These two documents, originating at Bofors in March and December of 1952 respectively, describe the plans for developing a working prototype of the 15 cm self-propelled artillery piece that was originally proposed in 1949, variously called 15 cm kv fm/49, akv 1949 and VK 152 S 49 (the latter being the internal Bofors designation). Initially, three alternatives for the track assembly and drive train are proposed: one using the existing drive train from the strv m/42 (Volvo A8B engine uprated to 450 HP and VL 420 gearbox), one a purely experimental project based on a Sherman’s gearbox and drive train, and one possible “merge” with the drive train and gearbox of a future tank being developed by KAFT (which is obviously project EMIL, but it was very much a paper project at this point).

The decision described in these documents is to go with the strv m/42 option, but this must’ve been changed to the third alternative at some point because eventually what ended up happening was that the project EMIL chassis and engine were used.

This is a delivery specification/data sheet for ikv 72 (known as “tankett m/49” during its development). Includes an armor scheme – not that the armor is of any significant thickness, only intended to protect against regular rifle-caliber rounds.

This document (dated 1951-01-20) discusses different possible way of rebuilding obsolete strv m/41 (license-built Czech TNH) into a tank destroyer armed with a modified 7,5 cm lvkan m/37 AA gun, which has very similar ballistics to the regular 7,5 cm pvkan m/43. Both turreted and fixed gun installations are discussed.

I’ve previously posted about project EMIL here; more specifically, a complete project summary with contents from various times during the project’s life. These 1951 documents however mark the very start of the project, suggesting that KAFT put six people to work for about a year in order to develop the project a loose idea to reasonably complete plans for a tank. There’s nothing new specs-wise here, just some project history.

This FOA report (dated 1951-01-23) summarizes the current state of anti-tank weaponry in the world, as well as current development trends. It contains some discussion on whether future anti-tank weapons should be based on kinetic projectiles or HEAT, and finds that in either case, the current Swedish anti-tank weapons are completely insufficient to fight current Russian tanks.

In 1950, a lieutenant at I 15, B. Schmidt, suggested to KAFT that in light of recent developments in the field of artillery-hunting radar it might be a good idea to mount the ubiquitous 12 cm Tampella mortar on a tracked chassis, enabling it to “shoot-and-scoot”.

This post features the lieutenant’s letter as well as a KAFT memo suggesting to try the idea out on the “tankette” chassis. As far as I know the idea was tried in reality but the mortar recoil turned out to be too big for the small chassis and the idea was dropped.

In 1950 it was becoming alarmingly apparent that current Swedish AT weapons were completely inadequate for fighting foreign top-of-the-line tanks. A series of discussions were thus held at KAFT in order to figure out what kind of “anti-tank super-weapons” the army should be equipped with in the future. Since kinetic weapons were seen as impractically bulky and heavy, HEAT was considered the main alternative despite its downsides (such as difficulties with spaced armor).

In March 1949 the army headquarters described the requirements for future AFV’s in a brief memo sent to KAFT. One of the vehicles called for was an unassuming 20-ton vehicle intended for infantry support, armed with a 75 or 105 mm gun. During 1949 and 1950 this vehicle was occasionally discussed, but left on the back burner in favor of the ongoing “tankette” development program. In August 1950 the army headquarters revisited the project and seems to have noticed certain alarming developments abroad; more specifically, tanks were rapidly becoming much bigger and heavier and with much greater protection.

As far as I know this project never led anywhere except to trials of the AMX-13, but it still gives some insight on what the army headquarters were thinking about tanks at the time. The sudden realization in late 1950 that foreign developments were just about immune to current Swedish tanks probably contributed to getting the EMIL project going the following year.