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I. Executive Summary

The Brazilian states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo
have been plagued for years by violent crime, much of it carried out by illegal
drug-trafficking gangs. In Rio, these heavily-armed gangs effectively control
hundreds of neighborhoods and are largely responsible for the metropolitan
region having one of the highest homicide rates in the hemisphere. In São Paulo, despite an encouraging drop in the homicide rate over the past decade,
gang violence also continues to pose a major threat to public security.

In both states, criminal gangs have carried out brazen
attacks, often in broad daylight, against the police, as well as against rival
gang members. In May 2006, for example, the First Command of the Capital (Primeiro
Comando da Capital) drug faction launched a series of assaults against
police posts in São Paulo, gunning down 43 police officers. More
recently, in October 2009, 12 people died in a single day during a turf battle
between the rival Red Command (Comando Vermelho) and Friends of Friends
(Amigos dos Amigos) factions, including two police officers whose
helicopter was shot down by one of the gangs. A third officer from the
helicopter died in the hospital days later.

Reducing violent crime and containing these gangs represents
a daunting and at times dangerous challenge for the police forces. Too often,
however, rather than curbing the violence, police officers in both states have
contributed to it through the unwarranted use of lethal force.

In nearly all cases in Rio and São Paulo in which
police have killed people while on duty, the officers involved have reported
the shootings as legitimate acts of self-defense, claiming they shot only in
response to gunfire from criminal suspects. In Brazil, these cases are referred
to as “resistance” killings. Given that police officers in both
states do often face real threats of violence from gang members, many of these
“resistance” killings are likely the result of the use of
legitimate force by the police. Many others, however, are clearly not.

The numbers alone are alarming. The Rio and São Paulo police have together killed more than 11,000 people since 2003. In the state of Rio, alleged resistance killings by
police reached a record high of 1,330 in 2007. While reported killings
decreased to 1,137 in 2008, the number remained alarmingly elevated, as it was the
third highest on record for Rio. The number of police “resistance” killings
in São Paulo, while less than in Rio, is also comparatively high: over
the past five years, for example, there were more police
“resistance” killings in São Paulo state (2,176) than police
killings of suspects in all of South Africa (1,623), a country with a much
higher homicide rate than São Paulo.

After a comprehensive, two-year investigation into policing
practices in Rio and São Paulo, Human Rights Watch has concluded that a
substantial portion of the alleged resistance killings reported in both states
are in fact extrajudicial executions. While this unlawful use of force by
police is particularly pronounced in Rio, it is also a very serious problem in
São Paulo. In addition, some police officers are members of “death
squads” (grupos de extermínio) or, in the case of Rio, illegal
armed militias, which together are responsible for hundreds of murders each
year.

In many purported “resistance” killings and
killings by death squads, police officers take steps to cover up the true
nature of the killing, and police investigators often fail to take necessary
steps to determine what has taken place, helping to ensure that criminal
responsibility cannot be established and that those
responsible remain unpunished.

Criminal justice officials, including the attorneys general
of both states, recognize that unlawful police killings are a serious problem. Several
key public prosecutors insist that extrajudicial executions and subsequent
cover ups are commonplace. Indeed, both states have implemented some measures
to curb police abuses, such as creating police ombudsman’s offices in the
1990s and, more recently, in the case of São Paulo, establishing a training
program in low-lethal defensive policing techniques (known as the
“Giraldi method”). In São Paulo, these measures may have
contributed to a drop in reported police killings from their overall peak in
the 1990s, but they have not come close to eliminating the problem. In Rio, they appear to have had virtually no impact at all.

The principal reason these reform measures have fallen short
is that they have not tackled the fundamental issue of accountability. Police
officers responsible for unlawful killings in Rio and São Paulo are
rarely brought to justice. Although there has recently been some important progress
in the reining of certain high-profile militias in Rio as well as in the arrest
of several death squad members in São Paulo, impunity for extrajudicial
executions committed by police officers remains the norm.

While many factors may contribute to this chronic impunity,
one in particular stands out: the criminal justice systems in both states
currently rely almost entirely on police investigators to resolve these cases.
In other words, the police are left to police themselves. This arrangement is a
recipe for continued abuse. So long as it remains unchanged, police impunity
will prevail, police homicide rates will stay high, and the states’
legitimate efforts to curb violence and lawlessness will suffer.

In Brazil, as in many other countries, there
is a common misperception that human rights and public security are conflicting
priorities. Some believe that investigating and prosecuting police abuses would
weaken the hand of law enforcement, and thereby strengthen criminal gangs. They
are wrong. Rather than undermining the state police forces, fuller
accountability would force them to do their job more effectively, and benefit
all of society.

Human Rights Watch conducted in-depth interviews with more
than 40 state and federal government officials. These included the attorneys
general as well as key prosecutors and the police ombudsmen in both states. In
Rio, we met with the governor, the mayor, and top police officials. In
São Paulo, we also met with top police officials. We also interviewed
multiple families of victims of police violence, witnesses, and civil society
groups.

Evidence drawn from these interviews, as well as from an
exhaustive review of scores of case documents and official quantitative data, is
the basis for the following findings:

Police Killings

There is substantial credible evidence that many persons
killed in alleged shootouts with police were in fact executed by the police
officers. In most of the 51 “resistance” killing cases that Human Rights
Watch focused on, the shootout narratives alleged by the officers appeared to
be incompatible with forensic reports documenting certain types of gunshot
wounds. In many of these cases, gunshot residue patterns were consistent with
the victim having been shot at point blank range.

While it is impossible to determine the precise scope of
extrajudicial executions by police, official government statistics are
consistent with the view of local criminal justice officials that the practice
is widespread in both states, and particularly pronounced in certain areas of
both capital cities. The high number of alleged resistance killings—11,000
cases since 2003—is all the more dramatic when viewed alongside the comparatively
low numbers of non-fatal injuries of civilians and police fatalities in those same
incidents or areas of operation.

For example, the São Paulo Shock Police Command (Comando
de Policiamento de Choque) a special operational branch of the military
police containing the Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar (ROTA), among other
units, killed 305 people from 2004 through 2008 and left only 20 injured. In
all of these alleged “shootouts,” the police suffered one death.
Similarly, in Rio, units operating in 10 particular military policing zones
were responsible for 825 “resistance” killings in 2008 while
suffering 12 police fatalities. In one of the zones of operation, police “resistance”
killings actually outnumbered all other intentional homicides in 2007.

Human Rights Watch also examined 23 case files containing
witness statements and evidence of certain modi operandi indicating that
police-linked death squads or militias were responsible for unlawful killings. Criminal
justice officials reported that unlawful killings by police-linked criminal
gangs are widespread. In São Paulo, the Police Ombudsman’s Office
recorded 541 killings by unknown assailants as potential police death squad
homicides from May 2006 through 2008. In Rio, the state security secretary
acknowledged that militias contribute substantially to the state’s
overall homicide rate, while a 2008 report unanimously approved by the state
legislature found that police-linked militias were operating in 171 communities
throughout the state.

Police Cover Ups

After fatal shootings by police, officers routinely
manipulate, disrupt, or fail to preserve evidence that is vital for determining
whether or not the killing was lawful. One common cover-up technique is to
remove a shooting victim’s corpse from the crime scene, deliver it to the
hospital, and claim that the removal was an attempt to “rescue” the
victim. These false “rescues” serve to destroy crime scene evidence
while providing a veneer of good faith on the part of the police.

When, for example, Rio police killed 19 people in Complexo
do Alemão in a single day in 2007, all the shooting victims ended up
being taken to the hospital. In at least nine of the killings, police documents
state that the victims were taken to the hospital in an attempt to
“rescue” them. Yet photographs and autopsy reports obtained by
Human Rights Watch leave little doubt that the victims were already dead prior
to their removal. In São Paulo, Human Rights Watch identified 17 police
shooting victims from May 2006 who, according to autopsy reports, had suffered
one or more shots to the brain before police took them to the hospital,
purportedly to “rescue” them.

Police officers often attack or threaten witnesses to
discourage them from reporting what they have seen. In April 2009, for example,
A.L. filed a criminal complaint against a military police officer in São Paulo, stating that the officer had illegally searched his home, beaten him, and
repeatedly threatened him over the course of several weeks. According to
A.L., the harassment intensified after he filed the complaint. Two months
later, two hooded assailants executed A.L. in the street near his workplace,
riddling him with some 32 shots, according to the police and autopsy reports. In
Rio, a witness to an alleged wrongful police killing in 2005 told Human Rights
Watch he was threatened when he went to the civil police precinct to make a
statement: “Police officers told me:
‘Watch what you are going to say.’ A police officer pointed a gun
to me and said: ‘Pa-pum, pa-pum,’” the witness told us.

Police Investigations

Police investigators routinely fail to conduct proper
inquiries into police killings. From the moment of an alleged
“resistance” killing, basic tenets of homicide investigation are
violated or ignored. These failures result in criminal inquiries that rarely
clarify events or provide sufficient evidence to establish criminal
responsibility in cases of wrongdoing.

Human Rights Watch reviewed dozens of police inquiries that
suffered from a range of serious shortcomings, such as failure to question all police
officers involved in a killing, failure to seek out and interview non-police
eyewitnesses, and failure to conduct basic forensic tests, such as crime scene
analyses. A detailed examination of 29 inquiries into “resistance
killings” by one Rio military police battalion from 2007 through 2008
found that every one of them suffered from all—or nearly all—of
these failings.

Such investigatory failures are not merely the result of
limited resources or poor training. Rather, they reflect fundamental conflicts
of interest inherent in assigning police investigators the responsibility of
investigating police abuse. In the most egregious cases, shooting inquiries are
conducted by members of a shooting officer’s own unit. More generally,
however, the lack of independence and autonomy of police investigators, as well
as an institutional culture that emphasizes loyalty, undermines the
impartiality of police inquiries into cases of alleged abuse by fellow police
officers.

Police Impunity

Human Rights Watch found a broad consensus among non-police
criminal justice officials—including the attorneys general of both
states—that police officers implicated in extrajudicial executions are
rarely brought to justice. In the majority of the cases we reviewed, no police
officers were held accountable. Many of the cases had been shelved without even
reaching trial or even resulting in criminal charges.

While the precise scale of impunity is difficult to
determine, the official data that is available lends support to the view that
impunity in police abuse cases is the norm. For example, over the past decade,
the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office recorded over 7,800 complaints against
police officers concerning criminal conduct; yet those complaints generated
only 42 criminal charges by state prosecutors and only four convictions.

According to prosecutors in both states, the main cause of
this chronic impunity is the absence of crucial evidence, a product of police
cover ups and investigatory failures. While Brazilian law grants prosecutors the
authority to conduct oversight of police activities, including investigations,
their ability to do so is limited by several factors, including problems with
crime notification procedures and the system of case allocation among
prosecutors, as well as legal and political challenges from the police. Consequently,
prosecutors usually rely entirely on investigations carried out by the police
investigators, which are often extremely deficient.

Key Recommendations

The surest way to curb unlawful police killings is to ensure
that the officers who commit them are brought to justice. The obstacles that
currently prevent or discourage prosecutors from doing so are serious, but not
insurmountable. The key to ending chronic police impunity—and thereby
deterring future abuses—is to ensure that prosecutors need no longer rely
so heavily on police investigators to resolve these cases. As the São
Paulo attorney general told Human Rights Watch, “The key problem is in
the police investigating members of the police itself.”

Toward that end, the Rio and
São Paulo prosecutor’s offices should create specialized units
with a mandate focused on police killing cases and the personnel, resources,
and expertise necessary to effectively ensure proper investigation and prosecution
of those cases in collaboration with the prosecutor designated by law (promotor
natural). Among other homicides by police, such a unit should
systematically review all alleged resistance killings.

To maximize the effectiveness of these special prosecutorial
units, other measures should be taken as well, including:

Establishing a special team of police
investigators detailed to the State Prosecutor’s Offices’ new
specialized units on police killings cases, and ensuring that these
investigators are selected by, as well as fully and exclusively answerable to,
the prosecutor’s offices rather than the normal police hierarchy;

Requiring police officers to notify
prosecutors of “resistance” killings immediately after they take
place (rather than waiting the full 30 days currently allowed by law);

Establishing and strictly enforcing a proper
crime scene protocol that allows gunshot victims to receive proper medical
attention but deters police officers from engaging in false
“rescues” and other cover-up techniques; and

Investigating potential police cover up
techniques, including false “rescues,” and prosecuting officers who
engage in them.

Finally, Human Rights
Watch believes that it is crucial for Brazil’s elected leaders to
publicly support the prosecutors’ efforts to ensure full accountability
for police officers who commit abuses. Moreover, they should publicly challenge
the misperception that human rights and public security are conflicting
priorities. By demonstrating leadership on this critical issue, they could play
a crucial role in curbing police abuses, improving law enforcement in Brazil, and making Brazilian society safer as a whole.

A complete list of detailed recommendations
is set forth at the end of this report.

II. Methodology

This report is based primarily on in-depth analysis of 74 cases of police
killings in which there is substantial credible evidence that the killings were
unlawful. We selected these cases for detailed study after reviewing documentary
and other evidence regarding more than 200 cases of alleged police abuse in Rio
de Janeiro and São Paulo. The majority of the cases occurred since 2006,
and all of them involve serious physical injury or death. The cases came principally
from archives maintained by state prosecutors, officers of the Brazilian Bar
Association, state police ombudsmen, and civil society groups.

In nearly all of the cases selected for in-depth study, we
were able to examine official police, forensic, and/or judicial records. For
certain cases, we also drew on victim and eyewitness interviews conducted
during several trips to Brazil from 2006 through 2009,[1]
government statements, NGO reports, and media accounts. Human Rights Watch
typically contacted victims and family members of victims through referrals from
their legal representatives or local civil society groups, some of which are
comprised of family members of victims of police violence. All interviews were
conducted by at least one staff member with fluency in Portuguese. No
interviewees were provided with remuneration. Finally, we evaluated official police
data on police violence and public security in order to assess patterns of
abuse.

We interviewed more than 40 state and federal government
officials. These included the state attorney generals and key prosecutors in
both states. In Rio, we also met with the governor, the mayor, the security
secretary, the chief of the civil police, the commander of the military police,
heads of police internal affairs units, and the police ombudsman. In São
Paulo, we met with the deputy secretary for public security, top military
police commanders, representatives from the Homicide and Protection of Persons
precinct, heads of police internal affairs units, and the police ombudsman. In
Brasília, we met with the national public security secretary, the
national human rights minister, and federal prosecutors specialized in police
oversight.

For security reasons, names of surviving victims, witnesses,
and relatives have been abbreviated and changed in the report, and certain
details have been omitted to protect their identities (except in the few cases
in which those interviewed affirmatively requested to be named).

When Human Rights Watch sought to find out the current
status of certain cases, we were at times hindered by witnesses’ fears of
retaliation, the difficulty of tracking and/or accessing certain police
records, and the lack of effective monitoring of police killings by police
internal affairs units and prosecutor’s offices.

Stefan Schmitt, the director of
the International Forensic Program at Physicians for Human Rights, reviewed and
provided critical input on the analysis of the forensic issues in this report.
Schmitt previously worked for nine years as a forensic analyst at the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement’s Crime Lab, and has participated in
forensic investigations in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Iraq, Liberia, and Rwanda.

Patrick Ball, Chief Scientist and Vice-President for Human
Rights Programs at the Benetech Initiative, reviewed and provided critical
input on the analysis of quantitative data in this report. Since 1991, Dr. Ball
has designed information management systems and conducted statistical analysis
for large-scale human rights data projects used by truth commissions,
non-governmental organizations, tribunals and United Nations missions in more
than thirty countries around the world.

Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were selected for this
study because they are states containing Brazil’s most populous and
influential cities, because they face serious security challenges, and because they
contain high numbers of police killings each year.

III. Background

Violence by Criminal
Gangs

Policing Rio and São Paulo is a difficult task. In Rio, hundreds of neighborhoods are effectively under the control of drug factions. In São Paulo, despite an encouraging drop in the homicide rate over the last several
years, brazen public attacks by a drug gang in May 2006 revealed the
state’s continuing security vulnerabilities.

There were over 10,000 victims of intentional homicide[2]
in Rio and São Paulo combined in 2008.[3] While
both states suffer from serious crime, the situation is markedly worse in Rio. In 2008, Rio’s homicide rate (34.50 per 100,000 inhabitants) was significantly
higher than São Paulo’s (10.76 per 100,000 inhabitants).[4]
The number of robberies per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008 was 854 in Rio and 530
in São Paulo.[5] Drug
traffickers in both states routinely engage in violent crime, including in
murder, torture and extortion. In Rio, police-linked militias also regularly
engage in violent crime in scores of neighborhoods.[6]

In São Paulo, violence
reached a peak in May 2006 when a criminal gang known as the First Command of
the Capital (Primeiro Comando da Capital or PCC) carried out more than 100
coordinated attacks against security forces, city buses, and public and
financial buildings.[7] The PCC simultaneously organized scores of prison
riots. The attacks left 43 police officers dead.[8]

In Rio, public security is in
permanent crisis. One particularly severe crime wave started in December 2006,
when drug gangs launched a series of coordinated attacks against police
officers, public buses, and public buildings, leaving 19 people dead and 22
wounded.[9] Seven passengers were killed by being burnt alive by
criminals inside a bus on a major roadway in Rio; another victim died days
later.[10] More recently, in October 2009, drug traffickers shot
down a military police helicopter, killing three officers and injuring four
others.[11]

There have been many
notoriously cruel episodes of violence perpetrated by drug traffickers. In July
2008 in Rio, drug traffickers staged a “tribunal” in Morro da
Mangueira for a 14-year-old girl accused of stealing a cell phone from a taxi
driver. As a “sentence,” they shot the girl through her hands.[12] In 2002, drug traffickers caught journalist Tim Lopes
in Vila Cruzeiro while he was investigating their promotion of child sexual abuse
and other illegal activities. Lopes was tortured and then executed with a
samurai sword.[13] In São Paulo, during a prison riot in 2005,
drug gang members in Penitentiary 1 in Presidente Venceslau decapitated five
fellow prisoners who were considered enemies of the gang.[14]

Inadequate Pay and
Police Corruption

Military and civil police in
Rio and São Paulo have very low salaries that do not reflect the
challenging nature of their jobs and aggravate problems of corruption and
abuse. For example, according to a military police colonel in Rio, a starting
military police officer earns less than a low-ranking youth in the drug trade. “A
fogueteiro (scout) in drug trafficking gets paid R$1300 per month
[roughly US$650],” he told us. “A soldier of the military police,
R$1090 [roughly US$545].”[15] Indeed, for years the salary for military police
soldiers in Rio has been among the lowest among military police in the country.[16]

United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions Philip Alston asserted
in his 2008 report that low police pay is one factor that has fueled police
membership in illegal gangs such as militias.[17] Annually, there are more violent police deaths
off-duty than on-duty in Rio and São Paulo.[18]

Reform Initiatives

Government authorities have
taken some practical steps aimed at increasing police professionalism and
curbing abuses. For instance, in 1995 São Paulo passed a law creating a
Police Ombudsman’s Office to receive and forward public complaints
concerning the police.[19] Rio did the same in 1999.[20]

More recently, the federal
government has invested significant funds in the National Program for Public
Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI), a national public security program, which
includes funds for police training and support for internal affairs divisions.[21] In São Paulo, the Public Security
Secretariat—which runs the police—has been implementing training
modules on the “Giraldi method,” a technique aimed at lowering
police lethality during certain confrontations.[22]

In Rio, pilot
“pacification” programs in a small set of neighborhoods, such as Dona
Marta, are being touted by officials as keeping out drug traffickers while
lowering police lethality. The programs involve placing a large police contingent
in a low-income community on a permanent basis.[23] “We have definitively occupied four communities
in distinct neighborhoods,” Rio Security Secretary José Mariano
Beltrame states on the official site of the program.[24]Officials claim these few pilot initiatives have been
successful.[25] Human Rights Watch did not independently evaluate
them.

Though some of these initiatives
are positive, none of these measures address the need for systematic external
monitoring of police abuses or replace the need for effective investigation and
prosecution of crimes committed by the police.

Criminal Justice in Brazil

Brazil has a federal system of government.[26]
Criminal law and criminal procedure is legislated at the federal level.[27]
Most law enforcement, however, is primarily the responsibility of the states,
which fund and run state-level courts, detention centers, and police forces.[28]

Police in Brazil, therefore, are organized and controlled
primarily by states (via security secretariats), rather than at the national or
municipal levels. The state police forces are divided into two nearly
autonomous entities, the civil and military police. The state governor controls
both forces, though the military police are also auxiliary and reserve units of
the military.[29] The state
civil and military police forces are divided along functional lines.

The military police are tasked with patrolling the streets,
maintaining public order, responding to crimes as they are occurring, and
arresting suspects who are caught in the act of committing crimes.[30]
The military police is also in charge of investigating military crimes, which
are defined as such by the Military Penal Code. Military police officers are
generally prosecuted and judged in military courts; among the most notable
exceptions to this jurisdictional rule is the crime of intentional homicide of
a civilian, for which military officers are tried before civilian courts.[31]

The civil police conduct criminal investigations in the
civilian justice system, including investigations of intentional homicides
committed by police against civilians.[32] Each
civil police precinct is run by a precinct chief (delegado).[33]
A police-led criminal inquiry (inquérito policial) may be
initiated by written orders of the appropriate police authority, at the
request of the victim or offended party, or by orders of a judge or the Prosecutor's
Office (Ministério Público).[34]
Once the civil police know of a violation of the penal code, they must take a
series of investigatory steps, including going to the crime scene and ensuring
that there is “no alteration in the state and conservation of things
until the arrival of criminal forensics experts.”[35]
Police investigators should collect as many facts as necessary to clarify the
crime and circumstances surrounding it, including by taking witness statements
and collecting physical evidence.[36]

Police investigators have 30 days to conclude an
investigation before they must send the corresponding case file to the
competent judge.[37] The
judge (usually at the request of a prosecutor) can repeatedly extend the given deadline
for the conclusion of an investigation.[38]

Once the police have concluded their investigations, they are
required to deliver a detailed written report to the competent judge.[39]
This report is passed on to the competent prosecutor to determine whether to
seek charges (denúncias) against a suspect. If either the prosecutor
or the judge believes that further police investigation is necessary, they may
order it.[40]

Police investigations may only be shelved (arquivados)
(i.e. indefinitely suspended) by order of the judge, ordinarily at the request
of the prosecutor. When a case gets shelved, it is essentially closed. Only in
rare circumstances in which new evidence emerges may it be reopened.[41]

In intentional homicide cases, which fall under the
jurisdiction of jury trial courts, the judge should reject a prosecutor’s
filings for charges if he or she determines that there is insufficient proof of
the existence of a crime (materialidade) or of individual responsibility
(autoria) or participation (participação).[42]
If, however, the judge believes there is sufficient basis, he or she should issue
an indictment (pronúncia).[43]

Brazil’s Obligations Under International Law

Under international law, Brazil has an obligation to criminalize
and prevent the commission of human rights violations, such as torture or extrajudicial
executions, by its police forces. It is also obligated to ensure that any
violations are promptly, thoroughly, impartially, and independently
investigated, that perpetrators are held accountable for their actions, and
that victims and/or relatives are provided fair and adequate compensation.

These obligations derive from international human rights
law, including treaty based obligations such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[44] and the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).[45]

Prohibition of Extrajudicial
Executions

The prohibition on summary, extrajudicial, or arbitrary
executions is derived from the right to life guarantees under Article 6 of the
ICCPR and Article 4 of the ACHR.[46] In this
report we use the term “extrajudicial execution” to encompass all
right to life violations by law enforcement agents, including not only
purposefully unlawful killings but also deaths produced by excessive use of
force. Force used by law enforcement is considered excessive when it contravenes
the principles of absolute necessity or proportionality, as interpreted in the
UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials (Articles 4, 5, 7, and 9) and the UN Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials (Article 3).[47]

The UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions include key
points relevant to the right to life violations considered in this report,
including inter alia:

“Governments shallprohibit
by law all extra-legal, arbitrary, and summary executions and shall ensure
that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws,
and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the
seriousness of such offenses...

“Exceptional circumstances including
a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions.
Such executions shall not be carried out under any circumstances including, but
not limited to, situations of internal armed conflict, excessive or illegal
use of force by a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity or a person acting at the instigation, or with the consent or
acquiescence of such person, and situations in which deaths occur in custody...

“Governments shallprohibit
orders from superior officers or public authorities authorizing or inciting
other persons to carry out any such extralegal, arbitrary or summary executions.
All persons shall have the right and the duty to defy such orders. Training
of law enforcement officials shall emphasize the above provisions...”[48]

In addition, prohibitions against torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment apply to Brazil,[49]
as do prohibitions against arbitrary detention.[50]

Duty to Investigate and
Prosecute Abuses

Victims have a right to a remedy for violations of their
rights.[51] In particular the obligation to protect the right to
life and the right to a remedy require
that an effective investigation be conducted when individuals have been killed
as a result of the use of force.[52] In cases in which state agents or bodies are involved
or implicated, this investigation is to ensure their accountability. The Inter-American Court has stated clearly that
“in cases of extra-legal executions, it is essential for the State to
effectively investigate deprivation of the right to life and to punish all
those responsible, especially when State agents are involved, as not doing so
would create, within an environment of impunity, the conditions for such events
to recur...”[53] An effective investigation is one which is prompt,
thorough, independent, and impartial. It must be
capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not
justified under the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of
those responsible.[54]Officials
are also required to provide victims with information about investigations into
violations.[55]

The UN developed a Manual on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions in 1991, which
is designed to be a practical exposition of best practices and procedures.[56]
Given the pervasive failures in police investigations into police abuse in Rio
and São Paulo, this manual is a particularly useful reference,
particularly with regard to its guidelines and procedures on proper crime scene
investigation,[57]
gathering of testimonial evidence,[58] and
performance of autopsies, including annexes on the postmortem detection of
torture and on sample form diagrams and charts to be used.[59]

“There shall be a thorough, prompt
and impartial investigationof all suspected cases of extra-legal,
arbitrary and summary executions, including cases where complaints by relatives
or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death in the above circumstances...
The investigative authority shall have the power to obtain all the information
necessary to the inquiry. Those persons conducting the investigation shall have
at their disposal all the necessary budgetary and technical resources for effective
investigation...”

“In order to ensure objective results, those conducting the autopsy must be able to functionimpartially and
independently of any potentially implicated persons or organizations or
entities...”

“In cases in which the established
investigative procedures are inadequate because of lack of expertise or
impartiality, because of the importance of the matter, or because of the
apparent existence of a pattern of abuse, and in cases where there are
complaints from the family of the victim abuse these inadequacies or other
substantial reasons, Governments shall pursue investigations through an independent
commission of inquiry or similar procedure. Members of such a commission
shall be chosen for their recognized impartiality, competence, and independence
as individuals. In particular, they shall be independent of any institution,
agency, or person that may be the subject of the inquiry. The commission shall
have the authority to obtain all information necessary to the inquiry and shall
conduct the inquiry as provided for under these Principles...

“Governments shall ensure that
persons identified by the investigation as having participated in
extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions in any territory under their
jurisdiction are brought to justice...

“The families and dependents of
victims of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions shall be entitled
to fair and adequate compensation within a reasonable period of time.”[61]

IV. Police
Killings

Police in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have
killed a combined total of more than 11,000 people since 2003, according to
official statistics.[62] In nearly
all such cases, police report the killings as legitimate acts of self-defense in
response to gunfire by criminal suspects, what they call
“resistance” killings. However, close analysis of case files,
statements by officials, and statistical data strongly suggest that a substantial
portion of these cases are in fact extrajudicial executions.

It is lawful for police to use lethal force when absolutely
necessary to prevent loss of life and serious injury to themselves or others,
provided the force is proportionate to the threat posed. Police officers in Rio
de Janeiro and São Paulo often do face real threats of violence from
members of criminal gangs, and many reported shootout deaths are likely the
result of legitimate use of force by officers during confrontations.

Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch obtained credible evidence
in 51 cases indicating that those killed in “resistance” episodes were
in fact victims of extrajudicial executions.[63] In some
of the cases, the evidence indicates that the killing occurred after the
alleged shootout had ended. In others, the evidence indicates that no
“shootout” took place at all. We obviously were only able to examine
in detail a small percentage of the 11,000 police killings that have taken
place in Rio and São Paulo since 2003, and there are undoubtedly many
more cases of extrajudicial execution than those which Human Rights Watch was
able to identify.

Several key criminal justice officials from both states spoke
of the practice of police reporting extrajudicial executions as
“resistance” killings as being widespread. São Paulo’s deputy police
ombudsman estimated that “80 percent” of police reports of alleged shootout
killings raised suspicion of police abuse.[64] A Rio prosecutor with jurisdiction over neighborhoods
with some of the highest levels of police killings in the city told Human
Rights Watch that he thought “almost all” the scores of
“resistance” killing cases he saw annually were
“farces.”[65] Even police officials acknowledged to Human
Rights Watch that some officers disguise killings as acts of self-defense.[66]

Moreover, official statistics analyzed by Human Rights Watch
are consistent with the conclusion that a significant portion of purported
“resistance” killings are likely to be extrajudicial executions.[67]
Rio police in the city of Duque de Caxias (bordering the city of Rio) killed 103 people in “resistance” killings in 2008, while suffering one police
fatality.[68]
Disproportionate statistics such as these, many more of which are included
below, raise serious doubts about the credibility of claims that legitimate use
of lethal force by police in “shootouts” explains the many
thousands of killings by police over the last few years.

In addition, a comparative
look at police violence statistics in South Africa and the United States helps
reveal just how disproportionate such killings are in the states of Rio and
São Paulo, even when compared to other violent places. Over the past
five years, for example, there were more police “resistance”
killings in São Paulo state (2,176) than police killings of suspects in
all of South Africa (1,623), a country with a much higher homicide rate than
São Paulo.[69]

Some police officers also commit
extrajudicial executions while off-duty. In Rio, police-linked militias
dominate scores of neighborhoods in the metropolitan area (Greater Rio) and are
responsible for large numbers of killings. In the greater metropolitan area of
the city of São Paulo (Greater São Paulo), police-linked death
squads are suspected of involvement in over 500 killings since 2006, according
to the Police Ombudsman’s Office.

“Resistance”
Killings

Human Rights Watch found
credible evidence that police executed their victims in 35
“resistance” killing cases in Rio and 16 cases in São Paulo.
The majority of these cases—40 out of 51—occurred since 2006. Most
cases are from the metropolitan areas of the two states, with many concentrated
in neighborhoods policed by particular units, such as Rio’s 16th
military police battalion.

The terms “account of resistance” from Rio and
“resistance followed by death” from São Paulo are used in
civil police reports to classify cases of killings by police in which officers
claim to have used legitimate force following an individual’s failure to
obey a lawful order. Essentially, these classifications denote police killings
of persons who allegedly resisted arrest. In all such police reports reviewed
by Human Rights Watch, “resistance” killings denoted police
killings of individuals whom they claim had engaged in a shootout with them.

In 33 cases
(incidents involving one or more “resistance” killings), police
reports claiming the victim was killed in a shootout appeared to be
inconsistent with forensic evidence. For instance, in at least 17 cases,[70]
gunshot residue patterns on the skin of victims indicates shots were fired at
point-blank range (from a distance of less than 50 centimeters),[71]
even though such close range shots are not typical of shootouts. (Of all the “resistance”
killing cases we reviewed, in only two did officers specifically note that they
were very close to the suspects during the alleged confrontations.)[72]

In several cases, autopsy reports showed gunshot entry
wounds to the back of the head or nape of the neck of the victim, injuries that
would seem unlikely in most shootout situations but are consistent with
executions.

On May 13,
2006, military police officers of the Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar (ROTA)
in São Paulo’s shock troop contingent killed J.T. and E.N.
in an alleged resisting arrest episode.[73] According to police, the victims were robbing a car
when they were confronted by police in what turned into a chase; the victims
then allegedly stepped out of the car, opened fire against the police vehicle,
and were killed by return fire from the officers.[74]

However, an autopsy report
showed that one of the victims was shot at point blank range.[75] Furthermore, no gunshot residue was found on the
hands of the victims (a positive finding would have been consistent with their
having used firearms prior to their deaths, as alleged by the police). There
were also no bullet markings on the police vehicle as a result of the alleged
firefight.[76]

Witness evidence also weighed
against the officers. A witness saw one of the victims being detained by the ROTA approximately two hours prior to the alleged shootout in a location 45 minutes away
from where the killing took place.[77] Finally, according to witnesses, the individual who
officers claimed had been at the wheel of the allegedly stolen car did not know
how to drive.[78]

A São Paulo prosecutor charged the officers with homicide and charged the owner of
the car with conspiring in an elaborate set-up involving two other unidentified
persons, all staged to cover up the murders.[79] He called the killings, “an act typical of a
death squad [grupo de extermínio],” since, “the
military police officers wanted to take revenge upon individuals with criminal
records because of the PCC attacks against state security forces.”[80] A judge accepted charges against the officers (though
rejected them against the owner of the car).[81]

Over 1000
officers from state and federal forces carried out a large-scale police
operation in Rio’s Complexo do Alemão starting in May 2007.
Some of these officers had been tasked with securing the city in advance of the
July Pan-American Games. Numerous police killings over several weeks culminated
in 19 alleged “resistance” killings in a single day on June 27, 2007.[82]

Though the police alleged
that they had only killed in self-defense during shootouts, autopsy records
strongly suggest that several of the victims were extrajudicially executed. Five
of the 19 victims suffered shots at point blank range. Two of the 19 suffered
shots exclusively from behind, and nine others were also shot in the back (four
of them in the back of the head or neck).[83]

Furthermore, a federal panel
of forensic experts asserted that forensic evidence indicated that at least two
of the victims were shot while lying flat on their backs.[84] The forensics panel—appointed by the federal
government’s Special Human Rights Secretariat to investigate the killings
—concluded “with certainty, that several of the deaths were the
result of a procedure of summary and arbitrary execution.”[85]

In May 2006
in São Paulo, civil police officers killed W.R. and P.B. in an alleged firefight. W.R., according to police, was a PCC gang leader in
the Vale do Paraíba area of São Paulo state. Police allege the
men formed part of a group that had plans to bomb public buildings in the area.
The autopsy of P.B. shows wounds compatible with execution: one shot between
the eyes at point blank range and another shot at point blank range in the
center of the mouth. P.B. was also shot two other times in the head (once on
top and once in the center of his forehead). He was further shot three other
places on his body.[86]

Officers of
the 16th military police battalion in Rio killed R.S. and G.T. on
September 9, 2007, in an alleged resistance killing. Forensic evidence raises
doubts about the officers’ stories. R.S. was shot twice, once in the back
of the head with an upward trajectory, a wound typical of an execution.[87]

Rio prosecutor Alexandre
Themístocles de Vasconcelos provided
Human Rights Watch with evidence in 13 “resistance” killing cases
in which forensic evidence showed circumstances of death that he concluded were
inconsistent with the the police’s claim that the victims had died in shootouts.
Examples of these cases include the following:

Officers of
the 16th military police battalion in Rio killed 17-year-old M.I. on
June 16, 2007, in an alleged resistance killing. M.I. was shot six times, twice
in the back and once from under 50 centimeters away.[88]

Officers of
the 16th military police battalion in Rio killed S.U. on September 1,
2007, an alleged resistance killing. S.U. was shot twice at a range of less
than 50 centimeters, according to his autopsy report.[89]

Officers of
the 16th military police battalion in Rio killed D.L. on April 4, 2008,
in an alleged resistance killing. D.L. was shot four times and all four shots
were to the back of his body.[90]

Officers of
the 16th military police battalion in Rio killed M.E. and R.R. on
February 14, 2008, in alleged resistance killings. Both victims were shot once.
M.E. was shot in the back, and R.R. was shot at a range of less than 50
centimeters.[91]

In at least 21 cases Human
Rights Watch reviewed, witness accounts support a finding of extrajudicial
execution. (The number may be higher, as in many cases we had access to some
official documents but not the entire case file.)

In December
2006, Rio police killed R.A. in alleged “resistance”
episode. The two civil police officers involved claimed that they shot R.A. in
self-defense during a firefight between them and a group of four men to which
R.A. belonged.[92] The police officers involved also claimed that R.A. had
not died at the scene and that they had tried to save his life by taking him to
the hospital.[93] However, the mother of R.A.’s girlfriend told
Human Rights Watch that she saw police shoot him when he was kneeling and had
his hands up in surrender while begging for his life.[94]

In July 2008,
police killed C.M. and B.N. in an alleged shootout following a
car robbery that resulted in a chase and stopped after a crash. However, amateur
video of the incident taken by a bystander shows C.M. raising his hands out of
the car in surrender before an officer grabbed him and pulled him through the
car window by the neck. The video then shows C.M. dead on the ground.[95]

In March
2009, police in São Paulo killed I.W. in an alleged shootout.
Police stated I.W. and another man had been fleeing the scene of a building where
they had committed a robbery. A neighborhood resident testified to the Police
Ombudsman’s Office that she witnessed the moment of the shooting, along
with other residents of her building. According to her, police had subdued the
suspects, who were lying on the ground unarmed, before shooting I.W.[96]

In June 2003,
I.M. was shot and killed by Rio military police officers. Police allege
that I.M. had initiated a firefight with them and that they killed him in
self-defense.[97] However, two witnesses, corroborated by accounts of
others, testified before police investigators that they saw I.M. being detained
by police officers hours before the alleged encounter and that police had put
him in a squad car along with two other youths.[98] I.M. was shot once in the back.[99]The corpses
of the other two youths detained at the same time as I.M. later turned up with gunshot
wounds in a canal in Pavuna.[100]

Widespread Scope of
Extrajudicial Executions

The failure of Brazilian
authorities to thoroughly and systematically investigate police killings in
which the victims are alleged to have resisted arrest makes it difficult to
give a precise estimate of how many such cases are actually extrajudicial
executions.[101] However, several key criminal justice officials in
both states who work with these cases told Human Rights Watch that they
believed the problem is widespread.

In Rio, prosecutor Alexandre
Themístocles de Vasconcelos—responsible
for receiving a substantial portion of police case files in the two areas in
Rio with the highest level of number of police killings—told us that he
thought “almost all” of the alleged resistance killing cases he saw
were “farces.”[102] Rio Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Human
Rights Leonardo Cháves also spoke of unlawful “resistance”
killings as a very serious problem in Rio.[103] At the São Paulo Police Ombudsman’s
Office, the deputy ombudsman estimated that “80 percent” of police
reports of alleged shootout killings raised suspicion of police abuse.[104] São Paulo prosecutor Carlos Cardoso, former
human rights aide to the attorney general from 1998 through 2008, said police
“with high frequency” forged shootouts to mask executions through
the use of planted evidence.[105]

An independent forensic
scientist has estimated on the basis of autopsy reports that 60 to 70 percent
of 124 persons killed by police in São Paulo during the May 2006 attacks
in alleged resistance cases bore signs of having been the victims of executions
rather than of shootouts.[106]

Even top police officials in
both states acknowledged that extrajudicial executions by police are an ongoing
problem, though not all accepted that it is widespread. The Rio security secretary,
who supervises the police, José Mariano Beltrame, acknowledged in a
meeting with Human Rights Watch regarding police alleged resistance killings
that “these executions do exist.”[107] When asked, neither he, the head of the civil police,
the commander of the military police, nor the head of the police General
Unified Internal Affairs unit could provide us with an estimate of what
proportion of alleged resistance killing cases were executions in Rio. Asked
about whether there was such an estimate, Secretary Beltrame shook his head.[108]

In São Paulo, the then
head of civil police internal affairs and current chief of the civil police,
Alberto Angerami, similarly acknowledged the use of resisting arrest reports to
mask executions on the part of the military police, particularly the ROTA unit.[109] The then deputy public security secretary of
São Paulo, Guilherme Bueno de Camargo, did not deny that alleged
resistance killings sometimes masked executions, but claimed that police abuse
“is the exception.”[110] When asked, he was unable to provide a more precise
official estimate of how many alleged resistance killings were illegitimate.[111]

Government statistics on
police killings support the view of those officials who assert that
extrajudicial executions are indeed widespread. The high number of alleged
resistance killings recorded in both states is particularly dramatic when
viewed alongside the total numbers of “regular” murders, arrests,
police fatalities, and persons non-fatally injured by police.

Moreover, a comparative look
at police violence statistics in South Africa and the United States (US) helps
reveal just how disproportionate such killings are in the states of Rio and São Paulo, even when compared to other violent places.[112]

South Africa is a particularly
compelling comparison because it has a higher homicide rates than the states of
Rio or São Paulo (in “financial year” 2008/2009, the murder
rate in South Africa was 37.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, while in Rio and
São Paulo in 2008 the intentional homicide rate was 34.5 and 10.76 per
100,000 inhabitants, respectively).[113] This is relevant since police lethality is often
argued to be a product of high crime. South Africa is also known to have high
levels of police violence. The US provides another useful comparison given that
it is a developed country with significant levels of police violence.

Total Police Killings

We use the term “police
killings” here to refer to on-duty killings by police in alleged
confrontations.[114]In the state of Rio, alleged resistance
killings by police reached a record high of 1,330 in 2007.[115] While reported police killings decreased to 1,137 in
2008, the number remained alarmingly elevated, the third highest on record for Rio.[116] In the state of São Paulo, though the number
of on-duty alleged resistance killings was significantly lower than in recent
peak years such as 2002 and 2003 (609 and 787, respectively), it remained high
and relatively constant between 2007 and 2008 (401 and 397, respectively).[117] In contrast, the total number of police killings in
the entire United States during this time period was 371 and in South Africa
was 468.[118] (In just the first 10 months of 2009, São
Paulo police killed 455 people in “resistance” episodes and is thus
on track to surpass the most recent South Africa figure.[119] In Rio, police killed 805 people in
“resistance” cases in the first nine months of 2009.[120])

Figure 1:

Population

Police killed 6.86 people per
100,000 inhabitants in Rio in 2008, while police in São Paulo killed 0.97;
by contrast, police in South Africa killed 0.96 people per 100,000 inhabitants
and police in the US killed 0.12 people.[121] The quantity of killings by police per capita in Rio
de Janeiro in particular suggests a highly elevated lethality.

Figure 2:

Other Intentional Homicides

For every 100 other
intentional homicides/murders[122] (i.e., “regular” killings not counting
killings by on-duty police officers in “resistance”-type cases)
that occurred in 2008, the police in Rio state killed 19.89 people and the
police in São Paulo state killed 8.46.[123] By contrast, police killed 2.58 people for every 100 murders
in South Africa and 2.62 for every 100 in the US.[124] (The numbers for Rio and São Paulo would be
even higher if it were possible to count the number of killings by police who
were off-duty.[125])

The substantially higher ratio in Rio and São Paulo casts doubt on the
possibility that police violence in these states is merely a reflection of the
general levels of violence in each place.

Figure 3:

Arrests

The police in Rio state
arrested 23 people for every person they killed in 2008, and the police in São Paulo state arrested 348 for every kill.[126] By contrast, police
officers in the U.S. arrested over 37,000 people for every person they killed
in an alleged confrontation that year.[127] (Human Rights Watch was unable to obtain arrest
figures for South Africa.) In other words, the police arrest to kill rate is
108 times lower in São Paulo than in the United States, and 1,641 times
lower in Rio.

Figure 4:

On-Duty Police Killed

In Rio, police killed 43.73
people for every officer killed on duty in 2008.[128] In São
Paulo, police killed 18.05 people for every on-duty officer killed in 2008.[129] By contrast, police in the US killed 9.05 people for
every officer killed.[130] (We were unable
to find comparable disaggregated on-duty police fatality figures for South
Africa.) Though differences in training, tactical support, and other factors may
to some degree account for differences in the number of people police kill in
shootouts per fatality their suffer, the large police killing to fatality ratios
in Rio and São Paulo are
consistent with the suspicion that in many cases police falsely report killings
as having been produced in confrontations that did not actually occur.[131]

Figure 5:

Persons Non-Fatally Injured by
Police

Every year for the last three
years, São Paulo military police officers have killed more people in
alleged “resisting arrest” episodes than they have injured.[132] In 2008, the on-duty military police killed 371
people in “resistance” cases, while injuring 283 in these cases.[133] The fact that police in the city of São Paulo kill
more persons than they injure in such episodes appears to run counter to the
historical norm in Brazil. As noted by investigative journalist Caco
Barcellos in his 1992 book on police violence in São Paulo, “[t]he
history of combat in Brazil consolidated an average ratio of four survivors for
every fatal victim.”[134]

This indicator, consistent
with police excessive use of force, is most pronounced among military police
units operating in São Paulo city and in Greater São Paulo.[135] It is alarmingly acute in relation to the São Paulo shock troop contingent, as described below.[136]

The Ten Most Lethal Military
Police Battalions in Rio de Janeiro

Over 70 percent of all
“resistance” killings by police in Rio in 2008 occurred in 10 of
the state’s 40 Integrated Areas of Public Security (AISPs).[137] Statistics from these 10 geographic zones, which are
noted in Table 1 below, show that in alleged resistance killings in each of
those neighborhoods, at least 10 and as many as 103 persons are killed for
every police officer killed. The disparities are greatest in the neighborhoods
policed by certain military police battalions.[138]

The 10 areas listed in Table
1 below are large and generally contain high levels of crime. Together they
accounted for 44 percent of Rio de Janeiro’s population and about 53
percent of the state’s murders in 2008.[139] They also contained a large proportion of the
state’s police killings. Together they accounted for 825 killings in
2008, or 73 percent of all official police killings in the whole state.[140] This is nearly as many as the combined total of
police killings in the United States and South Africa in 2008.[141]

Table 1: For a more
complete table including names of the respective cities, neighborhoods, civil
police precincts, and correlations with areas of known militia activity, see
Appendix I.

The Ten Areas with the Most Lethal Police in
the State of Rio de Janeiro (2008)[142]

Police “Resistance”
Killings

On-Duty Police Deaths

1)Integrated Public Security Area 3, (3rd
Military Police Battalion)

59

2

2)Integrated Public Security Area 7, (7th
Military Police Battalion)

62

0

3)Integrated Public Security Area 9, (9th
Military Police Battalion)

196

2

4)Integrated Public Security Area 12, (12th
Military Police Battalion)

41

0

5)Integrated Public Security Area 14, (14th
Military Police Battalion)

74

0

6)Integrated Public Security Area 15, (15th
Military Police Battalion)

103

1

7)Integrated Public Security Area 16, (16th
Military Police Battalion)

117

2

8)Integrated Public Security Area 20, (20th
Military Police Battalion)

68

1

9)Integrated Public Security Area 22, (22th
Military Police Battalion)

47

4

10)Integrated Public Security Area 40, (39th
Military Police Battalion)

58

0

Twelve officers were killed
on-duty in these 10 areas in Rio in 2008, a testament to the fact that policing
these locations is a challenging task. But 12 on-duty police deaths contrasted
with the 825 “resistance” killings by the police in these areas
casts doubt on how many of these hundreds of killings were lawful. For every
officer who died on-duty in these 10 zones, police killed nearly 69 people, all
of whom were supposedly resisting arrest, typically alleged to be actively
firing upon the officers. That kill/casualty ratio is highly dubious for even
the most well-trained, well-equipped force under regular conditions. In one
extreme example, police in the area of the 14th Military Police
Battalion killed 74 people in alleged resistance shootings in 2008. No on-duty
officers were killed. In the area of the 15th Military Police
Battalion, police killed 103 people and suffered one on-duty fatality.[143]

The 16th military
police battalion in particular is associated with extremely elevated police
violence statistics. In an unprecedented occurrence, in 2007, police killings
in the area patrolled by the 16th battalion (171 in total) actually outnumbered
other intentional homicides (170 in total).[144] In other words, police were responsible for the
majority of all intentional homicides in the 16th policing zone of
Rio in 2007.

The commander of the 16th
Military Police Battalion for much of 2007, Colonel Marcus Jardim, publicly called
the military police the “best social insecticide.”[145] In February 2008, he was promoted to top commander of
military police forces for the city of Rio de Janeiro.[146]

Even taking into account the
fact that police in the 16th AISP operate in some of the most
dangerous areas of Rio, the volume of police killings there is extremely high. One
interesting comparison is between Rio’s 16th AISP and
Ceilândia, one of the most violent areas near Brasília, in the
Distrito Federal. In several key ways (population, homicide rate, fatal robbery
rate, and drug-related crime rate), the 16th AISP in Rio was statistically similar to Ceilândia in 2007. However, there was a substantial
difference between the numbers of alleged resistance killings in each area. While
police in Ceilândia killed two persons who allegedly resisted arrest in
2007, the number of so-called “resistance killings” by police in Rio’s 16th policing zone that year was 171, a per capita rate nearly 60
times that of Ceilândia.[147]

By making this comparison,
Human Rights Watch does not intend to equate the security situation of the 16th
policing zone in Rio with those of Ceilândia. Among other factors, the
Distrito Federal police do not have to confront as many heavy armaments as
their counterparts in Rio.[149] However, the difference in police killings between
these two areas is so stark that it undermines the argument that the Rio 16th battalion’s frequent use of lethal force is proportionate to the
threat faced.

ROTA: One of São Paulo’s Most Lethal Military Police Units

From 2004 through 2008, São Paulo’s Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar (ROTA) killed 305 people while
on-duty, all during alleged “resisting arrest” episodes.[150] During the same period, the unit injured 20 people
during these “resisting arrest” encounters.[151] This means that the unit killed roughly 15 people for
every individual they non-fatally injured in these supposed firefights, an
inversion of the typical pattern in armed confrontations, where more people are
usually injured than killed over time, as previously discussed. Moreover, the
unit suffered exactly one on-duty fatality in the same five year period.[152]

Figure 6:

This disparity was
particularly dramatic in the aftermath of the May 2006 attacks by the First
Command of the Capital (PCC) in São Paulo. The São Paulo shock
troop contingency officially killed 47 individuals that month, left none
injured, and suffered no on-duty casualties.[153]

Killings by Death Squads and
Militias

Many police officers in both
Rio and Sao Paulo are also alleged to be members of illegal criminal gangs, commonly
referred to as death squads (grupos de extermínio) in São Paulo and militias in Rio. These gangs routinely commit extrajudicial
executions. Human Rights Watch reviewed evidence in multiple case files of suspected
death squad killings from São Paulo over the past three years and found
credible evidence of police officer involvement as perpetrators and in covering
up the murders. We also found credible evidence of police-linked militia
killings in Rio. Criminal justice officials in both states reported that the
problem of police-linked gangs continues to be widespread, despite valuable
steps taken to confront it.

São Paulo’s
Death Squads

Though police-linked death
squads have long been active in São Paulo, the number of cases of
suspected death squad killings increased from 2006 through 2008. Since May
2006, the state’s Police Ombudsman’s Office has documented 541
killings in 266 cases it suspects were “supposedly carried out by
so-called extermination groups.”[154] Human Rights Watch reviewed evidence in 21 cases of
killings since 2006 containing credible evidence of police death squad
involvement in São Paulo.

Following the initial days of
the May 2006 attacks by the PCC in São Paulo, suspected death squads composed
of police officers committed a wave of extrajudicial executions, according to
the police ombudsman.[155] For example:

On May 14,
2006, a group of men in ski masks killed five people and wounded one in the
neighborhood of São Mateus. The assailants detained their victims
outside a bar, lined them up against a wall, and executed them with shots to
the head. One of the shooters collected the discharged bullet casings.[156]

A group of military police officers arrived minutes later
and removed the bodies of the victims, only one of whom, according to
witnesses, showed any signs of life. All of the bodies were naked at autopsy, indicating
that key clothing evidence had, at a minimum, not been safeguarded. Military
police did not preserve what remained of the crime scene after the bodies were
removed, hindering the investigation. Blood on the ground at the scene was even
washed away before investigators arrived (the police alleged this was done by a
resident, while press accounts pointed to the police).[157]

The
Homicide and Protection of Persons Precinct (DHPP) of the São Paulo
civil police took on the case and concluded that it “had no doubt that
the perpetrators were military police officers” attempting to kill PCC
drug traffickers thought to be responsible for the murder of a fellow officer
earlier that day.[158]

The same day
in the Parque Bristol neighborhood of São Paulo, four men in an
unmarked car wearing ski masks shot and killed F.B., E.D., and S.L. and injured
F.O. and E.W.[159]

F.O., who survived, was
reportedly pulled out of the hospital by military police officers in early
morning hours of May 15 (the day after the attack), according to relatives and
friends of victims of the attack (F.O. himself was apparently too scared to
give direct interviews about the events). F.O. was said to have been in a
hospital gown and still bleeding when police put him in the back of a police
car and took him to a local precinct to testify about the shooting. In that
testimony, F.O. essentially stated he did not see much during the shooting. The
officers who had reportedly taken him from the hospital remained present during
his testimony, according to relatives and friends of the victims.[160]

In
December 2006, the DHPP summoned F.O. to give his testimony again. Soon after, F.O.
was gunned down in a drive-by shooting involving an unmarked car.[161]

The São Mateus and
Parque Bristol killings were not isolated incidents. The São Paulo
Ombudsperson’s Office examined 54 homicide cases totaling 89 fatal
victims of suspected death squads.[162] The ombudsman identified a particular modus
operandi in many of the killings: armed men in ski masks arrive on
motorcycles or in unmarked cars with tinted windows and gun down victims.

The Ombudsman’s Office
also noted as evidence of police collusion the fact that, in many cases, the
shooters would be followed closely in time by the arrival of uniformed military
police officers, who disturbed the crime scene, removing bodies and sometimes
other evidence like cartridge casings.[163]

Death squad activity has
continued in São Paulo since 2006. For instance:

In the
February 2007 Limão case, in the northern zone of the city of São Paulo, a pair of assailants who had been driving a Fiat Palio killed six young
men and wounded another with gunfire. The shooters lined the victims up with
their backs facing them before shooting them, and then fled the scene in the Fiat.
São Paulo’s specialized homicide team, the DHPP unit, stated that
27 witnesses—including the sole survivor as well as eyewitnesses, many of
whom had no relationship to the victims—confirmed the following facts: a
military police ROTA car escorted the Fiat Palio to a street near the scene
prior to the shooting; the assailants emerged from the Fiat with jackets
labeled “police” and carried out the crime; and the same ROTA car
escorted the Fiat away from the scene immediately after the killings.[164]

In October
2008, in Mauá, two assailants in a car with tinted windows drove
up to two men and one youth, got out of the car, and opened fire, killing all
three victims. According to the Ombudsman’s Office, witnesses stated that
the shooters identified themselves as military police officers prior to
shooting; witnesses also said that other military police officers then arrived
at the scene and removed cartridge casings prior to the arrival of the forensics
teams, which found only one casing on the scene though over 20 shots were
reportedly fired. The police ombudsman has received at least eight complaints
of homicides in Mauá in which death squads are suspected.[165]

One death squad in São Paulo targeted a top military police official who was investigating their
activities:

Military
Police Colonel José
Hermínio Rodrigues, commander
of the military police for the northern zone of São Paulo, was killed in
2008 by a death squad alleged to be comprised of officers from the 18th military police battalion, which came to be known as the “killers of the
18th.”[166] Prior to his killing, the colonel had been
investigating death squad links to gambling rings in the northern zone of
Greater São Paulo.[167] He had proposed that 56 military police officers be
fired in the course of his investigations, but reportedly received little
support from the military police internal affairs unit; he had also sought help
from the civil police’s DHPP unit.[168] In January 2008, Colonel Hermínio was shot six
times while doing his morning exercises in Mandaqui.[169] Forensic firearms examinations received by the São
Paulo’s Homicide and Protection of Persons Precinct (DHPP) matched one of
the guns used by the assailants to a gun used in the massacre of six people in
June 2007.[170] The DHPP’s work led to the arrest of Military
Police Officer Pascoal Santos Lima (nicknamed “the Monster”),[171] a man who has been linked to 16 other homicides since
2005, according to an official Police Ombudsman report.[172]

The death squad killing of Colonel
Hermínio forced the São Paulo government to acknowledge the
existence of such groups and led to some limited but positive efforts to combat
the problem. One month after the killing, São Paulo Governor José
Serra acknowledged the existence of death squads and announced his opposition
to them: “We do not condone [death] squads; we do not condone
extermination groups; we are combating them.”[173] Police also stepped up their investigations into
death squads and arrested military police officers suspected of involvement in
the “Killers of the 18th” death squad in the northern
zone of São Paulo.[174]

Months later, civil police
investigators arrested members of another police death squad in the
southwestern zone of Greater São Paulo.[175]

Military
police officers in Itapecerica da Serra were identified by civil police
investigators in 2009 as members of a group known as the “Highlanders.”
The group earned its nickname due to its grisly practice of removing the heads
of its victims[176] (this was a practice in the 1986 fictional film
called “Highlander”).[177]

By
March 2009, 15 men, 14 of whom were military police officers, were arrested in
relation to multiple homicides in Taboão da Serra as a result of a civil
police investigation.[178] The inquiry led to evidence that military police
officers (the majority of whom were members of the 37th Military
Police Battalion in São Paulo) were involved in the Highlanders death
squad, thought to be responsible for at least 12 murders. The final report of
the civil police investigators from Taboão da Serrá concluded
that police officers were part of an “extermination group,” which
ran extortion schemes by forcing individuals with criminal records to pay them
bribes.[179]

Despite the arrests of
suspected death squad members in some high profile cases, progress in
eliminating the death squads and holding their members accountable has been
limited.

According to the São
Paulo Police Ombudsman’s Office, killings by unidentified assailants
bearing the characteristics of possible death squad activity actually increased
from 80 in 2007 to 98 in 2008.[180] In the first semester of 2009, the police ombudsman
identified or received complaints of 32 homicides by unknown assailants
suspected of being police officers.[181]

Rio’s Militias

Police-linked militias[182]—armed groups which control dozens of
neighborhoods in Rio, extorting residents through “security taxes”
and running other illicit businesses—are responsible for numerous
extrajudicial executions.[183] Militias are now a major source of homicides as well
as other crimes in Rio, including torture, corruption, extortion, and—in
some cases—drug trafficking.[184]

In December 2008, a
unanimously-approved Rio state Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry report (CPI
report) found that hundreds of militia members in Rio control a sizeable number
of communities. Militias control a staggering 171 neighborhoods in the state of
Rio de Janeiro (118 of them in the city).[185]

All of the officials we spoke
with agreed that militias are responsible for a large number of killings in Rio. Rio Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame told the CPI that the militias
represent one of the greatest concrete security threats to the state.[186] In 2009, Secretary Beltrame told Human Rights Watch
that a spike in homicides in Favela Batan was due to the militias resisting a
large-scale police operation there.[187]

Militias routinely engage in
abuses. One well-known example of militia abuses comes from Favela Batan in May
2008, when a resident and three employees of the newspaper O Dia
conducting an undercover investigation into militia activities were kidnapped
and tortured by militia members. The captives endured beatings, suffocation,
electric shocks, Russian roulette, threats of sexual assault, and death
threats.[188] The episode led to the rapid approval of the state
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that produced the December 2008 militias report
mentioned above.[189]

Other locations infamous for
militia activities include Campo Grande, Jacarepaguá, and the Baixada
Fluminense.[190] In the latter, police suspect that a militia led by a
military police officer has been involved in over 100 killings.[191]

Many other areas in Rio suffering from police-linked militia
violence do not receive as much attention. For example, Human Rights Watch
gathered several credible reports of killings and other serious crimes committed
by the militia in the Quitungo neighborhood in Brás de Pina in the
northern zone of the city of Rio (Quitungo militia).[192]
The Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office, has received several complaints
regarding homicides by this militia since 2006, including the following:

September 2006 case file: A
caller tells the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office that over a year earlier,
police officers arrived at the community “killing the residents without
any reasons and organizing parties [baile] on the Estrada do Quitungo,
Brás de Pina, in the old Quitungo favela.” He further adds that
“the murders occur between 3:00 and 5:00 in the morning at the Rua Castro
Menezes, corner with Surui, known as the (Cova da Onça).” Residents
supposedly pay the militia for “protection,” which is a typical
method of extortion by militias. Four police officers are named by the
complainant.[193]

January and February 2007 case files:
A caller states that, at a street party in May 2006 known as the “Police
Dance” on the Estrada do Quitungo, four military police had an argument
with a youth named A.U., after which they led him away from the party. A.U.’s
friends were reportedly threatened and left the party. A.U.’s body was
found dead the next day in nearby Cordovil with a gunshot wound to his face.

The General Unified Internal Affairs unit of
the police eventually confirmed, in August 2007, that A.U.’s body had
indeed been found in the neighborhood in question at the time indicated by the
caller.[194]

September 2007 case file: A
complainant calls about a homicide supposedly committed by the alleged head of
the Quitungo militia, a military police officer, on the Estrada do Quitungo,
“near the Cruzeiro do Sul Garage, in Brás de Pina.” The
officer in the case apparently registered it as an alleged
“resistance” killing. In the police report of the incident, the
named police officer claimed he killed in self-defense after being subjected to
an “unjust aggression” in a shootout. The victim was taken to the
hospital by the police in an alleged attempt to rescue him, but he was dead.[195]

According to a study by Justiça Global, over a period
of 28 months ending in April 2008, the Rio crime reporting hotline received 92
complaints relating to police-linked militias in the area of Brás de
Pina, which contains the Conjunto do Quntungo neighborhood.[196]

Furthermore, the CPI report found that a militia known as
the “Galactics” operates at the Conjunto Habitacional do Quitungo neighborhood.
In existence since late 2004, the militia kills and extorts the community with
mafia-like tactics, earning money by insisting residents pay a “security
tax” and charging for natural gas and illicit cable television provision.
The militia is said to have 30 members, including civil and military police
officers and civilians. Their leaders, said to be one current civil police
officer and one former police officer, are named in the CPI report, as are
eight other members (at least two of the names are relatively rare and match
those of officers repeatedly named in complaints to the ombudsman). Officers in
two nearby civil police precincts (numbers 27 and 38), entrusted with
investigating crime in the area, are noted in the CPI report as being
“complicit” in the actions of the militia.[197]

Since the CPI report was issued, Rio authorities have taken
significant steps to combat militias, including arresting over 200 suspected
militia members.

Operations coordinated by the
current head of the Civil Police Precinct for the Repression of Organized Crime
(DRACO), Cláudio Ferraz, in dialogue with other institutions, including
the legislature, have produced many arrests of suspected militia members.[198] According to numbers provided to us by Secretary
Beltrame in July 2009, arrests of persons for involvement in militia activities
have gone up significantly in his years as secretary—from 24 in 2007, to
77 in 2008, and finally to 149 in roughly the first six months of 2009. Under
the prior government, only five individuals were arrested for militia
involvement in all of 2006.[199] Several key militias, such as the so-called “Justice
League,” have been weakened by the arrests. However, many other smaller
(but still violent) militias, such as the Quitungo militia, continue to operate
with little hindrance. The Chief of the Rio Civil Police told Human Rights
Watch in July 2009 that police had arrested the militia’s leader in
Quitungo. He claimed other investigations into the group were still ongoing because
the police were prioritizing larger militias.[200]

While some progress has been
made, even police acknowledge that militias continue to operate.[201] Indeed, as Rio Secretary of Human Rights and Social
Assistance Benedita da Silva told Human Rights Watch in April 2009, militias
continue to present a significant security challenge to the state.[202] Examples of ongoing militia violence include the
following:

In August
2009, a military police officer within Governor Sérgio
Cabral’s personal security detail was discovered to be a suspected
militia member linked to a quadruple homicide that month. The governor
publicly expressed outrage at the finding and ordered an investigation. The
discovery showed the continued vulnerability of the state in the face of the
militia threat, even at the highest levels.[203]

In a May
2009 raid on a Rio das Pedras militia, police found assassination
plans drawn up by militia members targeting state legislator and former
president of the CPI Marcelo Freixo, along with key aide Vinícius George
of the civil police. Both men have personal security details due to the
numerous death threats they have received as a result of their anti-militia
work.[204]

V. Police Cover Ups

After fatal shootings by
police, officers routinely manipulate, disrupt, or fail to preserve evidence
that is vital for determining whether or not a killing was lawful. Human Rights
Watch documented the repeated use of cover-up techniques in police killing
cases: false “rescues,” planting of evidence, and witness
intimidation.

False “rescues”
occur when police take the corpses of their shooting victims to hospitals and,
in the process, destroy crime scene evidence and hinder the capacity for
forensic analyses. Police sometimes also remove or fail to safeguard these
victims’ clothing, which can provide vital clues regarding the
circumstances of death. This is particularly relevant when there are reasons to
believe that a victim has been shot at close range and a gunshot residue
analysis of clothing could establish such a fact. While it is impossible to
determine the precise scope of false “rescues,” the practice is
recognized by criminal justice officials (other than police), health officials,
and Rio community members as a widespread modus operandi through which
police destroy physical evidence of unlawful killings.

Police officers also
sometimes plant false evidence to create the impression that a shootout has
taken place, or to otherwise incriminate their victims. This includes planting
guns in the hands of victims and firing them so as to leave gunshot residue on
them compatible with their having engaged in a firefight.

Finally, police officers
often intimidate or attack witnesses of abuse. Witnesses are sometimes
threatened both by the officers involved in abuses as well as by the officers
who are supposed to be investigating the abuses. The resulting fear of the
police makes witnesses hesitant to report any abuses to investigators.

False “Rescues”

Police officers in both Rio
and São Paulo routinely remove deceased victims of police shootings from
crime scenes and deliver them to hospitals in what they claim are
“rescue” attempts. While these false “rescues” give the
appearance of legitimate effort by officers to help victims, in reality they
disrupt crime scene evidence prior to the arrival of forensic teams.

Notwithstanding the specific
duties of police to rescue live victims, there is no duty to take already
deceased shooting victims to the hospital. On the contrary, when police
encounter a deceased individual, their duty under the law as well as standards
in place in Rio and São Paulo is to preserve the scene of the incident
and await the arrival of forensic experts.[205] But this almost never happens in cases in which the
police are the shooters.

In nearly all of the scores
of alleged resistance killing cases we examined, police removed deceased victims
from the scene of the shooting and delivered their corpses to hospitals. Police
typically claimed that they removed the victims in an effort to rescue them
from imminent death. However, Human Rights Watch reviewed evidence—such
as autopsy reports, photographs, and witness accounts—in numerous cases
indicating the victims had died from their gunshot wounds at the scene prior to
the removal and transportation of the body to the hospital.

In the 2007 Complexo
do Alemão case, in which Rio police killed 19 individuals in a
single day, police and medical files show that all the victims were taken to
hospitals. However, evidence reviewed by Human Rights Watch suggest that many
victims were subjected to “false” rescue attempts by police
officers by having their corpses taken away from the crime scene and driven to
hospitals.

Police documents for at least nine of the victims state that
they were taken to the hospital in an attempt to “rescue” them. (Recordkeeping
was poor in the files of the other victims and they contain no information as to who dropped the bodies off at
hospitals.[206])

Human
Rights Watch reviewed autopsy records and more than 100 photographs indicating
that the victims appeared to have died at the scene of the shooting, before
they were taken to hospitals. In the images, the victims appear to be lying
lifeless and unattended in parts of Complexo do Alemão prior to their
removal. Analyzed together, the evidence leaves little doubt that the victims
were dead prior to their removal to the hospital.

In the
aftermath of the April 2008 civil police shooting of C.L. in Rio, press photos showed C.L. lying seemingly dead on the street surrounded by police and
others yet officers removed his body from the scene and took it to a hospital[207] before forensic investigators arrived.[208] One photo shows civil police removing C.L.’s
body from the scene in a bed sheet. C.L. was then taken by police to the
hospital.[209] C.L.’s death certificate supports the view that
his wounds, which included a shot to the cranium, were likely to have resulted
in death at the scene.[210] His sister, who viewed his body at the hospital, testified
to the Brazilian Bar Association that a “large section of his head had
been destroyed as a result of innumerable gunshots.”[211]

In August
2008, a television news cameraman happened to be present after police shot at a
car containing C.C. and his apparent kidnapper, R.L., in Rio. Police
later alleged that R.L. shot at them during a car chase and that they did not
know that the other passenger was a kidnapping victim. The cameraman filmed the
police approaching the stopped vehicle after the shooting. An officer took C.C.,
who was still breathing at the time, out of the passenger’s seat and
dropped him to the ground. The officer then kicked C.C. out of the way as he
searched the car. Other officers then dragged C.C. along the ground to a
vehicle that took him and R.L. to the hospital. Both died as a result of the
incident. Before forensics teams arrived, a police officer drove away the
non-police vehicle involved in the chase, further disturbing crime scene evidence.[212]

Human Rights Watch also
analyzed dozens of autopsies that showed victims “rescued” by
police had suffered injuries that likely resulted in quick deaths. These
include 17 individuals (in 16 cases) with at least one gunshot wound to the brain
by police during alleged confrontations in May 2006 in São Paulo.[213]

In May 2006, Sao Paulo police killed B.Z., reporting that he had participated in a violent
assault on a police precinct.[214] B.Z.’s autopsy report shows that he was shot
once, between the eyebrows, from a distance of no greater than 50 centimeters.[215] B.Z. was also shot twice in the chest, both shots
bearing a downward trajectory. The bullets pierced his heart, liver, and both
lungs, and one shot lodged in his spine.[216] After the shooting, police removed B.Z.’s body
from the scene and deposited it at the hospital in an alleged rescue attempt.[217]

In
the police report, the shooting officer alleged that N.P. was still alive when
police backup arrived and took him to a hospital.[222] In support of this claim, the officer said N.P. had
been wearing a bulletproof vest. However, a bulletproof vest would not have
protected N.P. from the head injuries he sustained.

I.S. and
F.I. were killed by police officers
in São José dos Campos, São Paulo, in an alleged shootout
in May 2006.[223] They were shot seven and ten times, respectively. Each
was shot at least once in the head with the projectile causing brain injuries,
according to the autopsy report. The autopsy doctors determined that the wounds
of each led “rapidly to death.”[224] Despite the likelihood that they both were killed
immediately, police took their bodies away from the crime scene to the Pronto
Socorro do Parque Industrial hospital.[225]

Police officers in São Paulo have also engaged in false “rescues” when they arrive at the
scene of death squad executions. Human Rights Watch reviewed documentary
evidence in 12 of the 54 cases tracked by the São Paulo
Ombudsman’s Office of suspected death squad homicides from May 2006. In most
of those cases, after the gunmen left the scene of the crime, military police
officers rapidly arrived and removed bodies in purported rescue attempts. Many
of the bodies removed by the responding police officers had severe injuries and
were likely dead before being taken away.[226]

In the 2006 São
Mateus case, several masked gunman lined up six victims against a wall and
shot them (five of them in the head, according to their autopsies).[227] All of the victims were removed from the scene by arriving
military police officers, though only one victim showed any signs of life,
according to witness accounts reported in the press.[228] In addition, the responding officers failed to
preserve the crime scene by allowing blood to be washed away prior to the
arrival of investigators.[229] The DHPP’s final report on the case did not
mention any investigation into the responding officers’ failure to
preserve the crime scene.[230]

Human Rights Watch also
identified numerous other police killing cases from Rio containing credible
forensic evidence that officers had engaged in false rescues of their shooting
victims. For example:

In December
2007, the mother of 17-year-old L.A., the victim of a police shooting,
testified before the military police that the officers who killed her son shot
in her direction to prevent her from approaching his body before they placed
him in the back of an unmarked yellow car.[231] L.A. was dropped off at the hospital in a purported
rescue attempt.[232] At least three separate press accounts published
within 48 hours of the shooting cited witness narratives that coincided with L.A.’s mother.[233] According to the press, residents alleged the police
officers shot L.A. despite no provocation, dragged his body away, forged a shootout
by firing a planted gun from his hand, and removed his body from the crime
scene in a yellow car with a covered license plate.[234] These accounts appear to be supported by L.A.’s autopsy report which noted scrape marks on his knees and arms consistent with
the body having been dragged away after the initial shots. Moreover, the
autopsy reports documented that he was shot four times on the back of his body
and once in his neck.[235]

F.R. was killed by officers of Rio’s 16th military police battalion in June 2008. His mother claimed she arrived at the
scene moments after he had been killed only to have an officer hoot in her
direction to keep her away from his body. She said that rather than awaiting
the arrival of forensics teams, the officers placed her son’s already
dead body inside a Caveirão (“big skull”) armored police
tank and drove it to the hospital.[236]

Missing Clothes

Police often fail to
safeguard the clothing of “resistance” killing victims, thereby
depriving investigators of a key form of evidence. In these cases, it is
usually not possible to determine whether victims’ clothes have been
discarded before, during, or after a victim’s body was taken to the
hospital (or perhaps by the hospital itself). But what is clear is that those
who are subject to purported rescue attempts often arrive for their autopsies
naked.[237] The removal of clothing prior to forensics tests is
detrimental to investigations, since garments can contain key evidence needed
to determine the circumstances of the killing.

The ballistics evidence
sometimes found on clothing can be particularly significant. The presence of a
point blank gunshot—known in Brazil as a tiro a queima roupa or
“shot that burns the clothes”—is a widely known indicator
suggestive that a police shooting could have been an execution. However, as one
former homicide prosecutor in Rio told us, such close range shots may go
undetected if the markings they leave behind are absorbed by the victim’s
clothes that are then discarded prior to the forensic examination.[238] São Paulo prosecutor Eduardo Roberto Alcântara
Del-Campo, a former DHPP forensic scientist and former civil police precinct
chief, has noted the importance of examining clothing evidence for ballistics
markings left from close-range shots: “[n]ot rarely, the skin receives
only the projectile, all of the other residue being retained by the weaves of
the fabric.”[239]

In a substantial portion of
the alleged “resistance” killing cases reviewed by Human Rights
Watch, the victims appeared to have arrived at autopsies naked.

In the Complexo
do Alemão case, photographs show that at least 17 of the 19 persons
killed by police were wearing clothes at the scene under police custody.[240] However, all 19 victims arrived naked for autopsy.[241] According to a federal panel of forensics experts
commissioned to study the reports in the case, “the original garments [of
the victims] were not subsequently sent for [forensics] examination.”[242]

Of the 17
alleged May 2006 “resistance” killings from São Paulo in which victims were delivered to the hospital after being shot at least
once in the brain, six were noted as naked at autopsy and two were only in
underwear. (In three of the 17 deaths, no clothing information was noted in the
autopsy report. This suggests that the victims’ cadavers were naked,
since it is standard to describe clothing in such reports.[243])

Forensic
doctors said the body of B.Z., who was “rescued” after being
shot point blank between the eyes, arrived “naked, washed and with ink
for fingerprints on the tips of his digits.”[244]

Broad Scope of the False
“Rescues” Problem

Given the lack of systematic
investigation of police killings, it is impossible to determine precisely how
many false “rescues” occur each year. However, Human Rights Watch
found a consensus among criminal justice officials (other than police), health
officials, and community members that the practice is commonplace.

Criminal Justice Officials

Every non-police authority
with whom we spoke about this subject insisted that the practice of false
rescues by police is frequent in both São Paulo and Rio states. In São Paulo, Police Ombudsman Antônio Funari told Human Rights Watch that when
police officers execute suspects, “they normally take care” to take
the corpses to the hospital.[245] Based on his office’s examination of
“resistance” killing cases, Deputy Police Ombudsman Júlio
Cesar Fernandes Neves said the objective of police in bringing a corpse to the
hospital is often to “whitewash” a crime.[246]

Similarly, in Rio de Janeiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Human Rights Leonardo Cháves recognized
false rescues as a major problem.[247] A retired Rio police forensic scientist wrote in a
May 2009 blog post: “[regarding the] ‘removals’ by the police
of bandits in the favela, the only purpose is the intentional destruction of
the crime scene.”[248] Prosecutor Carlos Cardoso, human rights aide to the São Paulo attorney general from 1998-2008, said, “If there’s no way to
hide that the police did the killing, they remove the corpse. The [bullet] cartridges
disappear.... Everything disappears.”[249]

Health Officials

The directors of the state
medical associations in both Rio and São Paulo told Human Rights Watch
that false rescues by police are a common practice. The heads of the Regional
Medical Council of the State of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, stated that they
had sent a formal complaint to the Security Secretariat in the past but had
never received a reply. Dr. Márcia Rosa, former Council president,
complained of the police “dumping bodies on doctors” and even of
“doctors being threatened at gunpoint [to stay quiet].” According
to Dr. Rosa, former Council president, two cases are emblematic. In one, which
took place around 2004, two police vehicles dumped nine bodies at the entrance
to the Bon Sucesso Hospital. In the second, in 2008, police dumped 11 cadavers
in the emergency room at the Souza Aguiar Hospital.[250]

Similarly, in São Paulo, the president of the Medical Regional Council, Dr. Henrique Carlos
Gonçalves, reported that false rescues remain a problem, though he said
the number of bodies dropped off at hospitals by police has decreased somewhat
in recent years.[251]

Rio Residents

Residents in Rio communities where “resistance” killings frequently occur told Human Rights
Watch that police used false “rescues” to destroy or tamper with
evidence of killings. The fact that false “rescues” are
widely viewed to be a problem by Rio residents is demonstrated by the fact
that, in several cases we looked at, residents from different areas of Rio (AISP 3, AISP 22, and the Baixada Fluminense) complained of the police removing the
bodies of fatal shooting victims to hospitals.

In the case
of the December 2008 killing of eight-year-old T.L. in Rio, residents
accused military police officers of firing the bullet that pierced the
boy’s neck.[252] An ODia photograph shows family members and
neighbors physically surrounding the child’s body after the killing on
the steps where he had died, so as to prevent the reportedly insistent officers
from removing his body to the hospital.[253]

Two
mothers of victims of extrajudicial executions felt strongly that the practice
of false rescues was common. One told Human Rights Watch that: “[the
police] only take bodies. They don’t take the living. This is to destroy
the scene of the crime.”[254]Another observed:
“If they take them alive, then they kill them in the car, then take them
to the hospital to say they rescued them.”[255]

Police Duty to Rescue

Under Brazilian law, officers
have a duty to assist injured victims who survive police shootings, and
deliberate failure to do so may constitute a criminal offense.[256] In conversations with Human Rights Watch, some police
authorities attempted to justify “rescues” to Human Rights Watch on
the basis of this duty. For instance, one São Paulo military police
colonel emphasized, that “a police officer is not a doctor” and
could even fear prosecution for “omission in rescuing.”[257]

However, the professed
concern over the crime of “omission in rescuing” does not hold up
under scrutiny. Human Rights Watch asked the colonel or any of those present if
they could cite a single example of an officer who had been punished for the
crime of “omission” following a police shooting. They could not.[258]

Furthermore, as detailed
above, Human Rights Watch identified several cases in which there was virtually
no question that the victims the police purported to “rescue” were
already dead. As one Rio surgeon told O Globo: “Most of the time
the bodies arrive [at the hospital] shredded by firearms. Any lay person could
attest to the death.”[259]

Rio Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Human Rights Leonardo Cháves also told Human Rights Watch that
officers could call for appropriate medical attention, such as an ambulance, to
assist injured individuals in the city of Rio, and would not be guilty of “omission
in rescuing.”[260]

In an effort to address the
problem of police cover ups of executions during “resistance killings,”
the Rio state prosecutor’s office signed an innovative agreement in July
2009 with the civil and military police in the city of São
Gonçalo. The agreement mandates that officers involved in shootings call
for specialized medical assistance for their victims rather than moving them
haphazardly from the shooting scene and driving them in a police car to the
hospital.[261]

The agreement is in line with
local government guidelines in Rio and São Paulo regarding assistance to
car accident victims, which state that rescuers operating in non-rural areas
should call expert medical assistance to the scene. These rescuers should
provide, at most, first aid in cases of grave injury. But the guidelines make
clear that, in order to avoid injuring victims further, rescuers should not
move them prior to the arrival of medical professionals, except when necessary
to get them away from dangers like fire or drowning.[262]

Planting of Evidence

Police in Rio and São Paulo sometimes plant evidence, such as guns or drugs, on victims of shootings
in order to make it appear as though they were drug traffickers who violently
resisted arrest. This corrupt practice represents an extreme form of tampering
with evidence and, though not definitive, supports a finding that the killings
were unlawful.

O.E. told Human Rights Watch that he was tortured in his
São Paulo shop in 2005 by a group of military police officers who
questioned him about the local drug trade. Initially, according to O.E., a
group of eight military police officers simply searched his shop and left. But
soon they returned.[263] Next, said O.E.:

They held me by the neck and beat me. They put a gun on my
forehead, pulled my hair, and told me to kneel down on the floor. Then two
female police officers who accompanied the men suggested that they give me
electrical shocks. They gagged me with a towel and gave me shocks on my finger,
using the equipment that they found at my store. Then they told me to take my
pants off and threatened to give shocks on my genitals, and to throw water over
my body while giving the shocks.[264]

According to O.E., after the torture session, the
police—having obtained no information and wanting to create cover for
their actions—produced two guns, four stolen license plates, and a
quantity of marijuana, and, claiming these belonged to O.E., proceeded to
arrest him, purportedly in flagrante delito. Afterwards, they took O.E
to a civil police precinct for processing. There, the station chief noticed
O.E. had no criminal record and released him. O.E. told us that the military
police officers involved threatened to come after him if he ever reported the
case.[265] One
witness’ testimony, in a formal deposition, corroborated O.E.’s story.[266]

São Paulo prosecutor Carlos Cardoso, former human
rights aide to the attorney general, told Human Rights Watch in December 2008
that the “alteration of evidence,” including planting weapons, “[occurs] with
high frequency.” The aim, he said, is “to make executions look like
resistência (confrontations).”[267] São Paulo police ombudsman officials, for
instance, said that in one case officers had “forged a shootout”
with someone who had gunshot residue on his right hand despite being
left-handed.[268]

More recently, in a July 2009
official press statement, a Rio prosecutor recounted a suspicious alleged
confrontation in São Gonçalo in which a youth was kidnapped by
police and “[s]oon after, he showed up dead, with arms and drugs, in a
place that was a ranch, with no drug sale point [boca-de-fumo]
nearby.”[269]

The practice of planting
evidence on otherwise innocent victims of police extrajudicial executions has
been proven at trial in at least three cases:

In the 2002 Rio police killing of Hanry Silva Gomes de Siqueira, 16, there was strong forensic
evidence that the victim was shot at close range, which was incompatible with
the shootout story given by the police. Officers were convicted of the crime of
procedural fraud for having planted drugs and a .38 revolver on
Siqueira’s body. One officer was also found guilty of homicide.[270]

Police
officers were convicted of homicide and planting evidence to cover up their
crime in the death of Cristiano Ríspoli Barros, a student allegedly
killed in a “shootout” in Rio in 2004. As in Siqueira’s case,
the officers involved in Barros’s shooting were found to have falsely
claimed that a gun belonged to the victim.[271]

In São Paulo, police shot and killed Flávio Ferreira Sant’Ana, a 28-year-old
black dentist, as he was driving home one night. It was later proved that the
police had fired unprovoked upon his car, having supposedly mistaken him for a
vehicle thief. The courts found two police guilty of homicide and three guilty
of planting of a gun on his body in an attempt to make it seem he had been
killed in a shootout.[272]

Witness Intimidation

In many of the cases we reviewed, we found that police
officers who committed or investigated the abuses threatened witnesses,
discouraging them from reporting crimes by police. In some cases, suspected
perpetrators threatened witnesses in an effort to silence them. In other cases,
witnesses said they were intimidated or dissuaded by police investigators when
they testified about abuses or tried to file complaints. These threats create a
pervasive fear among the public of testifying against the police, which ensures
that many crimes go unreported and that police abuse remains unpunished.

According to
teenager J.N., he and his friend T.G. were beaten by roughly 9
police officers in September 2003, near J.N.’s home in Rio. J.N., who was
14 at the time of the incident, told Human Rights Watch that the officers, some
wearing black ski masks, started beating him and his friend without
provocation, asking them where “the other dealers” were, and where
they sold drugs. The beating intensified when the two youths said that they did
not know what the police were talking about. “They beat me for around 20
minutes with their hands and guns, kicked me, and threw me on the ground
several times,” he told Human Rights Watch.[273]

J.N.’s stepfather, L.S.,
said he heard screams from the street and went outside. “I saw five or
six police vehicles on the street. A police officer was beating J.N. Others
were pointing their guns at us, and three wanted to enter the gate to our
house. I shouted at them and they pointed a rifle at my ear.”[274]

J.N., T.D., L.S., and other
witnesses attempted to register a complaint about the incident with the civil
police the next morning. Officers discouraged them and warned them that their
complaint could put them in danger. “At the police station they tried to
make everything hard,” L.S. said.[275] “They wanted us to give them the names of the
police officers and the numbers of their vehicles. Since we didn’t have
this information, they didn’t want to register the case,” he said.[276]

J.N. also told Human Rights
Watch that the police investigators warned them “that we would need to
point out who had carried out [the beating], and we would become too exposed,
since the perpetrators could do something to us in retaliation.” He
added, “A blue-eyed police officer took me off to one side and asked me
what had happened. One of the officers who had beaten me had blue eyes. I
don’t know if it was the same person, since the officer who beat me was
wearing a ski mask. But I became very scared.”[277]

The experience of filing a
police abuse complaint at a civil police precinct left the victims feeling
frightened and vulnerable to reprisals. “After [reporting the abuse], I
was afraid to leave home for a long time,” J.N. told Human Rights Watch.[278]

When
Human Rights Watch interviewed the victims three years after the beating, none
had heard back from the police about their complaints. As far as they were
aware, no investigation had been conducted into the alleged police abuse. When
Human Rights Watch offered to go to the police station to check the status of
their complaint, the victims were emphatic that we not inquire about it. They
said militias with police members had moved into their community, and they
feared retaliation. “Now that the militias are in the community, we are
deaf, mute, and blind,” L.S. said.[279]

Witnesses
reported being threatened by police investigators in the case of the police
killing of C.S. in Rio in 2008. According to police, C.S. was riding a
bus with a gun in his possession. During the bus ride, a military police
officer boarded the bus and walked toward C.S.[280] According to one of C.S.’s friends who said he
witnessed the incident, the officer drew his gun and shot C.S. in the neck
while simultaneously reaching for the gun on C.S.’s waist.[281] In the police report, the officer said as he approached
C.S., the youth started reaching for the gun and then the officer shot him.[282]

After
the shooting, C.S.’s friends were detained and taken to a civil police precinct.[283] The officer did not secure any corroborating
eyewitness on the day of the shooting to testify as to his version of the sequence
of the shooting, though it happened in the middle of the day on a public bus.[284] According to C.S.’s three friends, while in
jail, they were visited by a police officer who warned them to not contradict
the shooting officer’s version and threatened that he would keep them in
jail if they did.[285] One of the youths said that an investigator already
had written statements prepared for them prior to the time he interviewed them.[286] The written statements of the youths in the police
file mainly concern their relationship with C.S. and do not contain indications
that the youths were asked about whether they witnessed the sequence of the
shooting.[287]

Relatives of L.D.
allege that the police killed him with indiscriminate fire in 2005 in Rio. Witnesses in the case told Human Rights Watch they were intimidated both by police
implicated in the killing as well as those investigating it. L.D.’s
father told Human Rights Watch that police officers stopped him and his two
sons in front of his shop. “They told me: ‘So you are the man who
likes to turn police officers into defendants,’ Then they looked at my
two sons and said: ‘Be careful, suddenly things could change around
here.’” He decided to close his shop after that encounter.[288]

Another
witness in the L.D. case told Human Rights Watch that the officers who were
supposed to be investigating the case threatened him with death. “When we
were at the police precinct to give our statements, police officers told me:
‘Watch out what you are going to say.’ A police officer pointed a
gun to me and said: ‘Pa-pum, pa-pum.’”[289]

In
2007, the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office received a complaint reporting
that a 14-year-old boy, who was a witness in a formal case against the police,
had been tortured by civil and military police officers in São
Gonçalo and was eventually found lying in a street in his neighborhood with
his head cut off.[290] The complaint specified an address where
the torture had allegedly occurred, and police documents later confirmed that
the address identified was the home of an officer of the 7th military police battalion who had been interviewed by the civil police
regarding a similar complaint in the past. The officer denied the accusations.
The Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office had no further information on whether the
complaint had been investigated.[291]

The problem of police
intimidation of witnesses is also serious in São Paulo.

In the São Paulo May 2006 Parque Bristol death squad killings, a surviving witness, F.O.,
had discussed few details about the case early on in the investigation. Relatives
of the victims, testifying to the São Paulo police ombudsman, said that F.O.
had been intimidated into silence by military police officers shortly after the
shooting. F.O. was killed in December of that year by unknown assailants in a
drive-by shooting, shortly after having been summoned by police investigators
to testify in the case again.[292]

In a São Paulo 2009 case, A.L. filed a formal complaint before the civil police and the Police
Ombudsman’s Office alleging that he had been arbitrarily detained,
beaten, threatened with having drugs planted on him, and had his house
illegally searched by a military police officer from the 13th battalion. A.L. claimed the beating incident had happened in front of other
members of the battalion, who failed to intervene. According to A.L., the
beating had occurred after he had initially tried to file a complaint against
the officer at his battalion headquarters. A.L. said that the officer had
threatened him in March 2009, saying, “I will pump you full of lead, this
time you will not escape, you shit.”[293] Three
days after filing the civil police complaint, police searched A.L.’s
house again and arrested him for supposed drug possession, which he said was
planted. Approximately two months later in June 2009, A.L. was shot some 32
times by unknown masked assailants.[294]

In addition to witnesses,
lawyers involved in efforts to prosecute alleged police abuse cases are
sometimes also subject to threats. For instance:

Lawyers
involved in the prosecution of alleged executions by São Paulo police
were threatened with death. The case involved the killing of C.J. and A.M. in Mongaguá in 2002. Officers were initially acquitted by a jury in 2005
despite significant testimonial and forensic evidence to the contrary.[295] As the lawyers weighed whether to appeal the ruling,
three were warned by police officers to give up the case. A police officer told
one of the lawyers that he did the police’s “dirty work” and that
the lawyer would die if he lodged the appeal.[296]

Fear of police retaliation is
a major impediment to investigating police abuse. “Much depends upon
witness evidence, and they are very afraid,” said Leonardo Cháves,
deputy assistant attorney general for human rights in Rio.[297] One mother of a victim of police execution in Rio told Human Rights Watch that family members and witnesses needed somewhere to turn to
besides the police. “We need a safe space in which to file complaints,”
she said.[298] Authorities in São Paulo concurred that
witnesses’ fear of police retaliation seriously hindered investigations
into police abuses.[299]

VI. Police Investigations

Police in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo routinely fail
to conduct proper investigations into police killings. From the moment of an
alleged “resistance” killing, basic tenets of proper homicide
investigation are violated or ignored by police investigators. These failures
result in criminal inquiries that rarely clarify events, let alone provide sufficient
evidence for prosecutions in cases of wrongdoing.

Our review found that police inquiries often suffer from the
following types of serious shortcomings:

Failure to adequately question police officers;

Failure to interview all police officers involved in a
killing;

Failure to obtain non-police eyewitnesses;

Failure to conduct forensic examinations;

Failure to promptly conduct investigations;

Failure to track records of individual police officers;
and

Failure to ensure that police officers under investigation
are taken off street duties.

The overwhelming majority of police investigations of police
killings we reviewed contained at least one—and usually more than
one—of these failings. In the case of the 29 inquiries into killings by
Rio’s 16th military police battalion, each contained nearly
all of these failings.

These investigatory failures are not merely the result of
limited resources or poor training. Rather, they reflect fundamental conflicts
of interest inherent in assigning the police investigators the responsibility
of investigating police abuse. In the most egregious cases, shooting inquiries
are conducted by members of a shooting officer’s own unit. More
generally, however, the lack of independence and autonomy of police
investigators, as well as an institutional culture that emphasizes loyalty,
undermines the impartiality of police inquiries into cases of alleged abuse.

Investigatory Failures

Under Brazilian law, the civil police is responsible for the
principal criminal investigations into intentional homicides, even when
military police officers are involved.

Human Rights Watch reviewed key case file documents in
dozens of police inquiries into “resistance” killings. In many of
these cases, these files contained very little evidence beyond a few standard
items, such as an initial case registration, the brief statements of a few of
the officers involved (often, just one statement copied and pasted several
times), some boiler plate forensic weapons reports that merely confirmed the
nature of the items turned in by the officers (e.g., a sheet verifying the
make, caliber, and firing efficacy of certain firearms), a criminal background
check on the shooting victim, and an autopsy report.

Human Rights Watch reviewed case files for 29 inquiries in
“resistance” killings by the 16th battalion of
Rio’s military police from the office of state prosecutor Alexandre
Themístocles de Vasconcelos. Over the past seven years, Vasconcelos has
reviewed hundreds of police inquiries into police killings in areas with two of
the most lethal military police battalions in Rio.[300]
In July 2009, he sought charges against 23 officers of the 16th
battalion for their alleged involvement in 15 extrajudicial executions (not the
same cases as the 29 we reviewed).[301]

Vasconcelos told Human Rights Watch that civil police
investigations into police killings rarely generate the evidence necessary to
determine what took place.[302] “In
90 percent of the inquiries, there is only the testimony of the two officers
who initially registered the case,” he said.[303]
Other prosecutors in Rio and São Paulo shared his assessment that police
investigations into police killings are generally shallow.[304]

Failure to Adequately Question Police Officers

In many cases Human Rights Watch found written records
indicating that the officers involved in the fatal shootings were not subject
to thorough questioning. Police testimonies in the files often appear to have been
cut and pasted from the testimony of other officers, suggesting interviews may
have been shallow or done collectively, if at all.

These failings suggest that investigators usually do not
conduct questioning in a way that might draw out meaningful inconsistencies
between different officers’ accounts or between the officers’
accounts and other available evidence.

In the 2006 police “resistance”
killing of N.F. in Rio, there were numerous failures in the questioning
of the officers involved in the alleged shootout. First, though eight officers
were at or near the scene of the killing, only three were interviewed on the
day the incident report was filed. Second, two of the three testimonies that
were written up on the day of the shooting were completed less than five
minutes apart by the same police interviewer. These testimonies were identical
to each other and nearly identical to the police report on the incident. This
raises serious doubts about the methodology in collecting the testimonies and
suggests that the investigator had merely copied and pasted from one testimony
to another.[305]

A
subsequent inquiry by the internal affairs unit of the military police
exhibited similar shortcomings. It took the internal affairs investigator
almost five months to interview the eight officers involved. The nearly
identical nature of the testimonies—which were purportedly taken on
different dates over the course of months—raises significant doubts
regarding whether the investigator had in fact independently interviewed the
officers or merely asked them to sign a previously prepared statement. The
chart below reproduces, phrase by phrase, the eight testimonies in the military
police inquiry in their entirety:

Complete statements of depositions of eight different military police officers on the death of N.F., Military Police Inquiry from the 6th Military Police Battalion[306]

Officer 1

Officer 2

Officer 3

Officer 4

Officer 5

Officer 6

Officer 7

Officer 8

4/13/2006 -10:15AM

4/18/2006 -10:10AM

8/18/2006 -10:10AM

8/25/2006 -10:05AM

8/25/2006 -10:45AM

9/1/2006 -10:40AM

9/11/2006 -10:00AM

9/11/2006 -10:35AM

#

said that:

said that:

said that:

said that:

said that:

said that:

said that:

said that:

1

on the 4th of January of the year 2006

on the 4th of January of the year 2006

on the 4th of January of the year 2006

on the 4th of January of the year 2006

on the day noted

on the fourth of January of the current year

on the day in question

on the day in question

2

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

around 17:30 hours

3

the GAT [Group of Tactical Actions] of the 6th
BPM [Military Police Battalion]

the GAT [Group of Tactical Actions] of the 6th
BPM [Military Police Battalion]

the GAT [Group of Tactical Actions] of the 6th
BPM [Military Police Battalion], commanded by him,

the GAT [Group of Tactical Actions] of the 6th
BPM [Military Police Battalion]

when he comprised the GAT [Group of Tactical
Actions] of the 6th BPM [Military Police Battalion]

when he was part of the squad of the GAT [Group
of Tactical Actions] of the 6th BPM [Military Police Battalion]

when on duty as part of the squad of the GAT
[Group of Tactical Actions]

when on duty as part of the squad of the GAT
[Group of Tactical Actions]

4

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

in an operation in morro da cotia

5

upon entering in the favela the police officers
present

upon entering in the favela the police officers
present

6

came upon heavily armed figures at the
location,

upon being seen by heavily armed figures

upon being seen by heavily armed figures

upon being seen by heavily armed figures

were seen by heavily armed figures

upon being seen by heavily armed figures

upon being seen by various armed figures

upon being seen by various armed figures

7

that immediately once the squad approached,
these figures started to shoot at the police officers

they were received by shots from firearms,

they were received by shots from firearms,

they were received by shots from firearms,

who started shooting firearms,

who started shooting firearms,

who started shooting firearms,

who started shooting firearms,

8

that they returned fire against the unjust
aggression, there being an intense shootout,

that they returned fire there being an intense shootout,

that they returned fire there being an intense shootout,

that they returned fire there being an intense shootout,

there was an intense shootout

they returned fire and there was an intense shootout

they returned fire against the unjust
aggression there being an intense shootout,

they returned fire against the unjust
aggression there being an intense shootout,

9

that after the shootout they saw a figure
fallen on the ground,

that after the shootout they saw a figure
fallen on the ground,

that after the shootout they saw a figure
fallen on the ground,

resulting from this a figure fallen on the
ground,

remaining from this a figure who, fallen on the
ground,

having as a result an injured figure,

where one figure came to be injured,

where one figure came to be injured,

10

the figure being rescued to the hospital of Andaraí, where he came to die, this fact being registered at the
25th DP [civil police precinct].

[the figure] being rescued to the hospital of Andaraí.

[the figure] being rescued to the hospital of Andaraí.

who was rescued to the hospital of Andaraí.

was rescued to the hospital of Andaraí.

who was rescued to the hospital of Andaraí.

who immediately was rescued to the hospital.

who immediately was rescued to the hospital.

11

Asked whether the operation was known to the
commander, he responded yes.

12

Asked whether the squad rescued the individual,
he responded yes, that the figure was rescued by the squad to the hospital of Andaraí where he came to die.

Asked whether the squad rescued the individual,
he responded yes, that the figure was rescued by the squad to the hospital of Andaraí where he came to die.

13

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

Asked whether any materials were apprehended
with the figure, he responded yes,

14

one .380 caliber pistol and lots of narcotics.

a pistol and lots of narcotic material.

a pistol and lots of narcotic material.

a pistol and lots of narcotic material.

a pistol together with narcotic material.

a pistol together with lots of narcotic
material were apprehended.

a pistol and various small sacs of white powder
were apprehended.

a pistol and possibly narcotic material were
apprehended.

15

Asked whether the figure was shot by the squad,

Asked whether the figure was shot by the squad,

Asked whether the figure was shot by the squad,

Asked whether the figure was shot by the squad,

Asked whether he could affirm that the figure
was shot by the squad,

Asked whether he could affirm that the figure
was shot by the squad,

Asked whether he could affirm that the figure
was shot by the squad,

16

responded that he could not say.

responded that he could not say, for there were
other figures firing DAF [shots from firearms] against the squad.

responded that he did not know to say.

responded that he did not know.

responded that he was not sure.

responded that he did not have a way to say.

responded no.

End

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

And since he said nothing more nor was asked
anything further...

In addition to being virtually identical, the cursory nature
of the eight testimonies suggests that the interviews were, at best,
perfunctory. Such perfunctory interviewing can lead to major errors and
shortcomings in the investigation.

In this case, four of the eight statements in the N.F. case
reproduced above conflict with the testimonies that two of the officers gave to
a civil police investigator shortly after the killing. In those earlier
statements, the two officers asserted that the police unit had split in two
during the operation, and that one team was not present at the scene at the
time of the shooting.[307]
However, in the testimonies provided to the internal affairs investigator, all
eight officers claimed that they were present at the shooting.[308]
This lack of consistency was not explored in questioning by the internal
affairs investigator.

In addition, none of the
interviews in the N.F. case contain any mention of the victim’s fatal
injury. However, the nature of the wound calls into question the genuineness of
the police claim that this was an attempt to “rescue” the victim.[309]
N.F. was shot through the neck, upper spine, and medulla, which likely resulted
in a quick death.[310] “When
I saw his body,” N.F.’s father told Human Rights Watch, “his
eyes were popping out and his neck was broken.”[311]

The written accounts of testimonies by two
officers in the 2007 Rio police “resistance” killing of L.A. also suggests cursory questioning. The accounts—prepared five minutes
apart by the same inspector—are identical, except for the sections
containing their names. Their testimonies are also identical to the narrative
in the official police report. That police report was written over five hours
after the incident, though no accounting for what caused the delay is provided.[312]

Similarly, in 15 of the 29 killing cases we reviewed
involving Rio’s 16th military police battalion, the
testimonies of the two officers deposed were identical except for biographical
details. In another six cases, the testimonies of the two officers deposed were
nearly identical, though a few synonymous words and phrases were different.

Not only are testimonies in the files often identical, they
are also typically vague, reflecting a lack of competent questioning on the
part of investigators. The absence of a concerted effort to collect information
related to a shooting is evidenced by the fact that in nearly all 29 inquiries
we reviewed into 16th battalion killings, the files suggested that civil
police investigators did not even know the full number of officers involved in
the incidents until they received a copy of the military police’s
internal affairs inquiry, which usually took several months to reach the
precinct.

In one 16th military battalion “resistance”
killing case in Rio from 2008, civil police investigators only wrote down the
first name of one of the military police officers who registered the alleged shootout
with the police precinct. Three months later, the precinct chief had to ask the
16th military police battalion for the full name of the officers
involved in the operation and for a list of weapons they used, because his
investigator had not recorded any of that crucial information when the officers
first reported the fatal shooting. Over a year after the shooting, civil police
investigators still had not determined the full name of one of the officers.[313]

Cursory interviews also sometimes fail to adequately explore
leads that might clarify responsibility for a killing:

In the 2006 São Mateus death
squad case from São Paulo, police investigators seem not to have
challenged weak alibis offered by police officers who had come under suspicion.
At least one potentially significant lead may have been dropped as a result. During
the investigation, a woman claiming to be the wife of a military police officer
involved in the killings sent an anonymous letter to authorities. The letter
named seven officers as members of a death squad and stated:

I am a wife with lots of fear, or better, am terrified. I
don’t love anymore, nor even get on well with my husband, I discovered he
is a monster. He is now part of a death squad, I found out that he and his
friends killed those boys that were shown on Fantastico [TV show] ... all
of them are from the group that stays behind the 49DP [police precinct], in
São Mateus [neighborhood]. I know that they committed other crimes and
they said that the captain did not get involved, but certainly, he knew
everything...[314]

The Homicide and Protection of
Persons Precinct (DHPP) identified the officers named in the anonymous letter,
but it did not appear to pursue the lead thoroughly. In his final report, the
police investigator summarily dismissed the letter’s accusations on
grounds that the officers in question all denied involvement and were off duty
on the day of the shooting. The claimed alibi of having been off-duty obviously
makes little sense in a case involving killings carried out by a group of
plainclothes masked gunmen in a civilian car.[315]

When we raised the problem of how
frequently we had come across shallow and seemingly cut and paste testimonies
in investigations of police killings in our conversation with the Rio security secretary, the chief of the civil police, and the commander of the military
police, they neither denied nor defended the practice. The chief of the civil
police nodded as if in acknowledgment, though none of the officials directly
addressed the issue.[316]

Failure to Interview
All Police Officers Involved in a Killing

Apart from failing to conduct proper interviews with police
officers, in many inquiries reviewed by Human Rights Watch police investigators
did not even interview all of the officers involved in the case or only did so
after a significant amount of time had elapsed. This delay allows for false
alibis to be worked out and recollections to be lost.

In reviewing police investigations into killings by Rio’s 16th military police battalion, for example, Human Rights Watch
found a consistent failure to interview all of the officers involved in
shooting episodes. Rio state prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de
Vasconcelos said that two military police officers are typically sent to
register killings at civil police precincts.[317]

In most police shooting cases, the two officers who register
the incident are the only ones whom investigators question, even if many more
officers are involved. In 14 of the 29 cases we reviewed from the 38th
precinct, the documents showed that although more than two officers were
involved in the killings, only two were interviewed during investigations. In
one 16th battalion shooting case involving 14 officers, only two
officers were interviewed.[318] At
least seven additional 16th battalion cases involved a high number
of officers (13, 9, 8, 8, 7, 6, and 6 officers), yet investigators only
questioned the two officers who registered the case.[319]
In only one of the 29 cases did police investigators interview more than the
two officers who initially registered the case at their precinct.[320]

Failure to Interview Non-Police Eyewitnesses

The failure to interview non-police witnesses is another
common problem. In the 16th military police battalion cases
investigators routinely failed to seek out or secure eyewitnesses apart from
officers themselves. Police investigators did not interview any eyewitnesses
other than the police in 26 out of the 29 killings by the 16th
military police battalion. In some cases, obvious eyewitnesses were left out.

In a December 2007 alleged
“resistance” killing case in Rio, one surviving victim, P.N.,
was hospitalized with a bullet in his arm. He was never interviewed by
investigators.[321]

Human Rights Watch found this failure repeated in other
police investigations elsewhere in Rio:

Investigators working on the alleged “resistance”
killing of R.A. in Rio failed to interview key witnesses. As of March 2009, N.
de C., an eyewitness to the shooting, had never been contacted by police
investigators, internal affairs agents, or prosecutors in the two-and-a-half
years since the event.[322] N.de
C. would have been a natural witness for the police to seek out, since she knew
the victim well (her daughter was his girlfriend) and lived next to the site of
the shooting.[323]

Failure
to Conduct Forensic Examinations

The most serious forensic deficiencies are rooted in failure
to gather vital evidence in the first place. Of the dozens of suspected police
execution cases we reviewed from Rio and São Paulo, we found fewer than
10 cases in which either the crime scene or the victims’ clothing were
the subject of a forensics report. Sometimes, press photographs were available
where official police ones were not:

In the Complexo do Alemão case, in
which police killed 19 people in one day, the Rio police did not produce a
single crime scene report or photograph in connection with this incident.[324]
The press secured scores of photographs of the operations, deaths, and
locations.[325]

Similarly, in all 29 inquiries we reviewed from the killings
by Rio’s 16th military police battalion, investigators failed
to conduct basic forensics examinations. The absence of certain types of tests
was uniform across all the cases, despite the fact that investigators sometimes
included these basic forensics examinations on their initial list of
investigatory duties to be performed. For example, there was no indication that
investigators had visited a single crime scene in the 29 cases investigated. Though
the investigations involved the deaths of 36 people, not one case contained any
reports, photographs, or descriptions of the crime scene.

As already detailed above, the clothing of shooting victims may
contain ballistics evidence relevant to investigations of alleged shootout
deaths, but not one 16th battalion case we examined contained an
analysis of a victim’s clothing. And even though gunshot residue tests
could be done on the victims in order to try to determine whether they had
recently fired a gun as alleged by police, not a single investigation contained
the results of a gunshot residue test.

Lastly, while investigators routinely submitted weapons
involved in the incident for forensics tests in order to ascertain their
general nature and firing efficacy, in none of the cases did police ask examiners
to try to match a bullet found in a victim’s body to the gun of a police
officer. Such tests, when conducted, might serve to individualize police
culpability, establish how many shooters hit a victim, and provide the basis
for a system of tracking whether an officer’s gun appears in other
homicides.

Human Rights Watch found that, even when forensics exams are
performed they often lack vital information, sometimes due to a lack of
resources. For instance, in dozens of autopsy reports reviewed by Human Rights
Watch, forensic doctors were unable to retrieve bullets from the bodies of
police shooting victims, rendering key ballistics tests impossible. The reports
typically attributed this omission to a lack of functioning X-ray equipment.

The quality of forensics reports varied significantly from
case to case. For example, some doctors’ autopsy reports were clear and
descriptive, while the brevity of others rendered them nearly worthless.
Furthermore, in contrast to São Paulo, almost none of the autopsy
reports from Rio that we reviewed included descriptions of bullet trajectories.
Such descriptions can be vital to determining the credibility of police accounts.[326]

Independent forensics scientists who have analyzed state
forensics reports from Rio and São Paulo have publicly complained about
the poor quality of forensic tests in the past. A team of federal forensic
scientists, for instance, criticized the forensics work of the Rio police in
the Complexo do Alemão case for: 1) not following the recommended
protocol for examination of possible extrajudicial, arbitrary, or summary
executions; 2) containing deficiencies in the description of injuries to the victims
in autopsy reports; 3) omitting bullet trajectories from autopsy reports; and
4) not analyzing victims’ injuries in light of the circumstances of each
shooting, in large part because of the lack of crime scene reports.[327]
In São Paulo, forensic doctor and university professor Ricardo Molina,
who reviewed 124 autopsies of victims killed in alleged shootouts with police
in May 2006, said the reports were generally, “poorly done,”
adding that, “there is no standard at all.”[328]

Failure to Promptly Conduct Investigations

Human Rights Watch encountered dozens of examples of harmful
delays that hindered investigations into police killings. Investigators failed
to pursue vital leads in first hours and days after a suspected killing. And
they allowed investigations to stretch out for months and years. Since evidence
tends to diminish in quality and reliability over time, these delays make it
more likely that the cases will not be adequately resolved.

According to the DHPP—São Paulo’s specialized
homicide investigation unit[329]—the
most vital period of a homicide investigation is the first 48 hours because the
evidence is fresh, witnesses’ recollections are intact, and perpetrators
are still working to cover their tracks and generate false alibis.[330]
However, in practice, almost none of the non-DHPP police inquiries into police
killings we reviewed showed anything close to that level of urgency. The police
usually take weeks or months to take testimonies.

In the case of the police killing of L.A. in Rio in 2007, at least three separate press accounts based on multiple
witnesses were published within 48 hours of the shooting. They contained
similar narratives from witnesses recounting police abuse and attempted cover
up.[331] Police investigators, however, did not even get around to taking a statement
from L.A.’s mother, who said she personally saw officers destroying crime
scene evidence, until 85 days after her son was killed.[332] The police’s concluding investigatory report requested that the case be
shelved on the theory that the officers had acted out of self-defense in a shootout
with a drug trafficker.[333]

Of the 54 suspected death squad cases the
São Paulo Police Ombudsman’s Office is tracking from May 2006,
inquiries into 16 killings were still pending after three years. Another 33 were
shelved with no resolution and only five had been resolved (all by the DHPP).[334]
In three of those five cases, the assailants were identified as having been
military police officers. In the other two cases, they were not police.[335]

In Rio, despite substantial amounts of
evidence already having been collected, the investigation of the 2003 suspected
police executions of A.R., L.L., and F.T. was still under civil police
investigation more than five years later.[336]

In the case of Marcio Antonio Maia de
Souza, killed by Rio police in 1995, the police inquiry dragged on for nine
years despite strong evidence of police abuse (e.g. police said they tried to
“rescue” Souza in taking him to the hospital, but police documents
show they stopped at a precinct to register the alleged resistance case before
dropping Souza’s body off at the hospital). Police investigators informed
state prosecutors several times that they had not performed necessary
investigatory tasks due to a lack of resources. The case was shelved in 2004.[337]

Delays also consistently hindered the investigations into
killings by Rio’s 16th military police battalions in 2007 and
2008. As of July 2009, none of the investigations had significantly advanced. Autopsy
reports, which are typically produced within days of a death, were still
missing for 7 of the 36 victims. Police investigators had not obtained the
hospital records of victims in 20 of the 29 cases. Two of the victims remained
unidentified, and criminal background checks had not yet been performed on 20
of the victims who were identified. No criminal background checks had been
performed on any of the officers involved.

In one case from September 2007, civil
police investigators still had not obtained a copy of the victim’s
autopsy report 22 months after the shooting. They had also not identified the
victim or interviewed one of three officers involved in the killing by July
2009.[338]

In an inquiry into a May 2007 alleged shootout
killing, investigators had not obtained an autopsy report or even performed a
criminal background check on the victim or officers involved two years after
the incident.[339]

Failure to Track Records of
Individual Officers

All of the 38th precinct’s inquiries into
16th battalion killings from Rio we reviewed suffered from a lack of
investigation into the background of the officers involved. While investigators
sometimes had run criminal background checks on the victims of police
shootings, they had not run checks on any of the officers.

Were civil police investigators to systematically track the
involvement of police officers in fatal shootings, they would find that certain
officers were involved in a significant portion of the killings. Human Rights
Watch identified 18 officers from the 16th battalion who
participated in at least three fatal police operations in 2007 and 2008. At
least 16 of the 23 officers who were charged by prosecutor Vasconcelos in July
2009 for death-squad style homicides had been involved in multiple fatal
“resistance” shootings in 2007 and 2008.[340]

Failure to Ensure That
Officers Under Investigation Be Taken Off Street Duties

In cases of killings by Rio’s 16th
battalion, police officers involved in fatal shootings were not taken off
street duty while investigations into their conduct remained ongoing. As a
result, many officers were involved in further alleged “resistance”
killings while they were being investigated.

Human Rights Watch tallied that one officer
was involved in at least five police operations resulting in alleged resistance
killings from 2007 through 2008. Two of these lethal operations were only five
days apart in June 2008. In the first case, a double homicide, one
victim’s mother wrote to the state prosecutor’s office claiming her
son had been executed by police. In the second case, Vasconcelos charged the
officer in question with homicide in July 2009.[341]

Human Rights Watch found that another
officer involved in a police operation resulting in an alleged resistance
killing on April 9, 2007, participated in another killing only six days later. In
total, the officer was involved in at least five police operations resulting in
alleged resistance killings from 2007 through 2008. He too was one of the
officers charged by Vasconcelos in 2009 with homicide.[342]

Conflicts
of Interest

Under international
standards, for an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by state agents
to be effective, the persons responsible for carrying out the investigation
should be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only
a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also practical
independence.[343] However
in Brazil a general bias towards the police officers’ versions of events
pervades police inquiries into suspected police abuse, a problem compounded by
a lack of institutional independence.

Although the principal investigations into killings by
military police officers are handled by the civil police, this does not
guarantee independence or impartiality of inquiries. In dozens of cases we
examined in which civil police investigated alleged military police abuses,
one-sided or shoddy investigations led to lack of progress or to inquiries
being shelved, ensuring impunity. Lack of institutional independence also
seriously hampers forensics institutes (which answer to police officials) and
police internal affairs units.

Civil Police Inquiries

Apart from the fact that there are obvious conflicts of
interest when civil police investigators are entrusted with civil police
shooting cases, there are also structural reasons why civil police inquiries
into military police abuse cannot be considered truly independent. First, the
civil and military police both have highly vertical and rigid command
structures that culminate in the same commander-in-chief: the state governor. Second,
at the local level, civil and military police often collaborate closely,
maintaining interconnected working relationships that hinder impartiality. Finally,
military and civil police officers sometimes collaborate in criminal
enterprises, which can further undermine the integrity of civil police
investigators; the CPI report, for instance,
contained numerous accounts of militias containing both military and civil
police officers in Rio.[344]

Human Rights Watch encountered a consensus among non-police criminal
justice officials—including the coordinator of the São Paulo
prosecutorial anti-organized crime unit, the São Paulo deputy police ombudsman,
and the Rio deputy assistant attorney general for Human Rights—that this
institutional loyalty was a major obstacle to impartial inquiries.[345]

Gustavo Leite, a former appeals court judge, said in a 2007
press interview when he was the head of the Unified General Internal Affairs of
the Rio police: “I do not remember any case in which a police officer
testified against another.”[346]

The bias resulting from this institutional loyalty was
readily apparent in police reports on recently begun or ongoing investigations:

In the 2006 case of R.A. in Rio, the
civil police precinct chief, when ordering the opening of an inquiry into the
police “resistance” killing, stated as if it were established fact:
“bearing in mind that the police officers involved were victims of an
unjust aggression.”[347]

In the São Paulo police killing of N.P.,
who was shot five times in the face in May 2006, the investigator—who was
from the same precinct as the officer involved in the shooting—began his
initial police incident report with the observation that: “[the police
officer] heroically and acting in strict compliance with his legal duties and
with legitimate self-defense, responded to the shooting in a moderate fashion,
attempting to repel the unjust and cowardly aggression.”[348]

In some cases, police do not take measures to resolve even
the most obvious conflicts of interest, such as preventing officers from investigating
colleagues from their own unit (as in the N.P. case). This problem is common in
shootings by the civil police, since the civil police themselves are entrusted
with the principal investigations into such cases. According to Rio prosecutor Vasconcelos, investigations by the civil police into potential human rights
violations committed by other civil police officers are generally “born
dead” because of the conflict of interest involved.[349]

In the Rio police “resistance”
killing of R.A., the civil police investigators in the case were
colleagues from the same precinct as the officers involved in the shooting.
Even more problematic is the possibility that the police precinct chief was
related to one of the officers involved in the killing, given that they shared
the same unusual four-part last name.[350]

Forensics Institutes

The fact that forensic institutes are part of the police
structure also undermines the independence of investigations and increases the
likelihood of manipulation by those being investigated. In Rio, forensics units
report to the chief of the civil police, while in São Paulo the
institutes report to the Office of the Secretary for Public Security. As a
result, their budgets and jobs are controlled by the police hierarchy, which
may make forensic investigators hesitant to investigate alleged police
perpetrators. In addition, police often fail to integrate forensic scientists
into investigations and only bring them in to assess specific pieces of
evidence or provide specific information; forensic scientists thus often are
not privy to many of the facts of a case beyond what particular technical
analysis has been asked of them.

Police Internal Affairs

Police internal affairs units (corregedorias) in Rio
and São Paulo lack the independence to adequately investigate police
killings.[351]
Internal affairs heads are subordinate to military and civil chiefs of police
and can be removed at any time, leaving them with little job security.
Furthermore, because many internal affairs officers eventually move on to work
in other parts of the police force, investigators are reticent to alienate
colleagues, and have a negative incentive to undertake thorough investigations.
In some instances, internal affairs units outsource their investigations to the
very battalions that are accused of abuses. Internal affairs investigations
reviewed by Human Rights Watch demonstrated that, even in cases where evidence
strongly suggests extrajudicial executions, investigators fail to adequately
investigate.

Internal affairs units lack independence since they fall
within the security secretariat chain of command, rather than operating
autonomously. Heads of internal affairs (corregedores) are named by the
chiefs of the military and civil police, and are subordinate to them. Similarly,
the head of the Rio General Unified Internal Affairs (CGU) unit—a unit
that is designed to deal with high profile cases—is picked by the secretary
for security and is subordinate to him. As a result, the heads of internal
affairs have no job security and can be replaced at will. This arrangement
makes internal affairs units vulnerable to political pressures, especially in
high profile cases involving ranking police officials. The judge in charge of
overseeing civil police inquiries in São Paulo told Human Rights Watch
that the civil police internal affairs unit has “some difficulty with
cases involving higher ranks.”[352] The
internal affairs chiefs we spoke with never admitted any interference, however.
The head of the CGU, in a meeting alongside the security secretary, assured us
he has never felt any pressure from above regarding his investigations.[353]

Furthermore, police officers working in internal affairs may
face negative consequences for investigating fellow officers. Because internal
affairs officers do not have a specific career path inside the department, many
end up transferring to other units. After leaving the internal affairs units,
many go on to work alongside colleagues who they had previously investigated.
As a result, investigators have less of an incentive to undertake thorough
investigations out of fear of future retaliation or ostracization.

Internal affairs units are regarded with contempt by many
police officers, and several heads of internal affairs told Human Rights Watch
that it is hard to find police officers who want to work in such units.[354]
According to some police officers working for internal affairs, the job has
prevented them from being promoted.[355] Federal
human rights secretariat official Pedro Montenegro cited the lack of a secure
career path for internal affairs officers in the internal affairs units as a
key contributor to police impunity.[356]

Particularly worrisome with regard to independence is the
practice by some internal affairs units of outsourcing their investigations to
the commanders of the officers under review. This creates an obvious conflict
of interest. The São Paulo head of internal affairs of the military
police said that, apart from exceptional cases, investigations into misconduct,
even including homicide, were carried out by the battalions of the officers in
question.[357] Up
until July 2009, this was the policy of the Rio military police internal
affairs unit, though the new military police commander said he has since
ordered all serious cases to be investigated by personnel from outside the
battalions of the officers under investigation.[358]

Lastly, the problem of
non-independence of police internal affairs units can increase victims’ reluctance
to file complaints. Citizens may fear going to internal affairs unitsto
denounce police officers, since the units are part of the police and the
atmosphere inside them is not always welcoming to those willing to file
complaints. For example, during an informal conversation at the military police
internal affairs unit in Rio de Janeiro, a police officer working as a
receptionist at the front desk told Human Rights Watch, “police officers
don’t like human rights. Human rights are not something for the police. There
are people who commit some horrible crimes and don’t deserve any type of
human rights.”[359] Military
police officers around him agreed.[360]

In São Paulo, civil police
investigators were highly critical of the military police internal affairs
investigations into the Highlander death squad case. According to the
civil police, although the internal inquiry of the 37th Military Police
Battalion into two of the killings was roughly 600 pages long “the
investigator had limited himself to disqualifying the victims, that is, saying
that they were delinquents and drug users.”[361] The military police investigators, “fixated on the [persons] disappeared,
creating stains on the dead and, consequently, justification for their
disappearances,” the civil police investigator added.[362]

In three other suspected death squad homicides in São Paulo, internal affairs investigators reached summary conclusions exonerating
military police officers from involvement despite strong evidence to the
contrary.

In the Parque Bristol death squad killings
of F.B., E.D., and S.L. and in the injuring of E.W.
and F.O. (who was later killed), the military police internal affairs
unit submitted a one-page report to the Ombudsperson’s Office in December
2007. The report found that there were “no indications” of any
involvement in the killings on the part of the military police.[363]

The São Paulo military police
internal affairs unit found that there were “no indications” of
wrongdoing by police officers in the São Mateus multiple death
squad homicide in May 2006. In the same case, by contrast, the civil
police’s DHPP unit asserted it “had no doubt that the perpetrators
were military police officers.”[364]

In the death squad killing of L.V., the
military police internal affairs unit found no evidence of police misconduct,
whereas the DHPP was able to identify a military police shooter, who was
charged with homicide.[365]

In Rio, the efficacy of the internal affairs divisions in
police violence cases is also low.

In nine of the 29 cases on alleged
“resistance” killings by the 16th military police
battalion in 2007 and 2008, internal affairs investigators concluded that the
officers involved had done nothing wrong before they had even identified the
victims in the cases.

In a blatant example of a conflict of
interest, a Rio military police internal affairs unit charged with looking into
complaints against four officers in relation to killings by the Quitungo
militia passed the investigation over in part to the local 16th military police battalion, the unit of the accused officers. That
battalion’s secret service (P2) investigation stated that “nothing
was found” in relation to the four officers named in complaints that had
been filed with the Ombudsman’s Office. Notably, instead of investigating
the homicide complaints, the 16th military police battalion
investigators characterized the scope of their inquiry as examining
“complaints ... of involvement [by security officers in efforts] to
impede the action of drug traffickers in the locations of Conjunto do Quitungo
and Conjunto Guaparé...”[366]

Non-police officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch all
agreed that internal affairs units need greater autonomy and job security.[367]
Some officials even suggested that the units be located outside of the police
structure altogether, and include officials from other institutions and parts
of the government in order to improve monitoring.[368]

Despite the inadequacies of the internal affairs
investigations, authorities claimed there have been some reforms taken in
recent years. In São Paulo, for instance, authorities informed us that the
military police internal affairs unit dispatches investigators to every alleged
shootout incident.[369] The
head of internal affairs for the military police there also told us that his
office holds weekly meetings to review shootout cases and identify officers
repeatedly involved in such killings.[370]

In Rio, the new commander of the military police,
Mário Sérgio de Brito Duarte, told us he removed the authority to
conduct internal affairs investigations into serious cases of police misconduct
from the battalion of the officers implicated and placed it directly with of
the internal affairs division itself.[371] As of
this writing, a similar reform had yet to be implemented in internal affairs
bodies in São Paulo.

VII. Police Impunity

In the majority of cases reviewed for this report
containing credible evidence of police extrajudicial execution, no police
officers have been held accountable. Many cases have been shelved without
reaching trial or even resulting in criminal charges.

According to prosecutors in both states, the main causes of
this chronic impunity are police cover ups and investigatory failures. While
Brazilian law grants prosecutors the authority to oversee police activities,
including investigations, their ability to do so is limited by several factors,
including problems with crime notification procedures and the system of case
allocation among prosecutors, as well as legal and political challenges from
the police. Consequently, prosecutors usually must rely entirely on
investigations carried out by police investigators, which are often extremely
deficient.

The existing accountability gaps are not resolved by other
mechanisms—such as police internal affairs units, police ombudsmen, and
federal bodies—which lack the independence, mandate, and/or political
will, to adequately address the problem of widespread police extrajudicial
executions.

Impunity
for Police Killings

Nearly all non-police criminal justice officials we spoke
with—including the attorneys general of both states—said that
police officers implicated in extrajudicial executions are rarely brought to
justice.[372] For
example, São Paulo prosecutor Carlos Cardoso, who served as the human rights
aide to the state attorney general from 1998 through 2008, said that "the
overwhelming majority of [police abuse] cases go unpunished.”[373]
His Rio counterpart, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Human Rights
Leonardo Cháves, agreed, stating that convictions of police officers for
human rights violations are “rare.”[374]

The precise scale of impunity is difficult to determine,
given that official statistics on
prosecutions—disaggregated by offense, alleged offender, and judicial
outcome—are hard to come by in the Brazilian justice system.[375]
Nonetheless, official data supports these officials’ estimation that
impunity in these cases is the norm. For instance, in its 10 years of existence
(from 1999 to 2009), the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office recorded over 7800
complaints against police officers concerning criminal conduct.[376]
Those 7800+ complaints, however, generated only 42 criminal charges by state
prosecutors and a paltry four convictions.[377]

In São Paulo, the Police Ombudsman’s Office
does not publish data regarding criminal charges that is disaggregated from
data on administrative penalties. However, the office did confirm that it was
rare for criminal charges to be sought in cases they tracked. When asked about
the number of criminal charges filed in connection with the over 27,000
complaints received by the Ombudsman’s Office from 1998 through 2008, a
representative of the Ombudsman’s Office responded that the number was
“very very small.”[378]

As a further illustration of the problem of impunity in
São Paulo, when the respected Brazilian daily Folha de São
Paulo looked at the ombudsman’s homicide files from the May 2006
attacks, the paper found that three years after the office began tracking 102
cases of suspected police involvement in 170 unlawful killings there was real
progress in only five cases. In two cases, investigators determined the
assailants were not police officers. In another case, investigators found a
police officer had been responsible but had since died. In two cases, charges
had been brought against military police officers who were still awaiting trial.[379]

The cases we reviewed for this report provide additional
evidence:

No one has been held accountable in
connection with the Complexo do Alemão police killings of 19
people on June 27, 2007, despite extensive evidence that multiple extrajudicial
executions occurred, crime scene evidence was deliberately destroyed, and
investigators negligently failed to request obvious forensics analyses. The
investigation into the case was “stalled” as of July 2009,
according to Rio Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Human Rights Leonardo
Cháves.[380]

No one has been held accountable for the
2006 police killing of R.A. His mother told Human Rights Watch that two
years after he was killed while kneeling with his hands up (an account
confirmed by an eyewitness[381]), she
had not once been contacted by police investigators or prosecutors. Fearing for
the safety of her remaining teenage son, she implored Human Rights Watch not to
try to obtain updated case records.[382] Human
Rights Watch confirmed that the officers involved in R.A.’s death were
still working in the Rio civil police.

No one has been held accountable for the May
2006 killing of N.P. in São Paulo. Despite evidence that the
shooting officer had used excessive force and tried to cover up his execution
of N.P., charges have not been successfully filed against the officer. In 2007,
a judge rejected a charge against him, arguing that the prosecutor’s work
with regard to the officer had been cursory.[383]

No one has been held accountable for the
2007 killing of L.A. in Rio. The prosecutor assigned to the case has
expressed doubts over the conclusion of civil police that the police had acted legitimately
in self-defense, according to lawyers representing L.A.’s family.[384]
However, by the time the prosecutor studied the file, 18 months had passed
since the incident, and she faced significant challenges in trying to collect
new evidence. The decision of whether to shelve the case was still pending as
of this writing.[385]

No one has been held accountable for the May
2006 São Mateus suspected death squad killings casein
São Paulo. Although an inquiry by the Homicide and Protection of
Persons Precinct (DHPP) concluded that military police officers had
participated in the unlawful killings, it did not identify the individual
perpetrators. A judge shelved the case in March 2008 due to lack of evidence,
at the recommendation of the prosecutor’s office.[386]

No one has been held accountable in
connection with the May 2006 Parque Bristol case involving the suspected
death squad killings of three people in São Paulo, nor the December 2006
killing of a surviving witness in that case.Both investigations were
still pending as of this writing.[387] The
human rights organization Conectas has formally requested that the case be “federalized”(taken
up within the federal justice system) given the failure to achieve justice at
the state level.[388] As of
this writing, the Brazilian federal attorney general had not acted on the
request.

These provisions of the criminal code could potentially play
a vital role in efforts to curb police extrajudicial executions. Incriminating
evidence of cover-up techniques is often readily available. Even in certain
cases in which it might be difficult to mount a full-blown homicide prosecution,
there might still be sufficient evidence to charge officers with a crime
related to obstruction of justice. The prosecution of these cover-up techniques
could serve as a powerful deterrent for police officers who might otherwise
help to cover up their colleagues’ violent crimes. By discouraging
collusion in cover ups—and thereby making it harder for police officers
to disguise extrajudicial executions—these prosecutions could also
discourage them from committing these violent crimes in the first place.

Unfortunately, however, these cover-up techniques are not
prosecuted on a regular basis. “I do not know of any case of [an officer]
being disciplined for disruption of the crime scene,” the São Paulo deputy police ombudsman told us in December 2008.[390]
The former human rights aide to the São Paulo attorney general, Carlos
Cardoso, was equally categorical in saying that such punishments were rare.[391]

While police officials in both Rio and São Paulo
asserted that administrative sanctions are, in fact, meted out for failures to
preserve crime scenes, they offered no statistical or case evidence to sustain
that claim. Though we asked several officials from both states for examples of
officers who were disciplined for failing to preserve crime scenes, in our conversations
with authorities in Rio and São Paulo,[392]
only one such case was cited to us: the 2004 forged shootout killing of
Flávio Ferreira Sant’Ana in São Paulo.[393]

Independently, Human Rights Watch did find two other cases
in Rio in which police officers were tried and convicted for manipulating the
crime scene (see chapter 5). However, in the other cases we reviewed, including
the Complexo do Alemão and São Mateus cases, for
instance, no one was held accountable in connection with the glaring
destruction of crime scene evidence. In the former case, an analysis of
photographic, medical, and police records indicated that false rescues had
occurred. In the latter case, investigators determined that the crime scene had
not been preserved; witness accounts in the press reported police removing
corpses from the location of the shooting prior to the arrival of forensics
teams.

Limited Accountability for Killings by Off-Duty
Officers

In recent years, Rio and São Paulo officials have
made some important arrests of officers for abuses committed while off duty. In
Rio, the government has reported detaining over 200 people since 2007 in
connection with militia activities.[394] In São Paulo, meanwhile, police investigators have exposed two death squads (the
“Killers of the 18th” and the “Highlanders”)
in 2008 and 2009.[395]

Yet despite initial progress, impunity for killings committed
by police while off-duty remains a serious problem. In São Paulo, the
vast majority of suspected death squad cases tracked by the Police Ombudsman’s
Office have remained unsolved. As of May 2009, the Police Ombudsman’s
Office noted on its website that “there have not been significant
advances” in the investigations they have been tracking.[396]

In Rio, much remains to be done given the large scope of the
militia problem. Despite a significant number of arrests of militia members, Civil
Police Chief Allan Turnowski acknowledged that many militias were still
operating, stating that authorities had opted to target the largest groups
first, given limited resources.[397] It is
far from clear that Rio will be able to fully address the militia problem without
expanding the enforcement effort and reforming the police accountability
structure. Indeed, the CPI report on militias issued 58 recommendations aimed
at addressing the problem of militias, but those have largely not been
implemented (one crucial recommendation was the proposed creation of internal
affairs units autonomous from the regular police chain of command structure).[398]
In June 2009, the Rio government announced that over 200 officers from just one
battalion (roughly 40 percent of the military police’s 9th
battalion) were under investigation by internal affairs for suspected militia
activities.[399] Given
current limitations on accountability mechanisms, it will be a daunting task to
hold militia members among the 9th battalion accountable, let alone
militia members in the dozens of other Rio battalions and civil police units.

The Role of State Prosecutors

Brazilian law assigns public prosecutors the authority and
duty to prosecute crimes and exercise external control over the police. Under
the country’s federal system of criminal justice, this responsibility
falls primarily on prosecutors at the state, rather than federal, level.

Institutional Autonomy

Unlike police investigators, public prosecutors operate
independently of the state government and are shielded from direct manipulation
by legal provisions guaranteeing their autonomy. The State Prosecutor’s
Office is formally an autonomous institution. State attorneys general in Rio
and São Paulo, though installed in a process that includes appointment
by the governor, do not fall under the supervision of the governor’s
office.

Prosecution of Crimes

Under Brazilian law, the legal duty and authority to prosecute
crimes falls to the State Prosecutor’s Office. Where there is evidence of
a crime, prosecutors are obliged to promote a prosecution.

State rather than federal prosecutors are in charge of
prosecuting the vast majority of criminal cases. Prosecutors in charge of
criminal dockets are generally geographically assigned and cover most or all
types of crimes in a given area. Specific geographically-assigned jury trial
prosecutors handle intentional homicide cases. Each criminal case has a
legally-designated natural prosecutor (promotor natural) so as to
prevent arbitrariness in prosecutorial assignments. Other prosecutors can collaborate
with the natural prosecutor in a case at the purely investigatory phase and
even the prosecutorial phase.[400]

Oversight of the Police

In Brazil, the constitutional duty of “external
control of police activities” falls to prosecutors.[401]
This responsibility is reiterated in multiple legal instruments, including
national legislation, a resolution by the National Council of Offices of the
Prosecutors, and state-level instruments put in place by attorneys general.[402]
Prosecutors have a large degree of formal authority and autonomy to carry out this
oversight function.

Moreover, the prosecutorial obligation of police oversight
contained in the Brazilian constitution has been interpreted in complementary
legislation to include responsibilities such as monitoring all stages of police
work, requesting documentation and information regarding investigations,
analyzing the technical aspects of the investigation process, and evaluating
evidence. In other words, the state prosecutor’s officehas a duty
to control the quality of investigations, and investigative materials, produced
by the police.

Prosecutors legally have free access to police precincts and
any other public facility[403] as
well as access to any documents related to police investigations.[404]

Obstacles to Effective Prosecution and Oversight

Prosecutors in both São Paulo and Rio states
identified multiple obstacles that hinder their ability to use their
prosecutorial and oversight powers to remedy the problem of police executions,
cover ups, and investigatory failures. These include delayed notification of “resistance”
killings, dispersed review of police killings, heavy case loads, and legal and
political challenges mounted by police associations and lawyers of individual
officers suspected of committing crimes.

Delayed Notification

State prosecutors are generally only notified of police
killings after 30 days have passed, the outer limit prescribed in the Criminal
Procedural Code. In many cases, notification comes even later. Both the
attorney general of Rio and the coordinator of the center for operational
support of the criminal prosecutorial division in São Paulo identified
delayed notification as a key problem.[405]

As described in the Ombudsman Office section below, the
São Paulo State Prosecutor’s Office helped craft an agreement
whereby the Police Ombudsman’s Office now provides early warnings to the
Attorney General’s Office when it learns of suspicious
“resistance” killings, reducing the delays significantly in some
cases.[406]

In general, however, prosecutors find out about potential
police abuse cases weeks after they have occurred and cannot provide guidance
to police on what cases or issues to prioritize and what types of evidence to
seek. In many cases, prosecutors are notified of cases only after physical and
testimonial evidence has already been lost or compromised.

Moreover, often prosecutors do not intervene significantly in
an investigation until the civil police have concluded their inquiry, which can
take several months or years. Rather than taking the initiative, prosecutors
wait for the results of the police inquiry and on that basis alone decide
whether to press charges.

Case
Distribution

There is no specific team of prosecutors in either state
tasked with addressing police homicide cases. Instead these cases are left to
percolate within various parts of the criminal justice system and end up with
geographically-assigned jury trial prosecutors responsible for all intentional
homicide cases.

Since “resistance” killings occur most
frequently in high-crime areas, this geographically-based distribution system
results in these cases being handled by prosecutors already burdened with
especially heavy caseloads. Given the intensity of public concern over common
crime, these prosecutors face considerable pressure to de-prioritize police
abuse cases. As a result, it can be difficult for them to devote the time and
resources needed to advance relatively complex and controversial criminal cases
against police officers.

Moreover, the dispersion of police killing cases means
prosecutors do not conduct the type of systematic analysis and supplemental
investigation necessary to identify patterns of forged “resistance”
killings, police off-duty killings, or police cover ups, or to develop
strategies for tackling such complex cases.

Prosecutors’ police oversight function is also
harmfully diffuse in both states. In Rio, the prosecutorial police oversight
function is dispersed across 51 geographically-arranged Prosecutorial Penal
Investigation Divisions (Promotorias de Investigação Penal -
PIPs), which also take care of police inquiries for the huge volume of normal
crimes that occur in their zones.[407] Furthermore,
the oversight mandate itself is very broad, with no particular emphasis placed
on cases of violence, like alleged shootout killings by police.[408]

In São Paulo, the lack of systematic analysis of
police killings is similar. The State Prosecutor’s Office in São
Paulo has a specific team dedicated to police oversight, the Special Action
Group of External Control of Police Activities (GECEP)—but it is a small
unit and its mandate is too expansive to effectively deal with police violence.
Most importantly, GECEP’s mandate specifically excludes intentional
homicide cases and crimes perpetrated exclusively by military police officers.[409]
(Intentional homicides are the only cases tried by jury in Brazil, so they are distributed to the geographically-appropriate jury trial division. Crimes by
military police officers that are not intentional homicides generally get
passed to prosecutors in the military justice system.) Believing that this
division often truncates his monitoring abilities, the head of GECEP,
Márcio Cristino, formally requested that he be granted oversight authority
to work on cases concerning the military police as well.[410]
This was denied.[411]

The existence in each state of committed human rights prosecutors
within the attorney general’s office is important but insufficient to
address the diffuse nature of prosecutorial oversight of the police given the
caseloads of such prosecutors. For example, Rio Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Human Rights Leonardo Cháves has made important advances in
promoting accountability for police abuses. However, he himself readily admits
that his task—addressing all human rights issues for the state of Rio—is far too ambitious for a single prosecutor to fulfill adequately.[412]

Legal Challenges

The police have challenged prosecutors’ legal
authority to directly investigate crimes, even where—as in the case of
suspected police involvement in crimes—conflicts of interest undermine
police legitimacy to conduct the investigations.

Civil police officers have organized to challenge the legitimacy
of prosecutor-led investigations before Brazil’s highest court, the
Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF). Recently, a Rio civil police association sued
in response to the Rio attorney general’s July 2009 resolution which
outlined norms for prosecutorial oversight of certain aspects of the civil
police.[413] The
associations claim that they alone have sole authority to conduct
investigations and allege any other investigatory effort should be void.

A court ruling overturning prosecutors’ investigatory
authority would be a significant setback, negating what advances have been
made. It would also be hard to reconcile with Brazil’s obligations to
ensure that crimes committed by the police are subject to effective
investigation by an independent and impartial body, and would raise questions
about the mandate given to prosecutors in the Constitution to monitor the
police.

Recent decisions by one panel of the STF in 2009 sensibly
recognized the right of prosecutors to conduct investigations, making it more
likely that the plenary STF will approve of prosecutor-led investigations as
well, at the very least when the cases involve police officers accused of
wrongdoing.[414]

Reliance on Police Investigators

The prosecutors’ offices in both states have teams of
police investigators that operate under their direct supervision. However,
these teams are very small: the Rio prosecutor’s office has a force of
200 investigators,[415] while São Paulo’s numbers less than 30.[416]

Consequently, prosecutors usually must rely on the
investigations carried out by the civil police. “Prosecutors currently
depend 99 percent [of the time] on the investigative work done by the
police,” Carlos Cardoso, then human rights aide to the attorney general
in São Paulo, told Human Rights Watch.[417]

Prosecutors have no direct administrative authority over
these police investigators. When they find that the investigation has not
produced sufficient evidence on which to base a criminal charge, they can
request that the inquiry be given back to the police authority so that more
investigatory steps can be taken.[418] However,
even when prosecutors do make such requests, they are forced to rely on the
same body that carried out the inadequate investigation in the first place.

Criminal justice officials (other than the police) agree
that the current police self-policing model fails to produce adequate
investigations. “The key problem,” explained the São Paulo
attorney general, “is in the police investigating members of the police
itself.”[419] One of
the current human rights assistants to the São Paulo attorney general
agreed, adding, “We are finding that we have to do some investigations
[ourselves] when those who should do them do not.”[420]
The attorney general of Rio took at similar view, stating, for instance, that
the problem with impunity for false resistance killings by the police was that
“the investigation of these cases is done by the police itself.”[421]
The deputy assistant attorney general for human rights in Rio agreed stating,
“Crimes by police officers should be investigated directly by the MP [State
Prosecutor’s Office]. The police cannot investigate the police
itself.”[422] The
former human rights aide to the São Paulo attorney general, now working
in an intentional homicide prosecutorial unit, also stated that cases often do
not result in accountability because “sufficient evidence wasn’t
collected in the police inquiry.”[423] A
São Paulo judge who manages the brunt of the caseload of torture
allegations against police officers in the state put it succinctly: “It
is difficult to have police investigate police ... in practice, it
doesn’t work.”[424]

Limits of Other External Accountability Mechanisms

Other
external accountability mechanisms exist that could, in theory, play a role in
promoting accountability for police officers who commit abuses. However, in
practice, they are largely ineffective.

Ombudsman’s Offices

Police ombudsman’s offices are relatively autonomous
governmental bodies that can play important roles in the accountability process,
but their impact is limited because they lack formal investigatory powers.

As demonstrated by the exceptional work of the São
Paulo office over the years, ombudsmen can provide many benefits, including 1)
serving as an alternative avenue for public complaints and commentary, 2) prompting
investigations by other institutions, 3) being a transparent source of
information on police conduct, 4) calling press attention to particular
problems, 5) tracking endemic problems, and 6) conducting studies on matters of
public concern with regard to policing.

At the same time, the role of the Ombudsman’s Office
is limited by a restricted mandate and budget that do not effectively allow it
to investigate complaints itself. In Rio, the restrictive side of the mandate
was repeatedly emphasized by the office’s leadership in interviews with
Human Rights Watch. The São Paulo Ombudsman’s Office is an open
institution, which takes its job seriously. It primarily functions to transmit
the complaints and positive comments of citizens to the relevant police
entities and request an accounting in return. Accordingly, it has become an
important interlocutor between the police forces and the public, including civil
society groups and journalists. The office was helpful, prompt, and transparent
in its approach to Human Rights Watch throughout the course of our research.

In terms of accountability for human rights abuses, among
the former São Paulo ombudsman’s most recent contributions was a
project to track police violence cases from the May 2006 attacks. This has evolved
into a permanent tracking of homicides that contain a modus operandi indicative
of death squad activities. In turn, the office has used this information to
highlight the problem of impunity for police abuse, calling attention to the
vast number of unsolved cases of suspected death squad homicides in the press.[425]

In another important effort, São Paulo Ombudsman
Antônio Funari recently established a partnership with the State Prosecutor’s
Office: under this plan, the ombudsman forwards suspicious police reports of
alleged resistance killings directly to the human rights aide of the attorney
general at the moment they are published, attempting in this way to provide
prosecutors with early warnings so as to allow them to better monitor
questionable cases. The human rights aide to the attorney general then sends
the case to the geographically-assigned prosecutor with a cover letter drawing his
or her attention to the dubious aspects of the police report.[426]
Prosecutor Augusto Rossini, human rights aide to the attorney general, said he
already detected some positive changes in the work of prosecutors on such cases
after the implementation of this relatively new project.[427]
The project is based on a mutual agreement between the two institutions, however,
and nothing prevents the next attorney general or ombudsman from ending it at
any time.

Despite its positive role in fostering accountability, the
São Paulo Police Ombudsman’s Office is also highly limited. It
lacks the teeth and resources to effectively push investigations. “We do
not have any investigatory power at all,” one official at the Ombudsman’s
Office told us.[428] As then-Ombudsman
Antônio Funari told Human Rights Watch in March 2009, “Do not
confuse us with internal affairs. Our authority is moral. We do not have the
resources to issue demands.”[429]

The performance of the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office
bears little resemblance to that of its São Paulo counterpart. First, even
though police violence indicators are higher in Rio across the board, the Rio
office dealt with only 16 homicide cases from 2007 and 2008 while the São Paulo office dealt with 296 homicide allegations in 2008 alone.[430]
Second, the Rio ombudsman told us he thought it was not his role to seek out
cases or conduct studies on police violence; he felt he should only address
what was sent to him.[431]

In the cases it does work on, the Rio Police
Ombudsman’s Office has little impact. For instance, though the office
received four separate complaints regarding homicide and other crimes committed
by the Quitungo militia since 2006, there is little evidence that the
office is focusing attention on the militia or that its efforts have had much
of an impact on the militia’s activities.[432]
In replying to a 2008 letter that protested that militias remained a serious
problem in Campo Grande despite repeated complaints, the Ombudsman’s
Office thoroughly described the highly limited role it envisioned for itself:

It behooves us to inform you that this Police
Ombudsman’s Office forwarded your just complaint to the competent
institutions of the State, trusting in the correct solution that we expect and
complying with the role that the law reserves to the Ombudsmen’s
Offices, which is to serve the citizens well as a channel of communication
with the authorities. We do not have the mandate nor the authority to interfere
directly in the actions of public institutions, even less so to act on our own
initiative in the investigation or punishment of those who might eventually be
found guilty. We will seek to follow the measures undertaken and inform you of
what it is possible for us to obtain.

One potential reason for the sharp difference in the
performance of the ombudsman offices of São Paulo and Rio is the
relative independence of the former compared to the latter. Though Rio police ombudsmen cannot be removed without cause for two years once appointed, they are
selected by the state security secretary, who controls the police.[434]
In São Paulo, the police ombudsmen are selected by the governor from a
list of three names picked by the State Council for the Defense of the Rights
of the Human Person, an institution whose members are 80 percent drawn from
civil society organizations.[435]

Federal Mechanisms

The federal government’s approach to the problem of
widespread police extrajudicial executions in Brazil’s two biggest states
has been defined by its limitations rather than its potential.

Federal bodies have taken some limited but important steps
in pushing for accountability for police extrajudicial executions in Rio and São Paulo. The federal police have assisted the fight against militias in Rio,[436]
and have intervened in limited ways in other cases. In the Complexo do
Alemão case, for instance, the head of the Commission on Torture and Institutional
Violence, Pedro Montenegro, pulled together a team of forensic analysts to
review evidence in the case; the report they produced was decisive in
establishing that executions had occurred.[437] In São Paulo, federal prosecutors were instrumental in gathering and providing public
access to forensic reports that allowed civil society groups to first discern
evidence of police abuses in the follow-up to the May 2006 attacks.

However, the federal attorney general has never once invoked
his constitutional authority to seek to take federal control (federalize)
important police abuse cases from Rio or São Paulo to ensure more
effective investigations and prosecutions. São Paulo human rights group CONECTAS
requested that the investigation and prosecution of the Parque Bristol death
squad killings be federalized, for instance, but the federal attorney general
did not act. The Complexo do Alemão case is another good candidate for
federal intervention since federal security forces were involved in the
operation. Yet so far federal authorities are not involved.

In most cases, federal prosecutors refrain from getting
involved in cases involving abuses by state police officers even where there is
evidence that state authorities are unable or unwilling to carry out serious,
competent investigations.

VIII. Recommendations

The legitimate efforts of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo to curb violence and lawlessness will continue to suffer so long as some
members of their police forces continue to commit unlawful killings. And these unlawful
police killings are almost certain to remain a major problem so long as the
criminal justice system of each state continues to rely so heavily on the
police to police themselves.

Human Rights Watch was encouraged to find that top
prosecutors in both states—including the attorneys
general—recognized the scope and nature of the problem of police abuse
and impunity, and insured us that they were fully committed to finding ways to
address it. We believe that the obstacles that these prosecutors face when it
comes to overseeing police investigators and prosecuting police abuses are
real. However, we also believe these obstacles can be overcome, provided that
the states take concrete measures to do so.

The key measure that both states should pursue is the creation
of permanent units within their respective public prosecutors offices
specialized in police killing cases, allocating
the personnel, resources, and expertise necessary to ensure effective
investigation and prosecute police abuse cases in collaboration with the
legally-assigned natural prosecutor (promotor natural).

Assigning prosecutors to work solely on this issue would
reduce conflicts of interests and create incentives to ensure that adequate
investigations are carried out. Pedro Fortes, a Rio prosecutor who used to work
on intentional homicide cases, identified several benefits to having a
permanent prosecutorial task force on alleged resistance killings by police, among
them the fact that the team would be able to analyze patterns of abuse,
recognize relevant modi operandi, identify bad actors early, and ensure
that investigations were properly conducted. It would also create a public
institution outside the police apparatus where family members of police abuse
victims could go and, hopefully, feel safe testifying and bringing complaints.[438]

Often, where prosecutors have been able to conduct or
closely follow investigations into police killings themselves, significant results
have been achieved. For example, Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos,
a prosecutor in charge of police oversight in connection with two of Rio’s scores of civil police precincts, looked closely at forensic evidence in 20
police killings in the area under his jurisdiction from 2007 through 2008. In
an unprecedented move, Vasconcelos brought charges against 30 military police
officers simultaneously in connection with the cases. São Paulo, too,
contains several positive examples of successful prosecutor-led investigations
of police officers in the Special Action Group for Combating Organized Crime (GAECO)
and GECEP units.

Other positive examples can be found in Brasilia. There, a
police oversight unit in the Prosecutor’s Office of the Federal District
routinely investigates police killing and torture cases directly. Today,the Federal District contains some
areas, like Ceilândia, with high levels of criminal violence yet
relatively low levels of police killings contrasted to places in Rio with comparable crime levels and demographics. Celso Leardini, a former civil police
precinct chief and now the head of the special team of prosecutors that carries
out police oversight in the Federal District said he strongly believes in the
ability of prosecutorial monitoring to prevent police abuse.[439]
In his unit, prosecutors themselves conduct or closely follow all police
killing and torture investigations.[440]

Human Rights Watch asked Leardini—who is also Coordinator of the National Group for the Effective
External Control of Police Activities of the National Council of States
Attorneys—in light of his experience as a civil police precinct
chief and as a prosecutor in charge of police oversight what he felt it would
take to do a similarly thorough oversight job in Rio, with its high rates of
police abuse. He estimated that one prosecutor equipped with two field
investigators, one forensic doctor, and another forensic expert could, with
difficulty, conduct 10 good investigations per month.[441]
This calculation led him to say that, in the case of Rio, the work required “a
task force of 50 or 60 men counting on independent forensic institutes,”
adding, “in an endemic case like Rio de Janeiro, if the investigations
are not done by the MP [State Prosecutor’s Office], you can forget about
it.”[442]

The Rio attorney general readily endorsed the idea of
creating such a group, stating “this is what we want.”[443]
The human rights deputy assistant attorney general for Rio thought that a
special prosecutorial unit designated to review police “resistance”
killings should exist, saying it would be “important.”[444]
The São Paulo attorney general, along with his two chief human rights
advisers, accepted that an action group focused on police violence could exist,
and promised to study the possibility of creating one.[445]
As Eduardo Días de Souza Ferreira, a human rights aide to the São Paulo attorney general, noted, such a group would address the current
“fragmented” nature of police oversight efforts in the office.[446]
Several other state officials concurred that such a group would be valuable.[447]

Given these considerations, Human
Rights Watch recommends that the relevant state authorities take the following
steps to curb police impunity, deter future police abuses, and strengthen
public security in Rio and São Paulo:

I. Establish Special
Prosecutorial Units for Police Killing Cases

To the Attorneys
General of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

The state
prosecutors’ offices of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo should create
permanent specialized prosecutorial teams dedicated to systematically reviewing
and leading investigations into killings by police officers, particularly those
carried out in alleged self-defense. Prosecutors need the proper resources to
do this job, which likely entails strengthening the GAP unit within the Rio
state prosecutor’s office and the relatively small investigatory unit in
the São Paulo state prosecutor’s office. The new special units
should regularly publish reports detailing their performance in individual
cases, in impacting the problem of police violence as a whole, and in serving
as an alternate public channel for complaints against the police.

Institutional
efforts aimed at curbing police criminal gangs need to be strengthened and
prioritized. In Rio de Janeiro, the recently formed prosecutorial
anti-organized crime nucleus should be granted the resources and authority it
needs to fulfill its mandate, and it should regularly publish an accounting of
its performance in order to promote public accountability. In addition, the
attorney general should endorse the creation of a multi-institutional Chamber
for the Repression of Organized Crime, as proposed by the state
legislature’s CPI report on militias. In São Paulo, the push to
combat organized crime within the police forces should include ensuring that
investigations into death squad activities be made a priority within a suitable
prosecutorial special action group, such as GAECO.

State
prosecutors should lead a systematic review of all alleged resistance killings committed
since at least 2003 in areas and/or by units where the data strongly suggests a
high number of executions. The review should focus on gathering evidence of
extrajudicial executions, false rescues, investigatory failures, and instances
of prosecutorial neglect. Where misconduct is found, the agents responsible
should be criminally and administratively sanctioned accordingly. At a minimum,
this review should encompass:

All alleged “resistance”
killings by military police units in São Paulo within the shock troop
command (especially the ROTA), the capital policing command, and the
metropolitan policing command for the period in question.

II. Ensure the Success of
Special Prosecutorial Units

To the Attorney Generals of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

Police cover ups of extrajudicial executions
should be investigated and prosecuted vigorously. Deterring potential cover ups
is a key way of deterring abuses generally. There may be cases in which it is
possible to prove a crime of obstruction of justice—such as procedural
fraud or threat—even if evidence regarding the homicide is harder to
obtain.

To the Governors of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

A team of police investigators should be
detailed to the State Prosecutor’s Offices’ new specialized units
on police killings cases. These police investigators should be selected by and
exclusively answerable to the prosecutors’ offices rather than the normal
police hierarchy.

Police institutions should be instructed to
notify the competent prosecutor (known as the promotor natural) as well
as the human rights prosecutorial officers within the State Prosecutor’s
Office of each police killing case as soon as they first learn of it.

Police
institutions should be instructed to conduct specialized inquiries into possible
procedural fraud in all alleged “resistance” killings in which
shooting victims are delivered dead by police at hospitals. Copies of all
documents regarding such investigations should be regularly forwarded to the relevant
police ombudsman’s office and to state legislative human rights
commissions.

Police
institutions should be instructed to cooperate fully with state prosecutors,
including special units working on police abuse, such as allowing them access
to necessary documentation and evidence without delay and ensuring that they
can promptly conduct interviews with officers implicated in cases as witnesses
or potential suspects.

Protocols on
proper police procedure for dealing with injured police shooting victims at
crime scenes should be studied, reformed, and published. Potential models
include state transportation agency protocols on best practices in responding
to car collision victims. The aforementioned 2009 São Gonçalo
agreement, mandating, inter alia, that police call competent medical
professionals to assist with injured victims, is another potential model. Failures
to abide by the new protocols should be investigated and disciplined. Any
reform should be the product of a truly consultative process, which could be
conducted, for example, by the state legislative human rights commissions.

To the Federal and Regional
Medical Councils

Policies designed to systematically identify, track, document, and report on deliveries
of corpses by the police to hospitals should be adopted and implemented.

Medical personnel involved in the receipt of
bodies from police at hospitals should be trained to ensure that the new
monitoring system is carried out safely and successfully. Personnel should also
receive training in the safeguarding of forensic evidence, including the rule
that the garments of victims of potential homicides should not be discarded.

III. Additional Measures
to Curb Police Abuse and Impunity

To the Governors of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

Police
internal affairs divisions must be ensured greater autonomy and should operate
with greater transparency. The heads of internal affairs divisions should not be
police officers, should be appointed with input from civil society, and should
be removable only for cause. An independent career track should exist for
officers working at internal affairs units. Internal affairs units should
systematically track police violence allegations and publish disaggregated
statistics on the number of complaints received, cases investigated,
investigatory steps taken, and accountability results achieved. Internal
affairs files and initiatives should be regularly made readily available for
full review by state prosecutors and police ombudsman’s offices,
particularly in cases of alleged serious abuse.

To the Security Secretaries of
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

All alleged
resistance killings in which shooting victims are delivered dead by police at
hospitals should be the subject of specialized internal affairs inquiries to
determine whether proper crime scene procedure was followed.

Civil police
internal affairs units should conduct a specialized review of the investigatory
sufficiency of all inquiries into alleged resistance killings. Minimum
investigatory standards must be upheld, such as ensuring documentation of crime
scenes and in-depth immediate interviews of all officers involved in fatal
shootings. The 1991 United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention
and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions provides a
model for investigations of police extrajudicial executions. Flaws and omissions on the part of investigators
should be corrected and misconduct disciplined.

To the Governors and
Legislatures of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

Forensics
institutes should be given effective autonomy, assured a secure appropriate
budget, and granted the safeguards necessary for the maintenance of
independence. They should be removed from the police apparatus and instead
report to a state entity not answerable to the police hierarchy.

Standard
operating procedures detailing specific investigatory steps that must be
undertaken in police shooting cases should be adopted and published; the
process should include meaningful public consultation before the procedures are
finalized.

To the Police Ombudsmen
of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

Attention should be (or continue to be, in
the case of São Paulo) focused on police violence cases, especially
cases of homicide and torture. The ombudsman’s offices should continuously
monitor the prevalence of such serious abuses and the efficacy of police
administrative and criminal investigative bodies in responding to them. The offices
should also keep statistics on criminal charges, convictions, sentencing, and
implementation of sentencing in cases where there is credible evidence of
police abuse.

To
the Attorney General of Brazil

The Federal Prosecutors’ Office should
take a more active role in ensuring that individual rights are respected by
Brazilian state and local police forces. This entails, at a minimum, regularly
seeking to federalize (moving the investigation and prosecution of cases into
the federal justice system) egregious police abuse cases that have failed to
progress at the state investigatory or prosecutorial phases, such as the 2007
Complexo do Alemão case and the São Paulo Parque Bristol death
squad killings from May 2006. If state prosecutors’ offices fail to
create an effective monitoring system for all police killing cases, federal
prosecutors should exercise jurisdiction in key cases, consistent with their
powers under Brazilian law, and conduct thorough investigations, seeking
assistance as appropriate from the Federal Police through the office of the justice
minister.

To
the National Council of Prosecutors’ Offices

The duty of state prosecutors’ offices
to fulfill their task of providing “external control of police
activities” should be the subject of heightened scrutiny. The National Council
should demand periodic public reports from state offices listing their charge
and conviction rates in police abuse cases along with an explanation for the rates.
It should also requisition a sample of alleged resistance cases from states each
year and conduct an evaluation of the performance of prosecutors in the cases, issuing
commendations and calling for disciplinary measures as appropriate. The National
Council should also monitor the performance of the Federal Prosecutors’
Office, requesting periodic public reports regarding state and local police
abuse cases in which federal prosecutors chose to intervene and evaluating
their selection of and performance in such cases.

To the Federal Special Secretariat for Human Rights

The
Secretariat should create a permanent federal forensics team specializing in the
investigation of human rights crimes. The team could conduct direct
examinations or review the performance of state-level forensics investigators,
as occurred in the Complexo do Alemão case.

To the President of Brazil and the National Congress

Brazil’s president should link the disbursement of
federal funds for state programs in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo to
strict benchmarks mandating a sharp reduction in on- and off-duty killings by
police officers, with particular attention to “resistance” killings
by police. The statistics should be made public and be periodically audited by
an independent expert agency.

Federal police
involvement in efforts to counter militias and death squads should be
increased, particularly when and where states are unwilling or unable to
address the problem.

Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Fernando Ribeiro
Delgado, Alan R. and Barbara D. Finberg Fellow in the Americas Division of
Human Rights Watch. Amercias Division researcher Maria Brant and consultant
Maíra Magro also carried out extensive research and made invaluable
contributions to the drafting of the report. The report was edited by Daniel
Wilkinson, deputy director of the Americas Division, Joe Saunders, deputy
program director, Aisling Reidy, senior legal advisor, Nik Steinberg, Americas
Division researcher, and José Miguel Vivanco, director of the Americas Division.
Americas Division associates Kavita Shah and Eva Fortes contributed to
logistics, production, and translation. Invaluable research support was
provided by associate Kavita Shah and Americas Division interns Luiza Athayde
de Araujo, Sergio Garciduenas-Sease, Max Schoening, and Sophia Veltfort.
Forensic analysis was reviewed by Stefan Schmitt, director of the International
Forensic Program at Physicians for Human Rights. Statistical analysis was
reviewed by Patrick Ball, Chief Scientist and Vice-President for Human Rights
Programs at the Benetech Initiative. Input on social science research methods
was provided by Brian Root. Portuguese translation was done by Nadejda Marques,
with the assistance of Celina Beatriz Mendes de Almeida.

Human Rights Watch is grateful to the many
individuals and civil society groups who helped make this report possible,
including Mães da Cinelândia, Rede de Comunidade e Movimentos
contra a Violência, Movimento Moleque, Projeto Legal, Centro de Estudos
de Segurança e Cidadania, Núcleo de Estudos da Violência da
Universidade de São Paulo, Ação dos Cristãos para
Abolição da Tortura, Centro de Defesa da Criança e do
Adolescente - Sapopemba, Conectas Direitos Humanos, and Centro Santo Dias. Human
Rights Watch would especially like to thank Justiça Global and the
Harvard International Human Rights Clinic for their support throughout the
research. Human Rights Watch is responsible for any errors or omissions.

Human Rights Watch is also grateful to the São Paulo
Police Ombudsman’s Office and the Human Rights Commissions of the Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo Sections of the Brazilian Bar Association for their
openness and cooperation. We would also like to thank the range of government
officials for their willingness to meet with us. In Rio, this included the
state attorney general and his human rights aide, the governor, the mayor, the
security secretary, the chief of the civil police, the commander of the
military police, heads of police internal affairs units, and the police ombudsman.
In São Paulo, this included the state attorney general and his human
rights aides, the deputy secretary for public security, top military police
commanders, representatives from the Homicide and Protection of Persons
precinct, heads of police internal affairs units, and the police ombudsman. In
Brasília, this included the national public security secretary, the
national human rights minister, and federal prosecutors specialized in police
oversight.

Finally, Human Rights Watch is deeply grateful to the survivors
of police violence, as well as the relatives of victims and witnesses, who
spoke with us, in some cases despite fears of reprisals.

Note: In bold
are cities or neighborhoods listed in a unanimously approved December 2008
state legislative report as containing militia activity[449] (See
the Abusive Policing and Public Insecurity chapter).

[1] Research
began in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 2006 and 2007. Research trips
in December 2008, March 2009, June 2009, and July 2009 complemented earlier
work. Human Rights Watch also traveled to Brasília in June 2009.

[3]Of these, 5,717 were in Rio
and 4,690 in São Paulo. Institute of Public Security of the Rio de
Janeiro State Secretariat of Security (Instituto de Segurança
Pública da Secretaria de Estado de Segurança do Rio de Janeiro),
“Resumo de Estado do Rio de Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008,” http://urutau.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/200812totalestado.pdf;
São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security (Secretaria de
Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo),
“Estatísticas trimestrais,” 2008,
http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/estatisticas/trimestrais.aspx.

[4]Institute of Public Security of the Rio de
Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de Estado do Rio de
Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008”; São Paulo State
Secretariat of Public Security, “Estatísticas – Total do
Estado de São Paulo,” http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/estatisticas/dados.aspx?id=E.

[18]In 2007 for instance, in Rio, 119 police
officers were killed while off-duty and 32 were killed while on-duty. That same
year in São Paulo, 60 police officers were killed while off-duty and 36
were killed while on-duty. Ibid., p. 23, footnote 39. Institute of Public
Security of the State Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro, “Resumo de Estado do
Rio de Janeiro – Dezembro de 2007,” ; Military Police Internal
Affairs Unit (Corregedoria da Polícia Militar) of the São Paulo
State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares
2008”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit (Corregedoria da Polícia
Civil) of the São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos
por Policiais Civis 2008.”

[28]The duties of the federal police, a relatively
small force, include prevention of interstate and international drug
trafficking, protecting Brazil's borders, and exercising the functions of a
federal judicial police (executing arrest warrants for those indicted on
federal offenses, for example). According to the Brazilian constitution, “the
Federal Police ... is responsible for: I – Investigating crimes against
the public and social order, or against the patrimony, services, or interests
of the Union ... as well as other crimes that have interstate or international
repercussion and need uniform suppression (repressão).” The
Brazilian constitution also establishes that in cases involving gross human
rights violations, the federal attorney general (Procurador Geral da
República) can request the Superior Justice Tribunal (Superior
Tribunal de Justiça) for a transfer of criminal jurisdiction over
the matter to the federal justice system. Ibid., art. 144, para. 1,
and art. 109, para. 5.

[29]The constitution states, “the military
police, corps of military firefighters, auxiliary and reserve forces of the
Military, are subordinate to, along with the civil police, the Governors of the
States, of the Federal District and of the Territories.” Ibid., art. 144,
para. 6.

[30]The constitution states, “the
military police has the duty of patrol policing (policiamento ostensivo)
and of preserving public order.” Under
Brazilian law, except as to military crimes or infractions, persons may only be
arrested if they are caught in the act of committing a crime (em flagrante
delito) or pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a judge. In cases of flagrante
arrests, once the military police detain a suspect they are required to
transport him to the appropriate civil police precinct (delegacia) for
processing. Ibid., art. 5(LXI), and
art. 144, para. 5; Criminal Procedure Code (Código de Processo Penal), arts. 282, 304, 308.

[31]The constitution states, “State Military
Justice is competent to process and judge state military personnel for military
crimes defined by law....” However, according to the Military Criminal
Code, as amended in 1996: “the crimes prescribed in this article, when
intentional, against life, and committed against civilians, will be judged by
civilian courts.” Brazilian constitution, art. 125, para. 4; Military
Criminal Code (Código Penal Militar), art. 9.

[37]
Ibid., art. 10. The same provision gives
investigators 10 days if a suspect has been arrested.

[38]Ibid., art. 10. In practice, the time
limits established by law for the completion of the inquiry are virtually never
met. The cases documented in this report include numerous instances in which
police inquiries dragged for months and even years.

[50]
UDHR, art. 9; ICCPR, art. 9; ACHR, art. 7. Among other sources, the standards
outlined by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention with regard to what
constitutes a violation of this prohibition are instructive. U.N. OHCHR,
“Fact Sheet No. 26, The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,”
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet26en.pdf.

[52]
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment of November 25, 2003, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., (Ser. C) No. 101 (2003), para. 157:
“In this regard, safeguarding the right to life requires conducting an
effective official investigation when there are persons who lost their life as
a result of the use of force by agents of the State.”

[59]
Ibid., secs. IV(B)(2) on “Autopsy,” V(B)(2) on “Laboratory
analysis of skeletal remains,” Annex II on “Postmortem detection of
torture,” and Annex III on “Drawings of parts of human body for
identification of torture.”

[62]
Officially, the number of on-duty police killings in “resistance”
cases totaled 11,010 from 2003 through September 2009, with Rio police killing
7611 people and São Paulo police killing 3399 people. Rio de Janeiro
State Secretariat of Security, “Indicadores de
Criminalidade,” Diário Oficial (2003 a 2008), http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=150;
Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of
Security, “Resumo de Estado do Rio de Janeiro – Trimestre
Móvel – Jul/Ago/Set - 2009,”http://urutau.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/200909totalestado.pdf;
Military Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State Secretariat
of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares (2003
– 2008)”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São
Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Civis (2003
– 2008)”; São Paulo State Secretariat of Public
Security, “Estatísticas
trimestrais,” 2009, http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/estatisticas/trimestrais.aspx.

[63]Stefan Schmitt, the director of the International
Forensic Program at Physicians for Human Rights, reviewed and provided critical
input on the analysis of the forensic issues in this report. Schmitt previously
worked for nine years as a forensic analyst at the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement’s Crime Lab, and has participated in forensic investigations
in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iraq, Liberia,
and Rwanda.

[67]
Patrick Ball, Chief Scientist and Vice-President for Human Rights Programs at
the Benetech Initiative, reviewed and provided critical input on the analysis
of quantitative data in this report. Since 1991, Dr. Ball has designed
information management systems and conducted statistical analysis for
large-scale human rights data projects used by truth commissions,
non-governmental organizations, tribunals and United Nations missions in more
than thirty countries around the world.

[68]
Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of
Security, “Resumo da AISP 15 – Dezembro de 2008,”
http://urutau.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/200812aisp15.pdf.

[69]
This five year period refers to the time from April 1, 2004, to March 31, 2009.
This is the most recent time period for which data is available for South
Africa. São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security,
“Estatísticas trimestrais,” 2009; Military Police Internal
Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security,
“Mortos por Policiais Militares (2004 –
2008)”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State
Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Civis (2004 –
2008)”; Independent Complaints Directorate of the Republic of
South Africa, “Annual Report 2008/09,” p. 49, http://www.icd.gov.za/documents/2009/ICD%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.pdf;
Independent Complaints Directorate of the Republic of South Africa,
“Annual Report 2007/08,” p. 57, http://www.icd.gov.za/documents/2008/icd-annual-%20rpt0708.pdf;
Independent Complaints Directorate, Republic of South Africa: “An
investigation into deaths as a result of police action in KwaZulu-Natal,
Eastern Cape and Gauteng,” 2007,
http://www.icd.gov.za/reports/2008/researchreport2007.pdf, pp. 10-11.

[70]The number may be higher than 17, since we were
unable to examine autopsy records in all cases.

[72]
In one such case, the officer alleged he engaged in hand to hand combat with
this shooting victim. In the other case, the officer alleged he bumped into his
shooting victim on a stairwell during a confrontation. Police Incident Report
(Boletim de Ocorrência), 2103/2006, 3 D.P.-Campos Eliseus, São
Paulo, March 10, 2006 (registro); Police Incident Report (Registro de
Ocorrência) 6685/2007, 38 D.P., Rio de Janeiro, October 11, 2007.

[84]The federal
commission of experts did a specialized analysis on two cases it described as
“illustrative” (the killings of U.J. and O.L.) and found “evidence
of death by summary and arbitrary execution,” noting that, with more
time, the same analysis could be done for the other deaths. Federal
Special Secretariat of Human Rights (Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos
da Presidência da República), “Relatório
Técnico Visita Cooperação Técnica – Rio de
Janeiro (RJ) - Julho de 2007,” October 3, 2007, paras. 11, 45, and discussion
following para. 25.

[101]As
explained further in Chapter 6, “Police Investigations,” internal
affairs units do review each alleged resistance killing in some form, but they
do not seem focused on them and do not appear to study larger patterns:
internal affairs officers could not provide us with estimates regarding the
size of the extrajudicial execution problem or even how many officers had been prosecuted
or disciplined for homicide-related infractions.

[106]The
independent forensic scientist, Professor Ricardo Molina de Figueiredo, made
the following findings as to the 124 cases of police killings registered as
having resulted from shootouts:

1) The majority of the shots
hit the victims in regions of high lethality;

2) A significant part of the
victims have bullet entry wounds with little dispersion, that is, with a small amount
of distance between them; and
3) There is a significant number of shots with a direction ‘from above to
below.’

“In a confrontation situation the three aspects
above are improbable, even if we consider them in isolation. Since they occur,
in many cases, simultaneously, we can assert that there were executions.”
Dr. Ricardo Molina de Figueiredo, “Relatório
Preliminar: Casos Apresentados como Resistência Seguida de Morte,” in
Crimes de Maio (São Paulo: Conselho Estadual de Defesa dos
Direitos da Pessoa Humana, 2007).

One case reviewed by Human Rights Watch that fit this
description was the police killing in Suzano, São Paulo, of an
unidentified man shot four times close to each other in the upper torso with
bullets in a downward trajectory. The officers claimed the man had fled,
turned, fired, and been hit by return fire, all at a distance. No crime scene
inspection was conducted by investigators to try to determine each
person’s position at the time of the shooting or to evaluate the terrain,
both of which could have shed light on the question of the bullet trajectories.
The case was shelved. Police Incident Report (Boletim de Ocorrência),
Protocolo 1238/06, Police Ombudsman, São Paulo, May 15, 2006.

[109]
For instance, Angerami told us, “in the ROTA [São Paulo special
operations military police unit], prior to 1988 it was common to have forged
resistance [cases] that were executions. Now they are doing it again, according
to my colleagues." The routine practice of
extrajudicial execution during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s by the
military police’s Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar (ROTA), a part of
the shock troop contingent, was extensively documented by investigative
journalist Caco Barcellos in his 1992 book, Rota 66: The History of the
Police that Kills. Human Rights Watch interview with Alberto Angerami,
December 1, 2008; Caco Barcellos, Rota 66: A História da
Polícia que Mata (9th ed.), (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2008)
[originally published in 1992 by Editora Globo].

[112]
Our analyses below employed official data for the US, São Paulo, and Rio, from calendar year
2008. For South Africa, all data pertains to “financial year” 2008
to 2009. The “financial year” measurement is used to refer to the
period of time beginning of April one year to the end of March in the
subsequent year; it is a common metric used in South African government data.

The indicators highlighted below were chosen in light
of the work of several police violence experts who have analyzed government
data in the past in attempting to discern evidence of police excessive use of
force. Ignácio Cano, Letalidade da Ação Policial no Rio
de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Estudos da Religião-ISER,
1997); Barcellos, Rota 66: A História da
Polícia que Mata; Paul Chevigny, “Police
Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, Brazil and Argentina,” in M.K.
Huggins (Ed.), Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on
extralegal violence (New York: Praeger, 1991); Human Rights Watch interview
with researcher and former Rio Police Ombudswoman Julita Lemgruber, Rio de
Janeiro, June 1, 2009; Human Rights Watch interview with Ana Paula Miranda,
former head of the Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State
Secretariat of Security (Instituto de Segurança Pública da
Secretaria de Segurança de Estado do Rio de Janeiro), Rio de Janeiro,
December 9, 2008; Human Rights Watch interview with Ana Paula Miranda, Rio de
Janeiro, February 19, 2009.

[113]South
African Police Service, “Crime Situation in South Africa for the
2008-2009 Financial Year,”;Institute of
Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo
de Estado do Rio de Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008”; São Paulo
State Secretariat of Public Security, “Estatísticas – Total
do Estado de São Paulo.”

[114] Official
terminology regarding police killings varies from place to place. In Rio, the
term "accounts of resistance" (autos de resistência) is
used to describe police killings of persons who allegedly resisted arrest. In
São Paulo, the term used for the same phenomenon is police
"resistance followed by death" (resistência seguida de morte)killings. In the U.S., the term is "justifiable homicides by law
enforcement," and is defined as “the killing of a felon by a law
enforcement officer in the line of duty.” In South Africa the term
"deaths as a result of police action" is used for police killings
generally and includes several types of deaths caused by police, including ones
resulting from motor vehicle collisions. Human Rights Watch’s analysis
here refers to police killings in South Africa classified in financial year 2008/2009
as:

1.“a suspect died during the course of a
crime,” (129),

2.“a suspect died during the course of an
escape,” (73),

3.“a suspect died during the course of
investigation,” (53) and

4.“a suspect died during the course of
arrest,” (213).

Thus our analysis excludes police killings in South
Africa classified in financial year 2008/2009 as, “an innocent bystander died
during the commission of a crime,” (12), “an innocent bystander
died during the course of an escape of another,” (20), “domestic
violence related and off-duty deaths,” (39), “negligent handling of
a firearm leading to a death,” (29), and “negligent handling of a
vehicle leading to a death” (44). Independent Complaints Directorate of
the Republic of South Africa, “Annual Report 2008/09,” p.49; “Expanded
Homicide Data” in Uniform Crime Reports, US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), “Crime in the United States - 2008,” Table 14,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_14.html;
Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro
State Secretariat of Security, “Avaliação do
Trabalho Policial nos Registros de Ocorrência e no Inquéritos
Referentes a Homicídios Dolosos Consumados em Áreas de Delegacias
Legais,” p. 43, http://urutau.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/RelatorioPesquisa003.pdf;
Túlio Kahn, “Jornal Folha de S. Paulo: Na
‘encenação’, o sangue é de verdade,”
February 27, 2007,
http://www.ssp.sp.gov.br/home/noticia.aspx?cod_noticia=10198.

[115]Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de Estado do
Rio de Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008.”

[117]
These São Paulo figures do not count the substantial number of police
killings committed while off-duty, some of which have in the past been recorded
in that state as “resistance” killings. In 2002, there were 152
such “resistance” killings off-duty, and in 2003, there were 124.
In 2007 and 2008, there were 36 and 34, respectively. These
“resistance” killings while off-duty from São Paulo have
been kept out of the analysis above in order to maintain the data comparable. Military
Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State Secretariat of
Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares (2002
– 2008)”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São
Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Civis
(2002 – 2008).”

