I then turned to mainland China. I said we had assumed Mr. Khrushchev was interested in other
areas of the Far East, not simply Laos. We were surprised by the
build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Fukien and asked him what he
knew about it. He said that he had no information other than what he had
seen in the press. I said that such information as we had was generally
in line with the press reports and that we had no knowledge of the
ChiCom intentions. I asked him whether he thought the move was
precautionary against possible attack by Chiang Kai-shek or a build-up for an attack on the
off-shore islands. Again he replied that he had no information.

I said I assumed Mr. Khrushchev
did not want to see a major military engagement break out in the Pacific
and, therefore, we considered it important that Mr. Khrushchev should know the U.S.
Government's attitude. Since there had been a good deal of talk from
Taipei regarding Chiang Kai-shek's
intention to invade the mainland, I thought Mr. Khrushchev should understand that
Admiral Kirk was not being
sent as Ambassador because of his experience in amphibious warfare.
Dobrynin commented that he had
read of this speculation. I explained that Admiral Kirk had been selected because of his standing
and the confidence that President Kennedy had in him; also, that we had no intentions
under existing circumstances of giving Chiang
encouragement or support for an attack on the mainland. It seemed
important for Mr. Khrushchev to
understand this. I pointed out further that an agreement had been
reached between Mr. Dulles and
President Chiang Kai-shek which
was still in effect, namely, that the ChiNats would take no offensive
action without full consultation and prior agreement on the part of the
United States. I also stated that in our meetings with the ChiComs since
1955 we had consistently
been urging agreement that force not be used by either side to change
the existing situation and of course we continue to adhere to that
position. He said he felt sure Mr. Khrushchev would be glad to learn this. In reply to his
question, I told him that Cabot
was seeing Wang in Warsaw
Saturday6June 23. & would
give him same information I was giving Dobrynin.7This sentence
appears in Harriman's
handwriting on the source text.

I then continued that if for any reason the ChiCom build-up was of a more
ominous character, Mr. Khrushchev
should understand our treaty with the GRC and I referred to the dangerous situation arising from
any aggressive action on the part of the ChiComs. With an air of
surprise, he commented “you wouldn't help defend the off-shore islands?”
I replied, “why not?” “But these islands are Chinese territory,” he
asserted. I said we believed in peaceful settlement of differences but
we could not stand by if the ChiComs took aggressive action.