Citation Nr: 0937510
Decision Date: 10/01/09 Archive Date: 10/14/09
DOCKET NO. 02-17 783A ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
THE ISSUES
1. Whether new and material evidence has been received to
reopen the claim for service connection for posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).
2. Entitlement to service connection for hepatitis C.
3. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder, to
include as secondary to Agent Orange exposure.
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
L. A. Rein, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The appellant served on active duty from June 1967 to March
1970, to include service in the Republic of Vietnam. This
period of service has been held to be of such nature as to
not qualify for Department of Veterans Affairs benefits. See
VA Administrative Decisions in July 1970 and December 1980.
He was also a member of the Reserve from March 1974 to May
1978 and had active duty for training from March to August
1974.
This case initially came before the Board of Veterans'
Appeals (Board) on appeal from a rating decision of the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which determined that new and
material evidence to reopen the appellant's claim for service
connection for PTSD had not been received.
In May 2004 the Board determined that new and material
evidence had not been received to reopen an August 1996
denial of the claim of service connection for PTSD. The
appellant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims (Court,). In a September 2007 Memorandum
Decision, the Court set aside the Board's May 2004 decision
and remanded the claim for readjudication.
The claims for service connection for hepatitis C and for a
skin disorder, come before the Board on appeal of a September
2004 administrative decision by the RO in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. This decision was related to the character of
the appellant's discharge.
In March 2008, the Board remanded these matters to the RO for
additional actions. After completing the requested actions,
the RO continued the denial of each claim on appeal (as
reflected in a July 2009 supplemental statement of the case
(SSOC)), and returned these matters to the Board for
appellate review.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All notification and development actions needed to fairly
adjudicate each claim on appeal have been accomplished
2. In a December 1980 Administrative Decision, it was noted
that the Defense Department, but not the Service Department
had upgraded the appellant's discharge. It was further held
that under VA regulations the discharge had been for willful
and persistent misconduct and was a bar to VA benefits. He
was provided notice of this decision and information
concerning his right to appeal later that same month, but the
appellant did not submit a timely appeal; hence, this
decision is final.
3. A RO decision dated in August 1996 denied the appellant's
claim for PTSD on the basis that, his diagnosis of PTSD was
based on a period of service which was terminated by a
discharge that precludes payment of VA benefits and his
claimed stressors were not verified in his second period of
service. The appellant did not submit a timely appeal, and
the August 1996 decision became final.
4. Evidence associated with the claims file since the
December 1980 Administrative Decision and the August 1996
rating decision is not so significant that it must be
considered with all the evidence on file to fairly decide the
merits of the claim.
5. The first period of active duty whereby the appellant
served in Vietnam is not an eligible period of service for VA
purposes, as the appellant's discharge was the result of
persistent and willful misconduct and the appellant is not
shown to have been legally insane at the time of the offenses
that led to the discharge.
6. There is no competent evidence which establishes that the
appellant currently has a skin disorder or hepatitis C.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The December 1980 Administrative Decision and the August
1996 RO decision are final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002);
38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 20.302, 20.1103 (2008).
2. As evidence received since the December 1980
Administrative Decision and the August 1996 RO decision is
not new and material, the criteria for reopening the
appellant's claim for service connection for PTSD are not
met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a)
(2001).
3. The appellant's discharge was the result of persistent
and willful misconduct for the period of service from June
1967 to March 1970, and is barred from VA compensation
benefits that may otherwise derive from that period of
service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5303 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.12,
3.354 (2008).
4. The criteria for service connection for hepatitis C are
not met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303
(2008).
5. The criteria for service connection for a skin disorder,
to include as secondary to Agent Orange exposure, are not
met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303
(2008).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Duties to Notify and Assist
The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), codified
at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, and
5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) includes enhanced duties to
notify and assist claimants for VA benefits. VA regulations
implementing the VCAA have been codified, as amended at 38
C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, and 3.326(a) (2008).
Notice requirements under the VCAA essentially require VA to
notify a claimant of any evidence that is necessary to
substantiate the claim, as well as the evidence that VA will
attempt to obtain and which evidence he or she is responsible
for providing. See, e.g., Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet.
App. 183 (2002) (addressing the duties imposed by 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)). As delineated in
Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004), after a
substantially complete application for benefits is received,
proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any
information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary
to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide;
(3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) must
ask the claimant to provide any evidence in her or his
possession that pertains to the claim, in accordance with 38
C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1).
