The Battle of Crazy Horse, fought May 19-23, 1966, in Vietnam, remains one of history’s classic infantry battles. Although the S.L.A. Marshall book, “Battles in the Monsoon”, published in 1967, has long been considered the definitiveaccount of the battle, the book is seriously flawed as a historic record since the author never interviewed the officersand NCO's who fought this battle. As a result, the account contains numerous errors, omissions and misleadingdescriptions of individual officer’s actions, as well as a general lack of balance in reporting the different events; which ultimately make up the battle.

I was there. I was Commander of B (Bravo) Company. The time has come to set the record straight for the history books.

May 20, 1966, 1600 hours: The first of three Chinook helicopters (CH-47s) lifted off from our Base Camp in An Khe,Republic of South Vietnam. Each aircraft carried 40 combat loaded paratroopers assigned to “B” Company 1st Battalion,8th Cavalry (Airborne/Airmobile), 1st Air Cavalry Division. The pilots climbed to an altitude of 9,000 feet. At this altitude,the air is fresh and cool. The day is clear with the exception of little white clouds at an altitude of 6,000 feet.

My command group consists of two radio operators, SP4 Jerry K. Brown, a young trooper from Indiana; and SP4 CarrollB. White of Baltimore, Maryland; the artillery recon NCO; and last, but not least, the senior medic. The 1st Platoon Leader,LT Robert Crum Jr., and his platoon make up this load. Many of these men have fought in every battle from Bong Son tothe Ia Drang Valley. Today they have that far away look in their eyes. Every man is busy with his own thoughts andfeelings. They are good, battle tested men who know their job. Two months earlier, it had been suggested that I rotate toanother position since I had completed my company command time. Fortunately, I had convinced the BattalionCommander to leave me with the “Bravo Bulls.” I loved and respected these men and felt safe with them. In my mind,soldiers are trained to fight. The major reason for my decision was that I had no desire for staff duty. These were battle-tested men, and there was no doubt in my mind that they were up to the battles that we are going to face.

I moved to the front of the aircraft so I could observe the terrain and get a look at the Landing Zone (LZ). We are flyingin a northeasterly direction. I can see a stream flowing out of the mountains. Far below I can see a small Army of theRepublic of South Vietnam (ARVN) Special Forces camp. At this point, we make a turn to the East. I can see the jungle riseto meet the mountains. There is a beautiful waterfall coming out of the mountains. Then we start to descend very rapidly.We are approaching a small LZ with tall elephant grass and a stream flowing through the middle. The LZ, named Horse, isless than a fourth of the size of a football field and is surrounded by hills. Approximately a half mile east of the LZ, I cansee smoke from cooking fires. I know that this area is infested with Viet Cong forces.

The CH-47 hovered at about 10 feet; only long enough for 40 combat loaded Airborne/Air Assault warriors to dismount.The entire procedure took less than 10 seconds. During the past six months, the battalion had been led by; LTC Kenneth D.Mertel; but at this time, LTC Levin B. Broughton led the battalion. These officers were the finest leaders in the Division.The two commanders differed in one important respect, though. LTC Mertel relied heavily on his Company Commanders (the bottom line is that he demanded perfection), while LTC Broughton put more responsibility on his staff officers.

At the time of this battle, the “Jumping Mustangs” had been in the country more than eight months. We had fought on theeast coast and in the central highlands. “B” Company had served as the reaction force for the Ia Drang Valley operation.We had fought in several major battles, and we had lost very few men considering the battles that we had fought. We hadlearned to travel light and fast; in order to close with and kill or capture the enemy, we had to be smarter, faster andbetter than they were. The average load consists of basic weapons, compass, steel pot, pistol belt supported by suspenders, two canteens, a first aid packet, ammo pouches, poncho on belt with one set of toilet articles per fire team, one toothbrush, one pair of extra socks, complete with C rations, tactical radios, grenades, fragmentation, concussionand smoke, special equipment as needed and lots of ammunition. (Note: We had learned early on that personal items likecommercial radios, magazines, etc., were luxuries that could become health hazards. I had long since abandoned mycamera in order to carry more ammunition).

”B” Company closed into the LZ at dusk. Weapons were cleaned, equipment checked and readied for the following day’s operation. I reported to the Battalion Command Post (CP), where the order was issued. At daybreak, tomorrow, May 21, 1966, two rifle companies will move to the northeast along a stream. With “B” Company on the right and “C” Company on the left, the two companies will maintain contact insofar as possible. The enemy has been identified as the 2nd VC/NVA Regiment reinforced C-14 Company and 32nd Artillery Battalion. Our mission was to find and destroy or capture the enemy. We were to have the usual artillery, gun ships and tactical air support. Supplies and ammunition would be air dropped on request. I returned to the company area and issued the order to the platoon leaders.

