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IBRD and IDA: Working for a World Free of Poverty.enOn the Strength of Avocados and Airplane Parts: Making Global Value Chains Work for Developmenthttp://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/strength-avocados-and-airplane-parts-making-global-value-chains-work-development
<p>Also available in: <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/es/el-poder-de-los-aguacates-y-las-piezas-de-los-aviones-hacer-que-las-cadenas-mundiales-de-valor" rel="nofollow">Español</a></p><p>
<img alt="In Chile, producers incorporated procedures that increased the quality of their avocados, thereby increasing their profit margins. Photo - Kristina/Flickr Creative Commons License." height="201" src="https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/files/trade/avocado.jpg" style="float:left" title="In Chile, producers incorporated procedures that increased the quality of their avocados, thereby increasing their profit margins. Photo - Kristina/Flickr Creative Commons License." width="300" />By now, developing countries are exporting parts and components used in some of the most sophisticated products on the planet. With the rise of global value chains (GVCs), workers in these countries are no longer just assembling imported parts for local sale, as has been done for decades. They are now participants in international production networks – in factories that cross borders.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
This change is significant for economic development, as we argue in our forthcoming book, “<a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/making-global-value-chains-work-for-development" rel="nofollow">Making Global Value Chains Work for Development</a>.” GVCs will also be the subject of a discussion by World Bank Group President <a href="http://live.worldbank.org/experts/dr-jim-yong-kim" rel="nofollow">Dr. Jim Yong Kim</a>, World Trade Organization Director-General <a href="http://live.worldbank.org/experts/roberto-azevedo" rel="nofollow">Roberto Azevêdo</a>, General Electric Vice Chairman <a href="http://live.worldbank.org/experts/john-g-rice" rel="nofollow">John G. Rice</a>, and Colombia Minister of Finance and Public Credit&nbsp;<a href="http://live.worldbank.org/experts/mauricio-c%C3%A1rdenas-0" rel="nofollow">Mauricio Cárdenas</a>&nbsp;-- and moderated by World Bank Trade and Competitiveness Senior Director <a href="http://live.worldbank.org/experts/anabel-gonz%C3%A1lez" rel="nofollow">Anabel González</a> -- on Friday at “<a href="http://live.worldbank.org/transforming-world-trade-global-value-chains-and-development?CID=TAC_BLAMvaluechainsEN_D_EXT" rel="nofollow">Transforming World Trade: Global Value Chains and Development</a>,” a flagship event of the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings.</p>
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<p>
<br />
Many of the benefits of GVCs have to do with the transfer of skills and knowledge. [[tweetable]]As developing countries participate in increasingly complex production processes, they gain “know-how” from foreign companies.[[/tweetable]] When Toyota makes car parts in Thailand, for example, Thailand imports Toyota technology, managerial and business practices, marketing expertise and more. With the prevalence of GVCs, developing countries can industrialize by joining an already-established GVC, as opposed to building one from scratch, as was done by Japan and the Republic of Korea in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<br />
<br />
Accordingly, GVCs are on the radar of policymakers in developing countries. And these policymakers are asking questions: How can my country join a GVC? At what point in this-or-that vertically specialized industry is my country suited to enter? And, later: How can my country upgrade its position – add more sophisticated tasks, add more domestic value to the product, engage more domestic firms – in a GVC that is already here?<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Unsurprisingly, because GVCs are ultimately built and led by large firms, the answers to these questions relate to business calculations. Essentially, countries must address two main concerns of these private-sector leaders, whose influence spans broad, complex, global networks: how to connect their factories and how to protect their assets. This means that good infrastructure and efficient borders are important, especially as they relate to the predictability, reliability and time sensitivity of trade flows. Slow and unpredictable land transport, for example, hurts Sub-Saharan Africa’s participation in the electronics and other value chains. Strong, well-enforced property rights are also essential to attracting and keeping foreign investors. Firms export valuable, firm-specific technology. It is important that their host countries enforce contracts between private parties.<br />
<br />
