I worked in Japan for more than 12 years in the eighties and nineties, in Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo with the U. S. State Department, Citibank and Merrill Lynch. After many more years in China in banking (Deutsche Bank and Ping An Bank) and consulting, I am back in Tokyo conducting the business of Yangtze Century Ltd. (Hong Kong/Shanghai) and producing this blog. E-mail me at smharnerco@yahoo.com.

Who Is Rewriting The History Of Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis? The State Department Or The Gaimusho?

In previous posts I speculated about why Japan went on to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands despite the certainty that this provocative status quo altering action would spark a major crisis with China (here); and asked why the U.S., which could have prevented this move–and avoided the crisis–by strongly opposing it, did not do so (here).

The most likely explanation for the first development was, I suggested, a strategy by Japan’s conservative national security and political establishment to use this crisis to draw the United States into reinforcing its commitment to defend Japan under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

The background for such calculus was Tokyo’s deep concern about trends in U.S.-Chinese relations. In a few words, Japan’s strategic thinkers are worried that Washington is coolly recalculating U.S. interests in Asia in a way unfavorable to Japan and to the continuance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S. is evaluating the growing disparity between Japan’s relative economic and absolute demographic decline and China’s already great and growing economic, political, and diplomatic power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

Against these objective and seemingly irreversible trends, Washington is beginning to warm to China’s expressed desire to “share power” within a “new power relationship” with the U.S. in Asia.

What Tokyo fears is that China’s vision (and longer term sine qua non) for shared power presupposes a bilateral relationship by and between equals, and not one in which the U.S. side is (as now) a constellation of U.S. “alliances” with states, like Japan and South Korea, that act as clients of the U.S. in foreign relations, as well as platforms for forward strategic military forces potentially (or actually) targeted at China.

In other words, a U.S. that moved toward satisfying China’s desire for a “new power relationship” in the region would be a U.S. that would be taking steps to gradually downgrade and, finally, abrogate–in fact if not in name–the U.S.-Japan military “alliance.”

For persons seeking to involve the U.S. and the U.S.-Japan alliance in a geopolitical quagmire, to provide a justification for “strengthening the alliance,” and to erect a barrier to U.S.-China accommodation, the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis might seem tailor-made. Its essence is “sovereignty,” on which China will never compromise or negotiate under challenge.

The U.S., while never taking a position on the islands’ sovereignty, was responsible for putting the islands under Japanese administrative control and, per the commitments of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, is obligated to consider a threat to the islands as a threat to the U.S.

My thesis, then, was that the Noda government–in fact, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remnant wing of Noda’s Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), with full support of the Abe Shinzo-led LDP–went ahead with nationalization knowing that it would create a crisis with China, but that it would also achieve a more vital objective–arresting the trend of U.S.-China strategic accommodation and keeping Japan a protectorate of the United States.

It was later that I read a new book on the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis by eminent Japanese sinologist Yabuki Susumu (posted here) in which Yabuki puzzled over an interview with Japanese ambassador to the U.S. Sasae Kenichiro published in the October 31, 2012 Asahi Shimbun. Sasae told the newspaper that Japan had sought the guidance of the U.S. before it decided on nationalization and was told that Washington “did not object” (hantai shinai) to such a move. Yabuki was puzzled by this, given his view–the subject of an earlier book entitled Chimerica–China-U.S. Collusion and the Way Forward for Japan--of the inevitability of U.S.-China accommodation and why Japan should abrogate the alliance (my post here).

If U.S. strategic thinkers are warming (or resigning themselves) to accommodating Chinese power through a “new power relationship,” how could the U.S. have failed to object to Japan’s nationalization last September? Assuming Sasae to be telling the truth, I had to conclude that military/bureaucratic forces in Washington–the State Department under a viscerally anti-China Hillary Clinton and DoD under Panetta–had decided to stop history. It was a puzzling and profoundly disturbing policy stance for being so clearly not in immediate or, particularly, long term U.S. interests.

The riddle seems to have a explanation: Sasae was not telling the truth. Or, to give him and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs the benefit of the doubt, Japan may have “misunderstood” the U.S. position.

This is the important conclusion we can draw from an interview with former U.S. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell published by Kyodo News Service April 9. Campbell says that when consulted by Japan the State Department expressed deep concern that Japan’s action was and would be seen by China as a provocative change in the status quo and would lead to a crisis. Therefore, the U.S. “strongly advised” against nationalization. That Japan blundered ahead left the State Department in consternation and in doubt about Japan’s judgment.

Who is telling the truth and who is trying to revise history? At this point, it hardly matters. What should be clear, however, is that the geostrategic trends that caused Japanese strategists such disquiet are still very much intact. Indeed, with the departure of the dyspeptic Clinton and arrival of John Kerry, U.S.-China relations seem to be back on a positive track.

