Shock and Awe

The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding
of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political,
strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course,
in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog,
friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising from
application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier
and similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500
B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective
outcome a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of
achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that "war is
deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant,
employment of force.

In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, understanding, and perception
through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need
first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an
adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose and
glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant
horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race,
culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers
registering these effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.

In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently
intimidating and compelling factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in
the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will
achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define
Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.

The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of
Shock and Awe in order to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate
each model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered. However, in
subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of
Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this methodology is to develop alternative
mission capability packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force structure,
organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each form or variant of Shock and
Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain
by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission
capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.

For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing historical types, variants, and
characteristics of Shock and Awe have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories
and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the
doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to
apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm,
incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves
and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and
operationally, is crucial to successful application.

There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this approach. The first is its
obvious reliance on large numbers of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1
tank, F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used
jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words,
this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though
command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.

The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-on-platform attrition basis is that
with declining numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this
doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear
that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the time
being, these have not replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It
should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a
comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.

Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts of force. This requires
significant logistical lift and the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always
follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or
distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money
provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the
commercial marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while also lowering price and
cycle time to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense
sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already cited. None of these
shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.

Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that are similar to those of current
doctrine. A major distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across
a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This breadth should lead to a
more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific components and units that
produce aggregate military capability and must include training and education, as well as new ways
to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is possible that in these resource, technical, and
commercial industrial areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may
constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.

The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The intent here is to impose a
regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive
destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than
targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or
systems. The employment of this capability against society and its values, called "counter-value" in
the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public will of the
adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over
the space of a few hours or days.

The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in determining whether this magnitude
and speed of destruction can actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an
adversary impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and probably
unachievably low levels of societal destruction; and whether a political decision would be taken in
any case to use this type of capability given the magnitude of the consequences and the risk of
failure.

It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of Desert Storm, similar objectives were
envisioned. The differences between this example and Desert Storm are through the totality of a
society that would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of destruction and the speed
of imposing those strikes as occurred to those Japanese cities. This example of shock, awe, and
intimidation rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in very short periods of time.

The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of Shock and Awe applies massive
and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive power largely against military targets and related
sectors over time. It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the adversary to resist.
In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion.
However, it is the cumulative effect of this application of destruction power that will ultimately
impose sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical means to resist, that an
adversary will be forced to accept whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of
the First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the Second World War (which
was not effective in this regard), and related B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New
Year period of 1972-73, illustrate the application of massive bombardment.

Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic targets, is indeed an aspect of applying
"Overwhelming Force," even though political constraints make this example most unlikely to be
repeated in the future. There is also the option of applying massive destruction against purely civilian
or "counter-value" targets such as the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II when unconditionality
marks the terms of surrender. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on the endurance and
capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects the will to resist that is the central foundation of this
example.

The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the question of political feasibility and
acceptability, and what circumstances would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive
bombardment. Outright invasion and aggression such as Iraq's attack against Kuwait could clearly
qualify as reasons to justify using this level of Shock and Awe. However, as with Overwhelming
Force, this response is not time-sensitive and would require massive application of force for some
duration as well as political support.

Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock and Awe were not achieved through the
massive application of firepower across a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of
force. Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve
maximum leverage but with total economies of scale. The German Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not
a massive attack across a very broad front, although the opponent may have been deceived into
believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in multiple locations and, wherever it could be
most easily penetrated, attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the shaped
charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank's armor and then exploding outwardly to
achieve a maximum cone of damage against the unarmored or less protected innards.

To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is directed against military targets, it
requires skill if not brilliance in execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. The
adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics, surrenders, or both. Hitler's
campaign in France and Holland and the seizure of the Dutch forts and the occupation of Crete in
1940 are obvious illustrations. The use of Special Operations forces in significant numbers is an
adjunct to imposing this level of Shock and Awe.

Desert Storm could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the attack were mounted without
the long preparatory bombardment and was concentrated in a single sectoreither the "left hook"
or the Marine attack "up the middle," and with total surprise. The major differences between the
operation in Kuwait and Germany's capture of France in 1940 were that the allies in Saudi Arabia
had complete military and technical superiority unlike the Germans and that, once under attack,
Iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition license to pick and choose the
points for penetration and then dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future
adversaries about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that they will face in us an
opponent able to employ technically superior forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in
achieving Shock and Awe through the precise application of force.

It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as guerilla war where this or most
means of employing force to obtain Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example,
the German Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the Vietnam War, where
enemy forces had relatively few lines to be penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of
warfare.

