Attorneys for Brown University have petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari in the Title IX athletics gender bias case. If the lower
court ruling is allowed to stand, colleges and universities may be held to a
compliance standard that conflicts with Supreme Court
precedents.

PROVIDENCE, R.I. -- Brown University is taking its Title IX athletics case
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Attorneys for the University filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari late Tuesday, Feb. 18, 1997, asking the Supreme Court to
review a split decision handed down Nov. 21, 1996, in Boston by a three-judge
panel of the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals. The lower-court
interpretation of Title IX would have required Brown to treat its male and
female athletes differently in order to meet gender-based numerical quotas.
Title IX, the 1972 federal education legislation, prohibits gender-based
discrimination in all colleges and universities receiving federal funds.

"Brown University designed its athletic program to accommodate the interests
and abilities of all students, without regard to gender," said Laura Freid,
executive vice president for external affairs. "The athletic program was ruled
out of compliance with Title IX because the ratio of men to women athletes
reflected the gender ratio of all qualified athletes. The lower court required
the gender ratio of athletes to mirror that of the undergraduate student
body."

If the rulings of the District Court and First Circuit are left to stand,
Brown argued in the brief filed Tuesday, "virtually every institution in the
country must now do what Brown has been ordered to do: Find the funds necessary
to continue expanding women's teams, or eliminate opportunities for men....
Universities that dismantle men's athletic programs to comply with the
standards at issue [will not be able to] turn back the clock when those
standards are later found to conflict with Title IX."

Supreme Court precedents

The District Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals held Brown to a
standard that is in conflict with established Supreme Court precedents, Brown
argued in its brief. During the last four years, Supreme Court opinions in the
analogous labor relations area have held that charges of bias must be evaluated
using a narrower population of qualified candidates. By using the gender ratio
of the entire student body as its compliance standard rather than the gender
ratio among potential varsity athletes, the courts chose a much broader
population.

The First Circuit majority said its 1996 ruling was bound by a 1993 opinion
on a preliminary matter in the case, written by a different three-judge panel
of the First Circuit. Chief Judge Juan R. Torruella strongly dissented from the
majority, insisting that because the legal standard had changed since that
earlier ruling, Brown was entitled to an appropriate review of its case on
appeal.

Torruella also supported Brown's contention that the lower court's ruling
effectively turned Title IX into an affirmative action measure, requiring a
gender-conscious remedial action that Title IX itself expressly forbids.

There is some urgency to this case, Brown said in its brief Tuesday. Other
colleges and universities, trying to bring their programs into what they
believe is the current legal definition of compliance, may dismantle parts of
their athletic programs in an attempt to manipulate gender ratios. Programs
that may have taken years to establish could suffer irreparable harm - all in
an effort to meet an inappropriate standard that may well be subsequently
overturned.

"Brown's record of leadership in women's athletics has never been an issue
in this case," Freid said. "Brown has demonstrated a historical commitment that
predates Title IX and continues to set the standard for the nation's colleges
and universities. We are confident that our athletic programs are administered
fairly, even-handedly and in full compliance with both the spirit and the
letter of Title IX."

Previous rulings

In the spring of 1991, as part of a campuswide budget cutback, Brown's
Department of Athletics and Physical Education changed the funding source for
four varsity teams: men's golf, men's water polo, women's volleyball and
women's gymnastics. The teams continued in varsity competition but were
required to raise their own operating funds. Sixty percent of athletes affected
by the change were male, reflecting the roughly 60-40 ratio of men to women in
Brown's varsity program at the time.

One year later, members of the two women's teams filed suit alleging gender
discrimination in violation of Title IX. Cohen v. Brown is a
class-action lawsuit named for Amy Cohen, a former gymnast and plaintiff in the
suit.

Cohen I - Plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction that would
require Brown to fund the women's teams and refrain from further reductions in
direct funding for women's teams until the case could be heard. U.S. District
Court Senior Judge Raymond J. Pettine granted that preliminary injunction. His
ruling is often cited as "Cohen I."

Cohen II - Brown appealed the injunction, and the First Circuit Court
of Appeals granted a temporary stay. The appeal was heard on Feb. 4, 1993. The
First Circuit upheld the lower court and lifted the stay in its ruling of April
15, 1993, known as "Cohen II."

Cohen III - The actual trial began Sept. 28, 1994, in Providence and
concluded with final arguments on Dec. 16, after 29 days in court. Judge
Pettine entered his final opinion and order, finding for the plaintiffs, on
March 29, 1995 ("Cohen III").

On the third day of that trial attorneys for both sides agreed to a partial
settlement which recognized that Brown's treatment of men's and women's teams
was nondiscriminatory with respect to locker rooms, facilities for practice and
competition, schedules, access to weight rooms and training staff, assignment
of coaches and many other factors. Brown agreed to continue those practices for
three years.

Cohen IV - Brown appealed the District Court's ruling. Attorneys for
both sides, as well as attorneys representing parties that had filed
friend-of-the-court briefs, argued the appeal April 1, 1996, in Boston before
the First Circuit Court of Appeals. In a split decision issued Nov. 21, 1996,
the First Circuit reversed the lower court's proposed remedy but upheld the
lower court's other findings. The First-Circuit majority deferred to Cohen II
as the law of the case. Chief Judge Juan J. Torruella dissented and indicated
that he would have reversed the District Court's decision.