My blog provides alternative view on Kashmir dispute and politics of South Asia, especially India Pakistan relations. It aims to educate people that they can make informed judgements.

Saturday, 27 January 2018

What Pakistani national interest is served by the presence of the Haqqani network on our soil? Marvi Sirmed

What Pakistani national interest is served by the
presence of the Haqqani network on our soil?Marvi
Sirmed

Daily
Times recently sat down with veteran Pakistani diplomat Najmuddin Shaikh to
discuss the situation in Afghanistan, the prolonged US presence there as well
as the role played by other regional players, such as China and India. Talking
to Marvi Sirmed, he discussed what he thinks the year ahead will hold in store
Pakistan within this geo-strategic context:

DT:
Pakistan and the US got off to a rocky start this year. First came the infamous
Tweet in which President Trump accused Islamabad of lies and deceit as well as
harbouring America’s enemies; while receiving $33 billion in military
assistance. Next was the inevitable strong response from our side. Do you think
that there can now be any positive way forward?

NS: Before addressing
your question, let me say a few things about the past myths we have entertained
about US-Pak relations. First, we talk today of our relations being
transactional but they have always been that way. We joined the American
sponsored pacts to contain communism in the Middle East and East Asia, when we
had no clash of interest with the Soviet Union or China but adopted
anti-communism to obtain the military and economic assistance we needed to
counter the Indian threat. We joined the Americans in the jihad in Afghanistan,
because we genuinely feared that a Soviet consolidation there would inevitably
lead to a Soviet move through Pakistani Balochistan to the Arabian Sea. The
Americans, on the other hand, were only interested in inflicting on the Soviets
the same humiliation that they had suffered in Vietnam. We created what I call
a contrived commonality of interests.

Second,
we seem to think that American interest in securing India as an ally is new. In
fact, it dates back to the 1950s when the US approached New Delhi first to join
the pacts that we joined after the latter rebuffed American overtures.

Third,
our involvement in the Afghan jihad and the consequences – gunrunning,
narcotics trafficking, unimpeded movement of Afghan refugees to any part of our
country – flowed from our decision to fight the jihad in the name of “Islam in
Danger” rather than in the name of “Afghan Nationalism”. This was the decision
of our then leader Gen Zia-ul-Haq, who believed that such a slogan would help
his programme of “Islamising” Pakistan’s domestic polity. It was not forced
upon us.

Fourth,
with regard to our relations with Afghanistan – a vital relationship – no party
in Afghanistan can afford to give up its irredentist stance on the
internationally recognised Pak-Afghan border. Theoretically this will remain an
area of contention. We have to see if there are practical consequences. If
there are none we should live with verbal jousting on what we should see as
part of the Afghan psyche.

These
are the realities, which must be part of the calculus on which our policies
should be based without emotional outbursts about betrayal etcetera.

To
come to your question, President Trump’s tweet on New Year’s Day was, by my
reading, related to the same incident that brought words of effusive praise
from the same President in October. When the Canadian-American family was
rescued from their Haqqani network captors, one of the hostage takers was
arrested by our forces. According to a New York Times story published on
December 29, the Americans learned of this and asked for access to the prisoner
saying that by interrogating him they would be able to establish the
whereabouts of two other Americans that they believed were being held by the
Haqqanis. We apparently refused to acquiesce. It is my conjecture that this New
York Times story was part of the daily briefing the President received on New
Year’s Eve and prompted the 4 am inflammatory tweet the following day.

With
regard to what I see as the future, the US cannot maintain its presence in
Afghanistan without the use of our overland routes and airspace. There is no
way the Northern Distribution Network can be resuscitated. On the other hand,
Pakistan must tread carefully when it contemplates a rupture in relations with
the world’s sole super power unless; its vital national interests are
jeopardised. We have to consider in a hard-headed analysis whether this is in
fact the case. American policy makers, Trump apart, realise this and have
therefore modulated their demands.

The
Americans want that whatever elements of the Haqqani Network are on Pakistan
soil be eliminated. Other requirements that were first laid down –action
against the LeT – have now been omitted. We maintain that there is no organised
presence of the Haqqanis in Pakistan and would act if provided actionable
intelligence. The Americans are obdurate that they are here and they are
planning attacks on Afghan and American targets in Afghanistan.

