Pages

Saturday, 16 March 2013

Miracles

I was asked to participate
in a panel discussion on televangelists, and in particular miracle
healing, from a psychological perspective. While not one of my usual topics of discussion I did find it a rather interesting area to explore as it ties in with my interest in independent thought.

Immediately the question
is raised of what a miracle is, and then whether certain individuals
can invoke or perform them. Rather strikingly this question seems to
have little to do with just religious belief in that there are plenty of
individuals who believe in God (including a Unitarian Minister who
was also part of the discussion) who simply don't believe in
miracles in the sense that they are often proclaimed by certain
televangelist ministries.

Holland (1965) has an
interesting article in American Philosophical Quarterly on 'The
Miraculous' where he clarifies two types of miracles; the violational
and the contingent. A violational miracle is one that in itself violates the
laws of nature, for example levitation or walking on water. A
contingent miracles is one that is not in conflict
with the laws of nature but just that it seems unlikely that it would
have happened.

Holland takes many of his
points from Hume's argument in chapter ten of Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding:

Nothing is esteemed a
miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no
miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden:
because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has
yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a
dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in
any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience
against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit
that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof,
there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact,
against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be
destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite
proof, which is superior.

The plain consequence is
(and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), "That no
testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony
be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than
the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case
there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only
gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which
remains, after deducting the inferior." When anyone tells me,
that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with
myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either
deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should
really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and
according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my
decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of
his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he
relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief
or opinion.

Hume's policy of rejecting
the greater miracle certainly seems pragmatic. Of course occurrences
that are violational to the laws of nature are in fact just violating
our understanding of the laws of nature and good science is all about
finding the exceptions to the hypothesis that we define and modifying the
theory accordingly. The type of miracles claimed by televangelists
would appear primarily to be in the contingency category.

Consequently what appear
to be miracles or exceptional occurrences have a tendency of being
normalised by scientific knowledge as such theorising catches up with
day to day experience. Whilst some might argue that it's good to have
room for miracles in life, I think I would argue that
everyday life is miraculous enough no matter how far we advance our
understanding.