Citation Nr: 9807216
Decision Date: 03/11/98 Archive Date: 03/25/98
DOCKET NO. 95-37 218 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Buffalo,
New York
THE ISSUE
Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder
to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: Military Order of the Purple
Heart
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
M. Miyake, Associate Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The veteran had active military service from March 1943 to
February 1946.
This appeal is before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board)
from a March 1995 rating decision of the Buffalo, New York
Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) which denied the benefit sought.
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL
The veteran contends that he suffers from a psychiatric
disorder which had its onset in service. He also maintains
his PTSD is the result of becoming lost on a training flight
in service.
DECISION OF THE BOARD
The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 7104 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997), has reviewed and considered
all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's
claims file. Based on a review of the relevant evidence in
this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is
the decision of the Board that the veteran has failed to meet
his burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a
belief by a fair and impartial individual that he has
presented a well-grounded, or plausible, claim of entitlement
to service connection for a psychiatric disorder to include
PTSD.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All relevant evidence necessary for an equitable
disposition of the veteran’s appeal has been obtained by the
RO.
2. An acquired psychiatric disorder was not manifested in
service and a psychosis was not manifested in the first post-
service year.
3. There is no competent evidence that relates the veteran’s
psychiatric disorder to service.
4. PTSD has not been diagnosed.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The claim of service connection for a psychiatric disorder to
include PTSD is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110,
5107(a) (West 1991).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
I. Factual Background
Service medical records are negative for complaints,
findings, or a diagnosis related to any psychiatric disorder.
The veteran was evaluated as psychiatrically normal on
enlistment examination in December 1942 and on separation
examination in February 1946. According to the National
Personnel Records Center (NPRC), any other service medical
records were destroyed in the 1973 fire at that facility.
Private treatment reports from July to November 1948 show
treatment for unrelated illnesses. Private treatment reports
from Gowanda State Hospital (Gowanda) indicate that the
veteran was first admitted in November 1961 after he
reportedly struck his mother for no apparent reason. He gave
the impression of a deteriorated schizophrenic. He was
untidy in his personal appearance. He was cooperative,
relevant, but occasionally disorganized. He looked dull. He
admitted having auditory hallucinations and delusions of a
persecutory nature. He had no insight into his condition,
but his judgment was good. Dementia praecox, catatonic type
was diagnosed.
An April 1962 convalescent care record from Gowanda indicates
that the veteran had been on electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)
and tranquilizing drugs. An improvement in his general
appearance was noted. Examination revealed he was free of
any psychotic manifestations, but was not fully aware of the
reason for his recent hospitalization. Medication was
prescribed. ECT was discontinued in March 1962. Dementia
Praecox, catatonic type was diagnosed. He was placed on
convalescent care into the custody of his mother in May 1962.
On VA psychiatric examination in April 1977, the veteran
reported that he had no psychiatric treatment prior to this
examination except for his admission at Gowanda. He
indicated that he was not seeking psychiatric help and had
not used tranquilizers. The examiner opined that there did
not appear to be any noticeable major psychiatric problem.
There was limited evidence of adult life adjustment.
Correspondence and treatment reports from the Erie County
Medical Center from September to December 1980 indicate the
veteran was evaluated at the request of the New York State
Educational Department. He was status post electro-shock
therapy. He was somewhat pessimistic and mildly depressed.
The examiner noted functional mental disturbance (residual
schizophrenia). The diagnoses were no definite evidence of
organic brain disease, residual schizophrenia, and mild
depression. It was recommended that the veteran seek
psychiatric treatment.
On VA psychiatric examination in March 1981, the veteran
reported that his reflexes were slow from the ECT he received
in 1961 and 1962, and that he was on welfare. He stated that
he had not received any psychiatric or medical treatment
during service. Schizophrenia, residual type was diagnosed.
In April 1994, L. J. Radice, M.D., indicated he had not
practiced medicine for 14 years and that any records of his
treating the veteran were destroyed.
