Sunday, January 31, 2016

Hindutva, a stock of knowledge and way of life unique to Indian civilisation, is being viewed differently and is facing challenges from within and without. On January 21, M. Venkaiah Naidu, India's Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, tweeted: "Feeling immensely motivated by seeing the great Hindu monk of India, Swami Vivekananda, who has taken…[the] message of Hindutva across the globe."1 Naidu made the comment after visiting the Vivekananda Rock Memorial in Kanyakumari. In this sense, Hindutva is seen as a universal way of life, and was presented in this meaning by Swami Vivekananda at the Chicago Parliament of the World's Religions in September, 1893. In Chicago, Vivekananda had stated: "We believe not only in universal toleration, but we accept all religions as true."2

On January 25, Ramachandra Guha, a noted Indian historian who describes himself as a "lapsed Marxist", tweeted: "I admire aspects of Hinduism and am a Hindu too… I am opposed to Hindutva and Hindu bigotry."3 Guha's tweet got a rejoinder the same day from Sudhanshu S. Singh who works in the humanitarian sector: "There are no clear-cut definitions of Hinduism and Hindutva. Often people abuse Hinduism in the name of Hindutva."4 In short, Hindutva – as a way of life, as a corpus of cultural practices, as a civilisation and as a religion and spirituality – has acquired a set of contentious meanings in Indian society.

The English word "Hinduism" does not reflect it completely due to its association with "ism" which denotes "ideology."The word "Hindutva" too is not a complete translation of "Hinduism" insofar as it conveys a sense of ideology. For example, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) website views Hindutva as an ideological movement, stating: "This movement, Hindutva, is changing the very foundations of Bharat and Hindu society the world over."5 It is immaterial what Hindutva means at the theoretical level. It is consequential how it is being viewed at the normative level. Therefore, various shades of Hindutva emerge at the popular level and are discussed below.

i) Hindutva – A Universal Way of Life: The term "Hindutva" has come to be associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, or the National Volunteer Organisation). The RSS views Hindutva in terms in which Swami Vivekananda spoke of – as a universal way of life. It views the entire corpus of knowledge and practices unique to India as Hindutva. The RSS sees itself as representing and defending the way of life that has been India's heritage from the ancient times. In other words, the RSS is the custodian of Hindutva. The RSS doesn't have an agenda of its own, but the diverse cultures of India are on its agenda.

While the RSS's understanding of Hindutva is universal in its meaning, the organisation itself has come to be viewed as a sectarian organisation, mainly because the non-Indian streams of thought such as those represented by Muslims and Christians feel threatened. Also, it is problematic that a single organisation should represent the entire diversities of a vast civilisation known as India, or Bharat. Nevertheless, the RSS's view of Hindutva does capture the vast diversities of India. As a result, a host of Hindu organisations are linked with the RSS by its antagonistic critics, whether or not they are organisationally connected to the RSS.

ii) Hindutva – A Secular Way of Life: A second meaning associated with the first definition views Hindutva as a secular way of life. In this sense, it is difficult to separate Hindu cultural practices from their religious conceptions. For Hindus, religion means spirituality, not an organised religion. However, this conception of spirituality cannot be separated from nature. For example, Hindus worship trees, rivers, snakes, cows and all life forms. In a historical sense – a sense in which history represents empirical practices – Hindutva is seen in a paradigm in which culture, spirituality and nature cannot be separated. Since history is secular, Hindutva is therefore secular.

In a recent article, eminent lawyer Ram Jethmalani quoted a 1995 Supreme Court judgement on Hindutva, which states: "Ordinarily, Hindutva is understood as a way of life or a state of mind and is not to be equated with or understood as religious Hindu fundamentalism... it is a fallacy... that the use of words Hindutva or Hinduism per se depicts an attitude hostile to all persons practising any religion other than the Hindu religion..."6 "Throughout India's ancient history, the word Hindu was never meant to denote religion," Jethmalani noted, adding that "Hindu" is the outsiders' term and the British gave a religious meaning to it.7 "Then came the first census of India by the British in 1871 that defined 'Hindu' as an omnibus term to encompass several religions that were not Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, or Jain," explained.8

iii) Hindutva – As Religious Fundamentalism: Most Hindu groups tend to agree over the two conceptions in which Hindutva is vastly diverse –as a universal way of life and as a secular way of life. However, at the empirical level, we are also witnessing groups of Indians who claim that they are Hindus and defy the above two definitions of tolerance and diversity. For example, bands of Hindu youths enter parks and shopping malls to dissuade youths from celebrating the Valentine's Day. Some Hindu groups that are at the forefront of such a fundamentalist movement are: Hindu Mahasabha, Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and others.9 These groups cannot be painted in terms of purely "religious" fundamentalism; their viewpoint is slightly larger and includes both religion and culture.

