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United Arab Emirates

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Overview

Last Updated:
April, 2015

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a member in good standing of all of the relevant nonproliferation treaties, organizations, and regimes, and is not known to possess programs for the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their delivery systems. Currently pursuing a peaceful nuclear program, the UAE is often referred to as a model for nuclear newcomers.

In addition to joining many of the major nonproliferation treaties, the UAE has pledged support to a number of ad hoc initiatives, including the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). [1] Most significantly for proponents of nonproliferation, the UAE made the unprecedented commitment in its April 2008 "White Paper" announcing its intention to evaluate peaceful nuclear energy and in subsequent October 2009 domestic legislation to permanently forego the acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutoniumreprocessing capabilities. [2] This pre-existing domestic commitment by the UAE is also reflected in its 2009 "123" nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, whose language concerning no enrichment and reprocessing is often referred to in the U.S. policy community as the nonproliferation "Gold Standard." The UAE has financially supported, in the amount of U.S. $10 million, efforts to develop an IAEAfuel bank. [3] Concerned about the ambiguous nature of Iran's nuclear program, the UAE relies for its security on close strategic partnerships with the United States and France. [4] The UAE has also purchased advanced conventional weaponry, such as missile defense systems, from its Westerns partners.

Nuclear

The UAE became a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995; concluding a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) in 2003 and acceding to the IAEA Additional Protocol in 2010. [5] In April 2008, the UAE released a policy document outlining its interest in developing a nuclear power program. [6] At the time, the country's electricity demand was growing approximately 9% annually. At that rate, the UAE would require an additional 40 gigawatts installed capacity to meet demand by 2020. [7] Although the country is rich in natural resources such as natural gas and oil, the government argues that "known volumes of natural gas that could be made available to the nation's electricity sector would be insufficient to meet future demand." [8] The UAE concluded that nuclear power is an "environmentally promising and commercially competitive" source that could contribute to the country's "economy and future energy security." [9] Therefore, the UAE rapidly moved forward with plans to build its first nuclear power plants. In 2009, the UAE signed a deal worth $20.4 billion with Korea Electric Power Corporation to construct four APR-1400 reactors. The first is scheduled to become operational in 2017 and the three subsequent reactors completed by 2020. [10] In September 2014, UAE officials announced work on the first reactor at the Barakah nuclear power plant was about 57% complete with construction on the remaining three units underway. [11]

The U.S.-UAE 123 nuclear cooperation agreement entered into force in December 2009, providing the necessary legal basis for any future nuclear commerce between the two countries. The agreement had significant precedent-setting potential; if the United States government treats future 123 negotiations similarly, nuclear newcomers could be required to accept the nonproliferation "gold standard" of forgoing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in order to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. [12] However, as referenced in the "Agreed Minute," should the U.S. negotiate a 123 agreement with another country in the Middle East with more favorable terms, the U.S.-UAE agreement can be renegotiated. [13] An intense debate over whether to insist on the "Gold Standard" in all future 123 agreements is ongoing in the U.S. government. [14]

With its many voluntary commitments, the UAE has set a positive nonproliferation example for other nuclear newcomer states. However, the UAE will need considerable foreign assistance and time to follow through on the nonproliferation pledges it has made. Without these, experts caution a "commitment-compliance gap" may emerge whereby the UAE lacks the institutional capacity to fully adhere to its commitments. [15] This is of particular concern in the area of nonproliferation export controls as the UAE only recently passed comprehensive nonproliferation export control legislation in 2007 and historically has been a major transit point for illicit transactions involving Iran and other neighboring countries. [16] The UAE has pledged its support for the Nuclear Suppliers Group's export control guidelines, and cooperated with efforts to bar shipments of sensitive technologies to Iran. [17] However, historically the UAE has reportedly housed "hundreds of front companies and foreign trading agencies that actively procure dual-use items for entities in countries under sanction." [18] Dubai's territory was a known hub for the A.Q. Khan network which illicitly supplied nuclear technology to countries such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea. [19] While the UAE is making good-faith efforts to crack down on illicit trafficking, the development of robust export controls, border security, and related legal infrastructure requires significant time and resources.

