Helix Model of Innovation in Israel: The Global Scheme and its Local Application

Senor and Singer’s 2009 book, “Start-Up Nation,” quickly hit the best-sellers list of the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times and was translated into some twenty languages. The book peaked the world’s fascination with Israeli innovation by answering “the trillion dollar question”: “How is it that Israel – a country of 7.1 million, only 60 years old, surrounded by enemies, in a constant state of war since its founding, with no natural resources – produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations?” And, “how is it that Israel has, per person, attracted over twice as much venture capital investment as the US and thirty times more than Europe?” The Israeli “miracle” stands as a code to be cracked, or as an exemplar for countries and regions worldwide that are seeking innovation-based development. The buzz around this book builds on the recognition of innovation as the critical component for success in the global knowledge economy: no longer can firms or nations grow solely off their natural- or human capital resources; rather, growth depends on innovativeness.

In seeking to decode the systemic foundations of innovation, previous studies analyzed the other so-called miracles of the global knowledge economy: Scandinavia, the Boston area and, of course, Silicon Valley. Many of these studies highlight particular causes for such innovation-based regional success – from immigration ties (e.g., Saxenian, 1994, 2006) to legal and financial institutions (e.g., Suchman, 2000, 2001) to network constellation (e.g., Whittington et al., 2009). But the question remains: What combination of such components and what “critical mass” of them would spark an innovation economy? Two conceptual tools, which were delineated in order to model the system components whose assemblage triggers a local innovation economy, dominate discussions throughout the past four decades: Christopher Freeman and Bengt-Åke Lundvall formulated the concept of “national innovation system” (NIS) and Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff outlined the Triple Helix Model. The work compiled in this volume takes the Triple Helix Model as a point of departure in mapping and analyzing Israel’s innovation economy.

1.1 The Triple Helix Model

Seeking to explain the socio-structural conditions that encourage knowledge-based economic development, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff proposed in 1995 the Triple Helix Model. The Model links among academia, industry and government and, building on the imagery of the double-helix structure of DNA, the Triple Helix model weaves these three helices into a spiral configuration which allows for multiple reciprocal links among the three institutions. Although Etzkowitz (2003) specifies as many as 10 propositions that express the Model’s tenets, three principles stand at its core: (a) the three helices, or institutions critical for innovation, are academia, industry and government, (b) there exist multiple points of contact and exchange among these three institutions, and (c) each of the institutions is transformed through such intensifying interconnectedness. The outcome is not merely a joint project or a jointly developed product, but rather an integrated, often hybridized, form of knowledge-based development, of nations and regions (see. Meyer, Grant and Kuusisto, 2013). And, this systemic interlacing among the so-called helices maintains the dynamism and flexibility that are core features of any system of innovation.

The three institutions laced into the Triple Helix model are described in Figure 1.1.

These are:

University. The University has always been entrusted with knowledge creation, through learning and research. In today’s knowledge-based economy, universities have been transformed into knowledge producers and market players. Etzkowitz describes this transformation as follows: “The university has traditionally been viewed as a support structure for innovation, providing trained persons, research results, and knowledge to industry. Recently the university has increasingly become involved in the formation of firms, often based on new technologies originating in academic research.” (2003: 294). Such commercialization of academic knowledge also drives universities to guarantee legal protections of their intellectual property and, with that, defy the normative order of public science (see, Bok 2003, Willmott 2003, Ramirez 2006, Rhoten and Powell 2010). And while recent decline in university patenting has been taken to mean a re-trenching of academia to focus on ‘core business’ of basic research and teaching (see, Meyer, Grant and Kuusisto, 2013: 193), the overall intensification of commercialization and co-production of knowledge is the hallmark that defines the entrepreneurial university, or the “3G university” (see, Wissema 2009).

Industry. With knowledge and innovation becoming the new source of capitalization for firms, firms too are transformed into knowledge producers: firms replace their traditional model of in-house R&D and innovation, which drew solely upon internal capacity, with an open innovation model, which calls for cooperative models of innovation and on outsourcing of innovation functions. As a result, firms not only continue to build in-house labs and sponsor academic research, they now cooperate intensely with academic research and allow – even welcome – the mobility of researchers between academia and industry. This post-Fordist production is a form of open innovation.

