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Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression, Volume II, Chapter XV
[Page 389]
Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between
the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top level with respect to
antipartisan warfare (3711-PS) is sworn to by Wilhelm
Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in
the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1946:
"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History
Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1946.
"Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state
that I remember the following from my knowledge of the
documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as
from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters
with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's
appointee for the compilation of the history of the
war.
"Counterpartisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces
to handle this matter.
"In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan
warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations
Staff of the OKW had
[Page 390]
to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations
Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific
officer was assigned the development of counter-
partisan warfare as his special job. It proved
necessary to conduct extensive operations against the
partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as
Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long
while threatened to cut off the lines of communication
and transport routes that were necessary to support the
German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report
concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in
occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone
from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during
that period, causing among other things, the loss of
from 200 to 300 locomotives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was
conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-
known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and
communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being
partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question
that these facts must have been known to the leading
officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the
Army's General Staff. It was further well-known that
Hitler believed that the only successful method of
conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel
punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in
Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to
Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of
the Russian SS Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the
German side."
"(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
"Retired Captain of the Reserve" (3711-PS)
The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were
made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler's headquarters with
respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively
that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that
the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully
aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same
is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who
attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the
equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made
three statements (3713-PS, 3714-PS). Roettiger was Chief of
Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group
Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:
"As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to
June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th
Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially
with antipartisan warfare. During these operations the
troops received orders from the highest authority, as
for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods.
These operations were carried out by troops of the Army
Group and of the Army, as for example security
battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were
issued through official channels, only a few prisoners
were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political
commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports
was very high in comparison with our own losses. From
the documents which have been shown to me I have now
come to realize that the order from highest authorities
for the harshest conduct of the antipartisan war can
have been intended to make possible a ruthless
liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by
using for this purpose the military struggle of the
army against the partisans." (3713-PS)
Roettiger's second statement reads: "Supplementary to my
above declaration I declare:
"As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-
in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many
times not to wage war against the partisans more
severely than was required at the time by the position.
This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation
of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a
surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we
necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since
very many of them could very well be used as members of
native volunteer units against the partisans.
"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans
there was propaganda directed at the. partisans and
also at the population with the object, by peaceful
means, of causing them to give up partisan activities.
For instance, in this way the women too were
continually urged to get their men back from the
forests or to keep them by other means from joining the
partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the
spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as
cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then
from time to time were partisans in evidence at times
when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from
neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account
on the orders of the Army Group to give up security
forces to the neighboring army to the south.
"(signed) Roettiger" (3713-PS)
[Page 892]
Roettiger's third statement reads:
"During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of
staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD
units were attached in the beginning, apparently for
the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-
line areas. It was clear that these SD units were
causing great disturbances among the local civilian
population with the result that my commanding officer
therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army
group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units
to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place
immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was
that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution
of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as
to threaten the security of the Army in its combat
areas because of the aroused civilian populace.
Although in general the special tasks of the SD units
were well known and appeared to be carried out with the
knowledge of the highest military authorities, we
opposed these methods as far as possible, because of
the danger which existed for our troops.
"(Signed) Roettiger" (3714-PS)
An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the
Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March
1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected
partisans to concentration camps in Germany (1786-PS). It
appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly
concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment
for suspected partisans, without at the same time
obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied
territories:
"The General Quartermaster [General Quartiermeister]
together with the Economic Staff (East)
[Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees
should be sent either to prison camps or to 'training
centres in their own area,' and that deportation to
Germany should take place only when the deportees are
on probation and in less serious cases.
"In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff
[Wehrmachtfehrungstab] this proposal does not take
sufficient account of the severity required and leads
to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the
'peaceful population' which has been called upon to
work. He recommends therefore transportation to
concentration camps in Germany which have already been
introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and
which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces
[Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province
of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces
[Ober-
[Page 393]
kommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan
helpers an(l suspects who are not to be executed should
be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police
Leader [Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer] and orders that
the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in
Germany' is to be made clear to the population." (1786-
PS)

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