Antonio Cecchi.The well-known Italian explorer, Antonio Cecchi, has, together with variousofficers and men of the Italian gunboats Volturno and Stafletta, lately fallen avictim to the treachery of the Somalis of the Benadir coast, of which he wasadministrator. During a trip towards the Webi Shebeli, the party was suddenlyattacked by night, and, after expending most of its ammunition, was obliged to beata retreat, amidst renewed attacks by the Somalis. All the officers lost their lives,and only three men succeeded in reaching Mogdishu. Cecchi was best knownfor his journey to Abyssinia and the Galla countries between the years 1877 and1882. The expedition, as at first constituted, was nominally under the commandof the Marquis Antinori, Cecchi being entrusted with the astronomical and meteorologicalobservations ; but of the five Europeans who took part in it, only Cecchiand Dr. Chiarini proceeded beyond Shoa, the latter subsequently dying of fever,while the former spent several years as a prisoner in the southern Galla countriesbefore returning to the coast. The results of this journey were published in twooctavo volumes at Rome in 1886, followed in 1887 by a third dealing with thetopographical surveys. Cecchi was afterwards for some years Italian consul atAden, and since 1890 had held a similar post at Zanzibar, where he was universallyrespected and beloved.''

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The Italian expansion which culminated in their first expedition into the interior of Benadir was succesfully halted a mere 12 miles out of the city and lead to the death of the man who spearheaded Italian expansion into Somalia.

In the coming installment I'll show how the Somali groups in Benadir first viewed the slow Italian encroachment on the Benadir coast and how the Lafole event sparked the fire of resistance in Benadir and Southern Somalia.

Read:- Italian Colonialism in Somalia by Robert L. Hess. 1966- The Shaping of Somali Society, Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900 by Lee V Cassanelli. 1982-Somali Sultanate, The Geledi City-State over 150 years by Virginia Luling. 2002-journals about history on Jstor.

For the Murder of Italians at Magadoxo, Africa.

Rome, Dec. 3.—In the chamber of Deputies today the Marquis Visconti Venosti, Minister of Foreign Affaires, confirmed the reports from Zanzibar of the murder of the Italian Consul, Signor Cecchi, the Captains, and a number of officers of the Italian warships Volturno and Staffeta, and the wounding of 100 or more other Italians by Somalis at Magadoxo. The men had fallen into an ambuscade and were attacked without warning.The Government , the Minister said, would take energetic measures to punish the Somalis who were guilty of the outrage.The Marquis said that the confirmatory reports showed that fourteen Italians had been killed, together with a number of the escorts of the Italians whose caravan was attacked during the night. Twenty-seven bodies were recovered by a rescue party when hurried to the scene from Magadoxo when the news of fighting reached there. The rescuers arrested a number of the Somalis who participated in the massacre and punished them appropriately. Many of the Somalis tribesmen were also killed by the Italians in the fight that followed the attack on the caravan.

The New York TimesPublished: December 4, 1986

In October 1923, De Vecchi di Val Cismon became the first fascist Governor of Somalia marking a change in Italian strategy in the Horn of Africa. De Vecchi set out to exterminate all who opposed his government’s desire for total control over what fascist propaganda called ‘La Grande Somalia’. However, the Somalis were heavily armed and led by men who had been given advanced training during the preparation for the First World War. An estimated 16,000 rifles were in Somali hands. The Governor’s first task, therefore, was to order the confiscation of arms and ammunition from the Somalis, particularly from the clans in the inter-riverine region. In March 1924, Sheikh Hassan Barsane, a leader of the Shabelle valley movement known as the Barsane Revolt, convoked a Shir (meeting of elders) where the participants, inflamed with millenarian zeal, denounced the Governor’s order. On behalf of the Shir, Barsane wrote the following to the Governor: In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful ... I have received your letter and understood its contents, but must advise that we cannot obey your orders and join with you in a covenant . . . Your government has its laws, and we have ours. We accept no law other than ours. Our law is the law of Allah and his Prophet . . . We are not like other people, none of us has ever enrolled in the Zaptie (colonial forces), never! ... and if you come to our land to fight against us, we will fight you with all possible means ... The world is very close to its end, only 58 years remain. We don’t want to stay in this world. It is better to die while defending our laws. After some initial success, the Somali resistance crumbled when Barsane was captured by the Italians on 4 April.

:The Storm of the Resistance gathers strength

As became clear from the NY times report (see page 3) on the ‘Lafole Massacre’, the Italian minister of Foreign Affaires commented on the ‘Lafole Massacre’ that the Italian government would take ‘energetic measures’ to punish the Somalis who were 'guilty of the outrage'.----

Now let us discuss these ‘energetic measures’ the Italian government wanted to take, and see whether they could stem the coming tide of the monsoon storm of resistance headed towards the Benadir coast region. As mentioned in part 4, the Italian foreign minister immediately appointed Commander Giorgio Sorrentino as royal commissioner extraordinary for the Benadir. His mission was as Robert L. Hess writes in his book ‘Italian colonialism in Somalia’:

''Sorentino was instructed 'above all to provide for the security and tranquillity of the region’ After a complete investigation of the causes of the attack at Lafolé, he was to take whatever steps should appear indispensable for our dignity and for the security of the colony’’

This investigation would be completed within ten days which was around February 1897 (see part 4). The conclusion Sorrentino drew from the investigation was as follows: ''Within ten days he had determined that Lafolé was neither the precursor of a general urprising against the Italians nor an Ethiopian ambush but an isolated case of action by Wadan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi; who had been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu’’ (Robert L. Hess)

The conclusion Sorrentino drew was that the guilty ones were Wacdaan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi, which meant that these tribesmen would be punished as the Italian foreign minister said in the NY Times report. Also Sorrentino believed that these tribesmen have been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu. These Arabs were Abu Bakr Bin Awod, Filonardi’s interpreter and a certain Islam bin Muhammed.The first thing, Sorrentino did was arresting Abu Bakr, while Islam bin Muhammed disappeared from the Benadir coast. The second thing, Sorrentino did was to plan a punitive expedition against the Somalis who were 'guilty of the outrage'. For this he had ordered two companies of Eritrean askaris. In the meantime, Sorrentino, researched the conditions prevailing in the Benadir, where he discovered the widespread practice of slavery and domestic servitude. But he could not do something about it, since obviously this meant distrubting the whole plantation economy of the South.

''Under the circumstances-the already difficult relations with the interior tribes- Neither Dulio nor Sorrentino could act immediately against slavery. Such action would have committed the Italians to a costly undertaking of doubtful outcome, a risk that Sorrentino had been ordered not to take.’’ (Robert L. Hess)

Sorrentino and Dulio, the Benadir Company's commissioner, had to content themselves with the expected punitive expedition against the tribes in the interior. Sorrentino was pleased at the prospect of this punitive expedition as he thought of the Somalis as: ‘liars, thieves, and murderers’ A clear grudge from the ‘Lafole massacre’He wrote in his book Ricordi del Benadir: ‘We’ve got a nasty cat to skin!, May God protect us!’