However, they have also reduced universal spiritualism of Hindutva to a religion. These Hindu organisations have developed a sense of insecurity, which originates from the fact that India has been invaded and ruled by outsiders for centuries but Indians have themselves never gone abroad to attack any other way of life. Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, the architect of India's missile programme and late president, was precise: "In 3000 years of our history, people from all over the world have come and invaded us, captured our lands, conquered our minds. From Alexander onwards. The Greeks, the Portuguese, the British, the French, the Dutch, all of them came and looted us, took over what was ours. Yet we have not done this to any other nation. We have not conquered anyone."10 The concern of these Hindu groups is valid, but they also do depart from the original conception of Hindutva.

iv) Hindutva – A Type of Jihadism: In recent years, some Hindu groups havedisplayed a militant opposition on some issues. On January 24, 2009, members of a Hindu group – known as Sri Ram Sena and headed by P. Muthalik – attacked women at a pub in Mangalore for violating Indian values, and over a dozen members of the group were arrested.11 Muthalik justified the attack: "In that pub, women were indulging in obscenity, they were taking drugs"; "Even if our sisters had done this, we would have acted like this only."12 Also, a series of terror attacks that took place in India do not appear to have been carried out by Muslims, though the attackers sought to blame Muslims. Abhinav Bharat, a Hindu group inspired by the conception of Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), has been linked to such attacks, as discussed by this writer elsewhere. 13

For such groups, Hindutva represents a form of armed doctrine, much like jihadism is for the Islamist groups worldwide. For example, Shiv Sena, a coalition partner with the Bharatiya Janata Party of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Maharashtra state and the federal Indian government, has gone on to advocate the use of suicide bombers to save the Indian civilisation. On June 18, 2008, an editorial in Saamna, a Shiv Senanewspaper, warned: "Islamic terrorism is increasing in Hindustan [India] and to confront this Islamic terrorism, Hindu terrorism of equal strength has to be evolved. Like the Islamic extremists, unless there are Hindu suicide bombers to protect the nation..."14 On August 15, 2015, the Shiv Sena reiterated this position in an editorial: "Hindus should be able to live in this country with pride and his (a Hindu's) voice should roar like that of a lion. If an answer has to be given to Pakistan extremists, Hindus will also have to become highly religious. To answer Pakistan, Hindus need to become human bombs and invade their country." 15

v)Hindutva – A Dynamic Way of Life: Hindutva is immensely diverse: Hindus worship rivers, trees, snake, men, women, sun, and practically everything. There is a temple in Delhi dedicated to the Saturn. But at the center of it, Hindutva is a dynamic force, open to accept change. For example, a temple was built in Bihar state in the name of cricketer Sachin Tendulkar.16 Similarly, fans of Bollywood actor Amitabh Bachchan built a temple in his name in Kolkata.17 Hindu masses, led by reformers like Raja Ram Mohun Roy, have also abandoned one of their sacred books Manusmriti, particularly with respect to its advocacy of caste system. There are indications that this truly Indian way of life is about to accept transgenders very soon legally.

Dr. David Frawley, an American Indologist, noted recently: "Hinduism… easily blends in with pluralistic social traditions, such as found in democratic traditions today."18 The acceptance of democracy in India by Hindu masses is unique – not seen for example in the Islamic world. This has led to the empowerment of a large number of masses. Millions of lower caste Indians are enabled as equal citizens due to Hindutva's willingness to change and acceptance of democracy. This acceptance results because Hindutva is a way of life willing to accommodate change; it is not merely a religion. It is due to this acceptance that millions of women are being empowered through the Panchayati Raj system. The rise of women in India's public space could be the biggest tribute to Hindutva's acceptance of democracy in coming decades.

Conclusion

Both peaceful and non-peaceful Hindu groups view their allegiance to Hindutva as the common stock of knowledge and way of life – i.e. as a system of ideas and practices in which culture, spirituality and nature cannot be seen separately. From the above discussion, it is clear that sections of people view Hindutva differently. As a way of life some groups are seeking to defend it militantly and therefore are disliked by those whose viewpoints are thus opposed. Some Hindu groups think that Hindutva is threatened by a combination of three forces: Christians, Muslims and liberal Hindus.

In coming years, some form of militant Hindutva is bound to be active because as the movements of ideas known as Islam and Christianity are succeeding in a manner that undermines the way of life known as Hindutva. For example, it is being seen that in case of inter-religious marriages, it is mostly Hindu girls who convert to Islam in order to marry – a phenomenon now known as Love Jihad. Hindus are generally open to marrying across religions without converting, a proposition unacceptable to Muslims. It is also being seen that in districts where Muslims acquire a sizeable population, they assert their religious values in a way that erodes Hindutva.

For example, Hindus of Nalhati village in Birbhum district of West Bengal have not been able to celebrate Durga Puja since 2012 because the local administration has banned it to appease Muslim sentiments.19 This appeasement is necessary for Indian writers and officials to look good, but in the process a vacuum is created in India's discourse that will strengthen the extremist shades of Hindutva, damaging the original meaning of Hindutva itself. This vacuum in India's discourse is being discussed nowadays on social media as “sickularism” – a combination of political correctness, liberalism and Islamism – and therefore poses a real threat to India's cohesion. In the course of such differences, the Indian Constitution must be the acceptable path.

Satya Prakash, the Legal Editor of Hindustan Times newspaper, thinks that the current concerns about aggressive Hindutva groups should be seen as a temporary siege mentality. "Hindutva as a way of life has pre-existed all other religions. If a few thousand people in a country of 1.25 billion people break from the original Hindutva, it does not mean that the entire civilisational corpus of Hindutva is threatened," he says, reminding: "What is important is that throughout history, instead of attacking others, Hindus have stood by their own core values which has saved the Indian civilisation despite centuries of European and Islamic rule over India. Hindutva as a way of life is like the Ganges that will continue to flow."

Tufail Ahmad is Director of South Asia Studies Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington DC. He tweets @tufailelif

Endnotes

[1] Twitter.com/MVenkaiahNaidu, January 21, 2016. All the English words used in this article have been mildly edited for clarity and standardization.

[19]This is also 'secular' India: Hindus not allowed to hold Durga Puja in Bengal village (http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/this-is-also-secular-india-hindus-not-allowed-to-hold-durga-puja-in-bengal-village_1815551.html), October 29, 2015.

