Crete

III: The Decision to Withdraw 5 Brigade

III: The Decision to Withdraw 5 Brigade

At Creforce HQ and Division the hours passed anxiously on
22 May while the commanders waited for firm news of the counterattack and tried to weigh up the significance of the reports that
reached them. By the middle of the afternoon it had become
sufficiently clear that the attacking battalions had failed to establish
themselves on their objectives. It was obvious to General Freyberg
that the enemy was pouring in reinforcements of men and material
and ‘quickly building up a formidable force.’

The vital question was whether we could attack and dislodge the enemy
from the Maleme Aerodrome area…. The enemy had absolute air
superiority; not only could he bomb any movement but he could call upon
about 400 fighter ground-straffers with cannon guns which would, and in
fact did, prevent any movement during the hours of daylight. We had
counter-attacked by night and succeeded, but our success had been temporary
only as we were bombed off again as soon as it was daylight. On the other
hand the possession of Maleme landing grounds was vital….

But if we had to regain Maleme and if we could not make the
necessary moves by day, any counter-attack must be again by night.
And if it was not too late it must be the coming night.

What forces were available? Some reserve must be kept in
hand in case of failure, and whichever force was to be employed for
the counter-attack must be capable of reaching the scene that night.
In practice, the only troops available were 5 Brigade which, however
weary, was on the spot; 18 and 2/7 Battalions of 4 Brigade; and
1 Welch. For 10 Brigade was already fully engaged, 2/8 Battalion
had an important part in the line and, even if it could have been
relieved quickly enough, was only two companies strong.

At 5 p.m. Freyberg called a conference and gave his orders for a
fresh counter-attack. Fourth Brigade was to be brought forward
and apparently 5 Brigade was also to take part, though the main
thrust would presumably have had to come from 18 Battalion
and 2/7 Battalion.

But the opportunity was now lost and the future belonged to the
enemy. When Puttick—who favoured a further attack by 5 Brigade
—returned to Division he found that the position had altered for
the worse. There was ‘considerable enemy movement’ on 10
Brigade front and ‘the road between 4 and 5 Inf Bde HQs was
commanded by an enemy detachment including a MG.’1 From
Division he went to 4 Brigade HQ, where a Bren carrier was
standing by to take him on to Platanias. But at 4 Brigade HQ he
learnt of ‘a strong enemy attack against GALATAS from the direction
of the Prison, while enemy movement from South to NW of galatas

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indicated the probability of important enemy forces attempting to
cut the canea–maleme road behind or East of 5 Inf Bde. This
road had always been commanded by enemy MG and mortar fire
on several occasions.’1

These were important considerations: an enemy breakthrough
either north to the main road or north-east through Galatas would
have made the situation of 5 Brigade untenable; to commit further
forces west of Platanias would involve the risk of having them also
cut off along with 5 Brigade. Finally, Brigadier Hargest—no doubt
in a discussion initiated by telephone or wireless from 4 Brigade HQ
—‘represented that his troops had been severely attacked, were
considerably exhausted, and certainly not fit to make a further
attack.’2

The sequel shows that Hargest underrated at this stage the
stamina and spirit of his battalions. The operations of 23 Battalion
on 25, 27 and 28 May, those of 28 (Maori) Battalion on 26, 27 and
28 May, and the conduct of 21 Battalion throughout, sufficiently
show that the troops were more than ready to do all that could be
asked of them. And this is to select only the more conspicuous
instances.

None the less Puttick, who now turned against the idea of
further attack, was probably right in doing so. The enemy strength
at Maleme was great enough for such an attack to have little
chance of success even if every possible reinforcement had been
contributed. There was still a chance, however slender, but to have
pursued it would have been little better than gambling and failure
would probably have destroyed any hope of orderly withdrawal.

Accordingly, Puttick got into touch with Freyberg by telephone
and discussed the new situation, urging that 5 Brigade should be
withdrawn from the exposed position. It was clear to Freyberg
that such a move would mean a sacrifice of territory unlikely to
be regained. But to replace 5 Brigade with 18 and 2/7 Battalions
was not worth attempting. For what the five battalions now on the
Maleme front could not hold could hardly be held by two.

In effect, then, to withdraw 5 Brigade was to accept the loss of
Maleme. The third crisis of the battle had been reached—the first
being the assault on Maleme on 20 May and the second the failure
of the counter-attack. And the second and the third were both
consequences of the first.

There seemed no help for it, however, and Freyberg told
Puttick to discuss the situation at Divisional HQ with Brigadier
Stewart who would have authority to decide on the action to be

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taken. Puttick, therefore, instead of going on to 5 Brigade,
returned to Division. There, at 9 p.m.,1 he and Stewart met and
decided to withdraw 5 Brigade, Brigadier Hargest's view as
expressed on the telephone no doubt being a powerful consideration.
And indeed it is clear from other sources that by now Hargest
saw the situation more darkly. Lieutenant-Colonel Gentry ‘had
R/T conversations with Brig Hargest during the evening, though
I cannot remember now what was said except that he was
pessimistic.’2 And if, as seems likely, the time 2107 hours is right,
and the time 1107 wrong, for an entry in 5 Brigade war diary
which reports Hargest as telling Division by wireless that ‘they
should withdraw that night’, we get a further glimpse of the
circumstances in which a decision was taken—a decision which as
Stewart now comments ‘virtually amounted to accepting the loss of
Crete.'3 Nor, all things considered, is it easy to see what other
decision was possible.

A warning order was sent by wireless to 5 Brigade at 10.30 p.m.
‘Prepare withdraw tonight 22/23 May 28 Battalion to old posn
remainder in rear of 28 Battalion details later. 32 vehicles being
forwarded Strutt4 as rd clear. Sending you all spare trucks and at
least 10 3 ton lorries salvage all possible.'5

The final orders for the withdrawal were worked out in detail
by Gentry by 12.15 a.m. on 23 May and sent forward to all brigades
concerned by special despatch rider. They ran:

Estimated enemy has 5 bns with heavy mortars and some motor
cyclists vicinity MALEME aerodrome. An attack on 10 Bde front this
afternoon by two enemy coys was repulsed with heavy loss.

Aust Bde came under comd Div 2200 hrs tonight.

5 Bde will withdraw night 22–23 May to defensive posn along coast
between former posn held by 28 Bn and North and South line through
046572.

20 Bn and 22 Bn come under comd 4 Bde on arrival both moving
to posn occupied by 20 Bn on 21 May. 20 Bn taking over from 2/7
Aust Bn who reverts to comd Aust Bde on completion of handover.

10 Bde will move right flank fwd to hold former FDLs including 047572
and hill 046559.

7 Fd Coy and 19 Army Tp Coy will move to area of sq 0656 coming
under comd 10 Bde on arrival.

10 Bde will supply guides to meet these parties on the main road.

5 Fd Amb will move to area South of rd junc 077563.

Arty to be in depth in infantry localities about squares 0356 and
0456.

Comd 5 Bde may move one Bn to area SE of 28 Bn provided that
area between 28 Bn and eastern boundary adequately held.

All moves to be completed before daylight if possible.

32 vehicles are being supplied for CRA. Two motor ambulances and
one 3 ton lorry for wounded. All other spare trucks and lorries available
being forwarded.1

The effect of the most important paragraphs in this order may
be briefly summarised. Fifth Brigade's new front line was to be
forward of Platanias and its battalions were to be disposed along
the main coast road to link up with the slightly modified line of
10 Brigade. Fourth Brigade was to regain 20 Battalion and take
over 22 Battalion, which should thus get a chance to carry out the
reorganisation it so badly needed.

The advantages of the plan were that the line was shortened,
the safety of the line of communication secured, and the junction
between Group West and Colonel Heidrich's force, if it was to
be made at all, would have to be made by means of a long detour
to the south. Moreover, Puttick would have the advantage of
holding a single front. The shortcomings of the plan are equally
plain. It meant that the enemy could now build up without interference even from our artillery and therefore must inevitably become
strong enough in time to force a continuation of the withdrawal.