CIA History Staff: Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators

Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators examines the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement with Nazis and their collaborators after World War II. It details the Agency's assistance to various US Government investigations, primarily by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigation (OSI) and by the General Accounting Office (GAO), of dealings with Nazis from the
1970s to the present day. The study recounts the Agency's long involvement with Nazis — first as an enemy in World War II, then as a quasi-ally in the Cold War, and finally as the subjects of criminal investigations and prosecutions by Federal officials. 1(U)

Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators examines

the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement with Nazis and their collaborators after
World War II. It details the Agency's assistance to various US Government
investigations, primarily by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigation
(OSI) and by the General Accounting Office (GAO), of dealings with Nazis from the
1970s to the present day. The study recounts the Agency's long involvement with Nazis
— first as an enemy in World War II, then as a quasi-ally in the Cold War, and finally as
the subjects of criminal investigations and prosecutions by Federal officials. 1 (U)
As a secret, intelligence agency in an open democratic society, historians,
journalists, and politicians have long suspected the Central Intelligence Agency of
maintaining clandestine relations with Nazis and non-Germans who aided the Third

1 The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, adopted by the United Nations in 1950
as General Assembly Resolution 95, defined crimes under international law as crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
also charged German defendants with conspiracy. Those who served in the Schutzstaffeln, or SS,
were accused of membership in a criminal organization. The Allied authorities also offered
specific charges in subsequent trials of German war criminals after 1945. The generic term "war
crimes" encompasses a variety of crimes committed by the Axis Powers and their collaborators
as recognized at Nuremberg. The term is commonly used to denote support rendered to Nazi
Germany by individuals even if these same individuals did not directly commit murder or other
violent crimes. It should also be noted that many individuals charged with war crimes in World
'War II were not members of the Nazi party or even German citizens. Alan S. Rosenbaum,
Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 22-23. See also
Appendices, Norman E. Tutorow, ed., War Crimes, War Criminals, and War Crimes Trials: An
Annotated Bibliography and Source Book (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 453-477. (U)

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Reich. 2 The story of escaped Nazis after the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 has long
gripped novelists and Hollywood screenwriters, as seen by such bestsellers and
subsequent box office hits as The Salzburg Connection, The Boys from Brazil, Marathon
Man, and The ODESSA File. 3 Since the 1970s, the topic has also proven steady fare for

historians and journalists. 4 (U)

2For an overall discussion, see Kevin C. Ruffner, "A Persistent Emotional Issue: CIA's Support
to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations," Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified ed. 1997), pp.
103-109. (U)
30ne guide to American spy movies notes, "Hollywood, in its unique, uncanny way, was quick
to turn out dramas about unrepentant Nazis planning for the next onslaught as early as 1944.
During the next few decades dozens of plots centered around schemes by former Nazis to steal
gold and jewels, restore their former glory and spread fear and hatred among the peoples of the
world. A few were earnest attempts to expose the flight of war criminals, some were simple
entertainments and others were undisguised propaganda films." See Larry Langman and David
Ebner, Encyclopedia of American Spy Films (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), pp. 258260. (U)
4Public interest in Nazi war criminals can be seen in the number of publications since the mid1970s, including Charles R. Allen, Nazi War Criminals in America: Facts— Action: The Basic
Handbook (New York: Highgate House, 1985); Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Unholy Trinity:
How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1991); Charles Ashman and Robert J. Wagman, Nazi Hunters: The Shocking
True Story of the Continuing Search for Nazi War Criminals (New York: Pharos Books, 1988);
Howard Blum, Wanted!: The Search for Nazis in America (New York: Quadrangle/The New
York Times Book Company, 1977); Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for Nazi
Scientists (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987); William B. Breuer, Race to the Moon:
America's Duel with the Soviets (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993); Linda Hunt, Secret
Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945-1990 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Beate Klarsfeld, Wherever They May Be! (New York: Vanguard
Press, 1975); John Loftus, The Belarus Secret, ed. Nathan Miller (New York: Paragon House,
1989, rev. ed. 1982); Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in
America (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984); Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged
Conscience: Seekers of Justice for Nazi War Criminals in America (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1984); Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and
Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988); and Efraim Zuroff,
Occupation: Nazi Hunter; The Continuing Saga for the Perpetrators of the Holocaust (Hoboken:
KTAV Publishing House, 1994). (U)
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During the first three decades after the war, however, the Soviet threat and the
possibility of a cold war turning into world Armageddon muted public scrutiny. The
presence of former Nazis and their collaborators in the United States generated little
interest from the American public, and even less from the Federal government. In this
environment, the Central Intelligence Agency simply avoided any discussion of its roles
as having used America's former enemies as intelligence sources and operational assets.
(U)
Criticism by various observers takes a broad approach. In particular, the Agency
comes under attack for the following activities:
1. CIA, and its predecessor organizations, including the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS 1942-45), the Strategic Services Unit (SSU 1945-46), and the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG 1946-47), employed German intelligence
personnel as sources of information.
2. CIA sponsored the new West German intelligence service, an organization
under the control of officers of the defeated German general staff. The ranks of
the Gehlen Organization sheltered many officers of the German SS and SD whose
loyalty to the new West German government remained in doubt.
3. CIA, and its predecessor organizations, employed former collaborators of the
Third Reich, primarily from Eastern and Southern Europe, initially as sources of
information and later as the operational assets for activities behind the Iron
Curtain.
4. CIA, including the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC 1948-1952), brought
German and Eastern European individuals to the United States to provide detailed
information on the Soviet Union.
5. CIA, including OPC, formed "secret armies" from various emigre groups in
Europe and trained them in the United States. The ranks of these groups included
numerous former collaborators of Nazi Germany and some of these people
remained active in other CIA projects.
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6. CIA evacuated Nazi war criminals through "rat lines" in Southern Europe,
allowing these people to escape justice by relocating them incognito in South
America.
7. CIA abused its legal authority to bring Soviet and Soviet Bloc defectors and
other persons of interest to the United States.
8. CIA covered up these activities from Congressional and other Federal
government investigators. (U)
The Agency's involvement with Nazis and their collaborators as well as the
impact that these relationships had on both American foreign and domestic policies is the
subject of numerous books and articles over the years. In his 1988 book, Blowback:
America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War, Christopher Simpson

asserts that:
US intelligence agencies did know - or had good reason to
suspect—that many contract agents that they hired during the cold
war had committed crimes against humanity on behalf of the
Nazis. The CIA, the State Department, and US Army intelligence
each created special programs for the specific purpose of bringing
selected former Nazis and collaborators to the United States.
Other projects protected such people by placing them on US
payroll overseas. 5 (U)
Simpson believes that the US Government's willingness to work with some of the
Third Reich's worst elements "did contribute to the influence of some of the most
reactionary trends in American political life."6 (U)
Allan A. Ryan, Jr., a former director of Office of Special Investigations (OSI), is
skeptical about claims that American intelligence deliberately brought Nazi war criminals
to the United States. While he acknowledges that the government assisted in the

5 Simpson, Blowback, p. xiv. (U)
6Ibid, p. 10. (U)

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immigration of a "small roomful of people at the very most," Ryan is convinced that
loose enforcement of US laws, such as the Displaced Persons Act of 1950, the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 permitted
far greater numbers of Nazi war criminals and collaborators to enter the United States
through legal means than any covert US intelligence project. 7 (U)
Ryan also criticized much of the literature dealing with US Government collusion
with Nazis. "From time to time in the past few years, books or other accounts have
appeared claiming to expose some newly-discovered conspiracy by CIA, or the military,
or a cabal of lawless bureaucrats, to bring Nazi collaborators to the United States after the
war." "These accounts," according to Ryan, "have offered dubious evidence and have
been unable to survive any objective analysis." In his role as director of the Office of
Special Investigations, Ryan wrote, "no Federal agency, including the CIA, ever objected
to any prosecution or tried to call off any investigation." 8 (U)
Since the 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency, in fact, has been one of the
leading government agencies involved in the investigation of Nazi war criminals. 9 The
Office of General Counsel (OGC), the Directorate of Operations (DO), the Office of
Security (OS), and other components of CIA have worked closely with the Office of

7Ryan, Quiet Neighbors,

pp. 4-5, and 328-329. (U)

8Ibid, pp. 4 and 267. (U)
9The US Congress enacted Public Law 95-549 in 1978, which allows the government "to
exclude from admission into the United States aliens who have persecuted any person on the
basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, and to facilitate the deportation of
such aliens who have been admitted into the United States." This law also established the Office
of Special Investigations in the Department of Justice to investigate Nazi war criminals in
America. US Congress, House, PL 95-549 Immigration and Naturalization Act - Nazi Germany,

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Special Investigations to identify and bring Nazi war criminals and collaborators to
justice for concealment of criminal activity during 1933-45. Prior to the establishment of
OSI, CIA worked with the Special Litigation Unit (SLU) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) for a brief period in the 1970s. In addition, Congress
ordered the General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct two separate investigations,
during 1977-78 and again during 1982-85, to determine the relationship between the US
Government and Nazi war criminals. The House of Representatives held public hearings
to discuss GAO's findings after both investigations. 10 (U)
According to the General Accounting Office, the Central Intelligence Agency did
not have a formal or even an informal program to bring Nazi war criminals or
collaborators into the United States. 11 The Agency did bring defectors from Iron Curtain
countries and provided "disposal" services for American agents from Europe. In some
cases, these defectors or agents also had Nazi pasts, but this did not constitute a basis for
US support or assistance. In its 1985 report, Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to
95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, United States Code, Vol. 4: Legislative History (St. Paul: West
Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 4700-4716. (U)
10US Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law on Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 95th Cong., 1st
and 2nd sess., 3 August 1977 and 19-21 July 1978. See also Committee on the Judiciary,

Oversight Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law
on GAO Report on Nazi War Criminals in the United States, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 17 October
1985. (U)
11 United States General Accounting Office, Comptroller General of the United States,

Widespread Conspiracy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi War Criminals Not Supported by
Available Evidence-Controversy May Continue, GGD-78-73 (Washington, DC: General
Accounting Office, 1978) and Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to Further US
Anticommunist Objectives in Europe-Some Immigrated to the United States, GAO/GGD-85-66

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Further US Anticommunist Objectives in Europe—Some Immigrated to the United States,

the GAO found no evidence of "any US agency program to aid Nazis or Axis
collaborators to immigrate to the United States." 12 (U)
Eagle and Swastika amplifies the findings of the 1985 GAO Report by detailing

the Agency's role in the years after Nazi Germany's collapse. The CIA expressed
reluctance to work with some individuals or organizations, as seen with the Ukrainian
nationalists and the Gehlen Organization. As tensions mounted between East and West,
the Agency retreated from this stand because of the pressing need for intelligence on the
intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union. The first half of this study examines
many of the CIA's earliest operations in Europe when the Agency decided to work with
individuals and groups with Nazi backgrounds. The second half of the study shifts to the
period of the 1970s to the present day and looks at the Agency's role in the investigations,
including such notable cases as Klaus Barbie and Kurt Waldheim. (U)
The records of the Central Intelligence Agency and its predecessor agencies,
including OSS, SRI, and CIG, form the basis for this study. These sources are scattered
throughout the Agency and are not easily identifiable or retrievable. Significant material
can be found in various individual "201 files" or project files maintained by the
Directorate of Operations as well as in individual files of the Office of Security.13

(Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1985) (hereafter cited as 1978 GAO Report or
1985 GAO Report). (U)
12 1985 GAO Report. (U)
13The 201 system provides the Agency with a method for identifying a person of specific interest
to the Directorate of Operations (DO) and for controlling and filing all pertinent information
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Operational files of the DO and correspondence maintained in the Executive Registry of
the DCI's office also provide extensive information. Records of the actual Nazi war
criminal investigations after the 1970s, including outside agency inquiries and CIA
responses, are maintained by the Office of General Counsel as well as by the DO. (U)
Numerous files exist in other US government agencies, including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the US
Army's Investigative Records Repository (IRR), and the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). Among the most important documents are those located in
Record Group 226, the Records of the Office of Strategic Services, which have been
declassified and transferred to the National Archives. In addition to the thousands of feet
of records already declassified by CIA, the Agency has released hundreds of thousands of
pages of World War Thera records under the auspices of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure
Act in 2000. This act has also brought forth a deluge of personal dossiers from the
Army's Investigative Records Repository at Fort Meade, Maryland. Probably no country
in the world, and certainly no intelligence service, has released to the public as much

about that person in a single file. It consists of a unique seven digit 201 file number assigned to
that individual and may be opened by a DO component when there is a reasonable expectation
that additional information will be acquired or retained on that individual. Normally, a 201 file
will be opened when a Main Index search reveals substantive information on that individual in
five or more documents. The Headquarters 201 file is the official file containing all biographic
reporting on and references to the individual such as personal histor y, assessments, and plans for
, copy located in
future use. DO Instruction C
CIA History Staff files. The Office of Security, likewise, maintains its own, separate file system
on individuals of interest to the CIA. (S)
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information about intelligence activities during the Second World War as the United
States. 14 (U)
The amount of material released in the last two decades, as well as material that is
still retained by CIA, is overwhelming. It is often possible to find the same document (or
a copy) as classified in Agency files but as declassified at the National Archives. While
this study is written at the classified level, a great deal of the source material and the
information itself is already available at the National Archives. This is especially true
following CIA's declassification of the greater portion of the "withdrawn" OSS material
in 2000. 15 (U)
Since 1998, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act requires the CIA to search its
holdings for still-classified material pertaining to Nazi war criminals and war crimes; the
ensuing searches located an extensive amount of material that was otherwise previously
unavailable to the author. Although the author attempted to mine this new vein of
information, a lack of time and resources to plow through the sheer number of files
generated by the name traces of over 60,000 known war criminals and SS officers proved
to be limiting factors. (U)

14 For further details, see Kevin C. Ruffner, "Record Group 226 at the National Archives,"
Center for the Study of Intelligence Newsletter (Summer 1996), pp. 3-4; Kevin C. Ruffner, "OSS
and CIA Records at the National Archives," Center..for the Study of Intelligence Newsletter
(Winter-Spring 1997), pp. 3-4; Kevin C. Ruffner, "CIA and the Search for Nazi War Criminals,"
Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin (Winter 2000), pp. 10-11; and Kevin C. Ruffner,
"CIC Records: A Valuable Tool for Researchers," Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin
(Summer 2000), pp. 11-16. (U)

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It should be noted for the record that the author did not enjoy full and unfettered
access to all DO and OS records, finding aids, manual indexes, or computer search tools.
Access to records and, even more importantly, the ways to find information are highly
restricted within CIA and even more so within the Directorate of Operations and the
Office of Security — for operational, security, and privacy reasons. While the various
components permitted me to review numerous records and 201 files, the author did not
enjoy carte blanche access to all files. This does not mean that the author did not receive
significant help to order and review those records that he determined to be of possible
relevance. Quite the contrary, the author received bountiful help over the years from the
unsung heroes of the Agency - the recordkeepers who toil in the bowels of Headquarters
and at the warehouse-like Agency Archives and Records Center. Without their help, no
Agency histories could be written. (U)
After shifting through hundreds of records boxes and personality files, the
author is convinced that it is impossible to write the definitive history of such a complex
issue as the relationships that existed between American intelligence and the Nazis during
and after the war. The topic is too broad, the issues are complex and changed over time,
and the timeframe itself encompasses the entire lifespan of the CIA and its predecessors.
The records are scattered, and many were destroyed or otherwise are not readily available.
The identification of every single Nazi war criminal or collaborator who came into

15 The "withdrawn" records now at the National Archives consist of material that had been
removed for security reasons from earlier batches of records declassified and transferred to
NARA. In 2001, the Agency declassified this major collection of OSS material. (U)
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contact with CIA is well nigh impossible. Thus, it is quite likely that investigators,
historians, and journalists will continue to claim to have uncovered Nazis with
connections to the CIA. (U)
Eagle and Swastika highlights the general operational activities of the Agency and

its predecessors and recounts specific projects involving those with Nazi backgrounds
from 1945 to the present day. The study should be regarded as a critical guide to future
research into this emotional and complicated subject. (U)
The strengths and weaknesses of this study rest primarily within the CIA's own
records management system. As an item of interest, Agency records generally do not
contain information that constitutes a basis for judging the guilt or innocence of war
criminals. The Office of Special Investigations, however, utilizes the Agency's records as
a tool in its examination of existing historical documentation. These documents, in turn,
may have some impact on the overall course of the investigation and prosecution. (U)
Interviews with retired Agency officers have provided some personal anecdotes
and information about the early days of American intelligence operations in Western
Europe after World War II. Both the GAO and OSI also conducted extensive interviews
during the course of their investigations. The interviews employed for this study have not
been as far ranging, but have enabled the author to gain a better understanding of the
Agency's operations in Austria and Germany in the first decade after World War II. This
time period, as will be seen, is crucial because the Agency became more involved with
Nazi war criminals and collaborators. (U)

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The lesson of the Nazi war criminals is perhaps best applied to present
intelligence operations. Sixty years after World War II, many Americans are concerned
that actions taken by the US Government during the Cold War to combat the Soviet threat
actually threatened our national liberties and democratic nature. Allen Dulles, the
Director of Central Intelligence during 1953-61 and a former OSS station chief, displayed
a cavalier attitude about Reinhard Gehlen, West Germany's then future intelligence chief.
"I don't know if he is a rascal," Dulles said about the former head of the Wehrmacht's
Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), the Foreign Armies East branch of military intelligence, that

dealt with the Soviet Union. "There are few archbishops in espionage. He's on our side
and that's all that matters. Besides," Dulles added, "one needn't ask him to one's
club." 16 (U)
Dulles's alleged response to concerns about the background and trustworthiness
of such an important figure as Gehlen exemplifies the attitude that the Agency adopted
with regard to the past Nazi activities and affiliations of its intelligence operatives during
the Cold War. Since the 1970s, this Cold War attitude has created considerable
problems, only to be compounded by other scandals that have roiled the Agency. With
the end of the Cold War, the Agency is hardpressed to defend or even explain some of its
actions during that trying period. The CIA still faces controversies over the backgrounds
of its agents, as witnessed in the recruitment of sources in Central and Latin America as

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late as the 1990s. Distrustful of the Agency, many American politicians have demanded
the release of all CIA records dealing with Nazis and their collaborators. (U)
The Nazi war criminal investigations are now the longest-running examination in
the CIA's history. Decades after the end of World War II, controversies about the
Agency's role linger. Most, but not all, of the records of the Office of Strategic Services
and the Strategic Services Unit have been declassified and released to the National
Archives. The US Government, however, retains control of countless other records from
the early Cold War period. Until all of this information is available to the public, the
Agency will continue to defend its past in the face of suspicion, intrigue, and
guesswork. (U)
In researching and writing this study, the author would like to acknowledge the
support and patience of J. Kenneth McDonald, E.
3, chief historians of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1991 to 2002. As pressure
mounted for the Agency to reveal its relations with Nazi war criminals, Ken McDonald
assigned me to write a history of the period in 1992. As a newly minted Ph.D. and CIA
historian who had joined at the end of the Cold War, the Nazi war criminal project has
proven both fascinating and frustrating. Little did I know that I would still be hard at
work on the topic over ten years later. (U)
During this journey, many individuals have assisted me. Over the years, my
colleagues at the History Staff and at the Center for the Study of Intelligence have
provided me with many references in the Agency's records and have graciously read the

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manuscript at various stages. Lawrence H. McDonald and William Cunliffe, archivists
and intelligence specialists at the National Archives, are the unsung heroes to researchers
of all backgrounds. Both men took me into the stacks at the National Archives to search
for every lead in the massive collection of records at College Park. The interest in my
work and cooperation shown by Eli Rosenbaum, director of the Office of Special
Investigations, and Elizabeth B. White, chief historian, also have been most gratifying.
(U)
While many inside and outside the Agency have helped me in one form or
another, I alone am responsible for the study's content and interpretations. (U)

From its formation in 1942, the Office of Strategic Services grew almost
overnight into a leading American intelligence service in the war against the Axis
Powers. By 1945, the OSS had some 12,000 men and women, both civilian and military
personnel, scattered throughout the world, although the bulk of the overseas operations
took place in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East.' The OSS dedicated a wide
array of resources to the German target, including support to resistance forces in occupied
Europe; support to domestic resistance efforts against Hitler; propaganda efforts; and
collection against Germany's industrial and military capabilities. In the course of its
operations from 1942 to 1945, the OSS came into contact with thousands of Germans,
dedicated anti-Nazis as well as those who had fought for the Third Reich. 2 The mission
of any intelligence service is to penetrate the forces of its adversaries to learn as much as

'For a general history of the Office of Strategic Services, see Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic
Services: America's First Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000). The
impact of OSS is discussed in George C. Chalou, ed., The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in
World War II (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992). (U)
2
As examples of the published works on OS S's war against Nazi Germany, see Joseph E. Persico, Piercing
the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II (New York:
Viking Press, 1979); Jurgen Heideking and Christof Mauch, eds., American Intelligence and the Resistance
to Hitler: A Documentary History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Christof Mauch, Schattenkrieg Gegen
Hitler: Das Dritte Reich im Visier der amerikanischen Geheimdienste 1941 bis 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1999); and Petra Marquandt-Bigman, Amerikanische Geheimdienstanalysen uber
Deutschland 1942-1949 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995). (U)

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possible about the enemy's capabilities and intentions. During wartime, few restrictions
hinder an intelligence service in the pursuit of its objectives. 3 (U)

Operation SUNRISE (U)

In November 1942, Allen W. Dulles took over the OSS station in Bern,
Switzerland, which soon became the eyes and ears for OSS in Europe. From his post in
neutral Switzerland, Dulles "used whomever he could to further his intelligence mission
even if some of his agents may have been of dubious political persuasion."
Consequently, Dulles worked with dozens of Germans and others, some were communist
while others were Nazis. 4 (U)
In addition to his work with the German resistance and his recruitment of an agent
who penetrated the Nazi Foreign Ministry, Dulles's most notable contribution to the war
effort was his involvement in the surrender of German forces in northern Italy prior to the
collapse of the Third Reich. Undertaken in secret, the surrender shortened the bloody
war in Italy and saved countless lives. Known as Operation SUNRISE, the talks did not
remain a secret for long; indeed, they received public attention just weeks after the war
ended. Twenty years after the event, Dulles's himself wrote a detailed history of the

3

As an example, the OS S recruited German and Austrian prisoners of war to serve as agents to cross Nazi
lines to collect intelligence and to spread propaganda. See Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors:
America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995). (U)
4John H. Waller, The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War (New
York: Random House, 1996), p. 359. (U)

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operation, The Secret Surrender, based on wartime documentation. Dulles' book forms
the general outline of our knowledge about the German surrender in Italy. 5 (U)
In the last year of the war, the German military situation became increasingly
desperate. The failure of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler and the bloody roundup of
coup suspects meant that there was little chance for the German resistance to negotiate an
end to the war. As the Soviets and Western Allies drew ever closer to Germany itself,
various German officials began to extend peace feelers to the British and Americans. In
December 1944, Dulles's agent, Gero von Schulze Gaevernitz, told Dulles that Alexander
von Neurath, the German consul in Lugano, was in close contact with senior German
military and SS officers searching for an American contact to discuss surrender terms.
Dulles was forced to reject this feeler because President Roosevelt and Gen. William J.
Donovan, the director of OSS, had expressed concern about the reaction of the Soviet
allies to any negotiations by the Western Allies with the Germans. 6 (U)
Over the next several months, Dulles continued to receive feelers in Switzerland
from senior SS officers, including such notable Nazis as Heinrich Himmler, Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, and Walter Schellenberg. But these contacts all came with strings
attached, such as the requirement that the Americans and the British join forces with the
Germans to fight the Soviets. At the same time, intelligence reports and simple rumors

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underscored the German determination to fight to the last man by fortifying the Alpine
regions of southern Germany and Austria. The so-called "National Redoubt" concerned
American planners who were anxious to avoid a major loss of lives at the end of the war.'
From the Allied perspective, Operation SUNRISE offered a way to end the fighting in
Italy while ensuring that the Germans could not mount a last-ditch battle in the Alps. (U)
By late 1944, various SS officials in Italy and in Germany decided to contact the
Allies. One of these undertakings, codenamed WESTWIND, failed because of rivalries
at the highest levels of the SS. By mid-February 1945, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl
Wolff, the commander of all SS troops in Italy, told Walther Rauff, a subordinate SS
officer, that he wanted to establish contact with the Allies in neutral Switzerland. Rauff
mentioned this to another SS officer, Guido Zimmer, who suggested Baron Luigi Parilli
as an intermediary. (U)
Parilli, the prewar European representative of a prominent American company,
was closely tied to Zimmer and may have been one of his agents. The Italian claimed
that Zimmer's love for Italy and his concern that the Germans would unleash a "scorched
earth" policy motivated both men to seek the Allies. Through Professor Max Husmann, a
Swiss schoolmaster, Parilli received a visa to visit Switzerland and present the German
proposal to Maj. Max Waibel, a Swiss intelligence officer and a contact of Allen Dulles,
the OSS station chief in Bern. This led to the first meeting between Gero von Gaevernitz
and Parilli in Lucerne and the beginning of Operation SUNRISE. (U)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
In March 1945, Dulles and Gaevernitz met in Switzerland with Wolff. Dulles
knew that Wolff wanted to discuss surrender terms, but the OSS station chief made
continued discussions conditional upon the release of several Italian resistance leaders in
German captivity. Wolff told Dulles that he wanted to surrender SS forces to the Allies
and that he would work to get Field Marshal Albert Kesslering, commander of all
German military forces in Italy, and his successor, Field Marshal Heinrich von
Vietinghoff, to do the same. (U)
Guido Zimmer played a steady role in facilitating German feelers with the OSS in
Switzerland. Within days after the first meeting between Gaevernitz and Parilli in
February 1945, Zimmer and another German officer, SS-Standartenfuhrer Eugen
Dollmann, traveled to Lugano to meet with the Americans. Dollmann had served as a
translator for Hitler when he visited Mussolini. Himmler valued Dollmann for his social
and political contacts in Rome. As events unfolded, Zimmer continued to be a key point
of contact and even coordinated the placement of a Czech-born OSS radio operator,
Vaclav Hradecky, first at the SS headquarters in Milano and later in Bolzano. With
Zimmer's protection, Hradecky, known as "Little Walter," provided communications
between Allied headquarters in Caserta and the Germans in northern Italy. (U)
In the meantime, Wolff met with Dulles and other British and American officers
in northern Italy to continue the preliminary discussions. Feelers by other senior SS
officials complicated Wolfrs own efforts to deal with the Western Allies. Hitler, in fact,
learned of Wolff's activities, but did not take any action against the SS general. The
death of President Roosevelt in April also created new problems when Dulles received
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orders to drop all contact with the Germans. After further delays and more frustration,
Dulles nonetheless succeeded in getting two representatives of the German army and SS
to sign the surrender documents on 29 April 1945. 8 (U)

A More Moderate Element in the Waffen SS (U)

The fact that Operation SUNRISE ended the war in Italy has been overshadowed
by other, more ominous, characterizations of the surrender in the decades after 1945.
Historians, journalists, and even some intelligence officers have downplayed the
importance of the secret surrender and criticized Allen Dulles for promoting his own role
and that of the OSS. More damaging, however, are the accusations that Allen Dulles
promised to prevent any postwar Allied retribution against the German officials involved
in the surrender negotiations. Operation SUNRISE is regarded by some historians as "an
early glimpse backstage before the curtain went up on a Cold War drama that dominated
international affairs for a long time to come." 9 (U)
Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi regard Dulles's efforts as an important
milestone in the postwar struggle between East and West. "Implicit in the cold war
evolution was a shift from the picture of Germany as an evil and aggressor nation to that
of comrade in the struggle against Communism . . . .What Operation Sunrise

8 Ibid. (U)
9Ibid, p. 390. (U)
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demonstrates is that individual Germans were eager to do what they could to push the
Western powers into a cold war stance as quickly as possible." I ° (U)
The case of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Wolff is well known to historians, who claim
that Dulles had made special arrangements for the German participants in Operation
SUNRISE. After having met Wolff in Bern in March 1945, Dulles cabled Washington to
say that "Wolff s distinctive personality, our reports and impressions indicate he
represents more moderate element in Waffen SS, with mixture of romanticism. Probably
most dynamic personality North Italy and most powerful after Kesselring." I I (U)
After the German surrender, the Allies did not put Wolff on trial at the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, although the Americans extensively
interrogated him. The British then held him as a witness in the trial of Field Marshal
Kesslering until 1949 and subsequently placed the SS general on trial in Hamburg. The
British failed, however, to present a solid case against Wolff. Aided by affidavits from
Dulles and other Allied officers involved in the German surrender in Italy, Wolff won an
outright acquittal. The West German Government eventually filed its own charges
against Wolff in 1962 when he was found guilty of being "continuously engaged and
deeply entangled in guilt" for the crimes of the Third Reich. He received a 15-year
prison sentence. 12 (U)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
As he wrote his recollections of Operation SUNRISE, Dulles had this to say about
Karl Wolff:
This is not the place or the time to attempt to pass on the extent of Wolff s guilt or
to analyze his incentives and motives in acting as he did in the Sunrise operation.
The German court has rendered its judgment, and it is useless to attempt here to
reconcile his conduct as a close confidant of Himmler's for many years with that
of the man who, more than any other person, contributed to the final German
surrender in North Italy. . . . The conclusions must be left to history. One point
seems to me to be clear: Once convinced that he and the German people had been
deceived and misled by Hitler, and that by prolonging the war Hitler was merely
condemning the German people to useless slaughter, Wolff determined that
whatever his past purposes and motivations might have been, it was his duty,
henceforth, to do what he could to end the war. During the weeks of our
negotiations he never weakened in this determination, or varied from this course;
he never, as far as I could see, made us promises which he failed to fulfill within
the limits of his power and capabilities. Hence, he made his great contribution to
the success of the Sunrise operation." (U)
While the case of SS Gen. Wolff has attracted the most attention, numerous
intermediaries paved the road to the eventual German surrender in northern Italy. How
did the other German participants in Operation SUNRISE fare at the hands of the
Western Allies? Three SS officers —Eugen Dollmann, Eugen Wenner, and Guido
Zimmer—also played important roles in Operation SUNRISE. When
Obergruppenfuhrer Wolff decided to contact the Allies, moreover, he did so through an
Italian businessman, Baron Luigi Parilli. The postwar records of those four men illustrate
the dilemmas facing the conquerors in later years. (U)

Crisis in Rome (U)

I3 Dulles, The Secret Surrender, p. 253. (U)

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The case of General Wolff was the best known of troubles that faced the German
participants involved in Operation SUNRISE. As new players and political forces
emerged in postwar Europe and Washington, the US government agencies in contact with
the former German officers multiplied—and in many cases these organizational shifts
erased institutional memories. Eugen Dollmann and Eugen Wenner created problems for
the Allies in the years after the war, with Dollmann remaining active in the intelligence
arena in Europe for the next decade. (U)
After a lengthy confinement, Dollmann and Wenner escaped from an Allied
prisoner of war camp in 1946. In August of that year, Capt. James J. Angleton, the head
of SCl/Z, the counterintelligence branch in Rome of the Strategic Services Unit (the
successor to OSS), learned from Baron Luigi Parilli that Italian military intelligence had
placed Dollmann and Wenner in custody in Milan. According to Parilli, a rightwing
Italian faction planned to use both Germans to discredit the Allies. 14 (S)
To forestall such a plot, Angleton managed to bring Dollmann and Wenner to
Rome and provided them with false identities. He also urged the US Army to publish a
"Cardinal Ildebrando Schuster of Milan claimed that he had saved Italy from German destruction and had
arranged for the Nazi surrender. A supporter of the Italian Fascist regime, Schuster had, in fact, been
involved in separate unsuccessful negotiations between the Italians and Germans in the last year of the war.
By using Dollmann and Wenner, Italian conservatives hoped to stir nationalistic fervor against the
Americans and the British, just as the Allies were negotiating a peace settlement with Italy. Bringing
German military and SS officers to justice for Nazi crimes committed in wartime Italy raised troublesome
issues in postwar Italy, including wartime collaboration with the Nazis, the role of the Catholic Church, and
how Italian Communisms used Italy's fascist past against the present Italian Government and the Allies.
The Allies ruled Italy through the Allied Control Council under the terms of the September 1943 armistice,
although the Italian Government was responsible for internal affairs after December 1945. The 1946 peace
treaty, dictated to Italy by the Allies, aroused considerable antagonism on the part of both Italian left and
rightwing parties. See Smith and Agarossi, Operation Sunrise, pp. 57, 66, 138, and 142. See also
Giuseppe Mammarella, Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943-1965 (Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1966), pp. 159-175. For further details, see Cable,
I to Snecial Operations, 20
November 1946, IN 44607, (S), in Directorate of Operations Records, C._
2, Box 7, Folder 201,
CIA Archives and Records Center (hereafter cited as DO Records, job, box, folder, and CIA AARC). (S)

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"white paper" on Operation SUNRISE to counteract the attacks by Italian rightists and
communists. The Italian police, however, arrested Dollmann, and he became caught up
in an internal power struggle within the Italian bureaucracy. Angleton, in turn, tried to
get Dollmann released from Italian custody. After learning about Dollmann's arrival in
Rome, the Italian Communism press raised his name as a witness, or as a possible
defendant, at the trial of Naii officers involved in the German massacre of 335 Italian
civilians in March 1944. 15 (S)
The British and Americans in Rome could not agree whether Dollmann and
Wenner had been offered any sort of immunity or protection as a result of their role in
Operation SUNRISE. British Maj. Gen. Terence S. Airy, one of the two Allied generals

I5 Cable. C Dto Special Operations, 20 November

1664,
664, IN 44607, (S), in DO Records, C
, Box 7, Folder 201,CIA ARC. Italian partisans attacked a column of SS troops in the Via
Rasella in Rome on 23 March 1944, killing some 32 soldiers. Upon hearing the news, Hitler ordered
German authorities in Rome to kill ten Italians for every German death. SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Herbert
Kappler, the head of the SS in Rome, hastily gathered Jews, communisms, and other prisoners and brutally
murdered 335 men and boys in the Ardeatine caves outside of Rome the following day. With the liberation
of Rome by the Americans in June 1944, Italian authorities began the gruesome task of recovering and
identifying the remains. In November 1946, the British tried two German generals for their role in the
Ardeatine Caves massacre; Kappler was a witness for the prosecution. The court found the two generals
guilty and sentenced them to death. As it turned out, the British later remanded the sentences to life
imprisonment and then cancelled the jail terms. The British released one of the generals in 1952 (the other
had died in prison of natural causes). In the meantime, the British also tried Field Marshal Kesselring in
1947 for ordering German troops to slaughter Italian civilians in Rome and elsewhere. He was found guilty
and sentenced to death; a judgment that aroused great debate in Great Britain. Winston Churchill and other
senior British leaders protested Kesselring's fate, and it was reduced to life imprisonment. In 1952,
Kesselring also returned to West Germany as a free man. In July 1947, the British turned Herbert Kappler
over to the Italian Government. In May 1948, the Italians tried Kappler and five other SS officers for their
roles in the Ardeatine caves massacre. All of the officers, with the exception of Kappler, were acquitted.
The Italian military tribunal found Kappler, as the commander, guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to
life imprisonment. After numerous appeals, the Italian Supreme Court confirmed the sentencing. Twentyfour years later, Kappler's wife assisted him in escaping from an Italian prison and smuggled him to West
Germany. Claiming that he was a "Christ-like figure," Mrs. Kappler declared, "the more they hate Herbert
Kappler, the more I love him. He was only obeying orders." Kappler died in West Germany in February
1978 at the age of 70. See Richard Raiber, "Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, Via Rasella, and the
`Girmy Mission," Militargeschichliche Mitteilungen 56 (1997), pp. 69-106. See also Robert Katz, Death
in Rome (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967), pp. 225-238. For Kappler's postwar troubles, see
"Herbert Kappler Dies; Nazi Fled Captivity in Rome," New York Times, 10 February 1978, p. A5. (U)

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who met with Wolff during the negotiations, denied that Dollmann played any role in the
surrender proceedings. Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), in turn, issued a press
release to this effect, stating that it had Dollmann in custody after his escape from a
British POW camp earlier in the year.

I6

Angleton, however, continued to urge officials

in Italy and in Washington to help Dollmann and Wenner, both of whom had since been
transferred to an American military prison in Rome." (S)
In Washington, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG, successor to SSU)
scrambled to find a way out of the mess.

r_

chief of CIG's Control branch,

contacted the State Department to ascertain its views on the Dollmann-Wenner case.I8
-Thold State that "he was in agreement that the record should be kept clear in Italy
and that we should not allow the Communisms to undermine our position on a false set of
facts, which could be cleared up by an official statement setting forth the truth with
regard to Dollmann and Wenner." Walter Dowling, the head of the Italian Desk at the
State Department and the official assigned to provide the Department's views on the case,

I6Dollmann's arrest is discussed in "Germans on Trial in Rome Massacre," New York Times, 18 November
1946, p. 5. The New York Times provided limited coverage of the British trial of Gens. Eberhard von
Mackenson, commander of the German 14 th Army, and Kurt Maelzer, German commandant in Rome, in
November 1946. (S)
"Cable, E.
to SO, 20 November 1946, C J 664, In 44607, (S), in DO Records,
2,, Box
7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. (S)
I8 Rome telegram 4255, 21 November 1946, provided the Secretary of State, with details of the Dollmann
case as the State Department had learned from the Italian press and from the American military and
intelligence. According to the cable, the Italian press "has commented bitterly, with usual strong antiAllied bias and propaganda appeal to latent Xenophobia. Principal complaints are that Allies have
derogated Italian police sovereignty and have further taken and hidden German officer who may well be
connected with Ardeatine caves massacre." A copy of the State Department telegram is found in DO
Records, c
Box 7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. (U)

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told C. 'that State felt that the US Government should not "protect" the two
Germans. 19 (S)
C -also faced a problem of ascertaining whether the Allies had made any
promises to Dollmann and Wenner during the negotiations. In researching the case for
Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenburg, the Director of Central Intelligence, C -reviewed the
1946 British interrogation report of Dollmann as well as Dulles's 1945 report of
Operation SUNRISE to see what information he could find. E 1 determined that they
had participated in the surrender negotiations "at no small risk." He found no evidence
that either had received any commitments. Dulles himself confirmed to C. -3that he had
"made no promises or commitments to Dollmann or Wenner, nor did he authorize any
other person to make such commitments." Dulles stated that "these men did participate
in the negotiations and his feeling is that if they are in trouble that some effort should be
made to help them." c i agreed and told his superiors that "whether or not binding
commitments were made to Dollmann or Wenner, it seems that we owe some
consideration to these two men." 20 (S)

IS E
; summary of the Dollmann-Wenner case and his discussion with Dulles are found in "Eugenio
7, Box 7, Folder 210, CIA
Dollmann and Eugene Wenner," no date, (S), in DO Records, EL
was the chief of Control tbr the Office of Special Operations
ARC. Born in 1902 in Los Angeles,
(OSO) in CIG. In this position, he was uiG's liaison officer with the State and Treasury Departments, the
military, and the FBI. He was a graduate of Yale University and its law school and served as a Foreign
Service officer in Latin America, the Far East, and Europe from 1928 until he joined OSS in 1943. Upon
his transfer to OSS, served as the chief of intelligence operations at Allied Forces Headquarters in
Caserta, Italy, and as Dulles's successor as the OSS and later SSU chief of mission in Bern, Switzerland.
C , resigned from CIG in June 1947. See Personnel File, c
(S)
, Box 7, Folder
— Eugenio Dollmann and Eugene Wenner," no date, (S), in DO Records, C._
201, CIA ARC. (S)
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On 27 November, Gen. Vandenburg cabled to Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee, Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater and commanding general of the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations United States Army (MTOUSA), stating that a
review of the OSS operational records and discussions With both Allen Dulles and Maj.
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who had been the American general officer present during the
SUNRISE talks, confirmed Dollmann's role in the surrender proceedings. 21 The DCI
told Gen. Lee that "it would appear that present representations by Italians is attempt to
undermine Allied position in Italy and in view of the above facts and particularly the
repercussions and results that any unjust treatment of these individuals would have on the
future long-range United States intelligence activities in Italy." Following the
recommendations offered by C. l Vandenburg stated that "it would appear that Allied
interests would best be served if AFHQ would confirm that Dollman[n] and Wenner
participated in SUNRISE negotiations and show these individuals appropriate
consideration in present circumstances." The DCI added that the State Department had
no objection to this proposed course of action. 22 (S)
Gen. Lee replied to Gen. Vandenberg on 29 November 1946. According to
research that Lee had done in Italy, Lemnitzer and Airey, the two Allied generals who
represented Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, during the
2I

Lyman L. Letnnitzer served as chief of staff to British Gen. Sir Harold Alexander who was the Supreme
Allied Commander for the Mediterranean Theater. He later served as chief of staff to the US commander
of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. See Ronald H. Cole, Lorna S. Jaffe, Walter S. Poole, and
Willard J. Webb, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Joint History Office,
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), pp. 66-75. (U)
22
Cable, Central Intelligence Group to Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
(COMGENMED), 27 November 1946, War Department 86566, (S), in DO Records, C
, Box
8, Folder 161, CIA ARC. A similar cable was sent from OSO to CI ]on the same date. (S)

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meetings with Wolff had "had the strictest instruction not to offer any form of immunity
or reward to any individual and only operate on the basis of unconditional surrender."
Lee stated, "they scrupulously carried out their instructions." Any promises made by any
other individual or party to the Germans ran counter to Eisenhower's orders. 23 (S)
Gen. Lee categorically denied that Dollmatm played any part in the negotiations
and refused to release him, claiming such a step would "not help Dollmatm and would
create confusion with respect to Allied Force Headquarters position." The American
commander noted that his headquarters had already offered Dollmann to the British as a
witness and would hand him over to the Italians if an Italian court decided to press
charges. "Since it is now known that Dollmann is held in United States custody, it would
place Allied Force Headquarters in untenable position morally should it refuse request
from Italian court that Dollmann testify." If and when legal proceedings subsided, Lee
promised, the Army would then "repatriate Dollmann through normal United States
chatmels." 24 (S)
Lee's cable brought a sigh of relief in Washington. On 3 December, Vandenberg
informed Lee that he "greatly appreciate[d] proposed action on Dollmann." Vandenburg,
in turn, provided the Army in Italy with further information on Dollmann's role as an
intermediary between Wolff and Dulles as well as in facilitating the release of the two
Italian prisoners held by the Nazis. "Records and Mr. Allen Dulles confirm that no
immunity in any form was offered to any individual involved in SUNRISE," Vandenberg

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assured Lee. "Interest of the Central Intelligence Group," the DCI stated, "is solely to
insure that long-range intelligence activities of the United States will be secured."

25

(S)

Continuing Intelligence Value (U)

By the end of December 1946, Gen. Lee in Caserta reported that neither the
British nor the Americans wanted to hold Dollmann for war crimes prosecution. The
Italians had not taken any steps to gain custody of either Dollmann or Wenner. Lee
recommended that Dollmann be returned to Germany where the Army could detain him
if the Italians decided to press criminal charges. 26 In relaying this information to
Angleton, the Central Intelligence Group stated that he should "confidentially advise
Dollmann solution of his difficulties and repatriation to Germany solely of efforts this
organization. 27 (S)
The Dollmann-Wenner case came to a head in the spring of 1947. In mid-April,
Joseph N. Greene, the acting US Political Adviser to Gen. Lee, reported to Washignton
that the Italians had asked for Dollmann's transfer on two occasions in January and again

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
in April, but that the Army had failed to act. 28 The Italians did not know that the
Americans also had Wenner, but his fate was clearly linked to Dollmann's. Both men,
the Army felt, had "continuing intelligence value" and should be transferred to the
Army's control in Germany. 29 By the first week of May, the State Department reported
that the Army now wanted to "dispose" of the two SS officers "without further delay."3°
(S)
In mid-May, the Army provided the State Department with an Italian warrant for
the arrest of four German SS officers, including Dollmann, for the murder of Italian
citizens. Of the four, the Americans had only Dollmann, who was ill at the time and
receiving treatment at the American military hospital in Rome. By now, however, State
Department officials in Italy wondered if handing Dollmann over to the Italians was a
good idea. The US consulate in Leghorn advised the State Department that the "long
range interest (including CIG) in Dollmann hinges on likelihood that if he is abandoned
to Italian jurisdiction other agents will doubt American ability [to] protect them." 31 (S)-Italian interest in trying Dollmann finally prompted the Army to act. On 17 May,
the Army in Italy turned over Dollmann and Wenner to representatives of the Army's

28As the Army cut its troop strength in Italy, MTOUSA headquarters moved from Caserta to Leghorn in
April 1947. Most of the 25,000 American soldiers in Italy in early 1947 were employed in occupation
duties in Trieste, graves registration work, civil affairs and war crimes activities in Rome, and maintenance
of lines of communication from Leghorn to Austria, as well as training support for the new Italian army.
See US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. III: British Commonwealth,
Europe (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 880-882. (U)
29Leghorn to Secretary of State, 12 April 1947, State 53, (S), in Dollmann, C._
2)1, DO Records.
(S)
30
Leghorn to Secretary of State, 8 May 1947, State 73, (S), in Dollmann,
DO Records.
(S)
il Leghorn to Secretary of State, 15 May 1947, State 77, (S), in Dollmann, C._
, DO Records.
(S)

a

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Office of the Director of Intelligence (ODI) of the European Command in Germany.32
informed CIG Headquarters of the transfer two months later and observed
that American intelligence had done everything in its limited power to not only prevent
handing over Dollmann and Wenner to Italian authorities, but also to the British. C _2
asked Headquarters to contact both men in Germany to assist in their "rehabilitation";
Dollmann and Wenner had "information which would place present Italian political
regime in bad light if published." Likewise, CIG in Rome was still anxious to inform the
two Germans that their deliverance from the Italian authorities had come through its good
graces. 33 (S)
Dollmann's and Wenner's return to Germany did little to diminish their reputation
as hot potatoes. 34 The Army confined both men to its interrogation facility in Oberursel,
near Frankfurt, although they soon agitated to return to Italy in the fall of 1947. The new
Central Intelligence Agency argued against their return and stated that they should remain
in the American zone and, if they traveled to Italy, "we will not [original italics] intercede
32 COMGENUSFMTO, Leghorn, to CIG, 28 May 1947, F 76420, IN 15447, (S), in DO Records,
Box 7, Folder 203, CIA ARC. (S)
"
.3o SO, 7 July 1947,
_1373, IN 17693, (S) in Dollmann, E.
J DO Records. The
next week, Foreign Branch M, which ran OSO's operations in central Europe, requested Foreign Branch P,
responsible for southern Europe, to provide the German Mission with a summary of the Dollmann-Wenner
case. See E..
to FBP, "Dollmami and Wenner," 14 July 1947, (S), and Chief, FBP to Chief of
Station, Heidelberg, "Dollmann and Wenner," 31 July 1947, MGH-A-253, (S), both documents in
Dollmann, t_
Z, DO Records. (S)
34 Dollmann and Wenner were not the only Nazi intelligence personnel returned to Germany from Italy by
the Americans. In August 1946, SSU in Germany asked the Army to transfer Carmine Renato Senise, an
Italian citizen who spied for the Germans in the United States and Sweden during the war. SSU had
arrested Senise in January 1946 and held him for questioning in the Italian capital. By August of that year,
SSU grew concerned that Italian authorities would try Senise for collaboration, and he would then divulge
his penetration of OSS in Scandinavia during the war. SSU wanted the Army to transfer Senise from Italy
to Germany for further interrogation under American control. See Henry D. Hecksher to Chief, CIB,
USFET, "Senise, Carmine Renato (Request for Transfer of Senise from AFHQ, Italy to USFET)," 26
August 1946, LWX-991, XARZ-27328, (S), in DO Records, .0
2, Box 2, Folder 15, CIA ARC.
(S)

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their behalf to get them out again." If they went south, the two Germans ran the risk of
being arrested, interrogated, and held for war crimes by the Italians. CIA in Washington
agreed to pay for the rehabilitation costs for both Dollmann and Wenner, but only in
Germany. 35 (S)
The case led to further disagreements within the CIA and the Army in November
1947. Col. Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director for Special Operations, and
Gordon M. Stewart, CIA's chief of mission in Germany, met with Maj. Gen. George P.
Hays of ODI to discuss Dollmann and Wenner. Hays criticized the CIA's position in
advocating amnesty in Germany for both men. He "again pointed out that the American
army had won the war in Italy and that OSS publicity about Sunrise was in extremely
poor taste and that these individuals, although they may have helped us were, at the same
time, possible war criminals or war profiteers." Hayes opposed any form of amnesty
because it would "condone their crimes without proper examination." 36 (S)
Hayes's position, however, was not shared by all of his own office. The chief of
ODI's Operations Branch, a Col. Wentworth, insisted that the two German officers be
allowed to proceed to Italy. Gordon Stewart again opposed this because it "would be
embarrassing to us and dangerous to them." As a compromise, the Army and CIA agreed
to let the two SS men return to their homes in Germany on a pass in order to settle their
domestic affairs. Stewart, however, expressed continued concern about the two
Germans. "It is presumed," the mission chief told Washington, "that Dollmann and
35 S0 to Heildeberg, 22 October 1947, Washington 8089, OUT 53419, (S), in Dollmann, IC
_7
DO Records. (S)
36 Gordon M. Stewart, COS, Heidelberg, to FBM, "Eugen Dollmann and Eugen Wenner," 7 November
1947, MGH-A-1976, (S), in Dollmann,
J, DO Records. (S)

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Wenner will not return after their leave, and it is expected that they will not be heard
from in the future. When their failure to return is noted in ODDI, they will be entered in
the rogues' gallery, and if they are picked up in Germany, they will be consigned to a
civilian internment enclosure to await [a] spruchkammer [denazification] trial. If they
decide, against our orders, to return to Italy, they understand that absolutely no support
will be forthcoming from the Allies."37 (S)
Stewart privately expressed his frustration over the US Government's handling of
Dollmann and Wenner. "Had this case been purely and simply ours, I should have been
inclined to consign Dollmann and Wenner to a civilian internment enclosure and to have
helped them with their trial. As it happens, however, the case passed out of our hands in
the Italian phase, and complete responsibility for the two bodies rests with ODD! [sic]."
Army officials, Stewart noted, "realize the chance they are taking in attempting to shield
Dollmann and Wenner from the spruchkammer trial." 38 The Army released Dollmann
and Wenner from its interrogation center in November 1947, at which time the Central
Intelligence Agency considered its affairs with both men closed. (S)
Wenner soon disappeared from sight, only to turn up later in South America.
Dollmann, however, did not vanish. An Italian source told the CIA in the summer of
1948 that the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps employed him in Milan. 39 His life story
soon appeared in serialized articles in the Italian press in 1949, and he published a

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memoir, Call Me Coward, in 1955. 40 Dollmann moved from Italy to Switzerland and
then to Spain and Germany, occasionally coming into contact with US diplomats. 41 The
Agency kept its distance from the former German SS officer, even informing its

a, "We warn against operational use of Dollmann during his stay in Spain because
he has already been involved with several intelligence organizations in Western Europe
since 1945; his reputation for blackmail, subterfuge and double-dealing is infamous; he is
a homosexual: 42 (S)

The Zimmer Case (U)

Dollmann and Wenner were a handful, but the Americans also faced problems
with what to do with Guido Zimmer after the war. Like Dollmann, Zimmer's
connections in Italy were extensive. Unlike either Dollmann or Wenner, OSS recruited
Zimmer as an agent at the war's end and harbored him in the months afterward. (S)
Born in Germany in 1911, Zimmer joined the Nazi party in 1932 and became an
SD officer four years later. He was posted to Rome under Foreign Ministry cover in
40Dollmann's book describes his convoluted wartime and postwar activities, but focused on his experiences
after 1945. He claims that Allen Dulles told Karl Wolff at a meeting on 19 March 1945 in Ascona that
"although you have put forth no demands of a personal nature whatever, and although you have not even
asked for any undertaking concerning your future activities in Germany, I hope nevertheless that after the
surrender has been carried through we shall be able to count on your co-operation and that of your closest
associates." Eugen Dollmann, Call Me Coward. Trans. by Edward Fitzgerald (London: Kimber, 1956), p.
191. (S)
4I For example, see Chief of Base, Pullach to Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, "Eugen Dollmann Case," 18
Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1954,
August 1954, EGL-A-10377, (S), enclosing C
(C), and Chief of Mission, Frankfurt to Chief, EE, "Eugen Dollmann Case," 22 September 1954, EGQ-A3, DO Records. (S)
48865, (S), all in Dollmann, C
'
1, "Germans in Spain: Eugen Dollmann," 23 April 1952,
42Acting Chief, WE, to Chiet C
',DO Records. Dollmann was known to have been
WSM-W-1725, (S), in Dollmann,
involved with the Italian intelligence services, and the Swiss had expelled him after uncovering his
homosexual involvement with a Swiss police official. (S)

7

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1940, working for Herbert Kappler, a police attaché because the Nazis had agreed not to
assign intelligence officers on Fascist Italian soil. Zimmer's true role as an officer in
Amt VI, however, was exposed to the Italians, and he was forced to return to Germany.43
Hauptsturmfurhrer Zimmer did not return to Italy until February 1944, when he opened

Amt VI's office in Milan, where he organized networks of German and Italian staybehind
agents in northern Italy. (S)
Zimmer was also involved in the roundup of Jews in Milan and Genoa, working
under Hauptsturmfurhrer Theodore Saevecke, the chief of the SD's Aussenkommando
Milan. Saevecke's senior officer, Standartenfuehrer Walther Rauff, headed the SS
Gruppen Oberitalien West in Milan. Rauff, in turn, reported to SS Gruppenfuhrer und
Generalleutnant der Polizei Dr. Wilhelm Harster, the chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and
Sicherheitsdienst in Italy. While only a relatively small number of SS officers served in

Italy during the latter part of the war, all of these men had notorious criminal records.
Rauff, for example, had previously headed SS efforts to liquidate Jews through the use of
mobile vans after the invasion of the Soviet Union. 44 (S)
With his ties to both Nazi war criminals and to Operation SUNRISE, Zimmer
found himself in a unique position when the war ended in Italy. Two parts of the OSS
sought him—one to recruit him as an agent and the other to arrest him as an SS officer.
James J. Angleton, the commander of the SCl/Z in Italy, began rounding up SS officers
°According to one source, Zimmer received a report from a German agent in Rome about a threat to
Mussolini's life. In Kappler's absence, Zimmer gave the information to a German Embassy official who,
in turn, provided the details to the Italian authorities. Zimmer's role in the Embassy and the identity of his
source were thus compromised, and Zimmer was brought back to Germany. See SAINT BB8 (Capt. James
J. An g leton) to SAINT AMZON, "Zimmer Guido," 28 November 1945, JZX-5519, (S), in Guido Zimmer,
, DO Records. (S)
-3, DO Records. (S)
44For further details, see Walter Rauff, C-

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and Italian agents and collaborators even before the war ended. 45 Zimmer, as the head of
Amt VI in Milan, was a key suspect, especially as the Americans had uncovered his
extensive files, which outlined the organization of the SD's networks in Italy. (S)
On 11 September, four months after the end of the war, Angleton reported to the
head of X-2 in Washington that "Zimmer has become the CI 'ghost' of this theater." The
German officer was "evidently receiving protection from some high AFHQ quarter on the
basis of his contribution to the Sunrise operation." Angleton denounced this alleged
special treatment and noted that even Gen. Wolff had been arrested and sent to
Nuremberg. Zimmer, he said, "should be given at least a complete tactical interrogation
on Abt [sic] VI activities in the Milan area, details of which, from all available evidence,
he knows thoroughly." The X-2 office in Milan, Angleton observed, "has been
considerably exercised by the sloppiness with which the case has been handled and the
apparent 'clamming-up' which takes place when straight questions are asked." 46 (S)
What Angleton did not know was that Zimmer had escaped from Italy and made
his way to Germany, where he had been recruited as an agent by X-2. On 27 August
when Zimmer reported to US Army authorities in Erlangen, near Nuremberg, he claimed
to have just arrived from Salzburg in Austria. Zimmer asked to be turned over to the

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local Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) unit. 47 X-2's Capt. George A. Schriever soon
made arrangements for Zimmer to settle at his wife's house in Erlangen and submitted a
request to use Zimmer as an X-2 agent. 48 Schriever wanted Zimmer to penetrate a
shadowy German underground group known as Freikorps Adolf Hitler. 49 (S)
By the end of 1945, however, Zimmer's usefulness as an agent had diminished.
The Freikorps Adolf Hitler had "not developed into anything really interesting,"
Schriever reported. "We are now beginning to feel that it is one of those organizations
which exist only in the minds of some men along with the broken splendors of Dr.
Goebbel's propaganda."5° SSU officials in Germany and Italy now wanted Zimmer off

47According to a postwar source, Zimmer ended the war in Switzerland although he reportedly returned to
Milan in an American officer's uniform in the summer of 1945. See Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief,
Foreign Division M, "Guido Zimmer," 28 March 1951, MGLA-5858, (S), in Zimmer, C._
DO Records. (S)
48 Born in February 1911, George A. Schriever received a B.S. in Political Science from the University of
Missouri in 1933. He joined the US Army as a private in February 1942 and served in the Aleutian Islands,
rising to the rank of sergeant major. After completing the Officer Candidate School at Ft. Benning, GA,
Schriever joined OSS where he served in Special Operations (SO) until transferring to X-2 in December
1944. Schriever remained as an Army officer until the spring of 1946 and worked as a liaison officer
between the Central Intelligence Group and USFET on CI matters in Germany. C_

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their hands. 5I Capt. Angleton in Italy, who continued to argue that Zimmer did not
deserve any special favors from American intelligence, pressed for a full interrogation of
Zimmer by SSU officials in Germany. "The measure of [Zimmer's] good faith,"
Angleton wrote, "will be found by comparing whatever he has told you" with the facts as
uncovered by SSU in Italy.

52

(S)

SSU in Germany eventually agreed, but wanted Zimmer handled in Italy. Capt.
Angleton still wanted to interrogate Zimmer if he returned to Italian soi1. 53 He protested
to the Army officials in Italy, "Zimmer has enjoyed privileged treatment at the hands of
non-CI agencies in this Theater because of his role in the SUNRISE Operation. This
fact," he warned, "makes it difficult for this Unit, under present circumstances, to take a
position" regarding Zimmer's disposal in Italy. Angleton offered his Opinion that
Zimmer "at the outset was deserving of no better or worse treatment than that afforded
persons of much greater importance to the success of SUNRISE than he, namely General
Wolff and Dollmann." 54 (S)
The Army now intervened to keep Zimmer in Germany because it opposed
bringing Zimmer and his family to Italy. The Army declared that Zimmer should be
treated like any other enemy intelligence officer and held for interrogation in Germany

5I Zimmer, in the meantime, had written both Husmann and Waibel in Switzerland to ask for their help.
Husmann told Zimmer that Waibel had taken up his case with Gero von Gaevernitz. See Husmann to
Zimmer, 15 November 1945, in Luigi Parilli, C.
DO Records. (S)
52SA1NT BB8 (Angelton) to SAINT, AMZON, "Zimmer, Guido," 28 November 1945, JZX-5519, (S), in
Zimmer, C._
, DO Records. (S)
"Capt. Angleton to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, "Lt. Guido Zimmer," 11 February 1946, JZX-6613, (S), in
Zimmer,
DO Records. (S)
541bid. (S)

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and then eventual repatriation there. 55 This decision, in turn, prompted SSU in the
American Zone to ask that Headquarters step in to reverse the Army's decision. 56 (S)
Anxious not to get caught in the middle of the two arguing missions,
Headquarters simply sent a cable to Germany and Italy asking what steps have been taken
to review Zimmer's request with Allied Forces Headquarters. Washington emphasized
that Dulles wanted to provide aid and comfort to Zimmer for his work with Operation
SUNRISE and his postwar efforts on behalf of X-2 in Germany. 57 Angleton's response
on 6 March was succinct. "In view of hostility to Zimmer reentering, believe it necessary
for you to take action through the War Department. We can take no further action," he
declared. 58 (S)
SSU officials in Washington now scrambled to gather the facts to resolve the
Zimmer dilemma. A former OSS officer in Switzerland, Frederick J. Stalder,
summarized his activities with Zimmer during the surrender proceedings. "There is no
doubt," Stalder quoted Dulles' report on SUNRISE, "that if Zimmer had ever been
•

ight in any of these operations, he would not be alive today." 59 Stalder concluded by

saying that while Dulles offered no promises to those involved in the surrender

55Cable, Rome to Washington, 22 February 1946, Rome 2167, IN 33190, (S), abstract in Zimmer, C
DO Records. (S)
"Cable. AMZON to Washington, 25 February 1946, AMZON 5107, IN 3328, (S), abstract in Zimmer, C
DO Records. (S)
'Cable, Washington to Rome, Washington, 28 February 1946, Washington 15957, (S), abstract in Zimmer,'
DO Records. (S)
5 "Cable, Rome to Washington, 6 March 1946, Rome 2677, IN 33808, (S), abstract in Zimmer, C.
..3%) Records. (S)
"Frederick J. Stalder to [first name not identified, but probably Philip] Horton, "Max Zimmer, Gen.
Wolff's Aide in the Sunrise Operation," 3 April 1946, (no classification listed), in Zimmer„
DO Records. Philip Horton was the chief of the Reports Board at OSS Headquarters in Paris in
1945; he later served as the SSU C_
3chief of mission in France. (S)

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negotiations, he hoped that Allied officials would give Zimmer every "consideration."6°

(S)
SSU's Bern Station weighed in with a cable on 9 April and said that the decision
to send the SS officer back to Italy "should rest largely on 110's [Dulles's] analysis moral
obligation to Zimmer." In any case, SSU in Bern advocated a full interrogation because
Zimmer "was very active various branches German espionage and sabotage agencies
until beginning of end north Italy." 61 (S)
In an effort to provide further evidence of Zimmer's importance to American
intelligence, Cdr. Edward J. Green, the Deputy Chief of the German Mission, wrote to
Washington on 12 April. Green quoted Gero von Gaevernitz as saying that "Guido
Zimmer was of outstanding help in Sunrise Operation by sheltering and protecting Allied
radio operator in his house in Milano, Italy, under great personal risk, right under the
nose of the Gestapo." Green also endorsed a proposal by von Gaevernitz and Lt. Col.
Max Waibel of the Swiss General Staff that the US Government pay for the therapy of
Zimmer's children in Switzerland as they recovered from bouts of tuberculosis.

62

(U)

Even as Green wrote his memorandum to Washington, Headquarters announced
its decision in Zimmer's case on 10 April. In a brief note, X-2 stated that "you are
advised that no action will be taken in Washington insomuch as it is believed from a

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
review of this entire matter that Zimmer is not entitled to any such preferential
treatment.„63 (s)
After this flurry of attention in 1946, Zimmer disappeared from the intelligence
scene. 64 His former partner in Operation SUNRISE, Luigi Parilli, however, continued to
interest the new Central Intelligence Agency. 65 Through Parilli, the Americans
eventually renewed acquaintances with the German SS officer when the paths of Parilli
and Zimmer crossed again in late 1948. When the Italian made his first trip to Germany
since the war, he visited Zimmer in Erlangen and offered him a position as his private
secretary. By this point, Parilli had become the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Sovereign Order of Malta to the Bavarian government and the US
military occupation authorities. Parilli, in fact, had spent a fascinating time after the war,

—7D0
63 SAINT to SAINT, AB 2, "Guido Zimmer," 10 April 1946, (S), in Zimmer, C.
Records. (S)
64 While Zimmer's case came to a fitful close in the spring of 1946, Angleton in Italy remained interested in
Zimmer's wartime activities. In late June, Angleton reported to Washington that the so-called Zimmer
notebooks had been translated into English. The four notebooks, written in shorthand, were first translated
into German and then into English, accounting for their lengthy delay following X-2's seizure in Milan at
the end of the war. The notebooks, broken into 167 separate memos, covered the period from late 1944
until May 1945, although the months of November and December 1944 were missing. In Angleton's
viewpoint, Zinuner's notes "provide one of the richest single bodies of information on the activities of Abt.
VI Milan and the background of the Armistice negotiations." The notebooks contained detailed
descriptions of Italian agents in the employ of the Germans as well as on the activities of the SS in Italy. In
reviewing the notes, Angleton observed, "it is apparent that the pre-armistice negotiations were as much the
work of the Intelligence (most particularly Abt VI) system on the German side as it was from the side of
the Allies." See BB 8 (Angleton) to JJ2, "The Zimmer Note-books," 28 June 1946, JRX-3748, (S), in
DO Records. (S)
Zimmer,
65As early as July 1945, Parilli had fallen out with the OSS, who viewed him as a German agent. In 1946
and again in 1947, a series of articles appeared in Italian newspapers on the German surrender in Italy.
American intelligence felt that Parilli was the source of information for these articles and a self-promoter of
his role in facilitating the German contacts with the Allies. (S)

c

n,

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and he had traveled to the United States on three separate occasions in 1946 and 1947 for
business purposes. 66 (S)
In meeting with Zimmer in late 1948, Parilli was on the verge of making contact
with the Gehlen Organization, the nascent West German intelligence service. Parilli felt
that Zimmer could be of benefit in reestablishing ties with many of his wartime German
intelligence officials now in the service of the United States. In fact, Parilli's visit to
Germany smoothed the way for Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the German service, to
travel to Rome in January 1949. Accompanied by Col. William R. Philp, the US Army
officer responsible for the Gehlen Organization, Gehlen met with the American military
attaches in Rome, Madrid, and Paris. The meetings in Rome were particularly important
because Gehlen wanted to renew his wartime ties with the Vatican. 67 (S)
The CIA, however, expressed concern about the developing close ties between
Parilli and Gehlen, in part because of the Italian's efforts to get the Gehlen Organization
to aid his former colleagues, including Dollmann and Wolff. The Agency, in turn,
warned Gehlen of Parilli's real intentions and the German intelligence chief began to
suspect Parilli's own motives when it came time to discuss joint business ventures. By

66 CIA did not learn that Parilli had been to the United States until late 1948. This led to a flurry of memos
between the Agency and the State Department trying to ascertain just how often Parilli had been to
America. In 1947, the State Department rejected Parilli's non-quota immigrant visa sponsored by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff because of his involvement with the Nazis and his misrepresentation of the facts about his
relationship with OSS. See Cable, C. :.]to Special Operations, 17 December 1948,C
1649, IN 19585,
3to Special Operations, 6 January 1949,C 31688, IN 20804, (S); D.L. Nicholson, Chief,
(S); Cable,
Division of Security, Department of State to Robert A. Schow, Assistant Director, CIA, "Baron Luigi
Parilli, 1 April 1949, (S); Chief, Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, C.: _713aron Luigi Parilli," 20
April 1949, MSB-W-1129, (S); Nicholson to Schow, "Baron Luigi Parilli," 21 April 1949, (S); and Chief,
Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, j "Baron Luigi Parilli," 28 April 1949, MSB-W-1166, (S); all in
Parilli, t
, DO Records. (s)
67Cable, Munich to special Operations, 7 January 1949, Munich 252, IN 20936, (S), in Parilli, C
a DO Records. (S)

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the fall of 1949, Gehlen told his CIA contact that he would maintain "only the most
casual and friendly relationship" with the Italian. This news was well received at
Headquarters where it had learned that even Parilli's SS contacts, including Gen. Wolff,
considered him as an "out-and-out mercenary." 68 (S)
In 1951, the CIA opposed the move on the part of the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to nominate Parilli as the semiofficial liaison between
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner nations and the Vatican. In a
cable from Headquarters to c

a the CIA observed "Parilli undoubtedly has

numerous Vatican contacts and even direct access to Pope, we are advised that his
proposed appointment would cause unfavorable reaction among many influential Italians,
because of Parilli's double agent role during the war." The Agency also opposed Parilli's
appointment due to "certain questionable postwar activities and manipulations."69 (S)
The Agency's interest in both men diminished after the early 1950s. In Zimmer's
case, the CIA reported only an "academic interest, despite his long disappearance from
the intelligence scene." 7 ° Another report noted that Zimmer was connected to Parilli and
probably with SS groups in Germany. The Agency regarded Zimmer as "unimportant

68 See Cable, Munich to Special Operations, 23 June 1949, Munich 574, IN 35287, (S); Pullach to Special
Operations, 25 June 1949, Pullach 001, IN 35477, (S); and Special Operations to Pullach, Karlsruhe, 30
J DO Records. See also
June 1949, Washington 5954, OUT 84266, (S); all in Parilli„
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Foreign Branch M, "Baron Luigi Parilli," 9 August 1949, MGL-A192, (S); Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Foreign Branch M, "Luigi Parilli," 21 September 1949,
MGL-A-425, (S); and Chief, Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "Luigi Parilli," 4 October
, DO Records. (S)
1949, MGK-W-3082, (S), all in Parilli,
69Cah1 e cn,.cial Operations to a _315 June 1951, Washington 46436, OUT 53886, (S), in Parilli,
DO Records. (S)
"Chief, EE to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "Guido Zimmer," 9 January 1951, MGK-W-7381, (S), in
_.D, DO Records. (S)
Zimmer, a

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and not of sufficient stature to take the initiative and thus become dangerous." 7/ By the
time that Dulles wrote The Secret Surrender in 1966, Parilli, who had long suffered from
poor health, had died twelve years earlier. Guido Zimmer, "the aesthetic captain who had
always cut a rather unlikely figure in the SS uniform," had moved to Argentina. 72 (S)

Unique Contributions (U)

In its historical summary of the wartime years, the Strategic Services Unit
concluded that "the negotiations carried out through OSS/Bern for the surrender of the
enemy armies in northern Italy and southern Austria had underlined one of the unique
contributions an undercover—and hence quasi-official—agency could make in the course of
modem war." 73 But, in order to bring about the surrender, the OSS had to deal face-toface with the enemy. While Wolff, Dollmann, and Wenner did not suffer as harsh a fate
as some of their SS colleagues in terms of lengthy imprisonments or even capital
punishment for their war crimes, the CIA and its predecessors did little to assist them in
the years after the war. Dollmann, in fact, harbored resentment against the Americans for
his postwar circumstances. Only in the case of Zimmer do we find that X-2 in Germany
sheltered the SS officer while, ironically, X-2 in Italy pushed for his confinement and
interrogation as an enemy intelligence officer. From the available documentation, it is

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apparent that the CIA preferred to keep the Operation SUNRISE negotiators at a distance
and, in the case of Luigi Parilli, distrusted their motives and actions. (U)

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Chapter Two

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHOOSEXEMPT ION

MI

IAZ I WAR CR IMES el

itLOSURI AC?

