The thesis deals with the use of counterfactuals in historiography from the point of view of causal explanation. It studies the various roles that counterfactual claims and counterfactual reasoning play in causal explanation and causal thinking in historiography. The aim is to defend the use of counterfactual what if -questions and inferences in the context of causal explanation and to create methodological guidelines for that use. The theory that is used in this thesis to explicate the role counterfactuals in causal explanation is the contrastive counterfactual theory of causal explanation.
The thesis consists of five discussion chapters. The second chapter introduces the basic concepts of the thesis and analyzes the debate on counterfactuals that has churned among historians within the past decades. The arguments of the opponents of counterfactual reasoning are divided into four categories: metaphysical arguments, semantic arguments, epistemological arguments and arguments based on historians disciplinary identity. The analysis of the arguments of the defenders of counterfactuals shows that there is a missing link in their main argument according to which the use of counterfactuals in historiography is justified because counterfactuals and causal reasoning are inherently linked together. The argument needs to be filled with a theory of causal explanation the contrastive counterfactual theory that explicitly shows how causal claims are related to counterfactual claims and helps to solve various methodological problems related to the use of counterfactuals in historiography.
In the third chapter the history and basic ideas most notably the ideas of contrastive explanandum and ideal intervention of the contrastive counterfactual theory are jotted down. It is showed how contrastive counterfactual theory deals successfully with the problems that have haunted the other counterfactual theories of causal explanation. Chapters four, five and six are dedicated to applying the contrastive counterfactual theory to the most puzzling questions in philosophy of historiography in order to see how far the ideas of contrastive causal explanatory claims and ideal interventions can go in solving these issues. Chapter four shows how the theory solves e.g. the problems of separating explanatory causes from background factors and the question to what extent historians causal explanations can be said to be objective. The final sections of the chapter compare the contrastive counterfactual theory both to the non-causalist view of explaining human action and to the covering-law model on scientific explanation. Based on the comparisons it is concluded that the contrastive counterfactual theory can be considered to be the most fruitful theory to approach the problems of historiographical explanation.
Chapter five deals with the epistemology and methodology of causal and counterfactual inferences in historiography. The method of process tracing is introduced as a way to make use of evidence to support causal and counterfactual claims. Historians evidence consists of traces of the past, as well as, of general theoretical ideas on the mechanisms that guide human behavior, society and culture. It is argued that it is sometimes extremely difficult or even impossible to assess the truth of some counterfactual claims due to the lack of evidence that historians often face. The idea of ideal intervention and its conditions are introduced to solve some of the major conceptual and methodological problems of causal and counterfactual reasoning in historiography, e.g. the problem how to choose sensible counterfactual antecedents. It is shown that complexity and non-modularity of the systems studied is the other major source of difficulty for historians causal and counterfactual inferences, in addition to the problems caused by the lack of evidence. In the end of the chapter, the difference between historians counterfactual could-inferences and would-inferences is explicated, and it is argued why would-inferences are central to causal explanation, whereas could-inferences serve the goals of tracking moral responsibility and prevention.
Chapter six discusses the uses of counterfactuals in historians causal reasoning. It is suggested that historians engage in four types of reasoning when they weigh causes in order to determine their causal significance or importance. It is also shown how the ideas of the contrastive counterfactual theory can be applied in all these cases. First of all, historians seek to select causes by separating them from the causal background. Secondly, historians can weigh causes with the help of using various contrastive explanatory questions. Thirdly, they try to assess the necessity and contingency of a result, and fourthly, they are interested in defining the sensitivity of causal relations. The final section of the thesis presents how counterfactual reasoning works in the construction of historiographical narratives.
The final closing chapter seeks to give a balanced answer to the arguments of the critics who question the use of counterfactuals in historiography, and to provide a toolkit for counterfactual explanatory reasoning in historiography based on the findings of the previous chapters. In addition, the results are assessed from the point of view of the contrastive counterfactual theory in order to evaluate whether the theory needs further developing.
Most of the topics discussed in the thesis are illustrated with examples mainly from political history, social history, history of international relations, and economic history. The arguments and conclusions should, however, be applicable to all fields of historiography.