The preamble refers to the "inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live
in security."

Operative Paragraph One "Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied
in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force." [3]

Resolution 242 is one of the most commonly referenced UN
resolutions to end the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the
basis of later negotiations between the parties.

Context

The resolution is the formula proposed by the Security Council
for the successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in
particular, ending the state of belligerency then existing between
the 'States concerned', Israel
and Egypt, Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon. The resolution
deals with five principles; withdrawal of Israeli forces, 'peace
within secure and recognized boundaries', freedom of navigation, a
just settlement of the refugee problem and security measures
including demilitarized zones. It also provided for the appointment
of a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East in order
to promote agreement on a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the principles outlined in the resolution.

Upon presenting the draft resolution to the Security Council,
the U.K. representative Lord Caradon said:

"All of us recognize that peace is the prize. None of us wishes
a temporary truce or a superficial accommodation. We could never
advocate a return to uneasy hostility. As I have said, my
Government would never wish to be associated with any so-called
settlement which was only a continuation of a false truce, and all
of us without any hesitation at all can agree that we seek a
settlement within the principles laid down in Article 2 of the
Charter. So much for the preamble.

"As to the first operative paragraph, and with due respect for
fulfillment of Charter principles, we consider it essential that
there should be applied the principles of both I withdrawal and
security, and we have no doubt that the words set out throughout
that paragraph are perfectly clear.

"As to the second operative paragraph, there is I believe no
vestige of disagreement between us all that there must be a
guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways.
There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem. There must
be a guarantee and adequate means to ensure the territorial
inviolability and political independence of every State in the
area.

"As to the third operative paragraph, I have said before that I
consider that the United Nations special representative should be
free to decide himself the exact means and methods by which he
pursues his endeavors in contact with the States concerned both to
promote agreement and to assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted and final settlement."[7]

Donald Neff, John McHugo, Glenn Perry, and John Norton Moore
have drawn attention to Israel's use of subsequent statements by
particular statesmen who were involved in the drafting and passage
of the resolution which are either inconclusive, or which
contradict what they actually said during the UN debates in 1967.
[8]

Secretary of State Dean
Rusk commented on the most significant area of disagreement
regarding the resolution:

There was much bickering over whether that resolution should say
from "the" territories or from "all" territories. In the French
version, which is equally authentic, it says withdrawal de
territory, with de meaning "the." We wanted that to be left a
little vague and subject to future negotiation because we thought
the Israeli border along the West Bank could be "rationalized";
certain anomalies could easily be straightened out with some
exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border for all
parties. We also wanted to leave open demilitarization measures in
the Sinai and the Golan Heights and take a fresh look at the old
city of Jerusalem. But we never contemplated any significant grant
of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war. On that
point we and the Israelis to this day remain sharply divided. This
situation could lead to real trouble in the future. Although every
President since Harry Truman has committed the United States to the
security and independence of Israel, I'm not aware of any
commitment the United States has made to assist Israel in retaining
territories seized in the Six-Day War.[9]

A memorandum from the President's Special Assistant, Walt
Rostow to President Johnson said "What's on the Arab
Ambassadors' minds boils down to one big question: Will we make
good on our pledge to support the territorial integrity of all
states in the Middle East? Our best answer is that we stand by that
pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine
peace. The tough question is whether we'd force Israel back to 4
June borders if the Arabs accepted terms that amounted to an honest
peace settlement. Secretary Rusk told the Yugoslav Foreign
Minister: "The US had no problem with frontiers as they existed
before the outbreak of hostilities. If we are talking about
national frontiers--in a state of peace--then we will work toward
restoring them." But we all know that could lead to a tangle with
the Israelis.

Rusk met with Foreign Minister Nikezic on August 30, 1967.
However, according to telegram 30825 to Belgrade, September 1,
which summarizes the conversation, Rusk said the key to a
settlement was to end the state of war and belligerence and that if
a way could be found to deal with this, other things would fall
into place; the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure
national boundaries was an important difference.[10]

President Johnson responded to a complaint from President Tito
that Israel could change the frontiers without Arab consent: "You
note that the Arabs feel the US interprets the draft resolution to
imply a change of frontiers to their detriment. We have no
preconceptions on frontiers as such. What we believe to be
important is that the frontiers be secure. For this the single most
vital condition is that they be acceptable to both sides. It is a
source of regret to us that the Arabs appear to misunderstand our
proposal and misread our motives."[11]