Government. As the representative of the public and an advocate of public good, government serves as the third component in the driving of innovation. Whether national, state, or municipal, government serves as an enabler of innovation ties, mostly by sponsoring start-up initiatives or funding “big science” projects in hope of spillover effects. In addition, government guides innovation through its regulatory power, for example by formulating IP arrangements. Still, government’s supervisory role as regulator may also result in suffocating innovation through, for example, regulatory restrictions on types of research or on taxation of foreign investment.

The important feature of the Model is that the 3 institutions, or helices, are intertwined and link in multiple points. Recalling DNA structure, the Triple Helix model of innovation laces the strands, or helices, and build multiple connects among them; this form is described as a “recursive overlay of interactions among the stakeholders” (Yang et al., 2012: 375). In its form, the Triple Helix Model distinguishes itself from two other possible format of relating academia, industry and government (Figure 1.2). The first alternative is the Lesseiz Faire Model, where a country has all three institutions, yet it is at their initiative and at their pace that any link is made between them. The second alternative is titled the Etatic Model. In this form of relations, government takes the responsibility to guide innovation and also to build innovation-related links between academia and industry. Like Goldylock’s choice of a bed at the bears’ home, Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz regard these two alternative models for innovation as either too loose or too tight. The Triple Helix Model calls for a balance among the three helices, so to prevent a case of tertius gaudens, where one sector benefits from any stress between, or weakness of, the other two helices (see, Etzkowitz and Zhou 2006: 77). Unlike these Lesseiz Faire and Etatic formulations, the Triple Helix model is both flexible and self-reinforced, allowing for appropriate room for agency while offering a structural backbone for links to form and stabilize.

Figure 1.2 Lessaiz Faire and Etatic models of relating academia, industry and government

1.2 Social Context

The backdrop for the Triple Helix Model is the discussions since the 1970s on the structural base of the transition into a knowledge economy. The Triple Helix model is, therefore, one of several eco-systemic outlines for innovation, all of which draft the environment, or social context, of innovation and entrepreneurship. Among such systemic maps of the innovation- and knowledge economy, and most clearly in comparison with the notion of NIS of Freeman and Lundvall (see, Nelson 1993), the Triple Helix model stands out due to several of its core features. First, it is a neo-evolutionary model, where the development of social institutions, herein the sectors of an innovation economy, is revealed as a co-evolutionary process. Second, it is a non-linear model of social action, herein of the interaction among the three sectors. In this sense, the development of an innovation economy, while path dependent to some degree upon historical circumstances, is sparked by the interactive and multilateral interactions among multiple stakeholders. Its neo-evolutionary tone makes the Triple Helix model most applicable for policy. Indeed, the model has been a basis for many policy reforms, of regions and nations seeking innovation-spurred development.

Epistemologically, from the perspective of organizational studies, the Triple Helix Model is a part of an overall move to regard organizations as open entities, which are embedded in a wider social context (see, Engwall 2007). For example, university governance is currently analyzed as involving relations with “external” and multiple stakeholders, such as accreditation agencies, international higher education associations, parents groups, and employers of their to-be graduates (see, Tuchman 2009). This understanding of the porous boundaries of each of the three core institutions in the Model does not weaken the positivist approach to social development that underlies the Triple Helix Model. Rather, contrary to the focus on academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Hoffman 2011), the Triple Helix Model regards university-industry ties as an imperative for innovation and development and as synergetic, rather than exploitative, relations. Overall, it is on such matters – of a model void of power, hierarchy and historical context – that the Triple Helix Model is most criticized.

1.3 Critique of Triple Helix Model

Criticism of the Triple Helix Model comes from two directions. First are those who challenge the premises of the Model and expose its ideological roots. In this group are the many studies of academia-industry relations that highlight power-asymmetries among the sectors. In the words of Yang et al., the Model “treats the roles of different innovation actors (universities, industry and government) symmetrically, which promotes the impression that innovation is the result of non-hierarchical collaborations around mutual development objectives.” (2012: 347). Prominent among such critics is the “Academic Capitalism” school, led by Sheila Slaughter, Gary Rhodes and Larry Leslie. This research tradition stresses the impact of the industrial sector and other commercial interests on academia and the tilting of academic research in the direction of such capitalist, profit-oriented interests. Benner and Sandstrom (2000), for example, call attention to the impact of research funding on the institutionalization of Triple Helix ties: research sponsors, they claim, “steer the attention of potential applicants in a specific direction” by, for example, setting criteria for evaluation and “influence the expectations and orientations of the applicants.”

