Law Enforcement Response Improves, Increases in Violence Related
to Poor Law Enforcement Response

"Local police will not arrest picketers -- [it]
is up to clinic staff/clients/escorts. [The] excuse given by local
police is that 'we' are the victims and so we must do [a] citizen's
arrest!"

--Clinic Director, 1994 Clinic Violence Survey

Our 1994 survey examined local, state, and federal law enforcement
response to clinic violence during the first seven months of 1994.
The survey also asked clinics to compare violence during this period
in 1994 with violence over the same period in 1993. A final set
of questions examined enforcement of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act during its first five months in force.

In May 1994, President Clinton signed the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act into law. The Act, which provides federal criminal
and civil penalties for acts of force, the threat of force, and
acts of physical obstruction targeted at those providing or seeking
to obtain abortion services, was passed by overwhelming majorities
in both the House and the Senate in November of 1993.

In addition to the FACE victory, abortion rights advocates prevailed
in two major U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1994. In NOW v.
Schiedler, the Court ruled in January that anti-abortion terrorists
could be sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). In Madsen v. Women's Health Center the Court
upheld the constitutionality of "buffer zone" injunctions
created by a state court to protect clinics.

These legislative and litigation victories, along with the concerted
efforts of abortion rights advocates urging prosecution of anti-abortion
extremists, may have improved law enforcement response to clinic
violence. Overall the majority of clinics described the response
of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials to clinic
violence during the first seven months of 1994 as "good"
or "excellent." However, clinics that experienced moderate
to high levels of violence were much more likely to characterize
local, state, and federal law enforcement's response to complaints
and incidents of violence as "poor. "

When asked to characterize the response of law enforcement agencies
during the first seven months of 1994, over one-third (35.4%) of
the clinics ranked local law enforcement response as good,"
with 30.3% reporting an "excellent" response and 11.5%
experiencing a "poor" response; 22.9% of clinics were
unable to characterize local law enforcement response.

Clinics had less contact with state and federal law enforcement
officials, but the actions of these authorities still elicited a
more positive than negative response. Of the clinics surveyed, 7.3%
reported an "excellent" response from state law enforcement
and 15.9% labeled state law enforcement response as "good;"
8.9% of clinics said state response was "poor." Two-thirds
(67.8%) of clinics could not describe state law enforcement response
and reported "don't know" on the survey. Slightly under
two-thirds of clinics (60.2%) also could not ratefederal law
enforcement response, while 10.5% said federal law enforcement response
was excellent," 21.3% said federal response was "good,"
and 8% reported a "poor" response.

The majority of clinics reported that local, state, and federal
law enforcement response had either improved or remained the same
since 1993, with the greatest increases in responsiveness coming
from local and federal officials. Close to half of -clinics
(46.8%) reported that local law enforcement response remained
the same in 1994, with 30.3% reporting improved response and 2.9%
saying that response had declined. One-quarter (25.5%) of clinics
said federal law enforcement response had remained the same,
while 22.9% said federal response had improved and 1.3% reported
the response had declined. Over one-quarter of clinics recorded
that state law enforcement response had remained the same,
with 14.6% reporting an improvement and 2.5% a decline in state
response.

Law enforcement response improved since the July murders, but
most clinics continued to rely on local rather than federal law
enforcement involvement. Fifty eight percent of clinics reported
increased sensitivity on the part of local law enforcement, with
4.1% experiencing decreased sensitivity, 24.8% no interaction, and
13.1% not answering the question. While fewer clinics interacted
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 34.7% reported increased
sensitivity on the part of the FBI, 1.3% decreased sensitivity,
and 53.2% reported no FBI interaction in the aftermath of the July
murders. A similar pattern prevailed in regards to Federal Marshals.
Of the clinics, 60.5% reported that they had no interaction with
federal marshals, but 28.3% of clinics reported increased sensitivity
on the part of marshals and 1% reported decreased sensitivity.

The importance of effective law enforcement is underscored by
1994 findings showing that the commission of certain violent acts
is related to law enforcement response at local, state, and federal
levels. Clinics that reported poor local law enforcement
response were more likely than clinics that reported an excellent
or good response to experience death threats (44.4%), stalking (36.
1 %), home picketing (44.4%), and blockades (30.6%). Of the
clinics reporting poor federal law enforcement response,
48% faced death threats, and 52% had staff members who were picketed
at home. Clinics that experienced poor state law response
were more likely to face blockades (23.7%). Clinics that reported
excellent state law enforcement response were more likely not
to have had either bomb threats or bombings (82.6%) or arson
threats or arson (78.3%) during the first seven months of 1994.

In addition, a statistically significant correlation was found
between clinics who experienced higher levels of violence and the
characterizations of local, state and federal law responses "poor.
" Fifty percent of clinics experiencing high levels of violence
(3-6 types) characterized local law response as "poor"
as did 47.2% of clinics experiencing moderate levels of violence
(1-2 types). Only 2.8% of clinics experiencing no violence reported
a "poor" response on the part of local law officials.

Of the clinics that experienced no violence, 7.1 % rated state
law officials as responding poorly to complaints of clinic violence.
Over half of the clinics (57.1%) that experienced moderate levels
of violence characterized state law response as "poor"
and 35.7% of those clinics that experienced high levels of violence
characterized the response rate as "poor."

