can never be understood, let alone experienced.

The central role of suffering in both the Buddhist and
Christian concepts of love has implications too
far-reaching for investigating in a single paper. Suffice
it to say that many of the ramifications are again
counter-intuitive. For affluent believers, building
churches and giving money to charity are positive
pleasures that require little in the way of self-sacrifice.
They are good works, certainly, and should be
applauded as such, but they are still firmly rooted in the
momchit world of you-and-I. They do not partake of
the mom-love and mom-suffering which both Jesus and
the Buddha taught.

Finally, I want to end by stressing my belief that the age
of religious partisanship has ended. I believe we are
entering a new age, in which spiritual seekers will be
willing to look for and accept wisdom and guidance
wherever they occur. As I hope this paper has shown,
non-theistic Buddhism has more in common with
theistic Christianity than one might otherwise assume. I
have come to believe that Buddhists can gain important
insights into their own tradition by looking at the way
Christianity and other religious faiths approach themes
of mutual concern such as love, compassion and
suffering. These are, after all, the key elements of
becoming truly human and one can never be too
truthful or too human. For me it doesn’t matter which
doctor the medicine comes from–the Buddha or Jesus.
It only matters that the disease be cured.