Much of the organization and the direction of operation of the blockade were
determined early in the war by the Blockade Strategy Board, an ad hoc committee including Captain Samuel F. Du Pont, chairman;
Professor Alexander D. Bache, superintendent of the Coast Survey; Major John G. Barnard, of the Army Corps of Engineers; and
Commander Charles H. Davis, recording secretary. The board (which had no formal name and was often referred to simply as "the
Strategy Board,") first met on 27 June 1861, and filled many of the roles that would in later wars be filled by a Joint Staff.

At
the beginning of the blockade, it was correctly surmised that the character of the coast and the nature of the blockade would
be different in different regions. So, the blockade was divided into the Atlantic Blockading Squadron, based at Hampton Roads,
Virginia, and the Gulf Blockading Squadron, based at Key West, Florida. The dividing line between the two squadrons was roughly
the southern tip of Florida.

Upon the resignation of Flag Officer Silas Stringham, the commander of the
Atlantic Blockading Squadron, the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was further divided into the North and South Atlantic Blockading
Squadrons (NABS and SABS), with the new commanders appointed on 18 September 1861. The NABS' main base continued to be Hampton
Roads, while the SABS' main base was situated at Port Royal, South Carolina, after its capture on 7 November 1861. The dividing
line between the two was at the North Carolina-South Carolina border, and the SABS area of responsibility continued south
to Cape Canaveral, Florida.

Federal Blockade: Union Blockade Squadrons

Courtesy Mark A. Moore

The Gulf Blockading Squadron was similarly subdivided, initially to provide a way to place David G. Farragut
in charge of a fleet for the attack of New Orleans. The East Gulf Blockading Squadron (EGBS) continued to be based at Key
West, and was responsible for the Florida coast from Cape Canaveral to Pensacola, Florida. The West Gulf Blockading Squadron
(WGBS) was based at Pensacola and Ship Island, Mississippi, and was responsible for the remainder of the coast to the Rio
Grande.

Within each blockading squadron, the breakdown was again regional, with certain
forces detailed to blockade each of the ports in the region. These forces generally reported to the most senior captain present
at each location, who in turn reported to the flag officer (after 16 July 1862, admiral) commanding the entire blockading
squadron. The squadron commanders reported directly to the Navy Department.

Variations existed within every squadron.
In the NABS, the Potomac River Flotilla, the James River Flotilla, and the vessels operating in the Carolina sounds usually
operated semi-independently, though still nominally reporting to the squadron commander. In the SABS, the mostly ironclad
force operating in the Charleston area from April 1863 till nearly the end of the war was under the direct supervision of
the commanding flag officer/admiral. While the WGBS was under Farragut, he tended to remain with his striking force of heavy
sloops (especially while on the lower Mississippi River in 1862 and 1863) and leave the administration of the blockade to
subordinates.

Recommended Reading:Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running
During the Civil War (Studies in Maritime
History Series). From Library Journal: From the profusion of books about Confederate blockade running, this one will stand
out for a long time as the most complete and exhaustively researched. …Wise sets out to provide a detailed study, giving
particular attention to the blockade runners' effects on the Confederate war effort. It was, he finds, tapping hitherto unused
sources, absolutely essential, affording the South a virtual lifeline of military necessities until the war's last days. This
book covers it all: from cargoes to ship outfitting, from individuals and companies to financing at both ends. An indispensable
addition to Civil War literature.

Recommended
Reading:Lincoln and His Admirals (Hardcover).
Description: Abraham Lincoln began his presidency admitting that he knew "little about ships," but he quickly came to preside
over the largest national armada to that time, not eclipsed until World War I. Written by prize-winning historian Craig L.
Symonds, Lincoln and His Admirals unveils an aspect of Lincoln's presidency unexamined by historians until now, revealing
how he managed the men who ran the naval side of the Civil War, and how the activities of the Union Navy ultimately affected
the course of history. Continued below…

Beginning with
a gripping account of the attempt to re-supply FortSumter--a comedy of errors that shows
all too clearly the fledgling president's inexperience--Symonds traces Lincoln's
steady growth as a wartime commander-in-chief. Absent a Secretary of Defense, he would eventually become de facto commander
of joint operations along the coast and on the rivers. That involved dealing with the men who ran the Navy: the loyal but
often cranky Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, the quiet and reliable David G. Farragut, the flamboyant and unpredictable Charles
Wilkes, the ambitious ordnance expert John Dahlgren, the well-connected Samuel Phillips Lee, and the self-promoting and gregarious
David Dixon Porter. Lincoln was remarkably patient; he often
postponed critical decisions until the momentum of events made the consequences of those decisions evident. But Symonds also
shows that Lincoln could act decisively. Disappointed by the
lethargy of his senior naval officers on the scene, he stepped in and personally directed an amphibious assault on the Virginia coast, a successful operation that led to the capture of Norfolk.
The man who knew "little about ships" had transformed himself into one of the greatest naval strategists of his age. A unique
and riveting portrait of Lincoln and the admirals under his command, this book offers an illuminating account of Lincoln and the nation at war. In the bicentennial year of Lincoln's birth, it offers a memorable portrait of a side of his presidency
often overlooked by historians.

