Complex Life: Non Modernity and the Emergence of Cognition and Culture

As its author introduces it, this book is both an
intellectual journey through theories concerning the evolution of
human beings and a plea for the application of complexity theory
techniques within the social sciences. Even though he remains far
from applications to illustrate his arguments, Alan Dean's book is a
nice introductory work on the subject. It presents a first depiction
of this interdisciplinary domain dealing with anthropology, sociology
and cognitive sciences.

The journey begins with an anthropological
discussion about the evolution from primates to humans. This chapter
succeeds in introducing the reader to some key ideas on human
evolution. Dean begins by analysing the old theories of Linnaeus and
Gray about the classification of species. These theories aimed at
placing humankind in the tree of species by comparing the presence or
absence of certain anatomical features. For these authors, what
distinguishes humans from non-humans are a number of morphological
and behavioural characteristics such as bipedalism, brain
enlargement, use of language and use of tools. The tasks of this
approach are to establish the nature of the last common ancestor and
complete the evolutionary record from that point up to modern humans
and then to unfold the quality of the selective pressures from which
the depicted adaptations arose.

Dean reports that the emergence of homo sapiens
has given rise to several explanations such as climate change,
adaptation, concurrence or migrations. However, when the earliest
hominids stood up, whether hunting for food or watching for
predators, they freed their hands which enabled them to use their
fore limbs for tools manipulation. Their brain volume then increased
through selective pressures on appropriate cognitive and behavioural
traits.

The author then introduces complexity theory to
emphasise this point: is evolution a linear or a non-linear process?
He argues that it is a non-linear process. The fossil evidence
suggests a mosaic pattern of change, rather than a pattern in which
the change from one ancestral type to another occurred in a distinct
and unambiguous manner. Dean then makes a plea for complexity theory
techniques, arguing that the concepts of emergence and
interconnectedness of causes and consequences are the key aspects of
this theory for our understanding of evolution.

As regards cranial expansion and the emergence of
modern humans, Dean recognises the significant roles of culture
(language and symbolic reasoning) and the environment. However, at
some point, the fundamental circumstances of human evolution expanded
to include the emergence of a cultural context to human existence.
Interactions between genes and culture are now setting the
context for human evolution.

The next milestone in the journey involves the
emergence of symbolic reasoning amongst human beings. This gives rise
to the use of spoken languages as a mean of communication. As Dean
observes, only humankind has grammatically structured languages.
Information used by all other social animals propagates largely by
the genetic inheritance of behavioural traits. For example, even
chimpanzees are limited in their ability to preserve skills and
knowledge from one generation to the next. Being able to communicate
complex ideas would be purposeless unless it was experienced
collectively.

Changes which facilitated the development of
language must have taken place prior to the emergence of language
itself. Clearly, language and symbolic reasoning could not be the
basis of their own emergence.

Dean agrees with Deacon's (1997) theory about the co-evolution of
language and the human brain. The ability to reason symbolically and
use a vocalised language could have evolved side-by-side. Introducing
the role that society played in this matter, Dean agrees that forms
of language and the facility to use language co-evolved socially.

However, the ability to reason symbolically must
have preceded the emergence of language. Edelman (1989) presents a theory of neuronal selection
which Dean discusses. Those neurons that are utilised, or selected
for, propagate at the expense of those that are unused. In this way,
diversity in the brain morphology derives directly from adaptive
processes at the levels of both cellular propagation and early
neuronal pathway formation.

Again pointing out that the emergence of our
species was an outcome of evolutionary processes, the author pleads
for the use of complex systems theory as some of its tools (like
strange attractors) share the same structure as systems of this kind.
Humankind is then travelling through an n-dimensional natural world
along the path of a strange attractor.

In regard to the origins of symbolic reasoning the
author states that big changes involving substantial morphological
shifts can only occur adaptively over long periods of time. Some
people like Gould and Eldredge (1993) have
argued for pre-adaptations without stating how these may have arisen,
whereas Dennett (1995) prefers a theory of
nested adaptations. Dean seems to share Gell-Mann's (1984) point of view, arguing that human
evolution is a complex adaptive system.

The third chapter deals with the link between
cognition and adaptation. Dean states that cognitive abilities arose
through natural selection before cultural selection or social
learning. His theory goes as follows. As the use of tools requires
not only high levels of manual dexterity but also the ability to
think abstractly, the human being acquires the ability to make an
abstraction of the tool, linking an object to its function. From this
arose symbolic reasoning about these tools. Symbolic reasoning can
then extend to other fields, mainly the social field, by experiencing
the social environment. The language emerging from symbolic reasoning
provides the social basis of the evolution of human cognition.

Naturally, the fourth chapter examines how the
early hominids encountered the cultural world. Dean starts by
describing Plotkin's (1994) theory about
instincts as being species-specific behaviours that are structured
inside the brain through natural selection and elicited by
environmental events, just like predator avoidance. Following from
this, the context of a linguistic and collective social life has
evolved into Darwinian cognitive algorithms. What Dean calls adaptive
rationality is thus a property of social interaction: adaptive
rationality refers to certain mental abilities rather than intended
computations.

The ability to analyse and represent the external
world symbolically enabled humans to think creatively about it.
Sharing Edelman's (1992) point of view,
Dean explains that the ability of higher-order consciousness to
interact with the external world symbolically enables the creation of
abstract symbols about the present which can be remembered and used
to reflect on future events. Elegantly, he thus justifies the link
between humankind the problem solver and humankind the speechmaker.
From then on, the emergence of categories in cognition can perhaps
best be seen as an outcome of social interaction. For this reason,
Dean argues that it is most likely that the further evolution of
language was driven more by social and cultural events than natural
selection acting through the physical environment. Human reasoning
has then evolved discontinuously in response to adaptive forces of
both a natural and social form. Human consciousness and languages
have co-evolved. Dean then defines the next stage of human evolution
as a system of feedback and feed-forward between nature, culture and
cognition.

The author examines the shift of natural selection
into cultural selection when most of human social and personal life
is still determined by nature through our biological structure and
environmental constraints. Nature and culture are indivisible parts
of human life. Mind, society and nature are then inextricably linked.
Taking the example of the incest taboo, Dean exposes some cultural
traits that impart a survival advantage. This advantage could be that
the more widespread the out breeding, the lower the frequency of
expression for lethal traits. But as Dean points out, incest may
confer advantage when mating with a stranger involves risks. For
instance, little is known about either their genetic wellbeing or
their abilities and commitment to parenting. Another interesting idea
is that for some populations (suffering from a lack of opportunities
to outbreed due to social or geographical isolation) inbreeding is
commonly practised. Then, selective forces would act over time to
limit consanguineous mating between close kin. However, wherever
there are few opportunities to mate due to social or geographical
isolation, consanguineous mating will be advantageous because without
it there won't be any possibility to have offspring at all.

The psychological and sociological parts of the
explanation for the incest taboo come from Freud (1960) and Malinowski (1960). Sexual attraction exists between
members of the same family in an impulsive way and these impulses can
only be moderated through social prohibition. There is then an
interrelationship between biological influences and social practices.
One proposal is that if there were an aversion towards incest there
would be no need for laws and norms to prohibit such acts. Then, as
each individual's disposition towards sexual activity will be unique,
arising both genetically and through developmental processes or
behaviour, it will be structured through social norms and
institutions and will thus appear largely uniform.

Returning the debate to the redefinition of
methods and frameworks used in the social sciences, Dean begins his
sixth chapter by justifying his claim that the social world is
non-linear. Certain components of cognition and cultural life can be
understood as being the expression of an underlying causative agency
that has occurred through selective processes, within a complex,
multidimensional and interconnected material world. As an example, a
spider's web will vary to some extent from any other construction of
the same type as a product of the prevailing material conditions.
Certain material conditions may lead to cultural practices that
engender particular family structures.

Dean then attacks the basis of the modern social
sciences arguing that these are based on a desire to realise the kind
of systematic knowledge associated with the natural sciences. Dean
cites Mills (1959) when exposing the
inability of humankind to comprehend the totality of its rational,
social, industrial and economic constructions.

Dean then refers to Latour's (1993) thesis which states that a key claim of
modernity (that nature and society are separate) is based upon false
assumptions. Everywhere scientific projects are infused with cultural
moments. This thesis is often summarised by its title "we have never
been modern". What Latour reproaches modern social science for is
three basic assumptions. Firstly, that although humans construct
nature, nature is as if humans did not construct it. Secondly, and
conversely, that even though humans do not construct society, society
is as if it is constructed. Finally, that nature and society must
remain absolutely distinct. These assumptions are false and Latour
wants to reclaim the middle ground between nature and culture and to
reassert the importance of the indivisibility between nature and
culture in the shaping of human events.

Starting from the duality of the subject and
object in human agency (the subject is both knowing and known), Dean
then suggests that complexity theory can provide a starting point for
such a project of reconciling nature and culture. He claims that
change within both natural and cultural networks can be understood as
arising from causative mechanisms that underpin the multidimensional
cognitive, social and cultural world. Complexity theory and human
evolutionary theory, if combined, allow for another approach within
which nature and culture are inseparably interconnected.

In conclusion, Dean makes the observation that
complexity theory reveals that outcomes observed at the macro level
arise as a consequence of interactions taking place at deep levels
within a system. This, for him, constitutes a strong argument for the
use of complexity theory tools and techniques to understand human
evolution.

To sum up, this book is quite a pleasant journey
through the existing theories on human evolution. However, the part
about the use of complex systems techniques is less convincing. Even
though I personally believe in such a meeting of methods, the
proposed arguments concerning the similarity between systems and
tools are not sufficient. There are actually more suggestive
examples illustrating Dean's purpose to be found in the work of
Kauffman (1995). One last disappointing
aspect of this intellectual journey is that it feels like it is being
made in a small plane without a compass. It is not particularly
pleasant at times and does not really take the most direct route. The
itinerary for the journey is spectacular but unfortunately, the lack
of illustrations and examples makes you feel you are travelling
behind closed curtains. It is as if you are allowed to make the trip
but not to see the landscape clearly. This is even more disappointing
as the in flight commentary allows you to imagine how marvellous the
landscape must be!