Tufail Ahmad is Director of South Asia Studies Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington DC. He tweets @tufailelif

In December 2015, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), an apex constitutional body suggesting further “Islamising” of the law in Pakistan, witnessed a comic scene. The chief of the CII nearly came to blows with a member who protested what he thought was a rather arbitrary agenda of the day. The chief priest — Islam forbids priesthood — Maulana Mohammad Khan Sherani wanted to reopen discussion on the re-apostatisation of the already apostatised Ahmadi community. Member Maulana Tahir Ashrafi thought the item was not notified earlier and protested loudly enough to have his shirtfront grabbed by the chief while other overweight followers of Sherani towered over him threateningly.

Sherani, made chief of the CII by the former PPP government as a political bargain with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), was seeking to do to the Ahmadis what the Islamic State is doing to sects it doesn’t like in Syria-Iraq: Kill those who were not born Ahmadi but had embraced the sect as “normal” Muslims. The CII was going to recommend to the government that it round up the targeted offenders and put them to death.

The Ahmadis are already under disabilities that a modern state should be ashamed of. They can’t call themselves Muslim on the pain of being stuffed in jail, where they are liable to be killed by a prison guard seeking salvation through murder. They can’t say the Kalima, unless they want to land in the cooler. If they say “Masjid”, pointing to their mosque, they go in for six months. The mind fails to imagine what would happen if they handled the Quran and pronounced its name.

Ahmadis are routinely attacked by their neighbours, which the state tacitly approves as piety. Their old graves are desecrated and corpses thrown on the roads. True Muslims go round trying to trap an unaware Ahmadi into pronouncing an Islamic phrase before putting him in police custody. One notorious cleric called Muawiya, known for doing this, happens to be the brother of Maulana Ashrafi, who has defied the CII chief and almost got thrashed by his Islamic goons. Ashrafi is a rare maverick who often stands up for the underdog in a society where humanity disappeared long ago. He has also put himself in harm’s way by opposing Pakistan’s heartless blasphemy law victimising mostly defenceless non-Muslim women.

When Maulana Sherani was made head of the CII, Pakistani scholar Nazish Brohi wrote in the Daily Times: “Pakistan has witnessed accelerated Saudiisation and all discourse seems increasingly legitimised only through religious inferences, so what difference does handing of the chairmanship of an Islamic review body, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), to a deputy of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) make?”

Pervez Musharraf had tried to cool the pious madness by appointing moderate Islamic scholars like Khalid Masud and Javed Ghamdi. When the “liberal” PPP came to power in 2008, it overturned Musharraf’s “reform” and brought back the dreaded extremists by appointing Sherani. Later, Ghamdi resigned and was made to flee the country after a terrorist attack felled his deputy.

The CII is an advisory body, which means its recommendations can be ignored, but it spreads the toxin of extreme Islam that many Pakistanis think is the true faith. Its members make the air more sulphurous by giving out to the media “recommendations” not even sent to the government. Here is a sampling: According to the Daily Jang, the CII will soon recommend that anyone blaspheming against Allah too should be punished. It will also recommend that no woman be allowed to marry without the permission of her Wali (male guardian). It is expected to ban kite-flying, organ transplant and smoking.

According to the Daily Khabrain, the CII has become seized with the question of a Christian Jallad (hangman) executing Muslim convicts in Pakistan. Among issues taken to the council by the religion ministry was the issue of girls marrying of their own choice. The CII announced that the Nikah of a girl without the permission of the Wali was un-Islamic and those girls getting married of their own choice should be punished under law. The other enlightened opinion of the CII was that co-education be banned, that all lotteries like prize bonds be banned and the paper used for printing the Quran not be recycled.

According to the Daily Din, the CII chairman criticised the Supreme Court for postponing the removal of bank interest for another year. The CII ruled that insurance of all kinds was against Islam and should be abolished forthwith. It had earlier endorsed the destruction of Afghanistan’s archaeological heritage by the Taliban.

The Daily Khabrain reported that despite the passage of 23 years since the CII made its first proposal about it, the government had not changed the flag. The recommendation was that the Kalima be inscribed on the Pakistani flag along with “Allahu Akbar”. It was a pity that such a good scheme for Islamising the national flag was not accepted so far, it was said. It also said women should be disallowed from appearing in ads and that only men should be used to promote products. Women were allowed to work as air hostesses but they should be wearing the Burqa or Hijab on board. No Darzi (tailor) should be allowed to sew women’s clothes and only women Darzis should be used by women. It also declared that sending anyone to prison was against Shariat and recommended that prison sentences be abolished. Early Islam had no jails, no police, and no banks. Thieves used to have their hands cut.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan is passing through another critical juncture where extremism and terrorism have engulfed our society and state. The state initially nourished forces that believe in transnational jihadism to establish a universal Islamic state; the one claimed in parts of Syria and Iraq is just the tip of the iceberg.

When Pakistani military authorities decided to ally Pakistan with the US-led War on Terror (WoT) post-9/11, certain militant organisations, owing to their peculiar ideological and corporate interests, turned against the Pakistani state by launching suicide attacks on state institutions. Similarly, while there were some militant organisations whose top leadership did not prefer to take on the feeding hand, the lower cadre of such organisations decided against their leadership and got involved in terror attacks against the state.

Such an ideological and operational divide among militant organisations helped conceive categories such as the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, and later good and bad jihadists. Factually, however, the good and bad categories are so superfluous that in the aftermath of a terror attack, the state, as well as citizens, keep wondering who the culprit was and on whose behalf they attacked.

