Summary:

The Monitoring Committee regrets the manifest lack of progress
with regard to the implementation by the Russian Federation of the
demands made by the Assembly in Resolution 2034 (2015). It equally regrets the decision of the Russian delegation
to suspend all official contacts with the Parliamentary Assembly
until the end of 2015, which is a clear rejection of the Assembly’s
offer of dialogue and which raises questions with regard to the
Russian delegation’s commitment to co-operate and to maintain a
constructive dialogue with the Assembly, including on the honouring
of its commitments and obligations to the Council of Europe.

However, the committee remains convinced that an open dialogue,
in good faith, between the Assembly and the Russian delegation remains
important in order to find a lasting solution, based on international
law and principles, to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and to the
illegal annexation of Crimea.

It is therefore essential that the Russian Parliament and
its delegation to the Assembly express their unequivocal commitment
to enter into a dialogue, without pre-conditions, with the Assembly
on Russia’s compliance with its obligations and honouring of commitments
to the Council of Europe, including with regard to its policy towards
its neighbouring States. As a signal of its commitment to such an
open and constructive dialogue with the Russian delegation, the
Parliamentary Assembly, while noting the sanctions currently in place,
should resolve not to annul, at this time, the already ratified
credentials of the Russian delegation.

A. Draft
resolution

(open)

1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls its Resolution 2034 (2015) on the challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still
unratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation,
adopted on 28 January 2015. In this resolution, the Assembly resolutely
condemned the grave violations of international law committed by
the Russian Federation with regard to the conflict in eastern Ukraine
and the illegal annexation of Crimea. As a clear expression of its
condemnation, the Assembly decided to deprive the Russian delegation
to the Assembly of a number of rights for the duration of the 2015
session. However, for the sole and explicit purpose of maintaining
an open and constructive dialogue with the Russian delegation, including
on its actions with regard to Ukraine, the Assembly decided to ratify
the credentials of the Russian delegation. At the same time, in
paragraph 16 of Resolution
2034 (2015), the Assembly resolved to annul the credentials of the
Russian delegation at its June 2015 part-session if no progress
had been made with regard to the implementation of the Minsk protocols
and memorandum, as well as the demands and recommendations of the
Assembly as expressed in that resolution, in particular with regard
to the immediate withdrawal of Russian military troops from eastern
Ukraine.

2. The Assembly deeply regrets the manifest lack of progress
with regard to the implementation of the demands made in Resolution 2034 (2015). It equally regrets the decision of the Russian delegation
to suspend all official contacts with the Assembly until the end
of 2015, including all visits on behalf of Assembly bodies. The
Assembly regards this as a clear rejection of its offer to maintain
an open and constructive dialogue, including about Russia’s action
in Ukraine. This raises questions about the Russian delegation’s
commitment to co-operate and to maintain a constructive dialogue
with the Assembly, including on the honouring of its commitments
and obligations to the Council of Europe.

3. The Assembly reiterates its position and demands with regard
to the Russian intervention resulting in a military conflict in
eastern Ukraine, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the continuing
deterioration of the human rights situation in that region, as expressed
in Resolution 1990 (2014) on reconsideration on substantive grounds of the previously
ratified credentials of the Russian Federation and Resolution 2034 (2015). In addition, it expresses its serious concern about, inter alia:

3.1. the harassment and closure of most non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and media outlets in Crimea that are critical of Russia’s
illegal annexation of the region, including the Crimean Tatar television
station ATR;

3.2. the continued deterioration of the human rights situation
in eastern Ukraine and credible reports of violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law by the two sides in the conflict,
including persistent abductions, summary killings, arbitrary detention
and torture of civilians in the areas under the control of the pro-Russian
separatists and Russian troops;

3.3. the refusal of the Russian authorities to release Assembly
member Nadiia Savchenko and their decision to prolong her pre-trial
detention, despite, inter alia,
her enjoying immunity under the General Agreement on Privileges
and Immunities of the Council of Europe and its Protocol (ETS Nos.
2 and 10), to which the Russian Federation is a Party;

3.4. the continuing violations, by all sides, of the ceasefire
agreed on in the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the
Minsk Agreements, signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and the continuing presence
of heavy artillery in the exclusion zone in violation of these agreements;

3.5. the continuing presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine
and the influx of advanced weaponry and “volunteers” from the Russian
Federation;

3.6. the harassment and persecution of political activists,
NGOs and media organisations in Russia who are critical of Russia’s
role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In this context, the recent
adoption of the “law on undesirable foreign organisations” is an
additional matter of serious concern.