The second platoon commanded by LT William L. McCarron, a Scottish born naturalized citizen from Virginia, would move first followed by the company command party. The first platoon, commanded by LT Robert Crum of Houston, Texas, would follow with the responsibility of securing the right flank of the company. 1st Sergeant (1st SGT) Ray “Top” Poynter, a WWII veteran with jungle warfare experience, was a seasoned combat soldier and would follow the First Platoon. Hison-the-spot training had saved many lives. He and I had been platoon sergeants in the 503d A.I.R at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky and later in Germany. We were like brothers. I did not have to worry about the logistical welfare of the men, because he would see to that. The third platoon, commanded by LT Jared East from Louisiana, would bring up the rear with the responsibility of rear security and as company reaction force for the operation. The platoon leaders were brave men always ready for a fight. They had earned the respect of their men and were supported by experienced platoon sergeants.

May 21, 1966, 0700: Morning came with a hot blazing sun. There was no wind, and the air was humid. We moved into the thick undergrowth on the edge of the jungle along a well-used trail and guided on the stream as planned. After moving about 200 yards, we moved into the jungle. The trees were tall and the boulders big.

At approximately 1100 hours, at an intersection in the stream, the 2nd Platoon came under automatic weapons fire. The fire was returned immediately and the enemy fire ceased. The point man, SP4 Milton Parks, was wounded. We had come upon the first outpost. The nearest LZ for evacuation was LZ Horse, where we had landed the day before.

I ordered the Artillery Recon Sergeant (Recon FO) to place fire on suspected enemy locations on the South flank. This was accomplished with care because we did not know the exact location of “C” Company. A litter was hastily designed from two poles and a poncho under the supervision of 1st SGT Poynter. We had done this many times, so it only took a few minutes. LT McCarron then designated a squad to evacuate SP4 Parks.

The Company proceeded to guide on the trail and stream to the left with caution. The farther we moved into the triple canopy jungle, the more signs of enemy activity we observed. The trail was heavily traveled, and there were recently abandoned enemy campsites. We recognized the smell of enemy campfires. Apparently, this was the source of smoke that I had observed yesterday. At this time we had not made contact with “C” Company. This caused me some concern since we needed to know their location in order to coordinate supporting fires. I called Captain Mozey, the “C” Company Commander, and arranged to meet him.

At approximately 1400 hours, the company formed a hasty defensive position. While checking the perimeter, I noticedwell-constructed bunkers on the end of a finger of land that ran to a bend of the stream. This hill was the commanding terrain, above and overlooking the stream. They were to our immediate front and on the opposite side of the stream. This gave me reason for worry. On closer inspection I saw that they were empty, but had been recently used.

I met Captain Mozey at the stream on the north side of our perimeter. General S.L.A. Marshall’s in his book, “Battles in the Monsoon” wrote that CPT Mozey, had “simply tarried” at the creek. Bill Mozey is one of the best, bravest, most dependable company commanders in the army. All who know him understand that he never tarries at any place. He and I had met and developed a friendship in the Infantry Officers Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. His combat savvy and outstanding leadership is the finest. We shared a can of jelly that he had. He made a small joke about something. Ifelt good knowing that we were together on this operation. We discussed the bunkers. Since they were on the “C” Company side of the stream, Captain Mozey said that he would occupy them immediately. He would hold these while “B” Company passed to the south. We knew there was going to be a big fight. His company had killed four VC/NVA earlier this morning. We reckoned that there was a battalion-sized VC/NVA force in this immediate area. The ashes from the cookfires were still hot, and numerous trails were found. These prepared bunkers indicated that the enemy had been herefor several days and planned to stay. We were in the VC/NVA’s house.

I asked the artillery recon FO to place fire on what appeared on the map to be a hill to our front. He informed me that he could not, because the 105mm battery was moving. “Battles In The Monsoons” questioned why I did not use artillery. There was none available. I knew that this was the worst possible time to be without artillery support. We had no choice but to move, because we were in an exposed position. McCarron reported three VC moving in a northward direction to our immediate front. Normally, 1st SGT Poynter would have joined the 3rd Platoon. Fortunately, he did not get the word. McCarron’s 2nd Platoon had just passed the enemy bunkers that were now occupied by “C” Company. The “B” Company Command Party, moving at the tail end of the 2nd Platoon, was moving through a defilade position to the front of the “C” Company bunkers.

