I was trying to suggest that Historically "Infantry" was not an arm of manoeuvre, in my opinion, and did not become so, in the modern sense until it became motorized.

Infantry has always been an arm of maneuver. Prior to the 19th century, maneuver was simply a matter of getting to the site of the battle and moving on after that. The growth of armies and the motorization of battle have changed warfare (not war, though), so the concept of maneuver has changed as battle moved away from the concept of "strategy of a single point". This is why we don't view Infantry and Armour doctrine and organization in the same context as a bunch of guys chasing Scottish hillbillies around the marches....

As for your concern for the Armoured Corps being sat on the sidelines, your fears are unfounded. The most heavily tasked unit throughout the Afghan mission was Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).

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"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

R031button

A few points regards that force structure you'r proposing. First and for most in man power. Where do we find the manning to turn an RCAC regiment into an infantry battalion with one company replaced by a squadron? That is essentially what you're getting at isn't it? Two CCV Squadrons essentially acting as mechanized infantry companies and a leopard squadron. So now we need to bring these Regiments up to that strength. While at the same time, we still need some form of armoured recce, where do we draw that from? You paint a picture of loads upon loads of armoured crewmen just "sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks," now I don't know much about what manning is like on that side of the fence, but I doubt it's really that rosey. Similarly I wouldn't called armoured recce just driving armoured trucks. What's you're proposal for armoured recce units? Where do they fit in?

Personally I'm less worried about how many units we have, and more worried about what those units consist of and whether or not they're up to strength.

I accept that troops do better with equipment they know intimately and that the best way to get to know your kit is to live with it. That is equally true for the RCAC as it is for the Gunners, Sappers and RCIC. Accepted and agreed.

Equally we both agree that on the modern battlefield (I think we can accept agreeing to disagree on the ancients and when they became modern), on the modern battlefield both the RCIC and the RCAC use a combination or manoeuver and firepower to close with and destroy the enemy. (A debate for another day is whether Patton's 3rd Army in 1944 and the 3rd ID in 2003 destroyed or merely disrupted their enemies).

Strangely, I find myself agreeing that the terrain and the vehicle constitute the deciding factors.

Accordingly I bring myself back to the position that a "tracked" CCV - nod to PPCLI Guy, tracks or wheels has not yet been decided - should be operated by the RCAC. If a "wheeled" CCV is selected then, to my mind, that becomes another RCIC vehicle.

But is the Marginal Advantage to the Government of a wheeled CCV over the LAV III Up sufficiently great to justify PWGSC supplying the RCIC with a slightly better protected and equally mobile (tactically, operationally and strategically) vehicle?

Or is the money better spent on a tracked vehicle that increases the Government's options?

My preference would be that PWGSC spend its money on the tracked CCV for the RCIC, complete with logistical support.

The LAV III LRSS system would be best operated by the RCIC, which already operates LAVs, or by the Arty which is handling the FSCC, FOO, UAV, Radars, Sound Rangers and mapping the battlefield for the guns, aircraft and all other "projectiles" - commandos, infantry platoons or tank troops.

The TAPV should be acquired as an A/B Echelon vehicle as part of the LVM programme and employed as rover/liaison/LOC protection/ACP.

As for the fortuitous slap at Scots Hillbillies - you have to have worn a kilt before you're allowed to make those kind of disparaging remarks about Scots.

A few points regards that force structure you'r proposing. First and for most in man power. Where do we find the manning to turn an RCAC regiment into an infantry battalion with one company replaced by a squadron? That is essentially what you're getting at isn't it? Two CCV Squadrons essentially acting as mechanized infantry companies and a leopard squadron. So now we need to bring these Regiments up to that strength. While at the same time, we still need some form of armoured recce, where do we draw that from? You paint a picture of loads upon loads of armoured crewmen just "sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks," now I don't know much about what manning is like on that side of the fence, but I doubt it's really that rosey. Similarly I wouldn't called armoured recce just driving armoured trucks. What's you're proposal for armoured recce units? Where do they fit in?

Personally I'm less worried about how many units we have, and more worried about what those units consist of and whether or not they're up to strength.

WRT manpower - somewhere along the way I saw a ppt presentation describing a balanced 2013 Force, a Heavy West Force, a Heavy Split Force (A and B) and finally the decision.

