Original in Dutch and English translation, also by Max van der Werff, appear here.

On April 12, 2017, a thousand days had passed since Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down above East Ukraine. Up until now, those who did it have not been identified, indicted or arrested, and many questions remain unanswered.

Foreword

After publication of the final report of the Dutch Safety Board in October 2015, I summarized the results of my two visits to the crash site and more than two thousand hours of Internet research in the article MH17 – Lying for Justice. Since then, I’ve had four meetings with the members of the MH17 Joint Investigation Team (JIT) and in total about 6 hours of talks have been recorded. Finally, I handed over 14GB of data to the Dutch researchers with the assurance that only Dutch researchers would have access to the material.

Special credits for citizen journalists Marcel van den Berg, alias MH17research and Hector Reban (alias). I frequently used Hector’s blog and Marcel’s blog for writing this article. No other public source can match the information that can be found on both websites.

For numerous topics related to MH17 I would like to refer you to the interview in Café Weltschmerz where I was interviewed as a citizen journalist myself.

Purpose of this article

1) Analysis of evidence presented by the JIT on September 28th, 2016.
2) Reporting what was not presented by the JIT (including motive, exact weapon, lies of Kiev).
3) Information on MH17 discussions in mass media.
4) Presentation of plausible scenarios of what might have happened to MH17.
5) Speculating on prosecution and quality of the future evidence.

Chronology

The entire press conference of the JIT is on Youtube and lasts in total 1 hour and 19 minutes. Left channel is Dutch spoken, right channel is with English translation. I divided the presentation into 74 parts and in an excel sheet [link] topic keywords and direct links are provided. This is useful not only as a reference, but is essential to split the press conference and discuss it in chronological order, the way events must have happened in reality, according to the JIT.

Key conclusions drawn by the JIT

– The Buk-Telar was brought to the firing location from the territory of the Russian Federation [26min05s]

– The type of Buk missile which downed MH17 is 9M38 series and Telar after being used is returned to the territory of the Russian Federation. [20min31s]

Reconstruction of the route and the evidence presented by the JIT

Route of 235 Km that the Buk (on a trailer) might have passed during the night of 16/17th of July 2014 from the Russian border to Donetsk.

The JIT doesn’t indicate which border crossing has been used and neither which route exactly might have been followed, but states: “At eight o’clock in the morning a witness has seen the Buk in Yenakiieve ” [33min27s]. Furthermore, the JIT used animated information from an anonymous Twitter account claiming that the Buk was standing at this crossroads in Donetsk [34min52s].

Route allegedly been driven on July 17th, 2014 is N21. I’ve done this route myself several times, both in the direction from Donetsk to Snezhnoye and back.
Volvo trailer in combination with Buk-Telar was filmed at this spot in Donetsk, by an anonymous freelance reporter claimed to be working for Paris Match.

Paris Match published the first photo on July 23, 2014. The second photo was put online on July 25th. That’s one week after MH17 was downed. The freelancer took this picture in the morning and later in the day MH17 was shot down. It immediately becomes the world news that the passenger plane is probably shot down by a Buk missile.

– Why would a magazine like Paris Match wait one week for the online publication of such huge scoop?
– Why does Alfred de Montesquiou, the leading reporter of Paris Match, claim that pictures were taken in Snezhnoye?

Only almost two years later, during the press conference of the JIT it is revealed that these two pictures are screenshots from a video recorded by hand.

May 3rd, 2016 (meanwhile, one year, nine months and sixteen days have passed) a new YouTube channel appears which is created specifically for placing of one video. The anonymous uploader uses the alias “Ivan Olifirenko. This video, just like the Donetsk video has abonimable quality and moreover is also edited with special software called Cropipic.
On July 15, 2014 a convoy of the fighting unit ‘Vostok’ is passing a petrol station which also appears in ‘Olifirenko’ ‘s video. This video clearly shows that the road surface is damaged by tanks and other vehicles.

But in the video of ‘Olifirenko ‘ that is supposed to be made on July 17, 2014, you can’t see any of this damage.
Thus, this video is from an earlier date than July 15th 2014, or the quality is (made) so bad that it is completely useless as evidence. It is also remarkable that video was put online on the same day as the BBC documentary about MH17 was broadcasted.

Zuhres video and the witness who wished to remain anonymous.

The original video has been removed from YouTube. If we search for “зугрес бук” (“Zuhres buk” in Russian), then we find this video with the upload date July 22, 2014. It’s not possible to check via the public sources when the original video was put online and removed.
Also the quality of this video is so substandard that it was a piece of cake to shop in another vehicle without being noticeable which vehicle is added:

This is the exact location in Zuhres 2 and I have interviewed many people here. On July 17, 2014 or on any other day nobody has seen a Buk on a trailer passing by and no one has heard anything about it from others.
However, I learned something else that is important for finding the truth. Several residents of apartment 31 told me that an alcoholic was living in the apartment where from the video has been recorded. This man passed away couple of months before my visit, in the summer of 2015.

Following information about registered persons at this address can be found:

The neighbors indicate that there were often several people staying for a long time in the apartment while the main occupant was absent and many of them had a key. Three persons are officially registered at the same address:

Exactly this Andrey Andryushin appears as a witness in a video from June 30, 2016:

Andrey claims that he recorded this video with the Buk-transport on July 5, 2014 and he didn’t put it on YouTube himself. The video was also on his VKontakte (sort of Facebook) page, but out of fear he deleted his entire account.

– Why does Andrey claim he made this video on July 5?
– Where is Andrey now? Is he safe? (See questions 4a/b/c/d)
– Did the JIT have contact with Andrey?

It’s worth noticing that the JIT presents the video for few seconds as evidence, but pays no attention to the statement of the creator of the video that he did not record it on July 17th.

Photo of Buk-Volvo combination made at the location ‘Pit Stop’ in Torez.

During the press conference the JIT did not show the pictures, but referred to a until now unknown video supposedly made in Torez [36min03s]. The original link of the Dutch police is removed. Here is a backup.

“Because of the importance to protect the creator of these images, the background is erased,” says the JIT. It remains unclear why the jeep in the video is riding with the door open. Quality of the video is so poor that you can’t see whether the wheels of the vehicle are turning.

Animation JIT: “Around noon, the white Volvo trailer with the Buk-Telar arrives to Snezhnoye. Buk is unloaded from the truck near the supermarket Furshet “[36min24s].

The Furshet supermarket is located on Lenin Street, a major thoroughfare. If there was indeed a Volvo with a trailer standing at this place and Buk-Telar was unloaded there from the trailer, many people would have seen it. Let’s look at the map:

The Buk Telar allegedly drove independently from the red cross on the map to the firing location through the green cross in Karapetiyan Street. In this case, the route that the Telar drove according to the JIT animation (red) can’t be right [36min36s].

Of course, I’ve also been at this location, made measurements and searched for witnesses. Some screenshots of the videos I made on October 19, 2015:

After studying the lines of sight it’s obvious the picture must have been taken from an apartment on the top floor, from building No. 3. An old lady told me that this apartment was not occupied in July 2014.

Also valid for this picture: anonymous photographer, low resolution, original file is not an open source and no metadata.

This photo was taken on June 5, 2015, almost a year after MH17. For better visibility, I increased the contrast slightly. See the original video. (Credit: Yana Yerlashova)

We are sure that no Buk has fired on June 5, 2015 and that it must be another source of the black smoke on the photo of that day.

– I asked the spokesman of the OM three times to confirm that the JIT claims that the presented photo shows the smoke plume of Buk missile which shot down MH17. The final answer was evasive.

– JIT presentation: “The photo is investigated by the NFI. The NFI has no evidence that this picture has been manipulated. “[38min14s]

It is important to know what have been the research questions and what has been studied exactly. That information (just like the original photo itself) is not public. The photo has been investigated by the NFI, the NIDF and FOX-IT. One of the persons who examined the photo wrote me:

“My research did not go beyond determining that these were real RAW files, and therefore in principle, original camera results. About what’s on it, no idea. I haven’t paid attention to that, except being amazed by the value that was tied to the rather obscure images. “

– For more detailed explanation and discussion of other problems with the smoke plume picture, I refer you to this article.

“Painstaking detective work on social media”

JIT presentation:
“Additionally, in spring of 2016 the research team after painstaking detective work on social media found two new photos.” [38min46s] “From the first picture and testimony of witnesses an analysis of sightlines was made. The direction in which the witness looked when he or she saw or photographed the trace. The place where these lines of sight come together is very close to the agricultural field in question at Pervomaiskyi.” [39min04s]

The displayed image is made at exactly the same location as this one ….… which appeared on Twitter on July 15, 2014, two days before MH17 was shot down. The coordinates of the recording location were calculated and published on the Webtalk.ru forum.

