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READ WHAT I WRITE. Do not make it up.

Originally Posted by Fuchs

There's not much insight and not many clever options to find in the realm of "kill! kill! kill!", not even on the tactical and much less on the operational level. It's a braindead concept on the strategic level where much more finesse is required.

I agree, but ignoring all the personal commentary, and cheap shots aside, that is NOT WHAT I SAY!

Sorry, but you are very deliberately putting words in my mouth in the most simplistic form possible, and I have explained this to you before.

a.) Killing is instrumental to warfare. Yes/No?
b.) You kill only as many as it takes to set forth the policy. If the other side gives up when you've killed 2 pet hamsters, then you stop.

War is a human activity. Central to that is the breaking of will. I am only interested in killing,wounding,capturing enough to break the will of those remaining, - in the service of policy.

Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

a.) Killing is instrumental to warfare. Yes/No?
b.) You kill only as many as it takes to set forth the policy. If the other side gives up when you've killed 2 pet hamsters, then you stop.

War is a human activity. Central to that is the breaking of will. I am only interested in killing,wounding,capturing enough to break the will of those remaining, - in the service of policy.

Wilf, all cheap shots aside,
I think every body agrees that warfare roots are found in killing the adversary in the service of a policy. So let's look at the "kill, kill, kill" issue in terms of efficiency.
There must be a reason why you prefer neutralising the opponent by "killing" him rather than arresting and detaining him. There must be a benefit that capturing does not provide. Otherwise, you just need to capture and detain in high security the maximum of opponents.
Also, in low intensity wars/liberation wars, it is also proven somehow that killing the opponent does reinforce the adversary will. Just as JMA said, in a societal system where you have second class citizens, killing them does reinforce the feeling they have to be abused and then reinforce the opponent support. It does makes it more dangerous but also reinforce the conviction that the loyalist army and police are "racistes". That's what happenend in Algeria and France (Taking apart Mr Papon whom case is pretty clear).
Bigeard, Trinquier and Massu were hardcore anticommunists but they have been also perceived as the arm of a racist administration enforcing racist policies (and it was the case in fact, at least for the policies).

There must be a reason why you prefer neutralising the opponent by "killing" him rather than arresting and detaining him. There must be a benefit that capturing does not provide. Otherwise, you just need to capture and detain in high security the maximum of opponents.

It is not what I "prefer". It's context dependant. There is usually a need to kill enough to make the rest give up - break their will to continue.
Sometimes, especially in irregular warfare, I want to capture people to help exploit the intelligence benefits, - or serve the policy of using the criminal justice system.
Killing is not the policy. Killing is an instrument of policy.
I am really pushed to make it simpler than that.
I never said or implied "Kill, kill kill." That is a gross, and possibly deliberate misrepresentation of what I have long suggested.

Also, in low intensity wars/liberation wars, it is also proven somehow that killing the opponent does reinforce the adversary will. Just as JMA said, in a societal system where you have second class citizens, killing them does reinforce the feeling they have to be abused and then reinforce the opponent support.

It is not proven. It is an observation devoid of the context of policy. Kill the wrong folks, for the wrong reason and you will not break will of those you seek to set forth the policy to.
When faced with a revolt, or rebellion, by your own population, you have to stop them gaining political advantage via violence. If you do not, then you fail as a Government, and simply cease to exist. - Unacceptable to most political entities.
Again, read what I write: Use Armed Force, against Armed Force - not against those whose death would undermine your policy.

Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Wilf, all cheap shots aside,
I think every body agrees that warfare roots are found in killing the adversary in the service of a policy. So let's look at the "kill, kill, kill" issue in terms of efficiency.
There must be a reason why you prefer neutralising the opponent by "killing" him rather than arresting and detaining him. There must be a benefit that capturing does not provide. Otherwise, you just need to capture and detain in high security the maximum of opponents.
Also, in low intensity wars/liberation wars, it is also proven somehow that killing the opponent does reinforce the adversary will. Just as JMA said, in a societal system where you have second class citizens, killing them does reinforce the feeling they have to be abused and then reinforce the opponent support. It does makes it more dangerous but also reinforce the conviction that the loyalist army and police are "racistes". That's what happenend in Algeria and France (Taking apart Mr Papon whom case is pretty clear).
Bigeard, Trinquier and Massu were hardcore anticommunists but they have been also perceived as the arm of a racist administration enforcing racist policies (and it was the case in fact, at least for the policies).

