The Baath Redirections of 1966 and 1970

By the summer of 1965, Hafiz began seeking to limit the influence of
the Alawis and Druzes. His own political orientation had begun to shift
toward compromise, moderation, union, and the slowing down of socialism.
In September 1965, he removed Jadid from the post of army chief of
staff, but the latter entrenched himself in his party position as
secretary general of the Regional Command. On December 21, 1965, the
National Command dissolved the Regional Command and removed Jadid's
three supporters from the five-man presidency council.

At the same time, Hafiz dismissed the cabinet of Prime Minister
Zuayyin, who had become a regionalist. He then called on the perennial
Bitar to form a new cabinet (his fifth) and recalled General Umran as
minister of defense. On Hafiz's authority, extensive transfers of
Jadid's supporters in the army were planned. On February 18, 1966, Aflaq
condemned the Jadid faction for "degenerating into regional
separatism" and (although he himself had assisted the process) for
the military usurpation of party and government power from the civilian
leadership. Thus, the stage was set for a confrontation between the two
parts of the Baath Party.

On February 23, 1966, Jadid, the Regional Command, and their army
units seized the government in the bloodiest of the many coups d'etat
since 1949. The general public, however, displayed no inclination to
fight for one Baathist military faction against the other.

Hafiz, wounded in the fighting, was arrested and imprisoned; the old
National Command was denounced and expelled; and Aflaq and Bitar were
read out of the party. Later released, both took refuge in Lebanon. One
of the first acts of the Regional Command after seizing the radio
station was the announcement of the appointment of Major General Hafiz
al Assad as minister of defense.

On March 1, 1966, a new government was formed. Jadid remained outside
the formal structure of government, directing affairs through his
position as party leader. So as not to appear as an outright military
dictatorship, the regime designated prominent regionalist Baath
civilians to office: Nureddin Atassi as president of the republic; Yusuf
Zuayyin, again as prime minister; and Ibrahim Makhus as foreign
minister. All were physicians and representatives of the urban
intellectuals. The first two were Sunnis; Makhus, an Alawi. In the
Regional Command, the top five positions were held by Jadid, Atassi,
Zuayyin, Makhus, and Assad, in that order.

On September 8, 1966, a military countercoup attempt was led by a
Druze, Salim Hatum, a leading partner of Jadid in the February 23 coup.
Although Hatum's men actually arrested President Atassi, the army chief
of staff Major General Ahmad Suwaydani, and Jadid himself, the attempt
failed when Assad threatened to send the air force against Hatum's
forces. The Workers' Battalions, a proletarian national guard organized
by Khalid al Jundi and influenced by the Chinese Red Guard concept, also
declared for Jadid. Agreement was reached between the factions for an
exchange of prisoners, and on the following morning Hatum and his
associates fled to Jordan. He returned to Syria in early June 1967 to
fight, he said, against Israel; he was arrested and shot.

The traumatic defeat of the Syrians and Egyptians in the June 1967
War with Israel discredited the radical socialist regimes of Nasser's
Egypt and Baathist Syria. The Jadid faction, which included Atassi,
Zuayyin, and Makhus, was particularly hurt. The defeat strengthened the
hands of the moderates and the rightists and was the catalyst for
Assad's ascent in Syria.

In the fall of 1968, open controversy developed between Assad,
reportedly representing a moderate faction centered in the military, and
extremists of Jadid's civilian regime. Although Jadid's power in the
party remained strong, in March 1969 an ostensible compromise was
reached between Assad and Jadid. The new government formed in May made
minor concessions to broadening the political base but represented no
real change in domestic or foreign policy. The rank order in the party's
hierarchy remained unchanged. Assad continued as minister of defense. A
number of Syrian Communists were arrested, and their leader Bakdash
again left the country.

