HETA: Commerzbank Files Suit Following Non-Payment of Debt----------------------------------------------------------Laura Noonan at The Financial Times reports that Commerzbank hasfiled a lawsuit challenging a resolution of Austria's Heta, theso-called bad bank, which suspended all payments to bondholders inMarch so it could work out how much it could afford to paycreditors.

The bank confirmed it had filed a case in Germany on May 5, a dayafter Heta failed to make a bond payment due to the German lender,the FT relates. According to the FT, a person familiar with thesituation said the case relates to less than a quarter of theEUR400 million of Heta bonds Commerzbank holds.

Heta, which was formed from the bad assets of collapsed lenderHypo Alpe Adria, imposed a 15-month moratorium on all bondpayments from March 1 after the Austrian government announced itwould not help the institution cover a potential EUR7.6 billioncapital shortfall, the FT recounts.

Commerzbank's accounts show it has taken a EUR200 millionprovision against its EUR400 million Heta bonds, the FT discloses.Germany's financial regulator had warned that the countries'banks, which own the majority of the affected Heta bonds, stand tolose about half of what they are owed, the FT relays.

Heta Assset Resolution AG is a wind-down company owned by theRepublic of Austria. Its statutory task is to dispose of thenon-performing portion of Hypo Alpe Adria, nationalized in 2009,as effectively as possible while preserving value.

The rating action concludes the review of the covered bonds issuedby Hypo Tirol and Hypo VBG. Hypo NOE's covered bonds remain onreview pending the decision of the issuer to post over-collateralization (OC) in form and amount necessary to support thecurrent ratings of Aa1 on the mortgage covered bonds and Aaa onthe public-sector covered bonds.

Hypo NOE mortgage covered bonds:

Hypo NOE does not carry a public rating. The CB anchor for themortgage covered bonds is the CR assessment plus one notch. This,with a TPI of Probable, restricts the rating of the mortgagecovered bond at Aa1, hence the one-notch downgrade. However, theOC in the program is currently only sufficient for a Aa2 rating.For a Aa1 rating, 21.5% OC would be necessary, of which 14.5%should be in committed form. For a Aa2 rating, 14.5% of OC issufficient, of which 1.5% should be in committed form. Therefore,Moody's extended its review in order to provide time to clarifythe issuer's plans regarding the implementation of committed OC.

Hypo NOE public-sector covered bonds:

The CB anchor for the public-sector covered bonds is the CRassessment plus one notch. This, with a TPI of High, allows thepublic-sector covered bond to achieve a Aaa rating. However, theOC in the program is currently only sufficient for a Aa1 rating.For a Aaa rating, 20.5% OC would be necessary, of which 20.5%should be in committed form. For a Aa1 rating, 12.0% of OC issufficient, of which 1.0% should be in committed form. As with themortgage covered bonds, Moody's extended its review in order toprovide time to clarify the issuer's plans regarding implementingcommitted OC.

Hypo Tirol mortgage and public-sector covered bonds:

The CB anchor for both the mortgage and public-sector coveredbonds issued by Hypo Tirol is the CR assessment plus one notch.After assigning a CR assessment of Baa3(cr), the CB anchor has notchanged. Therefore, Moody's has confirmed the ratings assigned toboth covered bonds.

Hypo VBG mortgage and public-sector covered bonds:

The CB anchor for both the mortgage and public-sector coveredbonds issued by Hypo VBG is the CR assessment plus one notch.After assigning a CR assessment of A3(cr), the CB anchor has notchanged. Therefore, Moody's has confirmed the ratings assigned toboth covered bonds.

Expected Loss: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) todetermine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOLdetermines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability thatthe issuer will cease making payments under the covered bonds (aCB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the cover poolassets following a CB anchor event.

Hypo Noe Gruppe Bank AG:

The CB anchor for the mortgage and the public-sector program isthe CR assessment plus one notch. The CR assessment reflects anissuer's ability to avoid defaulting on certain senior bankoperating obligations and contractual commitments, includingcovered bonds. Moody's may use a CB anchor of the CR assessmentplus one notch in the European Union or otherwise where anoperational resolution regime is particularly likely to ensurecontinuity of covered bond payments.

The cover pool losses for the mortgage covered bonds are 27.0%,split between market risk of 18.6% and collateral risk of 8.4%.The collateral score for this program is currently 12.5%.

The OC in the mortgage cover pool is 122.6%, of which Hypo NOEprovides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC levelconsistent with the Aa1 rating target is 21.5%, of which theissuer should provide 14.5% in a "committed" form. These numbersshow that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expectedloss analysis.

