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Personal Recollections and Experiences
CONCERNING THE
Battle of Stone River.
A Paper Read by Request before the Illinois Commandery of the
Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the U. S.,
at Chicago, 111., Feb. 14, 1889.
-BY-
MILO S. HASCALL,
OF GOSHEN, INDIANA,
Formerly a Lieutenant in the U. S. Army, and Brigadier-General
of Volunteers during the War of the Rebellion.
Personal Recollections and Experiences
CONCERNING THE
Battle of Stone River.
A Paper Read by Request before the Illinois Commandery of the
Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the U. S. ,
at Chicago, 111., Feb. 14, 1889.
-BY-
MILO S. HASCALL,
OF GOSHEN, INDIANA,
Formerly a Lieutenant in the U. S. Army, and Brigadier-General
of Volunteers during the War of the Rebellion.
Times Publishing Company,
GOSHEN, - INDIANA.
1889.
7 7
Personal Recollections and Experiences Concerning the
Battle of Stone River.
As will be perceived by the above caption to this paper, it
is proposed to relate what happened to me, and what I observed
during the battle alluded to, and might not inappropriately be
styled u What I know about the battle of Stone River."
In doinff so I shall not untertake to "five a general account
i5 cj O
of the battle, but shall confine myself to that portion which
came under my own observation, and to necessary inferences as
to what happened elsewhere. In setting out it will be well to
give a brief account of the history of the Army of the Cum.
berland, and its commanders, so far as I know, up to the time
of the memorable battle which is the subject of this paper.
My having been a cadet at West Point from June, 1848, to
June, 1852, when I graduated in the same class with Sheridan,
Stanly, S locum, Crook, Bonaparte and others, whose names
have since become so distinguished, and my service in the
regular army subsequently till the fall of 1853, threw me in
contact with, and was the means of my knowing personally,
or by reputation, most, if not all the prominent characters on
both sides, that were brought to the knowledge of the public
by the War of the Rebellion.
This knowledge of the men in the army of those times
served me well all through the war, as it was seldom I came in
contact with an officer on the other side, but what I knew all his
peculiar characteristics, and idiosyncrasies. For illustration
of this idea, as we were approaching Atlanta, my division had
the advance of the Army of the Ohio the morning we came in
sight of the cit}^. My -advance guard captured a rebel picket
post, and one of the men captured, had a morning paper from
M207747
Atlanta, in which was Johnston s farewell order to his troops^
and Hood s order assuming command. I had been three years
at West Point with Hood, he having graduated in 1853, in
Schofield s class. I knew Hood to be a great, large hearted,
large sized man, noted a great deal more for his fine social
and fighting qualities, than for any particular scholastic acquire
ments, and inferred, (correctly as the result showed) that John
ston had been removed because Davis, and his admirers, had
had enough of the Fabian policy, and wanted a man that
would take the offensive. I immediately sent word to Gen.
Sherman, who, with his staff, was not far off, and when he
came to the front, informed him of the news I had, and the
construction I put upon it, and in consequence, an immediate
concentration to resist an attack was made in the vicinity,
where we were. It was none too soon, as Hood, upon taking
command immediately moved out to Decatur with nearly his
entire army, fell upon McPherson s corps, with the besom of de
struction, killing the gallant McPherson early in the engage
ment, and with his vastly superior force, beating back the
Army of the Tennessee so fast, that there is no telling what
might have happened, had we not made the concentration we
did, and been prepared to give them a tremendous enfilad
ing fire as soon as they came opposite the flanks of the
Army of the Ohio. It was my fortune to be stationed
at Ft. Adams, Newport, Rhode Island, as soon as my fur
lough expired after graduating at the Military Academy,
and there found Lieut. W. S. Rosecrans, (afterward the com
manding general at Stone River), and from being stationed
some ten months at the same post, became somewhat familiarly
acquainted with him and his peculiarities. I had never met
Gen. Don Carlos Buel, and knew but little of him, although
he was a regular army man, until the fall of 61, upon my re
turn from service in West Virginia, during the first summer
of the war. I was then Colonel of the 17th Indiana, and was
assigned to the command of a brigade in Nelson s Division of
Buel s Army, which was then in and around Louisville, Ky.,
and whose purpose was a forward move against Nashville.
While Buel s Army, the Army of the Cumberland, was
-concentrating in and about Louisville, preparing for the for
ward movement, Gov. Morton, of Indiana, was frequently in
Louisville, consulting with Gen. Buel, and offering suggestions
as to army movements etc., and these, after a time, came to
be regarded by Gen. Buel as meddlesome, and uncalled for, so
much so, that he finally intimated to Gov, Morton that it would
be as well for him to attend to his duties as Governor of In
diana, while he would attend to his as Commanding General
of the forces in the field. It is important to mention this cir
cumstance here, as it will be seen further on, that this matter
had an important bearing upon Gen. Bud s subsequent career.
