In an article that provides key insights into the mind of Pope Francis, Fernandez compares adultery for the divorced and civilly remarried to self-defense, as allegedly exceptions to the general norm. Indeed, Pope Francis has spokentwice of alleged conflicts between the Fifth and the Sixth Commandments with respect to justifying the use of condoms. Moreover, Fernandez argues that the magisterial "flip-flops" at Vatican II on religious freedom and salvation outside the Church set precedent for Pope Francis to contradict his predecessors in Amoris Laetitia.

What follows is the full text of Msgr. Fernandez' article in an English translation by Andrew Guernsey.

Chapter
VIII of Amoris Laetitia: What is left
after the storm

Victor
Manuel Fernández*

Summary:

When
interpreting the eighth chapter of Amoris
Laetitia, particularly as regards access to Eucharistic communion for
divorcees involved in a new relationship, it is worth starting from the very
interpretation that Francis himself did of his own text, categorical in his
response to the Bishops of the region of Buenos Aires. Francis proposed a step
forward, which implies a change in the current discipline. Maintaining the
distinction between objective good and subjective guilt, and the principle that
absolute moral standards do not admit exceptions, differentiates between norms
and their formulation and specifically calls for distinctive attention to
mitigating constraints. These are not related only with the knowledge of the
norm but especially with the real possibilities of decision on the part of the
subjects in their concrete reality. Francis admits that a pastoral discernment
within the scope of the “internal forum”, attentive to the conscience of the
person, may have practical consequences in the manner of applying the
discipline. This novelty invites us to recall that the Church can really
evolve, as has happened in history, both in our understanding of the doctrine
and in the application of its disciplinary consequences. But in order to apply
this in the topic under consideration requires we accept a new logic without
rigid structures. However, this does not imply a rupture, but rather a
harmonious development and a creative continuity with regard to the teaching of
previous Popes.

*Titular Archbishop of Tiburnia and Rector of the
Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina. Doctor of Theology from the
Faculty of Theology of the UCA (Buenos Aires). Graduated with biblical
specialization from the Pontifical Gregorian University (Rome). He participated
as a guest priest in the Fifth General Conference of the Episcopate of Latin
America and the Caribbean (Aparecida) and as synodal Father in the two Synods
on the Family convoked by Francis. He was a parish priest, Seminary formator and adviser
for lay movements. Author of more than 300 publications on theology, exegesis
and spirituality. Email: victor_fernandez@uca.edu.ar

--After several months of intense activity by sectors
that oppose the novelties of the eighth chapter of Amoris Laetitia – minorities, but hyperactive ones – or of strong
attempts to disguise them, the war seems to have reached a stalemate. It is now
worth pausing to acknowledge that which is concretely what Francis leaves to us
as an irreversible novelty.

"THERE
ARE NO OTHER INTERPRETATIONS"

If one is
interested to know how the Pope himself interprets what he wrote,
the answer is very explicit in his commentary on the guidelines of the Bishops
of the Buenos Aires Region. After discussing the possibility that the divorced
in a new union live in continence, they say that "in other, more complex
circumstances, and when it is not possible to obtain a declaration of nullity,
the aforementioned option may not, in fact, be feasible." They then add
that

Francis immediately sent them a formal letter stating
that "the document is very good and completely explains the meaning of
chapter VIII of Amoris Laetitia."
But it is important to note that he adds: "There are no other interpretations" (Letter
from the Holy Father to Mons. Sergio Alfredo Fenoy,
Delegate of the Pastoral Region of Buenos Aires, September 5, 2016) Therefore,
it is unnecessary to expect another response from the Pope.

It could be called into question that the pope would
clarify his interpretation in a letter to a group of bishops. But, in fact,
this has happened other times. To give an example, let us recall an incident
about the interpretation of Vatican Council I. The German bishops responded to
Chancellor Bismark, who argued that a Roman centralism had been defined that
weakened episcopal authority. With their response, they rejected that
interpretation of the Council. Pius IX endorsed the interpretation of those
Bishops with a letter (March 12, 1875) and with the consistory of March 15, 1875
(DH 3112-3117). In a footnote to Lumen
Gentium 27 the letter of Pius IX to the German Bishops is quoted, whereby its
hermeneutical authority is confirmed.

Obviously, a letter from the Pope does not have the
same weight as an Encyclical, but, as we see, it can have a great practical,
decisive importance to explain the correct interpretation of a text of greater weight.
If the Pope has received a unique charism in the Church in the service of the
correct interpretation of the divine Word - the charism given to Peter to bind
and to loose and to confirm his brethren in faith - this cannot exclude his
ability to interpret the documents he himself
wrote.

"PERFECT
CONTINENCE"

St. John Paul II’s proposal to the divorced in a new
union to live in perfect continence, as a requirement to make access to
Eucharistic communion possible, was already an important novelty. Many resisted
this step. Still some today do not accept this proposal because they believe it
leads to relativism. On the other hand, we must note a later novelty in the
language of Benedict XVI. While Pope John Paul II asked them to "assume
the commitment to live in full continence" (FC 84), Benedict XVI proposed
to them, more delicately, "to commit themselves" to live "as brother
and sister" (SC 29b).

Francis recognizes the possibility of proposing
perfect continence to the divorced in a new union, but admits that there may be
difficulties in practicing it (cf. footnote 329). Footnote 364 gives a place to
administering the sacrament of Reconciliation to them even when new falls are
foreseeable. There, Francis calls into question priests who "demand of
penitents a purpose of amendment so lacking in nuance that it causes mercy to
be obscured by the pursuit of a supposedly pure justice" (AL 312). And
there he takes up an important statement of St. John Paul II, who held that even
the anticipation of a new fall "should not prejudice the authenticity of
the resolution" (Letter to Cardinal W. Baum, 03/22/1996, quoted in the footnote.).
Against this cautious precision of St. John Paul II, some seem to demand a kind of
strict control of what others do in intimacy. We must heartily congratulate
those who manage to live in perfect continence, enriching their daily cohabitation
in various ways. But that does not imply ignoring that others have serious
difficulties in achieving this.

When the need to avoid scandal is spoken about, we
must note that this only happens when people "flaunt" their situation
as if it were correct (cf. AL 297). Otherwise, scandal would also be given when
the first marriage has been declared null, since probably many who see them go
to confession and communion do not know about the annulment. For that matter, neither
could they know whether they live as brother and sister or not. The objective fault
is not "manifest" insofar as it cannot be confirmed from the outside,
and all deserve the benefit of the doubt. Let us leave this matter – in fact,
unverifiable – to the intimacy of the discernment of the member of the faithful
with his pastor.

The great resistance that this issue provokes in some
groups indicates that this question, beyond its importance in itself, breaks a
rigid mental structure, very concentrated in issues of sexuality, and it forces
them to broaden their perspectives. This is why Francis asks pastors to help
the faithful "to treat the weak with the logic of compassion, avoiding
aggravation or unduly harsh or hasty judgements." (AL 308).

ABSOLUTE
MORAL STANDARDS AND HUMAN LIMITS

Amoris
Laetitia brings back a teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the
application of the general principles: "The more we descend to matters of
detail, the more frequently we encounter uncertainty" (AL 304). Francis
does not affirm that general moral laws cannot provide for all situations, nor
that they are incapable of impeding the decision of conscience. On the
contrary, he says that "[they] set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected." However, "in their formulation they cannot provide
absolutely for all particular situations" (AL 304). It is the formulation
of the norm that cannot provide for everything, not the norm itself. And this
applies not only to positive laws, but even to our way of formulating the
natural law in its various expressions. In this line, the International
Theological Commission, within the Pontificate of Benedict XVI, stated: "Natural
law could not be presented as an already established set of rules that impose
themselves a priori on the moral subject; rather, it is a
source of objective inspiration for the deeply personal process of making a
decision" (International Theological Committee, “In Search of a Universal
Ethic: A New Look at Natural Law,” Rome, 2009, 59.).

The
absolute norm in itself does not admit exceptions,
but that does not imply that its succinct formulation must be applied in every
sense and without nuances in all situations. "Thou shalt not kill"
does not admit exceptions. However, it raises this question: should taking life
in self-defense be included within the term "killing" prohibited by
the norm? Should taking food from others to feed a hungry child be included
within the term "stealing" prohibited by the norm? No one would doubt
that it is legitimate to ask whether these concrete cases are actually included
within the narrow formulations of the negative precepts "Thou shalt not
kill" or "Thou shalt not steal."

For this reason, it is also licit to ask if the acts
of a more uxorio cohabitation should
always fall, in its integral meaning, within the negative precept of
“fornication”. I say, “in its integral meaning,” because it is not possible to
hold that those acts in each and every case are gravely immoral in a subjective
sense. In the complexity of particular situations is where, according to St.
Thomas, ‘uncertainty increases.’ Indeed, it is not easy to describe
as an ‘adulteress’ a woman who has been beaten and treated with contempt by her
Catholic husband, and who received shelter, economic and psychological help
from another man who helped her raise the children of the previous union, and
with whom she had new children and cohabitates for many years.

The question is not whether that woman does not know that cohabitation with
that man does not correspond with objective moral norms. It is more than that.
Some claim to simplify the matter in this way, by saying that, according to
Francis, "The subject may not be able to be in mortal sin because, for
various reasons, he is not fully aware
that his situation constitutes adultery." (This is what Claudio Pierantoni
stated in a recent conference, very critical of Amoris Laetitia in Rome on April 22, 2017.) And they question him
that it makes no sense to speak about discernment if "the subject remains
indefinitely unaware of his situation" (Ibid.). But Francis explicitly said
that "more is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule" (AL 301).
The issue is much more complex and includes at least two basic considerations.
First, if a woman who knows the existence of the norm can really understand
that not abandoning that man – of whom she cannot now demand a total and
permanent continence – is truly a very grave fault against the will of God.
Second, if she truly can, at this point, make the decision to abandon that man.
This is where the limited formulation of the norm is incapable of stating
everything.

In any event, the specific and principal proposal of
Francis, in line with the Synod, is not concerning the considerations on the
formulation of the norm. Why then is this question part of his proposal?
Because he calls for much attention to the language that is used to describe weak
persons. For him, offensive expressions such as "adulterer" or
"fornicator" should not necessarily be deduced from the general norms
when referring to concrete persons.

But his emphasis is rather on the question of the possible
diminution of responsibility and culpability. Forms of conditioning can
attenuate or nullify responsibility and culpability against any norm, even against negative precepts and absolute
moral norms. This makes it possible not always to lose the life of
sanctifying grace in a “more uxorio” cohabitation.

WHEN
ONE CANNOT

Francis considers that even knowing the norm, a person
"may be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act
differently and decide otherwise without further sin. As the Synod Fathers put
it, ‘factors may exist which limit the ability to make a decision’" (AL 301).
He speaks of subjects who "are not in a position to understand, value or
fully practice the objective requirements of the law" (AL 295). In another
paragraph he reaffirms: "Under certain circumstances people find it very
difficult to act differently." (AL 302).

He also recalls that John Paul II recognized that in
certain cases "for serious reasons, such as for example the children's
upbringing, a man and a woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate"
(FC 84; AL 298). Let us note that St. John Paul II recognized that "they cannot". Benedict XVI was even
more forceful in saying that in some cases "objective circumstances are
present which make the cohabitation irreversible,
in fact." (SC 29b).

This becomes particularly complex, for example, when the
man is not a practicing Catholic. The woman is not in a position to oblige someone
to live in perfect continence who does not share all her Catholic convictions.
In that case, it is not easy for an honest and devout woman to make the
decision to abandon the man she loves, who protected her from a violent husband
and who freed her from falling into prostitution or suicide. The "serious reasons"
mentioned by Pope John Paul II, or the "objective circumstances"
indicated by Benedict XVI are amplified. But most important of all is the fact
that, by abandoning this man, she would leave the small children of the new
union without a father and without a family environment. There is no doubt
that, in this case, the decision-making power with respect to sexual continence, at least for now, has serious forms of conditioning that diminish guilt and
imputability. Therefore, they demand great care when making judgments only from
a general norm. Francis thinks especially of "the situation of families in
dire poverty, punished in so many ways, where the limits of life are lived in
an excruciating way" (AL 49). In the face of these families, it is
necessary to avoid "imposing straightaway a set of rules that only lead
people to feel judged and abandoned" (ibid.).

BEYOND
SITUATIONALISM

The Pope, faithful to the real and limited
possibilities which the Synod opened - and even against the proposals of
progressive moralists - has preferred to maintain the distinction between
objective sin and subjective guilt. Therefore, although it can be held with all
clarity and forcefulness that sexual relations for the divorced in a new union
constitute an objective situation of habitual grave sin, this does not imply
that there necessarily exists grave sin in a subjective sense, that is to say, grave
guilt that takes away the life of the sanctifying grace:

The Church possesses a solid body of reflection
concerning mitigating factors and situations. Hence it is can no longer simply
be said that all those in any “irregular” situation are living in a state of
mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. (AL 301).

It is already widely accepted - even in the Catechism
- that "imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence,
duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social
factors" (CCC 1735).

For Francis, however, it is not the concrete
circumstances that determine objective morality. That forms of conditioning can diminish
culpability does not mean that what is objectively evil may become objectively good.
Suffice it to read the following sentence: "Because of forms of
conditioning and mitigating factors, it is possible that in an objective
situation of sin – which may not be subjectively culpable, or fully such – a
person can be living in God’s grace" (AL 305). That is to say, it remains
an "objective situation of sin", because there remains the Gospel’s clear
proposal on marriage, and this concrete situation does not objectively reflect that.
Francis, like the Synod, maintains the existence of objective truths and
universal norms, and has never defended subjectivism or relativism. God's plan
is a marriage understood as an indissoluble union, and this point was not placed
in doubt either in the Synod or in his pontificate.

THE
POWER OF DISCERNMENT

On the other hand, Francis has never claimed that
anyone can receive communion if he is not in the grace of God. But, as we have
just seen, for someone to be deprived of sanctifying grace, it is not always
enough that a serious objective fault exists. Therefore, there can be a path of
discernment, open to the possibility of receiving the nourishment of the
Eucharist.

This is only possible if a different way of thinking
about the consequences of the norm is
accepted. This does not admit exceptions with regard to the objective evaluation
starting from an absolute moral precept, but he allows a discernment with
regard to its disciplinary derivations.
Although the norm is universal, however, "since the degree of
responsibility is not equal in all cases, the
consequences or effects of a norm need not always be the same" (AL
300). “This is also the
case with regard
to sacramental discipline, since
discernment can recognize that in a particular situation no grave fault exists"
(AL footnote 336).

The question that arises is the following: Can this be
discerned in pastoral dialogue? The Pope says yes, and that is what opens the
way to a change in discipline. Francis’ great novelty is in allowing that a pastoral discernment in the realm of the “internal
forum” can have practical consequences in the manner of applying the discipline.
The general canonical norm is maintained (cf. AL 300), although it cannot be
applied in some cases as a consequence of a path of discernment. In this
discernment, the conscience of the concrete person plays a central role with
regard to his real situation before God, his real possibilities, and his
limits. That conscience, accompanied by a pastor and enlightened by the guidelines
of the Church, is capable of an assessment that gives rise to a judgment,
sufficient to discern regarding the possibility of access to communion.

Does this imply that a judgment can be given about
one's own state of grace? St. John Paul II stated that "the judgment of
one's state of grace obviously belongs only to the person involved, since it is
a question of examining one's conscience." (“De gratiae statu, ut patet,
iudicium solum ad singulos homines spectat, cum de conscientiae aestimatione agatur”:
EdE 37b.) But it must be clarified that it is only a certain moral security, the only thing which someone can obtain before
approaching to receive communion. It is never a certainty, however much one may
be unaware of having violated a commandment. The Council of Trent defined that,
looking at ourselves, we cannot be
certain about our state of grace (cf. Session VI, chapter 9). We speak,
then, of that minimal "moral security" that the person can obtain after
a process of personal and pastoral discernment, which should not be based only
on a single general norm.

Up to now, discernment about an attenuated culpability
did not allow for removing consequences at the external or disciplinary level.
The disciplinary consequences of the norm remained unaltered, because they were
based only on an objective fault against
an absolute norm. Francis proposes to go one step further. It is true that
the general norm is not purely a discipline, but it is related to a theological
truth, such as the union between Christ and the Church which is reflected in
marriage. But sometimes “undue conclusions
from particular theological
considerations" (AL 2) are derived when they are translated into a rigid
discipline that admits no discernment whatsoever. This is the point where
Francis makes a change with respect to the previous praxis.

THE
LEGITIMACY OF A CHANGE IN DISCIPLINE

Is this change possible and acceptable? Can Francis accept
what was taught by St. John Paul II and yet open a door that was closed? Yes,
because an evolution in the Church's understanding of her own doctrine and its disciplinary consequences is
possible. Let us look at some historical examples.

In 1832, Pope Gregory XVI, in Mirari vos, had said that it is an "absurd and erroneous
doctrine, or rather delirium, that freedom of conscience is to be claimed and defended
for all men" (MV 15). In the Syllabus
of Pius IX (1864) religious freedom is condemned as one of the principal
"errors." But in the following century, the Second Vatican Council
substantially modified these very firm ideas (cf. DH 2-3). A similar evolution
occurred on the issue of the possibility of salvation outside of the Catholic
Church. We recall also the case of slavery: Pope Nicholas V allowed the king of
Portugal to take slaves. Then, in 1455 the Bull Romanus Pontifex reaffirmed this. And this is not a secondary
issue, since it has to do with the inalienable dignity of the human person. (With
respect to this subject of the evolution in the understanding of the doctrine,
the examples can be taken into account which are given in: Thomas Rausch, “Doctrine at the service of the pastoral mission of the Church,” La Civiltà Cattolica, v. 3981, May 14,
2016; pp. 223-236.) As of those changes in the understanding of doctrine, there
were, as a consequence, various changes in discipline.

However, some hold that these comparisons are not
convincing, and insist that any evolution should be carried out in the same line as what was said
previously by the Church. It would be a kind of magisterial "fixism."
But, precisely in the examples mentioned above, it can be seen that the evolution
did not take place "in the same line" as before, at least not on the question in itself. Between allowing
slavery and not allowing it in any case, there is an immense evolution. There
is only Continuity in the general doctrine about human dignity, but not in the
precise point in question, where the Church really evolved in its
understanding. In the same way, between affirming that only a Catholic can be
saved and holding that there is a possibility of salvation outside the Church,
there is no continuity with regard to the question in itself. It is obvious
that the Church grows into a better reception of the proposal of the Gospel, in
a more complete vision and in new ways of applying
what has been taught. But some have an enormous difficulty in admitting that
something similar can occur in questions related to sexuality.

RECENT
CHANGES OF DISCIPLINE REGARDING NEW UNIONS

The fact is that even in the praxis related to the
disciplinary treatment given to the divorced in a new union, there have already
been major changes over the last century. Let us recall that, with the same
arguments with which it is not accepted that they may not receive communion, a
long time ago "the prohibition against funerals and any public funeral
service" was also applied to them (Francisco Elizari, Pastoral de los divorciados [Pastoral Care of the Divorced],
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31-32.). This changed without all the beliefs
that supported that praxis falling away.

Based on reasons that remain standing, the previous Code of Canon Law (1917) sustained a
discipline which the current Code (1983) does not maintain: "If, spurning
the admonition of the Ordinary, they stay in the illicit relationship, they are
to be excommunicated according to the
gravity of the deed or struck with personal interdict" (Canon 2336). This
indicates the possibility of changes in the disciplinary practice that do not necessarily make the great beliefs
that supported the previous praxis fall away, but the possible practical consequences of the general
norm are considered in another way.

Amoris
Laetitia gives rise to a new change, which does not imply a
contradiction with the previous teaching, but a harmonious evolution and a
creative continuity. The prestigious philosopher and specialist in the thought
of St. John Paul II - Rocco Buttiglione - has explained it very well:

John Paul II, however, does not want at all to nullify
the role of the subjective conscience. The objective aspect of the act determines
the goodness and the seriousness of the act. The subjective aspect of the
action determines the level of responsibility of the agent ... Pope Francis sets
himself on the ground, not of the justification of the act, but of the subjective
attenuating circumstances that diminish the agent's responsibility. This is
precisely the balance of Catholic ethics and distinguishes the realistic ethics
of St. John Paul II from the objectivistic ethics of some of Pope Francis's
opponents. ... Familiaris Consortio,
moreover, when it formulates the rule, does not tell us that it does not
tolerate exceptions for a proportionate reason. The rule that no one who is not
in grace God ought to receive Eucharist by its very nature does not tolerate
exceptions. Whoever receives the Body and the Blood of Christ unworthily eats
and drinks his own condemnation. The rule according to which persons in God's
grace are excluded from communion as the canonical penalty for the
counter-witness which they have given, however, may be subject to exceptions,
and this is exactly what Amoris Laetitia
tells us. (Rocco
Buttiglione, L'Approccio Antropologico di
San Giovanni Paolo II e quello Pastorale di Papa Francesco [The
Anthropological Approach of St. John Paul II and Pastoral Care of Pope Francis])

It would be fitting to clarify Buttiglione's
expression "for the counter-witness they have given" by saying:
"because their situation does not objectively correspond with the good
that the general norm proposes."

RECOGNITION
OF LIMITS AND GOOD THAT IS POSSIBLE

Once again, we may say that this does not imply
watering down an objective value. What Francis suggests is the situation of a
person who, in dialogue with the pastor, does not present the intimate acts of
a more uxorio cohabitation as
subjectively moral, that is to say, as the object of a personal choice that
legitimates them. It only presents them as difficult to avoid in their concrete
circumstances, even if they are sincerely willing to grow in this point.
Circumstances can diminish culpability, but not transform an act, immoral by
virtue of its object, into an act that one may justifies as a choice. In fact, the same Amoris
Laetitia, rejects the attitude of someone who "flaunts an objective
sin as if it were part of the Christian ideal" (AL 297). Therefore, it is
clear that Francis does not admit that that act is justifiable as a
"personal choice".

Amoris
Laetitia refers to people aware of the severity of their
situation, but with "great difficulty of going back without feeling in
conscience that one would fall into new sins" (AL 298). That culpability
is diminished, because the capacity for a decision is strongly conditioned,
does not mean presenting one’s situation as a personal plan consistent with the
Gospel. That is why discernment is not closed, but "is dynamic; it must
remain ever open to new stages of growth
and to new decisions which can enable the ideal to be more fully realized" (AL 303). This, according to an authentic understanding
of the "law of gradualness" (AL 295), invites us to respond better to
God each time by trusting in the help of His grace.

If the act remains objectively
immoral and does not lose its objective gravity, then it is not possible that
it can be "chosen" with conviction, as if it were part of the
Christian ideal. Still less could it be held that, by this "choice of
life", it becomes subjectively moral. It is another very different thing
is to propose, as Francis does, that in a context of attenuated culpability one
seeks to respond to the will of God with a greater commitment, possible in the context of that
situation. For example, with a greater generosity towards the children, or with
the decision to assume as a couple a more intense commitment for the common
good, or with a maturation in familial dialogue, or with the development of
mutual gestures of more frequent and intense charity, etc. These attempts can
be objects of a "personal choice", and they are examples of that
"possible good" that can be realized within the limits of the
situation itself (cf. EG 44-45, AL 308). They are expressions of the "via caritatis", to which "those
who have difficulties in living God’s law to the full" (AL 306) can always
turn. Staying on this path, conscience is also called to recognize "what
for now is the most generous response which can be given to God ... the
commitment which God himself is asking amid the concrete complexity of one’s limits”
(AL 303).

It is not that everything is the same, or that now
"nothing matters". The need to avoid concealing the seriousness of
the situation explains why the Pope sets some firm limits on the proposed
discernment. For example, it excludes the case of "a new union arising
from a recent divorce" or "the case of someone who has consistently
failed in his obligations to the family" (AL 298). At the same time, he
asks that people be guided so that they may sincerely recognize their own truth,
especially in relation to "how they acted towards their children" or
with the abandoned spouse (cf. AL 300). There are limits that discernment
should not exceed, particularly when the recognition of the other is at stake,
or when there is still little clarity about the situation itself. The Gospel is
not reduced, let alone its demands of charity, but it is incarnated in the
concrete possibilities of human complexity.

CONSCIENCE

In the discussions about Amoris Laetitia, some hold that the Pope claims to grant to people’s
conscience a power to create the truth and the norms at its whim. With this
argument, these opponents of Francis try to force others to assume a determinate
logic, from which there is no way out. The Gospel is thus subjected to a kind
of theological and moral mathematics. Once that mental structure is adopted,
there is no choice but to accept all the logic and consequences of that manner
of using reason. It is a death-trap.

