Thursday, February 28, 2013

The United States suffered from poor planning when it came
to preparing for post-war Iraq. There were always a number of different groups
tasked with the job, but they were not coordinated. One of the few things that
was agreed upon was the creation of an interim Iraqi government shortly after
the fall of Saddam Hussein. President Bush signed off on this idea just before
the 2003 invasion. Iraqi exiles were consulted, and several meetings held, but
then suddenly Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), scrapped the plan. Bremer reversed course from the U.S. wanting to
quickly leave Iraq to launching a long-term occupation of the country.

There were two competing ideas about what the U.S. should do
in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. One would be to quickly set up an interim government. Supporters of this idea said that the new authority should be
made up of both Iraqi exiles and those who had stayed in the country. The other
would be for the United States to run the country. President Bush, National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
members of his staff, U.S. representative to Iraqi exiles Zalmay Khalilzad, and
deputy head of the Central Command (CENTCOM) General John Abizaid all supported
the first plan. Before the war, Bush told a meeting, “We need to give this to
the Iraqis as quickly as possible to form a government.” This was in line with
Bush’s statements when he ran for president when he stated that he was opposed
to nation building. Bush campaigned on the fact that he would not be like
President Clinton who got the United States involved in a series of
humanitarian and failed state situations such as Haiti and the former
Yugoslavia. Other members of his cabinet such as Rumsfeld were equally opposed
to long-term overseas engagements. These ideas largely shaped the strategy in
Afghanistan when the United States overthrew the Taliban, held a meeting of
Afghans, and quickly set up a government, which allowed the Americans to draw
down their forces. It seemed initially that Iraq would follow that exact same path.

Right before the invasion, National Security Advisor Rice
tried to make an interim government official policy. Rice set up a postwar planning group within the National Security Council (NSC) under Frank Miller. On March 10 and 12, 2003, Miller briefed the NSC on postwar plans, which
included putting Iraqis quickly in charge of their country after the fall of
Saddam Hussein. The president signed off on the idea. The problem was that this
had no actual affect. The administration was dysfunctional when it came to strategizing for post-war Iraq. It always had several organizations
planning for the situation, but none of them were coordinated, and hardly
anything was every operationalized. Miller’s group was just one of many.

The U.S. military actually did try to act upon this plan,
but it fell apart. Deputy CENTCOM commander General Abizaid told Zalmay
Khalilzad that he needed to meet with Iraqi exiles to prepare them for an
interim government so that an Iraqi face could be placed upon the war.
Khalilzad wanted internal Iraqis included in any new authority, but he didn’t
know any. Abizaid was not concerned, and wanted exiles quickly brought to Um
Qasr in Basra right behind the invasion force to announce that they were the
new rulers of Iraq. As the war began, and the Coalition quickly moved towards
Baghdad, the interim government idea was dropped. Some in the U.S. armed forces
were concerned that the invasion could turn out to be a drawn out affair, and
not proceed as quickly as Rumsfeld had envisioned. That was what led people
like General Abizaid to push for an interim government being established even
before the war was over. When the Iraqi forces began disintegrating before the U.S.
and British armies however, it wasn’t deemed necessary to involve Iraqi exiles,
because the conflict was going to come to an end quickly.

In April 2003 Khalilzad met with Iraqis in Nasiriyah and
told them that the U.S. had “absolutely no interest in ruling Iraq.” (BBC)

After Saddam was deposed Jay Garner and the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) was placed in charge of Iraq.
Garner envisioned turning over the country to an interim government in just a
few weeks as well. On March 12, 2003, President Bush approved his plan at an
NSC meeting. Garner later told two Senate staffers as he was waiting in Kuwait
to enter Iraq that a new government would be created by August. Khalilzad
assisted in this process by holding a meeting with both internal and external
Iraqis in Nasiriyah just after Baghdad was taken. On April 22, Garner went to
Kurdistan to meet with Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and exile leaders to
continue the discussion. Many opposition groups had been trying to come up with
a government in waiting since late-2002, but to no avail. Now it seemed within
their grasp. The only problem was that Garner wanted to include some internal
Iraqis. Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress and Mohammed Baqir
al-Hakim of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq objected, because they believed
that would dilute their power in any new ruling coalition. With fewer parties
involved, the more influence each would hold. Still, Chalabi told the press that an interim government would be in place by July. Garner always thought
that his job would be a short one in Iraq. He originally thought that the war
would lead to a humanitarian crisis with refugees and food shortages, but that
the government would be up and running, and it would only be a few months
before everything would return to normal. It would be his job then to just
provide assistance, and then give Iraqis the reigns, and leave.

