Sunday, October 15, 2017

Key Takeaway:A battle is underway between the Iraqi Government, backed by Iran, and Iraqi Kurds for control of Kirkuk, Iraq. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counterterrorism Services (CTS), Federal Police, and Iranian-backed popular mobilization forces (PMF) launched a combined offensive with intent to seize the K1 military base, the Kirkuk airport, and Kirkuk’s oilfields from Kurdish Peshmerga forces at 2:00 a.m. on October 15th. The offensive follows two days of failed negotiations after the government of Iraq (GOI), backed by Iran, demanded Kurdish forces withdraw. US efforts to de-escalate failed. Iran’s role in the offensive further strengthens its influence within Iraq, sidelines the U.S., and will increase Arab Shiite popular support for Iranian-backed candidates in Iraq’s upcoming elections, currently scheduled for April 2018. Iran’s use of an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in Salah al Din Province, southwest of Kirkuk, on October 1 likely signals Iran’s resolve to use force to deter the U.S. from taking a direct military role. ISW is monitoring the situation and will provide regular updates.

What happened: Elements
from a combined force of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Counterterrorism Services
(CTS), Federal Police, and Iranian-backed popular mobilization forces (PMF) south
of Kirkuk City launched a probing attackagainst
Peshmerga forces southwest of Kirkuk at 2:00 a.m. on October 15th. The
Iranian-backed units include the Badr Organization’s Turkmen Brigade (the 16th
PMU brigade) and three brigades from Asai’b Ahl al-Haq (the 41st,
42nd and 43rd PMU brigades). Clashes are
ongoing in the industrial zone southwest of Kirkuk City at the time of
writing.

Context: The Iraqi Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) and the government of Iraq (GoI) have been in a standoff after
the KRG held a referendum on
September 25, 2017 to affirm its right to declare independence. The governments
of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have strongly opposed the Kurdish referendum and took
action to compel the KRG to stop short of declaring independence.The Iraqi Supreme Court declared
the referendum illegal on September 18th, pending legal review. The Iraqi
government and Iran both prohibited
flights to Kurdistan. Iraq held military
exercises with Iran along the latter’s border with Iraqi Kurdistan on October
1 and conducted symbolic
military exercises with Turkey on September 26 in order to demonstrate
solidarity against the referendum. Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) voted
on September 27 to authorize Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi to retake
Kirkuk and its oil fields, prompting a Kurdish boycott of the CoR.

The Iraqi Kurds have thus faced a decision about
whether to declare outright independence from Baghdad after receiving a popular
mandate to do so through the referendum. Intra-Kurdish divisions both within
Iraq’s main Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), complicated the Kurds’ way forward.
KRG President Masoud Barzani, the President of the KRG and head of the KDP, has
been the referendum’s staunchest supporter. His chief lifetime rival, Jalal
Talabani, died on October
3, 2017 after a stroke in 2012 and protracted hospitalization. Talabani’s death
accelerated a pre-existing competition for leadership over the PUK movement
between his family and a separate sub-faction led by KRG vice president Kosrut
Rasoul. The battle for Kirkuk will unify the PUK and KDP in defense of the Kurdish
region despite their political differences. Its outcome will likely affect the
timeline of KRG elections currently scheduled for November 1, 2017.

What changed:The
government of Iraq backed by Iran began to compel Iraqi Kurdistan into withdrawing its armed
forces from Kirkuk on October 12. Baghdad and Tehran separately issued ultimatums to the KRG. Prime Minister Haider al Abadi and leader
of the Iranian-proxy Badr Organization, Hadi al Ameri, both
issued statements on October 13 demanding Kurdish forces relinquish unilateral
control over Kirkuk. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force
Commander Qassem Soleimani traveled
to Iraq and likely delivered a direct ultimatum from Ayatollah Ali Al Khameni to Kurdish leader. He also
delivered a message of Khameni’s support to Abadi. He remains in Iraqi
Kurdistan at the time of writing, according to local reports.

The joint Iraqi-Iranian demand followed the
deployment of a combined force of Iranian-backed militias, Federal Police, and
the 9th Iraqi
Armored Division to frontline positions with the Kurdish Peshmerga
south and west of Kirkuk City on October 12th. Local Kurdish
Peshmerga commanders claimed that the local PMF and ISF commanders demanded Peshmerga
forces withdraw from oil installations, the Kirkuk airport, and the K1 military
base within 48 hours, citing a decision from Prime Minister Abadi. The KDP and
PUK immediately deployed as many as 6,000
reinforcements to Kirkuk and withdrew from areas west and south of Kirkuk City
in order to consolidate a new defensive perimeter. A lethal Iranian proxy group,
AAH,
attacked the headquartersof the PUK in
Tuz
Khurmatu, a disputed Kurdish and Shiite Turkmen town, overnight on October
13. The attack signaled Iran’s commitment to fight if the Kurds refused to back
down.

