Frederick S. Litten

The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion

[Originally published in: Republican China, vol.
XIV, number 1, November 1988, pp. 57-74. When using information or interpretations
presented here, please cite either the print version (preferentially),
or this one with all necessary details (author, title, full URL).
See also my article on the Long March and its background, at
http://litten.de/fulltext/loma.pdf]

Preface

The following is an abridged and
slightly changed translation of chapter two of my M.A. thesis on Otto Braun's
early activities in China.1 The
study of CCP-history in the 1930's still shows serious deficiencies, and
one of them concerns the role of the CCP in the Fujian rebellion. This
article sets out to provide new insights into some problems, historical
and historiographical, connected with this event, but should also be seen
as a starting point for further studies, which are surely necessary.

The article begins with a short introduction to
the background and then presents some information on Chinese Communist
historiography of the rebellion. Additionally two important accounts by
Otto Braun and the Russian A. G. Krymov are being summarized. Thereafter
I will examine three problems more closely: the political co-operation
between the CCP and the Fujian rebels, the military co-operation between
them, and CCP-internal discussions at that time.

After their endeavor to defend
Shanghai against the Japanese in January 1932, the Chinese 19th Route Army
was transferred to Fujian. Personal differences with Chiang Kai-shek, dissatisfaction
with his appeasement policy and the deployment to a province barely able
to sustain its local warlord armies3
created an increasingly rebellious mood among the leadership of the 19th
Route Army, especially Cai Tingkai, Chen Mingshu and Jiang Guangnai. Politically
they were supported by the so-called "Third Party", which, also opposing
Chiang Kai-shek, had some intellectual influence on Chen Mingshu and others,
at least in the beginning.4

Plans for setting up a military
government had been made by Chen Mingshu and the leaders of Guangxi and
Guangdong as early as May 1933; they failed because of Chen Jitang's stance.
A few months later new schemes emerged, with Chen Jitang being coerced
into support by mutinies among his troops and external threats.5
Help was promised by the leaders of the Guangxi-Clique, Li Zongren and
Bai Zhongxi, but also by northern warlords (e.g., Feng Yuxiang); the former,
however, warned against an agrarian revolution and an alliance with the
Communists, while rumours of the Preliminary Agreement between the Red
Army and the 19th Route Army were spreading.

This agreement, concluded
on 26 October 1933, mainly concerned a truce between the two armies, but
was also intended as a first step toward a fighting alliance against Chiang
Kai-shek and the Japanese, if and when the Fujian government complied with
conditions regarding freedoms and revolutionary activity.6

The rebellion began unofficially
on 18 November 1933 when Cai Tingkai put the Fujian branches of the Central
Bank and the Maritime Customs Offices under his control and, on the following
day, imposed martial law in Fujian. On 20 November an assembly of provisional
representatives declared the People's Revolutionary Government ‒ formally
established two days later with Li Jishen at the top; a new flag was unfurled,
a new calendar introduced and the removal of Sun Yat-sen's portraits from
official buildings ordered. These acts, however, proved to be more damaging
than helpful, as potential allies had second thoughts while public enthusiasm
was not aroused: not even the students participated actively.7

Among the aims of the new
government, stated in various declarations at that time, were: the overthrow
of the Nanjing government, regaining sovereignty from the foreigners, per
capita land allocation, more freedoms and so on.8
With the possible exception of land reform in West Fujian (prompted mainly
by the "Third Party"), nothing was realized and much not even attempted.9
Besides lack of time and money, subversion, etc., I think there was also
some kind of indifference on the part of the military leadership, which
even extended to military matters.10
After the initial revolutionary elan had slackened,11
they found themselves standing virtually alone against Chiang Kai-shek's
armies. Demoralization and disillusionment among the troops and the terrifying
air attacks by Nanjing's airforce compounded the problem and goes some
way to explain the hasty retreat of the 19th Route Army.12
Although Chiang Kai-shek's real offensive started only about 1 January
1934, three weeks later the rebellion was, for all practical purposes,
already put down; the leaders either fled the country or went over to Chiang
Kai-shek. One of the most prestigious fighting forces in China had been
quite ingloriously defeated.