The fact of the matter is that our state does not have a clear stance regarding nourished militant organisations. In some circles of the security establishment, certain organisations are still viewed as force multipliers vis-à-vis India and its subversive rule in Kashmir. This probably is the reason behind the non-existence of a clear-cut state-level policy that treats all militant organisations as a threat to Pakistan and regional peace and stability. Moreover, the non-clarity of policy hinders the growth of ideas in terms of generation and propagation of a well-argued and consensually concluded counter-narrative.

Since the state is uninterested in initiating and facilitating a counter-narrative, which will expectedly upset the prevailing militant discourse and its linkages with the state and society, there is a blind focus on the operational front by launching the army and Rangers’ operations in, for example, FATA and Karachi. “Such military operations can only help us win the battle but not the war,” argued the military analyst, Ayesha Siddiqa.

In addition, ad hoc policy has led policymakers to fight terrorism only through armed measures on two different levels. One, the police, along with other law enforcement agencies, are- in the wake of the terror attack on Bacha Khan University — seen conducting armed exercises in the heart of civil centres such as hospitals, universities and busy markets.

Two, the state seems to have abdicated its primary duty of protecting its citizens and, paradoxically, has shifted its responsibility back to society. Official notifications are being issued to schools, colleges and universities, both public and private, to enhance security and, importantly, train staff and teachers with heavy weapons. In my view, this policy of arming teachers will have the following implications. One, as mentioned earlier, shifting the responsibility of providing security to civilians onto the civilians will expose a weakened social contract between the state and society, and such a measure will be exaggerated by anti-state elements nationally and regionally. Two, teachers are, ontologically, trained and taught in the use of arguments, not guns. How can one expect a teacher to carry a gun in one hand and pen in the other? The mere sight of weapons will have a detrimental effect on young minds, especially at the school level. I never saw a weapon publicly displayed or privately carried during my seven-year stay in Europe.

Three, armed teachers will not be able to concentrate on their primary job and instead may use the provided weapons for wrong reasons. For example, corporal punishment is still practiced in many schools in rural and urban Pakistan. A video of a female teacher beating a female child in Karachi went viral on social media recently. What if a teacher shoots a student for not preparing a lesson or not obliging the teacher in carrying out his/her orders as is the case in our patriarchal society? Indeed, there have been reported cases of harassment of students and female colleagues in different parts of the country. Hence, provision of arms to such rough elements will have negative repercussions.

Four, students being trained in such an armed environment will, in the long run, never be able to compete with their foreign counterparts on account of having fear and hatred of the ‘other’, and less exposure to a liberal setting. Fifth, due to armed teachers and militarised educational institutions, students will struggle later on in life because their cognitive approach will be biased towards the application of military means. This then will compound our security problem, not solve it.

Instead of arming teachers and militarising educational institutions, our policymakers should pay heed to the following. First, we should keep a simple fact in mind: militarisation of an already militarised society will add to the problem. It is productive to arm and train the security guards of educational institutions; their number can be increased to guard main and other entry/exit points. Second, extra care should be taken not to let children observe weapons and their usage. Teachers in any case must not be allowed to carry arms within the premises and classrooms. Third, the police and other law enforcement agencies need to enhance their training, equipment and operational capabilities.

Finally, the state will have to come clear on the need for a counter-narrative. Without one, the radicalised majority from within society will be providing manpower and resources to terrorist networks and the tiny minority with an alternative worldview will be sidelined and finally eliminated. Until this mindset is reset through counter-arguments, Pakistan is most likely to witness more terror attacks with more innocent lives being sacrificed. To possibly reverse this, we need to arm our teachers with the pen, not guns.

Dr Ejaz Hussain is a DAAD fellow. He holds a PhD in Political Science and works as assistant professor at IQRA University, Islamabad. He tweets @ ejazbhatty

A new book, edited by Nick Buxton and Ben Hayes, both involved with The Transnational Institute, brings together a thoughtful collection of scholars, journalists and activists to explain the pre-eminence of the military and corporations in shaping the global response to the climate catastrophe as an 'opportunity'. See 'The Secure and the Dispossessed: How the Military and Corporations are Shaping a Climate-Changed World'. http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745336961& Do you think that this catastrophe is an 'opportunity'?

In a series of chapters both in the book and online, we are thoughtfully guided through a deeper understanding of how, for the security/military-industrial complex, 'climate change is just the latest in a long line of threats constructed in such a way as to consolidate its grip on power and public finance.' For corporations, the risk posed by climate change is an opportunity for profit as they promise us 'food security', 'water security', 'energy security' … even if it is at the expense of equity and justice and has 'disastrous implications for the security of human lives and dignity'.

For the security industry, for example, it is an opportunity to offer governments an endless supply of resilience and disaster-related services that have little to do with human security, if your concern is ordinary people. Similarly, 'water security' justifies a soft-drinks manufacturer 'securing' water supplies in drought-prone regions of India, denying local villagers clean drinking water.

And 'energy security' is used to justify the aggressive exploitation of 'unconventional' fossil fuels, the use of military violence to 'secure' energy transport routes, the suppression of protests against further fossil fuel extraction and 'the expansion of renewable energy in a way that ignores concerns about human rights, democratic governance, or energy access'.