The cover pool losses for the public-sector covered bonds are18.6% split between market risk of 16.3% and collateral risk of2.4%. The collateral score for this program is currently 3.6%.

The OC in the public-sector cover pool is 48.8%, of which Hypo NOEprovides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC levelconsistent with the Aaa rating target is 20.5%, of which theissuer should provide 20.5% in a "committed" form (numbers inpresent value terms). These numbers show that Moody's is relyingon "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recentmodelling (based on data, as per 31 December 2014).

The TPI assigned to the mortgage covered bonds is "Probable", andthat for the public-sector covered bonds is "High".

Hypo Tirol Bank AG:

The CB anchor for the mortgage and the public-sector program isthe CR assessment plus one notch. The guaranteed senior unsecuredratings are lower than the CR assessment; therefore the CB anchorof the CR assessment plus one notch also applies to theseguaranteed covered bonds.

The cover pool losses for the mortgage covered bonds are 27.5%,split between market risk of 19.6% and collateral risk of 7.9%.The collateral score for this program is currently 11.8%.

The OC in the mortgage cover pool is 486.1%, of which Hypo Tirolprovides 6.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC levelconsistent with the Aa3 rating target is 11.5%, of which theissuer should provide 0.5% in a "committed" form. These numbersshow that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expectedloss analysis.

The cover pool losses for the public-sector covered bonds are15.6%, split between market risk of 12.8% and collateral risk of2.8%. The collateral score for this program is currently 5.7%.

The OC in the public-sector cover pool is 85.1%, of which HypoTirol provides 9.5% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC levelconsistent with the Aa1 rating target is 12.5%, of which theissuer should provide 4.5% in a "committed" form. These numbersshow that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expectedloss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recentmodelling (based on data, as per 31 March 2014 for the mortgagecovered bonds and 31 December 2014 for the public-sector coveredbonds).

The TPI assigned to the mortgage covered bonds is "Probable", andthat for the public-sector covered bonds is "High".

Vorarlberger Landes- Und Hypothekenbank AG:

The CB anchor for the mortgage and the public-sector program isthe CR assessment plus one notch. The cover pool losses for themortgage covered bonds are 31.7%, split between market risk of22.7% and collateral risk of 9.0%.The collateral score for thisprogram is currently 13.4%.

The OC in the mortgage cover pool is 262.8%, of which Hypo VBGprovides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC levelconsistent with the Aaa rating target is 30.5%. To pass at thisrating level, the issuer does not need to provide OC in a"committed" form. These numbers show that Moody's is relying on"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

The cover pool losses for the public-sector covered bonds are33.1%, split between market risk of 29.4% and collateral risk of3.7%. The collateral score for this program is currently 6.8%.

The OC in the public-sector cover pool is 99.5%, of which Hypo VBGprovides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC levelconsistent with the Aaa rating target is 36.0%. To pass at thisrating level, the issuer does not need to provide OC in a"committed" form. These numbers show that Moody's is relying on"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recentmodelling (based on data, as per 31 December 2014).

The TPI assigned to the mortgage covered bonds is "Probable", andthat for the public-sector covered bonds is "High".

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond program'srating robustness. A change in the level of the CB anchor couldlead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds. The TPILeeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's might lowerthe CB anchor before the rating agency downgrades the coveredbonds because of TPI framework constraints.

The TPI Leeway for the mortgage covered bonds is zero notches.This implies that Moody's might downgrade the covered bondsbecause of a TPI cap if it lowers the CB anchor, all othervariables being equal.

Based on the "High" TPI, the TPI Leeway for the public-sectorcovered bonds is zero notches. This implies that Moody's mightdowngrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers theCB anchor, all other variables being equal.

Vorarlberger Landes- Und Hypothekenbank AG:

Based on the "Probable" TPI, the TPI Leeway for the mortgagecovered bonds is one notch. This implies that Moody's mightdowngrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers theCB anchor by two notches, all other variables being equal.

Based on the "High" TPI, the TPI Leeway for the public-sectorcovered bonds is two notches. This implies that Moody's mightdowngrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers theCB anchor by three notches, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur incertain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or sovereigndowngrade capping a covered bond rating or negatively affectingthe CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of theCB Anchor; or (3) a material reduction of the value of the coverpool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody'sApproach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in March 2015.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the EUR15million senior secured facility issued by Truvo Belgium Comm. V.The recovery rating on this facility is '1', reflecting S&P'sexpectation of very high recovery (90%-100%) in the event of apayment default.

In addition, S&P assigned its issue rating of 'CCC-' to the EUR58million payment-in-kind (PIK) instrument issued at Stelara PIKcoS.A. The recovery rating on this instrument is '6', reflectingS&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event ofa payment default.

In a related action, S&P withdrew its issuer and issue ratings onTalon PIKco N.V., which no longer has a link to Truvo N.V. S&Punderstands that Talon PIKco N.V. will be liquidated in December2015 together with the outstanding EUR77 million PIK notes.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that, while Truvo's debtrestructuring has lightened its debt load, the group's capitalstructure remains unsustainable in the long term. In addition,S&P believes that the group's operations in the structurallydeclining directories business will remain under pressure, whichwill limit free cash flow generation.

Truvo completed its capital restructuring on April 30, 2015,following unanimous consent from its lenders. The group'sfinancial restructuring resulted in a meaningful reduction of itscash-paid debt burden from EUR287 million of senior facilities toa EUR15 million term loan A. Despite the significant debtreduction, S&P continues to assess Truvo's financial risk profileas "highly leveraged," with S&P-adjusted debt now standing atapproximately EUR73 million, since S&P includes the EUR58 millionsubordinated PIK facilities at Stelara PIKco S.A. in S&P'scalculations. This results in Standard & Poor's-adjusted 2015-2016 weighted average leverage of approximately 6.8x postrestructuring (equivalent to 2.9x excluding the PIK facilities).

In addition, S&P continues to assess Truvo's business risk profileas "vulnerable," reflecting the significant risk of continuedstructural decline in the print directories sector. S&P'sassessment also factors in increased competition, as smallbusiness advertising expands across a greater number of onlinemarketing channels.

S&P considers that Truvo has material exposure to metropolitanmarkets, which could intensify the impact of the structural shiftfrom traditional classified directories to online services.Margins will remain under pressure, in S&P's view, due to Truvo'stransition to the highly fragmented, intensely competitive, andrapidly evolving online market.

S&P believes that in its online business, Truvo will havesignificantly less pricing power compared with its former leadingor incumbent positions in the traditional classified directoriesbusiness. In S&P's view, the company will have to establish itscompetitive edge in the online market.

Finally, S&P's rating also reflects its uncertainty surroundingthe timing and level of a turnaround in Truvo's revenues andearnings. Despite S&P's view that Truvo's highly leveragedcapital structure is unsustainable given the business model, S&Pbelieves that the risk of default over the next 12 months ismitigated by the group's low cash interest payment obligation andthe absence of short-term debt maturities apart from the EUR3.9million unpaid forbearance interest expected to be repaid onlywhen the cash balance exceeds EUR8 million.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of the ongoing pressureon Truvo's operating performance and the group's highly leveragedcapital structure that S&P sees as unsustainable in the long term.It also reflects some remaining vulnerability of free cash flowgeneration. In particular, S&P understands that the disruptionscaused by the transition of the invoice/sales systems in 2014,leading to significant working capital outflows, are not yet fullyresolved.

"We could lower the rating if it appears likely that Truvo isunable to halt the decline in its business. In such a scenario,we believe that the group could implement additional debt-restructuring measures that we would deem tantamount to a default.A material weakening of cash balances and free operating cashflow, leading to very short-term default prospects, could alsotrigger a downgrade," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if Truvo stabilizes EBITDAand maintains high cash interest coverage. We believe thisscenario would entail an increase in online revenues, since weanticipate that print advertising sales will remain undersignificant structural pressure," S&P added.

According to SeeNews, data from a protocol of a generalshareholders' meeting showed Agro Finance's shareholdersunanimously voted against the proposed liquidation of the company.

In April, Agro Finance said it planned to sell the land it ownsand delist from the Sofia stock exchange, SeeNews relates. Themove was proposed by Agro Finance's majority shareholder AgrionInvest, the reason being that under Bulgarian legislation thecompany would be fined in case foreigners acquire agriculturalland in the country, yet it cannot control real time trade in itsshares on the bourse, SeeNews discloses. However, under legalamendments adopted in late April, such fines would not be imposedon public companies, SeeNews says.

Corpbank was felled by a run on deposits in circumstances thathave never been fully explained, Reuters recounts. Its owner wassubsequently charged with embezzlement but he denies anywrongdoing, blaming the run on a plot hatched by his businessrivals, Reuters notes.

The central bank took control of Corpbank after the run and shutdown its operations, Reuters relays. It put its ownadministrators in charge of the lender until late March, when theywere replaced by temporary receivers, Reuters discloses.

"The investigation against them is because between November andMarch as administrators they deliberately did not take enough careof the assets of bank, which resulted in serious damage to thebank," Reuters quotes prosecutors as saying in a statement on May11.

The Bulgarian state has become Corpbank's main creditor aftershelling out more than BGN3.5 billion (US$2 billion) in guaranteeddeposits to clients following the collapse, Reuters states.

