Tuesday, May 31, 2016

The
operation to retake Fallujah has advanced towards the city limits since ISW’s May
26 Fallujah map, as joint forces from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
Popular Mobilization, and Sunni tribal fighters close in on a multiple-axis
assault to encircle the city. The ISF and Popular Mobilization continue to recapture
terrain north of Fallujah, including al-Sajar, and consolidate holdings around Garma
District, which was recaptured on May 23. Popular Mobilization Deputy Chairman
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a U.S. designated terrorist and Iranian proxy leader, arrived
in Arimiyah, north of Saqlawiyah, on May 31, in order to oversee operations on
the western axis, as the ISF and Popular Mobilization work to uproot ISIS from
the area. Joint forces retook Saqlawiyah’s city center on May
30, but they will need to secure the area before moving into Fallujah city. The
ISF entered Fallujah’s city limits on May 30, when forces from the Counter
Terrorism Service (CTS) reached Hayy al-Shuhada, the southernmost neighborhood
in Fallujah, where they face stiff ISIS resistance against moving into the city.

Iranian-backed
Iraqi Shi’a militias maintain a steady presence in northern Fallujah, where
reports have surfaced of abuses against Sunni populations. Several local
sources claim that Popular Mobilization fighters destroyed
the Great Mosque in Garma while chanting
sectarian slogans and vowing to kill residents. Sources claimed that militias prevented
the Sunni Waqf head from entering Garma to organize Friday prayers, have looted homes and factories around Garma,
and arrested civilians. A notable tribal sheikh in Garma claimed that Popular
Mobilization militants kidnapped 73 men from Garma District and executed 17 of them on charges of belonging
to ISIS. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, however, criticized media outlets for distorting the truth and inciting
sectarianism through false reporting on events in Fallujah.

Shi’a
militia abuses against the Sunni population might further radicalize Iraq’s
Sunni population. Fallujah’s population has suffered under ISIS’s rule for over
two years, but residents may be inclined to remain complicit or even identify with
ISIS’s extreme sectarian ideology if they feel terrorized by Shi’a militias.
Joint forces have opened several corridors for safe passage out of the city
that lead primarily to recaptured terrain to the north and south of Fallujah. However,
the U.N. has reported that only 3,700 civilians out of the estimated 50,000 remaining
in the city have fled from Fallujah over the past week. ISIS has prevented civilians
from leaving the area, by force and by requiring a steep payment to leave.
Nevertheless, historically anti-government Sunni residents, some of whom were complicit
when ISIS first took the city in January 2014, may be inclined to support ISIS
rather than seek aid from Shi’a militias. The mindset that Iraqi Sunnis are
better off under extremist ideology than in a Shi’a-driven government can
perpetuate the Salafi-jihadi movement in Iraq. Until Iraq can guarantee Sunni
representation and security, extremist groups will continue to find shelter
amongst Iraq’s Sunni population.

Saturday, May 28, 2016

Russia has continued its air
campaign against the Syrian opposition, despite its claims to temporarily suspend
airstrikes against Syrian al Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and the opposition. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced a temporary
pause in its air campaign against Jabhat al Nusra in order to give
opposition groups time to distance themselves from the jihadist group on May 25
and again on May
27. The withdrawal of opposition forces from key frontlines jointly held
with Jabhat al Nusra – particularly in Aleppo – would likely render core
opposition-held terrain vulnerable to advances by pro-regime forces. Russia is
conducting a concerted effort against opposition forces in Aleppo, following opposition gainsagainst
pro-regime forces in southern Aleppo throughout April and May 2016. Russian
air operations have largely concentrated against positions along the opposition’s
last remaining supply route into Aleppo City from May 13 - 26, including
against towns northwest of the city and areas in Aleppo’s northern industrial
outskirts. Pro-regime forces remain positioned to encircle and besiege
opposition forces in Aleppo City by severing this supply route. Pro-regime
forces continued
low-levelground
operationssupportedbyRussian
airstrikes from May 12 -17 to complete the encirclement through the city’s
northern industrial districts, although these efforts were unsuccessful.

Russia remains a decisive
military force in the Syrian conflict, despite its alleged drawdown. Operation
Inherent Resolve Spokesperson Col. Steve Warren stated that Russian currently retains
“almost identical” military capabilities following Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s announcement of a partial
withdrawal on March 14. The distribution of Russian air operations in
northwestern Syria demonstrates Russia’s continued prioritization of support to
the Assad regime. The military assets that Russia maintains in theater allow it
to respond within 24 hours to threats to regime terrain. Russian airstrikes
escalated against opposition forces in northern Homs Province and southern Hama
Province from May 12 – 16 and again from May 19 – 22 in response to renewed opposition operationsagainst
regime forces in the area. This concentration of strikes in defense of
pro-regime terrain, however, was largely unable to reverse opposition gains.

Russia has meanwhile continued to
present itself as an effective partner in the fight
against terrorism, while continuing to function as a destabilizing force in
the Syrian conflict. Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced on May
20 that Russia had presented a plan to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition to
begin joint
airstrikes against “international terrorist and illegal armed groups” that
violate the cessation of hostilities agreement. U.S. officials subsequently denied
the existence of any such agreement. Russia caveated its proposal for joint
strikes, stating that Russia would not accept any arrangement that prevented it
from conducting unilateral airstrikes in Syria. Russia is unlikely to halt
military action against mainstream elements of the Syrian opposition, which
remain the Assad regime’s largest adversaries. Russia has continued to indiscriminately
target both Jabhat al Nusra and mainstream opposition factions in northwestern
Syria despite the International Syria Support Group’s agreement to new measures
to reinforce a
nationwide cessation of hostilities on May 17. Russian airstrikes continued
to primarily target opposition forces in northwestern Syria from May 13 - 26,
rather than terrorist organizations such as ISIS. ISW was only able to assess
one Russian airstrike against ISIS for the two-week period from May 13 – 26
with low confidence, despite continued ISIS operations throughout Syria.

The following graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Popular Mobilization, and tribal fighters launched a major operation to retake Fallujah on May 23. The joint force quickly recaptured northern terrain on the first day, including Garma District, a historic hotbed for Sunni extremists including ISIS’s predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq. The joint force continued to consolidate surrounding terrain on May 24 as it advances towards central Fallujah. Security concerns, already heightened by an increase of ISIS attacks in Baghdad, could intensify as the Fallujah operation increases the likelihood of sectarian violence. The ISF must ensure that civilians fleeing Fallujah are not exposed to sectarian violence from Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias both during and after the operation.

Baghdad’s political and physical security are facing grave threats from ISIS, the Sadrist demonstrators, and Iraq’s own politicians. Sadrist demonstrators stormed the Green Zone on May 20 and broke into major government buildings, including the facilities housing the Council of Ministers (CoM), Council of Representatives (CoR), and Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s office, before Interior Ministry security forces ejected protestors. The chaos follows a significant increase in ISIS activity in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts. Deadly attacks targeted civilians in northern Baghdad on May 11 and 17, prompting the Sadrist militia Saraya al-Salaam to briefly deploy across Baghdad’s Shi’a neighborhoods before Sadr ordered their withdrawal on May 18. ISIS’s activity is significantly increasing in Baghdad’s northern Belts area. The group launched spectacular attacks in the districts of Balad on May 12 and 13 and Dujail on May 21, and carried out a large attack aimed at damaging the Taji Gas Plant near Camp Taji on May 15. Increased ISIS activity in the northern Belts and Baghdad could deteriorate the security situation to levels not seen since late 2014.

The deadly attacks indicate that ISIS is taking advantage of Iraq’s unstable political situation. ISIS has demonstrated intent to both exacerbate sectarian tensions and increase the possibility of intra-Shi’a conflict; its attacks have generated friction between the Sadrists, rival Iranian-backed proxy militias, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).The Sadrists are exacerbating tensions by putting thousands of unruly demonstrators out on the streets against Iranian proxy militia forces and units from the Interior Ministry, controlled by the rival Badr Organization, who have little interest in seeing the Sadrists succeed. ISIS will have opportunities to increase its attack capabilities while the ISF and the Popular Mobilization are engaged in operations on multiple fronts, including recent successful operations which regained control over Rutba District on May 19 and the Ramadi-Jordan highway on May 20. However, both the ISF and Popular mobilization have also committed significant forces towards completing the encirclement of Fallujah and clearing ISIS from western Diyala Province. These efforts have required further forward deployments of Baghdad and southern-based security forces away from their bases in southern Iraq. Forces shifting in southern Iraq leaves the area vulnerable to a resurgence in ISIS attacks and opens avenues for ISIS to launch attacks into Baghdad from the South.

Key Takeaway: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has
made significant gains in the Euphrates River Valley over the past two months,
recapturing almost the entirety of the southern bank. The ISF, backed by tribal
fighters and Coalition airstrikes, recaptured Hit District, west of Ramadi, on
April 14 before recapturing nearly the entirety of the area between Hit and
Baghdadi Sub-district over the subsequent weeks. Some villages, particularly on
the northern bank of the river, remain under ISIS control. ISW is changing the
status of these areas to Joint ISF-Sunni Tribal Fighter Control Zones.

Joint ISF and Popular Mobilization forces have launched operations to recapture
the Fallujah area. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the effort to
recapture Fallujah on May 23 at a meeting with senior ISF officials and proxy
militia leaders, including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Badr Organization leader
Hadi al-Amiri. The ISF, large numbers of Popular Mobilization fighters, and
Iranian proxy militiamen engaged in a concerted push to clear Fallujah's
northern environs. The groups cleared Garma Sub-district, a historical
safe-haven for Sunni extremist groups and a longtime base for ISIS attacks into
the Baghdad area, on May 23. The ISF, backed by Coalition airstrikes and tribal
fighters, also recaptured a stretch of highway south of Fallujah between the
Habaniya base and Amiriyat al-Fallujah, a town that faces constant pressure
from ISIS, on May 7. ISW is thus changing the status of this area to ISF
Control Zone.

The ISF also recaptured Rutba, a district that sits along the Jordan-Ramadi
highway in western Anbar, on May 10. ISW is thus changing the status of Rutba
to ISF-held location. Claims by the Joint Operations Command (JOC) that the ISF
fully control the highway between the Trebil border crossing with Jordan and
Ramadi could not be confirmed.

A joint Iraqi Shi'a militia, Turkmen, and Peshmerga force recaptured the Shi'a
Turkmen village of Bashir, south of Kirkuk, from ISIS on April 30. The
operation was a symbolic victory for Iraqi Shi'a militias and Turkmen militias,
as Bashir was the site of a massacre of Turkmen in late 2014. However, security
arrangements remain tenuous, as the Peshmerga belonging to the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) often have friction and occasionally clash with Iraqi Shi'a
militias and Turkmen militias, particularly in the joint-held town of Tuz
Khurmato, south of Bashir. Bashir could thus be an additional source of
friction between Turkmen and Kurds. ISW is changing the status of Bashir to
Joint Peshmerga and Iraqi Shi'a militia Control.

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Key Takeaway: Iraq’s Federal Court
will issue an important ruling on May 25 that could have a major impact on the
political crisis. The issues at stake
are the legitimacy of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s ministerial appointments
and the speakership of the Council of Representatives. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is a driver
of the political party that has raised the legal challenges. Iraq has been
experiencing a political crisis since April 12, and protesters have stormed the
Green Zone twice since April 30. They were followers of Shi’a cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr, who has been trying to channel a populist protest movement that has
been underway since August. One main
issue at stake is the composition of the Cabinet. Sadr and Prime Minister Abadi
are not close allies, but they both have sought to replace political party elites
with technocratic ministers. Their chief opponent has been Nouri al-Maliki, the
former Prime Minister and a rival of both. The appointment of ministers
requires approval of Iraq’s parliament, the Council of Representatives (CoR).
The body had fractured on April 12, when a group of members staged an overnight
sit-in against Prime Minister Abadi’s slate and the conduct of the Council of
Representatives under Speaker Salim al-Juburi.
The group consisted of parliamentarians from many political parties and
ultimately claimed a false quorum and enacted legislation.This rump parliament lasted for two weeks, but
then disbanded. Some of its members formed a political bloc, called the Reform
Front, and launched a legal case to try to preserve some of their rump
parliamentary decisions and block some of the ministerial changes underway. The
Reform Front is struggling for legitimacy as a legal entity and political power. The crux of the bloc’s legitimacy and its
future in the political process has been relegated to the Federal Court to
decide. The Federal Court, under longtime Maliki-ally Chief Justice Medhat
al-Mahmoud, announced it will hold the first session on May 25 regarding the
legitimacy of the legislation passed by the rump CoR on April 14 and the ministerial
changes enacted by Prime Minister Abadi on April 26. The Federal Court’s ruling
could change the composition and leadership of the Council of Representatives
and influence the momentum of Abadi’s reforms.