RATE 1001

An SD Agent of Rare Importance (U)

If Operation SUNRISE represents the role that OSS played to bring about the
conclusion of the war by strategic means (the high-level discussions between senior
German and Allied officials), then the use of low-level agents to counter enemy
intelligence activities took more of a tactical character. This responsibility fell to OS S's
X-2, or counterespionage branch.' X-2 collected information on Axis intelligence
organizations and espionage activities while protecting OSS from penetration. Following
its establishment in 1943, X-2 also maintained security of OSS's own operations,
"vetted" or conducted background checks on OSS employees and agents, and acted in a
liaison capacity with other American counterintelligence agencies and with foreign
intelligence services. (U)
In northwestern Europe, X-2 units, known as Special Counter Intelligence (SCI)
detachments, operated with the American forces in the field, including the Twelfth Army
i For a general study of X-2, see Timothy J. Naftali,

X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American
Counterespionage, 1942-44 (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1993). Naftali has also
written an article discussing X-2's operations in postwar Germany. See Naftali, "Im Zerrspiegel:
US Gegenspionage in Deutschland, 1945-1948," in Wolfgang Krieger and Jurgen Weber, eds.,

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Group and its subordinate armies, the First, Third, and Ninth. X-2 also had similar units
serving with the Sixth Army Group and its Seventh Army, and liaison with the First
French Army. Other SCI detachments supported the Communications Zone of the
European Theater of Operations in France and the British Twenty-first Army Group.2
They fell under the counterintelligence branch of the G-2, or intelligence, section of the
various headquarters to which they were assigned. The strength of the SCI units ranged
from 15 officers and enlisted men at the Army Group level to 10 operating at the Army
level. Like most OSS organizations in the field and at home, the SCI detachments
included both male and female members, including civilians, as well as a handful of
officers and enlisted men who came from the US Navy and Marine Corps. The bulk of
the military personnel, however, hailed from the Army. All told, X-2 had some 200
officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel in Germany in mid-1945 under the overall
direction of Lt. Col. Andrew H. Berding. 3 (U)

2The 31' SCI Detachment, with the First Army, landed in France in June 1944 and was followed
by the Third Army's 62d SCI Detachment the following month. Both units formed the Twelfth
Army's Group SCI Detachment in August 1944, and it split following the liberation of Paris.
Approximately half of the personnel remained in the French capital as the headquarters for X-2 in
France. In the meantime, the 69th SCI Detachment came up with the Seventh Army in southern
France in August 1944. The detachment later split into three separate SCI units: the 11th, 556,
and 88 th, the later serving with the Seventh Army at the front and the two other detachments in
the rear areas. X-2/Paris also ran its own CI operations in addition to providing command and
control for the SCI detachments in the field. The 103rd SCI Detachment handled X-2 liaison
with the British in the Twenty-First Army Group's area of operations. OSS War Report, Vol. II,
pp. 249-250. (U)
3Berding, born in 1902, graduated from Oxford University and worked as a journalist and editor
before the war. Among his foreign posts, Berding had been AP's bureau chief in Rome during
the 1930s. After the war, Berding held senior positions in the US Government, including deputy
director of the US Information Agency and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. He
was the author of several books and coauthor of The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Berding died in
August 1989. Who's Who in America with World Notables: A Biographical Dictionary of

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X-2 became involved in some of the most interesting operations during World
War II, some of which formed the foundation for the earliest American intelligence
operations in the Cold War. As outlined in a February 1944 directive from Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), an SCI detachment in the field had
the following missions:

1. To distribute and interpret to the CI Staffs all counterespionage information
received by them from London and from other SCI units, and advise as to its
most effective and secure use.
2. To afford the maximum protection to special sources of secret
counterespionage information.
3. To advise CI Staffs in the selection of counterespionage targets whose capture
is likely to yield materials of value.
4. To assist CI staffs in the examination of captured enemy documents or
material of special counterespionage interest.
5. To assist CI Staffs in the interrogation of captured enemy agents.
6. To pass to London all information on enemy secret intelligence services
collected in the field, including such captured documents and other materials
as are no longer required in the field.
7. To serve as a direct channel between each Army Group headquarters for
information on enemy secret intelligence services collected in the field.
8. To serve as a channel between the Army Groups and from the Army Groups
to London for any other counterintelligence information that cannot be passed
through normal service channels. (U)

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The British intelligence services, primarily MI 5 and Section V of MI 6, provided
X-2 with extensive training and background on the German intelligence services. In
particular, the British used X-2 as the channel to provide OSS with intelligence derived
from German radio traffic—the famous ULTRA intercepts. Likewise, the British
indoctrinated the Americans in the shadowy world of counterintelligence, especially
double-agent operations. The British, by this time, had eliminated or doubled all of the
German agents in the United Kingdom. The British and X-2 set up a CI War Room in
the spring of 1944 to compile and distribute information about the German intelligence
personnel, agents and operations. OS S's London Office controlled all X-2 operations
although the Americans also set up a subordinate headquarters in Paris in the fall of 1944
to handle counterintelligence activities on the Continent. While the close American and
British cooperation experienced some strains as the Allies moved across Western Europe,
X-2's liaison with the British services proved essential to its wartime success and to the
future of American CI activities in the postwar years. 4 (U)
Almost immediately after the Normandy landings, X-2 found itself in the business
of tracking down agents left by the Germans behind Allied lines. As X-2 uncovered
these individuals scattered throughout France, it developed some of them as "controlled
enemy agent" operations. By early 1945, X-2 had recruited a number of these agents—
some Germans and many French and other native collaborators—for its penetration
operations. The growing number of such recruitments prompted Brig. Gen. Eugene L.
See Timothy J. Naftali, "De Gaulle's Pique and the Allied Counterespionage Triangle in World
War II," in Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, eds., In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in
Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994), pp. 379 - 410. (U)
4
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Harrison, G-2 of the Sixth Army Group, to provide guidance to his subordinate CI staffs
at Army Group headquarters as well as the Seventh Army and the French First Army. In
February 1945, Harrison called for a recruited enemy penetration agent to meet the
following criteria:

1. He should previously have had some close and trusted contact with the
German Intelligence Services (GIS), preferably the Sicherheitsdienst or
Abwehr.

2. His contact should have been on a fairly high level. Local informants would
not come within this category, although clerical employees who handled
records would.
3. He should have been close to some German intelligence official for whom he
could ask and to whom he would be instantly recognizable and
recommendable.
4. He should be intelligent enough to realize that Germany has lost the war, and
that his only chance to avoid the penalties for his previous association with the
GIS is to help eliminate [the] GIS.
5. We should have very definite holds over him. He should owe to us his release
from jail and temporary suspension of whatever sentence has been passed
against him. His family should be on our side of the lines, and it should be
established that there has been no estrangement from his family. His finances,
if any, should be under Allied control or surveillance.
6. He should have had as genuine a change of political heart as possible.
Undertaking a penetration mission merely to affect a release from jail is not
sufficient motive.
7. He may be promised financial recompense; however, the recruiter must not let
the prospective agent believe that the recruiter considers this any motive for
the mission. The recruiter must convince the agent that he, the recruiter,
believes the agent is undertaking the mission for patriotic motives, and the
monetary angle is merely a side-issue designed to pay expenses or to maintain
the agent's family.

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8. It is also believed that the penetration cases using persons who did not work
for the German Intelligence Services similarly fall within such category
because of the design that such persons, used as agents by us, shall become
double agents through being used by the enemy. 5 (U)

A Convinced Nazi (U)

The recruitment of enemy personnel as penetration agents presented both
opportunities and risks for American intelligence. Brig. Gen. Harrison had appointed
himself the sole approving authority in the Sixth Army Group for double agents. To act
as his executive, Harrison designated Lt. Cdr. Akeley P. Quirk, the Sixth Army Group's
SCI Detachment commander and a naval officer, as the coordinator of Enemy Penetration
Cases. Requests by subordinate commands, including the French, to use enemy
personnel as agents were routed through Lt. Cdr. Quirk who, in turn, submitted the names
of the prospective agents to the War Room in London. 6 (U)
When considering the use of enemy personnel, Harrison warned, "every effort
will be made to prevent the agent from having access to [Allied] military information or
observation." Likewise, case officers would not use any Allied military information as
"feed" material until it had been coordinated by Lt. Cdr. Quirk and cleared, "word for
word," by the G-2 and G-3 staffs at Army Group headquarters. Following the return of

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the agent to Allied control, the Sixth Army Group G-2 advised a full interrogation by the
case officer to determine the reliability of the agent and his future usefulness. Case
officers, in turn, would provide a full report of the operation to the G-2. 7 (U)
As early as Christmas 1944, in the midst of the German offensive in the
Ardennes, Lt. Cdr. Quirk expressed his concerns to Col. Harrison about how prospective
agents were being handled in the Seventh Army. Quirk protested the Seventh Army's
Counter Intelligence Corps handling of Ludwig Nebel, a newly captured prisoner.
Quirk's inquiry highlighted the difficulties of using Germans as penetration agents and
foreshadowed the risks that American intelligence took in using these individuals. 8 (U)
On 2 November 1944, G-2, Seventh Army cabled the G-2, Sixth Army Group to
report that two German saboteurs had been captured after crossing into American lines.
The brief message stated that the two men planned to destroy gasoline pipelines and then
travel to Paris to meet at the house of another saboteur. Identified as Ludwig Nebel, a
Swiss-born member of the Waffen SS and an Untersturmfuhrer in the SD, and Maurice
Zeller, a French civilian, the two men were captured prior to executing their mission. A
third accomplice, Ferdinand Vliegen, had escaped capture and was being sought by
American and French officials. 9 (S)
The next day, Lt. Arthur Iselin, Jr., a member of the Seventh Army's SCI
Detachment, provided X-2, Paris with a copy of Nebel's interrogation report by the 307th

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
CIC Detachment at Seventh Army headquarters. Following Nebel's capture by the 36th
Infantry Division near Le Tholy, the German agent presented himself as an Alsatian who
sought to join the French army. After the 36th CIC Detachment could not crack his story,
the Americans turned him over to agents of the French Securite Militaire. According to
an official CIC history, the French "gave him a thorough going over physically," and he
was "unmercifully clubbed." Still he refused to confess until George Perper, a special
agent with the Seventh Army's 307 th CIC Detachment, produced a photo, that Perper
claimed showed Nebel at Gestapo Headquarters in Paris. At this point, Nebel broke
down and revealed that he was a SS NCO assigned to the sabotage section of RSHA Amt
VI. I ° (s)
Thirty-two years old at the time of his capture, Nebel was described as a
"convinced Nazi" who "would have been glad to carry out his sabotage mission in
France." A deserter from the Swiss army, Nebel had joined the Waffen SS in 1942. 11 He
stated that he had received his orders directly from Walter Schellenberg, the head of Amt

"It. Arthur Iselin, Jr., Seventh Army SCI Detachment, to Robert Blum, X-2/Paris, "Preliminary
Interrogation Report on Nebel, Ludwig, alias Neumann, Leon (nom de guerre) alias Haas, Karl,"
3 November 1944, (S), enclosing Capt. M.E. Porter and Special Agent George A. Perper, 307th
CIC Detachment, to Officer in Charge, "Nebel, Ludwig, alias Neumann, Leon (nom de guerre)
alias Haas, Karl, confessed German Agent and Saboteur," 3 November 1944, (S), in Nebel, C
DO Records. Porter and Perper wrote a follow-up report on Nebel's contacts in
France on 14 November 1944. This CIC report and a 2 November 1944 translation of Nebel 'S
"Confession" are located in his 201 file. See also US Army Intelligence Center, History of the
Counter Intelligence Corps, Vol. XVII, To the German Frontier Part II: Southern Armies 15
September-15 December 1944 (Baltimore: US Army Intelligence Center, 1959), pp. 12-15
(hereafter cited as CIC History, volume and page numbers). Citations are taken from the
classified version of the CIC History, although the history has been declassified and is available
at the National Archives and Records Administration and at the US Army Intelligence and
Security Command, Ft. Belvoir, Va. (U)
"Ibid. (U)

1,

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VI, on 1 October 1944. Nebel received a million French francs, food, explosives, and an
identity card in the name of an Alsatian who had been killed in an air raid. I2 Dispatched
across the lines through a quiet sector, Nebel planned to join the French army or gain
some other employment in order to get an identity card. He would then move into the
interior of France to join other agents to locate Allied lines of communication and supply
networks. (S)
Even before Seventh Army had an opportunity to finish its interrogation of Nebel,
X-2 ordered that the German agent and his French accomplice be transferred to Paris for
further questioning. X-2 promised to return both men after three days for disposition by
CIC (both men faced trial and possible execution as spies)." Upon arriving at the
interrogation center in Paris, Maj. Franklin P. Holcomb, Jr., the chief of X-2/Paris,
quickly observed that "Nebel in particular is an SD agent of rare importance, fully trained
in sabotage, well acquainted with both officials and operations of the SD, and also briefed
to contact a large staybehind network in France." Maj. Holcomb obtained verbal
permission from the chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2 at SHAEF to "exploit
I2 Interestingly, the Germans had also given British pounds to Nebel, which proved to be
counterfeit. According to a British report in January 1945, "this incident is an interesting one if
we assume that Amt VI S drew these notes from Germany and gave them to an agent for him to
live on, this will be the first occasion that we know of where the Germans have deliberately paid
an agent of their's with forged notes." While the British had encountered counterfeit money in
the possession of German agents in Portugal, the British believed that the agents had obtained this
false money on the black market. British intelligence felt that paying an agent in fake money was
"almost incredibly stupid," and if "this is a new feature in the technique of the German Secret
Service, it may be worth having on record." E.W. Reid to Teresa Clay, 11 January 1945, [no
classification listed] in Nebel, .C_
DO Records. (U)
"Cable, X-2/Paris to X-2, Seventh Army, 3 November 1944, Nr. 187, (no classification listed), in
Nebel, a
DO Records. According to Lord Rothschild, Lt. Gen. Alexander McC.
Patch, commander of the Seventh Army, wanted Nebel back from Paris within three days to
execute him. (S)
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the capture of Nebel and Zeller by utilizing them to identify and thus help destroy the
entire SD network." Holcomb promised to keep the Seventh Army G-2 posted of
developments in the case. I4 (S)
In Paris, Nebel underwent joint interrogations by both X-2 and MI 5 on his
espionage background and sabotage mission. Lord Victor Rothschild of British
intelligence examined Nebel's knowledge of German sabotage and quickly extracted
what he needed from him. 15 Rothschild then advocated that Nebel be sent to London for
a more detailed interrogation at Camp 020, a special MI 5 facility for enemy prisoners in
Great Britain. Instead, the French, who had been allowed to read the Nebel interrogation
material, wanted to retain him in order to identify other members of the German
staybehind network near Paris. The arrest of the third member of Nebel's team also
added to the need for further interrogation of the three men in France. 16 (S)

"Maj. Franldin P. Holcomb, Jr., X-2/Paris to G - 2, Seventh Army, "Custody of Nebel, Ludwig
and Zeller, Maurice by SCI-Paris," 10 November 1944, (S), in Nebel, C_
_a, DO
Records. Holcomb, born in 1917 in Washington, DC, was the son of Gen. Thomas Holcomb, the
commandant of the US Marine Corps. After attending Georgetown University, Holcomb entered
the Marine Corps in 1941 and served with OSS in Morocco, Algeria, the United Kingdom,
France, and China before leaving the service as a major in 1946. Holcomb later worked with the
Department of Commerce

I5 Born in 1910, Lord Nathaniel Mayer Victor Rothschild was educated at Harrow and received
his M.A. and Ph.D. from Trinity College, Cambridge. After his wartime service, Lord Rothschild
was assistant director of research in the Department of Zoology in Cambridge and a specialist on
fertilization. He held numerous appointments until his death in 1990. See Rothschild entry in
C.S. Nicholls, ed. The Dictionary of National Biography 1986-1990 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 384-385. (U)
16 B.1.0 to War Room, through Mr. Noble, 16 November 1944, enclosing "Ludwig Nebel
(Saboteur) Tactical Interrogation," 11 November 1944, (S); IID Cross-Reference Form, "SCI
Weekly Operations Report (Wed. 8 Nov. thru Wed. 15 November)," 21 November 1944, FX10
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By late November, the Allies decided to use Nebel to track down his French
contacts, especially a Richard Martin, the former mayor of Margency, near Paris, who
headed a staybehind organization codenamed JEANNE. In addition to Martin, the Allies
sought several other French links to the Germans and hoped to re-establish contact with
Nebel's SS associate in order to identify the locations of hidden ammunition dumps and
radio operators in Paris." At this point, X-2 assigned Nebel the codename OSTRICH
and transferred control of his third partner to the French. The Americans had not decided
what to do with Maurice Zeller, the Frenchman captured with Nebel. 18 (S)
Lt. Charles C. Michaelis, the X-2 case officer for the OSTRICH project, with the
permission of Lord Rothschild, released Nebel from confinement and put him up in an
apartment. I9 Michaelis and the French took Nebel to various locations near Paris in order
to identify individuals with whom he had been in contact before the Allied invasion. Lt.
Michaelis translated the comments of Lt. Bardet, the French Securite Militaire officer
010 - 1116, (S); Victor [Rothschild] to Miss Teresa Clay, B.! .C., 20 November 1944, (S); in
, DO Records. (S)
Nebel, C..
17 1' Lt. Charles C. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Paris, "Nebel, Zeller, Vliegen Cases,"
1J DO Records. (S)
27 November 1944," (no classification listed), in Nebel,
18 0 Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Nebell [sic], Zeller, Vliegen Case— Situation Report," 26
November 1944, (no classification listed); see Clipping, "SCI Weekly Report 22.11.44-29.11.44"
J DO Records. (S)
for the X-2 codename both in Nebel,
I9Born in 1910 in New York, Charles C. Michaelis lived his childhood and early adult years in
Paris. He was an avid sportsman, a journalist and photographer for various American news
papers in Europe during the 1930s and into the first years of the German occupation of France. In
1941, Michaelis returned to the United States and was inducted into the US Army in February
1942. After enlisted service, he completed OCS and was commissioned in October 1943.
Michaelis transferred to OSS in December 1943 and went to London shortly afterward to serve
with X-2. Following the invasion of France, Michaelis went with X-2 into France where he
specialized in locating and turning German agents. Michaelis returned to Paris where the Army
discharged him in December 1945. Michaelis remained in the French ca pital as the manager of
the Palais des Sports.
For further details, see Charles C. Michaelis, C...
, DO
j, Box 33, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
Records. See also DO Records, C_
11
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assigned to handle Nebel: "I believe that he is playing the game. [Nebel] is the prototype
of the accomplished adventurer, with no scruples whatsoever, recognizing but one
master, money, and one passion, women. As he is being kept happy," the X-2 officer
recounted, "there is no reason why he should, in his present situation, cause us any
trouble. Besides," Michaelis translated from the French report, "he is aware of the
present critical situation of Germany, which should be a major reason for him to switch
camps.' ,20 In a mid-December 1944 summary of Nebel's work with OSS, it was noted
that the Allies controlled Nebel because his girlfriend and infant daughter lived in
Mulhouse under Allied occupation. 21 Likewise, the Americans retained a large sum of
money that Nebel had with him at the time of his capture. X-2, in the meantime,
arranged to get his gold watch and knife returned to him from the 307 t1 CIC
Detachment. 22 (S)

We Have Confidence in Him (U)

With the opening of the German offensive in the Ardennes, Nebel's importance to
Allied intelligence increased dramatically. 23 The need for the Americans and British to

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
round up staybehind German agents in France mounted as the Allies learned that German
special forces had landed behind their lines during the Battle of the Bulge. 24 The
Americans, in particular, made a frenzied effort to track down disguised German troops
who caused havoc—but little actual damage—behind the lines. In a plan devised by Otto
Skorzeny and dubbed Operation GRIEF, a special unit of Germans who spoke varying
degrees of English dressed in American uniforms and drove Allied vehicles. At the same
time, German paratroopers, commanded by Oberst Friedrich A. Freiherr von der Heydte,
parachuted into Belgium to create further panic. Soon, Allied troops all the way back to
Paris were on the lookout for Germans dressed in US Army uniforms. On 28 December,
Michaelis reported that Nebel had spent several days at the Cafe de la Paix trying to
recognize German soldiers in American uniforms. 25 (S)
While Nebel spotted neither Otto Skorzeny nor any other German soldiers in
Paris, he was key to the unraveling of three networks of German agents operating in
France. 26 He enabled the Allies to capture Fernande Ney, the wife of the leader of the

if NNE sabotage network, who had returned to France and met with Nebel in Paris, at
which time she was arrested by X-2. 27 Ney's information led X-2 to Charles Moreau,

3, DO
24Cable, X-2/Paris to X-2/London, 22 December 1944, (S), in Nebel, C.
Records. (S)
25Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "OSTRICH Situation Report," 28 December 1944, [no
, DO Records. (S)
classification listed], in Nebel, LL
a
list
of
persons
identified
by
Nebel,
see
X-2/Paris,
"Personalities of RSHA Amt VI and the
26For
Lagardere Organization Under Control of SCI Paris," 17 January 1945, S-439, FPX-1901, (S), in
.3 DO Records. Several of these German agents later became double
Nebel, C,
agents for X-2. (S)
27Extract, SCI Weekly Operations Report, 13-20 December 1944, [no classification listed], in
DO Records. For a notice seeking the arrest of Ney's husband, see XNebel,
13

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another member of the group, and several other German support agents. 28 Further
interrogations revealed that the Germans had dispatched three young French women from
Germany via Switzerland to establish contact with Nebel. 29 The French also arrested
Rene Poncin, a key contact of Nebel's in Paris and a member of the JEANNE network.
Ironically, Poncin had enlisted in the French army after the liberation and was serving on
the frontlines at the time of his apprehension. 3 ° Furthermore, Nebel identified another
French agent of the Germans who had escaped to Switzerland. Armed with this
information, X-2/Paris contacted its counterparts in Switzerland, which resulted in the
agent's arrest by Swiss authorities. 31 (S)
These arrests, coupled with Nebel's firsthand knowledge of the SD sabotage rings
organized by Hauptsturmfuhrer Arno Besekow, a German SS officer and deputy to Otto
Skorzeny, persuaded Lt. Michaelis and Col. Rothschild of Nebel's value, though not of
his virtue. 32 The French confirmed that Nebel's information had played a critical lead in
2/Paris, "Rene Desire Nev, Saboteur of RSHA, Amt VI/S," 13 January 1945, S-408, FPX-1902,
, DO Records. (S)
(S), in Nebel, C
3 , DO
Cable,
X-2/Paris
to
X-2/London,
28 December 1944, (S), in Nebel, a
28
Records. (S)
29Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "OSTRICH Situation Report," 22 December 1944, [no
3 DO Records. (S)
classification listed], in Nebel, c_
"Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "ttene Poncin, SD Agent and Member of RICHARD Organization,
Paris," 1 December 1944, [no classification listed]; and X-2/Paris, "Statement of Rene Poncin,
Member of SD-Controlled 'JEANNE' Organization," 21 December 1944, S-288, FPX-1630, (S),
3 DO Records. (S)
in Nebel, C
31 X-2/London to X-2/Paris, "Our Letter on Marechal of Nebel Case dated 2.12.44," 19 December
1944, [no classification listed]; and X-2/Paris to X-2/London, "Marechal," 2 January 1945, (S), in
-7 DO Records. See also X-2/Paris, "Marechal, German Agent," 27
Nebel, C
f.") DO Records. (S)
January 1945, S-522, FPX-2026, (S), in Nebel, E
32 See Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Counter-Sabotage Measures vs. Amt VI (BESEKOW)
, DO
Organization," 31 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, . C
Records. For an additional report, see SAINT, Paris to SAINT, London and Washington, 29
January 1945, inclosing 1st Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Resume of Known Activities of
14
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uncovering German caches. 33 "We have confidence in him," Michaelis declared. Nebel,
who had been granted many liberties while in American hands, "is convinced that the
German cause is lost and that he will play with us if only to avoid a worse fate which
may await him in Germany." His cooperation with his captors was also a favorable
mark, and OSS felt that Nebel's work on behalf of the Allies had not been exposed to the
enemy. Michaelis reported that the "Germans consider him reliable, sure, and a valuable
agent." 34 (S)
Despite the claims on Nebel's behalf, however, other X-2 officers expressed
doubts. On 9 January 1945, Paul C. Blum, the X-2 chief in Bern, cabled X-2 in Paris and
warned Allen Dulles, the OSS station chief, what he had learned from a senior Swiss
police official. "Shoot him at sight; he's bad," the Swiss had exclaimed, adding that
Nebel was "thoroughly Nazi and completely untrustworthy." Indeed, a Swiss court had
sentenced Nebel to 15 years in prison in absentia for deserting the Swiss Army. 35 (S)
Officers at the Seventh Army still smarted over Nebel's removal by X-2/Paris and
his transformation into an OSS penetration agent. Lt. Cdr. Quirk, the head of the Sixth

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Army Group's SCI Detachment, informed Col. Harrison, the G-2, on 22 December 1944
that Lt. Col. Burskin, chief of the Seventh Army's Counter Intelligence branch, and Maj.
Alvie L. McDuff, commander of the Seventh Army's CIC detachment, had not acted in
good faith regarding the handling and disposal of enemy agents. Quirk protested that
both officers were trying to undermine Nebel's use by OSS. In fact, Quirk claimed that
Burskin had even threatened to have Nebel shot if he came into the Seventh Army's lines.
Faced with this reaction and the fact that the Seventh Army CIC had told the French
about the OSS's employment of Nebel, Lt. Cdr. Quirk wanted to clarify whether the
Seventh Army had any jurisdiction in a theater-level double—agent operation. 36 (U)

A Big Luncheon Party (U)

Swiss and Seventh Army concerns notwithstanding, X-2/Paris soon had big plans
for Nebel. 37 By returning Nebel to German control, Michaelis and Lord Rothschild
hoped that the Nazis would believe him and dispatch other agents to France where the
Allies could easily round them up. They also tasked Nebel to obtain German sabotage
target lists, identify Amt VI personnel involved in sabotage training, and locate enemy
radio operators in France. 38 Nebel, in the meantime, prepared for his mission to return to

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
German control and perfected his cover story. Lt. Michaelis even introduced Nebel to
Herbert J.W. Berthold, another German intelligence turncoat and a successful X-2
penetration agent who was dressed in an American uniform. 39 Berthold formed an
"excellent" impression of Nebel and his ability to recount a convincing story.4°
Michaelis even hosted a "big luncheon party" as a sendoff for Nebel on 5 January 1945;
the guests included Lord Rothschild, French Lt. Bardet, and Berthold - a courtesy that
defied proper counterintelligence procedures. 41 (S)
X-2/Paris was taking a big gamble. If Nebel proved to be unreliable, he could
expose the identities of his case officers and describe Berthold, the other German double
agent recruited by the Allies. Nebel could also reveal that the Allies had virtually
wrapped up the JEANNE network. Nevertheless, Rothschild and Michaelis felt that
Nebel's knowledge of tactical importance was "minimal" and that the benefits of sending
Nebel back into German hands outweighed the risks. "It is," the British nobleman
concluded, "a matter of great urgency for OSTRICH to be passed through the lines." 42 (S)

39 Berthold was a highly-successful X-2 penetration agent known as JIGGER. He had served in
the Abwehr and provided the Allies with extensive information on German agent networks and
personalities as well as the locations of numerous ammunition dumps hidden in France. Lord
Rothschild, for example, noted on 26 September 1944 that "Lt. Michaelis is aware of the number
of times I have been out with JIGGER and the fact that these dumps cannot be found without
JIGGER." For further details on JIGGER, see OSS War Report, Vol. II, p. 251. Extensive
documents on JIGGER, provided by him, are located in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 190B,
Boxes 19 and 20, PARIS-X-2-0P-3, and Entry 171, Box 47, WASH-X-2-PTS-15, NARA. (U)
°Extract of a Journal Maintained by 1" Lt. Michaelis, 26 December 1944 entry, [no classification
2 DO Records. (S)
listed], in Nebel, C
41 Extract of a Journal Maintained by 1 st Lt. Michaelis, 5 January 1945 entry, [no classification
DO Records. (S)
listed], in Nebel,
J DO Records.
42Unsigned note with no title, 12 January 1945, (S), in Nebel,

a

,

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Deutsche Agent Bitte Ich zum lc (U)

On the night of 14-15 January 1945, Nebel crossed from the sector controlled by
the 80th US Infantry Division into the German lines near Ettelbruck, Luxemburg. 43 Lt.
Michaelis planned to maintain contact with Nebel through his father, who still lived in
Switzerland. Nebel, while in Germany, would send his father a note indicating that he
was well and had spent several weeks in Berlin. This would indicate that his project was
going well and that he would be dispatched to France in the next few weeks. Actually
obtaining this information from Nebel's father, however, soon posed a problem.
Michaelis instead recommended that X-2 should instead take his brother, Joseph, into its
confidence and tell him that Ludwig Nebel worked for the Allies. In exchange for the
brother's help, the Allies would promise to help clear Nebel's name with the Swiss
authorities after the war. 44 James R. Murphy, the head of X-2, who was in Paris at the
time, approved of this approach and relayed the information to Paul C. Blum, the X-2
chief in Bern. 45 (S)
In the meantime, Allied officials began to wonder where Nebel was in Germany.
Two German parachutists, captured near St. Quentin on 3 March 1945, claimed that

°Extract of a Journal Maintained by Lt. Michaelis, 22 January 1945 entry, [no classification
_3)0 Records. See also Maj. Andrew H. Berding, Chief, SCI,
listed], in Nebel, C.
Twelfth Army Group to Chief, CIB, Twelfth Army Group, "Penetration Agents, Twelfth Army
Group, to 23 January 1945," 23 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, c_
DO Records. (S)
44Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Contacting OSTRICH's Father in Switzerland," 22 January 1945,
[no classification listed], in Nebel, L
DO Records. (S)
45
JJ001[James R. Murphy] to DB001 [Paul C. Blum], "OSTRICH Operation (Part A & B)," 26
January 1945, [no classification listed], in Nebel, C
TJ DO Records. The records do
not indicate that OSS ever established contact with Nebel through his family in Switzerland. (S)
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Nebel, known as LEO, had been well received upon his return to German control in
January. The two agents reported that the SD had promoted Nebel and that Hitler himself
had rewarded him for his service in France. 46 In addition, Michaelis, now at the front
with the SCI detachment of the Sixth Army Group, reported to X-2 in Paris that another
captured German agent had told the French that Nebel was last seen in Wiesbaden in
mid-March. Michaelis was still hopeful, however, saying that he expected Nebel to
remain with his German unit and turn the entire group over to the Allies. 47 (S)
Michaelis soon heard Nebel's saga upon his return to Paris. Nebel had entered
the German lines and encountered the first picket post where he told the guards,
"Deutsche agent. Bitte zum Ic," — "German agent. Please send me to the Ic, or

intelligence officer." Nebel was directed to the division headquarters and waited there
while his story was checked out in Berlin. He eventually made his way back to
niedenthal, the headquarters for RSHA Amt VI/S. Otto Skorzeny warmly welcomed
Nebel and informed SS headquarters of his safe return. The SS directed Nebel to go to
Berlin to meet with Hitler to tell him about an abortive plot to kill French leader Charles
De Gaulle. On 30 January, Hitler promoted Nebel to SS Obersturmfuhrer and awarded
him the Iron Cross, First and Second Class. 48 (S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
While in Berlin, Nebel discussed his plans to return to France to organize further
resistance efforts. Nebel wanted to dispatch equipment to France, where another man,
Jacques Doriot, would use it to foment an uprising among the French against the Allies.
The death of Doriot a few days later in a bombing raid ended this portion of the German
plans, but Nebel proceeded to the front to prepare for his return to France. While at
Badenweiler in southern Germany at the headquarters of the XVIII SS Corps, Nebel
learned from Oberleutnant Kurt Merck, a former Abwehr officer stationed in France, that
an agent named Alois Tonin had betrayed him. Tonin, it turned out, had escorted Nebel
across the lines in October 1944 and had been captured by the French in Strasburg. He
had been doubled and sent back to Germany, but reported to the Germans directly that he
had learned from French officers that Nebel had been captured and severely interrogated
until he agreed to work for the Allies. 49 (S)
Nebel now found himself suspected by the Germans, but his friends, including
Skorzeny and Besekow, refused to believe Tonin's accusations. As the Allies pushed
into Germany, Nebel could not undertake his mission to France and he, along with other
Information," 30 April 1945, S-1668, FPX-6398, (S); X-2/Paris, "Interrogation of OSTRICH," 7
May 1945, [S number and FPX number illegible], (S); in Nebel, , DO Records.
(S)
49Ibid. Interestingly, Merck appears later as an important figure in the Klaus Barbie case.
Beyond his link to Nebel as mentioned above, Merck, alias Captain Kaiser, commanded a
German army unit, known as Kommando ADLER, to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence
work behind the enemy's lines. In the last weeks of the war, X-2 expressed interest in Merck's
activities and those of his former driver in France, Obergrefreiter Johnny Plum, and Merck's
French mistress, a Fraulein Richter. For further details on this side aspect of the Nebel case, see
SCI Detachment, Sixth Army Group, "Fraulein Richter, Mistress of Merck Alias Capt. Kaiser,"
17 May 1945, S-949, (S), and SCI Heidelberg, "Obergrefreiter Johnny Plum," 21 May 1945, S1579, [no classification listed], in Nebel, c_
,DO Records. Merck's own postwar
intelligence activities are found in Kurt Josef Merk [note his name has various spellings], C
DO Records. (S)
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elements of the SS in the Black Forest, sought shelter. On 22 April, Nebel (and two other
SD members) surrendered to the French army who transferred him to Paris. 50 (S)
A Criminal Thug and Wholehearted Nazi (U)

After V-E Day, Michaelis brought Nebel and Berthold with him to the
headquarters of the Sixth Army Group's SCI detachment in Heidelberg. 5I By June, X-2
had transferred control of the two men from the Sixth Army Group to the SCI detachment
of the Twelfth Army Group in Munich to "discover personalities of interest to us in our
general operations." 52 The following week, Capt. Eric W. Timm, commander of the SCI
detachment in Munich, reported that he had arranged for both Nebel and Berthold to be
employed by a firm to recover damaged vehicles." Under this cover, both men could
travel throughout Bavaria transporting goods and, at the same time, collect information

50 Ibid. (S)
5I Sixth Army Group SCI Detachment, "Weekly Activity Report 13 May 1945 to 20 May 1945,"
20 May 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 190B, PARIS-X-2-0P-9, Box 22, Folder 183,
NARA. (U)
52Twelfth Army Group SCI Detachment, "Activity Report for Week Ending 9 June 1945," 10
June 1945, LWX-4, enclosing Twelfth Army Group SCI Detachment to Assistant Chiefs of Staff,
G-2, Third Army, Seventh Army, and Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, Twelfth Army
Group, "Activity Report for Week Ending 9 June 1945," 10 June 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records,
Entry 108A, WASH-REG-INT-163, Box 287, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)
53 Eric W. Timm, born in 1914, joined OSS in 1944 after having worked for several years as the
FBI's chief of the sabotage section. He entered the Army in August 1944 with a direct
commission as a first lieutenant. Following assignments in Washington and London, Timm
became the liaison officer for the Third Army SCI Detachment in the spring of 1945. He returned
to the United States in late 1945 and received his discharge from military service in early 1946.

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for Capt. Michaelis, who had been posted with X-2 in Munich. 54 OSS hoped eventually
to use both men in intelligence operations. 55 Timm and Michaelis kept Nebel and
Berthold busy with small assignments that summer. 56 As it turned out however, X-2 was

unsuccessful in placing Nebel in the trucking business, and he continued to live with
Berthold in Munich in September. 57 X-2 noted disappointingly that "great difficulties
have been experienced in establishing JIGGER and OSTRICH under adequate business
cover, and their intelligence activities have as a result been necessarily circumscribed."58
With the departure of Capt. Michaelis from Munich in late October 1945 and directives
from Washington to reduce the overall number of assets, both Nebel and Berthold were
dropped. Capt. Timm determined that the two men required "too much attention, [and]

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service, and demand [ed] substantial payment for information which can be obtained
from more stable sources." 59 (U)
American intelligence perhaps thought that this would be the last that it

heard

from Nebel. In fact, X-2 soon learned the extent to which Nebel had concealed his past
from the Allies. In March 1946, Lt. Sidney H. Lenington, the deputy chief of X-2 in
Germany, assigned Flight Officer Sherman D. Lamb to examine a Danish request for the
extradition of an X-2 agent named Koehler for war crimes committed in Denmark.6°
Lenington provided Lamb with the following details:

59 Lt. Sidney H. Lennington, Deputy Chief, X-2/Germany, to SAINT, Washington, "SemiMonthly Reports, SCl/Munich," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Capt. Timm to
Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany and G-2, CIB, Third Army, "Semi-Monthly Operations
Report SCI Munich," 31 October 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, WASH-REGINT-163, Box 275, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)
60s i
an ey
H. Lenington, born in 1912 to American missionaries in Brazil, entered the US Army as
a private in 1943. He transferred to the OSS in early 1944 and served in Italy, France, and
Germany where he received a direct commission as a second lieutenant in June 1945. Lenington
remained overseas and became chief of X-2 in Germany in January 1946. Upon his discharge
from the Army in mid-1946, Crosby Lewis, the chief of the German Mission, noted that
"Lieutenant Lenington has had almost insuperable obstacles facing him in merely keeping the
headquarters office of X-2 Branch functioning. Despite no personnel and no assistance or
direction from Washington, however, he has managed to carry out the operations of the Branch,
ensuring the security of SI operations, and maintaining throughout an intelligence, imaginative,
and cheerful attitude." C

Sherman D. Lamb, born in Utah in 1924, joined the
Army Air Force in 1943. After serving as a bomber pilot in Europe, Lamb joined the OSS as a
pilot and air operations officer in the summer of 1945. By early 1946, Lamb was a liaison officer
with the Strategic Services Unit in Germany. He left government service in mid-1947 to return to
college.

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Koehler was an early recruit by this organization and performed a series of
missions behind German lines in addition to other missions carrying him well into
the German Zone which proved of great usefulness to the Allied Command in the
building up of the OB [Order of Battle] of the German army and the accumulation
of general information on members of the German Intelligence Service.
The information given by Koehler has subsequently proved entirely reliable, and
the organization feels itself obligated to protect and aid him as much as possible
in setting him up on a normal basis of living. For this reason we are very anxious
to determine whether the charges made by the Danish Mission are substantiated
by sufficient evidence so that any element of doubt as to Koehler's guilt is
removed. At the time he was recruited there were rumors to the effect that he had
been mixed up with some unsavory deal in Denmark, but the charges were never
substantiated and we would be very loath to allow him to be transferred to
Denmark to stand trial for some denunciation which had no basis of actual fact.61
(U)
Lenington, however, emphasized that Lamb should verify the evidence collected
by the investigators in Nuremberg and, "if Koehler is actually guilty, then we will not
stand in the way of his being transferred to Denmark for trial." Lamb met with the
Danish investigator and reported that the case "rests on evidence sufficiently convincing
as to assure a death sentence." 62 (U)
In June, SSU's Bern Station transmitted a request for information on Nebel from
the Swiss Federal Police. The German Mission responded with the news that Nebel had
been arrested and would shortly be turned over to the Danish Government. "When War
Crimes approached us initially on the matter of his extradition to Denmark," Lt. Sidney
H. Lenington the deputy chief of X-2 in Germany wrote, "we felt ourselves obligated to

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give him as much protection as possible due to the work performed by him while under
our control. Since that time, however, the Danish Government has become increasingly
insistent and has produced evidence which has made it impossible for us to block the
extradition."63 (S)
The Nebel case continued to distract American intelligence for the next two years,
although there is no indication in existing records that the Strategic Services Unit, the
Central Intelligence Group, or the Central Intelligence Agency ever reviewed the case to
determine how Nebel had deceived the Allies as to his wartime background and hid his
activities in Denmark. (S)
In January 1947, Brigadier C.D. Roberts of MI 6 approached Lt. Cdr. Winston M.
Scott, CIG's representative in London, about Nebel's situation. Roberts informed Scott
that the Danes now held Nebel for crimes that he had committed in Denmark while with
RSHA Amt VI. "Although this man was undoubtedly a criminal thug and a
wholehearted Nazi," Roberts admitted, "the fact remains that he gave us a considerable
amount of information on the S.D. and worked loyally for the Allies at considerable
danger to himself" The British proposed that the two Allies make a "discreet approach"
to the Danes to inform them of the role that Nebel had played during the latter part of the
war. Roberts declared, "We would make it clear that we have no wish to interfere with
the course of Danish justice in dealing with crimes against the Danes in Danish territory
at a time when Nebel was an out-and-out Amt VI man, as any charges of this nature

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would no doubt be considered by them to be exclusively of a domestic Danish nature, but
we would ask them to take into consideration his later good efforts on our behalf." 64 (S)
Scott sent an urgent cable to Washington outlining Nebel's situation and the
British proposa1. 65 Washington, in turn, informed the CIG representative in Copenhagen
that it supported the British steps. "Maximum purpose of intercession," the Washington
cable stated, "is saving his life, not reduction of sentence non-capital." 66 Scott then told
Brig. Roberts on 3 February 1947 that "our Washington office is in complete agreement
with your policy of intercession with Danish authorities in Nebel's behalf and has
instructed our representative in Copenhagen to act accordingly." 67 (S)
Allied intercession soon became a sticky issue because the British and Americans
in Copenhagen both reported that any "representation about Nebel would be resented by
the Danish authorities." Nebel had been "loaned" to the Danes by the US Army in
Germany to aid in their war crimes investigations, and thus the MI 6 and CIG
representatives in Denmark argued that authorities in the American sector should make
any queries about Nebel's fate. 68 The Danes were holding Nebel as the leader of the

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German gang that had murdered Danish poet and religious leader Kaj Munk in 1944.
Munk had died in the "clearing murders"—inspired by Heinrich Himmler and approved by
Hitler—when the SS assassinated well-known Danes as well as many commoners in
revenge

for acts of resistance to the German occupation. 69 (S)

Nebel's case came up again in April 1947 when the German Mission cabled
Washington to request an update. For the first time, American intelligence linked Nebel
with Leo Kohler, the name of the man charged by the Danes. The German Mission
specifically asked the Danish Mission to provide the latest information on the case." Not
the C._

until early January 1949 did

provide additional information about Nebel. C._ -0obtained letters from Nebel's Danish
defense attorney to the British Legation in 1948, asking for British assistance in locating
several American and British officers, including Capt. Michaelis, Capt. Tirrun, and Col.
Rothschild, to verify that Nebel had been employed by the Allied "Secret Service." As of
early 1949, the British had not answered the request. 7I According to

c

3 "Kaj Munk, of whose murder [Nebel] is accused, has become a national
69For further details on the Danish "clearing murders," see Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial:
The Trial of the Major German War Criminals at the End of World War II at Nuremberg,
Germany, 1945-1946 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954, rev. ed. 1999), pp.
216-219. For a discussion of the war in Denmark, see Richard Petrow, The Bitter Years: The
Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway April 1940-May 1945 (New York: William
Murrow & Company, 1974). (U)
"Cable, Heidelberg to Washington, 11 April 1947, Heidelberg 399, IN 12293, (S), in Nebel, c
71

to the Legation of the British Empire, 3 April 1948 and
_3D0 Records. For further information on early

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martyr-hero. Emotion is connected with the very mention of his name. To take any stand
on this matter for the defense of [Nebel] would in no way change the outcome of the
[Nebel's] trial and would involve this organization's predecessor as well as the United
States Government in rather unfavorable publicity." As a result,c .3 stated that he
planned to take no action in regard to Nebel unless otherwise directed by Washington.72
(S)
The Danish Government sentenced Nebel to 12 years imprisonment with the right
to appeal. OSS and its successors had not been "implicated" in the trial. Consequently,
the C_

7 I in Washington wrote I C._

on 4 February

1949 to say that the Nebel case was closed as far as the CIA was concerned. "From
available records it has been determined that, while subject was turned over to the Danes
to stand trial for war crimes committed during the German occupation, he was given as
much protection as possible because of his work while under the control of our
predecessor organization." C

j noted that the Central Intelligence Group in 1947

.cl considered interceding on Nebel's behalf to save his life, but later decided that such a
move was inadvisable. "This viewpoint," noted c _3 'has not changed in the past
two years." Nebel's light sentence further persuaded CIA to take no action in his case.73
Nebel, whose name in German means "fog," appears to have masked his wartime actions
until his past finally caught up with him. (S)

Germany became the scene of intense competition between East and West as the
Cold War heated up.' While Berlin was the epicenter of this struggle, many of the
Central Intelligence Agency's earliest operations in Germany originated in Munich, the
birthplace of Nazism. The city's proximity to both Austria and Czechoslovakia
transformed the city into a crossroads for Europe's refugees in the wake of Hitler's
Gotterdammerung and a center of postwar intelligence operations. (U)

American occupation officials had sole responsibility for Munich, the largest city
in the US zone after the four allies divided Germany in 1945. The city's location
minimized direct contact with the Russians or, for that matter, with the British and the
French as well. Consequently, US intelligence agencies faced fewer obstacles from
competing Allied and Soviet intelligence services and preferred Munich for unilateral

'The literature on the American role in Germany after World War II is extensive. For example,
see Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (New York: Crown
Publishers, 1985); Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946
(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1975); and Harold Zink, The United
States in Germany 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1957). (U)

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operations. Intelligence collection and operation, however, was still split among several
US civilian and military organizations. In addition, American intelligence in Germany
was in a state of flux as the United States demobilized its military forces after World War
II and debated the merits of creating a peacetime, civilian-controlled central intelligence
structure. (U)
Life in Munich in the years after the war was a struggle. Between 1940 and 1945,
Munich had been the target of some 70 Allied air raids, which dropped over 60,000
bombs and 3.5 million incendiary devices. Of the city's prewar population of 820,000,
some 6,000 men, women, and children had died during the war and 15,000 had suffered
injuries. Another 18,000 residents of Munich had lost their lives as members of the
German armed forces, while 12,000 were still listed as missing. The city's physical
structure was heavily damaged by the bombings; 97 percent of Munich's buildings,
including many of its architectural wonders, sustained damage. The Americans used
many of the buildings not damaged by the air raids—including the Neues Rathaus and the
:1,/us der Deutschen Kunst— as headquarters, clubs, or billets. 2 (U)

With the disbandment of the OSS in the fall of 1945, the Strategic Services Unit
focused on two missions in Germany. This chapter examines the activities of Secret
Intelligence (SI) and Counterespionage (X-2), and their successor units in Munich, from
the Nazi surrender in May 1945 until mid-1947. The transition from declared war with a
2 Brian Deming and Ted Iliff, Hitler and Munich: A Historical Guide to the Sights and Addresses
Important to Adolf Hitler, His Followers and His Victims (Berchtesgaden: Verlag Anton Plank,

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known enemy to the murkiness of the underground war between East and West rapidly
took shape. In this new conflict, yesterday's foe became today's friend in Munich. (U)

SI's New Missions (U)

Secret Intelligence played a leading role in OSS operations in the European
Theater during the last months of the war. Tasked with the collection of information on
Nazi Germany's order of battle, its economic potential, the development of new weapons,
and the assessment of the chimerical anti-Nazi resistance, SI launched over 100
intelligence missions behind German lines in 1944 and 1945. 3 (U)
In June 1945, SI Bern station chief Allen W. Dulles established the new OSS
German Mission in Biebrich, near Wiesbaden. Secret Intelligence, a part of the German
Mission under the direction of US Navy Cdr. Frank Wisner was put to work, developing
new networks of agents to penetrate selected targets. Wisner targeted the remnants of the
\\,,,zi military, political, and security structures; Germany's industrial, economic, and
scientific elements; the defeated enemy's social, religious, cultural, and educational
n.d.), pp. 93-97. See also Landeshauptstadt Munich, Munchener Nachkriegsjahre
1945....1946....1947....1948....1949....1950....(Munich: Buchendorfer Verlag, 1997). (U)
3 For a description of SI's operations against Germany, C.
, Clandestine Services Historical
Program E
'M See also Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The
Penetration of Nazi Germany by OSS Agents during World War II (London: Michael Joseph,
Ltd., 1979). The most recent examination of OSS's role in the fight against Nazi Germany is

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hierarchies; and evidence useful to the investigations of Nazi war crimes. 4 He noted in
June 1945 that it was "becoming increasingly apparent that the American authorities in
Amzon [the American zone] consider the most useful activity of OSS in Germany to be
that of keeping them informed of conditions and developments in adjoining areas not
accessible to the other official information and intelligence agencies." 5 (S)
The new OSS/SI organization in Germany consisted of a Steering Division and a
Production Division. The former, run by Army Capt. Harry Rositzke, built upon lessons
learned by SI while in London during the war and maintained liaison with all American
organizations in Germany to identify intelligence requirements. The Steering Division
also established contacts with German civilian organizations, such as labor and church
groups. It processed positive intelligence reporting from various sources and ran
requirements, liaison, and distribution services. 6 (S)
SI's Production Division recruited agents to meet the requirements of the Steering
Division. It had Production Units, or "P Units," scattered throughout Western Europe
and the American Zone of Germany. 7 By mid-September 1945, SI/Germany had some
120 civilian and military personnel assigned to the OSS German headquarters and in "P
found in Christof Mauch, Schatten-Krieg Gegen Hitler: Das Dritte Reich im Visier der
amerikanischen Geheimdienste 1941 bis 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999). (S)

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Units" in Berlin, Bremen, Heidelberg, Kassel, Munich, Nuremberg, and Regensburg as
well as smaller units in non-German missions, such as Oslo and Prague. The "P Units"
were generally referred to by their British county codename; for example, the Munich "P
Unit" was called "Northampton" while Berlin had two separate SI missions known as
"Wiltshire" and "Cambridge." In addition to SI's regular missions, the Production
Division also controlled the "Crown Jewels," Dulles's collection of high-level agents who
returned to Germany from Switzerland after the Nazi surrender. 8 In September 1945,
Wisner ordered the "P Units" to target the Soviets in their zone in Germany as well as
German Communism Party activities in the Western Allied occupation zones. In the
meantime, SI continued to monitor German political activities in the American zone. (S)

SI Operations in Munich (U)

SI's activities in Munich fell short of expectations, and it had a brief existence.
oanded by Maj. John L. Caskey, an archeologist from the University of Cincinnati

who had previously served with SI in Turkey, SI/Munich collected mostly low-level,

7Ibid, pp. 96-97. (S)
8 The names and locations of SI personnel in Germany is found in Rolfe Kingsley to Shepardson,
"Personnel Roster of SI/Germany as of 15 September 1945," (S), in DO Records, C
Box 2, Folder 20, CIA ARC. Dulles recruited some 40 "Crown Jewels" during the war
from his base in Switzerland, and they continued to serve as intelligence sources in Germany
after 1945. Prominent German citizens, the Crown Jewels sometimes created additional handling
problems for OSS and its successor intelligence agencies. As late as 1970, one of the Crown
Jewels still provided information to CIA. a,

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open-source information on Bavarian political affairs. 9 In July 1945, SI/Munich
produced 75 reports, but the SI's Steering Division disseminated only 12 of them. Capt.
Rositzke commented that the Northampton reports were "mainly of CIC [Counter
Intelligence Corps] or MG [Military Government] rather than SI interest." In fairness,
Rositzke recognized, "a greater proportion of P-unit intelligence has thus far been of a
kind normally obtainable by overt means; but the full value of coverage by agents stably
and permanently placed in the German community has not been achieved by any [other]
unit." 10 (S)
SI's coverage of Bavarian regional affairs remained less than satisfactory
throughout the summer of 1945. In his report for the month of August, Rositzke
observed, "the Munich unit is not yet providing even semi-adequate coverage of the
priority targets in its area." 11 The outlook continued to be unimpressive for the
remainder of the year. In early January 1946, the German Mission complained that SI's

9 John Langdon Caskey was born in 1908 in Boston and graduated from Yale University in 1931.
He received his Ph.D. from the University of Cincinnati in 1939 and worked on excavations in
Troy. After the war, Caskey taught at the University of Cincinnati and served as the university's
head of the Department of Classics during 1959-72. He supervised archeological digs at several
sites in Greece and served as director of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens
during 1949-59. Caskey retired from active teaching in 1979 and died in December 1981.
Obituary, "John Langdon Caskey, Professor of Archeology," New York Times, 8 December 1981,
p. D31. (U)
10Rositzke to Wisner, "Monthly Re p ort of Steering Division, SUGermany," 2 August 1945, L010-731, (S), in DO Records, C.
, Box 2, Folder 19, CIA ARC. (S)
11 Rositze to Wisner, "Monthly Report of the Steering Division, SI/Germany," 5 September 1945,
L-038-905, (S), in DO Records, L
j Box 2, Folder 19, CIA ARC. (S)

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coverage of the Social Democratic Party and the German Communism Party in Munich
was "still semi-overt, gossipy, and unimportant." 12 (S)
SI confronted several administrative problems that limited its ability to collect
intelligence in Munich. Primarily, Maj. Caskey and three officers had little time for
intelligence operations because of their cover mission with the Office of Military
Government for Bavaria (0MGB). 13 While Maj. Caskey spent most of his time as
OMGB's Chief Intelligence Officer, his assistant, Lt. Calhoun C. Ancrum served as the
Military Government's Public Relations Officer. Wisner quipped that Caskey's
detachment was doing a "more valuable job for Military Government as such than for
ourselves." 14 (S)
Wisner, however, added that SI's Military Government cover had some benefits
because Caskey and his officers were "very much in the middle of things in a very
important political arena and enables them to have almost unlimited contacts with the
most knowledgeable and important Germans in Bavaria." 15 Wisner's successor as the
of SI in Germany, Maj. Gordon Stewart, however, disagreed with this assessment in

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January 1946. Stewart felt that SI's Military Government role in Munich "resulted in
Major Caskey's concentration on semi-overt political intelligence" and "double-checking
political gossip."16 (s)
In March 1946, Stewart released Maj. Caskey to the Army for direct assignment
with the Military Government or discharge to return to civilian life. "I decided," Stewart
wrote to Washington, "to discontinue the Munich operation where the energies of some
of our best personnel have been spent on cover work." 17 Like many other SSU
operations, SI/Munich was in the midst of the Army's postwar demobilization. Caught
between its clandestine mission and its cover role with the Military Government,
SL/Munich never developed its resources to provide broad intelligence coverage. (S)

An Influx of Staggering Proportions (U)

X-2 in Munich had greater influence and more longlasting impact than its SI
counterpart. Capt. Eric W. Timm, who transferred to the OSS in 1944 from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, established the SCI Detachment in Munich and commanded the

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detachment until his demobilization in November 1945. 18 Despite constant turnover in
unit personnel, Timm turned his attention to the new demands of a chaotic, postwar
world—a world marked by shifting alliances and desperate struggles for survival in the
rubble of what had been one of Germany's loveliest cities. (U)
At the end of the war, the OSS shifted to new missions in Germany with a strong
emphasis on counterintelligence, as opposed to positive intelligence. The gathering of
evidence for war crimes trials of Nazi officials, the rounding up of members of Nazi
underground movements in Germany, and the recovery of gold and art looted by the
Germans throughout Europe, all required OSS personnel and resources. 19 During this
hectic period, individual Germans scurried to broker deals with their conquerers. In its
monthly progress report for May 1945, X-2/Germany reported that "thousands of
Germans, having various degrees of counter-espionage interest, were either arrested or
processed through military channels in the three weeks following the end of the war.
Every effort," X-2 commented, "has been made to exploit to the fullest these German
Intelligence Service personalities, although the influx has been of staggering

18X-2 had its headquarters in Munich at 5 Heilman Strasse next to the main OSS billets at 1
Heilman Strasse. OSS had three separate units in Munich in 1945: Timm's X-2 detachment;
Caskey's P Unit; and the OSS Munich headquarters element. (U)
19 Secretariat, Strategic Services Unit, "The Office of Strategic Services on YE Day - VJ Day,"
11 March 1946, (S), in CIA History Staff Records, C
01, Box 36, CIA ARC. For
information concerning a joint project between OSS and the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps
involving the penetration of underground SS organizations immediately after the war, see files on
the "Danube" and "Elsa" operations in DO Records, L
Box 4, Folder 59, CIA ARC
(S). See also X-2, SCI, Seventh Army to SAINT, Washington, 20 September 1945, LWX-002920, 9S), enclosing Charles Flickinger, 307 th CIC Detachment, to Officer in Charge, "The

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proportions." A month later, X-2 observed that "there have been surprising offers on the
part of former Abwehr and SD members to turn over to the Allies networks of agents, but
most probably all offers were made either to ingratiate these men with the American
authorities in order to gain support for purely selfish motives (Austrian Nationalists in
one case) or to embroil us with the Russians." 20 (S)
In a single week in June 1945, Capt. Timm noted that X-2 in Munich had arrested
15 German intelligence officers and agents. 21 Timm wanted to use former GIS [German
Intelligence Service] officers and enlisted men to uncover German efforts to resist the
Allies. Consequently, X-2 in Munich and elsewhere concentrated on the recruitment of
German intelligence officers and agents to work for the Americans as agents and
informants. "It has been for sometime apparent," he wrote in August 1945, "that a wellbalanced network of counterintelligence and counterespionage agents must include
persons from all spheres of activity." Timm observed that "the implementation of the
penetration agent program wherein the use of former GIS personalities is contemplated
remains of critical importance." With the concerns of a resurgent Nazi party in mind,
Capt. Timm commented, "such persons are of importance because they are in a position

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to recognize other GIS personalities and are logical contacts for any illegal or resistance
group." 22 (S)
By late August, Timm had recruited 13 agents to work for him, with another
dozen under active consideration. 23 He was frustrated, however, by X-2's lack of
manpower and a breakdown in the process to vet new agents. 24 Timm also encountered
problems in getting his agents approved by the Military Government in Bavaria;
restrictions on the employment of Nazi party members and German military personnel
handicapped his recniitments. 25 As early as June, the German Mission's X-2 observed
that "in the absence of any well-defined policy concerning the direction in which

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American interests are to be pointed, aggressive exploitation [of German intelligence
personnel] has been somewhat stifled. 26 (U)
By the end of the summer, the lack of official policy posed a serious constraint to
Timm's plans in Munich as he pointed out to his superiors:

Numerous difficulties are being experienced in the actual implementation of our
program for recruiting and placing agents who were formerly members of the GIS
or other proscribed categories. Our primary interest in handling these people has
been to place them in positions of strategic importance so that they could be in a
position to obtain valuable information to observe trends and possible
underground activity, and to be self-supporting, as our budget does not allow us to
pay these people salaries. It is also realized that any person with no apparent
means of support could at best be a short term agent.
Realizing this fact we have for some time centered our contacts with Military
Government in this area, and were originally led to believe that the officers in
charge were cognisant [sic] of the problem involved, the essential value of
intelligence operations of the kind being conducted by SCI, and we were promised
active cooperation. However, in each instance, when we proposed some specific
individual there has always been a directive in existence which bars our man from
employment by Military Government. Even though we have offered to submit a
letter assuming full responsibility in the case, we have not been able to obtain
employment for such persons.
The proscribed list of persons has now grown so large that no former member of
the Nazi Party or Army officer, to say nothing of GIS personnel, can be hired.
We, of course, realize the desirability of such restrictions, but we do feel that the
blind adherence to a general policy without discretion on the part of Military
Government in this area is potentially dangerous. It is creating a huge segment of
society which has no hope of rehabilitation, and is driving the Army and the Nazi
party into each other's arms. However, it is not our function to comment upon the

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
overall policy. All we are interested in is the application of this policy as it affects
the operations of this unit. 27 (S)

A Shifting Focus (U)

Uncertainty in Washington as to the future of the Office of Strategic Services
complicated intelligence work in Germany. President Harry Truman, in fact, disbanded
the Office of Strategic Services on 30 September 1945, a few weeks after Japan's
surrender. He divided its various functions between the State and War Departments, with
the latter gaining SI and X-2 in the form of a new Strategic Services Unit. 28 The effect of

27 5CI Detachment, Munich to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2 Germany, "Semi-Monthly
Operations Report SCI Munich," 31 August 1945, G-TSX-2891, (S), DO Records, C
3, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. X-2 headquarters, in turn, raised the issue of treatment of
former GIS personnel who had assisted the Americans. See Lt. Col. Berding to Chief, Counter
Intelligence Branch, USFET, "Treatment of GIS Personnel," 13 August 1945, LWX-002-813,
(S), in DO Records, C
7, Box 406, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. In a vetting request
from Germany, a X-2 officer appealed to Headquarters to pursue requests to vet Germans,
including one who "appears to be an unmitigated stinker." This officer noted, "Whatever rumors
may circulate as to the duration of this organization, both branches [SI and X-2] will continue to
recruit agents here at this mission for two reasons. First, they feel it particularly desirable to
leave any possible successors with a well-established network of operatives. Second, much can
be produced with agents now being recruited — even during the next few months. Since those
months are to be critical ones for American policy in Germany, SI is anxious to do a good job
getting information for American policy makers. So, please don't feel that the vet fequests which
we forward to you are academic. The men are being and will continue to be used. Some will
occupy extremely important positions in German life and government for years to come. This is
not a dream. It is already happening." AB-16 [identity unknown] to SAINT, Washington,
"Vetting of Heinz Karl Hermann Krull for SAINT," 7 September 1945, LWX-002-97b, (S), in
DO Records,
Box 406, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
28 C
73 The Central Intelligence Agency: The First Thirty Years 1947-77
(Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1990), p. 10 (S). For additional information on SSU, see
"Salvage and Liquidation: The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group,"
Studies in Intelligence 39 (Fall 1995), pp. 49-57. (S)

r

j,

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Truman's action became apparent in Munich and threw into doubt many of the SCI
Detachment's efforts. Capt. Timm glumly reported:

In view of the impending administrative dissolution of OSS,
and the resultant uncertainty of the identity or nature of the successor
organization it is difficult to formulate operational plans for the future
at this time. Numerous contacts have been made by the Munich
Detachment who are in favorable positions to assume a preeminent
position in Bavarian life. Some will do so without assistance from the
Americans in general or this detachment in particular. Others have
been aided in some fashion to facilitate their obtaining passes, etc. At
the present time the unsettled political, social and economic conditions
which are a necessary result of the occupation make it impossible to
anticipate specific developments. It is therefore difficult to formulate
accurately a plan of definite future action for any of these people. 29 (S)
Changes in Washington coincided with a reexamination of American intelligence
targets and operations within Germany itself. 313 As late as September, X-2 had been
ordered by US Forces European Theater (USFET), the senior Army headquarters in
Germany, to mount an "intensive program of penetration of potential German intelligence
or subversive organizations." 31 In October, however, SSU headquarters near Wiesbaden

30 For example, in September, Lt. Col. William G. Suhling, Jr., the deputy of the German
Mission, outlined his proposal to dissolve OSS's presence in Germany. Likewise, Cdr. Wisner,
chief of SI in Germany, recommended that SI and X-2 merge because of the blurring of their
intelligence missions and the need to conserve manpower and resources. L
31 Maj. Thomas F. Pumer, Jr., OSS/X-2 Germany, to See Distribution, 10 September 1945,
LWX-003-910, (U), enclosing USFET, "OSS/SCI Personnel and Facilities," 21 August 1945, in
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ordered X-2 in Munich to reevaluate its agents for long-term productivity. In the light of
X-2's growing personnel shortages (the branch had dropped to 79 staff members by the
time of OSS's disbandment), SSU wanted to focus political groups in Germany
(including the Communist Party) because Nazi resistance to the Allied occupation had
failed to materialize. As a result, Capt. Timm reviewed his crop of 31 agents and decided
to retain only eight assets; the remainder were placed in an "inactive status," and some
transferred to CIC contro1. 32 (U)
Following a conference in Wiesbaden to discuss future SSU projects in Germany
that November, X-2 received orders to abandon efforts against German intelligence
organizations and the Nazi underground. 33 SSU shifted its efforts to collect information
on personnel, activities, and goals of all foreign intelligence services, with particular
emphasis on the Soviet Union. "It was, therefore, decided," Timm wrote,

that SCI would serve the future CIA [the projected, but
not yet formed Central Intelligence Agency] best by limiting its
WASH-REG-INT-163, OSS Records, RG 226, Entry 108A, Box 287, (no folder listed), NARA.
(U)
32Lt. Sidney H. Lenington, Deputy Chief, SSU/X-2, Germany to SAINT, Washington, "SemiMonthly Reports," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Timm to Commanding
Officer, SSU/X-2 Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report SCI Munich," 31 October 1945,
LMX-005-1130, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, Entry 108A, Box 275, (no folder listed),
NARA. (U)
33As early as 27 September 1945, OSS field stations received the following directive: "The
conversion of this agency from a wartime to a peacetime basis brings with it a shift in emphasis
in counterespionage targets. No longer are the German and Japanese Intelligence Services the
focal point of our attention. Instead, all foreign intelligence services, and personnel connected
thereto, now become the legitimate object of observation and study for this Branch." JJ1 to All
Field Stations, 27 September 1945, X010-927, (S), in DO Records,
Box 1,
Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

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primary targets to the gathering of information on personnel,
activities, and objectives of all intelligence services. This will
enable a CIA to have at its disposal central records of a worldwide nature concerning the various groups which come within
this purview. 34 (U)
Two Distinct Operations Are Being Developed (U)

While X-2 in Germany shifted its focus to the Soviet Union, the new Central
Intelligence Group—formed in Washington in January 1946—made plans to absorb SSU's
field elements and provide new guidance on operational targets. 35 X-2 became CIG's
new Security Control (SC) group while the Foreign Reports (FR) group assumed the
functions of SI. The Central Intelligence Group soon formed the Office of Special
Operations (OSO) in July 1946 to handle both the collection of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence work. CIG sorted SSU's field stations into geographic teams at
headquarters within OSO; consequently, the German Mission fell under Foreign Branch
M. Richard Helms, who had served with SI in Germany, was named the Branch's acting
chief. 36 The changes in Washington eventually provided the German Mission with new

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
personnel and a renewed sense of direction. 37 But change was slow in coming. Between
October 1945 and September 1946, X-2 in Germany had dropped from 19 officers and 56
enlisted men and civilians to less than 20 personne1. 38 (S)
In November 1945, Capt. Timm had rotated to the United States, leaving Sgt.
Boleslav A. Holtsman as X-2's lone representative in Munich. 39 In a summary of his
duties in January 1946, Holtsman estimated that he spent some 40 percent of his time in
the "recruiting, training, and running of penetration agents, particularly those in a position
to watch or enter the Russian service operating in Bavaria." His other major task
consisted of interrogating German intelligence personnel, "particularly their counterintelligence officers concerning the organization and activities of foreign intelligence
services, particularly Russian and location of German files pertaining thereto." In

37 For example, SSU's field stations in July 1946 received guidance for the priority collection of
intelligence. See SAINT to SAINT, Brussels, [no title], 16 August 1946, XA-333, (S), in DO
Records, Job 91-01046R, Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
38 Lewis to Helms, Acting Chief, Foreign Branch M, "Security Control Group, Amzon Mission,"
3 September 1946, L-002-903, (S), in DO Records, Job 79-00332A, Box 368, Folder 3, CIA
ARC. (S)
39 Born in Detroit in 1912 of Polish parents, "Bill" Holtsman spent his childhood years in Poland.
He returned to the United States in 1931 to attend college and was ordained as a minister in the
Lutheran Church. He entered the Army in 1942 and served as a translator and later as a case
officer with OSS in Europe until his discharge in early 1946. He received an appointment as
Intelligence Officer with SSU/X-2 in March 1946 C

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addition, Holtsman mingled in "German political and intellectual circles to keep abreast
as to the latest local developments which might lead to foreign agents."

