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The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.

Publications Tagged: force structure

The author makes the case that U.S. strategy demands the U.S. Armed Forces build a force with greater capacity for conducting stabilization operations concurrent with combat operation. He traces the strategic roots of the stabilization requirement, develops a warfighting concept for "progressive stabilization," and makes judgments on whether the Army's current Modular Force effort will generate the right type of force. He concludes by making some recommendations on where the Army should adjust its current modernization effort to make the force more relevant.

The author examines Army Reserve and National Guard enlisted retention patterns from 1995-2002. This study provides a necessary background to compare retention patterns in the past from those of today. Reserve component leadership could then assess their personnel retention efforts to adjust appropriate public policies to improve their force structure.

The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars.

The ideas and issues presented in this collection of papers from the Twelfth Annual Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War College in April 2001 will educate and inform anyone interested in the past and future course of American defense reform.

The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies convened a conference on "Alternative Military Strategies for the United States" to highlight the key issues that will have to be analyzed by the QDR and the new administration's security planning. This report summarizes the presentations from a distinguished group of patrons.

While there are arguably sufficient reaction forces to support NATO Ministerial Guidance, there are numerous weaknesses that would, and have, inhibited the efficient and effective deployment of land forces in crises. There are insufficient deployable reaction headquarters, both at the corps and component command level that would support a commander of a NATO Combined Joint Task Force.

In placing land power in context, we can spark an enlarged debate about land power, the strategic and operational versatility it offers policymakers, and its interrelationships with air and sea power. Additionally, we can examine the growing interdependence among the components of national and military power.

Promoting U.S. national interests through shaping the international security environment also will become a major role for the U.S. military. To fulfill its multiple roles, the Army's force structure and design must provide the capabilities necessary to operate across a broad spectrum of conflict in peacetime, crisis, and war.

Reduced national force structures, new NATO roles and missions emanating from the military implementation of Alliance Strategy and the rapid reaction requirements associated with the embryonic Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) Concept are but three of a multitude of inter-related issues.

Professor Douglas Lovelace articulates the exigent need to begin preparing the U.S. armed forces for the international security environment which will succeed the post-Cold War era. He defines national security interests, describes the future international security environment, identifies derivative future national security objectives and strategic concepts, and discerns the military capabilities

Only after the future roles of the U.S. military have been determined can the Department of Defense turn to the other important issues posed by Congress. Dr. William T. Johnsen concludes that the U.S. military will continue to perform its traditional roles: deterrence, reassurance, compellence, and support to the nation. The method and manner of carrying out those roles, however, will change.

While economic power has increased in importance in international relations, military power as traditionally conceived remains a dominant factor in determining the status of nations. He argues that doctrines will provide the basis for force structure, training, and weapons acquisition.