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IBRD and IDA: Working for a World Free of Poverty.en2014: 25 Years After 1989 or 100 Years After 1914?http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/2014-25-years-after-1989-or-100-years-after-1914
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<img alt="" height="251" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/Pic%20Berlin%20Wall.jpg" style="float:left" title="" width="400" />A couple of weeks ago, I was in Warsaw to attend a conference jointly organized by the Polish and Turkish Central Banks (“Polish and Turkish Transitions: Achievements and Challenges Ahead”) on the occasion of 600 years of diplomatic relations between Poland and Turkey. Six centuries of (predominantly friendly) relations is indeed worthy of commemoration, but for our Polish hosts another anniversary was of even greater importance: 25 years ago, Poland was the first country from the former Communist Block to embark on the transition towards democracy and market economy. For Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries that joined it as new members of the European Union 10 years ago, this transition laid the foundation for a remarkable economic, cultural and political revival as Indermit Gill and I have argued in <a href="http://worldbank.org/goldengrowth" rel="nofollow"><em>Golden Growth</em></a><em>. </em>Indeed, many in Poland would agree with the <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/06/special-report-polands-successes" rel="nofollow"><em>Economist</em></a><em> &nbsp;</em>that Poland has not had it as good as today ever since it was the preeminent Central European power some 500 years ago.</p>
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In my own country, Germany, too, we will be commemorating 25 years of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Just a couple of days before the Warsaw conference, I was with my in-laws in Naumburg, a small historic city in the eastern part of Germany, as they recounted how a quarter of a century ago, civil society suddenly emerged in every village and small town, as people formed the so-called “round tables” to negotiate the peaceful disintegration of the Honecker regime.<br />
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But among all the celebration, another commemoration looms large. In August 1914,100 years ago, Europe plunged into World War I; and some have argued that it was this cataclysm and its aftermath that precipitated the horrors of Nazi Germany, World War II, and the rise of Communism in Eastern Europe, and ultimately resulted in a divided continent. In the light of recent geopolitical developments, echoes of this centenary sound both louder and more ominous than the jubilant memories of 1989. For my summer reading, I packed <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Sleepwalkers-Europe-Went-1914/dp/006114665X" rel="nofollow">Christopher Clark’s <em>Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914</em></a> rather than dusting off my <a href="http://www.timothygartonash.com" rel="nofollow">Timothy Garton Ash</a>.<br />
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Christopher Clark is one among several authors who review how Europe ended up in the catastrophe that was World War I with lessons that may be relevant for today. (<a href="///C:/Users/wb247066/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.Outlook/HWICL9XP/:%20http:/blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/01/does-the-1914-parallel-make-sense/" rel="nofollow">Gideon Rachman of the FT provides an excellent overview</a>). What do I take away from Clark’s analysis? For me what is interesting is not so much whether the world may be entering another phase of major geopolitical confrontation and indeed whether this confrontation might end violently – I am no expert in international relations and can only pray that we may be wiser today. Rather, what I find striking and worrying are the similarities between the patterns of domestic politics in Europe at the time and what I observe across a number of countries today: Nationalist rhetoric, often perpetrated through the media, a civilizational discourse, and the importance attached to one’s country's position in the international pecking order.<br />
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Contrast this to the politics of by and large peaceful economic and political transition in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe 25 years ago. The international order may be better able to handle global crises today than it was in 1914, as many seem to argue. But there may be a lesson to be learned from the management of domestic politics in the transition to democracy and market economy 25 years ago for politicians today as well. Consensus building and negotiated settlements, focusing on the challenges of developing national competitiveness in the context of international economic integration and interdependency, belief in a free media and the free exchange of ideas. Of course one should not idealize what was a messy, for many, even traumatic, transformation. But I still prefer the memories of 1989 to the parallels of 1914.<br />
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Conjuring up the ghosts of nationalism is risky. If Christopher Clark is correct in his analysis, countries can sleepwalk into war. Perhaps the good news about all these anniversaries is that we have ample reason to reflect and stay awake.&nbsp; &nbsp;<br />
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Tue, 02 Sep 2014 08:00:00 -0400Martin RaiserTrading Up to High Income: New Firms, New Products, New Marketshttp://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/trading-high-income-new-firms-new-products-new-markets
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<img alt="" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/CEM_image.jpg" style="float:left; height:315px; margin:10px; width:460px" />A competitive export sector is one of the key engines of a successful transition to high income. Turkish policy makers knew this well, and so they put an increase in export competitiveness at the forefront of their ambitious targets to get the country into the top 10 economies worldwide by 2023. What are the chances of success?<br />
