ATTORNEYS:On
behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of
Thomas M. Rohe of Otjen, Van Ert, Stangle, Lieb & Weir, S.C.,
of Milwaukee.

Respondent

ATTORNEYS:On
behalf of the defendant-respondent Labor and Industry Review Commission, the
cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general,
and Jerome S. Schmidt, assistant attorney general.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent Alan D. Nehls, the cause was submitted
on the brief of Dennis H. Wicht of Murphy, Gillick, Wicht &
Prachthauser, of Milwaukee.

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

NOTICE

June 23, 1998

This opinion is subject to further
editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume
of the Official Reports.

Marilyn L. Graves

Clerk, Court of Appeals

of Wisconsin

A party may file with the Supreme Court
a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats.

No.97-1119

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF
APPEALS

Hermax
Carpet Marts and

Regent
Insurance Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Labor
& Industry Review Commission

and
Alan D. Nehls,

Defendants-Respondents.

APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:Christopher
R. Foley, Judge.Affirmed.

Before
Wedemeyer, P.J., Fine and Curley, JJ.

CURLEY,
J. Hermax
Carpet Marts and Regent Insurance Company (collectively, “Hermax”) appeal from
a circuit court judgment affirming a Labor and Industry Review Commission
(LIRC) order.LIRC’s order reversed an
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) order which had denied Alan D. Nehls’s claim
for additional worker’s compensation benefits.On appeal, Hermax claims that the circuit court erred in affirming
LIRC’s order because: (1) LIRC was required to, but did not conduct, a
credibility conference; (2) Nehls, as a matter of law, exceeded his two choices
of physicians under § 102.42(2), Stats.;
and (3) LIRC’s calculations are flawed.We disagree.Therefore, we
affirm the circuit court judgment.

I. Background.

This
worker’s compensation case arises from an injury which Nehls suffered on
November 13, 1988, while working as a carpet salesperson for Hermax.

Prior
to the 1988 injury, in 1973, Nehls injured his back while working for the A. O.
Smith Corporation.That injury
persisted until Nehls was hospitalized in 1979.A three percent permanent partial disability was assessed and a
fifty pound lifting restriction was imposed.Nehls was then laid off from A.O. Smith in 1981.

In
1985, Nehls began working for Hermax as a carpet salesperson.On November 13, 1988, Nehls was lifting one
end of a 150 pound roll of carpet when his foot caught another roll of carpet.Nehls’s body twisted and he fell, landing on
his right shoulder.Nehls experienced
lower back pain radiating to his right leg from this injury.

Following
the 1988 injury, Nehls began to seek treatment from a number of different
doctors.Initially, Nehls went to the
St. Francis Emergency Room, and was referred to Dr. Jeff Butler, an
orthopedist.Dr. Butler subsequently
referred Nehls to Dr. James D. Boblin, a neurologist, and Dr. Thomas J.
Flatley, a spinal specialist.Dr. Boblin stated that he could find “no good physiologic
explanation” for Nehls’s symptoms.Dr.
Flatley found that there were “no radiological changes” which explained Nehls’s
symptoms.Later, however, Dr. Flatley
assessed Nehls with a three percent permanent partial disability based on his
subjective level of pain. This three percent claim was conceded and paid by
Hermax.Dr. Butler also apparently
referred Nehls to Dr. D. P. Bogunovic.Dr. Bogunovic concluded that Nehls did not show any signs of permanent
injury.

In
December 1989, Nehls, without a referral, began treatment with
Dr. A. W. Bhatti, an orthopedist.At some point in 1992, Nehls, also without a referral, was treated by
Dr. Donovan, an osteopath.Eventually,
Nehls, again without a referral, began treatment with Dr. Salvatore Fricano, a
Family Health Plan doctor.Dr. Fricano
referred Nehls to Dr. Sanford J. Larson, a neurosurgeon.Dr. Larson eventually performed a spinal
fusion operation on Nehls on October 15, 1994.

In
January 1994, Nehls was examined by Dr. Richard K. Karr at the request of
counsel.Dr. Karr conducted a thorough
examination and diagnosed Nehls as having a degenerative lumbar disc and facet
disease, aggravated beyond its natural progression by the 1988 occupational
injury.In July 1995, Nehls was also
examined by an independent medical examiner, Dr. Dennis G. Brown.Dr. Brown also conducted a thorough
examination and concluded that Nehls’s back problems were related to a
preexisting deteriorating condition, and that the 1988 injury did not precipitate,
aggravate or accelerate the condition beyond normal progression.Dr. Brown found that, in addition to the
previously assessed disability, Nehls had a ten percent permanent partial
disability related to the 1994 fusion surgery.