According to Reuters, prosecutors suspect the administratorsamended the contracts of account holders who had enjoyedpreferential interest rates and were therefore not entitled tocompensation.

The two administrators denied wrongdoing, Reuters says. They saidthey had adhered to both the law and the recommendations of thecentral bank and of the state's Deposit Insurance Fund, Reutersrelays. They said they were ready to cooperate with theinvestigation, Reuters notes.

About Corporate Commercial Bank AD

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank inBulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, andfirst in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administrationand suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a rundrained the bank of cash to meet client demands.

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AUTODIS GROUP: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR, Outlook Stable-------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service affirmed Autodis Group S.A.S.'s('Autodistribution' or the 'company') corporate family rating ofB1, and the probability of default rating of Ba3-PD. Concurrently,the rating agency has affirmed the instrument rating of B2 on theEUR240 million existing senior secured notes issued by AutodisS.A., and assigned a B2 instrument rating to the EUR60 million tapissued by Autodis S.A. The ratings outlook is stable.

On May 11, Autodistribution announced the launch of a EUR60million tap issuance. The proceeds of the tap issuance are to paya EUR40 million dividend and raise EUR20 million cash for generalcorporate purposes. "The transaction positions Autodistributionweakly in the B1 CFR category and amongst its direct peers, basedon more aggressive financial policy with a dividendrecapitalization within the first 18 months of the initial notesissuance, a relatively weaker business and liquidity profile withlarge exposure to France and focus on debt funded acquisitions togenerate revenue growth", says Pieter Rommens, lead analyst forAutodistribution.

The B1 CFR rating reflects Autodistribution's (1) leading positionin the French automotive aftermarket, which is characterized byhigher customer loyalty and less cyclicality compared to theautomotive sector; (2) relative size compared to other independentplayers, manifesting itself in a dense distribution network andleading to economies of scale; (3) fragmented customer base,consisting of local distributors and garages; (4) track record ofimproving operational performance in the most recent years, mostrecently driven by the integration of ACR; and (5) strong currenttrading in the last 3 months ending March 2015, driven by thelight vehicles and collision parts segments and 12 months tradingof ACR.

The B1 CFR rating also takes into account the company's (1) largeexposure to France which represents about 90% of the company'ssales in 2014; (2) the intense competition in the sectorcharacterized by expected weak total market growth; (3) thecompany's modest size compared to some of its large automotivepart suppliers, which could potentially limit its bargainingpower; and (4) risks relating to potential further debt-funded M&Aactivity in order to grow revenue through acquisitions.

Moody's expects Autodistribution's Moody's-adjusted Debt/EBITDAratio to be in the region of 5.5x at December 2015 (pro-forma forthe tap issuance) which is fairly high, but takes comfort from thecompany's recent track record of EBITDA growth through marginimprovement through continued focus on operational synergies, costefficiencies and purchase savings.

Moody's considers Autodistribution's near-term liquidity positionas adequate. The company's liquidity position is supported by acash reserves of EUR68 million at the end of December 2014, anadditional expected EUR20 million cash raised by the tap issuancefor general corporate purposes and a fully undrawn EUR20 millionRCF.

The B2 rating on the notes, one notch below the CFR, reflects thelimited amount of guarantees from operational entities for thenotes, and Moody's view that the super-senior RCF and operatingliabilities (mainly trade payables and operating leases) rankahead of the notes in the capital structure. Both the notes andRCF benefit from first ranking security interests. The notes areguaranteed by part of the subsidiaries which, for the twelvemonths ended December 31 2014, represented 37.2% and 34.3% of thegroup's EBITDA and total assets, respectively. The RCF ranks supersenior in the enforcement waterfall and benefits from a guarantorcoverage test of not less than 80% of consolidated EBITDA andgross assets.

The stable outlook reflects our view that the company's financialmetrics will improve over the next 12-18 months. Moody's expectsprofitability enhancement would be driven by full year impact ofACR integration, ongoing productivity efforts across the companyand higher investments to enhance its distribution network and ITsystems.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was GlobalDistribution & Supply Chain Services published in November 2011.Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default forSpeculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada andEMEA published in June 2009.

Autodis Group S.A.S. is the holding entity of the Autodistributiongroup. The company is a leading distributor of aftermarket partsfor light vehicles and trucks in the independent automotiveaftermarket in France. The company also has a regional presence inPoland. The company generated revenue of EUR1,170 million in 2014,through its network of 48 wholly-owned and 44 affiliatedindependent distributors in France, operating together on 489distribution sites and around 3,200 affiliated garages in France.