As this deadly effort to dispossess the many to secure a future for the few plays out, control of the world's food supply concentrates dangerously in the hands of ever fewer corporations – starting with the ABCD of agribusiness: ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus – at the expense of small farmers and consumers. With land and water grabs and the spread of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) exacerbating the concentration of food production, distribution and access, the global elite is happy to systematically starve to death 100,000 people each day and send a billion to bed hungry. Profit trumps people. Insane? You decide.

And having created the 'refugee problem' by starving or bombing people out of their homes, elites now use a related set of corporations to erect border fences, provide 'border security' and maintain detention centres and prisons when these refugees seek a viable place to live away from the starvation/war zone they have been forced to flee. As always for the global elite, human beings are victims to be exploited or killed, not people to be supported and helped out of empathy and compassion.

While some corporations offer 'hi-tech solutions' to the crisis, such as geoengineering (or, more accurately, geopiracy as some have labelled it), we need to gently remind ourselves that there is no technical solution to a vast range of problems, including extinction. More importantly, there is no technical solution to human fear, and particularly the fear that makes some people view humans as 'masters' of the Earth rather than just one part of the web of life (who might also be responsible stewards, if we so chose).

Of course, like corporations, the military is also concerned about the climate catastrophe: how can it maintain its capacity to kill and destroy, and its pre-eminent role because of these capacities, in a world in which environmental impacts threaten military infrastructure, energy supply and transport routes but also reinforce the demand for a sensible reallocation of resources to deal with the crisis and other important social and environmental issues?

As the chapter on 'green washing death' explains, the US military, for example, is responding in a variety of ways, ranging from switching to nuclear power and agro fuels (supposedly 'green') to making 'green bullets' (with copper instead of lead). Strangely, systematically reducing military capacities to reduce the devastating climate and other environmental impacts of the military is not an option being considered. Nor is the option of economic conversion to non-military (that is, socially valuable) production.

In short, the military is looking to expand its role by emphasizing what it portrays as 'security' threats arising from ecological disasters (although there has been no suggestion that military training and bases should be reoriented/converted to disaster training institutes). And, of course: 'There are no military strategies that focus on the root causes of climate change and what should be done to change these, because the military's primary objective is to secure the current world order, no matter how unjust or unsustainable it is'.

And yet, despite everything that the military and corporations do to destroy the bonds of human solidarity in our world, many people still act selflessly as the people of Occupy Sandy did after Hurricane Sandy hit New York and the government and people of Cuba did after surviving the same hurricane. In addition to this simple example, however, the book offers many instances of people responding powerfully to the state of our world.

I have a few friendly issues with the editors and authors of this book reflecting my own long-term engagement with the concerns discussed thoughtfully in it.

First, my own reading of the science persuades me that we do not have 'climate change' but a climate catastrophe. Language is important and 'change' has a benign connotation for most people. Just as the word 'security' has been adversely co-opted so, in the context of the climate, has the word 'change'.

Second, I would talk about capitalism, not neoliberalism. The precise form that capitalism takes in a particular era might reflect 'evolution' of a sort but, in whatever guise, capitalism is fundamentally exploitative as playing the board game 'Monopoly' taught me as a child. Capitalism is designed to bankrupt and eliminate other 'players' from the 'game' leaving just one 'player' (the global elite) to own everything. With corrupted legal systems and military forces also used to defend capitalism as a structure of exploitation, there seems little point to me in shifting the focus to one or another manifestation of it. Capitalism kills people. Our task is to explain this, which this book does superbly.

Prior to the emergence of empires in the past few thousand years (which use/d military violence to extract resources from the empire's periphery and return them to the centre), and in contrast to capitalism (which now performs a similar function using exploitative trading arrangements backed by military violence when necessary), locally self-reliant forms of economic activity have maximised individual and species survival, and nurtured the Earth, for four billion years. These forms must be restored and supported now.

Third, buying into the elite narrative about the time we have to respond to this catastrophe by using an 'end of century' timeframe is unwise. At the current rate of synergistic environmental destruction, and based on the highly problematic assumption that we can prevent nuclear war, I expect human extinction by 2030 without a concerted and strategic effort by individuals, groups and communities. Why 2030? Because it is human fear, not environmental destruction, that is the crux of the problem. See 'Why is Near Term Human Extinction Inevitable?' https://www.oximity.com/article/Why-is-Near-Term-Human-Extinction-Inev-1

Fourth, in my view, it is important to identify and focus on elite insanity. See 'The Global Elite is Insane'. scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1402/S00056/the-global-elite-is-insane.htm For more detail, see 'Why Violence?' tinyurl.com/whyviolence Time and again throughout this book, one author after another described corporate and/or military behaviour that is quite insane. For example, the day after climate scientists reported a record decline in Arctic sea ice, Shell Alaska vice-president Peter Slaiby stated the company's view as follows: 'I will be one of those persons most cheering for an endless summer in Alaska'.

Apart from displaying a mind quite incapable of grappling with, and responding intelligently to, the complex reality explained by science, he also revealed himself to be someone who is quite insane: incapable of ‘normal perception, behaviour and social interaction’, someone who is incapable of love, compassion, empathy and sympathy for those organisms, human and non-human alike, who are already suffering the adverse impacts of the climate catastrophe. But Slaiby is not alone as an endless sequence of insane pronouncements by elite individuals is given ample publicity by the media. Do I need to mention the current crop of US presidential candidates in this context? We have become so used to this insanity, that it is rarely noted. But it is people in this category who are driving official inaction or wrong action.

