Terrorism – Global Politicshttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp
An International Affairs MagazineSat, 05 Aug 2017 07:38:12 +0000en-UShourly1From Terror to Deliberationhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/23/from-terror-to-deliberation/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/23/from-terror-to-deliberation/#respondFri, 23 Jun 2017 12:42:03 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=3096The United Kingdom has been shaken by four terror attacks in three months. Three were carried out by ISIS supporters and the latest was the result of anti-Muslim sentiments. These attacks follow a number of jihadi attacks in other European countries: France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. The recurrence of these events (and often their low-tech […]

The United Kingdom has been shaken by four terror attacks in three months. Three were carried out by ISIS supporters and the latest was the result of anti-Muslim sentiments. These attacks follow a number of jihadi attacks in other European countries: France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. The recurrence of these events (and often their low-tech dimension) is worrying and it has become clear that intelligence and military-based responses to the jihadi phenomenon are insufficient. On the other hand, far-right political solutions to the problem are usually simplistic and contradict democratic and liberal values. Here, I propose a deliberative approach to the problem.

In the aftermath of the third Jihadi attack Theresa May argued that this recent wave of attacks shows that Britain has been too tolerant of extremism. I ostensibly agreed with May. For decades Britain and other European countries have turned a blind eye to (and to a certain extent helped) the establishment of Salafi ideology in Europe. Salafism (or Wahhabism) is the intolerant radical Sunni theological school of thought which informs current terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda. The close economic and militaryrelationship between Western powers and Saudi Arabia (where Wahhabism is the state religion) is one of the reasons behind this tolerance of Salafism. Saudi Arabia has a huge influence on Sunni Muslim communities worldwide and is responsible for the training of a majority of Salafi clerics and the propagation of Salafi-oriented educational material in the West.

While recognising that Europe has been too complacent with certain extremist strands of Islam is a step in the right direction, it creates a number of epistemic and strategic issues. Here, I will only focus on two questions. First, how do we define and then recognise extremist ideas rooted in certain Islamic schools of thought? Second, once extremist views have been identified, what can be done about them? I believe that deliberative democracy can be a tool for answering these questions.

According to Jane Mansbridge et al., deliberative democracy performs three functions: epistemic, ethical, and democratic. The epistemic function relates to the importance of seeking a better understanding of political conflicts through the exchange of facts, justifications, and reasoned arguments. The ethical dimension relates to the requirement of mutual respect and recognition between the participants engaged in the deliberative process. Finally, the democratic function underlines the egalitarian and participatory dimension of the process: the capacity to argue and offer justifications determines the political power of the participants, not their wealth and status.

A deliberative approach to the problem of extremism would offer answers to the aforementioned questions and would create a climate of mutual discovery. It would allow non-Muslim communities to learn from Muslim communities who the extremists are and what their theological, social, and psychological motivations are. This would allow the non-Muslim public to differentiate between common Muslims and extremists and to, thus, avoid generalisations. A better understanding of the plurality of thoughts amongst Muslims would also allow authorities to better target their policies against extremism as some literature and speech patterns would reveal potential Salafi influences in mosques and community centres.

At a theological and ideological level this approach could create beneficial debates within Islamic communities, forcing members to engage with their scriptures to provide arguments and justifications (from within their own normative framework). The debates would highlight whether or not some Islamic texts are ethically and politically problematic, and whether or not these texts are a) historically and theologically sound and/or b) open to socio-historical contextualisation. Given that Islam is a religion with social and political dimensions, these theological debates would have a socio-political impact. This approach would represent an important step in fighting the ideological power of jihadi organisations.

At a socio-political level, deliberative approaches would also benefit non-Salafi Muslim communities (in particular the minority communities who suffer from Jihadism even more than non-Muslims) as these communities would be treated as equals and as partners in the political process. Their agency would be enhanced as they could further clarify aspects of their religion to the broader public and be recognised as valuable members of society with a rich, sophisticated tradition while clearly establishing the differences between their Islamic worldviews and the Salafi version of it. This approach is, in fact, not alien to Islamic doctrines as some school of thoughts emphasise the importance of the use of reason and value argumentation.

Deliberative practices would therefore answer both questions. They would help define the problem, and this process of definition through deliberation would in itself be a first step towards solving the problem. Indeed, these democratic practices would generate an increased feeling of mutual trust and respect between communities, helping to mitigate against the social isolationism and stereotypes that can lead to radicalism. It would also help in creating prevention policies developed from the bottom-up which would likely be more effective than a-posteriori initiatives focused on “de-radicalisation”. Finally, deliberative democracy and its emphasis on facts, justifications, and argumentation would offer an epistemically robust alternative to the simplistic political explanations and conceptual caricatures of both islamophobes and islamophiles.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/06/23/from-terror-to-deliberation/feed/0Getting the Facts Straight About Iranhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/16/getting-facts-straight-iran/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/16/getting-facts-straight-iran/#respondTue, 16 May 2017 16:20:26 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2954Critics of Iran Thus far, the Trump administration has adopted a harsher stance towards Iran than the Obama Administration. In a recent press statement, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reiterated the common statement that “Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror”. More recently in Astana, the agreement between Russia, Turkey, and Iran to create […]

Thus far, the Trump administration has adopted a harsher stance towards Iran than the Obama Administration. In a recent press statement, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reiterated the common statement that “Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror”. More recently in Astana, the agreement between Russia, Turkey, and Iran to create de-escalation areas in Syria met fierce criticism from the armed Syrian opposition because, according to them, Iran is a criminal entity fuelling sectarian tensions in the region. Both criticisms commonly inform Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric against Iran. While there is no doubt that Iran is an authoritarian state with very poor human rights records and a highly restricted form of democracy, I argue that the two aforementioned criticisms need to be challenged as they do not offer an accurate representation of Iran’s actions and ideology in the Middle East.

Iran as a sponsor of Terrorism

First, the statement that Iran remains “a leading sponsor of terror” (sometimes it is even considered as the leading sponsor of terror) is problematic because the main destabilising terrorist organizations in the world today are ISIS and Al Qaeda (and, to a lesser extent, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab in Africa). All these organisations are extremist Sunni armed groups. Iran, as a Shia nation is constantly criticised for anti-Sunni sectarianism. In fact the reality is more complex.

Iran and Hezbollah (Iran’s Lebanese Shia proxy) are currently involved in Syria and Iraq. They spend significant resources fighting Sunni extremists in both countries, and Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have lost top commanders in the fight against Sunni jihadi organizations. The irony is that as well as being criticised for fighting Sunni extremists, Iran has also been accused of supporting them as well. Iran supports Hamas but despite the Palestinian group’s involvement in acts of terror, it does not support a global jihad against the West as Al Qaeda and ISIS do. This support leads to the assessment of a second kind of criticism.

Iran as a sectarian entity

The idea that Iran fuels sectarianism is not supported by evidence and, on the contrary, the ideology of the Iranian government tends towards pan-Islamism and a Shia-Sunni unity. Freedom of speech in Iran is policed to nurture Islamic unity (wahid) and many Shia clerics were (some still are) imprisoned. Some of them, such as Grand Ayatollah Ya’sub al-Din Rastgari have been imprisoned for holding theological views which would upset Sunnis. By way of contrast, anti-Shia propaganda in Saudi Arabia is accepted by the authorities. Iran went as far as releasing a documentary portraying in a positive light the life of Sunni communities in Iran.

