EUROPEAN PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS

EUROPEAN PUBLIC CHOICE

Program

A.Y.

Course program not available

Updated A.Y. 2018-2019

Content
This course is composed of two parts:

Module 1
- European Public Economics: public good and common resources, the principles of optimal taxation on income and commodities, provision of public good (equity and efficiency). Basics of Procurement and Auction Theory.

Module 2
- European Public Choice: public policy formation, political processes and political institutions from a rational choice perspective

Attendance
Not compulsory, but strongly recommended. Active class participation is very much appreciated.

Course prerequisites
You need to have covered the material of a good undergraduate economics program: a good working knowledge of intermediate microeconomics (we will make almost no use of macroeconomics) some literacy in mathematics and some knowledge of game theory is necessary, as is a basic understanding of econometrics, at least through multiple regression (you should understand how to interpret regression coefficients and be aware of the possible pitfalls in their use). The first class is devoted to review some of these tools. An introductory course in public finance is useful but not necessary. In the second module the main tool of analysis will be the revelation principle, and students are advised to study it beforehand

Final Exam
The final exam is a three-hours written test consisting of six questions, as follows. Three questions from Module 1 (2 mathematical exercises, similar but easier than those carried out during the course, and the discussion of an article chosen among those presented in class), and three questions from Module 2 (2 mathematical exercises, and the discussion of an article chosen among those presented in class). Within each question there might be a choice of "subquestions". To pass the exam it is necessary to obtain a mark of 18 in at least four questions. The mark for the written exam is given by the average mark of the six questions. In each question the scale of marks goes from 0 to 34, so students can obtain a final mark of 30 even without answering perfectly all the questions.
In addition students can volunteer to give presentations and have their mark added to the mark of the exam. Each presentation will be given a mark from -2 to +3, which is added to the mark of the first exam session after the course only, and rounded to the nearest integer to determine the final mark of the students. Withdrawals from scheduled presentations will be marked with -2.
NB 1: There is one exam per session, plus an additional exam in the session that follows the course (but students can only sit for one of the two).
NB 2: MSc Economics students can take Module 2 separately, in which case the final exam will last 1.5 hours, with one exam per session only.

Module 1

Content
Detailed understanding of the provision of public good and its implications in terms of efficiency and equity. Principles of optimal income and commodity taxation in competitive market and under market power. The course also focuses on the role and use of common resources.
It is expected that the students will learn an analytical approach to the economic issues. This first module will help strengthen and ease the analysis of the second cycle of courses and make students able to develop and/or implement original ideas, potentially with original research in mind.

Course schedule
Please note that the dates on which material will be covered are approximate. Total 10 classes for a total of 36 hours. Classes will begin promptly; there will be a break of approximately 10-15 minutes, at an appropriate point towards the mid-point of the class.

Main references
The main text books are in general good enough to cover this part of the program (Gruber, Myles-Hindricks, Myles, Rosen e Gayer). The course basically follows Intermediate Public Economics (2006).

Course Web Page
The material for this course (syllabus, notes, announcements, materials) will be posted online. It is essential to consult this link, as all information regarding this course will be available there.
Exercises
Exercises will be assigned in advance and analysed during the lessons in the classroom with the active participation of students. Exercises questions will be downloaded from the course webpage. Some examples of the right answers will be provided on the course webpage, after each lesson. The day for the exercise section will be decide during the course according to the covered material.

Students’ presentations
These will be assessed and the student will be allowed to choose whether to have them included as an element of the final evaluation of the course.
The aim of the presentation is to transfer and communicate new knowledge to a group of people who have a general knowledge of economics or finance, but not necessarily in possession of complete familiarity with all aspects of that topic.
A skill that will be evaluated in the presentation is the ability to choose what needs to be explained and what you can assume that the public knows. "Wasting" time in explaining topics that the students of the master already know is not a good use of one's time.
The presentations will be held in the last week of the course.
The teacher will provide a list of articles (available on the web), and each student must choose an article from those.
In general, however, there will be wide choice regarding the topics to which students might be examined in each session.
The presentation in PowerPoint (or Beamer pdf) must be sent to the teacher’s email address by the deadline communicated during the course.

The presentation will last no more than 15 minutes. This limit may be reduced at 13 minutes depending on the number of presentations

Written and verbal suggestions on presentation techniques will be given during the course.

Each presentation will receive a detailed individual comment from the teacher

Module 2

Content
This course examines public policy formation, political processes and political institutions from a rational choice perspective. A one-term course cannot offer a comprehensive treatment of the complex working of political systems. The emphasis is on introducing some key formal models to simplify and analyze broad classes of situations. At the same time, rigorous empirical testing of formal models will be a central component. We will focus on the literature on voting, elections, partisan politics and political agency.

Required Text and Readings
No single textbook covers all the material presented in this course. A number of the recommended readings will consist of journal articles. I will also distribute the slides of each class. The books that will be used more frequently are the following:
- Besley, “Principled Agents?”, Oxford University Press , 2006 (henceforth: Besley)
- Mueller, “Public Choice III”, Cambridge University Press, 2003 (henceforth: Mueller)
- Persson and Tabellini, “Political Economics”, MIT Press, 2000 (henceforth: PT)
All readings are available through the Biblioteca Vilfredo Pareto, located in the building B. Class notes, as well as any other additional material/reading, will be available on the course web page.

Location
Classes will be held in room P10, 2nd floor, building A. Any eventual change will be posted on the course web page.

Course Web Page
The material for this course (syllabus, notes, announcements, materials) will be posted on the course webpage.

Material
In the following pages you will find the detailed reading list for each topic. This list is indicative, and can be subject to some changes. In particular, further readings may be provided during the lectures. Readings marked with a * represent compulsory reading, all other readings are just suggestions.

7. Bureaucracy
Mueller: 16
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), “Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments”, Journal of Public Economics 269-278
Alesina and Tabellini (2007), “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task”, American Economic Review, 169-179
Alesina and Tabellini (2008), “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks”, Journal of Public Economics, 426-447
Dal Bò, Finan and Rossi (2013), “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1169-1218 *

8. Special interest politics
Mueller: 15, 20
PT: 3.5
Coate and Morris (1995), “On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests”, Journal of Political Economy, 1210‐35 *
Hall and Deardoff (2006), “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy”, American Political Science Review, 69‐84
Mitchell and Munger (1991), “Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey”, American Journal of Political Science, 512‐546

Course program not available

Updated A.Y. 2017-2018

Content
This course is composed of two parts:

Module 1
- European Public Economics: public good and common resources, the principles of optimal taxation on income and commodities, provision of public good (equity and efficiency). Basics of Procurement and Auction Theory.

Module 2
- European Public Choice: public policy formation, political processes and political institutions from a rational choice perspective

Attendance
Not compulsory, but strongly recommended. Active class participation is very much appreciated.

Course prerequisites
You need to have covered the material of a good undergraduate economics program: a good working knowledge of intermediate microeconomics (we will make almost no use of macroeconomics) some literacy in mathematics and some knowledge of game theory is necessary, as is a basic understanding of econometrics, at least through multiple regression (you should understand how to interpret regression coefficients and be aware of the possible pitfalls in their use). The first class is devoted to review some of these tools. An introductory course in public finance is useful but not necessary. In the second module the main tool of analysis will be the revelation principle, and students are advised to study it beforehand

Final Exam
The final exam is a three-hours written test consisting of six questions, as follows. Three questions from Module 1 (2 mathematical exercises, similar but easier than those carried out during the course, and the discussion of an article chosen among those presented in class), and three questions from Module 2 (2 mathematical exercises, and the discussion of an article chosen among those presented in class). Within each question there might be a choice of "subquestions". To pass the exam it is necessary to obtain a mark of 18 in at least four questions. The mark for the written exam is given by the average mark of the six questions. In each question the scale of marks goes from 0 to 34, so students can obtain a final mark of 30 even without answering perfectly all the questions.
In addition students can volunteer to give presentations and have their mark added to the mark of the exam. Each presentation will be given a mark from -2 to +3, which is added to the mark of the first exam session after the course only, and rounded to the nearest integer to determine the final mark of the students. Withdrawals from scheduled presentations will be marked with -2.
NB 1: There is one exam per session, plus an additional exam in the session that follows the course (but students can only sit for one of the two).
NB 2: MSc Economics students can take Module 2 separately, in which case the final exam will last 1.5 hours, with one exam per session only.

Module 1

Content
Detailed understanding of the provision of public good and its implications in terms of efficiency and equity. Principles of optimal income and commodity taxation in competitive market and under market power. The course also focuses on the role and use of common resources.
It is expected that the students will learn an analytical approach to the economic issues. This first module will help strengthen and ease the analysis of the second cycle of courses and make students able to develop and/or implement original ideas, potentially with original research in mind.

Course schedule
Please note that the dates on which material will be covered are approximate. Total 10 classes for a total of 36 hours. Classes will begin promptly; there will be a break of approximately 10-15 minutes, at an appropriate point towards the mid-point of the class.

Main references
The main text books are in general good enough to cover this part of the program (Gruber, Myles-Hindricks, Myles, Rosen e Gayer). The course basically follows Intermediate Public Economics (2006).