But these are not the only concerns of policymakers. They do want to attract and maintain GVC investment, but they also want GVCs to help improve their nations’ economic and social well-being. The critical issues for policymakers are ensuring that GVCs are integrated into the economy as a whole – hiring local firms, transferring knowledge and technology, and enabling workers to add more value to the products produced – and ensuring that they are benefitting society through more and better-paid jobs, better living conditions, and social cohesion. In short, [[tweetable]]policymakers want GVCs to work for development.[[/tweetable]]<br />
<br />
In “<a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/making-global-value-chains-work-for-development" rel="nofollow">Making Global Value Chains Work for Development</a>,” we offer policymakers analytical tools and policy options to engage in a strategic approach to GVCs. We suggest ways in which a country’s leaders can think systematically about how to enter a GVC and then expand participation in a way that advances development goals.<br />
<br />
GVCs operate as complex, multi-dimensional networks – hubs and spokes in various directions – that lend themselves to mathematical analysis. We discuss how countries can use quantitative measures of GVC participation to make informed policy choices. Is a country’s position in GVCs central or peripheral? Is the country specialized in tasks closer to final demand, or does it participate in the initial stages of the value chain? These distinctions matter for success in GVC participation and upgrading.<br />
<br />
A key concept in understanding how GVCs can generate economic development is that of “value added.” For a GVC to help a country improve its income, it must operate in a way that adds value to the country’s productive factors, including capital and labor. This may be achieved by functional upgrading – labor executing higher value-added tasks – but also by process upgrading –by specializing in the tasks in which the country has comparative advantage and by putting more technology, know-how, and auxiliary services into these tasks.<br />
<br />
One example of this is the story of avocados in Chile, as told in a <a href="https://www.microlinks.org/library/combining-strategic-analysis-and-change-management-tool-improving-competitiveness-firms" rel="nofollow">2009 USAID case study</a>. At the basic level, avocados are just fruit that is harvested and sold with very little profit margin. To achieve better bargaining power and profit margins – and compete on international markets – producers can incorporate procedures and production tasks that increase the quality of the product. In the case of avocados, which are difficult to transport when ripe, this meant controlling the ripening of the fruit so that it happens at the destination.<br />
<br />
Another example is the <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204059804577226763868263758" rel="nofollow">maturation of the aviation industry in Morocco</a>. Over the past decade, in line with the government’s strategy to expand into more advanced manufacturing, leading aviation companies such as Boeing of the United States or Bombardier of Canada have invested in increasingly sophisticated factories in Morocco. This began in 2001 with a small operation that prepared cables for Boeing 737 jetliners. Within two years, workers hit high efficiency rates (70 percent) compared with industry norms, and job openings began attracting highly educated applicants. General Electric, Dassault Aviation and Airbus joined Boeing in using the Moroccan-made cables. Now the parent company of this operation, Safran, produces jet-engine housings, and the country’s aviation industry employs almost 9,000 people and pays 15 percent more than the country’s average monthly wage.<br />
<br />
In short, GVCs are at once a complex and important feature of modern trade, and developing countries would be wise to engage strategically with them – in a way that promotes development. Policymakers should be aware of the primary business concerns of GVC firms. But they should also take advantage of the opportunities for economic growth and welfare improvements that GVCs offer across a range of products – from avocados to airplanes.</p>Wed, 08 Oct 2014 09:00:00 -0400Daria TaglioniGrowth in Greece? A Logistical Possibilityhttp://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/growth-greece-logisitical-possibility
<p>
<img alt="The Partnenon in Athesn, Greece. Source - Nicholas Doumani." src="http://farm4.staticflickr.com/3049/3956600561_b1302bf3f9_b.jpg" style="float:left; height:200px; margin:4px; width:300px" title="The Partnenon in Athesn, Greece. Source - Nicholas Doumani." />More than 95 percent of goods traded between Europe and Asia are transported via deep sea. All of this happens through two primary routes-- some serious traffic. But it's far from stop-and-go. In fact, most doesn’t stop at all.<br />
<br />
Large container ships leave ports in Asia and proceed directly to Rotterdam,&nbsp;the Netherlands. Many&nbsp;choose&nbsp;to get there by passing through the Suez Canal, entering the Mediterranean, and bypassing its bygone empires.<br />
<br />