The UAE faces capacity-building challenges in a number of areas beyond export controls. The nuclear program will require a significant long-term commitment to training domestic and regional personnel by the UAE and its foreign partners. In the meantime, the country will need to rely on foreign experts to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear program, a practice that some find problematic for the long-term sustainability of the program, while others note the additional transparency and access to the program foreign participation allow. The UAE appointed an International Advisory Board (IAB), headed by Hans Blix to provide independent assessment and an additional layer of transparency. The IAB issues semi-annual reports describing the UAE nuclear program's progress, and suggesting areas for improvement. [20] As in virtually all industry areas, the UAE relies heavily on foreign expertise, including in the highest management positions of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and its U.S.-modeled regulatory agency, the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR). The FANR is headed by a U.S. expert formerly employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. [21]

IAEA assessments of the UAE's progress to-date have been favorable; with a December 2011 Integrated Regulatory Review Service team reporting that it was "impressed by the speed with which the UAE developed its regulatory framework and established a new regulatory body." [22] In June 2013, the UAE and the IAEA signed an Integrated Work Plan to facilitate interaction between the IAEA and the UAE's emerging nuclear power sector. [23]

However, the UAE is taking a regional leadership role in biotechnology issues, and will therefore need to develop robust export controls, biosecurity, and biosafety standards in order to mitigate the dual-use risks inherent to a large-scale biotechnology sector. In 2005, His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Prime Minister of the UAE and leader of Dubai, announced that Dubai would build the world's first free-trade zone dedicated to biotechnology, with the intention of becoming the Middle East's regional biotechnology hub and a venue for international collaboration. [25] Completing construction in 2010, the Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park (DuBiotech) includes R&D, manufacturing, and conference space accommodating up to 160 laboratories. [26] With its promise of tax-free operation for at least fifty years and customs duty exemption on all goods and services, dozens of companies, including Pfizer, Amgen, Genzyme, and Merck, have begun operating at DuBiotech. [27] DuBiotech also offers conference venues and has hosted biotechnology conferences on a range of issues. [28] DuBiotech laboratories were built to biosafety level-3 standards. [29] Although the United Arab Emirates aspires to become a global biotechnology hub, the UAE is not a member of the Australia Group (AC). [30]

The UAE will face increasing dual-use challenges requiring the development of robust export controls, chemical safety, and chemical security standards, as it is actively expanding its chemical industrial sector. In 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Abu Dhabi Investment Council and two chemical firms announced plans to develop a new Chemicals Industrial City in Abu Dhabi. [33] As envisioned, the Chemicals Industrial City would become the largest and most integrated chemical industry complex in the world, and a hub for petrochemical and other chemical products. [34] The project's timeline sets 2015 as the planned completion date. [35]

Despite its objections to the Black Shaheen deal, the United States has a significant strategic relationship with the UAE and has supplied it with numerous defensive systems. [39] In 2008, the UAE purchased the Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile-T (GEM-T) and the Lockheed Martin Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system from the United States. [40] Additionally, on 25 December 2011, the United States and the UAE signed an arms deal worth $3.48 billion dollars that included two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, 96 missiles, two radar systems, spare parts, and training, making the UAE the first international recipient of the THAAD system, which is reportedly capable of "destroying incoming missiles at a range of 200 km." [41] In November 2012, the United States cleared the way for a sale of 48 THAAD missiles and associated equipment at an estimated cost of over $1 billion. [42] The UAE also purchased an unspecified number of the new AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) from the United States in April 2013. [43]

The UAE possesses a small number of Scud-B ballistic missiles, with a range of 300km and payload capacity of 1,000kg, which it purchased from North Korea in the late 1980s. [44] A declassified U.S. national intelligence estimate from 1991 asserted that North Korea sold the UAE 18-24 Scud-B missiles in 1988. [45] Others believe the UAE purchased 25 Scud-B missiles from North Korea in 1989. [46]

