Spain and Portugal

The costs of a huge army and an expansionary foreign policy led to revolts and political
crises in Spain as well as France. In the sixteenth century, Spain was the wealthiest
and most powerful country in Europe, conquering Portugal in 1580 and ruling an empire
that stretched around the world. Gold and silver from New World mines poured
into Spain, and Spanish oil, wine, and wool were exported to the colonies. Serious
problems were already in evidence by the end of the century, however. Spanish armies
had not been able to quash the revolt in the Netherlands, and in 1609 Philip III (ruled
1598–1622) recognized the independence of the northern part of the Netherlands as
the United Provinces. Dutch and English ships took over much of the trade with
the Spanish colonies, and Spanish attempts to prohibit this were futile. Central and
South American mines gradually produced less metal, and the Indians and Africans
forced to work in them died of disease and malnutrition. Royal expenses continued
to increase, so much so that the crown declared bankruptcy fi ve times between 1590
and 1680. Declaring bankruptcy cancelled debts in the short term, but only heightened
the crisis, as new loans to keep the government afl oat could only be secured at
higher and higher rates of interest, thus transferring more wealth to the bankers and
merchants (many of them outside Spain) who were willing to risk loaning money to
the government.
Like the old French nobility, Spanish aristocrats disdained commercial ventures
as vulgar and lived off the rents of their lands. Their hostility to change and devotion
to past military glories were stronger than those of nobles elsewhere, however,
largely preventing the ennobling of new families through service as judges or offi -
cials. Though wealthy commoners could increasingly buy noble titles, they expected
after doing so to live off rents, not hold a legal or government position that would
require actual work. The exclusivity of the nobility was further enhanced by the obsession
with “purity of the blood” – having no Muslim or Jewish ancestors – for converts
included the sort of well-educated urban professionals that in other parts of
Europe were becoming state bureaucrats and royal administrators. In 1609 to 1611,
over 200,000 Muslims and Muslim converts were expelled to North Africa, further
reducing a population that had already declined signifi cantly because of famine and
epidemic disease. Spanish nobles saw no way other than raising rents to increase their
income and pay for imported luxuries, but this came at the same time as the government
was increasing taxes; the peasants often had no surplus to sell and could not pay,
abandoning their lands and drifting into cities or becoming vagabonds. The middle
class was tiny, and there was little support for programs to develop industry or improve
agricultural productivity.
The Spanish nobility did back the crown in its military ventures, but these only
brought further debt. Spain entered the Thirty Years War on the side of its Habsburg
cousins, which allowed Portugal to revolt against Spanish rule in 1640 and regain its
independence. The northern Spanish province of Catalonia revolted the same year, a
war that dragged on for fi fteen years, though ultimately Spain recovered the province.
Spain and France continued fi ghting after the Peace of Westphalia, with Spain eventually
compelled to give up large territories to France.
In recent years, historians have emphasized that the decline of Spain from its
sixteenth-century heights of power was not as uniform as earlier historians had
held. Philip III was long criticized for ruling through royal favorites and offi cials,
but this may have represented his recognition of the realities of governing a huge
and far-fl ung empire, rather than being simply a sign of weakness or incompetence.
The establishment of the Bourbon dynasty with Philip V (ruled 1700–46) did lead
Spain to become a fully unifi ed country, with its capital in Madrid. In the middle of
the eighteenth century Charles III (ruled 1759–88) began a few programs of reform,
which stabilized the economy somewhat and reduced government debt. Population
and industry grew, especially in rural areas away from the capital. These measures
were opposed by the nobility and the church, however, and this opposition combined
with further involvement in wars abroad meant that government fi nances
remained chaotic.
Portugal was under Spanish Habsburg rule from 1580 to 1640, when opposition led
to the proclamation of an independent Portuguese monarchy under John IV (ruled
1640–56). He left several sons, the younger of whom, at nineteen, ousted his older
brother in a coup, ruling as regent until the older brother died in prison, when he took
over offi cially as Peter II (ruled 1683–1706). Because of the rather questionable way
he had come to the throne, Peter shared power with the high nobles, whose support
he needed; he also made strategic marriage alliances with many of Europe’s ruling
houses. Portugal became involved in the War of the Spanish Succession, during which
parts of the country were left in ruins, but otherwise largely stayed out of international
confl icts. During the long reigns of John V (ruled 1706–50) and Joseph I (ruled
1750–77), Portugal benefi ted from gold fl owing in from Brazil. The kings built
churches and palaces in imitation of Louis XIV, and brought in a series of reforming
ministers. After the city of Lisbon was devastated by an earthquake in 1755, the
most dynamic of those ministers, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (1699–1782),
usually known as the marquis de Pombal, consolidated his power in the interests
of centralized control and sounder economic policies. He limited the independent
power of the nobility and greatly reduced the power of the church in both Portugal
itself and its empire. Pombal dramatically shrank the Inquisition, and in 1759, under
his direction, Portugal and its colonies expelled the Jesuits, accusing them of political
intrigue.ñêà÷àòü dle 12.1