The "Turkish model" : for whom?

In the aftermath of the Arab spring the “Turkish model” is being held out as an optimistic scenario for democratisation with an Islamic framework. In conversation with Deniz Kandiyoti, women’s rights and gender activist Pinar Ilkkaracan puts Turkey’s record under scrutiny - and finds it wanting

DK:The more optimistic commentators on the prospects for democracy in the
aftermath of the Arab spring have been invoking the “Turkish model” as a path
to emulate. As a long standing activist for women’s rights and sexual liberties
how do you evaluate the record in Turkey?

PI:The last positive piece of legislation in Turkey was the reform of the
Penal Code in 2004. Many commentators have
been totally celebratory about these gains as though they were achieved once
and for all. In fact, we have since been
witnessing a significant backlash and a process of backsliding. But before we
talk about this process, let me point out that we have been working closely
with our counterparts in the MENA region since 1999 in a network of about 45
institutions in the Coalition of Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies
(CSBR) whose members are involved in advocacy work for women's rights and
sexual and reproductive health and rights at the national level. Organizations such as ATFD and AFTURD in
Tunisia, EIPR and the New Woman Foundation in Egypt and Sister's Arabic Forum
in Yemen, to mention but a few, have been at the forefront of the Arab spring.
They were initially exhilarated by the developments and we exchanged euphoric
e-mails. However, within a month we started hearing they were increasingly
concerned and depressed. At the general assembly of CSBR which took place in
May 2011 in Istanbul deep concerns were voiced by members. It seems very clear
that the MENA region needs to be very alert for at least the coming decade and
that these will be extremely dangerous times for sustaining a gender equality
agenda. As for seeking guidance from the “Turkish model” the record on women’s
rights is far from rosy.

DK:What do you see as signs for concern in Turkey?

PI:
The Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002. Between 2002-2004 we
had first hand experience of JDP resistance to judicial reforms in the service
of gender equality. It would be fair to
say that the reforms were passed despite rather than because of the JDP government. In terms
of implementation of this legislation we are in a situation of stasis and nothing is being done.

In
the past two years there have been several attempts to claw back some of these
gains, and to change clauses of the Penal Code, for example in relation to the
reduction of sentences and penalties for sexual abuse of young girls. There are
many worrying trends and violence against women is on the increase.

The
rules of composition of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors have been changed by the JDP and this body is now much more aligned
with the Executive. In principle the role of the High Council
should be to enforce and implement the laws of the land, including the Turkish
Penal Code. Instead, they are reinstating the reduction of penalties for
rapists who marry their victims.

DK: Were there any
noteworthy institutional changes since 2004?

PI:
The women’s movement in Turkey has concentrated on four major areas
since we have achieved the major legal reforms for gender equality. First,
women’s labour force participation - which is the lowest among OECD countries.
Second, political representation - which is in a pitiful state. The ngo KA-DER pushed for a quota of 30% during the 2007
and 2011 elections but the increase was minimal. Third, violence against women.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found Turkey guilty of not preventing
violence against women and failing to establish gender equality, in the
landmark case Opuz vs. Turkey. Fourth, the reform of the
Turkish constitution to ensure gender equality.

We
petitioned all male and female MPs in 2006
asking them to translate the gender equality provision of the
Constitution ( clause 10) into substantive equality, demanding that the
article should be revised as: "the state is responsible for ensuring
actual equality between women and men," including positive
discrimination for women. This was met by public opposition to quotas for women
in the media by the State Minister for Women’s Affairs, Nimet Çubukçu, who went
on to take a court case against the petitioners on the grounds of defamation.
In their joint press statement the targeted organizations expressed surprise at
the minister’s insistence that quotas for women did not exist anywhere in the
world and her ignorance on this matter, and took issue with her about breaking
precedent by excluding the representatives of women’s organizations from
participation in the yearly UN Commission for the Status of women alongside the
official delegation, and her refusal to treat honour crimes as aggravated
manslaughter in a context where hundreds of women lose their lives yearly in
the name of honour.

Thus
the women’s movement in Turkey found that one of the tremendous obstacles in
implementing an agenda of gender equality came from the State Ministers of
Women’s Affairs themselves. The incumbent who followed Nimet Çubukçu declared
that homosexuality is a disease that must be cured and she played up her
disagreement with feminists.

The
present minister, Fatma Şahin, on the other hand, is showing greater commitment
to combat violence against women.