Iraqi Kurds initially attempted to de-escalate
the situation in Kirkuk without relinquishing control of the installations and
facilities demanded by Abadi. The Kurdish President of Iraq Fuad Masum traveled to Suleimaniya
on October 14 to mediate a possible resolution of the standoff in Kirkuk. He
later met with leadership from both
the PUK and the KDP in Dokan, Suleimaniya province and then delivered a
five-point proposal to Baghdad.
Baghdad rejected the proposal.

Implications: The attack
against Kurdish forces in Kirkuk could lead to full-sale war between the KRG
and government of Iraq. Iran’s role in the offensive further strengthens its
influence within GoI and will increase Arab Shiite popular support for
Iranian-backed candidates in Iraq’s upcoming elections, currently scheduled for
April 2018. It also sidelines the U.S. Iran’s likely use of an Explosively
Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in Salah
al Din Province, southwest of Kirkuk, on October 1 likely signals Iran’s
resolve to use force to deter a direct U.S. military role, if necessary.

Thursday, October 12, 2017

Key Takeaway: The return of a signature Iranian explosive device in Iraq
could indicate that Iran may already have escalated against U.S.
forces in Iraq either to deter the roll out of a new US strategy against
Iran, or to retaliate against it.

President Trump has signaled his intent to decertify the Iranian nuclear agreement and is scheduled to announce a new
counter-Iran strategy on
October 13th. Iranian officials have
signaled that Iran may take military action against US forces in the region if the U.S. takes harsh
steps against Iran such as designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Iranian proxies in Iraq that once
fought against the US have also repeatedly signaled their intent to oust
US forces from Iraq after defeating ISIS. The spokesman for Katai'b Hezbollah
stated that "we look at America as our first enemy" in early 2017, for example. Iran is most likely to use its
proxies to escalate in Iraq, where US forces are vulnerable.

A high-end Iranian signature weapon, an Explosively Formed
Penetrator (EFP), killed U.S. soldier Specialist Alexander W. Missildine and wounded another soldier on a major road in Iraq’s
Salahuddin Province on October 1st. The U.S. military
is still investigating the origin of the explosive. Yet Iran is the likely perpetrator. The
EFP is a high-end explosive device that Iran previously provided to its proxies in Iraq to kill U.S. soldiers during the Iraq War. Iranian-provided EFPs killed nearly 200 US soldiers and wounded over 800 from 2005-2011 according to
figures declassified by US Central Command.

ISW and CTP forecasted in September 2017 that Iran may opt for a “most dangerous”
course of action in the next six months and order its proxy forces in Iraq
to attack US personnel or contractors in Iraq. The use of an EFP against US
soldiers in Iraq could indicate the start of this Iranian path of escalation.

Main Effort: Iran will continue to prioritize efforts to constrain, disrupt,
and ultimately expel the U.S. from Syria. Iran will conduct operations to block
further expansion by coalition partners on the ground, including the Syrian
Kurdish YPG near Raqqa City. Iran will continue supporting operations to
bolster the presence of pro-regime forces in Deir ez Zour Province in Eastern
Syria. The pro-Assad coalition remains unlikely to launch major urban clearing
operations in Deir ez Zour City. They will likely choose to conduct further
operations to secure key oil fields and minor population centers along the
Euphrates River Valley. Iran will help Assad consolidate his control over
Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Dera’a Provinces in western Syria. Iran
remains unlikely to contribute additional, large combat forces to these efforts
unless required to preserve its proxies’ combat power or to counter an emergent
threat to Assad. Iran will likely remain cautious in supporting operations in
southern Syria to reduce the risk of a major direct conflict with Israel, which
Iran is not pursuing at this time. Iran will prioritize efforts to maintain and
develop the Russo-Iranian coalition as well as the Quartet with Russia, the
Assad regime, and Iraq.

