JSCEM's major recommendation is to abolish the existing system of party controlled preferences and instead allow voters to express their own optional preference for parties 'above the line'. It makes the related recommendation to end full preferential voting 'below the line' on the ballot paper. There are also proposals to tighten party registration rules.

Under the proposed system, a single first preference vote 'above the line' on the ballot paper would only imply preferences for the chosen party. The current ability of parties to take control of above the line votes and direct them as preferences to other parties on the ballot paper would be ended.

Voters would have a new option, to vote 1, 2, 3 etc above the line, allowing voters an easy option to direct their own preferences. Under the proposed system, the only preferences that would count are those filled in by voters themselves, the same as for House elections.

The argument for the JSCEM recommendation is to deal with the evident problems at the 2013 election. These problems were floods of parties and candidates that required reduced font sizes forcing the Electoral Commission to issue magnifying sheets with ballot papers. There were also the opaque deals on preferences that voters could not possibly assess and the consequent election of candidates from less than half a percent of the vote.

The proposed changes significantly simplify the options available to electors when voting, and make the composition of Senators elected more reflective of votes filled in by electors rather than preference deals done by candidates and parties.

The JSCEM recommendations should be assessed on whether they improve the conduct of the election, and whether they better translate the will of the electorate into representation in the Senate.

However, this is politics so there is a demand to know which parties will be advantaged or disadvantaged by the changes. Inside this post I go into great detail on how past results could have been changed under the new electoral system. In summary the finding are -

The tendency of Senate elections to produce deadlock is a consequence of switching from five to six Senators per half-Senate election in the 1980s. The change removed the possibility of a party winning a majority in its own right. While the proposed changes may have seen fewer Democrats elected in the 1990s, the tendency to Senate deadlock is a consequence of electing an even number of Senators and does not appear to be more or less likely as a result of the proposed changes.

The Coalition has done consistently better than Labor since 1990 because it has consistently polled better. That situation would continue under the proposed system if the Coalition continue to poll more strongly than Labor.

There would have been more 3:3 Labor-Coalition splits between 1990 and 2001 and fewer Democrats. The balance between Democrats, Greens and One Nation would also have been different in this period under the proposed system.

How the electoral system has interacted with the senate balance of power was fundamentally changed since the electoral disappearance of the Australian Democrats after 2001.

The major political change produced by the JSCEM recommendations would be to make it much harder for micro-parties to be elected from tiny proportions of the vote, a feature of the 2004, 2010 and 2013 Senate elections.

Assuming current voting patterns, the Greens would find themselves more likely to hold the sole balance of power. However, the new system may encourage the merging of the numerous micro-parties, raising the possibility that other minor parties could be elected.

The 1984 Increase in Senate Size

The number of Senators per state was increased from 10 to 12 in 1984, resulting in the number of Senators elected from each state at a half-Senate election increasing from five to six.

The first half-Senate election after the change in 1984 implemented the increase by electing seven Senators per state, and the second election in 1987 was a double dissolution that elected 12 Senators per state.

The first six Senator half-Senate occurred in 1990 and there have now been nine half-Senate elections using the increased numbers.

One of the consequences of electing an even number of members at half-Senate elections is that deadlock becomes more likely.

Before 1984 at five-member half Senate elections, a party that reached 50% after preferences would win three of the state's five seats. It was possible for Labor and the Coalition to aspire to win a Senate majority.

Since 1990, six member Senate elections deliver a party three seats with 42.9% of the vote, but it is next to impossible for one party to get to the 57.1% of the vote required to win a majority four of a state's six Senate seats.

Since six-Senator election began in 1990, no single party has ever won more than three seats in a state. When the Coalition won four seats in Queensland at the 2004 Senate election, it was from separate Liberal and National tickets. Had a joint Coalition ticket been run in Queensland in 2004, the Coalition would have only one three seats.

But the Coalition has been much more successful at winning three Senate seats in states than Labor. Over nine elections there have been 54 six-member Senate contests. The Coalition have won three at 42 contests compared to only 14 where Labor has won three seats. Three times the Coalition have won 18 or more state Senate seats since 1990, 17 twice and 16 twice. The best Labor has done since 1990 was to win 16 seats in 2007 and 15 seats on two other occasions. The table below shows the overall results of the 36 state Senators elected at elections since 1990, excluding the four Territory Senate seats.

Election

L/NP

ALP

DEM

GRN

OTH

Seats

1990

17

13

5

1

..

36

1993

17

15

2

1

1

36

1996

18

12

5

1

..

36

1998

15

15

4

..

2

36

2001

18

12

4

2

..

36

2004

19

14

..

2

1

36

2007

16

16

..

3

1

36

2010

16

13

..

6

1

36

2013

15

10

..

4

7

36

Even if you add Labor and the Greens together, only twice has this combination won more than 16 seats, winning 19 seats in 2007 and 2010. The Gillard government's workable Senate was entirely due to Tasmania, where in both 2007 and 2010 Labor won three seats, the Greens one and Liberals two.