Rostow said ... resolution required agreement on "secure and
recognized" boundaries, which, as practical matter, and as matter
of interpreting resolution, had to precede withdrawals. Two
principles were basic to Article I of resolution. Paragraph from
which Dobrynin quoted was linked to others, and he did not see how
anyone could seriously argue, in light of history of resolution in
Security Council, withdrawal to borders of June 4th was
contemplated. These words had been pressed on Council by Indians
and others, and had not been accepted. Rusk [12]

In an address delivered on September 1, 1982 President Ronald Reagan
said:

In the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its
narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within
artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask
Israel to live that way again... So the United States will not
support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or
permanent control by Israel. There is, however, another way to
peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached
through the give-and-take of negotiations; but it is the firm view
of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of
the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best
chance for a durable, just and lasting peace. It is the United
States' position that - in return for peace - the withdrawal
provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the
West Bank and Gaza. When the border is negotiated between Jordan
and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked
to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true
peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in
return. Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain
undivided, but its final status should be decided through
negotiations.[13]

According to Lynk there are three schools of thought concerning
the proper legal interpretation of the withdrawal phrase.[14] Some
of the parties involved have suggested that the indefinite language
is a “perceptible loophole”, that authorizes “territorial revision”
for Israel’s benefit. Some have stated that the indefinite language
was used to permit insubstantial and mutually beneficial
alterations to the 1949 armistices lines, but that unilateral
annexation of the captured territory was never authorized. Other
parties have said that no final settlement obtained through force
or the threat of force could be considered valid. They insist that
the Security Council cannot create loopholes in peremptory norms of
international law or the UN Charter, and that any use of indefinite
language has to be interpreted in line with the overriding legal
principles regarding the “inadmissibility of territory by war” and
the prohibitions on mass deportations or displacement in connection
with the settlement of the refugee problem.

Orakhelashvili says that the Security Council manifestly lacks
the competence to validate agreements imposed through coercion, not
least because the peremptory prohibition of the use of force is a
limitation on the Council’s powers and the voidness of coercively
imposed treaties is the clear consequence of jus cogens and the
conventional law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.[15] A
recent international study concluded that the ultimate status and
boundaries will require negotiation between the parties, according
to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The same study also
found that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which
govern ‘special agreements’ that can adversely affect the rights of
protected persons precludes any change in status of the territory
obtained through an agreement concluded during a state of
belligerent occupation.[16]

Preamble

John McHugo says that by the 1920s, international law no longer
recognized that a state could acquire title to territory by
conquest.[17]
Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations requires all members
to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.[18]

Michael Lynk says that article 2 of the Charter embodied a
prevailing legal principle that there could be "no title by
conquest". He says that principle had been expressed through
numerous international conferences, doctrines and treaties since
the late 19th Century. Lynk cites the examples of the First
International Conference of American States in 1890; the United
States Stimson Doctrine of 1932; the 1932 League of Nations
resolution on Japanese aggression in China; the Buenos Aires
Declaration of 1936; and the Atlantic Charter of 1941.[19]
Surya Sharma says that a war in self-defense cannot result in
acquisition of title by conquest. He says that even if a war is
lawful in origin it cannot exceed the limits of legitimate
self-defense.[20]

Throughout the 1990s, there were Israeli-Syrian negotiations
regarding a normalization of relations and an Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan
Heights. But a peace treaty was not made, mainly due to Syria's
desire to recover and retain 25 square kilometers of territory in
the Jordan River Valley which it seized from Israel in 1948 and
occupied until 1967. As the United Nations recognizes only the 1948
borders, there is little support for the Syrian position outside
the Arab bloc nor in resolving the Golan Heights issue.[22]

The UN resolution does not specifically mention the
Palestinians. Great Britain had recognized the union between the
West Bank and Transjordan.[23] Lord
Caradon said that the parties assumed that withdrawal from occupied
territories as provided in the resolution was applicable to East
Jerusalem. "Nevertheless so important is the future of Jerusalem
that it might be argued that we should have specifically dealt with
that issue in the 1967 Resolution. It is easy to say that now, but
I am quite sure that if we had attempted to raise or settle the
question of Jerusalem as a separate issue at that time our task in
attempting to find a unanimous decision would have been far greater
if not impossible." [24]
Judge Higgins explained "from Security Council resolution 242
(1967) through to Security Council resolution 1515 (2003), the key
underlying requirements have remained the same - that Israel is
entitled to exist, to be recognized, and to security, and that the
Palestinian people are entitled to their territory, to exercise
self-determination, and to have their own State."[25]