Officials from the Pentagon were pushing in the same
direction. Rumsfeld’s spokesman Larry Di Rita was sent to Kuwait to watch over
the ORHA before the war started. There he told a meeting of the organization
that the State Department under Clinton had failed in Bosnia and Kosovo, and
the Defense Department would not make the same mistakes this time. Di Rita stated,
“We’re going to stand up an interim Iraqi government, hand power over to them,
and get out of there in three to four months.” Harold Rhode of the Office of
Special Plans in Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith’s office
was in Kuwait at the same time, and pushed for Chalabi to be the new leader of
Iraq. Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress were favorites of the
neoconservatives in the United States, many of which held prominent positions
within the Pentagon. Rhode expressed their belief that Chalabi was a
Westernized Iraqi who could create a democracy in the country. Di Rita had the
same view as his boss Rumsfeld, who did not want to get bogged down in any
post-war situation. They both wanted to withdraw as quickly as possible after Saddam
had been kicked out of office.

All of these ideas were thrown out the window when Paul
Bremer assumed control of Iraq. On May 12, Bremer flew into Baghdad, and took
over from Garner. At first, it was expected that he would follow in
Garner’s footsteps, and continue with forming an interim government. That was
not to be. Khalilzad thought that he was going to go with Bremer to Baghdad, so
that he could introduce him to the Iraqis that he’d been talking to. He even
set up a date for that event on May 15. Instead, Bremer dismissed Khalilzad’s
plan. He was told right before the White House announced that Bremer was taking
over Iraq that an interim government was no longer in the plans. When Secretary
of State Colin Powell heard about that he called Rice warning that Khalilzad’s
work should not be discarded. Rice said that one of Bremer’s prerequisites for
taking the job was that he could run things the way he wanted. On May 16,
Bremer announced his plan for Iraq. That did not include an interim government.
Instead there would be a seven-step process to write a new constitution, get it
ratified, and then form a government, which would take over a year. Iraqis
immediately began complaining about the change. Followers of Moqtada al-Sadr
held a demonstration in Baghdad on May 19 against the U.S. occupation. The next
day, Iraqis met with the British representative to Iraq Ambassador Jeremy
Greenstock demanding that sovereignty be returned to the country. Then on May
22, the United Nations passed Resolution 1483 that recognized the United States
and the British as the occupying powers in Iraq. Bremer would use that document
as another reason why he should be in charge, and that people should follow his
strategy. Before Bremer departed for Iraq he met with President Bush who said
that he had as much time as he needed to transform Iraq. Bremer took that
promise literally, and completely changed America’s stance. No longer was Iraq
to be like Afghanistan where the U.S. would quickly withdraw. Instead they were
there for the long-term.

The decision to abandon an interim government was symbolic
of America’s handling of post-war Iraq. The United States went to war with no
real strategy for what should be done afterward. There had been planning for
returning sovereignty to Iraqis as quickly as possible, and Bush signed off on
the idea, but nothing substantive had really been done about it besides a few
meetings with Iraqi exiles. When Jay Garner entered Iraq he thought he would
have a straight forward humanitarian mission, but he never had the time to fulfill his vision. The
White House didn’t like the way things were going in Iraq with the post-war
chaos, and violence, and decided to replace him with Paul Bremer. Bremer wanted
to be the viceroy of Iraq, and personally guide the country towards democracy.
That could only be accomplished if the United States became the occupying
power. Bush gave him his support even though it was the exact opposite of what
had been discussed before the war. Since so many plans had come and gone with
none of them ever coordinated this was just another example. There’s no telling
how Iraq would have turned out if nationals were put in charge right after the
invasion. Afghanistan for instance, is not close to stability, is considered
even more corrupt than Iraq, and still has Coalition forces there, and it went
down the path of early sovereignty. The difference is that Iraqis would have
been in charge, bringing Iraqi sensibilities to things rather than trying to
impose American norms as the Coalition Provisional Authority attempted with few
successes.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Iraq has had grand plans for its electricity sector for
quite some time. After years of wars and sanctions the power grid is in poor
shape and needs billions in investment to provide the public with 24-hours of
power. That’s always been hard, because demand has skyrocketed since the 2003
invasion. That hasn’t stopped the Electricity Ministry and leading officials to
promise that a solution to the country’s power shortages is just a few years away.
An analysis of the industry however, reveals that Iraq is nowhere close to
resolving this dilemma, because the task is too large for the skills and
funding currently available.

