Chapter 9. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

123. IF man in the state of Nature be so free as has
been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody,
why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and
subject himself to the dominion and control of any other
power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in
the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed
to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as
he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict
observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the
property he has in this state is very unsafe, very
insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition
which, however free, is full of fears and continual
dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out
and is willing to join in society with others who are
already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which
I call by the general name- property.

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting
into commonwealths, and putting themselves under
government, is the preservation of their property; to
which in the state of Nature there are many things
wanting.

Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law,
received and allowed by common consent to be the standard
of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all
controversies between them. For though the law of Nature
be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet
men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant
for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a
law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular cases.

125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known
and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all
differences according to the established law. For every
one in that state being both judge and executioner of the
law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion
and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with
too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence
and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.

126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants
power to back and support the sentence when right, and to
give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended
will seldom fail where they are able by force to make
good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes
the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to
those who attempt it.

127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of
the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while
they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence
it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men
live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies
that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and
uncertain exercise of the power every man has of
punishing the transgressions of others, make them take
sanctuary under the established laws of government, and
therein seek the preservation of their property. It is
this that makes them so willingly give up every one his
single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone
as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such
rules as the community, or those authorised by them to
that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the
original right and rise of both the legislative and
executive power as well as of the governments and
societies themselves.

128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he
has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first
is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of
himself and others within the permission of the law of
Nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all the
rest of mankind are one community, make up one society
distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for
the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there
would be no need of any other, no necessity that men
should separate from this great and natural community,
and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a
man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the
crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up
when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or
particular political society, and incorporates into any
commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

129. The first power- viz., of doing whatsoever he
thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest
of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by
the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself
and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of
the society in many things confine the liberty he had by
the law of Nature.

130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up,
and engages his natural force, which he might before
employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own
single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the
executive power of the society as the law thereof shall
require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to
enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and
society of others in the same community, as well as
protection from its whole strength, he is to part also
with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for
himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the
society shall require, which is not only necessary but
just, since the other members of the society do the like.

131. But though men when they enter into society give up
the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in
the state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be
so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the
society shall require, yet it being only with an
intention in every one the better to preserve himself,
his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be
worse), the power of the society or legislative
constituted by them can never be supposed to extend
farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure
every one's property by providing against those three
defects above mentioned that made the state of Nature so
unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or
supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by
established standing laws, promulgated and known to the
people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent
and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by
those laws; and to employ the force of the community at
home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to
prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the
community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be
directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and
public good of the people.