Respondent was suspended for 90 days in an earlier case (DP
66/85). The two formal complaints in these consolidated cases
allege, among other things, that respondent continued to practice
during that suspension. The hearing panel found that respondent
committed misconduct, and entered an order suspending him for 180
days. We affirm.

I. Facts.

A. Grievance Administrator v Patmon, No DP
66/85.

On December 28, 1989, a hearing panel found that Mr. Patmon
had committed misconduct (failing to return money given to him by
his client, James DelRio, which was intended for investment in a
limited partnership). The panel suspended respondent for 90 days.
Respondent petitioned for review and the Board affirmed.
Respondent then sought leave to appeal from the Michigan Supreme
Court. Leave was denied in an order dated May 31, 1991 (S Ct No
89921).

When the Supreme Court order was issued, respondent was
representing a client in a Wayne County Circuit Court action
captioned Edward J. Holland, Jr. v Jobete Music Co, Inc,
et al, No 88-815355-CK. Respondent was also representing a client
named Avis Holmes in a case before the Michigan Court of Appeals.

On June 6, 1991, respondent filed a motion with the Michigan
Supreme Court entitled: "Respondent/Appellant’s Motion for
Stay of Discipline And Order of 5/31/91, Pending Filing of and
Decision on, Motion for Reconsideration and Pending Appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court." In orders dated August 5, 1991, the
Michigan Supreme Court denied respondent’s motion for stay, and
his motion for reconsideration.

Also on June 6, 1991, this Board sent a standard letter
(enclosing respondent’s order of discipline) to various courts,
agencies, and bar associations, notifying the recipients of the
suspension. A copy was sent to respondent and his counsel.
Respondent’s counsel replied to this notice in a letter dated
June 11, 1991. The June 11, 1991 letter claims that "the
Supreme Court’s order of 5/31/91 has not become effective,"
citing MCR 7.313(D) and (E). The letter also states: "As
soon as Respondent received notice of the Supreme Court’s order
of 5/31/91, an appropriate motion for stay was filed . . .
."

B. Grievance Administrator v Patmon, No.
93-47-GA.

The First Amended Formal Complaint in the case numbered
93-47-GA alleges that respondent "failed to notify opposing
counsel or the tribunal, in the Holland v Jobete
case, that his license to practice law had been suspended"
(& 13[b]). The complaint also alleges that respondent
continued to practice law and to hold himself out as a licensed
Michigan attorney, after the effective date of the Order of
Suspension, in that on the dates of June 12, 14, 17-21, 1991, he
appeared in the State of California, without a license to
practice law in that state . . . and deposed certain witnesses on
Mr. Holland’s behalf in the Holland v Jobete
litigation. [& 13(c).]

The hearing panel found that these allegations were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence and that these acts violated
several rules.

The record reflects that the defendants in Holland v Jobete
were represented by attorneys James Vlasic and David Nelson. They
testified before the panel that respondent deposed certain
witnesses in California on June 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21,
1991 (Tr 5/10/95, pp 21, 66-67). They learned that respondent had
been suspended effective May 31, 1991, according to a notice in
Michigan Lawyer’s Weekly (part of Respondent’s exhibit 2). They
wrote to the State Bar of Michigan for an ethics opinion, and
received one telling them that they had a duty to report
respondent’s conduct (id.). On October 4, 1991, they
reported the conduct to the Attorney Grievance Commission,
attaching pages from the deposition transcripts (id.).
Both Vlasic and Nelson testified that they received no notice
from respondent regarding his suspension (Tr 5/10/95, pp 24, 69).
Respondent did not testify.

C. Grievance Administrator v Patmon, No
94-157-GA.

The formal complaint in case 94-157-GA contains the following
allegations, which the panel found were sustained by a
preponderance of the evidence and were grounds for discipline:

Respondent violated his duties and responsibilities in that he
continued to hold himself out as an attorney and to practice law
during his suspension and to otherwise violate the terms of the
Order of Discipline, as follows:

a) He failed to remove himself as an attorney of record for the
plaintiff in Holmes v National Union Fire Insurance Company,
et al, Court of Appeals Case No. 117857;

b) He failed to notify the tribunal and the opposing party of his
suspension in the Holmes case or to advise the tribunal by
written notice, of his disqualification from the practice of law;

* * *

d) During the period of suspension he continued to file, or cause
to be filed, pleadings on behalf of the plaintiff in the Holmes
appeal; . . . [Formal Complaint, &14.]