If we place cutouts of the both photos above each other, we see an exact match. Photos (or video recordings) are almost certainly made with the use of a tripod:

The smoke from the ‘new photo’ is located more to the left compared to the two columns of smoke from the picture of the tweet on July 15:

Having the recording location and the coordinates of the launch site claimed by JIT, we can draw on a map a line of sight (white) and an estimated line of sight (red) for the columns of smoke on the picture of the tweet on July 15:

The red line of sight points to Saur Mogila, the highest point of Donbass. A place where in July 2014 fierce battles took place almost daily. On images from Google Earth of July 16, 2014 two pieces of scorched earth can be seen. Probably the smoke spots were caused by an attack on July 15.

It is clear that the apartment from where the recordings were made, served as an observation post, but why did Andrey Tarasenko twitter a photo of July 15 and not the one of the smoke plume on July 17?

Andrey Tarasenko claims he was walking home from work at the time of the attack:

A Ukrainian miner says that at the moment of the catastrophe with the Malaysian Boeing he saw a white trace shooting from the ground into the air. Twenty seconds later, he saw smoke rising in the distance. Andrey Tarasenko said he and his friend were walking home when it happened. “Do you know how does a trace of a plane look like? It was the same, but this was a rocket launched from the ground,” Tarasenko said. Tarasenko estimated that he was on a 16 kilometers (10 miles) distance from the Boeing 777 crash site. He never saw the plane. (source)

From the firing of a Buk-rocket untill the creation of smoke rising from the crashed MH17, several minutes have passed. Twenty seconds as claimed by Tarasenko is nonsense.

If the rest of Tarasenko’s story is correct, in any case he was not in the apartment when the recording was made. Interesting questions:

– Who made the image(s)?
– Who is the occupant of the apartment?
– How and from whom did Tarasenko get the files?

The main question is of course:

Why was “the long research on social media” necessary and photo (or video?) of the smoke plume from Buk that shot down MH17 wasn’t made public immediately?

Most searched weapon in the world – route back to the Russian Federation

JIT presentation: “Immediately after the launch, the Buk-Telar was discharged. There are almost no pictures available of the discharge route because it took place in the evening and night hours.” [41min27s]
“The Buk-Telar presumably was driving independently in direction of Snezhnoye. There he was put again on the white Volvo trailer in the late evening hours of July 17th.” [41min49s]

What we know:

– MH17 was hit around 16:20h.
– The distance of the route from the ‘launch site’ to the square of the Furshet Market is about 7 kilometers.
– Sunset on July 17, 2014 near Donetsk was at 20:22hrs.

If the assessment made by the JIT is correct, then the Buk-Telar was at least four hours within a radius of seven kilometers from the launch location since the launch of a missile and only after that it was loaded back on the trailer in the center of Snezhnoye for transport back to Russia.

– Statistically speaking, how many witnesses should have seen the Buk-Telar during almost four hours in the neighborhood and in the center of Snezhnoye and how likely is it that no satellite or spy images were made after it was known that MH17 was shot down?

Following the JIT story. In the late evening hours of July 17, the Buk-Telar is again put on the white Volvo trailer and drives through Lugansk to Russia. There are 175 kilometers from Snezhoye to Lugansk. That is, if you follow the route that Telar drove according to the JIT. The shortest route is less than 90 kilometers. Why this huge detour of about 80 kilometers?

Lugansk video

JIT-presentation: “In Lugansk in the early morning a video has been made of a Volvo-truck with a loader carrying the Buk Telar. It shows that the installation carries only three missiles. From there the transport drives to the Russian border and crosses the border.” [42min07s]

Arsen Avakov states on his Facebook page that the video is made by a surveillance-team on July 18th, at 04:50 in the morning.

The video displays a lighted streetlight next to the billboard. This is remarkable, as Lugansk was almost entirely without electricity in the morning of July 18, 2014.

The JIT claims to have obtained a lot of evidence through wiretaps alongside many pictures and witnesses. Joost Niemöller asked the following question [1u6min32s]

“What is the source of the wiretapped telephone conversations?”

