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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 31607
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PRELMARRPARMKPRPWPOZCURGCHUPL
SUBJECT: CAN WARSAW PACT MEMBERS QUIT?
/ MOSCOW MAY NOT KNOW
REF: A) MOSCOW 31520
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
-------------------
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
¶2. AT THE END OF OCTOBER A STIR WAS CREATED AS THREE
SOVIET SPOKESMEN STATED THAT EAST EUROPEAN STATES
WERE FREE TO QUIT THE WARSAW PACT IF THEY SO
DESIRED. THE SOVIETS REGARD THIS AS A LOGICAL
OUTCOME OF THEIR POLICY OF "NON-INTERFERENCE IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS." THEY INSIST THAT THEIR EAST
EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAVE FULL "FREEDOM OF CHOICE."
NEVERTHELESS, TOP PARTY FIGURES HAVE HINTED THAT THIS
IS NOT A BLANKET FREEDOM. IN PRIVATE, GORBACHEV AND
OTHERS HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WARSAW
PACT REMAINING INTACT. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE
UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF "GEOPOLITICAL
REALITIES" IN EASTERN EUROPE.
¶3. THE SOVIETS STRESS THAT NO WARSAW PACT MEMBERS
HAVE EXPRESSED ANY INTEREST IN LEAVING THE ALLIANCE.
IN FACT, SOVIET OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE
IN AN ALLY'S NATIONAL INTEREST TO LEAVE THE PACT.
HOWEVER, MANY SOVIET SCHOLARS BELIEVE THAT HUNGARY
COULD EDGE TOWARD NEUTRALITY IN THE NEAR-TERM.
SOVIET LEADERS HAVE STRESSED THAT THEY WILL NOT APPLY
MILITARY FORCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, REGARDLESS OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THE SENSE OF INTERVENING
MILITARILY TO IMPOSE IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY, THE
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE APPEARS DEAD.
¶4. IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE COST OF TAKING MILITARY
ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST A "DEFECTING" ALLY COULD BE
ENORMOUS, BOTH IN ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY
IMPLICATIONS. SHOULD HUNGARY MOVE TOWARD NEUTRALITY,
THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO EMPLOY ONLY POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC MEANS TO DETER THE DECISION. GEOPOLITICAL
REALITIES, HOWEVER, SEEM TO IMPOSE A SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT SET OF TOLERANCES AS REGARDS POLAND AND THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. TRADITIONAL SOVIET
SECURITY CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THESE COUNTRIES REMAIN
HIGH AND THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE WARSAW
PACT IS REGARDED BY MANY AS A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR FOR
SOVIET SECURITY AND EUROPEAN STABILITY. THIS MEANS
THAT DESPITE SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT FORCE WILL NOT BE
USED TO PREVENT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PACT, THERE ARE
CIRCUMSTANCES -- EXTREME THOUGH THEY MAY BE -- UNDER
WHICH THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION TO
PRESERVE THE VIABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT CANNOT BE
RULED OUT.
-----------------------
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-----------------------
¶5. THIS IS THE SECOND CABLE IN A THREE-PART SERIES
ADDRESSING CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD CHANGES IN
THE WARSAW PACT, WHICH WE HOPE WASHINGTON READERS
WILL FIND USEFUL IN PREPARING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
DECEMBER 2-3 MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. OTHER
REPORTS FOCUS ON SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO
TRANSFORM THE WARSAW PACT FROM A MILITARY-POLITICAL
TO A POLITICAL-MILITARY ALLIANCE (SEE REFTEL), AS
WELL AS THE ROLE THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THE WARSAW PACT
SHOULD PLAY IN MAINTAINING EUROPEAN STABILITY IN THE
1990'S AND ADVANCING EAST-WEST RELATIONS (SEPTEL TO
FOLLOW).
