Arce v. Louisiana State

When
Nelson and Lazaro Arce decided to challenge the Louisiana
criminal justice system's treatment of the deaf, the
Court doubts that they anticipated having to navigate through
two of the murkiest waters in American law: federalism and
separation of powers. Yet this case raises weighty questions
about the federal government's authority to endow private
citizens with the power to haul a State into federal court
without its consent, and about the powers of executive branch
agencies to authoritatively interpret federal statutes-and
thus requires nothing less than a deep plunge into both
pools.

The
State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections (“Louisiana”), moves for
dismissal of Lazaro Arce's claims against it on the
ground that neither Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“Title II”) nor § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”)
provides a cause of action based on associational
discrimination.[2] Louisiana also requests dismissal of
plaintiffs' Title II claim on behalf of Nelson as barred
by sovereign immunity-a request that the Court construes as a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.[3]See Cantu Serv., Inc. v. Roberie,
535 Fed. App'x 342, 346 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs
oppose both moves.[4]

After
considering the parties' submissions and the applicable
law, the Court concludes that Lazaro's claims against
Louisiana warrant dismissal and that plaintiffs' Title II
claim on behalf of Nelson may proceed.

I.

According
to plaintiffs, Nelson Arce (“Nelson”) was a deaf
individual whose “express, preferred, and most
effective means of communication” was American Sign
Language (“ASL”).[5] Nelson's proficiency in
written English was allegedly
“limited.”[6]Lazaro Arce (“Lazaro”) is
Nelson's father.[7]

On
February 9, 2015, Judge Michael Mentz of the Twenty Fourth
Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish[8] sentenced Nelson
to two years of active probation and two years of inactive
probation for a drug-related offense.[9] As a condition of his
probation, Judge Mentz ordered Nelson to enter and complete a
Louisiana-approved in-house substance abuse treatment
program, and required Nelson to meet regularly with his
probation officer.[10]

Plaintiffs
allege that Nelson's probation officer was aware that
Nelson required a sign language interpreter to effectively
communicate, but never provided an ASL interpreter during her
meetings with Nelson.[11] Despite Nelson and Lazaro's
alleged “repeated requests” for a qualified
interpreter-one who could translate legal terminology and
concepts[12]-the probation officer relied on Lazaro
to interpret for Nelson.[13]

Because
his probation officer did not provide a qualified interpreter
at their meetings, Nelson was allegedly unaware of the full
terms and conditions of his probation. Thus, he did not know
that “leaving [Louisiana] to attend drug treatment as
ordered by [Judge Mentz] was a violation of his
probation.”[14]

When
Nelson's probation officer learned that Nelson had
enrolled in a California-based in-patient drug treatment
program, she filed a motion to revoke Nelson's
probation.[15] Judge Mentz granted the motion and
sentenced Nelson to 90 days in the Jefferson Parish
Correction Center (“JPCC”).[16] Nelson was
then incarcerated at JPCC from December 8, 2015, until March
7, 2016, during which time JPCC inmates were allegedly
entitled to two thirty-minute telephone conversations per
day.[17] JPCC did not have video phones, but did
have a teletypewriter (“TTY”), [18]which is a
device that enables deaf individuals to communicate by
telephone.[19]

According
to plaintiffs, JPCC officials either denied Nelson access to
the TTY machine or provided him access only once per day on a
number of occasions.[20] All the while, other JPCC inmates
regularly received two thirty-minute telephone conversations
per day.[21]

Further,
JPCC officials allegedly penalized Nelson twice during his
incarceration for violating the rules contained in “The
Inmate Handbook” (“Handbook”), which
details the behavioral expectations for inmates incarcerated
at JPCC.[22] Despite an alleged request by Lazaro
that a qualified interpreter communicate the Handbook's
contents to Nelson in ASL, Nelson never received an ASL
interpretation of the Handbook and thus did not understand
the Handbook's rules and regulations.[23] Plaintiffs
allege that Nelson never learned which rule he violated on
one of the occasions that he was punished.[24]

Nelson
was released from JPCC on March 7, 2016, and resumed meeting
with his probation officer.[25] Nelson's probation officer
continued to attempt to communicate with Nelson either
through Lazaro's interpretations or written
English.[26] The probation officer allegedly
suggested that it was Nelson's responsibility to secure a
qualified interpreter for their meetings if he wanted
one.[27]

In
response to these events, Nelson and Lazaro brought this
lawsuit against numerous defendants, including Louisiana,
alleging violations of Title II and § 504, and seeking
both injunctive relief and money damages. Since Nelson and
Lazaro's initiation of the case, the Court has dismissed
the claims against Jefferson Parish, [28]as well as the
claims for injunctive relief.[29] Moreover, in light of
Nelson's death on May 9, 2017, [30] the Court permitted Ana
Christine Shelton (“Shelton”) to be substituted
in Nelson's place in her capacity as the natural tutrix
of Nelson's two surviving minor children and as the
administratrix of Nelson's estate.[31]

II.