The Board notes that, effective May 30, 2008, 38 C.F.R. §
3.159 has been revised, in part. See 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353-
23,356 (April 30, 2008). Notably, the final rule removes the
third sentence of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), which had stated
that VA will request that a claimant provide any pertinent
evidence in his or her possession.
VA's notice requirements apply to all five elements of a
service connection claim: veteran status, existence of a
disability, a connection between the veteran's service and
the disability, degree of disability, and effective date of
the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App.
473 (2006).
VCAA-compliant notice must be provided to a claimant before
the initial unfavorable decision on a claim for VA benefits
by the agency of original jurisdiction (in this case, the RO,
to include the AMC). Id; Pelegrini, 18 Vet. App. at 112.
See also Disabled American Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, the VCAA
notice requirements may, nonetheless, be satisfied if any
errors in the timing or content of such notice are not
prejudicial to the claimant. Id.
With regard to the petition to reopen the claim for service
connection for PTSD, a March 2009 post-rating letter notified
the appellant that to reopen his previously denied claim for
service connection for PTSD, VA had to receive new and
material evidence, and this letter further defined what
constituted new and material evidence specific to the reason
his claim was previously denied. Thus, the guidance of Kent
v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006) has been satisfied by
this letter.
With regard to the claims for service connection for
hepatitis C and a skin disorder, the March 2009 post-rating
letter also provided notice to the appellant of the evidence
and information needed to substantiate his claims for service
connection on appeal. This letter also informed the
appellant of what information and evidence must be submitted
by the appellant, and what information and evidence would be
obtained by VA. The letter further requested that the
appellant submit any additional information or evidence in
his possession that pertained to his claims.
The March 2009 letter also provided the appellant with
information regarding disability ratings and effective dates
consistent with Dingess/Hartman (cited above).
After issuance of the above letters, and proving the
appellant and his representative additional opportunity to
respond, the RO readjudicated each issue on appeal in a July
2009 SSOC. Hence, the appellant is not shown to be
prejudiced by the timing of VCAA-compliant notice. See
Mayfield v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 537, 543 (2006). See
also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006) (the
issuance of a fully compliant VCAA notification followed by
readjudication of the claim, such as in a statement of the
SOC or SSOC, is sufficient to cure a timing defect).
Additionally, the record also reflects that VA has made
reasonable efforts to obtain or to assist in obtaining all
relevant records pertinent to the matter on appeal. Pertinent
medical evidence of record includes the appellant's service
treatment records, VA medical records, and the reports of VA
examinations. Also of record and considered in connection
with the appeal are various written statements provided by
the appellant as well as by his representative, on his
behalf.
In summary, the duties imposed by the VCAA have been
considered and satisfied. Through various notices of the RO,
the appellant has been notified and made aware of the
evidence needed to substantiate the claims herein decided,
the avenues through which he might obtain such evidence, and
the allocation of responsibilities between himself and VA in
obtaining such evidence. There is no additional notice that
should be provided, nor is there any indication that there is
additional existing evidence to obtain or development
required to create any additional evidence to be considered
in connection with any claim(s). Consequently, any error in
the sequence of events or content of the notice is not shown
to prejudice the appellant or to have any effect on the
appeal. Any such error is deemed harmless and does not
preclude appellate consideration of the matters herein
decided, at this juncture. See Mayfield, 20 Vet. App. at 543
(rejecting the argument that the Board lacks authority to
consider harmless error). See also ATD Corp. v. Lydall,
Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
II. New and Material Evidence
Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting
from disease or injury incurred or aggravated during a
veteran's active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38
C.F.R. § 3.303 (2008).
There are two types of character of discharge bars to
establishing entitlement for VA benefits: statutory bars
found at 38 U.S.C.A. § 5303(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) and
regulatory bars listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). The legal
criteria provides that a discharge or release because of one
of the following offenses is considered to have been issued
under dishonorable conditions: acceptance of undesirable
discharge in lieu of trial by general court-martial; mutiny
or spying; offense involving moral turpitude (this includes,
generally, conviction of a felony); willful and persistent
misconduct; and homosexual acts involving aggravating
circumstances and other factors affecting the performance of
duty.