And fifth, my own experience is consistent with Gandhi's belief that resistance to structural violence requires powerful individuals to work collaboratively in a strategic manner. For this reason, giving individuals opportunities to experience and expand their individual power is an important corollary of providing opportunities for collective resistance. For this reason, I believe that 'The Flame Tree Project to Save Life on Earth' http://tinyurl.com/flametree offers a superior response for individuals, groups and communities who have not previously engaged in resistance but who must now be drawn into the collective overall effort to both fight the climate catastrophe but also, simultaneously, all other manifestations of elite-driven violence as well.

In short, giving people opportunities to respond powerfully, at home, is invaluable. Some of these will then join organised campaigns of resistance. Even if they do not, they are still personally involved in undermining the structural violence that is destroying our world.

But to return to the book: if you want further evidence of the elite insanity that is driving military and corporate interests to perceive the climate catastrophe as an opportunity to extend their control over people and resources and to maximise profits while doing so, then you do not need to go past this book.

In nauseatingly documented detail, the authors clearly spell out the challenges we face in resisting elite-driven violence while also intelligently responding to a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. For this reason, the book is invaluable.

Robert J. Burrowes has a lifetime commitment to understanding and ending human violence. He has done extensive research since 1966 in an effort to understand why human beings are violent and has been a nonviolent activist since 1981. He is the author of 'Why Violence?' http://tinyurl.com/whyviolence His email address is flametree@riseup.net and his website is at http://robertjburrowes.wordpress.com

Farahnaz Ispahani’s recent book, Purifying the Land of the Pure: Pakistan’s Religious Minorities, is a detailed and extremely educative account of the tragic history of her country. A well-known political activist and writer, Ms Ispahani bravely and categorically records not just the near-annihilation of religious minorities — Hindus, Christians and Pakistan’s now extinct Jews — from the nation founded by Jinnah, but also the intensifying sectarian conflict.

She worries, as others have, that a country born as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, gradually became an Islamic nation and finally a state upholding particular interpretations of Sunni Islam. In her book, she sees Pakistan’s Shia and Ahmadiyya communities as among Pakistan’s oppressed religious minorities. This is certainly a strange paradox, given so many Shias, including the Aga Khan, were instrumental in the Pakistan movement and in financially supporting its fledgling state. As Ms Ispahani reminds her readers, Mr Zafarullah Khan, Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister and an acclaimed politician and diplomat of his times, was a proud Ahmadiyya.

The Ahmadiyya community was officially declared non-Muslim by a constitutional amendment passed by the Pakistan Parliament in 1974. This was one of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s concessions to the Islamists and, rather, than stem demands, put his Government and his country on a slippery slope. Within years, Zia-ul-Haq was in power and promoting even stricter interpretations of (Sunni) Islam, complete with blasphemy laws that discriminated against minorities and other laws that discriminated against women.

The year 1974 and the fact that a modern Parliament decided to define religious identities by classifying sects and groups of populations as belonging to or not belonging to a religion is commonly regarded as a milestone in Pakistan’s history. It is seen as the date when the singling out of the Ahmadiyya people, observant and practicing Muslims, as heretical made them vulnerable to violence and in-country exile.

However, the targeting of Ahmadiyyas was not a recent phenomenon in 1974. It dated back to the earliest years of Pakistan. “In 1948,” Ms Ispahani writes, “an Ahmadi Army officer was murdered in Quetta, near the site of an anti-Ahmadi rally … By 1953, the resentment against Hindus was supplanted by antagonism towards the Ahmadiyya sect.” In 1953, there was a mass killing of Ahmadiyyas that began in Punjab, under the aegis of the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (Movement for the Protection of the Finality of the Prophet): “Its appeal to mainstream Sunni Muslims was emotive. The believers had to defend the Prophet Muhammad’s status as the final prophet of god and this could only be done by legislation declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims and by restricting their role in Government.”

The anti-Ahmadiyya riots began in Punjab in February 1953. In what Ms Ispahani describes as a “pogrom”, some 2,000 Ahmadiyya followers were killed by fellow Muslims. The Government either lost control or didn’t try too hard. The mob murdered the few policemen who sought to do their duty; most policemen didn’t bother.

In about a week, the book quotes an account as saying, “The telephone system, the railways and electrical distribution equipment were damaged and … it seemed as if Lahore might fall totally into the hands of the mob, and the Army’s assistance was requested.” Martial law was declared in Lahore, following the city’s biggest spell of violence since the Partition riots of 1947. Consider the irony. In six years, those who had “won” Lahore were fighting and killing one another.

The import of the 1953 riots is not just in the fact that they signalled the start of a sectarian blood feud among the Muslim people of Pakistan. Their true significance lies in the prescient Munir Commission report, which Ms Ispahani writes about in deserving detail. The two-person judicial commission, the “Punjab Disturbances Court Of Inquiry” to give it its formal name, was headed by Justice Mohammed Munir of the Pakistan Supreme Court. In less than a year, it produced a 387-page report, following 117 sittings, 92 of which, as the book tells us, were devoted to hearing “statements of various parties”.

The commission tackled the question of Pakistan being declared an Islamic state and what this may mean. The two judges — Justice Munir’s colleague was Justice AR Kayani, a noted jurist and civil liberties voice who suffered in later years due to his criticism of Ayub Khan’s dictatorship — were clearly concerned about the influence of religion on affairs of state. They pointed to the absence of consensus on basic definitions of Islam and Muslim identity, stressing that these were matters the Government and state would be wise to avoid.

“According to the Shias all Sunnis are Kafirs,” the commission’s report said, “and Ahl-i-Quran, namely person who consider Hadith to be unreliable and, therefore, not binding, are unanimously Kafirs and so are all independent thinkers… (as such) neither Shias not Sunnis nor Deobandis nor the Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims nor any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic state with the penalty of death if the Government … is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be Kafirs.”

