Van Mazijk, Corijn : Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awarenesshttps://philarchive.org/rec/VANHII-5
_Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences_:1-19. 2018 Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness. On the basis of Husserl’s phenomenological work, I argue that a focus on intentionality at the level of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible. The final part offers an alternative functional account of sensory awareness based on what Husserl called ‘immanent association’.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=VANHII-5&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11097-018-9558-y">direct link</a>)</div> Springs, Jason A. : Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversaryhttps://philarchive.org/rec/SPRHCI-2
US citizens perceive their society to be one of the most diverse and religiously tolerant in the world today. Yet seemingly intractable religious intolerance and moral conflict abound throughout contemporary US public life - from abortion law battles, same-sex marriage, post-9/11 Islamophobia, public school curriculum controversies, to moral and religious dimensions of the Black Lives Matter and Occupy Wall Street movements, and Tea Party populism. Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society develops an approach to democratic discourse and coalition-building across deep moral and religious divisions. Drawing on conflict transformation in peace studies, recent American pragmatist thought, and models of agonistic democracy, Jason Springs argues that, in circumstances riven with conflict between strong religious identities and deep moral and political commitments, productive engagement may depend on thinking creatively about how to constructively utilize conflict and intolerance. The result is an approach oriented by the recognition of conflict as a constituent and life-giving feature of social and political relationships.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SPRHCI-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cambridge.org%2Fcore%2Fbooks%2Fbeyond-conflict-in-contemporary-american-society%2F2614F1C174335B48F9AB83D9E0705849">direct link</a>)</div> Parsons, Josh : The shapes of incongruent counterpartshttps://philarchive.org/rec/PARTSO-2
Paper begins: I have two gloves, a left glove and a right glove. I can fit the left glove onto my left hand, but not the right glove. Why? Because the right glove is the wrong shape to go on my left hand. So the two gloves are different shapes…. Kittle, Simon : Some Problems of Heavenly Freedomhttps://philarchive.org/rec/KITSPO-2
_Theologica_ 2 (2). 2018 In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of these problems vary depending on the notion of free will which is endorsed. And I suggest that because these differing problems arise from distinct theological and/or philosophical commitments, there is little reason to think that one and the same feature or property of an account of heavenly freedom will address them all. Nordmann, Alfred ; Radder, Hans & Schiemann, Gregor (eds.): Science Transformed?: Debating Claims of an Epochal Breakhttps://philarchive.org/rec/NORSTD
Advancements in computing, instrumentation, robotics, digital imaging, and simulation modeling have changed science into a technology-driven institution. Government, industry, and society increasingly exert their influence over science, raising questions of values and objectivity. These and other profound changes have led many to speculate that we are in the midst of an epochal break in scientific history. This edited volume presents an in-depth examination of these issues from philosophical, historical, social, and cultural perspectives. It offers arguments both for and against the epochal break thesis in light of historical antecedents. Contributors discuss topics such as: science as a continuing epistemological enterprise; the decline of the individual scientist and the rise of communities; the intertwining of scientific and technological needs; links to prior practices and ways of thinking; the alleged divide between mode-1 and mode-2 research methods; the commodification of university science; and the shift from the scientific to a technological enterprise. Additionally, they examine the epochal break thesis using specific examples, including the transition from laboratory to real world experiments; the increased reliance on computer imaging; how analog and digital technologies condition behaviors that shape the object and beholder; the cultural significance of humanoid robots; the erosion of scientific quality in experimentation; and the effect of computers on prediction at the expense of explanation. Whether these events represent a historic break in scientific theory, practice, and methodology is disputed. What they do offer is an important occasion for philosophical analysis of the epistemic, institutional and moral questions affecting current and future scientific pursuits. Tanyi, Attila : Introduction to the guest edited section: world governmenthttps://philarchive.org/rec/TANITT-3
_Journal of Global Ethics_ 13 (3):260-263. 2017 ABSTRACTIn this introduction, I first present the general problematic of the special section. Our world faces several existential challenges war, and global injustice) and some would argue that the only adequate answer to these challenges is setting up a world government. I then introduce the contributions that comprise the scholarly body of the special section: Andrić on global democracy; Hahn on global political reconciliation; Pinheiro Walla on Kant and world government; Miklós & Tanyi on institutional consequentialism and world governance. Lastly, I briefly describe the practical context in which the idea of the special section has arisen and in which the present contributions have taken shape.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=TANITT-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F17449626.2018.1427716%3Fai%3D1jk%26mi%3D5vokgg%26af%3DR">direct link</a>)</div> Blum, Philipp : Aristotle’s Physics: The Metaphysics of Change, Matter, Motion and Timehttps://philarchive.org/rec/BLUAPT-2
<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BLUAPT-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fphilipp.philosophie.ch%2Fhandouts%2FAristotle17.pdf">direct link</a>)</div> Sher, Gila : Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Studyhttps://philarchive.org/rec/SHEWAY
In _Quo Vadis, Metaphysics?_ Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter Studium. forthcoming Abreu Zavaleta, Martín : Weak speech reportshttps://philarchive.org/rec/ZAVWSR
