A senior private sector economist (who needs to remain anonymous for career reasons) examines ten widely believed facts about the economic impact of Brexit and finds all of them wide of the mark. In some cases they are hugely wrong

"The UK government is still apparently undecided about what kind of Brexit ‘end-state’ to pursue, a state of paralysis that in our view has much to do with the nature of ‘official’ opinion on some of the key economic questions posed by Brexit. We believe much of the analysis behind official opinion on the economics of Brexit is flawed, often based on incorrect methodology or cherry-picked evidence. ‘Official’ estimates of key Brexit ‘costs’ are greatly exaggerated, in many cases by a factor of 5-10 compared to plausible numbers.

Proposition 1: the UK economy is hugely dependent on trade with the EU

Exports to the EU are about 43% of total UK exports, but this represents less than 10% of UK value-added. Around nine-tenths of UK GDP is not generated by exports to the EU.[1] The UK economy grew faster before we joined the EEC/EU. Even if one uses the USA as a benchmark, to control for changing global conditions, there is no indication that economic growth in the UK has improved through membership of the EU.

The Treasury claims that EU membership has increased UK exports the EU by 80%. This estimate looks greatly exaggerated, by a factor of 4-5. The Treasury estimates are not consistent with historic UK trade data, and use a flawed application of ‘gravity model’ methodology based on an ‘EU effect’ averaged across all EU members: If the numbers are re-run for the UK alone, Gudgin, Coutts & Gibson (2016) show the increase in UK trade from EU membership at a much lower 23%. An unpublished Treasury paper from 2003 shows EU membership raised UK exports to the EU by just 7%. Studies by Walsh (2008) and Dettmer (2014) struggle to find any statistically significant evidence of a positive effect of EU membership on services trade.

Proposition 3: Outside the EU, UK exporters will face big barriers to trade with the EU

EU tariff barriers outside agriculture average just 3%. If UK-EU trade moved to a ‘WTO basis’ around 35-40% of UK exports would face zero tariffs including important sectors such as pharmaceuticals, oil and civil aircraft. Only about 15% of UK exports would face a tariff of 10% or more[2].

Official sources emphasise non-tariff barriers (NTBs) but greatly exaggerate them. They are often claimed to be in the range of 20-25% of trade values but detailed work by Kee & Nicita (2017) estimate that the average tariff equivalent of NTBS facing UK exporters to the EU, weighted by imports, would be just 3.4%. A detailed study of post-Brexit NTBs for several sectors in the Netherlands found they might total around 1% of trade values.

Proposition 4: UK exports will collapse in a ‘WTO Brexit’

The Treasury claims UK exports to the EU would fall by 43% and total exports by 24% in a ‘WTO’ Brexit. Estimates based on more realistic assumptions are far lower. Kee & Nicita estimated that the imposition of WTO tariffs would cut UK exports to the EU by only 2%. Even doubling or tripling this for the impact of NTBs would leave the estimated fall in UK exports to the EU at between one-tenth and one-seventh of the Treasury estimate.

Proposition 5: long-term economic losses from leaving the EU single market and customs union will be very large

The Treasury’s 2016 document and the more recent ‘cross-Whitehall briefing’ claimed UK GDP would fall by 8% in the long-run in the event of the UK leaving the EU and reverting to ‘WTO rules’. This estimate is probably 3-8 times too high.

Paul Krugman has recently shown that economic welfare losses from declining trade can be surprisingly modest. Even if we assume a rise in UK-EU trade barriers of 25% and a 50% drop in UK-EU trade, standard welfare economics gives a welfare loss for the UK of less than 1% of GDP. Meanwhile, Ciuriak et al. (2017) used the same modelling approach as the ‘cross-Whitehall briefing’, and found that even in the most severe ‘WTO rules’ scenario, UK GDP only fell 2.5% in the long run – less than a third of the Treasury results. The LSE’s Centre for Economic Policy agree that tariff and non-tariff barriers on a WTO basis would have a small impact[3]. The reason for the difference is that the Treasury and others add on a series of highly negative assumptions (with weak evidential bases) to trade effects: - No trade reorientation, - sharp declines in productivity or FDI - and even subtracting hypothetical future gains from future EU integration.

