1. Israel Ambassador Harman called at Department afternoon
October 29 at request Assistant Secretary Hare to discuss GOI cross-border
raid into Lebanon. Hare referred to Meir-Barbour conversation reftel
and recalled GOI well aware from numerous past talks of strong USG opposition
to raids across ADL. Said we see retaliatory raids as disturbing rather
than positive factor. First, they disrupt armistice agreements. Hare
noted that in MAC context there is difference between identifying transgression
performed by Fatah or
other thugs and official action for which one side takes full credit.
Second, USG honestly and seriously believes such IDF actions contrary
to Israel's long-term interests.

2. Re specifics October 28-29 raid, Hare made following
points:

A. This amounts to triumph for Fatah. If irresponsibles
by wrong doing can provoke acknowledged action by responsible government
that is feather in their cap.

B. We understand there only three incursions from
Lebanon in past five months. After first one GOI expressed itself as
quite satisfied with GOL cooperation in MAC and actions outside it to
check saboteurs. Therefore present raid does not have aura of understandable
action.

C. Also Lebanon is, after all, somewhat different
in position and attitude from other Israeli neighbors. Furthermore,
present GOL having its internal troubles and this raid could make things
difficult for it.

D. Primin Eshkol in election speech only matter of
hours before raid had mentioned Fatah and Lebanon in sense of warning
them. Juxtaposition speech and raid just does not look good.

E. Finally, and Hare termed this as marginal consideration
but one we felt should be mentioned and in fact had been by Amb. Barbour
to Mrs. Meir, there are other matters USG and GOI have talked about
together. Things such as present raid can be bothersome to atmosphere
such discussions and certainly don't improve it.

3. Hare emphasized he hoped Harman and GOI understand
degree of USG concern this situation directly related to our concern
for Israel's basic security and welfare. Was for this reason we felt
it essential discuss situation with GOI without delay.

4. Responding, Harman outlined three elements in GOI
view situation. First, GOI can acknowledge no difference at all between
type incursions from Lebanon and Israeli action of October 28/29. Armistice
agreement very explicit on this. It disapproves both irregular and official
incursions. Arabs must understand border crossing is two way business.
Said GOI hopes USG will not press this point with it. If it becomes
point of public controversy Israeli border residents will endeavor take
law into own hands, and this GOI will not allow. Second, Israel had
noted October 27 incident took place despite GOL assurances after first
two incursions that forceful measures being taken against violators
and despite fact mukhtar of al-Huleh and other GOL officials could easily
detect new Palestinian faces in village and draw conclusion they were
up to no good (since Palestinians do not normally live and move close
to border areas in Lebanon, unlike case in Jordan). Third and "most
serious," there no connection with Israeli elections. GOI reaction
would be identical November 3 or any other post-election date. Main
point this episode was that October 27 incursion was attack against
occupied village. Israel cannot and will not live this way, and GOI
considers its elementary duty is to enable its people go to sleep at
night. IDF cannot be spread thin and pinned down to patrol every few
yards along border. Either Arab Governments must take responsibility
controlling border violators or GOI must act as it does to provide security.

5. Harman said IDF personnel were given strict orders
guard against human casualties and to his knowledge no life had been
lost nor a single shot fired. He painted sober picture of mood pervading
Israel's population. It had lived 17 long years under Arab threats and
bombast of every type. Every family had some member in armed forces
and constant cause worry about personal and national security. Emphasis
on military content Israel's Independence Day parades was essential
GOI tactic to assure populace its defenses at the ready. He knew of
no country anywhere whose citizens would take relaxed philosophical
view of bombs exploding under their homes. Concluded by hoping we would
take all this into account, and stressed that when GOI views these matters
from standpoint its own long-term security is convinced it must act
as it does. Present government has been as cautious as any government
could possibly be.

6. Hare assured Ambassador we minimized neither these
factors nor wanton character of Fatah incursions, but reiterated our
strongly held belief that retaliatory raids not the answer. Further,
we were not pronouncing USG conclusion present raid connected with forthcoming
elections though wanted mention that facts of situation might lead some
to such interpretation.

7. Israel Minister Evron sounded final notes. Said
Eshkol in other recent speeches had promised exploit to limit all diplomatic
and other peaceful means achieve border security, using force only as
last resort. His speeches should be taken together, not separately.
Urged we consider, on other hand, King Hussein's October 28 speech,
which GOI viewed as one of most belligerent it had ever read and was
itself flagrant violation of armistice agreement.

2. Telegram 450 from Tel Aviv, October 29, reported
that at the conclusion of a meeting that morning with Foreign Minister
Meir, Barbour raised the subject of Israel's raid into Lebanon the night
before, reminding Meir of the long-standing U.S. opposition to such
unilateral action. (Ibid.)