In this paper I will discuss Thomas Aquinas's view of prostitution and several issues
related to this topic. The main question that arises concerns his position on the social toleration
of prostitution, given his strong view on the morality of it. Aquinas's position rests upon his
understanding of natural law and its relationship to civil statute. His position has influenced
later
generations and, interestingly enough, has a certain contemporary character. Guider notes that
historically there have been three patterns of social policy toward prostitution toleration,
prohibition and abolition which have in some cases been enforced simultaneously.1 In the
medieval period a shift in thinking occurred concerning the social practice of prostitution. This
shift was away from the strict condemnation and uncompromising intolerance of prostitution
by
the early Church Fathers to a view of accommodation. Rossiaud maintains that the two major
works which changed thinking about prostitution from prohibition to toleration were the
second
part of the Roman de la Rose and Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae.2 In light of such a
recommendation, this study of Aquinas's position on the practice of prostitution will focus
primarily on the Summa.

The majority of Aquinas's references to prostitution occur in the second part of the Summa
Theologiae. There is no focused treatment of prostitution as a separate treatise. References to
prostitution are scattered and occur in the context of broader discussions of other topics, in
many
cases as examples to illustrate another point. The only sustained analysis of prostitution and
related topics occurs in the question concerning the sins of lust which arises in the broader
context
of the cardinal virtue of temperance.

Lust and the Morality of Prostitution

In question 153 of the second part of the second part, Aquinas discusses the nature of the
vice
of lust. First, he notes that though this vice focuses on physical gratification, lust "applies
chiefly
to venereal pleasures."3 His reason is that vene-

page 40

real pleasures "more
than anything else work the
greatest havoc in a man's mind"4 and that they most of all "debauch a man's
mind."5 So one can
have excessive physical pleasure in other ways such as eating food and drinking alcoholic
beverages but these activities are not acts of lust. Likewise, one can speak of a "lust" for power
and other objects, but this is using "lust" in an extended sense of excessive desire and not in the
strict sense.6

While Aquinas limits the vice of lust to venereal pleasures, he next qualifies his position by
denying that every act of sexual intercourse is sinful. A sinful act is a human act that is
contrary
to the order of reason, which in itself requires that a person by the dictate of reason use certain
things in a fitting manner according to the end to which they are adapted, for the sake of
something truly good.7 He notes that the end of venereal acts is
human procreation and is
directed toward the good of "the preservation of the whole human race."8 So just as eating food
is not a sin if conducted in a way that preserves the welfare of the body, so venereal acts are not
a
sin if performed in a way that preserves the nature of the human species. The pleasure, or what
Aquinas calls "exceeding pleasure," associated with sex is not contrary to virtue if the act is in
accordance with reason.9 An activity in accord with reason does not
necessarily require a
dispassionate, conscious rational process for Aquinas, since rational activity can be "sometimes
interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason," otherwise sleeping would
violate virtue.10

The sin of lust that occurs in relation to venereal pleasure does not result from the nature of
sexual intercourse but rather in exceeding its rational limits. He mentions that there is the
other
excessive relation to venereal pleasure in terms of aversion for sex, which in agreement with
Aristotle, Aquinas terms "insensibility." He states that this aversion can be to such an extent
that
one does not pay the marriage debt.11 However, he immediately notes that this
opposite extreme
to lust "is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure."12

So the vice of lust, whereby human beings exceed the order of reason in the pursuit of
venereal pleasure, is a mortal sin. Lust is also a capital or deadly sin, according to Aquinas. A
capital sin is a sin having such a desirable end that it induces a person to commit other sins that
originate from it. He mentions that an end is most desirable by "having one of the conditions of
happiness, which is desirable by its very nature."13 One condition of happiness is pleasure.14 So
lust's end of venereal pleasure has a tremendous desirability. Aquinas also notes that such
pleasure is desirable because of its intensity and because we have a natural affinity for it.15

These other sins that originate from lust are called the daughters of lust which are not types
of
lustful acts, but derivative sins. By affecting the human power of concupiscible desire, the vice
of
lust influences other human powers by hindering or disordering their activities.16 The other
powers that lust influences are reason and the will which Aquinas notes "are most grievously
disordered by lust."17 There are four disordered or hindered
activities for each human power, for
a total of eight daughters of lust. Reason, he points out has four activities in regard to

page 41

human
action and so there are four disordered activities that lust brings about by hindering normal
mental
processes. First, there is understanding where reason "apprehends some end as good,"18 meaning
good in some objective sense and not merely an apparent good. Lust hinders this apprehension
of
goodness to the point that there is "blindness of mind."19 Following upon apprehension of an end
is deliberation about the means for an end. This second mental activity is hindered by
"rashness"
which Aquinas defines as an "absence of counsel.20 The third hindrance is on the level of
judgment concerning what one should do and is called "thoughtlessness," while the fourth
activity
is called "inconstancy" where the command of reason to do something is not heeded.21 As an
example of inconstancy, Aquinas refers to a character in a work by Terence who, after
declaring
his intention of leaving his mistress, says, "One little false tear will undo those words."22