Background

Iraq’s
parliamentary crisis emerged from gridlock over a cabinet reshuffle that Prime
Minister Haidar al-Abadi had announced on February 9 and has tried to execute
since then. PM Abadi announced his intent to replace ministers in in Cabinet,
which has been a source of patronage for political elites. Sadrist Trend leader
Muqtada al-Sadr supported the reshuffle and called for the changes to be
technocratic, instead of political, appointments. Sadr pressured PM Abadi to present
a fully technocratic list by staging a mass sit-in at the entrance of the Green
Zone on March 18 and drumming up popular support. The pressure worked and PM
Abadi presented a fully technocratic list to the Council of Representatives (CoR)
for a vote on March 31. The list was praised by Sadr for its technocratic
composition, but other political blocs denounced it due to their lack of input
on ministerial candidates. PM Abadi returned the CoR on April 12 and presented
a second list which was a compromise of both technocratic and political
ministerial candidates. Despite the compromise, political blocs rejected the new
list as a partisan attempt to keep the quota system, so it was not put to a
vote. When CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi adjourned the session without taking
action on the list, several political blocs rejected the delay and demanded an
immediate vote. Protesting CoR members, including those from the Sunni Etihad
bloc, State of Law Alliance (SLA), the Sadrist-affiliated Ahrar Bloc, the
secular Wataniya bloc, and the Kurdish parties, began a sit-in that evening in the
CoR building in order to implement reforms.

The sit-in
parties demanded the dismissal of the three presidencies, President Fuad
Masoum, Prime Minister Abadi, and Speaker Juburi. Members reported on April 13
that they had collection a petition of 171
signatures,
which would allow both quorum and absolute majority, required in passing
legislation. This was never confirmed and pictures of the list of signatures
never seemed to suggest more than 115
signatures,
far below the quorum of 165 members. Juburi chaired an emergency CoR meeting the
next day on April 13 in accordance with the protesters’ demands in order to
discuss the Cabinet reshuffle and quell the protesters’ anger. Sources stated
that the meeting met quorum at 174 members. The session,
however, quickly descended into chaos after a fight broke out amongst CoR
members. Juburi adjourned the meeting until April 14.

The rump CoR
formed on April 14 in defiance of Juburi who had arrived to the CoR on April
14, announced that the meeting lacked quorum, and left. The protesters
convened their own session, maintaining that the April 13 session remained open
and that the quorum reached on April 13 still applied to the session on April
14. Some claimed that the April 14 session also reached 171 CoR members, though later
reports stated that it only reached 131 members. The protesters had
lost several members overnight, including members from the Kurdish parties and the
Etihad bloc. The rump CoR nevertheless claimed they had met quorum and that the
actions of April 14 were legal and binding. Under these terms, the protesters
voted to dismiss Juburi and replace him with an interim Speaker -
Wataniya member and former Baathist Adnan al-Janabi. Janabi adjourned the session until April 16.

However, the
rump CoR did not make quorum on April 16, following withdrawals from the Badr Organization, the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Etihad. The Kurds had likewise
begun withdrawing their support on April 13 and denounced the dismissal of Juburi on April
14. Rump CoR members fell as low as 125 members, far below the quorum threshold
of 165 members. The rump CoR lacked the legitimacy to undertake any further
legal actions and continued to weaken as an entity which could overtake the
legal CoR as the true legislative body.

The Rump CoR
Loses Legitimacy

The failure
of the rump CoR to meet quorum on April 16 drove the protesters to seek legitimacy
from the Shi’a religious establishment. The Shi’a establishment instead rebuked the actions of the rump CoR and called
for political agreement, not division. The rump CoR also botched an attempt to gain
legitimacy by tricking withdrawn political blocs into returning to a session on
April 19, as called for by President Masoum to resolve the split in the CoR.
The session made quorum but Juburi failed to appear at the session for unknown
reasons. When it was revealed that Juburi would not chair the
session and instead the rump CoR was in charge, the Kurdish blocs left in an outrage. The rump CoR claimed that the
initial presence in the meeting had met quorum and the meeting was valid, even
though the walk-out of several parties left the session far below quorum. The
rump CoR suffered another blow when the Ahrar Bloc withdrew from on April 20. As the beacon of technocratic
reforms in the April reshuffle process, the Ahrar Bloc had initially provided the
rump CoR a stamp of approval of its legitimacy. The absence of the Ahrar Bloc
not only further reduced the rump CoR’s numbers far below quorum, but also indicated
that the rump CoR could not assume the position of being the “true” CoR and was
relegated to a rogue group of CoR members operating outside of the political
framework.

The rump CoR
continued to fall short of legitimacy and their failure to meet quorum, which
they needed in order to operate according to legitimate standards, weakened the
rump CoR’s efforts. Even members of the movement saw the continued lack of
quorum as a sign of failure and suggested reintegrating into
the “legal” CoR. Meanwhile, the “legal”
CoR, chaired by Juburi, made marked success when it convened on April 26 and
voted in five new ministers as a part of the Cabinet reshuffle. The rump CoR physically tried
to obstruct the vote and claimed that the
session lacked quorum, but the vote continued. The success of the CoR to
implement reforms in contrast to the weakened rump CoR tarnished the movement
and made it clear that the rump CoR would never gain legitimacy next to the
legal CoR.