At a political and military level, Iran is the staunchest sponsor of Palestinian activism (Palestinians are Sunnis) and gives strong support to Hamas, a radical Sunni organisation. Iran’s pan-Islamism therefore opens the door to political and ideological alliances with Sunnis; Iran’s Supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has translated part of the works of Sayyed Qutb, a radical Sunni Islamist, into Persian. Even in their fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda, Iran intends to avoid alienating Sunnis by calling the members of these groups “takfiri” (those who are excommunicated) instead of “Sunni terrorists” or “Sunni extremists”. At the same time, Iran has been very restrained in using its power and influence to defend the rights of oppressed Shia minorities in the Middle East.

Iran and policy making

Iranian political influence in the Middle East undoubtedly represents a challenge. It is important, however, not to distort the facts about the Islamic Republic. Besides the intrinsic value of intellectual integrity and scientific enquiry, a misunderstanding of Iranian ideology and foreign policy can lead to unrealistic strategies in the region. One example of such a questionable regional strategy is the longstanding American and European political alignment with Saudi Arabia which, contrary to Iran, continues to support elements of the Salafist ideology favoured by ISIS. Furthermore, the constant demonization of Iran reinforces the grip of conservative authoritarian forces over Iranian society as they portray the West as unfair, untrustworthy and, ultimately, having policies inimical to the interests of the Iranian people. Western ignorance about Iranian culture and politics could, therefore, alienate the majority of Iranian people (both secular and religious) who have demonstrated in the past that they do not support those in power.

If we are willing to criticise Iran in an effective way it is important to criticise it based on empirical evidence, not based on blind ideology and a distorted representation of reality which serves particular interests.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/05/16/getting-facts-straight-iran/feed/0Martin McGuinness and the Not So Uncommon Transition From Terrorist to Statesmanhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/03/25/martin-mcguinness-not-uncommon-transition-terrorist-statesman/
http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/03/25/martin-mcguinness-not-uncommon-transition-terrorist-statesman/#respondSat, 25 Mar 2017 16:31:51 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2857With the death of Martin McGuinness, the former Provisional IRA senior commander turned peace-maker and Deputy First Minister, one is struck that such a transition was simultaneously, impressive and outrageous. I had the opportunity of meeting McGuinness last January when I interviewed him. I was struck by his warmth and generosity in taking time out […]

With the death of Martin McGuinness, the former Provisional IRA senior commander turned peace-maker and Deputy First Minister, one is struck that such a transition was simultaneously, impressive and outrageous. I had the opportunity of meeting McGuinness last January when I interviewed him. I was struck by his warmth and generosity in taking time out of his schedule to help a student write his undergraduate dissertation. Colin Parry, whose 12 year-old son was killed by the IRA in 1993, spoke of how Martin McGuinness ‘was an easy man to talk to’. Parry then pointed out that “history is littered with former terrorists who become statesmen” such as Nelson Mandela and those who have made up the Israeli government. This raises the question of how such transitions from violence to political leadership occur?

The first point is that: Terrorists are in many regards politicians from day one. In wresting with the question “Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” Boaz Ganor observes that, “Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians to achieve political ends.”[1] To paraphrase Clausewitz, it can be said that, terrorism “is the purist of the policy of a party, inside a country, by [violent] means”[2], indeed terrorists are inherently politically motivated. Their use of violence is often to change the status quo, to impact how politics takes place and to gain public recognition for their cause.

Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman’s book “Anonymous Soldiers” considers how the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, led by Yitzhak Shamir, succeeded in achieving an independent state in 1948. He notes: “terrorism, can in the right conditions and with the appropriate strategy and tactics, succeed in attaining at least some of its practitioners’ fundamental aims.”[3] Nelson Mandela’s struggle was to change the repressive race class and privilege system in South Africa. Leading scholar Richard English identifies that, McGuinness’s use of violence was a response to the “structural biases in Northern Ireland during the 1921-72 period towards unionists and against nationalists which made the unionist hold on public life almost absolute.”[4] This is not to condone the use of violence; it is simply to highlight that terrorists are often far more rational than we often first assume. If (and when) the opportunity arises for public office, this rationality manifests itself in the idea that one can be more useful in bringing about lasting legislative and administrative change inside the system rather than outside. Although McGuinness never succeeded in creating a united Ireland during his lifetime, his influence inside the Northern Irish Assembly brought greater cross community change and representation across the sectarian divide.

Secondly, a dose of realism is useful: Reality sets in. As terrorist campaigns progress and indigenous calls for peace are made, transitions away from violence can ensue. It has often been said that the 1987 Enniskillen bombing was the moment when IRA leaders such as McGuinness realised that the campaign had gone too far and marked the beginning of his transition towards peace. Michael Smith adds that by 1989, senior Sinn Féin members began ‘criticising the PIRA over civilian deaths’.[5] On the British side, Historian John Newsinger adds that, “British counter-terrorism approaches had grown stronger since their calibration after their mistakes in fuelling the bloody period between 1971-1974”.[6] These elements combined with the political and civilian fatigue at the costs of the Troubles, provided fertile ground and opportunities for the conversation (known as ‘the link’) between the PIRA and the British government to be explored. Other similar examples exist. Gustavo Petro, the former Mayor of Bogotá was also able to negotiate amnesty with the Columbian government, despite his involvement with the brutal M-19 group, demonstrating that the drive for peace often negates turbulent pasts. Government’s that are willing to negotiate and local popular support allow those who once bore arms to become democratically elected.

Thirdly, life as a terrorist is a hard and stressful one. Fear of imprisonment and being on the run is hard to sustain for long periods of time. If opportunities for negotiation present themselves in favourable ways, a seat in public office can be an attractive option. It is often the case that when terrorists are brought to the negotiating table, people are reminded that they are normal people, who have similar interests and desires, who can also laugh and cry.

Tony Blair and Jonathan Powell’s meeting with republican leaders in 1997 paved the way for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the monumental power sharing between the two former antagonists Ian Paisley and McGuinness in 2007, who became known as the “chuckle brothers” due to the friendship that developed between them. A similar transition can be seen in then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1987 proclamation against Nelson Mandela’s party:

Regardless, as the Independent recorded in 1990, “the spectacle of her almost falling over herself to meet Mandela in 1990 showed very clearly there is no such thing as an absolute in politics”.[7] As such, people can change and we must acknowledge that people’s firmly held beliefs can evolve over time. The transition from a stressful life in the shadows into a more stable life in public view and a career in public office has been a path many former terrorist leaders have followed.

Such a transition from terrorism to mainstream politics, from war to peace,comes at a cost. Peter McLoughlin has noted that

When peace is pursued, compromise must take place and difficult decisions have to be made. Personal inhibitions and bloodied pasts must be set aside to make room for the enemy to sit at the table.

