The Chinese Government has made economic development a priority, and lifted millions of people out of poverty, but Chinese Government policies and practices continue to violate the rights of Chinese citizens, and fall far short of meeting international standards. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which formally was established in 2000 by the legislation that granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) as China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), is mandated by law to monitor human rights, worker rights, and the development of the rule of law in China, as well as to maintain a database of information on Chinese political prisoners—individuals who have been imprisoned for exercising their civil and political rights protected under China’s Constitution and laws or under China’s international human rights obligations.

When China entered the WTO in 2001, the Chinese Government made commitments that were important not only for China’s commercial development in the international marketplace, but also for the development of the rule of law at home. These commitments require that the Chinese Government ensure nondiscrimination in the administration of measures that are trade related, and publish promptly all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings relating to trade. WTO accession and the Chinese Government’s years of preparation for accession provided the impetus for many changes to China’s legal system over the past two decades. Those changes, some of which have been significant, still have not produced a national legal system that is consistently and reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. The Communist Party rejects the notion that the imperative to uphold the rule of law should preempt the Party’s role in guiding the functions of the state. As this report shows, the Chinese Government’s repressive tendencies at home undermine the credibility of its stated international commitments to create a more open society that provides greater respect for human rights, worker rights, transparency, and the rule of law.

The development of a stable China firmly committed to the rule of law and citizens’ fundamental rights is in the national interest of the United States. Those rights include the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, religion, and other rights protected under China’s Constitution and laws or under China’s international human rights obligations. To ensure a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship, China’s leaders must demonstrate genuine commitment, not just in words but in deeds, to promoting the development of the rule of law, human rights, and transparency in no less measure than they have prioritized economic development.

The imperative to uphold the rule of law, human rights, and transparency could not be more relevant than it is with respect to planned expansion of bilateral cooperation on climate change recently announced by the United States and China. The United States and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on July 28 that elevates cooperation on climate change in the relationship between the two countries and expands bilateral cooperation to accelerate the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon global economy. In the pursuit of such a goal, the integrity of scientific data and technical information must be preserved, free from censorship or manipulation for political or other purposes. Researchers, engineers, and scientists engaged in international collaborative projects must be free from concern about whether the information they share with a research partner today will be declared a state secret tomorrow, and whether they will face prosecution as criminals as a result. To maximize the potential for progress on climate change, Chinese officials must engage as allies, and not repress, environmental whistleblowers, a vigilant press, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights lawyers. Recently announced goals for U.S.-China cooperation and top-level business collaboration on clean technology can only be achieved if accompanied by reliable and consistent enforcement of intellectual property rights in China.

This report documents, in each of its sections, the challenges and opportunities that exist for China to create a more open society with greater respect for human rights, transparency, and the rule of law. The report also demonstrates the importance of the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, a unique, powerful, and publicly available resource on which the Commission relies for advocacy and research work, including the preparation of this Annual Report. The human rights issues underlying political imprisonment and detention are numerous. Instances of human rights violations and resulting imprisonment form a pattern of systematic repression—the Chinese Government should demonstrate its commitment to international standards by reversing this pattern.

The Commission intends that the detailed contents of this report may serve as a roadmap for progress. By documenting human rights violations in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, by advocating in meetings with Chinese officials on behalf of political prisoners, by raising public awareness of human rights and rule of law issues, and by placing these issues on the agendas of bilateral and multilateral meetings, the United States Government establishes a baseline for measuring progress. Some of those who supported establishing permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China in 2000 believed that PNTR would improve the prospects that the Chinese Government would fulfill its commitments to international human rights standards—but the Chinese Government has yet to live up to those commitments. Holding the Chinese Government accountable to its international commitments and to its own laws, when those laws meet international standards, is an essential element of the roadmap for progress.

As the United States and China engage in bilateral and multilateral dialogues, the Commission urges Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials to monitor carefully Chinese Government positions and actions on issues critical to developing the rule of law, promoting transparency, and protecting human rights. The Chinese Government, for example, issued a National Human Rights Action Plan in 2009 that uses the language of human rights to cast an ambitious program for promoting the rights of its citizens. In meetings with Chinese officials, Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should inquire about the Chinese Government’s progress in translating words into action and securing genuine improvements for its citizens as set forth in the plan. To that end, this Annual Report and the information available on the Commission’s Web site, www.cecc.gov, provide an abundance of resources.

The Commission observed continuing human rights abuses and stalled development of the rule of law in China during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year (October 2008 to October 2009). The level of repression increased in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Tibetan areas of China, as did the level of harassment of human rights lawyers and advocates, and restrictions on Chinese reporters. Repression of religious adherents continued. Across the areas the Commission monitors, these general themes emerged:

Chinese leaders’ increasing preoccupation with maintaining what they deem to be "social stability";

more pronounced deficiencies in checks on state power, and in some cases the government’s undoing of existing checks;

the reversal of some trends toward greater transparency of and predictability in the legal system; and

greater Chinese Government and Communist Party sophistication in co-opting the language of human rights and the rule of law to shape perceptions of China’s record on these issues.

Maintaining Stability

The frequency of mass protests in China during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year attracted attention throughout China and worldwide. Party leaders considered 2009 to be a sensitive year and set an even greater priority on maintaining social stability. As a result, central and local governments increased public security budgets and expanded mechanisms charged with "stability maintenance work." Offices charged with "stability maintenance" focused on developing "early warning systems" for social instability and expanding networks of "informants" at local levels.

Many protests were triggered when workers, farmers and other rural residents, or urban residents turned to laws and regulations to defend their interests against those of businesses, allegedly corrupt government officials, or both. Many such disputes resulted, for example, from complaints against industrial pollution, worker grievances, property disputes, uneven development, and wealth inequality. Citizens’ appeals often included calls for fair and just government mediation. In some instances, more powerful and well-funded economic players took measures to cause the harassment and intimidation of local protesters. Local government officials in many cases justified taking police action against protesters by asserting that doing so helped to promote "economic development" and "defend social order." Police action against protesters in the name of maintaining order and "stability above all else" came to international attention in the past year as authorities forcefully suppressed a demonstration by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5, a day which also marked the start of violent clashes and attacks in the city.

The lack of adequate rule of law at the local level contributed to channeling social pressures toward administrative and Party officials for management or resolution, instead of through the judicial system. When economic disputes became protests, protesters often called on government officials to intervene on their behalf. The performance evaluation of officials, however, in part is based on the successful preemption or suppression of mass protests and petitioning as well as on achieving economic development targets. Such measures of government performance work against addressing the root causes of citizens’ protests and against resolving disputes in a fair manner. Even though empowering the courts to fulfill their constitutional and lawful purpose would serve citizens’ interests, officials fail to empower the courts. Government and Party officials are reluctant to bend to the rule of law, and the leadership fears that full implementation of the rule of law could unleash social forces that are beyond the capacity of the courts to control.

Checks on State Power

Deficiencies in institutional and legal restraints on state power became more pronounced during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. Serious abuses of fundamental human rights resulted in part from the weakness or absence of basic protections available to citizens through legal process. Even when procedural protections exist on paper, insufficient safeguards are in place to guarantee their implementation. For example, China’s lower courts frequently seek instructions from higher courts before issuing decisions. This system of "instruction on request" undermines the fundamental purpose of the appellate process, and serves as an impediment to the development of administrative and judicial decisions supported by statements of legal reasoning. That, in turn, negatively impacts the public’s faith in the integrity of legal institutions. During the 2009 annual session of the National People’s Congress, delegates introduced a bill aimed at abolishing "instruction on request." The shortcoming, therefore, is not that officials have failed to identify the problem, or that a viable solution is out of reach. Rather, officials do not empower lower courts for the reasons noted above: the Party’s unwillingness to bend to the rule of law, and the fear of unleashing social forces that are beyond the capacity of courts to control.

Even when laws on the books are well crafted, abuses arise. The presumption of guilt permitted under Chinese criminal law—especially in "politically sensitive" cases—confounds defense attorneys’ attempts to present evidence of innocence, to provide evidence that a defendant committed a lesser crime, or otherwise to mount an effective defense. To uphold the Chinese Government’s domestic and international commitments to adhere to legal procedure, China needs a community of legal scholars and lawyers well trained in procedural law to represent citizens—even in "sensitive" cases. This report documents that China has such lawyers, but local judicial bureaus and lawyers associations have denied a number of them renewal of their professional licenses. Absent adequate legal and institutional constraints on state power, government authorities and unofficial personnel continued during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year to monitor unlawfully and subject to periodic illegal home confinement social activists, dissidents, religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family members. Such unlawful activity increased during sensitive periods, such as during the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests.

Predictability of the Legal System

The impetus for much of China’s legal reform in the past two decades was its preparation for accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. Those changes, while significant, have not produced a national legal system that is consistently and reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. The Communist Party rejects the notion that upholding the rule of law should preempt the Party’s role in guiding the functions of the state.

The "crime" of disclosing state secrets exemplifies the limitations on the rule of law. Broad categories of information may be classified as state secrets, including information related to "economic and social development." Officials use this discretion to punish citizens for attempting to expose official abuse of power. For example, in 2005 officials sentenced Shi Tao, a journalist, to serve 10 years in prison for exposing a directive from propaganda officials concerning restrictions on media coverage of the 15th anniversary of the June 1989 Tiananmen protests. Officials had designated the directive "top secret." Individuals charged with illegally disclosing state secrets may mount a defense against the charge, but they cannot legally challenge the decision that classified the information as a state secret. A draft revision of the Law on Guarding State Secrets that the National People’s Congress published for public comment earlier this year leaves broad criteria for classifying information as a "state secret" intact.

Even in the domain of commercial law, developments over the past year have shown how business disputes and commercial issues may have real consequences for human rights when the Chinese Government or Party perceives its interests to be threatened. The case of Rio Tinto, an Australian mining corporation whose employees Chinese authorities reportedly detained initially on allegations of possible violations of state secrets laws, and later on accusations of violating laws on commercial secrecy, is an example.

Extralegal detention remains a serious problem that endangers the legitimacy and predictability of the legal system, and violates a number of basic human rights. Chinese citizens, including petitioners, peaceful protesters, and individuals deemed "undesirable" by authorities, remain subject to arbitrary detention in extralegal detention facilities such as secret jails and "law education classes." Some are held for nonmedical reasons in psychiatric hospitals. Authorities’ use of unlawful detention varies periodically—it increases prior to significant events and anniversaries—and from area to area.

Shaping Perceptions

Chinese Government and Party officials displayed during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year greater sophistication in co-opting the language of human rights and the rule of law to shape perceptions of China’s record on these issues. The soaring influence of China’s Internet and a greater focus on competing with international media in reporting on China have shaped the Party’s strategy of control. The Chinese Government and Communist Party’s official media expedite reporting on some events in order to influence mass media coverage. At the same time, the government increases censorship of unofficial information channels, such as the Internet. International journalists working in China face fewer restrictions than their domestic Chinese counterparts, but they continue to meet with harassment and their ability to function as an effective alternative to official "spin" sometimes is limited.

The Chinese Government continued to soften some rhetoric toward religion by articulating a "positive role" that religious communities in China should fulfill, but the government’s language casts for religion the duty to build support for state economic and social goals. Officials and central government directives continued to warn against foreign groups "using religion" to "interfere" in China’s "internal" affairs and to "sabotage" the country. The government continued to use legal measures to restrict rather than protect the religious freedom of Chinese citizens. Parents and guardians faced restrictions on their right to pass on religious education to children, and children remain subject to restrictions on their right to exercise the freedom of religion. The Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts. The government permitted and, in some cases, sponsored the social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious communities, but in the past year, authorities also took steps to block some social welfare activities by unregistered religious groups.

The government has in the past year used institutional, educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations. Chinese officials adopted a more assertive tone in expressing determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to pressure Tibetans living in China to accept only a Dalai Lama approved by the Chinese Government. Escalating government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy have resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.

In an apparent effort to shift attention from policy shortcomings in China, and to appeal to international support, authorities blamed a demonstration by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5 and strife in the region starting that day on the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Authorities also accused U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer of orchestrating events on July 5—a charge she denied— and launched a media campaign to portray family members denouncing her.

China’s global reach and expanding economy provide the government an array of international levers to penalize governments and organizations that criticize the Chinese Government’s human rights record, as well as channels to reward international entities that support the government’s positions, or who choose to remain silent. China’s actions related to Darfur and Sudan, and China’s reported surveillance and intimidation of non-governmental organizations, religious and spiritual adherents, and international activists may be understood, at least in part, in this context.

A summary of findings follows below for each area that the Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with the Commission’s mandate, submits a set of recommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, Chinese officials continued to target for punishment or harassment citizens who peacefully expressed political dissent or who advocated for human rights, including those who voiced concern that the Chinese Government had not adequately investigated the cause of school collapses following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, those who sought to express support for Charter 08 (a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights), and those who spoke out about alleged official misconduct. Officials treated such activity as a threat to national security, charging citizens with the crime of "incit-ing subversion," or treated such activities as "defamation." Officials ordered other citizens to serve time in reeducation through labor, a form of administrative detention without trial. Local officials also abused police power, subjecting citizens to surveillance and interrogation, warning them not to speak to news media, taking citizens into custody, and restricting their freedom of movement.

The government and Communist Party continued to apply a system of censorship and regulation of the news media and publishing industry that violates international human rights standards for free expression. Top Chinese officials continued to emphasize the media’s subservient relationship to the government and Party. Party and government officials continued to punish journalists and news media (for example, by suspending publication) and to rely on prior restraints on publishing, including licensing and other regulatory requirements, to restrict free expression. Officials continued to view news media commercialization as serving official over public interests. They have expressed a desire to create a more market-friendly media to facilitate the spread of propaganda and China’s "soft power."

The government continued to promote a limited watchdog role for journalists and to support raising professionalism among journalists, but emphasized political loyalty as an important criterion.

The increasing influence of China’s Internet and a greater focus on competing with international media for reporting on China have led the Party to adapt its strategy of control by expediting the release of official reporting of some events in order to shape mass media coverage, while at the same time increasing censorship of nonofficial channels of information.

Foreign journalists reporting in China face fewer restrictions than domestic journalists but they still face harassment.

While the Internet continued this past year to serve as a limited, but important, outlet for individual expression and criticism of government policies, the Chinese Government’s regulation of the Internet and other electronic communications continued to violate international standards for free expression.

Officials continued to shut down or block access to domestic and foreign Web sites based on those sites’ political or religious content. Chinese authorities and companies offering Internet content in China continued to monitor, filter, and remove political and religious content from the Internet.

Officials this past year also sought to strengthen their ability to monitor Internet users’ online expression. They introduced and then backed away from a requirement that all computers in China be sold with pre-installed censorship software found to filter political and religious content and monitor individual computer behavior. Officials also began forcing news Web sites to require new users to provide their real name and identification number in order to post a comment.

Officials continued this past year to describe campaigns to remove content as aimed at "vulgar" or pornographic content, but guidance issued by the government included political content as well.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Raise concerns with Chinese officials about their government punishing peaceful expression and preventing citizens from accessing information the government deems sensitive for political and religious reasons, under the guise of protecting national security or minors from pornography. Remind Chinese officials they are within their rights under international human rights standards to restrict freedom of expression to protect minors and national security, but that those standards also provide important limitations on such power.

Support U.S. Government programs that encourage Chinese journalists to visit the United States for professional development and training on a wide range of topics, from the practice of journalism at U.S. news media and legal protections for journalists in the United States, to the role of the media in American society, history, and culture, and how courts decide cases involving Internet restrictions and freedom of expression. The Chinese Government has a stated interest in increasing the professionalism of Chinese journalists, and officials have both likened their Internet restrictions to purported similar policies in the United States, while also saying that the news media in China should learn more from the United States.

Take steps to increase awareness by the American public and international community of the Chinese Government and Communist Party’s controls over their own media and their subsidy of Chinese media expansion overseas, and urge China to allow international news media freer access in China. The Chinese Government has committed 45 billion yuan (US$6.6 billion) to subsidize the overseas development of central government and Party-controlled media such as People’s Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV in order to expand the nation’s soft power.

Support U.S. Government programs that make available Chinese-language how-to guides on, for example, how to create a blog or how to access human rights Web sites. Support programs for both technologies and strategies that address problems implicit with China’s online censorship, as well as effective means of making such technologies and strategies widely accessible and known by Chinese citizens.

Support funding for Radio Free Asia and Voice of America news reporting and multi-dialect and multi-language broadcasting to China so that Chinese citizens have access to uncensored information about events in China and worldwide.

Solicit input from U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private companies on best practices and possible legislation in order to ensure American companies are promoting free expression in China, and also consult similar initiatives being undertaken by other countries, including the European Union. The Chinese Government’s recent effort to require all computer makers, including those based in the United States and other countries, to include filtering software that blocks political and religious content in all computers sold in China, is a reminder that Chinese officials continue to seek ways of co-opting technology companies in assisting in online censorship.

In official correspondence with Chinese counterparts, include statements calling for the release of political prisoners named in this report who have been punished for peaceful expression, including: Tan Zuoren (earthquake activist facing charges of inciting subversion), Huang Qi (earthquake activist facing charges of possessing state secrets), Liu Xiaobo (prominent intellectual and signer detained in connection with Charter 08), and other prisoners included in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

Workers in China still are not guaranteed either in law or in practice full worker rights in accordance with international standards, including, but not limited to, the right to organize into independent unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower-level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU. While the ACFTU has become more active, focusing on unionization of foreign-funded firms and organization of migrant workers, and pushing the expansion of collective contracts, the ACFTU continues to be dominated by the Communist Party with its overarching political concerns of social stability and economic growth.

Labor strife increased during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. With the economic crisis, Chinese workers have increased pressure on the Chinese Government to force employers to pay wages in a timely manner, improve working conditions, and comply with new labor legislation. Labor conflict occurred on a larger scale and was often more organized and more legalistic than in the previous reporting year. Workers were also increasingly strategic in their escalation of strike activity, often moving quickly from shopfloor disputes to public demonstrations to press for local government intervention in a workplace dispute.

Despite legislative activity in recent years that increased legal protections for workers, in the wake of the global economic crisis, the government is now focused on maintaining employment, often to the detriment of implementation and enforcement of the new labor codes. Local implementation measures for new labor laws that took effect in 2008 (i.e., the PRC Labor Contract Law, PRC Employment Promotion Law, and PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) are concentrated in the south and southeast. Many of these local measures are emanating from the judicial system rather than from local legislative or administrative units. Many of these judicial guiding opinions and measures are focused on addressing unemployment and investment flows.

With the large increase in labor disputes since 2008, the government has put increased emphasis on extrajudicial dispute resolution and flexibility in resolution procedures, especially encouragement of mediation at lower levels and cooperation between levels of government (e.g., cooperation between province and city, city and county, etc.) to limit the social and political impact of large-scale disputes.

Proactive local governments have passed regulations that offer special incentives to firms that mitigate layoffs. At the same time, they are also compensating workers in the wake of enterprise shutdowns and bankruptcies.

Informalization of the Chinese labor force accelerated this year as firms adopted measures to reduce the costs of formal employees. Widespread use of subcontracted workers and temporary workers continues. Informal workers often suffer substandard working conditions, nonpayment of wages, and exclusion from social insurance programs.

The central and local governments continued work on social insurance reform, especially national legislation to set broad goals and local legislation and policy that expand social insurance to rural migrants and increase the "portability" of social insurance benefits for mobile workers.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support projects promoting legal reform intended to ensure that labor laws and regulations reflect international norms. Prioritize projects that do not focus only on legislative drafting and regulatory development, but that ensure that implementation produces outcomes for workers that reflect real improvements, and measure progress in terms of compliance with international norms at the grassroots.

Support projects that enhance the professionalization of the dispute resolution process, including training of ACFTU officials, lawyers, human resource managers, arbitrators, and mediators. Prioritize programs that target the enhancement of the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the dispute resolution process.

Continue to support multi-year pilot projects that showcase the experience of collective bargaining in action for both Chinese workers and ACFTU officials. Where possible, prioritize programs that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective bargaining pilot projects even in factories that do not have an official union presence.

Support the production and distribution in various formats (print, online, video, etc.) of Chinese-language how-to materials on conducting elections of worker representatives and collective bargaining.

Support projects that prioritize the large-scale compilation and analysis of Chinese labor dispute litigation and arbitration cases, leading ultimately to the publication and dissemination of Chinese-language casebooks that may be used as a common reference resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers, employers, unions, and law schools in China.

Support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in defending the rights of workers.

Support projects that enhance the labor inspection process in China. Prioritize projects that involve multiple actors, including labor and legal aid organizations and ACFTU officials, as well as representatives of the media and government officials.

Extralegal detention remains a serious problem. Chinese citizens, including petitioners, peaceful protesters, and other individuals considered to be "undesirable" by authorities, continue to be arbitrarily detained in extralegal detention facilities, such as "black jails," "law education classes," and psychiatric hospitals for nonmedical reasons.

Government authorities and unofficial personnel persisted in unlawfully monitoring and subjecting to periodic illegal home confinement certain groups, including activists, dissidents, religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family members, particularly during sensitive periods, such as the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests.

The rights of criminal suspects and defendants continued to fall far short of the rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as rights provided for under China’s Criminal Procedure Law and Constitution.

While the revised Lawyers Law reportedly has led to some improved access to detained clients in certain jurisdictions, lawyers continued to confront obstacles in meeting with their clients, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Some suspects and defendants in sensitive cases were not able to have counsel of their own choosing; some were compelled to accept government-appointed defense counsel.

The Chinese Government released its first-ever human rights action plan in April, which contains encouraging policy commitments with respect to, among other things, fair trial rights and detainee rights.

There was a spate of unnatural deaths in detention centers during the first few months of 2009, which prompted the Supreme People’s Procuratorate to launch an investigation and review of management in China’s detention centers.

Although it is unlawful under Chinese law to obtain confessions and other evidence through torture, such evidence is nonetheless admissible in criminal trials. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced in August that it was planning to issue a regulation providing that confessions obtained through torture would no longer be admissible in death penalty cases.

In June, Beijing municipality announced that by the end of 2009 it would cease executing prisoners by gunshot, but instead would use lethal injections. The Supreme People’s Court indicated that eventually all executions nationwide will be carried out by lethal injection.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Raise with Chinese officials the issue of black jails and other secret detention facilities, and press the Chinese Government to adopt the recommendation of the UN Committee against Torture to investigate and disclose the existence of such facilities, as a first step toward abolishing such forms of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese Government to extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit China.

Call on the Chinese Government to provide the international community with a specific timetable for its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed in 1998.

Urge the Chinese Government to amend its Criminal Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced protections and rights for lawyers and detained suspects contained in the revised Lawyers Law, and ensure its effective implementation.

Ask the Chinese Government what measures it is taking to ensure that the laudable policy commitments with respect to fair trial rights and detainee rights contained in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan are translated into laws and regulations, and what steps it will take to ensure their successful implementation.

Urge Chinese officials to take all necessary measures to guarantee that evidence obtained through torture or other illegal means is inadmissible in all criminal trials.

The Chinese Government continued during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year to strictly control religious practice and repress religious activity outside of state-approved parameters. Local governments implemented measures to prevent "illegal" religious gatherings and to curb other "illegal" religious activities, in some cases destroying sites of worship and detaining or imprisoning religious believers.

In the past year, government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy escalated, resulting in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet. Buddhist communities outside the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism also faced continued government controls, and unregistered Buddhist temples remained subject to closure and demolition by government authorities. Catholic bishops in China’s unregistered church community re-mained in detention, in home confinement, under surveillance, in hiding, or in unknown whereabouts, while authorities strengthened rhetoric on the state-controlled Catholic church’s independence from the Holy See. The government maintained its longstanding ban against the Falun Gong spiritual movement and other religious and spiritual groups deemed to be cults, subjecting some members to detention, imprisonment, and other abuses. Repression of Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) worsened as authorities strengthened security campaigns targeting "religious extremism," and outside the XUAR, the government also maintained broad controls over the practice of Islam. The government continued to subject registered Protestant congregations to tight state control over their internal affairs and officials continued to target some unregistered Protestant churches for closure and to harass, detain, or imprison some church leaders and members. Authorities maintained restrictions over the activities of registered Taoist priests, and unregistered Taoist priests were subject to penalties for failing to submit to state control. Other religious and spiritual communities remained without legal recognition to practice their faith.

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, the government also continued to use legal measures to restrain, rather than protect, the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens. Children faced continued restrictions on their right to freedom of religion, and parents and guardians faced restrictions on their right to impart a religious education to their children. The Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts. The government permitted, and in some cases, sponsored, the social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious communities, but in the past year, authorities also took steps to block some social welfare activities by unregistered religious groups.

The Chinese Government and Communist Party in the past year continued to affirm basic policies of control over religious practice. Authorities continued to soften some rhetoric toward religion by articulating a "positive role" for religious communities in China, but used this sentiment to bolster support for state economic and social goals. At the same time, officials and central government directives continued to warn against foreign groups "using religion" to "interfere" in China’s affairs and "sabotage" the country.

The Chinese Government’s legal and policy framework for religion violates the protections for freedom of religion set forth in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international human rights instruments. Although the PRC Constitution guarantees that all citizens enjoy "freedom of religious belief," it limits citizens’ ability to exercise their beliefs by protecting only "normal religious activities," a vaguely defined term in both law and practice that has been used as a means to suppress forms of religious activity protected under international human rights law. Although the national Regulation on Religious Affairs and local government regulations provide a measure of protection for some religious activities, such protection is limited in scope and applies only to state-sanctioned religious communities.

Chinese officials harassed, detained, and in some cases, physically abused attorneys who defended practitioners of the banned spiritual movement called Falun Gong and members of unregistered Protestant churches. The Commission observed cases of procedural irregularities and violations in criminal cases involving religious practitioners.

The Communist Party’s 6–10 Office, an extralegal security force created to enforce the ban against Falun Gong, also actively targeted other banned groups deemed by the government to be "cult organizations," including groups of Protestant and Buddhist origin. The Commission documented various efforts by the 6–10 Office to suppress these groups, including propaganda campaigns, surveillance and intelligence operations, as well as detentions and imprisonment.

Despite creating space for some citizens to practice their religion within government-approved parameters, where some, but not all, Chinese citizens are allowed to do so, and where members of China’s five government-sanctioned religious communities remain subject to tight controls over their affairs, the Chinese Government has failed in its obligation to protect Chinese citizens’ right to freedom of religion.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call on the Chinese Government to remove its policy framework of recognizing only select religious communities for limited government protections and to guarantee to all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such prisoners include Jia Zhiguo (unregistered Catholic bishop whom authorities detained in March 2009 in connection with his religious activities independent of the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association), Phurbu Tsering (Tibetan Buddhist teacher and head of a Tibetan Buddhist nunnery whom authorities brought to trial in April 2009 on a weapons charge his lawyers said involves coerced confession and insufficient evidence), Shi Weihan (bookstore owner and Protestant house church leader sentenced in 2009 to three years in prison for illegal operation of a business after authorities accused him of illegally printing and distributing Bibles), Xu Na (detained for possessing documents and computer disks containing Falun Gong materials and sentenced in 2008 to three years in prison for "using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law"), Yusufjan and Memetjan (university students who are members of a Muslim religious group and were detained in May when members of the group met on a university campus), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

Support non-governmental organizations that collect information on conditions for religious freedom in China and that inform Chinese citizens of methods to defend their right to freedom of religion against Chinese Government abuses.

Support organizations that can provide technical assistance to the Chinese Government in drafting legal provisions that protect, rather than restrain, freedom of religion for all Chinese citizens.

The Chinese Government continued during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year to implement policies that undermine ethnic minority citizens’ rights. The government repressed expressions of ethnic identity perceived to challenge government authority, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. While the Chinese Government maintained some protections in law and practice for citizens it designates as ethnic minorities, shortcomings in the substance and implementation of Chinese policy continued to prevent ethnic minorities from exercising their rights in line with domestic law and international human rights standards. Ethnic minorities did not enjoy "the right to administer their internal affairs," as provided for under the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. [See Xinjiang—Findings, and Tibet—Findings in this section for additional information.]

In the aftermath of demonstrations in 2008 and 2009 by Tibetans and Uyghurs that highlighted systemic problems in state policies toward ethnic minorities and ethnic issues, the central government continued to attribute outstanding tensions to its citizens while asserting the effectiveness of government policies and amplifying publicity in their support.

In the past year, the government continued to implement development policies that prioritize state economic goals over protecting ethnic minorities’ rights and guaranteeing ethnic minority participation in decisionmaking processes. It also continued in the past year to impose controls over how individuals and communities define their ethnicity, interpret their history, and preserve their culture and language.

Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region continued to implement measures that undermine Mongol traditions and livelihoods and punish people who defend Mongols’ rights or who express dissent.

The Chinese Government pledged to increase protection for the rights of ethnic minorities in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP). While the HRAP outlines measures to support legislation, governance, education, personnel training and employment, language use, and cultural and economic development among ethnic minorities, domestic and overseas observers have questioned the likely impact of the HRAP amid the Chinese Government’s poor human rights record, including in the area of ethnic minorities’ rights.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Fund rule of law programs and exchanges that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for governance that protect ethnic minorities’ rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their affairs.

Support non-governmental organizations’ efforts to continue or develop programs that address ethnic minority issues within China, including training programs that build capacity for sustainable development among ethnic minorities, programs to protect ethnic minority languages and cultural heritage, and programs that research rights abuses in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Call on the Chinese Government to release people confined, detained, or imprisoned for advocating for the rights of ethnic minority citizens, including Mongol rights advocate Hada (serving a 15-year sentence after pursuing activities to promote Mongols’ rights and democracy) and other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

Support organizations that can monitor the Chinese Government’s compliance with stated commitments to protect ethnic minorities’ rights, including the commitments articulated in the government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan. Provide support for organizations that can provide assistance in implementing programs in a manner that draws on participation from communities involved and ensures the protection of their rights.

The Commission found increasing evidence, including from official sources, that Chinese authorities continue to employ compulsory abortion and sterilization as an official policy instrument on a large scale in over a third of China’s provincial-level jurisdictions. In some areas, authorities specifically targeted migrant workers for forced abortions.

In some areas, government campaigns to force women with "out-of-plan" pregnancies to undergo abortion or sterilization procedures reportedly included government payments to informants. Some local governments also linked job promotion with an officials’ ability to meet or exceed population planning targets. Officials received points on their performance evaluations for overseeing abortions of "out-of-plan" pregnancies.

The demographic impact of China’s population planning policies continues to manifest, most notably in the country’s highly skewed sex ratio. A study published in the British Medical Journal estimates that in 2005, there was an excess of 32 million males under the age of 20 in China. The study primarily attributes this "imminent generation of excess males" to the practice of sex-selective abortion.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge Chinese officials to cease coercive measures, including forced abortion and sterilization, to enforce birth control quotas. Urge the Chinese Government to dismantle coercive population controls, while supporting programs that inform Chinese officials of the importance of respecting citizens’ diverse beliefs.

Call on Chinese officials to permit greater public discussion and debate concerning population planning policies and to demonstrate greater responsiveness to public concerns. Impress upon China’s leaders the importance of promoting legal aid and training programs that help citizens pursue compensation and other remedies against the state for injury suffered as a result of official abuse related to China’s population planning policies. Provisions in the PRC Law on State Compensation provide for such remedies for citizens subject to abuse and personal injury by administrative officials, including population planning officials. Support the development of programs and international cooperation in this area.

The Chinese Government continued to enforce the household registration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s. This system limits the right of Chinese citizens to choose their permanent place of residence. Regulations and policies that condition legal rights and access to social services on residency status have resulted in discrimination against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban areas for work.

Authorities continued to relax certain hukou restrictions for Chinese citizens who met specific requirements. National-, provincial-, and municipal-level hukou measures enacted this past year aimed to promote employment amid the current economic downturn, but excluded most migrant workers who did not have a college education or special skills.

The government continued to impose certain restrictions on Chinese citizens’ right to travel that violated international human rights standards. Authorities placed a number of Chinese activists under home confinement and surveillance. Some Chinese citizens were prevented from leaving mainland China, while other Chinese individuals were prevented from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

In international discussions on internal migration, highlight the role played by China’s household registration system.

Support programs and organizations that defend migrant workers’ rights and encourage policy debates on household registration system reforms.

Call on the governments of the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions to cease the practice of denying entry to Chinese democracy activists or dissidents from overseas.

The Chinese Government’s implementation of some domestic laws and policies related to women’s rights continued to fall short of international standards. Problems such as lack of transparency and control over information flows have impeded some of the government’s efforts to fulfill these commitments.

Gender inequalities continue to be reflected in women’s low levels (relative to men) of political participation, unequal access to education, limited access to healthcare, and relatively weaker protection of property and inheritance rights.

Gender-based discrimination in China in areas such as wages, recruitment, retirement age, and sexual harassment remains, but the government has made efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination and promote women’s employment.

The differences in mandatory retirement ages for men and women in China continue to impede the career advancement of some women, especially those in senior positions and women with higher educational levels. The lower compulsory retirement age for women also contributes to hiring discrimination. Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and Party officials are 60 and 55, respectively, while retirement ages for male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, respectively.

Hainan province became the first province to require that courts at all levels establish a collegial panel of judges dedicated to the protection of women’s rights.

Recommendation

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support programs in China that remove barriers to educational opportunities for girls, especially in rural areas; that raise awareness among judicial and law enforcement personnel regarding domestic violence, sexual harassment, and sexual violence; and that expand women’s leadership training through U.S.-China exchanges and international conferences.

The legal definition of trafficking under Chinese law does not conform to international standards. Under Article 240 of the PRC Criminal Law, the trafficking of persons is defined as "abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a women or child, for the purpose of selling the victim." This definition is narrower in scope than the definition provided in Article 3 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which China has not yet signed. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), China’s definition "does not prohibit non-physical forms of coercion, fraud, debt bondage, involuntary servitude, forced labor, or offenses committed against male victims" and "does not automatically regard minors over the age of 14 who are subjected to the commercial sex trade as victims."

China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for human trafficking and abductions. The majority of trafficking cases are domestic and involve trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage.

Although the majority of trafficking cases take place within China’s borders, human traffickers—also called snakeheads— continue to traffic Chinese women and children from China to locations overseas, including to Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North America.

Women and girls from foreign countries, including North Korea, Vietnam, and Burma, continue to be trafficked into China, and forced into marriages, employment, and sexual exploitation.

The Chinese Government made some efforts to eliminate trafficking and comply with trafficking-related international human rights standards. Authorities during the past year continued to investigate, prosecute, and prevent trafficking crimes, especially domestic trafficking cases, and those involving the abduction of women for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation. Officials also continued to take steps to increase international cooperation and improve China’s anti-trafficking legal framework.

The State Council issued the National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012) (NPA) in December 2007. In March 2009, 29 ministries, central government offices, and Party organizations jointly issued implementation regulations for the NPA. The NPA and several similar provincial-level implementation plans and opinions issued in 2008 and 2009 focus mainly on women and children.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge the Chinese Government to sign and ratify the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, to revise the government’s definition of trafficking, to create a comprehensive anti-trafficking law to align with international standards, and to abide by its international obligations with regard to North Korean refugees who become trafficking victims.

Support legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of both foreign and Chinese trafficking victims.

Call on the Chinese Government to provide more services for trafficking victims, particularly for Chinese citizens trafficked for labor exploitation and trafficked abroad.

Support international and cross-border mechanisms that can help enhance the Chinese Government’s collaboration with other countries, regions, and international organizations on victim identification, repatriation, and criminal prosecution.

Central and local authorities sustained efforts to locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees hiding in China. Trafficking of North Korean women along the Chinese border into forced marriages and the sex industry continued in the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. The Chinese Government refuses to provide North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to repatriation.

Chinese local authorities near the border with North Korea continued to deny access to education and other public goods for the children of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. Chinese Government officials contravened guarantees under the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5) by refusing to register the children of these couples to their father’s hukou (household registration) without proof of the mother’s status.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Establish a task force to examine and support the efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to gain unfettered access to North Korean refugees in China, and to recommend a strategy for creating incentives for China to honor its obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol by desisting from the forced repatriation of North Korean refugees, and terminating the policy of automatically classifying all undocumented North Korean border crossers as "illegal economic migrants."

Urge Chinese officials to ensure that household registration, and the public goods such as access to education that registration provides, are promptly granted to children born to North Korean women in cohabitation with Chinese citizens, in accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5).

The Chinese Government launched a 10-year medical reform plan, which includes promises for reform in the areas of medical insurance, pharmaceuticals, public health services, and public hospitals.

Discrimination and social stigma against people living with medical conditions such as infectious disease, physical disability, and mental illness remain commonplace.

Chinese non-governmental organizations and individual advocates continue to play an important role in raising awareness about medical conditions and the rights of those living with them; however, Chinese authorities continue to suppress health-related activism.

Individuals with varying medical conditions continued to bring employment discrimination lawsuits under antidiscrimination provisions in the PRC Employment Promotion Law that took effect in 2008.

Due to insufficient public health services in rural areas and a lack of government transparency and public awareness regarding disease outbreaks, China’s rural population has proved to be particularly vulnerable to the spread of hand-foot-mouth disease, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and other infectious diseases this year.

The Chinese Government’s efforts to prevent and control the spread of influenza A(H1N1)—commonly referred to as "swine flu"—have prompted discussion about changes in its handling of disease outbreaks.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call on the Chinese Government to ease repression of health-related activism by individuals and non-governmental organizations and provide more support to U.S. organizations that address public health issues in China.

Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on effective implementation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law and related regulations that prohibit discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B virus, and other illnesses in hiring and in the workplace.

Urge the Chinese central government to work with local governments to ensure effective implementation of the healthcare reform plan. Local government cooperation is critical in achieving the projected goal of healthcare access for the entire population by the year 2020.

In 2007, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s top emitter of carbon dioxide. While President Hu Jintao has stated that China will "endeavor to cut carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by a notable margin by 2020 from the 2005 level," the Chinese Government has not agreed to carbon emission caps. A top Chinese climate change policy-maker reportedly recently indicated that China’s carbon emissions may continue to rise until 2050. At the same time, the Chinese Government has initiated a wide range of measures, especially to improve energy efficiency and lower energy intensity, the amount of energy expended per unit of gross domestic product. In addition, the Chinese Government actively has sought investment from developed countries for projects related to the Clean Development Mechanism that can provide "carbon credits" to developed countries that have agreed to emission reduction targets in international agreements.

Weaknesses in China’s environment-related implementation and enforcement capacity will pose significant challenges to efforts to improve energy efficiency and transform its economy into a "low-carbon economy." In addition, China’s capacity reliably to measure, report, and verify its greenhouse gas mitigation actions remains uncertain.

Limitations on citizen access to information, including pollution and related data, hinder efforts to raise environmental awareness, promote public participation, and develop incentives for compliance. Limits on access to remedies for environmental harms, selective enforcement, limited public participation in decisionmaking processes, and selective suppression of citizen demands for a cleaner environment also weaken compliance efforts and contribute to citizen dissatisfaction. Party and government officials have continued to implement policies restricting the operations of many NGOs.

The priority attached to economic development has led to compliance challenges that hinder the realization of some of the government’s environmental protection goals. Lack of accountability, corruption, local governmental protectionism, and malfeasance impede implementation and enforcement.

Without adequate procedural protections, implementation of environmental and climate change mitigation policy may place the rights of vulnerable groups, including the rural poor and ethnic minorities, especially nomadic herders, at risk. Hydroelectric dam construction, for example, has been accompanied by lack of attention to environmental impact assessment processes mandated by law, and by reports of the infringement upon the fundamental rights of local populations. Planned rapid acceleration of the pace of development of nuclear and hydroelectric projects heightens these concerns going forward. China’s planned efforts to increase carbon sequestration in grassland areas shines an additional spotlight on the need to guarantee the rights of nomadic herders who inhabit those areas.

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, official sources reported environmental protection successes, including the continued decline of sulfur dioxide emissions and chemical oxygen demand. Regulatory and institutional developments included issue of the Planned Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation, the introduction of environmental pollution liability insurance on a trial basis, the establishment of "environmental courts" in a few cities on a trial basis, the establishment of environmental "police" (environmental protection sub-bureaus within the public security bureaus) on a trial basis, and some limited progress toward the development of a "public interest litigation" system. The announcement of a draft PRC Tort Liability Law may in the future improve China’s framework for environment-related compensation suits.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support U.S. Government cooperation with China and other educational programs geared toward raising awareness among Chinese officials of how to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and environmental protection policies effectively without at the same time transgressing on fundamental rights.

Call upon the Chinese Government to cease punishing citizens, such as Wu Lihong and Sun Xiaodi, for their grassroots environmental activism, or for their utilizing official and institutionalized channels to voice their environmental grievances or to protect their rights.

Support U.S. Government engagement with relevant ministries in developing China’s capacity to reliably measure, report, publicize, and verify emission reduction strategies and techniques. Encourage Chinese officials to make government and expert research reports regarding climate change and its impacts in China public and easily available.

Invite domestic environmental civil society organizations and urge the Chinese Government to invite Chinese environmental civil society organizations as participants or observers in bilateral and multilateral climate change and environmental protection projects and dialogues. Invite Chinese local-level leaders, including those from counties, townships and villages, to the United States to observe U.S. public policy practices and approaches to problem solving. Engage local Chinese officials in their efforts to reconcile development and environmental protection goals. Call upon U.S. cities with sister-city relationships in China to incorporate environmental rights awareness, environmental protection, and climate change components into their programs. When making arrangements for travel to China, request meetings with officials from central and local levels of the Chinese Government to discuss environmental governance and best practices.

Establish a Working Group on Climate Change Policy Implementation, the Rule of Law, and Human Rights in accordance with Section II(B) of the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and Environment between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (the MOU) signed during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2009. (Section II(B) of the MOU states that, "[t]he Participants may establish working groups or task forces involving relevant ministries as necessary to support the objectives of the Climate Change Policy Dialogue and Cooperation.")

The Chinese Government continued to control civil society in China in ways that contravene international standards. Chinese citizens who sought to establish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and organize around issues deemed by officials to be sensitive faced obstacles, and officials in some cases intimidated, harassed, and punished NGOs and citizen activists.

NGOs continue to face challenges fulfilling registration requirements. NGOs that do not fulfill these requirements are left vulnerable to official pressure and bereft of legal protection.

The number of NGOs participating in legal and policy-making activities in areas that are not politically sensitive continues to increase gradually. At the same time, NGOs and individuals who work on politically sensitive issues continue to face challenges.

In 2009, at least one locality (Beijing) reportedly passed measures stipulating that NGOs based in the area will no longer need to obtain a sponsor organization when applying for government registration. In place of the sponsorship requirement, 10 city-level government-organized NGOs will manage Beijing-based NGOs legally registered with and approved by the Beijing city government.

In July, Beijing officials fined and then shut down Open Constitution Initiative (OCI)—a Beijing-based academic research and legal assistance organization, and detained two of its employees, including the center’s cofounder and legal representative, Xu Zhiyong. OCI was well known for taking on cutting-edge legal issues and cases, such as its investigation into the cause of the Tibetan protests and rioting in March 2008. Also in July, officials reportedly targeted Beijing Yirenping Center, an NGO that works to raise awareness about public health risks and eliminate discrimination against those who carry certain diseases.

Volunteer activities related to the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake reportedly have dissipated, and government officials have accused some volunteers of "stirring up protests" by victims’ families.

Several recent natural disasters, including the snowstorm in southern China in early 2008 and the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, contributed to an unprecedented spike in charitable giving. The government’s limited capacity to handle and manage these donations, particularly during the months after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, exposed flaws in China’s charity system and resulted in public demands for charity reform.

In December 2008 and February 2009, the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued circulars detailing new qualifications for legally registered NGOs to obtain tax-exempt status. Under the new guidelines, provincial-level governments and the central government will be in charge of verifying and approving the tax-exempt status of government-registered NGOs.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Strengthen U.S. Government support of public-private partnerships involving governments, businesses, media, and communities that will build social networks for NGOs and individuals and cultivate social entrepreneurship in China.

Develop a comprehensive strategy consistent with U.S. foreign assistance policy to bolster the U.S. Agency for International Development’s activities in China.

Take measures to facilitate the participation of Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant international conferences and forums, and support training opportunities in the United States to build their leadership capacity in non-profit management, public policy advocacy, strategic planning, and media relations.

The Communist Party continues to exercise control over political affairs, government, and society through networks of Party committees, which exist at all levels in government, legislative, judicial, and security organs; major social groups (including unions); enterprises; and the People’s Liberation Army.

Chinese leaders made repeated public statements emphasizing the leading role of the Party, the need to adhere to China’s unique style of "socialist democracy," and the impossibility of implementing "Western-style" democracy with a separation of powers and competing political parties. Isolated experiments with intra-party democracy are taking place around the country with high-level Communist Party support.

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, the Party created additional organizations to "maintain social stability." The Party expanded in 2009 the number of "stability maintenance offices" and "stability maintenance work leading groups" across the country at the central, provincial, municipal, county, township, and neighborhood levels, and even in some enterprises.

Village elections measures continued to expand, and Chinese legislators included revising the PRC Organic Law on Villagers’ Committees in the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s five-year legislative agenda. Problems continue to plague village elections, and corruption at the village level remains a concern.

In 2009, some Chinese Government agencies and other state institutions continued efforts to implement the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulation). Open government information regulations and high-level efforts to increase accountability and transparency at the local level, in principle, have the potential to improve government openness, but implementation has been problematic.

Public hearings and other processes appear to offer some opportunities for public engagement. Questions remain regarding the depth and breadth of participation, and the process of compiling, assessing, and incorporating public input is still not transparent.

Citizens and social groups were proactive in expressing demands for democratic reforms and human rights protections to be undertaken by the Party and Chinese Government, but these requests were repeatedly met with official reprisal, including harassment, detention, and in some cases, prison sentences.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in people’s congress and village committee elections, including expansion of domestic election monitoring systems.

Support projects that seek to work with local governments in their efforts to improve efficiency, transparency, and accountability, especially efforts to expand and improve China’s open government information initiatives.

Support projects that assist local governments, academics, and the non-profit sector in expanding the use of public hearings and other channels for citizens to incorporate their input in the policymaking process.

Call on the Chinese Government to release people detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to call for political reform within China, including Liu Xiaobo (signer of Charter 08 who was formally arrested on June 23, 2009, on the charge of "inciting subversion of state power") and other people mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

The Chinese Government’s uneven implementation of the commitments it has made pursuant to its obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) continues to prompt serious concern. The WTO, in a report dated August 12, 2009, found that certain Chinese regulations that restrict foreign companies and Chinese-foreign joint ventures from importing or distributing products such as books, DVDs, and music, as well as from importing films for theatrical release, violate China’s international trade obligations. In another case, the WTO ruled in July 2008 that China’s tariffs on auto parts imports violated WTO rules. On August 28, China announced that it will scrap the higher tariffs starting September 1, 2009. Beyond the context of China’s WTO commitments, additional concerns arose this year in areas such as food and product safety, telecommunications regulation, intellectual property, and economic crime. Developments in these areas overshadowed limited improvements in areas such as contract en-forcement, insurance, and antimonopoly.

Numerous cases of Americans suffering broken commercial contracts in China, incurring significant financial losses, have been brought to the Commission’s attention. At the same time, however, the Commission also noted indications of some limited improvement in the environment for judicial enforcement of commercial contracts, at least in large urban areas of China. In addition, during the Commission’s 2009 reporting period, contract enforcement received attention from central judicial authorities in the form of a new Interpretation Related to Questions Arising in Connection With Implementation of the PRC Contract Law (Interpretation), issued by the Supreme People’s Court. The Interpretation pushes lower courts to enforce oral contracts, and also is aimed at preventing local courts from dismissing form contracts out of hand. In a further development related to contract enforcement, on March 30, 2009, the Supreme People’s Court also made available to the public a nationwide database of judgment debtors. The online, searchable database lists all defendants against whom people’s courts have issued orders to pay outstanding money damages or other compensation for nonperformance of specific acts. The database creates incentives for debtors to comply with executable judgments issued by Chinese courts and also may reduce the costs that companies incur when assessing potential business partners and acquisition targets. The information available in the database also may be used by companies doing due diligence evaluations.

Recent detentions of business executives of an Australian mining company have drawn an international spotlight on economic crimes and the criminalization of commercial disputes in China. The range of economic crime in China is broad, and business disputes in China frequently become subject to criminal law enforcement.

Product quality and food safety emergencies continued to prompt changes in Chinese law. The new PRC Food Safety Law, enacted by the National People’s Congress on February 28, 2009, and effective as of June 1, 2009, aims to consolidate the regulatory and legislative landscape governing food safety and product quality. The impact of the law as yet is unclear as it will depend not only on the effectiveness of implementation and enforcement, but also on the thoroughness with which regulatory authorities specify standards, timeline, budgets, and dispute resolution procedures, and on China’s ability—as yet unproven—to develop local revenue sources and local expertise to hire and train qualified inspectors and regulators in sufficient numbers with requisite credentials.

Notwithstanding international criticism of China’s control of the Internet (including the controversy surrounding the Chinese Government’s proposed mandatory preinstallation of Green Dam Internet filtering software on personal computers sold in China [See Section II—Freedom of Expression]), the Chinese Government also used regulation of the telecommunications industry to control the transmission and dissemination of online content that the government and Party deem to be potentially detrimental to themselves, or to national unity, ter-ritorial integrity, social order, or stability. This was illustrated in the past year via the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s issue of Measures for the Administration of Permission To Provide Telecommunications Services, which took effect on April 10, 2009.

In December 2008, the National People’s Congress passed amendments to the PRC Patent Law (Amendments) that took effect on October 1, 2009, and are intended to encourage domestic innovation. The Amendments contain provisions for compulsory licensing (i.e., requiring patent holders to license patents to others) that foreign patent experts have found troubling. Under the Amendments, compulsory licensing decisions turn on vague standards such as "sufficient" use of patents and "proper justification" for patent holders’ decisions, and the amendments expand the potential for broad official discretion that could undermine intellectual property protections.

The PRC Insurance Law was revised in February 2009 and took effect October 1, 2009. If it is effectively enforced, the revised law would provide for stricter oversight of insurers by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and for a number of protections for policyholders. The revised law also includes provisions intended to contribute to the stability of the macro-economy. The revisions require strict separation between the insurance sector and other finance-related sectors, namely banking, securities, and trusts. In addition, insurers may not concurrently engage in the personal insurance business and the property insurance business. The law also introduces qualification requirements for directors, supervisors, senior management, and actuarial personnel of insurance companies. The revised law also requires insurance companies to establish internal compliance and reporting systems.

Enforcement of the PRC Antimonopoly Law (AML) has lagged as the three enforcement authorities, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), have devoted efforts to developing AML implementing regulations. This delay has led some parties alleging anticompetitive behavior to bring private cases directly to courts rather than to the administrative enforcement authorities. As enforcement authorities issue implementing guidelines, however, the number of complaints filed with administrative enforcement authorities is expected to rise. Even though courts offer a forum for grievances at the present time, they do not necessarily possess the requisite investigatory and regulatory capacity to dispose of the cases that already have been brought. For this reason, while private actions offer a channel for grievances now, experts on Chinese antimonopoly law do not expect the cases that already have been accepted by the courts to move quickly or to produce landmark judicial decisions.

MOFCOM is the enforcement authority responsible for the premerger review process under the AML. MOFCOM’s solicitation of third party views from government entities, customers, trade groups, and competitors appears to have become an integral part of MOFCOM’s premerger review process, a move ostensibly intended, at least in part, to address concern about the possibility of decisions made based on non-objective factors. MOFCOM’s review and much publicized denial of the proposed Coca-Cola/Huiyuan merger in the past year provides one illus-tration of MOFCOM premerger review processes.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support joint U.S.-China training programs and legal exchanges aimed at addressing problems anticipated in China’s implementation of compulsory licensing provisions in its newly amended Patent Law. Encourage bilateral discussions between U.S. and Chinese officials to address and resolve market access, legal, and other policy concerns arising from the amended Patent Law. Involve experts in fields where the threat to intellectual property rights posed by the new amendments is particularly acute (e.g., biotechnology).

Develop and support U.S.-China legal cooperation programs aimed at increasing incentives for Chinese farmers and food production companies to control quality at the grassroots. That is, support and develop U.S.-China legal cooperation programs aimed at improving individuals’ access to China’s existing system of private civil litigation providing improved access to counsel, legal aid, and access to channels for injured parties to take legal action against offending parties.

Call upon the Chinese Government to improve China’s systems for obtaining damages so that food product companies found to be in violation of food safety laws face a real threat of bankruptcy.

Encourage the Chinese Government to establish programs that help build the institutional foundations for producers in China to acquire reputations for safety and quality, which in turn would reinforce market-driven incentives to maintain higher quality in production and improved supply-chain management over the longrun.

Conditions for China’s human rights lawyers worsened this year. Public security officials and those working under their direction increasingly used abductions, physical violence, or threats of physical violence to harass and intimidate human rights lawyers. Authorities revoked the licenses of at least 21 human rights lawyers. The academic research and legal assistance organization Open Constitution Initiative (OCI), or Gongmeng, was shut down for alleged tax problems. Authorities detained law professor and cofounder of OCI, Xu Zhiyong, for several weeks for alleged tax evasion, before releasing him on bail.

Social stability was a major concern during this reporting year, and "mass incidents" were reportedly on the rise. Chinese authorities sought to strengthen institutions and measures to handle mass incidents.

In explaining the decline in Administrative Litigation Law cases during the first half of 2009 compared with the same time period in 2008, the Supreme People’s Court acknowledged that citizens lack confidence in the courts to fairly resolve disputes involving government officials.

The xinfang ("letters and visits") system is an alternative to courts by which citizens can seek redress for grievances by submitting petitions to relevant authorities. However, the system’s lack of accountability at the local level caused many petitioners not to obtain relief for their grievances, and large numbers have been harassed, abused, put in illegal black jails, locked up in psychiatric hospitals, or sent to reeducation through labor. The central government adopted measures that sought to improve the handling of "letters and visits," and to discourage citizens with grievances from traveling to Beijing to obtain redress through central-level institutions.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

In meetings and official correspondence with Chinese officials, express concern about the revocation of at least 21 human rights attorneys’ licenses this year, and the closure of the academic research and legal assistance organization Open Constitution Initiative (OCI). Request that the lawyers’ licenses be reinstated and that OCI be permitted to continue its work.

Support non-governmental organizations and other entities that partner with China’s human rights lawyers and non-profit legal organizations. Provide additional support to bring more Chinese human rights lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States on the International Visitors Leadership Program and other similar programs.

Support non-governmental organizations that address human rights issues confronting petitioners in China, and which also aim to build capacity among petitioners to protect their lawful rights. Urge the Chinese Government to protect the rights of petitioners to lawfully air their grievances.

Express concern to Chinese authorities over treatment of petitioners and encourage Chinese leaders to reexamine the incentive structures at the local level that lead to the forced return of petitioners from higher administrative levels and the stifling of citizen expressions of legitimate grievances.

Communicate concerns about possible official political abuse of psychiatry and politically motivated commitment of petitioners to psychiatric facilities in China to the American Psychiatric Association, the Geneva Initiative on Psychiatry, the World Medical Association, and the World Psychiatric Association (WPA). Concerns should be raised at the regional WPA meeting in Beijing in September 2010.

Call for the release of lawyers, activists, and others who are incarcerated, subject to unlawful home confinement, or who have disappeared for their activities to defend and promote the rights of Chinese citizens, including Hu Jia, Gao Zhisheng, and Zheng Enchong, as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) deteriorated during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. A demonstration held by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5, 2009, was forcefully suppressed by police, and outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day, drew an international spotlight to longstanding tensions in the XUAR and Uyghurs’ grievances toward government policies that have undermined the protection of their rights. The ensuing harsh security crackdown in the XUAR— including reports of arbitrary detention targeting Uyghurs and steps to punish acts of peaceful protest—further underscored longstanding government repression in the region and the use of anti-crime and anti-terrorism campaigns to quell dissent. Prior to the July 5 demonstration, however, human rights conditions in the region had already declined throughout the year, maintaining a trend in worsening conditions documented by the Commission in its 2008 Annual Report.

Authorities continued in late 2008 and in 2009 to tighten repressive security controls and use them to stifle dissent and independent expressions of ethnic and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs. The Chinese Government also maintained, and in some cases bolstered, policies in areas such as language use, labor, and migration that continued to disadvantage Uyghurs and other non-Han populations in the XUAR and engineer broad cultural, economic, and demographic shifts in the region.

Acts of deadly violence took place during the week of July 5, a time during which both Uyghurs and Han Chinese were reported to commit violent assaults on each other. However efforts to prosecute people appear to have extended beyond acts of violence and include political motivations in some cases, targeting dissent by Uyghurs. In the aftermath of the July 5 demonstration and strife in the region, the Chinese Government reiterated pledges to place "stability above all else" and called for "striking hard" against people involved in "instigating" and "or-ganizing" events on July 5. Against the backdrop of a criminal law system in which authorities have used criminal charges to cast free expression as a crime, it appears that some acts of peaceful protest or expression may be subject to formal criminal prosecution. While security measures are reported to remain tight in the region, a number of details and the full implications of the government response to events on July 5 remain unknown, especially in light of government controls over the free flow of information on the events.

The Commission also observed problems in the past year including state-sanctioned discriminatory job recruitment practices, abusive practices in state-led labor transfer and work-study programs, procedural violations in the criminal justice system and unique barriers to access to justice for non-Han ethnic groups, the intensification of educational policies that marginalize the use of Uyghur and other languages besides Mandarin Chinese, and the maintenance of harsh policies toward Uyghur refugees and other individuals returned to China under the sway of China’s influence in other countries. In addition, in the past year, the government began to destroy a cornerstone of the Uyghurs’ cultural heritage and undermined their property rights through a project implemented in the city of Kashgar to demolish most buildings in a historic area and resettle residents.

The government sharpened rhetoric throughout the year against U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer and "Western hostile forces" using the "cover" of human rights to "sabotage" the XUAR’s stability, calling into question the government’s willingness to engage with the international community in upholding its obligations to protect the rights of XUAR residents. Government rhetoric against Rebiya Kadeer heightened in July as authorities claimed that Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress, which she leads, instigated strife on July 5. Authorities did not produce evidence that proved their accusations, and Rebiya Kadeer has rejected the charges against her.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human rights.

Raise concern about human rights conditions in the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of antiterrorism and security campaigns to suppress human rights. Stress that protecting the rights of XUAR residents is a crucial step for securing true stability in the region. Call on the Chinese Government to demonstrate a commitment toward dialogue on human rights issues by ending rhetoric against "Western infiltration" and slander against peaceful Uyghur rights advocates.

Call for the release of Uyghurs imprisoned for advocating for their rights or for their personal connection to rights advocates, including: Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison after writing a short story); Miradil (Mir’adil) Yasin and Mutellip Te´yip (two young men detained in December 2008 after distributing leaflets on the Xinjiang University campus calling on students to organize a public demonstration); Ekberjan Jamal (sentenced in 2008 to 10 years in prison for "splittism" and revealing state secrets, after he used his cell phone to make audio recordings of public demonstrations and sent the recordings to friends overseas); and Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, for alleged economic and "secessionist" crimes), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

Especially in light of events of July 5, stress to Chinese officials the importance of: abiding by the guarantees for freedoms of speech, assembly, and association contained in the PRC Constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, distinguishing between acts of peaceful protest and acts of violence, and not treating peaceful protest as a crime; providing details about each person detained or charged with a crime, including each person’s name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office (i.e., procuratorate) and court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned; ensuring that security officials fulfill their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives or workplaces where detainees are being held; ensuring criminal suspects are able to hire a lawyer and exercise their right to employ legal defense in accordance with Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and are able to employ legal defense of their own choosing; allowing access by diplomats and other international observers to the trials of people charged with crimes connected to events on July 5; and allowing international observers and journalists full and unfettered access to all areas of the XUAR.

Support non-governmental organizations that address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue to gather information on conditions in the region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to preserve their rights and protect their culture, language, and heritage. Support the efforts of media outlets that broadcast news to the XUAR and gather news from the region, such as Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the Voice of America (VOA), to expand their capacity to report on the region and to provide uncensored information to XUAR residents.

Support legal programs in the XUAR to promote rule of law and train legal personnel, including those able to meet the legal needs of XUAR residents who speak languages other than Mandarin Chinese. Urge scholarship programs that operate in China, including those in law-related subjects, to increase outreach to students from the XUAR.

Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees with Chinese officials and with officials from international refugee agencies and from transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees. Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the refugee and citizenship designations of other countries. Call on transit and destination countries to abide by requirements in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and Convention against Torture on refoulement.

Call on Chinese Government officials to abide by the government’s domestic and international commitments to protect cultural heritage within its borders, including by protecting the right of Uyghurs to preserve their cultural heritage and property. Provide support for organizations that can directly assist Uyghurs in the documentation and preservation of their cultural heritage.

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, the Chinese Government and Communist Party strengthened the policies and measures that frustrated Tibetans prior to the wave of Tibetan protests that started in March 2008. Tibetans continued to express their rejection of Chinese policies by means that included staging political protests. As a result of Chinese Government and Party policy and implementation, and official campaigns to "educate" Tibetans about their obligations to conform to policy and law that many Tibetans believe harm their cultural identity and heritage, the level of repression of Tibetans’ freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and association increased further.

The environment for the dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese Government and Party officials continued to deteriorate: both sides have referred to the dialogue as having stalled. The principal results of the eighth round of formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Party officials were the Dalai Lama’s envoys’ handover of a detailed memorandum explaining Tibetan proposals for "genuine autonomy," the Party’s rejection of the memorandum, and the Party’s continued insistence that the Dalai Lama fulfill additional preconditions on dialogue.

The government has in the past year used institutional, educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations. Chinese officials adopted a more assertive tone in expressing determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to pressure Tibetans living in China to accept only a Dalai Lama approved by the Chinese Government. Escalating government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy has resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.

The government pressed forward with a Party-led development policy that prioritizes infrastructure construction and casts Tibetan support for the Dalai Lama as the chief obstacle to Tibetan development. The government announced a major new infrastructure program—the "redesign" of Lhasa—that is scheduled for completion in 2020, the same year that the government plans to have ready for operation several new railways traversing sections of the Tibetan plateau. The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Communist Party and the Minister of Railways discussed in May 2009 accelerating the construction of railways that will access the TAR. Confrontations between Tibetans and Chinese Government and security officials resulted in 2009 when Tibetans protested against natural resource development projects.

The government and Party crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008, continued during 2009. Security measures intensified in some Tibetan areas during a months-long period that bracketed a series of three sensitive anniversaries and observances in February and March 2009. As a result of increased government security measures and harsh action against protesters, Tibetan political protests in 2009 were smaller and of briefer duration than the protests of March and April 2008. The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database contained as of September 2009 a total of 670 records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008—a figure certain to be incomplete—for exercising rights such as the freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and association.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge the Chinese Government to move beyond the current stalled condition of the dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. A Chinese Government decision to engage the Dalai Lama in substantive dialogue can result in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for Chinese and Tibetans, and improve the outlook for local and regional security in the coming decades.

Convey to the Chinese Government the urgent importance of respecting Tibetan Buddhists’ right to the freedom of religion through measures that include: ceasing aggressive campaigns of "patriotic education" that compel Tibetans to endorse state antagonism toward the Dalai Lama and increase stress to local stability; allowing Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers in a manner consistent with their preferences and traditions; and using state powers such as passing laws and issuing regulations to protect Tibetans’ religious free-dom instead of remolding Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.

Continue to urge the Chinese Government to allow international observers to visit Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized, and his parents.

In light of the heightened pressure on Tibetans and their communities in the period following March 2008, increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, language, and heritage; that can help to improve education, economic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable benefits without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. Support funding for Radio Free Asia and Voice of America news reporting and multi-dialect broadcasting to the Tibetan areas of China so that Tibetans have access to uncensored information about events in China and worldwide.

Encourage the Chinese Government to take fully into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when the government plans infrastructure and natural resource development projects in the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese Government to engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of such infrastructure and natural resource development projects, and in advising the government on the implementation and progress of such projects.

Continue to convey to the Chinese Government the importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters, honoring the PRC Constitution’s reference to the freedoms of speech and association, and not treating peaceful protest as a crime. Request that the Chinese Government provide complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced with protest-related crimes.

Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative examples include: former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); reincarnated lama Bangri Chogtrul (serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for "inciting splittism"); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public festival).

In January 2009, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Chief Executive Donald Tsang announced his decision to defer the public consultation on electoral methods in 2012 until the fourth quarter of 2009, citing the preeminence of "tackling economic and livelihood concerns." Tsang’s decision appears to echo the Chinese central government’s focus on economic matters over political reform this year as well. Several pro-democracy legislators protested against Tsang’s decision, accusing him of using the economic downturn as an excuse to delay universal suffrage.

The Macau Special Administrative Region passed a National Security Law in February 2009 which criminalizes, as well as stipulates prison terms for, treason, secession, subversion, sedition, theft of state secrets, and association with foreign political organizations that harm state security. Citizens have reported concern that vague language in the law leaves it open for abuse by officials, and point to the March 2009 barring of Hong Kong pro-democracy lawmakers, academics, and activists from entering Macau as an example of such abuse.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call on the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to advance the progress of electoral reform and avoid further delaying the goal of election by universal suffrage in Hong Kong.

Call on the government of the Macau Special Administrative Region to review its policy of restricting the entry of lawmakers, scholars, journalists, and activists into Macau.

When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Check the Political Prisoner Database (https://ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on one prisoner, or on groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner’s database record for more detailed information about the prisoner’s case, including his or her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials have violated, stage in the legal process, and location of detention or imprisonment, if known.

Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious prisoners compiled from database records.

Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China to explore the database, and to advocate for the release of political and religious prisoners in China.

A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY

The Commission’s Annual Report provides information about Chinese political and religious prisoners1 in the context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses result from the Communist Party and government’s application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare summaries of information about political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.

The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at https://ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available at https:// www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)

The PPD has served, since its launch in November 2004, as a unique and powerful resource for governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and individuals who research political and religious imprisonment in China, or advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. Though completely Web based, it is not an archive that uses a simple or advanced search tool, nor is it a library of Web pages and files.

The PPD received approximately 30,700 online requests for prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31, 2009. During the entire period of PPD operation beginning in late 2004, approximately 30 percent of the requests for information have originated from U.S. Government (.gov) Internet domains, 16 percent from commercial (.com) domains, 15 percent from network (.net) domains, 12 percent from international (e.g., .fr, .ca) domains, 2 percent from education (.edu) domains, 2 percent from non-profit organization (.org) domains, 2 percent from Arpanet (.arpa) domains, and 1 percent from international treaty organization (.int) domains. Approximately 20 percent of the requests have been from numerical Internet addresses that do not provide information about the name of an organization or the type of domain.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work to maintain and update political prisoner records based on their areas of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners, and about events and trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China.

As of September 7, 2009, the PPD contained information on 5,176 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of those, 1,266 are cases of political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 3,910 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released, executed, or to have escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably more than 1,266 cases of current political and religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the PPD.

The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided by NGOs, other groups that specialize in pro-moting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY

The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in China. The upgrade to the database that the Commission hoped to have available by the end of 2008 is nearing completion. The upgrade will leverage the capacity of the Commission’s information and technology resources to support research, reporting, and advocacy by the U.S. Congress and Administration, and by the public, on behalf of political and religious prisoners in China.

Each prisoner’s record describes the type of human rights violations by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials. Users may search for prisoners by name, using either the Latin alphabet or Chinese characters. The PPD allows users to construct queries that include one or more types of data, including personal information or information about imprisonment.

The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet to query the database and download prisoner data without providing personal information to the Commission, and without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user’s computer. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal information to set up such an account. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a user’s computer as the result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not stored on a user’s computer. A user-specified ID (which can be a nickname) and password are the only information required to set up a user account.

Many records contain a short summary of the case that includes basic details about the political or religious imprisonment and the legal process leading to imprisonment. The upgrade will increase the length of the short summary about a prisoner and enable the PPD to provide Web links in a short summary that can open reports, articles, and texts of laws that are available on the Commission’s Web site or on other Web sites. Web links in Commission reports and articles will be able to open a prisoner’s PPD record.

When the PPD upgrade is available for public use, it will increase the number of types of information available from 19 to 40. [See box titled Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database: Current and Additional Data Fields below.] The upgrade will allow users to query for and retrieve information such as the names and locations of the courts that convicted political and religious prisoners, as well as the dates of key events in the legal process such as sentencing and decision upon appeal. The users will be able to download PPD information as Microsoft Excel or Adobe PDF files more easily—whether for a single prisoner record, a group of records that satisfies a user’s query, or all of the records available in the database.

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE: CURRENT AND ADDITIONAL DATA FIELDS

Current PPD Fields (19)

PPD Fields Added in Upgrade (21)

CECC record number
Detention status
Issue category
Main name
Chinese characters (main name)
Other (or lay) name
Alternate name(s)
Pinyin name (for non-Han)
Ethnic group
Sex
Age at detention
Religion
Occupation
Date of detention
Province where imprisoned
Current prison
Sentence length (years)
Legal process
Short summary

1 The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the Political Prisoner Database were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights protected by the PRC Constitution and law, or by international human rights conventions, or both.

During its 2009 reporting year, the Commission observed the continued failure of Chinese officials to protect the right of citizens to engage in free expression, as guaranteed under the PRC Constitution and international law. Chinese officials continued to target for punishment citizens who peacefully expressed political dissent or advocated for human rights, including those who voiced concern that the Chinese Government had not adequately investigated the cause of school collapses following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, sought to express support for Charter 08 (a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights), and spoke out about alleged official misconduct. Citizens faced prison sentences or reeducation through labor or other abuses of police power, including surveillance, interrogation, and restrictions on movement. Officials also continued to restrict peaceful religious expression, confiscating or punishing the distribution of unapproved bibles, Muslim books, Falun Gong documents, and other "illegal" religious materials, and restricting religious sermons, interpretations of religious texts, and the ability of citizens to proselytize or teach religion to their children. [For more information, see Section II—Freedom of Religion, including subsections titled Controls Over Religious Publications, Controls Over Religious Publications in the XUAR, and Restrictions on Proselytizing, Contact With Foreign Christians, as well as the box titled Religious Prisoners.]

Chinese officials continued to deny citizens the right to freedom of the press by censoring domestic news coverage and maintaining "prior restraints." Officials censored media coverage of stories relating to the economy, the environment, and protests in Iran following the contested June 2009 presidential election, and punished news media for covering "politically sensitive" issues. Officials strengthened "prior restraints" on the media, a system under which journalists, editors, publications, and Web sites must obtain licenses from the government in order to obtain legal status. Officials targeted for closure publications containing political or religious content dealing with Falun Gong, Tibetan areas of China, or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) or publications by organizations that did not have a license to publish. The government continued to allow the media limited space to question government officials and policies.

The Chinese Government’s regulation of the Internet continued to violate international standards for free expression. Authorities and Internet companies continued to remove political and religious content from the Internet, including references to Charter 08, and Web sites relating to human rights, Tibetan areas of China, and the XUAR. Officials also sought to strengthen their capacity to monitor Internet users’ online expression. They introduced and then backed away from a requirement that all computers in China be sold with pre-installed censorship software found to filter political and religious content and monitor individual computer behavior. Officials also began forcing news Web sites to require new users to provide their real name and identification number in order to post a comment. The Internet continued to serve as an important outlet for public criticism, including the Deng Yujiao case in which a young woman allegedly stabbed an official to death in self-defense, and public opposition to the government’s attempt to require computers in China to come with pre-installed censorship software.

This past year, the Chinese Government continued to express an intent to "guarantee citizens’ right of information." Implementation of the Regulations on Open Government Information, which took effect in May 2008, has been hampered by agency refusals to disclose information and the reluctance of courts to enforce compliance. Proposed revisions to the 20-year-old PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets do not address the vagueness and overbreadth of China’s laws and regulations related to state secrets that make them susceptible to abuse. Local officials continued to fail to disclose the extent of mining disasters, disease outbreaks, and information about polluters.

Chinese officials continued to target citizens who peacefully expressed political opposition or advocacy of human rights. These efforts to stifle free expression contravene China’s constitutional protections for freedom of speech and freedom to criticize government officials,1 as well as international standards. Chinese officials, however, insist that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of expression. During the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese delegation claimed that "[n]o individual or press has been penalized for voicing their opinions or views" and that China’s laws provide "complete guarantees" on freedom of expression.2 [For more information on cases of officials in China abusing the criminal law (e.g., charging citizens with "splittism") or police power to punish religious expression, including possession of Falun Gong materials or teaching religion to their children, see box titled Religious Prisoners in Section II—Freedom of Religion.]

Subversion and Inciting Subversion

This past year officials continued to label peacefully expressed opposi­tion to the Communist Party as a threat to national security and to rely on Article 105 in the PRC Criminal Law as the basis for this charge. Ar­ticle 105 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for attempts to subvert state power or 15 years for inciting such subversion.3 While international law permits a government to restrict expression to protect national security,4 China’s application of Article 105 violates inter­national law. Specifically, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 29) require that a restriction on free expression be lim­ited to that which is "necessary" to protect national security, or "solely for the purpose of" protecting national security.5 Chinese courts make no attempt to assess whether the speech in question posed an actual threat to national security.6 The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has said that the vague wording of China’s national security crimes leave their application open to abuse of freedom of speech.7 A recent study of "inciting subversion" cases by a human rights non-governmental organi­zation found that "speech in and of itself is interpreted as constituting incitement of subversion," 8 and Chinese defense lawyers have noted that courts have wide latitude because there exists no legislative or judi­cial interpretation limiting the application of the subversion crime.9

The recent case of Zhang Qi typifies courts’ handling of subversion cases. The Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Zhang on July 7, 2009, to four years in prison for "inciting subver­sion." 10 Zhang is a member of the Union of Chinese Nationalists (zhongguo fanlan lianmeng), an "illegal" organization which opposes the Communist system.11 The court opinion cited the following evidence: four essays Zhang posted online that "contained harmful information at­tacking the people’s democratic dictatorship and socialist system" (citing only the titles of the essays and no specific passages); online discussions in which Zhang expressed opposition to the Communist Party and a de­sire to change the socialist system; and Zhang’s involvement with the organization’s Web site and recruiting supporters.12 The opinion pro­vided no evidence that Zhang advocated violence, did not assess the threat Zhang’s activities posed to national security, and made no at­tempt to balance the state’s interest with Zhang’s right to free speech or association. Other cases this past year include:

In November 2008, the Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan province sentenced freelance writer and journalist Chen Daojun to three years in prison for inciting subversion.13 Prosecu­tors cited essays Chen wrote criticizing the government’s policies to­ward China’s ethnic Tibetan minority.14

In January 2009, the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Zhejiang province sentenced China Democracy Party (CDP) member Wang Rongqing to six years’ imprisonment for subversion, citing his publication of "The Opposition Party" and other articles critical of China’s political system, as well as his organization of activities for the CDP, an "illegal" opposition party.15

In March 2009, the Jixi Intermediate People’s Court in Heilongjiang province sentenced rights activist Yuan Xianchen to four years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion.16 The court cited Yuan’s distribution of anti-Party writings to petitioners in Beijing, interviews with the overseas news Web site Epoch Times in which he criticized the Party and called for democracy, Internet essays "at­tacking" socialism, and funds he received from domestic and over­seas organizations.17

In August 2009, the Suqian Municipal People’s Court in Jiangsu province held the trial of democracy advocate Guo Quan on charges of subversion of state power.18 Guo earlier told his lawyer that while detained, authorities questioned him about his online orga­nizing of a democratic party, support for a multi-party system, and essays alleged to have slandered socialism and subverted state power.19

PUBLIC CRITICISM OF COLLAPSE OF SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLCHILDREN DEATHS FOLLOWING THE MAY 2008 SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE

Officials sought to silence parents and other citizens seeking to investigate the role shoddy construction played in the collapse of large numbers of schools in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and legal remedies and names and figures for the schoolchildren who perished.20 Parents of deceased children reported that local officials offered them money in exchange for silence, ordered some to serve reeducation through labor, kept some under surveillance, stopped them from holding memorials, warned them not to speak to media, and prevented them from traveling to Beijing to petition the central government.21 As the one-year anniversary of the earthquake approached in May 2009, Ai Weiwei, a blogger and artist organizing a campaign to tally the student death toll, said that officials had attacked or detained 20 of his volunteers and that his blog postings were frequently removed from the Internet.22 Sang Jun, who lost his 11-year-old son in the earthquake, said that hundreds of officials were watching dozens of parents in Mianzhu county, Sichuan province.23 One Mianzhu official reportedly told Sang that contact with foreign press would be considered "unfavorable to China." 24 A Mianzhu official denied the reports of harassment.25

Officials charged other citizen activists with national security crimes. In August 2009, the Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan held the trial of writer and environmental activist Tan Zuoren on the charge of inciting subversion.26 Tan had begun an independent investigation into the school collapses and was detained shortly after he issued preliminary findings. Prosecutors reportedly cited Tan’s previous criticism of the government’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen protests as well as his interviews with international media after the earthquake.27 Also in August, the Chengdu Wuhou District People’s Court held a closed trial for rights activist Huang Qi on suspicion of "illegal possession of state secrets." 28 The underlying activity leading to the charge is unclear, but Chengdu officials detained Huang shortly after he visited earthquake areas and issued a report on his human rights advocacy Web site about parents’ demands for compensation and an investigation.29 The trials of Tan and Huang were marred by procedural irregularities and official abuse, including barring witnesses from testifying.30 Officials also released from custody Liu Shaokun and Zeng Hongling, both of whom were detained in connection with their articles, photos, and public comments about the earthquake.31

CONTROLS OVER FREE EXPRESSION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued to block free speech and harass, detain, and imprison people for peaceful forms of expression. In December 2008, XUAR media reported that Urumqi authorities took into detention Miradil (Mir’adil) Yasin and Mutellip Te´yip after the two young men distributed leaflets on the Xinjiang University campus calling on students to organize a public demonstration.32 University officials said the leaflets had "reactionary" content aimed at "inciting students to demonstrate in the streets and create chaos." 33 Available information suggests the leaflets may have called on students to peacefully protest tobacco and alcohol sales.34 [For more information see Section IV—Xinjiang—Controls Over Free Expression and Assembly.]

SUPPRESSION OF CHARTER 08

Officials harassed a number of citizens beginning in December 2008 in connection with Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China. More than 300 Chinese citizens released Charter 08 online on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.35 By October 2009, 9,700 people reportedly had signed the Charter.36 Liu Xiaobo, a prominent intellectual and signer, was detained on December 8, 2008, a day before the Charter was released.37 Authorities violated Chinese law by placing Liu under residential surveillance at an unknown location, instead of his Beijing home, by denying him access to his lawyer and family, and by holding him without formal charge beyond the six-month limit for residential surveillance.38 On June 23, 2009, Beijing public security officials arrested Liu on the charge of inciting subversion for "spreading rumors and defaming of the government," and refused to allow defense lawyer Mo Shaoping to represent him because Mo had also signed the Charter.39 In early January 2009, overseas non-governmental organizations and media reported that Chinese authorities sought to question, formally summoned, threatened, or otherwise harassed more than 100 signers of Charter 08.40 Those harassed reported that officials warned them not to give media interviews to promote Charter 08, sought to determine the main authors of the document and how it was disseminated, and demanded public retractions of signatures.41 Signers continued to report police questioning and surveillance during the first half of 2009, including one signer who was placed under residential surveillance after she distributed copies of the Charter on the street.42

HARASSMENT ON EVE OF 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF TIANANMEN PROTESTS

Officials sought to suppress the free expression of citizens in the lead-up to June 4, 2009, the 20th anniversary of the government’s violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.

In March 2009, officials briefly held Zhang Shijun, a former soldier who served during the protests, after he published an open letter to President Hu Jintao calling for a reassessment of the Tiananmen protests and gave interviews to foreign media.43

In April, police in Beijing detained Qi Zhiyong for one day and stationed officers outside his apartment. Qi, who lost a leg after being shot during the 1989 protests, had spoken out about the incident and given interviews to foreign news media.44

In March and May 2009, Beijing public security officials summoned Dr. Jiang Qisheng, a writer and vice chairman of Independent Chinese PEN Center, which is affiliated with an international writers association, and confiscated his computer, books, and manuscripts from his home.45 Jiang was reportedly preparing to publish an account of the Tiananmen protests and their aftermath.

In June, officials ordered Zhang Huaiyang to serve one and one-half years of reeducation through labor.46 Officials had detained Zhang on the charge of inciting subversion. Zhang had signed Charter 08 and posted an essay online titled "Is There Really No One Who Dares To Take to the Street To Commemorate 6–4? " 47

In June, officials in Chongqing municipality ordered Chen Yang, a Charter 08 signatory, to serve one year of reeducation through labor after he took part in an online discussion with friends about wearing white and lighting candles to commemorate the Tiananmen protests.48

Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported on June 4, 2009, that officials had harassed 65 activists to prevent them from commemorating the Tiananmen protests, including the detention of Wu Gaoxing for wearing a commemorative shirt while riding a bicycle. The report said police were stationed outside the homes of individuals such as human rights lawyers Pu Zhiqiang and Teng Biao and that other individuals were forced to leave Beijing or were visited at their home by police and warned against giving media interviews or meeting with friends to commemorate the event.49

Defamation

Local officials continued to abuse the crime of defamation to punish critics and whistleblowers. At a conference held in May 2009, the official Legal Daily reported that a number of Chinese legal scholars expressed concern at what the article described as "many" recent cases of local governments using the "crime of defamation" to retaliate against whis­tleblowers and "abuse government authority to smother citizens’ free­dom of speech and right to supervise." 50 The article noted that in 2008, journalists were the targets of such cases, while in 2009, the targets were citizens who used the Internet to expose problems. Scholars inter­viewed for the article blamed the "arbitrary" and "subjective" nature of official power in China and criticized Article 246 of the PRC Criminal Law, which provides officials with a loophole to pursue a defamation case in the absence of a complaint if "serious harm is done . . . to the interests of the State." 51 China’s lack of an independent judiciary also contributes to the problem.52 Cases this past year included: • In March 2009, police from Lingbao city, Henan province, traveled 1,200 kilometers to Shanghai to apprehend Wang Shuai after he suggested in an online post that Lingbao officials had misappro­priated funds intended for drought prevention. They brought him back to Lingbao and kept him in custody for five days. Following public outcry, provincial officials disciplined Lingbao police and paid Wang 784 yuan (US$115).53 • In April 2009, China Daily reported that police detained blogger Shi Zhixian for three days in March for alleging that officials rigged a local election in which he ran as a candidate. Police reportedly issued an apology, offered him compensation, and disciplined five of­ficers.54

The Chinese Government and Communist Party continued to censor and regulate the news media and publishing industry in violation of the PRC Constitution and international standards for free expression. Article 35 of the PRC Constitution provides for freedom of the press.55 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibit restrictions on the press except those "necessary" for, or "solely for the purpose of," respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting national security, public order, public health or morals, or the general welfare.56 The government and Party exceed these limits by restricting political and religious content and controlling the media for political purposes. Officials continued to deny the existence of press censorship.57

OFFICIALS TREAT NEWS MEDIA AS A TOOL OF THE PARTY

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, top Chinese officials continued to emphasize the media’s subservient relationship to the government and Party. In the Commission’s previous reporting year President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao gave a major speech on the role of the news media in June 2008, during which he said journalists should "promote the development and causes of the Party and the state" and that their "first priority" is to "correctly guide public opinion." 58 In November 2008, Liu Yunshan, director of the Party’s Central Propaganda Department, told local propaganda bureaus and "persons responsible for news media" to emphasize "positive propaganda" to deal with the economic downturn.59 In July 2009, Director Liu Binjie of the General Administration of Press and Publication, which regulates the news media, outlined the main tasks for news regulators during the second half of 2009, including "painstakingly organizing and leading news units to carry out news propaganda work welcoming the 60th anniversary of the nation’s founding." 60 Liu also called for propaganda on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s economic and social development and ethnic solidarity and to provide "ideological guarantees" and "public opinion support" for the work of the Party and nation. In a speech in June 2009 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Jiangxi Daily, Jiangxi provincial Party Secretary Su Rong said journalists must uphold the "Marxist view of journalism" and quoted former Party chairman Mao Zedong as saying "to do news work, the politicians must run the newspapers." 61

COMMUNIST PARTY DIRECTS MEDIA COVERAGE

This past year, the Party’s view of the news media as a mouthpiece continued to be reflected in Party directives restricting news reporting of certain topics deemed politically sensitive. The primary source of such directives, the Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD), informs publishers and editors what stories can and cannot be covered and how to cover certain topics, and in some cases instructs news media to run only stories from Xinhua, the official news agency of the central government.62 The following table indicates some of the publicly known directives over the past year.

Restricted Topic

Restriction

December 2008—Arrest of a re­porter at China’s only national tel­evision station, CCTV.63

Media ordered not to report on or publish essays by 247 persons, in­cluding Liu Xiaobo.

The directives are not transparent, and officials interviewed by the Commission denied their existence.72 In a prominent case from 2005, one court found that such directives are state secrets and sentenced the journalist Shi Tao to 10 years in prison for leaking a directive to an overseas Web site.73 In February 2009, the Deputy Director of the Yunnan Provincial Party Propaganda Department publicly acknowledged the ability of propaganda officials to dictate news coverage.74 During a domestic media interview, Deputy Director Wu Hao said "the propaganda department still has the power to direct the media. We can order the media to not report or comment . . ."75 In April, officials at one television station acknowledged that they received broad guidance on major topics such as coverage of large-scale disasters, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, but enjoy greater independence in the areas of science and technology, entertainment, and current affairs.76

OFFICIALS PUNISH JOURNALISTS AND NEWS MEDIA FOR REPORTING

This past year, Party and government officials continued to punish journalists and news media for attempting to cover "politically sensitive" stories or because they published such stories. In September 2008, the Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau ordered suspension of publication of the China Business Post for three months after the paper published a report critical of the state-run Agricultural Bank of China, which at the time was preparing for a stock offering.77 The paper said unspecified "higher-level officials" had punished it for failing to follow the requirement that "significant and sensitive news stories must be verified with the party being reported on before publication" and for disregarding a ban on "cross-regional reporting," in which newspapers reporting about events in other localities had once enjoyed some leeway.78 In November 2008, Li Changchun, a member of the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, reportedly ordered the removal of a publisher at Yanhuang Chunqiu after the magazine published an article in memory of former Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who died in 2005 after spending 16 years under home confinement following the 1989 Tiananmen protests.79 In January 2009, authorities in Shanxi province reportedly suspended two journalists and two editors for producing a television episode on the potential bankruptcy of a Linfen city textile mill and the uncertain future of the mill’s 6,300 workers.80

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE NEWS MEDIA AND PUBLISHING

The government continues to rely on prior restraints on publishing, including licensing and other regulatory requirements, to restrict free expression.81 No one may legally publish a book, newspaper, or magazine, or work as a journalist in China, unless they have a license from the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the government agency in charge of regulating the news media and publishing industry.82 Chinese law requires that every book, newspaper, and magazine have a unique serial number, and the GAPP maintains exclusive control over the distribution of these numbers.83 To obtain a license to publish news, applicants must meet financial requirements and must have a government sponsor, although sponsors vary in degree of oversight.84 The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) closely collaborates with government agencies to control the press.85

The government continued to use its licensing authority to violate freedom of the press. In July 2009, Beijing public security officers and officials from the Beijing City Cultural Law Enforcement Agency raided the offices of Beijing Yirenping Center, a public health non-governmental organization, and confiscated more than 90 copies of the center’s "China’s Anti-Discrimination Legal Action Newsletter." The officers claimed Yirenping failed to possess the necessary permits to publish the newsletter.86 From January to July 2009, officials reportedly seized 1.35 million "illegal" newspapers and periodicals.87 Authorities continued to use Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law, which defines operating a publishing business without government permission as an illegal business activity,88 to fine and imprison publishers. In June 2009, a Beijing court sentenced bookstore owner Shi Weihan to three years’ imprisonment under Article 225 because Shi had printed and given away Bibles.89

The government continued its campaign to target publications for their political and religious content. Chinese regulations include vague and sweeping prohibitions on the publication of material that "undermine the solidarity of the nations, or infringe upon national customs and habits," "propagate evil cults or superstition," or "harms the honor or interests of the nation." 90

In December 2008, GAPP issued a notice calling on customs officials to focus on "illegal publications" and " ‘Falun Gong’ and other ‘cults’ propaganda materials." 91

The State Administration of Industry and Commerce reported in January 2009 that it targeted "illegal political publications" in the runup to the 2008 Olympic Games and that rooting out such publications would remain a priority in 2009.92

In April and May 2009, local and provincial governments across China issued notices launching a special campaign targeting "illegal political publications." 93 The Fujian Provincial Transport Administration Department, for example, issued a notice that placed the focus on publications that "slandered the country’s political system, distorted the history of the Party, the country’s history, the military’s history, slandered the Party and the country’s leaders, publicized ‘Falun Gong’ and other evil cults, and incited ethnic splittism." 94

In March 2009, Harbin city police in Heilongjiang province reportedly seized more than 2,000 copies of "illegal political publications" including some relating to the Gang of Four and another 30,000 "illegal political publications" relating to famous Party leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and other books on Chinese politics and history.95

In April 2009, officials in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, reportedly burned more than 1,000 copies of "illegal political" publications and "Dalai clique splittist" publications.96

In 2009, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region authorities established a fund to reward efforts to "purify" the cultural market, with a focus on "illegal" religious and political publications.97 [See Section IV—Xinjiang—Controls Over Free Expression and Assembly for more information.]

Authorities have confiscated Bibles imported to the country,98 and in the past year, officials confiscated Bibles in raids on house churches.99 [See Section II—Freedom of Religion— Controls Over Religious Publications for more information.]

This past year, officials strengthened oversight over journalists.100 A January 2009 GAPP circular announced that journalists and editors working for Chinese news organizations must exchange their current press cards, which they are required to have to legally practice their profession, for new ones, affecting approximately 260,000 news personnel.101 The Chinese Government claims that government licensing and supervision of journalists and editors is needed to prevent corruption and protect journalists.102 International experts on freedom of expression, however, have declared such licensing schemes for print media unnecessary and subject to abuse and have found press accreditation appropriate only where necessary to provide access to certain places and events.103 GAPP also announced creation of a black list of journalists who "violate laws and regulations or professional ethics" and have had their press cards revoked.104 The current code of professional ethics, which was last revised in 1997 and reportedly will be further amended by November 2009,105 requires news workers to "make great efforts to learn and propagate Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping’s theory of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "firmly implement the Party’s basic orientation and principles."106

This past year, the government continued to link the professional training and selection of journalists with requirements for political loyalty. In April 2009, the CPD, the Central Office for Overseas Publicity, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, GAPP, and the All-China Journalists Association issued a circular launching a campaign called the "Three Items To Study and Learn" (sanxiang xuexi jiaoyu).107 The circular calls for "further strengthening the political quality of editors and journalists," and "guaranteeing the correct orientation of news propaganda work." 108 It notes that in recent years a large number of young journalists have risen in the ranks, "making it even more necessary to help them practically grasp the Marxist view." 109 An important goal of the campaign is to help news workers develop the capacity to avoid "ideological errors" and to "persist in using the Marxist view to correctly analyze and guide news practice." 110

FACTORS PROVIDING MEDIA SOME SPACE, WHILE THE PARTY SEEKS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL

Commercialization of news media

Over the last three decades, authorities have encouraged the proliferation of news media that depend less on financial subsidies from the government but have not sought to relinquish Party control over content.111 Commercialization has resulted in less severe state control, but all legal media in China remain "state-controlled" in the sense that they are still subject to propaganda directives and prior restraints such as being required to have a government sponsor. Some major media, such as Xinhua, People’s Daily, and CCTV, remain directly under the control of the government or Party and have as their main purpose the communication of the official line.112 A few more market-oriented media, including Caijing113 and Southern Metropolitan Daily, have developed a reputation for greater independence.114 Editors at these organizations, however, proceed cautiously and have been punished by officials in the past.115

Officials continue to use commercialization to serve their own interests. They cite the numerical growth in newspapers, magazines, and journalists as evidence itself of press freedom.116 They also express a desire to create market-friendly media to facilitate the spread of propaganda and China’s "soft power." President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao said in his June 2008 speech that commercial media need to be co-opted into a "new setup for public opinion guidance." 117 In March 2009, the deputy secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, Liu Yupu, spoke to journalists in Shenzhen about the effects of the global economic downturn, telling them they were "the most critical mouthpieces" of the Party and government and must "strengthen their own sense of political responsibility," while at the same time making their news "more readable and watchable . . ." 118 In April 2009, the government announced a plan to de-link most news publishers from the government and create five or six commercially viable media conglomerates whose aim would be to "raise the nation’s combined national power and cultural soft power." 119 The plan reflects official concern over the perceived dominance of foreign "Western" media in shaping China’s image120 and coincided with other recent policies to greatly expand China’s media presence abroad. In January 2009, for example, the central government announced plans to spend 45 billion yuan (US$6.6 billion) to improve the nation’s image through the overseas expansion of three major state news media: CCTV, Xinhua, and People’s Daily.121 While one Chinese academic said the de-linking policy could lead to less censorship,122 the guiding opinion announcing the policy noted the need to maintain the "Party’s leadership of news publishing work." 123

Government continues to promote limited watchdog role for journalists

Some aspects of the Party’s policy toward the media serve the Party’s interests but also give the news media some space to report. Under a policy called "public opinion supervision," journalists are encouraged to cover abuses and corruption at the local level, so long as it does not threaten the center, as a way of keeping central officials informed of local problems.124 Governments at all levels are urging officials to cooperate with journalists. For example, a November 2008 GAPP circular stated that "[n]o organization or individual should interfere with or obstruct" the "legal reporting activities" of news personnel.125 In July 2009, authorities in Kunming city, Yunnan province, reportedly proposed a regulation that imposes punishments on officials who interfere with "news media carrying out public opinion supervision in accordance with the law."126

This past year, the Commission observed some media issuing reports questioning government policies. Chinese media published stories critical of the confinement of petitioners in psychiatric hospitals,127 black jails [see Section II—Criminal Justice, for more information],128 the behavior of delegates to the National People’s Congress session in March 2009,129 abuses at detention centers,130 a government policy to require all computers sold in China to come with pre-installed filtering software,131 and the August 2009 trial of a prominent activist.132 The extent to which media can report on such issues and the boundaries for reporting are unclear, although coverage of such topics as the "military, religion, ethnic disputes, the inner workings of government" is reportedly off-limits.133 Some media may have greater leeway because, as in the case of Xinhua, People’s Daily, and CCTV, they are backed by top central leadership.134 Chinese officials also may allow certain stories to be published in English-language domestic media but not in the Chinese-language media.135

Controlling the news agenda to counter Internet and international media

The increasing influence of China’s Internet and a greater focus on competing with international media for reporting on China have led the Party to adapt its strategy of maintaining control through faster official reporting of some events while at the same time increasing censorship of nonofficial channels of information. In June 2008, President Hu said the Internet had become a significant source of information that needed to be managed better.136 He called on news reports on "sudden-breaking public events" (tufa shijian) to be released immediately so that the government could take the initiative in "news propaganda work." 137 Hu also called on journalists to help change international opinion that still reflects a "West is strong, we are weak" pattern. In an October 2008 article in the Party journal Seeking Truth (Qiushi), Central Propaganda Department Director Liu Yunshan praised the Party’s propaganda response to Tibetan protests (and rioting) in Tibetan areas that began in March 2008 as having effectively "influenced international opinions." 138 The Commission noted in its 2008 Annual Report the development that the Party had begun to allow journalists to report certain major breaking news more quickly and without official approval, so long as they toed the Party line.139

The trend of quicker reporting, accompanied by increased censorship of unofficial channels, continued this past year. Following a demonstration by Uyghurs and violence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in July 2009, Xinhua issued reports early on and provided regular updates, mostly in English, that overseas media relied upon.140 At the same time, authorities shut down numerous Web sites and deleted posts on Internet forums that contained descriptions or pictures of the protests.141 The government has sought to capitalize on this trend of quicker reporting.142 During the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese delegation cited media coverage of the contaminated milk scandal in the fall of 2008 as evidence of press freedom.143 As noted in the Commission’s 2008 Annual Report, however, one newspaper that had discovered cases of sick children was unable to publish the story because of censorship before the 2008 Olympic Games, and officials banned commentaries and news features about the tainted milk products.144

FOREIGN AND NON-MAINLAND JOURNALISTS WORKING IN CHINA

Foreign journalists reporting in China face fewer restrictions than domestic journalists but continued to face harassment. As a result of China hosting the Olympics in 2008, since January 2007 foreign journalists allowed into China may report without additional government permission, with the notable exception of closed-off areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region.145 In October 2008, officials issued permanent measures enshrining this policy.146 For Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwanese journalists, however, new rules issued in February 2009 reinstated an official approval requirement for reporting.147 Despite the positive legal change for foreign journalists, they continued to report instances of official harassment. In March 2009, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) criticized detentions and closed access as reporters tried to visit Tibetan areas one year after protests that began in March 2008.148 In July 2009, FCCC welcomed the "relatively open access" for foreign journalists traveling to the XUAR to cover the aftermath of the July 5 demonstration in the capital of Urumqi.149 Chinese officials reportedly allowed about 60 foreign journalists to travel to Urumqi on a government-arranged reporting trip and set up an on-site media center for them.150 The FCCC, however, cited "serious concerns," including officials ordering journalists to stop reporting and ordering them to leave certain areas, including the city of Kashgar.151

While conditions for foreign reporters may be improving, officials appear to be increasing pressure on Chinese sources and colleagues. At a Commission roundtable in July 2009, one foreign correspondent reported that "as the rules have more aligned with international reporting standards, harassment and intimidation may be ‘going underground.’ The pressure seems more often directed at vulnerable Chinese sources and staff." She noted a new code of conduct for Chinese news assistants that reminded them that it was illegal to conduct independent reporting and urged them to "promote positive stories about China." 152 As noted elsewhere in this section, this past year officials warned Chinese citizens not to speak to foreign journalists and punished them for doing so.153

The Chinese Government’s regulation of the Internet and other electronic communications continued to violate international standards for free expression. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right to "seek, receive and impart" information "of all kinds, regardless of frontiers," through any media of one’s choice.154 Article 19 permits restrictions on this freedom, provided they are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, or public health or morals. Chinese officials exceed these allowances, however, because their extensive censorship of the Internet and cell phones is not limited to the removal of content such as pornography, spam, or content deemed to violate intellectual property rights, but also political and religious content the government and Communist Party deem to be politically sensitive. Chinese officials continued to defend restrictions on the Internet as necessary and based in law,155 and in line with international human rights standards156 and the practice of other countries.157 They have also characterized their investment in information technology as done to "strengthen the infrastructure that allows citizens to fully enjoy freedom of speech." 158 At the same time, the Party has sought to reap the benefits from the Internet’s expansion, to aid in dissemination of Party propaganda and to support China’s economic development.159

The Internet continued this past year to serve as an important outlet for individual expression and criticism of government policies. According to statistics from China Internet Network Information Center, the state network information center, China has more Internet users than any country in the world, and the figured reached 338 million in June 2009.160 As of March 2009, there were 670 million cell phone users in China, and as of June 2009, 155 million cell phone users accessed the Internet through their phone.161 According to Freedom House, the Internet is freer than traditional media because of its "egalitarian nature and technical flexibility." 162 As in recent years, citizens this past year used the Internet to organize protests, expose corruption among local officials, and oppose government policies. Internet users reportedly played a significant role in raising awareness about the Deng Yujiao case involving a young woman who stabbed a local official to death to thwart an attempted rape.163 In March 2009, a local official in Hunan province lost his job after Internet users posted receipts showing lavish spending at a karaoke club.164 After Internet users, citizens in China, and domestic media, as well as foreign governments and companies, criticized a government requirement that all computers sold in China include censorship software, officials backed away from the plan.165 The presence of online criticism, however, does not signal the government’s intent to allow greater freedom of expression on the Internet in line with international standards. As noted here and elsewhere in the section, the government continues to control media reporting that appears on the Internet, to block, filter, and remove political and religious content, and imprison citizens such as Tan Zuoren, for using the Internet to disseminate criticism of the government.

Officials continued to shut down or block access to domestic and foreign Web sites because of those sites’ political or religious content. Authorities reportedly ordered the closure of the domestic "Rights Defense China" Web site in October 2008 for posting "sensitive information." 166 In January 2009, the Beijing Municipal Government’s Information Office reportedly ordered the closure of the blog hosting Web site Bullog (www.bullog.cn) after the site failed to remove large amounts of "harmful information" relating to current events and politics.167 In March 2009, authorities repeatedly shut down the multi-language Web site Uyghur Biz (also known as Uyghur Online) and interrogated Beijing-based Uyghur scholar Ilham Toxti (Tohti), who runs the site.168 In July, the technology pages of Sina.com and Netease.com, two popular domestic news portals, were shut down for several hours after posting articles about a corruption investigation in Namibia involving a company that had been overseen by President Hu Jintao’s son.169

Authorities continued to block domestic access to foreign news and human rights Web sites, including the Commission’s Web site,170 and blocked search engines and social networking sites during politically sensitive periods throughout the past year. In August 2009, the Chinese military newspaper PLA Daily warned that Twitter and YouTube were being used by Western forces as subversive tools, citing their use by those opposed to election results in Moldova and Iran.171

In December 2008 and January 2009, officials reportedly blocked the Chinese-language sites for the BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, YouTube’s Hong Kong and Taiwan sites, and the Web sites for the New York Times, Amnesty International, and the Hong Kong-based news organizations Ming Pao, Asiaweek, and Apple Daily, after some of the sites were unblocked for the 2008 Olympic Games.172

In March 2009, Google reported that its YouTube site was being blocked in China. Prior to the block, a video was posted on the Web site purportedly showing Chinese police beating Tibetans during protests in March 2008.173

In June 2009, days before the 20th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, authorities reportedly blocked access to the social networking site Twitter, the blogging portal MSNSpaces, the photo-sharing site Flickr.com, and the Microsoft search engine Bing.com.174

In July 2009, authorities reportedly blocked access to Twitter, YouTube, and Fanfou.com, a domestic micro-blogging site similar to Twitter, following the July 5 demonstration in Urumqi and outbreaks of violence starting that day.175 Two other domestic micro-blogging Web sites, Digu and Zuosa, also went out of service during this time, with a spokeswoman from one of the companies saying "it’s a sensitive period, so we are not in a rush to re-open it."176

Active filtering and removing of political and religious content

Chinese authorities and companies offering Internet content in China continued to filter and remove political and religious content from the Internet. Internet regulations, which apply to cell phone service as well,177 prohibit not only dissemination of pornographic and defamatory content, but political and religious content under broad and vague prohibitions on information "harming the honor or interests of the nation," "disrupting the solidarity of peoples," "disrupting national policies on religion," and "spreading rumors," the meanings of which are nowhere defined in Chinese law.178 The Chinese Government monitors the Internet through a large number of public security officials and agencies overseeing the Internet and places a legal burden on companies providing Internet and cell phone services to filter and remove content. Companies providing Internet or cell phone services in China, including those based in other countries, are required to monitor and record the activities of its customers or users, to filter and delete information the government considers politically sensitive, and to report suspicious activity to authorities.179 The law’s vagueness and the consequences for companies who allow too much information lead many companies to err on the side of censoring more information.180 In addition, the lack of clarity leads to wide variation in the level of censorship companies practice.181 In July 2009, the government reportedly issued a secret directive that strengthens monitoring of comments posted by Internet users on Chinese news Web sites. The directive forces such Web sites to require new users to provide their real name and identification number in order to post a comment, a move that could have a chilling effect on free expression.182

This past year, officials and companies continued to filter political and religious content critical of China’s top leaders, human rights record, policies toward Tibetan areas of China and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and information relating to Falun Gong and the 1989 Tiananmen protests.183 In April 2009, China Digital Times reported that Chinese Internet users were circulating leaked documents from Baidu, which runs China’s top search engine.184 The documents provide lists of topics and words to be censored, including references to petitioners, the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Falun Gong, and China’s leaders.185 The China-based search engines of Yahoo!, MSN, and Google also filter politically sensitive information.186 In October 2008, these companies and other participants announced the formation of the Global Network Initiative, a coalition of companies, human rights groups, and Internet experts, whose purpose is to encourage companies to comply with principles of freedom of expression and to submit to monitoring by independent experts.187

Examples of filtering politically sensitive content this past year include:

After Chinese citizens posted online Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights, in December 2008, references to the Charter appeared to have been removed from the Internet, according to searches carried out using the Baidu, Sina, and Google.cn search engines.188

In March 2009, Internet and cell phone text messaging services were reportedly disrupted in Tibetan areas of western China ahead of a series of dates that many Tibetans consider to have a high level of cultural and political sensitivity.189

In March 2009, authorities began to censor references to the "grass-mud horse," a Chinese word that sounds like an obscenity, after Internet users began using the term to protest a government crackdown on "vulgar" content on the Internet.190

Reporters Without Borders issued a report in June confirming the continued censorship of Internet searches in China for references to the 1989 Tiananmen protests.191

In August 2009, China Daily reported that Google.cn and Baidu had blocked searches for Xu Zhiyong, the law professor and rights defender who had been detained on charges of tax evasion.192

Chinese officials also continued to enlist citizens to help monitor the Internet and influence public opinion. In recent years, authorities have paid commentators known as the "50-Cent Party" to promote the Party’s views in online forums and to report "dangerous" content to authorities.193 In June 2009, Xinhua reported that Beijing officials were recruiting tens of thousands of volunteers by year’s end to monitor the Internet and report "lewd" content or Internet users showing "uncivilized behavior" while surfing the Internet.194

Officials continued this past year to label campaigns to remove content as aimed at "vulgar" or pornographic content, but guidance issued by the government included political content as well.195 For example, this year officials launched a campaign against "vulgar" content on the Internet and targeted audio- and video-hosting Web sites. The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television issued a circular in March 2009 requiring Internet audio-visual program service providers to edit or delete programs containing, among other things, "distortions of Chinese culture," "disparaging or mocking depictions of revolutionary leaders, heroes, and important historical figures," or "disparaging depictions of the PLA, people’s armed police, the public security bureau, or the judiciary." 196

Officials continued to acknowledge their ability to monitor and delete information on the Internet and expand their capabilities. In February 2009, Liu Zhengrong, a top official at China’s Internet Affairs Bureau, urged heightened vigilance this year, telling colleagues to "check the channels one by one, the programs one by one, the pages one by one. You must not miss any step." 197 The Deputy Director of the Yunnan Party Propaganda Department said in a February 2009 media interview that "we can delete all inconvenient, or negative, online posts one by one." 198 According to one Party scholar, local officials delete unfavorable commentary about them on the Internet and render the IP address of those computers inactive; on occasion they trace the comment and retaliate.199 [See box titled Defamation above.] In March 2009, the deputy director of the General Administration on Press and Publication, which also regulates online publishing, said that the agency would soon have the capability to monitor content on hundreds of thousands of publishing Web sites.200 Chinese scientists are reportedly developing better software to detect "undesirable content." 201 Officials this past year also sought to extend their ability to censor beyond the network level to the level of an individual computer. [See box titled Green Dam below.] While the government ultimately backed away from its Green Dam initiative, officials reportedly required all Internet service providers to install the Landun (Blue Shield) software on their servers by September 13, 2009, or face penalties.202 Blue Shield (also known as Bluedon or Blue Dam) blocks Web sites and records users’ online activities, and is reportedly much more effective than Green Dam.203

Green Dam

In May 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued a circular requiring that computers sold within mainland China after July 1, 2009, must come "pre-installed" (yu zhuang) with the government-approved "Green Dam-Youth Escort" Internet browsing filtering software.204 The order did not become public until June 9 and prompted domestic and international concerns over freedom of expres­sion, the software’s security, lack of notice and transparency, and the le­gality of the move under China’s competition, monopoly, and procure­ment laws.205 Officials claimed the move was intended to protect young people from "harmful information," but editorials in the official China Daily and Caijing questioned why the requirement applied to all com­puters sold and raised concerns about who would determine what con­tent to block.206 Tests conducted by several outside sources found that, in addition to pornographic content, the software also filtered political and religious information, including references to Falun Gong. OpenNet Initiative (ONI), one of the groups that tested the software, also found that the software "actively monitors individual computer behavior." 207 ONI warned that the policy of filtering at the level of personal com­puters would "increase the reach of Internet censorship to the edges of the network, adding a new and powerful control mechanism to the exist­ing filtering system." 208 The requirement also applied to foreign manu­facturers, who criticized the lack of transparency and short notice and called for reconsideration of the requirement.209 U.S. Secretary of Com­merce Gary Locke and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk issued a joint letter to the MIIT and Ministry of Commerce protesting the policy. "China is putting companies in an untenable position by requiring them, with virtually no public notice, to pre-install software that appears to have broad-based censorship implications and network security issues," Locke said.210 On June 30, 2009, the MIIT announced that it would delay the requirement,211 although some companies continued with ef­forts to comply.212 In August, the MIIT’s minister announced that it would not force all computers to come with the Green Dam software.213

Prior restraints: government licensing of Web sites

The government requires all Web sites in China to be either licensed by, or registered with, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII),214 with additional licenses required for sites providing news content215 or audio or video services.216 Web sites that fail to register or obtain a license may be shut down and their operators fined. An October 2008 People’s Daily article said that the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television was planning to target Web sites operating without a license for audio and video programs.217

Technical and legal challenges to censorship

Chinese citizens continue to take advantage of proxy servers and to employ other techniques to access and share information that the government has attempted to block or filter. After a demonstration and outbreaks of violence took place in Urumqi, XUAR, in early July 2009, authorities cut Internet access in the area,218 and appeared to block nationwide access to Twitter and YouTube, remove comments about the demonstrations from Web sites, and filter Internet searches.219 Despite these measures, citizens were reportedly able to send pictures, videos, and updates from Urumqi; in some cases, content was posted on sites outside China in order to save the content.220

Over the past year, citizens have filed lawsuits against Internet companies for censoring their online material. In January, a Beijing company executive and former standing committee member of the Anhui Province People’s Political and Consultative Conference, filed a lawsuit with the Haidian District People’s Court in Beijing against Sina.com after his blog was blocked the same day he posted an essay calling for political reform.221 In a potentially significant ruling, one court in Beijing ruled in May 2009 that there are limits to Internet companies’ censorship of user content, the first time an Internet user has won such a case.222 In that case, an economics professor challenged the decision by Beijing Xin Net to shut down the professor’s Web site after he posted articles calling for the abolition of China’s reeducation through labor system. The court, although not addressing free speech issues, ruled that the company violated the user contract by not providing proof of its claim that the site contained objectionable content and failing to show that it had requested the content be changed. In June 2009, Huang Zhijia, a judge in Hubei province, filed a lawsuit in Beijing’s Haidian District Court against Sina.com after it took down one of his blogs in which he accused the Party School of granting him an unrecognized diploma.223 In explaining how Sina.com applies government regulations, a customer service representative said the company works with public security officials to filter violent and pornographic content as well as "radical political comments." 224

Blocking of foreign tv, radio

The government continued to impose restrictions on Chinese citizens’ access to overseas TV, radio, and news. Access to foreign TV stations is generally restricted to hotels and foreign residences, and transmissions have been interrupted when politically sensitive stories about China appear.225 China’s sole national television station, CCTV, began a live broadcast of U.S. President Barack Obama’s inaugural address in January 2009, but cut away after a politically sensitive portion of the speech, which was later deleted from official "full" translations appearing in Chinese media.226 Chinese officials repeatedly pit the "Western" media in a battle against China, this year urging China to step up jamming of "hostile" foreign broadcasters such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia and "foreign enemy" broadcasting stations.227 In April 2009, China announced that Xinhua would not be regulating foreign financial information providers as part of an agreement in connection with a World Trade Organization complaint.228 Such financial providers are, however, still subject to China’s censorship standards.229

This past year, the Chinese Government continued to express an intent to "guarantee citizens’ right of information." 230 In March 2009, Xinhua reported that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) had begun posting the central government’s budget on its Web site, whereas previous data had been available in a finance year book.231 In June, the MOF and the National Development and Reform Commission announced that by 2010 all government agencies would have Web sites.232 As the Commission has noted in previous reports, in recent years the Chinese Government has passed regulations to encourage the government’s disclosure of information to citizens and improve public access to government information.233 The Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI regulation) went into effect in May 2008,234 and this past year citizens tested provisions in the regulations giving them a right to request information235 and challenge agency refusals to disclose information.236 Agencies have used a variety of reasons to refuse to disclose information. Agencies have, for example, asked for specific identification numbers of the documents requested, which is impossible because such documents are secret.237 They have also responded with vague or irrelevant answers, or claimed that the information does not exist or does not fall under the scope of information disclosure regulations.238 According to the vice president of Peking University Law School, government agencies frequently cite exceptions in the regulations that exempt disclosure of information relating to state and commercial secrets or that threaten national security or public order.239 The Ministry of Justice, for example, denied Beijing lawyer Xie Yanyi’s request for information on reeducation through labor policies saying it related to state secrets.240

A main problem, observers say, is the lack of an independent judiciary to enforce implementation.241 Almost a year after the OGI regulation took effect, a March 2009 Caijing report indicated that courts in every locality had received cases challenging agencies’ refusal to release information.242 Chinese observers of courts’ handling of OGI cases, however, have noted a number of problems that have contributed to a low success rate for plaintiffs. Courts reportedly have been reluctant to challenge an agency’s determination of a state secret.243 The OGI regulation contains no provisions to provide courts with guidance on the boundaries of what should not be disclosed because it is a secret.244 The Supreme People’s Court will reportedly issue a judicial interpretation by the end of 2009 that would provide courts with clearer guidance on handling OGI cases.245 The more fundamental issue is that China’s laws loosely define state secrets to cover essentially all matters of public concern. Following passage of the OGI regulation, some scholars had hoped that officials would amend the PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets to clarify the scope of state secrets to aid in implementation of the OGI regulation.246 The government is currently reviewing a draft amendment to the law.247 [See box titled Proposed Revision to State Secrets Law below.]

