Qatar

INDEPENDENCE

With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Arab
coast
of the gulf was ruled by ten families: in Kuwait the Al
Sabah; in
Bahrain the Al Khalifa; in Qatar the Al Thani; in the
present-day
UAE the Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi in Ajman,
the Al
Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum in Dubayy, the Al
Qasimi in
Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al Mualla in Umm al
Qaywayn;
and the Al Said in present-day Oman. These families owed
their
positions to tribal leadership; it was on this traditional
basis
that the British had negotiated treaties with their
leaders in
the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

A major provision of these treaties was the recognition
of
sovereignty. The British were concerned that rulers of the
weaker
gulf families would yield some of their territory under
pressure
from more powerful groups, such as the Al Saud or the
Ottomans.
Accordingly, the treaties signed between 1820 and 1916
recognized
the sovereignty of these rulers within certain borders and
specified that these borders could not be changed without
British
consent. Such arrangements helped to put tribal alliances
into
more concrete terms of landownership. This meant that the
Al
Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi, for example, not only commanded the
respect of tribes in the hinterland but also owned, as it
were,
the land that those tribes used--in this case, about
72,000
square kilometers of Arabia.

Controlling, or owning, land became more important with
the
discovery of oil. When oil companies came to explore for
oil,
they looked for the "owner" of the land; in accordance
with
British treaties, they went to the area's leading families
and
agreed to pay fees to the heads of these families. As oil
revenues increased, the leaders became rich. Although the
leaders
spent much of their new wealth on themselves, they also
distributed it in the area they controlled according to
traditional methods, which initially consisted mostly of
largesse: gifts for friends and food for whomever needed
it. As
time passed, the form of largesse became more
sophisticated and
included, for example, the construction of schools,
hospitals,
and roads to connect principal cities to towns in the
interior.

Oil revenues did not change traditional tribal ideas
about
leadership. New money, however, increased the influence of
area
leaders by giving them more resources to distribute.
Because of
oil exploration, tribal boundaries became clearer, and
areas were
defined more precisely. Distinctions among tribes also
became
more evident. A new sense of identity appeared in gulf
shaykhdoms
and aroused a growing expectation that they should rule
themselves. To do this, shaykhs had to cut themselves off
from
British control and protection.

By the early 1960s, this was something to which the
British
had little objection. India and Pakistan won their
independence
in 1947; this meant that Britain no longer had to worry
about
protecting the western flank of the subcontinent. Britain
was
also burdened by the tremendous sacrifices it made during
World
War II and could not be as globally involved as it had
been
before the war. Therefore, Britain yielded many of its
strategic
responsibilities to the United States in the postwar
period or
gave them up entirely. However, the British were bound to
the
gulf by treaties and so remained in the region, but it was
clear
by the 1960s that they sought to leave the gulf.

Kuwait was the first state to terminate the agreement
connecting it with Britain. Oil production in Kuwait had
developed more quickly than in neighboring states; as a
result,
Kuwaitis were better prepared for independence. They
declared
independence in 1961 but ran into immediate trouble when
Iraq
claimed the territory. The Iraqis argued that the British
had
recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait before World
War I
and, because the Ottomans had claimed to rule Kuwait from
what
was then the province of Iraq, the territory should belong
to
Iraq.

The British immediately sent troops to Kuwait to deter
any
Iraqi invasion. British and Kuwaiti positions were
supported by
the newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League),
which
recognized the new state and sent troops to Kuwait. The
Arab
League move left the Iraqis isolated and somewhat
intimidated.
Accordingly, when a new Iraqi government came to power in
1963,
one of its first steps was to give up its claim and
recognize the
independence of Kuwait.

The experience of Kuwait may have increased the anxiety
of
other gulf leaders about declaring their independence.
Even into
the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to make claims
on
territory in Bahrain and the UAE, although by the end of
1971
those states were independent, and nothing came of those
claims.
Gulf leaders also faced uncertainty about the form their
state
should take. Should they all, with the exception of Oman
whose
situation was different in that its treaty relationship
with
Britain did not guarantee its borders as did treaties of
the
other gulf states, band together in the largest entity
possible?
Or should they break up into nine separate states, the
smallest
of which had little territory, few people, and no oil?