The other four daughters of lust result from the disordering of two activities of the will.
One
activity is the desire for the end. When this will act is disordered there arises "self-love" in
relation to one's desire for pleasure and "hatred of God" because God forbids one's pleasure.23
The other activity is the desire for things connected with venereal pleasure. This involves a
"love
of this world" since one's desire is limited to this world and a "despair of a future world," where
a
person does not seek any spiritual goods because they seem "distasteful to him" on account of
his
inordinate desire for "carnal pleasures."24

In the next question Aquinas specifies the distinct kinds of lust. He notes that all six kinds
of
lust are determined on the basis of the woman and not the man. His reason is that in sexual
intercourse the man is active and a woman is passive and so since she is the one most affected,
the
species are determined by her material passivity. Reiterating that lust entails "seeking venereal
pleasure not in accordance with right reason."25 Aquinas notes that this discord with right
reason
can be of two types: the pleasure sought is "inconsistent with the end" of sexual intercourse, or
the sex is consummated with the wrong person.26 Given his stipulation that the end of
sexual
intercourse is preserving the human race,27 Aquinas states that the pursuit of venereal
pleasure can
violate this end in two ways. One type of sex entails "hindering the begetting of children"28 and
pertains to every sex act which cannot result in generation. He calls this form of lust the "vice
against nature" or "unnatural sins."29 The other type of sex between an
unmarried man and an
unmarried woman hinders "the due upbringing and advancement of the child" once it is born
and
is called the lust of "simple fornication."30 What is interesting to note is that Aquinas
feels that
sexual intercourse's end of preserving the human race entails not only physical procreation but
also the rearing of a child.

The other form of lust consisting of sex with the wrong person is divided according to
persons that one has some familial relationship with or the persons under whom a woman is
placed. Where there is a relationship of "consanguinity or affinity," the lust is incest. If the
woman is "under the authority of a husband," the lust is adultery; if under the care of a father
and
there is no violence, the sin is the lust of seduction; and if there is violence, the sin is the lust of
rape.31

page 42

A further specification is made by Aquinas
in the case of sacrilege, where intercourse
occurs with a woman who has made a vow to God to refrain from sex. Aquinas includes this
case
under adultery as a "spiritual adultery" since the woman had a form of marriage with God.32
Aquinas also notes that a husband "who is too ardent a lover of his wife" and who uses her
indecently may be considered an adulterer and even more so than if he were this way to a
woman
not his wife.33 His reason is that even though the
husband is not unfaithful to his wife in this case,
nonetheless he is "breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife" by the
way
he is treating her.34
The six types of lustful acts are, then, vices against nature, simple fornication, incest,
adultery, seduction and rape. Though a case can be made for including prostitution under
adultery, Aquinas places prostitution, which he also refers to as whoredom and intercourse
with
harlots,35 in the category of simple fornication.36 There are few direct references to
prostitution in
the works of Aquinas.37 He does note that prostitution is filthy
and against the law of God,38 that
it is something unlawful,39 a shameful occupation 40 that it is venal 41 and forbidden by the sixth
commandment.42 But Aquinas does not go into any depth
concerning the evil of prostitution
except in the discussion of simple fornication. What Aquinas has to say about simple
fornication
directly applies to prostitution and how he views the morality of the practice.

In the question on simple fornication, Aquinas notes that the Old Testament prohibits
consorting with whores and that such an action should be considered a mortal and not a venial
sin.43 The action is not an offense against God
that merely results in temporal punishment but a
sin that results in the soul's loss of the state of grace and hence a sort of spiritual death.
Aquinas's reasoning is that "every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin."44
Simple fornication, and by implication prostitution, "tends to injure the life of the offspring to
be
born of this union."45 Why so? He notes that the upbringing of
offspring among species of
animals requires both male and female in some cases, and only the female in other cases. But
for
human beings upbringing requires both parents. Aquinas maintains that rearing a human child
"requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father
as
guide and guardian."46

