Organized crime, Colombia's peace spoiler?

Now that the main potential impediment to a peace deal–a change in government–is out of the picture, it is time to start tackling other threats, not just to securing the agreement, but also to its implementation.

One hundred and twelve bales of cocaine recovered off the Colombian coast, worth more than US $367 million. Flickr/US Navy. Some rights reserved.

A couple of months ago in Colombia, we held our breath
waiting for the results of the second round of the presidential election. This was
not only a presidential election, but the campaign turned into a de facto referendum on the peace process
that the incumbent president (who was standing for re-election), Juan Manuel
Santos, led during his first term. His main campaign theme was about bringing over
50 years of internal armed conflict to an end. Running against him, Óscar Iván
Zuluaga (former-President Uribe’s appointee), campaigned for imposing stringent
requirements on the negotiations with the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). This would have meant, in all
likelihood, that the process would soon implode.

This campaign was a heated battle between two former
allies: both had been ministers during President Uribe’s term in office, and
both were part of very powerful elites. Although many polls predicted a swift
win in the first round for Santos, Zuluaga managed to capture the majority of
votes, though not enough to avoid a second round. For weeks before the second
round, people supporting the peace agreement flooded the media with articles,
closing ranks around the incumbent president in an attempt to convince
skeptical voters that peace was worth the sacrifice of voting for Santos. And
it worked. Santos won the second round with 50.95% of the vote.

Organized
crime’s interest in disorder

Now that the main potential spoiler of the agreement–a change in government–is out of the picture, it is time to start tackling
other threats, not just to securing the agreement, but also to its
implementation. And if reaching an agreement seemed like a monumental task,
maintaining peace will be much messier.

On the bright side, Colombians already have quite a
bit of experience in dealing with peace agreements, and lots of lessons learnt
from colossal blunders made during those processes. Still, one of the main
challenges for peace in Colombia is the big stake that organized crime has in
its failure. Stability and strong institutions are the last thing illicit
networks need because they thrive in contexts where their business runs
unchallenged. Trying to spoil the peace is precisely what some of these
networks did in the aftermath of the 2005 peace process with the paramilitary
groups, taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the power vacuum that
the process left in some key localities and entered the political arena. Some of
these lessons have been compiled in a forthcoming publication entitled Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin
America. This publication, the second in a series of regional studies, will soon be released by
International IDEA, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
and the Clingendael Institute of International Relations.

The
destabilizing effects of corruption

There is a limited but growing understanding about how
organized crime affects political stability and security, particularly by corrupting politicians and undermining peace. Organized crime criminalizes the nature of politics
in states affected by conflict by cementing structural weaknesses and thereby
avoiding any confrontation with legitimate authorities. At the same time, systemic
corruption and illicit financial flows bleed away resources that could otherwise
be used to develop legitimate institutions necessary to avoid relapsing into violence.
This happened in South Sudan, and Colombia could follow
a similar route if inadequate measures are put in place to counteract the
influence of illicit networks in some key localities.

Any effort to counteract these corrupt practices faces
an overwhelming enemy: the huge amount of money that organized crime generates,
particularly via the illicit drug trade. Globally, UNODC estimates approximately 1.5% of global GDP originates
from transnational organized crime, most of which comes from drug trafficking (where
the cocaine market is believed to be the most lucrative). Colombia, as the main
cocaine producer (now facing some competition from Peru), has experienced a
massive inflow of illicit cash.

The tremendous amounts of dirty money needing to be
laundered–floating around in proximity to politicians and political parties
in dire need of financial resources–creates a toxic environment for
corruption. Money in politics is not a bad thing in itself: it is a necessary
ingredient for politicians to campaign and for political parties to become more
competent and responsive, especially between elections. However, the high cost of politics coupled with lax
regulations and low enforcement levels make it easier for politicians to access
this rich pool of money that organized crime has to offer. This issue is
canvassed further in International IDEA’s forthcoming handbook on political
finance.

Money however, is not the only avenue for organized
crime to penetrate politics. Direct involvement of criminals in politics,
particularly at the local level, has been facilitated by the politicization of
the bureaucratic apparatus at the regional level. One politician I interviewed (under
condition of anonymity) for the forthcoming publication mentioned above, told
me how once a new mayor is elected, they need to repay ‘favours’ by distributing posts from different levels of
the public administration to various individuals in their informal networks of
influence. This was a similar story in most of the municipalities I visited. It
makes it easier for organized crime to control key institutions–such as
customs and border controls–by forging alliances with local politicians or
even by entering into politics themselves.

