Realist
balance-of-power theory in Asia predicts that, in the likely absence of
U.S. security presence in Asia, Japan would have no choice but to rearm.l
Constructivism instead, refers to the international context as explaining
why bilateral security and economic relations were preferred over multilateral
cooperative arrangements. As discussed by Katzenstein and Okawara, realism
cannot predict whether Japan will balance against the United States as
the only superpower or against China as the rising regional hegemon.2 Similarly,
Japan might also choose not to resist accepting a central position of China
in Asia-Pacific rather than attempting to counter it. 3 As argued by Kang,
"Japan has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need to,
and it has no intention of challenging China for the central position in
Asian politics."4

In contrast,Tamamoto
argues that, Japan has an aversion to any Chinese will to regional supremacy,this
being deeply rooted in threat perceptions of Japan's ruling elite.s Such
questions, however, will not be settled through pure strategic thinking.
Japan's choice will ultimately reflect the way it perceives itself and
its Others. The ideational context shaped by perceptions of Japan toward
its neighbors as well as those of its neighbors toward Japan will determine
policy choices. Security interests are defined by actors who act in response
to the ideational context, and, in process, their actions become part of
the context.There were often interrelated structural material and nonmaterial
factors that prevent a similar development of an Asian regionalization
process. First of all, structurally, both pre-Cold War and post-Cold War
contexts of Asia and Europe are different. The United States supported
multilateralism in Europe during the Cold War in the form of NATO and the
European integration process. These existing frameworks were helpful in
building a common identity among Europeans and in integrating formerly
communist East European nations after the end of the Cold War. This was
not the case for Asia. The United States preferred forming their alliance
with Japan and South Korea through bilateral security treaties. Hence,
there was no existing framework for building a common identity to prepare
the ground of post-Cold War regionalization. Rather, Asia was characterized
by a stronger degree of nationalism and deeply rooted historical animosity
against Japan, particularly in China and Korea. During the Cold War, Japan
benefited from its security reliance on the United States to achieve a
remarkable economic development rate. Yet this also ensured that it did
not have to face up to its history. The United States did not follow policies
that could lead to a regime change in Japan. The Japanese emperor was cleaned
from all war crimes allegations and particularly after the reverse course
in American occupation policies, leading members of the old Japanese elite
to be brought back to power. Thus, throughout the Cold War, Japan under
the leadership of the LDP, preferred to escape from its history rather
than agreeing to confront it and open a new page in its relations with
other Asian countries.After the Cold War, the shadow of history worked
to prevent Japan from utilizing its accumulated economic wealth to create
regionalization processes. On the level of perceptions, both Japan and
Asia remained far from each other. Under the hegemony of the Yoshida School
which sought to utilize relations with the United States for Japanese economic
development, Japan managed to escape from its history. In sharp contrast
with Germany, for instance, whenever Japan was caught in between the United
States and East Asia, the preference was always the United States. The
primary reason for this was Japan's inability to develop a consensus on
addressing its historical constraints. Despite the shock of the Gulf War,
Japanese political, economic, and intellectual elite could not reach an
internal agreement on what would be its vision and identity. As Keio University
professor Kazuya Fukuda argues, "we could afford to have no direction in
the past when our economy prospered, but international problems are shaking
the country's foundation, which is built on international order. We need
a clear national identity."5

Yet the question
is how to define this national identity. Japan had a clear direction in
the Cold War era: Western foreign policy orientation designed to achieve
economic development but to avoid sharing security responsibilities. As
it became clear with the end of the Cold War and dramatically displayed
with the Gulf War, this magic formula was no longer working. The post-Cold
War era was being increasingly characterized by intense debates on the
future direction and orientation of Japan.

Japan's Failure
to "Escape from Asia"

The hegemonic
Japanese approach during the Cold War was the Yoshida Doctrine, characterized
by Japan's reliance on the U.S. security system to develop itself economically
and expand its economic sphere of interests. Even though Yoshida himself
believed that it was necessary to keep Japan away from a deeper integration
with the U.S. regional security system in order to avoid affronting China
and other Asian neighbors and to prepare the way for eventual development
of an Asian community, he could not escape American pressures which dictated
to him a foreign policy made in the United States. Hence Japan always supported
the position of the United States wherever there was such a demand. More
hardliner Japanese leaders such as Kishi were even more enthusiastic in
implementing this view. They sought to return Japan to its normal power
status by means of the alliance with the United States rather than in spite
of it. In doing so, they ended up making Japan more dependent on the United
States and unable to exert itself as an independent power in Asia. With
the end ofthe Cold War, however, areas of conflict appeared to be enlarging.
One reason was the regionalization processes in other economic poles of
the world, namely, Europe and North America. Japan could not respond to
European integration and creation of NAFTA in the form of creating or helping
to create an Asian regional group. There were calls on Japan from Southeast
Asian nations to create an Asian economic integration such as the formation
of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) as proposed by Malaysia. However,
Japan always prioritized its relations with the United States for two reasons:
first, the United States was Japan's primary economic market, and second,
it relied on the U.S. security umbrella. Under both the Yoshida and Kishi
doctrines, Japan developed its trade relations with Asian nations only
as an extension of its relations with the United States. Actually Japan
developed its relations with Asia only to the extent the United States
allowed it. In this regard, Japan was part of the U.S. global grand strategy.
It was a stranger in the region in which it was geographically located.

Japan was always
cold to the idea of creating an Asian economic integration in the form
of a trade block and monetary system. Instead it preferred the loose mechanism
of the Asia Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC) that incorporates East Asian
economies together with the United States, Canada, and Australia. APEC
is a nonbinding forum for dialogue rather than an institution for decision
making. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir campaigned for establishment
of an Asian grouping, East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). The group would
bring together a core of East Asian states that arguably shared a common
culture and value system.7 Eventually, the establishment of the East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC) was finally achieved but only in a much watered-down
format. Realism would point to structural factors in explaining Japan's
uneasiness to contribute to a regionalization process that would exclude
the United States. The primary structural factor was China's emerging power.
Although the Japanese economy was several times larger than that of China,
the prospects of a Chinese hegemony in East Asia was real. Given the Chinese
population of over one billion people in addition to Chinese­ dominated
economies of Southeast Asia, it was not possible for Japan or for Southeast
Asians to balance this power. However, this realist perspective does not
provide a sufficient explanation of the Japanese position vis-a.-vis Asian
regionalization without the input of nonmaterial factors, namely, identity
as rooted in history. In the words of Funabashi, "it appears that history..
.has become the leading player on the East Asian international political
scene where the past is more unpredictable than the future."6

Towards a Re-Asianization
of Japan?

