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Uşūl al-Fiqh, the methodology of jurisprudence, which is usually - and inaccurately, if not incorrectly - translated “principles of jurisprudence,” is an Islamic science which is developed by Shiite scholars in two recent centuries into an unparalleled intellectual, logical system of thought and a comprehensive branch of knowledge which not only serves as the logic of jurisprudence but as an independent science dealing with some hermeneutical problems.

When the first English version of Shiite uşūl al-fiqh in its both comprehensive and concise version was introduced by the book “An Introduction to Islamic Methodology of Jurisprudence (Uşūl al-Fiqh), A Shiite Approach” (MIU Press, 2013), necessity of preparing a glossary of Shiite uşūl al-fiqh was strongly felt. That is why this valuable task was undertaken, and, as usual, itcould not be accomplished
without full support of the dearest friend, Dr. Seyyed Mohsen Miri, head of Islam and West Research Center of al-Mustafa International Research Institute (M.I.R.I).

The present work, which is, like its precedent, the first, is arrangedon the basis of
Arabic expressions, while presenting their English equivalents in parentheses. Secondary termsare referred
to primary entries. “Al-” in Arabic terms is not considered. An index in the end of the book gives Arabic equivalents to English expressions used in this glossary. Since this work is a glossary, detailed discussion of each entryshould be pursued
in Shiite books on uşūl al-fiqh.

The last words of every accomplished task must be “Praise belongs to God, the Lord of all Being (Qur.,
10: 10).”

Alireza Hodaee

Tehran, July 2013

Transliteration of Arabic Characters

A

• ‘Adam Şiĥĥat al-Salb (Incorrectness of Divesting)

Usage of a term in its designated meaning is literally correct, in another meaning with which it has some pertinence along with some contextual evidence is figuratively correct, and in another meaning without any pertinence is wrong. Therefore, usage of a term literally and figuratively is correct and “the usage” cannot specify whether a termis designated
for a meaning or it is used figuratively.

Now, should one know, through assertion of philologists, that a term is designated for a meaning it would be obviously clear that such word is to be used literally in that meaning and figuratively in other pertinentmeanings.
However, the case is not that clear sometimes and one may wonder how to treat the usage. What can one do in that case in order to find out whether such a usage is literally correct or it isfiguratively
so and hence one should use it with some contextual evidence?

Uşūlīs have mentioned some signs of recognition of the literal meaning the most important of which being preceding (al-tabādur [q.v.]) and incorrectness of divesting (‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb). By ‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb is meant that divesting a term of a meaning is not correct. To exercise this sign, let us consider the example of the term “lion.” We know that this termis used
for a specific animal literally and for a brave man figuratively. Since you cannot divest “lion” of that animalwhile
you can do that of a brave man, ‘adam şiĥĥat al-salb is a sign which indicates the literal meaning of the term lion.

•al-Amāra
(Authorized Conjectural Proof)

Uşūlīs mostly use the term amāra (lit. sign) intending al-żann al-mu‘tabar (the valid conjecture, i.e., the conjecture which is considered and made an authoritative proof by the divine lawgiver) and this may cause confusion that those two terms have the same meaning, while they do not. That usage is in fact a figurative one and not making another meaning for the word amāra. The literal object of denotation of amāra is whatever considered and made valid by the divine lawgiver because of its causing conjecture, such as the single transmission, and appearances. Here, either the name of cause, i.e., amāra, is used for its caused, i.e., conjecture, or that of the caused is used for itscause
as it is amāra that causes conjecture. Amāra is figuratively called valid or particular conjecture because it always or mostly causes conjecture typically for most people - and that is why it is called typical conjecture (al-żann al-naw‘ī). Since amārais made
valid and authoritative proof by the divine lawgiver because of that, it will be an authoritative proof for all people even though it may not cause an actual conjecture for some of them. Hence, if an actual conjectureis not actualized
by amāra for someone he should also follow it.

However, itshould be noted
that in books of uşūl all such terms as “the particular conjecture,” “the valid conjecture,” “the authoritative conjecture,” and the like are used while their cause, i.e., amāra is intended. It should also be borne in mind that the best English equivalent to amāra is “the authorized conjectural proof.”

On the other hand, the term amāra does not include practical principle (→ al-aşl al-‘amalī), but rather is contrary to it;
for the jurist can refer to practical principles where there is no authorized conjectural proof, i.e., where he finds no authoritative proof for the actual juristic precept. Amāra proves its object, but the practical principle does not. Practical principles do not indicate the actuality; they are references to which the duty-bound refers when he is in the state of perplexity and doubt with regard to the actuality - they are at most excusers for the duty-bound.