The nervousness that has developed on the Labor side of politics concerning the JSCEM recommendations stems from concern that the stronger Coalition position revealed by the above table would be re-enforced.Yet it is not the electoral system, or even the proposed changes, that have given Labor a weaker Senate position. Labor's Senate weakness stems from its weaker vote.

Six-member Senate elections produce deadlock by denying either side of politics the opportunity to achieve a majority. Each state tends to split with three seats for the 'left' and three for the 'right'. The political balance of power in the Senate then depends on whether preferences have been able to deliver a natural 'left' or 'right' seat to a minor party. The current deadlock encourages preference games by the major parties to engineer which minor parties win the balance of power.

What happened in 2013 is that micro-parties used the same games to engineer their own election.

The JSCEM proposals end preference games by abolishing group voting tickets. If the changes are implemented, the final seat in each state will rely more on the vote each party achieves rather than who can engineer exotic preference deals.

While the Australian Democrats existed, they acted as a centre party and tended to be elected on the preferences of either Labor or the Coalition, depending on which fell short of the third seat. When the two major parties polled well enough to elect three Senators each, the Democrats were shut out entirely.

With the Democrats insignificant since 2001, preferences have became much more complex as there is no longer a significant centre party to which preferences can be directed. (I am prepared to change this statement if the Palmer United Party proves to be more than a one election wonder.)

That became evident at the 2004 Senate election. The demise of the Democrats and growth of the Greens left Labor's third candidate in NSW, Victoria and South Asutralia competing with the lead Green candidate for the final seat. The Labor Party chose to engage in exotic preference deals with numerous minor parties to improve the chances of its third candidates defeating the Greens.

In NSW and South Australia the deals worked for Labor, both states splitting three Labor - three Liberal. In Victoria, Labor's vote was lower than expected, and the side deals between small parties were more exotic than Labor had expected. Labor's vote was not high enough for its third candidate to benefit from deals, and Labor's third candidate was excluded and elected Family First's Steven Fielding ahead of the Greens.

Since then, micro-parties have increasingly swapped preferences with each other for entirely strategic reasons, but have also been happy to buy into exotic deals with Labor and the Greens when the two parties have competed with each other for the final seat in a state.

Until the 2013 election, the Coalition had rarely fallen victim to preference harvesting. Coalition preferences had helped the DLP's John Madigan win election in 2010, but only because the Coalition's vote had been so low that its third candidate was excluded. It was not until 2013 that the Coalition was beaten to a seat by micro-party preference harvesting, beaten out of the third seat in both Victoria and Tasmania.

Both the Labor Party and the Coalition have played with micro-party deals in an effort to influence the last seat in each state, in particular to try and direct their political opponent's natural third seat to a different party. The Coalition has tried to elect minor parties to Labor's natural third seat, and Labor has tried to help minor and micro parties to the Coalition's natural third seat.

When Labor and the Greens think they can grab the third 'right' seat in a state by co-operating on preferences they do so. When Labor and the Greens are left competing for the third 'left' seat, competition becomes more cut-throat, as was shown by the exotic preference deals in SA and WA at the 2013 Senate election.

Such tactics would come to an end if the JSCEM recommendation to abolish group ticket voting were adopted.

Labor and the Greens could no longer rely on side deals with micro-parties in competing for the final 'left' seat in a state. The two parties would in future have to compete more on first preferences.

Similarly, the Coalition would no longer be able to do what it did in Victoria in 2010, elect the DLP by preference tickets when the Coalition vote was particularly low.

To assess the political impact of the JSCEM recommendations, let me go through each of the states for the nine Senate elections since 1990 and point to the elections where the new system could have produced a different result.

New South Wales

At the nine elections since 1990, NSW has elected three Labor Senators on five occasions, more than any other state. In the same period Labor has elected three Senators in Tasmania four times, three times in Victoria, once in Queensland and South Australia and never in Western Australia.

Seven times the Coalition elected three Senators in NSW. In both 1990 and 1998, Labor helped engineer the third 'right' seat to be won by the Democrats. The Greens won a 'left' seat from Labor in 2001 and 2010, while in 2013 the Liberal Democrats won the third 'left' seat that might otherwise have been won by the Greens.

The colour coded chart below shows the Senate seats won by party in NSW since 1990.

The table below shows the quotas polled by parties that played a significant part in the result at each election. Entries in the table with a grey background are those that could have produced a different result under JSCEM's proposed electoral system, as explained by notes below the table.

Election

L/NP

ALP

DEM

GRN

Significant Others

1990

2.68

2.84

0.83

0.14

..

1993

2.72

3.28

0.34

0.15

..

1996

2.89

2.61

0.67

0.19

..

1998

2.56

2.71

0.51

0.15

One Nation 0.67

2001

2.92

2.34

0.43

0.31

One Nation 0.39

2004

3.09

2.55

0.15

0.51

..

2007

2.75

2.94

..

0.59

..