40 (S)

The next month, in December 1945, Maj. Crosby Lewis, the new X-2 chief at the
German Mission, reported that he had held talks with USFET's Counter Intelligence
Branch (CIB) in the Office of the Director of Intelligence.

41 CIB wanted to separate X-2

from the German Mission and merge its projects and files with those of the Army's. In
essence, X-2 would cease to exist as an counterintelligence organization within SSU in
Germany. Maj. Lewis refused to agree to this arrangement, but he agreed that X-2 would
terminate the bulk of its cases in the American Zone and turn these over to the Army's
Counter Intelligence Corps.

42 Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, USFET's G-2 or intelligence

chief, ordered X-2 in early January 1946 to relinquish many of its counterintelligence
activities to the Army. Sibert cited SSU's manpower shortage and the need for better
coordination between the various intelligence agencies in the American Zone as his

40 Holtsman, OSS Position
41

Description Survey Form, 3 January 1946, in Holtsman, Personnel

file. (S)

Lewis, born in 1916, graduated from Haverford College in 1939. He enlisted in the Canadian
Army in 1940 and served with that military until his transfer to the US Army in 1942. Lewis
received his commission in 1943 and commanded the 202 nd CIC Detachment in North Africa,
Sicily, and Italy during 1943-45. He joined SSU in September 1945 as the German Mission's X2 chief and became the chief of SSU's German Mission in January 1946 C

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
reasons for this decision. He directed X-2 to concentrate on counterintelligence activities
outside of the American zone of occupation, with particular emphasis on the Russian
intelligence services. "Two distinct operations are being developed," according to Sidney
H. Lenington, X-2's acting chief in Germany during the absence of Crosby Lewis in
February 1946. The "accumulation, appraisal and study of documents prepared

by

the German I.S. on Russian intelligence efforts on the Eastern
Front during the war[,] and counter-intelligence operations actively in progress . . .
designed to gather all possible information on present personnel and techniques of the
RIS."43 (S)

A Top Target for Espionage Activities (U)

The changes in Washington gradually affected intelligence collection in Munich.
For much of the interim period, Holtsman found himself simply trying to keep X-2's
office in Munich and maintaining contact with other American agencies in Bavaria. He
did not receive much direction from either the German Mission or from Headquarters in
Washington. In fact, Holtsman had been informed in early 1946 that his office would
close and that he would join the Mission in Heidelberg. Likewise, it wasn't until March
1946 that Holtsman finally learned that "our objective is the SIS" [Soviet intelligence

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
services] and that "the GIS [German intelligence services] was liquidated and is to cease
to figure in our consideration." 44 (S)
Despite these difficulties, Holtsman still produced over 350 intelligence reports in
nine months. The arrival of new personnel in Munich allowed Holtsman to expand his
coverage and to spread his work load. George N. Belie, a US Navy officer who had
served in Rumania and Turkey during the war, joined SSU in March 1946 and was pocked
to Munich in May. A native of Russia, Belie took over several of the Russian cases in
Munich while Holtsman, who spoke Polish and Ukrainian, concentrated on other
projects. Belic's most important case was the debriefing of Anatoli Granovsky, a Soviet
defector codenamed SAILOR. Granovsky, the first major defector for SSU and CIG in
Germany, jumped a Soviet ship in Sweden and smuggled into the American zone from
Denmark in the fall of 1946. 45 Two other officers, Toivo Rosvall and Capt. Bengt C.
Herder, also arrived in Munich in 1946 and early 1947, respectively. 46 (S)

44 SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, Washington, "Review of Activity since 10 December 1945 to 10
September 1946," 17 September 1946, (S), enclosing AB-43, Munich [Holtsman] to AB-51,
AMZON [Hecksher], "Review of Activity since 10 December 1945 to 10 September 1946," 10
September 1946, L-010-910, (S), in DO Records, c_
_a Box 1, Folder 14, CIA ARC.
(S)
45 See Anatoli M. Granovslcy, I was an NKVD Agent; A Top Soviet Spy Tells His Story (New
York: Devin-Adair, 1962). Belic's role in the SAILOR project is discussed in Murphy et al,
Battleground Berlin, pp. 20 and 458. For additional information, see Anatoli Granovslcy,
DO Records. (S)
46 Belic, who shortened his name from Belicovitch in 1938, was born in Odessa, Russia, in 1911,
the son of a colonel in the Imperial Russian Army. Belie moved to the United States in the 1920s
and graduated from Georgetown University in 1936. After joining SSU C

3

J Toivo Rosvall, born in 1913, graduated from Clark University in 1934. A teacher and
author before the war, Rosvall served in the US Army during the war. He joined SSU in
February 1946 and reported to Germany in the spring. C.

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;. built an

Between 1945 and early 1947, C.

extensive network of contacts "to keep informed on CI matters in Munich." Under

C

3 direction, the intelligence post in Munich recruited or handled 129 agents, of

whom the Americans still maintained contact with 39 in March 1947. The contacts came
from all walks of life and nationalities with the bulk drawn from the ranks of Nazi
intelligence organizations or Eastern or Southern European collaborators of the Third
Reich. Munich's contacts were far-ranging and diverse, reflecting a growing need for
intelligence in the chaotic conditions in postwar Germany. 47 Cases worked by these early
CIA officers in Munich illustrate the shifting bureaucratic concerns during this uncertain
period. (S)

C-

D Bengt C. Herder joined OSS in May 1945 in London after serving as an Army

officer. Born in Sweden in 1920, Herder lived in Wisconsin at the outbreak of the war and spoke
five languages. He entered the US Army in 1942 and was commissioned the following year.
After serving briefly with OSS, Lt. Herder returned to the United States to serve at Army G-2
headquarters. He then joined SSU in February 1946 for assignment to Germany. E

The MOUNT case drew the attention of senior OSS officials in Washington,
including Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, and threatened to disrupt US-Soviet relations
even before the end of the war. 48 hi a separate move from Wolff s negotiations with
Dulles in Operation SUNRISE, Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, a major in the SS and a senior
intelligence officer in Amt VI, acted as an intermediary between senior Nazi officials
(such as Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler and RSHA chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner), and a
mixed bag of Austrian anti-Nazis who sought favorable terms with the Western Allies.49
Dulles in Switzerland reported that "Hoettl's record as a SD man and collaborator [of]
Kaltenbrunner is, of course,. . . bad and information provided by him [is] to be viewed
with caution, but I believe he desires to save his skin and therefore may be useful." OSS,
however, regarded Hoettl's dealings as a ploy on the part of Himmler and refused to enter
into negotiations. 50 (U)
Captured in Alt-Aussee, Austria, at the end of the war by the 80 th CIC
Detachment, Hoettl offered the Americans a "complex of agents in Rumania, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Montenegro and Albania, capable of reporting high-level political

13 present and dropped agents in Munich also appear
Folder 3, CIA ARC (S). Many of IC.
on this microfilm.
48Portions of this section on Hoettl appear in Kevin C. Ruffner, "Wilhelm Hoettl: International
Man of Mystery," Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin (Fall 2001), pp. 4-9. (U)
49Hoettl's contact with OSS is described in Petersen, ed., From Hitler's Doorstep. (U)
50Ibid., pp. 506-508. (U)

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and military information." 51 Hoettl claimed that his radio "Centrale" still existed in
Austria and could communicate with his isolated agents behind Soviet lines using a group
of Hungarian cryptographers. These elements could be resurrected under American
control if given the signal from Hoett1. 52 (U)
X-2 sought to uncover further information from Hoettl, who had been confined in
Munich in May 1945. 53 Capt. Timm in Munich and Capt. William B. Browne in
Steyerling, Austria, used members of Hoettl's "Centrale" to contact both Budapest and
Bucharest, although "only service messages are being sent in an effort to hold the entire
ring together until a final determination of policy can be made." Coming at the end of the
war, the Americans expressed natural concerns about operating a net behind the Soviet
lines; the Russians, of course, were still regarded as military allies. Timm offered several
possibilities about the MOUNT Case:

Capture and the Last Days of SS General Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Nazi Gestapo,
Criminal Police, and Intelligence Services (Inver Grovers: n.p., 1993). Mattson, a member of the
80 th CIC Detachment, participated in the apprehension of Kaltenbrunner, Hoettl, and other SS

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a. The offer is genuine and his net may believe that they are still working for him.
b. Hoettl's offer may be an effort to entangle the Allies.
c. Hoettl's agents may actually be working for the Russians already.
d. The offer may be a distraction to divert the US from other networks or
operations. 54 (U)
News of Hoettl's network soon made its way to the top echelons of OSS. Lt. Col.
Berding, X-2's chief in Germany, told Maj. Gen. Donovan on 8 June about Hoettl's offer.
In a series of lengthy memoranda, Berding recounted the history of the MOUNT case and
its implications for the Americans. Berding forcefully advocated that OSS "secure from
HOETTL the last syllable of information that he is able to furnish us on the Balkan
networks." Berding, however, believed Hoettl "is not in the slightest degree actuated by a
fatherly concern for the well-being of the American intelligence services; most of what he
has to gain must lie in the empoisoning of Russian-American relationships."
Consequently, the X-2 chief advocated that the Americans tell the Soviets about Hoettl's
system and that both powers jointly exploit it "in behalf of general Allied security." 55 (U)
Although Donovan had authorized X-2 to maintain radio contact for
counterespionage purposes on 10 June, the MOUNT case quickly dissolved after the

officers in what had been planned to be the center of German resistance in the "National
Redoubt." (U)
54Capt. Eric Timm, SCI Liaison Officer, Third Army, to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Third
Army, Seventh Army, and Twelfth Army Group, "Activity Report for the Week Ending 9 June
1945," 10 June 1945, G-TSX-201, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A,
Box 287, (no folder listed), NARA. (U)
55 Berding to Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, "Hoettl Case," 8 June 1945, in Berding,
"Documents Pertaining to Hoettl Case," NARA. (U)

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NKVD presented OSS with specific questions about the German operation. 56 By late
August, Donovan told the German Mission that the "JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] has now
authorized OSS to execute proposed liquidation of Hoettl network in collaboration with
the Russians as simply and promptly as possible." 57 (U)
Members of X-2, including Capt. Browne in the Alps, were disappointed. As
early as 24 June, Browne had reported to Lt. Col. Berding on the importance of the
MOUNT operation for postwar American intelligence:

It is my belief that both the organization and the direction of American
Intelligence agencies are inadequate for the successful operation of these networks
as a serious effort to penetrate Russian occupied territory. However, I do not
believe it will be in American interests to destroy, by handing it over to Russia,
the net. In Romania, at least, it can function without assistance or direction from
this side. My recommendation is that it be allowed to do just that. Key personnel
now in our hands could be disposed of through the IC [Interrogation Center] at
Freising, some allowance being made for the offer which they have made. The
Central can be easily dismantled. Unless we are sure to eliminate forever all
personnel involved thus far, a double-cross such as that contemplated in the plan
to turn over all the information to the Russians would eventually become known,
and would possibly result in the alienation of most of those well-placed political
elements in Rumania and Hungary who are tied into this net, and who now seem
so favorably disposed toward the United States. We would thus loose potential
friends without realizing any gain commensurate with such a loss; for all that we
56Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982),
pp. 752-754. See also David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey,
Battleground Berlin: CIA vs.KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997),
pp. 4-6 and 456. For more recent work on the role of OSS in turning over Hoettl's network to the
Soviets, see Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in
America—The Stalin Era (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 247-248, and Bradley F. Smith,
Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945 (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1996). (U)
57 Director to AMZON, 21 August 1945, OUT 20920, in WASH-OSS-R&C-3, RG 226, OSS
Records, Entry 90, Box 4, Folder 42, NARA. (U)

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could hope for by such a move would be gratitude and appreciation from a
government which has heretofore never displayed much of either. 58 (U)
In September 1945, US Army officials concluded that "Hoettl has been of great
assistance to Allied counterintelligence by debunking the myth of a [German] prepared
plan to continue operations after defeat." The Army noted, however, that Hoettl is "a
skilled opportunist and a firm believer in his own indispensability." 59 Following his
interrogation at the Third US Army Interrogation Center, the Army planned to transfer
Hoettl to Nuremberg as a witness for the International Military Tribunal and then turn
him over to OSS. By the fall of 1945, Hoettl had provided American interrogators with a
significant amount of information about German intelligence activities and
personalities. 60 (U)

58Browne to Chief, X-2, "MOUNT Operation," 24 June 1945, X-1339, in RG 226, OSS Records,
Entry 210, Box 305, Folder 1, NARA. For information regarding the dispersal of the "Centrale,"
see X-2 Branch, OSS Mission to Germany, to SAINT, London, 18 July 1945, enclosing Browne
to Chief, X-2, "MOUNT Operation," 12 July 1945, X-1301, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 210,
Box 305, Folder 1, NARA. These documents were among the 400,000 pages of OSS material
declassified by CIA in June 2000 and transferred to the National Archives. (U)
59 Headquarters, Third US Army Interrogation Center (Provisional), "Hoettl, Wilhelm, Dr. SS
Sturmbannfuehrer, AIC 984," 15 September 1945, in Record Group 338, European Theater of
Operations and US Forces European Theater, Records of the Third US Army Interrogation
Center, Box 69, NARA. (U)
°Some of the reports generated by Hoettl include Headquarters, Third US Army Interrogation
Center, Interrogation Report No. 15, "The SD and the RSHA," 9 July 1945; Interrogation Report
No. 16, "Amt VI of the RSHA," 13 July 1945; Interrogation Report No. 18, "The WIT Net of
Gruppe VIE of the RSHA," 16 July 1945; Interrogation Report No. 36, "Japanese Intelligence
Activities in Europe," 31 August 1945; Interrogation Report No. 38, "Plans of Amt VI for
Postwar Activities in Spain," 9 September 1945. All of these interrogation reports are found in
RG 338, ETOUSA/USFET, Third US Army Interrogation Center, Box 64, NARA. A critique of
Interrogation Report No. 15 by OSS is found in SAINT, London to SAINT, Washington, "War
Room Comment on the Hoettl Report," 6 February 1946, XX-10734, enclosing Counter
Intelligence War Room, "War Room Comment on the Hoettl Report," [no date], P.F. 602.139,
(U), in WASH-REG-INT-175, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 109, Box 58, Folder 3, NARA. (U)

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Between 1945 and 1947, the Americans held Hoettl in Nuremberg and Dachau for
further interrogations in support of Allied war crimes prosecutions. In his most
memorable testimony, Hoettl recounted a meeting at his home in Budapest in August
1944

with SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Adolf Eichmann, the "Architect of the Final

Solution." According to Hoettl, Eichmann, who was depressed about the German war
effort, admitted that he would rank among the chief war criminals sought by the Allies for
his role in the roundup and massacre of Europe's Jews. When asked by Hoettl how many
Jews had perished, Eichmann stated that some six million had died, including four
million in German concentration camps. 61 (U)
Following his return to Austria in late

1947,

Hoettl remained active in intelligence

circles in postwar Austria into the 1950s. The CIA, however, distrusted the former
German SS officer since his first days in American hands. One Agency officer who had
interrogated Hoettl considered him a "born intriguer and a dyed in the wool Austrian
Nazi," who had "delivered a sufficient number of Nazi war criminals to the gallows,
illeknownst to his former associates, to afford us a strong hold over him."62

61 Hoettl's claim that the Nazis killed some six million Jews is regarded as the most authoritative
source for the number of deaths during the Holocaust. See Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial:
The Evidence at Nuremberg (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954), pp. 313-314,
and United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, Volume V (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 380-382. (U)
62 Quote appears in Chief, FBM, "SS Sturmbannfiihrer Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl," 12 June 1949, in
Hoettl, CIA Name File, NARA. According to one source in Austria, Hoettl was hated by at least
one former comrade because Hoettl had betrayed the Nazi cause at Nuremberg. Adolf
Eichmann, for example, reportedly vowed to kill Hoettl. Likewise, former SS officers felt that
Hoettl had "willfully invented the number of 6 million Nazi-killed Jews, and thereby having

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Nonetheless, the Agency refused to have anything to do with Hoettl, although it spent
considerable time and resources to track his activities and contacts. 63 Hoettl continued to
surface in the news and, in 1961, Hungary demanded his extradition as an accomplice of
Adolf Eichmann's. 64 (U)
"Hoettl died at his home in Austria in 1999, by which point he had reconstructed
himself as a leading authority on the SS. 65 (U)

ROBOT (U)

Josef Mueller, nicknamed "Ochsenseppi," (Joe the Ox) was one of OSS' s earliest
contacts in Munich as an SI source and an agent for X-2. 66 Born in 1898 in Bavaria,

bought World Jewry protection." Former Nazis also regarded Hoettl as an agent of the
Americans and the Israelis who had stolen hidden SD gold and assets in Austria. (U)
63 CIA's extensive file on Hoettl is replete with reports about his postwar activities. Although
the Army's CIC used Hoettl from 1948 until 1949, CIA regarded him as a "notorious fabricator"
of intelligence. By the early 1950s, Hoettl had formed his own intelligence organization, and he
may have been in contact with other intelligence services, including the West Germans and
possibly the Israelis. In 1953, the US Army arrested Hoettl on the suspicion of spying for the
Soviets in the Curt Ponger, Otto Verber, and Walter Lauber espionage case. For further details
about this forgotten Cold War incident, see George Carpozi, Jr., Red Spies in Washington (New

York: Trident Press, 1968), pp. 30-59. (U)
64 1ronically, a Hungarian interrogator questioned Hoettl at Dachau in 1947 about looting of a
Jewish residence in Hungary in 1944. See "Interrogation of Dr. Hoetl [sic], W.C. at Camp
Dachau," 12 March 1947, in RG 260, Records of the Office of Military Government for
Germany, Restitution Research Records, Box 484, NARA. (U)

65 An extensive amount of declassified information regarding Hoettl is found in his CIA Name
File transferred to the National Archives on 27 April 2001. For Hoettl's writings, see Wilhelm
Hoettl as told to Ladislas Farago, "I Was Hitler's Master Spy," Argosy, November 1953, pp. 1819. See also Hoettl, The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage. Trans. by R.H.
Stevens (London: Weidenfeld-Nicolson, 1954); Hoettl, Hitler's Paper Weapon (London: R.

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Mueller served in World War I and later attended the University of Munich. He settled in
the city as a lawyer and became active in the Bayerische Volkspartei, or Bavarian Peoples
Party, a wing of the Catholic Center Party, witnessing at firsthand the rise of the Nazis.
Mueller represented Catholic interests in Bavaria and provided information to Catholic
leaders, thus earning the enmity of the Nazis. 67 (S)
Mueller's wartime saga illustrated the tangled and furtive efforts of the resistance
to Hitler from within the German military establishment. German armed forces
intelligence—the Abwehr—was a center of this small resistance movement. Abwehr leaders
early on recognized the usefulness of Mueller's links to high Church circles, which
included Father Robert Lieber, a Jesuit aide to Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (who became
Pope Pius XII in 1939), and Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, formerly the head of the Center
Party in Germany and in exile in Rome. 68 In 1939, Oberst Hans Oster, chief of the
Abwehr's Central Office, commissioned Mueller as an Abwehr lieutenant with the

clandestine mission of acting as a conduit between the military's resistance to Hitler and

Hart-Davis, 1955); and Hoettl, Einsatz fur das Reich (Koblenz: Verlag Siegfried Bublies, 1997)
(U)
66Mueller's file contains an extensive amount of information regarding his postwar intelligence
service. See Josef Mueller, C.
3., DO Records. (S)
67For a general description of Mueller's activities, see David Alvarez and Robert A. Graham,
Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage Against the Vatican, 1 939-1 945 (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 1997). See also John H. Waller, The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and
Conspiracy in the Second World War (New York: Random House, 1996). (U)
68The general account of Mueller's role as the contact between the German resistance and the
Vatican is found in Alvaraz and Graham, Nothing Sacred, pp. 23-33 and Waller, The Unseen
War in Europe, pp. 95-103, 114-128;306-324, and 392-393. For Mueller's interrogation by CIC,
see SAINT, London to AB/17, AMZON, "Josef Mueller," 24 October 1945, X-4116, (S),
enclosing Col. Earle N. Nichols, Assistant G-2, Allied Force Headquarters to SHAEF (Rear) CI

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the Vatican. Between 1939 and 1943, Mueller estimated that he traveled to Rome at least
150 times from his post in Munich. German intelligence agencies ran across various
leads to Mueller's clandestine role, but Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr,
was able to divert the SD from arresting Mueller. 69 (U)
In April 1943, the Gestapo finally arrested Mueller and searched his home in
Munich, uncovering substantial evidence of Mueller's anti-Nazi activities. But, once
again, Mueller's luck held out. He was acquitted of high treason, and spent the remainder
of the war at various concentration camps, including Buchenwald, Flossenberg, and
Dachau. (U)
In the final days of the war, the Gestapo transferred Mueller and other political
prisoners to Austria and then to northern Italy, where American forces liberated him in
early May 1945. The Americans, in turn, took Mueller to the island of Capri where CIC
first interrogated the German lawyer. After that point, Joe B. Cox, the CIC special agent
handling Mueller, accompanied him to Rome where he was reunited with Father Lieber
and his other Vatican acquaintances. Special Agent Cox completed his report on Mueller
in mid-June. 70 (S)
Mueller, in the meantime, returned to Germany via military air transport. OSS
quickly recognized that Mueller could be a valuable source of information about German

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resistance efforts against Hitler as well as political developments in occupied Bavaria.71
Henry Hecksher, an officer with the Third Army's Interrogation Center, who later served
with SSU and CIA, interrogated Mueller concerning the fate of Admiral Canaris and
other members of the German resistance. 72 "From a brief conversation with Mueller,"
Hecksher wrote in 1949, "I carried away the impression of an unusually forceful, shrewd,
and informed man, who even at the time of total internal collapse and national paralysis
was laying his plans, with deliberation and diplomatic skill, for a political career." Like
most American intelligence officers, Hecksher "was particularly impressed by the range
of Mueller's political contacts inside Germany and the Vatican. This, coupled with a

71 Mueller was first reported by SCI Munich as a possible penetration agent in X-2 Branch, OSS
Mission to Germany to SAINT, "Semi-Monthly Operation Report, SCI Munich," LMX-010-815,
(S), enclosing SCI Detachment, Munich to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2 Germany, "SemiMonthly Operation Report SCI Munich," 15 August 1945, in DO Records, j
J., Box
3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. Starting in 1944, OSS developed a file of known anti-Nazis living in
Munich, including Cardinal von Faulhaber. Mueller, however, does not appear in this file. See
"Munich Biographical Record Sheets," in 7 th Army-SSS-OP-1 in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry
158, Box 4, Folder 58, NARA. (S)
72Hecksher was born in 1910 in Hamburg, Germany, and came to the United States in 1939 after
attending the universities of Berlin and Hamburg. He entered the US Army in 1941 and served
as an instructor at the Military Intelligence Service school at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, when he
transferred overseas in 1944. Fluent in German, French, and Russian, Hecksher specialized in
the interrogation of German officials. He transferred to SSU as a first lieutenant in December
1945 and became a civilian employee in May 1946. Hecksher served in Heidelberg as the chief
of the German Mission's SC Branch during 1946-47 and later in Berlin. He did not depart from
Germany until 1954 at which time, Hecksher partook in the planning for Operation
. Until his retirement
C.
from CIA in 1971 C
. Hecksher died in New Jersey in March 1990. Personnel file,
Henry D. Hecksher

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seemingly untarnished personal and political record, induced me to prevail on the Munich
Detachment of SCI to recruit Mueller." 73 (S)
Boleslav A. Holtsman served as Mueller's case officer and, according to
Hecksher, Holtsman "succeeded in establishing an unusually close understanding with
Mueller, based upon mutual respect and the former's rare understanding of what in
Bavaria goes by the name of politics." 74 In submitting Mueller's biographical
information for vetting as an agent of SCI Munich, Holtsman noted in August 1945 that
he was "being approached for advice by all political factions and by many individuals.
He has numerous friends and acquaintances." 75 (S)
Holism= also queried whether Mueller should "be considered subject to our
'automatic arrest' policy? For in spite of the fact that he was our agent and informant
during the war with Germany, he was also a member of Abwehr." Holtsman admitted
that "this might sound very naïve at first glance, but our 'automatic arrest' policy does not
allow for any flexibility." 76 (S)

75 B.A. Holtsman to Commanding Officer, X-2, Germany, "Dr. Josef Mueller," 31 August 1945,
, DO Records. (S)
X 2874, (S), in Mueller,
76B .A. Holtsman to Commanding Officer, X-2, Germany, "Dr. Josef Mueller," 31 August 1945,
X 2874, (S), in Mueller, iC_ 3 , DO Records. In fact, SSU came under criticism from
the Office of Military Government in February 1946 because Mueller, "an ex-Abwehr character,
was not only still at large, but was in an influential position with the Christian Socialist Party."
See AB/11 to AB/02, Internal Route Slip, "Dr. Josef Mueller," 7 February 1946, L-003-207, (S),
and SSU's response, Lenington to Capt. George Schriever, "Dr. Josef Mueller," 11 February
1946, LX-003-211, (S), in Mueller, C
, DO Records. (S)

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By mid-September, Holtsman submitted eleven reports written or collected by
Mueller, including information on Communism Party activities and on the formation of
the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria. 77 He was a rising star in the early political
scene in southern Germany, and he was as much a source for SI as he was for X-2. 78 (S)
Despite Mueller's usefulness in assessing nascent German political developments,
American intelligence had lingering doubts about his credibility. London Station in •
October 1945 asked directly "Why wasn't Mueller executed? Everyone else taking part
in the July 20 conspiracy was and Mueller, while admittedly having good connections,
wasn't any more important or presumably better protected than Oster, Canaris, and
various others." The obvious question remained . — "Was he just plain lucky or did he at
one time or another talk?" 79 (S)
After an initial assessment of Mueller's case, London determined that "it seems
very likely that Mueller, having primarily served the Vatican both before and during the
War, will continue to do so after it. This might," SSU added, "not preclude his
usefulness to us bait would certainly seem to limit it." 80 SSU's uncertainty about

78 Examples of Mueller's political reporting during this period include SSU Intelligence
Disseminations, "Information Concerning Dr. Josef Mueller of the Bavarian Christian Social
Union," 3 October 1945, A-62357; "Christian Social Union in Bavaria," 10 October 1945, A61798; "Stegerwald Program for Germany," 10 October 1945 (date of distribution), A-61 798a;
"Future Plans for the Bavarian Christian Social Union (BCSU)," 10 December 1945, A-64163;
and "Josef Mueller and the BCSU," 20 February 1946, A-65375, (S), in Mueller, L-
.3 DO Records. (S)
7924 October 1945 cover memorandum to Mueller CIC Interrogation. (S)
801bid. (s)

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Mueller was never fully resolved, but X-2 in Munich moved ahead with its plans to use
Mueller as a penetration agent. 81 After receiving permission to do so in September,
Mueller was given the codename of ROBOT. 82 (S)
Mueller had already embarked on projects for X-2 that kept him busy in the fall of
1945. He identified the members of 0-VII (or Organization VII) in the former German
Army Wehrkreis (Military District) VII. This shadowy anti-Nazi group drew its members
from two Bavarian resistance formations, the Freihe its Aktion Bayern (FAB) and the
Bayerische Freihe its Bewegung (BFB), which sought to denounce former Nazis in

positions of power in Bavaria. 83 He also provided Holtsman with information about the
Austrian resistance movement that had sprung up just before the Nazi collapse. 84 In
addition to his work with SSU, Mueller also assisted the War Crimes Commission in

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Nuremberg. Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, the former director of OSS and briefly a
member on the American team for the ,International Military Tribunal, wanted Mueller to
gather information on German resistance to Hitler. 85 Donovan was particularly interested
in the Church's role in opposing Hitler, which allowed Mueller to draw upon his clerical
contacts. 86 (U)
SI's contact with Mueller ended when its Munich post closed in March 1946.r
In a report written in 1947, C

, formerly an SI officer in Munich,

recalled that he and other members of SUMunich would meet every week or so at
Mueller's house. The meetings, more like open gatherings with other guests, such as
members of the clergy and CSU party members, were informal, the Americans would
bring "ajar of Nescafe, as we would have done on any social visit to Germans."
stated that Mueller "never produced written intelligence for us and we never considered

utterances, rather than as actual information." (S)
Bill Holtsman, X-2's lone representative in Munich, continued for a time to draw
upon Mueller's connections to expand his coverage of the counterintelligence scene.88
Among his many acquaintances, Mueller introduced Munich X-2 to a senior Abwehr
officer who became a leading SCI asset. At least one of Mueller's contacts, however,
evoked a strong degree of antipathy from SSU. Holtsman informed his superiors in
November 1945 that Mueller had learned the whereabouts of Erich Heidschuh, an SS
officer who had evaded American efforts to track him in Munich. Holtsman reported that
"Heidschuh believed well informed mass murder [in] Poland, Abwehr activity in [the]
East and in France." According to Mueller, he could establish "friendly relations" with
Heidschuh, who was "reported as type to whom intelligence work appeals and is anxious
to work with West." Sidney Lenington at the German Mission headquarters responded
that "it would seem inadvisable to establish relations with Heidschuh" and that "it is our
suggestion that Heidschuh be not used and that, in light of his former activities, his case
be brought to the attention of CIC." 89 (S)

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X-2's relations with Mueller dwindled after 1946 for several reasons. His stature
in the CSU grew controversial when he ran afoul of both American Military Government
officials and the rightwing faction of his party. Mueller's contact with the French and the
Soviets raised new concerns about his political allegiances as he continued his rise in
Bavarian political circles. 90 In addition, C.was "very friendly with C

_3

reported in 1947 that, while Mueller

-3 in 1946, ROBOT subsequently began to

exploit the friendship to assist some of his CSU friends in denazification and other
matters. The services he required," C _3 wrote, "and the small returns received
prompted C

to break contact. On a different basis of association, ROBOT is still

potentially useful, since he is a shrewd and energetic politician with a good knowledge of
behind-the-scenes activities."91 (S)
Mueller's significance to American intelligence can be measured in the leads that
he provided. Although CIA continued to meet with Mueller periodically and reported on
his activities until the late 1950s, contact with and interest in the German lawyer-spypolitician never took on the same scale as it did during the first year after VE-Day.92
Mueller continued to play a leading role in early West German political developments.

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He served as deputy minister president and minister of justice in the Bavarian
Government from 1947 to 1950 and then joined the Federal government as minister of
justice until 1952. He remained a visible figure in CSU circles until his death in
September 1979. (S)

GAMBIT (U)

Hildegarde Beetz offered X-2 in Munich a unique perspective into the
machinations of the RSHA. Beetz, who came to the attention of American intelligence
through Wilhelm Hoettl, had been close to Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo, the sonin-law of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Ciano had served as Italy's foreign minister
until 1943 when he was arrested for betraying the Italian Fascist cause. (This led to his
execution the following year.) Born in 1919 near Weimar, Beetz joined the SD in 1939
as a clerk after receiving language training. Two years later, she transferred to Rome,
where she briefly worked for Guido Zimmer as a translator. She worked later in Amt VI
of the RSHA under Herbert Kappler, the SD's representative in Rome. (U)
With the Italian surrender in September 1943, Beetz, along with other German
female personnel, was evacuated from Rome. After her posting to Berlin, Hoettl, the
head of Amt VI's office dealing with Italy, assigned Beetz to be Count Ciano's secretary
and translator while he was held as a prisoner in Germany and later in Italy. The SD
wanted her to obtain Ciano's diary with his annotations about Italian peace negotiations

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and secret meetings. She accomplished her task and, at the end of the war, buried the
diary in the garden of her parents' home in Weimar. In the early summer of 1945,
American intelligence officers subsequently recovered the diaries, dubbing them the
"Rose Garden" papers. 93 (S)
After recovering the Ciano diaries, the Army interrogated Beetz about the German
wartime intelligence organization, activities, and personnel in Italy." As early as June
1945, OSS realized that it could employ Beetz to keep track of Hoettl. Lt. Col. Berding,
X-2's chief in Germany, noted that "as the former secretary and confidant of Dr. Hoettl,
she [Beetz] can be expected to find out from Hoettl what he considers to be the purpose
of his present collaboration with us, and what his plans are for the future of Germany and
of himself." 95 She provided "partial confirmation of the suspicion that Dr. Hoeftl had

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offered the services of his Southeastern Europe intelligence network to the Americans to
further his own political ambitions in Austria." 96 (S)
By August, OSS had decided to use Beetz as a "Penetration Agent" in Munich and
gave her the codename of GAMBIT. Special Agent Albert M. Grant, a member of X2/Munich, proposed that "Frau Beetz secure employment as a secretary through the
Arbeits Buro in Munich. She will then pick up former social contacts in the area which

have a former [Nazi] Party affiliation." In addition, Beetz will "join the Roman Catholic
Church. She feels that the Church will very possibly be the 'cover' used in any future
operations of the GIS. By cultivating contacts within the Church she will be in a position
to be immediately informed of any subversive action." Grant felt that Beetz could be
controlled because she fell into the "automatic arrest" category as a member of the SD
and because the Americans still held her husband as a prisoner. 97 Beetz claimed to have
been an "unwilling member" of the Nazi party and said she had stopped paying her Party
dues while in Rome. 98 (S)
Beetz soon found work with a small translating firm in Munich. The owner,
formerly a diehard Nazi and now converted to communism, published tracts urging
Germans to "engage yourselves with the ideals of Socialism." In December, Holtsman

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admitted that "GAMBIT's present activity has been very limited because of the limited
contact she is able to make." SCI Munich even contemplated setting up a joint operation
with CIC to more effectively employ Beetz. 99 (U)
By early 1946, it Was clear that Beetz was underutilized in Munich. At the behest
of Dana Durand, Beetz departed Munich in April for Berlin to embark on a secret project
in the divided city. Henry D. Hecksher of X-2/Berlin arranged with Lawrence E. de
Neufville, a former civilian OSS employee now posted with the Military Government, to
have Beetz employed as a confidential agent in the Economics Division of the Office of
Military Government to ascertain whether the Soviets had penetrated the American
conunand. 100 SSU falsified Beetz's denazification papers and gave her a new identity as
Hildegard Blum in order to facilitate her new employment. Hecksher, who had first met

100 Born in London, England, in 1913, de Neufville immigrated to the United States in 1933 and
became a citizen seven years later. Educated at Oxford and at Harvard University, de Neufville
was a journalist and magazine editor before the war. He joined OSS as a civilian in 1944 and
served in Morale Operations and X-2. De Neufville was one of the first two members of X-2 to
enter Berlin when the American forces moved into the German capital in July 1945. He resigned
from SSU in December of that year to accept a position with the Military Government in Berlin.

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Beetz when OSS put her in touch with Hoettl, felt that "she is probably one of those
extremely rare Germans who understand and are sympathetic to Democracy."101 (5)
As X-2's planning progressed in using Beetz to attract Soviet agents, Richard W.
Cutler in Berlin provided Hecksher with additional details about Beetz, now known as
GAMBIT, and her proposed role in What was now described as Project SITTING DUCK:

As an aid to current and prospective double agent operations against Soviet
Intelligence Stations lying outside Berlin it is proposed to place Frau Beetz in
OMGUS as a secretary in the near future. As is now well known, one of the
principal targets of the Soviet Intelligence System is the penetration of important
American offices at OMGUS. In the process of doubling back Soviet agents
dispatched on such a mission, it almost inevitably becomes necessary to use a
cutout, someone actually employed inside the Soviet target-office, in order to give
the Soviet controlling officers the illusion that their agent has in fact contacted a
well-placed source of information. Such a decoy or 'sitting duck' placed inside
the Soviet target would be subject to our complete control and, by giving the
Soviets increasing confidence in the success of their operation, enable our
penetration of their service to achieve greater results. (S)
In the past friendly and secure American officers have sometimes cooperated with
us as 'sitting ducks,' but the Soviets do not, for understandable reasons, appear to
trust such a contact of their agent as much as a well-placed German secretary. It is
therefore deemed imperative to have at least one, but preferably two or three,
German decoys inside the target. Newly discovered Soviet agents can then be
directed — probably unconsciously — to the decoy for neutralization, and doubled
101 A discussion of Beetz's role in Berlin is found in AB-16 [Richard W. Cutler] and AB-51
[Henry D. Hecksher] to AB-24 [Sidney H. Lenington], "Project for GAMBIT," SCI-B-174, LTXTS-160, (S). For approval of this project, see AB-16 to AB-24, "GAMBIT Project," 25 May
1946, LBX-TS-324, enclosing Col. H.G. Sheen, Chief, Counter Intelligence Section, Office of
the Director of Intelligence, to Brig. Gen. Draper, Director, Economics Division, OMGUS,
"Counter Espionage," 21 May 1946, (S), in Purwin,
DO Records. Further
discussion of Beetz's trustworthiness is found in Wilma Taber, X-2 Vetting Officer, to Sidney
Lenington, Acting Chief, X-2, "Vetting of Hildegard Beetz," 13 May 1946, LWX-TS-158, (S),
and SAINT, AMZON, to SAINT, Washington, "Hilde Beetz," 1 July 1946, LWX-531, enclosing
AB-16 to AB-17 [identity unknown], "GAMBIT's Lebenslauf and Analysis by AB-16," 5 June
1946, LBX-347, (S), in Purwin, C
JJ DO Records. (S)

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agents already under our control can use the sitting duck as camouflaging support
for their delicate double role. IO2 (S)
Project SITTING DUCK soon proved lame. By November 1946, five months
after Beetz accepted her job at the Economics Division, Hecksher was forced to declare
the project a failure. 103 Hecksher, however, planned to use another SSU double agent,
known as FORD, to entice MVD's Capt. Skurin's interest in the German secretary. The
Americans hoped that Skurin would seek out Beetz at OMGUS and try to recruit her. In
turn, SSU wanted to draw him out of the Soviet sector and, with Beetz's help, encourage
him to defect. Skurin refused to take the bait, despite meeting with Beetz in the French
sector. I04 (S)
Beetz, now redubbed CAMISE, continued to work for the new CIA, and she was
placed in the office of Arno Scholz, the publisher and editor in chief of Der Telegraf, the
British licensed, pro-Social Democratic newspaper in Berlin. Through Beetz, the CIA
monitored Scholz's activities, gathered information from him on his social and political

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connections, and subsidized the distribution of his paper in the Soviet zone.105
Operational use of Beetz petered out after 1950, when she become the head of the local
Telegraf bureau in Frankfurt am Main. She soon remarried, this time to Karl Heinz

Purwin, a West German trade unionist and editor of Welt der Arbeit. The Agency, in fact,
briefly considered using Beetz to penetrate the Social Democratic party through her
husband's connections. Over the next two decades, Beetz (now known by her married
name of Purwin) became a respected West German journalist and editor of the Neue
Rhein-Ruhr Zeitung in Essen. She was considered a friend of West German chancellor

Willi Brandt, and the government presented her with an award for her work in journalism.
(S)
The Agency periodically considered reactivating her as a source, but these
proposals were always dismissed. In 1961, for example, the German Station raised the
idea of using Beetz as an informant on the local political scene and as a way to plant
articles in West German newspapers. When the proposal reached the Counterintelligence
Staff for operational approval, it was quickly squelched. The CI Staff felt that Beetz was
too knowledgeable about the CIA's operations in Germany and could identify too many

1 05 Upon further investigation by the CIA, the Agency determined that Scholz had mismanaged

his covert subsidies. The Agency also concluded that Scholz gave false information between
1952 and 1954; CIA terminated its relationship with him in early 1955. For information on
Scholz, a
,DIArno Scholz, C
J DO
Records. (S)

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officers. Likewise, the CI Staff regarded Beetz as "politically confused" and in contact
with other intelligence services. 106 (S)
Two more proposals for using Beetz emerged and sunk in subsequent years.

.3, met Beetz, his former agent, in

Thomas Polgar t_

1979. Polgar, one of the original X-2 officers in Berlin, had known Beetz almost from
the beginning of her association with American intelligence. After talking with her on
several occasions, Polgar reported to Washington that he felt that Beetz had fine contacts
in Bonn and that she was a "living encycloepedia of political and personality
information." (S)
In 1982, the CIA once again examined Beetz's case; this time in relation to private
records and diaries that she asked to be returned. Headquarters claimed that all of her
papers had long ago been given back and that the diary had been missing since 1945. The
German Desk, in addition, reached the conclusion that her performance as an agent had
been mediocre and that her forte had actually been "the ease with which she handled case
officers for her own benefit. We earnestly hope you will not request permission to initiate

106

,-3, Chief, Cl/OA, to Chief, EE/Germany, "CAMISE," 19 April 1961, (S), in
Purwin, C_
, DO Records. In 1982, Headquarters provided C
with a summary written by Hecksher in 1949 about Beetz's work with CIA. "CAMISE is
probably better acquainted with the history of our organization and its personnel than any other
agent this base has ever run. This is in part due to an unfortunate occurrence that took place, I
believe, in 1945. At that time CAMISE requested that her private papers be returned to her.
Instead, however, of merely receiving those papers she was given the complete operational file
on a (very high level double agent operation) which she studied with bated attention and then
returned. After she had been turned over to BOB [Berlin Operations Base] for further handling,
CAMISE's case officer became deeply infatuated with her, and we assume that the drop in
security consciousness which is customary byproduct of infatuation helped to increase her

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a relationship with CAMISE unless you are convinced that she has something unique to
offer, something that she and she alone can provide." 107 (S)
While the CIA's interest in Beetz ceased 20 years ago, an Italian magazine located
her in 1996 in an unnamed town and interviewed her about her experiences with Count
Ciano. The magazine, however, left Beetz in peace and did not provide any further
biographical details beyond stating her new assumed name. 108 (U)

MALT (U)

The rounding up and interrogation of members of the defeated German military
intelligence services and the collection of their records absorbed a great deal of X-2 'S
time in the summer and fall of 1945. 109 In addition to the MOUNT case, SCl/Munich
had already organized two projects in June 1945 that utilized Nazi intelligence and
communications personnel. X-2 arrested Oberstleutnant Fechner, the head of the
Abwehr's Leitstelle II, and his adjutant, Hauptmann Novak, as well as another officer in

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charge of the organization's staybehind agents in Rumania. The TIP Case, as it became
known, resulted in the discovery of an extensive cache of material pertaining to German
clandestine activities in the Balkans. 110 In mid-August, Lt. Col. Berding cited Fechner's
aid to the Americans in recovering valuable enemy intelligence records. Berding sought
clarification from the Army as to the disposition of the "Leitstelle Group. "111 (s)
In a related case, X-2 in Munich also developed another project, the JUNKET
case, to interrogate members of the Wehrmacht's 506 th Signal Regiment. This unit had
the responsibility for maintaining communications with German agents in the Balkans,

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Italy, the Soviet Union, and Turkey. By June, X-2 and CIC had apprehended as many as
50 members of the unit and tried to crack the unit's call signs and frequencies. 112 (S)
X-2 continued to pursue these leads into 1946. In Munich, Bill Holtsman's
contact with Ober7eutnant Wolf Ulrich Wirth, a German signals intelligence officer,
proved valuable. Wirth, who served in an intelligence staff position and commanded a
communications unit in Russia, provided SSU with documents concerning the
interception of Soviet radio traffic. 113 He also supplemented American intelligence on
certain Soviet wartime espionage activities in Germany, known as Rote Drei, and
explained German intelligence material on the Polish service as it existed in 1939.
Holtsman remained in touch with Wirth into 1947 and helped him enter the journalism
department at the University of Munich. By this point, Wirth had been given the
operational designation of BARLEY. 114 (s)

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Holtsman's contact with Oberst Heinz Schmalschlager, who had commanded
Leitstelle III/Ost der Frontaufldarung, or the German Abwehr's counterintelligence

branch on the Eastern Front, was an important, but limited, success for X-2. 115 Born in
France in 1898, Schmalschlager surrendered to American forces in May 1945.116
Holtsman's contact with Schmalschlager (via Mueller and a former Abwehr officer, Karl
Suess) later that year coincided with SSU's shift from targeting Nazi resistance groups to
collecting information on foreign intelligence services operating in Germany.117
Schmalschlager became a desirable contact for his knowledge of the Red Army. In
November, Schmalschlager came to Munich to meet with Holtsman, who promptly
submitted a plan to X-2 to use the German intelligence officer and his contacts "for a
thorough interrogation into the past activities" of the Abwehr on the Eastern Front.118

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Holtsman described what he expected to accomplish with Schmalschlager (whom he now
dubbed MALT):

It is felt that even an extensive 'interrogation' done in the
usual catechistical way, would not cover all of his knowledge and
experience on the Eastern Front. Since MALT is energetic and
appears to be thorough and systematic, and since he has directed
an important unit of the Abwehr, and moreover, since he is
cooperative and willing to contact his friends who are experts on
the subject— he should have the chance of checking his own
information (which he will give us before any of his friends are
contacted) and enlarging upon it having all members of his
former staff in the same house. MALT, of course, is not doing
this for the love of the Americans and democracy, but because he
has a reasonable hope of having his 'active cooperation' listed on
his record. It is also evident that he, having worked for years in
this field, would not like to have the results of this work
'unappreciated and wasted.' 1 19 (U)
Schmalschlager provided Holtsman with extensive details about the Soviet
intelligence services, the organization of German counterintelligence on the Eastern
Front, and the location of other German intelligence personnel and records. In 1946, SSU
stated that the MALT reports "were the first comprehensive study of the Russian

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
intelligence services to come to the attention of the American intelligence services."120
In

early January 1946, Holtsman, however, learned to his chagrin that the Army's Counter

Intelligence Corps had arrested Schmalschlager as an "automatic arrestee" when he
visited his home in Nuremberg. In reporting the arrest, Holtsman downplayed it by
saying that it will not "seriously interfere with our investigation into the activities of
Leitstelle III/Ost." Holtsman planned to draw upon other officers under Schmalschager's

command as well as additional German wartime records that he hoped to obtain. 121 (S)
Army G-2 quickly recognized Schmalschlager's importance and transferred him
to its special interrogation center at Oberursel, where it had gathered other German
intelligence officers with Eastern Front experience. 122 SSU, in turn, provided the Army
with copies of the MALT report, which formed the basis of the Army's interrogations of

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Schmalschlager and other members of the Abwehr and Fremde Heer Ost. 123 The Army's
work at Oberursel in 1946 marked the beginning of what evolved into the Gehlen
Organization, although the Army's arrest of Schmalschalger ended SSU's brief effort to
set up its own network using German intelligence officers. 124 (S)
The Central Intelligence Agency had only limited contact with Schmalschlager in
the years after his arrest. C

,D a new member of the Munich Operations

Base, visited with Schmalschlager on several occasions in 1948 and 1949, just after his
release by the Army. Schmalschlager, who had returned to Nuremberg to rebuild his
business, expressed an interest in remaining on the Agency's books as an "informal,
unpaid adviser." The Agency, in turn, proposed to Schmaschlager that he meet with his
former officers to prepare reports on various German activities against the Soviets.
Beyond a vague idea of placing Schmalschlager in a new West German police force,
C .

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[Schmalschlager's new codename] as an occasional source and living reference on
Abwehr

wartime experiences." 125 (S)

Despite his reluctance to work for CIA, the Agency remained interested in
Schmalschlager's activities. Through a wartime Ukrainian contact of Schmalschlager's,
the Agency monitored him throughout the 1950s. Other contacts reported that
Schmalschlager had turned down offers to join various West German governmental
agencies and that he had been an unsuccessful candidate for a post with the Bavarian
Landesamt fur Verfassungschutz

(LfV). Sclunalschlager joined the Gehlen

Organization's counterespionage section in 1953. His role in the Gehlen Organization
and later the BND, however, appears to have been limited; he did not move to the
headquarters near Munich. After 1961, the Agency lost interest in Schmalschlaeger and
his file ends abruptly. Schmalschlaeger lived in Nuremberg until his death in 1972.126
(S)

125 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "AVOCET," 25 April 1949, MGM-A-1111, (S),
, DO Records. C J iad visited Schmalschalger at the
in Schmalschlager, C
European Command Intelligence Center (ECIC) in Oberursel in July 1948 to discuss his future
plans as an intelligence operative. The Agency wanted to know about Schmalschlager's
connections with the Gehlen Organization that had started at Oberursel. As it turned out,
Schmalschlager intensely disliked Hermann Baun, one of the top members of the nascent West
German intelligence service. At the same time, Headquarters was apprehensive of becoming
involved with former Abwehr personnel because of their close collusion with the Gehlen
Organization, still under the control of the US Army. See Chief, Munich Operations Base, to
Acting Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "An Interview with AVOCET at ECIC," 12 July 1948,
MGM-A-612, (S); and Chief, FBM, to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "AVOCET," 11 August 1948,
MGK-W-580, (S), both in Schmalschlager C
.D DO Records. (S)
126For further information on Schmalschlager's activities (known initially as AVOCET and later
as CANDIDA) in the 1950s, see numerous entries in Schmalschlager,

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FAMINE (U)

Several months before Bill Holtsman learned about Heinz Sclunalschlager, X-2 in
Munich recruited a member of the Abwehr as a source of information on the German
military intelligence service. Like Schmalschlager, this officer fell under the Army's
roundup of all mandatory or "automatic arrestees." On 5 July 1945, Capt. Timm in
Munich sent a routine cable to Lt. Col. Berding at X-2 headquarters announcing Sgt.
Holtsman's arrest of Oberleutnant Murad Fend. Berding, in turn, relayed the Third Army
SC! Detachment cable to the War Room in London for additional traces. This marked the
beginning of X-2's short-lived, but intensive, use of this rather unusual German
officer. 127 (S)
The War Room, indeed, was interested in Fend and ordered Timm to make him
available for further interrogation. Until his arrest, Allied intelligence only knew that
Fend, with his Abwehr codename of Dr. Foerster, was an important German intelligence
officer who had reportedly served in Greece. Beyond numerous references to his work in
building agent networks in the Balkans, the Allies had little direct knowledge of his
actual operations. 128 (s)

DO Records. (S)
127Cable, Timm to Berding, relayed to London, 5 July 1945, (S), in Bey Murad Fetid, C.
M DO Records. (S)
128 For a summary of Ferid's wartime activities, as summarized by Allied intelligence (primarily
British), see annotated OSS Form 1652a and additional card entries in Ferid,
DO Records. (S)

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Born in 1908 in Salonika in what was then the Ottoman Empire, Fend was the son
of a Turkish army officer and a Polish mother. After his father's death, Fend moved with
his mother to Munich. His grandfather, in fact, had been the honorary consul of the
United States in Munich for many years, and Fend had relatives in America. After being
wounded in action in Russia, Fend joined the Abwehr and because he spoke seven
languages, he was posted to Athens. In 1942, he married a German woman, and they had
a daughter two years later. Fend remained with the Abwehr as a referent on Turkish and
Middle Eastern matters when the RSHA Amt VI took over the military intelligence
service in 1944. At the end of the war, Fend, along with other members of the
Militarisches Amt, evacuated Berlin and moved to the Bavarian Alps. With the final

collapse of the Third Reich, Fend deserted his unit in Bavaria and simply rejoined his
family at his house in Miesbach, outside of Munich, in late April. Holtsman learned
about him in early July. (S)
Holtsman used Fend as a "bird dog" to search out other members of his wartime
eipnization. On 12 July, he drove Fend to Reit im Winkl, a village in the Alps on the
Austrian-German border. Getting out of the car before reaching the town, Ferid walked
into Reit im Winkl pretending to be a German soldier who had been released by the
French in Austria and was now making his way home. Ferid told townspeople that he
had no US discharge papers and thus had to watch out for the Americans until he could

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obtain his official release. 129 Information gathered from other German veterans in the
village allowed him to locate several intelligence officers. (U)
The SCI Detachment expressed its pleasure with Fend and gave him a lunch of K
Rations. "Ferid's cooperation" in this matter was exemplary. Holtsman wrote: "He acted
as though it was his own personal responsibility to locate these people. He is intelligent
and trustworthy." 130 (U)
The CI War Room in London, which had been informed of Ferid's mission in Reit
im Winkl, pressed the SCI Detachment to obtain information about Ferid's activities in
Greece. 131 Holtsman's two interrogations elicited extensive lists of names of individuals
with whom he had served in Germany, Greece, and elsewhere. Fend provided X-2 with a
unique perspective on German operations in the Balkans, a theater of the war in which
British intelligence had dominated. 132 (S)

129Lt. Col. Berding, Chief, X-2/Germany, to Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2, USFET,
"Dissolution Mil Amt D," 26 July 1945, LWX-53, enclosing SCI Twelfth Army Group, Munich,
to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Mil Amt D, Its Removal from Reit-im-Winkel and Final
Dissolution," 13 July 1945, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box
287, [no folder listed], NARA. A copy of this document also appears in Fend, L.
3 DO Records. A summarized form of this report also appears in Cable, SCI
Detachment, Third Army to X-2/Germany, "Donald & Holtsman Report," 13 July 1945, 985, (S),
in Fend, a
_3, DO Records. (S)
1301bid. (s)
131 Cable, X-2/Germany to SCI Detachment, Third Army, 18 July 1945, 467, (S), in Fend, C
3 DO Records. X-2 in London also wanted SCI in Munich to get Fend to identify a
German agent known as SOCRATES. X-2 in Athens had arrested Doris Papara and wanted to
know if she was Ferid's agent. X-2 in Greece also expressed interest in ascertaining
collaboration between the Bank of Athens and the Nazi occupiers. See Cable, X-2, London to X2/Germany, 31 July 1945, London 4317, (S), in Fend,
_D DO Records. (S)
132 Lt. Col. Berding, Chief, X-2/Germany, to Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2, USFET,
"Interrogation of Obit. M. Fend," 30 July 1945, X-1691, (S), enclosing SCI Twelfth Army Group

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Because of his demonstrated reliability, Holtsman submitted Ferid's name as a
prospective "penetration/informer agent" on 23 July. In Holtsman's opinion, Ferid's
recruitment as an American agent would "maintain contact with a person whom we feel
we can trust, who knows the German intelligence, whose position as a lawyer would keep
him informed as to what is going on in Bavaria, who would remain our constant reference
file to be consulted on old German Abwehr personnel." To place him in a position of
usefulness, Holtsman made arrangements with the Military Government in Miesbach to
appoint him as a county prosecutor. 133 (S)
But Fend had already been arrested by the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps on
21 July. Army headquarters in Frankfurt ordered his arrest without notifying X-2.
Holstman reported that Ferid's arrest "causes us great embarrassment in our relation with
the Miesbach CIC and with the Miesbach MG, who already have been approached re.
placement of Fend in an attorney's position under MG jurisdiction." Holtsman now had
to explain why the Army had changed its mind about the German officer. "It should be

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noted here" Holtsman reminded X-2 headquarters, "that Ferid's cooperation with us has
been outstanding: he cheerfully did all that we asked of him. The treatment which he
received at USFET will have a direct bearing on his trust in this office." 134 (S)
Lt. Edward R. Weismiller, X-2's chief of operations in Germany, told the SCI
Munich Detachment that Ferid's arrest had come about when Lt. Col. Lord Rothschild,
the British liaison officer, read about the German officer and asked for his apprehension.
"The authorities at CIB [Counter Intelligence Branch at USFET headquarters] directly
responsible for this action were extremely apologetic, and have acknowledged their error
in not checking into the matter more thoroughly before requesting Ferid's arrest."
Weismiller felt certain that the Army would take measures to avoid such "premature
arrests in the future." 135 (S)
Despite Ferid's arrest, Capt. Timm and Sgt. Holtsman still planned to use him as a
source for OSS. In a project outline dated 13 August 1945, X-2 noted that Ferid is a
"cosmopolite and not a Nazi." He had cooperated with the Americans "unstintingly."
placement as a criminal prosecutor would enable X-2 to keep an eye on nascent
underground movements in southern Bavaria. 136 The Army finally discharged Fend on

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27 August. 137 He had been a model prisoner and provided the Army with substantial
information that supplemented the earlier reports submitted by Holtsman. 138 Even before
his release by the Army, X-2 had approved of Ferid's use as an agent by Timm and
Holtsman. (S)
Now known as FAMINE, Fend returned to his home in Miesbach and worked on
minor taskings that Holtsman gave him. 139 In September, X-2 reported that Fend was
under consideration to become an assistant to Josef Mueller in a new Bavarian
Government. 140 Timm considered Fend a "high class" agent and wanted to use him to
infiltrate the Bayrische Freiheits Bewegung, a separatist movement that sought Bavaria's
independence from Germany. Likewise, Ferid also provided leads to German-speaking

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
refugees from Romania settling in Bavaria, which also provided insights into the state of
affairs in Romania. 141 (S)
Ferid's utility as a source diminished when American worries of an underground
Nazi movement receded. By early 1946, Fend had been reduced to minimal taskings, and
Holtsman soon listed him as dropped. 142 Holtsman, nonetheless, approved the use of
Fend as a letterbox for a project run by the Austrian Mission. CIG wanted to use a
former concentration camp inmate, Anton Rychlowski, to return to Poland to establish
contact with Polish resistance and obtain information on Soviet activities there. 143 The
use of Fend in a sensitive operation raised questions at the Austrian Mission and at
Headquarters in Washington. Fend was considered too visible and too well known as an
Abwehr officer to be used in "what is supposed to be high-grade United States counterintelligence activities." Headquarters, in fact, had had no updates on Ferid's activities

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
since the end of 1945. 144 By the end of March 1947, Security Control terminated the
project and with it the use of Ferid. 145 (S)
The Agency later learned that Fend had joined the Gehlen Organization but could
not determine his exact role. 146 In the fall of 1951, E-

visited Munich and

met with Fend, now a district attorney and instructor at the University of Munich's law
school. Fend told

1 that he had a contact within the Gehlen Organization who

worked on dispatching German agents into Czechoslovakia. This contact, Fend
indicated, felt that the Gehlen Organization sent poorly trained agents behind the Iron
Curtain. Fend said that the man's conscience bothered him and that "he would like to
work for an agency that is more concerned with the life of the agents it employs."
C

_told the German Station that Fend might be a "possible resident agent for CE

information in Munich." 147 The German Station at Karlsruhe dismissed the idea of using
Fend or his contact. Any American effort "to penetrate ZIPPER [the Gehlen

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Organization] is more dangerous than its potential value can justify," wrote C
at Pullach. 148 (S)
The Agency's last knowledge of Fend indicated that he was still in contact with
the Gehlen Organization in the Munich area. Agency records do not provide any further
information as to Ferid's whereabouts after June 1955. 149 (S)

SLOTH (U)

In March 1946, SSU headquarters in Washington requested that the German
Mission locate and interrogate Georg Gerebkov, a 37-year old, Russian-born German
who had worked in the "Directorate of Affairs of Russian Emigrants in France" for the
"Russiche Abteilung" during the Nazi occupation. 150 As a part of the overall shift from

targeting German wartime organizations to the new Soviet threat, US intelligence wanted
to learn from Gerebkov about his work in registering all Russians in France for the
Gestapo and about his recruitment activities for German army and labor organizations.

148 Acting Chief, Pullach Operations Base, to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "Operational," MGLA-8965, (S), in Fend, C
1 DO Records. (S)
I49 See UJVENTURE Worksheet in Fend,
J DO Records. The worksheet,
compiled by CIA analysts over the period of years after the Agency took over the Gehlen
Organization indicates that Fend was a member of the Gehlen Organization prior to March 1948.
The final entry on the worksheet is April 1955. (S)
150 Gerebkov's own account of his collaboration with the Nazis and that of other Russians in
France is found in SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, "Russian Emigration and Its Cooperation with
the Germans against the Soviets," 21 June 1946, LWX-463, (S), enclosing SCI Detachment,
Munich to Commanding Officer, SSU/X-2 Germany, "Russian Emigration and Its Cooperation

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SSU believed that Gerebkov's records "would be of interest to us as well as the
voluminous information he must have at his fingertips on the activities and organizations
of the Russians in France." 151 (S)
Gerebkov (whose name had numerous variants) was the grandson of an Czarist
general. An actor and dancer in the 1930s, he later served as the director of the Russian
Office for Confidential Affairs in Paris where he met Lt. Gen. Andrey Vlasov in February
1943. Vlasov, one of Stalin's leading officers and the hero of the battle of Moscow in
December 1941, fell into German hands six months later. Having lost faith in the Soviet
system, Vlasov agreed to head the Russian Liberation Movement (ROA) to cooperate
with the Germans against the communists. While Vlasov's work on behalf of the
Germans was often frustrated by opposition at the highest levels of the Third Reich,
thousands of former Soviet prisoners of war took up arms and served against the Allies
during the latter part of the war. 152 (U)
Gerebkov organized a large rally for Vlasov in Paris in July 1943 and later
Ued Vlasov's

political affairs with the Germans and other nations. He unsuccessfully

attempted to broker a separate truce between the Vlasovites and the Western Allies at the

with the Germans against the Soviets," 12 April 1946, (S), in DO Records, C
1, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
end of the war. 153 When the end came, Grebekov escaped repatriation to the Soviet
Union—unlike most Russians who supported the Nazis. 154 He instead found refuge as
an employee of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in
the American zone. As early as February 1946, two of Bill Holtsman's agents in Munich
reported that they had seen Gerebkov in the city and had tried to make contact with the
Russian. 155 (S)
Two months later, Bill Holtsman interrogated Gerebkov about his wartime
activities. Following this meeting, Holtsman listed several differences between what
Washington knew about the Russian and what he claimed to be the truth. Gerebkov
denied that he had joined the Nazi party after his arrival in Germany in the 1930s. He
also said that he was never a member of the SS although "his work among the Russian
emigrants was of necessity directed by RSHA Amt VI." Gerebov also claimed that he did
not spread propaganda against the Allies and that "professed anti-Semitism never caused
him to denounce or persecute the Jews." Rather, Gerebkov's attitude against the Jews

153 Sven Steenberg, a German soldier, who served on Vlasov's staff is the source of this
information about Gerebkov. See Sven Steenberg, Vlasov, trans. Abe Farbstein (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 110-112; 181-182; 185-186; and 213. (U)
154In fulfillment of the terms of the Yalta Agreement, the Americans and British repatriated over
a million Soviet soldiers who had been prisoners of war, forced laborers, as well as members of
the Vlasov Army in 1945. By August of that year, the US Army had returned over 90 percent of
the Soviet citizens in the American zone in Germany. The remainder, estimated at nearly 40,000,
refused to return to their homeland. American soldiers forced many of these Russians into
communist hands, including many Vlasov followers. An unpleasant task, the repatriation of
thousands of Russians to the Soviet Union by the Western Allies during 1945-46 remains
controversial to this day. Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 19441946, pp. 284-291 and 413-421. (U)

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"was based on the principle that it was through the Jews that communism was brought to
Russia; it was then, merely another expression of Gerebkov's anti-communism."
Gerebkov, likewise, professed that he was not anti-Western and denied that he genuinely
supported the Nazis. 156 (S)
French authorities, in the meantime, sought to try Gerebkov for his wartime
activities. In fact, a French court sentenced him in absentia to 20 years at hard labor in
June 1948. Instead of surrendering Gerebkov to the French for his collaborationist
activities, however, Security Control in Munich used him to provide leads to other White
Russian individuals and groups in southern Germany. Through Gerebkov (known
initially as SLOTH),

3 recruited three subagents who also provided information

to the Americans. 157 In addition, Gerebkov was tapped as a source of information about
the Russian anticommunism movement in western Europe. 158 (S)

(CLIP), and Sergei Froehlich (PRUNE). Larionov lived in the French zone in Germany and
provided information about Russian activities there. He remained a subject of CIA's
counterintelligence interest into the late 1960s. For details, see Victor A. Larionov, C.
DO Records. Froehlich, a Latvian of German ancestry, served as a liaison officer with
the Vlasov Army. Information about Froehlich's role with Vlasov is found in Steenberg, Vlasov,
pp. 93, 123, 125, 142, and 185. Dropped as an agent by c
3m early 1948, Froehlich
continued to be active in various intelligence circles in Cold War Germany. For a summary of
Froehlich's record, see Chief, EE to Chief of Station, Frankfurt and Chiefs of Base, Bonn and
Munich, "Sergei BERNHARDowitsch Froehlich aka Sergei Borrissowitsch Orlov," 24 January
1963, EGNW-2936, (S), in Sergei BERNHARDowitsch Froehlich, C.T
3 DO
Records. (S)
158 Holtsman's reporting about Russian personalities in Munich, based on Gerebkov's
information, is found in WASH-X-2-PTS-134 and 135, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 171A, Box

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,Lise of former Vlasov personnel as sources prompted mixed reactions

in Germany and in Washington. Wartime activities and disdainful political affiliations
were receding into the past, considered to be less relevant after 1946. 159 Instead,
Washington criticized the use of the Vlasovites because "most of the contacts which we
are cultivating in Munich are not worth the time and effort spent on them." The
identification and targeting of Soviet intelligence officials would be far more productive
than "concentrating as much as we have on doubtful and low level White Russian sources
of information." Headquarters feared that "we are getting away more and more from
arriving at primary aim. ”160 (s)
In Gerebkov's case, the CIA dropped him as an agent in 1949 after a review of his
production in Munich found the Russian not worth the Agency's time and effort.

67, Folders 821 and 822, and WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Boxes
285, 287 and 288, (no folders listed). Examples of declassified reporting at the National
Archives from Gerebkov, Larionov, and Von Meyer include SCl/Munich, Report No. 1, "NKVD
Activity in the Vic. Of Bodensee," 26 May 1946, LWX-TS-193, and Munich, AB-43 [Holtsman],
"Liquidation of the Russian Emigration in Yugoslavia," 10 August 1946, MSC-278, in WASHREG-1N'T-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Boxes 288 and 285 (respectively), (no
folders listed), RG 226, OSS Records, NARA. For Gerebkov's reporting on the wartime
activities of the anticommunist Russian groups, see SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, Washington,
"Russian Emigration and Its Cooperation with the Germans against the Soviets," 21 June 1946,
LWX-463, enclosing B.A. Holtsman to Commanding Officer, SSU/X-2'Germany, "Russian
Emigration and Its Cooperation with the Germans against the Soviets," 12 April 1946, (S), in DO
Records, Job 91-00976R, Box 1, Folder 9, CIA ARC; and SC, AMZON to FBM for SC,
Washington, "Russian Communism Activity in France - SLOTH," 8 April 1947, MGH-H-70,
(S), in DO Records,
1 Box 8, Folder 158, CIA ARC. (S)
159For example, FBM in Washington conducted a name trace for the C
J in January
1947. In its negative reply, Headquarters queriedC -3 why it had wanted to know if the
individual was a Nazi. "Straight political affiliations," Washington declared, "or background of
persons should not be our concern." SC, FBM to SC, E 2 'Max Herger," 27 January 1947, X9214, (S), in DO Records,
Box 6, Folder 128, CIA ARC. (S)

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Headquarters made this decision despite the protests of American case officers, who
noted that his conviction by the French "gives us practically complete control over
CANAKIN's life," as Gerebkov was now designated by CIA. 161 He soon vanished from
sight, only to reemerge briefly in 1961 when a CIA officer met him at a cocktail party in
Madrid and suspected that he was a BND agent. (S)

RADISH (U)

By the spring of 1946, X-2 in Munich had clearly shifted from looking for former
German intelligence officers who knew about wartime operations to a wider variety of
individuals believed to possess information on the Soviet Union. At the same time that
SSU searched for Georg Gerebkov in Munich, a former member of OSS, Jean M. Fisher,
now a UNRRA security officer near the city, informed Bill Holtsman about Leonid
Isaakiewitch Tschoudnowsky, a Russian-born émigré now working with the UNRRA in
Pasing. (S)
Born in 1888 in Ekaterinoslav, Russia, Tschoudnowsky had served in the Russian
Imperial Army and had earned several decorations. During the Russian Civil War, he
fought with Gen. Anton Denikin against the Bolsheviks and rose to the rank of captain.

