SRA Chairman Richard Bowker told a Select
Committee on 8 July 2003, that BR managers - by inference, all - were
“bereft of imagination”. The Select Committee’s Report does
not mention how that conclusion was reached. I have not been quizzed on my
performance nor has anyone to whom I have spoken. Every industry has
unimaginative managers. Motor cycle industry managers did not foresee the
popularity of small motor cycles, opening the door to the Japanese and
Italians, who consigned UK
products to history. Textiles collapsed under foreign competition. The motor
car industry lost overseas - and much of its domestic - markets due to poor
designs and poor quality. Shipbuilding vanished because it did not modernise
nor adopt project and management techniques used by BR.[1]In every field, unimaginative UK
industry lost a world lead, and addressed labour problems by increasing wages
[2] instead of productivity. Were these the perfect industries [3] that BR was
told to emulate? From the mid 1950s, BR introduced - and employees accepted -
work and method study, work measurement, etc. BR civil engineers introduced
labour saving machinery in 1948 - BR’s first year of existence - and
continued over ensuing years, without the disputes that greeted similar
attempts in UK
industry. BR engineers and managers initiated and implemented - without strikes
- thousands of imaginative changes annually to cut labour, material and asset
costs; and to improve services.[4] Unions delayed some changes, but even those
were, nevertheless, made. In contrast, UK industry threw in the
towel.

Some disagreed with Richard Bowker:

Tory MP, Michael Stephen: I do not subscribe to
the view the railway is badly managed. I have been impressed by BR senior and
middle-level managers; they are excellent, dedicated people.[5]Other MPs who praised BR include Robert
Adley (formerly Transport Select Committee chairman), Adrian Bayley, Nick
Harvey, Nigel Spearing, Sir Keith Speed, William Vane, Brian Wilson and John
MacGregor [6], Garnett, Chief Executive of GNER said “BR was bloody
efficient”.[7]

“BR managers were very effective in
dissuading staff from industrial action. Today’s managers do not have the
same skills. Many [current] staff believe managers are incompetent, and know
little about railways. One man has seven so-called managers: ‘Under
InterCity, I had one. I knew what to do and who to report to. Now, I
haven’t a clue’. Running a rail service came as a shock to those
from the bus industry who thought it would be a passage to easy profits”.
[8]

“Stop treating comparison with BR as
irrelevant. BR had many faults, but delivered probably the most cost effective
railway of its type in the world. There is much to be learned from its history
and little to be gained by routinely dismissing comparisons between then and
now”. [9]

Areas in which BR did lack imagination

Investment

BR gave priority to infrastructure, not shops
which congest concourses. New boys have convinced the public that new rolling
stock & assets are funded by the private sector, when taxpayers fund most
through bigger subsidies! Moreover, the average age of rolling stock is worse
than under BR.
[10]

Connex envisaged creating “humane standing
room” in coaches by replacing 67 seats by 32! “They are recruiting
a manager to sell this to the public”. [11] Unimaginative BR focused on
trying to provide more seats by lengthening trains or running additional
services.

“For three decades BR infrastructure
projects cost £5m per mile, usually minus a bit. Now West Coast route
modernisation is £16-23m per mile. The project is two years late and five
times the original cost”. [12]

Performance

To improve punctuality, BR didn’t extend
journey times, break connections [13] or miss advertised station calls, leaving
passengers on platforms and carrying others beyond their destination. Nor did
we calculate millions of minutes delay. Improving punctuality needs attention
to individual trains. There is a vast difference between telling the public
that x% of trains are punctual, and blinding them with millions of minutes
delay cut by z%, which may leave train punctuality unchanged or worse.

Up to the day before privatisation, incompetence
was deemed to be the cause of all train delays. The next day, ‘decrepit
stock’ was the cause! BR punctuality was better than that achieved now
[14] despite calls being missed and connections broken under the new
imaginative regime.

