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I " if 'S
y
ESTABLISHED 1S77.-NEW SERIES.
WASHINGTON, D. 0., THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1882.
VOL. II-r?0. 10.-WHOLE NO. 62,
i?
uu,
The History of Longstreet's Campaign
Against Burnsidc.
IMPORTANT MOVES.
Burnside Moves from Lenoir
towards EJnoxvilLe.
FIGHT AT CAMPBELL'S STATION.
Longstreet Fails to Gain the
Rear of the Union Army.
Cont inutd from last vcth.
General Burnside, having obtained almost
undisputed possession of East Tennessee, con
cluded, about the 1st of November, to place his
army in winter quarters at Lenoir's Station.
The Ninth Corps, under command of Brigadier
General K. B. Potter, was located in a forest of
second- owth pines near the station, which in
a short lane was converted into a village of
comfortable log-houses, in which tho troops
prepared to make themselves as comfortable as
possible.
Map of East Tennessee.
Colonel Chapin's brigade of General "White's
division of the Twenty-third Army Corps was
stationed midway between Lenoir's and Lou
don, with pickets on the Holston. Mott's bri
gade of the same division was posted at King
ston, on the extreme right flank of the line.
General Parke, acting as chief of stafT of tho
department, had his headquarters at Knoxvillc,
while General Burnside, and Generals Manson
and Potter, in command of tho Twenty-third
and Ninth Corps, established their headquarters
at Lenoir's. General Sanders's division of cav
alry was posted by brigades at points south of the
Holston, while General Ilascall's division and
Hopkins's brigade of the Twenty-third Corps,
a detachment of dismounted cavalry, and a few
skeleton regiments of Tennessee troops held
the defenses at Knoxvillc.
" THE PROPOSED CAMPAIGN".
About this time a camp rumor reached Gen
eral Longstreet that his corps had been desig
nated for a movement against Burnside. The
rumor developed into an order to report at the
headquarters of General Bragg on the 3d of
2vo ember, where, in consultation with Gen
erals Breckcnridgo ami llardee, a plan was
agreed upon which promised success. Long
strict urged that 20,000 men moving rapidly
might strike a swift and terrible blow and re
turn to the main army at Missionary Bidge
before the object of the expedition could become
known to their antagonist.
To effect the withdrawal of so large a force
unperccived, Longstreet urged the necessity of
retiring the main lino to a strong position be
hind the Chickamauga, in the rear of which the
force designated for the expedition could be
detached without attracting attention from the
Union lines. In this, however, ho failed to
make any impression upon tho mind of the
cjmmanding-geueral. McLaws's and Hood's
divisions, 12,550 strong, were designated as the
force with which to execute the movement.
General Longstreet argued the importance of
the expedition, and that its success depended
upon its overpowering strength, stating hih
conviction that the two divisions referred to
we re too weak to operate with that promptness
which the occasion required. The- consulta
tion ended with orders for him to begin his
preparations for the campaign.
longstreet's advance.
General Longstreet at once issued orders for
the withdrawal of Alexander's battalion or
artillery, and gave the order to McLaws to
withdraw his division from its positiou on
Lookout Mountain under cover of night, both
commands to proceed to Tyner's Station and
take tho cars for Sweetwater. Hood's division
and Snyder's artillery were withdrawn the fol
lewingjihjlit, their jdaco in. the line of invest-
SIEGE OF K10XYIL
r j
Hiymi 'mm
! 5.. h I t&P lo. 1ltt
1 - I -
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w .3 sml LA
ment being supplied by other troops, auel met
tho cars at the tunnel cast of Chattanooga.
Like many other important movements on
both sides during the war, tho failure of this
may bo traced to the ncqlect of minor details.
He was entirely unacquainted with the coun
try, and was unable to procuro topographical
maps of tho proposed route over which his
troops were to march. Tho transportation was
so insufficient that he found great delay in get
ting his troops to Sweetwater, and, having no
control of it, hael no power to enforce specel of
movement upon the railroad officials. When
on tho point of leaving Chattanooga on the 5th,
it occurred to him that as General Buckncr
had been for nearly a year in command of the
district of East Tennessee he should bo pro
videel with maps of tho country, ho Avroto him
the following letter:
"Headquarters, Chattanooga,
"Nov. 5th, 1SG3.
fcS. B. Buckxer, Major-General.
