this infantry and drove in its skirmish-line, and though not able todislodge Gordon, Merritt held the ground gained till night-fall, whenthe Confederate infantry moved off under cover of darkness to Hupp'sHill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek.

The next morning Crook marched from Stony Point to Cedar Creek, Emoryfollowed with Dwight, and the cavalry moved to the same point by wayof Newtown and the Valley pike, the Sixth Corps following thecavalry. That night Crook was in position at Cedar Creek, on theleft of the Valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the SixthCorps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the flanks. In theafternoon a heavy skirmish-line had been thrown forward to theheights on the south side of Cedar Creek, and a brisk affair with theenemy's pickets took place, the Confederates occupying with theirmain force the heights north of Strasburg. On the morning of the13th my cavalry went out to reconnoitre toward Strasburg, on themiddle road, about two and a half miles west of the Valley pike, anddiscovered that Early's infantry was at Fisher's Hill, where he hadthrown up behind Tumbling Run earthworks extending clear across thenarrow valley between the Massanutten and North mountains. On theleft of these works he had Vaughan's, McCausland's, and Johnson'sbrigades of cavalry under General Lomax, who at this time relievedGeneral Ramseur from the command of the Confederate mounted forces.

Within the past day or two I had received information that a columnof the enemy was moving up from Culpeper Court House and approachingFront Royal through Chester Gap, and although the intelligence wasunconfirmed, it caused me much solicitude; for there was strongprobability that such a movement would be made, and any considerableforce advancing through Front Royal toward Winchester could fall uponmy rear and destroy my communication with Harper's Ferry, or, movingalong the base of Massanutten Mountain, could attack my flank inconjunction with the force at Fisher's Hill without a possibility ofmy preventing it.

Neither Wilson's cavalry nor Grower's infantry had yet joined me, andthe necessities, already explained, which obliged me to hold withstring garrisons Winchester and other points heretofore mentioned.had so depleted my line of battle strength that I knew the enemywould outnumber me when Anderson's corps should arrive in the valley.I deemed it advisable, therefore, to act with extreme caution, so,with the exception of a cavalry reconnoissance on the 13th, Iremained on the defensive, quietly awaiting developments. In theevening of that day the enemy's skirmishers withdrew to Tumbling Run,his main force remaining inactive behind the intrenchments atFisher's Hill waiting for the arrival of Anderson.

The rumors in regard to the force advancing from Culpeper keptincreasing every hour, so on the morning of the 14th I concluded tosend a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal to ascertain definitely whatwas up. At the same time I crossed the Sixth Corps to the south sideof Cedar Creek, and occupied the heights near Strasburg. That day Ireceived from the hands of Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant-General'sDepartment, the following despatch, to deliver which he had ridden ingreat haste from Washington through Snicker's Gap, escorted by aregiment of cavalry:

"CITY POINT, August 12, 1864--9 A. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK

"Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain two (2) divisions ofinfantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) piecesof artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He mustbe cautious, and act now on the defensive until movements here forcethem to detach to send this way. Early's force, with this increase,cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for GeneralSheridan to attack. Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade ofthe Nineteenth Corps.

"I have ordered to Washington all the one-hundred-day men. Theirtime will soon be out, but for the present they will do to serve inthe defenses.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

The despatch explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morningof the 15th Merritt's two remaining brigades were sent to Front Royalto oppose Anderson, and the Sixth Corps withdrawn to the north sideof Cedar Creek, where it would be in a position enabling me either toconfront Anderson or to act defensively, as desired by General Grant.

To meet the requirements of his instructions I examined the map ofthe valley for a defensive line--a position where a smaller number oftroops could hold a larger number--for this information led me tosuppose that Early's force would greatly exceed mine when Anderson'stwo divisions of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had joined him.I could see but one such position, and that was at Halltown, in frontof Harper's Ferry. Subsequent experience convinced me that there wasno other really defensive line in the Shenandoah Valley, for atalmost any other point the open country and its peculiar topographyinvites rather than forbids flanking operations.

This retrograde movement would also enable me to strengthen mycommand by Grower's division of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson'scavalry, both of which divisions were marching from Washington by wayof Snicker's Gap.

