Media ownership has been an evolving “hot topic” in Australia as the government
grapples with the problem of keeping its cross media ownership laws relevant, in an age
where new technologies are blurring traditional media boundaries. Media ownership has
been an agenda topic for the Howard government since it was first elected in 19961, but
only recently has the major media players begun take tangible actions in preparing for a
pending relaxation of the media ownership laws.
Changes to the existing media ownership laws will undoubtedly generate new
opportunities for new players as well as present some significant threats to existing
players. However, understanding the complex web of ownership interdependencies that
currently exists, in order to develop a viable strategy for the future, is far from simple.
This situation was highlighted in Paul Sheehan’s review of media ownership in Australia
in 20022, where he states:
“Ownership of a smaller media company may be complex, with a variety of larger bodies
owning small percentages and associations with other organizations results in a complex
web of relationships”
In this paper, a technique is illustrated for firstly visualizing media ownership
relationship webs, and secondly, to then analyse them to look for new opportunities, or
threats that may exist once the media ownership laws are relaxed. The technique is called
Organisational Network Analysis (ONA), which is an evolution of social network
analysis techniques commonly used by sociologists to understand personal relationship
networks. Our research has shown that many of the concepts and analytical techniques
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See http://www.newmatilda.com/policytoolkit/policydetail.asp?policyID=331

for a chronology of media ownership developments over the past decade.
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that have been applied to personal networks can also be relevant to company networks.
Just like an individual developing her own social capital amongst her peer group,
companies can also build their own corporate social capital amongst potential alliance
partners in their chosen market.

ONA applied to Media Ownership in Australia
ONA visually maps relationships. Relationships can be deemed at a variety of levels,
from say, a joint marketing relationship between two firms, through to joint ownership of
an entity, which is generally the case with media companies. By visualizing complex
relationship webs, analysts are able to quickly identify where relationships are
concentrated and where opportunities exist for new relationships. The captured web of
relationships can then be analysed more clinically, using algorithms developed by social
network scientists to identify relative network attributes for the individuals or firms, such
as their level of centrality in the network or whether an individual is well placed to broker
new connections.
The example used to illustrate ONA of media ownership in Australia draws its data from
the register of controllers of commercial radio and commercial television broadcasting
licenses maintained by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)3.
ACMA is required by law to keep a public register of ownership of all commercial radio
and television licenses. The ACMA register identifies the company operating the licenses,
companies and/or individuals who participate in control of the license and the geographic
coverage for the license. While this exercise is limited to radio and television licenses, it
could easily be extended to include print and Internet media ownership using similar
ownership data.
So How Inter-connected are Australian Media Owners?
The ACMA register identifies 205 unique license holders and 319 owning firms or
individuals. As expected, owners will often be part owners in multiple licenses creating
quite a complex web of cross ownership as shown below:

One can see from the above graphic that the ownership network is essentially split into
two separate networks. The network in the centre shows three clusters of television
licenses intermingled with a far larger number of radio licenses. The number of owners
outnumber the number of licenses significantly in this cluster. The second network,
which surrounds the central cluster, is more loosely connected. One can see that only two
owners (Southern Cross Broadcasting and Tri-com Radioâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s part ownership of
Consolidated Broadcasting (WA)) are responsible for the interconnection of the network
at the top of the graph with the network at the bottom of the graph. The outer network
also shows a stronger concentration of owners in parts. For example, in the top left the
Macquarie group of companiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ownership of many regional radio licenses is evident. A
number of similar, but larger ownership clusters can also be seen to right of the
Macquarie cluster.
This visual representation of radio and television licenses may look a little confronting on
first inspection, however, the power of such visualization is the questions it can prompt
from the analyst, be they a media company owner or government regulator. The
interdependencies shown in the graph above are largely invisible using traditional data
base techniques. For the media company owner, the above graph may prompt questions
relating to their competitive situation. Are they able to exercise sufficient control over
their licenses compared to the competition? For the government regulator, some of the

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ownership clusters may be of interest. Are firms gaining unfair advantage through
indirect ownership or influence?
The next section will now explore how network analysis techniques can be used to
identify previously unseen intelligence held within the ownership network illustrated.
Uncovering the Hidden Opportunity â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Affinity Networks
What the media ownership map provides is a visualization of the formal ownership
relationships that exist. One of the more interesting ONA techniques is to use this data to
generate affinity network maps. Affinity maps basically look to infer potential affinities
between individuals or firms based on their common activities. An early use of affinity
maps was to study potential overlaps in board directorships. Affinities between individual
board members could be inferred by the number of boards that the individuals sat on
together. Likewise, two firms with management boards filled with common members
would also infer a close affinity.
In the case of the media ownership, affinities between owners could be inferred from
common ownership of multiple licenses. Likewise, licensees with high levels of common
ownership would infer potentially collective control over multiple licenses. The affinity
network map is therefore a representation of potential relationships inferred through
ownership patterns. Once developed, ONA metrics can be applied to the affinity network
to discover an individual or firmâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s preferential placing within the network.
What is meant by preferential positioning in a relationship network depends on which
social network theory you subscribe to. The theory of centrality and closed networks
suggests that being centrally located in the network is most preferential. Being centrally
located means that you are likely to have the greatest number of connections, and also
good connections to those that are also well connected. A competing theory relates to
those best positioned to take advantage of gaps or holes in the network, potentially
playing important bridging or brokering roles. While not as heavily connected as the
central nodes, the connections they do have provide much more leverage, potentially
spanning powerful cliques or clusters. In practice there is value in both positions.
However, while most of us could identify centrally located firms without the need for a
network analysis, those firms that span structural holes in the network may not even be
aware of the advantageous position that they occupy. ONA analysis can uncover firms
best positioned to act as bridges or brokers.
Using the media ownership data the following affinity maps were produced. Firstly, in
considering the affinity between license owners, the first map looks at the firms with the
highest connectivity:

