Policy Forumhttp://www.policyforum.net
The APPS Policy Forum a public policy website devoted to Asia and the Pacific.Fri, 09 Dec 2016 07:14:39 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.5.4Seoul and Tokyo’s new security axishttp://www.policyforum.net/seoul-tokyos-new-security-axis/
http://www.policyforum.net/seoul-tokyos-new-security-axis/#respondThu, 08 Dec 2016 21:59:59 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14842The new intelligence sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea could create a new international scenario, where regional coalitions take the place of a US super-protector, Juan Lopez-Aranguren writes. A classic Latin adage teaches us: Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”). One of the most obvious displays of this […]

]]>The new intelligence sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea could create a new international scenario, where regional coalitions take the place of a US super-protector, Juan Lopez-Aranguren writes.

A classic Latin adage teaches us: Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”). One of the most obvious displays of this statement was the Cold War’s mutual assured destruction doctrine that helped avoid a global escalation of conflict.

Now, with the emergence of the information society and globalisation, the sharing of intelligence plays an even bigger role in security. In an era where threats to security are not limited to state actors but also range from individual lone wolves to extremist religious movements, the need for efficient preemption has become vital.

In light of this new global phenomenon, the long-awaited announcement of an intelligence-sharing deal signed by Japan and South Korea has recently been made. The novelty of this agreement is that the exchange of information will be carried out bilaterally between both countries without using the US as an intermediary.

The agreement was ratified in Seoul by South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo and the Japanese ambassador, Yasumasa Nagamine. It was signed on the sixth anniversary of the North Korean bombing of the island of Yeonpyeong, where four South Koreans were killed, which many saw as an attempt to reduce the hostility that some South Koreans feel towards the agreement. This adverse public sentiment had been delaying the signing since 2012 and reflects the resentment that exists within certain sectors of South Korean society towards the ghosts of the Japanese militaristic past, ahead of a real concern with the current North Korean threat.

The intelligence-sharing agreement is also a very important step to take at the advent of the Trump era, an issue that is likely to have played a crucial role in seeing this deal finally materialise. Trump’s decision to adopt an isolationistic stance in the field of international security forces US allies, especially Japan and South Korea, to adopt a more proactive profile than what they had been maintaining until now under the comfortable protection of the American nuclear umbrella. Regardless of whether Trump’s threats are real or have been exaggerated as an electoral strategy to connect with discontented middle-class American voters, the shift in the international paradigm is clear. It forces Japanese and South Korean societies to adopt the uncomfortable role of taking on the political, economic and social costs that come with greater protagonism in their defence against the North Korean threat.

The new intelligence sharing agreement faces three major challenges. The first affects the Japanese intelligence services: a reformulation is essential to end the overlap between two opposing models of intelligence (the centralised American one and the decentralised British one) while at the same time it must be orientated towards communication for the following reasons. First, digital mass media has a direct effect on the articulation of sub-state threats in the globalised world of the 21st century (jihadist lone wolves are being radicalised and coordinated via the Internet in Europe). Second, threats to security are largely made with a propagandistic purpose (terrorist attacks seek to sway public opinion in order to achieve beneficial political agreements stemming from this fear).

The second challenge facing this agreement concerns the hostility of South Korean public opinion. Far from being a question buried in the past, criticisms of Japanese military history periodically resurface in different, potentially allied, Asian societies such as Taiwan, South Korea or Hong Kong. This can make it difficult to create a regional alliance between Asian democratic countries, much to the despair of the US. In this sense, issues such as the treatment of Korean comfort women play a fundamental role in any regional security policy achievement.

The third challenge concerns diplomatic relations to third states, especially with respect to China as a global actor. Although Beijing has long since orphaned the North Korean regime by not vetoing the UN’s strict sanctions against it, the emergence of a Tokyo-Seoul security axis may be a challenge too explicit for Beijing to ignore—especially at a time when conflicts with Japan over the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands have increased. This issue will test the diplomatic machinery of Seoul and Tokyo in minimising the cost that this agreement will undoubtedly have, something of particular concern since Japan is the third largest investor in the Asian giant.

Only time will tell if South Korea and Japan can overcome these challenges and forge what could be a new international scenario based on coalitions of regional actors instead of an American super-actor guaranteeing (and paying for) the security of its allies. If this were so, the pacem of the future would be achieved by building on the solid foundations of the current intelligence exchange.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/seoul-tokyos-new-security-axis/feed/0Singapore-China relations hit another snaghttp://www.policyforum.net/singapore-china-relations-hit-another-snag/
http://www.policyforum.net/singapore-china-relations-hit-another-snag/#respondThu, 08 Dec 2016 04:14:29 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14812Singapore is unlikely to cede to Chinese pressure over how it conducts its foreign policy, Liang Fook Lye writes. Singapore’s relations with the People’s Republic of China appear to have lurched from one incident to another, suggesting that all is not well with the relationship. In April 2016, two senior Singaporean diplomats reportedly accused China of meddling […]

]]>Singapore is unlikely to cede to Chinese pressure over how it conducts its foreign policy, Liang Fook Lye writes.

Singapore’s relations with the People’s Republic of China appear to have lurched from one incident to another, suggesting that all is not well with the relationship.

In April 2016, two senior Singaporean diplomats reportedly accused China of meddling in ASEAN’s internal affairs and attempting to divide the regional grouping after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that China had reached a four-point consensus with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos on the South China Sea issue. In response, a Chinese vice-foreign minister asserted that China’s intentions had been misunderstood and that China had sought clarification from Singapore on the accusation levelled by the diplomats.

In June 2016, Singapore returned to the spotlight when what was supposed to be a joint foreign ministers’ press conference with Wang Yi and Singapore’s Vivian Balakrishnan after a special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting ended up with only a solo media appearance by the Chinese minister. Chinese netizens went into overdrive and criticised Singapore – currently the country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations – for not doing enough to forge a consensus on the South China Sea issue.

