SSR 81-4c: SECTION 1614(d)(2) (42 U.S.C. 1382c(d)(2)) -- SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME -- MARITAL RELATIONSHIP BASED ON LIVING TOGETHER IN THE
SAME HOUSEHOLD -- CONSTITUTIONALITY

In January 1979, A and B, who are both disabled, applied for supplemental
security income (SSI) benefits. Although they have lived together for
about eighteen years, they have never been legally married, and the State
where they reside does not recognize common-law marriage. The Social
Security Administration (SSA) determined that A and B were holding
themselves out to the community as husband and wife and that as a
consequence, under section 1614(d)(2) of the Social Security Act (the
Act), they must be considered as a married couple for purposes of
determining their eligibility for SSI benefits. Accordingly, A and B were
awarded SSI benefits as an eligible couple. In April 1979, SSA approved
A's application for disability insurance (DI) benefits under title II of
the Act and advised B that A's entitlement to DI benefits rendered them
both ineligible for SSI benefits. (Under section 1614(f)(1) of the Act,
B's income was deemed to include A's income, including his DI benefits;
therefore, B was ineligible for SSI benefits because her income exceeded
the limit provided by statute.) Consequently, B filed a civil suit,
contending that the "holding-out" provision of section 1614(d)(2) of the
Act was unconstitutional because it violated her Equal Protection rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. B claimed that she
was being discriminated against because of her "disfavored social status,"
i.e., living with a man out-of-wedlock. Held, the provision in
section 1614(d)(2) is consistent with the requirements of the fifth
Amendment because its treatment of a man and a woman as husband and wife
when they hold themselves out as such is reasonably related to Congress's
goal in the SSI program of providing a family unit with a minimum standard
of living; therefore, SSA's determination denying B SSI benefits is
sustained.

TAYLOR, District Judge:

This Social Security case comes before this Court pursuant to the
Expedited Appeals Process provided for in Chapter III of Title 20 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 416, 20 CFR §§ 476.1424 et seq.
Pursuant to those provisions, plaintiff has agreed to accept the factual
determinations of the Secretary with regard to her claim (Tr. 2, 13; 20
CFR § 416.1424c(b)(1)). In exchange, the Secretary admits that but for the
effect of the challenged statute, § 1614(d)(2) (42 USC § 1382c(d)(2)),
plaintiff would be eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 USC §§ 1387
et seq.

The sole issue for determination by this Court is the constitutionality
of § 1614(d)(2) of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 USC §
1382c(d)(2). That section provides:

In determining whether two individuals are husband and wife for the
purposes of this title [Title XVI of the Act], appropriate state laws
shall be applied; except that --

. . .

(2) if a man and woman are found to be holding themselves out to the
community as husband and wife, they shall be so considered for purposes of
this title notwithstanding any other provision of this section.

Plaintiff is a 56-year old woman who has been living with one Dock
Pilcher for some eighteen years. They have never been legally married, and
Tennessee does not recognize common law marriage. The evidence in the
record shows that they own their common home in joint tenancy under the
names of Dock Pilcher and Laura Vickers (Tr. 10, 39), that plaintiff's
automobile title is in the name of Vickers (Tr. 42), that plaintiff
receives mail addressed to Laura Vickers at her residence (Tr. 6), that
Dock Pilcher introduces plaintiff to others as Laura Vickers (Tr. 8), and
that neighbors generally know her as Laura Vickers (Tr. 3). The evidence
further shows that they filed their 1978 income tax return as "married,
filing joint return" (Tr. 5), that Dock Pilcher has claimed plaintiff as a
dependent on the return (Tr. 6), that the close-community understands who
is referred to by the name Laura Pilcher (Tr. 3), that is someone refers
to plaintiff in her presence as Laura Pilcher, she does not correct them
(Tr. 6), and that merchants in their community believe that a husband and
wife relationship exists between plaintiff and Dock Pilcher (Tr. 3). Based
on this evidence, the Secretary determined that plaintiff and Dock Pilcher
were "holding themselves out to the community as husband and wife" (Tr.
4), and that for the purpose of their SSI eligibility, they must be
considered as a married couple (Tr. 4).

