I worked in Japan for more than 12 years in the eighties and nineties, in Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo with the U. S. State Department, Citibank and Merrill Lynch. After many more years in China in banking (Deutsche Bank and Ping An Bank) and consulting, I am back in Tokyo conducting the business of Yangtze Century Ltd. (Hong Kong/Shanghai) and producing this blog. E-mail me at smharnerco@yahoo.com.

Speaking to the press on January 11, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was emphatic:

Senkaku Islands (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“My stance on resolutely protecting the Senkaku Islands has not changed in the slightest. The problem is the damage to Japanese companies that are contributing to China’s economy and society, and the harm to Japanese citizens being done for political purposes. I want to say clearly that these actions are errors by the standards of responsible countries in international society. I want to improve Japan-China relations by returning to constructing a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”

The last phrase –戦略的互恵関係 in Japanese–has a specific meaning, particularly for Abe and also for China. It describes an initiative taken to Beijing in 2006 by then newly elected PM Abe, which aimed to repair the damage done to Japan-China political relations (though not to economic relations) by visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and a generally nationalistic stance of his predecessor, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, and to put relations on a positive long-term footing.

Abe’s 2006 initiative was warmly welcomed in Beijing and resulted the signing by then PM Fukuda Yasuo and President Hu Jintao and issuance in Tokyo on May 7, 2008 of the “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’.”

Since Abe is calling for China to return to the spirit of this statement—in the preamble of which it is call the “common understanding” of the countries’ leaders—we find some of its contents both noteworthy and thought-provoking (the whole statementat http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html is well worth reading):

“The two sides recognized that the Japan-China relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships for each of the countries and that Japan and China now have great influence on and bear a solemn responsibility for peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.”

“They also recognize that the two countries’ sole option is to cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the long term.”

“The two sides recognized that they are partners who cooperate together and are not threats to each other….Both sides stated that they would resolve bilateral issues through consultations and negotiations.”

“The two sides recognized that fostering mutual trust in the political and security area is of great significance to the building of a ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’….”

“The two sides resolved…to work together to make the East China Sea a ‘Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship’.”

It is easy to say and not hard to document that bilateral government statements or communiques such as this one have little effect and importance in the medium term and even less in the long term. But there are many exceptions to this cynical view (think the 1972 U.S.-China Shanghai Communique).

I view the “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’” as having a more permanent substantive effect than is common. My reasons are two: the people—notably its author, Abe, who must feel ownership of and responsibility for it; and the historical “moment”—a period when Japan and China vitally need a positive conceptual and (I cannot think of a better word) “emotional” framework on which to continue to nurture and strengthen political, economic, social, and security relations.

This being the case, the first sentence in Abe’s statement to the press—i.e., reiterating his resolve to defend the Senkaku Islands–is hardly positive. Indeed, it is profoundly negative.

To put it plainly, Japan’s most vital medium and, more importantly, long term interests require that it find a way to give up the Senkakus.

At least one authoritative Japanese voice is suggesting a way to do so. He is retired career Japanese diplomat and former Japanese ambassador to Iran and Iraq Magosaki Ukeru whose views on Japan’s foreign relations, particularly relations with the U.S., I have presented before.

Magosaki’s proposal harkens back to post WWII Europe and the formation, principally by France and Germany, of a supranational organization, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), given authority for exploiting and managing the coal and steel resources of the Ruhr, a perennially contested region that had provided the lure to and means of war between France and Germany over centuries.

Magosaki is hoping that leaders of Japan and China can summon the courage and wisdom, first to broach, then to conscientiously construct, an framework for putting the resources in an around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands under some sort of joint administration, in which the sovereign claims of Japan and China are neither recognized nor disputed, but overruled by a supranational governing body like the ECSC during the 1950s.

The European Coal and Steel Community was conceived as a mechanism to prevent, forever, a repeat of war between France and Germany. Japan and China should be no less resolved to prevent forever a repeat of the unspeakable disaster that is modern war between themselves.

Within the totality of the Japan-China relationship, which can and should be a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute is wholly negative and potentially disastrous, and the danger continues to escalate. The leaders of both Japan and China should make resolving this dispute their highest and most urgent priority. The United States should use all its influence to push both sides toward resolution.