In the early stages of an insurgency that is the time when (legal issues permitting the leaders of the insurgency need to be 'neutralised'. By the time the army have to get involved the shooting has either begun or is inevitable. At this stage it can only get worse when incidents like Bloody Sunday in NI happen. So any "kill, kill, kill" policy must be narrowly focussed on the insurgents. Collateral damage is inevitable but may be unavoidable if the insurgents are to be separated from the people.

Killing is just one of many means of disarming the enemy leadership (and thereby reduce its repretoire and prospects to the point at which they give up).

Any focus on killing and neglect of more refined options is detrimental because the "kill" option has already earned a lot of attention thanks to its obviousness.

Wilf; look at the island hopping strategy. An Admiral Nimitz who followed your approach would not have hadthe idea to bypass Truk, but would have considered it to be a target full of killable soldiers.

Another example is Kurland 1945; Stalin would have had his Red Army attemptto eliminate this pocket at great cost if he had followed you. That was entirely unnecessary, for it took less troops to keep the army cut off in the Kurland pocket than it would have incurred losses to attempt an elimination. The approach with greater finesse (keep 'em cut off) was clearly superior to a kill frenzy.

I am only interested in killing,wounding,capturing (...)

Strange, why do you always write about killing only?

And again; I already gave a list of additional options beyond that triad, less obvious options that require more thought and are often near-perfect substitutes of KIA because they have the same "disarming" effect against the enemy leadership.

Again: CvC mentioned that the enemy leadership should be disarmed in pursuit of breaking its will. The key here is that their options need to be minimized (and we all know that killing insurgents does not minimize the options of insurgent politicians for long). According to Clausewitz, taking away the hope for a successful military (organized violence) effort compels them to accept your terms.
That isn't about KIA/WIA/POW only at all.

Maybe the influence of Leonhard on you can help to explain another shortcoming of your approach; underestimation of countermeasures.
An insurgent that's being hunted, hunted, hunted will become more elusiuve, more elusive, more elusive - and expose himself only to incompetent opponents, such as civilians. Or he adopts tactics that don't expose him much (mines). That's where the conflict in Afghanistan has been for a while. The "kill kill kill" approach has already reached its dead end there.

Your approach overemphasizes the obvious and clouds the view for tactical/operational/strategic approaches that require more finesse.
That's why I put of opposition to your views here. I don't argue for a war without killing. Instead, I point out that the potential for further advances isn't to be found in such obvious things as the effect of killing enemies.
It takes much more intelligent approaches to add improvements on ~5,000 years art of war.

Another example is Kurland 1945; Stalin would have had his Red Army attemptto eliminate this pocket at great cost if he had followed you.

Huh? Sorry you are talking drivel. I would have isolated Kurland just as Stalin did. What do you not get?
Ever read the paper I wrote on isolation, as part of suppression? No?

Strange, why do you always write about killing only?

I don't. Yes I mention killing a lot, but always in the context of the use of armed force against armed force. - Kill, capture, destroy - aimed at the breaking of will. Kill so as the rest give up!

According to Clausewitz, taking away the hope for a successful military (organized violence) effort compels them to accept your terms.

Hurrah. You get it...and this can be achieved with no killing, capturing or destruction?
I have repeatedly and consistently stated my position on this, and nothing had changed.

Sorry Sven, you are plainly having some issues here with me personally. If you do not get it, then I do not know what more I can do.

Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Maybe you're just not aware what impression you leave with your writing?
I have issues with approaches to warfare that let me expect unnecessary hardships in the next war. To win by killing as many opponents as possible is among the bloodiest imaginable approaches to warfare.

You should be well aware that you do usually emphasize the "kill" aspect in threads enough to justify being paraphrased with "kill! kill! kill!". You didn't do that to the same extent here, and I do strongly suspect that this was done purposefully to reduce the vulnerability of your position to my critique.

