Chapter XII: Holding the Road to Bataan

On 30 December 1941 the Philippine Commonwealth reaffirmed its faith in
the future with the inauguration of President-elect Manuel Quezon at a
brief ceremony on the island fortress of Corregidor. Across the bay,
the American and Filipino troops were making ready for their last stand
before withdrawing to Bataan. Despite Quezon's brave inaugural words,
the future of the nascent republic never appeared darker.[1]

Almost all of the troops on Luzon were now north of Manila. The
North Luzon Force stood on the D-5 line, from Bamban to Arayat, in
front of San Fernando and the road leading into Bataan. (Map
8) Fifteen to twenty miles long, this line was the shortest of
the five defensive lines used by General Wainwright's forces. Guarded
on the left (west) by the steep heights of the Zambales Mountains and
on the right by the rugged 3,367-foot high Mt. Arayat and the
twenty-mile-long Candaba Swamp, it was susceptible only to frontal
attack by the Japanese force moving south from Tarlac along Route 3.

Ten miles south of Bamban, the west anchor of the D-5 line, an
unimproved road, Route 74, branched off from Route 3 to the southwest
to give access to Bataan. The main road into the peninsula, Route 7,
began at San Fernando, ten miles father south. Troops north and south
of San Fernando would have to pass through that town to get to Bataan;
only the left elements of the troops on the D-5 line would be able to
use Route 74.

General Homma's main striking force was not aimed at the D-5 line,
but at Manila. This force, which had broken through at Cabanatuan on
the 30th, was moving rapidly down Route 5, east of the Candaba Swamp.
Once it reached Plaridel, where a road led westward to Route 3, it
would be only a short distance east of the two bridges at Calumpit. If
the Japanese secured Plaridel and the bridges quickly enough, they
would cut off the retreat of the troops still south of Calumpit and, by
gaining a position west of the Pampanga River in the rear of the D-5
line, compromise the execution of the withdrawal into Bataan.

General MacArthur had foreseen this contingency as soon as the
Japanese had broken through at Cabanatuan and had quickly sent
reinforcements from the North and South Luzon Forces to hold Plaridel
and the road to the north as far as Baliuag. Defending Plaridel was as
essential to his plan for withdrawal to Bataan as holding the D-5 line.
Possession of this barrio meant that the Calumpit bridges over which
the forces east of the Pampanga must pass to get to San Fernando were
safe. The task of the forces on Luzon was, then, twofold: to hold in
the north along the D-5 line and on the east at Plaridel. Failure to

--203--

Map 8: Holding the Road to Bataan

--204--

hold long enough at either point spelled the doom of the
entire plan.

MOUNT ARAYAT, looking west.

The Defense of Calumpit

For the defense of the Calumpit bridges MacArthur placed every unit
that could be spared east of the Pampanga. From the South Luzon Force
came the 51st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) and the 75-mm. guns of
Colonel Babcock's SPM provisional battalion, both stationed at
Plaridel. The 194th Tank Battalion (less Company C) was posted at
Apalit, on the west bank of the Pampanga two miles above Calumpit, in
position "to insure the exit" of those forces east of the river. If
necessary, the tank battalion was to move to Bocaue, between Manila and
Plaridel, to reinforce Company C, part of the South Luzon Force, which
was to hold that barrio "until the extrication of North and South Luzon
Forces was insured."[2] At least one
company of the 192d Tank Battalion was in the Plaridel-Baliuag area.

The 91st Division, retreating down Route 5 from Cabanatuan,
reached Baliuag at daybreak of the 31st. It was joined shortly by
elements of the 71st Division--the 71st Field Artillery and the 71st
and 72d Infantry--which had been ordered there the night before by
General Wainwright. The 71st Division units took up positions north of
Baliuag and the 91st Division went into reserve south of the town.

