I wanna preface by saying this doesn't concern me personally, but it's something I wondered about given that I go to a clinic that also offers safe injections for people addicted to substances.

It made me wonder, do people administering safe injections cooperate with evil formally or materially? Has the Church weighed in on this, and do you guys have any personal opinions on the morality of it all?

They are definitely cooperating materially. The question here is similar to the questions concerning needle exchange programs, and you can find Catholic moralists on both sides of the controversy. I am fairly firmly of the opinion that it's excessively close and therefore impermissible proximate cooperation.

They are definitely cooperating materially. The question here is similar to the questions concerning needle exchange programs, and you can find Catholic moralists on both sides of the controversy. I am fairly firmly of the opinion that it's excessively close and therefore impermissible proximate cooperation.

It's hard to see how actually administering the injection is not formal cooperation. Imagine, in a country where abortion were illegal, a physician decided to make "safe" abortions available just so women would not try to abort themselves or go to someone "unqualified". We would never allow him (or her) to say that he was only cooperating materially.

Is it common for people to get the terminology mixed up, or is it a matter of legitimate dispute among theologians which terms apply to which concrete situations?

Because I came across this from The Ethics of Health Care by Fr. Benedict Ashley O.P,

Quote:

For example, if one works at an abortion clinic only because one needs a job to support one’s family, this is material cooperation. But the type of material cooperation will depend upon the manner in which the person cooperates with the person responsible for the evil action. If one operates the vacuum machine that aborts young fetuses, one is doing something that is essential for performing the evil of abortion. Thus, it would be immediate material cooperation. Immediate material cooperation in the evil act of another is not ethical, even if there is duress present.

But then I came across this from a paper titled "Jesuit Post"...

Quote:

(2) Immediate Material Cooperation: when the person cooperating does not approve of the evil action and does not want it to occur but participates in the execution of the evil action itself. This is only morally acceptable if done under duress. Example: you are a pharmacist for a state prison who personally disagrees with the death permit yet you mix the lethal dose of drugs for an inmate’s execution.

The Jesuits have long (and by long I mean, for the last 500 years) advocated moral laxity, sometimes, severe moral laxity. Their tendency to practice this is the reason why the adjective 'Jesuitical' is a kind of synonym for 'dishonest' or 'deceitful.'

This was actually one of the few legitimate complaints that the European monarchs of the 18th century who put pressure on the Pope to suppress the Jesuits made against the order.

Could it be argued that, at least for those incorrigible, safe injection sites are performing a medicinal service, ethically similar to giving weaning doses when withdrawal might kill? Only here, having failed rehab, methodone, etc, they are serving a need. Granted a need formed by bad choices, but a need nonetheless.

The Jesuits have long (and by long I mean, for the last 500 years) advocated moral laxity, sometimes, severe moral laxity. Their tendency to practice this is the reason why the adjective 'Jesuitical' is a kind of synonym for 'dishonest' or 'deceitful.'

This was actually one of the few legitimate complaints that the European monarchs of the 18th century who put pressure on the Pope to suppress the Jesuits made against the order.

Could it be argued that, at least for those incorrigible, safe injection sites are performing a medicinal service, ethically similar to giving weaning doses when withdrawal might kill? Only here, having failed rehab, methodone, etc, they are serving a need. Granted a need formed by bad choices, but a need nonetheless.

Is it common for people to get the terminology mixed up, or is it a matter of legitimate dispute among theologians which terms apply to which concrete situations?

Because I came across this from The Ethics of Health Care by Fr. Benedict Ashley O.P,

Quote:

For example, if one works at an abortion clinic only because one needs a job to support one’s family, this is material cooperation. But the type of material cooperation will depend upon the manner in which the person cooperates with the person responsible for the evil action. If one operates the vacuum machine that aborts young fetuses, one is doing something that is essential for performing the evil of abortion. Thus, it would be immediate material cooperation. Immediate material cooperation in the evil act of another is not ethical, even if there is duress present.

But then I came across this from a paper titled "Jesuit Post"...

Quote:

(2) Immediate Material Cooperation: when the person cooperating does not approve of the evil action and does not want it to occur but participates in the execution of the evil action itself. This is only morally acceptable if done under duress. Example: you are a pharmacist for a state prison who personally disagrees with the death permit yet you mix the lethal dose of drugs for an inmate’s execution.

Er, which one is right do you think?

The Dominican is, in my opinion, correct. However, I have read that immediate material cooperation is reducible to formal cooperation except when duress is present.

Quote:

Immediate material cooperation occurs when one person actually performs the action in cooperation with another person. Immediate material cooperation is the immoral act of another is always wrong, and the cooperator is equally as guilty as the principal agent, since both actually do the wrongdoing. Immediate material cooperation is the external evidence of intent to do the morally wrong act, and so it follows that immediate material cooperation is reducible to formal cooperation, and thus we call the cooperator an accomplice. The material aspect is the enactment of the intention made in the formal aspect. The only case in which immediate material cooperation is not reducible to formal cooperation and is not make the cooperator guilty of wrongdoing is that of the hostage.

I agree that duress lessens culpability, but it is (IMHO) an error to say that it is morally acceptable. My understanding is that we ought to prefer to die rather than commit even a venial sin, although it would take a pretty heroic level of virtue to do that.

Ok, I found something interesting (btw, this is the first time I've ever really taken initiative to read up on formal/material cooperation, so there may be some things I'm not understanding or I'm unintentionally misrepresenting; if so, please correct me).

But it looks like there's a debate among theologians about the lawfulness of immediate material cooperation:

Quote:

1526. Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.—(a) If one cannot cooperate immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see 1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all immediate cooperation is sinful.

