WikiLeaks: General Kayani wanted more US drone strikes in Pakistan

The cable states that Anne Patterson remarks that “Kayani is often direct, frank, and thoughtful. .. is an avid golfer, he is President of the Pakistan Golf Association. He smokes heavily and can be difficult to understand as he tends to mumble.Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, contrary to the military’s public posturing, had sought more US drone strikes to help battle militants, revealed a cable accessed by WikiLeaks .

We[LUBP Wallahs] have been saying much the same thing that US drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas are not possible without the consent and willingness of the Pakistan Army.

The Dawn Media Group and Julian Assange, Chief Executive of Sunshine Press Productions, the publishing arm of WikiLeaks, have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the exclusive first use in Pakistan of all the secret US diplomatic cables related to political and other developments in the country. The MoU signed in the UK allows the publication and use of these secret cables in Dawn, its website Dawn.com and DawnNews television.

Dawn cited secret internal US government cables which show that way back in January 2008, the country’s military was asking the US for greater drone back-up for its military efforts.

In a meeting Jan 22, 2008 with top US military official Admiral William J. Fallon, General Kayani asked Washington to provide “continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area” in South Waziristan.

The report of the meeting sent to Washington said that Admiral Fallon “regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request”. He, however, offered trained US Marines to coordinate air strikes for Pakistani forces on ground.

General Kayani “demurred” on it and pointed out that having US soldiers on ground “would not be politically acceptable”, reported Dawn.

The media report said that Pakistan’s military has always denied any part in the drone programme.

Then ambassador Anne Patterson wrote in a cable dated Feb 19, 2009: “Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans.”

The following is the news report published in The DAWN:

Army Chief Wanted More Drone Support

by Hasan Zaidi

In another meeting with US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen over March 3-4, 2008, Kayani was asked for his help “in approving a third Restricted Operating Zone for US aircraft over the FATA.” The request - detailed in a cable sent from the US Embassy Islamabad on March 24 - clearly indicates that two ‘corridors’ for US drones had already been approved earlier. - File Photo

KARACHI: Secret internal American government cables, accessed by Dawn through WikiLeaks, provide confirmation that the US military’s drone strikes programme within Pakistan had more than just tacit acceptance of the country’s top military brass, despite public posturing to the contrary. In fact, as long ago as January 2008, the country’s military was requesting the US for greater drone back-up for its own military operations.

Previously exposed diplomatic cables have already shown that Pakistan’s civilian leaders are strongly supportive – in private – of the drone strikes on alleged militant targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), even as they condemn them for general consumption. But it is not just the civilian leadership that has been following a duplicitous policy on the robotic vehicles.

In a meeting on January 22, 2008 with US CENTCOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon, Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani requested the Americans to provide “continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area” in South Waziristan where the army was conducting operations against militants. The request is detailed in a ‘Secret’ cable sent by then US Ambassador Anne Patterson on February 11, 2008. Pakistan’s military has consistently denied any involvement in the covert programme run mainly by the CIA.

The American account of Gen Kayani’s request for “Predator coverage” does not make clear if mere air surveillance were being requested or missile-armed drones were being sought. Theoretically “Predator coverage” could simply mean air surveillance and not necessarily offensive support. However the reaction to the request suggests otherwise. According to the report of the meeting sent back to Washington by Patterson, Admiral Fallon “regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request” but offered trained US Marines (known as JTACs) to coordinate air strikes for Pakistani infantry forces on ground. General Kayani “demurred” on the offer, pointing out that having US soldiers on ground “would not be politically acceptable.”

In another meeting with US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen over March 3-4, 2008, Kayani was asked for his help “in approving a third Restricted Operating Zone for US aircraft over the FATA.” The request – detailed in a cable sent from the US Embassy Islamabad on March 24 – clearly indicates that two ‘corridors’ for US drones had already been approved earlier.

In secret cable on October 9, 2009 (previously published by WikiLeaks), Ambassador Patterson reports that US military support to the Pakistan Army’s 11th Corps operations in South Waziristan would “be at the division-level and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video.” In fact, in November 2008, Dawn had reported then commander of US forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, telling its reporter that US and Pakistan also share video feeds from Predator drones that carry out attacks. “We have a Predator feed going down to the one border coordination centre at Torkham Gate thats looked at by the Pakistan Military, Afghan Military, and the International Security Assistance Force,” General McKiernan had said.

