"NATO, a survivor of the Cold War success, is in fact bogged down in a war of attrition in
Afghanistan.
Reconstruction efforts are only now being coordinated, after too
many years, while stabilization
and counter-insurgency operations are being
carried
out in the same battle
space.
Thus, the two efforts are hindering each
other."

This is an
historic moment. The U.N. is making its second attempt to launch and direct on
its own a complex operation, aptly labelled the “second generation of
peacekeeping." While the U.N. has been encouraged by its apparent success,
NATO and ESDP are in apparent disarray. Unfortunately, their troubles are
taking place while the world is experiencing significantly increasing tension.

NATO AND EU ISSUES

NATO, a survivor of the Cold War success, is in fact bogged down in a war of attrition in
Afghanistan. Reconstruction efforts are only now being coordinated, after too
many years, while stabilization and counter-insurgency operations are being
carried out in the same battle space. Thus, the two efforts are hindering each
other.

But this is not the only internal clash the Alliance is experiencing. A serious divide exists:

- There are the nations that are willing to accelerate the pace toward a global NATO, clearly
at the expense of collective defense, which in the face of growing asymmetric
threats has assumed a completely different form—now it deals with air policing,
energy security, cyber defence, maritime security operations, and ballistic
missile defense,

- There are other nations that are convinced that Article 5 is the only real and durable glue, as well as
a shield whose importance is growing apace with the increasing world tension.

The consequence of this clash is an endless series of mutually contradicting projects. The chain
of command wants to re-structure itself, in order to have more deployable HQs.
At the same time, it is willing to forsake the key expeditionary capabilities
of response forces. At NATO headquarters, the same committees also discuss how
to deploy HQs on one day and for the rest of the week deal with the new forms
of Article 5 operations.

The EU, which resembles an elderly couple unable to understand the needs of their newborn
child—ESDP—is working hard to allow the latter to implement the still
experimental concept of multi-disciplinary operations, which means that ESDP,
like any construction yard in which a skyscraper is being built, is quite
messy. Like two people experiencing difficulties in their relationship
therefore EU and NATO, while intent on resolving their internal difficulties,
are at present unable to cooperate.

If I could summarize this situation in a snapshot, I would use a photograph of a trench in
Gallipoli, with plenty of barbed wire, machine gun posts, and minefields just
in front of it. The trouble is that NATO appears to me to be on the ANZAC (the
Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) side, with its back to the sea, as its international
credibility and raison d’être are presently based only on its military
effectiveness—unless and until it understands the importance of Article 5 for
its longevity—while the EU has plenty of leeway available.

ESDP is building, slowly but steadily, a more coherent military instrument, through both a rather
effective force planning process and the capability development mechanism. Its
excessive willingness to mount as many operations as possible, wherever an
opportunity arises—something that may be seen more as an attempt to vindicate
the failures of the past 50 years than a desire to gain relevance—appears to be
a minor sin, tempered by the prudence of member-states already stretched too
thin by their multiple commitments of overseas forces.

It is ironic, therefore, that now NATO is less able to cooperate with ESDP than vice versa.
The key reason is NATO's inability to do anything beyond the so-called agreed
framework, also known as Berlin Plus, which was designed to foster purely
military-military cooperation, and is thus unable to provide a clear reference
for ESDP civilian operations.

It is true, however, that ESDP could be more active in convincing some of its member-states
to do their homework in order to remove some of the existing stumbling blocks and
that the EU could be more imaginative in finding specialized sectors of
partnership with some non-EU NATO members, just as the Alliance did with
Russia. It is also true, however, that, in NATO, some countries see ESDP as a
powerful and dangerous competitor to be kept at bay.

THE NEED FOR THE U.N.

Only the U.N., at present, can bring both organizations together, because it is in its primary
interest to do so. NATO can provide what the U.N. lacks, namely, an experienced
command structure and powerful response forces, while the EU has an outline
framework for collaboration that has withstood, rather successfully, its first
live test in D.R.C.

Is there enough time to have this happen? I doubt it. Time is running against the western
countries. Apart from the growing risk of asymmetric attacks, the magnitude of
the crises is now far greater than it was 15 years ago. At that time our
nations operated in relatively small territories, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Now the areas of crisis involve Afghanistan and Darfur—both larger
than France—as well as Somalia, an ulcer many international organizations have
vainly attempted to pacify during the last decades.

It is mediation by the U.N. that would eventually provide the final seal to a structure for
keeping peace in the world that was envisaged 60 years ago but is still to be
fully implemented—a U.N. that interfaces with all regional organizations.