In the 89 types of consciousness, enumerated in the first chapter, 52
mental states arise in varying degree.

There are 7 concomitants common to every consciousness. There are 6
others that may or may not arise in each and every consciousness. They are termed Pakinnakā
(Particulars).

All these 13 are designated a˝˝asamāna, a rather peculiar
technical term. A˝˝a means 'other', samana means 'common'. Sobhanas,
(Good), when compared with asobhanas (Evil,) are called a˝˝a - 'other',
being of the opposite category. So are the asobhanas in contradistinction to Sobhanas.

These 13 become moral or immoral according to the type of consciousness
in which they occur.

14 concomitants are variably found in every type of immoral
consciousness.

19 are common to all types of moral consciousness.

6 other moral concomitants occur as occasion arises.

Thus these fifty-two (7 + 6 + 14 + 19 + 6 = 52) are found in the
respective types of consciousness in different proportions.

In this chapter all the 52 mental states are enumerated and classified.
Every type of consciousness is microscopically analyzed, and the accompanying mental
states are given in detail. The type of consciousness in which each mental state occurs,
is also described.

To an impatient lay reader this chapter will appear rather dry and
uninteresting. To a critical and intelligent reader it will, on the contrary, serve as an
intellectual treat.

At the outset, for instance, a student of chemistry may find the
numerous chemical formulas somewhat perplexing. But he finds the subject interesting and
edifying, when he seriously attempts to analyze and examine the various substances with
different tests.

In like manner a student of Abhidhamma who reads this chapter should
first try to analyze and examine care fully every type of consciousness and see for
himself the mental states thereof according to his own reasoning. Later, he should compare
his results with the original text. He will then find this chapter most illuminating, and
instead of wasting time in memorizing numbers, he will intelligently grasp the meaning of
the text.

For example, let us analyze the first immoral type of consciousness,
rooted in attachment.

Somanassa-sahagata - Accompanied by pleasure,

Ditthigata-sampayutta - Connected with misbelief,

Asankhārika - Unprompted.

This consciousness, when analyzed, will show that the vedanā or
feeling is pleasure'.

The 7 Universals and all the Particulars are found in it.

The 4 Immoral mental states common to all immorals such as:

moha
(delusion),

ahirika (shamelessness),

anottappa, (fearlessness),

uddhacca (restlessness)

must arise in it.

What about the remaining ten?

Lobha - attachment must arise.

Ditthi - misbelief must arise.

Māna - conceit cannot arise.

Conceit does not arise in lobha consciousness, together with
misbelief. Ditthi is connected with wrong view, while māna is concerned
with egoism. Both of them, say the commentators, are like two lions that cannot live
together in one cave.

Dosa (hatred),

issā (envy),

macchariya (avarice),

kukkucca (brooding)

cannot arise, because these four are akin to aversion. They are
found only in hateful consciousness.

Thīna and middha - (sloth and torpor) do not arise
because this is an unprompted consciousness.

No sobhanas - (beautiful) occur in an immoral consciousness.

Total - 7 + 6 + 4 + 2 = 19.

Thus, on analysis, we see that the first immoral consciousness consists
of 19 mental states.

The other types of consciousness should be similarly analyzed.

(Definition)

ž 1. Ekuppāda-nirodhā ca - ekālambanavatthukā

Cetoyuttā dvipa˝˝āsa - dhammā cetasikā matā.

ž 1. The fifty-two states that are associated with consciousness, that
arise and perish together with consciousness, that have the same object and basis as
consciousness, are known as cetasikas (mental states).

Notes:-

1. Cetasika = Ceta + s + ika

That which is associated with mind or consciousness is cetasika.
(Sanskrit - caitasika or caitti).

Definition-

Cetasika is

(i) that which arises together with consciousness,

(ii) that which perishes together with it,

(iii) that which has an identical object with it,

(iv) that which has a common basis with it.

Readers will note that the author has not given here a logical
definition according to genus and species. Instead he speaks of four characteristic
properties of a cetasika. The Commentator cites reasons for attributing these four
properties.

No consciousness exists apart from its concomitants. Both consciousness
and its respective co-adjuncts arise and perish simultaneously. But there are some
material qualities such as vi˝˝atti rūpa* (Modes of Intimation) - that arise and
perish simultaneously with the consciousness. To exclude them the third property of having
a common object has been attributed. That which possesses these three characteristics must
necessarily be endowed with the fourth - a common basis.

*[ Kāyavi˝˝atti (mode of action) and Vaci
Vi˝˝atti (mode of speech)]

According to Abhidhamma, mind or consciousness is accompanied by
fifty-two mental states (cetasikas).

One of them is vedanā (feeling); another is sa˝˝ā
(perception). The remaining fifty are collectively called sankhārā.Cetanā
(volition) is the most important of them.

The whole group of feelings is called vedanā-kkhandha. So are sa˝˝ā-kkhandha
and sankhāra-kkhandha.

Thus these (thirteen) mental states should be understood as 'common to
each other' (a˝˝asamāna*).

* [A technical term applied collectively to all the 13 cetasikas
which may be either moral or immoral according to the type of consciousness in which they
are found. A˝˝a - another: samāna, common. When the good types of
consciousness are taken into account the evil are regarded as a˝˝a, and vice
versa.]

ž 8. (vii) With the Faculty of Wisdom these twenty-five mental states
are in every way to be understood as 'Beautiful.'

Summary

ž 9. Thus:-

Thirteen are common to each other. Similarly fourteen are common to
Immorals Twenty-five are 'Beautiful.'

Thus fifty-two have been enumerated.

Notes:-

2. Phassa- Derived from Íphas,
to contact.

For any sense-impression to occur, three things are essential - namely,
consciousness, respective sense and the object. For instance, one sees an object with the
consciousness through the eye as its instrument.

When an object presents itself to the consciousness through one of the
six senses there arises the mental state-contact. "It should not be understood that
mere collision is contact (Na sangatimatto eva Phasso).

Like a pillar which acts as a strong support to the rest of the
structure, even so is contact to the coexistent mental concomitants.

"Contact means 'it touches' (phusatī'ti). It has touching (phusana)
as its salient characteristic (lakkhana), impact (sanghattana) as its
function (rasa), coinciding (of the physical basis, object and consciousness) as
its manifestation (sannipāta paccupatthāna), and the object which has entered the
avenue (of awareness) as proximate cause (padatthāna)."

Contact is mentioned first because it precedes all other mental states.
"Touching by contact, consciousness experiences by feeling, perceives by perception,
wills by volition - (Phassena phusitvā, vedanāya vediyati, sa˝˝āya sa˝jānāti,
cetanāya ceteti)". According to Paticca-Samuppāda, too, Contact
conditions Feeling. But strictly speaking, there is no reason for the sequence because all
these mental states are coexistent. The Atthasālini states - "For of states, arisen
in one conscious moment, it is not valid to say that 'this' arises first, 'that'
afterwards. The reason is not because contact is a strong support. Contact is just
mentioned first in the order of teaching, but it was also permissible to bring it in thus:
- There are feeling and contact, perception and contact, volition and contact; there are
consciousness and contact, feeling, perception, volition, initial application of mind. In
the order of teaching, however, contact is mentioned first. Nor is the sequence of words
among the remaining states of any special significance."

"Contact is given priority of place, as standing for the inception
of the thought, and as the sine qua non of all the allied states, conditioning them much
as the roof-tree of a storeyed house supports all the other combinations of
material."

(Mrs. Rhys Davids - Buddhist Psychology, p. 6.)

3. Vedanā - Derived from Ívid,
to experience.

Feeling is a more appropriate rendering for vedanā than
sensation. Like contact, feeling is an essential property of every consciousness. It may
be pleasurable painful, or neutral. Pain and pleasure pertain to body as well. But
physical feeling is not of ethical importance.