"Dear Sir: I start to-day for Tyner's Sta
tion, and expect to get transportation to-morrow
for Sweetwater. Tho weather is so bad,
and I find myself so much occupied, that I shall
not be ablo to seo you to say good-bye. "When
I heard the report arounel camp that I was to
go to East Tennessee, I set to work at onco to
try and plan tho means of making tho move
with security and the hope- of great results.
As every other move hael been proposeel to the
general anel rejected or put off till time made
them more inconvenient, I came to the conclu
sion, as soon as tho report reachcel me, that
this was to bo the fate of our army, to wait
until all good opportunities had passed, anel
then in desparation to seize the least favorablo
one.
"As no ono had proposed this East Tenncssco
campaign to tho General I thought it possible
that wo might accomplish something by en
couraging his own move, aud proposed tho fol
lowing plan, viz.: To withdraw from our pres
ent lines and to withdraw tho forces now in
East Tennessee, the latter to give tho impres
sion to the enemy that wo were retiring from
East Tennessee anel concentrating near here
for battle or for some other movement, and
place our army in a strong concentrated posi
tion. Tho moment tho army was together,
mako a detachment of 20,000 to move rapidly
against Burnside and destroy him, and by con
tinued rapid movements to threaten tho ene
my's rear anel his communications to tho ex
tent that might bo necessary to draw him out
from his present position. This, at least, is a
tedious process, but I thought it gave promise
of some result, and was better than lying hero
destroying ourselves. Tho movement as I
proposed it would have left this army in a
strong position anel safe, anel would have mado
sure of tho capture of Burnside. That is, tho
army could spare 20,000 men if it were in tho
position that I proposed better than it coulel
spare 12,000, occupying tho lino that it now
does.
TnE force required.
"Twenty thousand men well handled coulel
surely capturo Burnside and his forces. Under I
-l -.. - . Aif- i; j. 1
present arrangements, however, tho lines arc to
bo held as they now are and tho detachment is
to be, say 12,000. "Wo thus oxposo both to fail
ure and really tako no chanco to ourselves of
great results.
" Tho only notice my plan received was a
remark that General Hardee was pleased to
mako : ' I don't think that is a bad idea of
Longstreet's.' I undertook to explain tho dan
ger of having such a long lino under tho firo of
tho enemy's batteries, and ho concentrated, as
it were, right in our midst and within twenty
minutes march of any portion of our lino. But
I was assured that ho would 'not disturb us.'
" I repeated my ideas, but they did not even
receive notice. It was not till I had repeated
it, however, that General Hardee even noticed
me. Have you any maps that you can lend
mo? I shall need every thing of tho kind. Do
you know any reliablo people living near or
cast of Knoxvillc, from whom I might get
information of tho condition, strength, &c, of
tho enemy?
" I have written in such a hurry anel confu
sion of packing and striking camp, that I
doubt if I have mado myself understood.
"I remain, very sincerely, your friend,
"J. Longstreet,
" Licutenant-Gcncral."
General Buckner responded to this request
with what maps ho had, but took tho precau
tion to state that they wero inaccurate.
The serene composure with which General
Bragg assured his subordinate that they would
"not bs disturbed" was rudely broken when
Geary led his command up through the morn
ing mists of the 2-ith of November, and, sweep
ing three brigades from Lookout Mountain,
plantcel the Stars anel Stripes in triumph upon
its crest.
It is possible, too, that when a day later tho
routeel confederates were flying in dismay be
fore tho glittering steel of tho Army of the
Cumberland their commander may have re
called tho prediction of General Longstreet.
General Stevenson, whoso force at Sweetwater
was relieved by Longstreet's aelvanco and or
dered back to the main line, informed the lat
ter that Burnside's force in East Tennessee
was estimated at 23,000, a remarkably close
calculation to be made by the commander of
an opposing force, and strongly suggestive of
spies about Burnside's headquarters. Long
street seemed destined to meet obstacles at
every step of his march, even beforo he came
in sight of the Union lines. General Stevenson
had had no intimation of Longstreet's move
ment anel had providcel no rations for his com
mand. Indeed, ho had been ordered to send
those on hand back to Chattanooga.
In his official report, General Longstreet, after
referring to the total lack of preparation made
for his expedition, says: "As my orders were
to drive tho enemy out of East Tennessee or, if
possible, capturo him, I determined that tho
only possible chance of succeeding in either or
both was to move anel act as though I had a
sufficient forco to do cither. I endeavored,
therefore, to do as I should have done had the
20,000 men that I asked for been given me.
