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ICSA E-Newsletter

Vol. 4, No. 3

September 2005

Academic Disputes and Dialogue
Collection: Preface

Michael D.
Langone, Ph.D.

Abstract

This paper briefly reviews the history of
academic disputes and attempts at dialogue
in the cultic studies field. The paper also
serves as an introduction to a
collection of
articles on this subject on the Web site of
International Cultic Studies Association:
www.culticstudies.org.

Over the years ICSA has
published a number of articles addressing
academic disputes and dialogue regarding cults
[1] and brainwashing (frequently called
“thought reform,” “coercive persuasion,” or
“mind control”). In order to illuminate the
history of these disputes and the issues they
have addressed, we have put together an online
collection, “Academic Disputes and Dialogue.”

The disputes became
conspicuous in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
when the Jonestown tragedy of 1978 made cults
front-page news and when parents of some
cult-involved youth were resorting to
“deprogramming” their children in order to
persuade them to leave the controversial
groups. Some parents were also lobbying
legislators to pass conservatorship legislation
that would facilitate parents’ attempts to get
their children out of cultic groups. Some
academicians, mostly sociologists and religious
scholars, were highly critical of these
activists, while some professionals and
academicians, mostly psychologists and
psychiatrists, were sympathetic to the parents
to varying degrees. This paper focuses on the
disputes and dialogue among academicians and
professionals. However, it should be noted that
lay activists have played important roles in
various disputes.

The academic disputants
were often referred to as “pro-cultists” and
“anti-cultists.” However, I prefer the terms
“cult critics” and “cult sympathizers” in order
to indicate that the disagreement is more a
question of how much critical emphasis a scholar
or professional deems appropriate, rather than
whether or not he or she is “for” or “against”
“cults.” Whatever terms one prefers, it is
clear that by the early 1980s there were indeed
two “camps” within the cultic studies field.

Two early and influential
books expressing the sympathizers’ position were
those of Bromley & Shupe (1981) and Robbins &
Anthony (1981). Clark, Langone, Schecter, &
Daly (1981) and Keiser & Keiser (1987) provided
two of the more balanced critical perspective on
the cult issue during these early years. I have
previously summarized the issues fueling the
debate between the two camps:

Sympathizers viewed cultists as “seekers” who
freely and rationally chose to join their
groups. Critics viewed cult joining as a
process dependent upon deception and
manipulation, that is, as an illusory or an
uninformed choice, as a more intense and
enduring form of the psychosocial influence
studied by social psychologists. Sympathizers,
nevertheless, often misrepresented the critics’
position by portraying them as advocates of a
robotization theory of cult conversion based on
The Manchurian Candidate. Sympathizers
saw cultists’ families as threatened by cults
and desirous of gaining control over their
cultist children. Critics saw families as
worried and anxious to save their loved ones
from cult harm. Sympathizers considered cults to
be “innovative” groups and cult leaders to be
“entrepreneurial.” Critics viewed cults as
destructive and their leaders as deceitful and
hypocritical. Sympathizers tended to accept at
face value cultists’ reports while doubting the
accuracy of ex-cultists and their reports,
sometimes pejoratively referring to them as
“apostates” (Lewis, 1989; Shupe & Bromley, 1981)
and “atrocity tales” (Bromley, Shupe, &
Ventimiglia, 1979), respectively. Critics tended
to doubt the accuracy of the reports of
cultists, whom they considered to be deceived
and manipulated, and looked favorably on
ex-cultists’ reports. Lastly, sympathizers
condemned deprogramming and guardianship
proposals, sometimes with a level of passion
inconsistent with their official persona of
“dispassionate scientists.” Critics, although
not usually in favor of deprogramming, tended to
sympathize with parents who attempted to
deprogram their loved one and to be at least
open to considering guardianship proposals.
(Langone, 1993, p. 32)

Some attempts at dialogue
between the two camps were made in the early
1980s. Volume 2, Number 1 (1983) of Cultic
Studies Newsletter (precursor to Cultic
Studies Journal) contained an interesting
collection of essays that reflected the disputes
of that day. Robbins (1983) commented on an
article in the previous issue of that newsletter
and, in so doing, expressed the substance and
tone of many sympathizer critiques of cult
critics during that time period (see also
Robbins, 1985).
Schuller (1983), in a review of
Bromley and Shupe (1981), similarly reflected
the critics’ critiques of sympathizers. In a
tongue-in-cheek essay, I reflected on how we
might enhance dialogue between the “two tribes”
of cultic studies researchers (Langone, 1983).

Kilbourne (1985) edited the
proceedings of an American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Pacific Division
conference in which critics and sympathizers
participated. Held in Logan, Utah, this
conference’s purpose “was to offer ‘neutral
territory’ for the proponents of the different
perspectives to present their views on the key
methodological and related issues concerning new
religions, the intention being to facilitate
communication between and understanding of the
different perspectives” (p. 7). My late
colleague, Dr. John Clark, and I contributed to
this conference (Langone & Clark, 1985).

These attempts at dialogue,
along with more productive dialogue that began
in the late 1990s contributed to at least some
critics’ and sympathizers’ adopting a more
nuanced perspective of the issues than that
portrayed in the longer quotation above.
Dialogue, however, was hindered by the fact that
in the mid-1980s former members of cultic groups
began to sue successfully for infliction of
emotional distress and other reasons (see ICSA’s
collection of legal articles). Richardson
(1996), for example, noted: “My initial concern
changed quickly into worry as it became obvious
that the brainwashing claims were being attended
to by the legal system and policy makers. A
pattern quickly developed in the legal arena,
with advocates of the brainwashing theories
winning in jury trials” (p. 118).

Shinn (1992), who wrote a
thoughtful essay on the conflict he felt as an
academician in the courtroom, says:

Early in my eight hours on the Robin George
witness stand, I learned to adjust my standards
of research reporting to allow me to give yes
and no answers much of the time and to ask
questions in return when I needed time to
explain an answer. Since our academic
profession is grounded in the fundamental
premise of accuracy in doing research and
honesty in reporting what we find, the ethical
crises caused by having to distill my answers to
simplistic truisms—thereby distorting my complex
research findings—was more than a little
disturbing.

Perhaps a more subtle and insidious effect of
such experiences was that before long I found
myself believing the simplistic pictures I was
forced to paint in the courtroom and in the
media. These left me less inclined to inject the
negative information I had unearthed in my
interviews and observations into my own analysis
and conclusions. Fortunately, early on in my
research I met a fellow Krishna researcher
nearly as biased in the negative direction as I
was in the positive one. Subsequently, in my
debates with this colleague I realized that the
most balanced analysis of the information we
shared likely lay between our divergent
analyses. This encounter also enabled me
constantly to question the relatively simplistic
analysis I was forced to give in the courtroom
and in the media and to allow my own negative
critical judgments to come forward along with
more positive interpretations of the faith and
practice of the Hare Krishnas. Nonetheless, the
courtroom and, to a lesser extent, the public
media, in their insistence upon simplicity and
absoluteness with respect to truth, challenge
any scholar’s “truthfulness.” Even when
religious studies scholars reach definite or
stark conclusions, they usually include
considerable nuance. Such is not the luxury of
the courtroom—or the television studio. (p. 283)

What Shinn perhaps did not
realize is that some cult critics felt the same
kinds of conflicts. My late colleague, Dr. John
Clark, for example, had made very similar
statements in private conversations. He
essentially said: “Those are the rules of the
legal profession. If you don’t play by those
rules, you won’t be effective.”

These legal battles, and
the academic distortions they tended to
encourage, increased the polarization of the two
“camps.” Also contributing significantly to the
increased polarization was the Frye standard,
which governed admissibility of expert testimony
at that time. Frye required that a scientific
theory be generally accepted by the scientific
community. Thus, a few short years after the
"divergent perspectives" volume was published
(Kilbourne, 1985), various documents,
conferences, articles, and books (see
http://www.cesnur.org/testi/se_brainwash.htm
for a collection of articles on this subject by
sympathizers) claimed that "the scientific
community had rejected brainwashing theory" —
precisely what the sympathizers' lawyers wanted
to hear! Never has "science" witnessed such
rapid "progress"! In only a few years the
"scientific community" supposedly concluded that
there were no longer two camps; there was one
camp and a handful of renegade scientists. The
fact that some of these "renegades" wrote
articles for prestigious publications, such as
The encyclopedia of sociology (Ofshe,
1992), The Merck manual of diagnosis and
therapy (Singer, 1986), and the
Comprehensive textbook of psychiatry (West &
Singer, 1980) seemed to have no effect on the
droning chant, "the scientific community has
rejected brainwashing."