According to the commentators feeling is like a master who enjoys a
dish prepared by a cook. The latter is compared to the remaining mental states that
constitute a thought-complex. Strictly speaking, it is feeling that experiences an object
when it comes in contact with the senses.

It is this feeling that experiences the desirable or undesirable fruits
of an action done in this or in a previous birth. Besides this mental state there is no
soul or any other agent to experience the result of the action.

It should be understood here that Nibbānic bliss is not connected with
feeling. Nibbānic bliss is certainly the highest happiness (sukha), but it is the
happiness of relief from suffering. It is not the enjoyment of a pleasurable object.

4. Sa˝˝ā - Sam + Í˝ā,
to know, (Compare Latin cognoscere, to know.)

The meaning of this term widely varies according to the context. To
avoid unnecessary confusion, it is best to understand the specific meaning used in the
particular connection as a universal mental state.

The chief characteristic of sa˝˝ā is the cognition of an
object by way of a mark as blue etc. It is sa˝˝ā that enables one to recognize
an object that has once been perceived by the mind through the senses. "Its procedure
is likened to the carpenter's recognition of certain kinds of wood by the mark he had made
on each; to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of jewelry by the ticket on each;
to the wild animal's discernment in the scarecrow of the work of man."

Sa˝˝ā, therefore, means simple sense perception.

"Perception," according to a modern Dictionary of Philosophy,
"is the apprehension of ordinary sense-objects, such as trees, houses, chairs, etc.,
on the occasion of sensory stimulation."

Perception is not used here in the sense employed by early modern
philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

As one of the five khandhas (Aggregates) sa˝˝ā is used
in the sense of perception.

Could it be that memory is due to this sa˝˝ā?

Sa˝˝ā, vi˝˝āna and pa˝˝ā should be
differentiated from one another. Sa˝˝ā is like the mere perception of a rupee
coin by a child. By its whiteness, roundness and size it merely recognizes the coin as a
rupee, utterly ignorant of its monetary value. A man, for instance, discerns its value and
its utility, but is not aware of its chemical composition. Vi˝˝āna is comparable
to the ordinary man's knowledge of the rupee. Pa˝˝ā is like the analytical
knowledge of a chemist who knows all its chemical properties in every detail.

5. Cetanā -

Both cetanā and citta are derived from the same root Ícit, to think.

In the case of citta - mind or consciousness - the root assumes
the meaning of discernment (vijānana), while in cetanā it is used in the
sense of co-ordination (abhisandhāna) and accumulation (āyūhana).

According to the Atthasālini and Vibhāvini Tīkā cetanā is
that which co-ordinates the mental states associated with itself on the object of
consciousness. (Attanā sampayutta-dhamme ārammane abhisandahati). Like a chief
disciple, or like a carpenter who fulfills his duties and regulates the work of others as
well, so does cetanā fulfill its own function and regulate the function of other
concomitants associated with itself.

A further explanation has been offered. Cetanā is that which
arrives at action in conditioning the conditioned. (Sankhatābhisankharane va
byāpāram āpajjatī'ti cetanā).Cetanā is that which plays a predominant
part in all actions, moral and immoral.

Shwe Zan Aung says that according to Ledi Sayadaw, the Burmese
Abhidhamma scholar, "Cetanā acts on its concomitants, acts in getting the object,
and acts on accomplishing the task, i.e., determines action." (Compendium, p. 236).

The most significant mental state in the Mundane Consciousness (lokiya)
is this cetanā, while in the Supra mundane it is pa˝˝ā, wisdom or
insight. Mundane thoughts tend to accumulate Kamma. Supra mundane thoughts, on the
contrary, tend to eradicate Kamma. Hence cetanā in the supra mundane consciousness
does not constitute Kamma. Cetanā in every moral and immoral type of mundane
consciousness, on the other hand, is regarded as Kamma. Although Cetanā is found
in Vipāka types of consciousness too, it is of no moral significance as it lacks
accumulative power.

It is this cetanā that is alluded to as sankhāra and
(Kamma) bhava in the Paticca Samuppāda. In the pa˝cakkhandha, by sankhārakkhandha
are meant the fifty mental states, excluding vedanā and sa˝˝ā, with cetanā
as the foremost.

From a psychological standpoint cetanā determines the
activities of the mental states associated with it. From an ethical standpoint, it
determines its inevitable consequences. Hence where there is no cetanā, there is
no Kamma.

6. Ekaggatā -

Eka + agga + tā = one-pointedness, or concentration on one
object, or focusing the mind on one object. It is like a steady lamp-flame in a windless
place. It is like a firmly fixed pillar that cannot be shaken by the wind. It is like
water that binds together several substances to form one concrete compound. This mental
state prevents its adjuncts from dissipation and fixes them on one object.

This one-pointedness is one of the five Jhāna factors. When it is
developed and cultivated it is designated samādhi. "It is the germ of all
attentive, selected, focused, or concentrated consciousness." (Compendium, p. 241).

7. Jīvitindriya -

Jīvita = life; + indriya = controlling faculty or
principle.

It is called jīvita because it sustains its co-associates.

It is called indriya because it controls its co-associates.

Although cetanā determines the activities of all mental states,
it is jīvitindriya that infuses life into cetanā and other concomitants.

Jīvitindriya is twofold - namely, psychic life (nāma-jīvitindriya)
and physical life (rūpa-jīvitindriya). Mental States are vitalized by psychic
life, while material phenomena are vitalized by physical life.

As lotuses are sustained by water, an infant is sustained by a nurse,
so are mental states and material phenomena sustained by jīvitindriya.

One rūpa-jīvitindriya lasts for seventeen thought moments.
Seventeen nāma-jīvitindriya arise and perish during the brief life of one rūpa-jīvitindriya.

There is a certain kind of rūpa-jīvitindriya in plant life.
But, rūpa-jīvitindriya in men and animals is differentiated from that which
exists in plants because the former is conditioned by past Kamma.

Both nāma-jīvitindriya and rūpa-jīvitindriya arise at
the moment of conception. They simultaneously perish at the moment of decease. Hence death
is regarded as the perishing of this jīvitindriya. Immediately after, due to the
power of Kamma, another nāma-jīvitindriya arises in the subsequent birth at the
moment of conception. Simultaneous with the arising of the one nāma-jīvitindriya
there arise three rūpa-jīvitindriyas in the case of a human being.*

Just as a boatman depends on the boat and the boat depends on the
boatman, even so jīvitindriya depends on mind and matter, and mind and matter
depend on jīvitindriya.

Turning the mind towards the object is the chief characteristic of manasikāra.
It is like the rudder of a ship, which is indispensable to take her directly to her
destination. Mind without manasikāra is like a rudderless ship.

Manasikāra is also compared to a charioteer that sits with
close attention on two well-trained horses (mind and object) as regards their rhythmical
movements. Manasikāra should be distinguished from vitakka which is to
follow. The former directs its concomitants to the object, while the latter applies or
throws (pakkhipanto viya) them on the object. Vitakka is like a favorite
courtier that introduces a villager (mind) into the presence of a king (object).

Attention is the closest equivalent to manasikāra, although the
Pāli term does not fully connote the meaning attached to the English word from a strictly
philosophical standpoint. As a mental state it is mere spontaneous attention. In manasikāra,
as in attention, there is no peculiar vividness or clarity. To sa˝˝ā may be
attributed this vividness to some extent.

Could manasikāra also be an aid to memory, as it is common to
all types of consciousness, whether mundane or supra mundane? Hence they are designated Sabbacitta-sādhāranā.

9. Vitakka -

Vi + Ítakk, to think.

It is difficult to suggest a suitable rendering for this Pāli term
which assumes different meanings in the Suttas and Abhidhamma.

In the Sutta Pitaka it has been employed in the sense of notions,
ideas, thoughts, reasoning etc. In the Abhidhamma it is used in a specific technical
sense.

'Lifting' of the concomitants to the object (abhiniropana) is
its chief characteristic. As someone ascends to the king's palace depending on a king's
favorite, relative or friend, likewise consciousness ascends to the object depending on vitakka
(Atthasālini, p. 114).

