Theses/Dissertations - Philosophyhttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/4792
Sun, 18 Feb 2018 06:32:42 GMT2018-02-18T06:32:42ZCultivating character : spiritual exercises, remedial virtues, and the formation of the heart.http://hdl.handle.net/2104/9661
Cultivating character : spiritual exercises, remedial virtues, and the formation of the heart.
According to philosophical situationists, empirical psychology suggests that most people are not virtuous, and that we should be skeptical about the possibility of cultivating virtue. I argue against the second claim by offering an empirically informed model of character formation. The model begins with ancient formational wisdom emphasizing emotion education, the practice of spiritual exercises, self-monitoring, and willpower, and is confirmed, nuanced, and supplemented by insights from recent empirical psychology. Many ancient philosophers, recent social psychologists, and philosophers of emotion agree that emotions are central to moral cognition. I defend a perceptual account of emotion, and show how this account suggests a practical upshot that empirical psychologists tend not to emphasize, but that the ancients would endorse: emotion education should be a primary focus of character formation. I dilate on this practical point using the remediation of inappropriate anger as a test case. Taking my remedial cues from the Stoic and Christian traditions, I argue that training the emotions through self-monitoring, willpower, and the use of “spiritual exercises”—practices of mind and body whereby one digests the doctrines of one’s philosophical school, so that those doctrines are not matters of mere notional understanding, but actually take up residence in one’s vision of the world—provides hope for meaningful movement in the direction of virtue. The rigorous practice of spiritual exercises involves difficult work. To have much success, the moral trainee will need at least the seeds of what I call “remedial virtues”: character excellences that enable an agent to do the demanding work of re-cultivating her character. The remedial virtues include self-vigilance (a kind of moral watchfulness) and the virtues of willpower (e.g., self-control, courage, perseverance, and patience). I develop empirically informed philosophical analyses of self-vigilance and the virtues of willpower, and offer empirical evidence to support the claim that they can be cultivated. Then I show how the remedial virtues can help us resist temptation, leverage temptation in the interest of further growth in character, and correct for the subtle situational forms of moral interference that situationists emphasize.
Fri, 05 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/96612016-02-05T00:00:00ZCommon sense epistemology : a defense of seemings as evidence.http://hdl.handle.net/2104/9636
Common sense epistemology : a defense of seemings as evidence.
Starting from an internalist, evidentialist, deontological conception of epistemic justification, this dissertation constitutes a defense of common sense epistemology. Common sense epistemology is a theory of ultimate evidence. At its center is a type of mental state called “seemings”—the kind we possess when something seems true or false. Common sense epistemology maintains, first, that all seemings are evidence for or against their content and, second, that all our ultimate evidence for or against a proposition consists in seemings. The first thesis entails phenomenal conservatism—an increasingly prominent and controversial epistemic principle. Together these theses imply that what stances we’re intellectually permitted to take will ultimately come down to what seems to be the case. Following a short introduction, the groundwork for the project is laid in Chapter Two. Common sense epistemology is presented in detail and situated within a larger epistemic framework. Starting assumptions are made explicit and briefly defended. The significance of the project is highlighted, including for those who reject the starting assumptions. I then begin my defense. The defense of common sense epistemology offered herein is holistic in that I strengthen the metaphysical and historical foundations of the theory in addition to arguing straightforwardly for its truth. In Chapter Three I show how common sense epistemology is a contemporary outworking of epistemic insights contained in the work of Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. In Chapter Four I give one of the most detailed accounts of seemings available and defend their existence. In Chapter Five I present my main argument for common sense epistemology. I begin with a Reidian argument for phenomenal conservatism. After concluding that all seemings are ultimate evidence, I consider what other kinds of mental states might serve in that role. All the likely alternatives are considered and rejected, leaving seemings as the lone candidate. In Chapter Six I respond to the problem of cognitive penetration—an influential objection that arises during my defense of phenomenal conservatism. Together these chapters compose one of the most thorough and sustained defenses of phenomenal conservatism and common sense epistemology in the literature.
