Thesis: Despite the historical antagonism between the
communications and intelligence communities, shrinking budgets,
interoperability issues and a requirement to let intelligence
drive operations in the information age will force the two
professions to call a truce.

Discussion: Intelligence information in national security and on
the battlefield has always played a critical role. The unique
nature of intelligence information however has created a longtime
anathema between it and the communications community. The
genesis can be traced to three causes encompassing special
handling requirements; vast amounts of data with timely
dissemination requirements; and available circuit prioritization.
The chasm between the two communities has resulted in stovepipe
communications infrastructures supporting unique intelligence
requirements. The results of these stovepipes are lack of
interoperability and wasted dollars in a declining resource
environment. Finally, communicators have born the brunt of the
intelligence community's criticism in the area of circuit
prioritization when indeed the responsibility lays with the
commander. The vogue answer to these problems has been to
combine intelligence organizations with communications
organizations (e.g. C4I) to ensure adequate support to the
intelligence community.

Conclusion(s)or Recommendation(s): Organizational changes
providing for the combination of intelligence and communication
agencies (e.g. HQMC C4I, ASD/C3I etc.) are not the answer to
coordination and support of intelligence communications
requirements within the C3 community. Communications
requirements, regardless of which function supported (e.g.
logistics, C2 etc.), should be consolidated under the technical
management of communications agencies or staffs (i.e. DISA,
J6/G6/N6). Additionally, although the commander is doctrinally
responsible for the prioritization of all communications in
support of functional areas, reports in various lessons learned
indicate we rarely hold him accountable for same.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE, INCLUDING THE AUTHOR'S NAME, PAPER TITLE, AND THE STATEMENT: "WRITTEN IN FULFILLMENT OF A REQUIREMENT FOR THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE."

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.

The Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force have often been
accused of blindly defending their individual roles and missions
at the expense of overall U.S. military efficiency and,
ultimately, the American taxpayer. Indeed, inter-Service
antagonism is well documented and has sometimes been a crippling
force within the Department of Defense. Just as crippling, but
not as well known, is the antagonism that exists between
functional areas across the Services.

One would be hard pressed to find the same level of
antagonism between functional areas (e.g., administration,
logistics, command & control, fire support, etc.) that one finds
between communications and intelligence. The chasm between the
two is deep and rooted in misunderstandings in doctrine, policyand the unique nature of intelligence information. Most
recently, Major General John A. Leide, USA, former director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) National Military
Intelligence Center, publicly addressed this issue in September
1995. General Leide noted the longtime anathema that has existed
between the communications and intelligence communities and the
need for a truce between the two.(1) This paper will examine the
historical differences between the two functional areas, identify
some results of this antagonism and offer some solutions to
improve operations between the two communities.

THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

The intelligence community has become a victim of its veil
of secrecy. The genesis of the antagonism between intelligence
and communications can be traced to three primary causes: 1)
special handling requirements of raw and exploited intelligence
information; 2) the vast amount of intelligence data collected
and the requirement for timely dissemination; and 3) the
prioritization of available communications circuits in support of
intelligence requirements.

The sensitivity of intelligence information usually requires
special handling by individuals with special clearances; this
fact distinguishes intelligence data from most other types of
military information. Historically, intelligence data has been a
closely held resource. The very fact that a piece of information
was known could reveal the source. For example, U.S. and British
leaders faced many a dilemma during World War II over the use of
intelligence collected via deciphered Purple (Japan) and Enigma
(Nazi Germany) messages.(2) Too much use of information derived
from deciphered messages would have advertised the fact of our
codebreaking success. This sensitivity to collection and
dissemination of intelligence data led to a closed door approach
(known to many as the "Green Door Syndrome")(3) to all areas of
intelligence. The Green Door Syndrome dictated the secrecy of
communications in support of intelligence efforts. With the
advent of increasingly sensitive collection methods, the
requirement to keep sensitive sources and methods behind the
green door became even greater. The fact that certain circuits
even existed required and continue to require classification
levels far above those held by many mainstream communications
providers. This sensitivity to all things intelligence related
has lead to the creation of a worldwide communications
infrastructure dedicated solely for the use of, and managed by,
the intelligence community.

By nature, the intelligence community relies on the
collection of vast amounts of information from numerous sources.
Sources such as text reports from human intelligence can be large
but few sources match the data size of high resolution
photography or videotape (i.e., imagery). As noted by General
Leide, imagery is an increasingly vital aspect on the battlefield
where there is "a constant thirst for imagery tactically as well
as strategically."(4) Once collected the data must be interpreted,
exploited and rapidly disseminated from the intelligence
processor to the user (warfighter, other government agencies,
etc.). Rapid dissemination often means the transmission of large
data files in minutes or seconds. Until recently, DoD
communications providers (e.g., the Defense Information Systems
Agency - DISA) were unaware of many of the intelligence
community's communications needs. Without knowledge of the full
scope of the intelligence communications needs, agencies such as
DISA were unable to provide sufficient support. A classic
"Catch-22" situation exists: DISA is tasked with providing
communications support but can not support a requirement it does
not know about, hence, the development of separate intelligence
communications networks.

For example, the National Security Agency (NSA), the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) have developed their own unique communications
networks. Other "stovepipe" DoD intelligence networks include
the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
and the U.S. Army-developed Trojan Special Purpose Integrated
Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT). Unfortunately, the lack
of a central communications provider has resulted in disparate
and non-interoperable network development across the different
agencies. Trojan SPIRIT's highly effective intelligence support
during DESERT SHIELD/STORM has convinced the Army, as well as the
Joint Staff and the Marine Corps, of its worth to the community,
resulting in limited inter-service interoperability. Again,
however, Trojan SPIRIT is another "stovepipe" intelligence
communications system, which only serves to widen the division
between the communications and intelligence communities.

The third point in the intelligence-communications conflict
is prioritization of available communications networks. Given
the high priority of dissemination of intelligence data, the
transmission of large intelligence data files can conceivably
saturate existing communications pipes. This is obviously an
unacceptable situation for the other functional areas
(operations, logistics, etc.). Communications providers are
often caught in the middle on deciding how to meet the needs of
all customers, not just those from the intelligence community.
Unfortunately, the existing general communications architecture
is insufficient to support all customer requirements. Once
again, this has led the intelligence community to develop a
communications infrastructure dedicated to its own needs.

Under the direction of Mr. Emmett Paige, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ASD) for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C3I), there is movement towards transferring
management of all communications networks to DISA. However, the
intelligence community has been very hesitant to release control
of their networks. The "what's mine is mine" and "if I own it,
it is responsive to my needs" attitude is prevalent. Although
understandable, this "rice bowl" issue hinders improvement of
services.

Finally, it should be noted that ignorance of communications
requirements and capabilities cuts both ways within the
intelligence community. DESERT STORM Lessons Learned and General
Leide discuss the failure to use all available communications
networks for dissemination of intelligence data. A key factor in
this failure was the intelligence community's insulation from the
general communications architecture.

THE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM

The communications community cannot be held responsible for
its alleged failure to support past needs of the intelligence
community. As outlined above, the wall of secrecy surrounding
intelligence operations essentially prevented communicators from
providing meaningful support. Existing support was limited to
simple tactical voice traffic (e.g., MEF/MAGTF CE/DIV/REGT Intel
Nets) and the common user Automated Digital Information Network
(General Service message traffic).

However, post-DESERT SHIELD/STORM requirements for joint
interoperable communications, combined with the drastically
declining DoD budget and compelling top down direction from ASD
C3I, are forcing communicators to support the majority of the
intelligence community's communications requirements. Obstacles
to providing this service include ignorance of intelligence
needs, competing requirements from other functional areas, a lack
of resources, and a lack of command involvement.

On the one hand, communicators have been tasked with
supporting intelligence communications without being given the
requisite background information, or familiarization, on
intelligence requirements. The intelligence community's numerous
communications architectures only serve to add to the confusion.
Without a central provider, communicators are forced to track
down each individual user's needs. On the other hand,
communicators originally failed to aggressively address these
problems. Fortunately, Mr. Paige stepped in and directed, in
very clear terms, the transfer of intelligence communications
support to the DISA. Currently headed by LTGEN Edmonds, USAF,
DISA has begun an earnest effort to assume responsibility for
supporting the intelligence community. Training communicators to
better understand and anticipate intelligence communications
requirements is a first step towards meeting that responsibility.
However, that first step is expensive and must occur during a
severely restricted fiscal period.

The problem of meeting intelligence communications
requirements is two-fold: the Information Age and a Commander's
prioritization. As discussed earlier, the intelligence community
is reluctant to release control of its communications systems.
This reluctance is based on a fear of a loss of responsiveness
and is quite understandable. The larger problem facing
communicators however, is the revolution of the Information Age
and its affect on available resources.

