"On July 28, 2005 the RSO for Longview Inspection, a radiography company located in Everett Washington, notified [the Washington State Radioactive Materials] department of a potential overexposure. In a written report sent that night, events were described as follows: Two Level 2 radiographers were dispatched to Kent Washington to perform radiography work on an above ground pipeline. Each radiographer was properly equipped with survey meters, self-reading pocket dosimeters, rate alarm dosimeters, and OSL [Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimetry]] badges.

"During the course of the on site work, radiographer #1 crawled under the pipe to search for pipe numbers. At that time, it is believed that his OSL badge was knocked off his shirt pocket where he had it clipped. Both radiographers continued to work taking shots in the area unaware of the missing OSL badge. The alarm rate and pocket dosimeters were worn in a pouch on his hip and not in his shirt pocket with the OSL badge.

"At the conclusion of the work, while both radiographers performed their break downs, equipment checks and daily radiation reports to complete the job, radiographer #1 discovered his OSL badge was missing. The immediate area was searched and the OSL badge was discovered under a sheet of plywood pulled into place to crawl upon while under the pipe.

"They returned to their shop in Everett, Washington and notified the RSO of the mishap. The two radiographers reported that their rate alarms had not sounded constantly and periodic checks of the pocket dosimeter did not indicate any abnormal doses. Both men stated that they were working side by side the whole day . Since it was the end of the month wear period, the RSO sent all the radiographers' OSL badges in for processing. He forwarded the dosimetry report to us with his written report of the incident.

"The report on the OSL found under the pipe had millirem readings of 5367 - Deep dose, 5638 Eye dose, and 6237 Shallow dose. The radiographer #2 had readings that were consistent with the doses reported for the wear period with other radiographers in the company.

"The RSO reported that he suspended the radiographer #1 who had lost the OSL badge under the pipe, until the RSO receives approval from the department to resume radiographic operations."

Washington State Report #WA-05-044

* * * UPDATE AT1815 EDT ON 9/2/05 FROM A. SCROGGS VIA EMAIL * * *

The following information was provided as an update and closeout for WA-05-044:

"On August 17, the department received the RSO's final report. In it the RSO stated it had been determined the recorded exposures had not been received by the radiographer. This conclusion was based on:

- Self-reading dosimeters for both radiographers had not gone off-scale,
- Both radiographer alarming rate-meters had not continuously alarmed,
- The OSL dosimeter for the second radiographer showed normal readings, and association with each individual indicated each could be trusted.

"The RSO calculated an exposure of 32 mRem for the day and had the dosimetry service assign a 300 mRem exposure to the individual for the month. The radiographer was allowed to return to work after the department reviewed the reported findings.

"The RSO stated that all facility radiography staff were reminded to ensure they are properly equipped prior to performing each radiographic activity."

Notified R4DO (Linda Smith) and NMSS (Tom Essig).

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!

VIOLATION OF MAXIMUM CORE POWER LEVEL PER OPERATING LICENSE REQUIREMENTS

"Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Item 2.H of the [Vogtle Electric Generating Plant] VEGP Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating licenses, [Southern Nuclear Company] SNC is notifying the NRC of overpower events in violation of the maximum core power level of 3565 MWt authorized by Item 2.C.(1) of the licenses.

"Based on a review of operating data dating back to January 2, 2002, SNC has identified occurrences where the daily average core power exceeded 3565 MWt by as much as 0.4 MWt for Unit 1 and 0.9 MWt for Unit 2."

The temperature signal from the steam generator blowdown, used as input into the computer calorimetric, was determined to be out of calibration in each unit. The licensee is evaluating this situation for a causal effect.

"The non-conservative measurement of a plant parameter used in the calorimetric heat balance resulted in underestimating the calculated reactor thermal power. Correcting the calculated reactor thermal power for non-conservatism resulted in the conclusion that the licensed power level was exceeded. This led to the notification described above.

"Further engineering evaluation identified conservatisms in the heat balance calculation that were demonstrated to more than offset the non-conservatism discussed above. It was therefore concluded that the maximum core power level did not exceed the power level authorized by Item 2.C.(1) of Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating licenses."

"On August 29, 2005 at about 1045 PDT, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3, removed a portion of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) from service for a planned upgrade to ensure long-term reliability and improve the human-machine interface. This work is expected to complete within seven days.

"The SPDS emergency assessment function at San Onofre is implemented by a combination of the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) and the Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS). The QSPDS portion, which provides emergency assessment capability to plant operators in the control room, will remain functional. The CFMS portion, which receives input from the QSPDS, implements the ERDS and communicates data to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Offsite Facility. Only the CFMS and ERDS are impacted by this upgrade.

"This planned CFMS outage is being reported in accordance with10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a courtesy notification even though only a portion of the SPDS will be removed from service and preplanned compensatory measures will be in place for the duration of the work.

"At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 100 percent power, respectively. The NRC Resident Inspectors will be notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report."

* * * UPDATE ON 09/04/05 AT 0249 FROM C. WILLIAMS TO P. SNYDER * * *

"The CFMS upgrade work was completed on September 3, 2005 at 2255 PDT. The SPDS and ERDS have been returned to service.

A STATE LICENSEE REPORTED ONE OF THEIR TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES HAD BEEN STOLEN

A Troxler moisture density gauge was stolen from the company truck while parked at the private residence of a Wingerter Laboratory employee. The gauge was checked out from the company at 0630 and taken to his residence to pick up job related paperwork. While at the job site the RSO was notified at 0830 that the gauge was missing. The driver said he made no stops while driving from his residence to job site. The Troxler gauge (model 3440, serial #19973) contained 8 mCi (milliCuries) of Cs-137; 40 mCi of AM-241/Be. Wingerter is offering a $1000 reward for the return of the gauge in local newspaper.

Florida incident #FL05-120

This is less than the quantity of a IAEA Category 3 source. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.