The modern scientific view.One cannot be an academic psychologist
without at some time having pondered the implications of our science for the
widely held assumption that humans have free will.Our professional journals are compendiums of
the factors that influence thought and behavior (hereafter called
‘behavior’).Historically, these factors
have been largely experiential, but in recent decades we have begun to
understand the details of how genetics influence behavior... and more
correctly, how experiential and genetic factors interact.As scientific psychologists, we continuously
try to decompose claimed active reasoning by our subjects into simpler, more
automatic processes that hinge on genes and experience.Long ago, it was recognized that simply
stating that a subject reasons or infers thus-and-such leaves us asking why the
homunculus within the subject’s head in fact reasons that particular way or
makes that specific inference.To answer
“because the subject reasoned that ...” is recognized by most of us as
scientifically unsatisfactory due to its circularity.Yet, many times a day we settle for accounts
like this in our nonscientific interactions with other people and the inanimate
environment.That is, when we turn away
even momentarily from the subject matter of our science, we revert to thinking
like a layman.The typical layman still
thinks of some behaviors (and other traits) as being the product of either
nature or nurture.For example, decades
ago when the mental retardation caused by phenylketonuria (PKU) was found to be
linked to a single gene site on chromosome 12, many people spoke of this sort
of mental retardation as genetically determined.But the identification of diets free of
phenylalanine (and now specific medications) allows individuals with this
genetic defect to avoid retardation.The
genes are unchanged, but the behavior is altered.Hence, even in this case, genes alone are not
destiny.Conversely, people tend to
think of the ability to solve algebra problems as being a product of taking an
algebra course.But no algebra course,
however well taught, is going to get a developmentally challenged individual
(or your dog Rover) to solve algebra problems.Hence, even in this case, experience alone is not destiny.More generally, there is no behavior for
which genes alone or experience alone is destiny.Practically all scientists today recognize
that a single trait in a given individual cannot be attributed solely to nature
or nurture; nature and nurture are orthogonal traits that interact rather than
summate.The issue I am raising here is that,
in the framework of modern psychology, experience (past and present) and genes conjointly are destiny, and this position is
diametrically opposed to a central premise of our society, that people are
individually responsible for their behavior.

Society’s
view and that view’s frailty.Why does society cling to the view that individuals are free
agents?Or stating it more personally, why
do we as scientists live with this disconnect between our professional
expertise and our interactions outside of the domain of our scientific
investigations?I would suggest that
there are two reasons for this.First,
we were raised in and indoctrinated by a culture that assumes that people make
free choices, and consequently are responsible for their behavior.The second reason that scientific
psychologists evaluatively judge the behavior of others, despite their rigorous
training, is the pervasive phenomenon of introspection.Introspection was an important method within
experimental psychology at the turn of the last century.The advent of behaviorism and subsequently
cognitive psychology did not vanquish introspection; they merely moved it into
the closet.William James used
introspection in declaring that he had free will in that he could decide
whether to walk home from the lecture hall on Divinity Avenue or Oxford Street.Of course the modern psychologist studying
William James’ decision making processes would try to account for his decision
in terms of experiential and genetic factors, and avoid invoking James’
homunculus.My earliest publication in
psychology (Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1967) involved a debriefing of subjects, which
demonstrated to me how poorly introspection accounted for actual behavior.There have been many publications documenting
dissociations between behavior and introspection, more specifically conscious
decision making.Recently the popular
book Blink by Malcolm Gladwell
summarized many such demonstrations, with surprisingly little impact on public
attitudes despite the acclaim the book received.Of course Gladwell merely chronicled a number
of specific instances in which introspection on decision processes failed to
fit the behavior actually observed.More
recently, a very readable New York Times Magazine article by Steven Pinker (11 Jan 2009) made similar
points concerning many important choices made in his own life.I am inclined to go out a limb and suggest
that all conscious decision making is epiphenomenal, with decision making
occurring unconsciously under the influence of genes and experience exclusively.However, I know that I will have little
company out on that limb.But let us
leave behind the question of why
people are so wedded to the view that they have free will and return to the
disconnect that this view has with our science.

