2 Understanding Critical Infrastructure Failure: Examining the experience of Biloxi and Gulfport Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. Carrie Beth Lasley, David M. Simpson, Thomas D. Rockaway, Terry Weigel Working Paper August 2007 ABSTRACT This article examines disaster recovery and resilience issues following a major hurricane. Two coastal communities were chosen for study following Hurricane Katrina in order to explore the issues in measuring and evaluating recovery and resilience. The communities were Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi. A mix of data sources were employed to determine effects on critical infrastructure at a community wide scale. The data sources included key informant interviews, GIS data, and secondary data such as newspaper reports, city financial statements, and similar documents. The key findings indicate a methodological problem with the formulation of recovery and resilience curves as discussed in other literature. While information regarding a particular community can be mapped, its characteristics are unique and difficult to generalize to other communities. While this issue is not necessarily new to the area of hazards research, it adds weight to the argument that more should be done to collect post event data that can be analyzed in a cross comparative way with other communities. Recommendations include the establishment of a data archivist position that would be co located in an EOC, and the development of standardized measurement sets that all disaster affected communities would gather post event. Finally, specific recommendations for further research are offered. INTRODUCTION AND ISSUES Methods for measuring and evaluating resilience have been developed for natural disasters. For example, Reinhorn and Bruneau (2007) evaluate resilience of hospitals to the effects of earthquakes. Recognizing that hospital operation is essential during and immediately after an earthquake to save lives and treat wounds, researchers measured how well hospitals can withstand and adapt to seismic events and their associated infrastructure failure. Resilience includes the ability of the structure to withstand the actual shaking of the ground, as well as the

3 ability to operate despite the loss of power and water, fires, and impacts on transportation networks. (Reinhorn 2007) Earthquake resilience has been a focal point of researchers at the SUNY Buffalo Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER), the Mid America Earthquake Center (MAE Center) at the University of Illinois, as well as others at Georgia Tech, the University of Central Florida and Texas A&M University. The research evaluating hurricane resilience, however, is not as developed. Hurricanes have multiple damage vectors from wind, storm surge, and flooding. Locating a facility in high elevation might mitigate flooding, but increases wind exposure. Hurricanes are the costliest and one of the deadliest natural disasters. NOAA data indicates that in the period in the U.S., there have been 22 hurricanes with damages exceeding $1 billion. (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2007). Several sources indicate the rebuilding cost for Hurricane Katrina will exceed $200 billion. While there may be limited structural mitigation that can withstand hurricanes and storm surge, advances in forecasting enable meteorologists to more accurately predict landfall and provide advance warning. Better models and improved data tracking enable 72 hour landfall forecasts to be more accurate. On August 26, 2005, three days before landfall, the National Weather Service s National Hurricane Center forecasted landfall just east of New Orleans, predicting a 15 20ft storm surge. As landfall approached, forecast accuracy increased (White House 2006). The August 26 model gave communities three days to prepare. Preparedness, however, is not uniform. Some communities are able to withstand hurricanes with minimal disruption, others are paralyzed for weeks. Developing a method to measure a community s vulnerability and resilience to hurricanes can provide a warning signal for communities, encouraging investment in mitigation. Cross community comparisons can illustrate

4 successful preparedness examples. Additionally, identifying potential storm impacts can better communicate to residents how life will change and for how long. This analysis focuses on critical infrastructure measurement and how that can assist communities in preparedness and planning. Critical infrastructure includes a community s ability to provide communication, water, electricity, emergency services and healthcare to residents. O Rourke (2007) describes critical infrastructure as lifelines, or as systems intimately linked with economic well being, security and social fabric. Critical infrastructure is dependent on other sectors within the community. If the transportation network is damaged, emergency services may be unable to reach those in need. Water pumps and treatment facilities need electricity to operate. Loss of one system of critical infrastructure often leads to failure of others. The systems are essential in minimizing loss of life and damage, and restoring quality of life. Loss of multiple systems intensifies the problems. A loss of electricity, water and communication networks, for example, could lead to the need for a boil water advisory, but with an inability to disseminate the message, leading to an increase in water related illnesses. The recovery curves we identify are partially a measure of resilience. They estimate the damage and the amount of time for loss recovery. Infrastructure capability (%) is on the x axis and recovery time in on the y axis. Challenges in Measurement Hurricanes pose a challenge in developing recovery curves, as they inflict three types of damage (wind, storm surge, and flooding). All pose a threat to infrastructure, and sorting out which peril does what damage is often difficult after the fact. A recovery curve aggregates damage from all three events, however, and depending on the individual storm, any one aspect

