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The Tismaneanu Commission’s Final Report, Television, and the Terrorists (VIII)

(purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of prior research and publications)

In episode one, Nicolae Stefan Soucoup related the capture and interrogation of terrorist suspect Silviu Dutu, a sergeant major from UM 0530 Rosu, a Securitate special unit (in this respect, readers may recall the references in December 1989 and in the initial months thereafter according to which the “terrorists” were members of Securitate “special units”). Far from a unique case, Dutu was to later escape prosecution based on the medical diagnosis of having “exercised poor judgment” as a result of “shock”: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-i/

In episode two, Soucoup related the words of the mortally-wounded rugby player Bogdan Serban Stan, who insisted that “I was shot by a civilian near me,” while defending the Television Station. Elsewhere in 1990, Soucoup was one of those who discussed the use of 5,6 mm caliber ammunition by those they were fighting against, the terrorists. Elena Bancila, the tenacious, grieving mother of Bogdan Serban Stan, detailed how the medical records at the hospital to which her son was taken showed he had been hit with a bullet smaller than 6 mm: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-ii/

In episode five, we saw how fellow former Military Prosecutor, General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan, and soldiers, officers, and civilians cited in the first Senatorial Commission Report give details which corroborate what we learned from episodes 1-4. Unlike General Dan Voinea, promoted and trumpeted by Tismaneanu Commission’s Final Report–who vigorously denies the use of any unusual ammunition in December 1989–these direct participants in the events that transpired in the Television zone believe that unusual ammunition was used: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-v/

The 2006 Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (also known as the Tismaneanu Report, after its Chairman, Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu) stridently alleges that Romanian Television and those who appeared on it beginning the afternoon of 22 December 1989 were intentionally responsible for creating the “majority of the diversions” through which 942 people died in the days which followed (versus 162 before 22 December under orders from Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu) by claiming that “terrorists loyal to the Ceausescu dictatorship” posed a lethal threat. The authors of the Report then add, as if to confirm their contention that the “terrorists” were an invention of those who took power in December 1989: “Later not a single terrorist was charged or tried.” To bolster their argument, they invoke the findings of Military Prosecutor General Dan Voinea [who led the investigation of the December 1989 events for much of the post-communist era], who states “In December 1989, the goal was to divert the anticommunist character of the revolution and to seize power through the terror they had installed.”

The Tismaneanu Report misunderstands and misrepresents both the “terrorists” and the role of Romanian Television. In fact, not only does it get the “terrorists” wrong overall, it doesn’t even manage to get right what happened in and around the Television building itself. Here’s why:

Soucoup outlines precisely the field of battle at the TV station, pointing out exactly from what buildings the terrorists fired, claims which corroborate many of the details outlined in military personnel in episode 5 (xeroxes reproduced below).