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the U.N.
Security Council: "We simply do not support the description of the
territories occupied by Israel in 1967 as 'Occupied Palestinian
Territory'. In the view of my Government, this language could be
taken to indicate sovereignty, a matter which both Israel and the
PLO have agreed must be decided in negotiations on the final status
of the territories. "Had this language appeared in the operative
paragraphs of the resolution, let me be clear: we would have
exercised our veto. In fact, we are today voting against a
resolution in the Commission on the Status of Women precisely
because it implies that Jerusalem is "occupied Palestinian
territory".[26]

The Palestinians were represented by the Palestine Liberation
Organization in negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords. They
envisioned a 'permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolution 242'.[27] The
main premise of the Oslo Accords was the eventual creation of
Palestinian autonomy in some or all of the territories captured
during the Six-Day War, in return for Palestinian recognition of
Israel. However, Minister Nabil Shaath admitted that the resolution
does not require a return to the lines that existed on June 4,
1967, when he said: "Whether a state is announced now or after
liberation, its borders must be those of 4 June 1967. We will not
accept a state without borders or with borders based on UN
Resolution 242, which we believe is no longer suitable. On the
contrary, Resolution 242 has come to be used by Israel as a way to
procrastinate."[28]

The Security Council subsequently adopted resolution 1515
(2003), which recalled resolution 242 and endorsed the Middle East
Quartet’s Road Map towards a permanent, two-State solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Quartet Plan calls for
direct, bilateral negotiations as part of a comprehensive
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the basis of UN
Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, 1850, and the
Madrid principles. The Quartet has reiterated that the only viable
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an agreement that
ends the occupation that began in 1967; resolves all permanent
status issues as previously defined by the parties; and fulfils the
aspirations of both parties for independent homelands through two
states for two peoples, Israel and an independent, contiguous and
viable state of Palestine, living side by side in peace and
security.[29]

Resolution 1860 (2009) recalled resolution 242 and stressed that
the Gaza Strip
constitutes an integral part of the territory occupied in 1967 that
will be a part of the Palestinian state.

Settlement of the refugee
problem

The resolution advocates a "just settlement of the refugee
problem". Lord Caradon said "It has been said that in the
Resolution we treated Palestinians only as refugees, but this is
unjustified. We provided that Israel should withdraw from occupied
territories and it was together with that requirement for a
restoration of Arab territory that we also called for a settlement
of the refugee problem."[24]
Upon the adoption of Resolution 242, French President Charles de
Gaulle stressed this principle during a press conference on
November 27, 1967 and confirmed it in his letter of January 9, 1968
to David
Ben-Gurion. De Gaulle cited "the pitiful condition of the Arabs
who had sought refuge in Jordan or were relegated to Gaza" and
stated that provided Israel withdrew her forces, it appeared it
would be possible to reach a solution "within the framework of the
United Nations that included the assurance of a dignified and fair
future for the refugees and minorities in the Middle East."[30]

Alexander Orakhelashvili said that ‘Just settlement’ can only
refer to a settlement guaranteeing the return of displaced
Palestinians. He explained that it must be presumed that the
Council did not adopt decisions that validated mass deportation or
displacement, since expulsion or deportation are crimes against
humanity or an exceptionally serious war crime.[31]

According to M. Avrum Ehrlich, 'Resolution 242 called for "a
just solution to the refugee problem," a term covering Jewish
refugees from Arab countries as stated by President Carter in 1978
at Camp David'.[32]

According to John Quigley, however, it is
clear from the context in which it was adopted, and from the
statements recounted by the delegates, that Resolution 242
contemplates the Palestine Arab refugees only. [33]

French version vs.
English version of text

The difference between the two versions lies in the absence of a
definite article ("the") in the English version, while the word
"des" present in the French version could be interpreted either as
the French indefinite article in
plural ("des"), or a contraction of the words "de"
and "les" (the latter being the French definite article in
plural), equal to the English "of the". While some observers
argue that the absence of the definite article in English does not
preclude an interpretation meaning "all territories," others
counter by claiming that the presence of the word "des" in French
grammar does not preclude an interpretation meaning "territories"
rather than "the territories." Although some have dismissed the
controversy by suggesting that the use of the word "des" in the
French version is a translation error and should therefore be
ignored in interpreting the document, the debate has retained its
force. On the other hand, both versions are of equal legal force,
as recognised languages of the United Nations.