Had the means been at hand for making the
proper moves I should havo marched for the
rear of Knoxvillo via Morgantown and Mary
villc, anel gained possession of tho heights there
by forced marches. My transportation was so
limited, however, that I could notsparoawagon
to haul the pontoons for our bridge. The only
move that I could make under tho circum
stances was by crossing the river at Loudon
where the cars delivered tho bridge."
A CAVAT.RY EIGHT.
General Wheeler arrived with his cavalry at
Sweetwater on the 1 lib, and on tho following
day the entire command moved forward.
Wheeler's orders were to " move by tho most
practicable route to Maryvillc, and endeavor
to capture the enemy's forco at that point,
and otherwise make a diversion upon the
enemy's flank."
The force stationed at Maryvillo was Colonel
Frank Woolford's brigade, consisting of, tho
First, Eleventh, and Twelfth Kentucky cav
alry, numbering 1,12G officers anel men.
After detailing a forco to guard tho line of
tho Tennessee from the mouth of the Hcawas
seo to Loudon, Wheeler moved with tho re
mainder of his two divisions, tinder command
fit Crfmnfllc "rivf i?i owl A rnicfrnrirr rrnfi;(:!!lir I
- ..vv....j ..A.tiiiA im &.iL.;ikw.i,, .w-...-
the Tennessee at Mai toy's Ford at dark on the
13th, and making a night march to placo his
command in rear of Maryvillc. On approach
ing Maryvillc he learned that but ono regi
ment was at tho point, the Eleventh Kentucky,
and he determined to attack it. Pushing for
warel with a portion of Dibbrell's brigade, ho
came suddenly upon it while passing through
a wood, drawn up in lino of battle. Dibbrcll
chargeel and drove them somo distance, when,
being re-enforced by tho remainder of the bri
gade, a sharp fight ensued, resulting in driving
Woolforel across Littlo Bivcr with a loss of
over two hunelred killed, wounded, anel pris
oners. Emboldened by his success, Wheeler pushed
on across Littlo Iviver. On tho following morn
ing ho came upon Woolford, who was nowr re
enforced by Pennebaker's brigade at tho bridge
over Stock Creek. Woolford had partially
torn up tho bridge, and the Union forces wero
postcel in a strong anel elevateel position behind
a fenco enclosing a thick wood. In their front
woro open fields elcsccneling towards tho road
in which Wheeler was aelvancing. Their entire
force was less than 1,500. On their right was
the Holston Eiver, while their loft flank rested
upon tho steep side of a high ridge. Wheeler's
command had no sooner mado its appearance
in tho afternoon than Woolford opencel with a
rapid artillery firo upon tho head of his col
umn, wounding Major Buford, of Wheeler's
staff.
THE CAVALRY TURN RACK.
Whcelor now dismounted Martin's division,
anel, crossing tho creek under a heavy fire,
mado an attack upon the left of Woolford's
line, driving it back. While this was in pro
gress a forco hael been at work repairing the
bridge, and soon Armstrong's division crossed
it and chargeel upon tho right, which rcsultcel
in driving tho entire command back under
cover of tho guns in tho fortifications on tho
heights south of Knoxvillc, when Wheeler
turncel back.
Longstreet does not seem to havo placed a
very high cstimato upon this exploit of
Wheeler. Ho says: "Wheeler was detacheel
to surpriso a cavalry force of tho enemy at
Maryvillc .(reported to bo a brigade), capture
it, and move on to tho rear of Knoxvillc, and
endeavor to get possession of tho heights on tho
south side, and to hold them till our arrival ;
or, failing in this, to threaten the enemy at
Knoxvillc, so as to prevent tho concentration
of his forces around us beforo wo reachcel Knox
villo. Ho surprised tho forco at Maryvillc,
only about 400 strong, captureel a part, anel
elispcrsed tho remainder. Ho moved on to
Knoxvillc, but failed to get possession of any
of tho heights which commanded tho town, but
createel tho diversion in my favor."
WJieelerwas now ordered to cross tho Jlol-
crin oncl i.ilTt flirt -iivlif- fl.inlr if T .t! .. 1
SW AAVi. JUiii UliU iillV illllJl. Jl XAiUgaL'lWb O
army. As beforo mentioned, tho transporta
tion in Longstreet's command being limiteel to
barely enough wagons to carry rations and
ammunition, tho pontoon bridgo necessarily
found a lodgement at tho terminus of tho rail
road. Tho train conveying it was halted out
of jght of tho pickets of Chapin's brigado, and,
under cover of night, run up to the river bank
at Loudon, whonco it was conveyed to Huff's
Ferry, three or four miles below tho town,
where it was laid during tho night of the 13th
of November.