_Philosophical Studies_:1-28. forthcoming Indirect speech reports can be true even if they attribute to the speaker the saying of something weaker than what she in fact expressed, yet not all weakenings of what the speaker expressed yield true reports. For example, if Anna utters ‘Bob and Carla passed the exam’, we can accurately report her as having said that Carla passed the exam, but we can not accurately report her as having said that either it rains or it does not, or that either Carla passed the exam or pandas are cute. This paper offers an analysis of speech reports that distinguishes weakenings of what the speaker expressed that yield true reports from weakenings that do not. According to this analysis, speech reports are not only sensitive to the informational content of what the speaker expressed, but also to the possibilities a speaker raises in making an utterance. As I argue, this analysis has significant advantages over its most promising competitors, including views based on work by Barwise and Perry : 668–691, 1981), views appealing to recent work on the notion of content parthood by Fine :199–226, 2016) and Yablo, and Richard’s : 605–616, 1998) proposal appealing to structured propositions.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ZAVWSR&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-018-1119-2">direct link</a>)</div> Block, Ned : If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?https://philarchive.org/rec/BLOIPI-2
_Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B_. forthcoming The success of the Bayesian approach to perception suggests probabilistic perceptual representations. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why doesn't normal conscious perception reflect the full probability distributions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in MT/V5 that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all horizontal. This article argues that the best Bayesian approach to this problem does not require probabilistic representation. Boccardi, Emiliano : Turning the Tables on McTaggarthttps://philarchive.org/rec/BOCTTT
_Philosophy_:1-16. 2018 According to A-theories of time, the metaphysical ground of change and dynamicity is provided by a continuous shifting in which events are past, present and future (A-determinations). It is often claimed that these theories make better sense of our experience of dynamicity than their rival, the B-theories; according to the latter, dynamicity is grounded solely in the irreducible earlier-than relations (B-relations) which obtain between events or states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that the experience of time's dynamicity, on the contrary, cannot be accounted for solely in terms of representations of irreducible A-determinations, because any representation which is adequate to ground these experiences must itself involve representation of irreducible B-relations, while it needs not involve representation of A-determinations. Even if, as a matter of contingent fact, our experiences of dynamicity consisted of representations of successions of A-determinations, what would account for them being experiences of dynamicity would be solely the B-theoretic relations of succession, rather than the irrelevant A-theoretic nature of the relata. Bhogal, Harjit : Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Naturehttps://philarchive.org/rec/BHONEA
_Oxford Studies in Metaphysics_. forthcoming Humeanism about laws of nature — the view that the laws reduce to the Humean mosaic — is a popular view, but currently existing versions face powerful objections. The non-supervenience objection, the non-fundamentality objection and the explanatory circularity objection have all been thought to cause problems for the Humean. However, these objections share a guiding thought — they are all based on the idea that there is a certain kind of divergence between the practice of science and the metaphysical picture suggested by Humeanism. I suggest that the Humean can respond to these objections not by rejecting this divergence, but by arguing that is appropriate. In particular the Humean can, in the spirit of Loewer (2012), distinguish between scientific and metaphysical explanation — this is motivated by differing aims of explanation in science and metaphysics. And they can further leverage this into distinctions between scientific and metaphysical fundamentality and scientific and metaphysical possibility. We can use these distinctions to respond to the objections that the Humean faces. Sher, Gila : The Formal-Structural View Of Logical Consequencehttps://philarchive.org/rec/SHETFV-5
_Philosophical Review_ 110 (2):241-261. 2001 This paper offers a response to William’s Hanson’s criticism of Sher’s formal-structural conception of logical consequence and logical constants.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SHETFV-5&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fread.dukeupress.edu%2Fthe-philosophical-review%2Farticle%2F110%2F2%2F241-261%2F2400">direct link</a>)</div> Schmitz, Michael ; Seebaß, Gottfried & Gollwitzer, Peter M. (eds.): Acting Intentionally and its Limits: Individuals, Groups, Institutionshttps://philarchive.org/rec/SCHAIA-26
The book presents the first comprehensive survey of limits of the intentional control of action from an interdisciplinary perspective. It brings together leading scholars from philosophy, psychology, and the law to elucidate this theoretically and practically important topic from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary approaches. It provides reflections on conceptual foundations as well as a wealth of empirical data and will be a valuable resource for students and researchers alike. Among the authors: Clancy Blair, Todd S. Braver, Michael W. Cole, Anika Fäsche, Maayan Davidov, Peter Gollwitzer, Kai Robin Grzyb, Tobias Heikamp, Gabriele Oettingen, Rachel McKinnon, Nachschon Meiran, Hans Christian Röhl, Michael Schmitz, John R. Searle, Gottfried Seebaß, Gisela Trommsdorff, Felix Thiede, J. Lukas Thürmer, Frank Wieber.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SCHAIA-26&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fview%2Fproduct%2F182450">direct link</a>)</div> Philip, Pettit : Democracy before, in, and after Schumpeterhttps://philarchive.org/rec/PETDBI
_Critical Review_ 29:1-13. 2017 The classical model of democracy that Schumpeter criticizes is manufactured out of a variety of earlier ideas, not those of any one thinker or even one school of thought. His critique of the central ideals by which he defines the model--those of the common will and the common good--remains persuasive. People's preferences are too messy and too manipulable to allow us to think that mass democracy can promote those ideals, as he defines them. Should we endorse his purely electoral model of democracy then, and accept that people do not exercise any control over government? Not necessarily. We can expand democracy to include the constitutional and contestatory constraints that people impose on their rulers. We may hope that people can rely on such democratic controls to ensure that government operates by community standards.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PETDBI&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F08913811.2017.1378401">direct link</a>)</div> Pettit, Philip : Political realism meets civic republicanismhttps://philarchive.org/rec/PETPRM
_Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy_ 20 (3):331-347. 2017 The paper offers five desiderata on a realist normative theory of politics: that it should avoid moralism, deontologism, transcendentalism, utopianism, and vanguardism. These desiderata argue for a theory that begins from values rooted in a people’s experience; that avoids prescribing a collective deontological constraint; that makes the comparison of imperfect regimes possible; that takes feasibility and sustainability into account; and that makes room for the claims of democracy. The paper argues, in the course of exploring the desiderata, that a neo-republican philosophy of government does pretty well in satisfying them.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PETPRM&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F13698230.2017.1293912">direct link</a>)</div> Kingston, Ewan : Climate Change as a Three-Part Ethical Problem: A Response to Jamieson and Gardinerhttps://philarchive.org/rec/KINCCA-5
_Science and Engineering Ethics_ 20 (4):1129-1148. 2014 Dale Jamieson has claimed that conventional human-directed ethical concepts are an inadequate means for accurately understanding our duty to respond to climate change. Furthermore, he suggests that a responsibility to respect nature can instead provide the appropriate framework with which to understand such a duty. Stephen Gardiner has responded by claiming that climate change is a clear case of ethical responsibility, but the failure of institutions to respond to it creates a (not unprecedented) political problem. In assessing the debate between Gardiner and Jamieson, I develop an analysis which shows a three-part structure to the problem of climate change, in which the problem Gardiner identifies is only one of three sub-problems of climate change. This analysis highlights difficulties with Jamieson’s argument that the duty of respect for nature is necessary for a full understanding of climate ethics, and suggests how a human-directed approach based on the three-part analysis can avoid Jamieson’s charge of inadequacy<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KINCCA-5&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11948-013-9483-y">direct link</a>)</div> Iacona, Andrea : Propositionshttps://philarchive.org/rec/IACP
Pautz, Adam : The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousnesshttps://philarchive.org/rec/PAUTSA
_Philosophical Perspectives_. forthcoming The Significance Argument (SA) for the irreducibility of consciousness is based on a series of new puzzle-cases that I call multiple candidate cases. In these cases, there is a multiplicity of physical-functional properties or relations that are candidates to be identified with the sensible qualities and our consciousness of them, where those candidates are not significantly different. I will argue that these cases show that reductive materialists cannot accommodate the various ways in which consciousness is significant. I also will argue that a nonreductive theory of the conscious-of relation can
easily provide a very satisfying, unified explanation of the ways in which this relation is significant.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PAUTSA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fphpe.12104%3Faf%3DR">direct link</a>)</div> Lipski, Joachim : Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationalityhttps://philarchive.org/rec/LIPRRA-3
_Organon F_ 25 (1):53-73. 2018 According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LIPRRA-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fklemens.sav.sk%2Ffiusav%2Forganon%2F%3Fq%3Den%2Fradical-rationalization-accommodates-rampant-irrationality">direct link</a>)</div> Ho, Dien & Monton, Bradley : Anthropic reasoning does not conflict with observationhttps://philarchive.org/rec/HOARD
_Analysis_ 65 (1):42–45. 2005 We grant that anthropic reasoning yields the result that we should not expect to be in a small civilization. However, regardless of what civilization one finds oneself in, one can use anthropic reasoning to get the result that one should not expect to be in that sort of civilization. Hence, contra Ken Olum, anthropic reasoning does not conflict with observation.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HOARD&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.interscience.wiley.com%2Fcgi-bin%2Ffulltext%2F118641603%2FPDFSTART">direct link</a>)</div> Kierland, Brian & Monton, Bradley : Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefshttps://philarchive.org/rec/KIEMIF-2
_Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_ 70 (2):384-395. 2005 One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss and self-locating beliefs (where a self-locating belief of a temporal part of an individual is a belief about where or when that temporal part is located). We analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, the duplication version of the Sleeping Beauty problem, and various related problems.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KIEMIF-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fphilsci-archive.pitt.edu%2Farchive%2F00001224%2F01%2Fminimizing_inaccuracy6.pdf">direct link</a>)</div> Ferdman, Avigail : Why the intrinsic value of public goods mattershttps://philarchive.org/rec/FERWTI
_Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy_:1-16. 2017 Existing accounts of public-goods distribution rely on the existence of solidarity for providing non-universal public goods, such as the humanities or national parks. There are three fundamental problems with these accounts: they ignore instances of social fragmentation; they treat preferences for public goods as morally benign, and they assume that these preferences are the only relevant moral consideration. However, not all citizens unanimously require public goods such as the humanities or national parks. Public-goods distribution that is based only on citizens’ preferences, therefore, means that non-universal public good are at a constant risk of under-provision, and has negative implications for human flourishing. The paper, therefore, develops a complementary justification for the distribution of public goods, that decouples the distribution of public goods from ad hoc preferences, and grounds the distributive justification in the intrinsic value of these goods. There are three reasons to include intrinsic-value considerations in public-goods distribution: responding to crowding-out effects; promoting shared heritage and cross-fertilization. Finally, the intrinsic-value justification may indirectly promote solidarity. Thus, the intrinsic-value and the solidarity justifications need not be mutually exclusive, rather they can be mutually reinforcing.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FERWTI&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F13698230.2017.1398869">direct link</a>)</div> Kolb, David : Tiger Stripes and Embodied Systems: Hegel on Markets and Modelshttps://philarchive.org/rec/KOLTSA-3