Unimaginative BR managers did not plead
“circumstances beyond our control” - which would have been
jeered.Now, it is the number one
excuse. When I tried to compare rail to bus services, National Express would
not supply the basis of schedules nor punctuality records, but said most delays
were due to “circumstances beyond our control”. BR - they believed
- had no similar excuse to theirs: human error, sickness, foul weather,
defective private sector made equipment, vandalism, congestion and accidents -
despite road vehicles crashing into bridges or onto the line! With no hint he
realised the irony of his remark, Trevor Smallwood, Chairman ofFirstBus which planned to go into
railways said trains must be reliable! Locally, FirstBus services are a byword
for unreliability.

BR managers did not realise that blocking lines
for months was “less inconvenient”, whilst millions extended
journey times and changed twice or thrice. It is claimed that weekend
possessions give only a few hours work. If a BR engineer had made such a
defeatist claim, he would have been told to find employment more suited to his
limited talents! Long blockages are said to save £0.5bn. The unanswered
question is what would otherwise be the cost, and over what period and mileage.
It may be 0.001% of estimated engineering cost over 25 years, but what of other
costs - e.g., buses - and lost revenue. On average, BR renewed track every 25 years
or so, mostly during 16 hour weekend blockages in which up to 14 hours work was
safely done - the balance being required to safely take possession, get track
machines and trains to site, and restore lines safely to traffic. Railtrack
extended renewals to an average 125 years [15] causing a dangerous backlog.
Now, possessions fail to end on time, “due to a safety problem”.
The public has not grasped that the same scenario will occur somewhere
annually, and in the same places every 25 years or so. Imaginative PR will
dress it up in differently. In the bad old days, BR engineers had to hand back
on time, with safety guaranteed.

Current long blockages are not remotely similar
to the 7-week blockage at Crewe in 1984, as some
claim. Then, most trains bypassed Crewe station via the Independent Lines,
where a temporary platform was built to serve Crewe,
whilst buses catered for a minority. Work ended on schedule.

It is claimed that blockages of four track
routes - where BR kept two tracks open - is required by the H&SE - but they
say it is a railway decision. It is unclear why men may work safely on
motorways protected by cones, but not railways. Cones do not prevent vehicles
swerving into workers, railway lines do, and train drivers obey safety speed
limits.

“The SRA will thin out trains to ease
congestion and help trains run on time .... so a problem with one train
doesn’t delay others” [16]. “Inter city face cuts in
frequency to drag railways out of a three year punctuality slump. Long distance
operators run too many lightly used services which congest the network and
delay other trains”.[17] It has taken eight years for imaginative new
managers to learn a lesson applied by BR for decades.

Imaginative new boys are planning to partially
re-merge what should not have been fragmented. Ministers were warned by their
backbenchers that fragmentation would be catastrophic. The much misquoted
Brussels Directive 91/440 did require it - requiring only separate train and
infrastructure accounts. It was never mentioned during privatisation debates as
a reason for fragmentation.

Complaints

BR lacked the imagination to re-designate
“complaints” as “comments”, “observations”
or “invited feedback”, as now applies. I tried to relate complaints
to journeys as a measure, but watchdogs would not wear it. Now, they accept it,
as “complaints are low in percentage terms”. The current percentage
is 100 times BR’s in my day.[18] We didn’t imply that passengers
wasted time and postage: “Thank you for taking the time and trouble to
send your comments” is a typical private sector response now adopted by
train companies to an unambiguous complaint.

Fares & Inquiries

Long distance fares rose twice as fast as
inflation and are likely to rise further. The £3.4bn in fares [in 2003/4]
is half of rail costs. The SRA believes fares must rise to force people outside
the peak.[19] Unimaginative BR managers cut off-peak fares to tempt passengers
outside the peak! The SRA said: “the cap of inflation minus 1% is unsustainable
and is harming the industry. The cap should be inflation plus 2%”.[20]
Given inflation minus 1%, BR would have been £11 billions better
off.[21]

Imaginative newcomers limit staff who answer
calls, to basic inquiries to expedite answering. This leads to many making two
or more calls: to NRES and to a train company to see if any cheap tickets are
left. There, one suffers the time-consuming obstacle course of a “voice
activated service” and push button options. NRES refer enquiries
regarding carpark fees to a train company, who refer one to a station - whose
ex-directory number they do not have! Delay in answering these extra calls is
excluded from statistics comparing NRES with BR, making it appear that
enquiries are answered quicker. NRES cannot give addresses of Rail Watchdogs,
which should reduce complaints. Contentious calls are referred to backroom
staff - “who will be with you in a minute”.

