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The Third Battle of 1066

By Guy Schofield

Reproduced with permission

October 1966

A few days before King Harold reached the north to win the battle
of Stamford Bridge in September 1066, the invading Vikings defeated the
English at Fulford, near York.

Historians have emphasized that the losses sustained by King Harold’s
army in defeating Harald Hardrada of Norway at Stamford Bridge must have
weakened the force with which he had to oppose William of Normandy at
Hastings shortly afterwards. This, and the exhausting marches of the
King’s levies between London and York, contributed to William’s
victory. Less attention has been paid to what was probably a more
decisive factor – the disaster that befell English arms at the other
battle of 1066, the Battle of Fulford. It has been unduly neglected,
sometimes dismissed as little more than a curtain-raiser for what was to
follow; yet a study of the facts suggests that it was of bitter
consequence for Harold Godwinson.

The three great earldoms of the land were those of Wessex, Mercia and
Northumbria. Harold himself, while overall monarch, was also Earl of
Wessex, as his father Godwin had been. Mercia and Northumbria,
constituting between them the whole of the midlands and north country,
were united under two brothers, Earl Edwin of Mercia and Earl Morcar of
Northumbria. The combined strength of their provinces appears to have
been at least fully a match for that of Wessex and the lesser earldoms
associated with it in the south. This had been demonstrated in 1050. In
that year Earl Godwin, with the southern armies, had challenged King
Edward the Confessor near Gloucester. Edward summoned the earls of
Northumbria and Mercia to his aid. Confronted by their power Godwin at
first temporised and then submitted. This distribution of military
resource is important when the events of 1066 are considered. Nearly
half the war-making potential of the Kingdom lay in the fyrd levies and
housecarles under the command of Earls Edwin and Morcar, whose base was
at York. The other half, commanded immediately by the King, was based on
London. There was thus an army of the North and an army of the South,
designed to meet the circumstances of the hour.

By the early summer of 1066, the English authorities had become fully
alive to the menace of double invasion. The general strategy appears to
have been that King Harold in the south, with the bulk of the fleet,
would watch the movements of William of Normandy, leaving the earls of
Northumbria and Mercia to deal with Harald of Norway and his ally, the
exiled Earl Tostig. It is sometimes argued that the north of England,
being far more interpenetrated by Norse blood and custom than the south,
contained elements of quislingism; but there is not a shred of reliable
evidence to sustain this theory; for the Norse sagas themselves record
the bitter opposition they met even at the hands of unarmed Yorkshire
rustics, as Snorri’s tale of Styrkar confirms. Out of earlier
divisions the English realm had now emerged; and in this crisis loyalty
to the nation – and to all the good things it afforded its inhabitants
– subdued regional feuds.

During the greater part of September, the wind blew from the
north, down the North Sea and across the Channel. This frustrated
William, but it enabled Harald Hardrada to steel a march over his rival
and further his design on the English crown. He sailed from the
region of Sogne fjord and crossed to the mouth of the Tyne, where he was
joined by Tostig, Harold Godwinson’s brother, who was set on regaining
the earldom of Northumbria, whence he had been ejected in favour of
Morcar after a revolt at York. It would seem he was prepared to help the
Norwegian King to conquer England on condition that he himself was
restored to his old privileges. He had gathered a force of longships
and, earlier in the summer, had ravaged the Humber estuary; but Edwin
and Morcar had by then put their provinces on a war footing and he had
been driven off with ease.

From the Tyne Hardrada and Tostig sailed southward. They attacked and
burnt Scarborough, hurling fire on the houses from the top of what is
now known as Castle Hill. Then, rounding Spurn Point, they turned their
ships into the Humber, en route for York. It is difficult for us to
envisage naval operations carried so far inland as the neighbourhood of
York; but the longships of those days could navigate comparatively
narrow rivers; and the Humber and its tributary Ouse offered a perfect
waterway up to the gates of the Northumbrian capital. As the invaders
rowed westward, the English scouts beheld a formidable armada. One can
only speculate about precise numbers; but some reasonable approximations
are possible. According to the Norse Heimskringla, the Norwegian fleet
consisted of well over 200 ships ‘beside provision ships and small
craft.’ The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle speaks of ‘a very great sea-force,
with 300 ships or more.’ How many Tostig was able to add is not known;
but he had been busy accumulating strength, and may possibly have
mustered 30 vessels. If the grand total is conservatively reduced to
200 ships of war, certain deductions can be made.

The longship of the 11th century was an open craft,
averaging about 80 feet in length and 17 in beam, with some 15 oars on
each side. A complement of 60 to 70 men was customary on warlike
operations. But even if we assume Harald’s 200 longships to have
provided no more than 50 fighting men apiece, the total would still have
amounted to 10,000. Some modern historians have estimated that the
Norman army at Hastings did not amount to more than 7,000 men. If that
was so, then the Norwegian invasion of Yorkshire may well have been
considerably more the dangerous. Its strength was probably greater
than the English had expected; and, what is more significant,
realization of its unexpected strength may have been why Harold of
England felt obliged to march north, even though he knew William’s
arrival in the south was imminent.

