Before
the Court is the civil action initiated by Plaintiff, William
Dempsie, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action
will be dismissed.

I.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

Plaintiff
is incarcerated at the Kentucky State Reformatory. In the
document initiating this action (DN 1), he states that he is
requesting “sovereign citizenship immunity.”
Included in this document is a paragraph under the heading
“Hold-Harmless Agreement” in which Plaintiff
states: “William Dempsie being the legal court debtor,
do hereby hold harmless one William Dempsie from any and all
legal law liability, obligations, warrants, summons, fines,
fees, imprisonment, penalty, costs, or whatever may be held
against William Dempsie for whatever reason and in whatever
states he may be in.” The document also has a section
marked “Notice to Rescind” wherein Plaintiff
declares that “the title owner legal name of William
Dempsie is and shall be outlawed for any use by
anybody” from July 28, 2017, until Plaintiff's
death or “until title owner releases it by written
notice.” The document also asserts that “[n]o
part of this legal title owner's name may be reproduced,
in any retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any
means electronic, mechanical, photo copy, recording, or
otherwise, without the prior written permission from the
legal title owner.”

Plaintiff
also filed what the Court considers to be an amended
complaint (DN 14) on a civil complaint form. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“A party may amend its pleading
once as a matter of course within . . . 21 days of serving
it.”) That amended complaint names as Defendants the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Kentucky Department of
Corrections. He lists as the bases for jurisdiction the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and
Seventeenth Amendments. He states: “False arrest in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. False imprisonment by the Kentucky
Department of Correction.” In the relief section of the
amended complaint, he requests only: “Sovereign
Citizenship Immunity or Diversity of Citizenship and Deport
from United States to Africa to live only.”

II.
ANALYSIS

When a
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A
claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se
pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall,454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

With
regard to Plaintiff's amended complaint, Congress has
explicitly provided a remedy for constitutional violations
brought against state and local officials and local units of
government in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Thomas v.
Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated
on other grounds, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989), the Sixth
Circuit held that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy
for constitutional claims brought against state and local
officials and local units of government. Therefore, the Court
construes Plaintiff's claims under the constitutional
amendments listed in his amended complaint as being brought
under § 1983. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992);
Henderson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 918 F.Supp. 204,
208 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).

Plaintiff's
amended complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim
because he seeks release from state custody. A § 1983
action is not the proper remedy for a state prisoner who is
challenging the fact or length of his custody. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). “[W]hen a
state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of
his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at
500. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Heck and
its progeny “taken together, indicate that a state
prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief) . . . if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
81-82 (2005).

A
favorable ruling on Plaintiff's claim that he was falsely
arrested and imprisoned would necessarily imply the
invalidity of Plaintiff's conviction and sentence.
Therefore, Plaintiff's amended complaint is barred by
Heck. See Smithhart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951,
952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (stating that
“Heck bars [the plaintiffs] claims
that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and
brought unfounded criminal charges against him” and
that the plaintiff could “challenge the validity of his
arrest, prosecution and conviction only by writ of habeas
corpus”)[1]

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;III.
...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.