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Is piety good in itself, or is it good because God commands it? Or put another way,are things good or evil in their own right, or are they good or evil simply because Godso decreed them? This seemingly innocuous matter has presented difficulty fortheists ever since Plato posed a similar question to Euthyphro during their well-knowncourthouse dialogue around 399 BC. The question is a µdilemma¶ because howeverthe theist answers, problems arise for theism. There is little explicit reference to thematter in the Islamic literature, yet it seems that a cogent solution may be inferredfrom the Risale-i Nur ± the 6000 page Quranic commentary by Bediuzzaman SaidNursi.[1] This brief article will aim to elucidate that solution.

If the theist were to hold to the first horn of Euthyphro¶s dilemma ± that things aregood or evil inherently ± she would need to deal with the ensuing problem for Divineomnipotence. In Islam, Allah (God) is held to be absolute and All-Powerful. He isknown to possess Absolute Will ( ), to be the Ultimate Reality ( )and to be perfectly Just (
). But if things are inherently good or evil, how does onemaintain that God is absolute? For inherency would seem to suggest that good andevil exist as some ultimate truths, above and external to God, which even He is boundto abide by if He is to act justly. God¶s Will and Power might thereby be constrained.Yet this would be problematic for the Islamic conception of Allah as the All-Powerful, Ultimate Reality.

If the theist were to hold to the second horn of the dilemma ± that good and evil arepurely by God¶s decree ± she would need to deal with the implication that God is notjust at all, but purely arbitrary. He may just as easily have decreed that unjustifiedmurder, torture and lying are actually good, not evil. But our very strong intuition isthat these things really are bad. So how then, are we to understand God¶s justice? IsHis justice arbitrary, thus not justice at all? Or is His justice beyond all humancomprehension? (Beers, p.4, 2010.)

Ôuslim scholars have very largely held to Divine voluntarism ± that Allah is utterlyfree to act as He pleases, that He is not bound to act in accordance with any externaltruths, since no such truths exist, and that therefore, good and evil are purely by Hisdecree. This is the view of a virtual ³who¶s who´ of Islamic scholarship, including nolesser authorities than al-Ashari, al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Hazm, among others(Beers, pp.13-14, 2010). Al-Ashari for example, states:

³We hold that good and evil are by Allah¶s decision and determination.´ (al-Ashari,cited in Beers, p.12, 2010.)

And elsewhere:³Then lying is evil only because Allah declared it to be evil? Certainly. And if Hedeclared it to be good, it would be good; and if He commanded it, no one couldgainsay Him.´ (al-Ashari, cited in Beers, p.13, 2010.)

Imam-i Ghazali agrees as follows:

³We confess that the decision concerning good and evil wholly depends on Allah.For whoever should say that the decision regarding good and evil depends uponanother than Allah would thereby be guilty of unbelief regarding Allah, and hisconfession of the unity of Allah would become invalid.´ (Ghazali, A. cited in Faris,N. 1999.)

And further:

³«He is free to impose unbearable obligations and to punish the innocent, whiletaking into consideration that which is salutary is not obligatory upon Him«´(Ghazali, A. cited in Faris, N. 1999.)

Western commentators such as Beers complain that the works of Ghazali go nofurther than stating this position of voluntarism, without dealing with the ensuingproblem of arbitrariness. Yet a closer look at the Islamic literature, particularly theRisale-i Nur, provides a compelling answer.

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Quran, 16:90.

When assessing the cogency of the Ôuslim position here, it is important to understandfirst what good, evil and justice !" mean in the Islamic context. Defining thesefrom the outset has the purpose of avoiding the many straw-man objections that mightbe raised against the position, based on simple equivocations of these key terms.

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Goodness, in the Risale-i Nur schema, may be seen as being one and the same asµbeing¶ or µexistence¶ (Ôermer, 2004). That which pertains to µexistence¶ is puregood, while that which pertains to non-existence is evil. (Nursi, S. pp.89-90, 1998.)How is this so? Said Nursi notes in various parts of the Risale-i Nur, including theEleventh Word and Thirty-First Word, that Allah possesses Absolute Beauty andPerfection (Î and ) in all His Names and attributes. Absolute Beauty andPerfection, taken together, may be seen as the very essence of goodness and are lovedfor their own sake:

As evidenced by ³«the testimony of His works, the Ôaker of the world possessesinfinite beauty and perfection. The two of them, both beauty and perfection, are lovedfor themselves. Since this is so, the Possessor of that beauty and perfection has aninfinite love for them, and His infinite love is manifested in many different ways inHis works of art. He loves His works of art because He sees His beauty and perfectionwithin them.´ (Nursi, p. 599, 2008.)