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The Red defeat of Denikin's forces and those of Gen. Peter Wrangel in southern Russia
prompted the evacuation of the survivors to Constantinople. Like many White Russians,
Tschoudnowsky was caste upon foreign shores; in his case, he settled in Yugoslavia.162
(S)
Tschoudnowsky quickly got on his feet in Yugoslavia becoming a prefect with the
Belgrade police. With the German invasion, the Nazis reportedly forced Tschoudnowsky
out of the government because of his Jewish background (Fisher described him as a
"Christian Jew"). According to one note, the Germans had placed Tschoudnowsky in a
concentration camp but released him when they learned of his anticommunist past. When
Soviet troops liberated Yugoslavia, Tschoudnowsky fled the country with his wife and
ended up in Bavaria. In August 1945, he joined the UNRRA, holding various job titles as
assistant security officer, legal officer, and employment manager. Fisher, in bringing
Tschoudnowsky to Holtsman's attention, noted that the Russian émigré was "a perfect
type of informant; he is a 'father-confessor' to many of the UNRRA and DP people in
Munich; he has police experience, good memory, is a willing worker." Fisher, who had
served with OSS Secret Intelligence during the war, raised a point of concern to which he

Germans?" 163 (S)
As early as April 1946, Tschoudnowsky, reporting through Fisher, was the source
for dozens of "spot reports" on members of the White Russian émigré community in
Munich as well as on Soviet intelligence operations in southern Germany. In June, X-2
formally requested that Tschoudnowsky be vetted as an agent. 164 In July, Holtsman gave
Tschoudnowsky a pass requesting both the Military Police and the German police to
permit him to drive a vehicle on Saturdays and Sundays on official business. 165 (S)
Tschoudnowsky's reporting focused on individuals that he encountered during the
course of his work for the United Nations. In August 1946, for example, Tschoudnowsky
told Holtsman what information he had obtained from Dr. Georg Kossenko, another
UNRRA employee in the Munich area. Kossenko, described by Tschoudnowsky as a
"honest, positive, anticommunist character," relayed his meeting with a Russian émigré,
known by the alias of Philip Sollinger, who had been arrested by the NKVD in July 1945

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
and who claimed to have met several American "agents" in Soviet jails before the Soviets
dispatched him to West Germany to spy on the British and the Americans. I66 (S)
By August 1946, Holtsman felt that Tschoudnowsky simply took up too much of
his time because his information tended to be of local interest and more suited to the
Counter Intelligence Corps. Tschoudnowsky, who served as a cutout to several other
agents employed by Security Control, needed to spend more time on collecting
information from his subsources. I67 Rather than terminate his services, Holtsman
transferred Tschoudnowsky to George Belie, who had just arrived in Munich to work
with X-2. When Belie met with Tschoudnowsky in mid-August, the new case officer
emphasized that he sought information on foreign intelligence services that could be
exploited for double-agent operations. Belie planned to use Tschoudnowsky as a chief
cutout to another agent and, while complimenting him for his previous work with
Holtsman, explained that his new taskings would be of a "different nature. ”168 (s)
Belie soon found himself with a problem. On 19 August 1946, just after Belie
met with Tschoudnowsky, Capt. Novakovic, the Yugoslav Repatriation Officer in
Munich, demanded that the local CIC office in Bavaria arrest the Russian émigré. The

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Yugoslay s had apparently learned about Tschoudnowsky's presence in Munich and
sought his arrest on behalf of the Yugolsav War Crimes Commission. Only through
Belic's personal intercession with the local CIC chief did the Americans not detain
Tschoudnowsky, From that point on, SSU knew that its agent was vulnerable to
communist machinations. 169 (S)
By November 1946, however, the Central Intelligence Group began to express
doubts about Tschoudnowsky's veracity. The Philip Sollinger case, as reported to
Tschoudnowsky by Kossenko in August, did not match up after the Counter Intelligence
Corps looked into the matter. Indeed, Kossenko now denied that he even knew Sollinger
or any of the facts of the story. "We are not surprised at the unsatisfactory outcome of
this investigation," Henry Hecksher in Heidelberg wrote Bill Holtsman in Munich. "As a
matter of fact," Hecksher wrote, "we would have been surprised if Kossenko had told the
truth, because it now appears that he himself may be engaged in activities of a
conspiratorial nature conducted in the interests of some unidentified Soviet agency. We
are also beginning to wonder how RADISH himself fits into the picture." 170 Hecksher

__3to present Tschoudnowsky with an ultimatum that he come clean on the

Sollinger affair or that the Americans may "have to resort to a confrontation between him
and Kossenko." Tschoudnowsky's performance, Hecksher noted, had been lacking and
his information had been "largely unsubstantiated and in many instances conjectural."
The German Mission's headquarters declared that "RADISH will have to be sharply
disciplined by you if we want to continue using him at all." 171 (S)
Tschoudnowsky quickly receded from view after late 1946. Two years later,
_D , on his reassignment to Munich from Washington, wrote about the
possibility of reusing Tschoudnowsky, who had been given the new codename of
CAMPHOR. 172 L Tin fact, bumped into Tschoudnowsky at a hotel in Munich in early
1949. He learned that the Russian emigre had been working as an agent for CIC and that,
while not physically well, he continued to serve as the chief of security police in the
Munich area for the International Relief Organization (IRO). Although

i did not plan

171 I1.id. On 15 August, Holtsman received a note requesting him to ascertain if Tschoudnowslcy
worked for Soviets in France. See AB-17 [unknown identity] to AB-43 [Holtsman], "Leonid
Tsclmoudnowslcy," 15 August 1946, LWX-913, (S), in DO Records, E.
Tn., Box 1,
Folder 11, CIA ARC. A week later, Belie sent the German Mission a copy of Tschoudnowsky's
Fragebogen with answers to his denazification questionnaire. See AB-102 [Belie] to AB-51
[Hecksher], "Tschoudnowslcy, Leonid, Vetting Information on," 22 August 1946, [no
3 , Box 1, Folder 11, CIA ARC. The
classification listed], in DO Records, C
Fragebogen and the two photos are not in this folder nor are they present in his 201 file. (S)
172"Former MOB Contacts," 8 November 1948, MGK-W-938, [no classification listed], in
DO Records. (S)
Tschoudnowslcy. C_

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to use Tschoudnowsky, the American case officer felt that the Russian was still a good
contact for information on DP personalities and activities. 173 (S)
All contact between the CIA and Tschoudnowsky ended when the Russian applied
to immigrate to the United States in 1951. Headquarters in Washington, after learning
about Tschoudnowsky's application to the US Displaced Persons Commission, simply
noted that it had no derogatory information in its files and asked the German Station to
take any necessary steps regarding its old agent. 174 (S)

Opening Act of the Cold War (U)

Between 1945 and 1947, Munich was a place of mystery, confusion, and intrigue,
a war played in the shadows. An entire generation of Cold War operations had their
genesis in Munich's ruined streets. The operations launched by X-2's C

3. and C.

_Dbetween 1945 and 1947 set the stage for the rapid

expansion of the CIA's Munich Operations Base after 1948. Their contacts tended to be
former German Intelligence Service personnel or Eastern Europeans who had supported
the Nazi regime in one form or another. The Office of Strategic Services first sought
those individuals in the weeks after the war to counteract the threat of a resurgent Nazi

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movement. These same individuals soon proved to be useful to the Straetgic Services
Unit, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Central Intelligence Agency for their
knowledge on the new threat, the Soviet Union. In its quest for information on the
USSR, the United States became indelibly linked to the Third Reich. (S)

In November 2000, CBS Television broadcast its efforts to locate hidden Nazi
treasures in the deep, dark waters of Lake Toplitz in the Totes Gebirge (Range of the
Dead) mountains of the Salzkammergut region in western Austria. 1 In one of the last
desperate acts of the Nazis in World War II, the SS dumped crate loads of money into
Toplitzsee, as it is known in German. The money sat undisturbed at the bottom of the
lake, measured in some parts at over 300 feet. 2 (U)
CBS, in conjunction with the World Jewish Congress and the Simon Wiesenthal
Research Center in Los Angles, hired Oceaneering Technologies, an underwater salvage
company that had discovered the Titanic as well as conducting several other headline
1 Portions of this chapter initially appeared in Kevin C. Ruffner, "Shifting from Wartime to
Peacetime Intelligence Operations: On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters," (S), in Studies in
Intelligence (Vol. 46, No. 2, 2002), pp. 41-53. (S)
2For information on the Toplitzsee expedition in 2000, see CBS 60 Minutes II, "Hitler's Lake,"
prod. by Bill Owens, 21 November 2000. See also Associated Press, "American Salvage Crew
Ends Search of Austrian Lake," 21 November 2000; Reuters, "Hitler's Lake' Yields Counterfeit
Currency," 20 November 2000; Associated Press, "American Team Begins Mapping Austrian
Lake in Search of Nazi Relics," 10 June 2000; Emmanuel Serot, "Underwater Search for Nazi
Relics in Austrian Lake," Agence France Presse, 7 June 2000; Julia Ferguson, "Divers Start Hunt
for Nazi Loot in Austrian Lake," Reuters, 5 June 2000; Nick Fielding and Shraga Elam, "Titanic
Team to Search Lake for Nazi Treasure," Sunday Times (London), 4 June 2000; Agence France
Presse, "Search for Nazi Documents in Austrian Lake to Start Monday," 4 June 2000; and Julia
Ferguson, "Is Austrian Lake a Treasure Trove of Nazi Plunder?," Reuters, 1 June 2000. See also
Robert Buchacher and Herbert Lackner, "Das Raubgold der 'Endloser,'"Profil 27 (2 December
1996), pp. 56-62 and Walter Mayr, "Mehr als Fische und Falschgeld," Der Spiegel (17 January
2000), pp. 140-141. (U)

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expeditions, including the recovery of TWA Flight 800 in 1997. Going far beyond earlier
searches of the lake by Stern, a German magazine, in 1959 and by the Austrian
Government in 1963, CBS wanted to use modern technology to locate the Nazi treasure
in Toplitzsee, whose legend had grown over the decades as the "garbage can of the Third
Reich." 3 Some felt that the lake contained not only German money and documents, but
also gold from the Vatican, and the looted panels of the Russian Imperial Amber
Chamber. (U)
For a month in the summer of 2000, Oceaneering mapped the entire lake and then
used a sophisticated one-man submarine to scour Toplitzsee's freezing dark bottom. The
lake, which has no oxygen below 65 feet, "preserves everything" that falls into the
water. 4 Finding Nazi relics, however, would be another matter. Even with modem
equipment, the salvage crew faced numerous challenges, ranging from bad weather in the
Alps to a lake floor covered by thousands of trees washed into the water over the
centuries (the preserved logs are stacked up to heights of 60 feet at the bottom of the
lake). As Bill Owen, Oceaneering's dive team leader, admitted, "we have a 50-50 chance
of finding what we're looking for." 5 (U)

3As quoted in Fielding and Elam, "Titanic Team to Search Lake for Nazi Treasure," Sunday
Times (London), 4 June 2000. For information on the 1959 expedition, see "Himmler Papers in
Lake," The Times (London), 11 August 1959, p. 6; "SS Secrets in Files Raised from Lake," The
Times (London), 12 August 1959, p. 6; "9M. Pounds 'Bank Notes' Go Up in Flames," The Times
(London), 19 November 1959, p. 10. (U)
4 Serot, "Underwater Search for Nazi Relics in Austrian Lake," Reuters, 7 June 2000. (U)
5Fielding and Elam, "Titanic Team to Search Lake for Nazi Treasure," Sunday Times (London), 4
June 2000. (U)
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Only toward the end of the search period did Oceaneering detect the remnants of
wooden crates, which turned out to contain counterfeit British pounds and American
dollars. Rabbi Marvin Hier of the Simon Wiesenthal Research Center declared that the
results justified the expense of the undertaking even though the anticipated treasures did
not emerge from the Toplitzsee. "Had this counterfeiting operation [been] fully
organized in 1939 and early 1940," the Holocaust scholar commented, "results of World
War II may have been quite different." 6 (U)
In the decades after the war, the search for treasures stolen by the Nazis during
World War II has taken both fictional and real-life characteristics. 7 How the Germans
obtained their wealth from individual victims and conquered nations and sought to hide it
from the Allies is one of the unsolved mysteries of World War

Hitler's Gotterdammerung

11. 8 (U)

(U)

6Reuters, "Hitler's Lake' Yields Counterfeit Currency," 20 November 2000. (U)
7 For a fictional look at hidden Nazi wealth and its impact over twenty years after the war, see
Helen Machines, The Salzburg Connection (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
Other recent examples of elaborate efforts to recover hidden Nazi wealth include recovery
attempts in Greece. See "Rush is on for Nazi Gold in Greek Sea," New York Times, 31 July 2000,
p. A4; Agence France-Presse, "Search for Nazi Loot off Greece is Unsuccessful," New York
Times, 16 August 2000, p. A3. (U)
8 The looting of European art from individual owners, dealers, and museums is one such example.
For further information, see Craig Hugh Smyth, Repatriation of Art. from the Collecting Point in
Munich after World War II (Maarsen: Gary Schwartz, 1988) and Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of
Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). The recovery of Nazi monetary and other wealth is found in Greg
Bradsher, "Nazi Gold: The Merkers Mine Treasure," Prologue: Quarterly of the National
Archives 31 (Spring 1999), pp. 7-21. (U)
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US intelligence was first drawn to Germany's counterfeiting operations as it
ascertained Nazi plans to conduct a final battle, or Gotterdammerung, in the Alpine
regions of Bavaria and Austria. In September 1944, Allen Dulles, chief of the OSS
mission in Bern, crossed the newly opened border from Switzerland into France.
Meeting with then Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, in
Lyons, the two intelligence officers flew to London and then to the United States. While
in New York, Dulles summarized his views of the future of postwar Europe, in particular
relations with the Soviet Union and the American role in defeated Germany. 9 (U)
Dulles warned his superior "upon the German collapse, hundreds of thousands of
Nazis and SS will attempt to hide themselves in the German community. There are
various conflicting stories as to the extent to which they are already preparing an
underground movement," Dulles admitted. "In any event, this is a danger which is
sufficiently real to justify the most careful following and we should have in Germany
competent secret police and CE [counterespionage] forces to attempt to break this up at
its inception." Dulles also discussed the "credible but not confirmed" reports of last-ditch
efforts by the Nazis to fortify the mountainous regions of southern Germany and
Austria. 10 (U)
Within six months after Dulles gave his appraisal of German postwar resistance
measures, Allied concern about a Nazi stronghold in the Alps had mounted

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appreciably." Rumors of an Alpenfestung or a National Redoubt in the Alps impacted
American and British strategy at the end of the war and had long-term political
ramifications. 12 The surprise German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December
1944 foreshadowed the fury that the enemy could unleash. In mid-January 1945, Dulles
told Washington that the "idea of a defense in a mountain fortress is in line with the
Wagnerian complex of the whole National Socialist movement and the fanaticism of the
Nazi youth. Hitler and his small band of brigands," the OSS station chief noted, "who
started in the beer-hall in Munich, may find their end not far away in the Bavarian Alps,
after having laid most of Europe in ruins." 13 (U)
Even as German forces melted away as Allies armies raced across the shell of the
Thousand Year Reich during the spring of 1945, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that
"if the German was permitted to establish the Redoubt, he might possibly force us to
engage in a long, drawn-on guerrilla type of warfare, or a costly siege. Thus," the Allied
Supreme Commander wrote, "he could keep alive his desperate hope that through
disagreement among the Allies, he might yet be able to secure terms more favorable than
those of unconditional surrender." 14 (U)

11 For a history of the end of the war in Europe, see Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive
(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993, rep. 1973 ed.). (U)
12For a review of the Allied knowledge about German measures to continue the war, see Rodney
G. Minott, The Fortress That Never Was: The Myth of Hitler's Bavarian Stronghold (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964). (U)
13Petersen, p. 430. Gen. Donovan's views in February 1945 as to the existence of a National
Redoubt are found in Petersen, pp. 447-448. (U)
14Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 11. (U)
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While the evacuation of high-ranking German officials and their offices from
Berlin to southern Germany seemed to presage the enemy's plans to continue the
struggle, Allen Dulles grew increasingly dubious of German plans to defend the Alpine
regions. 15 The potential threat of the National Redoubt, however, weighed heavily on
Allied leaders. In one of his most controversial actions of the war, Gen. Eisenhower
decided not to assault Berlin, the Nazi capital, but instead ordered American and British
forces to clear the northern and southern flanks. 16 The role that Allied intelligence
played in changing the course of the war in these last months still intrigues military and
intelligence historians. 17 (U)

Sonderkommando Schwendt (U)

As the Allied noose tightened around the Third Reich, OSS gleaned pieces of
information about an intricate plot by the Germans to undermine the American and
British currencies. In March 1945, OSS in Bern learned that the former chauffeur of the
Hungarian ambassador to Switzerland had met a "Herr Schwendt" as he passed through
Merano in northern Italy. According to the driver named Bela Tar, the mysterious man
(whom Tar called Fritz Wendig) proposed, that on his return to Switzerland, the

15 M example of OSS's increasing reluctance to accept the idea of a last-ditch German struggle
in the Alps can be found in OSS/X-2, German Section, "Memorandum of Nazi Resistance Plans,"
10 March 1945, XX-5674, (S), in Walter F. Schellenberg,
, DO Records. (S)
16Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966). (U)
17Timothy Naftali, "Creating the Myth of the Alpenfestung: Allied Intelligence and the Collapse
of the Nazi Police-State," Contemporary Austrian Studies 5 (1997), pp. 203-246. (U)
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Hungarian get a job in the American or British legations and provide information to the
Germans. At the same time, Tar would be furnished with dollars and pounds to sell on
the Swiss black market. 18 (S)
After crossing the Swiss border, Tar instead surrendered to the authorities and
provided OSS with his information. He reported that "Herr Schwendt" lived at Schloss
Labers, on the outskirts of Meran, which had "a radio station, extensive telephone
installations and source happened to see by chance where cases full of brand new Italian
Lire where [sic] being unpacked." Tar also gave the Americans a sketch of the Schloss,
which, in turn, OSS reported to Paris, Caserta, and Washington as a "bombing target."19
(S)
The following month, a German deserter told OSS in Switzerland that Heinrich
Himmler, head of the SS, had formed "Sonderkommando Schwendt" as an independent
unit "to purchase abroad a variety of objects including gold, diamonds, securities, as well
as certain raw materials and finished products such as silk stockings, expensive
perfumery, etc." The source pinpointed offices in Trieste, Meran, and Milan with the
goods stored in a military barracks in Merano and in nearby caves. 20 (S)
In May 1945, two weeks after VE-Day, OSS in Switzerland intercepted a letter
from what appeared to be a German civilian, who had been involved in obtaining the

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right paper stock for the printing of British currency. In the letter, the individual (who
was not known to OSS) provided an account of the beginnings of the operation, the
names of the firms involved, and the names of several SS officers who supervised the
production. The writer had visited the production facility and had met the Jewish
inmates. 21 (U)

The McNally Investigation (U)

As the Americans moved into northern Italy and Austria, Operation BERNHARD
quickly unraveled. 22 Immediately after the war, the United States undertook two
separate investigations of Operation BERNHARD. The first investigation, led by an
21 Germany: Economic. "Manufacture of English Pounds Notes," Date of Report: 20 June 1945,
Information: 26 May 1945, Date of Distribution: 10 July 1945, Report No. B-2832, in Col.
William G. Brey, Chief, Foreign Exchange Depository, Finance Division, Office of Military
Government (US), to Director, Finance Division, OMGUS, 3 October 1946, enclosing untitled,
undated report by Maj. George J. McNally, Chief Counterfeit Detection Section, with
attachments, in Record Group 260, Records of US Occupation Headquarters, World War II,
Records of the Office of Military Government (US), Office of Finance Division and Finance
Adviser, Central Files of Foreign Exchange Depository Group 1945-50, Box 451, File 950.31,
Currency — Counterfeit Investigations, NARA (hereafter cited as McNally Report, RG 260,
OMGUS Records, NARA). (U)
22A number of books have been written on the German counterfeiting operation. For example,
see Adolf Burger, Unternehmen BERNHARD: Die Geldfalscherwerkstatt im KZ Sachsenhausen
(Berlin: Edition Heinrich, 1992). Burger was one of the Jewish inmates forced to work for the
Germans. See also Anthony Pine, Operation BERNHARD (New York: William Morrow and
Company, 1962). While Pine provides an overall description of Germany's efforts to undermine
British and American currency, the book is misleading in some areas. For example, Wilhelm
Hoettl's role in the affair is obscured, and he is referred to as "Dr. Willi Holten." Ladislas
Farago's Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1974) should also be read with some caution. Other sources include Magnus Linklater, Isabel
Hilton, and Neal Ascherson, The Nazi Legacy: Klaus Barbie and the International Fascist
Connection (New York: Holt, Rinehart and,Winston, 1985) and Richard Wires, The Cicero Spy
Affair: German Access to British Secrets in World War II (Westport: Praeger, 1999), pp. 85-96.
(U)
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Army captain and a former Secret Service officer, sought to discover how the Germans
had compromised the security of the American monetary system. At the same time, OSS
undertook a separate investigation to locate members of Operation BERNHARD who, in
turn, could pinpoint the hidden wealth before it could finance underground Nazi
resistance efforts. (U)
In early May, Capt. George J. McNally, Jr., a Signal Corps officer assigned to the
Currency Section of the G-5 Division's Financial Branch at Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in newly captured Frankfurt, received word that American
troops in Bavaria had located a factory stocked with boxes of counterfeit British pounds.
At the same time, he learned that American soldiers and Austrian civilians were busily
fishing millions of pounds found floating in the Enns River. Meanwhile, a German army
captain had surrendered a truck with 23 boxes of English money, valued at 21 million
pounds sterling, in Austria. A Secret Service agent before the war, McNally specialized
in detecting counterfeit money, and he soon found his peacetime skills in demand in
occupied Europe. For the next eight months, McNally would trace the entangled webs of
Operation BERNHARD that extended into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and
Luxembourg. 23 (U)
Until McNally took charge in late May, the British and Americans had not
coordinated their investigation into German currency operations. Reports came from

23 George J. McNally with Frederic Sondem, "The Nazi Counterfeit Plot," in Secrets and Spies:
Behind-the-Scenes Stories of World War II (Pleasantville: The Reader's Digest Association,
1964), pp. 507-514. Originally published as "The Great Nazi Counterfeit Plot," in the July 1952
issue of Reader's Digest. (U)
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scattered army units throughout Germany and Austria, many linked to rumors of
sightings of German Werewolves, the Nazi underground resistance movement. From
intelligence sources in the Middle East, the British already knew that the Germans had
been busily undermining their currency. At a meeting in early June 1945 with British
officials in Frankfurt, McNally met P.J. Reeves, the manager of the St. Luke's Printing
Works in London (the British equivalent of the US Bureau of Printing and Engraving).
Reeves was visibly perturbed when he saw the amount of British currency that McNally
had recovered in Austria. "He began going from box to box, riffling the notes through
his fingers. Finally he stopped and stared silently into space. Then for several seconds,"
McNally later recalled, "he cursed, slowly and methodically in a cultured English voice,
but with vehemence. 'Sorry,' he said at last. 'But the people who made this stuff have
cost us so much.'"24 (U)
Capt. McNally, joined by Chief Inspector William Rudkin, Inspector Reginald
Minter, and Detective Sgt. Frederick Chadbourn from Scotland Yard and Capt. S.G.
Michel, a French army liaison officer attached to the Americans, soon concentrated their
efforts on interviewing Germans involved with Operation BERNHARD and
concentration camp inmates who produced the false money. Drawing on support from
the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CC), OSS, and the US Navy, McNally compiled

24 Indeed, the Bank of England had to recall all its notes and exchange them for new five pound
notes. McNally, "The Nazi Counterfeit Plot," p. 507. (U)
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an extensive report by the fall of 1945. His report summarized the history of Operation
BERNHARD and the known disposition of German false currency. 25 (U)
"While the exact date of inception is vague," McNally wrote, "it seems reasonable
to suppose in the light of all evidence that the German Reich had a counterfeiting plan as
early as 1939."26 By 1942, McNally reported that Operation BERNHARD was in full
swing with two barracks as living and work areas for Jewish prisoners at Sachsenhausen
concentration camp near Berlin. Isolated from the main prison area by barbed wire
fences, the SS, under Sturmbannfuhrer BERNHARD Kruger, oversaw the work of 140
Jewish inmates in such fields as printing, binding, photography, and engraving. The
Nazis placed a prisoner as the head of each section under the overall charge of Oskar
Stein (also known as Oskar Skala) as office manager and bookkeeper. In addition to
sparing their lives, Kruger offered the prisoners better food and other privileges for their
hard work. (U)
The Germans faced numerous technical difficulties to counterfeit British and
American money. By mid-1943, the SS had contracted with the Hahnemuhle paper
factory in Braunschweig in northern Germany to produce the special rag needed for
British money. The Germans used ink produced by two companies in Berlin. Wartime

25McNally Report, pp. 1-11, with attachments and addendum, RG 260, OMGUS Records,
NARA. The report indicates that McNally had provided photographs, but none are located with
the report at the National Archives. (U)
26McNally Report, p. 1, RG 260, OMGUS Records, NARA. Operation BERNHARD, known
originally as Operation Andreas, actually got its start in 1939 when two SS officers, Alfred
Naujocks and BERNHARD Kruger of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt, RSHA or the German
Security Main Office, undertook to produce false British currency in addition to other false
documents. For further background on Naujocks, see Gunter Peis, The Man Who Started the War
(London: Odhams Press, 1960). (U)
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shortages, coupled with imperfections, limited the production of British currency. Oskar
Stein estimated that only 10 percent of the fake money could be considered usable; yet
the Germans reportedly produced some 134 million pounds in less than two years.
Efforts to reproduce American currency proved less successful despite the work of Solly
Smolianoff, a well-known forger whom Krieger added to his collection of skilled workers
at Sachsenhausen. 27 (U)
In addition to American and British currency, the SS reproduced a wide array of
civilian and military identity cards, passports, marriage and birth certificates, stamps, and
other official documents from throughout the world. According to McNally,
Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler planned to use these forged documents and money for

Nazi agents as well as to create havoc among the Allies. For example, Himmler wanted
to drop the "expendable," or Abwurf, British pounds on the United Kingdom by airplane.
These notes "were good enough to fool anyone but an expert. Therefore," McNally
wrote, "if a large quantity was dumped and the English government declared them
counterfeit, many would say the government was merely trying to avoid redeeming them
and would hold them." 28 (U)
The rapid advance of the Soviet army into Germany in early 1945 necessitated the
evacuation of the Jewish inmates from SachSenhausen to Mauthausen, a concentration
camp in Austria. In mid-April, the Germans again moved the prisoners and machinery to
27For further details on Smolianoff, described as the "only criminal" involved in Operation
BERNHARD, see Murray Teigh Bloom, The Brotherhood of Money: The Secret World of Bank
Note Printers (Port Clinton: BNR Press, 1983) and Murray Teigh Bloom, Money of Their Own:
The Great Counterfeiters (New York: Scribner, 1957). (U)
28 McNally Report, p. 6, RG 260, OMGUS Records, NARA. (U)
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an unused brewery at Redl-Zipf where they hoped to start up production in an
underground factory in the mountains. The Nazis had little time to resume production as
the war came to a sudden end in Austria. By the last week of April, the Germans ordered
the inmates to destroy as much of the machinery, money, and records as possible. The
inmates, in turn, moved to Ebensee concentration camp where the US Army liberated the
camp on 6 May, shortly before the SS planned to kill them. By the time that Capt.
McNally launched his investigation, Operation BERNHARD's concentration camp
workers had scattered throughout Europe. (U)
As the fronts collapsed, the SS scrambled to get its money out of Berlin to safety
in the south. According to McNally's research, one truck left Redl-Zipf and made it as
far as Pruggern, where it broke down. The money was dumped in the Enns River where
the bills scattered for miles. Another truck left the same location and arrived in Bad
Aussee, and the SS then put the money on a cart for the trip to Toplitzsee, where they
dropped the cases into the lake. A convoy of trucks from Berlin brought more money to
Taxenbach, where the Germans burned the trucks and their contents. Another truck
ended up near Innsbruck, where the Counter Intelligence Corps found it and over two
million British pounds. A German army officer surrendered yet another truck with 23
boxes full of bills of small British dominations totaling some 21 million pounds.
McNally also tracked down other unconfirmed reports of sightings of the German money.
(U)
Throughout the summer and fall of 1945, McNally and his British and French
counterparts crisscrossed Europe to interview witnesses and interrogate German
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participants, including Obersturmbannfuhrer Josef Spacil, BERNHARD Kruger's
commanding officer. 29 Capt. McNally also tried to raise the crates of money that the
Germans had dumped in the Toplitzee and Traunsee. A special US Navy team of divers
flew from Le Havre, France, to Frankfurt and then drove to Austria. Despite the depths
of the Toplitzsee, the Navy divers entered the shallower sections of the lake, but found
nothing. The special team encountered a similar lack of luck in searching the area near
Gmunden. 30 (U)
By early 1946, McNally had wrapped up his investigation and completed his
report. "Thus," McNally commented, "in disorganization, flight and destruction, ended

29 Transcripts of interviews with former concentration camp inmates, including Adolf Burger and
Oskar Stein in Czechoslovakia, are found in McNally Report, RG 260, OMGUS Records, NARA.
The apprehension of Spacil by OSS is recounted in Capt. F.C. Grant, SCI Detachment, Seventh
US Army, to Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, Twelfth Army Group, "Weekly Report," 16
June 1945, LSX-002-616, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Box 276, [no folder
listed], NARA. Grant placed Spacil in the Seventh Army Interrogation Center for further
questioning about Operation BERNHARD. Later that year, McNally took Spacil from the
Military Intelligence Service Center's interrogation camp at Oberursel, near Frankfurt, to Austria
to get a firsthand description of what transpired at the end of the war. McNally's interrogation of
Spacil and Chief Inspector Rudlcin's report on Spacil are both located in McNally Report, RG
260, OMGUS Records, NARA. The Americans continued to seek information from captured
Germans about Operation BERNHARD even after the completion of McNally's investigation.
For example, see "SAINT, London to SAINT, Washington, "U/Stuf Rudolf Guenther," 7
February 1946, XX-10723, enclosing Headquarters, US Forces European Theater (USFET),
Military Intelligence Service Center (MISC), Counter Intelligence Preliminary Intelligence
Report (CI-PIR) No. 96, "U/Stuf Guenther, Rudolf' 17 January 1946, in WASH-REG-INT-175,
RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 109, Box 58, Folder 2, NARA. Guenther was Spacil's private
accountant after July 1944 and knew about Germany's counterfeiting activities. CIC arrested him
in Wurzburg, Germany, in June 1945 and sent him to Oberursel in late December. (U)
"Capt. McNally to Capt. W.A. New, US Naval Forces, Germany, "Recovery of Enemy
Materials and Equipment from Inland Waters in Germany and Austria," 26 September 1945;
Capt. New to Capt. McNally, "Enemy Materials and Equipment from Inland Waters in Germany
and Austria, Recovery of," 11 September 1945; and J.H. McDonald, US Naval Ship Salvage
Group, to Cdr. R.P. McDonald, 4 July 1945, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, Office of Finance
Division and Finance Adviser, Central Files of Foreign Exchange Depository Group 1945-50,
Box 451, File 950.31, Currency — Counterfeit 1945, NARA. (U)
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the most elaborate and far reaching scheme that an invading army ever devised for the
wholesale counterfeiting of the money and credentials of other countries." The American
military returned the counterfeit British currency to the Bank of England and closed the
file on Operation BERNHARD. Nazi Germany's clandestine activity became a curious
footnote in the annals of the war. Yet, the expertise gained by Operation BERNHARD's
participants would soon be a valuable tool at the dawn of the Cold War. (U)

RSHA Financial Operation (U)

At the same time as Capt. McNally learned of the Nazi fortunes in Bavaria and
Austria, OSS was already on the trail of members of Operation BERNHARD. In midMay, Lt. Alex Moore, an X-2 officer assigned to the Sixth Army Group's Special
Counter Intelligence (SCI) detachment, took Karl Hermann Friedmann, a captured SS
officer and member of Operation BERNHARD, to Rosenheim near Munich to pick up
George Spitz, a 52-year old Austrian Jew. 31 Friedmann fingered Spitz, a prewar art

31 Boni in Chicago in 1917, Alex Moore attended school in France and the United States and
received his degree from Stanford University in 1937. He served in France and England with the
American Red Cross during the early part of the war. Moore enlisted in the US Army in the
United Kingdom in the fall of 1942. After completing OCS in 1943, he served with a military
intelligence interrogation team in France and Germany until he transferred to OSS in January
1945. Assigned as X-2's Administrative Officer in Paris, Moore joined the SCI Detachment of
the Sixth Army Group in mid-May 1945. Moore was reassigned to the United States in the
summer of 1945 and subsequently released from military service. Moore later worked for the
UNRRA in Czechoslovakia during 1946-1947 and then joined the Economic Cooperation
Administration and later the Mutual Security Administration in Paris, where he came to the
attention of CIA. Moore remained with the US Agency for International Development and
served throughout the world until his retirement in 1969. He continues to live in Paris where he
worked for a French consulting firm. See Alex Moore, C..
, DO Records. Material
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dealer who had lived in the United States as a youth, as a key operator in the distribution
of the counterfeit funds. Spitz, in turn, admitted to Moore that he had worked for the
Germans, but only under duress, and he soon provided extensive leads into the Nazi
efforts to undermine the Western Allies monetary system. 32 (S)
Spitz recounted to Moore how he had escaped from the Nazis and then actually
worked for them. Spitz had approached a half-Jew, Hans Oskar Markuse, in Munich and
sought his help to obtain false documents in order to avoid arrest by the Nazis. For a
price of 5000 Reichmarks, Spitz received a false passport from an SS Obersturmfuhrer
Josef Dauser, who worked in the SD office in Munich, and his secretary, Frau Bertha von
Ehrenstein. In 1943, Spitz claimed to have met a man named Wendig in Munich who, in
turn, asked him to travel to Belgium to purchase gold, jewelry, and pictures. Spitz made
six trips and exchanged some 600,000 marks worth of English pounds on these trips. Lt.
Moore, the first OSS officer to work on this case, interrogated both Dauser and his
secretary to confirm the accuracy of Spitz's account. 33 (S)

from Moore's military service with OSS is found in Moore,
in WASH.3, Box 23, CIA ARC. Additional
HQ&HQ DET-PERS-13, in DO Records, C._
material is also located in WASH-PPB-PERS-13, in DO Records, C.
, Box 40, CIA
ARC. Moore also privately published a memoir of his wartime service entitled From Normandy
to Aachen in 1979. A copy of his memoirs and correspondence are found in the CIA History
Staff files. (S)
32 5CI Sixth Army Group, "Interrogation of Subject, George Spitz," 16 May 1945, (S); and SCI
Sixth Army Group, "Sale of Foreign Currency by the RSHA," 17 May 1945, (S); and SCI, Sixth
Army Group, "Agents Used by Lieutenant Moore, SCI 6 AG," 17 May 1945, (S), in George
Spitz, c_
, DO Records. (S)
33"Interrogation of Bertha von Ehrenstein," 25 May 1945; "Additional Statement of Mrs. Von
Ehrenstein," [undated]; and "Memorandum on Schwend alias Wendig," 30 May 1945, [no
classification listed], in Spitz, .
, DO Records. (S)
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By the end of the month, Moore had pinpointed Friedrich Schwend as Operation
BERNHARD's mysterious paymaster and identified his various cover names, including
Dr. Wendig and Fritz Klemp. Born in 1906 and a member of the Nazi party since 1932,
Schwend (spelled also on occasion as Schwendt) lived a charmed life. A businessman
who had settled in Abbazia, Italy, Schwend had married a wealthy German woman in
1929 whose aunt resided in Argentina. Drawing on his family ties, Schwend managed
the aunt's business in Latin America, and he established numerous contacts throughout
Europe and the Americas. In the 1930s, Schwend also established himself as an arms
dealer and provided aircraft and other weapons to China. (U)
At the outbreak of the war, Schwend's activities drew the attention of the
Gestapo, and the Italian was arrested as an Allied agent and was returned to Germany.
Schwend's time in prison was short as he was soon released to become the leading
salesman of Operation BERNHARD. From his headquarters at Schloss Labers, just
outside of Meran in northern Italy, Schwend distributed money throughout Europe using
numerous couriers. He was not a member of the SS, although he took the rank and
identity of SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. Wendig, who had died in a partisan attack in Italy in
1944. Schwend's castle in Merano was guarded by a detail of Waffen SS soldiers and
identified as Sonderstab — Generalkomrn ando III Germanisches Panzerkorps, the Special
Staff of the Headquarters of the Third German Armored Corps. (U)
Schwend retained one-third of the profits derived from the sale of the counterfeit
money. Despite mass destruction, money was still to be made in war-torn Europe.
Schwend and his underlings used the fake currency to purchase luxury items on the black
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market as well as to buy weapons from Yugoslav partisans anxious to make a buck from
arms provided by the British and Americans. The Germans, in turn, then sold the Allied
equipment to pro-Nazi groups in the Balkans. Money distributed by Schwend also went
to pay German agents throughout Europe; Elyesa Bazna, the famous German agent in
Turkey known as CICERO, was paid in false British currency produced by Operation
BERNHARD. (U)
It was, however, not a job without risks. The German secret police, the Gestapo,
was on the lookout for counterfeiters and black marketers and sometimes apprehended
Schwend's men by accident. Rivalries among senior German SS officers, including
Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich (first head of the RSHA), Heinz Jost

entities, such as the Foreign Ministry and Reichsbank, vehemently opposed any tinkering
with the monetary systems, even those of the enemy. As it turned out, German use of
counterfeit pounds destabilized the already fragile economies of several countries, Italy in
particular. (U)
With the aid of Spitz, Dauser, and von Ehrenstein, Moore identified most of
Schwend's collaborators, and he planned to apprehend the remaining members of

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Operation BERNHARD. 34 On 18 May, Lt. Moore took Spitz to Prien where they
located a large collection of trunks and crates belonging to Schwend. Schwend, however,
was nowhere to be found. 35 Spitz also helped Lt. Moore collar Heinrich Hoffmann,
Hitler's personal photographer, and Loomis Taylor, the American "Lord Hee Haw." (S)
On 10 June, OSS reported that it had arrested Schwend and started its
interrogation for further details about what it now referred to as the "RSHA Financial
Operation." 36 The Americans initially held Schwend at the Seventh Army Interrogation
Center in Ludwigsburg with hundreds of other German military officers and security
suspects. The Center's Weekly Status Report for the period 16-23 June 1945 listed
Schwend as being detained by the 307th

Detachment as a counterintelligence interest.

Listed as a "mechanical engineer," the Army noted that Schwend "bought machinery and
tools for factories." Whether the Army listed Schwend in this category out of ignorance
or for other reasons is not known. Shortly afterward, OSS officers removed Schwend

35 Moore to Commanding Officer, SCI, Sixth Army Group, "Financial Operations of RSHA Amt
VI," 22 May 1945, [no classification listed], in Spitz, C
DO Records. (S)
36 Early OSS reporting on Schwend is summarized on several note cards in his 201 file. Many of
these documents, however, are not located in his personality file, which the CIA did not open
until 1957. A good number of documents pertaining to the RSHA Financial Operation, Spitz,
Schwend, and other members of Operation BERNHARD are located in the declassified OSS
records at the National Archives. A copy of a report written by Schwend for OSS has not been
located in either the classified or declassified files. Spitz's classified 201 file, on the other hand,
is more complete and contains many early OSS reports on the RSHA Financial Operations. (S)
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from the Interrogation Center and placed him in Munich's Stadelheim prison where he
remained for three weeks before he relented to speak to his captors. 37 (U)
In an effort to get Schwend to talk, OSS brought George Spitz to Stadelheim
prison to meet with Schwend. Spitz, now a recruited American asset, had impressed
Capt. Charles C. Michaelis, who had replaced Lt. Moore as his OSS case officer, as
"reliable, trustworthy and intelligent. He is willing to cooperate and has already given
useful information." 38 Michaelis, it will be recalled, had served as Nebel's case officer
in France during the war, and he was now assigned to Munich. Still uncertain of the
connections between Schwend and his agents, OSS stated that it "believed that Spitz is
primarily responsible for the success of this mission." According to Michaelis, Spitz

37Weekly Status Reports for the Seventh Army Interrogation Center commanded by Maj. Paul
Kubala are found in Record Group 338, Records of United States Army Commands, 1942-,
Records of the European Theater of Operations/US Forces European Theater, Records of the
Seventh Army Interrogation Center, Box 74, Folder 2, NARA. The Seventh Army Interrogation
Center, or SAIC, prepared Weekly Status Reports (WSR) and Daily Status Reports (DSR)
providing a breakdown of the number of internees held at the Center and for what reasons. The
WSR also provides a listing by name of all internees while the DSR carries only numbers of
internees on hand. The DSR did, however, carry the names of those individuals admitted to or
released from the center. In Schwend's case, he was listed on Weekly Status Report Number 1
for the period 16-23 June 1945, but his name is not found in WSR No. 2. Interestingly, his
departure from SAIC is not found on the Daily Status Reports for that period. The Seventh Army
Interrogation Center prepared hundreds of interrogation reports of different types from April until
the Center's disbandment in October 1945. Schwend's name does not appear in the index of any
of these reports. See Seventh Army Interrogation Center, Index of SAIC Reports (6 April 1945-2
October 1945) in Box 73. (U)
38 Capt. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "George Spitz," 25 June 1945, X-645,
(S), in Spitz,
J,, DO Records. For information about Spitz's use by OSS and that
of other Operation BERNHARD personnel, see Capt. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X2/Germany, "Situation Report on Prospective Penetration Agents," 29 June 1945, LMX-002-629,
(S). in DO Records, C_
, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC (a copy is also filed in Spitz,
DO Records). OSS headquarters in Germany approved Spitz's use on 12 July
1945. (S)
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"persuaded Schwend that his best chance would be to confess his activities with the
RSHA and to cooperate with us." 39 (S)
As an act of good faith, Schwend agreed to turn over to OSS all of his "hidden
valuables." Capt. Eric W. Timm, X-2's chief in Munich, and Capt. Michaelis
accompanied Spitz and Schwend to a remote location in Austria in July 1945 where
Schwend uncovered 7139 pieces of French and Italian gold, which he had buried only
days before the end of the war. Michaelis reported that Schwend estimated that the gold,
which weighed over 100 pounds, had a value of $200,000. The "money constituted a
possible threat to Allied security as it could have been used to finance anti-Allied
activities," Capt. Michaelis stated. 40 (U)
With one successful mission under his belt, OSS began to use Schwend as a "bird
dog" for other hidden assets. In late July, Timm and Michaelis took Schwend and Spitz
to Meran in Italy to visit Schwend's former headquarters. The Army's Counter
Intelligence Corps had already rounded up several of Schwend's personnel, who had
remained in Meran, including several purchasing agents and George Gyssling, a former
German consul in Los Angeles and a friend and an associate of Schwend's. Capt. Harry

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Riback, the CIC commander in Merano "had no information on the exact missions of
these men nor did they have a clear picture of the over-all RSHA operation." 41 (U)
After interrogating one of Schwend's staff still in Meran, OSS recovered nearly
$200,000 worth of gold, American currency, and diamond rings. Timm and Michaelis
turned the treasures over to Capt. Riback who was "most appreciative of the information
given to him by SCI." 42 Both Spitz and Schwend had clearly established themselves
with OSS and, according to Capt. Michaelis, Schwend added to his laurels by writing a
history of Operation BERNHARD. 43 (U)

FLUSH and TARBABY (U)

After the summer of 1945, OSS changed the scope of its RSHA Financial
Operation. While it still collected information on Nazi Germany's clandestine efforts to
counterfeit money, OSS began to use both Schwend and Spitz as agents for information
beyond the scope of their wartime activities. In the meantime, OSS collected additional
information about Schwend, who had a somewhat shady reputation even within the SS.
Because of his role as a senior SS intelligence officer in Italy and the Balkans, Wilhelm
Hoettl had been in contact with Fritz Schwend. During an interrogation by American
41 Lt. Edward R. Weismiller, Chief, Operations, X-2/Germany to SAINT, Washington, "RSHA
Financial Operations," 2 August 1945, LWX-61, enclosing Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X2/Germany, "RSHA Financial Operation," 28 July 1945, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS
Records, Entry 108A, Box 287, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)
42 Ibid. A copy of the receipt dated 26 July 1945 is found in Spitz,
J DO
Records. (S)
43 As explained above, Schwend's report has not been found. (S)
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officers, Hoettl admitted "Schwend is a highly gifted businessman with a good bit of
adventurism in him who particularly enjoys to drive around in the middle of rebellious
areas and to deal with the most roughest partisan leaders. In doing so," Hoettl recalled,
"he was less concerned with the profit than with the adventure of the affair." 44 (S)
Walter Schellenberg's surrender in 1945, and his transfer to Great Britain for
interrogation, offered the Allies a window into German operations from the highest
vantage point. OSS in London relayed to Washington what it learned from the former
head of RSHA Amt VI throughout the summer of 1945. 45 Schellenberg readily told his
captors about the intrigues that riveted the intelligence and security organs and the Third
Reich. He elaborated in great detail about German activities throughout the world and
was especially helpful in filling in the gaps about Operation BERNHARD. (S)
Schellenberg grew incensed at the wide berth that Schwend enjoyed in disposing
of the false British currency. He decried the entire affair and blamed Schwend's success
on RSHA chief Kaltenbrunner and corrupt SS officers, including Wilhelm Hoettl. The
chief of Amt VI claimed that he did not even know Schwend's real name and only
recognized him by his pseudonym of Wendig. In Schellenberg's opinion, Schwend was
"one of the greatest crooks and imposters." By marketing his false money in territories

"Undated, unsigned German-language report and rough English translation pertaining to
Schwend. "Engineer Frederico Schwend" appears to be an excerpt of a longer interrogation of
Wilhelm Hoettl. The report, classified Secret in the English version, is located in Schwend, C..
3, DO Records. (S)
45 SAINT, London to SAINT, Washington, "Schellenberg Interrogation," 11 July 1945, (S), in
Ji,, DO Records. (S)
Schellenberg, C.
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controlled by the Germans, Schellenberg told his captors, the Reichsbank itself ended up
buying the counterfeit currency. 46 (S)
Despite reservations about Schwend's reliability, he became one of X-2's new
stable of agents in the fall of 1945. Schwend, in turn, recruited other Operation
BERNHARD associates, including George Srb, a Czech, and Guenther Wischmann, his
"salesman" in Slovenia, as subsources. 47 Capt. Michaelis had obtained Wischmann's
release from prison after his arrest by the US Army in June 1945 when the British
claimed that he had worked for them. 48 (S)
Following the departure of both Michaelis and Timm in the fall, Holtsman used
Schwend to obtain a variety of reports on personalities who "might be used by the
American intelligence in some way." 49 Additionally, Schwend gave the Americans
details on the organization and structure of the Czech intelligence service and the use of

46sAINT, London to SAINT, Washington, "Interrogation Report on Schellenberg, 27 June-12
July 1945," 2 November 1945, XX-9667, (S), enclosing a copy of the British interrogation report.
Schellenberg, C.—
2 DO Records. (S)
47For a description of Wischmann, see Lt. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany,"
"Preliminary Statement of Agi Zelenay in Connection with RSHA Operations," 4 June 1945;
Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Continuation of the Statement by Agi
Zelenay," 26 June 1945, in Spitz, ; C_
J , DO Records. (S)
48 Security Control (the successor to X-2 in the new Office of Special Operations or OSO) in
Munich eventually dropped Srb, known as CAMEL, as a source because of his black market
activities and denunciations as a German collaborator by the Czech Government. Wischmann,
also a subsource of Schwend's, traveled throughout Germany and Austria, but Holtsman did not
use him as a "full-time agent" because of suspicions about his dealings on the black market. For
further details on Wischmann, see various reports in Guenther Wischmann,
DO Records. (S)
49 Quote found in AB-43 [Holtsman], "Dr. Robert Scherkamp, Munich, Fuchsstr. 5," 30 August
1946, MSC-332, LVVX-002-916a, (S), in Schwend,
, DO Records. Examples of
other personality reporting are found in Schwend's personality file. (S)
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Jewish refugees by the Soviets. 50 Holtsman grew impressed with Schwend's work in
Munich and commented, "his knowledge of personalities and underground groups in
Italy, Yugoslavia, and in Germany is very wide." 51 Perhaps reflective of his ability to
get information, X-2 provided Schwend with the codename of FLUSH. (S)
George Spitz, in the meantime, provided information to both Schwend and
Holtsman as a X-2 source known as TARBABY. Capt. Timm had first used Spitz in a
variety of ways, although he was not generally tasked as a regular agent. In late October,
X-2's chief observed, "TARBABY will prepare and submit regular semi-monthly reports
on financial and economic matters, as well as other items of interest which he can
obtain." Timm felt that Spitz had "an encyclopedic knowledge of all figures of any
importance in industry and economics throughout Europe." 52 In this capacity, Spitz
gleaned tidbits on the German Red Cross and the Bavarian Separatist Movement in

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
southern Germany. 53 He also assisted OSS to remove a Nazi party member from an
estate in Bavaria, thereby allowing Spitz's sister-in-law to occupy the residence. 54 (S)
Spitz was also in contact with the INCA project. In September 1945, X-2
obtained the release of seven Munich businessmen, either directors of subsidiary
companies of I.G. Farben or prominent city bankers. Capt. Timm stated "these persons
are only of potential value if they are returned to their respective businesses. Contacts,"
Timm noted, "are constantly being made with the functional heads of Military
Government detachments to see if the men have been cleared to operate their businesses."
OSS expected the INCA agents to provide information on the financial aspects of illegal
Nazi activities within Germany. The INCA project, however, was short-lived and the X2 dropped it the following month when it realized that the operation's "value is still only
potential and it has not proven productive to maintain regular contact." 55 (S)

Neither Schwend nor Spitz maintained low profiles in the ruins of postwar
Munich, and they soon attracted attention. Spitz became a well-known figure in early
postwar society circles in Munich. In a 1947 report,

commented that he found

Spitz's parties to be an excellent way to meet senior American officials assigned to the
city's Military Government. 56 In turn, C

—7 aelped Spitz to obtain a vehicle and

supplies. 57 (S)
It did not take long for Spitz's past to catch up with him. In November 1946,
Edwin C. Rae, the chief of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section of the
Military Government in Bavaria contacted his headquarters to request that US authorities
in Italy assist in tracking down looted Dutch art in that country. The Dutch representative
at Munich's Central Collecting Point for art recovered from the Nazis had tracked down
several pieces of art and rugs that Spitz had sold to Schwend during the war. He wanted
the Americans to locate the missing paintings and rugs from Schwend's last known
location in northern Italy. 58 (U)

56 See "SC Munich Present and Discontinued Contacts." For much of this period, C
SSU's sole representative in Munich, and he needed to maintain good relations with Military
Government and CIC officials. (S)
57 C
, Refugee Control Unit, to Whom It May Concern, "Transportation, Supplies," 15
January 1947, and C
IRefugee Control Unit, to Verkehrsdirelction, "Provision of Tires,"
29 May 1947, in Spitz,
TJ DO Records. (S)
58 Edwin C. Rae, Chief, Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section, Restitution Branch,
Economics Division, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, to Office of Military
Government (US), Economics Division, Restitution Branch, Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives
Section, "Art Objects of Dutch Origin, now in Italy," 18 November 1946, enclosing R.F.P. de
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In October 1947, another Dutch investigator questioned Spitz about his activities
in Holland during the war. According to H.J. Stach, Spitz "became furious" and
demanded to know why he was being sought after when he was a Jew who had been in
the "underground." Spitz then produced a letter from Capt. Timm that the X-2 chief had
written in September 1945. He also told Stach to go see

as further

verification of Spitz's good service. Stach, however, distrusted Spitz and commented, "it
is of great importance that this case should be handled very carefully. Spitz is one of the
greatest swindlers." 59 (U)
In January 1948, Spitz again fell under suspicion for his role in the looting of art
in Europe during the war. 60 A year later in 1949, Spitz again drew high-level attention
Beaufort, Dutch Representative, to Mr. Rosenbaum, "Restitution of Art Objects in Italy to the
Netherlands," 18 November 1946, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, Records of Museum, Fine Arts,
and Archives Section, Restitution Research Records, Box 484, [no folder listed], NARA
(hereafter cited as RG 260, OMGUS Records, MFAA Section, Restitution Records Research,
NARA). (U)
59H.J. Stach to Stewart Leonard, "Interrogation of George Spitz, Opitzstr. 4, Munich," 28
October 1947, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, MFAA Section, Records Restitution Branch, Box
484, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)
600A,s German Mission told Headquarters in January 1948 that "G. Spitz presently under
investigation. Arts and monuments have turned over to ODI highly incriminating reports by
Belgian representative Central Collecting Point Munich and a Netherlands investigation officer
on Spitz's wartime activities." The Munich Operations Base added, "George Spitz, at present
being investigated by Dutch and Belgian authorities due to his war time art-looting activities, is
living in Munich and possibly in touch with Schwend. Spitz is engaged in questionable financial
deals and in minor black-market operations and is quite friendly with high-ranking officers of
OMGB [Office of Military Government for Bavaria]." Cable, Frankfurt to Washington, 27
January 1948, Frankfurt 628, IN 33751, (S); Cable, Heidelberg to Frankfurt, 27 January 1948,
Heidelberg 2840, IN 33727, (S); and Chief of Station, Heidelberg, to EUCOM Liaison Office,
"Fritz Schwend," 24 February 1948, MGM-A-365, (S), in Schwend, C..
, DO
Records. See also Cable, Berlin to Munich, Information Heidelberg, 13 January 1948, Berlin
804, (S), and Cable, Munich to Berlin, Information Heidelberg, 13 January 1948, Munich 125,
7,, DO Records. Berlin asked Munich if it should pressure the
(S), in Spitz, E.
Military Government in Berlin to stop this investigation. C.
_Din Munich responded that
"see no reason stop Spitz investigation . . . . if report refers only wartime activities Spitz in
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because of allegations that he worked with August Lenz, a Munich banker and a former
OSS agent with the INCA project, in the Munich black market. 61 In August 1945, Lenz
had worked with X-2 to gain the release of the head of the Bavarian Red Cross, a wealthy
countess, who had been arrested by CIC after an anonymous denouncement. 62 Lenz also
helped to manufacture the false Czech and Polish documents that American intelligence
used to evacuate SAILOR, one of its first Soviet defectors. 63 (S)
In the spring of 1947, E

dropped Spitz as an agent because he had

become a security risk. 64 A senior CIA officer later concluded in a 1949 cable that
"services both Spitz and Lenz minimal and reports praising their services need grain of
salt. Both believed [to be] opportunists who made most connections with American
officials to further [own] personal positions, which [were] quite precarious [in the] early
days occupation since it known that Spitz particularly had served as agent for SD and

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possibly Gestapo. His activities," CIA tersely noted, "Holland and Belgium during war
never satisfactorily clarified." 65 (S)
As late as 1959, the US Army and the West German Federal Intelligence Service
requested further information about Spitz. By that time, the CIA had lost track of the
Austrian Jew who played both sides. 66 (S)

He Will Always Remember the Americans (U)

George Spitz's troubles, however, occurred after Fritz Schwend left Europe. The
leading German member of Operation BERNHARD, however, continued to attract
attention. In February 1947, the Central Intelligence Group in Rome reported that CIC
and the Italian police had raided a number of buildings in Merano, including Schwend's
old headquarters at Schloss Labers, the previous year. According to this late report,
provided by CIC in Rome, the joint raid uncovered "large quantities of counterfeit pound

65 Cable, Special Operations to Karlsruhe and Munich, 11 May 1949, Washington 3385, OUT
81161, (S), in Spitz, C
J ,DO Records. (S)
66 See Chief of Base, Munich to Chief, ULS, "American Interest in Banker Georg Spitz,
Mauerkircherstrasse 95/0, Munich," 28 October 1959, EGMA-45439, (S), in Spitz, a
3 , DO Records. Spitz's file, opened in 1956, contains no further documents after 1959.
Spitz's case was not the only example of a Jew who supported the Nazis in Operation
BERNHARD. See Randolp L. Brahm, "The Nazi Collaborator with a Jewish Heart: The Strange
Saga of Jaac Van Harten," Eastern European Quarterly (Winter 2001, Vol. XXXV, No. 4), pp.
411-434. Van Harten, a German Jew born Jakob Levy, worked for the Abwehr, and later with
Schwend. Van Harten later moved to Palestine and was regarded a genuine hero of the Jewish
resistance movement until his death in 1974. (S)
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notes." The Americans, however, believed that the Germans had a plant still producing
counterfeit dollars and pounds as well as US military occupation script. 67 (S)
Schwend's position in Germany diminished, according to

because he

had defrauded what appears to have been the Gehlen Organization, the nascent West
German intelligence service under Army sponsorship. 68 At this point in early 1947,
Schwend went "to visit his family in Italy and thence immigrated to Brazil." E
attended Schwend's last party in Munich during which he announced that he would soon
take a trip. While the records do not indicate how Schwend escaped from Europe, it is
believed that he utilized the underground "rat line" through Italy to South America. He
later wrote two letters to C_.

..after his departure in which the German said that he

"will always remember the Americans for the kind treatment he received." 69 Using the
name of Wenceslau Turi, a Yugoslavian agricultural technician, on a Red Cross passport
issued in Rome, Schwend and his second wife, given the name of Hedda Turi, arrived in
Lima, Peru, after crossing the Bolivian border in April 1947. The new immigrants
declared their intention to take up farming in Ica. 70 (S)
In early 1948, Louis (also referred to as Aloys or Vjekoslav) Glavan denounced
Schwend in a letter to Gen. Lucius D. Clay, military governor of Germany, through the
67 Intelligence Report, External Survey Detachment, Rome, "Counterfeiting Plant in Milan Area,"
11 February 1947, PIR-1095, (S), in DO Records,
j Box 288, (no folder listed),
CIA ARC. (S)
68

3 discusses his work with Schwend and his departure from Europe in his 3 November
1993 interview. At one point, Schwend even provided
J with a car when the American
no longer had access to an official vehicle. (S)
69"SC Munich Present and Discontinued Contacts." (S)
70"Suspicious Personalities — Wenceslau Turi and Hedda De Turi," 17 February 1948, TPL-263,
(S), in Schwend, C_
.3 DO Records. (S)

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American ambassador in Rome. Glavan, who had handled Schwend's affairs in
Yugoslavia, had been arrested by CIC in July 1945, but, unlike Schwend or Wischmann,
he remained in confinement until August 1946. After his release, Glavan visited
Schwend in Munich as he made his way to Italy. Born in Italy of Yugoslavian descent,
Glavan was "an interesting personality," according to Schwend. The German recalled
that Glavan "is capable, intelligent, dependable (though, no doubt, without regard for law
or regulations), and [a] daring man open for any proposition." A real professional,
"smuggling is Glavan's trade, and he can smuggle things, news or people and keep his
mouth shut [original italics]." 71 (S)
Between the time of Schwend's meeting with Glavan in August 1946 and early
1948, the two men must have fallen out. In his letter to Clay, which was subsequently
referred to the European Command's Office of the Director for Intelligence (ODI) and to
the Central Intelligence Agency, Glavan claimed that Schwend and his wife had moved
to Lima using false identities and were living from proceeds derived from counterfeit
RSHA funds. Furthermore, Glavan fingered George Spitz as the individual who
persuaded the Americans not to investigate Schwend for his Nazi activities. He also
mentioned that several of Schwend's relatives in Switzerland and Italy supported
Schwend in his South American hideout. 72 (S)

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After a preliminary investigation, CIA told the Army that it had no contact with
Schwend and that it had nothing to do with his immigration to South America. 73 By
February 1948, CIA had cleaned its hands of the German operator and, as it stated in a
cable from Headquarters to C J, the allegations against Schwend "comes from a person
who is probably identical with one of his co-workers in the GIS, who may possibly be
denouncing Schwend for personal or business reasons. Thus," CIA concluded, "the
reliability of that information should not be taken at its face value until confirmed by
other sources." 74 The Army, in turn, handed the case over to the Military Government's
Financial Division to investigate Glavan's claims because it related to illegal German
funds. 75 (S)

Continuing Attention (U)

The investigation into Schwend's alleged use of old Nazi counterfeit money
appears to have come to a dead end. This did not mean that Schwend had successfully
3 to conduct traces of Schwend in Peru and report results to
73 Headquarters directed C-
Washington. See Cable, Washin2ton to C _j 30 January 1948, Washington 2081, OUT 58113,
DO Records. (S)
(S), in Schwend, C_
74FBM to Chief of Station, C _3"Fritz Schwend," 5 February 1948, TPL-W-275, (S), in
_a , DO Records. (S)
Schwend, LL
75 Extract, "Progress Report for Jan. 1948," 16 February 1948, MGF-A-727, (S), in Schwend,
DO Records. In 1960, Glavan reappears in Ecuador where he had reestablished
contact with Schwend. See Chief, WHD, to Chiefs C
3, "Transmittal of Traces on Friedrich Schwend C
j Ind
Additional Information on Aloys Glavan C
J )," 21 March 1960, HEQ-W-2309, (S); and
Chief C
to Chief, WHD, and Chiefs VC_
, "Friedrich Schwend
jaid Aloys Glavan cL.D," 15 August 1960, HEQ-A-4030, (S), in Schwend, C
, DO Records. (S)
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evaded his past. In 1955, an Italian court sentenced him in absentia to 24 years in prison
for having ordered Glavan to kill Theophic Kamber, another Operation BERNHARD
agent, who had embezzled some of the counterfeit money. While this conviction was
later overturned, Italian officials still sought Schwend's arrest, as did West German
authorities under an Interpol warrant. 76 After his arrival in Peru in 1947, Schwend
worked for Volkswagen in Lima and also served variously as an informant for several
Peruvian intelligence and security services. 77 Throughout the 1960s, Schwend's reputed
counterfeiting activities, drug smuggling, and arms dealings throughout Latin America
attracted the attention of CIA, the US Secret Service, the British Intelligence Service, and
the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the West German Federal Intelligence Service. 78 (S)

76Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI to DD/P, Memorandum Number A-279, 1 August 1963, ER
63-6111, (S), in Schwend,
DO Records. (S)
77"Unsigned Memorandum for the Record, Fritz Paul Schwend," 7 February 1963, (S), in
3 DO Records. (S)
Schwend, L
78 In 1963 and again in 1969, the West German Federal Intelligence Service requested that CIA
provide name trace results on Schwend. Cab lP Munich to Washington, 7 February 1963, Munich
4699, WI 63752, (S), and Chief C_
3 to Chief, EUR and Chief C
"Request for BDC Check and Traces," 14 July 1969, EGMA-72853, (S), in Schwend, C
DO Records. For the results of the trace done by CIA's representative to the US Army
headquarters in Heidelberg, see Cable, Frankfurt to Washington, 8 April 1963, Heidelberg 4043,
3 , DO Records. This cable provides additional
IN 13240, (S), in Schwend, Cinformation about West Germany's legal efforts against Schwend. Trace results on Schwend at
the Berlin Documents Center are found in the files for both 1963 and 1969. In 1965, the British
Intelligence Service told CIA that Schwend had approached the MI 6 C
3 and
offered to sell information. The British refused to make any deals despite Schwend's claim to
have worked for CIA. The Agency, in turn, replied "Schwend's statement that he had been
secretly taken out of Germany by this Agency in 1946 and had subsequently worked for us is
quite false." CIA Headquarters told the British representative in Washington, "we have no
operational interest in Schwend and believe your Head Office was well advised in recommending
that your
j have nothing to do with this man." See C
_7 MI 6
J;, MI 6 chief of station, to
Representative in Washington, for C._
"Frederick Schwend,"18 February 1965, CP/4965, (S); C
j to
J, "Frederick
Schwend," 17 March 1965, 2871, (S); and Chief, WHD to Chief L.
, "Frederick

_a,

c

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Schwend's case even came to the attention of Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in August 1963. Carter received visitors from
the Secret Service who were anxious to learn more about Schwend's wartime
counterfeiting activities and whether any communist countries, such as Czechoslovakia
or Cuba, had employed him in the counterfeiting field. Gen. Carter told Richard Helms,
the Deputy Director for Plans, "I did not pay too much attention to the details since I did
not want to become a case officer for this one!" The DDCI, however, directed Helms to
contact the Secret Service and "unless there are overriding reasons to the contrary with
which I am not familiar (and on which I would like to be briefed if existent), please
cooperate to the fullest extent." 79 (S)
Following up on the Secret Service request, the Agency directed a source in the
Peruvian Investigations Police to approach Schwend and ask if he was involved in any
counterfeiting activity. Schwend denied that he was involved in any current activity, but
he proceeded to tell the Peruvian informant about his wartime role with Operation
BERNHARD. Schwend claimed that he did not know where the plates for the British

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
counterfeit pounds were buried, although he suspected that they might be located with a
cache of RSHA chief Kaltenbiunner's papers near Toplitzsee in Austria. 80 (S)
As a result of the Secret Service's inquiry, CIA took a closer look at Schwend's
activities in Latin America. A West German walk-in to the US Embassy in Algiers in
1966, for example, claimed to be able to provide fresh samples of counterfeit dollars
produced by Schwend in exchange for "financial help. "81 After the Peruvians arrested
and interrogated Pierre Robert Roesch in April 1966, CIA learned that Roesch made a
number of allegations against Schwend, including that he was in contact with an East
German named Julius Mader. Shortly afterward, the US Army in West Germany
intercepted a letter from Schwend in which he described his work in Italy during the war
and denounced his former collaborator, Louis Glavan. 82 (S)

and
1 to C. 3, Info Bonn, Director, 28 November 1966,C_ 30063, IN 47738, (S),
in Schwend,
DO Records. (S)
Chief
•
Jt to Chiefs, WH Division, Europe, and Chief C-
82
.= "Results of
Interrogations of Pierre Robert Roesch," 24 June 1966, HPLA-8118, (S); and Deputy
Director for Plans to FBI, "Federico Schwend," 13 February 1967, CSCI-316/00667-67, (S), in
response to John Edgar Hoover to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, "Alois Jecoslav
Glavan," 21 December 1966, DBB-67314, (C), enclosing translation of 18 August 1966 letter
from Schwend to Julis Mader, a "well-known East German political agitator." Schwend's
comments about Glavan drew the attention of the FBI. In his letter, Schwend called Glavan "the
biggest swine whom I ever met" Schwend commented that he had helped to get Glavan out of
an American prison and enabled him to escape to South America. In return, Glavan stole $15,000
and a 23-carat diamond from his benefactor. Schwend thought that the Yugoslav, who had many
false names, had become a spy in California before moving to Ecuador. Despite Schwend's
efforts to have Glavan arrested, he managed to escape. (S)
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Schwend's Adventures (U)

The Agency's reporting on Schwend tails off in the early 1970s just when the
press began to publicize the presence of former Nazis in South America. According to
one book, Schwend collaborated with Klaus Barbie in trafficking arms in Spain, Chile,
and Paraguay. Both men manipulated the intelligence and security services throughout
Latin America and received protection from various countries. 83 As early as 1966, CIA
learned from an interrogation report that Schwend was in contact with Klaus Altman, a
name used by Barbie. That same year, CIA in Peru described SchWend as a "completely
unscrupulous person who thrives on intrigue and illicit schemes. Has bought protection
for himself in Peru by establishing high level political contacts and by peddling info to
local security service." 84 (S)
During the investigation of a murder of a wealthy Peruvian businessman in early
1972, the Peruvian Government took Schwend into custody. Papers found in his
possession revealed the extent to which Schwend had blackmailed Peruvian officials,
traded national secrets, and broken currency laws. While the Peruvian judge initially
released Schwend, the ensuing publicity exposed Barbie's hideout. This marked the

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beginning of the long trail leading to Barbie's eventual expulsion from Bolivia and return
to France to face justice for his World War II war crimes. 85 (U)
Schwend's life unraveled following his arrest in 1972. The Peruvian Government
tried Schwend, and he was found guilty of smuggling $150,000 out of the country; he
was given a two-year prison sentence. 86 In 1976, Peru deported Schwend to West
Germany, where he landed in jail once again when he could not pay a $21 hotel bill.87
The West German and Italian Governments, however, failed to pursue the wartime
murder charge, leaving Schwend a free, but homeless, man. He returned to Peru only to
die in 1980. 88 (U)

Wrapped Up in the Cold War (U)

Schwend's death, by no means, brought the riddle of Operation BERNHARD to a
close. In fact, the German counterfeiting plot became an opening drama at the dawn of
85 I1jid• In late 1972, the New York Times, citing a London Daily Express series on Martin
Bormann, reported that South America provided refuge for four major Nazi war criminals:
Schwend, Klaus Barbie, Josef Mengele, and Walter Rauff. Three years later, the paper noted,
"thirty years have passed since the war. The scores of wanted Nazis who fled to South America,
gambling that they could find refuge and anonymity in the widespread German communities here,
are virtually immune to the postwar European courts and Jewish agencies that once vowed they
would never forget." See "Paper Identifies 4 Nazis Said to be in South America," New York
Times, 1 December 1972, p. 11 and Jonathan Kandell, "Nazis Safer in South America Today,"
New York Times, 18 May 1975, pp. 1 and 26. (U)
... 86Reuters, "Nazi in Bolivia Called Chief of Peruvian Currency Ring," New York Times, 7
December 1973, p. 7. In addition to Schwend, the Peruvian prosecutor also indicted Klaus Barbie
and four other individuals. (U)
87Reuters, "Nazi Forger's Bad Bills," The Washington Post, 14 July 1976. (U)
88 "Nazi Plotted to Cripple British, American Economies," Los Angeles Times, 7 April 1980, p.
22. (U)
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the Cold War. Russian troops in Austria, for example, also fished British pound notes
from the Enns River and, consequently, Soviet headquarters quickly learned about the
mysterious appearance of large sums of money. 89 Like the race for German scientists,
the wartime Allies quickly scrambled to procure many of Germany's skilled
counterfeiters. In the spring of 1947, Army CIC in Berlin reported that the Soviets had
kidnapped Franz Zemlicka, a German engraver and draftsmen, who specialized in Soviet
documentation for the Abwehr. The Soviets failed in their attempt to apprehend Heinz
Eichner, who forged passports for the Abwehr and RSHA Amt VI during the war. CIC
brought Eichner to the American sector and eventually planned to move him to greater
safety in the American occupation zone of Germany. The Central Intelligence Group,
when it learned of the kidnap attempt on Eichner, commented, "examples of Eichner's
production have come to the attention of some members of this organization; they were
favorably impressed with Eichner's competency." 90 (S)
The Russians were not the only country interested in the abilities of the German
counterfeiters. As the Americans drew closer in late April 1945, BERNHARD Kruger,
the mastermind behind the German operation, left his charges. He took with him several
thousand British pound notes and vanished. Not until November 1946 did the British
catch up with him, and he was confined for the next two years. In 1949, the British
turned him over to the French, who promptly tried to recruit the former SS officer to start

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a new counterfeiting operation for the French intelligence service. Kruger refused and
after several more months of confinement, he was allowed to return home. Kruger lived
a quiet existence into the 1980s and downplayed his wartime infamy. 91 (U)
The Secret Service also wanted to locate Solly Smolianoff because it was
concerned that the Polish Jew could have run off with the plates to the America
counterfeit bills. Like Kruger, Smolianoff had disappeared in 1945. Nearly two years
later, the Treasury Department got a break when the American Consulate in Bern learned
about a Russian professor with counterfeit money. The Swiss police arrested the Russian
who, after lengthy questioning, revealed that he had been in touch with Smolianoff. It
was also learned that Smolianoff then lived in Rome, waiting for a visa for South
America.