Establishment of the Reform Front

The rump CoR
formally ended its sit-in on April 27, moving
to form an opposition bloc on April 28. The Reform
Front represents the new political bloc under which the members of the
now-disbanded rump CoR have organized. ISW assesses that the Reform Front has 84 members, primarily from
the Dawa Party and Wataniya bloc. The Reform Front, despite the failure of the
rump CoR, continues to maintain that the rump CoR was a legitimate legal body.
It maintains that the decisions made in the rump CoR, primarily the dismissal
of Juburi, were constitutional and binding. The Reform Front has added to the
political stalemate in the CoR by boycotting until Juburi leaves his position
and new elections are held. This stance has put the Reform Front at odds with
the other political blocs who have rejected the legitimacy of the rump CoR. The
Kurdistan Alliance and Etihad have boycotted the CoR as well, but their boycott
was the result of the failure to protect CoR members from the April 30 protest
which stormed the Green Zone. Ahrar continues to boycott until a technocratic
government is installed. Their conditions for return are party-specific, but
ultimately hinge on the assumption that Juburi remains as speaker.

Reform
Front Composition

The
composition of the Reform Bloc currently exists in a two-party polarity between
Wataniya members and pro-Maliki members of the Dawa Party, following the
withdrawal of the majority of its original participants. This odd alliance
between two political rivals, former PM Maliki and his competitor in the 2010
election Ayad Allawi, rests on a similar search for power and influence rather
than on common policy objectives. The Reform Front originally claimed to have 98 members on April 28, the majority from
Wataniya and Dawa. The Reform Front also boasts a majority of the members from
the Dawa in Iraq Party, a party in the SLA but distinct from Maliki’s Dawa
Party, as well as several members who have defected from their political blocs.

The Reform
Front is not a united front, however, as it has two dynamic leaders within the
bloc each vying for control of the Front and the future Iraqi Government. The pro-Maliki members dominate the Reform
Front with an alleged 42 members, and as such Nouri al-Maliki has
a strong claim to the bloc as its leader. Maliki had announced his support of
the protests in the CoR on April 14, calling the events in the CoR a “mature
political movement”
in opposition to earlier Green Zone sit-ins that aimed to “bring down the political
process.” Maliki denied on April 21 any rumors that he
was leading the rump CoR despite the heavy presence of pro-Maliki supporters in
the movement. Maliki’s position with the rump CoR offers possible legitimacy to
the movement, however his position in Iraqi politics is deeply controversial,
and even a deal-breaker, among other political parties and leaders, including
Ayad Allawi.

Ayad Allawi joined the rump CoR sit-in himself on
April 13 and has operated as a public and vocal spokesman for the Reform Front.
Allawi, however, claimed that he has a “fundamental
disagreement”
with Maliki on May 12, indicating that the Reform Front does not represent a
new political party with shared interests but rather a coalition of forces who
still answer to their original political affiliations. Allawi and Maliki share
a history which will continue to put the two leaders at odds. Allawi’s Wataniya
party won the popular elections in 2010, earning the right to the form the
government. Allawi was in line to become the next prime minister and replace
Maliki, who had held the premiership from 2005. However Maliki persuaded the
Federal Court to reword the definition of “largest bloc,” allowing the SLA to
gather more political allies in the CoR and reclaim the premiership. Maliki
remained Prime Minister and Allawi struggled to remain politically relevant.

The Reform
Front made claims of having over 100 members as of May 18. ISW
has assessed that the Reform Front has 84
members as of May 19, giving credence to the possibility that the Front does
have significant numbers. The Reform Front has attracted most of its members
from the SLA, diminishing the latter’s size dramatically. This new
configuration would legally make the Reform Front the largest bloc in the CoR,
giving it the right to form the government and chose the prime minister. The
Reform Front has not yet made claim to this right and the SLA has avowed on May 17 that it still holds
the right to the premiership. The weak legitimacy of the Reform Front, however,
diminishes its claim to the right to form the government. However, a favorable upcoming
ruling from the Federal Court could put the Reform Front in a stronger position
as a political bloc in the CoR.

The
Federal Court Decides on Legitimacy of Rump CoR

The Federal
Court, the highest judicial body in Iraq, will issue a ruling on May 25
regarding the constitutionality of CoR sessions held on April 14 held by the
rump CoR and the April 26 session which voted in new ministers under the
chairmanship of Speaker Juburi. The court announced on May 12 that it had
received six
lawsuits
regarding the CoR. Three cases regarded the dismissal and replacement of
ministers on April 26 and three regarding the constitutionality of two April
CoR sessions. The Federal Court announced on May 18 that it would hold the
first hearing of those on May 25 in order to rule on the legality of the April
14 and April 26 CoR sessions. A decision regarding the April 14 rump CoR
session, during which protesters voted out Juburi, would be a de facto ruling on the legality of Juburi’s position
as CoR speaker. A decision regarding the constitutionality of the April 26 will
likewise either validate or undermine the future of PM Abadi’s reform program.

Implications of the Court Ruling

A decision
regarding the April 14 session will decide whether the actions of the rump CoR
were constitutional to dismiss Juburi and elect an interim speaker. The Reform
Front has stated it will respect the decision of the Federal Court, however an
unfavorable ruling would further diminish the Reform Front’s legitimacy. The
Reform Front has maintained that it will not return to the CoR while Salim
al-Juburi is speaker. A ruling that established that the rump CoR lacked quorum
on April 14 will erase the dismissal of Juburi and eliminate the Reform Front’s
leverage over the political process. The Reform Front will need to return the
CoR and heed Juburi as speaker or else lose its ability to act as a political
party as it has lost its ability to act as political entity following the
collapse of the rump CoR.

The decision
of the Federal Court on May 25 will affect the
decision of other boycotting political parties to return as well. Osama
al-Nujaifi, leader of the Mutahidun in the Etihad bloc, announced on May 18 that the party is
waiting for the decision of the Federal Court regarding the way forward. The
ISCI-affiliated Mowatin bloc likewise announced on May 21 that it is waiting on the
decision of the Federal Court “to solve the crisis.” Spokesman for the Mowatain
Bloc Habib al-Tarafi stated on May 19 that “the logical and right solution is
to wait for a ruling from the Federal Court by resuming CoR sessions again,”
and that such court decision will be binding. A judicial ruling could provide
the push to break the stalemate in the political process by offering a solid foundation
for political blocs to move forward and rebuild the political process.

