A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

Father F. C. Copleston and Bertrand Russell

Broadcast in 1948 on the Third Program of the
British Broadcasting Corporation. Published in Humanitas
(Manchester) and reprinted in Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957).

Copleston: As we are going to discuss the
existence of God, it might perhaps be as well to
come to some provisional agreement as to what
we understand by the term "God." I presume that
we mean a supreme personal being -- distinct from
the world and creator of the world. Would you
agree -- provisionally at least -- to accept this
statement as the meaning of the term "God"?

Russell: Yes, I accept this definition.

Copleston: Well, my position is the affirmative
position that such a being actually exists, and that
His existence can be proved philosophically.
Perhaps you would tell me if your position is that
of agnosticism or of atheism. I mean, would you
say that the non-existence of God can be proved?

Russell: No, I should not say that: my position
is agnostic.

Copleston: Would you agree with me that the
problem of God is a problem of great importance?
For example, would you agree that if God does not
exist, human beings and human history can have
no other purpose than the purpose they choose to
give themselves, which -- in practice -- is likely to mean
the purpose which those impose who have the
power to impose it?

Russell: Roughly speaking, yes, though I
should have to place some limitation on your last
clause.

Copleston: Would you agree that if there is no
God -- no absolute Being -- there can be no absolute
values? I mean, would you agree that if there is no
absolute good that the relativity of values results?

Russell: No, I think these questions are
logically distinct. Take, for instance, G. E. Moore's
Principia Ethica, where he maintains that there is
a distinction of good and evil, that both of these
are definite concepts. But he does not bring in the
idea of God to support that contention.

Copleston: Well, suppose we leave the
question of good till later, till we come to the moral
argument, and I give first a metaphysical
argument. I'd like to put the main weight on the
metaphysical argument based on Leibniz's
argument from "Contingency" and then later we
might discuss the moral argument. Suppose I
give a brief statement on the metaphysical
argument and that then we go on to discuss it?

Russell: That seems to me to be a very good
plan.

The Argument from Contingency

Copleston: Well, for clarity's sake, I'll divide the argument into distinct stages. First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves
the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on
food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of
individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence.
There isn't any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is
something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events exist, and
since no object of experience contains within itself reason of its existence, this reason, the totality of
objects, must have a reason external to itself. That reason must be an existent being. Well, this being
is either itself the reason for its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must
proceed farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at
all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a being which contains within
itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot not exist.

Russell: This raises a great many points and it is not altogether easy to know where to begin, but I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best point at which to begin is the question of
necessary being. The word "necessary," I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only to such as are analytic -- that is to say -- such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I could only admit a necessary being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny. I should like to know whether you would accept Leibniz's division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of fact. The former -- the truths of reason -- being necessary.

Copleston: Well, I certainly should not subscribe to what seems to be Leibniz's idea of
truths of reason and truths of fact, since it would appear that, for him, there are in the long run only analytic propositions. It would seem that for Leibniz truths of fact are ultimately reducible to truths of reason. That is to say, to analytic propositions, at least for an omniscient mind. Well, I couldn't agree with
that. For one thing it would fail to meet the requirements of the experience of freedom. I don't
want to uphold the whole philosophy of Leibniz. I have made use of his argument from contingent to
necessary being, basing the argument on the principle of sufficient reason, simply
because it seems to me a brief and clear formulation of what is, in my opinion, the
fundamental metaphysical argument for God's
existence.

Russell: But, to my mind, "a necessary
proposition" has got to be analytic. I don't see
what else it can mean. And analytic propositions
are always complex and logically somewhat late.
"Irrational animals are animals" is an analytic
proposition; but a proposition such as "This is an
animal" can never be analytic. in fact, all the
propositions that can be analytic are somewhat
late in the build-up of propositions.

Copleston: Take the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a necessary being."
I consider that that proposition hypothetically expressed is a necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an analytic proposition, then -- in order to avoid a dispute in terminology -- I would agree to call it analytic, though I don't consider it a tautological
proposition. But the proposition is a necessary proposition only on the supposition that there is a
contingent being. That there is a contingent being actually existing has to be discovered by
experience, and the proposition that there is a contingent being is certainly not an analytic
proposition, though once you know, I should maintain, that there is a contingent being, it follows
of necessity that there is a necessary being.

Russell: The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I
don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings "contingent." These phrases
don't for me have a significance except within a logic that I reject.

Copleston: Do you mean that you reject these
terms because they won't fit in with what is called
modern logic"?

Russell: Well, I can't find anything that they
could mean. The word "necessary," it seems to
me, is a useless word, except as applied to
analytic propositions, not to things.