(U)

The Army's Criminal Investigations Division (CID) picked up Smolianoff in
Rome and questioned him about his activities. He provided a full account, although he
had spent most of his adult life in prison or in concentration camps. Newly married,
Smolianoff announced that he wanted to abandon his counterfeiting ways and start anew
in Uruguay. Released from custody, Smolianoff dropped from sight after he left for
South America in 1948. 92 (U)

While the search of Toplitzsee in 2000 appears to have quieted speculation that
the lake was the "garbage can of the Third Reich," the lure of hidden Nazi treasures is
still strong. Questions of collusion between American intelligence and the architects of
Operation BERNHARD are bound to come to the forefront. (U)
In 1946, the Strategic Services Unit wrote a classified history of OSS during
World War II. The RSHA Financial Operation was still fresh in the minds of the
compilers of the OSS War Report. X-2's role in Germany and Austria was hailed as a
great success story for OSS because of what it revealed about the German counterfeiting
operations and the recovery of large sums of money and other valuables. 93 Yet, for all the
positive attributes of the RSHA Financial Operation, it marked a growing link between
American intelligence and unscrupulous Nazi characters, including Fritz Schwend and
George Spitz. 94 (S)

93 Strategic Services Unit, History Project, War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services),
vol. II, The Overseas Target. New intro. by Kermit Roosevelt (New York: Walker and Company,
1976), pp. 353-354. (U)
"In turn, American intelligence may have been corrupted as an aftermath of Operation
BERNHARD. An unconfirmed statement indicates that at least one OSS officer may have
materially gained from his work on the RSHA Financial Operation. In 1969, Army trace results
reported that Schwend ten years earlier had written "various American authorities charging that
during confinement by CIC in 1945 he was robbed of a considerable amount of money and that
much of his immediate personal property was confiscated and never returned." The Army, given
the late date of Schwend's charges, was unable to investigate and found nothing in its files to
substantiate them. See Headquarters Liaison Team, US Army Intelligence Center, to Deputy
Director for Plans, "Schwend, Frederico (Fritz)," 19 August 1969, (C), in Schwend, C..
.D DO Records. (S)
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41

Even before the end of World War II, Allied intelligence grew intrigued by the
work that the Germans had done to rally much of Europe to the Nazi cause. As the Allied
armies fought across Italy and France in 1944, growing numbers of Wehrmacht prisoners
who fell into British and American hands were not Germans, but Poles, Czechs,
Hungarians, Russians, Baits, Cossacks, Ukrainians, and dozens of other nationalities and
ethnic groups that took up arms for the Third Reich. While many of these combatants
proved to be less than enthusiastic soldiers, the Nazis nonetheless raised substantial
manpower from Europe's non-Aryan populations. (U)
Within weeks after the collapse of German resistance, Allied intelligence
pondered the advantages and disadvantages of using for its own purposes the numerous
émigré groups that sought shelter in the West. As the US Army took up occupation
duties in Austria and Germany, it encountered members of these groups who claimed to
be not only anti-Nazi, but also anticommunist. Sorting out the various factions, their
leaders, philosophical goals, motivations, and backgrounds took up an increasing amount
of time and effort on the part of American intelligence as tensions mounted between the
East and the West. 1 (S)
'As an example, X-2 in Munich came into contact with Lithuanians in the summer of 1945, but
was told to leave those groups alone for SI's exploitation. See Boleslav A. Holtsman's reporting

1
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Mission RUPPERT (S)

Even before the war ended, the Americans made efforts to learn more about the
supposed anti-Nazi groups in Nazi Germany. On 3 November 1944, Youri Vinogradov, a
21-year old White Russian born in Germany and educated in France, crossed over
German lines. Recruited by SI's Labor Division in Paris for Mission RUPPERT,
Vinogradov had spent the latter part of the war in Berlin working at the Swiss Legation
until his arrest and brief confinement in a concentration camp. Following his release,
Vinogradov found a new job in the German capital, but finally decided to make his way
to Allied lines in the fall of 1944 with plans to join the French army. 2 (S)
After making his way across the lines, he was picked up by the French and
brought to Paris for interrogation by OSS. Vinogradov quickly proved to be a valuable
source of information on life in Germany. He also furnished details that led to the arrest
of a Gestapo agent in Paris and explained how French collaborationists operated in
Germany. His new SI case officer, Lt. Albert E. Jolis, proposed that Vinogradov be
returned through German lines to resume his life in Berlin. Jolis wanted Vinogradov to

on the Lithuanian activities in Bavaria in SCI, Twelfth Army Group to Commanding Officer, X2/Germany, "The Underground 'Government of Lithuania," 17 June 1945, (S), and SCI Twelfth
Army Group to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Union of the Combatants for the Freedom
, Box 515, Folder 2, CIA ARC.
of Lithuania," 19 June 1945, both in DO Records, C.
See also Headquarters, Third Army Intelligence Center, Research Section, to G-2, Intelligence
Center, "The Government of Lithuania (Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation)," 3 June
Box 515, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)
1945, (S), in DO Records, C

2 The basis of this account regarding Vinogradov's work with OSS is found in 1 st Lt. Albert E.
Jolis to Col. David K. Bruce, "Mission RUPPERT," 14 October 1944, [no classification listed],
J.7 ,DO Records. Mission RUPPERT is also recounted in
in Michael Kedia,
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979). (S)
2
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penetrate the SD through an acquaintance, who he claimed worked for the Nazi security
service. This man, a Georgian, "served the Nazis out of his opposition to the Stalin
regime. His position," Vinogradov told Jolis, "is now extremely delicate. He dreads the
arrival of the Russian armies and will undoubtedly gab at any opportunity of being able
to show that he helped the Allies." Jolis hoped Vinogradov would obtain an
organizational layout of the SD and learn its plans for resistance after Germany's defeat.
In addition, Vinogradov would also seek out targets to be attacked by Allied aircraft and
keep his finger on the pulse of life in Berlin. He would have no radio to communicate
with SI, but he would let OSS know that he had arrived safely by placing advertisements
in two Berlin newspapers as well as sending a postcard to an address in Switzerland. 3 (S)
German troops quickly seized Vinogradov and passed the White Russian, who
claimed to be dissatisfied with life in Paris because of the growing strength of the
Communist party in France, to SD Amt VI's office in Strassburg. Vinogradov claimed
that he was an agent for an SD collaborator named Michael Kedia, president of the
Georgian National Committee in Berlin and a critical link between the Nazis and various
Caucasian and Turkestan nationalist groups. Vinogradov was directed to report to a
Standartenfuhrer Bickler in Baden Baden, where he underwent an interrogation for three

days. He was then allowed to proceed to Berlin to visit his sick mother. He arrived on 7
November, changing trains 14 times en route due to the Allied bombings. On arriving in
the city, he contacted Kedia. 4 (S)
The next day, the Gestapo arrested Vinogradov after learning that he had returned
from Paris. Taken to a local office, Vinogradov met Sturmbannfuhrer Erich Georg-Karl
3 1' Lt. Albert E. Jolis to Col. David K. Bruce, "Mission RUPPERT," 14 October 1944, [no
classification listed], in Michael Kedia, C-
.J DO Records. (S)
4 "Personal Report of Agent RUPPERT," c. April 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, C
.D DO Records. (S)
3
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Albin Hengelhaupt, the Amt VI referent on Russian émigré matters. 5 Once again his luck
held. Hengelhaupt, who worked closely with Kedia, trusted Vinogradov and accepted
him as an Amt VI agent. Vinogradov was allowed to remain in Berlin, where he fought
various character denunciations while collecting information on the SD. As the Soviets
approached in April 1945, he managed to escape to the West with a group of fellow
Georgians, and he fell into American hands near Eisenach. He was transferred to Paris
for further debriefings. 6 (S)
The RUPPERT Mission was one of only three OSS operations in Germany in
December 1944. While OSS did not have regular contact with Vinogradov during his
five months in Berlin, he provided extensive information from the capital. Most
importantly, Vinogradov opened the eyes of OSS to the existence of an entire
underground network of Eastern Europeans who supported the Nazi cause. Upon his
return to Paris, he told OSS that he had been in regular contact with Prof. Gerhard von
Mende of the Ostministerium and a special assistant to Alfred Rosenberg, and with
Michael Kedia. 7 Vinogadov also told the Americans that Kedia and his followers had
5 For further details on Hengelhaupt, see Hecksher to FBM, "SS Stubaf. Dr. Erich Hengelhaupt,"
29 May 1947, MGH-003-529, XARZ-28061, (S), enclosing Hecksher to FBM, "SS Stubaf. Dr.
Erich Georg-Karl Albin Hengelhaupt," 26 April 1947, MGH-003-426, (S), with a copy of Maj. J.
Walmsley, 7 Review and Interrogation Staff, 7 Civilian Internment Camp, British Army of the
Rhine, "Report on the Interrogation of Dr. Erich Georg-Karl Albin Hengelhaupt," 7 March 1947,
[no classification listed], in WASH-REG-OP-1, DO Records, L
, Box 4, Folder 27,
CIA ARC. (S)
6"Personal Report of Agent RUPPERT," c. April 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia, C
3, DO Records. (S)
7Alfred Rosenberg was a leading figure in the development of Nazi anti-Semitism in the years
before the war. Born in Estonia, Rosenberg lived in Russia during the revolution and fled to
Germany where he became an avid supporter of Hitler. In 1941, Hitler appointed Rosenberg as
the Reich Minister of Eastern Occupied Territories. While he did not decry the Nazi genocide,
Rosenberg worked to get the Russian minorities to cooperate against the Soviets. The Allies
tried Rosenberg for his role during the Third Reich and sentenced him to death at Nuremberg in
1946. (U)
4
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escaped from Berlin to Switzerland where they wanted to meet with an American
representative. Kedia, according to Vinogadov, hoped to contact the International Red
Cross to assure the safety of the Georgians in Germany so as to prevent their repatriation
to the Soviet Union. He also sought Allied protection of some 100 officials, both German
and non-German, who were "most active in anti-Russian activities." Most interestingly,
he wanted to meet with OSS to discuss the 'mutual' problem of penetrating Georgia and
Russia." Kedia, Vinogradov felt, was hoping to meet with the Americans on behalf of
other unnamed individuals in the German SD, SS, and Wehrmacht. 8 (S)
Jolis quietly coordinated with the OSS station in Bern to establish contact with
Kedia's group "to determine what intelligence potential they represented." 9 At this point,
OSS had only a limited knowledge of Kedia's background as the leader of the Georgian
movement in Germany. 10 Jolis suggested a plan of action:
To talk with Kedia and find out what information he can give us immediately on
the SD and the post-hostilities clandestine movement.
Inform him of the treatment accorded to Russians captured by the American
forces (both Wehrmacht and civilian personnel) who either do not wish to return
to Russia or do not acknowledge Soviet citizenship.
Ascertain who are the 100 persons whom he wishes to protect and obtain a list aof
their names, pseudonyms, jobs, physical descriptions, if possible.

8Thomas S. Wilson, OSS/Labor Division to Cdr. Thomas G. Cassady and Maj. Robert B.
Dodderidge, "Preliminary Report on Mission RUPPERT (Youri)," 16 April 1945, (S); "Mission
RUPPERT," 19 April 1945, [no classification listed]; and "Mission RUPPERT: Summary of
Mission and Results Obtained as of this Date," 31 May 1945, [no classification listed], all in
Kedia,
, DO Records. (S)
9"Mission RUPPERT: Summary of Mission and Results Obtained as of this Date," 31 May 101'
[no classification listed], in Kedia, C.
, DO Records. (S)
10For a summary of what OSS knew about Kedia by the spring of 1945, see the entries on OSS
Form 1652a in Kedia r_
, DO Records. (S)
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Give him passwords whereby the above persons can contact OSS Field
Detachments.
Indicate to him that such persons will be treated as P/Ws (and will not be turned
over to the Russians) but that any other concessions will depend entirely upon
their value to us after suitable opportunities for interrogation and screening. 11 (S)
In late April, Jolis and Vinogradov slipped into Switzerland to meet with Kedia
and his motley group in Geneva. What Jolis found there did not please him. "He was
not," the SI Labor Division officer wrote a month later about Kedia, "a suitable person to
be used for current intelligence objectives. His fanatical anti-communism, which
amounted to a strong desire to see an early war between Russia and the US as a means of
realizing the independence of the Caucasus, and the fact that basically he is a political
activist and revolutionary, rendered it essential for security reasons that no commitments
be made to him, and that contact be held to a minimum." Jolis still expressed the hope
that Kedia could be the source of leads on Nazi planning for postwar resistance. 12 (S)

But the Allies Must Know Stalin (U)

With the end of the war, OSS began to learn more about Kedia and his shadowy
movement. On 11 May 1945, for example, a few days after the German surrender,
Eduard Waetjen, a German lawyer and Abwehr officer who had defected to the Allies in
1944, told Allen Dulles in Switzerland what he knew about Kedia and the Georgians.
Kedia, born in 1902 in what had been the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, was a

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
German national of Armenian heritage. He fled Georgia after the Russian Civil War and
settled in Paris, where he allied himself with the exile government of Georgia. In 1940,
he became the president of the Caucasian National Committee, a loose alliance of
Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijans, and Caucasians, formed by the Germans to support
the Nazi cause. During the war, the Committee recruited troops to serve with the
Germans and agents to penetrate Soviet-held territory. The Committee acted as the
government-in-waiting for the time when their nations were free of the Bolshevists, but
the Nazi regime was ambivalent in its support of the various nationalities. 13 (S)
Waetjen expressed his opinion that Kedia was "a person of great decency, strong
character, sharp intelligence and trustworthiness. Knowing him," the German agent told
Dulles, "we should give his friends the benefit of the doubt." Kedia and his comrades
were not traitors, but sought to free their homelands from the yoke of communism.
Waetjen urged the Americans to aid Kedia and other Georgians now in Allied prisonerof-war camps. By all means, they should not be turned over to the Russians, Waetjen
reported to Dulles. 14 (S)
Kedia stated his own case in an "aide memoire" that he prepared for Jolis on 28
1 1945. He justified his Committee's struggle against the Soviets and expressed his
vision of the future, now that Germany lay vanquished:
The principal question which dominates the international situation today is the
determination of Stalin to emerge as sole beneficiary from this war which has
been fought with so much sacrifice by the Allies . . . .
His aims are no longer the defeat of Nazi Germany, a fact which is already
practically accomplished, but the expulsion of the Anglo-Saxons in Europe, Asia,
13 Waetjen to Dulles, "Michael Kedia and His Friends of the Caucasian National Committee,"
11 May 1945, [no classification listed], in Kedia,C
141bid . (s)
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and wherever else he can. In addition to his legendary cunning and his iron will,
he possesses throughout Europe and Asia armies of discontented people and fifth
columns. The ranks of these fifth columns are being swelled in proportion with
Stalin's advance through Europe under the halo of a Liberator. . . .
In face of this grave danger which threatens them, the world democracies must
face Stalin without a day's delay with an active and tenacious policy. If the
democracies wish to avoid committing suicide they must prepare a cordon and
organize the people on this side of the barricade before the explosion of inevitable
armed conflict. . . .
With regard to the people of Eastern Europe including non-Russians in the USSR
who number 90 millions, the Baltic states, White Ruthenia, the Ukraine, the
Caucasus, Turkestan, Volgar-Tatar, and the Taxus people of the Crimea for whom
I and my friends were the spokesmen in Berlin; their organization and direction
will be simple. These people all want to separate from Russia and establish the
independence of their countries. . . .This great mass of men consisting of several
hundreds of thousands cannot of course be organized on a policy based on a
concept of the 'sub-human' out of the east, but with a democratic policy of Liberty
and the self-determination of peoples.
The first thing to be done in this direction is to prevent at once all the Caucasians
and other non-Russian people who have fallen into the hands of the Western
Allies as prisoners, refugees or deported workers from being returned to the
Russians. . . .
I hope that our apprehensions and fears for the policies and person of Stalin will
be received by you with more understanding than they were by the Nazi
government of the Herrnvolk who thought they understood everything better than
us poor 'sub-humans' from the East. 15 (S)
OSS did not follow up on Kedia beyond interrogating a few of his followers, who
had now scattered into refugee camps throughout Europe. In one case, OSS found a
Kedia collaborator, took him to X-2's interrogation center in Paris, and then turned him

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
over to the French. Kedia and a number of the other émigré leaders remained in
Switzerland where they quickly attracted the attention of the local authorities. (S)
In January 1946, an officer from X-2 met with the Georgian to discuss his
collaboration with the Germans and his activities in Switzerland since the previous May.
Kedia, "appeared ready to answer all questions," even claiming that he had helped to
protect Georgian Jews while trying to save those Georgians who had become Nazi
prisoners of war. He was still anxious to work with the Americans, but grew concerned
that he would not be able to do so if the Swiss placed him in an internment camp. He
urged his American contact to talk with the Swiss to prevent his detention. Paul Blum,
X-2 '5 chief in Switzerland, however, was not convinced that Kedia was all that he
seemed. Based on leads from several informants, Blum observed that Kedia could be a
possible Soviet spy. "In view of this confused story, our incomplete information on
Kedia and his Georgians and their many contacts, DB-1 [Blum] is leery of the whole
situation," X-2 reported to Washington. "For, if Kedia, who appears to be a professional
White Russian, is actually in contact with the JE-Land [Soviet] service and is offering his
network in a penetration attempt, any action on our part would involve a triple agent
operation." 16 (S)
As 1946 progressed, Headquarters in Washington grew interested in the role of
the Georgian émigrés in the Third Reich. In March, SSU sent out a lengthy study,
"Georgia and the Georgians," that had been prepared to provide field stations with some

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background material. X-2 in Washington also summarized its information on Kedia
contained in the larger study. SSU had ascertained that Kedia's contact with the Germans
had started in September 1940 when he began to work for the Abwehr. He specialized in
the recruitment for the Abwehr of Georgian emigres in France. Later during the war,
Kedia recruited a legion of Georgians to serve in the German army. SSU believed that
Kedia had also been the head of the section of the Sicherheitsdienst involved in German
sabotage and other subversive actions in the East (the so-called ZEPPELIN operations).
Kedia was implicated in several pro-Nazi organizations, including the Georgian National
Committee under the Ostministerium. From a variety of reports, SSU headquarters
determined that Kedia was an "opportunist," willing to take advantage of the situation for
his own gain. 17 (S)
Perhaps for this reason, American intelligence kept Kedia at a distance for the
next couple of years until he simply disappeared. While the Agency collected an
extensive amount of material on him, his activities, and collaborators, Americans
remained skeptical of the man and his motives. 18 Richard Helms, Foreign Branch M's

16pm [identity unknown] to SAINT, Washington, "Michael Kedia, Georgian Nationalist," 30
January 1946, BX-625, XARZ-26814, (S), in Kedia, C
_7 DO Records. (S)
"SAINT to SAINT, Bern, "Georgians in General — Kedia et al," 13 March 1946, XARZ-28659,
(S), in Kedia,
J, DO Records. A copy of the study, "Georgia and the
Georgians," is also located in Kedia,
DO Records. (S)
18 Kedia's file after 1947 contains reporting from numerous sources, including American,
German, Swiss, and Ukrainian, about Kedia and his activities. Much of it deals with suspicions
that Kedia was a Soviet agent and that his wife in Paris was the mistress of a high-ranking So'
official. The files show that, while the CIA was interested in Kedia as an intelligence
personality, the Agency did not recruit him as an agent or employ him for other purposes. The
Georgians, however, were among the groups that the Office of Policy Coordination later tried to
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chief, summed up the feelings in Washington in a note to Cstation in C_

_3, now

the chief of

in late December 1946:

Our present stand on the handling of Kedia and the Georgian group is, very
simply, that every effort should be made to obtain as much additional information
as possible on Kedia and his Georgian associates and that, for the time being, no
action whatever be taken on the utilization of Kedia and his associates for
operational purposes. . . . It is worth stressing that whether or not these lads are
ever employed in any fashion for the procurement of intelligence, detailed
coverage of their present and future activities represents a positive political
intelligence target of interest in Washington not only to State but also to the Army
and the Navy.
We agree most heartily with your reservations on keeping a potential Kedia
operation completely away from Germany and from the White Russians; although
in general terms and looking ahead for a few years, we can reasonably estimate
that whatever anti-Soviet minority groups maintain their organization for the next
year or two will inevitably coalesce into a more and more closely knit 'bloc' and
consequently make it extremely difficult to conduct any type of collaboration with
one group unbeknownst to the others. 19 (S)
Incredible Complex of Groups (U)

Helms's statement to C.

21, foresaw the growing American interest

and eventual utilization of the Ukrainian emigre movement in Germany. The young
Central Intelligence Agency 'established its closest bonds with the Ukrainians. These ties

rally as an anticommunist front group. Entries in Kedia's file, however, end in 1953.
Interestingly, Kedia's 201 file is among the first personality files organized by the new CIA in
1948.(S)
19 Helms to
Kedia, C

C J"Kedia and the Georgians," 16 December 1946, X-9010, XARZ-28658, (S), in
21, DO Records. A copy of this same document is found in DO Records,

3, Box 6, Folder 126, CIA ARC. (S)

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lasted long after the Agency realized that the Ukrainian exiles could not penetrate the Iron
Curtain to contact the small underground anti-Soviet movement there. (S)
By April 1946, the Strategic Services Unit had established contact with the
Ukrainian resistance movement in Western Europe. 20 Hesitant at first, SSU's contact
marked the start of one of the CIA's oldest covert action projects. 21 It also marked the
beginning of a controversial relationship between the Agency and a large Eastern
European population in which many had supported Nazi Germany's invasion of the
Soviet Union. While sharing a hatred for Russian imperialism and Soviet Communism,
many Ukrainians also despised Poles and Jews. The war that passed over Ukraine
became deeply entangled in ancient hatreds; the Agency's Cold War support to the
Ukrainian émigré struggle also became entwined with these age-old conflicts. (C)
Throughout 1946, American intelligence grew interested in anti-Soviet resistance
movements in the Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe. 22 Through a sensitive source

20Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Kevin C. Ruffner, "Cold War Allies: The
Origins of CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists," in
.21, Central Intelligence: Fifty Years of the CIA (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence
A gency, 1998), pp. 19-43. (S)
description of the first contact between American intelligence and the Ukrainian nationalists
is found in [Zsolt Aradil to Chief of Mission, "Belladonna Project," 24 June 1946, (S), in DO
Box 168, Folder 5, CIA ARC. For a request to vet various Ukrainian
Records, C__
clerics as SI agents, see Cable, Vienna to SSU, War Department, 13 June 1946, Vienna 131, IN
27 Box 3, Folder 25, CIA ARC. A week earlier,
38136, (S), in DO Records, C._
SI/Austria designated the American-Ukrainian contact as Project Belladonna. Alfred C. Ulmer,
Jr., to Chief, SI, SSU/Germany, "Project Belladonna," 7 June 1946, (S), in DO Records, C
21 Box 168, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)
22 SSU disseminated what it knew about the Ukrainians, their various factions, and the extent of
collaboration with the Germans in SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, "Ukrainian Nationalist
Movements," 24 June 1946, LWX-485, in WASH-INT-REG-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry
108A, Box 284, [no folder listed], NARA. SSU's London station response to this report is found
in SAINT, London to SAINT, AMZON, "Ukrainian Nationalist Movements," 16 July 1946, XX12288, in WASH-REG-INT-169, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 109, Box 91, Folder 133, NARA.
(U)
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in Switzerland, OSS had first learned in the summer of 1945 that Ukrainian partisan
groups, active in fighting the Germans, were now engaged against the Soviets. 23 X-2's
Boleslav A. Holtsman in Munich became the primary American contact with the
Ukrainian leaders in the American zone in Germany. 24 By September 1946, Holtsman
had obtained reports from Ukrainians dealing with the organization of Soviet intelligence
in Western Europe. 25 American intelligence also learned through other sources about the
partisan struggle in the Ulcraine. 26 (S)
SSU in Washington initially told its subordinates in Germany that "these White
Russians and Ukrainians have but one aim and that is to create dissension between us and
the Russians since they must be intelligent enough to know that their specific aim, i.e.,
the independence of the Ukrain[e] or of White Russia, is practically impossible of
fulfillment." 27 Headquarters also told its German mission that "we believe here that
generally it is not a good idea to have our officers make direct contacts with these

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
dissident groups before we have had an opportunity to find out much more than we know
now about their individual background, reliability, and motivation."28 (S)
American reservations, however, centered on the practicality and reliability of the
Ukrainians—not on their wartime affiliations. X-2's vetting personnel in Germany
expressed doubts about the reliability of Russians and other Eastern European
nationalities. "The White Russians. . . possess long experience in the anti-Soviet game.
In this respect the GIS [German Intelligence Service] background of many of them
becomes an asset, however distasteful." These same groups posed immense problems for
American intelligence because of "the sometimes almost incredible complex of groups
and ramifications of groups with which they are involved." According to a memorandum
to Washington in the summer of 1946, "the groups are the objects of vigorous Soviet
penetration attempts. Their relationships to other groups, their composition, even their
philosophy, shift." US intelligence officials were reluctant to use these sources because
"their ramifications stretch across borders, defying all attempts at definition." 29 Zsolt
Aradi, a Hungarian consultant in Munich with SSU, wrote a detailed account of the
Ukrainian nationalist movement, its tumultuous history, leaders, émigré groups, and
religious background. The study also listed Nazi organizations that administered
occupation policies in the Ukraine during World War II and discussed native
collaborators. 30 (S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Citing Aradi's study, SSU's Director, Col. William Quinn, recommended that
American intelligence concentrate on gathering information about Ukrainian groups
before "major steps are taken to exploit them for intelligence purposes." He believed that
US officials could obtain much of the information from open sources, but warned that
"unwillingness of a source to provide the information required must be interpreted as
evidence of bad faith and ipso facto [original emphasis] good ground for treating such
sources with the utmost caution." 31 Quinn summarized current activities among the
scattered Ukrainian groups and their impact on American intelligence:
The elements of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement . . . are presently engaged
in acquiring allies in their struggle against the USSR or, at least, in gaining
sufficient moral and physical support to maintain their existence in exile. Their
leaders, therefore, create the impression that their cause is just, that their past
record is a clean one, that there exists a strong resistance movement in the Soviet
Ukraine, that they have excellent intelligence services leading directly into the
USSR, and that they are backed by an efficient organization. 32 (S)

31 Ibid. As an example of what American intelligence gathered on the Ukrainians in the fall of
"Miscellaneous Ukrainian Personalities," 4
1946, see AB-51 [Hecksher] to L
Box 48,
November 1946, MGH-002-1104a, LTS-827, (S), in DO Records, C
Folder 42, CIA ARC. In this document, the Counter Intelligence Branch at USFET's G-2
interviewed Roman Stepanovich Smal-Stotslcy, an Ukrainian professor and the "minister of
propaganda" in the UNR, the Ukrainski Narodna Republica, an organization that claimed to be
the Ukrainian government-in-exile in Germany, who had applied to teach in the United States.
CIG later published a fuller report of the interview with Prof. Smal-Stotslcy in late 1946, but
Headquarters did not disseminate the information to its consumers. See External Survey
Detachment, Intelligence Report, "Ukrainian Organizations [and Personalities], 14 December
j, Box 271, [no
1946, MGH-409, (S), in WASH-REG-INT-131, DO Records. C_
folder listed], DO Records. Smal-Stotslcy recounted at great length the work that his friend, Gen.
Paul Shandruk, did during the war as the commander of Ukrainian troops in the German service
and his postwar activities in Munich. In early November 1946, CIG reported that the Army's G2 had also interviewed Shandruk, who reportedly offered to set up an intelligence network in the
Ukraine for the Americans at a monthly cost of $2,000. See AB-51 [Hecksher] to C
2.1 "General Szandruk, Head of the UPA (Ukrainian Partisan Army)," 4 November
73, Box 48, Folder 42, CIA
1946, MGH-002-1104c, LTS-826, (S), in DO Records, C.
ARC. (S)
32Ibid. (S)
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The SSU director then admitted "actually, these are almost all open questions for
each of the major groups concerned. The Ukrainian Nationalist leaders are among the
most highly opportunistic groups in Europe," Quinn reported. "They are adroit political
intriguers and past masters in the art of propaganda. The attempts of the old OUN
[Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] leadership, for example, now representing
UHVR-UPA [Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation CouncilUkrainian Insurgent Army], to give the movement a 'democratic' aspect and to represent
it as the only [original emphasis] effective Ukrainian group have been especially
conspicuous in recent weeks—the first statement is false, and the second is yet to be
proved." 33 (S)

Stefan Bandera and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (U)

Col. Quinn had good reason to question the motives of the Ukrainian nationalists.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, formed in Prague in the late 1920s to fight
for Ukrainian independence, split at the outbreak of the Second World War. The bulk of
the Organization followed Stefan Bandera while a smaller segment remained with Andrey
Melnik. Both factions had participated in terrorist activities against Polish officials
before the war. To complicate matters further, Ukrainian nationalists allied themselves
with Nazi "liberators" during of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. 34 (U)

33 Ibid. (S)
34Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis is discussed in Boshyk, ed., Ukraine during World War
II, pp. 61-88. The historical backdrop to Ukrainian political activism is found in John A.
Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 2d ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). See
also Jeffrey Burds, The Early Cold War in the Soviet West Ukraine 1944-1948, The Carl Becker
Papers, no. 1505 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2001); Alexander J. Motyl, The Turn to
the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (New
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While Ukrainian enthusiasm dimmed after the Nazis failed to support Ukrainian
statehood, thousands of Ukrainians fought with Germans until the end of the war. At the
same time, the OUN's leaders also stated that they had been held in German
concentration camps during the war. These claims made it difficult then, and now, to
determine the full extent of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. (U)
Stefan Bandera, one of the leading Ukrainian nationalists, earned a fierce
reputation for conducting a "reign of terror" against the Poles, according to an OSS report
issued in September 1945. "The mere mention of the name `Bandera' invariably brings
curses and imprecations among Polish refugees, OSS officers discovered." OSS
summarized its information on this notorious Ukrainian nationalist:
Bandera is a young and violent student who some five
years ago began opposing the elderly Melnik as leader of the
OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists]. In 1941 he went
to Lemberg [Lvov] and proclaimed himself head of a Ukrainian
state, supposedly with the approval of the German General Staff.
This caused the Germans great embarrassment, and he was
instructed to desist from further political activities unless given
official approval. However, he and his followers began a
campaign of terrorization, directed mainly against the followers
of Melnik, which resulted in his [Bandera's] arrest and
York: Columbia University Press, 1980); and Maria Savchyn Pyslcir, Thousands of Roads: A
Memoir of a Young Woman's Life in the Ukrainian Underground during and after World War I,
Trans. by Ania Savage (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2001). Timothy Snyder's article,
"To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and For All: 'The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in
Poland, 1943-1947," in Journal of Cold War Studies (Spring 1999), pp. 86-120, provides a
description of Ukrainian-Polish relations before, during, and after the war. Other sources of
information include John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews
during the Second World War," in Jonathan Frankel, ed. The Fate of the European Jews, 19391945 Continuity or Contingency? (The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry: The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Studies in Contemporary Jewry Annual XIII) (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997). See also Sol Littman, "The Ukrainian Halychyna Division: A
Case Study of Historical Revisionism," in Saul S. Friedman, ed., Holocaust Literature: A
Handbook of Critical, Historical, and Literary Writings (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), pp.
279-300. (U)
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confinement at Klein-Sachsenhausen. Melnik was also arrested.
Both were later released, however, when the Wehrmacht and
Ostministerium attempted to build up a strong Ukraine. Bandera
can be regarded as both anti-Soviet and anti-German. He appears
to be continuing his campaign of violence since the German
withdrawal from the Ukraine. 35 (S)
As the Third Reich collapsed, many Eastern and Southern European Nazi
collaborators fell into Western Allied hands as prisoners of war or displaced persons.
The presence of a large body of anticommunists in Germany and Austria, with intimate
knowledge of Soviet activities, proved too enticing for American intelligence to ignore.
(S)

SSU's Hungarian Connection (U)

Bill Holtsman in Munich became involved with the Ukrainians through Zsolt
Aradi. 36 The author of the October 1946 interim study, Aradi exploited ties to Ukrainian
church officials at the Vatican in order to meet with emigre leaders in Germany and to
gain positive intelligence on the Soviets. SSU moved Aradi from Italy to Austria in late
1945, where he continued to work as a "consultant." Aradi maintained close ties to his
Vatican sources and, according to Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., SSU's chief of mission in Austria,
"it is believed that KILKENNY [Aradi] was one of the first to suggest to OSS the use of
35 0SS Intelligence Report, A-61154-a, "Activities of Bandera," 21 September 1945, (S), in
Stefan Bandera, j
3 , DO Records. (S)
36Zsolt Aradi was born in Zombor, Hungary, in 1908 of Jewish background although his father's
family converted to Catholicism. He moved to Rome at the beginning of the war and worked as
press attaché at the Hungarian Legation at the Vatican until the Allies liberated the city in 1944.
Married to a German woman and a father of three children, SI recruited Aradi in June 1944. He
worked with OSS and its successors in Italy, Austria, and Germany until he moved to the United
States in early 1948. During the period that Aradi worked in Munich, he was known initially as
KILKENNY and, after September 1947, as CARRYALL. For further information, see Zsolt
Aradi, r
-"D , DO Records. (S)

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priests and Vatican contacts for obtaining intelligence in Central Europe." In the spring
of 1946, Aradi became acquainted with several Ukrainian religious leaders in Rome.
Through the Hungarian, Ulmer reported "it has been possible to establish contact with
representatives of the so-called Ukrainian government, an anti-Soviet political group."37
(S)
Ulmer made the following comments about the Ukrainian nationalists based on
reports provided by Aradi:
This group appears to be well organized both within the Ukraine
and among Ukrainian DPs in southern Germany and Austria. It
controls a strong resistance movement which appears to be giving
considerable trouble to the Red Army. Two vice-presidents of
the government (both of them closely connected with the Catholic
Church) have been contacted in southern Germany with the view
to exploiting the intelligence possibilities such a movement can
furnish to SSU . .. . If all goes well, within a reasonable period of
time there should be established a good line of communications
to the resistance within Russia and the results of this chain will be
available to both the Austrian and German Missions. 38 (S)
Both Ulmer and Gordon M. Stewart, chief of SI in Germany and later mission
chief, expressed satisfaction with Aradi's efforts. 39 Ulmer claimed "it should not be

37Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., to [Unstated], "Vatican Contacts," 4 June 1946, (S), in Aradi,
DO Records. For further details on Aradi's Vatican sources, see Lt. Benjamin H.
Cushing to Harry Rositzke, "Contacts in and through the Vatican," 17 February 1947, FSRO1379, (S) enclosing Zsolt Aradi, "Contacts in and through the Vatican," 5 February 1947, (S), in
DO Records, C_
J, Box 513, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
38 Ibid; and Aradi to Ulmer, 19 June 1946 (S), in Aradi,
DO Records. (S)

3

E

,

39Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., born in 1916, received his degree in English from Princeton University in
1939. He joined the US Navy in 1941 and served with OSS throughout the war, including a
lengthy period as operations officer of its German-Austrian Section and head of SI in Austria
immediately after the war. He became chief of mission in Austria in November 1945 L.

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forgotten that much of the success for past operations is due to KILKENNY himself. He
is ideally suited by years of experience in Church matters, by temperament, and as a result
of intimate contact with important people within the Church to carry out these valuable
and highly delicate operations."40 Stewart asked Ulmer to tell Aradi, "I am glad that your
relations in Munich are satisfactory and hope that your work in that area will soon bear
fruit." Commenting on Aradi's initial approach to Ukrainian nationalists in Bavaria,
Stewart wrote, "it is my understanding that Washington is quite interested in the type of
contacts you are making." 41 (S)
After dealing with several Ukrainian religious figures in both Italy and Germany,
Aradi met with the leaders of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR or
Ukrainska holovna vyzvolna rada) in Germany. 42 He initially worked with Father Ivan

Hrinioch and Yury Lopatinsky, two members of the Counci1. 43 Hrinioch, a Greek

43Aradi, "Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, MGH-391, (S), in DO Records,
Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC (hereafter cited as "Operation Belladonna," 27 December
1946). According to this memo, Aradi first met a Father Diaczisyn in Rome through Father Ivo
Zeiger, special adviser to the chief of the Vatican mission to the US Army in Germany.
Diaczisyn introduced Aradi to Bishop Ivan Buczko, an active Ukrainian nationalist, and an
adviser to the Pope on Ukrainian affairs. Buczko put Aradi in contact with UHVR's vice
president in Germany, Vasily Mudry, who then passed the agent on to Hrinioch and Lopatinsky
in the American zone. For further discussion of Aradi's initial contact with Ukrainian clergy, see
External Survey Detachment, Intelligence Report, "UHWR and UPA," 26 October 1946, FSRO677, (S), in Bandera,
DO Records. See also the results of an interview that
Aradi had with Mudry in External Survey Detachment, Intelligence Report, "[Current] Ukrainian
Affairs in Germany," 24 December 1946, MGH-410, (S), in WASH-REG-INT-131, DO Records,
C_
Box 271, [no folder listed], DO Records. (S)

3

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Catholic priest and longtime Ukrainian nationalist, served as the UHVR's second vice
president while Lopatinsky acted as liaison between UHVR and the Ukrainian Insurgent
Army, UPA (or Ukrainska povstanska armiia), fighting the Soviets in Ulcraine. 44 (S)
Aradi dubbed the Munich group Referat-33 (or R-33). It also included Mykola
Lebed, who still lived in Rome (he later moved to Germany with American assistance in
1947). 45 Lebed served as the foreign minister of Zakordonne Predstavnytstvo UHVR or
Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. A key figure in the
Ukrainian liberation movement, Lebed was also one of the most controversial. Convicted
for involvement in the 1934 assassination of the Polish minister of interior, his death
sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. A founder of the Organizacya

44Hrinioch (his name is spelled numerous ways) was the most important Ukrainian contact with
the Americans during this time period. Born in 1907, Hrinioch grew up in western Ukraine where
he was ordained in the Church and became an active Ukrainian nationalist. While one American
case officer noted "subject was in contact with the GIS [German Intelligence Service] during the
early stages of the German campaign in Galicia," American intelligence officers found Hrinioch
to be "very well informed and highly intelligent" as well as "incorruptibly honest." Hrinioch, in
fact, served as the chaplain of the infamous Ukrainian Nachtigall Legion of Ukrainian
Nationalists, which collaborated with the Nazis during the invasion and played a major role in
the 1941 proclamation of Ukrainian statehood. Hrinoich had the operational cryptonym of
CAPARISON in this early period and continued to provide information to US intelligence
through the 1970s. Hrinoich served after the war in his clerical role and by 1982 he had been
elevated to the rank of Patriarchal Archimandrite. See External Survey Detachment, Intelligence
Report, "UHWR and UPA," 26 October 1946, FSRO-677, (S), in Bandera, CDO Records. See also Acting Chief, Munich Operations Base, Memorandum to Chief, FBM,
"Personal Record of CAPARISON," 6 May 1949, MGM-A-1148, (S), in Ivan Hrinioch, C3 DO Records. In addition, see Ivan Hrynokh entry, Kubijovyc, ed., Encyclopedia of
Ukraine. Lopatinsky was born in 1906 and served as an officer in the Polish Army. He also
joined the Nachtigall Legion and immigrated to the United States in 1953. He died in New York
in 1982. Yurii Lopatynsky entry, Kubijovyc, ed., Encyclopedia of Ukraine. (S)
45"Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, p. 6. Referat-33 (R-33) included the following
members: Hrinioch, Lebed, Lopatinsky as chiefs; Myron Matvieyko (chief of the OUN's security
branch); and Yaroslav Stetsko (head of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). (S)
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Ukrainskych Nationaltiv or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Lebed fervently

desired the independence of his homeland. 46 (S)
Aradi reported to the Americans about the members of R-33. He observed that
Hrinioch, Lebed, and Lopatinsky were "determined and able men, but with the
psychology of the hunted. They are ready to sacrifice their lives or to commit suicide at
any time to further their cause or to prevent security violations, and they are equally ready
to kill if they must." The Hungarian added, "it is always necessary to remember that they
have an almost religious worship of their nation and distrust anything foreign: first and
foremost, Polish; then Russian; then German." Aradi believed that if the Ukrainians were
"properly treated they can be useful at any time and for any purpose." 47 (S)
By October 1946, Aradi reported that both Hrinioch in Munich and Lebed in
Rome offered to provide the Americans with intelligence on Soviet activities and agents
in exchange for US assistance to the Ukrainian struggle. 48 Drawing upon his contact
with numerous Ukrainian groups, Aradi commented later in December that "after a
thorough study of the Ukrainian problem and a comparison of information from several
sources in Germany, Austria, and Rome, source believes that UHVR, UPA, and OUNP , ridera

are the only large and efficient organizations among Ukrainians." Based on

information provided by leaders of the UHVR, Aradi believed that this group had "the
support of the younger generation and of Ukrainians at home." Aradi also noted "some
other groups are envious of the UHVR complex because the organization is independent
46Lebed was born in 1909 and organized the youth wing of the OUN in the early 1930s. For
_JD° Records, and Mykola
more information on Lebed, see Mykola Lebed,
Lebed entry, Kubijovyc, ed., Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Lebed's activities and immigration to the
United States are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. (S)
47 "Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, p. 17. (S)
48 E5D Intelligence Report, "UHWR and UPA," 26 October 1946, FSRO-677, (S), in Bandera,
_D DO Records. (S)
C_
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and forceful and has always refused to collaborate with Germans, Poles or Russians."49
(S)

First Projects (U)

In mid-1946, Aradi in Austria and Holtsman in Munich launched two separate
projects involving Ukrainians in Germany. The first project, BELLADONNA, drew
upon Aradi's contact with Hrinoich to dispatch Ukrainians from Germany into the
western Soviet Union in order to collect information on the Soviet military.
BELLADONNA had a positive intelligence function while LYNX, launched by Holtsman
in July 1946 as a supplementary project of BELLADONNA, focused on the identification
of Soviet agents in western Germany. Security Control in Munich (formerly X-2)
replaced LYNX with a new project, TRIDENT, in early 1947 to better manage Ukrainian
affairs and overall security. 50 A third project, known as UKELE, drew upon the services
of a double agent known as SLAVK0. 51 (S)
49 "Operation Belladonna," 27 December 1946, pp. 16-17. This report also enumerates the
Ukrainian proposals for cooperation. A supplement to this report is found in Aradi, "Belladonna
Operations - 2," 27 December 1946, MGH-430, FSRO-985, (S), in DO Records ; C_
Box 510, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. Aradi wrote both reports, but according to Stewart, "they
are the work of Zsolt Aradi and Mary Hutchison. If you find them obscure, don't hesitate to fire
questions at us. Mary did wonders in converting Zsolt's quaint English into 'Reports Style' but
the material has, after all, come a long way around (Ukrainian to Hungarian or German to
English) and some concepts may be a little blurred." Mary Hutchison, the wife of Capt. Gregory
L. Hutchison, the adjutant of the War Department Detachment in Germany, worked with X-2 in
Heidelberg. Stewart to Helms, "Belladonna Operation,' 2 January 1946 [1947], FSRO-1111, (S),
, Box 511, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
in DO Records, C-
50 For details on these early SC Munich operations, see "CE Operational Progress Report No, 5,"
_7 Box 513, [no folder listed], CIA ARC;
17 February 1947, (S), in DO Records, c
"Operation Trident: Progress Report 1," 21 January 1947, MGH-642, HSC/OPS/9, (S);
"Developments in the TRIDENT Project," 21 February 1947, MGH-900, HSC/OPS/026, (S); and
SC Munich, "Operation TRIDENT," 15 June 1947, (S), all in DO Records, C._
Z.7 , Box
4, Folder 20, CIA ARC (hereafter cited as "Trident Project."). See also SC, AMZON to FBM,
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E

1 used Myron Matvieyko, chief of OUN's security branch known as

Sluzba Bezpeka, as their primary contacts in Munich for the three projects. Matvieyko,

who had served as an agent for the German Abwehr during the war, exchanged
information gained by OUN's "bunkers" in Germany with American intelligence "in
return for protection in the American Zone and some minor operational supplies." 52 He,
however, proved to be increasingly unreliable, and the CIA eventually dropped
Matvieyko in 1950 for "ineptitude." The following year, Matvieyko defected to the
Soviets after his return to the Ukraine on a secret British mission. He later denounced the
entire Ukrainian emigre leadership as Nazi collaborators and tools of the "capitalist
intelligence services." 53 Matvieyko's defection seemed at the time to confirm some
American and Ukrainian suspicions that he had been a Soviet double agent throughout
the period of his work in Germany with US intelligence. (S)

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Matvieyko's illegal activities (including murder and counterfeiting) strained
American willingness to work with the Ukrainians in Germany. 54 As early as the fall of
1946, the Office of Special Operations expressed its dissatisfaction with the OUN when it
commented that Aradi's reports were slanted in favor of Hrinoich and Lebed,
downplaying the role of other Ukrainian nationalists. 55 Headquarters told Security
Control in Heidelberg that "the securing of information on activities of the various
Ukrainian groups in the American Zone is a straight CIC job and we should get no more
involved in it than we unfortunately already are." 56 (S)
By the spring of 1947, Headquarters personnel noted that "intelligence derived
from such Ukrainian groups is [not] worth the time and effort which would necessarily
have to be expended on such a project. Experience has shown that information derived
from such organizations has been both low-grade and ideologically biased." 57 In another
dispatch, Headquarters commented that "it has been impossible so far to elicit from our
SB [Ukranian] contacts the names of any of their subsources—this in spite of repeated
attempts to get such data from them. Time and again mention has been made by our
Ukrainian sources of the existence of "bunkers," supposedly small intelligence cells, in
the American Zone of Germany as well as Czechoslovakia." The report went on to say,
"it is fully appreciated that it is often extremely difficult to check on the veracity of such

54"Liquidation of Lt. Andrei Pechara," 3 June 1947, MGH-1399, (S), in "Trident Project." A
description of other murders committed by Matvieyko and the SB/OUN is found in
For description of Matvieyko's counterfeiting activities, see numerous reports in his
201 file. (S)

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reports; on the other hand unless attempts are made to verify the existence of such groups,
we will never be able to evaluate the quality of the intelligence reporting of the
Ukrainians." OSO added that "it is seriously recommended that this contact be severed
completely, although graciously." 58 (S)
Holtsman, in fact, dropped arrangements with the LYNX group in late 1946 and
focused on more limited contacts under Operation TRIDENT. In doing so, SC Munich
severed relations with Hrinioch (who had been Aradi's source) although it still
maintained contact with Matvieyko. In the meantime, the OUN's ongoing internal
dissension further tested American patience with the Ukrainians. The explosion came
after a stormy meeting in Germany in August 1948 when the leaders of the ZPUHVR in
Germany (principally Lebed and Hrinioch) broke with Bandera's OUN. The increasingly
totalitarian attitude taken by Bandera and his resentment toward the Americans
constituted the main reasons behind this break. 59 (S)

Hiding Bandera (U)

Despite the general instability of the Ukrainian emigre leaders and the dissolution
of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, American intelligence continued to protect
the Ukrainians in exchange for information. In 1947,C

brought Aradi's contact,

Michael Korzan, from Austria to Munich to provide better insight into the activities of the

58 "Munich Detachment," 6 May 1947, (S) in "Trident Project." (S)
59The background of this conference and the dissension between the OUN and ZPUI-IVR and
other Ukrainian groups is discussed in Chief of Station, Karlsruhe (signed by James Critchfield
to Chief, FBM, "Project ICON: Postwar Ukrainian Exile Organizations in
and
J, Box 1,
Western Europe," 20 October 1948, MGM-A-793, (S), in DO Records,
Folder 5, CIA ARC. This report is hereafter cited as Project ICON/Ukraine Report. (S)

a

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OUN. 60 Several months earlier, the German Mission had sheltered Stefan Bandera from
extradition to the Soviet Union. Since the end of the war, the USSR had demanded that
the United States return all Soviet citizens suspected of war crimes and Nazi
collaboration from the American zones in Austria and Germany. 61 The Ukrainians
60sc, AMZON to FBM for SC Washington, "CAPELIN—New Agent of SC Munich," 3 June
1947, HSC/OPS/60, (S), in "Trident Project." SC Munich reported that "CAPELIN [Michael
Korzan] was moved by us on 17 May 1947 from his former residence in Taxenbach, Austria
(E96), and is now living at Gausstrasse 3, Munich. We are supplying him with a residence permit
for Munich and the necessary food and identification cards." Korzan "is expected to give us
better coverage than has been possible through CAPANEUS [Matvieyko] and CANAAN
[Kamian Korduba] who have refused agent status, preferring instead to 'cooperate' with the
Americans. Consistent with this attitude, the two have been withholding information from us
when they judged it unfavorable to the Ukrainian cause." Korzan, a former member of OUN's
SB in the Ukraine, came to Germany from Austria to take charge of Matvieyko's SB
counterintelligence section. Korzan had already assisted American intelligence by identifying
SLAVKO, the double agent in Project UKELELE; something that Matvieyko had refused to do.
Information on Korzan was first reported in Aradi to C
"Belladonna Agent," 14 December
1946, (S), in DO Records, .0 Box 168, Folder 5, CIA ARC. For an example of an
OUN/SB semi-monthly report compiled from sources throughout Europe, see SAINT to SAINT,
Bern "DB-7/1 and Mme. Rudnika," 19 November 1946, X-8804, (S), in DO Records, a
J, Box 6, Folder 125, CIA ARC. (S)
61 It was common practice for the Soviet Military Administration to communicate to the
American military governor lists of names and organizations that it sought. In June 1946,
Marshal Sokolovslcy wrote Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, commander of US Forces in the European
Theater, to protest the presence of numerous Ukrainian groups "functioning in the American
of Occupation and engaged in open anti-Soviet propaganda and in spreading rumors aimed
at underming the friendly relations existing between our two countries." McNarney wrote back
in October stating that he had instituted tighter controls on newspapers published in the
American zone by displaced persons, but adding that the "evidence of the organizations
furnished by you cannot be substantiated by our investigations in all cases." McNarney added
that "it now appears that some national committees, by working under UNRRA, believed that
they had received some moral approval by the United States occupational authorities. However,
this is not the case." McNarney remained "greatly concerned in fair treatment in this Zone to
protect the interests of our esteemed allies. Measures are continually in effect for that purpose."
See Marshal Sokolovslcy to Gen. McNarney, 5 June 1946, R-496-A, and McNarney to
Sokolovsky, 12 October 1946, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, The Records of the Executive
Office, The Chief of Staff, Records Maintained for Military Governor Lucius D. Clay 1945-49,
Box 19, [no folder listed], NARA. As another example of a similar Soviet request in 1949 and
the American reply, see US Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, Germany: 1947-1949
The Story in Documents (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 124-127.
(U)
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presented an unusual situation, as did other Eastern Europeans, such as the Latvians,
Lithuanians, and Estonians. Many Ukrainians claimed to be Polish citizens, thus exempt
from repatriation to the USSR (Poland controlled tracts of Ukraine). Likewise, the
United States did not recognize the Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations in 1940, and
these refugees refused to be classified as Soviet citizens or to be returned to their
homelands as long as they remained under Soviet domination. (S)
A Soviet request for the repatriation of the Ukrainians came at the same time as
Zsolt Aradi and Boleslav A. Holtsman were making their first contacts with the OUN and
ZPUHVR. American authorities faced a predicament as to how to respond. On 15
October 1946, Colonel-General P.A. Kurochkin, the deputy commander of the Soviet
Military Administration, wrote his counterpart, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, to request the
arrest of Stefan Bandera as a war criminal. "For these crimes committed against the
Russian people," the Soviet officer wrote, "he should be arrested and tried by a Military
Tribunal, but this can only be done with your assistance because of the fact that he is now
hiding in the American Zone of Occupation" Three days later, Gen. Clay responded that
the Soviet request had been forwarded to Gen. McNarney, the commander of American
forces in Germany, for further investigation. 62 (U)
A few days later, Henry D. Hecksher, Security Control chief in Heidelberg,
advised Holtsman in Munich that he "should take special pains at steering a judicious
middle course." Hecksher wanted Holtsman to "place yourself squarely on record with
Bandera as greatly concerned as regards Bandera's security but equally unable to
materially contribute to its preservation, because you had not been taken into the
62 KurochIcin to Clay, 15 October 1946, R-934-A, and Clay to Kurochlcin, 18 October 1946, in
RG 260, OMGUS Records, The Records of the Executive Office, The Chief of Staff, Records
Maintained for Military Governor Lucius D. Clay 1945-49, Box 19, [no folder listed], NARA.
(U)
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complete confidence of the UHVR." 63 By doing this, Hecksher hinted that Holtsman
could blame Ukrainian reticence in the event of Bandera's arrest. "Tipping off Bandera,
if this should be decided upon, would have to be done with utmost discretion obviating
the remotest possibility that his escape is traced back to a US agency." Holtsman was
told to use cutouts to advise the Ukrainians "taking into account, of course, that should
any intimation of our connivance in Bandera's escape reach the ears of the UHVR, we
could expect with certainty that the Soviets would learn about it sooner or later." 64 (S)
Clay soon replied to the deputy Soviet military governor, informing him that the
US Army was doing what it could to locate Bandera. "US police agencies which were
already alerted were directed to intensify the search for Stefan Bandera. He has not yet
been apprehended and our initial efforts to date have proven fruitless." Clay assured his
counterpart that, if located, Bandera would be turned over to the Russians via "the regular
channels established by international agreement for the handling of war criminals." 65 (U)
Hecksher explained to Washington that "0-2 USFET is definitely loath to comply
with the Soviet request to find Bandera and to repatriate him as a 'war criminal."
Bandera's arrest would hurt American intelligence efforts to learn more about the
Ukrainian resistance movement. "We are," Hecksher wrote, "definitely interested in
cautiously cultivating our contacts with the UHVR if not along lines of active
cooperation, then with at least the objective to keep ourselves informed of what its plans

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
are and to what extent it has succeeded in building up and servicing cells in the
Ukraine." 66 Zsolt Aradi speculated that:
There can be little doubt as to what would happen in case the American
authorities should deliver Bandera to the Soviet. It would imply to the Ukrainians
that we as an organization are unable to protect them, i.e., we have no authority.
In such a case, there is not any reason or sense for them to cooperate with us.
One of the reasons why full cooperation between the UHVR and our organization
has not developed yet is the suspicion of these leaders that we will ultimately
'betray' them.
From the very beginning they complained that Americans have no real interest in
them and that Communist-penetrated USA officers will trade them to Russia.
This belief was shared by both the Bandera people and the conservative
Ukrainians.
My personal feeling and conviction is that in case of Bandera's arrest, it would
immediately put an end to operations Bella Donna and Lynx. (S)
Aradi concluded that "if it should be decided not to use these people and their
organization for intelligence purposes, it would be better to arrest not only Bandera, but
all the leaders whose names and whereabouts are known to us." 67 (S)
In the meantime, OSO officials at the German Mission headquarters in Heidelberg
remained concerned about how to handle this crisis. Gordon M. Stewart, Intelligence
Branch chief, told Richard Helms in early 1947 that he and his colleagues "wanted, on the
one hand, to have the American authorities appear energetic in satisfying the demands of
the Russians and, on the other, to have [Operation] BELLADONNA take on adequate

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
cover." In doing so, the Central Intelligence Group urged Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress,
USFET G-2, to delay his investigation until after 15 January 1947. 68 (S)
The additional time permitted Aradi "to inform his people that they must be under
cover by 15 January, because the United States Government is going to accede to a
legitimate request of the Russians that war criminals and conspirators be rounded up and
delivered to them, even if they are not former Soviet citizens." Stewart added, "by taking
cover we mean breaking off all contact with the overt political groups in the Ukrainian
colony, changing names and cover documents and actually hiding until the political flap
is over." 69 According to Stewart's communiqué to Helms in early 1947, "the result was
less dramatic than we expected." The Soviets did not push further for Bandera's arrest
and, Stewart wrote, "the Belladonnians fell into line very nicely." 70 (S)
Despite their role in sheltering Bandera, OSO officials in Washington's Foreign
Branch M and Special Projects Division still took a dim view of Munich's work with the
Ukrainians. This movement, Washington commented, "is, as the field agrees, primarily
[original emphasis] a terrorist organization." Headquarters felt that intelligence produced
by both LYNX and BELLADONNA had been minimal. In a fitting—and prophetic—
statement, Washington told its field officers that:
68 Stewart to Helms, "Belladonna Operation," 2 January 1946 [47], FSRO-1111, (S), in DO
, Box 511, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
Records, C.
69 Stewart to Lewis and Aradi, "Operation Belladonna," 10 December 1946, FSRO-1111, (S), in
_J, Box 511, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
DO Records, C
70 Stewart to Helms, "Belladonna Operation, 2 January 1946 [47], (S). CIC dubbed its role in
hiding Bandera from the Soviets as Operation ANYFACE, named after a Dick Tracy character.
No indication exists in the surviving records that CIG actually met with Bandera to warn him of
the search. As an indication of how difficult it was to track Bandera down, American
intelligence in Rome reported that the Ukrainian leader had escaped from the Ukraine and now
lived in Czechoslovakia. The CIA reported this in October 1947 based on information provided
by a Ukrainian named Federonczuk to the Counter Intelligence Corps. SeeC _D to Washington,
"Liberty International," 10 October 1947, PIRA-1580, (S), in DO Records,C_
J, Box
296, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
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The case of Bandera's extradition and our part in it brings to the
fore the whole Ukrainian problem. If the sine qua non of
Ukrainian cooperation is political, then we should cease all direct
contact [original emphasis] immediately. We are not in a
position to give it, and if we attempt to create the impression that
we can, we can expect only bad results, for it will become
obvious sooner or later that the protection we offer is extremely
fragile as factors beyond our control are brought into play. If we
accept the premise that political support is out, we must also face
the fact that in the long run operations using the Ukrainians as an
organized group will probably turn out to be worthless—simply
because without political support the Ukrainian nationalist groups
will be decimated by Soviet pressure and demoralization. It is
therefore difficult to see the Bandera problem as really
significant. The effects of Bandera's arrest will only be to
precipitate an inevitable development. 71 (S)
The day after Harry Rositzke, the acting chief of Special Projects Division—Soviet
(SPD-S), wrote this memo, he criticized OSO for failing to develop Soviet strategic
"Lambda targets." 72 Rositzke, who later headed CIA's efforts to penetrate the Soviet
Union, protested to Col. Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director for Special
Operations, that OSO was overinvolved in tactical operations in Europe. He expressed
concern about OSO's "hasty exploitation of sources of opportunity, especially anti-Soviet
eilligres from the USSR and satellite countries, to the exclusion of actual penetration
operations." Rositzke wanted to centralize American intelligence efforts against the
Soviets and to reduce "OSO exploitation of such organized anti-Soviet groups as the

71 SC, FBM to SC, AMZON, "Munich Contacts," 9 January 1947, X-9126, (S), enclosing SPD-S,
"AB-51 and Kilkenny's Views on the Effects of Bandera's Extradition," 7 January 1947, in DO
Records, .
Box 6, Folder 126, CIA ARC. A copy of this same document is found
in DO Records, C
Box 5, Folder 168, DO Records. (S)

3,

72The term LAMBDA was used to designate "critically important reports" dealing with the
Soviet Union. (S)
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Ukrainians, Georgians, and Baits for penetrating the USSR [which] involves dangerous
security and political hazards." 73 (S)
As a part of a major reorganization of operations in Germany and the formation of
the Munich Operations Base in mid-1947, Holtsman was told to reduce his work with the
various émigré groups, especially the Ukrainians, and to concentrate on other targets.
This led him to drop many of his Ukrainian contacts, with CIC, in turn, picking up both
Ivan Hrinioch and Mykola Lebed as sources. 74 (S)
CIG officials in Washington advocated a gradual reduction in the American
involvement with the Ukrainians during 1947 because of the inherent weaknesses of the
OUN and the UHVR as well as the belief that these organizations were penetrated by
Soviet intelligence. The fact that many of the Ukrainian leaders and organizations had
worked with the Nazis was not regarded as a decisive factor. American interest in the
Ukrainians lay dormant until the pressure of Cold War rivalry prompted another review.
(C)

From 1946 through 1948, American intelligence officials in Washington were
ambivalent, if not wary, of establishing contact with Ukrainian emigres in Germany.1
They regarded the exiled groups as splintered and vulnerable to Soviet penetration. At
the same time, American intelligence officers at Headquarters realized that these groups
had a record of employing terrorist measures and supporting the Nazis. The opportunistic
nature of the Ukrainian groups called into question the extent to which the United States
should become involved with the emigres. (S)
As the Cold War deepened, American rationalization for using these
anticommunist groups underwent a subtle, but crucial transformation. After 1948, the
Central Intelligence Agency moved to cooperate with the Ukrainians against the Soviets
as opposed to merely collecting information on the emigre movements. This denoted a
major shift from the approach that Headquarters took in 1946 and 1947. As a result of
this new cooperation, the CIA launched its first attempts to penetrate the Iron Curtain.2
The Ukrainians and other Eastern and Southern European emigre groups now became

1 Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Ruffner, "Cold War Allies: The Origins of
CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists," in L
, Central
Intelligence: Fifty Years of the CIA, pp. 19-43. (S)
2Winston Churchill at Fulton College in Missouri said on 5 March 1946, "From Stettin in the
Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." (U)

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linked to the CIA's own clandestine efforts against the Soviets during the Cold War. The
development of such relationships eventually raised questions about American
intelligence using men with unsavory backgrounds who had allied themselves with
America's enemies only a few years previously. (S)

Terra Incognito (U)

Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1947 to
1950, was reluctant to involve CIA with emigre groups in Europe despite pressure from
other Federal agencies, including the Army and the Department of State. In early March
1948, Frank Wisner, a former OSS officer and a member of the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff, proposed that the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee (SANACC) form an ad hoc committee to explore the use of Soviet émigrés.
The SANACC took up Wisner's proposal and circulated his paper, Utilization of
Refugees from the Soviet Union in US. National Interest (SANACC 395), on 17 March

1948. Shortly afterwards, the ad hoc committee, composed of members from State,
Army, CIA, and several other agencies, began exploring the paper's implications. 3 (U)
Wisner wanted SANACC 395 to "increase defections among the elite of the
Soviet World and to utilize refugees from the Soviet World in the national interests of the
US." Describing the history of the Russian anticommunist movement since the
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and Russian collaboration with the Nazis in World War II,
Wisner felt that the 700,000 Russians scattered in European DP camps and elsewhere
3 State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 395, Utilization of Refugees from the
Soviet Union in US National Interest, 17 March 1948, located in Scholarly Resources, Inc.,
National Security Policy of the United States, LM-54, Roll 32, SWNCC Case Files Nos. 382-402
March 1947-June 1949, NARA. (U)
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around the world could provide the bulwark of a new anti-Soviet movement. The
Russian émigrés, Wisner claimed, represented "the potential nucleus of possible Freedom
Committees encouraging resistance movements into the Soviet World and providing
contacts with an underground." According to Wisner, the United States remained "illequipped to engage in the political and psychological conflict with the Soviet World,"
and the "Soviet satellite areas like the USSR are tending to become a terra incognito."
American ignorance of the Soviet Union in all fields and at all levels, he lamented, was
profound and growing. 4 (U)
With SANACC's approval, Wisner planned to "remove present deterrents and
establish inducements" to spur defectors among the Soviet elite. He also wanted to
increase the utilization of these refugees "to fill the gaps in our current official
intelligence, in public information, and in our politico-psychological operations." At the
same time that the special group began to review SANACC 395, the State Department
requested that CIA prepare a study in accordance with Paragraph 6 of the SANACC 395's
recommendations and report its findings to the committee. 5 Navy Capt. Alan
McCracken, CIA's Deputy Assistant Director of Special Operations (DADSO), served as
the Agency's interim point of contact for SANACC 395. McCracken expressed great
reservations about the overall value of Soviet defectors, and he rejected most of Wisner's
proposals. A naval officer detailed to CIA, McCracken criticized the State Department
for wanting to establish a "social science institute composed of refugee and American
scholars for the purpose of doing basic research studies on the Soviet World."
McCracken considered "this proposal nothing but expensive hot air" just as he rejected

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
bringing Russians to the United States. "I do not think any [original emphasis] 'social
science scholars' will do us a particle of good—we have too damned many of this type of
faker in the US already." 6 (C)
Capt. McCracken also noted that he had no "objection to making a study, but I
cannot see that the refugee mass will be useful." He did, however, support thoroughly
interrogating defectors, and believed that "OSO is in a position to furnish a certain
amount of details on the capabilities of anti-Soviet refugees for intelligence purposes and
can supply additional data on the many factors connected with the utilization of these
groups and individuals for other than intelligence purposes." 7 (C)

Hillenkoetter's Response (U)

Adm. Hillenkoetter provided his own comments on SANACC 395 to the National
Security Council on 19 April 1948. Responding to the problem statement "whether the
mass of refugees from the Soviet world, now in free Europe and Asia can be effectively
utilized to further US interests in the current struggle with the USSR," the DCI told the
NSC:
1. During the past three years, CIA (and its predecessors) has systematically
explored the potential intelligence value of the numerous anti-Communist and
6 DA1SO, Alan R. McCracken, Memorandum to Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating and
Planning Staff (ICAPS), "Utilization of Soviet Refugees," 29 March 1948, (C), in DO Records,
-3 Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. This same document is also found in DO Records,
J, Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. McCracken's memo was in response to a request
C_
for comments by C
3, ICAPS chief and CIA's representative to the staff of the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. See Chief, ICAPS, to ADSO, "Utilization
of Refugees from the Soviet Union in US National Interest," 23 March 1948, ER-8618, (C), DO
Records, C_
Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (C)
7 Ibid. (C)
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anti-Soviet groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Contacts have been developed
with the leading groups of the mass of Soviet émigrés, e.g., Ukrainians,
Georgians, Balts and White Russians. Although these contacts were established
primarily for purposes of procuring intelligence on Eastern Europe and the USSR,
sufficient overall information on these groups has been inevitably gathered to
permit a sound evaluation of their possible value to the US Government for the
purpose of propaganda, sabotage and anti-Communist political activity.
2. On the basis of experience and careful analysis CIA has found the following
characteristics in every group in the mass of Soviet émigrés.
a. These groups are highly unstable and undependable, split by personal
rivalries and ideological differences, and primarily concerned with developing a
secure position for themselves in the Western world.
b. They have been completely unable to provide intelligence of real value
since they are rarely able to tap useful sources of information within the USSR,
and generally concentrate on producing highly biased propaganda materials in
place of objective intelligence.
c. They are almost exclusively interested in obtaining maximum support
(usually from the US) for their own propaganda activities and insist upon the
provision of substantial financial, communications, propaganda, movement and
personal assistance in return for vague and unrealistic promises of future service.
d. They immediately capitalize upon any assistance which they receive to
advertise the fact of official (US) support to their colleagues and to other
governments in order to advance their own personal or organizational interests.
e. These groups are a primary target for Soviet MGB and satellite security
agencies for purposes of political control, deception and counterespionage. CIA
has sufficient evidence at this time to indicate that many of these groups have
already been successfully penetrated by Soviet and satellite intelligence agencies.
(S)
Hillenkoetter concluded, "the large mass of these people cannot be effectively
used in time of peace." He added, "in the event of war, on the other hand, the possible
value to the US Government of large numbers of Soviet émigrés would be great. The US
Government would, in a war with the USSR, have a critical need for thousands of these
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émigrés as propaganda personnel, interrogation teams, and sabotage and espionage
operations and administrative personnel." 8 (S)
Hillenkoetter recommended that "there will be no organized utilization by the US
Government of large groups or the ma'ss of Soviet emigres." He did, however, advise that
the State Department screen all refugees from the Soviet orbit and prepare a master index
of names, residences, and occupations. This screening, Hillenkoetter noted, "must
include the object of isolating persons who are suitable for direct use in intelligence
purposes, as distinct from merely furnishing miscellaneous information." 9 (S)

Project ICON (U)

As early as March 1948, Hillenkoetter told James Forrestal, the secretary of
defense, that he preferred to recruit competent individuals within the Soviet Union or
former Russian intelligence officers as agents. 10 Only days after Hillenkoetter made this
statement, he assigned responsibility of investigating the operational utilization of emigre
groups to the Office of Special Operations.11(5)
As a result of SANACC 395, CIA undertook a study of the various émigré groups
in Europe asking for American support to fight Communism. By mid-1948, Zsolt Aradi,
8DCI to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, "Utilization of the Mass of Soviet
Refugees," 19 April 1948, ER-428, (S), in DO Records,
„ Box 498, Folder 9, CIA
ARC. (S)
9Ibid. (S)
10DCI to Secretary of Defense, "Exploitation of Anti-Communist Underground Groups in
Eastern Europe," 25 March 1948, OSO TS-658, (S), WASH-CIA-AD-75. This document has not
been located and information cited here is derived from an index card in CIA History Staff files.
(S)
11 ADSO to Chief, Operations, "Possible Utilization of Soviet Refugees," 30 March 1948, (C), in
DO Records, C.-
, --D, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. This same document is found in DO
Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (C)
Records,

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however, had departed Munich for the United States and C

3

had

transferred to a new assignment in Berlin. A fresh CIA case officer, C:
newly assigned to Munich, was assigned the job of assessing the Ukrainians and other
Eastern European groups under Project ICON.
In his 9 April 1948 report, C

12 (S)

surveyed the existing network of underground

groups in 12 Eastern and Southeastern European countries under Soviet domination.
C JJ called for Project ICON to "support, by clandestine means, ...resistance and
underground groups in Soviet-dominated Europe in their opposition to Communism." He
looked at the current situation, noting that traditional political groups and underground
resistance groups had all but been eradicated by the Soviets in Eastern Europe. The need
for security and control was essential in order for Project ICON to achieve any measure of
success. "Good security," C_ -wrote, "is therefore the first prerequisite to the
utilization of any group. Individuals and leaders of groups selected to implement Plan
ICON will be chosen on the basis of their previously demonstrated ability to conduct
secure operations." 13 (S)
The project called for three phases leading to the employment of the resistance
groups for "direct action" against the Soviets. The first or "initial" phase called for
identifying those individuals and small groups that were already established. The
12 C 7joined CIG in March 1947 after receiving a BA in German and Political Science at
Yale University. An Army veteran of the Mediterranean Theater,
J served briefly in CIC
in mid-1945 along the Austrian-German border. He served with OSO in Vienna, Heidelberg, and
Munich from 1947 until 1950 when he returned to Washin ton. He later returned to West
Germany and also served C _J. He retired in
1970 at the age of 47 after cutbacks in the Deputy Directorate of Plans (DDP) reduced personnel
strength. E

g

13

3

"Plan ICON" Report, 9 April 1948, OSOTS-743, (S), in DO Records, t—
Folder 88, CIA ARC. E Dais° discusses his work on Project ICON report in his 1996
memoirs and addendum. These documents are located at the CIA History Staff. (S)

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"implementation" phase would encourage those same groups to oppose the communist
regimes while inspiring the formation of new resistance organizations. Finally, the
"ultimate" phase would use the "tested underground groups for direct action against
Communist-dominated regimes, Communist Parties, and agencies of the USSR in Eastern
Europe." 14 (5)

A Fresh Look at the Ukrainians (U)

After completing his initial survey,

---lembarked on a larger study to update

Zsolt Aradi's earlier December 1946 report on the Ukrainian nationalists. 15 Drawing on
the files of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in Munich and CIA's own records,
C 3 evaluated the Bandera and Melnik factions of the OUN, the UHVR/ZPUHVR,
and the Ukrainian National Republic (an older emigre group in western Europe) to
determine which organizations met the following criteria:
a. The political platform and political or military leaders of the organization are
demonstrably acceptable to a sizable section of anti-Soviet Ukrainians at home
and in the emigration.
b. The political and ideological program of the group is one which the United
States would not be embarrassed to support.
c. The group has the recognition or approval of some resistance leaders in the
Ukraine and a communication channël to those leaders.