Petitioner’s exhibit #9 is a certified copy of a document
entitled "Reply to Answer of Defendants-Appellees to
Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing." It was signed
by respondent and was filed with the Michigan Court of Appeals on
June 11, 1991, in the Avis Holmes v NUFIC case.

Attorney John Jacobs was respondent’s opposing counsel in Holmes
v NUFIC. Respondent also named him as a defendant in the
case. Jacobs testified that he never received a notice from
respondent indicating that he was suspended. (11/2/95 Tr, p 67.)

Petitioner’s exhibit 10 is a certified copy of the docket entries
by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Holmes v NUFIC. It
contains no indication that respondent notified the Court of his
disqualification to practice law, or that he removed himself as
attorney of record. Respondent introduced no evidence to rebut
these allegations.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Propriety of the Panel’s
Legal Conclusions.

Respondent asserts generally that the Grievance Administrator
did not meet his burden of proof. See Respondent’s Brief, p 12
(citing to "[e]ntire record"). Respondent also makes
more specific arguments.

First, respondent asserts that "the AGC presented no
evidence to show that John Jacobs was an opposing party."
This is simply incorrect. Petitioner’s exhibit #10 lists Mr.
Jacobs as a party to the appeal, with the designation DF-AE
(defendant-appellee). Petitioner’s exhibit #12 contains the
Court’s opinion which expressly states that Mr. Jacobs was named
as a defendant. Holmes v NUFIC, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided April 25, 1991 (Docket No
117857), p 1. Moreover, Mr. Jacobs testified to this fact.

Respondent raises other spurious arguments in this regard, only
two of which we shall address.

Respondent apparently argues the panel incorrectly found that he
filed a "pleading" in the Holmes appeal after he was
suspended, and/or that the complaint failed to give him notice of
the charges. It is true that while most lawyers use the term
"pleading" in a generic sense to refer to most papers
filed with courts, the definition of pleading contained in MCR
2.110(A) does not include briefs, or a response to a motion or a
reply thereto. But, respondent’s overly literal argument is
without merit. It misses the clear import of the charge in
paragraph 14 of case 94-157′s formal complaint — respondent
continued to represent a client in the Court of Appeals after his
suspension became effective. The complaint (quoted above)
effectively informed respondent of the charge against him and in
no way prejudiced his opportunity to defend himself adequately. Grievance
Administrator v Crane and Roth, 400 Mich 484; 255 NW2d 624
(1977).

Respondent also points out that Vlasic was not an opposing party
in the Holland v Jobete case. Apparently, respondent
contends that he had no duty to notify opposing counsel (Vlasic)
of his disqualification from the practice of law, and, therefore,
that the panel erred in finding misconduct on the charge that
respondent "failed to notify opposing counsel . . . in the Holland
v Jobete case." (Case no. 93-47-GA, & 13[b].) A
suspended attorney is required in litigated matters to "file
with the tribunal and all parties a notice of the attorney’s
disqualification from the practice of law." MCR 9.119(B).
Except in certain enumerated circumstances not applicable here,
"[s]ervice required or permitted to be made on a party for
whom an attorney has appeared in [an] action must be made on the
attorney . . . ." MCR 2.107(B).

In sum, respondent can offer nothing to factually challenge the
charges that he continued to hold himself out as an attorney and
practice law while suspended. With respect to case 93-47-GA, we
find ample evidentiary support for the panel’s conclusion that
respondent violated MCR 9.104(1), (4), (8), and (9). We also find
ample evidentiary support, in case 94-157-GA, for the panel’s
conclusion that respondent violated MCR 9.104(1), (4), (8), and
(9), as well as MRPC 3.4(c) and MCR 9.119.

In addition to respondent’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, respondent argues that he was not really suspended at
the time he conducted the depositions in Holland v Jobete
and filed the reply to an answer to his motion for rehearing in
the Holmes v NUFIC appeal.

III. The "continuing automatic stay" issue.

Respondent argues that the order of discipline in the
underlying case was not effective until 21 days after the
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on May 31, 1991.
Respondent argues that the panel erred in concluding otherwise.
We disagree. Although the law is clear and well-settled, we
address this issue at some length because it relates to some of
respondent’s primary claims on review.

