Women in the new Libya: challenges ahead

Will the rights of the women, who participated in the struggles leading to fall of Gaddafi, be put under pressure in the new Libya? Kathryn Spellman-Poots assesses women’s status under Gadaffi and points to the perils ahead.

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The seven month long struggle that
led to the fall of Gadaffi and his regime saw Libyan women smuggling arms and strategic
information, tending to the injured, and participating in the creation of
symbols to represent the New Libya. In the aftermath, however, and not unlike
their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia, women have been excluded from the
highest levels of decision making and are grossly underrepresented in the
National Transition Council. Furthermore, in contrast to Egypt and Tunisia,
Gadaffi’s forty-two year long dictatorship has left Libya with a particularly
impoverished institutional infrastructure in terms of both political and civil
society. His years of dogmatism and scare mongering have silenced Libyans in
public life, making the private sphere of family and tribe –with varying but
often patriarchal gendered hierarchies - the main arena where day to day concerns
and disputes are dealt with.

It is a momentous event, therefore,
that the first-ever
international women's rights conference, organised by the Voice of Libyan Women movement, took place in Tripoli from 11-15 November 2011. Activists
from around the country assembled
to discuss gender equality issues, focusing particularly on women’s
involvement in politics, law, the economy, and
health concerns. In the presence of the leaders of the NTC, including
Mustafa Abdel Jalil and Abdurrahim el-Keeb, with an introductory speech by Ian
Martin, the UN Special Envoy for Libya, the participants drafted 22 recommendations to secure women’s legal rights
and full participation in the new polity. Although Libyans have a sense of national identity, the question remains as to
whether these demands can be met in a society increasingly divided along
kinship and regional lines, demarcated by varied but often conservative gender
codes and expectations. Moreover, with the legacy of Gadaffi’s “state
feminism”, as well as the relatively recent rise of Islamic social
conservatism, can women’s rights have any impact on the power structures of the
New Libya, avoiding being pushed aside or used for political leverage?

Gadaffi’s
State Feminism

Similar to Saddam Hussein and other authoritarian ‘socialist’ leaders,
transforming women’s roles in public life was featured in Gaddafi’s political
vision. In his system of Jamahiriya (state of the masses), which
was propounded in his Green Book in the mid-1970s, he declared
socialism, gender equality, Arabism and anti-imperialism as the pillars of the
new Libyan state. Changes
in policies concerning women’s legal status, education and public presence were important
instruments used to delineate the programme of the Jamahiriya and the
advancement of revolutionary ideals. Determined to push women into the public
domain, Gadaffi adopted radical measures. For instance, starting in 1979, women
were required to undertake military training and obtain a military certificate
before getting married. Additionally, without military training, families were
not allowed to travel abroad or exchange the local currency. (Interview with
Professor Amal Jerary, in Tripoli 2005.)

Over the years, a number of progressive
laws were also drafted, asserting that women have equal access to
education, social benefits and the legal system; rights to participate in the
General People’s Committees and national security; rights in marriage, divorce
and custody; rights to equal pay and full control over their income and assets.
The commitment to gender equality, symbolised by Gadaffi’s female police force
and body guards, was often used to showcase the progressive nature of his
regime to international audiences. This image was reinforced through Libya’s signatory status to a
number of international human rights treaties, including the African Charter on
Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ratified with reservations in 1989. In
keeping with the “first lady” syndrome, in
women’s rights advocacy in the rest of the Arab world, the women’s rights agenda was
entirely appropriated by Gaddaffi and
his inner circle – particularly his daughter, Aisha, who was the main
spokesperson for Libya’s gender regime.

This top down approach did enable some women,
particularly those living in cities, to make important advances in Libyan
society; near-to-equal representation in education on all levels, and entry into
prominent professions as doctors, lawyers and university professors. The state policies and
international treaties also provided some women the leverage to question and
challenge patriarchal notions prevalent in their households. But despite
partial progress, Libyan women have remained economically, politically and
socially under-represented in public life.
Women accounted for only 22% of the labour force and top positions have often been occupied by women
tied to the regime by patronage links.

Moreover, many of the laws to ensure gender equality –
particularly in the realm of family and personal laws – were often ignored, unevenly applied or
sidestepped by Islamic tradition and local custom. Gaddafi’s regime did not fully
subscribe to CEDAW, as two Articles (2 and 16 c/d) were
viewed as incompatible to Libya’s personal status code. Although civil and
Shari’a courts were combined after the 1969 revolution, Shari’a judges
continued to preside over court proceedings that dealt with family matters.
This does not mean, however, that clerics enjoyed autonomy from Gadaffi’s regime.
Throughout his years in power, Gadaffi often regulated religious
practices to suit his evolving ideological vision. Under criticism from
clerics, he created his own calendar based on Muhammad’s death, questioned the
legitimacy of the hadith (sayings of the Prophet)as the basis
for Islamic law, nationalised all mosques and closely monitored public
religious activities. Family laws pertaining to matters such as marriage,
adultery and divorce were therefore informed by a combination of sources,
including Gadaffi’s own agenda on women’s rights, the Maliki school of
jurisprudence, as well as local customs and traditions. Polygamy, for example,
which has become a hot topic ever since Jalil mentioned its realignment to
Islamic law in his victory
speech - was legal but restricted in Gadaffi’s Libya. Although discouraged, and not widely
practiced, a man could marry additional wives if he obtained the first wife’s
permission in writing, and proved to the courts that he was financially and
physically capable of supporting another wife.

