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To promote stable, constructive labor-management relations through the resolution and prevention of labor disputes in a manner that gives full effect to the collective-bargaining rights of employees, unions, and agencies.

This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority
on exceptions filed by the General Counsel to the attached decision of the
Chief Administrative Law Judge. The Respondent did not file an opposition to
the General Counsel's exceptions.

The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated
section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute (the Statute) by refusing to bargain in good faith over proposals made
by the Union which are substantially similar to proposals found negotiable by
the Authority in Fort Bragg Unit of North Carolina Association of Educators,
NEA and Fort Bragg Dependent Schools, 12 FLRA 519 (1983) (Fort
Bragg). The Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety.

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's rules and
Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, we have reviewed the rulings of
the Judge and find that no prejudicial error was committed. We affirm the
rulings. We adopt the Judge's conclusions only to the extent consistent with
this decision.

For the following reasons, we conclude, contrary to the
Judge, that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute
when it failed to negotiate over proposals which were substantially similar to
those found negotiable in Fort Bragg.

II. Procedural Background

On October 22, 1984, the Respondent declared
nonnegotiable a number of proposals concerning pay and fringe benefits made by
the Union during negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. The Union
filed an unfair labor practice charge on April 8, 1985, alleging that the
Respondent's failure to bargain about its proposals constituted an unfair labor
practice. At the same time, the Union filed a negotiability appeal in Case No.
0-NG-1071. The Union decided to pursue the negotiability appeal and the
Regional Director held the processing of the ULP case in abeyance. On July 31,
1987, the Authority issued its decision on the negotiability appeal in Fort
Stewart (Georgia) Association of Educators and Fort Stewart Schools, 28
FLRA 547 (1987) (Fort Stewart). The Respondent filed an appeal of the
Authority's decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.

On November 19, 1987, the General Counsel issued the
Complaint and Notice of Hearing in the instant case. The complaint alleged that
certain of the proposals which were declared nonnegotiable by the Respondent on
October 22, 1984, were "not substantially different from proposals found
negotiable by the Authority" in Fort Bragg. Complaint at 2-3. The
complaint alleged that the Respondent's conduct constituted a failure to
bargain in good faith in violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
Statute.

On January 19, 1988, the General Counsel submitted a
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion for Summary Judgment asserted that
Union Proposals 1(F) and 1(J) (set forth at pages 2-3 of the Judge's Decision)
were declared nonnegotiable by the Respondent on October 22, 1984. The General
Counsel asserted that the Respondent admitted that Proposals 1(F) and 1(J) were
the same as proposals raised in Fort Bragg. The General Counsel asserted
that because the Respondent had "admitted to all material facts alleged in the
Complaint," and because the Respondent's "only defenses in these matters [were]
those that [had] been rejected by the Authority," its Motion for Summary
Judgment was appropriate. Motion for Summary Judgment at 5.

On January 21, 1988, the Respondent submitted a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint to the Judge. The Motion contended that the Chief, Office
of Labor and Employee Relations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Department of the Army, herein called the Agency, had, on various
occasions, instructed the Respondent "not to negotiate salaries and money
related fringe benefits." Motion at 1. The Respondent submitted directives from
the Agency setting forth these instructions. The Motion concluded that the
Respondent had not violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute, as
alleged, because it had been "directed by [the Agency] not to negotiate [U]nion
proposals concerning wages and money related fringe benefits." Id. at 2.
The Respondent asserted that "where a subordinate activity merely complies with
a directive by the [a]gency the subordinate activity does not violate the
statute." Id.

On January 22, 1988, the Respondent submitted an Amended
Answer to the Complaint. The Respondent reiterated its contention that it had
rejected the Union's proposals on October 22, 1984, at the direction of the
Agency. Although the Respondent conceded that some of the proposals at issue in
this case were "similar to those found negotiable by the Authority in" Fort
Bragg, the Respondent asserted that the Union had "not shown that there
[were] no meaningful differences between its proposals" and those found to be
negotiable in Fort Bragg. Amended Answer at 1. The Respondent also
contended that some of the proposals in this case were not dealt with in
Fort Bragg, and that other proposals were found to be nonnegotiable by
the Authority in Fort Bragg. The Respondent renewed its request that the
complaint and hearing be continued pending the resolution of the appeal of
Fort Stewart in the Eleventh Circuit, asserting that in Fort
Bragg, "the Authority did not consider the Agency's arguments . . .
concerning the legislative history of the Statute." Id. at 2. The
Respondent also contended that the Union's proposals did not concern conditions
of employment as defined in section 7103(a)(14) of the Statute, that they
interfered with the Respondent's right to determine its budget under section
7106(a)(1), and that they violated "Federal statutes, Agency regulations having
the force and effect of law, and an Agency regulation for which a compelling
need exists . . . ." Id.

On January 25, 1988, the General Counsel filed an
Opposition to the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, contending that the
Respondent's Motion was untimely filed. The General Counsel cited the
Authority's rules, at section 2423.22, which state that "[o]nly in
extraordinary circumstances will . . . a motion be granted where filed less
than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing." The General Counsel
contended that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, filed only 8 days before the
date of the hearing, was untimely.

The General Counsel also stated that the charge in this
case names "Department of Defense, Department of the Army and Fort Stewart
Schools and the Complaint herein names Department of the Army, Fort Stewart
Schools as Respondent." Opposition at 2. The General Counsel contended that
"this is sufficient to bring Department of the Army in as a Respondent
independent of Fort Stewart Schools." Id. Therefore, the General Counsel
concluded, if the Respondent's "contention that Department of the Army directed
Fort Stewart Schools to declare the proposals in question non-negotiable [is
true it] would only serve to absolve Fort Stewart Schools" of the ULP but not
the Agency. Id. The General Counsel further argued that "even assuming,
arguendo, that Fort Stewart Schools is the only Respondent herein, . . .
[w]here only the activity has been named in the complaint, it will be found
guilty of an unfair labor practice, even if it was acting under orders from
higher levels of management because to do otherwise would not effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Statute." Id.

On January 26, 1988, the Respondent submitted a Response
to the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Response reiterated
the contentions asserted in the Respondent's January 22, 1988 Amended Answer to
the Complaint.

On January 29, 1988, the Respondent submitted a Response
to the General Counsel's Opposition to the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Complaint. The Respondent contended that its Motion to Dismiss was not
untimely, noting that the 10-day rule in section 2423.22 of the Authority's
regulations refers only to motions to change the date of the hearing. The
Respondent also asserted that it raised the contention that it was acting under
orders from higher authority in its Amended Answer. With respect to the
contention itself, the Respondent asserted that to "identify Department of the
Army and Fort Stewart Schools as the same is incorrect." Response at 1.
Finally, the Respondent requested a hearing on its Motion to Dismiss so that it
may "call the appropriate witnesses to verify the facts contained in all its
supporting correspondence." Id.

On February 8, 1988, the Judge issued an Order
Indefinitely Postponing Hearing and Requesting Further Briefs. The Judge
concluded that "[e]xamination of the documents submitted indicates that this
case is now ripe for judgment without a hearing." Order at 1. The Judge noted
that the complaint originally "identified some 38 proposals which were placed
on the table in 1984 and simply alleged that some unidentified and unknown
number of them was substantially identical to some of the 17 proposals
determined to be negotiable in Fort Bragg." Id. The Judge
concluded that "[t]he only proposals ultimately advanced . . . sought cost of
living salary adjustments and lump-sum payments for unused sick leave [and
were] in substance indistinguishable from their counterparts in Fort
Bragg." Id. at 2. The Judge concluded that "[i]t follows that the
refusal to bargain concerning them was an unfair labor practice." Id.
The Judge also concluded, however, that "[i]t does not necessarily follow that
they are actionable now, in this forum." Id. Therefore, the Judge
requested further briefs on "whether the Statute or Rules 2423.5 and 2424.5
contemplate the resolution of this kind of controversy in both the
negotiability and the unfair labor practice forums." Id.

The General Counsel and the Union filed briefs in
response to the Judge's request.

III. Administrative Law Judge's Decision

The Judge noted that "the substantive issue here is
simply whether the proposals at issue are substantially indistinguishable from
those determined to be negotiable in Fort Bragg." Decision at 5. The
Judge found that the proposals at issue (Proposals 1(F) and 1(J)) "were
substantially identical" to similar proposals found to be negotiable in the
Authority's earlier decision in Fort Bragg. Id. at 3.

The Judge also found, however, that there was "no reason
to [conclude] that the Authority would agree that reactivation of this charge
warranted issuance of [a] Complaint rather than dismissal in these
circumstances." Id. at 23. Therefore, the Judge recommended "that the
Authority dismiss this Complaint and modify its Rules to preclude the use of
the ULP procedures after a negotiability appeal has run its course" when the
negotiability determination is "based on a precedent which predates the
decision to seek a negotiability determination." Id.