Sinn Féin’s Gerry Kelly has noted that if absolute defeat for one side or the other is not possible “negotiations are a part of where you go.” Risks must be taken and uncomfortable lines crossed for both parties involved. Such symbols of peace were seen with McGuinness’s handshake with the Queen in 2012 – a big step for an Irish republican and for the Queen, whose cousin Lord Mountbatten had been killed by the IRA in 1979. Forgiveness and grace must be expressed and while differences inevitably endure a productive way forward incorporates working together with former enemies to build a peaceful and progressive future.

Although the Troubles present unique circumstances, what we can see in the life of Martin McGuinness is a familiar story, a journey that many other terrorists turned statesmen across the world have also made. The transition from violence to peaceful politics is not an easy one, yet in many regards when there is a stalemate the conversion is less unusual than one might expect. Through the ballot box Martin McGuinness was able to represent the opinions of citizens whose voices had been ignored before the 1970s. Although his terrorist past must not be forgotten, his commitment to the shared future for Northern Ireland must be remembered and commemorated.

]]>http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/03/25/martin-mcguinness-not-uncommon-transition-terrorist-statesman/feed/0In Defence of Belgian Counterterror Policyhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2017/01/21/defense-belgian-counterterrorism-policy/
Sat, 21 Jan 2017 00:12:50 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2798On March 22nd 2016 the two consecutive bombings at the Brussels’ Zaventem airport and the Maalbeek metro station brought Belgian counterterrorism policy under heavy scrutiny. With the Paris attacks foreshadowing an impending threat, the Belgian security alert had been raised to critical levels since November 2015. Yet in spite of warnings from numerous countries, the […]

On March 22nd 2016 the two consecutive bombings at the Brussels’ Zaventem airport and the Maalbeek metro station brought Belgian counterterrorism policy under heavy scrutiny. With the Paris attacks foreshadowing an impending threat, the Belgian security alert had been raised to critical levels since November 2015. Yet in spite of warnings from numerous countries, the Belgian counterterrorism strategy failed to deter a predicted ISIL attack. Now, ten months after the last terrorist attack on Belgian soil, police and army personnel are still routinely stationed throughout the capital’s busy shopping streets and tourist attractions. Belgium’s counterterrorism policy remains highly criticized, both internationally, as well as domestically. Are these regular accusations of Belgian incompetence justified?

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon to Belgium. Having fallen victim to a range of different types of political violence in the past two centuries – from left wing to anarchist to religious terrorism—, Belgium has continuously faced the many challenges of developing a functioning counter-terrorism strategy. The expansion of ISIL in Syria and Iraq in the recent years has complicated past Belgian strategies profoundly. With Syrian refugees fleeing to the European continent, and aspirant European fighters traveling to Syrian training camps, the Schengen system has stretched to breaking point Belgium’s capacity to regulate the movement of people at its borders. Further compounding the issue, the BBC reports more Belgian Islamists going to fight for ISIS per capita than any other European country. With so many Belgian citizens traveling to Syria, the issue of returning foreign fighters becomes a problem particularly pertinent to Belgian counterterrorism policy.

To add to these challenges, Brussels holds important symbolic value. Serving as the headquarters of the EU and NATO, the Belgian capital is particularly vulnerable as a target for anti-Western terrorism. Budgetary constraints further worsen Belgium’s ability to reconcile its small size with its accessibility as a target. The culmination of these factors makes the creation of an effective counterterrorism policy especially difficult, particularly if it involves the safeguarding of liberal principles and the rule of law.

Prior to the March 22nd bombings, Belgium had shown a clear policy of building criminal cases against domestic terrorist networks: bringing its members to court, and carrying out trials in accordance with existing legal frameworks. With the 2003 Terrorist Offence Act criminalizing participation in terrorist activities, Belgium has taken a cautious approach to its conceptualization of terrorism, remaining wary of the potential implications of framing terrorism as a Manichean battle against an irreconcilable opponent. In honoring the criminal justice system, Belgian policy sets a precedent that excludes particular practices, such as indefinite detention without trial or unethical interrogation methods. Doing so allows the Belgian government to draw legitimacy from its actions, and thereby evade some of the ethical pitfalls of “the war on terror”.

The current heavy presence of police forces throughout Brussels falls within this criminal justice model. With the typical pattern of ISIL-related attacks on soft targets – Christmas markets, beach promenades, cafés –, the current presence of police and security personnel should make Belgian targets more resistant. This, combined with Belgium’s existing preventative and reactive counterterrorism policies, as established by the EU’s “prevent, protect, pursue and respond” policy, is likely to serve as an appropriate response to the current threat. Further security measures would arguably only alienate the Belgian population rather than deter future attacks. Indeed, Belgium has looked to the historical tendency of hard, coercive methods propelling potential-recruits straight into the arms of violent organizations. For this reason, then, it is more important in the long run for Belgium to protect the rule of law in order to protect its values as a liberal democracy than to respond harshly.

Based on this understanding of the mechanisms of terrorist recruitment, Belgium has developed multi-layered frameworks that evenly balance proactive and reactive approaches. Going beyond purely reactive law enforcement strategies, Belgium has developed several anti-radicalization programs. Such policies policy are aimed at countering both “bottom-up” as well as “top-down” recruitment specifically tailored to the Belgian domestic situation. These strategies also involve bilateral partnerships with various European countries such as France and Turkey.

This being said, Belgian security and intelligence services have not shown “incompetence” or made fundamental “errors” as has been commonly suggested. This is not to say that improvements cannot be made. Indeed, the Belgian security and intelligence service are overwhelmed and lack the capacity to deal with the sheer extent of information flow. They also often fail to coordinate with one another, particularly between municipalities. Similarly, the overarching European counterterrorism structure needs to be reworked to create a unified, functioning framework. Yet these shortcomings demonstrate institutional and practical flaws rather than fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the threat itself, or strategies through which these threats should be deterred.

In the short-term, the current Belgian counterterrorism policy is unlikely to deter all future attacks. In spite of popular narratives or rhetoric suggesting otherwise, terrorism will never disappear entirely. There is no ‘quick fix’ policy, and Europe will inevitably face more security challenges in the future. However, the direction that European nations choose to follow when confronted with these threats is vital. Belgium has demonstrated a course that honors the openness of European society and the fundamental freedoms of its citizens. Looking forward, Belgian policy should aim to continue in this direction: developing policy that minimizes illegal weapons trading and prohibiting Belgian citizens from joining foreign militant groups in Syria, while simultaneously upholding and respecting the rights of its citizens.

Ultimately, despite accusations of a fragmented and institutionally flawed approach, Belgium’s counterterrorism policy evenly balances domestically tailored strategies with international partnerships and institutional policy frameworks. While such an approach does not guarantee immunity to future attacks, it sets a precedent for upholding democratic values and civil liberties. The Belgian model serves as an example of a long-term strategy that responds proportionally to the security threat without excessively compromising its liberal values.

]]>A Thought for September 12http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2016/09/13/a-thought-for-september-12/
Tue, 13 Sep 2016 18:24:29 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2724My seventeen-year-old brother doesn’t remember 9/11 – but it’s a day my country can’t forget. Nor should it. Many “millennials,” myself included, will only have vague memories of the day itself and the outpouring of patriotism that followed. Every year, we are reminded of the men and women that died so needlessly and so courageously […]

A flag flies in the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, September 15, 2001.