Vitakka may well be defined as the application of the
concomitants on the object. Manasikāra, as stated above, is the directing of the
concomitants to the object. The distinguishing characteristics of these two cetasikas
should be clearly understood.

Different values are attached to vitakka when it is used in
different connections.

As an ordinary particular (pakinnakā) mental state it is simply
called vitakka. When it is developed and cultivated it becomes the foremost factor
of the First Jhāna. Then it is termed appanā because the mind is steadfastly
fixed on the object. The ordinary vitakka simply throws the mind to the surface of
the object.

In the subsequent Jhānas vitakka is, however, inhibited, owing
to the habitual association with the object.

A villager, for instance, who visits the king's palace for the first
time, needs the introduction of a favorite courtier. For his subsequent visits no such
introduction is necessary as he is acquainted with the place.

It is this developed appanā-vitakka that is known as samādhi
or concentration.

When vitakka is present in the Supra mundane Path Consciousness (lokuttara
magga citta) it is termed sammā sankappa (Right Thoughts) because it
eliminates wrong thoughts and applies the mind to Nibbāna.

Vitakka is used in entirely a different sense when used in
connection with the temperaments of individuals. Vitakka carita means one of a
discursive temperament. (See Ch. 1. note 38.)

10. Vicāra -

Vi + Ícar, to wander.

Like vitakka, vicāra too is employed in a technical sense in
Abhidhamma.

Vicāra is the continued exercise of the mind on the object.

Examination (anumajjana) is its chief characteristic.

So far the renderings for vitakka and vicāra are initial
and sustained application respectively.

Both terms should be distinguished. Like a bee alighting on a lotus is vitakka,
like its gyrating around the lotus is vicāra. Like the flapping of a bird about to
fly is vitakka, like its planning movements in the sky is vicāra. Like the
beating of a drum or bell is vitakka, like its reverberation is vicāra.

It is compared to a judge that decides a case. It is also compared to a
steady pillar owing to its unwavering state.

12. Viriya -

Derived from Íaj, to go + īr.Vī is substituted for aj. Vīra is one who strenuously carries on his work
uninterruptedly.

It is defined as the state or action of energetic persons (Vīrānam
bhāvo, kammam). Or, it is that which is effected or carried out methodically (Vidhinā
īrayitabbam pavattetabbam vā).

It has the characteristic of supporting (upatthambana upholding (paggahana),
sustaining (ussahana).

As an old house is supported by new pillars even so concomitants are
aided and supported by Viriya.

Just as a strong reinforcement would help an army to hold on instead of
retreating, even so viriya upholds or uplifts its concomitants.

Viriya is regarded as a controlling factor (indriya)
because it overcomes idleness. It is also regarded as one of the five powers (bala)
because it cannot be shaken by its opposite idleness. Viriya serves as one of the
four means of accomplishing one's ends (iddhi-pāda). It is this viriya that
appears as Four Modes of Supreme Efforts (samma-ppadhāna). Viriya is sublimated as
one of the seven factors of Enlightenment (bojjhanga). Finally it has been elevated
to one of the eight members of the Noble Path (atthangika-magga) as sammā
vāyāma (Right-Effort).

Atthasālini states that viriya should be regarded as the root
of all achievements.

Effort, exertion, energy are suggested as best equivalents.

13. Pīti - See Ch. 1. note 40.

14. Chanda -

Derived from Íchad, to wish.

The chief characteristic of chanda is the wish-to-do (kattu-kamyatā).
It is like the stretching of the hand to grasp an object.

This unmoral chanda should be distinguished from immoral lobha
which is clinging to an object.

There are three kinds of chanda namely,

(i) kāma-cchanda which is sensual craving, one of the Five
Hindrances (nīvarana). This is ethically immoral.

(ii) kattu-kamyatāchanda, the mere wish-to-do. This is
ethically unmoral.

(iii) dhammacchanda, righteous wish. It is this dhammacchanda
that impelled Prince Siddhartha to renounce Royal pleasures.

Of them it is kattu-kamyatāchanda, meaning attached to
this particular mental state, that serves as one of the four dominant influences (adhipati).

Shwe Zan Aung says - "The effort of conation or will is due to viriya.
Pīti signifies an interest in the object; chanda constitutes the intention
with respect to object.' (Compendium p. 18).

Buddhists have this dhammacchanda for the realization of
Nibbāna. It is not a kind of craving.

15. Moha -

Derived from Ímuh, to be stupefied,
to be deluded. Moha is one of the three roots of evil and is common to all immoral
types of consciousness. It is opposed to pa˝˝ā - wisdom.

The chief characteristic of moha is confusion with regard to the
nature of an object. Moha clouds one's knowledge with regard to Kamma and its
consequences and the four Noble Truths.

16. Ahirika -

An abstract noun formed of "a" + hirika.

He who is not ashamed of doing evil is ahiriko. The state of
such a person is ahirikkam = ahirikam.

One who has hiri recoils from evil just as a cock's feather
shrinks in front of fire. One who has no hiri, would commit any evil without the
least compunction.

17. Anottappa -

Na + ava +Ítapp, to be
tormented.

Ottappa is fear to do evil, i.e., fear of the Consequences.

Anottappa is its opposite and is compared to a moth that is
singed by fire. A person who is afraid of fire would not touch it, but a moth, unaware of
the consequences, attracted by fire, would get burnt. In the same way a person without ottappa
would commit evil and suffer in states of woe.

Both these terms - hiri and ottappa - are found in
conjunction. Hiri should be differentiated from ordinary shyness and ottappa
from ordinary fear of any individual. Fear is regarded as one of the ten armies of Māra.
A Buddhist is not expected to be afraid of any individual, even a God, for Buddhism is not
based on the fear of the unknown.

Hiri arises from within, and ottappa from without.
Suppose, for instance, there is a piece of iron, one end of which is heated, and the other
smeared with filth. The filthy end one would not touch owing to disgust, and the other end
through fear. Hiri is compared to the former and ottappa to the latter.

The following note by Mrs. Rhys Davids on hiri and ottappa
clearly depicts the difference between these relative mental constituents:-

"Hiri and ottappa, as analyzed by Buddhaghosa
present points of considerable ethical interest. Taken together they give us the emotional
and conative aspect of the modern notion of conscience, just as sati represents its
intellectual side. The former term 'is equivalent to shame (lajjā),' the latter to
'anguish (ubbego) over evildoing.' Hiri has its source within; ottappa
spring from without. Hiri is autonomous (attādhipati); ottappa,
heteronomous, influenced by society (lokādhipati). The former is established on
shame; the latter on dread. The former is marked by consistency; the latter by discernment
of the danger and fearsomeness of error. The subjective source of hiri is fourfold,
viz., the idea of what is due to one's birth, age, worth, and education. Thus, one having hiri
will think 'Only mean folk (fishers etc.) children, poor wretches, the blind and ignorant,
would do such an act,' and refrains. The external source of ottappa is, the idea
that 'the body of the faithful will blame you,' and hence one refrains. If a man has hiri,
he is, as said the Buddha, his own best master. To one who is sensitive by way of ottappa,
the masters of the faith are the best guides."

In a supplementary paragraph the 'marks' (consistency etc.) are thus
explained: 'In hiri one reflects on the worth of one's birth, one's teacher, one's
estate, and one's fellow students. In ottappa one feels dread at self-reproach, the
blame of others, chastisement, and retribution in another life."

(Buddhist Psychology, p. 20).

Hiri and ottappa are regarded as the two dominant factors
that rule the world. No civilized society can exist without them.

18. Uddhacca -

U = up, above, + ÍDhu, to
waver, to shake off.

Uddhutassa bhāvo Uddhuccam = Uddhaccam - state of throwing up.
It is compared to the disturbed state of a heap of ashes when hit with a stone. It is the
unsettled state of mind, and is opposed to collectedness (vupasama). As one of the
five Hindrances it is the antithesis of sukha, happiness.