As Ms Ispahani stresses, with her carefully chosen extracts from the report, Justice Munir and Justice Kayani were astutely and firmly establishing the absurdity of the arguments made before them. “No two Ulema,” they wrote, “have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim. If the constituents of each of the definitions given by the Ulema are given effect to, and subjected to the rule of ‘combination and permutation’ and the form of charge in the inquisition’s sentence on Galileo is adopted mutatis mutandis as a model, the grounds on which a person may be indicted for apostasy will be too numerous to count.”

In conclusion, the Muslim Commission made a pithy remark: “If we adopt the definition given by any one of the Ulema, we remain Muslims according to the view of that Alim (scholar) but Kafirs according to the definition of everyone else.” In reproducing that line, Ms Ispahani has said it all.

Is it fair to describe Members of ISIS, Taliban and their likes as Kharijites or Khawarij? A number of Sunni religious scholars (‘Ulema) have identified these modern terrorists as neo-Kharijites. On the contrary, some argue that Kharijite ideas were particular to a historical period and could not re-emerge among these terrorists. How should a Muslim respond to these contradictory views? Should he or she believe such ‘Ulema’ or be neutral? Such are the questions answered in this article, with reference to 40 significant characteristics of the Kharijites.

Who are the Khawarij?

Before we begin, we must of necessity understand the concept of Khawarij. The Arabic term “Al-Khawarij is plural of kharija i.e. a faction. They are a group of (blameworthy) innovators who are named as such due to their leaving the Din (religion) and rebelling against the best of Muslims.” (Fathul Bari Sharh Sahih Ul Bukhari, vol 12, page 283).

Imam Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi says, “Khawarij are a group that possesses strength and fanaticism and revolt against Muslims or governments, owing to their (self-styled) interpretation. They hold the view that Muslims or governments are upon falsehood, disbelief or disobedience and thus it is necessary to fight against them. They declare that the blood and wealth of Muslims are lawful for shedding. (Bahr al-Raiq by Ibn Nujaym, vol 2, page 234). This precise definition by Imam Ibn Nujaym fits on Kharijites of all times.

The history of Khawarij dates back to the first century of Islam and has appeared throughout the centuries since. They deviated from mainstream Muslims, adopted extremist tendencies, anathematized many illustrious Companions of the prophet (Salallahu Alaihi Wasallam), rebelled majorly against Hazrat Ali (radi Allahuanahu) and were popularly known for killing Muslims under allegations ofTakfir (excommunication).

Characteristics of Kharijites currently apply to ISIS, Taliban and Al-Qaeda?

Several characteristics of Khawarij, mentioned in Hadith and prophecies of the prophet Muhammad (Salallahu Alaihi Wasallam) speeches of holy companions and scholars, assuredly prove that the modern terrorist organizations such as ISIS, Taliban and Al-Qaeda are Kharijites. Their forty major Characteristics are as follows:

1. They are mostly young in age (حداث الأسنان/حدثاء الأسنان/أحداث الأسنان)

As prophesized by the prophet (Salallahu Alaihi Wasallam), "In the last days of this world there will appear some people among you who are young in age, immature and senseless; they will use (in their claim) the best speech of all people (i.e. the Qur'an) and they will abandon Islam as an arrow going through the game. Their belief will not go past their throats (i.e. they will have practically no belief), so wherever you meet them, kill them, for he who kills them shall get a reward on the Day of Resurrection."

This hadith has been narrated in several places of the hadith books. The Arabic words used in hadith to refer to this first characteristic are ‘أحداث الأسنان’ or ‘حدثاء الأسنان’ or ‘حداث الأسنان’; all of them have the same meaning i.e. ‘Young people’ or ‘People with new teeth’ (i.e. young in age).

3. They will be the people with tucked-up loincloth / a waist sheet that was tucked up (مشمر الإزار)

(Sahih Muslim: The Book of Zakat 12, Chapter 47: The Khawarij and their attributes Hadith 189)

(Sahih al-Bukhari: The Book of Al-Maghazi 64, Chapter: Sending 'Ali and Khalid to Yemen, Hadith 378)

4. The people (Kharijites) will emerge from the East (يخرج ناس من قبل المشرق)

(Sahih al-Bukhari 7562: The Book of Oneness of Allah (Tawheed) 97, Chapter 57: The recitation of the Qur'an by an impious person or a hypocrite, Hadith 187)

In one narration, the prophet Muhammad (Salallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said while pointing his hand towards Iraq: “There will emerge from [Iraq] a people who recite the Qur’an but it will not go beyond their throats, and they will stray from Islam as an arrow strays from the animal [at which it is shot].” (Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 9, Hadith 68)

5. They will continue to appear until the last of them comes with Dajjal [Anti-Christ] (لا يزالون يخرجون حتى يخرج آخرهم مع المسيح الدجال)

This prophecy refutes those who think that kharijite ideas were particular to historical period and could not re-emerge in modern days among terrorist groups.

(Sunan an-Nasa'i 4103, The Book of Fighting [The Prohibition of Bloodshed] 37, Chapter: “The One Who Unsheathes His Sword and Starts to Strike the People With it”, Hadith 138, Grade: Hasan)

6. Their faith will not exceed their throats (لا يجاوز إيمانهم حناجرهم)

(Sahih al-Bukhari, The book on Virtues of the Qur'an, Chapter: The sin of the person who recites the Qur'an to show off or to gain some worldly benefit, or to feel proud etc, Hadith 82)

As the extremism of Khawarij is widely known, some scholars argue that Khawarij are disbelievers, adducing the prophet’s statement “to the point that they will leave it” as evidence for their standpoint. Other group of scholars keeps silence over the Takfir of Khawarij. However, all of them unanimously agree that the Khawarij have nothing to do with Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah: “orthodox Muslims”.

