Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings

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This paper examines how different rules for presentation of evidence affect verdicts in regulatory hearings and the welfare and efficiency properties these procedures exhibit. The hearing is modeled as a game of imperfect information in which the respondent is privately informed about validity of his case. The respondent may present evidence to support his case. The commission observes whether the respondent presents evidence, and the nature of the evidence presented to update its beliefs about the validity of the case. Based on these beliefs and the standard of proof for conviction, the commission decides whether the respondent's application should be accepted or rejected. The sequential equilibria of this game are examined for their implications regarding (i) the desirability of making disclosure of evidence mandatory rather than voluntary, (ii) the burden of proof undertaken by the respondent to prove his case, and (iii) the impact of information accuracy and disclosure costs on the outcome of the hearing and the welfare of the respondents. Ce papier étudie comment différentes règles pour la production de preuves peuvent influencer la prise de décision d'une agence de réglementation ainsi que les propriétés de bien-être de ces règles. Une firme réglementée possède une information privée quant à la validité de sa requête et peut produire des éléments de preuve pour la soutenir. Une agence de réglementation observe la preuve présentée par la firme et se forme alors une opinion sur la validité de la requête. Les équilibres de ce jeu sont caractérisés et les points suivants sont étudiés : (i) la production de certains éléments doit-elle être obligatoire ou volontaire ? (ii) quelles sont les conséquences du fardeau de la preuve que la firme doit supporter ? (iii) quel est l'impact de la précision de la preuve et des coûts associés à sa produciton sur la décision de l'agence et le bien-être de la firme ?(This abstract was borrowed from another version of thi(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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