The euro – part two will it survive another 20 years?

In part two of my analysis of the euro currency, I consider the impact of the global slump of 2008-9 and the ensuing euro debt crisis on prospects for the euro.

The global slump dramatically increased the divergent forces within the euro. The fragmentation of capital flows between the strong and weak Eurozone states exploded. The capitalist sectors of the richer economies like Germany stopped lending directly to the weaker capitalist sectors in Greece and Slovenia, etc. As a result, in order to maintain a single currency for all, the official monetary authority, the ECB, and the national central banks had to provide the loans instead. The Eurosystem’s ‘Target 2’ settlement figures between the national central banks revealed this huge divergence within the Eurozone.

The imposition of austerity measures by the Franco-German EU leadership on the ‘distressed’ countries during the crisis was the result of the ‘halfway house’ of euro criteria. There was no full fiscal union (tax harmonisation and automatic transfer of revenues to those national economies with deficits); there was no automatic injection of credit to cover capital flight and trade deficits (federal banking); and there was no banking union with EU-wide regulation and weak banks could be helped by stronger ones. These conditions were the norm in full federal unions like the United States or the United Kingdom. Instead, in the Eurozone, everything had to be agreed by tortuous negotiation among the Euro states.

The ECB, the EU Commission, and the governments of the Eurozone proclaimed that austerity was the only way Europe was to escape from the Great Recession. Austerity in the public spending could force convergence on fiscal accounts too (123118-euroeconomicanalyst-weekly). But the real aim of austerity was to achieve a sharp fall in real wages and cuts in corporate taxes and thus raise the share of profit and profitability of capital. Indeed, after a decade of austerity, very little progress has been achieved in meeting the fiscal targets (particularly in reducing debt ratios); and, more important, in reducing the imbalances within the Eurozone on labour costs or external trade to make the weaker more ‘competitive’.

The adjusted wage share in national income, defined here as compensation per employee as percentage of GDP at factor cost per person employed, is the cost to the capitalist economy of employing the workforce (wages and benefits) as a percentage of the new value created each year. Every capitalist economy had managed to reduce labour’s share of the new value created since 2009. Labour has been paying for this crisis everywhere.

Reduction in labour’s share of new value added 2009-15 (%)

Source: AMECO, author’s calculations

The evidence shows that those EU states that got a quicker recovery in their profitability of capital were able to recover from the euro crisis (Germany, Netherlands, Ireland etc) faster, while those that did not improve profitability stayed deep in depression (Greece).

One of the striking contributions to the fall in labour’s share of new value has been from emigration. This was one of the OCA criteria for convergence during crises and it has become an important contributor in reducing costs for the capitalist sector in the larger economies like Spain (and smaller ones like Ireland). Before the crisis, Spain was the largest recipient of immigrants to its workforce: from Latin America, Portugal, and North Africa. Now there is net emigration even with these areas.

Keynesians blame the crisis in the Eurozone on the rigidity of the single-currency area and on the strident ‘austerity’ policies of the leaders of the Eurozone, like Germany. But the euro crisis is only partly a result of the policies of austerity. Austerity was pursued, not only by the EU institutions, but also by states outside the Eurozone like the UK. Alternative Keynesian policies of fiscal stimulus and/or devaluation where applied have done little to end the slump and still made households suffer income losses. Austerity means a loss of jobs and services and nominal and real income. Keynesian policies mean a loss of real income through higher prices, a falling currency, and eventually rising interest rates.

Take Iceland, a tiny country outside the EU, let alone the Eurozone. It adopted the Keynesian policy of devaluation of the currency, a policy not available to the member states of the Eurozone. But it still meant a 40% decline in average real incomes in euro terms and nearly 20% in krona terms since 2007. Indeed, in 2015 Icelandic real wages were still below where they were in 2005, ten years earlier, while real wages in the ‘distressed’ EMU states of Ireland and Portugal have recovered.

Iceland’s rate of profit plummeted from 2005 and eventually the island’s property boom burst and along with it the banks collapsed in 2008–09. Devaluation of the currency started in 2008, but profitability up to 2012 remained well under the peak level of 2004. Profitability of capital in Iceland has now recovered but EMU distressed ‘austerity’ states, Portugal and Ireland, have actually done better and even Greek profitability has shown some revival.

Net return on capital for Iceland and Greece (2005=100)

Source: AMECO

Those arguing for exiting the euro as a solution to the Eurozone crisis hold that resorting to competitive devaluation would improve exports, production, wages, and profits. But suppose Italy exits the euro and reverts to the lira while Germany keeps the euro. Under the assumption that there are international production prices, if Italy produces with a lower technology level than that used by the German producer, there is a loss of value from the Italian to the German producer. Now if Italy devalues its currency by half, the German importer can buy twice as much of Italy’s exports but the Italian importers can still only buy the same (or less) amount of German exports. Sure, in lira terms, there is no loss of profit, but in international production value terms (euro), there is a loss. The fall in the value rate of profit is hidden by the improvement in the money (lira) rate of profit.

