was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing andfreezing alternately. It would not do to allow camp-fires except fardown the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allowmany of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march overfrom Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets andovercoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering.

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer onthe 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15,000 men, withoutintrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflictfurther than what was brought on by ourselves. Only one gunboat hadarrived. There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by themovement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there wasno actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in frontof McClernand's command. That general had undertaken to capture abattery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders orauthority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The battery wasin the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole armypresent. Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss onour side was great for the number of men engaged. In this assaultColonel William Morrison fell badly wounded. Up to this time thesurgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the housesnear our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals wereovercrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons thesuffering was not so great as it might have been. The hospitalarrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible tomake them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack oftents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally ofbut one or two rooms.

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I hadrequested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on hisexpedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as farup towards Donelson as possible. He started without delay, taking,however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamerAlps. Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, alittle after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a pointwithin gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the waterbatteries at long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival theday before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requestinghim at the same time to attack again that day so that I might takeadvantage of any diversion. The attack was made and many shots fellwithin the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. Theinvestment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troopsengaged would admit of.

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with theiron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboatsTyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade. On the morning of the14th Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had ordered over from FortHenry, also arrived about the same time. Up to this time he had beencommanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith.These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, andGeneral Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composedof the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrivedthe same day. This new division was assigned to the centre, giving thetwo flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a strongerline.

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, whilethe gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters andsilence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run thebatteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover. I hadordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to theriver above Dover in case they should be needed there. That positionattained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--anda very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled tosurrender.

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, andadvanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. After comingin range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but aconstant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bearupon the fort. I occupied a position on shore from which I could seethe advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance ofthe water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and Isoon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visiblydisabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed forthe day. The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides havingbeen hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through nearthe waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot,carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. Thetiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, droppedhelplessly back. Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that theyscarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel.

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but theywere jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the riverentirely out of the control of the men on board. Of course I onlywitnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at thetime over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that theenemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on thenight of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting FortDonelson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather hadturned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep upfires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, manyhad thrown away their overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest ofour gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility ofrendering any present assistance. I retired this night not knowing butthat I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for themen or build huts under the cover of the hills.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messengerfrom Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see meon the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before somuch that he could not come himself to me. I at once made mypreparations for starting. I directed my adjutant-general to notifyeach of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to donothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders,but to hold their positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen fordays and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads betweenthe troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads hadbecome cut up so as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of thenight of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. This made travel onhorseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as theroads would allow.

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in thestream. A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon onboard with the flag-officer. He explained to me in short the conditionin which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, andsuggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City withhis disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could havethe necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. I saw the absolutenecessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but Ishould be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. But theenemy relieved me from this necessity.

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no ideathat there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it onmyself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us thanthey had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12thto the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now wehad been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division oftroops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from FortHenry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, hadtaken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of mystaff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safetyof the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines infull force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which wasin full retreat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fasttime, but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had beenmade on the National right. I was some four or five miles north of ourleft. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point wherethe disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith andWallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held bySmith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part init. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the supportof McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within hislines.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre.When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had comeout in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand'sdivision had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force.His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in theircartridge-boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition near bylying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was notall of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who hadbeen educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantlysupplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men foundthemselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops whoseemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled, butmost of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of rangeof the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayerpushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops thatwere without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within hisintrenchments and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. Noofficer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had theirmuskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks,and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicateda determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as theprovisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff,who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badlydemoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted toforce his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first nowwill be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he getsahead of me." I determined to make the assault at once on our left. Itwas clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with hisentire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made onthe left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line,we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as wepassed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemyis trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." This actedlike a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. Werode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to himand directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his wholedivision, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a verythin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly shorttime, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while theywere working their way through the abatis intervening between them andthe enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night ofthe 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within thelines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederatesmust surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation,particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the nightof the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man oftalent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, didnot possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command,for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made himafraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain theConstitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all itsenemies. He had betrayed that trust. As Secretary of War he wasreported through the northern press to have scattered the little armythe country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail whensecession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he hadremoved arms from northern to southern arsenals. He continued in theCabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861,while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacymade out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid tofall into the hands of National troops. He would no doubt have beentried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had hebeen captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, andprided himself much on his services in the Mexican war. He telegraphedto General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebelrifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that theSouthern troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded thedispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were readingit Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it wouldbe impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was third inrank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to haveregarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding thedepartment, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters atNashville. Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelsonlost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at thesacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already inNashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing.Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It thendevolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position.Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Doverand before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigadeformerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000.Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on thesteamers. During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and someother troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passingbetween our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over theback-water in the little creek just south of Dover.

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter fromGeneral Buckner:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862.

SIR:--In consideration of all the circumstances governing the presentsituation of affairs at this station, I propose to the CommandingOfficer of the Federal forces the appointment of Commissioners to agreeupon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, andin that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862.

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army.

SIR:--Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment ofCommissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. Noterms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.I propose to move immediately upon your works.

SIR:--The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to anunexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under yourcommand, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of theConfederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrousterms which you propose.

I am, sir, Your very ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A.

General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the aboveletters, sent word to his different commanders on the line ofrifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to thesurrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify National troopsin their front so that all fighting might be prevented. White flagswere stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over thefort. As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received I mounted myhorse and rode to Dover. General Wallace, I found, had preceded me anhour or more. I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front,he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted,he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of GeneralBuckner.

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards servedwith him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. In thecourse of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me thatif he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easilyas I did. I told him that if he had been in command I should not havetried in the way I did: I had invested their lines with a smaller forcethan they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigadefull 5,000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon theircommander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works.I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. Hereplied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all thesick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry;that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men withthem; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during thepreceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but hesaid I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000.

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury hisdead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. I gavedirections that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. Ihave no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but itfamiliarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passingto and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobservedand went on. The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thoughtthey had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out ofthe army. Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that theywere tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and Ibade them go.

