A Mead Project source page

Originally published as:

Steuart Henderson Britt. "Past and Present Trends in the
Methods and Subject Matter of Social Psychology." Social Forces 15
(1937): 462-469.

Editors' notes

Editors' Note: This paper is one of 12 appearing in Social Forces to
document the small symposium at the 1936 meeting of the American
Psychological Association on THE SUBJECT MATTER AND METHODS OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY

Related Documents

No links yet

Site Navigation

Past and Present Trends in the Methods and Subject Matter of Social Psychology

STEUART HENDERSON BRITTThe George Washington University

IT SEEMS to me that social psychologists have spent a disproportionate amount
of time discussing exact
definitions and points of view, whereas the important thing is to go ahead
and make empirical investigations. I realize, of course, that a satisfactory
definition is desirable; but to engage in any lengthy discussion of exact words
or phrases will take time from our main business, namely, the subject matter and
methods of social psychology. Fay B. Karpf has written an excellent historical
critique of social psychology, which presents the European background and then
the development of

(
463) social-psychological thought in the United States.[1]
I have been appalled at the lack of either experimental or of observational
material in this development of social psychology; instead the major emphasis
has been on differences in points of view of various thinkers, e.g., Ward,
Baldwin, Cooley, Ross, Mead, Dewey, Faris, and others. And this is what has
characterized social psychology of the past: quarrels as to definitions and
points of view—words, words, words!

I do not decry the importance of sound historical orientation, and a
comparison of points of view; but I say that so much time has been spent in
arguments between various "schools" of thought that entirely too little time has
been devoted to systematic experimentation and observation. We may get so lost
in "battles of words" that investigators in other fields may justly accuse us of
sterility, or, worse still, of describing the obvious. The Murphys have rendered
a genuine service in compiling between two covers the significant work in
experimental social psychology[2]
;
yet the researches reported in their very excellent book have been criticized by
some as lacking in real significance.[3]

II

The introductory textbooks in general psychology have now become
sufficiently systematized that certain topics are treated in all books, for
example, individual differences, intelligence, personality, learning,
motivation, emotions, perception. In social psychology textbooks,
however, there is no such concurrence of topics; a comparison of the current
textbooks shows almost no agreement as to what representative topics should be
treated. "The social psychologies written by such outstanding men as Bogardus,
Allport, McDougall, Young, Kantor, and Dunlap are so unlike one another that it
would be entirely possible for a reader to understand any one of these volumes
quite thoroughly and yet be painfully ignorant of much (or even of almost all)
of the content of the others.” [4]

An examination of textbooks in social psychology also reveals that many are
still concerned with fostering a particular point of view-the individual
behavior approach, the social interaction approach, or the cultural approach-on
the unsuspecting student. I find that students (even the good ones) are pretty
much bored by a discussion of the differences in viewpoint between two college
professors, (say) Dunlap and (say) McDougall. On the other hand, they are very
much concerned with whether or not problems of personality, of propaganda, and
of the family will be discussed. Students simply do not get excited over the
history of social psychology, over a discussion of the "group mind," over the
principles of hedonism. They do get very much interested and even excited over
the very real problems which they themselves are facing: the detection of
propaganda so as to cope with it; the matter of sex adjustment and marriage; the
prevention of juvenile delinquency; the place of the church and religion in our
society; the problems of "race" differences

(
464) and race prejudice; the very urgent questions of pacifism and war. They
want answers to such questions as: "To what extent do newspapers print 'true'
news?" "What are the underlying myths and legends that cause friction between
Gentile and Jew?" "How much was our entrance into the World War due to
propaganda?" "Is the family necessary to the continuity of a nation?" 'How may
early family influences be overcome?'Students are demanding a course in social
psychology that is very much alive. For us to spend very much time as
teachers arguing the psychological (individual) versus the
sociological (group) position definitely detracts from our subject. The various
"schools" of social psychology have been discussed and re-discussed. It is high
time that we devoted more attention to the present-day empirical methods of
experiment, of observation, and of statistics. Our real task is not to draw
artificial lines around our field, but rather to make thorough, objective
analyses of important problems.

Galileo did not stop to consider whether his experiments would fall into some
artificial category of knowledge (today called "physics") before he rolled the
balls down the inclined plane. Karl Lashley did not refuse to extirpate the
brains of rats because he might be accused of conducting neurological, and not
psychological, experiments. McGeoch has assiduously investigated the problems of
retroactive inhibition, with no concern as to whether or not his work might be
considered in the field of education rather than psychology. Carmichael has not
hesitated to work with tadpoles, cats, and fetal guinea pigs for fear that he
would become a biologist as a result. These men and other scientists have seen
problems which needed to be solved, and they have gone straight ahead toward
solutions.

