Labor Organizations

The Sandinista unions played a major role in the
politics of
the Chamorro government's first years. The change of
government
sparked a competition in union organizing and activities
that
posed serious challenges to the new government. One
challenge for
the new Chamorro government was to create and maintain
political
bases by organizing workers; the other was to maintain
political
and economic stability when confronted by strikes led by
Sandinista unions.

The first challenge resulted from a new freedom for
unions to
organize, created by a law the National Assembly has
passed in
the interregnum. This law changed the labor code to allow
workplaces to have more than one union. The law was
adopted
because the lame-duck Sandinista majority feared that the
government would replace the Sandinista unions with UNO
unions
while maintaining a closed shop. After the new law took
effect,
the unions that had supported the UNO moved to break the
Sandinista monopoly on organizing in the public sector by
organizing groups of the required twenty-five members to
form a
new bargaining unit. In some places, such as the San
Antonio
sugar mill, which with 5,000 workers was the largest union
in the
country, workers decided to retain the old union but voted
out
the board of directors who had been Sandinista supporters.

A greater challenge was posed by strikes initiated by
the
strongest unions--those affiliated with the FSLN. These
unions
were no longer bound by ties to a leadership in power to
support
austerity policies that had had adversely affected the
workers.
Within a month after the Chamorro government took office,
the
Sandinista unions become a political and economic force
with
which to reckon.

Despite the election of a government supported by the
UNO-
affiliated unions, the Sandinista unions are widely
believed to
remain the largest and most powerful organized labor
sector,
despite diminishing power and membership. Although there
is a law
requiring the registration of new unions, the exact number
of
unions is not known because there is no legal provision to
account for those unions that had merged or ceased to
exist. At
the top of the labor-organizing hierarchy are four
confederations: one affiliated with the Sandinistas, two
with the
UNO, and one with a Trotskyite orientation. The
Sandinista-
affiliated confederation, FNT, organized in mid-1990,
claimed to
have 400,000 members among its seven-member organizations
during
the early Chamorro years, although most observers believe
that it
has lost considerable strength. The members of the FNT
include
the Sandinista Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de
Trabajadores--CST), a confederation of labor unions; the
Association of Agricultural Workers (Asociación de
Trabajadores
del Campo--ATC); the National Employees Union (Unión
Nacional de
Empleados--UNE), composed of white-collar workers; the
Federation
of Health Workers (Federación de Trabajadores de Salud--
Fetsalud); the National Association of Nicaraguan Teachers
(Asociación Nacional de Educadores de Nicaragua--ANDEN);
the
Union of Nicaraguan Journalists (Unión de Periodistas de
Nicaragua--UPN); and the Heroes and Martyrs National
Confederation of Professional Associations (Confederación
Nacional de Asociaciones Profesionales-Héroes y Mártires--
Conapro-Héroes y Mártires).

The UNO-affiliated unions are grouped in two
confederations.
One is the CTN, headed by Carlos Huembes Trejos. Formed
during
the 1960s, it is affiliated with the Christian Democratic
regional labor group, the Confederation of Latin American
Workers
(Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores--CLAT), and the
Christian Democratic international labor organization, the
World
Confederation of Labor. The CTN has an estimated 40,000
members.
The other UNO union is the Permanent Congress of Workers
(Congreso Permanente de Trabajadores--CPT) umbrella group,
organized in the late 1980s, which includes five
organizations.
Most prominent of these is the Confederation for Trade
Union
Unity (Confederación de Unificación Sindical--CUS), formed
in
1968 with the support of the Inter-American Regional
Organization
of Workers and the Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers
(autonomous) (Confederación de Trabajadores Nicaragüenses
[autónoma]--CTN[a]) of Agustín Jarquín Anaya, a break-away
faction from the CTN. The CPT also includes the Federation
for
Trade Union Action and Unity (Central de Acción de
Unificación
Sindical--CAUS) of the Communist Party, the General
Confederation
of Workers-Independent (Confederación General de
Trabajadores-
Independiente--CGT-I) of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party
(Partido
Socialista Nicaragüense--PSN), and the National Teachers'
Confederation of Nicaragua (Confederación Nacional de
Maestros
Nicaragüenses--CNMN).