Sources:
[1] "Non-Proliferation," Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, www.un.int.
[2] "UAE adopts nuclear law," World Nuclear News, 5 October 2009, retrieved from www.world-nuclear-news.org.
[3] "International Nuclear Fuel Bank," NTI Projects: Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org; Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, "Intervention by UAE: Cluster 3 – General Issues," 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee, 9 May 2012.
[4] Bryan R. Early, "Strategies for Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Lessons from the United Arab Emirates," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, June 2009, p. 5, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu.
[5] Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 8 July 2009.
[6] "Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy," The Government of the United Arab Emirates, 20 April 2008, www.fanr.gov.ae.
[7] Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr, "The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation," Congressional Research Service, 10 March 2010, www.fas.org.
[8] "Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy," The Government of the United Arab Emirates, 20 April 2008, www.fanr.gov.ae.
[9] "Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy," The Government of the United Arab Emirates, 20 April 2008, www.fanr.gov.ae.
[10] Mark Holt, "U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market: Major Policy Considerations," Congressional Research Service, 21 January 2010, www.fas.org; "Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates," World Nuclear Association, March 2011, www.world-nuclear.org; Andrew England, "S. Koreans win $20bn UAE nuclear power contract," The Financial Times, 28 December 2008, www.ft.com; "Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, February 2012, www.world-nuclear.org; "Powering the future of the UAE through safe, clean and efficient nuclear energy," The Emirates Nuclear Energy Cooperation, www.enec.gov.ae; and Ayesha Daya and Stefania Bianchi, "U.A.E.'s Nuclear Power Program Said to Cost $30 Billion," Bloomberg Businessweek, 29 November 2011, www.businessweek.com.
[11] Kimberly Peterson, "ENEC preparing to begin Barakah-4 construction in 2015," Nucleonics Week, October 2, 2014.
[12] Ambassador Thomas Graham, "123 Agreement for Nuclear Energy in the UAE: An Unprecedented and Responsible Step," The Huffington Post, 21 February 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com
[13] Mark Hibbs, "Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Ambitions," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 July 2010, www.carnegieendowment.org
[14] Elaine Grossman, "Administration Letter Provides "Case by Case" Approach to Nuclear Trade Deals," Global Security Newswire, 23 January 2012, www.nti.gsn.org.
[15] For more on the possibility of a "commitment-compliance gap," see: Bryan R. Early, "Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, 6 July 2009, p. 7, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu.
[16] Bryan R. Early, "Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, 6 July 2009, p. 7, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu.
[17] Bryan R. Early, "Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School , 6 July 2009, p. 7, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu; William Cohen and Sam Nunn, "Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in our Interest," The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 June 2009, www.nti.org.
[18] William Cohen and Sam Nunn, "Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in our Interest," The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 June 2009, www.nti.org. David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel, "Iranian Entities' Illicit Military Procurement Networks," The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 12 January 2009, www.isis-online.org; William Cohen and Sam Nunn, "Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in our Interest," The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 June 2009, www.nti.org.; Elaine Shannon, "A New Nuke Black Market for Iran?" Time, 9 May 2007, www.time.com.
[19] Richard P. Conin, K. Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni, "Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options," Congressional Research Service, 24 May 2005, www.fas.org.
[20] "About Us," The International Advisory Board, 27 April 2012, www.uaeiab.ae.
[21] Chris Stanton, "New Law Sets UAE's Nuclear Age in Motion," 5 October 2009, www.thenational.aen.
[22] "IAEA Concludes Peer Review of UAE's Regulatory Framework," IAEA Press Release, 14 December 2011, www.iaea.org.