In spite of the lack of definite articles, according to McHugo,
it is clear that such an instruction cannot legitimately be taken
to imply that some dogs need not be kept on the lead or that the
rule applies only near some ponds. Further, McHugo points out a
potential consequence of the logic employed by advocates of a
"some" reading. Paragraph 2 (a) of the Resolution, which guarantees
"freedom of navigation through international waterways in the
area," may allow Arab states to interfere with navigation through
some international waterways of their choosing.[34]

Glenn Perry asserts that because the French version resolves
ambiguities in the English text, and is more consistent with the
other clauses of the treaty, it is the correct interpretation. He
argues that "it is an accepted rule that the various language
versions must be considered together, with the ambiguities of one
version elucidated by the other"[35]. He
cites Article 33 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which states that except when a treaty
provides that one text shall prevail "the meaning which best
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of
the treaty, shall be adopted"[36] . He
furthermore argues that the context of the passage, in a treaty
that reaffirms "'territorial integrity', 'territorial
inviolability,' and 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war' - taken together cannot be reconciled with
anything less than full withdrawal"[37]. He
argues that the reference to "secure and recognized borders" can be
interpreted in several ways, and only one of them contradicts the
principle of full withdrawal.

On the other hand, Shabtai Rosenne, former Permanent
Representative of Israel to the United Nations Office at Geneva and
member of the UN's International Law
Commission, notes that:

It is an historical fact, which nobody has ever attempted
to deny, that the negotiations between the members of the Security
Council, and with the other interested parties, which preceded the
adoption of that resolution, were conducted on the basis of English
texts, ultimately consolidated in Security Council document S/8247.
[...] Many experts in the French language, including academics with
no political axe to grind, have advised that the French translation
is an accurate and idiomatic rendering of the original English
text, and possibly even the only acceptable rendering into
French."[...] "[o]n the question of concordance, the French
representative [to the 1379th meeting of the Security Council on
November 16, 1967] was explicit in stating that the French text was
"identical" with the English text.[38]

Only English and French were the Security Council's working
languages (Arabic, Russian, Spanish and Chinese were official but
not the working languages).

... both the British and the Americans pointed out
that 242 was a British resolution; therefore, the English language
text was authoritative and would prevail in any dispute over
interpretation.[40]

The French representative to the Security Council, in the debate
immediately after the vote, asserted:

the French text, which is equally authentic with the
English, leaves no room for any ambiguity, since it speaks of
withdrawal "des territoires occupés," which indisputably
corresponds to the expression "occupied territories" We were
likewise gratified to hear the United Kingdom representative stress
the link between this paragraph of his resolution and the principle
of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by
force....[41]

Opponents of the "all territories" reading remind that the UN
Security Council declined to adopt a draft resolution, including
the definite article, far prior to the adoption of Resolution 242.
They argue that, in interpreting a resolution of an international
organization, one must look to the process of the negotiation and
adoption of the text. This would make the text in English, the
language of the discussion, take precedence.

The negotiating and
drafting process

A Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief quotes policy
statements made by President Johnson in a speech delivered on
September 10, 1968 and by Secretary of State Rogers in a speech
delivered on December 9, 1969 "The United States has stated that
boundaries should be negotiated and mutually recognized, “should
not reflect the weight of conquest,” and that adjustments in the
pre-1967 boundaries should be “insubstantial.”[42]

President Carter asked for a State Department report "to
determine if there was any justice to the Israeli position that the
resolution did not include all the occupied territories". The State
Department report concluded:

Support for the concept of total withdrawal was widespread in
the Security Council, and it was only through intensive American
efforts that a resolution was adopted which employed indefinite
language in the withdrawal clause. In the process of obtaining this
result, the United States made clear to the Arab states and several
other members of the Security Council that the United States
envisioned only insubstantial revisions of the 1949 armistice
lines. Israel did not protest the approach.[43][44]

Ruth Lapidoth describes the view, adopted by Israel, which holds
that the resolution allowed Israel to retain "some territories".
She argues "The provision on the establishment of “secure and
recognized boundaries” would have been meaningless if there had
been an obligation to withdraw from all the territories.[45]

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled the first time
he heard someone invoke "the sacramental language of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242, mumbling about the need for a just
and lasting peace within secure and recognized borders". He said
the phrase was so platitudinous that he thought the speaker was
pulling his leg. Kissinger said that, at that time, he did not
appreciate how the flood of words used to justify the various
demands obscured rather than illuminated the fundamental positions.
Kissinger said those "clashing perspectives" prevented any real
bargaining and explained:

"Jordan’s acquiescence in Resolution 242 had been obtained in
1967 by the promise of our United Nations Ambassador Arthur
Goldberg that under its terms we would work for the return of the
West Bank of Jordan with minor boundary rectifications and that we
were prepared to use our influence to obtain a role for Jordan in
Jerusalem."[46]

However, speaking to Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon said
"You and I both know they can’t go back to the other [1967]
borders. But we must not, on the other hand, say that because the
Israelis win this war, as they won the '67 War, that we just go on
with status quo. It can't be done." Kissinger replied "I couldn't
agree more" [47]