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be givenwith entire accuracy. The largest number admitted by any writer on theSouthern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He gives the number at17,000. But this must be an underestimate. The commissary general ofprisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 Fort Donelsonprisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point. General Pillow reportedthe killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowingthe actual numbers than the officers of McClernand's division, for mostof the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of thatdivision, and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrenderand when Pillow was a fugitive. It is known that Floyd and Pillowescaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than3,000 men. Forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leavingsingly and in squads all night. It is probable that the Confederateforce at Donelson, on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21,000 in roundnumbers.

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27,000 men to confront theConfederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left,over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th,after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived.

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at themouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and supplies tome. At that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority oflaw to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. But everyboat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note ofencouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for anyassistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service atthe front I might send for him and he would waive rank.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPONNASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THECOMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL SMITH.

The news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great delight all over theNorth. At the South, particularly in Richmond, the effect wascorrespondingly depressing. I was promptly promoted to the grade ofMajor-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by the Senate. All three ofmy division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonelswho commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteerservice. My chief, who was in St. Louis, telegraphed hiscongratulations to General Hunter in Kansas for the services he hadrendered in securing the fall of Fort Donelson by sending reinforcementsso rapidly. To Washington he telegraphed that the victory was due toGeneral C. F. Smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country willapplaud." On the 19th there was published at St. Louis a formal orderthanking Flag-officer Foote and myself, and the forces under ourcommand, for the victories on the Tennessee and the Cumberland. Ireceived no other recognition whatever from General Halleck. ButGeneral Cullum, his chief of staff, who was at Cairo, wrote me a warmcongratulatory letter on his own behalf. I approved of General Smith'spromotion highly, as I did all the promotions that were made.

My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of FortDonelson the way was opened to the National forces all over theSouth-west without much resistance. If one general who would have takenthe responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of theAlleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis andVicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going onrapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at allthese centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy thatmight be found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition ofrebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so thatreinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could havebeen obtained to carry them to their destination. On the other handthere were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still attheir homes in the South-western States, who had not gone into theConfederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire togo. If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of themnever would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was giventhe enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twiceafterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the OhioRiver.

I promptly informed the department commander of our success at FortDonelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and Nashville; andthat unless I received orders to the contrary I should take Clarksvilleon the 21st and Nashville about the 1st of March. Both these places areon the Cumberland River above Fort Donelson. As I heard nothing fromheadquarters on the subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksvilleat the time designated and found the place evacuated. The capture offorts Henry and Donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken fromColumbus to Bowling Green, and it was known that he was falling backfrom the eastern point of this line and that Buell was following, or atleast advancing. I should have sent troops to Nashville at the time Isent to Clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there weremany prisoners to be forwarded north.

None of the reinforcements from Buell's army arrived until the 24th ofFebruary. Then General Nelson came up, with orders to report to me withtwo brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo. I knew General Buellwas advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scoutsthat the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all thesupplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the bestprovisioned posts in the South. I had no use for reinforcements now,and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelsonto proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson. I sent agunboat also as a convoy. The Cumberland River was very high at thetime; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all rivercraft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. Nashvilleis on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching fromthe east. I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's division would beuseful in ferrying the balance of Buell's forces across. I orderedNelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible,and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to returnbelow the city and await orders. Buell, however, had already arrived inperson at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell's division of hiscommand reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possessionof the city.

After Nelson had gone and before I had learned of Buell's arrival, Isent word to department headquarters that I should go to Nashvillemyself on the 28th if I received no orders to the contrary. Hearingnothing, I went as I had informed my superior officer I would do. Onarriving at Clarksville I saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the samethat had taken Nelson's division--and troops going aboard. I landed andcalled on the commanding officer, General C. F. Smith. As soon as hesaw me he showed an order he had just received from Buell in thesewords:

NASHVILLE, February 25, 1862.

GENERAL C. F. SMITH, Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville.

GENERAL:--The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to myintentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold thisside at every hazard. If the enemy should assume the offensive, and Iam assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is hisintention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only15,000 men. I have to request you, therefore, to come forward with allthe available force under your command. So important do I consider theoccasion that I think it necessary to give this communication all theforce of orders, and I send four boats, the Diana, Woodford, John Rain,and Autocrat, to bring you up. In five or six days my force willprobably be sufficient to relieve you.

General Smith said this order was nonsense. But I told him it wasbetter to obey it. The General replied, "of course I must obey," andsaid his men were embarking as fast as they could. I went on up toNashville and inspected the position taken by Nelson's troops. I didnot see Buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that I hadbeen in Nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. On myreturn to the boat we met. His troops were still east of the river, andthe steamers that had carried Nelson's division up were mostly atClarksville to bring Smith's division. I said to General Buell myinformation was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible.General Buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelvemiles away. I said: "Quite probably; Nashville contained valuablestores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probablytrying to carry away all he can. The fighting is doubtless with therear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting awaywith." Buell spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of anattack from the enemy. I said, in the absence of positive information,I believed my information was correct. He responded that he "knew.""Well," I said, "I do not know; but as I came by Clarksville GeneralSmith's troops were embarking to join you."

Smith's troops were returned the same day. The enemy were trying to getaway from Nashville and not to return to it.

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all theConfederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the exceptionof those in the extreme south. On the National side the forcesconfronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separatedepartments. Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supremecommand over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon onepoint, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, dividedinto independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious actionexcept by orders from Washington.

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston's troops east of the Mississippioccupied a line extending from Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs,on his right. As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the TennesseeRiver, the west bank of the Cumberland and Bowling Green, all werestrongly fortified. Mill Springs was intrenched. The National troopsoccupied no territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisonsalong its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront thatat Bowling Green. Johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferiorto that of the National troops; but this was compensated for by theadvantage of being sole commander of all the Confederate forces at theWest, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care ofhis rear without any detail of soldiers. But when General George H.Thomas moved upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally routed him,inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts Henry andHeiman fell into the hands of the National forces, with their armamentsand about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten theConfederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreatfrom Bowling Green on Nashville. He reached this latter place on the14th of February, while Donelson was still besieged. Buell followedwith a portion of the Army of the Ohio, but he had to march and did notreach the east bank of the Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24thof the month, and then with only one division of his army.