Others add that the Model is archetypical American and, with that, flattens cross-national variations in the triple-sectoral relations or in innovation systems in general. Therefore, while the Model portrays three-sector relations as a necessary condition, industrial development in Europe has long been anchored in industry-academia partnerships. Therefore, contrary to the Triple Helix Model’s imagery of innovation systems, Fogelberg and Thopenberg show that “[t]he mutual development that Arenas promoted was based on the tradition in the Swedish welfare model, i.e. a two helices industry-government partnership between large organisations, rather than on a Triple Helix process.” (2012: 355). From this perspective, the Triple helix Model reflects American definitions of innovation in the post World War II era, immersed in a culture of commercialization of the public good.

The second line of criticism of the Triple Helix Model includes the many calls for amendments to the Model, rater than replacing it. These calls are not taken as a challenge to the Model, but rather as a way to increase the Model’s relevance to varying conditions worldwide and to adapt it to changing circumstances. In fact, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff are themselves among those conceiving of extension- models, suggesting “triple helix twins” (Etzkowitz and Zhau 2006) or “N-tuple helices” (Leydesdorff 2011).

One direction for extension and adaptation of the Model, and with that a challenge of-sorts to its original formulation, includes the call for amendment to the geographical scope. Such challenges, which also speak to the American-centric tone of the Triple Helix Model, come on the basis of the adaptation that is required from the Model’s region-based analysis to its aspiration to speak for national systems. Specifically, the Triple Helix Model is scoped for regions, as it was developed from lessons of Silicon Valley and Route 128, yet it is used interchangeably with NIS, which is scoped for whole national economies and is guided by national policy. This “mismatch” between regional-, city- and national systems of innovation challenge the generalizability and applicability of the Triple Helix Model. Gray (2011), for example, calls for STI learning to occur between cities or between regions, rather than between countries. He concludes by saying that “it may make more sense for my international colleagues to spend more of their time visiting Albany, NY, Sacramento, CA, Raleigh, NC or one of the other host of states that have developed highly diversified approaches to supporting economic development via CSRC and less in our nation’s capital.” (2011: 132). Overall, this call for amendment is a call for careful application of the framework suggested by the Triple Helix Model beyond its original formulation for regions onto national-, city- or cross-border innovation layouts.

Most of the calls for amendment to the Triple Helix Model come on the basis of expanding the number of social sectors intertwined into the innovation system. Some calls are for the addition of a single, fourth strand to the university-industry-government model. Most importantly, both Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2003), Marcovich and Shinn (2011) and Yang et al. (2012), who wrestle with the definition of this amorphous social sector, suggest the adding of ‘the public,’ ‘society’ or ‘NGOs and local community organizations’ (respectively) as the fourth helix to the original triple–strand formulation. The involvement of civil society, nongovernmental organizations or local community is found to be of particular importance in the development of specific sectors of innovation, such as eco-innovation (Yang et al, 2012). Lately, Leydesdorff (2012) went as far as to suggest an N-tuple Helix model-of-sorts, as an acknowledgement of the diversity of stakeholders involved in the innovation process in the 21st century (see also, Carayannis and Campbell 2009). Yang et al. summarize these various helix models of innovation by comparing among Triple Helix, Triple Helix Twins, Quadruple Helix and N-tuple Helix models (Table 1, 2012: 377).

Others add a time dimension to the helixing. Specifically, Marcovich and Shinn (2011) not only add a strand for ‘society’ but also identify four phases to the formation of a field-level triple helix. They find that in the emergence of the research field of Dip-Pen nanolithography is phased into stages, each of which is characterized by binomial links: phase 1 includes academic instrument research (and involves university/society link); phase 2 describes the transformation from instrument to tool and the start up of a company (university/industry link); Phase3 is includes the development of a mature firm and commercialization (industry/society link); and Phase 4 is when confirming of ‘‘nanofication’’ occurs (society/industry link).

Marcovich and Shinn’s work, while addressing the general theme of time and process, also speaks to the specificity of the model to one sector or another. The possibility that triple helixing is sector specific also emerges from the work of Etzkowitz and Zhou (2006), who suggest that Triple helix Twins are formed due to the gap between innovation and sustainability in some sectors or due to the differences in economic emphases of sectors.

