Petitioner-Appellant Brian L. Brown, a federal inmate proceeding pro se,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in
federal district court claiming that prison disciplinary proceedings violated his
due process rights. The magistrate judge of the district court denied his habeas
petition.(1) Brown later moved for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on
appeal, which the magistrate judge promptly denied for lack of good faith.
Brown now seeks an appeal of the magistrate judge's decision and renews his
motion to proceed IFP. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the
magistrate judge, we affirm the order denying habeas relief, deny Brown's IFP
motion, and dismiss this matter.

I. Background

Brown is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Florence,
Colorado. On September 9, 2004, Brown received an incident report accusing
him of throwing his noon meal into the interior range, throwing newspapers from
his cell onto the range, setting the papers on fire, and then disobeying an order to
be handcuffed.(1) Brown was charged with
setting a fire, refusing an order, and
being unsanitary and untidy. The matter was referred to the prison's Unit
Discipline Committee (UDC) that day. On September 13, 2004, the UDC held a
hearing on the matter and determined that the charges should be forwarded to a
disciplinary hearing officer (DHO).

The DHO held a hearing on September 14, 2004. He found Brown guilty of
refusing an order and setting a fire and dismissed the third charge of being
unsanitary. The DHO imposed several sanctions, including the forfeiture of good
conduct time. At the time, the DHO did not complete the section of the DHO
report entitled, "Reason for Sanction or Action Taken."

Brown appealed the DHO's decision to the Regional Director for the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The Regional Director affirmed the convictions, but
instructed the DHO to amend his report to specifically state the reasons for the
sanctions. The DHO completed an amended report and delivered a copy to Brown
on November 11, 2004.

Brown then petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus in the federal court in
the District of Colorado claiming that the prison disciplinary proceedings violated
due process. Analyzing Brown's claims, the magistrate judge found them each
without merit and dismissed Brown's petition.

II. Analysis

We review de novo a district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus.
Martinez v. Flowers, 164 F.3d 1257, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998). To meet the
standards of due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding, an inmate must
receive the protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563­66
(1974): written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours before the hearing,
an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in defense of those charges, and
a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for
the disciplinary action. Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1990).
Additionally, due process requires "some evidence to support the hearing panel's
decision . . . and the decisionmaker must be impartial." Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354
F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 592) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).

After reviewing the merits of the Petitioner-Appellant's claims, we agree
with the magistrate judge that Brown received the due process required by Wolff.

A. Violations of BOP Regulations

First, Brown complains that prison authorities BOP regulations by failing to
serve him a copy of the incident report within twenty-four hours, failing to
provide him a UDC hearing within three working days of the time staff became
aware of the incident, and denying him access to legal materials and the prison
library. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.15(a)­(b), 541.12, and 543.10
(2006). These
allegations fail to raise a due process violation under Wolff.

Prison regulations are "primarily designed to guide correctional officials in
the administration of a prison. [They are] not designed to confer rights on
inmates." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481­82 (1995). Where a liberty or
property interest has been infringed, the process which is due under the United
States Constitution is that measured by the due process clause, not prison
regulations. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)
("[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, the question
remains what process is due. The answer to that question is not to be found in the
[state] statute.") (quotation and citation omitted); Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229,
1247 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[O]nce the property right is established, it is purely a
matter of federal constitutional law whether the procedure afforded was
adequate."); see alsoShakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 2004)
("[R]egardless of state procedural guarantees, the only process due an inmate is
that minimal process guaranteed by the Constitution."). Wolff mandates only a twenty-four hour advance notice of a disciplinary
hearing and an opportunity to present a defense. It does not require an UDC
hearing. Brown was therefore afforded protections in excess of those required by
law: (1) he received notice five days before his hearing, (2) received a
constitutionally unnecessary UDC hearing within three days, and (3) articulated
no argument on how he was prevented from adequately presenting a defense.
Even if minor violations of BOP regulations occurred,(3) they would not rise to a
constitutional violation under Wolff.

Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not err in denying these claims.

Brown's final due process claim was that the DHO "changed facts, not
previously presented at [the] hearing" in his final report. As determined by the
magistrate judge, the DHO only supplemented his final report with the reasons for
imposing sanctions, as required by the Regional Director. No additional facts
were incorporated into the report. Brown also objected to the correction of the
date of the incident to September 8, 2004 in the DHO's report based on the
reporting officer's indication that the date was originally misstated. Here, there is
no basis for equating the officer's correction of the record with constitutional
error.III. Conclusion

In sum, we agree with the magistrate judge's determination that the
disciplinary hearings at issue comported with the minimum requirements of due
process under Wolff. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the lower court's order, DENY
Petitioner-Appellant's IFP motion, and DISMISS this appeal.

Entered for the Court:

Timothy M. Tymkovich

Circuit Judge

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. This order is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

2. After examining the briefs and the appellate
record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

1. Both parties consented to magistrate judge
jurisdiction over the matter.

1. Initially, the reporting officer recorded the
date of the incident as
September 7, 2004. Subsequently, the reporting officer submitted a memorandum
correcting the date of the incident to September 8, 2004. The error was noted
and the correct date of the incident was affirmed as September 8, 2004. As the
magistrate judge noted, the exact date of the incident does not affect the analysis
of claims presented in Brown's petition.

3. Under the determination of facts found by
the magistrate judge, no
violation of BOP notice requirements appears.