In Michael J. Thompson (ed.), _Hegel's Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Politics_. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 286-300. 2018 From Hegel's philosophy of nature, this essay develops a critique of economic models and market society, based on Hegel's notion of what it takes for a formally described system to be embodied and real. Benton, Matthew A. : God and Interpersonal Knowledgehttps://philarchive.org/rec/BENGAI-2
_Res Philosophica_. forthcoming Recent epistemology offers an account of what it is to know other persons. Such views hold promise for illuminating several issues in philosophy of religion, and for advancing a distinctive approach to religious epistemology. This paper develops an account of interpersonal knowledge, and clarifies its relation to propositional and qualitative knowledge. I then turn to our knowledge of God and God's knowledge of us, and compare my account of interpersonal knowledge with important work by Eleonore Stump on "Franciscan" knowledge. I examine how interpersonal knowledge may figure in liturgical practice, in diffusing the problem of divine hiddenness, and in motivating a novel understanding of divine love. I also explore the possibility of epistemic injustice arising from dismissal or neglect of our religious testimony to one another, or of divine testimony to humanity, focusing specifically on the import of interpersonal knowledge. Mallozzi, Antonella : Putting Modal Metaphysics Firsthttps://philarchive.org/rec/MALPMM
_Synthese_. forthcoming I propose that we approach the epistemology of modality by putting modal metaphysics first and, specifically, by investigating the metaphysics of essence. Following a prominent Neo-Aristotelian view, I hold that metaphysical necessity depends on the nature of things, namely their essences. I further clarify that essences are core properties having distinctive superexplanatory powers. In the case of natural kinds, which is my focus in the paper, superexplanatoriness is due to the fact that the essence of a kind is what causes all the many properties and behaviors that are typically shared by all the instances of the kind. Accordingly, we know what is necessarily true of kinds by knowing what is essential to them in the sense of actually playing such causal-explanatory roles. Modal reasoning aimed at discovering metaphysical necessity thus proceeds via essentialist deduction: we move from essentialist truths to reach necessary truths. Fernandez, Anthony Vincent : Phenomenology, Mental Illness, and the Intersubjective Constitution of the Lifeworldhttps://philarchive.org/rec/FERPMI
In S. West Gurley & Geoffrey Pfeifer (eds.), _Phenomenology and the Political_. Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 199-214. 2016 <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FERPMI&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rowmaninternational.com%2Fbook%2Fphenomenology_and_the_political%2F3-156-cc03fe2d-a182-43e7-a431-e8aae0abe796">direct link</a>)</div> Chappell, Timothy : Persons in time: metaphysics and ethicshttps://philarchive.org/rec/CHAPIT
[About the book] Ethics seeks answers to questions about the moral status of human actions and human lives. Actions and lives are temporal things. Thus, one would think that answers to ethical questions should take some account of their temporal features. And yet, while a number of authors have drawn attention to the relation between time and ethics, there has never been a systematic study of the impact of temporal considerations on ethical issues. There is a pressing need for an investigation into how time and ethics impact on each other. This book leads the way in addressing that need. The essays in this collection raise and investigate some of the key issues that arise at the intersection between these two areas of philosophy. Anyone with an interest in ethics,, will have a reason to read this book, as will anyone with an interest in the metaphysics of time, and how it connects with issues in other areas of philosophy<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CHAPIT&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Foro.open.ac.uk%2F22183%2F">direct link</a>)</div> Hakkarainen, Jani : Hume on the Unity of Determinations of Extensionhttps://philarchive.org/rec/HAKHOT
_Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy_. forthcoming We do not fully understand Hume’s account of space if we do not understand his view of determinations of extension, which is too much ignored a topic. In this paper, I argue for an interpretation that determinations of extension are unities in Hume’s view: single beings in addition to their components. This realist reading is reasonable on both textual and philosophical grounds. There is strong textual evidence for it and no textual reason to reject it. Realism makes perfect sense of the metaphysics of determinations of extension along Humean lines and Hume’s view of spatial relations. Read, Stephen : Anti-Exceptionalism about Logichttps://philarchive.org/rec/REAAAL-3
_Australasian Journal of Logic_. forthcoming Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the idea goes back at least to Lakatos, who wanted to adapt Popper's falsificationism and extend it not only to mathematics but to logic as well. But one needs to be careful here to distinguish the empirical from the a posteriori. Lakatos coined the term ‘quasi-empirical' for the counterinstances to putative mathematical and logical theses. Mathematics and logic may both be a posteriori, but it does not follow that they are empirical. Indeed, as Williamson has demonstrated, what counts as empirical knowledge, and the role of experience in acquiring knowledge, are both unclear. Moreover, knowledge, even of necessary truths, is fallible. Nonetheless, logical consequence holds in virtue of the meaning of the logical terms, just as consequence in general holds in virtue of the meanings of the concepts involved; and so logic is both analytic and necessary. In this respect, it is exceptional. But its methodology and its epistemology are the same as those of mathematics and science in being fallibilist, and counterexamples to seemingly analytic truths are as likely as those in any scientific endeavour. What is needed is a new account of the evidential basis of knowledge, one which is, perhaps surprisingly, found in Aristotle. Golob, Sacha : Decadence & Aestheticshttps://philarchive.org/rec/GOLDA-2
In Desmarais & Weir (eds.), _Decadence_. Cambridge University Press. forthcoming he relationship between decadence and aesthetics is an intimate and complex one. Both the stock figure of the aesthete and the aestheticism of ‘art for art’s sake’ are classic decadent tropes with obvious sources in figures such as Théophile Gautier, Walter Pater, Joris-Karl Huysmans. Yet the links between aesthetics and decadence are more conflicted than might first appear: historically, aesthetics has served both as a site for the theorisation of decadence and as the basis of an attempt to stem it. The purpose of this chapter is to examine these intricate ties.
