XXXVI. Of all these sorts of motives, good-will is that
of which the dictates,[20] taken in a general
view, are surest of coinciding with those of the principle of utility. For the
dictates of utility are neither nor less than the dictates of the most
extensive[21] and enlightened (that is
well-advised[22]) benevolence. The
dictates of the other motives may be conformable to those of utility, or
repugnant, as it may happen.

XXXVII. In this, however, it is taken for granted, that
in the case in question the dictates of benevolence are not contradicted by
those of a more extensive, that is enlarged, benevolence. Now when the dictates
of benevolence, as respecting the interests of a certain set of persons, are
repugnant to the dictates of the same motive, as respecting the more
important[23] interests of another set of
persons, the former dictates, it is evident, are repealed, as it were, by the
latter: and a man, were he to be governed by the former, could scarcely, with
propriety, be said to be governed by the dictates of benevolence. On this
account were the motives on both sides sure to be alike present to a man's
mind, the case of such a repugnancy would hardly be worth distinguishing, since
the partial benevolence might be considered as swallowed up in the more
extensive: if the former prevailed, and governed the action, it must be
considered as not owing its birth to benevolence, but to some other motive: if
the latter prevailed, the former might be considered as having no effect. But
the case is, that a partial benevolence may govern the action, without entering
into any direct competition with the more extensive benevolence, which would
forbid it; because the interests of the less numerous assemblage of persons may
be present to a man's mind, at a time when those of the more numerous are
either not present, or, if present, make no impression. It is in this way that
the dictates of this motive may be repugnant to utility, yet still be the
dictates of benevolence. What makes those of private benevolence conformable
upon the whole to the principle of utility, is, that in general they stand
unopposed by those of public: if they are repugnant to them, it is only by
accident. What makes them the more conformable, is, that in a civilized
society, in most of the cases in which they would of themselves be apt to run
counter to those of public benevolence, they find themselves opposed by
stronger motives of the self-regarding class, which are played off against them
by the laws; and that it is only in cases where they stand unopposed by the
other more salutary dictates, that they are left free. An act of injustice or
cruelty, committed by a man for the sake of his father or his son, is punished,
and with reason, as much as if it were committed for his own.

XXXVIII. After good-will, the motive of which the
dictates seem to have the next best chance for coinciding with those of
utility, is that of the love of reputation. There is but one circumstance which
prevents the dictates of this motive from coinciding in all cases with those of
the former. This is, that men in their likings and dislikings, in the
dispositions they manifest to annex to any mode of conduct their approbation or
their disapprobation, and in consequence to the person who appears to practice
it, their good or their ill will, do not govern themselves exclusively by the
principle of utility. sometimes it is the principle of asceticism they are
guided by: sometimes the principle of sympathy and antipathy. There is another
circumstance, which diminishes, not their conformity to the principle of
utility, but only their efficacy in comparison with the dictates of the motive
of benevolence. The dictates of this motive will operate as strongly in secret
as in public: whether it appears likely that the conduct which they recommend
will be known or not: those of the love of reputation will coincide with those
of benevolence only in proportion as a man's conduct seems likely to be
known.[24] This circumstance, however, does
not make so much difference as at first sight might appear. Acts, in proportion
as they are material, are apt to become known: and in point of reputation, the
slightest suspicion often serves for proof. Besides, if an act be a
disreputable one, it is not any assurance a man can have of the secrecy of the
particular act in question, that will of course surmount the objections he may
have against engaging in it. Though the act in question should remain secret,
it will go towards forming a habit, which may give birth to other acts, that
may not meet with the same good fortune. There is no human being, perhaps, who
is at years of discretion, on whom considerations of this sort have not some
weight: and they have the more weight upon a man, in proportion to the strength
of his intellectual powers, and the firmness of his mind.[25] Add to this, the influence which habit itself,
when once formed, has in restraining a man from acts towards which, from the
view of the disrepute annexed to them, as well as from any other cause, he has
contracted an aversion. The influence of habit, in such cases, is a matter of
fact, which, though not readily accounted for, is acknowledged and
indubitable.[26]

XXXIX. After the dictates of the love of reputation
come, as it should seem, those of the desire of amity. The former are disposed
to coincide with those of utility, inasmuch as they are disposed to coincide
with those of benevolence. Now those of the desire of amity are apt also to
coincide, in a certain sort, with those of benevolence. But the sort of
benevolence with the dictates of which the love of reputation coincides, is the
more extensive; that with which those of the desire of amity coincide, the less
extensive. Those of the love of amity have still, however, the advantage of
those of the self-regarding motives. The former, at one period or other of his
life, dispose a man to contribute to the happiness of a considerable number of
persons: the latter, from the beginning of life to the end of it, confine
themselves to the care of that single individual. The dictates of the desire of
amity, it is plain, will approach nearer to a coincidence with those of the
love of reputation, and thence with those of utility, in proportion,
cęteris paribus, to the number of the persons whose amity a man
has occasion to desire: and hence it is, for example, that an English member of
parliament, with all his own weaknesses, and all the follies of the people
whose amity he has to cultivate, is probably, in general, a better character
than the secretary of a visier at Constantinople, or of a naib in Indostan.

