We have been publishing the BBS Reports since 2009. Each new edition is created through several months of research, including interviews with technology end-users, global surveys of technology decision makers, analysis of the end-user responses, and visualization of the data collected. Now in its eighth year of publication, the BBS remains the most comprehensive annual study of technology end-users in the global broadcast and media technology industry. Nearly 10,000 technology professionals in 100+ countries participate in the BBS each year, making it the largest market study of the media technology industry.

Based on feedback from technology vendors, media companies, and investors, we have updated the vendors, product categories, and market trends profiled in the 2016 BBS to better align with recent market developments.

Select updates include the global tracking of IP Standard Adoption, a product level review of the 4K upgrade cycle, and planned usage of programmatic advertising exchanges.

The continual updates over the past eight years have helped the BBS reports remain a critical reference for industry executives to improve strategic decision-making, customer engagement, marketing strategy, product planning, and sales execution. In addition to technology vendor and service provider strategic planning, BBS reports are also used frequently for M&A and investment activities by both buyers and sellers.

Three types of 2016 BBS reports are available:

2016 BBS Global Brand Reports: provides deep insight into how each more than 100 broadcast technology suppliers (see full list below) are perceived by market participants, along with comprehensive benchmarking of broadcast technology vendors on a wide variety of metrics

The Wall Street Journal reported that Kaleil Isaza Tuzman, the founder of KIT Digital was arrested in Monday, and “charged with market manipulation and accounting fraud related to a later company he founded, KIT Digital.”

The KIT Digital story is long and complex.

The company, which acquired a large number of online video technology properties eventually filed for voluntary bankruptcy protection in April 2013 “to cleanse itself of legacy issues, including financial, legal and regulatory matters.”

At that time, the company filed a Reorganization Plan with the Court under which it would go into bankruptcy, be recapitalized by a “plan sponsor group” of investors, and emerge as profitable, debt-free business.

According to the Reorganization Plan, the company entered Chapter 11 with the intention of closing at least eight loss-making subsidiaries, while retaining four of its profitable subsidiaries: Ioko 365, Polymedia, KIT digital France and KIT digital Americas. In its filings with the Court, Kit disclosed that the aggregate revenue generated in 2012 by these four remaining business was approximately $134.5 million.

KIT Digital emerged from Chapter 11 in 2013, and rebranded the remaining assets of the business as Piksel, which remains a leader in on-line video technology..

Kaleil Isaza Tuzman, star of the 2001 documentary “Startup.com” that chronicled the rise and fall of his company govWorks Inc., was arrested in Colombia on Monday, charged with market manipulation and accounting fraud related to a later company he founded, KIT Digital.

The charges against Mr. Tuzman were announced on Tuesday by Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara. KIT Digital’s former chief financial officer, Robin Smyth, was also charged with accounting fraud and was arrested in Australia. Messrs. Tuzman and Smyth are both being held pending extradition proceedings. Both were also sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

A call to Mr. Tuzman’s cell phone was answered by a woman identifying herself only as “Amanda,” who claimed to be his lawyer, but who declined to comment. Mr. Smyth couldn’t immediately be reached for comment.

The indictment alleges that Mr. Tuzman engaged in a scheme with an outside hedge fund to artificially inflate the share price and trading volume of KIT Digital shares. It also alleges that both Messrs. Tuzman and Smyth falsely inflated KIT’s sales by recognizing revenue for products the company hadn’t fully delivered and by using the company’s own cash to pay off customer invoices that were uncollectible.

KIT Digital, its name derived from the initials of its founder, sought to become an online video technology powerhouse by rapidly acquiring 19 companies. It raised more than $250 million via stock sales to help fund the deals and enjoyed positive recommendations from some Wall Street analysts whose firms also sponsored those stock sales.

The Wall Street Journal first raised questions about KIT Digital in November 2011, noting a rapid increase in accounts receivable that suggested customers weren’t paying their bills. The story also noted a run-in Mr. Tuzman had with Dubai police after getting into a fight with a lawyer there.