British action forced gulf leaders to decide. Because
of
domestic financial concerns, Britain decided in the late
1960s to
eliminate its military commitments east of Suez. As a
result, the
gulf shaykhs held a number of meetings to discuss
independence.
Initially, leaders considered a state that would include
all nine
shaykhdoms; Qatar had even drawn up a constitution to this
effect. In the end, however, so large a federation proved
unworkable.

An obstacle to creating a "superstate" was the status
of
Bahrain, which had been occupied by Iran at various times.
The
shah of Iran argued that he had a stronger claim to the
island
than the Al Khalifa, who had only come to Bahrain in the
eighteenth century. Furthermore, the shah indicated that
Iran
would not accept a federation of Arab states that included
Bahrain.

In the end, the United Nations (UN) considered the
issue of
Bahrain; it decided to deny the Iranian claim to the
island and
to allow the Bahrainis to form an independent state.
Bahrain was
better suited to independence than some of the other
shaykhdoms
because the island had been a center of British
administration
and had a more developed infrastructure and education
system than
its neighbors. Ironically, the greater British presence on
Bahrain made residents more resentful of treaty ties to
Britain.
Bahrain was the only place in the gulf where
demonstrations
against Britain occurred.

Backed by the UN decision, Bahrain declared its
independence
on August 15, 1971. On September 3, 1971, Qatar followed,
removing another state from any potential federation.
Although
Qatar had minimal contact with Britain, it was well suited
to
independence because it had a history of support from the
Al Saud
that went back to the beginnings of the Wahhabi state.
Accordingly, at independence, Qatar could expect continued
support from Saudi Arabia. It could also anticipate
substantial
oil revenues that had been increasing since the 1950s.

The same was not true for the other gulf states. The
five
southern shaykhdoms--Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah,
Sharjah,
and Umm al Qaywayn--had little oil in their territory and
so
could not afford self-sufficiency as countries. Although
substantial deposits had been discovered in Abu Dhabi and
Dubayy,
these two states preferred the security of a confederation
rather
than independence. Abu Dhabi, for example, had an
outstanding
border dispute with Saudi Arabia and a history of poor
relations
with that country because of Abu Dhabi's opposition to
Wahhabi
Islam. Abu Dhabi might have protected itself by forming a
federation with the five southern shaykhdoms, but this
would not
have suited Dubayy. Although Dubayy had oil of its own,
its
rulers, the Al Maktum, had a history of hostility toward
their
relatives in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuhayyan, from whom they
split in
the early nineteenth century. The Al Maktum would not have
liked
the Al Nuhayyan to dominate a confederation of gulf
leaders while
they were isolated in Dubayy.

Powers beyond the gulf coast also had an interest in
the
state to be formed. The Saudis no longer sought to control
the
gulf coast, but they remained concerned about stability on
the
eastern border. The British and other oil-consuming
countries in
the West were similarly concerned, and all parties
believed that
the largest state would also be the most stable.
Accordingly,
many forces were applying pressure in 1970 to convince the
seven
shaykhs to stay together.

Thus, in 1971 soon after Qatar became independent, the
remaining shaykhs, with the exception of the Al Qasimi in
Ras al
Khaymah, took the preliminary constitution that Qatar had
originally drawn up for a nine-member confederation and
adapted
it to a six-member body. On December 2, 1971, one day
after the
British officially withdrew, these six shaykhdoms declared
themselves a sovereign state.

Ras al Khaymah originally refused to join the
confederation.
The Al Qasimi, who ruled the area, claimed a number of
islands
and oil fields within the gulf to which Iran laid claim as
well.
In the negotiations to form the UAE, the Al Qasimi sought
support
for their claims from Arab states on the peninsula as well
as
from some Western powers. When their efforts proved
unsuccessful,
the Al Qasimi pulled out of the negotiations. They quickly
realized, however, that they could not exist on their own
and
joined the union in February 1972.