One of these ancient powers, Greece, now finds itself in a marginal position on the logistical map of Europe. Despite being geographically and economically well located, it’s far from being the hub it once was. The World Bank’s <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/trade" rel="nofollow" target="_blank" title="Homepage.">International Trade Unit</a> and the Transport Unit of the World Bank’s Vice Presidency for the Europe and Central Asia Region recently teamed up with the government of Greece to <a href="http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/11/11/000333037_20131111135922/Rendered/PDF/825690WP0P14480rt0FINAL0WEB0VERSION.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank" title="Full report here. ">find out how</a> the country can capture a share of the world’s growing East-West trade and kick-start an economy that has been struggling to maintain GDP growth after the global economic crisis.<br />
&nbsp;</p>
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<p>
The goal for Greece is to become more attractive to international supply-chain&nbsp;operators as a connection between land and sea, and between East and West. The potential is there. The southern port of Piraeus is the deepest seaport on the Mediterranean, and it has already started developing as a significant trans-shipment center. In the north, the port of Thessaloniki also has potential to evolve into a gateway to Southeast and Central Europe.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
But becoming a regional gateway will require competitive logistics along the whole supply chain, in addition to efficient ports and railway connections. These requirements can only be met through extensive reforms and strategic investments in logistics and transport.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The good news is that logistics already represents the second largest sector of the Greek economy. Developing it further will act as an accelerator of industrial growth, trade, and value addition. Countries such as the Netherlands have shown that logistics are an essential part of the infrastructure of a national economy.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Our new report identifies a number of ways the Greek government can improve the efficiency and viability of both sectors. While there’s no single, silver-bullet piece of legislation to make this happen overnight, the report highlights realistic reforms that can begin to significantly improve Greece’s business environment.&nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
In order to make these conclusions, we first identified factors holding back the modernization of the logistics industry. By comparing Greece to its neighbors, it was clear the country is underperforming. The industry is relatively underdeveloped compared to the rest of Europe. Excessive regulation and a general lack of coordination at all levels within the public sector and the private sector have led to slower, costlier transactions and to an inefficient market unable to generate investment.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The good news is that Greece is making progress in certain key indicators. This year, it was the world’s top reformer in making it easier to start a business, according to the World Bank’s 2014 “Doing Business” report. The government is privatizing TrainOSE, the state-owned railway company. It has instituted a National Trade Facilitation Strategy, and it continues to work on legislative changes to increase trade across borders. But it’s going to take more than this.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Efficient supply chains depend on infrastructure, institutions, quality service, well-designed regulation and a stable and durable institutional framework. Developing these underpinnings will require two types of reforms. The first—reforms in transformational sectors like trucking, railways, and ports —will be politically difficult and costly. These are the “big wins” that will take time to achieve.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
One example of a big win could come in expanding rail transport. Today, rail plays a marginal role in Greek logistics. Although fast and cheap, it is seldom used for freight transport. If ports such as Piraeus and Thessaloniki are to fully develop into gateways into Southeast Europe, a long-distance rail connection between Eastern and Western Europe will be essential.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The second type of reform—smaller, “micro-initiatives” such as&nbsp;promoting coordination between authorities and transparency vis-à-vis the private sector—can help boost the viability of Greek companies, improve logistical efficiency, and encourage competition in the market in the near-term.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Competition will be a key driver in reforming the logistics sector. Currently, Greece only outsources a scant 20 percent of transport expenditures on logistics. The average in more modernized European countries is normally 80 to 90 percent. For Greece to become an important center for high-quality logistics services, promoting outsourced logistics will need to be placed high on the reform agenda.<br />
<br />
