An intelligence report suggests America must try harder in Iraq if terrorists are to be quelled

THE release of parts of a weighty assessment of global terrorism this week confirms a depressing truth: George Bush is not, as he often claims, winning the war on terrorism, he is losing it (see article). Further, the main conclusions of the national intelligence estimate, which was completed by the 16 American intelligence agencies last April, suggest that Mr Bush is worryingly deluded. Jihadist terrorists are multiplying steadily in an increasing number of places. A key reason for this, the report says, is the debacle caused by America's invasion of Iraq—which is described as a “cause célèbre” for jihadists. These conclusions were leaked, accurately as it turns out, to the New York Times. Yet Mr Bush took the unusual, and baffling, step of releasing the text from which the leaks were drawn partly to face down the newspaper's claims. Instead of vindicating his prosecution of the war, the assessment is a dreadful indictment of it.

A little more hopefully, the intelligence estimate says that an American success in Iraq would be a demoralising blow for the jihadists. In his refusal to countenance failure there, Mr Bush seems to have understood this imperative. He is also showing—in an election year, with the war increasingly unpopular in America—an impressive resolution. But it is not clear that he is prepared to pay for his war. On September 20th, America's top general in the Middle East predicted that, contrary to the administration's predictions, American troop levels in Iraq would remain at their current level, around 140,000, well into next year. That figure does not represent the number needed to pacify Iraq, but the maximum number that can easily be dispatched there. Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, has sorely limited the number of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. But to succeed, as Iraq's security forces continue to disappoint and sectarian killing mounts, America needs to send more.

How many more, and for how long, must be for the generals to decide. Wherever American troop numbers have been increased in Iraq, security has been improved, at least for a while. At the same time, it is vital that any increase be kept to a minimum. Three and a half years since the invasion American troops remain brutal peacekeepers, winning few friends with their trigger-happy ways. And the strategy of pushing Iraqi forces to take responsibility for their country is sound. But at least one additional American division, around 20,000 men, is needed in western Iraq, according to the leaked estimate of the American commander there. A similar number are probably required in Baghdad, where last month reinforcements of 12,000 American and Iraqi soldiers had small success in taming the madness.

Finding these extra troops will be difficult and costly. Even to maintain its current numbers in Iraq, America must break yet more promises to its over-stretched soldiers. It will have to extend combat tours, shorten the intervals between them and perhaps, as a last resort, increase the stipulated 24 months for which the National Guard and the reserves may be deployed. Meanwhile, to ease the strain, it should increase the army's authorised size by at least 30,000 soldiers, the number temporarily added to the force by Congress earlier in the war. With luck, by the time those troops are ready, they will not have to be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan. But they will still be needed. America aims to be able to fight two wars and several smaller operations simultaneously. On current form, it clearly cannot.