The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown, and Speculation (Part 2)

China's
military reforms have the potential to dramatically change the
composition of China's top military body, the Central Military
Commission (CMC).

Note: This article is part of a series examining changes to China’s Military organizational structure and personnel. Part 1 examines what is known and unknown.Part 2 contains speculation as to changes that may occur in the future. Parts 1&2 are available as a single document at the bottom of this page.

As discussed in Part 1, the “unknowns” about China’s ongoing military
reorganization far exceed the “knowns” as the major changes are
revealed in a deliberate yet piecemeal fashion. Part 2 moves further
into the realm of speculation, focusing on two key areas. The first area
of speculation addresses the complex and understandably politically
sensitive area of reforming the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA)
cumbersome grade and rank system to meet the requirements of the
reorganized system. This process will affect every member and
organization in the PLA; some will benefit and some will not. It is
likely to be a challenging process. The second area of speculation
examines the various ways that the top leadership organ of the PLA, the
Central Military Commission (CMC), might evolve to better “command” as
well as represent the interests of the PLA and Chinese armed forces
overall. Understanding the dynamics of these two speculations, as well
as the outcomes, will be essential building blocks for future analysis
of the motives and the implications of this iteration of PLA
reorganization and reform.

Possible Changes to the PLA’s System of Grade and Ranks
In the PLA, every organization and officer is assigned a grade
from the platoon level to the CMC to designate their position in the
military hierarchy. Organizationally, units can only command other units
of lesser grade levels. Officers are assigned grades along with
military ranks. Each grade from military region leader down has two
assigned ranks, while some ranks, such as major general, can be assigned
to up to four grades. This is one of the PLA’s defining features, as an
officer’s grade is more important than his rank. [1]
Although no official reports on the reorganization have mentioned a
change to the grade system, there are at least four possible adjustments
based on the changes that have occurred. First, the Military Region
(MR) Leader and Deputy Leader grades will likely be renamed Theater
Leader and Deputy Leader, respectively. Second, the Division Deputy
Leader grade may be renamed Brigade Leader. This would reflect the fact
that over the past decade the PLA has been shifting several components
from a division and subordinate regiment structure to a brigade
structure with subordinate battalions. In addition, there is a third
possibility that the entire structure may be reorganized by adding or
eliminating both a Leader and Deputy Leader grade or adjusting units
from one grade to another. For example, there has been speculation that
all Corps Leader- and Deputy Leader-grade operational and support
organizations, such as group armies and the 15th Airborne Corps will be
downgraded to Division Leader; however, the Corps Leader and Deputy
Leader grades likely will remain for functional and administrative
departments (gwy.yibys.com,
September 9, 2015). A fourth possible adjustment is to abolish the
entire grade structure and rely solely on ranks. The grade structure
originated with the PLA’s predecessor, the Red Army, in the 1920s and
underwent several adjustments since then; however, it will have to be
replaced with some type of structure indicating rank. [2] One of
the driving forces to change the grade structure is presumably the
result of a previous round of reforms. In 2003, 200,000 personnel (85
percent of whom were officers) were downsized, their positions taken by
an expanded corps of tens of thousands of noncommissioned officers
(NCOs). Though they filled an important personnel gap, they currently
have no grade themselves and are referred to as “acting” (代理) leaders.

There is also speculation that the entire rank structure may be
altered in an attempt to clarify and simplify the personnel system and
make seniority, authority, and responsibility levels more transparent. [3]
As shown in Table 1 of Part 1, each grade up to MR Leader has a primary
and secondary rank where, as a general rule, officers receive a rank
promotion every four years up to colonel and a grade promotion every
three years up to Regiment Leader (China Brief,
February 4). After that, the rank and grade promotions, which are
rarely simultaneous, are based on available billets, requirements and
mandatory retirement ages. Furthermore, mandatory retirement ages are
based on their grade, not their rank or time-in-service. [4]One Grade, One Rank?
Based on a review of various unofficial media reports, one
possibility for rank structure reform is that the PLA will cease to have
two grades per rank, wherein one rank can be assigned to more than one
grade. This is a logical step in rationalizing the PLA’s rank system, a
process that began with the PLA’s eighth force reduction of one million
personnel that started in 1985 and reduced the number of MRs from 11 to
7. As part of the 1985 reform, the PLA transitioned from 18 grades to 15
and reestablished ranks in the PLA in 1988. From 1988–1994, each grade
had three ranks, before the system was simplified to two grades per
rank.

Senior Colonel Rank
A second possible rank structure reform involves the abolition of the
senior colonel (大校) rank, or that the PLA will re-introduce a new
4-star flag officer rank—or both (gwy.yibys.com,
September 9, 2015). Senior colonels currently may have positions in the
grades of division deputy leader, division leader, or corps deputy
leader-level. Based on their grade and position, the retirement age for
senior colonels ranges from 50–58 years old. Elimination of this rank
would be a reasonable step to take in conjunction with the options for
restructuring grades, units and responsibilities discussed elsewhere in
this paper.
4-Star Flag Officer
One of the driving forces for the adoption of a “4-star” flag officer
rank is the PLA’s growing foreign military relations program, such that
a “4-star” general or admiral meets with his “4-star counterpart.”
Although this matters in terms of protocol from a visual perspective, it
does not necessarily mean that they are co-equals. [5]

To date, one of the challenges for U.S. military leaders has been to
figure out who their PLA counterpart has been. As a general rule, the
U.S. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and China’s Defense Minister (DefMin)
are considered counterparts and host each other; however, it is
important to keep in mind that they are not true counterparts in terms
of responsibilities. [6] In addition to hosting the DefMin, the SecDef has also hosted five of the six CMC vice chairmen during visits to the U.S. [7]

The question is who will receive four stars. One possibility is that
all CMC vice chairmen and members and some Theater Leader-grade officers
will receive a fourth star, while certain Theater Leader- and Deputy
Leader-grade officers will have three stars, Corps Leader- and Deputy
Leader-grade officers will have two stars, and Division Leader-grade
officers will have one star. There are many other options, each with
downstream consequences for rank, grade and structural reforms. For
example, one alternative approach is that Corps Deputy Leader-grade
officers could receive one star and the Senior Colonel rank could be
eliminated; such a move would require redefining the organizational
positions and associated rank for all billets at the colonel to major
general levels—a major undertaking for any military. Table 1 shows a
possible grade and rank structure and demonstrates the complexity of the
system. For purposes of this article only, the following unofficial
acronyms are used: DM (Defense Minister), JSD (Joint Staff Department),
PWD (Political Work Department), LSD (Logistics Support Department), and
EDD (Equipment Development Department), PLAA (PLA Army), PLAN (PLA
Navy), PLAAF (PLA Air Force), PLARF (PLA Rocket Force), PAP (People’s
Armed Police), and HQ (headquarters).