Recently, Iraq’s Electricity Ministry released a 5-year
master plan that outlines its goals for the power network. The 5-year plan calls for boosting production to meet demand by 2015. That is to be
achieved by rehabilitating and expanding the existing transmission,
distribution, and generation system. New power stations are to be built,
generators installed, transmission lines laid down, etc. Deputy Prime Minister
Hussein Shahristani for example, told the press in mid-February 2013, that
three power stations would be opened per month until Iraq’s power struggles were ended. The Electricity Ministry wants to reach 13,000 megawatts by this summer, 20,000 megawatts by 2014, and 22,000 megawatts by the end of 2015. It also calls for a seven-fold increase in natural gas supply
to fuel all the new power plants. The problem is the Ministry predicated that
gas would only meet 50% of requirements within 5-years. That means that heavy
fuel will be used, which degrades equipment quicker, reduces production, and
raises costs. This has been a chronic problem within the country for years,
because the natural gas industry is so underdeveloped. Another issue is that if
all the components of the strategy are not met, it cannot reach its goals. That
is the larger dilemma that faces Baghdad, and there are no signs that it’s achievable.

Al-Musayib Thermal Power Plant (Hyundai Corporation)

First, Iraq is not appropriating nor attracting the
necessary funds. The 5-year plan calls for $31.8 billion in investment. The
2011 capital budget for the Electricity Ministry was only $3.2 billion, and it
only spent 33% of it that year. The government has tried to make up the
difference by soliciting foreign money. It offered four Independent Power
Producers partnerships that would have allowed international companies to
build, operate, and run facilities, while collecting revenues from them for the
sale of electricity. Baghdad could not agree upon the price for these deals, so
all of them fell through. That means the burden is completely upon the
government to provide the money required, and it is failing to budget enough or
even spend what it has. The capital budget would have to more than double for
the Electricity Ministry from 2012-2015 to meet its mark, but that hasn’t
happened.

Second, the Electricity Ministry has poor execution. The decision-making
within the Ministry is inefficient and fragmented between its various
directorates. It also doesn’t have the capacity to evaluate proposals, finish
contracts, implement large projects or maintain its infrastructure. In terms of
personnel it lacks engineers, managers, budgeting officials, and skilled labor.
Many of the workers that it does have are inefficient. In 2012 it was estimated
that it has over 100,000 employees. According to the Ministry, it takes an
average of 15 workers to generate 1 megawatt of power. In the rest of the Middle
East and North Africa, it only takes three. Since most of the 5-year plan is
based upon large construction deals, the inability to contract, finance, and
budget them, along with questions about whether they would be able to be
serviced afterward, puts the entire scheme in question.

Members of the government have already pointed out these
shortcomings of the Electricity Ministry. In September 2012, Deputy Premier
Shahristani boldly told the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
that all of the Ministry’s predictions should not be listened to, and that
their numbers should be considered theoretical. He went on to note that since
most of the companies that have won contracts in Iraq are new to the country
they could not be expected to finish on time. The Ministry supported that when
it stated that some of the corporations would be delayed due to the hot
summers. Shahristani is responsible for the energy folder in the government. If
he stated that the Electricity Ministry’s goals should not be taken seriously
that was a serious slap in the face to its abilities, and Iraq being able to
solve its electricity difficulties.

Another factor is the sorry state of the country’s
infrastructure. It was severely damaged in the 1991 Gulf War then neglected due
to sanctions, before it went through the Iraq war and insurgency. Militants for
instance, would routinely target electrical towers, and blow them up. The
effect of all these events can be seen in the installed capacity of the
country. In 1990, it was at 9,295 megawatts. By the end of 2003, it had fallen
to 3,300. The actual operating capacity was far less. On top of that, the
national grid is poorly designed. That leads to a huge amount of waste, low
voltage levels, and disruptions. More than 1/3 of the power produced is lost
before it ever reaches the consumers for example. That is the highest rate in
the Middle East. This is the main reason why Iraq needs such a huge amount of
money for its power system. Almost everything needs to be repaired, and tons of
infrastructure added.