2. Accounts of the relations between the CCP and the Fujian rebels

Chinese communist accounts

In their first statements on the fall of the Fujian
government, the Central Committee (CC) of the CCP and, in a speech before
the Second Soviet Congress, Mao Zedong explained that they were not at
all surprised about the events as the rebels had tried to take an impossible
"third way" between Guomindang and CCP and to deceive the people. They
did not want to co-operate with the CCP in fighting against their common
enemies, ergo they failed.13 An article
by Kai Feng defended the Preliminary Agreement against "some comrades"
by asserting that even Lenin had endorsed such agreements as long as they
were of one's own initiative and beneficial to oneself.14

Finally, in August 1934, the analysis by Bo Gu was
published, which also put the whole blame on the rebels and their failure
to co-operate. But Bo Gu saw some deficiencies in the implementation of
the CCP's plans too, mainly weaknesses in the sedition campaign against
the 19th Route Army while at the same time helping them.15
Thus in 1934 there was no real question that the CCP had acted correctly,
a view that soon disappeared.

The resolutions of the Zunyi Conference present
a different picture. The political line had at first been correct, but
then military-political, especially strategical, errors occurred. Certain
comrades, e.g., Bo Gu, had not supported the rebels; on the contrary, they
had redeployed Communist troops to the west of the Jiangxi Soviet and branded
the utilization of internal differences in the enemy's camp as "adventurism".
Only Luo Fu, Chen Yun reports, had tried to reverse the orders, but he
came too late.16

A similar step of mainly criticizing the military
line was taken by Wang Ming in Moscow. However, he still partly blamed
the Fujian rebels for the lack of co-operation, while the Zunyi resolutions
and a later analysis by Mao Zedong seem to decouple the behavior of the
rebels from the actions which the CCP should have undertaken.17
Concentration on military mistakes can also be found in the stories by
CCP leaders given to Edgar Snow in 1936. This led to prominence for Otto
Braun who was now held responsible for quite a lot of supposed military
errors.18 Moreover, at the end of 1936,
Mao Zedong unveiled a plan, he said, dated from the time of the Fujian
rebellion, following which the Red Army should have made contact with the
10th Army (Communist) in North Fujian and then threatened Chiang Kai-shek's
heartland: the area of Shanghai, Nanjing, etc., by swift maneuvering.19

Since the 1940s another version, which could be
called "Maoist", has been predominant. The failure to co-operate was blamed
squarely on the "leftist" leadership of the time, especially Bo Gu, Wang
Ming and later Braun, who were unable, for their ideological blindness,
to see the great chance which had presented itself in the rebellion. Neither
politically nor military was any co-operation said to have been attempted;
the Preliminary Agreement was forgotten.20
A modern variant is to focus on Braun's role: that he had convinced Bo
Gu that the rebellion was only to deceive the people and personally ordered
the troops to the west of the Soviet.21

Yet this is not the only version in modern China.
In two articles from 1983 a curious mixture of earlier statements can be
found which should not be ignored. There is no doubt about the massive
mistakes of the "leftist" leadership, but the weaknesses and omissions
of the Fujian government are no longer concealed. They did not comply with
the Preliminary Agreement, did not prepare for the fight against Chiang
Kai-shek and so on.22 This is, in my
opinion, an attempt for more differentiation within the given ideological
frame, which can also be seen in other areas, whose effects, however, are
still small.23

Otto Braun's account of the CCP during the Fujian rebellion

In his memoirs, Otto Braun gives his own version of
the events surrounding the Fujian rebellion, which will be summarized here.
After the Fujian government had been set up in November 1933, Cai Tingkai
sent two negotiators to Ruijin (Jiangxi Soviet) in January 1934(!), whose
task was to negotiate a non-aggression pact. Their authority was limited
because, as Braun explains, Cai Tingkai still remembered the Fujian campaign,24
but on the other hand did not want to anger the Guangdong government. Only
in February, when his position had deteriorated enormously, did he summon
up the courage for closer ties; however, it was too late then.