4. The Assembly remains convinced that an open dialogue, in good
faith, between the Assembly and the Russian delegation remains important
in order to find a lasting solution, based on international law
and principles, to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and to the illegal
annexation of Crimea. It is now essential that the Russian Parliament
and its delegation to the Assembly express their unequivocal commitment
to enter into a dialogue, without pre-conditions, with the Assembly
on Russia’s compliance with the obligations and honouring of commitments
to the Council of Europe, including with regard to its policy towards
its neighbouring States. The Assembly underscores that the acceptance
of such a dialogue is a basic tenet of membership of the Parliamentary
Assembly incumbent on all delegations. It therefore calls on the
Russian delegation to re-establish dialogue with the Assembly without
further delay, in particular with regard to the implementation of the
demands of the Assembly as expressed in Resolution 1990 (2014) and Resolution
2034 (2015) as well as in this resolution. In this respect, as a
first step, the Russian delegation should return to the work of
the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by
Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) and
allow this committee’s rapporteurs for the Russian Federation to
go to the country in the context of their work. In addition, the
Russian authorities, as the occupying power, should facilitate a
joint visit to Crimea of the co-rapporteurs for Ukraine and for
the Russian Federation to take stock of the human rights situation
in this region.

5. In addition, the Assembly calls upon the Russian authorities
to:

5.1. fully implement the Minsk
Agreements and the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the
Minsk Agreements, to which the Russian Federation is a Party, and
use its influence on the insurgent forces to do the same;

5.2. immediately reverse the illegal annexation of Crimea;

5.3. immediately release Nadiia Savchenko and allow her to
return to Ukraine;

5.4. release all captives, in particular civilians and including
captives held in the Russian Federation, and to use its influence
on the insurgent forces to do the same;

5.5. cease the harassment and prosecution of citizens, activists,
NGOs and media organisations in the Russian Federation that are
critical of the Russian Federation’s role in Ukraine;

5.6. bring the law on foreign agents fully into line with European
standards and principles;

5.7. fully respect the rights to freedom of assembly and expression,
including of those critical of the authorities’ policies.

6. As a signal of its commitment to an open and constructive
dialogue with the Russian delegation, the Assembly, while noting
the sanctions currently in place, resolves not to annul, at this
time, the already ratified credentials of the Russian delegation.

B. Explanatory
memorandum by Mr Schennach, rapporteur

(open)

1. Introduction

1. On 28 January 2015, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 2034 (2015) on the challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still
unratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation,
in which it decided to ratify the credentials of the Russian delegation.
At the same time, as a clear expression of its condemnation of the
continuing grave violations of international law in respect of Ukraine
by the Russian Federation, in particular as regards the Statute
of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1) and Russia’s accession commitments
to this Organisation, the Assembly resolved to suspend the following
rights of the members of the Russian delegation for the duration
of the 2015 session: the voting rights; the right to be represented
in the Bureau of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee and the
Standing Committee; the right to be appointed rapporteur; the right
to be member of an ad hoc committee on observation of elections;
the right to represent the Assembly in Council of Europe bodies
as well as external institutions and organisations, both institutionally and
on an occasional basis.

2. In paragraph 15 of Resolution
2034 (2015), the Assembly decided that it could consider reinstating
the Russian Federation’s voting rights and right to be represented
in the Bureau of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee and the
Standing Committee at its April 2015 part-session, if Russia had
made “marked and measurable progress towards implementing the demands
of the Assembly formulated ... in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.4, paragraphs
5.1 to 5.3, paragraphs 7.1 to 7.9, paragraph 11 and paragraphs 12.1
to 12.4”; and had given its full co-operation to the working group
mentioned in paragraph 17 of Resolution
2034 (2015).

3. In addition, in paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015), the Assembly resolved to annul the credentials of the
Russian delegation at its June 2015 part-session if no progress
had been made with regard to the implementation of the Minsk Protocols
and Memorandum, as well as “the demands and recommendations of the
Assembly as expressed in this resolution, in particular with regard
to the immediate withdrawal of Russian military troops from eastern
Ukraine”.

4. On 12 February 2015, the Assembly received a letter from the
Chairperson of the Russian delegation, Mr Alexei Pushkov, in which
he announced that the Russian delegation had suspended all official
contacts with the Parliamentary Assembly until the end of 2015,
including all visits on behalf of Assembly bodies.

5. On 17 March 2015, the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations
and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee), in the light of the manifest lack of progress on the demands
of the Assembly formulated in Resolution
2034 (2015), as well as the failure of the Russian delegation to
co-operate with the Assembly, unanimously requested the Bureau to
withdraw the item on the “Follow-up to Resolution 2034 (2015): Reconsideration of sanctions in respect of the delegation
of the Russian Federation to the Parliamentary Assembly” from the
agenda of the April 2015 part-session of the Assembly. The Bureau
of the Assembly supported this request and, on 20 April 2015, the
Assembly agreed to the removal of this item from the agenda of the
April part-session.

6. As a follow up to paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015), on 24 April 2015, the Bureau of the Assembly seized
the Monitoring Committee for report on “Consideration of the annulment
of the previously ratified credentials of the delegation of the
Russian Federation (follow-up to paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015))”. The Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and
Institutional Affairs was seized for opinion on this report.

7. At its meeting on 20 April 2015, in anticipation of the Bureau
decision, I was appointed rapporteur for the present report by the
Monitoring Committee.

