Markets, morals and civic life

What are the reasons for the impoverished public discourse of our time? And what might a morally invigorated mode of political argument look like?

Almost without realising it, we have drifted from having market economies to becoming market societies. The difference is this: a market economy is a tool — a valuable and effective tool — for organising productive activity. But a market society is a place where almost everything is up for sale. It is a way of life in which market values seep into social relations and govern every domain.

Why worry about this trend? For two reasons. First, as money looms larger in our societies, affluence, or the lack of it, matters more. If the main advantages of affluence were the ability to afford yachts and fancy vacations, then inequality would matter less than it does today. But as money governs access to education, healthcare, political influence, and safe neighbourhoods, life becomes harder for those of modest means. The marketisation of everything sharpens the sting of inequality.

Second, putting a price on all human activities can be corrupting. Consider voting. No democracies officially permit the buying and selling of votes. To sell my vote would be to degrade it, to corrupt its meaning as an expression of civic duty. But if a market in votes is objectionable because it corrupts democracy, what about systems of campaign finance (including the one currently in place in the US) that give wealthy donors a disproportionate voice in elections? The reason to reject a market in votes — preserving the integrity of democracy — may also be a reason to limit financial contributions to political candidates.

Of course, we often disagree about what counts as “corrupting” or “degrading”. To decide whether we should allow the buying and selling of human organs, for example, or whether we should hire mercenaries to fight our wars, we have to think through hard questions about human dignity and civic responsibility. But this suggests that market reasoning depends on moral reasoning.

The classical economists, going back to Adam Smith, rightly conceived of economics as a branch of moral and political philosophy. But the version of economics commonly taught today presents itself as an autonomous discipline, one that does not pass judgment on how income should be distributed or how this or that good should be valued. The notion that economics is a value-free science has always been questionable. But the more markets extend their reach into noneconomic aspects of life, the more entangled they become with moral questions.

In pluralist societies, we disagree about how to value goods, and so it is tempting to try to resolve our differences without bringing moral argument into politics. But this impulse is a mistake; it has contributed to the empty, hollow public discourse of our time. We should not ask citizens to leave their moral convictions at the door when they enter the public square. Instead, we should embrace a morally more robust public discourse, one that engages rather than avoids the moral convictions that citizens bring to public life.