Likewise, the
Federal Court’s ruling on the April 26 session will either add credibility or
destroy PM Abadi’s attempts to implement his Cabinet reshuffle. The April 26
CoR session is also under question for reaching quorum, and should the session
be found lacking, the decision will set back PM Abadi’s attempts to implement
reforms and cost what little momentum he gained from the session. SLA member
Jassim Muhammad Jaafar stated that he expected the Federal Court will return
the condition of the CoR to what is was before April 26, adding that PM Abadi will
be forced to present his new Cabinet again before the session. Jaafar stated
that these conditions are “most
likely to satisfy both sides” in the CoR, and that he expected the CoR to be
unable to hold sessions until after the ruling.

However, it
is unclear if all political parties will return to the negotiation table even
if the obstacles of the constitutionality of April 14th and 26th are resolved.
The issue of legality was only one hurdle for the Reform Front, who may be
unwilling to fully cooperate with Juburi as CoR Speaker and may seek new
leverage in order to guarantee their return. The Reform Front will continue to
seek more members to add to its ranks in order to force the government’s hand
into conceding to its demands. The Reform Front will continue to hold the
dismissal of Juburi as one of their primarily demands even if the Federal Court
rules in favor of his survival. The Reform Front could stall the political
process at a time of thawing in political relations, most notably with the
announcement that some Kurdish parties will return to Baghdad. The
Reform Front sent a delegation
to the Kurdistan Region on May 22 to meet with Kurdistan Regional President
Masoud Barzani and a delegation from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP),
which has not yet announced their return to the CoR. The Reform Front will
continue to bid for the KDP’s return to the CoR as a part of the Front. The
Reform Front’s growing size and pressure on the government could successfully
be used as leverage to achieve its demands through nonconventional means.

The Reform
Front has consistently seen that the future of Iraqi politics will be a two-party dynamic between a larger Reform
Front and a bloc formed from the current government. Maliki cleverly has a foot
in both parties as a prominent leader within the ruling State of Law Alliance
and a notable supporter of the Reform Front. Nouri al-Maliki even issued an initiative for political solution on May 23
in which he noted that only he was able to bring the Reform Front back into the
fold of the CoR, and that to do so the next CoR session would need to vote on
the survival of CoR presidency. If Maliki can successfully reunite the two
CoRs, he will cement his position as a leader in the Reform Front and in the
future political process. It will also displace Ayad Allawi as leader of the
Reform Front.

The Federal
Court’s upcoming rulings on May 25 may provide a staging area to resume
political dialogue as it can provide a binding resolution to controversial
questions. However, beyond May 25, the decisions of the Federal Court will
likely prove superficial. The Reform
Front is unlikely to renege its demand that Juburi leave its position, if the
Federal Court rules in Juburi’s favor, and instead will seek to gain addition
leverage over the CoR, likely by courting more political parties, such as the
Kurdish parties, to grow its ranks. The ruling can also further complicate the
already complex political situation, allowing Maliki the opportunity to work
the confusion in his favor and reestablish himself at the forefront of the
political scene in Iraq.

Saturday, May 21, 2016

Key Takeaway: Iraqi politics are deadlocked. Several
political parties and blocs boycotted the Council of Representatives (CoR)
following the Sadrist protesters’ first breach of the Green Zone on April 30.
The Kurdish Alliance, a bloc that consisted of nearly one-fifth of the CoR,
withdrew on May 5. The bloc has now split, and two of its component political
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, formally reunited
on May 14 to create a new bloc. The PUK
and Gorran were incentivized by the urgent need for financial assistance to the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and likely by Iranian urging. A loan from
the IMF in which Baghdad and the KRG will have a share proved decisive in
incentivizing their cohesion. The PUK-Gorran Alliance will therefore likely
strengthen ties between Baghdad and Arbil. Their rival, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), retains ambitions of regional independence and a
stranglehold on political power in the KRG. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
will either have to reintegrate or seek new political partners. The PUK and
Gorran will likely eventually return to the CoR. Although they are still
negotiating with the KDP, Kurdish parties are unlikely to return the CoR as one
entity, ending what had been a significant, cohesive bloc. The new political
alliance will nevertheless shift the power dynamics of both Baghdad and Arbil.

Introduction

The Kurdistan Alliance has been the framework under which
Kurdish political parties have formed a consensus agenda in the Iraqi
Parliament since 2005 elections. The Kurdistan Alliance since 2014 elections had
been comprised of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and Kurdistan
Islamic Group (KIG), the five of which constituted the entirety of Kurdish
representation in the Iraqi parliament and are the five largest parties in the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These five political parties are
answerable to both the politics of Baghdad and those of the Kurdistan Regional
Government. The Kurdistan Alliance has primarily aimed to maintain Kurdish
influence within the Iraqi Government in order to guarantee financial and
budgetary assistance for the KRG.

The Kurdistan Alliance persistently blocked Prime Minister
Haidar al-Abadi’s attempt to create a technocratic government through his
cabinet reshuffle, proposed first on February 9, 2015. The bloc has insisted on
retaining the ethnic and sectarian quotas that ensure Kurdish representation
within the government, preserve Kurdish control over ministries, and ensure
that the Iraqi Presidency remains in Kurdish hands. The bloc’s goal in the
reforms was retaining positions for Kurdish leaders, such as Minister of
Finance Hoshyar Zebari, a member of the KDP. PM Abadi’s reform plans, however,
seek to end the quota system on principle which threatens guaranteed Kurdish
representation and may lead to a decrease in Kurdish representation.