A few months later, in September, a robust exchange ensued between the Singaporean Ambassador in Beijing and the editor of the hawkish Communist Party publication, the Global Times, over what was perceived to be Singapore’s attempts (when in fact it was ASEAN’s efforts) to revise the Southeast Asia paragraphs in the Non-Aligned Movement Summit’s final documents.

Furthermore, various quarters in China have interpreted Singapore providing its facilities to US Littoral Combat Ships and US P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance as Singapore standing on the side of the United States to “contain” China. Before this, China was already reportedly irked with Singapore for constantly harping on about the sanctity of the rule of law in resolving disputes such as those in the South China Sea and ‘parroting the US line’ by reiterating the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the area.

Most recently, in November 2016, Hong Kong’s Customs and Excise Department seized nine Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicles belonging to the Singapore Armed Forces. This occurred while the tanks were in transit at Hong Kong’s Kwai Chung Container Terminal, ostensibly on the grounds that they were controlled military items that required special permits. It appeared that APL, the commercial carrier transporting the vehicles, did not comply with certain documentation that led to the seizure.

But there was more to the seizure than just documentation. For the first time, China publicly stated that: “The Chinese side is firmly opposed to any forms of official interaction between Taiwan and countries that have diplomatic relations with us, military exchanges and cooperation included.” China also lodged representations asking Singapore to act in accordance with the relevant laws of Hong Kong and, more importantly, called on Singapore to stick to the One China principle. In other words, alleging that Singapore had contravened the One China principle by continuing with its training facilities in Taiwan (as the vehicles were being transported back to Singapore after such a training exercise).

Many reasons have been offered as to why China has chosen only now to publicly chastise Singapore for contravening the One China principle when it has been well known that Singaporean troops have been training in Taiwan since 1975. They include China wanting to “punish” Singapore for being too outspoken on the South China Sea issue, for standing on the US side against China and for its continued vocal pronouncements on the rule of law. Some have even speculated that China is attempting to test the mettle of Singapore’s leadership in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.

Whatever the reason, there appears to be an attempt by China to browbeat Singapore into becoming more compliant with China’s wishes or at least into not being too outspoken on certain issues. A more crucial question to ask is what is Singapore’s response likely to be going forward?

For one, Singapore’s immediate goal is to recover the nine Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicles as expeditiously as possible through quiet but effective diplomacy. But this issue pales in comparison to the overall multi-faceted and multi-level interactions that Singapore and China share whether in terms of trade, investment, educational, cultural or people-to-people exchanges. The two governments have also launched the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative, which is regarded as “the key priority demonstration project” under China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. This project, launched during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Singapore in November 2015, underscores Singapore’s strong support for Xi’s OBOR.

Second, Singapore will continue to abide by the One China policy. In fact, Singapore has stated that it was precisely because of its support for the policy that it hosted the 1993 Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu cross-strait talks and, more significantly, the meeting between Chinese President Xi and then Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou in 2015 during Xi’s state visit to Singapore. Singapore intends to continue its military training in Taiwan as this activity predates Singapore establishing diplomatic ties with China and had proceeded without incident until the vehicle seizure episode.

Finally, contrary to the expectations of some in China, Singapore is likely to continue to conduct its foreign policy based on a hard-nosed assessment of its national interests and according to principles such as the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight. These are principles that small states like Singapore, without the luxury of a long history like China, rely on to survive and prosper.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/singapore-china-relations-hit-another-snag/feed/0How could this happen?http://www.policyforum.net/how-could-this-happen/
http://www.policyforum.net/how-could-this-happen/#respondWed, 07 Dec 2016 19:53:00 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14821Australia has churned through five prime ministers in the same time New Zealand has had only two. Why such a divergence between two otherwise very similar nations, Robert McMullan asks. The sudden resignation of John Key from the position of prime minister of New Zealand has generated a lot of positive assessments of his term […]

]]>Australia has churned through five prime ministers in the same time New Zealand has had only two. Why such a divergence between two otherwise very similar nations, Robert McMullan asks.

The sudden resignation of John Key from the position of prime minister of New Zealand has generated a lot of positive assessments of his term in office.

They seem to me to be well deserved.

Similarly, when Helen Clark was defeated in the 2008 election, there were many reflections on her very significant and successful period as leader.

These also seem well deserved.

What strikes me then is this: how has New Zealand had two successful and respected prime ministers in the same 17-year period in which Australia has gone through six prime ministerships (although admittedly only five different prime ministers)?

After all, New Zealand has a proportional representation electoral system, one that is generally recognised as likely to cause unstable coalitions. Australia, meanwhile, has the preferential voting system, which tends to create inflated majorities for the winning side.

Furthermore, they have been able to maintain policy stability on some of the long-term issues which require such mature policy-making.

The prime example is the carbon price.

The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme was introduced by the Labour Government in September 2008 and was continued, with amendments in 2009 and 2012, by the subsequent National Party Government.

There is no simple answer to the question: “how could this happen”?

Australia and New Zealand are too similar for there to be a “national character” explanation.

It may be coincidence (or as Ian Fleming would say happenstance).

There is no doubt that part of the explanation lies in the character of the five Australian prime ministers.

John Howard stayed too long; Kevin Rudd was unable to maintain the support of his team; Julia Gillard botched the transition; Tony Abbott never grew out of his opposition mentality and Malcolm Turnbull seems to have given up his mojo as the price for winning the top job.

But perhaps there is more to it than this.

The New Zealand electoral system may have created an environment in which compromise and stability are at a premium.

I have always been a defender of the Australian electoral system. Compulsory voting makes it harder for the extremes to flourish, preferential voting allows for protest and tactical voting while still giving voters the ability to exercise an effective choice between the alternative governments and we are able to deliver stable majorities on almost every occasion.

Proportional representation has a valid role in choosing parliamentary houses of review, even if preference deals have recently led to some bizarre results in the Australian Senate. However, I have never favoured it for choosing governments.

But perhaps those of us who have expressed strong views on this issue need to reconsider.