•al-‘Āmm
(General)

General is among clear,self evident
concepts which need no definition but lexical explanation for the sake of bringing the meaning closer to the mind. By general is meant a term whose concept covers whatsoever capable of being conformable to its designation in realization of the judgment. A judgment, too,is sometimes called
general due to its covering all instances of the object, the object of burden, or duty-bound.

With regard to direction of a judgment to a general, generality is divided into three kinds: al-‘umūm al-istighrāqī (the encompassing generality), al-‘umūm al-madjmū‘ī
(the total generality), and al-‘umūm al-badalī (the substitutional generality) [qq.v.].

•al-Amr
(Command)

By al-amr (the command; Pl. al-awāmir) is meant wish (in the sense that one wants something to be done: al-ţalab) which, in turn, means to express will (al-irāda) and desire through speech, writing, pointing, or the like; whether by such terms as “I command you” or by an imperative. Thus, the sheer will and desire withoutbeing expressed
in some way is not called wish. However, any wishis not called
command, but a specific one, that is, wish of superior from inferior. Hence, superiority is considered in the command, whether the superior demonstrates his superiority or not, and whether he uses an imperative (or uses the verb “command”) or not - the only point is that he should somehow express his wish. On the other hand, wish of the one who is not superior, whether he is inferior or coequal, is not a command, even though he pretendssuperiority
or uses an imperative.

As for the denotation of the command, it is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. There are a variety of opinions in this connection the most important of which being obligation (al-wudjūb), preference (al-istiĥbāb), and the common point between obligation and preference. The truth, however, is that the command is apparent in the obligation - not conventionally, but because of judgment of the intellect. It is intellect's judgment that when the Lord commands us we must obey Him and must be provoked in order to fulfill our duty as servants, unless He declares that His command is not a matter of must and we are free not to do it.

•al-Aqall
wa’l-Akthar al-Irtibāţiyyain (Relational Least and Most)

This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-

iĥtiyāţ
[q.v.].An example of this kind that one knows that performing prayers is mandatory but wonders whether sūra, i.e., recitation of one sūra after sūra al-ĥamd, is part of prayers (in the dubiety concerning obligation →al-shubha al-wudjūbiyya), or one knows that sculpturing an animating objects is unlawful but wonders whether sculpturing the whole body of such objects is so or making some parts is also unlawful (in the dubiety concerning unlawfulness →al-shubha al-taĥrīmiyya).

•al-Aqall
wa’l-Akthar al-Istiqlāliyyain (Independing Least and Most)

This is a kind of doubt dealt with in the discussion of aşāla al-iĥtiyāţ [q.v.].An example of this kind is where one knows that one has not performed a number of one’s daily prayers but doubts the number of them and wonders whether they were six, for instance, or four (in the dubiety concerning obligation →al-shubha al-wudjūbiyya), or one knows that one ejaculated and knows that recitation of Qur’ānic sūras containing specific verses upon the recitation of which one must bow down is unlawful in such cases but wonders whether recitation of the whole sūra is unlawful or only that of the verse (in the dubiety concerning unlawfulness →al-shubha al-taĥrīmiyya).

•al-Aşl
al-‘Amalī → al-Uşūl al-‘Amaliyya

• Aşāla al-Barā’a (Principle of Clearance)

Generally speaking, when it is doubted whether certain act is prohibited by the divine lawgiver and there exists no proof, two opinions are presented by Shī‘a scholars: non-obligation of precaution by eschewing the act, and obligation of precaution by eschewing the act; the former being called al-barā’a (meaning clearance from obligation) declared by Uşūlīs and the latter called al-iĥtiyāţ (meaning obligation of precaution→ aşāla al-iĥtiyāţ) declared by Akhbārīs.
This principle is one of “practical principles”.[q.v.]

• Aşāla al-Ĥaqīqa (Principle of Literalness)

Aşāla al-ĥaqīqa is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which
is used when one doubts whether a certain speaker has intended the literal or the figurative meaning - where there is no contextual evidence while its existence is probable. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the literalness,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its literal and not figurative meaning, for to use a word figuratively needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

• Aşāla al-Iĥtiyāţ or Ishtighāl (Principle of Precaution or Liability)

Contrary to the principle of clearance (→aşāla al-barā’a) which was concerned with the case where one was doubtful whether or not one was charged with a burden, the principle of liability, which is one of “practical principles” [q.v.], deals with the case where one definitely knows that there exists some burden but wonders what one is charged with, i.e., the doubt is concerning al-mukallaf bi.The criterion for the doubt concerning “what one is charged with” is that the doubt is (a) over the very object of the duty, i.e., performing or eschewing which is wished either itself or its opposite, or (b) the object of object, i.e., an external affair as it is doubted - when, of course, one has already known that it is externally actualized.

