Articles Posted inDisability Discrimination

A recent disability discrimination opinion from the District of New Jersey reflects the relatively low burden an employee has to meet to have his case decided by a jury.

Damian Melton, a Type I diabetic, worked as a doorperson for Resorts Casino Hotel in Atlantic City for approximately six years. Due to his medical condition, Resorts granted Mr. Melton an intermittent leave under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and did not require him to work the graveyard shift as a reasonable accommodation for his disability.

In August 2010, Mr. Melton injured his shoulder, necessitating surgery. When he returned to work a few months later the hotel assigned him to a light duty job as a valet cashier.

Around the same time, the company that owned Resorts went into foreclosure. Another company, DGMB Casino, LLC, agreed to purchase the hotel. All of the hotel’s employees received notices from Resorts informing them their employment was being terminated as of December 1, 2010. They also received notices from DGMB inviting them to apply for jobs with it.

Mr. Melton applied for numerous jobs, including doorperson, but DGMB did not hire him. Instead, it hired six doorpersons, five of whom previously worked for Resorts and a sixth who had not.

Mr. Melton sued, claiming DGMB failed to hire him in violation of both the FMLA and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”). The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the trial judge to dismiss his LAD claim. It argued Mr. Melton could not prove he was objectively qualified to perform his job, which is a requirement to prove a discrimination claim. Specifically, it claimed he did not have the physical ability to work as a doorperson.

In analyzing this issue, the judge explained it is necessary to determine the essential job functions of a doorperson. This has to be decided on a case-by-case basis, considering factors including which job duties the employer considers essential, what is stated in the written job description, how much time employees spend performing each function and the consequences if an employee is unable to perform the function.

Mr. Melton argued he is objectively qualified to perform his job because he was worked for Resorts as a doorperson for six years and received positive reviews from his supervisors and customers. The Court noted that due to his shoulder injury, Mr. Melton was unable to work as a doorperson when he last worked for Resorts and needed a light duty position. However, it recognized this was a temporary accommodation while his shoulder healed, and found he presented sufficient evidence to establish he was qualified for the job.

DGMB also argued Mr. Melton was not qualified for the job because he did not have enough flexibility with his work schedule since he cannot work the graveyard shift. It claimed this was important since there are only six doorpersons who have to cover the job 24 hours per day, seven days per week. However, Mr. Melton presented evidence that most of the other doorpersons work regular set schedules. Based on this, the judge ruled there is enough evidence for a jury to find Mr. Melton is qualified for the job.

Finally, the judge found there is enough evidence for a jury to find DGMB did not hire Mr. Melton because of his disability. The company claimed it did not hire him because he had poor job performance and a negative attitude in the past, and offered some evidence to support these claims. Nonetheless, the Court relied on the positive reviews Mr. Melton received from his employer and customers. It found this was enough to allow a jury to question the company’s explanation and to conclude his disability was the real reason DGMB chose not to hire him. Accordingly, in Melton v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., the Court denied the company’s motion for summary judgment.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal law that prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because they are disabled.It defines a “disability” as a physical or psychological impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.As a result, not every impairment is a disability.In contrast, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) all have significantly broader definitions of the term “disability” including relatively minor mental and physical impairments.

Late last month, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an impairment that prohibits an employee for sitting for too long can be a disability even under the ADA.The employee, Carmen Parada, worked for Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A.Approximately six months after she started working for the bank, Ms. Parada fell and hurt her back.As a result, she no longer is able to sit for a prolonged period.According to one of her medical reports, she is able to sit for only 15 minutes before she has to stand.

Ms. Parada asked the bank for an ergonomic chair which she believed would have allowed her to perform her job. The bank did not respond to her requests so she asked again, this time offering to pay for the chair herself.When she still did not receive any response she told the bank she could not continue to perform her job without a new chair.When the bank’s Operations Manager finally told Ms. Parada he would discuss her request when he returned from a business trip she complained to the Compliance Officer and requested a leave of absence. Ultimately, the bank fired Ms. Parada, claiming she failed to provide sufficient documentation to prove she was disabled and needed a medical leave, and declaring it considered her to have abandoned her job.