Sharing of video feeds does not imply operational control by Pakistan’s military, however, and even this sharing may have subsequently been suspended.

Despite the occasionally disastrously misdirected attacks which have fed into the public hue and cry over civilian casualties, there is, in private, seeming general acceptance by the military of the efficacy of drone strikes. In a cable dated February 19, 2009, Ambassador Patterson sends talking points to Washington ahead of a week-long visit to the US by COAS Kayani. Referring to drone strikes, she writes: “Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans.”

Another previously unpublished cable dated May 26, 2009 details President Zardari’s meeting on May 25 with an American delegation led by Senator Patrick Leahy. “Referring to a recent drone strike in the tribal area that killed 60 militants,” wrote Ambassador Patterson in her report, “Zardari reported that his military aide believed a Pakistani operation to take out this site would have resulted in the deaths of over 60 Pakistani soldiers.”

The general support for drone strikes from both the military and civilian leadership is also evidenced by the continuous demand, documented over numerous cables, from Pakistan Government officials to American interlocutors for drone technology to be placed in Pakistani hands. The issue conveyed to the Americans is not so much that of accuracy as that of managing public perceptions.

In the meeting with Senator Leahy, Zardari is directly quoted telling the US delegation to “give me the drones so my forces can take out the militants.” That way, he explains, “we cannot be criticized by the media or anyone else for actions our Army takes to protect our sovereignty.”

General Kayani also “focused on the need for surveillance assets” in the meeting with Admiral Fallon according to Patterson’s cable. “Kayani said he was not interested in acquiring Predators, but was interested in tactical Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).” Predators are considered ‘theatre-level’ technology able to cover wide regions such as the whole of Afghanistan and Pakistan through remotely stationed operations rooms while ‘tactical’ drones are less wide-ranging and can be operated by forces on the ground.

After the first US drone strike outside the tribal areas, in Bannu on November 19, 2008 which killed four people including an alleged senior Al Qaeda member, Ambassador Patterson had presciently noted in another previously unpublished cable (dated November 24, 2008) the dangers of keeping the Pakistani public misinformed. “As the gap between private GOP acquiescence and public condemnation for US action grows,” she wrote back to Washington, “Pakistani leaders who feel they look increasingly weak to their constituents could begin considering stronger action against the US, even though the response to date has focused largely on ritual denunciation.”

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A 2009 cable released by Wikileaks confirms that the Pakistani army for the second time approved deployment of US special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations.
In a comment written to Washington, former US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stated that these deployments are “highly politically sensitive” because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil.
The cable sent to Washington by Patterson states that the first deployment, with elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in Bajaur Agency, occurred in September 2009 and “was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.”
It said that US Special operations forces support to Pakistan military would be at the division-level and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video.
She writes “should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”
Patterson acknowledged that the Pakistani military leadership previously opposed letting the US embed special operations personnel with their military forces. It reads “the developments of the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking.”
US military personnel are known to be training the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary force in Warsak, Peshawar, Tarbela and Shahbaz Airbase. US officials in Islamabad have previously stated that they were in regular contact with Pakistan’s military leadership to enhance cooperation between the two forces rather than simply withdrawing its top officers from Pakistan.
In the 2009 cable, Patterson noted that the approval by GHQ – which she wrote was “almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani” shows that Pakistanis are increasingly confident that the American government does not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, she noted that the direct recipients of US special operations personnel training appear to have recognised the potential benefits of bringing US special operation forces personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support.
US recalls troops from Pakistan soil
An earlier report published in The Express Tribune stated that according to a top Pakistani military official, as many as 160 US soldiers had left Pakistan after the Abbottabad operation in May. However, he did not confirm the number stated by Pakistani officials, saying, “Over 200 US military personnel are still working here.”
Pakistan had formally asked the Pentagon to recall its men soon after the killing of al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in unilateral American raid in the garrison city of Abbottabad.
The strong stance comes in the aftermath of a resolution passed during a joint session of parliament, which focused on revisiting the country’s policy regarding the war on terror, officials said.

Why Pakistani generals are not court martialled! If President Obama had failed in getting Osama Bin Ladin it would have cost him his office! But in Pakistan: the mighty surrender in Dhakka, renting out army/ISI for Afghan Jihad for peanuts, Ojhri Blast, Jalabad disaster, Kargil fiasco, Kashmir compromise and now OBL shelter! Not a single general resigns or is court martialled! Politicians too feel no burden!