The phenomenon bore an
eerie resemblance to a political campaign
managed by public relations consultants and
implemented by "spin doctors." The so-called
"Hadden memo” (Hadden, 1989, December 20), when
it was leaked to the public, caused quite a stir
within the critical community, for it reinforced
the notion that “pro-cultists” were indeed
scheming on behalf of cults. But the memo also
generated some controversy and concern among
sympathizers because it claims to speak for Drs.
Eileen Barker and David Bromley, when in fact
they had disagreed with a number of points that
Jeffrey Hadden (now deceased) had made. I know
and respect all the parties involved. I’ve read
the memo in the context of the “cult wars” that
I have been describing. I don’t believe it is
as damning as some have made it out to be. Cult
sympathizers stand for certain principles, just
as do cult critics. Sometimes, these principles
place the parties on different sides of an issue
in the courtroom. The courtroom, unfortunately,
can tempt scholars to move into an inappropriate
advocacy mode. This advocacy mentality is what
is most striking in the Hadden memo. Here are a
few selections from the memo:

Singer's position is typically couched
in the notion that brainwashing is
"irresistible,
irreversible, and that it takes place subtly
without the
'victim' really being aware of what is
happening." It seems
to us fairly clear that this does not happen.
BUT, Singer's
testimony weaves back and forth between this
proposition and
"normal" social influence theory.

If she, and/or others, were to back away from
the
"irresistible, irreversible and subtle"
definition, how does
this change the battleground? Would our task be
easier or
more difficult? . . .

On the issue of the value of research and
litigation,
our legal consultant (Lieberman) was not
particularly sanguine
about the prospects of social scientists coming
up with
findings that would be of great value. In so
many words, he
told us that the most important think [sic] we
could do is prepare a
statement that refutes the claim that social
science can be
helpful. I interpreted this as the agnostic
statement we
discussed in Salt Lake. . .

AGENDA ITEM # 3 - Preparation of the "agnostic"
resolution
and development of a strategy for
encouraging the governing bodies of ASA,
APA (or perhaps Sect 38), SSSR, ASR, RRR
and CISR to adopt same.

In my opinion, much of
Hadden’s concern resulted from sensationalized
media reports and recognition that “cults” are
much more diverse than these reports (and some
of the early professional articles) implied. He
feared, as did I during the late 1970s and early
1980s, that an undiscerning view of the cult
phenomenon would result in abuses. That is why
I opposed conservatorship laws. Hadden (and
some of his colleagues), however, exaggerated
the threat that legal cases posed to freedom of
religion (see
Rosedale, 1993). As a result,
they attributed the caricature of brainwashing
theory (“irresistible, irreversible”) that might
have appeared from time to time in courtrooms
(recall the Shinn quotation above) to all
so-called “anti-cultists,” further exacerbating
the distrust between the two camps. These
caricature-based attacks against brainwashing
theory have, I believe, been decisively refuted
(see Amitrani & Di Marzio,
2000a;
2000b;
Bardin,
1994;
Martin, Pile, Burks, & Martin, 1998;
Rosedale, 1993; Zimbardo,
1997,2002) and the biases
against brainwashing theories within the
sociology of religion community exposed (Balch &
Langdon, 1998; Beit-Hallahmi, 2001 (alternate
version of this paper available at
www.apologeticsindex.org);
Kent &
Krebs, 1998a,
1998b; Zablocki, 1996, 1997).

Moreover, the sympathizers
appear to presume that the relevant
scientific community consists of sociologists of
religion and religious studies scholars.
However, if a court is investigating whether or
not a particular group harmed a particular
person (see Aronoff-McKibben, Lynn, & Malinoski,
2000), one might conclude that psychology is at
least as relevant a scientific discipline as
sociology. There has been a general
understanding within the mental health field
that groups can gain high levels of influence
over people. A recent survey of 700
psychologists (Lottick, 2005), for example,
found that over 50% strongly support a law
against “brainwashing” (therefore, they must
believe that “brainwashing” exists!), a figure
that ironically might be higher than what one
would find among psychologists who are cult
experts, perhaps because the latter might be
more sensitive to how such a law could be
abused. Thus, if one expands the “scientific
community” beyond the rather small group of
sociologists and religious studies scholars
specializing in new religious movements, the
notion that the “scientific community rejects
brainwashing theory” becomes more difficult to
defend.

The general acceptability
criterion of Frye became less important in 1993,
when Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. altered the criteria for admissibility of
scientific expert testimony.

Daubert overturned the seventy-year-old
threshold federal standard for admitting
scientific evidence which was established in
Frye. At the same time, the state court standard
was left in limbo as many state courts reexamine
their rules in light of Daubert.

As Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Daubert
explains, until 1993 most courts, federal and
state, followed the Frye rule that psychiatric,
psychological, or other scientific evidence
could be offered in the courtroom only upon the
showing that the type of evidence was generally
accepted in the field. That general principle
has been called into question with the
determination that, at least in the federal
courts, Federal Rule 702 supersedes Frye and
does away with the “general acceptance”
prerequisite. Instead, the new standard for
federal courts is whether “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence to determine a fact in issue.”
(Hominik, 1995, p. 43 – also available in
Appendix I of Web posting of this article)

Not surprisingly, since
Daubert the emphasis among sympathizers in the
courtroom has shifted to the alleged
methodological deficiencies of various theories
of extreme influence that have been lumped
together under the term “brainwashing.” In
particular, psychologist Dick Anthony has argued
that “brainwashing” theories are not scientific
(Anthony, 1996, 2001). Anthony contends that
so-called brainwashing testimony should not even
be allowed in the courtroom. However, despite
some victories for those who argue this point,
judges in numerous cases have allowed, and
continue to allow, testimony concerning the use
of powerful influence techniques (i.e.,
“brainwashing”) in group situations,
nonreligious as well as religious.

Before he died Herb
Rosedale, ICSA’s late president, had been
working on a paper on scholarship and advocacy,
in which he analyzed how expert testimony in
highly charged ideological areas, such as cults,
can affect the scholarship of academics and
professionals (Rosedale, unpublished). Footnote
86 of his draft paper rebuts arguments to
disallow brainwashing testimony:

A
brief comment directed to the erosion of
responsibility on the part of experts and others
in describing the state of the law in the U.S.
courts with respect to the admission of
brainwashing, mind control and coercive
persuasion testimony is also apposite. In
numerous papers and submissions to courts,
advocates for new religions state unequivocally
that American courts do not admit testimony of
brainwashing or mind control. Factually, that
is false. Many statements have been made by
those seeking to block admission of expert
testimony as to mind control, brainwashing and
coercive persuasion asserting that the decision
of the Federal District Court in the Northern
District of California in 1990, U.S. v.
Fishman, 743, F.Sup. 713, rejected the
theory of coercive persuasion and precluded
admission of expert testimony with respect to it
and that settled the issue. That view was
asserted in an affidavit submitted to a Florida
court by a well-recognized expert within the
last few months and a similar statement was made
by another expert academic in a presentation in
Europe last year. However, in Hejl v. Sands,
et al., Case #3PA-94-1035 in the Superior
Court of the State of Alaska in February, 2000,
Judge Eric Smith wrote an extensive decision in
which he expressly permitted Dr. Paul Martin to
testify as to coercive persuasion over objection
supported by an affidavit of Dick Anthony. In
its decision, the court pointed out that the
theory of coercive persuasion was not
susceptible to being barred in evidence because
it did not meet a falsifiability test under
Daubert. The court stated that there are
many soft sciences (such as psychiatry) which
are both reliable and not falsifiable and
testimony is admissible if supported by peer
review. Hejl v. Sands, et al., supra.
Opinion on motion seeking to preclude evidence,
p. 11 [Smith]. The opinion went on to state
that the theory is supported in a number of
scholarly books and journals which have been
peer reviewed and is also supported by the
personal experience of experts in the field.
The court pointed out that the Fishman
case was not dispositive and was, in fact,
inconsistent with the decision of the California
Supreme Court in Molko v. Holy Spirit
Association, 762, P2d, 46, California
(1988), and other cases in which evidence of
non-physical coercion led to admissibility of
evidence of coercive persuasion (Ibid. p. 13)
and cases cited at Footnote 3). In a further
opinion in which the defendants attacked the
admissibility of not only the testimony of Dr.
Paul Martin but the testimony of a psychiatrist,
Dr. John Hochman, the attack also failed (See
opinion on various of plaintiffs' motions in
Limine dated February 25, 2000). Reference to
defendant's motion 4 involves Dr. Martin's
testimony, 6 Dr. Hochman's testimony and also 7
Dr. Hochman's testimony, 9 deals with exclusion
of testimony relating to religious beliefs, at
pps 8-12, 13-20, 20-33. While both Fishman
and Hejl are decisions of lower courts, I
have never seen Hejl cited in any submissions
made or papers offered by the supporters of new
religious movements on the issues of mind
control, brainwashing or coercive persuasion,
although it is clearly the most recent
comprehensive and receive analysis of the
issues. Annexed hereto as Exhibit A are the
relevant pages from the decision of that court.
(Rosedale, unpublished paper, footnote 86)

It seems to me that
professionals on both sides of the debate will
continue to have divergent opinions, which
courts may or may not be interested in
considering in specific cases—in conjunction
with other evidence and opinions. It is
presumptuous for expert witnesses to think that
the future of religious freedom hangs on their
or their opponents’ testimony. If a certain
line of testimony is not persuasive, there is no
harm in its being heard. If that same line of
testimony is persuasive, then why, other than
the practical desire to win, keep it out of the
courtroom? Because one “camp” of experts has
decided that the importance of religious freedom
demands that we protect judges and juries from
their own gullibility? Is there a fear that
judges and juries will be ‘brainwashed” by
“brainwashing testimony”? I think this kind of
blacklisting is silly. Ultimately, intelligent
ideas will defeat stupid ones. And the republic
will endure.

The courtroom debates will
go on. These debates, however, should not
prevent us from continuing to dialogue with
those who might hold different opinions on
issues in the cultic studies field (see
Kropveld, 2003; Langone,
1995,2000). A book
entitled,
Misunderstanding cults: Searching
for objectivity in a controversial field(Zablocki & Robbins, 2001) is an especially
noteworthy attempt to foster dialogue. This book
tries “to restore a moderate perspective to the
social scientific study of cults” (p. xiii).
Zablocki (2001) presents his theory of
brainwashing in a chapter entitled, “Towards a
Demystified and Disinterested Scientific Theory
of Brainwashing.” In that same volume Dick
Anthony was given an opportunity to critique
brainwashing theories. Anthony’s chapter
(2001), “Tactical Ambiguity and Brainwashing
Formulations: Science or Pseudo Science,” takes
up 103 pages of this 515-page book—far and away
the longest chapter in the book.

Zablocki felt that
Anthony’s critique was so deficient that it
demanded a long, detailed, point-by-point
refutation. We have published Zablocki’s
rejoinder to Anthony in order to continue ICSA’s
historical documentation of the
critic-sympathizer disputes and dialogue
(Zablocki, 2005).

Although scholars will
undoubtedly continue to debate these issues in
and outside the courtroom, I believe that the
passions that once characterized this field have
diminished considerably. Recent years have
witnessed numerous civil and productive
exchanges between critics and sympathizers. Our
disagreements are more informed and respectful.
And there is a growing recognition that we have
more common ground than we once thought. I
believe that this trend will continue and will
do what I can to encourage it.

Balch, Robert W., &
Langdon, Stephen. (1998). How the problem of
malfeasance gets overlooked in studies of new
religions: An examination of the AWARE study of
Church Universal and Triumphant. In Anson Shupe
(Ed.), Wolves within the fold: Religious
leadership and abuses of power (pp. 191-211
). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Langone, Michael D.
(2000). The two “camps” of cultic studies: Time
for a dialogue. Cultic Studies Journal, 17,
79-100. Available at
http://www.culticstudies.org/infoserv_articles/langone_michael_twocampsofculticstudies.htm.

Lewis, James. (1989).
Apostates and the legitimation of repression:
Some historical and empirical perspectives on
the cult controversy. Sociological Analysis:
A Journal in the Sociology of Religion, 49,
386-397.

Lottick, Edward. (2005,
July). Prevalence of cults in the U.S.A. Paper
presented at the conference Psychological
Manipulation, Cultic Groups and Other
Alternative Movements, conducted by
International Cultic Studies Association and
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. July 14-16,
2005, Madrid, Spain.

Rosedale,
Herbert L., & Langone, Michael D. (1998).
On using the term “cult.” In American Family
Foundation, Cults and psychological abuse: A
resource guide (pp. 22-28). Bonita Springs,
FL: American Family Foundation. Also available
at
http://www.culticstudies.org/infoserv_articles/langone_michael_term_cult.htm

Zablocki, Benjamin.
(1996). Reliability and validity of apostate
accounts in the study of religious communities.
Paper presented at the Association for the
Sociology of Religion in New York City,
Saturday, August 17, 1996.

Zablocki, Benjamin.
(1997). The blacklisting of a concept: The
strange history of the brainwashing conjecture
in the sociology of religion. Nova Religio:
The Journal of Alternative and Emergent
Religions, 1(1), 96-121.

[1]This
paper relies on a slight modification of
the Zablocki definition of “cult”
presented in
Rosedale & Langone (1998): "an
ideological organization held together
by charismatic relationships and
demanding a high level of commitment."