Such a track is unlikely to bode well for the U.S.-Japan alliance, which increasingly seems–and to have been shown in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute–to be on the wrong side of history.

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For me, a radical/rogue US State dept under Clinton/Campbell trying to stick it to China and allowing Japan’s provocative actions (perhaps as a last gasp of their failed Pivot) seems more compelling than Kenichiro openly defying US wishes on the matter. Surely Kenichiro/Japan would weigh the huge risks in going behind US backs and intentions by taking actions counter to US wishes if the US really wanted de-escalation. US State could come out and flatly deny their claims. Japan would lose credibility and perhaps even be seen a loose canon if they did this. So, more convincing is that Clinton/Campbell did intend for Japan to stir up the pot more.

Perhaps more convincing is that the complex and vague manipulations involving so many parties, all of whom hold righteous suspicions about the other parties, means that no one has a grasp of the situation. The chances that the situation will spin out of control increase in such an environment.

To your point, the US, which has many and varied conflicts of interests in Asia (and at home), does not seem to have a problem dealing with the worst case scenario; conflict on foreign soil. For them, stirring the pot between foreign actors appears to be the core of their FP, more of a feature than a bug. Japan is playing with fire if it is, indeed, attempting to manipulate the US in this case.

The whole agrressive anti China pivot seems to have been started by Campbell – and was egged on and amplified by Clinton’s verbals. Campbell is a Japan specialist – and so it is not unreasonable to think – that Campbell was egged on and persuaded into his US anti China pivot – by his right wing Japanese connections. Of course Campbell – being a smart diplomat – would not want to be left taking the blame for the overly aggressive US military pivot – of which the Diaoyu’s/Senakaku’s are the linchpin – as their nationalisation would certainly antagonise China – and tried to protect his behind – by hinting that he Campbell warned Japan not to do it. All Campbell and the US had to say to Japan was that Japan’s nationalisation of the Diaoyu was in breech of the US’s neutrality on the issue – and therefore the US would not protect Jpan if the Diaoyu’s/Senkaku’s were attacked. I would be very surprised if Japan would not have backed down at this point. The reality is that Campblee and his right wing Japanese friends were probably in favour of nationalisation – as they knew it would be intolerable to China – and would fit Campbells overly agressive anti China US Asia pivot. In essence – Campbell was probably too much of a loose canon – not helped by Hilary’s fast and loose verbal attacks – which alienated the Chinese. One can’t have two hot heads in a marriage!! A calmer more long term and reflective approach to the situation was needed – and Kerry looks more likely to provide this.

China wants Senkaku back because Senkaku belonged to her since the time of the Ming Empire ?. What about Tibet and Uyghuristan (East Turkestan or Xinjiang) which were once independent countries of the Tibetans and the Uyghurs but were conquered and annexed by China. Many Chinese feel the pain of losing Senkaku, a tiny uninhabited island which they believe belonged to China a few hundreds years ago. Imagine the pain the Tibetans and the Uyghurs feel about losing their entire countries to China, countries which formerly belonged to the Tibetans and the Uyghurs since thousands of years ago. Many Chinese are angry when a dozen Japanese landed on and then left Senkaku. Imagine the anger the Tibetans and the Uyghurs feel as they watch hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrating into their countries, turning the Tibetans and the Uyghurs into ethnic minorities in their own countries. Chinese peoples can freely express their pain and anger about Senkaku on the media but the Tibetans and the Uyghurs have no way of expressing their pain and anger in any media because when the Tibetans and the Uyghurs do so, Chinese police would come to arrest them and put them in jail. Isn’t it selfish to focus on a small hurt other inflicted on you while ignoring the great hurt you inflicted upon others. Many Chinese are angry at Japan for killing millions of Chinese during the Second World War. Imagine the anger the Tibetans and the Uyghurs feel at China for killing Tibetans and Uyghurs during the conquest of Tibet and Uyghuristan and during the uprising in Tibet and Uyghuristan. Because there are only several millions of Tibetans and Uyghurs, the number of Tibetans and Uyghurs that were killed by Chinese troops constitute a greater percentage of the population as compared to the number of Chinese killed by Japanese troops. China condemns Japan when Japanese officials visit Yakusuni but China glorifies Mao Zedong and the PLA, the men who subjugated the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. Where is justice, fellow humans ?.

Mr. Harner’s sound analysis and warnings have as usual gone unheeded. What we have now is a hair-trigger environment in the Senkakus which could blow up at any minute. Because this is a lose-lose scenario it should not have been allowed to reach this stage. But that is water under the bridge. Let’s hope that cool heads will prevail and negotiations can begin in earnest to reach a mutually agreeable solution.