Proposed Revision to State Secrets Law

In June 2009, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Com­mittee reviewed a draft revision of the PRC Law on Guarding State Se­crets (State Secrets Law) and the NPC released the draft for public com­ment,248 but the proposed changes do not address abuses that occur under the current state secrets legal framework. Currently, the broad and vague definition of "state secrets" in Chinese law and regulations give officials wide latitude to declare almost any information a state se­cret.249 Officials use this discretion to deny citizen requests for govern­ment information250 or claim that a citizen possessed or leaked a state secret in order to punish political activity.251 Furthermore, police can declare that a case involves state secrets to deny criminal defendants basic procedural rights, including access to counsel and an open trial.252 Citizens cannot challenge such a determination253 and officials may de­clare information a state secret retroactively.254 Chinese academics and media have raised these concerns.255 In June 2009, the official China Daily issued an editorial that said:

Government institutions should no longer be allowed unlimited free­dom in defining State secrets. The unnecessarily wide scope of State secrets must be streamlined. . . . If citizens continue to shoulder unlimited, and undefined obligations, they should not be left de­fenseless when accused. There should be legal relief for citizens vic­timized by abuse of the definition "State secrets." 256

The proposed draft lacks any substantial provisions to deal with these concerns. The draft law leaves unchanged the broad and vague provi­sions defining state secrets in the current law (Articles 2 and 8).257 While at least one academic recommended that drafters consider grant­ing people’s congresses or judicial institutions the power to review an agency’s state secret determination,258 the draft law failed to incor­porate any independent review mechanism.259 The draft imposes an af­firmative obligation on Internet and telecommunications companies to report the discovery of a disclosure of state secrets and to remove such information upon official request.260 The draft law also adds administra­tive fines ranging from 1,000 yuan (US$146) to 50,000 yuan (US$7,321), which may make officials more willing to classify information as a state secret.261 The draft includes a few modest provisions that may curb some abuses. The draft law, for example, adds a requirement that agen­cies conduct periodic audits of information classified as a state secret to determine if any should be declassified.262 Such periodic audits are not provided under the current law.

Despite the OGI regulation, officials continued to hide vital information from the public. It took nearly three months for word to leak out about a July 2008 explosion at an illegal mine in Zhonglou, Hebei province that killed 35 men. The mine owner paid off the families, and local officials issued a false report, while journalists received bribes to remain silent. Two weeks after the accident, officials in Shanxi province announced the deaths of 11 persons in a natural landslide. Investigators, following a tip from the Internet, later discovered that 41 had died.263 A Shanghai-based Xinhua journalist who exposed a mine disaster coverup in Shanxi province was later summoned to Beijing and told by Xinhua officials to lay off the story in October 2008.264 In October, it was discovered that local officials in Liaoning province kept the discovery of melamine-tainted eggs quiet for weeks and ordered a ban on discussing the issue with media.265 The Beijing News, which had reported the egg coverup, also reported that authorities in Sichuan province failed to publicly announce an epidemic of maggots in mandarin oranges for a month.266 These incidents followed an alleged coverup of the melamine milk scandal in the runup to the 2008 Olympic Games. In March 2009, China National Radio reported that Henan officials underreported incidences of hand-foot-mouth disease.267 The Chinese public has also expressed frustration at the government’s delay in disclosing the number of children killed in school collapses following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.268 An environmental non-governmental organization announced in June 2009 that it had requested disclosure of information about businesses that had violated environmental regulations from 113 cities, and 86 cities had refused to provide any information.269

3 PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 105. In the case of subversion, sentences are generally no more than 10 years, but may be life imprisonment for "ringleaders" or someone who commits a "major crime." For inciting subversion, sentences are generally no more than five years, unless the defendant is a "ringleader" or someone who commits a "major crime," in which case they shall be sentenced to no less than five years. Article 45 caps fixed-term imprisonment to no more than 15 years. PRC Criminal Law, art. 45.

4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19 [hereinafter ICCPR]. China has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. As in previous years, the Chinese Government this reporting year continued to reiterate its commitment to ratifying the ICCPR, which China signed in 1998. In February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify the ICCPR. At the time, Chinese officials also said China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). Moreover, in the 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) issued by the Chinese Government in April 2009, officials stated that the ICCPR was one of the "fundamental principles" on which the plan was framed, and that the government "will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR." State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1).

5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 29.

7 Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, 10 March 06, paras. 34, 82(s). Nowak, in the report, also recommended that political crimes "that leave large discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as ‘endangering national security,’ ‘subverting State power,’ ‘undermining the unity of the country,’ ‘supplying of State secrets to individuals abroad,’ etc. should be abolished."

9 "Land Rights Activist Yang Chunlin Sentenced to Five Years," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 1. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Defense Pleading in First Trial Case of Tan Zuoren On Suspicion of Inciting Subversion of State Power" [Tan zuoren shexian shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen bianhu ci], 12 August 09, in which defense lawyer Pu Zhiqiang notes that China’s legal system has no legislative or judicial interpretation of the crime of inciting subversion of state power, and therefore could consider international guidelines such as the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information as a source of guidance.

17 Ibid. The court notes that in an "illegal" interview Yuan gave to the Epoch Times in 2007, he "called on China’s vast military to wake up, and dismiss the Communist Party." Much of the interview is also spent criticizing the Communist Party and calling for democracy. The court also says that Yuan distributed 20 to 30 copies of his anti-Party writings to petitioners in Beijing. The court merely cited the existence of this passage and the existence of a large number of writings over the Internet to conclude that Yuan had incited subversion and the overthrow of the socialist system, without determining whether Yuan’s writings posed any actual threat to national security. For the actual interview, see "Special Interview With Yuan Xianchen: Willing To Become the Second Yang Chunlin Promoting Chinese Democracy" [Zhuanfang yuan xianchen: yuan chengwei yang chunlin di er tuidong zhongguo minzhu], Epoch Times (Online), 13 August 07.

20 Human Rights Watch (Online), "China: End Quake Zone Abuses," 6 May 09. The government did not release a figure for the number of students killed in the earthquake until May 7, 2009. Andrew Jacobs and Edward Wong, "China Reports Student Toll for Quake," New York Times (Online), 7 May 09.

31 In September 2008, officials in Guanghan, Sichuan, released Liu Shaokun, a middle school teacher who posted photos of collapsed schools online and criticized their construction in a media interview, to serve out the remainder of his one year of reeducation through labor. "Sichuan Teacher Previously Sentenced to Reeducation Through Labor, Liu Shaokun, Obtains ‘Serve Sentence Outside Place of Custody’ and Is Set Free" [Bei pan laojiao de Sichuan jiaoshi liu shaokun huo suo wai zhixing huo shi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 3 October 08. In March 2009, a human rights NGO reported that officials released retired professor Zeng Hongling, who was detained by Mianyang officials in Sichuan in June 2008 on the charge of inciting subversion after she posted articles online alleging corruption and poor living conditions in areas affected by the earthquake. Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Tug of War Over China’s Cyber-space: A Sequel to Journey to the Heart of Censorship (Part II)," 19 March 09.

43 Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (Online), "Tiananmen Soldier Zhang Shijun Taken Away From His Home in the Middle of the Night" [Qian liusi jieyan budui junren zhang shijun shenye bei cong jiazhong zhuazou], 20 March 09; Tania Branigan, "Former Tiananmen Soldier Held," Guardian (Online), 21 March 09. See, however, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Just Spoke With Zhang Shijun Over Phone, He Thanks Everyone for Their Concern" [Gangcai yu zhang shijun xiansheng tongguo dianhua ta biaoshi ganxie dajia guanxin], 5 April 09. Chinese Human Rights Defenders published a story in which it claimed one of its volunteers spoke directly to Zhang over the phone and that Zhang had said he was free, that reporting about his open letter was not accurate, that he had not been harassed, and that he wanted some peace and quiet and so would temporarily not be accepting media interviews.

56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 29.

57 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, para. 71. See also CECC Staff Interviews.

77 "Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau Suspends China Business Post," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2008, 4. Cui Fan, the author of the July 11 report, filed a lawsuit against the Inner Mongolia Press and Publication Bureau, arguing that the agency failed to follow provisions in the PRC Administrative Punishment Law requiring prior notice to the paper, an opportunity to defend itself, and a comprehensive, objective,and fair investigation. Cui alleged that none of these procedural protections were carried out.

81 As noted in the Commission’s 2006 Annual Report: "The Chinese Government imposes a strict licensing scheme on news and information media that includes oversight by governmentagencies with discretion to grant, deny, and rescind licenses based on political and economic criteria." CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 25.

82 See, e.g., Notice Regarding Prohibiting the Transmission of Harmful Information and Further Regulating Publishing Order [Guanyu jinzhi zhuanbo youhai xinxi jinyibu guifan chubanzhixu de tongzhi], issued 5 November 01, effective 5 November 01, art. 2: "No one may establish an entity whose primary purpose is to transmit news information and engage in other news publishing activities without permission from the press and publication administration agency."

84 Article 11(2) of the Regulations on the Administration of Publishing states that publishing work units must have a sponsoring work unit and a managing work unit recognized by the State Council’s publishing administration agency. Ibid., art. 11. The "sponsoring work unit" must be a government agency of a relatively high level, and the publishing work unit must answer to its sponsoring work unit and managing work unit. Circular Regarding Issuance of the "Temporary Provisions on the Functions of the Sponsoring Work Unit and the Managing Work Unit for Publishing Work Units" [Guanyu fabu "Guanyu chuban danwei de zhuban danwei he zhuguan danwei zhize de zanxing guiding" de tongzhi], issued 29 June 93, arts. 5–6; Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), "Falling Short: Olympic Promises Go Unfulfilled as China Falters on Press Freedom," 2008, 24. The government restricts the right to publish to those who can afford to invest at least 300,000 yuan (US$37,500) in registered capital. Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 11(4) .

89 ChinaAid (Online), "Christian Shi Weihan Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for Printingand Giving Away Bibles," 11 June 09. See also, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information. In recent years, authorities have usedsimilar criminal charges to imprison other people for printing and distributing religious texts. See, for example, the cases of Cai Zhuohua, Wang Zaiqing, and Zhou Heng in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database.

99 See, e.g., ChinaAid (Online), "Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches Within Mainland China January 2008–December 2008," January 09, 19, 21(see pages 12 and 20 for examples in 2008 outside the Commission’s 2009 reporting year).

103 UN Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, "International Experts Condemn Curbs on Freedom of Expression and Control Over Media and Journalists," 18 December 03.

116 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 4th Sess., National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/ 1, 10 November 08, para. 60. In a section titled "Freedom of speech and of the information media," Chinese officials note that "China now has some 310 radio stations, 350 television stations, some 2,000 newspapers, more than 9,000 periodicals or magazines and has published 240,000 book titles." One official reasoned that news censorship is impossible in China because there are approximately the same number of journalists as police and "if all the police did was supervise journalists, they could do nothing else." CECC Staff Interview.

122 Henry Sanderson, "China Moves To Make Competitive Publishing Giants," Associated Press (Online), 7 April 09. At least one academic said the policy could spur greater professionalism among Chinese journalists. In April 2009 testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dr. Judy Polumbaum expressed the view that "specifically in reference to journalism, I would argue that external propaganda efforts in exposing Chinese media workers to international knowledge, ideas and examples create dynamics that further encourage professional trends in China’s journalism corps." China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities That Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 09, Testimony of Dr. Judy Polumbaum, Professor of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Iowa. Others, however, have taken the view that by consolidating the media industry into fewer entities it would make it easier for propaganda officials to control. CECC Staff Interview.

124 CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 79–80. See also Reporting the News in China: First-Hand Accounts and Current Trends, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 July 09, Written Statement Submitted by Ashley Esarey, Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics, Whitman College. In his written statement, Esarey noted: "Media commercialization during the Reform Era (1978–present) changed the incentives for media, which recognized that freer, less doctrinaire reporting appeals to the public. When opportunities appeared, greater media freedom has emerged, although local, rather than central, officials are the targets of critical news reports. In colloquial parlance, Chinese media ‘swat flies’ but do not ‘hit tigers.’ Powerful political and economic interests can coerce or bribe media to abandon potentially embarrassing stories."

125 Circular Regarding Further Completing Work To Safeguard News Reporting Activities [Guanyu jin yibu zuohao xinwen caifang huodong baozhang gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 11 November 08, art. 1. The government also announced that the new press cards would include additional language stating that officials "at people’s governments of all levels" should offer assistance and protection to journalists in possession of the card. "Without Reasonable Reason, Public Officials Should Not Refuse Interviews," China Youth Daily (Online), 11 February 09.

126 Kunming City Government Web Site, "Announcement Regarding Seeking Comment to ‘Regulations on Kunming City Prevention of Officials Committing Crimes Work’ " [Guanyu zhengqiu "kunming shi yufang zhiwu fanzui gongzuo tiaoli" yijian de gonggao], issued 21 July 09, art. 25(2). See also Wang Jingqiong, "New Law Protects News Media," China Daily (Online), 19 August 09. A Yunnan University journalism professor quoted in the article said the regulation lacked specific definitions of "interference" and "obstruction" and did not explain what the media could supervise legally.

135 "Media Silence in China," Agence France-Presse (Online), 5 June 09. The new English version of Global Times, which is controlled by the Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper,for example, issued a front page report on the atmosphere at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 2009, while Chinese-language domestic news media remained silent on the issue. Jiang Xueqing,"Prosperity Tangible Along Chang’an Ave," Global Times (Online), 4 June 09; Jonathan Ansfield, "English-Language Chinese Newspaper Breaks Silence on Tiananmen Crackdown," New York Times (Online), 4 June 09.

142 One official we spoke with, in describing the areas in which China has improved in pressfreedom, said that Xinhua reported the Sichuan earthquake just ten minutes after it occurred, beating out Agence France-Presse by six minutes and Associated Press by eight minutes. CECCStaff Interview.

143 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the UniversalPeriodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, para. 71.

157 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on March 24, 2009," 24 March 09. In responding to a question about China’s blocking of the YouTube Web site, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry said that it had drawn upon the experience of other countries. The spokesperson specifically cited U.S. regulations, including the Child Protection Act, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, other acts protecting consumers and minors, and intellectual property rights, as well as the Patriot Act. The official failed to note, however, that these acts have been challenged and litigated before U.S. courts and in some cases provisions have been struck down as being overbroad. No practical equivalent exists in China for citizens to challenge the constitutionality of such provisions even though events this past year indicated widespread discontent with official campaigns nominally aimed at censoring "vulgar" material but which also swept up content deemed politically sensitive. The spokesperson also repeated the common claim that what he considered the sizablenumber of Internet users, Web sites, and blogs in China is "convincing evidence of the fully open internet in China." The government made similar claims in its National Report to the UNHuman Rights Council in November 2008, arguing further that public investment in expansion of information industries is intended to "strengthen the infrastructure that allows citizens tofully enjoy freedom of speech." UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 4th Sess., National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution5/1, A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1, 10 November 08, para. 60.

181 For a recent study looking at how companies censor blogs, see Rebecca MacKinnon’s February 2009 report finding that the extent of censorship among different blog service providers "varies drastically." Rebecca MacKinnon, "China’s Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers," First Monday (Online), Vol. 14, No. 2, 2 February 09.

182 Jonathan Ansfield, "China Web Sites Seeking Users’ Names," New York Times (Online), 5 September 09. According to the New York Times article, officials have been pushing real name registration systems since 2003. As reported in the Commission’s 2007 Annual Report, officials had sought to implement a policy requiring all bloggers to register under their real names but in 2007 decided against making the policy mandatory following industry resistance. CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 83. Even without the real name system, officials can trace comments back to an Internet protocol address.

183 Freedom House (Online), "Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media," 30 March 09, 37.

214 All commercial Web sites must obtain a government license. Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 4. All non-commercial Web site operators must register. Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei’an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 5. Because the MII’s registration system gives the government discretion to reject an application based on content (i.e., whether the Web site operator intends to post "news," and if so, whether it is authorized to do so), it is qualitatively different from registration which all Web site operators must undertake with a domain registrar, and constitutes a de facto licensing scheme.

218 "Official: Internet Cut in Xinjiang To Prevent Riot From Spreading," Xinhua (Online), 7 July 09. An Urumqi Communist Party official said on July 7, "We cut Internet connection in some areas of Urumqi in order to quench the riot quickly and prevent violence from spreading to other places."

223 Wang Huazhong, "Blogging Judge Sues Over Pulled Plug," China Daily (Online), 10 June 09. For an English translation of the civil complaint in the case, see William Farris, "Huang Zhijia 2009 Civil Complaint for Breach of Contract and Copyright Infringement," Feichangdao (Online), 7 June 09.

232 "The Web Sites for All State Offices and Government Agencies Must Realize Openness to Outside by Next Year" [Suoyou guojia jiguan he zhengfu jigou wangzhan mingnian xu shixian duiwai gongkai], China Radio, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 15 June 09.

248 National People’s Congress (Online), "Guarding State Secrets Law (Revised Draft Legislation) Full Text and Explanation" [Baoshou guojia mimi fa (xiuding caoan) quanwen ji shuoming], 27 June 09; Human Rights in China (Online), "China Considers State Secrets Law Revision," 24 July 09. For an English translation of the full text of the draft and explanation, see Human Rights in China (Online), "Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (Revised Draft) (2009) Full Text and Explanation," 24 July 09.

249 See, e.g., PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 5 September 88, effective 1 May 89, art. 8. Article 8 defines state secrets as, among other things, secrets relating to "major policy decisions on state affairs" (clause 1), "national economic and social development" (clause 4), "science and technology" (clause 5), as well as "other matters that are classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department" (clause 7). In April 2009, lawyers, scholars, and experts organized by Peking University and the Beijing Lawyers Association met to discuss revising the Law on Guarding State Secrets. Minzu University Professor Xiong Wenzhao said that the scope of state secrets under the current law was too broad and that under clause 7 of Article 8, "all information can be brought within the scope of a secret to be guarded." "Guarding State Secrets Law Implemented for 20 Years, Scholars Suggest the Procedures for Determining a Secret Be Made Clear" [Baoshou guojia mimi fa shishi 20 nian, xuezhe jianyi mingxi dingmi chengxu], China Ningbo Net (Online), 20 April 09. See also Measures for the Implementation of the Law on the Protection of State Secrets [Baoshou guojia mimi fa shishi banfa], issued 25 April 90, effective 25 May 90, art. 4.

254 Measures for the Implementation of the Law on the Protection of State Secrets [Baoshou guojia mimi fa shishi banfa], issued 25 April 90, effective 25 May 90, art. 4. Article 4 expands the definition of state secrets beyond those matters already classified as such to include matters that would give rise to certain consequences, including that which "harms political or economic interests of the nation with respect to the outside world," or "weakens the nation’s economy or technological strength." See also Human Rights in China, "State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth," June 2007, 14.

268 "China Evasive on Number of Students Killed in Quake," Agence France-Presse (Online), 7 March 09; David Barboza, "Artist Defies Web Censors in a Rebuke of China," New York Times (Online), 19 March 09.

Workers in China still are not guaranteed either in law or in practice full worker rights in accordance with international standards, including, but not limited to, the right to organize into independent unions. Despite new laws in 2008 that codified new protections for workers, Chinese workers in 2009, particularly migrant workers, bore the brunt of the global financial crisis. During economic retrenchment and rising unemployment pressure, the Chinese Government focused less on writing labor protections into formal law and lowering reliance on labor-intensive manufacturing and more on maintaining employment and rapid economic growth.

Labor strife increased during the Commission’s 2009 reporting period. In May 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced that labor disputes in 2008 had nearly doubled from a year earlier to reach 693,000 disputes, involving over 1.2 million workers. One official from the Supreme People’s Court noted that labor strife has changed in several important ways, including more large-scale, coordinated labor actions.1 During 2009, local governments reported that this trend is continuing as companies look for ways to reduce employment and maintain flexibility in an uncertain economic climate. These reports also point to the increasing legal and rights consciousness of Chinese workers. Chinese workers have also become more strategic in their use of large-scale, coordinated action outside the workplace, including street demonstrations, traffic blockades, or sit-ins at local government offices. This strategy of escalation is built upon a realization that local governments will often respond quickly to worker actions that threaten social stability and draw the attention of higher level officials. Thus, there is an expectation that escalation is more likely to lead to higher compensation.2 In some regions with concentrated labor-intensive manufacturing, these large-scale actions are taken after the employer has absconded without paying wages or severance compensation, putting further pressure on local governments to respond.3

In response to the increased conflict, especially to collective conflict that is organized and large scale, the government is attempting to redirect much of the labor conflict away from the formal channels of arbitration and litigation toward more "flexible" and "grassroots-level" negotiation and mediation. These forms of dispute resolution often rely on coordination among levels of local government (e.g., provincial, city, town, etc.), involving local government and Communist Party units, the official trade union, and the police and security apparatus.

Given the growing concern of local governments to maintain rapid economic growth and employment, many localities have responded to the 2008 laws (i.e., the PRC Labor Contract Law, PRC Employment Promotion Law, and PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) with local opinions and regulations of their own that often have the effect of weakening the employee-friendly aspects of the national law. Provincial-level courts were the main conduit of these local regulations, issuing measures and "guiding opinions" of the national law. Some analysts have argued that this trend is likely to lead to the "regionalization" and "loopholization" of national law.4 Localities with large concentrations of foreign direct investment and labor-intensive manufacturing have been the most proactive in this regard, with high court explanations of the laws from Shanghai municipality and Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong provinces.5 The Supreme People’s Court also issued a guiding opinion in July 2009 on courts’ handling of labor disputes during the economic crisis.6

Chinese workers continue to be denied the right to freedom of association. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU. While the ACFTU has become more active, focusing on unionization of foreign-funded firms and organization of migrant workers, and pushing the expansion of collective contracts, the ACFTU continues to be dominated by the local Communist Party with its overarching political concerns of social stability and economic growth. In 2009, the ACFTU continued its drive to unionize foreign-funded enterprises and to press for collective negotiations with management in some companies. In general, however, the union does not act as an autonomous body with workers’ rights and interests as its main responsibility. Rather, it facilitates relations between the Chinese Government and Party and employers. With the change in the economy, ACFTU activities in 2009 have not been as vocal or as aggressive as those seen in 2007 and 2008, when, for example, the ACFTU was involved in high-profile organizing of Wal-Mart stores in China. In general, the ACFTU unions are focused on proactive and mediation-based labor dispute resolution and government-led attempts to persuade enterprises to minimize layoffs in exchange for wage reductions and working hours.

National and local governments continue to proceed with social insurance reform, focusing on the expansion of social insurance both in terms of the types offered and the citizens covered. Rural citizens’ and migrant workers’ social insurance is also being expanded. Some localities are experimenting with programs that allow for more portable social insurance so that migrant workers can take their social insurance benefits with them when they switch jobs and relocate to other cities. The draft PRC Social Insurance Law was released for public comment in late 2008 and is expected to be passed by the end of 2009.7

In 2008, the central government passed three major new laws on labor and employment: the PRC Employment Promotion Law, the PRC Labor Contract Law, and the PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law. The year 2009 was a year for local implementation and experimentation as the new laws took effect shortly before the global economic downturn. The National People’s Congress undertook several study trips to investigate local implementation and enforcement of the Chinese Government’s labor codes, and the central government continued to promote the laws despite complaints from some local governments and employers that the new laws were too harsh for China’s current economic climate. As there was with the initial debate during the legislative process leading to issue of the Labor Contract Law, there remain signs of a lack of consensus about the effects of the new labor legislation on different regions and types of workers.8

THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT GUIDING OPINION

In July 2009, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued a guiding opinion urging courts, when handling labor disputes during the economic crisis, to consider the interests of both labor and enterprise management, and to do so in a manner that both preserves "social stability" and is consistent with national economic policy.9 According to SPC officials, this opinion was a reaction to the unprecedented pressure on courts to resolve a very large number of disputes even as disputes have grown more complicated and contentious.10 The guiding opinion attempts to balance continued emphasis on protection of workers’ rights (that was reflected and promoted in the 2008 legislation) and the realization that employers might simply close down if not given assistance during the economic crisis. The opinion emphasizes the need to protect workers’ "right to existence" while recognizing the difficult economic position of many enterprises.11 The guiding opinion follows a long list of national and local administration instructions to employers to minimize layoffs12 and to seek consultation with employees, the trade union, and the local labor bureau when handling disputes, especially disputes related to layoffs.13

OTHER MEASURES RELATED TO LABOR RELATIONS DURING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

In addition to the local regulations detailed below, the central government, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and other units issued several circulars and instructions related to labor relations during the global economic crisis. On December 20, 2008, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) and the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation issued the Circular on Easing the Burdens on Enterprises and Stabilizing Labor Relations.14 This circular permits enterprises to temporarily suspend payment of social insurance contributions for six months.15 On January 23, 2009, the MOHRSS, the ACFTU, and the Chinese Enterprise Directors Association (CEDA) jointly issued the Guiding Opinion on Tackling the Current Economic Situation and Stabilizing Labor Relations.16 This opinion reiterated the government’s preference for companies to use alternative strategies to avoid layoffs, including wage reductions, vacation time, and flexible working hours.17 Grassroots trade unions were also instructed to educate their workers to support employers’ strategies.18 This opinion was particularly concerned with wage arrears and advised methods to reduce the impact of sudden non-payment of wages.19 The opinion also called for local governments, trade unions, and employers to work together to resolve any collective disputes that might emerge from factory closures and large-scale layoffs.20

On January 5, 2009, Legal Daily reported the ACFTU, the MOHRSS, and the CEDA convened a meeting in Beijing to discuss tripartite bargaining and announced their intention to implement a "Rainbow Plan" across China to initiate collective wage negotiations. Speakers at the conference, however, emphasized neither conflict between employers and employees nor the need to protect workers’ rights. Rather, officials spoke of the need to find common ground during the crisis and to emphasize "stable employment" and "harmonious labor relations." 21

DRAFT SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW

The National People’s Congress (NPC) addressed a key issue related to workers’ rights and livelihood—social insurance. The draft Social Insurance Law was released for public comment in December 2008. The draft law received more than 70,000 comments as the central government made an ambitious attempt to standardize social insurance for workers and to provide more comprehensive and portable insurance for employees generally, but especially for highly mobile migrant workers. The first step for this new welfare system is the creation of a social security system nationwide based on citizens’ identification card numbers.22 According to an interview with Hu Xiaoyi, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the distribution of about 80 million social security cards was approved.23

The draft law gives citizens, urban and rural, the possibility to receive retirement pensions and insurance for medical care, work-related injuries, unemployment, and maternity.24 Both employers and workers are responsible for paying the respective insurance premiums and fees (except that, for work-related injuries and maternity, only the employer has the responsibility to pay the insurance premiums).25 Employers are also subject to heavy legal liabilities if they do not pay the corresponding insurance premiums and/ or partake in fraudulent actions.26

One of the most important issues for citizens is the portability of insurance, especially for those citizens who migrate to different cities. In the draft law, citizens can pay retirement premiums in one location and receive payments in another.27 Medical insurance and unemployment insurance can also be transferred accordingly.28 At the same time, the draft law describes, as well, the establishment of a new cooperative healthcare system in rural areas in the medical insurance plan, funded by both farmers and local governments.29 Further, according to this draft law, the government will cover the medical insurance fees for individuals who live on minimum income subsidies, are disabled, or are more than 60 years old.30 Unemployed workers, may receive unemployment payments for a maximum of 24 months, depending on the accumulated amount of time these workers and their employers have been paying unemployment insurance.31

Overall, the draft insurance law seems to offer positive alternatives for mobile workers who are seeking better retirement plans and medical insurance. Implementation of the final law, however, will be the responsibility of local governments. The China-European Union Intergovernmental Social Security Reform Cooperation Project, launched in April 2006, is a five-year program providing technical assistance and expertise in building social insurance programs. There currently are about 20 pilot projects nationwide.32

In 2009, several localities released high court opinions of the 2008 legislation (i.e., the PRC Labor Contract Law, PRC Employment Promotion Law, and PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law). This judicial activity was focused in the south and the southeast with judicial opinions issued in Shanghai municipality and Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong provinces. These opinions included some important clauses that benefited employers, and in so doing may weaken the impact of protections for workers contained in the national laws.33 There is growing concern that given the economic crisis, local governments are increasingly opposed to implementation of the 2008 labor laws and are using local measures to pass locally specific rules that will protect employers against some provisions of the new laws that employers regard as more onerous.34 In 2009, local regulatory activity was concentrated in the courts. Judicial opinions and explanations are not subject to the same degree of transparency or participation required in local legislative institutions, so these rules are not publicly debated, nor are they produced jointly by "competing" interests such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Employers’ Association.

MEASURES TO PROTECT WORKERS IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN ENTERPRISE CLOSURE

Following the language of the national regulations, which emphasized the protection of workers’ interests and rights as the primary goals of the 2008 new labor legislation, local guiding opinions and regulations have maintained similar vocabulary in their measures with respect to issues that directly affect workers’ interests, namely, the establishment or termination of labor contracts, implementation or cancellation of arbitral awards, payment of compensation or other lawful expenses, and social insurance. However, many regulations recognize the fact that layoffs and terminations continue to increase as recessions in export destinations persist. As a result, if an enterprise closes due to bankruptcy or other reasons that are in accordance with the law, employers can cancel any labor contracts and labor relations with workers by sending an advanced notification to workers or paying the corresponding "substitute" fees, as suggested in the local regulations by Fujian province and Shanghai municipality.35 The Fujian measures state that employees of state-owned companies should seek assistance through the workers’ representative committee.36 The Guangdong province guiding opinion jointly issued by the Guangdong High People’s Court and the Guangdong Provincial Labor Arbitration Committee also encourages more communication and cooperation among arbitration committees and judges, especially in cases that involve the termination or cancellation of arbitrated judgments.37

Many local interpretations also address circumstances for workers whose employers have gone into hiding or disappeared, especially during labor dispute arbitration proceedings. In Jiangsu’s most recent guiding opinion on how to handle labor disputes during the global economic crisis, announced in early 2009, for example, it is stipulated that enterprise properties and assets should be quickly frozen or sealed up in order to maintain control over the properties of the hiding employers and to safeguard the workers’ rights and interests.38 However, the national-level Supreme People’s Court Guiding Opinion released several months later expressed sympathy for "responsible" companies and advised that local governments should be cautious in quickly freezing or seizing the assets of delinquent companies.39

As the global economic crisis deepened and the number of labor disputes has continued to increase at an alarming rate, there has been greater emphasis on encouraging mutual cooperation and agreement between employers and workers. A key notion in 2009 regulatory development is that protection of both workers’ rights and employers’ lawful rights and interests is essential to maintain stable labor relations and to continue with industrial and economic development.40 This language is a marked change from a year or two earlier when the central government spoke of industrial upgrading and leaving poor-quality jobs behind.41 Currently, the emphasis is on the maintenance of employment levels.42

MEASURES TO DEVELOP EXTRAJUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

The 2008 PRC Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes underlined the need to first exhaust all consultation, negotiation, and mediation avenues to resolve labor disputes. The legislation suggested that arbitration and litigation should be used only when the other alternatives failed.43 It also indicated the importance of the tripartite system of coordination between labor bureaus, trade unions, and enterprise representatives to solve labor dispute cases together.44 Earlier local interpretations echoed and encouraged the use of this structure,45 and in some instances, they also suggested major collaboration and involvement from local governments and other relevant departments and organizations.46

However, with the explosion of labor conflict cases in arbitration committees and courts, which suggests a growing preference on the part of workers to use formal legal channels over more informal negotiations with employers,47 the central government has been trying to redirect these labor conflicts to other channels at lower local levels, and to encourage more mediation in general and negotiation within the enterprises.48 Local governments are encouraged to strengthen and provide better guidance to improve the competence of labor dispute mediation organizations,49 and there is emphasis on the communication and exchange of information between the relevant bodies.50 Thus, the government is seeking interorganizational collaboration, where arbitration committees, courts, mediation committees, trade unions, and enterprises research and work together to resolve labor disputes.51

LOCAL MEASURES TO REGULATE LAYOFFS

In response to the current global financial crisis, on January 23, 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and the China Enterprise Directors Association (CEDA) issued a joint guiding opinion on how to maintain stable labor relations and reduce the possibilities for potential labor conflicts and legal disputes. In this guiding opinion, employers are encouraged to avoid or reduce mass layoffs and to adopt flexible alternatives, vocational training programs, especially for rural migrant workers, in order to improve workers’ skills, flexible working hours, leave rotations, wage adjustments, and other cost-reducing measures.52 Local governments such as Jiangsu province have issued their own measures reinforcing and complementing the actions suggested in the guiding opinion, including the reduction of social insurance premiums to save jobs.53

Under the guiding opinion, employers should lay off workers only when necessary due to "operational difficulties." They are advised to formulate a layoff plan in accordance with the law and regulations and to report in a timely manner to the local human resources and social security bureau.54 This is intended to reinforce the requirements in the PRC Labor Contract Law to provide early notices to both the workers and the local labor departments,55 and it also suggests more government involvement. The guiding opinion emphasizes the need to strengthen the government’s guidance and supervision and the provision of guidance to the struggling enterprises.56 However, there is increasing evidence that enterprises are avoiding these formal layoff procedures and using alternative measures to reduce employees, which do not require extensive consultation with the trade union or the workforce and also that do not require government notification.57

While employers are told to pay severance compensation and clear all wage arrears to avoid potential disputes,58 both the MOHRSS Guiding Opinion and some local measures give enterprises the option to pay workers in stages rather than all at once after consulting and negotiating with the trade unions or workers directly.59 Further, in the case of a delay in payments, employers are required to report the delay to the local human resources and social security bureau in advance and seek the consent of the trade union or the workers.60 As a result, these measures, while strongly highlighting the tripartite system of coordination and cooperation among the government, the enterprise, and the trade union, also allow for direct negotiation between employers and workers in the event of layoffs.

Labor Disputes Trends

The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced that labor disputes in 2008 had risen to 693,000, a near doubling of cases from a year earlier.61 Reports on disputes in 2009 show that this rapid rate of increase is continuing and that the explosion of disputes is par­ticularly apparent in coastal cities and provinces, including Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong.62 The number of cases ar­bitrated in Shanghai increased 119 percent from 2007 to 2008, with some districts reporting increases of over 300 percent. Shanghai labor arbitrators’ average annual caseload now exceeds 400 cases.63 Taizhou city in Jiangsu province found that in the first quarter of 2009, nearly one-third of labor dispute cases involved layoffs or terminations of con­tracts, approximately a fourfold increase from the same period last year. A government report stated that these statistics indicate "a wave of dis­missals" as companies search for ways to trim their workforces.64

There are several new trends in this large increase in disputes, in­cluding an increase in cases involving layoffs and severance compensa­tion, social insurance, and wages; an increase in the complexity of the cases, making them more difficult to resolve; and finally, an increase in collective use of the courts by groups of workers. These issues, coupled with the large increase in the workload of arbitrators and judges, have lengthened the time it takes to resolve disputes.65 In some cases, work­ers are waiting six months to a year to have their cases opened by the arbitration tribunal. A labor arbitrator in Guangzhou municipality stat­ed that workers filing labor disputes in April 2009 would have their cases heard in March 2010.66 In other cities, arbitrators are sending cases directly to the courts without hearing cases, due to their unman­ageable workload.67

Local governments are also changing their procedural guidelines to adjust to the pressure of a rapidly rising caseload and dissatisfaction with long delays between case filings and hearings. In particular, local governments are pushing disputes down to lower levels for resolution, and encouraging, even coercing, the disputants to resolve disputes through negotiation or grassroots mediation, often led by low-level offi­cials.68 This emphasis on mediation and extrajudicial resolution is not limited to local governments, but is also reflected in national- and pro­vincial-level regulations and circulars.69 These procedural changes may make it more difficult to assess accurately the true number of disputes, as many disputes will not reach arbitration and litigation, which are the sources for the most commonly used statistics for labor conflict in China. There were also new reports that the rate at which workers win labor disputes is decreasing. A district in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, re­ported a 210-percent increase in the loss rate for employees.70

In addition to the large increases in arbitrated cases, Chinese courts continued to be deluged with labor disputes. In some cases, these dis­putes were the result of strong dissatisfaction with the arbitration pro­ceedings, as most arbitrated cases can be reviewed in the courts if either side is dissatisfied.71 In other cases, the increase reflected the strong and growing rights consciousness of Chinese workers as they claimed new protections offered in the legislation passed in 2008 during a time of increased layoffs and economic crisis. The Supreme People’s Court re­ported a 93.9-percent increase in labor cases over the course of 2008. In 2009, this trend continued with nearly 170,000 cases in the first half of the year, an increase of 30 percent from the 2008 high.72 The President of the Guangdong High People’s Court reported that Guangdong courts received over 76,000 new labor cases in 2008, up 157 percent from the same period last year.73 The people’s court with jurisdiction over the Tangxia industrial zone in Dongguan city reported that by November 2008, each judge had received over 1,000 cases. More than half of the annual caseload is made up of labor disputes, most often migrant work­ers asking for workers’ compensation, overtime pay, or severance com­pensation.74 Courts in Jiangsu province reported similarly high in­creases. In Jiangyin city, labor cases at the court increased threefold. Court officials called for new measures to handle disputes earlier and to manage large, spontaneous protests that occur when factories suddenly close or initiate mass layoffs.75

Xinhua, the Chinese Government’s state-run news agency, reported that, due to economic pressure on companies and local governments, 2009 would be a year with many mass protests and some local govern­ments at risk of losing control over labor protests.76 While strike and mass demonstration data are not released publicly, anecdotal evidence suggests that many localities in southeastern China experience large strikes on a daily basis. Jiangsu province reported that, in 2008, arbi­trated labor disputes increased to 139,100, an increase of 79 percent over the year before. Collective disputes increased to 773, with over 30,900 people involved, increases of 49 percent and 104 percent, respec­tively. Jiangsu labor officials also intervened in 720 mass incidents, in­volving over 72,900 workers.77 An official publication announced that labor protests jumped 94 percent in the first 10 months of 2008.78

Following the economic downturn that began in 2008, there continue to be widespread reports of strikes and demonstrations in China’s manufacturing centers in southern China. These strikes are often motivated by factory slowdowns, closures, and non-payment of wages or overtime.79 There is no evidence of encouragement or involvement by official trade unions. Instead, the trade union often appears during the period of negotiation and settlement of the strike as subordinate to the government.80 An exception is the Wal-Mart strike discussed below.

Strikes occurred at Jetpower, a subsidiary of Gold Peak Batteries, as workers in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone complained of toxic poisoning from cadmium during battery production. Workers seeking compensation for occupational disease went on strike in April; earlier, workers had gone on strike in February over suspicions that the plant was relocating to another city. During negotiations between the company, workers, and government officials, the general manager of the plant was also the plant’s union chairman.81

In April 2009, 1,000 workers from a state-owned textile factory in Baoding city, Hebei province, organized a protest walk from Baoding to Beijing in order to draw attention to their dissatisfaction with plans for privatization. They eventually were stopped by officials, and brought back to Hebei by bus.82

In April, a nationwide plan to scrap assistant manager positions at Wal-Mart stores in China was cancelled after managers protested the plan, including a public protest at Wal-Mart China headquarters in Shenzhen. Wal-Mart employees asked the Shenzhen branch of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions to intervene. Under the direction of the Shenzhen union, collective negotiations ensued, leading to the cancellation of the plan. Later in the year, however, Wal-Mart announced plans to lay off a large number of employees, including many of those affected by the earlier plan, by allowing short-term labor contracts to expire.83

In July, steelworkers in northern China’s Jilin province violently protested the planned merger of their state-owned company with a private company from Hebei province. The number of protesters remains unclear. The general manager of the Hebei company was beaten to death during the protests, which took place as company executives met to discuss the merger.84 Smaller strikes, demonstrations, and individual disputes also have involved violence, against both workers and employers.85

Migrant Workers

Migrant workers in China are estimated to number over 140 mil­lion.86 They are defined as rural residents who have left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in Chinese cities, sometimes in the same province and sometimes far from home. The Chinese house­hold registration system (hukou) restricts easy migration between rural and urban areas in China. Therefore, migrant workers may work in a city for many years but are unable to qualify for city residency. Without city residency, they are denied many basic public benefits, such as inclu­sion into social insurance programs, education for their children, and healthcare. As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often abused or exploited by their employers who take advantage of their in­secure social position and lower levels of education. While the central government has allowed the hukou system to relax over time, this sys­tem of institutionalized discrimination continues to affect adversely the social, civil, and political rights of migrants.87

At the workplace, migrants have borne the brunt of the global eco­nomic crisis as they are concentrated heavily in sectors adversely af­fected by recessions abroad, especially in labor-intensive manufacturing and construction. In February, the central government reported that 20 million migrant workers were now out of work.88 While the National Statistical Bureau (NSB) reported that 70 million migrants returned to rural areas during the Chinese New Year holiday because of the lack of job opportunities (half the total number of migrants), post-Chinese New Year surveys indicate that 80 percent of those migrant workers returned to the coastal cities to find new employment during 2009.89 In July, the mayor of the southern city of Dongguan stated that at least 10 percent of all migrant workers in the city had lost their jobs in the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009.90

Wage arrears and non-payment of wages are some of the most serious workplace problems that migrant workers face. Other serious problems include workplace injuries and the lack of reliable social insurance, es­pecially for occupational injury and disease. During the global economic crisis, wage arrears problems increased dramatically as factories shut their doors.91 The NSB reported that 5.8 percent of all migrant workers returning home for the holidays were owed back wages, but the percent­age jumped to over 13 percent for migrants whose factories had shut down.92 Local governments and trade unions often intervened in these cases, paying the workers subsidies if they agreed to end their pro­tests.93 Human Rights Watch issued a report drawing attention to how discriminatory aspects of the hukou system combined with a more re­strictive labor market threatened already tenuous protections for mi­grant workers.94

The lack of social security for migrants and the long and arduous road through the legal system’s labor dispute resolution proceedings are two severe problems. In 2009, there were several high-profile cases of mi­grant workers’ injury and disease. In June, Liu Hanhuang, a migrant worker whose hand was amputated after a work injury, was pursuing a case through the appeals court when he reportedly murdered two Tai­wanese managers at his former place of work.95 Much of the media cov­erage and Internet discussion of the Liu Hanhuang case was sympa­thetic. One commentator argued that his crimes were the result of his frustration and anger about his case, which had dragged on for more than one year.96

Another migrant worker in Hebei province suffering from an occupa­tional lung disease drew national attention for his pursuit of his legal rights for compensation.97 The 28-year-old worker suffering from pneu­moconiosis demanded that he be given an invasive surgical examination in order to prove his illness after the local unit authorized to certify oc­cupational diseases issued a different diagnosis. When the exam verified that Zhang suffered from the fatal lung disease, the government criti­cized the hospital for doing an illegal examination. Like the Sun Zhigang case in 2003, when a migrant worker’s death in police custody was followed by changes in the laws governing repatriation of migrant workers to their home areas, this case was followed by new calls for changes to China’s system of worker protection and labor inspection.98

As the draft Social Insurance Law is debated and revised, many local­ities have expanded efforts to include migrants in social insurance cov­erage. However, there are still significant problems in terms of partici­pation (for both employers and employees), coverage, and portability be­tween rural and urban areas and even within urban areas. As many mi­grant workers returned to their hometowns during the Chinese New Year, there was an increase in the number of workers withdrawing their social insurance accounts from coastal cities. Migrant workers generally are able to withdraw monies only from their individual accounts, losing the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid by their employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about whether they would re­turn to the same place to look for new work, and with the portability of pension accounts highly restricted, they chose to withdraw their pen­sions. A single district in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone reported that on a single day in March 2009 3,000 workers applied to withdraw pen­sions. In addition to complaints regarding long lines and bureaucratic delays in withdrawing pensions, some migrant workers complained of the basic unfairness of the system. Urban workers are able to draw on both individual and company accounts when they retire, while migrants are able to draw out only their individual accounts as they move from job to job.99

Official reports estimate that only about 17 percent of all migrant workers even participate in retirement insurance programs.100 Increas­ing informalization of the workforce (see below) has led to declining so­cial insurance protection for many migrant workers and low-level urban workers.

Workers in China do not enjoy the right to freedom of association. Trade union activity in China is organized under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a quasi-governmental organ that is under the direction of the Communist Party.101 Leading trade union officials concurrently hold high-ranking positions in the Party. The ACFTU Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the Party and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese Government.102 The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues in China, such as shopfloor organizing and "formalistic" collective contract negotiations, but it does not consistently or uniformly advance the rights of workers.103

In recent years, the central government has shown support for an enlarged trade union role in collective contracting, and in union organizing in private firms in China, including multinational companies.104 These changes are less a sign of opening up and liberalization than they are a collection of strategies to improve the standing and legitimacy of the ACFTU in workers’ eyes. The government’s strategy appears to be based on its expectation that a more vibrant and engaged ACFTU may limit demands for independent union organization and spontaneous collective action by aggrieved workers.

At the shopfloor level, the ACFTU’s unions remain weak and marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at lower administrative levels play important roles in legislation and regulation of workers’ rights and employment laws, this bureaucratic role is not matched with power at the enterprise level. Generally speaking, firm level union branches are weak, non-democratic, and subordinate to management.105 Despite an increase in legislation and administrative regulations that gives the ACFTU more power at the firm-level to resolve disputes, the structural weaknesses of the trade union branches make improvements in trade union autonomy and worker advocacy difficult and slow.106

In recent years preceding the economic crisis, the ACFTU initiated a number of programs and goals that enhanced its standing internationally and increased its visibility to marginalized workers, such as migrant workers and workers in small, private firms. The November 2008 Regulations on the Establishment and Development of Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Region more clearly defined the role of the ACFTU in Shenzhen to protect workers and to represent workers during stoppages or strikes. This is in contrast to national legislation, which instructs the union to represent workers and restart production as soon as possible. The 2008 PRC Labor Contract Law, the Shenzhen Regulations, and other local-level regulations also gave unions a larger role in enterprise decisionmaking, including the decision to initiate layoffs.107 The trade union also vowed to continue high-profile union organizing in multinational firms.108 At the local and regional levels, unions have become more proactive in organizing workers across different firms and negotiating minimum wage standards and labor contracts.109 In early 2008, the Shenzhen Municipal Trade Union announced an ambitious plan to hire over 300 private lawyers to provide free legal aid to aggrieved workers. This plan was seen as a model for other unions across the country.110

The ACFTU has continued its campaign to set up unions in large multinational firms. With the impact of the global economic crisis and the increased fear of social instability related to rising unemployment, the trade union’s role has been focused on assisting the government in resolving disputes and conflict. This is reflected in the renewed emphasis on mediation and lower level resolution of labor disputes in local regulations and measures. Reports on strikes and violent conflict between workers and the police do not mention the ACFTU as representing workers effectively, but depict it as either absent or on the side of the employer.111 The Guangdong Provincial Trade Union announced in November 2008 that collective wage negotiations would cease temporarily in enterprises suffering economic difficulty.112

Collective contracts and some process of collective consultation and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor relations since the 1990s when state enterprise reform deepened and labor conflict began to increase rapidly, especially in the foreign and private sectors. The ACFTU has championed collective contracts and collective negotiations as important foundations for trade union work at the enterprise level. In recent years, the collective contract system has received more Chinese Government and Communist Party support as part of an attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU, and the employer associations.113 Nonetheless, the collective contract and consultation system remains weak and formalistic because enterprise-level trade union leaders are not positioned to serve the interests of their workers. Many collective contracts merely reflect the basic legal standards in the locality and often are the result of concerted government or Party work to encourage the enterprise to enter into formalistic contracts rather than the result of true bargaining between management and the enterprise trade union.114

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has pushed the establishment of collective contract regimes in foreign-funded enterprises in particular. Wal-Mart stores in China began to draft collective contract provisions in 2008. Experts have criticized these agreements for being reached between ACFTU officials and Wal-Mart managers with little consultation with Wal-Mart employees.115 However, as mentioned above, there have been instances in which Wal-Mart unions have attempted to protect workers against unilateral moves by management to trim the workforce. The trade unions in Shanghai municipality Wal-Mart stores completed a collective contract agreement in 2008 that went beyond basic legal protections and rights. This agreement set an 8-percent increase in workers’ wages for the next two years and stipulated that workers with three years’ tenure were entitled to non-fixed-term contracts.116

The 2008 Regulations on Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone are the most extensive local regulations regarding collective contracts and collective consultation. Chapter 3 of these regulations emphasizes the role local governments and trade unions play in collective consultation. The regulations encourage both employers and workers to use collective consultation in accordance with the law for the establishment and modification of labor contracts, adjustments in labor remunerations, improvement in labor conditions, and resolution of labor disputes.117 The employing unit and the labor union or the workers’ representatives (laodongzhe daibiao) should consult collectively on issues that include payments, health and safety, insurance benefits, and salary adjustments in collective contracts, on any changes in regulations that may affect workers’ interests, on the prevention and resolution of labor disputes, and other issues that require consultation between the involved parties.118 The city and regional government labor departments, as well as trade unions at every level, should provide guidance and help in coordinating collective consultation.119

The regulations also provide for representation by external professionals.120 The number of these representatives should not exceed one-third of the number of the original representatives.121 Regional (qucheng) or enterprise trade unions can also represent workers in collective consultation and/or the establishment of collective contracts.122 These measures may allow for collective negotiations to become more professionalized and legalistic. They may also make it more possible for collective negotiations to occur in factories without an ACFTU presence.

For salary adjustments, the Shenzhen Regulations instruct that the employing units and the trade union or the workers’ representatives should organize collective consultation—a process that should occur at least once a year.123 In addition, the regulations highlight the necessity to establish city and regional coordination committees for labor relations (shi qu laodong guanxi xietiao weiyuanhui).124 They should be composed of representatives of various local governments’ departments as well as organizations that include the participation of enterprise representatives and trade unions,125 and conferences should be organized to discuss questions related to labor relations and labor disputes, to provide opinions and suggestions on changes in laws and regulations that affect workers’ interests, as well as on how to handle labor disputes, and to provide research on how to conduct collective consultation and establish collective contracts, or any other related issues in accordance with the law and regulations.126

The ACFTU has also pushed for the extension of collective consultation to include regular negotiation between industrial trade unions and small and medium employers. In July, the ACFTU released a Guiding Opinion on Actively Launching Work on Industry-Level Collective Wage Consultation.127 According to the deputy chair of the ACFTU, this work by the trade union is to increase workers’ bargaining power in industries where large numbers of workers are employed by small and medium enterprises producing similar products in one locale.128 This is a strategy to enhance and promote the ACFTU among workers who often are not unionized and in the past have been neglected by ACFTU campaigns.

None of the ACFTU activity has changed the basic fact that freedom of association does not exist in China. Rather, the ACFTU activity and continued higher profile in recent years is a proactive attempt by the government to stave off the formation of independent unions. However, with the onset of the global economic crisis and increased concern for social instability, the ACFTU appears to have taken a more passive and subordinate role with respect to the Communist Party and government.

The 2009 crackdown on legal activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representing disadvantaged groups in public interest lawsuits is also adversely affecting the advancement of workers rights in China. The July detention of Xu Zhiyong, the closure of the Gongmeng Law Research Center,129 and the harassment of other NGOs that strive to protect civil rights in China impede recent advancements regarding migrant workers’ rights and employment discrimination. [See Section III—Civil Society.]

There is increasing evidence of deteriorating working conditions for many Chinese workers and increasing bifurcation of the workforce as highly skilled workers still are in high demand while lower level workers bear the brunt of the global economic downturn. The trend of informalization also hurts the lower rungs of the labor market more severely as employers seek to retain highly sought technical workers and managers while reducing the size of the less-skilled labor force.130 Generally speaking, recent wage and benefits increases are slowing down or disappearing altogether. The government’s emphasis on reducing layoffs and encouraging wage reductions, holidays, and other stopgap measures may also be leading to worsening compensation, though it may reduce overall unemployment.

Illegal labor practices have undermined minimum wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, especially for migrant workers. Subcontracting practices within industry exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. When investors and developers default on their payments to construction companies, workers at the end of the chain of labor subcontractors lack the means to recover wages from the original defaulters. Subcontractors, including companies that operate illegally, neglect their own duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any direct avenue to demand their salaries. In 2007, the Commission reported a steady increase in the number of workers who turned to labor arbitration to settle their disputes with employers.133 As detailed below, this trend appears to have continued.134

WORKING HOURS

The PRC Labor Law mandates a maximum 8-hour workday and 44-hour average workweek.135 As mentioned in the Commission’s 2008 Annual Report, forced overtime and workdays much longer than the legally mandated maximum are not uncommon, especially in export sectors, where some employers avoid paying overtime rates by compensating workers on a piece-rate basis with quotas high enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime wages.136 It has been reported that suppliers in China avoid exposing themselves to claims of requiring illegal, long hours by hiring firms that help them set up double booking systems for foreign importers who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and regulations. Such firms not only help suppliers prepare books to pass audits, but also coach managers and employees on how to respond to auditors’ questions.137

In 2009, disputes over working hours abuses continued to be a major reason for labor disputes, especially disputes involving overtime or wage arrears related to past abuses and to struggling enterprises avoiding legal responsibilities to cut costs.138 The PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law lengthened the time allowed to file a dispute and also put more evidentiary responsibility on the employer to demonstrate that overtime abuses had not occurred, which also resulted in an increase in the number of workers seeking compensation.139 Many workplaces reduced hours and salaries in the wake of the global economic crisis, which led to workers’ complaints of violations of the minimum wage.140

The economic crisis and increasing informalization of the less-skilled workforce also led to greater bifurcation between highly skilled workers and managers and low-level or production-level workers. In order to retain scarce skilled workers, companies continued to raise wages and benefits for such staff, while cutting those of lower-level workers who can be more easily replaced when the economy recovers.141

INFORMALIZATION

Since the mid-1990s, when China’s economic reforms quickened, there has been a "rapid and unprecedented rise" in informal employment.142 Informal employment is defined as employment that is not stable or secure, that lacks a written agreement or contract, and that does not provide social insurance or benefits.143 Economists estimate that 45 percent of urban employment in China is now informal. Of workers in the state or collective sectors, 22 percent are employed informally, while the percentage rises to 84 percent for workers in the private sector. "Informal employment is the rule rather than the exception," according to experts reporting on findings from the field.144 Informal employment is also more likely for women, the very young and the very old, and among less educated workers.145

The 2008 Labor Contract Law included provisions to reduce informal employment and to encourage the signing of labor contracts, particularly longer term or open-term contracts. A National People’s Congress (NPC) implementation report states that there has been considerable success in the expansion of the labor contract system. The NPC also reported that contract length had become longer. In Jiangsu province, 49.09 percent of all contracts were between one and three years, while contracts less than one year were only 14.42 percent. Open-term contracts had increased by 1.19 percent.146 However, it is likely that these figures overstate the number of Chinese workers with more security and stable employment since the passing of the PRC Labor Contract Law. There is evidence that the high rates of "labor contract signing" are leaving out a large number of workers who now are employed in an informal and unstable manner, receiving pay by the day, hour, or piece rate with no formal agreement or relationship.147

There are also reports of increased use of temporary workers to avoid the burdens of formal employment, replacement of older workers with younger workers to avoid longer term contracts, and the use of contract expiration as a principal method of laying off formal employees during the economic slowdown.148 Formal employment in China continues to erode, especially for unskilled urban workers and rural migrants.

In spite of legal measures to prohibit the practice of child labor in China, child labor remains a persistent problem.149 As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions on the elimination of child labor.150 The PRC Labor Law and related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under 16,151 and both national and local legal provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate a series of fines for employing children.152 Under the PRC Criminal Law, employers and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for forcing children to work under conditions of extreme danger.153 Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have dulled the effects of these legal measures. The overall extent of child labor in China is unclear in part because the government classifies data on the matter as "highly secret." 154

As reported by the Commission in 2008, child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors as well as in small workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and shoe manufacturing enterprises.155 Many underage laborers reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the education system and shortages of adult workers.156 Children in detention facilities also have been subjected to forced labor.157 Reports of child labor continued in 2009 with a high-profile case surfacing at a factory in Guangdong province that implicated foreign buyers. A migrant worker, Liu Pan, was crushed to death in a factory producing paper goods for the Walt Disney Company. It was discovered after his death that Liu was only 15 when he was hired at the factory.158 China Labor Watch also reported that the factory’s use of child laborers was widespread.159 Media also reported on the presence of underage workers in government-sponsored labor transfer programs that transferred workers from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to jobs in the interior of China [see Section IV—Xinjiang].

As reported in the Commission’s 2008 Annual Report, the Chinese Government, which has condemned the use of child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat it,160 permits "work-study" programs and activities that in practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor, and are tantamount to official endorsement of it.161 Under work-study programs implemented in various parts of China, children who are elementary school students pick crops and engage in other physical labor.162 [See Section IV— Xinjiang for more information on work-study programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

Central government legislation allows this form of child labor. National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that "education practice labor" and vocational skills training labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational institutes do not constitute the use of child labor when such activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the students.163 The PRC Education Law supports schools that establish work-study and other programs, provided that the programs do not negatively affect normal studies.164 A nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary and secondary school students outlines the general terms of such programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals, contribute to production outputs, and generate resources for improving schools.165 These provisions contravene China’s obligations as a member state to ILO conventions prohibiting child labor.166 In 2006, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations "expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of children under 18 years performing forced labor not only in the framework of re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular work programs at school." 167

In May 2009, another forced labor case was exposed at brick kilns in Anhui province. This case follows several high-profile scandals at brick kilns in 2007 and 2008, involving forced labor and child labor. In this case, brick kilns had employed mentally handicapped workers and employed them in "slave-like" conditions. The official media reported that investigations were continuing in possible trafficking of mentally impaired people in China as these workers came from a number of different provinces and the brick kiln owner reported that he "bought" the workers from a taxi driver in a nearby province.168

As reported in the Commission’s 2008 Annual Report, Article 244 of the PRC Criminal Law makes forced labor a crime. Events during this reporting year showed the deterrent value of this provision to be inadequate at best under current conditions.169 Current law applies only to legally recognized employers and does not apply to individuals or illegal workplaces. As the Commission noted in its last Annual Report, the All China Lawyers Association in June 2007 asked the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to introduce new legislation making slavery a criminal charge.170 It is unclear at the time of this writing whether such legislation is in process. However, in March 2008, members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) recommended to the CPPCC (which is not a lawmaking body) that the Criminal Law be amended to criminalize "violently forcing labor." 171

China’s International Commitments to Worker Rights

As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China is obligated to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor rights for workers, including freedom of association and the "effective recognition" of the right to collective bargaining.172 China is also a per­manent member of the ILO’s governing body.173 The ILO’s Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998 Declaration) commits ILO members "to respect, to promote and to realize" these fun­damental rights based on "the very fact of [ILO] membership." 174

The ILO’s eight core conventions articulate the scope of worker rights and principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is committed to respect the fundamental right or principle addressed in each core convention, even if that member state has not ratified the con­vention. China has ratified four of the eight ILO core conventions, in­cluding two core conventions on the abolition of child labor (No. 138 and No. 182) and two on non-discrimination in employment and occupation (No. 100 and No. 111).175 The ILO has reported that the Chinese Gov­ernment is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced labor (No. 29 and No. 105).176 On its face, Chinese labor law appears to incor­porate some of the basic obligations of the ILO’s eight core conventions, but in practice many of these obligations remain unfulfilled.177 Impor­tantly, Chinese labor law does not incorporate basic obligations of the ILO’s provisions relating to the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.

The Chinese Government is a state party to the International Cov­enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which guar­antees the right of workers to strike, the right of workers to organize independent unions, the right of trade unions to function freely, the right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations, and the right of the latter to form or join international trade union orga­nizations.178 In ratifying the ICESCR, the Chinese Government made a reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. The government asserts that application of the article should be consistent with Chinese law, which does not allow for the creation of independent trade unions.179

The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) participated in the economic track of the first meeting of the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009. Discussions at the economic track focused on ways to promote a sustainable global recovery and to ensure that future growth results in a more balanced global economy and stronger financial systems. USDOL and China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security agreed to further bilateral cooperation on labor issues, including undertaking a dialogue between the two agencies.

23 PRC Central People’s Government (Online), "Implementation of a National Social Security System and Social Security Cards Is a Long-Term Goal" [Shixing quanguo tongyi shehui baoxian haoma he shehui baoxianka shi changyuan mubiao], 11 June 09.

24 See also National People’s Congress (Online), "Draft Law of Social Insurance Draws Nationwide Debate," 20 February 09.

31 Ibid., art. 42. If unemployment insurance premiums were paid for more than one year and less than five, the unemployed worker can receive unemployment payments for a maximum of 12 months. If the premiums were paid for more than 5 years but less than 10 years, the unemployed worker can receive unemployment payments for a maximum of 18 months. If the premiums were paid for more than 10 years, unemployment payments can be received for a maximum of 24 months.

36 See, e.g., Circular on Improvement of Standardized Measures To Handle the Establishment, Modification, Dissolution, and Cancellation of Enterprise Labor Contracts in Fujian Province (Trial) [Guanyu yinfa fujian sheng jinyibu guifan qiye laodong hetong dingli biangeng jiechu he zhongzhi de banfa (shixing) de tongzhi], issued 31 March 08, secs. 11 (on the termination of a labor contract and labor relations due to bankruptcy, revocation of license, etc.), 12 (on reaching a settlement in accordance to national and provincial regulations with respect to section above), 13 (on art. 40 of the Labor Contract Law), and 18 (on employer’s and worker’s responsibilities when terminating/canceling the labor contract). In art. 30 of the Guangdong High People’s Court and Guangdong Labor Dispute Arbitration Committee Guiding Opinion on Questions About the Use of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the Labor Contract Law [Guangdong sheng gaoji renmin fayuan guangdong sheng laodong zhengyi zhongcai weiyuanhui guanyu shiyong "laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai fa," "laodong hetong fa" ruogan wenti de zhidao yijian], issued 23 June 08, it is suggested that if a contract is illegally terminated, the employer should pay the relevant severance fees. The Shanghai High People’s Court Opinion on Questions About the Use of the Labor Contract Law [Guanyu shiyong laodong hetong fa ruogan wenti de yijian], issued 3 March 09, does not seem to explicitly indicate what actions workers should take in case the employer violates or does not follow the legal procedures to end labor contracts and labor relations.

47 "Labor Lawsuits Double in 2008," China Labour Bulletin (Online), 3 March 09. See also "Cases Soar as Workers Seek Redress," China Daily (Online), 22 April 09, which suggests thatlitigation is preferred, for example, because workers seem to win more often (95% of the cases) at that level and get the benefits they demand. Further, "in most labour related cases courtsdo rule independently and according to legal statute (sic)."

48 See, e.g., Jiangsu High People’s Court Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor DisputeCases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation [Jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi anjian dezhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3. See also "Cases Soar as Workers Seek Redress," China Daily (Online), 22 April 09, which suggests that experts encourage the use of "more out-of-court mediation" with "extensive participation of government departments, labor unions, residents’ or villagers’ committees as well as mediators." Moreover, as reported in the article, QiuBaochang, head of Beijing’s Huijia Law Firm was quoted as saying, "workers should not rely solely on the courts and arbitration committees. Fair labor treatment can also be achievedthrough negotiations between workers and enterprises."

51 Ibid. Note that in Jiangsu High People’s Court Guiding Opinion on the Handling of LaborDispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation [Jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi anjiande zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3, pt. 4 (guidance to lower level courts), higher level courts are advised to supervise and guide grassroots courts in handling labor dispute cases,especially when there is a large number of them. Further, these courts should investigate or research the reasons and causes.

52 See generally Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and China Enterprise Directors Association, Guiding Opinion on How To Maintain Stable Labor Relations in the Current Economic Situation [Guanyu yingdui dangqian jingji xingshi wending laodong guanxi de zhidao yijian], issued 23 January 09. In sec. 2, it is indicated that large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises should take the lead in making efforts to avoid or reduce mass layoffs.

129 Human Rights in China (Online), "Law Research Center Is Shut Down as Authorities Tighten Control on Civil Society Groups," 17 July 09; Andrew Jacobs, "Arrest in China Rattles Backers of Legal Rights," New York Times (Online), 9 August 09.

133 See Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Online), "2006 Statistical Communique on the Development of Labor and Social Security Affairs" [2006 niandu laodong he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbu], last visited 10 October 07. For statistics by year, see data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site. See also Guan Xiaofeng, "Labor Disputes Threaten Stability," China Daily, 30 January 07 (Open Source Center, 30 January 07); "China To Enact Law To Deal With Rising Number of Labor Disputes," Xinhua, 26 August 07 (Open Source Center, 26 August 07); CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 66.

153 This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng an (si)], issued 28 December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 244.

157 For more information on this phenomenon, see International Labour Organization (Online), Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) China (Ratification: 2002) Observation, CEACR 2006/77th Session, 2006.

158 David Barboza, "Despite Law, Job Conditions Worsen in China," New York Times (Online), 23 June 09.

160 For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns, including child labor, see, e.g., Zhang Pinghui, "Crackdown on Slave Labor Nationwide—State Council Vows To End Enslavement," South China Morning Post (Online), 21 June 07.

166 ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage minors only where it is an "integral part" of a course of study or training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member States to eliminate the "worst forms of child labor," including "forced or compulsory labor." ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99.

167 International Labour Organization, "Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention," 1999.

169 PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97,amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 244. ("Where an employer, in violation of the laws and regulations on labor administration, compels its employees to work by restricting their personal freedom, if the circumstances are serious, the persons who are directly responsible for the offenceshall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined.")

172 These other rights are "(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation." International Labour Organization (Online), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 98, art. 2.

174 International Labour Organization (Online), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 98, art. 2. China has been a member of the ILO since its founding in 1919. For more information, see the country profile on China in the ILO database of national labor, social security, and human rights legislation (NATLEX) (Online).

178 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.

179 Declarations and Reservations, United Nations Treaty Collection (Online), 5 February 02. Article 10 of China’s Trade Union Law establishes the All-China Federation of Trade Unions as the "unified national trade union federation," and Article 11 mandates that all unions must be approved by the next higher level union body, giving the ACFTU an absolute veto over the establishment of any local union and the legal authority to block independent labor associations. PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, arts. 10, 11.

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, as in 2008, the dual priorities of maintaining "social stability" and preserving the Communist Party’s hold on power have played a significant role in the operation of the criminal justice system and the use of police power.1 Even before the global financial crisis, the Chinese leadership was concerned about challenges to "social stability" during 2009 because of several significant anniversaries, such as the 20th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, that would fall during the year.2 Anniversaries in China are potentially destabilizing events because they can act as a trigger for citizens’ protests against current policies and conditions.3 The attention Chinese leaders are placing on "social stability" is not surprising; the number of group protests, petitions, and riots reportedly is on the rise, and clashes between citizens and police appeared to intensify during this reporting year.4

The problem of unchecked police power and arbitrary detention of Chinese citizens showed no sign of abating during 2009. For example, the Commission noted numerous reports of petitioners being held in extralegal secret "black jails" (hei jianyu) (both in Beijing and elsewhere) during the annual March meeting of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.5 Extralegal detention and harassment of activists continued during this reporting year and intensified during the run-up to the 20th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests on June 3 and 4.6

Fair trial rights received significant attention among China’s online community and the media during the past year in the context of two criminal cases that were plagued by irregularities and suspicious official conduct.7 Yang Jia was executed in November 2008 after being convicted of killing six public security officers in Shanghai, apparently in retaliation for earlier police mistreatment, and Deng Yujiao, a young female worker in Badong county, Hubei province was exempted from punishment after she killed a local official and injured another in self-defense to stave off an alleged attempted rape.8 That members of China’s online community and activists sympathized with Yang Jia highlights the fraught nature of relations between the Chinese public security apparatus and the citizenry, and perhaps an increasing focus among citizens on the importance of procedural fairness and justice.9 The support among Chinese citizens for Deng Yujiao stemmed in part from the anger and resentment many citizens apparently feel toward corrupt local officials and the police.10

There were several potentially positive developments during this reporting year with respect to criminal justice. The first-ever National Human Rights Action Plan, which the government released in April, contains policy commitments, which, if implemented effectively, could lead to improvements in fair trial rights and detainee rights. Also in April, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate launched a five-month campaign to ensure "proper management" of detention centers in the aftermath of a spate of unnatural deaths of detainees at Ministry of Public Security-run detention centers during the first few months of 2009.11 In August, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced that confessions obtained through torture would no longer be admissible as evidence in death penalty cases.12 The revised PRC Lawyers Law, which has been in effect for over a year, reportedly has led to some improved access by lawyers to their detained clients in certain jurisdictions; however, serious implementation challenges remain.13 In June, the municipality of Beijing announced that by the end of 2009 it would cease executing prisoners by gunshot, but instead would use lethal injections.14 The Supreme People’s Court indicated that eventually all executions nationwide will be carried out by lethal injection.15

SUPPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS AND CITIZENS WHO SEEK JUSTICE RELATED TO "SENSITIVE ISSUES"

Public security (gongan) officers and officers in the domestic security protection (guobao) unit of public security bureaus continued to engage in extralegal tactics such as harassment, assault, kidnappings, and illegal detention in order to punish Chinese citizens who expressed dissent or sought to defend their rights and the rights of others.16 Such arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as China’s own laws.17

Parents seeking justice for their children who died in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and those who were injured or killed from drinking melamine-tainted milk were subjected to illegal treatment at the hands of the police or their agents.18 Authorities warned parent protesters in Sichuan province "of dire consequences if they continued to ‘make a fuss.’ " 19 Several parents who eluded the police and made it to Beijing to petition reported that after they returned to Sichuan, "the threats from local officials increased and the parents were told it was illegal for them to meet or talk to foreign journalists." 20 Beijing-based Zhao Lianhai, an organizer of parents whose children were injured or killed by melamine-tainted milk, had been questioned by public security officers more than 20 times between September 2008 and March 2009.21

Several lawyers who took on "sensitive" cases or got involved in "sensitive" issues during the past year were abducted or beaten by public security officers and/or individuals working under the direction or with the knowledge of the public security bureau.22 [See Section III—Access to Justice—Harassment and Abuse of Human Rights Lawyers.] Shanghai-based rights defense lawyer Zheng Enchong has been subjected to constant surveillance and harassment since his release from prison in June 2006.23 Zheng was summoned by police for questioning 10 times during April 2009 alone.24 Human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng was last seen being taken away by police and hired "thugs" in February of this year. As of mid-September, his whereabouts remain unknown.25

Within one month of the issuance in December 2008 of Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China, the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that more than 100 signatories throughout China had been summoned for questioning by the police.26 At the same time as signers of the Charter were being pressured by public security officers to renounce their support for the Charter, other officers were searching the individuals’ homes, often confiscating computers, manuscripts, and even bank account books.27 After prominent intellectual and rights defender Zhang Zuhua—one of the main drafters of the Charter—was taken into police custody on December 8, his home was searched and many items were confiscated, including computers, cash, credit cards, and bank deposit books.28 Zhang’s bank accounts were promptly emptied.29 In late March 2009, domestic security protection (guobao) officers warned Jiang Qisheng, a Beijing-based writer, activist, and signatory of Charter 08, not to engage in any activities commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Officers searched his home and took three computers, several bank deposit books, and many manuscripts and books.30 [See Section II—Freedom of Expression, for a discussion of Charter signatory Liu Xiaobo’s detention and arrest.]

The abuse of police power to summon citizens for questioning, search their homes, and arbitrarily confiscate their personal property sparked an unprecedented open joint statement from eight human rights groups in mainland China and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in April 2009.31 The declaration criticizes the Chinese Government’s frequent use of "police force to summon Chinese citizens, search their residences, seize their computers, bank deposit books, paper notebooks, drafts of their writings, etc." 32 The groups condemned such "illegal exercise of police power" and violations of Chinese citizens’ right to personal liberty and property, and other fundamental human rights.33

Authorities also unlawfully subjected family members of dissidents, rights defenders, and activists to strict surveillance and control during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. Officials use harassment (or the threat of harassment) of family members of activists for at least three purposes: (1) to punish and instill fear in activists by causing their families to suffer, (2) to create leverage for the government in its efforts to pressure activists to stop whatever conduct they are engaged in that the government does not like (i.e., "stop doing X, and we’ll stop harassing your family"), and (3) in the case of detained activists, to obstruct attempts by family members to bring public attention to the activist’s plight.34 For example, on December 26, 2008, police summoned Charter 08 drafter Zhang Zuhua for a second time regarding the Charter and threatened him that "severe consequences" to his family would follow if he continued promoting Charter 08 and giving interviews to the media.35 Liu Xiaobo’s wife, Liu Xia, has been followed constantly and monitored by public security officers since Liu Xiaobo was taken away on December 8, 2008.36

Yuan Weijing, wife of imprisoned legal advocate and rights defender Chen Guangcheng, continues to be placed under "soft detention" (ruanjin).37 As many as 26 guards, who reportedly work in two shifts, keep her confined to her home and prevent visitors from entering.38 Zeng Jinyan, a blogger, rights activist, and the wife of imprisoned human rights activist Hu Jia, is under strict surveillance by domestic security protection (guobao) officers. In February, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing, at least six guobao officers prevented Zeng from leaving her apartment, citing "an order from the top." 39 After fleeing China to the United States, Geng He, wife of disappeared attorney Gao Zhisheng, cited the Chinese authorities’ harassment and abuse of her children as the primary reason for their defection.40

Local law enforcement officials outside of Beijing often abuse their power in order to silence aggrieved citizens who may seek to go to the provincial capital and/or Beijing to petition.41 For example, in Sichuan province, public security officers illegally detained some of the parents who sought justice for their children killed during the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake in order to prevent them from petitioning or advocating for an investigation.42 And a 58-year-old petitioner from Jilin province, Du Mingrong, told the Guardian, a British daily newspaper, in May that he was locked up by local officials for two years and was never told why. "I was just petitioning to get back some money that the police had stolen from me. . . . I was beaten and tortured by officials in Baishan in Jilin. I came to Beijing to protest." 43

GOVERNMENT’S USE OF HIRED "THUGS" FOR INTIMIDATION AND ABUSE

A "disguised" form of police abuse continued during 2009: the use of hired, unofficial personnel (often referred to as "thugs" in media and human rights reports) to beat, abduct, and torture dissidents, activists, petitioners, and other "troublemakers," with the knowledge of the police or government officials.44 In December 2008, the UN Committee against Torture (UNCAT) concluded that the Chinese Government’s use of "unaccountable ‘thugs’ who use physical violence against specific [human rights] defenders but enjoy de facto immunity" was one of three "over-arching problems" that undermine effective implementation of the Convention against Torture.45 The UNCAT specifically noted reports that Gao Zhisheng and other human rights lawyers were harassed by "unaccountable personnel alleged to be hired by State authorities." 46 Gao was last seen on February 4, 2009, being dragged out of bed from his relatives’ home in Shaanxi by more than 10 police and "hired thugs." 47 In the fall of 2008, Xu Zhiyong, a law professor and co-founder of the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI) began to organize citizen rescue teams to free petitioners from black jails in Beijing. Government-hired "thugs" at Beijing’s Youth Hotel (which operates as a black jail) beat up Xu early on in his rescue efforts.48 Xu Zhiyong was told by a petitioner inside the black jail that the local government of Kaifeng municipality (in Henan province) had hired gangsters as "guards." The hired "guards" reportedly received 1,000 yuan (US$146) for a light beating and 3,000 yuan (US$439) for a heavy beating.49 [See Section III—Civil Society, for a discussion of the government’s shutdown of OCI and the detention and subsequent release of Xu Zhiyong.]

CLASHES BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND CHINESE CITIZENS

Relations between China’s law enforcement agencies and Chinese citizens appear to be on a steady decline. In April, Hong Kong-based analyst Willy Lam observed that police incompetence and corruption were responsible for "quite a number of relatively minor incidents . . . develop[ing] into law-and-order disasters." 50 According to the Open Constitution Initiative, which ranked the Yang Jia police-murder case as the most important law-related event of 2008, the fact that Yang Jia, "was regarded as a hero by ordinary citizens . . . indicated the unusual tension between the police force and the general public. The public has lost faith in police." 51 In March, a land dispute in Yingde county, Guangdong province resulted in violent clashes between police and farmers, resulting in many injuries.52 One injured villager told the Washington Post that he was now "terrified" of the police: "I feel that Chinese cops can kill people like ants with impunity." 53 In mid-August, human rights defenders in Beijing and Shanghai launched an online petition protesting police violence.54

The number of "mass incidents" (quntixing shijian), an imprecise term that includes mass petitions, violent riots, and unauthorized peaceful demonstrations and assemblies, appears to be on the rise.55 Chinese authorities reported 74,000 "mass incidents" in 2004,56 and in February 2009, the Hong Kong magazine Cheng Ming reported that an internal report circulated by the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security stated that during 2008 there were more than 127,000 "mass protests" (qunti kangzheng shijian) throughout China in which more than 12.1 million people participated.57 The growing number of such incidents and protests and the apparent inability of the Party, government, and security forces to prevent them in the first instance, and appropriately handle them once they occur, is one of the most serious problems facing China’s leadership.58 The number of attacks on police stations and police vehicles, and even on police officers themselves, reportedly has increased as well.59

Evidence of the fraught state of police-citizen relations was apparent in several high-profile incidents that occurred during the past year. On June 17, a mass incident erupted in Shishou city, Hubei province, following the suspicious death of a 24-year-old cook, Tu Yuangao, who was employed at a hotel that reportedly had close ties to the local government.60 Rumors circulated that Tu was killed because he had threatened to expose the hotel’s involvement in the local drug trade.61 The police, however, promptly declared Tu’s fall from the third floor to be a suicide.62 Protesters burned the hotel and overturned police cars in what became a full-blown riot that pitted tens of thousands of citizens against riot police for several days.63 In an unusual move, a local Shishou official named Li Guolin, blogged about the events and criticized the government’s characterization of the riot as an isolated incident.64 Li wrote, "[T]he unrest was precipitated by long established tensions in Shishou society. . . . Such tensions are what the media calls ‘hatred toward the rich, the officials and the police’ that spread widely among the society." 65 Another clash that revealed tensions between citizens and police occurred in late May in Huining county, Gansu province. Nearly 1,000 citizens protested the alleged beating of a student by traffic police personnel after the student failed to stop at a red light while riding his bicycle.66 A police car was overturned before 100 additional police showed up on the scene. Local citizens were reported as saying that the clash reflected long-simmering resentment of the rough tactics used by local police.67

The tense relationship between China’s public security apparatus and the citizenry was highlighted in the case of Yang Jia, a 28-year-old man who was convicted of killing six police officers in Shanghai in July 2008 and then executed for the crime in late November.68 The police killings were apparently in retaliation for an earlier incident of police abuse.69 Artist and blogger Ai Weiwei, who followed Yang Jia’s case closely, believed that Yang Jia killed the police officers as a "protest against the system." 70 Ai Weiwei noted that sympathy for Yang Jia grew as procedural irregularities in the Shanghai authorities’ handling of the case spread across the Internet.71 In an online poll conducted by Southern Weekend, Internet users ranked Yang Jia’s case as the most important event of 2008.72

Another form of state brutality that received substantial attention during this reporting year was the violence perpetrated by urban management (or administration) officers, or chengguan.73 The responsibilities of urban management officers include checking permits, shutting down unlicensed street vendor stalls, and generally assisting in maintaining "stability" in the cities, but in order to maintain "stability," chengguan often resort to violence.74 The reputation of urban management officers for brutality among Chinese citizens is so widespread that the word "chengguan" is used as a synonym in colloquial speech for "violence." 75 In April, excerpts from an official training handbook for Beijing’s urban management officers that included instructions on how to beat targets without drawing blood on the face or leaving marks on the body was posted online, sparking outrage in the media and blogosphere.76 In May, thousands of university students from the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Nanjing city, Jiangsu province, reportedly took to the streets after five students were beaten by chengguan officers as they were trying to set up vendor stands on the sidewalk.77 The unrest reportedly reflected simmering anger among students regarding the harsh tactics used by the chengguan.78 Over the past several years, academics and others have called for the abolition of the urban management system and have raised questions about the legal basis of the system.79 In July, the State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office issued for public comment draft measures that would legalize the business activities of street vendors and peddlers.80 A Caijing report on the draft measures noted that conflicts between chengguan and peddlers had increased and were becoming more violent.81

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be "arbitrary" if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) there is clearly no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual is deprived of his liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is grave non-compliance with fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international human rights instruments.82 Many forms of arbitrary detention also violate China’s own laws.83 Arbitrary detention in China includes various forms of extralegal detention, such as detention in secret black jails (hei jianyu), "soft detention" (ruanjin)— a form of unlawful home confinement—and the arbitrary confinement of individuals in psychiatric hospitals for non-medical reasons. Another form of extralegal detention—shuanggui ("double regulation" or "double designation")—is used by the Party for investigation of Party members, most often officials in cases of suspected corruption. Arbitrary detention also includes various kinds of extrajudicial administrative detention, such as reeducation through labor. Finally, the detention of those who have been de-prived of their liberty for exercising rights guaranteed under the UDHR and ICCPR is arbitrary.84 [See Section II—Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Religion, and other sections for information on specific cases.]

EXTRALEGAL DETENTION AND DISAPPEARANCES

The use of extralegal detention, discussed in previous Commission reports, continued unabated during this reporting year. As in 2008, Chinese authorities subjected citizens to at least three forms of extralegal detention: (1) arbitrary home confinement or "soft detention" (ruanjin) and control,85 (2) detention in black jails and other secret detention sites, which the UN Committee against Torture has deemed "per se disappearance," 86 and (3) shuanggui.87

Arbitrary "soft detention" and control

As discussed in last year’s Annual Report, and earlier in this section, the unlawful "soft detention" (ruanjin) or "home confinement" that numerous dissidents, activists, and their family members are subjected to has no basis in Chinese law and constitutes arbitrary detention under international human rights standards.88 Perhaps the most famous case of unlawful home confinement was former Premier Zhao Ziyang’s 16-year-long period of "soft detention," which ended with his death in 2005. Zhao’s thoughts on his confinement have come to light this year with the release of his memoir, "Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang." Based on tapes he secretly recorded around 2000, the memoir contains a letter Zhao wrote to President Jiang Zemin in 1997 regarding his illegal home confinement. Zhao states:

Since June 1989, I have been illegally subjected to either house arrest or semi-house arrest. This has gone on for eight and a half years already. . . . I do not even know what specific laws I have violated, nor do I know which state law enforcement agency and what procedure of law have been used to authorize my house arrest. How can subjecting a person to this kind of undeclared house arrest and depriving his rights as a citizen not constitute a crude trampling of the socialist legal system? 89

The abuse of police power to unlawfully restrict the personal liberty of dissidents, activists, writers, and others during the period surrounding the 20th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests was so severe that 81 individuals who signed Charter 08 launched the Anti-Soft Detention Anti-Surveillance United Movement.90 Their statement, issued on June 10, observes that every year, in the lead-up to June 4 and other politically sensitive dates, public security bureaus across China mobilize a massive amount of police power for the purpose of subjecting dissidents and rights defense activists to ruanjin and surveillance.91 The group accuses the Communist Party of wide-scale violations of human rights, particularly citizens’ right to personal liberty.92

Secret detention facilities and disappearances

According to the UN Committee against Torture, detention of individuals in secret detention facilities "constitutes per se disappearance." 93 Secret detention sites in China include black jails (often housed in privately-run small hotels, guesthouses, and government buildings), government facilities used for forced detention for "legal education" and "study classes," and psychiatric hospitals used to hold petitioners and others for non-medical reasons.

Black jails have no legal basis.94 Although the Chinese Government has denied the existence of black jails on several occasions, including during the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of its human rights record,95 the existence of black jails of various forms throughout China is well-documented.96 Black jails arose as a substitute for the dismantled "custody and repatriation" (shourong qiansong) centers that had been used to detain petitioners and undocumented migrants, up until they were abolished in 2003.97 Law professor and human rights defender Xu Zhiyong defines "black jails" as:

places used by provincial governments to illegally imprison petitioners; we call them black jails because, first, they are just like prisons—established by the government to restrict people’s freedom—and, second, they are "black" because they have no basis in any laws or regulations and are totally illegal.98

Xu believes that the government’s use of black jails is "in a sense . . . the biggest human rights issue because it involves so many people, it’s so widespread, and it’s so lacking in legal justification." 99 Chinese Human Rights Defenders and others have documented that the extralegal detention and repatriation of petitioners is good business for the public security apparatus in Beijing, small hotels that double as black jails, and interceptors (i.e., individuals who "catch" petitioners). One county in Hunan province reportedly pays nearly US$300 for each petitioner from the county who is caught in Beijing.100 Owners of small hotels in Beijing may be compensated up to US$35 per prisoner per day.101

There is compelling evidence that black jails in Beijing exist with the knowledge and even cooperation of the Beijing public security bureau.102 During one of Xu’s citizen rescue attempts, Xu was beaten by the guards, who warned him: "We are the government, what can we be afraid of? Do you want to call 110 [police hotline for emergency]? You can call now!" 103 Beijing public security officers reportedly were also involved in the detention of Wang Shixiang, a petitioner from Anhui province, who was detained in a black jail in Beijing during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to China in February 2009.104 After Wang was beaten by guards at the black jail, he managed to contact the Beijing Public Security Bureau, but once the officers who arrived at the scene learned that Wang was a petitioner, they did nothing to help him.105

"Legal education classes" (fajiaoban or xuefaban) or "study classes" (xuexiban), are another form of secret detention used by the Chinese Government.106 Officials forcibly detain petitioners, Falun Gong practitioners, and other "undesirables" in illegal detention sites where they are, on occasion, forced to study the "error" of their ways with the goal that they achieve a new understanding and cease their conduct.107 At other times, they are simply held in detention without any pretext of "education." 108 For example, petitioner Zheng Dajing, who went to Beijing to petition and was subsequently abducted and taken back to his hometown of Yunxi county in Hubei province, spent over a year in a detention center that was called a "law education class." 109 Another petitioner from Hubei province, Wang Zan, ended up in a black jail in Wuhan city in early March 2009 after traveling to Beijing to seek justice for having been detained in a "law education class" for 113 days before and during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.110

In October 2008, the Beijing News broke the story of Sun Fawu, a farmer in Xintai city, Shandong province, who was locked up in a psychiatric hospital by local authorities for approximately 20 days to prevent him from going to Beijing to petition.111 Sun was tied to a bed and forcibly medicated.112 Sun was only released after he signed an agreement that he would not attempt to go to Beijing to petition again. Following the Sun Fawu story, more journalists uncovered stories of petitioners like Sun who had no history of mental illness, being forcibly detained in psychiatric hospitals, and in some cases also forced to take medication.113

Once an individual "disappears" into a Chinese psychiatric hospital for non-medical reasons, he or she exists completely outside the legal system.114 For this reason, one Chinese commentator has called psychiatric hospitals in China a "gulag archipelago" with Chinese characteristics.115 Authorities have also used psychiatric detention as a convenient way to have people simply "disappear" who might present difficulties for the government, for example, in high-profile criminal cases. In the Yang Jia case, for example, Yang’s mother, Wang Jingmei, was taken by Beijing public security officers from her home on July 1, the same day that Yang Jia killed six public security officers in Shanghai’s Zhabei district’s police station.116 A few days later, Wang, who does not suffer from mental illness, was locked up incommunicado for over four months in a psychiatric hospital (ankang) run by the Beijing Public Security Bureau while Yang’s case made its way through the courts.117 Yang’s mother apparently knew important information related to the case, and her forced disappearance also may have played some role in her reportedly approving a defense attorney hand-picked by local Shanghai authorities.118 The attorney selected for Yang Jia, Xie Youming, had ties to the Zhabei district government, which presented a clear conflict of interest.119 After Wang was finally released and taken to Shanghai for a final meeting with her son before his execution, Wang insisted on speaking with a judge in Yang’s case. When she told the judge her story and asked him why they had prohibited her from testifying at her son’s trial and appeal, the judge told Wang that they had been unable to locate her.120

In another high profile case during this reporting year—the case of Deng Yujiao—after Deng killed a local official and injured another in self-defense to thwart an attempted rape, authorities in Hubei province detained Deng in a psychiatric hospital.121 Like Yang Jia, Deng Yujiao garnered much sympathy and support among Chinese Internet users and the media.122 Shortly after Deng was detained in the hospital, one of Deng’s friends managed to get into her room and found her tightly strapped to the bed. Deng’s friend reported that Deng had told him that she had been beaten and that officers had threatened her that if she did not admit she suffered from depression, they would give her the death penalty.123

The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng

The prominent human rights attorney Gao Zhisheng was last seen being forcibly taken away from his hometown in Shaanxi province by more than 10 public security officers and "thugs" on February 4, 2009.124 More than eight months later, Gao still has not been seen and his whereabouts are unknown.125 Gao angered Chinese authorities by taking on sensitive cases (such as those involving house church activists, Falun Gong practitioners, and victims of illegal property seizures) and exposing human rights abuses in China.126 In October 2005, Gao wrote an open letter to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao detailing torture of Falun Gong practitioners. A month later, authorities shut down Gao’s law firm and revoked his lawyers’ license. In December 2006, Gao was convicted of "inciting subversion of state power" and was given a three-year sentence, suspended for five years.127

In September 2007, public security officers abducted Gao, apparently prompted by the publication of an open letter Gao had written to the U.S. Congress in which he alleged widespread human rights abuses in China and described the Chinese Government’s harsh treatment of him and his family.128 During his abduction, which lasted more than 50 days, Gao was tortured in an unknown location outside Beijing.129 Gao’s account of his torture, titled "Dark Night, Dark Hood, and Kidnapping by Dark Mafia," was released in February 2009.130 Gao describes how he was struck repeatedly with electric batons all over his body, includ­ing his genitals, and subjected to other forms of torture. He was told that his tormentors—apparently hired "thugs"—were chosen specifically by higher level officials to torture Gao. They called him a "traitor" for writing to the U.S. Congress, and admitted that Falun Gong practi­tioners were indeed tortured as Gao had alleged, and that Gao would experience the same kind of torture. Gao was also warned that he would be killed if he told anyone about being abducted and tortured.131

In January 2009, Gao’s wife, Geng He, along with their two children, escaped from China and arrived in the United States on March 11, 2009.132 Geng He explained that the main reason she defected with her children was that Chinese authorities had prohibited her 15-year-old daughter, Geng Ge, from attending school, which led her daughter to at­tempt to commit suicide several times.133 On March 17, 2009, foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang denied that the family had been mis­treated. The spokesperson stated: "There’s no political persecution or limits on the freedom of the family." 134

Geng He issued an open letter to the U.S. Congress on April 23, 2009, asking that the U.S. Government pressure the Chinese Government to reveal the whereabouts of her husband.135 In official correspondence with Members of the U.S. Congress in early May regarding Gao’s where­abouts, the PRC Ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, in­dicated that Gao is "currently serving the probation" that he was sen­tenced to on December 22, 2006, and that "the public security authority has not taken any mandatory measure against him." 136

In June, Gao’s older brother, Gao Zhiyi, unsuccessfully attempted to locate his brother in Beijing.137 Gao Zhiyi first went to the Beijing Pub­lic Security Bureau, but was denied entry into the building. He then went to the police station near Gao Zhisheng’s home and requested to see his brother.138 Officers at the police station told Gao that they need­ed to get instructions from above, and they did not know how long that would take. The officers asked where Gao Zhiyi would be staying in Bei­jing, and he responded "at my brother’s home." 139 The public security officers said that was not permissible, even though Gao Zhiyi had a key to his brother’s apartment.140 Gao Zhiyi reportedly left Beijing without any news of his brother.

On July 10, Bob Fu, president of the U.S.-based non-governmental or­ganization ChinaAid, delivered to the Commission and the U.S. Depart­ment of State a petition of more than 100,000 signatures calling for the Chinese Government to release Gao Zhisheng.141 The petition was also delivered to the PRC Embassy in Washington, DC. In early September, Teng Biao reported on Twitter that Gao had apparently called his fam­ily in Shaanxi province in July, but Gao still has not been seen since February and his whereabouts remain unknown.142 As of the release of this report, there still has been no response from the Chinese Govern­ment regarding Gao’s whereabouts and condition.

Shuanggui: Extralegal investigatory detention of party members

Shuanggui, (often translated as "double regulation" or "double designation"), refers to the process of summoning a target of investigation (usually a Party official) to appear at a designated place at a designated time.143 As discussed in the Commission’s 2008 Annual Report, shuanggui not only contravenes the right to be free from arbitrary detention guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it also violates Chinese law.144 Shuanggui detainees generally are held in undisclosed locations and do not have the benefit of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law’s protections for criminal suspects and defendants.145 In December 2008, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern about "unacknowledged detention facilities" and recommended that the Chinese Government "ensure that no one is detained in any secret facility," noting that such detention violates the Convention against Torture.146

Shuanggui continued to be used by Party discipline inspection commissions during the past year to detain high-ranking officials in the Party’s ongoing battle against corruption. One senior official after another from Guangdong province’s political-legal apparatus has been put under shuanggui since last October, when Yang Xiancai, a former head of Guangdong’s High People’s Court was placed under shuanggui for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal. Huang Songyou, former Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court who had spent years working at the Guangdong High People’s Court, was also put under shuanggui in connection with Yang’s case.147 According to Caijing, a Beijing-based magazine, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission placed Shenzhen municipality’s mayor, Xu Zongheng, under investigatory detention in an undisclosed location in early June for what the Xinhua news agency called "serious violations." 148 The allegations involve bribery in connection with large-scale construction and development projects for the 2011 Universiade Games, which will be held in Shenzhen.149 Xu was promptly stripped of his position as the city’s deputy Party secretary, and he later resigned as mayor.150 In August, the former head of Chongqing municipality’s justice bureau was placed under shuanggui for alleged connections with triads and organized crime.151

REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR

The reeducation through labor (RTL) system operates outside of the judicial system and the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL); it is an administrative punishment that enables law enforcement officials to incarcerate Chinese citizens at RTL centers for a maximum initial period of three years, with the possibility of an extension of up to one year.152 According to the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, public security departments "control the entire process of sending an individual" to an RTL center, and RTL is frequently used to punish, among others, dissidents, petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, and religious practitioners who belong to religious groups not approved by the government.153 Earlier this year, Professor Fu Hualing, head of the Department of Law at the University of Hong Kong, wrote that RTL "continues to be used, extensively, for political control and persecution." 154

During the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese Government stated that there were currently 320 RTL centers in China with approximately 190,000 inmates.155 In 2005, Chinese official statistics put the number of RTL inmates at 500,000 (in 310 RTL centers).156 The Dui Hua Foundation reports that the decline in the RTL population may reflect the movement of drug-related offenders from RTL centers to drug rehabilitation facilities, but that it also perhaps may reflect an effort by the government to reduce the number of RTL inmates with the goal of modifying or possibly eventually abolishing the system.157

In February, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) issued a report on RTL which was based on a survey of over 1,000 petitioners in Beijing (many of whom were previously detained in RTL centers) and interviews with 13 former RTL inmates. According to CHRD’s report, frequent beatings and torture, forced heavy manual labor with little or no compensation, little medical care, deprivation of access to family and counsel, little or no exercise, and poor diet appear to be standard practices in RTL centers.158 CHRD also reported that "fellow detainees, usually camp bullies, are appointed ‘supervisors.’ They are instructed by camp officials to carry out torture and mistreatment and given free rein to tyrannize others." 159

While there are several avenues for challenging RTL decisions, such as administrative reconsideration or a lawsuit under the PRC Administration Litigation Law (ALL), such efforts rarely are successful.160 CHRD reports that courts often refuse to accept ALL cases relating to reeducation through labor, and that external interference (from, for example, local government and Party officials) when a court does accept an ALL lawsuit means little chance of success for RTL inmates.161 Of more than 1,000 petitioners surveyed by CHRD, only 5 percent had applied for administrative review or filed an ALL action.162 Not one RTL decision was overturned. One petitioner interviewed by CHRD stated: "We simply don’t know how to seek legal remedies. No one will help us or tell us where to look. When I was released I actually sought legal remedies, but without any results whatsoever." 163

Reformists and legal experts within China have been calling for an end to reeducation through labor for decades.164 Perhaps the most recent public call to end reeducation through labor came in the document Charter 08, which was issued by 303 Chinese intellectuals, activists, and others in December 2008.165 The Charter states: "A democratic and constitutional China especially must guarantee the personal freedom of citizens. No one should suffer illegal arrest, detention, arraignment, interrogation, or punishment. The system of ‘Reeducation Through Labor’ must be abolished." 166

In its final report on its review of China, the UN Committee against Torture (UNCAT) noted that it "remains deeply concerned about the continued allegations . . . of routine and widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody, especially to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal proceedings," while at the same time it welcomed China’s "efforts to address the practice of torture and related problems in the criminal justice system." 167 UNCAT repeated its call for China to adopt the exclusionary rule so that evidence obtained through torture would be inadmissible and that it amend its law to reflect the definition of torture contained in the Convention against Torture.168 Moreover, the UNCAT noted that the provisions in China’s laws that prohibit the use of torture are limited to the use of torture to ex-tract confessions, but should prohibit torture for all purposes.169 A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry called UNCAT’s report "untrue and slanderous." 170

UNNATURAL DEATHS IN DETENTION CENTERS

In its December 2008 report, UNCAT expressed concern about "reports of abuses in custody, including high numbers of deaths, possibly related to torture or ill-treatment, and about lack of investigation into these abuses and deaths in custody." 171 Just a few months after UNCAT’s report was issued, reports of a 24-year-old inmate’s unnatural death in a detention center (kanshousuo) in Yunnan province sparked online protests, and more reports of other unnatural deaths in detention centers soon followed.172 The spate of deaths in detention centers early this year prompted calls for reform from academics, Internet users, and some government officials.173 Detention centers are run by the Ministry of Public Security and are where suspects and defendants are held during investigation and trial.174 Duan Zhengkun, a former vice minister of justice, stated that "[d]etention houses should not be managed by public security departments, because they make arrests, and sometimes torture the accused to force them to confess." 175

The debate over detention center deaths has focused on two principal issues: (1) confessions extracted through torture and mistreatment of detainees, and (2) the use of inmates by detention center guards to serve as "jail bullies" (laotou yuba) to control and abuse other inmates.176 In late April, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) disclosed that there had been 15 unnatural deaths in detention centers to date in 2009,177 and initiated a five-month review of the nearly 3,000 detention centers across the country, with the goal of cracking down on "jail bullies" and ensuring "proper management" of detention centers.178 In mid-July, Xinhua reported that the SPP had completed its investigation of 12 of the 15 unnatural deaths in custody and concluded that 7 had been beaten to death, 3 had committed suicide, and 2 had died in accidents.179

The 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) released in mid-April restated the legal prohibition against confessions coerced by torture.180 The HRAP further declared that "the state will improve legislation concerning prison management and take effective measures to ensure detainees’ rights and humanitarian treatment." 181 In order to prevent detainee abuse during interrogations, the HRAP mandates a physical barrier in all interrogation rooms to separate detainees and interrogators, and that the detainees shall be physically examined before and after interrogations.182 If the policies pronounced in the HRAP are implemented fully in law, regulations, and practice, they would mark an important step toward the prevention of detainee abuse during interrogations.

TORTURE AND ABUSE

In addition to the reports of abnormal deaths in detention centers during 2009, reports of nonfatal torture and abuse in detention centers, prisons, and reeducation through labor (RTL) centers continued during the past year. As noted above, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) has documented that torture and abuse in RTL centers is a common occurrence.183 Torture and abuse in detention centers and prisons remains widespread, despite the central government’s repeated efforts to address this longstanding problem.184 Guards use torture to coerce confessions and enlist "jail bullies" to abuse inmates either under the direction of prison guards or with their knowledge.185

Chinese authorities continue to subject political prisoners to long periods of solitary confinement, in contravention of the PRC Prison Law and international human rights standards.186 U.S. permanent resident and democracy activist Wang Bingzhang, who is serving a life sentence in Beijiang Prison, in Guangdong province, has been held in solitary confinement for years.187 When a family member asked the prison warden why Wang was being held in solitary confinement, the warden reportedly said that because there were no other political prisoners in the prison, there was no one else with whom Wang could share a cell.188

In July, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reported that in the first six months of 2009, procuratorates found 6,430 violations relating to the management of detention facilities and prisons, a 114-percent increase from the same period in 2008.189 Deputy procurator-general Sun Qian stated that, as of mid-July, 291 people reportedly had been charged as a result of 243 investigations.190

MEDICAL CARE

The U.S. State Department observed in its report on China’s human rights situation for 2008 that "adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment." 191 Chinese Human Rights Defenders reports that there is "extremely limited medical care" available to inmates in RTL centers.192 Authorities have reportedly denied imprisoned legal advocate and rights defender Chen Guangcheng adequate medical treatment.193 Both Chen and his wife (on Chen’s behalf) have applied for medical parole, but with no result.194 Hu Jia’s wife, Zeng Jinyan, has expressed ongoing concern over the health of her husband, who suffers from hepatitis.195 After visiting Hu Jia in prison in April, Zeng wrote on her blog that Hu continues to lose weight, and that he told her he was unable to eat.196 Huang Qi, the Sichuan province-based human rights activist who was tried on "illegal possession of state secrets" charges in August, reportedly has been denied access to medical attention.197

Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process without the assistance of an attorney, despite the right to legal assistance provided under Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed, but not yet ratified.198 The Chinese media recently reported that less than 30 percent of criminal cases proceed with the involvement of a defense attorney, and several lawyers interviewed indicated that in some places, the rate is between 10 to 20 percent.199 The lawyers, including prominent criminal defense attorney Tian Wenchang, attributed the low rate of defense attorney involvement to several factors, including the risks and difficulties criminal defense attorneys face and the low compensation for criminal defense work compared with other areas of law.200

As Professor Jerome Cohen recently observed regarding pre-trial detention in China, "most accused remain detained throughout the trial and appellate process. Bail applications are seldom granted. . . ." 201 Detained suspects and defendants who do have legal representation continue to face substantial obstacles in meeting with their attorneys. In December 2008, the UN Committee against Torture noted "with concern the lack of legal safeguards for detainees, including . . . restricted access to lawyers." 202 More than a year has passed since the implementation of the revised PRC Lawyers Law, which was amended in part to address the longstanding "three difficulties" (san nan) facing defense attorneys (i.e., gaining access to detained clients, reviewing the prosecutors’ case files, and collecting evidence).203 Some of the provisions of the revised Lawyers Law conflict with the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), however.204 For example, with respect to gaining access to detained clients, the revised Lawyers Law provides that a lawyer need only show the "three certificates" (i.e., lawyer’s license, certificate from the lawyer’s law firm, and a power of attorney or legal aid papers) in order to meet with a detained suspect or defendant after the first interrogation, whereas the CPL stipulates that if the case involves state secrets, the lawyer must first obtain permission from the investigating entity (i.e., public security bureau or procuratorate).205 The Lawyers Law prohibits the monitoring of attorney-client meetings, while the CPL provides that investigating officers, when it is deemed necessary, have a right to be present at such meetings.206

Since the revised Lawyers Law took effect, access to detained clients in ordinary, nonsensitive cases reportedly has improved in Beijing and some other large cities.207 The chair of the Beijing Lawyers Association Criminal Defense Committee stated that lawyers in Beijing now have better and easier access to detained clients, and that they are able to see clients in detention centers with just the "three certificates." 208 He noted, however, that permission was still necessary in state secrets’ cases.209 Beijing’s Haidian District Public Security Bureau reported that it has implemented several practical measures to facilitate attorney-client meetings, such as setting up special meeting rooms and a lawyers’ "reception room," which has a full-time staff member to assist with, among other things, arranging attorney-client meetings.210 In addition, Beijing judicial authorities abolished an internal rule operative in detention centers that two lawyers had to be present for meetings with a detained client (now a single lawyer can meet a client on his or her own).211

The revised Lawyers Law has been less successfully implemented in other jurisdictions. In May 2009, the Legal Daily (Fazhi Ribao), Legal System Net (Fazhi Wang), and the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) conducted an online survey regarding the right of lawyers to meet with detained clients.212 Of 1,610 respondents (comprised of 1,080 lawyers, 187 individuals from the public security system, procuracy, and the courts, and the rest from other professions), 73.4 percent indicated that the situation had not improved at all after the implementation of the revised Lawyers Law. Only 8 percent of the respondents believed that the right of lawyers to meet with detained clients was being implemented entirely consistently with the new Lawyers Law.213

One challenge to the protection of lawyers’ professional rights is the belief among some law implementation agencies that because they are responsible for implementing the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), they must follow the current CPL, irrespective of the revisions to the Lawyers Law, which they also view as being a "lesser" law that regulates only the legal profession.214 While some experts contend that the provisions of the revised Lawyers Law governing lawyers’ professional rights can be fully realized through amendment of the CPL, others believe more fundamental change is necessary.215 Professor Chen Ruihua, a prominent criminal procedure professor at Peking University Law School, believes that the "three difficulties" are a product of China’s judicial system itself and that "without reform of the judicial system ‘the three difficulties’ will never be resolved—revising the CPL won’t make any difference." 216

In politically sensitive cases, authorities continue to frequently deny detained suspects and defendants access to counsel. For example, authorities unlawfully denied well-known criminal defense attorney Mo Shaoping permission to see his detained client, prominent intellectual and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo, from early December 2008 through mid-June 2009—the duration of Liu’s (illegally prolonged) residential surveillance.217 Under Chinese law, an individual subject to residential surveillance does not need to obtain permission to meet with his or her attorney.218 [See Section II—Freedom of Expression, for a discussion of Liu Xiaobo’s detention and arrest.] In late March 2009, Jiang Tianyong and Tang Jitian—two of the human rights lawyers whose licenses to practice law were not renewed by the May 31 deadline this year—were prevented from meeting their detained client, Ge Hefei, a Falun Gong practitioner, in Hebei province.219 Jiang and Tang, who had been entrusted to represent Ge by Ge’s family, were told by court personnel that Ge had not hired them and had not requested to see them. The lawyers argued that they had a right to see Ge and ask him directly whether he agreed to their representation and that Ge had a right to access to defense counsel.220 [See Section III—Access to Justice—Harrasment and Intimidation of Human Rights Lawyers.]

In its February report on reeducation through labor (RTL), Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) stated that many former RTL inmates the organization surveyed complained of lack of access to counsel and legal remedies. Although some of the former RTL inmates may have qualified for legal aid, CHRD observed that "government-funded lawyers are unwilling to advocate for RTL detainees because they are on the ‘wrong side’ of the local government." 221 Individuals who have "disappeared" incommunicado into black jails (including those held in psychiatric hospitals) are deprived of their right to access to counsel.222

Although most criminal cases in China proceed without a defense attorney’s involvement, in high-profile cases, authorities generally endeavor to ensure that defendants have some form of representation. The main access-to-counsel issues presented in such cases are whether the defendants or their family members are able to hire counsel of their own choosing, and whether government-assigned attorneys are, in fact, working in the defendant’s best interests. The Commission reported on this issue in the context of the defense of Tibetans detained after the protests in March 2008. The Tibetans were prevented from hiring attorneys of their own choosing and instead were assigned government-selected attorneys.223 This year, following the July 5 demonstration in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and outbreaks of violence starting that day, the Beijing Justice Bureau issued an urgent notice calling upon Beijing’s law firms and lawyers to "clearly recognize the nature" of the July 5 "beating, smashing, looting, and burning" incident in Urumqi and to "resolutely stand on the side of protecting national unity and harmony among ethnic groups" and exercise "caution" with respect to receiving requests for legal advice and representation.224 The government-controlled Xinjiang Lawyers Association likewise warned Xinjiang attorneys against getting involved in July 5-related cases.225 [See Section IV—Xinjiang.]

An important issue in the Yang Jia case was whether Yang had access to counsel of his own choosing. As discussed above, Yang Jia killed six police officers and injured several others at the Zhabei district police station in Shanghai in July 2008, possibly in retaliation for police abuse he reportedly suffered in the fall of 2007 at the Zhabei police station.226 Yang Jia’s mother, Wang Jingmei, with whom Yang had been living in Beijing before the attack, disappeared the night of the killings and was locked up in a Beijing public security-run psychiatric hospital (ankang) until just before Yang Jia was executed.227 During Wang Jingmei’s detention in the ankang, officials reportedly presented her with a document authorizing an attorney named Xie Youming to represent Yang Jia; Wang signed the document.228 Xie had ties to the Zhabei district government, which raised doubts about his ability to fairly and vigorously represent Yang.229 Yang Jia’s father did not agree to Xie representing his son, and instead lined up a group of Beijing criminal defense lawyers to act on his son’s behalf, but Shanghai authorities prevented the Beijing lawyers from seeing Yang Jia. Judicial authorities reportedly told the lawyers from Beijing that Yang Jia already had defense attorneys and that he did not want new ones.230

Another high-profile case in which local officials appeared to have had a hand in selecting defense counsel (and sidelining lawyers from Beijing) is the Deng Yujiao case.231 In May 2009, Deng became an Internet sensation after news spread that she had stabbed a local official in Badong county, Hubei province to death and injured another while defending herself against an attempted rape.232 After Deng was taken away to a psychiatric hospital,233 two Beijing lawyers, Xia Lin and Xia Nan (no relation), volunteered to represent Deng Yujiao pro bono.234 Deng’s mother hired the two lawyers. On May 21, after the two lawyers met with Deng Yujiao, Xia Lin filed a petition with the Badong Public Security Bureau demanding that the police press charges against the injured official, Huang Dezhi, for sexual assault.235 Xia Lin and Xia Nan were promptly fired. The lawyers learned of their dismissal as Deng Yujiao’s attorneys from the Badong county government’s Web site.236 Deng’s mother then hired two local attorneys.237

Prominent intellectual and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo, who has been detained since early December 2008, was also denied counsel of his own choosing. Liu’s family had retained the well-known defense attorney Mo Shaoping to represent Liu Xiaobo.238 After public security officers formally arrested Liu on June 23 for "inciting subversion," Mo Shaoping was informed that he was prohibited from representing Liu because he had also signed Charter 08.239 Two other attorneys from Mo Shaoping’s law firm, Shang Baojun and Ding Xikui, are currently representing Liu.240

The "three difficulties" faced by criminal defense lawyers discussed above has serious consequences for the fairness of criminal trials. In addition, because of the risks presented by Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law (the lawyer-perjury statute), most defense attorneys reportedly engage in passive defense; they focus on finding flaws and weaknesses in the prosecutors’ evidence rather than actively conducting their own investigations.241 According to well-known criminal defense lawyer Tian Wenchang, because of these challenges and risks, it is difficult for defense attorneys to present evidence of innocence or of a lesser crime.242 Moreover, there is a strong presumption of guilt, especially in "politically sensitive" cases.243

The failure of witnesses to appear in court to present testimony is a longstanding problem in China and is widely recognized as such by lawyers, scholars, officials, and the media.244 In late June 2009, the Chinese magazine Caijing reported that "the physical presence of a courtroom witness is rare in China." 245 Most criminal cases proceed solely on the basis of written witness statements that the prosecution presents to the court; the defense attorneys have no opportunity to question and cross-examine the witness who made the statement about its contents.246 The PRC Criminal Procedure Law states only that witnesses have a duty to testify; it does not require that witnesses appear in court to present live testimony, and there is no punishment for failure to appear.247

Chinese Government and Communist Party interference in court proceedings and decisions is common, particularly in "politically sensitive" cases.248 While the Caijing report on the absence of witnesses in courtrooms noted that no eyewitnesses appeared at Deng Yujiao’s trial, the eyewitness testimony in Deng’s case would have mattered only if the trial actually had been an attempt to determine innocence or guilt and assess whether Deng Yujiao’s self-defense was justifiable or "excessive" under Chinese law. But the outcome of Deng’s two-and-a-half-hour trial appears to have been a deal arranged in advance.249 Immediately upon conclusion of the trial, Deng was found guilty of inflicting intentional harm, but was exempted from punishment because, the court ruled, she had acted in self-defense and had turned herself in, and because she was found to have suffered from a mental illness and thus did not bear full criminal responsibility.250 Prominent human rights attorney Pu Zhiqiang told the South China Morning Post that there was no debate over evidence during the trial; it was "like the actual case itself was not important. What was important was to achieve a result acceptable by all sides." 251 Pu opined that while the case may have been something of a victory for public opinion, it was "definitely not a victory for the law." 252

Lengthy pre-trial detention and the reliance of public security officers and prosecutors on confessions to "establish" guilt remain the norm. Consequently, the widespread use of torture to extract confessions, a longstanding problem acknowledged by the Chinese Government, persists.253 Confessions coerced through torture and other illegally obtained evidence continue to be admissible in courts, with obvious implications for the fairness of criminal trials.254 In August 2009, an official from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) announced that the SPP would soon introduce a new regulation making confessions coerced through torture inadmissible in death penalty cases.255 The regulation purportedly will also mandate that prosecutors investigate and prosecute law enforcement personnel who may have coerced a confession through torture or otherwise used violence to obtain evidence.256

Although Chinese law requires that first-instance trials be held in public, there is an exception for cases involving state secrets.257 Politically sensitive cases are routinely closed to the public, even to family members of the defendant.258 Yang Jia’s murder case was not a "state secrets" case, but officials barred Yang Jia’s family and friends from attending his trial.259 Yang’s mother was detained illegally in a psychiatric facility in Beijing during Yang’s trial and appeal, and the lawyers from Beijing that Yang’s father had hoped could represent his son were also prevented from observing Yang’s first-instance trial.260 Yang Jia’s father attended the appeal, as did Beijing lawyer and blogger Liu Xiaoyuan and Ai Weiwei, the artist and blogger.261 Yang had a new attorney on appeal, who expressed concern about the fairness of that proceeding.262

In another death penalty case during this reporting year, Wo Weihan, a Chinese citizen, was convicted of military espionage for Taiwan and endangering state security in May 2007 and sentenced to death.263 In March 2008, the Beijing High People’s Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence; the Supreme People’s Court approved the death sentence in November 2008, and he was executed later that month. Wo’s case apparently was plagued by procedural irregularities; he was denied access to his lawyer for 10 months following his initial detention, and evidence used against him was not made available for his defense, allegedly because it in-volved "state secrets." 264 Wo reportedly made a confession while he was detained without access to his lawyer, because officials told him he would not be prosecuted if he signed a confession.265 Wo was tried behind closed doors.266 The first and only time Wo’s family was permitted to see Wo since he was first detained in 2005 was the day before Wo was executed in late November 2008.267

During the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record in February 2009, several delegations raised issues relating to China’s use of the death penalty; most of the recommendations focused on transparency and reduction in the number of crimes, particularly non-violent crimes, for which the death penalty was available. The Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review notes that the Chinese delegation stated that the use of the death penalty is strictly controlled, and that in practice, it "is only applied to very serious crimes and is not used in most of the applicable crimes." 268 China stated that it would review the recommendations "to reduce the number of crimes subject to [the] death penalty, especially for non-violent crimes." 269 In its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, the Chinese Government stated that the death penalty "shall be strictly controlled and prudently applied." 270

As noted in last year’s Annual Report, in early May 2008, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) reported that there was a 30-percent drop in death sentences during 2007, the first year in which SPC review of death sentences was restored, compared with 2006.271 And in late June 2008, the SPC announced that it had overturned 15 percent of all death sentences handed down by lower courts during 2007 and the first half of 2008.272 At the end of July 2009, the SPC stated that only an "extremely small number" of serious criminals would receive the death penalty and that death sentences with a two-year reprieve (sihuan) would be used more often, but the SPC did not release figures comparing the 2007 and 2008 execution rates or the percentage of death sentences the SPC overturned.273 The number of executions carried out annually remains a state secret.274 Based on publicly available reports, Amnesty International concluded that there was a 260-percent increase in the number of executions in China in 2008, compared with 2007. Amnesty International stated that 1,718 people were executed in China during 2008 (compared with 470 executions in 2007), and that 7,000 individuals were sentenced to death.275 In late August, the Dui Hua Foundation estimated that there will be approximately 5,000 executions in China during 2009.276

In June 2009, China Daily reported that by the end of the year, all those sentenced to death in Beijing would be executed by lethal injection, rather than a firing squad.277 Hu Yunteng, director of research at the SPC, was quoted as saying that lethal injections were "cleaner, safer and more convenient." 278 Lethal injection was legalized in China as an alternative to shooting in the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law.279 Lethal injections were first used in Yunnan province, and then gradually were used elsewhere in China.280 The SPC indicated that eventually lethal injections would be used nationwide as the sole form of execution.281 Liu Renwen, a criminal law scholar at the Institute of Law at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who advocates for the abolition of the death penalty, wrote that he believed the developments in Beijing were a step toward the eventual abolition of the death penalty.282 Donald Clarke, professor of Chinese law at George Washington University Law School noted, however, that the public discussion of lethal injections in China seemed to sidestep issues regarding the potential problems with death by lethal injection.283

During this reporting year, it was evident that procedures regarding family visits and information transparency for individuals facing imminent execution were in need of an overhaul. Wo Weihan’s family, who had not been able to see him since Wo was first taken into custody in 2005, met with Wo for the first time on November 27, 2008, after the SPC had approved his death sentence.284 The authorities told the family that they would be able to have a second visit with Wo before he was executed. Wo was instead put to death the next day, on November 28, before the promised second family visit.285 In Yang Jia’s case, Yang’s father only had one visit with Yang since he was detained after the killings on July 1, and that was in October 2008.286 Yang’s father was not able to see his son before he was executed, and only learned of the execution after Yang had been put to death on November 26, 2008.287 On November 23, Chinese officials suddenly took Yang Jia’s mother, Wang Jingmei, from the psychiatric hospital in Beijing where she was being held to Shanghai to meet with her son.288 She knew absolutely nothing about his case, let alone that the SPC had already approved Yang’s death sentence. Wang also did not know that her meeting with Yang on November 24 would be the last time she would see her son.289

7 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09, sec. 1.a (noting "serious irregularities" during Yang’s trial). See discussion of cases of Deng Yujiao and Yang Jia in Access to Counsel and Fairness of Criminal Trials subsections, and elsewhere in this section.

12 The announcement related to a regulation that would soon be released by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate regarding the inadmissibility of such confessions. The regulation will reportedly apply only to death penalty cases, "as a starting point." Ng Tze-wei, "Anti-Torture Measures in Works, Paper Says," South China Morning Post (Online), 11 August 09.

16 The domestic security protection units (guobao zhidui) are contained within the public security bureaus. One of their responsibilities is to monitor, investigate, and conduct surveillanceof, among others, dissidents, activists, family members of political prisoners, former political prisoners, human rights lawyers, house church leaders, and implementing illegal home confinement or "soft detention" (ruanjin).

23 See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen and Eva Pils, "The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng," Wall Street Journal (Online), 9 February 09. Zheng Enchong’s record of detention is searchable through the CECC’s Political Prisoner Database. China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Current Challenges and Prospects, CECC Roundtable, 10 July 09, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New York University Law School, Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute.

24 Liu Fang, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Shanghai Police Have Summoned Zheng Enchong 10 Times in Half a Month" [Shanghai jingfang dui zheng enchong banyue nei 10 ci chuanhuan], 24 April 09; Human Rights in China (Online), "Shanghai Rights Defender Harassed on Heels of National Human Rights Action Plan Release," 15 April 09. Zheng has also suffered physical abuse at the hands of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau; during an interrogation in June, he was stripped to his underwear and beaten, and lit cigarettes were held to his lips and eyelids. See ChinaAid (Online), "Christian Attorney Zheng Enchong Interrogated and Tortured by PSB," 23 June 09.

26 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Over One Hundred Signatories Harassed Since Launch of Charter 08," 8 January 09. Professor Andrew Nathan recently described Charter 08 as "the most broadly based and intellectually sophisticated challenge to [the regime’s] principles of rule since Tiananmen itself." Andrew Nathan, "Authoritarian Impermanence," Journal of Democracy, July 2009, 40. In late March 2009, domestic security protection (guobao) officers warned Jiang Qisheng, a Beijing-based writer, activist, and signatory of Charter 08, not to engage in any activities commemorating the 20th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Officers searched his home and took three computers, several bank deposit books, and many manuscripts and books. Liang Qiwen, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Beijing Dissident Jiang Qisheng Summoned, Home Searched: Police Actions Stepped Up in Advance of Anniversary of Tiananmen Massacre," 1 May 09.

40 David W. Chen, "How the Family of a Dissident Fled China," New York Times (Online), 9 May 09; "Rights Dissident’s Family Flees to US," Reuters (Online), 13 March 09; Bill Schiller, "Fears Grow Over Chinese Lawyer’s Disappearance," Toronto Star (Online), 13 April 09.

41 Yu Jianrong, (interviewed by Wu Huaiting), "Local Abuses Main Reason for Mass Incidents," Global Times (Online), 1 September 09; Does China Have a Stability Problem? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 27 February 09, Testimony of Jacques deLisle, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Director, Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

44 UN Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China,CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, paras. 15, 19.

45 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties UnderArticle 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, paras. 15, 19. New York University Law School professorJerome Cohen, a leading American expert on Chinese law, has observed that "one of the biggest headaches in Chinese justice today is that the police take many measures that are not author-ized—and to assist them they use non-police people who are just ad hoc recruited." Quoted in Jamil Anderlini, "Punished Supplicants," Financial Times (Online), 6 March 09.

46 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China,CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 18.

47 Jerome A. Cohen and Eva Pils, "The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng," Wall Street Journal(Online), 9 February 09; Jerome A. Cohen, "Beijing Must Reveal Fate of Human Rights Lawyer," South China Morning Post (Online), 19 March 09. Another example involved an assault on a 75-year-old retired professor in Shandong province who attempted to pay respects to Zhao Ziyang, the former Secretary General of the Communist Party who was sacked after he refused to support the use of violence against protesters in June 1989. On April 5, a day to honor the dead in China, Sun Wenguang was reportedly attacked by five men while he was on his way to a local monument on Heroes’ Mountain to pay his respects to Zhao. Although several police cars followed Sun to the cemetery, and were parked not far from where he was attacked, "the police hid somewhere and did not stop the violence," Sun told the Christian Science Monitor. Sun ended up in an intensive care unit with three broken ribs. Peter Ford, "China Cracks DownAhead of Sensitive Anniversaries," Christian Science Monitor (Online), 8 April 09. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Shandong Professor Assaulted for Commemorating Reformist Leader Zhao Ziyang," 7 April 09; "Chinese Pensioner Recounts Beating for Bid To Commemorate 1989 Leader Zhao," Sydney Radio National, 9 April 09 (Open Source Center, 9 April 09).

51 Open Constitution Initiative (Online), "The Ten Legal Events of 2008 Listed by OCI," 24 February 09 (Web site no longer accessible); See also Willy Lam, "CCPLA: Tightening the CCP’sRule Over Law," China Brief, 2 April 09, 4 (noting that the official Outlook Weekly had quoted Hainan residents in the wake of an attack on local police stations "as saying that they had losttrust in law-enforcement officials ‘because they are corrupt and they offer protection to criminals’ ").

53 Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Flare-Ups of Ethnic Unrest Shake China’s Self-Image," Washington Post (Online), 19 July 09; Open Constitution Initiative (Online), "About Us," last visited 15 July09 (Web site no longer accessible). Caijing’s editor-in-chief Hu Shuli wrote in a July editorial that "[u]nder China’s current legal system, the police function is more powerful than in countries with established rule of law. The police and prosecutors, therefore, should be more restrained and cautious in exercising power so that clumsy law enforcement does not trigger public resentment." Hu Shuli, "Heeding the Lessons of China’s Civil Unrest," Caijing (Online), 7 July 09.

57 Mu Mu-ying, "Number of Group Protests Exceeds 120,000 in 2008; Zhou Yongkang Admits That People Rebel Because of Cadres’ Misconduct," Cheng Ming, 1 February 09 (Open Source Center, 17 July 09). (Although Open Source Center translates "qunti" as "group," the word "mass" is consistent with how "qunti" is used in the term "mass incident" (quntixing shijian). See also Mark O’Neill, "Legal Crusaders on the March," 8 September 09 (also noting the report from the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security that more than 12.1 million people participated in 127,000 unauthorized protests during 2008).

58 See, e.g., Yu Jianrong, "Rigid Stability: An Explanatory Framework for China’s Social Situation" [Yu jianrong: gangxing wending zhongguo shehui xingshi de yi ge jieshi kuangjia], Southeast News Agency, reprinted in QQ News (Online), 9 May 09. An English translation of Yu’s presentation is available on the China Digital Times Web site: Yu Jianrong, "Rigid Stability: An Explanatory Framework for China’s Social Situation (Part 1)," 9 May 09, translated by David Kelly and reprinted in China Digital Times (Online), 26 May 09. See also Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Flare-Ups of Ethnic Unrest Shake China’s Self-Image," Washington Post (Online), 19 July 09; Yang Jun, "Breaking Inertia of ‘Maintaining Status Quo,’ " Southern Wind Window, 8 April 09–21 April 09 (Open Source Center, 22 May 09); Mu Mu-ying, "Number of Group Protests Exceeds 120,000 in 2008; Zhou Yongkang Admits That People Rebel Because of Cadres’ Misconduct," Cheng Ming, 1 February 09 (Open Source Center, 17 July 09); Carl Minzner, "Are Mass Incidents Increasing or Decreasing in China?" Chinese Law and Politics Blog (Online), 31 March 07; Email communication with Professor Carl Minzner, 23 July 09. Bao Tong, top aide to Zhao Ziyang, stated in an interview this year about the 1989 Tiananmen protests, that every day in China there are "miniature Tiananmens . . . in counties and villages where people try to show their discontent and the government sends 500 policemen to put them down." Jamil Anderlini, "Tea With the FT: Bao Tong," Financial Times (Online), 29 May 09.

60 Malcolm Moore, "Tens of Thousands of Chinese Fight the Police in Shishou," Telegraph (Online), 22 June 09; Zhan Caiqiang, "Cook Dies in Unusual Circumstances, Crowd Gathers and Block Streets," Southern Metropolitan Daily, 22 June 09 (Open Source Center, 22 June 09). The police preliminarily declared Tu’s fall from the third floor of the hotel a suicide; the protesters and the cook’s family claimed it was a murder that the government was trying to cover up. See Cai Ke, "Family of Dead Man Held for Riots," China Daily (Online), 23 July 09.

65 Sam Verran, China Elections and Governance (Online), "Shishou Official Speaks Out About Riot," 1 July 09 (Li’s blog post was translated into English by China Elections and Governance). In late July, police detained Tu’s brother and two of his cousins for disrupting public order in connection with the riot. See Lucy Hornby, "Chinese Police Detain Three After Shishou Riot," Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 23 July 09. See also Yu Jianrong (interviewed by Wu Huaiting), "Local Abuses Main Reason for Mass Incidents," Global Times (Online), 1 September 09. Yu Jianrong, Director of the Social Problems Research Center, Rural Studies Institute, at CASS, stated that "[l]ocal governments and officials often side with the offenders and mobilize the police to crack down on the people, which results in violent incidents and severe social consequences."

67 "Hundreds Rally in China Over Police Beating," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google (Online), 21 May 09. In another clash between police and citizens in May, Vietnamese Chinese tea farmers in Yingde city, Guangdong province, clashed with police over the detention of four farmers’ representatives who were seeking redress for grievances relating to the expropriation of their land. According to an account provided by the villagers to the Washington Post, what began as a small peaceful protest by 30 or so villagers grew into a crowd of several thousand, and the confrontation turned violent when hundreds of riot police from neighboring towns arrived and started beating people up. A police station was attacked and several police cars burned. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Flare-Ups of Ethnic Unrest Shake China’s Self-Image," Washington Post (Online), 19 July 09; "Tea Farmers Attack Police Stations," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 26 May 09.

73 Open Constitution Initiative (Online), "The Ten Legal Events of 2008 Listed by OCI," 24 February 09, last visited 15 July 09 (Web site no longer accessible). Yang Jia’s case ranked number one on the list; at number eight was the killing of Wei Wenhua, who was beaten to death in January 2008 by more than 30 chengguan in Wanba village in Hubei province, after he began taking photos of urban management officers beating up protesting villagers. Wei’s death prompted calls for the abolition of the urban management system, which is widely perceived as lawless and rife with abuses. See also David Bandurski, China Media Project (Online), "Brutal Killing of (citizen journalist) Wei Wenhua Underscores the Evils of China’s ‘Urban Management’ System," 10 January 08; "Guide to Beating Law-Breakers Sparks Outrage," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 23 April 09.

77 "Student Demonstrators Clash With Police in Nanjing," South China Morning Post (Online),20 May 09; Austin Ramzy, "Above the Law? China’s Bully Law-Enforcement Officers," Time (Online), 21 May 09. According to the Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rightsand Democracy, 30 students were injured, a police car was smashed, and 3 students were taken away by the police. See "Student Demonstrators Clash With Police in Nanjing," South ChinaMorning Post (Online), 20 May 09.

82 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21. Examples of the first category include individuals who are keptin detention after the completion of their prison sentences or despite an amnesty law applicable to them, or in violation of domestic law or relevant international instruments. The rights andfreedoms protected under the second category include those in Articles 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21 of the UDHR and in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27 of the ICCPR. The ICCPR providesthat the deprivation of an individual’s liberty is permissible only "on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law," and that an individual must bepromptly informed of the reasons for his detention and any charges against him or her.

84 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27. The rightsand freedoms protected under the second category, i.e., "an individual is deprived of his liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed under the UDHR and ICCPR" include rights containedin arts. 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21 of the UDHR and in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27 of the ICCPR.

85 The CECC and others have also rendered ruanjin as arbitrary or unlawful "house arrest," "home confinement," or "soft arrest."

86 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14.

88 Jerome Cohen and Eva Pils, "The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng," Wall Street Journal (Online), 9 February 09 (describing "a new and more effective ‘punishment at home’ that is less apparent to outsiders than a conventional prison sentence"); CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 34.

89 Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, ed. Bao Pu, et al. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 84. See also China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Current Challenges and Prospects, CECC Roundtable, 10 July 09, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, New York University School of Law, Co-director, U.S.-Asia Law Institute. Zhao’s top aide, Bao Tong, who was the highest ranking Communist Party official to serve a prison sentence after the 1989 Tiananmen protests, has been subjected to unlawful home confinement andsurveillance since his release from prison in 1996. See Jamil Anderlini, "Tea with the FT: Bao Tong," Financial Times (Online), 29 May 09; "Bao Tong: Beijing Should Explain How Charter‘08 Violates the Law," AsiaNews.it (Online), 17 December 08.

93 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China,CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14. The 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides that an "enforced disappearance"occurs when individuals are detained or abducted "or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individualsacting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned ora refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law." UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Protection of all Persons fromEnforced Disappearance, A/RES/47/133, 18 December 92. In February, during its Universal Periodic Review by the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human RightsCouncil, the Chinese government rejected the recommendation that it should consider ratifying the International Convention for Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adoptedby the General Assembly in December 2006. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09,paras. 38, 84, 117. The delegations from Mexico and Argentina offered this recommendation.

95 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 56, 82, 117. During the UPR, theCzech Republic delegation called upon China to abolish the system of black jails. The Chinese delegation stated that there are no black jails in China, and rejected the recommendation. SongHansong, from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, stated: "Our law clearly prohibits private detention facilities. There are no such things as ‘black jails’ in the country." Tim Johnson,"China Tells U.N. It Doesn’t Censor or Abuse Human Rights," McClatchy Newspapers (Online), 9 February 09. See also "China’s ‘Black Jails’ Uncovered," Al Jazeera (Online), 27 April 09. AlJazeera reported that in response to its question about the use of "black jails" in China at a foreign ministry press conference, spokesperson Jiang Yu responded: "I don’t know whatprompted you to ask this question. Things like this don’t exist in China. China is a country with the rule of law, and everything is handled according to the law."

105 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Petitioner Detained and Beaten for Attempting To Appeal to Clinton," 27 February 09. Petitioners and activists are particularly vulnerable to "disappearance" during the NPC and CPPCC annual March meetings (Two Sessions) held in Beijing and around other "sensitive" dates and events, such as visits from foreign officials. Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that in advance of the Two Sessions in early March, an estimated "600 Shanghai petitioners were either put under residential surveillance or sent to black jails while 30 were administratively detained to prevent them from petitioning." Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Abuses Against Petitioners Contradict Message of ‘Openness’ at Annual Session of China’s Legislature," 19 March 09. Although much of the reporting about black jails focuses on Beijing, black jails exist throughout China. Authorities in Sichuan province used black jails to silence parents of children killed in the May 2008 earthquake who sought to petition to call for an investigation into the cause of the collapse of the schools. According to Amnesty International, which conducted interviews with some of the parents whose children died in the earthquake, eight earthquake survivors, including an eight-year-old boy, were held in black jails for periods ranging from 1 to 21 days. Amnesty International (Online), "Justice Denied: Harassment of Sichuan Earthquake Survivors and Activists," May 2009, 10.

110 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Abuses Against Petitioners Contradict Message of ‘Openness’ at Annual Session of China’s Legislature (Appendix)," 19 March 09, para. 26. Another example of the use by authorities of "legal education classes" to arbitrarily detain citizens involved parents of children who died in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. One parent who sought justice for her child told Amnesty International that she was held in a "study class" for 10 days (after spending 7 days in two different black jails) during which she was instructed repeatedly that it was the earthquake that caused the collapse of the schools (and not shoddy construction). Amnesty International (Online), "Justice Denied: Harassment of Sichuan Earthquake Survivors and Activists," May 2009, 10.

112 Andrew Jacobs, "Complainers in China Hospitalized," New York Times (Online), 8 December 08.

113 Zhai Fangye, "Cases in Which Petitioner Becomes Psychotic Was Preface to Weng’an Incident," 9 December 08 (Open Source Center, 31 March 09); Andrew Jacobs, "Complainers in China Hospitalized," New York Times (Online), 8 December 08. In its December 2008 report on China’s compliance with the UN Convention against Torture, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern that Chinese authorities had detained "some people in psychiatric hospitals for reasons other than medical." See UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 35. In June 2009, Radio Free Asia reported that throughout China, local authorities forcibly send petitioners to psychiatric hospitals in order to prevent them from petitioning. See "Inside Story on Wuhan Petitioner Sent to Psychiatric Hospital and Tortured" [Wuhan fangmin bei song jingshenbingyuan zao cuican neimu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 June 09. The issue of governmental authorities forcibly detaining in psychiatric hospitals petitioners who do not suffer from mental illness gained more attention in April, after a professor of forensic psychiatry at Peking University, Sun Dongdong, stated in an interview with China Newsweek that 99 percent of all persistent ("professional") petitioners were mentally ill. His comment prompted extensive virtual and "live" protests and criticism; the controversy became so heated that Professor Sun was pressured to issue an apology. Stephanie Wang, "China’s Elite Stirs Up ‘Paranoid’ Petitioners," Asia Times (Online), 9 May 09.

115 Xiao Zhi, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Psychiatric Hospitals Have Become a Gulag Archipelago With Chinese Characteristics" [Jingshenbingyuan chengwei juyou zhongguo tese de gulage qundao], 17 May 09. The writer also warns that as the call for the abolition of reeducation through labor gains momentum, psychiatric hospitals will be used more and more frequently to arbitrarily detain citizens.

116 "The Story of Yang Jia’s Mother," translated by and reprinted in ChinaGeeks Blog (Online), 2 April 09.

119 Bill Savadove, "Killer’s Mother in Mental Hospital," South China Morning Post (Online), 11 November 08; Eva Pils, "Yang Jia and China’s Unpopular Criminal Justice System," China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2009, 59, 61. According to Wang’s own account of her disappearance, authorities at the hospital kept her door locked at all times and prevented Wang from speaking with anyone (other than her guards and "doctors") or from contacting anyone outside the hospital. Staff at the hospital attempted to force Wang to take medicine once, but she apparently was successful in thwarting their efforts (although the translation is not entirely clear on this point). At any rate, after that initial attempted forced "treatment," the staff did not try to give Wang medicine again. See "The Story of Yang Jia’s Mother," translated by and reprinted in ChinaGeeks Blog (Online), 2 April 09.

120 "The Story of Yang Jia’s Mother," translated by and reprinted in ChinaGeeks Blog (Online), 2 April 09.

127 See CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 37–38. The suspended sentence meant that Gao did not serve prison time after the court sentenced him. It also meant that Gao would be closely monitored and surveilled for five years, and that if he did anything that displeased his guards, he could end up in prison to serve out his three-year sentence. In March 2009, Jerome Cohen, professor at New York University Law School and a leading American expert on Chinese law, described Gao’s suspended sentence of "home surveillance" as "harsher than prison, not only for Gao but also for his wife and daughter." Jerome A. Cohen, "Beijing Must Reveal Fate of Human Rights Lawyer," South China Morning Post (Online), 19 March 09.

128 See Gao’s record of detention searchable through the CECC’s Political Prisoner Database; Human Rights in China (Online), "Torture Account by Missing Rights Defense Lawyer Gao Zhisheng," 8 February 09.

130 Human Rights in China (Online), "Torture Account by Missing Rights Defense Lawyer Gao Zhisheng," 8 February 09 (attaching PDF of Gao’s account titled "Dark Night, Dark Hood, and Kidnapping by Dark Mafia"); ChinaAid (Online), "A Letter From the Twenty-first Century Dun-geon—Over Fifty Days of Endless Inhumane Tortures in the Hands of the Chinese Government," translated by ChinaAid (Online), 18 February 09 (written on 28 November 07 and authorized for release to international community on 9 February 09.) The Web sites of HRIC and ChinaAid contain different English translations of the same Chinese language account written by Gao Zhisheng.

146 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State PartiesUnder Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14.

147 "Guangdong Cases Uncover Years of Abuse, Sources Say," South China Morning Post (Online), 16 April 09; "Supreme Court Vice President Huang Songyou Is Placed Under ‘Double Stipulations,’ " Southern Metropolitan Daily, 29 October 08 (Open Source Center, 29 October 08). In August, Huang Songyou was dismissed from all of his official positions and stripped of hisCommunist Party membership. His case was transferred to the procuratorate for criminal prosecution on corruption charges. See "Party Sacks Ex-Supreme Court VP Over Corruption,"Xinhua (Online), 21 August 08. In the first half of 2009, Zheng Shaodong, former Vice Minister of Public Security and Director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of Guangdong, and ChenShaoji, Chairman of the Guangdong Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and former head of Guangdong’s Public Security Department, were also placedunder shuanggui. "Guangdong Cases Uncover Years of Abuse, Sources Say," South China Morning Post (Online), 16 April 09. Zheng and Chen’s investigation were prompted by their allegedlinks to billionaire Huang Guangyu (Wong Kwong-yu), founder of Gome Appliances, who was placed under investigation in November for suspected securities fraud. See, e.g., "Former TopLaw Officials in Graft Probe," South China Morning Post (Online), 16 April 09; "Shenzhen Graft Probe Hits Three More Officials," South China Morning Post (Online), 9 June 09; He Xin, LuoJieqi, and Wang Heyan, "Shenzhen Mayor Bows Out on Bribery Probe," Caijing (Online), 2 July 09.

159 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses ContinueUnabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 4 February 09, 16. One of the former RTL inmates who was interviewed for CHRD’s report, Luo Hangshan, spent three years in an RTL center inLiaoning province. Luo reported that beatings were common and that he knew of seven or eight inmates who were beaten to death, a figure that did not include those who committed suicidebecause they could no longer stand the abuse. Luo said that all kinds of torture were common, including forcing the inmates to eat feces and drink urine, which the guards called eating frieddough sticks and drinking wine. Ibid., 58–59. In its December 2008 report, the UN Committee against Torture (UNCAT) urged China, as it had in the past, to "immediately abolish all formsof administrative detention." UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 13. The Committee also expressed concern about allegations of torture and abuse in RTL centers, and thegovernment’s failure to investigate such allegations. Ibid., para. 14.

161 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses ContinueUnabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 4 February 09, 11–12; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 53. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention observed after its 2004 visit toChina that ALL review of RTL decisions was "of very little value." See UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Mission to China,Addendum, 29 December 04, paras. 56, 73.

163 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses ContinueUnabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 4 February 09, 61. Jin Hanyan, a petitioner who spent one year and 10 months at the Hubei Women’s RTL Center, told CHRD that the detainees werenot allowed to have any visitors (including family), and thus she (and other detainees) could not meet with lawyers or others who might have helped them to pursue legal remedies. Jinwrote out a petition for administrative reconsideration herself, but later learned that the staff at the RTL center had kept it and not forwarded it to the relevant authorities. Jin stated thatother detainees had experienced similar treatment. Ibid., 53. See also China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Current Challenges and Prospects, CECC Roundtable, 10 July 09, Written Statementsubmitted by Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, New York University School of Law, Co-director, U.S.-Asia Law Institute (stating that generally a lawyer’s only possible role in reeducation throughlabor proceedings "is to assist people who have already been sent off to RETL confinement with an appeal for judicial review in the relatively few cases when the detainees are able to contactand hire counsel").

166 "China’s Charter 08," translated by Perry Link, New York Review of Books (Online), 15January 09. During the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of China in February, several delegations raised concerns about administrative detention in China and calledupon the Chinese government to abolish RTL and all other forms of administrative detention. See UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 43, 82, 92. The delegations that recommended China abolish all forms of administrative detention included Germany, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. The Chinese delegation rejected the recommendations that it abolish RTL and other forms of administrative detention. Ibid., para. 117.

167 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11.

168 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, paras. 11, 33. In addition, the Committee recommended that in order to comply with the definition of torture in the Convention, China must include the infliction of severe mental pain or suffering in its definition of torture, and ensure that any person acting in "an official capacity or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official can be prosecuted for torture." Ibid., para. 33. See also The UN Human Rights Council’s Review of China’s Record: Process and Challenges, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 16 January 09, Testimony of Felice Gaer, Director, The Jacob Laustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, Chair, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom ("the official Chinese definition [of torture] does not meet the UNdefinition"). The panelists participating in the roundtable agreed that China’s definition of torture was too narrow; among other things, it does not account for mental or psychological abuse,and applies only to law enforcement officers or other officials within the criminal system, thereby excluding from criminal liability other government officials (or persons working under theirdirection) who engage in violence and torture, such as urban management officers (chengguan), guards in reeducation through labor centers, black jail guards, hired "thugs," etc.

169 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture:China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 33.

170 Andrew Jacobs, "China Assails UN Report That Alleges Torture," New York Times, reprinted in International Herald Tribune (Online), 24 November 08. During the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, several delegations raised the issue of torture and abuse in custody. China rejected the recommendation that it "take immediate measures to implement the recommendations" made by the Committee against Torture after its review of China in November 2008. See UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 28, 117.

171 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State PartiesUnder Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 12.

172 Kent Ewing, "Chinese Prisons: Horror and Reform," Asia Times (Online), 24 March 09. The first case that came to light in 2009 involved the death in February of 24-year-old Li Qiaomingat a detention center in Yunnan, which was initially explained by officials to have resulted from fatal injuries sustained during a game of "hide-and-seek" ("duo maomao") with other inmates.The media and blogosphere spread news of the case; Internet users expressed anger over the death and the unconvincing explanation given by the officials, and called for an investigation.Amnesty International (Online), "China’s Detention System Under Pressure After Inmate Deaths," 20 March 09; Kathrin Hille, "China To Address Torture of Prisoners," Financial Times (Online), 3 April 09. After the investigation, officials stated that Li, in fact, had been beaten to death by "jail bullies" (laotou yuba). More reports of other suspicious deaths in custody followed. In March, for example, the Chinese media reported the death of a 50-year-old man in a detention center in Jiangxi province; officials initially explained the cause of death as the result of a "nightmare." Zhu Zhe, "Preventing Custody Deaths a Top Priority," China Daily (Online), 4 April 09.

174 Amnesty International (Online), "China’s Detention System Under Pressure After InmateDeaths," 20 March 09. If convicted and sentenced to a prison term by a court, a defendant is then transferred to a prison (jianyu).

175 Amnesty International (Online), "China’s Detention System Under Pressure After Inmate Deaths," 20 March 09; Kathrin Hille, "China To Address Torture of Prisoners," Financial Times (Online), 3 April 09.

184 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 37; UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 12.

185 Human Rights in China (Online), "Case Update: Elderly Activist Shuang Shuying Released; Reports Abuses in Prison," 13 February 09. In February 2009, rights activist Shuang Shuying, aged 77, completed a two-year sentence at Beijing Women’s Prison for hitting a police car with her cane. According to an interview Shuang gave to the non-governmental organization Human Rights in China shortly after her release, she was beaten by both prison guards and other inmates and also subjected to electric shock. Prison guards ordered one of Shuang’s cellmates to beat her, and threatened Shuang that her six cellmates would take turns tormenting her until she was "tormented to death." The guards warned Shuang that if she told her son about the beatings, they would deny her family visits and put her in solitary confinement. Ibid.

186 See, e.g., PRC Prison Law, adopted and effective on December 29, 1994, art. 58 (maximum term for solitary confinement is 15 days); Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Right, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak: Mission to China, E/CN.4/2006,6/Add. 6, 10 March 06, para. 45 (describing "prolonged solitaryconfinement" as a method of torture).

187 Times Wang, "Latest Visit With Dad," posted on Wangbingzhang.com, 11 July 09; Emailcorrespondence with Ti-Anna Wang on file with the Commission, 29 July 09. For more information about Wang Bingzhang, see his record of detention, which is searchable through theCECC’s Political Prisoner Database.

188 Email Correspondence With Ti-Anna Wang, 31 July 09 (on file with the Commission).Wang Bingzhang’s son, Times Wang, reported that during a July visit with his father Wang told him that he was in relatively good health (he suffers from phlebitis and bad allergies,among other ailments) and that he was getting along well with the guards. One of the guards at the prison told Times Wang that the warden wanted Times to know that the prison wasaware of the Wang children’s advocacy efforts on behalf of their father, and that he hoped they would be "accurate and truthful" in their assessment of their father’s situation. Times Wang,"Latest Visit With Dad," posted on Wangbingzhang.com, 11 July 09. Dr. Wang Bingzhang was included on a list of political prisoners Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi presented to President Hu Jintao during her May trip to China. Speaker Nancy Pelosi, "Pelosi Floor Speech on Tiananmen Square Resolution," Speaker Pelosi’s Web Site (Online), 3 June 09.

196 "Zeng Jinyan: Concerns for Health of Hu Jia in Prison," Zeng Jingyan’s Blog, translated by and reprinted in China Digital Times (Online), 9 May 09.

197 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Huang Qi Reportedly Ill in Detention, Denied Access to Medical Attention," 28 July 09. During a meeting in late May with his lawyer MoShaoping, Huang stated that he suffered from headaches and insomnia and an irregular heartbeat, and that four lumps had appeared on his chest and stomach over the past several months.As of late July, Huang had not received any medical attention for his ailments. Ibid.

199 "Ignoring Facts and Law as a Concession to Popular Will Actually Contravenes the Will of the People" [Weile qianjiu minyi bugu shishi he falu cai shi zhenzheng weibei minyi], ChinaYouth Daily (Online), 18 June 09; "Thirty Years After the Restoration of the Lawyers System" [Lushi zhidu huifu 30 nian], Democracy and Legal System Magazine, reprinted in Sina, 30 October 08.

202 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture:China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11. During the Universal Periodic Review of China in February, the Chinese government rejected the recommendation that China "ensureevery detainee has the right to regularly see visitors and has permanent access to legal counsel and effective complaint mechanisms." See UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report ofthe Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 43(b), 117. Germany made the recommendation.

204 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 38. Because the revised Lawyers Law conflicts with several provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) governing lawyers’ rights in criminal cases with respect to the "three difficulties," it was unclear how these conflicts would be resolved once the revised Lawyers Law took effect, despite a clear pronouncement from the Legislative Affairs Commission (fagongwei) of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee that in the case of a conflict, the more recent law (i.e., the Lawyers Law) takes precedence over the earlier law (i.e., CPL). See ibid., 38–39; "New Lawyers Law Is ‘One Year Old’: The ‘Three Difficulties’ Have Not Yet Been Resolved" [Xin lushifa "zhousui": "sannan" reng wei jiejue], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 4 June 09. Some lawyers hold the view that the fundamental issue is not whether the Lawyers Law is being implemented effectively, but whether it is being implemented at all. See "Ignoring Facts and Law as a Concession to Popular Will Actually Contravenes the Will of the People" [Weile qianjiu minyi bugu shishi he falu cai shi zhenzheng weibei minyi], China Youth Daily (Online), 18 June 09.

205 PRC Law on Lawyers, enacted 15 May 96, amended 28 October 07, effective 1 June 08, art. 33; PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 96. One lawyer reported that prior to the revised Lawyers Law, permission needed to be obtained from "relevant departments" every time a lawyer wanted to meet with his detained client during the investigation and review for indictment stages, even in non-state secrets cases. See "One Year Anniversary of Implementation of the [Revised] Lawyers Law: Lawyers Discuss the LawyersLaw and Protection of Their Professional Rights" [Lushifa shishi yi zhounian, lushi tan lushifa yu zhiye quanli baozhang], Xinhua (Online), 4 June 09. Another lawyer described his experiencewith a local regulation in Sichuan that requires a lawyer to get approval from "the relevant responsible person" at the investigating agency before he or she can meet with a detained client.Li Liang and Zhu Yuchen, "New Lawyers Law ‘Annual Inspection’: Difficulties With Lawyers’ Rights Are Making Steady Improvement" [Xin lushifa "nian jian": Lushi quanli jiannan zhongwenbu xiangqian], Legal Daily (Online), 4 June 09. "State secrets" is often invoked to prevent lawyers from meeting with their clients, particularly in politically sensitive cases. See Jerome A. Cohen, "Prisoner of the System," South China Morning Post (Online), 21 July 09; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on HumanRights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09, sec.1.e.

207 CECC Staff Interviews. A Beijing lawyer told CECC that for "ordinary" (putongde) cases, access to detained clients was good, but for state secrets cases, permission to meet with detainedclient was still necessary. See also "One Year Anniversary of Implementation of the [Revised] Lawyers Law: Lawyers Discuss the Lawyers Law and Protection of Their Professional Rights"[Lushifa shishi yi zhounian, lushi tan lushifa yu zhiye quanli baozhang], Xinhua (Online), 4 June 09. But the Legal Daily reported that relevant personnel in the procuratorate of anunnamed district in Beijing said that in practice, they were not implementing the "three certificates" provision of the revised Lawyers Law. See Li Liang and Zhu Yuchen, "New Lawyers Law‘Annual Inspection’: Difficulties With Lawyers’ Rights Are Making Steady Improvement" [Xin lushifa "nian jian": Lushi quanli jiannan zhong wenbu xiangqian], Legal Daily (Online), 4 June 09.

213 "New Lawyers Law Is ‘One Year Old’: The ‘Three Difficulties’ Have Not Yet Been Resolved"[Xin lushifa ‘zhousui’: ‘sannan’ reng wei jiejue], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 4 June 09. According to Professor Chen Guangzhong, the renowned criminal procedure professor fromBeijing’s China University of Politics and Law, the basic problem is the lack of specific regulations governing the procedure for implementing the improved rights of lawyers contained in therevised Lawyers Law, and, as a result, the law is not being implemented consistently. Ibid. Two lawyers interviewed by Xinhua also believed that one of the biggest obstacles to the realization of the expanded rights under the revised Lawyers Law is the lack of an implementing mechanism or structure, which would include detailed implementing measures and the establishmentof punishments for those who violate lawyers professional rights. See "One Year Anniversary of Implementation of the [Revised] Lawyers Law: Lawyers Discuss the Lawyers Law and Protection of Their Professional Rights" [Lushifa shishi yi zhounian, lushi tan lushifa yu zhiye quanli baozhang], Xinhua (Online), 4 June 09. A legal scholar from China University of Politics andLaw writing in the July 2009 issue of Chinese Lawyer magazine also observed that without a corresponding implementation mechanism there was no way to "operationalize" the new Lawyers Law. See Wang Jinxi, "A Look Back: ‘Lawyers Law’ Revision A Year On" [Huimou "lushifa" xiuding hou yinian], Chinese Lawyer, July 2009, 13, 15.

220 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Jiang Tianyong, Tang Jitian Prevented From Meeting With Client by Hebei Feixiang County Court" [Jiang tianyong, tang jitian bei hebeifeixiang xian fayuan zuzhi huijian dangshiren], 24 March 09. When Jiang and Tang went to the detention center where Ge was being held, they were told by detention center staff that thecourt had forbidden lawyers from meeting with Ge. Ibid.

221 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses ContinueUnabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 4 February 09, 12. A former inmate, Jin Hanyan, who spent nearly two years in the Women’s RTL Center in Wuhan, Hubei province, for "persistentand unreasonable petitioning" explained: "The RTL camp wouldn’t even let us meet with people who could help us with legal remedies, so how could we seek any legal remedies? I submitteda written petition for administrative review, but I found out later that the camp staff withheld it from the proper authorities. Other detainees had the same experience, and never received anykind of legal remedy." Ibid., 53.

222 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State PartiesUnder Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14.

223 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 39, 164. In two recent cases involving Tibetan defendants, authorities have denied the defendants access to counsel of their own choosing. Court officials in Xining city, Qinghai province, refused to let Beijing lawyer Li Dunyong represent the Tibetan documentary filmmaker Dondrub Wangchen. Li reportedly has said that he believes that authorities will handpick their own lawyers to ensure a harsh result for Wangchen. Judicial authorities in Gansu province likewise have prevented well-known Beijinghuman rights lawyer Li Fangping from representing two monks who were detained after alleged involvement in a political protest. "China Blocks Tibet Lawyers," Radio Free Asia (Online), 20July 09.

225 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), "Concern Over Mainland Lawyers’ Freedom to Legal Practice on Urumqi Protest Cases," 15 July 09; Teng Biao, "The Law on Trialin China," Washington Post (Online), 25 July 09 (stating that China’s "lawyers’ associations are, in fact, puppets of the government whenever a political question arises"). The Xinjiang Lawyers Association reportedly informed lawyers in Xinjiang that it would arrange the handling of all cases related to the protests. See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), "Concern Over Mainland Lawyers’ Freedom to Legal Practice on Urumqi Protest Cases," 15 July 09.

236 Xia Lin, "Statement Regarding Deng Yujiao" [Guanyu Deng yujiao yi an de shengming], Xia Lin’s Blog (Online), 23 May 09. Xia Lin and Xia Nan issued a statement in response. Theywrote that Deng’s mother, Zhang Shumei, was taken away by the head of the local police station on May 21, and since that time they had not been able to easily communicate with Zhang. Thelawyers wrote that they really had no way of knowing if they had actually been dismissed and that it was completely inappropriate for such an announcement to come from the government,and, consequently, there were serious doubts as to its validity. The lawyers wrote that later on the morning of May 23, they received a call from Zhang Shumei stating that the governmentpress release was not accurate and that she wanted to meet with them. They didn’t hear from Zhang until around 4 p.m., when she called to tell them that she did in fact want to dismissthem, and that she was unwilling to meet with them. Ibid.

239 "Chinese Dissident Liu’s Lawyer Challenges Police Interference Over Attorneys," Der Spiegel, 29 June 09 (Open Source Center, 29 June 09). Mo told Der Spiegel that the authorities had not provided him with any legal justification supporting their action, and that he planned to challenge the decision. He said that the "police have absolutely no right to lay down which attorney may or may not act on behalf of a defendant."

247 Ye Doudou, "How China Justifies Empty Witness Chairs," Caijing (Online), 26 June 09; PRC Criminal Procedure Law, art. 48; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 39. The Caijing report on the absence of witnesses in courtrooms noted that no eyewitnesses appeared at Deng Yujiao’s trial on June 16; "[i]nstead, the prosecution presented every bit of witness testimony by submitting written records to the court." In Deng Yujiao’s account of what happened to her, as related by Beijing attorney Xia Lin, there was at least one service worker who witnessed the two officials assaulting Deng Yujiao and a "captain" of the bathing services area who had tried to stop the two officials without success. Based on Xia Lin’s account, it appears thatthey likely also witnessed Deng defend herself with a fruit knife, after being dragged around by the men and pushed onto a sofa. See "Deng Yujiao Tells Her Story," Southern MetropolitanDaily, translated by and reprinted in EastSouthWestNorth Blog, 26 May 09; "The Official News Update on Deng Yujiao (5/31/09) (Xinhua)," reprinted in EastSouthWestNorth Blog, 31 May 09.Eyewitness testimony would have been crucial in establishing whether Deng Yujiao had been stripped from the waist down, as she claimed in the account provided by her attorney, andwhether her self-defense was indeed "excessive" as the prosecution claimed.

252 Ng Tze-wei, "Legal Experts Worried by Decision To Free Waitress," South China Morning Post (Online), 18 June 09. Nanjing-based law professor Zhang Zanning said that the verdict appeared to be a compromise "to please the higher authorities with a guilty verdict and, at the same time, to heed public sentiment by letting the woman go. But the legal system will bearthe brunt for losing public trust." Raymond Li, "Court Convicts, Frees Waitress Who Killed Cadre," South China Morning Post (Online), 17 June 09.

253 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture:China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11(d) (noting with concern the "continued reliance on confessions as a common form of evidence for prosecution, thus creating conditions thatmay facilitate the use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects"); The UN Human Rights Council’s Review of China’s Record: Process and Challenges, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 16 January 09, Testimony of Ms. Felice Gaer, Director, the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights; CECC 2007 Annual Report,10 October 07, 10–11.

254 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State PartiesUnder Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11(d); CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October07, 19. Not only is the arbitrary use of police power used to extract confessions from suspects and defendants, it is also sometimes used to create "facts" that can assist the authorities in handling certain cases. For example, there was no doubt that Deng Yujiao stabbed the two officials who had attempted to rape her on May 10, but the local authorities apparently were after something else when they confined her to a psychiatric hospital after the attack. Deng reportedly told a friend that authorities had beaten her and threatened that if she did not admit to be suffering from depression, they would give her the death penalty. Xiao Zhi, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Psychiatric Hospitals Have Become a Gulag Archipelago With Chinese Characteristics" [Jingshenbing yuan chengwei ju you zhongguo tese de gulage qundao], 17 May 09. Deng’s "mental disorder" provided one of the mitigating circumstances that led to theverdict of "exemption from punishment." An article in a Chinese news magazine suggested that Deng’s "mental illness" was "apparently a thinly-veiled attempt to appease netizens by exempting Deng from punishment, while preserving the reputation of local officials at the same time." Yu Xiaodong, "Netizens, the New Watchdogs," NEWSCHINA, 5 July 09, 20.

262 Bill Savadove, "Killer of 6 Police Loses Death Sentence Appeal," South China Morning Post (Online), 21 October 08. The attorney had requested a second psychological evaluation of Yang Jia, which the court denied. The initial psychological assessment, which was ordered by the police, was conducted by an institution that reportedly had ties with officials under the Ministry of Justice. The assessment found that Yang Jia was in good mental health and had the capacity for full criminal responsibility. See Eva Pils, "Yang Jia and China’s Unpopular Criminal JusticeSystem," China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2009, 61; "Killer of Six Chinese Police Executed in Shang-hai," Xinhua (Online), 26 November 08.

The Chinese Government continued during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year to strictly control religious practice and repress religious activity outside of state-approved parameters. Local governments implemented measures to prevent "illegal" religious gatherings and curb other "illegal" religious activities, in some cases destroying sites of worship and detaining or imprisoning religious believers. Government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy escalated, resulting in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.1 Buddhist communities outside the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism also faced continued government controls, and unregistered Buddhist temples remained subject to closure and demolition by government authorities.2 Catholic bishops in China’s unregistered church community remained in detention, home confinement, under surveillance, in hiding, or in unknown whereabouts, while authorities strengthened rhetoric on the state-controlled Catholic church’s independence from the Holy See.3 The government maintained its longstanding ban against the Falun Gong spiritual movement and other religious and spiritual groups deemed to be cults, subjecting some members to detention, imprisonment, and other abuses.4 Repression of Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) worsened as authorities strengthened security campaigns targeting "religious extremism," and outside the XUAR, the government also maintained broad controls over the practice of Islam.5 The government continued to subject registered Protestant congregations to tight state control over their internal affairs and officials continued to target some unregistered Protestant churches for closure and to harass, detain, or imprison some church leaders and members.6 Authorities maintained restrictions over the activities of registered Taoist priests, and unregistered Taoist priests were subject to penalties for failing to submit to state control.7 Other religious and spiritual communities remained without legal recognition to practice their faith.8

During the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, the government also continued to use legal measures to restrain, rather than protect, the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens.9 Children faced continued restrictions on their right to freedom of religion, and parents and guardians faced restrictions on their right to impart a religious education to children.10 The Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts.11 The government has permitted, and in some cases, sponsors, the social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious communities, but in the past year, authorities also took steps to block some social welfare activities by unregistered religious groups.12

The Chinese Government and Communist Party maintained an antagonistic stance toward religion in the past year and continued to affirm basic policies of control over religious practice.13 In addition to imposing controls over religion upon all citizens, the Party also maintained prohibitions on Party members’ belief in or practice of religion, thereby cutting off religious adherents from career opportunities, including high-level government and enterprise jobs, contingent on Party membership.14 In an October 2008 speech, State Administration for Religious Affairs Director Ye Xiaowen called for deepening study of Marxist and Communist Party viewpoints toward religion and for "keeping tabs" on religious leaders, religious activity, and sites of worship.15 Late 2008 anniversaries within the state-controlled Catholic and Protestant churches reaffirmed the government and Party roles in defining theology and controlling interaction between Chinese religious adherents and foreign religious institutions.16 Authorities continued to soften some rhetoric toward religion by articulating a "positive role" for religious communities in China, but used this sentiment to bolster support for state economic and social goals.17 At the same time, officials and central government directives continued to warn against foreign groups "using religion" to "interfere" in China’s affairs and "sabotage" the country.18 A press communique from the PRC Embassy in the United States included "freedom of religious belief" among "sensitive issues" to "properly handle" in order to advance progress in U.S.-China relations.19

The Chinese Government’s legal and policy framework for religion violates the protections for freedom of religion set forth in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international human rights instruments.20 Although the PRC Constitution states that all citizens enjoy "freedom of religious belief," it limits citizens’ ability to exercise their beliefs by protecting only "normal religious activities," 21 a vaguely defined term in both law and practice that has been used as a means to suppress forms of religious activity protected under international human rights law.22 In addition, the government has created a regulatory framework that in practice recognizes only five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism—for limited state protections for religious activity.23 Variations in implementation of government policy have enabled some unrecognized religious groups to carry out activities,24 but arbitrary toleration by some local officials does not amount to Chinese Government protection of these communities’ freedom of religion. In addition, the government has continued to formally outlaw some religious and spiritual groups,25 thereby wholly denying members of these communities the right to practice their faith openly. Despite creating space for some citizens to practice their religion within government-approved parameters,26 where some, but not all, Chinese citizens are allowed to do so, and where members of China’s five government-sanctioned religious communities remain subject to tight controls over their affairs, the Chinese Government has failed in its obligation to protect Chinese citizens’ right to freedom of religion.

The Chinese Government uses law as a tool to restrain rather than protect Chinese citizens’ right to freedom of religion. Although the national Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) and local government regulations provide a measure of protection for some religious activities, such protection is limited in scope and applies only to state-sanctioned religious communities.27 Under Chinese regulations, religious communities must apply to register with the government and must submit to state control over their affairs.28 Registered groups must receive government approval to establish venues for worship.29 Religious and spiritual groups that do not meet registration requirements and groups that choose not to submit to government control through registration risk harassment, detention, closure of sites of worship, and other abuses.30 Members of registered groups also risk repercussions where authorities deem their practices to fall outside vaguely defined legal protections for "normal religious activities." 31

Based on Commission analysis, the pace of legislation on religious affairs at both the central and provincial government levels slowed in the past year, a trend with potentially negative consequences despite the use of law as a means to restrain religious practice. Chinese Government efforts in recent years to legislate on religious practice have lent some formal transparency and consistency to government policies on religion, including as they relate to the limited number of legal protections for religious practice. The slowed pace of legislation also means that local government officials may continue to regulate religious affairs based on older, local regulations inconsistent with the RRA, creating a confusing legal terrain for citizens who aim to understand their rights. After eight provincial areas reported issuing new or amended regulations in 2005 and 2006 in accordance with the RRA, three provincial-level areas reported taking such action in 2007. In 2008 and in 2009, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, and Hubei provinces issued amended or new regulations on religious affairs.32

The RRA does not include criminal penalties for violation of its provisions,33 but the Chinese Government uses the PRC Criminal Law and related legal provisions as a means to punish and detain people for forms of religious practice deemed to fall outside of approved parameters.34 In addition, the Chinese Government uses administrative punishments, including reeducation through labor, to fine or detain citizens outside the formal criminal justice system.35 Authorities also have penalized or detained religious citizens without adhering to formal legal processes.36

In this reporting year, the Commission observed an increase in official pressure, harassment, and abuse of lawyers who defend religious adherents, among other groups. Although some religious communities and their lawyers have had some success in recent years in using the legal system to challenge official abuses,37 events from the past year underscore continuing challenges that communities face in defending their rights and that lawyers face in carrying out their work. [See Section III—Access to Justice for detailed information on the harassment of attorneys and see China’s Religious Communities—Falun Gong and China’s Religious Communities—Protestants within this section for specific information on attorneys harassed and detained for their activities defending members of these communities.]

In the past year, children continued to face restrictions on their right to freedom of religion, and parents and guardians faced restrictions on their right to impart a religious education to children. The various restrictions lack basis in national Chinese law and contravene protections in international human rights law, including in treaties the Chinese Government has signed or ratified.38 In some cases, authorities extended restrictions to young people and college students above the age of 18, who are considered adults under Chinese law.39 While a government spokesperson said in 2005 that no laws prohibit children from believing in a religion and that parents may provide a religious education to their children, some provincial legislation continues to penalize acts related to imparting religion to children.40 Though variations in local government practices have enabled children in some localities to access religious sites and religious education,41 the Commission in the past year tracked reports of ongoing efforts to prevent children from participating in religious activities.42 For example, local authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have continued to impose restrictions on children’s freedom of religion through measures such as monitoring their activities outside of school and launching a campaign to "weaken religious consciousness" among young adults and juveniles. [See China’s Religious Communities— Islam in this section for more information.] Authorities also have condemned Western religious organizations perceived to focus their activities on Chinese youth. An August 2008 speech by an official in Jiangxi province cautioned against "Western hostile forces" using religion to carry out "ideological infiltration" of young adults and juveniles, expressing concern about Christian organizations in particular.43 The references to "young adults" (qingnian) illustrated efforts to extend restrictions on children’s freedom of religion to people over the age of 18. In fall 2008, authorities targeted house churches near college campuses in Beijing and Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, detaining students in attendance, accusing church members of "preaching to students," and ordering four church leaders to serve reeducation through labor.44 A report from Shaanxi province made available in January 2009 referred to a notice implemented in recent years on "prohibiting Catholic catechism classes for young adults and juveniles." 45

The Chinese Government denies its citizens the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts,46 and Chinese authorities continue to punish religious adherents who publish or distribute religious materials independent of government controls. In June 2009, a Beijing court sentenced bookstore owner Shi Weihan to three years’ imprisonment for "illegal operation of a business," a crime under Article 225 of the Criminal Law,47 because Shi had printed and given away Bibles.48 Six other people connected to the case also received prison sentences.49 Authorities had held Shi in detention since March 2008 and earlier detained him between November 2007 and January 2008 in connection to the same activities.50 The government controls the publishing and distribution of approved religious materials, and some churches have reported an insufficient supply of Bibles.51 Authorities have confiscated Bibles imported to the country,52 and in the past year, officials confiscated Bibles in raids on house churches.53 In 2008, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region made "illegal" religious and political publications the focal point of a censorship campaign in the region.54 [See China’s Religious Communities—Islam in this section for more information.]

In the past year, the Chinese Government continued to permit, and in some cases, sponsor, the social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious communities, but authorities also took steps to block some activities by non-registered groups. The national Regulation on Religious Affairs permits registered religious organizations to engage in social welfare activities, as have earlier regional regulations.55 In addition, the Chinese Government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, released in April 2009, also states support for religious organizations’ social welfare activities.56 In the aftermath of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, religious communities in China provided aid to earthquake victims, including in partnership with overseas religious organizations,57 but some groups, especially unregistered organizations, met with official sanction. In October 2008, the Shifang city, Sichuan province, United Front Work Department—the Communist Party office that among other tasks oversees religious communities in China—described taking steps to curb "illegal proselytizing" in accordance with provincial-level directives on blocking proselytizing at disaster relief sites, one of which singled out underground Protestant groups in particular.58 In November, the U.S.-based organization ChinaAid reported that the Ministry of Civil Affairs ordered the abolition of the organization known as the Chinese House Church Alliance, on the grounds that the group, which had engaged in earthquake relief work among other activities, was operating without registration as a social organization.59 In December 2008, public security officers in an earthquake-affected village in Beichuan county, Sichuan province, disrupted reconstruction activities led by house church volunteers, detaining some people and confiscating property including religious materials.60 Zhang Xiuzhi, a registered church member who inquired about official mishandling of earthquake relief donations, reportedly was ordered to serve one year of reeducation through labor in April for "disturbing social order." 61 In June 2009, authorities in Nanbu county, Sichuan province, detained house church members Wei Sanhong and Wu Han and imposed administrative punishments on them in apparent connection with their earthquake disaster relief activities through their church.62

Although few reports of repression of Chinese Buddhists in non-Tibetan areas reach the international community, the Chinese Government and Communist Party exercise control over the institution and practice of Buddhism by ethnic Han citizens in much the same manner as for religions that demonstrate much higher levels of protest against state control of religion.63 The government requires all Buddhist monks, nuns, and institutions to register with the state-run Buddhist Association of China (BAC) in order to practice Buddhism legally.64 Officials often harass unregistered Buddhist groups, forcibly close their meeting sites, detain their leaders, and in cases where authorities brand such groups a "cult," punish them with detention or reeducation.65 Communities under the BAC encounter rules and regulations that cast nationalism and loyalty to the Communist Party as religious obligations with which Buddhists must comply and prohibit religious practices from being carried out at temples that the government deems "superstitious activities." 66 The BAC imposes rules governing personnel, practice, and teaching in registered Buddhist communities, examples of which include a BAC monopoly on issuing ordination licenses, the use of political criteria to judge ordination eligibility, prohibitions against certain traditional ordination rituals, restrictions on cross-provincial monastic study, restrictions on interactions with foreign Buddhists, requirements that prospective monastics receive parental and family approval before being ordained, and a prohibition against citizens under the age of 20 or over the age of 60 entering a monastic institution.67

Authorities in a number of localities continue to target unregistered Buddhist temples and lay communities for closure or demolition.68 A 2008 report to the Daqing Municipal People’s Congress in Heilongjiang province urged local officials to "strengthen strikes" against "unlawful religious activities," and expressed concern that "illegal Buddhist meetings have not stopped despite repeated attempts to ban them." 69 Officials also warned that some residents had opened their homes to "traveling monks and wild Buddhas" who gave unauthorized teachings and some of whom "spread feudal superstitions." 70 Party officials in Gansu province cautioned cadres against "indulging" or being "softhearted" toward those engaged in illegal religious activities and insisted that action must be taken to stop the "chaotic" construction of unauthorized Buddhist temples and sacred statues.71 Official reports indicate that a concerted effort is underway to clamp down on unregistered Buddhist temples and meeting sites in Jiangxi province.72 For example, officials in Jiangxi’s Ningdu county authorized "special disciplinary work" in order to rein in unregistered Buddhist temples. As of December 2008, 25 unregistered temples had been forcibly merged, 68 had been forcibly closed, 56 had been forcibly converted to non-religious use, and 3 had been demolished as a result of the crackdown.73 The government continues to enforce a ban against at least one Buddhist group that it has designated a "cult organization": a Taiwan-based sect known as the Quan Yin Method (Guanyin Famen).74 The 6–10 Office, an extralegal Party-run security force that suppresses banned religious groups, has stepped up efforts in some provinces to gather intelligence on Guanyin Famen and curb its spread.75 In June 2009, local media in Zhangye city, Gansu province, reported that authorities there detained six members of Guanyin Famen during the first six months of 2009.76

TIBETAN BUDDHISM

Chinese Government and Communist Party interference with the norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unremitting antagonism toward the Dalai Lama, key factors underlying the March 2008 eruption of Tibetan protest, continued to deepen Tibetan resentment and fuel additional Tibetan protests during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. The government and Party used institutional, educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations. Officials adopted a more assertive tone in expressing determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to pressure Tibetans living in China to accept only a Dalai Lama approved by the Chinese Government. Escalating government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy have resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet. [For more information, see Section V—Tibet.]

CATHOLICISM

The government seeks to control Chinese Catholics through mandatory registration with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), a state-controlled entity established to monitor and direct Catholic doctrines and practice and manage Catholic property and personnel. The CPA denies members of registered churches the freedom to pursue full communion and free communications with the Holy See and other Catholic institutions outside of China, and security forces regularly harass Catholics who resist CPA control. Since the 1950s, the government has prohibited traditional episcopal consecrations and insisted that the Holy See lacks authority to select Chinese bishops.77 In 2009, the Commission observed ongoing harassment and detention of unregistered bishops, priests, and lay Catholics in China, as well as enduring tensions between the Holy See and the government over the scope of papal authority in China.

Controlling Catholics in Shaanxi and Hebei provinces

In the past year, authorities in Shaanxi and Hebei, the two provinces with the highest concentration of Catholics, have engaged in campaigns to suppress the activities of unregistered Catholics and to coerce unregistered clergy to accept CPA control over their communities.78 An official report from the Web site of the Shaanxi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission in January 2009 outlines details of an ongoing crackdown that has led to the "dramatic weakening of underground Catholic forces." The report described the formation of a "Catholic work leading group" that had "effectively driven" the provincial effort to control Catholics in accordance with a nationwide campaign that began in 1999.79 In the past decade, Shaanxi has "greatly strengthened the construction of patriotic organizations" and now counts 44 CPA branches throughout the province.80 The Shaanxi report underscores the progress the government has achieved in suppressing unregistered Catholics through using coercive tactics:

[We] have carried out comprehensive management of underground Catholic forces, and adopted measures to capture, beat, and suppress core members. We have forcefully struck against illegal activities, frightened core members of the underground forces, and driven a segment of the underground priests to experience a relatively significant ideological conversion, which has brought about obvious changes. In five parishes within our province that previously fell under the control or influence of underground forces, political power has been seized by the patriotic forces, 90 percent of Catholic laity has eventually taken the road of loving the motherland and loving the church, and the patriotic forces have been greatly strengthened.81

The Shaanxi report also indicates that some unregistered priests and bishops relented under sustained government pressure to undergo "transformation." One such crackdown reportedly yielded the "transformation" of 13 unregistered priests, and more than 10 other priests achieved "new heights of ideological awareness." 82 Shaanxi authorities also note that the "transformation through reeducation" of an unregistered bishop named Li Jingfeng was "still being handled," while the "illegal activities" of another bishop, Yu Chengti, had been "effectively contained." 83 Shaanxi authorities detained unregistered Bishop Wu Qinjing of the Zhouzhi diocese in March 2007, and his whereabouts still are unknown.84 Foreign media and Chinese Government reports suggest that public security forces in Hebei province, in coordination with the CPA, have engaged in a multi-month campaign targeting unregistered priests and bishops in 2009 and stepped up "guidance work" for registered Catholic churches. At least one-quarter of China’s Catholic population resides in Hebei, the "seat of the underground church." 85 On March 24, Hebei public security officials detained Ma Shengbao, an unregistered priest, and his current whereabouts remain unknown.86 The campaign reportedly has resulted in the detention of 20 unregistered Catholic parishioners and 2 priests who organized demonstrations protesting the imprisonment of Bishop Yao Liang.87 In December 2008, Chen Huixin, Hebei’s top religious affairs official, warned local officials that their management of "churches controlled by the underground Catholic forces" had become "soft," "lenient," and "fallen short of the desired goal." 88 In response, Chen urged authorities to "strengthen management awareness, measures, and mechanisms." 89 In April 2009, Wang Xuhong, Secretary General of the Hebei United Front Work Department (UFWD), inspected registered Catholic churches and met with clergy in Wu’an city. While praising Catholics for various charity activities, Wang reminded clergy that "Catholicism surely must merge into society, conform to China’s national conditions, and construct a harmonious church. Only in this way will Catholicism enjoy better development." 90 In October and November 2008, a series of Party meetings in Hebei concluded that authorities must "strengthen standard management of Catholic seminaries, monasteries, and nunneries." 91

Harassment, detention, and "transformation"

Chinese Catholics who express their faithfulness to the Holy See by refusing to join the state-controlled church, as well as those affiliated with registered parishes that run afoul of the Communist Party’s policies, remain subject to harassment, arbitrary detention, and imprisonment. Unregistered bishops are particularly vulnerable to government persecution. In 2009, at least 40 unregistered Chinese bishops were either detained, under home confinement, under surveillance, in hiding, or had disappeared under suspicious circumstances.92 The government has provided no information about the condition or whereabouts of some unregistered bishops whom it has detained for years, such as Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang.93 In March 2009, security officials forcibly removed Bishop Jia Zhiguo from his living quarters and took him to an undisclosed detention facility.94 Bishop Jia, the 74-year-old unregistered bishop of Hebei province’s Zhengding diocese, previously served two decades in prison, and since 2003, authorities have detained him numerous times and kept him under strict surveillance when not detaining him.95 Authorities also took into custody Father Paul Ma, a 55-year-old priest from a nearby Catholic village called Donglu, for celebrating the Eucharist with unregistered Catholics.96 The mayor of Xiangong township in Shaanxi province invited Father Gao Jianli, a priest from the Fengxiang county diocese, to a meeting at his office in March 2009 to discuss a land dispute involving confiscated church property.97 When the priest arrived at the mayor’s office, two men locked him in the office and beat him to the point that he required hospitalization.98

In the past year, government officials continued to disrupt and obstruct pilgrimage to the Sheshan Marian shrine in Shanghai. In December 2008, the Longwan District Party Committee in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province, reported that the religious affairs bureau had established a "special work group" for monitoring Catholics and maintaining "stability and control" during the May pilgrimage season.99 The Longwan report indicates that authorities "diverted 108 pilgrims through persuasion," "dispersed" 20 others, and "dissuaded" 247 from undertaking the pilgrimage.100 Zhang Jianlin and Zhang Li, two priests who were taken into custody in Hebei province as they traveled to Sheshan in May 2008, are believed to remain in detention more than a year later.101

In 2008 and 2009, Party and government authorities continued to characterize unregistered Catholics as a threat to "social stability," and in some cases, called for security officials to "strike against" and "transform" unregistered communities.102 In September 2008, an official report from Fuzhou city, Jiangxi province, emphasized the need to "transform" and "expand the patriotism" of "underground Catholic forces" as a top priority for the Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD).103 The Fuzhou report describes "underground Catholic forces" as exerting a "severe negative impact on social stability." 104 An April 2009 report from the head of the Jiangxi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau makes clear that Fuzhou city is representative of a larger phenomenon, noting that authorities "have continually launched transformation through reeducation of underground Catholic forces for many years throughout the province." 105 Also in April, Dalian Medical University posted a notice from the Liaoning provincial UFWD calling for authorities to "aggressively launch transformation through reeducation of underground Catholic forces." 106 In 2008, a county UFWD office in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province, was given an award for "striking against . . . underground Catholic forces" and "steadily pushing forward with transformation through reeducation." 107 In Henan province, the Sheqi county UFWD’s tasks for 2009 included "transformation through reeducation of underground Catholic forces" and increasing local security to prevent "infiltration by foreign religious forces." 108

Intelligence gathering and surveillance of Catholic communities is widespread in China. Many Chinese Catholics report that government agents have infiltrated both unregistered and Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) churches, and that they attempt to foment internal strife as a means of inhibiting Church unity and growth.109 In December 2008, the Ministry of Public Security posted a "heroic life story" of an officer in Chongqing municipality named Wang Shuncai who was lauded for "throwing himself into the task" of penetrating and spying on religious groups.110 Wang was recognized for "capturing" an important unregistered bishop three times and contributing to his eventual "transformation through reeducation." 111 Wang conducted undercover stings against religious groups in at least six districts in Chongqing and traveled to Yunnan and Guizhou provinces to work on similar cases. Wang is also credited with having cracked three significant cases by "directing secret forces" that gathered "behind the scenes, early warning intelligence." 112 In April 2009, the aforementioned Sheqi county report instructs UFWD cadres to carry out intel-ligence activities against unregistered Catholics in order to "get a clear idea of the situation and ferret out the truth." 113

Bishop appointments, relations with Rome, politicizing Catholic faith

The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) exercises control over bishop ordination for the registered Chinese Catholic church, including through coercion of bishops to officiate ordinations.114 In recent years, the government has tolerated discreet papal involvement in the selection of some bishops, but without changing its insistence that the Chinese church must be "independent, autonomous, and self-managed." 115 In December 2008, the CPA co-hosted a celebration to commemorate 50 years of "self-elected, self-ordained" bishops, which featured a speech by Du Qinglin, the head of the Party Central Committee’s UFWD.116 Du stressed that "insisting on running the affairs of the church in an independent way is an inevitable path for the Chinese Catholic Church to adapt itself to socialist society," and reminded CPA officials that it is "necessary to put the scientific development concept in command of religious affairs" and "work hard to stimulate the patriotism of religious personages and believers." 117 Some CPA-registered bishops who received tacit papal approval are under increased government pressure to publicly support the Party’s policies. Bishop Li Shan of the registered Beijing diocese, who was previously friendly toward the unregistered church and faithful to the Pope, has incorporated CPA policy slogans such as "loving the motherland, loving the Church" and warnings against infiltration by "foreign states" in speeches following his September 2007 ordination.118 Bishop Li reportedly expressed regret for these speeches, one of which was given under conditions of duress in front of top Chinese Government and Communist Party officials on Christmas Eve 2008.119 In 2009, Pope Benedict XVI reiterated his call for reconciliation between unregistered and registered Chinese Catholic bishops, and the Chinese Government continued a decade-long pattern of acting to undermine reconciliation that does not occur on CPA-dictated terms.120 The detention of unregistered Bishop Jia Zhiguo in March reportedly was linked to the CPA’s displeasure at a Vatican-brokered reconciliation agreement between Bishop Jia and Jiang Taoran, the bishop of the registered Shijiazhuang diocese.121 Authorities in Shaanxi province also described cooperation between CPA bishop Yu Runchen and unregistered bishop Yu Chengti as an "intensification of foreign infiltration" that played a role in the "ideological backsliding" of some clergy.122 No papal involvement in bishop selection occurred during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year and no progress was made toward establishing formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Vatican.

FALUN GONG

Since July 1999, the Chinese Government and Communist Party have designated Falun Gong an illegal "cult organization" and implemented a "strike hard" campaign of suppression against it—the scope and intensity of which have been unrivaled in the seven years since the Commission began its work. 2009 marked the 10th anniversary of the government’s formal ban on Falun Gong, a spiritual movement based on the teachings of its founder, Li Hongzhi, and Chinese meditative exercises called qigong. Viewing the 10th anniversary as sensitive, the central government held fast in 2009 with its 2008 pre-Olympics efforts to ferret out and punish Falun Gong practitioners. Authorities conducted propaganda campaigns that deride Falun Gong, carried out strict surveillance of practitioners, detained and imprisoned large numbers of practitioners, and subjected some who refuse to disavow Falun Gong to torture and other abuses in reeducation through labor facilities. International media and Falun Gong sources also reported deaths of practitioners in Chinese police custody in 2008 and 2009.

"Strike hard" directives and "sensitive" anniversaries

The high priority that Party leaders place on the "struggle" against Falun Gong was demonstrated by its inclusion as a principal target for a "strike hard" campaign in a directive that set the agenda for public security bureaus (PSB) nationwide this year.123 In February 2009, the Central Committee on the Comprehensive Management of Public Security circulated a directive that urged PSB forces to "closely watch out for and strike hard against . . . infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by ‘Falun Gong.’ " 124 In November 2008, the People’s Daily reported that the Communist Party Secretary of Weifang municipality in Shandong province—a city where police tortured at least 12 Falun Gong practitioners to death in 2000 and where more than 60,000 were estimated to reside before the ban125—urged Party cadres not to relent in the crackdown: "we must not loosen our hold on the struggle with ‘Falun Gong’ in the slightest way. [Officials] at all levels must firmly grasp the objectives, go a step further to intensify measures, increase the force . . . make great efforts to carry out deep strikes against ‘Falun Gong’ . . . [and] maintain a state of high pressure from the beginning to end." 126 In May 2009, Gaoyou city in Jiangsu province issued an "implementation plan" that aimed to "raise the people’s understanding and support for the work of disposing of the ‘Falun Gong’ problem . . . [in order to] resolutely stop the spread of ‘Falun Gong.’ " 127 A lecturer at the Jilin Provincial Public Security Bureau Academy recently described the "anti-cult struggle" as an "unrelenting protracted war," and reiterated the government’s "determination" to "thoroughly eliminate the cult cancer." 128 The Wanquan County PSB in Hubei province reported plans in May to "forcefully strike against ‘Falun Gong’ diehard elements" by "strengthening patrols, forming a tight network of control, obtaining deep, behind-the-scenes intelligence, and getting to the point that we know when the enemy will move, before the enemy can move." 129

Chinese authorities placed the anti-Falun Gong campaign prominently on the agenda of a special public security taskforce called "Project 6521," which reportedly was established to maintain "social stability" during four sensitive anniversaries in 2009, including the 10th anniversary of the April 25 Falun Gong silent demonstration near the Party leadership compound in Beijing.130 District officials in Guiyang city, Guizhou province, reported on "deployment arrangements" taken to implement two "monitoring and control measures" during the 10th anniversary of the April 25 Falun Gong protest: (1) "take strict precautions to prevent ‘Falun Gong’ from conducting illegal activities and putting up posters and distributing propaganda materials"; and (2) "local police stations, community neighborhood committees, and public work units must strengthen efforts to root out and strike against Falun Gong . . . and in a fundamental way, eliminate hidden dangers." 131 In Shanghai’s Nanhui district, Party officials called an "emergency meeting" to focus on the "April 25 period," urging police and government officials to "sharpen their vigilance" and "strengthen coordinated warfare" against Falun Gong.132 In Tianjin municipality, officials increased police patrols and intelligence gathering focused on Falun Gong practitioners during the 20th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.133

The 6–10 office

In the past year, the 6–10 Office—an extralegal, Party-run security apparatus created in June 1999 to implement the ban against Falun Gong—continued to consolidate its central role in all aspects of the nationwide "anti-cult" campaign. A June 2009 official report from Henan province summarizes the role of the Chenxi County 6– 10 Office as "taking charge of the supervision, inspection, direction, coordination, and implementation of the entire county’s anti-cult work." 134 The duties of the secretariat of the 6–10 Office include "taking responsibility for protecting secrets" and "supervising and solving special investigations and coordinating the work of striking against and disposing of [Falun Gong]." 135 In December 2008, Li Xiaodong, the head of the central 6–10 Office, visited Siyang county in Jiangsu province for an inspection and told local officials: "As for the cult problem, the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau must vigorously cooperate with judicial offices in conducting strikes; as soon as you discover a group, simply attack it, as soon as it shows its head, hit it right away, you must never be softhearted." 136 The 6–10 Office in Jiangsu’s Suzhou city conducted "spot checks" in December on community and school "no-cult" projects in the Canglang district.137 Officials noted how the Canglang Party Committee and government "attach a high degree of importance" to the 6–10 Office’s work and that it had received a "full guarantee" of funding and personnel.138

The 6–10 Office and public security bureaus throughout China surveilled and monitored communities, residences, and workplaces in order to identify and isolate Falun Gong adherents. In May 2009, the Qidong city 6–10 Office in Jiangsu province conducted an "investigation to get to the bottom of the situation involving cults," which identified 176 Falun Gong practitioners living in one township.139 In October 2008, Linxiang city in Hunan province gave credit to its "24-hour control and monitoring line of vision" for allowing authorities to "thoroughly suppress" two Falun Gong incidents.140 In June 2008, Xuanwei city authorities in Yunnan province called for strengthened patrols, greater use of plainclothes officers, and closer cooperation between public security forces and residential committees in order to "thoroughly shatter" Falun Gong.141 Xuanwei authorities also authorized a "powerful political offensive" in all villages and neighborhoods involving mandatory resident participation in a propaganda campaign to "effectively frighten" Falun Gong.142 In Shandong province’s Huimin county, a 2008 workplan for "implementing concentrated rectification" of Falun Gong requires various agencies to investigate all religious personnel within their jurisdiction for involvement with "cult organizations." 143 In March 2009, the head of the Shashi District 6–10 Office in Jingzhou city, Hubei province, during an inspection of sub-district offices, called on officials to "reinforce monitoring and control of ‘Falun Gong’ practitioners." 144 In June 2009, Jiujiang city officials in Jiangxi province described a surveillance system focused on a group of 829 "key figures," composed primarily of former Falun Gong prisoners.145 In July, authorities in Shandong province’s Zibo city placed nine practitioners under a "system of 24-hour monitoring and control." 146

Identification and monitoring of Falun Gong practitioners is also accomplished through the 6–10 Office’s cultivation of paid informants. The aforementioned circular from Xuanwei city offered a reward of 10,000 yuan (US$1,464) for each Falun Gong practitioner who is captured distributing "reactionary propaganda" and 5,000 yuan (US$732) for informants who "provide clues to crack a case." 147 In March 2009, Linzi district in Shandong’s Zibo city unveiled a reward system for citizen reports of Falun Gong activities.148 The 6–10 Office in Liuyang, a county-level city under Hunan province’s Changsha municipality, launched a 24-hour hot-line for informants in March and announced rewards of between 50 and 1,000 yuan (US$7 and US$146).149 In April 2009, the Liuyang 6–10 Office issued an open letter that called for residents to "resolutely resist cults" and promised an "appropriate material reward" to those who "courageously report cult behavior." 150 The Wangcang County Communist Party Committee and government in Sichuan province issued a joint letter in April to rural residents that outlined the "severe danger" posed by Falun Gong, provided residents with a "cult" hotline, and guaranteed rewards for informants.151 Authorities in Anhui province’s Bengbu city credited an informant’s call for facilitating the capture of a 50-year-old disabled Falun Gong practitioner named Yu Xiaoping who was distributing leaflets.152

The 6–10 Office focuses on public schools and universities as venues for spreading its "anti-cult" message. In May 2009, the Xinjiang Agricultural University initiated a 10-month campaign to "build a durable ideological line of defense" to "guard against and resist" possible "sabotage and infiltration" by Falun Gong.153 In June, students and teachers from middle schools all across Panji district in Anhui’s Huainan city participated in a "surge of anti-cult education" that "raised their political consciousness." 154 In July, elementary school students in Leshan city, Sichuan province, attended a "lively" speech from the local Party secretary and viewed an "anti-cult warning film." The principal instructed students to study "anti-cult" materials during the summer, take notes or write a comic book to illustrate lessons learned, and return a form with a parent’s signature to verify completion of the assignment.155

Detention, abuse, and death in custody

Chinese authorities continue to employ an extrajudicial system of incarceration known as "reeducation through labor" (RTL) to punish multitudes of Falun Gong practitioners. Public security officials may order citizens who are suspected of minor criminal or political offenses to serve up to three years of RTL without establishing their guilt before a court.156 According to one scholar, authorities have "maximized" the RTL system as an "instrument for political control" over Falun Gong.157 In 2008, the Beijing Women’s RTL Center reportedly held 700 Falun Gong practitioners compared to only 140 prisoners accused of other crimes.158 In February 2009, more than half of 13 former RTL inmates interviewed for one study—none of whom were practitioners—noted that Falun Gong constituted one of the largest groups of RTL prisoners and that they are singled out for harsh treatment.159

As security intensified ahead of the 10th anniversary of the ban, the "strike hard" campaign resulted in widespread detentions and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners. In the first half of 2008, Harbin municipality authorities in Heilongjiang province placed 53 Falun Gong practitioners in criminal detention, 23 in administrative detention, formally arrested 23, and ordered 19 to serve RTL.160 In November 2008, Nanning municipality authorities in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region reported that they had taken 36 Falun Gong practitioners into custody, formally arrested 10, held 15 in administrative detention, and sent 3 to RTL.161 In December 2008, authorities in Pingjiang county, Hunan province, detained two Falun Gong "core elements" and "destroyed" an underground printing operation as part of a workplan to "ruthlessly strike against" Falun Gong.162 In February 2009, Dazhou municipality in Sichuan province disclosed that public security officials had detained 114 practitioners and "destroyed" 11 Falun Gong "gangs" and 17 "underground nests" in three years.163 Huai’an city officials in Jiangsu province noted that they had "cracked" more than 20 cases in the first half of 2009 that resulted in Falun Gong detentions.164

In addition to forced labor, RTL for Falun Gong practitioners involves a process known as "transformation" whereby they are subjected to various methods of physical and psychological coercion until they recant belief in Falun Gong.165 In January 2009, Sichuan Provincial Party leaders inspected the Xinhua RTL center where 42 male Falun Gong practitioners were detained. RTL authorities told Party leaders that their "unique model of transformation" had recently succeeded in reforming a group of "die-hard" practitioners.166 In June 2009, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Justice Bureau described the Hohhot Women’s RTL Center as a "main battlefield" in the "struggle" against Falun Gong, where a total of 518 practitioners had been "transformed." 167 The Assistant Director of the Jiangxi Provincial RTL Management Bureau pressed his subordinates to "increase awareness of the importance of this particular year to our transformation work and understand the urgency of overcoming the current low rate of transformation." 168 In July 2009, Party leaders in Heilongjiang’s Tailai county redoubled their efforts to "transform" one local practitioner who was reportedly the sole holdout among 212 others who had already "thoroughly transformed." 169

Cases of torture and death of Falun Gong practitioners in official custody, both confirmed and alleged, continued to surface in the past year. Amnesty International reported that over 100 practitioners died in detention or shortly after release in 2008 as a result of torture or other forms of mistreatment.170 In February 2008, a popular musician and Falun Gong practitioner named Yu Zhou died in Beijing police custody 11 days after he and his wife were detained. Authorities refused to allow an autopsy and Yu’s family suspects that he was beaten to death.171 In March 2009, a public security officer at the Shibei District Liaoyuan Road PSB station in Qingdao reportedly beat Lu Xueqin, a Falun Gong practitioner, for nine days until she was permanently paralyzed from the waist down.172 In July 2009, a 45-year-old practitioner named Yang Guiquan was reportedly declared dead upon arrival at the Fuxin City Mining Corporation General Hospital in Liaoning province after being held for 16 days by police and reportedly beaten with electric batons and force-fed.173

Harassment of attorneys, court irregularities, coerced confessions

In the past year, security officials in southwest China reportedly assaulted attorneys who attempted to defend Falun Gong clients facing charges in China’s judicial system. On April 13, 2009, public security agents in the capital of Sichuan province intercepted and beat Beijing-based lawyer Cheng Hai as he was traveling to meet the mother of a Falun Gong client. The agents reportedly kicked and punched Cheng for agreeing to defend Tao Yuan, a Falun Gong practitioner who was seeking medical parole from Chengdu municipality’s Hanyuan Prison.174 On May 13, 2009, more than 20 officers from the Jiangjin District Public Security Bureau (PSB) in Chongqing municipality reportedly physically assaulted attorneys Li Chunfu and Zhang Kai at the home of Jiang Xiqing, a Falun Gong practitioner whose death in custody they were investigating.175 Officers took Li and Zhang to the PSB where they hung them inside iron cages, interrogated, and beat them. Police reportedly told Li and Zhang that "you absolutely cannot defend Falun Gong; this is the situation in China." 176

The Chinese Government’s harsh treatment of lawyers who defend Falun Gong has been most severe in the case of Gao Zhisheng, a prominent human rights attorney who was last seen being forcibly taken from his hometown by public security officials on February 4, 2009.177 When public security officials abducted Gao in September 2007, Gao was tortured in a secret location outside Beijing for more than 50 days.178 Gao’s account of the abduction describes how he was repeatedly struck with electric batons all over his body, including his genitals, and subjected to other forms of torture. Gao recounts how his tormentors admitted that Falun Gong practitioners were indeed tortured as Gao had previously alleged: "you are not incorrect in saying that we torture Falun Gong followers. That’s right, we do. The 12 courses we’re serving you were perfected on the Falun Gong followers." 179 Gao was also warned that he would be killed if he told anyone about being abducted and tortured.180 He has not been seen since February. [See Section II— Criminal Justice—The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng.]

In 2009, authorities in northeastern China reportedly detained at least four attorneys on account of their defense of Falun Gong clients. In Harbin city, the capital of Heilongjiang province, authorities detained attorney Wei Liangyue and his wife in February. Public security officials reportedly ordered Wei to serve one and one-half years of reeducation through labor for meeting with Falun Gong practitioners, which they described as "gathering a crowd to disturb social order." 181 In July 2009, security officials abducted two lawyers from Shandong province because of their involvement in Falun Gong cases. On July 2, Jinan city officials detained Liu Ruping outside of his residence and took him to an undisclosed detention facility. Six days later, police in Pingdu city reportedly detained Wang Ping, an attorney with the Tianzhenping Law Firm.182 On July 4, plainclothes officers raided the home of Wang Yonghang, a lawyer in Dalian city, Liaoning province. Police detained both Wang and his wife, and while she was released, Wang remains in custody.183

In cases where authorities did not physically assault or detain attorneys who defend Falun Gong, officials often harassed and intimidated them. The government sought to silence Chinese human rights lawyers, many of whom have defended Falun Gong practitioners, by threatening de facto disbarment through the refusal to renew their licenses to practice. In May 2009, authorities contacted senior partners at nine law firms and demanded that they refrain from submitting license renewal applications for certain attorneys or deliberately submit incomplete applications that could be turned down on technical grounds.184 In four cases, authorities advised that certain lawyers should receive poor marks in their annual performance evaluations, which would be used as a pretense to disbar them.185 As of early September 2009, the government has used the normally routine process of "annual assessment and registration" to revoke the licenses of at least 21 rights lawyers.186 The government also obstructed Falun Gong practitioners’ access to legal defense when it forced the Beijing Yitong Law Firm to close for six months in March 2009, largely on account of its role in human rights cases, including on behalf of Falun Gong practitioners.187 [For more information, see Section III—Access to Justice.]

In the past year, trials of Falun Gong practitioners continued to display procedural irregularities and violations, while justice bureaus took actions that subverted ordinary legal protections. In October 2008, the Wuhou District People’s Court in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, sentenced 11 Falun Gong practitioners to between three and seven years in prison. The court reportedly barred family members from attending the trial and prohibited the defendants’ lawyers from speaking.188 More than 15 lawyers joined together to appeal the ruling, but the appeals court attempted to obstruct their access to court records.189 The Harbin Municipal Justice Bureau issued a directive in October requiring attorneys who defend Falun Gong practitioners to report to and receive pre-trial "guidance" from the government-controlled lawyers association.190 In January 2009, lawyers for two practitioners on trial at the Shashi District People’s Court in Jingzhou city, Hubei province, alleged that torture was used to extort the defendants’ confessions and complained that the court repeatedly interrupted the defense counsel’s statements and prevented them from finishing questioning.191 In February 2009, the Shenyang Municipal Justice Bureau in Liaoning province ordered several attorneys who had prepared a not-guilty defense on behalf of six Falun Gong practitioners to either withdraw from the case or cooperate with authorities, and threatened to not renew their licenses if they failed to comply.192 In March, during the trial of 12 practitioners in the Shibei District People’s Court in Qingdao city, Shandong province, the defendants’ counsel objected to the court proceedings because of unlawful procedural violations committed by the court and procuratorate, and alleged that authorities used torture to extort confessions from defendants.193

The Party’s 6–10 Office reportedly has interfered in the adjudication of Falun Gong cases. In November 2008, defense lawyers for two practitioners on trial at the Jiguan District People’s Court in Jixi city, Heilongjiang province, challenged the court’s independence when the presiding judge was seen meeting with 6–10 Office agents during a court recess.194 In February 2009, the Xi’an District People’s Court in Liaoyuan city, Jilin province, reported that when preparing for a trial involving Falun Gong and other "cult organizations," the court must first "petition" the municipal 6–10 Office, and only after receiving an affirmative response is the court then permitted to hear the case.195 A document that appears to be a "secret" directive dated February 10, 2009, from the 6–10 Office in Shenyang city, the capital of Liaoning province, surfaced on a U.S.-based Chinese-language news Web site in March. Among other things, the directive mandates that the 6–10 Office should "dispatch personnel to audit court proceedings of ‘Falun Gong’ cases and assist with managing sudden incidents." 196

ISLAM

Conditions for religious freedom for Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) deteriorated in the past year, and authorities maintained tight controls over the practice of Islam across China. Muslims throughout China faced state controls over activities including the interpretation of theology, the content of sermons, the training of religious leaders, and the freedom to make overseas pilgrimages.197 Inside the XUAR, religious repression increased as authorities implemented harsher controls over religion as part of broader efforts in the XUAR to strengthen security and guard against perceived threats to stability. [See Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in this section and Section IV—Xinjiang for more information.]

Authorities continued efforts to align aspects of Islamic practice in China to government and Communist Party policy. An official from the Islamic Association of China (IAC), the state-controlled organization that, along with local branches, controls Islamic practice in China, reported in December 2008 that the IAC had begun to establish a corps of liaisons within each province to deal with matters involving the interpretation of religious texts,198 a measure which builds on longstanding IAC work to compile sermons and religious texts consistent with government policy.199 A May 2009 report on an IAC Standing Committee meeting described plans to launch activities in 2009 to promote the "establishment of harmonious mosques," in order for Muslim circles to "better improve their quality" and contribute to political objectives including China’s economic and social development.200 Authorities expressed concern about aspects of Islamic practice deemed incompatible with government and Party goals. A government report from Qinghai province expressed concern that some people with "backward, conservative religious viewpoints" were challenging the authority of the democratic management committees formed within registered mosques.201 Muslim religious leaders throughout China remained subject to government- and Party-led political training classes.202 For example, in April 2009, a district in Beijing described enhancing efforts to train young Muslim religious leaders to build a "politically reliable" corps of such leaders.203 In the aftermath of the forceful police suppression of a demonstration held by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5, and outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day—events Chinese authorities cast as a "riot" and blamed on U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer and the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism204—Islamic associations in China reported spreading Party policy on the incidents.205 [See Section IV—Xinjiang, for more information on the July 5 demonstration and related events.]

Chinese authorities continued to maintain restrictions on Muslims’ freedom to carry out pilgrimages to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Authorities allow Muslims to undertake trips only under the auspices of official groups that impose political requirements on participants.206 An official from the IAC said that the IAC had made progress in curbing unauthorized pilgrimages in 2008.207 [See below for details on pilgrimage restrictions in the XUAR.]

Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Conditions for religious freedom for Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) deteriorated in the past year. Authorities continued to identify "religious extremism" and "illegal religious activity" as key threats to stability208 and took measures to further restrict Islamic religious practice in the region. Government authorities defined "religious extremism" and "illegal religious activity" to encompass religious practices, group affiliations, and viewpoints protected under international human rights guarantees for freedom of religion, expression, and association that the Chinese Government is bound to uphold.209 Authorities tightened controls over Islam as part of broader campaigns in the XUAR in the past year to strengthen security and guard against perceived threats to stability. The suppressed demonstration held by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5, 2009, violence in the region starting that day, and heavy security measures in the region, drew an international spotlight on longstanding government repression in the region, including controls over religion. Prior to the July 5 demonstration, however, human rights conditions in the region, including conditions for religious freedom, had already declined throughout the year, maintaining a trend in worsening conditions documented by the Commission in its 2008 Annual Report. [See Section IV—Xinjiang, for more information.]

Tightened controls over Islam in the XUAR

Policy statements in late 2008 and 2009 from the XUAR government and Communist Party indicated that heightened controls over religion, along with other controls implemented in the XUAR earlier in 2008, would remain an enduring feature within the region and would be further strengthened. In a major speech in September 2008, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri outlined increased measures to "strike hard" against perceived threats in the region including "illegal religious activity" and "religious extremism." 210 He called for "increasing the strength of punishment for illegal religious activities and curbing, in accordance with law, underground activities to teach religion and sermonize." 211 He added that "we must never allow fanatic religious ideas to gain ground, nor must we allow religious extremist forces to flourish and see success." 212 In March 2009, Nur Bekri stated that the region’s battle against separatism would be "more severe, the task more strenuous, and the conditions for battle more intense," attributing security threats to "Western hostile forces" and to the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.213 Authorities pledged tighter security measures and carried out additional security controls in the aftermath of the July 5 demonstration and outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day. [See Section IV—Xinjiang for additional information.]

Authorities at various levels of government in the XUAR reported throughout the year on taking steps to tighten controls over religion and punish "illegal religious activity," singling out aspects of Muslim identity and practice in particular.214 Authorities integrated controls over Islam into wide-scale anti-separatism ideological campaigns launched throughout the region.215 In October 2008, XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee member Shawket Imin called on Party cadres from the United Front Work Department to take measures including strengthening "leadership" and "education" of religious people, strengthening cultivation and training of religious leaders, and curbing unauthorized religious pilgrimages and "illegal religious activities." 216 Steps at the local level include:

In February 2009, the Hoten district government announced plans to implement a series of measures to deal with "illegal religious activity," including by strengthening capacity to "investigate" and "ferret out" "illegal" activity, strengthening oversight of students during vacation periods, and holding open trials to punish "illegal religious activity" and demonstrate its consequences to the public.217

The same month, an official in Shache (Yeken, Yarkand) county, Kashgar district, outlined measures to deal with "outstanding" problems including the discovery of unauthorized religious classes, "illegal religious activity" extending across multiple localities, and "inadequate enthusiasm" among some religious figures toward contributing to the development of the rural economy.218

A March report on steps to expand intelligence information networks in Awat county, Aqsu district, described mobilizing religious leaders and other groups to enhance intelligence collection efforts. According to the report, as a result of intelligence leads, authorities prosecuted cases of underground sermonizing, investigated instances of suspected participation in "illegal religious activity," and stopped one case of "religious interference into matrimony." 220

Authorities temporarily detained and fined a group of several hundred Uyghurs for worshiping at a shrine outside their home village in March, on the grounds that the gathering constituted illegal "cross-village worship," according to information from worshipers and officials provided to Radio Free Asia (RFA).221

The Uyghur American Association, drawing on Chinese and other sources, reported on security campaigns in spring 2009 in Kashgar and Hoten districts, including security sweeps and wide-scale detentions, that targeted acts including "illegal religious activity." 222

In June, RFA reported that in March 2009, the Ili Intermediate People’s Court in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture gave prison sentences ranging from three years to life to 12 men charged with "splittism." 223 The charges were connected to their activities teaching religion to children, according to the father of one of the men.224 [See box titled Religious Prisoners below for more details.]

The Commission found several reports indicating government and Party oversight of the religious practices and traditions of Muslim women, including women who play a prominent role in funeral rites and other religious practices. Reports of efforts to investigate or reduce the wearing of head scarves and alter women’s clothing habits continued in this reporting year.225 For example, a report from Toqsu county, Aqsu district, describing "outstanding problems" in "bizarre" women’s apparel, said that an expert invited by the Party-controlled XUAR Women’s Federation provided a "correct interpretation" of the Quran’s views toward women’s clothes.226 In the past year, an official from the XUAR Women’s Federation proposed bringing female religious figures (known as bu¨wi in Uyghur) who have played a prominent role in practices including funeral rites under greater government control.227 In 2009, at least two local governments in the XUAR reported on measures to train or regulate the activities of bu¨ wi.228

Authorities in the XUAR continued to take steps to prevent Muslims from making independent religious pilgrimages abroad, while restricting the number of people on official trips and subjecting them to tight oversight.229 For example, government officials in Huocheng (Qorghas) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, reported requiring pilgrimage participants to sign a contract agreeing not to do such things as bring on pilgrimage religious garments that "are not in accordance with the traditional social customs and habits of China’s ethnic minorities," including certain types of women’s veils.230 The Wensu (Onsu) county government in Aqsu district reported taking steps to monitor returnees from pilgrimages in order to "place them in the ‘line of vision’ of the government and Party committee" and "understand" the activities they participated in while abroad.231 Overseas sources continued to carry reports that authorities confiscate Uyghurs’ passports in an effort to curb unauthorized pilgrimages and that authorities create barriers to participating in official pilgrimages.232

As the Commission has tracked in recent years, authorities also restrict Muslims’ freedom to observe Ramadan. Authorities have placed curbs on students’ and teachers’ observance of the holiday, for example, and have ordered restaurants to remain open during the month-long period of daily fasting.233 News of Ramadan restrictions continued in 2009, including reported restrictions on government workers’ observance of the holiday and measures to make restaurants stay open.234 In response to an August report on the restrictions, a XUAR government spokesperson denied that authorities forced government employees to eat during fasting periods and was paraphrased as saying "[t]he government has never intervened with Uygurs’ religious activities[.]" 235

Political training for Muslim leaders in the XUAR

The XUAR government launched wide-scale political training for Muslim leaders in the past year. In a September 2008 speech (discussed above), XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri described plans to carry out a third cycle of training for Muslim religious per-sonnel,236 which was later reported to be launched in February 2009.237 According to Nur Bekri, the training will reach 29,000 religious figures between 2009 and 2012.238 In his September speech, Nur Bekri said, "We should always step up the ideological development of patriotic religious personages and the building of their ranks as the key link to be grasped in our religious work." 239 In February 2009, an official in Shache (Yeken, Yarkand) county, Kashgar district, described plans to expel religious leaders if they missed three political study sessions.240 In the aftermath of the July 5 demonstration and outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day, XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee member Shawket Imin called on religious leaders to strengthen their political consciousness and outlined restrictions on their behavior and activities.241

Controls over religious expression in the XUAR

Authorities in the XUAR continued in the past year to censor and confiscate religious publications. In 2008, XUAR authorities made "illegal" political and religious publications the focal point for that year’s campaign to "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications," and in 2009, authorities reported on the continuation of censorship campaigns that included focus on "illegal" religious and political publications.242 A district in Qaramay municipality reported in November 2008 that the municipal government had issued a "notice on confiscating Muslim books such as ‘The Truth About the Holy Teachings’ and ‘The Call to Orthodoxy,’ " and that authorities had investigated local book and music sellers in accordance with the notice.243 Authorities in Urumqi and in Hoten district reported confiscating "illegal" religious materials, including "illegal religious pictures" in Urumqi, as part of campaigns there to inspect cultural markets and curb "illegal" religious activity, respectively.244 In March 2009, official media reported that XUAR authorities would coordinate with propaganda departments from provincial-level areas including Gansu, Qinghai, and Shaanxi provinces and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to establish a cross-provincial mechanism to stop the printing and sales of "illegal" religious material. Media also reported that authorities established a fund to reward efforts to "purify" the cultural market, with focus on "illegal" religious and political publications.245 Authorities also continued to regulate religious speech by controlling the content of religious publications, including sermons, and by directing interpretations of religious doctrine.246

Controls over children’s freedom of religion in the XUAR

The XUAR government took steps in the past year to strengthen formal legal prohibitions over children’s freedom of religion. In June, the XUAR government deliberated over a draft regulation on the protection of minors that would strengthen curbs over children’s right to practice a religion and receive religious instruction.247 The draft regulation would replace 1993 legal measures in force in the XUAR that already include the harshest legal restrictions in the country on children’s freedom of religion.248 According to a description of the 2009 draft regulation, it retains the prohibition that parents or guardians may not permit minors to participate in religious activities and adds that minors "seduced into" or "forced" to participate in religious activities can seek protection from schools or government offices including public security offices. Under the draft regulation, organizations approached for help must not shirk their duties and must intervene promptly.249

In addition to restrictions in law, authorities within the XUAR also implemented steps in practice to restrict children’s freedom of religion. As part of measures to deal with "illegal religious activity" in Hoten district implemented in spring 2009, authorities outlined measures to strengthen oversight of students during their school vacation period through a system of both fixed and unscheduled contact with them.250 In February, authorities in Yining (Ghulja) city, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, targeted ethnic minority women, young adults, and juveniles for propaganda education activities to "weaken religious consciousness and uphold a civilized and healthy life." 251 A township in Bachu (Maralbéshi) county, Kashgar district, described promoting education in topics including atheism as part of the local school system’s fall 2008 anti-separatism education.252

PROTESTANTISM

The Chinese Government continues to repress Chinese Protestants who worship in unregistered congregations (house churches) and to impose strict regulations on the registered Protestant church. The Communist Party seeks to control Protestants by requiring all congregations to register with and submit to state-run entities charged with overseeing their activities. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the China Christian Council (CCC) are the official state-led organizations that manage Protestants on behalf of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and the Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD).253 Registered congregations are subject to state monitoring of church members, interference in clergy appointments, mandatory political study sessions for pastors, and restrictions on doctrine and topics for preaching.254 Officials continue to subject Protestants who refuse to register to harassment, detention, imprisonment, and forced church closure.

Controls over doctrine and theology

China’s state-controlled Protestant church manipulates and modifies doctrine and theology in an effort to eliminate elements of Christian faith that the Party regards as incompatible with its goals and ideology. The process whereby this is achieved is called "theological reconstruction." 255 In 2008, the CCC president described the purpose and function of theological reconstruction in the following terms:

In the past, Chinese theology for the most part mimicked conservative Western theology. . . . This negative and outmoded theology made it difficult for believers to conceive of adapting to socialist society. The initiative for theological reconstruction was meant to get rid of the shackles of negative theological thinking and open up a new situation in Chinese Christianity. . . . It is an expression of Chinese Christianity’s move toward reason, an essential path to adapting to socialist society, and a necessary trend in the fusion of Chinese Christianity and advanced Chinese culture.256

Chinese authorities often employ rhetoric in the theological reconstruction campaign that construes nationalism and loyalty to the Party as religious obligations with which Protestants must comply. In a November 2008 report, the TSPM argued that theological reconstruction seeks to "strengthen awareness that ‘a good Christian should be a good citizen’ " and bring about a "far greater understanding among Chinese Christians of patriotism . . . protecting social stability, ethnic solidarity, and the unification of the motherland." 257 According to an April 2009 Party report, one of the TSPM’s greatest accomplishments is that it has led "vast numbers of Protestants to fervently love China, support the leadership of the Communist Party, and support the socialist system." 258 Wang Zuo’an, Vice Director of SARA, drew the link between patriotism and Party loyalty when he told a 2007 conference of registered Protestants: "When Christians today speak of patriotism, its concrete expression must be to uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system." 259

Chinese authorities further politicize Christian faith by insisting that the Bible not only permits patriotism, but requires it. When Party leaders compel Christians to "adapt" to the demands of socialism, TSPM leaders advise Protestants that "there is no reason to oppose this in terms of faith: there is no conflict with basic biblical faith, nor is it harmful to biblical truth." 260 Ding Guangxun, the original architect of theological reconstruction and former TSPM chairman, has declared that "the Bible wants us to love our country." 261 SARA leaders echo Ding in proclaiming to Protestants that "love of country is a revelation and teaching found in the Bible." 262 The dean of a TSPM seminary has taught that the official policy of "loving the country, loving the church" is "an intrinsic and important part of Christian faith, with a wealth of biblical evidence" to support it.263 Authorities have raised Party Chairman Hu Jintao’s "harmonious society" slogan to the level of a divine mission. In 2008, the CCC president stated that "making Christianity an active agent in building the harmonious society is both the leading of God for the Chinese Church and the demand of the times for us." 264

In 2008 and 2009, Chinese officials celebrated theological reconstruction and pledged to continue promoting it. In November 2008, the TSPM and CCC convened a national summit to celebrate the 10th anniversary of theological reconstruction.265 Ding Guangxun used the summit to urge officials and pastors to "maintain the development of Theological Reconstruction as prima inter pares in every aspect of their work." 266 Wang Zuo’an delivered a speech on behalf of SARA that stressed the importance of bringing about a "theological system with Chinese characteristics and a unique witness that conforms to Chinese society and culture." 267 Wang told TSPM and CCC leaders: "Christians not only must connect with God, but they must also follow God’s teaching to connect themselves with the motherland and society." Giving credit to a decade of theological reconstruction "enriching the information coming out of the pulpit," Wang noted that "more and more Christians" have become "enlightened" and "gradually left behind the narrow faith that focuses on personal salvation alone." 268

In the past year, authorities wielded theological reconstruction as an instrument to "correct" specific tenets and traditions that are seen as out of step with Party policy and ideology. In a report on the 10th year of the theological reconstruction campaign, the TSPM identifies several Protestant beliefs that are problematic and warns of potential risks if they are not "promptly corrected": (1) A one-sided understanding of the second coming of Christ; (2) denial of the importance of works in this life; (3) using "believer and unbeliever" to differentiate people; (4) using "follow God and don’t follow men" as a reason for despising national laws and regulations; (5) misconstruing the TSPM as a movement to unify the church and state; (6) one-sided emphasis on "things of the Spirit" to the detriment of reason, which leads some towards a fanatical and superstitious faith; and (7) overemphasis on personal salvation.269 A core Protestant tenet that theological reconstruction seeks to uproot is the Lutheran (Pauline) doctrine of justification by faith alone (sola fide).270 Ding Guangxun has argued that "playing down some theological views today is permissible, and in fact, necessary," and identified justification by faith as a chief concept to be downplayed because it has been "overemphasized" in China.271

Controls over pastoral training and preaching

Chinese Government efforts to shape seminary education are an important component of the theological reconstruction campaign. In its summary report on the 10th year of theological reconstruction, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) identified registered Protestant seminaries as the "base" that serves a "key function" in promoting theological reconstruction. For seminary students and teachers who make "outstanding contributions" to theological reconstruction, the report recommends measures to reward them.272 The China Christian Council (CCC) also places priority on theological education in its 2008 work report: "Trained personnel are the basis of everything. We must train for the church a large contingent of a variety of outstanding personnel who uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." 273 In an "important speech" during an April 2009 inspection of the East China Seminary, Yang Xiaodu, a high-ranking Shanghai Party official, praised the seminary as a "base for cultivating patriotic clergy" and expressed "hope" that the school would continue its "fine tradition" of "adapting to socialism." 274 Also in April, authorities in Linfen city, Shanxi province, underscored the need to "strengthen patriotic education and diligently train a team of religious teachers who are politically reliable." 275 Upon graduation from a state-sanctioned seminary, new pastors encounter ordination regulations that mandate acceptance of the Party’s authority. The Measures for Recognizing Chinese Protestant Religious Personnel stipulate, as the first of five "basic conditions" for ordination in a registered church, that candidates must "support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." 276

The theological reconstruction campaign also aims to restrict sermon content and control how registered pastors interpret the Bible. In December 2008, authorities in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, provided unspecified "support" to the local TSPM’s "preaching and scripture interpretation class" for registered pastors.277 In its 2008 work report, the CCC noted the distribution of "sermon prompts" intended to form "the basis of sermon content," based on theological reconstruction "discussions" held in registered churches.278 Two publications highlighted in the CCC report—"A Course in Christian Patriotism" and "Remembering the Past as a Lesson for the Future"—are regarded as important material for seminarians that "should be studied and discussed in all Christian Churches, among pastoral workers and in the larger Christian community." 279 The latter of the two is described as a "factual history of the manipulation of Christianity by imperialism in its aggression against China." 280 The "promotion of theological education" through these publications will ultimately help Chinese Protestants, among other things, "establish a correct view of the Bible." 281 In April 2009, the Shenyang TSPM and CCC in Liaoning province designated theological reconstruction as this year’s "most important task" and vowed to strengthen it "without a second’s delay." Its stated purpose was to correct "ideologically backward" pastors who fail to preach an "interpretation of the Bible that conforms to the demands of social progress." 282

Restrictions on proselytizing, contact with foreign Christians

The Chinese Government restricts Protestants from proselytizing beyond the physical confines of registered churches, a prohibition that prompts many evangelicals to worship in unregistered congregations and limits interaction between Chinese and foreign Protestants.283 An ethnographic study conducted in a major city in southern China found that official policies "significantly curtailed" evangelization efforts by both registered and unregistered churches.284 Authorities often punish Protestants who proselytize with administrative detention, including reeducation through labor (RTL). On December 16, 2008, Zhoukou city public security officials in Henan province ordered three church leaders to serve one year of RTL for "illegal proselytizing." 285 In April 2009, public security officials in Henan’s Xinyang city raided a house church service and detained two Chinese missionaries for holding an "illegal" church meeting and possessing illegal foreign religious publications.286 In February 2009, police stormed a meeting of house church leaders from four provinces that was held in Henan and detained more than 60 participants, claiming that the presence of two South Korean pastors, whom the government deported and banned from China for five years, rendered the meeting an "illegal gathering." 287 In 2008, the Daqing Municipal People’s Congress in Heilongjiang province warned that the South Korean Good News Missionary Society had "infiltrated" local universities.288

Chinese officials routinely characterize contact between Chinese Protestants and international Christian organizations or individuals as dangerous incidents of "foreign infiltration," which security forces are tasked with preventing.289 State regulations on religious activities prohibit foreigners from engaging in missionary activity outside of the physical confines of government-registered churches and require foreigners to obtain government authorization before preaching inside registered churches.290 The "three-self principles" (self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation) of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) embed suspicion of foreign Christians within the basic institutional framework of the state-sanctioned Protestant church. Chinese officials often speak of foreign Christian groups in adversarial terms and credit the "three-self principles" for successfully severing the "ties of Chinese Christian churches with imperialistic invaders." 291 The China Christian Council (CCC) wrote in a 2008 report that "infiltration by groups overseas undermines the achievements of the TSPM. . . . Some of them attempt to use Christianity as an entry point to ‘Westernize’ or ‘split’ China. They continually devise new plans to infiltrate China, using religion to disguise their political ideas." 292 The Guangdong United Front Work Department (UFWD) deputy head has described the "house churches and underground churches" that receive support from "foreign enemy forces" as a "political tool in a plot to subvert the Chinese Government." 293 In select cases, visits by foreigners to registered churches are viewed positively by officials. In 2008, the UFWD praised the Beijing Haidian District Christian Church, a TSPM congregation, for cultivating foreign visitors as an "important means for disseminating overseas the Party’s and government’s policy of freedom of religious belief." 294

Harassment, detention, and closure of churches

The Chinese Government’s pre-Olympics campaign against Protestant activists and unregistered congregations in 2008 showed few signs of abatement in 2009. Instead, government efforts to suppress house church activities in some areas retained a relatively high level of intensity, as revealed by official rhetoric as well as ongoing arrests and detentions.295 Numerous Chinese localities carried out "special investigations and studies" in late 2008 and 2009 that sought to gather intelligence on Protestant groups, strengthen the ban on house churches, and improve official oversight and control of the activities of registered churches.296 Clergy and laity from unregistered churches, as well as those affiliated with registered churches that run afoul of Party policy, remain vulnerable to harassment, detention, and imprisonment. In 2008, authorities detained at least 764 Protestant leaders and adherents, 35 of whom were sentenced or ordered to serve terms of imprisonment or reeducation through labor (RTL) exceeding one year.297 In 2008 and 2009, government and security officials frequently targeted Pastor Zhang Mingxuan, president of the Chinese House Church Alliance (CHCA), by detaining him several times, confiscating money and personal belongings, evicting his family from their home, formally "abolishing" the CHCA, and severely beating his son with iron bars.298 Recent cases raise concerns about access to justice and the abuse of Protestants in official custody. In January 2009, officials told an attorney representing Protestants in Zhoukou city, Henan province, that the court rejected her lawsuit because it was "acting on internal documents ordering them not to accept cases involving religious groups." 299 In December 2008, another court in Henan, reportedly under pressure from above, refused an appeal by Mao Minzi, a house church pastor who was ordered to serve one year of RTL.300 Authorities have harassed some attorneys who defend house church Christians, and in March 2009, the government forced the Beijing Yitong Law Firm to close for six months, which caused a setback to Protestants’ efforts to defend their rights.301 In February 2009, 79-year-old Shuang Shuying, mother of house church pastor Hua Huiqi, was released after serving a two-year prison sentence for protesting her son’s detention and striking a police vehicle with her cane.302 Upon release, Shuang wrote a letter that told of torture that she suffered while in prison. Shuang was beaten, deprived of sleep, shocked with electric batons, forced to drink her own urine, and forced to stand naked outdoors in a stationary position for several hours at night.303 A U.S.-based non-governmental organization documented 19 cases of Chinese authorities abusing Protestants in custody during 2008.304

Raids of house churches persist in many localities. Public security officials targeted house churches in at least seven provinces during the 2008 Christmas season.305 Officers raided a nativity reenactment in Henan’s Yucheng county and detained nine participants for "organizing illegal religious activities." 306 On December 22, authorities in Dongzhi county, Anhui province, raided an unregistered Bible school, detained and interrogated 19 students and 2 leaders, and announced plans to demolish or sell the building.307 In Anhui’s Bozhou city, a house church was raided during its Christmas service and two leaders were detained.308 On Christmas Eve, more than 40 public security officials attacked Protestant volunteers engaged in housing reconstruction for earthquake victims, took several into detention, confiscated their Bibles, and threatened to demolish the newly constructed homes.309 In Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, public security forces were deployed to "closely follow Christmas activities at unauthorized sites and prevent illegal activities." 310 On February 11, 2009, nearly 100 security officials in Nanyang city, Henan province, forcibly disrupted a meeting of house church leaders and detained more than 60 Chinese pastors and 2 South Korean ministers.311 In October 2008, Nanyang authorities also dispersed a house church gathering and, after holding the pastor for 15 days in administrative detention, ordered him to serve one year of RTL for alleged membership in an "evil cult." 312 In April 2009, security agents forcibly shut down an Easter gathering of more than 1,000 unregistered Protestants in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, and detained 6 organizers.313

Detention and abuse of Protestants is often accompanied by official efforts to shut down or demolish sites of worship. On December 17, 2008, the Deputy General Secretary of the Yancheng City Party Committee in Jiangsu province and public security officials reportedly stormed the Chengnan Christian Church, a registered congregation, and began to raze the building, in violation of a court ruling in the church’s favor issued the day before.314 More than 10 church members were physically assaulted during the demolition.315 In December, more than 200 people with bulldozers tore down a Protestant-run drug rehabilitation center in Yunnan province without legal justification.316 Authorities banned an unregistered congregation in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) just before Christmas and threatened to arrest the congregation’s pastor if he defied the ban.317 In January 2009, Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) officials worked with government and public security officials to seize the property of Chang Fengying, an evangelist who hosted a house church in Muling city, Heilongjiang province.318 In February, Shanghai authorities ordered the landlord of the Wanbang Missionary Church to evict the congregation within 30 days because its pastor refused to cancel a seminar for urban house church pastors.319

Authorities closed unregistered churches dispersed across a wide area of China in the past year and in some places subjected house church leaders to a coercive "thought reform" process called "transformation through reeducation." 320 In October 2008, local authorities reportedly issued an order banning house churches in Heilongjiang’s Yichun city.321 At the same time, the Chengdu Municipal People’s Congress reported that local authorities had "banned" 161 house churches and "successfully transformed" 196 members of four Protestant "cult organizations." 322 Chongqing municipal authorities also implemented a series of measures in October to "ban" or "demolish" 88 Protestant house churches, and called for the "transformation through reeducation" of unregistered Protestants who serve as a vehicle for "infiltration" by "anti-China political forces." 323 In March 2009, officials in Jiangsu’s Taixing city vowed to "attach great importance to the transformation through reeducation of persons responsible for unregistered Protestant meeting sites" and "help them realize that freedom of religious belief does not equal freedom of religious activity." 324 In May 2009, Nanjing Party officials pledged to "ensure that there are no cult meeting sites, no unauthorized Protestant sites, no self-proclaimed missionaries, and that no religious conflicts reach higher authorities." 325 In April, authorities in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region declared that they would "punish" missionaries and house churches, while county-level officials in Jiangxi province received orders to "investigate and prosecute" the same groups.326

Banned Protestant groups and the 6–10 office

The Chinese Government continues to categorically prohibit some Protestant groups from exercising religious freedom by criminalizing their communities as "cult organizations." 327 The government has banned at least 18 Protestant groups with adherents in multiple provinces, though many more Protestant congregations and movements have been banned that are active within only one province.328 The threat of "cult" designation is a powerful tool for authorities seeking to intimidate and control unregistered Protestants. Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) leaders have invoked the specter of Falun Gong to persuade Protestants to embrace the theological reconstruction campaign. Ding Guangxun, former TSPM chairman, has warned Protestants that they "will not have a future" if they "begin to resemble Falun Gong or some other cult." 329 In October 2008, an official report from Chongqing municipality drew a link between "cult" prevention and the Party’s drive to remake Protestant theology: "passive, conservative, and backward theology is the ideological foundation that constantly produces cult activities." 330 Wang Zuo’an, the Vice Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, implied in a 2008 speech that failure to cooperate with the TSPM would provoke a harsh response from the government: "If the three-self principle is abandoned, Chinese Christianity, which has been moving smoothly along in the right direction, will veer off track and meet with a calamity of historical proportions." 331

Chinese authorities harassed, detained, and physically abused members of banned Protestant groups in the past year, particularly the South China Church (SCC) and the Local Church. The government banned the SCC in 1995 and executed its founder in 2001.332 According to the Ministry of Public Security, the SCC spread to 88 counties in 15 provinces and converted tens of thousands within one year of its founding in 1990.333 In November 2008, public security officials in Hubei province detained more than 18 SCC members, beat at least 8 of them, and raided the homes of their families.334 Several detainees were abducted from their homes or public places, four have since disappeared entirely, and at least five were compelled to write statements recanting their faith.335 Security officials have reportedly refused to disclose the charges against the detainees, forbidden family or legal counsel from visiting them, and declined their attorneys’ requests for information.336 Interrogators reportedly told three of the detainees that authorities aimed to "thoroughly destroy" the SCC and that "except the TSPM [Three-Self Patriotic Movement], all other organizations that believe in Jesus Christ are cults." 337 Zhu Yongping, an SCC missionary who went missing in November 2008, previously spent three years in a reeducation through labor facility where he was reportedly tortured.338

In 2008 and 2009, the Chinese Government maintained its long-standing campaign to suppress the Local Church, an indigenous Christian movement founded by Watchman Nee in the early 20th century which officials refer to as the "Shouters." 339 Throughout fall 2008, security officials shut down at least 10 Local Church gatherings in the cities of Beijing and Hangzhou.340 The raids of gatherings in university areas resulted in the detention and interrogation of more than 400 students, many of whom were later disciplined by their universities upon release.341 In Hangzhou’s Xiasha district, authorities simultaneously raided nine services on November 2 and detained more than 30 church members, 4 of whom have been ordered to serve a year or more of reeducation through labor.342 In Ningbo municipality, instructors used cartoons to teach elementary school students about the "dangers" of the Local Church in "anti-cult" training classes.343 Official reports from two localities in Fujian province in early 2009 indicate that the Local Church has been singled out as one of the targets that public security forces must "strike hard" against.344 In January 2009, security officials in Henan province arrested septuagenarian Yuan Shenlun for responding to an anonymous call to pick up Watchman Nee books and videos. Yuan previously served 14 years in prison for his involvement with the Local Church.345

The Communist Party’s 6–10 Office, an extralegal security force that suppresses banned religious groups, leads the clampdown on unregistered Protestant groups officially deemed to be "cult organizations." 346 During a December 2008 visit to Siyang county in Jiangsu province, Li Xiaodong, the head of the central 6–10 Office, urged local officials to "strengthen the punishment of privately established, rural Protestant meeting sites . . . ban the groups that should be banned, and establish a management system that is effective over the long term." 347 An October 2008 report on official efforts to regulate religion in the municipality that administers Siyang cited government statistics that claim 90 percent of "cult" participants have a Protestant background.348 A Beijing TSPM leader pledged in 2008 that the state-sanctioned church would "coordinate with the district 6–10 Office . . . to effectively hold back the spread" of the Disciples Association, a banned Protestant group.349 In Changsha, an April 2009 open letter from the 6–10 Office called for cadres and residents to "resolutely resist cults," specifically the Disciples Association, and promised an "appropriate material reward" for those who "courageously report cult behavior." 350 The letter provides a window into the Party’s use of the term "cult" from its description of their characteristics: "using the name of ‘God’ to incite its members to oppose the government." 351

TAOISM

The Chinese Government requires Taoist groups and religious personnel to register with the state-run Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) in order to legally perform ritual services and hold Taoist ceremonies.352 The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) exercises direct authority over the CTA, as it does for all "patriotic religious organizations." 353 Communities under the CTA face limitations on their religious freedom such as regulations that mandate political conformity, impose state scrutiny over doctrine, and prohibit religious practices that the government deems "superstitious." The CTA continues to compel Taoist communities to support Communist Party propaganda campaigns and policies; it declared that "strengthening the ideological education of Taoist personnel" would be the first of six work goals for 2009.354 In 2008, the CTA implemented measures for confirming Taoist priests that rank "fervent love of the motherland and support of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" as among the first of five basic conditions that must be met for ordination.355 The measures also impose penalties on Taoist priests for performing rituals in the homes of lay practitioners without prior CTA authorization or engaging in activities deemed to involve "feudal superstition" or "cults." 356 Unregistered Taoist priests—referred to by some government reports as "fake priests"—are subject to various penalties imposed for failure to submit to official CTA confirmation, including "transformation through reeducation." 357 In the past year, the CTA and SARA officials continued to launch special administrative campaigns to bring Taoist priests of the Zhengyi order, who typically marry and reside outside of monastic communities, under the control of local and national CTA authorities.358

OTHER RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

In the past year, the central government maintained its framework for recognizing only select religious communities for limited government protections, and it did not enlarge this framework to accommodate additional groups. Despite lacking formal central government recognition, however, some religious communities have been able to operate inside China.359 The Russian Orthodox Church holds services in some areas, and some local governments recognize the Orthodox church within local legislation.360 The Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill met with a delegation from China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) in February 2009. Kirill raised the issue of rebuilding an Orthodox church and the shortage of Orthodox clergy in cities with Orthodox communities.361 Orthodox church members in Shanghai continued to lack legal recognition to hold services but were reportedly able to participate in a feast day service at the Russian consulate in Shanghai in June.362 Under current Chinese Government regulations, foreign religious communities, including communities not recognized as domestic religions by the government, may hold services for expatriates, but Chinese citizens are not allowed to partici-pate.363

In recent years some local governments have passed legislation that both recognizes and provides a measure of protection for venues where Chinese folk belief activities are practiced, but that also bring such venues under government control.364 In 2007, Hunan province passed China’s first provincial-level legislation to recognize and regulate venues for folk beliefs.365 In November 2008, SARA visited Hunan to investigate the issue. A SARA official reported positively on the province’s regulation of folk beliefs and called for gradually bringing folk beliefs under legal regulation.366

Religious Prisoners

Authorities continue to detain, formally arrest, and in some cases im­prison Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of reli­gion.367 Such cases include:

Alimjan Himit (Alimujiang Yimiti), a Protestant house church leader in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whom authori­ties have detained at the Kashgar Municipal Detention Center since January 12, 2008. The Kashgar Intermediate People’s Court tried Alimjan Himit on July 28, 2009, on charges of "revealing state se­crets or intelligence to overseas organizations." The court has not yet issued a verdict. Alimjan Himit had previously worked at a for­eign-owned company shut down for "engaging in illegal religious in­filtration activities." A court in Kashgar first tried Alimjan Himit’s case on May 27, 2008, and returned it to the procuratorate due to "insufficient evidence."

Dorje Khadro, a Tibetan Buddhist nun of Pangri Nunnery, found­ed and headed by Phurbu Tsering and located in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, and one of more than 50 Pangri nuns detained on May 14, 2008, for staging a political demonstration to protest against patriotic education underway at the nunnery and demands that the nuns de­nounce the Dalai Lama and their teacher, Phurbu Tsering. On No­vember 20, 2008, the Ganzi Intermediate People’s Court sentenced "Duoji Kangzhu" to seven years in prison for "inciting to split the country."

Jia Zhiguo, the 74-year-old unregistered Catholic bishop of Zhengding diocese, Hebei province, whom authorities detained in March 2009 and took to an undisclosed detention facility. Bishop Jia previously served two decades in prison, and since 2003, authorities have detained him numerous times and kept him under strict sur­veillance when not detaining him, in connection with his religious activities independent of the state-run Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). His most recent detention was reportedly linked to the CPA’s displeasure at a Vatican-brokered reconciliation agreement between Bishop Jia and Jiang Taoran, the bishop of the registered Shijiazhuang diocese.

Liu Jin, a librarian at Shanghai Normal University, whom au­thorities held for nearly a year in pretrial detention. The Fengxian District People’s Court in Shanghai convicted Liu under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law for downloading Falun Gong materials from the Internet and distributing them. She was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison on November 14, 2008.

Merdan Seyitakhun, Ahmetjan Emet, Seydehmet Awut, Erkin Emet, Abdujilil Abdughupur, Abdulitip Ablimit, Mewlanjan Ahmet, Kurbanjan Semet, Dolkun Erkin, Omerjan Memet, Mutelip Rozi, and Ubulkasim, 12 young Uyghur men from the Ili Kazakh Autono­mous Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whom au­thorities detained between March and June 2008 and sentenced on March 24, 2009, to terms ranging from three years’ to life imprison­ment for "splittism." The charges were connected to their activities teaching religion to children, according to the father of one of the men.

Paul Ma, a 55-year-old Catholic priest from a predominately Catholic village in Hebei province called Donglu, whom authorities detained in March 2009. Authorities reportedly took Father Ma into custody because he celebrated the Eucharist with unregistered Catholics. His current whereabouts are unknown.

Phurbu Tsering, a Tibetan Buddhist teacher believed by Tibetan Buddhists to be a reincarnation, who founded and headed a Tibetan Buddhist nunnery in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. Public security officials detained Phurbu Tsering on May 18, 2008, after security forces detained more than 50 of the nuns he taught for staging a peaceful political protest march. On April 21, 2009, the Ganzi Intermediate People’s Court put Phurbu Tsering on trial for illegal weapons possession. One of his lawyers, Li Fangping, said that Phurbu Tsering denied the charges and claimed he was framed. On April 27, one of the judges contacted Phurbu Tsering’s other lawyer, Jiang Tianyong, to tell him that sen­tencing had been postponed indefinitely. [See CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009 for information on the political detention, criminal prosecution, and legal defense of Phurbu Tsering.]

Shi Weihan, a Christian bookstore owner and Protestant house church leader whom Beijing authorities arrested on March 19, 2008. Authorities accused him of illegally printing and distributing Bibles. On June 10, 2009, the Beijing Haidian District People’s Court sen­tenced him to three years in prison and fined him 150,000 yuan (US$21,960) for operating a business illegally. Public security offi­cials have reportedly pressured Shi’s family to refrain from appeal­ing his sentence. Shi is diabetic and has reportedly suffered from poor health while in detention. Authorities have denied his lawyers’ requests for medical parole.

Xu Na, an artist and poet, and her husband, Yu Zhou, a popular musician, whom public security officials detained on the night of January 26, 2008, for possessing documents and computer disks containing Falun Gong materials. Yu died 11 days later in police custody. The Beijing Chongwen District People’s Court sentenced Xu to three years in prison on November 25, 2008, for "using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law" (PRC Criminal Law, Article 300).

Yusufjan and Memetjan, a 27-year-old graduate student and 24-year-old undergraduate at Xinjiang University in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whom authorities detained along with five others on May 10, 2009, as the students—members of a Muslim religious group—met on the campus of Xinjiang University. Authori­ties ordered the group members to serve 15 days of detention and fined them 5,000 yuan (US$732) for "holding an illegal gathering." Five of the students were released after 15 days, but Yusufjan and Memetjan were reported to remain in detention as of June 2009, and their whereabouts are unknown.

14 Members of the People’s Liberation Army are also forbidden from practicing religion. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State (Online), International Religious Freedom Report—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 19 September 08.

18 See, e.g., "State-Controlled Catholic Church Celebrates Independence From ‘Foreign Interference,’ " CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2009, 4; "Government Calls for Strengthening Propaganda on Ethnic Policy," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2009, 2; China National Committee for the Wellbeing of Youth (Online), "Taking Socialism as the Core Value System for Guiding Work on Earnestly Caring About Next Generation" [Yi shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi wei zhidao renzhen zuohao guanxin xiayidaigongzuo], 23 October 08 (citing a speech delivered on August 21 by Liu Shangyang). See also China’s Religious Communities—Islam in this section and Section IV—Xinjiang for informationon rhetoric against foreign groups perceived to use religion to infiltrate Muslim communities, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

19 Yan Feng, "PRC Embassy in the US Issues a Press Communique Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-US Diplomatic Relations," Xinhua, 1 January 09 (OpenSource Center, 2 January 09).

20 This section of the Commission’s Annual Report primarily uses the expression "freedom ofreligion" but encompasses within this term reference to the more broadly articulated freedom of "thought, conscience, and religion" (see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18). For protections in international law, see, e.g., UDHR, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to "ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions"); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. China has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. As in previous years, the Chinese Government this reporting year continued to reiterate its commitment to ratifying the ICCPR, which China signed in 1998. In February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify the ICCPR. At the time, Chinese officials also said China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/ HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). Moreover, in the 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) issued by the Chinese Government in April 2009, officials stated that the ICCPR was one of the "fundamental principles" on which the plan was framed, and that the government "will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR." State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1).

22 For specific examples of the range of religious activities protected under international law, see General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1. The Chinese Government denies such protected activities as the freedom to "freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications" (General Comment No. 22, para. 4) and the "liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with their own convictions" (General Comment No. 22, para. 6). See Controls over Religious Publications and Restrictions on Children’s Freedom of Religion in this section for more information. See also China’s Religious Communities, in this section, for additional examples of suppression of different forms of religious practice. For an interpretation of the provision protecting "normal religious activities" within the Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA), written by drafters of the regulation, see Shuai Feng and Li Jian, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli shiyi], (Beijing: Beijing Religious Culture Press, 2005), 19. (See also page 6 of the preface of the book, noting the authors’ status as drafters of the RRA.)

23 The central government has referred to the five religions as China’s main religions, but in practice the state has created a regulatory system that institutionalizes only these five religions for recognition and legal protection. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], 1 October 97 (stating that the religions citizens "mainly" follow are Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism). Wording from this White Paper is posted as a statement of current policy on the Web sites of the United Front Work Department, the agency that oversees religious affairs within the Communist Party, and the State Administration for Religious Affairs. Some local regulations on religious affairs define religion in China to mean only these five categories. See, e.g., Guangdong Province Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs [Guangdongsheng shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 26 May 00, effective 30 June 00, art. 3, and Henan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Henansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05, effective 1 January 06, art. 2. There is some limited formal tolerance outside this framework for some ethnic minority and "folk" religious practices. See subsection on China’s Religious Communities—Other Religious Communties in this section and see also Kim-Kwong Chan and Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy, Administration, and Regulation (Santa Barbara: Institute for the Study of American Religion, 2005), 9–10, 15–16.

24 Some organizations operate without any registration. A limited number of organizations have registered with local officials without affiliating with a Party-controlled religious association. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State (Online), International Religious Freedom Report—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 19 September 08.

25 See China’s Religious Communities—Falun Gong in this section for detailed information.

26 See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State (Online), International Religious Freedom Report—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 19 September 08. According to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, a "zone of toleration" exists within China for registered religious communities acting within the parameters set by the government. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, "Policy Focus: China," 9 November 05, 4.

27 At the central government level, see generally Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05. For an overview of the general requirements within the RRA and an examination of several provincial-level regulations, see "Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10. Although the national RRA does not explicitly state that the regulation applies to state-sanctioned groups, the government’s policy framework of recognizing only select groups for recognition, and in some cases banning other groups, creates a legal structure that excludes some religious and spiritual groups from legal protections.

28 For registration requirements in the Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA), see Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 6. Under article 6 of the RRA, religious organizations must register in accordance with the rules established under the Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, issued and effective 25 October 98. See the RRA generally for provisions defining the scope of state control over various internal affairs of religious groups. For detailed analysis, including analysis of registration requirements in local government regulations, see "Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10.

29 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 12–15. In addition to provisions in the RRA on the registration of venuesfor religious activity, Measures on the Examination, Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity also govern this process. Measures on the Examination, Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity [Zongjiao huodong changsuo sheli shenpi he dengji banfa], issued 14 April 05, effective 21 April 05. For more analysis of registration requirements,including in local government regulations, see "Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June2006, 9–10.

31 For example, in 2006, local officials expelled a registered church leader in Shanxi provinceafter his church invited an American missionary to the church. ChinaAid (Online), "Government Intervenes Into a Three-Self Church in Shanxi Province, Pastor Evicted," 9 August 06. The sameyear, the national Buddhist Association, in coordination with government officials, expelled a Buddhist monk from a temple in Jiangxi province after the monk led religious activities to commemorate victims of the violent suppression of Tiananmen protests and took measures to address corruption among government officials and the Buddhist Association. Authorities accusedthe monk of engaging in improper relations with lay practitioners and dismissed him on those alleged grounds. "Jiangxi Buddhist Master Accused of Being a Womanizer and Driven Out ofTemple," Sing Tao Jih Pao, 25 August 06 (Open Source Center, 27 August 06); Human Rights in China (Online), "Top Buddhist Officials Join in Persecution of Activist Monk," 23 August 06.

33 See detailed analysis in "Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith," Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 26 June 06. TheRegulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) provides administrative penalties, such as fines, for violations of its stipulations; such administrative penalties also include the possibility of limitedshort-term detention under the Public Security Administration Punishment Law. The RRA is not authorized, as a regulation, to provide criminal penalties. At the same time, like other regulations, the RRA includes boilerplate language referring to the necessity of pursuing a criminal investigation if a "crime is constituted." For example, where "anyone uses religion to carry outsuch illegal activities as harm state security or public security, infringe upon citizens’ right of the person and democratic rights, impair the administration of public order, or infringe uponpublic or private property," criminal charges are to be pursued where a "crime is constituted." Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1March 05, art. 40.

34 The government uses Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law to punish activities deemed tobe cult related. Chinese authorities also punish religious adherents by prosecuting them under other Criminal Law provisions, such as by portraying the printing and distribution of religiousliterature, a freedom protected under international human rights law, as the crime of "illegal operation of a business." See information on Shi Weihan, discussed within, for an example ofthe use of this charge against religious believers. PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, arts. 225, 300.

35 Administrative punishments can range from a warning or fine to detention in a reeducation through labor (RTL) center for up to three years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. Forms of administrative detention include short-term detention under the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, RTL, forced psychiatric commitment, forced drug detoxification, work-study schools, and detention of corrupt officials under Party rules. For more information, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 51–53, and "Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith," Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 26 June 06.

36 "Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith," Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 26 June 06.

38 See The Legal Framework for Religion in China in this section for information on domestic law. On international human rights standards, see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to "ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions"); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14. See also General CommentNo. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 6.

39 Law on the Protection of Minors, adopted 4 September 91, effective 1 January 92, art. 2. See examples that follow for restrictions on college students’ activities.

41 ChinaAid reported in July that a Bible school in Jiangsu province was raided and studentsordered not to attend again. Prior to that, however, the school had "been in existence for several years without any problems from authorities." ChinaAid (Online), "Bible School Raided inSuqian City, Jiangsu Province," 20 July 09. See also, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September 06; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 89.

42 See China’s Religious Communities in this section for more information as well as Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on HumanRights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09.

43 China National Committee for the Wellbeing of Youth (Online), "Taking Socialism as theCore Value System for Guiding Work on Earnestly Caring About Next Generation" [Yi shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi wei zhidao renzhen zuohao guanxin xiayidai gongzuo], 23 October 08.

44 ChinaAid (Online), "More Than 400 College Students in Beijing and Hangzhou Detainedand Interrogated; Four Church Leaders Sentenced to Labor Camps," 3 December 08.

46 General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that freedom of religion includes the "freedom to prepare and distribute religioustexts or publications." General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 4. For more information on China’s system of controllingthe publication of religious materials, see "Prior Restraints on Religious Publishing in China," Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), last visited 23 June 09.

48 ChinaAid (Online), "Christian Shi Weihan Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for Printingand Giving Away Bibles," 11 June 09. See also the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information. In recent years, authorities have usedsimilar criminal charges to imprison other people for printing and distributing religious texts. See, e.g., the cases of Cai Zhuohua, Wang Zaiqing, and Zhou Heng in the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database.

49 ChinaAid (Online), "Christian Shi Weihan Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for Printingand Giving Away Bibles," 11 June 09.

50 For more information, see, e.g., ChinaAid (Online), "Imprisoned Christian Shi WeihanScheduled for Trial April 9," 6 April 09; ChinaAid (Online), "Shi Weihan Released on Bail, Government Officials Decide Not To Pursue Criminal Charges," 7 January 08. See also the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database.

53 See, e.g., ChinaAid (Online), Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches Within Mainland China January 2008–December 2008, January 2009, 19, 21 (see pages 12 and 20 for examples in 2008 outside the 2009 reporting year).

54 Based on CECC analysis, factors such as the content of the publications render them illegal, rather than or in addition to a possible status as a "pirated" publication or publication deemed pornographic. Government reports have differentiated between pirated publications and "illegal" ones. For background, see "Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political and Religious Publications," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2008, 4.

56 It states that the government "encourages and supports religious circles in launching social welfare programs, exploring methods and channels for religions to better serve society and promote the people’s well-being." State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09.

63 This section pertains to what official sources refer to as "Buddhism in the Han tradition,"an inaccurate umbrella term that encompasses all schools of Buddhism in China, aside from the Tibetan tradition. "Buddhism in the Han tradition" (hanchuan fojiao) is inaccurate in religious terms. Buddhists divide themselves along lines determined according to a number of traditions, ritual practices, and schools of thought, but not in purely ethnic terms. It is also worthnoting that with the possible exception of the Chan school of Buddhism, there is arguably no true "Han tradition" of Buddhism. All non-Chan schools of Buddhism in China can be clearlytraced to Indian sources. In addition, there are Chinese citizens belonging to officially recognized "ethnic minority" groups, such as the Dai, that practice Theravada Buddhism—a branch of Buddhism completely outside of what Chinese officials mean by the "Han tradition" (non-esoteric Mahayana Buddhism as practiced by non-Tibetans).

74 A Ministry of Public Security circular indicates that public criticism of the Communist Party by the sect’s founder—a nun called the Supreme Master Ching Hai—prompted the government to apply the "cult" designation to her followers in 1995. See Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues with Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Gonganbu guanyu rending he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30 April 00.

75 The Yunxi County 6–10 Office in Hubei province published a report in 2008 that characterized Guanyin Famen as a "cult that hides behind the banner of Buddhist faith" and urged citizen informants who witness or receive word about "cult activities" to "immediately notify" Party cadres and the public security bureau. Dianzi Township People’s Government (Online), "Yunxi County’s Ten Things To Know in ‘Upholding Science, Opposing Cults’ " [Yunxi xian ‘chongshang kexue, fandui xiejiao’ shi zhidao], 26 April 08. For other examples, see Hegang Municipal People’s Government (Online), "Municipal 6–10 Office Deploys Five Work Projects To Ensure the City’s Social Stability During the Olympic Period" [Shi 610 bangongshi bushu wuxiang gongzuo quebao aoyunhui qijian woshi shehui wending], 9 July 08; Tanggu District People’s Government (Online), "Xinhe Residential Community Judicial Office Earnestly Completed Social Stability Work in the ‘June 4’ Period" [Xinhe sifasuo renzhen zuohao ‘liusi’ qijian de shehui wending gongzuo], 11 June 09.

103 The United Front Work Department oversees the implementation of Party policy toward China’s eight "democratic" political parties, ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs, among other functions.

114 See CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 96–97, for information on coercion to participate in bishop appointments in previous years.

115 For more information on the government’s continued insistence on independence from the Vatican, see "China 50th Anniversary of ‘Self-Elected, Self-Ordained’ Bishops Commemorated,"Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 19 December 08. For examples of Papal involvement in bishop selection, see "Bishop Ordinations in 2007 Return to Holy See Involvement," Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 5 May 08.

123 The intention to set the public security agenda for the year was clearly conveyed in the title of the directive: "Main Points for Comprehensive Management of Social Order Work Throughout the Country in 2009" [2009 nian quanguo shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili gongzuo yaodian].

124 The Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security is a creation of the Party Central Committee and is chaired by Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang. Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security, "Main Points for Comprehensive Management of Social Order Work Throughout the Country in 2009" [2009 nian quanguo shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili gongzuo yaodian], reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 1 February 09.

125 Ian Johnson, "Death Trap: How One Chinese City Resorted to Atrocities To Control Falun Dafa," Wall Street Journal (Online), 26 December 00.

126 For the Weifang Party Secretary’s statement, see "Weifang Municipal Party Committee Convenes (Expanded) Meeting of the Members of the Standing Committee" [Weifang shiwei zhaokai changwei (kuoda) huiyi], People’s Daily (Online), 7 November 08.

130 Each of the four digits signifies the number of decades that will have elapsed in 2009 since four significant events took place: 6 decades since the founding of the PRC, 5 decades since the Lhasa uprising in Tibet, 2 decades since the Tiananmen crackdown, and 1 decade since the ban on Falun Gong. The presence of two of China’s top leaders at the helm of Project 6521, Vice President Xi Jinping and Zhou Yongkang, indicates the importance that the Party assigns to its political "struggle" against Falun Gong. Xi Jinping is also presumed by most experts as the leader most likely to replace Hu Jintao as Party General Secretary and President. Provincial and municipal governments were reportedly required to set up temporary 6521 taskforces led by the local deputy Party secretary and public security chief while county and township authorities were instructed to report their implementation of Project 6521 to the municipal and provincial taskforces. Cary Huang, "Taskforces Set Up To Keep Lid on Protests," South China Morning Post (Online), 28 February 09; Ching Cheong, "China Acts To Defuse ‘Crisis Year,’ " Singapore Straits Times (Online), 3 March 09; Michael Wines, "China’s Leaders See a Calendar Full of Trouble," New York Times (Online), 9 March 09.

134 Chenxi County People’s Government (Online), "Chenxi County Communist Party Committee 610 Office" [Zhonggong chenxi xianwei 610 bangongshi], 25 June 09. A December 2008 report from Leiyang city in Hunan province breaks down the organizational structure of the 6– 10 Office into a "composite group" and an "education group." The "composite group," among other things, is vested with the responsibility for "comprehensive investigation and research," "intelligence information," "protecting secrets and confidential information," and "administrative logistics work." The "education group" focuses on "anti-cult social propaganda work" and the "transformation through reeducation" of "Falun Gong" practitioners. See Leiyang City People’s Government (Online), "The 6–10 Office" [610 bangongshi], 29 December 08.

137 Canglang District Political-Legal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Committee (Online), "Our District Successfully Carries Out Annual Work Inspection and Evaluation by the Municipal Party Committee 610 Office" [Woqu shunli tongguo shiwei 610 bangongshi niandu gongzuo jiancha kaoping ji yanshou], 25 December 08. For another example of these "anti-cult" projects, in July 2009, officials from the Xuanwu District 6–10 Office in Nanjing municipality inspected and praised a local community for setting up "anti-cult warning and education activity stations," which they suggested would serve as a model for other localities. See Xuanwu District People’s Government (Online), "Xuanwu District 610 Office Inspects Zixincheng Community’s Anti-Cult Warning Education Activity Stations" [Xuanwu qu 610 bangongshi shicha zixincheng shequ fan xiejiao jingshi jiaoyu huodong zhandian gongzuo], 1 July 09.

139 The report did not indicate what measures were taken in response to this finding. Qidong City People’s Government (Online), "Huilong Township’s Situation With Social Stability Work" [Huilong zhen wending gongzuo dongtai], 27 May 09.

151 Wangcang County Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education Net (Online), "An Open Letter From the County Party Committee and County Government to the Entire County’s Rural Residents" [Xianwei xianzhengfu zhi quanxian nongmin pengyou de yifeng gongkai xin], 1 April 09.

156 Public security officials are also permitted to extend the sentence for up to one year beyond the initial three years. Fu Hualing, "Dissolving Laojiao," China Rights Forum: Rule of Law? No. 1, 2009, 54.

157 Fu Hualing, "Dissolving Laojiao," China Rights Forum: Rule of Law? No. 1, 2009, 54. International observers estimate that Falun Gong practitioners may constitute as many as half of the total number of Chinese held in RTL facilities. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2008 Annual Report, 1 May 2009, 161.

158 Leeshai Lemish, "The Games Are Over, the Persecution Continues," National Post (Online), 7 October 08.

159 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 10 February 09, 16. One interviewee remarked that practitioners were often deprived of sleep until they renounced their beliefs and that some were forced to sit on a "tiger bench." According to Falun Gong sources, a "tiger bench" is a small iron bench that is approximately eight inches tall. The victim’s hands are tied together behind his/her back while his/her knees are tied down to the bench. Hard objects such as bricks are often inserted under the tied legs to cause the legs to bend upward in a painful manner that sometimes causes the knees to break. CECC staff interviews with two Falun Gong practitioners formerly detained in RTL and now based in the United States confirmed the use of sleep deprivation and solitary confinement in RTL facilities, as well as cases where practitioners are forced to sit stationary on a small stool for up to 18 hours at a time. Other inmates are often placed in the cell and promised a reduced sentence if they ensure that the practitioner does not move from the stool. CECC Staff Interviews.

164 Huai’an City People’s Government (Online), "Brief Talk on How To Build Harmonious Relations Between the Police and the People in the New Period" [Qiantan ruhe goujian xinshiqi xia de xie jingmin guanxi jianshe], 30 June 09.

171 Michael Sheridan, "Yu Zhou Dies as China Launches Pre-Olympic Purge of Falun Gong," Times of London (Online), 20 April 08; Andrew Jacobs, "China Still Presses Crusade AgainstFalun Gong," New York Times (Online), 28 April 09; "Manipulation of the Criminal Law To Penalize ‘Cults’ Continues in the Case of Painter and Popular Musician," CECC China HumanRights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 2009, 5.

174 The security agents reportedly were affiliated with the Wuhou District office of the Committee on the Comprehensive Management of Public Security. Chinese Human Rights Defenders(Online), "Beijing Lawyer Cheng Hai Assaulted by Officials for Representing Falun Gong Practitioner," 14 April 09; Michael Wines, "China Said To Threaten Licenses of Human Rights Lawyers," New York Times (Online), 28 May 09.

175 Reeducation through labor authorities where Jiang was held cremated his body withoutthe family’s consent and said that he died of a heart attack, although the autopsy showed that he had three broken ribs. Human Rights in China (Online), "Beijing Lawyers Beaten for Representing Falun Gong Case," 13 May 09; Michael Wines, "China Said To Threaten Licenses of Human Rights Lawyers," New York Times (Online), 28 May 09; Leslie Hook, "Doomsday forChinese Human-Rights Lawyers?" Wall Street Journal (Online), 27 May 09; "Lawyers Beaten in Chongqing: Colleagues Protest in Beijing With Horizontal Banner" [Beijing lushi Chongqingbei ou tonghang la heng’e kangyi], Ming Pao (Online), 18 May 09.

197 See China’s Religious Communities—Islam—Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in this section for details. For a detailed report based on an investigation in 2007 of Muslim communities in southeastern China, including information on government oversight of sermons, religious leaders, and establishment of mosques, see "Scan of Islamic Work in Southeastern Coastal Areas" [Dongnan yanhai diqu yisilanjiao gongzuo saomiao], Chinese Religions (Online), 25 June 09.

208 A 1996 policy document from the Central Committee of the Communist Party identifies ethnic separatism and "illegal religious activities" as the "main dangers to Xinjiang’s stability." The document is cited in "Nur Bekri’s Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary Session"[Nu’er baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua], Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08, also available in translation by the Open Source Center, 29 September 08. "Religious extremism" (also described as "extremism") forms one of the "three forces," along with terrorism and separatism, that Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region authorities also identify as threats to theregion’s stability. For information on the "three forces" and use of the term to mean religious extremism, see, e.g., Kalpin (Keping) County Government (Online), "Question and Answer onReeducation in Battle Against Separatism and Uncovering, Condemning Terrorist Criminal Activities" [Fan fenlie douzheng zaijiaoyu, jie pi baoli kongbu zuixing huodong zhishi wenda], 11 November 08 (cached page); Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online), "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang," April 2005, 69 (pagination follows"text-only" pdf download of this report) (describing the "three forces" to include religious extremism); "Establishing a Harmonious Society Cannot Do Without an Environment of Good SocialOrder" [Goujian hexie shehui libukai lianghao de shehui zhian huanjing], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 13 January 06 (discussing religious extremism in the contextof the "three forces").

209 See examples within as well as a document defining "23 types of illegal religious activities,"such as "letting students pray," conducting certain religious practices pertaining to marriage and divorce, holding private religious instruction classes, "distorting religious doctrine," "fabricating history," "inciting religious fanaticism" and advocating "Pan-Islamism" and "Pan-Turkism." See, e.g., "Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal ReligiousActivity" [Zizhiqu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de jieding], 25 February 08, numbers 3, 4, 5, 20. For information on human rights standards, see, e.g., Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by General Assemblyresolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to "ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions"); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1.

232 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09. Radio Free Asia cited sources reporting that some Uyghurs are unable to participate in official pilgrimages due to political screening and corruption in the application process. "Uyghurs Encountering Obstacles to All Routes To Go on Haj" [Uyghurlarning hejge be´rishtiki barliq yolliri tosalghugha uchrimaqta], Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 May 09.

234 Uyghur American Association (Online), "Uyghur American Association Calls on Chinese Authorities To Guarantee the Safety of All People in East Turkestan in the Wake of New Unrest," 3 September 09. Amid blocked Web sites following the July 5 demonstration in Urumqi, the Commission was unable to find reports from XUAR local government Web sites, as found in previous years, on specific continued controls during Ramadan in 2009, though such controls would be consistent with ongoing campaigns throughout the year to curb "illegal religious activities" (such as children’s participation in religious activities) and weaken aspects of religious practice and observance. In addition, a document issued in 2008 enumerating "illegal religious activities" in the region includes among prohibited activities letting students fast for Ramadan. "Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal Religious Activity" [Zizhiqu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de jieding], 25 February 08, number 5. For official media reports describing basic information on the holiday’s commencement in the XUAR, see, e.g., "Urumqi Welcomes First Day of Ramadan Amid Tranquility" [Wulumuqi zai pingjing zhong yinglai zhaiyue di yi tian], Xinhua, reprinted in United Front Work Department (Online), 21 August 09; "Happiness, Unity, and Mutual Aid—Information on Ramadan for Urumqi’s Muslim Households" [Xingfu, tuanjie, huzhu—wulumuqi musilin jiating zhaijie jianwen], Xinhua, reprinted in United Front Work Department (Online), 22 August 09.

242 While "Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications" campaigns targeting a range of materials exist throughout China, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region target religious and political materials also as part of broader controls in the region over Islamic practice, over other expressions of ethnic identity, especially among the Uyghur population, and over expressions of political dissent. "Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against Political and Religious Publications," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2008, 4. For general information on developments in late 2008 and 2009, see "Xinjiang Authorities Block, Punish Free Expression," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 3.

253 In Chinese, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China Christian Council are commonly referred to as the lianghui (two organizations), which reflects the fact that the top leadership and general functions of the two often overlap.

256 Cao Shengjie, "Run the Church Well According to the Three-Self Principle, Play an Active Role in Building a Harmonious Society: Work Report of the Seventh NCCC," 21 Chinese Theological Review 5, 22–23 (2008).

258 Party School of the Chinese Communist Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Online), "The History of Protestantism and the History of Chinese Protestantism"[Jidujiao lishi ji zhongguo jidujiao de lishi], 29 April 09.

263 Yang Donglong, "Theological and Cultural Reflections on the Relationship Between Church and Society in China," 17 Chinese Theological Review 64, 72 (2003).

264 Cao Shengjie, "Run the Church Well According to the Three-Self Principle, Play an Active Role in Building a Harmonious Society: Work Report of the Seventh NCCC," 21 Chinese Theological Review 5, 26 (2008).

273 Cao Shengjie, "Run the Church Well According to the Three-Self Principle, Play an ActiveRole in Building a Harmonious Society: Work Report of the Seventh NCCC," 21 Chinese Theological Review 5, 30 (2008).

278 Cao Shengjie, "Run the Church Well According to the Three-Self Principle, Play an ActiveRole in Building a Harmonious Society: Work Report of the Seventh NCCC," 21 Chinese Theological Review 5, 9–10 (2008).

285 Police initially detained them on December 3 at a house church gathering along with 20others who were each ordered to serve 15 days of administrative detention. Authorities accused the detainees of belonging to the "Shouters" (Local Church), a group deemed a "cult" by the central government, but international observers indicate that they were members of a house church movement called the China Gospel Fellowship. The spouse of one of the three church leadersheld in reeducation through labor has pursued legal action, including filing an administrative lawsuit. ChinaAid (Online), "Three Christians Sentenced to One Year of Re-education ThroughLabor in Zhoukou, Henan," 6 January 09; ChinaAid (Online), "Unprecendented Motion Filed by Chinese House Church Leader To Dismiss Chief Justice for Non-Action," 26 January 09;ChinaAid (Online), "Motion To Dismiss the Chief Justice of Chuanhui District People’s Court of Zhoukou Municipality," 26 January 09; "Beijing Does Not Recognize Domestic Churches, andPersecutes Them," AsiaNews (Online), 16 January 09.

290 Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions on the Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens Within the Territory of the People’s Republic of China, effective 26 September 00,arts. 6, 17.

292 Cao Shengjie, "Run the Church Well According to the Three-Self Principle, Play an ActiveRole in Building a Harmonious Society: Work Report of the Seventh NCCC," 21 Chinese Theological Review 5, 18–19 (2008).

304 ChinaAid (Online), Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches Within Mainland China, January 2009, 5.

305 For example, authorities shut down Christmas services at the Liangren church in the capital of Guangdong province and at a Bible school in Weifang city, Shandong province. Authorities also detained seven house church leaders after raiding a Christmas Day service in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s Qitai county in the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture. On January 2 in neighboring Urumqi city, officers stormed a house church service and took 51 attendees into custody for questioning. Authorities held three of them in Public Security Bureau custody and extrajudicially oredered one woman to serve 10 days of administrative detention. See ChinaAid (Online), "51 Christians Detained in Xinjiang, One Young Mother Sentenced," 5 January 09. "Christians’ Legal Appeals ‘Denied,’ " Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 January 09; ChinaAid (Online), "Christmas Day Persecution in Anhui, Henan, and Xinjiang; 13 Christians in Prison," 26 December 08.

309 Police reportedly targeted the group because of the presence of Protestant volunteers from outside of the area. ChinaAid (Online), "Christians in Earthquake Disaster Areas Raided by Police on Christmas Eve," 28 December 08.

311 Most were released the next day after they paid fines ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 yuan (US$146 to 292), though two leaders were each ordered to serve 15 days of administrative detention. On March 1, Nanyang security forces raided another worship service and detained 18 house church members. "Henan House Church Members and Foreign Pastor Assaulted While Meeting, Many Are Detained" [Henan jiating jiaohui chengyuan yu waiguo mushi juhui bei chongji, duoren bei juliu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 March 09.

314 Yancheng authorities not only defied the court ruling, but also failed to uphold property rights that are granted to registered churches under the State Council’s Regulation on Religious Affairs. See Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 7 July 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 30; ChinaAid (Online), "Registered Church in Jiangsu Province Demolished, Christians Beaten," 22 December 08.

315 A coalition of local officials and real estate developers had long sought to seize the land on which the church was built. ChinaAid (Online), "Registered Church in Jiangsu Province Demolished, Christians Beaten," 22 December 08.

318 Authorities also detained Chang Fengying in a "black jail" during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. A Three-Self Patriotic Movement church reportedly assumed ownership of Chang’s property after it was seized. ChinaAid (Online), "TSPM Working in Collusion With the Government To Persecute House Church Christians," 21 February 09.

319 ChinaAid (Online), "Shanghai Authorities Plan To Deprive Wanbang Missionary Church of Its Right To Worship," 13 February 09.

320 The term "transformation through reeducation" describes a process of ideological re-programming whereby religious believers are subjected to various methods of physical and psychological coercion until they recant their beliefs. See CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 90.

327 The Chinese term is "xiejiao zuzhi." In 1995, the State Council and the Communist Party Central Committee formally outlawed a number of "heretical" or "cult" groups with Protestantroots. "Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups," Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, No. 12, February 2003, iii.

328 Fenggang Yang, "The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China," 47 Sociological Quarterly 93, 106–108 (2006). It is unknown how many members of these groups have been arrested or detained in recent years, but the total has likely risen on account of the extensive "anti-cult" crackdown of the last decade. For more information on the scale of the anti-cult crackdown, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 87–93. In the 17 months prior to the July 1999 commencement of the anti-cult crackdown, the Ministry of Public Security reported over 20,000 arrests of "cult" members from mostly Protestant groups. "Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups," Occasional Publications of the Dui HuaFoundation, No. 12, February 2003, iv.

332 Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Gong’an bu guanyu rending he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30April 00. The founder of South China Church was executed for alleged rape and "using a cult to sabotage the enforcement of state law." Members of the church contend that the rape allegation was extracted by torturing female adherents with electric batons. Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 147–148.

334 ChinaAid (Online), "Report by South China Church About Persecution in November 2008," 12 December 08; "RFA Exclusive Report: Many Members of South China Church Arrested and Forbidden From Seeing Family and Attorney" [RFA dujia baodao: zhongguo huanan jiaohui duoren beibu jinjian jiaren lushi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 February 09.

335 ChinaAid (Online), "Four Christians Missing in Hubei Since Beginning of November; Many More Persecuted by Authorities," 12 December 08; ChinaAid (Online), "Report by South China Church About Persecution in November 2008," 12 December 08.

336 "RFA Exclusive Report: Many Members of South China Church Arrested and Forbidden From Seeing Family and Attorney" [RFA dujia baodao: zhongguo huanan jiaohui duoren beibu jinjian jiaren lushi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 February 09.

337 ChinaAid (Online), "Report by South China Church About Persecution in November 2008," 12 December 08.

339 The government labeled the church a "counterrevolutionary group" in 1983 and designated it a "cult organization" in 1995. "Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups," Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, No. 12, February 2003, vii; Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Gong’an bu guanyu rending he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30 April 00.

340 ChinaAid (Online), "More Than 400 College Students in Beijing and Hangzhou Detained and Interrogated; Four Church Leaders Sentenced to Labor Camps," 3 December 08.

357 For a recent example, see Taixing City People’s Government Opinion on the Launch of Special Administration for Our Township’s Outstanding Problems With Religion [Guanyu dui wozhen zongjiao tuchu wenti kaizhan zhuanxiang zhili de yijian], issued 29 March 09.

358 These priests are often referred to as sanju daoshi in official reports. Chi-Tim Lai, "Daoism in China Today, 1980–2002," 174 China Quarterly 413, 417 (June 2003). For a recent example, officials in Shashi district, Jingzhou city, Hubei province, established a "small work group for managing Zhengyi priests" in November 2008 for the purpose of "strengthening the management of Taoist affairs" and "striking against illegal religious activities." Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission of Hubei Province (Online), "Shashi District Explores Management of Taoist Priests Who Reside at Home" [Shashi qu tansuo sanju daoshi guanli gongzuo], 6 November 08.

359 See discussion that follows on the Orthodox church in China. In addition, Chinese members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints were reported in 2006 to have held services in Beijing. They met at a facility used by foreign members of the church, but at a different time from the foreign church members. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September 06.

The Chinese Government continued in the past year to implement policies that undermine ethnic minority citizens’ rights. The government repressed expressions of ethnic identity perceived to challenge government authority, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See Section IV—Xinjiang and Section V—Tibet, for additional information on Uyghurs and Tibetans. For more information on Mongols, see Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in this section.] While the Chinese Government maintained some protections in law and practice for citizens it designates as ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu),1 shortcomings in the substance and implementation of Chinese laws and policies continued to prevent ethnic minorities from exercising their rights in line with domestic law and international human rights standards.2 Ethnic minorities did not enjoy "the right to administer their internal affairs" 3 as provided for under the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.4 As in the case of demonstrations by Tibetans and Uyghurs in early 2008, a demonstration on July 5, 2009, by Uyghurs in the XUAR and outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day—followed by harsh security measures—again directed an international spotlight on grievances held by non-Han ethnic groups, tensions in ethnic autonomous areas, and longstanding problems in Chinese Government policies toward ethnic minorities and ethnic issues. [See Section IV—Xinjiang, for details of the July 5 demonstration.]

The Commission tracked several developments from the Commission’s 2009 reporting year that underscored the continuing challenges ethnic minority citizens faced in protecting their rights.5 First, in the aftermath of demonstrations in 2008 and 2009 by Tibetans and Uyghurs that highlighted systemic problems in state policies toward ethnic minorities and ethnic issues, the central government continued to attribute outstanding tensions to its citizens while asserting the effectiveness of government policies and amplifying publicity in their support. Second, the government continued to implement economic development projects that prioritize government economic goals over broad protection of ethnic minorities’ rights and guaranteeing ethnic minority participation in decision-making processes. The projects build on longstanding development programs that have brought some benefits to ethnic minority regions but also have introduced additional threats to the protection of ethnic minorities’ rights. Third, although officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region reported taking steps to promote the use of the Mongolian language, they also continued to implement other measures that undermine Mongol traditions and livelihoods and punish people who defend Mongols’ rights or who express dissent. Fourth, the Chinese Government continued in the past year to impose controls over how individuals and communities define their ethnicity, interpret their history, and preserve their culture and language.

Also in the past year, the Chinese Government pledged to increase protection for the rights of ethnic minorities in its 2009– 2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP).6 While the HRAP outlines measures to support legislation, governance, education, personnel training and employment, language use, and cultural and economic development among ethnic minorities,7 domestic and overseas observers have questioned the likely impact of the broadly worded HRAP amid the Chinese Government’s poor human rights record, including in the area of ethnic minorities’ rights.8 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which examined the Chinese Government’s compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in August 2009, expressed concern with government policies affecting ethnic minorities in areas such as language rights, migration, government representation, freedom of religion, non-discrimination, development, and healthcare.9

In the past year, the Chinese Government continued to hinder opportunities for dialogue on ways to protect the rights of ethnic minority citizens. As the government heightened propaganda in support of its policies toward ethnic minorities, it amplified rhetoric against "international hostile forces" interfering in China’s ethnic affairs.10 Government officials continued to vilify the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama and Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, both of whom aimed to peacefully engage with the Chinese Government to improve conditions for ethnic minorities in China.11 At the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese Government rejected recommendations to review laws and policies toward ethnic minorities and to allow international agencies and media greater access to Tibetan areas of China.12

In the aftermath of demonstrations in 2008 and 2009 by Uyghurs and Tibetans that highlighted systemic problems in state policies toward ethnic minorities and ethnic issues,13 the Chinese Government continued in this reporting year to attribute outstanding tensions to its citizens while asserting the effectiveness of government policies and amplifying publicity in their support. In early 2009, the Central Propaganda Department and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) published an outline to strengthen general propaganda and education on government and Communist Party policy on ethnic issues. The outline affirmed the government’s existing policies and attributed perceived outstanding problems to "contradictions among the people." The outline also called for resisting "international hostile forces raising the banner of such things as ‘ethnicity,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘human rights’ to carry out Westernization and separatist activities toward our country." 14

Following the July 5 demonstration by Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region capital of Urumqi and outbreaks of violence starting that day, the government again emphasized the efficacy of its policies. At a press conference in July, Wu Shimin, vice minister of SEAC, denied any connection between events on July 5—which authorities have blamed on U.S.-based Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, the World Uyghur Congress, and the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism15—and Chinese policies toward ethnic minorities. He described the policies as "a long-term success" and said the government had no plans to reevaluate them.16

The government also heightened propaganda on ethnic unity in the past year. In November 2008, the Ministry of Education and SEAC issued a trial program directing schools throughout the country to implement "ethnic unity education" in a stated effort to promote Communist Party policy on ethnic issues.17 The program requires schools to guarantee 10 to 14 hours of "ethnic unity education" a year to students starting in grade three of elementary school through the high school and vocational school levels.18 The Central Propaganda Department, Ministry of Education, and SEAC held a meeting in late August again calling for measures to strengthen propaganda and education on ethnic unity.19

The government reported taking some steps in the past year to refine implementation of its existing framework for ethnic autonomy, at the same time it affirmed the basic features of the system. The government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, issued in April 2009, pledged to "expedite" drafting of regulations related to the implementation of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and to revise two existing regulations related to ethnic minorities.20 From May to July, central government and Party authorities reported investigating problems in implementation of state policy on ethnic issues, in accordance with directives issued in 2008 and 2009, and reported the investigations included focus on preventing and redressing discrimination toward ethnic minorities.21 According to Xinhua, SEAC announced plans in late July to increase research on ethnic issues "in order to better solve minority disputes." 22

The Chinese Government continued in the past year to implement development projects that prioritize state economic goals over protecting ethnic minorities’ rights and guaranteeing ethnic minority participation in decisionmaking processes. Steps implemented in the past year build on longstanding development efforts that have brought some benefits to ethnic minority regions but also have introduced additional threats to the protection of ethnic minorities’ rights.23 Development programs—such as the decade-old central government Great Western Development project directed at 12 provinces, municipalities, or autonomous regions24—have been implemented in a top-down fashion that marginalizes participation and decisionmaking by ethnic minority communities.25 Such policies have undermined ethnic minorities’ rights to maintain traditional livelihoods, spurred migration to ethnic minority regions, promoted unequal allocation of resources favoring Han Chinese, intensified linguistic and assimilation pressures on local communities, and brought environmental damage.26 Development policies also remain intertwined with political objectives to foster ethnic unity and political stability.27 [For more information on development projects in specific areas, see Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in this section, Section IV—Xinjiang, and Section V—Tibet.]

In November 2008, the central government issued an opinion on advancing science and technology development among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas,28 linking such development to strengthening "ethnic unity," the "unity of the motherland," and security in China’s border areas. The opinion includes potentially beneficial provisions, but lacks measures to ensure ethnic minorities have meaningful participation in determining development policies29 and receive benefits that accrue from development efforts.30 The government pledged in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) to devote 2 billion yuan (US$293 million) to promote economic and social development among ethnic minorities and in ethnic minority areas, including for infrastructure construction and poverty elimination for populations living in extreme poverty.31 The potential impact of the pledge remains unclear, however, amid the Chinese Government’s poor track record in implementing equitable development projects and amid doubts concerning the effectiveness of the HRAP.32

The Chinese Government continued in the past year to impose government controls over how individuals and communities define their ethnicity, interpret their history, and preserve their culture and language. Chinese Government policy imposes fixed ethnic identities on Chinese citizens and denies communities the freedom to fully interpret and define their ethnicity free from state intervention.33 Although state-determined identities mesh to some degree with how communities self-identify, and citizens have some leeway to change their formal ethnic affiliation in accordance with state-defined categories,34 the government’s system of classifying ethnic groups also has denied some communities the freedom to formally identify as distinct ethnic groups.35 In the past year, the government continued to impose official versions of Chinese history, including the histories of different ethnic groups, to legitimize the government’s current borders and policies.36 In addition, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television issued a notice in July that called for ensuring the accuracy of historical dramas and called for greater scrutiny of series touching on "particularly sensitive subject matter" like ethnicity and religion.37

The Chinese Government has used domestic and international mechanisms for cultural heritage protection to preserve some aspects of ethnic minority culture, but in accordance with government and Party aims and definitions.38 One central government official, speaking in 2006 on the protection of intangible cultural heritage, noted, "Protection of intangible cultural heritage and maintaining continuity of the national culture constitute an essential cultural base for enhancing cohesion of the nation, boosting the national unity, invigorating the national spirit and safeguarding the national unification." 39 In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, authorities launched a project in February 2009 to demolish and "reconstruct" the Old City area of Kashgar city after determining most buildings in the nationally designated historic area had little historic preservation value, a project which has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and outside observers for undermining heritage protection and forcing the resettlement of residents.40 [See Section IV—Xinjiang, for detailed information.]

The government and media publicized efforts launched in 2009 that were described as a means to promote ethnic minority culture, but in some cases emphasized the importance of such measures to meet state political goals. A June 2008 article noting government steps to promote ethnic minority languages and preserve endangered languages described such efforts as playing an "irreplaceable role" in such areas as "political stability," "social advancement," and "ethnic unity." 41 The Chinese Government included support for ethnic minority cultural endeavors in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan,42 and in July, the State Council issued an opinion to "promote the development of ethnic minorities’ culture." 43 The opinion includes calls for increasing support in areas such as building libraries in ethnic minority communities, promoting publications in ethnic minority languages, and preserving cultural heritage, but also calls for using media to disseminate information on Party policy and for guarding against "cultural infiltration" by "hostile forces" outside China.44

The government has increased educational opportunities for ethnic minorities,45 but recent legislation and policy have reduced support for education in ethnic minority languages despite the regional ethnic autonomy system’s support for educational autonomy and school instruction in ethnic minority languages.46 The 2005 implementing measures for the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) curbed the REAL’s support for education in ethnic minority languages47 in favor of "bilingual" education. The "bilingual" policy has been implemented in some areas to focus primarily on instruction in Mandarin Chinese. [See Section IV—Xinjiang, for more in-formation on implementation within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.] Outside of the "bilingual education" framework, other localities, such as some ethnic minority areas in south-western China, have focused on educating ethnic minority students in Mandarin Chinese.48 While Mandarin education responds to a growing need for proficiency in the language to obtain economic and social mobility, it also underscores the shortcomings of the Chinese Government’s ethnic minority policies in securing a form of autonomy that enables citizens to maintain economic and social opportunities in ethnic minority languages. [See Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in this section for information on language policy in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.]

As in other areas of China where authorities perceive ethnic minorities to challenge state power and support separatism, authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) have repressed independent expressions of Mongol ethnic identity and punished Mongols who have protested government policy and advocated for the protection of their rights. Ethnic Mongols in the region have faced controls over traditional pastoral livelihoods and barriers to protecting their language.49 Mongols also have faced pressures from Han migration,50 discrimination in job hiring,51 and, as followers of Tibetan Buddhism, tighter controls over their religious practices.52

The IMAR government continued in the past year to implement policies to resettle herders away from grasslands and shift them to new occupations, with the stated aim of improving grasslands conditions. For example, a March 2009 article from official media reported that authorities in the county-level Urad Rear Banner have planned to shift 80 percent of herders off grasslands to other sectors of employment, in order to relieve pressure on grasslands.53 In a speech the same month, the vice chair of the IMAR government called for better systematizing measures to shift farmers and herders to different sectors of employment.54 Also in March, the IMAR government passed a directive to promote the employment of at least one family member in a wage-based occupation by 2011, among families with no members employed in secondary or tertiary industries.55 The measures from the past year continue older "ecological migration" policies in the IMAR, sometimes reported to be compulsory, that have eroded Mongols’ pastoral livelihoods.56 Herding communities resettled to towns and urban areas have faced challenges in preserving traditions and adapting to new, government-imposed livelihoods.57 Authorities have required those who stay on grasslands to abide by government directives on fencing grasslands and laying pastures fallow.58 Scholars have questioned the effectiveness of these government policies in ameliorating environmental degradation.59 [For additional information, see Section II—Climate Change and Environment.]

After sustained implementation of policies that decreased the use of the Mongolian language in the IMAR, authorities have taken steps in recent years to spur greater use of the language. The IMAR government implemented legislation in 2005 to promote the language,60 but reported in 2007 that problems remained in implementation.61 That year, authorities issued an opinion on strengthening work on ethnic minority education that included measures to increase Mongolian-language education within a three-year period.62 In the past year, authorities in the IMAR continued to report on promoting efforts to expand Mongolian language use, through measures including free schooling and increased subsidies for students who receive education in Mongolian.63 At the same time, in recent years, including in 2009, authorities have targeted some Mongolian-language Web sites and Mongol discussion sites for scrutiny and closure,64 and a Mongol rights advocate in the IMAR has reported on curbs over the use of Mongolian on a university campus.65

Ethnic Mongols who aim to protect their rights or preserve their culture continue to face the risks of harassment, detention, and imprisonment. Mongol rights advocates Naranbilig and Tsebegjab remained under illegal home confinement for part of this reporting year after authorities held them in detention in 2008 in two unrelated incidents.66 In addition, authorities took steps in the past year to block Naranbilig’s participation in international forums to protect indigenous rights, including through confiscation of his passport.67 Mongol rights advocate Hada remains in prison since receiving a 15-year sentence in 1996 after he organized peaceful protests for ethnic minority rights in the IMAR capital of Hohhot.68 Following a trial in 2006, Mongol doctor Naguunbilig reportedly continues to serve a 10-year sentence for cult-related offenses, while his wife, Daguulaa, is under home confinement, after authorities reportedly accused them of using healing methods that were "a Mongolian version of Falun Gong." 69

Notes to Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights

1 The expression "shaoshu minzu" encompasses populations within China’s borders that the government designates as groups other than Han Chinese. Chinese and outside sources have used such terms as "nationality" and "ethnicity" to translate "minzu" into English. Varying terminology can introduce imprecision, and some scholars writing in English choose to leave the term untranslated. See, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent," East-West Center, Washington, 2004, Policy Studies 11, 49 (endnote 4); Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), xx–xxv (discussing the notion of minzu).

2 See discussion within for more information on restrictions on ethnic minority rights within China. For a detailed discussion of the relevant domestic legal framework, see Special Focus for 2005: China’s Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13–23. Regarding international human rights standards, see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 26, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 2(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, arts. 2(1), 30. See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 65, entry into force 4 January 69. Article 1(1) of CERD defines racial discrimination to mean "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life." China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. As in previous years, the Chinese Government this reporting year continued to reiterate its commitment to ratifying the ICCPR, which China signed in 1998. In February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify the ICCPR. At the time, Chinese officials also said China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114 (1). Moreover, in the 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) issued by the Chinese Government in April 2009, officials stated that the ICCPR was one of the "fundamental principles" on which the plan was framed, and that the government "will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR." State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1).

13 For detailed information on the 2008 protests, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 172, 183–186. See Section IV—Xinjiang for detailed information on the 2009 demonstration in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

16 Choi Chi-Yuk, "Policies Not To Blame for Rioting, Official Says," South China Morning Post, 22 July 09 (Open Source Center, 22 July 09); "FYI—CCTV–4 Live Coverage of PRC State Council Press Conference on Ethnic Policy," Beijing CCTV–4, 21 July 09 (Open Source Center, 21 July 09). Ashat Kerimbay, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and chair of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regional Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, described China’s policies on ethnic issues as "the best in the world." "Ethnic Unity Most Important for Regional Development," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 20 July 09. At the same time, at least one official, Guangdong Communist Party secretary and Politboro member Wang Yang, said state policies toward ethnic minorities "need adjustments" and that it was necessary to "adjust to the actual situation." He did not elaborate on precisely what kinds of adjustments are necessary. James Pomfret, "China Needs New Policies After Xinjiang: Official," Reuters (Online), 30 July 09.

18 Ministry of Education and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Guiding Program on Ethnic Unity Education in Schools (Trial) [Xuexiao minzu tuanjie jiaoyu zhidao gangyao (shixing)], issued 26 November 08. A July 7, 2009, notice based on a May meeting examining ethnic unity education called for strengthening the education in accordance with the earlier trial program and stressed the importance of strengthening oversight of the ethnic unity education. General Offices of Ministry of Education and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Circular on "Summary of Video Conference on Deployment of Work on National Elementary and Secondary School Ethnic Unity" [Jiaoyubu bangongting guojia min wei bangongting guanyu yinfa "quanguo zhong xiaoxue minzu tuanjie jiaoyu gongzuo bushu shipin huiyi jiyao" de tongzhi], issued 7 July 09.

20 The HRAP also affirms ethnic minorities’ right to administer in designated autonomous areas and outlines steps to further guarantee ethnic minority representation at various levels of government. State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. III(1).

28 State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, and the China Association for Science and Technology, Some Opinions Concerning theIncreased Strengthening of Science and Technology Work Among Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Minority Regions [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang shaoshu minzu he minzu diqu keji gongzuo deruogan yijian], 3 November 08. See also analysis in "New Science and Technology Plan for Ethnic Minorities Raises Questions About Ethnic Minority Rights," CECC China Human Rights andRule of Law Update, December 2008, 3.

29 For international standards on participation in economic life, see Declaration on the Rightsof Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 92, art. 2(2).

30 For example, a provision supporting the development of ethnic minority medicine does not specify steps for ensuring that ethnic minority communities maintain oversight and gain benefitfrom the development of ethnic minority medicine. State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, and the China Association for Science andTechnology, Some Opinions Concerning the Increased Strengthening of Science and Technology Work Among Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Minority Regions [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang shaoshuminzu he minzu diqu keji gongzuo de ruogan yijian], 3 November 08, art. 8. A previous provincial-level effort to promote the development of ethnic minority medicine and apply intellectualproperty protections has similarly lacked concrete measures that safeguard ethnic minorities’ rights and interests. CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 157.

31 State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. III(1). As of 2005, rural ethnic minority citizens comprised nearly half of all Chinese citizens living in extreme poverty, though ethnic minorities as a whole are less than 9 percent of China’s population. Zhao Huanxin, "Priority Plan for EthnicMinorities," China Daily, 30 March 07 (Open Source Center, 30 March 07). The 2009 Action Plan follows a separate five-year development program for ethnic minorities and ethnic minorityregions issued in 2007. State Council General Office, Circular on Printing and Issuing the 11th 5-Year Program for Ethnic Minority Undertakings [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu yinfashaoshu minzu shiye ‘shiyiwu’ guihua de tongzhi], issued 27 February 07. For more information, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 106.

34 On the process of affiliation, see generally Matthew Hoddie, "Ethnic Identity Change in the People’s Republic of China: An Explanation Using Data From the 1982 and 1990 Census Enumerations," in Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identity in China, ed. William Safran (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 119–141.

36 For example, in its 2009 policy directive on strengthening propaganda on ethnic issues, the government asserted that the Chinese state had existed throughout history as a unified entity, save for brief aberrations during "temporary" periods of division. Central Propaganda Department and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Outline Concerning Propaganda and Education on the Party and State’s Ethnic Policy [Dang he guojia minzu zhengce xuanchuan jiaoyu tigang], estimated date February 2009. For an overview of historiography on one area within the borders of the People’s Republic of China, see generally Gardner Bovingdon with contributions by Nabijan Tursun, "Contested Histories," in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). In the past year, the government also continued to promote government-defined historical accounts of Tibet to justify current Chinese policy in its March 2009 white paper on Tibet. State Council Information Office, Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 2 March 09.

37 State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, July 2009 Circular on Publicizing the Putting on Record of Nationwide Production of TV Dramas [Guangdian zongju guanyu 2009 nian 7 yue quanguo paishe zhizuo dianshiju bei’an gongshi de tongzhi], 20 July 09. See also "China’s TV Watchdog Warns Against Historically Inaccurate Shows," Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 24 July 09.

38 See, e.g., the discussion in "Demolition of Kashgar’s Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2, as well as the discussion in Rachel Harris, The Making of a Musical Canon in Chinese Central Asia: The Uyghur Twelve Muqam (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 109–136.

40 In addition to Section IV—Xinjiang, see also "Demolition of Kashgar’s Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2.

64 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), "Mongolian Internet Forum Closed for Discussing Ethnic Problems," 16 July 07; "Two Ethnic Minority Web Sites in Inner Mongolia Closed," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 14; "Authorities Close Two Mongolian-Language Web Sites for Posting ‘Separatist’ Materials," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 13–14. In addition, in 2009, the Web master of a Mongolian discussion site said authorities questioned him about the contents of the site, including whether it had connections to foreign countries and whether par-ticipants had posted articles on the independence of Mongols, Uyghurs, and Tibetans. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), "Southern (Inner) Mongolian Web Administrator Questioned," 22 June 09. Operation of this site and others was suspended in advance of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), "Continuing Shutdown and Blocks of Mongolian Internet Sites by Chinese Government," 18 September 09.

66 Authorities had detained Naranbilig for 20 days in 2008 in connection with his plans to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and with his broader activities advocating for the rights of ethnic Mongols. The same month, authorities also detained Tsebegjab and held him for over a month for his alleged ties to overseas Mongolian activists. For information on these cases, see the CECC Political Prisoner Database and CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 2008, 94.

68 While in prison, Hada has been subject to abuse, and authorities have harassed his wife and son. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on Hada’s case. For information on harassment of his family members, see "Authorities Try Mongol Couple, Assault Son of Imprisoned Mongol Activist," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2006, 2.

69 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information, as well as, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), "Statement of Enhebatu Togochog at the ‘Ethnicity With Chinese Characteristics? The Chinese State and Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongol Identities’ Conference by the National Endowment for Democracy," 5 December 08; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), "Jaranbayariin Soyolt Released and Deported Back to Mongolia," 19 June 08.

In the Commission’s 2009 reporting year, central and local authorities continued to interfere with and control the reproductive lives of Chinese women through an all-encompassing system of family planning regulations in which the government is directly involved in the reproductive decisions of its citizens. Population planning policies limit most women in urban areas to bearing one child, while permitting slightly more than half of women in rural areas to bear a second child if their first child is female.1 In the past year, the Commission notes that several Chinese municipalities are allowing younger couples in which both spouses hail from one-child households to have more than one child.2 Despite progress in this regard, local officials and state-run work units continue to interfere in the reproductive lives of Chinese women by monitoring their reproductive cycles in order to prevent unauthorized births.3 The Chinese government requires married couples to obtain a birth permit before they can lawfully bear a child and forces them to use contraception at other times.4 Violators of the policy are routinely punished with fines, and in some cases, subjected to forced sterilization, forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and torture.5

China’s population planning policies in both their nature and implementation violate international human rights standards. Although implementation tends to vary across localities, the government’s population planning law and regulations contravene international human rights standards by limiting the number of children that women may bear and by coercing compliance with population targets through heavy fines.6 For example, the PRC Population and Family Planning Law is not consistent with the standards set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development.7 Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families and additional abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against "out-of-plan" children, also violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,8 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,9 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.10 In December 2008, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern with Chinese authorities’ "lack of investigation into the alleged use of coercive and violent measures to implement the population policy" and urged the government to bring its population planning policies into "full compliance" with the relevant provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.11 As a state party to all of these treaties, China is bound to uphold their terms.

Local governments have in some cases stepped up efforts to impose penalties and fines against couples who give birth to an unauthorized child. Officials refer to these fines as "social compensation fees" (shehui fuyang fei), which for certain couples pose a dilemma between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring potentially overwhelming financial costs. In February 2009, the Ganzhou municipal government in Jiangxi province established a "collection management program" for social compensation fees that requires officials to maintain a file for each person who violates family planning regulations and stipulates that violators who refuse to pay the fines should be added to a credit "blacklist" in China’s banking system.12 The Ganzhou program also authorizes officials to apply "coercive measures" such as judicial detention and property seizure against those who refuse to pay the fines.13 In the same month, the Anxi county government in Fujian province issued a circular ordering officials to seek court authorization to carry out "coercive measures" when family planning violators fail to pay fines.14 In its 2009 work plan, the Qianguo County Population and Family Planning Commission in Jilin province called on local officials to "expand special punishments for illicit births, strictly enforce the investigation and prosecution of illicit births, and stress the strengthening of penalties for those who violate [family planning policies]." 15

Authorities in some localities are levying social compensation fees at higher levels according to the violator’s income and, in some cases, additional fines are imposed on women who resist official efforts to "implement remedial measures" such as abortion. In Chongqing municipality’s Tongliang county, for example, officials launched a multi-month project in July 2008 that would impose fines of between 5,000 yuan (US$731) and 10,000 yuan (US$1,464) on women who resist government efforts to compel them to have an abortion. This fine is levied in addition to the ordinary social compensation fee of 2,000 yuan (US$293) to 5,000 yuan (US$731).16 In November 2008, the Shanxi Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee passed an amendment to the provincial family planning regulations that imposes stricter standards for social compensation fees. For couples who have a second child in violation of these regulations, the government will assess a social compensation fee equal to 20 percent of a couple’s combined income once per year for seven years, which must total no less than 7,000 yuan (US$1,025). If a couple has a third child, the fine rises to 40 percent of their combined income assessed for a 14-year period, which must total no less than 30,000 yuan (US$4,392).17 In March 2009, Xinhua reported that authorities in Fuzhou city, Fujian province, fined two private entrepreneurs from the Cangshan district 200,000 yuan (US$29,275) and 300,000 yuan (US$43,912) each for "illegal births." Two other entrepreneurs from nearby districts paid 100,000 yuan (US$14,637) each in penalties for violating population planning policies.18

Local governments also offer monetary incentives to citizen informants who report violations of population planning regulations. In March 2009, the Beijing Times reported that the Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission had begun offering rewards of an unspecified amount to informants who report "out-of-plan" pregnancies and extramarital pregnancies.19 In April 2009, the Chun’an County Bureau of Population and Family Planning in Zhejiang province introduced a system for providing informants with cash rewards of 1,000 yuan (US$146) per violation reported. The circular also states that authorities will "strictly protect the secrecy" of the informant’s identity.20 In July 2009, Yangxin county authorities in Shandong province released measures for providing citizen informants with awards ranging from 300 yuan (US$44) to 3,000 yuan (US$439) depending on the severity of the reported violation.21

The use of coercive measures in the enforcement of population planning policies remains commonplace despite provisions for the punishment of official abuse outlined in the PRC Population and Family Planning Law.22 The same law requires that local family planning bureaus conduct regular pregnancy tests on married women and administer unspecified "follow-up" services.23 The population planning regulations of at least 18 of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions permit officials to take steps to ensure that birth quotas are not exceeded; in practice, these steps can include forced abortion and forced sterilization.24 In some cases, local officials coerce abortions in the third trimester.25 "Termination of pregnancy" is explicitly required if a pregnancy does not conform with provincial population planning regulations in Anhui, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Liaoning, and Ningxia provinces. In 10 other provinces—Fujian, Guizhou, Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Yunnan—population planning officials are authorized to take "remedial measures" to deal with "out-of-plan" pregnancies.26 In the past year, the Commission analyzed official reports from local governments in over a third of China’s provincial-level jurisdictions and found that the term "remedial measures" (bujiu cuoshi) is used synonymously with compulsory abortion.27

In the past year, authorities in various localities forced women to undergo abortions, and in some cases, reportedly beat violators of population planning regulations. In February 2009, a woman in Guangdong’s Shenzhen Special Economic Zone told local media that officials subjected her to a forced abortion six days prior to her due date because she was pregnant with her second child (her first was a daughter) before the officially mandated period between births had passed.28 Ten family planning workers took her to a clinic where she was injected in the abdomen with medication to induce an abortion. They reportedly kicked her in the stomach to expedite the abortion.29 In April 2009, several male family planning workers in Sihong county, Jiangsu province, reportedly took a woman from her home and beat her repeatedly because she missed the deadline for a mandatory pregnancy exam and intrauterine device (IUD) inspection.30 Authorities in Guangdong’s capital forced three young surrogate mothers to undergo abortions when they were discovered hiding there in April. Authorities physically forced the women’s thumbprints onto a consent form, according to one woman’s account.31 In June 2009, family planning officials in Guan county, Shandong province, forced 35-year-old Feng Junhua to have an abortion in her ninth month of pregnancy. The injection to induce abortion reportedly caused massive hem-orrhaging and killed the mother.32

In late 2008, officials in at least three provinces (Jiangsu, Guizhou, and Anhui) and one provincial-level administrative area (Chongqing), unveiled plans and circulars launching family planning campaigns that mandate abortions of "out-of-plan" pregnancies. Chongqing’s Tongliang county government introduced a multi-month project in late summer 2008 with an "overall objective" to "go further in reducing unwanted and out-of-plan pregnancies and to implement first term and mid-to-late term abortion remedial measures." 33 In November, officials in Qingshanquan township, Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, declared a "month of concentrated corrective activities" for family planning officials, the "focus" of which was "the implementation of . . . first- term and mid- to late-term abortion and other remedial measures." 34 The circular stressed that officials must "avoid just going through the motions" and should instead "resolutely implement abortion and other remedial measures, strictly standardize the birth policy, adopt remedial measures for each and every out-of-plan pregnancy, and reliably prevent out-of-plan births." 35 Also in November, the family planning "leading group" of Guizhou’s Qiandongnan Miao and Dong Autonomous Prefecture pressed local officials to "take forceful measures" and "resolutely adopt remedial measures for out-of-plan pregnancies." 36 It recommended "strengthening" pregnancy exams in order to "remedy" out-of-plan pregnancies at an early stage and thereby reduce "late-term abortions and control measures." 37 In December, authorities in Changfeng county, Anhui province, circulated a directive that ordered comprehensive inspections in which "no village misses any group, no group misses any household, no household misses any person, and no person misses any item." During these inspections, officials must "resolutely carry out remedial measures to the stipulated standard" for households with a son or more than one child.38

In 2009, authorities in some areas of Yunnan and Fujian provinces also employed abortion as an official policy instrument. In Yunnan’s Yanjin county, Niuzhai township officials developed a 2009 implementation plan that outlined abortion targets for specific groups: "strictly prohibit the birth of multiple children; for women who have multiple out-of-plan children and become pregnant again, the abortion rate must reach 100 percent; for women who have two out-of-plan children and become pregnant again, the abortion rate must exceed 90 percent; for women who have one out-of-plan child and become pregnant again, the abortion rate must exceed 85 percent." 39 In December 2008, Luxi city authorities in Yunnan decided that village-level Communist Party secretaries must "stand in the front of the line and set an example in breaking through difficult problems such as . . . abortions of out-of-plan pregnancies." 40 In February 2009, officials in Anxi county, Fujian province, initiated a five-week campaign of "concentrated service activities" that designated the "implementation of abortion remedial measures" among its five "primary tasks." The circular authorizing the campaign instructs officials to "adopt effective and comprehensive punitive measures and ensure that remedial measures against out-of-plan pregnancies are taken promptly and reliably." 41 In May 2009, officials in Xianyou county, Fujian, detained 55-year-old Wu Xinjie in order to pressure her daughter, who was nine months pregnant with a second child and had fled the area, to have an abortion.42 During the same period, Xianyou family planning authorities told a reporter that they forced a 20-year-old unmarried woman who was seven months pregnant to undergo an abortion.43 In June 2009, the Wuyishan county government in Fujian published village family planning regulations that stipulate the following: "In emergency situations when pregnancies violate family planning policies, report the matter to the village committee and promptly carry out remedial measures (abortion)." 44

Some local governments specifically target migrant workers for forced abortions. In April 2009, authorities in Jinyun county, Zhejiang province, drafted an implementation plan for a month-long family planning campaign in which villages would "battle with themselves" by conducting door-to-door inspections to obtain "clues" about out-of-plan pregnancies and determine the "true whereabouts" of migrant workers who have left the villages. The plan urges county-level officials to "assist the township law enforcement group with the implementation of remedial measures such as abortion and the collection of social compensation fees." 45 When migrants with out-of-plan pregnancies are discovered, officials should "promptly report to higher authorities and resolutely implement remedial measures; the implementation rate for remedial measures must reach 100 percent." 46 In Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, family planning provisions impose financial penalties designed to coerce migrant workers with unauthorized pregnancies to undergo an abortion.47 The provisions require enterprises that employ migrants and officials from the residential committees where they live to report out-of-plan pregnancies to the family planning authorities and to attempt to "persuade" the migrant to "take remedial measures." Local authorities then send the migrant a formal written "notification" that she must "take remedial measures." If the migrant worker fails to have an abortion after receiving the notification, authorities can deduct a fine directly from her wages on a provisional basis.48 After 15 days of the penalty period elapse, the government can impose an additional fine, calculated at 3 percent of the total deduction from her wages for each day that passes that she does not "take remedial measures to terminate the pregnancy." 49

Local authorities continue to mandate surgical sterilization and the use of contraception as a means to enforce birth quotas. In November 2008, a township in Jiawang district, Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, released a circular urging officials to "take the rectification of hidden dangers as your vehicle and ruthlessly seize the implementation of intrauterine device (IUD) implantation measures." 50 In March 2009, township-level authorities in Fujian province’s Sha county issued family planning recommendations that call on officials to "strictly act on the demand to carry out tubal ligation within one month" for women who give birth to a second or third child, and set the implementation target for this group at 100 percent.51 Officials must also ensure that IUDs are inserted in women within three months of the birth of a first child.52 Officials from Guidong county, Hunan province, reported in June 2009 the completion of examinations conducted on 819 women, resulting in nine tubal ligations and 17 IUD implantations.53 A newspaper in Yunnan province reported in February 2009 that officials there ambushed a woman named Zhang Kecui in the street and forced her to an operating room where she unwillingly underwent surgical sterilization.54

Some local governments offer monetary incentives and other benefits to couples who voluntarily undergo sterilization or abortion procedures. In October 2008, the Panyu District Population and Family Planning Commission in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, announced that women who undergo tubal ligation are eligible to receive a monthly reward of 25 yuan (US$4) starting from the month of the surgery until they turn 55 years old.55 In a November 2008 circular issued by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning Commission, authorities increased the one-time reward for women with two daughters who undergo tubal ligation from 500 yuan (US$73) to 1,500 yuan (US$220). Women who live in rural areas and have two children of either sex can also receive a 1,000 yuan (US$146) reward for choosing surgical sterilization.56 In March 2009, authorities in Guangdong province’s Shenzhen Special Economic Zone issued a circular announcing that married women who become pregnant without authorization are eligible for "subsidies" if they volunteer for an abortion. The circular specifies a reward of 500 yuan (US$73) for voluntary abortions performed within the first 14 weeks of pregnancy and 700 yuan (US$102) for those performed after the first 14 weeks.57

Many provinces link job promotion with an official’s ability to meet or exceed population planning targets, thus providing a powerful structural incentive for officials to employ coercive measures in order to meet population goals.58 In January 2009, Wuyishan county in Fujian province published a "family planning responsibility manual" for township and village officials that detailed a point system for performance evaluations on family planning issues. For example, officials receive 15 points for completing all of the tubal ligation targets for the year and 10 points for meeting intrauterine device targets.59 Five points are added for each mid-to late-term abortion that an official oversees and two points for each first-trimester abortion. Conversely, two to five points are deducted from an official’s evaluation for each child born out of plan, depending on the number of children already present in the household. Officials who score 90 points or higher on their evaluations are rewarded with a bonus of 2,000 yuan (US$293).60 Dasi township authorities, in Yunnan province’s Fengqing county, issued a circular in April 2009 that notified local officials that a percentage point would be deducted from their annual performance evaluations each time they fail to "promptly implement" contraception measures for all married women who give birth or have an abortion.61 Officials receive seven points if contraceptive measures sufficiently control the total number of "remedial procedures" to less than 21 "first-trimester abortions" and less than 12 "mid- to late-term abortions." 62

Chen Guangcheng, a legal advocate and rights defender from Linyi city, Shandong province, on whom the Commission reported in 2007 and 2008, was sentenced to more than four years in prison in 2006 for exposing widespread abuses by local family planning officials.63 In 2007 and 2008, prison authorities prevented Chen from communicating with his family, refused his medical parole request, and accused him of having "illicit relations with a foreign country." 64 In April 2009, Albert Ho of the Hong Kong-based China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group reported that Chen’s health while in prison "continues to worsen," and warned that "[Chen’s] life may be in danger." 65 Authorities have placed Chen’s wife, Yuan Weijing, under varying degrees of home confinement and surveillance since 2005. In March 2009, investigative journalist Wang Keqin and three companions were "beaten out of [Yuan Weijing’s] village" when they attempted to bring food and toys to Yuan and her two young children.66 When Wang telephoned Yuan to inform her that he could not visit, she responded: "[T]hese people have been around our home for more than a year. . . . There are always 11 people around our home, 24 hours a day. . . . When we go shopping or work in the fields, someone is watching us. At night, they even stoop outside the window to eavesdrop on us." 67 In April 2009, Yuan tried to visit her grieving sister after her brother-in-law’s death in a car accident, but nine men forcibly escorted her home where she was "punched and kicked by the men while being dragged back to her house." 68 Authorities have reportedly prevented Chen and Yuan’s children from enrolling in school.69

China’s skewed sex ratio presents a demographic challenge that will continue to worsen over the next 20 years, according to an April 2009 study in the British Medical Journal (BMJ).70 The study estimates that in 2005, there were 32 million more males than females under the age of 20, and 1.1 million more boys were born than girls.71 Considering the impact of China’s population planning policies, the study notes that "the fact that the problem of excess males in China seems to outstrip that of all other countries is perhaps no surprise." 72 Central government data from 2007 estimates a greater imbalance in the sex ratio: 37 million more males than females.73 In 2000, the most recent year for which national census data is available, the male-to-female sex ratio for the infant-to-four-year-old age group was reportedly 120.8 males for every 100 females. This is far above the global norm of roughly 105 males for every 100 females.74 At least five provinces—Jiangsu, Guangdong, Hainan, Anhui, and Henan—reported ratios over 130 in 2005.75 Some political scientists argue that large numbers of "surplus males" could create social conditions that the Chinese government may choose to address by expanding military enlistment.76 In response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese couples often engage in sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples whose first child is a girl.77 The April 2009 BMJ study found a steady increase in the sex ratio in China since ultrasound technology—through which pregnant couples can determine the sex of the fetus—became available in the 1980s.78 The study attributes what it calls an "imminent generation of excess males" largely to the practice of sex-selective abortion, rather than under-registration of girls or infanticide.79 In 2006, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee considered, but did not pass, a proposed amendment to the PRC Criminal Law that would have criminalized sex-selective abortion.80 Provincial governments in at least five provinces (Guizhou, Hubei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Jiangsu) have passed similar measures; 81 however, the central government has taken no action at the national level.

Population Planning in Jiujiang: A Case Study

Throughout June and July 2009, population planning authorities in Jiujiang, a prefectural-level municipality in Jiangxi province, published policy statements, policy objectives, and statistical reports which, taken together, illuminate the breadth and depth of population planning meas­ures in a local setting. Several themes emerged in these reports, includ­ing:

Concern for "remedying" unplanned births and insufficient compli­ance rates. A June 17 report issued by the Jiujiang county govern­ment emphasized the implementation of "remedial measures" to "resolutely put an end to unplanned births and comprehensively raise birth policy compliance rates." Officials and cadres were urged to place special emphasis on abortions as a part of these measures. The report said that "First-trimester abortions or mid- to late-term abortions must be performed on all individuals with unplanned pregnancies within the allotted time period to ensure the birth pol­icy compliance rate reaches the standard." 82

Statistics demonstrating the scale of population planning meas­ures in local communities. Governments submitted detailed statis­tics regarding local implementation of population planning meas­ures to officials at higher level jurisdictions. These reports typically contained information on the amount of fines collected and the num­ber of abortions, tubal ligations, pregnancy exams, and intrauterine device (IUD) implants conducted in the first half of 2009. Yining, Huanggang, Quanfeng, and Sidu townships published statistical re­ports on the Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Com­mittee (PFPC) Web site.83 On July 3, the Xiushui County PFPC re­ported that 13,731 instances of the "four procedures" were "imple­mented" in the first half of 2009, including 6,766 tubal ligations, 5,950 IUD implants, and 1,015 abortions.84 These developments are characterized as a "rapid surge of family planning services" result­ing from the creation of an "overwhelming atmosphere" of "strength­ened leadership . . . concentrated energy and strengthened meas­ures." 85

A propaganda drive aimed at both residents and officials. July was declared the "All-County Implementation of First-Trimester Abortion and Mid- to Late-Term Abortion Remedial Services Month" at a meeting held for Jiujiang county population planning officials on July 7. Officials were told to "ruthlessly master the implementa­tion of remedial measures, the control of unplanned births, and the improvement of the birth policy compliance rate." 86 Reports issued by Yining, Huanggang, Quanfeng, and Sidu townships described the use of propaganda vehicles, murals, banners, and slogans, and the distribution of leaflets and audio/video tapes to raise awareness about population planning policy.87 In Huanggang township, the propaganda campaign focused on the "two inspections and four pro­cedures" (liangjian sishu), which refer to IUD inspections, preg­nancy examinations (the two inspections), IUD implants, first-tri­mester abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and sterilization (the four procedures).88

Rewards and punishments for officials in charge of implementing population policy. On June 14, Jiujiang county reported that subor­dinate villages and townships would be ranked according to their performance in meeting population planning goals, and the leaders of the three lowest ranking areas would be required to give a "situa­tional accounting" at the next county meeting and to sign a written pledge.89 In Quanfeng township, two cadres were dismissed from their positions for "incompetence," but three villages under the township received 2,000 yuan (US$293) bonuses for their population planning performance.90 In Sidu township, two poorly performing villages came under "focused management" and were threatened with a 5,000 yuan (US$732) fine if their "rectification and improve­ment" was unsuccessful. The villages that ranked first and second were given a 2,000 yuan (US$293) and 1,000 yuan (US$146) re­ward, respectively.91

Rewards and punishments to ensure citizen compliance. Officials in Huanggang township were told to remind women of the "pref­erential policies" they would enjoy after undergoing tubal ligation.92 Almost all jurisdictions, however, also discussed the collection of "social compensation fees" to punish individuals who violated popu­lation planning regulations.93 A July 3 report indicates that Xiushui county in Jiujiang municipality collected over 10 million yuan (US$1.46 million) of social compensation fees in the first half of 2009.94 The Huanggang township report described fines for women who failed to undergo tubal ligation, IUD implantation, or an IUD inspection/pregnancy examination when required by the policy to do so. The report also stated that the fine would accumulate with each missed deadline until the individual underwent the required proce­dure.95

A hierarchical accountability system. According to several reports, cadres and officials are held responsible for their subordinates’ per­formance, with the lowest level officials personally responsible for the population planning policy compliance of residents in their neighborhoods or villages.96 In Yining township, Communist Party members were also held accountable for the compliance of their rel­atives, and residents were encouraged to enforce policy with their partners under the slogan, "Your partner is a responsibility, and that responsibility must be fulfilled." 97

Special emphasis on requiring mothers in "two-daughter house­holds" to undergo surgical sterilization. Local officials consider households that already have two daughters a high-risk group for population planning policy violations.98 Reports on population plan­ning measures from Jiujiang municipality jurisdictions included the number of tubal ligations conducted on women in "households with two daughters" or "households with daughters and no sons" as a distinct subset of the total number of surgical sterilizations. Xiushui county reported that out of 6,766 total tubal ligations, 296 were of women in two-daughter households.99 Sidu township reports that of­ficials "pooled their strength to ruthlessly master the implementa­tion of tubal ligation measures," and required that every village "complete their management of the amount of tubal ligations [and specifically] tubal ligations in two-daughter households." 100

Notes to Section II—Population Planning

1 The population planning policy was first launched in 1979, canonized as a "fundamental state policy" in 1982, and codified as national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China’s 31 provinces—accounting for 53.6 percent of China’s population—allow rural dwellers to have a second child if their first child is a girl. Gu Baochang et al., "China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century," 33 Population and Development Review 133, 138 (2007).

3 For example, officials in Huanggang township (Xiushui county, Jiangxi province) described a family planning campaign in July 2009 that focused on the "two inspections and four procedures" (liangjian sishu), which refer to IUD inspections, pregnancy examinations (the two inspections), IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and sterilization(the four procedures). See Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Huanggang Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family PlanningWork Dispatch Meeting" [Huanggangzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 15 July 09.

4 For example, in Fujian province’s Sha county, family planning officials are required to insert an IUD in women within three months of the birth of a first child. Sha County Zhenghu Township People’s Government (Online), "Recommendations Regarding Zhenghu Township’s Population and Family Planning Work for 2009" [Guanyu zuohao 2009 nian zhenghu xiang renkouyu jihua shengyu gongzuo de yijian], 25 March 09.

7 The PRC Population and Family Planning Law became effective in 2002. Beijing Declarationand Platform for Action (1995), para. 17; Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, para. 7.2. On the concept of "illegal pregnancy" and its use in practice, see ElinaHemminki, et al., "Illegal Births and Legal Abortions—The Case of China," Reproductive Health 2, No. 5 (2005).

8 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, arts. 2, 3, 16(1)(e).

9 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, andaccession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, arts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 26.

10 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art.10(3).

11 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States PartiesUnder Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture—China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 29.

12 Yudu County People’s Government (Online), Circular Regarding the Transmission of "Ganzhou Municipality Work Program for Collection of Social Compensation Fees" [Guanyuzhuanfa "ganzhou shi shehui fuyangfei zhengshou guanli gongzuo fang’an" de tongzhi], 25 February 09.

14 Anxi County People’s Government (Online), Circular on Lauching Population and FamilyPlanning Routine Work and Concentrated Service Activities [Guanyu kaizhan renkou he jihua shengyu changgui gongzuo jizhong fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 18 February 09.

15 Qianguo Erluosi Mongol Autonomous County Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), Qianguo County Population and Family Planning Bureau’s 2008 Work Summary and 2009 Work Plan [Qianguo xian renkou he jihua shengyu ju 2008 nian gongzuo zongjie he 2009 nian gongzuo anpai], 20 October 08.

25 For an official source that admits to mandatory abortions in the third term, see Jiujiang Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), "Jiujiang County Family Planning Commission Braves the Summer’s Intense Heat and Insists on Entering Villages and Homes To Direct and Supervise Family Planning Work" [Jiujiang xian jishengwei mao kushu jianchi jincun ruhu jiandao jisheng gongzuo], 17 July 09. For recent examples of cases of forced abortions in the third trimester, see Michael Sheridan, "Women Rebel Over Forced Abortions," Times of London (Online), 15 February 09; "Shandong’s Barbarous Family Planning, Mother and Child Both Die" [Shandong yeman jisheng muzi shuangwang], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 June 09.

27 These provinces include Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jilin. For two representative examples (Jiangsu and Fujian), see Jiawang District People’s Government (Online), Circular on the "Month of Concentrated Corrective Activities" for Population and Family Planning [Guanyu zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu "jizhong zhengzhi huodong yue" de tongzhi], 2 November 08. This report explicitly calls for officials to "resolutely implement first-trimester and mid- to late-term abortions and other remedial measures" (jianchi luoshi liu yinchan deng bujiu cuoshi). In addition, a report from a village in Fujian’s Wuyishan county states the following: "In emergency situations when pregnancies violate family planning policies, report the matter to the village committee and promptly carry out remedial measures (first-trimester abortion or mid- to late- term abortion)." Wuyishan County People’s Government (Online), Sandu Village Family Planning Village Regulations [Sandu cun jihua shengyu cungui minyue], 4 June 09.

28 Michael Sheridan, "Women Rebel Over Forced Abortions," Times of London (Online), 15 February 09.

34 Jiawang District People’s Government (Online), Circular on the "Month of Concentrated Corrective Activities" for Population and Family Planning [Guanyu zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu "jizhong zhengzhi huodong yue" de tongzhi], 2 November 08.

38 Changfeng County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), Circular on the Concentrated Launch of Sorting Out and Examination Work for Population and Family Planning in the Entire County [Guanyu zai quanxian jizhong kaizhan jihua shengyu qingli hecha gongzuo de tongzhi], 11 December 08.

40 Yunnan Provincial People’s Government (Online), Decision To Go Further in Implementing Cash Rewards and Punishments for Those Responsible for Investigating Population and Family Planning Work (Trial) [Guanyu jinyibu luoshi renkou yu jihua shengyu gongzuo zeren zhuijiu jiangcheng duixian de jueding (shixing)], 21 December 08.

41 Anxi County People’s Government (Online), Circular on Lauching Population and Family Planning Routine Work and Concentrated Service Activities [Guanyu kaizhan renkou he jihua shengyu changgui gongzuo jizhong fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 18 February 09.

43 Ibid. Family planning officials justified the forced abortion because the young woman had not reached the legal age in which parenthood is permitted. Fujian Population and Family Planning Regulations stipulate that women have to reach the age of 23 and men must be 25 before they can legally become parents.

50 Jiawang District People’s Government (Online), Circular on the "Month of Concentrated Corrective Activities" for Population and Family Planning [Guanyu zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu "jizhong zhengzhi huodong yue" de tongzhi], 2 November 08.

57 Longgang District People’s Government (Online), Circular on the Offering of Subsidies to Registered Households in Our District That Actively Carry Out Remedial Measures [Guanyu dui woqu huji renkou zhudong luoshi bujiu cuoshi jinxing buzhu de tongzhi], 31 March 09.

58 For more information on the importance of incentive structures for local officials in China, see Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).

69 "Reflections on a Visit to Chen Guangcheng’s Family, We Were Beaten Out of the Village," Wang Keqin’s Blog (Online), 14 March 09; Amnesty International (Online), "China: Wife of Human Rights Activist Beaten," 20 April 09.

73 "China Has 37 Million More Males Than Females," People’s Daily (Online), 10 July 07; State Council National Working Committee on Children and Women, "Adjusting Sex Ratio Imbalance Should Be Done Without Delay" [Zhili "xingbie shiheng" keburonghuan], 6 July 07.

77 See Mikhail Lipatov, Shuzhuo Li, and Marcus W. Feldman, "Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China," Proceedings of the National Academy of Social Sciences of the United States of America, 9 December 08, vol. 105 (49):19171. According to this study, "The root of the [gender imbalance] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference." See also Chu Junhong, "Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural Central China," 27 Population and Development Review 2 (2001), 259; Joseph Chamie, "The Global Abortion Bind: A Woman’s Right To Choose Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances," Yale Global (Online), 29 May 08.

83 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Yining Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Yiningzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 15 July 09; Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Huanggang Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Huanggangzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09; Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Quanfeng Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Quanfengzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09; Xiushui County Population and Family Plan-ning Committee (Online), "Sidu Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Siduzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 15 July 09.

84 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Xiushui County Brief Report on Efforts To Move Into the Leading Position in Population and Family Planning Work" [Xiushuixian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo zhengxian jinwei jianbao], 3 July 09.

87 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Yining Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Yiningzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 15 July 09; Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Huanggang Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Huanggangzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09; Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Quanfeng Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Quanfengzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09; Xiushui County Population and Family Plan-ning Committee (Online), "Sidu Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Siduzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 15 July 09.

88 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Huanggang Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Huanggangzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09.

90 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Quanfeng Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Quanfengzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhuifayan], 15 July 09.

91 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Sidu Township’sStatement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning Work Dispatch Meeting" [Siduzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 15July 09.

92 Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), "Huanggang Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Pl