26. Report by an Investigative Team Headed by the Chief of Staff,
United States Army (Wheeler), to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

At their meeting on 7 January 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
agreed that General Earle G.
Wheeler, who had twice postponed a scheduled visit to
Southeast Asia, should lead a team of senior Service and Joint Staff
representatives to South Vietnam. The team was asked to provide the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense with an
up-to-date assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. It was
composed as follows:

The team’s mission was to obtain information for use by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in making an assessment of the counter-insurgency
program in South Vietnam. The team was asked to form a military
judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of the
conflict in a reasonable period of time. Specific appraisals were
requested on the effectiveness of the present military program to
meet United States objectives in South Vietnam, to include: the
command and control arrangements of the United States and indigenous
military forces in Southeast Asia; effectiveness of employment of
United States and indigenous aviation; the quality and validity of
military intelligence; and the readiness of plans to meet
contingencies in the area. The team was to submit recommendations
for modifications to our program which appeared to be desirable.
Because the current counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam is
largely the result of an appraisal made by General Maxwell D. Taylor in November
1961, the team used his report3 as a point of reference in reaching its
conclusions.

3.

Subsequent sections of this report cover the current situation in
South Vietnam in terms of military, political, and economic factors,
specific conclusions as to the current state of affairs, prospects
for the future, and finally, recommended measures to improve the
mutual efforts of the United States and the Government of
Vietnam.

4.

The map and table4 at the frontispiece detail the localities and
activities visited by the team during its eight-day stay in South
Vietnam. The team visited CINCPAC headquarters on both its outbound and inbound
trips and stopped briefly in Okinawa to inquire into the
capabilities of the United States Army, Ryukyus, to support our
operations in South Vietnam.

The team approached its visit with the knowledge that the Vietnam war has
been in progress for fifteen years, during which the insurgents have not
allowed the young country the opportunity to pursue its nation-building
program. Despite this, the government has managed to survive. The team’s
assessment of progress achieved, and programs required, was made in
light of the strong nationalistic convictions of the Government of
Vietnam. These convictions limit the role of the United States to one of
advice and persuasion, supplemented only by the metering effect of our
material assistance. Finally, the team was mindful of the fact that, in
a counterinsurgency campaign, there are few major judgments that are
wholly military. Decisions, particularly in the campaign in Vietnam,
usually embrace political, economic, and ideological factors as well.
The team’s study and conclusions were influenced by this fact.

2. Military Factors

a.

The Growth of U.S. Advisory Strength. In
1962, the number of U.S. advisors with the Vietnamese military was
tripled, rising from 900 to over 3,000. At the beginning of the
year, there were no advisors where the bulk of the fighting takes
place, at the battalion level. At year’s end, there were over 400
serving with every battalion and comparable unit in the Vietnamese
armed forces. Likewise, the number of U.S. advisors with province
chiefs grew from two in January 1962, to over 100 in December 1962,
while the system of intelligence advisors expanded nearly tenfold
from 25, at the beginning of the year, to 220 in December. This
across-the-board increase in numbers has begun to have a noticeable
effect on the quality, uniformity, and coordination of military
operations. Also, the high quality of U.S. advisory personnel was
particularly noticeable. The “first team” is in the game in
Vietnam.

b.

Filling the Gaps. Responsive to another
deficiency portrayed in the Taylor report, in 1962 the U.S. has moved supporting
military formations to Vietnam to provide capabilities which the
Vietnamese, themselves, could not quickly develop. Nearly three
hundred aircraft in United States military units have been deployed.
They include 148 transport helicopters, 11 armed helicopters, 81
fixed-wing transport aircraft, 13 fighter bombers, 9 light bombers,
4 reconnaissance fighters, and 37 liaison aircraft. Additionally, we
provided, and are now operating, an urgently needed backbone
communications system which has drawn together the geographic
extremes of the country. To assist the Vietnamese in doing something
far beyond their own capabilities, we [Page 76]installed an effective electronic detection system
that is now capable of locating and following the movements of a
large number of the more active Viet Cong radio transmitters. We
have created an effective but austere logistic base to support all
of these United States gap-filling efforts and to avoid burdening
the overloaded logistic system of the Vietnamese armed
forces.

c.

Growth of the Vietnamese Military
Capability.

(1)

A comparison of the current strength of the Vietnamese
armed forces with that of a year ago is:

Army

Navy

AF

Marines

Civil Guard

Self Defense Corps

31 Dec 1961

167,971

4,426

5,441

3,123

67,163

56,426

15 Dec 1962

196,357

6,595

5,817

5,281

75,909

95,828

(2)

More important than these strength increases is the
improved state of training of the Government of Vietnam
armed forces. Direct United States training efforts have
been felt in all of the regular armed forces. Additionally,
United States’ operated training centers have given
individual training to over 90,000 members of the Civil
Guard and the Self Defense Corps. Training, much of it
technical in nature, has had to take place concurrently with
the absorption of large quantities of equipment, including,
for example, 55 aircraft, 27 naval craft, 474 personnel
carriers, 1,100 tactical radios, and 38,000 assorted
infantry weapons. Additionally, the process of expansion and
training was conducted in a combat environment, where the
demands of war often took priority over training
requirements. In assessing the over-all strength of the
Vietnamese armed forces, it is the team’s opinion that
current personnel strengths, modified only by minor
increases which have been recommended by the Assistance
Command, are adequate to meet the current level of Viet Cong
effort. Our aim for the future should be focused on
improving the quality of existing forces.