Suddenly, all functional areas within DoD have information
requirements far surpassing current communications capabilities
to support them. Users are no longer satisfied with textual or
even voice communications. In today's environment of multimedia
data presentations, the communicator is forever pressed to
deliver more data with fewer resources. Information requirements
now include graphical displays (e.g., situational map displays of
unit locations), high resolution still pictures (e.g., imagery or
X-rays) and real time video (e.g., video teleconferencing).
Current trends in information technology and on-going programs
such as the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) will soon
make the current bandwidth requirements obsolete. Programs like
INTELINK, INTELINK-S, Split Basing, Reachback, Data Archival
Search Tools, Common Operational Picture, Telemedicine and other
new technologies are going to place even greater demands on
common user networks. The amount of military and commercial
bandwidth per soldier in Bosnia as compared to that of Desert
Storm just six years ago is indicative of this trend.(5)

Unfortunately, the information explosion can not be fully
supported within today's climate of fiscal downsizing. DISA and
other communications agencies do not have the budget resources to
increase the manpower and equipment required to support current
customer needs. To alleviate this, service providers must become
more efficient in the design, installation and management of
communications networks. However, intelligence users must
understand that their requirements are not the only ones left
unmet.

The prioritization of communications support, in other words
who gets what and when, is probably one of the most misunderstood
aspects of military communications. For example, in a recent
professional military journal, a Marine Corps intelligence
officer admonished the communications community and proposed they
redefine intelligence circuit priorities within the communication
doctrinal publication (FMFM 3-30). However, the FMFM 3-30 does
not prioritize any communications circuit, intelligence or
otherwise. Because communicators, as the service provider,
establish communications links, supported users are under the
impression that priority of service is determined by the
communicator. In fact, it is the commander who is responsible
for setting priorities. As with all facets of any organization
and operation, the commander is responsible for providing
guidance regarding his priorities for information flow.(6) Too
often however, the commander is more concerned with his own
direct communications and leaves the communicator to guess the
commander's priorities for indirect communications links (e.g.,
intelligence, logistics, etc.). In turn, communicators tend to
support those functional areas with which they are familiar,
leaving intelligence priorities near the bottom.

The Marine Corps provides ample illustrations of this
problem. Desert Shield/Storm, Valiant Blitz 91 and Kernel Raider 93
Lessons Learned are replete with examples where low priority was
given to intelligence dissemination. "Intelligence is sometimes
not on the same level of priority as the other sections...we must
have an appreciation for intel."(7) "Lack of a dedicated
intelligence net for continuous flow of data...S-2 was required
to jump to another net to pass/receive data."(8) "The Division
failed to assign the necessary priority to intelligence
dissemination...dissemination was sketchy at best and often left
the Division's subordinate units without critical information."(9)
"Most intelligence was being relayed via an overloaded Tactical
Air Command (TAC) net since the intelligence net was eliminated
in order to reduce communications links...place intelligence as a
priority on the command net.(10) These are just several examples
of dozens. Many times doctrinal S-2/G-2 nets are not established
at all and intelligence is forced to be relayed over already
overloaded tactical command or logistics nets. In a service
which prides itself on the adage intelligence drives operations,
the aforementioned lessons learned would argue otherwise.

A commander must bear responsibility for the lack of
priority given to intelligence dissemination circuits. This
prioritization fight results in intelligence producers resorting
to non-standard commercial communications and/or unique
communication assets provided by DoD or outside intelligence
agencies (stovepipes). These assets are usually unfamiliar to
the general communicator and, consequently, not supported by
them. In addition, the extra communications afforded some units
by outside intelligence agencies, particularly for exercises
only, give a commander a sense that sufficient tactical
communications are available to support his requirements when
indeed, during real operations they would be insufficient.
Unfortunately, a real world contingency is the wrong time to
learn about a communications, or any other, deficiency.

THE SOLUTION

Solving the problem of communications support of
intelligence will require a significant change in institutional
mindsets. This mindset change must involve not only the shifting
of management responsibilities but also the shifting of resource
allocation. The solution, or end state, should be the
reconciliation of all DoD communications services under a single
agency - DISA.

To achieve this end state however, it must be clearly stated
what the responsibilities of a single service provider will be.

A current approach to solving the problems between the
intelligence and communications communities has been to combine
the two into a single staff agency. Specifically, this approach
has been adopted by ASD C3I and the Marine Corps (HQMC C4I).
Other approaches include reorganization of intelligence
communications support agencies as general communications support
agencies. For example, within ASD C3I the Intelligence
Communications Architecture group and the Intelligence Programs
Support Group have been combined to form the C4I Integration
Support Activity. These actions are intended to ensure closer
coordination and support of intelligence communications
requirements within the C3 community.