1. (C) SUMMARY. In a January 9 meeting with Codel Lieberman,
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani agreed that increased
training and exercises with the U.S. would be of great value,
but urged that U.S.-Pakistan military engagement remain
low-key for domestic political reasons. Lieberman
underscored need for Pakistan to hold free, fair elections in
February. They also discussed the need to add a humanitarian
aspect to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy. Kayani
noted four areas in which the Army was requesting technical
assistance. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Ambassador and Senator Joseph Lieberman met with COAS
General Kayani January 9. Lieberman noted that the Kayani
was held in high regard by the U.S. military and stressed the
importance of military-to-military relationship between the
U.S. and Pakistan. Lieberman then raised the possibility of
U.S.-sponsored training in counterterrorism and
counter-insurgency. Kayani responded positively, but
cautiously, noting that any joint military engagement needed
to have a low-profile in the current political climate.

3. (C) Lieberman said it appeared that President Karzai had a
more positive attitude toward engagement with Pakistan than
in the past. Kayani stated that he had had positive
exchanges with ISAF’s General McNeil and that progress had
been made in tripartite cooperation between the U.S.,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kayani also indicated cooperation
had improved with Afghanistan’s military on the tactical
level, adding there was increased engagement at the between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, “below the political level.”

4. (C) Lieberman suggested that the region shared common
concerns and common enemies; solid cross-border relationships
were key. Kayani responded that the regional situation was
complex but agreed a stable Afghanistan would benefit all.
Pakistan, he stressed, needed internal stability to
effectively fight regional terrorism and, therefore, had to
be careful about over-reaching on the domestic front. Many
didn’t understand that both short-term objectives and
long-terms goals depended on continued stability. For
instance, the situations in Waziristan, Balochistan and
Kashmir were volatile. It was important that the government
be able to balance these objectives and not overstretch its
military capacity.

5. (C) Commenting on Pakistan’s anti-terrorism strategy in
the border areas, Kayani concluded that “no pure military
solution” would fully address the problem. Pakistan forces
faced significant challenges in securing the confidence and
support of local communities; their military strategy
required a civil/humanitarian component to build confidence
with the people. Lieberman agreed that any military approach
needed to be supplemented with a strategy for civilian
engagement. Kayani said the Army faced a great challenge –
that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had
centuries’ old traditions and enmities which complicated any
proposed approach. Nonetheless, Kayani said, whether in FATA
or the settled area of Swat, the government must assert
control. Most of Swat valley was now under control, giving
the Army a chance to establish itself. He said U.S. economic
assistance was needed to help bring basic services to this
and similar areas.

7. (C) Lieberman then discussed potential threats to the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The greatest of these would be
another terrorist attack on the U.S. which would greatly
increase the pressure for military action. Lieberman also
expressed concerns regarding some of Pakistan’s recent
political actions, especially the suspension of civil
liberties and removal of the Supreme Court during the State
of Emergency. Still, he pointed out, if Pakistan could get
past its current political problems and hold credible
elections in February, it could emerge even stronger than it
was before the crisis.

8. (C) Kayani said recent political events needed to be
viewed within the larger, historical and security context of
Pakistan and the challenges it faced. He also noted the
detrimental effect of statements by U.S. politicians and
public figures suggesting the U.S. would take direct military

ISLAMABAD 00000164 002 OF 002

action in Pakistan. Lieberman agreed such remarks were
unhelpful and noted they received much more media coverage in
Pakistan than in the U.S. Lieberman added that another
instance that had received more attention in Pakistan was the
U.S. Congress’ recent deliberation over possible changes to
assistance legislation in light of the GoP’s political
actions.

9. (C) Lieberman than asked about the status of the search
for Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. It was unjust to
criticize Pakistan for not locating these men, asserted
Kayani, and he would place Pakistan’s track record in
pursuing and capturing al-Qaida operatives up against any
other country’s. He added that Coalition Support Funds were
being used appropriately in support of counterterrorism
efforts.

10. (C) Kayani closed with four requests for U.S. technical
assistance:

At the same time the Pakistani public was decrying the CIA’s use of drone strikes in their country, Pakistan’s top army general was asking a top U.S. official in behind-the-scenes meetings for more drones to help during military operations, according to a leaked U.S. State Department cable published online today.