Answer by Wilbert Paulissen, head of Dutch Police Investigations:

“These are mainly wiretapped telephone conversations of the Ukrainian service. Thus, these wiretapped telephone conversations are becoming available to the JIT via the court. That is the source of the wiretapped telephone conversations”.

Joost Niemöller:

“You say mainly. Are there any other sources?”

Wilbert Paulissen:

“No, these are: wiretapped telephone conversations from Ukraine. To put it simply.”

Ukrainian secret service falsified wiretapped telephone conversations

Almost immediately after it became known that MH17 was shot down, the Ukrainian secret service SBU published some wiretapped telephone conversations that would prove the guilt of the rebels. Here is an analysis of the audio:

The so-called evidence proves something quite different: Ukraine does not hesitate to produce (poorly) falsified evidence.
The fact that the audio was forged is not being denied by anyone. Not even by the top of the Dutch investigation team. However, JIT countries have agreed information is only being made public if no member objects. What this non-disclosure agreement contains exactly is… confidential.

Various wiretapped telephone conversations were played during the JIT presentation. Since it is proven that the SBU forged wiretapped telephone conversations, I limit myself discussing only one tap [43min21s]:

Person 1: “Where is the vehicle now?”
Person 2: “The vehicle is already in Russia for a long time.”

The JIT indicates that the tapped conversation was recorded on July 18, 2014 at 07:44. The Buk, according to the JIT, was filmed in Lugansk the same morning at 04:50 and then still had to travel the entire route to the Russian border.

How is it possible that the “vehicle” at 07:44 was in Russia for a “long time” already?

JIT fails to fulfill its promise to appoint exact weapon

Head of Dutch Police Investigations Wilbert Paulissen:
“Based on the criminal investigation it can be concluded that the flight MH17 was shot down on July 17, 2014 by a missile from the 9M38-series.” [20min31s]

The 9M38-series consists of two types: 9M38 and 9M38M1. From the outside the two missiles are almost identical, but according to manufacturer Almaz Antey the warheads of the two missile types contain differently shaped particles. The warhead of the 9M38 contains square particles of two different sizes, while the missile type 9M38M1 contains square particles of two different sizes and butterfly-shaped particles.

JIT: “The warhead of 9M38 is composed of an explosive core with a sheath of preformed particles which are dispersed with great force during the explosion.” [23min35s]

Using the term “9M38” in combination with a warhead of missile type 9M38M1 is at least confusing.

The JIT also shows an explosion of a warhead with butterfly particles in an animation. A missile of 9M38M1 type. And thus, not the 9M38 type.

Why does the JIT say that flight MH17 was shot down on July 17, 2014 by a missile from the “9M38-series”, but does not specifically appoint 9M38M1 as the weapon?
Buk manufacturer Almaz Antey during tests has detonated a warhead 9N314M of a 9M38M1 missile near the cockpit of a disused Ilyushin-86 .

After the experiment the aluminum skin of the IL-86 (right) contains many butterfly-shaped entry holes. There are no butterfly-shaped holes found in the skin of MH17. How can this be explained?

Russia claims it has no longer 9M38 missiles in its arsenal. This type of missile is still used by Ukraine, according to the Russians.

Does the JIT use the term “9M38-series” to disguise MH17 has not been shot down by a missile of the 9M38M1 type?

Primary radar data absent, primary radar data present.

More than two years ago Russia claimed the primary radar data had been erased, but six days before the JIT presentation it was reported a copy was nevertheless preserved.

Paulissen: “Regarding the new primary radar images the Russian Federation spoke about last Monday, I can report that they are not yet in possession of our research team and that we were not able to see them yet.” [44min15s]

Ukraine claims it has no primary radar data, because all radars were either under maintainance or had been destroyed before July 17, 2014.

Dutch MP Omtzigt: “DSB report: Russians have deleted primary radar data
Ukraine had them switched off due to maintenance. (So no radar data of the missile)

Westerbeke: “There has been a lot of talk about radar images. Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation provided radar data to the JIT.
Recently the JIT has, after intensive research, also traced a video file with relevant primary military radar data from the area. Recorded by a mobile radar in Ukraine. This radar was used at that time to test new software. Though this radar has a limited range, it did detect MH17 and completes the further completes the entire picture.” [14min16s]

Why Ukraine did not immediately make this primary radar information available to the JIT and why more than two years “intensive research” was needed?

Jeroen Akkermans rightfully states the Russians have wasted a lot of time and that the radar data “could obviously have been forged“.
Since we have already established Ukraine has produced falsified evidence, the uncritical attitude of the Dutch researchers and media towards that country is especially noteworthy.

Westerbeke: “The discussion about the radar images in our opinion can be closed. Today we want to emphasize that the material available to us is more than sufficient to draw conclusions in the criminal investigation. [14min55s]

This might be so as per Westerbeke’s opinion, but fact is the wrangling over the radar images is still ongoing after 1000 days. Point of discussion remains if the Russian radar data proves that no Buk was launched from the launch site designated by the JIT or the following applies:

“In this case the absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence” [46min06s]

No doubt about motive

Head of Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaichenko:

“Terrorists and militants have planned a cynical terrorist attack on a civilian aircraft Aeroflot AFL-2074 Moscow-Larnaka that was flying at that time above the territory of Ukraine.”

According to Ukraine this false flag operation failed because the Russian crew drove to the wrong place Pervomaiske and accidentally did not shoot down the Aeroflot airliner, but MH17 instead. The shooting down of an Aeroflot airliner with Russian citizens on board would according to Ukraine be used as casus belli for an overt Russian invasion of Ukraine.

What was said during the JIT presentation about the motive?

Paulissen: “The research is still focused on this question, but I have started my story deliberately sketching the context in which the event took place. That context, as we have seen it and as I told you, was that there was heavy fighting and that men sought an answer to the many air strikes by the Ukrainian army. Thus, that is an indication in a particular direction. Whether it is so, the further research will have to clarify, but we are attending to this matter.” [1u08min39s]

Westerbeke “Our research is focused precisely on that question. Was it a mistake? Was it deliberate? Who was in charge there? Who gave the order? These are real follow-up questions, and that is exactly what we are going to look for further.” [1u10min26s]

? JIT member Ukraine announced in August 2014 it possesses hard evidence about culprits and motive, but the JIT reports in September 2016 it is still looking for the culprits and their possible motive ?

The (Dutch) researchers have had two years to verify and evaluate the hard evidence collected by Ukraine. The fact that during the press conference both Paulissen and Westerbeke stated the issue about the motive remains unsolved is a strong indication Ukraine also lies about the motive issue.

“We never said that Russians definitely shot them down, but they definitely provided the weapon for it.”

So what is the truth?

Eliot Higgins:
“You confuse the statements in the investigation report of Bellingcat with my personal opinion. Bellingcat is a group of individuals working together. It would be wrong to attribute statements made by one of them to Bellingcat. It is my personal opinion that it is plausible that the BUK installation was operated by the members of the 53th brigade. The Bellingcat reports do not go that far and leave the question open, so that people can draw their own conclusions on the evidence presented in the reports.” [source]

– an incorrect launch site was claimed
– at least one witness testimony was forged

The coverage of AD is based on information from detective buro Correct!v. The factual and demonstrable errors in the analysis of Correct!v have been investigated by Billy Six and myself and Marcel van den Berg discusses not less than eight errors.

Despite all the “overwhelming evidence” spread by (social) media about the involvement and guilt of Russia in the downing of MH17 Westerbeke says:

“We as Joint Investigation Team, on basis of the research, are not going further at the moment than to confirm that the Buk Telar was brought from Russia and that it was transported back. We did not go further in our conclusions and this means we do not comment on the involvement of the Russian Federation as a country or persons from the Russian Federation.” [55min27s]

Which scenario can explain why all stakeholders frustrate and even sabotage getting the truth on the table?

This question keeps many people who rely on studying public information busy. What virtually everyone agrees on is the following:

Ukraine should have closed its airspace.

Even DSB (Dutch Safety Board) is clear about it. If the responsible authorities claim to be aware of the presence of weapons in a conflict zone that can shoot down a civil aircraft at high altitude and still do not close the airspace, there is at least a matter of gross negligence.
Professor Giemulla has started proceedings at the ECHR against Ukraine on behalf of a number of German family members of the deceased based on this argument. Professor Giemulla describes The Netherlands as “a black hole“, because until now no Dutch family members have joined this lawsuit.

Paulissen of the JIT: “regarding the closure of airspace, we state that the JIT investigation is not focused on this. That was part of the DSB research. Conclusions have been drawn, so we do not focus on it within the criminal investigation”. [1u02min28s]

Legal proceedings Ukraine vs Russia

Ukraine has filed a case against Russia at the International Court of Justice. MH17 is part of a complaint against Russia because of “aggressive” and “illegal annexation of Crimea”. According to Ukraine Russia has violated two international treaties by “financing of terrorism” and “racial discrimination”. The Court has not ruled on the case and experts do not know what the Court will finally decide. [April 19th 2017 – first order ICJ]

MH17 is a part of a geopolitical conflict

Main parties in this conflict are the United States and Russia. Netherlands (NATO) and Ukraine are in the US camp. Ukrainian rebels are in the Russian camp.

Opinions about the credibility of the JIT and especially the reliability of the input of the secret service of Ukraine are divided.

Based on public information (and thus not on the basis of information that the JIT claims to possess, but says it does not release due to tactical and strategic reasons), I am not convinced that a Buk coming from Russia shot down MH17. Who doubts the western narrative is being framed as a “useful idiot” and “Kremlin-troll”. So be it.

Back to the question: Which scenario can explain why all stakeholders frustrate and even sabotage getting the truth on the table? It is tempting to speculate on the basis of incomplete information and to fill in the missing pieces as “truth.” The last thousand days I was able to resist this temptation. I did however include a hypothesis of Colonel bd. Rudolph in Lying for Justice. According to Rudolph’s hypothesis, the Ukrainian air defense accidentally shot down MH17 during an exercise. Another hypothesis that also assumes it was an accident:

– Russian-backed rebels captured one or more operational Buks of the Ukrainian army.
– Nevertheless, Ukraine deliberatly did not close its air space.
– MH17 was accidentally shot down by rebels.

This scenario provides an explanation for the following motives:

– Russia does not want it becomes public knowledge MH17 was shot down by rebels backed by Moscow.
– Ukraine does not want to become public knowledge the murder weapon originated not from Russia, but from the arsenal of Kiev itself.
– Rebels obviously do not want to be identified as culprits.
– The Netherlands obediently follows the strategic interests of the United States and is committed to keep Ukraine out of the wind and make Russia look as bad as possible.

* Disclaimer: I still do not know what really happened *

JIT countries claim to know for sure the weapon came from Russia

It is nonsense to think that rebels could have organized a rent-a-buk without the highest authorities in Russia being informed about and having sanctioned it. If the actual murder weapon came from Russia, this claim will have to be substantiated. Eventually The Netherlands will have to initiate a lawsuit against Russia. If this is ever going to happen remains rather questionable.

Less unlikely is one day it will come to trial in which individual culprits with Russian nationality will be accused. (whether or not a trial in absentia).

Westerbeke:
“Which people were involved in the supply, command, protection, firing and discharging of the Buk Telar? [..] We now have a hundred people in the picture who can be in some way associated with the shooting down of flight MH17 or transporting the Buk. We have been able to determine the identity of these one hundred people.” [45min52s]

At the end of this article a reflection and prediction regarding the type of evidence that will be used in case of such litigation.

1) Tapped telephone conversations, videos and other materials that may have been forged by the SBU and of which the authenticity cannot be determined objectively.

2) Anonymous witnesses.

3) Evidence from classified US sources.

Westerbeke: “What we have said is we have gotten access from the Americans to all relevant material they have available and that it contains a significant portion of state secrets. We were given access to the material through the MIVD and through a special officer of the district prosecutor’s office. In combination with that we have received a report from the US with conclusions based on that material. We can use that report in a criminal case, it is a part of the case and therefore constitutes evidence. Especially in combination with the possibility that the officer who has seen the underlying material can make a statement. It remains a state secret and is therefore not declassified, but we can now fully use it in the research. [1u3min50s]
[…] As far as the question about the state of confidential information is concerned, it will be some kind of a legal response, it is also a bit complicated… It can be used as evidence, but in an indirect way, the way it has been agreed on for now. Namely, through a statement that will be given by the national officer anti-terrorism. The latter can then declare in court. However, that does not mean that the underlying material becomes available for the court itself or for the legal defense of any suspects.” [1u15min47s]

Thus, the circle can be closed this way. The United States in the background determines what evidence will or will not be used and which material remains unverifiable for third parties, lawyers of the suspects and even for the judges.