Here we have to dismiss some modern ideas. We are not the only
generation that has used espionage, nor the only people to have
elaborate communications. As the Norman host assembled at the mouth of
the Dive, it is reasonable to assume that Harold in England had a rough
estimate of the forces involved. Though he could hardly have kept a
check on the more distant Norwegians, London must have received early
reports of their strength when they entered the Humber. The main roads
of England were not intolerably bad: they ran on Roman foundations.
Relays of couriers and fine horses were available; and it is likely that
other methods of signalling had also been organized.

Unless we are to credit him with an even more marvellous march
than he actually achieved, we must accept the theory that Harold
collected his army of the South and set out for Yorkshire on about
September 18th – before he had received any news of an
engagement with the invaders. Two good reasons may have influenced
him. His confidence in the ability of Morcar and Edwin to destroy the
enemy had been shaken by what he had learned of the enemy’s strength.
Further, he probably saw that the time had now come, with one invader
actually here, to end the dangerous division of England’s forces.
Combined into a single host, the army of the South and the army of the
North, operating under his royal command, could overwhelm Harald of
Norway, and then return to London ready to meet William. Separated as
the armies were, the issues both north and south began to look
disturbingly uncertain. But events were to outpace him. As his thanes,
housecarles and fyrdmen trudged along the Ermine Street, through
Waltham, Stamford and Lincoln, affairs in Yorkshire drew to a climax.

Some historians, particularly Freeman, have been critical of
Morcar and Edwin. They have blamed them for not going out to meet
the invaders along the coast, for allowing them to venture so deeply
into the country. This criticism has given rise to doubts about the
loyalty of the two brothers; but it is demonstrably unjust. Surely it
was wise strategy not to disperse their forces in harrying operations;
it was wiser to allow the enemy to penetrate far inland, ‘lengthening
his lines of communication’ as modern soldiers would say. Moreover, it
gave the English a substantial base at York from which to operate. There
is other evidence that the northern earls were clear-headed in their
dispositions. This concerns the ships under their command. No hint
has come down to us of any action between ships, either at sea or in the
Humber estuary; but the old records suddenly inform us that an English
fleet was stationed at Tadcaster on the river Wharfe. A glance at the
map will show the shrewdness of this positioning. It meant that, if the
Norwegian fleet sailed on to York beyond the junction of the Ouse and
the Wharfe, it could be cut off from the sea by the English ships
slipping a few miles downstream. The fact that the Norsemen landed at
Riccall suggests they were alive to this possibility: they did not risk
going beyond the junction of the two rivers. It looks, indeed, as if
Morcar and Edwin were resolved to give battle somewhere in the flat land
around York, which is what happened. Did they know that their King was
hastening north to join them? If so, it might have been wiser to remain
within York’s palisades until he arrived. But the die was cast when
they ventured forth.

It was Wednesday, September 20th. Along the placid waters
of the Ouse, the lines of Norwegian ships lay tied up near Riccall, with
over one-third of the fighting men on guard over them. The scene must be
little different today; but it is still a lonely place. The river,
perhaps 200 feet wide, runs between low banks lined with alder hazel and
scrub. The fields are monotonously level, some pasturage, some cornland.
Hardrada, under his famous banner Landwaster, marched towards York,
followed by 7,000 to 8,000 warriors. They halted at Fulford or Apud
Fulford (Fulford water) as Simeon of Durham aptly called it. Today, it
is a congested suburb of York: then it was open country.

For the most detailed account of the battle we have to turn to the
Heimskringla. In respect of Stamford Bridge, this source is unreliable,
having incorporated traditions relating to Hastings; but about Fulford
it displays more convincing realism, especially in its insistence on the
sodden nature of the field. The low land south of York is still apt
to be flooded after rain. September 1066 was a dry, hot month in
Yorkshire; but even so, the undrained river meads of those days would
remain heavy and damp.

The Heimskringla explains how the Norwegian line stretched from the
bank of the Ouse eastward along a ditch, and adds that ‘there was also
a morass, deep, broad and full of water’. The English, significantly
described as ‘an immense army’, appear to have launched a confident
attack on the defenders of the ditch, approaching at an angle and, after
fierce fighting, rolling them up in disorder. The Norwegians gave way
and ‘Earl Morcar’s banner advanced bravely’. But the Norwegians
were more experienced solders; and they certainly had a more experienced
general. Hardrada kept his main strength near the river; and, at some
well-chosen moment, when the tumult of axe, sword and spear was at its
height, he threw out this left flank in a pincer movement, enfolding the
English and driving them back into the ditch itself. The fighting was
protracted and bloody; but, as the day wore on, the English found
themselves in desperate straits. In the end they broke, and a fearful
slaughter ensued, culminating in a rout. Some ran upstream, some down;
but a great company died along the ditch, and there were so many bodies
when it was finished that the invaders were able to go ‘dry foot over
the fen.’ From all accounts, it is clear that the mobilized power of
Mercia and Northumbria was cut to pieces at Fulford. What remained of
the best levies and housecarles of the two earldoms was scattered and
demoralized. The ‘immense’ army of the North had been broken before
the army of the South could reach it.