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To try and answer this question, the World Bank working closely with Turkey’s Ministry of Economy carried out a Trade Competitiveness Diagnostic <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/turkey/tr-cem-trade-eng.pdf" rel="nofollow">(“Turkey Country Economic&nbsp; Memorandum: Trading Up to High Income”),</a> which was just launched in Ankara. The team looked at how Turkey did during the past decade, a period of rapid growth in global trade. It turns out that Turkey did pretty well – its exports during the 2000s grew 15.3 percent annually, twice the average growth in the OECD, 6 percentage points above world trade growth and only 4 percentage points slower than in China. Turkey’s global market share grew by 60 percent (from 0.53 to 0.82 percent) between 2002 and 2009 and is getting close to Turkey’s share of the world population (1.06 percent). At the same time, Turkey increased its export sophistication and improved product quality.</p>
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One main reason for this success was trade integration with Europe. <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2014/04/15/evaluation-of-eu-turkey-customs-union-report-launch" rel="nofollow">The elimination of most tariff and non-tariff barriers in goods trade between Europe and Turkey after 1995 galvanized the modernization of Turkish industry, attracted FDI and boosted Turkey’s export competitiveness not just in the EU but in third markets as well</a>. Turkey has done quite well in diversifying into new markets, particularly in MENA and in Africa – thanks to its reputation for “selling European quality at Turkish prices,”&nbsp;as one African Ambassador in Ankara recently told me. By being close to the world’s largest and most sophisticated market, Turkey is now well placed to “trade up to high income.”<br />
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A more detailed analysis, however, also reveals concerns. Turkey could have had even faster export growth if it had specialized in a different product basket. While Turkish exporters have moved from low into medium-tech and have upped quality, they have not been prominent in the highest growth segments of the world economy: the largest gains in global market share were in sectors that experienced below average growth in global demand. Using firm-level data, the team further found that around two thirds of all export growth can be explained by increases in foreign sales of existing producers in existing markets, and only 9 percent by exports of products that newly entered the export basket. Export growth in new markets and the entry of new exporting firms accounted for respectively 15 and 11 percent of export growth between 2002 and 2011 (Figure 1; see also Cebeci and Fernandes, 2013: <a href="http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6452" rel="nofollow"><em>http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6452</em></a>).<br />
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&nbsp;<img alt="" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/turkstat.jpg" style="height:359px; margin:10px 90px; width:540px" /><br />
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The implications for Turkey’s future export prospects are clear: the country needs to get into higher value and faster growing market segments and it needs to have more companies engaged in exports. &nbsp;<br />
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The implications for policy are less clear, however. If the problem is the need to shift to a new export basket, should the solution lie in product or at least industry specific policies? Our report comes out differently, for two reasons. First, it argues that industry specific policies may remain ineffective if structural constraints have not been addressed. For instance sector specific incentives may mobilize little investment if there are overarching concerns regarding the enforcement of contracts, the predictability and business-friendliness of regulations or the availability of sufficiently skilled labor.<br />
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Second, building on the idea that trade is increasingly based on global supply chains (see Baldwin and Gonzales, 2013: <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w18957" rel="nofollow">http://www.nber.org/papers/w18957</a>) the team argues that Turkey has ample opportunities to move up the value chain, without the need for sector or product specific policies. Figure 2 presents an index of the length of global value chains by sectors produced by the OECD. It turns out that the longest chains can be found in sectors which already account for a large share of Turkey’s exports, such as motor vehicles, other transport equipment, or textiles. The longer the chain, the better are the chances to move up, for instances by attracting more of the pre-production research and development and design and post production marketing and specialized logistics activities.&nbsp;<br />
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&nbsp;<img alt="" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/turkstat2.jpg" style="height:427px; margin:10px 90px; width:540px" /><br />
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Export competitiveness is not just about doing different things, but also about doing things differently. This applies to all activities and hence horizontal policies may be as important, if not more, than industry specific interventions or incentives. &nbsp;Indeed, the report has 17 recommendations on “Fundamentals” – horizontal policies such as improvements in the business environment to attract more FDI or investments in skills – and only 4 specific recommendations on trade – such as better documenting existing export promotion schemes and their effectiveness.<br />
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In short – industrial policies are no short-cut to high income. When all the other ingredients are there, a light-handed industrial policy may help. But if the critical fundamentals are found wanting, industrial policies may achieve little. That’s my take away on the team’s detailed analysis of Turkey’s trade competitiveness. But I am sure, this is not the last word on it. Check out the evidence and let us know where you come out.<br />
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Mon, 26 May 2014 05:00:00 -0400Martin RaiserValue for Money in Public Procurement: Beyond Rules to Measurementhttp://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/value-money-public-procurement-beyond-rules-measurement