In the meantime, the Central Revolutionary Military
Commission (CRMC) had decided to assemble troops in the western part of
the Jiangxi Soviet, thus following a plan by Manfred Shtern,25
which had already been made before the rebellion. The aim was to cross
the Ganjiang and, bypassing the Nationalist armies, reach Nanchang. Instead
of taking action, however, the CCP discussed for nearly a whole month what
to do next. Bo Gu and, "half-heartedly", Zhou Enlai recommended co-operation
with the rebels, even against the wishes of Cai Tingkai. The Shanghai bureau
of the CCP and the Comintern's bureau agreed with Shtern not to work with
the rebels, who were ideologically unsound, but to implement Shtern's now
slightly modified plan. Mao Zedong wavered, criticized the Fujian government
and wanted to wait until the 19th Route Army had been victorious.

Finally a majority agreed to Shtern's plan, Bo Gu
gave in ‒ and now a dispute broke out between Shanghai and Ruijin on how
to profit from the internal differences in the enemy's camp for use against
Chiang Kai-shek's fifth encirclement campaign.

Shtern's modified plan was more grandiose than the
original one: it even aimed at Changsha. Braun, who until now had obeyed
all orders, no mater how stupid he thought them, began to rebel himself.
While ordering reconnaissance at Yongfeng in the west ‒ to show the impracticability
of Shtern's plan ‒ he decided to convince the CRMC of the necessity to
help the Fujian rebels in the east. He was successful, and even Cai Tingkai
agreed.

This happened, writes Braun, at the end of January
1934, when he was on an official trip around the Soviet. He says, he was
accused by Lin Biao of doing nothing or the wrong things, but could tell
him that just at the moment he was doing quite a lot to help the rebels,
which Lin Biao welcomed. The crack troops of the Red Army, the First and
Third Army Corps, moved in forced marches to Fujian, but they were too
late to decisively influence the outcome. Nevertheless the Red Army occupied
some territory in West Fujian and "secured" material and soldiers of the
19th Route Army.

Braun's conclusion is that the chance to break the
fifth encirclement campaign and build up an anti-Japanese united front
had been wasted by wrong decisions of Shtern and the bureaus in Shanghai
and the hesitation and high-demands policy of Mao Zedong.26

Krymov's (Shtern's) account

The following is a summary of an account given by A.
G. Krymov, which allegedly describes a report made by Arthur Ewert and
Manfred Shtern in spring 1935 to the politcommission of the Executive Committee
of the Comintern. It is at best only a second-hand version, which is to
be used cautiously, but since it is relatively unknown, yet interesting,
it is presented here.27

On 26 October 1933 a preliminary truce agreement
was made between the Chinese Soviet Republic and the 19th Route Army, which
was broadened within a month when, on 21 November 1933, the Red Army and
the 19th Route Army entered into an agreement to stop fighting each other
and prepare for joint operations against Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese.
This meant that, on the political side, the recommendations of the Comintern
had been observed.

However, in military strategy, errors were committed.
Shtern's plan had been to lure Chiang Kai-shek's troops into a "corridor"
between Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi and then to attack them from both
sides in a pincer movement with support from the 19th Route Army. But when
the vanguard of the Nationalist armies met the Red Army, the 19th Route
Army did not engage in battle. The Red Army was able to gain some victories
at Xunkou and in Fujian, then, however, it took a defensive position. At
that time, disagreement began to appear among CC members of the CCP. One
group proposed to send the First and Third Army Corps to Fujian, despite
the obvious unwillingness of the Fujian rebels to help them. Another group,
led by Mao Zedong, wished to wait until the 19th Route Army had been victorious
over Chiang Kai-shek's troops in Northwest Fujian.

