Understanding Iran’s Internal Divisions

A handout picture released by the website of the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (R) shows him shaking hands with Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency during a meeting in Tehran on Aug. 17, 2014. AFP Photo/Iranian presidency website/Mohammad Berno

Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Iran’s prosecutor-general and spokesman for the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, said this week that a case against three journalists, including Jason Rezaian, a Washington Post reporter and an Iranian-American, is a matter of “security.”

Mr. Eje’i stopped short of saying the three — Mr.Rezaian, his wife, Yeganeh Salehi, who works for the Dubai-based National newspaper, and a photo-journalist — would be charged as spies, but the July arrests appear to be another attempt to implicate Iranian-Americans in undermining national security. Mr. Eje’i, who had long been Iran’s intelligence minister, appears determined to prove the U.S. is using Iranian-Americans to lay the ground for a “velvet revolution” in Iran, like those in places like the Ukraine and Georgia where Soviet regimes were ousted.

The action is part of bitter political infighting since Hassan Rouhani was elected president last year on a platform of moderation, pragmatism and reintegration of Iran into the international community. Mr. Rouhani has faced continuing opposition from hard-liners, who have sought to embarrass and undermine him. It seems no coincidence that the Rezaian arrest took place at a critical juncture in the negotiations between Iran and six major powers over Iran’s nuclear program.

Mr. Rouhani is a member of the ruling elite. He has held high positions in government since the 1979 revolution, and is no novice when it comes to internal power struggles. He knows that negotiations between Iran and the West are reaching a crucial stage and that he will need an agreement he can sell to skeptics and opponents at home.

But the opposition to his government has proved more persistent and broader than many — perhaps even Mr. Rouhani, himself — anticipated. It comes from elements in the ruling class that include commanders of the Revolutionary Guards; the security services; social conservatives among the clergy; the leading men of the judiciary; some in lucrative positions of privilege, who fear losing out to Rouhani supporters; and men committed to revolutionary principles that they believe require militancy and opposition to American interests in foreign policy.

Revolutionary Guards commanders have warned that they are closely watching the nuclear talks lest Mr. Rouhani’s negotiating team give too much away. Members of parliament have sought an oversight role while activists calling themselves the “we are concerned” movement have held demonstrations and the hardline newspaper, Kayhan, has crowed that the negotiations appeared to be failing.

The infighting has been intense. Hard-liners have repeatedly warned against a return of the “men of the sedition,” as they refer to Mohammad Khatami‘s presidency in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In May, Mr. Rouhani said the government had no business interfering in citizens’ private lives nor was it responsible for forcing “people into heaven with a whip.” A leading hard-line cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, responded that the clergy has a duty to save Muslims from materialism and from paving a road to hell.

The judiciary and state security services have continued to arrest journalists, dissidents and intellectuals–clear challenges to a president who promised more political freedom. A clash between Mr. Rouhani and Iran’s parliament came to a head Wednesday when lawmakers impeached Iran’s minister of science and higher education for readmitting university students who were expelled on security grounds. The minister resigned immediately and was appointed as an adviser to Mr. Rouhani.

Opposition is evident in other areas of Iranian foreign policy: When Islamic State militants streamed into Iraq this summer to capture Mosul, Tikrit and other locales, Mr. Rouhani spoke publicly of potential Iranian-U.S. cooperation against the group. But Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, quickly squelched the idea.

Mr. Rouhani’s foreign policy team says an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program is within reach and speaks of resolving other issues with the West and inviting foreign investors to Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei is straddling the fence, speaking of the U.S. as Iran’s inveterate enemy while supporting the nuclear negotiating team though insisting that nothing will come of the talks.

The newspaper Kayhan continues to harp on Mr. Rouhani’s failure to resolve Iran’s severe economic problems and reduce unemployment, but the public seems willing to give the president a chance to show he can deliver. Mr. Rouhani appears to think that if he can resolve the nuclear issue and get international sanctions lifted, Iran’s economy will grow, foreign investment will come–and he will have a mandate to press a moderate agenda and rein in the judiciary and intelligence services.

Haleh Esfandiari directs the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She was held in solitary confinement in Evin Prison in Tehran for 105 days in 2007.

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