Copleston: In the first place, what do you mean
by "modern logic?" As far as I know, there are somewhat differing systems. In the second place,
not all modern logicians surely would admit the meaninglessness of metaphysics. We both know,
at any rate, one very eminent modern thinker whose knowledge of modern logic was profound,
but who certainly did not think that metaphysics are
meaningless or, in particular, that the problem of
God is meaningless. Again, even if all modern logicians held that metaphysical terms are
meaningless, it would not follow that they were right. The proposition that metaphysical terms are
meaningless seems to me to be a proposition based on an assumed philosophy. The dogmatic
position behind it seems to be this: What will not go into my machine is non-existent, or it is
meaningless; it is the expression of emotion. I am simply trying to point out that anybody who says
that a particular system of modern logic is the sole criterion of meaning is saying something that
is over-dogmatic; he is dogmatically insisting that a part of philosophy is the whole of philosophy. After all, a "contingent" being is a being which has not in
itself the complete reason for its existence that's
what I mean by a contingent being. You know, as
wel I as I do, that the existence of neither of us can
be explained without reference to something or
somebody outside us, our parents, for example. A
"necessary" being, on the other hand means a
being that must and cannot not exist. You may say
that there is no such being, but you wil find it hard
to convince me that you do not understand the
terms I am using. If you do not understand them,
then how can you be entitled to say that such a being does not exist, if that is what you do say?

Russell: Well, there are points here that I
don't propose to go into at length. I don't maintain
the meaninglessness of metaphysics in general
at all. I maintain the meaninglessness of certain
particular terms -- not on any general ground, but
simply because I've not been able to see an
interpretation of those particular terms. It's not a
general dogma -- it's a particular thing. But those
points I will leave out for the moment. And I will say
that what you have been saying brings us back, it
seems to me, to the ontological argument that
there is a being whose essence involves
existence, so that his existence is analytic. That
seems to me to be impossible, and it raises, of
course, the question what one means by
existence, and as to this, I think a subject named
can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described.
And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a
predicate.

Copleston: Well, you say, I believe, that it is
bad grammar, or rather bad syntax to say for
example "T. S. Eliot exists"; one ought to say, for
example, "He, the author of Murder in the
Cathedral, exists." Are you going to say that the
proposition, "The cause of the world exists," is
without meaning? You may say that the world has
no cause; but I fail to see how you can say that the
proposition that "the cause of the world exists" is
meaningless. Put it in the form of a question: "Has
the world a cause?" or "Does a cause of the world
exist?" Most people surely would understand the
question, even if they don't agree about the
answer.

Russell: Well, certainly the question "Does the
cause of the world exist?" is a question that has
meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of
the world" you're using God as a proper name;
then "God exists" will not be a statement that has
meaning; that is the position that I'm maintaining.
Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be
an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that
exists. For example, suppose you take as your
subject "the existent round-square," it would look
like an analytic proposition that "the existent round-
square exists," but it doesn't exist.

Copleston: No, it doesn't, then surely you can't
say it doesn't exist unless you have a conception
of what existence is. As to the phrase "existent
round-square," I should say that it has no
meaning at all.

Russell: I quite agree. Then I should say the
same thing in another context in reference to a
"necessary being."

Copleston: Well, we seem to have arrived at
an impasse. To say that a necessary being is a
being that must exist and cannot not exist has for
me a definite meaning. For you it has no meaning.

Russell: WelI, we can press the point a Iittle, I
think. A being that must exist and cannot not exist,
would surely, according to you, be a being whose
essence involves existence.

Copleston: Yes, a being the essence of which
is to exist. But I should not be willing to argue the
existence of God simply from the idea of His
essence because I don't think we have any clear
intuition of God's essence as yet. I think we have
to argue from the world of experience to God.

Russell: Yes, I quite see the distinction. But, at
the same time, for a being with sufficient
knowledge, it would be true to say "Here is this
being whose essence involves existence!"

Copleston: Yes, certainly if anybody saw God,
he would see that God must exist.

Russell: So that I mean there is a being whose
essence involves existence although we don't
know that essence. We only know there is such a
being.

Copleston: Yes, I should add we don't know
the essence a priori. It is only a posteriori through
our experience of the world that we come to a
knowledge of the existence of that being. And then
one argues, the essence and existence must be
identical. Because if God's essence and God's
existence was not identical, then some sufficient
reason for this existence would have to be found
beyond God.

Russell: So it all turns on this question of
sufficient reason, and I must say you haven't
defined
sufficient reason" in a way that I can understand --
what do you mean by sufficient reason? You don't
mean cause?

