[* Thatcher wou nie hê dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering sonder die goedkeuring van die Verenigde Nasies teen Swapo se verbreking van die wapenstilstand optree nie: “If the South Africans took unilateral action, ‘the whole world will be against you – led by me!’” (1318). Die bemoeisieke Renwick wou die Swapo-terroriste soveel moontlik beskerm: “I argued fiercely against air strikes … As I returned to Windhoek, I was told that the UN had accepted the need for action to deal with the incursions and Pik Botha told me the air strikes had been called off. Ground forces and police units were allowed to deploy instead” (1326).]

[** “With an estimated 35 000 insurgents flooding into the country to vote, and to cause trouble if the outcome was not to their liking, the security forces certainly had to be on their toes” (George Selby, From safari suit to camouflage, edited by Lillian van Velden, Partridge Publishing, 2016, 276p; Amazon Kindle $4,55, 4498). “It was amazing just how many blacks had already gathered for the next day’s voting, many of them carrying weapons: RPG-7s, machine guns, and rifles” (4557). “As more and more insurgents came out of the bush, so did intimidation and beatings of the locals, who had no choice but to vote for whom they were told” (4580). “The three days of polling were full of tension as many heavily armed insurgents loitered around the polling station” (4617). Vir meer inligting: “Verraad in Rhodesië/Zimbabwe en Suid-Afrika (Praag 3.04.2016).]

Ten spyte van al die bedenklikhede wat feitelik korrek aan Nelson Mandela toegeskryf kan word, verklaar Renwick: “My admiration for him was second to no one’s … the great man” (45; ook 2179). “He did indeed have some saintly characteristics … the authentic Mandela, generous in spirit, libertarian by instinct, and inspirational to everyone he met – including me” (62). Ná Mandela se vrylating Renwick “met him in the tiny match-box-style house he had returned to … The contrast was dramatic between these humble surroundings and the quality of the man inside” (1788). “His old-world courtesy and unfailing charm served to mask a steely determination not to compromise any of the principles for which he and others had sacrificed their liberty or lives” (1797).

Die kettingroker FW de Klerk word uiteraard positief deur Renwick voorgestel omdat De Klerk daarin geslaag het om blanke politieke mag mandaatloos aan swart mag oor te gee. “I found him to be open, friendly and impressively self-confident” (673). Ook: “FW de Klerk was friendly, approachable, personally impressive” (1064) en “I had been impressed by De Klerk’s strength of character” (1083). “I was able to establish a regular pattern of meetings with De Klerk” (1141). “I always found him focused on getting to the next stage and never losing sight of the goal, which was to agree [to] a new constitution that would give political rights to all South Africans” (97).

Daar is ‘n De Klerk-kenmerk wat myns insiens ‘n deurslaggewende rol in sy oorgawe aan swart mag gespeel het: “De Klerk said that he was not security-dominated in his thinking” (1113). “In his first decision as President, he had banned use by the police of the sjambok” (1490); eintlik knuppel. Na sy toespraak in die parlement op 2 Februarie 1990 “virtually all the troops had been withdrawn from the townships” (1711). In sy naïwiteit het De Klerk geen idee gehad van die boosheid van die vyand waarmee hy spoedig onvoorwaardelik onderhandel het nie. Onmiddellik na sy vrylating Mandela “reaffirmed his commitment to the armed struggle … ‘Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts’” (1723). Maar Douglas Hurd, die Britse minister van buitelandse sake (1989-1995) het De Klerk beskryf as “an amazingly brave and wise man” (1893).

In sy boek wou Renwick ‘n lansie vir Thatcher breek: “I hope that this book will lay finally to rest the contention that Margaret Thatcher was ‘a friend of apartheid’ and called Nelson Mandela a ‘terrorist’ (which, as a matter of fact, she never did)” (114); wat nie impliseer dat Mandela nie ‘n terroris was nie. By geleentheid het die ANC probeer om Thatcher af te dreig met “British businesses in South Africa would become legitimate targets for attack” – “if she continued to oppose sanctions” (759). Die Britse sanksies het “arms, oil and nuclear embargoes” ingesluit (1760) maar nie algemene handelsanksies nie. “Understandably irritated, she replied that this showed what a typical terrorist organisation the ANC was” (759). “Thatcher had never been an admirer of the ANC, given that the ‘armed struggle’ had been extended to civilian targets and included the necklacing of ‘collaborators’, and that the organisation was committed to nationalisation of much of the economy. Moreover, she had not failed to notice that, despite the SACP’s lack of any mass support, two-thirds of the ANC’s politburo were members of the SACP” (759).

Waarop Thatcher deurgaans aangedring het, was “the release of Nelson Mandela, the repeal of all the apartheid laws and independence for Namibia” (123) en “the front-line states should be spared further attacks by the South African armed forces” (412). Renwick het aan Thatcher voorgestel hoe sy die PW Botha-regering kon afdreig: “any major cross-border raids … would make her position intolerable and result in the withdrawal of her support” (500). In 1983 het Thatcher geskryf “that the exclusion of blacks from the political process was ‘a powerful factor in compelling black politicians to seek by violence what is denied to them by the laws under which they live’” (392). Op hierdie manier word terrorisme goedgepraat.

Soms het Thatcher se deuntjie ietwat verander: “She was, she said, against all forms of terrorism, but the ANC was an important factor in South African politics. The question was how to get them to give up violence” (1013). Die ANC was so verknog aan geweld dat hy dit nooit afgesweer het nie. FW de Klerk se “oplossing” was om met hierdie gewelddenaars te onderhandel terwyl hulle terselfdertyd met hulle geweld voortgegaan het, met uiteindelik die katastrofiese resultaat van oorgawe aan swart mag. Ná haar eerste ontmoeting met Mandela het Thatcher gesê: “‘I warmed to him.’ She told Mandela that he would get support from the British government in the negotiations for a new constitution … She concluded that ‘South Africa was lucky to have a man of Mr Mandela’s stature at such a time’” (2142).