(3)

Very recently, a Joint Operations Center (JOC) was established under the
Joint General Staff. The JOC
consists of staff officers from the Vietnamese Army, Navy,
and Air Force. In addition, U.S. Army and Air Force officer
advisors are assigned to the JOC to provide advice and assistance on the
planning and on the employment of air, ground, and naval
forces. The JOC provided a
composite display of military activities in progress
throughout South Vietnam, and when completed, will provide a
focal point for top level coordination of all military
planning and operations at any given time.

(4)

The Army. Built around nine light
divisions and several separate battalions, the Army tended
in the early months of 1962 to employ conventional tactics
involving large area sweeps by division-size units. These
operations were often inadequately planned, awkwardly
executed and usually unproductive. 1962 showed progress in
overcoming this basic weakness. Planning is now far better
coordinated. Commanders now consult their United States
advisors and give greater consideration to the influence of
supporting air operations. The great proportion of
operations now take place at the lower levels, some 26% of
which were of company size and 58% of platoon size during
the year. By the same token, progress has been made during
the past year in freeing the regular units to take the field
to attack and pursue the Viet Cong. Army units have been
replaced with Self Defense Corps and Civil Guard personnel
in many static tasks. In the average division, six or seven
of the nine battalions are usually free to conduct some 400
platoon and company-size offensive operations monthly.
United States advisors to Vietnamese Army units, at every
level, encourage their counterparts to be relentless in this
effort.

(5)

The Air Force.

(a)

The small Vietnamese Air Force is enthusiastic and
is becoming increasingly competent, although still
immature and limited by a pilot shortage. Comprising
two fighter squadrons, one transport squadron, two
helicopter and three liaison squadrons, it provides
escort, visual reconnaissance, strike, and close air
support of ground operations in a satisfactory
manner. Bombing and strafing approach the accuracy
and effect of highly-trained United States units.
However, without the currently planned augmentation
of United States tactical aviation units, it would
not be possible for the Vietnamese Air Force to meet
the daily sortie demands required by the current and
contemplated tempo of operations. It will be October
1964 before the pilot training program will match
the demands of operational requirements.

(b)

To facilitate the control and employment of all
Vietnamese Air Force and U.S. Air Force air
operations in South Vietnam, a Joint Air Operations
Center QAOC) has been established. The center
provides the means by which the air commanders can
allocate and control the available tactical air
effort to maximum advantage. Subordinate facilities
are established and planned to facilitate air and
ground coordination at lower echelons.

(6)

The Navy and Marines. Comprised of
about 6,000 men, the Navy is divided into a Sea Force, a
River Force, and a Junk Force. It has grown rapidly in
efficiency in recent months. It is capable of limited
amphibious operations, coastal and river patrols, and
provision of some logistic support of ground forces. The
Marine Corps, numbering 5,000 men, and organized as a
brigade of four battalions, has now completed basic training
in both helicopter and landing craft amphibious [Page 78]operations. In early
January, a landing of two battalions of Marines in the Ca
Mau Peninsula was
skillfully executed, and shows a capability for greatly
expanded amphibious activity in the Delta area.

(7)

The Civil Guard and the Self Defense
Corps. These two paramilitary forces, designed
respectively to provide regional security at the province
and district levels, matured greatly in 1962. The Civil
Guard increased in size from 65,000 to 76,000 during the
year, while the Self Defense Corps grew from 49,000 to
80,000 men. Far more important than their growth has been
the magnitude and quality of their training by United States
advisors. Over 30,000 Civil Guardsmen have undergone a
three-month training course, while 43,000 members of the
Self Defense Corps have had six weeks of United States
supervised training. Their growing role in the security of
the land testifies to the value of the program. However, the
team noted with sympathy General Harkins’ generally
unsuccessful efforts to persuade the Vietnamese government
to abandon their concept of holding many of the Self Defense
Corps in small static posts. This inheritance from the
French provides tempting, lucrative targets for the Viet
Cong. When overrun, they represent a source of weapons,
ammunition, and food.

(8)

Leadership. One area in which
training of the Vietnamese armed forces is particularly
important is leadership. They have only about 60% of their
required noncommissioned officers, and they are also short
junior officers. There are some senior officers, serving at
division and higher echelons, whose false pride and
unwillingness to acknowledge ignorance have impaired their
effectiveness. All of these factors manifest themselves on
the battlefield, and their elimination is a prime objective
of the United States military advisory and training
effort.

(9)

Intelligence.

(a)

In all of the fields of endeavor in South Vietnam,
development of an effective intelligence system
stands near the top in terms of progress achieved
during 1962. Starting from an initial zero, the
United States intelligence advisory program has, in
a single year, grown into a reasonably effective
mechanism. Its counterpart Vietnamese military
intelligence program has moved decisively, although
not nearly so far, in the direction of an efficient,
organized system. In 1962, United States
intelligence advisors have been accepted at each
level of Vietnamese military command, from the Joint
General Staff down to the division. In addition,
United States intelligence advisors are serving at
regiment and battalion level. These personnel,
provided with their own communication system, are
developing the capability to procure information and
transmit it rapidly. In addition to providing timely
information, the United States effort has the
ancillary effect of energizing the Vietnamese
intelligence system to a higher level of
performance. In the past year, the Vietnamese have
[Page 79]also
developed a basically sound military intelligence
organization which suffers only from technical
inexperience. A former problem preventing the easy
flow of information up through the civil and
military channels has been largely solved by making
the sector (military) and province (civil) leaders
one and the same man in all but three of the
forty-one provinces.

(b)

Deficiencies in the Vietnamese intelligence
operation include slowness in transmission of
information, weaknesses in interrogation of
prisoners, and the lack of skill among personnel at
the lowest levels. On the United States side, the
weakness lies mainly in linguistic proficiency.
These are defects which time should correct.