Iraq is also not dealing with a static amount of power that
it needs to provide to solve this dilemma. Since 2003, demand for power has
continuously increased. Iraq has high population growth, rising incomes, more
businesses opening, and a country to city migration that all mean more use of
electricity. The end of sanctions also released years of pent up demand,
especially for consumer goods like air conditioners and refrigerators that were
once scarce. Since the system cannot provide a consistent supply, Iraqis have
turned to illegally tapping into the system. It’s estimated that there are over
one million illegal hookups to the national grid. This obviously makes the
problem worse as it siphons off power. Because supply is so bad, many Iraqis do
not pay their electricity bills either. Those prices are already heavily
subsidized, and after protests broke out in 2011, the government began giving
away free power each month. All together that means that even if the
Electricity Minister were able to produce 22,000 megawatts by 2015, that’s
likely not to be enough to satisfy the public, and provide non-stop power.

In conclusion, the failure to deliver power affects not only
the economy, but also the standard of living, and the government’s image.
Businesses and factories are routinely shut down, because they lack
electricity. It forces them and common citizens to turn to generators, which
are a huge cost. This spending hurts investment and production by companies. As
demonstrations in 2011 and 2012 showed, the public is very angry that they
cannot get 24-hours of power each day. The perception is that there has been
little progress in the delivery of electricity since 2003. The public plays a role
in this as well, because it’s not like production has not increased. It’s that
consumption has grown faster. Because of all the institutional and
infrastructure problems that the Electricity Ministry faces there seems no
chance that it will be able to reach any of the goals it set for itself in its
5-year plan. That means for the foreseeable future, Iraq will face continued blackouts
and power shortages that reverberate throughout the society.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

At the beginning of February 2013, the Accountability and
Justice Commission, which replaced the deBaathification Commission, announced the
removal of Chief Justice Medhat Mahmoud from office for his ties to Saddam
Hussein’s regime. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki immediately retaliated by
firing the head of the Commission Falah Hassan Shanshal. Since Shanshal is from
the Sadr Trend, various commentators argued that the move against Judge Mahmoud
must have been orchestrated by that list. Sadr’s followers didn’t have the
votes on the Commission to act alone however, so other political parties had to
have voted on the matter as well. It was later announced that the Sadrists and
the premier minister cut a deal to give the Trend another commission head in
return for replacing Shanshal. That showed that Maliki and Moqtada al-Sadr are
still allied with each other despite various claims to the contrary.

Sadr and Maliki have since made up over the head of the
Accountability & Justice Commission (AIN)

An increasing number of reporters and commentators have
claimed that Moqtada al-Sadr has come out against Premier Maliki. They use
Sadr’s meetings with other parties over the no confidence vote in 2012, and his
verbal support for the on-going protests in Sunni regions as proof. The Sadr
Trend has actually taken few substantive actions against the prime minister.
Rather they are acting opportunistically in criticizing Maliki when
circumstances arise, while rarely ever going beyond just words. The Sadr Trend
is preparing for the April provincial vote, and the 2014 parliamentary
elections, so these actions help Sadr portray himself as an independent, and a
statesman rather than the militia leader he was once known for. At the same
time, the deal between Maliki and the Sadrists over the Accountability and
Justice Commission show that the two sides are still allied. The Trend for
example, holds the most ministries in the government as a result of their
support for Maliki’s second term in office. Sadr therefore has more to gain
right now by standing with the prime minister than splitting with him, which is
why arguments like the one over the Accountability Commission are so easily
resolved.

Monday, February 25, 2013

In January 2013, Iraq’s oil exports went up a fraction from
the previous month. The price for a barrel of Iraqi crude did increase by over
a dollar however. Still, with disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) over oil contracts, infrastructure bottlenecks, and
other issues, it appears as if Iraq’s ability to deliver more petroleum for
foreign sales has hit a plateau until some of these problems are resolved.