A.

Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
the dismissal of an action where the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. “A case is
properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass'n of
Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006,
1010 (5th Cir. 1998).

Any
party may object to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction “at any stage in the litigation, even
after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). So too may
the court raise the issue on its own initiative. Id.
Indeed, the court has an “independent obligation”
to ensure in every case that subject matter jurisdiction
exists. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94
(2010). If the court determines that subject matter
jurisdiction over an action is lacking, then the court must
dismiss the action. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514;
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

A court
may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
on any one of three different bases: (1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the
record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.”
Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir.
1986) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
413 (5th Cir. 1981)). Once the defendant has questioned the
court's subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
the burden of “proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the trial court does” possess the
requisite jurisdiction to hear the case. Patterson v.
Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).

Where
“a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with
other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack
on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281
F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). After all, “[f]or a
court to pronounce upon [the merits] when it has no
jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to
act ultra vires.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998).

B.

Under
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may move for judgment on the pleadings once the pleadings are
closed, as long as the party moves “early enough not to
delay trial.” “A motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard as
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doev. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008);
see also Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d
177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) case law in
the Rule 12(c) context).

Thus,
Rule 12(c)-like Rule 12(b)(6)-permits a court to dismiss a
complaint, or any part of it, where a plaintiff has not set
forth well-pleaded factual allegations that would entitle him
to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397,
401 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff's factual allegations
must “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other
words, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).

A
facially plausible claim is one where “the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. If the well-pleaded
factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, ” then
“the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).

Louisiana
moves for dismissal of plaintiffs' Title II claims on the
basis of sovereign immunity.[32] Moreover, Louisiana moves for
judgment on the pleadings as to all of Lazaro's
claims.[33]

Resolution
of the sovereign immunity question will involve addressing
the viability of Lazaro's Title II claims. The Court
therefore will structure its analysis around the issue of
sovereign immunity.

A.

The
Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Despite the
Eleventh Amendment's language targeting discrete
categories of Article III diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has fashioned a doctrine of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity defined by reference to “the
Constitution's structure, its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court.” Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); see alsoHans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); cf.
Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Tex., 410 F.3d 236, 240-41
(5th Cir. 2005) (“‘Eleventh Amendment
immunity' is a misnomer, . . . because that immunity is
really an aspect of the Supreme Court's concept of state
sovereign immunity and is neither derived from nor limited by
the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Sovereign
immunity operates as “a constitutional limitation on
the federal judicial power.” Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).
However, unlike other aspects of the federal courts'
subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity is waivable:
“a State may consent to suit against it in federal
court.”[34]Id. at 99.

In
addition, Congress may abrogate State sovereign immunity when
exercising at least some of its constitutional powers.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(holding that Congress has the power to abrogate State
sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); but see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla.,
517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that Congress does not have
the power to abrogate State sovereign immunity under the
Indian Commerce Clause). Abrogation requires “an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to
‘overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of
the several States.'” Pennhurst, 465 U.S.
at 99. “A general authorization for suit in federal
court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language
sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.”
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246
(1985), superseded by An Act to Extend and Improve
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 99-506, 100 Stat.
1807 (1986). If Congress wants to subject the several States
to federal jurisdiction, then “it must do so
specifically.”[35]Id.

B.

The ADA
is “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). “To
effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids
discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of
public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act),
public services (Title II), and public accommodations (Title
III).” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,
675 (2001).

Importantly
for present purposes, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment . . ., in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). To that
end, the ADA declares that “[a] State shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of
the United States from an action in Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction for a violation” of the ADA.
Id. § 12202. In 2001, the Fifth Circuit held
that this provision-although expressing Congress's clear
intent to abrogate State sovereign immunity-did not validly
do so with respect to Title II. Reickenbacker v.
Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 975 (5th Cir. 2001), abrogated
by Tennessee v. Lane, 546 U.S. 151 (2004).