After fully considering the matter, I determined to move back toHalltown, carrying out, as I retired, my instructions to destroy allthe forage and subsistence the country afforded. So Emory wasordered to retire to Winchester on the night of the 15th, and Wrightand Crook to follow through Winchester to Clifton the next night.

For the cavalry, in this move to the rear, I gave the followinginstructions:

"....In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you willhave to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be leftto invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, andstock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot beconsumed, destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should bedestroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people shouldbe informed that so long as an army can subsist among them,recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined tostop them at all hazards...." [Grant's letter of instructions.]

"GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant-Generalcommanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give thenecessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of aline from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap. You will seizeall mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army. Loyalcitizens can bring in their claims against the Government for thisnecessary destruction. No houses will be burned, and officers incharge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the peoplethat the object is to make this valley untenable for the raidingparties of the rebel army.

During his visit to General Hunter at the Monocacy, General Grant hadnot only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large forcesufficient to defeat Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he hadfurthermore determined to make that sections by the destruction ofits supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the Confederates.This would cut off one of Lee's main-stays in the way of subsistence,and at the same time diminish the number of recruits and conscriptshe received; the valley district while under his control not onlysupplying Lee with an abundance of food, but also furnishing him manymen for his regular and irregular forces. Grant's instructions todestroy the valley began with the letter of August 5 to Hunter, whichwas turned over to me, and this was followed at intervals by morespecific directions, all showing the earnestness of his purpose.

"If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them throughLoudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes,and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms. Inthis way you will get many of Mosby's men. All male citizens underfifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, not as citizenprisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so the momentthe rebel army gets hold of them.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,"CITY POINT, Aug. 21, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va.:

"In stripping Loudoun County of supplies, etc., impress from allloyal persons so that they may receive pay for what is taken fromthem. I am informed by the Assistant Secretary of War that LoudounCounty has a large population of Quakers, who are all favorablydisposed to the Union. These people may be exempted from arrest.

"Telegraphed you that I had good reason for believing that Fitz Leehad been ordered back here. I now think it likely that all troopswill be ordered back from the valley except what they believe to bethe minimum number to detain you. My reason for supposing this isbased upon the fact that yielding up the Weldon road seems to be ablow to the enemy he cannot stand. I think I do not overstate theloss of the enemy in the last two weeks at 10,000 killed and wounded.We have lost heavily, mostly in captured when the enemy gainedtemporary advantages. Watch closely, and if you find this theorycorrect, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it ispossible to follow to the Virginia Central road, follow that far. Doall the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock ofall descriptions and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. Ifthe war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley toremain a barren waste.

"In cleaning out the arms-bearing community of Loudoun County and thesubsistence for armies, exercise your own judgment as to who shouldbe exempt from arrest, and as to who should receive pay for theirstock, grain, etc. It is our interest that that county should not becapable of subsisting a hostile army, and at the same time we want toinflict as little hardship upon Union men as possible.

"Do you not think it advisable to notify all citizens living east ofthe Blue Ridge to move out north of the Potomac all their stock,grain, and provisions of every description? There is no doubt aboutthe necessity of clearing out that country so that it will notsupport Mosby's gang. And the question is whether it is not betterthat the people should save what they can. So long as the war laststhey must be prevented from raising another crop, both there and ashigh up the valley as we can control.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

He had rightly concluded that it was time to bring the war home to apeople engaged in raising crops from a prolific soil to feed thecountry's enemies, and devoting to the Confederacy its best youth. Iendorsed the programme in all its parts, for the stores of meat andgrain that the valley provided, and the men it furnished for Lee'sdepleted regiments, were the strongest auxiliaries he possessed inthe whole insurgent section. In war a territory like this is afactor of great importance, and whichever adversary controls itpermanently reaps all the advantages of its prosperity. Hence, as Ihave said, I endorsed Grant's programme, for I do not hold war tomean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, andmaterial interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which onecombatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is farworse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see butlittle of the horrors attending such a duel, and even growindifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselveswith encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, tofill up the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is anothermatter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to theirown doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss ofproperty weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, thanthe sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularlyconsidered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reductionto poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly thandoes the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man hasdemonstrated in more than one great conflict.

