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GEN. David Petraeus’ Baghdad office reflects the man: It’s spartan. There are no giant flat-screen TVs or I- love-me photos on the walls. There’s no spectacular view, just no-nonsense wall maps of the city and the country.

It may be the least ostentatious four-star general’s office in history. There’s a representational office elsewhere, but this is where the general runs his war – when he’s in an office: He often makes two or three grueling “battlefield circulation” trips around the country in a week.

In a session with The Post yesterday, Petraeus stressed that he wasn’t going to offer any premature declarations of victory. Far from it. Despite meaningful and measurable progress since he assumed command earlier this year, Iraq remains a brutally difficult place.

But it’s a better place than it was a year ago, with violence reduced by half in Baghdad. Long the deadly base of al Qaeda in Iraq, Anbar province has gone from hundreds of daily attempted attacks on our troops to four earlier this week. Iraqis assume ever more responsibility for their own security. And former enemies are rallying to fight beside us, instead of against us.

How did the general and the troops under his command achieve such rapid progress? He lays out a model: “The Re-Liberation of Iraq,” this time from a new wave of oppressors, the terrorists, insurgents and militias.

Petraeus acknowledges the errors made in the early occupation years, stressing, above all, the failure to provide security for the population. We cleaned out the violent actors from one city after another, but failed to stay and set the conditions for political and economic progress. When we left, the bad guys came back – and killed anybody who had cooperated with us.

Now, through the efficient use of American troops and a greatly increased employment of Iraqi forces, we’re taking an approach that allows for fighting fiercely when necessary, but which looks beyond the gunfights.

As one example, the general points out that, “When we took down Baquba this time, we had a post-operations plan in place.”

It’s critical to involve the local people immediately and enduringly in shaping long-term outcomes. Petraeus recognizes that there’s no one-size-fits-all solution for a country as complex as Iraq, but a series of common emphases have been working well thus far:

* Coalition forces went on the offensive – and sustained the pressure. This time around, al Qaeda and our other enemies didn’t get their accustomed break between rounds. And al Qaeda’s own arrogance and over-reaching, from targeting popular local sheikhs to destroying commerce all along the Euphrates River Valley, gave the general a timely card to play.

* Taking advantage of Sunni-Arab disillusionment with al Qaeda, Petraeus moved swiftly to present our renewed efforts as a far more attractive option than the terrorists.

* And post-combat operations are now Iraqi-centric, not futile attempts to turn Iraqis into Americans. “Involve the local people,” the general states, laying down a non-negotiable rule. “Instead of firing, we’re hiring locals” and putting them to work, he stressed. While providing dependable security is fundamental, it’s not enough. Economic issues can be fundamental. And the people need the services only a central government can deliver – while the new approach empowers local government, it avoids doing so at the expense of fatally weakening the Baghdad authorities.

Instead of backing mammoth, hyper-expensive construction projects designed in Washington, our new approach prods Iraqis to fix their existing infrastructure. Iraq’s utilities won’t be state-of-the-art, but they’re beginning to work again: Iraqi solutions for Iraqi problems. Sounds like a no-brainer, but it took a profound change of mindset for us to get there.

Nor will Iraqi democracy mimic our own. Petraeus works systematically with Iraq’s time-honored social structures, exploiting the levels of trust and control already in place. Instead of trying to replace tribal leaders with out-of-towners, we now focus on developing mutually supporting relationships between respected local authority figures and the feds from Baghdad.

The general’s recognition that locally recruited security forces have the immediate trust of the local population has been critical to the entire effort. Even with the surge, we lacked the forces to do it all ourselves. Petraeus recognized that, yes, all politics is local – and so is security. So he pushed hard for reconciliation programs to engage former enemies who now want to work with us to drive out al Qaeda.

Meeting rebellious Sunni Arabs halfway is yielding impressive successes. For just one example among many, 1,700 fighters who belong to a former insurgent group have been vetted and brought on board to serve their community in Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad. And no, contrary to media myths, we are not arming our former enemies. Iraqi tribes already have all the weapons they need. The issue is which way those guns are pointed – and they’re now aimed at our mutual enemies.

Could things go wrong down the road? Things can always go wrong. But when your former enemies are killing your worst enemies, it sounds like a pretty good deal.

Also, instead of massing behind the walls of large bases, our troops now live and serve beside their Iraqi counterparts, giving us a deeper understanding of the Iraqi way of doing things, of the opaque-to-outsiders fault lines in the population. Petraeus acknowledges that we’re doing things today that should’ve been done four years ago. The learning curve was steep.

And myths abound. Contrary to a common misperception, tactical commanders didn’t have adequate funds they could disperse early on – and, in Iraq, money does buy loyalty. Funds to jump-start local economies and employ young men are vital to inhibiting insurgent recruitment. Multiple tours in Iraq have convinced Petraeus that “Money is a weapon.” Not every project we’re providing with seed money now will meet OSHA standards – but this is Iraq, not Connecticut.

From working with tribal leaders to investing time and money at street- level, it’s essential to “understand the Iraqi style” of doing things. It’s counterinsurgency judo: working with the weight of tradition, instead of fighting a losing battle against it.

The general recognizes that political progress at the top in Iraq may lag as an indicator, but local initiatives look like the key to national success. He believes that, in this case, the politicians will eventually follow the people – who genuinely want better lives, not more bickering and butchery.

What will be the test of a worthy Iraqi government to Gen. Petraeus? “A government representative of and responsive to the people . . . at all levels.”

Can Iraq get there, after all its recent travails and struggling under the weight of history? Petraeus insists that “we’re realistic.” He believes that Iraq has a fighting chance. But he refuses to predict miracles.

That said, the general himself looks like the miracle Iraq needed. If that country ultimately fails – if Iraqis fail themselves – it won’t be the fault of David Petraeus and our men and women in uniform.

Ralph Peters is in Iraq on assignment for The Post. His most recent book is “Wars of Blood and Faith.”