Although many
nationalists interpreted the post-Cold War era as requiring a more assertive
Japanese foreign policy, many called for a reevaluation of Japan's approach
to Asian regionalization. Koyabashi Y otaro, one of Japan's influential
industrialists and Chairman of the Board of Directors of International
University of Japan, championed these demands for a "re-Asianization of
Japan." He argued: Since the Meiji Restoration in the late 1800s, progress
in Japan has been guided by an official policy of de-Asianization and pro-Westernization.
Adhering to this policy seemed a rational and natural course, as Japan
was driven to develop its technology and economy in order to take its place
among advanced nations of the West........Yet Japan's single-minded drive
for modernization took place at the expense of something very significant-the
friendship and trust of other Asian nations. Today, Japan should be pursuing
a path of "re-Asianization." This term may easily conjure up an image of
Japan isolating itself within the boundaries of Asia, or placing itself
at the center of Asia by dominating other countries in the region. This
is not the case. The re-Asianization I am promoting is not exclusive. Rather,
it involves strengthening ties in Asia, while at the same time maintaining
close relations with the West.9 Koyabashi acknowledges that Japan alone
cannot be the leader of Asia and argues that Japan should be the coleader
of Asia with China. 10 Funabashi Y oichi, a leading columnist of Japan's
liberal daily, Asahi Shimbun, argues that "East Asian regionalism and the
Japan-U.S. alliance can compatibly build a relationship of prosperous coexistence."
In his view, Japan is not in a position to choose one over the other: "Japan
must overcome its dependence on the United States and its fear of China
and develop its own Asian vision."11 More recent, Keizai Doyukai, an association
of corporate executives, published a proposal regarding Japan's role in
today's world. The proposal called for a greater economic integration in
Asia and supported abolishment of the yen in favor of creation of a common
Asian currency.12

Another such
effort was a 1993 article written by a senior foreign policy bureucrat
Ogura Kazuo, Ajia no Fukken no tameni (for a Restoration of Asia). Ogura
argued that Asian countries had to get rid of their Western­ minded elites
and overcome past anomosities in order to prepare itself for a Asian century.
Ogura asserted: As we prepare for the twenty-first century, we must seriously
reaxime the role of these Western-oriented intellectuals and leaders...
[who] are using their links with the West to maintain the legitimacy of
their superior position. What we see is in a sense a survival, although
under a different guise, of the old colonial arrangement by which natives
with Western learning could skillfully develop ties with the rulers and
thereby dominate the un­Westernized general populace. Under these circumstances,
members of the political elite have been hesitant to stress Asian values
lest they undermine the legitimacy of their own power. 13 These demands
for Japan to reevaluate its position in Asia have increased following the
Asian financial crisis that primarily hit the Japanese economy.

The 1997 Asian
financial crisis came as a shock to many Japanese. Despite enormous effects
on the Japanese economy, Japan could not respond to this crisis efficiently.
The Asian financial was caused by the massive outflow of foreign capital
from key Asian countries, starting with Thailand and quickly spreading
over Southeast Asia and South Korea. In 1996, about $100 billion flowed
into East Asia, but in 1997, $150 billion flowed out in the three months
after July. Only China appeared to resist the crisis due to its stringent
policies on controlling capital outflow and fixed currency regime. The
Japanese economy was adversely affected by the crisis due to the significance
of Asian markets for Japan. IMF and proponents of the neoliberal economic
system argued that domestic policies had caused the Asian financial crises
and the only way to exit the crisis was through implementation of the IMF
austerity programs.However, this argument was not accepted by some Asian
governments, most notably Malaysia.14 Many Asians believed that Asia had
to have regional financial arrangements to protect themselves from similar
volatility in the future. In Japan, there were calls to address the crisis
independent of the United States. For instance, Shintaro Ishihara, Japan's
most outspoken nationalist, argued: Japan should put its glut of financial
capital to good use by transforming it into an effective investment. There
are numerous ways of creating products more attractive than U.S. treasury
bonds. Under a sort of Marshall Plan for Asia, an Asian Recovery Bank could
be established on Japan's initiative. As East Asia has more energy than
any other developing region, it ought to be possible to get people to buy
into its future, especially if the Japanese government showed confidence
by guaranteeing investments in [the bank].

This is a battle
of minds and money. Japan has a historical responsibility toward the East
Asian countries which, as America's prey, are being slaughtered en masse.
It needs a new strategy . We should challenge Asia with an Asian standard
that exists within a fair and free framework.13

The Japanese
government, under the leadership of Vice Minister of Finance Sakakibura
Eisuke, launched an initiative to establish an AMF. Surprisingly, for the
first time since Second World War Japan assumed a pan-Asianist approach,
by proposing establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). It would create
a $100 billion fund prov.ided by East Asian states with a regional financial
surveillance mechanism and emergency loan facility to detect and suppress
future financial crisis. This regional fund would in practice replace IMF
in East and Southeast Asia, although Japanese officials stressed that AMF
would supplement and reinforce at a regional level existing IMF surveillance
and loan facilities. However, IMF and U.S. officials were clearly concerned
that the AMF proposal would undermine IMF's austerity programs by softening
the level of conditionality. 16 Both the United States and China but not
South Korea were concerned about the rise of a Japanese leadership and
hegemony in the region. Instead the United States advised Japan, in the
words of U.S. Commerce Secretary William M. Daley, that "the most important
contributions Japan can make to restore stability and growth in Asia are
to take steps necessary first, to strengthen domestic demand; second, to
deregulate Japan's economy; and third, to open up Imports." I 7

After external
pressures, Japan had to give up the idea. In the view of critics, "Japan
appeared once again to have crumbled in the face of U.S. pressure and to
have prioritized the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship over its commitment
to any form of regional multilateral cooperation.“18 For instance, Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed remarked that Japan had lost the will to
be "lead goose in the region," supposedly Japan's role in the flying geese
theory of economic development.19 Sakakibura resigned in 1999, but he did
not appear to lose his interest in the idea albeit acknowledging its difficulty:
The whole idea of regional cooperation is proceeding, although gradually.
There are now discussions among China, Korea and Japan going on. ASEAN
countries are inviting Korea, China and Japan to participate in their cooperative
schemes. It has started to move and that is good. But I don't think a monetary
fund can be established in a short period of time.......................
I feel it is absolutely necessary for Asian countries to develop a regional
mechanism. If we cannot develop a regional mechanism, we have only two
options: belong to the U.S. dollar zone or the European grouping. But I
would like to see a third pillar in the world economy.20

When the proposal
was killed, Japan created the Miyazawa Fund to provide liquidity to crisis-ridden
Asian nations through bilateral arrangements.The Japanese proposal to create
the AMF and the subsequent withdrawal from this plan reflect an internal
clash within domestic politics and Japanese bureaucracy. Although it would
be simplistic to call this a clash of pan-Asianism and pro­ Americanism,
Japanese politicians and bureaucrats had their own view of international
politics. Sakakibura and other bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance and
Ministry of International Trade and Industry had more multilateral Asianist
perspectives to the international political economy of East Asia. Japan's
Foreign Ministry (MOFA), however, emphasized bilateral relations with the
United States. As explained by Hook, each of these ministries perceived
clearly the challenges posed to Japan by the international structure, but
the response of each and adjustment between and amongst their varying interests,
which determined the final policy objectives of Japan was shaped by the
norms of developmentalism, Asianism and bilateralism.21

The Shadow of
History

Arguably there
is no country in the world where history does not act as a constraining
factor for foreign policy options. However, arguably the influence of history
on Japanese foreign policy has been more intense than any other case. In
no other country can a visit to a sacred place infuriate foreign capitals.
In this sense, Japanese foreign policy following the Second World War has
been a captive of its history. This remains to be the case after the Cold
War, despite the change in the international system. With the end of the
Cold War, the world has entered a new era characterized by lack of conventional
security dilemmas. The demise of the Soviet empire paved the way for democratization
in Eastern Europe and further integration into Western Europe. In East
Asia, however, a similar integration process did not take place. Although
the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to stability in East Asia,
an equally optimistic atmosphere akin to Europe was absent. In contrast
to Europe, continuities rather than change characterized East Asian politics
after the Cold War. Korea remained divided,with North Korea eager to go
nuclear. Despite the fact that China has taken remarkable steps towards
integrating its economic system with the capitalist world, its domestic
political system continued to be controlled by the Communist Party. The
Chinese developmental model was followed by Indo-Chinese nations. Japan
and South Korea have placed larger emphasis on their relations with the
United States. Although realists would have a hard time explaining European
integration with its steady progress toward supranationalism, they would
rejoice at pointing fingers at East Asia as a waterproof case of realism.
They often neglect the role of psychological and perceptional factors rooted
in the legacy of history in shaping East Asian international in the post-Cold
War era.22