(c)

There can be no more profound index to the
progress of the battle in Vietnam than the measure
of changes in the level and quality of information
coming to the Vietnamese forces. On the basis of
this very respectable measurement, the Government
of Vietnam is making steady and favorable
progress. Every Vietnamese corps commander, and
many United States advisors, attest to a growth in
confidence in the government which the common
people are now demonstrating by providing useful
intelligence. Successful operations in each corps
tactical area have recently been accomplished.
Many were based upon information supplied by the
inhabitants, who probably did so only because of a
conviction that the government is going to
triumph.

This favorable trend is self-regenerative. The
more good intelligence that is forthcoming, the
greater the number of successful operations that
can be undertaken. These successes, in turn,
provide for more tranquillity and confidence in
the countryside, with the result that there is
still greater willingness on the part of the
people to support the government cause with
information. A case in point is Plei Mrong, a
Montagnard training camp in the highlands near the
Cambodian border. It is located in an area which
has been dominated by the Viet Cong for fifteen
years. Here, an unsuccessful effort on the part of
the Viet Cong to destroy the training camp
resulted immediately in a change in attitude on
the part of the local residents, many of whom
began to volunteer useful information on Viet Cong
sanctuaries and personalities. This information,
in turn, has resulted in the capture of more Viet
Cong, and this has had a further impact on the
people, who have responded with still more
information.

This favorable note is being sounded with growing
resonance across the country, by Vietnamese
military commanders, provincial administrators,
and, most objectively, by United States advisors
at every high level. The intelligence tide has
begun to run toward the government.

(d)

As the volume of information has grown, there
have developed several basic intelligence
indications which are now serving to influence the
strategic and tactical thinking of the Vietnamese
and [Page 80]their
United States advisors. By no means are all of
these indications favorable. Among the adverse
indications, the principal ones are the continuity
of Viet Cong strength, the growth in quantity of
Chinese Communist weapons appearing in enemy
hands, and the increased size and sophistication
of the Viet Cong communications system. Taking the
indications in order, the first, and perhaps most
disquieting, is the apparent ability of the Viet
Cong to maintain their strength, or even increase
it slightly, in the face of growing pressure by
the government. It cannot be ignored that the
Vietnamese intelligence system, having improved
greatly, is doubtless uncovering Viet Cong
elements which have been in the country all the
time. Giving generous discount to this fact, there
still is basis for concluding that the
conscription base for Viet Cong rank and file is
still substantial, particularly in the Delta, and
that the infusion of cadres of leaders and
technicians, from outside the country, continues
at a significant rate.

The same factor of improved intelligence
resources applies to the growth in quantities of
Communist Chinese material in the battle area.
This cannot be permitted to obscure the fact that
heavy Chinese infantry weapons, such as 57
millimeter recoilless rifles and associated
ammunition, have recently been captured as far
south as the Delta area.

Our improved communication detection system now
reveals the existence of some 224 active communist
radios in South Vietnam, where a year ago only 60
had been located. While there may not be as many
more radios as the improved detection facilities
indicate, there is no question but that the
communist systems have improved, and we know that
their cryptographic arrangements have grown more
sophisticated.

These indications show that the communists are
engaged in a slow, though perceptible, increase in
effort. This suggests that the headquarters in
Hanoi is not yet persuaded that the Americans are
any different from the French; and that if they
will but respond to our efforts with a determined
reaction from outside the official battle areas,
we will ultimately lose our confidence and our
resolution.

(e)

There are intelligence indicators which fall on
the favorable side. The most significant relate to
deteriorations in the physical and moral condition
of the Viet Cong. Reports, in growing numbers,
reflect shortages of food, and an increased
repugnance of the Vietnamese people to Viet Cong
depredations upon their food stocks, and extortion
of their property and money. These are accounted as
one of the causes for the migration of some 145,000
Montagnards away from the Viet Cong into safer
areas. Likewise, reports emphasize the shortage of
medical supplies, and Viet Cong attacks on
Vietnamese outposts are frequently launched for the
express purpose of acquiring medicines. Hunger,
sickness, and lack of munitions have had a visible
effect in [Page 81]terms of Viet Cong defections, which have grown
steadily during the year from about 75 per month in
January to a peak of 215 in December. The level of
Viet Cong offensive activity has diminished in a
degree consistent with the foregoing impediments.
From a peak of almost 1,900 incidents in March 1962,
the intensity of the insurgent effort has dropped to
1,340 incidents in December 1962. In spite of this,
Viet Cong personnel losses grew steadily through
1962, from an initial level of 1,900 per month to
2,750 in the month of December.

(f)

On balance, the team concluded that the
intelligence picture is much better than it was a
year ago. A stronger intelligence organization;
more, better and more timely information; a growth
in the popular intelligence base; and a series of
interlocking intelligence indicators portray an
upward trend in the conduct of the war. A sobering
counterpoise is the strong evidence of effective
external support for the insurgency, with its
consequent implications in terms of protraction of
the conflict.

(10)

The Military-Economic-Political
Relationship. Although President Diem is fully aware of the
interlocking nature of these elements, many of his
subordinates are not. Therefore, all programs often do not
advance abreast. Here, too, United States military and
civilian advice has shown results during the past year. In
clear-and-hold operations, efforts are now made to have seed
and fertilizer readily at hand to permit the farmers to
exploit their liberated fields. Strategic hamlets are
encouraged to elect their own hamlet chief, thus to remove a
common Viet Cong propaganda target. Schools are now being
run for civil administrators, to help raise the standards of
province, district, village, and hamlet government. A
village and hamlet radio system has been installed for
intelligence, administrative and emergency warning purposes.
These developments mark a small beginning in weaving the
military solution into the nap of the politico-economic
situation. The team sees this as the longest-term task of
all. It is a task which gives rise to the greatest
apprehension, since the liberated farmer is still encumbered
with countless restrictions. Until he is freed from these,
the Viet Cong will continue to have volunteers from a
disgruntled fringe of the society.

3. Political and Economic
Factors

a.

Political Factors.

(1)

The team was impressed with the United States Country Team
in South Vietnam. Under the leadership of Ambassador
Nolting, the
work of the member agencies of the country team has been
carefully integrated to optimize the United States effort.
The JCS team believes that
the military measures being taken in South Vietnam must
continue to be considered as necessary, principally to
establish conditions favorable for political and economic
growth. The basic problem now is [Page 82]to restore law and order, particularly in
the rural areas, so that measures for the development of
political and economic strength can take hold. Historically,
the central government in Vietnam has not reached down and
made itself felt to the peasant. Likewise, the peasant has
not truly identified himself, his activities, or his future
with his government, nor has he thought in terms of national
political issues, as we know them. The team found that this
situation is slowly beginning to change. Now the government
is beginning to reach the people, and the people are
beginning to reach for the government.

(2)

The strategic hamlet program is perhaps the greatest
single case for this encouraging development. It is a
program aimed directly at the people that not only provides
them with an elementary system of defense against, and
isolation from, the Viet Cong, but also is the vehicle by
which the Government of Vietnam can carry forward a
political, economic, and social revolution. More than 4,000
strategic hamlets have been completed and another 2,000 of
the 8,000 programmed will soon be completed. In 1962, this
program was instrumental in bringing an additional 500,000
people under the control of the government.

(3)

To date, elections have been held in more than a thousand
hamlets. While the government attempts to insure that
candidates for office are not Viet Cong members or
sympathizers, the elections appear to be conducted in a
democratic manner. Following the election of a hamlet chief
and a hamlet council, the new officials, themselves, decide
on projects for the improvement of the well-being and living
conditions of the people. It is through this “rice roots”
program that the framework for a democratic political
process is being developed. It is the intention of the
government to extend this process from the hamlets and
villages up through the districts and provinces, whose
officials are now appointed by the central government. The
United States advisory effort, both military and civilian,
is being extended to the province level to assist in the
development of civic action and economic development
programs. Although this is a slow process, the team believes
that democracy cannot be legislated in South Vietnam, and
that the current political development program will move
forward in direct ratio to the results achieved in improving
the living conditions and satisfying the basic aspirations
of the people.

(4)

Another noteworthy development is the government’s
progress toward winning over the Montagnards. Long ignored,
and often exploited by the central government, a campaign
has been undertaken to protect these primitive hill people
from Viet Cong exploitation. Over 145,000 of these people
have willingly left their natural habitat to seek training
by, and support of, the government. They represent an
important plus for the Government of Vietnam, both
politically and [Page 83]militarily. They are tough and cunning fighters who are
completely at home in the rugged mountain terrain through
which the principal Viet Cong infiltration routes
pass.

b.

Economic Factors.

(1)

The increased economic activity throughout the country,
particularly on the lower levels, provides an indicator of
growing confidence in the government and in the eventual
outcome of the struggle with the Viet Cong. The number of
applications for licenses to start new businesses is
increasing; goods and food are moving-although with some
difficulty-by road and water; and trade with the Montagnards
is increasing. Six hundred million piasters were loaned to
farmers and fishermen for fertilizer and for purchasing
fishing boats and equipment. These loans are to be repaid on
the installment plan and the capital is to be
reinvested.

(2)

Education in rural areas has been expanded greatly.
Several new United States-financed technical and teacher
training schools have been opened. Training sessions were
completed for 120 provincial education chiefs, school
inspectors and school principals. During 1963, nearly 8,000
new teachers will be trained, and classrooms, textbooks, and
supplies for 150,000 primary school students will be
provided. This will add to the nearly threefold growth in
primary school population already experienced since 1955.
Expansion of intermediate and university student population
has been fivefold since 1955 and is programmed to continue
in 1963. In addition, over 7,000 students are being taught
the English language by the military members of the Military
Assistance Advisory Group.

(3)

The team believes that the current educational and
economic aid efforts will have a far-reaching impact on the
economic development of South Vietnam. However, the team
believes the achievement of a viable economy is still
remote.

III. The National Campaign Plan

1. As a result of the extensive United States and South Vietnam
effort of the past year, described in preceding paragraphs, the
South Vietnam armed forces are now attaining a position of strength,
capability, and disposition which should enable them to assume a
greater initiative than they have in the past.

2. The broad outline of this action is known as the “National
Campaign Plan,” sometimes erroneously referred to as “Operation
Explosion.” The National Campaign Plan is a concept of coordinated
political, economic, and military operations to be undertaken at an
accelerated pace by each corps, division, and sector commander in
his own area. In fact, the operations have already begun.

3.

There are four basic strategies involved in the National
Campaign Plan:5

a.

To seek out and destroy Viet Cong strongholds.

b.

To clear and hold areas heretofore dominated by the
Viet Cong.

c.

To build strategic hamlets in these areas and protect
them from Viet Cong attack.

d.

to gain and hold the plateau and mountain areas and
effect a degree of border control with the tribesmen
(chiefly Montagnards).

4. Operations under the National Campaign Plan are expected to
result in an ever-increasing measure of control by the Government of
Vietnam over its people and its territory. Since the basic concept
is one of many small operations, with decentralized control,
activity has been increasing in those areas where trained units have
been available and where the initiative of local commanders has been
most pronounced. The tempo of small scale operations has now reached
450 per month. This tempo should increase substantially in the
months ahead, as the strength of South Vietnam, developed over the
past year, makes itself felt. However, the successful completion of
the strategies listed will take considerable time and will demand
much in resolution and perseverance. There appears to be no quick or
easy solution.