King Harold of England arrived at Tadcaster on Sunday, four days
later. By then he must have heard about the catastrophe at Fulford, and
have known that he had arrived too late. According to the Anglo-Saxon
chronicle he ‘collected’ the fleet at Tadcaster; in other words, he
ordered the shipmen to join his land force. Then he pressed on to
York.

In the meantime, York had capitulated to the Norwegians, but the
victors did not enter the city in force, perhaps because Earl Tostig was
anxious that his capital should not be looted. It was arranged that
hostages from various parts of the shire should be brought in; and the
Norwegian army retired to Stamford Bridge to await their arrival. The
choice of Stamford Bridge is interesting. It lies seven miles to the
east of York, athwart the river Derwent. Many tracks converged on it;
but it is also worth noting that it was on the Roman road to the coast.
If unforeseen disaster overtook the fleet 15 miles away at Riccall, the
army was in position to retreat along this route to the coast.

On Monday, September 25th, the Norsemen lay about the
meadows beside the Derwent. It was very hot; and, the Heimskringla tells
us, the men had cast off their heavy mail and gear. They could relax;
they were conquerors. Suddenly a mass of ‘shining shields and bright
armour’ was seen approaching from the direction of York. Harold of
England had swept through the city and pushed straight on to Stamford
Bridge. The enemy was astounded; they had no suspicion that England’s
army of the South was in their neighbourhood. This is one of the
clearest pieces of evidence that an English fifth column did not exist.

Despite some contrary opinions, it seems that the Battle of Stamford
Bridge must have lasted most of the day. Every foothold was contested.
From the beginning to the end, the English were on the offensive. First
they fell upon the Norwegians who occupied the western bank of the
river. Then came the ferocious struggle for the ford, which appears to
have been the real crossing of the water. The celebrated story of the
mighty Viking who held the bridge may be based on fact; but it was
probably no more than a wooden footbridge beside the ford. Hardrada,
taken unawares, and knowing that his army had suffered grievous
depletion at Fulford, formed a ring or defensive ‘square’ on the
eastern side of the river, where the houses of the village now stand,
along an elevated ridge. He also sent an urgent message to his
lieutenant Eystein Orre, who was with the ships at Riccall, ordering him
to bring up reinforcements. But the Norwegian seems never to have been
able to extricate himself from the remorseless English pressure; and
before the day was done, he lost his life, as did his friend Tostig.
Harald of Norway was a mighty soldier. As one looks now across the
fields, the cottages and the gardens to the distant Howardian Hills, one
wonders whether his big bones still lie here, and, if so, where on
should measure the ‘seven feet of English ground’ that Harold of
England granted him.

The Battle of Stamford Bridge was decisive in our history; it ended
once and for all the long dream of Scandinavian adventurers that they
might one day annex this agriculturally rich island. Remnants of the
English army that had been defeated at Fulford no doubt had their
revenge here; and earls Morcar and Edwin may well have participated, for
they remained faithful to the King. After having sent home the fragments
of the Norwegian force in 24 of their 200 ships, Harold celebrated
his triumph at York; but almost immediately he received news that
William had landed at Pevensey. Once more, with his soldiers, he took to
the road, this time southward. His last command was to Morcar and Edwin,
whom he urged to raise a new levy from Mercia and Northumbria, and
hasten to his aid. This they loyally did; but by the time they reached
London, William had become the Conqueror and Harold was dead. All
these events belong to a far distant past; yet we still feel for the
tragedy of Harold Godwinson. Had the Norsemen not prevailed at Fulford,
a much more powerful army would have confronted William at Hastings; and
the North country would have met the invaders shoulder to shoulder with
the South.

'The combined strength of
their provinces appears to have been at least fully a match for that of
Wessex and the lesser earldoms associated with it in the south.'

'Out of earlier divisions the English realm had now emerged; and
in this crisis loyalty to the nation – and to all the good things it
afforded its inhabitants – subdued regional feuds.'

'But even if we assume Harald’s 200 longships to have provided
no more than 50 fighting men apiece, the total would still have amounted
to 10,000. '

'Its strength was probably greater than the English had
expected..'

'There is other evidence that the northern earls were clear-headed
in their dispositions.'

' Had the Norsemen not prevailed at Fulford, a much more powerful
army would have confronted William at Hastings; and the North country
would have met the invaders shoulder to shoulder with the South.'