Copleston: Not necessarily. Cause is a kind of
sufficient reason. Only contingent being can have
a cause. God is His own sufficient reason; and
He is not cause of Himself. By sufficient reason in
the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for
the existence of some particular being.

Russell: But when is an explanation
adequate? Suppose I am about to make a flame
with a match. You may say that the adequate
explanation of that is that I rub it on the box.

Copleston: Well, for practical purposes -- but
theoretically, that is only a partial explanation. An
adequate explanation must ultimately be a total
explanation, to which nothing further can be
added.

Russell: Then I can only say that you're
looking for something which can't be got, and
which one ought not to expect to get.

Copleston: To say that one has not found it is
one thing; to say that one should not look for it
seems to me rather dogmatic.

Russell: Well, I don't know. I mean, the
explanation of one thing is another thing which
makes the other thing dependent on yet another,
and you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things
entire to do what you want, and that we can't do.

Copleston: But are you going to say that we
can't, or we shouldn't even raise the question of
the existence of the whole of this sorry scheme of
things -- of the whole universe?

Russell: Yes, I don't think there's any meaning
in it at all. I think the word "universe" is a handy
word in some connections, but I don't think it
stands for anything that has a meaning.

Copleston: If the word is meaningless, it can't
be so very handy. In any case, I don't say that the
universe is something different from the objects
which compose it (I indicated that in my brief
summary of the proof), what I'm doing is to look for
the reason, in this case the cause of the objects --
the real or imagined totality of which constitute
what we call the universe. You say, I think
that the universe -- or my existence if you prefer, or
any other existence -- is unintelligible?

Russell: First may I take up the point that if a
word is meaningless it can't be handy. That
sounds well but isn't in fact correct. Take, say,
such a word as "the" or "than." You can't point to
any object that those words mean, but they are
very useful words; I should say the same of
"universe." But leaving that point, you ask whether
I consider that the universe is unintelligible. I
shouldn't say unintelligible -- I think it is without
explanation. Intelligible, to my mind, is a different
thing. Intelligible has to do with the thing itself
intrinsically and not with its relations.

Copleston: Well, my point is that what we call
the world is intrinsically unintelligible, apart from
the existence of God. You see, I don't believe that
the infinity of the series of events -- I mean a
horizontal series, so to speak -- if such an infinity
could be proved, would be in the slightest degree
relevant to the situation. If you add up chocolates
you get chocolates after all and not a sheep. If you
add up chocolates to infinity, you presumably get
an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up
contingent beings to infinity, you still get contingent
beings, not a necessary being. An infinite series of
contingent beings will be, to my way of thinking, as
unable to cause itself as one contingent being.
However, you say, I think, that it is illegitimate to
raise the question of what will explain the
existence of any particular object?

Russell: It's quite all right if you mean by
explaining it, simply finding a cause for it.

Copleston: Well, why stop at one particular
object? Why shouldn't one raise the question of
the cause of the existence of all particular
objects?

Russell: Because I see no reason to think
there is any. The whole concept of cause is one
we derive from our observation of particular
things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose
that the total has any cause whatsoever.

Copleston: Well, to say that there isn't any
cause is not the same thing as saying that we
shouldn't look for a cause. The statement that
there isn't any cause should come, if it comes at
all, at the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. In
any case, if the total has no cause, then to my way
of thinking it must be its own cause, which seems
to me impossible. Moreover, the statement that
the world is simply there if in answer to a
question, presupposes that the question has
meaning.

Russell: No, it doesn't need to be its own
cause, what I'm saying is that the concept of
cause is not applicable to the total.

Copleston: Then you would agree with Sartre
that the universe is what he calls "gratuitous"?

Russell: Well, the word "gratuitous" suggests
that it might be something else; I should say that
the universe is just there, and that's all.

. Copleston: Well, I can't see how you can rule
out the legitimacy of asking the question how the
total, or anything at all comes to be there. Why
something rather than nothing, that is the
question? The fact that we gain our knowledge of
causality empirically, from particular causes, does
not rule out the possibility of asking what the
cause of the series is. If the word "cause" were meaningless or if it could be shown that Kant's
view of the matter were correct, the question would be illegitimate I agree; but you don't seem to hold
that the word "cause" is meaningless, and I do not suppose you are a Kantian.

Russell: I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother,
and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but
obviously the human race hasn't a mother -- that's a different logical sphere.

