The
United States' plans for ballistic missile defense installations in Central
Europe will fuel the ongoing geopolitical contest between Washington and
Moscow.

As
an irony of history, a ‘Central Europe’ at the time termed "Mitteleuropa", was a political concept for a
German-dominated and exploited Central European union,
to be put in motion during WWI - that
obviously didn’t come to pass.

Today
instead, another ‘central Europe’ very much transformed since its
post-Stalinist era, can be seen intend on countering now Russia’s moves.

Yet
Russia’s cooperating with Western Europe on security issues, can be seen as a
tactic that both strengthens Moscow’s ties with Western Europe (particularly
Germany) and makes Eastern European countries that now consider themselves to
be part of 'Central Europe (between East and West)' - look unreasonable. The
growing rift between Western and Central Europe will eventually lead to a
crisis as the Central European countries try to avoid serving as a buffer zone
between Russia and the West.

The
Visegrad Group decided in May to form a VisegradBattlegroup under Polish command by 2016. The
actual capacities of this battlegroup are yet to be
determined, but the decision shows very clearly that it is evolving from a
primarily political grouping to one that places security at the forefront of
its mission.

Nordic
countries share the same suspicion of Russia as the Eastern European countries;
Sweden and Finland have interests in the Baltic States, and Norway is concerned
with Russian activity in the Barents Sea. These countries and the United
Kingdom are also concerned with the emerging German-Russian relationship.

The
Nordic-Baltic countries have a military component that was formed several years
before the Nordic-Baltic political grouping came together: the Nordic Battlegroup, created in 2008 under the EU Battlegroup format. Its current members are Sweden,
Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland, with Lithuania set to join in 2014. There
are signs that the wider Nordic-Baltic political grouping could enhance its
military component beyond this battlegroup that better
serve the national interests of what elsewhere has been called"Międzymorze" and
Nordic countries.

Russia
is not standing idly by as European countries respond to the evolution of the
continent’s geopolitics. Moscow is primarily concerned with the U.S. presence
in the region, which is seen as a tangible threat. (The Visegrad,
or V4, Battlegroup and the Nordic-Baltic security
relationship are budding alliances, but U.S. F-16s and BMD installations near
Ukraine and Belarus are real.) Thus, Moscow initially sought to counter the
U.S. military encroachment in Central Europe directly, most notably with
threats of placing Iskander short-range ballistic
missiles in Kaliningrad and Belarus, an option that remains available. Russia
also threatened to end its cooperation with the United States over the Iranian
nuclear program and on alternative transportation routes to Afghanistan if
Washington continued to pursue the BMD system.

However,
Russia has realized that countering U.S. BMD with military responses elsewhere
could unify NATO members against it. No country, including Germany, would
welcome Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Such a move
would depict Moscow as belligerent, supporting the Intermarium’s
argument that Moscow is a threat. Moreover, now that Russia is confident in its
hold over Belarus and Ukraine, it has the freedom to be selectively cooperative
and pragmatic in its foreign policy in order to pursue its national interests.

Therefore,
Russia has shifted its tactics — while retaining the option of responding
militarily — to facilitating the ongoing fragmentation of the NATO alliance. In
Moscow, this strategy is called “the chaos tactic.” In other words, the Kremlin
will sow chaos within Europe by cooperating with Western Europe on security
issues. The offer of a joint NATO-Russian BMD system is an example of this
tactic; it makes Moscow appear willing to cooperate on the BMD issue while
painting the Intermarium countries as belligerent and
uncompromising (“paranoid,” as the Kremlin often puts it) when they protest
Russia’s participation. Two other specific examples involve the European
Security Treaty and the EU-Russia Political and Security Committee.

The
European Security Treaty is a Russian proposal for a Europe-wide security
treaty that remains very vague. It is unclear what the treaty would actually
achieve, although a Russian-proposed draft would give primacy to the U.N.
Security Council over all security issues on the continent, thereby limiting
NATO’s power — theoretically. The specifics of the treaty are irrelevant; the
important point is that Moscow is negotiating with Western European countries.
The mere act of Moscow’s talking to Western Europe about a new security
framework irks the Intermarium; such talks show just
how shaky the NATO alliance has become. Russia is working around the Intermarium countries by talking to their supposed allies
about weakening the very alliance structure the Intermarium
holds dear. To date, a number of countries, including Germany, France and
Italy, have shown their willingness to discuss the issue. Moscow considers this
a success.