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KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to US$513.7MM Loan-----------------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B1 rating toKlockner Pentaplast of America, Inc.'s US$513.7 million seniorsecured first lien term loan with a maturity of 5 years, KPGermany Erste GmbH's EUR113 million and US$219 million seniorsecured first lien term loans with a maturity of 5 years, KlocknerPentaplast GmbH's EUR100 million senior secured term loan alsowith a maturity of 5 years and KP Germany Erste GmbH 's EUR100million revolving credit facility (RCF) with a maturity of 4.75years following a conclusive review of final documentation. Inaddition, Moody's has assigned a definitive Caa1 rating to theEUR300 million senior notes with a maturity of 5.5 years issued byKlockner Pentaplast of America, Inc.

Final changes to the credit facilities of Kleopatra Holdings 2S.C.A., the parent holding company of Klockner Pentaplast and thetop holding company of the restricted group have no impact tocurrent ratings.

The outlook on all ratings is stable. It reflects our expectationsthat Klockner's solid market positions and high share of salestowards non-discretionary pharmaceutical and food end-markets willcontinue to support the group's operating performance. It alsoincorporates Moody's assumption that the company will not embarkon any large debt-financed acquisitions, or engage in shareholder-friendly initiatives that will increase adjusted leverage above6.0x.

What Could Change the Rating -- UP:

The ratings could be upgraded if Klockner manages to maintainadjusted leverage below 5.0x on a sustainable basis. Furthermore,the rating could enjoy upwards pressure were Klockner to maintainfree cash flow generation above 5% of total debt.

What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN:

A deterioration in profitability, caused for instance byincreasing competition or challenges to manage volatile rawmaterial costs, or material negative free cash flow, or anincrease in adjusted debt/EBITDA above 6x could put negativepressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was GlobalPackaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containerspublished in June 2009. Other methodologies used include LossGiven Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in theU.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

At the time of the withdrawal, the rating on Unify primarilyreflected S&P's view that the financial support it received fromits 49%-owner, Siemens AG, helps address Unify's near-termrefinancing needs and equips the company with sufficient liquidityfor operations and its new restructuring and business-transformation program over the next 12 months. Nevertheless, S&Pbelieves that Unify's liquidity could weaken thereafter,particularly if the company is unable to implement the proposedissuance of a EUR100 million senior secured facility and, at thesame time, significantly turn around its weak revenues in fiscal2015 and achieve at least zero organic revenue growth in thefiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2016.

In January 2015, Siemens committed to injecting EUR130 million incash in the form of new preference shares and to backing a newEUR163 million facility. Unify used some of the proceeds toredeem all of its outstanding senior secured notes due November2015 (about EUR120 million as of Dec. 31, 2014) on March 9, 2015,and the balance will fund the company's new transformation plan.Unify also rolled over its fully drawn revolving credit facilityof EUR40 million for another year, and it is now due May 2016.

Unify's "vulnerable" business risk profile remains constrained, inS&P's view, by the company's relatively weak operating margins,continued very high restructuring costs, volatile customer demand,and significant competitive pressure from larger industry players,such as Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise, andAvaya, in the dynamic and volatile enterprise communicationsmarket. These factors are partly offset by Unify's diversecustomer base and its position as an established provider ofcommunications systems, applications, and services for enterprisecustomers, with leading market shares in Europe and particularlyin Germany.

Unify is a joint venture between the former enterprisecommunications business of Siemens AG and private equity investorThe Gores Group (not rated; 51% ownership). S&P's assessment ofUnify's stand-alone credit profile did not benefit from additionalgroup support from Siemens, primarily because S&P assess Unify asa nonstrategic subsidiary of Siemens under S&P's criteria.

Before the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P'sexpectation that the company will stabilize its revenue growth toat least zero by fiscal 2016, implement its latest restructuringprogram on time and on budget, improve its operating margins, andsignificantly strengthen its FOCF generation before restructuringand business-transformation costs in the next 12 months. Inparticular, S&P expected cash balances of about EUR100 million atyear-end fiscal 2015.

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GREECE: Taps Reserves at Escrow Account to Avoid Default--------------------------------------------------------Mehreen Khan at The Daily Telegraph reports that Greece avoided anunprecedented default to the International Monetary Fund on May 12after raiding an emergency cash account at the Fund, in a majorsign the country is edging ever closer to stiffing its seniorcreditor.

Athens tapped EUR650 million from an escrow account held by theBank of Greece at the IMF, scraping together a further EUR100billion in cash reserves to avoid going into arrears, The DailyTelegraph relates.

The move to effectively shift funds from different accounts at theIMF signals Greece has all but run out of cash to meet itsinternational and domestic obligations, The Daily Telegraph notes.

