The national outrage because of the decision of the National Authority of Environmental Licenses (ANLA) to grant the company HUPECOL a licence to exploit an oil block in the Special Management Area of La Macarena (AMEN), which forced the national government to subsequently revoke it, demonstrates the validity and the urgency of profoundly addressing the debate on the economic model that we, Colombians, want for our country.

That the economic model is not in discussion has been a reiterative government's argument whenever the Peace Delegation of the FARC-EP has raised at the negotiation Table the relevance of the topic to the content of the Agenda, which in two parts of the preamble reads: “Economic development with social justice and harmony with the environment, is a guarantee of peace and progress"; and "Social development with equity and welfare, including the big majorities, allows to grow as a country”.

La Macarena, Quimbo, Santurbán, Ranchería, Bruno, Van Der Hammen, Marmato, are a sample of what it means to continue the neoliberal economic model that the government refuses to discuss and which threatens to erase in a few decades priceless natural resources, seriously compromising the future of coming generations. Moreover, it is now common to hear the government's assertion that peace will have a marked accent in the territories; which judging by the facts, translates into a vision of territorial peace consisting on the cessation of armed confrontation to multiply business opportunities and increase profits of the multinationals and their local partners. On the contrary, our vision of territorial peace arises from the historical necessity of redeeming territories from the abandonment and backwardness caused by the long armed conflict.

Their residents are, overwhelmingly, settlers violently forced to go to the jungles which need to be opened by ax and machete. Our vision of the territory, on the contrary, goes beyond the simple geographical space with its natural resources, and incorporates, as an essential aspect, the communities with their complex network of social relations of production, distribution, consumption and exchange; their forms of relationship with nature of which they are an inseparable part; their world view, their culture. Its articulation (or isolation) with other territories and communities, with the whole nation and the world.

And it is precisely in the territories of the conflict, where historically the FARC-EP has settled, viewed in the already mentioned manner, where the FARC-EP fighters aspire to develop the process of social, economic and political reintegration once the abandonment of weapons is done, as it would be agreed in the peace treaty. This vision contained in the proposals referred to point 3. End of Conflict - which we left for consideration to the government since December 2015 - includes the creation of Special Territories of Peace.

The proposals state that under the signing of the peace treaty, the Special Territories in addition to the benefits resulting from agreements such as the normalization of land property; the construction of social infrastructure: roads, bridges, aqueducts, energy; the access to credit for technical and professional assistance for food production; as well as assistance in health and education; well, in addition to that, we say, the territories should enjoy special economic measures to encourage the formation of cooperatives of all kinds; benefits for companies that build their physical plants in those territories, or that employ local labor or establish agreements for trade and productive chain with such cooperatives.

In parallel, these territories should be prioritized within plans of decontamination from explosives and voluntary replacement of illicit crops; within special programs to protect the environment and preserve natural resources; as well as campaigns for reforestation. The Peace Territories, welcoming veterans of the insurgency, the Armed Forces and the paramilitaries, will be decisive factor in the process of national reconciliation, through social integration programmes with the communities. And in the context of a new culture of peace, judges could be created for citizen social and welfare, responsible for solving conflicts starting from conciliation.

In these territories, those who are sanctioned by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace will pay reparative sanctions. As we see, the idea of peace territories is aimed at cementing the true reconciliation of the Colombian family; and at laying the groundwork for what should be a democratic conception of the territories. Only from this type of conception of the territory, valuable natural resources that are the heritage of all Colombians can be safe from the voracity of transnational capital.

For this reason, we believe that the Special Management Area of La Macarena should be the first Territory of Peace to be created in Colombia. Only communities that inhabit the Special Management Area of La Macarena and the fighters who have harbored for years in her womb really know the natural treasures that this unique region on the planet contains; therefore, no one better to protect and care for this heritage.

Given the barrage of news regarding the possibility of a bilateral ceasefire before signing the final agreement, we consider it necessary to make some clarifications, since we noted a number of inaccuracies, both in the statements made by President Santos and by the chief negotiator of the government, as well as in press releases, which are all contributing to confuse rather than bringing closer the possibility to achieve that necessary measure.

The first thing to remember is that since March, the Technical Subcommission, comprising senior officers of the Armed Forces and guerrilla commanders in charge of addressing the issue of a bilateral and definitive cease-fire and the abandonment of weapons, has been working uninterruptedly and carefully.

During these seven months, the Subcommission has worked on the construction of the text of the agreement with its annexes and protocols, grouped into seven chapters that cover the following topics: Introduction, monitoring and verification, rules that govern the ceasefire , security, logistics, concentration of troops and abandonment of weapons. Topics that concern both parties alike, but which take different forms in each case and on which we have exchanged proposals, prepared joint drafts, and set methods for their discussion either during the plenary of the Subcommission or in work groups.

As is only logical, in the Subcommission as well as at the Conversation Table, a basic principle is bilateralism. This is why necessarily the construction of the texts and the decision-making involves consensus. We should not ever forget that this is a negotiation between equal parts and not a process of surrender.

It is necessary to note that the mandate of the Subcommission refers to the cease-fire that will take place when the final agreement is signed. This makes it different from any other form of ceasefire that may be eventually agreed between the parties before the final agreement. To put these two - clearly different - situations at the same level can only be due to ignorance on the subject or the clear intention of creating confusion among public opinion and put pressure on the other party, which is unacceptable.

During the three years of talks, the FARC has declared five unilateral ceasefires during electoral processes and two more as gestures of de-escalation, including the one currently in force and the unilateral indefinite ceasefire of December 21, 2015, which failed because of the systematic attacks by the security forces against the guerrillas in truce, killing more than 30 fighters, which led to an escalation of the war that threatened the continuation of the process.

Such ceasefires were clearly motivated by humanitarian reasons and have aimed at saving lives, and also political reasons, seeking to create an appropriate environment for the talks. This is why the recent proposal by President Santos to condition an eventual bilateral ceasefire to the agreement on one of the Agenda points, is incomprehensible.

Nor do we understand that it is intended to condition an eventual bilateral ceasefire to an alleged concentration of the guerrillas, which is an issue that, if we carefully analyze the chapters of the agreement being build in the Technical Subcommission, does not appear anywhere.

Much less do we understand why they want to impose unilaterally a monitoring and verification mechanism. Like everyone in the country knows, in the agreement entitled ?Expedite in Havana and De-escalate in Colombia?, the parties agreed to invite a representative of the Secretary General of the UN and one of the Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR, to accompany the deliberations of the Technical Subcommission on the issue of monitoring and verification, for which Mr. Jean Arnault and Jose Bayardi were appointed respectively. The Subcommission has met twice with them, but never defined which agencies or entities may be part of an eventual monitoring and verification mechanism; something that must be defined by the parties at the Conversation Table.

Therefore, we don?t see why we should talk about requesting a mandate from the Security Council of the UN for the establishment of the mechanism for monitoring and verification of an eventual ceasefire, as noted by President Santos, in a new attempt to impose unilateral decisions which violate the guiding principle of bilateralism.

Finally, if there is real political will from the government to reach a bilateral ceasefire before signing a final agreement, it is not necessary to concentrate the guerrillas in barns; all it would take is President Santos - in his capacity as Commander of the Armed Forces - to order his troops to suspend the operations conducted in the areas against the guerrillas in truce; because as it is recognized throughout the country, including by the delegation of Congress with whom we met yesterday, the FARC-EP is fulfilling its commitment to its unilateral cease-fire hundred percent.

We can only welcome President Santos' decision to suspend the aerial spraying with glyphosate. A sound if belated decision.

The open debate that followed the decision is positive as well, as it involves various social and political sectors, institutions and personalities from different spheres of national life, in an exercise of enriching discussion, around one of the big problems of the country: the existence of illicit crops and drug policy.

For some time, the FARC has maintained a position contrary to the military treatment that has been given to the problem of illicit crops by the state and governments. In our view, and basing ourselves on our knowledge of the reality of the regions where these crops are grown, we have argued that it is a clear socio-economic phenomenon. Therefore, the solution to this problem should essentially contain economic and social measures.

Although growers and consumers are the weakest link in the drug trafficking chain, drug policies have always focused on them; totally contrary to logic. Of course the governments and states know that; the thing is that the interests of the ruling elites in Colombia and the United States, which is where they design these policies, are different from the interests of Colombian and American ordinary people. The interest of the elites is business - and drug trafficking is one if the juiciest of the world - including fumigation and everything else that surrounds these drug policies.

But the fight against drug trafficking is also an effective pretext of American geopolitics to justify its interventions, but that is a matter that is beyond the limitations of this article.

If we really want to end drug trafficking, we should legalize consumption in order to deactivate the ram which raises business profits; but that is not the issue we want to discuss here either.

However, beyond refuting the fragile arguments of those who have been announcing the apocalypse as a result of the suspension of fumigation, what we really want is to formulate a proposal that puts us on the road to the ultimate solution of the problem; because we wouldn?t win anything if, as some suggest, we stopped using glyphosate to replace it with another poison.

Having already signed a partial agreement on item 4 of the Agenda that favors substitution of illicit crops with assessment of the communities, why not start its implementation through a pilot project, guided by the Table and with support and advice from the international community. It should be developed in a region or a municipality and could be supplemented simultaneously with another humanitarian agreement for the decontamination of explosives in the same area?

Isn't this a golden opportunity for the parties to demonstrate with facts our unwavering decision to move towards the end of the conflict?

Could there be a greater demonstration of the will of the parties to work for the de-escalation of the conflict, to develop plans like this together?

Isn't this a good way to defeat skepticism about the real possibilities of peace with social justice and regional development?

The proposal of the inter-agency committee of the judicial branch, composed of the Prosecutor and the Presidents of the high courts, to convene a constituent assembly dealing with the reform of Justice, provoked a series of reactions for and against the initiative.

The country knows well the profound crisis in which this branch of public power is immersed. Crisis that is common to all institutions, as evidenced by the fact that not a week goes by when a corruption scandal erupts at one of the institutions of the State. Part of the same crisis is the permanent confrontations between state branches, like the one between the judicial and executive bodies, and the own continuation of the armed conflict that the Constitution of 1991 failed to resolve, despite the advances it meant in matters of rights.

We, the FARC-EP, have been holding the thesis of the need for a National Constituent Assembly as a necessary step on the path for a political settlement of the conflict.

Three main arguments we have held in this regard: the constituent would be the scenario for resolving the so-called caveats, which are subjects of the agenda on which no agreement has been reached with the Government and because of its importance, may become a serious obstacle to the signing of the final agreement. Among others, on the agrarian topic, it was left pending, for example, the matters regarding the large estates, the foreign ownership of land and the extractive economic model. On the issue of political participation we have pending the definitions of the democratic restructuring of the State and the political reform; the democratization of the electoral political system and the popular elections of the supervisory bodies (Attorney General, Comptroller, Attorney and Ombudsman). On the fourth point of the agenda, one of the caveats was the suspension of fumigations with glyphosate that President Santos, for the benefit of all the people, decided to suspend today, as a result of the scientific research that shows the irreparable damage that this spraying causes to human and animal life, and to the environment.

The second argument that we have held in favor of the constituent, is that it gives the agreements the indelible stamp of the sovereign will of the people, the only true guarantee to avoid that in the future, the irrationalities of the ruling government of the day could ignore what was agreed upon.

The third and most important is that the constituent opens the possibility to adapt the road map of the country to the new situation arising from the agreements. It is not any light event in the life of a society, the termination of such a prolonged and traumatic conflict as the one we Colombians have suffered. Thus, the National Constituent Assembly is presented as a great opportunity for all sectors that today make up the Colombia of the 21st century, to sit down and do what we were never able to do because of the successive wars that we have faced throughout history: to design among all a social pact that gathers us and commits us to the future of the nation. That is the true lasting peace treaty that we need.

On the part of those opposed to the idea, it is argued that the constituent assembly could reject the peace agreements, which would constitute a risk even for the FARC; they add that the far right pro-Uribe forces could take over that scenario causing a regression in the matters of rights; but fundamentally they express their fear that the assembly covered with full powers, overflows in a reformist outburst.

