Father
appeals from the family court’s order terminating his residual paren=
tal
rights over B.W.He argues t=
hat the
court erred because: (1) there was no evidence regarding what a
“reasonable period of time” was from B.W.’s standpoint; =
and
(2) the court failed to consider if severing the father-child bond would be
harmful to B.W.We affirm.=
p>

B.W.
was born to father and mother in February 2001.In August 2002, father obtained a
relief-from-abuse order against mother, and he was awarded parental rights=
over
B.W.B.W. lived with father =
until
February 2003, when father decided that he could no longer care for him sa=
fely
and appropriately.B.W. was =
taken
into State custody, and in March 2003, he was adjudicated as a child in ne=
ed of
care and supervision based on father’s admission.In August 2004, the Department of
Children and Families filed a petition to terminate parental rights.After a hearing, the court termin=
ated
both parents’ parental rights.*

The
court made the following findings with respect to father.While in father’s care, B.W=
.lived in a socially isolated sett=
ing.Father struggled to pay for basic
necessities.He had difficul=
ty
finding employment, and his job search was exacerbated by his lack of a
driver’s license as well as his anxious, scattered and unfocused men=
tal
state.Father was smoking ma=
rijuana
weekly.In early 2003,
father’s health began to deteriorate.Father decided that he could no l=
onger
care for B.W. properly, and B.W. was adjudicated CHINS.

The
initial case plan, adopted in May 2003, contemplated reunification if pare=
nts
could meet certain goals within three to six months.The major goals for father were:<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> obtain and maintain stable employ=
ment;
obtain safe and stable housing; attend all scheduled visits with B.W.; acq=
uire
parenting skills; work toward economic self-sufficiency; get his driver=
217;s
license reinstated; abstain from using drugs and comply with the
recommendations of his substance abuse therapist; continue counseling; and
complete anger management classes.The court found that father did not achieve many of these required
expectations over the ensuing seventeen-month period.The court explained that although=
father
had shown more of an inclination to access services than mother, he did so=
at a
prolonged pace.He had ongoi=
ng
problems in getting to parental education appointments, and he made little
progress in the parent education program.=
During visits with B.W., father displayed clear love and affection =
for
the child, but his attention would often wander, and he had difficulty
controlling the child.Fathe=
r did
not maintain steady employment and continued to use marijuana
occasionally.By August 2004,
father still had no employment, no reliable car and he was struggling with
transportation.He was still
working on fixing his trailer and trying to make repairs to his car.

The
court explained that in September 2004, father had been robbed by an
acquaintance of the money that he had received for selling his trailer. Father then became homeless for an
extended time, and until the day of the hearing, he had been spending much=
of
the time in a shelter.He ha=
d since
moved out of the shelter and into a rooming house, which father conceded w=
ould
not be an appropriate setting for B.W.&nb=
sp;
Father opined at the hearing that it would take him at least three
months before he might find an apartment of his own, provided that he could
maintain steady employment.=
The
court found that father was not currently able to parent B.W.

The
court turned next to the larger question of whether father would be able to
parent B.W. within a reasonable time.&nbs=
p;
The court found that in the week before the hearing, father had beg=
un
training for a part-time job, and he had refrained from using marijuana fo=
r the
prior three months.The cour=
t found
that father’s testimony was largely undermined, however, by his
insistence that there had never been much need for DCF to become involved =
in
the first place.The court f=
ound
that father seemed reluctant to confront the facts and circumstances that =
had
led to the matter coming before the court, and he seemed unable to acknowl=
edge
any responsibility for the crises that had occurred in the early part of
2003.The court was also tro=
ubled
by father’s testimony that mother was mainly to blame for his
predicament, and that she had “ruined his life;” the court not=
ed
that father seemed fixated on this point.=

The
court found that, to his credit, father had been able to put B.W.’s =
needs
ahead of his own by seeking help in February 2003.He had made a far more comprehens=
ive
attempt than mother to engage in services to achieve reunification.He had tended to consistently vis=
it B.W.,
he had demonstrated a real interest in the child’s well-being and he
loved playing with his son.=
The
court found, however, that father continued to struggle with basic issues =
such
as stable housing and steady employment.&=
nbsp;
The court explained that these two issues were part of the disposit=
ion
report and he had made strides toward either only within the few days befo=
re
the hearing.Father acknowle=
dged
that as he moved from a shelter into a rooming house, it would still take
months before he could secure an apartment, assuming that he maintained st=
eady
work.The court found that s=
teady
work had been an elusive proposition for father from the start, explaining=
that
father had been unemployed or marginally employed for almost two years des=
pite
the assistance of numerous caseworkers.&n=
bsp;
The court stated that time would tell if his current part-time posi=
tion
would develop into a permanent, steady position, but the court needed to w=
eigh
that time against B.W.’s need for permanency and stability.

On
balance, in considering the statutory factors, the court concluded that fa=
ther’s
obvious love and affection for B.W. did not outweigh the risks that father
would need an extended period of time beyond what had already elapsed to g=
et
into a situation where he could resume parental duties.The court found that B.W. had bec=
ome
well-adjusted to his home with the foster family.B.W.’s material needs were =
being
met; and he also had stability, love and guidance.The child’s adjustment to t=
he home
had been positive, and having spent almost half of his life there, the cou=
rt
found that it wasalso
entrenched.The court conclu=
ded
that it would be harmful to uproot B.W. from this oasis of stability at so=
me as
yet undeterminable point down the road when father had finally stabilized =
and
become ready for B.W.’s return.&nbs=
p;
It therefore concluded that termination of father’s parental
rights was in B.W.’s best interests.Father appealed.