That quote is from Frs. Charles Callan and John M. McHugh's Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities. You can find it online. They're both Dominicans for what it's worth.

The manual also gave various examples. Here's one...

Quote:

1532. Material Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays. — Material cooperation is lawful, if the cooperation is not itself intrinsically wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.

(a) Cases of immediate material cooperation are those of players and dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse here, at least for a time.

(b) Cases of proximate material cooperation are those of musicians or singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one's patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one's presence or patronage.

He notes in the beginning though, that various moralists may disagree and that these are just general guidelines that seem right to the author, since this is an extremely difficult area in moral theology..

That quote from the EWTN site looks like its taking the same position as the Jesuit post article. At least when it comes to allowing exceptions for immediate material cooperation.

Been thinking about this for weeks now and found something in the manuals that pretty much has me taken aback.

Apparently, it's a debated question among theologians whether one can advise someone to commit a lesser sin, when that person is determined to commit a graver one.

From Fr. Thomas Slater SJ's A Manual of Moral Theology for English-speaking Countries:

Quote:

If I know that someone has made up his mind to commit sin and there is no other way of preventing him, I may lawfully induce him to be satisfied with some less offence of God than he was bent on committing. And so if a man was determined to commit adultery, I do nothing morally wrong, but rather the contrary, by persuading him to commit fornication instead. Many theologians, indeed, deny this doctrine on the ground that we must not do evil that good may come of it. But there is no question here of doing evil one's self; we are not justified in doing a less moral evil instead of a greater; we must abstain from all evil, great and small. The question is whether it is an evil action to persuade someone bent on committing a great sin to be satisfied with a less. This is denied by those who defend the above doctrine. And reasonably so, for it is a good action to persuade another to do less evil than he was bent upon doing. To lessen evil is surely to do good. This is the more probable view, according to St Alphonsus.

From The Casuist, Vol4:

Quote:

An innkeeper is in the habit of serving every customer who asks for drink, even if he is plainly drinking too much or is already intoxicated. The man may be wasting on drink money that belongs to his wife and children, but the innkeeper pays no attention. Is not such behavior a grievous sin? And can an innkeeper receive absolution if he habitually acts thus and will not promise to alter?

A question of this kind touches one of the difficulties in Moral Theology. The point is whether and under what conditions it is permissible to connive at another's sin. The doctrine of cooperation forms probably the most difficult part of practical moral theology. It is easy enough to say, as do the writers of most books on the subject, that formal cooperation is never permissible, but that material cooperation is allowed for comparatively important reasons. What is meant by formal and material cooperation? It is often difficult to distinguish them, and still more difficult to decide whether the existing reasons are sufficient to justify material cooperation.

[...]

To prove how difficult it often is to distinguish format from material cooperation, We may refer to the debated question, whether it is right to encourage someone to commit a sin, in order to deter him from committing some more grievous offense, which he is on the point of doing. This question bears a close resemblance to the one under discussion. St. Alphonsus (Theol. ,nor., lib. 3, tract. 3. n. 57) considers the theory that it is right "probobilior," giving as his reason that in such a case the lesser sin is no longer an evil but a good action, being less bad…

Following this line of argument, some writers maintain that it is right to advise a man to drink too much in order to preserve him from immorality. Schwane, however, in his Moraltheologie (Part 1, § 47, O. 147), says: "A lesser sin may be called a lesser evil, but not a good thing, and not a moral advantage, which is the point to be proved. It is always forbidden to cooperate in any sin by counsel. Other theologians, such as Laymann, Gury, Collet, etc., state the matter more precisely, and say that it is permissible to advise a man to commit a lesser sin in order to prevent his sinning more grievously, if the lesser sin forms a part of the greater. For instance, it is permissible to say to one about to commit a murder “Stop, do not kill him, only wound him.” By saying this, we should not give any formal cooperation to the sin, but we should only be preventing its complete committal."

I always assumed that no matter what, you can never recommend anybody to commit any type of sin. But apparently there are theologians who see it differently under certain circumstances. Even more surprising St. Alphonsus thinks it's probable...

It also reminds me of that entire fiasco awhile back, with Pope Benedict's comments about condoms.

That strikes me as pretty good sense. It's not a question of recommending to a person that he commit a sin. It's a question of discovering that a person is determined to sin, and trying to influence him not to sin as much as he'd planned.

I would reject the reasoning attributed to St. Aphonsus, that the lesser sin is actually a good action under these circumstances. But the reasoning attributed to him in the passage from the Casuist differs from the reasoning given in the quotation from Fr. Slater, who attributes to him the idea that it is good to convince a person to do less evil than he otherwise would have done, not that the less evil act itself is a good act (given the context). And this line of thinking from Fr. Slater seems pretty persuasive to me. Although I'm not sure about his example. Seems odd. Imagine, though, that someone of my acquaintance has decided to get "wasted" tonight, and is offered some kind of new dangerous drug--say, cocaine. (I mean, it's new to him. He's never used it before.) And he tells me he's going to take the cocaine. He's determined to get wasted, after all, and the cocaine seems appealing. So I say, why don't you just stick with the beer? I convince him, in other words, to get drunk instead of taking cocaine. This seems better in every way. Not good. And ordinarily, I would not encourage anyone to get drunk. But it seems (a) safer, (b) cheaper and (c) less directly dangerous than using cocaine. So if we assume that this man's choice is between beer and cocaine (without a third option naturally available--he's not going to be deterred from his decision to get wasted), it's a no-brainer, I'd say, that if I can influence him to just drink beer, I should.