According to estimates, Greece only has a paltry EUR90 million inspare cash reserves, making it unable to fulfil its monthly wageand pensions bill of EUR1.7 billion for May, The Daily Telegraphstates.

Greece owes the IMF a total of EUR9.7 billion this year and willneed to repay a further EUR2 billion over the course of June andJuly, The Daily Telegraph discloses.

But officials from the Fund said the Bank of Greece was under noobligation to replenish its escrow account and could use the cashas wishes, The Daily Telegraph relays.

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MURRAY HOLDINGS: Files Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Petition-----------------------------------------------------Michael Bathon at Bloomberg News reports that a unit of failedIcelandic bank Kaupthing Bank hf, Murray Holdings Ltd., soughtbankruptcy protection from creditors in the U.S. listing as muchas US$500 million in both assets and debt.

The company formerly known as Isis Investments Ltd. filed underChapter 15 of the bankruptcy code, which is used by companiesrestructuring abroad to protect assets and shield it from lawsuitsin the U.S., Bloomberg relates.

Murray Holdings, which is 100% indirectly owned by Kaupthing,according to court filings, initiated the bankruptcy to carry outa restructuring plan approved last year in an Isle of Man court,Bloomberg discloses.

The case is In Re Murray Holdings Ltd., 15-bk-11231, U.S.Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

The issue rating follows a commutation agreement between MBIA U.K.Insurance Ltd. (MBIA) and the class A bondholders on Dec. 3, 2014.Under this agreement, MBIA's rights and obligations under thetransaction documents have been terminated. It no longer providesa guarantee for the class A notes and the MBIA annual guaranteefee -- 0.35% of the value of the outstanding class A notes -- willnow be paid to the class A bondholders.

-- The project comprises 43 wind farms in Germany and France. Individual wind farms started operations between 1999 and 2008. The project is exposed to wind resource risk and higher-than-forecast repair and maintenance costs, as only 27% of the portfolio benefits from a long-term fixed-price operations and maintenance contract.

-- Volatile wind supply has been below historical averages over the past few years and availability has consistently been below S&P's original base-case assumption of 97%. In 2014, revenues were 15% lower than S&P had anticipated due to lower wind than it expected during the summer. As a result, for the first time, the issuer withdrew EUR1 million from the debt service reserve account (DSRA) to cover the shortfall in the debt service payment on the class A notes due on Oct. 19. Nevertheless, on April 19, 2015, the issuer paid debt service of EUR12.6 million on the class A notes in full. In addition, it paid the EUR2 million portion of deferred interest on the class B notes, but deferred the debt service on the class B and C notes due on April 19 in full.

-- The project is exposed to a structural weakness as replenishment of the senior DSRA is subordinated to payment of the class B debt, including repayment of deferred principal and interest. S&P forecasts that the class B debt will continue to defer its coupon for the remainder of the term of the senior debt and therefore any withdrawals made from the DSRA are unlikely to be replenished.

-- S&P forecasts that the senior debt will continue to be serviced in full and on time throughout the project's life. Debt service is due in two equal annual payments on April 19 and Oct. 19. However, given the low wind during the summer months, cash flow available for the senior debt service payment in October is tight. S&P forecasts that the project will continue to make modest withdrawals from the DSRA to meet its October-scheduled debt service payments. S&P forecasts that the annual senior debt service coverage ratio (ADSCR) will remain above 1x, and our analysis continues to focus on liquidity because of the project's reliance on the DSRA to meet its October scheduled repayment. The project is also exposed to market price risk. In the French regulatory system, the off-take period runs for 20 years. However, the fixed, guaranteed off-take price runs for only 15 years and is related to a reference yield. The project managers must negotiate the off-take price for years 16-20 with the off-taker, which exposes wind farm operators to market price risk during those years.

-- The 'D' rating on the class B notes reflects S&P's criteria for hybrid instruments with a coupon deferral or cancellation feature or principal write-down or deferral feature. S&P rates such instruments 'D' when payments are deferred or reduced on a permanent basis according to terms of the instrument, without causing a contractual (legal) default. This reflects the sustained losses absorbed by the instrument.

S&P's business assessment of the project's operations phase is '6'(on a scale of '1' to '12', with '1' being the strongestassessment), reflecting S&P's view of the moderate operationalcomplexity of on-shore wind turbines; moderate resource risk, aswind may not be available as expected at all times; and the marketprice risk toward the end of the life of the debt. The currentregulatory regime in Germany provides the project with pricecertainty for the wind energy produced over the life of the debt.In France, the regulatory regime provides certainty for the first15 years of the debt's life.

