THE
MILITARY-TELEGRAPH SERVICE Telegraph battery-wagon near Petersburg, June 1864

The exigencies and experiences of the
Civil War demonstrated, among other theorems, the vast utility and indispensable
importance of the electric telegraph both as an administrative agent and as a tactical
factor in military operations. In addition to the utilization of existing commercial
systems, there were built and operated more than fifteen thousand miles of lines for
military purposes only.
Serving under the anomalous status of
quartermaster's employees, often under conditions of personal danger, and with no definite
official standing, the operators of the military telegraph service performed work of most
vital import to the army in particular and to the country in general. They fully merited
the gratitude of the Nation for their efficiency, fidelity, and patriotism, yet their
services have never been practically recognized by the Government or appreciated by the
people.
For instance, during the war there occurred in
the line of duty more than three hundred casualties among the operators -from disease,
death in battle, wounds, or capture. Scores of these unfortunate victims left families
dependent upon charity, as the United States neither extended aid to their destitute
families nor admitted needy survivors to a pensionable status.
The telegraph service had neither definite
personnel nor corps organization. It was simply a civilian bureau attached to the
Quartermaster's Department, in which a few of its favored members received commissions.
The men who performed the dangerous work in the field were mere employees-mostly
underpaid, and often treated with scant consideration. The inherent defects of such a
nondescript organization made it impossible for it to adjust and adapt itself to the
varying demands and imperative needs of great and independent armies such as were employed
in the Civil War.
Moreover, the chief, Colonel Anson Stager, was
stationed in Cleveland, Ohio, while an active subordinate, Major Thomas T. Eckert was
associated with the great war secretary, who held the service in his iron grasp. Not only
were its commissioned officers free from other authority than that of the Secretary of
War, but operators, engaged in active campaigning thousands of miles from Washington, were
independent of the generals under whom they were serving. As will appear later, operators
suffered from the natural impatience of military commanders, who resented the abnormal
relations which inevitably led to distrust and contention. While such irritations and
distrusts were rarely justified, none the less they proved detrimental to the best
interests of the United States.
On the one hand, the operators were ordered to
report to, and obey only, the corporation representatives who dominated the War
Department, while on the other their lot was cast with military associates, who frequently
regarded them with a certain contempt or hostility. Thus, the life of the field-operator
was hard, indeed, and it is to the lasting credit of the men, as a class, that their
intelligence and patriotism were equal to the situation and won final confidence.
Emergent conditions in 1861 caused the seizure
of the commercial systems around Washington, and Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A.
Scott was made general manager of all such lines. He secured the cooperation of E. S.
Sanford, of the American Telegraph Company, who imposed much needed restrictions as to
cipher messages, information, and so forth on all operators. The scope of the work was
much increased by an act of Congress, in 1862, authorizing the seizure of any or all
lines, in connection with which Sanford was appointed censor.
Through Andrew Carnegie was obtained the
force which opened the War Department Telegraph Office; which speedily attained national
importance by its remarkable work, and with which the memory of Abraham Lincoln must be
inseparably associated. It was fortunate for the success of the telegraphic policy of the
Government that it was entrusted to men of such administrative ability as Colonel Anson
Stager, E. S. Sanford, and Major Thomas T. Eckert. The selection of operators for the War
Office was surprisingly fortunate, including, as it did, three cipher-operators-D. H.
Bates, A. B. Chandler, and C. A. Tinker-of high character, rare skill, and unusual
discretion.
The military exigencies brought Sanford as
censor and Eckert as assistant general manager, who otherwise performed their difficult
duties with great efficiency; it must be added that at times they were inclined to display
a striking disregard of proprieties and most unwarrantedly to enlarge the scope of their
already extended authority. An interesting instance of the conflict of telegraphic and
military authority was shown when Sanford mutilated McClellan's passionate dispatch to
Stanton, dated Savage's Station, June 29, 1862, in the midst of the Seven Days Battles.*
Eckert also withheld from President
Lincoln the dispatch announcing the Federal defeat at Ball's Bluff. The suppression by
Eckert of Grant's order for the removal of Thomas

*By cutting out of the message the last two sentences, reading:
"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any
other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

finds support only in the splendid victory of that great soldier at Nashville,
and that only under the maxim that the end justifies the means. Eckert's narrow escape
from summary dismissal by Stanton shows that, equally with the President and the
commanding general, the war secretary was sometimes treated disrespectfully by his own
subordinates.