All of the proposals generate 39 Combat Arms Sub-Units - 27 RCIC and 12 RCAC. In all of those scenarios bar one the RCAC had 3 or 4 MBT Squadrons and 7 to 9 Recce Squadrons. Those Recce Squadrons were TAPV equipped nominally but up to 5 of those Squadrons were Troops without Vehicles.

Meanwhile the Infantry was having LAVs replaced by CCVs in 3 or 4 Sub-Units.

Ultimately, apparently, the final decision decreed that the RCAC would lose 2 Sub-Units (down to 10 from 12) and that instead of the RCAC having Troopers without Vehicles the Infantry would have Lt Infantry troops with a few TAPVs as Weapons Carriers and 3 Sub-Units of troops scattered across 3 RCIC Regiments available for Parachute training - presumably if Aircraft were available.

Now while I agree it makes more sense to have Troops without Vehicles in the RCIC than it does in the RCAC, I have to say I would rather have those Lt Sub-Unit troops (9 Sub-Units in Total) reallocated to create 3 Deployable RCAC Regiments, 6 Deployable RCIC Battalions and a Full Strength CSOR Regiment.

Further to manning - an RCAC Sub-Unit (Recce) doesn't have to look like an RCIC Sub-Unit (Infantry).

Where Infantry starts with an assumption of 8-13 pairs of boots on the ground and 2-3 crewmen manning the vehicle, the RCIC can start with 2-4 crewmen manning the vehicle and 2-4 dismounts with whatever weapons they can load into the back of their bus.

14 LAVs may carry 140 RCIC types. 14 LAVs/CCVs may only carry 84 RCAC types. In both cases both Sub-Units would make valuable and complementary contributions to the battle. Even if their capabilities overlapped their focuses would be different as would be their operating envelope.

With respect to the last point about Number of Units vs Strength of Units.

There will never be enough resources to be able to do all things. Everybody ends up doing what they can with what they have. Infantry Battalions vary in size from 250 to 1250 (almost all of them have mortars and pioneers)

On the other hand the Number of Units reflects the number of teams that can train together for specific situations. The more Units available the more situations that can be covered: the more options available to HMG to respond.

I would rather have options. In particular I would rather have to choose amongst 9 Units trained for a particular environment and that have to be augmented by an additional sub-unit or two at a lower level of readiness, than have to choose amongst 6 larger units that are prepared for exactly the same environment.

From a FOO perspective, I would welcome and armoured turret Cmdr and Gnr. With this, I would need an independent hunter killer sight and the understanding that I am IC of the vehicle. The CF armoured troopers are uncontested in the turret. I will be the first to admit that. The Infantry, that can match them, are few and the rest are probably naive. The Arty and Eng cannot match them at all with exception of very few.

As far as the Inf go, it may not be a bad idea either. The Inf Sgt is IC of the vehicle and the turret Cmdr (MCpl/Sgt) fights the turret and answers to him.

Assuming the FOO or Sect Cmdr will dismount. If we don't have a solid turret Cmdr, what are our Zulu LAVs doing?

« Last Edit: September 02, 2011, 20:27:17 by GnyHwy »

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R031button

Where Infantry starts with an assumption of 8-13 pairs of boots on the ground and 2-3 crewmen manning the vehicle, the RCIC can start with 2-4 crewmen manning the vehicle and 2-4 dismounts with whatever weapons they can load into the back of their bus.

I would rather have options. In particular I would rather have to choose amongst 9 Units trained for a particular environment and that have to be augmented by an additional sub-unit or two at a lower level of readiness, than have to choose amongst 6 larger units that are prepared for exactly the same environment.

This is where we disagree. If the CCV is being purchased to provide dismounts to support the Leo 2s, which is my understanding of why we're buying it, then having it bring only 2-4 dismounts is pointless. The amount of "weapons they can load into the back" is also pointless, who will use them? Will they clear the objective with an 84 and a C6 strapped to their respective backs?

This is where we get into the other point of this argument, if a unit or sub unit doesn't have the man power to do the job, then what is the point of having it, out side of saying "oh look we have 12 armoured sub units, look how relevant we are!" Similarly, I would rather be trained to operate in a variety of environments, rather then specifically one and be crap out of luck when I do deploy to the wrong one.