A discharge or release because of willful and persistent
misconduct will be considered to have been issued under
dishonorable conditions. Willful and persistent misconduct
includes a discharge under other than honorable conditions,
if it is determined that it was issued because of willful and
persistent misconduct. A discharge because of a minor offense
will not, however, be considered willful and persistent
misconduct if service was otherwise honest, faithful and
meritorious. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(4).
As indicated above, the appellant's claim for service
connection for PTSD had previously been considered and denied
in an August 1996 rating decision. As the veteran did not
appeal that decision, it is final based on the evidence then
of record. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302,
20.1103. The appellant sought to reopen his claim for
service connection for PTSD in November 2000.
Under pertinent legal authority, VA may reopen and review a
claim that has been previously denied if new and material
evidence is submitted by or on behalf of the veteran. 38
U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a); see also Hodge v.
West, 155 F.3rd 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Under the law in effect for applications to reopen filed
prior to August 29, 2001, 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) provides that
"new and material evidence" is evidence not previously
submitted which bears directly and substantially upon the
specific matter under consideration, which is neither
cumulative nor redundant, and which by itself or in
connection with evidence previously assembled is so
significant that it must be considered in order to fairly
decide the merits of the claim. [Parenthetically, the Board
notes the regulations implementing the VCAA include a
revision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. However, that revision
applies only to claims filed on and after August 29, 2001.
See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), as in effect on and after August
29, 2001). Given the November 2000 date of the claim
culminating in the instant appeal, the Board will apply the
version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) in effect prior to August 29,
2001.]
In determining whether new and material evidence has been
received, VA must initially decide whether evidence received
since the prior final denial is, in fact, new. This analysis
is undertaken by comparing newly-received evidence with the
evidence previously of record. After evidence is determined
to be new, the next question is whether it is material.
The provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 require a review of all
evidence received from a claimant since the last final denial
on any basis to determine whether a claim must be reopened.
See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 282-3 (1996). Here, the
last final denial of the claim was in December 1998.
Furthermore, for purposes of the "new and material" analysis,
the credibility of the evidence is presumed. Justus v.
Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 512-513 (1992).
At the time of the 1996 rating decision, the RO determined
that the appellant was not entitled to service connection for
PTSD on the basis that the appellant's diagnosed PTSD was
based on events in a period of service when he was discharged
from service as a result of persistent and willful
misconduct, which precludes payment of VA benefits and his
claimed stressors were not verified in his second period of
service. PTSD was first clinically established years after
separation from the pertinent service.
Evidence considered at that time included medical records,
which showed PTSD had its inception due to stressful events
during the appellant's first period of service from June 1967
to March 1970, and no complaint, treatment, or diagnosis
referable to PTSD in the appellant's Reserve duty from March
1974 to May 1978. No signs or symptoms of PTSD were noted
during service and the disorder was first noted years after
service.
A VA Administrative Decision of December 1980 reported that
the appellant's discharge for the period June 1967 to March
1970 was considered to be a discharge, which precluded
payment of VA benefits. It was noted that the Defense
Department had issued an upgrade, but that his Service
Department had not. It was further held that for VA
purposes, the discharge had been the result of persistent and
willful misconduct which resulted in a bar to VA compensation
benefits based on that period of service. It was noted that
he was entitled to health care under Chapter 17, Title 38,
United States Code for any disabilities determined to be
service connected. He was provided a notice of this decision
at his address of record (and he used the same address when
corresponding with the VA some years later). There is no
indication that the letter was returned or was undeliverable.
VA treatment reports from August 1991 to April 1996 showed
that the appellant was treated for and had a diagnosis of
PTSD.
On VA examination of May 1996 the appellant reported that he
started receiving treatment for PTSD in 1988 in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, while he was incarcerated and continued
treatment at the Philadelphia Veterans Administration Mental
Health Clinic. PTSD was diagnosed, in pertinent part.
In this case, in order for evidence to be new and material,
it would have to tend to show either that the appellant had
received an upgraded discharge pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A. § 1552
or that he had been found to be insane at the time he
committed the offenses which resulted in his discharge, or
that a stressful experience from the appellant's second
period of service caused or aggravated his PTSD.
Evidence added to the record since the August 1996 RO
decision includes the appellant's November 2000 application
to reopen his claim for service connection for PTSD. A
January 2001 VA examination reflects that the appellant
reported that his role was to travel all over Da Nang and
fight fires as a result of plane and helicopter crashes and
that he had numerous traumatic memories related to his time
in Vietnam. He reported other traumatic events, all during
the initial period of service. PTSD was diagnosed.