Ms. Parada sued, claiming the bank committed disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, the NYHRL and the NYCHRL.However, the District Court dismissed her ADA claim, ruling she was not disabled under it based on an earlier case, Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Department.That case found a police officer who was unable to sit or stand for “too long” was not disabled for purposes of the ADA.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.It distinguished Colwell by explaining the employee in that case was too vague about his physical limitations.It ruled that employees do not have to prove they are completely unable to sit to establish they are disabled with respect to the major life activity of sitting.Rather, the relevant question is whether the employee is substantially impaired in his or her ability to sit in comparison to the average person.

The court further explained that the ADA requires employers and courts to make that determination on a case-by-case basis.As a result, it would be improper to set a bright-line rule that only employees who are unable to sit at all are substantially impaired with respect to sitting.In doing so it recognized that, under the right circumstances, even an employee who merely cannot sit for an extended period time could be disabled under the ADA.

Applying that law, in Parada v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s order dismissing the case.It instructed the lower court to analyze Ms. Parada’s impairments to determine whether her back injury meets the ADA’s definition of a disability.

Earlier this month, a federal judge in New Jersey ruled that Bryan Maher can proceed with numerous employment law claims against his former employer, Abbott Laboratories.

Mr. Maher began working for Abbott in June 2008 as a Senior Distribution Specialist. In 2009, his sales numbers declined. By June the company began requiring him to participate in weekly one-on-one telephone coaching sessions. It also received several complaints from Mr. Maher’s customers. By late August 2009, the company placed Mr. Maher on an informal coaching plan and warned him he could be fired if his sales did not improve.

In October 2009, Mr. Maher was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation (an irregular heartbeat) which was exacerbated by workplace stress. The company granted his request to take four days off from work for testing.

Mr. Maher continued to receive complaints from his customers, and his sales results did not improve. Eventually, the company began to prepare a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).

On approximately February 10, 2010, Mr. Maher requested a short medical leave because he was feeling ill due to stress at work. He also reminded his boss that his son is autistic. According to Mr. Maher, his boss responded by saying “I don’t give a sh*t about your stress, your heart, and I hate to say it but your son either. We need sales and we need numbers.” As a result, Mr. Maher did not take a medical leave. Shortly thereafter, Abbott formally placed him on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).

In March 2010, Mr. Maher took two weeks off from work because he needed to care for his autistic son and his own health issues. In the meantime, Abbott received several additional complaints from his customers. Ultimately, on May 11, 2010, the company fired him for “poor performance.”

Mr. Maher then filed a lawsuit, claiming Abbott discriminated against him because he is disabled and because of his association with his disabled son, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). He also alleged Abbott failed to provide him a reasonable accommodation for his disability and retaliated against him because he requested one.

Abbott eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss Mr. Maher’s case. In Maher v. Abbott Laboratories, the Court dismissed portions of Mr. Maher’s claim that Abbott failed to accommodate his disability. For example, it dismissed a claim relating to his request for vacation time in June 2009 because Mr. Maher did not indicate he needed the time off because of a disability. It also dismissed his claim related to his request to transfer his New Jersey sales territory to another salesperson because (1) he did not tell anyone at Abbott he wanted this change because of his disability, (2) employers are not required to provide accommodations that would waive an essential job function, and (3) the accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on Abbott’s business. The Court also dismissed Mr. Maher’s allegation that he was entitled to take two weeks off in February 2010 as a reasonable accommodation for his son’s autism since neither the ADA nor the LAD requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for a family member’s disability.

However, the Judge permitted Mr. Maher to proceed with his claim that Abbott failed to accommodate his disability when he asked for time off for his own medical condition in February 2010. The Court found Mr. Maher requested a reasonable accommodation when he made this request since the company knew he had a heart condition and knew he wanted the time off because of it. The Judge concluded his boss’s hostile reaction could lead a jury to conclude Abbot refused to even consider accommodating Mr. Maher’s disability, in violation of the ADA and the LAD.

