The matter before the Court
is a motion filed by petitioner to reconsider a previous order granting
a new trial. There is also a counter-request by respondent for sanctions
against the petitioner for bringing the motion to reconsider. Both motions
are denied.

The petitioner is insurer
for Thriftway North, a retail store in Helena, Montana. Respondent in
this matter was an employee of Thriftway and filed a claim alleging she
suffered a work-related back injury on July 25, 1989. Thriftway's insurer
ultimately denied the claim and brought this petition seeking a determination
that respondent's back condition is not related to any injury suffered
while working for Thriftway. After trial Judge Timothy W. Reardon entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law determining that respondent "has
not proven by a preponderance of the probative, credible evidence that
she sustained a compensable injury on July 25, 1989." Judgement,
¶ 2.

Respondent moved for a new
trial on two grounds, including new evidence of Dr. Allen Weinert, Jr.
On August 19, 1993, Judge Reardon granted a new trial based on representations
of respondent's counsel as to certain testimony Dr. Weinert would give
at a new trial. Petitioner then filed a motion to reconsider, attaching
reports of Dr. Weinert. The information contained in the reports does
not, however, directly repudiate the contemplated testimony outlined
by respondent's counsel and upon which Judge Reardon based his opinion.
In his order granting a new trial Judge Reardon stated that he was "unable
to draw any firm conclusions as to whether it [Dr. Weinert's testimony]
might change the outcome." Since Judge Reardon heard the case, the present
Judge is not in a position to second guess him as to the possible impact
of testimony by Dr. Weinert. I must therefore defer to his conclusion
that the testimony outlined by respondent's counsel, if presented at trial,
might have changed the outcome.

Respondent's cross-motion
for sanctions is without merit. There is no clear authority precluding
reconsideration of a grant of a new trial. There is authority which at
least suggests that reconsideration of an order for a new trial is within
the discretion of the trial court. See Ming Inc. v. District
Court, 155 Mont. 84, 466 P.2d 907 (1970). Moreover, there
is specific authority allowing motions for reconsideration generally,
even when addressed to a successor judge or judge of coordinate jurisdiction.
In Hayworth v. School District No. 19, 243
Mont. 503, 505, 795 P.2d 470 (1990), the Supreme Court considered
the grant of summary judgement by a successor judge after his predecessor
had denied the motion. On appeal the losing party argued that the successor
had exceeded his authority in granting the motion. The Supreme Court responded:

We disagree.
It is true that judges of coordinate jurisdictions sitting in the same
court and in the same case may not ordinarily overrule the decisions
of each other. This rule articulates the sound policy that when an issue
is once judicially determined, that should be the end of the matter
as far as judges and courts of coordinate jurisdictions are concerned.
However, this rule is not an imperative and it does not necessarily
mandate that a court does not have discretion, in appropriate circumstances,
to reconsider a ruling made by another judge in the same case. [Citations
omitted.]

In this case the respondent
failed to disclose all of what Dr. Weinert might say at any retrial. The
information provided by petitioner is clearly relevant to any opinions
of Dr. Weinert. In light of respondent's failure to bring the information
to the Court's attention, it was not improper for petitioner to do so.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL and the REQUEST
FOR SANCTIONS are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
the new trial be held in Helena, Montana, during the week of February
14, 1994. The entire matter shall be reheard at
that time.