THE favorite
Arminian dogma, that God's will concerning the salvation of individuals
is conditioned on His simple foresight of their improvement of their common
grace, in genuine faith, repentance, and holy obedience, is necessary to
the coherency of their system. If grace is invincible, and all true faith,
&c., are its fruits, then God's purpose as to working them must be
absolute in this sense. If grace is only synergistic, and the sinner's
free will alone decides the question of resisting it, or co-operating with
it, then, of course, the sovereignty of decision, in this matter, is in
the creature, and not in God; and He must be guided in His purpose by what
it is foreseen the creature will choose to do. Thus we reach, by a corollary
from the Arminian doctrine of "Calling," that which in time is first, the
nature of the Divine purpose about it. The student is here referred to
the Lecture on the Decree. But as the subject is so illustrative of the
two theories of redemption, the Arminian and the orthodox, I shall not
hesitate to discuss the same thing again, and to reproduce some of the
same ideas.

THE RESULT
MAY BE CONDITIONED, AND NOT THE DECREE

And let
me begin by reminding you of that plain distinction, by the neglect of
which, Arminians get all the plausibility of their view. It is one thing
to say that, in the Divine will, the result purposed is conditioned on
the presence of its means; another thing to say that, God's purpose about
it is also conditioned or dependent on the presence of its means. The former
is true, the latter false. And this, because the presence of the means
is itself efficaciously included in this same Divine purpose. Thus, a believer's
salvation is doubtless dependent on his repentance; in the sense that,
if he does not repent, he will not be saved. But God's purpose to save
him is not dependent on his choosing to repent; for one of the things which
God's purpose efficaciously determines is, that this believer shall have
grace to repent. Remember, also, that when we say God's election is not
dependent on the believer's foreseen faith, &c., we do not represent
the Divine purpose as a motiveless caprice. It is a resolve founded most
rationally, doubtless, on the best of reasons--only, the superior faith
and penitence of that man were not, a priori among them; because had not
God already determined, from some better reasons unknown to us, that man
would never have had any faith or repentance to foresee. And this is a
perfect demonstration, as well as a Scriptural one. The Arminian opinion
makes an effect the cause of its own cause. And that our faith, &c.,
are effects of our calling and election, see Rom. 8:29; Eph. 1:4, 5; 2
Thes. 2:13; 1 Cor. 4:7; Jno. 15:16.

(b). But
to this I may add the same idea in substance, which I used against Common
Sufficient Grace: That, in fact, differences are made, in the temperaments
and characters, opportunities and privileges of individuals and nations,
which practically result in the death of some in sin. Thus: what practical
opportunity, humanly speaking, had the man born in Tahiti, in the 18th
century, for redemption through Christ? Now the Arminian himself admits
an election of races or nations to such privilege, which is sovereign.
Does not this imply a similar disposal of the fate of individuals? Can
an infinite understanding fail to comprehend the individuals, in disposing
of the destiny of the mass? But, under this head especially, I remark:
the time of every man's death is decided by a sovereign Providence. But
by determining this sovereignly, God very often practically decides the
man's eternal destiny. Much more obvious is this, in the case of infants.
According to Arminians, all that die in infancy are saved. So, then, God's
purpose to end their mortal life in infancy is His purpose to save them.
But this purpose cannot be formed from any foresight of their faith or
repentance; because they have none to foresee, being savedwithout
them.

IF FORESEEN,
FAITH MUST BE CERTAIN

(c). God's
foresight of believers' faith and repentance implies the certainty, or
"moral necessity " of these acts, just as much as a sovereign decree. For
that which is certainly foreseen must be certain. The only evasion from
this is the absurdity of Adam Clarke, that God chooses not to foreknow
certain things, or the impiety of the Socinians, that He cannot foreknow
some things. On both, we may remark, that if this faith and repentance
are not actually foreknown, they cannot be the bases of any resolve on
God's part.

IMMUTABLE
DECREE CANNOT BE CONDITIONED ON A MUTABLE CAUSE, SCRIPTURE

(d) That
any purposes of God should depend on the acts of a creature having an indeterminate,
contingent will, such as Arminian describes, is incompatible with their
immutability and eternity. But all His decrees are such. See Ps.33:11;
2 Tim. 2.19; Eph. 1:4; Is. 46:10. In a word, this doctrine places the sovereignty
in the creature, instead of God, and makes Him wait on His own servant.
It is disparaging to God.

Last:
This very purpose of individual election to salvation is often declared
to be uncaused by any foreseen good in us. See Matt. 11:26; Rom. 9:11-16;
11:5-6, etc.

TEXTS
SEEMING TO EXPRESS A CONDITIONED PURPOSE

But Arminians
cite many passages, in which they assert, God's resolve as to what He shall
do to men is conditioned on their good or bad conduct. They are such as
1 Sam. 13:13; Ps. 81.13-14; Luke 7:30; Ezek. 18:21, etc.; Luke 19:42. Our
opponents here make an obvious confusion of things, which should be distinguished.
When God preceptively reveals a connection between two alternative lines
of conduct, and their respective results, as established by His law or
promise, he does not at all reveal anything thereby, as to what He purposes
with reference to permitting or procuring the exercise of that conduct
by man. Of course, it does not imply that His purpose on this point is
contingent to Him, or that the consequent results were uncertain to Him.
We have seen that many of the results decreed by God were dependent on
means which man employed; but that God's resolve was not dependent, because
it secretly embraced their performance of those instrumental acts also.
But the proof that the Arminians misconstrue those Scripture instances,
is this: That the Bible itself contains many instances of these conditional
threats and promises, and expressions of compassion, where yet the result
of them is expressly foretold. If expressly predicted, they must have been
predetermined. See, then, Is. 1:19, 20, compared with 7:17-20. And, more
striking yet, Acts 27:23-25, with 31.

EVASION
ATTEMPTED FROM ROMANS 9:11

Rom. 9:11-18,
is absolutely conclusive against conditional election. The only evasion
by which the Arminian can escape its force, is, that this passage teaches
only a national election of Israel and Edom, represented in their patriarchs,
Jacob and Esau, to the outward privileges of the Gospel. We reply, as before,
that Jacob and Esau certainly represented themselves also, so that here
are two cases of unconditional predestination. But Paul's scope shows that
the idea is false: for that scope is to explain, how, on his doctrine of
justification by grace, many members of Israel were lost, notwithstanding
equal outward privileges. And in answering this question, the Apostle evidently
dismisses the corporate or collective, in order to consider the individual
relation to God's plan and purpose. See the verses 8, 15, 24. That the
election was not merely to privileges is clearly proved by the allusion
of verse 8, compared with verses 4, 21, 24.

CALVINISTIC
VIEW AGREEABLE TO THE TRUE NATURE OF THE WILL

2. I am
now to show that the Calvinistic scheme is consistent, and the Arminian
inconsistent, with the philosophical theory of the will and free agency.
Let me here refer you to Lecture 11, where the true doctrine of the will
is stated and defended, and request you, if your mastery of the views there
given is not perfect, to return and make it so, before proceeding. While
I shall not repeat the arguments, the definition of the true doctrine is
so important (and has so often been imperfectly made by Calvinists), that
I shall take the liberty to restate it.

TRUE THEORY
OF THE WILL STATED

The Arminian
says that free-agency consists in the self-determining power of the will,
as a distinct faculty in the soul. The Calvinist says, it consists in the
self-determining power of the soul. An Arminian says an agent is only free,
when he has power to choose as the will may determine itself either way,
irrespective of the stronger motive. The Calvinist says that an agent is
free, when he has power to act as his own will chooses. The Arminian says
that in order to be free, the agent must be exempt from the efficient influence
of his own motives; the Calvinist, that he must be exempt from co-action,
or external constraint; The Arminian says, that in order to be free, the
agent must always be capable of having a volition uncaused. The Calvinist
says that if an agent has a volition uncaused, he cannot possibly be free
therein, because that volition would be wholly irrational; the agent would
therein be simply a brute. Every free, rational, responsible volition is
such, precisely because it is caused i.e. by the agent's own motives; the
rational agent is morally judged for his volitions according to their motives,
or causes.

MOTIVE
WHAT?

But when
we ask: What is the motive of a rational volition, we must make that distinction
which all Arminians, and many Calvinists heedlessly overlook between motive
and inducement. The object offered to the soul as an inducement to choose
is not the cause, the motive of the choice; but only the occasion. The
true efficient cause is something of the soul's own, something subjective;
namely, the soul's own appetency according to his prevalent, subjective
disposition. The volition is not efficaciously caused by the inducement
or object which appeals, but by the disposition which is appealed to. Thus,
the causative spring of a free agent's action is within, not without him;
according to the testimony of our consciousness. (The theory which makes
the objective inducement the true cause of volition, is from that old,
mischievous, sensualistic psychology, which has always been such a curse
to theology). But then, this inward or subjective spring of action is not
lawless; it is not indeterminate; if it were, the agent would have neither
rationality nor character; and its action would be absolutely blind and
brutish. This subjective spring has a law of its own activity--that is
to say, its self-action is of a determinate character (of one sort or another).
And that character is what is meant by the radical habitus, or natural
disposition of the agent. And this subjective disposition is what gives
uniform quality to that series of acts, by which common sense estimates
the character of an agent. (And this, as we saw, was a sufficient proof
of our doctrine; that otherwise, the exhibition of determinate character
by a free agent, would be impossible). God is an excellent Agent, because
He has holy original disposition. Satan is a wicked agent, because he has
an unholy disposition, etc.

DISPOSITION
WHAT?

Now, this
habitus or disposition of soul is not by any means always absolutely simple;
it is a complex of certain active principles, with mental habitudes proceeding
therefrom, and modified by outward circumstances. With reference to some
sorts of outward inducements, these active principles may act with less
uniformity and determinateness; with reference to others, with more. Here,
modifying outward influences may change the direction of the principles.
The avaricious man is sometimes prompted to generous volitions, for instance.
But our common sense recognizes this truth: that the more, original and
primary of those active principles constituting a being's disposition or
habitus, are perfectly determinate and uniform in their action. For instance:
no being, when happiness and suffering are the alternatives, is ever prompted
by his own disposition, to choose the suffering for its own sake; no being
is ever prompted, applause or reproach being equally in its reach, to prefer
the reproach to the applause for its own sake. And last: this disposition,
while never the effect of specific acts of volition (being always a priori
thereto, and cause of them) is spontaneous; that is, in exercising the
disposition, both in consideration and choice, the being is self-prompted.
When arguing against the Pelagian sophism, that man could not be responsible
for his disposition, because it is " involuntary," I showed you the ambiguity
wrapped up in that word. Of course, anything which, like disposition, precedes
volition, cannot be voluntary in the sense of proceeding out of a volition;
what goes before of course does not follow after the same thing. But the
question is, "whether disposition is self-prompted." There is a true sense
in which we intuitively know that a man ought not to be made responsible
for what is "involuntary," viz.; for what happens against his will. But
does any man's own disposition subsist against his will? If it did it would
not be his own. There is here a fact of common sense, which is very strangely
overlooked; that a man may most freely prefer what is natural to him, and
in that sense his prior to his volition choosing it. Let a simple instance
serve. Here is a young gentleman to whom nature has given beautiful and
silky black hair. He, himself, thinks it very pretty, and altogether prefers
it. Does he not thereby give us as clear, and as free an expression of
his taste in hair, as though he had selected a black wig? So, were he to
purchase hair dye to change his comely locks to a 'carroty red,' we should
regard him as evincing very bad taste. But I ask, if we saw another whom
nature had endowed with 'carroty red hair,' glorying in it with pride and
preference, we should doubtless esteem him guilty of precisely the same
bad taste, and precisely as free therein as the other. But the color of
his hair was determined by nature, not by his original selection. Now,
my question is: must we not judge the moral preference just as free in
the parallel case, as the aesthetic? I presume that every reflecting mind
will give an affirmative answer. If, for instance, a wicked man made you
the victim of his extortion, or his malice, you would not think it any
palliation to be told by him that he was naturally covetous or malignant,
nor would you be satisfied by the plea, that this evil disposition was
not at first introduced into his soul by his personal act of soul; while
yet he confessed that he was entirely content with it and cherished it
with a thorough preference. In fine: whether the moral agent is free in
entertaining his connate disposition, may be determined by a very plain
test. Does any other agent compel him to feel it, or does he feel it of
himself ? The obvious answer discloses this fact; that disposition is the
most intimate function of our self-hood, and this, whether connate or self-induced.

THIS THEORY
OBVIOUS. CALVINISM IN HARMONY WITH IT

Is not
this now the psychology of common sense and consciousness? Its mere statement
is sufficiently evincive of its truth. But you have seen a number of arguments
by which it is demonstrated, and the rival theory reduced to absurdity.
Now, our assertion is, that the Calvinistic doctrine of effectual calling
is agreeable to these facts of our free-agency, and the Arminian inconsistent
with them.

GRACE
CANNOT PRODUCE AN EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN HOLINESS AND SIN

(a.) First,
the equilibrium of will, to which Arminians suppose the gospel restores
all sinners, through common sufficient grace, would be an unnatural and
absurd state of soul, if it existed. You will remember that the Wesleyans
(the Arminian school which we meet) admit that man lost equilibrium of
will in the fall; but say that it is restored through Christ; and that
this state is necessary to make man truly free and responsible in choosing
the Savior. But we have shown that such a state is impossible for an active
agent, and irrational. So far as it existed, it would only show the creature's
action irrational, like that of the beasts. Hence, the evangelical choice
arising in such a state would be as motiveless, as reasonless, and therefore,
as devoid of right moral character, as the act of a man walking in his
sleep. And, to retort the Arminian's favorite conclusion, all the so-called
gracious states of penitence, &c., growing out of that choice, must
be devoid of right moral quality, how can those exercises of soul have
that quality? Only as they are voluntary, and prompted by right moral motives.
But as we have seen, motive is subjective; so that the action of soul cannot
acquire right moral quality until it is prompted by right moral disposition.
Hence, if that common sufficient grace were anything at all, it would be
the grace of moral renovation; all who had it would be regenerate.

THE NATURAL
WILL DECISIVELY BENT TO CARNALITY

(b.) Second:
We have seen that the notion of a moral agent without determinate, subjective
moral character, of some sort, is absurd. The radical, ruling habitus has
some decisive bent of its own, some way or other. Is not this simply to
say that disposition is disposed? The question of fact then arises, which
is the bent or determinate direction, which man's natural disposition has,
touching spiritual things? Is it for, or against it? Or, as a question
of fact, is the disposition of mankind naturally, and uniformly. either
way? Or, are some men one way disposed by nature, and some the other, as
to this object? The answer is, that they are all naturally disposed, in
the main, the same way, and that, against the spiritual claims of Christ
and God. What are these claims? That the sinner shall choose the holy will
of God over his own, and His favor over sensual, earthly, and sinful joys
in all their forms. Nothing less than this is evangelical repentance and
obedience. Now note, we do not say that no men ever choose any formal act
of obedience by nature. Nor, that no man ever desires (what he conceives
to be) future blessedness by nature. Nor, that every natural man is as
much bent on all forms of rebellion, as every other. But we assert, as
a matter of fact, that all naturally prefer self-will to God's holy will,
and earthly, sensual, and sinful joys (in some forms) to God's favor and
communion; that this is the original, fundamental, spontaneous disposition
of all; and that in all essential alternatives between self and God, the
disposition is, in the natural man, absolutely determinate and certain.
If this is true, then the unconverted man without sovereign grace is equally
certain to choose carnally, and equally a free agent in choosing so.

PROVED
BY CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE

But that
such is the determinate disposition of every natural man, is obvious both
from experience and from Scripture. Every renewed man, in reviewing his
own purposes, is conscious that, before regeneration, self-will was, as
against God, absolutely dominant in all his feelings and purposes; of which
no stronger test can be imagined than this conscious fact; that the very
best religious impulses to which his soul could be spurred by remorse or
alarm, were but modifications of self-will, (self-righteousness.) Every
true Christian looks back to the time when he was absolutely incompetent
to find, or even to imagine, any spontaneous good or joy in anything except
carnality; and the only apprehension it was possible for him to have of
God's service, in looking forward to the time when, he supposed, the fear
of hell would compel him to undertake it, was of a constraint and a sacrifice.
So, when we look without, while we see a good many in the state of nature,
partially practicing many secular virtues, and even rendering to God some
self-righteous regards, we see none preferring God's will and favor to
self-will and earth. All regard such a choice as an evil per se; all shrink
from it obstinately; all do so under inducements to embrace it which reasonably
ought to be immense and overwhelming. The experimental evidence, that this
carnality is the original and determinate law of their disposition, is
as complete as that which shows the desire of happiness is a law of their
disposition. And all this remains true of sinners under the gospel, of
sinners enlightened, of sinners convicted and awakened by the Holy Ghost
in His common operations; which is a complete, practical proof that there
is not any such sufficient grace, common to all as brings their wills into
equilibrium about evangelical good. For those are just the elements which
the Arminians name, as making up that grace: and we see that where they
are, still there is no equilibrium, but the old, spontaneous, native bent,
obstinately dominant still.

PROVED
BY SCRIPTURE

The decisiveness
of that disposition is also asserted in Scripture in the strongest possible
terms. All men are the "servants of sin," John. 8:34; Rom. 6:20; 2 Pet.
1.19. They are "sold under sin." Rom. 7:14. They are "in the bond of iniquity."
Acts 8:23. They are "dead in sins." Eph.2.1. They are "blind;" yea, "blindness"
itself. Eph. 4:18. Their "hearts are stony." Ezek. 36:26, They are "impotent"
for evangelical good 2 Cor. 3:5; John. 15:5; Rom. 5:6; Matt. 7:18; 12:34;
John. 6:44. "The carnal mind is enmity, and cannot be subject to the law
of God." Rom. 8:7. Surely these, with the multitude of similar testimonies,
are enough to prove against all ingenious glosses, that, our view of man's
disposition is true. But if man's free-agency is misdirected by such active
principles as these, original, uniform, absolutely decisive, it is folly
to suppose that the mighty revolution to holiness can originate in that
free-agency; it must originate without, in almighty grace.

INABILITY
DOES NOT SUPERSEDE RESPONSIBILITY

Nor is
it hard for the mind which has comprehended this philosophy of common sense
and experience, to solve the current Arminian objection; that the man in
such a state of will cannot be responsible or blameworthy for his continued
impenitency. This "inability of will" does not supersede either free-agency
or responsibility.

INABILITY
DEFINED

There
is here an obvious distinction from that external coaction, which the reason
and conscience of every man recognizes as a different state, which would
supersede responsibility. The Calvinists of the school of Jonathan Edwards
make frequent use of the terms, "moral inability," "natural inability,"
to express that plain, old distinction. Turrettin teaches us that they
are not new. In his Locus, 10, que. 4, section 39, 40, you will find some
very sensible remarks, which show that this pair of terms is utterly ambiguous
and inappropriate, however good the meaning of the Calvinists who used
them. I never employ them. That state which they attempt to describe as
"moral inability," our Confession more accurately calls, loss of all ability
of will." (Ch. 9 section 3). It should be remarked here, that in this phrase,
and in many similar ones of our Confession, the word "will" is used in
a sense more comprehensive than the specific faculty of choosing. It means
the "conative powers," (so called by Hamilton,) including with that specific
function, the whole active power of soul. The "inability," then, which
we impute to the natural man, and which does not supersede responsibility,
while it does make his voluntary continuance in impenitence absolutely
certain, and his turning of himself to true holiness impossible, is a very
distinct thing from that physical coaction, and that natural lack of essential
faculties, either of which would be inconsistent with moral obligation.
It is thus defined in Hodge's outlines: "Ability consists in the power
of the agent to change his own subjective state, to make himself prefer
what he does not prefer, and to act in a given case in opposition to the
co-existent desires and preferences of the agent's own heart." I will close
with a statement of the distinction, which I uttered under very responsible
circumstances. "All intelligent Calvinists understand very well, that "
inability" consists not in the extinction of any of the powers which constituted
man the creature he was before Adam's fall, and which made his essence
as a religious being; but in the thorough moral perversion of them all.
The soul's essence is not destroyed by the fall; if it were, in any part,
man's responsibility would be to that extent modified. But all his faculties
and susceptibilities now have a decisive and uniform, a native and universal,
a perpetual and total moral perversion, by reason of the utter revolt of
his will from God and holiness, to self-will and sin; such that it is impossible
for him, in his own free will, to choose spiritual good for its own sake."

REGENERATION
DOES NOT VIOLATE, BUT PERFECTS FREE-AGENCY

(c) Regeneration,
correspondingly, does not constrain a man to will against his dispositions;
but it renews the dispositions themselves. It reverse the morbid and perverse
bias of the will. It rectifies the action of all faculties and affections,
previously perverted by that bias. God's people are "willing in the day
of His power." Ps. 110:3. "He worketh in them both to will and to do of
His good pleasure." Phil. 2.13. In that believers now form holy volitions
at the prompting of their own subjective principles, unconstrained by force,
they are precisely as free as when, before, they spontaneously formed sinful
volitions at the prompting of their opposite evil principles. But in that
the action of intellect and desire and conscience is now rectified, purified,
ennobled, by the divine renovation, the believer is more free than he was
before. "He cannot sin, because the living and incorruptible seed" of which
he is born again "liveth and abideth in him." Thus, regeneration, though
almighty, does not infringe free-agency, but perfects it.

OBJECTION
SOLVED

The standing
Arminian objection is, that man cannot be praise or blame-worthy, for what
does not proceed from his own free-will. Hence, if he does not primarily
choose a new heart, but it is wrought in him by another, he has no more
moral credit, either for the change or its consequences, than for the native
color of his hair. This objection is, as you have seen, of a Pelagian source.
By the same argument Adam could have had no concreated righteousness; but
we saw that the denial of it to him was absurd. By the same reasoning God
Himself could have no moral credit for His holy volitions; for He never
chose a righteousness, having been eternally and necessarily righteous.
We might reply, also, that the new and holy state is chosen by the regenerate
man, for his will is as free and self-moved, when renovated in preferring
his own renovation, as it ever was in sinners.

THIS BECAUSE
THE SPIRIT MOULDS DISPOSITION A PRIORI TO THE WILL

To sum
up, then: The quickening touch of the Holy Ghost operates, not to contravene
any of the free actings of the will; but to mould dispositions which lie
back of it. Second: all the subsequent right volitions of the regenerate
soul are in view of inducements rationally presented to it. The Spirit
acts, not across man's nature, but according to its better law. Third:
the propensities by which the renewed volitions are determined are now
noble, not ignoble, harmonious, not confused and hostile; and rational,
not unreasonable. Man is most truly free when he has his soul most freely
subjected to God's holy will. See those illustrious passages in John 8:36;
2 Cor. 3:17; Rom. 8:21. Since this blessed work is like the free-agency
which it reinstates, one wholly unique among the actions of God, and essentially
different from all physical effects, it cannot receive any adequate illustration.
Any parallel attempted, from either material or animal causes, would be
incomplete. If, for instance, I were to say that the carnal man "in the
bonds of iniquity," is like a wretch, who is hindered from walking in the
paths of his duty and safety by some incubus that crushes his strength,
I should use a false analogy: for the incubus is external: carnality is
internal: an evil state qualifying the will itself. But this erroneous
parallel may serve us so far; the fortunate subject of effectual calling
has no more occasion to complain of violence done to his free-agency, than
that wretch would, when a deliverer came and rolled the abhorred load off
his body, restoring his limbs to the blessed freedom of motion, which might
carry him away from the death that threatened him. You must learn to think
of the almighty grace put forth in effectual calling, as reparative only;
not violative. Augustine calls it a Delectatio victrix. It is a secret,
omnipotent, silent, beneficent work of God, as gentle, yet powerful, as
that which restored the vital spark to the corpse of Lazarus. Such are
all God's beneficent actions, from the launching of the worlds in their
orbits, to the germination of the seed in the soil.