A Holiday Gift for President Ahmadinejad?

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- On 5 December 2007,
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called a U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate, declassified key judgments of which were released just days
before, "a declaration of the Iranian people's victory against the great
powers."
Indeed, the impact of the NIE has been a public relations victory for
Ahmadinejad's continuing efforts to enrich uranium, which is one route to a
nuclear weapon. The NIE key judgments could further embolden Tehran, allow
additional time for the Iranian regime to complete a nuclear weapons
program, and enhance the likelihood of an Israeli unilateral strike on
Iranian nuclear installations. The NIE key judgments also make it difficult
for the United States to revive the option of military action in the event
the regime has not abandoned its quest for the bomb.
While the NIE judged that "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear
weapons program," a footnote that accompanied this judgment defined
"nuclear weapons program" as "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work
and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related
work...we do not mean Iran's declared civil work related to uranium
conversion and enrichment." [Emphasis added.]
However, declared "civil" conversion and enrichment can easily be
applied to the construction of nuclear weapons. Indeed, uranium enrichment
is the most problematic part of constructing a nuclear weapon. The military
design phase, which the NIE judges to have ceased, is less problematic than
enrichment.
Capt. Chuck Nash (USN, Ret.), IPC Board of Directors, said, "Iran is
now free to continue developing the technology and building a manufacturing
capacity for weapons grade enrichment all under the guise of a civilian
program. As with the Indian 'civilian' program, the military goal will
become obvious when Tehran detonates its first nuclear device."
According to Prof. Raymond Tanter, former member of the Regan-Bush
National Security Council staff and Personal Representative of the
Secretary of Defense to arms control and security talks in Europe, and now
President of the Iran Policy Committee, "The NIE infers from halt of
weaponization that Iran's intentions have changed but downplays the dual
purpose nature of uranium enrichment capabilities. America's allies in the
Middle East, especially Israel, do not have the luxury of making such a
dangerous inference. It is likely that Iran maintained the intention to
build a nuclear weapon, stopped work on weaponization capabilities, and
continued mastering enrichment to get within a screwdriver's turn of the
bomb."
General Paul Vallely (USA, Ret.), IPC Advisory Council, stated, "The
NIE does not take into account the possibility that Iran made enough covert
progress in weapon design prior to 2003 to place weaponization on hold and
focus on uranium enrichment under the guise of a civilian program."
It is the importance of uranium enrichment to the construction of a
nuclear weapon, and not weaponization, which has made Iran's enrichment
activities the focus of negotiations. The NIE assesses that "Iran halted
the [weaponization] program in 2003 primarily in response to international
pressure...Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather
than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs."
According to Prof. Tanter, "Rather than making genuine concessions in
the face of international sanctions, which were designed to stop Iran's
enrichment activities, Tehran may be manipulating the international
community by placing a hold on its weaponization work to give accelerated
enrichment a 'civilian' face."
Evaluating Iranian perceptions, General Edward Rowny (USA, Ret.),
former ambassador to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, IPC Advisory
Council, said "Not surprisingly, Ahmadinejad recognizes the importance of
so-called peaceful uranium enrichment to the eventual acquisition of a
nuclear weapon. On 17 May 2006, Ahmadinejad said of the European Union
countries negotiating to halt Iran's uranium enrichment program, 'They
think that they can take away our gold and give us some nuts and chocolate
in exchange.'"
General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Ret.), IPC Advisory Council Chair,
said, "According to Iran Policy Committee research in What Makes Tehran
Tick, the Iranian regime is a revolutionary movement posing as a
nation-state. The regime's penchant for ideological expansion and hegemony
drives it to acquire a nuclear weapon at any cost, irrespective of the
'nuts and chocolate' offered by the West."
Bruce McColm, former Executive Director of Freedom House, IPC Board of
Directors, referred to one of America's European allies, "In February 2007,
German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded that Iran cease enriching uranium
'without ifs and buts and without tricks.' Iran's suspension of
weaponization is one such 'trick' meant to buy time for uranium
enrichment."
Continuing on the enrichment theme, General Paul Vallely (USA, Ret.),
IPC Advisory Council, drew attention to President Bush's 4 December 2007
press conference, in which the President said, "The most difficult aspect
of developing a weapons program, or as some would say, the long pole in the
tent, is enriching uranium." According to Gen. Vallely, "If the West
retreats from its tough stance on Tehran's uranium enrichment program
because weaponization may have halted, Ahmadinejad's June 2007 claim that
Iran's nuclear program 'has passed the point where they [can] stop it' will
indeed be true."
Regarding the trajectory of U.S. policy in light of the new NIE, Gen.
McInerney stated, "Before the November 2007 NIE, President Bush repeatedly
emphasized that 'all options are on the table,' regarding Iran. If the NIE
removes the military option from the table, Tehran will continue to enrich
uranium, America's Arab allies will further appease Tehran, and Israel will
take matters into its own hands. The November NIE and Ahmadinejad's remarks
welcoming the Estimate rank with Neville Chamberlain's 'Peace in our Time'
Agreement with Hitler -- the high point of appeasement that led to World
War II."
According to research of the Iran Policy Committee, the negative
incentive of a threat to take military action has to be left on the table
for Tehran to suspend enrichment of uranium, one route for the Iranian
regime to develop the bomb. In view of the Estimate, however, there are
proposals across the political spectrum for Washington to decrease negative
incentives and offer only positive inducements to encourage the Iranian
regime to suspend uranium enrichment and clarify whether its "civilian"
nuclear energy program is a ruse for a covert military program.
Paul Welday, former Chief of Staff to a high-ranking Member of Congress
and IPC Board Member, said, "Nothing in the 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate changes the fact that Ahmadinejad and the Islamic extremists in
Tehran control a rogue state determined 'to wipe Israel off the face of the
map.' The regime supports murderous terrorist organizations worldwide and
is playing an active role in providing the financing, weapons, and training
for insurgents targeting U.S. military personnel in Iraq. The only logical
conclusion from the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate is that
international pressure works and now is the time for the Administration and
Congress to consider all available policy options to stifle Iran's hostile
nuclear ambitions once and for all."
Building on the remarks about options, Prof. Tanter discussed the
November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran in relation to October
2007 designation for nuclear proliferation activities of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) by the Bush administration.
Prof. Tanter stated that "I strongly concur in the sanctioning for
proliferation activities of IRGC-affiliated entities and individuals as
derivatives of the IRGC, the Iranian regime's state-owned Banks Melli and
Mellat, and individuals affiliated with Iran's Aerospace Industries
Organization.
Prof. Tanter added that "The raison d'etre of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps is to advance the production of nuclear weapons and export the
regime's revolutionary ideology via acts of terrorism. And it makes little
sense for the United States to sanction Tehran's proliferation unit and
terrorist arm -- the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps -- and at the same
time also designate as terrorist the regime's main opposition groups, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran and the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, which
provide intelligence about the nuclear programs of the IRGC. And because
the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran fails even to
mention the IRGC, such omission weakens the effect of the designation of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps for proliferation activities and
provides an additional gift to Ahmadinejad and his ruling clique in
Tehran."