That
holding, however, was itself abrogated by the Supreme Court.
See UnitedStates v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151
(2006); Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34. In other words,
Congress did validly abrogate State sovereign
immunity under Title II-at least in some cases:

In United States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
established a three-part test for addressing whether Title II
validly abrogates [S]tate sovereign immunity in a given case.
A court should consider “which aspects of the
State's alleged conduct violated Title II” and then
determine “to what extent such misconduct also violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.” If the State's conduct
violated both Title II and the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. If the
State's conduct violated Title II but did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court must then determine
“whether Congress's purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is
nevertheless valid.”

Thus, a
court first subjects a plaintiff's allegations to the
familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Id. at 498. Where
the allegations state a claim under Title II, but not under
the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must then consider whether
Congress's abrogation of State sovereign immunity in a
particular case exhibits “congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that
end.”[36]City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520 (1997); see alsoWells v.
Thaler, 460 Fed. App'x 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam).

IV.

The
Court will first consider “which aspects of the
State's alleged conduct violated Title
II.”[37]Hale, 642 F.3d at 498 (quoting
Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As a general matter, a viable Title II requires a
plaintiff to allege “(1) that he has a qualifying
disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of
services, programs, or activities for which the public entity
is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the
public entity; and (3) that such discrimination is by reason
of his disability.” Id. at 499; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

As far
as which aspects of Louisiana's alleged conduct toward
Nelson violated Title II for purposes of the
Georgia analysis, the parties are in unison: the
decision by Nelson's probation officer not to procure the
services of a qualified ASL interpreter for her meetings with
Nelson.[38] When it comes to which aspects of
Louisiana's alleged conduct toward Lazaro
violated Title II, however, the parties could not be farther
apart.

Lazaro-who
is not deaf or otherwise alleged to have a “qualifying
disability”- offers a theory of Title II (and §
504) liability based on the concept of associational
discrimination. In a nutshell, Lazaro alleges that Louisiana
discriminated against him on the basis of his
association with Nelson and because of
Nelson's “qualifying
disability.”[39]

For its
part, Louisiana argues that Title II (and § 504) does
not permit associational discrimination claims, relying
almost exclusively on a recent opinion out of the Northern
District of Georgia.[40] Acknowledging that a regulation
promulgated by the Attorney General to implement Title II
recognizes such claims, [41]see 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(g), Louisiana contends that the regulation is
unlawful.[42]Finally, in the alternative, Louisiana
argues that Lazaro has failed to state a claim of
associational discrimination against Louisiana under Title II
(or § 504).[43]

Where,
as here, an executive agency's regulation interpreting a
federal statute is called into question, the Supreme Court
has instructed courts to analyze the interpretation's
permissibility through the lens of what may amount to
administrative law's most consequential-and
controversial[44]-doctrine: Chevron.

A.

Under
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), a court confronts two
questions when reviewing an agency's regulation
implementing a statute that it administers.[45] 467 U.S. at
842. “First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
Id. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43.

Where a
court concludes that “Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, ” then it
“does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation.” Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843. “Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.”
Id. “[A] court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”
Id. at 844.

B.

The
Title II regulation challenged by Louisiana states: “A
public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal
services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity
because of the known disability of an individual with whom
the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or
association.” 28 C.F.R. § 35:130(g). Whether this
regulation is consistent with Title II is the question to
which the Court will now turn.

i.

The
Court will begin, as it must, with the statutory text. Title
II provides that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132. Title II defines a “qualified
individual with a disability” as “an individual
with a disability who, with or without . . . the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, [among other things, ] meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.” Id. §
12131(2).

In
other words, Title II's nondiscrimination provision
protects a specific and discrete class of individuals against
discrimination by public entities: those with a
disability. Discrimination against a
nondisabled individual by a public entity due to his
association with a disabled individual does not run
afoul of the provision's plain language. See A
Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cty., Md., 515 F.3d 356,
363 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “Title II
contains no express right to be free from discrimination
because of association with qualified individuals with
disabilities”).