5 may have dominated the damage. A community may be prepared to withstand one damage type, but may suffer greatly from another. For example, Hurricane Katrina carried a great deal of rain and it is estimated that as much as half of the water that flooded New Orleans came from the sky (Christian 2007). Hurricane winds start at 74 miles per hour and can climb well above 150 mph. Katrina s winds exceeded 120 mph. In developing curves for Katrina affected communities, there were additional challenges. The first is fatigue. Katrina occurred in the busiest hurricane season experienced in recorded years. Reporters, aid workers and researchers came in droves. City officials and residents were asked questions repetitively. As those questions were answered numerous times, willingness to participate in research declined, and recollection of exact events began to fade. Another issue in data collection relates to critical infrastructure itself. Loss of power meant computers were no longer collecting data, but also meant that those in the best position to collect data were busy maintaining operations. Attention to details such as time, locations of failure, and the order of problems encountered were eclipsed by needs of response leaving critical information unrecorded, unknown, or forgotten. What data remained is incomplete, estimated, inaccurate or missing. Methodology Two cities were chosen as case studies to better understand how infrastructure failed during Hurricane Katrina. Fifty miles northeast of Katrina s landfall are the communities of Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi, both within Harrison County. These cities combine with Pascagoula to make a single Metropolitan Statistical Area on Mississippi s Gulf Coast. Gulfport (71,127 pop.) is larger (Biloxi, 50,644) and they are the second and third largest cities in Mississippi.

6 Three trips to the area were conducted to collect data and interview key informants. Press releases, media reports and journal articles were used to help pinpoint events. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected from multiple sources. The team conducted on site interviews of public works administrators, government officials and emergency personnel. Photographic evidence, geographic information systems (GIS) data, and public documents were used to supplement interviews. Where data was missing, investigators turned to press releases and media reports. Gulfport and Biloxi were selected because their size and services structure enabled largerscale observations of systems. A total loss of electricity was experienced by Mississippi Power, the area s provider. If backup generators were not available, loss of power was followed by cascading failures of services, data collection and communication. Even where generators were available, fuel shortages led to eventual service loss. Immediately following landfall, efforts were concentrated on saving lives and solving critical problems such as the unanticipated fuel crisis and closing of leaking gas lines. Data collection was a secondary consideration. A more complete data set might include all aspects of critical infrastructure behavior aggregated for both communities, but also available as separate sets. This was not possible. Analysis relied in many cases on data aggregated to Harrison County, while in some cases data was available in one community but not the other. A second common issue with the data is the assumption of resident return. Evidence suggests many residents hardest hit by storm surge could not, or chose not to, return. For example, in a January 2007 newsletter from the City of Biloxi, pre Katrina and post Katrina school enrollment numbers were compared. Fewer than 52 percent of students enrolled in 2004 returned to classes when school opened in October of In January 2007, that number had only risen to 76

7 percent (Tisdale 2007). The Biloxi GIS manager acknowledged that the northern suburb of Orange Grove experienced a population boom after the storm (Cohan 2006), indicating some residents who left low lying neighborhoods chose to move to higher elevations. Dislocation may be permanent or may continue only while residents await insurance payments, money from FEMA, or some additional level of recovery before returning. The following sections examine the critical infrastructure elements in the two communities, developing recovery curves where possible from the available data. These sections are followed by some preliminary conclusions, and recommendations for policy and research as result. Electricity Mississippi Power is the area provider of electricity for the communities and much of Mississippi. Upon Katrina s landfall, all 195,000 Mississippi Power customers lost service, including those in the Coast division. Map 1.1 shows key electric infrastructure in Harrison County, Mississippi, as well as the inundation contours. Map 1.1