At the turn of the year, while the CCP was quarreling,
Chiang Kai-shek attacked the rebels; the Communists withdrew, and the rebellion
was put down.

3. Reconstruction

Political co-operation

As far as explicit
comments exist, the view in China today is that the agreement of 26 October
1933 marked an important step; however, the "leftist" leadership had then
gotten cold feet and suddenly judged the Fujian government as dangerous.
Shtern's account, described above, shows quite a different course. Following
his version, the negotiations had continued and led to a second agreement.
Such an agreement, dated 21 November 1933, is mentioned in a Soviet Russian
history of China28; additionally, Hu
Hua dates a version of the Preliminary Agreement in one of his works as
21 November 1933.29 Furthermore there
are two leads to suppose the existence of two agreements: the different
termini for the agreement, varying from the official title ‒ Preliminary
Agreement ‒ to "truce agreement" (e.g., in the Zunyi resolutions), to
"fighting agreement" (e.g., in Chen Yun's manuscript), with the last expression
denoting the actual military agreement in the original Preliminary Agreement.

Moreover the
wording in some Chinese papers30 that
the Fujian rebels dclared their government on 20 November 1933 and then
concluded an agreement with the CCP suggests a different agreement.

What conclusions
can be drawn? There is the slight possibility of an error in all the mentioned
sources and the existence of only the October agreement. But a small difficulty
would still remain: with whom had the agreement been concluded? For the
second party to the October agreement, the original Fujian provincial government,
did by rights no longer exist after 20 November. Perhaps the November agreement
is thus only a renewed conclusion for "legal" reasons. This would explain
the Hu Hua date, but not necessarily Shtern's statement. One could also
assume that the November agreement was a supplementary agreement, mentioned
in paragraph one of the October agreement, regulating the border between
the two groups. Finally there could simply have been two different agreements.

Regardless of
which of the last three hypotheses is correct ‒ and these are much more
credible than the error conjecture ‒ the Communists did not suddenly break
their contact with the Fujian rebels or effect a radical re-orientation
in their relations with them after the October agreement. Negotiations
and contact obviously continued at least until the end of November.

Military co-operation

Since the Zunyi resolutions, one of the main charges
against the Communist leadership of 1933/34 has been their "wrong" military
strategy. It showed, according to these charges, in their not supporting
the 19th Route Army in any way. Cai Tingkai, one of the leaders of the
rebellion, concurs writing about the contrast between offers of the Red
Army to help and their inactivity in allowing Chiang Kai-shek's troops
to go through their territory and root the rebels.31
Nationalist accounts, on the contrary, state that the Red Army tried to
co-ordinate its actions with the rebels, e.g., at Tuancun and Deshengguan.32
A short discussion is in order, especially keeping Shtern's report in mind.

Before the outbreak of the rebellion the Communists
had lost the town of Lichuan to the Nationalist armies.33
The importance of this town lay in its being a junction to the 10th Army
Corps operating in Northwest Fujian. What is not mentioned in Communist
accounts is that Lichuan was a good starting point for operations in West
Fujian, if one could not easily march through the area then occupied by
the Communists.34 Looking at Nationalist
maps showing the distribution of troops at that time, one finds Communist
troops between the Nationalist ones around Lichuan and the 19th Route Army
in West Fujian.35 Peng Dehuai describes
operations of Communist corps mainly east of Lichuan, near the border of
Jiangxi and Fujian. He recounts the battle of Tuancun and various maneuvers
in that region without once mentioning their possible importance to the
survival of the Fujian government,36
although one of Chiang Kai-shek's main passage-ways went through exactly
this area, as Nationalist maps readily show. The fact that the Red Army
fought in this region until at least mid-December37
means, in my opinion, that back-up for the rebels was at least a welcomed
side-effect, as it could be connected with the maintenance of communications
with the 10th Army Corps.