Title
II further provides that its “remedies, procedures, and
rights” are available to “any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation
of” Title II's nondiscrimination provision.
Id. § 12133. Of course, only discrimination by
a public entity against a “qualified individual with a
disability” may result in a violation of said
provision. Id. § 12132; see Lightbourn v.
Cty. of El Paso, Tex., 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997)
(interpreting Title II's nondiscrimination provision to
require Title II plaintiffs to demonstrate, among other
things, “that they are qualified individuals within the
meaning of” Title II). Thus, a nondisabled person-who
is textually foreclosed from personally experiencing a form
of discrimination that violates Title II's
nondiscrimination provision-would seem equally foreclosed
from pursuing Title II's “remedies, procedures, and
rights.”[46] 42 U.S.C. § 12133.

Notwithstanding,
a number of circuits have interpreted Title II to permit at
least some organizations (or their operators) that experience
discrimination by public entities due to their association
with “qualifying individual[s] with a disability”
to seek redress under Title II. See Innovative Health
Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 47 (2d.
Cir. 1997) (concluding that a drug- and
alcohol-rehabilitation treatment center has standing to sue
under Title II), recognized as superseded on other
grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d
163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001); Addiction Specialists, Inc.
v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405-07 (3rd Cir.
2005) (same for the operator of a methadone clinic); A
Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 363 (same for the operator of
a methadone clinic); see also MX Grp., Inc. v. City of
Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 2002) (adopting
the relevant reasoning in Innovative Health as
“persuasive” in the context of an entity seeking
to open a methadone clinic). In reaching this conclusion,
these courts-like plaintiffs[47]-hone in on the phrase
“any person alleging discrimination on the basis of
disability, ” with a particular emphasis on “any
person.” 42 U.S.C. § 12133; see also 1
U.S.C. § 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act
of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the
words ‘person' and ‘whoever' include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals
. . . .”).

“Read
naturally, the word ‘any' has an expansive meaning,
that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever
kind.'” United States v. Gonzales, 520
U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 97 (1976)). Notwithstanding a
word's isolated meaning, however, one does not interpret
a text with any degree of accuracy by limiting the
interpretive enterprise to myopic examination of each of the
text's individual constituent words. See Roberts v.
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)
(“Statutory language . . . cannot be construed in a
vacuum.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead,
one must heed the particular combination of words
selected by the author, whether an individual or group of
individuals. In short, context matters. See Watson v.
Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007)
(observing that “broad language is not limitless”
and that “a liberal construction nonetheless can find
limits in a text's language, context, history, and
purposes”); Food & Drug Admin. V. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

With
two eyes on context, the breadth of “any” as used
in Title II seems as clear as crystal: “any” is
explicitly limited to “person[s] alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation
of” Title II's nondiscrimination
provision.” 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (emphasis added);
cf. Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5 (interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1), and distinguishing between a phrase that
explicitly limits the breadth of the word “any”
and a phrase that does not). Thus, the plain language of
Title II seems to reserve the keys to the remedial kingdom
for plaintiffs alleging both 1)
“discrimination on the basis of disability”
and 2) “discrimination . . . in violation
of” Title II's nondiscrimination provision.”
42 U.S.C. § 12133. While the former requirement is broad
enough to encompass associational discrimination-which is
based on disability-the latter requirement is not.

Looking
beyond the four corners of Title II's text, some circuits
have also considered Title II's legislative history as
relevant to interpreting the statute's scope. See,
e.g., Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at 47; A
Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 364. This nontextual evidence
suggests that at least some of the legislators involved in
drafting Title II intended that Title II cover all forms of
discrimination prohibited under Titles I and III of the ADA.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), at 84 (May 15,
1990). Titles I and III's nondiscrimination
provision-both of which prohibit discrimination against
individuals “on the basis of disability, ” as
opposed to individuals “with a disability”- each
explicitly prohibit discrimination by
association.[48]See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a),
(b)(4) (Title I); id. § 12182(a), (b)(1)(E)
(Title III); cf. Id. §12132 (Title II).

Yet
despite what may be gleamed from congressional records that
were not subjected to the rigors of bicameralism and
presentment, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 7 cl.
1-2, “[w]here the statute is so lucid, we need not look
to the legislative history for further guidance.”
Phillips v. Marine Concrete Structures, Inc., 895
F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1990). Such appears to be the case
with Title II, which provides a “straightforward
statutory command” that the Court need only follow.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 6.

