ORL

Hey Dallas – Thank you for a great first day. Here are some downloads that we talked about today that will help you in your endeavors. I’ve also included the text of the Urban Charger Intelligence Report below this list of downloads.

In the lead up to the decision, ACE participants published Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and supporting Intelligence Requirements (IR), as well as an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) product. (Three snapshots of the IPB Product follow. This is a very small percentage of the information contained in the IPB product, but gives you some great situational awareness of the area.)

One point to make about the IPB: very little of the violence was perpetrated by those who lived in Ferguson. The third item shows the crime statistics for the area: the fact of the matter is that Ferguson produces average crime rates. Out-of-area rioters (from Jennings and other places) are very likely responsible for most of the violence that occurred in Ferguson. I don’t know why no one else is picking up on that, because it’s one of the greatest pieces of Intelligence in the whole situation.

Population Density IVO Ferguson.

Income Density IVO Ferguson.

Ferguson has an average crime rate. Most of the violent protestors are from outside of Ferguson.

As soon as the press began announcing that a decision had been reached, we spun up ACE Operations. We put four collectors on monitoring OSINT and COMINT, and began to hear the National Guard elements move from their staging locations to some forward positions, roughly 90 minutes before the decision was broadcast. This was a good indicator that the National Guard were preparing for a No True Bill decision, and identifying this indicator immediately allowed the ACE to prepare accordingly. Forward positions for National Guard elements included fire stations, electrical substations, the mall, and some static posts.

At about 1900L, we received intelligence information that the National Guard set up a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at the Target superstore on West Flourrisant Ave. Callsigns observed at this time included Tango1, Tango2, Tango5, and Warfighter33. Warfighter33 was determined to be the callsign for the command element at the National Guard TOC.

From 1900L until the decision was made public, we observed National Guard elements (callsigns Tango1, Tango2, Tango3, and Tango5) picking up and dropping off unidentified personnel at various locations. (The unidentified personnel were likely National Guard troops.) These elements were likely traveling in thin skinned HMMVs. Some elements may have been dropped off at guard posts without transportation. (Other observed callsigns included Tac-A and Tac-B.)

At 1940L, intelligence information confirmed the presence of a thin skinned HMMV with an unidentified turret-mounted weapon system on station at a courthouse in St. Louis. There were no reports of any weapon systems mounted on HMMVs in Ferguson.

At 1950L, we received the first report of violent activity when two black males committed armed robbery at the corner of Kingman Drive and MLK Boulevard. At least one of the suspects was armed with a handgun. The level of violent activity steadily increased from this point.

Beginning at roughly 2000L, multiple new units were coming online and conducting radio checks (callsigns included Defender27, Warfighter11, Castle1, and Medic902. It is believed that these were additional National Guard elements, due to the callsign of “Regulator (indiscernible)” and an unidentified medical unit. In addition to the local emergency services frequencies, it was reported that National Guard elements were also using cell phones to communicate.

At 2050L, Squad 238 (local Law Enforcement unit) began receiving small arms fire, and was advised to move their location to avoid escalation of force. This was the first of numerous reports of Law Enforcement elements receiving or hearing small arms fire. Squad 238 was particularly involved in violent demonstrations from the rioters.

After 2100L, all available 200-series units began forming a skirmish line and moving north from their position (NFI).

At 2123L, we received reports of an element from the Fire Department receiving small arms fire (NFI).

At 2130L, a woman reported that her husband was beat up by unidentified individuals, kidnapped and thrown in a van, which sped away (NFI).

From 2130L to the end of ACE Operations, there were numerous reports of looting and other violent activities, which are all included in the Raw Data section.

Reported National Guard locations.

Traffic closures as of 2000L.

A photo of a HMMV, with no mounted weapon IVO Ferguson.

A Molotov cocktail photographed IVO Ferguson.

Unit patch of Missouri National Guard.

Lessons Learned

The biggest Lesson Learned is that with some facilitation and team work, a small group involved in ACE Operations can effectively battle track an emergency, as long as they have the means to collect intelligence information. The following are portions of participants’ feedback and Lessons Learned.

Brian: The Urban Charger (UC) operation was an incredible learning experience on using the methods taught by Samuel Culper through Guerrillamerica.com and the Culper Institute… UC had a long lead time and advanced preparation by establishing the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) early to facilitate a great list of primary intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements (IR).

Once the PIR and IR were vetted and posted, I began working on a quick IPC using the template from the Culper Institute Intelligence Preparation of the Community class and the Forward Observer Area Study class… Mapping was good and I missed an opportunity to upload my Google Earth .kmz of the UC operation early. It was well after the first night of rioting when I thought to share that file in the Open Source Intelligence group (OSINT).

Everyone did a great job using OSINT to get a volume of information that created a great picture of the actions. The team, in my untrained opinion, was great and did the work expected. If I wanted to see what was going on with no prior knowledge of events, I believe the collected and published information would certainly meet the objective.

I enjoyed the UC and I look forward to participating again in a similar operation in the future. I picked up valuable tips on application such as tasking assignments, use of various documents, radio monitoring, and sharing information. I cannot thank you enough for the time you take to make these things happen and for the information you share with all of us.

Robert: During the group chat after the event, someone (might have been me, I cant remember now) mentioned doing a live and in person ACE type event. I have been thinking on this over the break and would be really interested in it. I don’t think I am nearly ready for that sort of thing and would want to go through more of the Culper Institute classes first but it is something that I think would be invaluable.

It would be ideal if it could be scheduled around an actual event but how often do those come up with enough notice to book a place to gather and travel arragements and all of that. If we ever got organized enough to do a weekend like that, I have a place here in Texas with a proper network, projectors, enough seating, overhead sound system, etc. Really the only requirement of anyone attending would be to bring a laptop or desktop. Probably even have enough spare monitors to get everyone on at least a dual screen setup with their laptops.

Pre-Event Collection & Analysis

Here are portions (about half) of the pre-event collection and analysis:

What is the strength and disposition of law enforcement organizations in the AO?
• St. Charles County Sheriff – ???
• St. Louis County Police – 1,100 personnel in all divisions
• City of St. Louis Police – 1,843 personnel in all divisions
• Ferguson Police – 74 personnel

001 Analysis Report

Unified Command in St. Louis can field 2237 Police officers for 5 days. After 5 days they will be able to field 1801 officers (or 80% of the surge capacity). I estimate that the St. Louis Metropolitan Area (and satellite cities like Ferguson) normally field approximately 660 sworn officers per shift. Therefore 2237 in a surge capacity represents a 338% increase from normal police presence.

Protestors Most Dangerous Course of Action would involve additional protests/riots in Kansas City. This would significantly reduce the number of police officers KC could send to STL in support of anti-civil disturbance activities.

If I was an LE analyst I would recommend: Unified Command in STL have any officers “on loan” from other P.D.’s remove any location identification from their uniforms.

Unified Command should monitor protest groups to determine if their are any plans to protest in neighboring cities in the state, and what cities are threatened.

From the Perspective of the Protestors:

Law Enforcement Most Dangerous Course of Action would involve massive police and National Guard presence that curtails lawful expression of natural rights (including right to assemble, right of free speech, etc.). This action by L.E. could be anywhere on the spectrum of denying right to assemble, to mass arrests, to use of deadly force to disperse crowds.

If I was a protestor:

Identify what cities are sending police officers to STL in support of the Unified Command. Consider at least a feint if not actual protests in KC, and other large metro areas in Missouri by population. This will remove pressure from the main effort (protests in STL/Ferguson). Less police officers the Unified Command has to work with, the less options they have, and the shorter duration they will be able to field their “surge” force.

Assumptions and Limitations:

1) STL Metro PD and Ferguson PD define “surge” as 80% on duty.

2) Missouri State Police assign 30% of the 1097 officers to Unified Command.

3) The 9 largest cities in MO (by population) besides STL detail 20% of their officers to the Unified Command.

4) The National Guard fields 200 soldiers (like they did for the August riots) and offers them in support of the Unified Command.

5) No effort was made to include Federal Law Enforcement agencies in this analysis.

Raw Data
PIR1: What are the observed TTPs of Local, State and/or Federal Law Enforcement?
– IR1: What is the LE:Protester ratio in the AO?
– IR2: What LE vehicles are on scene?
2001L: Confirmed Air unit back over Ferguson at this time.
– IR3: What LE lethal/less lethal weapons are being used?
– IR4: What is the strength and disposition of the LE Agencies?
1927L: Early radio transmission confirmed the use of two choppers over Ferguson. “Air2 returning for fuel.” (AC: Air asset. STL Metro PD has three aircraft, two rotary wing helo’s and one fixed wing Cessna 172.)
2023L: Responding PD Unit: Team 231
2033L: Team 228 on Adams street
2033L: Police with helmets and riot shields (no body gear) pulling protestors out of the crowd
2034L: 3268 on site at Miramac
2036L: 52 south central, sending units. “large group moving to backpacks”

PIR2: What are the observed TTPs of the National Guard?
– IR1: What is the responding NG unit?
– IR2: What is the strength and disposition of the NG unit?
1900L: (T-90 minutes before the announcement), National Guard units began to forward stage. (AC: This is an example of an indicator.) Locations included fire stations, electrical substations, and static strategic posts.
1900L: “Arrived at Fire Station, just unloaded our troops,” was transmitted over the local police frequency.
1900L: National Guard command post/tactical operations center (TOC) was situated at the Target on West Flourissant. Observed call signs included Tang1, Tango2, Tango5 and Warfighter33. (AC: Warfighter33 is the Call Sign for the NG Command Element.)
1921L: “Tango 5 enroute back to base with three (pax) on board.” (AC: ‘Pax’ is a code word for personnel.)
1927L: National Guard unit at Galleria Mall, thin skinned HMV, 3 Guardsmen visible.
1931L: 2-4 man NG elements posted at substations and firestations, all sound to be static posts to stop damage. Unarmored humvees observed so far, but some elements appear to be dropped off without transport.
1950L: National Guard are making secured pickups of personnel and bringing them back to the TOC. (AC: Unclear as to who.)
1956L: “Tango 2, Tango 3 made it to St Louis Justice Center, on station now.”
1957L: “Tango 5 arrive back at base with 3 packs.” (AC: Three passengers.)
2003L: Multiple new units coming online performing radio checks.
2004L: At least on new Guard unit “Regulator____” and a Medic Unit
2019L: Tow truck was trying to make entry into secured area and NG and Ferg PD called to check if it had been requested. They denied request.
2020L: Defender27, new unit on comms.
2021L: NG unit also using cell phones to communicate.
2022L: Tango 2 on base with 2 packs.
2024L: Warfighter11, new unit on comms.
2026L: “unit on station at verdue (spelling) shopping center”
2027L: Castle1 new unit. Medic902 new unit.
2051L: Squad 238 being advised to move due to shots fired.
– IR3: What NG vehicles are present in the AO?
1927L: National Guard unit at Galleria Mall, thin skinned HMV, 3 Guardsmen visible.
1940L: Armored HMMV with turret mount located outside court building in St Louis proper (AC: NFI on weapon system. Based on current TTPs, likely a M240B or M249.)
No weapon mounted in the turret * in Ferguson.

– IR4: What LE lethal/less lethal weapons are being used?
1940L: Armored HMMV with turret mount located outside court building in St Louis proper (AC: NFI on weapon system. Based on current TTPs, likely a M240B or M249.)

PIR3: What are the observed TTPs of the protestors/rioters?
– IR1: How are the protestors/rioters coordinating command and control?
– IR2: How are the protestors/rioters communicating?
– IR3: What weapons/improvised weapons are being used in the AO?
1922L: Ferguson police department is reporting a black male with a long gun (NFI) at the Little Caesar’s showing off for the crowd.
1950L: Armed robbery being reported at the corner of Kingman Dr and MLK Blvd. 2 black males, fled in vehicle one armed with handgun (NFI.)
2037L: Lancer occupied by Black male with grey hoody throwing ammo at police line
2037L: Shots fired! 7343 Jennwood (sp)_
2037L: Multiple shoots fired calls now
2038L: 4659 Mattis Rd Explosion reported
2039L: Windows broken out by protestors on S. Florrsent
2050L: Squad 238 at Florissant and Paul have had several shots discharged at their location.
2054L: Shots fired were from Harrison (st/rd).
– IR4: What is the strength and disposition of the rioters?
1924L: North Florissant Rd shut off by protestors. Using persons and vehicles.
1949L: Crowd estimated 350+ outside Ferguson PD
2032L: Large crowd moving down Adams.

PART 2 ———— 2045L +
Front line officers at pd reporting objects being thrown at them

Com unit is seprate from Command post. They just reported looting at 145 S Fl. At Boost mobile store