At this time a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire, including 30- and 50-caliber machine guns, opened fire on the 1st Platoon. This was coming from my right rear and about 50 yards up the hill. The command post was also taking a high volume of fire. Fortunately, we were in a defilade position; and the enemy fire was going over our heads in the directionof “C” Company. The 1st Platoon leader did not answer his radio. However, someone from the 1st Platoon was returning the enemy fire.

**The account given in the Library of Congress, Catalog Card #67-24872, is as follows: “At least five 30-caliber machine guns and one 50-caliber machine gun opened up on the 1st platoon’s point squad from the heights above, immediately killing six men and mortally wounding the platoon leader, LT Robert H. Crum Jr. PFC David C. Dolby, a machine gunner in the platoon, ran to LT Crum’s side and pulled him to cover. “Take over,” the seriously wounded officer ordered. “Get the men out of here.” Dolby immediately took command of what was left of the platoon, directing his buddies to safe positions and covering their movements with fire from his M-60 machine gun as he flitted from behind rocks to behind trees. The deep throated, bark of the 50-caliber followed his movements, chewing branches and chunks of tree trunk into splinters,or digging foot-long furrows into the earth, just missing Dolby’s fleet-footed figure. Again and again he set up his machine gun and peppered one bunker after another with accurate fire. But each time he’d silence a VC/NVA machine gun, a replacement gunner would take over. There was no stopping this man. He was everywhere that rainy afternoon, scooting about and pulling the wounded to safety, placing fire against the enemy bunkers, directing his riflemen. When he finallydid raise the Bravo Company’s CO, the Captain ask him what had happened to LT Crum. “He’s wounded pretty bad, but what we need is ARA right away.” On the way,” the CO replied. “Just have your smoke ready.”**

I cannot vouch for the actions of PFC Dolby. I was not in a position to observe his actions. I am sure that he acted very bravely, as most of the other men did. However, the writer errs when he states that I talked to Dolby. I did not see ortalk with him until the following day.

There was no Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA), and there was no conventional artillery directed on these positions. First, it would have killed us and left the VC/NVA, who were protected by well-constructed bunkers, unharmed. All artillery, including ARA, was directed by a very capable artillery FO, who was present and very active. Please remember that tall trees covered this entire area making the use of ARA impractical. The ARA was used on targets of opportunity.

LT East, the 3rd Platoon Leader, reported that he was taking a heavy volume of fire. I asked him if he could flank the enemy positions. He reported that he could not, because he was pinned down. I asked the 2nd Platoon Leader, LT McCarron, if he could move to flank and assault the enemy positions. He reported that he would try. The Artillery Recon SGT stated that calling artillery and ARA on well-constructed bunkers would kill us and leave the enemy unharmed. Iasked him to direct the artillery on suspected enemy positions and communications routes. This would discouragereinforcement and ensure that it did not kill us. I asked the platoons to pop smoke, so CPT Mozey could see our forward positions in order to provide supporting M-60 fire. I asked him if he could place M-60 fire on the snipers that were keeping us pinned down.

Sergeant Gerald Hoover, one of the squad leaders from the 1st platoon, came to the CP to report that LT Crum had been killed and that all of the 1st platoon was pulling back to the hill where “C” company was located. I recognized the snap ofa bullet passing my left ear. The bullet hit SGT Hoover in the chest and he died before he hit the ground. I swung around just in time to kill the VC/NVA, who had advanced to within 10 yards of our position. Out of the corner of my right eye, I spotted three more VC/NVA closing on our position. I dropped all three, beginning with the last one first. They fell into a ravine directly to our front. I had modified the sling of my M-16 so that it came over the top of my shoulder, thereby ensuring that the barrel always pointed in the same direction that I was looking.

Based on the information provided by SGT Hoover, I knew that the 1st Platoon had withdrawn, leaving a gap between the 2nd and 3rd Platoons. The Command Group was in that gap. I called CPT Mozey, who was taking heavy automatic weapons fire, and asked him to please send a platoon to cover the position that the 1st Platoon had evacuated. He stated “the trees must be rotten over here chips are flying all over the place.” As a matter of fact, the trees were literally being shot up by the enemy automatic weapons, which were located on the opposite hill. I could hear the crack of the bullets as they passed directly over our position. However, this did not bother CPT Mozey. He continued to move about his unit giving orders and maintaining control of the battle. He immediately attached LT Frank Vavrek and his 3rd Platoon to “B” Company for this mission.

