See the author's extensive references to Russian-language (fn. 1) and English-language accounts (fn. 2) of the Kalamatiano case. Foglesong also discusses Kalamatiano in his America's War Against Bolshevism: United
States Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 114-123.

Foley, Robert T. "Easy Target or Invincible Enemy? German Intelligence Assessments of France Before the Great War." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 2 (Winter 2005). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]

From abstract: "For many years the assumption that Germany went to war in 1914 believing that the war would be short has remained unchallenged. However, recent research by Stig Förster has cast doubt on this traditional interpretation.... [This article] argues that German war planners did not view the French army as a serious threat and assumed the German army could defeat the French quickly and easily. Thus, German fears about a long war, if they did truly exist, must have come from the capabilities of Britain and Russia and not France."

The two former House speakers argue for establishing a permanent Committee on Homeland Security. Congress and the President created the DHS "to focus the government's counterterrorist efforts. Congress must now align itself with the new structure of the executive branch, or it will lose influence and DHS will lose focused congressional guidance at the most vulnerable early stages of its development."

"The author conducted a controlled experiment among a small sample of non-specialized analysts at four Unified Command joint intelligence centers to test the effect of applying a structured method to the qualitative analysis of an intelligence problem.... In brief, the author found that analysts who apply a structured method -- hypothesis testing, in this case -- to an intelligence problem, outperform those who rely on 'analysis-as-art,' or the intuitive approach."

On 31 July 2009, Chevron Mining Inc. donated 208 acres of land to the Navajo Code Talkers Association for a museum and veterans center. "Several hundred Navajos served as Code Talkers during the war.... They took part in every assault the Marines conducted in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945, including the battles of Guadalcanal, Saipan and Iwo Jima."

[WWII/FEPac/Navajo]

Fontaine, Judith
M. Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1990s: A Survey of College and University
Courses on the Subject of Intelligence. Washington, DC: National Intelligence
Study Center, 1992.

This book lists college and university courses taught in the United States (by state) and Canada, which specifically mention intelligence and have a substantial intelligence-related context. Eight selected syllabi are also presented, together with their required texts and additional reading lists. This is an indispensable "I-am-not-alone" publication for individuals teaching in the subject area. Clark comment: The above was written in the mid-1990s. Obviously, the field of intelligence studies has grown and even matured in the last 20 years, so the alone feeling comment is no longer as meaningful.

[RefMats/Teaching][c]

Fonzi, Gaeton.
The Last Investigation: A Former Federal Investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations Breaks His Oath of Silence. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994. [pb]

Clark comment: If he had not been demonizing David Atlee Phillips for 15 years, it would be easy to accuse Fonzi of beating up on someone unable to defend himself. As it is, the most that can be said is that Fonzi is consistent. This is yet another in the long line of "Bishop theory" (Phillips = Maurice Bishop, etc.) conspiracy arguments. Tiresome, at best, but certain to "inspire" others. Surveillant 4.1 notes that Fonzi's conspiracy "cabal"
includes Phillips, Richard Helms, E. Howard Hunt, Ted Shackley, and William
Harvey. He "adds newer facts from unreleased documents and undocumented
testimony to support his case."

Clark comment: The title gives no indication of the content of this book. Foote, an Englishman, was an agent and radio operator in the Rote Drei, a Soviet World War II espionage net operating out of Switzerland. Chambers notes that this is "Foote's version of events.... Werner disagrees violently with him."

For Pforzheimer, this is an "interesting early study ... [but] other writings have now caught up with some of Foote's errors and distortions." Aldrich, I&NS 6.1/212/fn. 4, says that Foote "inflated his own while attempting to attack [Alexander] Rado's personal integrity." After pointing to the controversy surrounding this book and its errors, Constantinides seeks to avoid discouraging potential readers by noting the value of Foote's "description of a Soviet network and of Soviet recruitment, cover, network financing, communications, and overall methods of operation."

Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 49-50, comments on reading this book early in his CIA career that it was "informative" and "had a lot of good information about what is called tradecraft -- the way espionage is conducted. He discussed how to compartment an agent, how to use a principal agent to run subagents, clandestine radio communications, and cipher techniques."

From "Abstract": "By examing the role of linguists in Y stations and at Bletchley Park..., the article explores the institutional language policies developed for intelligence, and the working practices of those with foreign language skills."

Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that the author argues that "during the interwar period intelligence was primarily a function of the military, and that the secret wars against Germany and the Soviet Union largely drove French intelligence."

According to Jackson, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), "[m]uch of the book is devoted to introducing the field of 'intelligence studies' to France as a serious academic sub-discipline." The authors "succeed brilliantly" in this undertaking.

Forcese, Craig. "Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection." Journal of National Security Law & Policy 5, no. 1 (2011): 179-210. [http://www.jnslp.com]

"Public international law rules pertaining to spying are ... a checkerboard of principles, constraining some practices in some places and in relation to some actors, but not in other cases in relation to other actors." Faced with a 2007 Canadian Federal Court decision, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) "has a choice: conduct extraterritorial spying without recourse to the courts, at risk of ultimately being called to account under domestic law, or honor the ... Court's construal of international law (and CSIS's jurisdiction) and pull in its truly international surveillance operations, potentially blinding the country's chief security intelligence agency."