8. The Assembly imposed the sanctions outlined in Resolution 2034 (2015) for the full duration of the 2015 session. When the
Assembly decided to withdraw discussion on “Follow-up to Resolution 2034 (2015): Reconsideration of sanctions in respect of the delegation
of the Russian Federation to the Parliamentary Assembly” from the
agenda of the April part-session due to the manifest lack of progress
on the demands made by the Assembly in Resolution 2034 (2015), it reconfirmed all five sanctions for
the remainder of the 2015 session. This cannot be altered by this
report.

9. At the same time, in paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015), the Assembly decided to consider the annulment of the
already ratified credentials of the Russian delegation. It explicitly
did not decide to consider the possibility of applying other sanctions.
This report and its draft resolution will therefore only consider whether
to annul the credentials of the Russian delegation on the basis
of the criteria set out in paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015) and will not, and cannot, consider reducing or increasing
the sanctions, other than the possible annulment of the credentials,
imposed against the delegation of the Russian Federation.

10. In the sections below, I will outline the main developments
with regard to the implementation of the demands and recommendations
made by the Assembly in Resolution
2034 (2015), as well as the main developments with regard to the
implementation of the Minsk agreements. In addition, I will include
a short section on developments concerning other obligations and
commitments of the Russian Federation that are relevant in this
context. Lastly, I will explore, in summary, the issues of dialogue
and sanctions by the Assembly.

11. When discussing the implementation of the demands
and recommendations made by the Assembly in Resolution 2034 (2015), it is important to recall that the Assembly agreed
to remove from the agenda of the April 2015 part-session the issue
of the reconsideration of sanctions in respect of the delegation
of the Russian Federation to the Parliamentary Assembly (follow-up
to paragraph 15 of Resolution
2034 (2015)), following a request of the Monitoring Committee as
a result of “the manifest lack of progress on the demands of the Assembly
formulated in Resolution
2034 (2015)”. The basis for my
analysis will therefore be the question of whether there have been
any developments since the April part-session that could lead to
a change in this assessment.

12. With regard to Crimea, there have been no moves to reverse
the illegal annexation and its further integration into the Russian
Federation is continuing unabated. In a documentary aired on Russian State television
on 15 March 2015, President Putin revealed that he had given the
order to prepare the annexation of Crimea on 22 February 2014, the
day former Ukrainian President Yanukovich fled to Russia. In this
context, he also admitted that he had deployed, from the onset,
covert Russian military troops without insignia for this purpose.
This documentary clearly showed that the annexation was premeditated
and planned from its onset by the Russian authorities and was not
in reaction to a spontaneous uprising of the Crimean people as a
result of the Euromaidan events.

13. The human rights situation in Crimea, and especially the situation
of the Crimean Tatars, has continued to deteriorate and is of serious
concern.

14. No progress has been made on the investigation of the deaths
and disappearances of pro-Ukrainian political activists and harassment of
persons opposing the illegal annexation continues. In addition,
public assemblies, including commemorative celebrations by Crimean
Tatars, are reportedly banned or disturbed.

15. Following the illegal annexation, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) were obliged to re-register according to Russian law. Only
a very few NGOs managed to do so. Of the more than 10 000 registered
NGOs that existed before the annexation, only around 400 were re-registered.
Those NGOs that are registered have reportedly been warned not to
organise pro-Ukrainian activities or they will face disbandment
under existing Russian anti-extremism legislation. Most worrisome,
the Crimean Tatar Mejlis was officially threatened with liquidation
under this legislation by the “Prosecutor General of Crimea”.

16. Similarly, media outlets were forced to re-register according
to Russian legislation before 1 April 2015. A
large number of media outlets, and practically all pro-Ukrainian
or Crimean Tatar media outlets, were denied registration by the
Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology
and Mass Media (“Roskomnadzior”). In
addition, a tender for the re-assignment of radio broadcasting frequencies
was organised before the re-registration process for media outlets
was finalised, resulting in a number of radio stations losing their
broadcasting frequency.

17. Regrettably, the harassment of Crimean Tatar
organisations has continued unabated. On 29 January 2015, the Russian
security services arrested Ahtem Ciygoz, the Deputy Chairperson
of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, on charges of organising mass disorder,
and on 30 January his house was searched. Despite international
outcry over his arrest, his request for bail was refused and he
was placed in pre-trial detention. Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov
continue to be persona non grata in
the Russian Federation and are not allowed to return to their residences
in Crimea. The Crimean Tatar Channel ATR was denied registration and
went off the air on 1 April 2015.

18. The human rights situation in eastern Ukraine continues to
deteriorate and serious human rights violations are being committed
by all sides, including by the Russian military and Russian volunteers
that are present in eastern Ukraine. In its report published on
3 March 2015, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine noted the credible reports of violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law by the two sides in the conflict,
including persistent abductions, arbitrary detention and allegations
of torture of civilians in the areas of control by the pro-Russian
separatists. On 17 March 2015, the
United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights expressed his concern
about the deterioration of the human rights situation in eastern
Ukraine as a result of the violations of the Minsk ceasefire agreement, especially
around Donetsk airport and Shyrokyne. On 9 April 2015, Amnesty International
issued a statement in which it condemned the torture,
ill-treatment and summary killings of Ukrainian soldiers captured
by pro-Russian separatist forces, and called for these war crimes
to be fully investigated. On 15 April 2015, the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe issued a decision on the situation in Ukraine
in which the Ministers’ Deputies “expressed their serious concern
regarding the continued deterioration of the human rights situation
in eastern Ukraine and Crimea”.

