Congressional Record: July 17, 2003 (Senate)
Page S9580-S9581
INVESTIGATING PREWAR INTELLIGENCE
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, for almost a week now the Senate has
been debating the appropriations bill for the Department of Defense.
Several amendments have been offered regarding the need to determine
the accuracy of our pre-war intelligence and the use of that
intelligence by the Executive--specifically, a reference in the
President's State of the Union message that has now been acknowledged
to be erroneous. I want to take a few minutes to comment on some of
these continuing questions regarding the accuracy of pre-war
intelligence which became a part of the public debate soon following
the invasion of Iraq. I have worked with Chairman Roberts to find a
bipartisan approach to reviewing these issues. On June 20 we reached
agreement on the terms of reference for what was by then an ongoing
inquiry. I had proposed a broader, more formal approach but after some
discussion agreed to proceed with a structured review and see where the
information led us.
The committee has been poring through the volumes of material
provided by the intelligence community and interviewing relevant
officials, and has held two closed hearings and one briefing.
But as this process has moved forward it has become increasing clear
that a business as usual, oversight review is not going to be able to
address our expanding appreciation of the scope of the problem. Every
day brings new information, often from the press, which requires us to
make sure that we have the right charter and organization for this
inquiry.
Tuesday it was the story, reported in the Washington Post, that a
four-star general was sent to Niger last year to inquire about the
security of Niger's uranium. According to the article, the general said
that he came away convinced that Niger's uranium stock was secure.
Obviously, there is much to be learned about this. Why was he sent?
What was his mission? Who was aware of the trip? And what happened to
the general's report when he returned?
This revelation follows on the heels of a week of accusations,
denials, admissions and recriminations among the senior members of the
administration's national security team about who was responsible for
language related to Iraqi uranium purchases appearing in the
President's 2003 State of the Union speech. By week's end, Director
Tenet had stepped forward to accept responsibility. His statement,
however, raised many other questions about how this information was
handled by those outside the intelligence community.
The credibility of the intelligence related to Iraq and Niger first
came to public attention in March when the IAEA determined the
documents supporting the charges to be fraudulent. I immediately asked
Director Mueller to have the FBI investigate the counterintelligence
implications of this revelation. Subsequently, Senator Roberts joined
me in asking the Inspectors General at the CIA and State Department to
investigate how this information was handled by the intelligence
community.
These investigations, however, will answer only questions of how we
came into possession of these documents and what the intelligence
agencies did with them. They cannot, because of the reach of these
investigative organizations, deal with the questions that have
dominated the public debate in recent days. How did information, known
to be dubious at best, find its way into the President's State of the
Union speech? Who is responsible for inserting the information? Were
reservations properly conveyed to senior officials? If not, why not? If
so, why were those reservations not heeded?
It seems clear that the White House staff played a key role in this
episode. Unless we follow the evidence wherever it leads, we will end
up reporting to the American people only part of the story. And the
Niger episode is just the first example of what we can expect as we get
further into this process.
I am committed to a complete, bipartisan investigation that covers
the full spectrum from collection to the analysis and use of prewar
intelligence about Iraq. I believe that the Senate Intelligence
Committee has the authority to conduct that investigation. But it has
to be willing to use the full authority that the Senate has given it,
or to ask the Senate if it needs any additional authority.
We should bite the bullet and authorize a formal investigation,
explicitly state that it will examine the full range of activities
concerning prewar intelligence--which includes the use of that
intelligence--and provide for the
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direction, organization and resources that will assure a complete and
probing examination of all facts.
In short, it is now clear that this is not an ordinary oversight
review but should be a full-fledged investigative effort, with a clear
charter and with sufficient staffing and resources. We must do whatever
is necessary to get to the bottom of this, and answer the fundamental
questions of how intelligence was used to support this war.
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