Presently
pending before the Court is Plaintiff Erin Swike's Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Costs. [Filing No. 32.]
Following her acceptance of Defendant Med-1 Solutions,
LLC's (“Med-1”) offer of judgment in
the total amount of $4, 000, Ms. Swike filed her request for
$31, 220.89 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 15
U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3). [Filing No. 32.] Defendant
opposes Ms. Swike's Motion. [Filing No. 35.] As
discussed below, the Court finds the hourly rate requested by
Ms. Swike's counsel to be excessive under the
circumstances. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN
PART and DENIES IN PART Ms.
Swike's Motion and awards Ms. Swike a total of $29,
011.39 in fees and costs.

I.

Background

On May
8, 2017, Ms. Swike filed her Complaint, alleging that Med-1
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).
[Filing No. 1.] Thereafter, Med-1 filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. [Filing
No. 14.] The Court denied Med-1's motion on
September 15, 2017. [Filing No. 23.] On October 10,
2017, following the Court's denial of the Motion to
Dismiss, Ms. Swike accepted an offer of judgment for $1, 000
in statutory damages and $3, 000 in actual damages.
[Filing No. 24.] The accepted judgment leaves it to
the Court to determine an award of reasonable attorney's
fees and costs. [Filing No. 24-1.] Ms. Swike seeks
$615.89 in costs and $30, 650 in attorney's fees based
upon rates of $595 per hour for attorney David Philipps, $585
per hour for attorney Mary Philipps, and $295 for attorney
Angie Robertson. [Filing No. 32 at 11.]

Mr.
Philipps has been practicing law since 1987 and has been
litigating FDCPA cases since the early 1990s. [Filing No.
32-5 at 2-3; Filing No. 32-5 at 12.] He has
publicly presented on issues involving the FDCPA at
conferences across the United States and is a founding member
of the National Association for Consumer Advocates, serving
on its Board of Directors since 2013. [Filing No. 32-5 at
3-9.] Ms. Philipps was admitted to the bar in 1987 and
has a similar practice to that of Mr. Philipps. [Filing
No. 32-5 at 7.] Ms. Robertson is an associate who has
been practicing since 2010. [Filing No. 32-5 at 7.]
Three practitioners, two consumer protection attorneys from
Chicago and one Indianapolis commercial litigator, have each
attested to the reasonableness of the claimed rates.
[Filing No. 32-6; Filing No. 32-7;
Filing No. 32-8.]

On
December 13, 2017, Ms. Swike filed her motion for Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs. [Filing No. 32.] The
Motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

II.

Discussion

Ms.
Swike argues that her fee request is reasonable because her
attorneys have previously received fee awards at the
requested rates, her attorneys are highly experienced at
litigating FDCPA cases, and she achieved complete success on
her claims. [Filing No. 32 at 7-10.]

In
response, Med-1 does not challenge the hours spent on this
matter, but argues that each of the claimed rates is
excessive. Specifically, Med-1 requests that the Court reduce
Mr. Philipps' rate from $595 to $275 per hour; Ms.
Philipps' rate from $585 to $275 per hour; and Ms.
Robertson's rate from $295 to $175 per hour. In support,
Med-1 argues that the requested hourly rates are unreasonable
because other attorneys in recent FDCPA claims received far
lower hourly rates than Ms. Swike's requested rates and
because the FDCA claim in this case was “simple and
uncomplicated.” [Filing No. 35 at 2-4.] Med-1
requests that the Court award hourly rates of $275 per hour
for David Philipps and Mary Philipps and $175 per hour for
Angie Robertson. [Filing No. 35 at 4.]

In
reply, Ms. Swike argues that her attorneys are far more
experienced than the attorneys who received lower hourly
rates in other FDCPA cases. [Filing No. 36 at 3.]
Ms. Swike also argues that the case was made more complicated
by Med-1's decision to file its unsuccessful Motion to
Dismiss. [Filing No. 36 at 5-6.]

Section
1692k of the FDCPA provides that “any debt collector
who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an
amount equal to the sum of . . . the costs of the action,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). The Court
“begins the fee calculation by computing a
‘lodestar': the product of the hours reasonably
expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.” Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553
(7th Cir. 2014). Because the parties do not dispute that the
number of hours Ms. Swike's attorneys worked were
reasonable (the first half of the lodestar calculation), the
sole task of the Court is to determine the reasonableness of
the hourly rates. The lodestar calculation produces a
“presumptively reasonable fee, ” which may be
adjusted based on factors not accounted for by the award
calculation. Id. (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the requested
hourly rate is reasonable and &ldquo;in line with those
prevailing in the community.&rdquo; Pickett v. Sheridan
Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11
(1984)). The best evidence is &ldquo;an attorney&#39;s actual
billing rate for similar litigation.&rdquo;
Montanez, 755 F.3d at 554 (internal quotation
omitted). A plaintiff may also prove the reasonableness of a
requested rate with, for example, evidence of attorney&#39;s
fee awards in previous cases and evidence of the rates of
similarly experienced attorneys performing similar work.
Id.Not all evidence should be treated equally,
however. Courts may properly discount &ldquo;conclusory
affidavits from attorneys merely opining on the
reasonableness of another attorney&#39;s fee, &rdquo;
evidence &ldquo;involv[ing] different markets, &rdquo; and
prior awards &ldquo;based on compromises between
parties.&rdquo; Id. (internal alterations and
quotations omitted). Moreover, &ldquo;while evidence of fee
awards in prior similar cases must be considered by a
district court as evidence of an attorney&#39;s market rate,
such evidence is not the sine qua non of that
attorney&#39;s market rate-for each case may present its own
special set of circumstances and problems.&rdquo;
Pickett, 664 F.3d at 646 (quoting Uphoff v.
Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 ...

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