S&P considers that the project is materially exposed to therevenue counterparties and to the suppliers of critical equipment,namely turbines and their components. However, thecreditworthiness of the counterparties is not currently aconstraining factor for the issue rating.

At financial close, project liquidity consisted of a EUR14 millionDSRA for the class A notes, which would cover about one of the twoannual debt service payments, and a EUR1.7 million reserve for theclass B notes, which covered about half of one of the annual debtservice payments.

EUR1 million has been drawn under the class A notes DSRA to meetdebt service, leaving a current balance on the DSRA of EUR13million, which is below the target balance. The class B DSRA isfully depleted. Therefore, S&P assess the liquidity as "less thanadequate."

The stable outlook on the class A notes signifies that S&P do notforesee a default under its base-case scenario, although itconsiders that the class A notes' DSRA is likely to deterioratefurther in future.

S&P does not expect to raise the rating because of the project's"weak" transaction structure assessment and S&P's view of itslikely reliance on the senior DSRA to meet its October scheduledsenior debt service payment in each year.

S&P could lower the rating if the operating performance of theproject or the liquidity deteriorates, causing Breeze Finance todraw more from the class A notes' DSRA than S&P currentlyanticipates.

Leveraged Finance Europe Capital IV B.V., issued in October 2006,is a Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio ofmostly high yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio ismanaged by BNP Paribas. The transaction ended its reinvestmentperiod on 11 November 2012.

The upgrades of the notes is primarily a result of significantdeleveraging arising from the last payment date in November 2014.As a result, the Class I-D notes, Class I-N notes and theRevolving Facility have collectively paid down EUR60 million (28%of their initial balance) resulting in increases in over-collateralization levels. As of the March 2015 trustee report, theClass III, IV, and V overcollateralization ratios are reported at156.35%, 117.51%, and 112.32% respectively compared with 130.12%,111.65%, and 108.78% in October 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weightedaverage recovery rate, are based on its published methodology andcould differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its basecase, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having aEUR pool with performing par and principal proceeds balance ofEUR94.5 million, a defaulted par of EUR4.4 million, a weightedaverage default probability of 27.32% (consistent with a WARF of4079 over a weighted average life of 3.82 years), a weightedaverage recovery rate upon default of 50% for a Aaa liabilitytarget rating, a diversity score of 14 and a weighted averagespread of 3.84%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of thecollateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life ofthe collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on futuredefaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in thecollateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody'sassumed that 100% of the portfolio exposed to senior securedcorporate assets would recover 50% upon default. In each case,historical and market performance and a collateral manager'slatitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors. Moody'sincorporates these default and recovery characteristics of thecollateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting themto stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLOliability it is analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's GlobalApproach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published inFebruary 2014.

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conductedsensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in theportfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weightedaverage recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs that werewithin two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomicuncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on thenotes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in thegeneral economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impactedeither positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investmentstrategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legalinterpretation of CDO documentation by different transactionalparties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

(2) Around 40% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions", published in October 2009.

(3) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over- collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitlymodelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee'sconsiderations. These qualitative factors include the structuralprotections in the transaction, its recent performance given themarket environment, the legal environment, specific documentationfeatures, the collateral manager's track record and the potentialfor selection bias in the portfolio. All information available torating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input fromother Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgmentsregarding the nature and severity of credit stress on thetransactions, can influence the final rating decision.

The CreditWatch placement follows DTZ's announcement that it hasentered into a definitive agreement to acquire Cushman &Wakefield, including cash and liabilities. The transaction isexpected to close toward the end of 2015, subject to customaryclosing conditions including regulatory approvals. TheCreditWatch placement reflects S&P's uncertainty regarding thecredit impact on the combined entity following the acquisition."Nevertheless, we believe this transaction has the potential toweaken DTZ's risk profile via increased leverage and reduced cashflow stability," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst RichardZell. Alternatively, if DTZ chooses to finance the transactionmostly with equity and the contribution from stable, recurringrevenue sources remains robust, S&P may raise the rating or revisethe outlook to reflect a stronger credit profile.

The current issuer credit rating reflects the high leverage andintegration risk resulting from DTZ's acquisition of CassidyTurley and DTZ's private equity ownership. A successfulintegration of both Cassidy Turley and Cushman & Wakefield mayposition the company as one of the largest providers of globalcommercial real estate (CRE) services, behind CBRE and Jones LangLaSalle. S&P believes that the primary revenue source for Cushman& Wakefield is sales and leasing related, which tends to becyclical, following general trends in commercial real estate. Theinclusion of this revenue stream into the combined entity couldresult in less stable cash flows than those DTZ previouslyexhibited, which had been largely dependent on stable, recurringfee revenue from property and facility management services. In atime when CRE services firms are benefitting from moremultinational corporations outsourcing and continued economicgrowth, S&P views the combination of DTZ and Cushman & Wakefieldfavorably, tempered by the possibility of increased leverage andvolatile cash flows.