Who Will Be on the CMC?
One of the biggest unanswered questions so far is who will be on the
“new” Central Military Commission and when will it reflect the new PLA
force structure. Currently, the two vice chairmen and eight members of
the CMC since the 18th Party Congress in 2012 continue to serve in their
same positions (MOD, January 1; www.81.cn,
January 28). Table 2, which provides a matrix with eight possible CMC
manning options (O-1 to O-8) ranging from a very small CMC to a large
CMC, demonstrates the complexity of the process. Each option poses a
different set of senior level personnel issues with potential political
as well as interpersonal ramifications for the leadership.

Prior to 2016, the leaders of the General Staff Department (GSD),
General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD),
and General Armament Department (GAD) were CMC Members because that was
the grade of their organization, while the commanders of the PLAN,
PLAAF, and PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) were “upgraded” based on a
“policy promotion” (政策升级) to CMC Member grade even though the grade of
their organization was only a MR Leader grade. As a result, it is
reasonable to anticipate that anyone who serves as the leader of a CMC
Member-grade organization in the future will also be an automatic CMC
Member. It is also reasonable to expect that commanders of the services
will continue to serve on the CMC. However, it is not necessary that
every Theater Leader grade officer will automatically become a CMC
Member. For example, there is no indication that the Theater-grade
leadership positions at the Academy of Military Science, the National
Defense University and the People’s Armed Police will be added to the
CMC.
It is assumed that the CMC will continue to have two uniformed vice
chairman; however, this too could change. For example, during the 1980s
and 1990s, there were various uniformed vice chairman-level billets,
including a secretary general, deputy secretary general, first vice
chairman, executive vice chairman, and first secretary. [8] In
addition, the number of uniformed vice chairmen has also ranged from six
or more in the 1970s to three in the 1990s and early 2000s. As such,
there would be a precedent for adding a third vice chairman.

The following bullets briefly discuss the information in each option.
· Option 1: The CMC retains the same members as prior to the reorganization.
· Option 2: The PLA Army commander is added.
· Option 3: The commander of the Strategic Support Force is added.
This would follow the precedent set by the inclusion of the commander of
the Second Artillery commander on the CMC.
· Option 4: The commanders of the five theaters are added; however,
to further confuse the issue, if the Central Theater is, in fact, only a
Theater Deputy Leader-grade organization, then the possibility exists
that it the commander will not be able to be a CMC Member, because he
would have to “skip a grade.”
· Option 5: Given the increasing emphasis on the People’s Armed
Police (PAP) as a component of the CMC, there is a slight possibility
that the commander could be added.
· Option 6: Given that the reorganization focuses on a three-tiered
structure of “CMC—theater commands—troops” command system and an
administration system that runs from the CMC through various services to
the troops, the commanders of the administrative organizations (PLAA,
PLAN, PLAAF, PLARF, and PAP) are not included, such that only the
operational commands (e.g., theaters) and PLA Strategic Support Force
(PLASSF) are included (www.81.cn, November 26, 2015).
· Option 7: The Commander of the Strategic Support Force is not included because the Strategic Support Force is not a service.
· Option 8: Only the Defense Minister, Chief of Staff (e.g., Chief of
the Joint Staff), and Director of the Political Works Department are
included (Sina.com, January 11). [9] This
is a possibility, because the Logistics Support Department and
Equipment Development Departments may be downgraded to Theater Leader,
since the previous General Logistics Department and General Armament
Department were already one-half step below the General Staff Department
and General Political Department, and their counterparts from the MR
Leader down to the Regiment Leader grade organizations were all one full
grade below the Headquarters Department and Political Department.

Table 2: CMC Member Options

Grade

O-1

O-2

O-3

O-4

O-5

O-6

O-7

O-8

CMC
Member

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD
LSD
EDD

DM
JSD
PWD

Theater Leader

PLAN
PLAAF
PLARF

PLAA
PLAN
PLAAF
PLARF

PLAA
PLAN
PLAAF
PLARF
PLASSF

PLAA
PLAN
PLAAF
PLARF
PLASSF
5 Theaters

PLAA
PLAN
PLAAF
PLARF
PLASSF
PAP
5 Theaters

PLASSF
5 Theaters

5 Theaters

When
determining who can serve as a CMC Member, both time-in-grade and
time-in-rank must be taken into consideration. The July 2010 group of
promotions demonstrated the path to full general, which combines rank
and grade promotions consisting of three observable steps (China Brief July 22, 2010, and China Brief, August 5, 2010):

Step One: Lieutenant generals (LTGs) in a MR Deputy Leader-grade move laterally to a second position in the same grade.

Step Two: After three or so years, they receive a grade promotion to an MR leader-grade position, and

Step Three: After three years or so as a LTG in an MR leader-grade position, they receive a rank promotion to full general. [10]

In
order to become a CMC member-grade officer, an officer first serves in
one of the above MR leader-grade billets; however, not every officer who
serves in one of these billets becomes a CMC member.

Historically,
previous CMC Members have held their 3-star rank for a minimum of two
years before they became CMC Members. Therefore, although at least four
of the theater commanders and the new PLA Army commander currently have
held the grade of MR Leader for more than two years, they only received
their third star in July 2015 and may not be eligible to receive a policy promotion to CMC Member until they have at least two years’ time-in-rank, which means mid-2017 (China Brief July 22, 2010, and China Brief, August 5, 2010). [11] In
recent practice, however, there have been a number of exceptions to the
time-in-grade and time-in-position standards that appeared to be the
pattern in 2010. [12]
It is not yet clear who will become members of the CMC and exactly
when the change in personnel will occur. This may be a phased in process
over the next 20 months, or it might not occur until the 19th Party
Congress in late 2017 when several members are due to retire. Whatever
happens, there should be a large changeover in the CMC. Based on the
existing pattern of age requirements (retire at age 68; continue to
serve at age 67), six members should retire, while four members of the
current CMC could stay on based on age, including Fang Fenghui (April
1951), Zhang Yang (August 1951), and Wei Fenghe (February 1954). Zhang
Youxia (July 1950) will be 67 and, although on the cusp of retirement,
should also still be eligible to remain. A potential CMC lineup in 2017
would include Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang as vice chairmen, Zhang Youxia
as the Defense Minister and perhaps vice chairman, and Wei Fenghe
continuing as commander of the Rocket Force.