Japan's relations
with the rest of Asia as well as Asian relations with Japan in the post-Cold
War era are shaped by the burden of history. A legacy of Japanese guilt
and remorse for the suffering of Asians at the hands of the Japanese before
and during the Second World War continues to cause Japan to pursue a foreign
policy that lacks self­ confidence and assertiveness.23 Both this legacy
itself and the inability of Japan to respond to this burden are deeply
rooted in the way Japan sees its place in Asia. The previous chapters have
discussed the emergence and consolidation of Japanese civilizational identity
during the Meiji period and how this sense of remoteness from Asia
prevented its peaceful integration with Asia during the ultra-nationalism
and pan-Asianistimperialism.

In the Cold
War era, Japan continued its self-identification as part of the Western,
this time American, alliance. Japanese foreign policy was delegated to
the United States. To the extent its suited American policies, Japan tried
to develop relations with Asia through foreign aid programs. As discussed
above, both liberal conservatives belonging to the Yoshida School and the
right-wing conservatives belonging to the Kishi School saw alliance with
the United States not onlv as unavoidable but also desirable and profitable.The
security alliance system with the United States provided Japan maneuvering
room to expand its sphere of interests into Southeast Asia. It allowed
Japan not to militarize but instead to concentrate on economic development.
A militarized Japan would create anxiety in the rest of Asia and complicate
Japan's difficult position. On the other hand, this comfortable security
system meant that Japan did not have to face its history and redefine its
position. However, with the collapse of the bipolar international system,
Japan faced an identity question increasingly more seriously. The search
for a Japanese national identity started in the 1980s and Japanese Prime
Minister Nakasone was one of the first to recognize this need. His answer
was internationalization (kokusai-ka), which tried to portray Japan as
an international power. Yet internationalization was not a solution for
Japan's own conflict with itself and its civilizational identity. Such
a response to Japan's identity escapes from its confrontation with history
as well as its role as an Asian power. Positioning Japan as a unique country
through the Nihonjin-ron discourse or as an internationalized nation (kokusai
kokka) was hardly an answer to regional challenges awaiting Japan in Asia.
Despite the growing but still politically underrepresented calls for a
re­Asianization of Japan, the primary difficulty for Japan to develop
an Asian outlook stems from its failure to come to terms with its history.
Japanese foreign policy after the Second World War has truly became a captive
of its own history. Japanese political and intellectual elites have distinct
approaches to this question, but one can distinguish three basic responses
to the question of history: (1) confronting history, (2) escaping from
history, and (3) embracing history. The first approach has ironically a
very weak basis in the ruling political party, the Liberal Democratic Party.
In the political platform, it is best represented by the Social Democrats.
The two last approaches reflect intra-LDP conflicts, chiefly among the
Hashimoto faction and the Mori faction, respectively. These two factions
have direct linkages to Yoshida and Kishi schools.

Confronting
History

The liberal
Japanese view on how to tackle the problem of history advocates that Japan
adopt the German way. Unlike Japan, Germany has arguably confronted its
own history and emerged on a clean slate. For instance, it cannot be imagined
that a German prime minister would visit a place of religious significance
or a monument built in honor of Nazi German leaders. In Japan, however,
there was no such direct confrontation with history. In comparing Japan
to Germany, the mainland Chinese People's Daily argues the following: "Germany
actually serves as a realistic and bright mirror for Japan. Japan that
wants to be a 'normal country' should seriously compare itself with Germany,
to see how Germany approaches history and takes history as a mirror.“24
The leading proponent of the idea that Japan has to follow the German example
is Doi Takako, once the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Japan
(SDPJ). In 1990, she prepared a parliamentary proposal to apologize for
Japan's colonization of Asia and its war of aggression. It failed to win
support of other parties. In 1991, some members of the LDP prepared a similar
proposal, which was rejected by nationalist LDP members of the Diet. When,
in 1993, LDP faced its first electoral defeat in 38 years of its history,
a coalition government was fonned by other parties, but due to their conflict
the government collapsed in 1994. At this point, the LDP fonned a coalition
government with the Socialist Party, which became the Social Democratic
Party (SDP), but it was the junior partner in this coalition and the position
of prime minister went to moderate leftist Murayama Tomiichi. One of the
deals that SDP imposed on the coalition agreement was the following: "on
the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII, we will actively
strive, among other things, to adopt a parliamentary resolution reflecting
upon the past war and expressing our resolve for peace in the future.“25

On June 9, 1995,
Diet passed the resolution titled "Resolution to Renew the Determination
for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History." Unlike other policy-related
resolutions proposed by the government, it obtained the support of 511
members of the lower house, the House of Representatives. On the day of
the vote, all 171 members of Shin shinto (New Frontier Party), then Japan's
largest opposition party, and more importantly many members of LDP were
missing. Having disappointed with this level of support, Murayama did not
push the resolution to the upper house, the House of Councilors, as it
was normally the practice for passing a resolution in the Japanese Diet.
26 This was the first such resolution ever passed in the Japanese parliament
after World War II. The content was prepared with a view of nationalist
opposition in juxtaposing Japanese "colonial rule" and "acts of aggression"
with those of Western imperialist nations. As Ryuji Mukae observes, it
expressed hansei (self-reflection) rather than shazai or owabi (apology),27
Prime Minister Murayama issued an apology on August 15, 1995, at the fiftieth
anniversary of the San Francisco Treaty. However, this apology was framed
as a personal apology with the usage of "I" rather than the "we" pronouns:
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a
mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare
the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule
and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of
many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that
no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility,
these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings
of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express
my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad,
of that history.28

