The opinion of the court was delivered by: I. LEO GLASSER, Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiffs bring this action against defendant UBS AG ("UBS" or
"Defendant") for an accounting, imposition of a constructive
trust, fraud, misrepresentation, spoliation of evidence, and
unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs name the United States as a party
to this case in an effort to obtain certain documents from the
Government to support its claims against UBS. In sum, Plaintiffs
contend that UBS, as a successor-in-interest to I.G. Farben ("Farben"), a German company which profited during the
Nazi regime, failed to turn over assets which rightfully belong
to Holocaust victims. Pursuant to, inter alia, Fed.R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), UBS now moves to dismiss the Amended
Complaint ("Am. Compl.") for the following reasons: (1) the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims; (2) Plaintiffs
do not have standing to assert the claims in the Amended
Complaint; (3) under principles of comity, the Court should give
preclusive effect to the judgment of a German court dismissing
the same claims alleged in this case; and (4) the political
question doctrine precludes litigation of the non-justiciable
questions presented in the Amended Complaint.

In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the All-Writs
Act, Defendant requests the Court to enjoin the plaintiffs in a
related, and virtually identical case, Makro Capital of Am.,
Inc. v. UBS AG, et al., Index No. 04-21917, pending in the
Southern District of Florida, filed well after Plaintiffs
initiated this action, from taking any further action to
prosecute that case and directing that the Makro action be
dismissed voluntarily and refiled in this District as related to
this case.

Finally, Plaintiffs have filed a motion for "preservation,
identification, inventorying and production of certain specific
documents relevant" to their claims (the "Preservation Motion"),
and the Trustees of Farben have filed a motion pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) for voluntary dismissal of the Amended
Complaint without prejudice.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss
the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
granted, and therefore it is unnecessary to address Defendant's alternate arguments.*fn1
The Court dismisses the claims against the Trustees of Farben
without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i).
Moreover, the Court denies Defendant's motion pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). In addition, the Court denies the Preservation
Motion as moot in light of its dismissal of the Amended
Complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Andreas Arndt, an individual, and Magus Verwaltungs,
a business entity, are German citizens and shareholders of I.G.
Farben ("Farben"), a company incorporated under the laws of
Germany in 1929. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 23-25.) Plaintiff Ludwig
Koch was appointed trustee of Farben by a German court on June
25, 2004. (Carroll Supp. Decl. Ex. B.)

In or about 1929, Farben founded I.G. Chemie ("Chemie"), a
company organized under the laws of Switzerland, which it
purportedly controlled at all times. (Am. Compl ¶¶ 1, 2). In the
1930's, Chemie, at the direction of Farben, acquired significant
stakes in several United States companies, including General
Aniline & Film Corporation ("GAF"). (Id. ¶ 3). After World War
II, Chemie changed its name to Interhandel. (Id. ¶ 8). UBS AG,
the Defendant, a Swiss bank, is a successor-in-interest to
Interhandel. (Id. ¶ 31).

In this action, Plaintiffs seek to recover GAF shares that were
returned to Interhandel (referred to as the "Interhandel Assets")
following a more than sixteen year litigation in the United States that concluded in a settlement in
1964 to which the United States was a party. See generally
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F.Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953),
order modified by, 225 F.2d 532 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 937 (1956). That suit arose out of the United States
government's seizure of the Interhandel Assets in or about April,
1942, after the commencement of World War II, pursuant to the
Trading with the Enemy Act ("TWEA"), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 21(e)). The government seized the assets claiming that
because Farben effectively controlled Chemie, the assets
belonging to Chemie had an enemy taint.*fn2 (Id.). The
United States used the proceeds from those assets to compensate
the United States for the cost of its war effort and post-war
reconstruction. (Id.)

In 1947, Interhandel (which had changed its name from Chemie in
1945) commenced litigation in the United States under section
9(a) of the TWEA to recover the Interhandel Assets, claiming to
be a neutral Swiss company, rather than one controlled by Farben,
a German company. (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) Farben unsuccessfully
attempted to intervene in the litigation. (Carroll Decl. Ex. F,
attaching order denying motion for leave to intervene issued in
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, No. 4360-48, at 1 (Dec. 19,
1958).) According to Plaintiffs, during the course of that
litigation, Interhandel failed to produce a number of documents
which reveal that Interhandel is in fact a successor-in-interest
to Farben. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) After sixteen years of pre-trial
proceedings, the United States and Interhandel ultimately reached
a settlement pursuant to which the United States returned to
Interhandel 40-45% of the 1966 auction value of the Interhandel
Assets.*fn3 (Id. ¶ 12.)

Farben was ordered liquidated and in 1983, sued the predecessor
of UBS in a German court to determine which entity rightfully
owned the Interhandel Assets. (Def. Mem. at 8.) There, Farben
claimed that Interhandel was merely a front for Farben. In 1988,
the Frankfurt court of appeals rejected Farben's claim and the
German supreme court denied a petition for certiorari. (Id.;
Carroll Decl. Ex. H (attaching Higher Regional Court decision)
and Carroll Decl. Exh. I (attaching denial of certiorari
petition)).

During the 1990's, there were several mass lawsuits brought by
and on behalf of victims of Nazi persecution against industrial
and financial firms concerning their World War II-era activities,
resulting, in particular, in the Swiss World War II Class Action
Settlement pending before this Court and the German Foundation
Initiative. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victims Assets
Litig., Nos. 96-4849, 96-5161, 97-461, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving settlement) (Korman, J.). Victims of
Farben's forced labor programs are eligible for compensation from
these settlements. Id.

Plaintiffs now claim that UBS wrongfully withheld assets that
can be traced directly to Farben and that should have been made
available to restitution programs or used in accordance with the directive of the Nuremberg tribunals
and German courts. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) According to Plaintiffs,
UBS concealed, misrepresented, altered and/or destroyed evidence
of its predecessor's connection to Farben. (Id.) By order to
show cause, Plaintiffs commenced this action against UBS.
Defendant UBS has now moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
against all parties.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Amended Complaint Without
Prejudice

Initially, the Court must decide whether Plaintiff Trustees of
Farben properly effected voluntary dismissal of the Amended
Complaint. On July 27, 2004, three days prior to the Court's
hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint,
plaintiff Ludwig Koch, as Trustee of Farben, filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, of all claims asserted on
behalf of Farben.*fn4 Fed.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i) provides
that an action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of the
court "by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary
judgment." Pursuant to this rule, the Court is required to grant
Farben's voluntary dismissal without prejudice because Defendant
has not served either an answer or motion for summary judgment.

It is well established that "[a] motion to dismiss under Rule
12 does not terminate the right of dismissal by notice." See,
e.g., Horton v. Trans World Airlines Corp., 169 F.R.D. 11, 15
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2263 at 259 (2d ed 1995)); see also
International Communications, Inc. v. Rates Technology, Inc.,
1988 WL 49214, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (plaintiff's filing of an
affidavit in opposition to motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6) does not preclude filing of voluntary dismissal
of complaint). Moreover, the fact that Farben may have styled its
dismissal here as a "motion" rather than a "stipulation" is
inconsequential  the Court must give effect to it despite the
nomenclature that the party used. Horton, 169 F.R.D. at 15;
see also Sheldon v. Anperex Elec. Corp., 52 F.R.D. 1, 6-8
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (dismissal without prejudice pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(I) granted even where parties engaged in
extensive discovery but prior to service of answer or motion for
summary judgment), aff'd, 449 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1971).
Accordingly, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i), the Court
dismisses the claims of the Trustees of Farben without prejudice.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Challenge

Defendant challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of this
Court to hear Plaintiffs' claims. On a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), the burden of establishing jurisdiction, by a
preponderance of the evidence, rests with the party asserting
that it exists. See Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. JVW
Investment, Ltd., 2004 WL 2181087, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2004) (citing Thompson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942) and
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)).
While the Court is constrained to accept the material factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint as true for purposes of this
motion, "jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that
showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party
asserting it." Shipping Financial Services Corp. v. Drakos,
140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The Court "may
resolve disputed jurisdictional factual issues by reference to
evidence outside the pleadings," including affidavits or other
evidence which the parties submit. Correspondent Servs. Corp.,
2004 WL 2181087, at *6 (citing e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 161 n. 30 (2d Cir. 2003)).*fn5

