"Although it is currently unknown what triggered the "tactical
development" along the Afghan-Pakistan border on Nov. 26, given recent
events in the area it is likely that the aerial destruction of the
remote Pakistani outposts was prompted by either the movement of Taliban
fighters between Kunar and Mohmand or by artillery salvos emanating
from Mohmand, or both."

And it's equally true cats with zero affinities for Taliban, al Qaeda or the Haqqi Networkwill be totally dissed and resentfully resent, violently even, having their nation state assailed with Drones Gone Wild and air power from abroad.Against this backdrop--Pakistan careening from one crisis to the next
and the Land of the Pure - Great Satan hook up at lowest level of suck available so far - - the quiz is - was NATO set up?

Reports suggest the Taliban may have deliberately tried to provoke a
cross-border firefight that would set back the fragile menage à trois l'guerre betwixt Great Satan, NATO and Pak. See, insurgency warfare is kinda hit and run - and it's hurtfully unhelpfull if the insurgents have a spot to run to after the hit

Pakistan remains a safe haven for insurgents, which makes military victory almost
impossible. "Slamabad is also unwilling to allow coalition forces to
root out the Taliban and foreign fighters because they may, one day, come in handy. The strategic rationale for supporting the Taliban - to have a sympathetic, radically "Slamist neighbor on its western flank - is an inescapable fact of geography.

If Pakistan should effectively cease all cooperation with Great Satan and
ISAF in allowing transit through Pakistan, it would shut off a critical
supply route in the winter, and one for which there is no good
alternative. The Northern route is barely possible, but it would take
months to find out just how much capacity is really available, and even
under the best conditions, the capacity would be inadequate and the lead
times would seriously affect both the campaign and aid efforts in 2012.

Pakistan needs aid, however, and at least a minimal face of good
relations with her largest patron. It seems likely that this crisis will get papered
over with an ISAF apology, a bribe in the form of better aid flows,
and some kind of smokescreen about better liaisons. In the process,
however, the NATO will face even less prospects that Pakistan will really
crackdown on insurgent groups in the border area, or stop seeing Afghanistan as an area where it competes with India, and which is useful for strategic depth in some future war with India.

There will be a new façade, but the fundamental differences in
strategic perspective will remain. A largely vacuous set of new pledges
and promises in the coming conference in Bonn will not affect the
reality that Pakistan now acts on the basis that the ISAF
forces allies will be gone at the end of 2014, and it must now serve its
own interests in keeping ties to the Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatayer.

Like many other regional states - and many states outside the region -
Pakistan will talk about new efforts at regional cooperation and
helping Afghanistan, but it will seek to create a zone of influence
along its borders. It will do what it can to use any talks between the
Afghan government and the insurgents to its own advantage, and to try to
push the Afghan government into closer ties to Pakistan and away from
the US. It will try again to reach out to China
as a substitute for US aid - although China is unlikely to be much more
forthcoming than in the past. It will ensure that any remaining US
advisory presence is narrowly constrained in ways that serve the
Pakistani military, and place even more limits on US intelligence and
use of UCAVs.

This will not cripple the US transition effort, but it will further
undercut it. It will make reaching any kind of stable outcome in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan as the US and ISAF withdraw their forces even
more doubtful. It will also send a message to Russia, China, the Central Asian states, India, and Iran
that they must do what they can to buffer themselves against the coming
cuts in US and ISAF forces, spending in the region, and aid to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. There will be more talk of a regional
solution, aid pledges, and enduring support, but the reality will be
very different. Every state will act to its own advantage and pursue
its own view of its narrow self-interests.

This will make Afghanistan's "transition" even more difficult to do
major without US and ISAF forces and anything like the present level of
spending and aid even more difficult, and create even more problems for Free World allies in getting the legislative support and
funds they need. It also will isolate Pakistan more, make the tensions
between its civil government and military worse, and reduce outside aid.
It will also mean that even if - as seems most likely - Pakistan does
reopen its supply routes to the US and ISAF, relations will remain so
tense that new incidents and crises in US and Pakistani relations are
inevitable.

This will undermine the already uncertain chances America can
actually achieve any stable benefits from the war after 2014 - either
in Afghanistan or Pakistan

wHoA!

h0t!

~hEy Y"all! DoN"t MiSs GsGf~!

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