Momentum

The death of Robert McNamara spurred some thoughts on Vietnam and the catastrophic American effort there. Why did one of the two most powerful nations in the world have such trouble in a country that by economic and military standards should have been nowhere near a match? There are obvious reasons, like the sheer distance from the continental United States, the essential irrelevancy of Vietnam to American interests (Cold War and domino theory notwithstanding), the resiliency of the Vietnamese opponent, and the corruptness of the Southern Vietnamese government. All of the above, however, could also be applied to the Philippines in 1899-1902 and yet the United States managed to win a mixed conventional and counterinsurgency fairly handily. Why the difference?

One large difference is that, unlike the Philippines, Vietnam had external sponsors in China and the USSR who were willing to supply her with enormous quantities of arms, equipment, and training. Those sponsors also effectively shielded North Vietnam from a conventional invasion, as the United States was unwilling to repeat the Korean experience of the previous decade, when MacArthur’s run to the Yalu had provoked a massive Chinese intervention.

In addition, both the United States and its military were fundamentally different in the 1960s than they were in the first decade of the 20th century. The society that fought the war in the Philippines was in the throes of industrialization, but was still essentially an rural society, with 60% of the population living in rural areas. The society that fought the war in the 1960s was an urbanized one, with a substantial majority of people living in cities or suburbs of cities. The military, too, had changed. In the Philippines, it was either a long-service professional military which had spent the last several generations fighting wars out in the west against Native Americans, or volunteer units put together specifically for the war, consisting largely of young men from rural counties. It was very much an ad-hoc military, with small regimental communities defining its identity and ethos. It was a military that was bad at things we now take for granted, like logistics. The military in the 1960s was a conscripted army, based on the much larger divisional communities. This military’s recent experience of warfare had been that of mass, industrialized warfare, in both World War II and Korea, and it was designed to fight another World War, albeit this time against the Soviets. It was the military of an industrial society, emphasizing the use of machines to leverage manpower into something greater: machine guns, tanks, airplanes, ships.

Bringing someone like Robert McNamara in to lead this organization encouraged the further industrialization of the American military. McNamara, with an MBA from Harvard and former President of Ford Motor Company, was the epitome of a mind shaped by and shaping industrialization and capitalism. McNamara worked to optimize the military for conventional industrial war, exactly not the kind of war it would be fighting. Those methods and that mindset proved not to work particularly well for the Vietnam War, and the U.S. effort there foundered amidst the counterproductive use of massive firepower, chemical weapons like Agent Orange, and an insistence that the enemy and the conflict conform to American preconceptions. David Halberstam explored, better than I could, many of the specific ways that this industrial mindset shaped the effort of the United States.

McNamara, the poster child of the industrial approach to war, became the avatar of a conflict he never really understood. But what is even more fascinating is that, after Vietnam, the U.S. military largely refused to learn any lessons from it at all. The experience in South East Asia was essentially airbrushed out of American doctrine in the 1970s and early 80s, replaced by a renewed emphasis on the potential world war with the Soviet Union. Teaching about counterinsurgency was downgraded at all levels of the military education system, and the military rebuilt itself as warriors in the clearness of Reagan’s America and Tom Cruise’s Top Gun. Echoing that military refusal, the memory of Vietnam in American society at large became more focused on domestic betrayal and an unwillingness to use all methods available. In this, Vietnam was not enough of a total war. What was needed were more Curtis LeMays and fewer Lyndon Johnsons and Jane Fondas. Such attitudes survived well past the fall of the Soviet Union and were only brutally shifted by the increasing catastrophe of Iraq. While the re-conception of that war by the Army in 2005-06 had the salutary benefit of focusing on the war that America was actually fighting, rather than those it wished to be fighting, there are already those arguing that the new emphasis on counterinsurgency is too much, and risks America’s abilities to fight the kind of wars at which Robert McNamara excelled.

This is officially an award-winning blog

HNN, Best group blog: "Witty and insightful, the Edge of the American West puts the group in group blog, with frequent contributions from an irreverent band.... Always entertaining, often enlightening, the blog features snazzy visuals—graphs, photos, videos—and zippy writing...."

67 comments

One small quibble: is there any evidence that Robert McNamara did indeed excel at total war? He was only defense secretary during smaller wars and invasions, and as I understand it, he did pretty miserably at all of them.

McNamara had a vision of the kind of war that American society was equipped to fight. I would even say, after reading the recent commentary on the “100,000” project, the kind of war that America needed to fight, for certain criteria of needs. A war that could work within the feedback loops of the economy. One where soldiers learned skillsets in the field that would be in demand at home, and where men called up from their everyday work were provisionally equipped by that work for the war they were to fight.
For example, this kind of war would deploy vast quantities of tanks. Tanks go to bulldozers go to the construction industry, and frontline soldiers turn into heavy duty mechanics, ready to go home and keep the backhoes running.
Vietnam was not that kind of war. It turned on continuous infantry action that used men up without offering them anything like the life skills offered by, say, World War II. It was a war for mercenaries, by which in this context I mean men sufficiently motivated by their pay on the day. And a mass conscript army cannot, virtually by definition, be compensated in this fashion. America could field such an army, but it would be much smaller than the one that fought Vietnam. In fact, it would probably look a great deal like Special Operations Command –probably no coincidence.
And it would lose, because North Vietnam _was_ fighting a war within its industrial development feedback loop. North Vietnamese peasants who went to the front were being paid, in the coin of life experience, every time they got to drive a truck. how much of a coincidence is Vietnam’s postwar trajectory of prosperity?
Now _there_ is an assymetric warfare. I wonder, being no McNamara expert, whether he ever thought about it that way.

Well, he was never going to actually fight a total war. As soon as nuclear bombs were held by more than one nation it became impossible to engage in total war without being destroyed. Well, unless all the nuclear powers decided to gang up on some country that wasn’t, but that obviously wasn’t going to happen. In the configuration that existed, total war was impossible — not impossible to engage in, only impossible to survive intact. It’s too bad they didn’t realize the implications of this, but I suppose we should count ourselves lucky that they weren’t quite stupid enough to actually use nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

Has anyone won this sort of war in the last 50 years? Who has successfully “conquered” another country in the last half century? The only example I can think of is China. If your target has an ethnically-related population, you can drive everyone else out (e.g. the former Yugoslavia or Turkish Cyprus) and establish control that way. Or you can just level the place, like the Russians eventually had to do to Chechnya. But I knew that Iraq was going to be a disaster when it’s proponents couldn’t pick a historical model that came after the invention of the AK-47.

A truly excellent, as always, argument. I would particularly emphasize the fact that ALL “wars” fought at that time (the Cold War) with the specter of involving the two major Super Powers (2 1/2 if one included China) was of necessity fought on a “limited” basis. On the same note you could compare the Soviet experience in Afghanistan with the initial American. However, although you do not explicitly state the actual “why” a “conscripted army” made a difference in the respective outcomes I would like to note that, counter intuitively, it was my experience and others during that time that, on the whole, draftees made as good as, or better soldiers than enlistees. You can certainly make the point that, consequently, more people had a vested interest in the wars prosecution and risk, spread across a broader socio-economic spectrum has a signal leveling influence on public ardor.