The explanation of the different approach to maintaining continuity of policy on long-term questions such as climate change is undoubtedly bound up with the explanation of the character of the various leaders in Australia, particularly Tony Abbott but all the others also to some extent.

It is also undoubtedly the case that the Australian economy is more directly impacted by a price on carbon than is the New Zealand one.

But although I don’t pay as much attention to New Zealand politics as I do to the Australian version, I have not heard of the New Zealand equivalent of the $100 roast lamb type claims voiced in Australia.

After the new New Zealand Prime Minister is chosen and confronts the challenges of governing and then trying to win an election, we may find the differences between the two sides of the Tasman narrow. We can then relax, satisfied that the reasons behind recent differences can be chalked up to the combination of luck and character – two factors that so often explain so much for which we seek more profound explanations.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/how-could-this-happen/feed/0Interpol: a tool for China’s political persecutions?http://www.policyforum.net/interpol-tool-chinas-political-persecutions/
http://www.policyforum.net/interpol-tool-chinas-political-persecutions/#respondTue, 06 Dec 2016 19:52:48 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14757China is more likely to use Interpol to hunt down corrupt officials than political dissidents, Jie Chen writes. The election of Meng Hongwei, a Chinese Vice-Minister of Public Security, as president of Interpol has raised concerns among human rights groups that China will use the international police organisation for a global hunt for political dissidents […]

]]>China is more likely to use Interpol to hunt down corrupt officials than political dissidents, Jie Chen writes.

The election of Meng Hongwei, a Chinese Vice-Minister of Public Security, as president of Interpol has raised concerns among human rights groups that China will use the international police organisation for a global hunt for political dissidents in exile. This is understandable since the Chinese police force is also tasked with clamping down on challenges to the party-state. However, overall this assumption underestimates both Beijing’s wisdom and its dilemma in handling dissidents.

China’s core dissidents overseas are activists in exile in the West, particularly in the United States, including Democracy Wall veterans, Tiananmen Square student leaders and intellectuals, and a host of other activists who became politicised while studying or living abroad. Though either wanted or blacklisted, evidence suggests that Beijing would rather they stay overseas forever, even though it joined Interpol in 1984. Some exiled Tiananmen Square student leaders, such as Wu’er Kaixi and Wang Dan, purposely staged return trips as publicity stunts to embarrass and provoke the authorities, only to find it was hard enough for them to sneak into Hong Kong, let alone any mainland Chinese airport. The New York-based Wang Juntao, the “black hand” of Tiananmen, was refused permission to attend his father’s funeral in China in 2013. Xiong Yan, a former Beijing student leader and now a US Army chaplain, was consistently rejected in his visa applications to meet with his dying mother during 2014 and 2015. A few others have been picked up at Beijing airport over the years and expelled after a few hours of interrogation.

Thus Beijing is more interested in imposing a permanent exile on the dissidents, in seeing them languish in their dreamed-about Western democracies because of linguistic and financial hardship and never-ending, reputation-destroying infighting. Some of China’s greatest public intellectuals from the 1980s died in exile. To seize, extradite and imprison dissidents for their “anti-China activities” will unnecessarily create diplomatic hot potatoes for Beijing and re-cast those ageing democracy fighters as heroes. What sense does it make for Beijing to request Interpol to use the crime of “subversion of the state” to assist in the extradition of those well-known dissidents who remain on Beijing’s most-wanted list but have become darlings of the US Congress and enjoy funding from the National Endowment for Democracy? Not even President-elect Donald Trump, who infamously praised the Chinese Government’s actions in the Tiananmen massacre, would oblige.

Certainly, a very small number of dissidents were abducted when venturing into Southeast Asia. As well as the recent cases related to Hong Kong booksellers and mainland activists trying to escape to the US and Canada via Southeast Asia, there is also that of Wang Bingzhang. Dr Wang, a pioneer of the first overseas Chinese democracy parties who also founded the China Spring magazine in New York in 1983, was kidnapped at the Sino-Vietnam border in 2002 in a secret joint operation between the two governments.

However, these opportunistic actions sound more like underworld operations. In places like Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand, authorities collude with Beijing, and shadowy ethnic Chinese elements are active. This comes in handy for Beijing and means there is little need for Interpol. On the contrary, involvement by Interpol may expose the nature of the cases. Additionally, Interpol’s official mandate forbids it from interventions that are of a political or religious nature.

Interpol may be used if a dissident can be conveniently labelled a “terrorist”. Wang Bingzhang was later charged with “terrorism” and sentenced to life imprisonment due to his loose talk on “armed revolution”. Though Beijing didn’t use Interpol to seize him, similar cases in the future may include them. However, dissidents usually don’t indulge in “armed revolution” rhetoric, for they are really acting like elements in an international branch of Chinese civil society – as social activists, diplomatic lobbyists, and online academics. This gives Beijing very little grounds to use an internationally accepted justification to request that foreign governments seize and extradite them. Wang was merely frustrated with the lack of Western support for human rights and democracy in his homeland.

One area where things are vague is the case of overseas Uighur activists campaigning for Xinjiang, or East Turkestan, self-determination. Beijing hesitates far less in alleging their connections to terrorist activities in Xinjiang. Indeed, Dolkun Isa, head of the World Uyghur Congress, has been placed on an Interpol Red Notice, which is “a request to locate and provisionally arrest an individual pending extradition”.

I believe Beijing’s motivation is principally to enhance Interpol’s role in tracking down and repatriating those fugitive officials originating from the mainstream party-state whom President Xi Jinping wants as part of his anti-corruption crusade. For example, of the 100 Red Notices issued by Beijing through Interpol last year as part of Operation Fox Hunt, not a single listed fugitive is a dissident or “terrorist” – all are corrupt officials on the run.

As usual, political foxes may continue to be watched, harassed, character-assassinated, and some may lose their skin and fur if wandering around in Southeast Asian jungles, hidden from watchful international eyes – until they are paraded on Chinese state television. As a matter of principle, the international community, particularly the Western states, should always guard against Beijing’s use of Interpol as a tool in its political persecutions. Having long lost its zeal for the promotion of democracy in China, Western states should by no means literally hand over a democracy advocate or peaceful “separatist” to Beijing.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/interpol-tool-chinas-political-persecutions/feed/0The guanxi of footballhttp://www.policyforum.net/the-guanxi-of-football/
http://www.policyforum.net/the-guanxi-of-football/#respondTue, 06 Dec 2016 11:57:41 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14778The purchase of a second-tier English football club by a Chinese conglomerate provides a window into a business culture of relationships and reciprocity, Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop and Dan Parnell write. When Chinese conglomerate Fosun International Limited acquired English second-tier football club Wolverhampton Wanderers (commonly referred to as Wolves), many of the club’s fans anticipated […]

]]>The purchase of a second-tier English football club by a Chinese conglomerate provides a window into a business culture of relationships and reciprocity, Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop and Dan Parnell write.

Fosun were clearly unhappy, as languishing in the lower reaches of second-tier English football neither cast the company in a positive light nor added significant value to China’s current football revolution. Even so, Fosun is unlikely to see its first foray into European club ownership as a disaster.

Football alone was never likely to be the only reason why Fosun bought Wolves. As a conglomerate, this might seem an obvious thing to say, as this type of organisation owns multiple businesses across a number of often-unrelated industrial sectors. At one level, Wolves could be just another investment in a broad portfolio of Fosun properties.

However, at another level, acquiring assets in football brings a much broader range of potential benefits. Fosun owns a 20 per cent stake in Gestifute, football super-agent Jorge Mendes’ player representation agency. Together, Gestifute and Wolverhampton have opened up a network to Fosun that is ultimately intended to be of much greater value to the company.

Networks in Chinese culture are so fundamental to doing business that China even has a name for it: guanxi. The literal translation of guanxi is often difficult to pin down but is sometimes defined simply as ‘relationships and connections’. Guanxi is rather more profound than Westerners might imagine, based upon their own notion of ‘connections’. It is a form of reciprocation – what Westerners may call ‘a favour for a favour’. That is, Chinese business people will often give something to someone in return for, at a later date, being able to ask that person to give something back or to exert influence on their behalf.

This is intended to enable Chinese businesses to create connections, relationships, and networks that help them bypass normal governance systems or conventional business practices. An important aspect of this is the social ties between individuals, which are intended to provide direct or exclusive access to insider information, business contracts or scarce resources.

Yet even if Wanderers do little more than play out the coming seasons in mid-table mediocrity, Fosun may not be too concerned. After all, guanxi dictates that there’s more to the Wolves deal than meets the eye. Indeed, having undertaken a social network analysis (which was derived from media sources) of Wolves and its new owner Fosun, it appears that the club is simply a hub in a much more significant collection of relationships and connections.

The diagram below gives some idea of what this network looks like:

Wolverhampton Wanderers’ owner Fosun is owned by Chinese billionaire Guo Guangchang. Guo is widely acknowledged as being one of China’s richest men, with a net worth of around US$5.9 billion. Guo has built a corporation with interests in everything from mining to pharmaceuticals to real estate. In many ways this is Guo’s guanxi, his network extending way beyond second-tier English football.

More significantly, in football terms, Fosun also set-up Foyo Culture and Entertainment Co Ltd. It is this company which in turn owns a minority stake in Mendes’ Gestifute. This provides agency services to football players through a subsidiary company, Polaris Sports. Among Polaris’ clients are Real Madrid players Cristiano Ronaldo and James Rodriguez. Polaris also works with current Manchester United manager Jose Mourinho, who has long-standing links with Jorge Mendes (his agent for many years).

Together, Gestifute and Polaris partner with American company CAA Sport (a global sports and entertainment agency), which has numerous clients across football including FC Barcelona and Chelsea. The agency is itself part of a larger company – CAA (Creative Artists Agency), which represents a number of Hollywood ‘A-List’ celebrities. Tom Cruise and Brad Pitt are two of CAA’s clients.

Cruise and Pitt may not appear to have too much in common with a post-industrial town in the middle of England, and are unlikely to be turning out on a Saturday afternoon in Wolves’ famed gold kit, yet our map of Wanderers’ guanxi network shows there is a road that stretches from Hollywood to Wolverhampton. This begs the questions: why, and what is the return on investment for Fosun?

In recent years, the Chinese conglomerate has diversified into films and television, via its production company Fosun Pictures. The network connections to Cruise/Pitt/CAA therefore make a lot of sense, especially if one looks ahead to a Fosun-produced Hollywood blockbuster at some stage in the future.

This still seems a long way, though, from Wolverhampton. However, the town’s location in England’s West Midlands conurbation (home to Birmingham – England’s ‘second city’) may hold some clues. Rumours are currently circulating that British terrestrial television broadcaster Channel 4 is about to relocate from London, with Birmingham thought to be its favoured location. It is also rumoured the move may be part of the development of a much bigger media and entertainment complex in the city.

A corporation like Fosun, already investing heavily into the sector, would therefore appear to be ideally placed to bid for contracts that might emerge out of such a development. At the same time, there are major plans for Britain’s HS2 rail link to pass through the West Midlands, which would generate further business opportunities. Fosun recently became the first private Chinese company to own a bigger stake (US$ 6.9 billion) than the government in a high-speed railway project. The company is therefore ideally placed to bid for HS2 work.