At the hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to submit
additional evidence to cure the jurisdictional defects, if any,
that may warrant dismissal of their claims. However, Plaintiffs
failed to submit any evidence to support their contention that
this Court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction to decide
their claims. Indeed, in opposing Defendant's motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence or even legal argument
why the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear their
claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs' only support for the proposition that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in
this case is found in one paragraph of the Amended Complaint:
"the Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1350  the Alien Tort Claims Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1351 
the Torture Victims Protection Act, insofar as restitution,
reparations and damages recovered are to be used in great part to
pay reparations and restitution for and/or damages to victims of
I.G. Farben related slave/forced labor, concentration and/or
extermination camp operations and atrocities, and whatever other
obligations as I.G. Farben AG (or in liquidation) may have in
accordance with existing contracts and directives from the
Nuremburg Tribunals and/or laws or Court Orders of the Federal
Republic of Germany." (Am. Compl. ¶ 35). Each of the two federal
statutes which Plaintiffs argue confer the Court with subject
matter jurisdiction is analyzed in turn.

A. The Alien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), first enacted as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, grants a federal district court
jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Under the ATCA, therefore,
federal subject matter jurisdiction exists when (1) an alien, (2)
claims a tort, (3) was committed in violation of a United States
treaty or the "law of nations"  the latter now synonymous with
"customary international law." See, e.g., Flores v. Southern
Peru Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 143 & n. 2 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing
e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)). In
this case, Plaintiffs satisfy elements one and two of the ATCA
because they are aliens (i.e., German citizens) and have
alleged one or more torts in the Amended Complaint (e.g., conversion). Plaintiffs do not assert that any United States
treaty has been violated and thus the dispositive issue for
subject matter jurisdiction is whether the Amended Complaint
adequately alleges that UBS violated "customary international
law."

The question whether a party has alleged a violation of
"customary international law" (or the "law of nations") has found
no easy answer. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739
(2004), the Supreme Court held that ATCA was primarily a
jurisdictional statute that did not offer litigants new causes of
action. The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the danger that
may occur when judges recognize claims "for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms" which
existed at the time Congress passed the ATCA. Sosa,
124 S. Ct. at 2765. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recognized "that an
opening, however small, exists for courts to consider claims
asserting new causes of action under the ATCA," although the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "good reasons exist for a
restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should
exercise in considering a new cause of action under the ATCA."
Weiss v. American Jewish Committee, 2004 WL 2072080, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2004) (citing Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761).

Further, and consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in
Sosa, the Second Circuit has held that a party claiming relief
under the ATCA must identify the specific international law that
the defendant allegedly violated. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.
This is a higher pleading standard than that typically required,
including under the more flexible "arising under" formula of
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.; cf. Jones v. Nassau County Sheriff Dep't,
285 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("whether a federal court possesses federal-question
subject matter jurisdiction and whether plaintiff can state claim for
relief under federal statute are two questions that are easily, and
often, confused;" if basis for jurisdiction is also an element of a cause
of action, a court only asks whether, on its face, complaint is drawn so
as to seek recovery under federal law and if so, will assume jurisdiction
and reserve further scrutiny for inquiry on merits).

In Flores, 343 F.3d at 154, the Second Circuit recognized the
difficulty that courts face when determining whether challenged
conduct violates "customary international law" because it is
"discerned from myriad decisions made in numerous and varied
international and domestic arenas." The court in Flores held
that to be actionable, the asserted rule of international law
must be (1) "universally recognized" by states; (2) establish a
legal obligation; (3) address wrongs that are of mutual, and not
merely individual, concern to states; and (4) specific enough to
be enforced. Id. at 154-56; see also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (under the ATCA, a
defendant's conduct must violate "well-established, universally
recognized norms of international law"). In "determining what
offenses violate customary international law, courts must proceed
with extraordinary care and restraint." Flores,
343 F.3d at 154.

Here, Plaintiffs do not identify any principle of international
law that they rely on to make out a claim under the ATCA. To the
contrary, in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs assert that this case "is a contract action" involving
a "German contract."*fn6 (Pls. Mem. at 2). Their specific
causes of action are predicated on garden variety commercial
claims, including fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misrepresentation which, according to Plaintiffs, are based on
UBS's failure to "come clean" about its historical relationship
to Farben. Thus, the question before the Court is whether these
common law claims amount to a violation of customary
international law. The Court finds that the law provides a
relatively easy answer to this question, even though in general,
the ATCA has posed "complex and controversial questions
regarding" its "meaning and scope." Flores, 343 F.3d at 153.
This is so because "[e]ven if certain conduct is universally
proscribed by States in their domestic law, that fact is not
necessarily significant or relevant for purposes of customary
international law." Id. at 155.

