Gazprom (C): The Ukrainian Crisis and Its Aftermath

Abstract

The case describes the resolution to the January 2006 gas crisis, precipitated by the decision of Gazprom, the largest natural gas producer in the world, to cut off gas supply to Ukraine because of disagreement on the terms of future trade. The case also narrates the events that have followed: the adoption by Gazprom of a comprehensive policy to renegotiate prices with the rest of the former Soviet states; the erratic relationship with Ukraine, dependent on the internal political configuration in the latter at any given time; and a persistence of Gazprom's negative image in the world.

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