Recommended
Reading:Naval Strategies of the Civil War: Confederate Innovations and Federal Opportunism. Description: One of the most overlooked aspects of the American Civil War is the
naval strategy played out by the U.S. Navy and the fledgling Confederate Navy, which may make this the first book to compare
and contrast the strategic concepts of the Southern Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory against his Northern counterpart,
Gideon Welles. Both men had to accomplish much and were given great latitude in achieving their goals. Mallory's vision of
seapower emphasized technological innovation and individual competence as he sought to match quality against the Union Navy's
(quantity) numerical superiority. Welles had to deal with more bureaucratic structure and to some degree a national strategy
dictated by the White House. Continued below...

The naval blockade
of the South was one of his first tasks - for which he had but few ships available - and although he followed the national
strategy, he did not limit himself to it when opportunities arose. Mallory's dedication to ironclads is well known, but he
also defined the roles of commerce raiders, submarines, and naval mines. Welles's contributions to the Union effort were rooted
in his organizational skills and his willingness to cooperate with the other military departments of his government. This
led to successes through combined army and naval units in several campaigns on and around the Mississippi River.

Recommended
Reading:Naval Campaigns
of the Civil War. Description: This analysis
of naval engagements during the War Between the States presents the action from the efforts at Fort Sumter during the secession
of South Carolina in 1860, through the battles in the Gulf of Mexico, on the Mississippi River, and along the eastern seaboard,
to the final attack at Fort Fisher on the coast of North Carolina in January 1865. This work provides an understanding of
the maritime problems facing both sides at the beginning of the war, their efforts to overcome these problems, and their attempts,
both triumphant and tragic, to control the waterways of the South. The Union blockade, Confederate privateers and commerce
raiders are discussed, as is the famous battle between the Monitor and the Merrimack.
Continued below…

An overview
of the events in the early months preceding the outbreak of the war is presented. The chronological arrangement of the campaigns
allows for ready reference regarding a single event or an entire series of campaigns. Maps and an index are also included.
About the Author: Paul Calore, a graduate of Johnson and WalesUniversity,
was the Operations Branch Chief with the Defense Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense before retiring. He is a supporting
member of the U.S. Civil War Center and the Civil War Preservation Trust and has also written Land Campaigns of the Civil
War (2000). He lives in Seekonk, Massachusetts.

Recommended
Reading:Confederate Blockade
Runner 1861-65 (New Vanguard). Description:
The lifeblood of the Confederacy, the blockade runners of the Civil War usually began life as regular fast steam-powered merchant
ships. They were adapted for the high-speed dashes through the Union blockade which closed off all the major Southern ports,
and for much of the war they brought much-needed food, clothing and weaponry to the Confederacy. This book traces their operational
history, including the development of purpose-built blockade running ships, and examines their engines, crews and tactics.
It describes their wartime exploits, demonstrating their operational and mechanical performance, whilst examining what life
was like on these vessels through accounts of conditions on board when they sailed into action.

Recommended
Reading:Seacoast Fortifications of the United States:
An Introductory History. Reader’s
Review: In the thirty years since this book was published, one always hoped another would equal or surpass it. None has, or
perhaps ever will. It is a marvelous history of the Forts along the American Seacoast, both Atlantic and Pacific, and even
the Philippines. …Any Fort enthusiast
must read this book. The author captures so much information, so many views, so much perspective in so few pages, the book
is breathtaking. It is easily the finest book on its chosen subject, which is why it never goes out of print. “If forts
interest you, read it, period.” Continued below...

The photographs from the author's collection, the army's files, the National Archives, etc., make it an
invaluable edition. But the text, the clear delineation of the periods of fort building since 1794 in the US,
and the differentiation of the periods, are so worth while. Ray manages to be both terse, and pithy. It is a great tribute
to any author to say that. “This is a MUST read for anyone interested in the subject, even one only interested in their
own local Fort, and how it relates to the defense plans of the United States when it was built.” “[T]here is NO
better book to read on the subject.”