Course Web Page
The material for this course (syllabus, notes, announcements, materials) will be posted online. It is essential to consult this link, as all information regarding this course will be available there.
Exercises
Exercises will be assigned in advance and analysed during the lessons in the classroom with the active participation of students. Exercises questions will be downloaded from the course webpage. Some examples of the right answers will be provided on the course webpage, after each lesson. The day for the exercise section will be decide during the course according to the covered material.

Students’ presentations
These will be assessed and the student will be allowed to choose whether to have them included as an element of the final evaluation of the course.
The aim of the presentation is to transfer and communicate new knowledge to a group of people who have a general knowledge of economics or finance, but not necessarily in possession of complete familiarity with all aspects of that topic.
A skill that will be evaluated in the presentation is the ability to choose what needs to be explained and what you can assume that the public knows. "Wasting" time in explaining topics that the students of the master already know is not a good use of one's time.
The presentations will be held in the last week of the course.
The teacher will provide a list of articles (available on the web), and each student must choose an article from those.
In general, however, there will be wide choice regarding the topics to which students might be examined in each session.
The presentation in PowerPoint (or Beamer pdf) must be sent to the teacher’s email address by the deadline communicated during the course.

The presentation will last no more than 15 minutes. This limit may be reduced at 13 minutes depending on the number of presentations

Written and verbal suggestions on presentation techniques will be given during the course.

Each presentation will receive a detailed individual comment from the teacher

Module 2

Content
This course examines public policy formation, political processes and political institutions from a rational choice perspective. A one-term course cannot offer a comprehensive treatment of the complex working of political systems. The emphasis is on introducing some key formal models to simplify and analyze broad classes of situations. At the same time, rigorous empirical testing of formal models will be a central component. We will focus on the literature on voting, elections, partisan politics and political agency.

Required Text and Readings
No single textbook covers all the material presented in this course. A number of the recommended readings will consist of journal articles. I will also distribute the slides of each class. The books that will be used more frequently are the following:
- Besley, “Principled Agents?”, Oxford University Press , 2006 (henceforth: Besley)
- Mueller, “Public Choice III”, Cambridge University Press, 2003 (henceforth: Mueller)
- Persson and Tabellini, “Political Economics”, MIT Press, 2000 (henceforth: PT)
All readings are available through the Biblioteca Vilfredo Pareto, located in the building B. Class notes, as well as any other additional material/reading, will be available on the course web page.

Location
Classes will be held in room P10, 2nd floor, building A. Any eventual change will be posted on the course web page.

Course Web Page
The material for this course (syllabus, notes, announcements, materials) will be posted on the course webpage.

Material
In the following pages you will find the detailed reading list for each topic. This list is indicative, and can be subject to some changes. In particular, further readings may be provided during the lectures. Readings marked with a * represent compulsory reading, all other readings are just suggestions.

7. Bureaucracy
Mueller: 16
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), “Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments”, Journal of Public Economics 269-278
Alesina and Tabellini (2007), “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task”, American Economic Review, 169-179
Alesina and Tabellini (2008), “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks”, Journal of Public Economics, 426-447
Dal Bò, Finan and Rossi (2013), “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1169-1218 *

8. Special interest politics
Mueller: 15, 20
PT: 3.5
Coate and Morris (1995), “On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests”, Journal of Political Economy, 1210‐35 *
Hall and Deardoff (2006), “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy”, American Political Science Review, 69‐84
Mitchell and Munger (1991), “Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey”, American Journal of Political Science, 512‐546

Course program not available

Updated A.Y. 2016-2017

Content
This course is composed of two parts:

Module 1
- European Public Economics: public good and common resources, the principles of optimal taxation on income and commodities, provision of public good (equity and efficiency).

Module 2
- European Public Choice: public policy formation, political processes and political institutions from a rational choice perspective

Module 1

Content
Detailed understanding of the provision of public good and its implications in terms of efficiency and equity. Principles of optimal income and commodity taxation in competitive market and under market power. The course also focuses on the role and use of common resources.
It is expected that the students will learn an analytical approach to the economic issues. This first module will help strengthen and ease the analysis of the second cycle of courses and make students able to develop and/or implement original ideas, potentially with original research in mind. Public provision of public goods

Content
This course examines public policy formation, political processes and political institutions from a rational choice perspective. A one-term course cannot offer a comprehensive treatment of the complex working of political systems. The emphasis is on introducing some key formal models to simplify and analyze broad classes of situations. At the same time, rigorous empirical testing of formal models will be a central component. We will focus on the literature on voting, elections, partisan politics and political agency.Outline of the course