In this paper I will first bring out some linguistic difficulties which suggest that the notions of benefit and harm are not as straightforwardly univocal as one might have thought, and then go on to make some distinctions within these notions which will bring to light their complexities, and help to clarify the relation between the good and the beneficial. The notion of the good and of the bene- ficial that are being used here are tied to human happiness. There (...) are other conceptions of the good of man, and I may be mistaken in connecting it exclusively with human happiness, but the logical points concerning the concepts of benefit and harm will not be directly affected by this. (shrink)

In recent years a number of writers have maintained that law can usefully be illuminated by game theory. Some believe that game theory can provide guidance in formulating rules for dealing with speciﬁc problems. Others advance the philosophically ambitious contention that we can gain a better understanding and/or appreciation of law by seeing it in terms of game-theoretic ideas. My purpose in this article is to examine some claims of the latter sort, and in particular to ask how distant law (...) can be from the assumptions of game theory and still be informed by it. Models are not expected to ﬁt precisely what they model, but at some point the deviation is too great and there is a failure to illuminate. (shrink)