Pradeu, Thomas : What is an organism? An Immunological Answerhttps://philarchive.org/rec/PRAWIA
_History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences_ 32. 2010 The question ‘What is an organism?’, formerly considered as essential in biology, has now been increasingly replaced by a larger question, ‘What is a biological individual?’. On the grounds that i) individuation is theory-dependent, and ii) physiology does not offer a theory, biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that it is the theory of evolution by natural selection which tells us what counts as a biological individual. Here I show that one physiological field, immunology, offers a theory, which makes possible a physiological theory of individuation. I give a new answer to the question ‘What is an organism?’, and try to link together the evolutionary and immunological individuations.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PRAWIA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fphilsci-archive.pitt.edu%2Farchive%2F00003923%2F01%2FPradeu_Organism.pdf">direct link</a>)</div> Litch, Mary M. : Philosophy Through Filmhttps://philarchive.org/rec/LITPTF
Do humans have free Will? What distinguishes morally right from morally wrong action? Does God exist? Does life have meaning? What is the ultimate nature of reality? What are the limits of human knowledge? Philosophy through Film offers a stimulating new way to explore the basic questions of philosophy. Each chapter uses a popular film to examine one such topic- from free will and skepticism to personal identity and artificial intelligence- in an approachable yet philosophically rigorous manner. A wide range of films is employed all of which are readily available through major video rental chains. This unique and engaging introduction provides an exciting new way to learn about philosophy, and connects complicated philosophical questions to the familiar settings of popular culture. Dohrn, Daniel : Presuppositional Anaphora Is The Sobel Truthhttps://philarchive.org/rec/DOHPAI
In Salvatore Pistoia-Reda & Filippo Domaneschi (eds.), _Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Approaches on Implicatures and Presuppositions_. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 199-238. 2017 Sobel sequences have had a huge impact on the discussion of counterfactuals. They can be composed of conditionals and mere descriptions. What is especially puzzling about them is that they are often felicitously uttered when their reversal is not. Up to now, there is no unified explanation. I examine two strategies. We might begin with conditionals and proceed to descriptions. Or we might begin with descriptions and proceed to conditionals. I argue for the latter variant and outline a universal theory of Sobel sequences in terms of presuppositional anaphora. One relevant result is that the phenomenon neither counts against nor in favour of the simplified standard account of counterfactuals à la Stalnaker-Lewis. Schmitz, Michael : Joint attention and understanding othershttps://philarchive.org/rec/SCHJAA-2
_Synthesis Philosophica_ 58:235-251. 2015 In this paper I criticize theory-biased and overly individualist approaches to understanding others and introduce the PAIR account of joint attention as a pragmatic, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that this relation obtains in virtue of intentional contents in the minds of the co-attenders, and – against the received understanding of intentional states as propositional attitudes – that we should recognize what I call “subject mode” and “position mode” intentional content. Based on findings from developmental psychology, I propose that subject mode content represents the co-attenders as co-subjects, who are like them and who are at least disposed to act jointly with them. I conclude by arguing that in joint attention we experience and understand affective, actional and perceptual relations at a non-conceptual level prior to the differentiation of mind and body. Rachels, James (ed.): Ethical Theoryhttps://philarchive.org/rec/RACET
Rachels's two-volume Ethical Theory provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary moral philosophy, reprinting classic and contemporary articles, including many that are not otherwise readily available. Each volume contains a clearly written, substantial introduction that guides the beginner through the intricacies of the subject. Herr, Ranjoo : Confucian Mothering: The Origin of Tiger Mothering?https://philarchive.org/rec/HERCMT
In Mathew Foust & Sor-Hoon Tan (eds.), _Feminist Encounters with Confucius_. Boston, USA: Brill. pp. 40-68. 2016 In recent years, the notion of “tiger mother” has been popularized since Amy Chua’s publication of her memoir, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother (2011). This notion is allegedly representative of “Chinese” mothering that produces “stereotypically successful kids” (ibid., p.3). No wonder, the characteristics of the tiger mother revolve around strict disciplining and pressuring of children to excel academically based on her assumption that children “owe everything” to her and that she knows “what is best for [the] children” (ibid., p.53). Chinese mothering is based roughly on Confucian mothering—a traditional mothering style originating from Confucian East Asia. Given the intense debate that has been generated by this popular book, it seems timely to theorize about what Confucian mothering involves, which has been largely neglected by Confucians themselves or contemporary feminists. This chapter attempts to start a conversation on this very important topic and explores the idea of Confucian mothering as follows: In sections II and III, I examine exemplary mothers in Confucian East Asia of the past in order to derive a preliminary idea of Confucian mothering. In order to consider whether Confucian mothering is conducive to promoting the Confucian ideal, I first identify the Confucian ideal in section IV by providing a plausible conception of Confucianism as a universal philosophical system. In section V, I elaborate on how Confucian mothering in its goal and style has been conducive to enabling male children to realize the Confucian ideal. Yet these historical instances of Confucian mothering cannot be incorporated into the universal Confucian philosophical system because Confucian mothers themselves were prevented from realizing the Confucian ideal. I therefore argue in section VI for a reconceptualization of Confucian mothering consistent with Confucianism as a universal philosophical system. Reconceptualized in this way, I show in section VII the ways in which Confucian mothering is distinct from tiger mothering and argue that tiger mothering is morally unjustifiable. Finally, I conclude by examining why Confucian mothering is relevant even for contemporary American parents in the 21st century. Herr, Ranjoo S. : Confucian Family-State and Women: A Proposal for Confucian Feminismhttps://philarchive.org/rec/HERCFA-2
In Ashley Butnor & Jen McWeeny (eds.), _Liberating Traditions: Essays in Feminist Comparative Philosophy_. New York, USA: Columbia University Press. pp. 261–282. 2014 I shall argue that, with a proper realignment of core Confucian values, an explicitly feminist reading of Confucianism—a conception of Confucian feminism—could be constructed to promote the feminist goal of gender equality in contemporary Confucian societies. My paper proceeds in the following order: first, I shall identify two aspects of Confucianism implicated in the Confucian subjugation of women: li and family. Given the centrality of both li and family in Confucianism, it may seem that Confucianism is inherently antagonistic to the feminist goal of gender equality. In order to determine whether this is the case, I shall reconstruct the valuational system of Confucianism and examine the proper locations of li and family within it. I shall argue that Confucian ethics promotes women’s self-cultivation on a par with men’s and that Confucian emphases on li and family do not necessitate the subjugation of women. However, some may worry that the importance of family in Confucianism may require the undivided attention of at least one parent, which in reality would be mostly the mother. To alleviate this worry, I shall argue that a democratic Confucian welfare state, entailed by the Confucian thought system, ought to pick up the responsibility of providing comprehensive assistance to families so that families can thrive in the Confucian polity. Herr, Ranjoo Seodu : Can Transnational Feminist Solidarity Accommodate Nationalism? Reflections from the Case Study of Korean “Comfort Women”https://philarchive.org/rec/HERCTF