It will not be necessary, nor appropriate in this paper, to enter
into a detailed account of the operations of the Army of the
Cumberland in its march upon, and capture of Nashville in
its subsequent march to Shiloh, and the part it took in that
most unfortunate, not to say (in many respects) disgraceful
battle to our army in its subsequent advance upon Corinth,
and its operations there in its subsequent march into northern
Alabama and the vicinity of Chattanooga, and the forced
march back to Louisville, made necessary by Bragg s advance
upon that city through the Sequatchie Valley, from Chat
tanooga. All this is known to the public, and the public has
arrived at its own conclusions as to the merits or demerits
of these various operations. It is not too much to say-,
however, that those of us who accompanied Gen. Buel in this
remarkable march and counter-march, and particularly these
who had important commands during the same, had ample
opportunity to arrive at intelligent conclusions as to the mer
its and demerits of the man. It may be inferred from what
has already been said that. Gen. Buel was not particularly
popular with political soldiers, newspaper correspondents, and
others who were carrying on the war from safe distances in
the rear. He was eminently and emphatically a soldier, with
no ambition or expectations outside the line of his duty, and
with honor and integrity so entirely above suspicion, that the
camp follower and money getter did not presume to even en
ter into his presence. Notwithstanding all this, by the time
of the return of the Army of the Cumberland to Louisville.
though that army had then performed services that justly en
titled it to the lasting gratitude of the country, and notwith
standing its eminent commander enjoyed, so far as I knew, the
entire confidence of the officers and men in regard to his loy
alty, patriotism and ability, yet there had sprung up a fire in
the rear party that was constantly impugning his loyalty, his
ability, and his fitness to command, and demanding his re
moval. In the -light of what has already been said, it can now
be seen whence, and from what source this hue and cry pro
ceeded.
On account of a contemporaneous popularity that Gen.
Rosecrans had achieved about that time, at the battle of luka,
there arose a demand in the press that Gen. Buel be super
seded in the command of the Army of the Cumberland by that
officer. As I have said, my acquaintance with Gen. Rosecrans
previous to his assuming command of the Army of the Cum
berland, had been confined to the ten months I had been sta
tioned with him at Newport, R. I., in 52-3.
My recollections of him were not such as to inspire me
with confidence in him as the proper person to be placed in
command of an army. At that time he seemed to be a great
enthusiast in regard to the Catholic Church ; seemed to want
to think of nothing else, talk of nothing else, and in fact do
nothing else, except to proselyte for it and attend upon its
ministrations. No night Avas ever so dark and tempestuous,
that he would not brave the boisterous seas of Newport Harbor
to attend mass, and no occasion, however inappropriate, was
ever lost sight of to advocate its cause ; in fact, he was what
would nowadays be called most emphatically a crank on that
subject, and might not inappropriately be considered a one-
ideaed man lacking in the breadth and poise, so necessary to
success in the commander of an army in the field. While
Buel s Army Avas in Louisville getting reinforcements and
preparing to renew operations against Bragg, I obtained a feAv
days leave of absence and had no end of inquiries on my Avay
home and after arriving there, as to Avhat I thought of the
propriety and necessity of relieving Buel. 1 uninformly re
plied that as far as the Army Avas concerned there Avas not that
I kneAv of, any want of confidence in Duel, but on the other
hand, nothing but the most sincere confidence and respect.
That the only reason that could be assigned was the want of
confidence that the fire in the rear might have caused in
the country at large, and that even if this was thought to bo
necessary, it would be very bad policy to substitute Kosecrans
in his stead. How near correct I was in this estimate the
public is now prepared to judge. Of course the possibility
of BueFs removal dispirited him, and perhaps inspired some
of the officers under him, that might by possibility be selected
to succeed him, with a desire that such might be the case. At
all events, shortly after the arm}- again took the offensive,
the notorious and disastrous affair at Perry ville took place, in
regard to which it was charged at the time by Gsn. Buel, arid
believed by others, that it was brought on by Gen. A. McD.
McCook separating himself more from the body of the army
than his orders justified, and beyond supporting distance, in
order that an engagement might be brought on, in which, if
successful, ho might claim the sole credit, and thereby super
sede Buel in command. However this may be, this engage
ment was the culminating affair in BueFs career. The blame
was (as I think) unjustly attached to him, and he was relieved of
his command, and Gen. W. S. Rosecrans appointed in his
place. After this battle, the Army resumed offensive oper
ations against Bragg and in due time arrived in Nashville,
\vhen offensive operations were for a time suspended, in order
to get supplies forward, and put the army in shape for active,
and if possible, decisive operations. During the weeks that
we thus la} encamped about Nashville I had frequent oppor
tunities to see Gen. Kosecrans and observe his manner, char
acteristics and surroundings and had hoped to be enabled to
form a more favorable opinion of the man and his fitness for
the high position to which he had been called than I had there
tofore entertained. I was sorry, however, to be forced to the
conclusion that my estimate of the man had been even more
favorable than the facts would justify. His head seemed to
have been completely turned by the greatness of his promo
tion. Instead of the quiet dignity, orderly and biiMness
methods that had formerly obtained at the headquarters of
the Army, the very reverse seemed to be the rule.