The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed ordisabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against anyNational troops that could have been brought against it within ten daysafter the arrival of the force from Bowling Green. Johnston seemed tolie quietly at Nashville to await the result at Fort Donelson, on whichhe had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in theStates of Kentucky and Tennessee. It is true, the two generals seniorin rank at Fort Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, evenclaiming great Confederate victories up to the night of the 16th whenthey must have been preparing for their individual escape. Johnston madea fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to Floyd, who hemust have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one.Pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. If these officers hadbeen forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then heshould have left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer,and with the remainder of his force gone to Donelson himself. If he hadbeen captured the result could not have been worse than it was.

Johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of National troops.He wrote to Richmond on the 8th of February, "I think the gunboats ofthe enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity ofemploying their land force in cooperation." After the fall of thatplace he abandoned Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to saveeither, and fell back into northern Mississippi, where, six weeks later,he was destined to end his career.

From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly unfortunate in notreceiving dispatches from General Halleck. The order of the 10th ofFebruary directing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly tothe land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for thatpurpose, reached me after Donelson was invested. I received nothingdirect which indicated that the department commander knew we were inpossession of Donelson. I was reporting regularly to the chief ofstaff, who had been sent to Cairo, soon after the troops left there, toreceive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to theSt. Louis headquarters. Cairo was at the southern end of the telegraphwire. Another line was started at once from Cairo to Paducah andSmithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively.My dispatches were all sent to Cairo by boat, but many of thoseaddressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancingwire and he failed to forward them. This operator afterwards proved tobe a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went southtaking his dispatches with him. A telegram from General McClellan to meof February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report infull the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d ofMarch.

On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my commandback to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at Donelson. FromFort Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport, Mississippi,and Paris, Tennessee. We started from Donelson on the 4th, and the sameday I was back on the Tennessee River. On March 4th I also received thefollowing dispatch from General Halleck:

MAJ.-GEN. U. S. GRANT, Fort Henry:

You will place Maj.-Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, andremain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to reportstrength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

I was surprised. This was the first intimation I had received thatGeneral Halleck had called for information as to the strength of mycommand. On the 6th he wrote to me again. "Your going to Nashvillewithout authority, and when your presence with your troops was of theutmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington,so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return." This wasthe first I knew of his objecting to my going to Nashville. That placewas not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expresslydeclared in orders, were "not defined." Nashville is west of theCumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me for dutyto occupy the place. I turned over the command as directed and thenreplied to General Halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved fromfurther duty under him.

Later I learned that General Halleck had been calling lustily for moretroops, promising that he would do something important if he could onlybe sufficiently reinforced. McClellan asked him what force he then had.Halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my commandwas concerned, but I received none of his dispatches. At last Halleckreported to Washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give thestrength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that I had goneto Nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority,and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at BullRun had been by defeat. General McClellan, on this information, orderedthat I should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should bemade into any charges against me. He even authorized my arrest. Thusin less than two weeks after the victory at Donelson, the two leadinggenerals in the army were in correspondence as to what dispositionshould be made of me, and in less than three weeks I was virtually inarrest and without a command.

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Hallecksent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated thataccounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him toinvestigate and report the facts. He forwarded also a copy of adetailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me;but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had createdall the trouble. On the contrary, he wrote to me, "Instead of relievingyou, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assumeimmediate command, and lead it to new victories." In consequence I feltvery grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had setme right with the government. I never knew the truth until GeneralBadeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of mycampaigns.

General Halleck unquestionably deemed General C. F. Smith a much fitterofficer for the command of all the forces in the military district thanI was, and, to render him available for such command, desired hispromotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders.It is probable that the general opinion was that Smith's long servicesin the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper personfor such command. Indeed I was rather inclined to this opinion myselfat that time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith as he haddone under me. But this did not justify the dispatches which GeneralHalleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them fromme when pretending to explain the action of my superiors.

On receipt of the order restoring me to command I proceeded to Savannahon the Tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. General Smithwas delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of thetreatment I had received. He was on a sick bed at the time, from whichhe never came away alive. His death was a severe loss to our westernarmy. His personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment andprofessional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidenceof those he commanded as well as of those over him.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE CONFEDERATE ATTACKAT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL SHERMAN--CONDITIONOF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

When I reassumed command on the 17th of March I found the army divided,about half being on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, whileone division was at Crump's landing on the west bank about four mileshigher up, and the remainder at Pittsburg landing, five miles aboveCrump's. The enemy was in force at Corinth, the junction of the twomost important railroads in the Mississippi valley--one connectingMemphis and the Mississippi River with the East, and the other leadingsouth to all the cotton states. Still another railroad connects Corinthwith Jackson, in west Tennessee. If we obtained possession of Corinththe enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies orsupplies until that running east from Vicksburg was reached. It was thegreat strategic position at the West between the Tennessee and theMississippi rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg.

I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion for Pittsburglanding, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at Corinth and collectingan army there under Johnston. It was my expectation to march againstthat army as soon as Buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me withthe Army of the Ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river wasthe place to start from. Pittsburg is only about twenty miles fromCorinth, and Hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mileor two nearer. I had not been in command long before I selected Hamburgas the place to put the Army of the Ohio when it arrived. The roadsfrom Pittsburg and Hamburg to Corinth converge some eight miles out.This disposition of the troops would have given additional roads tomarch over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance ofeach other.

Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had joined the Army of theTennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made anexpedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood ofEastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroadeast of Corinth. The rains had been so heavy for some time before thatthe low-lands had become impassable swamps. Sherman debarked his troopsand started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but theriver was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributariesthreatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, andthe expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. The gunshad to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats.