And yes, will can be broken even without kill, capture & destroy having provided any meaningful contribution to it (although that was a strawman argument of yours because I did not argue about their absence, but about the low promise of your approach).

Strategic level example; make diplomatic (and military) progress that mobilizes several neighbours of your enemy as your soon-to-be-allies. They all become potential adversaries of your enemy, he will fear a multi-front war against terrible odds and may give up in a limited conflict (to seek a quick peace by negotiations would at least be a rational choice, and thus be well in the realm of the possible).

Operational level example; deception operations suggest that the enemy won't be able to hold his line, additional offensive preparations motivate him to leave his positions in favour of better defensive positions to the rear.

Tactical level example: Again deception, visual and acoustic impressions - even the mere threat can break the will of a tactical commander. Some (especially limited) wars (such as border conflicts) can indeed be won by simply routing a single regiment or brigade.

Killing is not a particularly promising approach for forcing the enemy to give up in any but the strictly tactical level. Killing fanatizes both sides. It makes it harder to negotiate a moderate peace (because even the own people become more extreme), raising the amount of effort that you need to succeed. It does also activate a lot of resistance will on the upper levels of war (strategic, political, national moral).
A smarter approach would be to keep the flame of war small, for most things are easier then. Think of the French; their morale didn't fully break during WWI even though there were mass desertions in 1917. Their morale was extremely brittle after only about nine months of drôle de guerre, though. A lot of killing during those months would have fired them up, motivated them to invest more into their army's training and improved their overall resistance readiness.

And then there's the example of bombing campaigns. The typical idea is that more bombing increases the likeliness that the enemy gives up.
Yet, a rational analysis shows that the more you destroy, the less he's got left to lose. The threat shrinks.
The credible threat of destruction is actually a greater political lever (at the peace negotiations table) than actual destruction. The sunk costs fallacy can even reinforce this effect; some people want to fight on simply because they cannot accept that such great suffering was for no good.

I'd also like to point out that Germany lost WW2 despite being militarily better equipped and about as well manned a few months before its final defeat than at the outbreak of hostilities. WW2 battles saw much killing, but the local (tactical), regional (operational) and strategic overpowering was the key to success.
The killing, capture and destruction part merely aided the overpowerering effort, and the overpowering would also have worked in a drôle de guerre because the allies would still have had many times as many aircraft, tanks and men by 1945 after six years drôle de guerre - even if no side fired a shot.
Overpowering does therefore earn at least as much attention as the destructive activity of warfare.
Overpowering does fit into CvC's "disarm" if you keep in mind that at excessive force ratios your inferior forces become useless and you're therefore in such a situation de facto disarmed, incapable of expecting success by further military resistance.

War among states is a continuation of (dumb) policy. I believe we also agree that war does not put policy to a rest till its end. Policy goes on, and becomes a part of the war. The artificial separation of combatant and political actions in war that was introduced after the age of kings leading armies makes little sense.
Political actions can substitute for military actions (kill, capture, destroy) and can be extremely powerful.
Some wars in history were won (or prevented) by cutting the enemy's connection to a creditor!

There's so much more than kill, capture & destroy. These three obvious activities are understood even by Third World Colonel-dictators. We should seek the potential for improvement of the art of war in aspects of warfare that have (by comparison) been neglected in military theory because they were less easily accessible.

You should be well aware that you do usually emphasize the "kill" aspect in threads enough to justify being paraphrased with "kill! kill! kill!". You didn't do that to the same extent here, and I do strongly suspect that this was done purposefully to reduce the vulnerability of your position to my critique.

Sorry, but my position on this, is utterly consistent. I am not aware of being vulnerable to anything other than invention. You cannot capture unless you kill or threaten to kill. That which destroys also kills, etc etc.

Yes, I do emphasise killing (kinetic effects). I do not and have never said pursue it to the exclusion of all else. Killing is only instrumental. You will never get the enemy to surrender, until you have done him some collective harm.
The reason I feel it necessary to emphasise something this obvious is because people here get confused as to the aims of applying armed force, within the context of politics. Armed force means killing - and the things that flow from it. - Capture, breaking of will. IF you are not using armed force, you are using politics and diplomacy.

Strategic level example; make diplomatic (and military) progress that mobilizes several neighbours of your enemy as your soon-to-be-allies. They all become potential adversaries of your enemy....

Strategy uses all instruments of power. Thanks for the lesson.

Operational level example; deception operations suggest that the enemy won't be able to hold his line, additional offensive preparations motivate him to leave his positions in favour of better defensive positions to the rear.

Well I do no believe there is an "Operational level," but OK. Deception Operations? And... Deception operations are predicated on fear of harm/death. Deception is aimed at surprise. Surprise aims to make him unprepared for the harm you will do him.

Tactical level example: Again deception, visual and acoustic impressions - even the mere threat can break the will of a tactical commander....

Again, all nice in a perfect world of poor enemies, and stupid people.

Killing is not a particularly promising approach for forcing the enemy to give up in any but the strictly tactical level.

So Japan surrendered because it wasn't really worried about the next bomb?
The US withdrew from Vietnam because they could risk another 60,000 KIA?
So what you are telling me is that killing is not the best way to break will?

Killing fanatizes both sides. It makes it harder to negotiate a moderate peace (because even the own people become more extreme), raising the amount of effort that you need to succeed.

Seriously? After 3,500 years of organised violence, you want some "better way?"

There's so much more than kill, capture & destroy. .

Give men specifics relevant to the use of force, that can break the collective will. I am of the opinion that Psychological parlour tricks do not work.

As both Foch and Clausewitz warned, I have little patience for the idea that wars can be won without killing. - and I think it can be done better.

Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Give men specifics relevant to the use of force, that can break the collective will. I am of the opinion that Psychological parlour tricks do not work.

As both Foch and Clausewitz warned, I have little patience for the idea that wars can be won without killing. - and I think it can be done better.

a)
Cut his lines of communications. The amount of required killing/capturing/destruction is almost marginal in comparison to the effect; the enemy will likely withdraw (= broke his will to hold the line or advance).

b)
Please do not repeat that strawman argument yet again. I did not advocate warfare without killing. I advocate improvements of the art of war with smarter approaches than to simply increase the intensity of violence.
A 10 y.o. kid can tell you that killing, capturing and destruction is successful in its computer game. The worthwhile military theory advances need to be pursued in other areas than the primitive & obvious.

Besides; wars can occasionally be won without much killing. That's a niche solution that's not universally applicable, though.

Seriously? After 3,500 years of organised violence, you want some "better way?"

Those who don't should limit themselves to military history and should not discuss modern military theory, for it would be a waste of time.
Yes, I want it to be done better, and for a reason. We had no really major conflicts for 65 years, a similar period as the ~40 years without conflict between modern European great powers before 1912. We are not prepared, and peacetime improvements of military theory can substitute for some bloody lessons the next time politicians really f+*~ it up.

a)
Cut his lines of communications. The amount of required killing/capturing/destruction is almost marginal in comparison to the effect; the enemy will likely withdraw (= broke his will to hold the line or advance).

As I said before, I'm a big fan of Isolation, at all levels. As concerns the conduct of operations, I'm firmly rooted in orthodox proto-modern warfare. - and you isolate to enhance destruction. Isolation cannot guarantee destruction.

The worthwhile military theory advances need to be pursued in other areas than the primitive & obvious.

OK, that's your opinion. I think you are wrong, basically because most armies are not actually that good at warfare. Most people do not and cannot do "primitive and obvious."
- I just want to do the simplest thing that works and that can be taught in a simple way. At the end of the day you are trusting your ideas to very frightened young men who do not want fancy complicated stuff.

Besides; wars can occasionally be won without much killing. That's a niche solution that's not universally applicable, though.

The you wont have to kill that many to find that out. - you cannot plan for it.

We are not prepared, and peacetime improvements of military theory can substitute for some bloody lessons the next time politicians really f+*~ it up.

I'd forget about the theory. I am beginning to think "Military thought" is a largely a pseudo-science. I have just read JFC Fullers 1922, "The Reformation of War." - it's garbage - like a great deal of military theory.

The question I ask is "can this be taught?" If it can, then it might help.

Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Maybe. We do need a solid theoretical grounding for strategy, tactics, operations and equipment capability.
...the problem is most is very bad, and will always be meaningless unless it translates into, or supports practice.

Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

This is indeed a "must see" movie for anyone involved in any way with our current operations in the Middle East; or even for those who have no direct involvement at all but are trying to understand what is going on and why.

I was surprised by the depth of understanding of insurgency and the balanced approach to telling the story from both sides. An impressive piece of work. Put this on the shelf next to your copy of Galula; and well in front of your COIN FM.

Robert C. JonesIntellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self."Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

David Petraeus Wants This French Novel Back in Print!
Why Jean Larteguy's The Centurions appeals to our generation's most influential military strategist.

A copy of Jean Larteguy's The Centurions, an out-of-print French novel about paratroopers in Indochina and Algeria, can go for more than $1,700 on Amazon. That's reason enough for its republication this January by Amereon LTD for a list price of $59.95. But when I called the publisher, Jed Clauss, it turned out money wasn't his primary motivation: "Look, I'm an old guy," he said, "I'm at the end of my publishing career. I now only do fun projects. But David Petraeus wanted this republished. So I'm doing it."

Sounds like a great read and true dyed in the wool story of colonial soldiers fighting against all odds to suppress the flame of liberty among the oppressed populace of their colony.

"Centurions" is an accurate title. The Roman business model was "conquer and tax" and it was their Legions that made that business model work.

Which brings us to the sad accuracy and insights into our current approaches in this quote from the article Adam links to above:

In one of his last major interviews, McChrystal told the Atlantic: "We in JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] had this sense of … mission, passion … I don't know what you call it. The insurgents had a real cause, and we had a counter-cause. We had a level of unit cohesion just like in The Centurions.

So, if cause of the populace is a liberty free from the illegitimacy of some foreign intervening power, what exactly would one call that "counter-cause"? This is what happens when such operations are given to the military to resolve. It is far too easy to become intoxicated by the thrill of the hunt, to become obsessed with the accomplishment of the mission, etc. JSOC has become extremely good at what they do. What we are missing is a context that asks the question of if what they do produces any good.

I sat in too many morning office calls with the Commander, where the other two "tribes" would regale the commander with tales of "HVTs" killed in the night, or truckloads of opium stopped and burned in the desert. Truly some exciting, impressive operations on a near nightly basis. But to what effect on addressing the insurgency or addressing the danger of AQ? Then to lay out the persistent, populace focused efforts of the third tribe across the vast expanses of battle space where few conventional forces venture and where the other tribes only stayed long enough to kill, burn, count and leave. To (albeit rare, and from one BG in particular) comments like "Boy, the other guys are rolling up JPELs like crazy, when are you guys going to do something?"

Some of this is ignorance, and is curable. But stupid is a life sentence.

Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-28-2011 at 09:59 PM.
Reason: Citation in quotes not italics

Robert C. JonesIntellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self."Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

You should probably read the book. It doesn't sound like you have. The characters are motivated primarily by anti-Communism. That is how they saw themselves. They didn't see themselves as colonial oppressors. Whether their self-perceptions were accurate, who knows? But they saw themselves as holding back the Communists.

On another question, I read in so many places that night raids and numbers counting are doing us a world of hurt. Do you think that true and will they ever be stopped? From what little I know, they fell in love with these things in Iraq, where it worked; and use them enthusiastically in Afghan, where they don't.

The objective of this case study is to contributeto increased analytic understanding of revolutionary (internal) war. Specifically, the study analyzes the Algerian Revolution by examining two types of information in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, form, and outcome of the revolution:

(1) social, economic, and political factors in the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary situations;

(2) structural and functional factors of the revolutionary movement, such as the compositionof actors and followers, revolutionary strategy and goals, organization and techniques.

The study is not focused on the strategy and tactics of countering revolutions. On the premise that development of U.S. policies and operations for countering revolutions--where that is in the national interest--will be improved by a better understanding of what it is that is to be countered, the study concentrates on the character and the dynamics of the revolution.