VA medical records from July 2003 to April 2009 reflect that
the appellant has continued to receive ongoing treatment for
his PTSD. The appellant reported symptoms related to his
combat in Vietnam.
The Veteran has also submitted additional argument contending
that he had incompetent counsel at the time he was discharge
from the military and was not informed of his right. He
further contends that he was not informed of the 1980
Administrative Decision and therefore knew nothing about his
right to appeal. He also challenges the determination that
he engaged in willful misconduct and insists that the Veteran
VA should have considered whether PTSD affected his judgment
in his first enlistment.
The evidence received subsequent to the August 1996 RO
decision is cumulative or duplicative of evidence previously
of record as there is no showing of a nexus opinion between
the appellant's second period of service and his current
PTSD, nor is there evidence showing that the appellant had
received an upgraded discharge pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A. § 1552
or that he had been found to be insane at the time he
committed the offenses which resulted in his discharge.
As such, the evidence is not new and material evidence within
the meaning of the applicable law. While medical evidence
submitted since the August 1996 RO decision constitutes new
evidence such is not material since, by itself or in
connection with evidence previously assembled, it is not so
significant that it must be considered in order to fairly
decide the merits of the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156.
In this regard, the Board notes that the medical records
essentially reflect that the appellant currently experiences
PTSD incurred as a result of stressful events in his first
period of service, but diagnosed years later. There is no
showing of a psychiatric disorder during service, the
appellant is shown to have known right from wrong during that
period, and there is no medical evidence showing that he was
insane at the time he committed the offenses which resulted
in his discharge. There likewise were no symptoms noted when
he entered his second period of training.
The August 1996 RO decision determined that the appellant was
not entitled to service connection for PTSD on the basis
that, his diagnosis of PTSD occurred during a period when he
was terminated by a discharge that precludes payment of VA
benefits and his claimed stressors were not verified in his
second period of service. No evidence has been submitted
which disputes or in any way relates to the line of duty
determination. There is no new evidence to attribute the
appellant's PTSD to the second period of service.
To the extent that the appellant contends that his stressors
for PTSD for his second period of service were flashbacks of
incidents from his first period of service, such statements,
being in effect lay speculation on medical issues involving
the presence or etiology of a disability, are not probative
to this claim and, therefore, are deemed to be not material.
See Pollard v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 11 (1993) (pursuant to
Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992), lay testimony
attempting to diagnose frostbite or arthritis in service held
to not be competent evidence for such purpose, and thus not
material); see also Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211 (1993)
(lay assertions of medical causation cannot serve as the
predicate to reopen a claim under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108).
Although the appellant asserts that his counsel was
incompetent at the time of his discharge from service, such
allegations even if found to be true, would not provide a
basis to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD.
Any issues regarding incompetent counsel pertaining to
matters before the Service Department at the time of the
appellant's discharge should be addressed to the them, as
such matters are not within the jurisdiction of the Board.
It is noted that his discharge papers list the lawyer who
provided him notice of information concerning his taking his
discharge in lieu of Court Martial, and indicated that he was
satisfied with the advice given.
In regards to the appellant's claim that he was not informed
of the 1980 Administrative Decision and therefore knew
nothing about his right to appeal, there is a presumption of
regularity under which it is presumed that government
officials "have properly discharged their official duties."
United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1926); Mindenhall v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 271, 274 (1994) (VA
need only mail notice to the last address of record for the
presumption to attach). This presumption of regularity in
the administrative process may be rebutted by "clear evidence
to the contrary." Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 310
(1999).
The appellant's mere assertion that he didn't receive notice
of the 1980 Administrative decision and his appellate rights
is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity in
the administrative process. The record shows that an
appropriate notification letter was sent to the appellant at
his last known address of record at that time. The letter is
not show to have been returned by the U.S. Postal Service.
Thus, the Board is satisfied that the appellant was properly
and promptly notified of the dispositions with respect to the
1980 Administrative decision, which is final.
Lastly, as to the appellant's assertions that his PTSD
affected his judgment during his first period of service, the
Board notes that, in addition to the above, the regulations
provide that a discharge or release from service under one of
the conditions specified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 is a bar to the
payment of benefits unless it is found that the person was
insane at the time of committing the offenses. 38 C.F.R. §
3.12(b). In this case; however, there is no competent
medical evidence of record showing or even suggesting that
the appellant met the legal definition of insanity for VA
purposes. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). Indeed, there is no
evidence of a psychiatric deficiency of any kind until 1990,
more than 19 years after separation from the appellants first
period of service from which he claims resulted in his
current PTSD, and none of the medical evidence of record
suggests that the appellant's diagnosed PTSD caused him to be
insane at the time he committed the offenses in question. As
such, the Board does not find that the appellant was insane
at the time of his discharge in March 1970, which had been
the result of persistent and willful misconduct.
