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суббота, 6 сентября 2014 г.

How We Won the Cold War, but Lost the Peace

"The key emotional and
cognitive transformation that must be achieved, and that was not achieved by
this first post–Cold War generation, is to recognize that Russia is an
inalienable part of Europe."

By Nicolai N. Petro

To have any hope of healing the
deep wound in the very heart of Europe that is the crisis in Ukraine, we must
first separate two crises that have become intertwined. One is the crisis of
Ukrainian statehood. The other is the crisis of Russian relations with the
West.

The crisis of Ukrainian
statehood cannot, in fact, be resolved by Western intervention. One reason is
that even the most generous package of Western assistance imaginable is still
an order of magnitude too small to stabilize the entire Ukrainian economy.
Another reason is the West’s persistent failure to grasp that the current crisis
is not the result of the civil war. Rather, the civil war is the result of the
failure to resolve fundamental issues of national identity and statehood in a
manner that satisfies both Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. The
fateful decision by Western governments to back one interpretation of Ukrainian
nationhood in its effort to dominate over the rest merely ensures that this
conflict will continue for decades to come.

The second crisis that of
Russian relations with the West is the result of the unfortunate decision to
hold relations with Russia hostage to the success of Ukrainian statehood. Since
the success of a Ukraine identity whose conceptual roots rest in a relatively
small and highly localized portion of the population (Galicia) is far from
assured, such a linkage can only lead to the deterioration of relations to the
point of outright hostility and confrontation. Having put all their eggs in the
Ukrainian nationalist basket, however, both the current government in Kiev and
its Western supporters now have every incentive to blame Russia for any and all
failures.

But while the current crisis
has a precise origin—the overnight disavowal by the foreign ministers of
Germany, France and Poland of the February 21 transfer of power agreement
signed between president Yanukovych and the opposition—it has been over twenty
years in the making.

We are, in fact, now reaping
the bitter harvest of a post–Cold War relationship that was cast as a conflict
of values. Conflicts of this kind inevitably become existential conflicts, to
be seen through to the bitter end, regardless of the cost. Until victory is
achieved, it can only be mitigated. The “reset” initiated by President Obama
during his first term was just such an attempt to mitigate the impact of the
supposed conflict of values, which had spiraled out of control under George W.
Bush. Now that it has failed, the United States seeks to return to an earlier
model of mitigation that once rallied Europe behind it—containment.

Whether or not this
neo-containment will succeed is open to debate. The world is very different
today from what it was in the 1950s. While the English-speaking community of
nations seems quite willing to follow America’s lead in confronting Russia,
many Western and Central European nations (most notably Austria, Hungary, Czech
Republic and Slovakia) are reluctant to sever their profitable commercial ties
with Russia.

Meanwhile, within the CIS, fear
of Russian dominance often vies with a certain amount of nostalgia and envy of
Russia’s economic success. Those who blame the present crisis entirely on Putin
favor expanding NATO and confronting Russian aggression. On the other hand, the
disastrous social and economic impact of the Euromaidan has cooled the ardor
for EU and NATO expansion among others.

Finally, one should not
underestimate the global appeal of the BRICS, a rising economic and political
coalition of states of which Russia is a key member. These nations are
promoting an alternative to hegemonic stability that many nations around the
world find very appealing.

Overall, therefore,
neo-containment is not likely to be successful, unless Russia can be portrayed
as an inveterate aggressor and a systematic violator of international
agreements for ideological reasons, as it was during the height of the Cold
War. The obvious absence of such an ideology, however, has lessened the
international community’s sense of urgency and reduced neo-containment to
constraining President Putin. Beginning with former secretary of state Hillary
Clinton, U.S. government officials have sought to overcome Europe’s lack of
enthusiasm for neo-containment by arguing that Putin’s proposal to create a
Eurasian Union out of the current CIS Customs Union will reconstitute the USSR.
Most international observers, however, regard the Eurasian Union as a threat
primarily to European commercial interests.

Russia’s response to
neo-containment has thus far been ad hoc. During the present crisis, Russia has
been sticking to the three principles it previously formulated during the
conflict with the Saakashvili regime in Georgia, when it also faced sanctions
and accusations of aggression. First, Russia will “step aside” from direct
confrontation with the West and refuse to be drawn into any military conflict.
Second, it will diversify its markets, thereby limiting the impact of sanctions
on the Russian economy. Finally, it will seek to “democratize international
relations,” a strategy better known as fostering multipolarity.