The conflict between the Jadid civilian wing and the Assad military
wing of the party continued through 1970, and the government, although
reported to be widely unpopular, remained in firm control of the
country. From time to time different measures bore the influence of the
two factions. Party purges had decimated the air force, which suffered
from a critical pilot shortage, and Assad succeeded in restoring to duty
a number of air force pilots who had been retired for political reasons.
The Regional Command headed by Jadid, rather than the Ministry of
Defense, retained complete control of its institutionalized Palestine
guerrilla force, As Saiqa (Thunderbolt).

In its radical revolutionary role, the regime proclaimed support for
the guerrilla movements but, while polemically assailing Jordan and
Lebanon for their efforts to control Palestinian guerrillas in their
territories, did not hesitate to control the guerrillas in Syria. As
Saiqa was not allowed to launch operations from Syrian soil against
Israel because of the danger of reprisal, but was frequently used within
Syria for party security purposes.

In inter-Arab affairs, the Jadid and Assad factions largely negated
one another. Syria remained at odds with most Arab states, especially
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

In September 1970, the Jordanian army launched attacks on PLO camps
and on Palestinian refugee camps that were under the control of PLO
units; most were in the vicinity of Amman. Jordan's King Hussein ordered
the assaults in response to efforts by the PLO to implement its avowed
policy of deposing Hussein and other Arab monarchs. The hostilities in
Jordan--which became known by the PLO and its supporters as Black
September--had a profound impact on the Arab world and particularly on
the government in Syria.

During the civil war that lasted 10 days, Syria sent some 200 tanks
(nominally of the Palestine Liberation Army--PLA) to aid the PLO forces.
Iraq, Syria's Baathist rival, had a force of about 12,000 men stationed
near Az Zarqa northeast of Amman; these troops did not participate in
the fighting and withdrew to Iraq a few days later. The United States
dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and the Israeli
air force openly assumed a posture of military preparedness. Most
important, the Syrian air force refused to provide air cover to the
Syrian tank brigade, which came under severe attacks first by the
Jordanian air force and then by the Jordanian army. On September 23 and
24, the Syrian expeditionary force withdrew from the battle zone and
returned to Syria.

Syria's military fiasco in Jordan reflected political disagreement
within the ruling Baath leadership. The Jadid faction argued for full
support of and participation with the PLO in Jordan; Assad and his
associates opposed such action. For a variety of reasons, not the least
of which was fear of a devastating Israeli reprisal, Assad refused to
commit his air force to support the tank units. Jadid and his supporters
were militarily and politically humiliated.

The Baath Party's tenth congress, held in Damascus, lasted two weeks
and ended November 12, 1970. This conference, labeled an extraordinary
session of the National Command, underscored Jadid's continuing control
of the party apparatus. It adopted resolutions reaffirming the
government's position in internal and foreign affairs and censuring
Assad and his chief of staff Major General Mustafa Tlas on the grounds
of improper military influence in the government.

On November 13, 1970, army units arrested Jadid, Atassi, and Zuayyin
along with several others and seized the centers of communication
without effective opposition. Although a few minor demonstrations
occurred, the overthrow was virtually bloodless. Jadid was detained
under guard; Atassi, in house arrest. The others were soon released.

On November 16, the Regional Command of the Baath Party issued a
statement saying that the change that had occurred was a transfer of
power within the party showing that the party's progressive rank and
file were stronger than the misdirected forces of dictators. A new party
congress was to be convened to reorganize the party; a national front
government was to be organized under revised Baathist leadership; and a
people's council, or legislature, was to be formed within three months.
Continued support for the Palestinian cause was affirmed.

On November 19, 1970, the Regional Command announced the designation
of Ahmad al Khatib, a respected but hitherto little- known politician,
as acting chief of state and of Lieutenant General Assad as prime
minister and minister of defense. Assad then formed a 26-man cabinet,
consisting of about one-half Assad Baathists and the balance scattered
among Socialists, Nasserists, Independents, and Communists. This cabinet
met for the first time on November 23, 1970. In a press interview Assad
claimed that the change in government had been neither a coup nor the
result of political conflict along lines of military-civilian division,
but a natural development in the party's revolutionary movement, often
referred to as the "Correction Movement."