FOCUS Archives

FOCUS March 1998 Volume 11

The Contending Discourses on Women in Iran

Farideh Farhi - Tehran, Iran

Writing about the situation of Muslim women continues to
be a hazardous task. Caught between an international discursive
struggle, at times portrayed as a clash of civilizations and at other
times as simply a matter of human rights, the Muslim woman's complete
identification with the culture in which she is embedded and expected
to represent, by both insiders and outsiders, has always been
troublesome for her. In many ways, she stands dazed and even confused
as she is called upon either to defend or reject with absolute
certainty the terms of a contested terrain that she herself has had
very little to do in their creation. And once she speaks, no matter
how hard she tries to voice the complexities, variety of experiences,
and messiness of her life, hell breaks loose. Insiders will accuse
her of treason, abandoning Islam, and ultimately her native soul,
while outsiders see either collusion, compromise, and even ignorance
or her rightful rejection of an oppressive traditionalist
culture.

The problem is further complicated for an Iranian Muslim woman.
Her arena of maneuver has become so politicized that even a small
squeak on her behalf will be immediately interpreted, reinterpreted,
and turned into a sign post for something much bigger and more severe
than a simple desire to lead a decent life as a human being. A lock
of hair showing is perceived by outsiders as a sign of rejection of
the whole Islamic Republic while a simple bicycle ride (not forbidden
by law) can easily turn into a full-fledged internal debate about
cultural invasion. This is why words must be chosen carefully since
the path crossed is a sensitive or even dangerous one.

Having begun with this caveat, it is also important to reiterate
that the story of Iranian women and their relationship to the Islamic
state is very much intertwined with the story of the revolution and
understanding this dynamic will tell us much about the dynamics of
the revolution itself, the stages it has gone through, and the
development trajectory is has more or less settled upon. In this
paper I will attempt to lay out these stages, pointing to the complex
metamorphosis of the women question vis-a-vis the Islamic state. I
will end the discussion by pointing to certain obstacles that Iranian
women face in their struggle to find their proper place within and in
relation to the Islamic state as well as unexpected spaces that have
opened up for them to maneuver.

Women and Revolutionary Stages

Since the outset of the revolution, the state has maintained a
Janus-faced relationship with women; on the one hand, seeking to
mobilize and keep them, their faces, and bodies (if not their issues)
at the center stage of the revolution and, on the other hand,
forcefully attempting to be the articulator of what it deems to be
the "proper" Muslim woman. The result of this somewhat contradictory
approach has been, if I may be permitted to use this rather
un-Islamic metaphor, a tango with many false steps, stumbles, and
earnest tries of new steps. In this process, the relationship of
women to the Islamic state in Iran has been influenced by the
politics of revolution itself, cultural ambiguities about the role of
gender in the public domain, exigencies of the developmental state,
and women's increasing capacity to utilize the central role given to
them by the revolutionary drama in surprisingly effective ways to
maintain issues of real concern to them at the center stage of
Iranian politics. Of course, any periodization of the nature of state
will do injustice to the complexity of issues and dynamics involved.
Nonetheless, I think that at least four distinct stages can be
identified in the post-revolutionary period, with each having its own
particular characteristics. At the same time, it is important to note
that the traces of each period have left their marks on Iranian
politics and continue to be part of women's daily lives. In other
words, although in what follows I will talk about stages and
correlate these stages to a certain historical period, my point is
that the forces that have powerfully shaped the lives of women in
each period all continued to be present to this day, enabling
discursive practices that at times work in tandem and other times in
opposition to each other. In such a field of conflicting forces,
Iranian women have been both cautious and opportunistic, staying
aloof whenever necessary and seizing every possible opportunity
whenever a space for maneuver is smelled.