Or is the money better spent on a tracked vehicle that increases the Government's options?

Track is merely about tactical mobility (usually at the expense of operational or strategic mobility). How does pre-deciding that the vehicle must be tracked "increase the Government's options"?

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"The higher the rank, the more necessary it is that boldness should be accompanied by a reflective mind....for with increase in rank it becomes always a matter less of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others, and the good of the whole."

TANGENTI did note that link to the page about the Infantry. It is titled incorrectly. It hasn't been the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps for quite some time. It is the correctly known as the Infantry Branch. As well, some of the titles of the Regiments on that page are shown incorrectly. As well, the regiments from the Supplemental Order of Battle aren't displayed. They are:1.The Canadian Guards2.The Perth Regiment3.Royal Rifles of Canada4.The South Saskatchewan Regiment5.The Victoria Rifles of Canada6.The Winnipeg Grenadiers7.The Yukon Regiment

I have the link for the reference at work. Anyway, back to the CCV/No CCV argument. And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy." No mention of by day or by night or anything else.

1. The RCIC really does exist anymore (unless this government makes that change as well), just the Infantry will do;2. maneuver warfare (and thus maneuver arms), do you understand it? There is attrition warfare, where you wear down the enemy thorugh fire power, man power and continous battles. maneuver warfare is attacking the enemy's center of gravity (such as killing an enemy leader or cutting off his supply line or destroying a weapon system they are dependent on). In that sense, you can understand maneuver warfare and recognize the infantry has always being a maneuver arm. It has nothing to do with horses, vehicles, tanks, etc, etc.

Good to go?

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I am NOT a privileged white man by virtue of being male or white. I am privileged because I am alive and exercising my right to be who I am!

2. maneuver warfare (and thus maneuver arms), do you understand it? There is attrition warfare, where you wear down the enemy thorugh fire power, man power and continous battles. maneuver warfare is attacking the enemy's center of gravity (such as killing an enemy leader or cutting off his supply line or destroying a weapon system they are dependent on). In that sense, you can understand maneuver warfare and recognize the infantry has always being a maneuver arm. It has nothing to do with horses, vehicles, tanks, etc, etc.

Close enough. But before we bring MW in here, one would have to explain how a junk theory filled with bad history and opaque concepts is relevant to modern warfare. To date, I haven't seen Lind do it....

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"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy." No mention of by day or by night or anything else.

... and, coming out of the Second Word War, that is what we (the Canadian Army) felt was the role of both the infantry and the armoured. Ref: Canadian Army Publication 10M-10-48(1629) Military Science Part I and Part II. 1948

Kirkhill, I'm not terribly knowledgeble on this, and perhaps I'm misunderstanding the Cavalary's role, but isn't what your proposing something different from traditional Armoured Cavalary? I was under the impression that Cavalry forces were reconnaissance forces which had a great deal of firepower and protection in order to be able to fight for information, but they ultimately handed the fight off to larger forces so they could carry on locating the next objective. It seems to me that your proposal is slightly more ambition than 3 "heavy reconnaissance regiments" but a (in your terms) "cavalry" regiment that could be employed more flexibly than just destroying enemies via firepower and maneuver. Would what you envisage still constitue as cavalry?

Well that is just it. This confusion could quite possibly be due to my ignorance. I guess another question would be, do traditional Armoured Cavalry units, such as the American 11th ACR, contain infantry or armoured troopers acting in an infantry role or dragoons to clear tranches, etc? My understanding is that the Bradley used by US Cavalry units are Cavalry variants that carry far fewer troops. Thereby making them a cavalry fighting vehicle vice an infantry fighting vehicle.

A traditional "Cavalry" unit in modern US parlance is essentially manned by Armor. The scouts in the M3 Bradleys are not infantrymen. They provide an integral dismounted reconnaissance capability to the scout platoons in the cavalry troops.

A Cavalry unit can execute security missions that do involve more fighting than a pure reconnaissance unit. You would leave decisive fighting, especially holding or assaulting terrain to tank/infantry units.

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Well-trained, older Panzer crews are the decisive factor for success...It is preferable to start off with fewer Panzers than to set out with young crews who lack combat experience.

I am somewhat of a fan of Richard Simpkin, and his works suggest that airmobile formations like US Air Cavalry or Soviet era Air Assault Regiments would serve the functions of Cavalry due to their superior speed over ground formations.

