Despite what you see in the movies, lawsuits are not won when an
attorney gets up and makes his final argument to the jury. They are
not won when the evidence is given. They are not even won when the
jury is chosen. Lawsuits might be lost at those times, but they cannot
be won. Lawsuits are won before the doors of the courtroom are even
unlocked for the trial. They are won by careful preparation before the
trial, including the formulation of a realistic theory of the case and
the development of evidence that will win.

The case itself was an action for defamation against Professor
Deborah Lipstadt of Emory University for statements made in her book
Denying the Holocaust (1993). In this work, a history of
the movement that denies that the Holocaust occurred, David Irving is
mentioned several times as a person who denies the Holocaust and as a
frequent speaker before neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic groups. Based upon
these allegations, and the facts Professor Lipstadt used to make her
argument, Irving filed a lawsuit in British courts to recover damages
to his reputation and enjoin the publication of Lipstadt' s book in
Great Britain. Irving has also filed a similar lawsuit against
journalist and author Gitta Sereny for similar statements about him
and has threatened lawsuits against others including Professor John
Lukacs for his work The Hitler of History (1997).
Professor Lipstadt and Penguin Books, her publisher in England,
defended the lawsuit on a defense of "justification" under British
law.

David Irving lost his case against Deborah Lipstadt - and make no
mistake, he has lost it - not when the judge announced the final
decision or when he made a fiasco of his closing argument but through
a series of crucial errors before the trial even began. One of the
most crucial of those failures was the moment when Irving dropped his
pile of papers on the desk of a clerk and began his lawsuit. Relying
on myths and ignorance, he chose the wrong place in which to bring it
and paid dearly for that error.

David Irving had a clear choice as to where to file his lawsuit
against Deborah Lipstadt. He could file his case in Great Britain, his
prime residence, or at any of a number of state or federal
jurisdictions within the United States. Even though there were many
good reasons why the United States should have been chosen for the
lawsuit, Irving chose to file in Great Britain. The numerous
advantages of filing in the United States range from procedural and
technical to the manner in which substantive legal issues are handled.
They range from the fact that Irving could have obtained competent
counsel at no cost to the possibility of adding the parties which
Irving claimed were part of the "conspiracy" against him over which
British courts did not have jurisdiction. Even the technical manner in
which the evidence was presented to the court would have favored him.

Two examples should suffice. Irving evidently thought that the
climax of the case would be his cross-examination of Professor
Lipstadt. It is evident that he saw it as a confrontation between him
and the professor who does not even deign to admit that Irving has
standing to engage in a debate on the Holocaust. He thought of himself
as another Darrow reducing his opponent to a stuttering wreck as
Darrow did to Bryan at the Scopes Trial. Had he been able to do this
he would have won his case in the public eye no matter what the final
verdict, just as few now realize that Scopes was convicted.

That confrontation never happened. It never happened because Irving
decided to bring his lawsuit in Great Britain. Under British law a
defendant cannot be compelled to testify. Professor Lipstadt's defense
was allowed to insulate her from that confrontation and, thereby,
change the frame of reference of the case. The focus of the trial was
not on the defendant but on Irving's battles with the "establishment"
and the confrontation became not Irving versus Professor Lipstadt but
Irving versus the historians of the world. Irving complained bitterly
both in court and out about this impeccable legal strategy, but there
was nothing he could do but vent his obvious frustration that the
defense was not playing his game. In a civil trial in the United
States a defendant can be called to the stand by the plaintiff on
cross-examination. By filing in the United States Irving could have
guaranteed the direct confrontation with his adversary he craved.

A second example was that Irving was never able to establish his
theory of the case, the very theme of the trial. Irving wanted to
present himself as the victim of a conspiracy to falsely destroy his
reputation as an authority on Hitler and World War II. He saw this
case as a platform to attack not only Professor Lipstadt but the
various groups, Jewish and non-sectarian, which had heaped scorn upon
him and his work. But these groups were not sitting in the courtroom.
Almost all of those who he named as co-conspirators were not subject
to British law. Even the few that were could not be brought into the
court-room as, under British law the only issue before the court was
whether Professor Lipstadt had defamed Irving in Denying the
Holocaust. As a result, when David Irving filed a written
submission of his final argument to the court - a large portion of
which concerned the "conspiracy" - Judge Gray squelched this line of
argument in this exchange:

MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think I will give you a bit of guidance
because, having read yesterday's 56 pages, and I do not say this
critically but it did appear to me that there was a great deal on the
topic about which you obviously feel passionately, namely what you see
as being a conspiracy to bring your career as an author to a premature
end. Those are not your words, I appreciate.

