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The Corruption Corridor

Successive administrations in Washington have long wavered on Karimov’s abuses, even as, year after year, the State Department issues damning reports. In June, State gave Uzbekistan the worst possible rating in its annual human trafficking report for subjecting its “citizens to forced labor through implementation of state policy” during the annual cotton harvest. U.S. officials say they raise these concerns with Uzbek leaders behind closed doors as part of regular bilateral meetings. But little changes.

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“While U.S. officials make it clear the bilateral relationship cannot deepen absent improvements, there is no element of public diplomacy that signals there are red lines Uzbekistan can’t cross,” as Steve Swerdlow, Human Rights Watch’s Central Asia researcher, puts it.

While it might be uncertain what any outside player could do to achieve reform in Uzbekistan, it’s also unclear if Washington is even trying, especially given that the military aid keeps flowing. The United States learned its lesson in 2005 when Uzbek troops massacred hundreds of peacefulprotestors in the eastern town of Andijan. The Bush administration called for an international investigation; soon after, Karimov forced the Pentagon to abandon the Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan’s south, which American troops had used since 2001 to support the war in Afghanistan. For a time, the United States lightly sanctioned Uzbekistan. But in 2009, as the Pentagon was launching the NDN in Uzbekistan and beyond, Congress waived sanctions on national security grounds. In each subsequent year, the secretary of state has issued regular waivers. Congress lifted military sanctions in 2011.

As the war winds down and the United States prepares to exit by the end of this year—making withdrawal routes, including the NDN, crucial—it seems Washington finds a relatively predictable authoritarian preferable to putting U.S. strategic interests on the line. And to keep Karimov amenable, U.S. officials have promised him (nonlethal) military leftovers, such as protective wear and GPS devices.

That risks militarizing an increasingly divided region. Capitalizing on the post-2014 uncertainty, Russia has renewed base leases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, promising each country a lucrative military aid package. Karimov bickers constantly with both upstream neighbors over poorly defined borders and their plans to dam rivers that Uzbekistan relies on to irrigate farmland. Although the American equipment Uzbekistan is inheriting isn’t likely to include lethal gear, drones and night-vision goggles or a few military vehicles could be useful in any future conflict in the region.

The Obama administration promises it won’t abandon Central Asia when the United States leaves Afghanistan. But with Russia aggressively courting the region’s leaders and China spending heavily on oil and gas in the area, America’s leverage is evaporating.

“Policymakers insist that the U.S. will remain engaged, but without the strategic driver of supplying Afghanistan, there seems to be no compelling U.S. interest to do so,” says Alexander Cooley, a Barnard College expert on the region’s rivalries.

Karimov turned 76 on Jan. 30 and no one seems to know who, or what, will come next. The question is especially pertinent now because his two daughters, his wife and the head of the secret police appear to be engaging in a turf war, suggesting Uzbekistan could descend into a political clan struggle. Yet by closing its eyes to Karimov’s crimes and bolstering him with hard currency, Washington has not only debased its values; American policy has done little for the country’s long-term security, promoting personal patronage networks instead of durable institutions to manage a peaceful transitionof power in Uzbekistan.

David Trilling is the Central Asia editor at EurasiaNet.org and the Economist’s Central Asia correspondent. Follow him @dtrilling.