19. In Resolution 2034
(2015), the Assembly expressed its serious concern about the
arrest and indictment of Ukrainian helicopter pilot Nadiia Savchenko,
in contravention of international law. As Ms Savchenko was by then
a member of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Assembly asked the Russian
Federation to fully respect its obligations as a Party to the General
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe
and its Protocol (ETS Nos. 2 and 10), according to which Ms Nadiia
Savchenko enjoys European parliamentary immunity. It therefore called
on the Russian authorities to release Ms Savchenko, within 24 hours
after the adoption of the resolution, and ensure her return to Ukraine
or to hand her over to a third country.

20. To date, Ms Savchenko has not been released by the Russian
authorities. On the contrary, on 30 January 2015, the day after
the adoption of Resolution
2034 (2015), the Russian Investigative Committee brought additional
charges against Ms Savchenko for allegedly illegally crossing the
border of the Russian Federation. On 5 March 2015, Ms Savchenko
ended her hunger strike, also after an appeal by the Russian Ombudsperson.

21. On 29 March 2015, the Russian Investigative Committee, in
reply to a request from Ms Savchenko’s lawyers, refused to accept
Ms Savchenko’s immunity as a member of the Parliamentary Assembly.
On 7 April 2015, Ms Savchenko’s lawyers filed an appeal against
this decision with the court in Moscow. This appeal was rejected
on 6 May 2015. In addition, the court further extended her pre-trial
detention until 30 June 2015.

22. Immediately following the adoption of the Package of Measures
for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements on 12 February 2015,
President Poroshenko of Ukraine announced that Ms Savchenko would
be released by the Russian Federation as part of this agreement.
However, this was contradicted by the Chairperson of the Russian
delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, Mr Puskhov, who subsequently
stated that he saw no legal mechanism for the automatic release
of Ms Savchenko, who “should first prove her innocence before the
courts”. This was later confirmed by the
spokesperson of President Putin, who denied that Russia had given
any promise of liberating Ms Savchenko. On 14 April 2015, the German Foreign Minister
confirmed that Ms Savchenko should be released under paragraph 6
of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements,
which were signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015.

23. No progress has been made with regard to the demands made
by the Assembly in Resolution
2034 (2015) regarding Russia’s policy towards its neighbouring countries.
Controversially, on 18 March 2015, Russia and the de facto authorities of the self-proclaimed
“Republic of South Ossetia” signed a treaty for “alliance and integration”
similar to the one signed between Russia and the self-proclaimed
“Republic of Abkhazia”. This was condemned by the international
community, including by the Monitoring Committee rapporteurs for
Georgia, who considered it a sign of the creeping annexation of
these regions by the Russian Federation.

24. In paragraph 17 of Resolution
2034 (2015), the Assembly invited the Bureau of the Assembly “to consider
setting up, pending the agreement of the parliaments concerned,
a special working group with the participation of the Speakers of
the Russian State Duma and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, or their representatives,
to contribute to the realisation of all the propositions made in
this resolution and to formulate further possible action by the
Parliamentary Assembly in support of the implementation of the Minsk
protocols” and asked for the full co-operation of the Russian delegation
in it.

25. On 4 February 2015, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly,
Anne Brasseur, sent a letter to the Chairperson of the Russian State
Duma, Mr Sergey Naryshkin, regarding Russian participation in this
working group. In a letter dated 6 February 2015, declining the
invitation, Mr Pushkov, stated that “a working group was set up
to assist with resolving the situation in Ukraine within the framework
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in July 2014”, the work
of which was blocked, according to Mr Pushkov, by Poland, Ukraine
and the United States. As mentioned above, in a letter dated 12
February 2015, Mr Pushkov confirmed the decision of the Russian
delegation to cease all contact and co-operation with the Parliamentary
Assembly until the end of 2015.

3. The Minsk agreements
and Russian military presence in Ukraine

26. The developments in eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s
involvement in them, up until January 2015 have been succinctly
described in my report leading to Resolution 2034 (2015). A detailed outline of the events in eastern Ukraine
since then is beyond the scope and purpose of this report. I will
limit myself to the main developments that have taken place since
January 2015.

27. By mid-January, Ukrainian military troops had regained control
over Donetsk airport. On 21 January 2015, separatist forces, aided
by Russian military troops, launched
an offensive against Donetsk airport, which resulted in the ousting
of the Ukrainian forces. Following their successful capture of Donetsk
airport, separatist and Russian forces started a number of offensives
against Ukrainian military troops all along the line of contact
established by the Minsk agreements of September 2014. Fighting
was especially intense around Mariupol and the town of Debaltseve.