The
point is what Pakistani national interest is served by the presence of the
Haqqani network or, for that matter, the Afghan Taliban on our soil. In that
context we also have to look at what our interests are in currently war-torn
Afghanistan? To my mind our interest is to have a stable Afghanistan at peace
with itself and with its neighbours; and to have it be, along with Pakistan,
the bridge between South Asia and Central Asia, thereby allowing us and
countries eastward to benefit from trade with Central Asia and beyond. As well
as the import of Central Asian fossil fuel resources for the energy starved
nations of South Asia. That interest is not served by letting the Taliban
leadership be here.

DT:
You have touched on Afghanistan. What do you make of the political situation
over there? Namely, can the Ghani government survive? And will parliamentary
elections scheduled for this year ahead?

NS: Today in
Afghanistan the political situation, to say the least, is fraught. The National
Unity Government in which President Ashraf Ghani and Chief executive Abdullah
Abdullah share power – while disagreeing on a number of issues – were on the
same page in calling for a letter of resignation from Atta Noor Mohammad, the
Governor of Balkh and a key member of the Jamiat-e-Islami, which is Abdullah
Abdullah’s party. Atta refused to resign. There are reports that negotiations
have been going on since the dismissal was announced but so far there seems to
be no resolution of the issue. At the other end of the country, Gen Raziq, theoretically
a subordinate of President Ghani, reacted to instructions to refrain from
engaging in politics by stating that he was in his position by the will of the
people and would resign only when the people asked him to do so.

Elections
theoretically are to be held for the Parliament and district councils by July;
but at this time this appears impossible. In November the head of the IEC
(Independent Election Commission) was dismissed by President Ghani. A successor
has been named but he is accused of having counterfeit degrees. This may be
resolved but it still seems unlikely that the July deadline will be adhered to
given the other difficulties; including the issuance of identity cards far
exceeds the number of eligible voters.

Opposition
groups have been clamouring for change. A former ally of President Ghani has
said: “When he started off as President, his political base was formed by 54
political groups that were meeting on a weekly basis to support him. I doubt if
three of the 54 are left with him.”

It
is my feeling that the international community, nevertheless, has no choice but
to continue to support the NUG while urging it to settle internal differences.

DT:
And what of the security situation?

NS: The Afghan
National Defence forces, comprising the Army, the Air Force, the Afghan
National Police, the Afghan Local Police and the National Directorate of
Security, today amount to some 320,000 personnel. There is general
acknowledgement that only Afghanistan Special forces – numbering some 16,000 –
are effective fighters and have, as a result, been overused to throw back
Taliban attacks on provincial and district headquarters. President Ghani, on
the strength of the Trump policy of maintaining and marginally increasing
American troop presence and making withdrawals condition-based, now asserts
that the Taliban can no longer claim that while the Americans have the watches
the Taliban have the time. Time, he believes, is on the side of the government.
How much truth there is in this assertion will become more evident in the days
to come. Undoubtedly, a much greater use of American airpower in the past year
– 3, 554 weapons used against the Taliban, which is nearly three times the
1,337 dropped in 2016 – as well as the number of ground operations undertaken suggests
that substantial damage was inflicted on anti-government forces of all hues and
complexions. This has not so far resulted in any substantial gain in terms of
territory on the ground.

Gen
Nicholson has claimed: “There are signs the Taliban insurgency is lowering its
ambitions as it suffers greater losses” He says 12 percent of Afghanistan is
controlled by the Taliban while another 30 percent is contested; with the
government’s control extending to only 56.7 percent of the territory He says
his plan over the next two years is to extend government control to 80 percent
of the territory; leaving the Taliban with 10 percent, thus rendering them
irrelevant. Gen Nicholson is not alone in having claimed that US forces have
turned the corner in the battle against the Taliban. The same claim has been
made by the secretaries of State and Defence and even by the President; but the
situation on the ground so far belies these assertions.

DT:
What about securing the Afghan economy? What is the likely timeframe on that
front?