2010

2.73

2.56

..

0.75

..

2013

2.40

2.21

..

0.55

Liberal Democrats 0.67

Let me explain each of the highlighted elections.

1998 - After the election of two Labor and two Coalition Senators, two vacancies remained to be filled. On first preferences Labor was in the lead with 0.71 quotas, One Nation 0.67, Coalition 0.56 and the Democrats 0.51. Other party preferences put the Democrats ahead of the third Coalition candidate, and then Coalition preferences elected the Democrats and Labor to the final two seats, blocking One Nation's David Oldfield from election.

Without preference tickets, Labor would have won its third seat from 0.71 quotas, but the final seat would have been more complex. I doubt the Democrats could have passed both the Coalition and One Nation, and I doubt that Democrat preferences could have pushed the Coalition ahead of One Nation. Had the Democrats passed the Coalition, I doubt that Coalition preferences would have allowed the Democrats to pass One Nation. On the 1998 results, it would appear more likely that One Nation would have won the third 'right' seat instead of the Democrats.

2001 - The Coalition easily won three seats and Labor two. The final seat was up for grabs with the Democrats on 0.43 quotas, One Nation 0.39, Labor 0.34 and the Greens 0.31. An array of side deals saw the Greens get ahead of Labor and One Nation. The Greens had been the only party to inform One Nation they were putting the party last on its preference ticket. In a strange response to Green politeness, One Nation listed the Greens ahead of other parties on its preference ticket, resulting in the Greens winning the final seat on One Nation preferences.

Without group preference tickets, it seems more likely that the Greens and Labor would have been excluded and the Democrats would have won the last seat rather than the Greens.

2004 - Three Coalition and two Labor Senators were elected, and the race for the final seat was between Labor on 0.55 quotas and the Greens on 0.51. Preference deals delivered the last seat to Labor. Under the proposed system, the race would have been close enough for voter preference flows to determine whether Labor or the Greens won the final seat.

2013 - A record 110 candidates caused the font size on the NSW Senate ballot paper to be reduced. The large array of candidate names appeared to cause significant confusion, the Coalition vote surprisingly low and the largely unknown Liberal Democrats polling 9.5%, seemingly due to name confusion with the Liberal/National group. Without group preference tickets, it appears the Greens could have won a seat at the expense of the third Liberal, starting the count with 0.55 quotas compared to 0.40 for the third Coalition candidate. However, on the smaller ballot paper likely to be produced by the JSCEM recommendations, it is highly possible the Liberal/National vote would have been higher.

Victoria

In 2004 Family First won the third 'left' seat when Labor's preference deals backfired. In 2010 the Coalition polled badly and its surplus helped a preference harvest that delivered the third 'right' seat to the DLP's John Madigan. In 2013, the giant ballot paper fractured the major party vote and the Coalition found themselves short of a third quota, preference harvesting electing Ricky Muir of the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party in place of the third Coalition candidate.

The table below shows the quotas polled by parties that played a significant part in the result at each election. Entries in the table with a grey background are those that could have produced a different result under JSCEM's proposed electoral system, as explained by notes below the table.

Election

L/NP

ALP

DEM

GRN

Significant Others

1990

3.12

2.55

0.99

..

..

1993

3.09

3.15

0.28

..

..

1996

2.90

2.79

0.76

0.21

..

1998

2.65

2.84

0.69

0.17

One Nation 0.29

2001

2.77

2.58

0.55

0.42

..

2004

3.09

2.53

0.13

0.62

Family First 0.13

2007

2.77

2.92

0.12

0.71

..

2010

2.41

2.64

..

1.02

DLP 0.16

2013

2.81

2.27

..

0.76

PUP 0.26, AMEP 0.04

1996 - Preferences delivered the third 'left' seat to the Australian Democrats, but without ticket voting it would have been a closer contest with the third Labor candidate

1998 - Victoria was the only state where One Nation preferences determined the final seat. The Democrat vote in Victoria was higher than in any other state, but Victoria ended up the only mainland state not to elect a Democrat Senator. One Nation preferences elected the third Coalition candidate, where without preferences tickets, it would have been a much closer contest between the Coalition and Democrats.

2001 - The race for the final seat would have been a narrow one between Labor and the Democrats under the proposed system, but with preferences tickets was won by the Democrats on Green preferences.

2004 - Preference harvesting delivered the third 'left' seat to Family First but without preference tickets it would almost certainly have been won by the Greens.

2007 - Victoria split 3 Labor 3 Coalition, but without ticket voting, the race for the final seat would have been a closer contest between the third Coalition candidate and the Greens.

2010 - The first count elected two Labor, two Coalition and one Green Senators. The race for the final seat began with Labor on 0.64 quotas and the Coalition 0.41. The DLP with 0.16 quotas eventually won by using preference harvesting to pass the third Coalition candidate and then win thanks to the Coalition preference ticket. Without preference tickets, Labor would have been more likely to win a third seat, meaning the Greens would have won the third 'right' seat won by the DLP.