28. Debaltseve is a strategically important town that was under
government control. Due to its strategic position as a road and
rail junction, separatist troops, helped by Russian army troops,
started an offensive against it on 17 January 2015. In the following
days, the town was shelled by heavy artillery and multiple rocket launchers,
leading to considerable numbers of civilian casualties. By the end
of January, pro-Russian forces had practically encircled the town
and the situation of the Ukrainian defenders and civilians trapped
in the town had become untenable. By 31 January 2015, more than a
1 000 civilians had been evacuated by the Ukrainian authorities
and reinforcements were sent to aid the troops trapped in the town.
Fighting continued and by 11 February the town was completely encircled
by separatist forces. Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement
in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and in clear violation
of these agreements, separatist and Russian forces started a new
offensive and by 18 February they had managed to occupy the town.
The self-proclaimed leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic,
Alexander Zakharchenko, publicly stated that, for the separatist
forces, the February 2015 Minsk agreements were not applicable to
Debaltseve.

29. On 24 January 2015, separatist forces, reportedly assisted
by Russian artillery and troops, also started an offensive towards
Mariupol, including the shelling of the city that resulted in more
than 30 civilian casualties. This offensive was eventually pushed
back by a counter offensive of the Azov volunteer battalion and
the Ukrainian armed forces. The situation around Mariupol is especially
sensitive, with some separatist leaders openly announcing that they
will continue to try to take the city from the Ukrainian army. The
occupation of Mariupol by separatist and Russian forces would be
an important step towards establishing a land bridge to Crimea (or
even further, to Odessa), which is considered by many to be a possible
long-term objective of the Russian authorities.

30. The breakdown of the ceasefire agreed in Minsk in September
2014 resulted in a series of intense diplomatic negotiations led
by the German Chancellor and French President, which culminated
in the signing, on 12 February 2015 in Minsk, of the “Package of
Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”, which included a new ceasefire
agreement to come into force on 15 February 2015. The renewed outbreak
of hostilities and the separatist advance in January 2015 resulted
in the United States considering supplying lethal military aid to
the Ukrainian armed forces. It is beyond doubt that this possibility played
an important role in facilitating an agreement in Minsk on 12 February
2015.

31. A detailed discussion and analysis of the Package of Measures
for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements is beyond the scope
of this paper. I will limit myself to the aspects that are relevant
to the subject of this report. On 15 February 2015, the ceasefire
agreement negotiated in Minsk on 12 February came into effect. However,
as described above, in violation of this agreement, the offensive
of Debaltseve by separatist forces, with Russian backing, continued
unabated until the fall of this town into separatist hands. Nevertheless, the
ceasefire agreement has resulted, until now, in a cessation of large-scale
military hostilities. However, the ceasefire remains extremely fragile
and is violated on a daily basis, especially around Donetsk airport
and Mariupol. Both President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel have
repeatedly stated that a separatist offensive towards Mariupol would
result in a significant intensification of sanctions against Russia
by the European Union.

32. The Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements stipulates that both sides should withdraw their heavy
artillery to an equal distance to form a security zone. Both
sides have withdrawn considerable numbers of heavy weapons from
the so-called security zone, but many more remain. The extent of
the withdrawal of heavy arms cannot be conclusively verified by
international monitors who are regularly restricted in their movements
by both sides. In addition, several Western governments, as well
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), noted a considerable
influx of Russian arms and equipment to the rebels immediately following
the signing of the agreements in Minsk in February 2015.

33. The package of measures imposes the release of all hostages
and unlawfully detained persons by all parties to the conflict,
including Russia. Regrettably, as mentioned in the previous
section, Russia argues that Nadiia Savchenko is not covered by this
paragraph and refuses to release her.

34. The Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements outlines a series of steps to be taken to facilitate
a negotiated political solution to the conflict. In this framework,
the package of measures foresees the establishment of four working
groups: on security, on political process, on economic affairs and on
humanitarian issues. I call on the Russian authorities to participate
fully and constructively in these working groups and to ensure the
same from the representatives of the separatist forces.

35. The ceasefire agreement remains fragile and there are many
obstacles to the implementation of the Minsk agreement from all
sides that could easily lead to a renewed outbreak of full-scale
military hostilities. The possibility of this happening
was highlighted by a statement by the leader of the self-proclaimed
Donetsk People’s Republic, Aleksandr Zacharenko, in which he warned
that the ceasefire agreement would fail unless the independence
of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic was recognised. I reiterate the call made by the
Assembly to all parties in the conflict and, in the context of this
report, especially to the Russian Federation, to implement in good
faith the Minsk agreements. In addition, I call on the Russian authorities
to withdraw all their military troops from Ukrainian territory;
to immediately cease the supply of arms to separatist forces and
to take credible measures to end the participation of Russian volunteers
in this conflict.