Moreover, President Gerald Ford said: "The U.S. further
supports the position that a just and lasting peace, which remains
our objective, must be acceptable to both sides. The U.S. has not
developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will
give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement
with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan
Heights." [48]

Furthermore, Secretary of State George Shultz
declared: "Israel will never negotiate from, or return to, the
lines of partition or to the 1967 borders." Secretary of State Christopher's letter to Netanyahu
states: "I would like to reiterate our position that Israel is
entitled to secure and defensible borders, which should be directly
negotiated and agreed with its neighbors."[49]

A key part of the case in favour of a "some territories" reading
is the claim that British and American officials involved in the
drafting of the Resolution omitted the definite article
deliberately in order to make it less demanding on the Israelis. As
George Brown, British
Foreign Secretary in 1967, said:

The Israeli's had by now anexed de facto, if not formally, large
new areas of Arab land, and there were now very many more Arab
refugees. It was clear that what Israel or at least many of her
leaders, really wanted was permanently to colonize much of this
newly annexed Arab territory, particularly the Jordan valley,
Jerusalem, and other sensitive areas. This led me into a flurry of
activity at the United Nations, which resulted in the near miracle
of getting the famous resolution - Resolution 242 - unanimously
adopted by the Security Council. It declares "the inadmissibility
of territory by war" and it also affirms the necessity "for
guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every state in the area". It calls for "withdrawal
of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the recent
conflict." It does not call for Israeli withdrawal from “the”
territories recently occupied, nor does it use the word “all”. It
would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either
of these words had been included, but it does set out the lines on
which negotiations for a settlement must take place. Each side must
be prepared to give up something: the resolution doesn’t attempt to
say precisely what, because that is what negotiations for a
peace-treaty must be about. [50]

Lord Caradon, chief author of
the resolution, takes a subtly different slant. His focus seems to
be that the lack of a definite article is intended to deny
permanence to the "unsatisfactory" pre-1967 border, rather than to
allow Israel to retain land taken by force. Such a view would
appear to allow for the possibility that the borders could be
varied through negotiation:

Knowing as I did the unsatisfactory nature of the 1967 line
I was not prepared to use wording in the Resolution which would
have made that line permanent. Nevertheless it is necessary to say
again that the overriding principle was the "inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war" and that meant that there could be
no justification for annexation of territory on the Arab side of
the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war.
The sensible way to decide permanent "secure and recognized"
boundaries would be to set up a Boundary Commission and hear both
sides and then to make impartial recommendations for a new frontier
line, bearing in mind, of course, the "inadmissibility"
principle.[24]The purposes are perfectly clear, the principle is stated in
the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is stated in the
operative section. And then the essential phrase which is not
sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place to
secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very
carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be
recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And
that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I
would defend absolutely what we did. It was not for us to lay down
exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border very
well. It is not a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to
stop in 1948, just where they happened to be that night, that is
not a permanent boundary...[51]

Arthur J. Goldberg, another of the
resolution's drafters, concurred that Resolution 242 does not
dictate the extent of the withdrawal, and added that this matter
should be negotiated between the parties:

Does Resolution 242 as unanimously adopted by the UN Security
Council require the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all of
the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war? The answer
is no. In the resolution, the words the and all are omitted.
Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, without specifying
the extent of the withdrawal. The resolution, therefore, neither
commands nor prohibits total withdrawal.

If the resolution is ambiguous, and purposely so, on this
crucial issue, how is the withdrawal issue to be settled? By direct
negotiations between the concerned parties. Resolution 242 calls
for agreement between them to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement. Agreement and acceptance necessarily require
negotiations.[52]

Mr. Michael
Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, in a reply to a question in Parliament, 9 December 1969:
"As I have explained before, there is reference, in the vital
United Nations Security Council Resolution, both to withdrawal from
territories and to secure and recognized boundaries. As I have told
the House previously, we believe that these two things should be
read concurrently and that the omission of the word 'all' before
the word 'territories' is deliberate."

Mr. Joseph J.
Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 July 1970 (NBC "Meet
the Press"): "That Resolution did not say 'withdrawal to the
pre-June 5 lines'. The Resolution said that the parties must
negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and
recognized borders. In other words, the question of the final
borders is a matter of negotiations between the parties." Mr. Sisco
was actively involved in drafting the Resolution in his capacity as
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
in 1967.

"Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of respect for
political independence and territorial integrity of all the states
of the area. We reaffirmed that principle at the height of this
crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of all.

