2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

is clear, understandable, necessary and sufficient, without the complexities of compatibilist free will.

If that is libertarian free will, it is accessible and pragmatic.

And wrong!

Well the first description, in the sense of <I don’t do this because somebody other’s will> is fully ok, and in fact the compatibilistic one. Just the second description makes it fully inunderstandable, wrong, logically and scientifically untenable, and as such absolutely useless… <smiley of kkwan’s choice here>.

I never heard of the two stage description of free will before, but if I follow your discussion with kkwan correctly he is right in that putting the ‘random’ element at the beginning of the universe takes out the point for which the two stage model is meant: to explain how somebody under exactly the same circumstances ‘could have done otherwise’ (sorry have to go for a moment and rinse my mouth…).

If there is a ‘randomiser’ that generates alternative possibilities for actions, then even if the prior circumstances are the same, the randomiser could create other possibilities. However, for this a true randomiser is needed, whose output is at least partially independent of prior circumstances. Until now we don’t know if such randomisers exist, except in quantum processes. Now one could postulate such a quantum randomiser, but there is no empirical evidence that we have such a randomiser build in in our brains.

But practically it is nearly impossible to distinguish a true randomiser from a good pseudo-randomiser. Pseudo-randomisers can be based on chaotic processes, but still be completely dependent on deterministic laws of nature. So in practice we would not recognise the difference between a person with a real randomiser and another one with a pseudo-randomiser. So this second person can be fully determined, and we would not notice the difference.

Also, this concept makes our actions partially dependent on a random process. Now it can be that our actions are partially random (“What is your favourite colour?” “Blue…no red!”), but obviously this would be a disturbance of the possibility of free will (“I really wanted to take vanilla ice cream, but without reason I took chocolate, I really don’t know why”), instead of a condition for its existence.

And of course compatibilism does not say that the universe is determined. It says that determinism and free will are compatible, i.e. go hand in hand. The more our actions are random, i.e. not determined, the less free we can be. Happily enough macro-systems like the brain, have enough processes with a deterministic character that we can have free will. “Adequate determinism” is enough. kkwan’s statements that we do not live in a deterministic universe and therefore compatibilism is not true just beats thin air.

And of course compatibilism does not say that the universe is determined. It says that determinism and free will are compatible, i.e. go hand in hand. The more our actions are random, i.e. not determined, the less free we can be. Happily enough macro-systems like the brain, have enough processes with a deterministic character that we can have free will. “Adequate determinism” is enough. kkwan’s statements that we do not live in a deterministic universe and therefore compatibilism is not true just beats thin air.

It is implicit that determinism rules, in compatibilism, otherwise what is copatibilism compatible to?
Obviously, not indeterminism.

I did not state “that we do not live in a deterministic universe and therefore compatibilism is not true”.

There are alternative possibilities in my two stage model. The indeterminism is placed at the beginning of time.

Placing indeterminism “at the beginning of time” (whatever it means) is arbitrary to make your two stage model “work”, but in reality, indeterminism was, is and will be, in the universe whereas strict determinism does not exist at any level, in the universe.

With adequate determinism, your model will work well enough as a one stage and not a two stage model as it is superfluous to invoke indeterminism “at the beginning of time”.

Also we know adequate determinism has nothing to do with alternative possibilites. Simply toss a coin a few times to work that out.

Adequate determinism enables alternative possibilities because there is no absolute certainty, with adequate determinism.

I never heard of the two stage description of free will before, but if I follow your discussion with kkwan correctly he is right in that putting the ‘random’ element at the beginning of the universe takes out the point for which the two stage model is meant: to explain how somebody under exactly the same circumstances .

The idea isn’t that the person could have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.

The idea is they could have done otherwise depending upon their beliefs and desires and that their beliefs and desires could have been different depending upon how the indeterminism went in the first stage of the two stage model.

Since the first stage is out of our control it doesn’t need to be near to the time the choice is made.