4. [sic] Commander, United States Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, has developed a comprehensive plan6 designed to prepare the armed
forces of South Vietnam to exercise control of their territory,
without our help, by the end of calendar year 1965. It involves a
concurrent phase-out of United States support personnel, leaving a
Military Assistance Advisory Group of a strength of about 1,600
personnel. This comprehensive plan has been reviewed by the
Commander in Chief, Pacific, and was submitted on 25 January 1963 to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. As it finally
evolves, this [Page 85]plan will
provide general guidance for United States force requirements,
Military Assistance Program support (which has been developed in
coordination with the five-year Military Assistance Program), and
Military Assistance Advisory Group personnel requirements over the
next three years.

IV. Areas Where Improvement Can Be Made

1. Command Control of the United
States Effort in South Vietnam

a.

A difficult problem, at Saigon level, for over-all control and
correlation of the United States military effort stems from the
separate organization and operation of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group, which uses many of the same military personnel in
the field as are used in combat planning and operations monitored by
the Military Assistance Command Vietnam staff. The team considers
that improvement may be realized by more closely interrelating the
military assistance functions with the appropriate Military Advisory
Command Vietnam staff functions. This could be achieved without
prejudice to the planned phase-out of Military Assistance Command
Vietnam and the planned retention of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group.

b.

It may be both possible and desirable, within available resources,
to establish Army and Navy components of Military Assistance Command
Vietnam, deriving benefit from the clear channels of command such an
organization would afford. The Commander, 2d United States Air
Division, functions as the air component commander of Military
Assistance Command Vietnam. As such, the Air Force is the only
Service with an organization and commander under Military Assistance
Command Vietnam that actually functions as a component command. In
this context, Military Assistance Command Vietnam would become in
actuality a subordinate unified command of Commander in Chief
Pacific rather than a specially tailored organization with a number
of subordinate service activities reporting directly to the
headquarters. In any event, composition of the Military Assistance
Command Vietnam staff should be reviewed in the light of increasing
air and naval activity and in recognition of the growing importance
of and requirement for air and sea logistics lift.

c.

The potential of the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) should be more fully exploited.
It is important that the JAOC be
cognizant of all air activities planned or in progress in South
Vietnam. Significant United States air elements of the Army, Marines
and the Air Force are making up for a current deficit in the
Vietnamese Air Force capability. In the interests of efficient use
of these air resources, they should be responsive to shifting
between and among the corps areas to meet peak combat and other air
support requirements, and to take maximum advantage of good weather
areas. The JAOC is an excellent [Page 86]means for Commander United
States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, through his Air
Component Commander, to exert maximum influence on tactical air
planning and in the appropriate allocation of tactical air assets to
the growing air combat and tactical air support tasks. Similarly,
the JAOC has the potential to
assist in the task of bringing logistic airlift resources in South
Vietnam to bear on the air logistics problem, which is assuming
increasing proportions and importance. The team agrees that the use
of the JAOC for these purposes does
not imply centralized control of all aviation assets in South
Vietnam, certain of which will continue to be more appropriately
controlled at lower organizational levels of the army and air
structures.

d.

The transfer of responsibility for the numerous civilian irregular
groups [less than 1 line not declassified] to
the U.S. military is proceeding. The team noted, however, that
considerable numbers of irregulars are now being exempted from this
transfer, in terms which appear to contravene the basic concept of
establishing the entire project under the military, except for
elements wholly involved in secret intelligence.

2. Command and Control Problems within
the Vietnamese Armed Forces

Though generally recognized, these problems persist:

a.

A tendency to hold planning very closely within the armed
forces, ostensibly for security purposes, inhibits adequate and
concurrent air support planning. This practice also precludes
realizing such pre-operations advantages from the air elements
as photo, weather and visual reconnaissance and
observation.

b.

Some Vietnamese Army battalions are still immobilized by
allocation to local security tasks rather than to mobile
employment against the enemy. This is a constantly improving
situation, but requires continuing emphasis.

c.

The Joint Operations Center and the Joint Air Operations
Center are in their early formative states. Constant emphasis
and daily work with the Vietnamese armed forces, particularly
the Army and the Air force, are required in order that these
agencies develop and mature as quickly and soundly as
possible.

d.

The rank and grade structures of the Vietnam Air Force and
Vietnam Navy are significantly lower than in the Vietnam Army.
Although much smaller, these services have an important role to
play and they must be accorded a greater part in military
planning and decisions.

3. Nature of the Relationship between
United States and Government of Vietnam Authorities

a.

An important and interesting aspect of relationships between the
American military and the leadership of the Vietnamese Government
became apparent in the course of calls made by General Wheeler. Accompanied by General
Harkins, he called on
Minister of Defense Thuan
and President Diem. The
attitude of Minister Thuan
toward General Harkins is
completely open, frank and friendly. The two confer on matters of
organization, operations and assignment of personnel in the most
free and easy fashion. General Harkins has no hesitancy in pointing out mistakes in
military operations to Minister Thuan, and he in turn receives these comments with
equanimity and assurances that he will look into, and correct,
mistakes. General Harkins
told General Wheeler
privately that Minister Thuan had proved that he keeps his promises. General
Harkins has a great
influence upon the assignments of senior Vietnamese officers. While
this influence is not advertised (and General Harkins would prefer that it not
be known), nevertheless, it is known, and adds to the prestige and
influence of American officers in their advisory role.

b.

The conference with President Diem made it apparent that he, also, likes and
trusts General Harkins.
Moreover, General Harkins,
as with Minister Thuan, has
no hesitancy in pressing the President to carry out programs which
he considers to be important to the military effort. All-in-all,
this attitude at the very top of the government represents a vast
change from the aloofness and suspicion with which American advisors
were received by senior Vietnam officials a year ago.

c.

