qusayr syria conclusion

Meanwhile, figures were released to the losses of the rebel gangs in al-Qusayr. 2,745 rebel fighters were killed, 344 wounded. Of the latter, about 200 are in Lebanese hospitals for treatment. Approximately 1,000 fighters were arrested. Not less than 600 had success to escape from the encirclement.

The ratio of the killed fighters in the comparison to the wounded fighters is interesting. It testifies to the fact that there is virtually no medical help. Therefore, a good part of the rebels simply had to die because there was no medical treatment for them. The ratio seems generally quite characteristic for this war.

“Normally”, the ratio of the wounded to the killed would be something like 3:1, but here, it is at least the other way around. The hot weather and the result what it could mean for the untreated wounds is to take under a consideration, too.

Numbers about the losses of the Syrian army are “traditionally” not published (since about March 2012).

The taking of al-Qusayr comes along with the open occurrence of Hezbollah with a relative huge amount of fighters. The “international community” has not really been able to formulate a unanimously protest – to call the Lebanese Shiites foreign regular units would mean to give Hezbollah a completely different status than it is currently the case, when one is speaking of them as a “terrorist organization”.

Al Qusayr

The public and undisguised appearance of Hezbollah is, when one considers the matter, a quite unexpected step. That’s probably what Bashar al-Assad meant with his “asymmetric response” to Israel after the Israeli Air Force has attacked Syria. The Hezbollah fighters will certainly not return to Lebanon with empty hands.

Thereby, Hezbollah appeared in Syria at a quite well chosen moment. Probably this was not planned well in advance, but it is finally now relatively the same from where the help comes in the eyes of the war-weary people – the main thing is that the horror is over as soon as possible. If Hezbollah would have occurred in Syria a half or a year earlier, this would have probably fueled the confessional conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites.

However, in the meantime, the version of a war in sense of “Sunnis against Shiites” is, notwithstanding the fact that this is still boosted by the internet platforms of the rebell gangs and by the relentless media war on the channels of the Gulf monarchies, hardly up to date and this propaganda does not find a fertile ground in the hearts of the vast majority of Syrians. They consider Hezbollah as a true ally, without holding on to the religious peculiarities.

However, this very delicate situation should induce Syria and Hezbollah to limit their cooperation. Hezbollah’s leadership signifies that it is primarily acting against these gangs in whose inventory are radical Sunnis from Lebanon. And that’s just logical.

There are large quantities of Lebanese in the units of Al-Nusra (al-Nusra Front) in the Syrian provinces of Idlib and Aleppo. That is probably the reason that we have heard a few days ago about the fact that several thousand Hezbollah fighters establish themselves around Aleppo.

The technique of the Syrian army is also being shifted currently from the Lebanese border into the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo. They will probably try to use the announced “pause” in the preparation of the international conference on Syria to seal off the centers of these provinces and, at least, to begin the liberation of Idlib and Aleppo.

When this conference, as currently assumed, will start in the end of summer, the Syrians will try to “clarify” the huge cities in the north as much as possible. This would give Assad the best possible negotiating position.