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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NOUAKCHOTT 000191
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019
TAGS: PGOVPRELKDEMUSAULYMR
SUBJECT: FNDD READOUT ON QADHAFI'S MEDIATION
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 00189
¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 00187
¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 00188
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: On the day of President Abdallahi's return
from Libya and the eve of Qadhafi's visit to Mauritania,
rotating FNDD President Abdel Koudouss Abeidna remains
skeptical about the success of a Libyan mediation and
believes only targeted sanctions will precipitate a solution
to the crisis. President Abdallahi told Qadhafi he will not
resign but is willing to discuss any other options.
Nevertheless, Qadhafi, although aware that Abdallahi has more
popular support than the Libyans originally thought,
expressed it would be difficult to make the military step
down and said the president had to be willing to give
something up. Qadhafi was reportedly chided by the African
Union's Ping for not sticking to AU policy on Mauritania.
Abeidna also talked about the regional and international
impact of the Israeli's expulsion from Mauritania and the
regime's closeness to Iran. He wondered why the Europeans
are not more concerned about the security implications of
Iran's involvement in Mauritania. Finally, he stated that
the FNDD plans to reach out to Uganda to accelerate Security
Council sanctions. FNDD also plans to use Mauritania's
alliance with Iran to ask members of the Arab League --
including Morocco -- to be more supportive of the AU. End
summary.
--------------------------------------------
THE PRESIDENT RETURNED TO LEMDEN UNPROTECTED
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Abdel Koudouss Abeidna, in a March 8 meeting with
Charge and PolOff, confirmed that President Abdallahi
returned from Libya that same day and had traveled directly
from the airport to his native village of Lemden. Abeidna
explained that the FNDD feels the president is safer in
Lemden and advised him to remain there. As a result,
President Abdallahi will not greet Qadhafi upon his arrival
on March 9. Nevertheless, some FNDD members want to host a
reception for the guide. Note: Charge told Abeidna he
intends to attend Qadhafi's meet and greet at the airport if
invited and any receptions hosted by Qadhafi. Nevertheless,
he will decline any invitations to state dinners organized by
General Aziz in Qadhafi's honor. End note.
¶3. (C) In response to Charge's question on Libyan security
arrangements for President Abdallahi's trip, Abeidna stated
that the Libyans had offered someone to accompany the
President to and from Libya. Nevertheless, the President and
his entourage were surprised when they were put in separate
planes from the Libyans, which made them somehow nervous.
Abeidna also said that a military officer had facilitated the
trip from Lemden to the airport but no expediters had been
provided for the President's return to Lemden.
----------------------------------------
ABDALLAHI SATISFIED WITH SHOW OF SUPPORT
----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Abeidna repeatedly stressed the President's
satisfaction with the populace's show of support at his
arrival to Nouakchott from Lemden on March 6 (see ref A).
According to Abeidna, the Libyans were impressed and realized
for the first time that Abdallahi has a considerable number
of supporters. Abeidna stated that the president's visit had
changed the Libyan mind-set since they had been consistently
told by the regime that Abdallahi was finished and had no
real support.
--------------------------------
ABDALLAHI'S MEETING WITH QADHAFI
--------------------------------
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191 002 OF 005
¶5. (C) Abeidna said the President had found in Tripoli
pretty much what they had expected -- which wasn't very much.
Qadhafi was not sticking to the guidance laid down by the
African Union and was in fact dismissive of democracy. The
meeting may have had some impact on Qadhafi, and seemed to
have had a significant impact on Qadhafi's diplomatic
advisors who were impressed and surprised by the scale of
support for Abdallahi. Abeidna, stressing that this was
close hold within the inner circles of the FNDD, said, "If
Qadhafi comes up with something useful, we are of course
prepared to work with him. If he gives us more of the same,
the President will play him along, but yield nothing, since
breaking him will push him in with the military."
¶6. (C) Abeidna said that, in his meetings with Abdallahi,
Qadhafi had generally stuck to listening to the president's
position but had then gone off the AU script by suggesting
that democracy was not and appropriate system for Mauritania
and just a reflection of Western manipulation and stating
that as the military were effectively in power it would be
difficult to evict them, and that the president should be
ready to give something up.
¶7. (C) President Abdallahi, according to Abeidna, told
Qadhafi he will we was "prepared to do just about anything
except resign since that act would "hand over the presidency
and the country to Aziz on a silver platter." Other than
that, he is open to any discussions. Throughout the meeting,
Abeidna stressed President Abdallahi's refusal to resign and
said that if they want to reach an agreement, Qadhafi will
have to get rid of the military.
¶8. (C) Abeidna said the Libyans regurgitated General Aziz's
plan to step down in order to run for office and transfer the
country to the president of the senate. Their approach was
very much "ni... ni..." (neither Aziz, nor Abdallahi). The
president's response was that he did not need Qadhafi to
follow that plan.