On the 17th of March the army on the Tennessee River consisted of fivedivisions, commanded respectively by Generals C. F. Smith, McClernand,L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman. General W. H. L. Wallace wastemporarily in command of Smith's division, General Smith, as I havesaid, being confined to his bed. Reinforcements were arriving daily andas they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into adivision, and the command given to General Prentiss, who had beenordered to report to me. General Buell was on his way from Nashvillewith 40,000 veterans. On the 19th of March he was at Columbia,Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg. When all reinforcementsshould have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching onCorinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though thissubject was taken into consideration. McPherson, my only militaryengineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, butreported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampmentas it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, wasyet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to beeasily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would bein the hands of the enemy. The fact is, I regarded the campaign we wereengaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy wouldleave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he wouldbe attacked where he was if he remained. This view, however, did notprevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keepadvised of all movements of the enemy.

Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, andoccasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. On the 1stof April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing thatan advance of some kind was contemplated. On the 2d Johnston leftCorinth in force to attack my army. On the 4th his cavalry dashed downand captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed somefive miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road. Colonel Bucklandsent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with anentire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking theremainder of a brigade. The pursuit was kept up for some three milesbeyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and afternightfall Sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what hadoccurred.

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us,along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. My apprehension wasmuch greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was forPittsburg. I had no apprehension that the enemy could really captureeither place. But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapiddash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of whichwere kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could bereinforced. Lew. Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen thathe was not removed.

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned toSavannah in the evening. I was intending to remove my headquarters toPittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah.I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwiseshould have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. The skirmishingin our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of Aprilthat I did not leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I feltthere would be no further danger before the morning.

On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland's advance, I was very muchinjured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while I was trying toget to the front where firing had been heard. The night was one ofimpenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing wasvisible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes oflightning. Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse,without guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far, however, when Imet General W. H. L. Wallace and Colonel (afterwards General) McPhersoncoming from the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so faras the enemy was concerned. On the way back to the boat my horse's feetslipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. Theextreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the fewpreceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protractedlameness. As it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that myboot had to be cut off. For two or three days after I was unable towalk except with crutches.

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived atSavannah and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to bein a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's landing orPittsburg as occasion required. I had learned that General Buellhimself would be at Savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on hisarrival. Affairs at Pittsburg landing had been such for several daysthat I did not want to be away during the day. I determined, therefore,to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus savetime. He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised meof the fact and I was not aware of it until some time after. While Iwas at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction ofPittsburg landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buellinforming him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah. Onthe way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat to run in close toCrump's landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew. Wallace.I found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and Idirected him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders hemight receive. He replied that his troops were already under arms andprepared to move.

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's landingmight not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, abouteight A.M., I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable, andthat nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports andstores, was needed at Crump's. Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on mystaff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace tomarch immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river. CaptainBaxter made a memorandum of this order. About one P.M., not hearingfrom Wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, I sent two moreof my staff, Colonel McPherson and Captain Rowley, to bring him up withhis division. They reported finding him marching towards Purdy, Bethel,or some point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by severalmiles than when he started. The road from his first position toPittsburg landing was direct and near the river. Between the two pointsa bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at whichWallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at thetwo places to support each other in case of need. Wallace did notarrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. General Wallacehas since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter wassimply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which hemarched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy whereit crosses Owl Creek on the right of Sherman; but this is not where Ihad ordered him nor where I wanted him to go.

I never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary furtherthan to direct him to come to Pittsburg landing, without specifying bywhat route. His was one of three veteran divisions that had been inbattle, and its absence was severely felt. Later in the war GeneralWallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th ofApril, 1862. I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did hewould be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thusperform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of hiscommand, as well as to the benefit of his country.

Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing was a log meeting-housecalled Shiloh. It stood on the ridge which divides the waters of Snakeand Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Tennessee just north ofPittsburg landing, and the latter south. This point was the key to ourposition and was held by Sherman. His division was at that time whollyraw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but I thought thisdeficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander.McClernand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged atforts Henry and Donelson and were therefore veterans so far as westerntroops had become such at that stage of the war. Next to McClernandcame Prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart withone brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss,massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. The division ofGeneral C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General Smithwas still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hearing of our guns. Hisservices would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his healthpermitted his presence. The command of his division devolved uponBrigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer; aveteran too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war and had beenwith his command at Henry and Donelson. Wallace was mortally wounded inthe first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thusnecessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of hisdivision was much weakened.

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek on theleft to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearlysouth and possibly a little west. The water in all these streams wasvery high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. The enemywas compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did withgreat vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but sufferingmuch heavier on his own.

The Confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses ontheir own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. Theground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timberedwith scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troopson both sides. There was also considerable underbrush. A number ofattempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Shermanwas posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. But thefront attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success ofthese attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled,several times, to take positions to the rear nearer Pittsburg landing.When the firing ceased at night the National line was all of a mile inrear of the position it had occupied in the morning.

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded byGeneral Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left hisflanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 ofhis officers and men. General Badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th asabout the time this capture took place. He may be right as to the time,but my recollection is that the hour was later. General Prentisshimself gave the hour as half-past five. I was with him, as I was witheach of the division commanders that day, several times, and myrecollection is that the last time I was with him was about half-pastfour, when his division was standing up firmly and the General was ascool as if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four orlater, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured intheir camps is without any foundation whatever. If it had been true, ascurrently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people,that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, therewould not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousandskilled and wounded on the Confederate side.

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture ofPrentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day fromSnake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or theTennessee on the left above Pittsburg.

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing andgenerally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at allpoints at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash againstNorthern pluck and endurance. Three of the five divisions engaged onSunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received theirarms on the way from their States to the field. Many of them hadarrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load theirmuskets according to the manual. Their officers were equally ignorantof their duties. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing thatmany of the regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases, as I nowremember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearingthe whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these cases the colonels wereconstitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so theofficers and men led out of danger by them. Better troops never wentupon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwardsproved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle ofbullets and shell at Shiloh.