Mr. Tuzman stepped down in March 2012 and a subsequent Wall Street Journal story noted additional troubles facing the company and quoted his successor, Barak Bar-Cohen, saying he would like to “control-alt-delete the past.” KIT Digital filed for bankruptcy in 2013.

Mr. Tuzman now runs an investment firm called KIT Capital that focuses on asset sales, growth equity and real estate. He has been seeking investors for his latest project, a resort in Cartegena that hopes to be “Colombia’s 1st 6-star hotel,” according to the project’s website. The resort has its own Instagram account, @cartagenaviceroy, and Mr. Tuzman posed for a group photo in a hard hat last week.

Mr. Tuzman recently sent an invitation to the “7th Annual Colombia Celebration” sponsored by KIT Capital, which is leading the resort project, according to an Aug. 25 email reviewed by the Journal. The 10-day event in Cartagena and Medellin in November “straddles local independent day celebrations, island trips, world-class parties and the Miss Colombia coronation,” according to the invite. “We hope you will think of KIT Capital as your Colombian ‘connection.’”

Mr. Tuzman gained fame during the tech boom and bust for being featured in Startup.com, which is considered by some to be the quintessential eye-witness account of dot-com mania. Mr. Tuzman, who is Harvard educated, left a banking job at Goldman Sachs to become CEO of GovWorks, which struggled after raising large amounts of venture capital.

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The 2015 Big Broadcast Survey (BBS) Reports have now been published and are available from Devoncroft Partners.

We have been publishing the BBS Reports since 2009. Each new edition is created through several months of research, including interviews with technology end-users, global surveys of technology decision makers, analysis of the end-user responses, and visualization of the data collected. Now in its seventh year of publication, the BBS remains the most comprehensive annual study of technology end-users in the global broadcast and media technology industry. Nearly 10,000 technology professionals in 100+ countries participated in the 2015 BBS, making it once again the largest market study of the media technology industry.

Based on feedback from technology vendors, media companies, and investors, we have updated the vendors, product categories, and market trends profiled in the 2015 BBS to better align with recent market developments.

These updates help ensure the BBS reports remains a critical reference for industry executives to improve strategic decision-making, customer engagement, marketing strategy, product planning, and sales execution. In addition to technology vendor and service provider strategic planning, BBS reports are also used frequently for M&A and investment activities by both buyers and sellers.

Three types of 2015 BBS reports are available:

2015 BBS Global Brand Reports: provides deep insight into how each more than 100 broadcast technology suppliers (see full list below) are perceived by market participants, along with comprehensive benchmarking of broadcast technology vendors on a wide variety of metrics

After months of data collection, analysis, and visualization, we have now completed work on the 2014 Big Broadcast Survey (BBS). Reports from this study have now been published and are available from Devoncroft Partners.

If you’re not familiar with the BBS, it’s the most comprehensive annual study of technology end-users in the global broadcast industry. Nearly 10,000 broadcast professionals in 100+ countries participated in the 2014 BBS, making it once again the largest market study of the broadcast industry.

BBS reports have been designed to help readers improve their strategic decision-making, customer engagement, marketing strategy, product planning, and sales execution. BBS reports are also used frequently for M&A-related activities by both buyers and sellers.

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Three types of 2014 BBS reports are available:

2014 BBS Global Brand Reports: provides deep insight into how each more than 100 broadcast technology suppliers (see full list below) are perceived by market participants, along with comprehensive benchmarking of broadcast technology vendors on a wide variety of metrics.

2014 BBS Global Market Report: provides detailed information about industry trends, major projects being planned, products being evaluated for purchase, current and future plant infrastructure, broadcast technology CapEx budgets, and planned deployment of new technologies including 4K, Connected TV, and Social TV.

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If you would like information about these reports and how they can help your business, please get in touch.

In addition to these paid-for reports, we will also be publishing highlights from the 2014 BBS on the Devoncroft website. These articles will be posted on a semi-regular basis, so please check back often.

