ANDERSON, J.: Anthony Leroy Mattison appeals his conviction for possession
of crack cocaine. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence where (1) his consent was coerced and involuntary; (2) the
search exceeded the scope of his consent; (3) the search was not based on reasonable
suspicion; and (4) the search exceeded any scope authorized by Terry v. Ohio.
[1] We affirm. [2]

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2000, Patrol Officer William Jones, with the City of
Anderson Police Department, stopped a car traveling in Anderson because the
car had no rear license plate. There were three people in the car. Mattison
was seated in the back of the car, while the driver and another passenger were
seated in the front.

When Officer Jones approached the vehicle, he observed the front seat passenger
“concealing something in his left hand and reaching between his legs.” A consensual
search of the front seat passenger revealed he possessed crack cocaine. He
was subsequently arrested.

Officer Jones noticed Mattison in the back seat of the car. Jones
opened his door and asked Mattison, “Do you have anything on you?” Mattison
replied, “No.”Jones then asked Mattison, “Do you mind if I check?”
Mattison responded, “Go ahead.” At Jones’ request, Mattison exited the vehicle
unassisted. Jones conducted a pat-down of Mattison. Officer Jones testified:

When I got around to the waistband area, [Mattison] kept,
in a nervous manner, reaching his hands back down, which led [to] more suspicion
that there might be something down there. He kept putting them down. I told
him several times, ‘Keep your hands on the hood or on the trunk.’ He complied.
He was very cooperative.

At that point, I checked the crotch area and I felt a hard
rock-like substance, which I immediately recognized to be crack cocaine.

Jones unbuttoned the front of Mattison’s pants and, while wearing
a glove, retrieved a plastic bag wrapped in yellow tissue paper located near
Mattison’s genitalia. The plastic bag contained approximately 6 grams of crack
cocaine.

At no time did Mattison verbally express a desire for the pat-down to cease.
Officer Jones stated that Mattison did not appear to be under the influence
of drugs or alcohol. Jones declared there was no question in his mind that
Mattison “gave voluntary consent” to the pat-down. Jones asserted he did not
have his gun drawn and used no coercion to solicit Mattison’s consent.

With the assistance of a police dog trained to detect illegal drugs, officers
found more crack cocaine under the driver’s seat. The driver of the car was
placed under arrest.

At the arrest scene, four police officers, including Officer Jones,
were present. In addition, Staff Chaplain Lloyd Robinson was riding in the
car with Officer Jones and was at the scene. Finally, Randall Human accompanied
one of the officers to the scene. There were four police cars at the arrest
location.

Mattison was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent
to distribute and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute within
proximity of a park.

At trial, Mattison moved to suppress evidence found from his frisk by the police
officer, claiming his consent was not given voluntarily. In denying Mattison’s
suppression motion, the trial court, considering the totality of the circumstances,
ruled Mattison freely and voluntarily consented to the search because he did
not think police would search his genital area for drugs. Additionally, the
court concluded that, after Mattison gave consent, he “stood by silently while
the search occurred[,] without objection.” At the close of evidence, Mattison
moved for a directed verdict “on the basis that the evidence that has been identified
as crack cocaine should have been excluded.” He further requested “that Officer
Jones and anybody else[’]s testimony that [Mattison] consented should be excluded
under all the arguments” he made at the previous motion to suppress hearing.
The court denied the motions.

A jury convicted Mattison of simple possession of crack cocaine but
found him not guilty of the charge of possession of crack cocaine with intent
to distribute within proximity of a park.

ISSUES

I.

Was Mattison’s consent coerced and involuntary?

II.

Did the pat-down search of Mattison exceed the scope of his consent?

III.

Was the pat-down search based on reasonable suspicion?

IV.

Did the pat-down search exceed any scope authorized by Terry v. Ohio?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State
v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 545 S.E.2d 827 (2001); State v. Missouri,
Op. No. 3563 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 12, 2002) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 37
at 50). This Court is bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E.2d
105 (2000). The appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its
own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether
the trial judge’s ruling is supported by any evidence. Wilson, 345 S.C.
at 6, 545 S.E.2d at 829.

The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial judge. State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 564 S.E.2d 87 (2002);
State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 551 S.E.2d 240 (2001). A court’s ruling
on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion or the commission of legal error which results in prejudice to
the defendant. State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 543 S.E.2d 586 (Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Mansfield, 343 S.C. 66, 538 S.E.2d 257 (Ct. App.
2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is based
on an error of law. State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 540 S.E.2d 464
(2000).

The “totality of the circumstances” test applies whether the consent was given
in a non-custodial or custodial situation. Wallace, 269 S.C. at 550,
238 S.E.2d at 676; Brannon, 347 S.C. at 90, 552 S.E.2d at 775. In a
custodial situation, the custodial setting is a factor to be considered in determining
whether consent was voluntarily given. Wallace, 269 S.C. at 552, 238
S.E.2d at 677; Brannon, 347 S.C. at 90, 552 S.E.2d at 775. Custody alone,
however, is not enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced consent to search.
Brannon, 347 S.C. at 90, 552 S.E.2d at 775; see alsoUnited
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (finding
involuntary consent was not shown where defendant was arrested and in custody,
but consent was given while on a public street and not in confines of a police
station, he was given his Miranda warnings, and he was advised the results
of the search of his car could be used against him); Wallace, 269 S.C.
at 552, 238 S.E.2d at 677 (holding that custody itself is not enough to invalidate
a consent search).