36. The Russian authorities continue to deny the involvement of
Russian military troops or the supply of Russian advanced weaponry
to separatist forces in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. However,
this is clearly belied by the overwhelming body of publicly available
evidence to the contrary. These include reports by NATO and its
member States, analysis of commercially available satellite imagery
by independent defence analysts as well as journalists’ and other
eyewitness accounts, including accounts by Russian military personnel
on social media and in interviews. In March 2015, the renowned independent
British think-tank, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),
published a briefing paper detailing at the battalion level
the involvement of Russian military troops in Ukraine, as well as
the establishment of hybrid battalions of Russian military and Russian
and other volunteers in an effort to conceal the direct participation
of Russian military in the conflict.

4. Developments on
other commitments and obligations of the Russian Federation

37. As stated in Resolution
1990 (2014) and Resolution
2034 (2015), Russia’s actions with regard to Crimea, as well as
its role and participation in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, are
in direct violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe as well
as of its accession commitments, in particular paragraphs 10.7,
10.8 and 10.11 of Assembly Opinion
193 (1996). In
addition, the events in Ukraine have exacerbated a number of negative tendencies
– often related to the increasing importance of the ideology “Eurasianism”
– in the Russian Federation with regard to other obligations and
commitments that are of relevance for the completeness of this report.
These tendencies have led to an increasingly marginalised political
opposition, increased control over the media and the stifling of
independent voices in civil society.

38. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ensuing military
conflict in south-eastern Ukraine have led to increased harassment
and repression of activists and human rights organisations and intimidation
of dissident voices in Russia. The overall political climate, guided
by security and stability goals, has proved to be detrimental to
the respect for fundamental rights over recent months. Through the
setting up and the application of a repressive legal framework,
further restrictions have been placed on the opposition, independent
media and civil society, hindering the freedoms of expression and
assembly. Independent NGOs have been under constant threat, which
has been detrimental to their work.

39. The NGO legislation has hindered the activity of many human
rights organisations, forcing them to shut down or face harassment
and persecution at the hands of the authorities. The implementation
of this legislation has included harsh action aimed at preventing
and dissuading civil society organisations, including the Soldiers’
Mothers Organisation, from carrying out their work. Over 53 organisations
were registered as “foreign agents”. A number of these NGOs challenged
this decision in court. At least five of them lost their cases and at least 15 groups
decided to start disbanding in order to avoid further persecution. Concerns have also been expressed
about the complex procedure of removal from the “foreign agent”
registry, which does not
appear to have been solved by the new law regulating the procedure
of exclusion of non-commercial organisations from the foreign agents’
registry that was adopted in February 2015. The total amount of fines imposed
on NGOs for not registering as “foreign agents” is so far more than
6 000 000 rubles (about €100 000).

40. On 23 May 2015, a new law banning “undesirable foreign organisations”
was signed into force by President Putin. The Bill criminalises
the work of foreign non-profit organisations that are considered
to “threaten Russia’s constitutional order security and defence
capacity” and punishes anyone seen as “collaborating” with them
with heavy fines. The list of “undesirable foreign organisations”
will be under the responsibility of the General Prosecutor in co-operation
with the Foreign Ministry. This legislation is another troubling
sign of measures taken by the authorities to restrict public criticism.

41. In particular, the intimidation of media NGOs in Russia has
continued, with deliberate and excessive pressure imposed on them,
which has further endangered the situation of media freedom. The Mass
Media Defence Center (MMDC), which specialises in media law, provides
legal assistance and protects media rights, was informed on 20 February
2015 that it would be placed on the register of “foreign agents”. The media NGO Regional Press Institute,
which aims to assist journalists and the media, has had to pay the
biggest fine imposed so far under the “foreign agent” law for not
registering.

42. The Russian authorities have tightened State control over
the media industry in recent years. Legal obstacles have led to
restrictions on independent media, including restrictions on foreign
ownership of news outlets, warnings, revocations of licences, closure
of news outlets and blockage of websites and online platforms. In
this context, new legislation was passed – signed by President Putin
on 2 May 2015 – increasing tenfold the maximum fine that can be
levied on Russian news organisations accused of inciting terrorism
or extremism. These
legislative changes raise fears of increased pressure on the country's
remaining independent media outlets. News organisations can now
be obliged to pay up to 1 million rubles, around US$19 000 (instead
of 50 000 and 100 000 rubles) for publishing material deemed to
incite or justify terrorism or extremism. The legal definition of
“extremism” remains unclear and could lead to an arbitrary application
of the new provision. Extremism
warnings have also been given to news outlets critical of the Kremlin.
For example, in January 2015, a Moscow court rejected an appeal
brought by liberal-leaning radio station Ekho Moskvy against warnings
it had received from the Roskomnadzor for what the latter deemed
was an “extremist” on-air segment about the fighting in eastern
Ukraine.

43. This crackdown on civil society and the media is closely interrelated
with the systemic intimidation of opposition leaders in an attempt
to silence critical voices. Protests against the war in Ukraine
and the annexation of Crimea have been harshly and repeatedly repressed. The killing of the prominent political opposition
figure, Boris Nemtsov, on 28 February 2015 is the most significant
political assassination to date and clear evidence of the deterioration
of the political climate in Russia. This murder took place the day
before Boris Nemtsov was due to lead the opposition march to protest
against economic conditions in Russia and the war in Ukraine and
just before he was to publish a report on his investigations on
Russia’s participation in the Donbas conflict.