8 Storm surge affected the electric infrastructure significantly, striking several substations as well as the Watson power plant in Gulfport, indicated by the red circle on Map 1.1. Plant Watson provided three important services to Mississippi Power. It was the second largest power generator, and housed the emergency operations center and backup power generators. These services were lost upon flooding from storm surge; water filled the basement and a foot of the first floor. (Ball Spring 2006) Figure 1.1 shows the recovery curve for Plant Watson. It took about nine months to restore full power capability. (Mississippi Business Journal 2006) Figure 1.1 Plant Watson recovery /29/2005 9/29/ /29/ /29/ /29/2005 1/29/2006 2/28/2006 3/29/2006 4/29/2006 5/29/2006 Percent recovered Plant Watson recovery Aggregate data exists for total Mississippi Power restoration. Mississippi Power divides its service areas into divisions, and there is aggregate data for each division. Data for the coastal division was reported as percentage restored and given on a daily basis (in a press release) from Mississippi Power beginning on Day 5. The recovery curve is represented in Figure 1.2 below. On Day 5, the first day for which data was available, 14,169 residents on the coast had power restored, 19 percent of the customers in the division. Thereafter, a steady increase, followed by a jump from 39 percent to 72 percent, between Day 8 and Day 10, occurred. By Day 13, all customers who could receive power (90 percent) on the coast had received it. (Southern

9 Company 2005) This data suggests that 10 percent of its households and businesses receiving power before the storm were incapable of receiving it two weeks afterward, and were unlikely to be households where people were living, and therefore were not in need of electricity. Figure 1.2: Recovery curve for the coast division of Mississippi Power, a subsidiary of the Southern Company. Data is from daily press releases from Mississippi Power. Recovery curve for Coast Electric Landfall Day 2 Day 4 Day 6 Day 8 Day 10 Day 12 Day 14 Day 16 Day 18 Day 20 A Southern Company Mississippi Power Press release issued in January 2006 gave specific numbers of households not yet restored. This number was community specific. In Biloxi, there were 5,148 households without power. In Gulfport, there were 3,707 households without power. (A Southern Company 2006) Using census statistics from the 2000 Census, the final percentage in each community not restored was determined. Analysis indicated a larger percentage of the unrecovered customers were in Biloxi. With more outages (5,148) and a lower population (50,644), Biloxi residents were harder hit by electricity loss. About a quarter (24.6 percent) of households were without power in March, six months later.

10 Gulfport, on the other hand, had a larger population and a smaller number of residents. Just 14 percent of Gulfport households were not capable of coming back online by March. Figure 1.3 shows all three fragility curves, the aggregate or original curve, as well as the adjusted curves for each community. An additional assumption is made that Mississippi Power s final recovery statistic was the maximum it expected to restore after Katrina (U.S. Census, 2000). Figure 1.3: Numbers are adjusted based on population, household size and number of customers not receiving electricity in March of Adjusted Recovery Curves for Electricity Percent Restored Original Biloxi Gulfport Mississippi Power expected the restoration cost to be between $245 $295 million. About twothirds of the power infrastructure needed repairs. Among those necessary repairs, the utility s generating facility in Gulfport sustained flooding on its first floor, and additionally 1,000 miles of transmission line, 9,000 poles and 300 transmission poles needed repairs (A Southern Company 2005). These repairs would continue to disrupt Gulf coast lives on a local basis well after the storm, but Mississippi Power was able to restore power quickly due to a post storm functioning communication system, adequate staff, a sufficient inventory of replacement parts and system redundancy.