DISCOVERY OP THE MOVEMENT.
Information of tho movements of Longstreet
in his front reached Colonel Chapin on the
night of tho 13th anel a reconnoissanco was at
onco ordcrcel to Huff's Ferry, which demon
strateel tho ' fact that an advance across the
Holston at that point was conlemplateel. Gen
eral Whito at onco withdrew Chapin's brigado
to Lenoir's.
General Potter, in obedienco to orders from
General Burnside, destroyed tho mills and
factories and tho pontoon bridgo at Lenoir's
and sent his baggage train to Knoxvillc. About
noon of the 11th, Chapin's brigade, consisting
of tho Twenty-third Michigan, Thirteenth
Kentucky, Ono Hundred and Eleventh Ohio
and Ono Hundred anel Seventh Illinois in
fantry and two batteries of artillery, supported
by Fcrrero's division of tho Ninth Army Corps,
retraced its steps towards Loudon. About
four . m. Chapin's aelvanco encountereel Long
street's pickets about two-anel-ii-half miles
north of tho Holston, anel a brisk shirmish at
once ensued. Tho Thirteenth Kentucky, under
command of its boy colonel, (William E. Ilob
son,) advanced gallantly in connection with tho
One Hundred and Seventh Illinois, (Lieutenant
Colonel Lowry,) and drove tho confederate
pickets back two miles. "Up to this time,"
.says Chapin in his report, "the two regiments
had been about equally engaged, but now tho
enemy seemed to concentrate in front of the
Thirteenth Kentucky. The summit of tho hill
being wooded, mado gooel cover for the rebels,
and the side of the hill towaids the Thirteenth
Kentucky being bare, afforded no cover for
our men, who wero still in tho wootls at
the foot."
CHARGE Of THE THIRTEENTH KENTUCKY.
General White now came upon tho ground
and ordereel a charge to be made by the Thir
teenth Kentucky and Ono Hundred and Sov
cnth Illinois. "This was done," says Chapin,
"in most gallant stylo by both regiments, the
latter charging through the woods on the right
and tho Thirteenth Kentucky up the bare hill,
in the faco of a most galling fire, driving the
enemy off tho hill, which position was hold
until morning." In the meantime, Hartranft's
division had coino up and was sent to a point
opposite Loudon, where it remained until the
next afternoon, when the entire command was
withdrawn towards Lenoir's, Chapin's brigado
acting as rear-guard. Tho Union troops had
no sooner got into position at Lenoir's than, af
four p.m., Longstreet's skirmishers appeared
in their front. Longstreet complains, in his
report, of the muddy condition of tho roaels
which prevented him from taking advantage
of the retreat of the force in his front to punish
it severely. "The ground was so muddy and
tho hills so high almost mountains that we
wero not able to get ono division up and in
position iiiiiiiuu-iiJxiiLi.ui. porno oi me troops
were sent under guides after dark to get po.s
bcfcsion of the roads in the enemy's rear, and
about midnight General Jenkins aelvaneed his
brigade anel got possession of tho only ground
that the enemy could expect to occupy to give
battle. When daylight came it was found that
the guides had failed to put the troops upon
the right road and that tho enemy had during
the night abandoned a part of his wagon train
and made a hurried retreat." lielerring to
this movement, Potter sajs: "Tho enemy's
skirmishers appeared in strong forco beforo our
.losition Jit Lenoir's about four u. m
, and
woro
seemed disposed to push ua in. but
checked by a shell from Boomer's battery.
About this time. Colonel Biddlo (Seventy-first
Indiana mounted infantry) responded with
live or six hundred mounteil men and Gittings's
battery. I ordered him back to sizo the
junction of tho Kingston and Loudon roads,
near Campbell's Station, and to station a small
forco on tho road to Clinton and Concord.
General Hartranft having reported for duty, I
on.ercd him to move to the samo point with
whffi? force I had of the Second division and
the seven guns of Benjamin's and Van Schlcin's
batteries. Buckley's battery had already
staitcd for tho samo point, and Hartranft
moved about dusk. I soon received a report
from Biddlo that tho horse's in his battery had
given out anel that he had dismounted some of
his men and put tho horses to the guns, but,
ow;ng to the fearful state of the roads, ho could
ma'io no progress.
v. ESCAPING TROM LENOIR'S
'Ufartranft soon after reported that he could
not move his artillery, although ho had a
brigade of infantry assisting, and had been
obliged to destroy some ammunition and tem
porarily abandon limbers anel caissons. About
ten p. m. the enemy atteraptcel to drive in our
skirmishers, but were repulsed. Between four
and fivo a. m. I receiveel a number of mule
teams from General White, that wero given to
the artillery, when it at onco began to move.
