This paper analyses the repercussions of the institutional aspects of co-operatives in the decision making process, in arranging the incentive system for members, and discretionary behaviour among management. From a comparative analysis of capitalistic companies, the paper studies the nature of the hierarchical relationships present in co-operatives and reviews the control mechanisms available to them, with special emphasis on the board of directors. At the same time, lines of action are proposed that favour efficient control and reconcile the requirements of co-operative enterprises with their attributes as institutions.

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