Also the statement that the withdrawal of troops
to the west of the Jiangxi Soviet had hampered substantially the practicability
of action cannot be upheld. Already Liu Bocheng reported that only the
First Army Corps had been deployed to the west, and this is confirmed by
Nationalist sources.38 The Third and
Fifth Army Corps remained in East Jiangxi, West Fujian and even began to
regain territory there, e.g., by the conquest of Shaxian in the middle
of January 1934.39

This was seen by Mao Zedong, at one time, as proof
of the Communist support of the Fujian rebels,40
but I rate these actions as much more selfish because the fall of the Fujian
rebels would habe been obvious at that time. Concurrently the Communists
tried to take over Cai Tingkai's remaining troops; however, as he writes,
he had become suspicious by then and refused it.41

Summing-up it may be said that the Red Army's operations,
until the end of 1933, also helped the Fujian rebels, but it is not known
if there was any formal co-operation. This would presumably be more due
to the inaction of the rebels, thus enabling the Red Army to pursue its
own advantage. The failure of military co-operation is surely interconnected
with the political co-operation, therefore I do not think that operations
in January 1934 were made in co-ordination with or to help the rebels.

CCP-internal discussions

As has been shown in the previous two sections, there
existed at least in the beginning on the side of the CCP some willingness
to co-operate with the Fujian government. On the other hand we find in
the first public declaration of the CC of the CCP quite a different attitude.
Written allegedly on 5 December and published 12 December 1933,42
it compares unfavorably words and actions of the Fujian rebels. After about
a month of its existence the Fujian government was said to have proved
that it was not revolutionary, and, as far as is known, for the first time
the expressions "trick" and "deceiving the people" were used. The population
was called up to rise independently and to fight against Chiang Kai-shek
and the Japanese. A third way between CCP-led liberation and the imperialist
Guomindang could not exist.43

Had there been some sudden change of opinion, or
how can one explain this polemic against the rebels? Here it proves helpful
to consult two more documents, which were written a bit later: the telegrams
by Mao Zedong and Zhu De to the Fujian government and the 19th Route Army,
dated 20 December 1933 and 13 January 1934 respectively.44
Here the Communists complained, too, about the inadequate efforts of the
rebels, but they were much less pessimistic about the nature of the Fujian
government. If they achieved their program and the agreement with the CCP,
the rebellion could still be successful. Nowhere is the revolutionary (or
"unrevolutionary") character of the rebels mentioned.

The difference among the given documents is plain,
its reason much less so. Is it the different "audience" or does it reflect
CCP-internal discord alluded to in later documents?45
I will now try, with all due caution, to examine the positions of the Communists
mainly responsible, by studying reasons for their endorsement or rejection
of co-operation as given in the literature.

Chinese treatises see Mao Zedong as supporter of
co-operation with the rebels. He is said to have recognized the great chance
and rejected the "leftist" behavior of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. These statements
in themselves are not very credible. Support to the rebels had been suspended,
exactly because the great chance had failed to materialize; "leftist" is
an epithet which was not used at that time for the leadership and implied
ideological motives instead of real historical interest.46
On the other hand, Braun, Shtern and Gong Chu (a defector)47
accused Mao Zedong of hesitant behavior. This assumption is strenghtened
by the two telegrams which support co-operation, but at a price to the
rebels. Moreover, those Communists who had been in the Jiangxi Soviet for
a longer time had had bad experience with the 19th Route Army. Thus it
was more probable that Mao Zedong remained suspicious and did not receive
the rebels with open arms ‒ quite a "reasonable" attitude under the circumstances,
I think. Nevertheless one can assume that Mao Zedong, if he saw an opportunity
to fight against Chhiang Kai-shek, was quite willing to co-operate with
anyone, which happened to be the public party line in rough outlines.