Further,
even accepting as sound the conclusion that at least some
organizations may sue under Title II, the organizations
involved as plaintiffs in the relevant cases provided
treatment services to individual persons suffering from
alcoholism and drug addiction. See Innovative
Health, 117 F.3d at 37; Addiction Specialists,
411 F.3d at 399; A Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 356;
MX Grp., 293 F.3d at 326. Such individuals
may-indeed, some unquestionably do-fall within the protective
auspices of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)
(defining the term “disability” in the ADA);
Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of
Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (observing
that alcoholism and drug addiction constitute
“impairment[s]” under the ADA's definition of
“disability”), superseded by statute on other
grounds, ADA Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553; MX Grp., 293 F.3d at 336 (same);
see also Title II Technical Assistance Manual, The
American with Disabilities Act,
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html.

In this
case, however, a nondisabled individual-Lazaro-is
asserting a claim of associational discrimination under Title
II. This breed of associational discrimination claim seems
materially distinct from such claims asserted by the
organizations. After all, the discrimination that these
organizations allegedly experienced at the hands of public
entities-such as the use of local zoning laws to prevent a
methadone clinic from operating within city limits, MX
Grp., 293 F.3d at 328-likewise discriminated against a
class of Title II-protected disabled individuals by erecting
barriers to access to treatment facilities for such
individuals “by reason of [their] disability, ”
see 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Thus,
blessing these organizations' associational
discrimination claims under Title II was a direct means to
vindicate the rights of “individual[s] with a
disability.” Id. An individual associational
discrimination claim may also vindicate disabled
individuals' rights, but the vindication seems more
attenuated. Individual claims seem primarily designed to
vindicate the interest of the individual asserting it-and as
a nondisabled individual, Lazaro's interests seem beyond
Title II's concern.

On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first opined that “[i]t is
widely accepted that under both the [Rehabilitation Act of
1973] and the ADA, non-disabled individuals have standing to
bring claims when they are injured because of their
association with a disabled person.” McCullum,
768 F.3d at 1142. With respect to the ADA, the Eleventh
Circuit exclusively supported this proposition with citations
to the same Title II cases previously explored by the Court:
cases involving organizations that provide services to
individuals protected by Title II. See Id. at 1142
(citing Innovative Health, 117 F.3d at 46-48;
Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 405-09; A
Helping Hand, 515 F.3d at 362-64; MX Grp., 293
F.3d at 333-35).

The
Eleventh Circuit then went on to identify Title III's
explicit prohibition on associational discrimination as
“[t]he section of the ADA conferring standing on a
non-disabled party.” Id. When interpreting
this provision of Title III as to nondisabled individuals,
however, the court again referenced cases in which other
circuits recognized organizational standing to sue under
Title II. Id. (citing A Helping Hand, 515
F.3d at 358-59, 363-64; MX Grp., 293 F.3d at 329-31,
333-35).

As far
as its analysis of the ADA, then, the Eleventh Circuit in
McCullum may be off the mark in several respects.
First, McCullum seems to conflate the ADA's
various titles, and in the process does not consider
potentially material linguistic and structural differences
among them. Likewise, McCullum's use of case law
bearing on associational discrimination claims does not
distinguish among the ADA's titles, and does not
differentiate between organizations versus nondisabled
individuals. Based on these shortcomings, the Court declines
to follow McCullum's conclusions as to the ADA.

In the
end, the text of Title II does not appear to make room for
associational discrimination claims. The regulation
recognizing such claims, then, looks as if it rests on a
fragile foundation.

However,
in law-as in life-looks can be deceiving.

ii.

While
Louisiana's argument about the plain meaning of Title II
is “strong, ” what “may seem plain when
viewed in isolation” can become “untenable in
light of [the statute] as a whole.” King v.
Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original). Such is the case
here.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;That is
because &ldquo;Congress has instructed courts that
&lsquo;nothing in [the ADA] shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V
[i.e., &sect; 504] of the Rehabilitation Act . . . or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title.&#39;&rdquo; Frame v. City of Arlington, 657
F.3d 215, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
&sect; 12201(a)) (alterations in original). Thus, &ldquo;the
ADA actually prohibits courts from construing Title
II to apply a lesser standard than&rdquo; &sect; 504 and
regulations promulgated to implement it. Id. at 228
(emphasis added). If &sect; 504 permits individual
associational discrimination claims, then Title II must also
permit such claims, the plain text of Title II
notwithstanding.[49]Cf. ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.