Main Effort: Iran will focus on political efforts in Iraq to secure its
influence and the full withdrawal of U.S. forces. Iran will attempt to shape
the outcome of the 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Election in order to cultivate a
favorable government in Baghdad. Iran will likely attempt to craft a coalition
that sets political constraints on current Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi. Iran
could alternatively seek to ensure the election of a more responsive premier.
Iran will continue its efforts to establish durable influence within the ISF.
Iran has a number of possible courses of action it may pursue in support of its
main effort in Iraq in the next six months. They include:

Most
Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) - Iraq: The
Russo-Iranian coalition takes new steps to offset the U.S. role in Iraq
and set political conditions that accelerate an ultimate U.S. drawdown.
Iran uses its proxies to coerce the Iraqi government into launching
clearing operations in ISIS-held Tel Afar, now completed, and Hawija with
heavy PMU involvement and minimal U.S. involvement (this operation is well
underway). Iran uses these operations to further develop its influence
within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense while sidelining the U.S. Russia
offers military advisors to the ISF, PMU, or both in order to offset the
U.S. role. Russia and Iran may undertake a combined effort to build up
Iraq’s rotary wing capability independent from the U.S. and possibly in
direct support of the PMU. Russia and Iran both pressure key Iraqi
leaders, possibly including Abadi, to call for a full U.S. withdrawal from
Iraq rather than a residual U.S. troop presence.

Most
Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) - Iraq (A):
Iran orders its proxy forces to attack U.S. personnel or U.S. contractors
in Iraq in order to compel a U.S. withdrawal. This COA directly places
forces at risk and might escalate beyond Iraq. It is not likely unless the
U.S. decides to increase the U.S. troop presence in Iraq or to take
aggressive action against Iran after the U.S. policy review concludes,
such as imposing meaningful secondary sanctions against the entire IRGC.
Iran’s proxies could also target U.S. personnel that deploy to Iraq to
secure the highways from Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Baghdad.

MDCOA
- Iraq (B): Iran deploys ground forces
into Diyala Province in eastern Iraq in order to secure the province. This
course of action is likely if ISIS shifts reinforcements to Diyala
Province or has unspent capabilities there – not visible through open
sources – that let ISIS achieve a major breakthrough. This COA is
dangerous because it would further undermine Iraqi state sovereignty and
set a precedent for foreign intervention in Iraq that could embolden
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to increase his own involvement in
northern Iraq. Supporting Effort (enduring): Iran will prioritize efforts
to strengthen the capabilities and cohesion of the Axis of Resistance.
Iran will attempt to limit the costs of its ongoing interventions in Iraq
and Syria by discouraging large-scale troop deployments or sudden, massive
military campaigns by Assad. It will work to preserve and expand its
existing proxy forces including Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shi’a
militias. Iran will also continue supporting the al Houthi movement in
Yemen, although it remains unlikely to expand that support dramatically in
either scope or scale.

Supporting Effort
(enduring): Iran will vigorously
oppose the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. It will try to block or delay a
declaration of independence in principle and in practice after the independence
referendum. It will use military means to deny the incorporation of contested
terrain and key positions into Kurdistan. It will begin by positioning military
assets to deter Kurdish forces, but is willing to use force if deterrence
fails. Its primary instrument will be its proxy forces within the Iraqi Popular
Mobilization Units. Iranian-backed PMU are currently positioned on the southern
and western borders of the oil-rich disputed Kirkuk Province, currently largely
under Kurdish control. They are also present around contested areas in both
Diyala and Salah al Din Provinces. Iran will also use coercive means to deter
local councils in disputed areas from joining the referendum. This effort is
already underway. Iran will also pressure Arab politicians to reject the
referendum, and possibly to oppose it through force.

Friction: Iran’s primary source of friction will be the continued
threat posed by ISIS in Iraq. Iran is unlikely to press for the rapid expulsion
of the U.S. from Iraq if it would risk a resurgence by ISIS. Iran will opt to
increase political pressure on Baghdad to gradually reduce and ultimately end
the U.S. presence in Iraq. Iran will likely wait until after anti-ISIS
operations in Kirkuk and Anbar provinces conclude to push this campaign. Iran
could nonetheless orchestrate a more dramatic campaign to expel the U.S. from
Iraq if it perceived a more manageable threat from ISIS and al Qaeda or a more
urgent threat from the U.S. Iran could pursue this option if the U.S. attempts
to increase its force posture in Iraq or challenges Iran elsewhere in the
Middle East. Iran must also balance its hostile policy towards the U.S. and
Israel against its obligations in the Russo-Iranian coalition. Iran will avoid
generating a major confrontation with the U.S. in Syria. Iran will also refrain
from openly spoiling negotiated deals between the U.S. and Russia in Syria.
Iran could reevaluate its priorities if tensions escalate between the U.S. and
Iran elsewhere in the Middle East. Increased pushback by the U.S. against Iran
— including sanctions legislation passed this year and tougher rhetoric —
remains unlikely to generate such a decision in the absence of wider threats to
Iran’s core strategic interests.