In this case, precaution is intellectually obligatory, for the intellect judges that definite liability requires definite clearance, no matter the knowledge is detailed (→al-‘ilm al-tafşīlī) or summary-fashioned (→al-‘ilm al-idjmālī); and this is not, and cannot be, a matter of dispute.

• Aşāla al-Istişĥāb (Principle of Continuity of the Previous State)

When the duty-bound becomes certain of a precept or an object, then his precious certainty changes into uncertainty and he doubts subsistence of what he was certain of previously, he wonders what to do: should he act in accordance with what he was certain of, or should he not act so? The problem is that in both cases the duty-bound fears opposition of the actuality. However, there is a juristic principle in thisconnection which
removes such perplexity: the principle of istişĥāb, which is one of “practical principles”.[q.v.]
The Arabic term istişĥāb is derived from şuĥba meaning accompanying somebody or taking something with oneself. The expression, therefore, means to take what one has been previously certain of with one to the present time. That is why the best definition of istişĥāb is “to judge that what has previously been is subsistent.”

Constituents of Istişĥāb

In order for istişĥāb tobe called
istişĥāb or to be covered by the coming proofs for its authority, the following pillars should exist:

1. Certainty.
By thisis meant
certainty of the previous state, whether it is a precept or an object having a precept.

2. Doubt.
By thisis meant
doubt over subsistence of the definite affair. Itshould be noted
that the doubt includes both real doubt and invalid conjecture.

3. Conjunction of certainty and doubt, in the sense of simultaneous occurrence of certainty and doubt.This does not mean that origins of those two are simultaneous; for sometimes the origin of certainty is before that of doubt, such as where one is certain on Thursday that one’s cloth is religiously pure and on Friday doubts whether it is still pure or has become impure; sometimes the origin of certainty is after that of doubt, such as where one doubts on Friday whether one’s cloth is religiously pure and this doubt continues until Saturday when one becomes certain that one’s cloth has been pure on Thursday; and sometimes origins of those two occur simultaneously, such as where one becomes certain on Friday that one’s cloth has been religiously pure on Thursday and at the same time on Friday doubts whether that purity has been subsistent until Friday - all of these being subject to istişĥāb.
This component differentiates istişĥāb from “the rule of certainty (→qā‘ida
al-yaqīn).”

4. Unity of objects of certainty and doubt.
Ignoring the time, this means that the doubt is over the very thing that has been the matter of certainty.

5. The time of the definite affair preceding that of the doubtful one.
This means that the doubt must be over subsistence of what has already been existent in certain fashion. Should the time of the definite affair be subsequent to that of the doubtful one, which is called reverse istişĥāb (al-istişĥāb al-qahqarā),
it would not be an authoritative practical principle.

• Aşāla al-Iţlāq (Principle of Absoluteness)

Aşāla al-iţlāq is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which is used when a speaker has used an absolute term which has some states and conditions and one doubts whether its absolute meaning is intended by the speaker or he may have intended some of those states or conditions. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the absoluteness,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its absolute meaning not being limited to some states or conditions, for being limited needs contextual evidence which does not exist.

• Aşāla al-Takhyīr (Principle of Option)

This principle is one of “practical principles” [q.v.] which
is used where the generic compulsion is known while it is not known whether that compulsion is obligation or unlawfulness. In such case, since the burden is compulsory in any case on the one hand and obligation and prohibition are opposite burdens the duty-bound being unable to observe both, the intellect judges that he has the option to choose either of them. However, whether that option is primary (al-takhyīr al-badwī, meaning that one is allowed to choose at the beginning either of those two probabilities but one must observe that choice constantly without any change in mind) or continues (al-takhyīr al-istimrārī, meaning that one is always allowed to choose either of those two probabilities) is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs.

• Aşāla al-‘Umūm (Principle of Generality)

Aşāla al-‘umūm is one of “literal principles” [q.v.] which is used when a speaker has used a general term and one doubts whether it is still general or it has been restricted. In that case, it is said that “the principle is the generality,” i.e., one should principally treat the term as being used in its general meaning and not being restricted, for restriction needs contextual evidence which does not exist.