The U.S. Senate will soon debate the Export
Administration Act (S. 149). The purpose of the EAA is to establish
specific guidelines for the export of dual-use technology, items
with both military and civilian applications. The fact that the
international market for such items is highly lucrative and
competitive increases the temptation for the U.S. to expedite the
export licensing process, sacrificing national security safeguards
to increase profit margins.

The United States should not overlook the dangers
posed by rogue or potentially hostile nations struggling to obtain
American technology to improve their development of weapons of mass
destruction. Congress must ensure that sensitive technology is not
carelessly exported to countries that could use it against the
United States or its forward-deployed forces. Congress should
seriously consider several amendments to the EAA to strengthen the
checks and balances and restore the primacy of national security
while empowering the President to make timely decisions that
support America's trade interests.

The EAA's basic purpose--to protect the most
sensitive American technology with military application from the
hands to countries that would use it against the United States, its
friends, or its allies--is sound. However the speed with which
technology has advanced and spread throughout the world requires
that it be brought in line with the realities of today's high
technology and information technology base. Although American
companies should not be unduly impeded from competing in the
international marketplace by regulations that try to protect
technology that is generally available, the United States possesses
unique manufacturing processes and technologies that are not
available anywhere else and that therefore require protection.
What, then, should be done?

Establish a blue ribbon
commission for national securityCongress should establish a commission specifically to
examine the issues surrounding existing export control processes
and their impact on national security. Its conclusions and
recommendations should be reported to Congress to improve future
legislation.

Consult with national
security expertsThe EEA requires the Secretary of Commerce to consult with
labor, trade, and business groups when considering issues regarding
export control policy, foreign availability, and the mass market of
controlled items. Congress should also require the Secretary of
Commerce to consult with national security and non-proliferation
experts to ensure that security concerns are given equal
weight.

Strengthen commodity
classification requirementsThe Department of Commerce maintains a Control List of
sensitive items subject to licensing or authorization requirements.
In accordance with the 1999 Cox Committee recommendations, the
addition of an item to the Control List should require the
unanimous approval of the Departments of Commerce, State, and
Defense. Any disagreements on commodity classification should be
forwarded up the chain of command. Under the currently proposed
interagency dispute resolution process, strenuous objections by
individual departments are superseded by a majority vote.

Require consultation with
necessary departments Any regulations necessary to carry
out Title II or Title III of the EAA, which govern national
security and foreign policy export controls, should be carried out
by the Department of Commerce in consultation with the Departments
of State, Defense, and Energy. The EAA currently does not require
the Secretary of Commerce to submit these regulations to relevant
agencies for review.

License products that
contain sensitive U.S. componentsThe U.S. should require licenses for the export or
re-export of products made abroad that contain U.S.-origin
controlled items. S. 149 does not require licenses on exports of
such items. Furthermore, items re-exported to terrorist states
require licenses only if the value of the U.S.-made component
exceeds 10 percent of the final product--a loophole that can easily
be exploited.

Deny licenses to countries that refuse
post-shipment verification. The Secretary of Commerce should have
the authority to deny licenses to countries that do not allow
post-shipment verification of controlled items. As the United
States has learned from the inadvertent sharing of sensitive
technology between U.S. companies and China, the transfer of
technology can occur after the initial sale.

Provide realistic license
review periodsAs the 1999 Cox Committee report suggests, the existing
30-day limit for departmental license reviews may be inadequate for
complex requests that may have a lasting national security impact.
S. 149 allows for extensions only on a limited basis. Congress
should extend the review period or relax requirements for
extensions.

Give the President export
control authorityAs a final safeguard, the President should have the
authority to place controls on any item for national security
reasons. This includes "incorporated" parts and components as well
as "after-market" service and replacement parts. The President
should also be able to add items to the National Security Control
List and to delegate his authority.

Notify Congress about
export control violations Under S. 149, countries are
divided into tiers depending on the level of risk that a country
will misuse or divert items on the National Security Control List.
Congress should be notified whenever the Department of Commerce
changes the country tiers or when violations of the EAA occur.

Report to Congress all
exports to key proliferators In his semi-annual report to
Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence should include a
list of all items transferred to countries that have been
identified as recipients or sources of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile technologies. A cumulative effects analysis
of the transfers should also be presented to Congress annually.

ConclusionIn crafting the Export Administration Act, Congress has
the responsibility of weighing America's commercial interests
against its national security concerns. It is easy to assume the
importance of the former over the latter, given the preponderance
of international trade and the absence of a clear security
threat.

Although export controls should not be tools to
inhibit trade, America cannot risk the tragedy of U.S.-made
products being used against American soldiers. If expediting the
export licensing process entails weakening the necessary safeguards
that preserve national security in the long term, it is not worth
the risk. Congress should improve the export control regime,
starting with the Export Administration Act, to restore the primacy
of national security by establishing the necessary checks and
balances.