--205--

Before 1000 Wainwright's headquarters warned the two
divisions that they would have to withdraw from Baliuag in time to
clear the Calumpit bridges, nine miles away, by 0400 the next morning.[3]

At approximately 1000 that morning, General Sutherland,
MacArthur's chief of staff, telephoned Jones, commander of the South
Luzon Force, and placed him in command of all forces east of the
Pampanga. In effect, this made Jones commander of the troops holding
the Calumpit bridges. Sutherland ordered Jones to hold the bridges
until the 1st Brigade (PC) had passed over and warned him that all
troops would have to be west of the Pampanga River by 0600 of 1
January, for at that time the bridges would be blown. Apparently
General Wainwright was not informed of the change in command.[4]

The Fight for Plaridel

The defense of the Baliuag-Plaridel area was of the greatest
importance. Baliuag, a town of rambling houses and nipa huts scattered
along Route 5 and the north bank of the Angat River, commands the
approaches to Plaridel, six miles to the south. Plaridel is located at
the intersection of Route 5 and several secondary roads, two of which
extend along opposite banks of the Angat River to Route 3 and the
Calumpit bridges, some eight miles to the northwest The South Luzon
Force and those elements of the North Luzon Force in the area would
have to pass through Plaridel and along these secondary roads to cross
the Calumpit bridges. South of Plaridel lay the invader's route to
Manila.

General Tsuchibashi, 48th Division commander, was fully
aware of the importance of Calumpit and the Baliuag-Plaridel area. On
the 30th he had ordered two tank regiments and a battalion of infantry
to advance from Cabanatuan to the Angat River and cut the route from
Manila to San Fernando. This force, led by Col. Seinosuke Sonoda,
commander of the 7th Tank Regiment, and assisted by a company
of engineers to repair roads and bridges, was marching unopposed down
Route 5 toward Plaridel on the night of the 30th.[5]

On the morning of 31 December an advance detachment of Colonel
Sonoda's force reached the outskirts of Baliuag. The engineers,
protected by tanks, attempted to repair the bridge across the stream
north of the town, but were met by fire from the 71st Field Artillery.
Shortly after, the enemy tanks were brought under fire by a platoon of
Company C, 192d Tank Battalion, which lay in concealed positions below
the stream. The Japanese broke off the action and withdrew to the east
where they effected a crossing around noon. It was at this time that
the 91st Division left its reserve position below Baliuag and started
for Bataan, leaving the 71st Division elements alone in the town.[6]

--206--

By 1330 the Japanese tanks had reached the eastern
outskirts of Baliuag and were awaiting infantry reinforcements before
making an all out assault against the town. Meanwhile, the 71st
Infantry prepared to pull out of Baliuag in accordance with orders. The
two infantry regiments and the engineers left in buses around 1400, but
the artillery regiment remained behind.[7]

At about this time General Wainwright arrived at Jones' command post in
the Plaridel schoolhouse. The North Luzon Force commander, unaware of
the fact that Jones now commanded all troops east of the Pampanga,
ordered him to take up positions for a close-in perimeter defense of
the Calumpit bridge. Jones informed Wainwright of his orders from
Sutherland and explained that he intended to hold the enemy at Baliuag
rather than at the bridge. While Jones and Wainwright were talking,
General Stevens, 91st Division commander, entered the command post,
followed a short time later by a South Luzon Force staff officer who
announced that the 71st Division had moved out of Baliuag. Jones then
ordered Stevens to stop the 71st and put it in position west of
Plaridel, along the road leading to Calumpit. Wainwright left soon
after for his own command post.[8]

Stevens' efforts to halt the withdrawal of the 71st Division
infantry elements proved futile. By 1500 the main body of Sonoda's
mechanized force was standing in front of Baliuag and it was perfectly
evident that the Japanese were massing for an attack. Deeply concerned
over the effect of an attack on the untried 51st Infantry, Jones
ordered two platoons of Company C, 192d Tank Battalion, to cross the
river and attack the enemy concentration at the east end of Baliuag.
The tanks were to be supported by about a half dozen of Colonel
Babcock's 75-mm. SPMs which were to fire on Baliuag and its northern
approaches when the tanks broke off the attack. After a hasty
reconnaissance, Babcock placed his guns on the dry, baked fields a few
thousand yards west of Baliuag and sent a forward observer to a
position 500 yards west of the town. For communications with the tanks
Babcock had a radio-equipped scout car of Company C.