Oman was never considered a possible confederation
member.
Always geographically separate from its neighbors to the
north,
Oman had never entered into the agreements with Britain
that
governed other gulf rulers. The British had been closely
involved
in Oman since the middle of the nineteenth century, but
they were
under no official obligation to defend it.

The issue in Oman was one of internal unity rather than
of
sovereignty over foreign affairs. The historical split
between
coast and interior had continued through the second half
of the
nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. In
1920
the Al Said sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, came to terms with
this
split by granting limited sovereignty to the tribes of the
interior. Because of ambiguous language, the peoples of
the
interior believed that the treaty cut them off from the Al
Said;
the Al Said, however, never gave up their claim to all of
Oman.

The dispute between the two groups was exacerbated by
the
exploration for oil, which began in Oman in 1924. The oil
fields
lay in the interior, and the oil companies negotiated for
access
to them with the Al Said in Muscat. This Al Said sultan
gladly
sold them rights to the Omani oil fields, although the
tribes of
the interior claimed sovereignty over the area. When the
oil men
went inland to explore, they were attacked by the tribes,
whom
the sultan considered to be rebels, leading the oil
companies to
complain to the British government. Their complaints
encouraged
the British to continue their aid to the sultan, hoping
that he
would pacify the area and ensure Western access to Omani
oil.

The sultan was eventually successful. In 1957 forces
loyal to
Said ibn Taimur captured the town of Nazwah, which the Al
Said
had not controlled since the nineteenth century. In 1958
the
sultan withdrew to his palace in the coastal city of
Salalah in
Dhofar, a southern province that the Al Said had annexed
in the
nineteenth century, and took little interest in
maintaining
stability in the country. While keeping his military
relationship
with the British, he restricted Oman's contact with the
rest of
the world, discouraged development, and prohibited
political
reform.

In the end, the Al Said control over a united Oman
survived,
but Said ibn Taimur did not. Although the sultan had
partially
reestablished his authority in the Omani interior, he was
unable
to handle the increasing complexity of domestic politics.
By the
1960s, Omani affairs had become international issues.
Western oil
companies sought to work in the interior of the country,
and
foreign governments, such as the Marxist state of the
People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, were sending arms to the
rebels in
Dhofar.

The Al Said hold over the region remained problematic,
however, and in 1964 another rebellion arose, this time in
Dhofar. The Dhofar rebellion, which was not brought under
control
until 1976, obliged the sultan to seek foreign military
assistance; therefore, British forces, particularly the
air
force, resumed action in the country. The rebels pointed
to
British involvement as an indication of the sultan's
illegitimacy
and brought their case to the UN, which eventually
censured
Britain for its continuing involvement in Oman.

Said ibn Taimur's policies frustrated many, not only in
Oman
but also in Britain, whose citizens were heavily involved
in the
sultan's military and intelligence apparatus. By 1970
these
elements decided they could bear with the situation no
longer; a
coalition of Omani military and civilian forces, as well
as
British forces, attacked the palace and forced Said ibn
Taimur to
abdicate. They replaced him with his son, Qabus ibn Said
Al Said,
who had played no role in Said ibn Taimur's government.
The
sultan had actually locked his son in the palace for fear
that
Qabus ibn Said, who had been educated in Britain, would
challenge
his archconservative policies.

On his release, Qabus ibn Said consolidated the
sultanate's
hold over the interior and then solicited regional rather
than
British help to put down the rebellion in Dhofar. Other
Arab
leaders, as well as the shah of Iran, sent troops to Oman
in
response to Qabus ibn Said's requests; with the help of
this
coalition, by 1976 the sultan ended the Dhofar rebellion.

Qabus ibn Said was not an Ibadi imam as the first
rulers in
his line had been, but in 1970 this was less important
than it
had been in earlier times. Only about 60 percent of Oman's
population was Ibadi, concentrated in the northern
mountains.
Furthermore, the province of Dhofar had a relatively short
history of association with the rest of Oman.