As Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad

Name

This group's name is usually abbreviated as JTJ or most often shortened to Tawhid and Jihad, Tawhid wal-Jihad and sometimes Tawhid al-Jihad (or just Al Tawhid or Tawhid).

Origins

Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad was started by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, other foreigners, and local, mostly KurdishIslamist sympathizers. Zarqawi was a JordanianSalafi who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the Soviet-Afghan War, but had arrived after the departure of the Soviet troops; instead he busied himself with reporting on the fighting of others. After a trip home, he eventually returned to Afghanistan, running an Islamic militant training camp near Herat in Afghanistan. Zarqawi started the network originally with a focus on overthrowing the kingdom of Jordan, which he considered to be un-Islamic in the fundamentalist sense. Eventually, Zarqawi developed a large number of contacts and affiliates in several countries. His network may have been involved in the late 1999 plot to bomb the Millennium celebrations in the U.S. and Jordan. Zarqawi's operatives have been also responsible for the assassination of the U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan in 2002.[6]

Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, it is believed that Zarqawi moved westward into Iraq, where he may have received medical treatment in Baghdad for an injured leg. It is believed that he developed extensive ties in Iraq with Ansar al-Islam ("Partisans of Islam"), a Kurdish Islamist militant group that was based in the extreme northeast of the country. Ansar had alleged ties to Iraqi Intelligence; Saddam Hussein's motivation would have been to use Ansar as a surrogate force to repress the secular Kurds who wanted a "free Kurdistan".[7] In January 2003 Ansar's founder, Mullah Krekar, had staunchly denied any such contacts with Saddam's regime.[8] The consensus of intelligence officials has since concluded that there were no links whatsoever between Zarqawi and Saddam, and that Saddam viewed Ansar al-Islam "as a threat to the regime" and that Saddam's intelligence officials were spying on the group. The Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence concluded in 2006, "Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi."[9]

Following the 2003 U.S-led invasion of Iraq, JTJ was first developed as a militant network composed of the growing number of foreign fighters and the remnants of Ansar al-Islam to resist the coalition occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. In May 2004 JTJ joined forces with another small Islamist organisation, Salafiah al-Mujahidiah.[10] Many foreign fighters were not group members, but once in Iraq they became dependent on Zarqawi's local contacts.[11]

Goals

The stated goals of JTJ were to force a withdrawal of U.S-led forces from Iraq, topple the Iraqi interim government and assassinate collaborators with the "occupation," marginalize the Shia Islam population and defeat its militias, and to subsequently establish a pure Islamic state. Presumably, if and when those goals are achieved, the global Jihad would continue to establish a pan-Islamic state and remove Western influence from the Muslim world.

Tactics

JTJ differed from other Iraqi insurgent groups considerably in its tactics. Rather than just using conventional weapons and guerrilla tactics, it has relied heavily on suicide bombings, mostly with vehicles, targeting a wide variety of groups but most especially Iraqi Security Forces and those facilitating the occupation. U.S and coalition forces, the United Nations (UN), foreign civilians, humanitarian organizations, Iraqi Shia and Kurdish political and religious figures, Iraqi police and security forces, and Iraqi interim officials have also been targeted. The group have assassinated several leading Iraqi politicians of the early post-Saddam era.[11]

JTJ cited various texts from the Qur'an and the Sunnah (traditions) of Muhammad that they perceived to support their tactics. They referred to the tradition of the prophet Muhammad where he said to the people of Mecca when conquering them, "By the one in whose hand the soul of Muhammad is in, I came to you with slaughter" narrated in the books of Hadith (traditions). They also quoted Muhammad saying, "Whoever slaughters a non-Muslim (at war with Islam, i.e. those perceived to be 'enemy occupiers') sincerely for the sake of Allah, Allah will make hellfire prohibited upon him," as well as many verses of the Qur'an calling Muslims to fight invading non-Muslims and even behead them, such where Allah says in the Qur'an, "when you meet the non-Muslim (enemies in battle) strike their necks." The group's spiritual advisor (and deputy leader) was the Palestinian cleric Abu Anas al-Shami.

Strength and activity

The group's strength is unknown, with estimates that have ranged from 850 to several thousand full-time fighters in 2007.[25][26] In 2006, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that AQI’s core membership was in a range of "more than 1,000."[25] (These figures do not include the other six[27] AQI-led Salafi groups organized in the Islamic State of Iraq.) The group is said to be suffering high manpower losses (including from its many "martyrdom" operations), but for a long time this appeared to have little effect on its strength and capabilities, implying a constant flow of volunteers from Iraq and abroad.