And this is how guanxi works: when Fosun bought Wolves, the conglomerate was not simply just buying a football club. It was buying into a network of relationships and connections that Guo no doubt knew would have much broader, deeper and financially lucrative implications for the conglomerate. While it seems unlikely that Brad Pitt will become a regular spectator at Wolves’ home games, the fact he forms part of the club’s wider network reveals a great deal about both guanxi and how Chinese business works.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/the-guanxi-of-football/feed/0A nation at war with itselfhttp://www.policyforum.net/a-nation-at-war-with-itself/
http://www.policyforum.net/a-nation-at-war-with-itself/#respondMon, 05 Dec 2016 19:38:15 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14660Following the 2016 US Presidential election, America faces a challenge as profound as any it has encountered in the last 150 years, William H Chafe writes. Not since the Civil War in 1860 has the American nation been so divided. In many ways – as in the Civil War – race is at the core […]

]]>Following the 2016 US Presidential election, America faces a challenge as profound as any it has encountered in the last 150 years, William H Chafe writes.

Not since the Civil War in 1860 has the American nation been so divided. In many ways – as in the Civil War – race is at the core of the division. A decisive majority of white voters, women as well as men, voted for Donald Trump. Over 90 per cent of African Americans, by contrast, voted for Clinton. But the election was about more than race. Attitudes toward immigrants, Muslims and women also highlighted the degree to which we have become separate. We fail to understand each other, and we subscribe to values that appear to come from two different nations and cultures.

In some respects, the best way to understand the election – and the divide – is to realise that there were two Donalds and two Hillarys running against each other. But each side saw only one of the two, failing completely to understand the “other” Donald and the “other” Hillary.

Most people in the news media, and virtually all Democrats, saw Trump as bombastic, egomaniacal, racist, xenophobic and sexist. They viewed the videotape where he boasted of “groping” women, heard him call Mexican immigrants “rapists” and criminals, describe all blacks as swamped by poverty, and demand a ban on the migration of Muslims to America. Seeing only the Trump captured in these statements, they concluded that no decent American could ever vote for someone so bigoted and oppressive.

What the media and Democrats failed to see was the “other” Donald. This was the Trump who outspokenly condemned the “Establishment,” denounced the privilege of those in power and called attention to the plight of white working and middle-class Americans who had seen their incomes plummet, their job opportunities shrink, and their desire for representation in Washington ignored. Those Americans who saw this second Trump blast the Establishment each day viewed him as their voice, their defender. Paying little if any heed to the Trump who bragged about sexually assaulting women, they chose to listen to the Trump who resonated with their pain and spoke for their redemption.

These angry, primarily white voters who chose to support Trump also saw only one Hillary. This was the woman who embodied the Establishment, held and exercised power for nearly thirty years, never revealed her deep emotions and seemed repeatedly to convey the message that now it was “her” turn to be in charge of the country. She came across as someone who sought to perpetuate the “system” and values that Trump supporters saw as the source of their despair. This was the Hillary who received hundreds of thousands of dollars for giving a speech to the leading firm on Wall Street, then refused to divulge what she had said; the Hillary whose life revolved around the rich and powerful – precisely the people who Trump was attacking and who Hillary came to symbolise.

Virtually no one saw the “other” Hillary. This was the young woman whose mother insisted that she attend the Methodist Youth Fellowship at her church, who then became a convert to the “Social Gospel” – the belief that Christians should commit their lives to achieving the justice, equality, and fairness that Jesus preached – and who then devoted her college and post-graduate life to volunteering in ghettoes, to fighting for women’s and children’s rights and to achieving economic and racial equality. That Hillary was never seen during the campaign. The woman who was religiously inspired to work on behalf of those who were treated unequally never appeared in the lead up to the election. All voters saw was the woman who personified the Establishment, and sought to perpetuate it.

So America now faces a challenge as profound as any we have encountered in the last 150 years. How can we learn to listen to each other? Is it possible to overcome our bitterness and reach out to those so seemingly different than ourselves? Is it conceivable that we can rediscover the values that our schools taught all of us – a belief that every person in our society has the same right to demonstrate their abilities, get a fair hearing and work for the betterment of the entire community. After all, we are a nation of immigrants, from countries and religious faiths all over the world, of different races and with different backgrounds – but still deserving an equal right to be as good and successful as we can be.

It is as great a challenge as we have ever faced. If we fail to meet it, the country we love will disappear.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/a-nation-at-war-with-itself/feed/0Building the roads to sustainable developmenthttp://www.policyforum.net/building-roads-sustainable-development/
http://www.policyforum.net/building-roads-sustainable-development/#respondMon, 05 Dec 2016 06:22:44 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14750If countries of the Asia-Pacific are to realise the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, they must work together to solve the connectivity, pollution, and congestion issues facing the region, Shamshad Akhtar writes. Transport is a key contributor to economic growth, prosperity and societal well-being. Physical links across Asia and the Pacific have increasingly improved through […]

]]>If countries of the Asia-Pacific are to realise the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, they must work together to solve the connectivity, pollution, and congestion issues facing the region, Shamshad Akhtar writes.

Transport is a key contributor to economic growth, prosperity and societal well-being. Physical links across Asia and the Pacific have increasingly improved through years of steady investments in the Asian Highway, a project endorsed by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP) commission at its 48th session in 1992 to promote intergovernmental agreements to develop a regional highway network, and the Trans-Asian Railways, as well as through the facilitation of land transport projects. These intertwined projects have resulted in a network of 140,000 kilometres of roads being developed in 32 countries, which in turn have enabled better connectivity within Asia as well as between Asia and Europe, and contributed to the development of other related infrastructure.

Further deepening Asian transport connectivity, however, requires that we consider some additional imperatives. For instance, we must ensure that regional connectivity is seamless and promotes multimodal connectivity to allow for the most cost-effective and time-efficient delivery of goods from one point to another. To this end, some important regional initiatives, such as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, and the Eurasian Economic Union, provide strategic visions that will help forge broader regional and international transportation connectivity in our region. Moving forward, these initiatives must develop missing corridors and link Asia better with internal and outside markets in order to better promote seamless connectivity. Beyond this, we as a region must also develop a better understanding of how to harmonise these plans with the principles of sustainable development.

To promote regional transport sector development that is in sync with and reinforces the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, we must focus our efforts on three areas.