The Judge based his recommendation that the Authority
dismiss the complaint on his conclusion that "the Authority's approach to the
interface between negotiability determinations and unlawful refusals to bargain
has been flawed in fundamental ways from the very beginning." Id. at 19.
The Judge concluded that "[j]udicial economy . . . is offended . . . by holding
a viable ULP case while a negotiability determination is made which adds
nothing to the fund of negotiability law, and contributes nothing to the
resolution of the ULP case, and then reactivating the latter for an inquiry
which plows no new substantive ground." Id. at 21-22. The Judge further
concluded that "a decision to seek a negotiability determination . . . ought to
preclude the coexistence of a viable ULP charge." Id. at 22. Finally,
the Judge concluded that it was "wholly inappropriate to grant a 'make whole'
remedy" for the period of time prior to the Authority's negotiability
determination because "icing the ULP proceeding deprived Respondent of an early
opportunity to join issue in the dormant case and shorten its exposure to such
liability." Id.

IV. General Counsel's Exceptions

The General Counsel emphasizes that the issue in this
case is "strictly limited to the claim that Respondent declared two proposals
nonnegotiable when the Authority had already ruled virtually identical
proposals negotiable in Fort Bragg." Brief in Support of its Exceptions
at 4. The General Counsel contends that this case was not processed when the
original charge was filed "not because the outcome of the negotiability appeal
might have some legal impact on the ULP, but rather [because] . . . holding the
ULP in abeyance [gave] the parties the chance to settle their differences at
the bargaining table, possibly rendering the ULP moot." Id. The General
Counsel asserts that the ULP complaint was issued because the "parties had
reached no agreement nor did they otherwise make the ULP moot by the time the
negotiability appeal was decided." Id.

The General Counsel notes that the Judge found that the
two proposals "were in fact substantially identical to ones ruled negotiable in
Fort Bragg and indicated an unfair labor practice had occurred."
Id. at 4-5. The General Counsel concludes that the sole issue in this
case is whether the two proposals at issue are "so similar" to the proposals
found negotiable in Fort Bragg "that Respondent's declaration of
nonnegotiability constituted bad faith bargaining." Id. at 6.

The General Counsel asserts that "it is not good enough
to merely 'throw doubt' on whether the ULP process may be used here."
Id. According to the General Counsel, the Judge "must find that the
Rules and Regulations positively bar this otherwise valid ULP."
Id. (emphasis in original). The General Counsel also contends that
because sections 2423.5 and 2424.5 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
provide "that the procedure not selected to go first will be 'suspended[,]' . .
. the Regulations sanction the General Counsel's policy of holding ULP's in
abeyance pending the outcome of negotiability appeals[,]" and there is "no
basis for a finding that the Rules and Regulations bar the revival of a case
held in abeyance . . . ." Id.

The General Counsel concludes that, even if the Authority
decides to adopt the Judge's proposed changes in its Rules and Regulations,
"there is nothing that can be done about them in the context of this" case.
Id. at 8. The General Counsel cites the court's holding in AFGE v.
FLRA, 777 F.2d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1985) to support its assertion that
"unless and until [an agency] amends or repeals a valid legislative rule or
regulation, an agency is bound by such rule or regulation." Id. at
9.

Finally, the General Counsel contends that an appropriate
remedy in this matter would "include a cease and desist order, a notice posting
and an affirmative order directing Respondent to negotiate the Union's
proposals and giving any agreement reached retroactive effect."
Id.

V. Preliminary Issue

The General Counsel contends that the Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss was untimely filed because section 2423.22 of the Authority's Rules
and Regulations states that a Motion to Dismiss filed less than 10 days prior
to a hearing will be granted only in extraordinary circumstances. We
disagree.

Section 2423.22(a) of the Rules and Regulations states
that "[o]nly in extraordinary circumstances will such a motion be granted where
filed less than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing." The word "such"
refers to motions to change the date of a hearing. Therefore, as the
requirement in section 2423.22(a) of the Rules and Regulations that motions be
filed 10 days prior to a hearing is limited to motions to change the date of a
hearing, and as there is no other time limit established for the filing of
motions to dismiss a complaint, we conclude that the Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint was timely filed.