CCV's serve a specialized function in accompanying tanks, and are thus part of the combined arms team (some sort of SP gun and tracked engineer vehicles wold be needed to fill out the team).

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Dagny, this is not a battle over material goods. It's a moral crisis, the greatest the world has ever faced and the last. Our age is the climax of centuries of evil. We must put an end to it, once and for all, or perish - we, the men of the mind. It was our own guilt. We produced the wealth of the world - but we let our enemies write its moral code.

“213. GeneralThe role of the infantry is to close with the enemy at short range and kill or capture him. On some occasions the psychological effect of the presence of resolute infantry will be enough to defeat the enemy, but against a truly determined opponent it will usually be necessary to employ all weapons, and even to engage in hand-to-hand combat.214. Organization and Equipment..... Although all battalions are trained and equipped to operate on their feet, they may be specially categorized according to the major means of transport used to get to close quarters with the enemy. Truck-borne (motorized) or APC-borne (mechanized) battalions will be wholly mounted, the latter in APCs. Airborne (parachutist), air-transported, and dismounted infantry battalions will possess less transport and will move primarily by air or on foot....215. Characteristics and Employment1. The flexibility of its organization allows infantry to be used in any size group from the battalion to the section. In major operations the battalion may be deployed as a unit, or small sub-units may be detached to guard bridges, vital points, tank laagers, engineer construction tasks or other operation which needs the close protection afforded by infantry. The adaptability of infantry units assures them a role in all the operations of war and in other functions where disciplined men are required, such as internal security and peace-keeping operations.2. The employment of infantry depends to a large extent upon the characteristics of the various types of infantry unit. The ultimate task is to engage the enemy at close quarters and to defeat him, if necessary, by hand-to-hand combat. This means that the infantryman must be brought to where his short-range weapons (Edit: hands?) can be effective, and it will usually demand that he dismount from his transport to fight. APC-borne infantry....will only dismount to hold ground or to mop up.”

And if that list isn’t enough to keep the average Battalion commander engaged in preparing a training plan there is the constant change in personnel and the need for individual training and advancement.

To that list is added the need to maintain, operate and fight a fleet of vehicles – sometimes wheels, sometimes tracks, sometimes turrets, sometimes boats.

The Canadian Army’s infantry branch seems to have an awful lot expected of it. Especially when the operational decision matrix can mix and match any and all of the above in a multitude of combinations: Airmobile, riverine, internal security operations in an arctic desert city for example – dispersed sections with riot sticks.....

“close and destroy” ......

Apparently that is also the role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and, as McG notes, used to be the role of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.

As Technoviking points out, and as I noted at the beginning, there are no qualifiers to that statement when it comes to the infantry. The application is therefore unlimited. The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the Queen’s enemies: regardless of time of day; regardless of season or weather; regardless of terrain. And by inference, from an old and not nearly well enough thumbed copy of CLO, regardless of vehicle and regardless of weapon.

My inference from CFP 165 is that all can be ignored or abandoned if it furthers the effort to destroy the enemy. If the infanteer’s vehicle, if the infanteer’s rifle, hinders his ability to “close with and destroy” the enemy then the infanteer is expected to discard them and take on the competition in “hand to hand combat”.

That is an extraordinary undertaking.

Nobody expects that of the Gunners of the Ordnance. Their weapons are considered too valuable in terms of crown treasure to just discard them. They are too valuable in their effect to leave them unemployed. They are too dangerous to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. Consequently the Gunners job is to serve the guns to get full benefit out of Her Majesty’s investment and keep them from the enemy at all costs.

Under no circumstances could a gunner contemplate abandoning his gun. Conversely the infanteer is expected to abandon everything, including his “gun”, if it will permit him to close with the enemy. (And before anyone thinks that is too extreme perhaps GAP could fill them in on Tunnel Rats).

I would argue that the modern fighting vehicle is at least a valuable war machine as the gunner’s gun and therefore the vehicle’s crew is similarly charged to keep their vehicle “safe” at all costs. Nobody expects the crew of a Leo, when the enemy runs out of the range of their guns, to leave the vehicle and go haring after the bad guys on foot.