NS: The NUG
government has to depend on foreign aid for 55-63 percent of its budget. It is
the largest employer in the country. The terms of employment have created
pension liabilities of enormous size. The tax base remains small and there are
no immediate prospects for exploiting the country’s mineral resources or its
location which makes it the bridge between South Asia and West Asia. Almost the
entire expenditure on Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) –
amounting to 4.1 billion dollars annually – has to be met by foreign aid and
there is little prospect of this situation changing over the next decade or
more. Afghanistan will remain dependent on huge dollops of foreign assistance
well beyond the year 2020; till which time economic aid has been pledged by
foreign donors.

President
Ghani has said that the Afghan economy would collapse in six months if aid for
the ANDSF was withdrawn. The truth is that it would collapse in two months. Aid
must continue at least until 2030 – or perhaps 2035 – even if reconciliation
happens because it will take at least that long before Afghanistan can achieve
a modicum of self reliance and can reduce ANDSF to a more affordable size.

It
will be many years before Afghanistan’s location or its mineral deposits can be
exploited. Trump’s pledge to forsake “nation building” means Afghanistan may
not get the managerial assistance and money to bring about reform. The picture
is not bright.

DT:
What are the prospects for reconciliation?

NS: There appears to
be a reasonably good chance that some Taliban groups may be persuaded to engage
in a reconciliation process. This must be the first priority for all friends of
Afghanistan. But it must be recognised that this will be a long and arduous
process with many people – extremist Taliban on the one hand as well as Afghan
warlords anxious to maintain their fiefdoms – throwing a spanner in the works
at every possible opportunity. Persuading a recalcitrant Taliban that a team
authorised by Haibatullah Akhund will nominate the delegation for the talks may
be problematic. Reconciliation’s first requirement – localised ceasefires –
will be violated.

Let
me say that even if the Taliban were united, the negotiations would still be
long since they would involve: (i) changes in the constitution to bring it more
in accord with the Taliban interpretation of Sharia; (ii) settling disputes
over the degree of Taliban control in various provinces and districts; (iii)
agreeing the division of power between the Central Government and the Provinces
or even districts; (iv) the division of available funding between the Centre
and the Province or districts from tax resources and from foreign aid; (v) the
conversion of the Taliban movement into a political party recognised by the
IEC; (vi) the date for the next election: (vii) the number of unelected offices
to be given to Taliban nominees; (viii) possible concrete Taliban steps to curb
poppy cultivation and how the impact of this could be mitigated. In these
circumstances, it will be fortunate if the terms can be settled in negotiations
spread over five years.

DT:
What, for you, would be the best-case scenario for Afghanistan?

NS: Assuming that
there is a level of good governance and some progress on reconciliation and
some stability, the following may happen: some regional projects may start
functioning, such as TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas
pipeline) and CASA (Central-South Asia power plant); some trade between South
Asia and Central Asia begins to be routed through Afghanistan and yields
transit fee revenues; the agriculture sector takes off and increases exports of
Afghan products, including fresh and dried fruit as well as saffron to an
annual level of $1.5 billion against the current $500 million; while wheat
imports are reduced, thereby off-setting in some measure the losses caused by
the curbing of opium production. Availability of energy from TAPI and CASA
allows for the setting up of some small-scale industries and perhaps the
restarting of mineral resource exploitation.

The
ANDSF is reduced to about 80,000 with the Army being cut to 25,000 and the rest
being Afghan National and Local police. A reduction in budget deficits will be
achieved but the size of this will be heavily influenced by the pension burden.

A
target date of 2030-35 to achieve these desirable targets may be overly
optimistic but anything short of that would certainly be unrealistic.

DT:
How should Pakistan respond to these challenges?

NS: I do not believe
that the Americans want a permanent base in Afghanistan but it they do, does a
hard-headed analysis suggest that we can prevent it? What we do know from the
foregoing analysis is that American military presence and American financing is
necessary to prevent a collapse of the ANDSF and of the Afghan economy. This
need will to persist until 2030-35 and it would be in our interest, as the
country most affected by a collapse of the Afghan economy, to ensure that they
do stay and are not required to withdraw because of moves in the US towards
reducing “foreign involvement”.

