The FOB’s highly-publicised declaration of support for the disgraced former general couldn’t have come at a more problematic point in the electoral season, since it coincided quite precisely with a sudden outpouring of religious violence in the East Java city of Yogyakarta, to which Prabowo has so far responded with little more than routine lip service.

As reports of these events proliferated across the archipelago, circumstances have obliged Prabowo to condemn the attacks as a debased expression of religious intolerance and a gross affront to Indonesia’s secular constitution, which theoretically ensures religious freedom for all. By consenting to these righteous demands, however, Prabowo has embroiled himself at the centre of a perfect storm, in which he is required to make an impassioned, ‘presidential’ call for calm and tolerance, despite having just entered into an alliance with some of the most consistently violent and intolerant groups in Indonesia at present. Not surprisingly, the glaring discrepancy between Prabowo’s words and deeds has left the old general wide open to charges of unmitigated hypocrisy.

The FPI and Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) are comparatively much younger and smaller organisations, and therefore less important in terms of garnering votes, yet they do possess a level of influence which belies their numbers. The FPI and FBR’s characteristically vocal and often violent brand of activism—sometimes described as ‘moral policing’ or vigilantism—has gifted these organisations a formidable media presence, and has also allowed them to set the agenda on so-called religious issues through their aggressive lobbying of local authorities. The FPI has also been accused of acting as an “attack dog” for Indonesia’s police and intelligence services in situations where the authorities feel unable to sufficiently intimidate domestic dissenters.

The long-standing impunity enjoyed by Indonesia’s mob collectives such as those represented by the FOB is not only evidenced by the conspicuous lack of criminal convictions among their members, but is also reflected in the way that high-ranking politicians often seek their favour during times of political challenge or upheaval. Instead of striving to disband known criminal syndicates like the PP, FBR or FPI, Indonesia’s politicians have more typically been inclined to cultivate amicable working ties with such groups.

In terms of realpolitik, Prabowo is surely aware that he has entered into an indispensible union with three of the most belligerent, untouchable and effective thug organisations in the country, and this is a great boon to his potential presidency should he emerge victorious on July 9. If such a catastrophe does indeed transpire, then Prabowo will benefit from having pre-emptively defused any potential hostilities with the FOB, and will most likely enjoy the protection offered by a healthy stock of loyal preman who have a long history of conspiring to crush domestic dissent. Last week’s statement sends out out an implicit message that Indonesia’s preman are here to stay, and if they play cards right when it comes to the business of power brokering, then long shall they continue to operate with impunity.