PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of felony murder, MCL 750.316b, felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedure
This case arises from an October 23, 2001, armed robbery of a car dealership owned by
Joseph and Leonardo Arcome located on Gratiot Avenue in the city of Detroit. The prosecution
presented evidence that defendant and Brian Hamilton robbed Joseph at gunpoint inside the
dealership office. While the robbery was in progress, Leonardo returned to the office. Leonardo
drew a gun and a shootout between him and defendant and Hamilton ensued. Leonardo was
shot, allegedly by Hamilton, and died shortly after from his wounds.
Defendant was shot twice in the shootout. He and Hamilton ran out of the office, and by
coincidence, encountered an acquaintance, Shawn Walker, driving in his car. Defendant got into
Walker?s car, and told Walker he had been shot while robbing a car lot. Walker drove defendant
to Detroit Receiving Hospital.
Police questioned defendant at the hospital concerning his gunshot wounds. After
determining that defendant had lied about how he was shot, Sergeant Marian Stevenson of the
Detroit Police Department met defendant at the Detroit Receiving Hospital where he was being
released into police custody. Defendant was taken to the ninth precinct?s homicide division to
participate in lineups. A witness identified defendant as one of the persons who had run from the
car lot.
On October 25, 2001, Sergeant Stevenson received word that defendant wished to speak

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with her. Stevenson met with defendant, and discovered defendant did not have his prescribed
pain medication. Stevenson spoke to the officer at the ninth precinct front desk, who indicated
that the medications had been ordered, but not picked up from the pharmacy.
Defendant was read his constitutional rights and signed a waiver of those rights,
indicating that he wished to speak with Stevenson about the incident at the car lot. Stevenson
testified that defendant did not appear to be in pain and had no difficulty communicating. More
specifically, Stevenson indicated that she had a ?good conversation? with defendant for roughly
an hour and a half. Stevenson also stated that the only complaint she heard from defendant was
that he ?kind of hurt.? Stevenson also indicated that defendant was ?very cooperative? with her
in making his statement. At trial, Stevenson read into the record the following from defendant?s
written statement.
Q. What can you tell me about the shooting of Leo Arcome on Wednesday
[October 23, 2002]?
A. Me and Brian . . . went to the auto place . . . . And Brian told me to ask for the
key to the other car. When he went to get the keys, we followed him in. Brian
went first, I followed him.
Q. What happened next?
A Brian pulled his gun and I started searching his pockets.
Q. Then what?
A. Brian was looking around for something. I was looking out the window. I
saw the white guy pull up [Leo Arcome]. He pulled up close to the parking
lot. I heard him say who?s in there? I was trying to leave, but the white man
pulled his gun. So. I closed the door. And the white man started shooting
through the door. That?s when I got hit. And Brian started shooting then.
Q. What happened next?
A. I fell. I got up. I think the white guy ran off. We started running. We ran
one way. The white guy ran the other way. That?s when we ran to the light
blue Lincoln and they took me to the hospital.
II. Involuntary Confession
Defendant first argues his confession was involuntary because he was in ?extreme pain?
and forced to continue his interrogation without pain medication.
A. Standard of Review
On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence of a confession, deference is
given to the trial court?s findings. An appellate court will not disturb the trial court?s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Kowalski, 230 Mich App 464, 471-472; 584

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NW2d 613 (1998). This Court must affirm unless left with a definite and firm conviction that
mistake was made, People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000).
B. Analysis
Defendant argues his ?extreme pain? impaired his ability to make a free and
unconstrained choice to speak with the police. People v Peerenboom, 224 Mich App 195, 198;
568 NW2d 153 (1997). In determining voluntariness, the court should consider all the
circumstances, including: the duration of the defendant?s detention and questioning; the age,
education, intelligence and experience of the defendant; whether there was unnecessary delay of
arraignment; the defendant?s mental and physical state; whether the defendant was threatened or
abused; and any promises of leniency. People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 66; 580 NW2d 404
(1998).
At his Walker hearing,1 defendant testified that he was in ?extreme pain? when he was at
the hospital, and when he was transported to the ninth precinct. Also, that he was given
morphine for the pain. Defendant testified that he told Stevenson that he should not have been
released from the hospital because he was in extreme pain. Also that on October 24, defendant
asked Stevenson where his prescription for pain medication was, but it was not provided to him.
Further, that on the next day, when defendant met with Stevenson, another police officer told
him he would not receive the medication until he answered a few questions. Defendant testified
to the following:
Q. How did you feel when they said that to you [i.e., that you would have to
answer questions before getting the prescription]?
A. I felt like my rights was being violated in some type of way. I didn?t know
what type of way it was, and I asked them for a lawyer.
Q. Was a lawyer provided to you?
A. No.
Q. Did they continue to question you?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you answer questions if you felt your rights were being violated?
A. Well, I was in extreme pain. I felt the only way I could get some medication
is I tell them what they wanted to hear. So, that?s what I did.
Defendant further testified that after the interview with Stevenson, he asked to be returned to the
hospital. Defendant was returned to hospital and given his prescription.