The timeline for revamping the CMC, should it happen before the 19th
Party Congress, has several possible steps. Prior to 2017, in
conjunction with changes now underway, the CMC might be expanded from 10
uniformed vice chairmen/members to 11 or 12 with the addition of the
Army (GEN Li Zuocheng) and possibly the Strategic Support Force
commander (LTG Gao Jin). [13] These changes would pose two
“process” issues in that Li is not a member (full or alternate) of the
Party Central Committee–and the CMC is a Central Committee organization.
And LTG Gao, while an alternate member of the Central Committee, has
only been in an MR leader grade position as President of the PLA Academy
of Military Science (AMS) for one year and only a LTG since Aug 2013.

The expansion of the CMC at this time remains in question. One
possible course of action is that Li could be added to the Central
Committee at the next plenum in the fall of 2016 and Gao could be
promoted to full general this summer, paving the way for him to also be
promoted to the CMC at the next plenum. Alternatively, any change to the
CMC could wait until 2017 permitting due course retirements and
reducing policy exceptions for promotions.

Conclusions
Although official Chinese and PLA media articles have laid out the
general policy issues and reforms at the CMC, service headquarters, and
theater command levels, there has been no indication about who will
become the new generation of CMC leaders. Other important details, such
as the organizational structures of the services and theater commands or
the details of how operational units will be affected by the reforms,
have also not yet been announced. Even after the official announcements
are made, many gaps in the information made public, such as the
structure for the first-, second- and third-level administrative and
functional departments for the various organizations, remain. Constant
close attention and continuing analysis is necessary to better
understand the inner complexities of this complex bureaucratic
structure.
The past two years must have been a period of high anxiety for many
PLA personnel as they awaited word on how their jobs would be affected
by the reforms. Some, though probably not all, operational units
equipped with older generations of weapons likely will be cut from the
active force; some units, such as large caliber towed antiaircraft
artillery units in the Army and Air Force, may be transferred to the
reserves. A variety of local headquarters could also be consolidated or
eliminated. Some personnel billets traditionally allotted to the Army
could be assigned to the other services to better balance the force.
In the next few years, those who were not demobilized will
nonetheless have to cope with even more change as units are shifted
among headquarters and possibly reorganized internally. As the various
headquarters become operational, it will likely take some time for all
the functional offices to adjust to their new duties and de-conflict
overlapping responsibilities. At the same time, many personnel will feel
increased scrutiny from the super-charged discipline inspection and
audit agencies tasked to root out corruption.
A peacetime objective of the reforms is to reduce graft and
corruption in the PLA. Success in this regard will be visible through
disciplinary actions taken against those identified through more active
inspection and auditing protocols. However, the PLA’s success in its
battle with corruption will be hard for outsiders to judge, given the
sensitivities surrounding the problem and its relationship to larger
political issues in the Party and country as a whole.
In this period of transition from the old to new system, it is
possible that combat readiness in some units could suffer until all the
kinks are works out. While the stated goal is to increase the deterrence
and combat capabilities of the PLA, the true effectiveness of these
reforms cannot be judged until the PLA is put to the test of modern,
extended combat against a capable opponent.
So far, there is little evidence pointing to the emergence of a more
balanced, truly joint force before 2020. Even after personnel reductions
and organizational changes are finished, the Army will likely be more
than twice as large as any other service. For some time into the future,
Army officers will continue to dominate the CMC and theater command
headquarters indicating the degree of difficulty the PLA faces as it
attempts an historic shift to abandon the “traditional mentality that
land outweighs sea,” as proclaimed in the 2015 white paper on “China’s
Military Strategy.” Increasing the percentage of non-Army officers in
senior leadership positions, especially at the CMC level and potentially
including theater commands, will be a gradual process taking many
years. It will also require changes in the PLA’s system of academies and
universities to better prepare officers from all services to assume
joint leadership and staff assignments.
Nonetheless, the senior PLA leadership appears to be cognizant of the
problems it faces and recognizes that this series of reforms will take
years to implement and fine-tune. More changes will be necessary in the
decades ahead. These reforms are but the latest chapter in a
multi-decade, multi-generational military modernization and
transformation process that began in the late 1970s and is scheduled to
continue until the mid-century target of 2049, the 100th anniversary of
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. [14]

Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense Group Inc.
(DGI) and a concurrent Senior China Analyst with the USAF’s China
Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). He is a retired U.S. Air Force
officer, whose extensive service abroad includes a tour in China as the
Assistant Air Attaché. He has written numerous articles on Chinese
military affairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in international
relations from Boston University.Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), served
23 years as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer
specializing in China. Mr. Blasko was an army attaché in Beijing from
1992–1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995–1996. He is the author of The
Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012). John F. Corbett, Jr., an Analytic Director with CENTRA Technology,
Inc. since 2001, specializes in China, Taiwan, and Asian military and
security issues. He is a retired US Army Colonel and Military
Intelligence/China Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and has served as an army
attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong. He has published articles in The
China Quarterly and The China Strategic Review and has contributed
chapters to the NBR/U.S. Army War College series of books on the Chinese
military.