On
July 25, 1995, DIHLR had a hearing over which an ALJ presided.Nehls was the only witness who testified at
the hearing.The ALJ issued a written
decision and, based upon Dr. Brown’s report, found that there was no connection
between Nehls’s 1992 symptoms and his 1988 injury.The ALJ dismissed the claim for additional benefits.The decision included a WC-8019 form, in
which the ALJ indicated that the credibility of the witness was not at issue.

Nehls
appealed the ALJ’s decision to LIRC, and LIRC reversed the ALJ’s decision.LIRC found Dr. Karr’s and Dr. Larson’s
medical opinions, with respect to the relationship between Nehls’s prior
medical condition and the 1988 injury, more credible and better supported than
Dr. Brown’s opinions.LIRC then found,
based on Dr. Brown’s report, that the 1988 injury resulted in ten percent
permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, and awarded Nehls the
appropriate level of disability payments.LIRC also found that Hermax was liable for the medical expenses and fees
related to the spinal fusion surgery performed by Dr. Larson.

Hermax
then appealed LIRC’s decision by certiorari to the circuit court.Hermax made the same claims which it now
makes on appeal, and the circuit court affirmed LIRC’s decision.Hermax now appeals to this court.

II. Analysis.

A. Credibility
Conference.

“Where
credibility of witnesses is at issue, it is a denial of due process if the
administrative agency making a fact determination does not have the benefit of
the findings, conclusions, and impressions of the testimony of each hearing
officer who conducted any part of the hearing.”Shawley v. Industrial Comm’n, 16 Wis.2d 535, 541‑42,
114 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1962) (citation omitted).Thus, whenever LIRC overrules an ALJ’s credibility determination, LIRC
must hold a credibility conference in order to obtain the ALJ’s impressions
concerning the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility.See Conradt v. Mt. Carmel Sch., 197 Wis.2d 60, 70‑73,
539 N.W.2d 713, 717‑18 (Ct. App. 1995).LIRC must only hold a credibility conference, however, “[i]n situations
where an examiner hears conflicting testimony and makes findings based upon the
credibility of witnesses, and the commission thereafter reverses its examiner
and makes contrary findings ….”Braun
v. Industrial Comm’n, 36 Wis.2d 48, 57, 153 N.W.2d 81, 85 (1967).

In
the instant case, the credibility of testifying witnesses was not at issue in
either the ALJ’s or LIRC’s decisions.The ALJ did not hear conflicting testimony and did not make, or base,
its decision upon findings concerning the credibility of witnesses.In fact, on Department form WC-8019, which
specifically asked the ALJ whether “Credibility is at Issue?” the ALJ checked
the box marked “No.”Although Nehls
testified concerning his symptoms, it was the doctors, not Nehls, who were
qualified to interpret those symptoms and to make conclusions concerning the
medical basis for those symptoms.Thus,
the issue before the ALJ was not whether Nehls was a credible witness, but
rather which medical opinion most accurately interpreted the facts to which
Nehls had testified.Similarly, when
LIRC reversed the ALJ’s decision, it did not do so because it found Nehls to be
a credible or incredible witness.Instead, LIRC simply found Dr. Karr’s medical opinion to be a more
persuasive interpretation of Nehls’s medical condition than Dr. Brown’s.Therefore, because credibility was not at
issue in either the ALJ’s or LIRC’s decisions, a credibility conference was
unnecessary.

B. Choice
of Physicians under § 102.42(2), Stats.

Hermax claims that the circuit court
erred by misinterpreting § 102.42, Stats.,
and by finding that Hermax was liable for the medical expenses which
Nehls incurred as a result of his treatment through the Family Health Plan and
Dr. Fricano and Dr. Larson.We
disagree.

Section
102.42, Stats., requires an
employer to compensate an injured employee for his or her medical treatment,
but restricts the employee to two choices of practitioners.Section 102.42(2)(a), Stats., states, in full:

Choice
of Practitioner.(a) Where
the employer has notice of an injury and its relationship to the employment the
employer shall offer to the injured employe his or her choice of any physician,
chiropractor, psychologist or podiatrist licensed to practice and practicing in
this state for treatment of the injury.By mutual agreement, the employe may have the choice of any qualified
practitioner not licensed in this state.In case of emergency, the employer may arrange for treatment without tendering
a choice.After the emergency has
passed the employe shall be given his or her choice of attending practitioner
at the earliest opportunity.The
employe has the right to a 2nd choice of attending practitioner on notice to
the employer or its insurance carrier.Any further choice shall be by mutual agreement.Partners and clinics are deemed to be one
practitioner.Treatment by a
practitioner on referral from another practitioner is deemed to be treatment by
one practitioner.