However, the fallacy inherent in these approaches is that
the intelligence and communications communities must be combined
to ensure proper support for intelligence. If this were true,
then all other functional areas would also have to be merged into
the communications community as well. In other words, the tail
begins to wag the dog. Imagine if you will, an organization
called C4ILAAFS... (Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Logistics, Aviation, Administration, Fire
Support,...).

The changes listed above are merely headline service given
to meaningless organizational name changes. These changes amount
to little more than form over substance. The two communities do
not need to be combined. The other functional areas, which are
equally important, have not required merging with the C4
community to have their needs met. The DoD communications
community is a service community analogous to AT&T. Its mission
is to support the customer, be it the intelligence community or
any other community.

Regardless of the security level or type of communications
required, a single agency, DISA, should be tasked with providing
the necessary support. The goal is to consolidate resources
under a single agency. Although not a panacea, this approach
would serve to reduce duplication of networks, duplicate
management organizations, and network interoperability problems.
A single service provider would be aware of the total information
architecture and would be much more likely to take advantage of
existing infrastructures to minimize costs. This approach does
not necessarily mean the elimination of dedicated intelligence
communications networks. In fact, it is doubtful that
dissemination of information such as imagery can be effectively
supported via non-dedicated means. Security classification will
also continue to be an issue. The intelligence community may be
using open-source material on an increasing basis(11), but many
sources will continue to require special handling. Given the
proper security clearances, a single service provider should be
capable of supporting both dedicated and general service
networks.

More importantly, it should be recognized that current and
new intelligence communications needs can be supported through a
sharing of resources. As the responsibility for communications
support shifts from the intelligence community to DISA, so must
the resources shift. In other words, the people, equipment, and
budget currently involved in supporting intelligence
communications networks must also be moved to DISA. Future needs
could be supported through the transfer of money from the
intelligence community or through a shift in agency program
funding. The intelligence community would be responsible for
identifying their functional requirements and DISA would be
responsible for developing the technical means to support them.

On a tactical level, this general support concept has already
taken hold. The Marine Corps, through three years of debate, has
decided to place the Trojan Spirit communications system within
the Communications Battalion (vice the Radio Battalions which
provides Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) support to the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander) in general support of the
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with a priority towards
intelligence.(12) This places the onus on the commander to give
the priority to intelligence, exactly where it should be.

Another example is changes occurring at U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) at Scott AFB IL. Currently, the USTRANSCOM
SCI local area network is managed by the J2. However, the J2 and
the J6 have begun working on consolidating all network management
under the J6.(13)

CONCLUSION

Mr Paige's mandate to change the way the intelligence
community's communications needs are supported has created much
turmoil and consternation. In light of over 40 years of
"tradition," this is understandable. However, the atmosphere of
distrust between the intelligence and communications communities
can no longer be tolerated. Individual intelligence and
communications efforts have created redundant communications
management organizations, redundant research and development
organizations and redundant means for providing alternate means
of communications.

From a resource management perspective, none is probably
more wasteful than two redundant communications architectures.
Redundancy in this case applies to the creation of a multitude of
backup circuits that remain in standby until a primary circuit
fails. These backup circuits are the legitimate result of the
requirements for flexible, responsive, survivable and sustainable
communications. However, the existence of two backup
communications architectures places too much capability in
standby, particularly during a time when communications bandwidth
is at a premium.

Ultimately, the current approach fails to take advantage of
consolidated "bulk shopping." In other words, the creation of
separate small communications pipes is far more expensive than
having a single manager create large communications pipes in
support of several users. This concept of discount bulk shopping
can be seen in the Wal-Mart stores created by market pioneer Sam
Walton. The same principles can be applied towards
communications service within DoD.

Fiscal constraints and DESERT STORM Lessons Learned clearly
indicate the need for consolidation of communications providers.
Advocacy of this course of action should not be confused with any
advocacy of a single "Purple" military service. Instead, this
course of action should be seen as beneficial to the taxpayer in
terms of cost savings and as beneficial to the warfighter in
terms of efficient, timely and, possibly, lifesaving information
flow.

Finally, despite all the rhetoric on the criticality of
intelligence to any operation, countless lessons learned
highlight the disparity between the importance of intelligence
and the lack of importance given to dissemination of same.
Commanders, from the Chairman of the Joint Staff on down to the
platoon level, are the only ones who can truly solve this
problem.