First, we must urgently curb the transport sector’s contribution to the region’s greenhouse gas emissions. Asia’s motorised transport emissions are responsible for 23 per cent of global aggregate emissions and are set to rise to 31 per cent by 2030. If no action is taken, transport will become the single largest emitter of greenhouse gas, responsible for 46 per cent of the share of global emissions by 2035. Success in meeting the global climate change targets laid out in the Paris Agreement will require both reducing transport emissions and strengthening the resilience of transport infrastructure to the effects of climate change.

Second, tackling traffic congestion in our cities will help us unlock bottlenecks to economic growth by speeding up transportation and reducing costs associated with the movement of goods. To illustrate the significant effects of such bottlenecks, traffic congestion in Bangkok, where the UN ESCAP is headquartered, costs roughly 6 per cent of Thailand’s annual GDP.

Third, sustainability of transport calls for a careful response to the public health dimension of transport. Road accidents continue to be one of the leading causes of fatalities in our economies, killing over 700,000 people annually in the Asia-Pacific and injuring many more. The economic cost of road accidents is estimated to be 3 per cent of global GDP. Asia-Pacific’s low and middle income countries are shouldering road accident costs as high as 5 per cent of GDP, which is in many cases greater than the total value of their overseas development assistance.

Recognising these needs and challenges, the UN ESCAP, with support from the Government of the Russian Federation, is organising a Ministerial Conference on Transport in Moscow from 5-9 December 2016. Our aim is to provide an opportunity to our member states to develop a new five-year regional action program for sustainable transport. At its core, the regional action program will promote integrated intermodal transport systems to balance, link and coordinate the varied modes of transport such as roads, railways, maritime and aviation, in order to achieve optimum economic, social and environmental performance.

This program will facilitate greater intra-regional investment and trade in the region, and will also guide the transport sector to significantly cut greenhouse gas emissions by optimising resources, improving transport modal choices, and increasing efficiencies. Through enhancing road safety, advocacy, policy, legislation, infrastructure facilities, and cross-border operations, this program will provide remote, poor, and rural communities with better access to markets, investment, health, education and social needs. The program will also enable countries of the region to be better equipped to develop and implement evidence-based policies and plans to address urban transport challenges in order to underpin future economic growth.

Implementing this new regional action program will be a challenging, but ultimately critical task if we are to realise the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda. ESCAP, as the regional arm of the United Nations in the Asia-Pacific, will support the countries of the region to take visionary steps and work together in order to ensure the contribution of the transport sector to sustainable development.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/building-roads-sustainable-development/feed/0Who says democracy is dead?http://www.policyforum.net/says-democracy-dead/
http://www.policyforum.net/says-democracy-dead/#respondSun, 04 Dec 2016 19:54:18 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14667Carolyn Hendriks takes a trip to the Australian electorate of Indi, and finds a community keen to reinvigorate democracy. If anyone needs an antidote to the ‘Trump-dumps’ then can I suggest you take a road trip to northeast Victoria to the electorate of Indi. There you will be welcomed by a growing group of citizens […]

]]>Carolyn Hendriks takes a trip to the Australian electorate of Indi, and finds a community keen to reinvigorate democracy.

If anyone needs an antidote to the ‘Trump-dumps’ then can I suggest you take a road trip to northeast Victoria to the electorate of Indi.

There you will be welcomed by a growing group of citizens who are committed to switching democracy back on.

Recently I left the nation’s capital and headed south down the Hume to speak at the Annual General Meeting for the Voices for Indi (V4I) community organisation.

V4I is mostly known for its role in assisting Independent Cathy McGowan MP defeat liberal candidate Sophie Mirabella in 2013 and again in 2016.

But the democratic efforts of V4I extend well beyond mounting successful electoral campaigns. V4I is a movement of diverse people committed to making democracy work better in all manner of ways.

This year V4I held its AGM as an open public meeting in a Wangaratta community hall on a hot spring Sunday morning. Forget about that lazy brunch with smashed avocado by the Ovens River! This was an event attended by well over 50 young and old citizens from around northeast Victoria keen to talk more about public engagement and democratic change.

Like many around the world, these citizens are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. But rather than disengage they are mobilising people, speaking up, talking, listening, organising, acting, agitating and in some cases, standing for office.

Take, for example, Anne Shaw, aged 59, who is described as a real ‘worker bee’ of democratic change in the region. Anne is the furthest thing from a populist demagogue: she an unassuming, humble, democratic ‘do-er’. She works tirelessly behind the scenes of V4I – organising events, sending emails, writing minutes, maintaining the database, networking and connecting people. In addition, she continues to work with a host of community groups throughout the region, as she has done for most of her adult life. Anne’s longstanding commitment to community leadership, education, and social change earned her the honour of 2016 Wangaratta Citizen of the Year.

Then there’s Sophie Price, a 24-year old mum, who is youngest person to be elected in Indigo Shire council’s history. Sophie represents a new generation of democratic reformers. She’s committed to making local government work for the youth.

I also met Florent Thivillier, a young new Australian citizen from France who now lives in Benalla. Florent is passionate about making our democracy open to people from all cultures.

Another unassuming democratic change agent is Denis Ginnivan – a retired health worker, now farmer and events manager from Yackandandah. Denis is one of the founding members of V4I, and now President, he also works on several community projects including a local solar energy initiative.

These are just some of the hundreds of diverse citizens across Indi who are not just part of a V4I but who are actively working away to improve the quality and responsiveness of their democratic institutions.

Citizens like Anne, Sophie, Florent and Denis are what make democracies work. They get informed, ask questions, talk to people, engage in debates, organise, write letters, agitate, and most importantly, they act.

Indi is not alone. Communities around the world are full of committed and engaged citizens taking small, significant steps every day to make sure their democracies function as they should.

In an era of loud voices and populism, let us not forget the significant but often silent work of people within our democracies who are nudging away at change.

Through their often unseen efforts, our imperfect democratic systems are that bit more responsive and accountable to the public. A triumphant cheer for democracy’s worker-bees!

