11.4.17

Armenia’s election: The status quo wins at the expense of democracy

Armine Ishkanian

After a quarter of a century of ‘transitioning’ to democracy, Armenia remains at best a partly free
‘managed’ democracy and at worst a semi-consolidated authoritarian
regime. The country has high levels of poverty and inequality (over 30%
of Armenians live under the poverty line, with 47% of those aged 15 and above
being unemployed) and the discontent with the status quo has led to
continual emigration since the early 1990s and mass protests over recent
years.

In the immediate aftermath of the election on 2 April, in which the ruling Republican (Hanrapetakan) Party of Armenia, received nearly 50% of the vote, questions have been raised as to why, despite growing discontent
with the political and socio-economic status quo, including the
unresolved conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, so many Armenian citizens
appear to have given their support to the ruling party?

Table: Preliminary results of the 2017 Armenian election

Note: These are preliminary results and will change. Figures rounded to first decimal place.

There is now something of an air of resignation among some segments
of Armenian civil society, coupled with frustration, disillusionment,
and a growing realisation that the majority of Armenian citizens are not
interested in democracy and human rights, and are indeed prepared to
sell their votes to the highest bidder, even if that means returning the
ruling regime to power.

The fetishisation of elections

Since independence, elections have been used as benchmarks in
measuring the level of democratisation in Armenia and other post-Soviet
countries, as well as for assessing the progress these countries have
made in their transitions to democracy. A great deal of time and money
has been spent on training, preparation, and the observation and
monitoring of elections by donors, intergovernmental organisations and
NGOs over the past 25 years. But this fetishisation of elections, and in
particular of the election day itself, ignores the wider political and
social dynamics which can and do influence voter behaviour.

What we have seen in recent years is a focus on technical solutions
to addressing voting irregularities and fraud. Many scholars criticise
development agencies’ preference for technical and managerialist
approaches. As James Ferguson famously argued in The Anti-Politics Machine,
technical solutions are more attractive to donors and development
agencies as it provides them with a place to ‘plug’ themselves into
relatively easily and without appearing to be too politically intrusive.
While maintaining a stance of technocratic, objective, neutrality, such
technical approaches often ignore the political and structural causes
of voting irregularities and are therefore poorly placed to address
them.

For example, in preparation for Armenia’s 2017 elections, the European Union
spent €7 million developing voter identification technologies and
installing video cameras to live stream polling stations. The hope
was that these new technologies would “diminish the likelihood of voter
fraud on election day and will limit tampering with the electoral
process inside polling stations”. While the EU acknowledged that its
assessment of Armenia’s elections would not be limited to observing
electoral procedures on election day itself, this large investment
indicates an attempt to use a technical solution to address a problem
whose causes are political and structural.

The irregularities in Armenia’s electoral process, which include vote
buying and intimidation of voters, occur before and outside of election
day in places and spaces where livestreaming video cameras are unable
to reach. They happen in kindergartens
and schools, in workplaces, and offices across Armenia in the lead up
to a vote. Either through coercion, intimidation, or promises of future
benefits, voters are persuaded into selling their support. Coercion
alone is an insufficient explanation for voter behaviour, as some voters
are actively exercising their agency to pursue their material interests
by trading in a commodity (i.e. their vote). To address these problems,
it is not enough to capture vote tampering through cameras; we also
need to understand why some people are prepared to sell their votes.

Second, another popular election day monitoring strategy is the use
of observation missions. This year, for the first time, some of the
Armenian diaspora were actively encouraged and invited to participate in
election observations through the Citizen Observer Initiative. This
initiative, which was organised by a coalition of NGOs, called on the Armenian diaspora to “take a stand on the side of democracy and rule of law”. The Transparency Tour 2017,
which exemplifies what many scholars describe as a type of
‘volun-tourism’ included meetings with ‘local pro-democracy activists
and thought leaders’, an opportunity to learn about Armenian political
institutions, and to get immersed in ‘society, culture and current
events’.

While election observation missions indeed have some value, this
practice is another technical solution which fetishises election day and
ignores the processes leading up to the vote. While hundreds of
individuals from the Armenian diaspora travelled to participate as
observers, their numbers were overshadowed by the number of local
observers from some well-known and respected NGOs as well as some more
obscure and somewhat dubious organisations. The observation missions
organised by the latter groups, are, according to local sources, an
indication of the vote-riggers propensity to learn, adapt, and innovate.

To be clear, the point here is not to argue that technological
solutions and observation missions are not necessary. On the contrary,
they can be of great assistance in enhancing public confidence in the
electoral process. However, they are no substitute for the much more
difficult process of understanding and addressing the underlying causes
and factors which lead people to sell their votes.

Civil society and democracy in an age of anger and mistrust

According to most normative interpretations, civil society plays an
important role in democracy building by promoting active civic
participation, dialogue and debate, as well as developing social capital
and trust. Yet in recent years, public trust in many institutions,
including political parties, trade unions and NGOs, has sharply
declined, not just in Armenia, but in many parts of the world. Today,
some claim, we are living in the age of anger and mistrust and in an era
where politics is influenced by fear and anxiety. Many scholars agree
that recent protests linked to these issues around the world reflect
rising concerns about a lack of democracy, social justice and dignity,
as well as growing precarity and inequality.

Since 2010, Armenia has had its share
of protests and civic mobilisations against corruption, the absence of
the rule of law/democracy, the rise of oligarchic capitalism, and a
failure by the formal political elites to address the concerns of
ordinary Armenian citizens. In my own research, I found that activists
in Armenia often understood citizenship to mean that individuals have
rights as well as responsibilities toward their communities and their
country. As such, they would encourage people to become the ‘owners’ [derer]
of their country: active subjects rather than passive and silent
bystanders in society who privately complain about problems, but do not
take any public action to change things.

Yet, they also acknowledged that despite the visible anger and
discontent, this sense of empowered citizenship and civic responsibility
was not widespread in Armenia. As Sona Manusyan writes,
there continues to be ‘resistance against resistance in Armenia’ and
there ‘simultaneously exists a desire to change the situation alongside a
fear of change.’ Some Yerevan-based activists have attempted to build
links with communities and individuals outside the capital to widen
participation, but most recognise that much more needs to be done to
raise awareness and to build a culture of democracy.

Once the dust has settled, it remains to be seen how civil society in
Armenia will respond to the latest elections. Will it succumb to
frustration and despair or will it begin the difficult and
time-intensive work of building democracy from the bottom up? There is
clearly much to be done and it is too soon to make predictions.