One phase of life in the telegraph-room of the
War Department--it is surprising that the White House bad no telegraph office during the
war -- was Lincoln's daily visit thereto, and the long hours spent by him in the
cipher-room, whose quiet seclusion made it a favorite retreat both for rest and also for
important work requiring undisturbed thought and undivided attention.
There Lincoln turned over with methodical
exactness and anxious expectation the office-file of recent messages. There be awaited
patiently the translation of ciphers which forecasted promising plans for coming
campaigns, told tales of unexpected defeat, recited the story of victorious battles,
conveyed impossible demands, or suggested inexpedient policies. Masking anxiety by quaint
phrases, impassively accepting criticism, harmonizing conflicting conditions, he patiently
pondered over situations-both political and military-swayed in his solutions only by
considerations of public good. For in this room were held conferences of vital national
interest, with cabinet officers, generals, congressmen, and others. But his greatest task
done here was that which required many days, during which was written the original draft
of the memorable proclamation of emancipation.
Especially important was the technical
work of Bates, Chandler, and Tinker enciphering and deciphering important messages to and
from the great contending armies, which was done by code. Stager devised the first cipher,
which was so improved by the cipher-operators that it remained untranslatable by the
Confederates to the end of the war. An example of the method in general use, given by Plum
in his " History of the Military Telegraph," is Lincoln's dispatch to
ex-Secretary Cameron when with Meade south of Gettysburg.
Brilliant and conspicuous service was rendered
by the cipher-operators of the War Department in translating Confederate cipher messages
which fell into Union hands. A notable incident in the field was the translation of
General Joseph E. Johnston's cipher message to Pemberton, captured by Grant before
Vicksburg and forwarded to Washington. More important were the two cipher dispatches from
the Secretary of War at Richmond, in December, 1863, which led to a cabinet meeting and
culminated in the arrest of Confederate conspirators in New York city, and to the capture
of contraband shipments of arms and ammunition. Other intercepted and translated ciphers
revealed plans of Confederate agents for raiding Northern towns near the border. Most
important of all were the cipher messages disclosing the plot for the wholesale
incendiarism of leading hotels in New York, which barely failed of success on November 25,
1864.
Beneficial and desirable as were the civil
cooperation and management of the telegraph service in Washington, its forced extension to
armies in the field was a mistaken policy. Patterson, in the Valley of Virginia, was five
days without word from the War Department, and when he sent a dispatch, July 20th, that
Johnston bad started to reinforce Beauregard with 35,200 men, this vital message was not
sent to McDowell with whom touch was kept by a service half-telegraphic and half-courier.
The necessity of efficient
field-telegraphs at once impressed military commanders. In. the West, Fremont immediately
acted, and in August, 1861, ordered the formation of a telegraph battalion of three
companies along lines in accord with modern military practice. Major Myer had already made
similar suggestions in Washington, without success. While the commercial companies placed
their personnel and material freely at the Government's disposal, they viewed with marked
disfavor any military organization, and their recommendations were potent with Secretary
of War Cameron. Fremont was ordered to disband his battalion, and a purely civil bureau
was substituted, though legal authority and funds were equally lacking. Efforts to
transfer quartermaster's funds and property to this bureau were successfully resisted,
owing to the manifest illegality of such action.
Indirect methods were then adopted, and
Stager was commissioned as a captain in the Quartermaster's Department, and his operators
given the status of employees. He was appointed general manager of United States telegraph
lines, November 25, 1861, and six days later, through some unknown influence, the
Secretary of War reported (incorrectly, be it known), " that under an appropriation
for that purpose at the last session of Congress, a telegraph bureau was
established." Stager was later made a colonel, Eckert a major, and a few others
captains, and so eligible for pensions, but the men in lesser positions remained
employees, non-pensionable and subject to draft.
Repeated efforts by petitions and
recommendations for giving a military status were made by the men in the field later in
the war. The Secretary of War disapproved, saying that such a course would place them
under the orders of superior officers, which he was most anxious to avoid.