At about 1700 the tanks of Company C, led by Lt. William Gentry,
moved out to the attack. As the two platoons approached the enemy, the
covering artillery fire, presumably supplied by the 71st Field
Artillery, lifted. A bitter fight ensued. The American armor made a
shambles of that part of Baliuag in Japanese hands. The tanks rolled
through the streets, firing into bahas, smashing through the nipa huts
as if they were so many toy houses, and scattering hostile infantry
right and left. A brief but wild tanks-versus-tanks action followed. In
the fading daylight American and Japanese tanks chased each other up
and down the narrow streets, while enemy foot soldiers, in a futile
gesture, fired small arms at the tankers. The SPMs and artillery
remained idle, unable to fire for fear of hitting their own tanks. When
Company C finally broke off the action, it had knocked out eight
Japanese tanks with little loss to itself. As the tanks pulled back,
the SPMs and

--207--

artillery opened up on Baliuag and continued to fire until
2200 when Fowler and Babcock pulled their men back to Plaridel and then
west across the Pampanga. The last of the tanks crossed the Calumpit
bridge at about 0230 on 1 January.[9]

Holding the unimproved road from Plaridel to Calumpit was the
untried 51st Infantry. When at 0300 the 1st Brigade (PC) cleared the
Calumpit bridge General Jones sent his chief of staff to Plaridel with
orders for the 51st to withdraw immediately. The retirement began at
0400, 1 January. Meanwhile, the Japanese had entered Baliuag and were
pushing cautiously toward Plaridel. At 0400 they were close enough to
hear the sound of motors as the 51st Infantry began to pull out, and
immediately rushed forward to attack. Firing into the truck column the
Japanese hit the rear-most vehicles but inflicted no damage. Lacking
motor transportation they were unable to follow. Colonel Stewart pushed
ahead rapidly and crossed the Pampanga with his 51st Infantry at about
0500 on the morning of the 1st, the last unit to cross the Calumpit
bridge.[10]

"Blow the Bridges"

What the Japanese could not accomplished on the ground they might have
accomplished with their air force. On 31 December the highway and
railroad bridges spanning the Pampanga at Calumpit presented to the
Japanese air force the most inviting target since Clark Field. Heavily
laden with dynamite charges for rapid demolition and protected by only
two gun batteries of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA), the bridges were
extremely vulnerable to air attack.[11]
Indeed, like marriage, in Shaw's classic definition, they combined the
maximum of temptation with the maximum of opportunity.

The Japanese failed to take advantage of this opportunity for a
decisive blow from the air. The 48th Division urged that the
Calumpit bridges be bombed and there were heated discussions over this
question, but the view of Col. Monjiro Akiyama, 14th Army air
officer, that the destruction of the bridges would prove of little
value, prevailed. The 14th Army's order of the 30th, therefore,
directed the 5th Air Group simply to attack the retreating
enemy and to make an effort to destroy the bridges west of Lubao, just
above the base of the Bataan peninsula.[12]

Even with this limited mission, the Japanese air forces made only
a desultory effort. Col. Harry A. Skerry, the North Luzon

--208--

Force engineer and the man directly responsible for blowing
the bridges, later wrote that he was "amazed" by the "weak air efforts"
the Japanese made and "the few planes seen in the sky, despite the
previous almost total destruction of our air force and the resulting
enemy air superiority."[13]

CALUMPIT BRIDGES spanning the Pampanga River

At about 0500 on New Year's Day, as the 51st Infantry cleared the
Calumpit bridge, General Wainwright asked Generals Jones, Stevens, and
Weaver if all their units were safely across. He received affirmative
replies from these three, but Colonel Skerry pointed out that a platoon
of demolition engineers under Lt. Coo. Narcisco L. Manzano (PS) was
still on the road south of Calumpit. Nothing had been heard from
Manzano since the previous noon, and Colonel Skerry requested that
destruction of the bridges be delayed as long as the tactical situation
permitted, to enable Manzano's group to escape. Wainwright assented,
but all final preparations for demolition were made and orders were
issued to fire the charges at 0600.

