Q. But evolution includes biology, all the
biological sciences, cell biology, microbiology, genetics,
paleontology. And so evolution really has managed to accommodate
all of these many scientific disciplines?

A. Well, intelligent design, in a way, scopes out
the sciences differently, but it certainly has not been able to
get the sort of, you know, breadth of constituency that evolution
has had, but it's had much less time to work with.

Q. I want to talk about intelligent design's big
tent. Would you put up Exhibit 429, please.

A. Under the canopy of design, as an empirical
possibility, however, any number of particular theories may also
be possible, including traditional creationism, progressive
old-earth creationism, and theistic evolution. Both scientific
and Scriptural evidence will have to decide the competition
between these theories. The big tent of ID provides a setting in
which that struggle after truth can occur and from which the
secular culture may be influenced.

Q. So evolution brings together all sorts of
scientific disciplines. Correct?

Q. And intelligent design here brings together not
only some alleged science, but also religious views?

A. But this is not the intelligent design I'm
talking about. This is one particular scoping of it. I don't --
this is not the type that I'm talking about as being a scientific
competitor for evolutionary theory.

A. Vaguely, vaguely, yeah, yeah. He has some
connection with Dembski, doesn't he?

Q. He is a senior fellow at the Discovery
Institute. What's the intelligent design you're talking
about?

A. Well, I'm talking about the type that is
interested in playing by the rules of science in the sense of
trying to come up with a research program with testable
hypotheses, that, in a sense, is competing in the scientific
space, primarily, regardless of what the religious motivations
may be, but not taking the religious motivation itself somehow as
evidence, as it were, for the scientific validity of the
statements.

Q. Now, if the motivation, in fact, was shown to
be -- to develop a view that is consonant with Christian and
theistic convictions, would that change your opinion?

A. Well, it depends whether it was testable or
not, doesn't it? I mean if it's testable by scientific means. I
mean, after all, Sir Isaac Newton thought he was interpreting the
Bible when he was doing Principia Mathematica, but you didn't
have to hold that view in order to see that his theory was
valid.

Q. But if you start out with a premise that we're
going to design something to make it consonant with particular
religious views --

A. Yes. And here I would emphasize the point that
testability is a notion that is neutral to the tested parties. So
it's, you know -- so, in other words, one doesn't, as it were,
have theistic tests that only theistic people can abide by.

Q. And you'll see about four lines down it says,
The argument is less plausible to those for whom God's existence
is in question and is much less plausible for those who deny
God's existence. Do you see that?

Q. He's saying that if you are not sure about the
existence of God, it makes this theory less plausible, and that
if you deny the existence of God, if you're an atheist, then that
makes the theory even much less plausible. If you have a theory
that depends on whether or not you believe in God or not --

A. I think he's talking about the context of
discovery. Namely, is this kind of theory, intelligent design --
what kind of person is likely to be drawn to it is something to
turn into a research program. So it's a context of discovery
matter, I take it.

And historically, it is true, people like Sir
Isaac Newton and Mendel who, in a sense, thought they could get
into the minds of God had a much easier time dealing with the
design standpoint. Okay? And I think that's all he's saying. I
might be wrong. I haven't read the whole thing. But, you know, if
that's what he's saying, that's pretty innocent. He's not saying
validity, he's saying who would be attracted to this as a kind of
argument to pursue.

A. Okay, but plausibility, in a way, is what would
draw you to the argument as something you want to develop. Right?
I mean, this is the whole issue about heuristics. Certain kinds
of ideas, you know, usually like analogies, metaphors, and things
we find quite compelling and we use them as the basis for
research. And certain people will be attracted to certain ones
more than others. Some are attracted to organic metaphors,
mechanical metaphors. It seems to me that's the level at which
this remark is being made, at least prima facie.

Q. Well, but let's take it to the next level of
justification. I mean, if that's true, if you're more likely to
believe in this if you believe in God, if you're more likely to
be attracted and supportive of this argument if you believe in
God, does that affect your view of whether or not this is
science?

A. Well, look, if this were a statement about the
context of justification, where, in a sense, you need to believe
in God in order to see the validity of the argument, if that were
the case, if that was what he was saying, that would not be
scientific.

Q. I believe you testified today that intelligent
design is not creationism.

A. Well, what I mean there is that there is a
historical connection out of which it grew, and we share some
similar kinds of proclivities, but it's, in fact, moved in a
completely different direction, it seems to me.