Further, the Court found the same evidence could support the conclusion that Abbott fired Mr. Maher because he requested an accommodation for his disability. Although the company claims it fired him for poor job performance, a jury could find this was a pretext (excuse) for disability discrimination. The Judge explained this conclusion is further supported by the fact that the company fired Mr. Maher only three months after his boss’s hostile reaction to his request for time off. It also pointed to evidence that many of the performance issues the company used to justify firing Mr. Maher may have been caused by the company’s poor policies and procedures rather than by anything he did wrong.

Ultimately, the Court ruled a reasonable jury could find the company had exaggerated Mr. Maher’s performance deficiencies to justify firing him. Accordingly, it permitted him to proceed with his disability discrimination claims under both the ADA and the LAD.

Last month the American Medical Association (AMA) voted to designate obesity as a disease. More specifically, it adopted a resolution which states that obesity is a disease that leads to other conditions such as Type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease. As a result of the AMA’s decision, it is likely that more employees who are fired, demoted, harassed, or otherwise treated worse at their jobs because they are overweight will be legally protected by both New Jersey and New York law.

Both the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis that they are disabled. The two laws define the term “disability” broadly to include both physical and mental disabilities. Neither statute limits its definition to severe or permanent medical conditions. In particular, the LAD defines disability to include any “physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and other seizure disorders.” Similarly, the NYHRL’s definition to mean a physical or medical impairment “resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

Over a decade ago, in Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that an employee’s obesity can be a disability under the LAD, but only if it is “morbid.” Obesity is considered “morbid” if it prevents you from engaging in normal activities. In Viscik, the Court found the employee who filed the lawsuit was disabled because her obesity caused her other medical conditions including arthritis, a heart condition, obstructive lung disease and knee problems that limited her ability to walk. The court concluded this met the LAD’s definition of a disability.

Likewise, in Delta Air Lines v. New York State Division of Human Rights, a 1997 case, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that simply being overweight is not a disability under the NYHRL. However, it distinguished another case in which the company’s doctor concluded the employee was unable to perform her job because she was “grossly obese,” a diagnosed medical condition that impaired her ability to work. Thus, like the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the past New York’s highest court required an individual’s obesity to cause an illness, impairment or limitation before it can be considered a disability under the NYHRL.

But at least arguably, today the analysis could be much simpler. Since the AMA has deemed obesity itself to be a disease, it seems to fit within the LAD’s definition of disability as long as being overweight can be considered a form of malformation or disfigurement. Likewise, it seems to fall within the NYHRL’s definition since it is a physical or medical condition resulting from an anatomical condition that can be demonstrated by medically accepted clinical techniques.

Of course, how much this change actually will impact disability discrimination law is an issue that eventually will be decided by the courts. The bottom line is that the AMA’s new resolution could help extend protection against disability discrimination to additional employees who previously were not legally protected.

Last month, New Jersey’s Appellate Division reversed a verdict of over one million dollars in a disability discrimination and retaliation case because the only evidence supporting the claim was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is basically when you try to prove something is true based on the fact that someone else said it was true outside of the courtroom. Hearsay generally is not admissible at a trial because it is considered untrustworthy. However, there are many exceptions to that rule.

The case was brought by Anthony Pace, who was a security guard for the Elizabeth Board of Education for more than 15 years. In 2003, Mr. Pace suffered a knee injury at work, and filed a worker’s compensation claim. In 2006, the Board decided not to renew Mr. Pace’s contract as part of a reduction-in-force. Mr. Pace then sued, claiming the Board’s decision to lay him off was both disability discrimination and an act of retaliation because he filed a workers’ compensation claim. A jury agreed with Mr. Pace and awarded him $147,630 for past lost wages, $427,370 for future lost wages, and $250,000 in punitive damages. He also was awarded $237,843 in attorney’s fees and $7,708.84 to reimburse him for his litigation costs, bringing his total judgment to more than a million dollars.

The primary evidence to support Mr. Pace’s claims were two witnesses who testified that a former member of the Board, Carol Cascio, told them the Board was trying to eliminate employees who had brought worker’s compensation claims against it during the reduction-in-force. Both of the witnesses indicated that Ms. Cascio made those statements after she had left the Board.