In March the reinforcements of the two companies of Eritrean askaris finally arrived, and the Italians completed their plans for the punitive expedition against the Wacdaan and Geledi.On April 20, almost 5 months after the Lafole attack, Sorrentino led his expedition inland and burned first Lafole and then several other villages associated with the Geledi and Murusade clan. The religious settlement of Nimow from where Sheekh Axmed Xaaji preached his religious message, was also bombarded by an Italian warship.

''The Italian bombardment of the small coastal village of Nimow in retaliation for Cecchi’s death marked the first such colonial action against a Somali civilian population.’’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians were joyful about these ‘energetic measures’ against the Somalis who were found guilty. Surprisingly, the Italians thought that these measures would solve everything and concluded that the Sorrentino expedition was a success:

''With Abu Bakr arrested, the Ethiopians in voluntary retreat, Lafole avenged, and leaders of Somali opposition deported, Sorrentino had virtually accomplished his mission by the end of April’’ (Robert L. Hess)

The deported leaders were Hussein Dera of Mogadishu and other Somalis for collaboration with the Ethiopians and instigation of Somali attacks on trading caravans between Lugh and the Coastal towns. Although these punitive expeditions looked impressive, they had no lasting effect, as it further antagonized the Wacdaan and Geledi clans. Also, it became clear that the two Arabs had no influence whatsoever on the clans of the interior, and thus were not the source of opposition to the Italian presence.

''The impression made by the punitive expedition after Lafolé could hardly have been called lasting'' (Robert L. Hess)

This seems to be the case, since the Italians retreated to the coastal cities after the expedition.

''In the decade following the Lafoole incident, the Italians remained at the coast, their colonial policy marked by uncertainty and indecision. Their only major venture into the interior was the establishment of a garrison of Arab soldiers at Baardheere in 1902’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Also, in the book 'Italian colonialism in Somalia' of Robert L Hess, it becomes clear that the punitive expedition to avenge the Lafole attack was not followed by other expeditions into the interior.

''We make no expeditions against tribes guilty (of hostilities) but arrest individuals of that tribe who happen to be in town; (this policy) has persuaded the Bimal and the Somali of Mogadishu that we are not strong''

It thus becomes clear that the Italians retreated to the Coast, and only were visible in the cities of Merca, Mogadishu, Barawe and Warsheekh.

In Somali Sultanate, Virginia Luling also talks about the consequences of Lafole attack, in which she writes: ''On the Italian side, though the repercussions of the disaster delayed by three years the formation of the Benadir Company, in the long run it reinforced the conviction that it was necessary to take military control of the hinterland.’’

What made the punitive expedition not effective on the long run? Why did the Italians retreat to the Coast? To answer these questions we need to know how the different Somali groups in Benadir responded to the Lafole attack.

''It is clear from colonial reports and from Somali oral recollections that Lafoole precipated a response from all the districts of the hinterland'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

-------------

-To start with the Geledi Sultanate,

The Sultan of Geledi, Sultan Osman, as already discussed in the previous parts, wanted to accomodate the Italian presence on the Benadir coast. Cecchi apparently went to conclude a treaty with the Sultan, in order to penetrate the interior of the Benadir region. The Lafole episode came suddenly, and the Italians mounted their revenge expedition. As a consequence, Sultan Osman quickly succumbed to the Italian pressure and signed a treaty of peace with the Italians.

''The encounter with the Italians subdued the sultan of Geledi, who quickly signed a treaty of peace and pledged obedience to the Italian government'' (Robert L. Hess).

This however did not mean that the Geledi people supported the Italian penetration of the Benadir coast, or accepted the Sultan's treaty with the Italians.The young people of Geledi were fiercely opposed to the Italians and also played a role in the Lafoole attack.

''Acting-Governor Dulio felt that the young men of Geledi were fiercely opposed to the Italian presence, whereas their elders wanted some sort of accommodation'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Besides the young men, the uncle of Sultan Osman, and others felt that if the sultan wavered in his resistance, Gobroon authority would be weakened for good. This was true, since many from Adawiin lineage, whose religious prestige among the Geledi was second only to the Gobroon, preached a policy of non-accommodation. The reasons why the Sultan of Geledi succumbed to the Italians were varied. One of them was that Sultan Osman himself considered the possibility of shoring up his waning power through an alliance with the Italians.

The only articulated fierce opposition to the Italians from the Geledi was from the leader of a jamaaca (religious settlement) of the Ahmediya. This leader was Shaykh Abiker Ali Jelle, a member of the sultan’s own Gobroon lineage.

''When Abiker began to preach outright opposition to the colonials sitting threateningly on the coast, he was forced by the Geledi elders to leave the district’’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

This shows on which side the elders stood, and how they along with the Sultan were hesitant to join the resistance and thought accommodation was the best option for the group’s interest. We will see in later installments whether this actually was the case.

-The Wacdaan response:

As already discussed in the previous parts, the Wacdaan were from the beginning fiercely opposed to the Italian penetration of the Benadir. This fierce opposition culminated in the attack of Lafole, in which mainly Wacdaan warriors along with a few Murusade and Geledi warriors, attacked the Cecchi expedition and killed all but three men.The Italians directed their anger and revenge on mainly this group, by burning Lafole to the ground and bombarding the coastal village of Nimow from the sea. The Sorrentino expedition, with the Italian troops already based in Benadir port-cities and the reinforcements of the two Eritrean Askari companies, was also mainly directed at punishing the Wacdaan and their allies.

These punitive measures however did not subdue the Wacdaan. Instead the Wacdaan remained harassing Italian presence on the Benadir coast by attacking caravans to the Benadir port-cities, organising blockades of the caravan routes that went through their territory to Mogadishu.

''Now the Wacdaan were beginning to blockade the caravan routes that ran through their territory to the coast'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians sought to divide the Wacdaan and persuade sections of the group to submit peacefully. As said earlier the most numerous and militarily strongest section of Wacdaan, the Abubakar (Abukar?) Moldheere were lead by the famous Hassan Hussein, the fierce anti-‘infidel’ leader who along with Sheekh Axmed Xaaji articulated the opposition to the Italian penetration of the Benadir coast. This section of Wacdaan could not be persuaded, and continued to fight the Italians to the bitter end. The other section, the Mahad Moldheere, began slowly to depart from the rest of Wacdaan. They too participated in the Lafole attack, but started to move to the side of the Geledi. This was not suprising since they inhabited the territory contiguous to Afgooye and the fertile lands around Adadleh.