Now, since Allah¶s existence is the Highest Truth and Reality, denoted by His Nameof , and since He possesses Absolute Beauty and Perfection as part of Hisvery Essence or #$, all that exists is pure goodness. Thus, µgood¶ becomesconvertible with µexistence¶, and µexistence¶ amounts to Allah (Ôermer, 2004). Fromthe perspective of us created beings, µgood¶ actions and behaviors are those whichaccord with and properly reflect the Names and attributes of Allah, Who is goodnessitself. As will be discussed below, one can know what behavior reflects Allah¶sNames, simply by referring to His decrees. The key point that should be noted here isthat µgoodness¶ does not exist as some external truth that is independent of Allah.Goodness is rooted in His very Essence or #$.

Since Allah is pure goodness, there is no real evil in His creation. Evil should ratherbe seen as the absence or privation of good. Colin Turner puts it as follows:

³In the Nursian schema, then, evil is a lack of good, and its µcreation¶ by God ismetaphorical: That which is deemed evil is only apparently so, and it is evil simplyby dint of the wish and will of the human individual who has abused his free-will bydesiring it.´ (Turner, 2010.)

For the human actor then, the commission of evil is nothing more than a failure toproperly reflect the Names and attributes of Allah in the choices they make. Whilefrom Allah¶s perspective, nothing He does or creates is actually evil. Things thatseem bad R, really veil pure goodness, as follows:

³Nursi describes evil, imperfections and ugliness as a unit of measurement that showsthe degrees of good and beauty and hence augments and multiplies their realities. Evilis therefore indirectly good. Ôoreover, the non-existence of ugliness, which concealsnumerous instances of beauty, is not a single, but a manifold ugliness. For then,beauty would be of only one sort; its numerous degrees would remain hidden. Beautyand perfection belong to the Creator alone, and hence they are one. However, increation the degrees of beauty and perfection unfold through the intervention in themof ugliness and imperfection, just as high and low degrees of heat proceed from theadmixture of coldness. Ôinor instances of imperfection, ugliness, and harm result inor show up universal instances of perfection and beauty, and universal benefits. Thismeans that the creation of evils, imperfections and ugliness is not evil because itsconsequences are good.´ [2] (Ôermer, 2004.)

Thus, things in Allah¶s creation that superficially appear ugly or imperfect areactually necessary so that man, a finite being, can understand the infinite beauty ofAllah. This being the case, it is actually the absence of this metaphorical evil thatwould be evil, not its metaphorical µpresence¶. Because man is a finite, temporalbeing with limited capacity, he is unable to comprehend the absolute beauty of Allahall at once. He needs to see things in degrees, over infinite time. He commences thisexercise here, in this finite realm, but continues it forever in the Afterlife
".This notion of limited beings needing to see things in degrees, in order to begincomprehending the absolute attributes of God, is also relevant to the concept ofjustice, or µ, in Islam.

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% & %' &()* +( Quran 15:21.

The term justice, in the English vernacular, connotes things such as fairness,reasonableness and morally right behaviour. It brings to mind notions of equity andimpartiality. It can also refer to such things as appropriateness, correct measure andbeing fitting and suitable. In Islam, justice ± !± is derived from Allah¶s Nameof !
(Just). Allah¶s !, viewed holistically, certainly encompasses all of theideas mentioned above. Yet depending on the context, some connotations will bemore relevant than others. From the perspective of the relationship between Allahand His creation, ! should properly be understood as the creation andplacement of things in their rightful place, in correct measure and in the rightproportion. Ôore specifically, Allah¶s generates differentiation and degrees inthings, by creating them in complementary pairs of opposites, with the properbalance, and in the right measure and proportion. Allah µcreates¶ darkness to makelight known, cold to make heat known, and metaphorical ugliness to make beautyknown.[3] Nursi notes throughout the Risale-i Nur that !
always operates in tandemwith ± Allah¶s Name of Ôost Wise ± for what the rightful place, measure andproportion is, always depends on His wisdom (Turner, 2010).

Since Allah¶s justice always operates in tandem with His wisdom, it is useful toexamine briefly what His wisdom is, in so far as the creation of the Universe isconcerned. As already noted, Allah loves the beauty and perfection of His ownNames and attributes. Thus, He wishes to see manifestations of His beauty with Hisown discerning eye. And being a Ôerciful and Compassionate Being, He also wishesfor others to see it. He therefore creates the Universe, which manifests all His Names,and numerous varieties of conscious beings, who observe those manifestations. Ôanis one such species of being ± others include the and numerous forms of angelsand spirit beings. Since man, in particular, is a limited being, he cannot comprehendthe absoluteness of Allah¶s Names all at once. He needs to see things in degrees andthrough differentiation. And it is Allah¶s ! ± His creating things in balancedand proportionate pairs of complementary opposites ± that creates this differentiation.Thus, ! literally makes existence known. (Turner, 2010.)

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Nursi¶s foregoing ontology of µserves to elevate Allah¶s Name of !
to theposition of an
, ± a Greatest Name ± in the Risale-i Nurschema. As such, hesees
as being manifested more greatly in the present realm than some otherNames. (Nursi, S. pp. 396-408, 1999.) Since ! creates the differentiation anddegrees in things that makes µexistence¶ known, it has a central role in serving thewisdom in the creation of the universe. (Turner, 2010.)