According to the June 2008 CNN special report, al-Qaeda in Iraq is "a well-oiled organization (...) almost as pedantically bureaucratic as was Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party", including collecting new execution videos long after they stopped publicising them, with a network of spies even in American bases. According to the report, Iraqis (many of them former members of Hussein's secret services) now effectively run al-Qaeda in Iraq and "foreign fighters' roles seem mostly relegated to the cannon fodder of suicide attacks." The exception from this is the organization's top leadership, which is still dominated by non-Iraqis.[29]

Some suggest that the threat posed by AQI is exaggerated and some scholars claim that a "heavy focus on al-Qaeda obscures a much more complicated situation on the ground."[30][31]

Rise and decline of al-Qaeda in Iraq

The group officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in a letter in October 2004.[32][33][34] That same month, the group, now popularly referred to as "al-Qaeda in Iraq", kidnapped and murdered the Japanese citizen Shosei Koda. In November, al-Zarqawi's network was the main target of the U.S. Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, but its leadership managed to escape the American siege and subsequent storming of the city. In December, in two of its many sectarian attacks, al-Qaeda bombed a Shi'ite funeral procession in Najaf and the main bus station in nearby Karbala, killing at least 60 in the holy cities of Shia Islam. The group also reportedly took responsibility for a bombing which killed 41 people, mostly children, in Baghdad.[35]

Images of the ID cards of two missing U.S. soldiers, publicised by the ISI in June 2007

The high-profile attacks linked to the group continued through early 2007, as the AQI-led Islamic State claimed responsibility for attacks such as the March assassination attempt on Sunni Deputy Prime Minister of IraqSalam al-Zaubai, the April Iraqi Parliament bombing, and the May capture and subsequent execution of three American soldiers. Also in May, ISI leader al-Baghdadi was declared to have been killed in Baghdad, but his death was later denied by the insurgents (later, al-Baghdadi was even declared by the U.S. to be non-existent). There were also conflicting reports regarding the fate of al-Masri. In March-August, coalition forces fought a major Battle of Baqubah as part of the largely successful attempts to wrest the Diyala Governorate from AQI-aligned forces. Through 2007, the majority of the suicide bombings targeting civilians in Iraq were routinely identified by the military and government sources as being the responsibility of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, even when there was no claim of responsibility (as was in the case of the 2007 Yazidi communities bombings, which killed some 800 people in the most deadly terrorist attack in Iraq to date).

By late 2007, violent and indiscriminate attacks directed by AQI against Iraqi civilians had severely damaged their image and caused the loss of support among the population, isolating the group. In a major blow to AQI, many former Sunni militants that previously fought along with the group started to work with the American forces (see also below). In addition, the U.S. troop surge supplied military planners with more manpower for operations targeting the group, resulting in dozens of high-level AQI members being captured or killed.[42] Al-Qaeda seemed to have lost its foothold in Iraq and appeared to be severely crippled.[43] Accordingly, the bounty issued for al-Masri was eventually cut from $5 million down to a mere $100,000 in April 2008.[44]

Inciting sectarian violence through terrorism

Attacks against civilians often targeted the Iraqi Shia majority in an attempt to incite sectarian violence and greater chaos in the country.[45] Al-Zarqawi purportedly declared an all-out war on Shiites[46] while claiming responsibility for the Shiite mosque bombings.[47] The same month, a statement claiming to be by AQI rejected as "fake" a letter allegedly written by al-Zawahiri, in which he appears to question the insurgents' tactics in attacking Shiites in Iraq.[48] In a December 2007 video, al-Zawahiri defended the Islamic State in Iraq, but distanced himself from the crimes against civilians committed by "hypocrites and traitors existing among the ranks".[49]

Operations outside Iraq and other activities

On December 3, 2004, AQI attempted to blow up an Iraqi-Jordanian border crossing, but failed to do so (in 2006, a Jordanian court sentenced Zarqawi (in absentia) and two of his associates to death for their involvement in the plot).[51] AQI also increased its presence outside Iraq by claiming credit for three attacks in 2005. In the most deadly attack, suicide bomb 2005 Amman bombings killed 60 people in Amman, Jordan, on November 9, 2005.[52] They also claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks that narrowly missed the USS Kearsarge and the USS Ashland in Jordan, and which also targeted the city of Eilat in Israel, and for the firing of several rockets into Israel from Lebanon in December.[20]

In addition, the Lebanese-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam, which was defeated by Lebanese government forces during the 2007 Lebanon conflict, was linked to AQI and led by Zarqawi's former companion who had fought in Iraq.[53] The group may also have been linked with the little-known group called "Tawhid and Jihad in Syria", and may have influenced the extremist Palestinian group called "Tawhid and Jihad Brigades" (better known as Army of Islam) in Gaza.[54][55]

Al-Qaeda in Iraq has long raised money through various activities like ransomingkidnapping victims, car theft (sometimes killing the drivers), and hijacking fuel trucks, that bring them tens of millions of dollars.[44] According to an April 2007 statement by the rival Islamic Army, the group was demanding jizya and killing members of wealthy families when not paid.[56] According to both U.S. and Iraqi sources in May 2008, the Islamic State of Iraq was stepping up its racketeering campaigns as their strictly militant capabilities were on the wane (with especially lucrative activity said to be coming from oil rackets centered on the industrial city of Bayji). According to U.S. military intelligence sources, the group resembled a "Mafia-esque criminal gang" in 2008.[44]

