Discovering the adversary, one day at a time

Counterterrorism

January 20, 2013

As I blogged yesterday, here is the 2012 list of AQIM-related events in Illizi province. My news sources didn't have reports for June or July, and so the set is incomplete. Still, I think it shows a qualitiative change in the militant activity in Illizi between 2011 and 2012: more arms caches, more reports of cross border training. Though it's certainly not enough information to make solid analytical conclusions, the information hints at a consolidation of AQIM/militant operations (possibly leadership) in Libya, challenging the idea that northern Mali is AQIM's "base."

An unknown number of suspected AQIM members were arrested
at the Niger border. A local report
notes that the militants were crossing the border with hundreds of small arms
and light weapons

17 January

3 AQIM operatives kidnapped the governor of the Illizi
province in Debdab. The militants released a political aide and a driver who
were with the governor at the time. They were released a day later

22 January

2 AQIM suspected of weapons trafficking were arrested near
the Libyan border

06 February

7 AQIM suspects were arrested in several locations in
Algeria, including Ghardaïa, Illizi, Adrar and Tamanrasset provinces. The suspects were alleged to belong to a
weapons smuggling ring

20 February

A local report of a buried weapons cache recovered near In
Amenas. The cache allegedly contained: 15 SA-24s and 24 SA-7s

07 March

7 AQIM suspects were arrested In Amenas

13 March

1 AQIM member was arrested at an unnamed location in
Illizi province. One local report notes that he confessed to receiving
training at an AQIM camp in southern Libya

15 April

A shootout in Djanet, along the border with Libya, led to
the arrest of 2 AQIM suspects

08 August

4 AQIM suspects, including one Libyan, were arrested at an
unnamed location in Illizi

30 September

27 AQIM members were arrested at an unnamed location in
Illizi province. According to local
reporting, the suspects were part of a recruitment and training cell that
sent some members to Libya, specifically Bani Walid and Benghazi

January 19, 2013

The border region around En Amenas has been the scene of both criminal and AQIM-related activity for quite some time. In my day job, I call this activity microinstability: very select regions or localities in a country that experience extended periods of persistent threat activity. Algeria has a perfect example. Despite relatively stable public and social life (for a dictatorship) in most of the country, Tizi Ouzou remains one of the most dangerous localities in North Africa. In order to identify these patches of hell, an analyst needs to persistently study local activity, such as local crime and CT incident reporting. There's nothing innovative about the methods of research and analysis here. Rather, the innovation is how the analyst employs the information.

The few of my (few) readers around this long weekend might appreciate this list of terrorism and CT incidents for Illizi Province, Algeria for the year 2011. I'll get to 2012 later today or tomorrow.

A group called Movement of the Sons of Algeria for Islamic
Justice (MFSJ) accused the government of breaking a 2008 agreement. According
to one local report, the MFSJ was established in 2007, and attacked oil
facility at En Amenas

13 September

El-Khabar reported that energy companies operating in
southern Algeria were increasing their security measures. The measures were in response to a suspect
AQIM plot to target energy facilities in complex attacks

18 September

Algerian security forces captured 2 AQIM suspects. Local
reports suggest they were reconnoitering military facilities in the region.

18 September

Forces recovered a suspected AQIM cache of explosives
along the Niger border

August 06, 2011

Here and there in the midst of American society you meet with men full of a fanatical and almost wild spiritualism, which hardly exists in Europe. From time to time strange sects arise which endeavor to strike out extraordinary paths to eternal happiness. Religious insanity is very common in the United States.

I was at a local discount store the other day, where I saw a common sight here in Northern Virginia: a woman in a niqab. An African-American woman, wearing a niqab, was standing at the customer service counter trying to return an item. The customer service rep - another African american woman - was straining to understand her. Both were so engaged in the transaction that only the woman’s young daughter - adorned in a hijab - noticed me observing the transaction. The customer service rep was clearly uncomfortable with the transaction. Having worked a similar job, I could sympathize with her. Part of deciding whether to accept an item for return is assessing the customer’s sincerity, a nearly impossible task if you can’t see the person’s face. The niqab is a discomforting site for many people, but it very rarely poses a threat to the “public order."