A.

Respondent asks this Board to adopt the conclusion set forth
at the first full paragraph on page 8 of his brief:

Respondent submits that the proceedings in DP 66/85 were stayed
by ADB final order of 8/14/90, upon entry of the Mich S Ct order
of 5/31/91: (1) by operation of MCR 9.122(C) 21 days after the
"conclusion of [Respondent's] appeal or further order of the
Supreme Court" (which didn’t occur before 6/21/91); and/or
(2) until 21 days after the conclusion of Respondent’s appeal, or
alternatively, at the least, until 21 days after 5/31/91, by
continuation of the automatic stay provisions of MCR 9.115(J)(3)
– MCR 9.118(D) — MCR 9.122(C).

MCR 9.115(J)(3) provides that: "The order of discipline
shall take effect 21 days after it is served on the respondent
unless the panel finds good cause for the order to take effect on
a different date . . . ." Similarly, MCR 9.118(D), which
applies after this Board has conducted its review, provides that:
"A discipline order is not effective until 21 days after it
is served on the respondent unless the board finds good cause for
the order to take effect earlier." These rules do not afford
respondent a stay after the Michigan Supreme Court has denied
leave to appeal, nor does the rule which expressly governs in
that situation (MCR 9.122).

When respondent filed an application for leave to appeal from the
Board’s decision, he was entitled to a stay under MCR
9.122 which provides in pertinent part:

(C) Stay of Order. If the discipline order is a suspension
of 179 [119 at the time of respondent's suspension] days or less,
a stay of the order will automatically issue on the timely filing
of anappeal by the respondent. The stay remains
effective until conclusion oftheappeal or further order of the Supreme Court.
The respondent may petition the Supreme Court for a stay pending
appeal of other orders of the board. [Emphasis added.]

In addition to MCR 9.122(C), other rules make it clear that the
stay ended when the order denying leave to appeal was entered.
See MCR 7.313(E) ("The filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not stay the effect of the order addressed
in the motion."); MCR 7.317(D) ("Unless otherwise
stated, an order or judgment is effective the date it is
entered."). See also, Eston v Van Bolt, 728 F Supp
1336, 1340-1341 (WD Mich, 1989) (attorney not deprived of due
process when additional discipline proceedings commenced for
practicing while suspended; attorney knew or should have known
that stay of initial suspension was dissolved upon entry of
Michigan Supreme Court’s order denying application for leave to
appeal).

B.

Respondent subpoenaed Corbin Davis, Clerk of the
Michigan Supreme Court, and John Van Bolt, Executive Director of
the Attorney Discipline Board, and questioned them as to their
understanding of the effect of the Court’s May 31, 1991 order
denying respondent leave to appeal. He now argues that the
panel’s admission of the testimony was "highly prejudicial
and egregiously erroneous." We disagree.

First, this argument is not preserved for appeal. MRE 103(a)(1).
Second, a review of the record shows that the panel was aware of
its responsibility to find and interpret the law. Compare Grievance
Administrator v Dennis M. Hurst, No 95-32-GA (ADB 1996)
(rejecting Administrator’s claim that admission of expert legal
testimony required reversal). Finally, the panel reached the
correct legal conclusion.

This case does not present a novel question. This Board has
previously rejected the argument advanced by respondent here. In Grievance
Administrator v Hubert J. Morton, Jr., DP 135/86 (ADB 1988),
we explained in detail the effect of the rules under similar
circumstances:

Both parties filed timely applications for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court and it is agreed by both parties that the
suspension of the respondent’s license was stayed while the
appeals were pending. On March 5, 1986, the Supreme Court entered
an order denying application for leave but, without further
comment, increasing the respondent’s suspension from sixty to
ninety days. Mr. Morton acknowledges receiving that order within
a day or two and he concedes that he performed legal services on
March 7, 10 and 11. His defense rests on the argument that the
automatic stay of discipline remained in effect after the Court
denied his application for leave to appeal and he
"assumed" that his filing of a motion for
reconsideration on March 26, 1986 created a further automatic
stay.