Colombians
hope for peace

It is no secret that, just like the paramilitaries, FARC
has been involved in the drug business. When the former demobilized in 2005, many
groups previously involved in controlling routes and providing manpower simply
re-branded themselves into new criminal gangs or ‘bacrims’, and kept the illicit activities going, including drug
trafficking, extortion and money laundering.

Other parallels could be drawn between the 2005
process with the paramilitaries and the current process with FARC, particularly
the challenges that Santos’ government will face in dealing with local issues
from a national perspective. Crime networks are primarily rooted at the local
level, and the highly decentralized Colombian political system leaves little
room for national accountability and transparency of local level politics.

But the current scenario is not totally bleak. Even
with its challenges, the process not only offers an opportunity for peace but to
deal potentially with some of the factors which allowed the drug business to
flourish in Colombia. As already mentioned, organized crime thrives in a
context of disorder, and creates a vicious circle where conflict facilitates
crime, which in turn facilitates conflict. But the opposite is also true: addressing
conflict cuts the arteries that bring oxygen to organized crime, and as crime
diminishes, peace has better a chance of settling. Recent progress suggests
that things might be moving in the right direction.

The country has become much better at tackling the
flow of illicit money. Cutting organized crime’s flow of money is the most
effective blow you can deal. According to some estimates, there has been a 76%
increase in government revenue from addressing illicit financial flows in Colombia.
Regulations have also become more sophisticated. Punishment for involvement in
organized crime does not only focus on individual politicians, but now puts the
responsibility on political parties who face the possibility of losing seats in
Parliament, due to the ‘empty chair' law. Parties have also made efforts to
clean up their ranks, by discussing inter-party agreements during elections to ban criminals
and prevent candidates shopping around from party to party looking for
endorsements.

Peace
opportunities

The peace process and the institutional transition
this will foster could open new opportunities to strengthen democracy at the
local level, building stronger and cleaner state institutions:

- A
strong Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process that
includes opportunities for young people to be reintegrated could impact negatively
on the structures and manpower illicit networks enjoy.

- A
transitional justice process that sheds light on the crimes committed during
the conflict and exposes some of the networks behind the illegal businesses
would also hit crime interests.

- The
end of the conflict could open the doors for a security sector reform (SSR) to continue cleaning up corruption in these
institutions. SSR would also shift security policies towards countering crime away
from counter-insurgency military tactics which may affect human rights.

Most importantly, the cessation of armed struggle and the
institutional stabilization in some of the most affected localities would close
some safe havens where organized crime operates. It would also make it easier
to channel much needed resources into development rather than security. This
does not mean securitizing the development and democracy agenda; rather it means
that smart policies to foster peace and tackle organized crime need to be
sufficiently coordinated and informed by each other.

So the glass is half full. Thus far negotiations have progressed
to deal with some of the underlying illicit economic interests that have fuelled
the conflict. Albeit with limitations, as Annette Idler points out in her
recent article in Razón Pública, they have touched upon the
drug issue and FARC’s involvement in it. The last point which was agreed during
the discussions between the government and FARC in Havana sets the basis for FARC
as a whole to give up its drug trafficking interests, which some estimate to account for 50%
(directly and indirectly) of the drug business in Colombia–around US $2.5 billion per year. Part of this feeds local corruption. Some individuals will opt out of
the deal and continue with the drug business. However, the structures will be
weakened, particularly the activities where FARC is involved, such as coca-base
processing and the management of some routes.

Other components of the deal also support these
efforts to tackle organized crime’s interests in the conflict. Negotiators
agreed on a settlement for territorial and rural development that sets the
basis for creating legitimate opportunities in the most remote localities. Such
localities are often used by organized crime to create strongholds in collusion
with corrupt political structures. There is also an agreement with regards to political
participation of former insurgents. This could create opportunities for much
needed institutional strengthening at the local level that offer legitimate
avenues for politicians, parties and movements to compete without being dependent
on dirty money.

About the author

Catalina Uribe Burcher is a Programme Officer for the Democracy, Conflict and Security unit at International IDEA. She specializes on research and policy-oriented analysis regarding the threats that transnational illicit networks pose to democratic politics, mainly in Latin America, the Baltic States and West Africa. She conducted fieldwork in Latin America as a research fellow for the Social Science Research Council, as part of the Democracy, Security and Drugs Programme. Prior to International IDEA, Catalina has worked as consultant and lecturer.

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