Proposition 6: Outside the customs union, customs processes will be expensive and time consuming

In June, HMRC claimed the cost of running standard customs processes for UK-EU trade could total £20 billion – around 1% of UK GDP or 6% of the value of UK exports to the EU. These figures are likely to be over-estimated by a factor of at least six and possibly 20 times. They double count EU and UK costs, use inflated estimates of rules of origin costs, confuse estimates of costs of customs declarations per container with cost per consignment and assume no behavioural change by businesses.

International evidence from Switzerland and the Netherlands suggests costs of customs processes in the range of 0.1-1% of GDP and evidence from UK firms importing from outside the EU suggests costs as low as 0.04% of the value of trade[4].

Claims that long customs delays will occur after Brexit also look exaggerated. EU states check as few as 1% of consignments arriving from outside the EU. There is not lots of testing of whether products conform to EU standards at the border. Most manufacturers outside the EU can self-certify their goods as EU-compliant, most checks happen beyond the border.

It is argued that components criss-cross boundaries in modern UK-EU supply chains. This is correct. However, this phenomenon is not unique to the EU, or to customs unions. A good example of this is the NAFTA trade agreement that covers the US, Canada and Mexico. This is not a customs union and has border controls. Yet, as the FT noted recently, the NAFTA pact has spawned ‘integrated supply chains’ in which ‘components cross the world’s busiest border multiple times as they are transformed into finished goods’, especially in the auto industry.

This plus the evidence above on customs checks makes recent suggestions that the UK should continue to align fully with EU product standards to reduce border checks appear redundant – any ‘reduction’ will be minimal.

Rules of origin (ROO) costs relate to the administrative costs of proving products originate in the UK rather than in other countries and feature in free trade agreements. The IoD and HMRC claim they are high but their claims are exaggerated. A WTO study for firms in North America and the EU suggests rules of origin costs are likely to be less than 1% of trade values. Based on this, the HMRC estimate that ROO for the UK in a free trade deal with the EU would be up to £7bn is likely to be at least four times too high.

European Commission estimates for the impact on the UK of the proposed EU-US TTIP deal suggested UK exports to the US could rise by about 20%. Since the EU-Korea FTA came into force in 2011, UK exports to Korea have almost tripled[5].

Proposition 10: The UK financial services sector is heavily reliant on ‘passporting’ for its revenues

In fact, the evidence suggests ‘passporting’ is of rather limited importance for UK financial institutions. A report for Briefings for Brexit showed that measured trade barriers in services between the UK and EU had changed little since the early 2000s, despite the various EU directives that created passporting.

This should not be surprising because the great bulk of UK financial services output is wholesale and not much affected by EU membership. It is telling that announced job relocations by the UK financial sector so far have been a tiny fraction of the early lurid claims of mass movements."

Wonderful news for Britain in the FT AFLI: ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ May prepares to face down Eurosceptic ministers Prime minister seeking to force through ‘soft Brexit’ strategy at Chequers showdown By George Parker, Political Editor

FT, 6 July, 2018

Theresa May will on Friday attempt to face down opposition from six Eurosceptic cabinet ministers as she tries to force through a new “soft Brexit” strategy at a day of decisive talks at Chequers, her country retreat.

Boris Johnson on Thursday convened a meeting of pro-Brexit ministers at the Foreign Office to plan a counter-attack, after Mrs May circulated plans to keep Britain closely aligned to the EU’s single market on goods and customs union.

The Brexiters believe Mrs May’s plan would betray the spirit of the Brexit vote, with Jacob Rees-Mogg, the leading pro-Brexit Tory MP, claiming the prime minister’s plan could leave the country as “a vassal state in chains”.

The marathon Chequers meeting, starting at 9.30am and scheduled to conclude by 10.30pm, will see the Tory party’s longstanding splits on Europe come to a head, with some of Mrs May’s allies predicting that some Eurosceptic ministers may quit.

“If Boris quits, so what?” said one minister close to Mrs May, after the foreign secretary convened the caucus of pro-Brexit ministers on Friday. Other supporters of Mrs May said she was ready to take on the Eurosceptics in her party, if they did not accept her new Brexit plan.

The prime minister will tell ministers — 22 full cabinet ministers and six other ministers who have the right to attend cabinet — that they have “a great opportunity and a duty” to adopt a new Brexit strategy, aimed at breaking the deadlock in talks in Brussels.

“I think we will end up with a concrete position that everyone is prepared to sign up to,” David Lidington, cabinet office minister, told BBC’s Today programme.

According to news website Politico, mobile phones will be confiscated on arrival and ministers have been told that no overnight accommodation will be provided. “If we haven’t got an agreement by 10pm, we probably won’t reach an agreement,” said one minister attending the meeting.

Mrs May’s team is braced for possible resignations and ministers have been warned they will not be able to use their official cars to make the 40-mile journey back to London if they quit. “Taxi cards for Aston’s taxis, the local cab firm, are in the foyer,” said one Downing Street insider.

Mrs May said: “This is about agreeing an approach that delivers decisively on the verdict of the British people — an approach in the best interests of the UK and the EU, and crucially, one that commands the support of the public and parliament”.

Mr Johnson was joined at the Foreign Office on Thursday by Michael Gove, environment secretary, David Davis, Brexit secretary, Andrea Leadsom, leader of the Commons, Penny Mordaunt, international development secretary, and Esther McVey, welfare secretary.

They are expected to oppose Mrs May’s plan to keep Britain in lock-step with the EU on the regulation of goods and agriculture, favouring a much looser agreement similar to a Canada-style free trade agreement.

But Mrs May argues that the plan is needed to ensure frictionless trade and to avoid a hard border in Ireland, arguing that the Conservative party cannot take any action which could lead to a break-up of the UK.

She will be backed by Greg Clark, business secretary, who is expected to give a bleak assessment of the impact on British manufacturers of a hard Brexit. His allies said that Mr Clark would “not pull his punches”.

Chancellor Philip Hammond will warn that the economic shock of a hard Brexit would hit the public finances, just at a time when ministers gathered at Chequers are hoping to win more money from the Treasury to fund new spending commitments.

Liam Fox, trade secretary, is expected to back Mrs May after winning assurances in private discussions with the prime minister that her proposed Brexit deal would not hinder his ability to strike free trade deals.

The majority of those ministers gathered at Chequers backed Remain in the 2016 referendum and Mrs May can expect to command a comfortable majority at the meeting: her dilemma is whether she has the political strength to take on the Eurosceptics.

“They are backed into a corner — nobody knows quite what they are going to do,” said one official close to a pro-Remain minister. Pro-Brexit Tories have warned Mrs May they could trigger a leadership challenge if she sells them out on Brexit.

Under Mrs May’s plan, Britain would have a “common rule book” with the EU on goods and agriculture, restricting its ability to weaken regulations — for example on farm products — to strike trade deals with countries like the US.

The European Court of Justice would have a role in overseeing this new common regulatory framework, although the EU will argue that Britain must also embrace free movement and make budget contributions if it is to enjoy full single market benefits.

Services would be covered by a looser framework, with Mrs May accepting that sectors including financial services would enjoy less access to the EU single market in exchange for more regulatory freedom.

A new “facilitated customs arrangement” would see Britain remain part of the EU’s customs territory, while retaining the ability to vary its tariffs and strike trade deals.

Wonderful news for Britain in the FT AFLI: ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ May prepares to face down Eurosceptic ministers Prime minister seeking to force through ‘soft Brexit’ strategy at Chequers showdown By George Parker, Political Editor

FT, 6 July, 2018

Theresa May will on Friday attempt to face down opposition from six Eurosceptic cabinet ministers as she tries to force through a new “soft Brexit” strategy at a day of decisive talks at Chequers, her country retreat.

Boris Johnson on Thursday convened a meeting of pro-Brexit ministers at the Foreign Office to plan a counter-attack, after Mrs May circulated plans to keep Britain closely aligned to the EU’s single market on goods and customs union.

The Brexiters believe Mrs May’s plan would betray the spirit of the Brexit vote, with Jacob Rees-Mogg, the leading pro-Brexit Tory MP, claiming the prime minister’s plan could leave the country as “a vassal state in chains”.

The marathon Chequers meeting, starting at 9.30am and scheduled to conclude by 10.30pm, will see the Tory party’s longstanding splits on Europe come to a head, with some of Mrs May’s allies predicting that some Eurosceptic ministers may quit.

“If Boris quits, so what?” said one minister close to Mrs May, after the foreign secretary convened the caucus of pro-Brexit ministers on Friday. Other supporters of Mrs May said she was ready to take on the Eurosceptics in her party, if they did not accept her new Brexit plan.

The prime minister will tell ministers — 22 full cabinet ministers and six other ministers who have the right to attend cabinet — that they have “a great opportunity and a duty” to adopt a new Brexit strategy, aimed at breaking the deadlock in talks in Brussels.

“I think we will end up with a concrete position that everyone is prepared to sign up to,” David Lidington, cabinet office minister, told BBC’s Today programme.

According to news website Politico, mobile phones will be confiscated on arrival and ministers have been told that no overnight accommodation will be provided. “If we haven’t got an agreement by 10pm, we probably won’t reach an agreement,” said one minister attending the meeting.

Mrs May’s team is braced for possible resignations and ministers have been warned they will not be able to use their official cars to make the 40-mile journey back to London if they quit. “Taxi cards for Aston’s taxis, the local cab firm, are in the foyer,” said one Downing Street insider.

Mrs May said: “This is about agreeing an approach that delivers decisively on the verdict of the British people — an approach in the best interests of the UK and the EU, and crucially, one that commands the support of the public and parliament”.

Mr Johnson was joined at the Foreign Office on Thursday by Michael Gove, environment secretary, David Davis, Brexit secretary, Andrea Leadsom, leader of the Commons, Penny Mordaunt, international development secretary, and Esther McVey, welfare secretary.

They are expected to oppose Mrs May’s plan to keep Britain in lock-step with the EU on the regulation of goods and agriculture, favouring a much looser agreement similar to a Canada-style free trade agreement.

But Mrs May argues that the plan is needed to ensure frictionless trade and to avoid a hard border in Ireland, arguing that the Conservative party cannot take any action which could lead to a break-up of the UK.

She will be backed by Greg Clark, business secretary, who is expected to give a bleak assessment of the impact on British manufacturers of a hard Brexit. His allies said that Mr Clark would “not pull his punches”.

Chancellor Philip Hammond will warn that the economic shock of a hard Brexit would hit the public finances, just at a time when ministers gathered at Chequers are hoping to win more money from the Treasury to fund new spending commitments.

Liam Fox, trade secretary, is expected to back Mrs May after winning assurances in private discussions with the prime minister that her proposed Brexit deal would not hinder his ability to strike free trade deals.

The majority of those ministers gathered at Chequers backed Remain in the 2016 referendum and Mrs May can expect to command a comfortable majority at the meeting: her dilemma is whether she has the political strength to take on the Eurosceptics.

“They are backed into a corner — nobody knows quite what they are going to do,” said one official close to a pro-Remain minister. Pro-Brexit Tories have warned Mrs May they could trigger a leadership challenge if she sells them out on Brexit.

Under Mrs May’s plan, Britain would have a “common rule book” with the EU on goods and agriculture, restricting its ability to weaken regulations — for example on farm products — to strike trade deals with countries like the US.

The European Court of Justice would have a role in overseeing this new common regulatory framework, although the EU will argue that Britain must also embrace free movement and make budget contributions if it is to enjoy full single market benefits.

Services would be covered by a looser framework, with Mrs May accepting that sectors including financial services would enjoy less access to the EU single market in exchange for more regulatory freedom.