The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths. Can brilliance and superiority be
maintained? Is there a flexible enough infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the
supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the systems to maintain this
operational and technical superiority? Rapid Dominance requires a positive answer to these
questions, at least theoretically.

The fifth example is named after the Chinese philosopher-warrior, Sun Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example
is based on selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe.
This discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this from Hiroshima and Massive
Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before Ho Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of
Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters on war and proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the rules
applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged Sun Tzu to turn the royal
concubines into a marching troop. The concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head
cut off the head concubine. The ladies still could not bring themselves to take the master's orders
seriously. So, Sun Tzu had the head cut off a second concubine. From that point on, so the story
goes, the ladies learned to march with the precision of a drill team.

The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe and hence compliance or
capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal and ruthless, and rapid application of force to
intimidate. The fundamental values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is to convince the
majority that resistance is futile by targeting and harming the few. Both society and the military are
the targets. In a sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe but
through far more selective and informed targeting. Decapitation is merely one instrument. This
model can easily fall outside the cultural heritage and values of the U.S. for it to be useful without
major refinement. Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to communicate is another variant
but without many historical examples to show useful wartime applications.

A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is deception. In this subset, the attempt is to
deceive the enemy into what we wish the enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or
force the adversary. The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and knowledge of the
adversary. In some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is an early example of deception. However, as
we will see, the deception model may have new foundations in the technological innovations that
are occurring and in our ability to control the environment.

The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the Massive Destruction and the Blitzkreig
examples. It is questionable that a decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in quasi- or
real assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Further, the standard to maintain the ability to
perform these missions is high and dependent on both resources and on supporting intelligence,
especially human intelligencenot an American strong point.

Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is distinct from the Blitzkreig or Sun
Tzu categories because it focuses on depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose Shock
and Awe. The image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to incapacitate an
adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade produces blinding light and deafening noise.
The result shocks and confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. The aim in this example of
achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so much light and sound or the converse, to deprive the
adversary of all senses, and therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the adversary
becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable.

A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas is a dramatic if unachievable
illustration. Perhaps a high altitude nuclear detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and
electrical equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of likelihood of use. Depriving
the enemy, in specific areas, of the ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is a more
reasonable and perhaps more achievable variant. This deprival of senses, including all electronics
and substitution of false signals or data to create this feeling of impotence, is another variant. Above
all, Shock and Awe are imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is deprivation of the senses.

The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part shortcomings of other approaches.
Technological solutions are crucial but may not be conceivable outside the EMP effects of nuclear
weapons. Intelligence is clearly vital. Without precise knowledge of who and what are to be
stunned, this example will not work.

The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian" example (or to the purist, the
Potemkin Village example). It is based on imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and
indeed through deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from the U.S.
intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the early 1800s, native Haitians were seeking to extricate their
country from French control. The Haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting French
military contingent and marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions repeatedly in review. The
French were deceived into believing that the native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and
concluded that French military action was futile and that its forces would be overwhelmed. As a
result, the Haitians were able to achieve their freedom without firing a shot.

To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian example and the others. Deception,
disinformation, and guile are more crucial in this regime. However, the target or focus is the will and
perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu category comes closest to this one except
that while Sun Tzu is selective in applying force, it is clear that imposing actual pain and shock are
essential ingredients and deception, disin-formation, and guile are secondary. Demonstrative uses of
force are also important. The issue is how to determine what demonstrations will affect the
perceptions of the intended target in line with the overall political aims.

The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major dependency on intelligence. One must be
certain that the will and perceptions of the adversary can be manipulated. The classic misfire is the
adversary who is not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the unintended
actions of the aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait demonstrate when this
Potemkin Village model can backfire. Saddam simply let his bluff be called.

The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving Shock and Awe rests in the ability to
deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability
and our own invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a considerable period
of time. The target set encompasses both military and societal values. In occupying a vast empire
stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of forces to
secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman forces were far superior to native forces
individually and collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the perpetrator could
rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would take place. This was similar to British
"Gunboat Diplomacy" of the nineteenth century when the British fleet would return to the scene of
any crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the wholesale destruction of
offending villages.

There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve Shock and Awe. The invincibility of its
Legions, or the perception of that prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most
significant factors. In other words, reprisals and the use of force to exact a severe punishment, as
well as the certainty that this sword of Damocles would descend, were essential ingredients. The
distinction between this category and the others is the ex post facto nature of achieving Shock and
Awe. In the other categories, there is the need for seizing the initiative and applying
con-temporaneous force to achieve Shock and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and
Awe have already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise of new and as yet
unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use of force.