This post is a collaboration with Pop Politics Aus – the blog for everything you want to know about political organisations and participation.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/says-democracy-dead/feed/0Najib’s fear campaignhttp://www.policyforum.net/najibs-fear-campaign/
http://www.policyforum.net/najibs-fear-campaign/#respondFri, 02 Dec 2016 06:36:42 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14712The Malaysian Prime Minister’s ruthless tactics to hold on to power at all costs demonstrate that he is the one who is most afraid while his people are willing to fight on, Bridget Welsh writes. This week Najib Tun Razak is beating the Malay chauvinist drum at his party’s annual general assembly (AGM). Meetings of […]

]]>The Malaysian Prime Minister’s ruthless tactics to hold on to power at all costs demonstrate that he is the one who is most afraid while his people are willing to fight on, Bridget Welsh writes.

This week Najib Tun Razak is beating the Malay chauvinist drum at his party’s annual general assembly (AGM). Meetings of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) have regularly followed this mode, but the use of racism and paranoia have taken on greater intensity in the face of its leader’s eroding political legitimacy.

For the past two years, Malaysia’s Prime Minister has been beleaguered by the 1MDB scandal that has involved not only nearly $700 million going into Najib’s personal account but also raised issues of criminal money laundering, embezzlement and economic mismanagement involving over $3.5 billion. The case is being investigated and prosecuted in over six jurisdictions, most notably by the US Department of Justice. The scandal featured centre stage in last month’s Bersih 5 rally in which thousands went to the streets to protest corruption, economic mismanagement and systematic inequalities in the electoral process.

Despite public discontent, Najib has adeptly used a variety of tactics to stay in power, which is crucial if he is to avoid international prosecution. The most obvious of these involves a crackdown on political opponents. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in 2015. Since then more than 10 opposition politicians have faced a variety of charges from sedition to challenges to ‘parliamentary democracy’. Last month whistleblower and parliamentarian, Rafizi Ramli, was convicted of violating the Official Secrets Act for releasing evidence associated with 1MDB. This week’s UMNO meeting has called for continued no-holds-barred attacks on the opposition.

The crackdown on dissent has also targeted civil society. On the eve of the 19 November Bersih 5 rally, its chairperson, Maria Chin Abdullah, was arrested under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act. She was held in solitary confinement, using a provision in the law that was designed for terrorism and national security. This follows a litany of attacks on other activists, cartoonists and artists, as well as ordinary citizens for ‘insulting’ posts on Facebook and WhatsApp. In 2015 there were 91 cases for ‘sedition’ alone. Human Rights Watch has detailed these in an October 2016 report.

The media has also been in the firing line. In 2015 the harassment of publishers led to the closure of The Malaysian Insider. Last month the online portal Malaysiakini was raided, and its editor Steven Gan was charged for simply publishing a video. This comes on the back of the Communication and Multimedia Act being tightened in March. ‘Protection’ from insults has extended beyond Najib to those seen to be protecting him. The aim is to silence criticism of Malaysia’s most unpopular prime minister.

To complement these attacks, Najib’s government has deepened its use of racial chauvinism. From the 2013 elections onwards, it has depicted opposition to it as ‘Chinese’ and reinforced the view that Najib’s UMNO party, is the only viable protector of the Malays. This politicised framing lacks any grounding in reality as over 40 per cent of Malays voted for the opposition in 2013 and the most recent Bersih rally showcased the breadth of multi-ethnic opposition to Najib, especially among young Malays. Nevertheless, Najib’s strategy has increased ethnic tensions along political lines. His ratcheted war-like rhetoric at the UMNO meeting points to a willingness to tear the society apart for his own political survival.

Scare tactics have extended to thuggery, most evident in the crass use of violence and intimidation by the UMNO-linked ‘red shirts’. Some of these political vigilantes – many of them allegedly paid to participate in hooliganism – have also been arrested but have clearly received favourable treatment. Despite official denials, the widespread perception is that thuggery is being promoted by the government.

Najib’s machinations also involve political manoeuvring. He has forged an alliance with conservative Islamist zealots. His government has allowed Wahhabi Islam to extend its extremist and intolerant tentacles through the unchecked and increasingly locally- and internationally-funded religious bureaucracy, with particular support from Najib’s close ally and 1MDB partner Saudi Arabia. Lacking moral authority of his own, Najib has chosen to ally himself with the discredited Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), led by Hadi Awang and his designer suit-wearing appointees. Perceptions of corruption and discriminatory land grabbing from indigenous people have corroded PAS’s public support, as Hadi has introduced a bill that hypocritically strengthens the punishment of ordinary Muslims for immoral activity. This bill, known as RUU 355, will open up opportunities for abuse by authorities in a government where the rule of law is not fairly practised and fuel ethnic tensions. It is no coincidence that bill was reactivated after the Bersih 5 rally.

Most of Najib’s politicking has focused on maintaining the support of his own party. He has repeatedly paid off UMNO leaders for their ‘loyalty’ through patronage while also purging UMNO of its leading critics. Former Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad resigned from the party earlier this year due to his opposition to Najib, while the party voted to expel former deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, another prominent critic of the Prime Minister. Najib appointed the grassroots party-stalwart Ahmad Zahid Hamidi as his deputy, aiming in the short-term to deflect party challenges. He is seen to be holding off on the appointment of his favoured cousin, Hishammudin Hussein. But even within UMNO dissatisfaction remains high due to the realisation that Najib is an electoral liability and UMNO could lose. This is despite the attacks, divisions and lack of clear alternative leadership from the opposition. The public shows of loyalty through dictator-like salutes of the leader at the UMNO AGM hide real unease among members and growing discontent between UMNO elites and the grassroots.

It is therefore little wonder that Najib has increasingly relied on the levers of power to stay in office. His government has broadened gerrymandering and malapportionment in the 2015-2016 electoral re-delineation exercise, conducting it without transparency and repeatedly dismissing the record number of challenges. He has also increased populist measures to buy support among Malaysia’s poorest citizens, a pattern that was replicated in the May 2016 Sarawak state elections. These measures have been introduced despite serious strain on operating budgets for government departments and widespread cuts to education and public services.