But a more comprehensive
strategy might be in the works. Putin’s address to the Valdai discussion club
in September 2013 suggests a distinctive, Russian vision of a new world order.
Albeit still based on Western values (which Russia shares as much as any other
country, according to Putin), it confronts the obvious decay of those values in
the West and calls for a restoration of tradition. Putin suggests that policies
based on traditional Western values would show greater respect for the
traditional values of other cultures, and usher in a world restored to the
principles of classical political realism.

Getting
Beyond Neo-Containment

The West’s inability to shake
off the intellectual straitjacket of containment, even two decades after the
demise of the Soviet Union, highlights just how much needs to change to end the
cycle of hostility inherited from the Cold War. The key emotional and cognitive
transformation that must be achieved, and that was not achieved by this first
post–Cold War generation, is to recognize that Russia is an inalienable part of
Europe.

If Russia had been embraced as
part of Europe immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO might
have expanded to include Russia, a prospect that Putin saw as a distinct
possibility back in 2000. All the conflicts that have occurred in Eastern
Europe since then have been the result of the fateful decision to exclude Russia
from the European alliance system and to set up a separate track for dealing
with Russia, instead of bringing her into the consultative process. Had Russia
been included as part of Europe, the entire political and cultural conflict in
Ukraine would also have been avoided, since there would be no “civilizational
choice” to make.

Second, an entirely new
philosophy must underpin European security. Instead of forging a new
pan-European security framework to anchor Russia to Europe, we repurposed NATO,
disingenuously pretending that a military alliance that excluded Russia and
that justified its continued existence as a bulwark against threats from Russia
would not invariably be perceived as directed against Russia.

Throughout the nineties, and
even well into Putin’s second term, Russia refused to act on this threat,
preferring to advance its security through “more profound integration” with
NATO. But when these institutions were put to the test during the August 2008
crisis with Georgia, and Russia’s appeal to the Russia-NATO Council for
assistance in bringing about an immediate cease-fire was rejected, attitudes in
Russia changed dramatically and a new anti-Western consensus was formed.

Instead of pushing Russia into
ever-greater isolation through sanctions and other punitive measures, European
statesmen would be wise to embrace the concept of mutual dependence which has
proven so successful in overcoming other seemingly intractable conflicts, such
as the age-old conflict between Germany and France.

Alas, there is little evidence
of such creative thinking today. Still, perhaps we can take some comfort in the
knowledge that Europe has weathered such conflicts before. As the late British
historian Sir Herbert Butterfield (1900-79) recalls:

"In the days of my own
childhood, it was still the English against the French, these latter being the
traditional enemy. I can remember even now the schoolbook which said that the
English owed all their freedom to their kinship with the Germans, for liberty
went back to the Teutons in their primeval forests. . . . The antithesis to all
this was to be found in the Latin countries. I still remember how it was all
spelled out: Italy stood for the Papacy, Spain had had the Inquisition, while
France, twice over, if you please, had chosen to live under Napoleonic
dictatorships, an evil which, in my young days, had as yet had no parallel in
other countries."

Then, as now, rising above
ancient enmities depended on recognizing that our enemy's cultural heritage is
not just similar to our own; it is, in fact, our own. Only when all Europeans
fully recognize and embrace this idea can the script of "Western
democracy" be rewritten to include Russia, just as it was once rewritten
to include Germany and Japan.

The present generation grossly
underestimated the difficulty of burying the past and treating Russia as an
equal partner. This task now falls to future generations, hopefully less
burdened by the legacy of the Cold War and more familiar with Russians as
business partners, schoolmates, travel companions, maybe even film stars and
cultural icons. Let us hope that they will have the courage needed to overcome
the destructive stereotypes that have prevented us from fulfilling the promise
of the end of the Cold War.

Nicolai N. Petro is professor
of politics at the University of Rhode Island. He has recently returned from a
year-long Fulbright research scholarship in Ukraine.

Facts from History

CEDAW

UNSCR 1325

Strategy for engagement and joint actions on confidence building and P2P diplomacy that involve women. Final Report

YOUTH PEACE PLAN OF GEORGIA

This publication is produced within the framework of the project - ‘‘Support Democratic Participation of Young Women in Building Peace and Stability in Georgia’’ implemented in Georgia by International Network for Civil Development - INCD in partnership with Young Women Experts’ Network for Peace and Security (YWEPS) and with the financial support of the Embassy of Canada through Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI).