The articles and essays in this blog range from the short to the long. Many of the posts are also introductory (i.e., educational) in nature; though, even when introductory, they still include additional commentary. Older material (dating back mainly to 2005) is being added to this blog over time.

Friday, 26 June 2015

Notes (1)

(1) Christof
Koch Admits There's a Mind-Body Problem

Even
hardcore “reductionists” admit that there's a problem with
providing a scientific account of subjective states.

For
example, Koch admitted to John Horgan that

“all
science can do is provide a detailed map of the physical processes
that correlate with different subjective states” (182).

Koch
admitted it's a problem. Or perhaps he simply responded without
thinking to Horgan's use of the phrase “mind-body problem”. In
other words, it isn't a problem as such, only something that can't be
achieved. (Though isn't that a good definition of a problem?) In
addition, perhaps this particular expression of the “problem” is
simply a conceptual or theoretical impossibility. In other words,
it's impossible in principle to offer more that the “physical
processes that correlate with different subjective states”. What
more can be offered? What else is there?

(2) Consciousness
is Off-limits to Science

Daniel
Dennett gives a rather simple and commonsensical explanation as to
why so many people are never satisfied with any - or even all -
theories of consciousness/mind. He says that “[w]e can't explain
anything to everyone's satisfaction”. And then Horgan gives some
examples.

He
says that “many people are dissatisfied with science's explanations
of, say, photosynthesis or biological reproduction” (179). However,
it's still the case, Dennett says, that “the sense of mystery is
gone from photosynthesis or reproduction”.

This
isn't to say that Dennett's theory of consciousness is rejected for
these reasons. Or that all of them are rejected for these reasons.
However, regardless of Dennett's own theories, this may explain the
problem which many people have with all theories of
consciousness. Perhaps they don't think what Dennett calls the
“mystery” has been truly solved. More tellingly, many don't want
the mystery of consciousness to be solved. Or, as Dennett himself
says about Colin McGinn and other 'mysterians', they “don't want
consciousness to fall to science”. They also “like the idea that
this is off-limits to science”. But when they think or say this (if
they ever do admit it), then they aren't really doing either science
or philosophy: they're doing religion, morality or even politics.

(3) Alan
Turing & Computers which Learn

In
the 1940s Alan Turing tried to create a machine with “intuition”
or with “initiative”. He attempted to achieve this by
introduction a random element into the machine or computer.

This
has been achieved.

To
put it how John Horgan puts it:

“Proponents
of artificial intelligence rebut Penrose's Godel argument by
contending that one can always design a computer to broaden its own
base of axioms to solve a new problem; in fact, such learning
algorithms are rather common (although they are still extremely crude
in comparison to the human mind).” (177)

Of
course even though there are computers which contain axioms which
enable them to solve their own problems by broadening their own base
of axioms (learning algorithms), that may not mean that this
automatically refutes Penrose's “Godel argument”. Or,
alternatively, that it actually displays genuine artificial
intelligence. It does mean, however, that computers learn. What else
could it be called other than learning? Still, can it be
called 'artificial intelligence'? Of course it can; though that would
depend – as it always does – on definitions. Does it mean that a
computer is conscious? I would intuitively say: absolutely not!

Added
to this one can add the examples which Daniel Dennett offers. He says
that there are

“software-writing
programmes and software-debugging programmes and code that heals
itself, you create new artefacts that have a life of their own”
(180).

(4)Subjective
States: Functional & Physical States

John
Horgan wrote the following words in 1996 (or at least that's when the
book was first published):

“Given
the rate at which neuroscientists are learning about it, within a few
decades they may have a highly effective map of the brain, one that
correlates specific neural processes to specific mental functions –
including consciousness as defined by Crick and Koch.” (188)

Well,
we are nearly two decades on from 1996: has this been achieved? Have
neuroscientists been able to “correlate specific neural processes
to specific mental functions”? Which functions is Horgan referring
to? Seeing a blue object? Making the calculation 2 + 2 = 4?
Finding one's way around a cluttered room? Or even listening to Brian
Ferneyhough?

Clearly
these correlations between mental functions and neural processes
(bits of the brain) don't immediately bring on board “subjective
states” or consciousness. Nonetheless, they all involve subjective
states and consciousness. Even a mental calculation clearly involves
subjective states and consciousness. A mental computation - if not
the equation itself - will even involve subjective states and what
philosophers call qualia. Nonetheless, they can be studied as
functions and as correlations with neuronal states and processes.
Consciousness and subjective states are another, if related, problem.