"This principle can be effective in the Middle East only on the
basis of peace between the parties. The nations of the region have
had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they
now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will
give them security against terror, destruction, and war.

"There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an
immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. As our
distinguished and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has already
said, this is not a prescription for peace but for renewed
hostilities. Certainly troops must be withdrawn, but there must
also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the
refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation
of the arms race, and respect for political independence and
territorial integrity." [53]

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Foreign Relations of
the United States

On June 19, 1967 President Johnson declared the five principles,
including land for peace, that he believed comprised the components
of any United Nations settlement of the Middle East crisis. He
pledged the U.S. Government would "do its part for peace in every
forum, at every level, at every hour".[54] On
July 12, 1967 the Secretary of State announced that the U.S.
position on the Near East crisis was outlined in the President's
statement of June 19 and that it provided the basis for a just and
equitable settlement between the Arab states and Israel.[55] On
August 16, 1967 the Israeli Foreign Office stated that Israel
agreed with the principles set forth by the President on June 19
and indicated that no resolution would be acceptable if it deviated
from them.[56]

On June 9, 1967 Foreign Minister Eban assured US Ambassador
Goldberg that Israel was not seeking territorial aggrandizement and
had no "colonial" aspirations.[57]
Secretary Rusk stressed to the Government of Israel that no
settlement with Jordan would be accepted by the world community
unless it gave Jordan some special position in the Old City of
Jerusalem. The US also assumed Jordan would receive the bulk of the
West Bank as that was regarded as Jordanian territory.[58]

On November 3, 1967 US Ambassador Goldberg, accompanied by Mr.
Sisco and Mr. Pedersen, called on King Hussein of Jordan. Goldberg
said the US was committed to the principle of political
independence and territorial integrity and was ready to reaffirm it
bilaterally and publicly in the Security Council resolution. The US
believes in territorial integrity, withdrawal, and recognition of
secure boundaries. Goldberg said the Principle of territorial
integrity has two important sub-principles, there must be a
withdrawal to recognized and secure frontiers for all countries,
not necessarily the old armistice lines, and there must be
mutuality in adjustments.[59]

Walt Rostow advised President Johnson, that Secretary Rusk had
explained to Mr Eban that US support for secure permanent frontiers
doesn't mean we support territorial changes.[60] The
record of a meeting between Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow
and Israeli Ambassador Harmon stated that Rostow made clear the US
view that there should be movement from General Armistice
Agreements to conditions of peace and that this would involve some
adjustments of Armistice lines as foreseen in the Armistice
Agreements. Rostow told Harmon that he had already stressed to
Foreign Minister Eban that the US expected the thrust of the
settlement would be toward security and demilitarization
arrangements rather than toward major changes in the Armistice
lines. Harmon said the Israeli position was that Jerusalem should
be an open city under unified administration but that the Jordanian
interest in Jerusalem could be met through arrangements including
"sovereignty". Rostow said the US government assumed (and Harman
confirmed) that despite public statements to the contrary, the
Government of Israel position on Jerusalem was that which Eban,
Harman, and Evron had given several times, that Jerusalem was
negotiable.[61]

Ambassador Goldberg briefed King Hussein on US assurances
regarding territorial integrity. Goldberg said the US did not view
Jordan as a country that consisted only of the East Bank, and that
the US was prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan
with minor boundary rectifications. The US would use its influence
to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it would be
required to give up. Finally, although as a matter of policy the US
did not agree with Jordan's position on Jerusalem, nor with the
Israeli position on Jerusalem, the US was prepared to use its
influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem.[62]
Secretary Rusk advised President Johnson that he confirmed
Golberg's pledge regarding territorial integrity to King
Hussein.[63]

During a subsequent meeting between President Johnson, King
Hussein, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Hussein said the
phraseology of the resolution calling for withdrawal from occupied
territories could be interpreted to mean that the Egyptians should
withdraw from Gaza and the Jordanians should withdraw from the West
Bank. He said this possibility was evident from a speech given by
Prime Minister Eshkol in which it had been claimed that both Gaza
and the West Bank had been "occupied territory". The President
agreed, and promised he would talk to Ambassador Goldberg about
inserting Israel in that clause. Ambassador Goldberg told King
Hussein that after taking into account legitimate Arab concerns and
suggestions, the US would be willing to add the word "Israeli"
before "Armed Forces" in first operative paragraph.[64]

A State Department study noted that when King Hussein met on 8
November with Lyndon Johnson, who had been briefed by Secretary
Rusk on the US interpretation, the Jordanian Monarch asked how soon
the Israeli troops would withdraw from most of the occupied lands.
The President replied "In six months."[65][44]