Finally, in addition to these two types of reforms, there is a&nbsp;crucial third aspect&nbsp;to this strategy. The successful private-public sector dialogue developed&nbsp;through the Logistics Permanent Committee over the course of the last few years must be institutionalized to ensure the necessary continuity of the reform agenda. Only by building a strong institutional framework where the private sector&nbsp;has the power to come in and hold the public sector accountable will Greece stay on track in achieving its long-term goals.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Whether big or small, reforming the logistics and transport sectors will require a continued, coordinated effort with full cooperation by all parties involved. The government of Greece must look at the big picture. Developing the type of competitive logistics sector necessary to attract global supply-chain operators will require the patience to target medium- to long-term market demand. If the government continues to invest strategically, listen to the needs and solutions proposed by the providers and the users of professional logistics, streamline customs and fiscal procedures, and build a reputation for high-quality services, Greece could reestablish itself as a port of call in the Mediterranean.</p>
Wed, 13 Nov 2013 11:21:00 -0500Daria TaglioniUncertainty and the Wait-and-See Effects on Tradehttp://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/uncertainty-and-wait-and-see-effects-trade
<p>
If your job were suddenly in jeopardy, and you couldn’t predict next month’s income, you might put off buying that new car you had been eyeing. Similarly, an appliance company faced with sudden hardship among its customer base might delay building a new refrigerator-manufacturing plant. It turns out that uncertainty affects international trade flows, too. In a working paper published by the World Bank’s <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,noSURL:Y%7EcontentMDK:21685233%7EmenuPK:167358%7EpagePK:210058%7EpiPK:210062%7EtheSitePK:239071,00.html">International Trade Department</a>, we explore how that uncertainty hurts some types of trade more than others.</p>
<p>
&nbsp;</p>
<p>
The research, entitled “<a href="http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&amp;theSitePK=469372&amp;piPK=64165421&amp;menuPK=64166093&amp;entityID=000158349_20121015093042">Innocent bystanders: How foreign uncertainty shocks harm exporters</a>,” is an attempt to address a shortcoming in scholars’ ability to anticipate the trade-related impacts of crises. In 2008, for example, trade economists failed to predict the drop in international commerce that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an event that shook the global financial system. More recently, trade economists have failed to capture the full impact of the European debt crisis on exporters across the globe. While models and simulations have been getting better, the impacts of such shocks on trade are still poorly understood. Our research explores a theory that places exceptional uncertainty at the beginning of a chain-reaction that ultimately slows trade.</p>
<p>
We find that, when the shock is big enough, uncertainty is an important factor in predicting a slump in trade flows. It finds that exporters can be hurt by uncertainty in the countries where they are sending their goods. It also finds that exporters of durable goods, such as cars, appliances, and other long-term-use commodities, are more likely than exporters of consumable goods to be affected by uncertainty in destination countries.</p>
<p>
&nbsp;</p>
<p>
Our data analysis is grounded in research on producer and consumer behavior. The literature shows that both producers and consumers take a “wait-and-see” approach when the market is volatile; during uncertain periods, they freeze activity and postpone purchasing decisions. In particular, they delay the purchase of capital goods (for producers) or durable goods (for consumers) whose purchase is difficult to reverse. This resonates with every-day decision-making. If your income was uncertain, you would be likely to shop at the grocery store, but postpone your trip to the car dealership. The literature also shows that once uncertainty subsides, pent-up demand leads to a medium-term period of overshooting in production and consumption of durable goods. This also sounds intuitive: once your paycheck is assured, you decide to go buy that car and also replace your refrigerator, which had broken down in the meantime.</p>
<p>
Data on trade flows measures consumer and producer decisions in aggregate. So for the impact of a shock to be detected in trade data, it must affect a critical number of consumers and producers. Our analysis found that if a shock is big enough, it does indeed change trade flows between countries. Specifically, we used bilateral trade data from 32 countries to look at the impact on trade of uncertainty (proxied by stock market volatility and other financial indices) in the importing country. So, for example, uncertainty in the US would affect German, Chilean, and Australian exporters. Our results show that in these moments of big-enough-shocks, uncertainty leads to an 11.5 percent reduction of aggregate exports in partner countries.</p>
<p>
&nbsp;</p>
<p>
