A rebel fighter in Libya on the Benghazi-Ajdabiyah road. Photograph: Goran Tomasevic/Reuters

The west has not run out of patience in Libya; it has run out of options. As of last week, France and the UK had nothing more to lose. They had already severed their political and commercial ties with Gaddafi, meaning that a survival of his regime would have meant a significant strategic loss in the region. The US revealed this realisation slightly later, by waiting until Tuesday to throw its weight behind the UN resolution, but it amounts to the same thing: the only way of ensuring any western leverage over a future Libya would be to protect the opposition headquartered in Benghazi and ideally help them to govern some or all of the country.

Yet the decision-making process to launch a major round of air strikes on Gaddafi's infrastructure needs examining. The claim by his foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, on Saturday that the resolution would be accepted and the ceasefire observed should obviously not have been taken at face value, and there was arguably not enough time to send UN observers before Gaddafi's troops moved into Benghazi. But it would still be interesting to know what independent, verifiable reports came through to allied intelligence that persuaded the French to begin their air strikes on Saturday. Plenty of Libyan opposition, both in Libya and overseas, tweeted or were quoted as saying that Gaddafi's attacks continued, but surely such sources should be viewed with almost as much scepticism as spokesmen from his regime. There has been a huge information gap in this Libya conflict, and it is sadly reminiscent of Iraq that a decision to enter what could be a prolonged, bloody conflict was again based on a lack of reliable information – even if the short-term goal was worthy.

Even before the uprising, it was virtually impossible to know what was really going on in Libya without being there. This was already a country full of rumours and gossip, of unreliable government statistics, and where the only way of verifying a piece of information was to check it with your own eyes. Different officials within the same government departments or companies would give out contradictory information, and there was a general sense of a staggering lack of communication and co-ordination between the different arms of the same state body. The idea that every minute detail of the country was controlled by some central, all-seeing authority is absurd.

This information gap is now even more gaping, and does not seem to have been appreciated by those who are now making crucial decisions. Early on, William Hague was prepared to believe rumours that Gaddafi had fled to Venezuela, while many tweets and quotes from "on the ground" have been equally unreliable, sometimes dangerously so. While the attacks may prevent atrocities by Gaddafi's regime, a continuation of foreign military intervention risks making the conflict significantly worse over the longer term and causing a substantial number of civilian casualties, both directly and indirectly. It is worrying, for instance, that the western powers seem to believe that the opposition leaders in Benghazi represent the will of the entire country. Yes, the vast majority of Libyans do not want Gaddafi in power, and no one but his closest supporters would miss him, but that does not necessarily mean that Libyans will support those new leaders once he has gone – and even less so if those leaders' survival has only been guaranteed by foreign intervention.

Libya is an enormous, complex country full of deep-seated territorial and tribal allegiances, a fact that the opposition in Benghazi has skimmed over in its desperate rush to protect itself using foreign support. They might well have a credible long-term plan for governing Libya, but we don't know about it yet, and supplying arms to these non-unified forces – which is no doubt already happening in one way or another – just adds another ingredient to a recipe for protracted war. It is highly uncertain how the many various communities around Libya would react to a collapse of the Gaddafi regime. Many small towns where garrisons and soldiers had defected might simply form their own local councils and protect themselves against the threat of outsiders, retreating to a kind of localised power system.

Divides between small neighbouring towns, especially in the desert Fezzan region, might have been contained for the past 42 years by tight central control, but will now be allowed to rear their head in the volatile, nervous environment that would doubtless ensue. If so, who will quell any violent local uprisings and forge dialogue, and who will protect civilians? Is there not potentially a risk of serious and perhaps bloody reprisals against any remaining Gaddafi supporters by unchecked and victorious opposition forces, keen to consolidate their new power base?

Unlike Egypt, the US does not have close links with the military in Libya, or what remains of it, meaning that there is no underlying stabilising force for national security. The opposition forces based in Benghazi are ill-equipped, have no experience of running a country (let alone trying to unite and pacify one that has been hewn apart after four decades) and have poorly defined motives beyond their stated aims of removing Gaddafi and making Tripoli their headquarters.

The position of the leaders of the Transitional National Council is also unclear. Several of these men were senior figures in the Gaddafi regime and some of them even moved in his closest circles. Will they really be trusted by the majority of Libyans if Gaddafi falls, and indeed should they be trusted by the western powers who are now so eager to protect and back them? Only time will tell.