Oil exports barley changed from January 2013 to December
2012, and was far lower than the amounts seen last year. In January, the Iraqi Oil Ministry reported an average of 2.35 million barrels a day in exports. That was only a small increase from December’s 2.34 million barrels. Both
figures were below the 30-year highs seen in 2012. In October and November for
example, Iraq hit 2.62 million barrels a day, the highest amount since the
1980s. The south remained the workhorse of the country’s industry, exporting an
average of 2.093 million barrels a day last month, up from 2.022 million in
December. The flow through the southern pipeline went up despite the Rumaila oil field shutting down for a short period for maintenance work, and bad weather preventing tankers from docking in Basra’s ports. Both of these are
routine events, which have a negative affect upon exports. The northern
pipeline on the other hand, has seen a three-month decline. In January, 264,500
barrels a day went through the line, down from 325,800 in December. This was due to the Kurds ending exports in the middle of December over disputes
with the central government over paying oil companies operating in the north,
and more importantly, who has the right to sign oil contracts and sell
petroleum. The central and regional governments have signed a series of
short-term deals that inevitably break down, which means a steady flow of
Kurdish oil through the northern pipeline cannot be counted on until the larger
arguments are resolved. The northern line was also blown up in January in Turkey. The Iraqi government blamed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is carrying out a campaign against Turkey’s energy field. Finally, 11,000
barrels a day were trucked to Jordan in January. Iraq has seen steady progress
in oil production in the last several years. What the country lacks is adequate
infrastructure and political agreements to fully exploit that potential. Iraq
has plans to address the former, but they are coming along slowly. The
differences between Kurdistan and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki are more
enduring, and are unlikely to be solved any time soon. All together that
accounts for why exports have plateaued after witnessing record highs last
year.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits
2011-2013

Month

Avg.

Exports

(Mil/

Bar/

Day)

Avg. Price Per Barrel

Revenue (Bill)

Jan. 11

2.16

$90.78

$6.082

Feb.

2.20

$98.44

$6.064

Mar.

2.15

$107.13

$7.167

Apr.

2.14

$114.26

$7.342

May

2.22

$108

$7.45

Jun.

2.27

$105.17

$7.173

Jul.

2.16

$108.79

$7.311

Aug.

2.18

$104.91

$7.124

Sep.

2.10

$104.89

$6.619

Oct.

2.08

$104.04

$6.742

Nov.

2.13

$106.59

$6.833

Dec.

2.14

$106.18

$7.061

2011 Avg.

2.16

$105.00

$6.913

Jan. 12

2.10

$109.08

$7.123

Feb.

2.01

$112.92

$6.595

Mar.

2.31

$117.99

$8.472

Apr.

2.50

$116.79

$8.795

May

2.45

$103.03

$7.831

Jun.

2.40

$90.09

$6.487

Jul.

2.51

$97.14

$7.577

Aug.

2.56

$106.22

$8.445

Sep.

2.59

$107.59

$8.371

Oct.

2.62

$105.51

$8.578

Nov.

2.62

$104.32

$8.200

Dec.

2.34

$103.72

$7.551

2012

Avg.

2.41

$106.20

$7.835

Jan. 13

2.35

$104.92

$7.672

Oil
Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February
1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917
mil/bar/day

April 2.115
mil/bar/day

May 2.086
mil/bar/day

June 2.085
mil/bar/day

July 2.216
mil/bar/day

August
2.252 mil/bar/day

September
2.178 mil/bar/day

October
2.172 mil/bar/day

November
2.122 mil/bar/day

December
2.022 mil/bar/day

January
2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January 2012
393,500 bar/day

February
375,800 bar/day

March
400,000 bar/day

April
393,300 bar/day

May 364,500
bar/day

June
316,600 bar/day

July
300,000 bar/day

August
312,900 bar/day

September
420,000 bar/day

October
451,600 bar/day

November
426,600 bar/day

December
325,800 bar/day

January
2013 264,500 bar/day

Despite exports hardly changing, the price of oil did go up
for Iraq. In January a barrel of Iraqi crude went for $104.92. In December it
sold for $103.72 per barrel. That dollar plus increase allowed Iraq’s revenue
to go from $7.551 billion in December to $7.672 billion in January. The value
of oil has been above $100 a barrel for twenty-one of the last twenty-four
months for Iraq. This is a prime time for the country to pump and sell as much
petroleum as possible in case prices take a dip. That is actually Iraq’s
current strategy. Unfortunately, that has not been possible, because of the
problems stated above.

