Published 4:00 am, Thursday, April 6, 2006

The recent U.S.-India agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation is a clear net gain for global nonproliferation efforts, yet many in the American arms-control community have criticized the deal. Some critics argue that Congress should reject the changes to American nonproliferation laws proposed by the Bush administration as part of this deal. Others want this agreement to be contingent on a commitment by India to stop its weapons-related fissile material production. Careful consideration will reveal that such conditions are unnecessary and may end up harming U.S.-India ties for a long time.

The clear net gain is this: As part of the nuclear agreement, India has agreed to bear the same responsibilities as other nations with advanced nuclear technology. Some arms-control hawks argue that the five nuclear powers recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have all stopped producing weapons-related uranium and plutonium, therefore India must do so ALSO. This argument is misleading.

Countries such as the United States, the Great Britain and France, which have declared an end to their weapons-related fissile-material production, have several times more weapons and fissile stockpile in reserve than India. It is easy to stop grocery runs with a full pantry.

Despite its many successes in checking the spread of nuclear weapons, the inflexibility and the inequity of the nonproliferation treaty has made it ineffective as the sole mechanism to promote nonproliferation. The treaty allows no new country to join as a weapon state, but is powerless to force the existing weapon states to disarm, as per the treaty obligations. For many years, American policymakers have been trying to accommodate a rising and friendly India under the nonproliferation system, but India-U.S. ties were unlikely to reach full potential if a practical compromise was not on the cards.

Deal critics seem to believe that India could be forced to cap its weapons capability for the right price. Such a conclusion flies in the face of India's history of fiercely defending its strategic independence at any cost. Should this agreement fall through, India is not likely to choose between bombs and nuclear energy. Instead, India will probably choose to use its abundant supply of dirty coal for electricity and save its uranium stock for strategic contingencies. An India that burns gargantuan quantities of coal is definitely not in the interests of the world environment.

Another compelling reason to support the Bush administration's nuclear deal is that India is the only potential supplier of advanced nuclear power technology to be outside the nonproliferation mainstream. For the last 30 years, India voluntarily decided not to export nuclear technology to other countries, even though many nations such as Libya, Iran and Iraq offered to buy Indian nuclear expertise. As India continues to be stifled by the international nuclear order, there is no guarantee that Indians would continue to believe that virtue is its own reward and maintain their exemplary restraint. Unlike their predecessors' "nonaligned" vision, younger Indian leaders see a future where a growing India can aggressively leverage its economic muscle and technological capital to advance its national interests. This is why it is critical for nonproliferation to have India as a part of the system.

Yes, it is true that India will retain its ability to make nuclear weapons under the deal with America. It is also true that while Great Britain, the United States, France and Russia have indeed publicly committed to not increase their fissile stockpile, China has not made any such formal commitment and still gets to partake in civilian nuclear trade. China, in fact, even refused to subject American-supplied reactors to international safeguards. It would be unfair and illogical for the United States to constrain a deal with India with a condition that it does not enforce on other nuclear states.

India has, in fact, set an example for the nonproliferation treaty weapon states by agreeing to safeguards in perpetuity. India will also have 14 of its power reactors under safeguards as opposed to the five nonproliferation treaty powers who have just one power reactor -- combined -- safeguarded.

Once it weighs the merits of this deal, Congress should come to the logical conclusion that accommodating India is in the interests of nonproliferation.

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