Strong public procurement systems are central to well-functioning public financial management institutions and good public sector governance. But how can governments ensure public procurement is efficient? Traditionally, the recommended approach has emphasized the importance of adequate rules that encourage competitive bidding. This involves transparent tender documents and processes with as little discrimination as possible, an independent procurement agency that would set standards and monitor their enforcement, and an independent appeals body to hear complaints of participating bidders. In addition, to ensure the smooth functioning of a rules-based system, governments have invested in significant capacity building and in new technologies, such as e-procurement systems to reduce transaction costs.<br />
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A rules-based approach has the great advantage that it limits the discretion of public officials. And - as the experience of countries such as <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/albania" rel="nofollow">Albania</a>, <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/croatia" rel="nofollow">Croatia</a>, <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/philippines" rel="nofollow">the Philippines</a> or <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey" rel="nofollow">Turkey</a> with procurement reform indicates - the move towards a rules based system can save a lot of money if it introduces genuine competition.<br />
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However, a rigid application of rules also has costs in terms of reduced flexibility, complicated processes and risks of delays. Governments have thus sometimes resorted to exceptions from the legal framework to regain some room for discretion. Turkey is a good example, where numerous amendments have been passed in recent years because the existing law was found to be too rigid or impractical. While understandable, a return to greater discretion risks undermining the principles of competition and transparency without any guarantee that improved outcomes will justify a laxer application of the rules. So when should we insist on compliance, and when might greater flexibility be justified?&nbsp;<br />
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The answer to this question lies in improved measurement. That's why performance measurement in public procurement is the major discussion topic at the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2014/03/05/public-procurement-knowledge-exchange-platform-2014" rel="nofollow">10th Public Procurement Knowledge Exchange Platform</a> organized by the Asian Development Bank, EBRD, Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank in cooperation with SIGMA, and EIB, and hosted by Government of Turkey in Istanbul. Participants will exchange experiences and hear about advances in performance assessments of public procurement along three main dimensions: (i) National, system-level assessments of the legal framework for public procurement and the strength of institutions and processes that govern its implementation; (ii) assessments of the capacity of procuring entities, such as line ministries, local governments or state owned enterprises to manage risks, deploy complex procurement methods to ensure quality and efficiency, and (iii) contract level assessments that determine whether the results of a tender and subsequent contract implementation has delivered value for money.<br />
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New indicators are being developed along all three dimensions. For instance, the World Bank Group's <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/" rel="nofollow">Doing Business</a> team is piloting a national procurement system assessment tool that will allow countries to benchmark themselves against international best practices. Assessment of procurement entities are emerging as critical components of a move towards more results-oriented development finance. Thus, when a procuring entity is seen to have "good enough" systems and processes in place, the development partnership can shift from a focus on fiduciary controls and the financing of inputs, to support for a government program targeting specific outputs. But, perhaps the most exciting development in procurement reform is the move beyond rules and towards greater emphasis on value for money in the assessment of individual contracts. This implies a shift from ex ante controls to ex post audits. It also implies a shift in the focus of accountability from compliance to performance.<br />
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These are all exciting developments, but they should not blind us to the challenges of a move beyond rules to performance measurement. Performance measurement implies that there are well defined and consistent goals and objectives at the level of policy as well as at the project level, and that governments and procuring entities are willing to undertake the necessary investment in data gathering and monitoring and evaluation systems. The shift from compliance to performance requires a change in culture and a change in the way oversight bodies exercise their roles. And perhaps most importantly, it requires the active participation of non-government stakeholders - businesses and citizens - to ensure public entities are held to account not only for doing things right, but also for doing the right thing.<br />
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It is good and appropriate that Turkey is hosting the 10th Public Procurement Knowledge Exchange Platform this year. While more remains to be done to strengthen Turkey's procurement rules, a move beyond rules to performance measurement offers the promise to refocus the public debate and reform efforts on the issue that really matters - is the country getting value for money from the procurements carried out by the public sector? Let's join forces to ensure this question does not remain unanswered in Turkey and elsewhere.Wed, 21 May 2014 12:58:00 -0400Martin RaiserA Working Future for Turkey’s Women?http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/working-future-turkey-s-women
