The Run & Shoot system uses a formation consisting of one running back and between two and four wide receivers. This system makes extensive use of receiver motion (having a receiver suddenly change position by running left or right, parallel to the line of scrimmage, just before the ball is snapped), both to create advantageous mismatches with the opposing defensive players and to help reveal what coverage the defense is using.

The basic idea behind the Run & Shoot is a flexible offense that adjusts "on the fly," as the receivers are free to adjust their routes as they are running them in response to the defensive coverage employed. The quarterback, as a result, also has to read and react to the defense's coverages in a more improvised manner than with other offensive systems.

In the purest form of the offense, the proper complement would consist of two wide receivers lined up on the outside edges of the formation and two "slotbacks" (running backs who are capable of catching the ball as well as running with it, e.g. Ricky Sanders and Richard Johnson of the USFL's Houston Gamblers) lined up just outside and behind the two offensive tackles.

Many of the National Football League teams that used the Run & Shoot in the early 1990s used true wide receivers in all four receiving positions. The types of running backs used varied from smaller backs who could catch passes to big, bruising running backs who could run with power. The frequent passing plays run out of this formation tend to spread out the defense's players. If repeated pass plays work, the defense is not as prepared for running plays; running the ball between the offensive tackles, or just off-tackle, is now possible and more likely to succeed.

At the Collegiate level, the 1989 Houston Cougars football team demonstrated the scoring potential of the run and shoot offense as quarterback Andre Ware set 26 NCAA records and won the Heisman Trophy while the #14 ranked Cougars finished the season 9-2. The Cougars were disallowed from having its football games televised or playing in a Bowl Game that season due to NCAA sanctions imposed some years earlier. The following two seasons Houston quarterback David Klingler continued the success of the run and shoot throwing for 9,430 yards and 91 touchdowns, including 716 yards and 11 touchdown passes in a single game which were all records. Quarterbacks Ware and Klingler were both drafted in the NFL first round. The success of Houston's run and shoot offense and the inability of its record setting quarterbacks to translate their success into the NFL lead to the label of being a "system quarterback".

The Pulitzer Prize-winning Press-Enterprise, an independent news source whose coverage area spans four of Southern California's largest counties, noted that "the team's Silver Stretch Run 'n' Shoot offense," inspired by Mouse Davis, mentor of Coyote coach J David Miller "and the pioneer of the modern four-wide offense, has paid great dividends over the SoCal Coyotes first five seasons." [1]

The original inventor of the Run & Shoot, Tiger Ellison, first started out with a formation that overloaded the left side of the offensive line for his scrambling quarterback. He called it "The Lonesome Polecat.[disambiguation needed]"

A year later, he came back with a more balanced formation that is similar to the diagram below. The formation bears a strong resemblance to the Flexbone offense.

WR................LT.LG.C.RG.RT...............WR

...........SB................QB................SB

.................................FB

Other variations of the above formation are similar to the way spread offenses like to set up their systems. Originally, the run and shoot was set up so that the quarterback would be positioned behind the center in a single back position, with the single running back lined up a few yards back. Later, during his tenure with the University of Hawaii, June Jones used quarterback Colt Brennan out of the shotgun. In this case the running back is offset to the right of the quarterback (as in the formation below).

X.........LT.LG.C.RG.RT...........Z

......W................................Y

......................QB...SB

Another formation that can often be seen with the run and shoot is the "trips" formation, where three wide receivers are situated to the right or left side of the line of scrimmage. Most of the time, this formation will be created out of motion when the W or Y receiver moves to the opposite side of the formation.

Every team has its own specific naming conventions, but they all have the same basic principles. To make diagramming plays easier, the receivers used in the Run & Shoot are often given standardized names depending on their position. One way to do this is to label the receivers, from left to right, X, W (for "Wing"), Y, and Z, with the running back being called an S-Back (for Singleback or Superback).

The initial movements of the receivers can also be labelled by using code names for "left" and "right" such as "Lil and Rob," "Liz and Rip," or "Lion and Ram." As an example, a quarterback may call an "X Liz, W Liz, Y Go, Z Rip, SB flat", which tells the X and W receivers to run to their left, the Y receiver to run a go (or fly) route, the Z receiver to run to his right, and the S-Back to run to the flat (close to the line of scrimmage and toward the sideline).