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing fromone part of the field to another, giving directions to divisioncommanders. In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed itimportant to stay long with Sherman. Although his troops were thenunder fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presencewith them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled themto render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best ofveterans. McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting wasin front of these two divisions. McClernand told me on that day, the6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him.A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that daywould have been a sad one for the troops engaged at Shiloh. And hownear we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in thehand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making aslight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition tothis he had several horses shot during the day.

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used infront; I therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--ofwhom there were many. When there would be enough of them to make ashow, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sentto reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regardto their companies, regiments or brigades.

On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and metGeneral Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but atthat time there probably were as many as four or five thousandstragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most ofwhom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, beforethey would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protectthemselves. This meeting between General Buell and myself was on thedispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah. It wasbrief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river.As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the menlying under cover of the river bank. I saw him berating them and tryingto shame them into joining their regiments. He even threatened themwith shells from the gunboats near by. But it was all to no effect.Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of thosewho saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have no doubt thatthis sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreatwould be a good thing just then. If he had come in by the front insteadof through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and feltdifferently. Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he wouldhave witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. The distantrear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which tojudge correctly what is going on in front. Later in the war, whileoccupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, Ilearned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed muchfrom that within our own. Some of the country people estimated thestragglers from Johnston's army as high as 20,000. Of course this wasan exaggeration.

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: along the top ofthe bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing,Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more piecesof artillery facing south or up the river. This line of artillery wason the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into theTennessee. Hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of thisartillery, extending west and possibly a little north. McClernand camenext in the general line, looking more to the west. His division wascomplete in its organization and ready for any duty. Sherman came next,his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other two, wascomplete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any serviceit might be called upon to render. All three divisions were, as amatter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers fromthe terrible battle of the day. The division of W. H. L. Wallace, asmuch from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigadecommanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost itsorganization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division.Prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members havingbeen killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant servicesbefore its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to thedefence of Shiloh.

The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake Creek, a shortdistance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for thepurpose of connecting Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing. Shermanhad posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlookedboth the bridge over which Wallace was expected and the creek above thatpoint. In this last position Sherman was frequently attacked beforenight, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advancein order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came up after dark.

There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. TheTennessee River was very high and there was water to a considerabledepth in the ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort toturn our flank, but was repelled. The gunboats Tyler and Lexington,Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided thearmy and effectually checked their further progress. Before any ofBuell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing hadalmost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of theenemy to advance had absolutely ceased. There was some artillery firingfrom an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do notremember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. Ashis troops arrived in the dusk General Buell marched several of hisregiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired brisklyfor some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firingreceived an injury. The attack had spent its force.

General Lew. Wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing hadceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came,Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came; but none--unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men whosaved Shiloh on that first day against large odds. Buell's loss on the6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36thIndiana infantry. The Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least7,000 men. The presence of two or three regiments of Buell's army onthe west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect inpreventing the capture of Pittsburg landing.

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next daywould bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative,that I visited each division commander in person before anyreinforcements had reached the field. I directed them to throw outheavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, andpush them forward until they found the enemy, following with theirentire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soonas found. To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson,and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh. Victory was assuredwhen Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. I wasglad, however, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them withdoing all there was for them to do.

During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell'sarmy crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, formingthe left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came upthe river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bankearly on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person. My command was thusnearly doubled in numbers and efficiency.

During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed tothe storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a fewhundred yards back from the river bank. My ankle was so much swollenfrom the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise wasso painful, that I could get no rest.

The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep withoutthis additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing restive underthe storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house underthe bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded menwere being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputatedas the case might require, and everything being done to save life oralleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encounteringthe enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the campsoccupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile backfrom the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before.It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell'scommand. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tentsduring the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were droppedupon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night.

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was asfollows: General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his left; thenMcClernand and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army, was on ourextreme left, next to the river.

Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right, McCookfollowed and formed the extreme right of Buell's command. My oldcommand thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly underBuell constituted the left wing of the army. These relative positionswere retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven fromthe field.

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. Thisday everything was favorable to the Union side. We had now become theattacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been theday before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last pointheld by him was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, onthe left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About three o'clock, beingnear that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhereelse, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, fromtroops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward,going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. Atthis point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable forcharging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to break andonly wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join theirfriends who had started earlier. After marching to within musket-rangeI stopped and let the troops pass. The command, CHARGE, was given, andwas executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemybroke. (*7)

CHAPTER XXV.

STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ONSHILOH.

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right toleft and back, to see for myself the progress made. In the early partof the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson and Major Hawkins,then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. We weremoving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward theriver above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to ourright, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from theedge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells andballs whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. I do notthink it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight.In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did notstop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position wehalted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting asif ready to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struckhim forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirelythrough. In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given nosign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the metalscabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off;before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. There werethree of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one asword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no worse.

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains forsome days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemycarrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, madethem still worse for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had notthe heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days,lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feeldisposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, topursue. Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only afew weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time past, a departmentcommander, while I commanded only a district. I did not meet Buell inperson until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; buthad I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at leastrequested him to follow.

I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found thatthe enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, someammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening theirloads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out wefound their field hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must haveresulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners andprobably some guns.

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, andbut few in the East equalled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw anopen field, in our possession on the second day, over which theConfederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered withdead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, inany direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching theground. On our side National and Confederate troops were mingledtogether in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the fieldnearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not beenploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, busheshad grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not oneof these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were allcut down.

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience ofthe army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We werewithout intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more thanhalf the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drillas soldiers. The officers with them, except the division commanders andpossibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equallyinexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the menwho achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroyan army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavyloss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged andconvinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders tolet the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detailparties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury theConfederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers soburied. The latter part of these instructions was not carried out byall; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some ofthe parties sent out by McClernand. The heaviest loss sustained by theenemy was in front of these two divisions.

The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have beenintrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and spade had been butlittle resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subjectunder consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, asalready stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besidesthis, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drillmore than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe.Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that hadbeen hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments ofincomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other.Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline wereworth more to our men than fortifications.

