Eugene
Ladd, an inmate committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction=
s,
filed a Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 complaint challenging his
classification for participation in a community reintegration program.The superior court granted summar=
y judgment
in favor of the Commissioner. Ladd
contends the court erred in determining that the classification was within=
the
Commissioner’s statutory authority.=
We affirm.

Ladd
is currently incarcerated for several convictions, including grossly negli=
gent operation
of a motor vehicle with serious bodily injury resulting, in violation of 23
V.S.A. § 1091(b).The
Department of Corrections operates an offender reintegration program, unde=
r 28
V.S.A. § 721, in which an inmate’s participation may be limited=
if the
inmate was convicted of a “listed crime.”Id. § 722(2).Listed crimes are defined by stat=
ute,
and include—as originally set forth by the
Legislature—“careless or negligent operation resulting in seri=
ous
bodily injury or death as defined in section 1091(c) or (d) =
of
Title 23.”1999, No. 4,
§ 1 (codified at 13 V.S.A. § 5301(7)(X)) (emphasis added).Ladd’s complaint alleged th=
at he
was improperly classified as having been convicted of a listed crime, beca=
use
the crime for which he was convicted is set forth in 23 V.S.A. § 1091=
(b),
which defines the substantive offense of grossly negligent operation.Subsection (c), in contrast, mere=
ly
states that “the provisions of [§ 1091] do not limit or restric=
t the
prosecution for manslaughter,” while subsection (d) provides for a $=
50
surcharge for persons “convicted of violating subsection (b).”=
The trial court rejected LaddR=
17;s
argument, concluding that the Legislature had inadvertently referred to th=
e wrong
section, and that it made no sense to adopt a “literalist approach t=
hat
would nullify the section entirely.”

We
agree with the trial court’s conclusion.The fundamental purpose of statut=
ory
construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislat=
ure,
and in so doing we look principally to the plain language of the statute.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> In re Huntley, 2004 VT 115,
¶ 6, 865 A.2d 1123.How=
ever,
when the plain language of the statute would render it meaningless or
ineffective, we are not required to apply a literal construction.See Burr & Burton Seminary=
v.
Town of Manchester, 172 Vt. 433, 436 (2001) (“[W]hen the plain
meaning of the statute contradicts the intent of the Legislature, we are n=
ot
confined to a literal interpretation of the statutory language.”); <=
u>State
v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 511 (1981) (explaining that in construing sta=
tute,
court is not “confined to a literal interpretation of the statutory
language” that would render statute “meaningless” or
“ineffective”).=
Indeed,
we have held that this Court “may correct a statute whose language d=
oes
not promote the intent of the Legislature due to clerical error in
transcription, writing, or redrafting.”In re C.S., 158 Vt. 339, 3=
43
(1992).

Such
an error was plainly the case here.The Legislature obviously intended to include grossly negligent
operation of a motor vehicle with serious bodily injury resulting as a
statutorily “listed crime,” and mistakenly referred to the wro=
ng
subsection.This is readily
apparent from the fact that the Legislative Council has recently changed t=
he
provision in the statutory Cumulative Supplement to refer to 23 V.S.A. &se=
ct;
1091(b).Although it may not
“alter the sense, meaning or effect of any act of the general
assembly,” the Legislative Council—in preparing an act for
codification in the Vermont Statutes Annotated—may, among other thin=
gs,
“correct manifest typographical and grammatical errors.”2 V.S.A. § 424, 424(8).Although Ladd notes that the Legi=
slature
has previously amended the statute without changing the reference to
subsections (c) and (d) of 23 V.S.A. § 1091, this does not, in our vi=
ew,
demonstrate an intent to refer to a provision that would otherwise render =
the
statute meaningless and ineffectual. See Baldwin, 140 Vt. at 511 (n=
oting
that we avoid constructions that would render statute meaningless or
ineffective).

The
trial court’s construction of the statute as including Ladd’s
conviction among the “listed crimes” was therefore correct. Accordingly, we discern no basis =
to
disturb the judgment.