Principles of British Foreign Policy 1815-1865

Marjie Bloy, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow,
National University of Singapore

It is possible to identify a number of consistent aims and objectives in British
Foreign Policy in the period between the end of the French Wars and the death
of Lord Palmerston: 1815 to 1865. These principles are as follows:

Maintenance of the peace in Europe

This was not altruism on the part of Britain but the result of important considerations.
There was a great 'war-weariness' throughout Britain and also in Europe. The
French Wars had lasted for twenty-two years and throughout that time, only Britain
consistently opposed the French. Other European nations had been defeated by
the French armies and/or had signed peace treaties with them. The people of
Britain remembered the effort that had been made by the country during the French
Wars; also the wars had cost Britain £600 million. Other — and perhaps
more important --considerations related to Britain's economic situation. Britain
depended on trade for survival. Her colonies provided raw materials and a ready
market for Britain's manufactures, invisible earnings — banking and insurance
— provided vast amounts of incoming cash. These things invariably suffered
in wartime so Britain wanted to see that diplomacy was the first weapon used.
After 1830 Britain was the 'Workshop of the World', needing raw materials to
maintain her growing industries and markets for the finished goods. She also
needed safe shipping routes. Palmerston said he wanted peace and prestige; he
used 'gun-boat diplomacy' as a last resort to clarify Britain's position and
to avert a more serious situation.

Status

In 1815, Britain was seen in Europe as the principle agent in defeating France
in three ways:

militarily, through the successful activities of the Royal Navy and then
Wellington's army in the Peninsular campaign and later in Europe

economically through providing gold to her allies and also providing supplies
to the allied armies

diplomatically through the establishment and maintenance of four coalitions

Britain was anxious to enhance her European status after Waterloo: she saw
herself as a major force and wanted to 'count for something' on the international
scene. Of all the European nations, Britain's political system was the only
one that had remained intact throughout the French Wars. Other crowned heads
had been removed from their thrones; countries had had their systems of government
overturned and replaced, sometimes several times in the period. In Britain,
it was felt that only Britain was stable enough to pull Europe together again.
Also, Britain had no ambitions in Europe so could act as the 'honest broker'.
At the same time, Britain could not afford to distance herself from Europe because
of the proximity of potentially huge markets and the fact that continental instability
invariably impacted on domestic affairs.

Maintenance of the balance of power in Europe

Britain adopted this principle in an attempt to prevent the domination of Europe
by any one Power. In the past and at various times different nations had dominated
Europe: Spain, France, and Austria-Hungary in particular. The Treaty of Paris
in 1815 and the settlement agreed at the Congress of Vienna
ensured that there were no obvious winners or losers from the French Wars. Britain
wanted to maintain the status quo of 1815. Britain also wanted to balance
constitutional regimes against autocracies. In 1815 more territory in Europe
was controlled by autocratic rulers than by constitutionalists, therefore wherever
possible, Britain encouraged the spread of constitutionalism, especially in
littoral countries: Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. [A 'littoral'
country is one that has a coastline]

Cautious containment of France

Britain wanted to contain France through co-operation with the other Powers.
This was a priority in 1815 and was a policy that was shared by all other European
nations. Later it became a British prejudice under Palmerston, who failed to
see the rise of Prussia. Britain was almost paranoid about possible French expansionism,
whether it was diplomatic, territorial or through influence. Britain tried to
keep France pinned down within her borders because France was seen as the most
dangerous nation in Europe. This policy towards France was rather limited and
was maintained for far too long: by about 1850 the Foreign Office was virtually
blind to the rise of Prussia, which was a greater threat to the peace and stability
of Europe than France. Bismarck and Prussia were able diplomatically to hoodwink
Britain

A policy of cautious colonial expansion

This was an example of the Foreign Office being 'in tune' with the Department
of Trade. There was no suggestion of 'British imperialism' as yet — imperialism
has strong overtones of ideology and politics as motives for the acquisition
of territory, such as the 'Scramble for Africa'. The early Nineteenth Century
saw the growth of British overseas possessions for bases and markets, or as
an extension of influence, for example in South Africa or the Far East, through
the extension of trade. Britain needed to expand the markets for British goods
and also to develop more sources of raw materials.

This was carried out by the

physical acquisition of territory — usually islands as bases — as at the
Congress of Vienna when Britain acquired or kept Heligoland, Malta, the Ionian
Islands, Ceylon

extension of diplomatic influence with the motive of expanding markets.
For example, Canning's recognition
of the South American republics may be seen as part of this policy. There
was little physical presence by Britain. This method became more important
as free trade developed.

A market-conscious foreign policy developed as the Industrial Revolution speeded
up because of the increased need for cheap raw materials and overseas markets,
but not as imperialism, because imperialism costs money and therefore becomes
a liability.

A consciously naval policy

The navy was Britain's trump card, and foreign policy was dominated by the
Royal Navy. British power and prestige was strongest in areas that the navy
could reach. Often, British success in diplomacy can be gauged by the use of
the navy. Sea power was very important and the Royal Navy was the right hand
of the Foreign Office, although secondary to diplomacy: the use of the navy
was not necessarily aggressive.

A conscious promotion of constitutional states in Europe

Britain wanted to help other nations to have constitutions similar to that
of Britain, but wanted it especially in the littoral states such as the Netherlands,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece. Britain helped with advice and even
militarily on occasion. Britain's aim in doing this was to help to develop her
own trade. It was thought that constitutional governments would have similar
outlooks and ideas, and would be easier with which to negotiate. Britain also

felt that it would encourage peace

thought that it would provide allies

thought that it would balance autocracy, which was the dominant system of
government in Europe in 1815

By 1865 Britain had played a major part in setting up constitutional monarchies
in almost every European littoral state from Belgium to Greece. These countries
provided a barrier to central and eastern European autocracies. Also, the Foreign
Office considered trade and income for Britain by using the physical support
and presence of the fleet and army or by utilising her diplomatic influence
to encourage constitutional governments. Britain, as the most democratic state
in Europe, was generally tolerant towards Liberal Nationalism and had sympathy
for the aims of the Liberal Nationalists. After 1832, Britain was even more
democratic, following the passing of the Reform
Act; by the 1850s, as the idea of a second Reform Act began to develop,
Britain had even more empathy towards Liberal Nationalism.

Britain had an increasing sensitivity towards Russia and the 'Eastern Question'

Turkey — the 'sick man of Europe' — got weaker and the 'Russian bear' became
more of a threat in the Straits and the Mediterranean. British sensitivity was
enhanced because of economic reasons: trade in the Mediterranean and the overland
route to India was threatened by Russia's interest in Turkey. This eventually
led to the Crimean War.

This was 'part and parcel' of Britain's increasing sensitivity towards Russia
and often involved restraining Russian attempts at expansion into the Ottoman
Empire. However, supporting the Sultan did run the risk of producing a weak,
reliant Turkey. Britain's sensitivity over the Eastern Question increased in
the Nineteenth Century because India became more important, especially for cotton
goods. Britain's trade routes had to be protected: the Suez Canal was not opened
until 1869. As conflicting aims between Britain and Russia grew, so did the
likelihood of hostility. The alliance of 1815 degenerated into the enmity of
1853.