It was still dark. There was no Japanese air bombardment or
artillery fire, but from the south came the sounds of rifle fire. The
nervous Filipino troops fidgeted in their positions and stared
apprehensively across the river. At 0545, when there was still no sign

--209--

of Manzano's detachment, Wainwright extended the time for
blowing the bridges to 0615.

As dawn broke, the noise of enemy rifle fire from the south
increased. General Wainwright, unaware that the main Japanese force was
pushing toward Manila and that less than a regiment had been sent
toward Calumpit, believed that this fire presaged a major Japanese
effort to cross the Pampanga. Blowing the bridges would place the deep,
unfordable river squarely in the path of the advancing enemy and give
the Bataan force time to prepare for defense. Wainwright then made his
decision; Manzano and his men would have to reach Bataan by other
routes. he turned to his engineer. "Skerry," he said, "we cannot wait
any longer. Blow the bridges."

The covering force withdrew to a safe distance, the explosives
were checked, and at 0615 the charges were detonated. The air was
filled with a roar and a rushing noise, a flash lit up the sky, and the
Calumpit bridges disappeared in a mass of falling debris. In front of
the defenders flowed the deep Pampanga; to their rear lay San Fernando,
where the road to Bataan began.

The D-5 Line: Bamban-Arayat

By the first day of the new year the bulk of the American and Filipino
forces had escaped from the enemy pincer movement designed to trap them
on the plain before Manila. Calumpit had been passed successfully and
the troops from the south had side-stepped the Japanese and withdrawn
in good order across the Pampanga. MacArthur's men no longer faced the
main strength of Homma's 14th Army, which was pushing rapidly
toward Manila.

San Fernando, nine miles north of Calumpit, was as vital to the
successful completion of the plan of withdrawal as Plaridel. Not only
did the South Luzon Force have to pass through it before turning
southwest to Bataan, but almost the entire North Luzon Force would
funnel through that town also.

Thirty-five miles northwest of Manila, and strategically second in
importance only to the capital, San Fernando is an important road and
rail junction. It is there that Route 7, the main road to Bataan, joins
Route 3. The troops from Calumpit would have to travel northward along
Route 3 to reach San Fernando; those on the D-5 line would withdraw
south along this road and Route 10. At San Fernando both groups would
pick up Route 7 for the final lap of their journey to Bataan.

The 21st Division on the west flank of the D-5 line was the only
unit which could escape into Bataan without going through San Fernando.
At Angeles, midway between Bamban and San Fernando, it would leave
Route 3 and follow Route 74 to Bataan. All other units north and south
of San Fernando would reach Bataan via San Fernando and Route 7.

Even if the enemy did not impede the march to Bataan, the roads
over which the tired soldiers must travel to reach the peninsula would
present many obstacles. From Calumpit north to San Fernando, and from
there south to Bataan, the road was packed with a "solid stream of
traffic," military and civilian.[14]
Vehicles of all types--cars, buses, trucks, artillery, and
tanks--filled the center of the road. In some places, there were
stretches of several miles

--210--

where the vehicles were lined up almost bumper to bumper.
On each side was an endless line of pedestrians, mostly civilians
fleeing from the invading army.

SAN FERNANDO, looking northwest. Route 3 from Calumpit runs
diagonally through the photograph; Route 7 leading to Bataan is in
upper left. Zambales Mountains are visible in background.