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as muchprofessional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. Ihad been two years at West Point with him, and had served with himafterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more. Hewas not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimateacquaintances. He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidenceand respect of all who knew him. He was a strict disciplinarian, andperhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who"enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. Onesystem embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men ofsocial standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character.The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in anyother occupation. General Buell became an object of harsh criticismlater, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. No one who knewhim ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing couldbe more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war andthen betray the trust. When I came into command of the army in 1864, Irequested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerablythrough the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people.Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had beenconducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why.Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every worddropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did notconfirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the waror the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurredfor me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjustcharges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the verycharge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty. This brought from GeneralBuell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York World some timebefore I received the letter itself. I could very well understand hisgrievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustainedby an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I repliedto him, but not through the press. I kept no copy of my letter, nor didI ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces atthe beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon ofthe first day. This wound, as I understood afterwards, was notnecessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But he was a man who would notabandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger andconsequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted bythe loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon afterdied. The news was not long in reaching our side and I suppose wasquite an encouragement to the National soldiers.

I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war and later as an officerin the regular army. He was a man of high character and ability. Hiscontemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to knowhim personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to provethe most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce.

I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army toprove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon hismilitary ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches ofJohnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer'squalifications as a soldier. My judgment now is that he was vacillatingand undecided in his actions.

All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were so discouraging to theauthorities in Richmond that Jefferson Davis wrote an unofficial letterto Johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, andsaying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship,but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. The letter was nota reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as thoughit had been one. General Johnston raised another army as rapidly as hecould, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth. He knew theNational troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position.But he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of hisoperations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign whichwould restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish stillmore. We have the authority of his son and biographer for saying thathis plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh and crush them; then tocross the Tennessee and destroy the army of Buell, and push the waracross the Ohio River. The design was a bold one; but we have the sameauthority for saying that in the execution Johnston showed vacillationand indecision. He left Corinth on the 2d of April and was not ready toattack until the 6th. The distance his army had to march was less thantwenty miles. Beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to theattack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the Nationaltroops would attack the Confederates in their intrenchments; second, wewere in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched.Johnston not only listened to the objection of Beauregard to an attack,but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. Onthe evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of hisgenerals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th.During this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached,the battle began by the National troops opening fire on the enemy. Thisseemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battleof Shiloh. It also seems to me to settle the question as to whetherthere was a surprise.

I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or hisability. But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by manyof his friends. He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated.

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to thecommand, which he retained to the close of the battle and during thesubsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place.His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but Ido not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under thecircumstances. Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won whenJohnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me wouldhave been annihilated or captured. IFS defeated the Confederates atShiloh. There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefullybeaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlesslyover the enemy and IF all of theirs had taken effect. Commandinggenerals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact thatwhen he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make acharge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there wasneither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unboundedconfidence on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, nohour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy,although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did notarrive at an earlier hour.

The description of the battle of Shiloh given by Colonel Wm. PrestonJohnston is very graphic and well told. The reader will imagine that hecan see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of Unionsoldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towardsthe Tennessee River, which was a little more than two miles away at thebeginning of the onset. If the reader does not stop to inquire why, withsuch Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting,the National troops were not all killed, captured or driven into theriver, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. But I witnessed thefight from the National side from eight o'clock in the morning untilnight closed the contest. I see but little in the description that Ican recognize. The Confederate troops fought well and deservecommendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April,without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more thantheir just dues.

The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of thefirst day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had beenvery heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on theNational side, with the difference that those of the enemy left thefield entirely and were not brought back to their respective commandsfor many days. On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell backfurther than the landing on the river, and many of these were in linefor duty on the second day. The admissions of the highest Confederateofficers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd.The victory was not to either party until the battle was over. It wasthen a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohioboth participated. But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entirerebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and nightalone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson'sdivision.

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skillclaimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing tocriticise except the claims put forward for it since. But theConfederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority ingeneralship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to theUnion troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The troopson both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreignfoe. It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little moredash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly lessenduring.

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their menagainst ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at severalpoints at once. This they did with daring and energy, until at nightthe rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was tobe prepared to resist assaults wherever made. The object of theConfederates on the second day was to get away with as much of theirarmy and material as possible. Ours then was to drive them from ourfront, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of theirmen and material. We were successful in driving them back, but not sosuccessful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. Asit was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as muchartillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one greatcapture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemygained from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman lost seven pieces ofartillery, McClernand six, Prentiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries.On the 7th Sherman captured seven guns, McClernand three and the Army ofthe Ohio twenty.

At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces on the morning ofthe 6th was 33,000 men. Lew. Wallace brought 5,000 more afternightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955.According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this numberprobably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard ornurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry amusket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving payfrom the government is counted. Excluding the troops who fled,panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a timeduring the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. On the 7thBuell brought 20,000 more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's didnot reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firinghad ceased, but not in time to be of much service.

Our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and2,885 missing. Of these, 2,103 were in the Army of the Ohio.Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed,8,012 wounded and 957 missing. This estimate must be incorrect. Weburied, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of thedivisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. Beauregardreports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their totalloss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares thathe could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed italways did both before and subsequently when I was in command. Thenature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it coulddo nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. Thecountry was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of thebattle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger fromfire from the gunboats as the foe. But about sundown, when the Nationaltroops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was nearthe river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which wasdelivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when firing hadentirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself,approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea ofdropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutesduring the night. This was done with effect, as is proved by theConfederate reports.

Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other citizens,believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapsesuddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of itsarmies. Donelson and Henry were such victories. An army of more than21,000 men was captured or destroyed. Bowling Green, Columbus andHickman, Kentucky, fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville,Tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell intoour hands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths tothe head of navigation, were secured. But when Confederate armies werecollected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, fromMemphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumedthe offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had beenlost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except bycomplete conquest. Up to that time it had been the policy of our army,certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property ofthe citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to theirsentiments, whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regardedit as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found attheir homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support orsupply armies. Protection was still continued over such supplies aswere within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold;but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded asmuch contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction wasaccomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as thedestruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war.Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished.Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under thedirection of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners,if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermasteror commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northerndepots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when itcould not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone tothe support of secession and rebellion.