44. Evidence has pointed to the use of torture on the suspects
arrested in the course of the investigation into Boris Nemtsov’s
murder. The Russian authorities
have threatened to bring criminal charges against two human rights
activists who published torture allegations by the two men accused
of the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, raising alarming questions
about the fairness of the investigation.

45. The reported harassment of the opposition can also be seen
as an effort to destabilise attempts to constitute a united political
alternative in the run-up to the forthcoming 2015 and 2016 elections.
On 17 February 2015, Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was
sentenced to 15 days in prison for breaching a law that restricts
demonstrations, barring him from attending a rally planned on 1
March 2015. On 28 April, the Ministry of Justice announced that
Mr Navalny’s Progress Party had been withdrawn from the list of authorised
parties, following the cancellation of its legal registration due
to the party’s alleged failure to register its regional branches
on time. The decision came ten days after the announcement of the
creation of a new opposition movement in which the democratic opposition
had united on a joint platform for the 2015 regional elections and
2016 general elections. The coalition includes Boris Nemtsov’s party
RPR-Parnas, co-chaired by Mikhail Kasyanov, Alexei Navalny’s Party
of Progress, and four other parties.

5. Co-operation between
the delegation of the Russian Federation and the Parliamentary Assembly

46. In Resolution
2034 (2015), the Assembly stated that: “The Russian Federation therefore
needs to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Assembly on this
issue as well as on the honouring of its obligations and commitments
to the Council of Europe. However, the Assembly emphasises that
such dialogue can only take place if the Russian authorities are
willing to participate, in good faith and without preconditions,
in a constructive and open dialogue with the Assembly, including
on those issues where the views of the Assembly and Russia differ.” It
therefore decided to ratify the credentials of the Russian delegation
– while suspending a comprehensive set of rights to express its
clear condemnation of Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine
– for the sole purpose of fostering “dialogue with the Russian Federation.”

47. However, as mentioned above, following the adoption of Resolution 2034 (2015), the Russian delegation decided to cease all contacts
and co-operation with the Parliamentary Assembly until the end of
2015. I strongly regret the Russian delegation’s decision, which
is a clear rejection of the Assembly’s proposal to maintain open and
constructive dialogue, including about Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
This raises questions about the Russian delegation’s willingness
to co-operate and to maintain a constructive dialogue with the Assembly,
including on the honouring of its commitments and obligations to
our Organisation.

48. At the same time, a dialogue in good faith between the Assembly
and the Russian delegation remains important in order to find a
lasting solution, based on international law and principles, to
the conflict in eastern Ukraine and to the illegal annexation of
Crimea. In addition, such a dialogue is necessary for the Assembly
to hold the Russian delegation accountable on the basis of the Council
of Europe’s values and principles.

49. The Assembly has, on multiple occasions, expressed its clear
wish to engage in such a dialogue, including in April 2014 and January
2015, when it adopted Resolutions 1990 (2014) and 2034 (2015), in
which it ratified the credentials of the Russian delegation to this
end. It is now essential that the Russian parliament and its delegation
to the Assembly express their unequivocal willingness to enter into
a dialogue, without pre-conditions, with the Assembly on Russia’s
compliance with the obligations and honouring of commitments to the
Council of Europe, including with regard to its policy towards its
neighbouring States. It should be stressed that the acceptance of
such a dialogue is a basic tenet of membership of the Parliamentary
Assembly incumbent on all delegations. I therefore call on the Russian
delegation to re-establish dialogue with the Assembly in particular
with regard to the implementation of the demands of the Assembly
as expressed in Resolution
1990 (2014) and Resolution
2034 (2015).

50. As a first step, the Russian delegation should return to the
work of the Monitoring Committee and allow this committee’s rapporteurs
for Russia to visit the country in the context of their work. In
this respect, it should be noted, according to Rule 8.2.b of the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly, that “lack of co-operation in the Assembly’s monitoring
procedure” is in itself a ground to challenge the credentials of
a delegation.

51. It is clear that annulling the credentials of the Russian
delegation, on top of the already comprehensive sanctions imposed
by the Assembly, could hinder, in practical terms, the establishment
of such a dialogue with the Russian delegation. At the same time,
it should be clear that the refusal of the Russian delegation to establish
a dialogue, on the terms described in the previous paragraphs, could
lead to ever increasing calls in the Assembly for the credentials
of the Russian delegation not to be ratified in January 2016. The
possibility of establishing a constructive dialogue with the Assembly
as a whole during the next six months is a chance the Russian delegation
cannot afford to ignore.

6. Sanctions by the
Assembly

52. In the following three paragraphs, I reiterate some
of the observations on the issue of sanctions from my report on
the challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials
of the delegation of the Russian Federation from January 2015. In my view, these
observations remain fully valid for the consideration of the annulment
of the credentials of the Russian delegation.