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<a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/worldbank/3963500106/" rel="nofollow" title="Building hospital gurneys at the Tautmann factory in Turkey by World Bank Photo Collection, on Flickr"><img alt="Building hospital gurneys at the Tautmann factory in Turkey" src="http://farm3.staticflickr.com/2588/3963500106_b6096cb7b8.jpg" style="float:left; height:253px; margin:10px; width:380px" /></a> A couple of weeks ago, just after International Women’s Day, we had a coffee hour in the World Bank’s Ankara office to watch short videos of five women that have recently started up their own business and transformed their lives and that of their families (stay tuned for the release of these films, currently being edited). Their stories were uplifting, but the discussion quickly turned to the dismal field of statistics. Commentators stressed that female labor force participation in Turkey remains at only half of the OECD level, that Turkey loses around 25 percent of its potential GDP because of this, and lamented that social norms and mixed political messages on the role of women in society were preventing greater progress towards gender equality.</p>
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So far and so familiar to those working on gender issues in Turkey; and yet, two pieces of evidence have recently caught my attention and left me hopeful that we will see a growing proportion of Turkish women at work in the years ahead.<br />
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The first piece of evidence comes from a closer look at Turkey’s own labor statistics. The Turkish economist <em>Insan Tunali</em> &nbsp;<a href="http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Sunum.pdf" rel="nofollow">has looked at the labor force participation rate of urban women in different cohorts</a>, starting with those born in 1953 and ending with those born 30 years later. The striking finding, captured in Figure 1, is that participation rates have shifted upwards by around 20 percent between the 1963 and 1983 cohorts. As more and more families live in urban areas, the rise in labor force participation rates among young, urban women compensates for the decline of working women in agriculture. As a result, female labor force participation rates have been shifting upward since the mid-2000s by around 6 percentage points and among women in prime working age 25-55 even by 10 percentage points.<br />
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<img alt="" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/workingwomenturkey.jpg" style="height:317px; margin:10px 60px; width:540px" /><br />
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The second piece of evidence comes from <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA9878/abstract" rel="nofollow">research by Erik Meyersson published in the January edition of <em>Econometrica</em></a><em>. </em>Dr. Meyersson examines the evolution of secondary education enrolment rates since the mid-1990s at the level of Turkish municipalities. Dr. Meyersson’s interest is in the impact of Islamic rule on female school enrolment. The article uses Regression Discontinuity analysis to compare municipalities where candidates from the Islamic Refah party narrowly won in the 1994 municipal election with municipalities where they narrowly lost, and establish a causal link with secondary school enrolment rates for girls. The results establish a robust causal and positive relationship between Islamic rule and female secondary school enrolment (equivalent to a 3 percentage point increase on average), which remains positive even after 17 years. Dr. Meyersson’s interpretation is that Islamic rule reduced barriers to female participation among the poorer and pious segments of society by making them more comfortable about sending their girls to school.<br />
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Combining both pieces of evidence, we may start to see a pattern whereby access barriers – whether socioeconomic or social-norm related – to education among girls are being eroded and this in turn leads to growing aspirations among women to enter the labor force. Indeed, among women who make it through higher education, labor force participation rates increase to 62 percent. Net enrolment rates in tertiary education are close to 35 percent for both men and women, up from just 20 percent just 6 years ago. So here, too, the trend is positive.<br />
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Does this mean that Turkey will inevitably follow the typical U-shaped pattern of female labor force participation during its transition from middle to high income (e.g. <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w4707" rel="nofollow">Goldin, 1994</a>; <a href="http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/mammon-development.pdf" rel="nofollow">Mammen and Paxson, 2000</a>)? I believe this is quite likely. But that does not mean there is no room for policy to shift the entire U-curve upwards or bend the upward sloping part to make it steeper. Interventions such as improved child care facilities, more flexible work arrangements, including support for part-time work, balanced parental leave provisions (for both men and women) and continued public advocacy are all needed to close the gap that still separates Turkey from its OECD peers.<br />
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A particularly interesting question is whether social norms are indeed evolving towards greater gender equality in work life. Figure 2 reports results from several waves of the World Value Survey. The picture is mixed. While the share of respondents who believe men should have priority when jobs are scarce has been declining over the past decade, it is still more than 50 percent (and above levels in the 1990s). This matters, because <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/18831522/good-jobs-turkey" rel="nofollow">Turkey’s significant improvement in female labor force participation since the mid-2000s came at a time of record employment growth</a>, with over 4 million jobs created since 2009 alone whereas the late 1990s were a period of economic crisis and poor job market performance. As Turkey enters a period of moderate growth, the key challenge will be to make sure women are not the first ones to suffer from a less buoyant labor market. That may be the real test of whether my optimism in this blog is justified.<br />