This graphic marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. This graphic depicts significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from September 27 – October 10, 2017. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of October 10, 2017.

Special credit to Sana Sekkarie of the Institute for the Study of War for the text of this Syria SITREP Map.

Tuesday, October 10, 2017

The Kremlin continued its campaign to destabilize Ukraine while political tensions in Kyiv escalated as major players began to position for 2019 elections. Ukraine took further steps toward NATO and EU integration, but key anti-corruption reforms stalled. The Kremlin’s campaign continued to focus on exploiting political, cultural, and ethnic divisions in Ukrainian society and attempting to legitimize its proxy forces in Donbas while they continued relatively low-level combat operations against Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. signaled broader military support for Ukraine, but it must take a holistic approach to helping Kyiv defend itself from the Kremlin’s multifaceted campaign.

The Kremlin continued its covert and overt campaign aimed to destabilize Ukraine. Russian proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine conducted daily attacks on the positions of Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, damaging local infrastructure and killing Ukrainian soldiers. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) also reported pro-Russian agents engaged in acts of subversion and sabotage across Ukraine designed to damage Ukrainian infrastructure and spread discontent. The SBU announced on 17 AUG that it obtained information indicating that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was planning kinetic attacks within Ukraine. The Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff accused Russian special services of destroying a major Ukrainian arms depot in the Western province of Vinnytsia on 27 SEP, the fourth Ukrainian arms depot destroyed since the conflict began. Ukraine has been unable to halt these acts of sabotage and report that they are starting to seriously impact the Armed Forces of Ukraine's (AFU) combat readiness.The Kremlin attempted to isolate Ukraine by exploiting Eastern European cultural, ethnic, and political tensions with mixed success. The SBU detained members of a group of saboteurs on 02 OCT in Western Ukraine before they could damage a Hungarian monument. The SBU claimed that these men had conducted similar attacks against Polish monuments, government buildings, and diplomatic facilities in Ukraine and were connected to members of the defunct pro-Russia “Party of Regions.” The Kremlin would likely have attempted to frame Ukrainian nationalists as the perpetrators of the sabotage of the Hungarian monument, as it did in the previous incidents against Polish structures. This act of sabotage was likely intended to inflame existing tensions between Hungary and Ukraine. Hungarian leaders condemned a Ukrainian education bill mandating the use of Ukrainian in school, which they argue harms the small ethnic Hungarian population in western Ukraine. Poland, Moldova, and Romania have also expressed concerns about the welfare of their ethnic populations in western Ukraine. The Kremlin will continue to use its operatives in Eastern Europe to drive wedges between European states and decrease regional political, economic, and military cooperation.

The Kremlin made a peace overture designed to allow it to posture as a responsible international actor and frame Ukraine and the West as the drivers of the conflict. The Kremlin submitted a draft resolution to the UN with terms known to be unacceptable to Kyiv calling for the deployment of peacekeepers, including Russian soldiers, to Donbas on 05 SEP. The Kremlin’s proposal limited the role of peacekeepers to protecting international monitors in restricted areas in eastern Ukraine, rather than assisting with the implementation of the Minsk II ceasefire. The Kremlin also continued to call for Ukraine to negotiate directly with separatist forces, which would help legitimize its proxies. Ukraine and the U.S. rejected the Kremlin’s proposal. Ukraine provided a counter-proposal that called for peacekeepers to be deployed throughout the conflict zone, including the Russian-Ukrainian border, with a broad mandate to help stabilize the region. The Kremlin rejected Ukraine’s proposal and accused Kyiv of delaying the peace process, while continuing its military campaign against Ukraine.

