For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness,

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused....

When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

But while a party can use evidence of subsequent remedial measures to impeach witnesses, it can only do so if such evidence is relevant, which was a problem for the defendant in Leprino Foods Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3134625 (10th Cir. 2011).

In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, [for] a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death.

But let's say that a declarant makes a statement relatively soon before dying without being told that his death is imminent or any overt indication that he believes his death to be imminent. Can the court infer such a belief based solely on the nature of the declarant's injuries? According to the recent opinion of the Court of Appeals of Mississippi in Moore v. State, 2011 WL 3066211 (Miss.App. 2011), the answer is "yes."

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party except that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by the party calling the witness by means of a prior inconsistent statement only upon a showing of surprise and affirmative damage.

And because the prosecution impeached its own witness through a prior inconsistent without a showing of surprise and affirmative damage inState v. Holloway, 2011 WL 2899596 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 2011), the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, had to reverse the defendant's conviction.

For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness,

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused....

Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

Unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness, [for] records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth...matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel....

So, are probation records admissible under Rule 803(8)(B) or inadmissible under its criminal case restriction? According to the recent opinion of the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Gregg, 2011 WL 2899622 (Colo.App. 2011), they are admissible. But was the court correct that the plain language of the Rule compels this conclusion?