The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)

Wednesday, December 5, 1787 [Alexander Hamilton] (excerpt)

To the People of the State of New York

AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address,
may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America.
It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to
absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local
purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I
confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the
general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The
regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to
ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have
charms for minds governed by that passion....

Federalist No. 19

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)

THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of
experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle,
which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common
chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has
taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious
arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment,
which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire.
Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of
imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the
national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to
sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain
such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire....

Federalist No. 18

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)

AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics,
associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated
institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the
federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary
for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all
controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the
confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of
religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of
jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle....

Federalist No. 20

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)

THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable
texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition
of equal and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be
unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about fifty
deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one
years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to make war and peace; to raise
armies and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however,
unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive
ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on
imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns
the dependent territories....