Father
first argues that the family court erred because its findings do not show =
that
it weighed the amount of time that father needed to improve against the am=
ount
of time that B.W. could wait.Father asserts that the court could not predict at what point father
would be able to resume parenting, and it speculated that, at whatever poi=
nt
that was, B.W. would be harmed by the removal from his foster home.According to father, there was no
evidence as to the prospect of such harm, and without such evidence, the
court’s ultimate conclusion regarding a “reasonable period of
time” is unsupported.

When
the termination of parental rights is sought, the family court must conduc=
t a
two-step analysis.In re =
B.W.,
162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994); see 33 V.S.A. § 5532(a).It must first find that there has=
been a
substantial change in material circumstances; second, the court must find =
that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.In re B.W., 162 Vt. at 291=
.In determining a child’s be=
st
interests, the court must consider the factors set forth in 33 V.S.A. &sec=
t;
5540.The most important fac=
tor in the
court’s analysis is the likelihood that the natural parent will be a=
ble
to resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable period of time.In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 3=
36
(1996).As long as the court
applied the proper standard, we will not disturb its findings on appeal un=
less
they are clearly erroneous; we will affirm its conclusions if they are
supported by the findings.<=
u>In re
G.S., 153 Vt. 651, 652 (1990) (mem.).

We
find father’s first claim of error without merit.The court’s findings reflec=
t that
it properly considered whether father would be able to resume his parenting
duties within a reasonable period of time.The court concluded that father would require an extended period of=
time
beyond what had already elapsed before he could be in a position to parent
B.W.This conclusion is supp=
orted
by the court’s findings, which are in turn supported by the record.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> We need not reiterate all of the
court’s findings here.The
court also found that B.W. was doing well with his foster family, and he h=
ad
been in their care for more than half of his life.The court recognized that father =
loved
B.W., and B.W. was happy and excited to see father during their visits. The court concluded that on balan=
ce,
however, father’s love for B.W. did not outweigh the risks associated
with further delay.Given
B.W.’s young age, and his need for permanence and stability, along w=
ith
father’s failure to make any significant progress in meeting the goa=
ls of
the case plan, as well as father’s current situation and his future
prospects, the court did not err in concluding that father would not be ab=
le to
resume parenting within a reasonable period of time as measured from
B.W.’s perspective.Se=
e In
re J.S., 168 Vt. 572, 574 (1998) (mem.) (upholding family court’s
conclusion that a reasonable time had passed for reunification based on fa=
mily
court’s findings as to age of children, length of time that they had=
been
separated from parents, and their need for stability and permanence).

Father
next asserts that the family court failed to properly consider whether the
severance of the father-child bond would be harmful to B.W.Relying primarily on out-of-state=
case
law, father argues that the family court must assess whether the disruptio=
n of
the parent-child bond would be less harmful to the child than the disrupti=
on of
the foster parent-child bond.Father maintains that, in this case, the strong bond between B.W. a=
nd
father was acknowledged by the court, but there was insufficient evidence
presented regarding the consequences of severing that bond.Father relies on In re E.M., 620
A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), in support of his argument.

We
find no error.The family co=
urt
properly considered the relationship between father and B.W. in reaching i=
ts
conclusion that termination of father’s parental rights was in
B.W.’s best interests.As
previously discussed, the court recognized the bond that father shared wit=
h the
child, but it concluded that father’s love and affection for B.W. di=
d not
outweigh the risks associated with further delay.The court’s analysis reflec=
ts its
consideration of the factors set forth in 33 V.S.A. § 5540, and its
findings are supported by the record.

Father’s
reliance on In re E.M. is misplaced.First, that decision is not bindi=
ng on
this Court. The decision also reflects the application of a different legal
standard than that employed in Vermont, and it is factually
distinguishable.In In re=
E.M.,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded a termination order b=
ased
on its conclusion that an important element relating to the “needs a=
nd welfare”
of the children had not been adequately considered in the proceeding
below.See 620 A.2d at 483-84
(noting that in considering what situation would best serve a child’s
needs and welfare, a court “must examine the status of the natural
parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents’ r=
ights
would destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial̶=
1;
(parentheses and quotations omitted)).&nb=
sp;
As the court explained, in the proceedings below, the trial court h=
ad
recognized that the question of the bond between the children and their na=
tural
mother had not been fully considered, but it had nonetheless concluded that
once a parent had been judged incompetent, there was no need to ascertain
whether a beneficial bond existed between the natural parent and the child=
, nor
whether additional factors counsel that continuing the relationship might
otherwise serve the needs and welfare of the child.Id. at 485.Thecourt rejected this reasoning, stating that it was clearly conceiva=
ble
that a beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such tha=
t, if
the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme emotional
consequences.Significantly,=
the
State’s expert had testified at the hearing that a better assessment=
of
the relevant emotional factors could have been made if an evaluation had b=
een
conducted of the children’s interactions with their natural mother a=
nd
with their foster father.Th=
us, the
court concluded that “[t]o render a decision that termination serves=
the
needs and welfare of the child without consideration of emotional bonds, i=
n a
case such as this where a bond, to some extent at least, obviously exists =
and
where the expert witness for the party seeking termination indicates that =
the
factor has not been adequately studied, is not proper.”Id.

Unlike
E.M., and notwithstanding the different legal standard employed the=
rein,
the family court in this case did consider the bond that father shared with
B.W. in reaching its conclusion. =
span>It
evaluated the relationship in terms of the factors set forth in 33 V.S.A.
§ 5540, and concluded that termination of the relationship was in
B.W.’s best interests.We
find no error in the family court’s order.