Hence, the impact of globalisation on voter behaviour – and what type of market economy citizens want instituted (type of capitalism) – is far more complex than a simple preference for “left wing” and/or “right wing” public policies.

These intersections go some way to explaining the rise of the nationalist right.

Attitudes toward the welfare state

This becomes even more complex when we split the socio-economic variable (more/less tax) into two dimensions (type of tax, and type of expenditure).

Different socio-economic groups (the four quadrants earlier) want the government to spend their taxes (public expenditure) on very different things.

Social protection (social welfare state)

Social investment (social investment state)

Higher income voters, paying higher taxes, regardless of their preference toward taxation, generally want government to prioritise social investment, not welfare.

These different attitudes toward the “welfare state” increasingly overlap with attitudes toward immigration, leading to “welfare chauvinism”. Think Brexit.

Low-to-middle income working class voters, with relatively conservative-nationalist attitudes, and who are more threatened by liberalisation of trade/immigration, also tend to have increasingly negative attitudes toward the welfare state.

Note that the volume effect of jobs/voters will always be in the bottom two quadrants. No political party can form a government by only targeting one group.

In terms of tax/spend policies (fiscal policies, which are central to the social contract governing the relationship between citizens and state), the supply/demand of politics would suggest the following coalitional possibilities:

In Western Europe, research suggests that Left parties have lost political support among the traditional working class (bottom left quadrant), but have expanded their support among the professional middle class (top left quadrant).

This is often described as the “middle-class shift” in comparative politics.

Ireland

Ireland is qualitatively distinct from the rest of Western Europe in that it has not witnessed the rise of a populist authoritarian right-party.

This is partially explained by the fact that on the “supply” side of politics, it’s a left-nationalist party (SF) mobilises voters in the bottom right/left quadrants.

Ireland is also qualitatively distinct in that it never had a clear left/right divide within parliament (again, this is on the “supply” side of politics).

Ireland’s welfare state was constructed by a popular centre-right nationalist party (FF), and not a Christian Democratic, or Social Democratic party.

Conclusion

Why does this matter? For scholars of power resource theory, in particular Esping-Andersen (Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism), the electoral foundations of working-class power were crucial to the longevity of the welfare state. This has been transformed by social change.

But despite the decline in what was traditionally called the “working class vote”, the welfare state remains in place, and it remains stable. Next week we will discuss why this is the case, with reference to the path dependent and historical effect of institutions.

The decline in working-class support for left parties has been replaced by a pro-welfare move by right-wing parties, but also partly from a leftward move among middle class voters.

The result is shifting welfare state coalitions that look quite different from those of the past.