¶6. THE SOVIET UNION INSISTS THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED
MILITARILY TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON ITS ALLIES. THE
DOCTRINE OF THE DAY IS "NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL
AFFAIRS," AND SOLIDARITY'S SUCCESS IN POLAND GIVES IT
SOME CREDIBILITY. AT HOME, GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO
PUSH A BOLD PROGRAM OF REFORM. ABROAD, HE HAS
ACTIVELY PROMOTED THE BUILDING OF A "COMMON EUROPEAN
HOME." HIS FOREIGN POLICY GOAL IN EASTERN EUROPE IS
STRAIGHTFORWARD -- STABILITY. BY THIS HE DOES NOT
MEAN A HALT TO THE POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS, BUT
STABILITY IN TERMS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND "AMIABLE"
RELATIONS. BUT DOES THIS REQUIRE THAT EAST EUROPEAN
STATES REMAIN MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY
ORGANIZATION?
-----------------
A BARBERSHOP TRIO
-----------------
¶7. AT THE END OF OCTOBER, THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE
STATEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT EAST EUROPEAN
NATIONS WERE FREE TO LEAVE THE WARSAW TREATY
ORGANIZATION (WTO): YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV, CHAIRMAN OF
THE SUPREME SOVIET COUNCIL OF THE UNION; NIKOLAY
SHISHLIN, A CENTRAL COMMITTEE AIDE WHO SPECIALIZES IN
EASTERN EUROPE; AND MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN GENNADIY
GERASIMOV (WHO LATER SAID HE HAD BEEN MISQUOTED).
PRIMAKOV SAID THAT WTO MEMBER STATES WERE FREE TO
LEAVE, BUT EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL BELIEF THAT THIS
WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR INTEREST. SHISHLIN SAID THAT
HUNGARY WAS FREE TO LEAVE THE WTO, BUT WAS MORE
GUARDED WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE
GDR. FINALLY, GERASIMOV, REPEATING AN ANALOGY HE HAD
MADE IN SEPTEMBER IN ITALY, SAID THAT THE BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE HAD BEEN REPLACED BY THE "FRANK SINATRA
DOCTRINE," I.E. COUNTRIES CAN SAY "I DID IT MY WAY."
(WE NOTE THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVAN
ABOIMOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE WTO POLITICAL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REFUSED TO COMMENT ON ANY OF
THE ABOVE STATEMENTS -- SEE MOSCOW 30503).
¶8. WHILE IT IS UNIQUE TO HEAR SUCH A HARMONIOUS
CHORUS AT ONE TIME, SIMILAR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE
BY SOVIET SPOKESMEN IN RECENT MONTHS. SHISHLIN, FOR
EXAMPLE, MADE THE SAME REMARK ABOUT HUNGARY IN A
PARIS INTERVIEW IN SEPTEMBER. FURTHERMORE,
PRIMAKOV'S REMARKS WERE VERY SIMILAR TO COMMENTS MADE
BY MARSHAL SERGEY AKHROMEYEV IN JULY. AKHROMEYEV, IN
WASHINGTON TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE, SAID EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS WERE FREE TO
DECIDE WHETHER TO REMAIN IN THE PACT, BUT ADDED HE
COULD NOT SEE ANY REASON FOR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO
QUIT AS IT WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR INTEREST. IN
ADDITION, AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENTS ECHOED REMARKS MADE
EARLIER BY OLEG BOGOMOLOV, THE DIRECTOR OF MOSCOW'S
INSTITUTE OF THE ECONOMY OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST
SYSTEM.
-------------------
"FREEDOM OF CHOICE"
-------------------
¶9. GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED IN HIS AUGUST 1 SPEECH TO THE
SUPREME SOVIET THAT THERE WERE NO UNIVERSAL SQCIALIST
MODELS AND THAT EACH COUNTRY'S PEOPLE DECIDE THE
FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY THEMSELVES AND SELECT ITS
SYSTEM ON THEIR OWN. HE INSISTED THAT NOBODY MAY
INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY OR IMPOSE
ITS VIEWS ABOUT ITS POLICY UNDER ANY PRETEXT. THE
SOVIETS HAVE STRESSED THAT A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF
THEIR NEW POLITICAL THINKING IS FREEDOM OF CHOICE.