The enemy air force could hardly be expected to overlook so obvious and
inviting a target on their way to other, more important military
missions. The primary objective of the thirty-two light bombers of the 5th
Air Group that day was ammunition dumps, but the Japanese pilots
reported that they also dive-bombed American vehicles and "motorized
units."[15] Colonel Collier noted that
"hostile bombers, with the rising sun glistening on wing tips, flying
at low and high altitudes, crossed and recrossed the road."[16] But he saw no dive-bombing or
strafing attacks. "Had the bombers struck the jammed columns with bombs
and strafing," he wrote, "out withdrawal into Bataan would certainly
have been seriously crippled."[17]

Since 30 December General Homma had been strengthening his forces
in front of the D-5 line. By New Year's Eve he had on Route 3, in and
around Tarlac, the entire 9th Infantry Regiment, the Kanno
Detachment (3d Battalion, 2d Formosa), 8th Field Artillery (less
one battalion), two batteries of the 22d Field Artillery, and a
battalion of the 48th Mountain Artillery. The mission

Along the D-5 line stood two Philippine Army divisions, the 11th
on the right and the 21st on the left. Between the high ground on each
end of the line the terrain was flat, the vegetation consisting of cane
fields and uncultivated grassland. As the troops reached this position
they began to clear fields of fire and, when they could get the wire,
erected-barbed-wire entanglements.[19]

The 21st Division held the left (west) portion of the flatlands
along the south bank of the Bamban River from the Magalang-Concepcion
road to the Zambales Mountains. On the right was the 22d Infantry; to
its left was the 21st Infantry, with the 3d Battalion on the right and
the 2d Battalion on the left. Along the front, between the two
battalions, were two high multiple-span steel bridges (one railroad and
one highway) fording the Bamban River. The engineers had destroyed both
bridges, but the river, practically dry at this season of the year,
presented no obstacle to advancing infantry and only a slight one to
vehicles. To strengthen the river line, therefore, Company C, 23d
Infantry, was posted on the high ground north of the Bamban River and
west of Route 3, in position to dominate the road and railroad south of
the town. The 21st Field Artillery was in general support.[20]

The wisdom of placing Company C in this position was soon
confirmed. At about 0130 New Year's Day, a Japanese force mounted on
bicycles and estimated as of company size was observed pedaling down
the road from Bamban toward the destroyed bridge between the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 21st Infantry. The enemy troops were part of the Kanno
Detachment, which had been caught in the open by American tanks at
Zaragoza two days earlier. Their reception at Bamban was no less warm.
As the Japanese cyclists advanced along the short stretch of road
paralleling the river east of the bridge, Company C delivered a
punishing fire in their midst. After some minutes of confusion and
milling about, the surprised and badly hit Japanese force retreated,
having suffered thirty-five casualties. Company C gained an assortment
of bicycles, swords, and miscellaneous equipment, as well as a wounded
Japanese noncom. Since he spoke no English and no one present
understood Japanese, he proved useless as a source of information. By
the time he had been evacuated to the rear he had died of his wounds.[21]

By 0900 the remainder of the Kanno Detachment had reached
Bamban. The infantry soon began an attack against the river line and
Company C; the artillery joined in the action about noon. That
afternoon the fighting was brisk, with heavy shelling on both sides and
with Japanese aircraft participating in the action. But all efforts by
the Japanese to cross the river met with failure and Company C was
still in position late in the day.

At division headquarters reports of Japanese troop movements south
from Tarlac

--212--

to Bamban had been received earlier in the day, once scout
noting "that one of our own tanks was being driven around Tarlac to the
hilarity of the enemy troops."[22]
These report were accurate. The 9th Infantry and supporting
troops were moving forward to reinforce the Kanno Detachment.
As the Japanese came within artillery range they were brought under
fire by guns of the 21st Field Artillery. Although suffering losses in
personnel and equipment, the 9th Infantry by 1600 had joined
the Kanno Detachment on the north bank of the river.

But the Japanese for some inexplicable reason failed to attempt a
crossing. At nightfall the 21st Division began to move out, Company C
wading the shallow Bamban to rejoin the division. The entire division
withdrew down Route 3 to Angeles, then turned southwest along Route 74
to Porac. The enemy followed cautiously and it was not until 1130 of
the 2d that the Kanno Detachment reached Angeles. The Japanese
now had possession of the Clark Field area.