We affirm the panel’s ruling that the respondent had no
reasonable grounds for making such an assumption. The Court Rules
dealing with practice before the Supreme Court are clear. A
motion for rehearing of an "opinion" results in a stay
in accordance with MCR 7.313(D)(2). A motion for reconsideration
of an "order" filed under MCR 7.313(E) does not create
a stay.

The respondent testified that he thought that motions for
rehearing or reconsideration were basically the same thing and he
assumed that the difference was just a matter of semantics. (Hrg.
6/25/87 Tr. p 45) In fact, the label placed by respondent on his
subsequent motion was not determinative. The order issued by the
Supreme Court on March 5, 1986 was clearly not an opinion as
defined by MCR 7.317(A). Just as clearly, it was an order which
was effective on the date it was entered [MCR 7.317(D)] and the
filing of respondent’s subsequent motion did not stay the effect
of the order [MCR 7.313(E)].

We affirm the panel’s legal conclusion and reiterate our own. The
May 31, 1991 order denying leave to appeal was effective upon
entry. Respondent’s suspension became effective on that date.

This is not a case where respondent’s application was denied on
day 1, he practiced on day 2, and received the order denying
leave on day 3. Respondent’s actual notice of the Court’s order
is established by, among other things, his motion for
reconsideration and stay (Petitioner’s Exhibit #5), and is not
contested.

This is also not a case where respondent forthrightly moved for a
stay on the grounds that he needed more time to wind up his
practice. Rather, in the motion for reconsideration he filed with
the Court (see Petitioner’s Exhibit #5), respondent simply relied
on the manifestly erroneous argument that a stay remained in
place. We conclude that he knew or clearly should have known that
"the stay of his [90 day suspension in case No DP 66/85] was
dissolved upon the entry of the [Michigan] Supreme Court’s order
denying application for leave to appeal." Eston, 728
F Supp at 1342-1341.

C.

Finally, with regard to respondent’s continuing stay
argument, we are compelled to address the following portion of
respondent’s brief in support of his petition for review:

In 6/91, when VanBolt fashioned, authored and withheld mailing of
his letter dated 6/17/91 (Resp Exh 3) until 6/21/91, he did so to
give effect to the ADB’s construction and recognition of the
general 21-day rule under MCR 9.115(J)(3) or MCR 9.122(C).
(VanBolt, 5/10/95, TR 138-146.) [Respondent's brief, pp 6-7.]

Respondent cites to pages 138-146 of the May 10, 1995 transcript,
and to Respondent’s exhibit #3, for the proposition that this
Board considered respondent’s suspension to be effective 21 days
after the Court had denied leave. Neither supports this claim.

The testimony clearly establishes that the exhibit is a form
letter which is sent to suspended attorneys who have not filed
affidavits of compliance under MCR 9.119. That rule requires such
attorneys to notify tribunals, clients, and others of the
suspension within 14 days after the effective date of the
order of discipline. Thus, the very fact that such a letter was
sent, proves that the effective date was prior to the date of the
letter (June 17, 1995). The letter itself bears this out.

Respondent’s Exhibit #3 states that it is regarding
"Non-compliance with . . . MCR 9.119," and references
case No DP 66/85. The body of the letter goes into detail about
the notices required and the affidavit demonstrating compliance
with the rule which must be filed with the Board. The first
sentence of the letter is significant:

The Order of Discipline which became effective in this matter
on May 31, 1991 contained a provision in accordance with MCR
9.119(C) requiring that an Affidavit of Compliance be filed . . .
within fourteen (14) days of the effective date of the Order.
[Respondent's Exhibit #3.]

No reasonable person could read this exhibit as supporting the
claim that the effective date of the order of discipline was
other than May 31, 1991. This argument is utterly devoid of
merit.

Elsewhere in his brief, respondent asserts that he is being
disciplined for exercising his right of access to the courts, and
his right to self representation. We can only assume that this is
a reference to his appeal, in the Holmes v NUFIC
litigation, from the circuit court’s order sanctioning him for
knowing violation of MCR 2.113(C)(2) and 8.111(D)(3) (requiring
counsel filing a complaint to notify the court of other actions
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence). This claim
lacks merit.