Mao Zedong's great antagonist in many accounts is
Bo Gu. On the basis of the January program he is said to have been a supporter
of co-operation. This program (January 1933) declared the party's intention
to begin truce negotiations with any group stopping attacks on the CCP,
offering the people its rights and arming the population. It did not, as
far as one can tell, allow the establishment of an united front in its
later form, and it is not clear to which degree it applied to Guomindang
factions.48

This program was surely an important factor in political
decision-making; however, with two of the three conditions not having been
fulfilled, the January program should have lost credibility as motivation
for co-operation. Bo Gu, being painted as a faithful follower of the Comintern,
may have backed co-operation in the beginning, but I do not share Braun's
conviction that he did it enthusiastically, especially since the great
chance is again mentioned. Bo Gu may have had a higher opinion of the 19th
Route Army than others ‒ he had seen them fighting in Shanghai ‒ but
is this enough for the supposed fervor to ally with them? Interestingly,
Zhou Enlai, whom Braun concedes only "half-hearted" support for co-operation,
is placed by Gong Chu at the top of the "activists", that group which urged
serious efforts top help the rebels.49
The degree to which Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai (and others like Luo Fu) engaged
in proposing and enforcing co-operation remains obscure, in particular
in the case of Zhou Enlai, on whom Chinese sources are curiously silent.

It is especially important (but also difficult)
to determine the positions of Braun and Shtern. Surprisingly Braun condemns
Shtern, the Comintern representative, and the CCP bureau in Shanghai by
classifying them as opponents of co-operation ‒ i.e., attacking them even
more fiercely than Mao Zedong. How can one explain such a judgment? If
Shtern and Ewert really rejected any co-operation, then this would be wholly
in line with Braun's assertion that despite his, Bo Gu's and Zhou Enlai's
positive attitude and Mao Zedong's wavering no measures were taken to help
the rebels. But as I tried to show, there was help for the rebels, even
if only informally and as a side-effect.

Krymov reports that Shtern tried to support the
rebels and was only thwarted by their negative attitude. Strangely he then
seems to have had no hand in the withdrawal of Communist troops, an action
he disapproves of. I think that Shtern, at the beginning, favored military
co-operation; when it could not be realized to the CCP's advantage, he,
like Bo Gu and others, may have been content with letting Chiang Kai-shek
and the rebels decimate themselves.

At this point the struggle about utilizing the differences
in the enemy's camp, mentioned by Braun, may have begun: it was not about
helping the rebels or nor ‒ help had been largely rejected by now ‒ but
about the future actions of the Red Army, i.e., employment in the east
or west or on both fronts, pausing, etc.50

But if Shtern did not deviate too much from the
party line, then why does Braun accuse him? Should Braun not have presented
Mao Zedong as the saboteur and malefactor, taking into account his well-known
antipathy and his ideological world view?51
There are probably two reasons for Braun's strange behavior.

First, tensions surely existed between Braun and
Shtern, because Braun, who thought highly of his military expertise, could
not really welcome someone else as senior military adviser, especially
if Shtern was actually working for the rival Soviet Russian intelligence
service.52 In fact, Krymov's article
seem to put Braun in his place as Shtern's assistant.53
The fact that Braun obviously passed Shtern's career off as his own may
also point to envy.54

Furthermore Braun presents himself in favorable
light by his account. Although he is quite self-critical ‒ which heightens
the credibility ‒ he makes clear that he was the only one to oppose Shtern's
"stupid" plans; conduct which was actually sanctioned by the Comintern
later on. This is to show that he thought about the orders he got and did
not mechanically execute them.55

What was Braun's position then? He writes he was
supporting co-operation with the rebels on the basis of the January program
and a Comintern directive, although the rebels were not too keen on an
alliance. But, similar to Bo Gu's situation, it remains obscure why Braun
should heed the directives of the Comintern, and Shtern and Ewert not.
To prove his fervor for co-operation, braun tells the story of his "rebellion"
to redeploy Communist troops, but here he steps into a minefield. He writes
that he convinced the CRMC to deploy troops to Fujian at the end of January
(or beginning of February) with the explicit purpose of helping the Fujian
government. Yet he also speaks about his participation at the Second Soviet
Congress which happened a bit earlier, and this proves his undoing.