Conflicts with the other Sunni militant groups and the Awakening movement

The first reports of a split and even armed clashes between AQI/MSC and other insurgent Sunni groups date back to 2005.[57][58] In the summer of 2006, local Sunni tribes and insurgent groups, including the prominent Islamist-nationalist group Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), began to speak of their dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and its tactics,[59] openly criticizing the foreign fighters for their deliberate targeting of Iraqi civilians. In September 2006, thirty Anbar tribes formed their own local alliance called the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), directed specifically at countering al-Qaeda-allied ("terrorist") forces in the province,[60][61] openly siding with the government and the U.S. troops.[62][63]

By the beginning of 2007, Sunni tribes and nationalist insurgents had begun battling with their former allies in AQI in order to retake control of their communities.[64] In early 2007, forces allied to al-Qaeda in Iraq committed a series of attacks against Sunnis critical of the group, including the February 2007 attack in which scores of people were killed when a truck bomb exploded near a Sunni mosque in Fallujah.[65] Al-Qaeda also supposedly played a vital role in the assassination of the leader of the Anbar-based insurgent group 1920 Revolution Brigade, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement.[66] In April 2007, the IAI spokesman accused the ISI of killing at least 30 members of the Islamic Army, as well as members of the Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna and Mujahideen Army insurgent groups, and called on Osama bin Laden to personally intervene to rein in al-Qaeda in Iraq.[56][67] The following month, the government stated that AQI leader al-Masri was killed by ASC fighters.[3][50] Four days later, AQI released an audio tape in which a man claiming to be al-Masri warned Sunnis not to take part in the political process (later in May the U.S. forces announced the release of dozens of Iraqis who were tortured by AQI as a part of the group's intimidation campaign[68]), but also said that reports of internal fighting between Sunni militia groups were "lies and fabrications".[69]

By June 2007, the growing hostility between foreign-influenced religious fanatics and Sunni nationalists led to open gun battles between the groups in Baghdad.[70][71] The Islamic Army, however, soon reached a ceasefire agreement with AQI, yet still refusing to sign on to the ISI.[72] There were also reports that Hamas of Iraq insurgents were involved in assisting U.S. troops in their Diyala Governorate operations against al-Qaeda in August 2007. In September 2007, AQI claimed responsibility for the assassination of three people including the prominent Sunni sheikhAbdul Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar "Awakening council". That same month, a suicide attack on a mosque in the city of Baqubah killed 28 people, including members of Hamas of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, during a meeting at the mosque between tribal and guerilla leaders and the police.[73] Meanwhile, the U.S. military began arming moderate insurgent factions on the promise to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq instead of the Americans.[74]

By December 2007, the strength of the "Awakening" movement irregulars (also called "Concerned Local Citizens" and "Sons of Iraq") was estimated at some 65,000-80,000 fighters.[75] Many of them were former insurgents (including even alienated former AQI supporters), now being armed and paid by the Americans specifically to combat al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq. As of July 2007, this highly controversial strategy proved so far to be effective in helping to secure the Sunni districts of Baghdad and the other hotspots of central Iraq and rout out al-Qaeda-aligned militants.

Transformation and resurgency

In early 2009, with American forces pulling out of cities across the country and security being left to the Iraqi Army, police, and their paramilitary allies, experts and many Iraqis worried that in the absence of U.S. soldiers AQI may attempt to resurface and once again carry out mass-casualty attacks,[76] the fears that soon find confirmation in the spike in suicide attacks.[77] Through the mid and late 2009, al-Qaeda in Iraq has rebounded in strength and appeared to be launching a concerted effort to cripple the Iraqi government as U.S. troops withdraw from the country.[78] During August and October of 2009, AQI asserted responsibility for four powerful bombings that targeted five government buildings in Baghdad, including the attacks that killed 101 at the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance in August and 155 at the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works in September; these were the deadliest series of attacks directed at the government in more than six years of war. This strategy represents a shift in tactics from the group's previous efforts to incite sectarian violence, although a series of suicide attacks in April targeted mostly Iranian Shia pilgrims, killing 76, and in June a mosque bombing in Taza killed at least 73 Shi'ites from the Turkmen ethnic minority.

According to the commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, AQI "has transformed significantly in the last two years. What once was dominated by foreign individuals has now become more and more dominated by Iraqi citizens." Odierno's comments reinforced accusations by the government of Nuri al-Maliki that al-Qaeda and ex-Ba'athists were working together to undermine improved security and sabotage the planned Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2010.[79]

Special Groups (Iraq) Iranian backed factions of the Mahdi Army which went on to become separate organisations which continued fighting after the Mahdi Army's disbanding.

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous)
The largest Special Group, allegedly led by Qais al-Khazali and his brother Laith al-Khazali. The group is therefore also referred to as the Khazali network.

Promised Day Brigades
The Special Group which was created as successor of the Mahdi Army and continued activities against US and coalition forces

Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades)
The most notorious Special Group, it also became a completely independent organisation from the Mahdi Army and other Speicial Groups