III

Fortunately during the last decade an empirical attack has also been made on
many problems by social scientists. Social psychology of today is a far cry from
that of the past, and the contrast is worth our attention. Social psychology of
the "past" was tainted by too much "armchair" philosophizing-it was typified by
wordy arguments and discussions of points of view. Social psychology of the
"present" can be typified in one word: empirical.6 The empirical method
may be characterized by three important techniques: the , experimental method;
the use of first-hand observation; and the employment of statistics.7 Probably
the most important development of the empirical movement has been the emphasis
on an experiential approach to social-psychological problems, and the
concomitant "dropping out" of the tendency to rely on the personal

(
465) opinion of oneself or others.[8]
Although social psychology has not succeeded in developing any exact
social principles,[9]
it is rapidly
"coming of age."

I shall present some typical samples of social psychology of the "past," and
then some examples of present-day work, in order to contrast the former
"arm-chair" systems with our present-day empirical approach. In doing this I do
not imply that the writings of the past were not important. In fact, they were
of great significance, because of their stimulating influence on the thinking of
other investigators of both the past and present, and because of their emphasis
on the fact that there were problems of society which needed to be investigated.
It would seem, however, that many of the early writers had some particular
concept-often a "catch-phrase"-around which an entire system of social
psychology was built. The concepts were presented almost as magic keys which
would unlock the solutions to all social problems. Elaborate classifications
were often devised, beautiful in phraseology but devoid of scientific merit. For
example, Wundt built his entire social psychology around his already adopted
views of individual psychology, and then went ahead with a classification of the
"ages" of man: the age of "primitive man"; the totemic age; the age of heroes
and gods; the era of humanity, which is "coming to be."[10]
Walter Bagehot had this same predilection for neat categories, but a different
classification of "ages": the preliminary age, with imitation and the "cake of
custom" of primary importance; the nation-making age, with struggle and war, and
conflict between "cakes of custom"; and, finally, the age of discussion, with
government by discussion, and the development of tolerance.[11]

Durkheim, in France, built a system around one central concept; he wrote of
représentations collectives,
and emphasized the importance of the group factor to the extent of
practically ignoring the actions of the individual.[12]
Tardé took the opposite stand, and put his emphasis on the individual factor in
social causation; he wrote of the importance of invention by the
individual, and then the spreading of inventions by imitation in the
group.[13]
Lévy-Bruhl had his own pet
scheme, too, and developed Durkheim's
représentations collectives in his explanation of How Natives Think.[14]
Lévy-Bruhl did not make field studies of "Natives," but instead wrote within the
academic "tribe" of the Sorbonne; he devised a supposed law of "contradiction"
for civilized man and a supposed law of "participation" for primitive man,
maintaining from the confines of his library that civilized man and primitive
man are separated by a considerable gulf.[15]

(466)

Graham Wallas was another who wrote of problems of society without conducting
experiments or making first-hand observations.[16]
Like Trotter and Hobhouse, a great deal of his attention was devoted to an
"arm-chair" discussion of instincts.[17]
In the United States, Cooley wrote three important works on the social order
without embodying any great amount of empirical material.[18]

These details have been given simply to illustrate the fact that past writers
have been content to discuss problems of social psychology with no empiristic
slant other than an attempt at "fact-mindedness."[19]
Beautiful hypotheses have been expounded, detailed classifications built up, and
new terms added to our vocabulary. All these things have been stimulating and
helpful, but have not compared in significance with the empirical attitude so
typical of the last decade-the experimental, observational, and statistical
approaches.

IV

As contrasted with Wundt's philosophizing and Lévy-Bruhl's study while he
lived in Paris of primitives who lived in the jungle, we have had a number of
important empirical investigations within the past few years. The experimental,
observational, and statistical methods have all been employed, in ways that were
not dreamed of by our predecessors. Social psychology is no longer content
merely to devise classifications and to invent new terms, but demands empirical
verification of hypotheses. I will illustrate this by mentioning some of the
important fields of study, and by giving an intensive sampling in each field of
some of the major contributions. I wish to emphasize that the investigations
which I mention are classified separately only in order to illustrate the
principal techniques being employed today. The classification and arrangement is
not a rigid one; the types of studies mentioned in any one paragraph
below are not mutually exclusive of the types of studies discussed in other
paragraphs.

1. Tests. The development of intelligence tests and aptitude tests
into serviceable tools for education and industry may be cited as examples. The
name Edward L. Thorndike is a synonym for progress in this work.

