Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, "The Battle of Baghdad,"
Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2006

Although there has been much good news to report about security progress in Iraq
this summer--the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the handover of security responsibility
for Muthanna province, the fifth of 10 Iraqi Army Division Headquarters to assume
the lead in its area of responsibility--Iraq faces an urgent crisis in securing
its capital, Baghdad. Although Iraqi leaders and the Coalition have a sound strategy
to turn the situation around, it is vital that Iraqis control sectarian violence
and come together against the terrorists and outside powers that are fomenting
the violence.

In July, there were 558 violent incidents in Baghdad, a 10% increase over the
already high monthly average. These attacks caused 2,100 deaths, again an increase
over the four-month average. More alarmingly, 77% of these casualties were the
result of sectarian violence, giving rise to fears of an impending civil war in
Iraq. While statistics should not be the sole measure of progress or failure in
stabilizing Iraq and quelling violent sectarianism, it is clear that the people
of Baghdad are being subjected to unacceptable levels of fear and violence.

This trend is especially troubling because we cannot achieve our goal of a secure,
stable and democratic Iraq if such devastating violence persists in the capital.
Baghdad represents one-fifth of Iraq's total population, and is a microcosm of
Iraq's diverse ethnic and sectarian communities. Baghdad is also Iraq's financial
and edia center, the latter of which is especially important given that the declared
strategy of the terrorists and violent sectarian groups in Iraq revolves around
creating a perception of growing chaos in an effort to persuade Americans that
the effort in Iraq has failed. Therefore, violence in Baghdad has a disproportionate
psychological and strategic effect.

The deterioration of security in Baghdad since February's attack on the Samara
Mosque is the result of the competition between Sunni and Shiite extremists to
expand their control and influence throughout the capital. Although the leadership
of al Qaeda in Iraq has been significantly attrited, it still has cells capable
of operating independently in Baghdad by deploying car bombs to Shiite neighborhoods.
At the same time, Sunni and Shiite death squads, some acting as Iranian surrogates,
are responsible for an increasing share of the violence. This cycle of retaliatory
violence is compounded by shortcomings in the training and leadership of Iraq's
National Police. To combat this complex problem, Iraq's national unity government,
led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has made securing Baghdad its top priority.
The government's Baghdad Security Plan has three principal components:

--Stabilizing Baghdad zone by zone.Four Iraqi Army battalions, two Coalition brigades
and five military police companies will be redeployed to Baghdad, resulting in
more than 12,000 additional forces on the city's streets. The National Police
will simultaneously undergo intensive retraining, with each brigade to be subjected
to a three-day assessment period, with its leadership evaluated and, if necessary,
replaced. Each brigade will subsequently receive additional training focused on
countering violent sectarianism before redeployment. Over the last 10 days this
approach began to be implemented in five areas of Baghdad--Doura, Ghazaliyah,
Rashid, Ahmeriyya and Mansour. In coming weeks other districts will be added.

Iraqi government and Coalition forces are adopting new tactics to stem sectarian
killings. Increased checkpoints and patrols are being used to deny freedom of
movement and safe haven to sectarian killers. The leaders of the death squads
are being targeted. Security forces have started to work with cross-sectarian
neighborhood committees. These and other new tactics will drive toward the goal
of achieving security neighborhood by neighborhood. As each district of Baghdad
is secured, operations will expand into contiguous zones over coming weeks and
months.

--Disrupting support zones. Even as Iraqi and Coalition forces concentrate on
securing specific neighborhoods, they will continue to conduct targeted operations
in other zones that are staging areas for the violence. This includes targeted
raids and other operations on areas outside of Baghdad's center, where planning
cells, car-bomb factories and terrorist safe houses are located. This will degrade
the ability of the terrorists and death squads to mount offensive operations into
the areas we are working to stabilize.

--Undertaking civic action and economic development. One of the most tragic elements
of the increasing violence in Baghdad is that it has robbed the Iraqi people of
the sense of normalcy they desperately seek after living under crushing tyranny
for more than three decades. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq's liberation,
the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people was demonstrated as Baghdad's shops
overflowed with consumer goods prohibited under the previous regime. However,
the increasing violence in the streets of Baghdad has forced many Iraqis to close
their shops for fear of their safety.