East reported that a platoon-sized enemy force was moving behind him. He stated that they had killed five NVA. He estimated the platoon size force was moving up the stream toward “C” Company. Shortly afterward, LT Vavrek encountered and engaged this group in a fierce battle. At first contact, two of his squad leaders were wounded by a well-entrenched 30-caliber machine gun spitting fire from a heavily sandbagged bunker. SP4 Michael G. Vinassa, a grenadierin the 2nd squad, crawled forward despite the heavy enemy fire until he reached the left lip of a draw, where he began lobbing grenades among the enemy positions with telling effect. One by one, he silenced the VC/NVA gunners. The 2nd squad was still bogged down by deadly fire from the 30-caliber machinegun which sprayed the area.

Vinassa saved the day for the platoon when he shouted; “I’ll get the gun” and dashed from the lip, into the draw andup the slope straight at the bunker, while the machinegun continued to fire on the squad’s positions. Pulling a grenade from his harness, Vinassa bent low and hurled himself across the last 30 feet into the machinegun’s muzzle. It swung in his direction just as Vinassa chucked the grenade in an underhanded throw through the firing aperture. The muzzle was aimed right at the heroic grenadier, and he caught the blast in the chest. A moment later, an explosion erupted within the machinegun position then smoke and dust burst from the bunker. SP4 Vinassa was dead when the troopers of the 2nd squad reached his side in their rush up the hill. Two enemy machine gunners lay slumped across their weapons in abunker jammed with full ammo belts.

Further up the hill, 1st SGT Poynter, who had been following the 1st platoon with Platoon Sergeant William Robinson anda couple of riflemen, found themselves in the path of several VC/NVA that were following PFC Dolby and other withdrawing members of the 1st Platoon. SFC Robinson took a round in the magazine of his M-16. Poynter fired into the advancing enemy, killing several. One enemy soldier dropped his weapon and ran back up the trail. Poynter next stopped PFC Dolby and directed him to place fire on the enemy positions. Unfortunately, Dolby continued to withdraw and joined “C” company. First SGT Ray Poynter’s combat experience combined with courage and fast action saved the withdrawing members of the 1st platoon. He would hold the position until later that night when LT East’s platoon closed on thatlocation.

At this time, a re-supply drop that had been ordered by CPT Mozey came falling through the jungle canopy. It landed between the position held by Poynter and the bunkers occupied by Mozey. The re-supply drop was timely, in that we were running out of ammunition. Some of this came close to hitting some of the men. Sergeant Robert E. Speakman stated that Dolby and some other members of “B” Company picked up some of the ammunition and moved to the “C” Company perimeter and joined them. Captain Mozey states that he placed Dolby and the men with him in a position vacated by his 3rd Platoon.

LT McCarron returned with the 2nd Platoon and reported that he could not flank the enemy positions because heencountered heavy enemy fire from the front and the left. He further stated that he had not received any fire from the right and that there may be a gap in the enemy positions. I told him, “Follow Me. We are going to attack.” Only half of our mission had been accomplished, the “close with” part. We had killed some of them, but not nearly what we were going to kill. LT East’s platoon, LT Vavrek’s platoon, the action of Sgt. Poynter, and the supporting fire provided by “C” Company, combined with the fact that they now occupied the positions that the VC/NVA had planned to be in at this time, presented the perfect conditions for us to attack.

Based on LT McCarron’s report and what I saw, the weakness in the enemy defense was a draw and the steep side ofthe hill. We would crawl up the side of the hill, under the cover of the supporting fire, and break through the bunker line. At about this time, the Battalion S-3 wanted to know what we planned to do. White answered, “Six says we are going to attack.” This RTO had learned to read my mind. Fortunately, the rain was falling hard and darkness was coming. This, combined with “C” Company’s covering fire, enabled us to crawl up the steep hill. We crawled through the first line of bunkers unnoticed.

I asked CPT Mozey to raise the M-60 fire to the top of the hill. We continued up the hill until we were well above the enemy defensive positions. We discovered several communication wires running down the hill to the bunkers. Platoon Sergeant James L. Johnson cut these wires. He and SGT Arsenio D. Lujan would provide rear security, while the remainder of the 2nd Platoon and the Command Group attacked the bunkers.