If the QB reads 5 or less in the box, run the football. This means that traditional defensive formations using a 3-4 or 4-3 front will have moved 2 defenders outside of the "box" for coverage help. The "box" is the area about a yard outside of the tight end or offensive tackle on one side of the line to the other offensive tackle/tight end on the other side of the line and about 5 yards beyond the line of scrimmage.

Use motion and formations to spread the defense out and anticipate what the defense is going to do. If one uses motion and the defensive back follows the motioning receiver, they are probably playing man coverage or blitzing. If no defensive back follows the motion receiver, then they are probably playing zone defense.

Forces the defense to switch to 4 DB or 5 DB formations, often substituting shorter and thinner DBs in place of taller and thicker LBs. This allows the offense an advantage in the running game as it often employs a bigger RB to help block and run in between the tackles. By incorporating inside running plays, the much bigger RB (usually 220-240 pounds) would be able to get more yards after going up against DBs who are usually 180-200 pounds in weight. This also allows wide receivers to have a better ability to break tackle by a 190 pound DB as opposed to a 240 pound LB.

By reading the DB, the WRs are able to run routes to uncovered areas in zone coverage or simply beat their defender in coverage. This allows the QB to go down the field vertically or take what the defense gives him and go underneath (throw short passes in front of the defensive coverage personnel) to let his WR get yards after the catch (hopefully "make a play"). Since a lot of the routes are downfield to vertically challenge the outside and seams, successful QBs can not only put up staggering numbers but it also allows them to put up very high yard per completion numbers.

Personnel combinations never need to be changed because they are not dictated by the defensive coverage. As a result, a team can go down the field using the same personnel without having to change from their base formation due to what the defense has lined up in.

The offense allows for wide open running lanes inside and allows for running backs to maximize the 10-14 carries a game they may get as opposed to running the ball 25 times but less successfully per carry.

There are several potential disadvantages to using a Run & Shoot offense:

Since the formation does not use any tight ends or fullbacks, the quarterback is at increased risk for being hit or sacked since there are fewer players available to block a defense's blitz.

Teams often use a strong running game to keep possession of the football, especially at times when it would be advantageous for them to run out the clock. A criticism of the Run & Shoot offense is that teams would often continue to rely upon the pass rather than establish the run to finish off a game. One example of this is the 1992 AFC Wild Card game where the Houston Oilers, after earning a 35-3 lead against the Buffalo Bills, rather than winding the clock down with the running game and preserving the lead for the victory, called 22 pass plays against only four runs in the second half and eventually lost the game by a score of 41-38. Alternatives like the Spread offense have been preferred over the Run & Shoot in part because they place more emphasis on the running game.

Many commentators noted that the Run & Shoot is less effective in the "Red Zone," when the offense is less than 20 yards from the goal line. In this area the offense has less room to move around and cannot spread the defense out as in other areas of the field.

Quarterbacks often have to be either mobile or have a very quick release if they are not mobile. Having a lot of arm strength is not a requirement but they need to have enough to make various throws. Jim Kelly was 6'3" and around 215 pounds. Andre Ware was 6'2" and around 200 pounds. David Klingler was 6'3" and around 210 pounds. Colt Brennan was 6'2" and around 205 pounds. Warren Moon was 6'3" and around 215 pounds.

Halfbacks need to be built much like fullbacks as they often have to deal with no lead blocker and are often the only defense to blitzers for the QB's protection. Chuck Weatherspoon was 5'7" and around 230 pounds. Craig Heyward was 5'11" and around 240 pounds. Dorsey Levens was 6'1" and around 230 pounds. Kimble Anders was 5'11" and around 230 pounds. Lamar Smith was 5'11" and around 230 pounds. Gary Brown was 5'11" and around 230 pounds.

Wide Receivers can vary although Mouse Davis was prone to opting for shorter receivers who were more explosive due to their smaller size. Andre Rison was 6'1" and around 190 pounds. Sterling Sharpe was 6'0" and around 210 pounds. Drew Hill was 5'9" and around 170 pounds. Ernest Givins was 5'9" and around 180 pounds. Haywood Jeffries was 6'2" and around 200 pounds. Eric Metcalf was 5'10" and around 190 pounds. Michael Haynes was 6'0" and around 190 pounds. Jason Phillips was 5'7" and around 170 pounds. Davone Bess was 5'10" and around 190 pounds.

