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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TEGUCIGALPA 000117
SIPDIS
DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY, AND TIN
MCCARTER. DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN AND G/TIP FOR LUIS
CDEBACA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELABEINDETRDKTIPPHUMGOVPOISIPDISUSAID
HO
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED
LABOR FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 56
¶B. 09 STATE 131995
¶C. 09 STATE 69221
¶D. 09 TEGUCIGALPA 39
¶1. On June 28, 2009, Honduran President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya
was removed from power in a coup d'etat. The United States
did not recognize the de facto regime that subsequently took
over and remained in power until the January 27 inauguration
of democratically elected President Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo. As
a result, it was not possible to engage in high-level
advocacy on the issues of child labor and forced labor with
the de facto regime and there is limited information on the
subject due to our no contact policy with the de facto
regime. With the newly democratically elected government in
place, we will reengage on this issue.
TASK 1: The use of forced labor and/or exploitive child labor
in the production of goods:
--------------------
¶2. The Department of Labor's 2009 "List of Goods Produced by
Child Labor or Forced Labor" included coffee, lobsters, and
melons as products produced in Honduras with the use of child
labor. As outlined in paragraph 13 and 14 of ref B, there is
no new information to report with regard to forced labor and
exploitive child labor in the production of goods.
¶3. As directed, the Embassy contacted non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that work with child labor issues,
including the International Labor Organization (ILO), and
various other stakeholders to inquire about new cases
involving forced labor or exploitive child labor in the
production of goods. Under the Department's no contact
policy, the Embassy did not contact the Ministry of Labor
(MOL) regarding task 1 or task 2 (ref B). Many other
organizations had limited information on these issues,
including the ILO, due to limitations placed on their contact
with the MOL following the June coup.
Task 2: Additional information on exploitive child labor
--------------------
PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD LABOR
¶1. In what sectors were children involved in exploitive labor?
--There was anecdotal evidence to suggest children were
involved in domestic service, street vending, including
dangerous activities such as juggling flaming batons in order
to earn tips, private transportation companies, child
prostitution, and the sale of drugs. An April 20 article in
the national daily newspaper, "La Tribuna," reported
community efforts to move children selling food on the
streets to the classroom in the Department of Olancho. A
June 13 report in the national daily newspaper, "La Prensa,"
reported children were working as fare collectors on private
urban bus lines in Tegucigalpa. Finally, in a March 16
investigate report in the national daily newspaper, "La
Tribuna," Public Prosecutor Reina Valerio said that her
office was processing cases in which "high risk" children
were found to be working as drug mules and selling drugs in
the streets of La Ceiba, San Pedro Sula, and Tegucigalpa.
NGOs that work with at risk children, such as USAID's "Youth
Regional Aliance," reported to Poloff that there were
anecdotal cases of children being used as drug mules in urban
areas, however there were no known ongoing investigations or
prosecutions.
--The National Institute of Statistics (INE) published the
results of a national household survey in May 2009 that
includes a list of sectors in which children work, however
there was no breakdown according to age and the survey
numbers included children aged 5-17. The report found that of
the 391,195 minors aged 5-17 working, 75.6 percent work in
rural areas and 60.6 percent work in the agriculture sector.
¶2. Did the government collect or publish data on exploitive
child labor?
--The National Institute of Statistics (INE) published the
results of a national household survey in May 2009 that found
170,046 children aged 5-14 worked in some form or another.
As in the past, the INE survey showed that 140,088 working
children lived in rural areas compared to 29,957 working
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 002 OF 011
children in urban areas. The largest single group (73,915)
was 10-14 year olds working while attending schools in rural
areas. The next largest group was children aged 10-14 working
and not attending school in rural areas (58,409).
--The report was broken down into the following categories of
types of work: 173 children aged 10-14 were working in the
"public sector," 29,456 in the "private sector," and 2,399 as
domestic workers. A total of 6,964 children aged 5-14
worked in their own business while a total of 131,053
reportedly worked without payment. This last group are
crompised of children that work on family farms and in other
enterprises. There was no indication this group constituted
children working in forced labor conditions.
--A copy of the detailed results of the May 2009 household
survey is available and Post can transmit it separately to
the Department of Labor.
2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS
------------------------
¶1. What new laws or regulations were enacted in regard to
exploitive child labor over the past year?
--According to ILO and Democracy without Borders, there were
no known changes or additions in 2009 to the legal framework
addressing exploitive child labor in Honduras.
¶2. What is the adequacy of the country/territory's legal and
regulatory framework for addressing exploitive child labor?
--Honduras is a signatory to ILO Convention 182 regarding the
worst forms of child labor and its Child Labor Code precludes
participation by minors in unhealthy or dangerous conditions.
Honduran law regulates child labor and provides that minors
between the ages of 14 and 18 cannot work unless authorities
determine that the work is indispensable for the family's
income and will not conflict with schooling. The
constitution and the law establish the maximum work hours for
children under 18 as six hours daily and 30 hours weekly.
Parents or a legal guardian can request special permission
from the MOL to allow children between the ages of 14 and 15
to work, so long as the MOL performs a home study to ensure
that the child demonstrates economic necessity to work and
that the child will not work outside of the country or in
hazardous conditions, including offshore fishing. In 2008,
the Government of Honduras reformed Article Eight of the
Child Labor Code to include a list of tasks considered too
dangerous for children under 18 years of age. The change
bans minors from engaging in activities such as forestry,
fishery, hunting, mining, quarrying, manufacturing,
construction, transportation, morgue activities, and street
cleaning. Despite these limitations, minors aged 16 and 17
may receive authorization from the Office of Labor and Social
Security to perform dangerous labor under certain
circumstances.
--The law prohibits night work and overtime for minors under
the age of 16 and requires that employers in areas with more
than 20 school-age children working at their business
facility provide a location for a school. In practice, the
vast majority of children worked without MOL permits.
--The law prohibits forced or bonded labor but there is no
specific provision for children trafficked into exploitive
labor situations. The Special Prosecutor for Children, Nora
Urbina, commented to Poloff on January 19 that from her point
of view, the lack of laws covering trafficking into
exploitive labor situations is a shortcoming in the Honduran
law.
--By law, individuals who violate child labor laws in
traditional work sectors may receive prison sentences of
three to five years along with a fine. There were no
reported changes in the maximum 5,000 Lempira (USD 260) fine
for those responsible for violating the child labor code.
There were no known changes to the practice of the MOL giving
violators a probationary period to correct the violation
instead of levying fines.
--ILO staff told Poloff on January 14 the legal framework to
combat exploitive child labor in Honduras is adequate, but
enforcement is lacking. The Special Prosecutor for Children,
Nora Urbina, told Poloff on January 19 that she understood
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 003 OF 011
that the Congressional Commission for Family and Childhood
and the National Commission for the Gradual and Progressive
Eradication of Child Labor would work in the future to pass a
law that specifically targets trafficking for the purposes of
exploitive labor.
--The ILO reported that the MOL took two significant steps in
2009 to support the 2008 revision of Article Eight of the
Child Labor Code. The MOL first issued an internal memo
instructing all inspectors to follow the changes and secondly
issued an announcement to the National Commission for Sport
Installations of Honduras (CONAPID) informing them of the
change and of a new ban on the use of children in the sale of
alcoholic beverages at sporting events.
2C, Section I: Hazardous child labor
--------------------------------------
¶1. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child/forced child
labor?
--The Ministry of Labor is the primary government agency that
is responsible for the inspection of labor conditions and
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child/forced child
labor. Government-wide coordination is managed under the
National Plan for the Eradication of Child Labor (NPECL), a 7
year plan passed in May 2008. An ILO-led initiative called
the "Roadmap for the Eradication of Child Labor in Honduras"
(RECL) was in progress prior to the June coup. In a December
2009 internal report by the de facto regime's Ministry of
Labor provided to a local ILO representative, the RECL
program was listed as "pending due to the situation in the
country." The RECL was a joint effort between the ILO and
the MOL to organize the objectives and targets to better
coordinate the GOH response to child labor and was placed on
hold by the ILO following their decision to reduce contact
with the MOL after the June coup. The report also stated
that a pending action for the MOL is the coordination and
execution the NPECL.
--The Public Ministry's Office of the Special Prosecutor for
Children (OSPC) prosecutes criminal charges against those
involved in hazardous and forced child labor as well as those
suspected of sexual exploitation of children.
--The Honduran Institute for Children and the Family (IHNFA)
leads government efforts to care for children that are
victims of child labor. Other internationally funded
programs fight child labor, including programs funded by the
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
Spanish government to build opportunities for children at the
margins of society. Many of these programs were on hold or
suspended following the June coup.
¶2. Mechanisms for exchanging information and their
effectiveness.
--In January 2009, the MOL released a "Procedure for the
Integral Attention to the Child Worker from the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security." The procedure outlines the
appropriate response of MOL inspectors and coordination
between various government actors, including special
procedures when a child worker is found to be in a hazardous
situation. For example, if found to be working in a
pre-defined "worst forms of child labor" the case skips a
number of steps involved in a normal labor inspection and
instead is passed to the Public Ministry for immediate
attention by the OSPC. The National Commission for the
Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor (NCECL)
was the primary tool utilized to share information on the
topic and the NPECL provided government ministries with
benchmarks in order to combat child labor. According to the
OSPC, the technical council of the NCECL met on a monthly
basis during 2009.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making
complaints about hazardous and forced child labor violations?
--The MOL maintains a process for making complaints about
hazardous and forced child labor violations. ILO reported
that in 2009 the MOL received 24 complaints against companies
for violating child labor laws. OSPC reported on January 19
that the Public Ministry had not received any cases of child
labor referred to them by the MOL for criminal prosecution.
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 004 OF 011
¶4. Funding for agencies responsible for inspections of child
labor cases.
--A December 2009 internal report by the de facto Ministry of
Labor provided to a local ILO representative lists the office
that handles inspections as using 95 percent of its budget to
pay for salaries and benefits, which leaves only 5 per cent
to carry out inspections. According to the same report, the
office of inspections at the MOL had a 2009 budget of
6,685,057 lempiras (approximately USD $351,845), of which
6,082,152 lempiras (approximately USD $320,113) went to the
payment of salaries. The same internal report stated the
budget for inspections was insufficient and recommended an
increase in the budget.
--Similarly, in April, UNICEF representative Sergio Guimaraes
told national daily newspaper, "La Prensa," that a large
problem facing IHNFA is that over 90 percent of its budget
goes to salaries for employees and that IHNFA needed a
recomplete overhaul, including an increased budget in order
to fully carry out its mandate. IHNFA's mandate is to
provide care to child labor victims.
¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ?
--A December 2009 internal report by the de facto Ministry of
Labor provided to a local ILO representative lists 120
inspectors being employed at the end of the year 2009.
¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried
out?
--ILO reported that 14,795 workplace inspections were carried
by MOL inspectors in 2009. Of this nationwide total, there
were 377 child labor inspections carried out in the country's
capital, Tegucigalpa. There was no information available on
the break-down of complaint-driven versus random,
government-initiative inspections and there was no
information available on the number of specific inspections
concerning child labor abuses outside of Tegucigalpa.
However, it is commonly understood that inspectors are
looking for child labor violations during regular workplace
inspections.
¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of
inspections? Were these children actually provided or
referred for services as a result (as opposed to simply
fired)?
--ILO estimates that at least six children were removed from
the workplace for child labor violations in 2009, given that
MOL authorities sanctioned six companies. There was no
information available on the treatment received by these
minors. However, the MOL's "Procedure for the Integral
Attention to the Child Worker from the Ministry of Labor and
Social Security," which was released in January 2009,
instructs inspectors to refer the child worker to IHNFA for
care after a case of child labor is discovered.
¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened?
--ILO reported that in 2009 the MOL received 24 complaints
against companies for violating child labor laws. The OSPC
told Poloff on January 19 that in 2009 the Public Ministry
had not received any cases of child labor referred to them by
the MOL for criminal prosecution.
¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved?
--The ILO reported that during 2009, the MOL sanctioned six
companies with administrative fines for employing minors.
The names of three of the companies were available and are:
Chevez Comercial, CONHSA PAISA, and Constructora CERO (the
later two are both construction companies). The names of the
other three are unknown.
¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached?
--See answer to questions 8 and 9.
¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve
child labor cases?
--ILO estimates that during 2009, on average, it took 9
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 005 OF 011
months to resolve child labor cases in Honduras.
¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties
actually applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence
served? Did such sentences meet penalties established in the
law?
--The OSPC told Poloff on January 19 that the Public Ministry
had not received any cases of child labor referred to them by
the MOL for criminal prosecution. This information suggests
that the MOL continued sanctioning companies for child labor
infractions with fines without passing cases for criminal
investigation to the Public Ministry. By law, individuals
who violate child labor laws in traditional work sectors may
receive prison sentences of three to five years with a fine.
It was also a common practice to give violators a
probationary period to correct the violation in lieu of a
fine.
¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above
reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor?
--Based on the 2008 INE household survey, there were 144,412
working children between the ages of 5-14, of which 29,219
worked in urban areas and 115,194 worked in rural areas. The
2009 INE household survey showed an increase of approximately
25,634 children aged 5-14 working in Honduras. The majority
of children in this age group continued to work in rural
areas, where formal MOL inspections are typically carried
out. However, the National Plan of Action for the Prevention
and Eradication of Child Labor addresses this population and
according to the ILO, institutions within the Honduran
government continued working to meet benchmarks outlined in
the plan.
--Honduras faced a serious political crisis in 2009 with the
June coup and a subsequent decrease in the general protection
of the rights of vulnerable communities. This undoubtedly
impacted working youth. However, it appears that the
institutions in Honduras maintained a commitment to combat
exploitive child labor with the continuance of labor
inspections and the continued existence of a national
commission and plan to address the problem. As with many
challenges in Honduras, the various Honduran institutions
that comprise the commission struggled with resource
limitations in achieving their goals to address child labor.
¶14. Did the government offer any training for investigators
or others responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any)
impact have these trainings had?
--Training was offered by MOL for inspectors prior to the
June coup; however, many of these activities were suspended
due to funding terminations by international donors after the
June coup. ILO supported six workshops between January-June
2009 for IHNFA staff that offer care to child labor victims
as well as 17 educational workshops on child labor,
especially sexual exploitation, for university students,
government employees, police, and journalists. No
information was available on training offered after the June
coup.
2C, Section II: Forced Child Labor
-----------------------------------
¶1. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child/forced child
labor?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 1. The same
Honduran institutions are responsible for forced child labor
as are responsible for hazardous child labor.
¶2. If multiple agencies were responsible for enforcement,
were there mechanisms for exchanging information? Assess
their effectiveness.
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 2. The same
Honduran institutions are responsible for forced child labor
as are responsible for hazardous child labor and their
effectiveness in exchanging information on forced child labor
was the same for other child labor issues.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 006 OF 011
complaints about hazardous and forced child labor violations?
If so, how many complaints were received in the reporting
period?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 3. The same
complaint mechanism is in place for institutions that are
responsible for forced child labor as are responsible for
forced child labor as for other child labor issues.
¶4. What amount of funding was provided to agencies
responsible for inspections? Was this amount adequate? Did
inspectors have sufficient office facilities, transportation,
fuel, and other necessities to carry out inspections?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 4. The same
Honduran institutions are responsible for forced child labor
as are responsible for hazardous child labor.
¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ? Was the
number of inspectors adequate?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 5. The same
inspectors are responsible for forced child labor as are
responsible for hazardous child labor.
¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried
out? If possible, please provide breakdown of
complaint-driven versus random, government-initiated
inspections. Were inspections carried out in sectors in which
children work? Was the number of inspections adequate?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 6. There were
no known inspections in the formal work sector of alleged
forced child labor.
¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of
inspections? Were these children actually provided or
referred for services as a result (as opposed to simply
fired)?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 7. There were
no known inspections in the formal work sector of alleged
forced child labor.
¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened?
--The only known reports of forced child labor were those
cases that involved minors trafficked for sexual
exploitation. The office of the OSPC had 83 pending
investigations at the end of 2009 into allegations of
trafficking and sexual exploitation of children. The total
number of new cases opened in 2009 was not known.
¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved?
--According to the office of the OSPC, 10 cases of child
trafficking or sexual exploitation were closed in 2009.
¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached?
--According to the OSPC, 9 convictions were handed down in
cases for the crime of trafficking or commerical sexual
exploitation.
¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve
child labor cases?
--The OSPC reported that the length of time to resolve a
child trafficking case was between one and two years.
¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties
actually applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence
served? Did such sentences meet penalties established in the
law?
--In the cases in which violations were found, penalties were
applied, including fines and jail sentences.
¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above
reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor?
--The Public Ministry continued to investigate and prosecute
the only known reported forced child labor, that of
trafficking children for sexual exploitation. Through the
efforts of the Public Ministry and the National Plan Against
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 007 OF 011
the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, there was a
commitment by authorities to combat forced child labor in
Honduras. The number of cases brought to trial in 2009 was
consistent with the number processed in 2008 (ref D).
¶14. Did government offer any training for investigators or
others responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any)
impact have these trainings had?
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 14. The topic
of forced child labor was covered in many of the trainings
offered to labor inspectors and others that are responsible
for enforcement.
2D, Section I, II, and III: Child trafficking/Commercial
Sexual Exploitation of Children/ Use of Children in Illicit
Activities
---------------------------------
Note: the same institutions, investigators, and prosecutors
are assigned to cover child trafficking, commercial sexual
exploitation of children, and the use of children in illicit
activities. Responses to questions 1-14 have been combined
for Sections I, II, and III of 2D. End note.
¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel
dedicated to enforcement of child trafficking/CSEC/use of
children in illicit activities?
--The OSPC within the Public Ministry employed one
prosecutor, one assistant prosecutor, and four analysts
committed solely to the commercial sexual exploitation and
trafficking of minors. In approximately July 2009, the
Attorney General approved the consolidation of all
trafficking (children and adults) investigations under the
authority of the newly named "Unit to Combat Commercial
Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking" located within the OSPC.
The OSPC reported that an increase in staff could result in
speedier processing of child trafficking and CSEC cases.
--Honduras enacted in May 2008 a National Plan of Action to
Eradicate Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children. The
plan is meant to coordinate the efforts of various government
agencies. According to the OSPC, the technical council of
the Inter-Institutional Commission to Combat Commercial
Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Children, the entity
that oversees the national plan to combat CSES, met during
¶2009. The most recent meeting of the commission was held in
January 2010.
--The OSPC relied on national police to investigate
trafficking/CSEC/cases of children in illicit activities.
The OSPC reported that at times, there was difficulty in
obtaining an adequate amount of investigate support given
that the police investigators did not report directly to the
Public Ministry. OSPC told Poloff on January 19 that they
continued to support the creation of a proposed investigative
arm for the sole use of the Public Ministry.
¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for
investigating child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in
illicit activities? Was this amount adequate? Did
investigators have sufficient office facilities,
transportation, fuel, and other necessities to carry out
investigations?
--There was no information available on the level of funding
provided in this area. UNICEF assisted the OSPC by financing
four temporary lawyers to document and process cases
involving CSEC and trafficking. The OSPC reported in a
January 2010 report that this assistance was a "significant
advance" in their fight against CSEC and trafficking.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other
mechanism for reporting child trafficking/CSEC/use of
children in illicit activities violations? If so, how many
complaints were received in the reporting period?
--The national commission to eradicate CSEC worked in 2009
toward the creation of a national toll free telephone hotline
to report child trafficking, CSEC, and the use of children in
illicit activities. The hotline, which will be staffed by
police officers, was set to be launched in early 2010.
--In 2009, ILO launched an initiative with six of the primary
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 008 OF 011
unions in Honduras in which the regional offices of those
unions create a network to advocate for the eradication of
commercial sexual exploitation of children as well as provide
a location to facilitate the filing of violations with the
OSPC. The program is called the Worker's Commissioner for
the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labor and Commercial
Sexual Exploitation. The program included the following
unions: Unitarian Workers Confederation of Honduras (CUTH),
General Workers Confederation (CGT), Honduras Worker's
Confederation (CTH), Union Coordinator of Banana and
Agro-Industrial Workers (COSIBAH), Council of Farmers'
Organizations (COCOCH), and National Council of Farmers (CNC).
¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to child
trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? Was
the number of investigations adequate?
--In March, IHNFA reported to "La Tribuna" newspaper that
they estimated 12,000 minors are victims of commercial sexual
exploitation in Honduras. In September, Casa Alianza Director
Manuel Capellin reported to local press that they estimated
at least 10,000 minors are victims of commercial sexual
exploitation.
--The OSPC reported that during 2009, their office received
53 complaints of trafficking or CSEC. There was no
information available on the breakdown between trafficking
and CSEC.
¶5. How many children were rescued as a result?
--ILO reported that Casa Alianza, in coordination with IHNFA,
removed and assisted 168 children from situations of
trafficking and CSEC.
¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions
carried out?
--According to the OSPC, 26 cases went to trial for CSEC or
trafficking during 2009.
¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved?
-The OSPC reported that 10 cases were closed. 3 cases were
for charges of CSEC, 3 cases were for charges of trafficking
of minors, and four cases were for related charges such as
child pornography.
¶8. How many convictions?
--The OSPC reported that of the 10 cases closed, 8 resulted
in convictions.
¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the
legal framework?
--Yes. The sentences imposed ranged from 3-18 years in
prison.
¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served?
--There was no information available that suggested the
sentences imposed were not served.
¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve
cases of child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit
activities?
--As with other child labor cases, the OSPC estimated that
cases take between 1 and 2 years to reach a conclusion.
¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators
or others responsible for enforcement of child
trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? If
so, what was the impact (if any) of these trainings?
--On March 5, INHFA held a training for members of the Public
Prosecutor's office, police officials, and members of various
NGOs to discuss a new manual that outlines proper attention
to trafficking victims of commercial sexual exploitation.
The OSPC reported that with the support of UNICEF, their
office held 8 trainings for those involved in enforcing laws
against CSEC and civil society representatives. The OSPC
reported holding 217 "collateral activities" dealing with
CSEC and trafficking of children. These activities included
TEGUCIGALP 00000117 009 OF 011
inter-institutional meetings and trainings, speakers hosted
by educational centers and civil society groups and other
activities to promote the rights of children. In addition,
the Special Prosecutor for Children, Nora Urbina, attended
various international trainings on the topic of trafficking
and CSEC during 2009.
¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict
during the reporting period or in the recent past involving
the use of child soldiers, what actions were taken to
penalize those responsible? Were these actions adequate or
meaningful given the situation?
--This question is not applicable to Honduras.
2E: GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR:
--------------------------------------
¶1. Did the government have a policy or plan that specifically
addresses exploitive child labor? Please describe.
--Please see 2 C, Section I, questions 1 and 2. Exploitive
child labor policies are covered by the same institutions and
policies that combat child labor in all its forms,
trafficking, and CSEC.
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate exploitive child
labor specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty
reduction, development, educational or other social policies,
such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, etc? Please
describe.
--The national plan to eradicate child labor charges various
ministries of the government, for example IHNFA, to
incorporate child labor issues in the various social policies
administered by the government. However, the 28-year "Vision
of the Country" strategy document approved by the National
Congress on January 13, 2010 does not include reference to
child labor, trafficking, or CSEC. The most recent poverty
reduction strategy paper remained in draft form at the end of
2009, but included sections on child labor.
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the plans described
above? Please describe the amount and whether it was
sufficient to carry out the planned activities.
--The administration of President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya,
who was removed from power by the June 28 coup d'etat, never
submitted a 2009 budget. The de facto regime that took power
after the coup hastily put together a budget based on the
2008 budget (ref A). The NPECL proposed funding in 2009 of
15,667,442 Lempiras (approximately USD 824,602) for various
government ministries to carry out specific activities to
combat child labor. The budget passed by the de facto regime
after the June 2009 coup did not contain a line item
specifically funding the NPECL. The institutions that carry
out the NPECL were funded in the July 2009 budget; however,
the individual budgets of these institutions were not
available.
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child
labor plans? Please describe.
--The government before the June coup provided human
resource, technical expertise, and other non-monetary support
for child labor plans. It appeared that the issue of child
labor remained a concern at the working level following the
June coup.
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and
effectiveness of the government's policies or plans during
the reporting period in regard to exploitive child labor.
--Please see 2 B, question 2.
¶6. Did the government participate in any commissions or task
forces regarding exploitive child labor? Was the commission
active and/or effective?
--The Congressional Commission of the Family and Child, led
by Congresswoman Marcia Facusse de Villeda until January 27,
is charged with legislative proposals dealing with exploitive
child labor. Due to the Department's no contact policy after
the June coup, the activities of this commission were not
known in 2009, but post understands that Congresswoman
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Facusse was active in the Inter-Institutional Commission to
Combat Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of
Children.
--Please see above reference to the various commissions that
the government participated in that deal with child labor.
Given the political crisis before and following the June
coup, these commissions were less active in 2009 than in
previous years.
¶7. Did the government sign a bilateral, regional or
international agreement to combat trafficking?
--There were no new agreements to combat trafficking in 2009.
OSPC reported better cooperation with prosecutors and
immigration authorities in neighboring countries on cases of
trans-national trafficking.
2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE OR PREVENT CHILD LABOR:
--------------------
¶1. Did the government implement any programs specifically to
address the worst forms of child labor? Please describe.
--The approach of the government was to partner with NGOs to
combat child labor. For example, on May 18, the Ministries
of Governance and Security and the Public Ministry signed
memorandums of understanding with NGO Save the Children to
work together through workshops and information sharing to
combat child labor and the trafficking of children. In
April, the Health and Education Ministries working with the
Catholic Church and other NGOs worked to place 40 children in
school who had previously worked selling tortillas in the
streets of Juticalpa, Olancho.
--There were no new "social programs" to prevent Child Labor
in 2009.
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate child labor
specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty
reduction, development, educational or other social programs,
such as conditional cash transfer programs or eligibility for
school meals, etc? Please describe.
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 2.
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the programs
described above? Please describe amount and whether it was
sufficient to carry out the planned activities.
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 3.
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child
labor programs? Please describe.
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 4.
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and
effectiveness of the government's activities during the
reporting period in relation to the programs described above.
If the programs involved government provision of social
services to children at risk of or involved in exploitive
child labor, please describe and assess the effectiveness of
these services.
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 5.
¶6. If the government signed one or more bilateral, regional
or international agreement/s to combat trafficking, what
steps did it take to implement such agreement/s? Did the
agreement/s result in tangible improvements? If so, please
describe.
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 7.
2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS
----------------------
¶1. Considering the information provided to the questions
above, please provide an assessment of whether, overall, the
government made progress in regard to combating exploitive
child labor during the reporting period.
--Honduras continued to combat child labor during 2009.
Information was unavailable about the exact number of
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inspections of child labor violations nation-wide, so it is
not possible to compare this number to 2008 levels. In
comparison to 2008, the MOL appears to have made progress in
the enforcement of child labor laws based on sanctions they
applied to six companies for child labor violations. The MOL
fell short in not passing the cases to the Public Ministry
for prosecution, and instead relied on probation periods and
fines to enforce anti-child labor laws.
--Due to the political crisis, it is difficult to evaluate
the government's commitment to taking actions outlined in the
national plan to eradicate child labor. It appears that at a
working level, NGOs, international organizations, and
agencies operating under the de facto regime continued to
follow the national plans to eradicate child labor, CSEC, and
child trafficking. However, it does not appear that any
great strides were made to fully fund the programs in place
to eradicate child labor in Honduras.
LLORENS