I asked CPT Mozey to ceasefire. It was getting darker, and we could barely see. “C” Company’s artillery FO was adjusting flares fired by his unit. In addition, he called for a flare ship. I saw an AK-47 pointing around the left side of a tree, an indication that the owner was left-handed. I pulled the pin of the grenade that I was holding to throw into the bunker that he was guarding. I counted 1,000, 2,000, then lobbed the grenade. It exploded just as it passed his head. The explosion blew him clear of the tree; he appeared to be very small and very dead. I rushed the bunker before the enemy had time to react and tossed a grenade through the door. Following the explosion, I heard moaning and scuffling sounds coming from the bunker.

Off to my left, a VC/NVA machinegun crew opened fire on LT McCarron, hitting his RTO, SP4 Allen Ritter. McCarron threw a grenade, then charged the position firing his M-16 and killing the gunner, his assistant and the ammo bearer. He then charged another bunker, destroying it and killed the remaining occupants with a grenade. I did not hear any more firing after this. Aided by the light provided by flares, we moved from bunker to bunker, killing the occupants with well placed grenades and carefully aimed M-16 fire.

When we destroyed the last bunker, we joined Johnson and Lujan back up the trail. The silence after a firefight is awesome, and the feeling is unexplainable. I heard a VC/NVA chattering as he came up the trail. A flare drop exposedhim, and he was headed straight for SGT Antonio Lopez. My M-16 was jammed. Lopez killed him with one shot. The soldier was carrying one of our old 50-caliber machine guns, no doubt captured from one of the ARVN outposts. The flare ships remained on station, and the artillery FO continued to drop flares for much needed light. By this time, it was very quiet.The smell of grenade and gunpowder filled the air, and it continued to rain.

I asked LT McCarron to provide security, while I searched the area for any wounded or missing. Since the position heldby “C” Company provided the best terrain for security, and the fact that my 1st Platoon, including the dead and wounded, had closed into that position three hours ago, we decided to close into this position for the night. We moved down the hill where we met 1st SGT Poynter, LT Vavrek, LT East and their platoons. I ordered LT Vavrek to take his men and move up the steep slope and join “C” Company. East and his platoon would follow. LT McCarron and his raiders would cover the movement. We finally closed into the position at 0100 hours, May 22, 1966.

The medics were treating the wounded under the watchful eye of CPT Mozey and LT Jon Williams. The credit for evacuating the wounded goes to Lt. Williams’ Platoon. They had been evacuating the wounded during the entire firefight. They did this under fire and with bravery and compassion found in few men. Unfortunately, they were never given the credit that they deserved. PFC David McCallum, a medic attached to “C” Company deserves special recognition for his untiring efforts to treat and comfort the wounded.

CPT Mozey met me as I came into his perimeter and guided me to the CP, where I found 1st SGT Poynter. I was totally exhausted. We had fought the good fight, and we had defeated the enemy in his own house. The few remaining VC/NVA had gathered some of their dead and retreated. We took roll call and found that LT Crum and PFC Angel Rodriguez were missing. Since they had been reported KIA and I had personally searched the area where they were last seen, we decided to recover the bodies at first light. There was no further enemy activity this night.

22 May 1966: At first light, LT Vavrek’s platoon and PFC Dolby with his buddy PFC Kenneth Fernandez recovered the two missing troopers, LT Crum and PFC Rodriguez. In the meantime a chain saw was lowered through the jungle canopy and used to clear a small opening to evacuate the wounded and dead. The casualties were hoisted up to a hovering CH-47, using a basket designed for this purpose. The wounded were evacuated first, followed by the dead, then the enemy weapons and equipment that may have intelligence value. This action took most of the morning. Thanks to the CH-47crew and modern extraction procedures, many of the wounded are alive today.

”C” Company moved out to sweep the battle area and to continue the attack. CPT Mozey reports that he counted 58 VC/NVA bodies and bloody trails where some of the dead or wounded had been carried away. He reports that he found the fully dressed body of a high-ranking Chinese officer in the command bunker. He also found several other bodies of NVA Officers buried in shallow graves. His report provides proof that the VC/NVA forces had been severely beaten since they never leave their dead behind, especially officers, unless they do not have the ability to evacuate them. The VC/NVA had made a hasty retreat leaving behind more than 58 bodies and numerous weapons, including three 50-caliber machine guns.

We shored up our defense, regrouped and continued to evacuate the enemy weapons and equipment. These activities took most of the day. The company remained in this position overnight because it was a good defensive position and we would move to support “C” Company if they needed our help. The VC/NVA survivors had broken contact, and there was no more action in this area. The following morning we moved to the LZ and were air lifted to another firebase.