The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of reprisals and the capacity to take
punitive action. That is not and may not always be the case with the United States, although we can
attempt to make others believe it will be. The takeover of the Embassy in Tehran by dissident
"students" in 1979 and American impotence in the aftermath are suggestive of the shortcoming.
That aside, the example or perception of the invincibility of American military power is not a bad
one to embellish.

The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the Decay and Default model and is
based on the imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period but without the application of
massive destruction. This example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In this example, both
military and societal values are targets. Selective and focused force is applied. It is the long-term
corrosive effects of the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately compels an
adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe are therefore not immediate either in
application or in producing the end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and
aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do not threaten the entire society
but apply pressure as in the Chinese water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally,
the preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a variant of Shock and Awe
in the form of frustration collapsing the will to resist.

The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In many cases, the time required to
impose such a regime of Shock and Awe is unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by
conventional or politically acceptable means.

The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police," whose unofficial motto was
"never send a man where you can send a bullet." The distinction between this example and the
others is that this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu and implies that standoff capabilities
as opposed to forces in place can achieve the required objectives. There should not be too fine a
point, however, in belaboring differences with the other examples in this regard over standoff. A
stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from a cruise missile fired at 1,000 miles
regarding the effect of ordnance on target.

A few observations about these examples offer insights on which to test and evaluate means of
applying Rapid Dominance. It is clear that the targets in each category include military, civilian,
industrial, infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. In certain cases, time is the
crucial consideration in imposing Shock and Awe and in most of the examples, emphasis is on a
rapid or sudden imposition of Shock and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects of Shock
and Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved over time or achieved through
earlier conditioning and experiences. Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on
new technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different is the extent to which brilliance
and competence in using force, in understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in
executing military operations with deftness, are vital. While this recognition is not new, emphasis is
crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or
institutionalized and is not a function only of gifted individuals.

There is also a key distinction between selective or precise and massive application of force.
Technology, in the form of "zero CEP" weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory
capability of systems that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive
disruption, destruction, or damage. This damage goes beyond the loss of power grids and other
easily identifiable industrial targeting sets. Loss of all communications can have a massively
destructive impact even though physical destruction can be relatively limited.

In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels of power and force to achieve
Shock and Awe. In the attempt to keep war "immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one
point should not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty business or, as Sherman put it, "war is hell."
While there are surely humanitarian considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability
to Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm. The
Clausewitzian dictum concerning the violent nature of war is dismissed only at our peril.

For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the concerned Member of Congress with
responsibility for providing for the common defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and
hierarchies? First, there are always broader sets of operational concepts and constructs available
for achieving political objectives than may be realized. Not all of these alternatives are necessarily
better or feasible. However, the examples suggest that further intellectual and conceptual effort is a
worthwhile investment in dealing with national security options in the future.

Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in generating new thinking. In many
past cases, time was generally viewed as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to
arrive "firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to ensure we had ample
forces on station should they be required. Rapid Dominance would alleviate many of these
constraints as we would have the capacity to deploy effective forces far more quickly. Therefore, in
this case, we can view time as an ally. The political issue rests in longstanding arguments to limit the
President from having the capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation
without conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is an obvious point, it should not
eliminate alternative types of force packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration
and experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and emergency release
procedures shows that delegating instant presidential authority can be handled responsibly.

Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several models, it is clear that one
capability not presently in the arsenal is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise and
timely. It is also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important attributes in war,
there are no guarantees that they can be institutionalized in any military force.

Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates to the Sun Tzu example. Suppose
there are "EMP-like" or High Powered Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide
broad ability to incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. In using these weapons, the nerve
centers of that society would be attacked rather than using this illustrative system to achieve hard
target kill because there were few hard targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like systems have
been and are being carefully researched.

Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, and misinformation are crucial aspects
of waging war, Rapid Dominance would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By using
complete signature management, larger formations could be made to look like smaller and smaller
formations made to seem larger. At sea, carrier battle groups could be disguised and smaller
warships could be made to appear as large formations. This signature management would apply
across the entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or electronic ranges. Indeed, gaining the
ability to regulate what information and intelligence are both available and not available to the
adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception. It is control in the fullest sense of the
word.

The next step is to match the four significant characteristics that define Rapid Dominance
knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and controlwith Shock and Awe against achievable military
objectives in order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces and force packages
accordingly, and determine those integrated systems and innovative uses of technologies and
capabilities that will provide the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that
include both the MRC and OOTW.