Friction between these two world views.In the laboratory, experimental psychologists
routinely assume (without overtly stating it) that free will is an
illusion.Then we leave the laboratory,
or even turn to our research assistants, and behave as if people possess free
will.In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), B. F. Skinner declared free will
to be an illusion and provided us with his views concerning how we might make a
better world through environmental manipulations, specifically, appropriate
reinforcement contingencies.Skinner,
being a student of learning in a time in which we knew little about the role of
genes in modulating behavior, placed great emphasis on shaping of behavior by the
environment, but more recent data raises gene-environment interactions to
center stage.Skinner’s suggestions were
not widely applauded because many readers, not unreasonably, objected to
‘others’ defining the type of society that would be created by scientific
intervention.But by rejecting Skinner’s
prescription for society, we have not escaped being manipulated. Rather the
reins of manipulation have been taken up by individuals or groups with the knowledge
and resources to shape behavior, but who avoid offending people by publicizing
these manipulations.Madison Avenue and
political gurus, not to mention the occasional charismatic dictator, have
expertly manipulated the environment to influence people’s decisions without
the intended benevolence of Skinner’s ‘utopian’ society.There is nothing new about the notion of ‘manipulating
the masses,’ but, with recently discovered psychological knowledge, the
manipulators (and at some level we are all manipulators) are getting ever better
at controlling the views and behaviors of people.(Of course at a higher level of analysis, the
behaviors of the manipulators are themselves a product of those individuals’
genes and experiences.It would be
scientifically inconsistent to single out these people and hold them personally
responsible for their behavior.)

Scientific resistance to the modern
scientific viewpoint.To
suggest that our behavior is determined by genes and experience meets much
resistance today, not only from laymen, but often from scientists. Although our cultural upbringing and
introspection are the bases for much of this resistance, further objections are
based on our science’s current inability to account for select behavioral acts.Like the theory of evolution, many supportive
data points are missing and existing accounts are apt to be tweaked as new data
are obtained.However, the extant data
are overwhelming.We don’t have all the
answers, but the approximate trajectory is clear.More and more behavior can be understood in
terms of the experiences (past and present) and genes of organisms.Scientific psychology is focused on the
experiential and genetic roots of behavior.No account cites free will (which would be surrendering control to a
homunculus), except those with foundations in active rationalism which again
invokes the need for a homunculus, something that even economists are now
coming to reject.

Can
either world view constructively replace the other?Does embracing a scientific account of
behavior in terms of genes and experience mean rejecting individual moral
responsibility for one’s behavior?Science is neither moral nor amoral.It simply seeks to illuminate causal relationships.The illusion of individual responsibility for
one’s own behavior appears to be very useful in allowing society to function
and serve us as individuals.Our
indoctrination in taking personal responsibility for our behavior and being
subject to reward and punishment as a consequence of our behavior are both
powerful experiential factors in regulating our behavior in socially
appropriate ways.There appears to be no
viable alternative to society’s holding people responsible for their
behavior.To reject individual responsibility
would be similar to accepting the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ which
asserts that behaviors reflecting our evolutionary past are excusable as we are
strongly predisposed to emit such behaviors.Take murder.Over 90% of
convicted murderers are males.Many
researchers (e.g., Daly and Wilson) have written extensively about testosterone
levels and male predispositions towards violence as part of their competition
with other males and more generally trying to get more of their genes into the
next generation.While details of these
accounts may be suspect, the general story appears highly credible.But even if it is correct, society would be
poorly served excusing murder by males.The threat of punishment for murder is likely a strong experiential
factor in holding down the murder rate.Perhaps the child molester is a better example.The child molester is loathed by the
community, the police, and the courts.But the clinical psychologist does not (or at least should not) scorn the
child molester.The child molester is a
product of his genes and experience, and the job of the therapist is to get him
to stop his behavior.This may take the
form of psychotherapy (i.e., new experiences) or even drugs, and maybe
avoidance of certain provoking environments.Alternatively stated, the therapist’s job is to modify the child
molester’s cumulative experience so as to reduce the likelihood of future child
molestation.This of course is the
scientific approach to child molestation.But the threat of societal rejection and punishment as embodied in the
judgment of the community, police, and courts also constitutes a part of the
experience of the potential child molester that likely reduces future incidents
of child molestation.This example makes
the point that the illusion of free will can be very useful to society.In sum, the naturalistic fallacy does not
identify a falsehood, but simply stands as recognition that our society could
not function by attributing behavior to genes and experience rather than
individual responsibility for one’s own behavior.

Living
with the disconnect.Where does all this leave us?Our science would falter if we introduced
free will to our accounts of behavior.And the functioning of our society would be seriously impaired if [the illusion
of] free will were rejected.This leaves
us with a disconnect between our science and the
socially useful illusion of free will.At the risk of sounding Panglossian, I would suggest that both science
and society are well served by their present disconnect.