Ambassador Magosaki’s proposal could be the best and most workable solution for all parties. It should be a basis for secret diplomacy to begin soon.

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1895 After 10 yrs of survey to make sure﻿ the islands were inhabited and not belonged to the Ming dynasty of China, Japan incorporated these islands to Okinawa pref. …. 1920s Chinese ship men were rescued by the Japanese in the Senkaku. Chinese gov sent a letter of gratitude stating ‘Residents of Senkaku islands, Japan’

1950s, 60s China’s official map CLEARLY stated that these islands were Japanese territory. 1968 UN research revealed these islets may contain large amount of oil 1971 China﻿ wants these islets now.

The fact is: Chinese or Okinawan found these islets in 15th century, that is correct However, China has never own the islets in history. They never lived in the islets. They didn’t even care when Japan incorporated them in 19th c. But now they want it, so they started to use their history cards.

NEW YORK — A New York Times editorial has slammed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for planning to revise Japan’s formal apology for its World War II aggression, as well as its acknowledgment that the Imperial army forced hundreds of thousands of Asian women and girls into prostitution.

Thursday’s article, titled “Another Attempt to Deny Japan’s History,” referred to Abe’s recent interview with the daily Sankei Shimbun, in which he voiced his willingness to issue a “forward-looking statement” that would replace the 1995 apology by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s for the country’s wartime expansionism.

Also mentioned was Abe’s remark in the same interview that his previous Liberal Democratic Party administration, from 2006 to 2007, had found no evidence that “comfort women” had been forced to work as sex slaves in military brothels during the war.

Abe “seems inclined to start his tenure with a serious mistake that would inflame tensions with South Korea and make cooperation harder,” The New York Times said, pointing out that “it is not clear” how the rightwing leader might modify the apologies, but he “has previously made no secret of his desire to rewrite his country’s wartime history.”

“Any attempt to deny the crimes and dilute the apologies will outrage South Korea, as well as China and the Philippines, which suffered under Japan’s brutal wartime rule,” the newspaper warned. “(Abe’s) shameful impulses could threaten critical cooperation in the region on issues like North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.”

The disputed claims by Japan and China has been extensively covered by many shrill cries. Forgetting who is right or wrong, there is a dispute of which Japan has not even acknowledged yet. That according to several Japanese media giants, is unreal, and the Abe admin is adopting the same laughable stand that there is no dispute here. The reality is that this dispute is hurting Japan a lot more than China for many reasons. The reality is Japan cannot simply peddle away from her neighbours into the questonable arms of muther America. So what Stephen and many peace-nicks in Japan are trying to figure what should be done were they to be in Abe’s shoes. So, sir, although I cannot convince you that the Japanese claim is limp, I am trying to let Stephen stay on topic. What will ease the dispute. The benefits of resolution far far outweight continuing this lukewarm war, fetid-non-dispute.

Sharing the exploitaton of resources was being talked about a couple of years back, but nothing came of it. So here is a good time to start that talk again. But as I posted before, it does look like Abe’s group persona is under the impression that they can talk all around China, ASEAN, India! Britain! and as Abe dreamed, may be there will be pressure from so many nations that China will be prevailed upon to be “flexible” towards Japan? It is exactly the wrong approach, talking tough in the face of losing your shirt every next day.

