Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20441

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DC Field

Value

Language

dc.contributor.author

Takalo, Tuomas

en_US

dc.contributor.author

Poutvaara, Panu

en_US

dc.date.accessioned

2009-01-28T16:14:08Z

-

dc.date.available

2009-01-28T16:14:08Z

-

dc.date.issued

2004

en_US

dc.identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20441

-

dc.description.abstract

We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the setof citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidatemodel of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning andpolitical parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards havepreviously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly,increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costsare sufficiently high.