Ukraine advanced its military integration with Western military and economic structures, while it lost momentum in its fight against corruption. The AFU furthered integration with NATO and improved joint interoperability through participation in multinational military exercises such as ‘Platinum Lion 2017’ and NATO exercise ‘Rapid Trident 2017.’ Ukraine also agreed to deepen military cooperation with Poland by expanding the role of the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade. Ukraine formally entered into an Association Agreement with the EU, which will accelerate economic, judicial, and government reforms to meet EU standards, on 01 SEP. Ukrainian civil-economic reforms nonetheless showed signs of stagnation despite this progress. Ukraine failed to advance its initiative to establish much-needed independent anti-corruption courts, due to resistance from within the Ukrainian government. The last members of the independent advisory board for Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz, which had been a flagship of reforms, resigned on 21 SEP and accused the Ukrainian government of “dismantling” reform efforts. All other members of the advisory board had previously resigned and leveled similar accusations against Poroshenko’s government.

Ukraine’s domestic political volatility increased ahead of the 2019 presidential elections. Former Georgian president and former governor of Odessa Oblast, Mikheil Saakashvili, whose citizenship Poroshenko had previously revoked, entered Ukraine on 10 SEP after his supporters helped him break through Ukraine’s western border. Saakashvili condemned the Poroshenko administration for corruption and pledged to lead protests against the current government. He met with Ukrainian opposition politicians, including ‘Fatherland’ opposition party leader Yulia Tymoshenko. He also attempted to court the reformist bloc by supporting many of its policy recommendations including the formation of independent anti-corruption courts. Saakashvili is unlikely to gain enough support to challenge Poroshenko, but his momentum indicates rising discontent with Poroshenko in Ukraine’s reformist coalition. Pro-Russia political players are also setting conditions ahead of the elections. Leader of the pro-Russia political party ‘Ukrainian Choice’ Viktor Medvedchuk and an ally of President Putin held a closed-door meeting Putin in Crimea on 18 AUG, during which they likely refined the Kremlin’s strategy of returning Kyiv to its sphere of influence. The Kremlin will seek to exploit and foster the growing political instability in order to fracture the pro-Western coalition and boost its political proxies in Ukraine. Poroshenko and the reformists must address core governance issues ahead of the 2019 elections, particularly by taking decisive anti-corruption measures, or risk losing control of the government.

The U.S. advanced legislation intended to bolster its military support to Ukraine, although additional efforts will be needed to counteract the Kremlin’s multifaceted subversion campaign. The U.S. Congress passed a bill allocating $500 million to Ukrainian defense on 19 SEP that includes a provision authorizing the supply of lethal defensive aid. This is a critical step in supporting the AFU’s efforts to reform into a modern military force capable of defending Ukraine. The U.S. and its partners must nonetheless take a comprehensive approach to successfully counter the Kremlin’s destabilization of Ukraine, including economic incentives and pressures to encourage Ukraine to pursue reforms. The West should not be distracted by the Kremlin’s disingenuous negotiating proposal, and keep pressure on the Kremlin to remove its forces from Ukraine.

Key Takeaway: Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to leverage uncontested basing in the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate Russian naval capabilities, while asserting its freedom of action on NATO’s southern flank. Russia focused on showcasing the increased cruise missile capability of its Black Sea Fleet’s permanent Mediterranean Task Force (MTF) from August – October 2017. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on August 25 that both sea and airborne cruise missiles were successfully utilized during a coordinated attack on ISIS positions for the first time since Russia’s entry into the Syrian Civil War in September 2015.[1] Russia deployed two previously non-combat tested submarines to its Tartous naval base along the Syrian coast on August 28, signaling Russia’s continued prioritization of combat experience for the MTF.[2] The two submarines later executed their first combat operation with Kalibr cruise missiles against ISIS in Eastern Syria on September 14.[3] September marked the highest frequency of Russian Kalbir cruise missiles strikes in a single month in 2017. The Kremlin meanwhile demonstrated its continued desire to challenge U.S. and NATO forces in the Mediterranean through the deployment of additional naval vessels and a second S-400 long-range air defense system to Syria.[4] Russia briefly deployed the Admiral Grigorovich to the Syrian theater under the guise of participation in a bilateral cultural festival between Russia and Greece from September 27 – October 1.[5] The Admiral Grigorovich cut its deployment short and rotated back to Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea (Ukraine) on October 4, likely due to mechanical error.[6] The Grigorovich has routinely rotated between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean since June 2016.[7] Moscow’s expanding footprint in Tartous underscores the Kremlin’s intent to use its positions on the Syrian coast to establish Russia as a permanent regional power and challenge the Unites States and NATO in the longterm.[8]