LDP members
of the Diet expressed their reactions to Murayama's apology, arguing that
the prime minister deviated from the text of the resolution passed in the
parliament.29 It was also noteworthy that eight of his cabinet members
were visiting Yasukuni Shrine, a shire that venerates Japan's war casualties,
including fourteen executed Class-A criminals, at the time ofMurayama's
speech. Murayama government which never enjoyed popular support got further
weakened by an allegedly slow response during the Kobe earthquake. In the
1996 general elections, socialists lost many seats in the parliament. LDP
formed a coalition government and Ryfitaro Hashimoto, the former chief
ofLDP's liberal faction which is a direct descendant of the Yoshida faction,
became prime minister. Hashimoto served as prime minister between January
11, 1996, and July 30, 1998.Clash of LDP Factions: Escaping from History
vs. Embracing History Although LDP is generally very conservative and nationalistic
when it comes to the matter of history, there are clearly two different
positions, informed by views of Yoshida and Kishi lines. Among the largest
LDP factions is Heisei KenkyUkai, led by Tsushima Yuji after former faction
leader Hashimoto's death in 2006. The faction represents Yoshida's liberal
conservative approach in Japanese politics, whereas the Seiwa Seisaku KenkyUkai
(the former Mori faction, now led by Machimura Nobutaka) represents a more
assertive and nationalist line, defending Japan's return to normal power
status. It used to be the largest faction in the party. However, the recent
elections and the tide of nationalism brought more nationalist members
of the party to the Diet. On the question of history, however, both of
these groups are highly conservative. Their chief difference stems uom
disagreements not over the content of history but over the style in which
historical questions need to be tackled. The Tsushima faction, its ideology
derived from the Yoshida school, defends a position which can be described
as "escaping from history." Their approach rests in a strategy of avoiding
discussions and confront!~tions related to history. Consequently, in foreign
policy matters, Tsushima faction prefers maintenance of Yoshida Doctrine
as Japan's basic foreign policy strategy and prefer to avoid provocations
in relations with China and South Korea. The Yoshida School proponents,
chiefly the Tsushima faction, inside the LDP represent this view. Members
of the faction firmly oppose attempts to return to the normal power status,
which would require Japan to remilitarize. While in power, former faction
leader Hashimoto followed policies that aimed to counter China through
stronger ties with regional powers, chiefly Russia and ASEAN. In 1997,
as prime minister of Japan, Hashimoto indicated his interest in developing
a more assertive Japanese foreign policy characterized by regional initiatives
that aimed to counter the growing power of China. He proposed his Silk
Road or Eurasian diplomatic initiative aimed to develop deeper ties
between Japan and Russia and oil-rich Central Asian nations. Despite the
end of the Cold War, Japan and Russia remained minimal1y engaged because
of the disputed islands north of Japan. Hashimoto for the first time developed
a new approach to Russia by sidelining the disputed islands problem. He
also offered the creation of a Eurasian region that would link both maritime
and continental Asia, a plan that would provide Russia with a place in
maritime zone of Asia and reduce its dependence on relations with China.
With these ambitious moves, Japan was clearly aiming to avoid isolation
in the context of growing Sino-Russian relations and the changes brought
by the end of the Cold War. As a part of this new approach, Japan did not
raise the issue of islands in supporting Russia's membership in the G-8
group. However, this strategic initiative on the part of Japan was less
directly linked to regionalism initiatives in other parts of the world
than to the rise of China in order to gain leverage in global politics.3o
Similarly, Hashimoto's interest in developing closer relations with Southeast
Asia aimed to counter the growing influence of China. In his tour of Southeast
Asia in January 1997, Hashimoto proposed regular summit meetings between
Japan and Southeast Asia, a proposal which the Southeast Asian nations
did not respond wholeheartedly because of their concerns with offending
China.31 However, he did not agree to support creation ofa Asian regional
organization that would include China and South Korea in addition to ASEAN
and Japan.32 Overall, he did little to go beyond the conventional Cold
War Japanese foreign policy approach that had avoided approaching Japan's
regional neighbors with self­ confidence. At the center of Japan's difficulty
in forming such relations with China and Korea was its inability to directly
confront the question of history. Hashimoto faction has represented the
hegemonic orientation towards history within the LDP characterized by ambivalence
and reluctance to deal with the burden of history. To illustrate Hashimoto's
own stance on history, it should be noted that in 1996 Hashimoto visited
the highly controversial Yasukuni Shrine eleven years after the visit by
Nakasone, provoking an angry response from China that "Japan has failed
to repent that period of history and settle its war crimes.“33 Hashimoto
responded to these protests by asking "why should it matter anymore?“34
Yet he did not repeat the visit. Hashimoto's own foreign policy reflected
this attitude and aimed to create regional counterweights north and south
of China. This, however, proved to be difficult because of China's growing
influence in the region because no regional actor was willing to sacrifice
their own relations with China to offer Japan any realistic chance of countering
China. Yet complicating all of these for Japan was the fact that China
was growing in significance in the eyes of Americans themselves.

The Tsushima
faction has represented the hegemonic Japanese school of thought during
much ofthe Cold War when demands by the United States for Japan's cooperation
were stronger and consequently Japan had leverage on the United States.
However, this strategy faced two immediate problems associated with the
end of the Cold War international system. First, security in Northeast
Asia was more a Japanese problem than an American one. It was Japan that
needed the United States to address the problem, and the United States
had insisted Japan share its cost in the form of commitment in areas beyond
the Pacific, such as the Iraq War. Second, China has replaced Japan as
the most significant trade partner and investment opportunity for the United
States. As China was becoming fully integrated into the world economy,
one could talk no longer about an exclusive American preference for Japan
in the Pacific. In this sense, it was no longer feasible for Japan to expect
the United States to tolerate its traditional security strategies.

The Japanese
right-wing conservatives believed (and still do today) that Japanese foreign
policy has been hijacked by its history and the only solution to escape
from this dilemma is through embracing Japan's historical past. This "no
repentance" position has its precedent in the vision of Kishi and later
Nakasone, who in a contradictory way, advocated internationalization of
Japan. Such nationalists, who have risen to a hegemonic position within
the LDP with the coming to power ofKoizumi, have developed a revisionist
stance as regards the past, particularly the Second World War and Japan's
colonization of Asia. These elements within the LDP believe that an apologetic
stance is futile. If Japan wants to form a national identity, it cannot
be built on shame. Although there are some revisionists who accept the
need to apologize, this had to be done only to Asians rather than Western
nations. They point out that the West was equally guilty for its colonization
of Asia and imperialist policies but never apologized for its past.

On December
1, 1994, a number of key LDP members of Diet formed a group, called the
Parliamentarians' League on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World
War II (PLF A). The group, led by nationalist Okuno Seisuke, claimed an
original membership of 143 members, which amounted to half of all LDP Diet
members and included influential LDP leaders such as Secretary-General
Mori, MITI Minister Hashimoto, former Secretary-General Kajiyama, and Japanese
Defense Agency Director General Tamazawa. PLF A issued its Operational
Guidelines adopted on January 31, 1995, which stated: We cannot approve
of a resolution containing words of remorse, apology, and the renounciation
of war because it would be tantamount to reconfirming: biased post-war
interpretations of our history, thereby creating difficulties for our nation's
future.35 The group leader, fonner education minister Okuno Seisuke, known
for his views that Japan fought the war to liberate Asians ITom Western
colonialism, made statements to the effect that comfort women who were
forced to work as sex slaves did it for money.36 Okuno believed that "the
war was to liberate Asians from the colonial control of the Caucasian race.“37
The group's secretary general was Itagaki Tadashi, son of General Itagaki
Seishiro who was a military officer in Manchuria and war minister of the
anny. He was convicted for war crimes and executed for his involvement
in the Manchurian Incident of 1931. His son, Itagaki Tadashi, led the Japan
War-Bereaved Families Association, a powerful pro-LDP group with strong
ties to the Yasukuni Shrine, and was harshly critical of the Murayama government's
apologetic stance.38 In 1996, Itagaki had a famous debate with a Korean
woman, Kim Sang-Hee, who claimed to have been abducted by the Japanese
military in Korea and forced to work as a sex slave at the hands of the
Japanese anny in 1937. In response to her accusations, Mr. Itagaki told
her: "I don't believe there has ever been such a case. Are you sure that
in those eight years you didn't receive a single sen (IOOth of a yen)?"39

Japan as "Normal
Power"