The concept of ! and its generation of differentiation and degrees, also appliesto the creation of good and µmetaphorical¶ evil. For instance, Allah creates numerouskinds of illnesses, of varying severity, so as to make known in degrees, His absoluteName of º ± The Healer. In relation to human actions in particular, !operates to create a whole spectrum of behaviors which are, by His decree, eithergood or bad, to varying extents. Always working with together with , it hasthe function of enabling man to be examined, impelling him to strive, overcometemptation and endure difficulty. This striving is the µmechanism of progress¶ for thespiritual growth that man must attain, to be able to reflect and appreciate ever-higherlevels Divine Beauty. (Nursi, S. p. 108, 1999.)

There is a further, and perhaps more significant reason, why Allah¶s decrees are notarbitrary. Things are decreed good or evil, on the basis of the Divine Names.[4]!
operates to create a range of actions or behaviors that free-willed beingsmight engage in, which represent, to varying degrees, either a reflection or departurefrom the beauty of those Names. Actions which reflect His Names are decreed good,while those which represent a departure from His Names are decreed evil. But thecreation of these evil actions is not evil, for it serves an indispensible role ± it createsvarying degrees of imperfection, which makes known the beauty of good actions.Something like theft is decreed evil, since is represents a departure from µ
, whilelying is forbidden because it is a departure from Haqq, and so on. At the other end ofthe spectrum, giving alms is good because it reflects - (Ôerciful), whilegaining knowledge is good because it reflects !
(All-Knowing). Theresponsibility of man, if he is to act with !, is to acknowledge that whatevergood he does is rightly attributable to Allah, since the goodness of his actions isgrounded in the beauty of Allah¶s Names. As Nursi says, ³In reality, the beauty andperfection in things pertain to the Divine Names and are their impresses andmanifestations.´ (Nursi, p.334, 1998.)

Given Nursi¶s above ontology of !, one may see that Allah¶s decrees are neverarbitrary. They are rather made with ! and to achieve His purposes increating the universe in the first place. Nor are they dependent upon sometranscendent notions of good and bad ± they are rather rooted in the Divine Namesand Essence.

The Ôuslim position on the ontology of good, evil and Divine justice has always beenone of voluntarism ± that good and evil are purely by God¶s decree, and that whateverHe decrees is perfectly just. This view has served to avoid offending the omnipotenceof God. But at the same time, it has risked devaluing Divine justice by turning it intosomething arbitrary. Yet Divine justice or ! ± properly understood as beingAllah¶s creation and placement of things in their rightful place, in correct measure andproportion, to achieve differentiation and create degrees in things ± always operatestogether with , to achieve the Divine purposes in the creation of the universe.It is therefore not arbitrary, but purpose driven. Further, the decision concerning goodand evil does not depend on any independently existing notions of piety, for no suchnotions exist. Good and evil rather depend on Allah Names, since goodness isgrounded in the Divine Essence. Evil on the other hand, is merely the privation ofgood and thus has only an insubstantial existence. It amounts simply to a departure,by free-willed beings, from the beauty and perfection of the Divine Names.

Note [1] This is not to say that a solution to the dilemma might not be found, implicitly, in the works ofprevious Ôuslim scholars. This article simply aims to show that a solution can be seen quite clearly inthe Risale-i Nur, given its sharper focus on Allah¶s Name of µAdl.

Note [2] Note that the µcreation¶ of evil is not a creation in the positive sense. It is a creation in thenegative sense, in that it comes into metaphorical being as a logical result of the privation of µgood¶.An example that might clarify this is that of darkness being µcreated¶ by the removal of light. Darknessdoes not exist in any real or independent sense; it is merely the lack of light. Thus, it has no need ofbeing created in the positive sense, in the same way that light does. So the term µcreated¶ is used heremerely for linguistic convenience.

Note [3] Again, the term µcreate¶ here is used for linguistic convenience, since darkness, cold andugliness do not require to be positively created ± they are merely the absence of light, heat and beautyrespectively.

Note [4] An objection that might be raised here is this: If Allah¶s decrees depend on His Names, is Henot to decree certain things good, and others bad? And if He is, doesn¶t this limit His Power?One possible way of dealing with this is to simply underline the difference between toact, and to act. Allah possesses (Absolute Will), meaning He is never compelled toact is any particular way. Thus, one might say that He is not compelled to act in accordance with Hisown Names even (contrary to what some Ôu¶tazilites thought). If He does act in accordance with HisNames, it is only because He freely chooses to do so.

Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, one might take the position that it is meaningless to ask whetheror not Allah act contrary to His Names. For it amounts to asking, ³Can Allah be not-Allah?´ Thisis an incoherent question for if Allah could be not-Allah, He would cease to be the subject of thequestion that is being asked. Thus, the question amounts to a meaningless philosophical trick, muchlike the question, ³Can God create a rock He can¶t lift?´ Again here, as soon as there exists a rock thatcannot be lifted by the referent in the question, the referent ceases to be the Being that was beingspoken about in the first place, and .