MR IRVING: I astutely avoided that word.

MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, but there is an awful lot on that
topic. Much of it did not appear to me to have anything to do with the
Defendants. You may take a different view, but I am not sure that the
evidence suggests that the Defendants are as involved with all the
things of which you are complaining as you suggest. I, therefore,
rather doubt whether it would be appropriate for you to use this court
as a platform for what one might call a general attack on the
conspirators, as you regard them.

Under American law alternate causes of action could have been
pleaded and those other defendants could have been in court. As it
was, Irving's claim of a vast, world-wide conspiracy against him was
nothing more than a final appeal to the bedraggled fanatics of his
claque.

The lawsuit itself was a dubious matter in whatever forum Irving
had chosen. As Judge Gray states, Irving definitely oversold the
evidence that he could produce as to the existence of a conspiracy. In
fact, Irving failed utterly, as Judge Gray noted, to demonstrate
either that a conspiracy existed or that the defendants were part of
that conspiracy. These were elements that Irving had to prove in order
to prevail. Further the defense was able to turn the tables, putting
Irving on the defensive throughout the trial, an almost impossible
position for a plaintiff in an action for defamation. These mortal
wounds upon his case would have been inflicted in the courts of either
the United States or Great Britain. If Irving had wished to have even
a slim chance of winning his lawsuit - probably only possible if the
defense self-destructed - that chance was much larger in the United
States than in Great Britain simply because his discovery would have
been given more latitude.

The crucial decision to bring this action in Great Britain was no
accident; it is the determined policy of David Irving. He has, for
example, threatened Professor John Lukacs with just such a lawsuit if
The Hitler of History is published in Great Britain. The
question, then, is not whether Irving has decided to bring his actions
in Great Britain but why he made that decision. It is here that Irving
can be seen to have acted on emotion rather than reason. Irving claims
that he filed in Great Britain because of the legal situation in the
United States. That rationale depends on Irving's misconceptions of
the American law of defamation.

One would expect, that a litigant - especially one like Irving who
claims to be totally ignorant of the law - would at the least consult
competent counsel prior to taking any action. Competent counsel is
required to explain the legal dangers and pitfalls of a cause of
action and point out the technical realities of the courtroom. As will
be made clear, Irving's decision to file in Great Britain was
apparently based upon an incomplete understanding of American law and
a woeful ignorance of the advantages he could have had in an American
court.

To explain his decision Irving has repeatedly claimed that the
famous case of "New York Times v. Sullivan" would have precluded
recovery in the United States. The odd claim that no action in
defamation can be brought by a "public figure" was reiterated by
Irving in a recent interview on Court-TV after the evidence was
complete and his mistake evident, when he said:

"I'm going after Lipstadt because she's peddling her book in
England; in the U.S. she is protected by NY vs. Sullivan, by the First
Amendment..."

A more colorful explanation of this ignorant view of American law
can be found on the internet site of Raeto West, who serves as a
Charlie McCarthy to Irving's Edgar Bergen where this rather bizarre
and illogical explanation is presented:

"Libel law in America appears to be influenced by New York Times vs
Sullivan. Or something like that; the actual case perhaps hardly
matters. This trial would be thrown out in the US, because nobody in
the public eye can take action for defamation: if you were to start a
libel case, you thereby put yourself into the public eye, and
therefore have no case. My guess is that such a ruling, presented as a
liberal reform (e.g. presumably you can say 'McNamara is a war
criminal' without being sued) in fact allows the American mass media
to broadcast or print any rubbish without any possibility of redress."

Even if Irving does not sink as deep in his ignorance as West, his
position is so gross a misstatement of American law that it is clear
that either Irving failed to consult an American lawyer, ignored the
advice of American lawyers, or is deliberately misstating the reason
for his decision.