Similarly,
the not-yet-realized EU-Russia Political and Security Committee is an attempt
by Moscow to have a voice in EU security issues. The committee is a
German-Russian idea and thus illustrates the countries’ close relationship.

Russia
is using the concept to both plant doubt in Central
Europe about Germany’s commitment to the Intermarium
and to give Berlin the sense that diplomacy is an effective tool in dealing
with Moscow. The more Russia can convince Germany that Berlin can manage
Russian aggression in Europe, the less Berlin will
support the Intermarium’s efforts to counter Russia
with military alliances. Russia thus wants to give Germany the confidence that
it can handle Moscow. Germany sees the EU-Russia Political and Security
Committee as a diplomatic success and proof of its influence over Moscow,
whereas the Intermarium countries see it as proof of
Germany’s accommodationist attitude toward Russia.

A
Coming European Crisis?

The
current geopolitical shift in Europe will engender a crisis by the middle of
the decade. The 'Intermarium/Międzymorze'
countries do not want to take Germany’s Cold War-era role as the chessboard
upon which Russia and the United States play. Instead, the Intermarium
and the Nordic countries — led by Poland and Sweden — want to move the buffer
between Europe and Russia to Belarus and Ukraine. If they can get those two
countries to be at the very least neutral — not formally within Russia’s
political, economic and military sphere of influence — then Central Europe can
feel relatively safe. This explains the ongoing Polish-Swedish coordination on
issues such as the EU Eastern Partnership program, which is designed to reverse
Russia’s growing influence in the former Soviet sphere, and the opposition of
Belarusian President AleksandrLukashenko.

Several
issues will come to a head in a few years. The United States is expected to be
fully withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2013, which will allow it to focus more on
Central Europe. The U.S. BMD presence in Romania is supposed to be formalized
with an SM-3 missile battery in 2015 and in Poland by 2018 — pieces in an
increasingly dispersed, capable and scalable BMD network in Europe. By then,
the V4 Battlegroup and the Nordic-Baltic alliance
security components should also be more defined. All of these dates are subject
to change, but that they will take place within a few years of each other (in
or around 2015-2020) suggests the middle of the decade will be a crucial point
in the shifting landscape of the European battleground.

Russia
has a secure grasp on buffer states Ukraine and Belarus and is fairly
successful in causing chaos within Europe’s security institutions. However,
Russia will lose some of its confidence when a collection of security pacts and
installations become effective nearly simultaneously by the middle of the
decade, especially if Europe’s security institutions continue their attempts to
move eastward. Traditionally, when Russia is threatened, it lashes out.
Although Moscow is currently acting cooperatively — while concurrently creating
chaos across the continent — it can easily resume using more aggressive
tactics. Moscow has contingency plans, including moving troops against the
Baltic and Polish borders in Belarus, potentially increasing its military
presence in Ukraine and the Black Sea, and placing missiles in Kaliningrad and
Belarus.

But
the overall balance between the United States and Russia in Central Europe will
depend on another country: Germany. The question at this point will be the
extent to which Germany is willing to see the Intermarium
draw in a U.S. military presence. Like Russia, Germany does not want to see a
U.S.-dominated continent, especially when Berlin is strong enough to command
the region politically and economically. Nor does Germany want to see a more
aggressive Russia in a few years. Berlin has limited options to prevent either
scenario, but it could use NATO and EU structures to stall the process — though
it would cause an identity crisis for both institutions. It will be important
to watch how the United States and Russia use Germany against each other in the
fight over Central Europe.

Many
questions remain as to how all of these issues will play out in the coming
years, but the foundation for a real shift in European security is already
being shaped. It is unclear if the new battleground between the United States
and Russia in Central Europe really is a battleground, or if the current
situation will end in a stalemate, as was the case on the previous front line
in the Cold War. Regardless, one difference remains: Unlike Cold War-era
Germany, the above discussed states considering themselves
to be part of a sort of new ‘Central Europe’ will not quietly accept becoming
the staging ground for a U.S.-Russian contest.