If the numbers of members given by labor organizations
are
accurate, some 650,000 of an estimated total active labor
force
of 1.1 to 1.2 million persons are affiliated with a union.
Some
analysts believe that number, which is more than 50
percent of
the labor force, is very high. Whatever the size of their
membership, at least the Sandinista unions have had a
major
influence in shaping the direction and pace of the
Chamorro
government's economic policy.

The potential of the Sandinista unions to disrupt the
government was first demonstrated within two weeks of the
Chamorro government's inauguration. Estimates are that
30,000 to
60,000 out of some 150,000 government workers impeded work
in
government offices, schools, banks, public transportation,
and
telephone and airport operations in mid-May 1990. The
strike
began as a result of the Chamorro government's decisions
to
reexamine the lame-duck legislation passed by the outgoing
Sandinista Assembly as well as other government actions
during
the transition period. In labor matters, the Chamorro
government
annulled the lame-duck collective bargaining arrangements
and
suspended the civil service law giving job security and
increased
benefits to public employees. President Chamorro also
announced
that tenants would be allowed to cultivate unused
expropriated
farmlands while property claims were being settled, and
she
established a commission to review claims to confiscated
lands.
Other measures taken early in the Chamorro government
included
the National Assembly's passage of an amnesty law
pardoning all
political crimes as of the effective date of the
legislation and
annulment of a March law giving amnesty to Sandinista
government
officials for crimes committed in the course of performing
official duties.

The Sandinista-affiliated UNE called first for a work
stoppage of selected workers and then for a general
strike.
Formally, workers demanded a 200 percent pay increase and
restitution of the civil service law, but calls in the
streets
encompassed a variety of political demands, including
President
Chamorro's resignation. At first the government declared
the
strike illegal, threatened to fire striking workers, and
refused
to meet with Sandinista union leaders. When the strike
persisted,
the government decided not to test the loyalty of police
and
military forces by ordering the use of force to dislodge
strikers
from occupied buildings and instead negotiated with
leaders of
the public workers' union.

The strike resulted in the Sandinistas gaining some but
not
all that they had asked for: a 25 percent wage increase on
top of
the 16 percent that the government had already promised,
the
right for unions to take part in drafting regulations to
implement the civil service law that had been revised by
the UNO
National Assembly, and the rehiring of workers fired after
March
19, 1990. Some analysts viewed the strike as actually
hurting the
Sandinista unions. Politically, however, the Sandinista
unions
had demonstrated their power to force the government to
reconsider its actions. The strike also strengthened
Sandinista
demands for national dialogue on the property issue. Many
viewed
the strike as a fulfillment of Daniel Ortega's promise
during the
election aftermath that the Sandinistas would rule from
below.
The FSLN's leadership denied, however, that the FSLN had
orchestrated the strike.

The next large-scale strike of 85,000 to 100,000
workers was
called on June 27, 1990 by the newly formed FNT. It began
in
earnest on July 2 and ended on July 11 only after several
people
had died and hundreds more had been injured. The FNT's
initial
seven demands, subsequently expanded, encompassed a grab
bag of
issues, including a higher minimum wage, reenactment of
the
Sandinista civil service law, suspension of two decrees on
property restitution, and measures for public support of
construction, basic services, health, and education. The
unions
were widely viewed as the winners when an agreement was
finally
reached to end the strike. This agreement provided for
increased
wages; benefits for dismissed workers; guarantees for
continued
transportation subsidies; suspension of the program
renting
unused and disputed land to previous owners; FNT
participation in
plans for reactivation programs and programs to maintain
jobs;
including subsidies to failing textile and construction
companies; and talks on a minimum wage law. The
government's
economic concessions were broad and backtracked on its
economic
reform and adjustment program.