Overall, the many calls for expansion of the Model to additional geographical scopes, additional social contingencies, and most importantly additional helices, reflect the complexity of innovation and the intricacies involved in specifying the system that springs innovation. Our work here follows this line of expansion of the original Triple Helix Model. Through a thorough analysis of the systemic components of Israel’s successful innovation economy, we propose an extension to the original formational of the Model by adding additional helices and, with that, specifying socio-political contingencies for innovation in Israel.

1.4 The Case of Israel

Israel’s innovation economy is flourishing and still many concerted efforts are made to maintain Israel’s edge in the global knowledge- and innovation economy. Israel also boasts a solid foundation for a Triple Helix format, with most active academic, governmental and industrial sectors.

University. Israeli academic institutions, two of which predate the founding of the State of Israel[1], include 9 universities and dozens of colleges and, remarkably, 46% of Israeli adult population attained tertiary education. And while the quality of science education, from elementary to high schools, is in lower middle OECD range, the success of Israeli academia is expressed in a high rate of scientific publication, high ranking of universities, international awards for Israeli science[2], and patent productivity of universities[3] – all of which contribute to Israel’s repeated ranking as #1 worldwide in quality of scientific research institutions according to the Global Competitiveness Report. The leadership of Israeli universities is noted in particular in computer science, mathematics, economics, and chemistry[4] and national plans set several specific scientific fields as national priority[5]. Such leadership is also evident in Israel’s leadership in patenting in specific fields, most notably IT (see, Figure 1.3). In 2011 reports Israel ranked 4th worldwide in patent production ratio[6]. As noted in Chapter 4, all seven of Israel’s research universities have a technology transfer arm, with Weitzmann Institute’s YEDA founded in 1959, much earlier than noted TTOs elsewhere in the world.

Figure 1.3 Technology Productivity, by Field 2007-9: Israel in Comparison to OECD Countries (Index based on PCT[1] patent applications)

Source: OECD STI Outlook 2012, p. 4.

[1] The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is the 1970 international patent law treaty harmonizing patent registration procedures and patent protections.‬‬

Industry. Israel’s first high-tech firms were Tadiran and Elron Electronics, founded in 1962 and thus Israel’s celebrated software sector came following a strong IT standing was set (see, Braznitz 2007). Israel’s noted standing in education and STI productivity quickly lured high-tech multinationals to invest in Israel, with Motorola being the first US firm to set an Israeli arm in 1964. Notably, the main activity of multinational tech companies in Israel is R&D: Microsoft and Cisco Systems built their first R&D center outside in the US in Israel; Motorola set its largest R&D center in Israel; Intel, which started operating in Israel in 1974 and has 2 manufacturing facilities, has 4 R&D centers in Israel and Google holds 2 R&D centers in Israel. Overall, in 2012 over 240 foreign companies established R&D centers in Israel. By 2000 Israel’s “Silicon Wadi” cluster was recognized as equal in strength to Boston, Helsinki, London, and Kista (Sweden), second only to Silicon Valley (Hillner 2000). R&D-related products comprise more then half of total industrial exports (excluding diamonds). And Israel ranked 11th worldwide in company R&D spending[7] and is leading among OECD countries, in particular in knowledge-intensive industries (see, Figure 1.4). With 2010 gross domestic expenditure of R&D (GERD) standing at 4.40% of GDP (excluding defense) and an average annual growth of 4.1% in 2005-10, Israel stands as an OCED leader in R&D-related expenditure; 52% of GERD in 2008 came from private sector funding. All these factors, including the ingenuity of founders, account for the success of Israel’s knowledge-intensive industry even in the face of the challenges of political uncertainty, wars, and geographical distance (see, Chorev and Anderson, 2005).

