The documents made public in the Delaware shareholder derivative case against Massey Energy management provide an incredible glimpse inside Massey. It’s likely that the records currently being held under seal by West Virginia’s Supreme Court are even more fascinating and important — for understanding how the coal industry works and how the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster could happen.

In a further effort to address violations at Massey’s operations, the Board and management enlisted the help of a third-party auditing firm, Pavlovich & Associates, to conduct safety audits of individual mines and make recommendations on how to address issues identified during those audits.

Specifically, Pavlovich was asked to focus its attention on “target mines” based on their above-average volume of violations incurred and/or injuries suffered, which included the Tiller No. 1, Ruby Energy and UBB mines.

For those who don’t know … Pavlovich & Associates is my old buddy Joe Pavlovich, a longtime and fairly well respected former MSHA official who also served on the McAteer teams that investigated the Sago Mine Disaster and the Aracoma Alma No.1 Mine fire.

When he examined the Upper Big Branch Mine (prior to the disaster), Joe P. found, according to Massey’s own legal brief:

… A need for improved rock dust application at certain mines, including in certain areas of UBB.

Now, the Massey brief explains that the board of directors was informed that “remedial action” had been taken including the deployment of “additional pod and sling dusters and re-emphasis of existing rock dusting policies and regulatory requirements.”

Two years before the Upper Big Branch Mine blew up, miner Nathaniel Jeter complained to Performance Coal Co. President Chris Blanchard about the condition of the mine’s track-mounted rock-dusting machine.

“I said to him, ‘Well, when are they going to get that track duster fixed?'” Jeter told investigators. “He said, ‘Track duster? I didn’t know we had a track duster.’

“I said, ‘Well, yeah. We need to get that fixed.’ He said, ‘Well, I’ll look into it.'” Jeter said. “So they had a write-up for it, all the parts and everything, but it never left the mines.”

Rock-dusting is the industry term for spreading large amounts of crushed limestone on mine floors, walls and other surfaces. For more than a century, it’s been understood that proper rock dusting in underground mines can prevent coal-dust explosions.

“Efficient use of a track duster in a mine the size of Upper Big Branch would have required drilling a borehole midway in the mine and not far from the working sections,” the report said. “This would have allowed a speedy delivery of bulk rock dust to refill the tank dusters.”

Upper Big Branch had no such borehole. The mine had just one crew assigned to rock-dusting duties. And the equipment they had never seemed to work properly.

“Sometimes it would clog up, so we would have to spend 30 minutes trying to unclog the hoses to get dusted,” Jeter said, describing the orange rock-dusting machine. “Then it would clog up again.”

Records uncovered by investigators indicated the orange duster was at least 25 years old, and had not been reconditioned for at lest seven years.

After the explosion, when Massey employees tried to start up the duster for MSHA-required tests, the motor burned up.

Investigators found another duster parked in the mine shop. It was tagged “out of service,” and had been stripped down to its frame for parts.

MSHA is worthless, our state inspectors are perfectly capable. We do not need a federal regulatory agency in our industry. It is common knowledge that mines tend to blow up, and sometimes cave in. It is an occupational hazard. People go into mining knowing it is dangerous. UBB was a freak accident. MSHA specifically “picks” on Massey, and harasses its employees daily. To the stock holders… let it go, the merger is a great thing.

Ken, Your post is a sad comentary on the safety issues of the coal industry.
But what is really sad is the condition ( pictures) of the equipment that a small crew had to use to protect their fellow workers in that mine.

I don’t share the assessment that MSHA is “worthless.” If the state inspectors are so capable, why did they not address some of these problems in Ken Ward’s reporting? And obviously mines DO need some type of regulatory agency. I mead don’t you want the FDA inspecting meat your family eats? Regulation should be effective and accountable; they owe it to the miners. All the miners I know and work with and for would not want to see the end of MSHA or any mine safety agency. Great reporting; All this series has gone straight to the point. I hope that miners continue to post. Thanks.

It was Joe Pavlovich and Earnie Teaster who wrote about MSHA’s poor performance regarding the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster where the the mine was so poorly engineered that it was primed for a collapse. While the operator must design the plan (like all plans) Pavlovich and Teaster said that MSHA failed to see the problems (due to inaccurate computer modeling, and a supervisor over-riding concerns of a subordinate) and approved a plan that was “destined to fail.” Maybe EVERYONE should start listening to Mr. Pavlovich and actually implement his recommendations since it only takes one mistake to make a disaster. http://www.msha.gov/ccreview/CrandallCanyonIndependentReview.pdf