To compensate for the lack of funds and rising debt, Najib has turned to his new geostrategic ally – China – for money. Not only did China bail out Najib over 1MDB, but he also returned from a visit to Beijing at the beginning of last month bearing some $34 billion worth of deals, funds perceived to help greasing the patronage wheels ahead of the next elections to be scheduled before the end of 2018.

China has a vested interest in keeping a weak, dependent, autocratic leader in power. Little attention is being paid to the potential loss of Malaysian territory to the Chinese, to the unfavourable terms of these arrangements and their limited positive impact on Malaysia’s economy. Guarding against the possibility of electoral defeat, Najib has also established the new National Security Council, which came into effect in August and allows the prime minister to dictatorially declare ‘security areas’ through a body made up of his own appointees. At the same time, Najib has created a new special defence force and increased his personal protection.

While the Prime Minister has tried to use fear against his people, the person who has been the most afraid is Najib himself. This week’s UMNO meeting reflects rising paranoia. So far he has managed to hold on to power, but not without incurring serious costs. Growing authoritarianism, widening political polarisation, deepening ethnic tensions and discredited immoral leadership have damaged Malaysia’s social and political fabric. Najib’s mismanagement is also evident in the economy’s contraction and the depreciating currency. That thousands braved threats of arrest and thuggery to attend the Bersih 5 rally shows that many Malaysians are willing to fight on and will not be cowed. The test ahead will be the point when Najib’s fear campaign backfires more widely, and more Malaysians realise that the only thing they have to fear is Najib himself.

This article is published in collaboration with New Mandala, the premier website for analysis on Southeast Asia’s politics and society.

]]>http://www.policyforum.net/najibs-fear-campaign/feed/0China’s seizure of Singaporean tankshttp://www.policyforum.net/chinas-seizure-singaporean-tanks-no-reason-panic/
http://www.policyforum.net/chinas-seizure-singaporean-tanks-no-reason-panic/#respondFri, 02 Dec 2016 05:09:03 +0000http://www.policyforum.net/?p=14697Taiwan has long been a thorny issue in Sino-Singaporean relations, but is it behind China’s seizure of nine Singaporean tanks or is the incident more closely linked to the South China Sea dispute? Stephan Ortmann sheds light on the situation. When Hong Kong authorities seized nine Singaporean tanks on 23 November, after supposedly having been […]

]]>Taiwan has long been a thorny issue in Sino-Singaporean relations, but is it behind China’s seizure of nine Singaporean tanks or is the incident more closely linked to the South China Sea dispute? Stephan Ortmann sheds light on the situation.

When Hong Kong authorities seized nine Singaporean tanks on 23 November, after supposedly having been tipped off by Chinese authorities, it evolved into a major public relations crisis for Singapore’s government and apparently strained the relationship between the Southeast Asian city-state and one of the world’s most powerful nations. The advanced military equipment, that had been shipped by a commercial company and passed through Xiamen, potentially exposed Singapore’s military secrets to Chinese authorities. Despite growing concern over worsening ties between China and Singapore, the incident should not be exaggerated.

Many suggested that the action might have occurred in retaliation for Singapore’s stance in the South China Sea dispute in which the city-state has not sided with China regarding the Nine-Dash Line. China claims ownership of most of the South China Sea, which overlaps with many other Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam. Although not involved in the territorial disputes, Singapore believes Chinese control over the seas is not in its national interest and might affect the free flow of goods.

Others have asserted that China might be punishing Singapore for having military relations with Taiwan, which the former regards as a renegade province. The opposition against Communism had formed the basis of the friendship between the two states during the Cold War. Singapore’s first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, visited the island state 25 times during his lifetime, once even after Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000. Singapore’s military relationship with Taiwan, known as Operation Starlight, began in 1975 and has lasted for over 40 years. As many as 15,000 conscripts are sent to Taiwan for large-scale military games annually. China has viewed the training camps with great concern over the years.

Singapore has a long history of seeking to balance geostrategic interests in the region by maintaining a close relationship with the United States, while also seeking to improve its relationship with China. In 1971, Singapore voted in favour of admitting the People’s Republic China into the United Nations to take the place of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the General Assembly. The Singaporean government has spent significant amounts of money to gain the goodwill of the Chinese government. This has included the development of special means of economic cooperation such as the China–Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park in 1994 and the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city. Both projects have gone beyond economic cooperation and have sought to transfer lessons for socio-economic and political development. As China sees the one-party dominant but economically successful Singapore as a possible role model, it has sent thousands of officials there on study tours.

The city-state has also tried hard to improve cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Singapore has hosted important talks between the two Chinese states twice, first in 1993 and second in 2015. These most recent talks, between Taiwan’s leader Ma Ying-jeou and China’s President Xi Jinping, were seen as a milestone in the relationship between the two and Singapore was praised for its role. The goal was to achieve peaceful dialogue to enhance cross-strait relations. At the same time, the Singaporean government has repeatedly emphasised its support for the ‘One-China Policy’, which is also in line with US

At the same time, the Singaporean government has repeatedly emphasised its support for the ‘One-China Policy’, which is also in line with US policy. In 2013, China did not object when Singapore signed a free trade agreement with Taiwan, showing China was no longer opposed to the idea.

One should also not forget that last month’s tank incident was not the first time Singapore has clashed with China over Taiwan. In July 2004, the Chinese government was furious when then Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited Taipei. Most of the Chinese print media criticised the visit, and strong opposition was voiced online. The trip occurred at a time when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in power, leading some observers to regard it as an attempt to punish Taiwan. As such, the current escalation in tension is very similar to previous incidents, because the DPP has returned to power. But as Singapore reaffirms its commitment to the “One-China policy” and China prepares to return the military equipment, the relationship is likely to improve once again.