Following the 1988 accident, Nehls saw four different
practitioners, as the term is defined in § 102.402(2)(a), for diagnosis
and treatment.These practitioners
were, in chronological order: (1) Dr. Flatley, Dr. Boblin; and Dr. Bogunovic,
by referral from Dr. Butler; (2) Dr. Bhatti; (3) Dr. Donovan; and
(4) Dr. Fricano, and Dr. Larson, by referral from the Family
Health Plan.[1]Nehls, however, only sought reimbursement
from Hermax for the expenses related to the first and last practitioners.Nehls did not seek reimbursement from Hermax
for the expenses related to the second and third practitioners, Dr. Bhatti and
Dr. Donovan.[2]Nevertheless, Hermax argues that, according
to its interpretation of § 102.42, Stats.,
it is not liable for the expenses related to Nehls’s treatment by Dr.
Larson and Dr. Fricano, because those doctors constituted Nehls’s fourth
“choice” of practitioner.LIRC,
however, argues that Nehls did not “choose” treatment by Dr. Bhatti or Dr.
Donovan, for purpose of § 102.42, Stats.,
because he did not seek reimbursement from Hermax for the medical
expenses related to those doctors.Therefore, according to LIRC, Dr. Larson and Dr. Fricano constituted
Nehls’s second choice of practitioner, and Hermax is liable for the medical
expenses related to those doctors.We
conclude that LIRC’s interpretation of § 102.42 is correct, and that
Hermax is liable for the medical expenses related to Nehls’s treatment by
Dr. Larson and Dr. Fricano.

The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
the intent of the legislature.The
first step of this process is to look at the language of the statute.If the plain meaning of the statute is
clear, a court need not look to rules of statutory construction or other
extrinsic aids.Instead, a court should
simply apply the clear meaning of the statute to the facts before it.If, however, the statute is ambiguous, this
court must look beyond the statute’s language and examine the scope, history,
context, subject matter and purpose of the statute.

The
phrase “choice of attending practitioner” found in § 102.42(2)(a), Stats., could reasonably be interpreted
in two different ways.As Hermax argues, the statute could
reasonably be interpreted to mean that an employee can only seek reimbursement
from an employer for expenses related to the first two practitioners from whom
he or she seeks treatment.According to
this interpretation, the employee “chooses” a practitioner by seeking treatment
from that practitioner, whether or not the employee ultimately seeks
reimbursement from his or her employer for the expenses related to that
treatment.By contrast, as LIRC argues,
the statute could also be reasonably interpreted to mean that an employee can
only seek reimbursement for expenses related to two practitioners, regardless
of whether or not those practitioners are the first two practitioners from whom
the employee seeks treatment.According
to this interpretation, the employee “chooses” a practitioner by seeking
reimbursement from the employer for the medical expenses related to that
practitioner.Section 102.42 does not
explicitly define the phrase “choice of attending practitioner,” and the
meaning of the phrase is not clear from the language of the statute standing
alone.Therefore, because reasonable
minds could differ as to the statute’s meaning, the statute is ambiguous and we
must look beyond it in order to resolve the ambiguity.

When
resolving statutory ambiguities, courts should advance the legislature’s basic
purpose in enacting the legislation.See
UFE, 201 Wis.2d at 288, 548 N.W.2d at 63.“The Worker's Compensation Act was created to ensure that
employees who become injured or ill through their employment receive the prompt
and comprehensive medical care that is necessary for their well-being.”Id. (citations omitted).The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the Act should be construed liberally in order to fully effectuate
this purpose.Seeid.

In
this case, Hermax’s interpretation of § 102.42, Stats., clearly would not effectuate the remedial purpose of
the Worker’s Compensation Act.The
purpose of § 102.42(2) is not to preclude employees from seeking treatment
from more than two practitioners, it is to preclude an employee from being
reimbursed for the expenses related to more than two practitioners.The fact that Nehls sought treatment from
four practitioners should not preclude him from being reimbursed for the
expenses related to two of those practitioners.According to Hermax’s interpretation, however, because Nehls
chose to be reimbursed for his first and fourth practitioners’ expenses, as
opposed to his first and second practitioner’s expenses, Nehls would ultimately
be compensated for only one practitioner’s expenses.Hermax claims that this harsh result is necessary to prevent
“unlimited doctor shopping” and “unnecessarily duplicative treatment.”We are not persuaded.

