maandag 26 januari 2015

An argument for a world-for-us epistemology

That the world appears exhaustively mathematizable, can be cashed out as argument for the claim that we only have access to the-world-for-us. Let me explain. Mathematics can be applied succesfully to the world. But why is this in fact the case? Why is the world so perfectly mathematizable? This asks for some kind of explanation. But how to explain this? On metaphysical realism, there does not seem to be a straightforward explanation (although some philosophers, such as Craig, have opted for a theistic solution). However, on a world-for-us epistemology the almost perfect applicability of mathematics to reality is no surprise. For if mathematics is just extended rigorous thought (which seems plausible to me), then it is no wonder at all that the world as it is thought by us (i.e., the-world-for-us) is inherently mathematical. In fact, on an epistemology according to which we can only access the-world-for-us the successful applicability of mathematics is simply something one would expect. Therefore it seems to me that the fact that the world appears exhaustively mathematizable increases the likelihood of a world-for-us epistemology. Clearly, it is what Meillassoux has dubbed 'correlationism' in his much discussed book After Finitude.