[A]n Administrative Law Judge is not endowed with power
to disregard precedents and principles once established by the Authority. While
the Authority may, within its sound discretion and subject to review by the
circuit courts, reexamine its policies and interpretations which it senses are
no longer apposite or possibly erroneous, an Administrative Law Judge, no
matter what his personal inclination might be, has no such power. Where the
Authority determines that it will reexamine and change a precedent, the
Administrative Law Judge is obligated to give the resulting principles
conscientious effect as the applicable law until abandoned or modified. Any
application otherwise would constitute a revision of statutory interpretation
which is contrary to responsible administration of the
Statute.

In this case, the Judge disregarded these principles.
Despite clear precedent, which the Judge recognized, that it is an unfair labor
practice for an agency to refuse to negotiate about proposals which are
substantially identical to proposals previously found to be negotiable by the
Authority, the Judge recommended the dismissal of the complaint in this case.
For the following reasons, we reject his recommendation.

Sections 2423.5 and 2424.5 of the Authority's Rules and
Regulations provide, in pertinent part, that where a labor organization files
an unfair labor practice charge which involves a negotiability issue and also
files a petition for review of the same negotiability issue, it is required to
choose which procedure to pursue first. Cases which involve only an agency's
allegation that the duty to bargain in good faith does not extend to the matter
proposed to be bargained, and which do not involve alleged unilateral changes
in conditions of employment, must be processed exclusively under the
negotiability procedures in part 2424 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.
In our view, these regulations are consistent with the language of sections
7117 and 7118 of the Statute, which specify separate procedures for resolving
negotiability and unfair labor practice cases, respectively. They are also
consistent with the legislative history of the Statute, which indicates that
Congress considered but rejected a provision which would have required all
negotiability disputes to be resolved in unfair labor practice
proceedings.

Unfair labor practice remedies are available in
appropriate refusal to bargain situations, such as (1) where the refusal to
negotiate is accompanied by unilateral changes in conditions of employment; and
(2) where an Agency refuses to bargain over a proposal substantially identical
to one which the Authority has previously determined to be negotiable under the
Statute.

(Footnote and citations omitted.)

In this case, the Respondent declared nonnegotiable a
number of proposals involving the pay and fringe benefits of teachers. Some of
the proposals were different from those found negotiable in Fort Bragg,
and some of the proposals involved issues not dealt with in Fort Bragg.
Therefore, the Union first sought a negotiability determination with respect to
its proposals. After the resolution of the negotiability appeal in Fort
Stewart, the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that only two of
the proposals declared nonnegotiable by the Respondent were substantially
similar to proposals found to be negotiable in Fort Bragg.

Not all of the Union's proposals were alleged to be
substantially similar to proposals previously found to be negotiable by the
Authority. Therefore, the issues resulting from the Respondent's allegations of
nonnegotiability were not only ULP issues. After the "pure" negotiability
issues were decided in Fort Stewart, the Union pursued its remaining
contentions with respect to the "pure" unfair labor practice question as to
whether the two remaining proposals were substantially similar to those
previously found negotiable in Fort Bragg. That is the issue in this
case. Under these circumstances, we find that the Union acted consistent with
sections 2423.5 and 2424.5 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. In
addition, we conclude that there is no reason for changing the Authority's
Rules and Regulations concerning the processing of dual negotiability appeals
and unfair labor practice charges involving related matters.

In Veterans Administration (Washington, D.C.) and
Veterans Administration Hospital (Brockton, Massachusetts), 35 FLRA 188
(1990) (Brockton VA Hospital), we dealt with the Judge's concern that
the Regulations appear to allow a party an opportunity to litigate the same
issue twice. We concluded that:

[N]othing in the Authority's Regulations concerning a
party's election to proceed under an unfair labor practice proceeding or a
negotiability proceeding supports a conclusion that a party may litigate the
same issues in both proceedings. Rather, the procedures enable the
filing party to pursue in a second proceeding any issues which are unresolved
after the first proceeding. In this regard, certain issues may be resolved only
in an unfair labor practice or a negotiability proceeding. For example,
allegations that a proposal is nonnegotiable because it conflicts with an
agency regulation for which there is a compelling need must be resolved in a
negotiability proceeding. Similarly, allegations that a party has no duty to
bargain over a proposal (apart from allegations that a proposal itself is
nonnegotiable) may not be resolved in a negotiability proceeding. Where cases
involve only an agency's allegation that a proposal is nonnegotiable and do not
involve actual or contemplated changes in conditions of employment, these cases
must be resolved in a negotiability proceeding.