William Quandt, wrote about Johnson's meeting with Eban on
October 24, 1967, and noted that Israel had annexed East Jerusalem.
He said Johnson forcefully told Eban he thought Israel had been
unwise when it went to war and that he still thought they were
unwise. The President stressed the need to respect the territorial
integrity of the Arab states. Quandt said "'The President wished to
caution the Israelis that the further they get from June 5 the
further they get from peace.' Meaning the more territory they
insisted on holding beyond the 1967 lines, the worse would be the
odds of getting a peace agreement with the Arabs."[66]

Interpretations

Israel interprets Resolution 242 as calling for withdrawal from
territories as part of a negotiated peace and full diplomatic
recognition. The extent of withdrawal would come as a result of
comprehensive negotiations that led to durable peace not before
Arabs start to meet their own obligations under Resolution 242.[67]

Initially, the resolution was accepted by Egypt, Jordan and
Israel but not by the Palestine Liberation
Organization.[68] The
Arab position was initially that the Resolution called for Israel
to withdraw from all the territory it occupied during the Six-Day
War prior to peace agreements.

Israel and the Arab states have negotiated before the Israeli
withdrawal. Israel and Jordan made peace without Israel withdrawing
from the West Bank, since Jordan had already renounced its claims
and recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the
Palestinians.[69] Egypt
began negotiations before Israel withdrew from the Sinai.[67]
Negotiations ended without Egypt ever resuming control of the Gaza
Strip, which Egypt held until 1967.[67]

Supporters of the "Palestinian viewpoint" focus on the phrase in
the resolution's preamble emphasizing the "inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war", and note that the French version
called for withdrawal from "des territoires occupés" -
"the territories occupied". The French UN delegation
insisted on this interpretation at the time, but both English and
French are the Secretariat's working languages.

Supporters of the "Israeli viewpoint" note that the second part
of that same sentence in the preamble explicitly recognizes the
need of existing states to live in security. They focus on the
operative phrase calling for "secure and recognized boundaries" and
note that the resolution calls for a withdrawal "from territories"
rather than "from the territories" or "from all territories," as
the Arabs and others proposed; the latter two terms were rejected
from the final draft of Resolution 242.[70]

Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius

The Common Law legal principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(which, for Common Law jurisdictions such as the UK and USA, states
that the express mention of one thing excludes all others) is cited
by some as operating against an "all territories" reading. Foreign
Minister Eban argued, "Every word, long or short, which is not in
the text, is not there because it was deliberately concluded that
it should not be there."[71]
Others point out that the legal maxim in question is not a rule of
law and cannot operate so as to create ambiguity. The principle
would also exclude the possibility of Arab concessions, since the
Arab forces are not mentioned in the operative withdrawal
clause.

Alexander Orakhelashvili cites a number cases in which
international tribunals have ruled that international
organizations, includuing the Security Council, are bound by
general international law. He says that inclusion of explicit
clauses about the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by
war and requiring respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty
of a state demonstrates that the Council does not intend to offend
peremptory norms in these specific ways. The resolution also
acknowledges that these principles must be part of an accepted
settlement. That is confirmed by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties which reiterates the prohibition on the use of force
and provides that any settlement obtained by the threat or use of
force in violation of the principles of international law embodied
in the Charter of the United Nations or conflicting with a
peremptory norm of general international law is invalid. According
to Hans-Paul Gasser, ‘doubtful’ wording of the Council’s
resolutions must always be construed in such a way as to avoid
conflict with fundamental international obligations.[72][73]

The USSR, India, Mali, Nigeria and Arab States all proposed that
the resolution be changed to read "all territories" instead of
"territories." Their request was discussed by the UN Security
Council and "territories" was adopted instead of "all territories",
after President Johnson told Premier Kosygin that the delegates
should not try to negotiate the details of a Middle East settlement
in the corridors and meeting halls of the United Nations, and
Ambassador Goldberg stipulated that the exact wording of the
resolution would not affect the position of any of the parties.[74] Per
Lord Caradon, the chief author
of the resolution:

It was from occupied territories that the Resolution called
for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That
was a test not possibly subject to any doubt. As a matter of plain
fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were
occupied in the 1967 conflict. It was on withdrawal from occupied
territories that the Resolution insisted.[24]

We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line;
we did not put the 'the' in, we did not say all the territories,
deliberately.. We all knew - that the boundaries of '67 were not
drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a
couple of decades earlier... We did not say that the '67 boundaries
must be forever; it would be insanity.[75]

