A Political Treatise, by Benedict de Spinoza

Chapter XI.

Of Democracy.

I PASS, at length, to the third and perfectly absolute dominion, which we call democracy. The
difference between this and aristocracy consists, we have said, chiefly in this, that in an aristocracy it depends on
the supreme council's will and free choice only, that this or that man is made a patrician, so that no one has the
right to vote or fill public offices by inheritance, and that no one can by right demand this right, as is the case in
the dominion, whereof we are now treating. For all, who are born of citizen parents, or on the soil of the country, or
who have deserved well of the republic, or have accomplished any other conditions upon which the law grants to a man
right of citizenship; they all, I say, have a right to demand for themselves the right to vote in the supreme council
and to fill public offices, nor can they be refused it, but for crime or infamy.

2. If, then, it is by a law appointed, that the elder men only, who have reached a certain year of their age, or the
first-born only, as soon as their age allows, or those who contribute to the republic a certain sum of money, shall
have the right of voting in the supreme council and managing the business of the dominion; then, although on this
system the result might be, that the supreme council would be composed of fewer citizens than that of the aristocracy
of which we treated above, yet, for all that, dominions of this kind should be called democracies, because in them the
citizens, who are destined to manage affairs of state, are not chosen as the best by the supreme council, but are
destined to it by a law. And although for this reason dominions of this kind, that is, where not the best, but those
who happen by chance to be rich, or who are born eldest, are destined to govern, are thought inferior to an
aristocracy; yet, if we reflect on the practice or general condition of mankind, the result in both cases will come to
the same thing. For patricians will always think those the best, who are rich, or related to themselves in blood, or
allied by friendship. And, indeed, if such were the nature of patricians, that they were free from all passion, and
guided by mere zeal for the public welfare in choosing their patrician colleagues, no dominion could be compared with
aristocracy. But experience itself teaches us only too well, that things pass in quite a contrary manner, above all, in
oligarchies, where the will of the patricians, from the absence of rivals, is most free from the law. For there the
patricians intentionally keep away the best men from the council, and seek for themselves such colleagues in it, as
hang upon their words, so that in such a dominion things are in a much more unhappy condition, because the choice of
patricians depends entirely upon the arbitrary will of a few, which is free or unrestrained by any law. But I return to
my subject.

3. From what has been said in the last section, it is manifest that we can conceive of various kinds of democracy.
But my intention is not to treat of every kind, but of that only, "wherein all, without exception, who owe allegiance
to the laws of the country only, and are further independent and of respectable life, have the right of voting in the
supreme council and of filling the offices of the dominion." I say expressly. "who owe allegiance to the laws of the
country only," to exclude foreigners, who are treated as being under another's dominion. I added, besides, "who are
independent," except in so far as they are under allegiance to the laws of the dominion, to exclude women and slaves,
who are under the authority of men and masters, and also children and wards, as long as they are under the authority of
parents and guardians. I said, lastly, "and of respectable life," to exclude, above all, those that are infamous from
crime, or some disgraceful means of livelihood.

4. But, perhaps, someone will ask, whether women are under men's authority by nature or institution? For if it has
been by mere institution, then we had no reason compelling us to exclude women from government. But if we consult
experience itself, we shall find that the origin of it is in their weakness. For there has never been a case of men and
women reigning together, but wherever on the earth men are found, there we see that men rule, and women are ruled, and
that on this plan, both sexes live in harmony. But on the other hand, the Amazons, who are reported to have held rule
of old, did not suffer men to stop in their country, but reared only their female children, killing the males to whom
they gave birth. 1 But if by nature women were equal to men, and were equally
distinguished by force of character and ability, in which human power and therefore human right chiefly consist; surely
among nations so many and different some would be found, where both sexes rule alike, and others, where men are ruled
by women, and so brought up, that they can make less use of their abilities. And since this is nowhere the case, one
may assert with perfect propriety, that women have not by nature equal right with men: but that they necessarily give
way to men, and that thus it cannot happen, that both sexes should rule alike, much less that men should be ruled by
women. But if we further reflect upon human passions, how men, in fact, generally love women merely from the passion of
lust, and esteem their cleverness and wisdom in proportion to the excellence of their beauty, and also how very
ill-disposed men are to suffer the women they love to show any sort of favour to others, and other facts of this kind,
we shall easily see that men and women cannot rule alike without great hurt to peace. But of this enough.

1. Justin, Histories, ii. 4.

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