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<img alt="" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/workingwomenturkey2.jpg" style="height:358px; margin:10px 60px; width:540px" /></p>
Mon, 24 Mar 2014 01:55:00 -0400Martin RaiserInclusive Growth in Turkey – Can it Be?http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/inclusive-growth-turkey-can-it-be
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<a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/worldbank/4248412455/" rel="nofollow" title="Turkey-21406200003 World Bank by World Bank Photo Collection, on Flickr"><img alt="Turkey-21406200003 World Bank" src="/futuredevelopment/files/futuredevelopment/turkey.jpg" style="float:left; height:426px; margin:10px; width:280px" /></a>The issue of social inclusion in Turkey is a controversial one. In this blog, I want to present some data that suggest Turkey experienced inclusive growth over the past decade or so. My colleagues and I have shared this basic story with a number of audiences in Turkey and often the reaction is disbelief. So what does the data say?<br />
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<strong>The bottom 40 percent can look up</strong><br />
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I use three pieces of evidence to make my case.&nbsp; The first is based on recent work by Joao Pedro &nbsp;Azevedo and Aziz Atamanov of the World Bank on shared prosperity. Joao Pedro and Aziz’s work is ongoing and much richer than what I want to present here. So let me just focus on the following chart, which shows the growth of consumption of the bottom 40 percent in Turkey between 2006-2011 and in a number of other countries during roughly the same period. Turkey looks reasonably good albeit not exceptional. The rate of consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent was just over 5 percent, around 0.2 points below the rate of growth for the average. What this means is that during this period of significant global economic turbulence the average welfare of the bottom 40 percent improved by more than one quarter. This was better than India, Indonesia, or Mexico, albeit worse than Brazil, China and Russia.</p>
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Shared Prosperity in Turkey and Peers </strong>
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Further analysis of the Turkish data shows that he two main drivers of income gains in Turkey are the labor market and pensions. For the bottom 40 percent, labor earnings and increases in employment together account for almost half of all income gains even during the crisis period. Pensions account for another fifth. This can be related to government policies, as minimum wages were raised during the crisis, jobs were protected through short-term work schemes and reduced social security contributions for women and labor force entrants, and pension coverage was extended. But unlike in much of Latin America, redistribution through social transfers does not account for a large share of improvements in the welfare of the bottom 40 percent. This is consistent with inequality failing to improve during this period. Growth can be inclusive without redistribution.<br />
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<strong>Closing the gap in health and education</strong><br />
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The second piece of evidence I presented was the improvement in health and education coverage and resulting reductions in inequalities of health and education outcomes across socio-economic groups. This is well documented in other reports even if not always well known (see for instance: <a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(13)61051-X/abstract" rel="nofollow">Universal health coverage in Turkey: enhancement of equity</a>; and &nbsp;<a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16049" rel="nofollow">Promoting Excellence in Turkish Schools</a>). Just a couple of statistics to make the point: infant mortality rates for children whose mother had no education were almost three times higher than for children whose mother had at least secondary education in 2003 – by 2008 the difference had vanished. Infant mortality in the lowest asset quintile was 31.1 per 1000 live births higher than in the highest quintile in 2003, but this narrowed to just 11 by 2008. It should be noted that these improvements extended gains made since 1990, but the reduction in inequalities in access and health coverage is nonetheless remarkable.<br />
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In the case of education, between 2003 and 2009 PISA results for the bottom quintile improved by 20 points on average across reading, maths and science and by 25 points in the second lowest quintile, but only by 3 points in the top quintile. &nbsp;The bottom 1 percent of achievers, which are predominantly drawn from the lower socio-economic strata, even saw improvements of between 25-33 percent in their PISA results. This is equivalent to around three quarters of a full academic year of additional schooling.<br />
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<strong>More women are getting to work</strong><br />
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The third piece of evidence, and here it becomes most contentious, is the fact that the share of women in in Turkey who work has been increasing since a low point in 2005. This is because around that time the number of women in salaried work started to increase faster than the number of women in agricultural and informal employment declined. In fact, there were some increases in informal and agricultural employment of women during the crisis, but the share of women in salaried work has risen continuously since the 1990s. Together with evidence that employment rates among more educated women are higher and the fact that education levels among women are increasing, I argued that we may be seeing a trend towards gradually increasing female employment.<br />
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<strong>What’s missing?</strong><br />