In some rare instances uddhacca is used in the sense of
puffed-up state of mind, corresponding to conceit. Here it is not used in that sense. As a
rule uddhacca is differentiated from māna because both of them are treated
as samyojanas (Fetters).

These four, viz., moha, ahirika, anottappa, uddhacca - that head
the list of Immoral cetasikas - are common to all Immoral types of consciousness.

19. Lobha - See Ch. 1, note 9.

20. Ditthi. - See Ch. 1, note 11.

The difference between moha and ditthi should be noted.
The former clouds the object; the latter deals with one's views, such as "this indeed
is truth, and the rest is false". Ditthi is opposed to ˝āna, wisdom.
The former rejects the real nature and views wrongly. The latter discerns the object as it
is.

When the Pāli term ditthi is used alone, unqualifyingly, it is
employed in the sense of micchā ditthi - wrong belief.

Sammā ditthi or amoha is used as the antithesis of moha.

21. Māna - Derived from Íman,
to think.

22. Dosa - See Ch. 1, note 9.

23. Issā - Derived from i +Ísu, to be envious, to be jealous.

It has the characteristic of envying others' success and prosperity. As
such it is objective.

24. Macchariya -

Maccharassa bhāvo - the state of an avaricious person.

Commentary gives another explanation:-

'Let not this wonder be to others, but to myself'.

(Mā idam acchariyam a˝˝esam hotu, mayham'ev hotu).

The chief characteristic of macchariya is the concealment of
one's prosperity. Contrary to issā, this is subjective.

Both issā and macchariya are regarded as the friends of dosa
because each of them arises with it.

25. Kukkucca -

Kukatassa bhāvo = kukkuccam = the state of having done amiss.

According to the commentary evil that is done is ku + kata, and
so is good that is not done. Remorse over the evil that is done is kukkucca, and so
is remorse over the good that is not done.

It has the characteristic of grieving over the evil that is done and
the good that is not done.

Dhammasangani explains:-

"What is worry?"

"Consciousness of what is lawful in something that is unlawful,
consciousness of what is unlawful in something that is lawful; consciousness of what is
immoral in something that is moral; consciousness of what is moral in something that is
immoral - all this sort of worry, fidgeting, over-scrupulousness, remorse of conscience,
mental sacrificing - this is what is called worry".

(Buddhist Psychology - p. 313).

Kukkucca is one of the five Hindrances and is used together with
uddhacca. It pertains to past things only.

According to Vinaya, kukkucca is healthy doubt with regard to
rules, and is commended. According to Abhidhamma, on the contrary, it is repentance which
is not commended.

It is the shrinking state of the mind like a cock's feather before
fire. It is opposed to viriya. Thīna is explained as citta - gela˝˝am,
sickness of the mind.

As such it is the antithesis of citta-kamma˝˝atā,
adaptability of the mind, one of the sobhana cetasikas.

27. Middha - Derived from Ímiddh,
to be inactive, to be inert, to be incapable.

This is the morbid state of the mental factors.

Both thīna and middha are always used in conjunction,
and are one of the five Hindrances. They are inhibited by vitakka, initial
application, one of the Jhāna factors. Middha, too, is opposed to viriya.
Where there are thīna and middha there is no viriya.

Middha is explained as the kāya-gela˝˝a, sickness of
the mental body. Here body is not used in the sense of material form, but is applied to
the body of mental factors, viz., vedanā, sa˝˝ā and sankhāra (feeling,
perception, and the remaining fifty mental factors). Hence middha is the antithesis
of kāya-kamma˝˝atā, adaptability of mental factors.

Both thīna and middha are explained in the Dhammasangani
as follows:-

"What is stolidity (thīna)?"

"That which is indisposition, unwieldiness of intellect, adhering
and cohering; clinging, cleaving to, stickiness; stolidity, that is, a stiffening, a
rigidity of the intellect - this is called stolidity.

"What is torpor (middha)?"

"That which is indisposition, unwieldiness of sense, a shrouding,
enveloping, barricading within; torpor that which is sleep, drowsiness; sleep, slumbering,
somnolence this is called torpor".

(Buddhist Psychology, pp. 311, 312).

28. Vicikicchā - See Ch. 1, note 13.

Vicikicchā, as a Hindrance, does not mean doubts with regard to
the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, etc.,

Majjhima Nikāya commentary states - "it is so called because it
is incapable of deciding that it is as such."

(Idam'ev'idanti nicchetum asamatthabhāvato'ti vicikicchā).

29. Saddhā - Sam, well; + Ídah,
to establish, to place, to put.

Sanskrit sraddhā is composed of Srat = faith + Ídha to establish.

According to Pāli, saddhā is well-established confidence in
the Buddha, Dhamma, and the Sangha. Purification (sampasādana) of its mental
associates is its chief characteristic. It is compared to the water-purifying gem of the
universal monarch. This particular gem, when thrown into water, causes mud and water-weeds
to subside. The water is consequently purified. In the same way saddhā purifies
the mind of its stains.

This saddhā is not blind faith. It is confidence based on
knowledge.

One might question whether a non-Buddhist could also possess this saddhā.

Atthasālini raises this very question and provides an answer which is
rather unsatisfactory and inadequate.

"Do men of false opinions not believe in their own teachers?"
questions Venerable Buddhaghosa. His answer is:-

"They do. But that is not saddhā, it is a mere
acquiescence in words (vacana-sampaticchana-mattameva)".

If saddhā is limited only to Buddhists, what shall we say when
a non-Buddhist places his faith or confidence in his teacher? Surely his mind also gets
purified to some extent when he thinks of his particular religious teacher.

Could it be ditthi - false view? Then it is immoral (akusala).
In such a case there is no occasion for a non-Buddhist to experience a moral
consciousness.

Would it not be more correct to say that saddhā is mere
confidence or faith, instead of restricting it to the Triple Gem?

Dhammasangani explains saddhā as follows:-

"The faith which on that occasion is trusting in, the professing
confidence in, the sense of assurance, faith, faith as a faculty and as a power".

(Buddhist Psychology, p. 14.)

Saddhā is also apprehension intuitively of experience or
knowledge gathered in past births.

30. Sati - Derived from Ísar,
to remember.

Sati does not exactly correspond to the Western conception of
memory. Mindfulness is a better equivalent for sati. It has to be developed. In the
Satipatthāna Sutta are described in detail various methods to develop this sati.
When it is highly developed one acquires the power of remembering past births. It is this sati
that is regarded as one of the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path.

Sati tends to present before oneself good things without
allowing them to be forgotten. Its chief characteristic is 'not floating away' (apilāpana).
Unlike pumpkins and pots that float on water, sati plunges into the object of
thought.

It should be noted that this particular sati is not found in
immoral types of consciousness.

What is found in immoral consciousness is micchā sati (wrong
mindfulness).

Dhammasangani explains sati as follows:-

"The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting, calling
back to mind; the mindfulness which is remembering, bearing in mind, the opposite of
superficiality and of obliviousness; mindfulness as faculty; mindfulness as power, right
mindfulness".

(Buddhist Psychology, p. 16).

Commenting on sati, Mrs. Rhys Davids says:-

"Buddhaghosa's comment on sati, in which he closely follows
and enlarges on the account in Mil. 37, 38, shows that the traditional conception of that
aspect of consciousness had much in common with the Western modern theory of conscience or
moral sense. Sati appears under the metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating
between good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far as to render it by
'conscience', but this slurs over the interesting divergence's between Eastern and Western
thought. The former is quite unmystical of the subject of sati. It takes the
psychological process or representative functioning (without bringing out the distinction
between bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under an ethical aspect".

(Buddhist Psychology, p. 16).

31. Hiri & Ottappa - See ahirika and anottappa

32. Alobha -

This is opposed to lobha (See Ch. 1 note 9).

Dāna or generosity is implied thereby. This is a positive
virtue involving active altruism. It is one of the three roots of good. Like a drop of
water that runs off a lotus leaf without adhering to it, non-adhesion to an object is its
chief characteristic.

33. Adosa -

This is opposed to dosa (See Ch. 1 note 9). It is not mere
absence of hatred or aversion, but is a positive virtue.

Adosa is synonymous with mettā, Loving-kindness, which
is one of the four sublime abodes (brahma-vihāra).

Readers will note that in enumerating the sublime abodes only two are
mentioned, viz. - karunā and muditā. The reason being that mettā
is implied by this adosa; and upekkhā by tatramajjhattatā,
equanimity.

Adosa is also one of the three roots of good. Like an agreeable
friend, absence of churlishness or coarseness (candikka) is its chief
characteristic.

34. Three Roots of Good: -

Alobha, adosa and amoha are the three roots of good. Amoha
is not mentioned amongst the nineteen Beautiful cetasikas because it is implied by pa˝˝ā
- wisdom.

Atthasālini gives a vivid description of these three virtues as
follows:

"Of these three, alobha has the characteristic of
non-adhesion of the mind to an object, or of not sticking like a drop of water on a lotus
leaf. Its function is non-appropriation like an emancipated Bhikkhu (Arahat). Its
manifestation is detachment like a man fallen in filth.

"Adosa has the characteristic of non-churlishness or
non-resentment like an agreeable friend. Its function is the suppression of annoyance or
feverishness like sandal wood. Its manifestation is loveliness like the full moon. The
characteristic, function, etc., of amoha have been explained in connection with the
term pa˝˝indriya (Faculty of Wisdom). Of these three, again, alobha is
opposed to the taint of selfishness, adosa to that of impurity (dussīlya),
amoha to the non-development of moral conditions.

"Alobha is the cause of generosity, adosa of
morality, amoha of meditation.

"Through alobha what is in excess is not taken, for the
greedy take what is in excess. Through adosa what is not less is taken, for the
hateful take what is less. Through amoha what is unperverted is taken, for the
deluded take what is perverted. Through alobha, one regards a manifest fault as
such and admits it, but the greedy conceal it. Through adosa one regards a manifest
virtue as such and admits it, but the hateful efface it. Through amoha, one regards
what really is as such and admits it, but the deluded regard what is false as true, and
what is true as false.

"Through alobha there is no sorrow arising from separation
of the beloved, for affection is the intrinsic nature of the greedy as well as the
inability to bear the separation from the beloved. Through adosa there arises no
sorrow from association with the unbeloved since disagreeableness is the intrinsic nature
of the hateful as well as the inability to bear the association with the unbeloved.
Through amoha there arises no sorrow from not getting what one desires, for it is
the intrinsic nature of the deluded to think - 'From where could it be got?' etc.

"Through alobha there arises no sorrow from rebirth, since
the former is opposed to craving and the latter is the root of craving. Through adosa
there arises no sorrow from decay, since the intensely hateful become quickly aged.
Through amoha there is not sorrow from death, for a bewildered death is painful.
There is no such death for the undeluded.

"There is harmonious living to the lay people through alobha,
to the recluses through amoha, and to all through adosa.

"In particular through alobha there is no rebirth in the
plane of Petas, since beings are generally born amongst Petas through craving. Alobha
is the antithesis of craving. Through adosa there is no rebirth in the niraya
(Woeful State). Through hate, which is of a churlish nature, beings are born in woeful
states resembling hatred. Adosa is the antithesis of hatred. Through amoha
there is no rebirth in the animal plane. Due to utter delusion through ignorance, beings
are born amongst animals. Amoha is the antithesis of ignorance.

"Of them alobha dissuades attraction from lust; adosa
from recoiling through hate; amoha from stolid indifference through ignorance.

Moreover through these three there arise respectively these three
notions - those of renunciation, non-anger and harmlessness; and those of loathsomeness,
immeasurableness, and fundamental elements (dhātu).

"Through alobha the extreme of indulgence in sensual
pleasures is inhibited: through adosa that of self-mortification. Through amoha
there is training according to the Middle Path.

"Similarly through alobha the bodily bond of covetousness (abhijjhā
kāyagantha) is destroyed, through adosa that of ill-will, and through amoha
the remaining two.

"The first two states of mindfulness are accomplished by the power
of the first two, and the last two by the power of the third.

"Herein alobha is conducive to health, for the unattached
person does not resort to what is attractive but suitable - hence health ensues. Adosa
is conducive to youthfulness, for the unhateful person remains young for a long time,
being not burnt by the fire of anger which causes wrinkles and grey hair. Amoha is
conducive to longevity of life, for the undeluded person, distinguishing between what is
agreeable and disagreeable, avoids the latter and adopts the former and lives long.

"Alobha is conducive to the acquisition of wealth, for by
generosity wealth is obtained. Adosa is conducive to the acquisition of friends,
for by loving-kindness friends are won and are not lost.

"Amoha is conducive to personal achievements, for the
undeluded person, doing only what is beneficial to himself, regulates his own self.

"Alobha is conducive to divine life, adosa to Brahma
life, and amoha to Aryan life.

"Through alobha one is at peace with his acquisition of
wealth amongst beings and things belonging to one's party, for through their destruction
there is no grief caused to him by excessive attachment. Through adosa amongst
those belonging to other parties he is happy, for the non inimical person is devoid of the
feeling of ill-will even amongst the hostile. Through amoha he is happy amongst
those who belong to a neutral party, for the undeluded person is devoid of all attachment.

"Through alobha there is insight into impermanence, for the
greedy person does not see impermanence in things that are impermanent, owing to his
desire for enjoyment. Through adosa there is insight into suffering for one with a
loving-disposition has abandoned that grasping, the cause of vexation, and sees things as
sorrowful. Through amoha there is insight into soullessness, for the undeluded
person is skillful in understanding things as they truly are. He sees the guideless
fivefold group as guideless.

"As insight into impermanence and so on is brought about by these
three states, so are these states brought about by insight into impermanence and so on.

"Through insight into impermanence there is alobha; through
insight into sorrow, adosa; through insight into soullessness, amoha.

"Who indeed knowing well that this is impermanent would develop a
desire for it? Who indeed perceiving ill in things would develop another ill caused by
exceedingly violent anger? Who indeed realizing the emptiness of a soul would again fall
into utter delusion?

Impartial view of objects is its chief characteristic. It is compared
to a charioteer who views equally a pair of well-trained horses.

Tatramajjhattatā and upekkhā (equanimity) are sometimes
used as synonymous terms. It is this tatramajjhattatā that is regarded as upekkhā
of the four Sublime abodes. Hence upekkhā does not occur amongst the Sublime
abodes. It is this tatramajjhattatā that is raised to the dignity of a Bojjhanga,
one of the seven factors of Enlightenment. Tatra-majjhattatā has also to be
distinguished from hedonic upekkhā or indifference. At times both these mental
states simultaneously arise in the same consciousness, e.g., in all upekkhā-sahagata
kusala cittas.

This tatramajjhattatā is regarded both as an intellectual and
ethical upekkhā (See Ch. 1. note, 42).

36. Kāya Passaddhi & Citta-Passaddhi-

Passaddhi is composed of pa+Í
sambh, to calm, to be tranquil.

Passambh + ti = passadhti = passaddhi.

Passaddhi is tranquillity, calmness, quietude, serenity.

The chief characteristic of passaddhi is the suppression or the
allaying of feverishness of passions (kilesadarathavūpasama). It is like the cool
shade of a tree to a person affected by the sun's heat. Passaddhi is opposed to uddhacca,
restlessness, or excitement. When highly developed it becomes a factor of Enlightenment (bojjhanga).