With corporation influence and corps
rivalries so rampant in Washington, there existed a spirit of patriotic solidarity in the
face of the. foe in the field that ensured hearty cooperation and efficient service. While
the operators began with a sense of individual independence that caused them often to
resent any control by commanding officers, from which they were free under the secretary's
orders, yet their common sense speedily led them to comply with every request from
commanders that was not absolutely incompatible with loyalty to their chief.
Especially in the public eye was the work
connected with the operations in the armies which covered Washington and attacked
Richmond, where McClellan first used the telegraph for tactical purposes. Illustrative of
the courage and resourcefulness of operators was the action of Jesse Bunnell, attached to
General Porter's headquarters. Finding himself on the fighting line, with the Federal
troops hard pressed, Bunnell, without orders, cut the wire and opened communication with
McClellan's headquarters. Superior Confederate forces were then threatening defeat to the
invaders, but this battle-office enabled McClellan to keep in touch with the situation and
ensure Porter's position by sending the commands of French, Meagher, and Slocum to his
relief. Operator Nichols opened an emergency office at Savage's Station on Stimner's
request, maintaining it under fire as long as it was needed.
One of the great feats of the war was the
transfer,, under the supervision of Thomas A. Scott, of two Federal army corps from
Virginia to Tennessee, consequent on the Chickamauga disaster to the Union arms. By this
phenomenal transfer, which would have been impossible without the military telegraph,
twenty-three thousand soldiers, with provisions and baggage, were transported a distance
of 1,233 miles in eleven and a half days, from Bristoe Station, Virginia, to Chattanooga,
Tennessee. The troops had completed half their journey before the news of the proposed
movement reached Richmond.
While most valuable elsewhere, the military
telegraph was absolutely essential to successful operations in the valleys of the
Cumberland and of the Tennessee, where very long lines of communication obtained, with
consequent great distances between its separate armies. Apart from train-dispatching,
which was absolutely essential to transporting army supplies for hundreds of thousands of
men over a single-track railway of several hundred of miles in length, an enormous number
of messages for the control and cooperation of separate armies and detached commands were
sent over the wires. Skill and patience were necessary for efficient telegraph work,
especially when lines were frequently destroyed by Confederate incursions or through
hostile inhabitants of the country.
Of great importance and of intense interest are
many of the cipher dispatches sent over these lines. Few, however, exceed the ringing
messages of October 19, 1863, when Grant, from Louisville, Kentucky, bid Thomas " to
hold Chattanooga at all hazards," and received the laconic reply in a few hours,
" I will bold the town till we starve." Here, as elsewhere, appeared the
anomalous conditions of the service.
While telegraph duties were performed with
efficiency, troubles were often precipitated by divided authority. When Superintendent
Stager ordered a civilian, who was engaged ill building lines, out of Halleck's
department, the general ordered him back, saying, " There must be one good head of
telegraph lines in my department, not two, and that head must be under me." Though
Stager protested to Secretary of War Stanton, the latter thought it best to yield in that
case.
When General Grant found it expedient to appoint
an aide as general manager of lines in his army, the civilian chief, J. C. Van Duzer,
reported it to Stager, who had Grant called to account by the War Department. Grant
promptly put Van Duzer under close confinement in the guardhouse, and later sent him out
of the department, under guard. As an outcome, the operators planned a strike, which Grant
quelled by telegraphic orders to confine closely every man resigning or guilty, of
contumacious conduct. Stager's efforts to dominate Grant failed t rough Stanton's fear
that pressure would cause Grant to ask for relief from his command.
Stager's administration culminated in an order
by his assistant, dated Cleveland, November 4, 1862;,strictly requiring the operators to
retain " the original copy of every telegram sent by any military or other Government
officer . . . and mailed to the War Department." Grant answered, " Colonel
Stager has no authority to demand the original of military dispatches, and cannot have
them." The order was never enforced, at least with Grant.
If similar experiences did not change the policy
in Washington, it produced better conditions in the field and ensured harmonious
cooperation. Of Van Duzer, it is to be said that he later returned to the army and
performed conspicuous service. At the battle of Chattanooga, be installed and operated
lines on or near the firing-line during the two fateful days, November 24-25, 1863, often
under heavy fire. Always sharing the dangers of his men, Van Duzer, through his coolness
and activity under fire, has been mentioned as the only fighting of officer of the Federal
telegraph service.