My seventeen-year-old brother doesn’t remember 9/11 – but it’s a day my country can’t forget. Nor should it. Many “millennials,” myself included, will only have vague memories of the day itself and the outpouring of patriotism that followed. Every year, we are reminded of the men and women that died so needlessly and so courageously – the man in the red bandanna, the first responders, the Brit that led thousands of his employees to safety, Falling Man. Every year, I – along with the rest of the country – am brought to tears by the courage of the American citizens and residents affected by that day, and I take a long, hard look at what patriotism means to me.

And yet, every year – every year – when the calendar turns to September 12, the fog of camaraderie inevitably burns off to expose the hatred beneath. Why? Why, if we applaud and mourn the bravery of those who lost their lives that day, can we not exhibit some of that courage in our own lives? I don’t necessarily mean putting our lives on the line, but smaller acts: of tolerance, of care for one another. Putting aside our rhetoric about how great America is (or isn’t), we all know America has serious problems. Take your pick: failing schools, unemployment, systematic racism, gender discrimination, homophobia and transphobia, bigotry, failed foreign relations, brutal election cycles.

I could go on, but I think anyone reading this can think of some issues of his/her/their own. Some belong in the hands of government, but many belong with us, everyday Americans. The one beautiful thing that came out of the September 11 attacks was a reminder to Americans about their capacity to love one another. Love and courage go together; one requires the other. I cannot find a single case of someone discriminating when helping their fellow man out of a burning building or judging their compatriot as they wept on one another’s shoulders.

That all ended September 12 as confusion and grief curdled into anger and blame, which quickly rotted into full-blown hate towards people of color and Muslims incorrectly deemed responsible. Even the needs of first responders were lost in the political turmoil – not until 2010 were they given the healthcare they required. Fifteen years later, it seems the ugliness has persisted instead of the love, and that makes sense. Ugliness is easier. It’s easier to hold on to your opinions than to change them. It’s easier to judge than understand. 9/11 reminds us of the courage it takes to love our fellow Americans, but as we get further away from the day, it becomes easier to relegate this reminder into one, neat square of the calendar – especially for the young people who have grown up in the dark shadow of the attacks without understanding the light that shone through despite the horror and smoke. And, like the fluid, diverse ideas of “patriotism” or “America,” 9/11 is an event too-often coopted into divisive narratives.

This is my small plea for us not to let that happen, to not forget the legacy or allow it to be swallowed up by politics. Spend September 11 honoring the sacrifices of those who died, and spend September 12, September 13, heck, the whole rest of the year, honoring their legacy. Aim to understand and accept those around you. Purposefully engage in discussion with people with whom you don’t agree or understand. Listen to protestors, don’t lambast them for pointing out our flaws. Welcome those “downtrodden” that America has always prided itself on harboring, whether they be refugees, Muslims, Jews, Christians, gays, lesbians, gender fluid, liberal, conservative, hawks, doves, brown, black, or white.

I don’t care which political party you support, what God you worship (or don’t), your race, who you are or what you’ve done. I don’t want to appeal to any of those things. Instead, I ask you to accept your differences, to understand one another’s hopes and dreams alongside your fears. Don’t write off a youth for his race or his hoodie; don’t discount a woman for her head covering; don’t absolve yourself of your share of blame for society’s ills – we are all responsible. This will be hard. It requires a bravery and an openness and a decency and a deep, human love of the sort we, as a nation, have put aside for far too long.

I know this plea is hopelessly idealistic; in fact, it is the sort of horribly subjective piece I normally eschew. But I have watched too many September 12s come and go while remaining silent. I started writing this thinking of my brother and how, for young people, this day is becoming one like any other – though this piece is not for him. This is for everyone who does remember, a sort of request for us to give this day its proper due, and to allow that singular twenty-four hour period of love and horror to continue inspiring us to be better as individuals and as a nation. It is a reminder that no one “owns” America or American-ness. In this era of anger and fear, I want my brother to see a positive example of patriotism. I want to see it myself.

“There is no justification for terror,” responded Netanyahu. “The comments of the U.N. Secretary-General encourage terror.”

In the epochal ‘war on terror,’ the Netanyahu ‘them versus us rhetoric’ has dominated—from ground zero in New York to the bloodstained cafes of Paris.

Amid these ruins, anger and vengeance fester. But could this very human reaction to affliction exacerbate our struggle with violent fundamentalism?

Throughout history, humans have reacted to perceived grievances, oppression and struggle with violence. While ends do not justify the means—understanding injustices, rather than suppressing them, are the key to peace building.

Mr. Ban’s explanation for the Palestinian violence—occupation, settlement encroachment and a paralyzed peace process—was not offered by way of justification for violence. But he was seeking to bridge divides and perhaps connect Palestinian and Israeli narratives through a call for introspection.

For a victim of violent extremism it would be more gratifying to respond with commensurate force. But in order to break cycles of violence, targeting motivations are essential to de-fueling the fire.

Of course, grievances can be distorted and amplified, but no dialogue and divisive policy toward those associated with radical thoughts does little to halt or reverse the radicalization process. In fact, it solidifies it—by entrenching the view that ‘terrorists will be terrorists.’

In a recent study, the Quilliam foundation, an anti-extremism think tank, noted that

“[Governments] must…ensure that the grievances that are exploited by extremists are not unwittingly exacerbated and that counter-narrative approaches are not derailed.”

Radicalization, defined as the process by which an individual or group comes to adopt extreme political, social or religious ideals, is not unique to any region or religion. It happened in 1930s Nazi Germany—and is occurring today in Burma, led by radical Buddhist monks opposed to Islam.

Though highly idiosyncratic, radicalization appears to find energy from a nexus of state building failures—be it ethnic conflict, economic inequality or social injustice, perceived or otherwise.

A greater awareness of the environments in which extremist ideologies, religious or otherwise, could permeate has led to a growing Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) movement.

The Soufan Group, a strategic intelligence firm, analogized CVE to inoculating against disease as opposed to costly and ineffective approaches of treating it after an ‘infection.’

For example, the UK’s Prevent CVE initiative broadly aims to support those vulnerable to extremism, address grievances and challenge ideologies.

But, many CVE programs have under-performed for lack of a clear vision and funding for essential community and NGO-level participation say experts.

Fashioning coherent, coordinated and well-resourced CVE programs on a domestic level is key to long-term security—alongside measured military action, intelligence gathering, law enforcement and state building assistance.

As events in Paris showed last year, nations remain exposed to homegrown extremism, which thrives in the dense, destitute and segregated districts of our capitals.

Molenbeek neighborhood, on the edge of Brussels—where several arrests were made in connection with the November Paris attacks—had a reputation for unemployment, crime and drugs. But, it largely fell under the radar amid Belgium’s bureaucratic and decentralized governance systems.

Such vulnerable environments will become ever more volatile as the estimated 27,000-30,100 battle-hardened Jihadi fighters who are currently in Iraq and Syria start filtering back to their home countries.

Yet for the past 15 years we have let anger drive our counter-terrorism policy, with quick-fire military reprisals to satisfy the short-term illusion of security. As things stand now, efforts aimed at de-radicalization, together with counter-narrative and general community development policies closer to home have barely gathered steam.