[120]Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de Estado do
Rio de Janeiro – Setembro de 2009.”

[121]It is
worth noting, however, that the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo
do have significantly higher population densities (378.79 and 165.75 persons
per square kilometer, respectively) than the countries of South Africa and the United States (of 39 and 31 persons per square kilometer, respectively). Independent
Complaints Directorate of the Republic of South Africa, “Annual Report
2008/09,” p. 49; Statistics South Africa, “Mid-year population
estimates – 2008,” p.3, http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022008.pdf;
“Expanded Homicide Data” in FBI,
“Crime in the United States - 2008,” Tables 1, 14; Military
Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State Secretariat of
Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares –
2008”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State
Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Civis –
2008”; State System Foundation of Data Analysis
(Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados; SEADE) of
the São Paulo State Secretariat of Economics and Planning (Secretaria de
Economia e Planejamento), “Projeção de
População Residente em 1o de Julho – Total do Estado de
São Paulo – 2008”; SEADE, “Caracterização
do Território – Densidade Demográfica (Habitantes/km2) -
2008”; Institute of Public Security of the
Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de Estado do Rio de
Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008”; Population Division of the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects:
The 2008 Revision (2005 figures),” http://www.learnstuff.com/world-population-resources/.

[122]“Murder”
is the relevant reported category in the United States and South Africa. “Intentional homicides” is the closest analogue in crime
statistics in Rio and São Paulo, since it also does not include
negligent killings. As noted above, under Brazilian criminal law, “the crime is called...intentional when the agent
wanted the result or assumed the risk of producing it,” (Diz-se o crime...doloso, quando o
agente quis o resultado ou assumiu o risco de produzi-lo). Criminal Code, art. 18,
121.

[123]In
addition, the Secretariat of Public Security keeps statistics on how many
people are murdered by police officers outside of alleged confrontations. In 2008, this amounted to a further 121 people. Military
Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State Secretariat of
Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares (2002
– 2008)”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São
Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Civis
(2002 – 2008)”; São Paulo State Secretariat of Public
Security, “Estatísticas
trimestrais,” 2008; Rio de Janeiro State
Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de Estado do Rio de Janeiro –
Dezembro de 2008.”

[125]“Unofficial”
police killings, such as those committed by militias and death squads, are not
counted here as part of the police killing rate, so the already elevated
figures presented here actually may substantially underestimate the
contribution made by police in Rio and Sao Paulo to the overall quantity of
homicides.

[126]These
numbers include arrests “em flagrante” (of persons caught during a
criminal act) as well as persons arrested through warrants. Institute of Public
Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de
Estado
do Rio de Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008”; São Paulo State
Secretariat of Public Security, “Estatísticas
trimestrais,” 2008.

[127]The comparison with the U.S. is used simply to make a
point about police lethality as inferred from the ratio of arrests to kills by
police. We do not here endorse the quantity or legality of the large number of
arrests made in the U.S. “Estimated Number of Arrests” in Uniform
Crime Reports, US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Crime in the
United States - 2008,” Table 29,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_29.html.

[128]
A total of 26 Rio police officers were killed while on-duty in 2008. Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo de Estado do
Rio de Janeiro – Dezembro de 2008.”

[131] A
significant number of police on-duty casualties suffered would also be expected
if many police killings were happening during armed confrontations.

[132]Unfortunately,
the statistics we were able to obtain regarding São Paulo are not disaggregated
by specific police units in the capital or greater metropolitan area, where
most suspicious alleged resistance killings occur. Military Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São
Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais
Militares – 2006-2008”; Civil Police Internal Affairs Unit of the
São Paulo State Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por
Policiais Civis – 2006-2008.”

[133]Among the police, on
the other hand, many more were injured than were killed last year. In 2008, 363
São Paulo military police officers were injured while 19 were killed
on-duty. Military Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State
Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares (2003
– 2008).”

[135]The military police units of the Capital Police
Command, which operates in São Paulo city, killed 151 people and left
108 injured in “resistance” cases in 2008. The military police
units of the Metropolitan Police Command, which operates in greater São Paulo, killed 83 people and left 44 injured in “resistance” cases in
2008. Military Police Internal Affairs Unit of the São Paulo State
Secretariat of Public Security, “Mortos por Policiais Militares –
2008.”

[136]Unfortunately,
Human Rights Watch did not obtain data on Rio de Janeiro, the U.S., or South Africa regarding persons non-fatally injured by police during alleged confrontations
with criminal suspects. Ibid.

[138]Through
an analysis of official statistics in Rio, it is possible to identify where the
highest number of police killings exists and which units are principally
responsible. The Rio government’s Institute for Public Security (ISP)
releases its data according to geographic zones called Areas of Integrated
Public Security (AISPs), each of which corresponds to a territory under the
responsibility of a single military police battalion. This is not to suggest
that only local military police battalions commit killings. In Rio, civil police officers, particularly those affiliated with specialized precincts such
as the civil police’s Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais (CORE)
unit, regularly appear in press reports and government records as those committing
alleged resistance killings. In addition, special military police units, like
the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE),
also account for a portion of police killings. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to infer that the military police battalion responsible for patrolling a given
AISP is typically responsible for the majority of the official police killings
occurring in that zone. Indeed, it is commonly understood that the military
police, not the civil police, commit the majority of official police killings
in alleged “resisting arrest” episodes given the size and nature of
their deployment. And since special military police units are only supposed to
be exceptionally deployed, this leaves local military police battalions as
those probably accounting for the majority of the official police killings in a
given zone over time. Institute of Public Security, Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Relação das AISPs.”

[144]Institute
of Public Security, Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo
da AISP 16 – Zona Norte – Dezembro de 2007,” Instituto de
Segurança Pública, Secretaria de Segurança de Estado do
Rio de Janeiro, http://urutau.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/200712aisp16.pdf.

[145]Colonel
Jardim’s statement that, “the PM [military police] is the best
social insecticide,” was made to the press in April 2008 following a
police operation that had resulting in nine deaths in Vila Cruzeiro. He had
recently been promoted to be commander for all military police forces in the
city of Rio. Malu Toledo, “Nove morrem em ação do BOPE;
colonel diz que PM é ‘o melhor inseticida social,’” Folha
de S. Paulo, April 16, 2008, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u392620.shtml
(accessed on May 11, 2009).

[146]Rio de Janeiro State
Military Police (Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro),
“Novas trocas de Comandos,” February 8, 2008,
http://www.policiamilitar.rj.gov.br/detalhe_noticia.asp?ident=48.

[147]Population
figures for Ceilândia are from 2004, the most recent available from the
Distrito Federal planning authority. Civil Police of the Federal District
(Polícia Civil do Distrito Federal), “Relatório de
Análise Criminal – No. 18, 2008,” Região
Administrativa No. 9 – Ceilândia, January to December (2006/2007), http://www.pcdf.df.gov.br/Upload/PDF/AnaliseCriminalRA/FileUploadAnaliseCriminalPDF9_1.pdf;
Federal District Planning Company (Companhia
de Planejamento do Distrito Federal) of the Government of the Federal District
(Governo do Distrito Federal), “Coletânea de
Informações Socioeconômicas,” Região
Administrativa RA IX Ceilândia, May 2007, p. 15, http://www.codeplan.df.gov.br;
Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of
Security, “Resumo da AISP 16 – Dezembro de
2007.”

[148]Population
figures for Ceilândia are from 2004. Civil Police of the Federal District (Polícia Civil do Distrito Federal), “Relatório de
Análise Criminal – No. 18, 2008.”
Federal District Company of Planning of the Government of the Federal District, “Coletânea de Informações
Socioeconômicas,” p. 15. Institute of Public Security of the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Resumo da AISP 16
– Dezembro de 2007.”

[149]The
prosecutor in charge of police oversight in the Public Prosecutor’s
Office of the Federal District and Territories told us that the gangs faced by
police in the Federal District did not have as many heavy armaments as in Rio.
Human Rights Watch interview with Celso Leardini, head of the Núcleo de
Investigação e Controle Externo da Atividade Policial,
Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios, June
3, 2009.

[157]As
reported in the Folha de São Paulo: “‘[The bodies] were put in two cars, thrown there like
dogs. When they were going to throw Ivan, the last, a little heavier than the
others, the bodies slid and fell on the floor,’ recalls one witness,
reconstituting as follows the dialogue she said she heard between a [military
police] soldier and her superior. ‘Throw that shit there on top, with the
others,’ the superior had responded, pointing to one of the vehicles. The
residents of São Mateus found strange the quickness with which the
police arrived on the scene, the speed with which they removed the bodies and
even washed the sidewalk, which was soaked in blood.” “Testemunhas de chacina acusam
policiais,” Folha de S. Paulo, May 18, 2006; São Paulo Police Ombudsman’s Office, Protocolo 1277/06.

[176]On April 11, 2008, officers in Itapecerica da Serra, a
city neighboring São Paulo’s southwest side, found the headless
tortured body of a man with his hands tied behind his back lying in the brush
beside Avenue Soldado Gilberto Augustinho. Given the missing head, the body
went unidentified and the crime unsolved at the time. A month later, on May 29
and 30, police found two more decapitated bodies with the same characteristics
near the same road. The group thought to be responsible for the murders would
come to be known as the “Highlanders” because of this modus
operandi. In October 2008, two more headless corpses appeared on different days
in the same city bordering São Paulo. However, the day before one such
body was found, witnesses spoke of a military police GM Blazer that had taken Antônio
Carlos da Silva Alves away in custody, a man with a mental disability.
Antônio Carlos was not seen again until family members identified his
remains through a tattoo. His hands and head had been cut off. Relatório de Investigação, Regional Precinct of
Taboão da Serra, São Paulo Civil Police, March 6, 2009.

[179]Civil police investigators said there was “no
indication” that some of the murder victims had criminal records. And
given the suspected role of extortion in the squad’s operation, it
appears that a target might be able to purchase their way out of a death squad
execution. Relatório de
Investigação, Regional Precinct of Taboão da Serra,
São Paulo Civil Police, March 6, 2009.

[180]However, the total number of fatal victims was slightly
higher in 2007 (190) than in 2008 (186), given that 2007 had more mass
killings. One case from the western zone of São Paulo in 2007 had seven
victims. São Paulo Police Ombudsman’s
Office, “Comparativo dos Casos de Autoria Desconhecida, Chacinas e
Execuções, 2006 X 2007 X 2008”; São
Paulo Police Ombudsman’s Office, “Ouvidoria no atendimento à
população.”

[182]Given
that the line between militias and death squads is sometimes blurry, it is also
worth noting the substantial evidence that police-linked death squads have
remained a problem in Rio over the last several years. First, in the course of
tallying complaints regarding militia, researcher Ignácio Cano noted
there were 180 complaints about death squads (“extermination
groups”) received by the hotline Disque Denúncia over 28 months.
Second, the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office received 171 complaints of
death squads in the last decade. The 2005 death squad killing of 29 residents
in a single night by masked officers in the Baixada Fluminense continues to
serves as a chilling reminder of such groups in Rio. In 2007, O Dia reported
that no less than 300 police officers in the Baixada Fluminense were under
investigation by internal affairs for death squad activities. Ignácio
Cano, “Seis por meia dúzia?: Um estudo exploratório do
fenômeno das chamadas ‘milícias’ no Rio de
Janeiro,” in Justiça Global, Segurança tráfico e
milícias no Rio de Janeiro, 2008, p. 56; Police Ombudsman of the Rio de
Janeiro State Secretariat, “Trimester Report of Activities,” Table
III (Tabela III),
http://www.seguranca.rj.gov.br/seseg/site/conteudo/Relat%C3%B3rio120meses-COR.pdf;
Justiça Global, “Impunidade na Baixada,” 2005,
http://www.global.org.br/docs/relatoriobaixada.pdf; Jefferson Machado,
“Grupos de matança já são um batalhão,”
O Dia, December 2, 2007.

[183]There
is no single accepted definition of the term “militia.” For our
purposes, we will use an understanding of the term “militia” based
on researcher Ignácio Cano’s seminal work in a 2008 Justiça
Global study on the subject. The CPI report also referenced Cano in discussing
the militia phenomenon. Cano defined militias as having the following
simultaneous characteristics:

“1. The control of a territory and population in which an
irregular armed group partially inhabits.

2. The, to some degree, coercive character of the control
over the residents of the territory.

3. The motive of
personal profit as the principal motive of the members of these groups.

4. A legitimating
discourse referring to the protection of the residents and the establishment of
order, which, as with all forms of order, guarantees certain rights and
excludes others but permits the creation of rules and expectations for
normalizing conduct.

5. The active and recognized participation of state agents
as members of the groups.”

Ignácio
Cano, “Seis por meia dúzia?” p. 59; Rio de
Janeiro State Legislative Assembly (Assembléia
Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro), “Relatório Final da
Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito Destinada a Investigar a
Ação de Milícias no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro,” approved December 16, 2008, pp. 33-38.

[185]
In eight of the 171 areas, the Parliamentary Investigation Commission
(Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito; CPI) report simply named a
municipality rather than a neighborhood. We count them as neighborhoods
alongside the other 163 neighborhoods listed under the assumption that the lack
of specificity is due to a lack of information rather than a claim that the
entire municipalities in question are militia-dominated. Rio de Janeiro State
Legislative Assembly, “Relatório Final da Comissão
Parlamentar de Inquérito Destinada a Investigar a Ação de
Milícias no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de Janeiro,” pp.
220-228; “Relatório da CPI das milícias é aprovado
por unanimidade na Alerj,” G1, December 6, 2008,
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Rio/0,,MUL925529-5606,00-RELATORIO+DA+CPI+DAS+MILICIAS+E+APROVADO+POR+UNANIMIDADE+NA+ALERJ.html.

[186]
Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly, “Relatório Final da
Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito Destinada a Investigar a
Ação de Milícias no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro,” p. 43.

[192]
The area containing Quitungo is no stranger to police abuses. The community in
question is located in a zone under the responsibility of the 16th
Military Police Battalion, which, as noted above, is among the 10 most violent
in Rio.

[194]
Though A.U. had been shot in the head, the case was initially improperly
registered by the local civil police as a “finding of a body,” and not
as a homicide. Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security Police
Ombudsman’s Office, Protocolo 0033-07, January 15, 2007; Rio de Janeiro
State Secretariat of Security Police Ombudsman’s Office, Protocolo
0147-07, February 9, 2007.

[201]
One complicating factor is the involvement of militias in electoral politics. A
full chapter of the December 2008 legislative report describes, “patterns
of vote concentration for parliamentary candidates compatible with those of an
electoral enclosure, constituted by means of coercion and/or clientalism, in
areas identified by the [Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry] as dominated by
militias.” Investigations into the links of some legislators to militias
have led to arrests, but the broad threat posed to democracy by a potential
resurgence of powerful militias remains. “Electoral enclosure” in Brazil refers to areas in which pressure is unlawfully being placed on voters to vote a
certain way. Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly,
“Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar de
Inquérito Destinada a Investigar a Ação de Milícias
no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de Janeiro,” p. 91; Human Rights
Watch interview with José Mariano Beltrame, Mario Sérgio de Brito
Duarte, and Allan Turnowski, July 31, 2009.

In one case, Human Rights Watch did not obtain the
autopsy page containing the cause of death, though the records did show the
individual was shot in the brain stem (tronco cerebral). Laudo nescroscópico 1100/06, IML de Guarulhos, São
Paulo, May 16, 2006.

[237]
While the removal of clothing prior to an autopsy does not necessarily mean
that the clothes were not otherwise described in the investigation, Human
Rights Watch only confirmed one example of a case in which a victim’s
clothes had been submitted to forensics tests though they had been missing in
the autopsy; São Paulo State Ombudsman’s Office, Protocolo 525/06.

[240]
It was not possible to determine whether the other two victims were wearing
clothing, as the photographs were only of their naked torsos and heads. Processo
14314/2007 and attached photographs, Rio de Janeiro State Section, Brazilian Bar
Association, July 3, 2007 (protocolado).

[250]
Human Rights Watch interview with Preisdent Luiz Fernando Soares Moraes and
former President Márcia Rosa, heads of the Medical Regional Council of
Rio de Janeiro (Conselho Regional de Medicína do Rio de Janeiro), Rio de Janeiro, June 2, 2009.

[251]
Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Henriqui Carlos Gonçalvez, president
of the Medical Regional Council of São Paulo, June 3, 2009.

[257]
The colonel in question was in charge of a community policing program. Human
Rights Watch interview with Deputy Secretary for Public Security Willian
Sampaio de Oliveira, Coordinator for Planning and Analysis Túlio Kahn,
and several top military police colonels, including Davi Nelson Rosolen, São Paulo, June 4, 2009

[266] The witness, a neighbor
of O.E., said that she heard him screaming after police entered his shop. She
also said she witnessed a police officer hold a pistol against his neck, make
him kneel, and curse at him. Inquirição Sumária de E.C., Quartel
do 2º BPMM, February 17, 2005.

[281]The other two friends said they were asleep around the time of
the shot. L.L.’s written record of testimony
(Termo de Depoimento), Procedimento 12.861/2008, Rio de Janeiro State Section, Brazilian Bar Association, May 27, 2008; E.L.’s written record of
testimony (Termo de Depoimento), Procedimento
12.861/2008, Rio de Janeiro State Section, Brazilian
Bar Association, May 27, 2008; V.E.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento), Procedimento 12.861/2008, Rio de Janeiro
State Section, Brazilian Bar Association, May 27, 2008.

[285] L.L.’s written record of testimony (Termo
de Depoimento), Procedimento 12.861/2008, Rio de
Janeiro State Section, Brazilian Bar Association, May
27, 2008; E.L.’s written record of testimony, Procedimento 12.861/2008, Rio de Janeiro
State Section, Brazilian Bar Association, May 27, 2008;
V.E.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento), Procedimento 12.861/2008, Rio de Janeiro State Section, Brazilian Bar Association, May 27, 2008.

[286] V.E.’s written record of testimony (Termo
de Depoimento), Procedimento 12.861/2008, Rio de
Janeiro State Section, Brazilian Bar Association, May
27, 2008.

[295]
Witnesses testified that the two youths were approached in a bar by police
officers who dragged them to the bathroom. The witnesses heard the victims screaming
before seeing them being driven away in a police car. The two boys never went
home, and a week later their bodies were found, buried in a shallow grave in
their town. They had been shot five times each: twice in the head and three
times in the torso. An official ballistic examination found that at least one
shot in each victim had come from the gun of one of the policemen. The police
car driven by the officers on the day of the event recorded that it had covered
a distance in kilometers which was greater than any other police car that night
and incompatible with the two policemen’s account of their activities. It
was later found that they did not have authorization to get away from their
company’s area of radio coverage, as the officers had claimed they did. Additionally,
the police officers said they brought the young men to the police precinct and
liberated them soon after, but three police authorities whom they quoted as
having seen the young men in the precinct directly refuted this allegation. Jury trial branch (Vara do Júri), Comarca de Itanhaém,
Processo-crime nº 02/04, fls. 480, 485, 491, 501, 506, 516, 523, 532, 536;
Institute of Forensics Medicine (Instituto Médico-Legal), Exame de Corpo
de Delito, B.O. 2015/02, Laudo 3375/02; Jury trial branch (Vara do
Júri), Comarca de Itanhaém, Processo-crime nº 02/04, fls.
135-149; Jury trial branch (Vara do Júri), Comarca de Itanhaém,
Processo-crime nº 02/04, fls. 58 (Apenso H) and 525 (Deposition of L.O.); Jury
trial branch (Vara do Júri), Comarca de Itanhaém, Processo-crime
nº 02/04 (Depoimentos de J.G. and L.U.); “Summary of Cases
Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received,” Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executons Philip Alston,
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1,
March 27, 2006, pp. 39-41.

[299]Human Rights Watch
interview with Luciana Leal Junqueira Vieira, judge in the fifth department of
police inquiries in the São Paulo courts, São Paulo, December 15,
2008; Human Rights Watch interview with Carlos Cardoso, former human rights
aide to the state attorney general, São Paulo, December 17, 2008; Human
Rights Watch interview with Augusto Eduardo de Souza Rossini, coordinator of
the Center for Operational Support for the Criminal Prosecutorial Divisions,
and Eduardo Dias de Souza Ferreira, coordinator of the Human Rights Area of the
Center for Operational Support of the Civil and Collective Prosecutorial
Divisions, both human rights advisors to the state attorney general, São
Paulo, March 11, 2009; Human Rights Watch interview with Márcio
Cristino, head of the Special Group on External Control of Police Activities in
the Public Prosecutors’ Office, São Paulo, December 2, 2008.

[329]
Police authorities in São Paulo informed us that the rate of murders
solved by the DHPP was 47 percent, which is above the national average. Human
Rights Watch interview with Guilherme Bueno de Camargo et. al., December 16,
2008.

[340]
Human Rights Watch identified a further four military police officers of the 16th
BPM who, despite involvement in at least three fatal police operations in 2007
and 2008, have remained under the radar since they were not charged by Vasconcelos
and, thus, have only been the subject of shallow case by case investigations.

[350]
Corroborating this last piece of information is the fact that both the
investigating official in question and the officer sharing his long family name
recently switched to the same police precinct in a different part of the city
of Rio. Fearing reprisals, R.A.’s mother asked Human Rights Watch not to
include the officers’ names in this report; Police Incident Report
(Registro de Ocorrência), Delegacia de
Polícia, December 2006 (identifying information withheld at
family’s request); Email correspondence with a civil police precinct
chief and staff, Rio de Janeiro, May 2009.

[351]
Both the military and the civil police have their own internal affairs units in
both states. In addition, in Rio de Janeiro, there exists a General Unified
Internal Affairs (CGU) unit to deal with the most serious cases.

[356]Human Rights Watch interview with the Coordinator
of the Permanent Commission for the Combat of Torture and Institutional
Violence of the federal Special Secretariat of Human Rights Pedro Montenegro,
Brasília, June 3, 2009.

[367]Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General
Fernando Grella Vieira, Coordinator of the
Center for Operational Support for the Criminal Prosecutorial Divisions Augusto
Eduardo de Souza Rossini, and Coordinator of the Human Rights Area of the
Center for Operational Support of the Civil and Collective Prosecutorial
Divisions Eduardo Dias de Souza Ferreira, São Paulo, June 5, 2009; Human
Rights Watch interview with Augusto Eduardo de Souza Rossini and Eduardo Dias
de Souza Ferreira, March 11, 2009; Human
Rights Watch interview with State Legislator and President of the Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry on Militias Marcelo Freixo, Rio de Janeiro, March 23,
2009; Human Rights Watch interview with Carlos
Cardoso, December 17, 2008.

[375]
Various facets of the organizational nature of the Brazilian criminal justice
system make gathering statistics for quantitative analysis extremely difficult
and time-consuming. Perhaps the greatest challenge lies in the fact that a large
quantity of police inquiries are formally archived before ever becoming
full-blown judicial cases, which makes tracking them difficult even though they
have to go through a judge’s hands before being shelved.

[398]
Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly,
“Relatório Final da Comissão Parlamentar de
Inquérito Destinada a Investigar a Ação de Milícias
no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de Janeiro,” approved December 16, 2008.

[399]“Mais de 200 PMs do mesmo
batalhão suspeitos de participar de milícia,” in “RJTV,”
TV Globo, June 17, 2009, http://rjtv.globo.com/Jornalismo/RJTV/0,,MUL1198467-9099,00.html.

[400]
One example is in the work of the Special Action Group for Combatting Organized
Crime (GAECO) in the São Paulo State Prosecutor’s Office. “Aprovada no Órgão Especial a
Reorganização do GAECO,” São Paulo State
Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público do Estado de
São Paulo), August 2008, http://www.mp.sp.gov.br/portal/page/portal/noticias/publicacao_noticias/2008/Agosto/Aprovada%20no%20%C3%93rg%C3%A3o%20Especial%20a%20reorganiza%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20do%20GAECO;
Ato Normativo nº 549-PGJ-CPJ, São Paulo State Prosecutor’s
Office (Ministério Público do Estado de São Paulo), August
27, 2008; Luiz Flávio Gomes, “Princípio do promotor
natural,” August 6, 2008,
http://www.lfg.com.br/public_html/article.php?story=2008080114085859.

[415]
Increasingly, that unit is becoming functionally part of the State Prosecutor’s
Office. In June 2009, the paycheck for those officers finally started being
drawn from state prosecutorial coffers. Human Rights Watch interview with
Cláudio Soares Lopes and Leonardo Cháves, July 30, 2009.

[429]
Without the power to subpoena documents and witnesses or to conduct regular
field inquiries, the Ombudsman’s Office is essentially at the mercy of
the information provided to it. Furthermore, the very fact that so many of the
thousands of complaints to the Ombudsman fail to lead to criminal charges is a
testament to the office’s limited authority. For instance, though the
Ombudsman’s Office had transmitted six suspicious homicide cases
allegedly involving, in some form, the Military Police Officer Paschoal Lima do
Santos dating back to 1999, it was not until 2008 that the officer in question
(nicknamed “the Monster,” according to the Ombudsman’s
Office) faced the consequences of a genuine criminal investigation following
his alleged killing of Military Police Coronel José Hermínio
Rodrigues. Human Rights Watch interview with Antônio
Funari Filho, March 11, 2009; Email communication from São Paulo
Police Ombudsman’s aide Benê Rodrigues to Human Rights Watch, July
14, 2009.

[448]
Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Indicadores
de Criminalidade,” Diário Oficial (January - December
2008); Institute of Public Security, Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat of Security, “Relação das AISPs.”

[449]
Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly, “Relatório
Final da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito Destinada a Investigar
a Ação de Milícias no Âmbito do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro,” pp. 220-228.