Having by this time surrounded himself, in addition to
the usual staff and appliances ordinarily to be found at the
headquarters of an army in the field, with a numerous coterie
of newspaper correspondents, and Catholic priests, who seemed
in his estimation to be vastly more important than anyone else
about him, and laid in a good supply of crucifixes, holy water,
spiriting frumenti, Chinese gongs, flambeaux, jobbing presses,
printers devils, javelins, white elephants, and other cabalistic
emblems and evidences that a holy crusade was about to bo
entered upon, and having daily announced through his
various newspaper correspondents, jobbing presses, and
other means of reaching the public and the Confederate
Army lying immediately in our front, exactly what was
going on, one could but wonder at the sublime indifference
of Bragg, and his Army remaining in the State of Tennessee, in
the midst of preparations for their destruction such as these.
As this magnificent and resplendent cavalcade of Holy,
Oriental, and gorgeous splendor moved about from camp
to camp during the weeks that we lay at Nashville making
these gigantic and awe-inspiring preparations for the
advance, every knee was bowed, and every tongue confessed,
that Allah was great, and thrice illustriously great was this
Savior that had been sent to us. All things though, however
grand and glorious, must have an end, and it was finally an
nounced during the last days of December, 1862, that the army
was ready for a forward move. You will not be surprised to be
informed after what has preceded, that it was my opinion that
the Catholic officers having command in that army would fare
well when the honors of the campaign came to be distributed.
Accordingly, I made a prediction in writing that every one
of these, consisting of Brig. -Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, Brig.-
Gen. D. S. Stanly, Brig. -Gen. James S. Negley, and C/apt.
James St. Claire Morton, would all be promoted entirely re
gardless of what the fortunes of war might have in store for
them. This I did without the slightest feeling of unkindness
or jealousy towards these officers, but simply on account of
my belief that the Commanding General was such a narrow-
minded bigot in regard to Catholicism, that it was impossible
for him not to allow considerations of this kind to control his
estimate of men. We shall see how nearly correct I was in
this estimate further on. At the time this campaign was
entered upon the National Forces had not been divided into
Army Corps and numbered. Each Army commander divided
his army as to him seemed best. Rosecrans divided his into
three grand divisions called the Right, Center, and Left, and
each of these into three ordinary divisions of four brigades
each, the Right, Center and Left commanded respectively
by Generals A. McD. McCook, George H. Thomas and Thos.
L. Crittenden.
At the time of this advance and for a long time previous
thereto, I was commanding a brigade in Gen. Thos. J. Wood s
division of the left wing. The advance movement all along
the line finally commenced about the 26th day of December,
18f2. The first day Palmer s division of the left wing had
the advance and on the evening of that day, had reached the
vicinity of Lavergne, having had some pretty sharp skir
mishing in so doing. The next day by rotation Wood s
division had the advance.
It was not the place of my brigade to lead the division
that day, but I was specially requested to take the advance,
however, as the progress made the day before had not been
satisfactory. I consented to do so upon condition that the
cavalry, which had been in advance the day before should be
retired to the rear of my brigade ready to be brought into use
should we succeed in routing the enemy, and should the topog
raphy of the country admit of the successful use of cavalry.
I had seen so many disastrous results ensue from the use of
squadrons of cavalry in advance of an army under such cir
cumstances as we were advancing, that I did not want to run
any such risks in addition to the ordinary and inevitable risks
of such advances against an army in the field. The cavalry
necessarily has to retire before any effective work can be done,
and usually comes back pell mell with a lot of riderless horses,
and creates infinitely more confusion, consternation, and even
8
danger to the advancing army, than anything the enemy would
be likely to do at that stage of the operations.
Having thus arrived at the front and got the cavalry out
of the way to the rear, I found the enemy securely lodged in
the town of Lavergne,and masked from our view by the build
ings, shrubbery and fences. My orders contemplated an im
mediate advance along the main pike toward Murfreesboro.
Thus no opportunity was given for flanking them, and so
compelling them to abandon the town. The country was open
between my command and the town, and afforded no shelter
whatever for the troops. I formed the brigade in two lines
about 200 yards apart, with a strong line of skirmishers about
the same distance in advance of the first line, with a section of
artillery in the interval between the infantry lines. As these
dispositions were about completed preparatory to ordering an
advance of the line a heavy infantry fire was opened upon us
from the buildings and cover the town afforded to the enemy,
and their tire was taking effect even upon the first line of in
fantry back of the skirmish line. At this juncture I ordered
the infantry to lie down, the artillery to open with shot and
shell upon the town, and the heavy line of skirmishers to fix
bayonets and on double quick to make the distance between
them and the town; to be immediately followed by the main
lines of infantry as soon as the skirmishers had reached the
town. This movement was entirely successful; we soon had
routed the enemy from tne town, -but had left some forty or
fifty dead comrades behind us to be cared for by those in our
rear.
As soon as we had driven the enemy beyond the town, we
continued the same order with two regiments in line of battle
about 200 yards apart to the left of the main pike, and two to
the right in like manner, all preceded by a heavy line of
skirmishers, and pushed forward with all possible dispatch.
A heavy rain set in about the time we commenced the advance
beyond the town, which continued all day, so the corn-fields
and other plowed fields soon became ankle deep with mud.