The desire to vilify those who commit and associate themselves with terrorist acts is understandable.

But we must not let such emotions cloud our awareness of the very rational processes and environments that lead people—at home and abroad—toward extremism in the first place.

]]>Poll: Most Bangladeshis See Country Pointed in Right Directionhttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2016/02/09/poll-most-bangladeshis-see-country-pointed-in-right-direction/
Tue, 09 Feb 2016 23:02:17 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2149Recent attacks by extremists have not dampened enthusiasm for future. By Mohammad Ziauddin, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the United States Bangladesh is headed in the right direction. That’s the conclusion of a new survey conducted by the respected International Republican Institute. IRI, an independent, non-partisan U.S. based organization that assists political parties to achieve good […]

Bangladesh is headed in the right direction. That’s the conclusion of a new survey conducted by the respected International Republican Institute. IRI, an independent, non-partisan U.S. based organization that assists political parties to achieve good governance and civil society development, reports that Bangladeshis are confident about the future of their country and their own well-being.

A key reason for the optimism is that the economy is growing smartly. The Bangladeshi economy grew over 6 percent annually over the past several years and is poised for even higher growth. In particular, Bangladesh’s important garment industry is booming and has shifted to producing high-end, higher-profit products. Working conditions are improving in garment factories as Bangladeshi women increasingly become breadwinners in their households.

All of these changes, and more, are reflected in the IRI poll. An overwhelming majority of those surveyed (79 percent) believe the country’s economic condition is good. 65 percent said their personal and/or family’s economic situation improved over the last year, and 72 percent said they believe it will continue to improve over the next year.

By a large margin, respondents showed faith in Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government and her direction for her country. 72 percent of those polled approve of the job being done by the government, according to the IRI. The IRI has been actively engaged in improving democracy throughout Asia.

And despite recently reported attacks by extremists on Bangladeshis and foreign guests, 80 percent of the poll’s respondents said that Bangladesh’s security situation is either good or very good. One reason is surely that Bangladeshis have seen the swift, decisive action taken against the perpetrators of these attacks. In other words, the poll reveals a striking difference in the perception of safety and security in Bangladesh by those who live there as opposed to the views expressed in the Western media.

Bangladesh is investing heavily in its infrastructure to ensure that its growth is sustainable over the long term. One example of this investment is the four-mile-long, multipurpose Padma Bridge, which will link the southwestern part of the country to the capital Dhaka and the northern and eastern regions. This bridge will help improve and change the image of Bangladesh. It will connect vast areas of the country to Dhaka and transform the lives of many Bangladeshis living in the isolated southwestern region of the country. By reducing the distance between major urban centers, the Padma Bridge will help to increase regional trade, alleviate poverty and speed up the country’s growth and development.

The Padma Bridge will carry multiple modes of transportation. The connecting railway on both sides of the bridge has been constructed to hold higher loads than usual. This will provide the missing but essential rail infrastructure needed in the region and increase both imports and exports for the country. The bridge will facilitate inter-regional and cross-river transports to passengers and freight. It will also transport natural gas and help spur telecommunications and electricity transmission in a cost-effective way.

The construction of the bridge will be a huge job creator. It will drive tourism in southwest regions that have been difficult to reach. The bridge will also help rural farmers by providing easy forms of transportation to directly send perishables to Dhaka and other cities. In fact, it has been estimated that the Padma Bridge will increase Bangladesh’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by as much as 1.2 percent as soon as the bridge becomes operational in a few years.

With a growing workforce and developing infrastructure, the future for Bangladesh is bright. The IRI survey is the latest proof of that progress.

]]>The Forerunners of ISIShttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/12/06/the-forerunners-of-isis/
Sun, 06 Dec 2015 18:49:14 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=2030The recent creation and sudden conquests of the so-called “Islamic State” have astonished policy-makers, military strategists, and foreign affairs analysts. The self-proclaimed caliphate of Abû al-Baghdâdi went from a broken outfit of Iraqi insurgents to a feared theocracy that currently threatens the established order of the Middle East. One can be forgiven for thinking such a movement as being […]

]]>The recent creation and sudden conquests of the so-called “Islamic State” have astonished policy-makers, military strategists, and foreign affairs analysts. The self-proclaimed caliphate of Abû al-Baghdâdi went from a broken outfit of Iraqi insurgents to a feared theocracy that currently threatens the established order of the Middle East. One can be forgiven for thinking such a movement as being without precedents.

But there are precedents.

Take the eerily similar story of the Almohads, a fanatical Moroccan sect that rose to power in the twelfth century. Born deep in the Maghrib and led by a self-styled caliph, the Almohads toppled moderate states in North Africa and Southwest Europe in order to impose a puritanical Islamic society. That society bore images frighteningly similar to those seen in present-day Iraq and Syria: crucifixion, enslavement, massacre, and the expulsion of non-Muslims.

Castillian ambassadors attempting to convince almohad king Abu Hafs Umar al-Murtada to join their alliance. Contemporary depiction from The Cantigas de Santa Maria.

The Almohads were followers of a fiery preacher named Mu?ammed ibn Tûmart. Tûmart denounced the corruption of the region’s ruling order and in the 1120s led an insurgency from the Atlas Mountains. The insurgency reached a stalemate by the time of Tûmart’s death in 1139; thereafter, a factional leader named ‘Abd al-Mu’min took control of the insurgency, declared himself caliph, and continued the struggle.[ref]Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus, (London, Longman, 1996), p.200-1[/ref]

Under their caliph’s stewardship, the Almohad warriors waged a renewed jihâd with great fervor, sweeping across virtually the whole of the Maghreb. Disenfranchised Berber tribes, opportunistic élites, and religious fundamentalists flocked to the Almohad cause, filling Mu’min’s ranks and extending his reach. The young caliphate’s victories caught the attention of Muslim leaders across the Gibraltar Strait, who were in desperate need of aid against the Christian armies of Europe. The caliph was more than happy to take advantage of this opportunity.

The first Almohad warriors landed on European soil in the 1140s, spreading into the Iberian hinterland to eventually seize the great cities of Almería, Córdoba, Sevilla, and València. Within a generation, the Almohads controlled approximately 40 percent of the peninsula.

Much of the Almohads’ success came from a valuable combination of discipline, inspiration, and order. Almohad warriors genuinely believed themselves to be doing God’s work, regardless of how cruel that work might appear.

And cruel it was. The Almohad occupation may have brought security to Southern Iberia, but that security brought with it harsh and intolerant singularity to what had once been a richly multicultural society. “Impious” texts, those that did not conform to strictly Islamic tenets, were stripped from libraries and destroyed. Scholars deemed subversive to the new order were ousted and imprisoned. Dissidents to the theocracy were subject to public crucifixion.[ref]Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus, (London, Longman, 1996), p.212[/ref] Christians and Jews were given the choice of conversion to the Islamic faith or death.

Unsurprisingly, there was a massive exodus from the Almohad realm. Christians might at least find sanctuary with coreligionists to the north, but Jews faced a more uncertain fate. The resulting persecution saw prominent non-Muslim scholars, most notably Moshe ben Maimon, flee to more tolerant lands in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Almohads succeeded in creating a wholly Islamic order in Southern Iberia, all the while ending a multi-religious and cosmopolitan renaissance.