Among American Muslims the niqab is shrugged off as an expression of extreme practice, but not much more. The community of women who wear niqab may be small, but more important, it is part of a broad and variable continuum of Muslim religious practice. In other words it is just one idiosyncratic expression of faith among many.

Anyone who sincerely practices an Abrahamic faith recognizes those co-religionists who perhaps take it a little too far. For the most part, they inspire indifference. Idiosyncratic characteristics of all three Abrahamic faiths lend themselves to America’s vibrant faith life. America has become home to many communities of extreme practice that co-exist in mutual indifference with everyone else. They echo de Tocqueville’s idea of America’s unique “religious insanity.”

Not so the government of France which has been meddling in the conscience of its Muslim citizens since the first hijab controversy in 1989. But with its latest effort -- the 2010 national “burqa ban” -- the government tacitly accepts defeat in a decades-long engagement with Muslim communities within French society.

France’s much-admired intellectual and political classes apparently never fully engaged the country’s Muslim communities. Its collective arguments are generalized (women’s rights), condescending, (they’re forced to wear it), and weak (it’s counter to French “ideals”) when juxtaposed to extreme Islam’s powerful appeal to conscience. As a result, whatever engagement did occur had no effect on the religious practices of the most extreme of France’s Muslim community. One spoke post-structuralist jargon concerning the power of “symbols;” the other spoke of a personal relationship with God. Both spoke past each other. In the end, the French political class chose to imposed its view of Muslim religious practices through the full force of government.

There are lessons in France’s “burqa” and foulard laws for anyone involved in the current dialogue over counterterrorism strategy or counter violent extremism (CVE) policy. They are terrible policy, creating an artificial confrontation between government and citizens where none existed before. They ignore the true roots of radical Islam in both its intellectual and physical confrontation with secularism and secular governments. Its enforcement builds a long-term environment of mutual distrust and intellectual isolation that practically guarantees homegrown collective challenges to the state within a generation

July 20, 2011

Second, the scholarly and counterterrorism communities have narrowly approached the history of al-Qaeda through the lens of Peshawar and Arab precursor organizations, such as Maktab al-Khidamat (Afghan Services Bureau). Less credence and attention has been given to areas like Loya Paktia and Miram Shah, which functioned (and continue to function) as other centers of gravity for the mobilization and operational development of foreign war volunteers and future members of al-Qaeda. These areas, and the Haqqani Network's role in them, were not only more central to the operational development of al-Qaeda than Peshawar, but have also proved to be more enduring over time.

When the Taliban fell in late 2001, Al-Qaeda leadership fled to safehavens in Pakistan. Yet, we failed to dedicate as much effort into understanding local political and cultural dynamics within Pakistan as we did (eventually) in Iraq and Afghanistan. We're still paying the price. With limited pre-9/11 resources, and continually misdirected post-9/11 resources, Western analysts quickly lost site of the obvious.

March 10, 2011

Now that Twitter is my drug of choice, I’m basing this Around the Web edition on the numerous tweets I’ve favorited over the past few weeks.

While I was stoned on twitter, Leah at All Things Counterterrorismpublished an excellent article in Foreign Policy in the true counterterrorism tradition. I also agree with her assessment of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) - they are greatly underestimated, even after Mumbai.

Evgeny Morozov’s link to this Social Science Resource Council analysis of the religion in the Arab public sphere was quite popular.

The more I see “radicalization” applied in the real world, the less I’m willing to accept its legitimacy as a discipline within counterterrorism. Daveed posted a link to a Brennan Center for Justice report on radicalization that scratches the surface of this deepening crap pile.

The Arabist linked to this Guardian article on Egypt’s media revolution.

Steve’s link to the Flaming Oil Port Index gives you a bit of context on why we’re paying over $4 dollars for Premium.

January 31, 2011

Published in 1996, the excerpt of the following article calls for the implemention of shariah into community arbitration services as a means of "improving" the current legal system in the United States. Today it offers a fascinating peek into the pre-9/11 mindset of an American Islamist: "The time to begin conceptualizing our social and judicial institutions is now." The United States and Canada appear to offer endless opportunities for future implementation of Islamic law.

The article, "Community-Based Arbitration as a Vehicle for Implementing Islamic Law in the United States," begins with the premise that

we must not be content to cling to the predominate legal system, as it continues to slowly lapse deeper into semi-paralysis, choking on its own obstructive litigiousness…Through mediation and arbitration, the Muslim community may be able to design and implement a modified system of justice that would be responsive to its concern and the might evolve into a more comprehensive one in the future.