POLITBURO MEMBER ALEKSANDR YAKOVLEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE
CPSU'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY COMMISSION, SAID THAT
THIS WAS THE "MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF EAST EUROPEAN
DEVELOPMENTS." SHISHLIN TOO HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS
POLICY MEANS THAT THERE IS NO LIMIT THAT THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MUST NOT EXCEED IN THEIR DOMESTIC
POLICIES.
¶10. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE SOME HINTS
THAT THIS IS NOT A BLANKET FREEDOM. IN PRIVATE TOP
SOVIET LEADERS, GORBACHEV INCLUDED, HAVE STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE WARSAW PACT REMAINING INTACT. LAST
WEEK, YAKOVLEV TOLD ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THAT IT WOULD
BE DESTABILIZING IF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WERE TO PEEL
OFF FROM THEIR CURRENT ALLIANCES. IN ADDITION, HE
PLACED A PROVISO ON "FREEDOM OF CHOICE" -- THAT THERE
BE NO "INTERFERENCE FROM THE U.S. AND THE WEST IN
GENERAL. SHISHLIN HAS ALSO NOTED THAT THERE WERE
CERTAIN "GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES" WHICH COUNTRIES
SHOULD NOT IGNORE.
-------------------------
BUT NO ONE WANTS TO LEAVE
-------------------------
¶11. MFA SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ADMINISTRATION CHIEF
GORAL'D GORINOVICH EMPHASIZED TO POLOFF THAT THE
HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF
LEAVING THE WTO, NOR HAD ANY OTHER PACT MEMBER STATE
-- "NOT HUNGARY, NOT POLAND, NOT ROMANIA." HE SAID
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE QUESTION
OF WARSAW PACT MEMBERS POSSIBLY QUITTING THE
ALLIANCE, AS NO MEMBER HAD EXPRESSED SUCH A DESIRE.
IN RECENT MONTHS, THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY LITANY OF
STATEMENTS OF FIRM AND UNDYING SUPPORT FOR THE WARSAW
PACT FROM THOSE EAST EUROPEAN STATES WHICH ARE
UNDERGOING REFORM.
------------------------------------
COULD HUNGARY LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT?
------------------------------------
¶12. NEVERTHELESS, MANY SOVIET SCHOLARS WOULD NOT BE
SURPRISED IF HUNGARY DECIDED TO LEAVE THE WARSAW
PACT, BECAUSE OF ITS EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR NEUTRALITY
AND THE EXAMPLE OF NEUTRAL AUSTRIA JUST ACROSS THE
DANUBE. HOWEVER, MOST OF THEM ARGUE THAT WERE
HUNGARY TO DO SO -- ABSENT SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST -- IT WOULD FIND ITSELF IN
VERY DIFFICULT STRAITS. THEY BELIEVE THAT IF HUNGARY
SEVERED ALL ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE
SOVIET UNION AND ITS OTHER EASTERN NEIGHBORS, IT
COULD SIMPLY END UP CRIPPLING ITSELF.
¶13. HUNGARY'S WTO PARTICIPATION IS REGARDED AS MORE
SYMBOLIC THAN SUBSTANTIAL. LIBERAL SCHOLARS HERE
ARGUE THAT HUNGARY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WTO IS NOT
REALLY SIGNIFICANT AND THAT EVEN IF IT ADOPTED
NEUTRAL STATUS, THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES IN
EUROPE WOULD REMAIN BASICALLY INTACT. IN FACT, USA
INSTITUTE DEPARTMENT HEAD ANDREY KORTUNOV HAS ARGUED
THAT IN MILITARY TERMS A GREATER THREAT MIGHT BE
POSED BY COUNTRIES LIKE HUNGARY REMAINING IN THE
ALLIANCE, DUE TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THEIR TROOPS
SHOULD A CONFLICT EVER ARISE.