In the afternoon of the 16th I started back to Winchester, whence Icould better supervise our regressive march. As I was passingthrough Newtown, I heard cannonading from the direction of FrontRoyal, and on reaching Winchester, Merritt's couriers brought me wordthat he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah byKershaw's division of Anderson's corps and two brigades of FitzhughLee's cavalry, but that the attack had been handsomely repulsed, witha capture of two battle-flags and three hundred prisoners. This wasan absolute confirmation of the despatch from Grant; and I was nowmore than satisfied with the wisdom of my withdrawal.

At daylight of the 17th Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville,and the same morning Crook and Wright reached Winchester, havingstarted from Cedar Creek the day before. From Winchester, Crook andWright resumed their march toward Clifton, Wright, who had the rearguard, getting that day as far as the Berryville crossing of theOpequon, where he was ordered to remain, while Crook went ahead tillhe reached the vicinity of Berryville. On the afternoon of the 17thLowell with his two regiments of troopers came into Winchester, wherehe was joined by Wilson's mounted division, which had come by a rapidmarch from Snicker's ferry. In the mean time Merritt, after hishandsome engagement with Kershaw near Front Royal, had been orderedback to the neighborhood of White Post, so that my cavalry outpostsnow extended from this last point around to the west of Winchester.

During all these operations the enemy had a signal-station on ThreeTop Mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, from which every movementmade by our troops could be plainly seen; therefore, early on themorning of the 17th he became aware of the fact that we were retiringdown the valley, and at once made after us, and about sundown droveTorbert out of Winchester, he having been left there-with Wilson andLowell, and the Jersey brigade of the Sixth Corps, to develop thecharacter of the enemy's pursuit. After a severe skirmish Wilson andLowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined itscorps at the crossing of the Opequon. This affair demonstrated thatEarly's whole army had followed us from Fisher's Hill, in concertwith Anderson and Fitzhugh Lee from Front Royal, and the two columnsjoined near Winchester the morning of the 18th.

That day I moved the Sixth Corps by way of Clifton to Flowing Spring,two and a half miles west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; andEmory, with Dwight's and Grower's divisions (Grower's having joinedthat morning from Washington), to a position about the same distancesouth of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike. Following thesemovements, Merritt fell back to Berryville, covering the Berryvillepike crossing of the Opequon, and Wilson was stationed at SummitPoint, whence he held a line along the Opequon as far north as thebridge at Smithfield. Crook continued to hold on near Clifton untilthe next day, and was then moved into place on the left of Emory.

This line was practically maintained till the 21st, when the enemy,throwing a heavy force across the Opequon by the bridge atSmithfield, drove in my cavalry pickets to Summit Point, and followedup with a rapid advance against the position of the Sixth Corps nearFlowing Spring. A sharp and obstinate skirmish with a heavypicket-line of the Sixth Corps grew out of this manoeuvre, andresulted very much in our favor, but the quick withdrawal of theConfederates left no opportunity for a general engagement. It seemsthat General Early thought I had taken position near Summit Point, andthat by moving rapidly around through Smithfield he could fall upon myrear in concert with an attack in front by Anderson, but the warmreception given him disclosed his error, for he soon discovered thatmy line lay in front of Charlestown instead of where he supposed.

In the manoeuvre Merritt had been attacked in front of Berryville andWilson at Summit Point, the former by cavalry and the latter byAnderson's infantry. The exposed positions of Merritt and Wilsonnecessitated their withdrawal if I was to continue to act on thedefensive; so, after the army had moved back to Halltown thepreceding night, without loss or inconvenience, I called them in andposted them on the right of the infantry.

My retrograde move from Strasburg to Halltown caused considerablealarm in the North, as the public was ignorant of the reasons for it;and in the excited state of mind then prevailing, it was generallyexpected that the reinforced Confederate army would again cross thePotomac, ravage Maryland and Pennsylvania, and possibly captureWashington. Mutterings of dissatisfaction reached me from manysources, and loud calls were made for my removal, but I feltconfident that my course would be justified when the true situationwas understood, for I knew that I was complying with my instructions.Therefore I paid small heed to the adverse criticisms pouring downfrom the North almost every day, being fully convinced that the bestcourse was to bide my time, and wait till I could get the enemy intoa position from which he could not escape without such seriousmisfortune as to have some bearing on the general result of the war.Indeed, at this time I was hoping that my adversary would renew theboldness he had exhibited the early part of the month, and strike forthe north side of the Potomac, and wrote to General Grant on the 20thof August that I had purposely left everything in that direction opento the enemy.

On the 22d the Confederates moved to Charlestown and pushed well upto my position at Halltown. Here for the next three days theyskirmished with my videttes and infantry pickets, Emory and Cookreceiving the main attention; but finding that they could make noimpression, and judging it to be an auspicious time to intensify thescare in the North, on the 25th of August Early despatched FitzhughLee's cavalry to Williamsport, and moved all the rest of his army butAnderson's infantry and McCausland's cavalry to Kerneysville. Thissame day there was sharp picket firing along the whole front of myinfantry line, arising, as afterward ascertained, from a heavydemonstration by Anderson. During this firing I sent Torbert, withMerritt's and Wilson's divisions, to Kerrteysville, whence he was toproceed toward Leetown and learn what had become of Fitz. Lee.

About a mile from Leetown Torbert met a small force of Confederatecavalry, and soon after encountering it, stumbled on Breckenridge'scorps of infantry on the march, apparently heading for Shepherdstown.The surprise was mutual, for Torbert expected to meet only theenemy's cavalry, while the Confederate infantry column wasanticipating an unobstructed march to the Potomac. Torbert attackedwith such vigor as at first to double up the head of Breckenridge'scorps and throw it into confusion, but when the Confederates realizedthat they were confronted only by cavalry, Early brought up the wholeof the four infantry divisions engaged in his manoeuvre, and in asharp attack pushed Torbert rapidly back.

All the advantages which Torbert had gained by surprising the enemywere nullified by this counter-attack, and he was obliged to withdrawWilson's division toward my right, to the neighborhood of Duffield'sStation, Merritt drawing back to the same point by way of theShepherdstown ford. Custer's brigade becoming isolated after thefight while assisting the rear guard, was also obliged to retire,which it did to Shepherdstown and there halted, picketing the riverto Antietam ford.

When Torbert reported to me the nature of his encounter, and that apart of Early's infantry was marching to the north, while FitzhughLee's cavalry had gone toward Martinsburg, I thought that theConfederate general meditated crossing his cavalry into Maryland, soI sent Wilson by way of Harper's Ferry to watch his movements fromBoonesboro', and at the same time directed Averell, who had reportedfrom West Virginia some days before, to take post at Williamsport andhold the crossing there until he was driven away. I also thought itpossible that Early might cross the Potomac with his whole army, butthe doubts of a movement like this outweighed the probabilitiesfavoring it. Nevertheless, to meet such a contingency I arranged tothrow my army on his rear should the occasion arise, and deeming myposition at Halltown the most advantageous in which to awaitdevelopments, my infantry was retained there.

If General Early had ever intended to cross the Potomac, Torbert'sdiscovery of his manoeuvre put an end to his scheme of invasion, forhe well knew that and success he might derive from such a coursewould depend on his moving with celerity, and keeping me in ignoranceof his march till it should be well under way; so he settled all thepresent uncertainties by retiring with all his troops aboutKerneysville to his old position at Bunker Hill behind the Opequon,and on the night of the 26th silently withdrew Anderson andMcCausland from my front at Halltown to Stephenson's depot.

By the 27th all of Early's infantry was in position at Brucetown andBunker Hill, his cavalry holding the outposts of Leetown andSmithfield, and on that day Merritt's division attacked the enemy'shorse at Leetown, and pressed it back through Smithfield to the westside of the Opequon. This reconnoissance determined definitely thatEarly had abandoned the projected movement into Maryland, if he everseriously contemplated it; and I marched my infantry out fromHalltown to the front of Charlestown, with the intention of occupyinga line between Clifton and Berryville the moment matters should soshape themselves that I could do so with advantage. The night of the28th Wilson joined me near Charlestown from his points of observationin Maryland, and the next day Averell crossed the Potomac atWilliamsport and advanced to Martinsburg.