And then goes on to offer a method of employing community arbitration services as a means of introducing Shariah into the current legal system which the authors describe through analogy as "atrophying."

The article appears in the Spring/Summer 1996 issue of The Journal of Islamic Law, a quarterly published through the Takoma Park, MD-based non-profit called the Institute for Intercultural Relations. Sometime after 2000, the title changed to The Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, and it appears to have stopped publication after 2004, only to restart in 2008 as a monthly, and only to vanish again after an October 2009 issue.

Information on the Institute is more elusive than the publication. Originally operating in Takoma Park, MD, the organization had a DC-based address in 2009. Its editor appears to have held the position of General Counsel for the Corporation for National and Community Service, but his name no longer appears on the group's website.

I don't want you to think I'm cueing some ominous music to explain an Islamist group's maniacal plot to take over the US legal system. I have no analytical opinion on the issue of various Islamist plot and plans for domination -- they're so numerous they should count as their own genre. However, I do find the ideas expressed in this article, and in other articles from the same journal, to be fascinating. They provide a window into a "mainstream" American Islamist's mindset and intent long before September 11th altered the playing field for everyone.

January 24, 2011

Well, sort of. I’m trying to be “back.” After a crazy 2010 in which I married a real life Frog and really turned 40. Not sure what my 40s will bring, but a few things are certain -- it will include counter-jihad, vulgar French idioms, petanque, and plenty of very fine wines. Unfortunately, it will also include English Premier and Ligue 1 “fuutbawl,” but that’s for a different post.

The two Aaron’s

Aaron, did some excellent work not too long ago exploring the connections between the online world of Swede suicide bomber, Taimour al-Abdaly and the online world of The Pest, aka Samir Khan.

Meanwhile, if you were reading Aaron Zelin’s Jihadology you would know that...

-- Bin Laden’s recent message to the French had nothing to say about the burqa law.

It is also through Aaron Z -- retweeted by the estimable Mr Orange -- that Mark Stout just posted a fascinating analysis of an early EIG (Egyptian Islamic Group) counter-intel piece.

One last thing...

I forgive you, Jarret...

...for employing any ideas that spring forth from the demented mind of 1998 Bad Writing contest winner, Judith Butler in your noble struggle against online jihadis. I admire your work. I loved your book. But the Butler reference is beyond the pale. She’s Lacan without the pen. Come back to us, Jarret, come back! Come back to the real world of applied jihad analysis! Sigh, well, if you insist on wasting your time in the dark chambers of post structuralism, just remember this: Sometimes a pen is just a pen.

January 19, 2011

I came across this April 2009 Le Figaroreport on the FBI’s new-found interest for things French. In it, Yves Jannier, a French counterterrorism judge, crows about French influence in FBI’s evolving CT approach.

“There has been an increase in the number of technical meetings between ex[perts from the two countries,” the report notes. “Last week French teams were at the American embassy in Paris to exchange information directly with their colleagues during the course of an encrypted videoconference...”

I have mixed emotions after reading this report.

US and French cooperation goes back a long time. And there’s been innumerable articles in the US press (random one here) on our post 9-11 Atlantic partnerships with the UK, France and other EU countries. However, I’ve never read one specifically about the Bureau before, and in the French press no less! Without knowing it, the article provides a good clue to the Bureau’s changes in CT approach. More sting operations, more arrests earlier in the radicalization "cycle."

I’m more than happy to see the Bureau finally grasp on to some strategy. When I was there in 2003, the Bureau and its phalanx of NSLU and DOJ attorneys were still drifting without a clear mandate, let alone a means of achieving it. Someone, at some point, grabbed the reigns and has sought solutions.

But did they have to be French solutions? With their draconian detention laws, and their unhealthy reliance on individual magistrates, the French way provides few checks against abuse of judicial power. Regardless of how many times Kepel condescendingly reminds his American audiences that France has not experienced a terrorist attack since the '95 Metro bombing, is this really what we want for the US?

