Abstract

Social interactions involving coordination between individuals are subject to an “evolutionary trap.” Once a suboptimal strategy has evolved, mutants playing an alternative strategy are counterselected because they fail to coordinate with the majority. This creates a detrimental situation from which evolution cannot escape, preventing the evolution of efficient collective behaviours. Here, we study this problem using the framework of evolutionary robotics. We first confirm the existence of an evolutionary trap in a simple setting. We then, however, reveal that evolution can solve this problem in a more realistic setting where individuals need to coordinate with one another. In this setting, robots evolve an ability to adapt plastically their behaviour to one another, as this improves the efficiency of their interaction. This ability has an unintended evolutionary consequence: a genetic mutation affecting one individual’s behaviour also indirectly alters their partner’s behaviour because the two individuals influence one another. As a consequence of this indirect genetic effect, pairs of partners can virtually change strategy together with a single mutation, and the evolutionary barrier between alternative strategies disappears. This finding reveals a general principle that could play a role in nature to smoothen the transition to efficient collective behaviours in all games with multiple equilibriums.

Copyright

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