While respondent may have been entitled to appeal an award of
sanctions against him, that was not the basis of the panel’s
order of discipline. Rather, respondent was disciplined for
filing a paper entitled "Reply to Answer of
Defendants-Appellees to Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for
Rehearing" on his client’s behalf while he was suspended
from the practice of law. The Reply commences with the statement:
"Now comes Plaintiff-Appellant, and submits her reply
. . ." (emphasis added). It addresses the arguments raised
on the client’s behalf (propriety of lower court’s reassignment
and ultimate dismissal of the case), not simply the award of
sanctions against respondent. (See Petitioner’s Exhibit #9.)

V. Jurisdiction of the Board and Hearing Panels.

Respondent apparently argues that the disciplinary system
established by subchapter 9.100 of the Michigan Court Rules may
violate due process. Although the argument is not clearly
presented, it is implied in respondent’s citation to the federal
district court opinion in Fieger v Thomas, 872 F Supp 377
(ED Mich, 1994), remanded with instructions to dismiss, 74 F 3d
740 (CA 6, 1996).

To the extent that respondent argues that he is entitled to have
all discipline proceedings conducted by a "court," he
has abandoned this argument by failing to cite applicable
authority. Moreover, it has been held that the Michigan
disciplinary system does not offend due process. Grievance
Administrator v Tucker, 94-12-GA (ADB 1995), lv den 449 Mich
1206 (1995). See also Fieger v Thomas, 74 F 3d 740, 749
(CA 6, 1996) (provision for appeal by leave satisfies the
requirement that there be an adequate opportunity to raise
constitutional challenges in state proceedings before a federal
court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction).

Similar claims relying on state law have also been rejected by
the federal courts. See Ortman v Thomas, 99 F 3d 807 (CA
6, 1996). In Ortman, the Sixth Circuit considered the
argument "that the Michigan attorney discipline system is
unconstitutional because the Michigan Constitution prohibits
delegation of judicial power." Ortman, 99 F 3d at
811. The Court found the argument to be "patently
meritless." Id.

VI. Disqualification & other issues.

Throughout these proceedings, respondent has asserted that
various entities or individuals are out to get him. While his
frivolous tactics must try the patience of everyone, there is no
credible evidence for the claim that any disciplinary agency,
member, panelist, or employee is biased or has acted improperly.
Although respondent needlessly prolonged these proceedings with
baseless legal and factual contentions, we conclude that the
panel acted fairly and impartially in its rulings and report.

Respondent filed several motions to disqualify hearing panel
members. The motions were denied by the Board Chairperson.
Respondent also filed motions to disqualify the Board
Chairperson. These motions were also denied. The motions to
disqualify were, without exception, baseless. They were properly
denied.

We find no merit to any of the remaining issues raised by
respondent.

VII.Level of Discipline.

Respondent argues that any misconduct he may have committed
was de minimis. We do not agree.

At the hearing on discipline, the Grievance Administrator cited
ABA Standard 8.1 for the proposition that disbarment is
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a discipline order
causing harm or potential harm to a client, the public, legal
system, or profession. As to harm, the Grievance Administrator
pointed out that then-circuit Judge White suppressed the
depositions conducted by respondent in Holland v Jobete.

Respondent’s counsel argued:

There’s no evidence in this record . . . that there was any harm
to any client, that there was any harm to the public. There’s no
evidence of any intentional or conscious misconduct on Mr.
Patmon’s part, and we’ve argued the good faith position, and when
you really boil it down in terms of mitigation, it’s our position
that the alleged conduct was de minimis. It wasn’t a long, drawn
[out] practice kind of thing, and you’re talking about a period
between June the 11th of ’91 and June 21st ’91. That’s the window
of misconduct. [Tr 9/12/96, pp 50-51.]

By suspending respondent for 180 days, the minimum period
triggering reinstatement proceedings under MCR 9.123(B) and MCR
9.124, the panel impliedly rejected respondent’s "good faith
position." We agree that there is ample evidentiary support
for the finding that respondent’s violation of the order of
discipline in case DP 66/85 was intentional.

Respondent’s de minimis argument is at odds with our prior
pronouncements in this area. Disregard of an order of discipline
"is a very serious offense that strikes at the very heart of
the Supreme Court’s effort to protect the public." Grievance
Administrator v Phillip E. Smith, Nos. DP 123/82, DP 65/82
(ADB 1983). The panel’s imposition of a 180-day suspension
requires respondent to establish his fitness in reinstatement
proceedings, and is in no way excessive.

VIII. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the hearing
panel’s order of discipline.