August 14, 2010

Back in 2004 the InfoVlad Clearinghouse was perhaps the only English-language online forum where users could share and discover jihadi media. It was a modest operation in comparison to the mega jihadi forums, all in Arabic, directed by the London jihadi frontgroups. Those forums were probably the most spooked-out websites on earth, and inhospitable places for non-Arabic speakers.

I was an "active" lurker on Infovlad. I posted a few comments; nothing memorable. However, I do remember one "graduate" going on to set up the Anti-Imperialist Forum (AIF). I also wonder whether the "Bilal" on the forum was the "Bilal" recently arrested in Alaska. Now I wonder if the Pest and some of his other friends weren't making their first forays into the virtual jihad on the Clearinghouse.

This may seem like "ancient" history to some. After all, the Pest has gone on to bigger and better things. "Bilal" is cooperating with authorities. And the Clearinghouse is no more. But accurate timelines do matter, particularly in dynamic environments like the US's virtual jihadi community. Incomplete or misdirected analysis now could create dramatically inaccurate pictures five or ten years down the analytical road. America's online jihadi community -- a center of media attention at the moment -- has a few starting points, and I am beginning to believe that the Clearinghouse was one of them.

March 14, 2010

Congratulations to the folks at JawaReport and the YouTube Smackdown Corps for their tireless work in tracking some rather nasty jihobbyist -- JihadJane and her basket of evil YouTube eggs. I’m scarred for life. In one simple collage of images, the Jawa folks, redefine “hard blonde” for a generation of CT analysts. And they’re about to do it again with their coverage of one of LaRose’s evil eggs, Jamie Paulin-Ramirez.

Congratulations, Rusty, Howie, Stable Hand, and all the others. Love, ya. I'm doing a Snoopy Dance just for you.

February 10, 2010

The Christmas Day attack has exposed a broader systemic failure in the entire post-9/11 approach to intelligence: the “over collection” of information. It is leading, once again, to an ever-expanding bureaucracy of stovepiped analysts disconnected from real threat activity. In one of many cringe-inducing situations since 12/25, the Skeptical Bureaucrat recently highlighted this painful exchange between "senior State Department officials" and the press during a briefing following the release of the Department's Security Review of the Christmas Day attack

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- the interview. As far as being anything else, no, I don’t think there was – I don’t think the not knowing that he didn’t have a visa, not reporting that – and the report says that. It says: “A determination to revoke his visa, however, would have only occurred if there had been a successful integration of the intelligence by the CT community, resulting in his being watch-listed.” So --

QUESTION: So even if he was he was spelled – even if it was spelled right and you knew he had a visa, he still wouldn’t have been – it still wouldn’t have been revoked?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That’s correct.

There is more Q&A here, but the exchange gives you an idea of the complexity of the failure. Numerous embarrassing anecdotes leaked over the past two months -- from a CIA analyst waiting on a picture to some $12/hr contractor "misspelling" Abumutallab's name – expose an ungovernable system devoid of imagination and will.

There had been plenty of discussions about Yemen, and the U.S. was clearly concerned about the fertile soil there for extremism -- but no policy maker seems to have taken the intelligence about AQAP's intentions seriously enough to significantly alter counterterrorism policies regarding AQAP's ability to threaten the U.S

That, however, is always the failure when an intelligence failure occurs, in the United States or in any country in the world. Bureaucratic, moribound intelligence organs focusing on major threats (USSR, Israel), fail to see the emerging threats in front of them (Hizbullah, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya). Even the suggested solutions appear to be conventional: better training, more information sharing, the application of “structured methods,” etc.

The National Counterterrorism Center does not have enough analysts to comb through the thousands of pieces of terrorism-related information it receives every day, even though a plan to cut millions of dollars from its budget has been reversed, NCTC Director Michael Leiter told House lawmakers on Wednesday… Each day, the NCTC receives more than 5,000 pieces of terrorist-related information and reviews 5,000 names of suspected terrorists, Leiter said.

There is a broader systemic failure in the entire post-9/11 approach to intelligence: the over-collection of information. In the rush to find and “connect” dots after 9-11, the focus of information collection became too broad, encompassing too many sources, and offering little direct authority for possible response. The result is disparate points of information get caught up in the cogs of bureaucratic processes disconnected from any reason to act.