Nevertheless we pressed forward continuously. If we encoun
tered the enemy in any considerable force, the skirmish line
9
gradually slackened their progress until the main line came up
with them. Artillery was brought forward and fired advancing
along the road. In this manner we kept up an almost con
tinuous advance, our dead and wounded being cared for by
those in our rear. By night-fall we had made an advance of
nearly eight miles, to Stewart s Creek. As we approached
Stewart s Creek we discovered that the enemy had set the
bridge over the same on fire. I immediately concentrated four
pieces of artilllery on a little eminence to the right of the road,
and commenced shelling the enemy beyond the creek. Under
the cover of this fire the infantry was ordered forward at
double quick, and succeeded in subduing the flames before
sufficient damage had been done to prevent the use of the
bridge by our army. So rapid had been our advance that
three companies of rebel cavalry that had been hovering on
our left flank during the advance, were cut off before they
reached the bridge, and were captured by us with all their
horses and accoutrements. In the evening we were congratu
lated by all our superior officers for having accomplished a very
satisfactory day s work.
This brought us up to the evening of the 27th of Decem
ber. During tne time between this and the afternoon of the
30th of the same month, all portions of our army had pressed
forward along the different lines of march laid out for them,
encountering the usual incidents of driving in the enemy s
cavalry and outposts, until finally at that time our entire army
had arrived along the left bank of Stone River, opposite the
city of Murfreesboro, some two or three miles further on.
Here we encountered the enemy in force and their fortifica
tions were plainly visible all along opposite us on the right
bank of the river, between it and the city of Murfreesboro, and
here it was very evident Bragg intended to make his stand
and accept the guage of battle.
There was desultory firing all along the line during
that memorable afternoon, but during that time our army was
finally concentrated, McCook, with his three divisions on the
right, Thomas, with his three in the center, and Crittenden,
10
with his three on the left. The whole line, with the intervals
for artillery and cavalry, occupying a distance of two or three
miles, more or less. Crittenden s three divisions were formed,
two divisions in line of battle, and one in reserve, as follows :
Palmer s division on the right, Wood s on the left, and Van
Cleve in reserve opposite the interval between Palmer s and
Wood s, and each division consisting likewise of three brigades,
were formed in like manner, two in line and one in reserve. In
Wood s division W agner s brigade was on the right, my own on
the left, and Marker in reserve. This arrangement brought my
brigade on the extreme left of the entire army. During that
evening we were made acquainted with the plan of the attack
which was to be made by our army under cover of the gray of
the morning the following day, the memorable 31st day of
December, 1 862. This was for the left wing (Crittenden s)
to cross Stone River which was at that time fordable at all
points for all arms of the service and deliver a furious
attack on the enemy s extreme right, this to be followed up by
a wheel to the right by other portions of our army in case
Crittenden was successful in his attack, until all portions of
our army should become engaged and the battle become gen
eral all along the line.
This plan was well conceived, and might have worked
well enough perhaps, if the enemy had waited for us. The
same mistake (or a similar one rather) was made here that
was made by Grant at Shiloh, only the latter was much more
faulty, In that case Grant was moving his army up the
Tennessee River to Savannah, the object being to attack
Beauregard, then at Corinth, some twenty miles from Savan
nah, as soon as he should have made a junction with Buel s
army, then at Nashville, Tenn., and which was to march from
that place to Savannah. Grant s army proceeding by boats, ar
rived at Savannah by detachments first, and should have
all been landed on the side of the river toward Grant s rein
forcements, instead of on the side toward the enemy unless
he considered from the time he landed, anything more than a
picket force of cavalry to keep him advised of the enemy s
movements on the side toward them that he had enough to sue-
11
cessfully cope with him. If he thought the latter, he should have
been with his troops on the side of the river toward the enemy
instead of eight miles below on the other side. Thus the most
elementary principles of grand tactics and military science, that,
in case two armies are endeavoring to concentrate with a view
of delivering an attack on a superior force of the enemy, the
inferior force nearest the enemy, should be careful to oppose
all natural obstructions, such as rivers, mountains, heavy
forests, impassable marshes, between it and the enemy
until, a junction can be made. In this case the detachments of
Grant s army were allowed to land on the side toward the
enemy, select their locations as best they could without instruc
tions or concert of action of any kind, and this within fifteen
to eighteen miles of the enemy in force, in the enemy s coun
try, where it w T as known to all that he had daily and hourly
opportunity from the citizens who fell back before our forces,
to find out all the time the exact locations and strength of
Grant s and Bud s armies, respectively. Under circumstances
like these, the merest tyro in military knowedge ought to
have known that an experienced, able officer, such as Beau-
regard. was known to be, would not wait for the concentration,
before anticipating the attack. So it was no surprise to any
one except the troops on that side the river towards Corinth,
and possibly to Grant, then at Savannah, that on that fatal
Sunday morning in April, 1862, when Grant had got sufficient
troops on that side of the river to make it an object for Beau-
regard to destroy or capture them, and w r hen Buel s advance
had approached within twenty to twenty-five miles of Savan
nah, that Beauregard determined upon an attack, and declared
he would crush or capture the troops on that side, and water
his horse in the Tennessee river that night, and that but for
the timely arrival by forced marches of, Buel s advance of
two divisions on the field about four o clock that afternoon, he
would undoubtedly have executed his purpose. If Buel had
been guilty of such blundering (not to call it by any worse
name than this) it would have been impossible to make the
country at the North believe that he did not meditate its de
struction. For this blunder Grant was promptly relieved of
12
,his command, by the proper authorities, and ft was many
years afterwards, before any one was found, who did not think
this was very moderate punishment, under such circumstances.