“Has anyone won this sort of war in the last 50 years? Who has successfully “conquered” another country in the last half century?”

Your premise is incorrect. Vietnam was either (or both) an insurrection or a civil war in which the U.S. participated. There were no territorial ambitions. The Philippines were “won” by the U.S. from Spain as a consequence of the Spanish-American War and thus we inherited a “situation” to which we thought we were “legally” entitled. There have been a number of successful suppressions of insurrections over the decades. Greece following WWII, Malaya by the British, and most recently, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. As to the successful conclusions of Civil Wars there was Nigeria in the 60s, Ethiopia and the others you mention. I personally view the Bosnian and Kosovo arrangements as particularly noteworthy successes.

“One where soldiers learned skillsets in the field that would be in demand at home, and where men called up from their everyday work were provisionally equipped by that work for the war they were to fight.
For example, this kind of war would deploy vast quantities of tanks. Tanks go to bulldozers go to the construction industry, and frontline soldiers turn into heavy duty mechanics, ready to go home and keep the backhoes running.
Vietnam was not that kind of war.”

I’m afraid this is a fairly naive construct. The kind of practical “skill sets” one learns in the military are presumably (in this argument) derived more from support functions than combat. One can then do a fairly easy study of the respective “logistical tails” (currently referred to as the “Tooth to Tail Ratio” – the number of support troops required for one combat soldier). In WWI 28% of the troops were employed (or available) for direct combat. In WWII it was 19%. In Vietnam 7.5%.

The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INSThttp://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA472467

Vietnam was either (or both) an insurrection or a civil war in which the U.S. participated.

Is that the best way to view it? It’s hard to think of a war that couldn’t be phrased that way. Was the USSR “participating in a civil war” between the PDPA and the mujahideen? That doesn’t sound right. The Vietnam war seems a lot more like the Iraq invasion than it does to the fight between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil Tigers. If one side of a fight consists largely of another country’s soldiers, is “civil war” the best description? Would you argue that NATO is suppressing an insurrection against Karzai’s govt, not conducting an invasion?

Territorial ambitions are neither here nor there – it’s not the only reason for warfare. It’s a subset of something like “establishing political control over another country using your military”. Which doesn’t seem to have a strong record of success lately.

I withheld an irrelevant comment about how Top Gun and Red Dawn complement one another as cultural narratives. Then there was another one about the durability of the “total war” ontology in America and how it tends to shadow articles about the disintegrating economic bonds of “Chimerica,” perhaps gaining cultural expression in futurist-primitivist/post-apocalyptic movies like the Terminator franchise…

Then a search on the Red Dawn production staff yielded this: an upcoming remake, starring the Chinese as the stand-in inundating force. One can only assume the improvised weaponry will involve some novel, montage-making use of snakes and sparklers. That’ll teach those darn reds and their—I mean our houses full of disposable wares.

Is it accurate to counter that “total war” strategic dogma allows for little or no account for the role of terror and/or rogue regimes, but instead prefers to see the global map through the lenses of national homogeneity? My reaction to the “wars we wish we were fighting” is that they take no account of the heterogeneous economic and political relations structuring 21st century democracies, coupled with the fact that, as Philip Bobbitt asserts, the threats that emerge from such a state of affairs are “divorced from territorial sovereignty” and thus from traditional strategic remedies as well.

“Is that the best way to view it? It’s hard to think of a war that couldn’t be phrased that way.”

The War of 1812, Napoleonic Wars, The Mexican-American War, Spanish-American War, Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War, Russo-Japanese War, Sino-Japanese War, WWI, WWII, Iran-Iraq War, First and Second Gulf War? Need I go on? None of those could, by any stretch of the imagination, be termed an “insurrection” or a “civil war”.

“The Vietnam war seems a lot more like the Iraq invasion than it does to the fight between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil Tigers.”

I’d rather not go into a history lesson here, but for better understanding let me define my terms. An “insurrection” is an attempt by a group of citizens (invariably a small minority) to overthrow their government. A “civil war” is an attempt by a group of citizens to either; 1. form a separate state/government within the borders of the existing nation (United States, War of Spanish Succession, Boer, Sri Lanka), or 2. an insurrection achieves enough popular support that it can field its own standing army (i.e. the English, Mexican, Chinese & Russian Civil Wars).

“If one side of a fight consists largely of another country’s soldiers, is “civil war” the best description?”

Well, I’m open to suggestions. How would YOU characterize it? If the Confederate States of America had been lucky enough to win recognition from Great Britain, France or both, would it have ceased being a Civil War?

“Territorial ambitions are neither here nor there – it’s not the only reason for warfare. It’s a subset of something like “establishing political control over another country using your military”.

I agree with your first statement, disagree with your second. War is, as Clausewitz states, “the continuation of politics by other means”, but does not necessarily involve a second country, particularly, by definition, in the case of a “civil” war.

P.S. I WOULD argue that NATO is suppressing an insurrection against Karzai’s government or, giving the Taliban the benefit of the doubt (Vietnam-like), fighting on the side of the Karzai government in a civil war.

In addition, both the United States and its military were fundamentally different in the 1960s than they were in the first decade of the 20th century. […]

I don’t understand what this sentence and the following paragraph mean. The distinction between a rural and an urban army seems both artificial and irrelevant to the topic of successful counter-insurgency fighting.

If I had to find reasons for US success in Philippines vs. failure in Vietnam, I’d list

As you mention, the lack of sponsors the Philippine Republic had, as well as generally all sorts of supplies (food, weapons, etc.) becoming much cheaper in real terms as the 20th century went on and technology improved
US not being so squeamish about causing death and suffering to the civilian population. Quoth Wikipidea:”U.S. attacks into the countryside often included scorched earth campaigns where entire villages were burned and destroyed, torture (water cure) and the concentration of civilians into “protected zones” (concentration camps).” It worked for the US against the Filipinos, it worked for the British against the Boers, but it probably wouldn’t work today because
the media wasn’t as omnipresent or visual as it is today.

Erik Lund’s analysis is interesting but flawed in several areas:
first, I would question how transferrable the skills of modern mechanised warfare are to civilian life; a good tanker is not necessarily a good excavator driver (that would be a sapper);

second, you can’t argue that the US army in VN was mainly infantry learning useless skills, and that the VPA was mainly truck drivers learning useful ones. The US had a far larger logistic tail, and it’s the tail arms, not the teeth arms, that have the transferrable skills.

if he thinks that WW2 wasn’t an infantry-heavy war, he should think again; it was if anything more so than VN; what sort of “life skills” (if any) did an infantryman learn in New Guinea that his son would not learn in the Mekong Delta?

I’m very sceptical of the proposition that Vietnamese economic growth in the 1990s was due to the skills that the Vietnamese population had learned in the 1960s and 1970s. For a start, by the time real growth started in the late 1980s after the Doi Moi reforms, roughly half the Vietnamese workforce was too young to have fought in the war. The war veterans were all mid-thirties or older, and very many of them were dead or crippled.

So basically McNamara bucked the trend and fought the war *before* last?