Information collection on such a vast scale – 5000 pieces of information per day, according to NCTC officials -- is a sign of systemic weakness. It shows an inability to pinpoint current and emerging threats at their source, and to focus analytical capability at those known threats. Instead, analysts sit a desk each working day, reading thousands of pieces of “information” that have little or no connection to real threat activity. In this environment, conventional wisdom becomes the most intellectually expedient answer to policy maker’s demands.

The answer lies in redirecting collection toward real-world threats, not loose dots of information. If we were better prepared in Yemen, then we would have never missed Abumutallab, regardless of how a $12/hr data entry clerk spelled his name.

After September 11th, senior policy makers and bureaucrats feasted on an avalanche of executive-level attention and, more important, funding. It was a brief moment in time when real reforms could have made the IC an effective defense against the United States’ myriad threats. Instead, bureaucrats without real experience managing information were given money to expand collection based on personal whims and the inevitable interest in maintaining their pockets of power.

The “one-stop shop” portal became a mantra of the IC. “Watchlists” were established, supposedly designed to be single-sources of information on all suspected threats. None of this was ever designed to fix systemic problems, despite what the brochures said. Rather, it only added to the inevitable stovepiping of information. So many one-stop shop portals and single source databases were implemented that bureaucrats responsible for “information sharing” began to demand integration of the portals.

This is where my experience as a library manager kicks in. Information collection is, by nature, an expensive cost with few immediate or tangible benefits whether it is an oil company library or an analytical team in a ministry of energy. One of the only means of adding sustaining value to information collection services is by promising subject specialization and service exclusivity. In other words, offering quality versus quantity.

Government bureaucrats, unskilled in the day-to-day work of research and information management, tend to see value in collecting more information, not better information. They also tend to rely on complex technological solutions to support collection, rather than real-time command and control. Bad idea. Professional experience has shown me, at least, that human-based management is always more effective than IT solutions. The failure of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a case where a one-stop shop portal, based on an proven IT “solution,” failed to support its underlining mission.

The powers that be are failing again to address the problem of achieving quality over quantity in collection and analysis. The govexec.com article goes on to report that the very points of weakness, such as unusable “watch list” databases, are expecting further expansion. Do you feel safer?

January 18, 2010

Daveed makes a good point in his recent critique of Jessica Stern's Washington Postop-ed:

Stern also writes that in Europe, "second- and third-generation Muslim youths are rebelling against what they consider the culturally contaminated Islam that their parents practice" -- but claims that this is not evidence of their religious zealotry because "the form of Islam they turn to is often highly unorthodox." Yet this is a terrible metric to use to assess religious zealotry, for two reasons. First, "Islamic orthodoxy" is not a meaningful distinguishing factor for those (like Stern) who lack a background in studying Islamic law and thus cannot define what Islamic orthodoxy is. Second, a person's religious zealotry is not related to whether his religious interpretation is orthodox. One can be zealous about an unorthodox interpretation of a faith.

January 10, 2010

These past few weeks have seen an avalanche of annoying second guessers, awkward mea culpas and an insidious slow-bleed of embarrassing information on bureaucratic missteps preceding AQAP's failed operation against Flight 253. If you google "intelligence failure" at google news you can see how this is playing out in the American media. Not pretty.

The poor folks at Waq-al-Waq have been paddlingupstream against a current of idiocies. They deserve a round of applause.

My favorite report of the Flight 253 cycle comes via FoxNews. Is it accurate? I have no idea. Is it plausible? Oh, hell, yes!

In the end, it was the usual bureaucratic nonsense that happen here, not a failure of "proper analysis" (whatever that is).

Lost in the cacophony of Flight 253 hysterics, was a recent Playboy article that explores another massive intelligence failure, albeit a woefully under-covered intelligence failure. Back in December 2003 the entire IC was jacked up on a perplexing threat. I can remember various high-level meetings and briefings, and a general sense of doom around the office. Well, Playboy Magazine, has an article on the massive intelligence failure that precipitated that moronic slip into hysterics. Warning: it is a Playboy article and probably won't make it past employer internet filters. Open it at home.

In a related, if under-reported, story: the December publication of a stinging report on the state of our intel capabilities in Afghanistan by Major General Flynn, et al, has caused a bit of a fuss in the blogoshere.

Mike -- aka my boss at Current Intelligence -- makes a good point about the dangers of COINophilia.