Although the correlation between violence and a poor response
was not as strong on the state level, it was once again apparent
on the federal level. Forty-eight percent of all clinics that experienced
high levels of violence characterized federal law enforcement as
"poor," 40% of those clinics that experienced moderate
levels of violence agreed and 12% of clinics that experienced no
violence also characterized the response of federal law officials
as poor.

One clinic administrator made a direct connection between active
federal officials who operated on the local level and the lack of
violence at her clinics, "[This clinic] has not experienced
any violent activity this year; however, the local FBI agent has
contacted us numerous times and has emphatically stated that her
office, the Federal Marshals, and the U.S. Attorney for this district
are closely monitoring anti-choice activities."

To combat violence clinics often were forced to turn to the courts
for protection. Legal remedies were sought by over one-fifth (21
%) of the clinics during the first seven months of 1994. Five of
the eight clinics seeking temporary injunctions received them. Yet
permanent injunctions were granted to only 27.8% of the eighteen
clinics seeking this form of relief. Of the sixteen clinics that
sought restraining orders, 68.8% obtained them. Clinics experiencing
multiple types of violence were most likely to seek legal remedies.
Almost half (48.8%) of clinics that faced four or more types of
violence sought legal remedies. Of clinics reporting three types
of violence, 41.7% sought legal remedies, and 31.5% of clinics experiencing
two types of violence sought legal relief.

FACE Enforcement Inadequate

"On June 10, 1994, Paul Hill decided to step up
his protests by trying to prevent patients from entering the [Pensacola
Ladies Center] Clinic Property and screaming into Clinic windows.
Since the FACE bill had been signed into law by the President the
week before, I wanted him arrested under that law. Our local police
had no guidelines for such an arrest. I then telephoned the local
office of the ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] to ask
who had the authority to make such an arrest and was referred to
the FBI and explained what had happened; they sent out an agent.
The agent said he would "take down the information," but
could not make an arrest as he had no guidelines.... I decided to
go to the top. I telephoned the Justice Department, Attorney General
Janet Reno's office, and after two explanations, was put in touch
with Kevin Forder in the Civil Rights Division. I explained who
I was, what had happened, and what I was seeking. Mr. Forder informed
me he was familiar with the Clinic and Paul Hill's activities; but
this was not the time to arrest him. He said, 'These problems have
always been a local police problem, and would continue to be so..."

-- Linda Taggart, Clinic Administrator, Testimony before a hearing
of the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, September 21,
1994

During the first five months after FACE was enacted, 16.6%
(52) of the clinics sampled reported FACE violations. The majority
of clinics that reported FACE violations were non-profits (42.3%),
followed by for-profit clinics (28.8%) and private doctor's offices
(26.9%).

Federal officials rarely chose to pursue FACE claims themselves,
instead directing clinics to seek assistance from local law enforcement
or to pursue claims on their own. One quarter of the clinics that
identified a FACE violation to federal law enforcement officials
were either told that federal authorities would not prosecute or
were directed to turn to local law enforcement officials for relief.
(See Table 7.) Moreover, even though 55.7% (29) of clinics reporting
FACE violations were visited by federal authorities, these visits
rarely resulted in the filing of formal charges under FACE.

To date, only two FACE prosecutions have been sought by federal
authorities. Blockaders were charged and convicted in November under
FACE for physically obstructing the entrance to a clinic in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Paul Hill was convicted of the murders of Dr. Britton
and James Barrett and the attempted murder of June Barrett under
FACE.

In responding to questions about FACE enforcement in the survey,
one clinic director reported that, "[Since passage of FACE
there has been] little change in response by local law enforcement.
They don't appear to know how to handle complaints and are awaiting
their legal department's "interpretation" of FACE law. Another particularly
besieged clinic administrator reported that over the course of the
first seven months of 1994 her facility experienced blockades, invasions,
bomb threats and bombs, arson and arson threats and chemical attacks.
Her staff was picketed at home and staff members received numerous
death threats. When the administrator contacted federal law enforcement
officials in order to report potential FACE violations, she was
referred back to local authorities whose previous responses to requests
for assistance was minimal.

Inadequate enforcement of FACE was a central concern expressed
at oversight committee hearings of the Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee held on September
21, 1994. At those hearings, clinic workers detailed continuing
anti-abortion threats and harassment and the lack of federal response
to possible FACE violations.

At the hearing, a four-member panel comprised of a physician,
a clinic owner, a police sergeant and a clinic administrator related
numerous incidents of anti-abortion violence and intimidation that
law enforcement officials did not pursue as FACE violations. Susan
Hill, President of the National Women's Health Organization, which
owns nine abortion clinics across the country, testified that neither
local nor federal law enforcement officials were making arrests
under FACE.

Death threats, in particular, have not been dealt with by federal
authorities even though FACE expressly prohibits the use or threat
of force in connection with the provision of abortion services.
While this survey shows that the number of clinics reporting death
threats has climbed dramatically, FACE charges have not been instituted
against anti-abortion extremists issuing direct death threats to
specific health care providers.