In cases which involve issues which may be resolved in
only one forum as well as other issues which may be resolved in both, the
selection procedure enables a union to determine which issues will be resolved
first. Unresolved issues may then be litigated in the second proceeding. Only
in cases where all issues may be resolved in an unfair labor practice
proceeding (such as a case involving a change in conditions of employment where
an agency alleges both that it has no duty to bargain over a proposal and that
a proposal is nonnegotiable for reasons other than compelling need) would a
union possibly be encouraged to pursue unfair labor practice procedures instead
of negotiability procedures. Even in that situation, however, a union may
choose to utilize a negotiability proceeding for various reasons, including the
assurance that it can obtain a decision from the Authority as compared to the
possibility that the General Counsel may decide not to issue an unfair labor
practice complaint.

Id. at 195-196 (citations omitted).

Our decision here is consistent with the requirements of
Brockton VA Hospital. The issue in this case is whether Proposals 1(F)
and 1(J), declared nonnegotiable by the Respondent, were substantially similar
to proposals previously held to be negotiable by the Authority. That issue was
not resolved in the negotiability determination in Fort Stewart.
Therefore, our decision herein is limited to the question of whether the
Respondent engaged in bad faith bargaining, a different issue from those
resolved in Fort Stewart.

Specifically, the Judge found, and we agree, that the two
proposals "were substantially identical" to proposals found negotiable in
Fort Bragg. Judge's Decision at 3. The Authority has held that an agency
violates section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute if it refuses to bargain
over a proposal that is substantially identical to a proposal the Authority has
previously determined to be negotiable. Internal Revenue Service, 32
FLRA 57, 58 (1988); Department of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Academy,
6 FLRA 548 (1981), affirmed sub nom.Department of the Air Force,
United States Air Force Academy v. FLRA, 717 F.2d 1314 (10th Cir.
1983).

In its various pleadings, the Respondent has raised a
number of defenses to its refusal to bargain about the two proposals in this
case. These included the Respondent's contentions that the proposals (1) do not
concern conditions of employment as defined in section 7103(a)(14) of the
Statute, (2) interfere with the Respondent's right to determine its budget
under section 7106(a)(1), and (3) violate Federal statutes, Agency regulations
having the force and effect of law, and an Agency regulation for which a
compelling need exists. These defenses were raised by the Respondent in the
negotiability proceedings in Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart,
however, and, consistent with Brockton VA Hospital, these issues may not
be relitigated in this unfair labor practice case.

Moreover, we reject the Respondent's assertion that it
did not violate the Statute because its assertion of nonnegotiability was
based, in part, on an argument (the legislative history of the Statute as it
relates to the definition of conditions of employment) that was not considered
by the Authority in Fort Bragg. We conclude, instead, that a respondent
acts at its peril when it refuses to negotiate about a proposal which is
substantially identical to a proposal previously found negotiable, without
regard to whether a respondent raises "new" or "old" arguments. To hold
otherwise, in our view, would undermine the collective bargaining process by
encouraging agencies to continue the litigation of negotiability issues.

Of course, if the Respondent had prevailed on any basis
in the negotiability proceeding, its conduct would not be found violative of
the Statute. The Respondent did not, however, prevail in the negotiability
proceeding. Accordingly, the fact that its assertion of nonnegotiability was
based, in part, on an argument not considered by the Authority in Fort
Bragg does not provide a defense for the Respondent's unlawful conduct in
this case. CompareAdjutant General, State of Ohio, Ohio Air National
Guard, Worthington, Ohio, 21 FLRA 1062, 1067 ("[W]hile an agency acts at
its peril when it refuses to negotiate on proposals similar to proposals
previously found negotiable by the Authority, an unfair labor practice will not
be found where subsequently established law supports the agency's
position.").

Further, the Respondent's request that we await the
outcome of its appeal of the Authority's decision in Fort Stewart before
we decide the unfair labor practice in this case is moot. In Fort Stewart
Schools v. FLRA, 110 S. Ct. 2043 (1990), affirming 860 F.2d 396
(11th Cir. 1988), the Supreme Court affirmed the Authority's decision in
Fort Stewart that various proposals, including the two involved here,
are negotiable.

The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint also
contended that its refusal to bargain did not violate the Statute because it
was directed by the Agency not to negotiate concerning any pay and fringe
proposals. In support of its contention, the Respondent submitted various
Agency directives requiring it to refuse to negotiate concerning any pay and
fringe proposals pending the outcome of appellate litigation challenging the
Authority's determinations that such matters are negotiable. The General
Counsel asserted that the complaint was broad enough to encompass both the
Agency and the Respondent.