For example, in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit refused to apply the ATCA to a
suit by an international investment trust organized under the
laws of Luxembourg against a Bahamian corporation and others, for
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste in conjunction with a
securities scheme. In its decision, the court did not accept the
plaintiffs' view that the Eighth Commandment, "Thou shall not steal," is part of "customary international law"
for purposes of jurisdiction, because while every civilized
nation "doubtless has this prescript as a part of its legal
system, a violation of the `law of nations' arises only when
there has been a violation by one or more individuals of those
standards, rules, or customs (a) affecting the relationship
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and
(b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings
inter se." IIT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (concluding that ATCA is
to be applied only in extraordinary circumstances); see also
Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (only rules
prohibiting acts that are "shockingly egregious" likely to give
rise to violation of universally recognized principles of
international law) (per curiam); Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v.
Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 528 F.Supp. 1337, 1347
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (jurisdiction unavailable under the ATCA because
"commercial violations" do not constitute violations of
international law), aff'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 274
(2d Cir. 1984); De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V.,
570 F.Supp 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (action for, inter alia, the
alleged withholding of wages and benefits does not confer subject
matter jurisdiction under the ATCA because the alleged causes of
action did not amount to the "extraordinary circumstances"
required for invocation of that statute).

Courts outside this Circuit have also held that the types of
claims which Plaintiffs assert in the Amended Complaint do not
constitute violations of international law recognized by the
ATCA. See, e.g., Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc.,
475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1974). In Abiodun, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the ATCA did not vest jurisdiction under the ATCA for an aliens' cause of action allegedly sounding in the
tort of fraud but violating no international law. The plaintiffs,
Nigerian citizens, had signed contracts with an oil company for
training as executives in the United States and subsequent
employment in Nigeria. After they arrived in the United States,
the plaintiffs discovered that they were to be trained not as
executives, but only as service station operators. The plaintiffs
argued that subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the
district court under the ATCA on the theory that the defendants'
conduct constituted a tort in violation of the "law of nations,"
alleging that on its face, the claim was for breach of contract
and fraud. In response to the plaintiffs' argument that fraud is
considered immoral and unlawful by all nations and thus is a
violation of the "law of nations," the court said that although
the concept of "law of nations" is an elusive one, there was
nothing in the authorities cited by the plaintiffs that would
support such an expansive interpretation of federal court
jurisdiction under the statute. Abiodun, 475 F.2d at 145; see
also Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F.Supp.2d 1124,
1130 (D. Colo. 2004) (dismissing ATCA claim and finding that
while defamation "is a tort under American law and, presumably,
the domestic law of many other nations[,] [i]t is not, however, a
subject of the proscriptions of the law of nations or any of the
treaties and sources of international law cited in this case");
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3661.1 (subject matter jurisdiction under ATCA "has
been limited to cases involving violations of norms of human
conduct recognized by a consensus of the international community;
for example, jurisdiction has been granted in cases involving
official torture, genocide, bombings, violations of diplomatic
immunity, and violations of a treaty, but denied in cases involving unseaworthiness or negligence, fraud or deceit,
property damage incurred outside the United States in wartime,
terrorist attacks, and alleged violations by the President of the
constitutional provision reserving to Congress the power to
declare war") (citations omitted).

A close review of the Amended Complaint reveals that Plaintiffs
have not alleged any, let alone, specific facts demonstrating
that Defendant violated "customary international law" (or a
treaty of the United States). The claims asserted in the Amended
Complaint  including fraud, conversion and misrepresentation 
may be legal theories that can be advanced in many if not all
States, but these are not "wrongs" expressed by mutual concern
and reflected in "international accords." Flores,
343 F.3d at 155-56 (citing IIT v. Vencap, supra). Because of this
essential pleading deficiency, Plaintiffs do not state a claim
for relief under the ATCA within the subject matter jurisdiction
of this Court.

