Excerpt:.....is satisfied that any transfer of property referred to in sub-section (1) was made by a proprietor in good faith and in the ordinary course of village management, he may declare that the transfer shall not be void after the date of vesting. in my opinion, therefore, the decree in this appeal is well-founded and cannot be reversed. 966 of 1956) must fail for the same reason......on fighting the case on the revenue side, the first court passed a decree for rs. 737/ 8/- and costs. on appeal by the defendant the amount was reduced to rs. 625/- with costs in proportion. the present appeal has been filed by the defendant against that decree.3. singhai shrinandanlal as proprietor lambar-dar of mauza kirrawada also transferred in occupancy rights to suratsingh khasra nos. 2 to 5 and 34 on 21-3-1951 for rs. 1000/- by a registered deed. these fields were recorded as chhota ghas,suratsingh applied for recognition of the transfer but it was refused. he thereafter took the same fields from the state for rs. 2250/-. on 20th octo-ber, 1954, suratsingh claimed rs. 1600/- including rs. 606/- as charges for ploughing by tractor, rs. 400/- other expenses, rs. 50/- for.....

Judgment:

M. Hidayatullah, C.J.

1. The judgment in this second appeal shall also govern the disposal of second appeals Nos. 966 of 1956 and 1015 of 1956. The other two appeals are appeals against a common judgment and decree.

2. The case comes before us on a reference by one of us. The whole matter in dispute is referred to the Division Bench. Singhai Shrinandanlal (who was the defendant in the two suits) was proprietor and lambardar of mauzas Belai and Kirrawada in Khurai tahsil. On 29-7-1950 he orally created two brothers Laxmansingh and Durjansingh occupancy tenants of fields Nos. 688 and 691/1 of mauaa Belai on receipt of Rs. 625/-. The fields were recorded chhota ghas. The tenants applied to be recognised as tenants but the Board of Revenue by its order dated 18-8-1953 declined to do so.

Laxmansingh and Durjansingh later purchased these same fields in an auction held by the State for Rs. 1230/- on 12-6-1951. They brought the suit for Rs. 1000/- including in their claim Rs. G25/- consideration, interest on the same and Rs. 100/- spent on fighting the case on the revenue side, The first Court passed a decree for Rs. 737/ 8/- and costs. On appeal by the defendant the amount was reduced to Rs. 625/- with costs in proportion. The present appeal has been filed by the defendant against that decree.

3. Singhai Shrinandanlal as proprietor lambar-dar of mauza Kirrawada also transferred in occupancy rights to Suratsingh khasra Nos. 2 to 5 and 34 on 21-3-1951 for Rs. 1000/- by a registered deed. These fields were recorded as chhota ghas,Suratsingh applied for recognition of the transfer but it was refused. He thereafter took the same fields from the State for Rs. 2250/-. On 20th Octo-ber, 1954, Suratsingh claimed Rs. 1600/- including Rs. 606/- as charges for ploughing by tractor, Rs. 400/- other expenses, Rs. 50/- for expenses in revenue Courts and Rs. 50/- for stamp duty and registration of the document. The first Court decreed the claim for Rs. 1600/-. On appeal by Sin-ghai Shrinandanlal the amount decreed was reduced to Rs. 1000/-. The two second appeals (Nos. 966 of 1956 and 1015 of 1956) have been filed by Shrinandanlal and Suratsingh respectively against the same judgment and decree.

4. The two transactions are of 29th July 1950and 21st March 1951. They are both hit by section6(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of ProprietaryRights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950.That section reads as follows:-

'6 (1) Except as provided in Sub-section (2), the transfer of any right in the property which is liable to vest in the State under this Act made by the proprietor at any time after the 16th March, 1950 shall, as from the date of vesting, be void.

(2) Where on the application of the transferor or the transferee, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that any transfer of property referred to in Sub-section (1) was made by a proprietor in good faith and in the ordinary course of village management, he may declare that the transfer shall not be void after the date of vesting.'

5. It is quite clear that unless the transferor or transferee obtained the declaration under the second sub-section, the transfer became void from the date of vesting. That date was 31st March, 1951. It is equally clear that during the period 29-7-1950 and 21-3-1951 till the date of vesting the agreements were not void and valid contracts existed.

6. Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act lays down :

'When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it.'

The matter is covered by the expression 'when a contract becomes void' because the original contracts became void on the 31st March, 1951. Even if the contracts became void when the orders by which permission was refused were passed, they did become void and the lessor was bound to refund the consideration. In Raja Mohan v. Man-zoor Ahmad, AIR 1943 PC 29 their Lordships of the Privy Council awarded interest even though none had been claimed. In my opinion, therefore, the decree in this appeal is well-founded and cannot be reversed. This appeal (Second Appeal No. 864 of 1955) thus fails and is dismissed with costs.

7. As regards the other two appeals, that of Singhai Shrinandanlal (Second Appeal No. 966 of 1956) must fail for the same reason. It is dismissed with costs. As regards the appeal of Suratsingh by which Suratsingh claims an additional sum of Rs. 600/- by way of damages, the words 'any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it or to make compensation for it' do not cover a case of damages. I am clear that in such a case where property has been taken away in exercise of the right of the State to acquire property there can beno question of damages for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment. Where the lessee is evicted by an Act of the Legislature the lessee cannot sue the lessor for disturbance of possession. The appeal of Suratsingh (Second Appeal No. 1015 of 1956) thus fails and is also dismissed with costs. The parties to these two cross-appeals shall be entitled to set off the costs of these two appeals.