Defense strategy is not my game, but can I make a suggestion? The floundering Afghan strategy may also be a symptom of another failure. If I'm not mistaken, preparing for two simultaneous wars was a strategic imperative of 90s-era Pentagon policy. Well, 2001-present has seen just such a situation, but we've been woefully unable to balance the two. What happened to the two-war strategy?

December 21, 2009

It's back! Around the Web has returned (I know you've missed it). After thinking about it for some time, I admit that it's still the best way for me to keep up with the daily fire hose of information. And after a day of cooking (chicken chili soup anyone?), I’m ready to pick through the web for a little counter-terrorism fun.

Let's begin then...

One of the more intriguing recently thwarted plots comes to us from Bosnia .

New jihadi blog. New to me, anyway: http://madkhalis.com/

Hey, check out Aaron, all grown up and writing for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: "Comparison of Visual Motifs in Jihadi and Cholo Videos on YouTube," Volume 32, Issue 12 December 2009 , pages 1066 – 1074

What this suggests to me is that we need to be able to speak / read not only spoken or written languages of our sources, suspects, informants and opponents — but also the language or underlying logic of their thought.

Charles, I call this “thinking with the adversary.” It’s a modification of an old Catholic theological principle.

I know this is old in blog-time, but I can’t resist writing this sentence: It was never 2000, and it’s not 50 now, and it was never 30 and it’s not 200 now. The numbers have always been in the 5 or 10s. Bradford’s law extends even to jihobbyists.

July 13, 2009

I continue to see reports of arrests and plot disruptions throughout the MENA region, suggesting an open season both on AQ operatives and their plots against foreigners, military assets, and energy infrastructure. Last week’s news of Al Qaida arrests in Saudi Arabia belie continued reports of the group’s waning influence on the Peninsula.

Clearly, there are still operational and logistical cells plotting attacks in Saudi Arabia, and considering the economic slow down in the region, expect reports to increase in the coming years as some educated young men seek spiritual fulfillment in the liminal life of violent jihad. Al –Qaida saw a boom in the 1990s when Gulf economies were struggling to employ their educated middle class young men, and they may just experience a forth stage or re-emergence in the next five years.

Recent arrests also follow a pattern that goes back to 2005 with the late-August disruption of a near-operational plot targeting energy infrastructure in Ad Dammam. The pattern includes disruptive arrests preceding official announcements of thwarted ambitious attacks usually during late summer, some perhaps to coincide with the September 11th anniversary. It happened in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

To put it into perspective a second, 2006-2008 saw a dramatic decline in al-Qaida’s operational capabilities in Saudi Arabia, and yet they maintained enough local capacity to plot and support large-scale attacks. Now that al-Qaida’s Yemen branch has established itself as a serious player in regional conflicts, it’s building its operational capacity in the region, including Egypt and Gaza. Though I haven’t seen much reporting on it, AQAP could easily be the strategic source for recent reports of AQ activity in Gaza and the Sinai plots. I think I recall a recent statement by the current AQAP leader announcing their intent to infiltrate Gaza. I take their intentions seriously, and assume that they have tried and met with some success.

Taking AQAP’s operations in Yemen out of the picture for a moment, 2009 has seen several CT arrests on the Peninsula and Sinai. Often brief reports they are a background noise barely heard through the cacophony of news from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions. Some of the reports are vague, but are easily associated with al-Qaida, others are more ambiguous and could be explained as criminal activity (they’re in gray). Notice, too, that there have been various reports of arrests and plots against US military assets and personnel throughout MENA, suggesting that al-Qaida may have been plotting an attack on military and naval assets.

July 07, 2009

You've probably noticed that I haven’t been posting “around the web” posts recently. A new job and a busy personal life have drawn me away from dedicated posting here at MSJ. I’ll continue to post here, but not as regularly as in the past. I know that – somehow, some way – you will survive, readers, especially since Tim is doing such a good job with his InfoBore posts. Meanwhile, I’m contributing to CTLab’s Current Intelligence blog.

April 01, 2009

At Long War Journal recent reports by Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn highlight the the current state of Somalia. Both reports made me recall a small analytical report I wrote up at the end of 2006. I'm sharing a draft of a December 2006 update. The update contains information on the then-active war between Ethiopia and the Islamic Courts Union.