II. Analysis
At the outset the Board notes that some of veteran’s service
medical records are not available. The United States Court
of Veterans Appeals (Court) has held that where “service
medical records are presumed destroyed . . . the BVA’s
obligation to explain its findings and conclusions and to
consider carefully the benefit-of-the-doubt is heightened.”
O’Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). In this
case, however, the veteran has provided no leads that the VA
could pursue to further develop the record. He has
consistently reported that he received no psychiatric
treatment until 1961.
The threshold question is whether the veteran has met his
initial burden of presenting a well-grounded claim, i.e., one
that is plausible. If he has not, then his claim must fail
and there is no duty to assist him further in the development
of the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). As explained below, the Board finds
that the veteran has not submitted evidence sufficient to
establish a well-grounded, or plausible, claim of service
connection for a psychiatric disorder to include PTSD.
Service connection is warranted for disability resulting from
disease or injury that was incurred in or was aggravated by
service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110. For certain chronic diseases,
such as psychoses, service connection also may be granted on
a presumptive basis when they become manifested to a degree
of ten percent or more within one year from the date of
separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113;
38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may be granted
for a disease first diagnosed after service when all the
evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in
service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).
For a service connection claim to be well-grounded, there
must be competent evidence of a current disability (a medical
diagnosis), of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or
injury in service (lay or medical evidence), and of a nexus
between the in-service injury or disease and the current
disability (medical evidence). Caluza v. Brown, 7
Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff’d, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Evidentiary assertions by the veteran must be
accepted as true for the purposes of determining whether a
claim is well grounded, except where the assertion is
inherently incredible or when the fact asserted is beyond the
competence of the person making the assertion. King v.
Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993).
Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence
establishing a current, clear diagnosis of PTSD, credible
supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor
actually occurred, and a link, established by medical
evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-
service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10
Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). The stressor may be the result of
either a combat or non-combat experience. If the claimed
stressor is not combat related, then the veteran's lay
testimony regarding his inservice stressors must be
corroborated by credible evidence. Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.
App. 283, 289 (1994); however, after-the-fact medical
evidence cannot be used to establish the occurrence of the
stressor. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996). The
Board notes that this standard is more liberal than the
previous interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), which
required service records corroborating the veteran’s
testimony as to the occurrence of the claimed non-combat
stressor. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994);
Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). Accordingly,
service connection may not be granted for PTSD based on a
diagnosis unsupported by credible evidence of an inservice
stressor. On the other hand, if the claimed stressor is
related to combat, service department evidence that the
veteran engaged in combat or that the veteran was awarded the
Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman Badge, or similar combat
citation will be accepted, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, as conclusive evidence of the claimed in-service
stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f).
It is not in dispute that the veteran has a psychiatric
disorder. However, with respect to the more specific claim
of service connection for PTSD, it is noteworthy that such
disorder is not diagnosed. Consequently, to the extent that
the veteran seeks service connection for PTSD, he has not met
the threshold requirement of showing current disability, and
that claim is not well grounded.
The report of the veteran’s service separation examination
shows no evidence of a psychiatric disability. From
separation, in 1946, to 1961, an interval of 15 years, there
is no medical evidence indicating that the veteran had a
psychiatric disability. Although schizophrenia has been
diagnosed since November or December 1961, no competent
medical evidence has been presented to show a nexus between
that psychiatric disability and the veteran's service, and it
obviously was not manifested to a compensable degree in the
first post-service year.
Notwithstanding the veteran’s own vigorous contentions that
his psychiatric disorders were incurred as a result of
service, his statements are not supported by the objective
statements of any competent medical authority. His own
assertions do not suffice to make the claim well grounded
because, as a layman, he is not competent to render a medical
opinion on the diagnosis or etiology of a condition. Layno
v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). In the absence of any
competent medical evidence showing that a current psychiatric
disorder is related to service, the veteran has not submitted
a well-grounded claim.
ORDER
Service connection for a psychiatric disorder to include PTSD
is denied.
George R. Senyk
Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals
NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West
1991 & Supp. 1997), a decision of the Board of Veterans'
Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits,
sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of
notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of
Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board
was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or
after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988). The
date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes
the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you
have received is your notice of the action taken on your
appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals.
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