However, in Pace v. Elizabeth Board of Education, the Appellate Division ruled that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. In doing so, the court rejected numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. For example, it found an exception for statements made by the opposing party did not apply since Mr. Pace did not sue Ms. Cascio personally so she could not be an opposing party. Similarly, it found an exception for statements by agents, employees and representatives of an opposing party did not apply because Ms. Cascio was no longer an employee of the Board when she allegedly made the statements. It also rejected an exception for statements that are against the speaker’s interests because Ms. Cascio did not say anything that personally implicated herself in any wrongdoing. Likewise, it rejected other exceptions to the hearsay rule because there was no evidence the Board had authorized Ms. Cascio’s statement, and no evidence it adopted her statement as its own. Ultimately, having found the only evidence of discrimination and retaliation was inadmissible hearsay, the Appellate Division overturned the jury’s verdict.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is entitled to subpoena a broad range of information during its investigations into possible violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Third Circuit is a federal appellate court that handles cases that started in the District of New Jersey.

The appeal stems from an investigation the EEOC is conducting regarding Kroger grocery store’s alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA prohibits companies from using tests when hiring employees if they “screen out or tend to screen out” disabled job candidates, unless the tests are “‘job-related for the position in question” and “consistent with business necessity.” Kroger uses a Customer Service Assessment test that was written for it by another company, Kronos Incorporated, to screen its job applicants. Kroger decided not to hire a job applicant, Vicky Sandy, after she scored poorly on that test. Ms. Sandy is hearing and speech impaired.

During its investigation into Ms. Sandy’s disability discrimination claim, the EEOC sent a subpoena to Kronos seeking information about how the test impacts disabled job applicants. Kronos refused to respond to the subpoena. The EEOC then filed a motion to enforce the subpoena in federal district court. The district court eventually limited the information the EEOC was entitled to receive to information relating to the state in which Ms. Sandy applied and the job titles for which she applied during an 18 month period. In 2010, the Third Circuit reversed that decision, and removed those limitations. It then sent the case back to the district court to modify its order.

But the EEOC again disagreed with the order the district court issued, and appealed to the Third Circuit. This time, it objected to a limitation that it was only entitled to information from any research or studies about the test’s impact on disabled individuals that Kronos “relied upon in creating or implementing the test for Kroger.”

In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kronos, Inc., the Third Circuit again agreed with the EEOC. It explained that the EEOC is entitled to subpoena information during its investigations if it can show that (1) the investigation has a legitimate purpose; (2) the information requested is relevant to that purpose; (3) the EEOC does not already have the information it is requesting; (4) the EEOC has complied with its own administrative requirements; and (5) the information it requested is not unreasonably broad or burdensome. Applying that test, the court concluded that the EEOC was entitled to the information it was seeking whether or not Kronos specifically considered it with respect to the test it developed for Kroger. It therefore instructed the district court to remove that limitation from its order.

Before he started working for the dealership, Mr. Fajge had a history of mini-strokes (or transient ischemic attacks), coronary artery disease and hypertension, and had suffered a heart attack.
Three weeks after he started the job, he suffered another mini stroke. He was taken to the emergency room by ambulance, and remained in the hospital for five days before his doctor cleared him to return to work.

Within a week after he returned to work, the dealership had to call another ambulance for Mr. Fajge because he was not feeling well. After examining him, the paramedics concluded he was fine. According to Mr. Fajge, his boss called him at home the next day, and said he did not think he was strong or healthy enough to continue doing his job, and as a result they were going to have to “part company.” Although his boss denied making that statement, he admitted he called Mr. Fajge to ask him how he was doing. When his boss was asked at his deposition if he calls other employees at home when they are out sick, he answered “No. But most employees don’t like nearly drop over dead in front of me two times in a row in less than a month.”

Approximately two weeks later, the dealership fired Mr. Fajge. It claimed it did so because of his job performance. For example, his supervisors testified that he wasted a lot of time in his office instead of trying to sell cars, and he was often on the internet, including occasionally looking at pornography at work.

Mr. Fajge then filed a lawsuit in which he alleged the dealership fired him because he is disabled, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Unfortunately, Mr. Fajge passed away while the case was pending. However, his estate decided to pursue his discrimination lawsuit on his behalf.

The Judge’s Ruling

Without deciding whether Mr. Fajge actually had a disability, the Judge found he was protected by the LAD because the dealership perceived him to be disabled. The LAD prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who they believe are disabled, whether or not they are actually disabled. The Judge also found there was enough evidence for a jury to find the dealership fired Mr. Fajge because it believed he was disabled. This includes Mr. Fajge’s testimony that his boss said he did not think he was strong enough to perform his job, and his boss’s testimony that Mr. Fajge twice nearly dropped dead in front of him. The Judge also relied on a company document that said it fired Mr. Fajge because of his “inability to work the hours required,” and inconsistencies in the dealership’s evidence about Mr. Fajge’s supposed poor performance. The Judge’s ruling paves the way for the case to go to trial, where a jury will decide whether the dealership fired Mr. Fajge because of an actual or perceived disability.

Last month, New Jersey’s Appellate Division dismissed an employee’s discrimination lawsuit because the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (DCR) had already dismissed the employee’s case. That employee, Francis Cornacchiulo, was a senior vice president for Alternative Investment Solutions. Mr. Cornacchiulo has multiple sclerosis. Alternative fired him after he apparently started experiencing symptoms of his disability at work. He then filed a disability discrimination claim with the United States Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). When Mr. Cornacchiulo submitted additional information to the EEOC, he marked a box agreeing to jointly file his claim with the DCR.

The EEOC eventually told Mr. Cornacchiulo it was “unable to conclude that the information establishes a violation of federal law.” The DCR then wrote a letter to Mr. Cornacchiulo indicating that since the EEOC had closed its file, “a determination has been made” and the DCR was closing its file on the same basis. It did so even though there are important differences between federal and state employment laws, and the DCR had previously informed Mr. Cornacchiulo that, on request, it will review whether the EEOC’s conclusions are consistent with New Jersey law.

After Mr. Cornacchiulo received the letter from the DCR, he filed a lawsuit in a New Jersey state court, claiming Alternative fired him because of his disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Several weeks later, the DCR sent a letter to Alternative’s lawyer stating it was adopting the EEOC’s conclusion and closing Mr. Cornacchiulo’s case. However, the agency never told Mr. Cornacchiulo it had adopted the EEOC’s conclusion.

Alternative then asked the court to dismiss Mr. Cornacchiulo’s lawsuit based on the DCR’s finding. In the meantime, Mr. Cornacchiulo’s lawyer attempted to withdraw his claim from the DCR.

On June 19, 2012, in Cornacchiulo v. Alternative Investment Solutions, L.L.C., the Appellate Division ruled that Mr. Cornacchiulo could not pursue his state law disability discrimination claim in court. The appellate court explained that under the LAD an employee has the option of pursuing a discrimination claim either through the DCR or in court. It also noted that when someone files a case with the DCR, he or she has the option of withdrawing it and filing a private lawsuit. However, he or she has to do so before the DCR reaches its final determination. This is different from determinations by the EEOC, which are not considered final and do not bar a subsequent discrimination lawsuit.

Based on its analysis, the Appellate Division found that the lower court properly dismissed Mr. Cornacchiulo’s lawsuit. It rejected Mr. Cornacchiulo’s arguments based on the fact that he did not realize he had marked the box to file his claim in the DCR, and the EEOC’s form did not warn him of the potential consequences of jointly filing with the DCR. The court ruled that once the DCR reached its final determination, Mr. Cornacchiulo lost his right to bring a separate lawsuit claiming Alternative fired him because he is disabled. However, he still has the option to appeal the DCR’s decision.

The Lesson of the Case

Perhaps the biggest lesson of the Cornacchiulo case is how important it is to speak to an employment lawyer before pursuing your legal rights. For example, although there are some circumstances where it might make sense to pursue a claim through the EEOC or the DCR rather than filing a lawsuit, you should discuss your options with an attorney before you decide which option is best for you.

Specifically, in November 2011 the EEOC issued a letter which indicates that an employer would violate the ADA if it rejected a job candidate because he does not have a high school diploma if a disability prevented the job candidate from graduating from high school, unless the employer proves the diploma requirement “is job related and consistent with business necessity.” The letter also indicates that an employer would “not be able to make this showing, for example, if the functions in question can easily be performed by someone who does not have a diploma.” The EEOC received substantial backlash to its position, including many who claimed it had created a disincentive to graduate from high school.

The EEOC’s article last week clarifies that the ADA does not prohibit employers from requiring job applicants to have high school diplomas. Rather, under limited circumstances a company might have to allow a job candidate to show he is qualified for the job if a disability made prevented him from graduating from high school. For example, an individual who could not graduate from high school because of a disability might prove he is qualified for a job by showing his work experience in similar jobs.

The EEOC’s article also makes it clear that employers are not necessarily required to hire a job candidate who is disabled. Companies have the right to select the job candidate who is best qualified for the job.

What is still unclear is whether the employer or the employee has the burden of proof when a company rejects a job candidate whose disability prevented him from graduating from high school. The EEOC’s November letter indicates that employers must demonstrate that a high school diploma is necessary for the job. However, its February article indicates that the disabled employee has to prove he is qualified for the job even though he did not graduate from high school. It seems likely the EEOC originally intended to place the burden on the employer, but changed its mind in response to the backlash it received last November.

Last month, in Gibbs v. Caswell-Massey, New Jersey’s Appellate Division ruled that Linda Gibbs could proceed with her disability discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, Caswell-Massey. Caswell-Massey is a luxury bath and body products company in Edison, New Jersey. It hired Ms. Gibbs in 1993 . She was gradually promoted through the company’s ranks, and eventually became its Corporate Manager, Retail Stores and International Sales.

In 2000, Ms. Gibbs’s doctor diagnosed her with sleep apnea. This disability causes Ms. Gibbs fatigue, and often makes it difficult for her to stay awake at work. For example, she occasionally nods off at her desk. Caswell-Massey warned Ms. Gibbs on several occasions that her unexcused absences, sleeping, and poor job performance were unacceptable, and that she could be fired if she had any further performance issues. Nonetheless, Ms. Gibbs received an overall performance rating of “above overall expectations” in both 2005 and 2006.

In November 2006, Ms. Gibbs took a four-week disability leave to have hernia surgery. The company fired her two days after she returned to work. It claims its decision to fire was based on information it received from Steven Culter during Ms. Gibbs’s disability leave. Mr. Cutler was business partners with Ms. Gibbs’ husband. He and Mr. Gibbs apparently worked together at the Route 18 flea market in East Brunswick, New Jersey. Mr. Cutler claimed that Ms. Gibbs was stealing products from Caswell-Massey, and her husband was selling them at the flea market. He eventually provided the company with photographs of Caswell-Massey’s products that he was selling at the flea market, a copy of a book with Gibbs’s handwriting that listed prices for Caswell-Massey products, and his own sworn statement claiming Ms. Gibbs admitted she had taken products from Caswell-Massey.

Caswell-Massey investigated Mr. Cutler’s allegations. During the investigation, Ms. Gibbs claimed she did not know her husband was selling Caswell-Massey products at the flea market. She also claimed that Mr. Cutler was blackmailing her, and provided evidence including threatening voicemail messages that Mr. Cutler had left her. Caswell-Massey suspended Ms. Gibbs without pay while it conducted its investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, it fired Ms. Gibbs, supposedly because she had violated the non-compete provision in her employment contract.

The trial court dismissed Ms. Gibbs’s case, including her claim that Caswell-Massey fired her because of her disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). It ruled that she did not have enough evidence to prove that Caswell-Massey’s explanation for firing her was a pretext, or excuse, for discrimination.

The Appellate Division disagreed. It held that a reasonable jury could believe that Caswell-Massey discriminated against Ms. Gibbs, based on evidence supporting the conclusion that the company conducted an inept and cursory investigation, relied on Mr. Cutler’s statements even though he was a biased and questionable source, and ignored Ms. Gibbs’ 13 year history with the company, in addition to the lack of evidence that Ms. Gibbs’ husband ever sold a single Caswell-Massey product. However, the Court also indicated that a jury could come to the opposite conclusion, and could find that the company fired Ms. Gibbs because she violated her non-compete agreement. As a result, the Appellate Division sent the case back to the trial court, so a jury can decide whether Ms. Gibbs has proved that Caswell-Massey illegally discriminated against her.

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