DTZ and Cushman & Wakefield reported they expect the resultantentity to have total revenues of about US$5.5 billion and a strongglobal presence with more than 250 offices in about 50 countries.The combined firm will be called Cushman & Wakefield, given thepopularity of its brand name in the U.S. and Europe.

"Upon the completion of our review, we could lower the ratings ifwe believe the company's risk profile will be materially weakerfor an extended period as a result of the proposed transaction andthe introduction of volatile cash flows. For instance, we couldlower the rating if we believe that pro forma debt to EBITDA willexceed 6x, on a sustained basis, or if EBITDA-to-interest coveragefalls below 2x. We could also lower the rating on DTZ ifintegration issues endanger client relationships and ultimatelythe firm's cash flows," S&P said.

Alternatively, S&P could affirm its ratings on DTZ if it believesthat leverage will not increase meaningfully. If leverage risesmoderately, S&P will weigh the benefits of increased geographicdiversity and a larger global presence against the proportionalshift in revenue toward more volatile sources.

While perhaps least likely, S&P would consider raising the ratingif it expects DTZ to finance the transaction in a way that lowersleverage to less than 5x. S&P would also consider affirming therating, but with a positive outlook, if leverage was littlechanged and the improved diversity more than offsets the change inrevenue mix. At that point, S&P would look for evidence that theintegration of DTZ, Cassidy Turley, and Cushman & Wakefield hadbeen successfully implemented before raising the rating.

Since the last rating action on May 13, 2014, the class A and Bnotes have been repaid in full. The affirmation of the most seniortranche still outstanding is driven by the effect of sequentialallocation of principal and the strong underlying loan performanceto date. Delinquencies and defaults have been minimal due to highdebt service coverage across the portfolio and low leverage, dueto seasoning (most vintages are pre-2004) and amortization.

As well as improving the credit quality of the senior bonds, thesequential allocation of principal receipts has also increased theissuer's cost of funds. Together with a relatively static level ofsenior costs, this has meant revenue funds are insufficient tofully meet scheduled interest payments to the class D and E notes.However, a mechanism is in place to defer any interest shortfallsstemming from prepayments (which account for all shortfalls todate and expected). Unlike standard available funds caps, in thiscase deferred interest remains ultimately due and payable in full.

Fitch's interpretation of transaction documentation is that thesedeferred amounts become due and payable when the related class ofnotes is redeemed (for principal). Therefore once the class Dnotes have redeemed, Fitch assumes the issuer will switch to itspost-enforcement waterfall, subject to which the class D deferredinterest amounts will rank senior to class E interest andprincipal.

While this route to repayment hinges on a technical event ofdefault, given the amount in question is expressly deferrable, isnot payable periodically (or even predictably) and is "passthrough" in nature, it is treated in Fitch's analysis as principalrather than interest. The rating tests for ultimate repayment ofthis amount using diverted junior principal. So far the shortfallaccumulated for the class D notes is GBP396,000 and for the classE GBP600,000. Fitch expects this to continue to grow, with theeventual magnitude (including interest accruing on the shortfall)dependent on the (p)repayment profile of the remaining loans.

The largest loans have all been repaid, and were generally in thehigher margin buckets. In parallel the weighted average (WA)margin of the notes has quadrupled since closing (to 1.75% from0.43%) and will rise further until the class C notes have beenredeemed. At the May 2015 interest payment date, the poolconsisted of 41 loans with an aggregate balance of GBP26.8million, down from 419 loans/GBP581.9 million as at closing inAugust 2008. The majority of the pool provides for some scheduledamortization, while seven loans mature by the end of 2015.

Most loans have a remaining balance of less than GBP1 million andare secured on a single asset. The low reported WA loan-to-valueratio (LTV) largely relies on pre-crisis valuations, conductedbetween 1990 and 2005. Two loans have a reported LTV of above100%. Although almost all loans continue to make debt servicepayments, a few borrowers are supporting these payments fromequity as the collateral is vacant. Given past performance, heavyexposure to the London asset market, modest leverage and furtheramortization, Fitch believes that losses will be minimal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Overcollateralization is currently GBP1.6 million. Adverseprepayment profiles could lead to greater interest shortfalls thatmight not be recoverable, especially if accompanied by higherlosses. These drivers could cause the class D to be downgradedfurther. The junior notes would be downgraded in the eventexpected or realised losses exceeded overcollateralization.

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' recoveries of GBP23.8 million.

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