A new “facilitated customs arrangement” would see Britain remain part of the EU’s customs territory, while retaining the ability to vary its tariffs and strike trade deals.

A senior private sector economist (who needs to remain anonymous for career reasons) examines ten widely believed facts about the economic impact of Brexit and finds all of them wide of the mark. In some cases they are hugely wrong

"The UK government is still apparently undecided about what kind of Brexit ‘end-state’ to pursue, a state of paralysis that in our view has much to do with the nature of ‘official’ opinion on some of the key economic questions posed by Brexit. We believe much of the analysis behind official opinion on the economics of Brexit is flawed, often based on incorrect methodology or cherry-picked evidence. ‘Official’ estimates of key Brexit ‘costs’ are greatly exaggerated, in many cases by a factor of 5-10 compared to plausible numbers.

Proposition 1: the UK economy is hugely dependent on trade with the EU

Exports to the EU are about 43% of total UK exports, but this represents less than 10% of UK value-added. Around nine-tenths of UK GDP is not generated by exports to the EU.[1] The UK economy grew faster before we joined the EEC/EU. Even if one uses the USA as a benchmark, to control for changing global conditions, there is no indication that economic growth in the UK has improved through membership of the EU.

The Treasury claims that EU membership has increased UK exports the EU by 80%. This estimate looks greatly exaggerated, by a factor of 4-5. The Treasury estimates are not consistent with historic UK trade data, and use a flawed application of ‘gravity model’ methodology based on an ‘EU effect’ averaged across all EU members: If the numbers are re-run for the UK alone, Gudgin, Coutts & Gibson (2016) show the increase in UK trade from EU membership at a much lower 23%. An unpublished Treasury paper from 2003 shows EU membership raised UK exports to the EU by just 7%. Studies by Walsh (2008) and Dettmer (2014) struggle to find any statistically significant evidence of a positive effect of EU membership on services trade.

Proposition 3: Outside the EU, UK exporters will face big barriers to trade with the EU

EU tariff barriers outside agriculture average just 3%. If UK-EU trade moved to a ‘WTO basis’ around 35-40% of UK exports would face zero tariffs including important sectors such as pharmaceuticals, oil and civil aircraft. Only about 15% of UK exports would face a tariff of 10% or more[2].

Official sources emphasise non-tariff barriers (NTBs) but greatly exaggerate them. They are often claimed to be in the range of 20-25% of trade values but detailed work by Kee & Nicita (2017) estimate that the average tariff equivalent of NTBS facing UK exporters to the EU, weighted by imports, would be just 3.4%. A detailed study of post-Brexit NTBs for several sectors in the Netherlands found they might total around 1% of trade values.

Proposition 4: UK exports will collapse in a ‘WTO Brexit’

The Treasury claims UK exports to the EU would fall by 43% and total exports by 24% in a ‘WTO’ Brexit. Estimates based on more realistic assumptions are far lower. Kee & Nicita estimated that the imposition of WTO tariffs would cut UK exports to the EU by only 2%. Even doubling or tripling this for the impact of NTBs would leave the estimated fall in UK exports to the EU at between one-tenth and one-seventh of the Treasury estimate.

Proposition 5: long-term economic losses from leaving the EU single market and customs union will be very large

The Treasury’s 2016 document and the more recent ‘cross-Whitehall briefing’ claimed UK GDP would fall by 8% in the long-run in the event of the UK leaving the EU and reverting to ‘WTO rules’. This estimate is probably 3-8 times too high.

Paul Krugman has recently shown that economic welfare losses from declining trade can be surprisingly modest. Even if we assume a rise in UK-EU trade barriers of 25% and a 50% drop in UK-EU trade, standard welfare economics gives a welfare loss for the UK of less than 1% of GDP. Meanwhile, Ciuriak et al. (2017) used the same modelling approach as the ‘cross-Whitehall briefing’, and found that even in the most severe ‘WTO rules’ scenario, UK GDP only fell 2.5% in the long run – less than a third of the Treasury results. The LSE’s Centre for Economic Policy agree that tariff and non-tariff barriers on a WTO basis would have a small impact[3]. The reason for the difference is that the Treasury and others add on a series of highly negative assumptions (with weak evidential bases) to trade effects: - No trade reorientation, - sharp declines in productivity or FDI - and even subtracting hypothetical future gains from future EU integration.

Proposition 6: Outside the customs union, customs processes will be expensive and time consuming

In June, HMRC claimed the cost of running standard customs processes for UK-EU trade could total £20 billion – around 1% of UK GDP or 6% of the value of UK exports to the EU. These figures are likely to be over-estimated by a factor of at least six and possibly 20 times. They double count EU and UK costs, use inflated estimates of rules of origin costs, confuse estimates of costs of customs declarations per container with cost per consignment and assume no behavioural change by businesses.

International evidence from Switzerland and the Netherlands suggests costs of customs processes in the range of 0.1-1% of GDP and evidence from UK firms importing from outside the EU suggests costs as low as 0.04% of the value of trade[4].

Claims that long customs delays will occur after Brexit also look exaggerated. EU states check as few as 1% of consignments arriving from outside the EU. There is not lots of testing of whether products conform to EU standards at the border. Most manufacturers outside the EU can self-certify their goods as EU-compliant, most checks happen beyond the border.

It is argued that components criss-cross boundaries in modern UK-EU supply chains. This is correct. However, this phenomenon is not unique to the EU, or to customs unions. A good example of this is the NAFTA trade agreement that covers the US, Canada and Mexico. This is not a customs union and has border controls. Yet, as the FT noted recently, the NAFTA pact has spawned ‘integrated supply chains’ in which ‘components cross the world’s busiest border multiple times as they are transformed into finished goods’, especially in the auto industry.

This plus the evidence above on customs checks makes recent suggestions that the UK should continue to align fully with EU product standards to reduce border checks appear redundant – any ‘reduction’ will be minimal.

Rules of origin (ROO) costs relate to the administrative costs of proving products originate in the UK rather than in other countries and feature in free trade agreements. The IoD and HMRC claim they are high but their claims are exaggerated. A WTO study for firms in North America and the EU suggests rules of origin costs are likely to be less than 1% of trade values. Based on this, the HMRC estimate that ROO for the UK in a free trade deal with the EU would be up to £7bn is likely to be at least four times too high.

European Commission estimates for the impact on the UK of the proposed EU-US TTIP deal suggested UK exports to the US could rise by about 20%. Since the EU-Korea FTA came into force in 2011, UK exports to Korea have almost tripled[5].

Proposition 10: The UK financial services sector is heavily reliant on ‘passporting’ for its revenues

In fact, the evidence suggests ‘passporting’ is of rather limited importance for UK financial institutions. A report for Briefings for Brexit showed that measured trade barriers in services between the UK and EU had changed little since the early 2000s, despite the various EU directives that created passporting.

This should not be surprising because the great bulk of UK financial services output is wholesale and not much affected by EU membership. It is telling that announced job relocations by the UK financial sector so far have been a tiny fraction of the early lurid claims of mass movements."

Hopefully whoever this 'anonymous economist' is will be right. It smacks a bit of the work by Dr Graham Gudgin, certainly the underlying principle that all official (and a lot of unofficial) estimates are wrong by a factor of at least 10. That premise has been widely criticised in the profession apparently for being misleading and based on unrealistic assumptions (like unrestricted, completely frictionless and free global trade from day 1).

Much of the arguments here seem to be based on examples of current agreements in place, e.g the NAFTA trade agreement that covers the US, Canada and Mexico is sited as one example. That was an idea put forward by Reagan 1979, but it took 9 years for American and Canada to agree and sign the first version. And then another 4 years before the final version involving Mexico was passed through senate.

So 13 years, for 1 agreement. I'd therefore like to see anyone arguing an case based on examples of current agreements being honest with the likely timescales involved. And what happens while we're waiting for these agreements to be set up?

It will be an interesting showdown today at chequers. Might be tasting brextreemist tears tonight

Maybe. Although today could be meaningless as they've still got to get this latest set of proposals through the EU, but they include things the EU have already said no to. So expect a lot of tantrums when they say no again.

Maybe. Although today could be meaningless as they've still got to get this latest set of proposals through the EU, but they include things the EU have already said no to. So expect a lot of tantrums when they say no again.

It has been fairly obvious from the start that the EU are going to say no to everything, regardless of what it is. Which makes these ’negotiations’ obsolete and a complete and total waste of time.

This is why we seriously need to consider walking away without a deal. They’d soon start saying yes to things if they were about to lose the £50 billion plus we are going to give them.

The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which.

Highjack, the problem is that the remoaners are happy for the EU to turn down ALL of our proposals just so Brexit is dealt a blow regardless of how fair they are. Like you say the only way is saying to them OK if that’s not enough we will have to settle for a no deal and like you say they will soon change their tune they have far more to lose than us.How can you negotiate with someone if they think you will accept anything like the remoaners seem intent on doing.

It has been fairly obvious from the start that the EU are going to say no to everything, regardless of what it is. Which makes these ’negotiations’ obsolete and a complete and total waste of time.

This is why we seriously need to consider walking away without a deal. They’d soon start saying yes to things if they were about to lose the £50 billion plus we are going to give them.

Mein Gott, what a load of bollocks.

For some reason the curious mix of unequivocal assurances and condescending smugness accompanying the numerous assertions that German carmakers would force Merkel to cave in to Britain's free trade demands seem to have completely slipped you mind.

Have Mrs Merkel's cake and eat it too ring a bell? No? That's because all these Brexiter assurances are about as grounded in reality as the Emperor's new clothes.

Highjack, the problem is that the remoaners are happy for the EU to turn down ALL of our proposals just so Brexit is dealt a blow regardless of how fair they are. Like you say the only way is saying to them OK if that’s not enough we will have to settle for a no deal and like you say they will soon change their tune they have far more to lose than us.How can you negotiate with someone if they think you will accept anything like the remoaners seem intent on doing.

It is my belief that the great and the good and maybe the not so good too will unite an make sure the UK doesn't commit the act of collective suicide that is a hard Brexit.

Yes, it will be a minor humiliation for the country, but nothing remotely comparable to the national disaster that would befall this country if Britain crashes out. Even the spineless Teresa May realises that now.

Do you think president Trump should speak about Brexit when he’s in the UK soon.

Trump can say what he wants when it comes to Brexit and Britain’s future relationship with the US. Why would I or anyone oppose that? I reserve the right to question what he says. He’s America first, so whilst on the face of it, he will sell a deal to us as easy and mutually beneficial, but that might not be the case in practice.

For some reason the curious mix of unequivocal assurances and condescending smugness accompanying the numerous assertions that German carmakers would force Merkel to cave in to Britain's free trade demands seem to have completely slipped you mind.

Have Mrs Merkel's cake and eat it too ring a bell? No? That's because all these Brexiter assurances are about as grounded in reality as the Emperor's new clothes.

They’ve blamed the EU for everything that is wrong with Britain. No surprise that they’re crying like babies that it’s the EU’s fault that Britain will be getting a bad deal and worse off as a result. They really are pathetic deluded romantics.

They’ve blamed the EU for everything that is wrong with Britain. No surprise that they’re crying like babies that it’s the EU’s fault that Britain will be getting a bad deal and worse off as a result. They really are pathetic deluded romantics.

It’s not the Eu’s fault if we get a bad deal. it will be partly Theresa May and her shambolic team and mainly the remainers who have done everything on their power, from the off, to make it impossible to get a good deal.

They’ve blamed the EU for everything that is wrong with Britain. No surprise that they’re crying like babies that it’s the EU’s fault that Britain will be getting a bad deal and worse off as a result. They really are pathetic deluded romantics.

The only problem is May and the other remoaners. Walk away and watch the eu come running