We found, as we expected, that the negative impact of uncertainty generally increases as trade relationships gain intensity in durable goods. There is a surprise, however: the countries at the highest end of the spectrum – those that are most intensive in durables-trading -- are resilient to uncertainty. For example, Japan’s trade with the US is more than 80 percent durables, and is relatively unaffected by uncertainty shocks. While this dynamic deserves more exploration, we have some hypotheses about why it might occur. One is that the prevalence of value-chain production methods might mean that some countries exporting durable goods might be removed from the final consumer. For example, it might happen that the production of a computer goes through a three-country-process: microchips made in China, assembly done in Costa Rica, and the finished product sold in the US. Each transaction involves the export of a durable good, but an uncertainty shock affecting consumers in Costa Rica would not affect demand for the product, so it would not impact the trade relationships.</p>
<p>
&nbsp;</p>
<p>
Another explanation for the immunity to uncertainty in high-durables trade relations has to do with possible substitution goods. For example, an uncertainty shock in the UK might cause a decrease in demand for Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) from the US, which might be considered luxury goods. But consumers facing uncertainty about future income still have current income to spend. They might spend that money on laptop computers, which they consider more of an every-day staple. So while US car exports to the UK might decrease, its computer exports would increase, and both are durable goods. To understand the dynamic at that level of detail, however, we would need more nuanced information about consumer preferences in importing countries. This is an area for possible future study.</p>
<p>
&nbsp;</p>
<p>
Finally, we asked whether a country’s experience in facing an uncertainty shock would help them navigate subsequent shocks. Did they learn to implement a policy, for example, that would mitigate the downturn in trade? We found that they did not. In fact, countries with prior experience in confronting a shock did not behave any differently when confronted with another. &nbsp;This result suggests that countries could benefit from interventions that better anticipate uncertainty shocks -- or that ensure that the shocks are as short as possible – whether through an automatic stabilizer triggered by an early indicator of crisis or some other action that could offset the trade losses brought by uncertainty. In any case, we hope that our research will add to a conversation about this issue and help countries maintain economic stability in an ever-more-connected world.</p>
<p>
&nbsp;</p>
<p>
<img alt="" height="342" src="/growth/files/growth/exceptional_volatility_0.jpg" width="500" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<strong>Periods of exceptional uncertainty.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: smaller;"><em>Bloom, N. (2009, 05). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica 77(3), 623-685.</em></span></p>
Wed, 14 Nov 2012 13:12:00 -0500Daria TaglioniUncertainty and the Wait-and-See Effects on Tradehttp://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/uncertainty-and-the-wait-and-see-effects-on-trade
<p>If your job were suddenly in jeopardy, and you couldn’t predict next month’s income, you might put off buying that new car you had been eyeing. Similarly, an appliance company faced with sudden hardship among its customer base might delay building a new refrigerator-manufacturing plant. It turns out that uncertainty affects international trade flows, too. In a working paper published by the World Bank’s <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,noSURL:Y~contentMDK:21685233~menuPK:167358~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:239071,00.html"><font color="#0000ff">International Trade Department</font></a>, we explore how that uncertainty hurts some types of trade more than others.</p> <p>Our recent working paper, “<a href="http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&amp;theSitePK=469372&amp;piPK=64165421&amp;menuPK=64166093&amp;entityID=000158349_20121015093042"><font color="#0000ff">Innocent bystanders: How foreign uncertainty shocks harm exporters</font></a>,” is an attempt to address a shortcoming in scholars’ ability to anticipate the trade-related impacts of crises. In 2008, for example, trade economists failed to predict the drop in international commerce that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an event that shook the global financial system. More recently, trade economists have failed to capture the full impact of the European debt crisis on exporters across the globe. While models and simulations have been getting better, the impacts of such shocks on trade are still poorly understood. Our research explores a theory that places exceptional uncertainty at the beginning of a chain-reaction that ultimately slows trade.</p><p><!--break-->We find that, when the shock is big enough, uncertainty is an important factor in predicting a slump in trade flows. It finds that exporters can be hurt by uncertainty in the countries where they are sending their goods. It also finds that exporters of durable goods, such as cars, appliances, and other long-term-use commodities, are more likely than exporters of consumable goods to be affected by uncertainty in destination countries.