Notes
1. See Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds, The PLA as Organization v2.0, p. 10–15. .
2. Zhu Jianxin, Guo Fei, Ji Haitao, Officer System: Comparison and
Reforms (军官制度:比较与改革), Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press,
December 2006, pp. 36–37.
3. The PLA did not have a rank system until 1955 and subsequently
abolished it in 1965. The current rank system was implemented in 1988.
4. Xu Ping, ed., Record ofNew China Implements Military Rank System (新中国实行军衔制纪实), Beijing: Gold Wall Press, June 2010. According to the Chinese Military Encyclopedia,
the first ranks Regulations were passed on July 1, 1988 and amended on
May 12, 1994. The Regulations were amended again on July 1, 1998. The
Regulations were last amended on December 20, 2002. The 1988 Regulations
re-established officer ranks after they were abolished in 1965. Of
note, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a Military Service Law
in May 1984 that laid the ground work for reinstituting ranks, but the
follow-on PLA Officer Rank Regulations were not implemented until 1988.
The 1984 Law was amended on December 29, 1998. Song Shilun and Xiao Ke,
eds., Chinese Military Encyclopedia (中国军事百科全书), Beijing: Academy
of Military Science Publishers, July 1997, Volume 4, p. 392.
;
. The
Military Service Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国兵役法) was
adopted on May 31, 1984 by the Second Session of the Sixth National
People’s Congress.
5. Pollpeter and Allen, Chapter 3 on the Ministry of National Defense, p. 85–116.
6. See Kenneth W. Allen, Christopher M. Clarke, John F. Corbett, Jr.,
and Lonnie D. Henley, “China’s Defense Minister and Ministry of
National Defense,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., The PLA as Organization v2.0, <www.pla-org.com/downloads/>.
7. Kenneth Allen and Phillip C. Saunders, “PLA Foreign Relations
under Xi Jinping: Continuity and/or Change?,” National Defense
University, Forthcoming mid-2016; Other examples of the mis-match
between U.S. and Chinese counterparts during state-to-state visits
include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), heads of the
Air Force and Navy, and commander of Pacific Command. The CJCS has been a
rough equivalent to the two CMC vice chairmen, but was also considered a
counterpart to the former Chief of the General Staff (COGS), who served
as the director of the General Staff Department. It is not clear who
CJCS’s new counterpart will be under the reorganization. The
responsibilities of the new Joint Staff Department (JSD) and its
Director are much more limited in scope than the responsibilities of the
former General Staff Department and the COGS. At least five functional
subdepartments were removed from the GSD and resubordinated to become
new CMC functional organs. Other GSD responsibilities were assigned to
the new Army Headquarters and the Strategic Support Force. As such,
while the Director of the JSD may be first among the leaders of the CMC
subordinate staff elements (except perhaps for the Director of the
General Office) it does not appear that he will be a true counterpart to
the U.S. CJCS in terms of duties and responsibilities. Whereas the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) and the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) have direct PLA counterparts (e.g., the PLAAF and PLAN
commanders, respectively), the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)
previously did not have a direct counterpart until the new Commander of
the PLA Army was appointed in January. Meanwhile the Commander of
Pacific Command (COMPACOM) has visited China more than any other person
holding a leadership position. Although he does not have an exact
counterpart, various Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (DCOGS) and MR
Commanders have hosted him and vice versa. He will most likely continue
to deal with the new theater command commanders and Deputy Chiefs of the
Joint Staff Department.
8. “The Central Military Commission,” in Hu Guangzheng, ed., China Military Encyclopedia Version 2, Military Organization (军制) Volume 1. Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, July 2007, p. 22–31.
9. Although the head of the former General Staff Department was
identified as the Chief of the General Staff (总参某长), the head of the new
Joint Staff is known only as the Chief of Staff (参谋长).
10. Since the rank-to-grade adjustment in 1994, all Military Region
(MR) leader-grade officers in the PLA have received their third star,
but it is not always at the same time they assume their billet.
11. Li Zuocheng, Song Puxuan, Liu Yuejun, and Zhao Zongji were all
promoted to full general on July 31, 2015. The commander of the Central
Theater, Han Weiguo only received his second star at the same time.
12. Six of the ten officers promoted to full general/admiral in 2015
were exceptions. ADM Miao Hua moved to a MR-grade position in 2014 with
less than two years as a LTG; then was promoted to full admiral having
served in two MR-grade positions in one year. Five others were promoted
after having only served two years or less as a LTG and/or less than
three years in a MR-grade position. In hindsight, one could speculate
these were “policy” exceptions preparing the way for the current
reorganization now underway.
13. Generals Li and Gao were born in October 1953 and April 1959
respectively, meaning that they would be eligible for the CMC based on
mandatory dates of retirement. Dates of birth are from DOD’s Directory of PRC Military Personalities, March 2015.
14. See Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “A First Cut at the
Organizational Restructuring of the Chinese Military,” National Defense
University’s Joint Forces Quarterly, forthcoming, early 2016, for additional information about the reorganization.

Tuesday, February 09, 2016

It should not be news to anyone by now that the PLA is undergoing a profound organizational restructuring, perhaps the most dramatic since 1949. To help us to get a better handle on the effects of those changes, CDF is proudly present the latest by the “A” “B” and “C” of the PLA watching community (Allen, Blasko, and Corbett), the single best scholarly article published on this subject thus far. Enjoy.

** A great thanks goes to Jamestown for putting everything together on this important work **

The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part 1)

Note: This article is part of a two-part series examining
changes to China’s Military organizational structure and personnel. Part
1 examines what is known and unknown. Part 2 contains speculation as to
changes that may occur in the future.
On December 31, 2015, the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
began its eleventh major reorganization since 1952. Most previous
reorganizations focused on reducing the size of the infantry and bloated
higher-echelon headquarters, turning over entire organizations, such as
the railway corps, to civilian control, and transferring units to the
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). [1]
To date, most Western analysis of the current reorganization has
addressed the reasons for and policy implications of the current
reorganization. Instead, this article addresses what is known about
changes to the PLA’s organizational structure—the essential factor
needed to inform any credible analysis of the reasons for and the
implications of the current reorganization. [2]
Although there are lots of media reports and blogs writing about the
reorganization, much of what has been written has been incorrect or
based on speculation. As a result, the “known” component of this article
is based on official Chinese reporting in Chinese and English from the
Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) website, China Daily, and Xinhua.

Although there are many media and blog articles about various parts
of the reorganization, until the information is available in official
PLA or Xinhua reporting, this article identifies them as “unknown” or
“speculation.” Another issue arising from the variety of reporting on
the reorganization is terminology. One example is the “official” English
translation for the geographic groupings that are replacing China’s
military regions (军区). For example, the PLA officially has translated
the term “zhanqu” (战区) as “theater of war,” “theater,” and
“battle zone”; however, various Western analysts have translated it as
“war zone” and certain unofficial media reports have used “combat zone” (Bowen, January 9). [3] Due
to the use of “Theater Command” in an article published by the Chinese
MND announcing the official “standing up” ceremony on February 1, this
article will use “Theater Command” (MOD, February 1).