Offensive Linemen need to be stout in pass protection and fast/agile enough to drop back constantly. Jamie Dukes was 6'1" and around 290 pounds. Bill Fralic was 6'5" and around 280 pounds. Chris Hinton was 6'4" and around 300 pounds. Bob Whitfield was 6'5" and around 310 pounds. Lomas Brown was 6'4" and around 280 pounds. Bruce Matthews was 6'5" and around 300 pounds. Mike Munchak was 6'3" and around 280 pounds. Don Maggs was 6'5" and around 290 pounds.

As more coaches incorporated the Run & Shoot as an offense, several coaches continued to fine-tune and put their own touches on the offense as the years went by. Mouse Davis initially incorporated a straight forward, more balanced offensive attack that featured half rolls to the right or left, where the QB would settle behind the OG and OT. Mouse also featured his QBs under center and preferred using shorter, thinner wide receivers due to their ability to quickly change direction. The offense also typically preferred to be designed around quick, short to intermediate passes that would get the ball out of the quarterback's hand faster.

John Jenkins was one of the first coaches to start tinkering with the Run & Shoot. He started incorporating more of an aggressive, vertical attack within the offense preferring to challenge defenders deep. Jenkins not only preferred throwing the ball down the field but also heavily favored throwing the ball and used the running backs more as a change of pace in comparison to what Mouse Davis did with the Houston Gamblers and Detroit Lions.

Upon being named head coach at the University of Hawai'i, June Jones started tweaking the Run & Shoot as well. He largely eliminated the half roll system and removed the QB from underneath the center, setting him up in the Shotgun instead. This allowed for a bit more pocket time while keeping his QB further away from defenders.

As he moved around as an NFL offensive coordinator, Kevin Gilbride started incorporating more of the Erhardt-Perkins offensive system while featuring more of the running back and also utilizing a tight end as both a blocker and an intermediate receiving threat. While Gilbride largely kept Run & Shoot concepts in relation to reading and diagnosing coverages, he also began to tie in more of an accepted Pro Style in regards to emphasizing the running game.

But if everyone runs their pattern and does their job, the defenses will never matter to me. Because someone will always be open and we'll always be able to move the ball. It's easy. - Houston Gamblers Quarterback Jim Kelly in 1985[4]

"The run-and-shoot is much less complex than it seems,' Houston's Moon said. 'For a quarterback, it's the least complicated system I've ever been in. Of course, there are a lot of options to learn--a receiver can break off (from a defensive back) three or four different ways, sometimes eight or 10 ways. But once you can read the options, that's all there is. You've got the run-and-shoot." - Houston Oilers Quarterback Warren Moon in 1990[6]

"We'll play a team, and the next time we play 'em, we'll see parts of our offense in their offense." - Detroit Lions Offensive Coordinator Mouse Davis in 1990[7]

"It puts four very quick and explosive receivers on the field. And you have the potential to have a wide-open, explosive offense. You have the ability to turn a short gain into a long play." - Houston Oilers Offensive Coordinator Kevin Gilbride in 1990[8]

"That's the dilemma. The run-and-shoot is not going to be real effective if you're not going to have an effective running back. If you have an effective running back, like Detroit, it's going to create problems." - Philadelphia Eagles Defensive Coordinator Jeff Fisher in 1990[9]

What the backs like about it is you're not running into a clogged-up line. Without even having to block, there's going to be room ... Essentially what you're telling a receiver is, `I want you to run to get open and, based on what you see as the play develops, you're taking the best route." - Seattle Seahawks Offensive Coordinator John Becker in 1990[10]

"You’ve got the freedom to do pretty much whatever you want. The playbook’s open to you. You’ve got to be on your game. But if you are, it’s a great thing ... There’s some of that. But we’re trying to scheme. We’re trying to find the best possible play vs. that defense at that time to just gash them. That’s why it works.” - New York Giants Quarterback David Carr in 2012[11]

"Other than that, everybody’s running the same concepts of the run-and-shoot that we were running back then. Maybe they don’t have as many adjustments off the routes as we did, but they do have the adjustments. And it’s funny to see those route combinations when I’m watching tape when different teams play, because that was our offense.” - Quarterback Warren Moon in 2013[12]