This tranquillity is twofold, viz., tranquillity of kāya and citta.
Here kāya is not used in the sense of material body. It is the body of psychic
factors - namely, vedanā (feeling), sa˝˝ā (perception), and sankhāra
(mental states). It should be understood that kāya is used in the same sense in
the subsequent cetasikas. Citta connotes the whole consciousness. The
difference therefore lies between psychic factors and consciousness as a whole. The same
explanation applies to the other pairs as well.

37. Kāya-Lahutā & Citta-Lahutā -

Derived from laghu, light, quick. (Skt. laghutā).Lahutā
is bouyancy or lightness. Suppression of the heaviness of the mind and mental factors is
its chief characteristic. It is like the laying down of a heavy burden. It is opposed to thīna
and middha - sloth and torpor - which cause heaviness and rigidity in mental
factors and consciousness.

38. Kāya-Mudutā & Citta-Mudutā -

The chief characteristic of mudutā is the suppression of
stiffness and resistance. It removes stiffness and becomes pliable in receiving objects.
It is compared to a skin that is well moulded by applying oil, water etc. It is opposed to
false views and conceit (ditthi and māna) which cause stiffness.

Its chief characteristic is the suppression of unserviceableness or
unworkableness of consciousness and its factors. It is like a heated metal made fit for
any use. It is opposed to all the remaining Hindrances. Atthasālini states that these two
allied concomitants produce serenity (pasāda) in propitious things, and are
adaptable like pure gold, for beneficial works.

40. Kāya-Pāgu˝˝atā & Citta-Pāgu˝˝atā -

This is proficiency or skillfulness. Its chief characteristic is the
suppression of sickness of mind and its concomitants. It is opposed to such passions as
faithlessness etc.

41. Kāyujjukatā & Cittujjukatā -

This is straightness or rectitude, and is opposed to crookedness,
deception and craftiness. Its chief characteristic is straightness.

42. All these 19 concomitants are common to all types of moral
consciousness, unlike the immoral concomitants which do not arise in an immoral
consciousness in toto. No moral consciousness arises without all of them. Along
with this 'Beautiful' group some other moral concomitants may arise according to the type
of consciousness.

Strictly speaking, these three mental concomitants collectively arise
only in the Supra mundane consciousness (lokuttara citta). In other cases they
arise separately because there are three cetanās.

These three when present in the lokuttara citta are regarded as
Factors of the Path (magganga), and they constitute sīla (Morality). Sammā-ditthi
and sammā sankappa which constitute pa˝˝ā (Wisdom) are implied by pa˝˝indriya
and vitakka-cetasikas respectively. Sammā vāyāma, sammā sati, and sammā
samādhi which constitute samādhi, (Concentration) are implied by viriya,
sati, and ekaggatācetasikas respectively.

As the object of these virtues is the infinite number of beings, they
are called appama˝˝ā, lit., illimitable (Skt. aprāmānya). They are also
called brahma vihāra -Sublime Modes of Living.

Mettā, karunā, muditā, and upekkhā are these four
illimitables.

As explained above mettā and upekkhā are represented by
adosa and tatra-majjhattatā. Hence only two are mentioned here.

45. Mettā -

Derived from Ímid, to soften, to
love. According to Sanskrit mitrasya bhāvah = maitri; state of a friend. That
which softens the mind, or friendly disposition is mettā.

Goodwill, benevolence, loving-kindness are suggested as the best
renderings. Mettā is not carnal love or affection. The direct enemy of mettā
is hatred or ill-will (kodha), its indirect enemy is affection (pema). Mettā
embraces all beings without exception. The culmination of mettā is the
identification of oneself with all beings (sabbattatā).

Mettā is the sincere wish for the good and welfare of all. It
discards ill-will.

Benevolent attitude is its chief characteristic.

46. Karunā -

ÍKar, to do, to make + unā.

That which makes the hearts of the good quiver when others are
afflicted with sorrow is karunā. That which dissipates the sufferings of others is
karunā.

The wish for the removal of sufferings of others is its chief
characteristic. Its direct enemy is wickedness (himsā) and its indirect enemy is
grief (domanassa). Karunā embraces sorrow-afflicted beings. It discards cruelty.

47. Muditā -

Derived from Ímud, to be pleased.

It is not mere sympathy but appreciative joy. Its direct enemy is
jealousy and its indirect enemy is exultation (pahāsa). Its chief characteristic
is happy acquiescence in others' prosperity (anumodanā). Muditā embraces
prosperous beings. It discards dislike (arati), and it is the congratulatory
attitude of a person.

48. Upekkhā -

Upa = impartially, justly + Íikkh,
to see, to view, to look.

Upekkhā is to view impartially, i.e., neither with attachment
nor with aversion. It is the balanced state of mind. Its direct enemy is passion (rāga),
and its indirect enemy is unintelligent indifference. Attachment and aversion are
eliminated by upekkhā. Impartial attitude is its chief characteristic.

Here upekkhā does not mean mere neutral feeling, but a sterling
virtue is implied thereby. Equanimity is the closest equivalent. That term, too, conveys
only one aspect of upekkhā. (See Ch. 1, notes 10, 42). It is this upekkhā
that is elevated to a bojjhanga factor.

Upekkhā embraces all good and bad ones, loved and unloved ones,
agreeable and disagreeable things, pleasure and pain and all such similar opposite pairs.

49. The following illuminating note by Mrs. Rhys Davids on these
four virtues is well worth reading.

"On these four great exercises, see Rhys Davids, S. B. E. xi 201,
n.; and on their emancipating efficacy, M. i. 38. Buddhaghosa again refers to the reader
to his Visuddhi Magga for a more detailed commentary (vide chap. ix, and cf. Hardy,
'Eastern Monachism', p . 243 et seq. )... The object of thought (ārammana) in this
connection will be 'limited' if the student dwells in love etc., on but a restricted
number of beings; 'infinite' if his heart embraces vast numbers.

'The commentator has not a little to say in the present work, however,
on the nature and mutual relations of the 'Abodes' (pp. 193-195). First, the
characteristics of each are fully set forth, together with their false manifestation (vipatti).
Clinging (sinehasambhavo) is the vipatti of love, the essential mark of
which is the carrying on of beneficent conduct etc. Tears and the like are less truly
characteristic of pity (karunā) than is the bearing and relieving the woes of
others. Laughter and the like are less genuine expressions of sympathy (muditā) than
is appreciation of what others have achieved. And there is a condition of
disinterestedness (upekkhā) which is prompted by ignorance, and not by that
insight into the karma of mankind which can avail to calm the passions.

"He next designates the four antisocial attitudes which are to be
extirpated by these ethical disciplines taken in order - ill-will (vyāpāda),
cruelty (vihesā), aversion (arati), and passion (rāga) - and shows
how each virtue has also a second vice opposed to it. This he terms its near enemy, as
being less directly assailed by it than its ethical opposite, the latter resembling an
enemy who has to lurk afar in the jungle and the hills. Love and vengeful conduct cannot
coexist. To prevail in this respect, let love be developed fearlessly. But where love and
its object have too much in common, love is threatened by lust. On this side let love be
guarded well. Again the near enemy to pity, more insidious than cruelty, is the self-pity
pining for what one has not got or has lost - a low, profane melancholy. And the
corresponding worldly happiness in what one has, or in consequence of obliviousness as to
what one has lost, lies in wait to stifle appreciation of the good fortune of others.
Lastly, there is the unintelligent indifference of the worldling who has not triumphed
over limitations nor mastered cause and effect, being unable to transcend external things.

"The remainder of his remarks are occupied with the necessary
sequence in the four Abodes, and the importance of observing method in their cultivation,
and finally with their other technical appellation of appama˝˝ā or infinitudes.
In this connection he repeats the touching illustration given in Hardy (op. Cit., 249) of
the mother, and the four children. Her desire for the growth of the infant is as mettā;
for the recovery of the sick child as karunā; for the maintenance of the gifts
displayed by the youth as muditā; while her care not to hinder the career of her
grown-up son is as upekkhā.