It is not the logic that Francis proposes for the
shepherds of this time (cf. AL 296. 312). In addition, he rejects the pretension
of "those who long for a monolithic body of doctrine guarded by all and
leaving no room for nuance" (EG 40). He recognizes the value of reason to
reflect on the Gospel, and appreciates the dialogue between faith and reason.
But this does not imply canonizing "a" reason, a determinate manner
of reasoning, a philosophy to which the Gospel and the whole Church must
submit. The Gospel is not enclosed in a philosophy because "Christian
morality is not a form of stoicism, or self-denial, or merely a practical
philosophy or a catalogue of sins and faults" (EG 39).

If a determinate manner of using reason is
absolutized, only those who possess this mental structure will be able to interpret
doctrine and revelation, and they would place themselves even above the pope. The
supernatural vision of the Church and the Petrine ministry would thus be lost.
Someone has said that this is an "intellectual Pelagianism", because
a determinate reason occupies the place of the Gospel and of the action of the
Spirit in his Church. The Scriptures would serve only to illustrate the logic
proper to "that" reason, administered by an oligarchic group of
ethicists.

Anyway, let us remember what Francis says about the
importance of conscience; for example, in the following texts:

We also find it hard to make room for the consciences
of the faithful, who very often respond as best they can to the Gospel amid
their limitations, and are capable of carrying out their own discernment in complex situations. We have been called to
form consciences, not to replace them
(AL 37).

…Individual conscience needs to be better incorporated
into the Church’s praxis in certain situations which do not objectively embody
our understanding of marriage (AL 303).

However, Francis does not indicate that the conscience
of each member of the faithful should be left completely free to its own judgement.
What he asks for is a process of discernment accompanied by a pastor. It is a
"personal and pastoral" discernment (AL 300), which also takes very
seriously "the teaching of the Church and the guidelines of the
Bishop" (ibid.) and supposes a "properly formed" conscience (AL
302). It is not a conscience that pretends to create the truth as it pleases,
or to adapt it to its desires. On the part of the pastor, it "never
implies dimming the light of the fuller ideal, or proposing less than what
Jesus offers to the human being", nor "an undue reticence in
proposing that ideal" (AL 307). Some priests may be questioned who tend to
fall into irresponsible or hasty discretion, causing confusion. The Pope does
not ignore these risks that must be avoided (cf. AL 300). Each local Church
will find the right balance through the experience, dialogue and guidance of
the Bishop.

Francis's proposal is very demanding. It would be
easier or more convenient to apply norms in a rigid and universal way, to
pretend that everything is "black and white" (AL 305), or to start
with some general beliefs and draw fixed conclusions without taking into
account the complexity of reality and the concrete life of persons. But
this comfortable rigidity can be a betrayal of the heart of the Gospel: "At
times we find it hard to make room for God’s unconditional love in our pastoral
activity. We put so many conditions on mercy that we empty it of its concrete
meaning and real significance. That is the
worst way of watering down the Gospel." (AL 311).

A
SECONDARY QUESTION

Although the question of the possible access to the
communion for some divorcees in a new union has caused much commotion, the Pope
intended - unsuccessfully - that this move be made in a discreet manner.
Therefore, after developing the presuppositions of this decision in the body of
the document, the application to communion for the divorced in new union was
made explicit in the footnotes.

This caution is explained by the fact that what
Francis considers "central" are the chapters of Amoris Laetitia "devoted to love" (AL 6), where he
proposes for us a beautiful task in order to stimulate "the growth,
strengthening and deepening of conjugal and family love" (AL 89). He asks
us to carry on "before anything else a pastoral care of the marriage bond,
assisting couples not only to deepen their love but also to overcome problems
and difficulties" (AL 211), a pastoral care that encourages communion,
generous dedication, the bonds of tenderness and mutual belonging.

For, ultimately "marital
love is not defended primarily by presenting indissolubility as a duty, or by
repeating doctrine, but by helping it to
grow ever stronger under the impulse of grace" (AL 134). It would be
very good for us to work more intensely in this line, in the face of a world
darkened by the comfortable and superficial individualism that weakens and
destroys these bonds.