Government. Several laws guide Israeli policy regarding STI, revealing policy emphasis on only on education but particularly on R&D.[8] Several core government program stand successfully: for example, MAGNET program – which was established in 1994, is managed by the Office of the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Trade & Labor, aims at supporting technology initiatives in Israeli industry – had a budget of 57 million USD in 2011; the 1991-1998 incubators program which came to alleviate stress of large and highly educated immigration from the former Soviet Union and spun some 500 graduating companies with 50% success rate (Trajtenberg 2000); and a 2010 Ministry of Finance initiative titled “relative advantage” (יחסי יתרון) is aimed at locating financing sources for Israeli start-up companies. In addition, several measures of The Higher Education Plan 2011-15, which aims at improving higher education and research, were implemented: doubling of in Israel Science Foundation funding (from 75 million USD in 2011 to 139 million USD by 2015) and a 362 million USD I-CORE (centers of research excellence) project. Still, Israel’s STI policy is regrettably at the jurisdiction of several ministries (Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Education and there is no comprehensive national STI plan or strategy.[9] With that, the path of Israel’s STI policy is unique in comparison to other emerging economies: Israel’s successful IT industry builds upon already present R&D and educational capacity and then was spurred by a “market-failure-focused, industry-neutral S&T policy” (Breznitz, 2007). As noted in OECD reports, in comparison to other OECD-member countries, Israel’s innovation policy is lagging (see, Figure 1.5).

Without challenging the important role of these three sectors, which are core to the Triple Helix Model, in the success of Israel’s innovation economy, are these the only institutions involved in spurring innovation in Israel and thus influencing Israel’s innovation economy? What additional institutions shape Israeli innovation? Are these additional institutions “helixed” into the traditional 3-helix model?

Drawing upon discussions of our research team, we concluded that the 3-helix model, which identifying the core institutions and articulating their tights and entangled relations, does not fully capture the institutional complexity of Israel’s innovation. Rather, Israel’s innovation requires the helixing of several additional strands into the traditional 3-strand, Triple Helix Model. Specifically, we propose that any description of Israel’s innovation system by the helix model of innovation requires the addition of at least the following institutions:

Military. In spite of the secrecy concealing much of Israel’s defense-related R&D, the Israeli defense sector has a fundamental impact on the development of Israel’s IST sectors. Much of Israel’s R&D sponsorship was directed at defense projects and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), along with the Israeli military industries, stand to be both a client for innovation and a producer of innovation. By 1980s estimates, 65% of the national expenditure on R&D were defense related, with only 13% oriented towards civilian industries) and about half the scientists and engineers employed in the industrial sector worked in defense industries (Peled, 2001: 5). IDF also influences innovation by way of its alumni, through spin-offs and cultural imprinting: many of Israel’s start-up spun off knowledge gained during compulsory military service, much of Israel’s business network is built off ties that were formed during military service, and skills of teamwork and initiative-taking born of military culture heavily imprint Israel’s STI work culture (see, de Fontenay and Carmel, 2004; Senor and Singer, 2009). Overall, the prominence of military R&D in Israel’s STI is fueled not only by Israel’s security concerns but also draws upon the spirit of Vannevar Bush’s Science – The Endless Frontier (1945), which is the constitutive document for STI policy ever since. In addition to the principle of public funding and sponsorship of STI, Bush also set a central role to military R&D thorugh collaboration with university- and industry-labs. The IDF operates according to this logic, also building DARPA-like R&D centers within the military.

Financial sector. With Israeli economy overwhelmingly dominated by the public sector until the early 1980s, much of the funding for education, science and R&D came from government sources (ministries, government-controlled banks and public agencies). Trajtenberg (2000) reports that while until 1980s financial support was directed solely at National R&D Labs, academic and agricultural R&D, and the (presumably weighty) defense-related R&D, the “beginning of government support for industrial (civilian) R&D in Israel dates back to 1968: a government commission, headed by Prof. Ephraim Kachalski (Katzir)[10], called for the creation of the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, with the mandate to subsidize commercial R&D projects undertaken by private firms.” Still, even after the massive privatization of the 1980s and the mounting pressure on sufficiency of higher education institutions, governmental subsidies and government-sponsored programs heavily influenced the sprinting of knowledge-intensive industry in Israel. For example, Lach (2002) calculates that “an extra dollar of [R&D] subsidies increased long-run company-financed expenditure on R&D by 41 cents.” Following the first Israeli firms to register on American stock exchanges, with Elscint beings the first Israeli IT company to go public on NASDAQ in 1972, many more followed to seek private funding. In 2012, Israel was second only to China in Nasdaq-listed companies: in 2012 over sixty Israeli companies are listed on Nasday, of more than 250 Israeli companies that has IPO on Nasdaq since 1980 and with 33 new Israeli listings in the year 2000 alone. Here emerge a few paths for innovation funding. In comparing Israel R&D intensive companies registered on US- and Israeli stock-exchanges, Blass and Yosha (2002) show that the companies listed in the US use highly equity-based sources of financing and are more profitable and faster-growing, whereas those listed only in Israel rely more on bank financing and government funding and are slower to grow. With the global opening of Israeli industry and financial sector, and with added boost from the Yozma government initiative to give tax incentives to foreign VC investments, came the entry of venture capital into Israel: between 1991 and 2000, Israel’s annual venture-capital expenditures rose nearly 60-fold, from $58 million to $3.3 billion and the number of companies launched by Israeli venture funds rose from 100 to 800 (IVC, 2012). With that, Israel is the largest venture capital in the world outside the US (Breznitz, 2007). This VC infusion has been found to directly impact high-tech growth in Israel (Avimelech and Teubal, 2006). In addition to the shift from public- to private funding, as of late there is also a shift from venture capital to private equity funding and a growing number of “angels” and “angel funds” (IVC, 2012). Overall, over the course of the past four decades we see a dramatic change in the finance base for STI in Israel, while Israel is also turning into a global player in STI financing.