"New York Times v. Sullivan" 176 US 254 (1964) is
one of the landmark cases of the law of defamation in the United
States. It holds that the free exchange of debate about public
officials is so important an interest that no defamation action by a
public official could be maintained unless "actual malice" could be
proven. This decision does not, however, directly affect Irving as he
claims. It applies only to public officials. The decision which could
affect him, as any American lawyer could have explained, is a later
decision "Curtis Publications, Inc. v. Butts"
388 US 130 (1967) in which the Supreme Court held that,
under certain circumstances a private person could be so prominent
that the standard for public officials should be applied to them. This
is, apparently, the basis for Irving's fallacious claim that "New York
Times" would have precluded his lawsuit. But this position is simply
not supported in American law. Not only does "Butts" not bar such
lawsuits (as Irving claims) but it is not even certain that Irving
would qualify as a public figure.

The crucial point of "Butts" (a football coach in Alabama) was that
some private individuals were so prominent and had so much access to
the media that they have the same advantages in a public debate as
public officials. It is, however, a later case "Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc," 418 US 323 (1974) which actually defines a
"public figure." "Gertz" states that there are actually two types of
public figures. The first is a pervasive or "all-purpose" public
figure who is considered the equivalent of a public official in any
action. These are people of prominence and influence who have, by
assuming that position "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood." ("Gertz" pp. 344-5).
It is, in fact, quite rare that this status is accorded to a private
person. For example the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland) has never found a
plaintiff to be an all-purpose public figure. Examples of those who
have been determined all-purpose public figures by the Courts include
Jerry Falwell, Johnny Carson and his wife, and the head of a Mafia
family. Clearly Irving fails to meet this standard except in his own
mind.

The final category to which Irving could be claim membership is
that of "limited purpose" public figures. Limited purpose public
figures are those who have thrust themselves to the forefront of a
public controversy and who, thereby, surrender their position as a
private figure to the extent that the alleged defamation relates to
their participation in that controversy. The concept that the
plaintiff "injected" himself into that controversy is of extreme
importance. "Iafrete v. Hadesty" 621 A.2d 1005
(Pa. Super.; 1993). In determining whether a plaintiff is a
limited purpose public figure, the courts must consider whether the
alleged defamation involves a public controversy and the nature and
extent of involvement in that controversy in which the plaintiff has
injected himself.. "McDowell v. Patewonsky" 769 F.2d 942
(3rd Cir.; 1985). That same case defines public controversy
as involving a "real dispute the outcome of which affects the general
public or some segment of it." Matters which are merely "of interest
to the public" are not characterized as "public controversies."
(769 F2d at 948)

Since "Gertz" is the basic case on the concept of defining a public
figure, it is instructive to look at the plaintiff in that case to
discover how this standard is applied and how it would be applied to
Irving. Elmer Gertz was a prominent attorney in Chicago, a professor
in a law school who maintained a private practice on the side and
wrote books about his work; in the 1960s he occupied a place quite
similar to that which Alan Dershowitz occcupies today (without, of
course, the wide exposure that cable television gives Dershowitz
today). His clients included such public figures as Nathan Leopold
(for whom he obtained a parole), Jack Ruby and the Ruby estate, and
Henry Miller. In one of their publications, "American Opinion," the
John Birch Society related a controversy over illegal activities of
the Chicago Police Department in spying upon and harassing groups that
opposed Mayor Richard J. Daley. The magazine claimed that Gertz, who
was not the lead attorney in the actions against the police
department, was a "Communist" agent who had stirred up the problem.
The Supreme Court rejected the defendants' claim that they were
entitled to the protection of "New York Times" and held that Gertz was
not a limited purpose public figure.

There is no certainty, therefore, that an American court would have
characterized Irving as a limited purpose public figure. Indeed, the
holding in "Gertz" indicates that it is unlikely that Irving qualifies
as a limited purpose public figure. First, there appears to be no
actual "controversy" within the legal meaning of the term. The
propositions that the Holocaust did not occur or that Hitler was not
responsible for it, are simply not matters of controversy affecting
the public. It is, at best, an academic debate in which Irving, who
claims he is not a historian of the Holocaust, has only participated
on a limited basis. Moreover, the "defamation" of which he complains
does not really involve that debate but how he has, generally,
conducted himself as a "historian" and concerns material that was not
part of that debate. The application of the label "limited use public
figure" to an individual is narrowly defined and used only with
hesitation.