"It may be remarked, by the way, that when Hardy with a
foreigner's want of muditā calumniates the Buddhist mendicant (p. 250) as one who
thinks about the virtues of solidarity without practicing them, he quite forgets that
these exercises are but preparations of the will for that ministering to the intellectual
need of others to which the recluse's life was largely devoted, and the importance of
which the Western, in his zeal for material forms of charity, does not even now appreciate
at its real value. And Buddhism did not believe in giving the rein to good impulses
unregulated by intellectual control".

As pa˝˝ā dominates in understanding the real nature and as it
overcomes ignorance, it is called a controlling faculty (indriya).

In Abhidhamma ˝āna, pa˝˝ā, and amoha are used as
interchangeable terms. In types of consciousness connected with knowledge (˝āna-sampayutta)
the reference is to this pa˝˝ā. By amoha, one of the three moral roots,
is also meant this pa˝˝ā. As one of the four means of accomplishing one's ends (iddhi-pāda)
it assumes the name of vīmamsā (lit., examination). When purified by samādhi,pa˝˝ā assumes the honorable role of abhi˝˝ā (higher knowledge). Highly
developed pa˝˝ā is elevated to the state of a bojjhanga-dhamma-vicaya
(Investigation of the Truth) and magganga-sammā ditthi, Right View. The
culmination of pa˝˝ā is the Omniscience of a Buddha.

Pa˝˝ā, in the strictest sense of the term, is seeing things
as they truly are, i.e., in the light of anicca (impermanence), dukkha
(sorrow), and anattā (soullessness).

Reason, intellect, insight, knowledge, wisdom, intelligence - all
convey some aspects of pa˝˝ā, but none of them exactly corresponds to the Pāli
term. Both knowledge and wisdom are employed here according to the context.

Mrs. Rhys David's comment on this important term is interesting. She
writes:-

"To fit the term pa˝˝ā with its approximate European
equivalent is one of the cruxes of Buddhist philosophy. I have tried in turn reason,
intellect, insight, science, understanding and knowledge. All of these have been, and are,
used in the literature of philosophy with varying shades of connotation, according as the
sense to be conveyed is popular and vague, psychological and precise or transcendental and
- passez-moi le mot - having precise vagueness.

And each of them might, with one implication or another, represent pa˝˝ā.
The main difficulty in choice lay in determining whether, to the Buddhist, pa˝˝ā stood
for mental function, or for the aggregate product of certain mental functioning, or for
both. When all the allusions to pa˝˝ā in the Sutta Pitaka have been collated, a
final translation becomes possible. Here it must suffice to quote two. M i. 292, he who
has pa˝˝ā (pa˝˝avā) is declared in virtue thereof to understand (pajānāti)
the nature of the phenomenon of pain or ill (the Four Noble Truths). In D. i. 124 Gotama
asks: what is this pa˝˝ā? and himself sets out its content as consisting in
certain intellectual attainments, viz., the Jhānas, insight into the nature of
impermanence, the mental image of one's self, the power of iddhi, the cosmic Ear,
insight into other minds, into one's own past lives, the cosmic Eye, and the elimination
of all vitiating tendencies. Buddhaghosa also (Visuddhi Magga Ch. XIV,) distinguishes pa˝˝ā
from sa˝˝ā and vi˝˝āna. He describes it as adequate to discern not
only what these can, viz., sense-objects and the Three Marks (impermanence, pain and
non-substantiality) respectively, but also the path. For him, then, it might be called
intellect 'at a higher power'. And in Gotama's reply, all those terms are described in
terms of intellectual process. Nevertheless, it is clear that the term did not stand for
bare mental process of a certain degree of complexity, but that it also implied mental
process as cultivated in accordance with a certain system of concepts objectively valid
for all Buddhist adepts. Hence I think it best to reject such terms as reason, intellect,
and understanding, and to choose wisdom, or science, or knowledge, or philosophy. Only
they must be understood in this connection as implying the body of learning as assimilated
and applied by the intellect of a given individual".

(b) Attachment is found only in the eight types of consciousness rooted
in attachment.

(c) Misbelief (*2) is found in the four types of consciousness
accompanied by wrong view.

(d) Conceit (*3) is found in the four types of consciousness
dissociated with wrong view.

(e) Hatred, Jealousy, Avarice, and Worry (*4) are found in the two
types of consciousness accompanied by ill-will.

(f) Sloth and Torpor (*5) are found in the five types of prompted
consciousness.

(g) Doubt is found only in the type of consciousness accompanied by
doubt.

(*1) The root of every evil is moha
(ignorance), because the evil-doer is not aware of the evil consequences. With it are
associated shamelessness to commit the evil and disregard for the effects that follow.
There is a certain amount of restlessness of the mind when an evil is committed.]

(*2) As ditthi gives rise to the conception of "me"
and "mine connected with oneself, it occurs in the consciousness rooted in
attachment]

(*3) Māna too originates with the "I" - conception
connected with oneself. As such it also is present only in types of consciousness rooted
in attachment. Nevertheless, both ditthi and māna do not arise
simultaneously in one particular consciousness. Where there is ditthi there is no māna.
Commentaries compare them to two fearless lions that cannot live in one den. Māna
may arise in those four types of consciousness dissociated with ditthi. But it does
not follow that māna is ever present in them.]

(*4) These four cannot arise in a consciousness rooted in attachment
because there is some form of aversion in them instead of any of clinging. Even macchariya
is a kind of aversion to others' viewing with oneself.]

(*5) Thīna and Middha are by nature opposed to
adaptability. They lack the urge. As such they cannot arise in types of consciousness that
are unprompted (asankharika) which are naturally keen and active. They appear only
in types of prompted consciousness.

(Summary)

ž 7. Four are found in all Immorals, three in those rooted in
attachment, four in those rooted in ill-will and so are two in the prompted.

Doubt is found in the consciousness accompanied by doubt. Thus the
fourteen are conjoined only with the twelve Immorals in five ways.

ž 8. (a) Of the Beautiful, at first, the nineteen mental states common
to the Beautiful are found in all the fifty-nine types of Beautiful consciousness.

(b) The three Abstinences are definitely obtained all at once in all
places in the Supra mundane type of consciousness. But in the mundane Sense-sphere Moral
types of consciousness they are at times present severally.
(8 + 8 = 16).

(c) The Illimitables arise at times differently in twenty-eight types
of consciousness - namely, the twelve Sublime types of consciousness, excluding the fifth
Jhāna, the eight Moral types and the eight sahetuka functional types of
Sense-sphere consciousness. Some, however say that Compassion and Appreciative Joy are not
present in the types of consciousness accompanied by upekkhā (Equanimity or
Indifference). (12 + 8 + 8 = 28)

(e) In the Fifth Jhāna type of consciousness which is accompanied by
Equanimity, all those excluding Initial Application, Sustained Application, Joy, and
Happiness.

Thus in every way fivefold is the synthesis of mental factors arising
in the eight types of Supra mundane consciousness according to the five Jhānas.

Respectively there are thirty-six, thirty-five, thirty-four, and
thirty-three in the last two.

Thus in five ways they arise in the Supra mundane.

* Because their objects are living beings, while the lokuttara
consciousness has Nibbāna for its object.

** Vitakka is eliminated in the 2nd Jhāna. The
elimination of other factors in the remaining Jhānas should be similarly understood.

Notes:

52. Aniyatayogi and Niyatayogi -

Of the 52 types of mental states eleven are called aniyatayogi -
unfixed adjuncts. They arise in different kinds of consciousness separately because their
particular objects differ. They may or may not arise in those types of consciousness to
which they are allied. For instance, issā, macchariya, and kukkucca must
arise in a consciousness connected with aversion. One of the three must arise at one
particular moment. All the three do not occur simultaneously. Besides they are not bound
to be present in such a consciousness. So are the three Abstinences, two Illimitables,
Conceit, Sloth and Torpor.

The remaining 41 types are called niyatayogi - fixed adjuncts.
They invariably arise in those types of consciousness allied to them.

53. Abstinences -

These three are collectively found only in the Supra mundane
consciousness, as they constitute three of eight factors of the Noble Path. They cannot
arise in the rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara, nor in the kāmāvacara
vipāka and kriyā cittas. They deal with three forms of refraining from
committing evil through word, deed, and livelihood. As such they arise separately only in
the eight types of moral consciousness according to the abstinence from the particular
evil.

These Abstinences appear in full force only in the lokuttara-cittas,
because the corresponding evils are completely eradicated by them. In the kāmāvacara-kusala-cittas
there is only a temporary inhibition of evil.

As kāmāvacara-vipāka-cittas are merely effects they cannot
arise in them. Since kriyā-cittas are experienced only by Arahats, they do not
arise in them. In the rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara planes they do not
occur because the need for moral purification, the function of these abstinences, does not
arise there.

54. Illimitables (Sublime Abodes)-

Of the four only two are mentioned here. The other two have already
been dealt with in their respective places.

It should be noted that the objects of these tables are beings.
Therefore they cannot arise in the Supra mundane consciousness which has for its object
Nibbāna. This does not mean that Arahats and other Aryans do not possess these virtues.
They are not present only in the Path and Fruit consciousness.

They do not occur in the fifth Jhāna as it is accompanied by upekkhā
- neutral feeling. In the arūpa-cittas also they do not arise as they also are
connected with upekkhā. In the eight kiriya cittas, which the Arahats
experience, they arise because the Arahats also radiate thoughts of karunā and muditā
towards all beings.

The two Illimitables and the three Abstinences should be fitted in
severally. (*2)

(ii) Similarly in the second couplet all of them arise excluding
Wisdom;

(iii) in the third couplet, associated with Wisdom, Joy is excluded;

(iv) in the fourth couplet Wisdom and Joy (*3) are excluded.

In the Functional consciousness the three Abstinences are excluded.
(*4) Likewise in the four couplets they are combined in four ways.

Similarly in the Resultant consciousness they all arise except the
Illimitables and the Abstinences. (*5)

Thus in all the twenty-four types of Sense-sphere Beautiful types of
consciousness the combination is twelve-fold according to pairs.

ž 15. With respect to Sense-Sphere consciousness with roots -Moral,
Resultant, and Functional - there arise in the Moral (first pair) thirty-eight, twice (*6)
thirty-seven (in the second and third pairs), and thirty-six( in the fourth pair). In the
Functional thirty-five (in the first pair), twice thirty-four (in the second and third
pairs), thirty three (in the forth pair). In the Resultant thirty three (in the first
pair), twice thirty-two (in the second and third pairs), thirty-one (in the fourth pair).

ž 16. Herein the Abstinences are not present in the Functional and
Sublime consciousness.(*7) So are Illimitables in the Supramundane and the two
Illimitables and Abstinences) in the Sense-Resultants. (Note 54)

In the Highest the Jhāna factors are distinctive (*8); in the Middle (rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara), the Illimitables (and
Jhāna factors *9); in the Small (kāmāvacara), the
Abstinences, Wisdom and Joy.

(*2) Because they are not fixed adjuncts. They arise at
different moments of conscious experience.

(*3) Being accompanied by upekkhā.

(*4) Because the Arahats have completely eradicated the
Abstinences.

(*5) Illimitables do not arise because they have
limitless beings as the objects, while the Resultants are restricted to lesser objects.
The Abstinences are absolutely moral. Hence they do not arise in a resultant
consciousness. In the Supramundane Fruit consciousness they however arise because it is
like a reflection of the Path consciousness.

(*6) i.e., thirty-seven in each of the second and third
couplets.

(*7) i.e. in the rūpāvacara arūpāvacara
planes. Because no occasion arises for such evil to spring up.

(*8) The supramundane consciousness, when classified
according to five Jhānas, differs with respect to Jhāna factors.

(*9) Ca in the text includes Jhāna factors.

(*10) Morals differ from Resultants and Functionals on
account of Abstinences. Morals and Functionals differ from Resultants on account of
Illimitables. Respective couplets differ on account of Wisdom and Joy.

In all the rootless the seven (Universals) occur. The rest
(Particulars) arise accordingly. Thus in detail the groupings are told in thirty-three
ways.(*7)

Understanding thus the combinations and synthesis of the mental
adjuncts, let one explain their union with the consciousness accordingly.(*8)

(*1) In the consciousness connected with laughter there
is no wish-to-do, See Ch. 1, p.31.

(*2) It is the manodvāravajjana-mind-door
consciousness-that assumes the name votthapana - Determining.

(*3) Although santīrana means investigating, it
is a passive resultant consciousness. It lacks both will and effort.

(*4) Manodhātu - lit., the mere faculty of apprehension
(mananamatta' meva dhātu). It comprises the pancadvārāvajjana - sense-door
consciousness, and the two sampaticchanas - recipient consciousness. The ten types
of sense-consciousness are called dvipa˝ca vi˝˝ānadhātu. The remaining
seventy-six types of consciousness are termed manovi˝˝ānadhātu, as they excel
others in apprehension.

Both sampaticchanas are accompanied by upekkhā which
does not coexist with pīti. Like the santīrana these two are resultants
and are passive. Therefore they lack both effort and will. In the pancadvārāvajjana,
too, as in manodvārāvajjana effort and will are lacking.

(*5) The two santīranas accompanied by upekkhā
- both moral and immoral resultants are known as the ahetuka patisandhi yugala the
pair of rootless relinking types of consciousness. Conception in woeful states is obtained
by the akusala ahetuka santīrana, and amongst human beings as congenitally
blind, deaf, etc., by the kusata ahetuka santīrana. This pair is also
accompanied by upekkhā.

(*8) In this chapter are explained in what types of
consciousness the respective mental states are present and what types of mental states
occur in each type of consciousness.

The author concludes the chapter advising the readers to explain the
union of these mental states with each consciousness accordingly as, for example, -
Universals are eighty-nine-fold because they are present in all the types of consciousness,
phassa of the Particulars is fifty-fivefold because it arises in fifty-five types
of consciousness, etc.

ental
adjuncts, let one explain their union with the consciousness accordingly.(*8)

(*1) In the consciousness connected with laughter there
is no wish-to-do, See Ch. 1, p.31.

(*2) It is the manodvāravajjana-mind-door
consciousness-that assumes the name votthapana - Determining.

(*3) Although santīrana means investigating, it
is a passive resultant consciousness. It lacks both will and effort.

(*4) Manodhātu - lit., the mere faculty of apprehension
(mananamatta' meva dhātu). It comprises the pancadvārāvajjana - sense-door
consciousness, and the two sampaticchanas - recipient consciousness. The ten types
of sense-consciousness are called dvipa˝ca vi˝˝ānadhātu. The remaining
seventy-six types of consciousness are termed manovi˝˝ānadhātu, as they excel
others in apprehension.

Both sampaticchanas are accompanied by upekkhā which
does not coexist with pīti. Like the santīrana these two are resultants
and are passive. Therefore they lack both effort and will. In the pancadvārāvajjana,
too, as in manodvārāvajjana effort and will are lacking.

(*5) The two santīranas accompanied by upekkhā
- both moral and immoral resultants are known as the ahetuka patisandhi yugala the
pair of rootless relinking types of consciousness. Conception in woeful states is obtained
by the akusala ahetuka santīrana, and amongst human beings as congenitally
blind, deaf, etc., by the kusata ahetuka santīrana. This pair is also
accompanied by upekkhā.

(*8) In this chapter are explained in what types of
consciousness the respective mental states are present and what types of mental states
occur in each type of consciousness.

The author concludes the chapter advising the readers to explain the
union of these mental states with each consciousness accordingly as, for example, -
Universals are eighty-nine-fold because they are present in all the types of consciousness,
phassa of the Particulars is fifty-fivefold because it arises in fifty-five types
of consciousness, etc.