In sum, the appellant's first period of service does not
qualify for VA benefits. This was the holding in 1980 and in
1996 and there has been no new evidence which would warrant a
change in that conclusion. Thus, there is no new and
material evidence on that point. Furthermore, nothing
submitted relates the PTSD to the second period of duty. As
such, new and material evidence on that point has not been
received.
Under these circumstances, the Board must conclude that new
and material evidence to reopen the claim for service
connection for PTSD has not been received. As such, the
December 1980 Administrative decision and the RO's August
1996 decision remain final, and the appeal must be denied.
As the appellant has not fulfilled the threshold burden of
submitting new and material evidence to reopen the finally
disallowed claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not
applicable. See Annoni v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 463, 467
(1993).
III. Service Connection
As discussed above, the appellant's character of discharge is
a bar to VA benefits for his first period of military service
from June 1967 to March 1970. Thus, his claims for service
connection for hepatitis C and for a skin disorder will only
be considered for his second period of service from March
1974 to August 1974.
Service connection may be granted for disability resulting
from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated during
service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Such a
determination requires a finding of current disability that
is related to an injury or disease in service. Watson v.
Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309 (1993); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.
App. 141, 143 (1992). Service connection may be granted for
a disability diagnosed after discharge, when all the
evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes
that the disability is due to disease or injury that was
incurred or aggravated in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).
Service treatment records from the appellant's second period
of service are negative for complaints, findings, or
diagnosis of a skin disorder or for hepatitis C.
VA medical records from October 1990 to April 2009 are
negative for findings or treatment of a skin disorder.
A January 2001 VA general medical examination report reflects
that the appellant had no ongoing inflammatory liver disorder
nor did he have ongoing hepatitis C virus infection. The
appellant's skin was evaluated as normal and well kempt. The
diagnosis was a normal general medical examination. A
hepatitis C antibody was weakly positive. An HCV RNA
qualitive was ordered and this was negative. Therefore, the
HCV antibody was falsely positive or the appellant had
hepatitis C and had spontaneous core. No evidence of
hepatitis C injection at this time.
An August 2003 VA treatment record shows hepatitis C positive
blood work.
A June 2006 VA treatment record shows that the appellant was
HCV Ab positive, but HCV viral load was negative, assessed as
probably cleared virus.
An October 2006 VA treatment record reflects a negative viral
load, no further workup.
A January 2009 VA treatment record shows that the appellant
had a history of HCV, which cleared.
In this case, the Board finds that the medical evidence fails
to establish that the appellant currently has a skin disorder
or hepatitis C, and neither the appellant nor his
representative has presented, identified, or even alluded to
the existence of any medical evidence of a current diagnosis
of a skin disorder or hepatitis C. The Board notes that in
regard to hepatitis C, while there was some indication that
at one time laboratory results showed positive hepatitis C
findings, a more recent January 2009 VA medical record
clearly found that while the appellant had a history of
hepatitis C, it had since cleared. Thus, notwithstanding the
Veteran's complaints, without competent evidence of a
diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition,
such does not constitute a disability for which service
connection can be granted. As indicated above, Congress has
specifically limited entitlement to service connection for
disease or injury incurred or aggravated in service to cases
where such incidents have resulted in disability. See 38
U.S.C.A. § 1131. Hence, where, as here, competent evidence
does not establish the disability for which service
connection is sought, there can be no valid claim for service
connection. See Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In
the instant case, the claims for service connection for
hepatitis C and for a skin disorder must be denied because
the first essential criterion for a grant of service
connection- evidence of a current disability upon which to
predicate a grant of service connection, on any basis -has
not been met.
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
ORDER
As new and material evidence to reopen the claim for service
connection for PTSD has not been received, the appeal is
denied.
Service connection for hepatitis C is denied.
Service connection for a skin disorder, to include as
secondary to Agent Orange exposure, is denied.
____________________________________________
MICHAEL D. LYON
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Department of Veterans Affairs