Will China Revert To Another Maoist Era Next Month?

On October 18, the world’s most consequential meeting this year begins. It’s the Communist Party’s 19th National Congress. Xi Jinping, China’s strongman, is expected to consolidate his power at the gathering in Beijing.

Watch out if he succeeds.

Watch out if he doesn’t.

In recent years, the Party, to the great applause from hopeful foreigners, has institutionalized internal rules governing, among other matters, the selection of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of Chinese political power, and the tenure of the general secretary, the leading political figure in China.

The development of rules is certainly an improvement over the no-holds-barred fighting of the Maoist era, where losers sometimes lost their lives.

To ensure peaceful leadership transitions, Deng Xiaoping, who made himself Mao’s successor, not only selected his successor, Jiang Zemin, but also his successor’s successor. Hu Jintao, no ally of Jiang, took over in a mostly “smooth” process beginning in 2002 at the 16th Congress, thanks to Deng.

Deng, however, was in no position to choose Hu’s successor. The willful Xi, after rumors of severe disagreements among senior Party politicians, took over from Hu as the Party’s general secretary at the 18th Congress.

Jiang and Hu had legitimacy in large measure because they were chosen by Deng. Xi, on the other hand, had no such advantage. He has had to fend for himself.

Xi, fending for himself, has apparently challenged the norms, guidelines, and rules of succession.

Take the “seven-up, eight-down” rule introduced in 2002 at the 16th Congress. According to this formulation, political figures 67 or younger at a Congress are eligible for selection to the Standing Committee. Those 68 or older are not.

At the moment, there are seven members of the Standing Committee. Five of the seven would be ineligible for reappointment if the rule were followed.

This year, seven-up, eight-down appears to be under stress. Wang Qishan, now 69, is one of the five members ineligible for another five-year term on the Standing Committee if the rule is followed.

Wang, a Xi Jinping ally, is chairman of the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. As such, he has led a so-called “anti-corruption” campaign, which is more accurately described as Xi’s unprecedented purge.

Most observers believe Xi, a young 64, wants Wang to continue in the role, and China’s supremo has said that the age rule is “not absolute,” at least according to a “retired Chinese official” speaking to the New York Times.

Xi, if that is what he said, is correct. The Party’s various age “rules” have been bent, rewritten, and completely ignored, depending on the needs of the powerful. Jiang Zemin, even when he was well into his 70s, was particularly adept at manipulating age limits to help himself and harm others.

Yet more than Wang Qishan’s fate is at stake at the 19th Congress. Observers, like Thomas Kellogg writing on the Foreign Policy site, believe that if Wang gets one more term, Xi will use that as precedent to break another guideline, the limit of two five-year terms for general secretaries.

Xi has not allowed the selection of his successor, who, according to precedent, would be revealed by the time of this Congress. The thinking is that if Wang gets an additional term on the Standing Committee, Xi will then be able to argue that the two-term limit applicable to him can also be ignored. Xi seems to be angling for a third—and possibly a fourth—five-year term.

If Xi succeeds in blocking the naming of a successor and keeping Wang on the Standing Committee, then China could be entering a new Maoist era where, unbound by rules, a strongman can stay for as long as he can hold onto power.

Some argue that would be a good thing for China. A powerful Xi, once he can do what he wants after the 19th Congress, will be a reformer, at least according to this narrative. Those optimistic comments echo similar ones five years ago. Then, hopeful analysts said Xi would accelerate reform after he was named general secretary.

Xi, in his first five years, has turned out to be the opposite of a reformer, unless one thinks Maoism is the way China should go. He has, in addition to repeatedly paying homage to the first leader of the People’s Republic, reversed China’s gaige kaifang—“reform and opening up”—policies, adopting a model Mao would recognize and perhaps approve.

Xi, as general secretary, has been busy recentralizing the economy by rebuilding state monopolies, strengthening government enterprises, and closing off opportunities for both foreign and private Chinese competitors. At the same time, he is increasing state domination of the financial markets.

Moreover, Xi has, also over the course of his rule, been stifling dissenting voices in society, making China far less free than it was in the eras of Jiang and Hu. Personally, Xi has, by mimicking Mao, demanded “absolute loyalty” from all others. Whether or not Xi is trying to replicate a Maoist political system, he is pushing China in extremely troubling directions.

So watch out if he gets more power to wall off China from the world, to accumulate personal power, and to engage in more belligerent acts against the U.S. and neighbors. Xi’s Beijing has been trying to grab territory and seas from nearby countries.

And what happens if Xi fails at the 19th Congress? His opponents—and there are still many of them waiting to strike if he falters—will become emboldened to challenge his leadership.

Xi’s accumulation of power in the last five years has come at a price. Now, with so much authority, “the buck stops with him,” Mike Chinoy of the University of Southern California points out in comments to CNN. “And there are a lot of people he has antagonized, waiting for him to do something wrong.” Potential adversaries are also waiting for Xi to falter in his bid to consolidate his position. In either case, we could see disunity in the leadership group and debilitating infighting in Beijing.

China, despite the appearance of stability at the moment, could be at one of those turning points.

We will get our next indication as to what will happen when we learn if Wang Qishan is rewarded with another five years on the Standing Committee and whether anyone is designated as Xi’s successor.

Everyone has a stake in the outcome of the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress.