Compensation for nuclear damage: a comparison among the international regime, Japan and China

Abstract

Following the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011, how the compensation system for nuclear damage should be improved has obtained broad attention. The compensation system, including liability rules, insurance and government involvement, does not only concern to what extent the victims can be sufficiently compensated, but is also relevant to create incentives for the nuclear industry to enhance safety. International compensation regimes for nuclear damage started to emerge since 1960s, but still fail to engage some (potentially) big “nuclear power” ones. The Japanese and Chinese systems are such ones which received less attention until recently. This paper will, on the one hand, engage in a positive study by giving a comparison between the international regime, the Japanese and the Chinese system; on the other hand, provide a normative analysis by using economic criteria to examine the efficiency of the systems and formulate suggestions for reform.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Michael Faure is grateful to the China Ministry of Education and to the Research Centre for Law and Economics of CUPL for their support.

References

Ameye, E. (2010). Channelling of nuclear third party liability towards the operator: Is it sustainable in a developing nuclear world or is there a need for liability of nuclear architects and engineers? European Energy and Environmental Law Review,19(1), 33.Google Scholar

Duncan, E. J. Currie. (2008). The problems and gaps in the nuclear liability conventions and an analysis of how an actual claim would be brought under the current existing treaty regime in the event of a nuclear accident. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy,35(1), 85–127.Google Scholar

Faure, M. (1995). Economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents: some lessons for the revision of the Paris and vienna conventions. European Journal of Law and Economics,2(1), 21–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Faure, M., & Fiore, K. (2008). The civil liability of european nuclear operators: Which coverage for the new 2004 protocols? Evidence from France. International Environmental Agreements,8, 228–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Faure, M., & Liu, J. (2012). The tsunami of March 2011 and the subsequent nuclear incident at Fukushima: Who compensates the victims? William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review,37, 129–218.Google Scholar

Faure, M., & Van den Borre, T. (2008). Compensating nuclear damage: A comparative economic analysis of the US and international liability schemes. William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review,33(1), 219–286.Google Scholar

Schwartz, J. A. (2006). International nuclear third party liability law: The response to Chernobyl, In International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period (pp. 41–44), Paris, OECD-NEA.Google Scholar

Schwartz, J. A. (2009). Great expectations: Where do we stand with the international nuclear liability conventions? In Norbert Pelzer (Ed.), European nuclear liability law in a process of change Berlin, Nomos, 43 et seq.Google Scholar

Watabe, A. (2006). An economic analysis of nuclear accidents in Japan. In G. Liu (Ed.), Perspectives on international state and local economics (pp. 209–234). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.Google Scholar