The
least we can say is that the JDP has no integrated policies to achieve gender
equality in Turkey. There is no concerted effort to meet gender equality goals
and the very institutions that are meant to safeguard these goals are staffed
by personnel with conservative agendas. Statistics are showing that Turkey is
dropping in the league tables and that the gender gap is widening. Since our
campaign for the reform of the Turkish penal code for gender equality
(2002-2004), it was very clear to us that the JDP is intent on targeting
the women’s and LBGT movements as the main pillar of its conservative politics.
However, our voice was not heard by the EU or the world. Yet, this must have become obvious to all
since July 2010, when Prime Minister Erdoğan declared, at a meeting with representatives of 60 women's
organizations, that he does not believe
that women and men can be equal on the basis on their “nature”. The PM was
equally reluctant to cede on pluralist measures, such as allowing education in
their mother tongue for the Kurdish minority. It is
quite clear to feminists that the struggle for gender equality is part and
parcel of the struggle for greater pluralism and an inclusive democracy in
Turkey.

Since
the JDP achieved 50% of the electoral vote it has started sidelining and
eliminating the women’s organizations that it had previously collaborated with.

A
further development was the establishment in 2011 of a new ministry for the
"Family and Social Policy" - replacing the former state ministry
responsible for "Women and Social Affairs" - clearly showing the
priorities of the government, treating
women predominantly as mothers and wives, as recipients of welfare rather than individuals
in their own right.

DK:
Have there nonetheless been successful initiatives?

PI: In 2007 we started the Women’s Constitutional Platform (Anayasa Kadin Platformu)-
a platform for the reform of the Constitution for gender equality. We demanded
substantive equality and called for the inclusion of a clause that states that
“the state is responsible to take all measures to achieve actual gender equality”. Unfortunately, the JDP
government has done everything to ensure that there was no time to discuss
their proposal for the constitutional reform voted at the referendum by the
public. In fact the whole debate about the constitution lasted for three days.

We
must remember that these efforts are taking place in the context of anti-feminist policies of the government.
For instance, women are exhorted to have at least three children, a special
call made by the prime minister to the public on several occasions. The freedom
of the press is severely constrained. And conservative politics is bearing
fruit with (according to surveys) youth becoming more conservative. There is
also a concerted cadre-building policy that favours incumbents with
conservative leanings.

I
have for years fought for the right of women and girls to choose their own mode
of dress, including the right to
wear the headscarf. But in the current
political context the headscarf has become a means of political preferment.
Whether your wife is veiled or not makes a difference to whether you get a
public contract or not. Research carried out by Binnaz Toprak, titled Being Different in Turkey, revealed the extent of
pressures towards conformity and the
stigma attached to minority or marginal identities.

In
recent interviews I conducted in women’s shelters, I was told that a woman who
was subjected to domestic violence is less likely to receive state subsidies or
financial support and benefit if she does not wear a headscarf. This clearly
provides women with an incentive to cover.

So
we witness targeted conservative policies with a religious flavour.
Nonetheless, I think the normative framework of violence against women (VAW) as
a violation of human rights is well established and has become a norm in
Turkey.

DK:
To get back to where we started, what is your conclusion about the prospects
for a gender equality agenda in the aftermath of the Arab spring?

PI: First, Turkey cannot be a model
since it is struggling with gender equality issues itself. Besides, the
influence goes both ways. If in the coming decade there are negative
developments in the Middle East and North Africa this will certainly
reverberate back onto Turkey. If there is a backlash in Tunisia because gender
equality policies were associated with the previous regime, this will no doubt
be reflected in Turkey. This is of course grossly unfair since the women’s
movements were opposed to authoritarian regimes. In the new openings created in the public sphere it is perfectly
understandable that Islamic actors will become more visible in the first
instance. The question is whether some social contracts-such as those on the
gender equality front- will be torn up and discarded. Women’s movements will
have a tough battle ahead.

We
call on world citizens, the EU and the UN to support feminist movements in the
region, who will definitely be major actors for democratisation in the Middle
East, rather than concentrating on the misleading notion of a “Turkish
model”.

Pinar Ilkkaracan is the co-founder of Women for Women's Human Rights (WWHR) in Turkey, and the the International Coalition of Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies (CSBR), an international network of NGOs and academicians working towards promotion sexual and bodily rights in the Middle East/ North Africa and South/Southeast Asia. She is Adjunct Professor at Bogazici University, Istanbul.

Pinar has participated in various UN meetings and conferences on women's human rights both as a member of the Turkish delegation and NGO representative. She has written extensively on women and law; sexuality and religion; sexual and reproductive rights; human rights education and violence against women. She is the editor of Women and Sexuality in Muslim Societies (translated into Arabic and Turkish) and Deconstructing Sexuality in the Middle East and North Africa: Contemporary Issues and Discourses.

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