To receive posts when they are published, just enter your email in the box in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

The tables below show the product categories and broadcast technology vendor brands covered in the 2014 BBS.

After more than a year of rumor, speculation, management changes, and shareholder lawsuits, it appears that the Kit Digital roller coaster ride is finally coming to an end – with a successful outcome for company management.

The one-time high-flying online video delivery provider announced that its Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 will be confirmed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

At that time, the company filed a Reorganization Plan with the Court under which it would go into bankruptcy, be recapitalized by a “plan sponsor group” of investors, and emerge as profitable, debt-free business.

According to the Reorganization Plan, the company entered Chapter 11 with the intention of closing at least eight loss-making subsidiaries, while retaining four of its profitable subsidiaries: Ioko 365, Polymedia, KIT digital France and KIT digital Americas. In its filings with the Court, Kit disclosed that the aggregate revenue generated in 2012 by these four remaining business was approximately $134.5 million.

With the new announcement, it appears the company’s Reorganization Plan has now been approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

Kit says that once it emerges from Chapter 11, it will change its name to “Piksel,” and re-brand in time for the IBC trade show in September 2013.

If the company can overcome the “legacy baggage” of Kit Digital, Piksel may turn out to be a formidable player in the broadcast industry once it is fully up and running later this year.

According to Court documents, Piksel will have more 800 employees and revenues in excess of $100m, making it one of the largest players in the industry broadcast industry, where the majority of its business comes from. After emerging from Chapter 11, it’s also likely that the company will have little debt.

More importantly, Piksel will operate in an area where broadcasters and media companies are increasingly focusing their attention, the management and delivery of multi-screen video services. Not only does the new company have core technical expertise in this area, it also boasts a large professional services organization capable of specifying and implementing complex multi-screen deployments, and a 24×7 network monitoring operation, which is offered as a service to clients who do not want to build their own multi-platform NOC.

It remains to be seen how well the company will fare once it comes out of Chapter 11, but Peter Heiland, who became interim CEO of Kit Digital in August 2012, provide a few clues in his upbeat statement about the company’s future. “Piksel is set to emerge as a healthy, dynamic company with a great mix of talented employees, market-leading customers, profitable assets, and sufficient liquidity for operations and investments,” he said.

Heiland went on to say that the new company will “leverage its solutions expertise; the flexibility of which will be driven by a suite of software applications, industry partnerships, and world-class professional and managed services.” He also acknowledged the people who helped the company through what was presumably a traumatic period, saying “I would like to thank all of those who dedicated so much time and effort, including our employees and advisors, to helping us complete our restructuring.”

One-time high flying online video delivery leader Kit Digital has signed a memorandum of understanding to settle a series of federal securities lawsuits filed against the company and some of its KIT’s current and former officers and directors.

A total of four lawsuits are subject to this agreement. They were filed separately in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired KIT stock during the period between May 19, 2009 and November 21, 2012.

The court combined these separate actions into a single Class Action lawsuit.

At issue was conduct that was alleged to have occurred between 2008 and 2011, and alleged violations of federal securities law arising from, among other things, alleged accounting issues, material weaknesses in the internal controls and financial reporting at KIT, certain acquisition transactions that KIT consummated during 2008-2011, and other events from that time period.

Under the terms of the deal, KIT’s insurers will pay approximately $6m to settle all claims of the Class, and all parties will execute mutual releases. KIT and the other defendants will have no obligation to fund any part of the settlement, and any fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel will be paid from the settlement.

KIT digital Interim CEO, Peter Heiland said: “The federal securities lawsuits, which concerned conduct under KIT’s prior management, have been a significant distraction to the business, hindering its ability to attract capital and grow according to its real capability. Resolving these lawsuits signifies our continued progress towards putting the company back on its feet and freeing the company to focus solely on delivering the best in cutting-edge video software and services.

