Bright star: the rise and rise of Xi Jinping

When Chinese troops trekked into Indian-administered Kashmir on April 15, the region was caught off guard. Initial reports suggested the incursion was a navigational error or even the actions of a “rogue patrol". After all, why would two platoons of Chinese soldiers deliberately inflame an already tense border area that is claimed by three nuclear-armed players, Pakistan being the other. When the Chinese soldiers pitched their tents, however, the narrative quickly changed. It emerged they had ventured 19 kilometres across the Line of Actual Control – the border – and ignored repeated demands from Indian troops that they turn back.

The ensuing stand-off lasted three weeks and it became clear this was no map-reading error or the actions of a renegade commander. The timing was significant, coming just a month after China completed it’s once-in-a-decade leadership transition, in which
Xi Jinping
added the title of President to his positions as General Secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The state-controlled media portrays the 60-year-old Xi as a smiling fatherly figure, and he has given the Communist Party a much-needed softer and more sympathetic public face. But this deft image-making has been accompanied by a stronger resolve from China’s new leaders to assert themselves across the region. The Kashmir incursion was just one example of this more forceful China, a strategic decision by China to shake up the established order.

This is Beijing’s new way of operating. It likes to prod and push in search of a weak point, withdraw and never entirely explain what happened. The idea is to create sufficient doubt about its intentions that opponents will be left wondering how strongly they should challenge. The same strategy is being employed in the East China Sea, where a rhetorically charged argument with Japan over the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands has become a regional flashpoint. China is quite literally pushing the boundaries, attempting to find any sign of brittleness in Tokyo’s resolve. Beijing’s territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia in the South China Sea are following a similar pattern.

Xi Jinping’s escalating border policy

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While border disputes have been a feature of the regional landscape for decades, there has been a noticeable escalation since Xi took over last November. He heads a more strategically focused Chinese leadership, without the distraction of opinion polls or questions from the opposition.

This muscular leadership is partly due to Xi emerging as a far stronger figure than many foreign experts had predicted. In the lead-up to November’s National Party Congress, the common narrative was that Xi would be a weak leader, beholden to the increasingly divided factions. Not only would his predecessor
Hu Jintao
be looking over his shoulder, but also former President
Jiang Zemin
. Like many predictions made about elite Chinese politics, that one proved well wide of the mark.

Indeed, Xi is shaping up as the most powerful leader since
Deng Xiaoping
. There are two reasons for this. First, Xi has managed to consolidate power faster than anyone thought possible, partly due to Hu unexpectedly stepping down as head of the military in November, replaced by Xi. Many thought Hu would remain for a further two years. Second, Xi appears to have brought the factions together and gained some public support due to his crackdown on corruption and government excess. Fawning state media coverage showing the President regularly smiling and walking among ordinary people has also gone some way to winning over the general public, which is accustomed to dour, unsmiling leaders.

Such a rapid consolidation of power has allowed Xi to dispose swiftly of his rivals. Supporters of ousted politburo member Bo Xilai found themselves caught in a corruption crackdown. High-profile bloggers and advocates for political reform have also been detained, while political freedoms are quickly being wound back in Hong Kong.

Implications for Australia

For Australia, the combination of a strategically focused China and more powerful Chinese leader throws up any number of awkward possibilities. Australia’s vulnerability stems from its reliance on China for trade. Not only is China the number-one buyer of Australian resources, but also agricultural commodities. Exports to China of high-end manufactured goods such as medical equipment and pharmaceuticals are also growing rapidly.

Indeed, Australia is more reliant on China today than it was on Britain after World War II. More than 35 per cent of its exports go to the world’s second-largest economy, up from 20 per cent just five years ago. This gives Beijing enormous leverage, a position of power it appears intent on exploiting.

When former prime minister
Julia Gillard
signed a strategic partnership with China in April, Beijing was quick to claim victory. The Global Times newspaper, which often reflects Beijing’s more hawkish foreign policy views, said China had taken a big step in luring Australia away from the US and Japan by using its economic muscle. “This is a strategic victory for China," said the paper’s editorial on the morning Gillard flew out of Beijing.

This is not a new phenomenon, as Australia discovered in the 1960s. Back then, wheat was China’s commodity of choice. Mao Zedong’s disastrous Great Leap Forward had brought about the largest famine in human history and the Chinese were desperate for imported wheat. In the space of two years, Beijing became Australia’s most important wheat customer, accounting for half of all exports in 1963. By the end of the decade, China was buying a third of Australia’s total wheat production.

But Canberra made the mistake of thinking trade and politics were separate issues. As the Chinese bought record amounts of Australian wheat, conservative politicians spoke about the “evils of communism" and the perils of being associated with “Red China".

In October 1970, the wheat trade abruptly ended. This was partly attributed to comments made the previous year by the then minister for external affairs, Gordon Freeth, who said there was a “serious questioning of conscience in Australia about how far we’re justified in trading with China". His remarks came as China’s domestic wheat production was restored and another big wheat exporting nation, Canada, put aside its concerns about communism and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.

The switch was immediate. Australia was dumped and the Canadians were rewarded with their largest-ever wheat contract. “China did mix trade and politics," wrote historian Billy Griffiths in The China Breakthrough. This was a lesson in how China operates and a factor in the Whitlam government recognising the People’s Republic in December 1972.

Since then the growing power of China has led the likes of
Hugh White
, from the Australian National University, to speculate that Australia may one day be forced to make a choice between Beijing and Washington. For Australia, it’s about deciding between its dominant trade relationship and its historical security ties. Politicians from both sides vehemently deny such a choice will ever be necessary, but China’s recent behaviour shows it’s hardly in the mood for compromise.

An ultimate choice may be many years away, but in the short term, Australia will need to make a series of smaller choices, each one likely to take on greater significance as China turns the screws. The issue is how willing the Abbott government will be in its accommodation of China.

Take the Dalai Lama. Over the past two decades, most Western leaders have met the Tibetan spiritual leader. Beijing protested loudly, but there were no real consequences. That has changed, as British Prime Minister
David Cameron
found out. Cameron and his deputy
Nick Clegg
met the Dalai Lama in May last year and for the next 13 months the bilateral relationship froze over. The Chinese suspended ministerial contact and Cameron was effectively barred from entering China.

Beijing even asked the Prime Minister to make a humiliating apology, an outrageous claim even by Chinese standards. The apology never came, but in what were described as “peace negotiations", Beijing appeared to win an undertaking from Cameron that he will not meet the Dalai Lama again. Trade was the weapon used by Beijing and it’s one it can deploy far more effectively against Australia. Given the diplomatic fall-out from Cameron’s meeting, Abbott would be a brave man to shake hands with the exiled Tibetan leader. This will be awkward since he met the Dalai Lama twice while in opposition and got some mileage out of former prime ministers
Kevin Rudd
and
Julia Gillard
refusing to meet him.

The other factor for Abbott will be his friends in the US telling him to stand up to China. There’s no better way to do this than a handshake with the Dalai Lama – he’s met every US president since 1990. This one relatively minor issue demonstrates the bind in which Australia finds itself in 2013, caught perfectly between China and the US.

As the rise of China continues and its leadership becomes more confident, the decisions Australia makes on investment, human rights and democracy are only going to get harder.