Merritt's possession of Smithfield bridge made Early somewhat uneasy,since it afforded opportunity for interposing a column between hisright and left flanks, so he concluded to retake the crossing, and,to this end, on the 29th advanced two divisions of infantry. Asevere fight followed, and Merritt was forced to retire, being driventhrough the village toward Charlestown with considerable loss. AsMerritt was nearing my infantry line, I ordered. Ricketts's divisionof the Sixth Corps to his relief, and this in a few minutes turnedthe tide, the Smithfield crossing of the Opequon being regained, andafterward held by Lowell's brigade, supported by Ricketts. The nextmorning I moved Torbert, with Wilson and Merritt, to Berryville, andsucceeding their occupation of that point there occurred along mywhole line a lull, which lasted until the 3d of September, beingundisturbed except by a combat near Bunker Hill between Averell'scavalry and a part of McCausland's, supported by Rodes's division ofinfantry, in which affair the Confederates were defeated with theloss of about fifty prisoners and considerable property in the shapeof wagons and beef-cattle.

Meanwhile Torbert's movement to Berryville had alarmed Early, and asa counter move on the 2d of September he marched with the bulk of hisarmy to Summit Point, but while reconnoitring in that region on the3d he learned of the havoc that Averell was creating in his rear, andthis compelled him to recross to the west side of the Opequon andmass his troops in the vicinity of Stephenson's depot, whence hecould extend down to Bunker Hill, continue to threaten the Baltimoreand Ohio railroad, and at the same time cover Winchester.

The same day I was moving my infantry to take up the Clifton-Berryvilleline, and that afternoon Wright went into position at Clifton, Crookoccupied Berryville, and Emory's corps came in between them, formingalmost a continuous line. Torbert had moved to White Post meanwhile,with directions to reconnoitre as far south as the Front Royal Pike.

My infantry had just got fairly into this position about an hourbefore sunset, when along Crook's front a combat took place that atthe time caused me to believe it was Early's purpose to throw acolumn between Crook and Torbert, with the intention of isolating thelatter; but the fight really arose from the attempt of GeneralAnderson to return to Petersburg with Kershaw's division in responseto loud calls from General Lee. Anderson started south on the 3d ofSeptember, and possibly this explains Early's reconnoissance that dayto Summit Point as a covering movement, but his rapid withdrawal lefthim in ignorance of my advance, and Anderson marched on heedlesslytoward Berryville, expecting to cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby'sGap. At Berryville however, he blundered into Crook's lines aboutsunset, and a bitter little fight ensued, in which the Confederatesgot so much the worst of it that they withdrew toward Winchester.When General Early received word of this encounter he hurried toAnderson's assistance with three divisions, but soon perceiving whatwas hitherto unknown to him, that my whole army was on a new line, hedecided, after some slight skirmishing, that Anderson must remain atWinchester until a favorable opportunity offered for him to rejoinLee by another route.

Succeeding the discomfiture of Anderson, some minor operations tookplace on the part of, Averell on the right and McIntosh's brigade ofWilson's division on the left, but from that time until the 19th ofSeptember no engagement of much importance occurred. The line fromClifton to Berryville was occupied by the Sixth Corps and Grower'sand Dwight's divisions of the Nineteenth, Crook being transferred toSummit Point, whence I could use him to protect my right flank and mycommunication with Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened theenemy's right flank and line of retreat up the valley.

The difference of strength between the two armies at this date wasconsiderably in my favor, but the conditions attending my situationin a hostile region necessitated so much detached service to protecttrains, and to secure Maryland and Pennsylvania from raids, that myexcess in numbers was almost canceled by these incidental demandsthat could not be avoided, and although I knew that I was strong,yet, in consequence of the injunctions of General Grant, I deemed itnecessary to be very cautious; and the fact that the Presidentialelection was impending made me doubly so, the authorities atWashington having impressed upon me that the defeat of my army mightbe followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, itwas believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if,indeed, it did not lead to the complete abandonment of all coercivemeasures. Under circumstances such as these I could not afford torisk a disaster, to say nothing of the intense disinclination everysoldier has for such results; so, notwithstanding my superiorstrength, I determined to take all the time necessary to equip myselfwith the fullest information, and then seize an opportunity undersuch conditions that I could not well fail of success.