Tue, 05 Apr 2016 00:00:00 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/96362016-04-05T00:00:00ZCivic friendship and a value assumption in Rawls.http://hdl.handle.net/2104/9616
Civic friendship and a value assumption in Rawls.
In the late twentieth century, John Rawls reinvigorated the social contract theory in political philosophy. Previous contract theories could not explain how those bound by the social contract consent to be bound. Rawls argues that we consent to the contract hypothetically. If we would agree, under ideal conditions for resolving questions about the basic structure of society, to a particular social contract, then we actually consent (in the relevant sense) to the contract. With this understanding of consent in mind, Rawls argues in two stages. First, he argues to the original position – arguing that his original position thought experiment represents the ideal conditions for resolving questions about the basic structure of society. Subsequently, Rawls argues from the original position - parties in the original position would agree to two principles of justice which he names justice as fairness. If both arguments are sound, then all of us give our hypothetical consent to the terms of the social contract spelled out by justice as fairness. This dissertation argues that these arguments cannot both be sound. I approach Rawls’ work with a specific concern – in modern American society, discourse has become increasingly uncivil. This background condition gives rise to inquiry into civic friendship – how citizens might wish their anonymous fellow-citizens well and thus give rise to more amicable social conditions. Rawlsian liberalism helps adapt an Aristotelian conception of civic friendship to modern conditions of the pluralistic nation-state. Yet this conception of civic friendship has certain important limitations. Rawls designs the original position carefully – controversial assumptions may prevent people from acknowledging it as the ideal position, undermining the argument to the original position. But the argument from the original position requires the parties to select principles of justice from among a slate of options. This selection, like all acts, requires some ascription of value by the actor. In Rawls’ arguments, the parties assume that fulfilling the rational desires of persons is choiceworthy. This is inconsistent with the requirement that the original position avoid controversial assumptions. The argument to the original position and the argument from the original position cannot both be sound.
Wed, 16 Mar 2016 00:00:00 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/96162016-03-16T00:00:00ZTheism and the justification of first principles in Thomas Reid’s epistemology.http://hdl.handle.net/2104/8852
Theism and the justification of first principles in Thomas Reid’s epistemology.
Poore, Gregory S.
The role of theism in Thomas Reid’s epistemology remains an unresolved question. Opinions range from outright denials that theism has any relevance to Reid’s epistemology to claims that Reid’s epistemology depends upon theism in a dogmatic or a viciously circular manner. This dissertation attempts to bring some order to this interpretive fray by answering the following question: What role or roles does theism play in Reid’s epistemology, particularly in relation to the epistemic justification of first principles?
Chapters 2-4 lay the foundation for answering this question and clarify some terminology. Chapter 2 distinguishes key senses in which Reid uses the terms “principle” and “first principle.” Chapter 3 argues for a novel interpretation of common sense and the principles of common sense. This interpretation avoids a number of objections to Reid’s principles of common sense. Chapter 4 considers the initial externalist justification of Reid’s first principles. It shows Reid has a surprisingly well-developed proper-functionalism and brings to light several overlooked elements of his epistemology.
Chapters 5-8 argue theism can and does play various important and philosophically respectable roles in Reid’s epistemology, particularly in relation to the justification of first principles. Chapter 5 argues that even on the standard foundationalist interpretation of Reid’s epistemology, theism can and does boost the justification of first principles. Chapter 6 shows Reid’s epistemology is not a form of simple foundationalism but contains coherentist elements. This enables theism further to boost the justification of first principles. Chapter 7 reveals that Reid’s epistemology contains different kinds or levels of knowledge, and shows that theism enables the highest form of knowledge, which I call scientia. Chapter 8 argues that within Reid’s epistemology theism helps protect and preserve the justification of first principles.
Tue, 24 Sep 2013 00:00:00 GMThttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/88522013-09-24T00:00:00Z