Plaintiff and Pilcher filed a joint application for SSI in January, 1979.
The record indicates that the application was approved and plaintiff and
Pilcher began receiving SSI benefits in 1979. (Tr. 27, 29). In April, the
SSA approved the individual application of Dock Pilcher for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Act (DIB) and in June, 1979, sent
plaintiff a Notice of Overpayment. SSA claimed that because the two must
be considered as husband and wife, the DIB benefits received by Dock
Pilcher rendered them both ineligible for SSI. (Tr. 21).

Plaintiff claims that the "holding-out" provision here in issue, 42 USC §
1382c(d)(2), violates her Equal Protection rights as embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361 (1974). She appears to argue that (1) the statutory scheme of the Act
which classified her as a spouse for the purposes of Title XVI SSI
benefits, and at the same time as a non-spouse for the purpose of Title II
DIB wife's insurance benefits, 42 USC §§ 402(b), 416(b), is arbitrary; and
(2) that she has been the subject of invidious discrimination by reason of
her "disfavored social status", i.e. living with a man out-of-wedlock.

First, it must be emphasized that the constitutionality of the provision
allegedly precluding plaintiff from eligibility for Title II benefits is
not properly before this Court. There is no allegation in the compliant,
nor does it appear from the record, that plaintiff has ever applied for
DIB. Therefore, the Secretary has rendered no final decision, and this
Court is without jurisdiction to consider the issue. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).

The sole issue before us, then is whether § 1614(d)(2) (42 USC §
1382c(d)(2)) and the regulations promulgated thereunder are invidiously
discriminate against plaintiff in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.

Plaintiff claims that she is being discriminated against because of her
"status", which, pursuant to the Expedited Appeals Process Agreement (Tr.
13), we must assume to be that of a woman living with a man and holding
herself out as his wife (Tr. 4). Although her argument is not clear, she
appears to be arguing that she is being treated differently from a woman
who is living with a man, but no so holding herself
out.[1] The precise question is
whether the difference in treatment is invidious or arbitrary.

The Act embodies a social welfare scheme and delineates eligibility
requirements for economic distribution, and in this sense is
indistinguishable from an unemployment insurance program. thus, the
categorizations defined by Congress need not be precise, but are
sufficient if they are reasonably related to the purposes for which they
are drawn. Califano v. Boles, _____ U.S. _____, 47 LW 4874 (1979);
Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, (1977).

The purpose of one SSI program, as defined in the regulation is to assure
a minimum level of income for people who are age 65 or over, or who are
blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to
maintain a standard of living at the established federal minimum income
level. 20 CFR § 416.110.

It is for Congress, not this Court, to determine both the federal minimum
income level and the criteria by which it will be established.

It is clear from the statutory scheme that Congress intended to utilize
the family unit as a vehicle by which both to measure need and to
distribute benefits. In doing so, Congress was justified in assuming that
people living together and behaving as a family for some purposes, e.g.,
tax and credit, would likewise carry out the family role for other
purposes including the distribution of SSI benefits. Thus, the conclusion
is inescapable that the treatment as husband and wife of those persons
holding themselves out as such is reasonably related to Congress' goal of
providing a minimum standard of living for those people involved.

It may be that Congress' assumption does not precisely fit the lifestyles
of all individuals involved. But that is not the test of
constitutionality. As the Supreme Court has recently stated:

The process of categorization presents difficulties inherent in any
linedrawing exercise where the draftsman congronts a universe of potential
beneficiaries with different histories and distinct needs. He strives for
a level of generality that is administratively practicable, with full
appreciation that the included class members whose "needs" upon a
statutorily defined occurrence may not be as marked as those of isolated
individuals outside the classification. "General rules are essential if a
fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency,
even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences
in some individual cases." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53
(1977). A process of case-by-case adjudication that would provide a
"perfect fit" in theory would increase administrative expense to a degree
that benefit levels would probably be reduced, precluding a perfect fit,
in fact. (citations omitted) Califana v. Boles, supra, 47 LW at
4875.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the provision challenged by
plaintiff is consistent with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the determination of the Secretary denying
her SSI benefits be, and the same hereby is, sustained. It is further
ORDERED that this case be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.

Order accordingly.

[1] It must be emphasized that
the classification of which plaintiff complains is not based on the fact
that she lives with Pilcher out-of-wedlock, but only on the fact that she
holds herself out as his wife as defined in the Act.