What fornication and prostitution create is an indiscriminate sexual union that does not
provide for the care of offspring. This care of offspring is the end of sexual intercourse in terms
of preservation of the human race. But Aquinas also notes that care for offspring is "most
necessary for the common good"47 and so has a social and political value.
Indiscriminate union
results in a loss of the contribution of the male to the upbringing of children. This male
contribution must be a sustained one. He states that "human nature rebels against an
indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate
woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime."48 Aquinas goes on to
assert that this union with a determinate woman is based on the natural law and is "directed to
the
common good of the whole human race."49 Therefore, the union of the sexes should
be
determined by law in

page 43

the form of matrimony. Prostitution, which consists of
indiscriminate
union
of the sexes, is thus opposed to both the good of a child's upbringing and matrimony.50
Public Policy Toward Prostitution

Given this strong condemnation of fornication and prostitution, it would seem obvious that
Aquinas would want to engage every force against them, especially civil law. Oddly enough he
does not. Instead he notes that the state should allow fornication and prostitution to exist for
the
sake of the common good. Relying on the well-known passage from Augustine's De ordine,
Aquinas advocates tolerance of prostitution by noting: "Accordingly in human government
also,
those who are in authority rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain
evils
be incurred: thus Augustine says [De ordine 2.4]: If you do away with harlots, the world will
be
convulsed with lust.'"51 If these social practices were to be
suppressed, the public reaction might
be such as to threaten the peace of society. Remember, Aquinas already maintains (1) that
prostitution is a species of lust that is one of the capital vices that wreak the greatest havoc on
the
human soul and leads to other sins; (2) that it is a mortal sin that threatens the proper rearing
of
children and by extension threatens the common good of society; and (3) that it violates the
natural law and matrimonial union. How then could one tolerate such an evil, particularly a
natural law thinker such as Aquinas? Is Aquinas compromising on his principles or playing
utilitarian?

To answer questions such as these requires a look at Aquinas's understanding of the
function
of human law in society which is discussed in the "Treatise on Law" of the first part of the
second
part, in questions 90-108, more particularly question 96 on the power of human law. First off,
Aquinas is not a theocratic thinker advocating a union of secular and ecclesial powers in one
religious figure.52 Though human law is founded on natural
law, they are not identical. Nor is the
human law an application of divine law in everyday living, since the purpose of human law is
the
temporal tranquility of the state, whereas the end of divine law is eternal happiness.53

Secondly, Aquinas makes a distinction between interior and exterior human acts. Exterior
acts are those observable by another, while interior acts, such as intention and knowledge, are
not
directly observable. Human law is concerned with external actions 54 and so is not able to punish
or forbid all evil deeds.55 There are some areas of human affairs
that human law cannot direct and
so it should not meddle with these matters. Aquinas is not troubled by this limitation in
human or
civil law because the eternal law can direct what human law cannot.56 So he notes that human law
permits certain things to occur in society which it cannot control. However, such permission is
not equivalent to approval of such behavior.57

This limitation of civil statute clearly applies to the area of personal virtues and vices.
While
civil law does forbid certain vicious acts such as murder and theft, and requires certain acts of
virtue such as caring for one's children and paying one's debts, it cannot "forbid all vicious acts"
nor can it prescribe "all acts

page 44

of virtue."58 Aside from the fact that it would supplant
the need for
eternal law, why cannot civil law be enacted to prohibit all vicious activities? The goal of
human
law is the temporal tranquility of the state and not eternal salvation. Given this goal of
temporal
peace and order, Aquinas notes that the mandate of human law is to prohibit "whatever
destroys
social intercourse" and not to "prohibit everything contrary to virtue."59 The main reason for civil
law's inability to prohibit all vice is that it cannot effect a full internal reform of an individual.
An
individual in their personal moral life is wounded by original sin and can only be restored by
God's
grace. Therefore the coercive and educating power of human law is inefficacious in this realm.
Aquinas asserts, then, that human law cannot "exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue
belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to
direct."60

Given these limitations of civil statute in regard to virtue and vice, Aquinas goes on to assert
that human law leaves many sinful things unpunished and the example he uses is simple
fornication, under which he has included prostitution.61 He clearly wants to include fornication
and prostitution under that category of vices that human law cannot control and which must
be
left to eternal or divine law. Yet could not a case be made that prostitution is one of those
activities that destroys social intercourse and so should be prohibited by civil statute? His
general
principle, by which the state would tolerate prostitution without approving it, is that human
laws
"leave certain things unpunished on account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and
who
would be deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments
appointed for them."62 What Aquinas seems to suggest is that
civil statute should not place too
much of a moral burden on its citizens. In the disputed question on evil, Aquinas goes so far as
to
say that God permits evil to exist and in a similar way human law permits some evil to exist in
light of the common good.63 Such tolerance on the part of Aquinas is
striking given his absolutist
positions on other topics such as lying.64