Copleston: Well, I can't really see any parity. If I were saying "every object has a phenomenal
cause, therefore, the whole series has a phenomenal cause," there would be a parity; but
I'm not saying that; I'm saying, every object has a phenomenal cause if you insist on the infinity of
the series -- but the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series.
Therefore, the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause.

Russell: That's always assuming that not only every particular thing in the world, but the world as a whole must have a cause. For that assumption I see no ground whatever. If you'll give me a ground I'll listen to it.

Copleston: Well, the series of events is either caused or it's not caused. If it is caused, there must obviously be a cause outside the series. If it's not caused then it's sufficient to itself, and if it's sufficient to itself it is what I call necessary. But it can't be necessary since each member is contingent, and we've agreed that the total has no reality apart from its members, therefore, it can't be necessary. Therefore, it can't be (caused) -- uncaused -- therefore it must have a cause. And I should like to observe in passing that the statement "the world is simply there and is inexplicable" can't be got out of logical analysis.

Russell: I don't want to seem arrogant, but it does seem to me that I can conceive things that
you say the human mind can't conceive. As for things not having a cause, the physicists assure
us that individual quantum transitions in atoms have no cause.

Copleston: Well, I wonder now whether that isn't simply a temporary inference.

Russell: It may be, but it does show that physicists' minds can conceive it.

Copleston: Yes, I agree, some scientists -- physicists -- are willing to allow for
indetermination within a restricted field. But very many scientists are not so willing. I think that
Professor Dingle, of London University, maintains that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us
something about the success (or the lack of it) of the present atomic theory in correlating
observations, but not about nature in itself, and many physicists would accept this view. In any
case, I don't see how physicists can fail to accept the theory in practice, even if they don't do so in
theory. I cannot see how science could be conducted on any other assumption than that of
order and intelligibility in nature. The physicist presupposes, at least tacitly, that there is some
sense in investigating nature and looking for the causes of events, just as the detective
presupposes that there is some sense in looking for the cause of a murder. The metaphysician
assumes that there is sense in looking for the reason or cause of phenomena, and, not being a
Kantian, I consider that the metaphysician is as justified in his assumption as the physicist. When
Sartre, for example, says that the world is gratuitous, I think that he has not sufficiently
considered what is implied by "gratuitous."

Russell: I think -- there seems to me a certain unwarrantable extension here; a physicist looks for causes; that does not necessarily imply that there are causes everywhere. A man may look for gold
without assuming that there is gold everywhere; if he finds gold, well and good, if he doesn't he's
had bad luck. The same is true when the physicists look for causes. As for Sartre, I don't
profess to know what he means, and I shouldn't like to be thought to interpret him, but for my part, I
do think the notion of the warld having an explanation is a mistake. I don't see why one should
expect it to have, and I think you say about what the scientist assumes is an over-statement.

Copleston: Well, it seems to me that the scientist does make some such assumption. When he
experiments to find out some particular truth, behind that experiment lies the assumption that the
universe is not simply discontinuous. There is the possibility of finding out a truth by experiment.
The experiment may be a bad one, it may lead to no result, or not to the result that he wants, but
that at any rate there is the possibility, through experiment, of finding out the truth that he assumes. And that seems to me to assume an ordered and intelligible universe.

Russell: I think you're generalizing more than is necessary. Undoubtedly the scientist assumes
that this sort of thing is likely to be found and will often be found. He does not assume that it will be
found, and that's a very important matter in modem physics.

Copleston: Well, I think he does assume or is bound to assume it tacitly in practice. It may be
that, to quote Professor Haldane, "when I Iight the gas under the kettle, some of the water molecules will fly off as vapor, and there is no way of finding out which wiII do so, " but it doesn't follow necessarily that the idea of chance must be introduced except in relation to our knowledge.

Russell: No it doesn't -- at least if I may believe what he says. He's finding out quite a lot of things -- the scientist is finding out quite a lot of things that are happening in the world, which are, at first,
beginnings of causal chains -- first causes which haven't in themselves got causes. He does not
assume that everything has a cause.

Copleston: Surely that's a first cause within a
certain selected field. It's a relatively first cause.

Russell: I don't think he'd say so. If there's a
world in which most events, but not all, have causes, he will then be able to depict the
probabilities and uncertainties by assuming that this particular event you're interested in probably
has a cause. And since in any case you won't get more than probability that's good enough.

Copleston: It may be that the scientist doesn't hope to obtain more than probability, but in raising the question he assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. But your general point
then, Lord RusseII, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?

Russell: Yes, that's my position.

Copleston: If it's a question that for you has no meaning, it's of course very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?

Russell: Yes, it is very difficult. What do you say -- shall we pass on to some other issue?