2013 - Without ticket voting the Liberal Party's Helen Kroger would have won a third seat for the Coalition, where preference tickets delivered it to Ricky Muir of the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party.

Queensland

The Coalition have won three of the six seats in Queensland at seven of the nine elections since 1990. In 1998 they lost a seat to One Nation, and in 2004 the quirks of the system saw the Liberal Party elect three Senators and the the Nationals one. Had the two parties run a joint ticket in 2004, as they have since 2007, then the Coalition would have won only three seats.

Mirroring Labor's traditionally weak position in Queensland, the party has only won three seats in Queensland since 1990, winning three when Kevin Rudd led Labor to government in 2007.

The table below shows the quotas polled by parties that played a significant part in the result at each election. Entries in the table with a grey background are those that could have produced a different result under JSCEM's proposed electoral system, as explained by notes below the table.

Election

LIB

NAT

ALP

DEM

GRN

Significant Others

1990

2.05

0.95

2.73

0.87

..

..

1993

2.20

1.02

2.76

0.49

0.22

..

1996

2.48

1.05

2.12

0.92

0.17

..

1998

1.99

0.67

2.29

0.55

0.15

One Nation 1.04

2001

2.44

0.64

2.22

0.47

0.23

One Nation 0.70

2004

2.68

0.46

2.22

0.15

0.38

..

2007

2.83

..

2.74

0.13

0.51

..

2010

2.90

..

2.06

..

0.89

..

2013

2.90

..

2.00

..

0.42

PUP 0.69

There was a joint Liberal/National ticket in 2007 and the merged LNP has carried the Coalition banner since 2010.

1993 - Five seats were filled on the first count, Labor two, Liberal two and National one. Labor then had 0.76 quotas, the Liberals 0.20, Democrats 0.49 and the Greens 0.22. Ticket preferences allowed the Democrats to overhaul Labor's lead on first preferences, a result that would have been unlikely under the proposed system,

1998 - The count very quickly elected two Labor, two Liberal and one One Nation Senator. The race for the final seat then came down to starting quotas of National 0.67, Democrats 0.55, Labor 0.29 and Greens 0.15. Ticket preferences allowed the Democrats to win the final seat, where National prospects would have been much stronger without ticket preferences.

2001 - The first count elected two Labor and two Liberal Senators. The final two seats were a race between One Nation 0.70, National 0.64, Democrat 0.47, Liberal 0.44, Labor 0.22 and Greens 0.23. The Nationals would still have been favoured to win a seat on Liberal preferences. Ticket preferences allowed the Democrats to overhaul One Nation and win the final seat, but this would have been much more difficult to achieve under the proposed changes.

2004 - The first count elected two Labor and two Liberal Senators. Ticket voting allowed the Liberals on 0.68 quotas and Nationals on 0.46 quotas to win the final seats. The next placed parties were the Greens 0.38, Labor 0.22, Family First 0.24, One Nation 0.22, Pauline Hanson as an Independent 0.24 and the Democrats 0.15. Given this wide split of votes, it is likely the Liberals and Nationals would have won the final two seats even without ticket voting.

Western Australia

Western Australia has consistently been the Coalition's strongest state, winning three seats at every election, and Labor's weakest, winning two seats at eight elections and only one in 2013 and at the 2014 re-run election.

If the proposed electoral system were adopted, most of the change in Western Australia would come about in the balance of whether the Greens or Democrats won the final seat.

The table below shows the quotas polled by parties that played a significant part in the result at each election. Entries in the table with a grey background are those that could have produced a different result under JSCEM's proposed electoral system, as explained by notes below the table.

Election

LIB

NAT

ALP

DEM

GRN

Significant Others

1990

3.03

0.21

2.35

0.66

0.59

..

1993

3.39

0.12

2.68

0.29

0.39

..

1996

3.18

0.15

2.38

0.65

0.40

..

1998

2.69

0.09

2.43

0.45

0.40

One Nation 0.73

2001

2.81

0.16

2.39

0.41

0.41

One Nation 0.49

2004

3.45

0.06

2.28

0.14

0.56

..

2007

3.24

0.10

2.52

..

0.65

..

2010

3.01

0.24

2.08

..

0.98

..

2013

2.74

0.35

1.86

..

0.66

PUP 0.35

1990 - After the election of three Liberal and two Labor Senators, the Democrats had 0.66 quotas, the Greens 0.59, Labor a surplus of 0.35 and the Nationals 0.21. National and Labor preference tickets delivered the final seat to the Greens where the Democrats would have had a stronger chance under the proposed system.

1993 - After electing three Liberal and two Labor Senators, the remaining quotas were Labor 0.68, Liberal 0.39, Green 0.39, Democrat 0.29 and National 0.12. Democrat preferences eventually put the Greens ahead of the third Labor candidate and then Liberal preferences elected the Green's Dee Margetts. Under the proposed system, it is much more likely that Labor would have won the final seat.