This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening theend.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg landing, has been perhaps lessunderstood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistentlymisunderstood, than any other engagement between National andConfederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of thebattle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau and, in a speechbefore a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of theseappeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after publicopinion had been most erroneously formed.

I myself made no report to General Halleck, further than was containedin a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that anengagement had been fought and announcing the result. A few daysafterwards General Halleck moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landingand assumed command of the troops in the field. Although next to him inrank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I wasignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territorywithin my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troopsengaged at Shiloh I was not permitted to see one of the reports ofGeneral Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they werepublished by the War Department long after the event. For this reason Inever made a full official report of this engagement.

CHAPTER XXVI.

HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED.

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April andimmediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Popearrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of IslandNumber Ten in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburglanding five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: theArmy of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Popecommanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided thecombined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing.Major-General George H. Thomas, who had been in Buell's army, wastransferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee and givencommand of the right wing, composed of all of that army exceptMcClernand's and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was assigned tothe command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace'sdivisions. Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Popethe left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I was named second incommand of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of theright wing and reserve.

Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to send intheir reports without delay to department headquarters. Those fromofficers of the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me; but from theArmy of the Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing throughmy hands. General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report,but I positively declined on the ground that he had received the reportsof a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their coming through me.He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, butexplained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving thecommand, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it toWashington.

Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander foran advance on Corinth. Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, andexpeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if ourposition was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towardsCorinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were alsoconstructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by differentroutes could reinforce each other. All commanders were cautionedagainst bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that itwould be better to retreat than to fight. By the 30th of April allpreparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile and Ohiorailroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth as far asMonterey twelve miles from Pittsburg. Everywhere small bodies of theenemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force tofight battles.

Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburglanding and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, butprobably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four milessouth of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, andat the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with theMobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile. From Pittsburgto Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevationthat makes high hills to pass over. In 1862 the greater part of thecountry was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses.Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines,but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passingthrough with ease. There are two small creeks running from north of thetown and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creekwhich empties into the Tuscumbia River. Corinth is on the ridge betweenthese streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. The creeksare insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widensout in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of anenemy. On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy wasstrongly intrenched.

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, andconsequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. We ought tohave seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville,when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then itshould have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops atPittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival ofPope should not have been awaited. There was no time from the battle ofShiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not haveleft if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from theirdefeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green,Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact fromhaving been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that astand for the time would have been impossible. Beauregard madestrenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. Heappealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and receiveda few. A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the samequarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He hadnegroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooksand laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into theranks. The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, werenot willing to part with their negroes. It is only fair to state thatthey probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and forthe families left at home.

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shilohwith 17,000 men. Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted toadd to the strength at Corinth. With these reinforcements and the newregiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large forceon paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. We estimatedhis strength at 70,000. Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. Thedefensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that numberfor an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of.

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shilohupon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the close.The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of coursethe small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way foran advance. Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "notto bring on an engagement." "It is better to retreat than to fight."The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simplyobservers there were but few engagements that even threatened to becomebattles. All the engagements fought ought to have served to encouragethe enemy. Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; aline was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position.Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troopsto concentrate in case of attack. The National armies were thoroughlyintrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth.

For myself I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent directto the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made fromone line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. My positionwas so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during thesiege to be relieved.

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time,with the right wing. Pope being on the extreme left did not see so muchof his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. On the 3dof May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, butthrew forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth.His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, butcarried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. There would thenhave been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to forma new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conformwith the general line. On the 8th of May he moved again, taking hiswhole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to therebel line. Again he was ordered back. By the 4th of May the centreand right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out. Their advance wasslow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. Theleft wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself closeto the enemy. The creek with the marsh before described, separated thetwo lines. Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained eitherline at this point.

Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right ofthe right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and four from theworks in their front. The creek, which was a formidable obstacle foreither side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on ourright. Here the enemy occupied two positions. One of them, as much astwo miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation anddefended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. A heavy woodintervened between this work and the National forces. In rear to thesouth there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of thisclearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied byinfantry. Sherman's division carried these two positions with some lossto himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May,and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as completeas it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west of the Mobile andOhio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroadeast of Corinth.

Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that Ithought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by therear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope wouldfind no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no seriousartificial one. The ground, or works, occupied by our left could beheld by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. Tothe right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. I wassilenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested anunmilitary movement.

Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command wasthen on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had beenevacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinthwith his brigade. Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out ofCorinth constantly. Some of the men who had been engaged in variouscapacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, byputting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains weremoving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. They saidloaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones comingin. Subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment.Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and onthe 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared forbattle and announced in orders that there was every indication that ourleft was to be attacked that morning. Corinth had already beenevacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession withoutopposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. TheConfederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on thearrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees thatreinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or wounded man leftby the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had beenblown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns,logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels ofwagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us.

The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategicimportance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. Itwas nearly bloodless. It is a question whether the MORALE of theConfederate troops engaged at Corinth was not improved by the immunitywith which they were permitted to remove all public property and thenwithdraw themselves. On our side I know officers and men of the Army ofthe Tennessee--and I presume the same is true of those of the othercommands--were disappointed at the result. They could not see how themere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effectiverebel armies existed. They believed that a well-directed attack wouldat least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth. Formyself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a twodays' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements afterthe battle of Shiloh.

General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinthon a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took thewhole National army to do it. All commanding points two or three milesto the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. It wasexpected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits.They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men tofully man them. It was probably thought that a final battle of the warwould be fought at that point. These fortifications were never used.Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops,General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and GeneralBuell soon followed. Buell was the senior of the two generals andcommanded the entire column. The pursuit was kept up for some thirtymiles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war orprisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and werewilling captives. On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all backat Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of thesemovements.