United States officials, military and civilian, are not in a
position to command, control or direct Government of Vietnam
military, economic or political activities, nor do they desire such
added responsibility. They must, therefore, be in a strong position
to influence Government of Vietnam activity along the desired lines
and thus achieve the desired objectives. Fortunately, excellent
relations exist between United States and Government of Vietnam
authorities in all major fields of joint endeavor and United States
advice is generally, though not always, accepted. The team feels
these relationships will continue to strengthen and United States
advice will be increasingly followed as Government of Vietnam
confidence in themselves and their advisors continues to
grow.

4. Airlift and Air Logistics

a.

There is a significant airlift currently available in South
Vietnam. Thus far it has readily met all requirements levied against
it. Expanded operations visualized in the National Campaign Plan and
[Page 88]the number and extent of
“special situations” requiring air logistic support will generate a
wide variety of additional airlift requirements. Until road and rail
nets can be secured and improved, major reliance for logistic
support and transport of personnel will continue to be placed in the
airlift forces. The number and types of fixed and rotary wing
aircraft available, and the magnitude of the air logistic effort
currently forecast, merit special attention.

b.

The team has asked General Harkins for his views on the desirability of
augmenting his headquarters with a small group of officer’s,-experts
in air logistics and air transportation, to assist him in coping
with the anticipated air movement problem.

5. Rules of Engagement

a.

An Army aviation unit was deployed to South Vietnam by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to test the applicability and effectiveness of the
armed helicopter, in an escort role, under combat conditions as they
exist in South Vietnam. The principal armament of this unit consists
of two fixed, forward-firing, machine guns and two 2.75 rocket pods.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff-established rules of engagement state that
the aircraft carry United States markings; be flown by United States
crews; have a Government of Vietnam observer or crew member aboard
on all flights; and that fire delivered be considered defensive in
nature.

b.

The team learned that Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam have placed
additional restrictions upon rules of engagement for the armed
helicopters. They require that the aircraft must be fired upon
before they may engage a target, even when an enemy target is
clearly identified.

c.

Under these rules, helicopter pilots are placed in the position of
being unable to attack clearly identified Viet Cong targets of
opportunity, in a combat situation, unless first fired upon. To some
degree, this places United States lives and equipment at risk
unnecessarily and gives the enemy an advantageous option. The United
States Air Force “Farmgate” units in South Vietnam are not faced
with these specific restrictions. They can attack identified Viet
Cong targets provided that: a Vietnam Air Force observer is aboard;
the Vietnam Air Force does not have the capability to engage the
target, the aircraft carry Vietnam Air Force markings and the
targets are designated by the Vietnamese.

d.

The team believes that Commander in Chief Pacific should
reconsider the present restrictions on the rules of engagement
pertaining to armed helicopters in South Vietnam to allow these
aircraft to engage clearly identified Viet Cong targets which may
emerge as targets of opportunity during combat operations.

The mutual distrust and dislike between the Diem government and the foreign
press, particularly United States press representatives, has created
serious public relations problems which impact directly on the war
effort both in the United States and in Vietnam. Press
representatives charge the Government of Vietnam with repressing the
freedom of the press (two American newsmen were expelled from
Vietnam), being unduly secretive, issuing deliberately erroneous
news bulletins, and attempting to use the press as involuntary
propaganda tools. The press attitude is summed up this way: “The
Western press refuses to submit to such treatment.”

b.

The Government of Vietnam regards the foreign press as
untrustworthy, prone to publish secret and false information derived
from private sources and biased to the extent that the press writes
up only the bad and not the good aspects of events in South Vietnam.
A revealing nuance of the Government of Vietnam press feud was
communicated to General Wheeler by a first-hand source. Madame Nhu, wife of the brother
and principal advisor to President Diem, and an important figure in her own right,
deeply resents the press stories of the bombing of the President’s
palace during which she and her children were in grave danger of
death. She states that the stories revealed an “ill-concealed
regret” that the bombing failed in its objective.

c.

While the truth of these countercharges probably lies, as usual,
somewhere between the extremes of the allegations of the two
parties, the fact remains that the situation is serious, because the
continuing bad press has colored public attitudes both in the United
States and Vietnam. The unfortunate aftermath of reports of the
fight at Ap Bac on 2 January 19637 is a prime
instance of the harm being done to the war effort. Press members
admit that they were appalled at the flood of editorial punditry and
cries of doom elicited by the first incomplete accounts of the
clash. They insist defensively, and contrary to the facts, that the
battle was a defeat and that the stories were derived from United
States sources. The latter is true, but only to the extent that the
stories were based on ill-considered statements made at a time of
high excitement and frustration by a few American officers.

d.

Nevertheless, great harm has been done. Public and Congressional
opinion in the United States has been influenced toward thinking
that the war effort in Vietnam is misguided, lacking in drive, and
flouts the counsel of United States advisors. Doubts have been
raised as to the courage, the training, the determination and
dedication of the Vietnamese armed forces. In Vietnam the backlash
of these reports, both in governmental and military circles, is
apparent. The Vietnamese [Page 90]resent statements in the American press of such a derogatory
nature to their personal characteristics and military habits and
objectives. Moreover, relations between the United States diplomatic
and military representatives, on the one hand, and the press
representatives on the other, is somewhat strained.

e.

Officials at the United States Embassy and within the United
States Advisory Group have long been aware of this unfortunate
atmosphere and have attempted to overcome it by press briefings
given by the Public Information Officer of United States Military
Assistance Command Vietnam. General Harkins himself is readily available to the press at
almost any time. However, it is considered that further efforts must
be made, both in Vietnam and the United States, if the current
course of events is to be reversed.

8.Infiltration

a.

Almost every judgement reached by the team had to be accompanied
by the reservation that it had validity only under the current level
of Viet Cong effort. The enemy, however, has both resources and a
latitude of choice, and could materially increase the level of his
effort if he chose.

b.

External influence on the situation is considerable. Facts in the
hands of the Advisory Command characterize this infiltration as
substantial, at least in terms of quality. Entrance is gained
through four general routes. Cadre personnel (estimated as an
average of 500 per month for the past few months) enter from North
Vietnam or Laos near the 17th parallel, and move southward in stages
through the Annamite Chain of mountains, utilizing a well developed
underground railway. Alternatively, some personnel, as well as
equipment, move down the Ho Chi
Minh trail through Laos, some entering South Vietnam
at the waist of the country, and some moving farther south to enter
via Cambodia. Some supplies enter by sea, either across the Gulf of
Siam from Cambodia, or by coastwise junk from North Vietnam. In
terms of magnitude it is noted that some 3000 junks were inspected
by the Vietnamese Navy during the past year, of which number 160
were proved to harbor Viet Cong. Finally, it is accepted by the
Advisory Command that there is a movement across the border of
selected commercial items, in undetermined quantity, purchased on
the open market in Cambodia.

c.

Without the sophisticated infusions of weapons, code books,
medicines, fuzes, leaders and technicians, it is certain that the
lot of the Viet Cong would be much harder. But to cauterize the 900
miles of border and 1500 miles of coastline presents a problem which
even the most dynamic of efforts on the part of the Vietnamese will
not greatly diminish. It is plain that, apart from the task of
gaining the respect of [Page 91]the
people, this matter of external assistance for the Viet Cong is the
greatest problem facing the Vietnamese, and it must be solved by
methods more practicable than surveillance of the country’s
borders.

V. Conclusions

1.

a. The situation in South Vietnam has been reoriented, in the
space of a year and a half, from a circumstance of near
desperation to a condition where victory is now a hopeful
prospect. There are numerous options of support and involvement
available to the United States. They range from complete
disengagement to overt commitment of United States forces with a
concomitant demand on our part for full command authority over
the Vietnamese. The first extreme is unacceptable. It sacrifices
all that has been gained, and is tantamount to relinquishment of
our position in Asia. The second is impracticable in terms of
what the Vietnamese would accept, and it is undesirable from our
viewpoint in that it would tend to make us responsible for every
misadventure in the conflict. Intermediate to these extremes is
the course of augmenting, greatly, our aid and advice to the
Vietnamese; a program which could only be justified if there
were major benefits clearly promised. This is not the case;
there are no areas of assistance which are deficient in a
quantum degree. This leads to the conclusion that the current
support program in Vietnam is adequate, and should be retained
with only minor alterations as may be recommended by the
Advisory Command. This view derives from the conviction that we
are winning slowly in the present thrust, and that there is no
compelling reason to change.

b. At the same time, it is not realistic to ignore the fact that
we have not given Ho Chi
Minh any evidence that we are prepared to call
him to account for helping to keep the insurgency in South
Vietnam alive, and that we should do something to make the North
Vietnamese bleed. Here again, the opportunities cover the full
spectrum, from overt, pre-emptive attack by United States forces
of targets in North Vietnam, to being content with the minor
intelligence and sabotage forays [1 line not
declassified]. The former is a grave step, embodying a
far-reaching national decision which might have serious
implications elsewhere. The latter offers essentially no promise
of influencing the progress of the war. This leaves the more
reasonable course of authorizing the Assistance Command to build
up a much stronger unconventional warfare capability in the
Vietnamese military, and then directing it in a coordinated
program of sabotage, destruction, propaganda, and subversive
missions against North Vietnam. To do this has the virtue of
putting organized pressure on the North Vietnamese on a basis
which keeps the United States wholly in the [Page 92]background while at the same
time conducting the anti-North Vietnam campaign as a powerful
military endeavor rather than as an ancillary [1 line not declassified].

2.

Turning to the specific areas which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed be addressed, the team reached the following conclusions:

a.

The National Campaign Plan is a
logical outgrowth of the marshalling process which has taken
place in response to the Taylor report. It should not create
requirements for great increases in United States support
and offers reasonable prospects for improving greatly the
military situation. As such, it deserves to be
supported.

b.

Command and control, within the
United States structure, embodies few problems, none of
which is fundamental and all of which can be solved locally.
The team would prefer to see the Military Assistance
Advisory Group absorbed into the Assistance Command and sees
some virtue in the formal designation of the Assistance
Command as a formalized subordinate Unified Command. The
team learned, however, that General Harkins and Admiral
Felt are opposed
to one or the other of these moves. The team considers that
their views in both areas should prevail.

c.

The employment of air assets
absorbed much of the team’s time. Its conclusion, and that
of Generals Harkins
and Anthis is that the basic relationships are satisfactory,
but that there are weaknesses in the joint planning for
supporting air operations, reporting on helicopter
movements, and in logistic airlift operations. A team of
four experts has been offered to General Harkins to assist in
solving the problem of logistic airlift operations. The
problems of planning and reporting are being solved
locally.

d.

Intelligence. A continuous
improvement in the areas of intelligence reporting,
communications, interrogation, and basic reliability of
contacts with the civilian society was noted. The team
concluded that no change is indicated in the thrust of
intelligence operations.

e.

Contingency planning, conducted
both by CINCPAC and the
Assistance Command, gave evidence of adequacy and
responsiveness to the contingencies which might
arise.

3.

The team reached other conclusions, in areas not specifically
delineated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as follows:

a.

Political restrictions add to the
complexity of achieving the desired military objectives in
South Vietnam. The privileged sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia
for Viet Cong concentration and infiltration, and
restrictions on overflights of Laos and North Vietnam, tend
to restrict the freedom of military action of the Government
of Vietnam and ourselves. These restrictions make victory
more remote.

b.