The fault in the case under consideration differs in kind, but
not in its disastrous effects upon our cause and our army.
The right of our army at Murfreesboro, judging from
what happened (and as I said at the outset, when I don t know
personally what happened, I speak from necessary inference)
seemed to think that inasmuch as our plan of battle contem
plated an attack by the extreme left, to be followed up by
them subsequently during the day, that they had nothing to
do at that early hour in the morning, but to keep a picket
force out, send their artillery horses to a distant point for
water, stack their arms, and get breakfast. They did not
seem to think possibly Bragg might have plans of his own r
and that our attack might be anticipated, and that our right
might receive a desperate attack while our left was preparing
to deliver one. This, as you all know, was what happened^
and you all know its disastrous results.
Current reports at the time were to the effect that the
right was found when the attack came upon them in the con
dition already described, and the prompt manner in which they
were hurled from the field, corroborates this view of the case.
This, of course, caused the troops to their left to be imme
diately out-flanked, and no resistance, to amount to anything,
from that portion of our line could be expected under such
circumstances. How much Gen. Rosecrans and his staff are
properly to blame for the state of things existing on the right
at the time of the attack, I have no means of knowing, and do
not undertake to say but that it was the prime cause of the
very serious disaster to our arms, and to the prestige of our
army that happened at that battle, there can be no doubt or
chance for two opinions. How the battle raged, and what
happened, so far as I then knew, I cannot better describe than by
extracting from my official report of that day s proceedings,
made on the 6th of January, following, and which I do as
follows:
13
HEADQUARTERS 1st BRIGADE, IST DIV N, LEFT WING, NEAR
MURFREESBORO , Term., Jan. 6, 1863.
Capt. M. P. Bestow, A. A, A. G.:
SIR : I have the honor to submit the following report of the oper
ations of my brigade, (formerly the 15th Brigade, 6th Division, but
under the new nomenclature, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, left wing)
on the eventful 31st of December, 1862. During the night of the
30th I had received notice through Gen. Wood, our division com
mander, that the left wing, Crittenden s corps, would cross Stone
river and attack the enemy on their right. My brigade was posted
on the extreme left of our entire line of battle and was guarding and
overlooking the ford over which we were to cross. On the morning
of the 31st heavy firing was heard on the extreme right of our line,
(McCook s corps) but as they had been fighting their way all the
distance from Nolensville as we had from Lavergne, no particular
importance was attached to this, and I was getting my brigade into
position, ready to cross as soon as Gen. Van Cleve s division, which
was then crossing, was over. All this time the firing on the right
became heavier, and apparently nearer to us, and our fears began to
be aroused that the right wing was being rapidly driven back upon
us. At this juncture Gen. Van Cleve halted his division and the
most terrible state of suspense pervaded the entire line, as it became
more and more evident that the right was being driven rapidly back
upon us. On and on they came till the heaviest fire was getting
nearly around to the pike leading to Nashville, when General Rose-
crans appeared in person, and ordered me to go with my brigade at
once to the support of the right, pointing toward our rear, where the
heaviest fire was raging. Gen. Van Cleve s division and Col. Hark-
er s brigade of our division received the same order. I at once
changed the front of my brigade to the rear, preparatory to starting
in the same direction, but had not proceeded more than 200 yards
in the new direction before the fugitives from the right became so
numerous, and the fleeing mule-teams and horsemen so thick, that
it was impossible for me to go forward with my command without
its becoming a confused mass. I therefore halted, and awaited de-
velopements. Gen. Van Cleve and Col. Harker not meeting with so
much opposition pressed forward and got into position beyond the
railroad, ready to open on the enemy as soon as our fugitives were
out of the way. They soon opened fire, joined by some batteries
and troops belonging to the center (Gen. Thomas corps) and Es-
tep s battery of my brigade, and after about an hours fighting along
this new line, during which time I was moving my command from
point to point, ready to support any troops that most needed it. The
14
onslaught of the enemy seemed to be in a great measure checked^
and we had reasonable probability of maintaing this line. During
all this time my men were exposed to a severe fire of shot and shell
from a battery on the other side of the river, and several men were
killed. About this time an aid of Gen. Palmer s came galloping up
to me, and said that unless he could be supported his division would
give way. Palmer s division formed the right of Gen. Crittenden s
line of battle on the morning of the 31st. After consulting with
Gen. Wood he ordered me to send a regiment to support Gen. Pal
mer. Accordingly I sent the 3d Kentucky regiment, commanded
by Lieut. Col. Sam 7 ! McKee. Before the regiment had been ten
minutes in its new position, Capt. Kerstetter, my Adjutant General r
reported to me that Col. McKee had been ki led and the regiment
badly cut up. I therefore moved with the other three regiments of
my command to their relief. The line they were trying to hold was
that port of our original line of battle lying immediately to the right
of the railroad, and forming an acute angle with the same. This
portion of our original line, about two regimental fronts, together
with two fronts to the left held by Colonel Wagner s brigade, was all
of our original line of battle but what our troops had been driven
from ; and if they succeeded in carrying this they would have
turned our left, and a total route of our forces could not then have
been avoided. Seeing the importance of the position, I told my men
that it must be held even if it cost the last man we had. I imme
diately sent in the 26th Ohio, commanded by the gallant M ijor Wm.