When the infantry is tasked with operating with fighting vehicles of that class it finds itself having to decide whether to pursue the enemy “a l’outrance” as the French would have it or, call it a day and decide to look after Her Majesty’s investment.

TAPV-APC-IFV-MICV-Lt Tank-Med Tank-Hvy Tank-SPATG-SPH-SPRL(ATGM, AA, LRPRS) on wheels or tracks. We all know the differences until we try to determine where one vehicle type stops and the other starts.

It is easily agreed that they are all surface bound vehicles.

Perhaps it is not so easily agreed that the only difference amongst them beyond that is the nature of the projectiles carried and therefore their target sets.

Prior to World War One Admiral Fischer described the British Army as a “projectile launched by the Royal Navy”.

Equally if is possible to see the infanteer as a projectile to be launched: a smart projectile, possibly even a brilliant projectile and one that engages with other infanteers in co-ordinated swarming attacks, but still a projectile. How he is transported to the “place of slaughter” (as the bard of the Battle of Brunanburh would have it) is immaterial.

When an infanteer is locked up in the back of a vehicle he is a wasted resource. Just like a round of 5.56mm ball in inventory. And just like a poorly stored round his effectiveness declines with the time spent in inventory – when released from inventory it is harder to predict if the round will act as intended, misfire or cook-off. Consequently it makes sense to keep the minimum inventory on hand and keep the majority of your stock in a controlled environment. An infanteer not in the back of a vehicle can be resting, eating, training or conducting another operation somewhere else. It doesn’t make sense to me to have the very small number of infanteers at Canada’s disposal tied up riding around in the back of the truck. Infanteers and trucks should be married on an operational basis as close to the point of use as possible. Economy of Effort and Concentration of Forces would demand it.

Her Majesty’s current Canadian Government has engaged in a military policy that I believe can be paraphrased thusly:1. We will ensure we have the resources to secure our home;2. We will engage with the rest of the world to the best of our ability.

At home, in Canada, we have few existing external threats, limited prospects of such threats and a geographical location that limits the risk of a mass invasion. We have the treasure to buy the technology to disrupt any large scale invasion force at sea or in the air before it arrives. (Not to mention a really big buddy who shares our desire to limit access to our treasures).

Internationally we engage when and as we choose. We don’t have to engage everywhere.

We are a treasure rich, manpower poor society. Most places that need or want our assistance are manpower rich and treasure poor. They need what our treasure can buy. They need the technology that we can afford but they can’t. They need our ISTAR systems, our communications, our vehicles, our guns. Equally they need our expertise – our expertise as operators, planners and trainers.

Infantry is a manpower rich capability. We will always be short of infantry.

Cavalry on the other hand (Armour, Rangers, MI, Lt Horse, Dragoons, what-have-you – only in Canada apparently is it impossible to conflate the historic roles of Cavalry with the modern Armoured Branch or Corps – all the rest of our ABCA cousins seem to have no difficulty with it), Cavalry on the other hand leverages the available manpower to a greater extent than infantry.

In the hands of the PPCLI 4 LAVs or CCVs will be transport for 40 infanteers. The infanteers must be expected to abandon their vehicles when the terrain becomes unfavourable to continue their pursuit, or even just when they are training to continue the pursuit.

In the hands of the LdSH those same vehicles will be considered an effective force with as few as 12 troopers. Similar forces are fielded successfully by the LdSH now (Coyote), Australian 2nd Cavalry Regiment (ASLAV), USMC Lt Armoured Recce Battalions (LAV25) and find gainful employment. The LdSH Troopers, like Gunners, will have one job in life: To serve Her Majesty’s investment; to train on it, to supply it, to maintain it, to fight it to the utmost of its capabilities and, above all, to defend it.

When fielded, when deployed, they, like the infantry would be required to “close and destroy”. But unlike the infantry they would be expected to exploit forward only as far as their vehicles can take them. The enemy may escape their pursuit but that is not their problem. It then becomes an infantry problem.

In foreign interventions, in Cabinet wars of choice, this is not an issue. Canada’s Cavalry would have done what it could to the best of its ability. From that point on the problem would devolve to the Host or Allied nation forces. In those types of war, no matter what Canada does it will never be able to solve the problem on its own. This is the situation the RCAF finds itself in while in Libya.