1998 - After the election of two Labor and two Liberal Senators, the race for the final two seats began with One Nation 0.73 quotas, Liberal 0.69, Democrats 0.45, Labor 0.43 and Greens 0.40. Labor and Green preference tickets elected the Democrats to the fifth seats and then the Democrat surplus elected the third Liberal. Under the proposed system, the Liberals would probably have still won a third seat, but One Nation would have had a much stronger chance of defeating the Democrats in the race for the final seat.

2001 - Very similar to 1998. Two Liberal and two Labor Senators were elected. At that point the Liberal Party had 0.81 quotas, the Nationals 0.16, One Nation 0.49, the Greens 0.41, Democrats 0.41 and Labor 0.39. The Liberals would still have won a third seat, but One Nation would have had a chance for the final seat because of the split in the 'left' vote between Labor, the Greens and Democrats. In 2001 the Democrats Andrew Murray won the seat on Labor and Green preference tickets. Under the new system it is likely there would still have been enough preferences to allow one party to pass One Nation, but One Nation would have had a better chance than under ticket voting.

2013 - Ignoring the 2014 re-run and using the 2013 result, the first count elected two Liberal and one Labor Senator. The remaining totals were Labor 0.86, Liberal 0.74, Green 0.66, National 0.35 and Palmer United 0.35. Under the proposed system using these results, the final seats would have gone one Liberal one Labor one Green, the Labor Party winning the seat won by Palmer United under the current system.

South Australia

The Liberal Party has won three of the six seats in South Australia at seven of the nine elections since 1990, missing out only at the two elections contested by Nick Xenephon in 2007 and 2013. Labor only won three seats in 2004 when preference harvesting allowed the third Labor candidate to stay ahead of the Greens.

The table below shows the quotas polled by parties that played a significant part in the result at each election. Entries in the table with a grey background are those that could have produced a different result under JSCEM's proposed electoral system, as explained by notes below the table.

Election

LIB

ALP

DEM

GRN

FFP

XEN

Significant Others

1990

2.90

2.60

1.15

0.15

..

..

..

1993

3.19

2.66

0.69

0.12

..

..

..

1996

3.21

2.26

1.02

0.15

..

..

..

1998

2.84

2.24

0.87

0.15

..

..

ONP 0.68

2001

3.19

2.33

0.88

0.24

..

..

ONP 0.32

2004

3.32

2.48

0.17

0.46

0.28

..

..

2007

2.47

2.49

0.06

0.45

0.20

1.25

..

2010

2.61

2.68

..

0.93

0.29

..

..

2013

1.92

1.59

..

0.50

0.26

1.74

..

text

2004 - The first count elected three Liberal and two Labor Senators. The remaining quotas were Labor 0.48, Green 0.46, Liberal 0.32, Family First 0.28 and Democrats 0.17. Anti-Green preference arrangements kept Labor ahead of the Greens, and Liberal preferences eventually put Family First ahead of both Labor and the Greens. At that point the Greens were excluded electing Labor. Without ticket preferences, Family First would not have passed Labor and the Greens, and Labor and the Greens would have been left competing for the final seat.

2007 - The first count elected two Liberal and two Labor Senators as well as Nick Xenophon. The remaining quotas then stood at Labor 0.49, Liberal 0.47, Green 0.45, 2nd Xenophon candidate 0.24 and Family First 0.20. The flow of ticket preferences then put the Greens ahead of Labor and delivered the final seat to the Greens on Labor preferences. Under the proposed system the race for the final seat would have been a much closer contest between Labor, Liberal and Green.

2010 - The first count elected two Liberal and two Labor Senators. The quota count then stood at Greens 0.83, Labor 0.68, Liberal 0.61 and Family First 0.29. The Greens would have won under either system, but the existing preference tickets saw Family First deliver the final seat to the Liberals. Under the proposed system, the race would have been much closer for the final seat between Labor the Labor and Liberal Parties.

2013 - The first count elected Nick Xenophon, one Liberal and one Labor Senator. The count then stood at Liberal 0.92, Xenophon 0.74, Labor 0.59, Greens 0.50, Family First 0.26 and Palmer United 0.19. The Liberal Party won a second seat and would also have won a second seat under the proposed system. The existing system delivered the final two seats to the Greens and Family First. The proposed system would have delivered the final seats to Xenphon's running mate and probably to the second Labor candidate.

Tasmania

Tasmania is the state where the Liberal Party has fallen short of a third seat most often, losing to Brain Harradine in 1993 and 1998, to Palmer United in 2013, and losing the third 'right' seat to the Greens in both 2007 and 2010. These two Green victories were entirely responsible for the Gillard government's lack of problems with the Senate. Equal representation of the states in the Senate gives small states extra power and it is significant that the two smallest states, Tasmania and South Australia, are the only two states where Independents have achieved quotas in their own right. The large shifts between the Labor and Liberal parties evident in Tasmanian politics can have disproportionate impact on the balance of power in the Senate.

The table below shows the quotas polled by parties that played a significant part in the result at each election. Entries in the table with a grey background are those that could have produced a different result under JSCEM's proposed electoral system, as explained by notes below the table.

Election

LIB

ALP

DEM

GRN

HARR

Significant Others

1990

3.08

2.89

0.55

0.34

..

..

1993

2.57

2.99

0.12

0.48

0.73

..

1996

2.96

2.73

0.50

0.61

..

..

1998

2.37

2.91

0.27

0.41

0.55

One Nation 0.26

2001

2.72

2.58

0.32

0.97

..

One Nation 0.23

2004

3.23

2.35

..

0.93

..

..

2007

2.62

2.81

..

1.27

..

..

2010

2.31

2.90

..

1.42

..

..

2013

2.63

2.30

..

0.82

..

PUP 0.46

1990 - The count started with the Liberal Party on 3.08 quotas, Labor 2.89, Democrats 0.55 and the unnamed Green group 0.34. Green preferences delivered the final seat to the Democrats where the proposed system would have delivered Labor a third seat.

1996 - The first quota totals had Liberal 2.96, Labor 2.73, Green 0.61 and Democrat 0,50. This very quickly elected three Liberal and two Labor Senators. Ticket preferences saw Democrat preferences elected the Green's Bob Brown to the Senate for the first time. Under the proposed system, the contest between Labor and the Greens for the final seat would have been much closer.

1998 - The count started with Labor on 2.91 quotas, Liberal 2.37, Brian Harradine 0.55, Green 0.41, Democrat 0.27 and One Nation 0.26. Liberal preference easily elected Brian Harradine. Under the proposed system, Harradine would still probably have been elected, but the contest would have been less clear cut.

2013 - The first count elected two Labor and two Liberal Senators. The count then stood at Green 0.82 quotas, Liberal 0.63, Palmer United 0.46 and Labor 0.30 with 0.70 held by a myriad of other parties. The Greens won the fifth seat on Labor preferences, and preference harvesting allowed Palmer United's Jacqi Lambie to overhaul the third Liberal candidate. Under the proposed electoral system, the Greens would still have won the fifth seat, but the Liberal Party would have been favoured to win the sixth.

Comments

Antony, are your estimates based on people voting 1 only, or estimating preference distribution and exhaustion rates based on NSW, or something else? Thanks

COMMENT: I'm making rough guesses based on the NSW experience. If a party is more than 0.1 of a quota ahead of another, the high exhaustion rates indicate it is tough to narrow a lead.

- tomd June 24, 2015 at 02:49 PM

It would seem the Senate is party controlled - I imagine that the founders of Federation thought the Senators would be representatives of their State rather than pawns of their party - i find this regretable &amp; wonder whether if it may have better to have a Senate drawn from a cross section of society as done in Ireland

COMMENT: The founding fathers made the Senate popularly elected and voters have consistently voted on party and not state lines. The Irish model may be nice, but the Australian Senate is the most powerful upper house of any international parliamentary system of government, nothing like the relatively weak Irish Senate.

- Andrew Martin June 24, 2015 at 09:51 PM

What makes the Australian Senate more powerful than the US Senate? Is it the ability to disallow many actions of the Executive?

COMMENT: I said most powerful upper house in a parliamentary system of government. The United States has a Presidential system where the executive's authority is by direct election of the President. Barring impeachment, the President is not 'responsible' to either chamber of the US Congress.

In a parliamentary system the executive is derived from and responsible to the Parliament, which usually means the lower house. The Australian Senate is unusual in being so powerful. Around the world upper houses generally have power to delay but rarely power totally impede or to bring down a government with a majority in the lower house.

- kme June 25, 2015 at 10:13 AM

Was a return to below-the-line only voting mooted as a possibility in this enquiry? Surely who gets elected should be determined by the voters - not either through backroom deals or parties themselves?

COMMENT: Parties have determined the order their candidates appeared since 1940 and none of them support the abolition of above the line voting though they have proposed abolishing the ticket preferences. None of the micro-parties agree with abolishing ticket voting so they don't support getting rid of above the line voting.

Even before the ballot paper was divided in 1984, candidates were always elected by party in the order parties put them forward. There were a couple of examples in Tasmanian Senate elections in the 1950s when candidates were elected out of paery order, but nothing since.

- James June 25, 2015 at 02:23 PM

When is this legislation likely to be implemented?

There has been a lot of conjecture recently that Tony Abbott may call an early poll later this year.

Would there be time for the AEC to implement the Senate changes for a Federal election held in 2015?

COMMENT: No there wouldn't. At the same time, it would be madness to hold a double dissolution election under the current rules. A double dissolution might see a really nasty change introduced, like a $50,000 deposit for a box above the line, just to control the size of the ballot paper.

- paulz June 25, 2015 at 03:20 PM

Is there even a trigger available for a DD this year? Or would the govt need to create one?