--------------------------------------------- ----
PERHAPS HUNGARY COULD QUIT, BUT IT'S A SMALL FISH
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶14. THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN RAISED ABOUT A HUNGARIAN
"DEFECTION" WOULD BE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF AN
ALLIANCE MEMBER QUITTING AND THE CHANCE THAT OTHER
PACT MEMBERS MIGHT DECIDE TO FOLLOW ITS EXAMPLE. IF
HUNGARY DECIDED TO QUIT THE ALLIANCE, THERE IS LITTLE
DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE LOATH TO INTERVENE
MILITARILY. INSTEAD, THEY WOULD MOST LIKELY SEEK TO
ENCOURAGE HUNGARY TO REMAIN A MEMBER BY USING
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEVERS OF INFLUENCE.
¶15. MANY OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE
DEFECTION OF A LESS IMPORTANT WTO STATE, SUCH AS
HUNGARY, WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET CONSERVATIVES'
HAND, BY PROVIDING THEM WITH YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF
HOW GORBACHEV'S PERESTROYKA AND NEW POLITICAL
THINKING ARE UNDERMINING NATIONAL SECURITY.
NEVERTHELESS, WE AND OUR SOVIET CONTACTS DOUBT THAT
THIS COULD APPRECIABLY DIMINISH GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL
POWER, PARTICULARLY IN COMPARISON WITH THE DRASTIC
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND NATIONALITY PROBLEMS THAT HE
HAS TO FACE. THERE ARE BIGGER FISH IN THIS POND,
HOWEVER, WHOSE POSSIBLE DEFECTION COULD POSE A FAR
MORE DANGEROUS THREAT.
------------------------------------
A SOVIET POLICY OF "DIFFERENTIATION"
------------------------------------
¶16. MFA SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ADMINISTRATION CHIEF
GORINOVICH INSISTED THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN HOW THE SOVIETS VIEWED HUNGARY, POLAND OR THE
GDR UNDER THE WARSAW PACT. NIKOLAY SHISHLIN,
HOWEVER, WAS HESITANT ABOUT PLACING HUNGARY AND THE
GDR IN THE SAME CATEGORY. ANDREY KORTUNOV, HEAD OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF
IUSAC, HAS SAID THAT MANY SOVIET MILITARY MEN STILL
VIEW EASTERN EUROPE IN TERMS OF BUFFER ZONES AND
DEPTH OF DEFENSE. IN THEIR OPINION SOME EAST
EUROPEAN ALLIES, IN PARTICULAR THE GDR AND POLAND
WERE CRUCIAL TO SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS. YURIY
DAVYDOV, HEAD OF IUSAC'S "EUROPEAN CENTER" HAS VOICED
SIMILAR CONCERNS.
----------------------------
THE GDR: THE PACT'S KEYSTONE
----------------------------
¶17. SHISHLIN HAS STATED THAT "FREEDOM OF CHOICE" MUST
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN "GEO-POLITICAL REALITIES."
IN RECENT MONTHS, WE HAVE FREQUENTLY HEARD THIS
PHRASE VOICED IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF
THE GDR. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT FOR THE GDR,
THESE REALITIES COULD INCLUDE THE STATIONING OF
FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE FRG AND THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE
WEST GERMAN BUNDESWEHR, IF NOT THE EXISTENCE OF NATO
ITSELF. IN LIGHT OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO ENVISION THE GDR BEING ABLE TO LEAVE THE
WARSAW PACT IN THE NEAR-TERM WITHOUT POSING A SERIOUS
THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY AND OVERALL EUROPEAN
SECURITY.