¶9. (C) Abeidna revealed Jean Ping arrived the second day of
the meetings, supposedly following U.S. advice. AU Peace and
Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra told Abeidna that
Qadhafi had said he did not care about the international
community and "would solve the Mauritanian problem his way."
Ping said he told Qadhafi he should not think as a Libyan
leader anymore but as an AU leader. Abeidna said Ping was
"going crazy" over Qadhafi's tenure as AU President.
---------------------------------------------
DEMOCRACY'S TRIUMPH NOT IN QADHAFI'S INTEREST
---------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Abeidna claims that Qadhafi is both impressed by
and afraid of the FNDD. An FNDD victory would change the
mind-set of politicians in North Africa and could represent a
threat to Qadhafi in his own country. He noted, "This is the
first time he has seen North Africans really fighting for
democracy -- even against European sentiment." Nevertheless,
Abeidna expects Qadhafi's visit to Nouakchott to go smoothly
but suspects that "Qadahfi will play tricks before leaving."
--------------------
QADHAFI MAY NOT COME
--------------------
¶11. (C) Abeidna suggested that Qadhafi may cancel his trip
to Nouakchott if he does not reach an agreement with at least
one of the parties. According to Abeidna, Qadhafi would not
risk coming and having to leave empty handed. (Comment -- all
indications his arrival is still on for the afternoon of the
9th.)
--------------------------------------------- --
BRING ON THE SANCTIONS! (AND LET THEM EAT CAKE)
--------------------------------------------- --
¶12. (C) Abeidna kept coming back to the subject of
sanctions. He said Ping and Lamamra told him sanctions were
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191 003 OF 005
taking time as the AU was having problems with the Spanish.
The Europeans believe that individual sanctions should bring
increased humanitarian aid. According to Abeidna, this would
not really be sanctions but more "like taking from one hand
to put in the other." He stated that if the international
community, and particularly the EU, distributes food, it will
be giving General Aziz more time. Abeidna believes that the
more there are shortages, the quicker the regime will fall.
Charge stated that the U.S. did not want people to suffer and
would not use humanitarian aid as a political instrument.
Abeidna answered that the FNDD, even though accused by
General Aziz of the contrary, did not want Mauritanians to
starve but stated that they don't want General Aziz to use
international community food for his own benefit. "If aid
goes through the UN that's fine," said Abeidna, as the FNDD
"would not want General Aziz to say the U.S. has recognized
him."
¶13. (C) For the FNDD, targeted sanctions are the only
measure that would trigger a quick resolution to the crisis.
According to Abeidna, the moment sanctions are declared "they
will be like roaches looking for a hideout." He suggested
sanctions against Mohamed Hmayenne Bouamatou, cement mogul
Sahraoui Salek (NFI) and Mauritania's main sugar and flour
importer Bahaye Ould Ghadda.
¶14. (C) Charge told Abeidna that sanctions against someone
like Bouamatou would be relatively easy to adopt since his
pro-coup actions were quite visible -- whereas it is harder
to make the case against other financiers. The U.S. would
needed concrete evidence about the others' linkages to the
regime. Abeidna stated he could ask the FNDD to provide
evidence of their support to the coup, which they have
financed directly and indirectly. Charge stated proof about
alien smuggling and drug trafficking would be extremely
useful. Abeidna said state evidence exists but it is in the
government's hands and could only be retrieved if Abdallahi
came back to power. Abeidna accused former President
Haidallah and Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall of involvement in
drug trafficking. He said he feared that if these
allegations were true, what happened in Guinea-Bissau could
happen in Mauritania.
-------------------
THE JUNTA HAS MONEY
-------------------
¶15. (C) According to Abeidna, the junta has the money to
organize elections. He implied that they were behaving as if
Qadhafi had given them a big check. He also said that
Qadhafi probably paid to obtain the regime's permission to
travel with weapons. Charge explained this was not unusual
for the Libyans who always had unreasonable demands when
traveling and ruffled feathers by the time they left. "I
wonder how much longer the regime can go on, even if Qadhafi
pays for the month's bills," Abeidna said.
------------------------------
ALIGNING WITH THE AXIS OF EVIL
------------------------------
¶16. (C) Abeidna explained that Morocco's decision to sever
ties with Iran March 6 was a clear message to Mauritanians
that if they wanted to be part of the Axis of Evil, they
would have to do so without Morocco's support. "Moroccans
sent us the message that we are on our own." Mauritania's
closeness to Iran puts them in opposition to Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, countries that have traditionally supported
Mauritania.
