Mr. Kahn, you were telling us why we looked at U.S. numbers and why we didn't look at Canadian numbers. Walk us down that path a bit more. Give us a decent overview of how that unfolds, why it's important, and why we end up basically at the same stop at the end of the day.

The program has had well-publicized cost overruns and delays. But one of the advantages is that we now have some useful reference points. We've recommended that parliamentarians at least consider that figures coming out of the selected acquisition report, plus reports from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, begin to illuminate the subject—providing estimates on both acquisition costs and O and S, long-term sustainment--in effect, life cycle costs.

There are now good reference points. A year ago when we did our report, there was not an independent estimate that you could pull out for the F-35A or for sustainment, of which operating support is the largest component. A year later now, you're seeing these numbers on a selected acquisition report and through the U.S. Department of Defense's CAPE unit. You're seeing average procurement unit cost numbers that are also important, because this is the basis of budgeting in the United States and appropriations, not recurring fly-away.

You'll see in the selective acquisition report that the same figures used here will be part of the defence department's submission for the budget process.

Since we will buy this plane, if we buy it, from the U.S. government, not actually from Lockheed Martin—that's the way it will be eventually, if we decide to buy this plane—we get the same price they get for that particular model, according to the MOU.

Is it safe to assume that the cost to operate here would be plus or minus 5%, say, of what the costs are to operate in the U.S.?

Sir, at this point that would be speculative. I think we can refer you to the fact that they've now done an estimate of the cost difference—their belief in the cost difference—using parametric models to look at the O-and-S cost, operating and support, per flying hour for the F-35. You'll see on page 84 that they actually give you the flying hours for the F-35A versus the other variant. We've provided a kind of illustrative calculation of that, and you can now start to see those indications.

To your first question, it is useful now to start using these reference points to look at what's reasonable. I think it's the same point about parametric modelling and the use of it: what's reasonable.

If points start to converge, then at least, from a parliamentary point of view, there's a richer planning environment. You can have a little more confidence going forward.

We caution that they're all estimates at this point. But to your first question, it becomes interesting when they start to converge. That's why we think the latest report published just five weeks ago from the U.S. Department of Defense is very handy in that regard.

Sir, if I may add very quickly, just to put in a plug for the Department of National Defence officials, we would say the numbers they presented to cabinet on a full life cycle basis looking at operation and support were quite close to what was provided very recently by the selected acquisition report.

I don't disagree, by the way, that the $25.1 billion reported to cabinet is what a reasonable—to use your term, Mr. Khan—person doing this would probably come up with. Unfortunately, that's not the number they told the Canadian public. They said it was less than $15 billion. The reality is that albeit we can give them credit for telling cabinet, we can't give them credit for not telling us and the general public that it was $10 billion less. That's what they communicated. They didn't really give us what information they knew; they gave us other information.

Mr. Page, I recognize you've done this as a career, I would assume as a cost analyst. In your experience, have you seen these programs ever go down in price?

No. Actually, sir, that's one of the reasons that when we looked at different models and we looked at the experience of the F-35 when we took on this project, we thought a cost-estimating relation of the kind of project that picks up these escalating costs....

There's a chart we have—I know you can't see it, but it's in our report—that looks at 30 or 40 years' worth of history. When you look at the cost of this type of technology, these sorts of systems, on a per-kilogram basis it's been growing exponentially, certainly 3.5%, or actually in the 4% range when you add in the weight itself. The costs have been going up.