''Their interests coincided more with those of the agricultural Geledi. However, their smaller numbers gave them less influence in Wacdaan clan councils, which came to assume greater importance for policymakers as the Wacdaan began to act independently of the Geledi. While the Mahad Moldheere apparently cooperated in the Lafoole siege, their leader Abiker Ahmed Hassan subsequently struck an independent diplomatic stance.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

When in 1899 the Italians demanded forty hostages to be surrendered to the authorities in Muqdisho as a sign of Wacdaan submission, only the Mahad Moldheere responded. Their leader Abiker became a stipended official, which enhanced his standing among those of pacific persuasion.The Abubakar Moldheere refused to send the twenty representatives demanded of them and for some years remained openly defiant of Italian authority.

''They continued to attack caravans and occasionally to boycott the market of Muqdisho. There is some evidence to suggest that feuding within the Wacdaan increased after this rift between the two major lineages’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Biyamaal response:

The Biyamaal were one of the first group to express their support for the Wacdaan in the lafole attack. They boycotted the markets of Merca, and the northern Biyamaal even collaborated with Hassan Husein of the Wacdaan. This collaboration led to the Biyamaal becoming also a target of punitive expeditions.

''After the Lafoole episode, several Biimaal sections boycotted the market of Marka to express their support for the Wacdaan action. The northern Biimaal collaborated with Hassan Hussein of Lafoole in cutting off land communications between Muqdisho and Marka.'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians also targeted the Biyamaal for their support to the Wacdaan. In this they seized Jeziira, 13 miles south of Mogadishu.

-------------These were the immediate responses of the Italian colonialists and the different Somali groups to the Lafole episode.

These actions and reactions would accelerate in the coming years, as the Italians were determined to colonize Benadir coast as the springboard for the eventual colonization of the rest of Southern Somalia. In this, the Italians would target the two most fiercest resistance groups in the Benadir: the Wacdaan and Biyamaal, who were already allied in their economic sanctions and operations to distrubt the lines of supplies and communication of the Italians in Mogadishu. As will become clear in the next installments the Italians would target the very foundation of the Wacdaan and Biyamaal power: their means of production and thus means of power-->the plantation economy of the Benadir coast.

In the next installment the plantation economy of the Benadir coast and Southern Somalia will be discussed and the Italian strategy to undermine this by their anti-slavery campaign.

This strategy of directly targeting the foundations of the Benadir agricultural society and thus the power of the two most fiercest resistance groups against Italian pentration of the Benadir coast would trigger the monsoon Storm of Resistance that struck the Benadir coast region.

''Southern Somali history is Ajuuraan and Silcis, then Geledi. Geledi are king of kings, every clan in the south knows.''

Here you discharge the centuries old alliance between Geledi and Wacdan by claiming all credit. Weren't Wacdan with you when the Silcis were defeated, the Wacdaan themselves claim to be the ones that defeated them while the Geledi also do the same.

Also, weren't Biyamaal powerful enough to never have submitted to the dominance of Geledi, and even killed Sultan Yusuf and his son at the zenith of Geledi power?

Anyways, never become like the one who is sweettalking to you, never monopolize history and run away with all the fame. If your people behaved in this way, there would not be an alliance that lasted centuries.

''The first thing, Sorrentino did was arresting Abu Bakr, while Islam bin Muhammed disappeared from the Benadir coast''

After that I discuss the socalled punitive actions the Italians took in which they thought they could destroy the Resistance since the ''Osama Binladen and Al-Zahawari'' were taken care of along with the burning of several villages and coastal towns.

''In March the reinforcements of the two companies of Eritrean askaris finally arrived, and the Italians completed their plans for the punitive expedition against the Wacdaan and Geledi.On April 20, almost 5 months after the Lafole attack, Sorrentino led his expedition inland and burned first Lafole and then several other villages associated with the Geledi and Murusade clan. The religious settlement of Nimow from where Sheekh Axmed Xaaji preached his religious message, was also bombarded by an Italian warship.''

These actions along with the dealing of the two arab men would have stopped the Resistance if it was that simple as SB and co believe, but this is far from the truth. The Resistance was just sparked off, with the powerful Biyamaal been drawn in the Resistance alongside Wacdaan and allies.

As both Robert L Hess and Lee V. Cassanelli acknowledge, the ''punitive actions'' had nearly any effect on the morale of the Resistance, it only reinforced the groups involved and drew the powerful Biyamaal ever closer to the side of the Resistance.

''The impression made by the punitive expedition after Lafole could hardly have been called lasting'' (Robert L. Hess)

''In the decade following the Lafoole incident, the Italians remained at the coast, their colonial policy marked by uncertainty and indecision. Their only major venture into the interior was the establishment of a garrisson of Arab soldiers at Baardheere in 1902'' (Lee V. Cassanelli )

In another passage, Robert L. Hess writes about the Italian commanders remark:

''We make no expeditions against tribes guilty (of hostilities) but arrest individuals of that tribe who happen to be in town; (this policy) has persuaded the Bimal and the Somali of Mogadishu that we are not strong''

It thus becomes clear that the Italians retreated to the Coast, and only were visible in cities/towns like Mogadishu, Merca, Warsheekh and Baraawe.

----

For more detailed picture just read Ch5 on page 5 and see who is distorting historical events by photo-copying some pieces as indha-sircaad without looking at the matter seriously and turning a couple of pages around to get a fuller picture. At least I discuss the Lafole event comprehensively.

PS:

One last comment,

On page 215 of the book written by Lee V. Cassanelli, we can see what the reasons were behind the Wacdaan decision to resist. SB and co have presented a silly argument that two arab men ''outsmarted'' the Wacdaan into fighting the Italians, this argument has already been shown to be silly and a blatant lie and distortion of events.

Lets see what Lee V. Cassanelli writes on page 215:

''Two factors bearing heavily on Wacdaan attidutes toward the colonial presence were the internal struggle for leadership, and the economic dislocation brought about by the abolition of the slavery and by the famine years of 1889-95''

It continues, on the same page:

''The dry years of the 1890s only exacerbated the economic situation: it was reported in 1898 that one-half of the Wacdaan population had been forced to abandon its home territory for pastures further inland. Apart from weakening their bonds with the Geledi, these developments, we can surmise, made the Wacdaan extremely fearful of any further threat to their land and well-being. They were, moreover, the first Somalis whose territory was actually invaded by colonial soldiers at the time of Cecchi expedition''

From the above pieces it becomes clear that Wacdaan had various reasons to resist, like their traditional fierce anti-infidel attidute, the hard economic situation around 1890s, combined with the famine years of 1889-95, the abolition of the slavery (the destruction of their means of production) etc etc. So to reduce all these factors into: ''two arab men tricked them and outsmarted them to fight the Italians'' is really chidlesh thinking. And I am not even surprised as the one who makes this argument. What actually surprises me is why I even take the time to respond. But its my duty to educate my fellow Somali people who are still reasoning like kids.Last edited by Somaliweyn on Fri Mar 21, 2008 2:33 pm, edited

Like for example that the Sultan of Geledi started to accomodate the Italians and started to establish friendly relationshops with the Italian governors of Mogadishu.