There are, then, certain limitations to the application of law in society, according to
Aquinas.
Legal statute cannot punish every wrong action, but should rather concentrate on those acts
that
threaten the social order. In light of these limitations public authority can tolerate the existence
of
certain moral evils taking into account the imperfections of its citizenry and other goods or evils
which may be at stake. However, such tolerance by civil authority does not constitute the
commission or approval of the evil act in question.

Pastoral Recommendations

Given his general tolerance of prostitution, Aquinas goes on to make specific
recommendations. In a discussion of almsgiving he forms a number of judgments about
financial
transactions concerning the prostitute as well as the customer. One question concerns ill-gotten
gains. He states that the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the law of God. However,
he
notes that a woman's profit from whoredom is not unlawful by her taking money, but because
it is
the outcome of something unlawful. So a woman does not act unjustly in her taking

page 45

money for
her services. It is lawful for her to keep it and also to give it to charity even though it is
acquired
by an unlawful action.65 Again, Aquinas notes that "paying a
prostitute for fornication involves
money given for something unlawful, but the giving itself is not unlawful."66 He states that "she
may keep her fee" and is not obliged to give it back to the customer.67 However, if she extorts
too much money from her client, she must make restitution to him.68

In another context Aquinas states that money can be acquired from "shameful occupations"
such as prostitution and play-acting, but again one is not obliged to restore these monies to the
customers.69 Interestingly, both the play-actor and the
prostitute are bound to pay tithes to the
Church on their monies as personal goods. One stipulation is that the Church accept these
monies
only after the individuals in question have done penance, "lest she appear to have a share in
their
sins."70 So while Aquinas recommends social
tolerance as a public policy, he is uncompromising
in the demand for individual repentance. Finally, in discussing the seven daughters of avarice,
Aquinas states that one can be excessive in taking by going after base profits in making money
out
of the evil activities of others, such as prostitution. This judgment would seem to apply to both
the prostitute and the pimp.71 One might naturally ask why go into
detail concerning a practice
that one finds sinful and disreputable, but given the readership that Aquinas had in mind when
writing his Summa Theologiae, it would appear that these recommendations are geared toward
clergy in their roles as confessor and pastor.
Historically, prostitution was tolerated as a necessary evil throughout the Middle Ages along
lines
similar to Aquinas's position.72 Some even thought that the availability of
prostitution protected
the integrity of families.73 The reaction of the Church was to seek
the reform of prostitutes
through rescue missions and convents for penitents. Pope Innocent III commended those who
married a prostitute, and Gregory IX urged bachelors to marry repentant women or that they
enter the cloister.74 Gradually, systems of local regulation
emerged and some cities had public
brothels for revenue.75
The legal movement to suppress prostitution is relatively recent in history.76 It was not
until the end of the fifteenth century that social opinion changed as a result of fear concerning
the
spread of syphilis that ravaged the populations of first southern, and then northern, Europe.77 The
Protestant and Catholic Reformation movements contributed to the push to close brothels.78 But
by the end of the seventeenth century, the suppression of prostitution changed to concerns
about
sanitation and hygiene.79 Britain did not make brothels illegal until
the mid-eighteenth century,
while the United States did not legally abolish its infamous redlight districts until 1912 in
conjunction with Congress's passing of the Mann Act prohibiting interstate transportation of
women for immoral purposes.
What is interesting about Aquinas's position on the practice of prostitution is the limits he
puts on civil statute to legislate behavior. He is aware of the role that the moral condition of a
society plays in conducting public policy. Civil statute can only demand as much as the
personal
morality of its citizenry can bear. In that, Aquinas is more in concert with modern and
contemporary politi-

page 46

cal views. He is also opposed to the law demanding a level of personal
moral
behavior beyond what is needed for the common good and in that way is opposed to many
currents of political correctness that exist today. By tolerating the practice of prostitution while
noting its grave sinfulness, Aquinas both recognizes the concrete condition of humanity and the
need for grace that transcends any solutions from public policy technicism. He also shows a
benevolent care for those caught up in the life of prostitution by acknowledging their monetary
rights while at the same time stipulating conditions for possible reconciliation with the Church.
In
doing this, Aquinas avoids a hypermoralism by detesting the sin but loving the sinner.