The public and the
private: the growing divide

This is not to say, however,
that family grievances and private matters necessarily reached the courts of
law. Maintaining
the family’s honour - particularly the reputation and
respectability of women – was (and remains) crucial in Libyan society. In order
to avoid the perils of gossip, private matters were often settled within
familial networks. Staying clear of entanglements with the State’s legal system
was an added incentive to settle matters in private.

The distance between the public and
private domains became even more pronounced during the 1990s when Libya was
subjected to international sanctions. As was the case
in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, when faced with the deterioration of public
services, Gadaffi strategically
empowered certain tribal and family leaders to maintain political control.
Inadvertently, local networks and the burgeoning parallel economy were pushed
further underground. Although women played an active role in informal networks,
particularly by catering to social welfare concerns, social conventions that
undermined gender equality gradually grew more rigid during this period. A new culture of religiosity, stemming mainly from Egypt, also
became widespread in Libyan society. Changes in gender roles and
expectations began to be shaped by these religious currents, which, in turn,
became increasingly visible in public life. Gadaffi’s regime, mindful of the
popularity of this new religious sensibility, tolerated overt public display of
Islamic piety as long as it was not seen as a sign of political or militant
Islam. Over the years, even the most liberal minded Libyans began to feel the
pressure to dress and behave in line with the socially conservative outlook
that had become dominant in public life.

After years of political and
economic isolation, Gadaffi’s regime had little choice but to thaw diplomatic
relations with the West. The sanctions were softened in 2003-4 after the regime
publicly renounced weapons of mass destruction, allocated compensation to
Lockerbie families, and pledged to join forces with Britain and the US in the
war against terror. As the travel bans were lifted, Libya (haphazardly) started
to open up to investors, international agencies, academics and tourists. The
‘official’ women’s rights agenda which had been placed on the back burner
during the 1990s, was once again used as a symbol
of Libya’s democratic aspirations, and a tool to reintegrate itself back into
the international community. But despite promises of genuine political and
social reform at home, the political inertia in Libya persisted since there were
strong vested interests around the status quo.
Consequently, when the spirit of the “Arab Spring” spread to Libya in
February 2011, starting with street protests in
Benghazi on 15 February, it was women’s informal networks that became
politicised and contributed to the eventual fall of Gadaffi’s regime.

Women’s rights in post-Gadaffi Libya

What does the future hold for
the women of Libya? Still recovering from the aftershock of the violent
struggles, Libya faces a number of immediate
challenges during this period of transition, including restoring security,
building trust across regions and clans and providing basic services to the
Libyan people. Nevertheless, women
activists have not wasted any time in their newly found freedom, to assemble
and develop agendas to protect their rights in the new Libya. The first ever international women’s rights conference in Libya is just one example of the many platforms
they used, several of which are linked to international human
rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Humans Rights Watch,
that have emerged over the past few months. Debates
surrounding the future of women’s rights in Libya also extend to and are
informed by Libyans living in the diaspora,
who have been playing an active role in the recent struggles.
Libyan women activists have also stressed the
importance of learning from women’s experiences in neighbouring countries. As secular liberals, Islamists
and tribal leaders declare their positions and party affiliations in the lead
up to the elections, questions surrounding gender equality, particularly in
relation to Islamic law, will inevitably come to the fore. The ways in which
the New Libyan state chooses to appropriate or obliterate the remnants of
Gadaffi’s gender regime also remain to be seen. The National Transition
Council chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil’s comment on removing restrictions on
polygamy demonstrates how gender issues are already being used to advance (or
appease) ideologies and to stake out the political boundaries of the new
Libya. Although his comments raised eyebrows
in Libya, and were scrutinised at the International Women’s conference, it is
generally assumed that Islamic law will inform the legal and political
framework of the new Libya to a greater extent than was previously the case.
Similar to Egypt,
there has been an absence of any detailed discussion on what this could mean in
real terms. The chasm between the goals of state building and the rule of law
and the practices that are prevalent in the private domain is likely to become
exacerbated the longer armed militias hold
sway. As in many other instances of the collapse of law and order, as in
Iraq and Afghanistan, women are the principal victims of increasing levels of
violence and insecurity. Until the private sphere in Libya is scrutinised - and
seen as a societal and political domain - by both the new Libyan state and the
burgeoning civil society, women’s rights will continue to be brushed aside or
used as political stakes in the power struggles among the various contenders
for power.

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