One of those exiles, the Jewish poet Ezra Ha-Salla?, mourned the end of a cherished era:

I shave my head and weep bitterly for the exile of Seville–

For its nobles are the corpses and their sons captives,

Their elegant daughters handed over to a foreign religion.

How was Córdoba plundered and become like the desolate sea?

There sage and great men died in famine and

Not a Jew besides me is left in Jaén or Almería.

Mallorca and Málaga are without sustenance

And the Jews who remained received a festering blow.

That is why I mourn, learn to wail bitterly, and utter so grievous a lament!

The Almohads benefited greatly from the division of their enemies. The Christian Iberian states of Aragon, Castile, Leon, Navarre, and Portugal were in an almost constant state of hostility with one another. The caliph played a game of divide-and-conquer, forming a temporary treaty with one state in order to assault another, consolidate his gains, and then strike at his treaty partner.

By the 1200s, the caliphate had inched into Central Iberia and taken the strategically valuable Balearic Islands, an excellent staging point for expansion into the Northwest Mediterranean.

That fact sobered Christian Europe for the need to take action. The archbishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jiménez, called for Europe’s Christian rulers to unite against the Almohad forces. The pope, seeing the severity of Almohad threat, ordered a crusade to crush the caliphate once and for all.

Volunteers from across the continent and Britain flocked to aid the Spanish cause. In a rare instance of solidarity, the Christian rulers of the peninsula agreed to a joint campaign against the caliph. In the summer of 1212, the kings of Aragon, Castile, and Navarre met at Toledo. After agreeing on a strategy, the three monarchs marched south against the caliph.

It turns out that the timing of the campaign could not have been better: Mu?ammad an-Nâ?ir, the fourth Almohad caliph, was preoccupied with revolts in Northwest Africa. The report of a massive Christian offensive forced Nâ?ir to suspend his efforts in the Maghreb and hurry back to Iberia, where he hastily mobilized the semblance of a force to intercept the European coalition.

That point of interception would be at Las Navas de Tolosa in the valley below the Sierra Morena. Nâ?ir expected the dense mountain range to provide an effective buffer while he set up camp. Unbeknownst to the caliph, Christian forces navigated through a little-known pass along a gorge. Nâ?ir awoke on the morning Monday, July 16, to find three European armies facing him and holding the high ground.[ref]Fletcher Pratt and Edward Gorey, The Battles That Changed History, (Mineola, Dover Publications, 2000), p.106-7[/ref]

Almohad zeal proved not enough in the ensuing mêlée. Christian forces overwhelmed the Muslim defenders, quickly descending on the caliph’s tent. Nâ?ir, finding all hope lost, abandoned the camp and raced away from the battlefield, leaving behind thousands of his warriors to perish. Nâ?ir did not have long to enjoy his survival from battlefield, dying the following year.

His caliphate never recovered. The Almohads were soon forced to relinquish vast swathes of territory to Christian invaders and Muslim rebels, all of whom sensed that momentum was on their side. By 1240, most of the Almohad empire had vanished. By the 1260s, the caliph’s once-great domain consisted of a mere residence in Marrâkesh. By 1270, the dynasty was extinct.[ref]W. Montgomery Watt, A History of Islamic Spain, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh U. Press, 1965), p.93-6[/ref]

In hindsight, the Almohads’ most distinguished attributes–puritanical fervor and immense conquests–proved their greatest liabilities. The caliphate’s fervor and puritanism brought order to a fractious region; yet it also created a harsh, intolerant society that fostered discontent far and wide. The speed and scale of the Almohads’ conquests seemed clear proof of divine grace; yet, conversely, those conquests finally drove the dynasty’s enemies to unite and take decisive action in order to halt, and eventually shatter, the caliphate.

The Almohads left behind an enduring legacy, one that demonstrated how the most ignoble of movements could dramatically and violently shape the course of a region.

]]>The overlooked story of Syria’s Yarmouk death camphttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/04/20/the-overlooked-story-of-syrias-yarmouk-death-camp/
Mon, 20 Apr 2015 22:30:39 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1475A brave 12-year-old girl named Zeynab Daghastani recently attempted to escape the grim living conditions of a besieged Palestinian refugee camp in Syria. Starving and bone-tired, she did not make it very far before being shot and killed by an ISIS sniper. Welcome to Yarmouk. On April 1st, a group of ISIS’s mask-wearing jihadists swept through the […]

A brave 12-year-old girl named Zeynab Daghastani recently attempted to escape the grim living conditions of a besieged Palestinian refugee camp in Syria. Starving and bone-tired, she did not make it very far before being shot and killed by an ISIS sniper. Welcome to Yarmouk.

On April 1st, a group of ISIS’s mask-wearing jihadists swept through the Yarmouk refugee camp. ISIS brutally subjugated the Yarmouk residents and effectively enveloped them in an oppressive environment described by Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon as “the deepest circle of hell.”

Even before ISIS transformed Yarmouk into an iron-fisted prison camp where shootings are widespread and beheadings are recurrent, the refugee camp was already a theatre of human despair. Located right on the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus, Yarmouk has long been victimized by bombing campaigns and subjected to human rights violations by Assad forces amid the raging civil war in Syria.

In his recent piece for The Guardian, Mehdi Hasan described the nearly impossible living conditions in Yarmouk:

Water and electricity were cut off long ago, and of the 160,000 Palestinian refugees who once lived in the camp only 18,000 now remain. The Syrian regime has, according to Amnesty International, been “committing war crimes by using starvation of civilians as a weapon,” forcing residents to “resort to eating cats and dogs.”

A resident of Yarmouk equated life there with turning off all your electricity, water and heat while only eating once a day in the dark. This is all in addition to the unrelenting violence that comes with the inconvenience of being stuck between a genocidal army of terrorists and a murderous regime.

While ISIS is slaughtering people in the streets, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a monitoring group with a network of contacts in Syria, reported to The New York Times that the Assad regime had dropped 36 barrel bombs on the camp between April 5 and 10. Scores of people were killed. “The sky of Yarmouk has barrel bombs instead of stars,” said Abdallah al-Khateeb, a political activist living inside the camp.

Most of the world is well-aware of the upheaval that has permeated Syria, but these descriptions from Yarmouk’s residents powerfully filter the situation through intimate perspectives that illuminate a disturbing reality: it is innocent people who bear the brunt of this senseless conflict.

The plight of these Palestinian refugees should matter to us all; they are in desperate need of help. There seems to be a distinct outrage and vast media coverage when Americans are executed by ISIS, and widespread condemnation when Palestinians are persecuted by Israelis. However, there is an unsettling silence while throats are being slit and a malnourished, dehydrated population is withering away in the bomb-blackened streets of Yarmouk. This unceasing humanitarian catastrophe emanating from Syria is hugely exacerbated by such pervasive apathy.

This apathy is demonstrated by the ineffectiveness of the UN’s recent appeal for emergency funds to ease the suffering in Yarmouk. According to Chris Gunness, Spokesman for the UNRWA, they are requesting $415 million to provide emergency humanitarian aid for refugees in Syria. Unfortunately, the funds are nearly empty, and this will likely prevent critical assistance being given to the refugees.

