*1
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Clemente, J.),
entered July 6, 2005 in Albany County, which, in a
proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed the petition.

Petitioner
claims membership in the Shinnecock Indian Nation and is the
proprietor of the Shinnecock Smoke Shop, which is located on
the Shinnecock Indian Reservation in the Town of Southampton, Suffolk
County. Petitioner asserts that two of his credit card vendors
refused to process his customers' credit card purchases after receiving
letters from respondent stating that petitioner, along with certain other
cigarette sellers, engaged in direct shipment of cigarettes to customers
in violation of Public Health Law § 1399-ll.
After respondent declined petitioner's request to ?withdraw?
any assertions made to his credit card vendors that he
had violated New York law, petitioner commenced this CPLR article
78 proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that Public
Health Law § 1399-ll
is invalid as applied to him. Petitioner maintains that as
a member of the Shinnecock Tribe, he enjoys a free
trade guarantee pursuant to the 1664 Treaty of Fort Albany
between certain Indians and the colony of New York, and
that respondent violated this guarantee. Supreme Court dismissed the petition
in its entirety and petitioner now appeals. Because we conclude
that petitioner lacks standing to bring this proceeding, we affirm.

To
establish standing, a petitioner ?must
show ?injury
in fact,?
meaning that [petitioner] will actually be harmed by the challenged
administrative action?
and that the injury ?fall[s]
within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be
promoted or protected by the statutory provisions under which the
agency has acted?
(New
York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello,
2 NY3d 207, 211 [2004]; see
Society
of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk,
77 N.Y.2d 761, 772-773 [1991] ). Here, it cannot be
said that petitioner suffered an injury attributable to respondent's actions.
In contacting petitioner's credit card companies, respondent recognized that credit
card companies have long-standing policies prohibiting the use of their
cards for illegal transactions and encouraged those vendors to stop
processing transactions that are not in compliance with Public Health
Law § 1399-ll.
Respondent threatened no legal action against the credit card companies
if they chose not to terminate their relationships with such
vendors. Under these circumstances, the actions taken by the credit
card companies represent nothing more than the companies' voluntary adherence
to their own policies and procedures and, as such, cannot
be ascribed to any administrative act performed by respondent. Inasmuch
as any alleged injury to petitioner resulted from the independent
actions of third parties, he fails to demonstrate that he
was ?actually
...
harmed by the challenged administrative action?
and, thus, he cannot meet the first prong of the
test for standing (New
York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, supra
at 211).

*2
Moreover, the treaty provision under which petitioner seeks to sue
involves a free trade guarantee that is, if applicable here
at all, reserved to the Shinnecock Tribe rather than to
individual tribal members. The Tribe did not sue, however, and
petitioner has not sued on behalf of the Tribe or
shown that it has authorized this proceeding. Accordingly, he lacks
standing to invoke on his own behalf any rights that
the Tribe may have under the 1664 treaty (see
Canadian
St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. State of N.Y.,
573 F Supp 1530, 1538 [ND N.Y.1983]; see
also United
States v. Oregon,
787 F Supp 1557, 1566 [D Or 1992], affd
29 F3d 481 [9th Cir1994], cert
denied
515 U.S. 1102 [1995]; cf.
United
States v. Dion,
476 U.S. 734, 738 n 4 [1986] ).

Petitioner's
remaining arguments are either rendered academic by our decision or,
upon review, have been found to be lacking in merit.