What is “Known”
In November 2013, the Third Plenum of 18th Party Central Committee
announced the decision to “optimize the size and structure of the army,
adjust and improve the balance between the services and branches, and
reduce non-combat institutions and personnel.” This rebalance is meant
to correct the domination of the PLA Army, which with the Second
Artillery, currently has 73 percent of the PLA’s total troops, followed
by 10 percent for the Navy (PLAN) and 17 percent for the Air Force
(PLAAF). The Central Committee also announced creation of a “joint
operation command authority under the Central Military Commission (CMC),
and theater joint operation command system” and to “accelerate the
building of new combat powers, and deepen the reform of military
colleges” (CNTV.com,
November 16, 2015). This announcement pointed to upcoming changes in
four main categories: 1) PLA personnel size and force structure, 2)
command organization and structure from the CMC down to the unit level,
3) modern military capabilities as found in “new type combat forces,”
and 4) the PLA professional military education system of universities,
academies, colleges, and schools.

Nearly two years passed before CMC Chairman Xi Jinping announced the
first details of these reforms. At the September 3, 2015 military parade
in Beijing, Xi proclaimed a reduction of 300,000 PLA personnel,
bringing the size of the active duty PLA down to two million. An MND
spokesman further clarified the cuts would be completed by the end of
2017 and would mainly affect “troops equipped with outdated armaments,
administrative staff, and non-combatant personnel, while optimizing the
structure of Chinese forces” (Xinhuanet,
September 3, 2015). The only specific unit reported so far to have been
eliminated is the Nanjing Military Region Art Troupe, one of numerous
performing arts troupes, which have traditionally provided entertainment
for PLA units (Global Times, January 25).

In November 2015, Xi declared the “current regional military area
commands [also known as Military Region headquarters] will be adjusted
and regrouped into new battle zone commands supervised by the CMC.” A
three-tier combat command system from the CMC to theater commands to
units would be created. But this system will be separate from the
administrative chain of command running from the CMC to the four service
headquarters to units. As such, service headquarters are responsible
for “construction” functions, such as organizing, manning, and equipping
units (Xinhuanet, November 26, 2015). These changes will take place over the next five years through the year 2020. [4]

On the last day of 2015, Xi presided over the establishment
ceremonies for the PLA Army’s leading organ (national-level
headquarters) (PLAA), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and the PLA
Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and named their respective commanders
and political commissars (Chinamil.com,
January 1). The Army headquarters was charged to transform from “the
regional defensive type to the full-spectrum combat type” and the Rocket
Force, identified as China’s “core strategic deterrence power,” was
upgraded to a full service (军种) from its former status of “an
independent branch treated as a service,” (兵种). Later the PLA Daily indicated Rocket Force units would be the same as the former Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) (www.81.cn, January 10). As a service, the Rocket Force eventually could be expected to have its own distinctive uniform.

Though buried in an article about the reforms, another important
target of the reforms was mentioned: reducing the size of the militia (Chinamil.com,
January 1). The militia is not part of the PLA, but one of three
elements of the Chinese armed forces (the other elements being the
active and reserve units of the PLA and the PAP). Militia units are
commanded by the system of local PLA headquarters from provincial
Military Districts down to Military Sub-districts/Garrisons to People’s
Armed Forces Departments (PAFD) in counties and below. No details of the
militia reduction have been announced, but this development opens the
door for potential reductions also in local headquarters, particularly
at the Military Sub-district/garrison and PAFDs at county and grassroots
levels.

On January 11, 2016, a new CMC organization with 15 functional departments, commissions, and offices was announced (Chinamil.com,
January 11). One significant detail included was that the new CMC
National Defense Mobilization Department will be responsible for
“leading and managing the provincial military commands [i.e., also known
as Military Districts],” a task previously assigned to Military Region
headquarters. A photograph accompanying the announcement showed a total
of 69 uniformed officers, of which 58 were PLAA/PLARF, six were PLAN,
and five were PLAAF, which is not an auspicious start for greater
jointness at the most senior levels of the PLA command structure.

On February 1, at a ceremony attended by the entire CMC, five new
“theater commands” were established and their commanders and political
commissars (PC) announced. In what appears to be their protocol order,
the new headquarters are the Eastern (东部), Southern (南部), Western (西部),
Northern (北部), and Central (中部) Theater Commands. [5] The new
headquarters have been tasked to respond to security threats from their
strategic directions, maintain peace, deter wars and win battles, and
assist in “safeguarding the overall situations concerning the national
security strategy and the military strategy” (Chinamil.com,
February 1). All theater commanders and PCs were senior Army officers.
The theater commands will have Army, Navy, and Air Force components
based, respectively, on the “relevant naval fleets” and air forces of
the former Military Regions (MR)—Rocket Forces were not mentioned. On
February 2, PLA Daily reported the formation of the Army headquarters
under the Eastern Theater Command (东部战区陆军) in Fuzhou, Fujian Province,
but the ceremony to establish the new headquarters had been held earlier
on January 24. This first Army headquarters to be set up in one of the
new theater commands is commanded by LTG Qin Weijiang (秦卫江), son of
former Defense Minister GEN Qin Jiwei, with MG Liao Keduo (廖可铎) as PC (81.cn, February 2). [6] PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian presided over the creation of five PLAAF theater commands on February 5 (81.cn, February 5).

More general information about the reforms is expected to be
announced officially over time, but many operational- and tactical-level
details likely will only be learned by close analysis of the Chinese
media. Since an objective of the reforms is to improve the “joint
operation command authority” of the force, it will be necessary to
restructure PLA officer corps billets to create new opportunities for
non-Army personnel to serve in senior joint command and staff
assignments. The new force and personnel structure may require changes
to the PLA’s existing system of grades and ranks.

The Grade and Rank Foundation
The foundation for understanding the reorganization is the PLA’s
15-grade structure shown in Table 1, which was last modified in 1988. [7] Under
the existing system, every PLA organization and officer is assigned a
grade from platoon level to CMC to designate their position in the
military hierarchy. Organizationally, units can only command other units
of lower grade levels. For example, a corps leader grade unit is
authorized to command divisions, but not vice versa. Officers are
assigned grades along with military ranks. Each grade has two or more
ranks assigned to that level. On average officers up to the rank of
senior colonel are promoted in grade every three years, while they are
promoted in rank approximately every four years. In the PLA, an
officer’s grade is more important than his rank. [8]

Part 2 of this article will address the options for changes in the
grade and rank systems that appear likely to accompany the extensive
changes anticipated in the PLA organization and structure. Table 1 is
included here to assist in understanding the organizational changes
already underway and discussed in Part 1.