Volgens Renwick PW Botha “never forgot that his mother had been interned by the British during the Anglo-Boer War” (546). Waaraan het tweegesprekke met PW Botha vir Renwick herinner? “Conjuring up images of what it must have been like calling on the Führer in his bunker” (546). Renwick lug later weer sy smerige begeerte om PW Botha met Adolf Hitler se vergelyk: “The last-ditch atmosphere around PW Botha was like that which must have prevailed around Hitler in his bunker” (1042). Oor PW Botha se uittrede as president skryf Renwick: “I doubted that he would agree to go gracefully, but felt a sense of great relief and satisfaction at seeing the last of him. For this was a man who never should have been put in charge of the fortunes of his or any other country” (1413). Renwick sê nie iets soortgelyks van enige swarte nie; dus ook nie van bv Jacob Zuma of Robert Mugabe nie.

PW Botha “exercised a reign of terror over the cabinet. He believed in intimidation across the board” (750). Daar was ook “PW Botha’s chief henchman, the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, leader of the group of so-called securocrats … Malan was a great believer in ‘taking out’ enemies of the regime, internally through special force units, which had developed into assassination squads, and externally by whatever means were necessary” (657). “If the security police and military intelligence were allowed to continue their activities, including murder squads, unchecked, there was no way any of us were going to be able to help South Africa” (1104). Renwick verwys na “the lunatic fringes of the security establishment” (1384) maar die misdadige optrede van swart terreurbendes word nêrens deur Renwick veroordeel nie. Die naaste wat hy daaraan kom, is wanneer hy verwys na “the equally violent record of members of the security forces” (1874).

“I also tried to establish friendships with a number of ex-Robben Islanders” (640) en ander swart politieke leiers. “A number of Robben Islanders became regular visitors to the embassy, as did a number of National Party MPs” (649), wat vir Renwick gehelp het om die Nasionale Party te rysmier: “Some at least among them could hardly fail to be impressed by the qualities of those the regime had condemned to years of imprisonment for their political acts and views” (657). Die (opportunistiese) politieke begeertes van swartes word “legitimate aspirations” genoem (824). Oor die “apartheidsregime” beweer Renwick “you [are] isolating yourselves” (915). Die ANC, PAC en Swapo se terreurbendes word nie terroriste genoem nie maar “guerrillas” (bv 1159).

“I went to Soweto to meet Walter Sisulu and the other released Robben Islanders … I told them that I had spoken to the government about the need not to interfere with the planned rally to welcome them back to Soweto … It was an emotional occasion to meet at last these legendary figures in the history of the ANC. None of the venerable gentlemen … looked very much like revolutionaries, though several were members of the SACP” (1574). “In his public statements following his release, Sisulu continued to emphasise the armed struggle. He also called for more sanctions” (1584).

Renwick het Suidwes-Afrika besoek toe Suid-Afrikaanse troepe in Angola militêr teen Swapo en (ander) kommunistiese magte bedrywig was. Let op Renwick se bevooroordeelde invalshoek: “I was briefed by a half-mad South African colonel on the battle of the Lomba River … On the struggle against Swapo in Namibia, he took the view that victory was certain — but for the efforts of the enemy within. When I inquired who the enemy within were, he replied: ‘The churches, the trade unions and the teachers’” (1193). Renwick het nie daarvan gehou dat kommunistiese magte deur die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe opgehel word nie. “I asked the South Africans whether they did not think they were in danger of overreaching themselves. Johan Heyns inquired publicly whether it made sense to have men ‘defending South Africa’ two hundred miles inside Angola” (1211). Dus, voorspringaksies moet nie buite Suid-Afrikaanse grondgebied uitgevoer word nie; ons moes wag totdat terroriste ons land binnegedring en verwoesting plaaslik gesaai het. Die onafhanklikwording van Suidwes-Afrika word soos volg deur Renwick beskryf: “Namibia returned to legality” (1301).

Ná sy vrylating Mandela “needed some practical help from us. Not wanting to rely for his security only on the South African police, he asked us to provide training for his personal bodyguards, which we arranged for the SAS [British Special Air Service] to do. Later on, when he moved to his wife’s much larger house, he asked for our help in providing better privacy and security there” (1833). Die Britte kon nooit genoeg by Mandela kruip nie. Toe Mandela Brittanje en Amerika besoek het, het die goeie Britte vir hom gedoen wat hulle kon: “To give him some rest before going there [America], we planned to arrange for him to spend a quiet weekend in the English countryside with his great friend and colleague Oliver Tambo” (2076).

Ek dink Suid-Afrika sou beter daaraan toe gewees het as Renwick nooit toegelaat is om sy voete in Suid-Afrika te sit nie. Hy is egter vereer toe sy termyn as Britse ambassadeur in Suid-Afrika in 1991 verstryk het. “When I left, Wits University, on the proposal of Helen Suzman, was kind enough to award me an honorary degree ‘for services to the struggle against apartheid’. (The offer from the South African government of the Order of Good Hope I had to decline – on the same grounds Margaret Thatcher had declined the freedom of the city of Johannesburg)” (2585). Volgens Renwick was daar iets “that pleased me the most” tydens sy plaaslike ambassadeurskap: “It was possible to try to act as a genuinely honest broker … I left with an unaccustomed sense of humility” (2594).