Also, I discuss how this combined with the fierce anti-infidel mentality of Wacdaan lead to the alliance been cooled of.

Lee V. Cassanelli writes (for the owners of the book see page 209)

''In fact, the sultan was in a difficult position. Within his own Gobroon lineage, advisers were urging him to stand against the Italians and so restore his prestige among nearby clans who were fearful of the foreigners. Geledi's long-time allies the Wacdaan had apparently acted independently at Lafoole; and they had been assisted by a handful of warriors from the Murursade, also Geledi allies. Now the Wacdaan were beginning to blockade the caravan routes that ran through their territory to the coast. Osman's uncle and others felt that if the sultan wavered in his resistance, Gobroon authority would be weakened for good''

If we analyze this issue further (unlike the indha-sircaad of one page) and go to page 215, about Wacdaan we can see clearly that the alliance cooled off since the Wacdaan (the largest sections) were determined to resist, while the only section that followed Geledi were the Mahad Moldheere (smaller section) who shared more with Geledi since they were farmers etc.

''Apart from weakening their bonds with the Geledi, these developments, we can surmise, made the Wacdaan extremely fearful of any further threat to their land and well-being.'' Page 215, book of Lee V. Cassanelli.

So there goes silly argument nr1.

If we go further to argument nr2, we can see evidence that only reinforces what has been told in this topic.

For example, if we again go to page 5, chapter 5 we can see that the Italians sought to divide the Wacdaan and persuade sections of the group to submit peacefully. This is nothing new in Colonial warfare and strategy (divide and conquer strategy). They succeeded in luring one section which was called Mahad Moldheere. The most numerous and militarily strongest section of Wacdaan, the Abubakar Moldheere stood their ground and continued to resist. See page 5, chapter 5, the Response of Wacdaan.

Also, the reason why Mahad Moldheere was bribed was because they inhabited the territory contiguous to Afgooye and the fertile lands around Adadleh. They shared more with the Geledi (farmers) then with the fierce pastoralists of Benadir like Biyamaal and Wacdaan (Abubakar Moldheere).

''Their interests coincided more with those of the agricultural Geledi. However, their smaller numbers gave them less influence in Wacdaan clan councils, which came to assume greater importance for policymakers as the Wacdaan began to act independently of the Geledi. While the Mahad Moldheere apparently cooperated in the Lafoole siege, their leader Abiker Ahmed Hassan subsequently struck an independent diplomatic stance'' (Lee V. Cassanelli,page 216)

This quotation kills two birds with one stone.

ON the one hand it SHOWS that Wacdaan and Geledi alliance cooled off, and that the Wacdaan acted independently since they wanted to resist while the Sultan of Geledi wanted to accomodate and collaborate with the Italians.

ON the other hand it SHOWS that the Italians divided the Wacdaan, and that they could only bribe one calool-u-shaqeyste (opportunist) called Abiker Ahmed Hassan, and that they could convince Mahad Moldheere (minority section of Wacdan) using this opportunist that they should not resist. In this they succeed since the Mahad Moldheere shared more with the Geledi and saw the Geledi not resisting, hence they diverged from their Wacdaan brothers that went ahead in the Resistance.

After the Italians fully colonized Somalia and crushed all resistance coming from various Somali groups, the collaboreters (traitors) were treated good, while the brave ones who resisted were reduced in numbers and power. Hence why the minority section Mahad Moldheere in the 1960s (after a half century of Italian preferential treatment since they collaborated with the Italians) became powerfull and rose in status.

''In the early 1960s, a man of the Mahad Moldheere was recognized as titular head of all the Wacdaan'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli, page 217)

Doesn't this support all the other evidences presented so far in this topic? Isn't there so far consistency in the discussion of Axad Shiiki?

Now, who is distorting historical events by indha-sircaad (photo-copying) and by his biased (even envious and hateful) attidute?

''With government approval, Cecchi prepared for an expedition into the interior. By November 25, he was ready to move; his caravan consisted of seventy askaris, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians, for the most part members of the crews of the two ships. That very night their encampment at Lafolé, some twelve miles inland, was attacked. In the early morning hours, as the caravan once more got under way, it was attacked again. By eight-thirty in the morning of November 26, all but three sailors were dead or dying.''

''First Adowa, then Lafolé; the future of Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa looked very umpromising at the end of 1896''

This event sparked one of the longest resistance struggles in Southern Somalia (Benadir) against Italian penetration and occupation of Somalia. This long resistance is only second to the heroic great struggle of Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle Hassan and his darawish army.

What happened on that day of November 25-26th of 1896? Who was this Cecchi guy? Who were these mysterious warriors that swiftly defeated this first Italian colonial penetration of the hinterland of Benadir? Why is this event put in the same line as the humiliating defeat of the Italians by Ethiopians in Adowa? And last but not least, what were the consequences of this event in Lafole?

This episode in Somali history is perhaps the least known, although it had crucial impact on the future of Somalia. Instead, most Somalis are not aware of this event while the Italians had built a monument for Antonio Cecchi in Lafole which still stands in the bush unvisited, while throughout the Banaadir 1896 is remembered in the count of the years as Axad Shiiki, the ‘Sunday Year of Cecchi’.

To present an elaborate account of this event, we need to start with the context. Who were the main groups in the Benadir region? Who was Antonio Cecchi and what was his role in the Italian expansion into Somalia? And what were the consequences of this event both for Somali groups and Italy?

In a number of series I'll present the complete story, and show why this event and the shockwave it send throughout Benadir and Southern Somalia is still relevant to this day.

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1: Backrgound on Benadir region.

Benadir region constited of the four Benadir ports of: Warsheekh, Mogadishu, Merca and Baraawe. These four port-cities were inhabited by Somali groups along with arabs and people with mixed origins and traders from the Indian Ocean. The authority of Mogadishu for example was nominally under Omani rule, but the city had two real administrations, one in Xamarweyne and the other in Shangaani.

These four Benadir ports were the linkages between the hinterlands of Somalia and the Indian Ocean trade. Caravan trade flourished in these hinterlands, connecting trade centre’s of Harar and Ogadeniya to Benadir ports, through the trade towns of Lugh, Baardheere and Geledi.

The relevant groups in this discussion of Axad Shiiki are: Geledi Sultanate, Wacdaan, Biyamaal and Murusade.

The Geledi Sultanate

The Geledi Sultanate was a sultanate that came into existence when the clans of Geledi and Wacdaan made an alliance against the Silcis group who then ruled the Shabelle Valley. After this successful revolt, the two clans lived together and linked their future which gradually led to the formation of the Geledi Sultanate.

For two centuries or so the Geledi and their Wacdaan allies had formed a small independent state, that prospered by trade, which they attempted to control, and had for a time held together a much wider clan ‘empire’.

In spite of the differences between them in way of life, language and traditions, Geledi and Wacdaan formed a close and lasting alliance. They were joined later - sometime early in the 19th century – by a section of another Hawiye clan, the Murursade. (Virginia Luling 2002)

The Wacdaan

The Wacdaan is a Mudulood group that settled in Lower Shabelle as early as the 18th century. They were allied with Geledi and Murursade, and lived between Afgoye and the coast region around Mogadishu.

The Biyamaal

The Biyamaal arrived in the Lower Shabelle around the end of 17th century and established control over Merca and the hinterlands. The Biyamaal were in constant war with the Geledi Sultanate, and even killed 2 Sultans of Geledi through out the war.

The Murursade

The Murursade joined the alliance between Wacdaan and Geledi and were granted land northeast of Geledi town, where they established four villages.2: Italian expansion into Benadir/Somalia

The Italian expansion into Somalia.

Italy was eager to join the leagues of other European imperialist nations like Britain, France and Germany. To achieve this they set their eyes on East Africa, and made their first incursion into Eritrea in which they acquired Massawa port.

Italian expansion in Somalia began in 1885, when Antonio Cecchi, an explorer led an Italian. expedition into the lower Juba region and concluded a commercial treaty with the sultan of Zanzibar. In 1889, Italy established protectorates over the eastern territories then under the nominal rule of the sultans of Obbia and of Alula; and in 1892, the sultan of Zanzibar leased concessions along the Indian Ocean coast to Italy.

Antonio Cecchi's role:

As already becomes clear, Antonio Cecchi spearheaded the Italian expansion into Somalia. He was chosen to lead the mission because of his past and reputation of been a supporter of Italian expansion into East Africa.

''The choice of Cecchi to head the mission was logical, for he had been active in the exploration of northeast Africa. In 1876 he had led an expedition from Zeila to the frontiers of Kaffa in southern Ethiopia. From that time he was an ardent partisan of Italian expansion into the horn. Cecchi was probably the first to succeed in directing Italian attention toward the Somali coast’’ (Robert L Hess)

After he returned from the Lower Jubba region he became obsessed with Italian expansion into Somalia.

''On the basis of his explorations and his often unfounded enthusiasm for the area, he insisted on the importance of the Juba River as the key to a much larger colonial program:

..Once we acquire with certainty the knowledge that the Juba is navigable…then it is certain that it will become the most natural artery for the exportation of the abundant coffee harvest of Kaffa and the surrounding regions…Now that our Italy has established itself at Massawa…it is possible for Italy to extend its possessions toward the south…The Juba would thus mark the extreme southern boundary of our possessions.'' (Robert L.Hess)

Italy succeeded through negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar to sign commercial treaties with Zanzibar, which allowed Italy to trade with the Banadir region. This initial success was followed by long negotiations in which the Italians wanted to lease the Benadir region. After a while they succeeded in this too, and set up a commercial enterprise named after the Italian trader in East Africa Filonardi. Filonardi Company was lead by Filonardi himself and received some support from Italy in order to penetrate the Benadir and Somalia economically.

''From 1893 to 1896, the Italian presence was limited to a small garrison of soldiers at Luuq on the upper Jubba River, and a few traders along the coast. The Italian outpost at Luuq had been established in 1895 to gather information on Somali trade in the region and to protect Italian interests in the face of Ethiopian claims to the area.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

This insignificant presence of Italian commercial interests in Benadir can hardly be called ‘colonization’. There were a few Italian residents, and the police (askaris) were still Arab who did not went further then their garrisons. Because of this situation, most Somali groups were not pressed to fight this initial penetration since the intentions of Italians were still vague.

''Perhaps because of the Filonardi Company’s limited intervention in Somali affaires, there was only one notable incident of Somali hostility between 1893 and 1896. That occurred on 11 October 1893, the day the Italian flag was first raised over the garesa in Marka. A Somali attacked and killed an Italian soldier; he in turn was killed with three shots from a ‘Wetterly’’ gun.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

This was the setting in Somalia and Benadir, before Cecchi became dominant in convincing the Italian government to penetrate further into Somalia as he returned to Italy.

''On his return to Italy, however, Cecchi continued to pressure the government to tap the ‘’rich commercial resources’’ of Somalia (Cecchi, Pesaro, to foreign Minister C.F Nicolis di Robilant, August 27, 1886)

Antonio Cecchi was an ardent expansionist who for some time had been urging the Italian government to take over the Benaadir concessions. In seeking to promote his own version of Italian power in Somalia, Cecchi upset the fragile commercial arrangements that Filonardi had constructed. He replaced Filonardi’s influential Hadrami interpreter with Arabs of his own choosing, returned an unpopular Italian resident to Marka, and sent soldiers to the lower Jubba area to try to force Somali caravaneers to unload their wares at Baraawe rather than at the British-held ports of Kismaanyo and Goobweyn. (Lee V. Cassanelli)

Cecchi’s presence also resurrected Somali fears of territorial dispossession … Thus it did not escape public attention when a cousin of Cecchi visited the Benaadir in 1895 to investigate the possibilities for commercial agriculture. There soon followed talk of growing cotton on Italian plantations along the Shabeelle. This cousin was Giorgio Mylius, a wealty Milanese industrialist. The Industrialist was particularly interested in the possibility of growing cotton in Somalia.

Finally, Cecchi appeared to symbolize colonial aggressiveness in the distant interior

About Geledi Sultanate, The Wacdaan were from the beginning in the alliance, they even claim that Wacdaan pastoralists were the first to rise up against the tryants of Silcis, and Geledi too claim they were the first. But one thing is true: Both played a keyrole in this and both were from the beginning of this revolt allyied with each other.

3: The Somali response to Italian expansion

The Somali groups described in part 1 responded differently to the Italians who were expanding slowly but steadily into Benadir coast, and would inevitably venture into the hinterlands.