Subsidy

BR managers lacked the imagination to double the
subsidy [23] by splitting profitable InterCity into seven unprofitable
companies. Likewise, splitting Network SouthEast - which had cut its subsidy
and achieved parity - into eleven unprofitable companies. The imagination to
quintuple subsidies was way beyond BR skills! Newcomers claim that subsidies
should increase as there are more passengers - largely due to economic upturn!
Increased business should cut subsidies. BR managers would have delivered a
gold plated railway for current subsidies.[24]

Politicians forecast that imaginative
entrepreneurs would need lower subsidies. BR repeatedly told Ministers that
commuter trains were expensive due to the peaks, but lacked the imagination to
convince Ministers that this required more subsidy and higher fares, which
newcomers have claimed. If their imagination fails them - “they [train
companies] are protected against decline: the Franchising Director will
increase subsidies if passengers reduce!”[25]InterCity companies should defer boasts
of paying a premium, until they have repaid - with interest - subsidies
hitherto paid, as BR’s InterCity was unsubsidised

“The cost of maintaining railways soared
under Railtrack. The bill has been paid by taxpayers. The SRA propped up
companies with extra subsidies and is keen to see them have more freedom on
fares”.[26] The SRA recognises there is a limit to risk that companies
will take.”[27]

GB Railways was bailed out by £3.8m extra
subsidy. Go-Ahead sought re-negotiation of a loss-making franchise. Anglia gets £23m on top of £16.5m granted for
2002-4. Anglia said “it wasn’t
management failure but external factors not envisaged at the time of the
original franchise. A new agreement gave South Central £670m, almost
twice that under previous agreements. South West Trains subsidy is up £120m:
250%. Connex asked for an outrageous extra £200m subsidy on top of
£58m already agreed. [28]

BR lacked the imagination to pursue bustitution
without a subsidy cut. If BR was allowed to withdraw a train service, the
subsidy was cut at once. For 20 years, if a bus company provided a replacement
service, BR had to subsidise them, even though BR was not then subsidised. BR
would not have had the imagination to farm out 1200 route miles to local groups
using unpaid labour, or replacing trains by buses, whilst keeping the subsidy!
That is imaginative!

John MacGregor said: “We have chosen to
subsidise operators, not Railtrack. Subsidy is best directed at the continued
provision of socially necessary passenger services which might otherwise
disappear. Railtrack will operate on commercial lines, making an appropriate
return”.[29] He stated: “If - this is entirely hypothetical - a
franchisee runs into problems, he will be able to return to discuss the
contract. In the unlikely event of a failure of the franchisee, the franchising
authority will find alternative operators for the franchise”.[30]Inevitably, they would want a bigger
subsidy.

National Express will buy more buses and
rationalise its interests in trains after another sobering year. “If we
don’t think we are going to get a return out of a bid, we will walk
away”.[31] That’s private sector imagination and enterprise!

One excuse to justify rocketing subsidies is
that track had not been renewed since the 1960s - the West Coast route was
highlighted. West Coast rails were renewed about every 20 years or so, on a
rolling programme.

Monopoly

Unimaginative BR managers failed to convince
Ministers that there was no BR monopoly. Ministers had admitted BR had no
monopoly fifty years ago.[32] New boys told politicians that there was a
profusion of external competition. Politicians were then convinced.

Whereas, government permit private sector train
operators to operate buses, BR could not operate buses as feeders or
alternatives. When buses were needed after an accident or to replace late or
cancelled trains, BR paid top dollar! Sweden with whom BR was adversely
compared, allow their state railways to own buses, and the infrastructure and
to run 90% of trains. Their Chairman said UK proposals for privatisation were
insane.[33]

Areas
in which BR managers were imaginative

Productivity

From 1948, managers continually developed ways
to cut costs and improve performance. Under privatisation, whizz kids came in
and sacked staff, and had to cancel thousands of trains. “Through the
1980s Bob Reid [34] expected 3% year-on-year efficiency savings from managers -
if not - you were replaced by someone who could”.[35]

Advisors

BR created a profitable consultancy [36]
employing BR managers and engineers on secondment, to meet demands from eighty
countries to solve operating, planning, engineering, technical and other
problems. It also sold BR designed equipment and products. New boys employ
advisors from countries which sought BR advice!