COMMENT: There is one that meets the requirements of Section 57, but it is one that if the Governor-General was a constitutional lawyer, they might be tempted to reject.

The trigger was achieved before the current Senate was in place. The government has not tried to put the legislation before the current Senate. So using the test applied by Sir Ninian Stephens in 1983, the Governor-General would be entitled to deny a request for double dissolution and suggest the government try passing the legislation by normal methods.

- paulz June 25, 2015 at 04:13 PM

would Govt be tempted just to have house election.

COMMENT: Maybe, but it would require a separate half-Senate election eighteen months later.

- Peter June 25, 2015 at 04:43 PM

Antony. Pardon my ignorance. I thought that DD trigger legislation had to be rejected by the Senate in consecutive parliamentary sittings? Are u saying there is no "expiration" in potential DD legislation after it is rejected the first time?

COMMENT: I don't quite understand your question. A double dissolution trigger is legislation blocked twice by the Senate with a three month gap between the presentation and defeats. There is one piece of legislation that has achieved this status, but a Governor-General would be entitled to question whether it should be used as a trigger.

- paulz June 25, 2015 at 05:08 PM

To rephrase, is there no time limitation between the first and second rejection by the Senate in order for the conditions of Sect 57 for calling a DD to be fullfilled?

COMMENT: There is only one limitation - it must not be less than three months.

- paulz June 25, 2015 at 05:25 PM

I realize Wikipedia is not always a reliable source, but it says that "The conditions stipulated by section 57 of the Constitution are-"

- Bill originates in HoR

- at least 3 months between rejections

- "The second rejection occurred in the same session as the first, or the subsequent session, but no later."

It's the last bit I'm concerned with.

Does the existing trigger meet that test?

COMMENT: Ignore it. That mention of sessions is there to stop a government proroguing a parliament to cancel a double dissolution trigger. Australian parliaments no longer have 'sessions', they have a single sessions that runs from the first day of sitting to the last day three years later. Even if they did have sessions, the trigger runs over the life of a parliament.

- paulz June 25, 2015 at 05:40 PM

Thanks Antony.

- Paulz June 25, 2015 at 05:51 PM

If legislation puts an end to the undemocratic Group Voting Tickets, combined with the fact that the vast majority of voters just place a 1 above the line on their senate ballot paper, then the only parties that will be capable of creating a preference flow of note are those that have enough active supporters to hand out how to vote cards.

The recent NSW Legislative Council election where Greens preferences enabled the Animal Justice party to come from behind to win the last seat is an example of where distributing how to vote cards with a recommended preference flow can influence the result in an optional preferential voting system.

- Geoff Ash June 26, 2015 at 12:40 AM

Many voters are now familiar with just voting '1' above the line. Would this habit mean that the small proportion of people who number all the boxes below-the-line have a strong but unpredictable influence on the final seat?

Are there different methods of counting optional preferences for multi-seat electorates that would result in different outcomes from the same set of ballot papers?

COMMENT: The small number of people who vote below the line is substantially larger than the small number of people who lodge preference tickets for parties and currently have a very strong but unpredictable influence on the final seat

- Scott D June 26, 2015 at 02:49 PM

The Governments aim is to eliminate the minor groups because of the intransigence and obstruction by the Senate . The process of above line voting brought in by Hawke is undemocratic as it works to exclude the minor groups and independents. A government should not be allowed to make changes to the electoral act without going to a referendum. There should be a constitutional challenge on the validity of the above line voting again, as the rushed decision by the high court previously was not correct. To make the senate election democratic the draw on the ballot card should be by lot out of the hat, no political party should have more than one candidate and all candidates should have the groups registered political party name. or unregistered organisation name or independent or whatever name the independent wants to call himself, also no preferences should apply, and half senate elections should be done away with.

- Brian Buckley Clare June 27, 2015 at 08:16 PM

As reported by The Guardian, The Greens have now introduced their own private member's bill (29/6). As reported, this bill actually proposes abolishing above the line voting entirely.

It occurs to me that there is another reason why The Greens would want to abolish compulsory preferences. At present Labor strategists are able to assume the overwhelming majority of Greens voters will always preference Labor ahead of the Coalition. Hence Labor can ignore its left wing/ Greens as far as formulating policy, and can even beat up on the Greens when deciding preferences.

Voluntary preferences would mean Left wing votes will also have to be fought for.

COMMENT: No, the bill abolishes group ticket votes. It adopts the NSW system where a single '1' above the line applies only to the chosen party. Voters can optionally give preferences for other parties above the line. This is the JSCEM recommendation for change. Nick Xenophon has put forward a similar bill. Neither bill will get anywhere. This will come down to what the government proposes and then how the bill might be amended.

I think you've got the preference story around the wrong way. The proposed system will tend to deliver three Coalition seats and two Labor seats in each state, with the final seats a competition between Labor and the Greens. It will be the first preferences of the two parties and the preferences of other parties that will determine the final seat. It would not normally be Labor or Green preferences determining the final seat.