The second LDP
approach is Japan's returning to normalcy, that is, synchronizing its economic
power with a parallel military power and refusing an apologetic approach.
In doing so, Japan would gain a national character and identity. Under
the nationalist Koizumi government, the question of Japan's return to the
"nonnal power" status was intensely debated. A growing group of nationalists
within the LDP made demands that Japan should develop its own foreign and
security policy strategy even independent of the United States. This would
be possible with a military power commensurate with Japan's economic capabilities.
The primary architect of Japan's return to normalcy has been Ozawa Ichiro,
currently a member of the Democratic Party of Japan. Ozawa was Nakasone's
Home Minister and later became LDP secretary general in 1989. He split
from the LDP to form the Japan Renewal Party, which was part of the LDP-free
coalition in 1993 together with other parties, including the Socialist
Party. Ozawa laid down his ideas about Japan in A Blueprint for a New Japan
or Nihon Kaizo Seikaku, which was his master plan to transform Japan into
a "normal state," through political reforms as well as constitutional revision.
In this book which came out of a study group of bureaucrats and scholars,
he advocated Japan assume a larger role in UN international operations:
Japan should be a "responsible member of the international community, bearing
the costs of peace and freedom, and limiting the power of the central government.',40
He also defended adding a third paragraph to Article 9 of the Constitution,
allowing Japan to participate actively in UN peace-keeping operations.
The book caused a storm of protests in Japan, and Ozawa was accused of
diverting Japan from its peaceful orientation.. Attempts to implement some
of these ideas during the conservative-socialist coalition came into conflict
with the position of the socialists who eventually left the coalition.
It is ironic that many of these discussions have become mainstream in the
current context of Japanese politics.

More recently
"normal power" discourse is best represented by members of the Mori faction,
from which former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro obtained his support.
The current Prime Minister Abe Shintaro belongs to this group as well.
Proponents of "normal power" status believe that Japan's militarization
cannot be achieved independently of the United States and therefore they
advocate complete support of American policies such as the Iraq War in
exchange for American support for Japanese militarization. Furthermore,
they favor a stronger role for Japan's emperor in politics. In this regard,
former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's remarks that Japan is a divine nation
with the emperor at its core was quite noteworthy. In addition, Foreign
Minister Aso urged the emperor to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.
Beyond discourse, the most concrete step towards "normalization" was the
endorsement by former Prime Minister Koizumi of legislation to upgrade
Japan's Defense Agency to a cabinet-level ministry. Japan's lack of a defense
ministry was a symbol of its low profile in security matters in line with
its pacifist constitution. According to Defense Agency Director General
Fukushiro Nukaga, the next logical step will be scrapping Article 9. Nukaga
asserts that the change would mean not only that his organization would
have greater control over its policies and budget, but also the agency
and troops would face new and heavy responsibilities.41 A group of young
LDP leaders, including Abe Shinzo, who was elected as LDP president and
consequently became prime minister in September 2006, and Foreign Minister
Aso Taro, are supporters of a more assertive and independent Japanese foreign
policy. Abe and Aso, maternal grandsons of Kishi and Yoshida respectively,
are likely to expand Koizumi' s nationalist overtures. Despite being a
maternal grandson of Yoshida Shigeru, Aso is among those who believe that
his grandfather's doctrine needs to be replaced by an assertive foreign
policy direction. In October 2005, Aso drew worldwide attention when he
stated that Japan is the only country in the world having "one nation,
one civilization, one language, one culture and one race." He sees China
as a major threat to Japan: "There is a neighbouring country with a population
of more than a billion thathas atomic weapons, and has had double-digit
growth in military spending for 17 straight years. It's becoming a considerable
threat.“42

Before his election
as LDP president and prime minister of Japan, Abe Shinzo was a strong supporter
of Koizumi' s persistent stance on the Yasukuni Shrine issue against the
pressure exerted by China and South Korea. Because of the escalation of
the North Korean conflict following its claim over testing of a nuclear
bomb in October 2006, Abe saw that it was necessary to obtain the support
of North Korea's neighbors to address the crisis. Consequently, he has
not repeated his predecessor's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Yet it is
not clear how his nationalist stance on critical issues such as history
and the Yasukuni Shrine would help him mend relations with China. Even
though he has declared that his government has no intention to distance
itself from the apologetic statements of the previous governments, his
view on history remains revisionist as reflected on such statements that
the Class-A war criminals as convicted by the Allied Powers after the war
are not criminals under Japan's domestic law.43 Despite the recent attempt
to resolve the North Korean issue through the Chinese help, Abe supports
the view that China desires to hold Japan captive by means of the question
ofhistory.44 To counter China, he proposed strategic links with India,
Australia, and democratic Asian states, in addition to already existing
alliance with the United States. Abe stated that his platform included
the issue of constitutional reform.45 He claims that Japan needs a military
that can cope with growing obligations abroad in the twenty-fIrst century.
As a symbolic step that would facilitate the process of Japan's normalization,
Abe believes that it is necessary and only natural to elevate the status
of the Defense Agency to a cabinet-level ministry.46 Abe's other challenger
Fukuda Yasuo supports the conciliatory approach to China and North Korea.
Regardless of the LDP presidential elections, these two hawkish leaders
will play significant roles in LDP politics, because of the definite tilt
towards nationalism among young members of the LDP. They constitute the
core support group for Koizumi, who was elected to the LDP presidency and
became prime minister through their support. Most other members of the
Machimura (former Mori) taction agree that the Yoshida Doctrine is outdated
in the post-Cold War system, as Japan is no longer capable of playing with
the dynamics of superpower rivalry. Hence, they argue, it is necessary
for Japan to assume an independent capability of protecting its security
interests in a region characterized by problems such as North Korea and
the rise of China. The image of an unappreciated Japan in the Gulf War
is strong in their mind set.The rival Tsushima (fonner Hashimoto) faction
opposes this attempt for a remilitarization of Japan. Endorsing the Yoshida
Doctrine, the faction advocates a cautious realism in believing that economic
growth has priority to security issues, as Japan's economic power boosts
its regional and international status. The Machimura faction, however,
appears to believe that an economically strong but militarily weak Japan
does not suit post-Cold War Japan's needs to prepare for an eventual withdrawal
of the United States from Asia The Yasukuni Shrine and the History Debate
Yasukuni Jinja, literally the Peaceful Nation Shrine, was built in 1869
on the orders of Emperor Meiji to honor victims of the Boshin Civil War
(1868-69) that took place between the Tokugawa Shogunate and the pro-imperial
forces. According to one interpretation, it is "the Japanese equivalent
of America's tomb of the unknown soldier at Arlington National Cemetery.“47
However, the Yasukuni Shrine has a deeper meaning, because the war dead
are not only remembered but also worshipped as, according to Shintoism,
their souls are transformed into kami or deities when they died. Since
then the shrine has enshrined the souls of2.5 million of Japan's war dead,
which has included, since 1978, fourteen Class-A war criminals convicted
by the Tokyo War Tribunal. Prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
were always a political issue.