In conclusion, I do not understand why the report printed in the “First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam,” Library of Congress, Catalog Card #67-24872, and General S.L.A. Marshal’s “Battles In The Monsoon,” do not report this battle accurately. I was not able to provide any initial input, because we were airlifted to a firebase that was under sniper fire. Our mission was to secure the area and stop the fire. While performing this assignment, I was severely wounded and evacuated. Fortunately, several operations provided by our medics, the best doctors and nurses in the world enabled me to live to fight other battles.

When I first read their reports, I was at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, assigned to the Airborne and Electronics Special Warfare Board. CPT Mozey came from Ft. Benning, to air drop and test a radio. He and I revisited the battle and subsequent report. I was determined to correct the record. This battle was one of the greatest victories. Unfortunately, many of the men who won this battle were never mentioned. Two statements are outright fabrications: First, and most importantly, Captain William B. Mozey did not “tarry” at the creek. Second, we did not withdraw; and there was no ARA or artillery called on these immediate positions.

After years of research, interviews and soul searching, I believe that the above account presents an accurate report ofthis battle. I am convinced that there is no way that all of the individual bravery can be accounted for and reported. Ironically, the platoon that conducted the major attack and killed the most VC/NVA was never mentioned. I want to go on the record and thank LT William L. McCarron and the other brave men from the 2nd Platoon for providing the knock out punch that destroyed the enemy and his will to fight. I also want to thank my good friend and fellow warrior, Captain W.B. “Bill” Mozey, for loyalty, combat savvy, unselfish devotion to duty and actions that helped save the day.

The bottom line is that no matter how sophisticated or powerful the weapons and machines are, the Infantry soldier isthe ultimate weapon. His mission is “to close with and kill or capture the enemy,” and there will be friendly casualties.War is a dirty business. For this reason, war should always be the last resort. Unfortunately, as long as there are tyrants like Hitler, Tojo, Saddam Hussein and other bullies, there must be war to prevent the tyranny that is worse than war.

I strongly recommend that the accounts printed in “First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam,” Library of Congress, Catalog Card #67-24872, be corrected to reflect the true account of the action. Furthermore, I recommend that the editor of “Battles In The Monsoon” write a letter of apology to Captain W.M. Mozey for the misleading statement that “he tarried at the creek.” Long ago, when I read the first account of the battle, I called General S.L.A. Marshall and asked him to correct the error. Shortly thereafter the book disappeared from the bookstores. Unfortunately, there are still enough copies around to give misleading impressions of this battle. Please be advised I do not want to remove any of the honors that have been given to those brave men who fought this battle. However, I do want to give an accurate report. The reader will conclude that this battle was not fought or won by a few good men or by one company. It was fought by, two companies of very brave, well trained men working together in a self less way to insure victory.

The Infantry Soldier is truly the ultimate weapon. I am proud to have been a small part of this battle.

Recommendation: That "B" and "C" Companies be awarded the unit citations for their action.

To the families and friends of these brave men, I say be proud that your Soldier was one of the finest, fiercest, fittest and bravest warriors that ever lived. To Captain Mozey, Lt. William McCarron, Lt. Vavrek, First Sergeant Ray E. Poynter and all the Officers and Enlisted men I say without any reservation that you are the Bravest Warriors that I have ever known. Your are without a doubt the most unselfish, combat wisest men that I have ever served with. May God bless and grant you long life and well earned peace.

Then Cpt. Roy Martin.

SKETCH CRAZY HORSE BATTLE (Bill McCarron)

Sketch map showing actions/movement of Bravo Company during Operation Crazy Horse, specifically the battle on 21 May 1966. Charlie Company also played a key role in this battle by engaging the enemy force, providing heavy and well placed supporting fire in support of Bravo Company, assisting in the evacuation of casualties, and providing a defensive perimeter for Bravo Company to move into following the battle. (Sketch prepared by LTC (RET) Bill McCarron based on his memory of the battle).

Comments: Outstanding report on the ground actions of B and C Company during Operation Crazy Horse. I had just joined B Companyin May of '66. Crazy Horse became my baptism under fire and will live in my memory forever. This is the first time that I stopped to readthe whole report and look over the map of Bill McCarron. I'm glad I did. Makes me just that more proud to say that I am a JumpingMustang through and through. Airborne/Ranger all the Way with Honor and Courage!! (06-10-00)