Question: if we had listened to Eisenhower about the military-industrial complex, would we have had a military better equipped (doctrinally and organizationally) to have fought the kind of war Vietnam actually was, not the kind McNamara wanted it to be? (This is somewhat reminiscent of Rumsfeld’s quote about going to war with the army you have – exactly whose responsibility did he think it was to decide what kind of army the US needed to have and then make sure it had it, if not the SecDef’s?)

As for the Dolchstosslegende, I don’t think the Iraq war has dislodged it from our national politics. Rather, it is another example – we would be Winning In Iraq (don’t ask what that means) if not for the traitorous liberals who want us to lose. The marginalization, for now, of the people who believe this does not make them nonexistent or unimportant.

But what is even more fascinating is that, after Vietnam, the U.S. military largely refused to learn any lessons from it at all. The experience in South East Asia was essentially airbrushed out of American doctrine in the 1970s and early 80s

I first heard about this refusal-to-learn in Andrew Bacevich’s New American Militarism. I find it boggling — “learning to fight the last war” is the stereotypical weakness of officer training, not “refusing to learn to fight the last war because it turned out to be no fun”.

I would love to hear from other historians and/or military about “Vietnam amnesia” and its causes. I’ll dig out my copy of Bacevich and refresh my memory about what he said, but IIRC it wasn’t really clear to me.

I think what the military learned from the Vietnam War is that they didn’t want to fight another one. Hence the Powell Doctrine, which places all kinds of limits on the commitment of the American military, and promotes the use of force only in instances where massive firepower and overwhelming mobility can be used — the things in which the American military has no equal.

Powell and his peers who served as junior officers in Vietnam were shaken by the experience and the damage that it did to the institution of the armed services. They did not want a repeat. (It also led, in my opinion, to their complete opposition to reinstating the draft.)

Yes, logistics absorbed vastly the greater proportion of American armed forces personnel in World War II and Vietnam. The logistics branches also suffered comparatively light casualties.
The problem lay in motivating the fighting –dying– arms.
What did fighting soldiers receive that might have compensated them? They learned to operate, and, more importantly, _maintain_ their equipment.
Because, no, a sapper is not a better backhoe operator than a tanker, because driving a backhoe isn’t hard. Teenagers do that. What teens do not do is load _their_ backhoe onto a trailer one dark morning, drive it a hundred miles up a logging road, and run it there for the three days that it takes to repair a washed out road, where calling a mechanic when something breaks means missing a mortgage payment.
Now, if I were talking about the US army in WWII, or the NVA in 1975/79, I could throw in a truck (double clutch!), or a radio just as easily. The issue from this is the electronics sales and services shop down the street, the everyday infrastructure of a modern economy.
This was a novel challenge for the Vietnamese economy when the NVA did all this in 1975, and then some more in Cambodia. It was a novel challenge for the US Army in 1944 –even the infantry. It is hardly a coincidence that the bulldozer and chainsaw penetrated modern society in 1939–45 after decades on the periphery.
I’m not saying that this sufficiently explains the fact that the WWII could be fought, but it would be folly not to recognise the social change that had taken place by the time of the Vietnam War, especially when Robert McNamara put his finger on it.
The best way to fight and win a war is to make it an incidental trade school. That was what McNamara had in mind, and it worked for most of the Americans who went there. It failed at that task for the infantry to an extent that it had not in 1939–45, because of that social/technological change. This was a grievious, perhaps fatal failure. Notice how few memoirs of either war feature someone who spent the war fixing aircraft engines? The social wounds were inflicted when men died.

“I first heard about this refusal-to-learn in Andrew Bacevich’s New American Militarism. I find it boggling — “learning to fight the last war” is the stereotypical weakness of officer training, not “refusing to learn to fight the last war because it turned out to be no fun”.

I have not read Bacevich, but understand his “Long War” is considered a seminal read. There’s a little hyperbole in that last line, but it certainly has merit. There was a debate, however brief, initiated during the Clinton administration about a “Heavy” vs “Light” Army. Unfortunately, the “Light” proponents (Special Forces, Special Ops, the “elite” infantry/airborne units) never gained any traction. “Civil Affairs” was considered the role of the State Dept before Rumsfeld.

“I think what the military learned from the Vietnam War is that they didn’t want to fight another one. Hence the Powell Doctrine, which places all kinds of limits on the commitment of the American military, and promotes the use of force only in instances where massive firepower and overwhelming mobility can be used — the things in which the American military has no equal.”

The Powell Doctrine has much merit, but I would contend nowhere does it necessarily promote the use of massive firepower (although, if that’s all you’ve got . . . ). On the other hand, fighting an insurgency would, almost by definition, violate at least three of Powell’s precepts.

I’ll have to look for “The Long War”. Dear Inter Library Loan, how I love you …

the “Light” proponents (Special Forces, Special Ops, the “elite” infantry/airborne units) never gained any traction. “Civil Affairs” was considered the role of the State Dept before Rumsfeld.

I wonder how much (a) was due to the “Light” Army being less of a feeding-trough for the military-industrial complex than the “Heavy” Army is. And I wonder how much (b) was due to wariness about taking on frank imperialism before PNAC.

I can hardly claim much expertise in the military arena, but my sense of what Powell was advocating was the use of force in settings where all of our advantages — mechanized warfare, artillery, air and naval power, technology and mobility could be brought to bear (along with substantial national interest, popular support, a clear goal and a clear exit strategy). I believe he characterized the use of force to be a last resort, but one that when applied should be overwhelming and disproportionate.

Bacevich is very good — I thought “The Limits of Power” was also a very worthwhile read.

The irony of the Powell Doctrine is pretty clear by now, I think. I mean, I’m for it — and I could be reasonably characterized as “one of those dirty hippy peaceniks”. But in actual practice, Powell and his Doctrine folded like a house of cards in the face of Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld.

From this not-very-distant historical perspective, the Powell Doctrine looks as though it was designed to give the military cover to resist the desires of Democratic Presidents, but it was tossed aside when a Republican was at the helm.

This is something Bacevich talks about as a post-Vietnam development in the culture of the officer corps: that they became more politicized in a specific, Republican (and Christianist) direction.

The impression I get is that the officer corps developed a Dolchstoßlegende to explain Vietnam — while simultaneously refusing to “re-fight the last war” enough to come up with a way to actually *win* the next similar action. The interwar Germans may have *blamed* the Jews for the stab-in-the-back, but they also developed the Blitzkrieg to ensure that the next war would actually be different.

It looks to me almost as though the American military subculture and its admirers blamed their Dolchstoß on a specific political party, the Democrats. In practice, the Powell Doctrine was designed to specifically protect the military’s backs from *Democratic* knives — Republicans have been assumed to “support the troops”.

I dunno. I think the bigger problem was the underestimation by the United States on the part of the Vietnamese. It wasn’t obvious a) how serious the backers of a Communist Vietnam were or would be and b) how contemptuous the U.S. was. I suppose the emphasis on an industrial/mechanized army is part of that but also consider the small number of troops in the beginning of the war. Even in a small country like Vietnam, complete dominance requires a massive amount of troops which was a big problem until it was too late.

“I wonder how much (a) was due to the “Light” Army being less of a feeding-trough for the military-industrial complex than the “Heavy” Army is. And I wonder how much (b) was due to wariness about taking on frank imperialism before PNAC.”

I think it is more mundane. The guys from the regular arms (infantry, armor, artillery) tend to look upon the Special Forces, Airborne, etc with the kind of disdain you might find at an engineering school for architects or art history majors. (it’s interesting to note how many of Petraeus’ coterie of colonels own PhDs in the social sciences). Then there’s that boyish preference for large toys that make a lot of noise.

“The impression I get is that the officer corps developed a Dolchstoßlegende to explain Vietnam”

A what????????

“From this not-very-distant historical perspective, the Powell Doctrine looks as though it was designed to give the military cover to resist the desires of Democratic Presidents, but it was tossed aside when a Republican was at the helm.”

*Vietnam was either (or both) an insurrection or a civil war in which the U.S. participated. There were no territorial ambitions*

Well, right- “we” weren’t planning a 51st State, or anything… and I’m sure “we” don’t have designs on Italy, Germany, Turkey, Okinawa, etc etc… except as “strategic watch-towers”. But I can imagine that those who live near one of our hundreds of installations consider it rather “ambitious” on “our” part… and a territorial involvement…

I guess “politics by another means” might explain the Iran/Iraq war… but I wonder if that would have happened if “we” had managed to keep the Shah in place. I mean, wasn’t Saddam visualizing himself as a kind of latter-day Nasser? (I remember his “long barrel” that he was planning to lob stink bombs with, into Jerusalem…)

Is it just a coincidence that a US would try to- what?- ‘resuscitate’ a former French colony, and a generation later try to do the same with a former British “zone of influence”? Hearing the vilification of the Brits by Iranian clerics last week kinda took me back (maybe ‘aback’, as well… or would have, were I Brit). ^..^

“But I can imagine that those who live near one of our hundreds of installations consider it rather “ambitious” on “our” part… and a territorial involvement…”

Undoubtedly some do. Saudi Arabia being a classic case. Others are quite pleased to have the reassuring presence. Much of Europe at one time or another, South Korea . . . hey, we’re Americans, we’re supposed to be “ambitious”.

“I guess “politics by another means” might explain the Iran/Iraq war… but I wonder if that would have happened if “we” had managed to keep the Shah in place.”

Probably not, but I’m not sure I get your point.

“Is it just a coincidence that a (the) US would try to- what?- ‘resuscitate’ a former French colony, and a generation later try to do the same with a former British “zone of influence”?”

Even if the point you’re trying to make is for a U.S. Empire supplanting the ol’ European one, I’d still say it was a coincidence.

“Hearing the vilification of the Brits by Iranian clerics last week kinda took me back (maybe ‘aback’, as well… or would have, were I Brit).”

A “stab-in-the-back-myth”, DaKooch. Used to describe the attitude of the German officer corps after the Great War – “we weren’t defeated on the battlefield, we were stabbed in the back by the filthy socialists/liberals/Reds” – and possibly relevant to more recent political debates in the US.

The guys from the regular arms (infantry, armor, artillery) tend to look upon the Special Forces, Airborne, etc with the kind of disdain you might find at an engineering school for architects or art history majors.

I don’t think they do, actually. Are you seriously suggesting that the average infantry officer thinks “Special Forces – bunch of wets who don’t know anything about real warfare?”

“A “stab-in-the-back-myth”, DaKooch. Used to describe the attitude of the German officer corps after the Great War – “we weren’t defeated on the battlefield, we were stabbed in the back by the filthy socialists/liberals/Reds” – and possibly relevant to more recent political debates in the US.”

Oh! You mean like the “Lost Cause” devotees you can still find lurking down South.

Listen, perhaps I was being a little too glib or there was something lost in the metaphor, but I do contend that there is a serious unease amongst the (at least higher) echelons with the “Light” Army people. It is not that they don’t know anything about “real warfare”, but that they can’t be trusted with the larger issues. Great at tactics, but don’t know shit about strategy.

But in actual practice, Powell and his Doctrine folded like a house of cards in the face of Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld.

I thought at the time that naming Powell Secretary of State was an odd move – as a career military man he seemed like a solid choice for Defense, but State seemed to both waste the skills he did have, and potentially call for ones he didn’t.

In light of this thread, I wonder if he wasn’t being shunted aside so that he couldn’t speak up for his doctrine because he was both out of the military, and kept busy by his other responsibilities. IIRC, there’s now some evidence Bush was planning war with Iraq not only before 9/11, but even before the election, so his cabinet appointments could certainly have been part of that planning. (This would imply that Powell was set up to fail at State so that the collapse of negotiations could help justify the war. Failure, in turn, would further discredit any attempt he made to defend the doctrine bearing his name. In that light, appointing him to a job outside his area of expertise makes perfect sense. Ironically, now I’m the one suggesting that a general was stabbed in the back.)

There’s really not much a cabinet secretary *other* than Defense can do about a bad *military* decision by the President except maybe say “I think this is a bad idea”, and even that would be an extraordinary, probably career-ending, step if done publicly. (Meanwhile, several senior military officers who *did* oppose the war on Powell Doctrine-like grounds were fired, IIRC.)

The Powell Doctrine was never a law (not that Bush followed the law either, for that matter), just a prediction about when it was a dumb idea to involve the American military. Seems to me it proved completely accurate.

P.S. If you really think that the last war was lost *because of* civilian control of the military and how it handicapped the war effort, then fighting the last war would logically consist precisely of trying to remove civilian constraints on the military and getting public opinion in favor of the war via domestic propaganda. The actual military operations are beside the point if you believe they aren’t why you lost last time.

From that PoV, the Powell Doctrine is not a sensible precaution to be taken before sticking the nation’s hand into a meatgrinder, but rather, one of the very restraints on the military that weaken the nation, and circumventing or destroying it would be a high priority.

I think Powell had all the credentials to be a fine Secretary of State — other than working for a tool of a president. Oh, and being a Republican didn’t help. But George Marshall went from being career military to a very successful Secretary of State.

dakooch,

I think that a “stab in the back” theory similar to the post World War I German experience did occur in the U.S., but was largely the province of shameless right wing politicians and pundits. I don’t get the sense that the military elite felt that the failure in Vietnam stemmed from this, although, I think they rightly decided that continued political support for a war was an important factor in deciding to use force.

“From this not-very-distant historical perspective, the Powell Doctrine looks as though it was designed to give the military cover to resist the desires of Democratic Presidents, but it was tossed aside when a Republican was at the helm.”

For example, Powell had no hesitation in backing President Clinton down on gays in the military. IIRC, he appeared on TV criticizing the repeal of the ban, which was unheard of.

Oh, and you are absolutely right about the army historically having an insitutional skepticism towards “light” forces and those who lead them. Army doctrine from the Civil War through World War II was pretty much focused on massive firepower — it’s hard to change such long established institutional mindsets.

The marines, which have been deployed more frequently in brush fire wars and have always had much lighter forces, have been friendlier to the light approach.