It is interesting how the United States did not hesitate to provide support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, which is likely to sink that country deeper into chaos, but has not found a way to sufficiently help those attempting to mitigate the effects of a humanitarian cataclysm in Syria. Furthermore, the rest of the Saudi-led coalition, and those supporting it – Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Somalia – should be ashamed for joining forces in the military action against the Houthis in Yemen, but failing to display the same urgency when it comes to aiding their suffering neighbors in Syria.

The vast majority of Yarmouk’s refugees are people who believe deep in their hearts that there is more in the world for them to experience outside the imposed boundaries of their conflict-ridden, impoverished environment. They are not wrong, but, sadly, those who attempt to transcend these walls of oppression, like 12-year-old Zeynab Daghastani, are often met with a similar fate: a bomb blast, bullet to the head or knife to the throat.

At the very least, we owe it to the people of Yarmouk to share their story and show them that they are not invisible. Hopefully, an increase in awareness will galvanize the international community into action.

]]>After Authoritarianism: State Development and National Identity in the Middle Easthttp://global-politics.co.uk/wp/2015/04/18/after-authoritarianism-state-development-and-national-identity-in-the-middle-east/
Sat, 18 Apr 2015 14:07:08 +0000http://global-politics.co.uk/wp/?p=1489The Arab Uprisings have resulted in an increase in the expression of both sectarian and trans-state identities, making the process of reunification and the prospects for a peaceful coexistence somewhat dependent on the new leaderships’ ability to unite, make amends and, possibly for the first time in the region, craft a territorial nationalism that complements rather […]

The Arab Uprisings have resulted in an increase in the expression of both sectarian and trans-state identities, making the process of reunification and the prospects for a peaceful coexistence somewhat dependent on the new leaderships’ ability to unite, make amends and, possibly for the first time in the region, craft a territorial nationalism that complements rather than conflicts with sub-state and supra-state identities. But what is it about the nature and history of Middle Eastern states that has created such a fragile balance between territorial nationalism and extraterritorial nationalism? And why is it that the collapse of authoritarianism in the region has lead to an increase in sectarian identity? Finally, how has the Islamic State (ISIL) picked up the pieces of these fractured identities and reconstituted them into a “state”?

Identification, as Hall (1996) argues, “turns out to be one of the least well-understood concepts…it is drawing meanings from both the discursive and the psychoanalytic repertoire, without being limited to either.”[ref]Hall, S. & Du Gay, P. Questions of cultural identity. London: Sage, 1996, p. 2[/ref]Identification relies on the recognition and belief in a ‘common origin’[ref]Ibid.[/ref] or, for Benedict Anderson, a belief in the of the nation.[ref]Anderson, B. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London:Verso, 1983[/ref] For Anderson, it is the construction of these imagined communities that has provided nations with the cohesive materials necessary to form a state. In contrast, Anthony Smith argues that these nations are not simply a product of a constructed or imagined cohesion, but rather are a product of much older ethnic origins, rooted firmly in a continuous and distant past. [ref]Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986[/ref]

Despite the differences between these two theories, both would agree that the logical end result or by-product of nationalism should be the realization of a sovereign state. However, history has shown this hasn’t always been the case. In fact, the consolidation of states in the Middle East runs contrary to Smith and Anderson’s assumptions in numerous ways. As Hinnebusch argues, the consolidation of nation-states in the Middle East has been “obstructed by the profound flaws originating in its largely external imposition: the resulting often arbitrary borders and ill fit between states and national identities means that loyalty to the individual states is contested by sub-state and supra-state identities.”[ref]Hinnebusch, R. and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 7[/ref] This was due, in large part, to the colonial processes by which the former Ottoman territories were divided, which in some cases reflected certain pre-existing entities, but for the most part involved either the restructuring of former Ottoman provinces, as in the case of Trans-Jordan, or combining several provinces as in Syria and Iraq.[ref]Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 9[/ref] As a result, the states took on a rather artificial shape, “with their new names, their new capitals, their lack of ethnic homogeneity and their dead-straight boundaries.”[ref]Ibid., p. 9[/ref] The immediate effect of this fracture was that these new ‘states’ and their citizens had no real nationalistic attachment to the state, and often times only a flimsy attachment to its territorial boundaries. As a consequence, common colonial practices like the census and the issuing of identity cards were used to re-categorize and re-identify populations, whilst central governments issued laws by which the relationship between citizen and state, as well as the principals of the newly defined nationalism were established. In the case of the Arab states, this redefined nationalism was determined, as Owen argues, by a combination of territorial attachment, with citizens proving nationality based on historical connections to territory within the newly defined borders, as well as proof of a family member having lived in the territory before a certain date.[ref] Ibid., p. 9[/ref] Therefore, both the ethno-nationalism of Smith and the imagined community of Anderson, while useful up to a point, fall short in that territorial sovereignty, and its implied territorial nationalism, assume a certain measure of particularity. Implicit in this particularity is the presumption that nationalism is limited to the boundaries of the state, whereas the development of states and nationalism in the Middle East has acted, as Noble argues, more as “a set of interconnected organisms separated only by porous membranes”, rather than the kind of mechanical determinism of Smith and Anderson.[ref]Hinnebusch, p. 7[/ref]

As a result of national identity’s extraterritorial character and lack of any real democratization processes within the majority of Arab states, which would have helped secure state-centric national support from the masses (Turkey), Arab political elites have attempted to secure their legitimacy through a number of populist strategies aimed at creating a singular identity for their citizens and whilst attempting to absorb traditional and localized power structures on the periphery. As Zubaida agues, elites attempted to curb cross-border relationships through what he terms the ‘national political field’, in which all political activities were focused inward towards the capital city and all assertions of localized power were centralized.[ref]Zubaida, Sami. Islam, the people and the state: essays on political ideas and movements in the Middle East. London: Tauris, 1993, p. 145[/ref]

This was the case with the early 20th century expression of Pharaonism, a territorial nationalist movement in 1920s and 30s Egypt. The development of nationalism in Egypt is unique to the Middle East in that Egypt’s historic territory has, more or less, remained constant throughout history (with a few exceptions). Meaning that, unlike other former Ottoman provinces, the Egyptian state was never in a position to “convince” its citizens of their territory. There was, however, an attempt to convince Egyptian citizens of their cultural uniqueness amongst the Arab states. As Charles C. Smith argues, Pharaonism attempted to both undermine the traditional authority of the ulama (religious elite), by focusing on the period prior to the introduction of Islam, and to sever extraterritorial connections by focusing on the pre-Arab ethnic character of Egypt.[ref]Smith, Charles C., “Imagined identities, Imagined Nationalisms: Print Culture and Egyptian Nationalism in Light of Recent Scholarship” International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997): 612[/ref] To what extent the Egyptian state succeeded in this is debatable, however, as C. Smith argues, even when supra-Egyptian nationalism spread and began to supplant Pharaonism in the 1930s, “Egyptians…continued to assume ‘hegemony’ over their Arab neighbours, indicating a continued feeling of being Egyptian vis-à-vis their counterparts from other Arab regions”, while continuing to feeling connected to them through Islamic and pan-Arab nationalism. [ref]Ibid., p. 612[/ref] Regardless of the fleeting success of these territorial nationalist movements, what became clear to Arab leaders in their state’s nascent period was that any attempt to legitimize their authority must include what had become populist issues: namely, anti-colonial pan-Arabism, the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict and Islamism.

Therefore, during the period between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 1967 War, Arab leaders sought legitimisation through what Hinnebush and other have termed ‘symbolic politics’, with the Arab leadership co-opting issues more broadly central or symbolically relevant to the Arab world.[ref]Hinnebusch, p. 8[/ref]However, after the failure of the 1967 and Yum Kippur Wars with Israel, it became clear that anti-Zionist posturing was nothing more than rhetoric and that the pan-Arabism of Nasser had failed to counter western and Zionist imperialism in the region.

This period of soul searching lead many of the Arab states to abandon pan-Arabism in favour of an inward consolidation of power made possible, in part, by new investment from the USSR in the Levant and Egypt, and the United States in the Gulf. These regimes and monarchies were able to redistribute wealth to the middle and lower classes, thus pacifying to a certain degree internal opposition to the ruling elites, whilst securing their grip on power through the development of pervasive security apparatuses. The failure of the Arab States to curb Israeli aggression in Palestine and beyond also had the effect of increasing the popularity of Islamist movements, which was furthered by the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by the forces of Saddam Hussein and subsequent American military intervention, the unforeseen consequence of which was the strengthening of anti-western sentiment in the Islamic world, as well as a general shift in attitude away from the pan-Arabism of the 1950s, 60s and 70s towards pan-Islamism. If we fast forward to the Arab Uprisings we were then left with several types of states in the Middle East: the oil rich and western-backed monarchies of the Arabian peninsula and Gulf, the authoritarian regimes of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and beyond, and the stateless nations of Palestine and Kurdistan.

The Islamic State and National Belonging

When this article was first published in 2013, it explored how the breakdown of authoritarianism in the region would ultimately lead to a collapse of nationalisms – a ‘post-authoritarian identity crisis’. It also suggested that new political actors would seek popular legitimacy through the reconstitution or co-opting of traditional identities not necessarily bound to contemporary international borders. Now, some four years after the Arab Uprisings began, the emergence of the Islamic State seems to suggest that this new paradigm now exists in the Middle East. But it also leads to the question of how national belonging has evolved in response to and within ISIL – particularly as ISIL attempts to carry out many of the functions of a state – administrative, military, etc. – whilst lacking fixed borders, a shared culture, language or ethnic background and other basic elements of national identity. What then provides a sense of national cohesion for a population that has very little in common – apart from a shared experience of Sunni Islam? Indeed, is a form of pious-nationalism cohesive enough to constitute a “state” in the contemporary context?

Within the Andersonian model of national identity, a move towards secularism within nation-states is implied because the state gradually replaced the church in areas of politics, education, and social welfare. As a consequence, the public role of the church declined. Simultaneously other allegiances and identifications, which, ‘in a pre-modern age or in more traditional societies, were given to tribe, people, religion and region, came gradually in western societies to be transferred to the national culture.’[ref]Hall, Modernity–an Introduction to Modern Societies / Edited by Stuart Hall … [Et Al.}.[/ref] However, grounding the analysis of national identity within the secularism model is problematic, not only because, since the 1970s it has become outmoded, but also because it seems to apply only to a western experience, and even then only marginally.

In the context of the Middle East, Wedeen, Kartveit, Zeberi and others have discussed the role of pious-nationalism within Arab states, where religion has continued to play a significant role in the public discourse and politics. In essence this model largely forgoes territoriality in the place of membership in the global religious community. While the long-term goal might be unification of the religious community in a single territory, national aspirations may take priority. However, pious-nationalism can take on several different forms. Two obvious examples are Hamas and ISIL. Whilst Hamas views Palestine as an Islamic waqf, its political ideology and goals are largely based upon a territorial nationalism, which prioritises the liberation of Palestine over the establishment of a global Muslim Caliphate. In other words its national identity is simultaneously Palestinian and Islamic. In contrast, ISIL views itself as the “authentic” Caliphate representing the entire global Muslim community – whether they like it or not. Its goals are therefore not based upon any one national project, in the sense of Iraqi or Syrian nationalism, but rather the establishment of a global Islamic hegemony. “Nation” in this context can be equated with the Islamic umma or global community of Muslims, and is less orientated towards “state”.

Within a typical nation-state, modes of national attachment and public displays of nationalism might include the celebration of national days, wearing of national costumes, traditional dances, etc. These are, in essence, a form of secular ritual with the focus on the citizen and state rather than the believer and God. Expressions of pious-nationalism in the Islamic context place emphasis on the umma – expressed through hajj, the observance of religious holidays, public morality, and other areas of social conduct. In this way, the global Muslim community can relate to other Muslims regardless of their national, ethnic or other backgrounds. Loyalty to ISIL in relation to other Islamist or national groups is proven through the adherence to a specific brand of Islamic interpretation. This brand is reinforced through shari’a schools attended by both children and new immigrants to the state, but also through the very public enforcement of ISIL branded Islamic morals. One then proves one’s loyalty to the state by adhering to these principles, which distinguish the Islamic State not only from the surrounding Arab states, but also crucially between a correct and incorrect interpretation of Islam. In a roundabout way, this actually mirrors the construction of national identity within nation-states in that the practice of national identity necessarily distinguishes itself from the other.

Authoritarian Arab states utilised their monopoly on violence to curb the plethora of trans-state and other traditional identifications. Their collapse and, ultimately, the disintegration of state borders has allowed the Islamic State to play upon traditional identities in order to secure a stronger sense of legitimacy for itself. Whilst these terms “traditional” and “modern” conjure up a rather orientalist interpretation of Middle Eastern society, they do highlight certain factors that undoubtedly influence the construction of identity within the Middle Eastern context; namely that political actors will often frame their own ideologies and understandings of the nation within traditional cultural, religious or tribal frameworks. In other words, political actors may attempt to merge, reconstitute or repurpose traditional affiliations in order to both consolidate power (through identification with a cultural or demographic majority), and to unify otherwise heterogeneous populations (as the state seeks to secure its position as the primary authority).

As discussed above, this is accomplished primarily through ‘recurrent social practices’ like ceremony, tradition and religious ritual. [ref]Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity / Anthony Giddens (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1990., 1990)., cited in Hall, Modernity–an Introduction to Modern Societies / Edited by Stuart Hall … [Et Al.}., 599.[/ref] By placing these social actions within a continuous narrative of past, present and future, traditional societies can make use of symbols and histories that represent the collective experience of previous generations.[ref]Ibid., 599. [/ref] In other words, the use of traditional symbols may actually serve to create a stronger sense of legitimacy for ISIL vis-à-vis the past Arab regimes because it can present itself as representing a time prior to the end of Islamic hegemony and western colonialism in the region. Whereas the Arab regimes represented the last vestiges of a past corrupted by colonialism, the Islamic State presents itself as being rooted in a period and worldview before this occurred. This is obviously a perspective shared by numerous Islamist groups, but the difference is that ISIL has succeeded in establishing itself as a “state”, where other groups remain isolated within larger national contexts.