Neil Shenvi - Apologetics

A Brief Response to The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins

This essay was originally written as a guest post for an agnostic friend's blog.

I'd first like to thank Ben for giving me the opportunity to write this guest post. I'm grateful that
the general tenor of this blog is much more respectful than the average Internet discussion. Speaking
personally, the arguments raised by this blog have been extremely useful in helping me formulate my faith
and clarify the reasons that I am a Christian.

The topic of this post is Richard Dawkins' book The God Delusion which has been hailed as a convincing
defense of atheism. Dawkins sets out not only to defend atheism but to portray its worldview as morally and
aesthetically pleasing in a way that atheist thinkers of the past (say, Nietzsche) didn't. In fact, the
majority of the book is not actually an argument against the existence of God, but rather a polemic against
the origins, abuses, and beliefs of religion (in Chapters 1,2,5-10). (At this point, let me briefly
apologize to anyone reading this post who, at the hands of professed Christians, has experienced some of the
hatred that Dawkins describes. It makes me very ashamed, not of Christ, but of those of us who follow him
and bring his name into such ill repute). However, since I have limited space, I've decided to focus only on
the rational arguments for atheism since, to rephrase Dawkins: atheism's (or religion's) power to comfort (or
offend) doesn't make it true (or false).

Let me focus explicitly on the end of Chapter 4, since Dawkins presents in it what he calls "the central
argument of [his] book" (p. 157; all quotations and page numbers are from the 2006 edition). I have tried to
take Dawkins' statements in context, but please correct me if you think I've been unfair.
His argument is as follows:

Life is too complex to have come about by pure, random chance

It is therefore tempting to believe that it was created by an "intelligent designer"(p. 157) like other
complex things

However, this belief is false because a designer would be more complicated than the thing designed, and
"the whole problem we started out with was the problem of explaining statistical improbability" (p. 158)

Darwinian evolution shows how life "with [its] spectacular statistical improbability" could have been
produced (p. 158)

There is no analogous argument for physics, but the anthropic principle allows us to take "more luck"
into account than we normally would in most arguments (p. 158)

Probably a better argument for physics does exist

Therefore, "God almost certainly does not exist" (p. 158)

I'd like to point out two central inconsistencies in this argument. In addition, I'd like to examine
whether Dawkins' arguments are purely empirical and derived wholly from scientific evidence and reason, or
whether they contain an element of "faith".

First, let's note that Dawkins' argument is essentially one of probability. What Dawkins has attempted
to show is not that God's existence is disproved but merely rendered very, very improbable. In the section
Irreducible Complexity, Dawkins points out that "Chance is not a solution [to the problem of biological
complexity], given the high levels of improbability we see in living organisms, and no sane biologist would
ever suggest that it was." (p 119-120) We need to be very careful here. Technically speaking, chance is a
possible solution to the problem of biological complexity in the sense that it is physically possible that
in 40 million B.C. a random fluctuation of molecules accidentally assembled the entire Eocene ecosystem. In
the same way, a hurricane in a factory just might assemble a 747. There are no physical laws that are
actually violated by either process (not even the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics; e-mail me later). But what
Dawkins is saying is that no scientist in his right mind would believe a theory that depended on such a
small probability. In contrast, says Dawkins, natural selection provides an elegant mechanism for the
production of complex lifeforms: "natural selection is a cumulative process, which breaks the problem of
improbability up into small pieces" (p. 121). In other words, given that some primitive form of life
exists, natural selection provides a mechanism which ensures that the development of complex life is, if
not guaranteed, at least very very probable.

What about the origin of life? Dawkins freely admits that "in once sense, it is a bigger gap" and that
the origin of life may have been an "extremely improbable event" (p. 135). When he has to conjure up odds
for the sake of argument, Dawkins throws out a truly improbable number (1 in a billion, p. 138), although he
does say later that he "doesn't for a moment believe the origin of life was anywhere near so improbable in
practice" (p. 138). Doesn't this mean that complex life existing at all is incredibly improbable? No, says
Dawkins, because of the anthropic principle (Dawkins is actually invoking the weak anthropic princinple as opposed to the strong anthropic principle). There are a billion, billion planets in the universe. Even if
the chances of life evolving spontaneously on a random planet is one in a billion, that means that there
are a billion planets on which life began, and given natural selection, nearly all of them will have
evolved complex life. Of course we are on one of the lucky ones, because if we were on one of the unlucky
ones, we wouldn't be sitting here wondering why there is life on our planet.

Let me try to summarize Dawkins' argument thus far: given the (weak) anthropic principle, and natural
selection, it is not at all surprising (i.e. it is probable) that there is a planet (perhaps many planets)
somewhere in the universe which contain complex, sentient life like humans; there is no need to invoke a
designer. Now we come to the problem: what Dawkins has presented thus far is not an argument, but a
framework. He set out to show that there is a natural and probable explanation for the origin of
complex life in the universe. If P is the probability for the existence of sentient life somewhere in the
universe, then he claims that P is large (say > 50%), so we need not look for a creator God. According to
his argument, P = p * N where p is the probability of spontaneous biogenesis and the subsequent evolution
of life on a random planet and N is the number of planets in the universe. Since astronomers and
cosmologists tell us that N = 10^20, the final, conclusive step in his argument is to provide an estimate of
p and to show that p * N is large. So what is the probability that Dawkins calculates? He doesn't provide
one. Although this number is the cornerstone of his argument, he makes absolutely no attempt to calculate
it.

Since this number is such a crucial piece of his argument, let's try to estimate it using Dawkins'
(admittedly low) number 1/10^9 for the probability of the spontaneous genesis of life on a random planet
and his estimate of the number of planets in the universe, 10^20. If these numbers are correct, then the
probability that sentient life evolved somewhere in the universe is essentially 100%. But are we missing
anything? Later in the chapter, Dawkins mentions that "it may be that the origin of life is not the only
major gap in the evolutionary story that is bridged by sheer luck, anthropically justified. For example, my
colleague... has suggested that the origin of the eucaryotic cell was an even more ... statistically
improbable step than the origin of life. The origin of consciousness might be another major gap whose
bridging was of the same order of improbability" (p. 140). But if we take Dawkins at his word, something
interesting happens. If -as he suggests- each of those steps were equally unlikely (1/10^9), then the
probability of overcoming all three would be 1/10^27. Given that there are 10^20 planets, that leaves only
a one in ten million chance that there is any planet, anywhere in the universe that contains sentient life
like us.

Let me be clear that I am not a biologist, nor am I claiming that the probability of spontaneous
biogenesis is one in a billion or one in a trillion, or any other number (if any molecular biologists are
reading this, I would be very interested to know your estimate; I've asked biologists that I know and there
doesn't seem to be a consensus). My point is that Dawkins does not provide any number at all because he is
taking his argument the wrong way around. If you are trying to prove that P is large and find that P = p *
N, the next logical thing to do is to estimate p and N using what we know about physical laws from
astronomy and biochemistry (see p. 137). It is a specious argument to instead assert "since we know P is
almost 1, we can estimate p." Unfortunately, this is precisely what Dawkins does. On page 140, at the end of
his argument about biology, he says "The anthropic principle states that, since we are alive, eucaryotic
and conscious, our planet has to be one of the intensely rare planets that has bridged all three gaps". But
the anthropic principle (as Dawkins is using it) doesn't exactly say that. It says that we have a certain
number (10^18) of planets to work with. If the probability of conscious life evolving spontaneously is
greater than 1/10^18, then whatever our theory of biogenesis is, it is a probable one. But conversely, it
also says that if the probability is significantly less than 1/10^18, then our theory is very unlikely
indeed. It simply does not say "since we're here, we must be a very probable event" (the strong anthropic
principle does make this argument, but Dawkins doesn't invoke it, presumably because it undermines his
argument that there is a probable, natural explanation for the universe). Dawkins has constructed an
elaborate framework, but has left out the final step which is the very crux of his argument.

My central objection to Dawkins' reasoning is essentially this: he has mistaken one of his postulates for
a conclusion. What was his postulate? That there IS a natural, probable explanation for the origin of life.
If this statement is accepted as a postulate then, and only then, does his reasoning make sense. If there
is a natural, probable explanation for the origin of life, then we can assert (indeed, must assert), as
Dawkins does, that "our planet has to be one of the intensely rare planets that has bridged all three gaps"
(p. 141). However, if we are trying to determine WHETHER there is a natural, probable explanation for
life, we certainly cannot use this reasoning. Well, why does Dawkins' believe that there is a natural,
probable explanation for life? I assert it is part of his faith in materialism. At this point, this
statement might appear a bit excessive, but I believe that further justification emerges when we examine
Dawkins' next argument regarding the values of the fundamental physical constants.

Dawkins points out that there are six (although there may be as many as 26) fundamental physical
constants, which, if any of them were altered very, very slightly from their current values, would prohibit
the existence of a life-supporting universe (usually due to the collapse of the universe within a few
attoseconds of the Big Bang). Of course, this presents a similar puzzle as the origins of complex
biological life and, in a sense, is a precondition for it: if these constants hadn't lined up and the
universe had collapsed, complex life wouldn't exist.

Let's stop for a moment at this point. We have been trying thus far to determine whether or not there is
a natural, probable explanation for the existence of complex life somewhere in the universe. Let us assume
that Dawkins' argument about biology is correct: natural selection provides a mechanism that explains how
otherwise highly improbable-looking evidence (biological life) has a very probable explanation. Dawkins
takes great pains to show that the beauty of Darwinian evolution is that it provides such an elegant
mechanism, without which the existence of life would be highly suspect. But what if we did not have an
elegant theory like natural selection which purported to account for the complexity that we observe? Would
not the existence of a finely tuned, complex ecosystem then be highly suspect?

That is precisely the case we find ourselves in when it comes to the fundamental constants. To quote
Dawkins in what is a bit of an understatement: "we don't yet have an equivalent crane [i.e. mechanism] for
physics" (p. 158). In other words, given our current understanding of the laws of physics, there is no
objectively verified theory which explains the coincidence of the fundamental constants. If they were
determined by pure chance, then the probability that the universe would have been able to sustain life is
ridiculously small (Roger Penrose apparently estimated the probability to be 1 in 10^(10^123) ). I think it
is at this point that Dawkins' presuppositions become most apparent. For instance, as far as I'm aware
there is not a single piece of experimental evidence for a multiverse (see the recent review of
Susskind's book in Nature). In a preface to his treatment of multiverse theory in The Elegant Universe,
Brian Greene states that "No one knows if these ideas are right or wrong, and certainly they currently lie
on the outskirts of mainstream science" (p. 366). That is not surprising since the infinite universes
postulated by multiverse theory are usually tucked away in black holes or in other dimensions where we can't
observe them. In the face of no concrete evidence and overwhelmingly negative odds, Dawkins states that "We
should not give up hope of a better [mechanism] arising in physics" (p. 158). Perhaps we should not. But
again, my objection is not about whether some alternate theory of physics exists that will explain life. My
argument is that any belief that such a theory exists rests, as Dawkins says, on "hope" (p. 158), not on
evidence.

A fundamental postulate of the materialist (I use the word descriptively, not pejoratively) worldview
which Dawkins espouses is that: "everything in the universe can be feasibly explained by natural laws", a
statement to which I think Dawkins would readily assent. But is this assertion based on solely on empirical,
objective evidence? There is an easy way to find out. Can everything in the universe currently be explained
by natural laws, as we now understand them? In the case of physics, at least, the answer is a resounding
no. The immediate objection is that we would be able to explain these phenomena if we had the right theory.
But how do you know there is such a "right theory"? Such an assertion merely brings us back to the original
postulate. The assertion that "at some point in the future, we WILL have a theory of that explains
everything" is no more or less evidence-based than the assertion that "at some point in the future, we WILL
live on the moon". Both of these statements are plausible; they may even be true. But they certainly are
based, at root, on faith. That is, these statements form a set of axiomatic beliefs or presuppositions.
We do not derive them from evidence; rather, they are part of our worldview.

Let me be clear that I am not disparaging Dawkins' for having a worldview. I have one too. Everyone has
one. You can't do science or mathematics or anything unless you begin with a set of assumptions about the
nature of reality. These assumptions may appear very reasonable and almost unavoidable, but it is important
to recognize that they are assumptions, not conclusions. I also have deliberately avoided the question of
God's existence. I do happen to think that science gives us very clear reasons to question materialistic
assumptions and to believe in the God who has revealed himself in the Bible. Historical evidence regarding
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ gives us even more. I also think that Dawkins'
philosophical arguments against God's existence (for instance, his statement in Point 3 on page 158 that God
is improbable because he is complex) are simply wrong. But for the purposes of this essay, I have limited
myself to Dawkins' scientific arguments in order to show that they are not as clear-cut as he claims and
that scientific evidence does not necessarily lead us to materialism. Rather, we import materialism, or
deism, or theism into our reasoning about evidence.

To restate my central objection, I believe that Dawkins is failing to distinguish between his assumptions
and his conclusions. As a result, he is unable to see how much his worldview is coloring his interpretation
of the evidence. When it comes to physics (and as a consequence to biology), the evidence we face is a set
of fundamental constants which all conspire to permit the existence of life in a manner currently so
improbable that it defies description. What is it that makes Dawkins so confident that such a coincidence
has a natural explanation? What makes him sure that multiverse theory, or many worlds quantum theory, or a
grand unification theory which so far have no objective justification will explain the universe? What makes
him certain that, in the end, we will find a solution that does not involve a personal, omnipotent, creator?
Faith. A set of basic, presuppositional, axiomatic beliefs through which we evaluate the evidence. Dawkins, like all of us, possesses faith. As human beings, we cannot decide whether to have faith;
we can only decide what or whom to put our faith in.

If anyone reading this essay has questions about it or about
Christianity in general, feel free to e-mail me at Neil -AT- Shenvi.org
I also highly recommend the book The
Reason for God by Tim Keller.
It is a phenomenal book. Free sermons treating many of the topics covered by this book can be found here.