11 Water and Wastewater Flooding, storm surge and high winds combined to severely impact the water and wastewater infrastructures. System damage, coupled with power loss, created a situation in which running and potable water could not be delivered to Harrison County residents. This section describes recovery efforts of the water and wastewater infrastructure. Map 2.1 shows water utility infrastructure in Gulfport of Harrison County and Katrina surge inundation limits. Map 2.2 shows wastewater assets in the same area. Map 2.1 Map 2.2

12 Information on water utilities was unbalanced. While good data exists for Gulfport, the same cannot be said for Biloxi. Public notices have helped determine when the majority of the water system came online. Full recovery data is not available, although it is likely that all wells were either brought back online or were bypassed in the municipal water system. Figure 2.1 shows the recovery curves for each community. Biloxi is limited to 91.3 percent. Figure 2.1 Water Restoration Curves Biloxi Gulfport 20 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Recovery with time does not reflect the severity of damage done to the infrastructure. Although both communities were able to quickly restore service to residents, Biloxi s water restoration was problematic. Biloxi s water recovery came with a warning that the pressure was very low on Sept. 4. Two of 23 wells were still out of service. (City of Biloxi 2005) The city warned residents to employ strict conservation measures until the pressure was restored. Restoration of running water, however, did not mean that it was safe to drink.

13 Although water was not pumping through the pipes, both cities ensured water needs were met. Five locations in Biloxi were open daily to distribute bottled water, and Gulfport residents also received bottled water. United Parcel Service was among several corporations and organizations that sent water and food to Biloxi and Gulfport. (United Parcel Service 2005) The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had to approve water services before boil water notices could be lifted. The systems had been exposed to debris and sewage during Hurricane Katrina. Once the system was cleared by the EPA, the boil water notices could be lifted. Figure 2.2 shows the recovery curves for potable water, represented by the expiration of boil water advisories. Figure 2.2: Data showing when municipal boil water advisories were lifted for Gulfport, Miss., and Biloxi, Miss. Boil water advisories Day 1 Day 4 Day 7 Day 10 Day 13 Day 16 Day 19 Day 22 Day 25 Day 28 Day 31 Day 34 Gulfport Gulfport lifted the boil water advisory to the part of the community and to the full community at a faster rate, but Biloxi restored water to 1 percent more households on Sept. 16. This is due to a slightly lower proportion of residents living south of the railroad tracks in Biloxi. Each community was able to lift boil water advisories on north of the railroad tracks faster than the heavily damaged area south. Gulfport needed two weeks to restore service to most residents, and Biloxi required a few extra days. (Reimann 2006, Nolan 2006) Biloxi

14 In both communities, the water infrastructure suffered severe damage pumping stations were flooded, debris found its way into wells. Even after running water was restored, there was still a great deal of damage from which to recover. Manhole covers were not locked down, and were easy displaced by storm surge. Nine months after Katrina, Gulfport estimated that recovery of the water system was just 30 percent complete. (Reimann 2006) In Biloxi, generators were necessary for lift stations. One year later, the generators were still being used. In some instances when wastewater treatment plants returned to service, they were not fully functional. For two months after the storm, manual chemical treatment was still needed (Holloway 2006). In Biloxi, the Biloxi Regional Medical Center needed a mobile treatment unit from the EPA to continue operating (Grumbles 2005). Both cities, despite crippled infrastructure, had restored water and sewage a little more than two weeks, with all those who could receive service restored. In the state of Mississippi, six weeks after the storm, there were still 30 utilities, serving 10,000 customers, not operating in any capacity, and 54 utilities, serving 43,000 households still operating under boil water advisories. (Grumbles 2005) Both cities fared better than neighboring counties. Discussions with Gulfport officials noted that the city successfully implemented its emergency preparedness plan, confirming the operation of backup power on the wells that were so equipped. The Public Works department deployed tire repair kits, and sent the fleet of vehicles home with workers so the fleet would not be vulnerable at a single location. The fleet dispersion allowed workers to quickly respond to problems in their own neighborhood, thus allowing a number of sites to receive attention early. No vehicles were lost as a result of the storm. Municipal workers also removed vegetation near the drainage system to lessen the potential for contamination and clogging by debris. (Reimann 2006)

