Placed as a symbolic gesture to honor
the memory of the men of the Sixth South Carolina Volunteers who fought and died
at Wauhatchie, Tn. during the rare nighttime and early morning
battle of Oct 28-29, 1863.

Above:
Several members of the 6th SC Volunteers pose for a photo at the top
of Lookout Mountain near Chattanooga, Tennessee. Top/Down: Gerald
Goins, Joseph Marett. L/R: Tommy Pappas, Rick Walker, Erik Marcusson
and John Wilson. The valley in the background of this image was the
site of the rare nighttime Battle of Wauhatchie. The battle took
place during the night and early morning hours of Oct 28-29, 1863,
between elements of Geary's Federal Division and South Carolinians
under Col John Bratton. (1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th SC, Palmetto
Sharpshooters and Hampton's Legion).

Above:
L/R; Sixth members Erik Marcusson and Rick Walker carefully and
delicately chisel into the stone the simple but meaningful
inscription of "6SC".

Above:
Sixth member Joseph Marett gives his hand at finishing the stone's
engraving.

Above: Completed Stone
Engraving. The
smooth stone was found by a member of the Sixth while participating in the
145th Battle of Chickamauga reenactment located at Davis Crossroads,
Georgia. It was located in a wooded area within one of the
Confederate camps and was chosen for its gray color and unusual shark-tooth like
appearance.

Above: The stone marker's final resting place.
Located near the vicinity of the monument
erected to New York units of Ireland's Brigade where Bratton's men
first engaged them under Geary's command.

Excerpt from the Report
of Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding corps, with
field dispatches, &c. relative to engagements at Wauhatchie, October
28-29, 1863:

GREENEVILLE, TENN.,
March 25, 1864.

Colonel:

On the 28th, I met the commanding general on the mountain in
accordance with his appointment. While engaged in an examination of
the enemy's new position, one of my signal party reported to us that
the enemy was advancing in force from Bridgeport. He guided us to a
projection on the mountain about a mile off, where we saw the head
of the enemy's column, and where we saw his force [about 5,000] file
past and unite with the force already at Brown's Ferry. The rear
guard of this command [about 1,500, with a battery of artillery]
came up in about an hour and halted about 3 miles from the main
force. The road between the two commands ran along the western base
of a Ser. of heights, and parallel to them. The position that had
been taken by Gen. Law's brigade was about a mile from this road,
and opposite the point of the road, about half way between the rear
guard and the main force.

As soon as the rear guard halted I sent orders to Gen. Jenkins to
concentrate at the base of the mountain his three brigades that were
on the east side, and to be ready to cross it as soon as it was dark
enough to conceal our men from the fire of the enemy's batteries and
I directed that he should report to me upon the mountain at once. I
also ordered Gen. Law to advance his brigade as soon as it was dark
and occupy the height in his immediate front, which commanded the
road between the enemy's forces.

Gen. Jenkins reported in time to see the positions occupied by the
enemy. He was ordered to hold the point designated for Gen. Law with
a sufficient force, while a portion of his command moved up the road
and captured or dispersed the rear guard. He was also directed, if
time and circumstances favored it, to make a demonstration against
the main force, and if an attack at night should give us such
advantage as to warrant it, to endeavor to drive the enemy across
the river; but if the latter should appear inexpedient, to recross
the mountain before daylight.

As soon as it was dark his troops were put in motion, but the route
across the point of the mountain was so difficult that he was not
able to get his troops into their positions until midnight. He
arranged two brigades under Gen. Law to hold the position between
the enemy's force, while his own brigade, under Col. Bratton, was
sent to make the attack upon the rear guard. His fourth brigade
[Gen. Benning's] was held on the left of Gen. Law's two in readiness
to reenforce Col. Bratton. The brigade under Col. Bratton claims to
have had complete success up to the moment that it was recalled. It
was recalled in consequence of Gen. Law's abandoning his position,
which was essential to the safety of Col. Bratton's command. As soon
as Gen. Law yielded his position it became necessary to recall Col.
Bratton and send the troops back to their positions, in order that
they might pass the mountain before daylight. The loss sustained by
the two brigades under Gen. Law was probably one-tenth of the loss
sustained by the single brigade which claims a victory. As Gen.
Law's troops were veterans, I can only attribute the want of conduct
with his troops to a strong feeling of jealousy among the
brigadier-generals.

About 8 o'clock at night on the 28th, I received notice that the
commanding general had approved my plan, and information from him
that another of my divisions had been relieved from the lines and
could be used in this attack, but it was too late for it to cross
the mountain before daylight, and the success of the affair depended
entirely upon a night attack and a surprise. To have put two
divisions on the west side of the mountain during daylight would
have exposed them to an attack from the enemy's entire force without
artillery, and in a position where they could not be re-enforced. My
object was merely to inflict such damage upon the enemy as might be
accomplished by a surprise. That the point was not essential to the
enemy at Chattanooga is established by the fact that he supplied his
army at that place some six weeks without it.