Other than telegraphic espionage, the most
dangerous service was the repair of lines, which often was done under fire and more
frequently in a guerilla-infested country. Many men were captured or shot from ambush
while thus engaged. Two of Clowry's men in Arkansas were not only murdered, but were
frightfully mutilated. In Tennessee, conditions were sometimes so bad that no lineman
would venture out save under heavy escort. Three repair men were killed on the Fort
Donelson line alone. W. R. Plum, in his " Military Telegraph," says that "
about one in twelve of the operators engaged in the service were killed, wounded,
captured, or died in the service from exposure."
Telegraphic duties at military
headquarters yielded little in brilliancy and interest compared to those of desperate
daring associated with tapping the opponent's wires. At times, offices were seized so
quickly as to prevent telegraphic warnings. General Mitchel captured two large Confederate
railway trains by sending false messages from the Huntsville, Alabama, office, and General
Seymour similarly seized a train near Jacksonville, Florida.
While scouting, Operator William Forster
obtained valuable dispatches by tapping the line along the Charleston-Savannah railway for
two days. Discovered, he was pursued by bloodhounds into a swamp, where he was captured up
to his armpits in mire. Later, the telegrapher died in prison.
In 1863, General Rosecrans deemed it most
important to learn whether Bragg was detaching troops to reinforce the garrison at
Vicksburg or for other purposes. The only certain method seemed to be by tapping the wires
along the Chattanooga railroad, near Knoxville, Tennessee. For this most dangerous duty,
two daring members of the telegraph service volunteered--F. S. Van Valkenbergh and Patrick
Mullarkev. The latter afterward was captured by Morgan, in Ohio. With four Tennesseans,
they entered the hostile country and, selecting a wooded eminence, tapped the line fifteen
miles from Knoxville, and for a week listened to all passing dispatches. Twice escaping
detection, they heard a message going over the wire which ordered the scouring of the
district to capture Union spies. They at once decamped, barely in time to escape the
patrol. Hunted by cavalry, attacked by guerillas, approached by Confederate spies, they
found aid from Union mountaineers, to whom they owed their safety. Struggling on, with
capture and death in daily prospect, they finally fell in with Union pickets-being then
half starved, clothed in rags, and with naked, bleeding feet. They bad been thirty-three
days within the Confederate lines, and their stirring adventures make a story rarely
equaled in thrilling interest.
Confederate wires were often tapped during
Sherman's march to the sea, a warning of General Wheeler's coming raid being thus
obtained. Operator Lonergan copied important dispatches from Hardee, in Savannah, giving
Bragg's movements in the rear of Sherman, with reports on cavalry and rations.
Wiretapping was also practiced by the
Confederates, who usually worked in, a sympathetic community. Despite their daring skill
the net results were often small, owing to the Union system of enciphering all important
messages. Their most audacious and persistent telegraphic scout was Ellsworth, Morgan's
operator, whose skill, courage, and resourcefulness contributed largely to the success of
his daring commander. Ellsworth was an expert in obtaining dispatches, and especially in
disseminating misleading information by bogus messages.
In the East, an interloper from Lee's army
tapped the wire between the War Department and Burnside's headquarters at Aquia Creek, and
remained undetected for probably several days. With fraternal frankness, the Union
operators advised him to leave.
The most prolonged and successful wiretapping
was that by C. A. Gaston, Lee's confidential operator. Gaston entered t@e Union lines near
City Point, while Richmond and Petersburg were besieged, with several men to keep watch
for him, and for six weeks he remained undisturbed in the woods, reading all messages
which passed over Grant's wire. Though unable to read the ciphers, he gained much from the
dispatches in plain text. One message reported that 2,586 beeves were to be landed at
Coggins' Point on a certain day. This information enabled Wade Hampton to make a timely
raid and capture the entire herd.