LIRC’s
liberal interpretation of the statute will most clearly effectuate the purpose
of the Worker’s Compensation Act, and will not lead to “unlimited doctor
shopping” or “unnecessarily duplicative treatment.”Under LIRC’s interpretation, although employees may seek
treatment from any number of physicians, they may only be reimbursed for two
practitioners’ expenses.If employees
choose to seek treatment from more than two practitioners, the employees will
be required to bear the cost of that additional treatment themselves.As a result, employees will still have a
strong economic incentive to minimize unnecessary medical costs, and will be
unlikely to pursue unneeded treatment.Employees will, however, have the right to seek treatment from as many
practitioners as they desire, without forfeiting the right to be reimbursed for
the expenses related to any two of those practitioners.

Because
LIRC’s interpretation of § 102.42, Stats.,
is reasonable and most clearly effectuates the remedial purpose of the
Worker’s Compensation Act, we adopt that interpretation.For the purposes of § 102.42, an
employee “chooses” a practitioner by seeking treatment from that practitioner and
by seeking reimbursement for that practitioner’s expenses from the employee’s
employer or its insurance carrier.In
this case, although Nehls sought treatment from four practitioners, he only
sought reimbursement for the expenses related to two practitioners.Therefore, as a matter of law, he has not
exceeded his choice of physicians under § 102.42.

C. LIRC’s Calculations.

Finally,
Hermax claims that LIRC’s calculations concerning the amount of Nehls’s
permanent partial disability are flawed.LIRC made a factual finding that Nehls’s injury resulted in a ten
percent permanent partial disability.Four months after the 1988 accident, however, Dr. Flatley assessed a
three percent permanent partial disability, which was conceded and paid by
Hermax.Hermax argues that the three
percent award which they had already paid should have been subtracted from the
ten percent award, resulting in a total seven percent award.We are not persuaded.

LIRC’s
factual findings must be upheld if they are supported by relevant, credible and
probative evidence.See Princess
House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis.2d 46, 54, 330 N.W.2d 169, 173-74
(1983).LIRC’s factual finding that
Nehls suffered ten percent permanent partial disability was in addition to the
previous award of three percent permanent partial disability, and was supported
by credible evidence found in Dr. Brown’s medical reports.Therefore, it will be upheld.

LIRC
specifically stated in its written decision: “Dr. Brown set disability due to
the surgery at ten percent.The
commission accepts such rating.”LIRC,
however, also stated in its written decision, “Dr. Brown further found that
applicant has a ten percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole
related to the October of 1994, fusion surgery, in addition to the
previously assessed disability.”(Emphasis added.)Therefore,
LIRC clearly meant to award ten percent permanent partial disability, in
addition to the three percent award.LIRC’s award was also supported by credible evidence because Dr. Brown
stated in his second medical report, “In addition to the previous assessed disability,
he [Nehls] has a ten (10) percent permanent partial disability of the body as a
whole related to the October, 1994 fusion surgery.”(Emphasis added.)Therefore, LIRC’s award of ten percent permanent partial disability, in
addition to the previous award of three percent permanent partial disability,
was clearly supported by credible evidence, and will be upheld.

By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

[1] As
noted, in § 102.42(2)(a), Stats.,
“Partners and clinics are deemed to be one practitioner,” and “[t]reatment by a
practitioner on referral from another practitioner is deemed to be treatment by
one practitioner.”

[2] Hermax
argues that the circuit court improperly assumed that Nehls did not make a
claim for reimbursement for the expenses related to Dr. Bhatti and Dr. Donovan,
and that LIRC improperly failed to make a finding of fact on that issue.Hermax, however, has not actually disputed
LIRC’s claim that Nehls did not seek reimbursement for Dr. Bhatti’s and Dr.
Donovan’s statements, or presented us with any evidence showing that Nehls
actually did seek reimbursement for these expenses.Hermax has also not disputed LIRC’s assertion, which is clearly
supported in the record, that Nehls waived any claim to reimbursement for Dr.
Bhatti’s and Dr. Donovan’s expenses at the ALJ hearing.Therefore, we conclude that Hermax’s
argument is insufficiently developed, and we decline to address it.See Barakat v. DHSS, 191
Wis.2d 769, 786, 530 N.W.2d 392, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1995) (court of appeals need
not address “amorphous and insufficiently developed” arguments).