Friday, October 6, 2017

Key Takeaway: Iraqi Kurdistan’s drive for independence is generating new
regional alignments that deepen Iranian – and potentially Russian – influence in
Iraq at the expense of the United States. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq adopted a
coordinated, aggressiveforce
posture in retaliation for the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) independence
referendum on September 25, 2017. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducted military
exercises
on the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan with the Turkish Armed Forces, the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps, and Iranian Artesh. Turkey and Iran implemented a ban on direct
flights from Northern Iraq on September 29. The ISF has also begun to establish
security checkpoints at border crossings from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey and
Iran. The tripartite has yet to enact economic embargos, although the three
states threatened
to block crude oil exports from the KRG following a temporary ban
by Iran. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq nonetheless
remain unlikely to escalate militarily in the near term. The U.S. has
opposed the KRG’s unilateral campaign on the grounds that it will harm the
prospects for a unified, independent, and representative Iraq. The tripartite
response and Iran’s growing role also threaten that goal. The
tripartite cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq builds upon preexisting
multilateral frameworks that ultimately expand Iran’s regional influence and
undercut American influence. Russia, Iran, and Syria have begun coopting
elements of the Iraqi government into a ‘Quartet’ for operations along the
Syrian-Iraqi Border. Russia and Iran have also drawn Turkey into a diplomatic
process that favors their own interests through the Astana Talks on the Syrian
Civil War. Iran will
exploit these overlapping forums to expand and legitimize its destabilizing
involvement in Iraq, Syria, and the wider Middle East.
Russia also sees opportunity in these
forums.It has set
conditions to engage more deeply in Iraq amidst the uncertainty surrounding
the KRG’s drive for independence. These forums will undermine the prospects for
establishing independent, representative, and unitary states in Iraq and Syria
– a requirement for achieving broader U.S. objectives.

The Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project at
the American Enterprise Institute identified increasing regional instability
and additional flashpoints as likely outcomes of the referendum in a joint
estimate and forecast published in September 2017.

Thursday, October 5, 2017

Key Takeaway:Russia will not act
decisively either against or in support of the movement for Kurdish
independence in Iraq. Russia will instead posture as neutral regarding the potential
declaration of independence by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) given Moscow’s
competing interests and partnerships with Iran, Turkey, and KRG President
Masoud Barzani. Russia will nonetheless position itself to seize low-risk opportunities
as the U.S., Turkey, and Iran take steps to isolate Iraqi Kurdistan.

Russia will only play a peripheral role in
Iraqi Kurdistan amidst the potential declaration of independence by the KRG.Moscow willcontinue to remain neutral regarding the crisis in order to position
itself to take advantage of U.S. policies that may alienate Barzani and
Iraqi Kurds. Russia is poised to seize economic opportunities with the KRG,
but only those that pose little risk to its relationship to Iran or Turkey.
These opportunities may position Russia to play an increased role in
post-ISIS Iraq in the future, however.

Russia’s vested interests in Kurdistan are
primarily economic.Russia has
entered into a number of energy agreements with the KRG including the
funding of gas pipelines, exploration and investment in oil blocks, and pre-financing of oil exports. Moscow also has political interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and maintains historical relations with the Barzani family as Masoud
Barzani’s father, Mustafa Barzani, lived in exile in the Soviet Union in
the 1940s and 50s. Russia will nonetheless seek to balance the protection
of these interests with the promotion of Moscow’s role as a security guarantor
and economic partner in Iraq, particularly in the event of an outbreak of
violence in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Moscow’s policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan will
remain patient, opportunistic, and reactionary. Russia has set conditions forfuture cooperationwith both Arbiland Baghdad in recent months. As a result, the
Kremlin simply has to wait for opportunities to arise within the
Government of Iraq or the KRG. Russia’s neutrality will prevent the
alienation of any potential or current allies, allowing Moscow to
capitalize on the outcome of conflict, while avoiding blame for any
potential violence. Russia is posturing to compete with the U.S. as an ally of Barzani, for example. However, the U.S. remains
far closer to Barzani as of October 2017.

Russia is unlikely to use military force
in Iraqi Kurdistan,despite
recent deployments and exercises by Iran, Turkey, and Iraqi Security Forces along the Turkish and Iranian borders
with northern Iraq. Instead, Russia may seek to increase diplomatic
engagement with Iraq, Iran, Turkey, or the KRG in order to secure the
Kremlin’s energy interests in the case of an outbreak of violence. Russia
may also increase diplomatic engagement in anticipation of one of these
actors becoming the key powerbroker in Kurdistan as a result of the
conflict.