15 Gulfport Public Works observed that upon landfall, system pressure dropped quickly, and was completely lost within 30 minutes (at 8:30 a.m.). By 2 p.m., damage was under investigation, and the system south of Interstate 10 was purposefully cut off from the rest of the system due to heavy damage. Even in areas heavily damaged by the storm, water pumps were operational; though they were pumping into flood water. (Reimann 2006) Telecommunications During a disaster, the ability to communicate is critical. Communications help those working the recovery to report observed needs, progress and damage. Communication between officials and the public, and between members of the public, facilitates information distribution, such as boil water advisories and road closings. The loss of electricity proved to be a lethal blow to communication links, contributing to slow recovery. The House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina stated that the Gulf Coast of Mississippi experienced total destruction of communications infrastructure. (U.S. House of Representatives 2006) One month after the storm, 22,000 households in the state were still without phone service. Cell towers suffered, with more than 2,000 towers taken off line by Katrina. A month later, a little more than half had been restored to service. The House Select Committee estimated that 20 million calls failed to go through; including 911 calls. (U.S. House of Representatives 2006) Where communications existed, it was often cited as insufficient. Operability was an issue when lines, poles, switching centers, cellular towers and radio antennas were damaged by the storm. Lack of interoperability created problems when responders could not communicate with other organizations. In the White House report on Katrina, federal communications aid given to local and state agencies was criticized as being insufficient. The report notes that two of five

16 MERS (Mobile Emergency Response Support) vehicles were deployed, but in retrospect, more should have been ready to assist. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security used its National Communications System to assist, but this was still not enough to coordinate (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). One of the clear issues was the problem interoperability. A report from the 2004 Conference of Mayors indicated that 44 percent of cities had agency interoperability issues in the previous year, and that most could not communicate effectively with state and federal agencies. (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2004). In Katrina s aftermath, most agencies could communicate internally, but interagency communications were difficult. The House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina pointed to a lack of redundancy in planning. (U.S. House of Representatives 2006) The most successful alternate communication mode was satellite phone. High winds and heavy bandwidth traffic jammed lines and many essential messages failed to get through. Another unanticipated problem was the off target satellite antennas caused by high wind. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency noted there was an insufficient cache of satellite phones. (U.S. House of Representatives 2006) Communication networks are complex. To measure the loss and subsequent recovery, a rubric was created that evaluated which communication systems were necessary, which were available, which were working, when a failure occurred and the length of the delay before service was recovered. The matrix is displayed in Appendix A. In total, 30 possible methods of communication were considered. These include the traditional forms of communication, such as landline phones, cellular services, 911 and police radios. It includes methods of disseminating information to residents such as radio, TV and newspaper. Points were assigned based on the ease of communication with state and federal

17 agencies such as MEMA, FEMA and the National Guard. One point was assigned if the county had provisions in place to maintain communications. Another point was awarded if the communication system worked. For a perfectly functioning communication system, the score assigned would be 60. Harrison County scored 41.5 or had 69.2 percent of its total possible communication needs met at landfall. Table 3.1 below shows a summary of which networks were available at landfall, and which were not. Multiple media outlets of the same media are combined in the table Table 3.1: Summary of communication networks in Harrison County and their availability or failure upon landfall of Hurricane Katrina Network Operational Failed Landlines Cellular Lines Internet Satellite phones 911 Call Center Public Works Police and Fire Redundant System Radio TV Newspaper Mail National Guard FEMA MEMA Neighboring Communities Outside Help There were a total of 15 networks that failed, five of them cellular. Two were landline networks one for local calls and one for long distance calls. The following section examines recovery curves and information about recovery and systems that did not fail.

