92 : ;- :)::. ::t < : ",,:;,.,, .( . / :. . . i .' >, f f . 6 , ';) \ jf' ) ; j l ' . 1 . ; t . ). f: . ' I ' , .. if.': - ( / -I . f. . A. ... 'I ., .... :: . :0":- -.{ { ,,/ :, .,-': i New extra fine writing from Cross. NOW A DISTINCTIVE GIFT IS EVEN FINER CROSS@ SINCE 1846 Timeless Cross excellence in the Selectlp Pen In your choice of medium, fine and new extra fine porous tips Suggested pnces from $16.50 Now the finest name in wnting IS even finer mally does go on. The point is the heavy emphasis on the subject in this Administration. The idea that nuclear war can be wholly, or even largely, limited to strategic targets seems to a great many experienced people to be dangerous nonsense. For example, for- mer Secretary of State Dean Rusk, writing in the Washington Post last ,Î October, said, "One does not know "r whether to be amused or alarmed by some of the precious and pseudo- sophisticated talk going around about strategies for limiting damage In a nuclear war. It is suggested, for exam- ple, that counterforce strikes would send a signal to the other side that we would limit our strikes to military targets (in the hundreds) and that the other side would accommodate by leaving our cities alone. If the idea is to send signals, the best way to send a signal is to pick up the phone and talk to them. . . . Several hundred nuclear missiles aimed at 'military' targets, with their accompanying cones of deadly fallout and the fatal pollution of the earth's atmosphere, cannot be distinguished from an all-out nuclear strike, except by playing with words unrelated to the real world." In the current planning for nuclear war, it is apparently a short step from excluding cities to defending city dwellers. There are many people in this Administration (there were also some in the la t one) who think that the So- I. viet Union holds a big ' strategic advantage be- cause of its civil-de- fense program. The ability to protect its citizens, like the abil- ity to threaten Ameri- can missile sites, they think, will encourage Soviet adventurism and intimidation, and could also enable the Russians to "win" a nuclear war. The So- viet civil-defense program is suppos- edly based on an orderly and system- atic evacuation of masses of people from population centers. It isn't clear, even to American officials who take all this seriously and think that we, too, should have such a program, exactly how the evacuees would fend for themselves. One of these officials is T. K. Jones, the Deputy U nder- Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces; he recently acquired notoriety by telling the Los Angeles Ti,nes what he had been tell- , . . : I I " ','-- .. 51- : \ - .. -t Y , ....(.... .., - - JUNE 7, 1982 ing audiences around the country about how to survive nuclear war. "Everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around,)) J ones said. The idea is "to dig a hole, and cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it." Over the years, Jones has written by the yard on this subject. He and a colleague warned in an article that appeared in a journal called Orbis in the fall of 1978 that "to overpower the Soviet popula- tion defenses would require a five- to tenfold increase in the U.S. strategic arsenal. " The Administration has asked for four billion two hundred million dol- lars over the next seven years to ex- pand civil-defense programs. The peo- ple in charge of the programs say that the United States could survive a nu- clear attack and recover within a rela- tively few years. Not many outside the programs support that view. Little is known-reliably-about Soviet civil defense, and the reason may be that there isn't a great deal to it; that, at least, is the opinion of several people who have looked into it. There aren't many people anymore who think that either side could do much about de- fending its society in a nuclear war- not when each side has several thou- sand nuclear weapons with which to attack the other. Some of the Admin- istration's critics see two of its concerns as contradictory. The missile silos are sup- posedly vulnerable because they could be attacked without warn- ing. But civil defense based on mass evacu- ation-"crisis reloca- tion" is bureaucracy's term-assumes several days of warning time. The Administration seems confused about other military issues as well. Haig and Weinberger couldn't agree on whether NATO's contingency plans included firing a nuclear demonstration shot, and the President couldn't supply the answer. In his most recent news conference- on May 13th-Reagan mistakenly said that submarine-launched missiles, unlike those in silos, could be inter- cepted, or recalled, if they were launched inadvertently. (He made four other misstatements on the nuclear is- sue in this news conference.) And sev- eral weeks before that, on April 14th, 1(( '\ ' ..." " - ----: -- A /, J 3C/5o/,z.