During a symposium on the subject Lord Caradon said that Israel
was in clear defiance of resolution 242. He specifically cited the
"annexation of East Jerusalem" and "the creeping colonialism on the
West Bank and in Gaza and in the Golan."[24]

I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or
improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing
of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a
difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN
Security Council. I formulated the Security Council Resolution.
Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab
leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories
that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means
that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.[76]

Statements by
Security Council representatives

Supporters of an "all territories" reading point out that the
intentions and opinions of draftsmen are not normally considered
relevant to the interpretation of law, their role being purely
administrative. It is claimed that much more weight should be given
to opinions expressed on the matter in discussions at the Security
Council prior to the adoption of the resolution. The representative
for India stated to the Security
Council:

It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if
approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the
principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the
territories - I repeat, all the territories - occupied by Israel as
a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967.

We understand the decision taken to mean the withdrawal of
Israel forces from all, and we repeat, all territories belonging to
Arab States and seized by Israel following its attack on those
States on 5 June 1967. This is borne out by the preamble to the
United Kingdom draft resolution [S/8247] which stresses the
"inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". It
follows that the provision contained in that draft relating to the
right of all States in the Near East "to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries" cannot serve as a pretext for the
maintenance of Israel forces on any part of the Arab territories
seized by them as a result of war.[77]

Israel was the only country
represented at the Security Council to express a contrary view. The
USA, United Kingdom,
Canada, Denmark, China and Japan were silent on the matter, but the US and
UK did point out that other countries' comments on the meaning of
242 were simply their own views. The Syrian representative was strongly critical of
the text's "vague call on Israel to withdraw".

The statement by the Brazilian representative perhaps gives a flavour
of the complexities at the heart of the discussions:

I should like to restate...the general principle that no
stable international order can be based on the threat or use of
force, and that the occupation or acquisition of territories
brought about by such means should not be recognized...Its
acceptance does not imply that borderlines cannot be rectified as a
result of an agreement freely concluded among the interested
States. We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure permanent
boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighboring
States.

However, the Soviet delegate Vasily Kuznetsov
argued: " ... phrases such as 'secure and recognized boundaries'.
... make it possible for Israel itself arbitrarily to establish new
boundaries and to withdraw its forces only to those lines it
considers appropriate." [1373rd meeting, para. 152.]

U.S. Supreme Court JusticeArthur Goldberg, who represented the US
in discussions, later stated: "The notable omissions in regard to
withdrawal are the word 'the' or 'all' and 'the June 5, 1967 lines'
the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories,
without defining the extent of withdrawal".[78]

Implementation

On November 23, 1967, the Secretary General appointed Gunnar Jarring as
Special Envoy to negotiate the implementation of the resolution
with the parties, the so-called Jarring Mission. The governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon recognized Jarring's appointment and
agreed to participate in his shuttle diplomacy, although they
differed on key points of interpretation of the resolution. The
government of Syria rejected
Jarring's mission on grounds that total Israeli withdrawal was a
prerequisite for further negotiations.[79] The
talks under Jarring's auspices lasted until 1973, but bore no
results. After 1973, the Jarring mission was replaced by bilateral
and multilateral peace conferences.

^
State Department Study of the Meaning of Resolution 242, by Nina J.
Noring of the Office of the Historian, and Walter B. Smith II,
Director of the Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs,
Department of State, The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security
Council Resolution 242 of 1967, Its Legislative History and the
Attitudes of the United States and Israel since 1967, February
4, 1978

^
State Department Study of the Meaning of Resolution 242, by Nina J.
Noring of the Office of the Historian, and Walter B. Smith II,
Director of the Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs,
Department of State, The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security
Council Resolution 242 of 1967, Its Legislative History and the
Attitudes of the United States and Israel since 1967, February
4, 1978

^
The Unmaking of U.N. Resolution 242: The Story of how Resolution
242 was Undone Before it was Even Finished, New Society, Harvard
College Student Middle East Journal, September 7, 2007, By Danielle
R. Sassoon

^
Hans-Paul Gasser,‘Collective Economic Sanctions and International
Humanitarian Law - An Enforcement Measure under the United Nations
Charter and the Right of Civilians to Immunity: An Unavoidable
Clash of Policy Goals’, (1996) 56 ZaöRV 880-881

From Wikisource

Adopted unanimously by the Security Council at its
1382nd meeting, on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave
situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace
in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United
Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied
in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
political independence of every State in the area, through measures
including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a
Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish
and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this
resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.

This work is excerpted from an official document of the United
Nations. The policy of this organisation is to keep most of its
documents in the public domain in order to disseminate "as widely
as possible the ideas (contained) in the United Nations
Publications".