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This document is reproduced as a supplement to Mead's "Review
of An Introduction to Comparative Psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan",
Psychological Review 2, (1895). The book is a classic in the history
of psychology, marking the first English language text on comparative
psychology.

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An Introduction to Comparative Psychology

Prolegomena

C. Lloyd Morgan

IN a treatise on human psychology, it may be possible and advisable to proceed on
purely empirical lines and to keep in the background the philosophy of the subject. But in
a consideration of comparative psychology, which introduces the conception of evolution,
and, of the relation of mind to the organism, such a procedure seems to be neither
possible nor advisable. It will conduce to clearness and prevent misconception, therefore,
if I here prefix to my work an introductory section, containing, in the form of prolegomena,
a succinct account of the monistic views which I accept.[1] Nearly
every philosopher contends now-a-days that he is a monist. But there are monists and
monists. I must therefore endeavour to state clearly the form of monism which I accept.

First of all, I accept a monistic theory of knowledge. The dualist
starts with the conception of a subject introduced

(2) into the midst of a separately and independently existent objective world. For him
the problem of knowledge is how these independent existences, subject and object, can be
brought into relation. In the monistic theory of knowledge it is maintained that to start
with the conception of subject and object as independent existences is false method, and
that the assumed independence and separateness is nowise axiomatic. Starting then from the
common ground of naive experience, it contends that, prior to philosophizing, there is
neither subject nor object, but just a bit of common practical experience. When a child
sees a sweet, or when a dog sees a cat, there is a piece of naive and eminently real
experience upon which more or less energetic action may follow. It is only when we seek to
explain the experience that we polarize it in our thought into subject and object. But
what logical right have we to say that the subject and object, which we can thus
distinguish in thought, are separate in existence? No doubt it is a not uncommon, and a
not unnatural, fallacy to endow with independent existence the distinguishable products of
our abstract and analytic thought. The distinguishable redness and scent of a rose may
thus come to be regarded as not only distinguishable in thought, but also separable in
existence. But, until it shall be shown that " distinguishable in thought " and
" separate in existence " are interchangeable expressions, or that whatever is
distinguishable is also independent, the conclusion is obviously fallacious. And it is
this fallacy which the monist regards as the fundamental error of the dualistic theory of
knowledge. While dualism, then, starts with what I deem the illegitimate assumption of the
independence of subject and object, the monist, starting from the common ground of
experience, looks upon subject and object as the distinguishable aspects of that which in
experience is one and indivisible. They are distinct from each other, and the distinction
is fundamental; but they are nowise independent

(3) and separate in existence. The apparent dualism is a dualism of aspect, not a
dualism of existence. It need only be added that this is a theory of knowledge, and of the
experience of which knowledge is the outcome. Of that which is not known and not
experienced, it neither asserts nor denies anything. But, accepting as it does the reality
.of experience, it does assert that the aspect which we polarize as objective is just as
real, and real in the same sense, as the aspect we polarize as subjective. The reality of
object and subject is strictly co-ordinate. And those who hold this view regard as little
better than nonsense the assertion that whereas the reality of the subject is
unquestionable, the reality of the object is a matter that is open to discussion. Self and
cosmos are of co-ordinate reality : they are the polarized aspects of experience as
explained through reason.

But a theory of knowledge is not a complete interpretation of nature. There lies on a
lonely mountain height a stone. I ascend the mountain, and the stone becomes an object of
experience. That we may explain on our monistic theory of knowledge. But how about the
stone before I got there, and after I had left the mountain top, when it was not yet or no
longer an object of experience ? To this question the theory of knowledge that is modest
and knows its business replies:-" I do not know. Ideal with experience. I can tell
you nothing concerning that which is not yet experienced or no longer experienced. That is
a matter of the interpretation of nature."

There are some excellent folk who believe that a philosophy can be built up without
assumptions. I am not among their 'number. Hypotheses, or assumptions, are as necessary in
philosophy as they are in science. I assume that nature is wider than actual experience. I
assume that the stone on that lonely mountain top exists in some form capable of again
appearing as object, and that this continuous existence is quite independent of whether
anyone is there to experience it

(4) as object or not. I cannot possibly prove this, and do not attempt to do so. I
suppose I accept it for this reason, that of the two hypotheses (a) that it continues to
exist in some form or other whether it be an object of experience or not, and (b) that it
dodges in and out of existence according as it is experienced or not-experienced, (a)
appeals to me as the more rational assumption. Anyhow, if I cannot prove (a), neither
can anyone else prove (b). I assume, then, that the world, which forms the objective
aspect of experience, continues -somehow to exist quite independently of its being sensed
or perceived. That there is a nature to interpret is thus an hypothesis or assumption, the
sole justification of which is that, though it can never be proved, it accords more
satisfactorily with the facts of experience than any other assumption. It does not
conflict with, but supplements the monistic theory of knowledge. It fills in the gaps of
actual experience with "permanent possibilities " of experience.