- David Lau June 29, 2015 at 06:37 PM

Thanks for clarifying Antony, The Guardian's article was ambiguous.

I take you point about the likely race for the final quota. My point though was broader, about the effect of optional voting on strategy. You would know the exact numbers, but at present preference flows from Greens to Labor would be extremely high. Optional preferences means that some of those voters may choose not to preference Labor if they are very disaffected with Labor. Hence those voters will need at least to be "considered" (even if Labor strategists decide other priorities are higher). And I would imagine there will be final quota races that don't involve the Greens where Greens preferences might matter to Labor.

COMMENT: Again, it's not the flow of preferences between Labor and the Greens that would matter. Labor strategists are more concerned about losing the ability to use their own preferences to elect another third party at the expense of the Liberal Party or the Greens, and especially with their ability to use third party preferences in races between Labor and the Greens for the final seat in each state. If you go through the last three Federal elections, you find Labor and the Greens generally are in competition for seats and their preferences aren't critical to electing each other.

- David Lau June 30, 2015 at 09:44 AM

Hi Antony, thanks for this post. A great read. One thing I've heard you talk about (but couldn't find any information about) is the enlargement of the House of Reps - more specifically around redistribution time. Would you be able to elaborate on this on this comment or in a blog post?

COMMENT: One year after every Federal election, the Australian Electoral Commissioner applies the formula defined in Section 24 of the Constitution (augmented by the Electoral Act) to determine how many seats each state and territory will have in the House at the next election. The determination for the next election is that NSW losses a seat and WA gains a seat. The overall size of the House will be the same.

Do you know how fast the population of the Northern Territory is growing compared to the rest of the nation and is it likely to overtake the ACT any time in the future?

If it does, do you think this would make it more likely the NT would be allocated 12 Senators in the event it voted to become a state? When the NT voted against statehood, its population was less than the ACT and understandably it would have been odd to award it 12 Senators to the ACT's 2. If however its population was greater than that of the ACT but less than Tasmania, it would be interesting to see how the Parliament would act.

And if North Queensland ever does become an independent state, do you think it would be allocated 12 Senators since its population would likely exceed Tasmania's?

COMMENT: At the end of 2014 the population of the Northern Territory was 244.3 thousand, the ACT 387.6. The population growth rate of the NT is less than the ACT and on current trends it will never pass the ACT.

Original states are guaranteed equality of Senate representation, but not new states. New states will be allocated as many seats as the Parliament thinks appropriate.

If a new state were created for North Queensland, I would imagine the current Senate representation of Queensland would be divided between the two states. If the two states that were formerly Queensland had more Senate representation combined than any other original state, then it would certainly trigger several provisions of the constitution concerned with maintaining equality of representation between the original states.

- Curious July 04, 2015 at 11:34 PM

Just a follow up. I understand the Parliament decides Senate representation of new states. My point was that if the NT "state" had a population greater than the ACT and something approaching Tasmania's might there not have been a moral obligation to treat it as a full state, but since this isn't going to happen, I accept it's a moot point.

I think you've misunderstood what I said about North Queensland. Surely, the Queensland government would not allow it's state to be treated as two new states, with the Commonwealth deciding Senate representation. Surely the original state of Queensland would continue to exist and would be constitutionally entitled to 12 Senators.

According to S 124, "a new State may be formed by separation of territory from a State". I expect that would be the circumstance of North Queensland secession. With the result being a new state called whatever, Capricornia for instance, and the original state of Queensland. Rather than North and South Queensland.

In light of that, I expected Queensland would retain 12 Senators, and my question was that since the New Nrth Qld would have a population greater than Tasmania's, would it be likely that the Parliament would allocate it 12 Senators, even though I realise it is not required to. Just as I expect if New Zealand joins the federation it will have 12 Senators despite no such obligation existing, or if each island joins as a separate state, each would receive 12 Senators.

COMMENT: Section 7 paragraph 3 of the Constitution states that the size of the senate can be varied but that "equal representation of the original states shall be maintained". If one of the original six states is divided, I would expect the High Court would interpret that provision to mean the divided original state can't be given more representation than any other original state.

The fifth paragraph of section 128 also refers to 'diminishing the proportionate representation of any state' requiring the support at referendum of the state having its proportionate representation reduced. If one of the original states was divided and increased its proportionate representation, it would be reducing the proportionate representation of the other original states and would therefore require approval by referendum in every state.

If you were creating a new Northern Australia state across the Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australia, it is more clearly a case of a new state where original states maintain their current status. But if only one state is divided, you bring into play every clause of the Constitution that refers to an original state.

There is no requirement that any new state have equal representation with the original states. The original states agreed to the Constitution and have priority rights over any new states.

- Curious July 06, 2015 at 09:39 AM

I presume the Senate issue will be 'fixed' when there is an odd number of senators from each state once again, that is, seven.

COMMENT: It will fix the numeric deadlock created by electing an even number all the time, but it won't fix preference harvesting and all the other issues created by group ticket voting.

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