Social sector, civil society or the non-profit sector. Following in the steps of earlier discussion by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2003), Marcovich and Shinn (2011) and Yang et al. (2012), it is evident that Israeli civil society is indeed increasingly influencing the course of STI development. Under the canopy of social sector innovation and entrepreneurship come many different initiatives, varying by goal (to create socially-minded ventures or to close social gaps in ICT access, use and creation), by sponsorship (governmental, corporate philanthropy or non-profit bodies) and therefore by being more or less formal. Operating formally as drivers of social innovation and entrepreneurship, many more Israeli NGOs are focusing their attention to innovation and social-innovation-minded international NGOs, such as Ashoka (see Chapter 6), are now operating in Israel. Some, like Olim BeYakhad (ביחד עולים) which works with educated and skilled Ethiopian immigrants, focus on social innovation, especially among weakened populations; others, like or The Hub TLV, give home also to tech or artistic innovation; and other, like Presenentse mentorship club, focus on supporting business and tech ventures. And, such socially-minded innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives are increasingly professionalized (see, ואשכנזי אברוצקי, 2011). With that, Israeli civil society is spurring the redefinition of innovation and development to include social innovation and social entrepreneurship. For one, the Prime Minister’s Prize for Innovation, which is distributed since 2010 and is a part of Israeli participation in Global Entrepreneurship Week, is giving equal credence annually to technology- and social inventors. In addition, Israeli civil society is imprinting STI industrial connections. For example, Rothchild and Darr (2005) show how much of the links between academia and industry in Israel depend on informal networks of affinity: much of the exchange of know-how and practice between the Technion and a partnering incubator depend on cyclical models of network relations among Israeli-born managers or, separately, among Russian-born scientists. And, as noted earlier, much of Israeli high-tech sector is traceable to social ties formed during military service, which still remains a “melting pot” for the Jewish non-Orthodox segment of Israeli society. This results also in the isolation, and marginalization, of any Israeli-Arab tech venture; this itself sprung civil society initiative to close the Jewish-Arab gap, with for example The Arab-Israeli Center for Technology and Hi-Tech working as a non-profit organization since 2008 in response to the high unemployment rates among highly educated Arab Israelis by encouraging their placement with Israel high-tech firms.

Diaspora, Social network relations closely tie Israeli society with two social groups outside its borders: the Jewish- and Israeli diasporas. It is estimated that in 2010 Israel was home to only 35% of the world’s Jewish population, with Israel’s Jewish population only slightly bigger than the Jewish population in the US alone. Still, with Israel declarably the home for the Jewish people, the worldwide Jewish diaspora ha strong relations with Israel and, specifically, has also impacted STI sectors. Initial support of Israeli institutions, most notably of academia, were philanthropic donations; many of the buildings, programs, and prizes in Israeli universities are named after their sponsors. As of late, it seems, more such sponsorship comes as a form of investment (Shimoni 2008 and Silver 2008 in Schmid et al., 2009): sponsorship medical- and agriculture research that comes as a form of partnership and investment.