[23] "United Arab Emirates and IAEA sign an Integrated Work Plan (IWP) to support the implementation of the national nuclear power programme," International Atomic Energy Agency, 6 June 2013, iaea.org.
[24] William Faria, "Dubai's Biotechnology Park caters to Middle East," 28 January 2012, www.gulftoday.ae; "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Congressional Research Service, 14 January 2000.
[25] "The Premier Life Sciences Cluster in the Middle East," Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, Dubai, UAE, www.dubiotech.ae, accessed 16 March 2012.
[26] "The Premier Life Sciences Cluster in the Middle East," Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, Dubai, UAE, www.dubiotech.ae, accessed 16 March 2012; "DuBiotech succeeded in attracting and retaining 86 companies," The Arab Hospital Magazine, 25 October 2011.
[27] "DuBiotech: Dubai Biotechnology and Research Center," Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, Dubai, UA, www.dubiotech.ae, accessed 16 March 2012; Press Release, "Ministry of Health and Dubai Customs to Raise Awareness against Counterfeit Medicines at Pharmaceutical Logistics Middle East 2012," Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, 7 March 2012.
[28] "The Premier Life Sciences Cluster in the Middle East," Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, Dubai, UAE, available at www.dubiotech.ae.
[29] "The Premier Life Sciences Cluster in the Middle East," Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, Dubai, UAE, available at www.dubiotech.ae.
[30] The Australia Group, "Australia Group Participants," www.australiagroup.net.
[31] "Status of Participation in the CWC," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 21 May 2009, opcw.org.
[32] "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Congressional Research Service, 14 January 2000.
[33] Borealis News & Events, "New Chemical Industrial City planned for Abu Dhabi," Borealis AG, 19 March 2008.
[34] Borealis News & Events, "New Chemical Industrial City planned for Abu Dhabi," Borealis AG, 19 March 2008.
[35] "UAE economy projected to grow 3.9% in 2013," MENA Financial Network, 6 January 2013, menafn.com; Abu Dhabi Ports Company, "ADIC to develop Chemicals Industrial City in Tewaleh area," 5 May 2008.
[36] Karim Sadjadpour, "The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2011, p. 15, Carnegie website, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[37] "The UAE: Non-Proliferation," The Government of the United Arab Emirates, 20 April 2009, www.uae-embassy.org.
[38] Dennis M. Gormley, "Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles," Adelphi Paper 339 (2001): 40; "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, April 2009, www.fas.org; Jeffery Lewis, "Storm Shadow, Saudi and the MTCR," Arms Control Wonk, 31 May 2011, www.armscontrolnetwork.com.
[39] Karim Sadjadpour, "The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2011, p. 15, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[40] "Raytheon Awarded $3.3 Billion Patriot Order for United Arab Emirates," Inside Defense, 31 December 2008.
[41] "Strategic Weapon Systems," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Gulf States, 13 June 2011. Other information on the deal available from: "U.S., UAE reach deal for missile-defense system," CNN, 30 December 2011, www.cnn.com; and Dan De Luce, "U.S. Arms Deal Bolsters UAE's Missile Defense," Google News, 31 December 2011, google.com.
[42] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "News Release: United Arab Emirates – Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System Missiles (THAAD)," Transmittal No. 12-40, 5 November 2012, www.dsca.mil.
[43] Gopal Ratnam, "U.S. to Announce $10 Billion Arms to Israel, Saudis, U.A.E.," Bloomberg, 19 April 2013; "In changing region, US committed to military ties with Gulf Arabs," Today's Zaman, 2 May 2013.
[44] "Onward Proliferation from North Korea," in Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), p. 181.
[45] Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, "Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control," NIE 5-91C, Volume II: Annex A (Country Studies), July 1991, p. 6, www.nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault.
[46] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Stategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 130.

Get the Facts on United Arab Emirates

Set the "gold standard" precedent for 123 nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States by agreeing not to acquire enrichment or reprocessing capabilities

Plans to have 4 nuclear power reactors operational by 2020

Possesses undisclosed number of Black Shaheen Cruise Missiles

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2016.