About six a. m. of tho IGth Ferrcro's division
and Chapin's btigado of White's division,
Twenty-third Corps, moved from Lenoir's,
with Humphreys's brigado covering the rear.
"The enemy followed at once, but showed no
force or disposition to press us until within
two miles of Campbell's, when they began to
press heavily upon tho rear, but woro held in
dice k by Humphreys."
F-ndiug that it was impossible to move the
artillery over the road from Lenoir's to Camp
bell i Station with the artillery horses, General
Wlr to promptly burned his wagon train and
used the mules to transport the artillery.
If? will bo observed by tho military reader
that the movement of Longstreet to placo his
troojs between Lenoir's and Knoxvillc was
antiLipated by Burnsidc, whe, by promptly mov
ing Hartranft with his artillery to Campbell's
Station, opened the way for tho (movement of
tho ontiro command to the samo point at dawn
of day.
LONGSTREET OUTGENERALED.
No moro important movo was made at any
time during the operations that preceded tho
siege of Knoxvillc. Immediately on tho ar
rival of Biddlo and SiglVied, Hartranft had
placd them in position, with a section of ar
tillery on tho Kingston road. After securing
all tho roads ho sent two hundred of Biddlo's
mounted men along tho Kingston road, with
orders to go until they found tho enemy, and
attack at onco. They had not far to go. Two
miles and a half from CampbolFs Station they
camo upon McLaws's advance. Finding that
Pors command had escaped him, Longstreet
at oeu ordered a vigorous pursuit by Jenkins's
eiivj'pa, wtilo McLaws aelvaneed on fcbv
A-&
road, with orders to " movo forward as
.ipirfly as po-siblo and cu-ioavor to intercept
the enemy at Campbell's Station." Longstreet
says " Jenkins's sharpshooters pursneel rapidly,
skirmishing nearly all tho timo and making
overy effort to forco tho enemy to mako a
stand, but diel not succeed in doing so until
after ho hael passeel Campbell's Station. Ho
escaped General McLaws also, anel took a strong
positiou cast of Campbell's Station." McLaws,
deceived by the cavalry into tho belief that it
was tho cover of a strong forco in his front,
eliel not attempt to push it until his force was
well up, thus affording time for tho romaindor
of Potter's force to gain position on tho Knox
villo road. Longstreet, now finding that his
attempt to turn Potter's right and gain tho
Knoxvillo road in his rear hael failed, elcter
mined upon a vigorous attempt to rout the
force in his front, and, if it escaped him at all
to send it into Knoxvillo in a demoralizcel
condition. Ho had a sufficient forco to war
rant tho expectation, about two to ono of his
opponent, 12,530 infantry anel artillery, against
(J.lfal. Longstreet says: "As soon as McLaws
got up ho was ordered to deploy threo of his
brigades in front of tho enemy, and to put his
other brigade upon a ridge on our loft, so as to
threaten tho enemy's right. At the samo timo
Colonel Alexander put his artillery in position,
and Gen. Jenkins was ordered withhisdivision
around the enemy's left, and upon arriving oppo
site tho cnomy's position to make an attack upon
that flank whilst General McLaws was aelvanc
ing against the front to follow Jenkins's attack.
McLaws's division advanced promptly anel
brought f ho enemy to a stand about a mile
towards his rear, in a moro commanding posi
tion. If General Jenkins could have mado his
attack during this movement, or if ho could
have made itaftcr tho enemy had takon his sec
ond position, wo must havo destroyed this force,
recovereel East Tennessee, and, in all proba
bility, captured tho greater portion of tho
enemy's forco. He attributes his failure to do
so to somo niisarrangenient of General Law,
commanding ono of his brigades. Beforo I
could get a staff officer to him to ascertain tho
occasion of his delay, night camo on and our
efforts ceased."
FIGIIT AT CAMPRELTS STATION".
General Potter's report corroborates that
of his antagonist. Ho says: "At 11 a. in.
tho enemy was pressing us heavily on both
roads and turning Hartranft's right. Hmn
phroys charged and drove them back on tho
Lcnuir road, Hartranft's forces holding them
back on the other. All the artillery and
trains having passed the junction of tho roads,
and Whito being in position beyond Aio creek
at Campbell's Station, in accordance with
orders, I prepared to withdraw, having first
placed Morrison's brigado of Fcrrero's division
bulow tho junction of tho two roads, with its
right and left extending to them, and senel
ing Biddlo and Gitting's section of artillery
to tho rear, followed by tho troops of Hart
ranft. and Fcrrero not in position." Having
all tho troops remaining on tho samo line,
General Potter now ordered them to retire, and
Ihevfull back slowly to their new position,
llumphroys firston tho left, followed bj- Morri
son and Sigfried, which, in the new position,
placed Christ's brigado on tho oxtromo right,
with Morrison next and Humphreys in sup
port of batteries, General Whito holding the
centre. Hartrantc was piaccet next, Jiolenug
tho Uft, with ono regiment in support of bat
teries and one, out of ammunition, in reserve.
Benjamin's battery was placed on tho right of
the ifnoxvillo road, with Gitting's on tho right
and Van Schlcin's and Buckley's in tho rear,
Boomer's battery being on tho left of tho road.
On a small hill, near Chapin's brigado of Whito's
division, tho Twenty-fourth Indiana battery
and llenshaw's Illinois battery, bclongiug to
that division, wero planted.
To be continued.'
T
The Mormons continue to sond missionaries
to Europe and to mako converts to their doc
trine by tho hundred.
A DEED OF DAM.
The True Story of the Capture of a
Rebel Railway Train.
A CLEVER SURPRISE.
That Twenty Minutes for
Breakfast at Big- Shanty.
SUDDEN AND SUCCESSFUL START.
Their Race with Death
What Came of It.
and
J?t Rev. Wm. ruiengcr.
The greater number of us arranged to pass
tho night at a small hotel aeljoining the Mari
etta depot. Beforo retiring we left orders with
tho hotel clerk to rouse us in time for tho north
ward bound train, eluc not long after daylight.
Notwithstanding our novel situation, 1 never
slept more sounelly. Good health, extreme fa
tigue, and tho feeling that tho die was now cist
anel further thought useless, made me sink into
slumber almost as soon as I toucheel the bed.
Others, equally brave anel determined, were
affecteel in a different way. Alfred Wilson
says:
"Xo man knows what a day may bring forth,
and tho very uncertainty of what that day's
sun would bring forth in our particular cases
was the reason that some of us, myself at least
of the number, did not sleep very much. Our
doom might be fixed beforo the setting of an
other sun. Wo might bo hanging to tho limbs
of some of the trees along the railroad, with an
enrageel populace jeering and shouting ven
geance because wo hael no more lives to give
up; or we might leave a trail of tire anel de
struction behinel us, and come triumphantly
rolling into Chattanooga and Huntaville, with
in tho Federal lines, to receive tho welcome
plaudits of comrades left behinel, anel tho
thanks of our general, and tho praises of a
grateful people. Such thoughts as these passeel
in swift review, anel were not calculated to
mako one sleep soundly."
As the hotel was much crowded, wo obtained
a few rooms in closo proximity, and crowded
them to their utmost capacity. Andrews noted
our rooms beforo retiring, that ho might, if
necessary, seek any one of us out for consulta
tion beforo wo roso. Porter and Hav-kias wero
unfortunately overlooked; they hid arrived
on an early train anel obtained lodging at some
distance from tho depot. Tho clerk failed to
havo them called in timo for tho morning
train, as they had ordered, and, greatly to their
regret and chagrin, they wero left behind.
This was a serious loss, as thoy were both cool,
brave men, anel Hawkins was the most experi
ciiccel railway engineer of our company. W.
F. Brown, who took his place in this work, was,
however, fully competent, though possibly
somewhat less cautious.
MORNING AT LAST.
Long before tho train was due, Anelrcws, who
had slept little, if at all, that night, glided from
room to room silently as a ghost, tho doors
being purposely left unfastened, anel aroused
tho slumberers. It seemed to some of us
scarcclj' a moment from tho timo of retiring
until he came thus to the bedside of each sleeper
in turn, and, cautiously wakening him, asked
his name, to provent the possibility of mistake,
and then told each one exactly the part he was
expected to tako in the enterprise of the day.
There was hasty dressing, and afterwards an
informal meeting held in Andrews's room, at
which nearly one-half of the whole number
were present, anel plans were moro fully dis
cussed. Then Marion A. Boss, ono of tho most
determined of the whole number, took the bold
step of advising and even urging tho abandon
ment, for tho present, of the whole enterprise.