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Figure 2 - Owners affinity map - centrally connected firms

The above affinity map shows that owners tend to belong to identifiable clusters. The size
of the node reflects the relative connectedness of the firms. In this case a measure has
been selected which identifies those firms who are most connected to other well
connected firms. The clusters of large nodes reflect ownership syndicates, where multiple
firms and/or individuals have formed informal buying syndicates. These syndicates are
quite evident in the registration data. The map however clearly identifies the degree of
co-operation within the syndicates.
From a competitive intelligence perspective, its perhaps the broker or bridging firms that
could be of most interest. The ONA measure of â&#x20AC;&#x153;betweennessâ&#x20AC;? identifies those firms who
are preferentially placed on the intersections between network clusters. They could be
seen as best placed to broker connections between ownership clusters or could in fact be
the bridge between clusters, without whom there might be no connection. The following
map is a repeat of Figure 2 but now with the node size reflecting the level of betweenness.

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Southern Cross
Broadcasting
(Australia) Pty Ltd

Figure 3 Owners affinity map - Betweenness

The stand-out feature of this map is the role that Southern Cross Broadcasting could play
as a potential broker or bridge between the two largest ownership clusters. What the map
indicates is that Southern Cross has joint ownership with a number of the largest
ownership syndicates. As joint owners they are well positioned to at least influence new
alliances or partnerships amongst the more powerful ownership syndicates, as the
opportunities from reduced regulation arises. Co-operation between the other clusters
would require new relationships to be developed, rather than relying on existing ones.
An affinity map relating media licensee firms has also been developed. In this case, an
affinity between licensees would be determined by the level of common joint ownership.
Again the greatest insights can be obtained from those licensee firms who are in bridging
or brokering positions in the network.

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Regional Television

Tasmanian Digital Television
Mildura Digital Television

Radio Newcastle

Consolidated Broadcasting Systems (WA)

Canberra FM Radio

Figure 4 - Licensee affinity map â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Betweenness

The larger nodes in the above map identify those licensee companies that have the
greatest diversity in their ownership. One could infer that the market might consider these
licenses strategically placed and perhaps forcing a greater diversity of ownership.
Alternatively they may be seen as speculative investments by owners who may not be too
concerned about competitive issues with the other joint owners. It would appear that
Radio Newcastle could be of particular interest, being partially owned by one of the
strongest syndicates as well as a less connected network of other owners. The clustering
of licenses might also be of interest to regulators. The ONA maps make clearly visible
how licenses are clustered according to ownership. Overlaying broadcasting location
permissions could uncover intended or unintended regulatory compliance issues arising
from indirect influence, more so than direct ownership.
Summary
With a market confronted with regulatory ownership relaxation, identifying which
licenses to own, and with whom, will occupy the minds of many a media executive. The
ONA maps provided in this paper were developed from publicly available data and with
no particular domain knowledge by the author. The purpose of this paper has been to
introduce ONA as a technique for mining previously undiscovered intelligence from preexisting data. As such, readers familiar with the Australian media industry may find the
analyses presented either insightful or perhaps even a little confusing. Either way the
intent was to demonstrate a level of analysis of media ownership data that goes beyond

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traditional approaches. Even if it only prompts new questions for media executives to
address, then it will have served its purpose.
From a regulatory perspective, understanding the diversity and concentration of license
ownership can go a long way to facilitating a fair and equitable market place. While the
ownership registers provide direct ownership influence, the ONA maps can provide a
richer perspective on the indirect influences that could potentially impact the market
place. This paper has dealt with only the commercial radio and television licenses. Once
the print media and Internet are added along with a larger foreign ownership, the network
relationship influences can only become more complex and pervasive, making an even
stronger argument for more sophisticated business intelligence tools like ONA.

About the Author and Optimice
Laurence Lock Lee is a co-founder and principal of Optimice Pty Ltd, a company
specializing in optimising business relationships. He has over 35 years of working
experience as a researcher, manager and consultant across a breadth of public and private
sector industries. His research and consulting has focused on the analysis and facilitation
of relationship networks. He is currently completing a PhD on the links between a firmâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s
corporate social capital and firm performance. He was published widely in the business
and academic press on the above topics and presented and lectured on these topics in
Australia, Asia, the USA and Europe.
Optimice is a niche consulting and intellectual capital company. It provides services to
firms looking to improve and optimise their business relationships at the personal, intraorganisational or inter-organisational level. Optimice has developed ONA relationships
maps for a number of industry sectors including media, information technology, health,
finance and insurance sectors.
Contact: llocklee@optimice.com.au; www.optimice.com.au