Re. Vietnam, I doubt there was as much of a Dolchstoßlegende as some people seem to think. After all, the war wasn’t lost when we made peace in 1973 — it was more than lost two years later after the successful “war president,” Nixon, was driven from office. His Vietnam strategy from 1969 onwards was, in my view, fairly sound: “Vietnamization,” a steady drawdown of US ground forces, sustained air support with better precision strike capabilities, and what one long-forgotten grad school professor of mine called “the strategic isolation of the battlefield” — the establishment of friendly relations with the PRC. This cut off the principal secure supply route between the USSR and North Vietnam and forced greater reliance on the port of Haiphong, which was (after the start of the Easter Offensive in 1972) interdicted with good success. The Easter Offensive was contained, with enormous NVA losses, by Vietnamese ground forces backed by increasingly effective US airpower. So who’s to say the lessons were “airbrushed out of US doctrine?” The importance of indigenous forces, the success (albeit small-scale) of the USMC CAP program, the need for ever-improving precision airstrike capabilities and effective suppression of enemy air defense — all these were digested during the late 1970s and 80s. The Army’s emphasis quite naturally shifted to the European theater where the USSR’s military capabilities were peaking, and our doctrinal response — AirLand Battle — was appropriate. My Army colleagues argue, with modest justification, that the doctrine proved itself in Iraq in 1991, and I’m happy to concede that while privately arguing that airpower won that sorry excuse for a war.

But the point today is that the current emphasis on COIN and peacekeeping is not misplaced. Can anyone see a strong likelihood of a “big war?” Frankly, I’m with Tom Barnett on this one, and therefore OK with bagging the FCS and curtailing F-22 production.

Oops! Meant to say the Vietnam War “was lost more than two years later.” Largely because of Watergate, which leads to interesting speculation about the role of chance and circumstance in history. In this case a minimum-wage security guard notices a door latch taped open across rather than down, and thereby visible. A not very competent bag job unravels, along with a presidency. The counterfactual is what an untainted President Nixon might have been able to do in the way of deterring Hanoi, at least until 1977.

The distinction between a rural and an urban army seems both artificial and irrelevant to the topic of successful counter-insurgency fighting.

Sorry about the delay in answering; I’d been called away by a number of things. As you might guess, I don’t think it’s an artificial distinction at all. The rural society that was America in the 19th century produced an army that was good at things that I would identify as being particular to a rural society: long-range scouting, individual infantry skills like accurate shooting, and tracking. All of these played a substantial role in the waging of the war in the Philippines in 1900-01, when it was really decided. The concentration camps that you point to were actually less important and came in late 1901-02 in the areas that were holding out. The war had already turned in the U.S. favor by the time what we think of as modern counterinsurgency tactics were deployed.

By contrast, the urban and industrialized United States of the 20th century produced an army in its image, which was good at the things that you might suspect: the mass production of firepower and the application of that firepower, the organization and supply of large units of soldiers, sailors, and marines, and so on. Those things translated badly in the Vietnamese situation.

After all, the war wasn’t lost when we made peace in 1973

You are applying the same problematic measure of victory/defeat that the military did in Vietnam. Occupying terrain is not a useful measure in this case. The North Vietnamese goal with regards to the Americans was to drive them out of Vietnam. They did so, and were then free to turn to dealing with the South Vietnamese. We were defeated in southeast Asia and should have learned those lessons.

So who’s to say the lessons were “airbrushed out of US doctrine?”

Uh, I think I just did. The lessons of Vietnam were not gathered and incorporated into American doctrine and practice and the topic largely disappeared from the military education system. That AirLand Battle was an enormously successful conventional doctrine (and I agree with you that it was) does not mean that knowledge and planning for counterinsurgency should have been essentially eliminated from the military knowledge base.

The lessons of Vietnam (I and II, and Algeria, and Yemen, and Angola, and Mozambique, and Rhodesia, and Afghanistan, etc) were learned quite well in the AUS, actually; there’s a reason the US 3rd Army didn’t roll on Baghdad in 1991, for example.

The lesson is that in the postwar 20th Century, a counterinsurgency war by a foreign power within a third-world nation is doomed to failure, because the locals always have more skin in the game than the outsiders.

Imperialism/colonialism has alway lost to nationalism in a post WW II conflict where the combatants are peers – and given the US strategy of fighting a geographically limited ground war within Vietnam (along the line of TR Fehrenbach’s “this kind of war” statement), that basically meant that there would always be more Vietnamese nationalist 11 Bravos than American (or “Free World,” including the ARVN) 11Bs.

The only real excpetion to the above post-WW II is Malaya, and the great difference there is the “insurgents” were ethnic Chinese – a minority who tended to stand out from the majority Malay/Muslim population. Little tough for the guerilla to “swim among the people” when he was, essentially, flopping around in a puddle…

Iraq II was, is, and remains an idiocy of the highest order; not quite as bad as the Athenian expedition to Sicily, but close…Vietnam is up there in Athenians to Sicily territory, of course. Korea, for that matter, was not far behind.

The PI-US war in 1899-1903 was another century, essentially; it had as much (or more) in common with the campaigns against the Seminole in the first two decades of the 19th Century as it did with Vietnam or Iraq…

Looking for contrasts between the age of the Krag/Mauser and the M-2/M-16/SKS/AK-47 (much less Elihu Root and William MacNamara) seems more than a little forced.

* I do contend that there is a serious unease amongst the (at least higher) echelons with the “Light” Army people. It is not that they don’t know anything about “real warfare”, but that they can’t be trusted with the larger issues. Great at tactics, but don’t know shit about strategy*

My conjecture would be that, “Light” Army or “Heavy”, there’s pretty much agreement on overall Strategies of “maintaining the Defense Budget at recent historical levels, or better”…

My question about the Iran/Iraq War was to wonder aloud if it was essentially a “proxy” war- the US ‘punishing’ Iran by use of Saddam Hussein… which suited HIS career goals, gave an opportunity to pit Arab Shi’a against their Persian brethren, slap down the Kurds with impunity, and burnish his credentials as the “Arab Strongman” in the region. The effective ‘end’ of the war resulted from an overt US Navy engagement… the Argus strike on the civilian Iranian airliner. At that point, our new “regional ally”, Saddam, became our strategic headache, as well… & the beat goes on… ^..^

The lessons of Vietnam (I and II, and Algeria, and Yemen, and Angola, and Mozambique, and Rhodesia, and Afghanistan, etc) were learned quite well in the AUS, actually; there’s a reason the US 3rd Army didn’t roll on Baghdad in 1991, for example.

They really weren’t learned at all; they were avoided, just as rolling on Baghdad was avoided.

Looking for contrasts between the age of the Krag/Mauser and the M-2/M-16/SKS/AK-47 (much less Elihu Root and William MacNamara) seems more than a little forced

The difference in the weapons systems you mention above is exactly why the comparison is important.

the Vietnam War “was lost more than two years later.” Largely because of Watergate

That’s pretty much a Dolchstoßlegende right there, dude.

I’m curious — how old are you, roughly? I was born in the 50s, so grew up during the Vietnam War. My memory is that by 1968 it was widely perceived that the war was militarily unwinnable, for precisely the reasons TF Smith gives above:

in the postwar 20th Century, a counterinsurgency war by a foreign power within a third-world nation is doomed to failure, because the locals always have more skin in the game than the outsiders.

My memory also is that by 1968 there was *already* a considerable Dolchstoßlegende developing among the pro-war civilians and at least some military leaders. They couldn’t believe that the US was losing to a bunch of gooks, and they were fervent in their belief that the only thing stopping a US victory was domestic reluctance to BOMB MOAR.

This is why I’m asking how old you are. Are your ideas about what went on in the Vietnam Era based on personal observation, or on what you’ve heard from others, or on historical research?

“I don’t think the whole of Southeast Asia, as related to the present and future safety and freedom of the people of this country, is worth the life or limb of a single American…I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty bloody dollar crooked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed exploited people, they will arrive at a solution of their own design and want, that they fight and work for. And if, unfortunately, their revolution must be of the violent type…at least what they get will be their own and not the American style, which they don’t want…crammed down their throat.”

David M. Shoup
Pierce College (Los Angeles)
1966

Now, who was Shoup, some dirty hippie?

Not quite.

Shoup, a former commandant of the Marine Corps (four stars) and MOH recipient from Tarawa – along with James Gavin, Matthew Ridgway, Lauris Norstad, Henry Hester, and a battalion’s worth of extraordinarily distinguished WW II-era flag and general officers – all spoke out against Vietnam, and long before it was accepted.

And to give DDE credit, there were quite a few China Lobby types in the GOP and elsewhere in 1954 who wanted the US to save the French at Dien Bien Phu, to the extent there was active planning for USAF air strikes and even the deployment of a corps (2-3 divisions) worth of troops from Korea and CONUS…thankfully, all of the above was aborted in time by Ike, among others.

Unfortunately, the LBJs and MacNamaras of the world triumphed, and in 1967 the US jumped in with both feet, to our everloving misfortune.

The same sorts of idiots triumphed under Bush and Cheney, and we have the chance to re-run the king of Epirus’ triumphs for the rest of this decade…yippee.

I would suggest that simply by changing “east” to “west” in Shoup’s quote above, one would have a perfectly functional foreign policy for the 21st Century with regard to all the lands – whether occupied by our “friends” or “enemies” between the Med and the Arabian Sea…

First of all, I would like to thank Silbey for a truly superb thread, but we may need someone to do a summary of the points of view (all well-stated) here for those of us even mildly afflicted with ADD.

That having been said let me address a few issues;

The Powell Doctrine

Contra Dr Science Wikipedia is not necessarily MY friend. My original understanding was based on readings done years ago, but to refresh it went there and found “The List” and, being time-constrained used its authority in the argument,

“On the other hand, fighting an insurgency would, almost by definition, violate at least three of Powell’s precepts.”

I would suggest everyone read it. My original understanding was essentially twofold; 1. “sufficient” force (not exclusively military) be applied to a given situation and 2. the military be given a clear mandate/objectives. Not only does this NOT rule out COIN, but encapsulates it (and I might add, various humanitarian missions at which the military has become quite adept). In retrospect I find the Wiki article wanting and would claim his statement that, “The reason for our success is that in every instance we have carefully matched the use of military force to our political objectives,” is an excellent directive for any soldier/statesman.

Dolchstoßlegende

Aside from a certain Jungian appeal in describing a certain mindset I would contend it has no (or exceeding little) intellectual traction amongst the higher echelons of the military. Maybe in some VA facilities, various programs on “Talk Radio” and a bunker here and there in the inter mountain region east of the Cascade/Sierra cordillera, but not where it counts.

Ralph Hitchens

While a very interesting argument with much merit and does much to address the issue of “civil war” it fails to address the “insurgency” issue. For that failure (and it was) I suggest reading Neil Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie, John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam”.

T.F. Smith

“The lesson is that in the postwar 20th Century, a counterinsurgency war by a foreign power within a third-world nation is doomed to failure”

Well, making a blanket statement and then noting a classic exception one would think you might also amend the original statement. Granted “ethnicity” is one means of isolating an insurgency, but so is religion, economic status and virtually any other human condition that provided the original impetus. Some are obviously more easily “isolated” than others, but it does not mean that COIN doesn’t work, it only indicates how difficult it is.

“there’s a reason the US 3rd Army didn’t roll on Baghdad in 1991”

The reason was they had achieved their military and political goal, they had removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Bush Sr may have been a poor domestic President, but internationally he was one of the more astute.

“Looking for contrasts between the age of the Krag/Mauser and the M-2/M-16/SKS/AK-47 (much less Elihu Root and William MacNamara) seems more than a little forced.”

Aside from the personality contrasts, Root/MacNamara (who said that? Did I miss something?) I’m inclined to agree on the technology argument.

Dr Science

“I’m curious — how old are you, roughly? I was born in the 50s, so grew up during the Vietnam War. My memory is that by 1968 it was widely perceived that the war was militarily unwinnable, for precisely the reasons TF Smith gives above”

I was in ROTC in 1968 and that was the year we “began” to think it might be unwinnable. Ralph’s argument has merit for the foreign policy aspects vis-a-vis the ongoing Paris Peace Talks. Characterizing it as some sort of cultural psychosis is, in a word, unkind.

All

Granted the Iraq War was, as Tom Ricks’ describes it, a “Fiasco” it does not necessarily follow that you throw in the towel and sulk home. As an Australian COIN expert states, “just because you entered stupidly doesn’t mean you have to leave stupidly.”

Shoup is also, I believe, the man who during the Cuban missile crisis made a presentation in which he superimposed a map of Tarawa on a map of Cuba and detailed the casualties incurred in taking the microscopic island in the Pacific during World War II to argue against an invasion of Cuba.

He, Gavin, and Ridgeway were extraordinary military leaders who were probably not fully utilized as they should have been.

“My conjecture would be that, “Light” Army or “Heavy”, there’s pretty much agreement on overall Strategies of “maintaining the Defense Budget at recent historical levels, or better”…”

I would guess (merely) not, unless getting rid of expensive weapons systems in return for increasing the manpower and pay proved to be a wash.

“My question about the Iran/Iraq War was to wonder aloud if it was essentially a “proxy” war- the US ‘punishing’ Iran by use of Saddam Hussein… which suited HIS career goals, gave an opportunity to pit Arab Shi’a against their Persian brethren, slap down the Kurds with impunity, and burnish his credentials as the “Arab Strongman” in the region. The effective ‘end’ of the war resulted from an overt US Navy engagement… the Argus strike on the civilian Iranian airliner. At that point, our new “regional ally”, Saddam, became our strategic headache, as well… & the beat goes on… ”

Perhaps you are mistaking me for someone else, but I have no issue with any of those gentlemen or their statements. I should note though that AT THE TIME the General with the most cachet was Maxwell Taylor and, for better or worst he was a Vietnam hawk.

Well, the word on the street is that after V-N the Army decided they would never again fight a guerrilla war in a country with trees.

While interesting, the thread seems to indicate that, like generals, historians like to fight the last war they won. My takeaway from a look back is somewhat different in bullet points. As for my age, I was about to go in the service in 1968 when two vets from V-N convinced me it would be both criminal and stupid.

There was nothing in V-N for the US to win. There was no strategic significance, no vital natural resource, and certainly no hope that representative government would improve the lives of the areas under our sway. In fact, by most accounts the area we controlled underwent a shocking social devolution, while being made increasingly uninhabitable by defoliants, mines, and unexploded bomblets and bombs.

Nobody is looking at how the stage was set. The 1956 Peace Accords specified free elections in 1958. V-N was temporarily partitioned, with many southerners going north and many northerners going south. Many of the troops we called northerners were actually southerners intimately familiar with what they regarded as their own land.

The bottom line to all this was that most of the people we thought of as civilians actually had relatives on both sides of the fence, a sort of family insurance policy so that no matter which side won, some family members would be on that side. Naturally, nothing we did was a secret for long.

Nobody has mentioned the corruption described by Dave Hackworth. From this and other first-person histories it seems obvious that our officer corps was not up to snuff. In fact, their own troops began shooting them, never a good sign.

It may pay to take a second look at the war we “won”, the Philippine insurrection. Apparently “winning” in that context consisted of denying the Filipinos self-government. It seems obvious from the rather tenuous hold of the Filipino government, even today, in some rural areas, that the US did not actually govern large areas of the Philippines at all in 1910.

Instead, what we created in the early 20th century in the Philippines was a “failed state”, one that would toggle between corrupt rule by politicians and generals with colonial oversight by the US until the wheels finally fell off the colonial bandwagon after WW II. After that we supported dictators until the people power revolution in the Philippines finally brought a semblance of democracy.

What we “won” in the Philippines was a coaling station for the US fleet- a fleet that was shortly to begin the conversion to oil-firing. (My dad’s ship in WW II was the Vestal, built as a collier in 1909, converted to fleet repair in 1927.) As long as those facilities, and American business interests, remained secure from either self-government by the Filipinos or invasion, we had no further interest in the country. We declared victory and got out of 98% of the Filipinos country and lives.

That option wasn’t available in V-N. Having no strategic reason to be in V-N, we were left only with the defense of the counterfeit country we had created from the whole cloth by refusing the re-unification elections of the Geneva Peace Accords. The longer we stayed, the less likely it became that any of the gangsters or generals could convincingly create a “democracy” that would withstand attacks by the former owners.

Americans in general thought we went to V-N to “save” the country. That was the trap Johnson fell into when we first saw Marines wading ashore from landing craft. McNamara was just frosting on this delusional cake.

A) The Philippine Insurrection/Philippine-American War/etc offers positive lessons regarding the strategic, political, or economic value of imperialism for the United States;
B) Ditto for the US involvement in Vietnam;
C) Ditto for Iraq and Afghanistan;

“When we invaded Iraq, we took on a moral and legal responsibility for its people’s well being.”

Anyone agree?

If so, does this statement follow from the one above?

“Regardless of anyone’s position on the decision to invade, those obligations still stand and cannot be wished away merely because they have proven inconvenient…”

See, I disagree; I think they can be wished away, in the same way American “obligations” to the RVN were, Soviet obligations to the Communist regime in Afghanistan were, French obligations to the pieds noires and Algerie Francaise were, and even British obligations to their various puppet states in Asia and Africa over the past century were…

Puppet states, by definition, do not impose obligations on great powers; in fact, it is the other way around…great nations, after all, have only interests, not friends…

I agree on all points save the “family insurance policy”, perhaps you’re just being glib? Hackworth’s “About Face” is a great read.

T.F. Smith

I can’t speak for anyone else here, but I agree with the first part of your comments on US “imperialism”. On the other hand I also agree with Powell’s statement that, “you broke it, you own it”. While in large part subscribing to the Real Politick to which you seem to allude, I would suggest that if we have any pretense to holding some moral “high ground” (and the proponents of American exceptionalism make me cringe) than we do have some obligation superior to, at least the French and Soviets (I would suggest that the Brit’s had some successes). Furthermore, unlike Vietnam, we do have some very strategic interests in the region and, unlike your characterization, I am unwilling to concede that the Maliki government is a “puppet”.

Sir Charles

“There’s something funky about the way the comments appear here”

I have read where others here see seem to have that problem, but I don’t seem to. Your comment about Shoup, Gavin, et al, although addressed to me, did not seem (at least to me) to be addressing anything I’d said specifically (it was TF Smith’s comment), but to use the ol’ saw, “just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean people aren’t plotting against you” I took some (a very little) umbrage.

However, it was I that brought up Maxwell Taylor, soldier/scholar/statesman (and, inevitably schmuck). Hopefully (ahh, the persistent dream) Petraeus will do better.

“When we invaded Iraq, we took on a moral and legal responsibility for its people’s well being.”

“Legal”? That’s a bit odd.

“Moral responsibility . . .” sounds right, but its too indefinite.

“. . . for it’s people’s well-being”? Too broad.

But if there was generally something like safety and order in Iraq before we invaded (and it seems there was–for the most part, if you stayed out of politics, you weren’t a target of the regime), then it seems there’s some kind of moral responsibility to leave it in a condition superior to bloody and apocalyptic anarchy.

The legal bit comes under the obligations of occupying powers, as per the Geneva Conventions. I don’t have the reference, but it’s real. Unless, of course, international law doesn’t exist, which is the view of some…

I think the US abandoned the moral high ground in Southwest Asia a long time ago; 1967, at least, if not before…

The quotes are from the aforementioned Col. Kilcullen; my point is if the above is typical of the outlook of “the new broom” than the US is in an even deeper hole than under the last bunch of true believers…

As far as the “strategic interests” go, I have yet to hear an convincing explanation of what, exactly, they are and how they are threatened in any way by which particular group of locals (Baathist, Islamist, Nationalist, Fascist, Communist, Socialist, Masonic, or Rotarian) are in power in which particular fiction of the British and French foreign ministries, circa-1919, that remain in existence today.

If they have oil, they still depend on a stable world market to make money; if they don’t, where’s the interest?

I don’t know enough about the Taylor-Kennedy relationship to make a comment; on balance, it looks like a wash. It is worth mentioning that Ridgway took over 8th Army pretty close to the nadir of US fortunes in Korea, and so would, I expect, have a better idea of the realities of American power in Asia, as opposed to Taylor’s experience…

It is a debatable point, but more than a few of the “red” marines (from Butler through Krulak, Shoup, and Walt) had spent a lot more time out in the boondocks than many of their Army peers; it might be worth looking at where the China-Burma and Pacific theater(s) Army veterans fell out on Vietnam in the 1950s-60s time frame, as opposed to their peers who had been in the European theater…

“I think the US abandoned the moral high ground in Southwest Asia a long time ago; 1967, at least, if not before…”

Pity the poor foreign minister of a country tasked with devising a long term policy vis-a-vis the United States where the ideologues, legalists and realists compete every four years to control OUR foreign policy. Well, to quote Whitman,
“Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)”

Nonetheless, I would contend the U.S. has done very well in the First Gulf War and Bosnia as well as a number of significant humanitarian efforts in the Indian Ocean and Pakistan.

Comparing Kilcullen’s legalistic interpretation to a Neo-Con’s bold assertion is, to be kind, painting with a very broad brush indeed. Similarly your comment about “strategic interests” which borders on the willfully obtuse.

“If they have oil, they still depend on a stable world market to make money; if they don’t, where’s the interest?”

WHAT stable world market since we invaded Iraq????!!!

Maxwell Taylor’s, “The Uncertain Trumpet” had significant influence in and outside the military during the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations. Unlike a speech at some obscure college in L.A., many people, particularly in the military, read it and it influenced our strategic outlook.