He reasoned with great forco that under pres
ent circumstances, with the rebel vigilance
fully aroused by Mitchcl's rapid advance, with
guarels stationeel arounel the train we wero to
capture, as we hael learned would be the case at
Big Shanty, and with the road itself eibstructcd
by numerous trains, the enterprise was sure to
fail, anel would cost the lifo of every man en
gagcel in it. Andrews very gently answered
his arguments, and strovo to show that the ob
jections urgeel really weighed in favor of tho
original plan. No such attempt as we purposed
had ever been made, anel consequently would
not be guarded against ; the presence of a line
of sentinels ami of so many troopsat Big Shanty
would only tcnel to relax vigilance still fur
ther; anel the great amount of business dono
on tho road, with tho running of many tin
scheduled trains, woulel screen us from too closo
inquiry when wo ran our train ahead of time.
This reasoning was not altogether satisfactory,
anel some of tho others joined Boss in, a respect
ful but firm protest against persisting in such a
hopeless undertaking. But Andrews, speaking
very low, as was his wont when thoroughly
in earnest, declareel that ho hael once beforo
postponcel tho attempt, anel returned to camp
disgraced. "Xow," ho continued, "I will ac
complish my purpose or leave my bones to
bleach in Dixie. But I do not wish to control
any one against his own judgment. If any of
you think it too hazardous, you aro perfectly
at liberty to tako the train in the opposito di
rection and work your way back to camp as
you can."
This inflexible determination closed tho dis
cussion, and as no man was willing to desert
his leader, wo all assured him of our willing
ness to obey his orders to the death. I hael
taken no part in tho discussion, as I was not in
possession of sufficient facts to judge- of the
chanco of success, anel I wished the responsi
bility to rest upon the leader, where it properly
belonged.
ALL ABOARD.
The train was now nearly duo, auel wo pro
cecdeel to the station for tho purchase of tickets.
By tho time thoy had been procured not all
for ono place, as wo wished to lessen tho risk of
suspicion tho train swopt up to tho platform.
Hastily glancing at itxin tho early morning
light, anel seeing only that it was very long
anel apparently well filled, tho twenty adven
turers entered by eliffcrent doors, but finally
took their places in ono car.
From Mariotta to Big Shanty tho railroad
sweeps in a long bend of eight miles around
the foot of Kennesaw Mountain, which lies di-
rectlv between the two stations. This eleva
tion ianowBcarredall over with rebel intrench- I
ments, anel was tho sceno of ono of tho severest
contests of tho war. This, howovcr, as well as
tho wholo of the three moi:hs' struggle from
Chattanooga to Atlanta, camo a year and a
half later. At this time the nearest Federal
soldiers wero more than two hundreel miles
away.
When tho train moveel on and the conductor
came to take our tickets we observeel him care
fully, as we knew not how closely his fate anel
ours might bo linked together in the approach
ing struggle. Tho most vivid anticipation fell
far short of the reality. Upon the qualities of
that one man our success or failure hinged. Ho
was quite young not moro than twenty-threo
or four, anel lookcel like a man of resolution
aud energy. We noticcel that he. was also scru
tinizing us anel tho other passengers very
closely, and naturally feared that ho had, in
somo manner, been put on his guard. In fact,
as wo learncel long afterwards, he hael been
warneel that some of tho new conscripts who
wero reluctant to fight for the confedcracyjvcro
contcmplating an escape, anel might try to get
a rido on the cars. His orders wero to watch
for all such anel arrest them at once. But ho
did not think that any of tho men who got on at
Marietta looked in tho least like conscripts or
deserters.
Tho train ran slowly, stopping at several in
tervening points, and did not reach Big Shanty
until it was fully daylight. This station had
been selectcel for tho seizure, because the train
breakfasted there, and it was probable that
many of the employees and passengers woulel
leave it for their meal, thus diminishing tho
opposition wo might expect. Another most
important reason for the selection was the ab
sence of any telegraph office. But, on the other
hand, Camp McDonald hael been lately located
here, and a large body of soldiers somo ac
counts saiel as many as ten thousanel men
were already assembled. Their camp included
the station within the guarel-line. When An
drews and tho first party had been at Atlanta,
threo weeks earlier, few troops had yet arrived
at this point. The capturo of a train in tho
mielst of a camp of the enemy was not a part of
tho original plan, but subsequently becamo
necessary. It was certainly a great additional
element of danger, but it was not now possible
to substitute any other point.
THE DECISIVE HOUR ARRIVES.