Although many
Japanese prime ministers including Shidehara, Yoshida, Kishi, and Hashimoto
visited the shrine in their individual capacity, it was Nakasone who did
it for the first time in his official capacity. It is interesting to note
that the Yasukuni visits are not necessarily related to factional loyalty
of LDP politicians. Whereas Yoshida visited the shrine four times, militarist
Kishi Nobusuke visited it only two times and Mori Yoshiro did not make
any visit while in office.48 However, Nakasone's visit was significant
because it was made after the controversial decision to enshrine the convicted
war criminals in 1978. Only two Japanese prime ministers so far repeated
Nakasone's visits: Hashimoto and Koizumi. Whereas Nakasone and Hashimoto
refrained from further visits because of protests from China and South
Korea, Koizumi displayed a stiff resistance to international and domestic
opposition in repeating his Yasukuni Shrine attendance.49

Koizumi made
six Yasukuni visits, including his August 14,2006, visit on the anniversary
of the Japanese surrender, the last one before he steps out in September.
Koizumi clearly utilized these visits to assert his view of Japanese nationalism
and his approach to history. According to this notion, for Japan to escape
from its moral capitulation to China, it needs to assert that it has nothing
to feel ashamed of in its history. The Yasukuni Shrine works for this purpose
because this view is shared by the way history is told at Yasukuni's controversial
museum, Yushukan. Yasukini Shrine's English website greets its visItors
with the message that "we hope that many worshipers will come to know the
elevated thoughts of the noble souls who gave up their lives for the country
that they loved."so The website has a direct link to the controversial
war memorial museum, Yushukan, that is attached to the Yasukuni Shrine.
Yushukan's website opens with a modem-looking flash introduction, which
starts with a sentence amidst sketches of war aircraft that were used in
kamikaze attacks: "The truth of modem Japanese history is now restored."
The shrine's display of war pictures does not refer to any enemy but presents
the war in Asia as a war for the liberation of Asia and remembers "heroic"
sacrifices of the Japanese soldiers in this war. Yasukuni Shrine's English
website displays a note by Kenji Ueda, president of Kokugakuin University,
in which the author asserts what he calls "A Correct View of History" as
follows: The text books used in history instruction at intermediate schools
from the 1997 school year will contain material on the subject of comfort
women. The textbooks depict as a historical fact the story of Asian women
who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese Army. Imparting this
story to students who are still young and immature has become a great problem
since last year. This matter is drawn upon the judgment professed by the
Military Tribunal for the Far East that Japan fought a war of aggression.
Can we say that this view is correct? We must pass judgment on this matter
in the same manner of a tribunal that passes judgment after gathering credible
proof. We cannot help but feel that the possibility of ulterior motives
have not been discounted. Isn't it a fact that the West with its military
power invaded and ruled over much of Asia and Africa and that this was
the start of East-West relations? There is no uncertainty in history. Japan's
dream of building a Great East Asia was necessitated by history and it
was sought after by the countries of Asia. We cannot overlook the intent
of those who wish to tarnish the good name of the noble souls of Yasukuni.51

The Yasukuni
Shrine's display of history closely follows ideological trends in Japan.
With the rise of nationalism in the country, there is a greater acceptance
and endorsement of this view of history. As Richard Bitzinger explains:
Ten years ago that museum contained some expressions ofregret and remorse
for the loss of life, both Japanese and foreign... .Back then there wasn't
an effort to tell a story about the war. Now, it is revisionist. A whitewash.
Major battles where many thousands lost theIr lives on both sides are simply
called Japanese "operations" or "incidents.“52 Japanese businessmen and
intellectuals seem to be divided on the issue of prime ministerial visits
to the shrine. Fukuoka District Court ruled out on April 7, 2004, that
Koizumi's visits contravened the constitutional principle of secularism.
Four major Japanese newspapers appeared to be divided on the court decision:
Asahi and Mainichi were supportive of the court, whereas Yomiuri and Sankei
were critical. Intense debate in the Japanese media illustrates the nationwide
controversy of the issue, as "Japanese media rarely experience such disagreement
on legal matters."53 For instance, in an opinion piece that appeared on
the Daily Yomiuri, Yoshiyuki Kasai, the chairman of Central Japan Railways,
strongly urges Koizumi and his successors not to stop visits: The Yasukuni
issue, from the Chinese point of view, is a kind of allegiance test to
see whether Tokyo will bow to Beijing.Accordingly, not only Koizumi, but
also his successor, must not avoid visiting the shrine, irrespective of
their individual beliefs. China, in its pursuit of hegemony over the Asian-Pacific
region, is trying to split public opinion in Japan and drive a wedge between
Japan and the Unite States. For the Chinese, the Yasukuni issue is nothing
but a convenient tool to use in this strategy. 54

The right-wing
nationalist Sankei newspaper was highly supportive of Koizumi's visits
and urge him not to stop them. 55 In an opinion piece that appeared in
Asahi Shimbun, Taichi Sakaiya, a former bureaucrat at MITI, believes that
Koizumi should make these visits in a private capacity and explain
the rationale behind his visits better.The author argues that because Yasukuni
is a religious place, visiting the shrine by a state official in his official
capacity violates the principle of secularism. On the other hand, he claims
praying at the shrine should be viewed in the context of Shintoism, which
is based on the belief system that "all people good or bad become 'deities'
when they die. People worship good gods to seek their blessings and offer
prayers to bad gods to deliver them from evil.,,56 In an interesting development,
eight former prime ministers expressed their disappointment with Koizumi'
s insistence to visit the Yasukuni. They met the former House of Representatives
Speaker Yohei Kono. Kono, who was one ofLDP's most senior politician known
for his long career as a Foreign Minister and known as pro-Chinese, asked
Koizumi to consider his visits, but Koizumi insisted that he would make
the most appropriate decision. 57

The Question
of China and the United States

The emergence
of China as a global economic power has been the most important challenge
for Japan. While in the context of the Cold War, Japan could ignore China
and rely on the United States for its security and economic relations,
this appears to be increasingly difficult. In the 1980s, the major academic
and political attention on East Asia was centered on Japan; China has regained
its central status.The discourse of "Japan as Number One" has been replaced
by the debates that highlight the growing significance of China. 58 China
has replaced the United States as Japan's largest trading partner, and
China became the third largest trade partner of the United States after
Canada and Mexico.Currently Japan exports more to China than to the United
States, helping to ease its economic troubles and preventing a fall
into recession. Also, Japan is China's top import supplier. Trade volume
between Japan and China, including Hong Kong, reached $213 billion in 2004,
accounting for 20.1 percent of Japan's total trade. Trade volume between
Japan and the United States was $197 billion, which amounted to 19 percent
of total Japanese exports and imports.59

China is integrating
its economy heavily with the United States, decreasing Japan's relative
significance to the United States.60 Arguably, both economically and politically
the world's most important bilateral relations are between the United States
and China. Chiefly through sales by Wal-Mart corporation, which is the
most significant importer of Chinese goods in the United States, China
has become the number 1 exporter to the United States.61 China is a large
investment zone for American companies. However, the direction of investment
is not one-way. China has started to invest in the United States through
purchase of key American companies such as IBM computers.62 While the Chinese
bids to buy other American companies such as the oil giant Unocal have
provoked an intensive debate in the U.S. Congress for security implications,
the United States is well aware of China's importance for the U.S. economy
and hardly in a position to take any preventive measures against Chinese
investments. Meanwhile, the United States became China's largest export
destination. Like many American companies, Japanese companies utilize China
as a production base to export into the U.S. market and the Japanese exports
to China are partly used in Japanese-owned production facilities in China.Despite
China's growing significance to Japan, the perceptions of China in Japan
remains low. Opinion poll research data indicate favorable opinion of China
has declined, particularly after the Koizumi government came into office.
In an opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in 1999, only 30 percent
of the respondents in Japan answered affirmatively to the question, "in
the future, do you think China and Japan will be able to work together
to adopt the same common values about democracy and a market economy?"
Only 55 percent of the respondents did not believe that they will be able
to work together. According to the same poll, 55 percent of the respondents
thought that relations of Japan with the United States were more important
than those with China, whereas only 15 percent of the respondents pointed
to China as the more important partner and 21 percent indicated that both
countries were equally significant. 63 In another poll sponsored by the
Japanese government, Japanese respondents were asked how closely they felt
toward China. The results were as follows: 12 percent very closely, 37
percent rather closely, 30 percent not very closely, 18 percent not closely
at all.64

However, in
2004, a cabinet office survey finds that only 37.6 percent of the respondents
feel friendly towards China, and 58.2 percent of them do not. Interestingly,
the same poll finds pro-South Korean feelings as increasing. When it comes
to South Korea, 56.7 percent of the respondents indicated favorable opinion.65
In this regard, the anti-Japanese feelings expressed in China following
Koizumi's provocative Yasukuni Shrine visits seemed to have exacerbated
anti-Chinese feelings among the Japanese public.