XL. The dictates of religion are, under the infinite
diversity of religions, so extremely variable, that it is difficult to know
what general account to give of them, or in what rank to place the motive they
belong to. Upon the mention of religion, people's first thoughts turn naturally
to the religion they themselves profess. This is a great source of
miscalculation, and has a tendency to place this sort of motive in a higher
rank than it deserves. The dictates of religion would coincide, in all cases,
with those of utility, were the Being, who is the object of religion,
universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and
powerful; and were the notions entertained of his benevolence, at the same
time, as correct as those which are entertained of his wisdom and his power.
Unhappily, however, neither of these is the case. He is universally supposed to
be all-powerful: for by the Deity, what else does any man mean than the Being,
whatever he be, by whom every thing is done. And as to knowledge, by the same
rule that he should know one thing he should know another. These notions seem
to be as correct, for all material purposes, as they are universal. But among
the votaries of religion (of which number the multifarious fraternity of
Christians is but a small part) there seem to be but few (I will not say how
few) who are real believers in his benevolence. They call him benevolent in
words, but they do not mean that he is so in reality. They do not mean, that he
is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent: they do not mean that he is
benevolent in the only sense in which benevolence has a meaning. For if they
did, they would recognize that the dictates of religion could be neither more
nor less than the dictates of utility: not a tittle different: not a tittle
less or more. But the case is, that on a thousand occasions they turn their
backs on the principle of utility. They go astray after the strange principles
its antagonists: sometimes it is the principle of asceticism: sometimes the
principle of sympathy and antipathy[27].
Accordingly, the idea they bear in their minds, on such occasions, is but too
often the idea of malevolence; to which idea, stripping it of its own proper
name, they bestow the specious appellation of the social motive.[28] The dictates of religion, in short, are no other
than the dictates of that principle which has been already mentioned under the
name of the theological principle.[29] These,
as has been observed, are just as it may happen, according to the biases of the
person in question, copies of the dictates of one or other of the three
original principles: sometimes, indeed, of the dictates of utility: but
frequently of those of asceticism, or those of sympathy and antipathy. In this
respect they are only on a par with the dictates of the love of reputation: in
another they are below it. The dictates of religion are in all places
intermixed more or less with dictates unconformable to those of utility,
deduced from tests, well or ill interpreted, of the writings held for sacred by
each sect: unconformable, by imposing practices sometimes inconvenient to a
man's self, sometimes pernicious to the rest of the community. The sufferings
of uncalled martyrs, the calamities of holy wars and religious persecutions,
the mischiefs of intolerant laws, (objects which can here only be glanced at,
not detailed) are so many additional mischiefs over and above the number of
those which were ever brought into the world by the love of reputation. On the
other hand, it is manifest, that with respect to the power of operating in
secret, the dictates of religion have the same advantage over those of the love
of reputation, and the desire of amity, as is possessed by the dictates of
benevolence.

XLI. Happily, the dictates of religion seem to approach
nearer and nearer to a coincidence with those of utility every day. But why?
Because the dictates of the moral sanction do so: and those coincide with or
are influenced by these. Men of the worst religions, influenced by the voice
and practice of the surrounding world, borrow continually a new and a new leaf
out of the book of utility: and with these, in order not to break with their
religion, they endeavour, sometimes with violence enough, to patch together and
adorn the repositories of their faith.

XLII. As to the self-regarding and dissocial motives,
the order that takes place among these, and the preceding one, in point of
extra-regarding influence, is too evident to need insisting on. As to the order
that takes place among the motives, of the self-regarding class, considered in
comparison with one another, there seems to be no difference which on this
occasion would be worth mentioning. With respect to the dissocial motive, it
makes a difference (with regard to its extra-regarding effects) from which of
two sources it originates; whether from self-regarding or from social
considerations. The displeasure you conceive against a man may be founded
either on some act which offends you in the first instance, or on an act which
offends you no otherwise than because you look upon it as being prejudicial to
some other party on whose behalf you interest yourself: which other party may
be of course either a determinate individual, or any assemblage of individuals,
determinate or indeterminate.[30] It is
obvious enough, that a motive, though in itself dissocial, may, by issuing from
a social origin, possess a social tendency; and that its tendency, in this
case, is likely to be the more social, the more enlarged the description is of
the persons whose interests you espouse. Displeasure, venting itself against a
man, on account of a mischief supposed to be done by him to the public, may be
more social in its effects than any good-will, the exertions of which are
confined to an individual.[31]

20. When a man is supposed to be prompted by any motive
to engage, or not to engage, in such or such an action, it may be of use, for
the convenience of discourse, to speak of such motive as giving birth to an
imaginary kind of law or dictate,
injoining him to engage, or not to engage, in it.

26. Strictly speaking, habit, being but a fictitious
entity, and not really any thing distinct from the acts or perceptions by which
it is said to be formed, cannot be the cause of any thing. The enigma, however,
may be satisfactorily solved upon the principle of association, of the nature
and force of which a very satisfactory recount may be seen in Dr. Priestley's
edition of Hartley on Man.

28. Sometimes, in order the better to conceal the cheat
(from their own eyes doubtless as well as from others) they set up a phantom of
their own, which they call Justice: whose dictates are to modify (which being
explained, means to oppose) the dictates of benevolence. But justice, in the
only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for
the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility,
applied to certain particular cases. Justice, then, is nothing more than an
imaginary instrument, employed to forward on certain occasions, and by certain
means, the purposes of benevolence. The dictates of justice are nothing more
than a part of the dictates of benevolence, which, on certain occasions, are
applied to certain subjects; to wit, to certain actions.