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The evidence is not in dispute. So why does the suggestion that Turkey had experienced inclusive economic development often meet with incredulity? I offer two possibilities. First, while I have looked at improvements over time, others may compare Turkey with the standards of advanced economies – for me the glass is filling, for them it is still less than half full. For instance, Turkey’s income inequality with a Gini of 0.43 in 2011 is higher than in all EU countries. Turkey’s average PISA ratings are still around one full year, or 40 points, behind the OECD average, and of course Turkey’s female labor force participation rate is much below the level of even other middle income countries. Second, perhaps the concept of inclusion is broader than what economic and social statistics convey. It may have something to do with a sense of being included in a national dialogue, from which some groups may feel excluded.<br />
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We are currently engaged in an exercise to draw lessons from Turkey’s experience. The fact that economic development seems to have been inclusive is one of the possible emerging messages. I’d be curious to hear your views whether this is correct and how if at all it should be qualified.<br />
&nbsp;Tue, 19 Nov 2013 00:18:00 -0500Martin RaiserWomen’s Day in Turkey – a Working Dayhttp://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/women-s-day-in-turkey-a-working-day
<p>Having lived in many countries throughout the former Soviet Union over the last nine years, I am familiar with <A href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTGENDER/0,,contentMDK:23355772~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:336868,00.html">International Women’s Day </A>as a holiday. In <A href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,menuPK:361718~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:361712,00.html">Turkey</A>, however, Women’s Day remains a work day.</p>
<p><IMG alt="" align=middle src="http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/files/meetings/turkey_womens_day_blog_photo.jpg" width=480 height=320></p>
<p>And quite appropriately so, it seems to me. <!--break--></p>
<p>Getting more women into the workforce is a key challenge for this country, economically, but also in terms of social policy and, perhaps, even in terms of ensuring more equal representation in public life.&nbsp;</p>
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<p>Only around 30 percent of women in Turkey work and the majority of Turkey’s girls never make the transition from school to work. As a result, Turkey’s economy is missing one engine. Taking recent growth simulations by the <A href="http://www.oecd.org/">Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)</A> as a basis, Turkey could boost long-term economic growth by 0.6 percentage points by increasing female labor force participation from 30 to 50 percent, which is around the average in the OECD.</p>
<p>This much is relatively well known. What is less well known is that Turkey has seen a tremendous amount of female employment creation after the crisis of 2008-2009. Indeed, female employment has grown by over 8 percent per year in the past three years and female labor force participation is up from the low of around 25 percent reached in 2006. While the majority of these jobs continues to be in the informal sector (and many in agriculture), the turnaround is nonetheless striking. What might account for this? Let me offer a few hypotheses that require more investigation.</p>
<p>First, the growth in female employment may be a reflection of the crisis. As incomes fell, households needed a second income to maintain living standards – the so-called “added worker” effect. If this is only crisis-related, the recent rate of female job creation may not be sustainable.</p>
<p>Second, policy may have induced the creation of jobs for women. As such, incentives to encourage employers to hire new female entrants into the labor force were introduced in 2008 and expanded in 2011. Vocational training through the Turkish Employment Organization (ISKUR) and support for young female entrepreneurs through the Small and Medium Business Development Organization (KOSGEB) have been significantly expanded. How effective have these programs been?</p>
<p>Third, we may observe the start of a new structural trend. Turkey has become a predominantly urbanized country and in some cities is experiencing increasing labor shortages. At the same time the new generation of women born in cities, with completed secondary education, and confronted with the opportunities offered by city economies may no longer be content to remain at home. Something similar happened in southern Europe in the 1970s and 80s. Could it be happening in Turkey today?</p>
<p>We don’t have conclusive evidence yet. But under a program of work with the newly created Ministry of Family and Social Policy in Turkey and sponsored by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) we will have a chance to find out more. This three year program will help fund analytical work on female employment and entrepreneurship, develop evidence based policy proposals for measures to boost the involvement of women in the economy and help raise awareness throughout society.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Clearly a lot more can and should be done to get more women into work in Turkey. Access to quality childcare could encourage more women to look for work. More flexible employment contracts could facilitate part-time work, and allow women and men to balance work and family life. Further improvements to education and training could help place more women into a job that matches their skills. Husbands and brothers could be more supportive…</p>
<p>To find out more about the constraints that women face, and to hear the stories of women who have successfully started a business, created a cooperative or found a job that matches their skills, the Ministry with the support of TUSIAD (an association of Turkish industry) and the World Bank has been hosting a series of public events in different Anatolian cities. The stories of these women have one overwhelming message: the chance to work is a chance to realize one’s aspirations, a chance to achieve one’s full potential.</p>
<p>Do you have a story to share or a proposal to make how we can help Turkey boost female employment?</p></p>
<P>Read other posts on International Women's Day <A href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/women-in-the-workforce-a-growing-need-in-emerging-europe-and-central-asia">here </A>and <A href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/international-womens-day-a-serbian-perspective">here</A>.</P>Thu, 07 Mar 2013 15:31:49 -0500Martin RaiserGrowing Green – Opportunities for Turkey http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/growing-green-opportunities-for-turkey