Given Canada’s resources, to make the greatest impact in the world stage, I would be inclined to transfer all LAVs (all 651) as well as all future CCVs in to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and join them to the tanks.

651 LAVs only require some 2000 troops to fight effectively and would field 6 Regiments equivalent to the ASLAV 2nd Cavalry. Joining 138 CCVs with 114 Leo 2s would create a force equivalent to a US Cavalry Regiment (or 3 RCAC Regiments). The manpower bill for that force would be on the order of 1500 in the 3 Regiments (including Line 1 and 2 support).

Sending expeditionary forces of this nature abroad would continue the precedent of Laurier where he despatched mounted forces to assist in the quieting of state (not so much a failed state as a potentially troublesome state). It would also continue the tradition of Sir John A. MacDonald’s Mounted Rifles (aka the RCMP) who were sent to quiet the wide open spaces of Canada’s southern North West.

Those types of mounted troops (previously known as rangers or dragoons) were invaluable because a mounted man could see farther, travel farther, travel faster, carry more supplies and carry more weapons – consequently could react effectively to a greater variety of situations – than a man on foot.

Canada’s very small infantry corps (or branch) is too valuable to tie down to the care and maintenance and service of the mechanized vehicles. There are too many tasks, in too many environments for which they are needed, both at home and abroad, to dissipate their numbers turning wrenches – and doing it poorly.

The infantry would be better served focusing on heliborne operations (suitable for all terrains and environments) and training for employment as platoon and combat team QRFs that would be equally valuable domestically and abroad when used in conjunction with the cavalry.

Equip them with heli-transportable light vehicles and boats for local operations with a maximum 72 hour operational limit. 72 hours and out – or at least located in a secure, defendable facility with good, secure lines of communication.

Not a rant – but a considered response to the firestorm of “schooling” that was being brought down on my head.

I would argue that the modern fighting vehicle is at least a valuable war machine as the gunner’s gun and therefore the vehicle’s crew is similarly charged to keep their vehicle “safe” at all costs.

I don't see the comparison of an IFV to a gun.

IFVs/BG= approx 60 IFVs, they fire a 25-40mm bullet to a max range approx. 3000m line of sight and with very little HE capability.

Guns/BG= 6 guns, firing a 155mm bullet, to a max range of 30km non line sight, with a lot of HE, precision munitions and a few other munitions.

There is no comparison. I am not saying this just because I am a Gunner, but there are many reasons guns are HVTs and IFVs are not.

Quote

Given Canada’s resources, to make the greatest impact in the world stage, I would be inclined to transfer all LAVs (all 651) as well as all future CCVs in to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and join them to the tanks.

651 LAVs only require some 2000 troops to fight effectively and would field 6 Regiments equivalent to the ASLAV 2nd Cavalry. Joining 138 CCVs with 114 Leo 2s would create a force equivalent to a US Cavalry Regiment (or 3 RCAC Regiments). The manpower bill for that force would be on the order of 1500 in the 3 Regiments (including Line 1 and 2 support).

Are you suggesting the Infantry walk everywhere or will every attack involve an air assault? Limiting to air assault would be one dimensional and if the enemy has any air defence capability, even HMGs, the attack could not happen.

I can see reasoning behind having Armd turret cmds and gnrs operating Inf CCV turret, but the Inf Sgt in the back is still overall IC and dismounts with his section. I doubt it will ever happen, but one could make an argument for it.

As well, you forgot, the Arty will need some of those CCVs also.

Last point for some common ground. I am fully aware and fully agree that our Armd Corps turret gunners are top notch and the other Cbt arms units can't compare to their gunnery skills. For the record, I would welcome and Armd Gnr in my turret anytime.

Not a rant – but a considered response to the firestorm of “schooling” that was being brought down on my head.

Yeesh, ya gotta tighten up your Mean Point of Impact my friend.

I read your post (it took me two times) and all I can offer is that I believe you have some misconceptions about a few things and a completely incorrect outlook on what a vehicle implies for the Infantry, what it costs in terms of time and resources, and what it demands of the soldiers. I think you assume too much because the thing has a turret. I won't fence with all 38 of your paragraphs but I will respond to any points in detail (maintenance, training time, employment, etc) if you wish to hone in on them.