Second,
the Indians, as the second largest aid donors to Afghanistan and the purveyors
of soft power by way of their film industry, enjoy a great deal of support
among Afghan officials and the general public. They are using this and their growing
physical presence in Afghanistan to create trouble for us in Balochistan and
for funding and otherwise helping the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and
other groups ranged against us.

India’s
growing influence in Afghanistan is troublesome but we need to make a
dispassionate assessment of to what degree their presence in Afghanistan adds
to the potential they already have for mischief across the Pak-India border and
across our long coastline that is known to be a smuggler’s paradise. I don’t
think we can come to the conclusion that the accretion to their disruptive
potential is such as to justify the jeopardising of the Pak-Afghan relations.

Third,
the CPEC has the potential to be a game changer for Pakistan but to see it in
narrow Sino-Pak terms is doing a disservice to the grand regional vision of the
Chinese planners and the significant part they visualise CPEC playing in the
overall One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. The Chinese ambassador to New
Delhi, answering questions about the mischievous Indian assertion that CPEC is
illegal since it runs through India’s territory, suggested that another fork of
the CPEC could be built through Indian-occupied Kashmir. This was not just a
gambit to disarm Indian objections. It was part of the view that CPEC would be
truly successful when it served the entire region: West Asia, South Asia and
Central Asia. I believe the capacity of Gwadar was designed to provide access
to the sea for the trade of the Central Asian Republics. It is also the logical
route for other South Asian countries to trade with Western China.

We
have been so focused on security – for understandable reasons – that we have
ignored the one advantage that we enjoy in an area where we are in many ways
dwarfed by our neighbours; either because of size or because of natural
resource bases. We, along with Afghanistan, are the overland bridge between
South Asia and Central Asia. We are also the bridge between India and the other
SAARC countries lying to the east for overland trade with West Asia and through
the latter to markets in Europe.

The
ISPR rejoinder to the Indian Army chief’s rather stupid statement about calling
Pakistan’s nuclear bluff underlines our confidence in the deterrence value of
our nuclear capacity which, rather than conventional weaponry, will be our
principle defence against India. I have long argued that with this capability
in hand – we do not need to give security against India’s conventional strength
the salience that it had perforce enjoyed in the past.

Let
us now focus not on the security aspect of our location but rather on the
economic and expand trade in every direction. We are already committed to
allowing Turkmen gas to pass through our territory to the market in India when
TAPI becomes operational. Why should we be wary of allowing other traffic when
it will yield transit fees and generate other economic activity?

DT:
What do you think will be the end game over the coming year?

NS: Pakistan, the
US, China, and Afghanistan working in tandem; getting the Taliban shifted to
Afghanistan and engaging in reconciliation talks with local ceasefires coming
into being. The US has persuaded the State Department to provide advice and
finances for economic and administrative reform under President Ghani; whom I
see as genuinely committed to what will be the enormously slow process of
freeing Afghanistan from opium, from warlords and a reduction of current ethnic
tensions. A tall order, I know, requiring in the most propitious circumstances
many years to bring to fruition but helped, perhaps, by the opening of trade
routes.

About Me

Dr Shabir Choudhry has done extensive research on the issue of Kashmir and Indo Pakistan relations. He passed BA Honours in Politics and History, and Mphil in International Relations (title of the thesis, ‘Kashmir and Partition of India’); and title of his PhD thesis is ‘Kashmir- An issue of a nation not a dispute of a land’.

Apart from this Dr Shabir Choudhry passed Post Graduates Certificates in Education, and NVQ Assessor’s qualifications; and taught English in London.

Political Achievements

Founder member of JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front established in 1977) and got elected as a Press Secretary in 1984.

Became its Secretary General in 1985, and resigned from this post in 1996.

Got elected President of JKLF and Europe in May 1999, and decided not to contest in elections of July 2001.

Said good - bye to the JKLF as it is in many groups and is largely seen as advancing a Pakistani agenda on Kashmir dispute, and set up a new party Kashmir National Party in May 2008.

.

At present, he is:

·Spokesman Kashmir National Party and Director Diplomatic Committee;

·Spokesman for International KashmirAlliance;

·Founder member and Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs;

Previously

·A founder Member and Trustee/ Director of London based registered charity, Kashmir Foundation International and resigned from this position in August 2001.