It was now the turn of the 11th Division to extricate itself and
withdraw into Bataan. This division had recently been strengthened by
the return from the Cagayan valley of about 1,000 of its men, drawn
largely from the 12th and 13th Infantry Regiments. Its sector of the
D-5 line extended from the Magalang-Concepcion road eastward to the
Pampanga River. On the right (east) was the reorganized 12th Infantry,
holding a front from Mt. Arayat to the Pampanga River and the town of
Arayat. It was in position to guard against an unexpected Japanese
advance toward San Fernando along Route 10, which connected Gapan on
Route 5 with that town.

The western portion of the 11th Division line, from the Magalang
road to Mt. Arayat, was held by the 11th Infantry under the command of
Col. Glen R. Townsend, who had led the Cagayan valley force. At
Magalang a north-south road from Concepcion branched off, one section
leading to Angeles on Route 3 and another to Mexico, a few miles
northeast of San Fernando. The 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, was posted
across the Magalang road, a few miles north of the town and directly in
the path of a Japanese advance from Concepcion. The 3d Battalion
extended the line east to the mountains, and the 1st Battalion,
recovering from its hard fight at Zaragoza on the 30th, was in reserve.[23]

Early on 1 January General Brougher, the division commander,
ordered Colonel Townsend to withdraw his 11th Infantry, starting at
2000 that day. The regiment was to retire along the Magalang road
through Mexico and San Fernando to Guagua, about fifteen miles from
Bataan.

While the 11th Infantry was preparing to move, an enemy force
estimated as a reinforced battalion of infantry with artillery support
was pushing south along the Magalang road from Concepcion. At 1630 this
Japanese force attacked Townsend's line. Maj. Helmert J. Duisterhof's
2d Battalion, composed of Igorot troops, bore the brunt of the assault.
Despite repeated attacks, the Igorots, supported by two 75-mm. SPM

--213--

guns, held firm, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. A
Japanese attempt to outflank the 11th Infantry line by pushing elements
through dense fields of sugar cane met with failure. At 2000, the
appointed hour, the 11th Infantry broke contact and began its
withdrawal, passing through the 194th Tank Battalion in position east
of San Fernando. By 0200 of the 2d the regiment had reached Guagua.
During the night it was joined by the 12th Infantry and remaining
elements of the 13th Infantry.[24] With
the successful withdrawal of the 11th Division, the troops on the D-5
line had made good their escape through San Fernando. Meanwhile the
remaining troops south of that town were doing the same.

Escape Through San Fernando

The blast that destroyed the Calumpit bridges in the early hours of 1
January signaled the end of the South Luzon Force. Its mission
completed, the force moved on to Bataan where General Jones rejoined
the 51st Division. At the same time General Stevens of the 91st
Division and General Weaver, commander of the tank group, went on to
San Fernando to join their units.[25]

When the debris had stopped falling at the Pampanga crossing, the
covering force of 71st and 91st Division elements, originally organized
by Stevens, returned to its positions along the river bank. A second
force, the 3d Battalion of the 23d Infantry, with a battery of the 21st
Field Artillery, moved into position near Apalit, about 4,000 yards to
the north on the west bank of the Pampanga. The mission of this
battalion, led by Maj. Charles A. McLaughlin, was to "assist in
delaying the enemy advance on San Fernando," by preventing a hostile
crossing before 2000. In support of both forces was the tank group,
posted just below San Fernando.[26]

Late on the morning of 1 January the Japanese reached Calumpit.
The Tanaka Detachment (2d Formosa, less 3d Battalion,
and a battalion of the 48th Mountain Artillery) had moved
cautiously from Plaridel during the night and now faced the covering
force across the wide, unfordable Pampanga. The sight of the Japanese
at such close proximity was extremely disconcerting to the poorly
trained Filipino troops. Their nervousness was increased by the sight
of the Japanese bombers which passed overhead that morning on their way
to bomb installations on Bataan.