It seems astounding that Grant, Sherman, Thomas,
and Meade, commanding armies of hundreds of thousands and working out the destiny of the
Republic, should have been debarred from the control of their own ciphers and the keys
thereto. Yet, in 1864, the Secretary of War issued an order forbidding commanding generals
to interfere with even their own cipher-operators and absolutely restricting the use of
cipher-books to civilian " telegraph experts, approved and appointed by the Secretary
of War." One mortifying experience with a dispatch untranslatable for lack of
facilities constrained Grant to order his cipher-operator, Beckwith, to reveal the key to
Colonel Comstock, his aide, which was done under protest. Stager at once dismissed
Beckwith, but on Grant's request and insistence of his own responsibility, Beckwith was
restored.
The cipher-operators with the various armies
were men of rare skill, unswerving integrity, and unfailing loyalty. Caldwell, as chief
operator, accompanied the Army of the Potomac on every march and in every siege,
contributing also to the efficiency of the field-telegraphs. Beckwith was Grant's
cipher-operator to the end of the war, and was the man who tapped a wire and reported the
hiding-place of Wilkes Booth. Another operator, Richard O'Brien, in 1863 refused a
princely bribe to forge a telegraphic reprieve, and later won distinction with Butler on
the James and with Schofield in North Carolina. W. R. Plum, who wrote " History of
the Military Telegraph in the Civil War," also rendered efficient service as chief
operator to Thomas, and at Atlanta. It is regrettable that such men were denied the glory
and benefits of a military service, which they actually, though not officially, gave.
The bitter contest, which lasted several years,
over field-telegraphs ended in March, 1864, when the Signal Corps transferred its
field-trains to the civilian bureau. In Sherman's advance on Atlanta, Van Duzer
distinguished himself by bringing up the field-line from the rear nearly every night. At
Big Shanty, Georgia, the whole battle-front was covered by working field-lines which
enabled Sherman to communicate at all times with his fighting and reserve commands. Hamlev
considers the constant use of field-telegraphs in the flanking operations by Sherman in
Georgia as showing the overwhelming value of the service. This duty was often done under
fire and other dangerous conditions.
In Virginia, in 1864-65, Major Eckert made great
and successful efforts to provide Meade's army with ample facilities. A well-equipped
train of thirty or more battery-wagons, wire-reels, and construction carts were brought
together under Doren, a skilled builder and energetic man. While offices were occasionally
located in battery-wagons, they were usually under tent-flies next to the headquarters of
Meade or Grant. Through the efforts of Doren and Caldwell, all important commands were
kept within control of either Meade or Grant--even during engagements. Operators were
often under fire, and at Spotsylvania Court House telegraphers, telegraph cable, and
battery-wagons were temporarily within the Confederate lines. From these trains was sent
the ringing dispatch from the Wilderness, by which Grant inspired the North, I propose to
fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."
During siege operations at Petersburg, a system
of lines connected the various headquarters, depots, entrenchments, and even some picket
lines. Cannonading and sharpshooting were so insistent that operators were often driven to
bombproof offices --especially during artillery duels and impending assaults.
Nerve-racking were the sounds and uncomfortably dangerous the situations, yet the
operators held their posts. Under the terrible conditions of a night assault, the last
despairing attempt to break through the encircling Federal forces at Petersburg, hurried
orders and urgent appeals were sent. At dawn of March 25, 1865, General Gordon carried
Fort Stedman with desperate gallantry, and cut the wire to City Point. The Federals
speedily sent the message of disaster, " The enemy has broken our right, taken
Stedman, and are moving on City Point." Assuming command, General Parke ordered a
counter-attack and recaptured the fort. Promptly the City Point wire was restored, and
Meade, controlling the whole army by telegraph, made a combined attack by several corps,
capturing the entrenched picket line of the Confederates.
First of all of the great commanders,
Grant used the military telegraph both for grand tactics and for strategy in its broadest
sense. From his headquarters with Meade's army in Virginia, May, 1864, he daily gave
orders and received reports regarding the operations of Meade in Virginia, Sherman in
Georgia, Sigel in West Virginia, and Butler on the James River. Later he kept under direct
control military forces exceeding half a million of soldiers, operating over a territory
of eight hundred thousand square miles in area. Through concerted action and timely
movements, Grant prevented the reinforcement of Lee's army and so shortened the war.
Sherman said, " The value of the telegraph cannot be exaggerated, as illustrated by
the perfect accord of action of the armies of Virginia and Georgia." Source: Photographic History of the Civil War, Volume IV,
article by A. W. Greely, Major-General, United States Army