Ethical and Moral Relativism
(and its relationship to Tolerance)

Relativism is the idea that
there are no generally valid or binding moral standards. But this is
not the same as the empirical fact that people disagree about moral
standards. People could disagree about moral standards even if there
were some generally valid moral standards, much as people once disagreed
about whether the earth moved round the sun or vice versa, even though
there is (and always was) a valid--indeed, true--resolution of this
disagreement.

What is important is to note that disagreements
do not imply that there are no generally valid moral standards. They tell
us only that people don’t always agree on what the standards are or should be.
Relativism is a stronger claim. It is the denial that there are generally
valid moral standards. In this sense, it is not a empirical claim at all.
It is not about what people do believe, but about what they should believe.
That is to say, relativism cannot be proven or disproven by empirical tests,
such as surveys that would show that people do or do not believe in universal
moral standards. It is a philosophical claim about the existence of
universal moral standards, whether or not people believe in them. And thus
it must be proven or disproven by philosophical arguments.

A dangerous mistake is to confuse relativism with
tolerance. Some people think that the belief that there are generally
valid moral standards is the basis for imposing one person’s moral beliefs
(held by him to be the valid ones) on another (who might believe other things
about morality). But imposing one person’s moral beliefs on another is only
wrong if the belief is really wrong! Tolerance is itself a moral principle. To
believe that intolerance is really wrong is to believe that tolerance is really
right--thus it is to believe in the existence of a generally valid moral
standard. This is precisely what a relativist cannot believe. He cannot believe
that intolerance is wrong because he cannot believe that anything is really
wrong.

But there’s more. People who believe that it is
wrong to impose one person’s beliefs on another will usually believe that it
is wrong to impose one person’s will upon another, say, by violence or
deception. And then it is clear that people who believe that imposing one
person’s beliefs on another is wrong, believe that there are numerous things
that are really wrong. Is there anyone who thinks that we should be tolerant of
those who murder, cheat and steal?

Belief in tolerance is itself a belief that there
is at least one generally valid moral principle, namely, that people should not
have others’ views imposed on them -- principles related to freedom, privacy
and autonomy. But not imposing moral values is not relativism, and cannot be
supported by relativism. Indeed, a relativist must believe that there is nothing
really wrong with imposing one person’s views on another, because there are no
generally valid standards to show that anything is really wrong at all.

Now, most people think that there really are
moral wrongs: the Nazis committed great wrongs, that racism, sexism, violence
against innocents, manipulation, deception, betrayal and so forth are serious
moral wrongs. To test your own beliefs, consider this story:

A student in an ethics class like this one
announced that she was a relativist. The professor responded, “That’s fine,
however, I’m going to give you an F in this course as a result.” The student
protested: “But, that’s not fair!”“ Oh, really?” replied the
professor. “I thought you were a relativist. Do you mean to tell me you think
that there really is a standard of fairness? Tell me about it.”

Don’t
you think there is a standard of fairness? Don’t you think that
the professor in this story is really being unfair? If so,
then, you, like most people, believe that there are some standards that
distinguish right from wrong. But, perhaps you think that this is because
you share the standards of fairness in your culture. Do you think that, in
another culture, it could be fair to flunk someone in a course just for
their beliefs, rather than on the basis of their performance? Suppose you
answer this last question by saying that it could be fair in another
culture if students knew in advance that they would be treated that way
.But, then, you are still insisting on a universal standard of fairness,
namely, that it is only fair to treat people according to principles they
know and understand in advance.

There
are fewer real relativists than people who say they are relativists. But
this doesn’t mean that relativism is not a serious problem. What it
suggests rather is that the only answer to relativism lies in showing that
some moral standards are generally valid on the basis of rational
arguments. If this can be done, then we may either convince the
relativists or show the non-relativists that they are justified in holding
the relativists to at least some moral standards. To see if any moral
standards can be shown to be generally valid on the basis of rational
arguments, we must look at what moral philosophers have to say.

This
site defines ethical
relativism, discusses how ‘Moralities are Social Products,’ then
describes the strengths and weaknesses of ethical relativism, including through
the application to real life events and examples.

The
Truth in Ethical Relativism is an article from the Journal of Social Philosophy by Hugh LaFollette. In this essay, the author begins with a definition of ethical relativism
and critiques the extreme positions regarding ethical relativisms: “…we
should strive for a rational yet relativistic ethic which emphasizes the
exercise of cultivated moral judgment rather than the rote application of extant
moral rules.”