An Austin Ordinance that prohibits landlords from discriminating against prospective tenants based on "source of income," including federal housing subsidies, is not preempted by the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.

The ALJ correctly denied Castillo's pre-hearing motion to dismiss the charge based on res judicata and motion in limine to exclude the testimony and expert written report of Giménez's treating psychiatrist

The district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's disparate treatment claim under the FHA

SSDI letters that do not contain expiration dates sufficiently establish that the disability benefits would likely continue and lenders may not require SSDI recipients to provide medical documentation as additional proof that the disability benefits would continue

The Court should not review petitioners' claim that the Fair Housing Act does not encompass disparate-impact liability, noting that all 11 circuits to have decided the issue have permitted such claims

The Department of Housing and Urban Development, consistent with its longstanding position, has recently promulgated a regulation providing for disparate-impact liability. Because the new regulation lays out a burden-shifting analysis for deciding such claims, the Court need not review any circuit split on the appropriate burdens of proof

Because this case was decided without the benefit of the new regulation and respondents had not raised their current claims below, the case was not an appropriate vehicle for resolving the questions presented in the petition for certiorari

The district court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law by applying an incorrect legal standard in analyzing plaintiff's FHA claim that required the jury to determine if the ad focuses on the suitability of the property to the renter, rather than the acceptability of the renter to the owner

Plaintiff needed only to show that the ad indicates to the ordinary reader an unlawful preference, and that this ad on its face shows such a preference based on sex and familial status

The district court erred in requiring plaintiffs to show that they were treated differently than similarly situated individuals who do not have disabilities to prove intentional discrimination based on disability

The court erred by failing to determine whether the action as a whole was "substantially justified," and by failing to recognize that a pattern or practice case, by its very nature, is a single claim, not a collection of individual claims

The court failed to recognize that given its denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict, there is a presumption that the government's case was substantially justified

District court's decision is correct insofar as it found that RISA violated HOPA until September 2007, but a remand is appropriate because of inadequate findings as to whether the community met HOPA's three criteria after September 2007

The district court erred in concluding that even assuming that Mr. Rodriguez was disabled, “no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant knew or should have known Mr. Rodriguez was disabled and that HHA knew the requested accommodation was necessary.”

The facts are sufficient to establish that HHA knew or should have known that Mr. Rodriguez was disabled and requested an accommodation

Therefore HHA had an obligation to engage in an interactive process to try to resolve the request

The district court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction enjoining the residential community from removing or tampering with the footbridge built by an individual with a disability on land owned by the residential community

The district court properly exercised its discretion to issue preliminary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo

Rehearing en banc is appropriate in this case because the Fifth Circuit’s ruling (1) conflicts with Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent interpreting the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act for the United States as plaintiff and (2) erroneously holds that that Section 3612(o) limits the United States to the kind of equitable relief a private party suing on his or her own behalf could obtain

The district court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff, a non-profit fair housing organization, lacked standing to file suit on its own behalf to enforce the Fair Housing Act

United States was “substantially justified” in naming the site developer as a defendant, and the site developer did not "incur" attorney's fees that its liability insurance carrier paid

The district court erred in ruling that the United States was not "substantially justified" in seeking to hold TWM liable for its participation in the inaccessible design and construction of Applegate Apartments

Attorney's fees that TWM’s insurer was
obligated to pay and did pay were not
"incurred by" TWN under EAJA

HUD correctly interpreted its own regulations to require, upon proof of noncompliance with HUD’s Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, that petitioners demonstrate compliance with some other objective measure of accessibility.

Montana Fair Housing has standing under the Act

The ALJ’s initial decision dismissing the suit against the Nelsons is not HUD’s final order, and thus, not reviewable

HUD’s ruling that front entrances must be made accessible correctly interprets the Act

HUD properly held Bernard Nelson liable as a co-owner of the property;

Petitioners are not protected by their holding company from the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the remedial order’s retrofitting requirements

On petition for review, Ho argues that the ALJ’s default judgment of liability and assessment of damages against her deprived her of due process. Fung argues that the ALJ’s default judgment of liability and assessment of damages arbitrarily departed from HUD and Circuit precedent. The Division responded to these claims and cross-petition for enforcement of HUD’s final order

Any error that may have occurred during the cross-examination was invited error, and therefore is not reviewable

In the alternative, Mullins is unable to establish plain error

The record is not sufficient to allow the court of appeals to address Mullins’ ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, and, even if it were, Mullins is unable to demonstrate prejudice because the evidence supporting his conviction was overwhelming

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary
injunction

The design of the 19 proposed buildings violates the Fair Housing Act

The district court had discretion to enter a preliminary injunction because
the United States demonstrated at least a reasonable probability that a
statutory violation had occurred or was about to occur

Even if the traditional equitable factors applied here, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction

Fair housing group established standing under the Fair Housing Act and
Article III by demonstrating that the defendant's illegal housing discrimination
injured the group's fair housing educational and counseling program, requiring
the group to undertake remedial programs in the community to mitigate the damage

Landlords' Free Exercise Clause challenge to local fair housing law must
fail because landlord did not make colorable claim that fair housing law
constituted a taking of property or violated First Amendment right to free speech

Amicus curiae suggestions may be submitted to crt.amicus@usdoj.gov. Submissions should include case name, docket number, circuit/district court name, a brief description of the case and issue, and the current status if known.