In sum, if Italy devalues its currency, its exporters may improve their sales and their money rate of profit. Overall employment and investments might also improve for a while. But there is a loss of value inherent in competitive devaluation. Inflation of imported consumption goods will lead to a fall in real wages. And the average rate of profit will eventually worsen with the concomitant danger of a domestic crisis in investment and production. Such are the consequences of devaluation of the currency.

The political forces that wish to break with the euro or refuse to join it have expanded electorally in many Eurozone countries. This year’s EU elections could see ‘populist’ euro-sceptic parties take 25% of the vote and hold the balance of power in some states like Austria, Poland and Italy. And yet, the euro remains popular with the majority. Indeed, sentiment has improved in 13 member states since they joined, with double-digit bumps in Austria, Finland, Germany and Portugal. Even in Italy, which has witnessed a roughly 25-point decline, around 60% of people still favour sharing a currency with their neighbours. Greeks are still 65% in favour. What this tells me is that working people in even the weaker Eurozone states reckon ‘going it alone’ outside the EU would be worse than being inside – and they are probably right.

Ultimately, whether the euro will survive in the next 20 years is a political issue. Will the people of southern Europe continue to endure more years of austerity, creating a whole ‘lost generation’ of unemployed young people, as has already happened in? Actually, the future of the euro will probably be decided not by the populists in the weaker states but by the majority view of the strategists of capital in the stronger economies. Will the governments of northern Europe eventually decide to ditch the likes of Italy, Spain, Greece etc and form a strong ‘NorEuro’ around Germany, Benelux and Poland? There is already an informal ‘Hanseatic league’ alliance being developed.

The EU leaders and strategists of capital need fast economic growth to return soon or further political explosions are likely. But as we go into 2019, the Eurozone economies are slowing down (as are the US and the UK). it may not be too long before the world economy drops into another slump. Then all bets are off on the survival of the euro.

The highest principle of the capitalist economy is: property is protected. This applies in particular to the creditors’ money. The debtor states in the EU (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) felt this. Whoever pretends that in the EU this principle does not or should not apply, that borrowed money has to be repaid with interest, spreads illusions about the character of the EU and each of its individual states. The so-called “austerity” was not a “bad” policy measure, but was to ensure that money lent to governments flows back to creditors. The cancellation of this debt was never an option. Unfortunately this is seen differently in Michael’s article.
The economic history of the EU shows nothing different from the economy of each EU country: the rich get richer and the poor stay poor or get even poorer.

Great article! One point of contention: I would be highly skeptical of the polling data for or against support of the EU. I think it’s much too volatile on the ground to gain an accurate assessment of people’s thoughts on the EU. It could vary greatly depending on the latest news cycle.

I think you are missing something. Getting out of EU/Eurozone is not the same for a country like England or even Italy on the one hand, and Greece on the other.

For Greece it was either defaulting on its debts, and therefore leaving the Euro, or continuing on the austerity policies that favor the rise in the profit rate you are describing at the expense of the people. Leaving Euro, with a leftist government would probably also mean getting out of EU sooner or later, in order to follow independent policies, breaking with the EU constraints and rules etc, as for instance to develop some (new) industries etc.

Assuming that capital at best wouldn’t invest in such a political and economic situation, and in the worst case, it would show a political behavior similar to the one of the big capital in Venezuela for instance…, the whole breaking with EU and Euro effort would be possible only if the state took over banks, major industries and investment, and therefore via a sharp rise in social struggles. This is exactly the strategy communist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist parties should opt for.

If there is a reason why “European peoples”, Greeks included, are still hesitant to opt for such a strategy, it should be the arguments of John Smith’s book where we should look for.

Even after a 30-40% loss of purchasing power or 20-30% of unemployment for Greeks, they still have a lot to loose: their children find well paid and interesting jobs in EU, they still have some savings or private property -e.g. their homes…- from the previous “golden” years, and most of their economy is fully integrated in the one of EU. Even the “national industry” of tourism would hate a period of turmoil….

Greeks are dependent on EU, e.g., they cannot even vote for a law without the agreement of the technocrats appointed to check upon them (as well as on NATO for their defense…), but they still make part of the western “developed” world and the Greek people have still a lot to loose…

At the same time, though, Greece is a NO FUTURE country and a new crisis could bring a lot with it… And this time, the Greeks will now that there is no “easy” -SYRIZA like- solution, but only one that has to do with breaking with the EU and the local elite…

Hi Chris – thank you for your support. But I have deliberately not started a twitter account as it takes up so much time. My Facebook site is enough! I see that the account you have set up gives the impression that it is mine. It may be a good initiative on your part but I would appreciate it if you make it clear that it is not actually my account in case there are any misunderstandings in the future.