The issue of voluntary consent, when contested by contradicting testimony,
is an issue of credibility to be determined by the trial judge. State v.
Maybank, Op. No. 3566 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 12, 2002) (Shearouse Adv.
Sh. No. 37 at 90); Dorce, 320 S.C. at 482, 465 S.E.2d at 773. A trial
judge’s conclusions on issues of fact regarding voluntariness will not be disturbed
on appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to be an abuse of discretion. State
v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 391 S.E.2d 244 (1990) (dealing with voluntariness
of a statement); State v. Greene, 330 S.C. 551, 499 S.E.2d 817 (Ct. App.
1997).

There is no dispute that Mattison consented to Officer Jones’s request to search
him without imposing limits on the scope of the search. No evidence indicates
Mattison gave consent while incompetent. Moreover, the record reveals no overt
act, threat of force, or other form of coercion. Mattison claims the fact that
he was “surrounded” by a drug dog and four police officers with squad cars flashing
blue lights demonstrated a “show of force” that indicates coercion. This argument
lacks merit, as their presence was necessary at a crime scene. Thus, we cannot
say as a matter of law that this activity constituted coercion, because the
drug dog was instrumental in finding drugs in the car and the multiplicity of
suspects warranted the plethora of law enforcement officers.

Based on the evidence in the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s ruling that Mattison’s consent was voluntarily given.

II. Exceeding Scope
of Search

Mattison maintains that, if he did voluntarily consent to
a search, Officer Jones exceeded the permissible scope when he proceeded to
search Mattison’s groin area. We disagree.

Under our state constitution, suspects are free to limit the scope of the searches
to which they consent. State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d
837 (2001). “When relying on the consent of a suspect, a police officer’s search
must not exceed the scope of the consent granted or the search becomes unreasonable.”
Id. at 648, 541 S.E.2d at 843. Even in a situation where police have
received a general and unqualified consent, “‘the police do not have carte blanche
to do whatever they please.’” Id. at 648-49, 541 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 612 (3d ed. 1996).
The scope of the consent is measured by a test of “‘objective’ reasonableness—what
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between
the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251,
111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991).

Here, Mattison’s co-passenger had just been searched and arrested after the
police found crack cocaine. Immediately thereafter, in response to Officer
Jones’s question, “Do you have anything on you,” Mattison replied, “No.” Officer
Jones then asked, “Do you mind if I check?” Mattison responded, “Go ahead.”
Mattison imposed no limits on the scope of the search he granted in response
to Officer Jones’s request to search him. Mattison clearly consented to a search
of his body for drugs. We conclude a reasonable
person would have understood that consent to encompass a search of Mattison’s
groin area. SeeUnited States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (noting that genital area is a frequent hiding place for drugs).

The United States Supreme Court has described a typical pat-down search as
including a thorough search of the suspect’s “arms and armpits, waistline and
back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface
of the legs down to the feet.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 1877 n.13, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 903 n.13 (1968) (emphasis added). A
suspect’s “objectively reasonable” consent to a body search indicates consent
to a “traditional frisk search,” including a “sweeping motion” over the outer
garments of the crotch area. SeeUnited States v. Ashley, 37
F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Mattison’s generalized consent authorized the kind
of “traditional frisk search” undertaken here. Furthermore, once Officer Jones
identified the presence of the crack cocaine, he was allowed to remove it.
SeeUnited States v. Mattarolo, 209 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Withdrawal
of Consent

Mattison asserts he withdrew consent when he attempted to lower his
hands as the officer searched his groin area. However, Mattison verbally gave
unequivocal consent and never stated that he withdrew his consent to the search.

Conduct falling short of “an unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal” is
not sufficiently indicative of an intent to withdraw consent. United States
v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1991). Effective withdrawal of a consent
to search requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of either an act, statement
or some combination of the two, that is inconsistent with consent previously
given. Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741 (D.C. 1994). We find Mattison’s
act of lowering his hands falls far short of an unequivocal act or statement
of withdrawal, something found in most withdrawal of consent cases. SeeUnited States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating
defendant exclaimed, “The search is over. I am calling off the search.”); United
States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding a withdrawal
of implied consent to airport search where prospective airline passenger balked
at search of luggage, saying, “No, it’s personal.”); United States v. Bily,
406 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that defendant’s statement, “That’s
enough. I want you to stop,” was a withdrawal of consent); United States
v. Ibarra, 731 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Wyo. 1990) (noting motorist’s act of closing
and locking trunk of his car after a police officer’s consensual warrantless
search of trunk constituted withdrawal of that consent and barred further search);
Cooper v. State, 480 So. 2d 8 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (ruling that although
first search of airplane was pursuant to voluntarily and freely given consent
of defendant, his act of locking plane after he taxied plane to hanger area
and before being driven by police to nearby motel, effectively revoked defendant’s
consent to any future searches); State v. French, 279 N.W.2d 116, 119-20
(Neb. 1979) (“[D]efendant’s unequivocal ‘no’ could only be reasonably interpreted
as revoking whatever consent might have previously been given, if any.”). Instead,
Mattison’s hand movement more closely resembles conduct within the ambit of
United States v. Brown, 884 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1989), where a defendant
who consented to a search of his suitcase, but later became extremely reluctant
to relinquish his suitcase keys, was held not to have withdrawn his consent.

IV. Reasonable Suspicion

Mattison alleges the officer’s search was not based on reasonable suspicion
as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968). We do not reach this issue because we previously found Mattison
voluntarily consented to a search of his person.

V. Exceeding Scope
Under Terry

Mattison argues the officer’s search exceeded the scope permissible under Terry.We do not reach this issue because we previously found Mattison
voluntarily consented to a search of his person.