2. Questionnaires. Whereas tests measure ability, questionnaires are
designed more for the measurement of conduct or attitude.[20]
As examples of determining attitudes toward a particular act, the work of
Goodwin Watson as to attitudes toward Orientals is in point,[21]
and the work of Bogardus as to "social distance."[22]
As examples of measurements of attitudes toward certain concepts, we have the
work of Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman on attitudes toward the League of
Nations, prohibition, etc.,[23]
and that
of Stuart A. Rice on Quantitative Methods in Politics.[24]

(
467)

3.Psychophysical studies. Thurstone has been the chief
advocate of the psychophysical technique for the measurement of attitude and
opinion.[25]
Instead of writing a
philosophical discussion of what people
probably believe about prohibition, or about the church, he has used
empirical methods to find out what they do believe.[26]

4. Genetic studies (biographies and case histories). Much of
psychological interest has been found in biographies of various people from
Edgar Allan Poe to Mark Twain.[27]
However, a definite empirical approach to a well-defined group of problems is
best illustrated by the genetic studies of gifted children, by Professor Terman,
Dr. Catharine Cox Miles, and others.[28]
The need of social case workers for definite information as to a person's
background and personality has resulted in the development of standardized
techniques in social case work.[29]

5. Personality studies. Obviously related to the other types of
studies mentioned is the field of personality. The Bernreuter Personality
Inventory represents an important development in this field.[30]
The series of studies by Hartshorne and May are another instance of the fact
that social psychologists are no longer willing to wonder what people do in
certain situations nor to write generalities about traits of character; instead
Hartshorne and May set out to investigate "honesty" and "deceit" by means of
experiments, firsthand observations, and statistics.[31]

6. Physiological studies. Although physiological methods have not been
widely used in social psychology, they are illustrated by Howells' study of
differences between religious radicals and religious conservatives,
[32]
and by numerous studies of emotion
by Carney Landis.[33]

7. Group studies. Workers today actually investigate the true
influence of groups on individual behavior. Floyd H. Allport has been a pioneer
in this field.[34]
Recent studies
involving groups are Doob's analysis of progaganda,[35]
and Hadley Cantril

(
468) and Gordon W. Allport's investigation of the psychology of radio.[36]

8. Field studies. Theories of what certain people are probably like
have given way to studies made in person by scientists who have taken the
trouble to go into certain localities and investigate firsthand. This, has been
done in foreign cultures, as shown by Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage
Society,[37]
and by Margaret Mead's
Coming of Age in Samoa[38]
;
and it has also been done in our own culture, as demonstrated by Thrasher's
The Gang,[39] and by the Lynds'
Middletown.[40]

9. Psychoanalytic studies. The psychoanalytic background has been the
basis in large measure of such works as Malinowski's Sex and Repression in
Savage Society,[41] and of Jerome
Frank's Law and the Modern Mind.[42]
A psychoanalytic and genetic approach is exemplified in Dollard's recent book.[43]

10. Studies of institutions. The study of any institution---whether
the institution is religion, education, politics, law, or whatnot---entails a
thoroughly empirical and objective attitude. Professor Robinson's Law and the
Lawyers is the outstanding example of this approach.[44]
Beaglehole's Property is another instance.[45]

11. Contributions from general psychology. An abundance of data has
been gathered as to instincts, the learning process, the development of habits,
and the mechanism of conditioning, which has tremendous import not only for
social-psychological theories but for the types of research to be conducted.[46]

Once more I should call attention to the fact that the classifications I have
given are not neat "pigeon-holes" all to themselves, but that they are
interrelated. As to the three classifications which follow, they not only are
intimately related to the above studies, but at the same time they typify the
empirical method.

12. Experimental studies. Actual experiments in the laboratory may be
illustrated by the devising of developmental norms for infants by Gesell and his
associates.[47]

13. Observational studies. As an example, children have sometimes not
been submitted to artificial conditions in order to study their social behavior,
but they have been observed in natural situations, with tabulations kept of
their activities as to dominance, submission, and the like.[48]

14. Statistical studies. The application

(469) of statistical techniques has given social psychologists of today
tremendous advantages over those of the last century. The majority of the
studies mentioned have employed statistics.

V

This sampling of studies shows that the keynote of present-day social
psychology is truly empirical. It also demonstrates that the materials
for social-psychological investigation are often gleaned from fields other than
"pure" sociology and "pure" psychology: economics, anthropology, history,
political science, law, or other "disciplines." This means, then, that the
social psychologist of today must have a sound philosophical and historical
background. He must have been saturated in the history of thought in order to
have the proper perspective as to his own investigations. He must also have more
than a passing acquaintance with the other social sciences; in many cases he
must master the pertinent materials in some other field before even beginning an
investigation. Finally, he must have the ability not only to assimilate but also
to integrate pertinent facts and hypotheses from philosophy, history, and other
fields with those in sociology and psychology.