Even if Irving's dubious assertion that an American court would
find him a public figure for the purpose of his lawsuit, Irving's
position that his lawsuit would be barred under American law is
without merit. The law applied to public figures does not, as Irving
and West, state, automatically preclude such actions. It only places
an additional burden on the plaintiff; that of showing "actual
malice." What is confusing to many is that the phrase "actual malice"
has, in this context, a very specific and a very limited meaning. It
does not encompass to motive and it does not mean "ill will" or a
desire to injure someone's reputation. The sole meaning of "actual
malice" in this context, is that the person making the defamatory
statements either knew that they were false or acted with a reckless
disregard for whether they were true or not. To distinguish this term
from the normal meaning of malice, the term "constitutional malice" is
often used for specificity with the term "common law malice" (which is
also used in the American law of defamation) denoting the common
meaning of "malice."

To claim that the requirement of demonstrating "constitutional
malice" is an insurmountable barrier for Irving or any other public
figure is just as foolish as Irving's basic assertion that "New York
Times" bars his action. While the presence of "actual malice" and the
burden it imposes upon a litigant is grist for the lectures of law
professors, its practical effect is negligible. To paraphrase Annie
Savoy's comments about baseball, law might elucidate the metaphysical
ontology of the universe, but it is also a business. American trial
lawyers who represent plaintiffs in defamation cases do so on a
contingency basis; that is, their compensation is based on the amount
that they can actually collect on a judgment. The harsh reality is
that, whatever the technical burden of proof, the size of the verdict
depends on convincing the jury that a large award is justified.

And what convinces a jury to reach deep into the pockets of a
defendant is malice. One of the most successful plaintiffs' attorneys
in the U.S., who has won cases for several acknowledged public
officials (Sen. Paul Laxalt) and public figures (Richard Sprague,
First Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia) openly states that
a case is worthless unless he can convince the jury that the defendant
acted with both "constitutional" and 'common law" malice.
Thus, while "New York Times" might impose an additional technical
requirement on a "public figure" there is no change in the realities
of the litigation.

What is even odder about Irving's claim is that, when he entered
the court room in London, not only did he attempt to prove
constitutional malice, but his task was made harder because the
concept is judicially unknown in Great Britain. From the beginning
Irving has claimed that Denying the Holocaust was the end
result of a lengthy conspiracy to demolish his reputation and deprive
him of his livelihood. Irving has this to say about a "conspiracy" on
his internet site:

"While I cannot yet go into detail on what Discovery against
Lipstadt has already yielded, I can state that I have developed enough
information and documentary evidence from my sources to establish that
she made herself the Willing Executioner of a global conspiracy to
destroy my legitimacy as an historian, by whatever means, since the
people paying her fundamentally disliked the tune that I was playing."

This statement can be characterized as the theory used by Irving in
the development of his case. It was the underlying theme of both his
opening address and his closing argument which he directed not at the
judge but to the spectators. It was Irving's burden to prove this
conspiracy if he was to prevail. And, significantly, it is exactly the
legal theory that could have established "actual malice" in an
American court. Irving's case was soundly rejected by the British
judge hearing the case even before the final submission to the court.

In short, Irving's decision made it even harder for him to win his
case. Irving handicapped himself by attempting to present a theory of
the case which was alien to British libel law and was further hampered
by the practical realities of how evidence is presented in Great
Britain. While his decision to have a bench trial allowed him a
latitude to play to his claque - an opportunity not as available in a
jury trial - his choice of jurisdiction frustrated and, ultimately,
defeated him. Irving, given the rare luxury of a choice of forums in
which to bring his action, exacerbated the problems of his tenuous and
marginal case. Irving's initial mistake of ignoring the opportunity to
bring his lawsuit in the United States, was an error from which
neither he nor any other litigator could recover. It was not the last
mistake Irving would make, but it was one of the most important. In
grasping for the illusory advantages of British libel law, Irving came
up with a handful of air.