On July
13, 2018, self-represented Plaintiff Bryant Malcolm Carter,
who is confined at the Wicomico County Detention Center
(WCDC) filed this Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983
and a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Form Pauperis. ECF 1,
2.[1]
As Carter's financial information indicates that he is
indigent, this Court will grant his Motion to Proceed in
Forma Pauperis.

Carter
claims that on July 7, 2018, he informed Officers Abner and
Johnson that he needed his cell door opened to use the rest
room and to get his toilet paper. ECF No. 1 at 3. The
officers responded that the cell would be open "at the
top of the hour." Id. Carter then explained
that someone was in the shower and he therefore could not use
the shower commode. Carter claims "because of there
[sic] lack [sic] of negligence and the rules of the Wicomico
County Detention Center," he defecated on himself and
was "humiliated and embarrassed." Id. As
redress, Carter seeks a public apology and compensation for
his embarrassment and humiliation. Id.

DISCUSSION

Carter
is proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §1915, which permits an
indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court
without prepaying the filing fee. To protect against possible
abuses of this privilege, the statute requires a court to
dismiss any claim that fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28
U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1). This Court is mindful of its
obligation to liberally construe the pleadings of
self-represented litigants such as Carter. See Erickson
v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro
se complaint, a plaintiffs allegations are assumed to be
true. Id. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Nonetheless,
liberal construction does not mean that a court can ignore a
clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth
a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,901 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton,775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a district court
may not "conjure up questions never squarely
presented"). Carter's Complaint is deficient in
several respects and will be dismissed under this standard.

Carter
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but
merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.' "Albright v. Oliver,510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). To prevail on a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a "person" acting under color of state law. 42
U.S.C. §1983; West v. Atkins,487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988) (citation omitted). Carter, however, does not allege
facts supporting a violation of his constitutional rights or
federal law. Further, the only Defendant he names, WCDC, is a
prison facility, not a "person" subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Allison v. California
Adult Authority,419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969)
(California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison are not
"person[s]" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Preval v. Reno,57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D.
Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a
'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983."); Brooks v. Pembroke City
Jail,722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989)
("Claims under § 1983 are directed at
'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to
suit.").

Even if
Carter were permitted an opportunity to name proper
defendants, his claims are still deficient as he has failed
to state a constitutional or federal claim. First, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act states, in pertinent part, "[n]o
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in
a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

Next,
to the extent Carter may intend to raise a claim under the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, the protections afforded a
pretrial detainee by the Fourteenth Amendment are coextensive
with those provided by the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v.
Wolfish,441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The inquiry with
respect to the conditions alleged is whether or not those
conditions amount to punishment of the pretrial detainee
because due process proscribes punishment of a detainee
before proper adjudication of guilt. Bell v.
Wolfish,441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). A prison
official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 828 (1994); see Hill v. Nicodemus, 979
F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). "While a convicted
prisoner is entitled to protection only against 'cruel
and unusual" punishment,' a pretrial detainee, not
yet found guilty of any crime, may not be subjected to
punishment of any description." Hill, 979 F.2d
at 99\(citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital,463 U.S. 238, 244 (1983). Conditions that
"deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities" may amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman,452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). To establish a claim for cruel and unusual punishment
due to conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must allege
facts sufficient to show (1) an objectively serious
deprivation of a basic human need causing serious physical or
emotional injury, and (2) that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to that need. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; Wilson v. Setter,501 U.S. 294, 198
(1991).

To meet
the first prong, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to
show that the condition complained of caused a
"sufficiently serious" deprivation of a basic human
need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. "Only extreme
deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component
of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of
confinement." De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330
F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). Demonstration of an extreme
deprivation proscribed by the Eighth Amendment requires proof
of" 'a serious or significant physical or emotional
injury resulting from the challenged conditions or
demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting
from the prisoner's exposure to the challenged
conditions.'" Odom v. S.C. Dep't of
Corr.,349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
De'Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634). A plaintiff bears
the burden of alleging facts sufficient to show that the risk
from the conditions of his confinement was so grave that it
violated contemporary notions of decency and resulted in
significant physical or emotional injury. See Hudson v.
McMillian,503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Strickler v.
Waters,989 F.2d 1375, 1379-81 (4th Cir. 1993).

To meet
the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to
show that the defendant knew of circumstances from which an
inference could be drawn that a "substantial risk of
serious harm" was posed to plaintiffs health and safety,
that he drew that inference, and disregarded the risk posed.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To establish a sufficiently
culpable state of mind, there must be evidence that a known
excessive risk of harm to the inmate's health or safety
was disregarded. See Wilson v. Setter,501 U.S. 294,
298-99 (1991). Eighth Amendment liability" 'must
involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the
prisoner's interests or safety ... It is obduracy and
wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,
that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause....'" Id. at 299
(quoting Whitley v. Albers,475 U.S. 312, 319
(1986)) (emphasis added in Wilson). "In other
words, 'the test is whether the guards know the plaintiff
inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could
avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.'"
Brown v. N.C. Dep't of Corr.,612 F.3d 720, 723
(4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d
605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Carter's
claim, as stated, fails to set out a constitutional
violation. This Court cannot conclude that a one-time
deprivation of bathroom facilities for a short, less than
one-hour period amounts to a violation of constitutional
dimension. Certainly, Carter's inability to access a
toilet and then soiling himself was discomforting and
embarrassing, but it does not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment, as evidenced by the absence of serious physical
or psychological injury. Notably, Carter does not claim that
he has a medically acknowledged physiological problem with
incontinence or a bladder-control issue or that the officers
were of such a condition. Carter's allegations at best
state a claim for negligence, which is not actionable under
§ 1983. See Daniels v. Williams,474 U.S. 327,
328-336 (1986).

Carter
is cautioned that once three of a prisoner's civil
actions have been dismissed as malicious or frivolous or for
failure to state a claim, that prisoner may not file another
civil action while incarcerated without paying the full
filing fee up front, unless he is "under imminent danger
of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
This case qualifies for a first strike under" the
statute.

CONCLUSION

For
these reasons, this Court will dismiss the Complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A
...

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