“Referring to the situation in Waziristan, [Pakistani General Ashfaq] Kayani asked if [U.S. Admiral William] Fallon could assist in providing continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area. Fallon regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request,” says the February 2008 cable posted by the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks. Waziristan is a mountainous region in northwest Pakistan that borders Afghanistan.

While the U.S. State Department by policy does not verify the contents of leaked secret cables, the Pakistani military responded to news reports on the drone request today, saying Pakistan has never asked for armed drone attack support “for our operations which have been conducted using our own resources.” There has only been sharing of technical intelligence in some areas, the spokesperson said.

During the specific operation to which the cable refers — a military operation in Waziristan from 2008 to 2010 — “not even outside technical support was asked for,” the spokesperson said.

The cable does not make it clear if Pakistan was requesting the drones for surveillance or direct strikes. In 2008, U.S. Gen. David McKiernan revealed that the U.S. military does at times share direct video links from drones with its Afghan and Pakistani counterparts.

However, in the exchange directly following the denied drone request from Kayani, Fallon and Kayani discuss other options including using American training to help Pakistan build a “night-capable, air-to-ground capability in the Pakistani Army.” When the U.S. Air Force discusses “air-to-ground capability,” it generally refers to the ability to attack surface targets.

At the time of the operations, the Pakistani government was thought to have only given the controversial drone program tacit approval behind closed doors due to the public outcry that often followed deadly strikes. In November 2008, Pakistan summoned then U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson to protest drone strikes that killed at least 20 in the three months prior.

Then, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani told Pakistan’s National Assembly the missile attacks were “intolerable,” according to a report by Reuters.

Despite continued public protests, the Agency has kept up the program which was started under former President Bush and continues today — including an attack that reportedly killed three militants in North Waziristan earlier today.

Also included in the new batch of leaked cables is an alleged 2008 admission by Pakistani National Security Advisor Mahmood Durrani that the Pakistani government, while not involved directly in the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, did “have some contacts with bad guys and perhaps one of them did it.”

(Reuters) – Pakistan’s top military leader not only tacitly agreed to the controversial drone campaign against militants, in 2008 he asked Washington for “continuous Predator coverage” over tribal areas, according to recently released U.S. State Department cables.

According to a fresh batch of cables released by WikiLeaks, Pakistan’s chief of army staff General Ashfaq Kayani asked Admiral William J. Fallon, then commander of U.S. Central Command, for increased surveillance and round-the-clock Predator coverage over North and South Waziristan, strongholds for Taliban militants.

“Referring to the situation in Waziristan,” the February 11, 2008 cable says, “Kayani asked if Fallon could assist in providing continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area.”

Predators are the workhorses of the United States’ unacknowledged remotely-piloted drone campaign in northwest Pakistan. Hundreds of militants and civilians have been killed, fuelling anti-American sentiment in Pakistan because the flights are seen as a violation of its sovereignty.

In the cable, released in partnership with Pakistan’s Dawn Newspaper, and India’s The Hindu and NDTV, Fallon “regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request.”

But he offered U.S. personnel to aid Pakistan in command and control for its attack aircraft. Kayani said this offer would “not be politically acceptable.”

In a statement released on Friday, the Pakistan Army denied the contents of the cable.

“In the past, there has only been sharing of technical intelligence in some areas,” the statement said. “No armed drone attack support has ever been asked for our operations which have been conducted using own resources.”

DRONE STRIKE ON VEHICLE

Also on Friday, two missiles fired by a drone aircraft hit a vehicle in North Waziristan on the Afghanistan border, killing at least six militants, local intelligence officials said.

There was no independent verification and militants often dispute official casualty figures.

Kayani has often publicly criticized drone strikes, with his strongest objections on March 17 when a U.S. drone strike killed at least 45 people in North Waziristan. He called the strike “unjustified and intolerable.”

Perceived violations of Pakistani sovereignty by the United States have been aggravated since the secret May 2 raid on Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden.

While the United States has generally focused on how bin Laden had been able to hide in Pakistan for six years or more, the Pakistani leadership and the military have concentrated on how U.S. special forces were able to operate with impunity inside Pakistan for more than an hour.

Pakistani journalists — many with alleged ties to the military and intelligence establishment — have also focused on the American actions, with popular talk show hosts fuelling criticism of U.S. actions.

Other cables show that in the days following the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai by Pakistani-based militants that killed at least 166 people, Kayani opposed U.S. and Pakistani civilian government efforts to send the head of Pakistan’s spy agency to India as a good will gesture.

In a November 29 meeting with Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, U.S. Charge d’Affaires Gerald Feierstein urged Pakistan to send ISI Director Shuja Ahmed Pasha to India, the cable from the same day said.

“If Pasha did not go to India, this would be seen as a bad sign that Pakistan was retreating from its promises of cooperation.”

The ISI, or Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, is Pakistan’s powerful spy agency. It has been accused of maintaining cooperation with anti-Indian and anti-Western militant groups. Pakistan denies such allegations.

Kayani, the next day, however was “non-committal” on sending Pasha to India.

“Kayani made clear he believed the GOP (government of Pakistan) had nothing to do with” the Mumbai attacks. He also criticized India’s “rush to judgment” on placing blame for the Mumbai attacks.

WikiLeaks has revealed another hidden nook in Pakistan’s policy, this time relating to drone attacks by the CIA, which is going to cause, first confusion, then anger, in Pakistan. Secret internal American government cables, accessed from WikiLeaks, provide confirmation that the US military’s drone strikes programme within Pakistan had more than just tacit acceptance by the country’s top military brass. There seems to be incontrovertible proof, as in specifics, that as recently as January 2008, the country’s military was requesting the US for greater drone backup for its own military operations. More precisely: “In a meeting on January 22, 2008 with US Centcom commander Admiral William J Fallon, Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani requested the Americans to provide ‘continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area’ in South Waziristan where the army was conducting operations against militants”. The request is contained in a ‘secret’ cable sent by, then, US ambassador Anne Patterson on February 11, 2008. The ‘leaks’ contain other details highlighting the extent of ‘understanding’ between the two armies on the ‘corridors’ being used by the drones, as they targeted the terrorists. Another cable confirms what a Pakistani field commander in Waziristan, a two-star general, had already confirmed this year — that the drones were effective.
What does one make of this? Some cables point to a growing disagreement over whether the drone technology could be given to Pakistan. The military seems to have required the drones for surveillance to improve its knowledge of terrorist movement on the contested terrain, but not the Predator itself which delivers precise hits on the ground. The American side was not willing to give Pakistan the drones for surveillance for reasons that may not be very difficult to guess. Starting 2008, it could be the beginning of the rift that developed into war, climaxing in the arrest of Raymond Davis in 2011. In 2010, politicians in government, who had previously openly supported the drone attacks against their killers, began to voice their opposition to them.
The possible mistake made was: Keeping the people uninformed about the Pakistan-US ‘joint strategy’ behind the drone attacks. There is evidence that the army under General Kayani began to balk at public reactions soon after the exit of General Musharraf. This is what happened in 2008, when the GHQ issued a statement against the Kerry-Lugar Bill and its ‘conditionalities’ after assessing the public hue and cry over Pakistan’s ‘sovereignty’ raised in the mostly anti-government media. It is quite possible that the decision to oppose the drones was made after taking the public pulse. Many observers actually thought that the army could be behind the orchestrated groundswell of anti-drone emotion, which looked like a trend supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda and hating the Americans. To external observers it all looked maddeningly like al Qaeda and the Pakistani media singing in unison. Of course, the military could have chosen to take the opposite route because, by coming clean on this issue, it could have tried to influence public opinion by telling the people what seems to be the truth: That the drones are quite effective and a much-needed instrument of attack in the war against the militants. Had this been done the war against militancy, which the government and the establishment both say needs the support of the public, would have got just that: A public behind the strategy to target the terrorists. Instead, anybody who even remotely supported the drone strikes in the media was labelled as a traitor and/or America’s poodle, with the result that the anti-drone camp was appropriated by the hyper-right wing. (Even the ISPR’s denial following this story is hard to digest and in any case, the issue of surveillance has note been denied). One reason, according to another cable which quotes General Kayani, that the Pakistanis didn’t want to go public with this support was that it didn’t want the army to be seen as a force which couldn’t take on the militants without outside help. Even if that is taken at face value, surely, the benefits would have far outweighed the cost of carrying on what clearly seems to be a duplicitous strategy on drone attacks.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 21st, 2011.

The nod and wink approach to drone strikes is “demeaning and self-defeating”, said a Pakistani daily after US cables accessed by WikiLeaks revealed that army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had supported the drone attacks. An editorial in the The News International on Saturday said that publicly, the army and the government have always condemned drone attacks as a violation of Pakistan’s airspace and sovereignty. “But now, secret internal US government cables reveal that Pakistan’s top military brass supports US drone strikes in Pakistan, despite public posturing to the contrary.”
US cables showed that way back in January 2008, the country’s military was asking the US for greater drone back up for its military efforts.

In a meeting Jan 22, 2008 with top US military official Admiral William J. Fallon, Gen Kayani asked Washington to provide “continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area” in South Waziristan.

The editorial said that when a drone attack killed 40 in the North Waziristan Agency, Gen Kayani “came out in a manner uncharacteristic of him and strongly condemned the attack, calling it ‘senseless,’ ‘careless’ and ‘callous’.”

It went on to say that the most important element in “all these contradictory, not to mention confusing, statements point to is a lack of clarity on Pakistan’s drone policy, and the implications of the continuing ambiguity”.

“…military and political leaders should publicly change their stated position, openly seek greater cooperation with US forces to yield success in the long term, and move on.

“On the other hand, if the army and government really are against the strikes and think they do more harm than good, then they should stop bemoaning them in public and supporting them in private.”

It bluntly said that “the nod-and-wink approach to drone strikes is demeaning and self-defeating”.

mr, ashfaq pervaiz kiani watch some other indian movies which made at my life circumstances. army cantt is necessary in faisalabad at this time. fanaa. om shanti om. jail. ghajini. rab ne bana di jodi. you must talk at phone with mian rashid farzand ali.he is man of animal nature.he is hinder in my life matters.rashid has its own govt in pakistan.he does not accept govt of pakistan. phone, 0300-8484867 . i am with out car and bike at this time. i am also district media coordinator of msf in faisalabad.msf can provide me car and bike but some persons are negative in faisalabad. saha. from- ghias ,prophet of God (nabi) my home address,35- a- gulshane hayat colony ,abc road, us- street ,faisalabad. phone,03077503403

pax vobis-there is no positive change in circumstances because enemy is not ready for less. after see all situation in very small view ,its very clear that method is not pakistani but also is of saudi arab. pakistani negative people are doing perform in the method of saudi arab. enemy is doing try and focus on health destroy. such negative people are not sincere with pakistan. this is voice of the time that pakistan army must cover every area of pakistan and should not leave people of any area free . in the future , pakistan army shall have to certain this thing that every child in pakistan is growing after birth and safe. enemy planning was complete but enemy failed because his life is pakistani not international. close telephone calls of any person and couriers is according to law and standard or not… saudi arab shall have to pay price of negative planning against pakistan. now world is safe and people of all over world are doing enjoy their life. saudi people and govt can suicide and leave the world . holy prophet p.b.u.h said that world is dead animal and its hanker is dog . from- dr-ghias arsalan – phd in mass communication management . ptcl-041-2553403

pax vobis- what is difference between israel and lahore city ? pakistani flag is not complete , red colour is necessary in pakistani flag at white part. able child kill in pakistan till 5 to 10 year age by monopolist . such child news donot print in news papers and tv. saudi arab is doing work in pakistan for buggery from 15 years and tend man to another boy for sexual life. cm, punjab mian shahbaz sharif is doing nurture of wild elephants in pakistan muslim league nawaz. ex-squadron leader pakistan air force , ashfaq ahmed and his wife zamurd kausar , ex- ptv actress (peshawar studio) both are terrorist . dr, khalid mehmood butt (gold medalist) and shaukat rajpoot both are terrorist but attack only at single person. ex-imam of haram sheikh amin bin abdur rehman came in pakistan year 1995 and stay in karachi at this address-flat no 10, hameed market ,a-block , north nazimabad , karachi. after some years sheikh amin bin abdr rehman shifted in multan city with his disciple at this address- 381 -a, shah ruknealam colony, new multan , multan city. ex-imam of haram in saudi arab sheikh amin bin abdur rehman was terrorist. saha. from-ghias arsalan (jundui) chief of the army staff , pakistan army . ptcl-041-2553403 . mobile-03077503403 ,0332-6813389 .

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