18 In terms of response, Harrison County was an example for other storm affected counties to follow. Harrison County never lost 911 services, when most communities did. In order to protect responders, calls to the service were stacked, with names and addresses taken to help guide early rescue efforts. County Sheriff s Deputies, municipal police and fire encountered few communication problems. (Kessie 2005) Figure 3.2 shows the recovery period for voice communications between Harrison County emergency response officials and various emergency agencies. Figure 3.2: Recovery curves for real time voice communications between the Harrison County Emergency Management Agency and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, emergency management agencies in the neighboring counties of Hancock, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone and George and with the Mississippi National Guard. Percentage restored Harrison Co. EMA voice communications recovery 29 Aug 30 Aug 31 Aug 1 Sep 2 Sep 3 Sep 4 Sep 5 Sep 6 Sep 7 Sep 8 Sep 9 Sep 10 Sep 11 Sep 12 Sep MEMA FEMA Neighboring Counties National Guard The National Guard, MEMA and state responders and law enforcement were among those with whom Harrison County could not communicate easily. Within these agencies, memos and face to face meetings were the available methods. The inability for Harrison County officials to communicate up the line continued for at least 48 hours. The House Select Committee found in its report that the Mississippi National Guard had access to satellite phones but was not receiving

19 calls on two important lines. It was later discovered the National Guard has changed the number prior to the storm, and had failed to alert others (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). Harrison County was cited by the House Select Committee as an example of a prepared community. Interoperability grants allowed the creation of the Enhanced Digital Access Communications Systems (EDACS). Although this system remained operable throughout the storm and its aftermath, communication with federal and state agencies was not possible due to interoperability problems. However, the system was capable of communicating with Florida agencies who aided in first response and law enforcement. Therefore, emergency response within Harrison County was possible, and within two weeks, Harrison County s Emergency Operations Center could communicate with first responders in adjoining counties. Communications with organizations higher up, such as Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, were not as reliable. Immediate communications were possible with MEMA from the Harrison County EOC via satellite, and permanent satellite radios mounted in coastal counties should have provided 12 hours of communication. In Harrison County, the radio system suffered severe damage and was inoperable. Communication between the two emergency management organizations was established via a mobile emergency response vehicle through the internet (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). A communications success was use of the Southern LINC system of radios deployed in eastern sections of the state, including Gulfport and Biloxi. While the 115 radio units in the system were not sufficient to connect everyone who needed them, they did operate. Alabama Public Works officials as well as some in Mississippi used the system to relay information about power, water and wastewater needs. The radios are programmed for disaster response, with

20 channels for various aspects of recovery and telephone capabilities. (U.S. House of Representatives 2006) Gulfport Public Works utilized the Southern LINC system, experienced no operation or communication problems. (Reimann 2006) Harrison County has been identified as a communications success story. The Federal Communications Commission oversees Magazine, and reviewed Harrison County s successes in its April 2006 issue. It noted that Harrison County had the only emergency call center to remain operational in areas directly hit by Katrina. In the article, Harrison County Emergency Communications Commission Telecommunications Manager Robert G. Bailey cited off site redundancy, staff training, engineering forethought and service contracts as key elements that made communications more dependable. To restore most communications, the only significant post storm task was the re alignment of satellite dishes. Specific actions taken by Harrison County that resulted in a functioning communication system during Hurricane Katrina include (Scott 2006): Constructing antenna platforms 4 feet above the 500 year floodplain Pre assigning radio frequencies for search and rescue agencies Conducting annual emergency training for all communications staff Conducting annual testing and backup and redundant systems Establishing service contracts with vendors for use in emergencies Figure 3.3 shows the recovery curve for landline phone service. Winds snapped phone lines and downed telephone poles, creating a communications black hole in the region and further isolating survivors of the storm. The White House report states that the state of Mississippi lost 50,000 telephone poles, and more than 3 million customers lost phone service. (White House February 2006) Bell South provides phone service in the area, and recovery was tracked by company press releases. BellSouth s first step was to provide long distance service, completed by Aug. 31.

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