BEIJING - When Genghis Khan and his Mongol hordes approached Europe in the
early 1200s, they were preceded by scary tales of their acts of cruelty as well
as the history of the invasion by their possible ancestors - Attila's Huns.

The mighty army of Genghis Khan had superior weapons (the reflex bow, which
could shoot an arrow twice as far as a normal bow); sophisticated tactics
involving fast horses and advanced logistics that allowed soldiers to move
three or four times faster than normal armies. Moreover, they were a fierce and
war-hardened people.

Earlier, to stop the Huns with a cross, as Pope Leo I reputedly did on the
banks of the Mincio River in northern Italy in the summer of

AD 452, shortly before Attila's plunder of Rome, was nothing short of a
miracle.

For both the Huns and the Mongols, their military cultures and traditions were
very strong, and one could hardly hope to settle disputes with them through
discussion and finding common ground. Their main sources of "income" were
conquest and pillage.

One of the traditions was that they could be bought off with a ransom high
enough to out-value their costs of conflict, according to records of people
attacked by the Mongols and the Huns.

With regard to China, it has developed a rich military culture over the
centuries.

To explore this, Nicola Di Cosmo edited the book Military Culture in Imperial
China (Harvard University Press, (February 16, 2009). He gathered 14
specialists on China's history, divided between them 25 centuries of imperial
China, and asked them all the same question: what was the military tradition in
that time?

The book dispels the easy notion of any conflict in Chinese culture between wen
(culture, literature) and wu (military affairs), in which wen is
superior to wu, and as if wu were the last resort of the weak,
uncultured mind.

From ancient times, the Chinese had a passion for stratagems and ruses that
minimized the full brunt of combat. Nevertheless, war was considered "a matter
of life or death for the state" and everybody took it seriously, as Sun Tzu
(722-481 BC), the influential author of the book The Art of War, wrote.

In Di Cosmo's book, the final two contributors, Yingcong Dai and Peter Perdue,
highlight the military weaknesses that allowed the Qing Empire (1644-1912) to
crumble under the combined pressure of domestic rebellions and foreign attacks.
Financing the army became cumbersome, corrupt, and strained by a series of
costly border wars. Meanwhile, the "privatization" (if we use a modern term) of
military provisions and armaments led to the neglect of proper military
preparations. This was at the time Western armies, which were organized and
well-equipped, started challenging China.

This confirms and adds details to the accepted perception that the war prowess
of the Manchu (the ruling elite of the Qing Dynasty) had been gradually watered
down after centuries of rule. It was not an issue of corruption of the spirit,
it was a very practical matter of military overstretch and poor logistical
organization.

Kathleen Ryor presents an alternative view of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).
Contrary to the traditional idea that Ming China was in the hands of effeminate
weaklings and that the Manchu conquerors were a race of warmongering predators,
Ming literati made a point of also undergoing military training. They were avid
collectors of swords and other weapons, and training in martial arts was
necessary to become an official. A Ming official could have been as proficient
with the sword as his Japanese samurai counterpart.

Throughout Military Culture in Imperial China, it is clear China did not
have the dramatic split between military and literary culture that many have
perceived. Nor were the Chinese cowards and coyly averse to war before
bellicose foreign - mostly northern - invaders. Rivers of blood have been shed
in Chinese history during domestic wars and rebellions, all fought with great
proficiency and determination from generals down to foot soldiers.

Reality and ideology played different roles in China's military regimes. As
Joanna Waley-Cohen shows, Manchu invaders used their alleged "martiality" as an
ideological tool to legitimize their conquest. This was important, as China,
subjugated by the Qing foreigners, became a target of even more martial
foreigners - Western powers. This created a sense among Chinese and foreigners
that China was somehow unfit for war and that it was an easy pushover.

This is not true, and the book proves it without falling into the trap of
arguing that China was some kind of warmongering country akin to Genghis Khan's
Mongolian raiders.

As China grows economically, politically and militarily, it will become
increasingly important to understand China's present military culture, which is
rooted in the imperial tradition explored in this book. According to the
lessons of ancient Chinese generals, understanding the psychology of the
opposing army is the key to the right strategy.