CAPT: I have the honor to submit
to you the following report of the participation of this brigade in
the action of the 28th [of October] beyond Lookout Creek:

It was, I think, about 8.30 or 9
p. m. when the brigade reached the railroad, having crossed the
mountain since dark. There it was halted, and I was informed by the
brigadier-general commanding the division that Law's brigade had
already crossed the creek at the lower bridge; that Robertson's was
then crossing there; that these two brigades would be on the right
of the line of battle, occupying ridges so as to command the road on
the other side of the ridges and prevent the force of the enemy
encamped on the right moving up that road to the assistance of the
force encamped on the left when that should be attacked; that it
would be attacked by Col. Bratton with Jenkins' brigade; that
Jenkin's brigade was already across the creek, having crossed it at
the upper bridge, and was advancing toward the enemy's force
encamped on the left; that my brigade must follow Col. Bratton and
occupy the crest of the hill in front of the bridge as soon as Col.
Bratton had passed the hill in marching forward, and that,
connecting on the right with the two brigades on the right, I should
co-operate with them in preventing the enemy's force on the right
from moving up the road to the aid of that on the left. In an hour
or two I was ordered to advance. I crossed the creek, and had to
halt again for some time till the troops in my front could get out
of my way. At length my brigade ascended the ridge indicated and
formed in line of battle on it. I discovered almost immediately that
the road was too far off to be commanded from that line. The
distance could not have been less than 300 yards, and the
intervening ground was a thickly wooded mountain side, in some
places very steep, the wood entirely excluding a view of the road. I
thought the spirit rather than the letter of my instructions was to
be obeyed, and therefore I advanced the brigade till it came within
thirty yards of the road. There I halted again in line of battle.
Shortly after assuming this position I received an order to march to
the left to the railroad. I did so by the flank, thus leaving a wide
gap between my brigade and the two on the right.

On arriving at the railroad the
brigadier-general commanding informed me that he wished me to select
the best position there for covering Col. Bratton on his return from
the attack on the left, whom he had ordered back, or was about to
order back. I then placed my line in the road which passes to the
right out of the road from the bridge and makes a short cut-off into
the valley road from which I had come. Thus my line faced
sufficiently toward the left to oppose any force moving from that
direction, and yet on the right commanded a part of the valley road,
by which it could intercept an attack from that side. Here I ordered
a breast-work of rails to be erected as quickly as possible. A
pretty good one was put up in a very short time. When this was about
completed the pickets reported to me that the enemy were near on the
right. I then turned the breast- work across the road at right
angles, and ran it thirty or forty yards into the woods. The men
formed behind this rectangular work. Soon afterward Col. Logan with
the pickets of the division, who having after night-fall been
relieved on the other side of the mountain had lately come up and
been placed under my command, was ordered by me from his first
position on my left to a position on my right in continuation of the
line across the road into the woods. This order he executed
promptly. These depositions made, we awaited the approach of the
enemy. Little firing had taken place. Our pickets had shot down
several cavalrymen attempting to dash up the road from the right to
the left where the fight was going on, and had taken a few
prisoners. The enemy, however, were still near at hand, and a part
of them had got into the wood and on the ridge which I by the
original order was to occupy. I heard them talking myself, and their
line was visible to the pickets. Thus they were threatening to cut
us off from the bridge. About the time Col. Logan had established
himself in his new position on my right in the woods I saw the first
of Col. Bratton's troops returning down the road. They proved to be
two regiments, the foremost commanded by Maj.-. They were moving in
perfect order, and without any sign of hurry or excitement. Knowing
that the enemy were in the wood toward the bridge, I requested the
major to form his regiment in front of the bridge and face the hill
instead of crossing over. He did so. I afterward found him in line
there. The rest of Col. Bratton's command passed down to the bridge
by another way nearer the creek, which way was out of my sight. When
the whole command had crossed the bridge, except the part of it
lately formed in line in front of the bridge, I moved my brigade
back to the bridge, leaving in the breast-works a strong line of
skirmishers. Col. Logan pursued a similar course with his command.
Arriving near the bridge, I deployed the Fifteenth Regt. Georgia
Volunteers as skirmishers in front of the bridge and of the line
referred to. This line then crossed the bridge and I followed it
with the three other regiments of my brigade. My skirmishers were
sent for when I commenced moving to the bridge with the three
brigades. They all came in safely; having repulsed two attacks of
the enemy, one a dash of a small cavalry party on the breast-work
across the road, the other an attack of infantry skirmishers on the
angle of the work. Thus, captain, I have given you an account of the
part which this brigade had in the night affair of the 28th, and I
regret much having had to use so many words for so little matter. We
had two or three wounded, not dangerously, and two are missing, no
doubt taken prisoners, as they went toward the part of the wood
occupied, as we afterward found out, by the enemy. It was important
to know where Gen. Robertson's left was. These two young men
volunteered to go and ascertain. They were gallant fellows. Their
names are John J. Boswell, Company C, Seventeenth Georgia, and David
Zachary, Company H, Seventeenth Georgia.