In the
real world we live in, what is the obvious solution to airline security? The
answer is easy: Don't let any bad guys or bad stuff on any aircraft. Now all we
need do is implement this solution.

In my
submarine days, the fleet developed a simple, elegant solution for ensuring that
workers who welded on a submarine pressure hull did their best. When the sub
performed its first test dive after a shipyard period, all the guys who welded
on the pressure hull were guests for that dive. Sure, we tested every weld, but
we added this extra safety step to make sure. And you know the welders did their
best.

What
are an aircraft's vulnerabilities?

*
Repair and maintenance;

*
Hold baggage inspection and loading;

*
Carry-on baggage;

*
The passengers;

*
The crew;

*
The aircraft itself, including security of the cockpit, emergency exits, etc.;

*
External factors such as being rammed by a small plane, etc.

The
crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in New York on Monday is still under
investigation and very little is yet known about the cause, except that two of
the Airbus A300 engines and the tail apparently fell off prior to the aircraft
impacting the ground.

Excuse
me: fell off?

We
will, of course discover more about the real cause of this tragic event, but
were all airlines to implement a policy of requiring a member of a repair crew
for any significant repair to fly on the aircraft shortly thereafter, you know
repairs would be done with the utmost attention to detail.

Since
most flights typically have one or more empty seats, the FAA could establish
this policy: All personnel associated with any aspect of prepping a plane for
flight would rotate randomly every one or two months to a flight list, and would
be required to take a flight on short notice.

When
you don't know when you might be required to fly, or what flight you might be
required to take, I suspect you will regularly ensure that your particular
responsibility is done to the best of your ability.

Obviously,
all hold baggage must be inspected. That we are not already doing this is
astonishing. We live in the digital age. If an appropriate program doesn't
exist, we should create one to conduct preliminary inspection of x-ray images
for all hold baggage. We should also “sniff” all hold baggage for
explosives. Items that don't pass initial screening should be diverted to
inspection units manned by well-trained personnel, and if necessary, are
inspected by hand.

Ditto
for carry-on baggage. By letting computer programs do initial screening, we can
shorten long security lines and move them more quickly. We can match passengers
and baggage by using luggage tags and claim tickets containing computer chips
that register the presence of the owner passenger onboard the aircraft. If a
passenger is missing, we can then remove the offending luggage before take-off.

Passenger
screening is more complex, but nearly instantaneous criminal checks are possible
by linking identity determining units such as fingerprint or iris pattern
readers to FBI databases. This won't find a mole, but will absolutely identify
an identified bad guy. Sky Marshals can handle anything that slips through this
initial screening.

We can
let the airlines handle crew and aircraft. Soon enough, all crewmembers will
have been screened and double screened, and cockpit doors will have been
replaced. Arming crewmembers with lethal or non-lethal weapons has defenders and
detractors. I think it probably is a good idea, on balance, at least for the
cockpit crew. I am a bit leery of putting a weapon in the hands of a relatively
inexperienced flight attendant who might not be able to bring her weapon to bear
against a stronger male hijacker. Arming the cockpit crew, however, and giving
them some form of remote surveillance over the entire aircraft makes sense.

The FAA
and the homeland security mechanisms being put into place will have to deal with
potential external threats like small planes flying into passenger jets, and
possible Stinger-style missiles launched by terrorists.

The
suggestions presented here cost a lot of money, and I have not addressed who
does what. The obvious responsible party for security before an aircraft is
boarded is the airport – not the airline companies, not the feds, not the
state. An airport can set up appropriate security perimeters and can standardize
all inspections, coordinate the personnel and equipment, and is far better
positioned than any other unit to do this. The required equipment is very
expensive, and untrained minimum wage personnel will not be able to use this
equipment effectively. Initially, the federal government should supply funds to
purchase and install necessary equipment and train appropriately skilled
personnel.

In the
long run, however, the FAA (or whoever ultimately regulates such things in
today's over-regulated world) must establish a ticket surcharge on every ticket
sold. This surcharge would not migrate into the federal or state financing black
hole. Rather, it would be collected into a national pool and used directly to
reimburse initial federal expenditures, and then to finance all further expenses
at every airport in America.

Initially,
I envision a surcharge of $25, but this probably should be the subject of a
short and intense study to ensure that sufficient funds are made available to do
the job. The bottom line is, if you fly, you should pay for your own security.

Taken
together, we can remarkably improve maintenance and repair actions. We can
dramatically increase safety in baggage handling by requiring those involved
with these actions to fly randomly on aircraft they service. And we can apply
current technology to its best advantage to ensure that no unauthorized object
or person boards an aircraft.