The First Stage: Gender and the Politics of Revolution

This is the immediate post-revolutionary period and the stage in
which the central role of women in the unfolding of the revolutionary
drama becomes clearly and forcefully inscribed. During this period of
power contestation and reproduction, and state building, the
representation of the proper Muslim woman assumes much significance
as the veiled domesticated woman symbolizes the search for
authenticity and cultural revival. Accordingly, women's behavior,
appearance, and range of activities comes to be defined and regulated
by the political or cultural objectives of various political
movements, the state, and leadership. *[1]
It was in this period that compulsory veiling was
legislated, coeducation banned, segregation imposed in many public
areas, a general assault on day-care instituted, and female judgeship
not recognized. Most significant was the 1979 abrogation of the
Family Protection Law (legislated in 1967 and amended in 1974),
effectively denying women the right to divorce and re-establishing
men's unlimited right of divorce. *[2]
In addition, women's voices were banned from radio and female singers
barred from television. A campaign was waged to tie women to home and
family. Women were restricted from certain professions, such as law,
and women university students were not allowed into programs such as
agricultural engineering and veterinary sciences. The state assumed a
pronatalist stance, banning abortion and distribution of
contraceptives, extolling the Muslim family, and lowering the age of
consent.

Women's responses to new gender codes varied by class and
political/ideological orientation, and from enthusiastic support to
acquiescence to outright hostility. The common ground upon which
almost all women stood, however, was that of a bystander; most if not
all of the changes were effectively promulgated irrespective of the
multiplicity of the women voices present. Indeed, the model of
Islamic womanhood the consolidating state sought to impose on the
population was an integral part of the political-cultural project of
Islamization as the transformation of Iran was seen as incumbent upon
the transformation of women, defined in singular and extremely
homogenous terms. As has been repeatedly noted, (re)definitions of
gender are frequently central to political and cultural change and
the Islamic state in Iran took this task very seriously. *[3]

Despite the renunciation of many rights previously held by women,
however, it is important to note that the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic, ratified during this period of intense political struggles,
reaffirmed the basic and fundamental political right of women, 15
years or above, to elect their representatives. According to Article
62 of the Constitution, the deputies of the Majlis as well as the
president are elected by the direct vote of the people, so are the
representatives of councils of provinces, towns, cities, districts,
villages, and productive and industrial units (Article 100). Women
have also been vested with the constitutional right to get elected or
appointed to the highest political and administrative offices of the
land. The only exception to this rule involves the office of
presidency which carries an interpretative clause (Article 115 of the
Constitution), stipulating that the candidate for the office must be
among the "distinguished political and religious personalities" (so
far interpreted to be men). *[4]

The interpretive or fluid character of the Iranian Constitution is
evident in many other areas. For instance, the Constitution provides
for "the rights of the people" and guarantees the rights of women,
but "in all areas according to Islamic standards." This explicit
qualification regarding the laws of Islam clearly locates women's
rights along with many other rights in the category of interpretive
rather than inalienable, hence assuring that debates concerning their
interpretation will remain part of the struggles and conflicts within
the political process. This is especially the case since the general
and clear constitutional acknowledgment of equal political rights for
women are often in contradiction with the situational civil
restrictions and unequal social, economic, and criminal rights (some
of which were mentioned above) that have been imposed on women.

The Second Stage: One Step Forward or Two Steps Backward?

As mentioned, the policy choices of the immediate
post-revolutionary period, affecting the daily lives of women in
fundamental ways, were made in haste and had more to do with the
construction of a new national and Islamic identity than the concrete
experiences and problems of women. As such, it was only after the new
state builders came to experience all the dimensions of their roles
as distributors and guarantors of justice that different aspects of
their policy choices regarding women began to become slowly manifest
(a process that continues to this day). During this stage, which can
generally be identified with the eight-year war with Iraq, a variety
of women not generally involved in the public domain became mobilized
in a whole series of activities. For instance, they staffed the mass
laundries and kitchens servicing the war front, served as nurses in
the military hospitals, and given more pronounced civilian profile in
many government offices.