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
d. The support of the groups by the United States could feasibly remain
clandestine and work to the detriment of the present Russian government and its
military potentia1. 16 (S)
To provide him with some firsthand accounts of the Ukrainian nationalist
movement,

-3. reestablished

contact with Ivan Hrinoich in mid-1948. C - D held

ten interviews with ZPUHVR's clerical first vice president and with Michael Korzan, an
early member of the OUN and a member of the Austrian branch of the Anti-Bolshevik
Bloc of Nations (ABN), for Project ICON. 17 Hrinioch, whom ci z had not
contacted since 1947, had been picked up as a source by both CIC Special Agent Camille
S. Hajdu and by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), two different Army
organizations in Munich. 18 Capt. Zoltan Havas of MIS, in the meantime, had already
embarked on discussions with Hrinioch about expanding the ZPUHVR's courier
networks between Germany and UPA operatives in the Ulcraine. 19 Interestingly, Havas
used Dr. Fritz Ant, a former SS officer, as his cutout to Hrinoich. 20 (S)
161bid ., p . 2. (s)

17 1bid., p. 1; Dr. Hrinioch is cited directly in the report while Korzan is referred to as CAPELIN.
(S)
18 A description of C_
contact with Hrinioch is contained in COS, Karlsruhe to Chief,
FBM, "Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 1: The Genesis through 20 January 1949," 16 March
, Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. This
1949, MGM-A-1023, (S), in DO Records, amemo discusses how Hrinioch proved difficult to work with and explains the delays that the CIA
experienced with ZPUHVR. See also Project ICON/Ukraine Report, pp. 19-21. (S)
19 Special Agent Hajdu assumed control of Hrinoich immediately after C
7 dropped him in
1947. By mid-1948, however, the Counter Intelligence Corps had reduced its contacts with
Eastern European dissident groups in West Germany. By February 1949, CIC dropped the
Ukrainian priest from its list of active informants. See COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Project
ANDROGEN Memo No. 1: The Genesis through 20 January 1949," 16 March 1949, MGM-A•3 Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Talks between Hrinoich
1023, (S), in DO Records, C
and Capt. Havas, which started in August 1948, are discussed in Cable, Munich to SO,
Karlsruhe, 13 January 1949, Munich 265, IN 21449, (S), in DO Records, C
L, Box 4,
Folder 23, CIA ARC. Ironically,
OSO's Executive Officer, told the Personnel
Division in September 1947 that "it has been learned from the US Constabulary that Captain
Havas (first name unknown) is being relieved from assignment and sent home. The Constabulary
does not consider him qualified for intelligence activities, and, therefore, Heidelberg has
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Like Aradi two years earlier, C- -3 decidedly favored the ZPUHVR. He
believed that the Foreign Representation had the support of both Ukrainians at home and
in western Germany. According to C

the ZPUHVR's leaders practiced good

security measures, and they also "demonstrated that they are not interested in personal
gain or profit." C 3was also impressed that "ZPUHVR has kept itself morally and
politically uncommitted and uncompromised over a period of three years." 21 (S)

informed this office that Havas's employment by us would create a poor impression.'.
, Executive Officer, Special Operations, Memorandum to Chief, Personnel Division,
'
-3ox 1, Folder 5, CIA
"Captain Havas," 8 September 1947, (C), in DO Records,
ARC. For another report on Havas, see Cable, Heidelberg to Washington, 8 October 1947,
_D Box 9, Folder 220, CIA ARC.
Heidelberg 1867, IN 25139, (S), in DO Records, C
Havas, born in Czechslovakia in 1920, came to the United States in 1937 and joined the US
Army in 1942. He served in the Signal Corps and with Army intelligence following his
commission as an officer in 1943. Havas commanded a MIS unit in Germany and worked
with CIG and CIA in 1947 and 1949; both times, he was considered for employment.
The Agency rejected his application in 1949 based on questions regarding his character,
integrity, and political loyalty. The Army later released him in 1954 following allegations of
black market activities. Havas worked for the New York Times in Paris where he was briefly in
contact a
. For further details, see Zoltan Havas, E
IJ , DO
Records. (S)
20Born in 1912, Fritz Arlt joined the Nazi party in 1932 and served in numerous positions before
the war. He served briefly in the Wehrmacht in 1939 and later in the Waffen SS where he rose to
the rank of Obersturmbannfuhrer. He reportedly handled liaison between the RSHA and
Ukrainian and Vlasov Army representatives. After the war, Arlt worked as an informant for CIC
and later served as a member of the Gehlen Organization. The US Army apparently maintained
its contact with Ant until the late 1960s, and his name came up in conjunction with the Heinz
Felfe investigations of the KGB's penetration of the BND. For further details, see Fritz Arlt, C
DO Records. (S)
21 Project ICON/Austria Report, pp. 14-15. (S)

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efforts, which met only halfhearted approval in Washington, CIA headquarters now
eagerly sought to work with the Ukrainians in Munich. Richard Helms, chief of Foreign
Branch M, cabled Munich on 3 December 1948 to ask Hrinoich and ZPUHVR if the
Ukrainians could provide volunteers for courier missions under American control. The
CIA now wanted to work with the Ukrainians against the Soviets, as opposed to merely
collecting information on the émigré groups. "Best approach these groups. . .," Helms
advised, "probably stating our aim as rendering assistance [to] dissidents rather than
purely intelligence purposes." 22 (S)
Following Helms's directive, a

convinced both Hrinioch and Mykola Lebed

in January 1949 that the United States now planned to cooperate with the ZPUHVR to
send couriers (the so-called APOSTLES) to the Ukraine. By early February, C
cabled Washington with the news that "our relations with ZPUHVR have greatly
accelerated at our initiative. Both Havas and CAPARISON [Hrinoich] agree to turn
complete operational allegiance of ZPUHVR over to MOB [Munich Operations Base]."
C. _3 also informed Headquarters about Ukrainian requests for support and other details
concerning the commencement of operations. 23 (S)
C. gathered as much information as he could about the ZPUHVR's periodic,
but generally unsuccessful, courier missions that had attracted some open press reporting
since 1946. 24 By late March 1949, C 27 submitted a developmental plan for Project
22 Cable, SO to Munich, Karlsruhe, 3 December 1948, Washington 5815, OUT 72439, (S), in DO
Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. (S)
Records, C
23 Cable, Munich to SO, Karlsruhe, 2 February 1949, Munich 292, IN 22867, (S), in DO Records,
, DO Records, CIA ARC. (S)
24 A report concerning the arrival of the Apostles is found in COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM,
"Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 2: How the APOSTLES Came to Germany," 16 March 1949,
MGM-A-1024, (S), in DO Records, C:
2 , Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. See also
Acting Chief, MOB to Chief, FBM, "Personal Record of APOSTLES 1 and 2 (Ops)," 3 May
1949, MGM-A-1136, (S), in DO Records, C
Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)
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ANDROGEN that called for the "accumulation of information on the status of the
Ukrainian underground movement for use as a frame of reference in ascertaining the
various ways in which the existence of this movement could have bearing on the course
of an open conflict between the United States and the USSR." The American case officer
noted that the ZPUHVR activities were not only illegal under US military government
regulations, but that its key figures also had no legal status in Germany. c_

wrote, "if

the courier operation fails and the personnel is simply dropped, no disposal costs are
envisaged." He added, however, that the "evacuation of CAPARISON [Hrinoich],
ANTLER [Lebed], and ACROBAT [Lopatinsky] and their four dependents from Western
Germany may be deemed advisable at a later date whether the initial attempt to develop
this project as a whole is successful or not." 25 (S)
C _7agreed that CIA's base in Munich would provide a number of services for
the Ukrainians, including housing and training for the APOSTLES. The Agency likewise
would replace the funds previously confiscated by the German border police from the
Ukrainian couriers when they entered the country. Perhaps most importantly,

n

agreed that "our organization will endeavor to shorten the distance to be traversed on foot
by the APOSTLES between Munich and their destination." 26 After reviewing previous
missions (only one courier had arrived in Ukraine from Germany since 1946), C.

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
admitted, "transporting the APOSTLES and several radios by air to be dropped by
parachute offers the only solution with good possibilities of success." 27 (S)
• In the first of many demands, the ZPUHVR wanted the CIA to publicize its
resistance efforts as well as to permit several of its leaders, including Hrinoich and Lebed,
to address Ukrainian groups in the United States and Canada. The Ukrainian
organization even asked that CIA assist the ZPUHVR to promote its activities outside of
Germany. 28 (S)
Foreign Branch M's Richard Helms and Harry Rositzke, chief of Foreign Branch
S, submitted a proposal to Col. Robert A. Schow, the new Assistant Director for Special
Operations, on 26 July 1949 seeking approval to exploit the Ukrainian resistance
movement within the Soviet Union. Schow approved the project the same day. 29 At the
same time, the Ukrainian project was redesignated as Project CARTEL (it had been
known as ANDROGEN), utilizing the same personnel. In addition to providing radio and
cipher training to the Ukrainians, unmarked American aircraft would transport the

r

,

27COS Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 1: The Genesis through 20
January 1949," 16 March 1949, MGM-A-1023, (S), in DO Records,
Box 4,
Folder 22, CIA ARC. Donald G. Huefner at FBM in Washington complimented C.. D aid said
that "your progress report on Project ANDROGEN is regarded here as excellent and exactly the
type of report we like to receive on such operations. Prior to the receipt of this memorandum
communications on this project have been almost entirely confined to cable traffic, and although
we have been informed of developments as they occurred, cables do not indicate the time and
effort in such negotiations." Huefner also noted the difficulties in working with ZPUHVR and
said, "it is obvious that in order to obtain the maximum amount of cooperation from such groups
as the UHVR and to minimize the delays such as encountered in your dealings with
CAPARISON, we must be prepared to grant assistance to them which is not primarily associated
with intelligence." Chief, FBM to COS, Karlsruhe, "Project ANDROGEN," 11 April 1949,
, Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. (S)
MGK-W-1879, (S), in DO Records,
(s)
29Chief, FBM and Chief, FBS to ADSO via COPS, "Proposed Air Dispatch of Androgen Agents
into the USSR," 26 July 1949, (S), in DO Records, C , Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC.
(S)
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Ukrainians and their equipment. The American case officer, known simply as "Mister H"
to the Ukrainians, also provided funds to the bankrupt ZPUHVR. 30 (S)

Black Missions (U)

The first CIA-sponsored airdrop into the USSR took place in September 1949
when two Ukrainians landed near Lvov. This mission, coordinated and handled by
sought to establish contact with the UHVR/UPA in the Ulcraine. 31 While this
mission failed because the Soviets quickly rounded up the agents, C

; operation

sparked considerable interest at Headquarters. The Agency moved to expand its
exploitation of the ZPUHVR as well as with other émigré groups in Germany. 32 By
1950, the CIA engaged in joint talks with the British to launch operations into Ukraine;
30 00S, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "CARTEL," 24 June 1949, MGM-A-1312, (S), in DO
—7, Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. (S)
Records,
31 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe (signed by L 21 to Chief, FBM, "Project CARTEL: Operational
Memorandum No. 8. A Synopsis of the HIDER-CARTEL Plane Flight," 16 September 1949,
MGM-A-1584, (S), in DO Records, E
Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Headquarters
response to C 3 report is found in Chief, FDM to Chief of Station, "CARTEL Project," 10
October 1949, MGK-W-3164, (S), in DO Records, C
-3 Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC.
The various CIA-Ukrainian missions are covered extensively in c
_3
32The growth in CIA's interest in Ukrainian operations can be seen in the following documents:
Schow to Wisner, "Exploitation of Ukrainian Nationalist Resistance Organization," 22 December
1949, (S), in DO Records, C
, Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC; J. Bryan LH to Chief,
Programs and Planning Division, OPC, "Use of Ukrainian Partisan Partisan [sic] Movement
Against USSR," 25 January 1950, (S); undated, signed, "Agreement for Joint OSO/OPC
Exploitation of ZPUHVR/UHVR;" undated, unsigned, "Memorandum of Understanding between
OPC and OSO Concerning the Joint Exploitation of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian
Supreme Council of Liberation (ZPUHVR) and the Supreme Council (UHVR);" Project Outline
Clearance Sheet, AERODYNAMIC-PBCRUET, 15 December 1950; and "Summary Joint
OSO/OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, 12 December 1950" with cover sheet,
Schow and Wisner to DCI, "Joint OSO/OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, 4

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the Americans, however, continued to support the ZPUHVR while the British promoted
Bandera's OUN.

33 (S)

The Ukrainian airdrops also formed the basis for expanded CIA illegal border
crossings into the Soviet Union by Foreign Division S, which assumed responsibility for
all OSO operations behind the Iron Curtain in February 1950. The bulk of these missions
were launched from Munich in a project called REDSOX. These operations took agents
to Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and other areas of the Soviet Union. But it was
a project marked by tragedy. According to one CIA official in 1957, "the path of
experience in attempts at the legalization of black infiltrated bodies into the USSR has
been strewn with disaster." At least 75 percent of the 85 CIA agents dispatched under
REDSOX disappeared from sight and failed in their missions. A survey of these agents
reveals that most of these men had recently deserted from the Soviet Army or had
collaborated with the Nazis during the war.

34 (S)

January 1951, all documents located in DO Records,

j Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC.

S)

33 For an example of US-British discussions and agreements about Ukrainian operations, see

M to Chief, FDW, "CIA/State Department Talks with SIS/Foreign Office in London
Beginning Monday, April 23, 1951," 4 May 1951, WELA-5084, (S), both documents in DO
Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. Further accounts of the Anglo-American
Records, C
talks about support for Ukrainian and other Eastern European groups are found in

e

34 For a more complete history of CIA's UDSOX operations. C.
Clandestine Service Historical Series C.
For another perspective, see "Survey of Illegal Border Operations into
Czechoslovakia and Poland from 1948 through 1955," (S), in DO Records,
Box
1, Folder 2, CIA ARC. For "open source" discussions of CIA operations behind the Iron Curtain,
see Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times Books,
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Going to America (U)

After 1953, the CIA no longer supported aerial missions into the Ukraine, but the
Agency's operational relationship with the Ukrainians remained not only the first such
activity, but one of its most resilient. Even before the missions were abandoned, the
Agency brought Mykola Lebed to the United States in 1949 where he became the
president of the Prologue Research Corporation, a CIA proprietary company, three years
later. Prologue (supported by the Agency in a number of projects called
AERODYNAMIC, QRDYNAMIC, and QRPLUMB) was a Ukrainian publishing and
distribution corporation with affiliates in Munich, London, and Paris. It published
Suchanist, a Ukrainian-language monthly political-literary magazine, and other material
for dissemination in Ukraine. 35 The Agency regarded this activity as one of its best
projects with the emigres and it took on a larger role as the CIA abandoned efforts to
infiltrate agents into the Ukraine. The costs were relatively minor C.....

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
the Agency continued to support it until September 1990 when it ended "after 38 years of
successful CA operations." 36 (S)
When he submitted his proposal for Project ANDROGEN in March 1949, t.
the possibility that the United States might have to evacuate the chief
Ukrainian operators from Munich. 37 Only two months later, Lebed (using the alias of
Roman

Turan) with his wife and daughter began processing for immigration to the United

States under the provisions of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act. Munich told Washington
in a cable on 18 May that "subject's face and true name are well known in Germany,
Poland and Western Russia as result of widely advertised police and [Russian] LS. search
for subject in those lands." Because of his blown cover in Europe, his poverty (Lebed
relied upon a "ZPUHVR monthly handout"), and the fact that his presence in Germany

36Lebed served as president of Prologue from 1952 until his retirement in 1979. He then
remained as a part-time consultant for the organization.
, Memorandum for the
Record, "Justice Department's Interest in QRPLUMB/2," 31 October 1991, (S). The cost of CIA
support is found in Chief, SB to CIA Legislative Counsel, 11 April 1967, (S), both documents in
j , DO Records. (S)
Lebed, C..
37COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Androgen Project," 31 March 1949, MGM-A-1059, (S), in
DO Records, C
_3., Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Special Agent Hajdu had already
arranged for the US Army's secret airlift of Lebed and his family from Rome to Munich in
December 1947 because of threats to Lebed's life by the Soviets. Hrinoich had also asked that

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
was not essential to the airdrop mission, Munich base recommended that he move to the
United States under an alias. "Subject does not dare use true name for immigration
purpose [ because he] has had to go into complete hiding several times in Germany
because of threats on life." 38 (S)
Even at this point, knowingly using a false identity during immigration posed
legal issues for the Agency and Lebed himself. "Subject loath to perjure self and face
deportation after arrival as result of passing false info to the US Govt. and therefore wants
our sanction for his immigration under alias," C. =told his superiors. The Agency in
Munich did not anticipate any problems with the background checks being done by the
Army's Counter Intelligence Corps in Bavaria, but it was concerned about immigration
officials in the United States. 39 Headquarters, in the meantime, wanted complete
personal details on Lebed, but allowed the Ukrainian's immigration to proceed. 40 (S)
Shortly after Munich's initial cable to Washington, Navy Capt. Clarence L.
Winecoff, newly appointed CIA Executive, wrote Mr. W.W. Wiggins, CIA's point of
contact at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in June 1949 to inform him about

December 1947, (C). All documents are found in Mykola Lebed, Dossier C 8043982WJ, IRR,
INSCOM. (C)
38 Cable, FBM to SO, 18 May 1949, Munich 472, IN 32012, (S), in DO Records, C.:
Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. For a discussion on the threats to Lebed's life and why the Army
moved him from Italy to Germany, see C J, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 19441948, pp. 54-55. (S)
39 Ibid. The CIC in Germany conducted an investigation of "Roman Turan" prior to Lebed's
immigration to the US as a displaced person. Results of this investigation are found in Lebed,
Dossier C 8043982WJ, IRR, INSCOM. (C)
40Cable, SO to FBM, 26 May 1949, Washington 4214, OUT 82118, (S), 26 May 1949, in DO
., Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. (S)
Records, E._
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the Agency's plans for the Ukrainian resistance leader. Winecoff, in turn, told the INS
that Lebed, using the name of Roman Turan, had submitted paperwork for his departure
from Germany. 41 Winecoff advised that, "for some time, one Mykola Lebed has been
rendering valuable assistance to this Agency in Europe." He added, "the reasons for
using the name Turan are substantial." Repeating much of the same information as in the
Munich cable, Winecoff admitted that Lebed "possesses rather extensive knowledge of
certain CIA operations and is familiar with certain groups with which we are in contact.
Consequently, for his own personal safety and for the security of our operations, it is
essential that he not be picked up [by] any police authorities." In the margin of the
document, Winecoff added that since Lebed had already been using the alias "prior to
entry, his entry under that name would be legal. ”42 (s)
The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed to the CIA's request in July
'and Headquarters told the German Station that "full info on CARTEL 2 given

immigration authorities here and no objection their part to use alias." Headquarters also
stated that Lebed should maintain his cover story and that "our action best protection
[against] fraudulent entry charge and no difficulty anticipated on resumption [of] true
identity upon CARTEL 2 entry [into the] States."'" On 16 September, Munich notified
Washington that Lebed had completed his immigration processing under his alias. Lebed

41 In addition to his alias of Roman Turan, Lebed also had CIA cryptonyms of ANTLER,
CAPARISON 2, and CARTEL 2 during this same time period. (S)
42 Winecoff to Wiggins, 20 June 1949, (S), in Lebed,

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expressed his desire to remain in touch with the Agency upon his arrival at his uncle's
residence in Brooklyn. 44 Lebed sailed from Bremerhaven on the USS General Howze, a
DP transport ship, on 25 September and arrived in New York in early October. 45 (S)

No Better Than OUN Leader Stephen Bandera (U)

After settling in New York, Lebed maintained a low profile but resumed the use
of his real name. The Agency quickly reestablished ties with Lebed and conducted
extensive debriefings about Ukrainian resistance activities and the relationships between
the UHVR and the different Ukrainian émigré groups, particularly Bandera's OUN. 46 At
the end of November 1949, Helms asked the Office of General Counsel to check with US
immigration officials about Lebed's entry status and to make sure that he could use his
own name. 47 The INS rejected Lebed's petition for permanent residence, and he was
informed that he needed to obtain legal counsel in order to revert to his real name. The

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Central Intelligence Agency subsequently asked the INS at the end of January 1950 to
"take such action as may be deemed appropriate in order that subject can file his first
papers under his true name."48 (S)
Lebed's arrival in New York did not go unnoticed within the large Ukrainian
émigré community. He founded the Association of Friends of the Ukrainian Liberation
Struggle, but soon encountered jealousies in New York. In November 1950, a Peter
Jablon (also known as Peter Jary) told the FBI that he considered Lebed a "bandit" who
had committed many assassinations. Lebed, in Jablon's words, was "no better than OUN
leader Stephen Bandera." A New York-based special agent from the FBI subsequently
interviewed Lebed about these allegations in early 1951. Lebed acknowledged that he
had been active in Ukrainian groups in America and that he was currently working on a
book about the Ukrainian resistance movement. Lebed held up his anticommunist
credentials at the same time as he proclaimed Jablon as a "strange man" with numerous
personality inconsistencies. 49 (S)
Word that Lebed's arrival in America did not sit well among various immigrant
factions in New York filtered back to the Washington bureaucracy. In 1951, the Agency
undertook a research project to ascertain Lebed's role in the 1934 assassination of
Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior. Because of his murder conviction in
Poland, Lebed now faced deportation from the United States. On 1 June 1951, c

this action:
...since the subject is known to us for his liberal and
democratic political views and for his work as the legitimate
Foreign Minister of the clandestine anti-Soviet government in the
Ukraine, it is the opinion of FDS that no just grounds exist for his
deportation which would outweigh the serious political
repercussions subsequent to his deportation among the antiSoviet emigration all over the world. 50 (S)
The Immigration and Naturalization Service soon informed the CIA about the
case it planned against Lebed. The charges, as stated in 1951, remain controversial today
and merit full citation:
For over a year several Ukrainian informants have mentioned the
presence in this country of one MYKOLA LEBED. They all
believed he had arrived here as a Displaced Person under an
assumed name, and since his arrival, has been very active in
Ukrainian Nationalistic activities, speaking on numerous
occasions in different cities in the Eastern part of the United
States. Lebed was well known in Ukrainian circles in Europe for
years as one of the most important Bandera terrorists. He is
known as one of the group of Bandera men that assassinated
Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior during 1934.
Lebed and his associates were tried and sentenced to death in
January, 1936. However, it is believed that the death sentence
was later commuted to a prison term. Lebed was in jail in Poland
until the Germans overran that country, when he was either
49 FBI Report, "Mikola Lebed," 2 February 1951, NY File No. 105-1504, (S), in Lebed, C_2 DO Records. (S)
"Acting Chief, FDS to STC, "Mykola Lebed," 1 June 1951, (S) in Lebed,
DO Records. (S)
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released or escaped from jail in the confusion of a German air
raid. Lebed then rejoined the Bandera group and began working
for the Germans in organizing Ukrainian groups to aid the
Germans in fighting the Russians. These Ukrainian groups are
reported as having been trained in a Gestapo school later
furnished with aims and equipment and worked with German
Storm Troopers, suppressing local resistance, to the Germans,
following the withdrawal of the Russian Army. Wholesale
murders of Ukrainians, Polish and Jews usually took place. In all
these actions, Lebed was one of the most important leaders.
During the German occupation of Ukraine, Lebed and his
terroristic group were known as 'Special Defense Service.' Their
activities were directed by the Gestapo. 51 (S)
Four months later, Col. Sheffield Edwards, CIA's Security Officer, told Mr.
Wiggins at the INS that "we are not in possession of any information indicating that he
[Lebed] is engaged in any activities prejudicial to the interests of the United States."
Based on Lebed's own accounts, Col. Edwards rejected allegations that Lebed
participated in the Pieracki assassination. The Agency even reviewed contemporary
Polish newspaper accounts of the trial at the New York Public Library and concluded that
the 1935-36 trial had been tainted for political reasons. Likewise, it also discounted the
labeling of the OUN as "terrorist" because this designation had been employed by the
Soviets as well as other groups with an anti-OUN bent. Similarly, CIA believed that
many of the sources of the allegations against Lebed were "questionable and probably
biased." 52 (S)

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As far as Lebed's wartime activities were concerned, the Agency believed that the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army had "fought with equal zeal against both the Nazis and the
Bolsheviks." The CIA also cited a warrant issued by the Gestapo in October 1941 for
Lebed's arrest as proof of his anti-Nazi activities. The Agency argued that Lebed's role
as Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation, an organization
founded in 1944, placed him in an "influential position to render unique service to the
United States and to this Agency in the furtherance of its intelligence mission." 53 (S)
Despite these assurances, the Immigration and Naturalization Service remained
doubtful about the Ukrainian. While the Service held no deportation hearings in 1951,
the Agency fretted that the INS might refuse to allow Lebed to reenter the United States
in the event that he traveled overseas for operational purposes. Lebed had already
returned once to Germany in 1950 for a short visit and planned to do so again in the near
future. 54 To preclude any problems concerning his status in the United States, CIA again
examined Lebed's past. 55 (S)

53 Ibid. (S)
54 An Affidavit of Identity in lieu of a passport, issued in Washington, D.C., on 17 April 1950
and a pass for the Western Zone is included in Lebed, .0
DO Records. (S)
55 ADPC to DCI, "Mykola Lebed," 28 March 1952, with attachments, (S) in Lebed,
3 DO Records. A copy of the 8 April 1952 Questionnaire with Lebed's 18 May 1952
answers is located in Lebed, C
J, DO Records. This document does not appear to
have been translated from Ukrainian to English until 22 January 1986. The English-version
translation is also located in Lebed's records. The depth of this 1952 background investigation
appears shallow as most of the phrases employed by CIA officials to defend Lebed against the
INS were simply adopted from previous CIA correspondence about him. For another report about
Lebed, see Chief, Contact Division, 0/0 to ADSO, "Information Concerning Anti-Soviet
Ukrainian Resistance," 13 March 1951, (S), in Lebed, C
3, DO Records. (S)
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Inestimable Value (U)

The CIA concluded that Lebed's activities on the behalf of American intelligence

were of such "inestimable value" that the Agency could ill afford to lose him as an asset.
Allen W. Dulles, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, told the Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization on 5 May 1952 that the Agency planned to sponsor
Lebed in the United States under Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949. This act, discussed
later in greater detail, permitted the DCI, with the approval of the INS Commissioner and
the US Attorney General, to admit up to 100 aliens per year for national security reasons
regardless of their eligibility under normal immigration regulations. Dulles furthermore
requested that Lebed's entry date under Section 8 be made retroactive to his initial arrival
in the fall of 1949. 56 (S)
Through the use of this act, the CIA prevented Lebed's deportation. Tireless in
liis efforts on behalf of Ukrainian nationalism, Lebed remained one of the Agency's
oldest contacts until his death in 1998. 57 The CIA's actions in 1949 and again in 1952,

56 DDCI to Argyle R. Mackey, Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization, "Mykola
Lebed," 5 May 1952, (S), in Lebed, L
3 DO Records. (S)
57A 1957 Request for Investigation and Approval shows that Lebed, as a covert associate for
Project AERODYNAMIC, performed the following tasks: "Principal agent in CIA exploitation
of AECASSO WARY 1 [this refers to Hrinoich]; for CE, PP, and Fl purposes. To be used in the
United States, Western Europe, Latin America, and any areas where agent's emigre group can be
profitably exploited. Activities include: Newspaper support; clandestine radio; leaflet campaign;
poison pen letters; sending of letters and printed matter to the Soviet Union; recruitment, training
dispatch, and interrogation of agent playback operations against the Soviets; doubling of
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however, have not stilled nagging suspicions about Lebed, and he remains a controversial
figure to this day. 58 (S)

A Curious Anomaly (U)

couriers; preparation, receipt, and sending of messages via S/W and WIT to and from the USSR."
See Request for Investigation and Approval, 21 June 1957, (S), in Lebed, C._
, DO
Records. As a part of this investigation, Lebed underwent polygraph testing. The examiner noted
that Lebed refused to undergo testing in April 1951 but consented six years later. He found
Lebed "to be frank and truthful in his statements and did not seem to be hiding or attempting to
give misinformation on any specific question asked." Lebed, however, "appeared to more
concerned about his past association with the incident of the assassination of the Polish Minister
than his work and the alleged collaboration with the Nazis during World War II." The examiner
believed that Lebed told "the truth, but that he still has some pertinent information which may be
obtained by further debriefing." Interrogation Research Branch to Chief, Security Support
Division, "S.F. #40828," 13 April 1957, (S), in Lebed, C
i, DO Records: (S)
58 Lebed was one of 12 individuals investigated by the General Accounting Office in its 1985
Report (listed as "Subject D"). This report and the Lebed's subsequent identification drew media
attention, including the Village Voice and The New York Times. For an example of this coverage,
see Ralph Blumenthal, "CIA Accused of Aid to '30's Terrorist," The New York Times, 5
February 1986, p. B-5. In October 1991, the Office of Special Investigations informed the CIA
that it planned to conduct inquiries with foreign governments about Lebed's wartime role. OSI
had previously conducted an interview with Lebed six years earlier. Eli M. Rosenbaum, Principal
Deputy Director, OSI, to Office of General Counsel, 4 October 1991, OGC 91-05243, and
.0
.D :, Memorandum for the Record, "Interrogation of QRPLUMB/2," 16 October
1985, (S), both in Lebed, CL
2 , DO Records. Roman Kupchinslcy, president of
Prologue, in turn, demanded that both the CIA and the GAO apologize to Lebed. See Roman
Kupchinsky, "GAO Report on War Criminals Entering the US," 16 July 1985, in Lebed,C
DO Records. Kupchinslcy believed that the Soviets were behind many of the
accusations leveled against Ukrainian nationalists. See Roman Kupchinslcy, "Nazi War
Criminals: The Role of Soviet Disinformation," in Boshyk, ed., Ukraine During World War II:
History and Its Aftermath, pp. 137-144. The CIA's concerns about exposing Lebed and his
connection to the Agency are found in C.
Chief, Political and Psychological Staff,
Memorandum to DDO, "Department of Justice Investigation of QRPLUMB/2," 6 January 1986,
(S), in Myroslav Prokop,
,, DO Records. Lebed continues to draw public
interest as seen in Ralph Blumenthal, "CIA is Planning to Unlock Many Long-Secret Nazi Files,"
The New York Times, 10 September 1992, p. B-8; and Ralph Blumenthal, "Nazi Hunter Says CIA
has Files on Man Accused of War Crimes," The New York Times, 17 September 1992, p. B10.
(S)
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By the end of the 1940s, the CIA's initial reluctance to use pro-Nazi Germans and
Eastern European collaborators as intelligence sources and, indeed, as operatives had
waned considerably. The wartime roles of many of these individuals and groups became
a negligible factor as the CIA began active operations behind the Iron Curtain. The
Agency downplayed accounts of the brutality of many of the Eastern European émigré
groups and their collaboration with the Nazis. DCI Hillenkoetter, for example,
responding to an inquiry from the chairman of the Displaced Persons Committee in the
spring of 1949 about the status of certain groups, stated:
A curious anomaly has developed since the end of the war.
Several of these organizations (for example, the Melnik and
Bandera groups and the Lithuanian Partisans) sided with the
Germans during the war not on the basis of a pro-German or proFascist orientation, but from a strong anti-Soviet bias. In many
cases their motivation was primarily nationalistic and patriotic
with their espousal of the German cause determined by the
national interests. Since the end of the war, of course, these
opportunistically pro-German groups remain strongly anti-Soviet
and, accordingly, find a common ground with new partners. 59 (S)

Two years later, CIA admitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that
it had hidden Stefan Bandera and other Ukrainians from the Soviets. "Luckily the
[Soviet] attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few farsighted
Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding." Citing the Ukrainian
resistance movement's struggle against the Soviets, the Agency believed that "the main
activities of the OUN in the Ukraine cannot be considered detrimental to the United
59DCI to Ugo Carusi, Chairman, Displaced Persons Commission, 7 April 1949, (C), in DCI
, Box 13, Folder 538, CIA ARC. (C)
Records. c_
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States." The Agency in 1951, at the same time as it defended Mykola Lebed, excused the
illegal activities of OUN's security branch in the name of Cold War necessity:
There are at least twenty former or active members of the SB of
OUN/Bandera in the United States at the present time. Although
the SB is known to have used extra-legal methods while
investigating or interrogating suspected Soviet agents, there have
been few cases to date where it was possible to pin a specific
criminal activity on any individual belonging to the SB and take
court action. Since the SB kept elaborate files and conducted
investigations on Ukrainians and suspected Soviet agents of other
nationalities, no serious attempt has ever been made by American
officials in Germany to disband the SB .. . . Operating
independently, the SB has upon occasion been more of a
headache to American intelligence than a boon. Nevertheless in
war-time a highly nationalistic Ukrainian political group with its
own security service could conceivably be a great asset to the
United States. Alienating such a group could, on the other hand,
have no particular advantage to the United States either now or in
war-time. 60 (S)
In summary, while American intelligence had contact with a number of groups in
Western Europe in the years after World War II, it was not until after 1948 that the
Central Intelligence Agency, still in its infancy, took steps to actually employ these
groups in operations behind the Iron Curtain. The Office of Special Operations drew
upon its Ukrainian contacts not only to fight the cold war in Germany and the Soviet
Union, but brought one of the chief Ukrainian leaders, Mykola Lebed, to the United
States to lead resistance efforts here. At the same time as OSO worked with the

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Ukrainians to penetrate the Iron Curtain, a new CIA organization, albeit a sometime rival,
joined in the struggle against world communism. The formation of the Office of Policy
Coordination in 1948 accelerated the use of Nazis and their collaborators by American
intelligence. (S)

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Could He Not Be Brought to This Country and Used? (U)

The year 1948 marks a milestone in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency.
During the first years after World War II, American intelligence, like the military itself,
was in the throes of demobilization. Uncertainty in the wake of the disbandment of OSS
was compounded by personnel turnover, a lack of funding, and, most importantly,
confusion as to targets and missions. The Strategic Services Unit and the Central
Intelligence Group had both been small, resource-starved organizations while the new
Central Intelligence Agency, established by the National Security Act of 1947, still had to
establish itself as the first civilian intelligence agency in the history of the United States.
Over the next two years, the United States Government reevaluated the role of secret
intelligence. Directives issued by the National Security Council (NSC) transformed the
young CIA into an action-oriented, operationally minded agency. As the Cold War
heated up with the outbreak of fighting in Korea in 1950, the Agency witnessed a
tremendous expansion of agents and operations that broadened its overall thrust of

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foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to the new world of psychological warfare
and covert action. (U)

Covert Operations (U)

NSC 4-A in December 1947 authorized CIA to conduct "covert psychological
operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a
threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the aims and
activities of the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security."1
The National Security Council soon broadened CIA's responsibilities with NSC 10/2 in
June of 1948. 2 Perhaps one of the most important documents in the CIA's history, NSC
10/2 authorized the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) to conduct "covert operations,"
or "activities. . . which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile
foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so
planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to
unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim
any responsibility for them." (U)
NSC10/2 authorized the OPC to handle such covert operations as:

1 A copy of NSC 4-A is found in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1996), pp. 649-51. In response to NSC 4-1, the CIA established a Special Procedures
Group, whose duties were taken over by the Office of Policy Coordination. (U)

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propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action,
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuative
measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance
to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee
liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist
elements in threatened countries of the free world. 3 (U)
Headed by Frank G. Wisner, the State Department official who had recommended

the use of émigrés a few months earlier, OPC had virtual autonomy in the new field of
covert operations. The new office received its guidance from the Departments of Defense
and State, especially from the latter's Policy Planning Staff under George Kennan. 4 (U)

OPC's Rapid Growth (U)

OPC left a deep mark on American intelligence during its brief life (it merged
with the Office of Special Operations in 1952 to form the Clandestine Services of the
Deputy Directorate of Plans, or D/DP). Under NSC 10/2, the Truman Administration
gave Wisner the clear signal to proceed with his plans to utilize émigré groups in Europe.
As he had originally conceived in SANACC 395, Wisner wanted to exploit the

2A copy of NSC 10/2 is found in Sate Department, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
weaknesses in Soviet society by US covert support to resistance groups and by "black"
propaganda. Some of the most notable Cold War legacies—such as Radio Free Europe
(RFE), and the American Committee for Freedom for the Peoples of the USSR (later the
American Committee for Liberation)—all had their genesis under OPC. 5 (U)
OPC underwent rapid growth and transformation. In 1948, for example, Wisner
had some 30-odd personnel in three bases in Germany. Within two years, it had swollen
to 253 personnel in Germany handling 62 various projects and operations, many
associated with German political parties, labor unions, and media outlets. 6 OPC had so
many widespread activities that it called for a budget of nearly Cthat amount, the office planned to spend nearly C._

-Din 1953. Of

I for operations in Eastern

Europe. OPC also funded other psychological warfare missions. The National
Committee for a Free Europe and its radio programming swallowed an additional C.
.3 while OPC wanted to spend another

on the AmComLib. Projected

expenses for paramilitary training, escape and evasion routes, and staybehind networks
amounted to over C-

2t•7 (S)

5 An overall perspective of this period is found in Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who
Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). (S)
6A summary history of OPC's early operations in Germany is found in C

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The veterans of SSU, CIG, and early CIA were amazed, and somewhat dismayed,
by the growth of OPC. While the Office of Special Operations initially concentrated on
exploiting those assets at hand in Germany and slowly built up its knowledge of the
USSR, OPC had broader goals. 8 OPC's rapid expansion caused confusion among US
intelligence agencies in Germany because they competed for many of the same agents and
operations. Gordon M. Stewart, OSO's chief of mission in Karlsruhe, recalled these
heady days:
As a result of Korea [the conflict broke out in 1950] we
found ourselves in the midst of a large military buildup and the
hectic expansion of CIA's activities. Europe got more men and
arms than the Far East; CIA's staff in Germany increased several
fold. One cold war project was piled on top of another, agents
were recruited by the hundreds. Any project which would
contribute to the slowdown or harassment of invading Soviet or
satellite forces got a hearing. The effect on CIA was too much
money and too many people. By mid-1952 the nature of our
organization had been radically changed and we were up to our
hips in trouble. 9 (U)
Frank Wisner's belief that Russian and other emigre groups could contribute to
the defeat of Soviet communism added to the CIA's own organizational transformation
and operational uncertainties. While expanding CIA's contact with the émigré groups in

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Europe, Wisner also turned to European "experts" on the USSR to gain intelligence on
the Soviets. 10 (S)

Psychological Fission (U)

The German experience in the Soviet Union during World War II intrigued the
Office of Policy Coordination. Frank Wisner, in particular, sought to learn the lessons of
the German defeat in the East—a defeat that he felt was due in large measure to Nazi
failure to capitalize on the anticommunist sentiment of the Russian people. Reviewing
the Nazi experience on the Eastern Front, Wisner felt that the United States "should stop
thinking of the Soviet Union as a monolithic nation and investigate the internal strains."
He advocated the use of consultants, in some cases Americans and others of foreign
backgrounds, who had firsthand knowledge of the Soviet Union, its peoples, and political
system. 11 (S)
For political insight, OPC drew upon the services of Gustav Hilger, a Russianborn German, who had served with the German Foreign Ministry in the Soviet capital.
OPC also employed Nicholas Poppe, a Russian social scientist, who possessed an

10According to a 7 September 1949 memorandum from Robert P. Joyce to George F. Kennan,
"OPC was advised to undertake plans and preliminary operations looking forward to the
organization of the Russian non-returnees and DPs presently in US Zone of Occupation in
Germany and Austria." As early as January of that year, Kennan told Wisner that "as the
international situation develops, every day makes more evident the importance of the role which
will have to be played by covert operations if our national interests are to be adequately
protected." See Joyce to Kennan, 7 September 1949, TS 41303, (S), in CIA History Staff
Records, HS/CSG-761,C.,
., Box 5, CIA ARC; and Kennan to Wisner, 6 January
1949, TS 29143, (S), in CIA History Staff Records, HS/CSG-759,
Box 5, CIA
ARC. (S)
11 See Wisner to Offie et al, ". C.
Hilger, L
DO Records. (S)

_3; Proposal," 30 April 1949, (S), in Gustav

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encyclopedic knowledge of the various nationality groups in the USSR. Both men had
worked in the Soviet Union and, as it turned out, both Hilger and Poppe played leading
roles in Nazi Germany. American diplomats, in fact, valued Hilger's expertise even
before the war. His capture by American forces after Germany's collapse was seen as
fortuitous. While Poppe had more esoteric value to American intelligence, the
combination of Frank Wisner's interest in the "psychological fission" of the Soviet Union
and the mandate of NSC 10/2 impelled OPC to exploit both men. (5)
The Agency's use of Hilger and Poppe reveals the extent to which the OPC
appropriated German wartime expertise for its own purposes. Just as the Agency had
expressed reluctance to become involved with the Ukrainians, CIA officials initially
rejected the use of foreign experts. The Agency's reluctance, however, withered in the
face of the growing need to prepare for war with the Soviet Union. In the end, CIA
became deeply involved with both Hilger and Poppe. (S)

A Fabulous Scholar (U)

Nicholas Poppe first came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Group in
August 1946 when Richard N. Frye, a former OSS officer and a Harvard University
professor, informed Stephen Penrose, Jr., a senior OSO official in Washington, that he
planned to visit "a fabulous scholar" now in hiding in the British zone of Germany.12
12 "209" to Stewart, "Visit of Mr. Richard N. Frye," 26 August 1946, L-003-826, (S), in DO
, Box 2, Folder 21, CIA ARC. Born in Alabama in 1920, Frye received
Records. a
his AB from the University of Illinois in 1939 and a master's from Harvard the next year. He
served during the war in the Near East section of R&A and completed his Ph.D. at Harvard in
1946. A specialist in Iranian history and culture, Frye was a visiting professor overseas and a
Harvard University professor with numerous books and articles to his credit. Stephen Penrose
was a specialist on the Middle East with OSS,
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Following a meeting with Poppe, both Frye and Henry Hecksher "were quite impressed
with his abilities," according to Gordon Stewart in early 1947. 13 As it turned out, the
Soviets also knew that Poppe was hiding in western Germany, and they requested his
arrest in a memorandum to Lt. Gen. Clay in November 1946. Colonel General P. A.
Kurochkin, the deputy commander of the Soviet Military Administration, noted that
Poppe "took an active part in betraying Soviet citizens who participated in the fight
against the German-Fascist invaders in the occupied Soviet territory." The Soviet officer
added, "it was established that N.N. Poppe was an active agent of the Gestapo and
personally cooperated with members of the Gestapo in the interrogation, often attended
by cruel beating, of arrested Soviet citizens." 14 (U)
After a preliminary investigation, Maj. Gen. Frank A. Keating, the Assistant
Deputy Military Governor, reported back to his Soviet counterpart that American officials
had been unable to locate Poppe, but promised that the search would continue. 15 In fact,
the German Mission sent C

0 to northern Germany to locate Poppe while

the Army's CIC searched for him in the American zone. C. 3 did not find Poppe in
the British zone, but did meet with his son. Gordon Stewart, the chief of the Intelligence
Branch, told Richard Helms in Washington that "in view of the fact that the British are

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either attempting to hide him or intend to debrief him and then turn him back, we have
decided to drop the whole matter." 16 (S)
Frye, however, was not willing to let matters drop. In April 1947, he traveled to
Washington after his return from another trip to Europe, and spoke with Col. Robert
McDowell at Army G-2 about the Russian. Frye expressed his frustration that CIG had
not taken steps to protect Poppe, but offered the hope that Army intelligence would be
interested in this "gold mine of information re Soviet Asia & relations with Japan &
China."

sent a reply to Frye explaining that CIG, in fact, tried to contact Poppe.

Given the British interest in Poppe's case,

_3 concurred with the field's

recommendation that it was best to let things pass. He was, however, willing to try to
contact Poppe again if CIG could ascertain his location in Germany. 17 (S)
Following up on his correspondence to Frye, C j cabled to Heidelberg asking
that Hecksher take another look at Poppe to determine his usefulness to American
intelligence. 18 In the meantime, Frye expressed his frustration at the US Government's
inability to protect Poppe, complaining that Poppe was still waiting for assistance.
"Frankly," Frye told C

3 "I am more sorry than angry at the way things have not

developed. It is the same old story of lack of authority, or lack of initiative, or lack of
desire to take responsibility. As I told you before, I & Henry H. who went with me to
interview him, are convinced the man is a mine of information, rather —more important—
knowledge. C.I.C. shouldn't be able to turn him back to the cousins, because he is an
16 Stewart to Helms, "Nokolai N. Poppe," 22 January 1947, MGH-003-122, XARZ-29325, (S),
enclosing
TJ to Chief, Intelligence Branch, "Poppe, [Nikolai]," 15 January
3 , Box 3, Folder 20, CIA ARC. (S)
1947, (S), in DO Records, Z.
17 C
]to Frye, 30 April 1947, in response to Frye to C __J22 April 1947, XARZ-29326,
in DO Records,
Box 3, Folder 25, CIA ARC. (U)

University if CIG would facilitate his immigration to the United States. "In such a case
your people, who seem to fear taking responsibility on a possible 'gold brick,' would be
soothed & could use his services, as he is most willing." 19 (S)
Later in May 1947, Frye wrote another member of CIG for assistance. "The
problem is Nikolai Nikolaievitch Poppe, a friend, and the greatest living authority on
Soviet Siberia and Outer Mongolia," Fyre explained. According to Frye, Poppe was
"born in Shanghai in 1897, speaks twelve languages, prof. in the University of Leningrad
1923-28, and Moscow 1930-41. The two years in between mark the time when he was in
Outer Mongolia organizing proper USSR-Mongol relations. He has done the same for
Chinese Turkestan, and has lived in various cities of Asiatic Russia." 20 Frye glossed over
Poppe's wartime activities, noting only that he "joined the Germans, returned to Germany
and his friends." Now living as a displaced person in the British Zone, Frye appealed,
"could he not be brought to this country and used?" In Frye's opinion, Poppe "is of
importance to our gov't, and also to the scholarly world," and he pleaded "that such a
person not be allowed to perish, but to serve a function." 21 (S)
Frye's efforts sparked yet another round of talks within the Central Intelligence
Group as to Poppe's usefulness for American intelligence. The German Mission reported
in early June that it could not assess Poppe's value to American intelligence because of
his "peculiar background." The field stated that it could arrange his interrogation at
Oberursel, if Headquarters desired, but felt that Poppe "would be far greater value in
19Frye to C-
415 May 1947, XARZ-29325, in DO Records, C
20, CIA ARC. (S)

Box 3, Folder

20Frye to r.
(S)

, DO Records.

21 Ibid. (S)

28 May 1947, (S), in Nicholas Poppe, C

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DRAFT WORKING PAPER
US" 22 Headquarters, in turn, asked Heidelberg to consult with the British about Poppe.23
Richard Helms, FBM's chief, reported British sentiments to Col. Galloway, the Assistant
Director of Special Operations, in August 1947. "There has been considerable
investigation of the Poppe case dating back some months. He lives in the British Zone of
Germany, the British know all about him, and would, in fact, be glad to get rid of him
because of his nuisance value." 24 Despite Poppe's credentials, Helms maintained "we
can see no compelling reason to go to all the trouble of getting him to the United States.
It is granted that he is a Far Eastern scholar of distinction, but, aside from his
background," Helms added, "he has little present or future usefulness to a secret
intelligence organization." Helms commented that if Frye "wants the man to come to this
country so badly. . . . he should have him apply as any other DP would apply, then do
what he can to get the State Department to grant a visa." Col. Galloway agreed with
Helms's assessment. 25 (S)
Two months later, the British requested that the US Army take control of Poppe.
Helms reiterated, "Poppe has no operational interest to OSO" and cut right to the heart of
the matter: "Does the United States Army or CIA desire as a courtesy to the British to
dispose of Poppe? If it is decided that this courtesy be afforded the British, the decision
will involve as a corollary necessary arrangements to bring Poppe to the United States."26
22Cable, Heidelberg to Special Operations, 3 June 1947, Heidelberg 912, In 15664, (S), in DO
3 Box 4, Folder 28, CIA ARC. (S)
Records,
23 Cable, Special Operations to Heidelberg, 5 June 1947, Washington 2947, OUT 2947, (S), in
Box 4, Folder 28, CIA ARC. (S)
DO Records,

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The Agency agreed to take Poppe from the British after mid-October 1947, although the
actual transfer itself did not occur until May 1948. (S)
Poppe arrived in the American Zone at the instigation of Carmel Offie, a State
Department official assigned to the Office of the US Political Adviser in Germany
(POLAD). 27 In an operation known as FATHER CHRISTMAS, Poppe moved from the
British Zone and met Offie at a Frankfurt office of the Counter Intelligence Corps on 12
May 1948. A member of OSO, who attended the meeting observed, "Offie said he had
come specifically from Washington to deal with his case among other specific problems."
Interestingly, Offie told Poppe that "State Department permission would not [original
emphasis] be necessary for Poppe to immigrate and that it could be arranged through
him. ,, 28 (5)
Following the interview in Germany, Offie returned to Washington and called on
Larence R. Houston, CIA's General Counsel. After Offie urgently asked Warner to
arrange for Poppe's transfer to the United States, Warner discussed the case with Frank
Wisner. OPC later asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Intelligence Objectives
Agency to expedite Poppe's immigration. 29 By January 1949, Poppe had received a CIA

27 Born in 1909 in Pennsylvania, the son of Italian immigrants, Carmel Offie was a colorful, if
not unusual CIA officer. He joined the State Department in 1931 as a clerk and rose through the
ranks after his assignment to US Embassy in Moscow. Outgoing, fluent in several foreign
languages, Offie made quick friends in high society circles. He joined OPC in 1949, but served
only briefly when he resigned in May 1950. By this time, Congressional investigators and the
FBI had pinned Offie as a homosexual. Charges of corruption and other scandalous affairs
hounded Offie until his death in a plane crash in Paris in 1972. C
See also various entries on Carmel
Office in Hersh, The Old Boys. (U)
28.
Special Operations Section to ADSO, "Poppe Nikolaus - Operation "Father
Christmas," 13 May 1948, (S), in Poppe, C

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
pseudonym, Stewart G. Waite, while he waited at the European Command Interrogation
Center for the Agency to complete its investigation. In the meantime, Wisner approved
Offie's proposal to employ Poppe. 30 (S)

Is Justice a Janus-Faced Being? (U)

Not until mid-February 1949, however, did the chief of station in Karlsruhe
transmit to Washington copies of the British reports of Poppe's interrogation in 1946.31
These reports discussed Poppe's anticommunist activities and his work with the Nazis
after the German occupation of the Caucasus in mid-1942. Poppe admitted that he had
worked for the Germans as a translator, and claimed to have saved the "Mountain Jews"
from German retribution prior to the retreat of Nazi forces from the region. He went from
there to Berlin as a researcher on Soviet matters at the RSHA's Wannsee-Institut, and
later worked at the German Ost-Asien Institut in Czechoslovakia. While Poppe tried to
make his work with the Germans seem harmless, both institutes in reality conducted
research on the "Jewish problem" in order to perfect the Nazi killing machines. 32 (S)
While in British hands, Poppe bemoaned his fate and said, "but I am called a
traitor, a war criminal and I am refused in any country not only as specialist on my

30Wisner to Chief, Special Funds Division, OSO, "OPC Project JITNEY-JIBOA 1-E-4," with
3 , DO Records. Originally proposed as Project
funding for $3750 in Poppe,C
EARTHQUAKE in December 1948, Project JITNEY sought to prepare and implement plans for
the training, equipping, and use of guerrilla warfare units as a part of a larger underground
movement. (S)
31 British reports on Poppe were sent from Germany to Headquarters in Chief of Station,
Karlsruhe to Chief, SPG, "Nikolas Poppe," 11 February 1949, MGK-A-6169, (S), in Poppe, C
, DO Records. (S)
32 See "Interrogation Report on Professor Nicholas Poppe," 11 November 1946, PF20541, (S),
DO Records. (S)
Enclosure 4 to above-cited document in Poppe, C
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scientific subjects but even as teacher on other subjects familiar to me. I must live in
hiding as if I were an escaped criminal. Is there any justice, I mean human justice."
Comparing his situation with the Bolshevik revolutionaries of World War I, Poppe said,
"why people who had plotted against the lives of the Czars and their Ministers were
allowed to live openly in Switzerland and in other countries? Or are there two justices,
one concerning murderers of the Czars and another concerning fugitives from Russia? Is
justice a Janus-faced being?" The British generally accepted Poppe's melodramatic
presentation and concluded that while he worked for the RSHA, he was simply a traitor
and not a war criminal. 33 (S)
Despite this admission, neither the British nor the Americans returned Poppe to
Soviet hands. The fact that the Soviets wanted Poppe made him an even greater asset for
OPC as it scoured Europe for Soviet experts. Bringing Poppe to the United States,
however, proved to be a slow process and one that tested Offie's patience. He
complained bitterly to C.

L, CIA's acting Executive Director, in April 1949

about the length of time that the Agency took to process Poppe's immigration. 34 (S)
Offie's complaint apparently hastened the procedure because Poppe arrived on a
US Air Force transport at Westover Field, Massachusetts, on 16 May 1949. Entering the
United States as a displaced person under the sponsorship of John Davies of the State
Department's Policy Planning Staff, Poppe immediately went to Washington, to learn that
he would earn $500 a month as a consultant to OPC. 35 Within weeks, Poppe (who also
was referred to in official correspondence as Karl H. Bergstrom or "Professor"
33 Ibid. (S)
34Carmel Offie to C
,n DO Records. (S)

3 "Nikolai Poppe," 11 April 1949, (S), in Poppe, C.:

35Poppe worked as a consultant for OPC under Project QKJIBOA. This project was solely
dedicated as a research project for Poppe and was canceled on 20 February 1950. (S)
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Bergstrom), began producing reports, such as "Ethnic and Religious Frictions in Chinese
Central Asia" and "Broadcasting to Asiatic Peoples in the USSR in their Native
Languages," for American intelligence. 36 Poppe's case officer in June also desired
information about "Soviet mass desertions in the summer of 1941 and the welcome by
peasants and townspeople of the Germans as liberators." 37 (S)

Handled on a Classified Basis (U)

Poppe's arrival in 1949 complemented the studies being written by Gustav Hilger,
perhaps OPC's most prized Soviet expert. While Poppe fell out of Offie's favor later that
year and left to take up a teaching position at the University of Washington, Hilger's star
shone bright at both OPC and the State Department. 38 Hilger had a notable career in the
36Poppe resumed his real identity in June 1949 after his identity papers had been retrieved from
INS. He had surrendered all of his documentation when he arrived at Westover Field. Copies of
Poppe's reports are found in his 201 file. Robert P. Joyce told Carmel Offie on 8 June 1949 that
"it appears obvious that the fruits of the good professor should be made available not only to key
persons in Dept. of State, but also to key posts in the field." (S)
37 C
"Soviet Desertions," 21 June 1949, (S), in Poppe, C
-3[to. C
.3. DO Records. (S)
38 Poppe accepted a teaching position despite OPC's overall reservations in 1949. By this point,
OPC had learned that "Offie had revised his opinion of Poppe and thought that he had a low
potential." Despite this change in attitude, Poppe continued to act as a consultant for CIA on
other projects even after he departed Washington and provided reports until 1973. There was
some confusion in 1950 as to OPC's commitment to Poppe to bring his two sons to the United
States from Great Britain. See "The Poppe Case: Terms of Employment," in Poppe
DO Records. The GAO reviewed Poppe's case during its second investigation and he
is listed as "Subject E" in the 1985 GAO report. OSI also reviewed the CIA's holdings on Poppe
in 1984 and 1985. One CIA official resented the fact that OSI obtained its lead on Poppe from
the Soviet Embassy. While OSI had access to CIA files, this official wrote, "a review of the file
[Poppe's 201 file] makes clear that this is just Soviet vengeance against a man who is in essence
a defector, not a war criminal. I don't quite see why this agency should be forced to open its files
to DOJ/OSI fishing expeditions every time the Soviets pass on a new name." For notes made by
GAO investigators on Poppe from CIA records, see DO Records, C., 13 Box 3, Folder
49, CIA ARC. For DO and OSI correspondence on Poppe, including C_
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German Foreign Ministry, serving in the German embassy in Moscow and later as
personal secretary to Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany's Foreign Minister (who was
convicted of war crimes and executed at Nuremberg). During the war, Hilger helped to
bring Soviet defectors into the German ranks and organized the Vlasov Army. His
firsthand experience with both Soviet officials and anticommunist groups was
considerable; a fact quickly recognized by both the Americans and the Russians. (S)
Hilger surrendered to the Americans in the spring of 1945 and underwent
extensive debriefings in the United States about his knowledge of the Soviets. 39 He even
produced a study, "Diplomatic and Economic Relations between Germany and the USSR,
1922 to 1941," for the Department of State. 40 Upon his return to Germany, Hilger
worked as the chief of the political section in the evaluation side of the nascent West
German intelligence service. 41 While working for the Gehlen Organization, the US
Army facilitated the escape of Hilger's wife, daughter, and two grandchildren from Soviet
hands and brought them to the American sector in Berlin. Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., the
US Army officer responsible for the Gehlen Organization, supervised the removal of
Hilger's family and commented that "the Russians have a great interest in the people we
are attempting to evacuate in this case and therefore it is urgently requested that they be

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
afforded adequate protection against any type of harm or kidnapping from that quarter."42
(S)
Huger 's reputation and his reports on the Soviet Union stirred interest at OPC as
well as the State Department. Both organizations wanted to bring Hilger to the United
States. Indeed, George Kerman at State arranged for Hilger and his family to travel to
America using an Office of the Military Government of Germany (OMGUS) Temporary
Travel Document on 18 October 1948. Hilger and his wife also possessed nonimmigrant
visas issued by the US Consul in Germany. Lawrence Houston, CIA's General Counsel,
asked the INS that Hilger's "examination at the port of entry be waived, and that the case
be handled on a classified basis."43 Hilger and his wife remained in the United States
and received extensions to their Military Government permits through May 1951. At the
same time, the State Department explored ways to legalize the status of the Hilger family
as Russian immigrants—both Hilger and his wife had been born in Russia, although they
were German citizen 's." (S)

The Agency soon established Hilger at its headquarters in Washington. By April
1949, he had produced 16 reports on topics ranging from "Strategy and Tactics of
Bolshevism" to "The Ukrainian Problem as it Showed up in the War between Germany
and the Soviet Union (1941-1945)." In the latter report, Hilger described Germany's
failure to take advantage of Ukraine's situation during the war and some of the resultant
difficulties. In light of the overall weakness of Ukrainian nationalism in the face of
Soviet repression, Hilger felt that there was little hope for the Ukrainians to confront the
Soviets. In the event of wax, the Ukrainians, in Hilger's opinion, could be expected to
support Russia's adversary if that country could "guarantee the Ukrainians the abolition
of collectivization and a raising of their standard of living."45
Hilger's access to raw as well as finished intelligence products did not sit well
with officials within the CIA. OPC's Executive Officer, r-

-Dt, who had

returned to Washington from his assignment as the deputy chief of the German Mission,
requested in November 1948 that the Agency's Inspection and Security branch conduct a
"covert" investigation of Hilger after his arrival in the country. 46 Col. Sheffield Edwards,
.11\.'s Security Officer, in fact, refused to extend Hilger's clearance a year later. 47 (S)

, Acting DADPC, to C.
45 For a list of Hilger's reports, see G
-0
Office of Operations, "Reports by Dr. Hilger," 26 April 1949, (S), in DO Records, C
.2 Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. Copies of some of these reports are located in Folder 2 of
•this same job. Hilger's report on the "Ukrainian Problem" has been declassified and is located in
the Records of the National Security Council at the Harry S. Truman Library. (S)
44
_7 to a
__J , Inspection and Security Branch, "Dr. Gustav
Hilger," 4 November 1948, (S), in GAO Notes, Hilger file. (S)
47:C
D., Acting Chief, Special Staff, to Chief of Programs and Planning,
"Clearance of Gustav Hilger," 20 October 1949, (S), in Hilger, C
(S)

18
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DO Records.

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Tensions developed between OSO and OPC regarding Hilger's use of classified
material. In September 1949, nearly a year after Hilger's arrival, Frank Wisner appealed
to the DCI to permit Hilger "access to certain categories of classified information which
is needed for Dr. Hilger to perform his job." Wisner warned Adm. Hillenkoetter that "we
will have to dispense Dr. Hilger's assistance if information can not be accessible to him
to perform his valuable task." 48 By this point, OPC had hired Hilger for a yearly salary
of $8000. 49 OSO, however, did not want Hilger to use raw intelligence, especially the
intelligence reports from the Gehlen Organization. 50 (S)
The situation appeared to have been resolved by late 1949, when ADSO Robert A.
Schow, insisted that "no OSO information, or OSO-developed information, be made
available to Hilger without the specific concurrence of this office." 51 Wisner agreed to
Schow's request and noted, "it is proposed that he [Hilger] shall instead receive certain
finished intelligence reports, studies, periodicals, and summaries with a classification of
no higher than Secret." 52 By January 1950, the Inspection and Security Branch reached a

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
similar agreement with OPC about Hilger's presence in government buildings and his
access to classified materia1. 53 After a polygraph interview, a CIA security officer noted,
"Hilger's account of his dealings with people, countries visited, and time was such that he
accounted for all periods of time and his actions satisfactorily." Security also approved
Hilger because "there was no evidence of past activities, future intentions, and or,
connection with the Communists or Bonn government in the form of deception on the
polygraph test."54 (S)

Taking Stock (U)

OPC soon found itself running out of work for Hilger. 55 C
chief of OPC's Programs and Planning Division, told

, acting
, the deputy chief of

Staff I, in February that "Hilger has been with us for relatively a long time. He has
produced, I believe, a few very excellent papers but in the main I believe that he has been
busily engaged in the production of his memoirs." "I have not been convinced," C.__
lamented, "as to Hilger's precise, positive value to us at this time." C —3 wanted Hilger
to produce more research to determine whether to retain him or not. 56 (S)

Concerning Hilger's overall usefulness, C -was "convinced" that:
a. Hilger is a definite asset.
b. We will seldom get from him precise answers to precise questions. We can,
however, profit greatly from his evolutionary thought.
c. He can only be exploited by mature and intelligent persons.
d. His problem has three aspects: administrative, security, and exploitation. (S)
Consequently, c 3 recommended that Hilger be handled by "an extremely high
caliber person," and he suggested C

of the Office of Reports and

Estimates. 57 In an effort to boost Hilger's value to OPC,E Jalso arranged to have him
hold biweekly briefings at a conference room in Building K after May 1950. Hilger could
then speak for 25 minutes on "the implications of current events from the viewpoint of
Soviet policy," and answer questions for another 30 minutes. Even these presentations,
however, faced limitations for security reasons. 58 (S)
With the opening of the war in Korea, Hilger's value jumped as both OPC and the
State Department sought his views on matters pertaining to the Soviet Union. In one
case, Hilger informed Frank Wisner in July 1950 that he expected the next Soviet
aggressive move to take place in Iran, although he did not foresee an imminent conflict.59
57

59Unsigned, Memorandum to Chief, EE, "Certain Remarks by Karl H. Bergstrom and Arthur T.
Latter on the Korean and World Situations," 20 July 1950, (S), in Hilger, C_
, DO

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In a meeting with George Kennan in November 1950, Wisner raised the subject of
Hilger's usefulness. Kerman, who had known Hilger in Moscow before the war, told
Wisner that he believed the German to be an "honorable and decent individual." 60 As a
result of this discussion, Wisner nominated Hilger for the new Office of National
Estimates. 61 C-

_D ,

chief of EE-4, seconded this proposal; in part,

because "actually we have exhausted most all the topics on which Dr. Hilger is an
authority over the past year and a half." 62 (S)
Wisner also took steps to legalize Hilger's presence in the United States. He
wanted the DCI, in conjunction with the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the
INS, to approve Hilger's admission to the country under Section 8 of the CIA Act of
1949. 63 The General Counsel's office recalled that the CIA had once deemed it
"incompatible" for Hilger to seek permanent residency because he planned to return to
Germany upon the restoration of civilian government. 64 DCI Walter Bedell Smith in
May 1951 authorized Hilger and his wife to remain in the United States. Smith asked

Records. The State Department sought Hilger's views on Stalin's comments on capitalist
encirclement and the prosecution of revolution. See John Davies, Jr., to Mr. Joyce, "Hilger,
DO Records. See also C
Gustav," 3 August 1950, (S), in Hilger, C
2 , Chief, EE to ADPC, "Arthur T. Latter," 6 July 1950, (S), in DO Records, Job 7801094R, Box 2, Folder 12, CIA ARC. (S)
60Unsigned, Memorandum for the Record, "Conversation with Mr. Kennan re: Panel of
Consultants for National Estimates," 14 November 1950, (S), in Hilger, C
J
Records. (S)

DO

61 Wisner to Dr. William L. Langer, Assistant Director of National Estimates, "Subject Who
May Be of Interest to Dr. William Langer," 13 December 1950, (S), in Hilger,
DO Records. (S)
62 , c
, Chief, EE-4, to Chief, EE, "Utilization of Dr. Hilger,"18 December
1950, (S), in Hilger,

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization present the CIA's application
to the Attorney Genera1. 65 In less than four months, the INS notified the Agency that
Hilger and his wife were now permanent residents as of the date of their initial arrival at
Westover Field in 1948. 66 (S)
Despite this new status, Hilger and his wife left the United States in late 1953
after the new West German Government offered him a substantial pension if he returned
to work as an adviser for Soviet affairs. 67 According to one official, Hilger (under the
pseudonym of Arthur T. Latter) "is leaving the US with great reluctance, since he has
made many friends here and has enjoyed living here. He is also extremely grateful to
KUBARK [CIA] for having looked after him so well for the last five years. He is willing
and anxious to continue a liaison contact in Bonn after his return." 68 Hilger, indeed,
maintained a steady relationship with American intelligence until his death in 1965. 69 (S)
65 Co1. Sheffield Edwards, CIA Security Officer, to the DCI, "Gustav Hilger and Wife, Marie
Hilger," 3 May 1951, (S); and DCI to Argyle R. Mackey, Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization, "Gustav Hilger and Wife, Marie Hilger," 4 May 1951, JL-567, (S), both
documents in Hilger,
66 Peyton Ford, Deputy Attorney General to the DCI, 23 August 1951, granting admittance to
Hilger and his wife under Section 8; and W.F. Kelly, Assistant Commissioner, Enforcement
Oi vision, to DCI, 30 August 1951, noting that the INS had backdated Hilger's admission for
permanent residency to 18 October 1948, See GAO Notes, Hilger file. (S)
67Peer de Silva for
.
1953, (C), in DO Records, a

68chief, EE, to Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, "Arthur T. Latter," undated [probably 1953], EGQJ, DO Records. (S)
W-11845, (S), in Hilger,
69Hilger's presence in America later attracted some attention. The Jewish War Veterans of the
USA, for example, protested to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in 1963 about Hilger's
work for the Federal government. Col. Edwards responded to the Department of Justice and
stated that Hilger "was not an employee nor a consultant of CIA at this time." As the Attorney
General's Office knew, the CIA and the State Department had used Hilger "because of his wealth
of information concerning the USSR." See Morton L. London, National Commander, Jewish
War Veterans of the USA, to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, 23 January 1963, in Hilger,
,j), DO Records, and Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security to J. Walter
Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, "Gustav Hilger in Reference to
23
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The fact that the Office of Policy Coordination wanted Nicholas Poppe and
Gustav Hilger as consultants and brought them to the United States for permanent
residence is a significant step. It indicated that American intelligence had expanded its
idea of what constituted insightful perspectives on the Soviet Union. German diplomats
and Russian social scientists with Nazi records, in addition to German wartime
intelligence officers and agents, were now regarded as valuable assets in the struggle
against the Soviet Union. While the use of Poppe and Hilger turned out to be rather
benign, OPC had other, more sinister plans to develop "secret armies" by utilizing émigré
groups. Inevitably, these plans brought Wisner's OPC into greater contact with other
collaborators of the Third Reich. (C)

Jewish Veterans of USA," 4 February 1963, (S), in GAO Notes, Hilger file. In August 1979, OSI
requested information on the present residence of Hilger and his family from the CIA. After a
search of various Agency components, the Agency reported no information as to where Hilger
lived after he left the United States. See Jeffrey N. Mausner, Trial Attorney, OSI to C
, OGC, "Gustav Hilger," 20 July 1979, (C), and C J to various components, "Nazi War
Criminal Investigations—Gustav Hilger, aka Gus Hilger," 8 August 1979, OGC 79-07323, (C), in
OGC Records, C.- ,
, Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. Interestingly, responses from most
CIA offices, including the Office of Security, claimed no information at all on Hilger. The DO
simply reported no information about the current whereabouts of Hilger and his family. E.
Chief, Operations Group to
Chief, FPL Group, "Nazi War
Criminals Investi gation—Gustav Hilger, aka Gus Hilger," 30 August 1979, EIRS-0372/79, (S), in
DO Records, C.
3, Box 1, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)
24
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The National Security Council's charter granted the Office of Policy Coordination
considerable leeway to support anticommunist groups. 1 OPC's expansion brought it into
contact with thousands of men and women throughout Europe. In particular, OPC's
interest in black propaganda, paramilitary groups, and staybehind forces in the event of a
third world war drove it to seek out Europeans with anticommunist credentials. If these
same individuals also had military experience combined with knowledge of Eastern or
Southeastern European geography, language, and culture, so much the better. Many of
the people that OPC desired shared another common link: their anticommunism had led
them to support the Nazis during the war. (U)

The C. -3 Study (U)

By 1948, the Russian groups in Germany, from both the "old" and "new"
emigration (that is those who fled after the Bolshevik Revolution or who came out of
Russia during World War II) had reorganized from the tumult of the war and the Allied

J , Hearts and Minds: Three Case Studies of the CIA's
1 For an overview, see
Covert Support of American Anticommunist Groups in the Cold War, 1949-1967 (Washington,
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), (S).

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repatriations. These groups and their various splinter organizations soon agitated for
American support while biding their time in overcrowded DP camps. Almost all of the
leaders had collaborated with the Germans during the war in one form or another. (U)
In early 1949, C

. a retired Foreign Service Officer now working for

the Office of Policy Coordination, began a study of Russian emigre groups and their
usefulness to American intelligence. Following many of the leads initially proposed by
Wisner in SANACC 395, C

in his paper, "Utilization of Russian Political Refugees

in Germany and Austria," advocated the establishment of a Russian Welfare Committee.
C

• envisioned that this committee would broadcast messages to the Soviet Union and

its allies as well as support other propaganda efforts against the communists in Eastern
Europe. 2 (S)
__a

ideas quickly found fertile soil in OPC and the State Department. By

September 1949, OPC moved ahead with E

proposal although doubts remained

about the overall relationships of the new group with the State Department, OPC, and
OPC's newly formed National Committee for a Free Europe. 3 In order to determine the
extent of Russian anticommunist activity in Europe,

r_j

went to West Germany to

survey the various emigre groups. Using his cover as C
_3 C._
3 Clandestine Services Historical Series C

joined by Spencer

3 A copy of E

ana C
paper has not been located as its most likely repositories, Projectc
Box 2, Folders 10 and 11, were destroyed in 1979. Project
files, in DO Records, C
.3 sought to establish contact with, exploit, and direct the major Russian, anti-Soviet
political groups that have as their objective the overthrow of the Soviet regime. Project
_3; dealt with the formation of a Russian Welfare Committee. (5)
C:
3 Ibid., pp. 5-2 through 5-3. The State Department authorized OPC to establish the Russian
in the meantime, worked with C
Welfare Committee on 13 September 1949.c
to establish contact with Russian groups in Germany and US
and c_
agencies there. (S)
2
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__I and C-

J prepared an extensive report on the Russian groups in 1950.

This summary, and the recommendations offered by C-

and IL

3, formed the

basis of OPC's overall dealings with these groups. 4 (S)
In their study, "Survey of the Russian Emigration," the OPC authors examined the
major and minor Russian groups as well as some of the non-Russian groups, including
Cossacks, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. Drawing upon support of Army officials in
Germany (but interestingly not from the Office of Special Operations), the C- _3 Survey
sought to "give a factual account of the origins, aims, and activities of the various
political movements created, or revived, since the war [World War II] by the Russian
emigration, indicating the chief personalities who have been active in the various
movements and the present state of the several organizations." 5 (S)

The Vlasov Army (U)

The report focused on Gen. Andrey Vlasov who organized Russian resistance to
Stalin after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. After recounting the

4 The C
study, "Survey of Russian Emigration," is found in the Project QKACTIVE (Radio
Liberation) files as DO Records, C._
• _3, Box 3, Folder 3, CIA ARC. Another copy is
also available in DO Records, C.
, Box 2, Folder 14, CIA ARC. E_ D prepared this
report for E
_a, the mobilization of Soviet refugees as an anticommunist force.
Two other reports, "Survey of the Russian Emigration: C
_UReport Based on Observations,
Contacts, and Interviews in Germany and Austria in March-April 1950," and "Recommendations
with Regard to the Utilization of the Russian Emigration," from 17 April 1950, have not been
located. Another paper, "Supplement (Covering 1950-1951) to Survey of the Russian
Emigration," dated December 1951, (S), is found in DO Records, E._
'
Box 3, Folder
4, CIA ARC. (S)
5 Foreword to "Survey of the Russian Emigration." The study examined such Russian groups as
the NTS, ODNR, ATSODNR, SAF, SVOD, SBONR, ROSS, RONDD, and VAZO as well as
non-Russian groups composed of Cossacks, Byelorussians, Ukrainians (both Eastern and
Western), and smaller nationalities. (S)
3
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lukewarm assistance that Vlasov received from the Nazis and the overall history of the
Russian Liberation Army (ROA) and the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of
Russia (KONR), formed in Prague in 1944, the American study offered several
conclusions about the Vlasov movement. Despite Hitler's opposition to using Vlasov,
-D and his group were impressed by the fact that thousands of Russians voluntarily
joined his "army" in the last months of the war. Likewise, the Americans realized that
Vlasov's presence on the battlefield spurred unrest within Soviet ranks until the final
battle of Berlin in 1945. Lastly, C- J noted the overwhelming anticommunist sentiment
among the Vlasov supporters, many of whom had been fully indoctrinated in the
Bolshevist teachings. "The transformation, in a short period of time and under extremely
adverse conditions, of trusted Soviet workers into staunch anticommunists is a
phenomenon of great significance," C-

wrote. 6 (S)

OPC justified its support for Russian and other Eastern European groups on the
basis of their anticommunist record during World War II. This record, of course,
included varying degrees of collaboration with the Nazis and participation in the roundup
and murder of the Jews on the part of some of the nationality groups. M J summarized
OPC's view about the Russian liberation movement, with many of its leaders now in the
American zone in Germany:
The Vlasov movement never espoused German aims and
objectives or Nazi ideology and consequently was never
completely trusted by the Nazi leadership. The Vlasovites took
up arms as political refugees with the aim of serving the Russian
National cause and the intention of receiving German help
without directly serving German purposes in so doing. They did
not consider the formation of an anti-Soviet army under the
Germans as collaboration. They had to resort to German
6 Ibid., pp. 22-24. (S)
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assistance not because they loved the Germans or approved of
their political system, but because it was to them the only
possible means of achieving their objective—the overthrow of the
communist dictatorship in Russia. Cooperation with the German
Army was an unavoidable evil] (S)

An Almost Instinctive Urge (U)

The C istudy hailed the "almost instinctive urge on the part of the Russian
emigrants to consolidate their forces and establish an anticommunist center which would
unite all emigrant groups." The Americans, ]C 3reported, had stymied this effort
because US intelligence agencies in Germany had provided insufficient funds and only
lukewarm support to the Russian emigre groups to date. Consequently, the Russian
emigres in Germany had made only piecemeal and uncoordinated efforts against the
Soviet Union. Likewise, the Russian emigration movement lacked any leader comparable
to Vlasov (whom the Soviets executed in 1946) to unite the different factions. 8 To
overcome these problems, C. .called for a Directing Center of the United Front,
supported by American intelligence, to rally the Russians, who could then conduct covert
propaganda work in addition to acting as a military reserve in the event of war. 9 (S)
C1 recommendations resulted in the establishment of an OPC front group,
the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, in 1951. 10 This

7 Ibid., p. 22. The Agency has a collection of primary material from World War H on the Vlasov
Army obtained from the Berlin Documents Center in 1948. A brief description of this material in
English and the documents themselves (in Russian) are found in Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to
Chief, FBM, "Vlassov Documents," 23 April 1948, MGB-A-1669, (S), in DO Records,
Box 1, Folder 8, CIA ARC. (S)
8 c_
p. 6 - 2. (S)
9Ibid., pp. 6-2 through 6-3. (S)
101bid., pp 7-1 through 7-5. (S)
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group of prominent Americans, formed by Frank Wisner, ostensibly promoted the ideals
of democracy among refugees and exiles from the USSR. In reality, the group served as
cover for OPC's relationship with the Russian emigre groups under Project QKACTIVE.
This project, approved by OPC in September 1950, called for "the political organization
and activation of the Russian emigration with a view to securing the cooperation of the
peoples of Russia in the struggle of the Western democracies against the present rulers of
Russia." 11 (S)
With C _3 serving as political adviser and C-

as its acting

principal agent, Project QKACTIVE sought to rally the Russians into a "United Front"
organization. OPC, in turn, planned to use this group to funnel funds and resources to the
various organizations within the front. In addition, Project QKACTIVE sought to
establish an institute for Russian studies in Germany as well as to develop newspapers,
radio broadcasts, and other propaganda tools. After many discussions and arguments
over the formation, ideals, and membership of this "United Front," ten Russian and other
nationality groups finally convened in Munich in October 1952 to form a Coordinating
Center of Anti-Bolshevist Struggle (KTAB). 12 (S)
Veterans of the Vlasov movement and various minority groups that had
previously been allied with the Nazis, such as the Georgians and North Caucasians,
formed the core of the Coordinating Center. 13 While QKACTIVE failed in most of its

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
objectives, the project's radio work proved the most succes'sful aspect of the entire
plan. 14 Radio Liberation went on the air in March 1953 and quickly drew attention in the
Soviet Union when it broke the news of Stalin's death. 15 The CIA continued to support
the radio program (later renamed Radio Liberty) until 1974. (S)

NTS (U)

The Coordinating Center, however, failed to attract support from any of the major
Ukrainian groups or the Russian solidarists, or groups that believed in a greater Russia.
The lack of unity among all of the anticommunist groups proved to be fatal for the
Coordinating Committee. OPC's work to bring the Narodno-Trudovoy-Soyuz, the
National Labor Union or NTS, into the Center's fold, for example, is significant and
illustrative in this regard. NTS represented the best organized Russian resistance
movement in Western Europe, and, like virtually every Eastern European anticommunist
group, had a long history of rightwing tendencies and was tainted by collaboration with
the Third Reich. 16 (S)

"The radio aspect of Project QKACTIVE grew more important because the political effort
failed to unify the various groups. The British also undercut the Coordinating Center by
supporting their own groups, which increased rivalry among the Russians and other nationalities
for money and prestige. By August 1952, the CIA began to emphasize radio broadcasts and
downplaying the emigre aspect of the project—a move confirmed by the President's Committee
on International Information Activities (headed by William H. Jackson) in 1953. By this time, the
Coordinating Committee had dissolved. C.
15 1C_ 3 The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 123. (S)
16 Like many pro-Nazi groups in Europe, the NTS tried to spread its own message while
supporting the general principles of the Germans. Although the Germans had mixed feelings
about groups such as the NTS and OUN, they still tolerated them and even promoted them as the
Soviets pushed the Nazis out of Russia. See Steenberg, Vlasov, pp. 42-44 and 163-164. (S)
7
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-report summarized the history and philosophies of the NTS. According
to C-

the NTS traced its roots back to a youth organization in the early 1930s. By

1933, the group took up its identity as the National Labor Union and molded its political
program based on authoritarianism coupled with Russian expansionist ideals. The
Germans drew from NTS members scattered throughout Europe, to act as interpreters and
propagandists in their campaign against the Soviets during World War II. The NTS also
supported the Vlasov movement and formed a cadre for German-sponsored Russian
military units. Relations between the Nazis and the NTS nevertheless were unstable
because of differences in political agendas and disagreements about defeating
communism. While the Gestapo cracked down on the NTS in mid-1944 and arrested
most of the leaders, the organization nevertheless survived the war. Indeed, the Germans
continued to support the NTS in a limited manner until 1945. 17 (S)
The NTS thrived in the disarray of postwar Germany and soon controlled many of
the Russian DP camps. By 1947, the NTS had established Russian-language schools and
published three newspapers in the western zones of Germany. The organization actually
increased its membership by providing false documentation for Viasov Army veterans to
plotect them from forced repatriation. While the NTS suffered from internal divisions as

well as from the worldwide dispersal of Russians from the DP camps after 1948, it still
formed the largest single Russian anticommunist group in Western Europe. 18 (S)
The NTS attracted the CIA's attention because both the US Army and British
intelligence had already provided some support to the group. While OPC could not
persuade the NTS to join the Coordinating Center, it did launch a joint project,
AESAURUS, with the Russians in early 1953. This project sought to promote and
17 "Survey of the Russian Emigration," pp. 31-34. (S)
181bid., pp. 34-36. (S)
8
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coordinate the training and dispatch of NTS agents into the Soviet Union, the
dissemination of propaganda material to Soviet forces in East Germany, and NTS radio
broadcasts to the homeland. 19 (S)
OPC's efforts with the NTS met with mixed results. The anticommunist group
put some pressure on the Soviet regime, both internally and externally. NTS members
also served as a hot war reserve in the event of a Soviet invasion. In retrospect, however,
inadequate operational planning and poor security marred the CIA's relationship with the
NTS.20 (S)

The Will to Fight and the Will to Lead (U)

Not only did OPC organize emigre groups for both propaganda tools and
operational purposes, Frank Wisner also launched a program to train Eastern Europeans
for clandestine operations against the Soviet Union. Wisner approved ZRELOPE in late
July 1950 because "the acceleration of extensive OPC operations in the Soviet Union and
its satellites, and further pursuance of resistance activities elsewhere abroad require the
utilization of strong numbers of specially-trained personnel native to the area concerned."
OPC estimated that it needed to train some 2,000 personnel over the next year in such
fields as political warfare operations, resistance operations, escape and evasion
19 The CIA's first contact with NTS, for example, started in 1950 when OPC supported a NTS
anticommunist paper in Germany under Project QKDROOP. OPC expanded its contact with
NTS in 1951 with airdrops in Soviet Union under Projects CACCOLA and AENOBLE. Project
AESAURUS was formalized in January 1953. For further information, see "Transmittal of
AESAURUS Report," 19 August 1953, EGMA-7379, (S), in DC1/HS Records, HS/CSG-2326,
r_":1 • Box 2. CIA ARC, and C
Clandestine Service
Historical Series C..
20C
.3, pp. 170-194. (S)
9
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operations, communications, and "the will to fight and will to lead." 21 OPC's use of
emigres coincided with mounting interest among the US government agencies to organize
displaced persons into paramilitary formations. 22 (C)
Given the poor security environment in Germany (the Russian Intelligence
Services had targeted virtually every emigre group there), OPC proposed to train these
personnel in the United States. Prior to launching ZRELOPE, OPC formed a special task
group to contact both Federal agencies and private individuals about the feasibility of this
project. By November 1950, this group presented its report and recommended that OPC
train a "diverse group" of foreigners in the United States for covert operations and
establish a civilian cover committee "in order to sponsor trainees and disburse funds."
The group also recommended that the DCI approve ZRELOPE and obtain similar
approbation from the National Security Council (neither level of approval was mandatory
for OPC projects at the time). In December 1950, OPC decided to initiate a pilot program
with 100 trainees at a budgeted cost of C

Z23 (C)

While OPC sought a suitable facility for ZRELOPE (it selected Grand Bahama
Island in Florida after examining 70 sites), a number of unforeseen problems arose.24
ZRELOPE, for example, suffered from splintered command and control within OPC.
Whereas E

_D headed up Task Group BOULDER (which formulated

overall planning and delivery of the candidates to the United States), OPC's Eastern
21 Project Outline, "Project ZRELOPE," (C), DO Records, C

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Europe Division (EE) ran the selection, recruitment, and clearing of ZRELOPE trainees.
The Training Division (TRD), a joint OSO/OPC element, trained the candidates and
provided for cover and security of the project and its personne1. 25 (C)
Project ZRELOPE had a grueling schedule. C_

chief of EE, told

C an March 1951 that the Department of Defense required 1,000 graduates by June
1952. 26 To facilitate the selection of candidates, Frank Wisner informed the ADSO that
same month that OPC needed to interview some four to five thousand candidates in
Europe in order to fill the required 2,000 training slots. Wisner added, "as each candidate
will require a field security investigation prior to final screening, a heavy burden will fall
upon your field organizations, especially in Germany and Austria." 27 The project's haste
naturally raised questions about the thoroughness of the background investigations of the
selected recruits. (C)
of EE traveled to Germany in May 1951 to review the
progress of ZRELOPE and its subprojects, JBPLEDGE (recruitment of trainees) and
KMKIMONO (recruitment of instructors). 28 OPC planned to draw from some 60 "guard
companies," with approximately 200 men each, performing various housekeeping tasks at
US Army garrisons throughout Germany. By May of 1951, C._

-J estimated that

some 60 percent of the guard company members had already been canvassed and that
to ADPC,
to ADPC, "ZRELOPE," 1 March 1951, (C), and C
, Box 5, Folder 35, CIA
"ZRELOPE," 15 March 1951, (C), both in DO Records, C
ARC. (C)
Chief, EE, to Chief, TGBOULDER/SP, "Time Schedule for ZRELOPE
Operation," 22 March 1951, (C); see also C a to ADPC, "Time Schedule - ZRELOPE
3, Box 5, Folder 35, CIA
Operation," 26 March 1951, (C), both in DO Records,
ARC. (C)
27 Wisner to ADSO, "Field Security Investigation in Connection with Project ZRELOPE," 19
Box 5, Folder 35, CIA ARC. (C)
March 1951, (C), in DO Records, C
25C_

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
OPC had selected nearly 800 candidates. OPC had five case officers to do the screening,
although a native Russian speaker handled the initial interviews and conducted the
records checks. Candidates then traveled to Munich for psychological assessment,s. The
actual recruitment occurred after the psychological assessment. 29 (C)

ZRELOPE's Problems (U)

29Minutes of Meeting in "Field Situation re ZRELOPE and Estimate of Capabilities," 23 May
_3 Box 5, Folder 35, CIA ARC. The CIA's use of
1951, (C), in DO Records,. Li
European guard companies as holding areas for trained personnel in the event of war is discussed
in a 6 February 1952 study, "Examination and Appreciation of Current CIA Systems and
Mechanisms for the Promotion, Exploitation and Employment of Indigenous Europeans (USSR
and/or I ISSR-Dominated) for CIA Purposes." See CIA History Staff Records, HS/CSG-1244,
, Box 8, CIA ARC. In addition, the US Government planned to recruit escapees
from "abandoned" areas of Eastern or Southern Europe under Public Law 165, the Mutual
Security Act, or the so-called "Kersten Amendment." See US Congress., House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Staff Memorandum on Manpower Provisions of Mutual Security Act of 1951,
82d Cong., 2d sess., 29 February 1952 in DO Records, C
7, Box 2, Folder 3, CIA
ARC. The US Government also had a number of other plans in mind, including a German
Volunteer Freedom Corps, composed of former officers and enlisted men from the Wehrmacht,
and Projects LCPROWL and KMHITHER. The latter project sought the recruitment of former
German military personnel for various resistance activities. Project LCPROWL, authorized by
Wisner in August 1950, used the German Bund der Deutschen Jugend as a source for a
clandestine paramilitary resistance organization. The BDJ later became a source of
embarrassment to the CIA when the West German Government uncovered its arms caches,
training sites, and plans to eliminate political rivals in the event of war. Christopher Simpson
considers that the BDJ affair "is a clear indication of just how little control US intelligence had
over many of its farflung paramilitary operations and how carelessly it was willing to spend
money." For further details on the German Volunteer Freedom Corps, see miscellaneous
documents in CIA History Staff Records, HS/CSG-1075, C
, Box 7, CIA ARC.
Project outlines, monthly project status reports, and other correspondence for KMHITHER and
, Box 5, Folders 22 and 38, respectively, in
LCPROWL are found in DO Records, C
CIA ARC. Another item of interest regarding the CIA's overall thinking about paramilitary units
Memorandum 34, "Reflections on the Possibilities of
can be seen in
Organizing Anticommunist Military Units from Defector Ranks," 29 March 1954, (S), in DO
Records, C
JBox 2, Folder 23, CIA ARC. Quote about US paramilitary operations
in Germany, see Simpson, Blowback, pp. 146-148. (S)
12
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Despite morale problems (the candidates did not want to leave their families in
Germany),

-D; presented an optimistic appraisal. "I believe," he noted,

"they will turn up in time a sufficient number of likely candidates to produce 100 willing
candidates that can be started moving to the states between September 1st and September
15th [1951]. In saying that, I believe that we will be able to procure the minimum
number of personnel which they require, that the field security will be able to speed up
the results of their security checks and that home security will do the same." 30 (C)
The security issue posed a serious problem, as C

J of TRD discovered

in early 1951. 31 OPC, in looking for ZRELOPE candidates, sought individuals with
experience in political and paramilitary action as well as with general knowledge of
resistance and partisan warfare activities. 32 C

—3responsible

for TRD's security

review of potential candidates, discovered two cases in which OPC had selected
individuals with suspicious credentials to work as instructors. One had served as an

30Minutes of Meeting in "Field Situation re ZRELOPE and Estimate of Capabilities," 23 May
_a, Box 5, Folder 35, CIA ARC. (S)
1951, (C), in DO Records, C.__
31 : C
was
born
in
East
Prussia
in 1907 and immigrated to the United States with his
--a
family in 1923. He joined the US Army in 1942 and upon his commissioning as an officer, he
transferred to OSS in 1944. He served as an officer with SI in London, Paris, and Wiesbaden
I became the chief the Heidelberg Field Base
until March 1946. In July of that year, C
until July 1947. He served as the head of the Karlsruhe Operations Base until his return to the
US in August 1948. He was medically retired from the Army as a captain after contracting
tuberculosis, but he remained as a civilian employee with the CIA until his retirement in 1968.

32The CIA maintained an extensive collection of records on Project ZRELOPE in DO Records,
_3, including lists of ZRELOPE candidates. These records were
3, and C-
C_
destroyed in March 1979 and February 1981, respectively. Some ZRELOPE records remain in
], Box 5, Folder 35, CIA ARC. Fortunately, microfiche index sheets
DO Records, L
to the destroyed files, including the names of ZRELOPE candidates, survive as C
in DO/IMS, Central Files Branch. Using these names on the index sheets, one is able to
review individual 201 files for information on the ZRELOPE candidates. (S)
13
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intelligence officer with the Germans during the "malodorous Tamara Operation" in the
Caucasas, but had not undergone any significant investigation into his World War II
background. According to C

he also apparently worked with the Gehlen

Organization. 33 (C)
Lt. Col. William R. Peers, an OSS veteran and Army officer serving as TRD's
chief, found OPC's selection of ZRELOPE candidates to be less than adequate. 34 Peers
told Wisner that "although the foreign division concerned will be responsible for the
selection of the students, including the checking of their security and political affiliations,
it is readily apparent that if these matters are not given full consideration and properly
handled initially, the Training Division later may be faced with the situation of having
numerous security problems on its hands which by that time it will be powerless to
correct." 35 (C)
After great discussion and even greater expense, ZRELOPE proved to be a shortlived program. 36 It failed because OPC could not recruit and vet candidates to meet its
goal of 2,000 trained resistance fighters. The paramilitary aspect of ZRELOPE (known as
33: a

. Di to Chief, TRD, "C.E. and Security Aspects, KMKIMONO - ZRELOPE,"
, Box 5, Folder 35, CIA ARC. (C)
21 February 1951, (C), in DO Records, E
34 William R. Peers was born in 1914 and attended the University of California at Los Angeles.
Commissioned in the US Army in 1938, Peers joined the Coordinator of Information in 1941 and
was assigned to OSS's Detachment 101 in the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations as its

commander from December 1943 until its disbandment in July 1945. He transferred to the China
Theater as the commanding officer of the OSS Southern Area until September 1945 and then
became the Deputy Strategic Services Officer in the China Theater. Peers returned to the United
States in December 1945 and returned to normal staff duties with the Army and later was an
instructor at the Command and General Staff College. In July 1949, Peers was assigned to the
CIA as the chief of the Training Division. He later held numerous command and staff
assignments with the Army and commanded the 4 th Infantry Division in Vietnam. (U)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
ZRCORSET) was the first subproject to be discontinued because of a lack of recruits. In
turn, CIA soon abandoned efforts to procure a "suitable" training area in the United States
for the project. The political action element of ZRELOPE, or ZRDAMSEL, conducted a
class in 1952 for a dozen-odd students at a hotel near Winchester, Virginia, utilizing the
cover of the Franklin Development Foundation of Philadelphia. Despite plans to bring a
new class to the training site, CIA canceled the entire program in November 1952. TRD
estimated that the political action portion of ZRELOPE alone cost $30,000 per student—an
incredible expense for little gain. 37 (S)

Hot War Cadre Programs (U)

Despite the disappointing results of ZRELOPE, CIA continued to believe it could
fashion the emigres into a potent fighting force in the event of a Soviet invasion of
Western Europe. Several CIA projects concentrated on the recruitment of foreigners for
paramilitary or insertion training in the United States. Even as OPC dropped ZRELOPE,
it expanded an earlier project, WSBAKERY. In January 1952, OPC (with OSO's
consent) organized Project AEACRE, which called for the establishment of a Domestic

a

'n Office of Training Series
The history of the project and its various
components is also discussed in
Office of Training Series
(S); and C—
Services Historical Series c.

Clandestine

15
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DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Operations Base (DOB) near Washington, DC, that would allow the Agency to
interrogate, assess, and prepare agents for dispatch into the Soviet Union. 38 (C)
Like ZRELOPE, AEACRE encountered problems in recruiting knowledgeable
instructors as well as in finding suitable agent candidates. 39 This project, however, had
no difficulties in the "black" entry and exit processing of agents thanks to the cooperation
of the US Air Force and the INS. This aspect of CIA's covert training seems to have
rarely posed a problem. 40 The majority of personnel trained at DOB participated in
REDSOX missions. 41 These operations declined after the mid-1950s as CIA realized
their futility, but the Soviet suppression of Hungary in 1956, however, rejuvenated DOB
because the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned new unconventional warfare tasks to the
aA.42 (s)
AEACRE spawned a new project in 1956 as the CIA upgraded its "hot war" plans
in anticipation of the need for a reserve body of trained agents. In late 1956, Project

38"AEACRE Basic Plan," 10 December 1951, (C), and Joint Memorandum to DD/P, "Project
AEACRE, Amendment No. 1," 25 March 1952, (C), in DO Records, f
Box 3,
Folder 13, CIA ARC. Monthly Project Status Reports for AEACRE, WSBAKERY, and other
subprojects are also included. (C)
39A descrintion of the problems encountered with Project AEACRE can be found in
Clandestine Services
Historical Series C.-

(S)
40 ZRELOPE had a subproject, E

J,

to handle the covert air transportation of its
candidates. Responsibility for airlift was transferred from ZRELOPE to EE/AM on 30 September
1952. C

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
AEREADY came into existence to build up a force of personnel, native to various target
areas of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East, who possessed area
knowledge, language skills, and paramilitary training. Following basic training under
CIA auspices, these agents returned home to their civilian jobs and held themselves ready
for emergency callup and annual refresher training. Unlike either ZRELOPE or
AEACRE, AEREADY did not require overseas recruitment or transportation to the
United States. Rather, the new project identified these specialized individuals from INS
rosters of immigrants and displaced persons already in America. AEREADY, however,
also suffered from a lack of suitable personnel. After extensive nationwide searches, CIA
ended up assessing 27 candidates for each successful agent that completed training.
Members of the US armed forces with foreign language skills provided the initial cadre of
AEREADY traine,es. 43 (S)
The Army provided cover for Project AEREADY at Fort Meade, Maryland, where
it established Material Testing Unit No. 1. Similar units were also organized for
specialized training at Army posts in North Carolina, Virginia, and New York. 44 By
1961, AEREADY (known as AEDEPOT after 1958) had produced a pool of 63 reserve
agents from 13 ethnic groups. Ukrainians formed the largest single body of agents with
17 personnel, followed by Russians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. 45 CIA integrated teams

Clandestine Services Histories Series C

3. Yury Lopatinslcy, one of the main ZPUHVR leaders in the American
zone in Germany, later trained at AEACRE and served as a "spotter" for Project AEREADY. In
addition to his service as an officer in the Ukrainian Nachtigall Legion, the Germans dispatched
Lopatinslcy by aircraft into the Ukraine to establish contact with the OUN in December 1944. He
made his way back to the American Zone of Western Germany one year later and claimed to be a
lieutenant colonel in the UPA. Yury Lopatinslcy, C_
DO Records. (S)

44

pp. 32-33. (U)
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of AEDEPOT personnel into various military training exercises, both in the United States
and in Europe. (S)
The need to maintain a reserve cadre of European agents, however, diminished in
the 1960s as the threat of Soviet invasion of Europe receded. In its place, communist
insurgencies in Latin America and Southeast Asia posed new challenges that prompted
CIA to reconsider its reserve hot war program. In 1966, the Agency deactivated
WUDEPOT (as AEACRE and AEDEPOT had been redesignated two years earlier).
While a handful of the reserve agents served in Latin America and Vietnam, the
cancellation of WUDEPOT effectively ended the CIA's paramilitary training of Eastern
Europe emigres. 46 (S)
In the sixteen years that followed OPC's Project ZRELOPE, the Central
Intelligence Agency had contacts with thousands of Europeans from all backgrounds
concerning paramilitary training. While a number of these individuals had proven both
their anti-Nazi and anticommunist ideals (such as the Polish and Czech contract
employees who flew air missions behind the Iron Curtain), the bulk of the CIA's
resistance candidates and trained agents came from other areas of Eastern Europe where
collaboration with the Nazis tended to be regarded as a positive sign of
anticommunism. 47 (S)
Altogether, OPC's efforts to use emigre groups and to organize "secret armies"
failed. None of these efforts had much impact on the Cold War, at least, in terms of

46Ibid, PP.

34-46. (U)

47For a review of the Polish pilots and crewmen of the 1045th Operational Evaluation and
Training Group (OETG) who flew missions in Europe and later in Central America, see
"Personal Characteristics, Motivation, and Reliability, of the [deleted] Group," 1 June 1960, (S),
and 11 April 1961 Supplement in CIA History Staff Records, HS/CSG-818,
, Box
5, CIA ARC. (S)
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defeating Soviet communism. The Agency's operations resulted from the belief in the
likelihood of war in Europe and the need to be prepared for a Soviet invasion of western
Germany and other states. Consequently, the CIA approached these projects with a "can
do" attitude where time was of the essence. As it turned out, war did not break out in
Europe and, after a more reflective examination, the Agency dropped most of its "hot
war" projects and reduced its levels of involvement with the various emigre
organizations. But the impact caused by the Agency's almost overnight entry into covert
action and paramilitary affairs lingered for decades. (C)

In 1949, just as the Office of Special Operations began to use emigre groups (such
as the ZPUHVR) and the Office of Policy Coordination entered into covert action, the
CIA assumed responsibility for the nascent West German intelligence service. 1 More
than any single project, this action linked the Central Intelligence Agency with veterans of
Nazi Germany's intelligence services, some with notorious wartime reputations. 2 The
Agency, however, reached this decision only after a long-running debate with the US
Army about the wisdom of supporting a resurrected German General Staff and a quasiindependent national intelligence organization. 3 (U)

'Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Ruffner, "A Controversial Liaison
Relationship: American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49," (now declassified),
Studies in Intelligence 41 (1997), pp. 69-84. In addition, many of the documents discussed in
this chapter are found in Ruffner, ed., Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins
of the BND, 1945-49, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999). (now
declassified) (U)
2For a somewhat radical view regarding the CIA's link with the West German intelligence
service, see Carl Oglesby, "Reinhard Gehlen: The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt," Covert Action
Information Bulletin (Fall 1990), pp. 8-14. (U)
3 For an "open" history of the American relationship with the German intelligence service after
World War II, see Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax:
George Mason University Press, 1990). Other books, of varying degrees of reliability, include
E.H. Coolcridge (nom de plume for Edward Spiro), Gehlen: Spy of the Century (London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1971); Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling, Network: The Truth about General
Gehlen and His Spy Ring, trans. by Richard Barry (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972); and
lastly, Reinhard Gehlen, The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, trans. by David

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Gehlen's Saga (U)

The story behind the CIA's involvement with the Gehlen Organization actually
started during the final hours of World War II. With the Soviets fighting in the streets of
Berlin and the British and Americans racing across the shell of the Third Reich in the
spring of 1945, many German officials realized the desperation of their cause. Reinhard
Gehlen, the former chief of the German Army's intelligence branch dealing with the
Eastern Front and Soviet forces, planned to survive Hitler's Gotterdammerung as the
Third Reich crumbled in the spring of 1945. Like most Germans, Gehlen preferred
surrender to the Western Allies as opposed to an uncertain fate at Russian hands. (U)
Born in 1902, Gehlen entered the Reichswehr, the Weimar Republic's small army,
shortly after the end of the World War I. He joined the General Staff as a captain in
1936. During the invasion of Poland three years later, he served as a staff officer in an
infantry division, where his organizational planning and staff work attracted the attention
of senior officers. By mid-1942, Gehlen took charge of the German Army High
Command's Fremde Heer Ost (FHO or Foreign Armies East), with responsibility for
preparing intelligence assessments on the Soviet Union. Gehlen's work in this position
eventually incurred Hitler's wrath, and he rejected Gehlen's pessimistic reports about the
strength and capabilities of the Soviet Army. Hitler summarily dismissed Gehlen, now
Generalmajor, in April 1945. (U)

Irving (New York: World Publishing, 1972). A draft manuscript (June 1996) by James H.
Critchfield, entitled Germany: From Enemy to Ally 1946-1956, promises to add significantly to
the literature on this topic. (U)
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Gehlen did not leave Berlin emptyhanded. He knew that the FHO contained some
of the most important files in the Third Reich and that the possession of these records
offered the best means of survival in the post-Hitler period. As the Soviets drew closer to
Berlin, Gehlen dispersed his staff and transferred the FHO's intelligence files from the
capital to secret locations in Bavaria. There, Gehlen and his handpicked officers waited
to surrender to American forces. Gehlen believed that the Western Allies and the Soviet
Union, while wartime allies, would soon become peacetime rivals. With his knowledge
about the Russians, combined with the FHO's collective resources, Gehlen felt he could
influence relations between East and West and Germany's role in postwar Europe. (U)

On the Lookout (U)

Even before Germany's capitulation, Allied forces were on the lookout for
German intelligence officers and enlisted men. Indeed, as the Americans looked for
Gehlen, he tried to find an American unit in order to surrender. After a circuitous route,
the US Army finally delivered Gehlen and his men to the Twelfth Army Group
Interrogation Center near Wiesbaden in June 1945. Interned at the "Generals' House,"
Gehlen reassembled his staff and files under the overall direction of Army Capt. John R.
Boker, Jr. (U)
Boker, who had previously interrogated other German officers and Vlasov Army
members, expressed his feelings as he started his interrogation of General Gehlen. "It
was also clear to me by April 1945 that the military and political situation would not only
give the Russians control over all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans but that, as a result
of that situation, we would have an indefinite period of military occupation and a frontier

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contiguous with them." 4 Thanks to his interrogation of German officers who had fought
on the Eastern Front, Boker quickly became the Twelfth Army Group's resident expert on
the Soviets. (S)
Gathering Gehlen's staff and records required some subterfuge on Boker's part.
He was aware, from previous experience, that "there existed in many American quarters a
terrible opposition to gathering any information concerning our Soviet Allies." He did,
however, gain the support of Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, G-2 for the Twelfth Army
Group and later head of intelligence for USFET, to employ the former FHO staff
members to produce reports on the Soviets. 5 Gehlen also wanted Boker to establish
contact with some of his frontline organizational elements, such as Oberstleutnant
Herman Baun, who commanded Stab Walli I, which conducted espionage work against
the Soviets using Russian defectors and provided raw intelligence to Gehlen's FH0.6
Gehlen insisted that he had access to still-existent agent networks in the Soviet Union
through Baun's sources. (S)
Army headquarters in Washington learned about Gehlen's activities at
Wiesbaden and, after some debate, Boker received orders to bring the German group to
the United States. Army G-2's primary interest, however, centered on the retrieval and

4 Boker's account of his role during 1945-46 is found in John R. Boker, Jr., "Report of Initial
Contacts with General Gehlen's Organization," 1 May 1952, in DO Records, E
Box 2, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)
5 A general history of this early period is found in Chief, EE to EE/G, "History of the Gehlen
Intelligence Organization," 28 March 1960, (S), enclosing
J, "History of the
Gehlen Intelligence Organization," September 1953, DO Records, E
Box 1, Folder
5, CIA ARC (hereafter rited c "Gehlen History").
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analysis of the FHO records, not in its personnel. Boker, who had become quite attached
to his project, resented losing control of Gehlen and his staff after their secret departure
for Washington on 21 August 1945. Placed as virtual prisoners in a classified building at
Fort Hunt, Virginia, (known simply as P.O. Box 1142), the Army planned to use Gehlen
in conjunction with a larger project being conducted at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to
compile a history of the German army on the Eastern Front. (S)
Through Boker's efforts (he had accompanied Gehlen's group to the United
States), and officers at the Eastern European Order of Battle Branch at the Pentagon, the
situation for the Germans gradually improved. The BOLERO Group, as Gehlen's team
became known, served under the direction of Army Capt. Eric Waldman until its return to
Germany in June 1946. Gehlen's men prepared reports based on German records , and
the general himself also had access to and commented on American intelligence reports.

(s)
OSS and SSU Kept in the Dark (S)

The Office of Strategic Services played little role in the interrogations of Gehlen
and his staff in Germany and in Washington. In the throes of dissolution during the fall
of 1945, OSS declined the Army's invitation to employ Baun in Germany. The new
Strategic Services Unit also expressed some reluctance about using the German FHO for
American intelligence purposes. 7 SSU, however, did try to determine the nature of the
relationship between Gehlen and Army intelligence. On 25 October 1945, Crosby Lewis
in Germany informed Winston N. Scott in London:
7 Col. W.W. Quinn to Col. Galloway, "Operation Rusty," 5 December 1946, (S), in DO Records,
, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)
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For your information only, Baun and a group of other members of
Fremde Heere Ost, experts in the GIS on espionage against the
Russians, are being collected by two officers, of the G-2 section,
USFET, who are responsible only to Gen. Sibert. It appears
likely that Sibert got an OK from Washington on this when he
was in the US last month, at which time it appeared that OSS
might fold up. Von Gehlen and several high-ranking staff
officers who operated for Fremde Heere Ost and for some of the
Army Group staff on the Eastern Front during the war have been
flown to the US—all this without any contact with the OSS here.8
(S)
In November 1945, Lewis responded to a request by Gen. Sibert that SSU take
over Baun's operation from the Army. After reviewing Baun's plans, Lewis rejected
them outright, calling them "rather grandiose and vague suggestions for the formation of
either a European or worldwide intelligence service to be set up on the basis of wartime
connections of Oberst Baun and his colleagues, the ultimate target of which was to be the
Soviet Union." Lewis found a number of shortcomings with Baun's employment,
including cost, control, and overall poor security measures. The fact that the Russians
wanted to question Baun and Gehlen, as well as other German intelligence figures, did
not sit well with Lewis. 9 (S)
In early January 1946, SSU in Germany reported to Headquarters what it had
learned "through discreet inquiries" about the Army's activities. SSU described the flight
of Gehlen and his FHO staff from Berlin and their activities with the Americans. The
report also stated that Gehlen had recommended that Herman Baun be contacted to
8 Crosby Lewis to Winston M. Scott, 25 October 1945 (S), in Baun, C
Records. See also Scott to Lewis, 30 October 1945, (S), in Baun
(S)

DO
DO Records.

9"Gehlen History," pp. 14-15 (S). SSU's objections to takeover in 1945 are outlined in Lewis to
Col. Galloway, "KEYSTONE Operation," 22 September 1946, (S), in DO Records,
Box 36, Folder 8, CIA ARC. A copy of this same memorandum with an attachment is
Box 3, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (S)
also located in DO Records,

E

,

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provide further information about the Soviets while the general worked in the United
States. Baun, in fact, had been arrested by the 80th CIC Detachment as a "mandatory
arrestee" (members of Nazi party organizations and high-ranking German Army and SS
officers were subject to immediate apprehension by the Allies) in late July 1945 and
interrogated at the Third Army Interrogation Center the following month. The
announcement of his arrest and the distribution of Baun's Preliminary Investigation
Report raised great concern at Army G-2 because the Soviets now demanded the
extradition of both Baun and Gehlen. 1 0 (C)
While the Army refused to accede to the Soviet demands, it secluded Baun and
several other FHO personnel at the Military Intelligence Service Center (MISC) at
Oberursel on the outskirts of Frankfurt (also known as Camp King and later officially
designated the 7700th European Command Interrogation Center). The small group,
including Gerhard Wessel, who had succeeded Gehlen as the head of FHO in 1945, was
quartered at the "Blue House," where Baun developed his plans to launch a full-scale
intelligence organization. The Army's G-2 planned to use Baun to resurrect his Abwehr
network against the Soviets, but SSU "advised them [the US Army] to interrogate Baun
at length and have nothing to do with his schemes for further intelligence activity." 11 (S)
Meanwhile, SSU's Bill Holtsman in Munich had interrogated another officer of
Stab Walli, Oberst Heinz Schmalschlager, about German intelligence activities against
the Russians. SSU, in fact, considered Schmalschlager more valuable than Baun.12

10 Preliminary Interrogation Report, 16 August 1945, (C), in Baun,

DO

Records. (S)
AMZON to SAINT, "Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service," 8 January
_7 DO Records. (S)
1946 (S), in Baun,
12sAiNT, AMZON to SAINT, "Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service," 8 January

in DO Records. (S)
1946, (S), and untitled note to "Reg Phelps," in Baun, C.:7
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Despite SSU's advice that the Army dismiss Baun and reduce its reliance on FHOderived intelligence, the opposite took place. Baun continued to operate and even thrived
under US Army auspices. In January 1946, he established a service to monitor Soviet
radio transmissions in the Russian zone and, two months later, the Army authorized him
to conduct both positive and counterintelligence activities within Germany. 13 (S)

Operation RUSTY (U)

In the summer of 1946, the Army returned Gen. Gehlen and the remaining FHO
members to Germany. At this point, Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., the operations officer at
the Military Intelligence Service Center published his plans to merge Gehlen's BOLERO
group with Baun's already existent staff, known as KEYSTONE. Gehlen would
coordinate the functions of both elements of the German organization while he had direct
responsibility for the Intelligence Group, which provided evaluations to economic,
military, and political reports obtained by agents of Baun's Information Group. 14 The
Army designated the entire organization Operation RUSTY, under the overall supervision
,f Col. Russell Philp, Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., and Capt. Eric Waldman, who preceded
Gehlen's return to Germany from Washington. 15 (S)
13"Gehlen History," pp. 15-16. (S)
14For a roster of the Intelligence Group (also known as the Evaluation Group) and the
Information Group, see "Gehlen History," pp. 21-22. Gustav Hilger, for example, is listed as a
member of Baun's Information Group. (S)
15 Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., Operations Officer, USFET MISC, to G-2, USFET, "Plan for the
Inclusion of the BOLERO Group in Operation RUSTY," 2 July 1946, (S), in DO Records, E
3 Box 2, Folder 2, CIA ARC. The operation is variously described as gaining its
designation from either a nickname given to Deane's young son or that given to Col. Russell
Philp, commanding officer at "Basket," the secure facility at Blue House. See Reese, General
Reinhard Gehlen, p. 207, and Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Bi-Weekly Letter," 4
December 1948, MGM-A-859, (S), in DO Records,
1. Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC.
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The Army planned to provide Operation RUSTY with US intelligence reports for
comments and insight. Gehlen's Evaluation Reports, Deane expected, "will be of great
value to the G-2 Division in that they will furnish the closest thing to finished intelligence
that can be obtained from sources other than US." 16 Deane's optimistic outlook indeed
spurred the Army to submit more requests to Operation RUSTY, and Baun quickly
expanded his collection efforts to meet the Army's insatiable appetite for information on
the new threat in Europe. By October 1946, Gehlen and Baun claimed to have some 600
agents operating throughout the Soviet zone of Germany, providing the bulk of
intelligence on the Russian Order of Battle. 17 (S)
As the Army increased its demands on Operation RUSTY, the group was
transformed from a select group of German General Staff officers to a larger group that
suffered from poor cohesion and mixed allegiances. In addition to covering eastern
Germany, Operation RUSTY took on new missions in Austria and other areas of Europe
as well as broadened earlier wartime contacts with emigre groups in Germany and with
members of the Vlasov Army. 18 The few American officers assigned to the Blue House
C 2states emnhaticallv that Operation RUSTY gained its name from Deane's son, C
16Deane to G-2, USFET, 2 July 1946; for a copy of one Evaluation Report, see Evaluation
Report No. 2, Operation RUSTY, "Political and Military Training of German PWs in USSR for
Box 1,
Commitment in Germany," 27 September 1946, (S), in DO Records, C.
Folder 5, CIA ARC. This Evaluation Report was prepared in response to a May 1946 US Army
request that the Gehlen Organization report Soviet efforts to form a new German army. This
same folder also contains numerous Intelligence Reports produced by Operation RUSTY in
1946. (S)
17Lt. Col. J.L. Collins, Chief, Information Section, to Chief, Intelligence Branch, "Operation
Box 6, Folder 15, CIA ARC.
Rusty," 24 September 1946, (S), in DO Records, C
(S)
18White Russian General Pictr Glazenap acted as the point of contact between the Germans and
the Vlasov veterans. Glazenap exploited this position and American subsidies to build up his
own emigre movement, the SAF, which later created problems for OPC's efforts to rally the
divergent anticommunist groups into a central group. See Cannel Offie to Wisner, "General Pictr
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barely knew the identities of RUSTY agents, thus making it difficult to confirm the
validity of German reporting. Baun's recruiting and training of his agents proved
haphazard while their motivation also raised questions. Throughout the Western Allied
zones of Germany, men and women openly claimed to be working for American
intelligence, leading to many security breaches and undermining RUSTY's overall
effectiveness. To make matters worse, the US Army also assisted RUSTY's agents to
avoid the established denazification procedures in Germany. 19 (S)
As early as November 1946, C--

J in Munich complained to CIG

headquarters in Heidleberg that the Gehlen Organization was busy at work in the Munich
area seeking new agents. 20_Dold Henry Hecksher that "most of the recruited
Glazenap," 24 January 1949, (S), enclosing C._
D"Is the US Using Genl. Glazenap,"
25 December 1948, in Hilger, j
2 DO Records. (S)
19For a description of many of these problems, see "Gehlen History," pp. 24-29, 34. Examples of
SSU and CIG reporting about RUSTY's security problems are numerous and can be seen in Hans
L. Marchand to Chief. lB. "A gent Net Operating in the Bamberg Vicinity," 17 September 1946;
C.
J! to C.
j, "American Intelligence Network," 18 March 1947, enclosing
"American Intelligence Network," 25 January 1947; and various intelligence reports about
Operation KEYSTONE from CIG's various agents in Munich in 1947. All of these documents
are located in DO Records, C
Box 5, Folder 8, CIA ARC. (S)
20 Among the Gehlen Organization's agents, Horst Paul Issel came to the new service with a
tous wartime reputation. Born in Berlin in 1912, Issel served in the RSHA headquarters in
Berlin and later in occupied Denmark. SS Obersturmfuehrer Otto Alexander Friedrich Schwerdt
formed a SS Sonderkommando unit in Denmark, known as the "Peter Unit," in December 1943.
Issel joined the unit in the summer of 1944 and commanded it by the end of the year. The unit, a
gang of SS men and Danish collaborators, committed the infamous "clearing murders" in
Denmark during the last year of the war. According to Danish officials after the war, the
Germans pinpointed specific Danes for execution to wipe out the Danish resistance and to
terrorize the civilian population. All told, the Germans conducted some 267 acts of retaliatory
murder or sabotage, including the death of Kaj Munk, a well-known Danish poet and minister.
At Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal found the "clearing murders" in Denmark to
be a "Himmler-conceived and Hitler-ordered form of reprisal, in which innocent persons were
assassinated by their captors as a method of rule by terror." Issel escaped from Denmark in the
last days of the war and ended up in the Gehlen Organization. The British arrested him in Berlin
in early 1949 and, despite an appeal from the Gehlen Organization for his release, the US Army
refused to help Issel. The Army, in fact, denied that Issel was a member of the Gehlen
Organization and by the time that it realized its error, the British had turned over Issel to the

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people have till now been acting as subsources for either us or CIC, but now their
informant days are over because they have 'at last contacted top American intelligence
which has a lot of money." The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, it appeared, was
helpless, "because they are afraid of interfering with work of the 'higher Headquarters.'21
(S)

Hecksher, in turn, reported to CIG's contact at Army headquarters about the state
of affairs. "In line with our standing complaint that talent scouts working for 'Operation
Rusty' in the Munich area are cornering the market by offering monetary incentives far
out of proportion to the potential intelligence yield they can expect," Hecksher stated,
"we are passing on to you the well-substantiated account." While Hecksher observed that
"we are not directly affected by this practice inasmuch as we try to recruit our agents from
circles less susceptible to the lure of exorbitant rewards. Hardest hit, so far," the CIG
counterintelligence officer commented, "has been CIC, Munich. At the same time, we on

Danes. The Danish Government tried Issel and sentenced him to death for war crimes. The
Military Government's Office of the Director of Intelligence in Berlin expressed its
dissatisfaction with the Issel case in a note to the Army officials responsible for the Gehlen
Organization. "It is strongly recommended that increased effort on your part be made to
complete your central file of agents," wrote the Deputy Director. "The Issel case can be used as
a warning to those who are reluctant to submit names to your central file, because it must be
emphasized that no effort will be made to protect them if they cannot be identified as working for
a US agency." Army headquarters furthermore declared that "it will also prevent statements as
follows, allegedly said by one of your agents to the British who arrested Issel: 'if the SOB
Americans won't protect us, we won't work for them." See Deputy Director, Intelligence
Division to Commanding Officer, 7821 Composite Group, "List of Agents," 15 March 1949,

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principle regret to see an inflationary spiral set off in rewarding agents and informants."22
(S)
The situation had only grown worse by 1948 when Hecksher reported that
RUSTY "took over some of the informants dropped by Munich Operations Base after it
had been conclusively established that the intelligence they furnished was of no value
whatsoever." 23 The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps and the Military Intelligence
Service also picked up agents when they had been dropped by SSU or CIG. As early as
December 1946, Headquarters told OSO's Security Control in Germany that "we believe
our best policy would be to steer clear of it and let such agents and informers who are
being lured away by higher inducements, go their merry way. It seems a shame that
anyone is willing to pay so much for very low grade and mostly unverifiable
information." 24 (S)

The Army Pitches RUSTY to CIG (U)

Operation RUSTY turned out to be an expensive project and, by mid-1946, Army
G-2 found itself running out of funds. The Army once again tried to persuade SSU to
take over the operation following Gehlen's return to Germany. On a tour of SSU
installations in Germany, Col. William W. Quinn conferred with Gen. Sibert and Crosby
Lewis, now SSU chief in Germany, about the Army's proposal. Lewis repeated many of

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his objections that he had made earlier in the fall of 1945, and he suggested that SSU
make a "thorough study" prior to any decision by Headquarters. 25 In early September
1946, Lewis specified in writing to Gen. Sibert the conditions under which SSU would be
prepared to assume responsibility for Gehlen, emphasizing the need for US intelligence to
have complete access to all German records and identities of leading personalities and
agents for initial vetting. 26 In his review in the fall of 1946, Lewis summarized his
thoughts:
It is my opinion that SSU AMZON should be given complete
control of the operation and that all current activities of this group
be immediately stopped before further security breaches nullify
the future usefulness of any of the members of the group. I
further recommend that an exhaustive study be made along CE
lines of the entire operation, past and present, so that at least, if it
appears that the group is too insecure to continue an operation,
the wealth of intelligence which is contained in the minds of the
various participants as regards Russia, Russian intelligence
techniques, and methods of operation against the Russians, could
be extracted. In conclusion, however, it is most essential that if a
final decision is made to exploit these individuals either singly or
as a group, SSU understands that their employment in the past
and their exploitation in the future constitutes to a greater or less
degree the setting up of an incipient German intelligence
service. 27 (S)

In addition to the Army's efforts to get SSU to take over the Gehlen Organization,
Crosby Lewis was buffeted by other proposals to employ former Nazis. In October 1946,
he went to Switzerland to meet with Paul Blum and Henry Hyde, the former commander
of the Seventh Army's SI detachment and Blum's predecessor as chief of mission in
Switzerland. 28 The three Americans met Eddy Waetjen, a former German Abwehr
officer and one of Dulles's Crown Jewels. Waetjen told the Americans about his
discussions in Washington with Col. Quinn. According to Waetjen, he spoke with Quinn
about three projects to gain further insights into happenings in the Soviet zone of
Germany. 29 (S)
The first project involved US support to the Eugen Gerstenmaier's Hilfswerk der
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (HEKD), the welfare agency of the Lutheran Church

in Germany with ties to the east. 30 Secondly, Waetjen advocated the expansion of the
interrogations of German prisoners of war returning from Russian camps. Thirdly, and

28Lewis to Blum, 22 September 1946, L-002-922, (S), in WASH-REG-Int-112, DO Records,
3 Box 2, Folder 20, CIA ARC. (S)
29Lewis to Helms, 22 October 1946, MGH-003-1022, (S), in DO Records, C:
_3. Box
49, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)
30Eugen Gerstenmaier was a leading member of the German Lutheran church who rose to
become president of Bundestag. During the war, he was in touch with Allen Dulles in
Switzerland and with German members of the plot to kill Hitler in 1944. Imprisoned by the
Nazis, the Americans liberated Gerstenmaier and he became an OSS contact. Working with
Harry Hermsdorff, a SI officer in Berlin, Gerstenmaier founded the HEKD in August 1945. The
group raised donations to help German civilians, but it fell under suspicion of the West German
customs office in 1949 for violating tax and customs regulations. As a result, Wolf von
Gersdorff, the HEKD's business manager and a former Abwehr officer, fled to Chile. The West
German court eventually settled the case out of court, but the CIA was also implicated. OPC, for
example, subsidized the organization's paper, Christ und Welt. Gerstenmaier, in the meantime,
left the HEKD and concentrated on his political career. He, however, retained his ties with the
Agency and several officers, includin g Dulles,
_D and, and
.D1
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most importantly, Waetjen advocated that the Americans interrogate German General
Staff officers who had served on the Eastern Front. In fact, Hyde, who had commanded
the Seventh Army's SI detachment during the war and was later chief of station in
Switzerland after Dulles had gone to Germany, had provided Col. Quinn in early
September with a list of Germans who could be useful in this regard. 31 The names,
drawn from Waetjen's contacts, "were the most likely to give us a picture, both of the
German operations against Russia and the agent personnel used by the GIS." 32 (S)
Richard Helms, in turn, forwarded two lists of names of individuals furnished by
Waetjen to Lewis a few days later. The chief of Foreign Branch M told the German
Mission chief, "it is possible that you may be able to handle these interrogations in
conjunction with the Keystone Project." Helms emphasized, "in any event, it is
considered highest priority here that everything possible be done to get complete data on
the experience of all Intelligence Services which have worked on Russia. Such
information," Helms stated, "should not only provide us with good operational

31 For information on Hyde's background, see Wolfgang Saxon, "Henry Hyde is Dead at 82;
Wartime Spymaster for 0.S.S.," New York Times, 8 April 1997. (U)
32Hyde to FBM, "Contacting Former Members of the German GIS Who Were Woking on the
USSR," 6 September 1946, (S), enclosing Hyde to Quinn, "German Individuals Involved in
Box 44,
Intelligence Work on USSR," 4 September 1946, (S), in DO Records, E
Folder 5, CIA ARC. See also Hyde to Helms, "Names of Germans Likely to be Informed on
German Intelligence Operations into Russia Proper Furnished by Watjen [sic]," 16 September
Box 44, Folder 5, CIA ARC. The lists include such
1946, (S), in DO Records, C
names as Gen. Ernst Koestring, the pre-war German army attache in Moscow, Oberst Arnim von
Lahousen, the head of Abwehr Amt II until relieved in 1943, Maj. Paul Leverkuehn, the Abwehr
representative in Istanbul, and Prof. Gerhard von Mende, Kedia's contact in the

Ostmininisterium. Waetj en also recommended that American intelligence contact
Sturmbannfuher Erich Georg-Karl Albin Hengelhaupt, who had directed German clandestine
operations in the Caucasus. (S)
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information, but also may lead to the discovery of individuals in a good position to
continue this type of work for us." 33 (S)
After Lewis met with Blum, Hyde, and Waetjen in Bern, he summarized the
results of the conference. Lewis rejected using German General Staff officers as sources
of information on the Soviet Union. "On the whole," Lewis wrote Helms, "I am of the
opinion that in matters of intelligence it is preferable to talk with professionals and not to
General Staff officers. When dealing with professionals," Lewis remarked, "the ethics
which may restrain the individual from discussing intelligence matters with an American,
or even with a German cut-out, do not come into the picture. It is my view," he added,
"that the proper subjects for interrogation on German intelligence activities in the East are
the group potentially involved in the KEYSTONE operation." 34 (S)
Lewis became incensed when he realized that Washington planned to use Waetjen
as its link to members of the former General Staff. Lewis denounced Dulles's group of
old agents as a series of problems that the German Mission had to contend with after
Dulles had returned home:
It is my feeling that having finally, after a great deal of effort, rid ourselves of the
Crown Jewel Group, as a group, it would be a great mistake to bring them back
into the picture. The Crown Jewels always seemed to me like a very exclusive
club, in which every member knew all about every other member and in which
discussions were carried on with complete disregard for normal security
measures. .. . On the whole, our experience with the Crown Jewels has shown
that they are to a man interested in promoting certain special groups inside
Germany and incidentally assisting the American intelligence effort, rather than
working for American intelligence and incidentally assisting certain special
groups. It is this approach by the Crown Jewels which makes it impossible for us
33 Helms to Lewis, "Attached Memorandum," 6 September 1946, L-009/1-906, (S), in DO
.D Box 3, Folder 42, CIA ARC. (S)
Records, I
34Lewis to Helms, 22 October 1946, MGH-003-1022, (S), in DO Records, C_
49, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)
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to control it. Moreover, at a time when we here in the field have been receiving
the strictest sort of orders about the security of the organization, it was a bit of a
shock to hear Waetjen discussing Washington as if he were [sic] a staff
member. 35 (S)
Lewis's vehement objection raised eyebrows in Washington. Helms, forwarding
his memorandum to Col. Quinn and Henry Hyde, noted that Waetjen's trip to Germany
"is for short duration to attempt to turn up a useful contact and that the German Mission
should support him even if he does talk too much." 36 Col. Quinn, in a note to Col.
Galloway, added, "this was started (project Keystone) in the early summer (before
RUSTY came into the picture), i.e., we had to get going on Russian techniques and
develop background material on possible ways of penetrating. Crosby L.," the director
commented to the ADSO, "has always had it in for the Crown Jewel group and is a little
venomous on the subject." 37 (S)
In December, Helms hastened to reassure Lewis and Blum about plans to use
Waetjen. Helms said that Headquarters sought Waetjen, who desperately wanted to
become an American citizen, for an operation in Turkey and as a contact for the German
staff officers. "There was no thought that Eddy would permanently handle these men,"
Helms hastened to add. "The idea was simply that he would make the initial contact and
attempt to turn the men over to us for our use." CIG, however, postponed Waetjen's visit
to Germany "because the Keystone Project is still hanging fire and we wanted to get its
status clarified before we undertook other work along the same line." 38 (S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Reviewing the overall history of the Crown Jewels since the end of the war,
Helms said that it needed "no elaboration here. We are certainly sympathetic to the
problems which Germany has had on this score (didn't I personally have my headaches!),
but we do not want to pass up any bets which might be worth exploitation." If Waetjen
came to Germany, the chief of Foreign Branch M simply asked that "he should be
handled courteously but there is no need to take him into the family or to give him any
more information than is necessary for him to give the assistance which he claims he
can." Waetjen, however, does not appear to have made the trip and this proposal faded
away. 39 (S)

The Vandenberg Report (U)

At the end of Gen. Sibert's tour as USFET G-2 in Germany, the debate whether a
civilian intelligence agency should be responsible for Operation RUSTY shifted from
Germany to Washington. Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress, Sibert's successor, appealed to
Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, formerly Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence and now
Director of Central Intelligence, for CIG to assume control of RUSTY. His
memorandum, supported by extensive documentation, noted that USFET considered "the
organization one of its most prolific and dependable sources." 0 (C)