A political agreement with all sectors, without any kind of exclusion, which opens the way to this call and simultaneously determine its composition, scope and boundaries, is the solution to these fears. The truth is, that as time goes by, the need for this scenario as the best formula is becoming more evident, so that together we find the path to national reconciliation and reconstruction of the homeland; having as a framework, a new Constitution that reflects the interests of all sectors who today make up the Colombian nation.

Through digital media we have known the statements of the National CTI director, Julián Quintana, related to the fate of your son Andrés Mejía, who ensures the following: "We denounce that many sources, demobilized fighters and people who have some kind of relationship with the guerrillas, said they have seen Andrés in the ranks of the guerrillas. That is, he is under custody. We reiterate the call we made to the FARC to please release him or give us some sign of life."

The same report states: "Andrés Felipe's father, Alvaro Mejía, said he was willing to travel to Havana to talk with delegates of the peace talks and "beg for information about his child." "Specifically", states the article, "he wants to talk to Carlos Antonio Lozada, leader of the FARC who commands that area".

We are very much wanting to help restore calm in your family; but unfortunately the above information is not true. We are sure, without any room for doubt, that there isn't the slightest possibility that Andr?s Felipe is held by the FARC-EP.

Undoubtedly, the Prosecution investigators and other State agencies know about the unreliability of the information obtained thanks to rewards or testimonies of demobilized fighters eager for personal benefits, even at the expense of the suffering of others.

As a parent, I am no stranger to the pain and the distress you and Mrs. Blanca Ruby are suffering; so I ask you to accept my solidarity, extending it to Andr?s Felipe's brothers, other relatives and friends.

We express our readiness to receive you in Havana, if you think a personal meeting could be helpful.

With regards,

Carlos Antonio Lozada.Member of the Secretariat of the FARC-EP.

CTI: Technical Investigation Team is part of the Office of the Attorney General of Colombia

The presence of a plural number of guerrilla Comandantes in Havana, who will integrate the technical commission, is an unprecedented fact that will bring together representatives of the insurgency and active military, with the common purpose of developing recommendations for the two parties related to item 3 of the Agenda, on issues of bilateral ceasefire and abandonment of arms, is undoubtedly an event of singular political importance, result of the progress that has been made. But it is also a clear sign of the commitment of the FARC-EP to the process, a step forward for peace with social justice in Colombia.

This means a bit of fresh air amid a turbulent political atmosphere, caused by the constant attacks of the extreme right against the Peace Talks in Havana, spurred in part by the pusillanimous attitude of the government. This administration hasn't been able to defend, from the start and with the necessary determination, its main and almost only accomplishment of its first 4 years in office, due to its ambivalent stance on a political solution to the conflict.

The importance of the topics to be discussed and the composition of the commission are creating great expectations, given that the progress on the construction of agreements on one of the crucial items of the Agenda will depend on the outcome of its work.

With regard to the FARC-EP, we got to this point in the process convinced of the real possibility of reaching agreements on these sub-points, taking into account the wilingness expressed by both parties, which in our case was ratified by the decision to take away from the scenarios of war a considerable number of Comandantes and cadres, to devote their efforts to the construction of proposals in order to make feasible a bilateral cease-fire and the abandonment of weapons, within a feasible period of time. This is something that, in our view, could take as a starting point some partial agreements for the de-escalation of the confrontationt, until achieving an armistice between the parties, as a prelude to the end of the armed conflict; which should lead all Colombians to the possibility of resolving our differences through politics, without resorting to arms.

Not an easy task, if we consider the complexity of the issues that still need to be discussed and the number of obstacles to be overcome, until we achieve a final agreement on all the items of the Agenda; definitive agreements that should provide the structural bases on which peace with full and real democracy, with sovereignty and social justice, must be build.

The face to face meeting of insurgent Comandantes and active military officers, to work on a common purpose while the confrontation goes on, is a clear sign of progress of the peace talks, which must convene the most active and broadest possible support of all Colombians, in order to create a compact group which, with its strength and force, will isolate and defeat the militarist ultra-right-wing, grouped under Uribe. Only social mobilization of the majority of the population that aspires to a Colombia in peace will be able to impose itself upon the powerful interests and government hesitation.