More importantly, however, many problems particularly regarding
the families of those killed in the war came to the fore. This is not
to say that these problems did not exist in regards to other
families; rather it simply suggests that because of the devastating
impact and heavy toll of the war as well as the important social
basis the families of those serving in the war constituted for the
Islamic state, the new leadership in Iran could not ignore the
problems posed. For instance, one of the particularly difficult
problems created by the war was the question of mother's guardianship
of the children which was taken away in absolute terms by the new
laws. *[5]

The right to absolute guardianship given to the husband and the
paternal family led to many abuses as many young children were, in
some cases, forcefully taken away from the wives of those killed in
the war as a way to collect the funds given to these children by the
Foundation for the Martyred or other governmental agencies. After
much complaints by the martyrs' wives, and quite a bit of discussion
and debate in the parliament, a new law was passed in 1985 giving the
right of fostership of a minor to the mother unless the courts reject
her competence. This allowed her to collect governmental funds for
their children even after she wedded another man. Although this
practical legislative maneuver did not bring into question the legal
and religious foundations of absolute paternal guardianship (since it
only pertained to funds distributed by the government and not
inherited property), nevertheless it can be seen as progressive
attempt to deal with a concrete problem articulated by women
themselves.

Although no clearly articulated solution to the problem has yet to
be found, the state and the judicial system went through a similar
process as many problems became manifest in regards to women's
inability to divorce and men's right to enter into several temporary
and permanent marriages. Increasingly the courts have begun to show
flexibility in regards to the women's right to divorce and to certain
amount of marital wealth after a man-initiated divorce, even if the
question of women's economic well-being after a woman-initiated
divorce has yet to be addressed in a satisfactory way.

Measures such as paying women for services rendered in the house
in case of divorce or adjusting women's mehr to inflation again in
case of a man-initiated divorce, although passed by the parliament in
the years after the war, can also be put into the category of
pragmatic steps dealing with women's immediate grievances. The common
point for all these steps has been the reaction registered to the
grievances of a particular base of support through attempts to reform
the existing laws. Hence, it is clear that the legal arena has been
identified as the main terrain of struggle. But these steps also
reflect an unwillingness or at least hesitance to deal with the
deeper and more fundamental inequalities that exist within the family
arena regarding divorce and marital rights (e.g., Article 1133 of the
Civil Code stating that a man can divorce his wife whenever he wants)
as well as in other spheres of law (e.g., inheritance laws and laws
regarding blood money). As such, those engaged in the
reinterpretation of Islamic jurisprudence have been willing to
maneuver within the existing categories but have so far not been able
to question the categories themselves. *[6]

Endnotes

For an analysis of gender and post-revolutionary state-making
see Farideh Farhi, "Sexuality and the Politics of Revolution in
Iran," in Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World
edited by Mary Ann Tetreault. Columbia, South Carolina: University of
South Carolina Press, 1994.

The Family Protection Law was intended to reverse some of the
unlimited rights given to husbands in relation to divorce.
Accordingly,

it gave men and women, under specific circumstances, the right
to divorce;

it obligated both men and women to offer their supporting
evidence for divorce to the Family Protection Court;

it specified circumstances which allowed the husband to seek
divorce, hence limiting his unlimited right of divorce.

For the best collection of how these redefinitions have worked
themselves out in the Islamic world see Deniz Kandiyoti, ed. Women,
Islam and the State. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

For a succinct delineation of women's political rights after
the revolution see Mehranguiz Kar "Women's Political Rights in Iran
after the Revolution." The Iranian Journal of International Affairs
8, 3 (Fall 1995), 659-675. I will deal with the question of whether
women can be president in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
debates generated around this question later in this paper.

A recent example of the swift reaction on the part of Islamic
juridical tradition to the questioning of juridical categories came
in the words of Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani who responded with
vehemence to an apparent attempt by the women in the Parliament to
initiate a debate on blood money, which for a killed woman is half of
the amount given for a killed man. As has been usually the case,
those attempting for reform were reacting to a particular case which
had received much publicity in the press. Lankarani's riposte was
merciless: "Who are you and I to meddle in Islamic jurisprudence?" He
then went on to blast those who without any knowledge are attempting
to understand matters "those of us who have spend years studying do
not understand."