The decisive hour had arrived. It is scarcely
boastful to say that the annals of history record
fow enterprises more bold and novel than that
witnessed by the rising sun of Saturday morn
ing, April 12, 18G2. Hero was a train, with
several hundred passengers, with a full comple
ment of hanels, lying inside a line of sentinels,
who were distinctly seen pacing back and forth
in close proximity, to be seizeel by a mere score
of men, auel to be carried away before the track
coulel be obstructed, or the intrueling engineer
shot down at his post. Only tho most careful
calculation anel prompt execution, concentrat
ing the power of the whole band into a singlo
lightning-like stroke, could afforel the slightest
prospect of success. In tho bedroom confer
ence every action was predetermined with tho
nicest accuracy. Our engineer and his assist
ant knew the signal at which to start; tho
brakesmen hael their work assigned ; tho man
who was to uncouple the cars knew just tho
place at which to make the separation ; the re
mainder of the number constituted a guard, in
two divisions, who wero to stand with ready
revolvers abreast of tho cars to bo seized, and
shoot elown without hesitation anyone who at
tempted to interfere with the work. Andrews
was to command the whole, and do any part of
the work not otherwise provided for. Should
there bo any unexpecteel hinelrance, we were to
fight until we either overcame all opposition
anel captureel the train or perishcel in a body. If
we failed to carry off our prize, we were inevi
tably lost ; if any man failed to be on board
when tho signal was given, his fate also was
sealed. A delay of thirty seconds after our de
signs became clearly known would have re
sulteel in the slaughter of the whole party.
When our train rolled up to the platform tho
usual announcement was shouted, " Big Shanty;
twenty minutes for breakfast!" Most fortu
nately for us, the conductor, engineer, firemen,
anel train-hands generally, with many of tho
passengers, poureel out, and hurried to the long,
low catiug-room which gave its name to tho
station. The engine was utterly unguarded.
This uncommon carelessness was the result of
perfect security, and greatly favored our de
sign. Yet it was a thrilling moment! Victory
or death hung on the noxt minute! Thero
was no chance for drawing back, and I elo not
think any of us hael the disposition. A littlo
while before, a sense of shrinking came ovor
the writer like that preceding a plunge into
ice-water; but with the next breath it passed
away, and left me as calm and quiet as if no
enemy hael been within a hundred miles. Still,
for a moment, wo kept our seats. Anelrcws
went forwarel to examine tho track anel seo
if there was any hindrance to a rapid rush
aheael.
ALL RIGHT, ROYS!
Almost immediately ho returned, anel said,
very quietly, "All right, boys; let us go now."
Thero was nothing in this to attract special ob
servation ; but whether it eliel or diel not was
now a matter of indifference. Tho time of con
cealment was passed. We rose, left the cars,
anel walkeel briskly to tho heael of the train.
With tho precision of machinery, every man
took his appointeel place. Threo cars back from
the tcuder the coupling-pin was drawn out, as
tho loael of passenger-cars would only havo been
an incumbrance. Wilson W. Brown, who acted
as engineer, William Knight as assistant, Al
freel Wilson as fireman, together with Andrews,
mounteel the engine, Knight grasping the lever,
and waiting tho worel for starting. The ap
pDintcel brakesmen threw themselves flat on
tho top of the cars. At a signal from Andrews,
the remainder of the band, who ltael kept watch,
climbeel with surprising quickness into a box
car which stooel open. All was well ! Knight,
at Andrews's orders, jerkcel open tho steam
valve, and wo were off! Beforo tho camp
guards or tho bystauders coulel do more than
turn a curious eyo upon our procecelings, tho
train was uneler way, auel wo wero safo from
interruption.
Tho writer was stationeel in tho box-car, and
as soon as all were in, wo pulled the doors shut
to guard against any stray musket-balls. For
a moment of most iutonse suspense after wo
wero thus shut in all was still. In that mo
ment a thousand conflicting thoughts swept
through our minels. Then came a pull, ajar,
a clang, anel wo wero flying awaj' on our peril
ous journey. Thoso who wero on the engine
caught a glimpse of the excited crowel, soldiers
and citizens, swarming and running about in
tho wildest confusion. It has been saiel that a
number of shots woro fired after us, but thoso
in the box-car know nothing of it, and it is cer
tain that no ono was injured. A widely-circu-lateel
picture represented us as waving our hats
and shouting in triumph. Nothing (so melo
dramatic took place. The moment was too
deejp and earnest, and we had too many perils
X---
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