53. On 11 April 2014, the Bureau of the Assembly invited the Committee
on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs to “elaborate
a list of rights of participation or representation that may be
derived or suspended in the context of a challenge or reconsideration
of credentials”. On 30 September 2014, this committee approved an
opinion for the Bureau on this subject, presented by
Ms Nataša Vučković (Serbia, SOC). This opinion was approved by the
Bureau of the Assembly at its meeting on 30 September 2014.

54. In her opinion, Ms Vučković stresses that it would be impossible
to give an exhaustive list of rights of participation or representation that
could be suspended or withdrawn, as this would in practice only
be limited by the inventiveness and creativity of the members. However, the explanatory memorandum
did also state that any sanctions applied should be based on the
principles of consistency and legal certainty of sanctions as well
as the principle of proportionality to the seriousness of the infringement
in question.

55. The principles of legal certainty and proportionality are
therefore important criteria when discussing and deciding on possible
sanctions to be imposed on the Russian delegation. Legal certainty
in this context implies that similar violations should lead to similar
sanctions if repeated, and that similar sanctions by other delegations
should lead to sanctions of similar gravity. Proportionality implies
that when deciding on applying sanctions, these sanctions – or the
absence thereof – cannot be so severe, or so light, that it would
make it impossible on future occasions for the Assembly to apply
sanctions for more serious or less severe violations of a given
country’s membership obligations and accession commitments.

56. As mentioned, Ms Vučković also noted that a decision to apply
a sanction should be consistent from both a legal and regulatory
viewpoint, as well as from a political point of view. In that respect,
a decision to apply a sanction should be rational and take into
account the effectiveness and clarity of the sanction applied.

57. In Resolution 2034
(2015), the Assembly decided to apply a series of serious sanctions
that have had a profound impact on the privileges of the members
of the Russian delegation. These sanctions remain in place until
the end of the 2015 session. The main effect of an annulment of
the credentials, in addition to the sanctions already in place,
would be that the members of the Russian delegation would no longer
be able to participate and speak in the Assembly and its committee
meetings. However, as mentioned above, the Russian delegation has
made the regrettable decision to cease all contact and co-operation
with the Parliamentary Assembly until the end of 2015. Therefore,
the annulment of the credentials in practical terms would not have
much additional effect and would mostly be a symbolic gesture. It
should be emphasised that, at the same time, the condemnation of
Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea are already clear
from the comprehensive sanctions applied. However, annulment would
close a number of practical avenues for the Russian delegation to
re-open a dialogue with the Assembly, with a view to re-establishing
co-operation in order to address the issues of concern of the Assembly
as mentioned, inter alia,
in Resolution 1990 (2014) and Resolution
2034 (2015).

7. Conclusions

58. As mentioned in the introduction, the only question
to be dealt with by this report is the possible annulment of the
credentials of the Russian delegation. The sanctions in Resolution 2034 (2015) have been imposed on the Russian delegation for the
duration of the 2015 session and therefore remain valid until the opening
of the first part of the 2016 session. This report cannot reduce
or increase the sanctions in place, other than the possible annulment
of the credentials.

59. It is clear that no progress has been made with regard to
the demands made by the Assembly in Resolution 2034 (2015). In addition, the ceasefire that is part of the Minsk
process remains fragile and is violated on a daily basis. Considerable
numbers of Russian military forces remain in eastern Ukraine and
their presence has reportedly been strengthened following the signing
of Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements
on 12 February 2015. In addition, the supply of advanced heavy weaponry
to separatist forces and Russian “volunteers” is continuing unabated.

60. However, the annulment of the credentials of the Russian delegation
would mostly be a symbolic gesture that would have little additional
effect in the light of the sanctions already in place and the decision
of the Russian delegation to suspend its participation in the Assembly
until the end of 2015. The explicit condemnation by the Assembly
of the actions of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine, as
well as of its illegal annexation of Crimea, is clear from the comprehensive
set of sanctions that were imposed by the Assembly for the duration
of the 2015 session.

61. In addition, annulling the credentials at this time would
hinder any possible attempts by the Russian delegation to establish
the constructive and open dialogue the Assembly has been calling
for. I strongly believe that the Russian delegation should be given
one more chance to engage in a serious and concrete dialogue with
the Assembly, without pre-conditions, on Russia’s compliance with
its obligations and honouring of commitments to the Council of Europe,
including its policy towards its neighbouring States and the demands made
by the Assembly in Resolution
1990 (2014) and Resolution
2034 (2015).

62. I therefore propose that the Assembly does not annul, at this
point, the already ratified credentials of the Russian delegation.
However, at the same time it should urge the Russian delegation
to use the rest of this year to start a meaningful dialogue with
the Assembly on the implementation of the demands made in Resolution 1990 (2014) and Resolution
2034 (2015). Failure by the Russian delegation to do so could easily lead
to a renewed challenge to the credentials of the Russian delegation
during the January 2016 part-session.