When a major policy fails to produce
the desired results, put the blame on an unrelated reason
for its failure and go after the removal of
that unrelated reason. That, in essence, is what the United
States is trying to achieve in its current endeavors
to remove Mohammad ElBaradei as the head of the
United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). His supposed fault, according to
US sources, is that he "lacks impartiality" in his
dealings with Iran in the ongoing diplomatic crisis over
its nuclear programs. A front-page report of the
Washington Post published on December 12 has thrown light
on the continuing power play between Washington and the
IAEA, a tussle that ElBaradei might lose - despite that it
has done nothing wrong.

There is
no doubt that Iran's supposed aspiration to
develop nuclear weapons has vexed the US for many years. Even in
the first Bill Clinton administration in the early
1990s, that very issue clouded US-Russia relations, since
Moscow was, and remains, involved in providing Iran
with nuclear technology. In the post-September 11,
2001, environment, depriving the so-called "rogue states"
- whose new label under the Bush administration
became "axis of evil" states - of weapons of mass
destruction has become one of the foremost objectives of
President George W Bush's national-security strategy. That was
also the first purported reason underlying the US-led
invasion of Iraq. However, the absence of nuclear
weapons in Iraq has created a sort of long-term drawback
- if not a credibility gap - for the US when it comes to
accusing another member of that "axis" of nuclear
ambitions, and then persuading the world body to impose
punitive sanctions.

That was why the US had to
take a back seat and let the European Union's "big
three" - France, Germany and the United Kingdom - take
the lead in negotiating an agreement with Tehran to
freeze its uranium-enrichment program. This development aside,
the role of the IAEA has remained a source of ongoing,
if not permanent, friction with the White House.
The United States' modus operandi on the
issue of nuclear non-proliferation is to consider an
accused "axis of evil" nation guilty, and then to insist
that it should produce incontestable evidence
proving its innocence. The chief motivation of the IAEA,
on the contrary, is to bring about
nuclear non-proliferation with a country under inquiry without
any prior assumptions of its guilt. At the same time, the
IAEA is not interested in responding to the
specific national-security agendas of any of the member nations of
the world body, and it insists on maintaining
strict neutrality and impartiality in the entire process of
its inquiry. That was the chief reason the IAEA came
under major criticism from the US when Hans Blix was
heading it, during its dealings with Iraq under Saddam
Hussein.

ElBaradei shares that legacy
of impartiality for which the IAEA is despised in
US national-security institutions. According to the
Washington Post report, the US has eavesdropped on
ElBaradei, as it did during the term of Blix. Some Bush
partisans are claiming that the intercepted calls have
shown a lack of impartiality by the chief of the IAEA as
he tried to help Iran navigate a diplomatic crisis over
its nuclear programs. However, according to that report,
the "intercepted calls have not produced any evidence of
nefarious conduct [of partiality] by ElBaradei". Others
take the position that "the transcripts [of the
intercepted calls] demonstrate nothing more than
standard telephone diplomacy".

A well-known US
intention in this entire episode of questioning
ElBaradei's impartiality is to force him into not
seeking a third term next summer. However, the Egyptian
diplomat has an impeccable reputation and strong support
among the 35-nation board of the IAEA, which is likely
to vote for his reappointment. In a rare show of
independence from the Bush administration, even the
United Kingdom is reportedly reluctant to press for
ElBaradei's ouster. However, outgoing US Secretary of
State Colin Powell is citing the so-called "Geneva rule"
of limiting the chief of the IAEA's tenure to two terms.
What might be helping ElBaradei is the fact that no
acceptable major candidate has yet emerged, even though
a near-ideal US choice is reported to be Australian
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.

The
ElBaradei controversy only underscores America's frustrations
with the international negotiating process that is
not immediately leading to iron-clad guarantees about
Iran's promise to freeze its uranium-enrichment program. But
the chief of the IAEA has broken no rules and has shown
no favors toward Iran. In fact, by becoming unpopular
within the chauvinistic cadres of American bureaucrats,
if anything, ElBaradei, like his memorable predecessor
Blix, has proved that he is a stickler for going by the
book, and for the use of international diplomacy for the
sole objective of bringing about global nuclear
non-proliferation.