·Regularly take part in the Sessions of the UN Human Rights (Commission) now Council in Geneva; and address various conferences and seminars to oppose violence and highlight the Kashmir cause.

·Participated in a Round Table Conference on Kashmir, organised by Socialist Group of European Parliament in Brussels in 1993.

·Addressed as a Chief Guest in a seminar on issue of Mangla Dam during the UN Sub Commission’s proceedings in August 2003.

·Addressed as a key - note speaker in a seminar on the issue of Gilgit and Baltistan, organised by Association of British Kashmiris.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker on human rights conference in Paris in 1991.

·Addressed at CambridgeUniversity as a Chief Guest in a conference on Kashmir in 1990.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker at New Delhi conference on Kashmir, which was part of Track Two diplomacy in November 2000.

·In September 2008, addressed a Conference arranged by Interfaith International in Geneva, topic of which was:“Kashmir Issue, Terrorism and Human Rights”.

·Addressed as a speaker in a NGO Conference on Self - Determination in Geneva in August 2000.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker in a fringe meeting of Liberal Democrats at their Annual Conference in Brighton in 1995.

·Participated in World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993.

·Before President Clinton's visit to India and Pakistan in 2000, lead a JKLF delegation to the State Department to discuss Kashmir dispute and situation in South Asia.

·Also had two rounds of meetings with senior State Department officials before President Musharraf’s meeting to Washington in June 2003.

·Apart from that had meetings with senior officials including Ministers of different countries, and also held many meetings with the State Department and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials on number of occasions.

·Played important role in advancing a Kashmiri perspective on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir; and also helped Baroness Emma Nicholson with her report ‘Kashmir: present situation and future prospects’, which was adopted by the European Parliament in May 2007.

·Won first prize in an essay competition in Urdu in 1976. It was organised by High Commission of Pakistan in London, and title of the essay was 'Qaaid-e- Azam's role in Islamic History'.

·Apart from that have addressed conferences in Brussels, Geneva, Toronto, Islamabad, Delhi, and

Publications

·Got first Urdu novel ‘Fareena’ published at the age of eighteen.

·Second Urdu novel ‘Bay-Khataa’ which was about the problems of Asian youths living in UK published in 1983.

·Third Urdu book ‘Pakistan and Kashmiri struggle for independence’ published in 1990.

·Fourth Urdu book is also on Kashmiri struggle, 'Is an independent Kashmir a conspiracy?'

·Apart from that has twenty books and booklets published in English on various aspects of the Kashmiri struggle.

·Recent publications are: Kashmir dispute as I see it

·Different perspective on Kashmir

·JKLF visit to Pakistan Administered Kashmir

·Kashmir Needs Change of Heart

·If not self - determination then what?

·Emma Nicholson report- who has won?

·Struggle for independence, Jihad or proxy war (Introduction by Baroness Emma Nicholson)

·

Future publications

Following books were completed some time ago and shall be published in near future:

In Search of Freedom - My visit to Srinagar and Islamabad

Kashmir and Partition of India

A brief background

Dr Shabir Choudhry was born in a small village called Nakker Shimali (near Panjeri) in District Bhimber, Azad Kashmir. He went to UK in 1966, and like other people from the region, holds a dual nationality. He left secondary school in 1970 with no qualifications and began his life as a textile worker.

In 1975 he started part time studies and passed Matriculation from Government High School Panjeri, passed ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels from UK, and resumed full time degree course in 1981, and passed BA (Hons) in Politics and History in 1984.

He continued full time and part time jobs until he got his Mphil. He passed his PGCE (Post Graduates Certificate in Education) in 1990, and then started full time job as a Lecturer. Due to health problems he resigned from teaching in 1999. At present he is self - employed, provides private tuition, translation and interpretation and consultancy.

Through out his adult life he has actively worked for the cause of Kashmir, and even during long illness he effectively carried out his responsibilities as a leader of the JKLF, a ‘prolific writer’ and consistent campaigner of Rights Movement and peace in Jammu and Kashmir and South Asia.