Mr Ling Nam your statement that Ming and Qing Dynasties “..has never owned the islets in history” is wrong given that numerous court record in Imperial China as avaible as part of China’s claim today. You saying they don’t exist cannot make the disappear. These are in the official “White Paper” of China. Read it. And if you are an expert like Professor Gava MacCormick of Australia, state your proofs. The secret Cabinet documents of Meiji Japan that led to and included the internal decision to “Annex” these “Diaoyutai Islands” cannot be erased either. Japan just wants to ignore the fact that only in the year 1900, they changed the name to Senkaku. Look in on the Hayashi map yourself it is in my computer, “Diao Yu Tai”. They belonged to Taiwan. So now Japan has a new law that if a piece of rock in your country is not inhabited it is fair game for anyone. That was the miserable attitude of the Colonial powers that whenever they came to a land not touched by any European, it was “no-man’s land”. A lot of the “developing literature” on the UNCLOS is still quite strange to a post-colonial person such as me, and to some UCLOS experts like Professor Gavan MacCormick. But claim however you shout cannot alter the reality that these islands are very near Taiwan, the Fujian Coast of Wenzhou and then only Okinawa, which until now had been verbally written by the Japanese as “second-class land” in those so many word-meanings. Suddenly calling even Okinawa, inherent ancestral land of Japan won’t cut it. It is even more bullying to push at the Chinese to day, ” you had never wanted it anyway!” kind of thing. Don’t forget China was considered an enemy by America and so no matter what each side said to the UN about each other, there will be some who will deny ever hearing it. The fact is there was China disputing giving the islands to management to Japan by Nixon. From the get go, Zhou Enlai and Tanaka could have gotten to a hot shooting war over it if they chose. But on suggesting by Zhou Enlai that they both stood back and not push their claims a gentlemen’s handshake was confirmed. That again is without doubt, and yet another fact that the Noda admin tried to deny ever happened. So it seems to me useless to try and reverse history rather point to a road back to civility and the conditions necessary for that.

“Beijing’s policies in the South China Sea today resemble those of the Qing empire, China’s last ruling dynasty, in the late 18th century. The emperor then, Qianlong, liked to speak to the “myriad nations” to the south as a .father would address his children. Current Chinese leaders, who are exerting their influence in countries like Vietnam and Laos, echo his paternalism.

It is unlikely that China’s neighbors will appreciate this now any more than they did then. Qianlong got involved in a war in Vietnam in the 1780s that severely weakened his empire. Since then, the countries in the region have had their own waves of nationalism, often in response to Western colonialism. Indonesia, a country of 248 million, does not regard itself as “small,” even compared with a giant like China. It is bound to seek to counter China’s power unless Chinese attitudes and policies change.”

This is an inspired suggestion. Now let us hope quiet approaches can be made to put flesh out the details. In fact, it would be exceedingly beneficial to Japan and Abe but requires some tolerance on the part of China’s leaders. In fact China previously proposed joint exploitation before the hawks managed to make it die through neglect. However, once Noda started the ruckus, Chinese need not push at all and each day Japanese market shares in China will keep losing until Japan’s administration will cry “uncle”. I also believe that this proposal is more likely to be accepted by China than by the Japanese because the leaders of China have real power while in Japan there are major blocks of reactionary self-interests that is try to restart the musical chairs of Prime Minister is they don’t like what their self-interest will get for this peace project. China’s leaders have a plan and they would love to be co-operating with Japan which can speed up China’s goals. To them, “why not” is the best reason for co-operation.

1895, Ming dynasty perished hundreds 250 years before that already, of course the island didn’t belong to her.

hmm.. let’s look at the timeline again then

1879, the empire of Japan annexed Ryukyu Kingdom, starting its conquer of Asia. 1895, Japan took Taiwan from Qing Dynasty, and Taiwan’s Diaoyu Island. You mean Qing had a shot at that time saying “wait, just take Taiwan, leave Diaoyu to me?” 1910, Japan annexed Korea, after decades of de facto ruling. 1930s, Japan began conquering mainland China, starting from Manchuria. … 1942, the empire of Japan reached its peak, including Korea, 1/3 of China, the whole southeast Asia… a huge maritime empire in Asia 1945, Japan lost war, gave up all conquered lands…

EXCEPT for Diaoyu Islands and Ryukyu Kingdom, maybe it’s about time now?

Don’t assume USA is taking a neutral position. USA is obvious biased for Japan in exchange for US’s present in East Asia. US government has put on some effort to round up Nazi war criminals and anyone denied Jewish genocide. But US government never does anything against Japanese denial of war crime, simply because US government needs Japan during Cold War. US government obviously has double standard.

The author’s use of the ECSC as an analogy is completely at odds with what the ECSC actually was. I am not familiar with Mr. Magosaki’s original suggestion, but if he did consider this as precedent, he committed a number of errors in historical understanding:

1. The Ruhr area was certainly not “perennially contested” in 1951. Any ambitions some French politicians might have had post-1945 to detach the region from Germany had been put to rest as early as 1946 in the famous “Stuttgart speech”: http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm The Ruhr area also certainly had not been a “lure” for any war. It gained its importance only with Industrialization, and all French-German wars after Industrialization saw Germany invading France, not vice versa.