Mao Zedong declared unexpectedly on 29 January 1934
that the Congress would have to close six days earlier than planned, i.e.,
on 1 February, because Chiang Kai-shek's troops had put down the Fujian
rebellion and were now marching on the Jiangxi Soviet.56
Even if Braun only now learned of the fall of the rebels' government, which
seems quite improbable,57 there was
no longer any government one could help. But Braun's official trip, when
he told Lin Biao of his plans, came after the Congress, thus the whole
episode is rendered anachronistic.

There are two hypotheses to explain it. On the one
hand, Braun's "rebellion" could have been the result of quarrels with Shtern,
connected with the differences within the CCP after the failure of co-operation,
which Braun "inadvertently" transferred to a later date. For example, Braun
could have wished all troops to remain stationed in the east, whereas Shtern
would have wanted to try their luck in the west while the enemy was mainly
occupied with the rebels.58 On the
other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that at the beginning of
February a concentration of troops could be found in the east, after the
First Army Corps had actually been deployed there,59
that one of them did not approve. If Braun had "rebelled", he probably
wanted the concentration for tactical reasons, but it did not lead to real
success in that area, while in the west of the Jiangxi Soviet Nationalist
troops could regain territory.60

These hypotheses, probably both valid, would confirm
Braun's account on one point: that he had to submit to Shtern for some
time and then disobeyed him, but for military rather than political reasons.
Until more sources are available, especially from the Comintern archives,
the actual course of events will remain puzzling.

Results

Notwithstanding the
inherent uncertainty in writing about historical events, some remarks on
the CCP-Fujian government relations can be made quite confidently.

Contrary to most
accounts, the then leadership did not suddenly reject political co-operation
after the 26 October agreement but continued negotiations and contact at
least until 21 November 1933, and it can be assumed even longer. The re-orientation
which followed had less to do with ideology than with the military situation.
While nearly everyone states that the CCP did not support the rebels militarily,
there are indications that exactly that happened nonetheless. It is unclear
if the CCP did it intentionally, but that they did it, for a limited period,
is reasonable and on record.61 The
Red Army fought with Chiang Kai-shek's troops in the northeastern sector
of the Jiangxi Soviet at a time those troops should have marched through
against the Fujian rebels. This may be explained by the CCP's then allegedly
valid strategy not to abandon any territory, but even in that case they
indirectly lightened the load of the Fujian government. It is quite incredible
that the military leadership of the Red Army should not have been aware
of this fact. Besides there are hints (for example by Krymov) that the
battles were meant to divert Chiang Kai-shek from the rebels.

When the Communists
realized that the 19th Route Army scarcely fought and the motivation for
political co-operation disappeared because of the Fujian government's inaction,
support was stopped about mid-December and a short time later Chiang Kai-shek's
troops began their offensive against the rebels. Coincidence?

It is more difficult
to ascertain CCP internal positions and discussions. The few contemporary
documents we have are targeted at the public and thus present a reasonably
uniform picture. They give the impression that the main responsible persons
did not differ much in their assessment and treatment of the Fujian government.
To find out what they really thought and proposed is immensely problematic.
Personally I do not think they had fundamental disagreements, but tactical
differences surely existed, e.g., between Braun and Shtern. The problem
is that memoirs and secondary literature don't provide much help as they
are more or less systematically distorted. Even accounts in today's less
ideological China are not totally reliable, and the same goes for Western
literature, as its base is often as insecure. Thus one has to take the
utmost care in writing about these things, and my discussions of CCP internal
politics is certainly not definitive but a point of departure for further
studies. These should concentrate not on Mao Zedong but on other party
leaders, such as Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Luo Fu, etc., and also, if at all possible,
on Shtern and Braun. Not only in connection with the Fujian rebellion have
these people been neglected to an astonishing degree.62
Furthermore some rethinking is required on the alleged differences between
Mao Zedong and Braun, which are very probably exaggerated, and on the whole
theory of two political lines at that time. As I said in the beginning,
further studies are surely necessary.