Please note: this is a working draft reformatted for this post, and lacks my footnotes and sources.

In June 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control over Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia. ICU is a radical Islamist militia with close ties to Al Qaeda, which supports the establishment of Islamic law in Somalia. Since the seizure of Mogadishu, the ICU has expanded its control over much of the rest of Somalia, enforcing Islamic law, bringing in weapons, and setting up training camps for its forces. With its explicit support for Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda’s regional goals, the ICU poses a considerable threat to Western interests in Africa, as well as to regional governments. Particularly, Somalia’s strategic location along the east coast of Africa poses a significant threat to military and maritime traffic in the Red Sea, as it may provide an operational safe haven for Al Qaeda to plan and execute attacks on oil and natural gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region.

Significance of Somalia’s Location

Somalia’s strategic location along the east coast of Africa poses a significant threat to maritime interests and regional governments. Al Qaeda strategists are beginning to show interest in the region as a long-term strategic base of operations. For example, Al Qaeda leadership has publicly called for i) attacks on Gulf-based energy infrastructure and shipping; and ii) support for the ICU, as regularly mentioned in its public videos.

Somalia’s key location provides Al Qaeda not only an easy access to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, but also an operational safe haven for terrorists to plan and carry out attacks on oil and natural gas infrastructure in the region. Somalia has potential to become a logistical and strategic support center for terrorist activity across Africa. It will compound the already chaotic situation throughout the continent, involving volatile mix of smuggling and piracy along the coast.

The following is a chronology of recent terrorist activities involving Somalia and the region:

Recent Terrorist Activities Involving Somalia

2006 July Osama bin Laden released an audiotape praising the ICU. 2005 July Somali expatriates were suspects in attempted bombings in London.2005 January A Somalia national was arrested and sentenced in Kuwait for participating in a series of attacks. 2002 The Al Qaeda field commander responsible for the embassy attacks fled to Somalia and is suspected of being the commander of the 2002 Mombasa operations against Israeli tourists. 1996-1998 Several Al Qaeda attacks in East Africa, including U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.1993 Islamist-backed Somalis, funded by a nascent Al Qaeda, attacked U.S. forces in Mogadishu.

ICU and Its Leadership

ICU came to prominence in 2004 as the political situation in Somalia deteriorated and the newly elected government was forced to flee to neighboring Kenya. President Abdullah Yusef, leader of Somalia’s traditional parliament, continues to operate a government in exile. Ethiopia is the only strategic counterweight to ICU support in the region and a key supporter of the Yusef regime, which is now located in Baidoa, Somalia.

ICU supports the strict imposition of Islamic law, and since its inception, the group has prevented the return of the Somalia government, and has threatened jihad against regional peacekeepers. It began instituting Islamic law as early as 2004 when it began closing down movie theaters and other recreational facilities they deemed unIslamic.

ICU has two leaders: Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Sheikh Sharif Shekh Ahmed founded the ICU in 2003 when he felt compelled to seek justice in the kidnapping of a student at his Islamic school. In 2005, Ahmed explicitly stated the organization’s goals to demonstrators in Mogadishu: “the only solution is to adopt the…Islamic laws.” Since its inception, the ICU has prevented the return of Somalia’s internationally recognized government and has threatened jihad against regional peacekeepers.

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was once head of Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), a radical Islamist group founded in the 1990s through the influence of Osama bin Laden, then located in Sudan. Since September 11th, AIAI has been placed on the State Department’s list of terrorist groups and has been the focus of western counterterrorism efforts. He also has a possible connection to the 2005 UK attacks. A London Times report has United Nations officials identifying U.S. and UK agents following members of AIAI and the Egyptian group al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (ATWAH) in the wake of the July 7th London bombings.

Current Situation

In May 2006, ICU militias drove their rivals from Mogadishu. Since then, the rivals have relented in their fight, further empowering the ICU. The situation continues to be fluid, but it is clear now that the ICU is the only group in control of Mogadishu and its environs. Without clear rivals, the ICU is the only authority in the country. According to a recent Associated Press report, the ICU has surrounded the compound of the internationally recognized government in Baidoa, Somalia. Ethiopian forces are poised to defend the recognized government, but U.S. officials recognize that the ICU has the advantage.

The ICU receives funds and support from a large expatriate community. A U.S. State Department official recently testified that money and weapons come from Eritrea and Yemen, and that “some of the funds came from Somali businessmen based in Saudi Arabia.” Another recent report notes that Sheikh Aweys travels abroad “quite freely – to Saudi Arabia and Dubai, without being arrested. ICU leadership refuses to accept United Nations or regional African relief services or any peacekeeping missions. The humanitarian situation in Somalia continues to deteriorate, including a steady stream of reports of brutal enforcement of Islamic law.

December Update: Since September 2006 ICU leadership has consolidated its control over key areas of the country outside of Baidoa where the internationally recognized Somali government is defended by Ethiopia’s military. Meanwhile, there were two assassination attempts targeting leaders of the recognized government using car bomb tactics regularly seen in Iraq. A recent United Nations (UN) report acknowledges the increasing presence of foreign fighters operating within the area of ICU control:

The ICU has established numerous military training facilities throughout central and southern Somalia and has been actively recruiting new Somali militia members. Foreign volunteers (fighters) have also been arriving in considerable numbers to give added military strength to the ICU. An unknown number of the volunteers, but believed … to be significant, have combat experience gained from participation in wars and hostile conflicts and actions in the Middle East and Asia…

[F]oreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare and special topics or techniques consisting of bomb making and the use of bombs against different targets such as a variety of different types of transport and buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of assassination by ambush and sniping… [T]he ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into what is currently an Iraq-type scenario, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities.

In December ICU leadership rejected UN requests for talks and has threatened war with Ethiopia unless Ethiopian troops leave Baidoa.

The African Advantage

In June 2006, Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad), a Saudi-based jihad periodical, published an article by Al Qaeda strategist, Abu Azzam al-Ansari, exploring the possibility and advantages of a strategy for Africa. The following table summarizes the 13 advantages:

Al-Ansari's 13 Advantages to Expanding Al Qaeda Operation

1 “Jihadi doctrines” are well entrenched in most predominantly Muslim countries. This jihadi expansion has old roots in many of the African countries.2 The general chaos and corruption found throughout the continent which eases “the ability of the Mujahidin to move and plan and organize themselves…”3 Tribal and geopolitical conflicts produce “groups and individuals willing to heroically [sacrifice] themselves.”4 [Similar to #2]5 General chaotic conditions “provide [a] huge amount of weapons and military equipment easy to obtain…”6 Western interests use Africa’s “maritime routes” to transfer weapons and equipment” and “use these routes to shift oil to the rest of the world. Targeting these routes will be fatal for the Crusaders…”7 “Africa is also one of the closer routes to Palestine…”8 Africa’s poverty offers opportunities to offer “finance and welfare” programs.9 Educated Africans could be recruited for the jihad.10 Africa’s large Muslim population is predominantly Sufi, a group considered to be easier to work with than “any other trend, such as the Shi’is or the Communists.”11 Specific local conflicts pit “true Muslims against rivals, including the “potential of the renewal of the conflict in Egypt.”12 “Another advantage is he links to Europe through North Africa, what eases the move from there to carry out attacks.”13 “Africa is rich in economic sources, oil and raw materials. This is very useful for the Mujahidin in the medium and long term.

So apparently Sheikh Qaradawi's IslamOnline.net has opened a DC office. The first question that pops into my mind: who's funding this? Second question: was the location in the National Press Building, intentional? The Press building is about five blocks from FBI's HQ, and perhaps 5 or 6 from the OEOB.

And they wasted no time throwing a much needed wet blanket on the hype over AQ's alleged brush with the plague. I'll be blunt: this story is about as stupid as suitcase nukes and border-hopping Chechens.

Also while I was away: The Daily Star closed up shop. (via Abu Muqawama)

It's Salafi Time with Ze Fronk!http://www.scribd.com/doc/11021222/La-Femme-Sous-lAbri-de-lIslamhttp://www.scribd.com/doc/11024016/01-La-Polygamiehttp://www.scribd.com/doc/11021245/Les-Caracteristiques-de-La-Femme-Salafiyahttp://www.scribd.com/doc/11021276/Son-Statut-Dans-La-Oummaetc....

I was surfing via iPhone while I was unplugged at home, and if you're interested in more links, check out the MSJ Clipping section to the right.