Along with the chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization that’s progressing in a way that we’re confident will satisfy creditors — as well as shareholders keen to invest in the reorganized KIT business, Piksel — the signing of this MOU is yet a further indication that I think we’re finally seeing blue sky ahead.”

KIT added that its entry into the MOU is not an admission of any fault, wrongdoing, or liability for the claims and damages asserted in the Consolidated Action.

The settlement embodied in the MOU is subject to execution of all necessary documents, including a formal stipulation of settlement, as well as all necessary court approvals.

One-time high flying online video delivery leader Kit Digital announced that it has filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

The KIT story has been interesting to watch, and judging by what the company appears to be planning, things are going to a lot more interesting.

According to documents filed with the court, KIT has reached an agreement with three of its largest shareholders, Prescott Group Capital Management, JEC Capital Partners, and Ratio Capital Partners; who are collectively referred to as the “plan sponsor group.”

Under its reorganization plan, KIT will go into bankruptcy, be recapitalized by the “plan sponsor group,” and emerge as profitable, debt-free business with more than 800 employees focused on multi-screen video deployments.

The company plans to shed its loss-making businesses, while retaining four of its profitable subsidiaries, Ioko 365, Polymedia, KIT digital France and KIT digital – Americas. These four businesses will be consolidated into a new company to be Piksel.

According to court filings, these businesses generated aggregate revenues of approximately $134.5 million in 2012.

However, the company said it anticipates that another eight of its subsidiaries “will still need to be wound-down or divested through this chapter 11 case.”

KIT says that at the end of the reorganization process, it expects to emerge as “a healthier, focused company that is poised to take advantage of the burgeoning demand in its industry and to generate significant cash flows after obtaining a financial ‘fresh start.’”

The company also says that this plan will enable it to be in a position to pay all employees, vendors and suppliers for their valid pre-petition claims.

During the time of the reorganization, the company will continue to operate its business as a “debtor-in-possession” under the jurisdiction of the court.

KIT says it plans to be out of reorganization in about 90 days, just in time to launch Piksel at the IBC Show in September.

Court filings detail rise and fall

The documents KIT has filed with the court provide insight into what was happening at the company, and ultimately what led to the decision to file for Chapter 11. It’s fascinating reading.

The Debtor’s proposed restructuring is the result of an extensive marketing process that began over a year ago after the Debt or suffered a number of significant setbacks that impacted its operations. First, in early 2012, the Debtor accepted the resignation of its then-CEO amid an SEC investigation into certain of his trading practices with respect to the Debtor’s stock. Thereafter, the Debtor’s audit committee uncovered financial irregularities and the Debtor announced that it would need to restate historical financials from 2009 onward, sparking a flurry of securities lawsuits and derivative claims along with attendant litigation costs. Contemporaneously, the company was incurring extensive losses from unprofitable acquisitions made over the prior twenty-four (24) months. While the Debtor’s core businesses were (and remain) profitable and strong, mounting legal expenses and the costs of divesting and liquidating the unprofitable non-core businesses caused the Debtor to experience a near-term liquidity crunch. The crunch became more acute when the Debtor’s prepetition lender, without forewarning, swept the Debtor’s operating account and withdrew approximately $1.1 million.

Recognizing it had a short runway and no audited financials, the Debtor redirected the efforts of its investment banker, Deutsche Bank (“DB”), to assist the company with possible financing or sale alternatives. DB conducted an extensive marketing process over the past year canvassing a wide range of over fifty-six (56) financial and strategic players, as well as possible stand-alone financing options to accompany the Debtor in a chapter 11 process. In addition to DB, the Debtor also retained financing brokers to look into the availability of third-party financing. Although the Debtor engaged in extensive negotiations on non-binding terms with at least two parties, the negotiations ultimately failed to culminate in a binding term sheet either because of the need to provide audited financials or because of extensive requirements for due diligence that represented a substantial execution risk.

In March 2013, the Debtor was approached by a group of shareholders with the terms of a restructuring plan. The Debtor (through a special committee of its independent board of directors) negotiated with the shareholder group, which ultimately included the Debtor’s largest shareholders, Prescott Group Capital Management, JEC Capital Partners (an affiliate of the current CEO), and Ratio Capital Partners (collectively, the “ Plan Sponsor Group ”), on the terms of a restructuring to be backstopped by the Plan Sponsor Group. The special committee’s negotiations culminated in a plan support agreement (the “Plan Support Agreement”), which provides the Debtor with the resources necessary to fund this chapter 11 case and a reorganization plan that is expected to pay allowed unsecured claims in full while also providing a meaningful recovery to the Debtor’s equity holders in the form of the opportunity to participate in the reorganized company. A copy of the Plan Support Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 7. The Debtor believes the contemplated re organization pursuant to the Plan Support Agreement marks the best opportunity for the Debt or to preserve its global operations and the jobs of its over 800 employees world-wide. It is economically the best proposal the Debtor received through the prepetition marketing process, even including bids conditioned on due diligence. The Plan Support Agreement, however, requires the Debtor to emerge from chapter 11 within ninety-five (95) days of the filing date. Accordingly, to meet the required tight timeframe, contemporaneously herewith, the Debtor has filed a chapter 11 plan with the hope that confirmation of such plan can occur within 90 days of the date hereof

Under the management of its former CEO, the Debtor spent much of the last few years acquiring other companies in an effort to increase its market share in the video technology market. Since late 2008, the Company made 22 acquisitions, taking its revenue from less than $30 million to slightly over $200 million in 2011. While certain of these acquired businesses have enhanced the Debtor’s operations, others have struggled or posed integration and operational problems. In total, since May 2008 , the Debtor has paid, in both cash and common stock, more than $320 million in connection with acquisitions on its way to becoming an online video technology powerhouse.

The time and expense associated with the Debtor’s “buying binge” took a significant toll on the Debtor. Indeed, the acquired businesses that could not be successfully integrated became a significant cash drain on the entire KDI corporate group. Out of a total of $389 million paid-in-capital, $320 million was spent on acquisitions and approximately $60 million was spent operating and then liquidating or winding down unprofitable Subsidiaries. The Debtor anticipates 8 of its Subsidiaries will still need to be wound-down or divested through this chapter 11 case.

In the beginning of 2012, the Company experienced a protracted period of upheaval. In April 2012, Mr. Tuzman, the Debtor’s then-CEO, resigned as chairman and CEO after the Debtor’s receipt of subpoenas from the SEC related to certain 2010 transactions purportedly undertaken by Mr. Tuzman in the Debtor’s common stock. Several other Board members and officers of the Debtor, some of which were affiliated with Mr. Tuzman, had also resigned by this time. A securities class action lawsuit, two shareholder derivative lawsuits, as well as other similar litigations were initiated against the Debtor, diverting management time and expense at a critical time for the company.

To address the leadership void left after Mr. Tuzman’s exit, the Debtor made significant changes to the composition of its Board of Directors and its management team. On June 28, 2012, two independent directors, Bill Russell and Greg Petersen, were elected to the Board, and in July 2012, I was brought in as Chief Financial Officer. The following month two shareholder representatives were elected to the Board, Seth Hamot and K. Peter Heiland. Thereafter, K. Peter Heiland was also appointed as the Debtor’s interim Chief Executive Officer, a position he holds today.

The Debtor’s new management team took proactive steps to begin to focus the Debtor’s operations on its core strengths, while cutting costs. Ultimately, management was successful in reducing operating losses from an average consolidated monthly loss of -$7.0 million to -$1.0 million by October 2012. During the same time period, however, the audit committee (the “Audit Committee”) of the Debtor’s Board, after an extensive investigation, uncovered certain accounting errors and irregularities related to recognition of revenue for certain perpetual software license agreements entered into by the prior management team in 2010 and 2011. The Audit Committee also determined that certain transactions the Debtor entered into under the prior management team during fiscal years ended December 31, 2008 through 2011 were related party transactions and additional disclosure with respect to those transactions should have been included in the footnotes to the relevant financial statements. As a result, the Audit Committee concluded on November 15, 2012, that the Debtor’s financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2009, 2010 and 2011 and each of the three quarters in 2009, 2010 and 2011 would need to be restated. Because of the need to restate prior periods, the financial statements for the quarters ended March 31, 2012 and June 30, 2012 also had to be amended.