In addition
to the China problem, the emergence of a nuclear North Korea is the most
significant challenge for Japan. A nuclear North Korea would significantly
reduce Japan's relative security position in East Asia. Japanese sense
of security and confidence will dwindle in the context of Korean and Chinese
nuclear powers. Again, Japanese response to this challenge can never be
free from its historical baggage. If Japan resorts to nuclear weapons on
its own, this would be reacted by other Asians. If Japan maintains its
current policy of relying on the U.S. security umbrella, then it would
also be seen as half­ hearted. The shadow of history haunts Japanese foreign
policy options. However, there is no single way to look at this dilemma.
Japanese intellectuals, policymakers, and opposition groups have their
distinct ways to approach the problem, in such ways that render use of
"national identity" highly problematic.

Japan and the
Iraq War

Former Prime
Minister Koizumi will be remembered for his assertive pro-U.S. stance.
Like his factional predecessor Kishi, Koizumi believed in a utilitarian
approach to relations with the United States and sought to utilize this
alliance to increase Japanese assertiveness in foreign policy. The Koizumi
government contributed to the post­ September 11 U.S. foreign policy both
in discursive and practical ways. In addition to its dispatch of naval
forces to the Indian Ocean during the Afghanistan War, Japan made its first
deployment of troops to a conflict zone, Iraq, after the Second World War.
According to polls, a majority of the people opposed their country's sending
troops to Iraq. The critics asserted that this was a clear violation of
Article 9, which banned Japan from sending troops to conflict zones. However,
the government legally justified its dispatch of troops, arguing that Shiite-populated
Samawah where Japanese troops were stationed in Iraq was itself a nonconflict
zone. However, as Japan's well-known Middle East expert Sakai Keiko argues,
the entire country had to be considered as a conflict zone rather than
a part of it and thus legality of the government's claim is highly disputed.
Bb Sasaki Takeshi, president of Tokyo University, "WTites that the deployment
of troops to the Iraq War can be interpreted as one consequence ofthe post-Cold
War history of U.S.-Japan relations. According to him, three factors contributed
to Japan's decisions:

1. The Gulf
War paranoia: Japan was not appreciated for its financial contribution
short of military commitment.

2. North Korea
as a suspected nuclear power prevents Japan from completely disentangling
itself from the U.S. security umbrella. Continued U.S. commitment to Japan's
defense required Japan to similarly be committed to U.S. security priorities:
"an assessment that the war in Iraq is a war against international terrorism
is not totally absent in Japan, but in comparison with Spain, for example,
the circumstances are fundamentally different because of the issues surrounding
North Korea."

3. Personal
relations between Koizumi and Bush are the closest between the leaders
of these countries since the era of Nakasone and Reagan.67 The Gulf War
diplomacy of Japan was largely criticized by the United States despite
the fact that Japan contributed to the war cost. As a Foreign Ministry
official states, "we shouldn't shoulder war costs.. . . Our effort was
not appreciated much in the time of the Gulf War, and we faced criticism
that we only offered money.“68 However, the Gulf War syndrome of Japan
cannot be thought of independently of its quest for returning to a normal
power nation status under the Koizumi government. Moreover, international
legality and popularity of the Iraq War were very much in question so that
no Gulf country asked Japan to contribute to the war. Japan could side
with the rest of the world in not joining the United States and still show
its independent foreign policy abilities. In comparison, Germany, which
was in a comparable situation with Japan in terms of returning to normal
power status following the Cold War, chose to exert its political power
by not joining the United States. For Turkey as well, refusing to allow
U.S. troop passage was an attempt to escape the Cold War international
system, which locked the country in complete obedience to the United States.
Hence the Gulf War syndrome appears to be a useful discourse to convince
public opinion that Japan had to be more involved in international crisis.
Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion remained overwhelmingly opposed to the
deployment of SDF. As of July 2004, the support level is slightly above
30 percent while Koizumi government has been losing support in parallel
to the Iraq war.69

It should be
noted, however, that this level of support was in the context of no Japanese
military casualty so far in the Iraq War. In historical comparison, the
Iraq dispatch of Japanese troops is the first extension of Japanese alliance
with any Western power in its history beyond the Pacific. In the Anglo-Japanese
alliance during the First World War, Japan limited its alliance responsibility
to the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the dispatch is not only legally but
also symbolically a controversial issue. It also shows continuation of
Japan's Western orientation and inability to devise diplomacy independence
from the U.S.-Japan alliance system. One of the foreign policy expectations
of the Koizumi government from the Iraq War is to obtain U.S. support for
a permanent Security Council seat in the United Nations. Koizumi has eagerly
lobbied for this goal that would give Japan a global security role and
contribute to its return to normal power status. With the calls for reforming
the UN system, Japan appears to be a strong contender for a permanent UN
Security Council seat. The other candidates are Germany, India, and Brazil.
The United States supports the bid of Japan but opposes Germany apparently
because of its opposition to the Iraq War, despite the fact that Germany
is the second largest contributor of troops to UN-mandated missions. Condoleezza
Rice refused to endorse the German bid: "the only country that we have
said unequivocally that we support is Japan, having to do with Japan's
special role in the U.N. and support for the U.N.“70 The support of the
United States appears to be a key factor for Japan to achieve this goal;
therefore Japan's participation in the coalition in the Iraq War was timely.
However, any refonn within the UN system must be approved by all current
veto-holding members of the Security Council that includes China. The Chinese
strictly object to Japan's quest for a pennanent Security Council seat.
In April 2005, during a state visit to India, Chinese Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao, supported Indian ambition to gain a permanent seat, but objected
to that of Japan by arguing that Japan need to face up to history before
seeking such a goal.71 Once again, Japan confronts the challenge of China
in its drive to achieve a global security role. China utilized the Internet
in the form of online petitions with millions of people signing their names
in opposition to the Japanese bid.72

Conclusion P.2

The end of the
Cold War meant the end of Japan's comfortable escape from itshistory. It
also meant that Japan could no longer enjoy a privileged relationship with
the United States while China was isolated from the international system.
This special relationship had allowed Japan to escape from any further
punishment for its past and to retain its political system as symbolized
by the dramatic comeback of Kishi Nobusuke who has his personal signature
in many ofthe prewar decisions. Due to this special relationship, Japan
was not tolerated and allowed to forget rather than deal with its war history
and its occupation of Asia. In this regard, much was in contrast with Germany,
which, having dealt with the question of history, was able to further the
process of integration in Europe. One can regard the entire history of
Japanese foreign policy as a response to the question of how to locate
China in Japanese national identity. Once removed from its central place
in the Meiji era, China never returned back to its original place in Japanese
identity. In the post-Cold War security and economic structure in East
Asia, however, Japan has faced a new reality about China. It was a regional
and increasingly global actor. Japan's ability to reconcile its identity
and reality will shape the future relations between these two countries.