A. I think that's a little misleading. It's a
really radical transformation. It's a really substantively
different thing, and that's indicated by the kind of training of
the people who are, in fact, in intelligent design. They actually
are trained as scientists of one sort or another.

Q. Line 15. And the question asked is, You've used
this phrase ID in conjunction with earlier forms of creationism,
not just in your previous answer, but also in your report. And I
infer from that what you mean is intelligent design is a modern
view of creationism. Then there's an objection from Mr. Gillen,
and then the question restated, Is that correct? And your answer
is, Well, again, yes, in a sense, but, I mean, not all
creationism has been six-day creationism.

So this isn't young earth creationism, but it is a
modern view of creationism, it's a type of creationism?

A. I would say it has evolved out of creationism,
but it's become a totally different thing, something where one
doesn't need to be an adherent to the various theological views
of creationism in order to practice it.

Q. If you could go to the next page, Page 68, and
starting on Line 21, the question is, Intelligent design is
creationism, not just six-day creationism? And then your answer
beginning on Line 24, It is a kind of creationism, it is a kind
of creationism.

I didn't read the same passage twice. It's
actually twice on there. Did I read that accurately?

A. Well, it looks like that is what the sentences
say. But, I mean, if I may, let me just have a look here. Well,
it seems to me that what I'm talking about here is that there is
some historical connection between creationism and intelligent
design. And so in that sense, there is a genealogy that goes back
to that. But that's all I'm saying at this point. I'm not saying
that to practice intelligent design, one has to be some kind of
creationist.

Q. And beginning on Line 2, the question is, When
you use the word "creationism," what do you mean? And could you
read Lines 4 through 9, please, into the record.

A. Well, I mean that the idea that there is a kind
of unified order to nature that is evidence of intelligent
design. I mean what we now call intelligent design which used to
be called the creator because the creator was always the person
who had the intelligent design. So there is this historical
lineage. I don't think that's controversial. So I'm making a
historical point here. That's all I'm doing, is making a
historical point.

Q. And creationism presupposes a creator that is
separate from creation?

Q. And by that do you mean that each of the
species was specially created by God or some master intellect
that arose -- that they arose and did not come from a common form
of life and each one is made specially by design?

A. I mean, the basic point about special creation
is the denial of common descent. I think that's the fundamental
view about it, much more so even that God happened to have done
it. But, again, historically, special creation is connected with
this idea of the creator, as well. There are several versions of
it. But you've given a particularly sort of strong version of
it.

A. I'm not objecting to it. I'm just saying that
there are different types of special creation. And some don't
actually have to postulate a creator, it's more kind of a denial
of common descent. So if you believe there were multiple origins,
perhaps, right, of life or the universe or something like
that.

Q. Well, but special creationism really is
predicated on species arose from some divine blueprint?

A. Well, I mean, historically there is that
connection, but there are people who believe -- who seem not to
worry about the creator. I mean, Linnaeus may have been one
example, actually, because Linnaeus has a kind of special
creation presupposition built into his classification system but
not a lot of thought about God behind it.

Q. And special creation is a remnant of the old
biblical creation story?

A. Historically, of course. But then most notions
in biology have some kind of root back there.

Q. And I believe you just said that special
creation is really the opposite of common descent?

A. Historically, yes, that's true. And certainly
they move in different directions, different spaces.

Q. Matt, could you put up Plaintiffs' Exhibit 562,
the page we've identified.

A. Oh, okay. Creation means that various forms of
life began abruptly through the agency of an intelligent creator
with their distinctive features already intact, fish with fins
and scales, birds with feathers, beaks, and wings, et cetera. Is
that enough, or do you want me to go on?

Q. No, that's fine. Would you agree that that's a
definition of special creation?

Q. American discussions of public understanding of
science have been more open to matters concerning alternative
medicine and so-called new-age and multicultural knowledges, as
well as the incorporation of religiously inspired doctrines, and
then in parentheses, e.g., intelligent design theory, a.k.a.
creationism, close paren., into mainstream science education.

A. That's right. And that's an issue, too, because
there's a sense in which intelligent design, in its scientific
form, really has only taken off in a serious way since 1996, I
would say. So there is a sense in which there is some fuzziness
here about the dividing line. But if I were writing this today, I
would make a very clear distinction because it seems to be there
are two clearly separable tendencies going on here.

Q. So it was creationism and then sometime in 1996
or later it stopped being creationism?

A. No. What happened is, new people started to get
involved with it. Behe and Dembski weren't part of the old
creationist crowd. Okay? I mean, they are different people.
They're sort of like a new generation of people who may be
religiously inspired but who are sort of playing by the rules of
science and have proper scientific training. So it's a sort of
different ball game, people with different backgrounds.

Q. So could you say that this is creationism
without reference to God or the Bible and it's really expressed
in the language of --

A. What kind of creationism is this that we're
left with then you have to wonder.

Q. Well, would you say that it's creationism
expressed in the language of biochemistry and information
theory?

A. Well, look, after a certain point, it doesn't
matter what the motivation is. If it's done in information
science and biochemical theory or whatever, then that's what it
becomes, regardless -- even if there was some sense in which this
stuff was religiously motivated, if it is being completely or
largely expressed in the idioms of these sciences, then it has
effectively entered into the scientific domain.

Q. So even though it may be the same concept but
now you're talking about it in scientific or mathematical terms
--

A. You're getting metaphysical with me here. The
same concept? You mean the same motivation, don't you?

A. Why did I do that? Well, because that term was
coming into vogue at the time and it wasn't quite understood
where that term was coming from. And so, in a sense, I was giving
a kind of historical marker to it.

A. Yes. And also, to be perfectly honest, I wasn't
all that familiar with intelligent design back then. I had some
knowledge of it, but there was a sense in which differences of
the kind that I'm able to sort of be more confident about I
wasn't so clear on before. I mean, the thing has changed, and
I've learned more about it.

Q. So you were using creationism as a place holder
because you didn't know that much about it?

A. No, I'm saying it goes way beyond that and
doesn't even require -- it doesn't require interpreting
creationism.

Q. If you could turn to Page 153 of your
deposition, please. And if you could look at the bottom, I'm
going to read the question and ask you to read the answer. The
question is on Line 21. But clearly you are indicating that
intelligent design is creationism --

Q. Question: But clearly you are indicating that
intelligent design is creationism in some sense? And then Mr.
Gillen objects. And then your answer, if you could read your
answer going through Line 1 of the next page.

A. It is -- it does have roots in that. I mean,
intelligent design is a way of interpreting creationism, that's
true. Okay. I didn't say it was exclusively that, and I do think
it's an unfortunate choice of words.

A. Well, because, first of all, it gives the
impression that intelligent design is exclusively to be
understood in relation to creationism. That's sort of the main
error. But also to talk about intelligent design as a kind of
interpretation rather than as an original sort of form of
research. That is something I think was misspoken. Certainly I
wouldn't say that today.

Q. Now, intelligent design uses human design
capacities to lead us to conclusions about what nonhuman,
non-natural actors can do in terms of creating biological
life?

A. Well, William Paley, as I mentioned, is one
such source, not exactly my ideal source, but he is one source
for this.

Q. And Paley -- and, again, correct me if I'm
wrong, I'm a novice at all this, but Paley's idea was if human
beings can do it, then God can do it kind of in a bigger way?

A. Well, that's kind of -- that's kind of the
idea, though, in fact, the motivation traditionally has been
because we're created in the image and likeness of God, we can
understand the plan. It was originally -- the design inference
wasn't an inference to the existence of God but rather to the
capacities of humans to be able to understand the universe.

Q. And that science can't explain the origin of
genetic information, that physical and chemical laws cannot
explain the ordering of DNA and proteins because they do not
specify any particular order in a chemical chain of letters and
that random assembly of functional genes and proteins is far too
improbable to actually occur?

Q. I'm sorry, 538, you're right. My tentative
approval notwithstanding, Meyer's view raises its own questions,
one theological and the other more strictly scientific. Is it
reasonable or even non-blasphemous to suppose that God is the
ultimate artificer?

A. Yes. I mean, this is the playing God issue that
I was talking about earlier this morning that was one of the
reasons why a lot of these design-oriented people like Newton had
to kind of go underground with their theological views because,
in a sense, they thought they could know the mind of God, and
Meyer's seems to be kind of moving in the same direction with his
theory.

Q. So even if we understand how human beings
create things, why should we think this is any kind of model for
understanding how God does things and let alone how life is
created?

A. Well, that's correct. I mean, I didn't say that
I endorsed that particular -- if that's the inference that he's
drawing, I don't particularly endorse it. I mean, I actually
think the way that the design works, the design -- the argument
for design in science works the other way around, namely by
putting ourselves in the mind of God as if we were God, we can
sort of understand how the natural world works rather than saying
that we can infer God from the way humans do things.

A. He's trying to actually figure out the
existence of God. And I'm saying people like Newton thought they
already knew God's mind, and they were trying to figure out how
nature works.

Q. But you would conclude that it's blasphemous to
suggest that we know -- that what we know and what we can do is a
model for God?

A. I think this is the kind of thing a lot of
theologins would get upset about. I personally wouldn't lose
sleep over it. I happen to like the connection between the human
artificer and God. And I like the idea that people can think of
themselves getting into the mind of God, because I think that's
been very helpful in the promotion of science. And, again, Isaac
Newton is my benchmark. So I have no problem with this, but I
understand theologins would find this blasphemous because who are
we to sort of figure out how God's mind works.

Q. Well, and not only theologins, but there may be
non-theologins. They may be everyday, average, ordinary people
who would find this blasphemous?

A. Sure, yes. Yes, I mean, I didn't say that
Stephen Meyer would make it to Heaven.

Q. And it's only 4:00 here, but I think we feel
the same in a lot of ways. We're going to wrap this up
quickly.

Mr. Walczak has directed your attention to a few
pages of your deposition, Steve, and for the sake of ensuring
completeness in the treatment of your testimony there, I want to
ask you to look at a few more passages.

Working our way back, I'd ask you to look at --
Mr. Walczak asked you to look at a question and answer series at
the bottom of Page 153. Would you look at 153 and see if you can
see that passage you were asked to look at.

A. Okay, I see the page. Remind me what I'm
supposed to be looking at.

Q. Sure. Starting at -- look at 19. It says,
Question: Okay. And 20, you say, No, so it's not that kind of
creationism. Mr. Walczak asked you about the lines on 153 running
over into 154. I want to ask you to continue and read through 154
beginning at Line 3 down through Line 18, please, for the
record.

A. Okay. Mr. Rothschild says: Okay. And what
aspects of -- what do you mean by creationism when you say
intelligent design does have roots in creationism or is
creationist? Mr. Gillen: Objection to form. The witness: Well, I
mean the motivation. The motivation for putting forward
intelligent design is from people who do think there is a divine
creator. I mean, I think historically that's been the case, and I
think it's probably true of these people. But, again, what makes
it science isn't that fact. I mean, again, all kinds of religious
motivations inform science. I mean, so there's nothing, in a
sense, by calling it creationism. What I'm doing is I'm giving
something about the motivation of the people but not necessarily
about the scientific status of what they're doing. Those are two
separate issues. You've got context of discovery, context of
justification.

Q. Is that consistent with the testimony you
offered here today on your direct?

Q. Okay. I'd also ask you to direct your attention
to Page 146. And you'll see, if you look at 145-146, you were
asked questions about this, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 788. And I want
you to read your testimony there as it relates to 146 beginning
at Line 6 where you talked about this a.k.a.

A. The witness: But it's -- no, but it's not all
of creationism. And it's, in fact, a part of creationism that
gets taken into science. So, I mean -- I mean, obviously I'm just
-- because in the time that this piece was written, right, so
this was written in 1998, intelligent design theory wasn't that
widely used as an expression, so I put the creationism in there
so people kind of have a sense of what exactly intelligent design
is without me having to give a whole song and dance about it
because I'm just using it as an example. But I didn't mean to say
that everything about intelligent design corresponds to
everything about creationism.

Q. And what I want to get at, Steve, is to make
sure that's clear. Are you saying, again, that the context of
discovery is there are elements of continuity, but with respect
to the context of justification there is what you regard as a
critical difference?

A. Well, it has to do the way by which theories
are tested in intelligent design and validated, at least in
principle, by scientific means and also the sort of people who
are doing it are, in fact, people who do have scientific
credentials of some sort, unlike the previous generation of
people who are associated with creationism. So there are some
really clear kinds of breaks that one can talk about both
philosophically and sociologically.

Q. In terms of the negative argument, Mr. Walczak
asked you if intelligent design theorists make a negative
argument against evolutionary theory, that doesn't necessarily
prove design. Let me ask you, do evolutionary theorists make the
same sort of argument against design?

A. Yes. In fact, that's how I would characterize
the presentation that Professor Miller did with the bacterial
flagellum where he basically showed that Professor Behe's thesis
about irreducible complexity was false and therefore it followed.
That was sort of the spirit in which the presentation was being
made. And therefore it follows from the natural selection
story.

Q. And, Steve, I'd ask you to look again at
Plaintiffs' 788 which is the piece on the First Global
Cyberconference on the Public Understanding of Science. Turning
your attention to Page 331.

Q. Now, this is another place where you use that
a.k.a., and the portion of the sentence I'd like to direct
yourself to is the phrase which begins, As well as the
incorporation of religiously inspired doctrines.

In light of that language usage on your part in
this piece, I'd like you to describe your purpose in terms of the
context of discovery versus the context of justification.

A. Well, I'm only referring to the context of
discovery here, obviously, when one is talking about religiously
inspired.

Q. And so, again, for the purpose of clarity, are
you demonstrating that you see this connection as one that is in
the context of discovery, not justification?

A. Well, because this big tent that's being
described here is basically kind of a fig leaf for all of the
various forms of creationism that have ever existed. And it seems
to me that the -- what is intellectually interesting and
substantive and continuous with the history of science in
intelligent design is kind of lost from this picture
entirely.

Q. Well, and that's what I want to just make clear
from your direct this morning. When you speak of intelligent
design as having the possibility of providing a big tent, do you
mean a big tent of the kind described in this piece?

A. No, I mean of reconfiguring the sciences as
they are -- the sciences, the things we normally call science
now, but reconfiguring what their relationships are.

Q. So in terms of the context of justification,
would that be a big tent that is justified by what you've called
the coin of science?

Q. Given your training in the history and
philosophy of science and looking at intelligent design theory as
it exists today, would you anticipate that a movement which
aspires to an explanatory theory at the level of generality
proposed by at least some intelligent design proponents to have
advanced to the stage where it could be engaged in an
experimental program?

A. It still needs to be developed a bit more, but
in principle it could. But it really does need more adherence and
more time to sort of develop the implications of its views.

Q. Earlier Mr. Walczak asked you some questions
which looked at other sorts of scientific revolutions or paradigm
shifts, and there was a suggestion that the case with intelligent
design could be the same.

Do you see the situation confronted by intelligent
design proponents as different from that of, say, the proponents
of plate tectonic theory?

A. Well, I think there's a lot more opposition at
the moment to intelligent design theory in terms of being able to
get the institutional resources to be able to reach the critical
mass to mount a research program.

I mean, because with all these examples that Mr.
Walczak brought up, there was still some institutional ability to
sort of pursue research, even if it wasn't taken all that
seriously at the time. People could train, graduate students
could get jobs, and even though they were marginal, they were
still there in the system. But I think the problems facing
intelligent design are much more radical institutionally.

Q. And in that regard, do you see the nature of
the opposition or the resistance as different in kind in terms of
metaphysical or ideological dimension?

A. Well, I think generally it's -- the religious
motivation ends up blocking people from taking the theory
seriously. And, in fact, intelligent design has some very natural
affinities with a lot of things going on in computer-driven forms
of artificial life and artificial intelligence research that, in
fact, there could be some alliances forged there.

But I think at the moment, because it's so --
there's such restricted access to it and there are so few people
who have an incentive to work on it, that it isn't able to
develop those kinds of connections. And so that's why I would say
it does need to be mainstreamed.

Q. Mr. Walczak asked you some questions about a
piece authored by Behe. And I want to see if I understand or if
you need to further explain your position. In terms of the
dichotomy between context of justification and context of
discovery, from the bit of Behe's article that you looked at,
what do you see Behe discussing there?

A. The context of discovery. And the word
"plausibility" suggests that to me. He says what would make it
plausible, right, to adopt an intelligent design position would
be if you believe in the existence of God. He's talking about the
context of discovery, how would one use that as a heuristic for
doing research, who would be more attracted to it. But he's not
saying anything about how it would be validated.

Q. And is it your understanding that they
were justifying creationism in the coin of science?

A. Well, I actually don't have enough
on-the-ground familiarity to know whether they -- I mean, whether
this was just a fig-leaf term "science" or whether there was
anything resembling what we would call science there. So I can't
really -- you know, I mean, they may have been trying. I mean,
obviously using the word "science" suggests they were trying, but
whether it would pass my criteria of what science is is another
matter.