The public announcement of the need to restate the Debtor’s historical financials resulted in a significant decline in the trading price for the Debtor’s stock. Additional litigations were initiated against the Debtor, further diverting management time and expense. In addition, an event of default was triggered under the WTI Loans for breach of a financial representation therein, and on November 21, 2012, WTI, without advance notice to the Debtor, swept approximately $1.1 million from the Debtor’s cash collateral account.

Without reliable financials, the Debtor’s ability to “borrow” out of its near-term liquidity crisis by accessing the capital markets was foreclosed. In addition, the Subsidiaries, although profitable on a consolidated basis, could not continue to fund the Debtor’s mounting legal expenses and regulatory costs.

In February 2012, the Debtor engaged DB to assist the company in identifying sale alternatives. DB conducted an extensive search of financial and strategic players, aggressively canvassing the marketplace to locate potential financial or strategic partners to purchase the Debtor. Although DB contacted fifty-six (56) potential buyers (twenty-five (25) strategic and thirty-one (31) financial), no firm interest in the purchase of the Debtor resulted. Following the conclusion that its financials would have to be restated and the resulting short term liquidity constraints, the Debtor, to preserve its Business, redirected the efforts of DB to find stand-alone rescue financing or potential chapter 11 stalking horse bidders. In addition to DB’s efforts, the Debtor also reached out to specialized financing brokers who contacted over twenty-five (25) potential financing sources for stand-alone financing options. While several parties provided draft term sheets, the Debtor could not move forward with such proposals either because of the need to provide audited financials or because of extensive requirements for due diligence that represented a substantial execution risk. Moreover, despite advancing work fees to two interested parties, the Debtor still failed to obtain a binding commitment from either of those parties that could serve as a basis for a successful restructuring.

Thereafter, the Debtor was approached by a group of shareholders led by JEC, the private equity firm affiliate of KDI’s CEO, with the terms of a restructuring alternative. As a result, and to remove any conflicts of interest in the Debtor’s decision-making, the Board constituted a special committee of its independent directors to consider the shareholder proposal. Among other things, the special committee was charged with overseeing the sales and/or restructuring process from then forward, including the decision to file for chapter 11.

The special committee met numerous times to consider the Debtor’s alternatives. From the outset, the special committee, in an effort to achieve the highest and best result for the Debtor’s stakeholders, pursued restructuring on a dual-track, negotiating with the shareholder group and its then-proposed third-party DIP lender, on one hand, while having DB continue to canvas interested third-parties, on the other. All the while, the special committee was mindful of the Debtor’s dwindling cash position, which I advised them on regularly.

Discussions with the shareholder group stalled in early April 2013, when the group’s proposed DIP lender could not come to terms with the special committee on a path forward for the financing necessary to fund a chapter 11 process. Thereafter, the Debtor, unable to upstream sufficient funds from its Subsidiaries, failed to make a scheduled payment in respect of the WTI Loans on April 1, 2013, triggering an 8-K obligation to disclose the event of default. The special committee faced and prepared for the possibility of having to file chapter 11 without a restructuring plan in place, thereby risking the Debtor’s customer relationships and putting the Debtor’s chances of restructuring in peril. Indeed, if a filing would have happened at that time, the Debtor had sufficient cash in its corporate group to operate in chapter 11 for only several weeks. The Debtor was, put simply, at the end of its rope by early April 2013.

Ultimately, the shareholder group reconstituted itself into the Plan Sponsor Group and proposed terms for restructuring the Debtor, which included a debtor-in-possession financing from an affiliate of JEC sufficient to fund the chapter 11 case.