H. Squires, to take position on the right of the 3d Kentucky, and
support it, and dispatched an aid for the 18th Indiana battery to
come to this point and open on the enemy. No sooner had the 26th
Ohio got in position than they became hotly engaged, and the nu
merous dead and wounded that were immediately brought to the
rear told how desperate was the contest. The gallent" Lieut. Mc-
Clellan of that regiment was brought to the rear mortally wounded,
and expired by my side in less than five minutes from the time the
regiment took position. Still the fight went on, and still brave men
went down. The 3d Kentucky, now reduced to less than one-half its
original number, with ten officers out of its founeen remaining ones,
badly wounded, was still bravely at work. In less than ten minutes
after the fall of Lieut. Col. McKee, the gallant Major Daniel R.
Collier, of that regiment, received two severe wounds, one in the leg
and one in the breast. Adjutant Bullitt had his horse shot from un
der him, but nothing could induce either of them to leave the field.
Equally conspicuous and meritorious was the conduct of Major
Squires and Adjutant Franklin, of the 26th Ohio. Major Squires
horse was three times shot through the neck ; nevertheless, he and
15
all his officers stood by throughout and most gallantly sustained and
encouraged their men.
Estep s battery came up in due time, and taking a position on a
little rise of ground in the rear of the 26th Ohio, and 3d Kentucky,
opened a terrific fire of shot and shell over the heads of our infantry.
About one hour aftor the 26th Ohio got into position, this terrible
attack of the enemy was repulsed, and they drew back into the
woods, and under cover of an intervening hill, to reform their shat
tered columns and renew the attack. I now took a survey of the
situation, and found that along the entire line to the right and left
of the railroad, which had not yet been carried by the enemy, I was
the only general officer present, and was therefore in command, and
responsible for the conduct of affairs. CoL Hazen, commanding a
brigade in Gen. Palmer s division, was present with his brigade to the
left of the railroad. Col. Gross, commanding another brigade in the
same division, was also present with what there was left of his bri
gade, and most nobly did he co-operate with me, with the 6th and
25th Ohio to the right of the railroad, while Col. Wagner, command
ing the 2d brigade, 1st division, (left wing) nobly sustained his front,
assisted by CoL Hazen to the left of the railroad. I now relieved the
3d Kentucky regiment, who were nearly annihilated, and out of am
munition, with the 58th Indiana regiment of my brigade, commanded
by Col. Geo. P. Buell ; and this being a much larger regiment than
the 3d Kentucky, filled up the entire space from where the right of
the 3d Kentucky rested, to the railroad. I then threw forward the
right of the 6th Ohio regiment of Col. Gross brigade, which was on
the right of the 26th Ohio, so that its line of battle was more nearly
perpendicular to the railroad, and so its fire would sweep the front
of the 26th Ohio, and 58th Indiana, and supported the 6th Ohio with
Estep s battery on a little eminence to its right, and brought the
97th Ohio, Col. Lane, from Wagner s brigade, to still further
strengthen the right. These dispositions being made, I galloped a
little to the rear, and found Gen. Rosecrans, and called his attention
to the importance of the position I was holding, and the necessity of
keeping it well supported. He rode to the front with me, approved
of the dispositions 1 had made, spoke a few words of encouragement
to the men, cautioning them to hold their fire until the enemy had
got well up, and had no sooner retired than the enemy emerged from
the woods over the hill, and were moving upon us again in splendid
style, and in great force. As soon as they came in sight, the 6th
and 26th Ohio, and Estep s battery opened on them, and did splen
did execution ; but on they came, until within IOC yards of our line,
when Col. Buell, of the 58th Indiana, who had lost three men, but
16
had not fired a gun, ordered his men to fire. The effect was indis-
cribable ; the enemy fell in winrows, and went staggering back from
the effects of this unexpected volley. Soon, however, they came up
again and assaulted us furiously for about one and a half hours, but
the men all stood their ground nobly, and at the end of that time
compelled the enemy to retire as before.
During the heat of this attack a heavy cross fire was brought to
bear on the position I occupied, and Corporal Frank Mayer, of the
3d Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, in command of my escort, was shot
through the leg, and my Adjt. General, Capt. Ed. R. Kerstetter, was
shot through his coat, grazing his back. The regiments all behaved
splendidly again, and the 58th Indiana won immortal honors. Lieut.
Blackford, of that regiment, was shot dead, and several of the officers,
including Capts. Downey and Alexander, badly wounded. Estep s
battery was compelled to retire from the position assigned to it after
firing a half dozen rounds, but it did terrible execution while there.