<p><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Can emerging markets make economic growth compatible with climate action? Can the trade-off between growth and rising emissions be influenced by policy? </SPAN></p>
<p><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">For a country like Turkey – with the lowest carbon footprint in the OECD (around 5 tons per person in 2008), but also one of the highest rates of growth of carbon emissions over the past two decades – these are not idle questions. A recent talk with a senior Turkish policy maker about how Turkey is adjusting its policies to meet the challenge of growing green left me feeling optimistic about the role Turkey can play in this discussion.&nbsp;I believe that for Turkey, growing green is an opportunity. Let me explain why I think so: <!--break--></SPAN></p>
<p><B><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">First</SPAN></B><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">, there are Turkey’s endowments. We tend to think of Turkey as an energy poor country – dependent on imports for almost 60 percent of its domestic needs. But the country has significant renewables potential. For instance, Turkey’s economically viable hydro potential is estimated at 140 TWh, or close to 60 percent of total 2012 energy demand. Surrounded by three seas, Turkey is one of the most promising markets for wind power in Europe and it has lots of sunshine - as millions of tourists can confirm! Sitting on the Anatolian fault line, Turkey is geologically active and is estimated to have the 7<SUP>th</SUP> largest geothermal resources in the world. These are enviable endowments for a green growth future.</SPAN></p>
<p><B><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Second</SPAN></B><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">, although the energy intensity of its economy is not high, Turkey has large unexploited reserves in energy efficiency. For instance, only 5 percent of buildings in Turkey are properly heat insulated (my corner office in Ankara is clearly not one of them…), yet potential energy savings in this sector are 30 percent. In some industrial sectors, inefficiencies are similarly large. Greater energy efficiency is thus both a significant commercial opportunity, but also a strategic priority to ensure the growth in domestic demand for energy is kept in check. &nbsp;</SPAN></p>
<p><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">If Turkey brought its renewable energy potentially fully into operation and increased the level of energy efficiency to the top of the range among developed economies, it could grow fast and still remain one of lowest OECD countries in terms of carbon footprint. Moreover, many of the required investments will pay for themselves. A recent </SPAN><A href="http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/trsp7.pdf"><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><FONT color=#0000ff>EBRD report</FONT></SPAN></A><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"> shows that carbon emission savings through investments in hydro and wind power - as well as a wide range of energy efficiency applications - essentially pay for themselves. Indeed, up to 111 million tons of carbon emissions could be avoided at no additional cost at all! </SPAN></p>
<p><B><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Finally</SPAN></B><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">, there is one more reason for optimism. Turkey’s rapidly growing demand for energy and high domestic energy prices could help catalyze a growing domestic production base for green technologies - from wind and hydro turbines, to solar panels and energy efficient building materials. Turkey, with its excellent market access to the European Union and a developed manufacturing base, could become a production location of choice for green technologies. Turkey could learn from Germany, Korea, China and California how to make use of this opportunity. &nbsp;&nbsp;</SPAN></p>
<p><SPAN style="LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; COLOR: black; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">Muharrem Bey, one of Turkey’s pioneering renewable investors, shares my optimism. With assistance from a World Bank financed credit line, Muharrem has invested around USD 135 million in three geothermal plants in western Turkey. He is also confident that these will not just be green but profitable as well. Perhaps more telling is that Muharrem is calling these plants “Dora” after the name of his granddaughter. He chose this name to signal that his commitment to renewables is a commitment to the lives of future generations. It’s a kind of joint pension and environmental insurance for his granddaughter. Are you similarly optimistic about the present and the future?</SPAN></p>Wed, 30 Jan 2013 13:01:52 -0500Martin RaiserWhat next for the Arab Spring? Lessons from the ‘Color Revolutions’ http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/what-next-for-the-arab-spring-lessons-from-the-color-revolutions
<P><IMG height=180 alt="" src="http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/files/governance/orangerev_0.jpg" width=265 align=left>Having lived through the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall – and its subsequent domino effect through the region– we have been watching the ongoing <A href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/an-arab-spring-demanding-good-governance">Arab Spring </A>with a strong sense of familiarity. Yet, in spite of the obvious parallels between the two, it seems to us that it is another series of events in Eastern Europe – this time during the 2000s – that may prove to be the more enlightening comparison: What can the <A href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colour_revolution">Color Revolutions </A>teach us about aftermath of the Arab Spring? What can they tell us about the sustainability of democratic gains and the possibility of democratic reversals?</P>
<P>Recently, <A href="http://www.economist.com/">The Economist</A> ran a sharp <A href="http://www.economist.com/node/18238190?story_id=18238190">piece</A> on the events that unfolded in Egypt and Tunisia, observing that toppling leaders is quite different from disposing of governments. While one man may fall quickly, entrenched regimes are much harder to remove. This, in a nutshell, has been rather evident in the aftermath of the Color Revolutions – most notably in Ukraine.&nbsp; So what were the missed opportunities there? And how might this be relevant in the current situation in the Arab world?</P>