The Kurdish parties had presented a unified bloc in Baghdad
until May 1, while within the KRG they have been fractious and struggling with
one another for power. KRG President Masoud Barzani has retained his office
past when his term limit ended in 2013 when the legal council in the KRG
parliament twice granted him a two year extension, first in August 2013 and
then in August 2015,
granting him full powers until the 2017 parliamentary elections. His rivals in
the Gorran Party, the second largest party in the KRG, and the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) denounced this extension, calling for new
presidential elections and even for a new form of government. The political crisis split the KRG on October 12, 2015 when the
KDP blamed Gorran for the large-scale anti-KDP demonstrations which erupted in Sulaimaniyah
Province over unpaid salaries. The KDP expelled Gorran from the KRG, demanding
that Gorran not return to the government until they had replaced several Gorran members whom the KDP blamed for the political
tensions. The split in the KRG has continued since then without resolution. The
KDP and Gorran have yet to reconcile and Gorran has not returned to the Kurdish
Government in Arbil. The PUK attempted to act as a mediator between the five
main political parties in the KRG in early 2016 in order to restore Gorran to
the KRG. All five Kurdish parties met on February 3 for the first time since
October 2015. They were scheduled to meet again on February 7 in the presence
of Masoud Barzani, but the KDP “indefinitely
delayed”
these negotiations for reconciliation. These divisions have created incentives
for Gorran and PUK to try to thwart Barzani’s consolidation of power, and even
to seek recourse in Baghdad to achieve those gains.

The Kurdistan Alliance Withdraws from
Baghdad Politics

The Kurdistan Alliance withdrew from Iraq’s
Council of Representatives in Baghdad, outraged over the failure of security
forces to secure the CoR building during the April 30 protests, when Sadrist
Trend-driven protesters stormed the Green Zone and the parliamentary building
and physically assaulted Kurdish CoR members. Those assaulted included PUK
senior member Ala Talabani, niece
of PUK founder Jalal Talabani, and Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad. The
Kurdish parties left for Iraqi Kurdistan
on May 1 after escaping the Green Zone and announced that they would not return
to Baghdad until their physical safety was guaranteed. One Kurdish CoR member
stated that there was “no hope in the current government” to contain the crisis, and called CoR Speaker Salim Juburi’s
efforts to resolve the crisis as temporary and incapable of being
implemented. The Kurdish parties on May
5 refused to come back to the CoR for
the next session, originally scheduled for 10 May.

The Kurdistan Alliance’s withdrawal from Baghdad
represents a major inflection point in the Iraqi political crisis because the
Kurdish parties control a significant proportion of the CoR and have the
ability to help determine a quorum as well as advance and dismiss legislation.
Their unified walk-out gave the Kurds a new source of leverage over the CoR, as
Iraq’s political process remains paralyzed without their participation.

The Kurdistan Alliance’s Demands

President Masoum met with senior ISCI member
Adil Abdul-Mahdi on May 6 to
discuss the political crisis and future plans in the Ministry of Oil,
especially regarding the mission of self-sufficiency in the oil industry. The
Kurdish demands regarding oil and gas laws were likely a central focus of this
conversation as a solution to resume the political process in Baghdad. Kurdish
demands also included
addressing Article 140 in the Constitution regarding the disputed status of
Kirkuk Province, a highly controversial topic which will not be resolved in
these negotiations. President Masoum
continued to meet with other political parties with significant clout in the
Iraqi Government, including meetings with ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim,
National Alliance leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and
SLA leader Nouri al-Maliki all
individually on May 9, where Masoum likely acted as mediator between political
parties in order to relay the financial prerequisites of the Kurdish CoR
members’ return and hear the negotiating terms from these three Shi’a political
leaders. These negotiations were not decisive and failed to draw the Kurdish
political parties back to Baghdad.

Most Kurdish demands of Baghdad were driven by
money rather than security. Initially,
the Kurds maintained that the primary condition of their return to Baghdad was
a guarantee that the events of April 30 would not repeat, calling
it a “black day” in
Iraqi political history. But the Kurdish political bloc continued to pursue its
enduring demands for legislation in Baghdad on the core issues of revenue
sharing, budget relief, and the status of the disputed internal boundaries
(DIBs) that it wishes to incorporate into the Kurdish region. The KRG currently
struggles to pay the salaries of both its government employees and its
Peshmerga forces and, like Baghdad, is burdened with falling global oil prices.
The Kurdish Alliance thus replaced the blustering of the previous days in order
to demand more tangible financial concessions from Baghdad. These demands include the payment of government and
Peshmerga salaries and implementation of oil and gas laws which would help the
KRG’s floundering economic situation. They were relayed between various
political parties by Iraqi President Fuad Masoum, a senior member of the PUK
who also speaks on behalf of the Kurdish parties in Baghdad’s power politics.

The Kurds also issued a set of demands which
were both unreasonable and unattainable. The walk out on May 1 was coupled with
the publication of an op-ed by Masrour Barzani, nephew of KRG President Masoud
Barzani, calling for an “amicable divorce” from Baghdad on May 5. The KDP thereby added the threat of
declaring independence to the list of demands. Masoud Barzani announced back on January 26 that he would seek to hold a referendum before
the U.S. 2016 presidential elections, likely using the upcoming U.S. elections
as a tangible deadline to foster a sense of imminent change.

Baghdad Vies for Kurds to Return

The threat that Kurdish parties would withdraw
indefinitely, and possibly permanently, from Baghdad changed the ongoing
negotiations among Iraqi Government leaders who immediately prioritized
negotiations for the Kurdistan Alliance’s return. But because Baghdad’s leaders
were themselves fractured over Abadi’s reforms among other issues, several political
groups within Baghdad will vie for the Kurds’ return to the CoR and into new
political agreements. The emerging Reform Front, created from the rump
parliament session on April 27, seeks
Kurdish membership in its efforts to reach a quorum. Abadi hopes to court the
Kurds back into the political process in order to resume his reform legislation
and to block the Reform Front’s efforts to changing the status quo.

CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi was among the first
to visit some Kurdish parties in order to secure their return to the political
process in Baghdad, but he went to Sulaimaniyah, the headquarters of the PUK,
rather than the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Arbil where the KDP prevails. Juburi’s
outreach to Kurdish leaders on May
8 appeared to be relegated to the
Kurdish opposition parties of the PUK and Gorran, with Juburi visiting recently-returned
Gorran leader Nushirwan Mustafa, who had returned to the Kurdistan Region on April 28 after seven months in London
seeking medical treatment. The timing of his return is not coincidental. Juburi
also met with Gorran Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad and PUK leader Ala
Talabani. Gorran and the PUK stand to lose from continued political absence and
are less committed ideologically to an independent Kurdish Region as the KDP.
They also have stakes in removing the political stranglehold of President
Barzani over KRG politics.

The international community, led by Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq Jan Kubis, finally achieved
a breakthrough that softened some Kurdish parliamentarians’ hardline stance
against their return to the CoR by appealing to financial interests. Kubis
carried out a series of meetings in both Sulaimaniyah, the headquarters of the PUK, and Arbil, the headquarters of the KDP, on May 8, where he reminded the
Kurdish parties that they would have access to the much needed International
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan only if they participated in the government in
Baghdad. Iraq stands to gain significant financial support from a proposed $15
billion loan from the IMF over the next three years. The KRG, as a part of Iraq,
would stand to inherit a portion of that fund, which, if approved, is slated to
release the first of three installments in June 2016. The prospect of massive
financial support through the IMF loan is further enticement for Kurdish
parties to remain active in the Baghdad government.

The Kurdish Alliance Fractures

The Kurdistan Alliance has formally fractured
over these financial incentives. The threat of no international financial
assistance has motivated several Kurdish CoR members to walk away from
stringent Kurdish demands of independence and from the KDP. The Iraqi
Government has continued to court Kurdish opposition parties, who are the most
likely to soften at prospects of the IMF loan, as Prime Minister Abadi
personally sent a delegation to
Sulaimaniyah on May 12 to meet with PUK member Ala Talabani and Gorran Second
Deputy CoR Speaker Aram Sheikh Muhammad. The IMF loan was the weight needed to
break apart the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran and the PUK announced on May 14 that
they had ratified a new political alliance. The two announced that
they would run on the same list in 2017 elections and would coordinate in
political efforts in the KRG, in the CoR, and in provincial governments.

The new PUK-Gorran Alliance will seek
alternative demands and negotiations for participation in Baghdad and will be
more willing to cooperate with the federal government than the KDP in order to
achieve their financial demands. A Reform Front member made an unconfirmed
report on May 13 that suggested that
the PUK-Gorran Alliance and Baghdad plan to carry out significant financial
negotiations including handing over oil sales to Baghdad in exchange for
Baghdad providing salaries for Kurdish employees in Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk, and
Arbil provinces.The PUK and Gorran are not in favor of declaring independence
of Iraqi Kurdistan at this time, and a senior PUK official, Mulla Bakhtiar,
noted during Juburi’s May 8 visit that “we
are still a part of Iraq.” Deputy
Prime Minister of the KRG and PUK member Qubad Talabani later stated on May 15 that now was not the
time for Kurdish independence, pointing specifically to the KRG’s weak economy
and infrastructure. The KRG, with the PUK-Gorran Alliance in charge, would
remain a part of Iraq and would seek negotiations with Baghdad.

The PUK and Gorran together have 29 CoR members
(originally 30; one Gorran member has joined the Reform Front) to the KDP’s 25.
Currently 216 of 328 CoR members are assessed to be boycotting CoR sessions,
the possible return of the new PUK-Gorran Alliance would likely influence other
blocs, notably the Sunni Etihad bloc with roughly 40 active members, to return
as well. (The current size of Etihad is unclear, as some members have joined
the Reform Front, but Etihad likely retains a sizeable number of members.)
These additions could put the CoR in range of meeting quorum and resuming
sessions. The KIU and KIG may also be persuaded to follow the PUK-Gorran lead
and return their seven CoR members to Baghdad. The Reform Front will try to
court the PUK-Gorran Alliance to join their bloc in order to sway the CoR
majority in their favor. Nouri al-Maliki praised the new PUK-Gorran Alliance on May 18 as an “important step” to
overcoming divisions within the Kurdistan Region and “an overall understanding
with Baghdad.” The Reform Front will likely increase relations with the new
alliance in the coming days in order to persuade the PUK-Gorran Alliance to
considering rejoining the CoR as a part of the Reform Front.

__________

Note: ISW has tracked Iraq’s building political crisis since early February, following political reforms proposed by Prime Minister Abadi and the challenges to them. The Council of Representatives (CoR) has also faced challenges from an increasingly fractious set of parties some of which have attempted to break off from the CoR and form a “rump” Parliament that later morphed into a new opposition bloc, the Reform Front, composed of members from various parties. As with all political maneuvering, ISW has relied on media reporting as well as our own assessment of likely political coordination, cooperation, and alignment among and between individuals and parties. We are currently re-examining our methodology in light of recent maneuvers and statements leading up to the CoR Ramadan break and will update our CoR graphic when that analysis is completed.

__________

Iran and the New PUK-Gorran Alliance

Iran has used its
historic relationship with the PUK in order to facilitate this Kurdish
political reorganization consistent with their interests: preventing Kurdish independence,
marginalizing Barzani, and returning to a stability in Baghdad consistent with
the status quo prior to protests. Iranian representatives therefore conducted a
series of meetings with the PUK after the April 30 protests, likely in an
effort to steer them politically and guide their demands. Iranian Ambassador to
Iraq Hassan Danaifar met with KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani on May 3 to discuss the political crisis. Danaifar met on May
4 with Second Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Barham Salih in an
unpublicized meeting that did not reach vetted media. Iranian Intelligence
Minister Mahmoud Alavi likewise visited both PM Nechirvan Barzani and President Masoud Barzani in Arbil on May 15, the latter
of whom Alavi invited to visit Tehran. Alavi then with Barham Salih and First
Deputy Secretary General of the PUK Kusrat Rasul Ali in another unpublicized meeting in Sulaimaniyah on May 15.
Iran likely has their own requests of the PUK and Gorran, including the return
of the Kurdish political parties to Baghdad in order to restore stability in
the Iraqi government. The Iranians have likewise used their relationship with
the PUK to corral President Masoud Barzani’s move towards independence and
attempts to monopolize power.

