Safeguarding Others' Nuclear Fuel

December 27, 1994

Even after Germany stopped several cases of nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union last summer, some doubted the true extent of the proliferation danger from that source.

Not the Clinton administration. It has followed a strong non-proliferation policy, letting it be known early on that it would buy nuclear material from other countries in order to convert it to peaceful use.

But it only recently revealed that it had taken extraordinary and unprecedented steps to secretly buy enriched uranium from Kazakhstan, ship it to the United States and secure it at a government facility.

The administration trumpeted the mission as an historic example of the way nations can work together in the post-Cold War era to reduce the lingering nuclear threat. And, indeed, if the material was as dangerous as the White House maintained, it was prudent and in the nation's best interest to remove this potential source of nuclear terrorism.

But the unique deal with the former Soviet republic raises several questions. Has the White House taken it upon itself to turn the U.S. into the world's dumping ground for fissile material? If so, who will foot the bill? How much material can the U.S. accept? And what, if any, are the risks in storing it?

These aren't rhetorical questions. A recent Energy Department study reveals that America's aging nuclear weapons facilities, now used mainly to store plutonium and uranium, have flaws that pose risks to workers and, in some cases, to the public. The material is slowly eating away its containers, and the government, despite years of study, has not yet decided on a way to dispose of it over the long term.

The Kazakhstan deal began to take shape when, in the summer of 1993, Kazakh officials asked whether Washington would be interested in buying half a ton of weapons-grade uranium-enough to make more than 20 nuclear devices. The White House, worried that some of the poorly secured material could end up in Iraq, Iran or North Korea, began negotiations.

In Washington, support wasn't unanimous. At the Energy Department, which has been battling state government officials over storage of spent nuclear fuel from Europe in the U.S. and which has been struggling to clean its own nuclear facilities, some officials were opposed. Some argued Russia should take it, and some State Department officials worried that Moscow might be offended if the U.S. did.

But Russia, already mired in its own swamp of nuclear material, didn't want it and blessed the U.S. deal. This fall, a special team of 31 Americans worked six weeks to put the material in steel canisters. Last month, the uranium was flown to the East Coast and trucked to the nuclear complex at Oak Ridge, Tenn.

It cost U.S. taxpayers $3 million to get the uranium to Oak Ridge, and it will cost tens of millions more in increased aid to Kazakhstan. Some of the expenses will be recouped, however, because the material eventually will be burned in commercial nuclear reactors.

It may be that the U.S. doesn't have the resources or the technical capability to buy and take all the dangerous nuclear leftovers of the Cold War. But in this one case, the final bill-whatever it turns out to be-will be money well spent on national security.