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Our data analysis is grounded in research on producer and consumer behavior. The literature shows that both producers and consumers take a “wait-and-see” approach when the market is volatile; during uncertain periods, they freeze activity and postpone purchasing decisions. In particular, they delay the purchase of capital goods (for producers) or durable goods (for consumers) whose purchase is difficult to reverse. This resonates with every-day decision-making. If your income was uncertain, you would be likely to shop at the grocery store, but postpone your trip to the car dealership. The literature also shows that once uncertainty subsides, pent-up demand leads to a medium-term period of overshooting in production and consumption of durable goods. This also sounds intuitive: once your paycheck is assured, you decide to go buy that car and also replace your refrigerator, which had broken down in the meantime.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>Data on trade flows measures consumer and producer decisions in aggregate. So for the impact of a shock to be detected in trade data, it must affect a critical number of consumers and producers. Our analysis found that if a shock is big enough, it does indeed change trade flows between countries. Specifically, we used bilateral trade data from 32 countries to look at the impact on trade of uncertainty (proxied by stock market volatility and other financial indices) in the importing country. So, for example, uncertainty in the US would affect German, Chilean, and Australian exporters. Our results show that in these moments of big-enough-shocks, uncertainty leads to an 11.5 percent reduction of aggregate exports in partner countries.</p><p>&nbsp;</p> <p>We found, as we expected, that the negative impact of uncertainty generally increases as trade relationships gain intensity in durable goods. There is a surprise, however: the countries at the highest end of the spectrum – those that are most intensive in durables-trading -- are resilient to uncertainty. For example, Japan’s trade with the US is more than 80 percent durables, and is relatively unaffected by uncertainty shocks. While this dynamic deserves more exploration, we have some hypotheses about why it might occur. One is that the prevalence of value-chain production methods might mean that some countries exporting durable goods might be removed from the final consumer. For example, it might happen that the production of a computer goes through a three-country-process: microchips made in China, assembly done in Costa Rica, and the finished product sold in the US. Each transaction involves the export of a durable good, but an uncertainty shock affecting consumers in Costa Rica would not affect demand for the product, so it would not impact the trade relationships.</p> <p>Another explanation for the immunity to uncertainty in high-durables trade relations has to do with possible substitution goods. For example, an uncertainty shock in the UK might cause a decrease in demand for Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) from the US, which might be considered luxury goods. But consumers facing uncertainty about future income still have current income to spend. They might spend that money on laptop computers, which they consider more of an every-day staple. So while US car exports to the UK might decrease, its computer exports would increase, and both are durable goods. To understand the dynamic at that level of detail, however, we would need more nuanced information about consumer preferences in importing countries. This is an area for possible future study.</p> <p>Finally, we asked whether a country’s experience in facing an uncertainty shock would help them navigate subsequent shocks. Did they learn to implement a policy, for example, that would mitigate the downturn in trade? We found that they did not. In fact, countries with prior experience in confronting a shock did not behave any differently when confronted with another. This result suggests that countries could benefit from interventions that better anticipate uncertainty shocks -- or that ensure that the shocks are as short as possible – whether through an automatic stabilizer triggered by an early indicator of crisis or some other action that could offset the trade losses brought by uncertainty. In any case, we hope that our research will add to a conversation about this issue and help countries maintain economic stability in an ever-more-connected world.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p><strong>Periods of exceptional uncertainty</strong></p> <p><img alt="Periods of exceptional uncertainty. Bloom, N. (2009, 05). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica 77(3), 623-685." align="middle" src="/files/trade/exceptional_volatility.jpg" width="500" height="342"></p> <p><em>Source: </em><i><span>Bloom, N. (2009, 05). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica 77(3), 623-685.</span></i></p>Wed, 14 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500Daria Taglioni