John C. Tidball (USMA, 1848) was
an artillery officer who is most noted for his command of the Second Horse
Artillery Brigade under Alfred Pleasonton. In 1863, he was appointed Colonel of
the 4th New York Artillery and commanded the II Corps of the Army of the Potomac
in the Wilderness in 1864 and served briefly as the commandant of cadets at West
Point from July to September 1864. From October through the end of the war,
Tidball commanded the IX Corps artilllery and became a brevet major general in
1865.

Shortly before his death in 1906, Tidball drafted his memoirs. Titled,
Remarks upon the Organization, Command, and Employment of the Field Artillery
During the War, based upon experiences of the Civil War, 1861-5., the work
was never published. This extract is from the copy in the holdings of the Fort
Sill Museum archives.

APPENDIX E
PERSONAL ARMAMENT OF BATTERIES

Battery drill regulations before and during the Civil war period prescribed a
saber for all men of a battery -- non-commissioned officers, drivers, and
cannoneers alike, but this saber was a heavy clumsy affair, exceedingly
inconvenient to the soldier at all times but particularly so at such times as
required most activity.
When volunteer batteries came into service they, too, adopted the saber; but as
campaigning progressed this weapon was cast aside by both volunteers and
regulars, except only in instances when it was retained for the use of
non-commissioned officers. A very little active field service proved it to be
entirely useless as a weapon and so cumbersome as to interfere with the
performance of duty required of artillery soldiers. It was so superfluous that
the War Department made no attempt to improve it, either in weight or model.
With such qualities it was soon abandoned, not, however, by any form or official
order but by simple disappearance. On the march it soon found its way, with
other trash of its kind, to the caissons or carriages of the pieces, where
battered, broken, and rusty, it was carried along as trash until such time as it
could be brought before a duly authorized inspector for formal condemnation to
be dropped from the property returns of the battery; or, more frequently, it was
eliminated from the returns by the remark, “lost in action”.
The sabers retained for non-commissioned officers re used more as badges of
authority than as weapons. Non-commissioned officers not thus armed were
supplied with revolvers, certainly a very great improvement on the saber.
The first battery equipped as horse artillery completely discarded the saber and
adopted entirely the revolver for all of the men. Other batteries, following as
horse batteries, adopted the same custom. But it was soon discovered that
revolvers were of no practical use for men of a battery, even for horse
batteries, and in a little while they, too, fell out if use except for
non-commissioned officers who still retained them as badges of authority than
for actual use as weapons.
The revolver, while not as objectionable as a saber is still an encumbrance to
the soldier; is more difficult to keep in serviceable condition; is liable to
theft and loss from many causes; and being without practical use is quite
superfluous as a piece of equipment.
The fundamental idea suggesting that the men of field batteries be individually
armed arises from the supposition that the battery may be caught without the
protective support of the other arms of the service and thus fall as easy prey
to the enemy. All of which might possibly occur with a carelessly conducted
expedition, or even in an army corps marching in hostile territory without
ordinary precautions. But where such conditions exist no amount of personal
armament will suffice to correct the evil. When batteries fall under incompetent
commanders whether of army corps or of small expeditions, they must take their
chances.
Batteries do not operate in the field without other troops. In a general sense,
all the troops about them, whether a single battalion or an army corps, become
their supports, and. reciprocally, they are supports to such troops. They each
do their proper share of the battle with their own specific arms, using them in
such a manner as to be most effective.
In spite of everything to the contrary, batteries will sometimes be lost in
battle, even by the victorious party. But to attempt to prevent it by such
ridiculous measures, such as the use of sabers and revolvers, is to tempt fate.
It is sometimes supposed that batteries require arms for their camp guards.
Nothing is more erroneous. A driver’s whip in the hands of a sentinel at the
picket line is far better for preserving order among the horses than a saber and
revolver; and, as to the sentinels of the battery park, their function as
watchmen are performed as well without as with arms. To the eye of the amateur
soldier these suggestions may seem highly unmilitary, but it must be remembered
in time of war all that is not actually useful should be discarded.
The issue of battery armament received serious consideration by a board of
battery commanders who but a short time previous to the outbreak of the Civil
War, prepared the drill regulation of that period. These officers, all Mexican
War veterans, and some with more recent experience in the Utah Expedition, were
imbued with the idea that batteries should be able to take care of themselves
under any and all conditions, and although divided in opinion as to the kind of
arm for the men of the battery, they compromised on the saber, which proved to
be entirely useless. At the time, the board did not imagine a war of the scope
of the Rebellion, and this explains their selection of the weapon.
While hand weapons of any kind are useless for a battery on campaign, there are
useful for some garrison purposes; drills to ensure a soldierly bearing in the