Your comment on the “red” marines has some merit, but jungle warfare was to Vietnam as the First Gulf War was to the Second.

This is an excellent discussion, with lots of good points. A few notes:

It may pay to take a second look at the war we “won”, the Philippine insurrection. Apparently “winning” in that context consisted of denying the Filipinos self-government. It seems obvious from the rather tenuous hold of the Filipino government, even today, in some rural areas, that the US did not actually govern large areas of the Philippines at all in 1910.

Yes, the military victory in that context involved denying the Filipinos self-rule. So, too, our victory over Germany in WWII involved denying Germans self-rule. Neither of those is particularly relevant to whether they were military victories, the context and analysis of the post. And the United States did not control large areas of the Philippines in 1910 because it left the governance largely to the Filipinos; this was a deliberate plan, not a failure of the military effort. (there was also, of course, the Moro Rebellion going on, a different counterinsurgency than the Philippine-American War, but also one that the U.S. won militarily.)

Instead, what we created in the early 20th century in the Philippines was a “failed state”, one that would toggle between corrupt rule by politicians and generals with colonial oversight by the US until the wheels finally fell off the colonial bandwagon after WW II. After that we supported dictators until the people power revolution in the Philippines finally brought a semblance of democracy.

That’s not a failed state; a failed state is one that cannot rule its own country. The Filipino government managed reasonably well at controlling its own territory. It was certainly autocratic government, but it was not a failed one in the sense that ‘failed’ is used for Somalia and the like.

On the _moral_ level, the United States failed in both situations particularly to puts its own ideals into action and surely should be held accountable for that, but on the _military_ level, the counterinsurgency in the Philippines was remarkably effective.

On another note, I was researching something else, and I came across this analysis, which I would have put in the post if I’d found it earlier. It’s from _On Point II_, the official U.S. Army history of the second half of the Iraq War, p. 61:

By 1976 the Army had completed its retreat from stability and support operations by publishing a new version of its capstone manual, FM 100-5, Operations, which focused exclusively on fighting conventional battles in Europe. While this manual emerged just 3 years after the end of the US involvement in Vietnam, it contained no mention of irregular forces, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, or stability and support operations. The Army’s focus clearly reflected the nation’s focus on the overwhelming Soviet military threat to US and NATO interests. For the next 15 years, the Army continued to emphasize its primary mission as high-intensity combat. Army doctrine reflected this core mission with little attention paid to unconventional operations.

I guess no one will dispute Somalia’s categorization (where, it seems – read the article – even Al Qaeda decided it was too failed), but the term apparently describes a broader category of merely misgoverned states.

Uh, yes, I have that one. I’m not sure how it helps a discussion of whether the United States picked up the lessons of Vietnam immediately afterwards (i.e. it doesn’t really talk about it).

but the term apparently describes a broader category of merely misgoverned states.

I have really serious issues with FP’s use of failed states to mean a whole range of things from economic decline to “their government’s kind of nasty.” Applying those standards to 1900 would make a lot of states of the time “failed” or “failing.”

“Uh, yes, I have that one. I’m not sure how it helps a discussion of whether the United States picked up the lessons of Vietnam immediately afterwards (i.e. it doesn’t really talk about it).”

“Ohh contrare”, as the Gaullists were fond of proclaiming. The manual makes two very interesting references;

1. The first line in the foreward notes, “This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations.”

2. The vignette on pages 2-12/13 describes the “successful” CORDS program in Vietnam (and, incidentally claiming that we won the insurgency, but lost the “civil” war).

This would seem to imply that not only did the Army feel that they had run a successful COIN operation in Vietnam, but that they had published those “lessons” as late as the late 1980s. What happened between then and now then becomes the question. The more interesting question which many have discussed, here and elsewhere, is how successful the CORDS program actually was (see the aforementioned Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie”).

“I have really serious issues with FP’s use of failed states to mean a whole range of things from economic decline to “their government’s kind of nasty.” Applying those standards to 1900 would make a lot of states of the time “failed” or “failing.”

I am with you on that, but the point I was trying to make was that when discussing such terms as “failed state” one may be assuming (incorrectly it seems) that there is a broad-based understanding of what that term means. You may disagree with FP’s usage, but I would bet they have a lot more influence than you in propagating their understanding. Personally I prefer the more narrow definition of, “a country where even Al Qaeda can’t operate successfully”, but of course that would include the United States too. Ahh well, back to square one.

1. The first line in the foreward notes, “This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations.”

2. The vignette on pages 2-12/13 describes the “successful” CORDS program in Vietnam (and, incidentally claiming that we won the insurgency, but lost the “civil” war).

This would seem to imply that not only did the Army feel that they had run a successful COIN operation in Vietnam, but that they had published those “lessons” as late as the late 1980s. What happened between then and now then becomes the question.

Sure, but that’s not particularly an exploration of the era from 1973-2003 in any kind of useful detail. It’s nice that it backs up my argument, but _On Point_ goes into more detail.

As to what that statement implies, I’d rather go with the explicit statement from _On Point II_. That the Army put out manuals on counterinsurgency in this period (and the forward is wrong, I think: FM 100-20 on low-intensity conflict came out in 1991, which is less than 20 years ago) is surely true. But they paid little significant attention to them or the lessons learned in the period from 1973-2003 in the critical ways in which the Army defines itself: Counterinsurgency was a minimal part of army education at all levels; weapons acquisitions focused on conventional weapons; and the way up the promotions list was through the conventional arms, like the armor branch, not the Special Forces.

The latter continued even into Iraq. H.R. McMaster, a Petraeus protege and one of the young officers most clearly identified with effective counterinsurgency practice, was turned down for promotion to brigadier general the first time he came up, and the message was received clearly by a lot of officers: counterinsurgency was *still* not a golden child. The Bush Administration went to the length of making *Petraeus* the head of the next promotion board (he had to fly back from Iraq to do it, I believe) and McMaster got the promotion, eventually.

You may disagree with FP’s usage, but I would bet they have a lot more influence than you in propagating their understanding

We can go back and forth on this if we wish, but my larger point in the discussion of the U.S. effort in the Philippines was that it was effective militarily in winning a counterinsurgency and imposing a government on the islands. We may find that effort and government morally appalling, but that’s extraneous to the point I’m making.

Late reply to Dr. Science: I’m 63, & served as a USAF pilot during the Vietnam War. I not only saw the war along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but also spent two months seeing the big picture while working in “Blue Chip,” the USAF command post at MACV. When I came home (November 1972) I was somewhat pessimistic about our prospects, and when the Watergate affair engulfed the Nixon presidency a few months later, crippling whatever flexibility he had, it was certainly all over but the shouting. It took several years of reading and reflection for me to realize that Nixon did have a plan, it more or less worked, and the North Vietnamese leadership clearly understood 1) that they had to get the US out of the war at any cost (see Ronald Spector’s book, After Tet), and 2) renewing the war in the South was not possible until Nixon was gone from the scene. Sure, there are a lot of “what ifs,” like would there have been a War Powers Act and deep cuts in US military aid to Saigon with an untainted Nixon — keeping in mind that the Watergate conspiracy was discovered by accident. Anyway, I think a good basis for argument exists.