With an adequate background in the history of thought and in the other social
sciences, the dangers of "raw" empiricism may be avoided. Thus, the use of
experimental, of observational, and of statistical methods may result, not in a
mass of insignificant and unrelated facts, but in a wealth of practical
material, significant for present-day social problems.

Notes

Their book has even been dubbed "a monumental compilation of trivial and
patently insignificant research." [Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler,
Crime, Law, and Social Science (Harcourt, Brace, 1933) P. 80, ftn. 22.]

Kenneth L. Smoke, "The Present Status of Social Psychology in America,"
Psychol. Rev., 1935, 42, 537-543, at 538-539. Smoke's Table, showing
"approximate percentage of the material in recent books on social psychology
which is devoted to representative topics listed in their subject indices," is
well worth study.

This group of questions has been raised by students in my class in Social
Psychology this summer. For a large group of such "practical" questions, see
Hadley Cantril, "The Social Psychology of Everyday Life,"
Psychol. Bull., 1934, 37, 297-330.

"empirical = 1. pert. to experience; i. pert. to methods or
conclusions based on observation or experiment. [Syn. (z) experiential.
Contr. (2) w. deductive and rational, whether as a term of reproach
(i.e. lacking necessary theorizing), or as a term of praise (i.e. avoiding
rigorously all hypothesis except working hypotheses).]" [Howard C. Warren,
(ed.), Dictionary of Psychology (Houghton Mifflin, 1934), p. 92.]

Carmichael has shown that ambiguity has resulted from the use of the
phrase "empirical psychology" in at least three major senses: in the
historical sense, as experimental, that is, antithetical to rational and
inferential; in the epistemological sense, as ontogenetic, that is,
antithetical to nativistic; in the Titchenerian sense, as antithetical to
hypothetical. (Leonard Carmichael, "What Is Empirical Psychology?," Amer.
J. Psychol., 2926, 37, 521-527.) The second and third usages arc
not implied here.

I should agree with Dewey, however, who suggests that social psychology is
only making a good beginning and stands about where physical science stood
three centuries ago. (John Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology,"
Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 266-277, esp. 275 -77.) Dewey also says that "all
psychology is either biological or social psychology. And if it still be true
that man is not only an animal but a social animal, the two cannot be severed
when we deal with man." (Ibid., p. 2-76.)

This has been shown by Har, who has examined some 136 supposed
"'social laws" and shown that they are in the main very general statements.
Since our knowledge is so inadequate as to the conditions under which the
various social tendencies interact on one another, he suggests that we refer,
not to "laws," but to "statements of tendencies." [Kyung Durk Har, Social
Laws: A Study of the Validity of Sociological Generalizations (Univ.of
North Carolina Press, 1930).

William Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (T.
Fisher Unwin, 1916);Leonard T. Hobhouse,
Mind in Evolution (Macmillan, 1901).

Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (Scribner's,
1902.), Social Organization
(Scribner's, 1909), Social Process (Scribner's, 1918).

The attempt at "fact-mindedness'' has perhaps been due in part to the
influence of Auguste Comte
(1790-1857), with his concept of a "social physics." His positivistic
slant and his disdain of the introspective methods of his day affect even
present-day investigations. (Cf. Karpf, op. cit. note 1, pp.
145.)

Thurstone uses the concept attitude "to denote the sum total of a
man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions,
ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specified topic," and the
concept opinion to "mean a verbal expression of attitude." (L. L.
Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," Amer. J. Sociol., 192-8, 33,
51-9-554, at 531.)

For instance, Bartlett has shown the significance of "remembering" as a
study in social psychology. [F. C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in
Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1932).]

The content of this page is still protected by copyright in the United States
of America and can not be reproduced within its boundaries for any purpose other
than one's own scholarship. The Mead project exercises no control over that
copyright.

This page and related Mead Project pages constitute the personal web-site
of Dr. Lloyd Gordon Ward (retired), who is responsible for its content.
Although the Mead Project continues to be presented through the
generosity of Brock University, the contents of this page do not reflect
the opinion of Brock University. Brock University is not responsible for
its content.

Fair Use Statement:

Scholars are permitted to reproduce this material for personal use.
Instructors are permitted to reproduce this material for educational use by
their students.

Otherwise, no part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, for the purpose of profit or personal benefit, without written permission from the Mead Project. Permission is granted for inclusion of the electronic text of these pages, and their related images in any index that provides free access to its listed documents.