Iraq’s oil industry has hit several plateaus in recent
years. It now appears that the country is facing another. Exports peaked in late-2012,
but have since gone back down to what they were at the beginning of last year. With
new infrastructure only slowly coming on line, and more importantly, the
continued bickering between Kurdistan and Baghdad over the future of the energy
industry there appears little chance for change in the short-term. Iraq will
still be able to reap a huge amount of money, but it could be earning a lot
more if it was able to solve these outstanding issues.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Many have tried to compare Iraq and Afghanistan,
but the nature of their conflicts are quite different. Afghanistan has a
healthy insurgency, and is a mostly rural nation. Iraq on the other hand
suffers from high levels of urban terrorism. For five of the last six years
casualties in Afghanistan have increased, while Iraq’s have dropped
dramatically for three years, and then increased slightly over the last two.
Most would think that Afghanistan would suffer from far higher levels of
violence, but in fact, Iraq’s militants have been able to take a far deadlier
toll. That’s because Iraq’s large cities provide far more targets of
opportunity than are available in Afghanistan.

When
comparing the number of civilian deaths in the two countries, Iraq has far more
than Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, there were 1,523 civilians
killed in 2007, 2,118 in 2008, 2,412 in 2009, 2,790 in 2010, peaking at 3,131
in 2011, before dropping to 2,754 in 2012. Iraq Body Count recorded 25,280
deaths in 2007, 9,626 in 2008, 4,967 in 2009, 4,073 in 2010, 4,144 in 2011, and
4,568 in 2012. The numbers cannot be directly compared, because Iraq Body
Count includes police fatalities, while the United Nations does not. By going
through Iraq Body Count’s individual incident reports, the statistics for
civilians killed in Iraq can be discerned. In 2012 for instance, there were
3,717 civilian deaths in Iraq. That was still far higher than the 2,754 seen in
Afghanistan that year. The statistics for Iraq are so much higher that
it can only be assumed that it is deadlier than Afghanistan. 2011 might be the
only year that the two were close, because Iraq had around 1,000 more deaths
then, which is roughly how many Iraqi police are killed annually. The reason
why Iraq still has far higher death counts is because of the change in tactics
taken by the country’s militants. After the civil war ended in 2008, the
majority of the public was tired of fighting. That led to many turning on
militants, which eventually ended most of the insurgency. The remnants have now
increasingly turned to terrorist bombings in an attempt to undermine the
government and restart the sectarian conflict. That’s shown in the fact that
Iraq Body Count recorded 7.3 people killed per day in suicide or car bombings
compared to 5.0 by gunfire in 2012. Iraq provides plenty of targets, because 66% of the population is urban. Afghanistan has a thriving insurgency, but
the country is mostly rural. Only 23% of the population lives in cities there.
Much of the fighting occurs out in the country and in small towns where the
population is more spread out. Overall, there are far fewer opportunities to
kill large numbers of people each year in Afghanistan than in Iraq.

Comparison of Deaths In
Afghanistan and Iraq 2007-2012

Afghanistan Civilian Deaths

Iraq Civilian & Police Deaths

2007

1,523

25,280

2008

2,118

9,626

2009

2,412

4,967

2010

2,790

4,073

2011

3,131

4,144

2012

2,754

4,568

Iraq
and Afghanistan are suffering from different forms of violence. In Afghanistan,
the insurgency is mostly fighting the government and Western forces, along with
targeting public workers. In Iraq, civilians are the main victims of attacks as
militants there are trying to stoke tensions amongst the Shiites to restart the
civil war, and have largely given up directly confronting the police and army.
Mass casualty bombings occur far more often in Iraq as a result. With large
urban populations these acts of terrorism usually take a far higher toll than
they do in Afghanistan. That accounts for why Iraq remains a deadlier place than
Afghanistan.

SOURCES

CIA,
The World Factbook

Iraq
Body Count

United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, “Afghanistan
civilian casualty figures drop for the first time in 6 years,” 2/19/13

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com