South Vietnam is, in large measure,
a special situation. Generalizations affecting United States
doctrine, concepts, equipage and training must be viewed
conservatively and without predisposition or preconception.
[Page 93]There needs to be
a full awareness that the special environment may respond
better to new techniques and different applications, or to
old techniques and applications carefully and consciously
adapted to the problem rather than to the textbook
solution.

c.

Vietnam is at the end of a long
logistics pipeline. The United States military
structure there should be held to its operational essentials
and not become encumbered with marginally productive special
interest activities. With respect specifically to research,
development, test and evaluation, the team concludes that
there may be too many organizations, equipment, and projects
in Vietnam now. All of these activities require overhead and
supporting structures and are competing for resources that
should be directed to producing combat power. All such
activities should be brought completely under the authority
of the Assistance Command, who should appraise them under
the objective criterion of whether or not they contribute
directly and significantly to the conflict. This appraisal
should not be prejudiced by the origin of the project or
function.

d.

The schism between the United States
press and the Government of Vietnam is more than a
simple lack of communications. To span the gap
requires great effort and, on our side, much patience. An
objective, on the-spot appraisal of the war by mature,
responsible newsmen is gravely needed as a counter to the
sometimes frustrated reporting of the resident
correspondents.

e.

Finally, the performance of United
States military personnel in South Vietnam,
whatever their task, is of a uniformly high quality. The
United States image is being steadily enhanced by their
actions, and the experience they are receiving is of great
value.

VI. Recommendations

1.

The team recommends that we:

a.

Maintain the current general level of military support for
the Government of south Vietnam.

b.

Accept the Advisory Command’s Comprehensive Three Year
Plan for South Vietnam (19 January 1963) as a generally
sound basis for planning the phase-out of United States
support. In this connection, the Advisory Command’s requests
for additional support should be considered in a favorable
light, on a case-by-case basis.

c.

Re-evaluate the situation in South Vietnam semi-annually
and make alterations in the Comprehensive Plan as indicated
by the reassessment.

d.

Request the Advisory Command to present its view on an
optimum command arrangement, designed to bring under most
effective control all of the United States military elements
functioning in South Vietnam.

e.

Direct that all research, development, test, and
evaluation be brought directly under the Advisory Command
and that it review every United States endeavor in South
Vietnam in terms of its usefulness to the prosecution of the
war, recommending the termination of projects or the return
to the United States of personnel where they do not meet
this criterion.

f.

Procure authority for air and ground reconnaissance
missions in Laos.

g.

Undertake a press orientation program embodying a series
of sponsored visits to Vietnam by mature and responsible
news correspondents and executives.

h.

Intensify the unconventional warfare training of the
Vietnamese military forces and encourage their execution of
raids and sabotage missions in North Vietnam, coordinated
with other military operations. The purpose of this effort
is to consume communist resources and prevent the North
Vietnamese from giving unimpeded attention and support to
the insurgency in South Vietnam. [1
sentence (2-1/2 lines) not declassified]

2.

Finally, the team wishes particularly to emphasize that, in sum,
the preparations of 1962 have led to the development of the human
and material infrastructure necessary for the successful prosecution
of the war within South Vietnam. The team believes that unless the
Viet Cong chooses to escalate the conflict, the principal
ingredients for eventual success have been assembled in South
Vietnam. Now, perseverance in the field, and at home, will be
required in great measure to achieve that success.

The source text does not
provide a more specific date. According to telegram MACJ00 433 from
General Wheeler at MAC/V
headquarters to the Chairman of the JCS, January 21, the Wheeler team did not return from Southeast Asia to
CINCPAC headquarters in
Hawaii until the last week in January. Wheeler expected to work on the report in Hawaii and
submit it to the JCS after the
team’s anticipated return to Washington on January 30. (Ibid., T-184-69) In 1964, Wheeler recalled that when he
returned to Washington, he reported first to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and then to President Kennedy. He reported to the
President that things were going well in Vietnam militarily, but
that “Ho Chi Minh was 9ghting
the war for peanuts and if we ever expected to win that affair out
there, we had to make him bleed a little bit.” The President,
Wheeler recalled, “was
quite interested in this.” (Kennedy Library, Oral History Program, Earle G. Wheeler interview, July
11, 1964)↩

On February 2,
Lieutenant Commander Worth H.
Bagley, Naval Aide to General Taylor, sent a memorandum
to Taylor assessing
the Wheeler Report,
in which he discussed the evolution of the four strategies
outlined in the report:

”The Wheeler Report discusses the National
Campaign Plan in detail (pages 14-15). The four basic
strategies stated as involved in that plan are in
essence an incorporation of the original Thompson
concept of Province Rehabilitation (Clear and Hold); the
Nhu concept
which splintered off from Thompson of establishing
Strategic Hamlets separately from, as well as with,
Province Rehabilitation operations; [2
lines not declassified]; and the Thompson concept that
as Province Rehabilitation progressed the regular RVNAF forces would seek
out and destroy the Viet Cong at their bases. It is a
restatement of original strategy. The discussion of this
complete strategy in the Three Year Plan, also under the
heading of the National Campaign Plan, says the same
thing in more general terms, but confuses the situation
by listing the Strategic Hamlet program as a separate
entity as Nhu has
made it. General Wheeler’s expression of the National
Campaign Plan brings the Strategic Hamlet program back
into the orderly and sound concept of Province
Rehabilitation. This is the appropriate strategy and the
one we should follow. Forrestal and Hilsman noted this difference in
approach in their Report and recommended we get back on
track with Province Rehabilitation (Clear and Hold).”
(National Defense University, Taylor Papers,
T-240-69)