Attorney General Charles
M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and
Solicitor C. Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for respondent.

________

GOOLSBY, J.: Angelo
Muldrow appeals his conviction for armed robbery. He argues the court erred
in denying his directed verdict motion because the evidence failed to show that
he was "armed" while allegedly committing a robbery. We affirm.

FACTS

On January 4, 1997, a man walked
into the Carolina Shell Station in Kingstree and asked the store clerk for a
pack of cigarettes. When the clerk retrieved the cigarettes, the man "flashed
a note" at her that read "give me all your cash or I'll shoot you." The clerk
asked the man if he was serious, and he said "yes," that he was not "B.S.ing,"
and to "hurry up and give [him] the money before he shot [her]." The clerk opened
the cash register and gave him the money. As the man was leaving the store,
he told her that if she called the police, he "was coming back for [her]." At
no time during the robbery did the man display a weapon. Muldrow was subsequently
arrested and indicted for armed robbery.

Following the prosecution's case
at trial, Muldrow moved for a directed verdict. The trial judge denied the motion.
A jury convicted Muldrow of armed robbery, and the judge sentenced him to thirty
years imprisonment.

LAW/ANALYSIS

When reviewing the denial of a directed
verdict motion in a criminal case, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State.(1) In doing so, we are
concerned with the existence of the evidence and not its weight.(2)

Muldrow argues the trial judge erred
in denying his directed verdict motion because the State's evidence failed to
show either that he was armed with a deadly weapon or that he used a representation
of a deadly weapon or any object that a person during the commission of the
robbery reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon. We disagree.

South Carolina Code Section 16-11-330(A)
states a person is guilty of armed robbery if he or she commits robbery "while
alleging, either by action or words, he was armed while using a representation
of a deadly weapon or any object which a person present during the commission
of the robbery reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon . . . ."(3)

Muldrow argues the State only proved
that he alleged he was armed, not that he did so while using a representation
of a deadly weapon.(4) We disagree.

Muldrow's interpretation of the statute
is unduly narrow. He would require the phrase "representation of a deadly weapon"
to be an object that one present during the commission of the robbery reasonably
believed to be a deadly weapon. The statute does not so read; instead, it requires
either that the robber allege he or she was armed while using a representation
of a deadly weapon or that the robber allege he or she was armed while
using any object that a person present during the robbery reasonably believed
to be a deadly weapon. The statute does not require that the "representation
of a deadly weapon" also be an object that a person present during the commission
of a robbery would reasonably believe to be a deadly weapon. Such a requirement
would render the phrase "representation of a deadly weapon" surplusage.(5)

We hold the phrase "representation
of a deadly weapon" includes words that convey to a victim the thought that
a robber possesses a deadly weapon.(6) Here,
Muldrow's note and his words conveyed the thought that he was in fact armed
and capable of fulfilling his promise to shoot the clerk if she did not comply
with his demand for money. Indeed, the store clerk obviously believed Muldrow's
representation because she gave him the money that he demanded.

AFFIRMED.

HOWARD, J., concurs.

MOREHEAD, A.J., dissents
in a separate opinion.

MOREHEAD, A.J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion correctly states, a person is
guilty of armed robbery if he commits robbery "while alleging, either by action
or words, he was armed while using a representation of a deadly weapon or any
object which a person present during the commission of the robbery reasonably
believed to be a deadly weapon." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (Supp. 1999).
The statute requires the robber to allege he is armed by action or words and,
separately, to use either a representation of a deadly weapon or an object one
could reasonably believe to be a deadly weapon.

The majority asserts that, by orally
threatening to shoot the clerk, Muldrow alleged he was armed and, by presenting
the written note, Muldrow used a representation of a deadly weapon. I disagree.
I believe the note was a mere allegation that Muldrow was armed rather than
a representation of a deadly weapon. What if an unarmed robber enters a store
and twice orally threatens to shoot the clerk without doing anything more? In
that situation, clearly he is not guilty of armed robbery. I find it difficult
to distinguish between that hypothetical situation and Muldrow's situation.

The statute is stretched too far
by allowing a written note to be a representation of a deadly weapon. I do not
believe a mere statement, written or oral, can be a representation of a deadly
weapon. SeeScott v. State, 334 S.C. 248, 513 S.E.2d 100 (1999)
(penal statutes should be strictly construed against the State and in favor
of the defendant).

I also do not believe a representation
of a deadly weapon requires the presentation of an object, as asserted by Muldrow.
There are circumstances under which a robber could represent that he had a deadly
weapon without using an object. If Muldrow had patted his hip pocket while threatening
to shoot the clerk, there would be evidence he was guilty of armed robbery.
Under those circumstances, patting the hip pocket would be a representation
but not an object.

While I believe Muldrow was guilty
of robbery, I cannot agree Muldrow was guilty of armed robbery in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority's interpretation
of the armed robbery statute.

4. SeeState v. Gourdine, 322 S.C. 396, 399 n.1, 472 S.E.2d 241, 242 n.1 (1996)
(noting the amendment to the statute requires that the robber allege he was
armed while using a representation of a deadly weapon).

6. A "representation"
has been defined as "a presentation to the mind in the form of an idea or image;
a visual or tangible rendering of someone or something." See Dictionary.com
(visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=representation>.