men, for example. For this, though, both the saber and the rifle are inferior to
the infantry rifle or cavalry carbine. In this connection it should be mentioned
that small arms target practice is a highly useful means of making artillerymen
expert in aiming their guns. Such practice not only sharpens the eyesight but
aids in recognizing distant objects. It helps in estimating distances and every
artilleryman should be thoroughly drilled in all such matters.
The cavalry carbine is almost equal to the infantry rifle for all the foregoing
purposes and therefore suggests itself as a suitable arm to be issued to the man
of a battery for garrison purposes; never, however, as an arm to be taken to the
field for campaigning. A broad distinction should be made between garrison and
field service.
Recruits for batteries in the field should be thoroughly drilled and instructed
in the foregoing points at camps of instruction before being sent to batteries,
for in the field there is little or no opportunity for such instruction. This
matter was very much neglected in all armies of the Civil war. No attention was
given to target practice at all, even for the infantry, and thousands of men
fired their first shot in battle, and artillerymen were even worse off in
practical knowledge of their guns. All of their preliminary instruction was
confined to the school of the Piece and to some battery maneuvers. They received
no instruction in target practice or in the exercises leading to it. Even under
these adverse conditions, many of the men became passably expert in using their
guns and greatly assisted in making the batteries efficient.
There was no military head at the War Department to direct such matters, and
suggestions from the field tended to be ignored.
A saber for a soldier on horseback certainly adds to his martial appearance. The
same weapon attached to a soldier trudging by the side of his piece on the march
adds nothing to his martial appearance and the evident uselessness of his weapon
makes him appear ridiculous. Even when mounted on an ammunition chest with his
saber by his side, the cannoneer appears ridiculous.
A strong sheath knife, something after the Bowie pattern, is a most convenient
thing for an artilleryman to carry. It comes in handy for many purposes about
the camp or on the march; does not encumber the soldier, and when attached to
his belt does not detract from his appearance. The roman cutlass, experimented
with at one time for such a purpose was too heavy and awkward to give
satisfaction. It was neither sword nor knife.
Mention has been made of the camps of instruction for the preparation of troops
for the replenishment of batteries in active campaign and in this connection,
although not directly tied to the subject of personal weapons for artillerymen,
it may be remarked that such camps, had but little development during the Civil
War. The result was that troops fresh from civilian life and entirely unfamiliar
with the duties of a soldier, were hurried to the field and expected to
immediately perform the service and to accomplish the deeds of the trained
soldiers; a condition most hurtful to the armies and to the cause.
The entire system of recruitment on the Federal side was defective in the
extreme -- so defective that it has been impossible, after years of labor by
statisticians for the war Office to compile more than a very rough estimate of
the actual number of troops put into the field. Calls for troops were spasmodic,
usually in response to a dire emergency when additional troops were needed to
avert some calamity.
Under such methods, armies, becoming depleted in the midst of a campaign, had to
halt until such time as they could be replenished, even by fresh troops raised
under an emergency call.
Under this system camps sprang into existence all over the country. Each state
had one or more, but in general they were mere camps of rendezvous for the
assembling and mustering in of their respective quotas. They were in no sense
camps of instruction. The levies assembled at them were hastily equipped, and
taking on the semblance of soldiers hurried to the front picking up as they went
what they could of the rudiments of their new profession.
While this was the case generally of all troops, the field artillery fared a
little better, for as the war advanced, camps were created and assumed a greater
degree of stability. They served in great measure as camps of instruction as was
the case of Camp Barry near Washington. After the Army of the Potomac had taken
to the field, Washington continued as a grand depot for outfit, and Camp Barry
became a place of concentration for batteries organized in the various states
east of the Alleghenies, and there were sent their men and officers to receive
their guns, horses, and the other requirements of a field battery. This required
but little time; after which the batteries were sent industriously to work
acquiring the rudiments of drill. This instruction did not reach the point of
target practice with the guns of the battery or of any other battery. The
batteries were thus deprived of the prime essential for efficient service
against the enemy. Economy in ammunition was the primary argument against it.
Camps similar to that at Washington were established at various points in the
west, to supply batteries operating in that region. To all such camps batteries
were sent from the field which required refitting and recuperation. These camps
also served as depots from which batteries could be supplied for expeditionary
enterprises, one of the great features of the war. This was particularly true of
camp Barry.
In many ways they proved themselves an essential factor for the maintenance of
armies in the field in a good state of efficiency; showing them to be one of the
first things to be established at or prior to the outbreak of hostilities.