_Hypatia_ 31 (1):41-57. 2016 This article aims to refute the “incompatibility thesis” that nationalism is incompatible with transnational feminist solidarity, as it fosters exclusionary practices, xenophobia, and racism among feminists with conflicting nationalist aspirations. I examine the plausibility of the incompatibility thesis by focusing on the controversy regarding just reparation for Second World War “comfort women,” which is still unresolved. The Korean Council at the center of this controversy, which advocates for the rights of Korean former comfort women, has been criticized for its strident nationalism and held responsible for the stalemate. Consequently, the case of comfort women has been thought to exemplify the incompatibility thesis. I argue against this common feminist perception in three ways: first, those who subscribe to the incompatibility thesis have misinterpreted facts surrounding the issue; second, the Korean Council's nationalism is a version of “polycentric nationalism,” which avoids the problems of essentialist nationalism at the center of feminist concerns; and, third, transnational feminist solidarity is predicated on the idea of oppressed/marginalized women's epistemic privilege and enjoins that feminists respect oppressed/marginalized women's epistemic privilege. To the extent that oppressed/marginalized women's voices are expressed in nationalist terms, I argue that feminists committed to transnational feminist solidarity must accommodate their nationalism<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HERCTF&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fresolve%2Fdoi%3FDOI%3D10.1111%252Fhypa.12213">direct link</a>)</div> Vermeulen, Robert : Football stadium “wave” as analogy for brain functionhttps://philarchive.org/rec/VERFSW
The rise and fall of spectators performing “the wave” in a football stadium offers an analogy for how brain waves ripple across the cortex and lower brain. In both, the underlying actors (humans, neurons) serve multiple roles.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=VERFSW&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Frobotgenes.com%2F">direct link</a>)</div> Fredericks, Rachel : Courage as an Environmental Virtuehttps://philarchive.org/rec/FRECAA
_Environmental Ethics_ 36 (3):339-355. 2014 We should give courage a more significant place in our understanding of how familiar virtues can and should be reshaped to capture what it is to be virtuous relative to the environment. Matthew Pianalto’s account of moral courage helps explain what a specifically environmental form of moral courage would look like. There are three benefits to be gained by recognizing courage as an environmental virtue: it helps us to recognize the high stakes nature of much environmental activism and to act accordingly; it can make environmental activism more appealing to a broader audience by helping us dismantle stereotypes associated with environmentalism, including sexist and homophobic ones; and it aides in the de-militarization of the concept of courage<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FRECAA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pdcnet.org%2Foom%2Fservice%3Furl_ver%3DZ39.88-2004%26rft_val_fmt%3D%26rft.imuse_id%3Denviroethics_2014_0036_0003_0339_0355%26svc_id%3Dinfo%3Awww.pdcnet.org%2Fcollection">direct link</a>)</div> Komasinski, Andrew James : Faith, Recognition, and Community: Faith, Recognition, and Community Abraham and “Faith-In” in Hegel and Kierkegaardhttps://philarchive.org/rec/KOMFRA
_American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly_. forthcoming This article looks at “faith-in” and what Jonathan Kvanvig calls the “belittler objection” by comparing Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s interpretations of Abram (later known as Abraham). I first argue that Hegel’s treatment of Abram in Spirit of Christianity and its Fate is an objection to faith-in. Building on this with additional Hegelian texts, I argue that Hegel’s objection employs his social command account of morality. I then turn to Johannes de Silentio’s treatments of Abraham in Fear and Trembling and Søren Kierkegaard’s Works of Love to argue that Kierkegaard defends faith-in as part of a moderate divine command account of moral knowledge. Finally, this article suggests that the belittler objection is ultimately an objection to faith-in as a divine command source of moral knowledge or obligation rather than social command.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KOMFRA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pdcnet.org%2Facpq%2Fcontent%2Facpq_2018_0999_5_10_153">direct link</a>)</div> Berges, Sandrine : Why the capability approach is justifiedhttps://philarchive.org/rec/BERWTC
_Journal of Applied Philosophy_ 24 (1):16–25. 2007 Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach has in the past twenty years become an increasingly popular and influential approach to issues in global justice. Its main tenet is that when assessing quality of life or asking what kind of policies will be more conducive to human development, we should look not to resources or preference satisfaction, but to what people are able to be and to do. This should then be measured against a more or less narrow conception of what any human being should be able to be and do, i.e. which functions are essentially human. To have a capability is to be able to function in that way. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that despite its many attractions, the capability approach did not present a sufficiently strong challenge to Rawlsian resourcism. In this paper, I address Pogge's criticisms of the capability approach, and I argue that from the point of view of Nussbaum's Aristotelian version of the approach, his objections are not successful.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BERWTC&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.interscience.wiley.com%2Fcgi-bin%2Ffulltext%2F118520516%2FPDFSTART">direct link</a>)</div> Brzović, Zdenka : Natural Kindshttps://philarchive.org/rec/BRZNK
_Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. 2018 A large part of our exploration of the world consists in categorizing or classifying the objects and processes we encounter, both in scientific and everyday contexts. There are various, perhaps innumerable, ways to sort objects into different kinds or categories, but it is commonly assumed that, among the countless possible types of classifications, one group is privileged. Philosophy refers to such categories as natural kinds. Standard examples of such kinds include fundamental physical particles, chemical elements, and biological species. The term natural does not imply that natural kinds ought to categorize only naturally occurring stuff or objects. Candidates for natural kinds can include man-made substances, such as synthetic elements, that can be created in a laboratory. The naturalness in question is not the naturalness of the entities being classified, but that of the groupings themselves. Groupings that are artificial or arbitrary are not natural; they are invented or imposed on nature. Natural kinds, on the other hand, are not invented, and many assume that scientific investigations should discover them.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BRZNK&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iep.utm.edu%2Fnat-kind%2F">direct link</a>)</div> Unnsteinsson, Elmar : Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peethttps://philarchive.org/rec/UNNRIA
