Comments on: Samizdata quote of the dayhttp://www.samizdata.net/2013/02/samizdata-quote-of-the-day-250/
A blog for people with a critically rational individualist perspectiveSun, 02 Aug 2015 21:44:41 +0000hourly1http://wordpress.org/?v=4.2.3By: Julie near Chicagohttp://www.samizdata.net/2013/02/samizdata-quote-of-the-day-250/#comment-296555
Sun, 24 Feb 2013 01:53:10 +0000http://www.samizdata.net/?p=16722#comment-296555Thanks, Laird. It’s really helpful to know what people mean by some of the current buzzwords.
]]>By: Lairdhttp://www.samizdata.net/2013/02/samizdata-quote-of-the-day-250/#comment-296523
Sat, 23 Feb 2013 22:21:16 +0000http://www.samizdata.net/?p=16722#comment-296523To me, it’s the former: a description which sets (or better, defines) the standard. RRS may feel differently, though.
]]>By: Julie near Chicagohttp://www.samizdata.net/2013/02/samizdata-quote-of-the-day-250/#comment-296196
Fri, 22 Feb 2013 22:47:21 +0000http://www.samizdata.net/?p=16722#comment-296196Laird–I don’t know how to get at this distinction in a single sentence. So….

In trying to define proper Libertarianism as a political philosophy, one might draw up lists of necessary and sufficient features that a properly Libertarian political system must have, and possibly a list of conditions that must be absent.

So, would “normative Libertarianism” refer to the (abstract) defining characteristics of a Libertarian political system properly so-called, or would it refer to those actually-existing (if any) Libertarian systems that meet the defining conditions?

In the first case, “normative Libertarianism” would mean something like “a political philosophy which sets the standards that a Libertarian political system must meet.” In the second, the term would mean “the elements of Libertarianism that you will find in any properly Libertarian political system (if you can find one).” (With the proviso, in this second meaning, that those elements must include all the defining characteristics, but that there may also be other commonalities which are logically entailed by the interplay between the abstract definition and the Real World.)

OK, here! In short: Is “normative Libertarianism” a description or definition which SETS the standard, or a real existing system which MEETS the standard?

(Or to all those commonalities which real existing systems turn out to share, even if not directly prescribed in the definition?)

I think the problem is that my understanding of “normative” differs from yours. I thought it would refer to the standards of what is good (or right or acceptable) in human interpersonal or social behavior or activity, within a Libertarian political system. And in the end, I do think there are certain standards of conduct that must be met by the people constituting any genuinely Libertarian society.

From your explanation, it sounds to me as if by “normative Libertarianism” you mean either the standard (i.e. the set of criteria) which defines “Libertarianism” as a political philosophy; or else, you mean that which all forms of Libertarianism have in common–that which might be called “normal” vis-a-vis Libertarianism, except that “normal” might be too weak a word since it could be taken to imply that there are forms of Libertarianism (in theory, if not in actuality) that are ABnormal, that are NOT common to all forms of Libertarianism.

Do you use that phrase to refer to whatever responsibilities or obligations or duties persons in a society with minimum or no (official) government should or would voluntarily assume toward each other (without being ordered to do so by government)?

No, I don’t. Perhaps I have a different concept of “government.” Government is not some form of freely operating entity distinct from the relationships of the members of a social order in which it appears. Government is a mechanism through which certain of those relationships are conducted. The form of the mechanism is determined by the nature of the relationships and alters as those relationships alter; though not always in coincident order. To explain by example, I would change your parenthetical phrase to read: (without being coerced to do so by other persons in the society using the mechanisms of government for that coercion).

Further, I see duties, responsibilities and commitments all as forms of obligation (ultimately based on oughtness, the personal sense of right and wrong). Each of those forms differ in regard to the circumstances giving rise to the obligation response. A commitment would be a voluntarily undertaken obligation. A responsibility is an obligation arising out of the nature of a particular relationship or form of action by an individual. A duty would represent the commonality of recognition and acceptance of individual obligations amongst a broad or particular segment of the members of a social order. All of those matters are distinct from Libertarianism as an “ism” in the sense of “give and take” relationships within the political sphere.

Or do you mean it to refer to WHATEVER standards of behavior toward each other the system of libertarianism under discussion would require?

No, I don’t. While there may be standards of behavior within a social order necessary to support the existence of Libertarianism, as a form of political conduct in that social order, my reference is not to those standards of behavior. My reference was to a standard element to be noted in all the discussed forms of Libertarianism and that is the nature of the:

relationship of the members of a social order as conducted through mechanisms of governments.

I do not think you will find any form of Libertarianism which is not concerned with that particular form of relationship and attempts to deal with it. However, I am open to other views.

If I understand correctly, “normative” refers to some standard element. So that if restated to include the prescription of that standard element, one would say:
“That form of Libertarianism, whose standard element is the relationship of the members of a social order as conducted through mechanisms of governments, is framed by . . ..

That is, to refer to the dimension of good behavior in general within the context of any given libertarian society?

No, not at all. My reference was only to Libertarianism as a political aspect of the social order and not to any particular form of society.

Your follow-up has made me simplify the expression of my viewpoint, which is that we are likely to see an accelerating transition in the economic structure, rather than an immediate “collapse” (although there may not appear to be much difference in effects from collapse in that abandonment); and, that as you note, unless the underlying economic culture (reflecting the characteristics of the citizenry, which supports the current economic structure), change, any economic structure framed by the current economic culture will fail; possibly through a series of transitions, but ultimate collapse.

Gee, that’s not near as simple an expression as I had hoped.

Incidentally, I was brought up to recognize and accept that we are always in periods of transition.

If the economic structure resulting from that economic culture becomes unsustainable is it not more likely, rather than “collapse,” that the economic culture (arising from the desires of the members of the social order -who,pace, John Galt, seem inured to collectivism) will produce a replacement, possibly totalitarian in economic structure, in order to maintain the current quests for devolution of responsibilities (“collective obligations”) and aggregation of “entitlements?”

Of course it is ‘possible’. But such a system will still face the problem of where to get the wealth to fund its entitlements, given that the ‘collapse’ will doubtless leave even less enterprises to be taxed and regulated and a more totalitarian order will most likely make it even harder to accumulate a stock of milk-able economic cash cows. So it is also ‘possible’ that quite opposite could happen. But as I cannot see how collapse of the current order can be avoided, given the nature of the prevailing culture, I suppose we are going to find out… so I am more inclined to argue from a ‘purer’ position these days as I don’t really care if what I am saying does not fit the current meta-context of most people and thus it puts me on the lunatic fringe. I would rather not be in the non-lunatic ‘middle’ when the wheels come off as it happens