Anti-Semitism and the Jewish future in Europe

An oft-quoted new survey seems to suggest that many Jews in Europe are not living with the peace of mind and sense of security that every ethnic and religious group ought to enjoy. This survey, however, has several limitations.

Historically, the relationship of Jewry to Europe has
been ambiguous. On the one hand, Europe has been the homeland for generations
of Jews since antiquity. This is reflected in the names of two of the main
ethnic categories of Jews in the world: Sephardi (‘Spanish’) and Ashkenazi
(‘German’). In modern times, Europe has incubated Jewish movements as diverse
as Hasidism and the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment), Zionism, and Bundism. On
the other hand, it also gave birth to anti-Semitism, culminating in the Nazi
Holocaust: the mass murder of millions of Jews across the continent and the
wholesale destruction of Jewish life in eastern Europe. For this reason, Europe
is sometimes seen as the Jewish graveyard rather than the Jewish homeland.

At first sight, a recent
survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA),
“Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences
and perceptions of antisemitism” (November 2013), might appear to lend support
to the latter view and cast doubt on whether there is a long-term future for
Jews in Europe. A headline in the Jewish Daily Forward asks, “Could
Spreading European Anti-Semitism Drive Jews From Homelands?” Shimon Ohayon, Likud Yisrael Beitenu MK and chair of the Knesset Lobby
for the Struggle against Antisemitism, remarked: “There are now places on the continent where Jews can no longer live
and many others where no outward expressions of Jewishness are tolerated.” The
“rise in hate,” he said, “is creating an untenable situation for the Jews of
Europe.”

The FRA report presents the results of an open online
survey of 5,847 people in eight European Union (EU) countries where about 90
percent of the estimated Jewish population in the EU live: Belgium, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK). (Romania
was included initially but the number of responses was so low that the data
were not included in the main body of the report.) The survey, which was
conducted about a year ago by a consortium of the UK-based Institute for Jewish
Policy Research (JPR) and Ipsos MORI, was open to individuals 16 years or older
who live in the selected countries and who identify as Jewish. For the most
part, the questionnaire was quantitative, though at the end respondents could
add comments in their own words.

The picture that emerges from this survey is certainly
troubling: “Two thirds of the respondents (66 percent) consider anti-Semitism
to be ‘a very big’ or ‘a fairly big problem’ in the country where they live”
(p. 15). Some 76 percent “consider that antisemitism has worsened over the past
five years in the country where they live” (p. 16). Overall, 75 percent “consider
antisemitism online as a problem today in the country where they live” (p. 19),
while 73 percent “perceive that antisemitism online has increased over the last
five years” (p. 20). Some 59 percent “feel that antisemitism in the media is ‘a
very big’ or ‘a fairly big problem’, while 54 percent say the same about
expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street and other public places”
(p. 19). Moreover, 46 percent “worry about becoming a victim of an antisemitic
verbal insult or harassment in the next 12 months, while one third (33 percent)
worry about being physically attacked in that same period” (p. 32). In
addition, 29 percent “have considered emigrating in the past five years because
they did not feel safe there as Jews” (p. 37).

The picture that emerges is troubling because it shows
that many Jews in Europe are not living with the peace of mind and sense of
security that every ethnic and religious group ought to enjoy. It is troubling
also because there is bound to be some basis in reality for this state
of affairs. Nor is this news: no one with a sense of history can doubt that the
well of anti-Semitism runs deep in Europe and anyone following current events
will know that the well has not run dry. However, the statistics I have quoted
from the report are about what the survey respondents ‘consider’, ‘perceive’,
‘feel’ and ‘worry about’. It is not possible on this basis alone to infer the
extent to which anti-Semitism exists in the EU, nor is it possible to determine
the degree to which it has – or has not – changed for the worse.

Nonetheless, the liberal-left UK daily the Guardian
covered
the report under the headline “Antisemitism on the rise, says European survey.”
Similarly, Aljazeeraran the
headline “Anti-Semitism on rise in Europe.” (The subhead said that the FRA
survey “shows an anti-Semitism increase across Europe over the past five
years.”) Both headlines appear to jump to conclusions. Compare the more accurate BBC headline: “Anti-Semitism ‘on the rise’ say Europe’s Jews.”

In a press release, the European Jewish Congress made
the more specific
claim that the survey shows “a substantial rise in the number of Jews who
have been subjected to anti-Semitic attacks.” It is difficult to see how this
interpretation can be justified. Chapter 2 of the report includes data on
anti-Semitic incidents, classified either as ‘verbal insult’ or ‘harassment’ or
‘physical attack’. One in five respondents experienced at least one such
incident in the previous 12 months (of which 2 percent were physical attacks),
but no indication is given as to whether this represents a rise or fall (or
neither) over previous years (p. 29). Chapter 3, which homes in on specific
types of harassment and violence, distinguishes between a shorter and longer
term (but without a year-by-year breakdown). Some 7 percent of respondents
experienced an incident of anti-Semitic violence (or threat of violence) in the
past 5 years and 4 percent in the previous 12 months. (p. 42). Some 33 percent
of respondents experienced anti-Semitic harassment at least once in the past 5
years and 26 percent in the past 12 months (p. 43). These figures do not
indicate that such incidents have increased.