Table 1: PLA’s 15-grade Structure since 1988

Grade

Primary Rank

Secondary Rank

CMC Chairman (军委主席)
Vice Chairmen (军委副主席)

None
General

CMC Member (军委委员)

General

MR Leader (正大军区职)

GEN/ADM

LTG/VADM

MR Deputy Leader (副大军区职)
副大军区职
)

LTG/VADM

MG/RADM

Corps Leader (正军职)

MG/RADM

LTG/VADM

Corps Deputy Leader (副军职)

MG/RADM

SCOL/SCPT

Division Leader (正师职)

SCOL/SCPT

MG/RADM

Division Deputy Leader (副师职) (Brigade Leader)

COL/CPT

SCOL/SCPT

Regiment Leader (正团职) (Brigade Deputy Leader)

COL/CPT

LTC/CDR

Regiment Deputy Leader (副团职)

LTC/CDR

MAJ/LCDR

Battalion Leader (正营职)

MAJ/LCDR

LTC/LCDR

Battalion Deputy Leader (副营职)

CPT/LT

MAJ/LCDR

Company Leader (正连职)

CPT/LT

1LT/LTJG

Company Deputy Leader (副连职)

1LT/LTJG

CPT/LT

Platoon (排职)

2 LT/ENS

1LT/ENS

New CMC Organizations

As mentioned above, on January 11, 2016, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping met
with all of the new leaders of the reorganized CMC’s directly
subordinate elements. Table 2 provides information about the 15
functional sections comprised of seven departments (including the
important General Office), three commissions, and five directly
affiliated offices. The new CMC structure expanded its former
subordinated elements though the incorporation of many functions
previously found in the former four General Departments, namely the
General Staff Headquarters (also known as the General Staff Department
[GSD]), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department
(GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD).

As can be seen from the new CMC structure, the biggest loser
organizationally is the former General Staff Department and its leader,
the Chief of the General Staff. The new Joint Staff Department has lost
the GSD’s oversight of military training and education, mobilization,
strategic planning, and likely cyberwar and electronic warfare units,
not to mention the personnel and functions transferred to the new Army
headquarters. Moreover, the new Political Work Department is responsible
for “human resources management,” which implies that it has taken over
the GSD’s oversight of enlisted personnel in the former Military Affairs
Department. If true, the new Political Work Department will be
responsible for all personnel matters concerning both cadre and enlisted
personnel.
Table 2 includes the current organization name, the name of the
person who has been assigned as the leader, as well as that person’s
previous position and grade. Based on each person’s previous grade, it
is assumed that they are still filling a billet of the same grade. It is
also assumed that the MR Leader Grade and Deputy Leader Grade will be
renamed Theater Leader Grade (正大战区职) and Deputy Leader Grade (副大战区职),
respectively.

While the new offices are identified as CMC “functional sections,” it
is not yet clear how the command or leadership relationships will work
between the CMC leadership and the subordinate organizations. Also,
while the general departments have gone away in name, the functions of
all four departments continue under the new CMC structure and the new
organizations have retained their same CMC member as the Chief of Staff
(formerly Chief of the General Staff) or Director (for the GPD, GLD, and
GAD). Only one of the functional sections—the Agency for Offices
Administration—appears to be a new entity, probably because it is not
clear where its component offices came from (possibly a management
office from each general department). The other functional sections can
be traced back to their former general department or office and, in many
cases, they have retained the same leadership. As discussed elsewhere
in this paper, it is not yet clear what the organizational grade of the
15 sections will be. For example, the corps-grade organizations listed
in Table 2 could reasonably be expected to be raised to a higher grade
reflecting their apparent enhanced status as a CMC-subordinate
organization; however, any such change will affect every billet in the
organization.

The Four Services and Strategic Support Force
Table 3 provides a list of the four services—PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and
PLARF—and the PLASSF (MOD, January 1). The table includes the current
organization name, the name of the person who has been assigned as the
leader, as well as that person’s previous position and grade. Based on
each person’s previous grade, it is assumed that they are still filling a
billet of the same grade.
The PLAA now has an official headquarters at the same level as the
PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF. Previously, the four General Departments served
as the Army Headquarters and the Joint Headquarters for all the PLA.
Second, the PLASAF, which was previously an independent [Army] branch
treated as a service, is now a full service equal to the PLAA, PLAN, and
PLAAF. Third, the PLASSF does not appear to be a “service.” It is a
“force,” a status similar to that of the former PLASAF. The key is the
Chinese terms: Second Artillery Force and the Strategic Support Force
are “budui” (部队), which the PLA translates as “force,” while the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF use the term “jun”
(军) and “junzhong” (军种), which means “service.” The Chinese use of the
term “leading organ” for the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF is because the
PLA does not have an official term for “headquarters.”

Table 3: PLA Services and Strategic Support Force

Organization

Organization Assessed Grade

Leader

Leader’s Previous Position

Leader’s Previous Grade

Army Leading Organ
(aka PLA Army)
(陆军领导机关)

Theater Leader

GEN Li Zuocheng
(李作成)

Commander, Chengdu MR

MR Leader

PLA Navy
(海军)

Theater Leader

ADM Wu Shengli (吴胜利)

Commander, PLA Navy

CMC Member

PLA Air Force
(空军)

Theater Leader

GEN Ma Xiaotian (马晓天)

Commander, Air Force

CMC Member

PLA Rocket Force (火箭军)

Theater Leader

GEN Wei Fenghe (魏凤和)

Commander, PLA Second Artillery Force

CMC Member

PLA Strategic Support Force
(战略保障部队)

Theater Leader

LTG Gao Jin
(高津)

Commandant, Academy of Military Science

MR Leader

Theater Commands
The new theater command organizational structure is one more step in
the consolidation and evolution of Military Regions that began with 13
MRs in 1955 and then reduced them to 11 MRs (1970) and 7 MRs (1985). [9]
After extensive speculation, on February 1, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping
presided over the inauguration ceremony formally establishing the five
new “theater commands” or “zhanqu” (战区), replacing the previous seven
Military Regions. Table 4 shows the five new theater commands in
protocol order along with the new commanders’ and political commissars’
names and rank, as well as their previous position and grade. Of note,
four of the five commanders came from an MR that was not part of the new
theater command, while four of the five PCs came from the same MR that
formed the base for the new theater commands.