B. Torture Victims Protection Act

The Court finds that an identical conclusion must be reached
with regard to the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"),
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (and note). The TVPA, which Congress passed in 1992
and the text of which was reprinted in the historical and
statutory notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, establishes a cause of
action in federal court against an individual who, under actual
or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation
subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing. See
Flores, 343 F.3d at 152-53. "Though the [TVPA] creates a cause
of action for official torture, this statute, unlike the" ATCA,
"is not itself a jurisdictional statute." Kadic,
70 F.3d at 246. Rather, the TVPA allows parties "to pursue their claims of official
torture under the jurisdiction conferred by the" ATCA and "also
under the general federal question jurisdiction of section 1331."
Id. (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass.
1995)); see also Flores, 343 F.3d at 153 ("The Senate
Report on the TVPA states that the statute was intended to
establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has
been successfully maintained under the ACTA") (internal
quotations and citation omitted).

Whether subject matter jurisdiction for a claim asserted under
the TVPA must be conferred on this Court through the ACTA or can
be based solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a thorny issue which the
Court does not need to resolve in deciding this motion. Flores,
343 F.3d at 153 (recognizing a split of authority on the issue
whether a claim under the TVPA may be based solely on § 1331).
Here, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy either standard.

As described above, Plaintiffs do not plead the elements of a
claim under the ACTA in the Amended Complaint. Further, UBS AG is
not an individual, but a corporation, and as such cannot be sued
under the TVPA. Friedman v. Bayer Corp., 1999 WL 33457825, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1999) (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,
Inc., 969 F.Supp. 362, 381-382 (E.D.La. 1997), aff'd,
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, Plaintiffs do not make any
allegations in the Amended Complaint that Defendant UBS subjected
them (or anyone else) to "torture" or "extrajudicial executions"
necessary to make out a claim under the TVPA. Because of these
essential pleading deficiencies, the TVPA does not state a claim
for relief within the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court.*fn7

III. Motion for Injunction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

Defendant UBS moves the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
to enjoin the prosecution of an action, pending in the Southern
District of Florida, Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS, Index
No. 04-21917, which it argues has been brought by the same or
similar Plaintiffs with identical claims. The Court recognizes
that if Defendant is correct about the nature of the Makro suit
(Plaintiffs have not opposed Defendant's motion), allowing it to
proceed would unfairly expose Defendant USB (and defendant United
States of America) to further expense and other courts to the
wasteful dissipation of their already scarce judicial resources
at the expense of parties to other lawsuits. However, the
All-Writs Act does not vest authority in this Court to issue the
relief which UBS seeks.

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) states that a district court "may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of" its "respective
jurisdiction." Pursuant to this statute, district courts have the
"authority to enjoin and bind non-parties to an action when
needed to preserve the court's ability to reach or enforce its decision in
a case over which it has proper jurisdiction." In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 338 (2d Cir. 1985); Neuman
v. Goldberg, 159 B.R. 681, 685 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Courts
frequently use their injunctive powers to maintain control over
ongoing federal litigation"); see also Moore's Fed. Prac. 3D,
ch. 19 § 204.05[2] at 204-20 ("The All-Writ Statute is applied
appropriately when a district court has properly exercised its
jurisdiction in entering an order, it is empowered to issue writs
in aid of jurisdiction to" enjoin parties or non-parties who are
"in a position to frustrate the order").

However, in contrast to the situation where a district court
enjoins the prosecution of a later filed action to protect any
judgment it may enter in a pending action and to avoid
inconsistent judgments, see generally Meeropol v. Nizer,
505 F.2d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1974), the Court has found, as noted
above, that it lacks jurisdiction in this case to decide
Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, the All Writs Act cannot be applied
here because invocation of that statute would not be in aid of
the Court's jurisdiction, which it has expressly disclaimed.
See, e.g., Covanta Onondaga Ltd. v. Onondaga County Res.
Recovery Agency, 318 F.3d 392, 395-401 (2d Cir. 2003) (once
district court remanded case to state court, it lacked
jurisdiction to enjoin party's efforts to obtain relief in
bankruptcy court pertaining to that case; such order would not
aid or protect district court's jurisdiction because it had no
jurisdiction to aid or protect). As such, Defendant's motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to enjoin prosecution of the
Makro action and require it to be refiled in this district is
denied. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the claims of
the Trustees of I.G. Farben Aktionarsvereinigung without
prejudice pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i); the Court
grants Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint as
against Andreas Arndt and Magus Verwaltungs GmbH pursuant to
Fed.R. Civ. 12(b)(1); the Court denies Defendant's motion for an
injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); and the Court denies
as moot Plaintiffs' motion for preservation, identification,
inventorying and production. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is
directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

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