To start with the Geledi Sultanate,

The Geledi Sultanate was in decline throughout the 19th century. The Sultanate was in the shadow of its former splendid and power. The Geledi confederation headed by the Gobroon shaykhs of Afgooye had lost much of its cohesiveness as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The succession of Osman Ahmed in the 1880s brought to the Geledi sultanate a man of lesser ambitions and more political skills than his illustrious forebears. Osman, for example, did nothing to punish the Biyamaal when they blocked a branch of the Shabeelle River and thus caused severe hardship to Geledi´s agricultural allies downriver. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

Despite these setbacks, Osman inherited baraka (grace) as a member of the Gobroon lineage was still respected by many ordinary Somalis in the region. In the mid 1890s Osman´s army had still been strong enough to defeat their traditional Hintire rivals down the river.

What was the view of the Sultan of the Italian expansion?First of all what was the general mood in Geledi?

Most people were suspicious of the Italian encroachments and as described earlier people were whispering about Italians taking over the land and their farms. When the Italians came, The Geledi were divided on the issue to resist the penetration of Italians of Benadir coast or accommodate. While the people wanted to resist, the attitude of the Sultan and those in authority was cautiously accommodating the Italian presence in Benadir Coast. The Geledi-Wacdaan alliance came under strain at this time, for many of the Wacdaan were opposed to any compromise with the foreigners.

The Sultan started to accommodate the Italians and he started to establish friendly relationships with the Italian governors in Mogadishu. Cecchi apparently felt that Osman remained a force to be reckoned with, for the ill-fated Lafoole expedition had originated with Cecchi´s scheme for an Italian-Geledi alliance ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

The Wacdaan

The Wacdaan were mainly pastoralist, with a small group turning to farming throughout the centuries of their alliance with the Geledi clan who were mainly agriculturalists. As said above, the Wacdaan were opposed to any compromise with the foreigners. This fierce anti-foreign stance was persistent in the culture of Wacdaan and in the very place of Lafoole. The place has been called Lafoole because apparently the Wacdaan defeated the Gaalo Madoow when they migrated to the Lower Shabelle around the 18th century, hence the translation of Lafoole which is: Bones . ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

Because the Sultan of Geledi seemed hesitant to resist the Italian expansion into Benadir coast, the alliance was cooled off. Apart from the weakening of their bonds with the Geledi, the drought of the 1890s which lead to a large population of Wacdaan abandoning their homelands, the Italians posed the greatest threat to the group. They were, moreover, the first inland Somalis who’s territory was actually invaded by colonial soldiers at the time of the Cecchi expedition.

On of the most influential leaders among the Wacdaan was the leader Shaykh Ahmed Haji Mahhadi. He was not a Wacdaan but became the sheikh of the Wacdaan. He was born in Mogadishu and hailed from a lineage of Mogadishu (Abgal). He had lived there most of his life, teaching alongside such renowned Muslims scholars as Shaykh Sufi and Shaykh Mukhdaar. Like the latter, he found coexistence in a town which housed infidels intolerable, and he chose to retire to the small coastal enclave of Nimow, a little south of Mogadishu. There he set up a small jamaaca which attracted several of the local inhabitants. When Nimow was shelled by an Italian warship in retaliation for the Cecchi ambush, Ahmed Haji fled to Day Suufi (in the heart of Wacdaan territory) where he intensified his preaching against the infidels. As late as 1907, the acting Italian governor considered him ‘the most listened-to propagandist' in this area of the Shabeelle. Even the Geledi turn to him rather than to their own sultan for religious counsel. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

One of the Wacdaan leaders apparently influenced by Ahmed Haji was Hassan Hussein, titular head of the largest subsection of the Wacdaan clan, the Abubakar Moldheere. The Abubakar Moldheere were the most numerous and hence the most militarily powerful section of the Wacdaan in the late nineteenth century. Hassan Hussein is remembered as one of the first Wacdaan to oppose the Italians: warriors from his lineage were prominent among the forces that attacked Cecchi at Lafoole. Likewise , his lineage was spokesmen for the Abubakar Moldheere who most strenuously urged the blockade of caravan routes to Mogadishu (economic sanctions).

The Biyamaal

This group is the best known group in the southern Somali resistance. Like the other groups in Benadir, the Biyamaal too were wary of Italian expansion into the Benadir coast. In the beginning the Biyamaal were following the actions of the Italians very carefully, while trying to accommodate them if they posed no threat. Yet there is little question that the resistance in Merca district was the fiercest and most prolonged in the Benadir. This is not surprising in light of the earlier history of the Biimaal: their continual struggle against many enemies had given them a cohesiveness and a military organization far tighter than that of most other southern Somali clans ( Lee V. Cassanelli).Throughout the nineteenth century the Biyamaal had stood together to defend their territory and their independence against encroachments by the powerful sultans of Geledi: both Yusuf Muhammad and his son Ahmed Yusuf lost their lives in battle against the Biyamaal. These proud nomads had also firmly resisted the sultan of Zanzibar´s growing influence in Marka by ambushing the governor of that town together with forty askaris in 1876 ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Not only by sheer force were the Biyamaal able to resist the influence of the sultan of Zanzibar but they could also assure their influence on Marka by placing economic sanctions on the city. When occasional differences arose between the Biyamaal leadership in the interior and the old Arab and Somali families of Marka – who were always more interested than Biyamaal in establishing relations with foreign powers – the Biyamaal would hold up food supplies to the townsmen and divert their exports to smaller outlets along the coast. These boycotts proved extremely effective in assuring Biyamaal influence in urban politics, as the Italians would learn in 1904.

The Biyamaal consisted of four territorial sections spread along the coastal dunes between Jesiira and Mungiya and extending inland to the farmlands along the Shabelle. Each of these sections was represented by a number of religious authorities known generally as macaallimiin and by anumber of politico-military figures known as malaakhs and amaanduule. In times of crises, the leaders from all four sections would gather in shir to work out a common policy of action.

With the arrival of the Italians at the coast in 1890, Biyamaal leaders were almost in constant shir to coordinate their plans for the inevitable showdown between Italian expansion and their resistance. The Italian government always viewed them as its most determined opponent, colonial polcy was geared towards the dividing of Biyamaal leadership and thus divide the opposition. Remarkably the Biyamaal have presented a united front even when they were eventually defeated in 1908.

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The setting of 'Axad Shiiki' is completed, it is time to discuss that very day of 25th Novermber of 1896 and the morning of 26th Novermber of 1896.

What happened on those two days? Who attacked and annihilated the Italian expedition force? And how did this event spark the fire of resistance in the whole of Banadir which would last till 1908?Italy was not an ''advanced'' and organized colonial power in the world as was Britain. So Italy wrote not as many papers on their colonies than say Britain which had a well-functioning colonial deparments, like the Colonial War Office, which has the most data about Sayyid Muhamed Abdulle Hassan and his darwish army.

And to make matters worse, all the colonial data about Southern Somalia is burried in Italian language. As most Somalis speak by now English, it is difficult to go for Italian account.

I have an Italian book, which takes alot of time to translate, and since it concerns history, one must be very carefull in translation and interpretation.

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Anyways, I will do my utmost best to present the resistance in Benadir-Southern Somalia against Italian expansion. Axad Shiiki (1896) is the sparking point, and I'll continue down to 1910, when Italy succeeded in their occupation of Southern Somalia.

The reasons for resurrecting this history has to do with the current situation in Benadir. The shamefull Ethiopian occupation is something all Somalis who are aware of our greatness strokes in their heart.

The spark that lit the Resistance: Lafoole 25-26th of November 1896

Lafoole as explained earlier was within Wacdaan territory. It lay in an area with thick brush and scrub grass, a suitable spot for a well-prepared ambush. The Wacdaan were waiting for this moment, as Cecchi was despised by all Somali groups in the Benadir, since he embodied colonial aggressiveness which became evident by his plans to ‘tap into the rich resources of Somalia’.

Also, the Wacdaan were from the beginning fiercely opposed to any compromise with the 'infidels'. This attitude was persisent in the culture of Wacdaan as explained earlier. Another impulse to this fierce anti-infidel attitude was the coming of Sheik Axmed Xaaji, the sheikh that found it intolerable to coexist with the 'infidels' in Mogadishu (see part 3). He lived among the Wacdaan, set up a jamaaca (religious school) and became the sheikh of the Wacdaan (religious leader). His ideas have apparently influenced the leader of the largest subgroup of Wacdaan (Abubakar Moldheere): Hassan Hussein.

Hassan Hussein, together with Sheikh Axmed Xaaji were instrumental in articulating the opposition to the Italian presence in Benadir. As already explained this too had its consequences for the political geography in Benadir, mainly the cooling of the alliance between Geledi and Wacdaan. Within the Geledi, the people wanted to resist the Italian expansion but the Sultan and the ones with authority choose for accommodation. In this the Wacdaan were slowly moving away from Geledi, and moving towards the Biyamaal, their erstwhile enemy.

The clash at Lafoole:

On 25th of Novermber in 1896, the moment arrived in which the Italian government gave the approval to venture into the interior, thus effectively leaving the garrisons in Mogadishu. Cecchi too was waiting for this moment since he was eager to sign treaties with the Sultan of Geledi, which he still thought was powerful enough to be instrumental in the Italian plans for Somalia. What he didn’t know however was that the Sultan did not represent the feelings of the people, who were fiercely opposed to Italian expansion. Cecchi and the others in the expedition would find out too late about this fierce anti-infidel attitude of the Somalis.

This expedition consisted of Antonio Cecchi, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians. In the evening when the expedition force set their camp at Lafoole, they were attacked in which a fierce fight followed. Apparently, this attack was not decisive enough to finish off the expedition. The next morning a renewed attack followed which successfully finished off the expedition, with only 3 survivors to tell the story.

''With government approval, Cecchi prepared for an expedition into the interior. By November 25, he was ready to move; his caravan consisted of seventy askaris, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians, for the most part members of the crews of the two ships. That very night their encampment at Lafolé, some twelve miles inland, was attacked. In the early morning hours, as the caravan once more got under way, it was attacked again. By eight-thirty in the morning of November 26, all but three sailors were dead or dying.'' (Robert. L Hess)

Who were these groups that attacked the Italian expedition?

In the Shaping of Somali Society, (Lee V. Cassanelli) it becomes clear that the group that attacked the Italians were of mainly Wacdaan warriors, accompanied by Murursade and Geledi warriors.

''In November 1896, he and a score of Arab askaris set out to meet with the presumably influential sultan of Geledi. It was the first colonial attempt to penetrate the interior with a military contingent, and it ended disastrously for the Italians. Cecchi’s expedition was besieged and most of it destroyed at a place called Lafoole, along the Muqdisho-Afgooye road by Somali warriors of the Wacdaan clan.''

In another passage the author reveals more about the composition:

''Geledi’s long-time allies the Wacdaan had apparently acted independently at Lafoole; and they had been assisted by a handful of warriors from the Murursade, also Geledi allies''

Virginia Luling instead talks about Wacdaan and others, which thus means Murursade and Geledi warriors, since the alliance consisted of these three groups:

''…Antonio Cecchi, famous as an explorer and one of the most enthusiastic and influential advocates of Italian colonisation, set out from Muqdisho for Geledi with a party of soldiers in Novermber 1896, intending to negotiate with Sultan Cusmaan Axmed. They were surprised and attacked while camping in Wacdaan territory, at Laafoole at the edge of the deex, where the white earth meets the black, and the thorny bush gives way to more open country. Out of the seventeen Italians, only three survived.The assailants were from the Wacdaan and perhaps other clans.''

Virginia Luling further sheds light on the location of Laafoole:

''It must be a particularly suitable place for surprise attacks, for fourteen years earlier, Révoil’s caravan had been attacked by Wacdaan at the same spot, and its name ‘place of bones’, comes from a much earlier slaughter, supposedely of the ‘gaalo madow’. ''

------Reactions to the clash:

The ‘Lafoole Massacre’ as the Italian press called it, came less than a year after the humiliating Italian defeat at Adowa in Ethiopia. It was a severe physiological damage to Italian colonial ambitions.

For Somalis, it was a great day, which send a shockwave throughout the Benadir region. The 'Lafoole Massacre' which already severely shocked the Italian colonialists, was immediately followed by sporadic incidents along the whole Benadir coast.

In Mogadishu 100 or more Italians were wounded in a general uprising. In Marka, a young Somali, Omar Hassan Yusuf, assassinated the Italian resident, Giacomo Trevis. According to local accounts, Omar emerged after praying in the small mosque of Shaykh Osman ‘Marka-yaalle’ and knifed the ‘infidel’ Trevis as he walked along the beach. Giacomo Trevis was a hated man in Marka for a lot of reasons, besides been an unwanted colonialist, he was also hated for his policy of compulsory labor. In Warsheekh, a government askari was confronted as he stepped outside the garrison.In Baraawe, the well-known and influential Haji Shaykh Abbas railed against his Somali compatriots and called them ‘woman’ for allowing the Italians free movement there. ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians in Benadir were shocked, and when the news reached Rome, the foreign minister immediately appointed Commander Giorgio Sorrentino as royal commissioner extraordinary for the Benadir. Initialy, the Italians thought that Lafoole was an Ethiopian ambush since Ethiopians were besieging Lugh at that time and since there were rumours of an Ethiopian invasion of Benadir. When Sorrentino landed in Mogadishu,on 26th of January 1897, he immediately started the investigation of Lafole.

''Within ten days he had determined that Lafolé was neither the precursor of a general urprising against the Italians nor an Ethiopian ambush but an isolated case of action by Wadan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi; who had been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu’’ (Robert L. Hess)

This was a gross understatement of the Lafoole incident, and the attitude of the Benadir groups to the Italian presence.