Table 4: PLA Theater Commands

Organization

Organization Grade

Commander

Commander’s Previous Position/Grade

Political Commissar

PC’s Previous Position/ Grade

Eastern
Theater Command
(东部战区 )

Theater Leader (正大军区级)

GEN Liu
Yuejun
(刘粤军)

Commander, Lanzhou MR/ MR Leader

GEN Zheng Weiping
(郑卫平)

PC, Nanjing MR/MR Leader

Southern Theater Command
(南部战区)

Theater Leader (正大军区级)

GEN Wang Jiaocheng
(王教成)

Commander, Shenyang MR/ MR Leader

GEN Wei Liang
(魏亮)

PC, Guangzhou MR/MR Leader

Western Theater
(西部战区) Command

Theater Leader (正大军区级)

GEN Zhao Zongji
(赵宗岐)

Commander, Jinan MR/ MR Leader

LTG Zhu Fuxi
(朱福熙)

PC, Chengdu MR/MR Leader

Northern Theater
(北部战区) Command

Theater Leader (正大军区级)

GEN Song Puxuan
(宋普选)

Commander, Beijing MR/ MR Leader

GEN Chu Yimin
(褚益民)

PC, Shenyang MR/MR Leader

Central
Theater Command
(中部战区)

Theater Leader (正大军区级)

LTG Han Weiguo
(韩卫国)

Deputy Commander, Beijing MR/ MR Deputy Leader

GEN Yin Fanlong
(殷方龙)

Deputy Director, GPD/MR Leader

At
a press conference following the official announcement of the theater
commands, the MND spokesman used the term “theater leader” (正大军区级) to
identify the grade level of the new theater commands, which is the same
term used for grade of the former MR leaders (www.81.cn,
February
1). This arrangement suggests that Han Weiguo, shown as a LTG
in the photograph of the establishment ceremony, likely will be promoted
in rank and grade, even though he only received his second star in July
2015 and has been one of the Beijing MR deputy commanders.
The various announcements have not yet included specific details on
the organizational structure of the new theater commands. Also, to date,
there has been no official announcement as to what provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities the theater commands will
include, or where the headquarters are located. At least four different
maps have been published in the unofficial Chinese and Western media
showing different sets of boundaries for the new theaters (Tieba, January 15; nddtv.com, January 29; cjdby.net; Sina Blogs, January 27; Phoenix, February 1).

Prior to the establishment of the theater commands, activities taking
place clearly indicated the change was imminent. For example, in
mid-January, PLA Daily announced that all seven MR newspapers had ceased operations (China Daily,
January 22). It is not clear whether the new theater commands will have
their own newspapers or not. The websites for the former MRs were also
shut down; however, they have been replaced by new theater websites
(db.81.cn; nb.81.cn; xb.81.cn; b.81.cn, and zb.81.cn). Also, the Hong
Kong-based Wenweipo published photographs of ceremonies
transferring units from the Chengdu, Nanjing, and Lanzhou MRs, but did
not specify where the units were now assigned (Weiwenpo,
January 18). It is likely that similar ceremonies were held in the
other military regions. Associated with the dissolution of the Military
Regions, “transitional work offices” (善后办公室) were established to manage
holdover personnel and property issues (Chinamil.com, February 2).

Unanswered Questions
Many unknowns concerning the reorganization remain. The following
questions identify topics for further examination as the reforms unfold
in the coming months and years.

The CMC:
Will the CMC departments/commissions/offices and theater headquarters
become true “joint” organizations with a balanced mix among members
from each of the four services plus the PLASSF?

The MND:
Has the role of MND been changed? Previously, the MND was not in the
chain of command from the CMC to MRs to units. The latest official
announcements do not insert the MND into the operational or
administrative chain of command. In September 2015, a three-part series
of articles laid out a very aggressive reorganization that basically
took all non-combat and combat-support organizations and placed them
under MND; however, it does not appear that this has occurred (gwy.yjbys.com, September 2, 2015; gwy.yjbys.com; gwy.yjbys.com). Will there be any significant changes to the role of the MND in the new structure?

Personnel Cuts:
Although one of the first announcements Xi made about the
reorganization concerned a 300,000-man downsizing, to date, no specifics
have officially been announced other than the abolition of the
performing arts troupe in the Nanjing MR (MOD,
January 22). How will the remaining 2 million personnel be balanced
among the services? Even if all 300,000 cuts were made only to the Army,
it would still amount to some 63 percent of the 2 million-man force.
Therefore, the other services would need to receive additional billets
to better balance the force. This has done in the past by reassigning
entire units from one service to another.

How will the PLA’s 2 million personnel be divided among officers,
uniformed civil cadre, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and
conscripts/volunteers? In 2003, the PLA implemented a 200,000-man
downsizing, of which 85 percent were officers, including over 200
one-star generals and admirals. In addition, about 70 junior officer
specialty billets were turned over to NCOs. To date, thousands of NCOs
have now filled those billets; however, they are still called “acting”
(代理) leaders.

Will the local headquarters system of provincial Military Districts,
Military Sub-districts, and Peoples Armed Force Departments be altered?

Operational Units:
What operational units will be disbanded? A review of internet
sources since January 1, 2016 indicates that all 18 group armies remain
operational. Will there be any change to the organization and
subordination of the PLAN’s three fleets? Currently, all three fleets
are reported operational. [10] There has been no official reporting on any changes in PLAAF units (MOD, February 2).

The Strategic Support Force:
To what headquarters (or CMC) is the PLASSF subordinate? What units
comprise the PLASSF? What are the specific missions of the PLASSF? How
many personnel are in the PLASSF? The reporting that the PLASSF will
include responsibility for space-related activities as well as
cyber/electronic warfare-related activities raises the likelihood that
former GAD launch and monitoring bases and GSD Third Department
Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus will be re-subordinated to the PLASSF,
but this remain to be confirmed. Additionally, will any other
operational units that previously were directly subordinate to the
various General Departments be reassigned to the CMC functional
departments, such as other intelligence, electronic warfare, political
warfare, and logistics units?

Militia and the Reserves:
In addition to reductions in the militia, will PLA reserve units
undergo change? Some active duty units equipped with older weapons could
be transferred to either the reserves or militia.

Education:
What is the status of the Academy of Military Science, National
Defense University, and National University of Defense Technology? Will
they continue to be directly under the oversight of the CMC? What
changes will occur in the PLA system of educational academies and
schools? Will the number of new students be reduced because of the
300,000-person reduction? Will new academies be formed or former
academies transformed into new entities based on changes in personnel
and force structure? For example, will more NCO schools or more command
academies be established?
Will PLA-wide guidance be issued establishing education and
experience requirements for officers to be considered qualified as joint
officers?