8. They are excessive in performing acts of worship (يجتهدون في العبادة)

9. Every one among you will consider his prayer and fasting insignificant as compared with their prayer and fasting (يحقر أحدكم صلاته مع صلاتهم وصيامه مع صيامهم)

The Messenger of Allah (Salallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said, “Leave him (Dhul Khuwasira, one of BanuTamim), for he has friends (who would outwardly look to be so religious and pious) that everyone among you would consider his prayer insignificant as compared with their prayer, and his fast as compared with their fasts. They would recite the Qur'an but it would not go beyond their collar-bones. They would pass through (the teachings of Islam so hurriedly) just as the arrow passes through the prey”.

27. The best of the Slain are those who were killed by them (خير قتلى منقتلوه)

(Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 1, Hadith 181) (Tirmidhi)

28. The Khawarij are the worst of the slain who are killed under heaven (شر قتلى تحت أديم السماء)

(Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 1, Hadith 181) (Tirmidhi)

29. They (Khawarij) are dogs of the hellfire (إنهم كلاب النار)

(Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 1, Hadith 181) (Tirmidhi)

30. The Khawarij hold that a Muslim becomes disbeliever due to every sin,saying “they leave the fold of faith and enter into disbelief”. (Sharhul 'Aqeedah al- Tahawiyyah page. 298)

31. The Khawarij believe that the Muslims who commit major sins will live eternally in the Hellfire. (Sharhul 'Aqeedah al- Tahawiyyah page. 360)

32. The Khawarij are the worst people in deriving rulings based on analogy. (Al-Milal wan Nihal 1/116)

33. Some sects of Khawarij consider those who do not accept their views to be disbelievers, and then declare their blood lawful for shedding. They also allow killing women, children and the old who oppose them. (Lawaamiul Anwaar al Bahiyyah (1/86)

34. One of the characteristics of khawarij is that those Muslims who are following Taqleed are a cause for disbelief and the destruction of Islamic ummah. Thus they oppose Muqallid scholars. (Diraasatun Anil FiraqwaTaareekhil Muslimeen, pg. 146-147)

35. Some of the Khawrij believe that a person who believes that the consensus (Ijma’) of the scholars is proof in Islamic Sharia is a disbeliever. (Diraasatun Anil FiraqwaTaareekhil Muslimeen, pg. 143)

36. They prefer illiteracy to education, claiming that the combination between religious sciences and the practical secular sciences is not possible. (Diraasatun Anil FiraqwaTaareekhil Muslimeen, pg. 134)

37. They use only those verses of the Qur'an that are about Wa'eed (Allaah's warning of punishment) while they avoid using the verses regarding the Wa'ad (Allaah's promise of forgiveness and mercifulness) (Al Khawarij Awwal ul Firaq fi Taarikhil Islam p. 38)

39. They outwardly display the attributes of calling towards good and forbidding the evil, using Religious texts, while they dispute with and rebel against the rulers and fight against those Muslims who do not obey them. (Al Khawarij Awwal ul Firaq fi Taarikhil Islam p. 37)

40. They incite teenage girls, family members, and wives, mothers and fathers to break away from their relatives and family to join their Kharijism.

Translation: “Then they (Khawarij) went slipping away alone to avoid detection so that no one would be able to prevent them from leaving. They went from the midst of their fathers, mothers, uncles and aunts, leaving behind all the kith and kin. Due to their ignorance, little knowledge or understanding, they believed that it would please the Lord of Earth and Heaven, not realising that it was in fact of the greatest crimes, the most destructive sins, monstrosities and wrong doings. They did not realise that this had been made attractive to them by the devil and their own egos hell-bent on wickedness. Some people were able to salvage some of their offspring, relatives, and brethren, and return them back and rebuke them. Then, some of these remained upright while others fled afterwards and joined the Khawarij, and so became losers until the Day of Resurrection.” (Al-Bidaya wan Nihaya, v. 10, p. 581)

Given the characteristics of Kharijites clearly mentioned in several Hadith, speeches of holy companions and religious scholars, as some of which referenced above, it is quite fair to describe the ‘ISIS’ and other Islamist terrorists as Kharijite terrorists. It is also worthy to note here that in several Sahih Hadith, the Prophet (Salallahu Alaihi Wasallam) has commanded Muslims to fight Kharijites. It is, therefore, incumbent (Wajib) upon Muslim governments and rulers to fight against the ISIS, Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, in order to protect Muslims and non-Muslims and establish peace worldwide. As for Muslim scholars, they ought to perform this fight as a wajib on ideological ground, refuting their Kharijite narratives and characteristics.

A regular columnist for New Age Islam, Ghulam Ghaus is an Alim and Fazil (Classical Islamic scholar) with a Sufi background. He completed the classical Islamic sciences from a Delhi-based Sufi Islamic seminary Jamia Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia Zakir Nagar, New Delhi with specialization in Tafseer, Hadith and Arabic. He completed his Alimiat and Fazilat respectively from Jamia Warsia Arabic College, Lucknow and Jamia Manzar- e- Islam, Bareilly, U.P. He did his graduation in Arabic (Hons) and post-graduation (Arabic) from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.