Notes

1 My thesis has been published, in German, as #124 of the
Arbeiten aus dem Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Paper, under
the title, "Otto Brauns frühes Wirken in China (1932-1935)" [table
of contents]. I would like to thank Professors Lloyd Eastman and Herman
Mast for encouraging me to prepare this translation. Back

2 This section is based mainly on Lloyd Eastman, The
Abortive Revolution (Cambridge, MA 1974), ch. 3. Back

10 Yorke (p. 278) claims that Chiang Kai-shek stopped
payments to the 19th Route Army before the rebellion broke out, thus implicitly
forcing Cai Tingkai to rebel. This may explain the indifference, as Chiang
Kai-shek's action necessitated a clean break, which the leaders of the
19th Route Army did not really want, so that they continued only for "face".
Superimposed would be the genuine wish for revolutionary action by the
"Third Party" and other groups, whose influence declined after the initial
period. Further study on this question is doubtless needed. [Cf. my more
recent note on Chiang Kai-shek and the Fujian Rebellion.]
Back

19 Mao Zedong, "Strategische Probleme des revolutionären
Krieges in China," Mao Zedong: Ausgewählte Werke, 290. A similar
proposal had been made to Cai Tingkai, cf. Qiu Guozheng 155. Shtern is
also said to have made such a plan, see Otto Braun, Chinesische Aufzeichnungen
(1932-1939) (Berlin 1973), 90. Personally I think the plan is quite
unpromising. Back

20 One exception would be Liu Bocheng, "Liang tiao
junshi luxian de douzheng qingkuang" [Situation of the fight between the
two military lines], Zunyi huiyi wenxian, 89. A more thorough study
of the historiography of the rebellion, also in the Soviet Union, would
be welcomed. Back

34 The loss of Lichuan could have had strategic importance
both for the alliance plans between the rebels and the CCP and the punitive
expedition of Chiang Kai-shek if he really controlled the outbreak of the
rebellion. Back

42 "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui wei Fujian
shibian gao quanguo minzhong" [Statement of the CC of the CCP to the people
of the whole country regarding the Fujian Incident], Douzheng #38
(12.12.1933): 1ff. If it was really written on 5 December 1933, it is not
clear why it stated that nearly a month had passed since the establishment
of the Fujian government. See p. 1. Back

46 "Leftist" was then used for adversaries of support,
which definitely were not thought to include Bo Gu. Anyway the play with
words like "leftist" often obstructs research and should be discontinued.
Back

51 Braun (p. 367) sees his memoirs as a weapon against
Mao Zedong. Back

52 Braun was, as I tried to ascertain in ch. 1.3 of
my thesis, very probably working
for the Soviet Russian military intelligence service GRU (then Fourth Directorate);
Shtern is believed to have worked for the rival service, the OGPU. Back

61 Gustav Amann (Bauernkrieg
in China [Heidelberg 1939], 86f) mentions how reasonable it would have
been for the Communists to support the rebels ‒ he was not quite sure
but believed they had not supported them ‒ and that Chiang Kai-shek anyway
prevented the co-operation by attacking the Communists in the northeastern
area. He also reports an attack by Communists on Nanchang, but questions
whether it was only coincidence. It is quite remarkable that he acknowledged
his doubts. Back

62 For example, Luo
Fu held the famous opposition statement at Zunyi, and not Mao Zedong. See
ch. 4 and 6 of my thesis.
Back