The end of the
Cold War did not necessarily bring improvements in Japan's security environment.
The question of North Korea remains unsolved. If the nuclear ambitions
of North Korea are fully materialized, this leaves the Japanese with a
situation in which they are the only nonnuclear East Asian nation. Given
the uncertainty about the prospects of American military presence in East
Asia, this may lead Japanese to search for their own nuclear power in the
context of historically rooted culture of insecurity. It is hard to predict
future developments in Japanese foreign policy. Much depends on whether
nationalists continue to rule the country. Much depends on the questions
of the military presence of the United States in East Asia, the question
of North Korea, and ultimately the future role that China desires to play.
The Korean situation and the rise of China have changed the ideational
context in East Asia to the advantage of nationalists. Consequently, the
nationalist faction within the LDP has solidified its power, having occupied
the position of prime minister in the last ten years. Unless antinationalist
LDP factions and parties are able to put a more organized resistance, one
can only expect an increasingly assertive Japanese foreign policy. In this
situation, Japan's return to its "normal" status will be unavoidable. However,
nationalists will not bring a change to Japan's long-term psychological
isolation from Asia. Under them, Japan will remain a country that is physically
in Asia but psychologically remote from it. If this emotional distance
from the continent is not addressed, Japan may be destined to remain as
a marginal power in the shadows of the United States and China. Most recently
then, Yasuo Fukuda appointed his new team Sept. 24, 2007, a day after being
elected as Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party's new president. The
resignation of Japan's previous prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and the election
of Fukuda is about restrengthening the LDP for the next election (likely
within the next two years) and continuing the general trend of LDP policies
initiated under Abe's predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. Fukuda's election
is about a tightening of internal party control, necessary before reform
efforts can be reinjected with momentum. Internal reform efforts -- aimed
at reconfiguring the underlying economic structures (such as postal bank
reform and pension reform) and at breaking Japanese politics from its habit
of constant backroom dealings -- have progressed little since Koizumi left
office. The need for economic reform has barely changed since Abe's first
day in office. Japan's budget deficit and national debt, as percentages
of gross domestic product, are still the highest in the developed world.
Furthermore, Japan's demographic aging and shrinking suggests that (far)
worse times are ahead. Economic reform is imperative if the Japanese system
is ever to lift out of its indefinite decline, but domestic inertia and
rural resistance are at record highs.

Fukuda was chosen
primarily as a person about whom few could complain. He is nearly 20 years
older than Abe and has more political experience than his predecessor.
The son of a former prime minister, Fukuda has worked in at least three
different administrations; his most recent position was chief Cabinet secretary.
He is seen as a "fixer" and formulated the Koizumi government's response
and foreign policy position after 9/11, coordinating the passage of the
anti-terrorism special measures law. Although focusing tightly on foreign
policy at the expense of domestic priorities was what brought his predecessor
down, Fukuda is slated to continue with Abe's warming toward China and
South Korea. Not only will he not pay homage to the Yasukuni Shrine (a
Japanese memorial housing 14 convicted Class-A war criminals, Japanese
prime ministerial visits to which are an extremely sensitive subject with
both Beijing and Seoul), but he also likely will come out and officially
confirm that he has no plans to visit the shrine. In terms of relations
with the United States, Fukuda likely will continue to use the United States'
regional needs -- such as Japan's cooperation in security -- as well as
various offers from Washington in order to strengthen and expand Japan's
interests within the region.

If anything,
Fukuda will face a tougher time than his immediate predecessor. Abe at
least could count on the echo effect, drawing from Koizumi's legacy and
popularity. Fukuda begins on the same "square one" where Abe started in
September 2006 as far as challenges are concerned -- but he follows Abe,
who was unsuccessful because he failed to address domestic social priorities
directly and lacked the eccentric qualities (a la Koizumi) to endear him
to the Japanese public and to play various LDP factions against each other.
It was not Koizumi's reform agenda that made him successful; it was his
strategy of keeping his opponents guessing and daring to challenge convention.
Looking ahead, more important to watch is the rise of Ichiro Ozawa, leader
of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), whose mission for the
last year has been to dislodge Abe. Despite his party affiliation, his
policies and ideals are more akin to those of the LDP core conservatives
than to those of his DPJ counterparts.Even if LDP deputy leader Taro Aso
had won the prime ministerial post instead of Abe, the need to balance
out powerful party factions -- many of which are resistant to change --
would remain. Fukuda is not any more significant than Abe in the sense
that both are cogs within a Japanese system that continues evolving in
the post-Cold War reality. And the twin rewards of autonomy and prestige
are within Japan's grasp for the first time in living memory. To reduce
associated risks, Japan will be cautious. It will be normal. It will hedge.
The security strategy and institutions abetting this hedge will be neither
too hard nor too soft.

Finally then,
on Oct. 15 North Korean and Japanese officials met in China, for two days
of normalization talks, results of which have not been analysed by the
time of writing although what can be said with certainty is that there
will be more talks soon.

As for today,
while Japan's imperial past gives the country some influence throughout
East Asia, it mostly has earned Japan enmity. Particularly vitriolic is
the contempt in which Japan is held by the Koreans, who resent Japanese
cultural influence, economic domination and attempts to forcibly redefine
Korean identity during the Japanese occupation. North Korea launched a
ballistic missile over Japan in 1998 in a show of force, and in 2006, Pyongyang
tested a nuclear device. Marry those two technologies and Japan clearly
has a pressing need for NMD, and this is even before the economic might
of South Korea is combined with North Korean military technology in a reunification
that is crawling ever closer.

Now then, in
the past few days, suddenly Russia's attention has come to rest on Japan,
the state that is most consistent in its effort to participate in national
missile defense (NMD), and on Tuesday, the Japanese government flatly,
officially and firmly rebuffed Russian calls to abandon the system. The
core Russian concern is that the system ultimately will be fine-tuned and
expanded so that it can hedge in Moscow, something that may well be lurking
about in the depths of U.S. strategic planning. But Japan wants NMD for
its own reasons. China, of course, offers a more direct and immediate challenge
for Japan. As big as Asia is, it probably does not have room for both a
land-based and a sea-based regional superpower. Japan's technological edge
combined with China's existing nuclear arsenal leaves Japan pushing for
NMD, no matter what the Russians do. But even without the more pressing
concern of Asia pushing Japan toward NMD cooperation with the United States,
Russia is on Tokyo's radar. The two hardly have a friendly history: Japan
has served as Washington's proxy in East Asia, blocking Soviet access to
the Pacific. Russia still has not reached a peace accord with Japan, for
World War 2. And before that, Japan defeated Moscow in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese
War, becoming the only Asian state to defeat a European power and inflicting
the geopolitical equivalent of a root canal.Clearly however, the Kremlin
currently is attempting to put pins in a number of potential conflicts
in order to focus on its own immediate concerns. But so far as Japan is
concerned, Russia remains firmly on the "future trouble" list.