Consequently, after joint Coalition and Iraqi military operations have secured
a neighborhood or district, a structure of Iraqi security forces sufficient to
maintain the peace is expected to be left in place and reinforced with the capacity
to undertake civic action and foster economic revitalization. This will be supported
with $500 million in funds from Prime Minister Maliki's government and at least
$130 million of U.S. funds.

These economic support funds will be used to offer vocational training and create
jobs, especially for 17-to-25-year-old males; to foster public support through
improved services, such as medical care and trash and debris removal; and to build
local governmental capacity to protect and provide for their citizens. These goals
will be achieved through a mixture of high-impact, short-term programs; mid-term
programs designed to stabilize these initial gains; and programs focused on long-term
economic development. Prime Minister Maliki's plan for securing Baghdad is also
closely tied to the national unity government's larger program for reconciliation,
which seeks to foster political understanding between Sunni and Shiite forces,
including those that either control or influence unauthorized armed groups involved
in sectarian conflict.

In addition, a moral compact between the religious leaders of the two Islamic
communities--which will ban sectarian killings--will delegitimize the violence.
Such a compact would deny the killers a political or religious sanctuary while
Iraqi and Coalition forces deny them physical shelter. For the longer term, the
plan seeks to induce insurgents and militias to lay down their arms by implementing
a program to demobilize unauthorized armed groups. It will also review the implementation
of the de-Baathification process--referring those accused of crimes to the judiciary
and reconciling with the rest.

It is understandable that when the American people hear of new U.S. casualties
and witness the images of bloodshed from the streets of Baghdad, they conclude
that our plans for stemming sectarian violence in Iraq have failed. Yet, implementation
of the Baghdad Security Plan has only recently begun. Iraq's national unity government
has been in office barely three months, and its ministers of defense and interior
have been on the job for less than 80 days. Iraqi ministers are still hiring key
staff, and they are learning to work together, under the leadership of a new prime
minister. The Committee for National Dialogue and Reconciliation, charged with
overseeing implementation of the reconciliation plan, was formed only three weeks
ago.

Moreover, as tragic and dangerous as the ongoing violence is to our shared vision
of a free and prosperous Iraq, it is not representative of the Iraqi people's
sentiments toward one another. In July, a poll by the International Republican
Institute, a nonpartisan organization dedicated to democracy promotion, found
that 94% of Iraqis said they support a "unity" government representing
all sects and ethnic communities, with only 2% opposed. Some 78% of Iraqis opposed
Iraq being segregated by religion or ethnicity, with only 13% in favor. Even in
Baghdad, where the worst of Iraq's sectarian violence has occurred, 76% of those
surveyed opposed ethnic separation, with only 10% favoring it. The challenge of
the Baghdad Security Plan and its accompanying effort at national reconciliation
is to realize the overwhelming majority of Iraqis desire to live in peace with
one another against the violent minority who seek to impose their vision of hatred
and oppression.

These programs are already beginning to show positive results. The Iraqi Ministry
of Defense reports that the crime rate in Doura has been reduced by 80%. In the
Rashid district, Sunni and Shiite political leaders, tribal leaders and imams
met and signed an agreement forswearing violence. The tribal leaders went a step
further by renouncing protection for tribal members who engage in sectarian violence.

Although it is too early to determine whether these success stories will be replicated
throughout the city, this initial progress should give Iraqis, as well as Americans,
hope about the future. Contrary to those who portray Iraq as hopelessly mired
in ancient ethnic and sectarian feuds, Iraqis themselves want to put the divisions
of the past behind them. The Battle of Baghdad will determine the future of Iraq,
which will itself go a long way to determining the future of the world's most
vital region. Although much difficult work still remains to be done, it is imperative
that we give the Iraqis the time and material support necessary to see this plan
through, and to win the Battle of Baghdad.