_Australasian Journal of Philosophy_:1-6. 2018 Buchanan (2014) argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet (2016) develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan’s own proposal. I argue that both theorists fail to notice a significant distinction between the kinds of cases at issue. Those appearing to count against direct reference theory must be described such that speakers have false beliefs about the identity of the object to which they intend to refer, beliefs that appear relevant to the determination of what constitutes communicative success. This suggests, further, that cases of this sort do not provide a basis for robust generalizations about singular reference.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=UNNRIA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Felmargeir.files.wordpress.com%2F2018%2F02%2Freferential-intentions-a-response-to-buchanan-and-peet.pdf">direct link</a>)</div> Weber, Marcel : Experiment in Biology (2018 update)https://philarchive.org/rec/WEBEIB-3
_Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. 2018 <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=WEBEIB-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fbiology-experiment%2F">direct link</a>)</div> Bokulich, Alisa : Using Models to Correct Data: Paleodiversity and the Fossil Recordhttps://philarchive.org/rec/BOKUMT-2
_Synthese_. forthcoming Despite an enormous philosophical literature on models in science, surprisingly little has been written about data models and how they are constructed. In this paper, I examine the case of how paleodiversity data models are constructed from the fossil data. In particular, I show how paleontologists are using various model-based techniques to correct the data. Drawing on this research, I argue for the following related theses: First, the 'purity' of a data model is not a measure of its epistemic reliability. Instead it is the fidelity of the data that matters. Second, the fidelity of a data model in capturing the signal of interest is a matter of degree. Third, the fidelity of a data model can be improved 'vicariously', such as through the use of post hoc model-based correction techniques. And, fourth, data models, like theoretical models, should be assessed as adequate (or inadequate) for particular purposes. Kant, Immanuel : On Educationhttps://philarchive.org/rec/KANOE
"One of the greatest problems of education," Kant observes, "is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child's capability of exercising his free will." The famous philosopher explores potential solutions to this dilemma, stressing the necessity of treating children as children and not as miniature adults. Rather than a systematic study of theories, this succinct treatise encompasses Kant's thoughts on the subject of education. His positive outlook includes a conviction that human nature can be continually improved. To achieve this end, he advocates raising the science of education to academic status-an innovative notion for the 18th century, and a landmark in modern Western education theory. Annette Churton translation. Hughes, Matthew A. : The Power of Perception: Authentic Inauthenticity of Christian Pilgrimage Sites in the Galileehttps://philarchive.org/rec/HUGTPO-24
_Semiotics_:195-203. 2015 <div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HUGTPO-24&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pdcnet.org%2Fcollection%2Fshow%3Fid%3Dcpsem_2015_0195_0203%26file_type%3Dpdf">direct link</a>)</div> Saatsi, Juha : Realism and Explanatory Perspectivismhttps://philarchive.org/rec/SAARAE
In Michela Massimi & C. D. McCoy (eds.), _Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects_. New York: Routledge. forthcoming This chapter defends a (minimal) realist conception of progress in scientific understanding in the face of the ubiquitous plurality of perspectives in science. The argument turns on the counterfactual-dependence framework of explanation and understanding, which is illustrated and evidenced with reference to different explanations of the rainbow. Barnett, Samuel A. : What decision theory provides the best procedure for identifying the best action available to a given artificially intelligent system?https://philarchive.org/rec/BARWDT-3
Decision theory has had a long-standing history in the behavioural and social sciences as a tool for constructing good approximations of human behaviour. Yet as artificially intelligent systems (AIs) grow in intellectual capacity and eventually outpace humans, decision theory becomes evermore important as a model of AI behaviour. What sort of decision procedure might an AI employ? In this work, I propose that policy-based causal decision theory (PCDT), which places a primacy on the decision-relevance of predictors and simulations of agent behaviour, may be such a procedure. I compare this account to the recently-developed functional decision theory (FDT), which is motivated by similar concerns. I also address potentially counterintuitive features of PCDT, such as its refusal to condition on observations made at certain times. Khoury, Andrew C. & Matheson, Benjamin : Is Blameworthiness Forever?https://philarchive.org/rec/KHOIBF-2
_Journal of the American Philosophical Association_. forthcoming Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections. Dellsén, Finnur : Scientific Progress: Four Accountshttps://philarchive.org/rec/DELSPF
_Philosophy Compass_. forthcoming Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories ‘get closer to the truth’, i.e. increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is that progress consists in increasing theories’ effectiveness for solving scientific problems. A third answer is that progress occurs when the stock of scientific knowledge accumulates. A fourth and final answer is that scientific progress consists in increasing scientific understanding, i.e. the capacity to correctly explain and reliably predict relevant phenomena. This paper compares and contrasts these four accounts of scientific progress, considers some of the most prominent arguments for and against each account, and briefly explores connections to different forms of scientific realism. Pettit, Philip : Making Up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self‐Knowledge, Self‐Knowability and Personhoodhttps://philarchive.org/rec/PETMUY
_European Journal of Philosophy_ 24 (1):3-26. 2016 If language is to serve the basic purpose of communicating our attitudes, we must be constructed so as to form beliefs in those propositions that we truthfully assert on the basis of careful assent. Thus, other things being equal, I can rely on believing those things to which I give my careful assent. And so my ability to assent or dissent amounts to an ability to make up my mind about what I believe. This capacity, in tandem with a similar capacity in respect of other attitudes, supports three important lessons. It means that I can know what I believe by seeing what commands my assent, that I can put aside the possibility of error in committing myself to holding such a belief, and that I can therefore perform as a person: I can organize my mind around commitments to which others are invited to hold me.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=PETMUY&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fresolve%2Fdoi%3FDOI%3D10.1111%252Fejop.12137">direct link</a>)</div> Cowen, Nick : Introduction: Symposium on Robust Political Economyhttps://philarchive.org/rec/COWISO-2
_Critical Review_ 28 (3-4):420-439. 2016 Mark Pennington’s Robust Political Economy is a systematic exposition of a framework for analyzing institutional performance. The Robust Political Economy framework evaluates institutions according to their ability to solve knowledge and incentive problems. On grounds of robustness, Pennington combines insights from Austrian market-process theory and public-choice theory to defend classical liberalism from several compelling critiques. These include theories of market failure in economics; communitarian, deliberative-democratic, and liberal-egalitarian theories of justice; and concerns with social capital, domestic and international poverty, and ecology.