The 6th and 26th Ohio did noble service, as did the 97th, but their own
immediate commanders will no doubt allude to them more particu
larly. Thus ended the third assault upon our position. I should
have remarked that the 100th Illinois, the other regiment composing
my brigade, which was in reserve during the first engagement de
scribed above, had, under instruction of Col. Hazen, moved to the
front on the left of the railroad, and taken up a position at right
angles with the railroad, where they fought splendidly in all the
actions that took place on the left of the road. There was no for
midable attack made upon them, though they were almost constantly
under fire of greater or less severity, particularly from shot and shell,
and suffered quite severely in killed and wounded. Lieut. Morrison
Worthington, of that regiment, was killed while gallantly sustaining
his men, and six other commissioned officers, including Major Ham
mond, were wounded. Their operations being to the left of the rail
road, in a wood, did not come so immediately under my personal
observation, but their conduct, from Col. Bartleson down, was such
as leaves nothing to be desired. The 58th Indiana having now been
over three hours in action, and the 26th Ohio about four hours, were
exhausted and very near out of ammunition. I therefore relieved
the 58th Indiana with the 40th Indiana from Col. Wagner s brigade,
and the 26th Ohio was relieved by the 23d Kentucky. There was
now not more than an hour of the day left, and though the enemy
was constantly maneuvering in our front, no formidable attack was
made upon us, except with artillery. The enemy having been three
several times repulsed in their attack on that position, seemed satis
fied to keep at a respectful distance, and the sun set upon us, masters of
17
the situation. We had sustained ourselves and held the only portion
of the original line of battle that was held throughout by any portion of
our army. To have lost this position would have been to lose every
thing, as our left would then have been turned also, and utter rout
or capture inevitable.
During the evening of the 31st, I was officially notified that in
consequence of the indisposition of Gen. Wood, and a wound re
ceived by him during the forenoon of that day, he was relieved of
the command of the division, and that the same would devolve upon
myself. I therefore turned over the command of the brigade to Col.
Geo. P. Buell, of the 58th Indiana, and assumed command of the
division. All of which is respectfully submitted.
MILO S. HASCALL, Brig. Gen. Vols., Corn s Brigade.
ED. R. KERSTETTER, Capt. & A. A. G. (Official.)
After the battle was over, during the evening, Colonel
Harker\s brigade that had gone to the assistance of the right,
returned to where we had been in action during the day, and
thus the division was once more together, and &lt;fn this groumd
we did the best we could towards getting something to eat,
and prepared to bivouac on the same ground for the night.
About eleven o clock that night, I was visited by Capt. John
Mendenhall, Chief of Artillery on Gen. Crittenden s staff, and
who belonged to the Regular Army of the United States, and
a gentleman of tirst-class intelligence, and purity of charac
ter, and informed that since the cessation of hostilities for the
night, a council of war had been held at Gen. Rosecrans
headquarters, by himself and his Grand Division Commanders,
and that a general retreat to Nashville had been decided upon,
and that all except Gen. Crittenden concurred in the advisa
bility of such movement, and he was overruled by the others,
and that in pursuance of such determination, I was forthwith
to send all the transportation of my division, except one wagon
for each brigade, to the rear, and when the transportation was
all under way, this was to be followed by a general retreat of
our army to Nashville. Mendenhall said that Crittenden was
very much incensed at the proposition for retreat; said his
army was in position and on hand, and that if he were over
ruled and if a retreat was decided upon, that he would cross
18
the river and retreat by way of Gallatin to Nashville. How
ever, the retreat was decided upon, and the baggage had been
sent to the rear as above directed, and we were laying on our
arms awaiting the further order to retreat, when a very singu
lar circumstance caused Rosecrans to change his mind, and
conclude to fight it out where we were. A large number of
our straggling, demoralized detachments in the rear of our
army, being hungry and thirsty, had concluded to disobey
orders, and make fire and try and get something to eat. One
party would make a fire, another would go there to get a fire
brand to start another, and when this became general along
our rear, Rosecrans concluded the enemy had got in our rear,
and were forming line of battle by torch lights, and hence
withdrew the order for a general retreat. After this, about
one o clock, I was informed also by Capt. Mendenhall, that
the retreat had been given up, and that I was ordered to fall
back with my division about half a mile, and take up a posi
tion that would there be assigned me. Accordingly I did so,
and in the morning found myself occupying a position with
no advantages for offensive or defensive operations, and very
much exposed to the enemy s fire, with no chance for return
ing it with any effect. The enemy w r ere occupying the position
I had fallen back from, and at that point concentrated a large
number of pieces of artillery, with which, about nine o clock
in the morning, they opened upon us a tremendous artillery
fire, under the cover of which I supposed their infantry would
charge upon us, but for some strange reason or other, they
did not do so. Desultory firing afterwards, was kept up dur
ing the day, until about three o clock in the afternoon. In
the meantime we had sent a division across the river to the
left, which was occupying the high ground near where the
enemy s right was resting originally. About three o clock
Breckenridge s troops, of the rebel army, fell furiously upon
this division, and drove them rapidly from their position, on
account of their superior numbers. At this juncture Critten-
den ordered Mendenhall to concentrate his artillery on the
bank of the river to our front and left, which he promptly
did, and ordered me, with my division, to promptly cross the
19
river in support of the division already there in retreat. Upon
our arrival on the other side of the river, the furious tire from
Mendenhall s artillery had checked the rebel advance, and the
division over there turned upon their assailants, and with the
assistance of my division, drove Breckenridge back to the