Q. And what I think I just understood you to
say is that in terms of all of these statements that we've shown
to you that you've testified about in terms of creationism
sharing some concept, some verbiage with intelligent design,
that's all on the discovery side of the equation?

A. Yes. I mean, there's not that much
verbiage, actually, between creationism and intelligent design
these days, even. I mean, maybe some motivational things, but in
terms of even how the hypotheses and theories are formulated in
the research programs, there's not a lot of overlap in the
language.

Q. But the way you've explained all of the
statements I read back to you where you were equating intelligent
design with creationism, say in this 1998 article, you're saying
that's on the discovery side of it?

Q. And intelligent design has not yet made
its case on the justification side?

A. No, because it's not sufficiently
developed yet. You actually have to have more theory developed,
you have to have more interpretation of existing phenomena to
then be able to develop the appropriate kinds of tests.

Q. And intelligent design has been around
for almost 20 years. Is that correct?

THE COURT: For this witness. All right.
Well, I guess we're going to pick up the testimony of the
assistant superintendent, but it's late in the day. It seems late
to endeavor to start that. Do you agree?

MR. GILLEN: Your Honor, as Liz is bringing
the hammer down, I have reluctantly agreed to do Friday and
Monday. I wanted to meet with you to ask your forbearance. Bill
Buckingham is coming Thursday. The reporters are scheduled for
Thursday. I see Mike Baksa continuing on Friday. I will do my
best to prepare another witness for that day, and I know I can
get someone here, but I might not be able to fill the whole
day.

THE COURT: I understand that. I told Liz
that that's no harm, no foul. I don't want to put you in a
difficult spot. These are days I can open up. And I really would
like to not extend past next week, and so I thought the greater
caution would be to open the days up, if that's acceptable to
everybody. And if you can't fill a day, that's fine. I hope
you'll try.

MR. GILLEN: I will try, Your Honor. I want
this over as much as the next one.

THE COURT: I have a creeping concern which
hasn't elevated to the point of hysteria. Perhaps it is for Liz,
but not with me. And that's why we're opening up these days. If
we end up with an early quit on Friday -- I was going to be here
doing case management conferences anyway. It seems absurd for me
to spend time doing that when we could open up a trial day.
Monday I had a sentencing hearing all day, and it was not a
problem to move that to next month. I know you have travel issues
and other things, and I don't want to put you in a difficult
spot, but on the other hand --

MR. GILLEN: But that was my request, and I
thank you, Judge, for your forbearance.

MR. WALCZAK: I don't know how long you
expect Mr. Buckingham to go on Thursday, but I don't know that
the reporters are going to take a half a day, so we may have some
time Thursday to finish Baksa.

MR. GILLEN: Okay. And I frankly can't be
sure. I think Mike is -- my guess is, just because of the paper
that he's responsible for, will take the morning and maybe just a
little bit of the afternoon on Friday.

THE COURT: We'll take care of that. But
we'll open it up for Friday, for the 28th, and Monday the 31st.
And Liz will execute me for saying this, but if worse came to
worse, I mean, I can't make you do what you can't do, and if you
don't finish by the end of next week, I'm going to let you try
your case, and I'll have to do what I have to do, so you
understand that.

I'm just trying, as much as I can, given
everybody's schedules -- you know, I want to give everybody an
opportunity to put their case on, so if we have to go further,
we'll go further. But I'd like to try to add days within the
weeks that we set rather than to add them --

THE COURT: All right. The consultation with
counsel at sidebar was for the purpose of scheduling. Let me make
this announcement. We are now, with the cordial agreement of all
counsel, going to -- in addition to the trial date previously
scheduled for October the 27th, which is Thursday, we will now
sit on Friday for as long as we can. It may be a full-day session
or it may not, depending upon the availability of witnesses on
somewhat short notice. So we will sit on Friday the 28th.

We will likewise sit on Monday the 31st of
October. We're adding that as a trial day next week, as well. I
think that is our fourth trial day now next week. I think we had
previously scheduled three trial days. Am I correct, Counsel?

THE COURT: So that will add day four in an
effort to conclude this matter by the end of next week, if at all
possible, with the cooperation of counsel and the parties. So
we'll have two more trial days this week, one more the following
week. We have a total of three this week and then four next
week.

With that, we'll then adjourn today, and we
will be in recess until Thursday morning the 27th when we will
reconvene at 9:00 a.m. on that day. We'll see you then. Thank
you.