<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=COWISO-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1080%2F08913811.2016.1264158">direct link</a>)</div> Abell, C. : McIntosh's Unrealistic Picture of Peacocke and Hopkins on Realistic Pictureshttps://philarchive.org/rec/CABMUP
_British Journal of Aesthetics_ 45 (1):64-68. 2005 I defend Christopher Peacocke's and Robert Hopkins's experienced resemblance accounts of depiction against criticisms put forward by Gavin McIntosh in a recent article in this journal. I argue that, while there may be reasons for rejecting Peacocke's and Hopkins's accounts, McIntosh fails to provide any<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CABMUP&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fbjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org%2Fcontent%2F45%2F1%2F64.short">direct link</a>)</div> Hamed, Mohammed A. : The Effectiveness of Using an Intelligent Tutoring System in Water Knowledge and Awarenesshttps://philarchive.org/rec/HAMTEO-29
Due to the tremendous progress in technology and the methods used in its application to facilitate and refine human's life, Intelligent Tutoring System was created to contribute in this era. In this study, the Intelligent Tutoring System was adopted as a platform in linking the complex Technological fields for obtaining information smoothly, and highlighting the importance of water issues and in the Gaza strip. In the light of the absence and inability of the formal education system to raise awareness of the water crisis and its consequences on the daily life of the Gazans, the current Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) has been utilized to disseminate knowledge and enhance awareness of water problems. The ITS aims to embrace a new water conservation practices and ensure the sustainability of fresh water.
Basically the software of the tutoring system is used to create a program which could be easily used by the public population and specialists in the water field. The resulting program was fed with plenty of information about the current local water status and its related problems which are considerably useful for anyone interested to raise his/her level of knowledge and awareness about the local water status in addition to the researchers by reducing their dependency on human sources.
The ITS system was presented to two groups of people: The first one consists of specialized water experts and the other consists of master student enrolled in Institute of Water and Environment in Al-Azhar University in Gaza who are interested in water problems. Both groups were requested to use the final version of the system and give their feedback by filling a questionnaire, and then the averages of the answered questions were measured for each group. It was found that the overall impressions of the users were positive.
Ostas, Daniel T. : The Law and Ethics of K Streethttps://philarchive.org/rec/OSTTLA-3
_Business Ethics Quarterly_ 17 (1):33-63. 2007 This article explores the law and ethics of lobbying. The legal discussion examines disclosure regulations, employment restrictions,bribery laws, and anti-fraud provisions as each applies to the lobbying context. The analysis demonstrates that given the social value placed on the First Amendment, federal law generally affords lobbyists wide latitude in determining who, what, when, where, and how to lobby.The article then turns to ethics. Lobbying involves deliberate attempts to effect changes in the law. An argument is advanced that because law implicates the use of force and because law ideally reflects the values of a democratic society, seeking to slant the law to serve a client’s narrow interests cannot provide an adequate ethical end for a lobbyist. On the contrary, a lobbyist has an affirmative moral duty to seek reasonably balanced and just laws. The article examines, refines, and defends this proposition in a number of settings<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=OSTTLA-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pdcnet.org%2Fcollection%2Fshow%3Fid%3Dbeq_2007_0017_0001_0033_0063%26file_type%3Dpdf">direct link</a>)</div> Abell, Catharine : Against Depictive Conventionalismhttps://philarchive.org/rec/ABEADC
_American Philosophical Quarterly_ 42 (3):185 - 197. 2005 In this paper, I discuss the influential view that depiction, like language, depends on arbitrary conventions. I argue that this view, however it is elaborated, is false. Any adequate account of depiction must be consistent with the distinctive features of depiction. One such feature is depictive generativity. I argue that, to be consistent with depictive generativity, conventionalism must hold that depiction depends on conventions for the depiction of basic properties of a picture’s object. I then argue that two considerations jointly preclude depiction from being governed by such conventions. Firstly, conventions must be salient to those who employ them. Secondly, those parts of pictures that depict basic properties of objects are not salient to the makers and interpreters of pictures.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ABEADC&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2F20010200">direct link</a>)</div> Hedden, Brian : Hindsight Bias is not a Biashttps://philarchive.org/rec/HEDHBI
_Analysis_. forthcoming Humans typically display hindsight bias. They are more confident that the evidence available beforehand made some outcome probable when they know the outcome occurred than when they don’t. There is broad consensus that hindsight bias is irrational, but this consensus is wrong. Hindsight bias is generally rationally permissible and sometimes rationally required. The fact that a given outcome occurred provides both evidence about what the total evidence available ex ante was, and also evidence about what that evidence supports. Even if you in fact evaluate the ex ante evidence correctly, you should not be certain of this. Then, learning the outcome provides evidence that if you erred, you are more likely to have erred low rather than high in estimating the degree to which the ex ante evidence supported the hypothesis that that outcome would occur.