position he had occupied before making the assault. The latter
part of these operations were carried on in the darkness, and
we slept upon our arms, amidst the dead and wounded. It
had been raining hard all the night, and the river was rising
very rapidly, so much so that if we had remained there until
morning, there would have been danger that the river would
become impassable, and the divisions been left there by them
selves in the presence of the Avhole rebel army. Accordingly,
about two o clock at night, we were ordered to recross the
river, and take up positions where we had been during the
previous day. We arrived back there between that time and
morning, thoroughly wet through, and completely jaded out,
having had no sleep, and but little to eat during the previous
forty-eight hours. Both armies continued after this during
the third day, to occupy the positions they had on that morn
ing. It was cold, wet, and very disagreeable weather; both
armies were completely tired out, and seemed content to
do nothing more than to engage in some desultory firing, and
watch each other closely. On the morning of the fourth day,
January 3, or rather, during the forenoon of that day, the
stragglers from the right, during the first day s battle, who
had not stopped in their flight until they reached Nashville,
began to return in large numbers, in companies, and even
regiments, and Bragg, observing this, concluded we were re
ceiving large bodies of reinforcements from the north, and
therefore concluded to fall back and give up the contest. He
accordingly did so, and on the fourth day, January 4, he took
possession of Murfreesboro without the firing of a gun. Thus
ended the great battle of Stone River. We had not made a
single attack during the whole time ; were badly beaten
and well nigh driven from the field the first day, and only
saved from an ignominious retreat upon Nashville by the ri
diculous misconception on the part of Rosecrans, already
20
alluded to on the first night after the battle commenced. As
it was, we lost all oar transportation, by sending it to the rear,
that night, preparatory for the retreat, the whole having been
burned by the rebels at Lavergne, notwithstanding we were
supposed to have some cavalry in our rear, under (jen. Stan
ley. Where it was at the time our transportation was being
burned by the rebel cavalry, I have never heard.
Finally our fugitives from the first day s battle began to
return, thereupon Bragg became very much frightened and
beat a retreat, and we thus gained Murfreesboro. After this
reports were written up to praise the men it had been deter
mined upon in advance to promote, and these identical men
that I had predicted would be favored, were promoted ; one
of them, St. Claire Morton, from Captain to Brigadier-General,
while others, upon whom rested the heat and burden of the
day, and who saved the army from utter annihilation, were
not only not promoted, but in many instances not even men
tioned. It was, for instance, Sheridan s fate to be early driven
from the field, whether from his fault or not, it is not neces
sary to inquire. Enough for this occasion that it was so, and
the facts of his subsequent career no more justify what was
done for him on this occasion, than would the subsequent
illustrious career of Gen. Grant justify his promotion for the
terrible blunders committed by him concerning the most un
fortunate battle of Shiloh.
In what I have said in this paper in regard to the Cath
olic Church, I do not wish to be understood as having any
desire to say anything against that church, but simply to
condemn the idea of making membership in that, or any other
particular church, a necessary concomitant to advancement,
either in a military or civil capacity, under our government.
Farther, in all that I have said nothing has been said in malice
towards any officer or person, but simply that that criticism
so necessary to the establishment of right and justice in regard
to the late war may be freely indulged in, whether it affect
the highest officer, or the lowest private that offered his life in
defense of his country. It will be seen that my estimate of
21
the fitness of Gen. Rosecrans to command an army was not
enhanced by his career during and preceding the battle of
Stone River. When disaster came to the right, he should
have given his attention personally to that, and lent the magic
of his personal presence to rallying the fleeing troops from
that division, in place of going to the extreme left himself in
stead of by a staff officer for ordering the movement of troops
in that direction. When the whole affair was over, and quiet
restored, I made an application to be transferred to another
army on account of want of confidence in him as the com
mander of an army in the field. This I supposed would cause
my arrest, and give an opportunity for me to demonstrate the
great cause that existed for my apprehensions, but instead of
doing this, he returned my application endorsed that he could
not spare the services of so useful an officer as myself, and
that there would be no forward movement of the army for six
months, and detailed me to proceed to Indianapolis, Ind., to
superintend the work of returning deserters from Ohio, Indi
ana, and Illinois. Just before my leaving Murfreesboro for
Indianapolis we saw Bragg s telegraphic account to Richmond,
of the first day s proceedings. It was as follows : ; This
morning, under cover of the darkness, we attacked the enemy
on his extreme right, and have routed him from every portion
of his line except upon his extreme left, where he has suc
cessfully resisted us." As I left there was a proposition
started in Crittenden s command to raise money to present
Bragg a sword for making the above truthful statement
of the first days operations. While at Indianapolis, I was,
at the request of Gen. Burnside, transferred by the War De
partment, to the army of the Ohio and given the command
of a division in that army. The next that we heard of Gen.
Rosecrans was at the battle of Chickamauga, and that was the
last we heard of him in a military way, and all can now see
how much cause there was for the apprehensions I entertained.
This was not the first instance that great unfitness achieved
high rank in our armies and it was quite common for great
merit to be entirely unrewarded, and indeed entirely unknown.
But time is a great healer, and let us hope that honest merit
22
will in the end get its recognition, trusting in the truthfulness
of the idea that
" Ever the world goes round and round,
And ever the truth comes uppermost,
And justic^ shall be done."
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