Defence

The logic of Sierra Leone

The conflict there is a test case for Britain’s new defence doctrine

AT ANY time in the past two years, you could have asked the authors of Britain's Strategic Defence Review what sort of crisis they were preparing to face more often, and the answer would have been the same: a slide into anarchy in some developing-world state, probably African and quite possibly on the coast, in which British lives were at risk and a broader humanitarian disaster loomed. In other words, Sierra Leone. Which is where the Labour government's aspiration to use the military as a “force of good” all over the world—even in areas which lack the strategic stakes of the Balkans or the Middle East—could face its make-or-break test.

As long as the operation in Sierra Leone is seen to be effective, limited in scope and does not incur many British casualties, it could be an impressive vindication of the SDR—and its far from self-evident claim that even with a modest, post-cold-war budget, Britain can be a sort of moral global policeman, projecting military power over long distances with increasing effectiveness. So far things are going well. British troops have emerged unscathed from clashes with the rebel RUF, whose leader has been captured by government forces (see article).

At the same time, the spectre of Somalia, where American troops intervened in a burst of high-minded idealism, only to withdraw hastily after suffering heavy losses in a feud with a local warlord, will haunt British ministers as they struggle to stop the Sierra Leone mission becoming over-ambitious in its aims.

At least on paper, Britain's approach to humanitarian intervention is pretty ambitious to begin with. Despite the government's recent emphasis on boosting firepower in Europe, the SDR—which is still the basic mission statement for Britain's arms-buyers and top brass—suggests there are big differences between Britain's strategic profile and that of most European states.

For example, it justifies the retention of Europe's biggest navy, and a plan to construct two giant aircraft-carriers, by stressing Britain's worldwide interests: a trade-oriented economy, with 10m citizens living overseas, 13 dependent territories and close ties to other Commonwealth states. And one of the review's main ideas—keeping at the ready a “spearhead” infantry battalion, ready to engage in robust peacekeeping operations anywhere in the world—is having its first test in Sierra Leone.

So far, the military planners have been lucky. It was fortunate, perhaps, that the “spearheads” on duty at the critical moment were paratroopers. It was also a happy chance that the navy's newest assault ship, HMS Ocean, was within easy distance; and that one of Britain's three small aircraft-carriers, HMS Illustrious, was free to sail nearby.

The spearhead battalion is intended for one-off interventions of up to four months' duration (although the Ministry of Defence insists that the one in Sierra Leone will not take nearly that long); in other words, it has nothing to do with the open-ended sort of deployments—like those in the Balkans and Northern Ireland—which, because of the need for training and recovery time, tie up three times more troops than actually serve at any given time. So the over-stretch problem should not, in theory, be made any worse by Sierra Leone.

Moreover, success in Africa could help the Ministry of Defence's cause in its perpetual skirmishes with the Treasury over the cost of the ships and aircraft needed to wield military might in distant war zones.

Power projection

Britain's credibility as a global power-projector received a separate boost this week with the confirmation that four C-17 transporters—able to carry big tanks and artillery pieces just about anywhere—will be leased from Boeing for £500m ($745m).

The announcement, by Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, was part of a £5 billion package of equipment orders in which industrial and diplomatic pressures, as well as real military needs, had to be factored in.

A £1 billion purchase of air-to-air missiles will mostly be awarded to a European consortium, dominated by French and British companies, although Raytheon, an American missile-maker, was given a small order to meet short-term needs. Bill Clinton had lobbied hard for the contracts. But European leaders prevailed by pointing out that Europe's high-tech missile industry would be doomed, and Raytheon's monopoly assured, if Britain yielded to America.

While the C-17 should certainly be useful in future sorties to distant war zones—as could the Airbus consortium's A400M transporter, which Mr Hoon has agreed in principle to buy once it is ready, around 2007—defence experts are less convinced, privately, of any pressing need for air-to-air missiles.

In a world where western aircraft already dominate the skies, the only strong argument for developing an even more deadly air-defence missile has to do with fighting off a similarly lethal projectile which Russia is developing and may eventually (if the western defence contractors are lucky) sell to some nasty regimes. But Sierra Leone is still a distinctly low-tech conflict.