<P>In a policy brief aptly titled “<A href="http://pasos.org/www-pasosmembers-org/publications/will-the-arab-world-follow-ukraine-s-path">Will the Arab World Follow Ukraine’s Path</A>?” Vira Nanivska observes that democratic reversals follow democratic revolutions not because of the personalities of the leaders, but because of the lack of democratic transformation in the institutions. She goes on to suggest that the international community’s role in post-revolutionary environments should therefore be one of strengthening democratic institutions. Phil Keefer <A href="http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&amp;piPK=64165421&amp;theSitePK=469372&amp;menuPK=64216926&amp;entityID=000016406_20070227140453">makes a similar point</A>,&nbsp;observing that in the absence of collective action by citizens and bureaucracies, the transition from disorganized autocracy to disorganized democracy may not necessarily lead to improvements in development prospects.</P>
<P>However, as <A href="http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/robert-putnam">Robert Putnam</A> has most famously argued, the <A href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital">social capital</A> that allows collective action problems to be solved locally and nationally takes decades, if not centuries, to build. This timeframe to build or rebuild institutions is far too long to satisfy either citizens or the donor community, who expect to see "results" fairly quickly. And as we all know, patience is a luxury that few politicians can afford. This is why leadership matters and why we need to understand better how leaders can use the momentum of a civic revolutionary movement to catalyze real changes in the governance of their societies.</P>
<P>Like their East European predecessors, the new political leaders across the Middle East need strategies to deliver rapid ‘results’ while not being inconsistent with the longer-term goal of institution building. What might such strategies consist of? Looking at the Ukraine and her neighbors, we offer three tentative suggestions (tentative because we are not experts on the Middle East and suspect the differences across countries may be large):</P>
<P>(i) <STRONG>establish basic rules of the game early on, ideally choosing prominent and recognizable signals</STRONG>. In Ukraine, for example, the <A href="http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/25/business/worldbusiness/25steel.html">privatization of Krivorizhstal </A>by the Timoshenko government was a positive signal of a commitment to better governance that reverberates to this day. While the lack of follow-up on the murder of a prominent journalist (the "<A href="http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071534.html">Gongadze case</A>") or the <A href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83b51a08-e242-11dd-b1dd-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1LzBIscV0">non-transparent gas deal </A>involving an economically redundant 'middleman' company - RosUkrEnergo – signaled the opposite.</P>
<P>(ii) <STRONG>retain legitimacy by delivering some visible improvements to the population quickly</STRONG>. Georgian President Saakashvilii's reform of the road police and generally decisive moves to stamp out administrative corruption are excellent examples how this can be done even when underlying institutional capacity is low.</P>
<P>(iii) <STRONG>uphold the reform process by building sustainable pro-reform coalitions</STRONG>. These coalitions will reward leaders for carrying through reforms. Whether these exist in the country or can be created is not clear ex ante. Accountability at all levels of government and inviting citizen feedback and participation are important complements to strong leadership.</P>
<P>Given these suggestions, what can we at the World Bank do to help? <STRONG>We need to start off by better understanding the conditions for collective action </STRONG>and make educated guesses about how willing political leaders are to champion institutional transformation. This is an important step and we must be open to making substantial investment in the information-gathering process. Where we find willing and capable leaders, we should leverage such leadership decisively and find ways to galvanize support quickly. Many Ukrainian observers have lamented that external support was slow to emerge after the Orange Revolution and hence expectations were quickly disappointed, allowing the stalwarts of the old regime to regain political support.</P>
<P>Furthermore, we must <STRONG>work with champions to help them demonstrate commitment to reform early </STRONG>on, and follow this up by focusing on interventions that deliver results quickly, thereby reinforcing expectations and generating trust. In situations where the basic conditions for collective action are weak, assistance needs to be targeted towards opening the space for participation and accountability. In this case, expectations of both citizens and donors will need to be managed – transitions to good governance may take time in such circumstances.</P>
<P>One final hopeful note: <STRONG>even when the initial heady expectations may be disappointed, political transitions may provide a second chance</STRONG>. Indeed, we believe there is still everything to play for in Ukraine. Its democratic institutions may not be as strong as they were in eastern Europe in the 1990s, but its civil society and media are among the most vibrant and sophisticated in the former Soviet Union. Much will depend on the willingness of the current leadership.</P>
<P>The ultimate verdict on the “Color Revolutions” is still out. But the experience of the former Soviet Republics to date may provide valuable insights into the risks and opportunities that lie in the aftermath of a political transformation in Europe’s neighborhood. We must use these lessons wisely to ensure the enthusiasm and excitement surrounding the Arab Spring lives up to its promise.</P>
<P>Photocredit: flickr user <A href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/spacelion/471266721/">Gueorgui</A></P>Thu, 19 May 2011 15:17:54 -0400Martin Raiser