Throughout the Benadir, from Warsheekh to well south of Marka, 1896-97 is remembered as Axad Shiiki ( the ‘Sunday year of Cecchi’). The Biyamaal date the beginning of their twelve-year resistance at Axad Shiiki. ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The clash at Lafoole is immortalized by this shirib:

Shiin digow Sheikh Axmed XaajiShiiki sheydaan mooho?

Translation:

Writer of (the Koranic verse) shiin, Sheikh Axmed XaajiIs not Cecchi a devil?

Sheikh Axmed Xaaji is the well-known religious leader of the Wacdaan who had established the jamaaca to teach Quran, religon etc

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The Italians have misinterpreted the signs of the coming storm which would engulf the Benadir region.

In the coming part, I'll explain the immediate consequences of the clash at Lafoole. How the Italians reacted to the 'Lafoole Massacre' and how the different Somali groups in Benadir reacted to the event and the wider issue of Italian pressence in Benadir coast. Slowly on from there we will arrive at the heroic struggle of the Biyamaal and their allies, amongst which their erstwhile enemy Wacdaan, against the Italian expansion.

http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/index.htm

http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/indice.htm#illavoro

Vittorio Bottego

http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/pca-vb-bellap.pdf

the Bimaal

Feuding hostilities led to several confrontations between Italy and the Somali tribes. Eno reveals, “Merca, Jilib, Jesira and Dhanane are some of the notable battlefields where the Bimaal (Hawiye) pastoral tribe engaged colonial soldiers constituting Somalis.”27 Nevertheless, revelations such as by Italian naval officer Gaetano Bossi had already done the damage. He recommended the pertinence of a more organized government role. Commander Onorato di Monale who undertook an investigation upon the early announcements of the Benadir Coast slavery scandal wrote another equally discrediting report. Some excerpts of the report, including information given by the local chiefs and other outstanding figures of the community, read:…not only did slaves enter Benadir ports, but that the last slaves to enter the town date back only to last December. Slaves are bought and sold in the Benadir towns, not only under the eyes of Italian authorities…but according to registry of the cadis of Mogadishu…with the sanction of those authorities. In the Benadir, a slave can be bought, sold, imprisoned, inherited, given as a gift, exploited, and rarely liberated. Far from taking steps towards the gradual disappearance of domestic servitude, the company is perpetrating it and aggravating the condition.28

In a gesture to consolidate its colonial activities firmly, Italy succeeded in the purchase of the Benadir ports for the estimated amount of 3,600,000 Italian Lira , the equivalent of 144,000 British pounds, an achievement seen as a step forward. But within the colony, as Italy was aware, resistance was unavoidable since some tribes were discontented by the abolition policy.The Somali slave owners, as is paradigmatic of the nomadic psychology, tinted the abolition policy as a religious issue in a bid to gain legitimacy for their cause of war and sympathy from other clans, under the philosophy of Jihad (holy war). Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, the Mad Mullah and leader of the Dervish, assisted the Bimaal cause to that end. The colonial administration recruited soldiers to face the arrogant and unabiding Bimaal. When the battle erupted, several Bimaal villages were torched off. The Bimaal, in retaliation, forged several attempts to overrun the Italian askaris in Dhanane, situated between Merca and Mogadishu. They were all in futility until the Bimaal were relentless subdued.In a diplomatic move to step up the scale of ‘pacification’, the colonial officials approached chiefs and notables of the various tribes to win their support and maintain good relationship between the colonists and the colony. The Somali pastoral tribes seized the opportunity. The two ensuing reasons were for access to the colonial officials (as a medium between the Italians and the community), and secondly for the payroll which displayed a recognition of their social status as the leadership. The Sultan of the Geledi was one of such leaders who subscribed wholeheartedly to this kind of colonial appeasement.29Skirmishes between the Bimaal and the Italians continued for quite some time, though intermittently.30 The colonial troops got a breakthrough and eventually penetrated the towns of Bariire, Malable, Audegle (Aaw-Dheegle) in the Dhoobooy area of Merca, and Afgoi a few kilometers from Mogadishu. The event has finally tamed Bimaal resistance, widening the aspiration for peace and liberty. Sheikh Hassan Barsane’s Resistance to the Abolition of SlaveryOne Sheikh who was exaggeratedly honoured as a hero in Somali history, Sheikh Hassan Barsane of the Gaal-Jecel sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, has resisted abolition of slavery to the extent of misinterpreting the Holy Scripture – the Qur’an, by writing tothe Italians: “All our slaves escaped and went to you and you have set them free. We are not happy with the [Antislavery] order. We abandoned ourlaw, for according to our law we can put slaves in prison or force them to work.”And what law was the ‘respected’ Sheikh referring to?“The government has its law and we have ours. We accept no law other than our law. Our law is that of God and of the prophet…. “God has said: The few can defeat the many. The world is near its end; only 58 years remain…It is better to die following Muslim law. All Muslims are one.31 In the preceding statement, Barsane has made not less than three discrepancies contrary to the Islamic faith. But a Jareer poet who was against enslavement of Muslims, an un-Islamic practice, sets the main response in this verse:* Ninki Ashahaato Adoon ma AhaadoAmar Eebe diidi yaa kaa Aqbalaayo32Translation:Whoever announces the oneness of Allah in submission, no longer remains a slave;So, nobody abides by your orders regarding what Allah has illegitimated.Sheikh Hassan Barsane is one of a few heroes honoured in the history of Somalia. He is, as far as we have seen in the history curricula of schools in the country, dignified as a sharp protestant against the Italian colonialists, and one who died for the cause of nationalism. But on the contrary, he died due to his rejection to free Muslim lives in the campaign to the abolition of slavery and of slave trade. As far as Islam is concerned, a good model is Abubakar who paid money to purchase Bilal’s freedom after the latter converted to Islam. In this case, the two acts of Abubakar and Sheikh Hassan Barsane are contrary to each other, but the former’s gesture accommodates well with the harmonious tenets of Islam. Barsane’s, in retrospect, amounts to a villain’s misuse and abuse of the Holy Scripture.Previously, many scholars have written concern over the obstruction of the truth about

Egalitarian in nature, the nomadic Somalis, never let their traditional leaders unbridled onthe exercise of power and other essential functions over the clan. 150 years ago, a Britishtraveller Burton, in his diary, noted the following quotation:

“Every free-born man holds himself equal to his ruler, and allows no royalties or prerogatives to abridge his birthright of liberty. Yet I have observed that with all their passion for independence, the Somali, when subject to strict rule as in Zayla and Harrar, are both apt to discipline and subservient to command .”7