Appearance and Sense: Phenomenology as the Fundamental by Gustav Shpet

Despite, or even greater by means of advantage of, its very brevity, visual appeal and feel is a tricky textual content to learn and comprehend, quite if we make the test independently of Husserl's rules I. this is often definitely a minimum of partly as a result of the rationale in the back of Shpet's paintings. at the one hand it strives to provide Husserl' s most up-to-date perspectives to a Russian philosophical viewers now not but conversant with and, probably, no longer even conscious of, his transcendental idealist flip. With this target any analyzing may perforce be exacting. but, nonetheless, Shpet has made scant concession to his public. certainly, his textual content is much more compressed, particularly within the an important parts facing the sense-bestowing function of realization, than Husserl' s personal. For all that, Shpet has now not bequeathed to us easily an abbreviated paraphrase nor a selective observation on rules I, even supposing at many issues it's only that. quite, the textual content more often than not is a severe engagement with Husserl' s suggestion, the place Shpet between different issues refonnulates or not less than provides Husserl's phenomenology from the viewpoint of hoping to light up a standard philosophical challenge in an intensive demeanour. considering that Husserl's textual content was once released merely in 1913 and Shpet's seemed someday in the course of 1914, the latter should have been conceived, idea via, and written in amazing haste. certainly, Shpet had already complete a primary draft and used to be busy with a revision of it via the top of 1913.

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Extra info for Appearance and Sense: Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its Problems

Example text

Precisely for this reason the "theory of knowledge," if it is identified with theoretical philosophy in general, leads inevitably either to a subjectivistic metaphysics or to a direct rejection of philosophy, taking the latter as the cognition of what actually is. "2 We must recognize a very important factor in the history of philosophy, 9 10 Appearance and Sense which at least in part explains the widespread sway of negativism in contemporary philosophical thought. The fact is that positive philosophy, both in its solutions as well as in the formulations of its problems and tasks, often manifested itself, if not erroneously, then in any case at least incompletely.

Any statement about the given is subject to analysis with the aim in fact being to isolate the given, and furthermore, in fact, to isolate the originarily given. All existing and real things, whatever be their forms of being, represent a variety of the subjects mentioned. Our theoretical (in the broadest sense) orientation is directed to them, as a problem whose first question concerns the originarily given in direct presentive intuition. Through "perception" we obtain what is intuitiona1ly really given as individual and factual.

The difference between intuitions, clearly given and to which our "mental regard" is directed, and their surrounding background is that they can be considered two different modifications of consciousness: the actional and the non-actional, or potential; explicit consciousness and implicit consciousness. On the whole, a stream of mental processes can never simply consist of pure actionalities. One mode of consciousness always turns into another. The cogito, taken as an act, an act of consciousness, turns into a potential consciousness and vice versa.