The People’s Armed Police (PAP):
Will there be any changes to the CMC and State Council/Ministry of
Public Security’s dual command of the People’s Armed Police? If so, this
will require a change to the National Defense Law. Will the size and
composition of the PAP remain the same?

Conclusion
As can be seen thus far, the PLA is in the early stages of an
extensive and complex reorganization, the objective of which is to
enhance CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s goal for “…conducting military reform
and building a strong military… on the road of building a strong
military with Chinese characteristics” (MOD,
January 12). The amount of available information is limited, as the
reorganization is being implemented in a deliberate step-by-step manner
and details revealed piecemeal; the “unknowns” far exceed the “knowns.”
The changes are likely to continue through the 19th Party Congress in
2017 with full implementation possibly as far away as 2020—previously
identified as the intermediate milestone year in the modernization
process with the final goal of completion by the middle of the century.
Part 2 of this report moves deeper in to the area of speculation and
will discuss the options and ramifications of reforming the grade and
rank system along with the prospects for reform of the CMC itself.

Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense Group Inc.
(DGI) and a concurrent Senior China Analyst with the USAF’s China
Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). He is a retired U.S. Air Force
officer, whose extensive service abroad includes a tour in China as the
Assistant Air Attaché. He has written numerous articles on Chinese
military affairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in international
relations from Boston University.

Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), served
23 years as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer
specializing in China. Mr. Blasko was an army attaché in Beijing from
1992–1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995–1996. He is the author of The
Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

John F. Corbett, Jr., an Analytic Director with CENTRA Technology,
Inc. since 2001, specializes in China, Taiwan, and Asian military and
security issues. He is a retired US Army Colonel and Military
Intelligence/China Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and served as an army
attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong. He has published articles in The China
Quarterly and The China Strategic Review and has contributed chapters
to the NBR/U.S. Army War College series of books on the Chinese
military.Notes

For the PLA’s official definition see: Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(中国人民解放军军语), Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, September
2011, p. 77; The 2012 and 2015 Defense White Papers both referred to zhanqu simply as “theater”; an article in the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, by contrast, translated zhanqu as “battle zone” (Xinhua, November 26, 2015). Most recently, The PLA’s English website used the term “Theater Command” (Chinamil.com, February 2).

This
system of dual responsibilities is similar to, but not exactly the
same, as the U.S. military’s division of responsibilities between
combatant commands and the services.

This order breaks from the
previous precedence that reflected the sequence in which the various
regions were brought under control from the Kuomintang.

BEIJING, Feb. 2 (ChinaMil) -- China's
Ministry of National Defense (MND) held a special press conference in
Beijing on February 1, 2016, at which the Defense Ministry spokesman
Yang Yujun answered journalists' questions about the adjustment and
establishment of the theater commands.

Q: Why re-adjust and re-divide the theater commands?

Yang: The five new
theater commands, namely the Eastern Theater Command, the Southern
Theater Command, the Western Theater Command, the Northern Theater
Command and the Central Theater Command are set up according to China's
security environment and the military's missions and tasks.

This adjustment is made on the principle
that the Central Military Commission (CMC) takes charge of the overall
administration of the Chinese armed forces, the theater commands focus
on combat readiness, and the various military services pursue their own
construction and development.

This adjustment is conducive to
improving the joint operational commanding institutions, forming the
joint operational system, better safeguarding national sovereignty,
security and development interests, and maintaining regional stability
and world peace.

Q: How were the five new theater commands established?

Yang: The five new
theater commands' organs are established on the basis of the functions
and institutions of the former seven Military Area Commands (MAC). Under
the leadership of the CMC, the five new theater commands are equivalent
to the level of the former MACs, and the top commanding officers are
also equivalent to the same level of the former MACs. As the adjustment
and establishment is completed, the former seven MACs - Shenyang,
Beijing, Lanzhou, Ji'nan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu - will be
canceled.

Q: What are the duties and missions of the theater commands?

Yang: As the only top
joint operational commanding institutions in their respective strategic
directions, the theater commands are responsible for performing joint
operational commanding functions, dealing with security threats in their
strategic directions, maintaining peace, deterring wars and winning
battles.

Q: What's the goal of theater commands construction?

Yang: The goal is to
resolutely implement the Communist Party of China's goal of building a
strong military under new circumstances, resolutely carry out the
military strategy and guideline under new circumstances, resolutely
carry through the principle that the CMC takes charge of the overall
administration of the Chinese armed forces, the theater commands focus
on combat readiness, and the various military services pursue their own
construction and development, and build the loyal, competent and
efficient joint operational commanding institutions.

Q: Will there be services' organs in the five theater commands?

Yang: To adapt to the
establishment of theater commands, services' subordinate organs are
formed within the five theater commands during this round of reform.

The Army's subordinate organs within the
five theater commands are built on the basis of certain functions and
institutions of the former MACs, the Navy's subordinate organs within
the five theater commands are built on the basis of relevant naval
fleets, and the Air Force's subordinate organs within five theater
commands are built on the basis of the air force of former MACs. To
date, the adjustment and establishment of the services' organs within
five theater commands has been completed.

Q: Since the theater commands don't directly lead and manage the troops, will that affect their commands over the troops?

Yang: As the only top
joint operational commanding institutions in their respective strategic
directions, the theater commands can carry out unified command and
control over all troops undertaking combat missions according to the
commanding rights and liabilities endorsed by the CMC.

We will adapt to the operational
requirements of the new commanding system, improve relevant rules and
laws, and make sure the commanding rights and liabilities of the theater
commands be earnestly put in place.

Q: After the theater commands
adjustment and establishment, will China's national defense policy and
military strategy be changed?

Yang: China always
upholds a national defense policy that is defensive in nature and
insists on the military strategy of proactive defense. Such policy and
strategy are determined by China's political system, development
strategy, foreign policy and historical and cultural traditions and will
remain unchanged.

The Chinese armed forces will adhere to
the security outlook of common, comprehensive, cooperative and
sustainable, actively expand the space for military security
cooperation, and create a security environment conducive to the nation's
peaceful development, and make greater contributions to world peace.

Q: How to deal with the follow-up work and left-over problems after the former MACs are canceled?

Yang: According to the
actual situations of the reform, President Xi Jinping and China's CMC
have decided to form transitional work offices to specifically deal with
the follow-up work.

This arrangement is good for well
serving the retired officers and properly arranging the officers and the
wounded, sick and disabled, and is conducive to strengthening the
management of funds, materials, equipment and facilities, so as to
ensure the smooth transition from the old system to the new one and also
the security and stability of the troops.