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ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS
by
Rahul Nilakantan
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(ECONOMICS)
August 2010
Copyright 2010 Rahul Nilakantan

This dissertation examines the economics of non-profit institutions in the television industry and agriculture. We analyze two kinds of non-profit institutions: (1) state owned welfare maximizing television broadcasters, and (2) agricultural cooperatives. With regard to the television industry, our main results are as follows. Broadcasters’ decisions on advertising levels and viewer subscription fees are not always more optimal under mixed economy. Social welfare is always higher under mixed economy except in situations where the state broadcaster carries 0% advertising level (e.g. BBC, France TV etc.), or 100% advertising level. Private broadcaster profits are mostly lower under mixed economy, thereby lending credence to their complaints of suffering due to "anti-competitive" actions of state broadcasters. However, no regulatory action is required unless the state broadcaster carries 0% or 100% advertising level, since lower private broadcaster profits are consistent with higher welfare under mixed economy. The state broadcaster usually makes lower profits than its private counterpart, and sometimes even makes losses while fulfilling its public service broadcasting mandate. However, a welfare argument can be made for the continued existence and operation of loss making state broadcasters.; With regard to agricultural cooperatives, it is the case that in India, most agricultural cooperatives have local area monopoly status in their area of operation (typically a number of villages). One purpose of according local monopoly status to agricultural cooperatives was to rectify the market power imbalance caused by a large number of small farmers facing a few large traders. In light of the findings of the literature on the quantity and quality distorting effects of monopolies, this dissertation investigates the welfare implications of permitting the unregulated operation of monopoly cooperatives in agricultural settings where quality is unobservable and grading capacity is insufficient to grade all available output. We find that for a given cost of quality and a given quality gap between low and high quality output, if the grading capacity is low enough, the co-op member farmer may provide a greater amount of high quality output at a lower price than the equivalent perfectly competitive farmer, leading to higher welfare under monopoly.

ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS
by
Rahul Nilakantan
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(ECONOMICS)
August 2010
Copyright 2010 Rahul Nilakantan