Economically, the May and July strikes cost the
government an
estimated US$270 million, according to one source.
Politically,
the July 1990 strikes and settlement pact also dealt
several
blows to the Chamorro government. First, the tensions
between
Chamorro's UNO backers and her small executive team over
reconciliation gestures toward the Sandinistas widened
into an
open rupture as the Chamorro government bent to the
Sandinista
unions. Vice President Godoy announced that he was forming
a
Committee of National Salvation to deal with the strike
and
received the backing of Cosep, UNO leaders in the National
Assembly, and UNO-affiliated union leaders. Thus, the
Chamorro
government's short-lived truce with its UNO backers was
over.
Second, the Sandinista unions demonstrated the
destabilizing
possibilities of their "rule from below" study. Although
the
Sandinista military and police had dismantled street
barricades
put up by the strikers and had not been openly disloyal to
the
government during the strike, the government still
appeared
unwilling to test their loyalty and did not order the
military
and police to use force against or arrest the strikers.
These
events foreshadowed a situation in which the price of
social
peace would be either substantial concessions from the
government
or actions by the Sandinista leadership to back up
statements of
support for the government's economic plan by exercising
control
over their affiliated unions. The relationship between the
Sandinista directorate and the unions became a source of
controversy, with members of the directorate denying that
they
had encouraged the union protests. Critics doubted,
however, that
Sandinista party discipline had declined to the point that
the
unions could act autonomously. The Chamorro government
signed
agreements ending the strike directly with the unions, not
with
the Sandinista leaders, however, indicating that the
Sandinista
leadership's control over the unions was limited.

The political situation in July 1990 further encouraged
the
government to cultivate good relations with Sandinista
leaders
and unions because, as the July disturbances suggested,
the
government had no alternative. Yet the Sandinistas'
ability to
incite followers to the streets waned quickly after the
summer
strikes. A call from the Sandinista leaders and the FNT
for a
nationwide strike in October 1990 prompted little
response. An
FNT rally against the government's economic policies
turned out
3,000 rather than the expected 60,000 demonstrators.
Probably as
a result, the FNT agreed to join President Chamorro's
discussions
among unions, producers, and the government to reach a
national
understanding, the concertación, on economic and
social
policies. The concertación agreement, signed in
October
1990, brought several months of peace before the property
issue
ignited. Another damper on Sandinista union activity may
have
been Humberto Ortega's cautionary remarks to the July 1991
Sandinista National Congress; he noted that irresponsible
union
demands and actions would condemn the country to crisis
and
imperil revolutionary goals.

The concertación agreement also appeared to
temporarily defuse economic unrest. Strikes soon after the
accord
were of the uncontrolled variety, more likely to alienate
than
attract followers. However, a crisis developed in October
1991
when Daniel Ortega criticized the government as harking
back to
Somozaism with its policy of returning land to former
owners and
with the announcement that the mayor of Managua was
contemplating
the creation of a municipal police force. Ortega indicated
that
the people might have to exercise their right to civic
rebellion,
even with arms. President Chamorro accused the FSLN of
calling
for armed insurrection.

Protesting the new policy of privatization, Sandinista
union
members occupied a meat-packing plant and slaughterhouse
in
September 1991; five sugar refineries, a soap plant, and
many
large farms were taken over by early November. Workers
demanded
that they be granted a 25 percent share in ownership when
properties were returned to the private sector, something
the
Chamorro government had promised in August 1991
agreements. In
Managua, police battled with students and health workers
who
marched to the Ministry of Labor armed with clubs and
homemade
bombs. The violence escalated after the FNT's rejection of
a
November 7 agreement between the FSLN directorate and the
government to end the strikes. There reportedly were also
violent
incidents in Matagalpa and Estelí, and riots in Managua,
where
Sandinista followers destroyed Radio Corporación, attacked
Contra
offices with rocket-launched grenades, and looted and set
fire to
city hall. Earlier, armed men had fired on the home of
Vice
President Godoy. The rioting ended when President Chamorro
said
she would call in the army and Daniel Ortega appealed to
Sandinistas for order.

The 1991 incidents displayed the distance between the
Chamorro government and the UNO-affiliated unions. The CPT
complained when Vice President Godoy stated that the army
and
police chiefs should be dismissed for not stopping the
rampage
that caused an estimated US$3 million in damage. On
November 13,
the CPT went further, deploring the executive branch's
tolerance
of and complicity in Sandinista terrorism and crimes, a
complaint
that continued in 1992 and 1993.

The labor problem continued to present a serious
challenge to
the Chamorro government through at least the midpoint of
her
term. Former President Ortega emerged openly as the
champion of
labor union mobilization against the Chamorro economic
policies.
In the midst of a strike of transport workers in September
1993,
Ortega urged Sandinistas to support marches protesting a
vehicle
ownership tax and a gasoline price increase. He tied these
new
taxes to the need for a change in the government's
economic
policies and the need to resolve property issues.

Content
on this web site is provided for informational purposes only. We accept no responsibility
for any loss, injury or inconvenience sustained by any person resulting from information
published on this site. We encourage you to verify any critical information with
the relevant authorities.