Furthermore, the report comments that due to “a
relatively low number of incidents – both as regards physical attacks/threats
and harassment – no country breakdowns are presented here” (p. 47). In a
similar vein, it says: “The few cases of antisemitic vandalism in the past five
years (5 percent of all respondents, n=264), and physical violence or threat of
physical violence over the same time period (7 percent of all respondents,
n=403) pose an obstacle for a more detailed analysis of the incidents” (p. 50).
It is hard to see how this adds up to “a substantial rise in the number of Jews
who have been subjected to anti-Semitic attacks.”

This is not to deny the seriousness of the problem of
anti-Semitism in Europe; it is only to say that the FRA survey is not designed
to answer questions about whether anti-Semitism is or is not on the rise or
whether anti-Semitic incidents, including physical attacks, have or have not increased.
It is a mistake even to try to extract conclusions of this kind from the
report, a mistake that implies a failure to understand where the value of this
report lies. It lies chiefly (as the section “Why is this survey needed?”
explains) in providing “comparable data on the perceived extent and
nature of anti-Semitism among Jews in the EU” (p. 7, emphasis added). This is a
useful contribution to our knowledge, but the value of this contribution is
inherently limited.

The survey is limited in at least three other
respects. First, there is its reliance on an open online questionnaire. The
report explains the advantages but frankly admits that this method is “unable
to deliver a random probability sample fulfilling the statistical criteria for
representativeness” (p. 7). Moreover, as the annex on survey methodology
comments, “the chosen survey mode is likely to have excluded some eligible
members of the target population” (p. 70). In particular, it can be ‘assumed’
that unaffiliated Jews (Jews who are not members of a synagogue or some other
Jewish community organisation) “are underrepresented in the current sample” (p.
74). Whether and to what extent this affects the findings is a matter of
speculation.

Second, the focus on perception introduces a
large element of subjectivity. What, for example, counts as an anti-Semitic
view or comment? Question
B15b gives a list of eight potentially offensive statements. It includes the
statement “Israelis behave ‘like Nazis’ towards the Palestinians.”[1] In the opinion of 81 percent of
respondents, a non-Jew who says this is anti-Semitic (p. 23). Question B17
gives a list of six possible views or actions by non-Jews. It includes
“Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products” and “Criticises Israel.” These were
considered anti-Semitic by 72 percent and 34 percent of respondents,
respectively (p. 27).[2] These opinions
about what constitutes anti-Semitism are all debatable. Given the way the
survey is constructed, it is impossible to assess the extent to which they
affect overall estimates of anti-Semitism.

Third, the survey does not allow comparisons to be
made that would help put the data on European Jewish perceptions of
anti-Semitism into perspective. It would be useful to make a comparison with
perceptions in other regions. (In the AJC 2013
Survey of American Jewish Opinion, 81 percent of respondents consider
anti-Semitism to be a problem in the United States. Compare this with 66
percent of respondents in the FRA survey who consider anti-Semitism to be a
problem in their countries (p. 15).) It would also be useful to be able to
compare Jewish perception of anti-Semitism with, say, Muslim perception of Islamophobia
or migrants’ perception of xenophobia, or the perception by any other group of
the racism that targets that group. On the strength of this report, it is not
possible to say whether the Jewish case is exceptional or, on the contrary,
representative of minority ethnic or religious groups in Europe.

The questionnaire does, however, include two questions
that allow a comparison to be made between Jewish perceptions of anti-Semitism
and Jewish perceptions of racism. Question B03 asks respondents to say whether
they think that anti-Semitism and racism have increased or decreased or stayed
the same over the past five years. Some 76 percent think that anti-Semitism has
gotten worse (p. 16), but, unless I have missed a trick, the report does not
give the data on perceptions of racism. This is tantalizing, especially in view
of the answers to the previous question (B02), which asks respondents to rate
nine issues in terms of the magnitude of the problem in the country in which
they live. On average, respondents put racism (along with unemployment and the
state of the economy) ahead of anti-Semitism (p. 15). In other words,
respondents, on average, think that racism is a greater problem than
anti-Semitism.

All surveys have limitations. A limitation is not a
defect, but it is necessary to keep the limitations of a survey in mind in
order to assess its findings. The FRA report holds up a mirror to the EU Jewish
population, giving us a glimpse of how European Jews perceive and experience
anti-Semitism today. In this way, it contributes to our understanding. It does
what it does, no more, no less. It does not license sweeping statements about
the rise of anti-Semitism, nor does it warrant gloomy prognostications about
Jews leaving Europe in droves.

There is one finding from the survey that JPR (which
conducted the research) emphasizes in a separate publication: “The vast majority of Jews in the sample feel a strong sense of
belonging to the country in which they reside, and are highly integrated into
mainstream society.” It is a pity that this finding did not make it into the
FRA report. Arguably, it has a bearing on the question of the Jewish future in Europe.[3]

This piece originally appeared on December 10, 2013 in the Reviews and Critical Commentary pages of the Council for European Studies.

[1] The survey questionnaire is included as annex 1 in the Technical Report
accompanying the FRA survey.

[2] In all three cases, the percentage scores combine two affirmative
responses: “Yes, definitely” and “Yes, probably.”

Brian
Klug is a senior research fellow and tutor in philosophy at St Benet’s
Hall, University of Oxford. His most recent book isBeing
Jewish and Doing Justice: Bringing Argument to Life, Vallentine Mitchell, 2011

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