During the day the Japanese made numerous attempts to push a force
across the swiftly flowing Pampanga, but to no avail.[27] The covering force on the river line pulled out
for San Fernando during the afternoon, followed that evening by
McLaughlin's battalion. The remnants of the 71st and 91st Divisions
which constituted the first of these forces were "so badly disorganized
and in need of equipment" that they were sent directly to Bataan.
McLaughlin's battalion

--214--

rejoined the 21st Division at Porac on the morning of 2
January. The last elements to pass through San Fernando were the tanks.
Reaching the town at 0200 on the 2d, after all the others had left,
they found it to be "truly a ghost town." The tankers gave the order to
blow the bridge across the San Fernando River and in the darkness moved
down Route 7 toward Guagua and the American line being formed there.[28]

The Japanese did not cross the Pampanga until the afternoon of 2
January when at 1600 the Tanaka Detachment finally got its
artillery over the swiftly flowing river. Once across, Colonel Tanaka
moved forward rapidly and by 1830 had reached San Fernando. There he
made contact with the Kanno Detachment which had pushed down
Route 3 from Angeles.[29]

In the few days from 30 December 1941 to 2 January 1942 the North
and South Luzon Forces had completed successfully the most complicated
and difficult maneuver of the campaign thus far. They had held at
Plaridel and along the D-5 line. A part of the force had crossed the
Calumpit bridge, marched through San Fernando, and down Route 7 toward
Bataan. Another part had withdrawn from the D-5 line, along the flat
grassland west of Mt. Arayat to Mexico and San Fernando to join the
others retreating down Route 7. The remainder had moved down Route 3 to
Angeles and then along Route 74 to Porac. Everywhere the enemy had been
held and the route of escape kept open until the last unit was on its
way into Bataan.

Footnotes

[1]
Quezon, The Good Fight, pp. 227-35. General MacArthur and High
Commissioner Sayre also spoke briefly and feelingly at the ceremony.
MacArthur's speech is printed in Hunt, MacArthur and the War
Against Japan, pp. 48-49.

[7]
USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 39; ltr, Fowler to author, 30 Apr 49.
Official reports do not record the fact that the 71st Field Artillery
remained in Baliuag. This fact is established by the artillery
commander, Colonel Fowler.

[8]
General Jones was unaware that the 71st Field Artillery was still at
Baliuag. Interv, author and Falk with Jones, 1 Nov 49 and 6 May 50. See
also, Jones, Diary, pp. 16-17; NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 13-14;
USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 39; ltr, Fowler to author, 30 Apr 49,
OCMH; MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, p. 15.

[9]
The account of this action is based on the following sources, many of
them in conflict with each other: Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 14; ltr,
Weaver to author, 30 Jan 50; Jones, Diary, p. 17; interv, author and
Falk with Jones, 31 Oct and 1 Nov 49, 24 Jan 50; ltr, Maj Curtiss
(forward observer for the 75-mm SPMs), To Whom It May Concern, 50 Jun
45, copy in OCMH; Collier, Notebooks, II, 78-80; Lt Col Thomas Dooley,
The First U.S. Tank Action in World War II (paper prepared for Advanced
Officers Class No. 1, The Armored Force School, 1 May 48), p. 12; ltr,
Weaver to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45, copy in OCMH; 14th Army Opns,
I, 84.

[10]
Jones, Diary, p. 17; 14th Army Opns, I, 84; ltr, Col Skerry,
NLF Engineer, to Lt Col George A. Meidling, 4 Jun 49, Comment 9. Col
Skerry's comments, altogether numbering twenty-one, pertain to Chapter
II of Compat Engineer Operations, a projected volume in the Series Engineers
of the Southwest Pacific 1941-1945. These comments were sent to the
author by Colonel Skerry and are on file in OCMH. They are hereafter
cited as Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, with appropriate number.