2. The ECSC did most definitely not establish an “authority for exploiting and managing the coal and steel resources of the Ruhr”. In fact it replaced such an authority, namely the IAR which had been established earlier: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/agreement_for_an_international_authority_for_the_ruhr_london_28_april_1949-en-39099742-20be-484c-b7b2-95a7c03c972f.html Of course, this was not at all an agreement between West Germany (which inititally was not even a party) and France, but imposed by the Allied military occupation.

3. What the ECSC treaty did establish was an open, common market for coal and steel without any barriers among the parties. Of course, this required Germany, the largest supplier to open its market to the other parties on an equal footing and thus served French interests. But nevertheless, this open market was in fact equal and gave Germany the same access to French resources as vice versa: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_coal_and_steel_community_paris_18_april_1951-en-11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58.html As one can easily see, there is no reference to the Ruhr, or control over any specific territory in the treaty.

I am quite sure that Japan would be delighted to establish a rapport with China and other countries in the region to establish what the ECSC actually did establish: An open, equal, common market for crucial resources. I can hardly see China agreeing to this. And it does not have anything to do with the author’s suggestion that Japan should simply surrender to China’s claim of sovereignty over the Senkakus.

Thank you for your authoritative comment. It seems that the ECSC is not technically an applicable model for a solution to the Senkakyu/Diaoyu issue. I think Magosaki’s proposal is more about adopting the spirit of the ECSC and the ethos of supranational authority over resources (including markets). He is recognizing that neither China nor Japan will renounce claims to the islands, or to the fishing and mineral resources that come with them. The objective of diplomacy should be, firstly, to avoid at all costs war over such objectively non-vital interests, and secondly to find a mechanism by which–without conflict–the resources can be exploited, satisfying the desires of both parties, in a “win-win” fashion. It is very hard now to see how, without constructing some kind of supranational or “neutral” third party authority to remove the barrier of either China or Japan having to “surrender” its sole claim, an agreement to jointly develop the resources could be reached. I should say here that the U.S. would not be acceptable as a “neutral third party,” and it is hard to imagine any other state or institution, like the U.N., filling this role. This leaves the concept of a “supranational authority.” Again, while the ECSC, being of another place and time, will not be the exact model, the concept of supranationality applied in special circumstances and in limited places, seems to me, as I suppose to Magosaki, one of the few potential ways out of this quagmire.

If it’s about the spirit of the ECSC, I would certainly agree. The ECSC is, after all, the direct precursor of the EU and the EU, whatever else you may think about it, is an extremely important factor in having maintained peaceful relations in Europe. And yes, the general principle of establishing a supranational authority which relies on equal participation of multiple parties would be desirable in East Asia. It could possibly based on the “ASEAN+3″ area and would certainly be beneficial both in economic and political terms.

However I am doubtful that it will be as easy as the post-WW2 rapprochement between West Germany and its Western neighbours. West Germany and France, to take the main actors, had a lot more in common on many levels than Japan and China do today. Both were liberal, capitalist democracies, a nascent one in Germany’s case, but nonetheless. The countries were of roughly equal size, population, and level of economic development. And they had a common defense interest against Soviet encroachment on Western Europe.

On the other hand, Japan is a liberal, capitalist democracy with some characteristically Japanese trappings, while China is a state-capitalist authoritarian regime with socialist trappings. China is much larger in both area and population, but still lagging behind severely in overall development. And finally, instead of being in the same overall political camp, Japan is allied to a traditional rival of China, the United States.

On the plus side, one could argue that in 1951, the last war between Germany and France had only ended five years prior, and that thus China and Japan had a much longer time to develop a working relationship. But as last year’s events have shown, this long time has apparently not cooled any passions, especially not in China.

For all these reasons, I doubt that China and Japan will be able to work out the issue in the spirit of mutually beneficial cooperation on their own and establish a new supranational authority to defuse tensions. In my opinion, US diplomacy should instead aim to get both parties, especially the Chinese side as they aim to change the territorial status quo, to get established international authorities, specifically the ICJ, into the boat and consider the matter under international law.