Investment

BR train design staff had the imagination to
liaise at an early stage with those responsible for infrastructure, avoiding
the risk that trains could not be used due to inadequate power supplies or a
need to re-build platforms.

BR asset renewals practice minimised track
defects. BR engineers had the sense to apply different maintenance and renewal
standards to track and signalling on inter city and rural lines. The new boys
have now discovered “it made no sense to apply the same standards used on
125mph InterCity lines to rural railways.”[39]

Under career railwayman Sir Henry Johnson, BR
set up a rolling stock leasing company in 1971, but was told by the Treasury to
terminate it in 1975.[40]. Under privatisation, the Treasury designated leasing
as flavour of the month.

Accidents

BR managers had the imagination not to involve
lawyers and accountants in accidents. BR developed contingency plans - revised
with each timetable change - for use if a line was blocked by accident, floods,
lorries on the line, suicides, etc. The Control organisation was empowered to
make decisions and implement these plans. Controls had been subject to
economies and modernisation over many years.Accidents such as that at Southall would
have been avoided had newcomers retained unified Controls. Still, credit where
it is due, ten years after destroying the unified Control structure, they are
moving towards re-integrated Control - and making it sound like a new
idea!

Fares

Imaginative BR managers introduced railcards for
senior citizen, students, young persons, family and disabled; Savers, Weekend
First and London Travelcard, etc. They lacked the imagination to copyright
these ideas, allowing newcomers to infer that they are a product of
privatisation. This is remarkable, because Ministers only agreed that Railcards
would be retained after a revolt by backbenchers, who feared that Cards would
disappear. “Train companies imposed conditions that make the South East
railcard useless for 90% journeys”.[41]

Safety

BR managers had the imagination to rely on the
skills of low graded staff, such as a track patrolman, who was empowered to
enter a signalbox or signalling centre and block a line or impose a speed
restriction for safety reasons without higher authority. Confident that staff
would perform their duties with the skill born of experience, we didn’t
panic when one restriction was imposed, and impose thousands elsewhere. After
an accident, BR managers safely restored lines to traffic much quicker than
applies today, having first established the cause.

Reality or Perception

The Reality is that private sector imagination
has led to higher subsidies, more complaints, worse safety worse performance
and a higher average age of rolling stock [42]. A SRA Policy Statement stated
that franchisees failed to achieve what was promised under privatisation, that
several have not been viable and have been given extra subsidy. “The
extent to which risk has transferred to the private sector is
questionable”.

Mr. Bowker told a Select Committee that
“the current perception of services is poor, but it is not the
reality”. In fact, the Reality is that the public now see that they have
a service that is worse than under BR; [42] and that, it was then that they had
the misleading perception, when there was nothing with which to compare.
Stimulated by the media, they were led to believe that railways would become UK’s
first perfect industry: no complaints, 100% safe, prices below inflation, no
subsidy, total reliability. Now, the media concedes those standards are
unattainable.

MPs complained that BR’s last
London-Berwick train was 6.30pm. Imaginative newcomers retimed it to 6.0pm, and
have not - as MPs expected [43] - reinstated direct overnight sleepers from
Berwick to London,
which BR withdrew.

“Cost control is now so weak that
upgrading costs nearly three times as much as under BR. Privatisation has
achieved none of the promised benefits. It hasn’t improved services,
reduced public funding or made managers more responsive to
customers”.[44] “Too many suffer dirty overcrowded trains with
unusable lavatories and are starved of essential information when services go
wrong. Franchises should re-written with financial incentives to run cleaner,
more user-friendly operations. Services go downhill when managers spend more
time bidding for each other’s networks than concentrating on boring old
punctuality and reliability”.[45] Surely, the incentive is supposed to be
implicit in private sector operation?