--------------------------------------
JUNTA IRKED BY ABEIDNA'S MOROCCO VISIT
--------------------------------------
¶17. (C) Abeidna's recent visit to Morocco had annoyed the
HSC, who had accused Abeidna of "screwing up the junta's
relations with Morocco." The HSC is particularly irked
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191 004 OF 005
because they have no idea what Abeidna did in Morocco and
they think he went there to open a mediation with the
Moroccans. These rumors were sparked by two articles in
Moroccan newspapers. "If I was allowed to do that -- he means
to meet with high-level government representatives -- that
must mean Moroccans are not with them."
----------------------------------------
WHY ARE THE EUROPEANS BEHAVING THIS WAY?
----------------------------------------
¶18. (C) Abeidna expressed great frustration with the
Europeans. In his view, the Spanish, Germans and French have
shown "unconditional love" for General Aziz despite his
mistakes, his government's unimpressive results and his
alignment with Iran. In Abeidna's view, if the Europeans
were so concerned about security they would be paying
attention to Mauritania's newfound relationship with Iran.
Abeidna said Iran could bring missiles to the country and
pointed out the distance between Banc d'Arguin that he
suggested "could target Miami." Abeidna also wondered
whether the Europeans desired to have a Shia stronghold so
close to home. "They are not weighing the risks," said
Abeidna. Abeidna also intimated that Iran could reach out to
AQIM to get rid of Westerners and that they would be able to
provide serious funding for terrorist activities and to
support an adversarial regime.
¶19. (C) Abeidna asked Charge to clarify the Spanish
position. Charge responded that the Spanish had seen results
in the fight against illegal immigration and were benefiting
from that cooperation. They also valued Mauritanian fish and
desired to curtail the drug trade so they favored security
over democracy.
¶20. (C) Abeidna confessed his disappointment with the
Europeans and particularly with the German Ambassador. "I
told the German 'You keep blowing in our ear about the
importance of democracy, but when we strive to preserve it
you turn your back.'" he said.
--------------------------------------------- ----
WORK ON UGANDA, THE EUROPEANS AND THE ARAB LEAGUE
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶21. (C) Abeidna, following advice from Ping, is convinced
that Uganda, one of the African Security Council members, is
key in accelerating UN Security Council sanctions. The FNDD
has not reached out to Ugandans yet but plans to do so.
Abeidna asked whether the U.S. could encourage the Ugandans
to forward a Mauritania resolution in the Security Council
or, perhaps, facilitate a video-conference between the FNDD
and Ugandan officials as previously offered with Tanzania.
¶22. (C) Abeidna believes that China and Russia will accept
a Security Council resolution calling for sanctions --
particularly if introduced by the Africans -- as they had
expressed displeasure with the junta. As for Libya, he's
convinced that they would themselves introduce a resolution
if asked by the U.S. Charge expressed skepticism on that
point.
¶23. (C) According to Abeidna, Ping has expressed
disappointment at the Arab League for not supporting the AU.
Now that Mauritania is getting closer to Iran, Abeidna thinks
that FNDD could work on Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to
persuade them to be more supportive.
------------------------------
REACTIONS TO ISRAELI EXPULSION
------------------------------
¶24. (C) Abeidna asked Charge about European reactions to
the Israeli Ambassador's departure (see ref B). He then
stated the Spanish were mediating between the Israelis and
the military. He related that the German Ambassador had
previously told him, "If the Israelis are thrown out, Angela
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191 005 OF 005
Merkel will call me personally." Abeidna was clearly hopeful
that the regime's decision to force the Israelis out would
toughen the European stance against the regime -- both in
support of Israel and because the decision suggests
Mauritania falling into bed with the Iranians.
¶25. (C) Of the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador, Abeidna
said the regime "had sold it" to the Iranians and Libyans in
exchange for support and hoped to use it against the FNDD.
General Aziz thought that the people would go to the palace
to congratulate him but that has not happened (Comment --
given the hoopla over Qadhafi's arrival, the populist boost
Aziz might have expected over the Israeli departure has
largely been lost). "Aziz has put us in big big trouble,"
stated Abeidna. He wondered why the regime would want to be
cast as an Iran/Syria/Hamas supporter. "When confronted with
dissension, they'd rather 'align with the devil' than seek a
decent exit," he said.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶26. (C) In the ups and downs of Mauritanian politics,
Abeidna is more encouraged this week than he was last week.
While doubting the utility of the Qadhafi initiative, the
Tripoli trip offered Abdallahi the chance to demonstrate to
Aziz and the outside world that there is some real public
support behind him. The Israeli expulsion is seen as playing
into the FNDD's favor by turning of some of the Europeans who
are soft on the coup and casting the regime as tending
towards the extremist branch of the Muslim world. The
Qadhafi initiative forces everyone to play along, but it
seems unlikely he will make any real headway.
HANKINS