The desperate condition of people in the Gaza
strip and the continuing violence across its border with Israel, the unsettled
political condition of Lebanon, and the internal divisions among Palestinians
and Israelis, all highlight the gulf between current realities in the middle east
in the first weeks of 2008 and the achievement of a peace settlement that could
transform them. But these events too are only part of a more varied picture, and it may be timely to explore the
realistic steps that could be taken in this - perhaps decisive - year to
achieve such a settlement.

He has published widely on
Iraq and the middle eastThis article is based on a talkVolker Perthes delivered to theRedebeitrag beim Symposium der Zeit-Stiftung in Hamburg, on 15 January 2008Also by Volker Perthes in openDemocracy:

In mapping a possible way forward that
includes all relevant actors - Israel, the Arab countries (especially the
eastern, Mashreq states, Europe, and of course the United States - consider the
following situation: a US president, one year before the end his term (and with
a certain eye on his legacy) makes an eleventh-hour effort to mediate peace
between Israel and the Palestinians, eventually attempting to use his personal
charm in common meetings with the key players in order to bridge gaps on the
"final-status issues".

The description could be of George W Bush
since the Annapolis conference of 27 November 2007 and his tour of the region on 8-16 January 2008; but it
equally applies to the last year of the Bill Clinton presidency. This, it is
true, can be an argument for scepticism about the prospects of the current
Israeli-Palestinian peace process: both in 2000 and today, the aims (two states
living peacefully side by side), the problems (the knotty final-status issues),
and the solutions (the "Clinton parameters" of December 2000, and ensuing Taba accord)
are all the same (see Fred Halliday, "Palestinians and Israelis: a
political impasse", 5 June
2007).

It is also striking that President Bush - who
so long avoided a hands-on approach to the Israel-Palestine-conflict and even
denied its relevance - now, after seven years in office, tries to broker a
deal. There must be fears (reinforced by the landmark speech of his tour, in Abu Dhabi on 13 January) that
Bush may be engaging for the "wrong" reasons - that he may see the
Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts as part of a process of alliance-building
against Iran. If this is indeed the president's logic, it would be a misreading of the situation in
the middle east: in the sense that it underrates both how much regional actors (even in
Palestine) are driven by their own local agendas and interests, and how
relevant a resolution of the Palestine conflict is for the Arab world -
particularly (again) for the Mashreq countries and Saudi Arabia.

The end
of unilateralism

If some scepticism is appropriate, then, this
should not mean resignation. For a lot has changed in the years between
Clinton's and Bush's last years. True, 2000-08 has been a wasted period that
has inflicted enormous costs in terms of human suffering on the Palestinians,
the Israelis and the Lebanese (to name only those) as well as high opportunity
costs - chances for progress not exploited - on the entire region. It seems,
however, that key policy-makers have learned some lessons. The acknowledgment
of Israel's prime minister Ehud Olmert that Jerusalem will eventually have to be divided, for
example, may not be new; but the fact that an Israeli prime minister has stated
it publicly is important. It could become a confidence-building measure towards
the Palestinians - if it wasn't undermined by new settlement projects in the occupied part of the city.

Moreover, the president and prime minister of
the Palestinian Authority - Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad have started very serious
efforts to establish the monopoly of force in their quasi-state, even under the
very unfavourable conditions of occupation. Even Hamas, at least its governing
faction in Gaza, was again - before the upsurge in violence and the humanitarian crisis of mid-January 2008 - talking about a
truce and negotiations with Israel. (The seriousness of such endeavours will be
judged against the willingness of Hamas to stop its rocket-attacks on the towns
of Sderot and Ashkelon in southern Israel.) Moreover,
the Arab states are much more supportive with regard to the peace process than
they were at the time of Camp David in 2000; the support of Saudi Arabia in particular is enormously important both
for the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership.

Also in openDemocracy
on the Israel-Palestine conflict and the international community:

On a more general level, the most important
aspect of current Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab dynamics could be called
"the end of unilateralism". Since 2000, when the Camp David talks between
Israelis and Palestinians as well as the Israeli-Syrian talks broke down, there
has been no peace process in the middle east. Instead, there has been only a
series of unilateral measures - some of them admittedly meant to be
constructive (such as Israel's withdrawals from Lebanon and from the Gaza
strip, or the unilateral ceasefire which Hamas maintained for almost one year).

But even such measures did not make up for the
absence of negotiations. Arguably, the dominant unilateral mode brought Israel
back to southern Lebanon and Gaza in summer 2006; it also created an idée fixe that Israel had no partner on
the other side (Yasser Arafat was too much in cahoot with terrorists, Hamas
would not recognise Israel, Abbas was too weak...). But over the years, it has
become clearer that your counterparts in the conflict are never the ones you
wish for: it may be easier to act unilaterally, but you have to engage with who
is available (including your outright enemies) if you want to resolve the
conflict - you will even have to help them to become partners.

True, even if this process is begun, success
is not guaranteed. Many commentators have pointed out the weakness of key
actors in Israel and Palestine. Ehud Olmert is barely surviving in a coalition
government which remians stable only as long as he does not fulfil Israel's
obligation under the "roadmap" of June 2003 and does not make compromises
which he knows are necessary; Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are not even in control of the West Bank and
are unable to move people or goods from one part of the Palestinian territories
to others, or to provide basic public facilities in the Gaza strip.