The KDP Reacts

The new PUK-Gorran Alliance is also large
enough to be a formidable rival to the KDP in KRG. The PUK became the third
largest party within the KRG after the 2013 parliamentary elections when Gorran
split from its ranks and formed its own party, seizing 24 seats in the KRG
parliament and reducing the size of the PUK from 29 seats in 2009 to 18 seats
in 2013. The KDP remains the largest party with 38 seats. As 2017 elections in
the KRG approach and as President Barzani continues to remain as president
beyond his term limit, the re-merger between the PUK and Gorran, which at
current numbers would boast a combined 42 seats in the KRG parliament, could
pose a significant political driver and perhaps a threat to Barzani, who has
occupied his office since since 2005. The KDP unsurprisingly denounced the new
alliance as “deepening internal
issues” within the KRG on May 18.

The KDP is now fracturing internally. Some members
still call for independence. One KDP CoR
member stated on May
10 that the “partnership between Baghdad and Arbil has collapsed.” President
Masoud Barzani’s speech on the
centenary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on May 16 called for recognition that
the Sykes-Picot had “ended” and to treat Iraq as a “brother and neighbor” and no
longer a partner. These strong condemnations of continued contact with Baghdad
contradict actions and statements made by other ranking KDP members.

Other KDP members would prefer to remain in
Baghdad politics. KDP member and Finance
Minister Hoshyar Zebari met with President Fuad Masoum on May 11 about
the impending IMF loan. KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani stated on May 12 that “as long as we are part of
Iraq, we should not be cut off from the political process,” calling for the
Kurdish CoR members to return to Baghdad. Nechirvan Barzani’s statement echoes
sentiments closer to PUK official Mulla Bakhtiar than to KDP associates and
family members. Some KDP members may therefore
return to the CoR on their own accord.

Alternatively, the lack of cohesion in rhetoric
may be a way for the KDP to maintain its political leverage. President Masoud
Barzani’s continued rhetoric requires political negotiators in Baghdad – whether
it is Abadi or the Reform Front – to likewise increase their bids for the KDP’s
return. Meanwhile, PM Nechirvan Barzani and key KDP officials like Zebari
continue to soothe Baghdad’s concerns that their bids are unreceived and provide
continued physical contact between the KDP and Baghdad. The KDP will not
relinquish power easily, whether in Baghdad or Arbil, and will play all its
cards in order to make Baghdad cater to its demands..

Baghdad Sweetens the Deal

President Fuad Masoum arrived in Arbil on May
16 and May 17, meeting with President Masoud Barzani and
later with Vice President Qubad Talabani to
stress the importance of political solutions. Masoum also met with PUK founder
Jalal Talabani and
with Gorran leader Nushirwan Mustafa in
Sulaimaniyah on May 19 to congratulate the new PUK-Gorran Alliance and discuss
the return to Baghdad. Masoum seeks to bring the Kurds back to Baghdad while
maintaining the cohesion in the Kurdish bloc.

On May 17, the Iraqi Central Bank, managed by
Ali al-Alaaq, announced that it will open a branch in the Kurdistan Region as
the result of talks between the “federal government” and KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani. Alaaq, a prominent member of the Dawa Party, was part of the
delegation personally sent
by PM Abadi to meet with PUK and Gorran officials in Sulaimaniyah on May 12.
The opening of a banking establishment in Arbil that is directly and inherently
connected to Baghdad suggests long-term coordination between Baghdad and Arbil
and an intent to establish continued relations. The opening also underscores
that the Kurdistan Region will not move for independence any time soon and
instead will continue negotiations that allow for long-term financial support
from the Iraqi Government in return for the Kurdish parties’ return to the CoR.
Additionally, the announcement on May 19 that the IMF has a $5.4 billion standby agreement to Iraq, with
the ability to receive up to $15 billion from international aid over three
years, and the rumor that the Kurds would receive 17% of
this loan, adds further pressure and enticement for the Kurds to remain active
in the Baghdad political process. The personal visit of Oil Minister Adil
Abdul-Mahdi to visit President Masoud Barzani in Arbil on May
19 also suggests that the KRG and
Baghdad will continue to conduct financial agreements. These signs of the KRG’s
continued financial dependence on Baghdad indicates that all Kurdish parties
will return to the CoR, however it is unclear when they will return and if they
return as a cohesive bloc or separate entities.

Will the Kurds Return to Parliament?

The fracture of the Kurdistan Alliance will
force the Kurdish parties to reevaluate their positions in both Baghdad and
Arbil. It is unlikely that the Kurdistan Alliance as it existed before April 30
will remain. The new PUK-Gorran Alliance will shift the power dynamics within the
Kurdish political parties. The PUK and Gorran are likely to return to the CoR
as negotiations, primarily over the IMF loan, continue. The KDP may return as
well, but it is unclear if it will return within the framework of the
PUK-Gorran Alliance or outside of it. The new PUK-Gorran Alliance will likely work
more closely with the Abadi government in Baghdad.

PM Abadi may find the Kurdish parties with the
PUK-Gorran Alliance at the helm a more malleable and open-minded political ally
that can help him retain his control over the government and keep pro-Maliki
political forces at bay. The PUK and Gorran will likely soften their position
on Baghdad’s oversight in northern Iraq if Baghdad can guarantee substantial
financial support to the alliance’s primary support base in Sulaimaniyah and
Kirkuk provinces. The PUK-Gorran Alliance’s current disinclination towards
Kurdish independence will also ease the concerns of Abadi, Iran, and the U.S.
which seek a unitary Iraq.

The KDP may seek new partners within the CoR in
order to maintain its relevance as the PUK-Gorran bloc moves ahead. Maliki’s
Reform Front is trying to entice it, a dangerous course of action because it
could empower the Abadi government’s main challenger. But the PUK-Gorran
alliance itself is also negotiating for the KDP’s return, and it can offer a
combination of concessions in Arbil and Baghdad that help stabilize both, a
tremendous boon for an Iraqi government on the verge of collapse.