Keeping our heads below water

Opinion
Andrew DaviesUpdated
Mon 11 Feb 2008, 10:48 AM AEDT

Photo

By 2025, Australia's six Collins class submarines will be thoroughly outnumbered and far short of 'state of the art'. (File photo)

ADF

About 15 years from now, the next submarine for the Royal Australian Navy will be well down the path to completion. Designed to replace the Collins class now in service, the new subs will cost billions of dollars and will take over a decade to design and build.

Subs remain flexible and powerful warships. Because of their ability to operate covertly, even the suspected presence of a submarine in an area of operations causes an adversary to use up vital resources. The same characteristic makes them ideal platforms for covert intelligence collection or for special forces operations. They can strike targets on land with cruise missiles or at sea with torpedos, mines and missiles.

Australia is far from being the only Asia-Pacific nation contemplating new submarines. Over the next two decades, scores of new submarines will be launched by countries in an arc from Pakistan to Japan. Some will be 'off the shelf' European submarines with limited range and endurance but potent capability in their areas of operation. And there will be nuclear submarines operated by China, India, Russia and the US.

Outnumbered, outdated

By 2025, Australia's six Collins class submarines will be thoroughly outnumbered and, despite a series of progressive upgrades already underway, will also be far short of 'state of the art'. To maintain its operational effectiveness, the RAN's submarine fleet will need to be replaced and, preferably, expanded.

The biggest shortfall of the Collins fleet is that we only have six. Because some are always in maintenance or undergoing modification, on a good day we could put four to sea, and we really can't count on more than three. Geography dictates that Australian submarines can be expected to operate in waters ranging from the Indian Ocean right around to the North Pacific. Given that it takes time for a submarine to reach a distant patrol area, we don't have enough to conduct a sustained campaign in more than one or two places. For planning extended submarine operations, more is better.

On the other hand, submariners naturally want to have the best possible technology. Future submarines will have advanced systems that allow them to run submerged for longer and they may also have remotely piloted 'mini-subs' that can range away from the parent boat for days at a time, collecting information or providing targeting information.

No one wants to be in a fair fight - much better if our subs are quieter and harder to find than anyone else's. If they can extend their reach by having weapons and sensors that are effective at longer range, the more likely it is that they will succeed in their missions and return safely. For individual mission effectiveness, better is better.

The trouble is that history shows that incorporating state of the art technology into a new submarine (or any defence project) increases the risk of cost or schedule overruns. When that happens, it is hard to convince those in control of the purse strings that they should support the purchase of more submarines.

That's why we have only six Collins submarines. Originally plans were for a minimum build of six, with options for another two. But the well-publicised development problems of the class and cost and schedule overruns of around twenty percent resulted in the government declining to take up the option. That is an important (if obvious) lesson - it is easier to buy more submarines if each one is cheaper and the government can be confident of delivery.

Like all other military equipment, the cost of each successive generation of submarines has increased steadily. If, as is likely, we again go down the road of building an indigenously-designed large submarine, we can confidently expect each replacement sub to cost more than the $1 billion of each Collins. If we decide on a fleet of 10, the project is going to be one of the two biggest defence buys ever (the other is the Joint Strike Fighter) and is likely to cost upwards of $15 billion.

Buy designs

One way we could cut costs and increase confidence in delivery schedules is by buying established submarine designs from elsewhere.

One option that meets our operational needs is a nuclear submarine. But, apart from political and environmental sensitivities that would come into play, Australia lacks the infrastructure to support a nuclear submarine.

So we will be in the market for a conventional sub. The trouble is that no-one else builds submarines that do what we want our subs to be able to do. European designs lack the range and payload for operations at large distances and the US hasn't built conventional submarines for decades.

So we will almost certainly build our own submarines again but at least our industrial base will be older and wiser than it was when we set out to build Collins. (Which, despite the bad press, was ultimately a quite successful project.)

That means we will at least know where the 'traps for young players' are likely to be and hopefully avoid some of the problems that beset Collins.

The battle will be between fleet affordability and the technological sophistication of each individual submarine. Where the balance should lie is the multi-billion dollar question.

Andrew Davies is the director of operations and capability at the Australian Strategy Policy Institute. The views here are his own.