In addition, Israel is also linked with an Israel diaspora, comprising of Israelis who reside outside of Israel: By 2008 estimates of the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption, the Israeli diapora is estimated at 12.5% of Israel’s Jewish population, with some 60% residing in the US. While decreed as Yordim for many years, the stigma that came with emigration from Israel has slowly been lifted and Israelis who found success abroad have followed in the way of Jewish philanthropist and investors to contribute to Israel’s growth. Such “circular immigration” or “Brain Circulation” (Saxenian, 1994, 2006) has been translated to IST: Israeli-heritage ties were the bridges to bring several global high-techs firms, most notably Intel in the 1970s, to establish branches in Israel (Orpaz, 2012). More formally, several government initiatives reach out to the highly educated and affluent Israeli diaspora: programs targeting “returning scientists” and activities such as that of the California-Israel Chamber of Commerce Israeli foster and maintain relations with the aim of linking business and academic communities of Israelis outside of Israel with Israel’s innovation economy.

In addition to the impact of these two diasporic communities outside of Israel, it is upon Jewish diasporic ties that Israel’s high-tech sector grew. Specifically, Israel’s knowledge-intensive industries, and particularly its post-1990 high-tech boom, relied upon waves of high-skill immigration: the 19991-1993 wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union served as a critical human capital infusion for Israel’s high-tech sector (see, Avimelech and Teubal, 2006; Chorev and Anderson, 2006).

In summary, in attempting to apply the Triple Helix Model to the Israeli case we came to the realization that the three-strand formation does not cover the full breadth of institutions, or sectors, that are tightly involved in the success of Israel’s innovation economy. Rather, we find that to the university-industry-government formation, one must add 4 so-called strands: the military, financial sector, civil society and the diaspora. With that, the Israeli innovation system is best described as a 7-helix model. The structure of this book follows this logic: each team member focused her or his research on a specific strand, regrettably with the exception of the “strand” of diasporic ties.

1.5 Structure of this Book

Following on the review of the conceptual background and critique here (Chapter 1) and the introductory note by Henry Etzkowitz (Chapter 2), the book offers a total of 6 chapters, each devoted to the exploration of a single innovation helix in Israel.

Chapter 3, written by Alexandr Bucevschi, focuses on innovation in Israel’s industrial sector, by focusing patent as and on the inter-helix relations that are reflected in patenting. With empirical verification of the Israeli industry (Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. and Elbit Systems Ltd.), looking at the affiliations of patent owners and inventors appearing in applications, he demonstrates the connections between one helix and its different sectors and between it a other helices. With that, Alexandr identifies patterns that set a basis for future causal studies as well as allowing for an early look into the influences global changes have over local industries and their patenting policy.

Chapter 4, written by Navah Berger, sets to map out the characteristics of the mechanisms used for translating academic knowhow into commercialized technologies, namely university technology transfer offices. All seven[11] Israeli research universities have a cohesive model of technology transfer that plays a role in innovation creating the field of study. By exploring their three technology transfer strategies (patenting, licensing and spin-offs), Navah reveals the extent to which commercialization of academic knowledge is well ingrained into Israeli academia, thus setting Israeli academia is a solid basis for Israel’s booming innovation economy.

Chapter 5, written by Amy Ben-Dor, analyzes the role that government initiative splay in fostering innovation in Israel, specifically exploring the gender bias in such government initiatives. Specifically focusing on the Tnufa[12] Program of Israel’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, which is aimed at supporting young entrepreneurs, Amy reveals the maintenance of social inequalities and reproduction of gender differences through the review procedures of proposals coming before the Program. In this manner, Tnufa Program is a gendered program, exposing the gendered, specifically masculine tone of the different helices.

Chapter 6, written by Noga Caspi, offers a study of Ashoka-Israel as an exemplar of the impact that civil society, or non-profit, organizations have on the field of innovation and entrepreneurship. Studying the project portfolio of Ashoka-Israel, Noga reveals that through promoting the creation of social value, A-I has reframed social activity with notions of innovation and entrepreneurship. In this way, she argues, Ashoka-Israel becomes involved in innovation work in Israel.

Chapter 7, written by Ohad Barkai, centers on the funding of research. Relying on his own compilation of research funding information that is publically available, he creates a series of network maps of Israeli institutions that are involved in funding of research, specifically medical research, in Israel. Ohad Barkai then concludes that a variety of organizations are involved in funding of medical research in Israel: government agencies (such as Israel Science Foundation), pharmaceutical and medical firms (such as Novartis), and non-profit organizations (such as Israel Cancer Association). And since Ohad studied the number of research projects funded, rather than the size of the funding, it is clear that the major sponsors of research in Israel are not the big-budget organizations but rather the non-profit organizations. Ohad’s conclusions reinforce the importance of the civil society “helix.”

Chapter 8, written by Avida Netivi, focuses his study on Talpiyot[13] Project, which is a military program designed to build a cadre of innovative R&D personnel for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The selected excelling recruits are sent for physics, CS, or mathematics studies at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, while also going through military training and introduction to defense-related industries. Avidah’s study, which started with the assumption that the military is an N-th helix in Israel’s system of innovation, concludes that Telpiyot project is in itself an expression of a Triple Helix Model. Talpiyot’s curriculum triangulates among university studies, industry experience, and officers’ military training. On the basis of such analysis, Avidah continues with a consideration of the innovation system as helixed (interlinked strands) versus hybrid (fused).

One helix proposed for Israel’s N-Tuple helix model, namely diaspora, was not analyzed because of shortage of research collaborators. We encourage others who are interested in studying Israel’s miraculous entry into the global innovation economy to explore the importance of long-standing relations between Israel and the Jewish worldwide diaspora as well as the new and still tenuous relations between Israel and the worldwide Israeli diaspora.

1.6 Concluding Comments

The Triple Helix Model offers us a starting point for an analysis of the innovation system in Israel. We are inspired by the Model’s highlighting of multi-sectoral formation and its emphasis on the interlacing and recursive relations among these many stakeholders. In this work, we take the Triple Helix Model to be a methodological tool for generalizing innovation formation and dynamics. First, relying on the Model’s triple-sectoral formation and accepting its metaphor of intertwined helices, we here expand to analyze the Israeli case as a 7-sector innovation-economy. Second, relying on the Model’s suggestion of multiple points of interaction among the helices and the transformative effects that such interaction has on each of the involved institutions, we analyze the cross-cutting relations among the Israeli military, academia, industry, financial sector, civil society sector, and the Israeli government. We contend that Israel’s innovation was spurred, and still thrive upon, the helixed relations among all 6 strands 9and by extension also the 7th helix of diasporas). It is these helixed strands that formed the “critical mass” of innovation in Israel and turned the once isolated and labor-driven economy into the hothouse of innovation for the global knowledge economy.

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[1] Technion (Israeli Institute of Technology) held classes starting in 1924 and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1925.

[2] Most notably, of the 10 Israeli Nobel Prize laureates, 6 received the award for scientific excellence: 4 in chemistry and 2 in economics.

[3] In terms of PCT patents field by universities and public labs; OCED 2012.

[4] According to Shanghai ranking of universities 2001: in computer science Weitzmann Institute ranks 11th worldwide; Technion 15th, Hebrew University 26th and Tel Aviv University 28; in Mathematics, Hebrew University 22nd, Tel Aviv University 32nd and Technion in group 51-75; in Economics both Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University in group 51-75.

[5] Specifically, the national I-CORE project specifies policy priority for the following higher education and research fields: molecular basis of human diseases, cognitive science, computer sciences, and renewable and sustainable sources of energy. And the Israeli Biotechnology Fund set brain research, nanotechnology and biotechnology as its priority sectors.

[8] Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development Law 5744-1984 (amended as late as 2006); Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment, 5719-1959 (amended as late as 2011); and laws for preferential treatment of R&D investments in the Negev and Galilee.

[9] For comprehensive review of policy, updated to 2007, see Getz and Segal (2008).

[10] Prof. Ephraim Kachalski was a chemist and among the founders of the Weizmann Institute. Upon his appointment as the 4th President of the State of Israel (1973-1978), he Hebraicized his last name to Katzir.

[11] Israel’s two additional universities do not have TTOs: Open University is primarily a distance-learning institution and Ariel University of Samaria was given the status of a university only in 2011.

[13] “Talpiyot” translated to solid and magnificent structure, or fortress.

[14] The classic Trivium and Quadrivium were the core and supporting academic disciplines that constituted the knowledge-base of medieval Europe. See Etzkowitz, Ranga and Dzisah, 2012.

[15] Author discussion with Yozma founders at the 3rd Triple Helix Conference in Rio de Janeiro, 1999. FINEPE, the Brazil Development Agency invited Yozma representatives to the conference and held side meetings to arrange transfer of the Yozma model to Brazil. FINEPE added an additional element, “FINEPE University,” a series of workshops held around the country to train entrepreneurs in “pitching” to venture firms.

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