This weakness is a problem, but it is a reason
to continue and deepen new negotiations rather than to abandon them. For one of
the most important elements of negotiation is precisely to strengthen the
different sides by engaging them in a serious process which improves the
situation on the ground and brings closer a resolution of the conflict. This
applies to both sides, but its relevance is especially clear to the Palestinian leadership and institutions - the more there is delay,
the more the chance of a renewed unilateralism and even greater corroding of
Palestinian institutions.

Europe at
the centre

But the two sides - again, as in 2000 - cannot
do it alone. Where is Europe in all this, and where in particular is the
trilateral relationship between Europe, Israel, and the Mashreq Arab countries?
From a European perspective, the response to this question is sobering.

It is undeniable that European involvement in the region has increased over the last
years, something that can be measured in regard to economic aid and political
engagement. The efforts during Germany's presidency of the European Union in
the first half of 2007 to revive the Quartet (the United States, European Union, United
Nations and Russia) and to get Syria into the process, are notable here. There
has even been involvement in the security field; the EU runs two European
security and defence policy (ESDP) missions in Palestine, and there is a strong
European participation in the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Lebanon
(Unifil), including - quite important for Germany - the first military
contribution of the Bundeswehr to peacekeeping in the Arab-Israeli conflict area.

At the same time, Europe's ability to
influence events on the ground seems rather limited. It hurts to say, but it
may be healthy to realise, that before the Annapolis conference the issue of
whether the Saudi foreign minister or a Syrian delegate would participate was far more important than whether the
German or the French foreign minister (or indeed the high representative of the
European Union would attend). This, partly the consequence of the EU's
recurrent inability to act as a single body in the middle east, results in Europe's
damaging loss of leverage over important actors; in Palestine, the refusal to
talk to elected representatives after the legislative elections of January 2006, and the failure to clearly support the short-lived
Palestinian unity government of 2007, are two examples.

The Quartet principles agreed in 2003 - which demand that the
Palestinian government refrains from violence, honours agreements, and
acknowledges Israel's right to exist - are legitimate, and continue to express
what Europe rightly expects. However, turning them into conditions even to talk
is quite unusual, and not what Europe practices in relation to many states in
the region. Moreover, the withdrawal of support from pre-state institutions
which we have actively helped to establish, has no doubt contributed to their breakdown.

The EU continues to be the most important donor to the peace process and the Palestinian
territories. This has been underlined by the Paris donor conference on 17 December 2007. Europe is also the most important trade partner
to all Mashreq countries; it runs important projects in Palestine and its Arab neighbours, and it tries to further
regional cooperation through the Barcelona process (see Fred Halliday, "The ‘Barcelona process': ten
years on", 11 November
2005)

At the same time, the EU action plan for the
middle east peace process, initiated by Germany and launched in October 2007 is strikingly unambitious (or perhaps
realistic). The proposed action focuses on support for Palestinian businesses
and universities, and on strengthening the Palestinian police, political
parties, and other institutions. There is no more lamenting about Europe being
a "payer, but not a player"; nor any mention of any other diplomatic role
except the support of American efforts through the Quartet. Some of these
instruments in the EU's toolbox will indeed become more important once a point
"beyond peace" is reached. But a more active diplomatic role is also needed.

Six
questions

What might this look like? One way to approach
this is - starting from the instruments and institutions the European Union has
at hand - to pose six questions and remarks regarding the EU's practical
involvement in the region.

First, can (and how can) Europe use its network of relationships with the Mashreq
countries - established under the Barcelona process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) - to catalyse regional and sub-regional
cooperation in the economic, political, educational, and security fields? This
is necessary not only to support the peace process, but even more so to strengthen
a peace, which, if achieved, will probably lack societal support and be fragile
for some time to come.

Second, can Europe develop its EMP so as to
offer Israel, still Europe's closest regional partner in economic and political
terms, a prospect beyond its association agreement - one that might allow it to
participate in some EU institutions such as the European Economic Area (EEA), like Norway and Switzerland? The idea,
of course, cannot be to integrate Israel into Europe and thereby isolate it
from its middle-eastern neighbourhood. In that case, it would be essential also
to help make Arab states - Palestine, Syria and others - fit both for trade and
for competition with Israel; this would reduce asymmetries which are an
obstacle to cooperation and in the 1990s limited the willingness of Arab states
to fully engage in projects aiming to create a "new middle east". In the
political and diplomatic field, even before peace, there may be responsibilities
here for European actors.

Third, will Europe be able to carry peace
negotiations forward over the United States's period of transition to a new president - if no final deal is
struck by the end of the Bush presidency, or if a basic agreement is reached
but needs further deliberation on details? A new Washington administration
takes a long time to get started, and one result could be the stalling of a
positive dynamic in the middle east. Can Europe enter this gap, and fill it
without letting the US escape from its responsibilities?

Fourth, can Europe assume a monitoring and
management support role in the implementation phase of any agreement? And can
it take the fire, if that also implies becoming tough with parties that fail to
live up to their commitments?

Fifth, will Europe prove capable of becoming a
catalyst of talks between Syria and Israel, and probably between Syria and
Lebanon, using its leverage with Damascus, Tel Aviv and Beirut? (I assume that
Europe has more of that leverage than Russia, which has announced that it will
bring Israel-Syria talks back on track).

Sixth, will Europe be able to bring moderate
Islamists not only into negotiations, but eventually into the institutions that
will support peace? If we want an eventual peace to be stable and alive, Europe
cannot afford to let actors whose worldview may be very different but who have
a real constituency remain outside the process. Europe's credibility here is an
asset. I am convinced that by constructively using our strong political and
societal links with Israel, and by opening channels to this element of Arab
societies, Europe's own "soft power" in the region will be increased - to
everyone's benefit.