Abstract

Dignity is a homonym, signifying both private law conceptions of valuable
reputation, and the innate humanness that informs universal human rights. Natural
law tradition distinguishes between these two substantially different ideas by
referring to the former as &lt;I&gt;dignitas&lt;/I&gt; and the latter as <I>dignatio</I>. As implicitly
confirmed by certain landmark decisions, notably <I>Makwanyane</I>, the dignity
guaranteed by the Constitution is dignatio. However, in <I>Jordan</I>, the Court appears
to have relied on dignitas to give meaning to inherent human dignity. In this
article, I argue why constitutional dignity is dignatio and outline certain
consequences that arise from this. Furthermore, I argue that dignatio is principally
realised when respect is shown to the human body. Such respect includes: fostering
autonomy in relation to the body; rejecting a market imaginary for investigating
humanness; and ensuring that the exclusion of those never yet fully included in
society does not continue.