I pass now to a second phase of monism. I accept a monistic interpretation of
nature. What do I mean by a monistic interpretation? Well, the essence of this view
comes out when we consider the position of man in nature. According to this hypothesis,
man, as an organism, is one and indivisible (though variously maimable), no matter how
many aspects he may present subjectively or objectively. That the inorganic and organic
world have reached their present condition through process of evolu-, tion, is now widely
accepted. But the dualist contends that mind is a separable existence, sui generis, forming
no part of the natural world into which it is temporarily introduced. , Here the
monist joins issue, and contends that, alike in its biological and its psychological
aspect, the organism is the product of evolution ; that mind is not extranatural nor
supra-natural, but one of the aspects of natural existence.

(5)

Observe the frankly hypothetical nature of this view. The -monist assumes that what we
call nature is co-extensive with knowable existence. He assumes that far, very far, as we
may be at present from anything like a complete or adequate explanation of nature, yet
still this nature is explicable, and that by one method, the method of scientific
procedure. Herein lies the essence of monism as an interpretation of nature. If in the
wide region of the known and the knowable there be any modes of existence which not only
are not explicable, but from their very nature never can be explicable, as parts of one
self-consistent whole, our monism falls to the ground. We contend that it is this to which
science, philosophy, poetry, ay and religion too, has been tending throughout the
centuries of human progress.

A monistic interpretation of nature, so long as it holds to the main principle of being
throughout self-consistent, Rows any amount of individual freedom in the treatment of
details. It is characterized, not by the possession of a common scientific or philosophic
creed, but by a common It appears to me, for example, that in the evolution 'which sweeps
through nature, the process is throughout characterized by the following traits : -- (I.)
It is selective; (2.) it is synthetic; (3.) it tends from chaos to cosmos. And these
traits seem to me characteristic alike of organic, organic, and mental evolution. Now I
dare say there are not half-a-dozen independent monists who will agree with me in singling
out these three traits for especial prominence. But what does that matter? My aim is as is
also theirs. And there is plenty of room for any differences and even divergences of
opinion among those who are in search of a self-consistent theory of thought and things.

I now turn to a third aspect of monism, which may be termed analytic monism. This
consists in an an analysis of the object of knowledge, or in other words, of nature as
known

(6) and knowable. Now here it is essential quite clearly to grasp the fact that all
that we know must, in the act of becoming known, be an object of knowledge. The object of
knowledge- is not merely the object of sense, but includes also the object of thought. All
that we know of the subject, all that we attribute to the self, must, in becoming known,
be the object of thought. It is only in reflection or introspection, which is also
retrospection, that this is possible. You cannot analyse any bit of experience at the
moment when it is being experienced, you can only look back upon it in a subsequent moment
of reflection. In that subsequent moment it may be polarized into object and subject, and
either the objective aspect or the subjective aspect may then be the object of thought. In
this way the subjective aspect of experience in moment (n) may be the object of
thoughtexperience in any subsequent moment (q). But never can the subject of
experience in any moment be the object of knowledge in the same moment. Hence it follows
that without reflection there can be no knowledge of the subjective aspect of experience.
And hence it follows also that our knowledge is always dealing with the self of a moment
ago. It is an assumption which. can never be proved, but one on the validity of which we
all place implicit reliance, that the subject is continuous, and that the subject of the
present moment is practically identical with the subject of a moment ago, of which we have
knowledge through reflective thought.

Let us now take that natural object which we call a man, and let us assume that he is
constituted in all essential respects as we are. We analyse him in thought; and we may
carry our analysis but a short distance, or as far as ever we can. Analyse him a little
way down, and we reach the conception of body and mind. It is clear that the concepts of
this analysis are closely connected in origin with the concepts reached by the analysis of
experience, and that body

(7) and mind are analogous to the object and subject of sense experience. Now the fact
to which analytic monism should, as it seems to me, stick close, is that body and mind are
the products of analysis. What is practically given is the man and this man is one and
indivisible, though he maybe polarized in analysis into a bodily aspect and a conscious
aspect. It may be said that this is an assumption. Granted. It is part of the fundamental
assumption of the monistic interpretation of nature. According to that assumption or
hypothesis, the organism in all its aspects is a product of natural evolution. We proceed
to study that product. We analyse these aspects. We find that a certain group, of them
hang together in a special way, and we call them bodily aspects; and we find that a quite
different group of them hang together in their special way, and we call them mental
aspects. There is no getting on without an hypothesis of some kind, and this is the one
which the monist adopts. The dualist says that the organism in its bodily aspect is a
product of evolution, or of some other process of genesis, that the mind is implanted
therein by some extra-natural process. That is his assumption. The future must decide
which assumption is the more reasonable.

According to the monistic assumption, then, the organism one and indivisible, but is
polarizable in analytic thought to a bodily and a mental or conscious aspect. Body and
mind, like object and subject, are distinguishable but not separable And now we may
proceed to carry the analysis deeper. We reach the brain, or some part of it; and here
analysis discloses, as one aspect, certain forms of nervous change or transformation of
energy, and, as the other aspect certain phases of consciousness. Note clearly that this
is rely through carrying further the same process of analysis; and that, of the products
of analysis, neither can claim priority or superior validity to the other. They are
strictly co-ordinate: each is as real as the other. The true reality

(8) is the man with which the analysis starts: no valid product of the analysis of that
man, through the application of rational thought, can be more real than another.

The question then arises: Given an organism in which analysis gives two aspects,
complex energy and complex consciousness, from what have these been evolved by an
evolution which is selective, synthetic, and cosmic or determinate" From the nature
of the case, the bodily aspect is that of which alone we can have objective knowledge. We
trace the evolution backwards and find, in our interpretation thereof, simpler and simpler
organisms, until the organic passes into the inorganic. We find the energy less and less
complex as we look- back through the vista of the past. And what about the other aspect?
Does it not seem reasonable to suppose that, no matter what stage we select, analysis
would still disclose the two aspects? That with the simpler modes of nerve-energy there
would go simpler modes of consciousness, and that with infra-neural modes of energy there
would be infra-consciousness, or that from which consciousness as we know it has arisen in
process of evolution ? This, is admittedly speculative. But is it illogical?

Let us return, however, from this speculative excursion, to emphasize again the fact
that for monism the organism in practical experience is the starting-point ; that it is
one and indivisible, though it has different aspects, which may be distinguished in
analytic thought; and that these aspects are strictly co-ordinate--neither is before nor
after the other.

Opposed to such a view are-(I.) the hypothesis of materialism, according to which the
body is the real substance, the mind being one of its properties; and (2.) the hypothesis.
of what may be termed psychism, which is, in the words of Charles Kingsley, that "
your soul makes your body, just as a snail makes its shell," that mind is the reality
and body the mere phenomenal appearance. These views depart from the cardinal principle of
monism, which is that

(9) practical experience is the fountainhead of reality. They give to one product of
the analysis of this experience a validity superior to that of another product of this
analysis.

Now analytic monism by itself is insufficient and partial. It is open to the criticism
that, while professedly monistic,, it postulates a dual aspect, and is therefore merely
dualism. in disguise. But this criticism falls to the ground when this analytic monism is
taken in association with the monistic theory of knowledge and the monistic interpretation
of nature and of man. Monism must be judged as a whole, or not at all. Its cardinal tenets
are:-That nature is one and indivisible, and is explicable on one method, the method of
knowledge; that experience is one and indivisible, though we may distinguish its
subjective and objective aspects ; that man is one and indivisible, though our analysis
may disclose two strongly contrasted aspects, body and mind. It contends that man in both
aspects, biological and psychological, is the product of an evolution that is one and
continuous; and, combining the results of its theory of knowledge with those of its
analysis of man, it identifies the mind, as a product of evolution, with the subject, as
given in experience.

There is one further result of the analysis of experience upon which I must briefly
touch in bringing these prolegomena to a conclusion. Monism regards nature and
experience as one and indivisible, and all apparent dualism, as a dualism of aspect,
distinguishable in thought, but indissoluble in existence. It contends, as I have
endeavoured to show, that the individual mind on the one hand, and the cosmos on the other
hand, are alike products of an evolution which is one and continuous. In both the products
which we thus distinguish we find a synthesis which is selective and determinate.
Empirically, that is as far as we are justified in going. Empirically we must just accept
this continuous and progressive synthesis as the ultimate con-

(10) -clusion of science. But it is characteristic of man as a thinker that he is
seldom able to stop here. He is constrained to take one further step in his analysis; and
it only remains for me to indicate the nature of this final step as viewed in the light of
a monistic philosophy. The selective synthesis of the cosmos, which we call evolution, is
regarded as the manifestation, under the-conditions of time and space, of an underlying
activity which is the ultimate cause thereof. This underlying activity is not a product of
evolution ; it is that in and through which evolution is rendered possible. In like manner
the selective synthesis of my mind, which we term its natural development, is regarded as
the manifestation, under the conditions of time and space, of an underlying activity, one
in existence with and yet distinct in analysis from that of the cosmos at large. This
underlying activity, which is the ultimate essence of my individual personality, is not a
product of evolution; it is that in and through which the evolution of my consciousness is
rendered possible. Object and subject are thus the correlative modes of manifestation of
an underlying activity, one in existence, but none the less fundamentally distinct in
aspect.

The questions briefly considered in these Prolegomena have been recently
(1903) discussed at length by Prof C. A. Strong, in a work entitled Why the Mind has a
Body. He reaches the conclusion that the reality-the thing in itself-underlying
experience and knowledge is consciousness. Those who believe that, amid all the
multifarious differentiations of noumenal existence, the most fundamental, for human
experience and thought, is that into the diverse aspects of subject and object, mind and
not mind--those, I say, who have been led to such a metaphysical interpretation will find
it impossible to accept the view that one of these differentiated aspects has preserved
all the reality which the other has wholly lost.

Notes

Those for whom philosophy has no special interest will do well to pass over these
prolegomena and proceed at once to Chapter I. Those on the other hand for whom the
philosophical interest is central should re-read this section after the perusal of the
body of the book.

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