Can't do everything. Shouldn't try.Manpower is scarce.Give available manpower all the tools you can afford.....Domestically - most places the Army is needed are places the police aren't. Generally speaking, if there are roads there are police. The Army needs to be able to go where the police can't.

If there are roads then troops can find local National Defence transport available to assist them. That could be MLVWs, TAPVs or even LAVs and CCVs. - Driven by the owners.

A vehicle is not "everything", so I don't know why you characterize it as such. Domestically, we don't need the Army for places the police aren't, and the police can go where there are no roads. Domestically, we need bodies and we need command and control that can handle many moving parts over a large area with bad stuff happening. It's as simple as that, and almost any Army unit, regardless of trade, can provide those two things to some extent, although some are better than others.

In the end, if I didn't have 3 guys crewing a LAV III, they would be humping a GPMG with the section instead. In return for losing that GPMG team, I get 2 GPMGs and a stabilized 25mm cannon. Those guys also "hump" all of their section's marching order, taking much strain off their fellow bayonets. They also hump 72 hours food and water and a few loads of ammo, taking more strain off the bayonets and making things for the CQ a little easier. They also have some pretty advanced optics, saving their section mates from having to pack something like a NOD.

So, it is a pretty good trade-off for 3 guys, especially knowing I can dump the thing for a while in the rear area if I have to (with or without crew) or leave it in Canada for whatever reason and still take those 3 crew because they are trained Infantrymen. Believe it or not, IFV crews do not spend 100% of their time dealing with a vehicle and they are still quite adept as dismounted bayonets; at least mine were. If you go to a turretless I, it only costs you 2 guys at a loss of some firepower (not a big deal). It is going to cost the Army those 2-3 guys anyways, but the gains in administrative ease, flexibility and cohesion by having them integral with those who would live and fight with them are, in my opinion as a commander in a mechanized infantry unit in both training and operations, far better then any of the esoteric arguments about Cavalry and manpower bills I've seen to date.

My 2 cents,

Infanteer

Edit: spelling

« Last Edit: September 08, 2011, 20:30:07 by Infanteer »

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"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

I don't get this. In both Britain and the United States, Infantry own their vehicles, just like us. It is like this in most other NATO countries I've worked with. Australia is the wild card, not us.

Not arguing the ownership of the vehicle. I agree that infantry can own its own vehicles.

However, I think we can get better value for money by having the RCAC operate the vehicles we have as they operate them with fewer personnel.

The infantry we have, have many many demands placed on them. I am not convinced that we need them locked up in LAV Bns learning how to do what the RCAC already does.

The comment about Cavalry vs Armour was the result of comments trying to parse the differences amongst Armoured Regiments, Cavalry Regiments, Armoured Recconaissance Regiments, Lt Armoured Recconaissance Regiments and Mechanized Infantry Regiments, especially when all of the above are mixed and matched in Combat Teams, Battle Gps, Bde Gps and even Divs.

I was referring to the nomenclature and titles - which as has been pointed out to me - mean SFA. The definition is in the role.... but even there there seems to be a whole lot of the same words being used to different effect.

The Brits have their Royal Armoured Corps and Household Cavalry made up of Tank Regiments and old time Horse Cavalry Regiments all doing the same jobs they did on horseback.

The Yanks Armor Branch includes Tank Companies alongside Cavalry Squadrons in Cavalry Regiments serving alongside Tank Battalions. Their Cavalry includes Abrams and Bradleys operating in the same Sub-Unit (9 Abrams and 13 Bradleys). Other Cavalry operate from Strykers. Both conduct recce and "assault" missions as well as contributing to OOTW.

The Aussies RAAC, as noted cheerfully disregard terminology but includes any unit that ever rode a horse, including the Lt Horse - also known variously as Mounted Infantry or Mounted Rifles. The defining commonality then was the horse. The defining commonality between then and now was the ability of the units to range far and fast.

In Canada the RCAC is very much like the RAAC and incorporates Horse Regiments of various lineages and Tank regiments.

The reason for the "Crack" was in reference to a question, earlier on in the thread, about why I chose to call a similar formation a Cavalry formation.

What is the difference in capability (or burden) between a Mech Inf Coy (CCV) reinforced by a Half-Squadron of Leos and a US Cavalry Abrams-Bradley Troop reinforced by a Platoon of dismounted infantry?