We conclude that the Respondent is the only entity named
in the complaint. The term "Department of the Army," used in the complaint and
title in this case, merely locates the organizational placement of the
Respondent. However, in U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Administration and Management, San Francisco, California, 33
FLRA 429, 432 (1988), the Authority held that where, as here, "agency
management at a higher level is not a named respondent, agency management at a
subordinate level will be held to have violated the Statute, even where
subordinate level management was merely following orders." We conclude,
therefore, that although Agency management was not named as an independent
respondent in the complaint in this case, the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by refusing to negotiate over the Union's
proposals, even if its refusal was directed by Agency management. Under these
circumstances, we need not reach the question of whether the Agency directed
the Respondent to take a particular position regarding the Union's
proposals.

Under these circumstances, where we have rejected the
Respondent's defenses against the contention it committed an unfair labor
practice, we grant the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment and
conclude that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute
when it failed to negotiate with the Union about Proposals 1(F) and 1(J), which
are substantially identical to proposals found negotiable in Fort
Bragg.

VII. Remedy

The General Counsel contends that an appropriate remedy
in this matter would "include a cease and desist order, a notice posting and an
affirmative order directing Respondent to negotiate the Union's proposals and
giving any agreement reached retroactive effect." Brief in Support of its
Exceptions at 9. We agree with the General Counsel that, consistent with the
Authority's remedial authority, a retroactive bargaining order is appropriate
in this case.

A retroactive bargaining order is appropriate to remedy a
refusal to bargain over a proposal that has previously been found negotiable by
the Authority. See generallyNational Treasury Employees Union v.
FLRA, No. 87-1165 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 1990) (enbanc).
Moreover, providing a retroactive bargaining order here is consistent with
remedies provided by the Authority in previous cases. SeeVeterans
Administration, Veterans AdministrationRegional Office (Buffalo, New
York), 10 FLRA 167 (1982). Accordingly, we will order the Respondent to
negotiate over the proposals at issue here, which involve a salary schedule
tied to the Consumer Price Index and lump sum payments for unused sick leave
upon termination, and to apply the results of that bargaining retroactively to
the date when the Respondent rejected the Union's proposals.

VIII. Order

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and
Regulations and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute, the Department of the Army, Fort Stewart Schools, Fort Stewart,
Georgia, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Failing and refusing to bargain in good faith about
Proposals 1(F) and 1(J) submitted by the Fort Stewart Association of Educators,
National Education Association, the exclusive representative of its employees,
on the basis that such proposals are nonnegotiable, or any other proposals that
are substantially identical to proposals already found to be negotiable by the
Authority.

(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights assured
by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

2. Take the following affirmative action in order to
effectuate the purposes and policies of the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute:

(a) Upon request of the Fort Stewart Association of
Educators, National Education Association, the exclusive representative of its
employees, bargain in good faith about Union Proposals 1(F) and 1(J), involving
cost of living adjustments and lump sum payments for unused sick leave, which
it rejected as nonnegotiable on October 22, 1984, and apply retroactively to
that date the results of such bargaining.

(b) Post at its facilities at Fort Stewart Schools, Fort
Stewart, Georgia, copies of the attached Notice on forms furnished by the
Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of the forms, they shall be
signed by the Superintendent, Fort Stewart Schools, and shall be posted and
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that these Notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules
and Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region IV, Federal Labor
Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order, as
to what steps have been taken to comply.

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
AUTHORITY

AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF
THE

FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
STATUTE

WE NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain in good faith about
Proposals 1(F) and 1(J) submitted by the Fort Stewart Association of Educators,
National Education Association, the exclusive representative of our employees,
on the basis that such proposals are nonnegotiable, or any other proposals that
are substantially identical to proposals already found to be negotiable by the
Authority.

WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights assured
them by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

WE WILL, upon request of the Fort Stewart Association of
Educators, National Education Association, the exclusive representative of our
employees, bargain in good faith about Union Proposals 1(F) and 1(J), involving
cost of living adjustments and lump sum payments for unused sick leave, which
we rejected as nonnegotiable on October 22, 1984, and apply retroactively to
that date the results of such bargaining.

___________________________(Activity)

Dated:__________
By:_____________________________

(Signature) (Title)

This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.