¶18. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT THE GERMAN
QUESTION CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED WITHIN AN ALL-EUROPEAN
CONTEXT. IN FACT, VALENTIN FALIN, CHIEF OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, IS
REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS IN EARLY
OCTOBER (SEE BONN 32350) THAT THE USSR COULD ACCEPT
NEITHER GERMAN REUNIFICATION NOR THE GDR'S LEAVING
THE WARSAW PACT.
------------------------------------------
POLAND: LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND HISTORY
------------------------------------------
¶19. A GROUP OF AMERICAN SCHOLARS RECENTLY MET WITH
RAFAIL FEDOROV, A CENTRAL COMMITTEE AIDE, TO DISCUSS
DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. FEDOROV ADMITTED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD STRONG GEOPOLITICAL
INTERESTS IN POLAND, INSISTING, HOWEVER, THAT THEY
COINCIDED FULLY WITH POLISH NATIONAL INTERESTS. HE
SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT INTRUDE IN
POLISH AFFAIRS, BUT HIGHLIGHTED THE SUBSTANTIAL
NETWORK OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
STATES, AS WELL AS THE OUTSTANDING "GERMAN
QUESTION." IN FACT, FEDOROV POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET
MILITARY FORCES IN POLAND WERE PRINCIPALLY IN THE
WESTERN BORDER AREAS, LEAVING UNSAID THE FACT THAT
THESE WERE FORMER GERMAN LANDS (WHICH WOULD FALL
INSIDE THE 1937 BORDERS).
¶20. SOVIET SCHOLARS, AS WELL AS FEDOROV, HAVE NOTED
THAT POLAND HAS BEEN THE TRADITIONAL PATH OF INVASION
TO THE SOVIET UNION AND NOW PLAYS A CRUCIAL ROLE IN
MILITARY LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE GDR. THESE
FACTORS EVOKE CONSIDERABLE EMOTION ON THE PART OF THE
SOVIET MILITARY -- AND MANY CIVILIANS -- AND CAST
INTO DOUBT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE POLES WOULD BE
TOTALLY FREE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN LOT. SIMILARLY,
KORTUNOV NOTED THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF
POLAND QUITTING THE ALLIANCE, WHICH BEARS THE NAME OF
ITS CAPITAL, COULD BE DEVASTATING. IN FACT, WE WERE
TOLD BY A CONTACT IN THE MFA ARMS LIMITATION AND
DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION THAT THIS WAS ONE FACTOR
THAT HAD LED THE SOVIETS TO CONSIDER PROPOSING WARSAW
AS THE POSSIBLE SEAT FOR A PERMANENT WARSAW PACT
HEADQUARTERS.
-------------------------------------------
COST OF STOPPING ANY DEFECTOR WOULD BE HIGH
-------------------------------------------
¶21. SOVIET SCHOLARS DRAW A BLANK WHEN ASKED WHAT
COULD BE DONE TO STOP A POTENTIAL DEFECTOR. THE
STANDARD METHOD UNDER "OLD THINKING" -- SENDING IN
THE TROOPS -- IS REGARDED AS PARTICULARLY OUT OF STEP
WITH THE TIMES. YAKOVLEV HAS INSISTED PRIVATELY THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT APPLY MILITARY FORCE IN
EASTERN EUROPE, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
SHISHLIN, TOO, HAS SAID THAT THE USSR IS "OPPOSED TO
ANY USE OF TROOPS IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES'
INTERNAL AFFAIRS. TO DO SO WOULD BE A TOTAL
REPUDIATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY LINE THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAS ESPOUSED FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.
¶22. FURTHERMORE, MANY SOVIET SCHOLARS WE HAVE SPOKEN
WITH BELIEVE THAT IF THE USSR WERE TO TAKE ANY
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST A DEPARTING WARSAW TREATY
MEMBER, IT WOULD RISK DESTROYING MOST OF ITS RECENT
FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS. RELATIONS WITH THE
WEST WOULD LIKELY COME TO A STANDSTILL -- PROGRESS IN
ARMS CONTROL AND EXPANDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE COULD VANISH.
¶23. FINALLY, THE DOMESTIC RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH A
POLICY COULD BE UNPRECEDENTED. THERE IS A CHANCE
THAT A MAJOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE
COULD LEAD TO A CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THAT
THE REFORM MOVEMENT UNDERWAY HERE MIGHT COME TO A
RAPID HALT. IT WOULD BE HARD TO IMAGINE THAT A
MILITARY MOVE AGAINST REFORMERS ABROAD WOULD NOT HAVE
A CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON REFORMERS AT HOME -- JUST AS
THE 1968 WTO INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA CHILLED
REFORM THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶24. THE SOVIETS HAVE WOVEN FOR THEMSELVES A FOREIGN
POLICY PARADOX. THEY APPEAR TO BE PERFECTLY PREPARED
TO LET THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES FOLLOW THEIR OWN
INDIVIDUAL PATHS TO SOCIALISM -- OR WHEREVER ELSE
THEY MAY BE HEADED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH "NEW POLITICAL
THINKING." NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THEIR BASIC
REJECTION OF POWER POLITICS, THEY BELIEVE THAT THESE
STATES WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO USE THIS NEW FOUND FREEDOM
TO TAKE STEPS THAT COULD UNDERMINE SOVIET SECURITY
INTERESTS -- IN THIS CASE, LEAVING THE WARSAW PACT --
BECAUSE THE SOVIETS BELIEVE TO DO SO WOULD NOT BE IN
SUCH A STATE'S NATIONAL INTEREST.
¶25. IS THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE THEREFORE A THING OF THE
PAST? IN OUR VIEW THE ANSWER IS BOTH YES AND NO. IN
THE SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INTERVENE TO ENFORCE
IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY -- TO ENSURE THAT A CLIENT
STATE FOLLOWED THE SOVIET MODEL OR PATH TO SOCIALISM,
IT APPEARS THAT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IS INDEED
DEAD. IN A BROADER, GEO-POLITICAL SENSE, HOWEVER, A
MORE BASIC FORM OF THE DOCTRINE MAY REMAIN. THE
SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY
CONCERNS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THESE
FACTORS CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED WHEN EVALUATING BASIC
SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS. TO DATE, REFORM IN
EASTERN EUROPE HAS, REASSSURINGLY FOR THE SOVIETS,
PROCEEDED WITHOUT EITHER SUBSTANTIAL MANIFESTATIONS
OF ANTI-SOVIET FEELING OR DOMESTIC TURMOIL WHICH
THREATENED TO GET OUT OF CONTROL. GORBACHEV'S
PERSONAL POPULARITY AMONG EASTERN EUROPEANS SEEKING
REFORM HAS THUS FAR SERVED ESSENTIAL SOVIET SECURITY
INTERESTS WELL.
¶26. THERE IS, NEVERTHELESS, A POINT AT WHICH THE
SOVIET UNION'S LEADERSHIP COULD FEEL COMPELLED, EVEN
THOUGH IT WOULD DESTROY MUCH OF THE PROGRESS IT HAS
RECENTLY ACHIEVED, TO MOVE MILITARILY IN EASTERN
EUROPE. AS DETAILED ABOVE, THE MOST LIKELY VENUES
FOR SUCH ACTION WOULD BE IN EITHER POLAND OR THE
GDR. EVEN HERE, WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT GORBACHEV
WOULD USE EVERY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEVER HE COULD
TO PRECLUDE HAVING TO INITIATE SUCH AN ACTION.
THEREFORE, THE SPECTER OF SOVIET MILITARY
INTERVENTION, WHICH HAS HUNG OVER EASTERN EUROPE FOR
THE PAST FORTY YEARS, THOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY
DISPELLED, HAS FADED APPRECIABLY.
¶27. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
MATLOCK