The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6thof June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces tookpossession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source tothat point. The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put ingood condition and held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson,Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held theTennessee River from its mouth to Eastport. New Orleans and Baton Rougehad fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now theConfederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication withRichmond to the single line of road running east from Vicksburg. Todispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the firstimportance. The possession of the Mississippi by us from Memphis toBaton Rouge was also a most important object. It would be equal to theamputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy.

After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besidesenough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motionfor the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of therebellion. In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swellthe effective force. But the work of depletion commenced. Buell withthe Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphisand Charleston railroad. This he was ordered to repair as he advanced--only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops assoon as he was out of the way. If he had been sent directly toChattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisionsalong the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could havearrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the lossof life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Braggwould then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possessionof middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone Riverand Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside wouldnot have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himselfor escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought.These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable,which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinthfell into the possession of the National forces. The positive resultsmight have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or toany other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.

CHAPTER XXVII.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURNTO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCEUPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command,became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove myheadquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked, between the fall ofDonelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty underHalleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation ofthe town. I then obtained permission to leave the department, butGeneral Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urgedme so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain. Myapplication to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was,however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point withmy staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. There wasa detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles westto be stationed as a guard to the railroad. I went under cover of thisescort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to LaGrange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me.

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There wereno troops stationed between these two points, except a small forceguarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad.Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange.General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had hisheadquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious countryhouse. The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, heinvited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him. I accepted theinvitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was athorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession.After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with arecital of the services he was rendering the cause. He was too old tobe in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but hismeans enabled him to be useful in other ways. In ordinary times thehomestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supplythe slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi. Nowhe raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have thatyear a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men whohad gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the"patriotism" of those better off. The crops around me looked fine, andI had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to begathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvestthem for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of therebellion instead of its support. I felt, however, the greatest respectfor the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughlybelieved in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible toconceive.

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was verywarm, even for that latitude and season. With my staff and small escortI started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twentymiles of Memphis. At this point I saw a very comfortable-lookingwhite-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a littledistance from the road. I let my staff and escort ride ahead while Ihalted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. I was invited atonce to dismount and come in. I found my host very genial andcommunicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady ofthe house announced dinner and asked me to join them. The host,however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and,mounting my horse, rode on.

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up fromthe southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis. A mile west ofthis junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shadeof forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet backfrom the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of theroad. I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of theafternoon, and then rode into Memphis.

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was aMr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union. He had not pressed me to tarrylonger with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr.Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch asif something had hit him. Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel GeneralJackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. Hisneighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche inthat of the Union. The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknownto Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it andwould give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasantto him after the call of Dr. Smith.

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guardingworkmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis. On the day Ientered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which hadbeen sent east for the troops so engaged. The drovers were not enlistedmen and he released them. A day or two after one of these drovers cameto my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, saidJackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that hewas six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad whenhe learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and hadridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with thatfrom La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passedthree-quarters of an hour before. He thought it would be useless topursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start.Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me withmy party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even armsin our hands with which to defend ourselves.

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at notcapturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among thesoldiers the facts related were learned. A day or two later Mr. DeLoche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivilityin not insisting on my staying for dinner. He said that his wifeaccused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of hisneighbor, he had felt restless until I got away. I never met GeneralJackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at hisvery comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado. I remindedhim of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that hewas thankful now he had not captured me. I certainly was very thankfultoo.

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long.The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel tome. Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where thecitizens were at home in any great numbers. Dover was within thefortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, everycitizen was gone. There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, andbut very few at Corinth. Memphis, however, was a populous city, andthere were many of the citizens remaining there who were not onlythoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thoughtthat even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if theycould only be induced to make an honest confession. It took hours of mytime every day to listen to complaints and requests. The latter weregenerally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaintswere not always, or even often, well founded. Two instances will markthe general character. First: the officer who commanded at Memphisimmediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troopshad ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to thesoldiers. Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. Second:at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a lawconfiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including thedebts of Southerners to Northern men. In consequence of this law, whenMemphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all theevidences he could obtain of such debts.

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. Thegentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own highstanding as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian. He was a deacon in thechurch which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and bya Union chaplain filling the pulpit. He did not use the word "defile,"but he expressed the idea very clearly. He asked that the church berestored to the former congregation. I told him that no order had beenissued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. He said ofcourse the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differedso radically with them on questions of government. I told him thetroops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and thatthey would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimedfrom the pulpit. This closed the argument on the first point.

Then came the second. The complainant said that he wanted the papersrestored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal underprotest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number oflarge business houses at the North; that "his government" hadconfiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners,or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the"government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had beenpermitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officialsknowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollarreceived. He said that his "government," when it came in possession ofall its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claimshe had surrendered to the provost-marshal. His impudence was so sublimethat I was rather amused than indignant. I told him, however, that ifhe would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate governmentwould ever molest him. He left, no doubt, as much amazed at myassurance as I was at the brazenness of his request.

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic ordersappointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters inWashington. His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field ofduty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety andinterests of his previous command. I was next in rank, and hetelegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters atCorinth. I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had beenordered to a different field and did not know whether to move myheadquarters or not. I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staffwith me, and received word in reply: "This place will be yourheadquarters. You can judge for yourself." I left Memphis for my newfield without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month.General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was veryuncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been calledto Corinth for.

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief Iremained in command of the district of West Tennessee. Practically Ibecame a department commander, because no one was assigned to thatposition over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the25th of October. General Halleck while commanding the Department of theMississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooganorth. My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west ofthe Cumberland River. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, aspreviously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, withinstructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as headvanced. Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of theMobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus. Othertroops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to GrandJunction, and still others on the road west to Memphis.

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which enteredCorinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was putentirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile tothe Union. One of the first things I had to do was to constructfortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could bespared to man them. The structures that had been built during themonths of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of theengineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in designbut suited to the command available to defend them.

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with thesituation as rapidly as possible. The forces at Donelson, Clarksvilleand Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, Iregarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west.The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth,to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson,Tennessee, to Bolivar. Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphisrailroad were abandoned.

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn,with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five toforty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri. Thismovable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar orMemphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be toweaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was.Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere,