Second-guessing second-guessed

Michael Rubin argues, convincingly I think, that the “Fallujah experiment” has failed and should be put to an end. As Rubin explains: “Former Iraqi army officers have failed in their promise to apprehend those guilty of the mutilation of four American civilian contractors on March 31. Rather than expel foreign fighters, the Fallujah Brigade protects them. The Brigade has also not affected the surrender of heavy weapons. Meanwhile, free from the pressure of the siege, insurgents in Fallujah have regrouped, reequipped, and reorganized in the run-up to the June 30 transfer of sovereignty.”
Rubin also argues that failure of the Baathist generals to promote our goals in Fallujah undercuts the conventional wisdom that it was a mistake to dissolve the Iraqi military. It seems to me that our success in the Shiite south may also undercut that “wisdom.” For I question whether the Shiite uprising would have petered out as it has if Sunni Baathists were in charge of an Iraqi army.