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Notwithstanding defendant?s testimony, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that defendant was not in ?extreme pain? when giving his statement to police. In
contrast to defendant?s testimony, Sergeant Stevenson testified that defendant did not request
medication and did not appear to be in extreme pain. Moreover, the trial court observed that
defendant neatly wrote in detail about the robbery and neatly signed his statement. These
characteristics about the written statement are inconsistent with defendant?s claim of ?extreme
pain.? Thus, the trial court?s finding that defendant was not in ?extreme pain? at the time
relevant to his giving his statement to police is not clearly erroneous.
Further, we conclude that defendant?s pain did not impair his ability to make a free and
unconstrained choice to speak with the police. At the outset, defendant was fully apprised of his
constitutional rights, and signed a waiver of those rights before any questioning by police.
Defendant admitted during his Walker hearing that he was able to provide very specific answers
to the questions posed by officers. He also stated that he was telling the truth when he provided
answers during interrogation. Therefore, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that
defendant?s confession was involuntary, and reversal is not required on this basis.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant lied at his Walker
hearing about requesting counsel before his interrogation. Deference is given to the trial court?s
assessment of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court?s
findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Shipley, 256 Mich App
367, 372-373; 662 NW2d 856 (2003). Here, the trial court found that the signed statement of
confession along with the signed waiver of constitutional rights supported the conclusion that
had never requested counsel. The trial court properly weighed defendant?s alleged request for
counsel before interrogation against the evidence that defendant waived his right to counsel.
Therefore, we decline to reverse defendant?s convictions on this issue, giving due deference to
the trial court?s ruling that defendant never requested counsel.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that the intent element
of felony murder was presumptively satisfied by the commission of an armed robbery.
A. Standard of review
A claim of prosecutorial misconduct not preserved by a timely and specific objection
during trial is subject to limited review for plain error which affected the defendant?s substantial
rights. People v Moorer, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2004); see People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
B. Analysis
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must examine the
pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor?s remarks in context. People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Further, the propriety of a prosecutor?s remarks will
depend upon the particular facts of each case. People v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621, 625; 468
NW2d 307 (1991). ?A prosecutor?s clear misstatement of the law that remains uncorrected may
deprive a defendant of a fair trial.? People v Grayer, 252 Mich App 349, 357; 651 NW2d 818

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(2002). However, if the jury is correctly instructed on the law by the trial court, an erroneous
legal argument made by the prosecutor can be cured. Id.
The prosecutor made the following statement in regard to felony murder:
And our position to you is going to be very simple. Is that whenever you
go in teamed with a partner both armed with handguns to take property that does
not belong to you by force during an armed robbery that you are creating a
situation which by its own definition is one that creates a very high risk of death or
great bodily harm . . . . And quite simply put, an armed robbery always satisfies
the third prong of second degree murder. And that is a person who creates a
situation where there is a high risk of death or great bodily harm. [Emphasis
added.]
Defendant correctly notes that People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304
(1980), abolished the common-law felony murder rule that a defendant was guilty of murder for
a homicide that occurred during the course of a felony if he had the intent to commit the
underlying felony. Thus, the malice necessary for a felony murder conviction cannot be inferred
from the intent to commit the underlying felony alone. People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 398; 563
NW2d 31 (1997). Instead, the prosecution must establish one of the three intents that define
malice in every murder case: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do great bodily harm, or (3) a
wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the defendant?s act is
to cause death or great bodily harm, i.e., depraved heart murder. Id. at 396.
While arguably the prosecutor misstated the law by claiming that, ?an armed robbery
always satisfies the third prong of second degree murder,? we nonetheless conclude defendant
failed to establish plain error affecting his substantial rights. Any misstatements of law during
the prosecution?s opening and closing remarks were cured by the trial court?s proper instructions
concerning the felony murder charge. Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial from the
misstatements of law by the prosecutor where they were corrected by the trial court. See Grayer,
supra at 357. Moreover, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that only the court?s
instructions were to be followed. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v
Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Therefore, defendant failed to show the
alleged error affected his right to fair trial. Carines, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder