"We
have just celebrated the fifth
anniversary of the conclusion of our
non-aggression pact with Poland. There
can scarcely be any difference of
opinion today among the true friends of
peace as to the value of this agreement.
One only needs to ask oneself what might
have happened to Europe if this
agreement, which brought such relief,
had not been entered into 5 years ago.
In signing it, the great Polish marshal
and patriot rendered his people just as
great a service as the leaders of the
National Socialist State rendered the
German people. During the troubled
months of the past year, the friendship
between Germany and Poland has been one
of the reassuring factors in the
political life of Europe."

But
that utterance was the last friendly word from
Germany to Poland, and the last occasion on
which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the
German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During
February 1939 silence fell upon German demands`
in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final
absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place and
Germany had also occupied Memel, Nazi pressure
upon Poland was at once renewed. In two
conversations which he and the Defendant
Ribbentrop held on the 21st of March and the
26th of March, respectively, with the Polish
Ambassador, German demands upon Poland were
renewed and were further pressed. And in view of
the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia, in
view of the grave deterioration in her
strategical position towards Germany, it is not
surprising that the Polish Government took alarm
at the developments. Nor were they alone. The
events of March 1939 had at last convinced both
the English and the French Governments that the
Nazi designs of aggression were not limited to
men of German race, and that the specter of
European war resulting from further aggressions
by Nazi Germany had not, after all, been
exorcised by the Munich Agreement.

As
a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland
and of England and of France at the events in
Czechoslovakia, and at the newly applied
pressure on Poland, conversations between the
English and Polish Governments had been taking
place, and, on the 31st of March 1939, Mr.
Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of
Commons, stated that His Majesty's Government
had given an assurance to help Poland in the
event of any action which clearly threatened
Polish independence and which the Polish
Government accordingly considered it vital to
resist. On the 6th of April 1939 an Anglo-Polish
communique stated that the two countries were
prepared to enter into an agreement of a
permanent and reciprocal character to replace
the present temporary and unilateral assurance
given by His Majesty's Government.

The
justification for that concern on the part of
the democratic powers is not difficult to find.
With the evidence which we now