39 Ibid. (S)
40 Burress to Vandenberg, "Operation RUSTY - Use of the Eastern Branch of the Former
7, Box 13,
German Intelligence Service," 1 October 1946, (C), in DCI Records C.-
.3, Box 11, Folder 481, CIA ARC. A full copy of the
Folder 13, and DCI Records, L
Burress memorandum and supporting documents can be found in DO Records,
Box 2, Folder 2, CIA ARC. The "Vandenberg Report" is the best summary report about
Operation RUSTY during the Army's early period of control. (C)
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Vandenberg directed that the Office of Special Operations take a fresh look at
RUSTY. On 16 October 1946, OSO presented its summary of the Burress material and
dismissed Gehlen's Intelligence, or Evaluation, Group as "drawing broad conclusions
from inadequate evidence and a strong tendency to editorialize." Regarding Baun's
Information Group, OSO determined that "there is no evidence whatsoever which
indicates high-level penetration into any political or economic body in the Russianoccupied zone." The review also blasted Operation RUSTY for its yearly budget of C
—roughly( )times that of OSO's German Mission. OSO decidedly rejected
assumption of RUSTY, although it did call for a full study in order to identify salvageable
aspects of the operation. The report made two significant comments that reflected OSO's
overall frame of mind:
1. It is considered highly undesirable that any large-scale USsponsored intelligence unit be permitted to operate under even
semi-autonomous conditions. Unless responsible US personnel
are fully acquainted not only with the details of each operation
carried out but also with the identities and background of all
individuals concerned, no high degree of reliability can be placed
from an American point of view upon the intelligence produced.
2. One of the greatest assets available to US intelligence has
always been the extent to which the United States as a nation is
trusted and looked up to by democratic-minded people
throughout the world. Experience has proven that the best
motivation for intelligence work is ideology followed by common
interests and favors. The Germans, the Russians, their satellites,
and to a lesser extent, the British, have employed fear, direct
pressure of other types, and lastly, money. With most of these
factors lacking to it, Operation RUSTY would appear to be
dependent largely upon the last and least desirable. 41 (C)
41 "R.K." to Deputy A, "Operation RUSTY," 16 October 1946, (C), in DO Records, C J, Box 5, Folder 2, CIA ARC (C). The identity of the correspondent is uncertain although
it may have been Rolfe Kingsley. In November 1946, Vandenberg asked the Army to send
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In a letter to Gen. Vandenberg, Col. Galloway reiterated CIG's concerns about
RUSTY's costs and questions about its security. He also recommended that CIG not take
over the operation.4I(S)

The Bossard Report (U)

Both the Army and CIG agreed in the fall of 1946 that the latter organization
could conduct its own examination of RUSTY. As a result of discussions held in New
York City in December, Samuel B. Bossard arrived at Oberursel in March 1947 to
conduct a two-month study of the German operation and its potentia1. 43 Bossard's report
marked the first time that SSU or CIG had the opportunity to examine on its own the
operation and to interview Gehlen and Baun as well as other members of the German
group. Unlike Crosby Lewis, Bossard reached a positive impression of Operation
RUSTY." "The whole pattern of operation," Bossard proclaimed in the first paragraph
Gehlen and Baun to the United States for conferences with the CIG. See DCI to Maj. Gen.
Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, "Operation RUSTY - Use of the Eastern Branch
' Former German Intelligence Service," 20 November 1946, (C), in DCI Records, C
Box 13, Folder 549, CIA ARC. (C)
42Galloway to DCI, "Operation RUSTY," 17 October 1946, (S), in DO Records,
Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. This document appears as an annex to the Bossard Report. (S)
43 The New York meeting on 19 December 1946, organized by Gen. Vandenberg, brought
together a number of top American intelligence figures to discuss RUSTY. Held at the
apartment of Allen Dulles, the meeting included Dulles, William H. Jackson (both special
advisers to CIG), Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright (DDCI), Brig. Gen. Sibert, Col. Galloway, Col.
Laurin L. Williams of Army G-2, Lt. Co!. Deane from RUSTY, Richard Helms, and Samuel
Bossard. The group agreed that CIG should hold an investigation of RUSTY "on the ground"
because "certain parts had possible long-range values."
.
See also Helms, Memorandum for the Record, "Operation Rusty," 19 December 1946, [no
classification listed], in DO Records, L.--j Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)
44 Samuel B. Bossard was born in 1912 and received degrees from Princeton and Columbia
Universities. He studied in Germany before the war and, with his language skills, served as an
interrogator in American prisoner-of-war camps until joining OSS in 1944. Assigned to X-2 in
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of his report, "is accordingly positive and bold; the factors of control and risk have
become secondary considerations and thus yield to the necessity of obtaining information
with speed and in quantity." 45 (S)
In a stunning reversal of the earlier criticism of RUSTY, Bossard compared the
operation to the wartime work of OSS with various resistance groups where results
mattered more than control. He dismissed "the long bill of complaints prepared by our
own counter-intelligence agencies against the lack of security in this organization."
Bossard declared, "in the end [this] serves more as a testimony to the alertness of our
counter-intelligence agencies and a criticism of our own higher authorities for not
effecting a coordination of interests [rather] than a criticism of the present organization
and its operating personnel." 46 (S)
In Bossard's viewpoint, Operation RUSTY had proven to be a useful
anticommunist intelligence organization. If the United States abandoned RUSTY, it
would still have the same intelligence requirements as before although with fewer
resources. Likewise, American control of the German operation could only strengthen
the overall project and reduce its security risks. Bossard believed that Operation RUSTY
offered the Americans a readymade, knowledgeable German intelligence service that

London, Bossard became an officer and acted as liaison between OSS and British intelligence.
He was stationed in London when he was detailed to examine the Gehlen Organization in 1947.
In 1949, Bossard handled CIA's Washington desk for matters regarding the new German
intelligence service. Bossard resigned from the Agency in 1950 and died in 1996. r_

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
formed a "strong core of resistance to Russian aggression."'" Impressed with the
anticommunist sympathies of the Germans and the breadth of their contacts (especially
with various emigre groups), Bossard found "no evidence to prove that the unusual
confidence that had been placed by American authorities in the German operators had
been abused." 8 (S)
He made eight recommendations to the DCI, with the bottom line being that the
Central Intelligence Group should take responsibility for RUSTY. Noting RUSTY's
personnel problems, Bossard advised that CIG should eliminate those members whose
"past records, previous connections, or actions constitute potential sources of political
embarrassment or are actual threats to our security," specifically mentioning Russians as
well as members of the Nazi party and SS. These men, Bossard stated, should "as far as
possible" be used only as agents as opposed to actual employees of the German
organization.49 (S)

Washington in a Flurry (U)

Bossard's findings unleashed a flurry of activity in Washington during the
summer and fall of 1947. On 3 June, Col. Galloway reversed his previous stand and
recommended to Adm. Hillenkoetter, who had just taken over as DCI from Gen.
Vandenberg, that he approve the Bossard Report. Col. Galloway remained concerned
that support of the German intelligence service could conflict with both State Department
policies dealing with a "potential resistance group" as well as interfere with the signals
47 Ibid. (S)
"Ibid. (S)
49 Ibid. (S)
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intelligence work of the US Army and Navy. Accordingly, he added that CIG's takeover
of RUSTY should be cleared through the G-2 at European Command and brought to the
attention of the National Intelligence Authority (predecessor of the National Security
Council). 50 (S)
A few days later, Adm. Hillenkoetter prepared a memorandum for his superior sin
the National Intelligence Authority. He expressed the "strong" recommendation that
"Operation RUSTY be liquidated and that CIG assume no responsibility for its
continuation or liquidation." 51 Hillenkoetter felt that the Central Intelligence Group
should have no connection with RUSTY without the knowledge and approval of the
National Intelligence Authority. (S)
Hillenkoetter's draft recommendation discredited in effect the Bossard Report and
Col. Galloway's advice. It raised a furor in Army circles. On 19 June 1947, the DCI
discussed Army-CIG relations and Operation RUSTY with Maj. Gen. Stephen J.
Chamberlin, the Army's Director of Intelligence. Hillenkoetter warned Chamberlin about
the national security risks posed by the American support of a resurgent German General
Staff and intelligence service. Gen. Chamberlin agreed that this perception created
problems and promised to have Maj. Gen. Robert L. Walsh, EUCOM's G-2, oversee
tighter control over the operation. 52 Chamberlin persuaded Hillenkoetter not to send his
50 Galloway to DCI, "Operation RUSTY," 3 June 1947, DOTS 1171, (S), in DO Records,

a

Box 498, Folder 1, CIA ARC. A draft of the cable from CIG to G-2 EUCOM is also
included. A copy of the actual cable, Director, CIG to G-2, EUCOM, 5 June 1947, War 99500,
OUT 2890, (S), is found in DO Records, C. _3 Box 7, Folder 203, CIA ARC. (S)
51 DCI to Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Personal Representative of the President,
3 Box 11, Folder 481, CIA ARC.
"Operation 'RUSTY," (S), in DCI Records, C
This document contains marginalia, dated 20 June 1947, written by Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright,
DDCI, about the decision not to send this memorandum. (S)
52Wright, Memorandum for the Record, 20 June 1947, (C), in DCI Records, C
Box 13, Folder 549, CIA ARC. In addition to Hillenkoetter and Chamberlin, Gen. Wright and
Col. Williams also attended the meeting. For another description of this meeting, see Cable,
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draft and urged the CIA to keep an open mind on the question of assuming RUSTY. For
its part, the Army momentarily relented in its efforts to have the CIG take over the
German organization. (S)

Uneasiness in Pullach (U)

While the CIG and the Army debated the merits of Operation RUSTY from a
distant vantage point in Washington, Lt. Col. Deane monitored the almost-daily growth of
Gehlen's intelligence service. The hectic expansion of agents and reports in 1946
presented a serious control challenge. Upon his return from the United States, Gehlen
had discovered that Baun had his own plan for a German intelligence service. Gehlen
resented Baun's grasp for control of the organization and worried about the costs and
security of Baun's agents. With the help of the Americans, Gehlen gradually removed
Baun from the leadership of the service during the course of 1947. 53 The Army, in the
meantime, took steps to improve its control over RUSTY, including the formation of a
military cover organization, the 7821st Composite Group. 54 Just before RUSTY moved
Washington to Heidelberg, 27 June 1947, Washington 3718, OUT 3718, (S), in DO Records, C
Box 9, Folder 220, CIA ARC. (S)
53The Army and CIG discussed bringing Baun to America for several months in order to prevent
him from "going independent." Bossard, Memorandum for the File, "Removal of Lt. Col.
Hermann Baun to the United States," 3 September 1947, DOTS-1121, (S), in DO Records, C.
j Box 498, Folder 4, CIA ARC. The situation between Baun and Gehlen created
internal division within the German intelligence service within days after the general's return to
Germany in 1946. Gehlen, however, retained Baun and sent him to Iran to conduct strategic
planning in the Middle East. He died in Munich in December 1951 at the age of 54. (S)
54 CIG's recommendations to Gen. Chamberlin for changes in RUSTY are found in a 27 June
1947 untitled, unclassified note written by Bossard, in DO Records, C.
Box 5,
Folder 9, CIA ARC. The implementation of some of the changes are announced in Headquarters,
First Military District, General Orders Number 54, "Organization of 7821st Composite Group," 1
December 1947, DO Records C. .DBox 2, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)
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from Oberursel to its own compound in Pullach, near Munich, in the late fall of 1947,
Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Deane as the Operations Officer for the German
project. 55 (S)
There was still little enthusiasm for RUSTY among members of the new Central
Intelligence Agency. Henry Hecksher, who had served as chief of the German Mission's
Security Control branch during 1946-47, explained to Richard Helms in March 1948 that
while RUSTY "enjoys the unqualified backing of the Army in Germany," it seemed likely
that the Soviets must have penetrated the German group. "The political implications
alone (leaving aside the espionage angle) would come in handy if the Russians at any
time should look for a pretext to provoke a showdown in Western Germany," Hecksher
declared. Likewise, he was concerned about "the political implications of sponsoring an
organization which in the opinion of qualified observers constitutes a re-activation of the
German Abwehr under American aegis." 56 (S)
Headquarters received more complaints about RUSTY over the course of 1948.
With great disgust, G

2, acting chief of the Karlsruhe Operations Base,

related his experiences with RUSTY in a 19 August memorandum. E

_I had

.1countered Baun's operatives in the summer of 1946 when the Counter Intelligence
55 Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen, pp. 93-97. Relations between Liebel and Gehlen
deteriorated soon after Liebel's arrival; in part due to the American officer's insistence on
obtaining identities of the German agents. Col. Liebel also criticized Gehlen (referred to by his
operational name Dr. Schneider) for poor security practices. Capt. Waldman supported Gehlen's
stand during this period, which created tension within the American chain of command. For this
letter, see [Colonel Liebel] to "Dr. Schneider," 3 March 1948 and Gehlen's vehement reply, "Dr.
Schneider" to Col. Liebel, 11 March 1948, in DO Records, C.

J, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA
ARC. Liebel departed Pullach in August 1948 and Col. Russell Philp, an old "Blue House"
veteran, arrived as his successor in December 1948. Liebel's blackmarket activities and the poor
state of discipline among US military personnel assigned to Pullach affected the Army's efforts
to tighten control over the Germans. C56Hecksher to Helms, "Operation RUSTY," (S), 18 March 1948, in DO Records, C
Box 5, Folder 8, CIA ARC. (S)
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Corps arrested a number of Germans who claimed to work for American intelligence.57
CIC informed SSU about these arrests and C.-

investigated the backgrounds of the

agents. He found that "some of the agents employed were SS personnel with known Nazi
records and, in most cases, undesirable people. Recruiting methods then employed," he
complained, "were so loose that former German officers and noncoms were blindly being
approached to work for American intelligence in espionage activity directed against the
USSR." 58 (S)
RUSTY's approach went against all principles of intelligence work. "In the
recruitment methods no attention was paid to the character of the recruits, security,
political leanings or quality with the result that many of the agents were blown almost
immediately."

L.

7

felt that RUSTY's "recruiting methods indicated a highly

nationalistic group of Germans who could easily become the nucleous [sic] of serious
subversive activity against any occupying power. At the same time, C

l amented,

"the distribution of operational supplies, money, etc. was so loose and elaborate that the
influence on the black market certainly was considerable." 59 (S)
C_

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
The general consensus is that RUSTY represents a tightly-knit
organization of former German officers, a good number of which
formerly belonged to the German general staff. Since they have
an effective means of control over their people through extensive
funds, facilities, operational supplies, etc., they are in a position
to provide safe haven for a good many undesirable elements from
the standpoint of a future democratic Germany. Most of these
officers are unable to find employment and they are therefore able
to maintain their former standard of living without having to put
up with the present difficulties of life in conquered Germany.
They are likewise able to maintain their social standing as former
officers and to continue their own study in the military field and
continue training along military lines. The control of an
extensive intelligence net makes it possible for the leaders to
create a cadre of officers for the perpetuation of German general
staff activity. The organization of RUSTY makes it possible for
them to continue a closely-knit organization that can be expanded
at will. 60 (S)
C_

_3 formerly chief of X-2 in Germany and now head of the

Munich Operations Base, reported his views of RUSTY in a July 1948 memorandum to
Gordon Stewart, the chief of mission in Germany. Like his colleagues, C_
protested RUSTY's poor security practices and its "free-wheeling" methods of agent
recruitment.

j expressed particular distaste at RUSTY's abuse of the

denazification laws, which undermined the operation's overall standing. C_
quoted a "local cynic" that "American intelligence is a rich blind man using the Abwehr
as a seeing-eye dog. The only trouble is—the leash is much too long." 61 (S)
In summarizing the sentiments of Agency officials in Germany, Richard Helms
told Col. Galloway in March 1948, "nothing about RUSTY has been altered which could
lead us to change the position taken by us last year. In fact, the reports in the Soviet

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
dominated press in Germany concerning the use of former German staff and intelligence
officers are such that there is no question that the Russians know this operation is going
on even though they may have some of the details wrong." Helms added, "certainly the
fact that so much publicity has been given to this indicates serious flaws in the security of
the operation." 62 (S)
Little by little, however, the Army managed to get CIA more involved with
RUSTY, despite the complaints from the field and even DCI Hillenkoefter's opposition.
In December 1947, Gen. Walsh brought up the issue of the Agency's taking over of
RUSTY with r

, then CIA's chief of base in Berlin. Walsh maintained that

while the Army's running RUSTY in 1947 might have been considered a "sin of
commission," the failure to run it in 1948 would constitute a "sin of omission." 63 (S)
As late as mid-1948, Hillenkoetter continued to resist the Army's overtures to
assume control of RUSTY. In July, the DCI informed the Army's Director of Intelligence
that he did not want the Army to use a 1946 letter of agreement between the War
Department and CIG to obtain services, supplies, and equipment for the 7821st
Composite Group, the Army's cover organization for RUSTY. Hillenkoetter believed
ilew, and separate, agreement should be drawn up between both organizations to
support the Army's requirements for RUSTY. 64 (S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
At the same time, Hillenkoetter provided Gen. Chamberlin with some news about
RUSTY that he had learned from various sources. In one case, Samuel Bossard, back in
England, had received a letter from a mysterious "R. Gunner" about "some dangerous
points." Gunner, believed to be Gehlen, asked for Bossard's "personal advice concerning
certain business questions" and wanted him to come to Munich. 65 Disagreements
between Gehlen and his American military counterpart, Col. Liebel, now made their way
to the highest levels of CIA. The entire project appeared on the verge of disintegration.66
(S)

The Critchfield Report (U)

Matters quickly came to a head after this point, forcing CIA to consider whether it
should maintain a German intelligence organization. While the Army finally took steps
to issue some priorities in terms of targets and geographic regions for RUSTY, Gen.
Walsh, informed Adm. Hillenkoetter in October that the Army could no longer fund
RUSTY for any activities other than Order of Battle intelligence. 67 During a visit to
Germany, the DCI discussed the matter with Walsh and agreed to provide limited funds
while the CIA conducted yet another investigation of the Army's German operation.
a, Box 13, Folder
65 DCI to Chamberlin, 31 August 1948, (C), in DCI Records, -C
549, CIA ARC. Another copy of this memorandum also appears in DO Records, C
Box 5, Folder 8, CIA ARC. (S)
66Headquarters told its officers in Germany to refrain from forwarding information about
RUSTY to Army officials there because the Army apparently regarded the news as "sniping."
See Cable, SO to Heidelberg, Washington 2664, OUT 58734, 13 February 1948, (S), and Stewart
to Helms, "RUSTY," 17 February 1948, MGH-A-4058, (S), both in DO Records,
.3 Box 5, Folder 8, CIA ARC. (S)
67 For the agenda of the meeting between the Army, Air Force, and Gehlen and list of priorities,
see "Minutes of Meeting," 1 October 1948, (S), in DO Records, E
J, Box 2, Folder 3,
CIA ARC. (S)
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Immediately prior to Adm. Hillenkoetter's agreement with the Army, Col. Galloway and
Gordon M. Stewart conferred about RUSTY. They concluded that the Agency needed to
penetrate RUSTY, and "pay particular attention to its attempts to become the official
German intelligence service." 68 (S)
On 27 October 1948, Col. Galloway informed Stewart that he wanted James H.
Critchfield to examine RUSTY. Critchfield's mandate specified that he should evaluate
RUSTY's Order of Battle facilities and determine which elements should either be
penetrated by the CIA, exploited, left with the Army, or liquidated. The report, Galloway
noted, should be thorough, but also completed within a month. 69 (S)
Critchfield, a young US Army combat veteran, had served in military intelligence
staff positions in both Germany and Austria when he joined the new CIA in 1948. 70 He
embarked on his new project with vigor and met his deadline when he cabled a summary
of his findings to Washington on 17 December. 71 In an extensive study (his full report,

68 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "RUSTY," 15 October 1948, MGK-A-3583, (S), in
-a, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)
DO Records, C
69Cable, SO to Karlsruhe, 27 October 1948, Washington 4193, OUT 70606, (S), in DO Records,
_J., Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. Richard Helms also provided some guidance for this
.av,stigation in Chief, FBM to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "RUSTY," 2 November 1948, MGK3, Box 5, Folder 8, CIA ARC. (S)
W-914, (S), in DO Records, C
70Born in 1917, James H. Critchfield joined the CIA in March 1948. An officer who had risen
from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel in four years, Critchfield had seen extensive combat
in Europe. Following the war, Critchfield served as the chief of the Third US Army's Counter
Intelligence Branch from March 1946 to January 1947 and as chief of the Intelligence Branch of
the United States Forces in Austria from January 1947 to January 1948. Critchfield retained his
US Army rank on joining the CIA, and he was chief of the Munich Operations Base from
September 1948 to March 1949. In June 1949, Critchfield assumed control of the Pullach
Operations Base, the Agency's point of contact with Gehlen, until 1956. Critchfield later held
senior positions in the DD/P and served as the National Intelligence Officer for Energy until he
retired in 1974. Personnel file, James H. Critchfield,
—7
71 Cable, Karlsruhe to SO, 17 December 1948, Karlsruhe 2925, IN 19522, (S), in DO Records,
, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)
C.
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with annexes, arrived at Headquarters after that point), he and several associates
examined the Army's relationship with RUSTY, its funding, organizational structure,
intelligence reporting, operations and procedures, and Gehlen's own plans for his group.
Critchfield's report stands as the Agency's most thorough review of the growing German
intelligence service. 72 (S)
He also set the tenor for future CIA relations with Gehlen. While Critchfield
made several important points, the CIA officer observed that the Agency could not ignore
the presence of RUSTY. He wrote:
In the final analysis, RUSTY is a re-established GIS which has
been sponsored by the present de facto national government of
Germany, i.e. by the military occupational forces. Because the
4,000 or more Germans who comprise RUSTY constitute a going
concern in the intelligence field, it appears highly probable that
RUSTY will emerge as a strong influence, if not the dominant
one, in the new GIS. Another important consideration is that
RUSTY has closest ties with ex-German General Staff officers
throughout Germany. If, in the future, Germany is to play any role
in a Western European military alliance, this is an important
factor. 73 (S)
As Critchfield pointed out, RUSTY was a fait accompli, regardless of whether the
CIA wanted the German organization or not. He advocated the Agency's assumption of
RUSTY because "from an intelligence viewpoint, it seems desirable that CIA enter
RUSTY at that point where it can control all contacts and operational developments
outside of German territory." 74 The Agency now believed that the United States could no

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longer simply dismantle RUSTY, prompting the CIA to take control from the Army in the
summer of 1949. Hillenkoetter reluctantly agreed to this move and made it clear that
"CIA was not asking to take over Rusty and was expressing a willingness to do so only
because the Army was requesting it." 75 (S)
Gen. Omar Bradley, the Army's Chief of Staff (and soon-to-be Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal both supported the
Agency's move, as did individual members of the National Security Council. Throughout
the first months of 1949, the Agency, the Department of the Army, and Gen. Lucius D.
Clay, US military governor of Germany, dickered over the CIA's assumption of
RUSTY. 76 At the same time, Critchfield in Pullach had his hands full with an
acrimonious dispute between Gehlen and Col. Philp, the US Army commander on the
scene. 77 With Gen. Clay's departure from Germany in May, the Agency took full
responsibility for the Gehlen Organization from the US Army on 1 July 1949. 78 (S)
75Helms, Memorandum for the Files, 1 February 1949, (S), in DO Records,
5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

., Box

76For correspondence during this delicate transition period, see S. Leroy Irwin, Director of
Intelligence to DCI, "Operation 'Rusty," 19 January 1949, SD-13884, (S); Cable, SO to
Karlsruhe, 9 February 1949, Washington 8885, OUT 75997, (S);
j, Executive
Officer to Chief of Operations and Chief, FBM, "ODEUM," 1 April 1949, (C); Cable, SO to
Karlsruhe, 16 May 1949, Washington 3624, OUT 81439, (S); all of these documents (with the
exception of the 'C .z memo) are located in DO Records, L
a, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA
ARC. The _3 , memo is found in DO Records, C
3, Box 2, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (S)
"Chief, FBM to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "Operational, 10 February 1949, MGK-W-1361,
(S), enclosing Alan R. McCracken, Acting ADSO to Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin, Director of
Intelligence, "Operation Rusty," 9 February 1949, in DO Records, C_.
_7, Box 5, Folder
9, CIA ARC. For further information on the hostile environment at Pullach, see Chief of Station,
Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Letter to General Hall," 10 February 1949, MGM-A-961, (S), and
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "ODEUM: Current Situation," 18 April 1949, MGMA-1094, (S), both in DO Records, Job 78-02133R, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)
78 Shortly after CIA took over RUSTY from the Army, the Office of the US High Commission
for Germany (HICOG) assumed control from the Office of the Military Government (OMGUS)
and the Occupation Statute went into effect. In September 1949, the Federal Government of
Germany formed following the ratification of the Basic Law, the new republic's constitution in
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Advisers and Liaison (U)

Even prior to the official transfer, Critchfield specified the terms of agreement
between the CIA and the German organization. The reform of the German currency in
1948 hurt Gehlen's operations and resulted in extensive budget negotiations for the next
two years. The basic agreement reached by Critchfield and Gehlen in June 1948
recognized that "the basis for US-German cooperation in this project lies in the mutual
conviction of the respective parties that increasing cooperation between a free and
democratic Germany and the United States within the framework of the Western
European Union and the Atlantic Community is indispensable for the successful
execution of a policy of opposition and containment of Communist Russia." 79 (S)
Critchfield acknowledged, "the members of the German staff of this project are
acting first and foremost as German nationals working in the interest of the German
people in combating Communism." Yet, the Agency's chief of base insisted that, until
Germany regained its sovereignty and the two countries made new arrangements, the
Central Intelligence Agency would remain the dominant partner. Critchfield, for
example, would specify intelligence priorities to Gehlen and "complete details of
operational activities will be available to US staff." While American officials would deal
with the Germans in "an advisery and liaison capacity," Critchfield planned to scrutinize
May. In the spring of 1952, Germany and the Western Allies replaced the Occupation Statute
with Contractual Agreements. Three years later, West Germany became a sovereign nation and
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Several months later, West Germany
reformed its military forces and the Gehlen Organization became Germany's official intelligence
service in February 1956. (U)
79Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Basic Agreement with ODEUM," 13 June 1949,
, Box 5, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)
MGL-A-8, (S), in DO Records, C
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the Gehlen Organization. "All operations outside of Germany will," Critchfield noted,
"be reduced to a project basis with funds provided for each project as approved and on
the basis of continuing review of operational details and production." 80 (S)
Relations between the Agency and the German intelligence service in subsequent
years were often at odds. Gehlen resented the CIA's intrusion, which was far more
sweeping than the Army's. In 1950, for example, Critchfield reduced the number of
Gehlen's projects from 150 to 49, and he soon whittled this latter number to ten.
Critchfield bluntly told Gehlen in 1950 that "it was high time he recognized the fact that
his organization, while viewed in a most creditable light for its tactical collection and
especially its military evaluation work, was considered definitely second class in any
intelligence activity of a more difficult or sophisticated nature, and that if he had any
aspirations beyond that of producing a good G-2 concern for the future German Army,
some drastic changes were in order." 81 (S)

In Hindsight (U)

The CIA now found itself in a similar quandary as the Army had been in dealing
with ODEUM (the Agency's new name for RUSTY). 82 It provided considerable funding
(s)
81a

/. through XI-7. For more complete details of the conflict
between CIA and Gehlen, see "Gehlen History." (S)

82The Agency dropped the use of the term RUSTY in 1949, and used a new operational code,
ODEUM, through 1950 when it changed to ZIPPER. Following the establishment of the BND in
1956, the Agency referred to Gehlen's group as UPHILL and UPSWING. CIA's Pullach Base
stopped using the Army's cover as the 7821st Composite Group and became known as Special
Detachment, EUCOM, or the 7878th Signal Detachment. This later changed to Special
Detachment, US Army Europe, and then to the US Army Technical Coordinating Activity. C

_D
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and support to Gehlen, but had little actual control over the service. 83 This marked,
perhaps, the greatest shortcoming of the Agency's work with the West German
intelligence service and created long-term problems for both the Americans and Germans.
(S)
The Gehlen Organization has long been accused of acting as a shelter for Nazis
and those who committed crimes during the Third Reich. Because of their sponsorship of
the German intelligence service, the US Army and CIA are implicated in this criticism.
From the earliest days, SSU, CIG, and later CIA recognized this as a problem and, in fact,
warned the Army about supporting Gehlen. After 1949, CIA inherited these same
concerns and, while it curbed Gehlen's viewpoints on the American war crimes program,
the Agency could never get the Germans to "clean house." 84 (S)
On occasion, the Agency tried to determine the composition of the German
intelligence service and the number of former NSDAP party members. A CIA staff
3 per month in .1949 to run his operations. By
83The CIA initially provided Gehlen with C.
3 to support the West German
1955, the Agency had an .annual expense for over C_
21 on Gehlen's organization
intelligence service. Between 1950 and 1968, CIA spent C.
and US liaison operations. The CIA received some funding support from the Army while
TQTY, in the early days, increased its revenue through black market activities. The Agency
never had full access to the identities of Gehlen agents, forcing the Agency to employ clandestine
means to identify German intelligence personnel. C

3

"For Gehlen's viewpoints concerning American war crimes trials of German officers, which
resulted in a stir between CIA and the German service,
By 1953, the official perception of CIA and Ciehlen's intelligence service had
become so entwined that even Roger M. Keyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense criticized the
Agency's role in Germany. Frank Wisner, now DD/P, responded, "there is no adequate answer or
correction of the assumption that we rely very largely upon the ZIPPER effort for intelligence on
Eastern Europe generally. This is a common fallacy which is always cropping up and it should be
pointed out that we have our own independent operations in addition to the ZIPPER effort."
Wisner to DCI, "Communications from Under Secretary of Defense dated 4 December and
Relating to (a) Military Cover for CIA Operations; and (b) Deficiencies in Intelligence
Collection and Dissemination," 12 December 1953, TS 92318, (C), in DO Records,
, Box 13, Folder 16, CIA ARC. (C)
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officer at Pullach estimated in the mid-1950s that some 13 percent of Gehlen's
organization (76 out of 600 identified "ZIPPERites") were "known to have been either
former SS, SD, SA members, NSDAP members, War Crime offenders and/or a
combination of the same." A few years previously, Gehlen had told Critchfield (who
served as the CIA's contact with the Germans and as chief of CIA's base at Pullach from
1948 through 1956) that 28 percent of his officers had been Nazi Party members. The
German general expressed an ironic pleasure that his intelligence service had a lower
percentage of SS and Nazi party members then had the German Bundestag in 1953. 85 (S)
t, who

conducted the unofficial survey of Nazis within the

German service, did uncover several "individuals still in the employ of ZIPPER whose
records appear from a qualitative standpoint particularly heinous." He listed these five
members of Gehlen's group (Arwed Flegel, Willy Heinrich Friede, Conrad Fiebig, Otto
Somann, and Karlgeorg Wellhoener) and discussed their Nazi records and service with
Gehlen.

noted, "we feel it is a bit late in the game to do anything more than

remind UTILITY [Gehlen's CIA cryptonym] that he might be smart politically to drop
such types." 86 Despite American apprehensions, Gehlen's BND did not purge these Nazi

85 [Unsigned] to EE, "Former Nazi and SS Membership in ZIPPER, circa 1954, (S), in DO
Records, C
Box 2, Folder 4, CIA ARC.E Ji identifies C
as the
author of the CIA memorandum about Nazis in the West German intelligence service.
, never sent this memorandum to Headquarters. a
Apparently,[
_Js
86 [Unsigned] to EE, "Former Nazi and SS Members in ZIPPER," circa 1954, (S), in DO

D„ Box 2, Folder 4, CIA ARC. CIA records indicate that Arwed Flegel,
Records, c
for example, was a Waffen SS officer who had escaped from an internment camp in 1946, but
was recaptured by the British later that year. By 1953, the Agency reported that Flegel was
involved in a scandal in northern Germany involving rivalries between the Gehlen Organization
and a local security service. See Arwed Flegel, C
DO Records. In the case of
Konrad Fiebig, CIA's records indicate that he was wanted by the Army's CIC in 1946 for mass
murder. A brief notation indicates that Fiebig was a suspected member of an SD
Einsatzkommando in Russia during the war. Fiebig was later charged, but found not guilty of the
charges, by a West German court in 1962. The BND, however, dismissed him for falsifying his
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leftovers until the 1960s after the Service had been rocked by a series of spy scandals.87
(S)
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, the full
extent of the communist penetration of the Gehlen Organization and its successor, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst, has become more apparent. The KGB's ability to use former

Nazi officials as agents from the first days in the mid-1940s led to further exploitation of
the West German intelligence services by the East German STASI until 1989. The
concerns of the OSS, SSU, CIG, and CIA about RUSTY's security proved a belated
finale of the Gehlen Organization's legacy. (S)

2,
record. See Konrad Fiebig, i
Records. Gehlen also cultivated support from
some of Germany's most prominent military and political leaders. Gehlen placed a German
general in charge of these Special Connections (Sonderverbindungen) to cultivate their
assistance. By 1951, C-
_J;, a CIA staff member at Pullach, determined that Gehien
had at least 207 Special Connections from all elements of German society. In his first report in
1950,
J noted that the "Special Connections reach into the Government, the political
parties, the former officer corps, the former NSDAP and SS, the diplomatic corps, the legal and
medical profession, the press . . . the industrialists, the aristocracy, the intellectuals, the state
police forces." The Special Connections offered Gehlen access to information throughout the
country hut ni g () tied the new nraanization to the power structure of the old Nazi regime. C_
87 Gehlen's intelligence service suffered from a rash of intelligence scandals, including the Felfe
case, perpetrated by members of the BND who had served in the SS during World War II.

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GECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Chapter Ten

BDURCEGMETHODSEXEMPT ION

DAtt 2007

A Valuable Man Whom We Must Control (U)

As RUSTY became a stronger player in Western Europe, the Central Intelligence
Agency needed more, rather than less, information about its personnel and operations.1
In fact, both the CIA and the CIC in Germany conducted their own separate intelligencegathering operations against Gehlen throughout the early 1950s. 2 The Agency also kept a
close eye on known German intelligence agents and, in one important case, took over a
top Gehlen agent to become a CIA source. Gaining one of Gehlen's agents presented an
unusual opportunity for CIA, coming at a time when the CIA had just recently assumed
responsibility for ODEUM (CIA's new operational term for RUSTY). The Agency
wanted to curb Gehlen's appetite for expansion, particularly in Austria. (S)

Penetration of the Gehlen Organization (U)
1 Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Ruffner, "Prussian Nobleman, SS Officer,
and CIA Agent: The Case of Otto Albert Alfred von Bolschwing," in Studies in Intelligence
(1998), pp. 61-77 (now declassified). (U)
2The Army's CIC, in particular, resented the development of RUSTY and the relatively free
range that its agents operated in Germany. After the CIA's assumption of the German service, the
CIC launched its own intelligence-gathering project, Operation CAMPUS, against Gehlen. CIA,
likewise, launched an intensive data-gathering operation, known as UJDREDGER and later
UJVENTURE, to identify German intelligence personnel and methods. The Agency also
implemented a telephone and mail intercept program, known as CALLIKAK.

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"ODEUM," case officer Thomas A. Lucid at Pullach wrote in late 1949, "should
not be allowed to build, plan, or even desire to extend itself into Austria, whether as a
little Austrian ODEUM, with recognition from or penetration into the Austrian
government in the least comparable to the recognition and relative position they hope to
achieve here in Germany." ODEUM's activities in Austria, "if at all, it must be restricted
to a low-level, purely operational favor-for-favor horse-trading basis." 3 (S)
Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing seemed to offer potential for recruitment by
the Americans because he could provide extensive insight into ODEUM's foreign
intelligence activities. Operating in Salzburg, Bolschwing had reestablished his wartime
ties to members of the Romanian Iron Guard now scattered throughout southern Europe.
Bolschwing had joined RUSTY in 1947, although he had fallen from Gehlen's favor by
1950 because of his unwillingness to provide Pullach with operational information.
Throughout 1949 and 1950, the CIA debated whether to pick up Bolschwing from
ODEUM and to use him as an American source. (S)
In a late 1949 memorandum, Thomas A. Lucid, who had just transferred to the
CIA from the CIC, discussed US intelligence plans for Austria with Richard Helms.4
Otto von Bolschwing figured prominently in Lucid's planning. "It would seem," Lucid

3 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "ODEUM and Austria," 12 December 1949, MGLDO Records. This same document is also
A-945, (S), in Otto von Bolschwing,
Box
5,
Folder
5,
CIA
ARC. (S)
found in DO Records,

L

a

3„

4Thomas A. Lucid joined the CIA in August 1949 after serving with the 430th CIC Detachment •
in Austria. Born in 1917, Lucid had been an Army captain for five years and served with the 88th
CIC Detachment in Italy and Austria. A lawyer by training, Lucid remained in Austria as a
civilian employee and CIC section chief in Linz. Lucid spent ten years (1949-1959) at Pullach
and later served in South Vietnam and Taiwan. He capped his career as chief of base in Munich
and retired in 1972. Lucid died in 1985. Personnel file, Thomas A. Lucid,

C

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•

declared, "that [it is] a basis for splitting Bolschwing away from ODEUM and at the same
time making the action work [to] our advantage. For example, he might conceivably be
able to break into the future official Austrian IS, at the same time remaining a
collaborator of ours." Lucid did have some reservations about Bolschwing. "The
suggestions regarding Bolschwing," he wrote, "should not necessarily be taken as an
indication that we regard him as a top-flight operative. As a matter of fact he may be, but
if this is the case, he has apparently managed to keep a bushel handy for concealment
purposes. Always giving the devil his due," Lucid added, Bolschwing "may indeed have
great potentialities which could be nursed along, particularly in the political field." 5 (S)
Lucid's mixed feelings about Bolschwing echoed earlier sentiments expressed by
the Central Intelligence Group. A trace request to Headquarters from Austria in the
spring of 1947 brought word that "Otto Albrecht Alfred Bolschwing is shady character."6
Security Control in Munich also confirmed that Bolschwing was considered unreliable.7
Upon receipt of this information, the Security Control chief in Austria responded, "after
considering the information on subject provided by Headquarters, together with

5 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "ODEUM and Austria," 12 December 1949, MGLA-945, (S), in Bolschwing, C.
_2 DO Records. (S)
6Cable, Washington to Vienna, Heidelberg, 27 March 1947, Washington 766, IN 8397, (S), in
Bolschwing, E__
L ,DO Records. See also Security Control Division to Commanding
Officer, Austria, "Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing," 25 March 1947, X-9573, (S), in DO
3, Box 6, Folder 128, CIA ARC. A copy of this same memo is found in
Records, C.
DO Records, c_ Box 5, Folder 168, CIA ARC. Interestingly, Bolschwing claimed
to have known Lt. Rene Grammel, the SI officer in Munich killed in an automobile accident in
late 1946. In its trace, Headquarters could find no evidence that Grammel and Bolschwing had
any connections. (S)
7. C.
_ to AB-51 [Hecksherl, "Bolschwing, Otto Albrecht Alfred," 26 March 1947,
MSC/Memo/176, (S), in Bolschwing, IL
u DO Records. C
_3 in Munich
wrote the reply and noted, "Lt. Grammel, as you know, is dead and many of his casual contacts
cannot be now ascertained." C
j believed, however, that any contact between the deceased
CIG officer and Bolschwing was of "only a casual noncommittal nature." (S)
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Heidelberg's reply to our inquiry, we have decided not to use subject in any capacity. No
approach will be made to him." SC Austria added, "we will make an effort, however, to
be kept informed on his activities, particularly with regard to the CE aspect." 8 (S)

Prussian Nobleman, Adventurer, and SS Officer (U)

Bolschwing's personal history was, indeed, "not the best." 9 Born in 1909 in
Prussia, the son of a nobleman, he was orphaned when his father was killed in action on
the Eastern Front during World War I. As a young man, Bolschwing worked with several
trading companies and other businesses in Germany, Great Britain, and elsewhere in
Europe. He then struck out to make his fortune in the British Mandate territory of
Palestine, where he became embroiled in early Nazi intelligence activities in the Middle
East. 10 (U)
Bolschwing's own "Life History," (written for the CIA in the fall of 1949)
contained a number of fanciful exaggerations about his activities following his return to
Germany in the mid-1930s. 11 While he denied his Nazi past and claimed that he always
the regime,

Bolschwing actually worked for the section of the German RSHA

dealing directly with the "Jewish problem." In 1940, he moved from this work to assume
the post of SD representative in Bucharest, Romania, where he supported the Iron Guard
8 Security Control Division, Austria to Chief, FBM, "Otto Albrecht Alfred Bolschwing," 16 April
, DO Records. A copy of this same memo
1947, LSX-645, (S), in Bolschwing, C
Box 402, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
is found in DO Records,

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
in a bloody but abortive coup attempt against Marshal Ion Antonescu in January 1941.
Bolschwing undertook this action without the approval of his superiors in Berlin, which
prompted the German Foreign Ministry to protest the SD's interference in the Reich's
external affairs. Following the suppression of the Iron Guard revolt, Bolschwing spent a
"few months" in confinement in Germany. His arrest and imprisonment as well as his
subsequent demotion in the SS later bolstered his self-projected image as a resistance
fighter—an aspect that the wily German played up by obtaining certificates from US Army
units attesting to his underground activities at the end of the war. 12 (S)
Bolschwing's statements in 1949 failed to convince the CIA about his
trustworthiness. 13 One report noted that "most evaluations of B. .. . run as follows: self
-seeking, egotistical, and a man of shifting loyalties. His protests of democracy and, more
particularly, feelings of Austrian nationalism seem to contradict his history." 14 Another
observer wrote, "he is an adventurer, a lover of intrigue, and a wire-puller who is fond of
power." Furthermore, Bolschwing claimed that "in his position in Romanian he was able
to frustrate many of the evil designs of the Nazi regime, but it should be remembered as a
black mark against him rather than a point in his favor that he arranged the escape of
[Romanian fascist Horia] Sima and others at a time when these men were at the height of
their crimes." This report added, "if one adds to these objections the difficulties inherent

12Bolschwing received certificates from various American units in Austria, including the 71st
and 410th Infantry Regiments for service in the summer of 1945. He later stated that he worked
with the 44th Infantry Division from April through June 1945; the 103rd Infantry Division in
July and August 1945; the 84th Infantry Division until December 1945; and finally with Third
US Army Intelligence through December 1946. One of the officers who provided Bolschwing
with a certificate, Lt. Col. Roy F. Goggin of the 71st Infantry Regiment, later sponsored him as
an immigrant. (S)
13 Bolschwing, "Statement on Life History." (S)
14Undated, unsigned memorandum, "UNREST (Bolschwing) Files," (S), in Bolschwing,
DO Records. (S)
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in Bolschwing's involvement with political reporting on Austria, it is hard to see how,
among all our other commitments, much could be gained by having MOB [Munich
Operations Base] take him over as the principal agent for three Romanian projects." 1 5 (S)
The Romanian projects in question, ODEUM Projects 114, 115, and 116,
involved members of the Iron Guard faction under Constantin Papanace. Based in Italy,
the group broke away from the main body of the Horia Sima's Iron Guard movement
while quarantined in Germany during the war. Bolschwing's ODEUM projects claimed
to have widespread political and military coverage throughout Romania through his Iron
Guard contacts. 16 After reviewing Bolschwing's potential, James Critchfield at Pullach
commented, "we are convinced that Bolschwing's Romanian operations, his connections
with the Papanace group, his internal Austrian political and intelligence connections, and
last but not least, his knowledge of and probable future on ODEUM's activities in and
through Austria make him a valuable man whom we must control." 17 (S)

CIA's Man in Austria (U)

By early 1950, CIA decided to take Bolschwing as an agent. Bolschwing met
with Gehlen in January and discussed the terms of his departure from ODEUM.
Bolschwing then informed US intelligence about this development, and Critchfield spoke

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
with Gehlen about Bolschwing. 18 Ironically, Critchfield found that "UTILITY [Gehlen]
expressed conviction that the Papanace connection is of great value and should be
salvaged" and that he "strongly recommended that the AIS in some way establish
connection with Bolschwing and attempt to obtain from him a comprehensive description
of these operations." Consequently, Critchfield directed

to contact

Bolschwing to learn more about his work with the Romanians. I9 (S)

'a

_Isoon met with Bolschwing and provided a description of his sources,

both Romanian and Austrian. 20 C.

...atated that "UNREST [Bolschwing's CIA

codename, issued in February 1950] has risen steadily in the opinion of this case officer
and POB [Pullach Operations Base] in the last six months . . . . He is unquestionably an
extremely intelligent person, an experienced intelligence operator, a man with an
unusually wide and well placed circle of friends, acquaintances, and sources, and a man
whose grasp of the political-intelligence field throughout the Balkans, and to a lesser
degree in western Europe, is of a high order." 21 Both c

and Ciitchfield were

18 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM, "Interim Solution to the Bolschwing-Austrodeum
Problem," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1200, (S), in Bolschwing,
, DO Records.
Bolschwing's account of his dismissal is found in Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM,
"Bolschwing Report—ODEUM," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1199, (S), enclosing "Final
Conversation with German Organizational Chiefs," 26 January 1950, (S), in Bolschwing, C.
,DO Records. (S)
19 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM, "Interim Solution to the Bolschwing-Austrodeum
Problem," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1200, (S), in Bolschwing, t _j DO Records.
(S)
20
joined CIG in October 1946 and served in Karlsruhe and Berlin before his

a

transfer to what became Pullach Operations Base in May 1949. Born in 1911, E Ci remained
in Pullach as a part of the Agency's Positive Intelligence Operations Section (under Thomas A.
Lucid) until 1954. He later served C._
j until his resignation
to take !private emnlovment in 1957.
(s)
21 "AUSTRODEUM II," Extract of Report, 20 March 1950, MGL-A-1540, (S), in Bolschwing,
DO Records. (S)

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impressed by Bolschwing's preference for working for American intelligence as opposed
to staying with Gehlen. "Probably the single ambition of Bolschwing," the chief of POB
observed, "which is greater than that of playing a key role in Austrian intelligence is to
become an American citizen and work in some capacity in political and intelligence
affairs in Europe or in the United States as an American citizen." 22 (S)

The First Coverup (U)

CIA's interest in Bolschwing soon extended to covering up his Nazi past. In early
1950, the Austrian Ministry of Interior investigated Bolschwing's presence in that country
(Bolschwing was a German citizen) and requested the Americans to provide a copy of his
Nazi party records from the Berlin Documents Center. When Pullach received word from
the Berlin Base about this request, it immediately asked that his file be withheld. Peter
M.F. Sichel agreed to pull Bolschwing's records and hold them separately, warning that
Bolschwing was prominently mentioned in the "German Primer." 23 In a revealing
memorandum to Pullach, Sichel forwarded his recommendations:
1. We would like to draw your attention to some circumstances,
which, in my opinion, make it unwise to have a negative file
check on such persons as von Bolschwing . . . .

22 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM, "ODEUM Situation Austria," 1 February 1950,
MGL-A-1198, (S), in Bolschwing, C.
_3, DO Records. (S) .
23 The German Intelligence Services, two volumes of British Intelligence reports on German
Abwehr and SD/SS intelligence personnel, organizations, and operations compiled during World
War II. The "German Primer" was used by Allied intelligence during the war and remained in
use afterward. C_
. A copy of the "German Primer" is available in
the CIA History Staff files. (S)
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2. The files at the Berlin Documents Center as to Nazi
membership and SS membership, as well as the SS personnel
files, are so complete that it is unlikely that any person checked,
who was a member of either of these two organizations would not
be found in the files. On top of this the persons you are dealing
with are so well known and their background so well publicized
in the past that I deem it improbable that you can protect them
from their past history.
3. At the end of the war we tried to be very smart and changed
the name of several members of the SD and Abwehr in order to
protect them from the German authorities and the occupation
authorities. In most cases these persons were so well known that .
the change in name compromised them more than if they were to
face a denazification court and face the judgment that would have
been meted out to them. In the meanwhile, the developments in
Germany and probably also in Austria have been such that
membership in the SS, or in the SD, or in the Abwehr no longer is
regarded as a strike against any personality. Since I regard it
impossible to keep secret such associations, except in cases where
a person was a clandestine agent of a given organization, I request
you to reassess the advisability of withholding information
available in the Berlin Documents Center.
4. For the record I would like to state, however, that we can
withhold such information if desired. 24 (S)
E

J, Bolschwing's case officer, commented on the Agency's efforts to obscure the

Peter M.F. Sichel served as chief of
1950, MGB-A-5974, (S), in Bolschwing,
the CIA's Berlin Operations Base from 1948 until 1952. A German refugee, Sichel was born in
Mainz in 1922 and escaped from the Nazis. He joined the US Army in 1942 and served in France
with the Seventh US Army's OSS Detachment. He remained in Berlin after the war and ran th,.
base's positive intelligence operations. Gordon M. Stewart, the chief of the German Mission,
rated Sichel as the "most experienced, most capable intelligence officer under my control" in
..he resigned in 1960
1949. Sichel later served C._
to return to his family's wine business. Personnel file, Peter M.F. Sichel,

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UNREST requested us to extract or block files which he believed
were in the Berlin Document[s] Center, to prevent their being
sent to Austria in case of a request for them. This was done.
These files, of which we have a copy, show that UNREST
became a member of the NSDAP in 1932 with the number, 984
212. This is mentioned in his personal history. He was a
member of the SD Hauptamt and in 1940 was promoted to
Obersturmfuehrer, in 1941 to Hauptsturmfuehrer. In February
1945, he was demoted to enlisted man in the SS and thrown out
of the organization. UNREST explains in his autobiography that
he received in 1935 a pre-dated membership in the party, which
made him appear to have been a member since 1932. Subject
was arrested by the Gestapo first in the winter of 1937-38, later in
1942 in Greece, and in September 1942 in Vienna when he was
sent to Berlin and held in a Gestapo prison until April 1943. No
records of these arrests appear in the file from the Berlin
Document[s] Center. UNREST's statement in his personal
history, 'that he held no real SS membership and that his party
membership was somehow mysterious' refers probably to the fact
that as an SD man, he automatically became a member of the SS
and that he received his party membership in 1935, but ostensibly
belonged beginning in 1932. We believe that further explanation
of UNREST's SD, SS, and NSDAP connections are in order and
will request that he provide it. We will later explore UNREST's
reasons for keeping these files from the Austrians. 25 (S)
As C

3 soon learned, Bolschwing's ostensible reason for having the

Americans deny his Nazi record to the Austrian Government centered around his own
suspicious business activities in that country. Bolschwing worked in an Americansponsored firm, the Austria Verlags GMBH, but ran into tax problems with the Austrians.
As matters developed, the CIA denied Bolschwing's Berlin Documents Center file not
only to the Austrians, but also to the 430th CIC Detachment and the Army's Criminal
Investigations Division (CID). This problem dragged on through 1950, eventually
leading the CIA to request the CID's assistance in stalling any Austrian investigation of
25"AUSTRODEUM II," Extract of Report, 20 March 1950, MGL-A-1540, (S), in Bolschwing,
M DO Records. (S)
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Bolschwing. 26 While both of the Army agencies took no action, in Bolschwing's favor,
the CID also declined to provide any assistance in the Austrian probe. The Austrian
Government apparently dropped the case by the end of 1950 for lack of evidence. 27 (S)

Poor Performer (U)

In the midst of Bolschwing's legal problems, CIA also expressed dissatisfaction
with his overall performance. Redesignated as USAGE in March 1950, Bolschwing
failed to redirect his efforts to expanding coverage in southeastern Europe; rather he
preferred to supply "political information, largely overt" about internal Austrian matters.
"This," Critchfield noted in August 1950, "is quite contrary to our desires, since our
primary interest is in fact in the Balkans and not in Austria." At a meeting with
Bolschwing that month, Critchfield told him explicitly:
USAGE must immediately shift his emphasis not only to
clandestine operations into the Balkans, but within this field must
get down to the business of reporting detailed operational
information and bridle his own tendencies to produce political
and sociological studies, interesting from an historical and
academic point of view, but not the type of material which will
ensure continuance of his salary. The history of the Legionary
Movement in Romania, which he has been preparing for from

26At least 24 cables about Bolschwing's tax situation and CIA's efforts are located in
_3, DO Records. (S)
Bolschwing,
27 For CIA's summary report of Bolschwing's tax case, see "USAGE Status as of 15 June 1951,"
DO Records. An Austrian report noted Bolschwing's
(S), in Bolschwing, LL
affiliation with the "CC" in Salzburg and that he did not undergo denazification because he
claimed to have been an active underground fighter. Report also states Bolschwing's SS rank and
that he served in the SD. See Chief of Station, Vienna, to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "Austrian
Police Report on Otto von Bolschwing," 12 November 1950, MAV-A-7053, (S), in Bolschwing,
, DO Records. (S)
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four to six months, will be of interest and possibly add some new
information on the subject. However, USAGE must first
establish his position with us as a clandestine operator before we
are willing to finance the exploitation of his intellectual interest
in the Balkan problem. 28 (S)
Bolschwing reacted with surprise to the American discontent with his "reporting,"
and he spoke of "his Austrian coverage and connections as the aircraft carrier from which
he can operate into the Balkans." He promised, however, to expand his contact with
Papanace's Romanian sources as well as activate two projects in Hungary.29
Bolschwing, in fact, traveled to Rome with Austrian Iron Guard leader Ion Magarit to
consult with Papanace about resurrecting nets throughout Romania and Greece.
Bolschwing, using an Army cover as Captain Albert A. Eisner (provided by the CIA),
never fully reported the results of his Rome trip and nothing really came out of his
collaboration with the Iron Guardists. (S)
What little information Bolschwing provided about his operational activities
disappointed CIA. He did provide the identities of the sources in his networks, but the
Agency dropped the Papanace connection in early 1951 as too expensive and duplicative
of information already obtained in Italy. 30 Pullach also questioned the effectiveness of
his ongoing Austrian projects and proposed Hungarian projects. In the summer of 1951,
28 Extract, MGL-A-3208, 29 August 1950 [Notes of Meeting between Critchfield and
, DO Records. See also
Bolschwing, 24 August 1950], (S), in Bolschwing, C_
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "OFFSPRING-Austria," 29 August 1950, MGL-A, Box 5, Folder 5, CIA ARC. Bolschwing's codename
3208, (S), in DO Records, C
changed from UNREST to USAGE on 17 March 1950. (S)
29 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "USAGE/Operational Report," 12 September
DO Records. (S)
1950, MGL-A-3321, (S), in Bolschwing,
30 The identities of many of Bolschwing's contacts and Headquarters trace results are located in
his 201 file. For an example, the 1952 Personal Record Questionnaire on Dr. Anton Fellner, an
Austrian lawyer, is located in the 201 file. Fellner published a Nazi paper, the Volkischer
Beobachter in Austria before the war. He later commanded a propaganda unit in Russia and
became a colonel in the SS. Many of Bolschwing's contacts and subagents shared similar
backgrounds. (S)
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Pullach base reevaluated Bolschwing in a report to Headquarters. "It seems apparent," an
Agency report summed up, "that while Pullach relations with USAGE have been cordial,
and while USAGE has professed to be completely cooperative, Pullach has not been
much more successful than ZIPPER [the Gehlen Organization] in terms of overall
results." Critchfield added, "there appears to be little hope that he will ever develop into
a first class agent." 31 (S)

A Very Rare Bird (U)

Rather than drop Bolschwing as an unproductive agent, Pullach base
transferred him to the Salzburg Operations Base in Austria. 32 Bolschwing's new case
officer, E-

, quickly found him to be "reliable, efficient, amenable to direction,

and can be increasingly guided into activities directly supplementary to Austrian Station
activities." 33 1

_7reported to Headquarters that USAGE "is genuinely devoted to the

United States; he possesses truly extraordinary energy and efficiency; and he will
cheerfully accept and is anxious to receive direction and guidance." He excused
Bolschwing's previous failure by putting the blame on the Pullach base. "It would
appear," C _3 wrote, "that his past sins—which were in any event chiefly the result of

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
lack of thorough direction—may be forgiven." C. -D considered Bolschwing "one of the
most valuable assets of the Austrian Station," and accepted his story about his Nazi
past. 34 (S)
Bolschwing now claimed to have several new projects, including penetration
operations into Czechoslovakia, intelligence sources on the Soviet zone in Austria, and
contacts with Austrian police and political parties. 35 For the next two years, Bolschwing
(now known as GROSSBAHN after his transfer to Salzburg) provided a vast amount of
information on the Soviet zone while also supporting Salzburg's REDCAP and
REDSKIN programs. He worked for the CIA under a loose journalistic or publishing
cover with seven subagents. In early 1953, the Agency estimated the total yearly cost for
Project GROSSBAHN (including Bolschwing and his sources) at $20,000. 36 (S)
Bolschwing's main activity during this period, however, focused less on
intelligence gathering than in winning admittance to the United States. In early
September 1952, C 3 agreed with several other CIA officials that Bolschwing should
depart Austria for America for security purposes. Noting his "long and faithful service
for US intelligence," C .3 felt that "the granting of citizenship and contract agent
earance to GROSSBAHN would permit him to concentrate his full energies on
operations and his own support problems and to integrate his activities directly with
34 C._

known as C. was born in 1915 and served in the US Army in Europe during
the war. He joined CIG in late 1946 and served in Frankfurt, Karlsruhe, and Berlin before his
assignment to Salzburg as chief of Hungarian operations. Immediately prior to his arrival in
(-iad worked on the ZIPPER Desk in Washington. C ____Iretired from the CIA in
Austria, C
1965 and died ten years later. Personnel file, L

Base, concurred in this recommendation and added:
We are certainly aware of the exceptional measures we are asking
in GROSSBAHN's case, but we feel that the action will be most
beneficial to the operations of this base. GROSSBAHN is an
exceptional individual and offers, we believe, sufficient long
range potential to warrant extraordinary measures to get him on
the team. He is devoted to United States interests, vitally
interested in and capable of long term intelligence work, and has
all the earmarks of a professional intelligence operator and
executive. Coupled with his demonstrated loyalty and reliability,
these qualities make him a very rare bird, and one we should go
to considerable pains to exploit. 37 (S)
To support Bolschwing's immigration,

prepared'a packet pertaining to his

intelligence work. Bolschwing contributed another account of his life, Nazi activities,
and work for the resistance. After reciting his story (in a more embellished form than his
1949 account), Bolschwing now exclaimed, "I may also state that I have never been in the
pay of SS or the party or the German Government, and I flatter myself that at least in this
respect I am an exception." 38 (S)

37 Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN - US Citizenship," 29 September 1952,
_D , born in
, DO Records. C
EAS-A-112, (S), in Bolschwing,
1921, received his degree in Romance Languages from Ohio State University in 1943. That same
year, he was inducted into the US Army and joined OSS in October. He served with X-2 in the
European Theater of Operations and remained in Europe after the war. From October 1947
through early 1949, C was CIA's liaison officer with the European Command in Frankfurt
and Heidelberg. He then became chief of the Karlsruhe Operations Base during 1949-50 before
moving to Vienna as the chief of the Hungarian Operations Section until 1952. At that point, he
took over the Salzburg Operations Base through 1954 and oversaw Bolschwing's activities.
. He retired in 1974 and
Cj later served E:
died in 1978. C.
38 Ibid. The Austrian Station also sent information to Headquarters concerning Bolschwing's
second wife and child. See Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—US

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Upon the receipt oft..

J packet, Washington observed that Bolschwing's

proposed immigration raised several questions. Headquarters asked whether the Austrian
Station understood the legal requirements for a foreigner to gain an immigrant visa and
obtain US citizenship. The process, it declared, was not as simple as bringing
Bolschwing to America for three months and then returning him to Austria. On another
note, Washington asked what advantages American citizenship would give Bolschwing as
a long-term agent in Austria. 39 Headquarters warned that "in the event that it is finally
decided to go through with the proposed course of action, Grossbalm should clearly
understand that we do not and cannot assume unlimited responsibility for him." 40 (S)
The Headquarters communique engendered more discussion in Austria.
, Bolschwing's newest American case officer, detailed in a lengthy memorandum in
the spring of 1953 why Salzburg Base wanted Bolschwing to move to the United States.
C_ __Idefended the course of action because "we feel GROSSBAHN's background and
experience qualifies him for consideration in a position as closely approximates that of
staff status as his citizenship will allow." After elaborating on several points, . C
added that "we will do all possible to imprint in his mind that taking the initial steps
toward US citizenship will in no way obligate us, morally or otherwise, to assist him in
his relocation should the course of events force his severance with KUBARK [CIA]."41
(S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
After several months of back-and-forth discussions, Headquarters authorized
Bolschwing's move to the United States. 42 The Agency, however, refused to use its
special legal procedure and warned that it could take some time for the INS to waive
Bolschwing's Nazi party membership and allow him to enter the United States.
Washington also warned that it would terminate its association with Bolschwing upon his
immigration "unless much stronger, more specific plan presented for future work upon
return to Austria. On basis past performance we [are] unconvinced future efforts as
recruiter will be productive enough to warrant undertaking sponsorship his return. Such
sponsorship," Washington added, "[is] bound to make ultimate disposal much more
difficult."43 (S)
Bolschwing applied for a regular immigration visa under the German quota at the
American Consulate General in Munich in August 1953. The Eastern Europe Division
asked the Agency's Alien Affairs Division to coordinate Bolschwing's arrival in America
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The CIA did not conceal Bolschwing's
NSDAP membership or his SD service from the INS. EE , however, did not offer details
about his past other than repeating Bolschwing's own stories. 44 Meanwhile, the CIA in
Austria "rechecked" third agency files, notably CIC and USFA, G-2. Two of the

42 Bolschwing was not the only member of Gehlen's staff to enter the United States. For a list of
postwar West German intelligence service personnel residing in America, see Chief, EE to Chief
of Base, Pullach, "Former ZIPPER/UPSW1NG Personnel in the US," 21 December 1956, EGL, Box 2, Folder 38, CIA ARC. (S)
W-2995, (S), in DO Records, C..
43 Cable, DCI to Senior Representative Austria, 28 August 1953, Director 17553, OUT 84658,
DO Records. (S)
(S) in Bolschwing, c_
44Chief, EE to Director of Security, ATTN: Alien Affairs Officer, "Request for Aid in
j, DO Records.
Facilitating US Entry for Agent," [undated], (S), in Bolschwing,
3 to
J "Mechanics of Aiding Agent to Obtain US Visa," 19
See also C_
J DO Records. A note at the bottom of this page
May 1953, (S), in Bolschwing, C..
states that the CIA anticipated problems in obtaining visa because of Bolschwing's Nazi party
affiliations. (S)

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documents found in this new search (both derived from informants) identified
Bolschwing as a member of Adolf Eichmann's staff. 45 (S)

Significant Reactions (U)

The CIA responded to this evidence by ordering a third polygraph examination in
September 1953. 46 The Agency tried on three occasions to ascertain Bolschwing's bona
fides through polygraph testing. After his first exam in April 1952, the examiner
concluded Bolschwing was not trying to conceal anything important from the Agency. "It
would, of course, be remarkable if the subject had nothing important to hide from us. He
several times stated that his life was an open book to us, and we could ask what we like.
Sensitivity to the question was not of an order that would indicate this man had
something vitally important to conceal from us but that there was at least one thing that
he would rather not discuss about his past." 47 (S)
Immediately prior to his departure for the United States, the Agency again
interrogated Bolschwing, "a rather poor LCFLUTTER subject," for a total of 22 hours
over three days in September 1953. The examiner determined that "it appeared questions
regarding subject's activities prior to 1945 cause more LCFLUTTER tension and
45 Chief of Base to Chief, EE, "Otto von Bolschwing—Local Traces," 28 September 1953, EASJ, DO Records. (S)
A-2171, (S), in Bolschwing, 1
46Bolschwing's first polygraph took place in April 1952 and a second test occurred in May 1953
when the CIA learned that one of his agents had been in touch with Wilhelm Hoettl. See Chief,
EE to Chief of Base, Salzburg, "Grossbahn—CC-2," 26 November 1952, EAS-W-82, (S); Chief of
Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, "Grossbalui—CC-2," 2 February 1953, EAS-A-770, (S); and Chief
of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, "Grossbahn—General Security," 6 May 1953, EAS-A-1310, (S),
DO Records. (S)
all in Bolschwing, C
47Chief of Station, Frankfurt to Chief, EE, "Detailed Report of CARRIAGE Test of USAGE on
19 April 1952," 21 April 1952, MGM-A-09283, (S), in Bolschwing, C.
J.,, DO
Records. (S)
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disturbance than questions regarding his activities subsequent to 1945." When asked, for
example, about his connection to Adolf Eichmann, Bolschwing claimed that he had met
him only twice and refused his offer to join the "Eichmann Sonderkommando." After
"detailed discussion" on this point, the examiner concluded that "it does not appear that
subject has been withholding any important information regarding Eichman[n], but
considering his initial reaction to the question it is some minor fact related to the matter
that subject is unwilling to mention."'" (S)
When asked about any official positions that he had held with the Nazis,
Bolschwing "produced significant reactions every time that particular question was
asked." The polygraph operator then compared Bolschwing's reactions to questions that
dealt with his activities both before and after the end of the war. "It is this examiner's
considered opinion that this difference is not due to any deception but rather to the fact
that subject is unable to recall all the exact details behind all the activities that he has
engaged in prior to the war and during the war, and therefore becomes emotionally
disturbed by the thought that he might have forgotten some essential point." 49 (S)
Despite the fact that the CIA had already told the INS about Bolschwing's
SDAP membership, Agency officials in Austria advised him not to admit this fact after
his arrival in the United States. 50 The CIA worried that if Bolschwing admitted this at a
later date, the INS "would be forced, for appearances sake, to follow the letter of the law"
48L

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
and deport the German. The Agency had obtained Bolschwing's immigration visa over
the objections of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

E

.]

also told

Bolschwing not to contact any member of the Central Intelligence Agency in the United
States except in case of "dire emergency." This restriction included the renewal of social
contacts or trying to reenter the intelligence business. 51 (S)
Headquarters quickly responded to the field station's request for guidance about
what Bolschwing should state about his Nazi record. In addition to warning Bolschwing
against applying for any sensitive or government jobs, EE elaborated on what approach
Bolschwing needed to take in the United States:
Assuming that he has not denied Nazi affiliations on his visa
application form, he should definitely not deny his record if the
matter comes up in dealings with US authorities and he is forced
to give a point-blank answer. Thus, if asked, he should admit
membership, but attempt to explain it away on the basis of
extenuating circumstances. If he were to make a false statement
on a citizenship application or other official paper, he would get
into trouble. Actually, GROSSBAHN is not entering the US
under false circumstances, as ODURGE [INS] will have
information concerning his past record in a secret file. He will
enter legally under an ODURGE interpretation of the provisions
of the immigration law applicable to his case. (Of course we are
asking that they grant such a favorable interpretation.) 52 (S)
By the end of 1953, Bolschwing had turned over his subagents to his CIA case
officers, although Salzburg Base expected his departure to be delayed until January 1954.
This layover required an extension of Bolschwing's immigrant visa, which expired in

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
December 1953. 53 The base, meanwhile, tied up loose ends—a chore complicated once
again by the fact that Bolschwing had never paid Austrian taxes. The Agency
circumvented this dilemma by having Bolschwing and his household baggage leave the
country under the identity of Army Capt. Albert D. Eisner—the cover name that
Bolschwing had used in his earlier tax battles. 54 (S)

A Permanent Goodbye to Intelligence Activities (U)

In wrapping up affairs with Bolschwing in Austria, a

j , his case officer,

summarized the course of events that resulted in his immigration. "It was the consensus
of opinion (Headquarters, VOB, and SOB) that Agent's time in Austria had been used up;
he was too badly compromised and too well identified as being a KUBARK agent in all
circles." C _a added, "Grossbahn was told that his days of usefulness in Austria were
rapidly drawing to a close, and if he were ever to realize his ambition of getting to the
States and becoming a US citizen, now is the time to do it." E 3 also advised
Bolschwing, "if he did not accept the terms being offered to him at present, no guarantee
could be made as to his ultimate future." 55 (S)

53 Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—Progress Report for the Period 1
October to 30 November 1953," 10 December 1953, EAS-A-2619, (S); and Chief of Base,
Salzburg to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—Termination," 10 December 1953, EASA-2619, (S),
, DO Records. (S)
both in Bolschwing, C
54 Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—Final Termination Report," 27 January
3 , DO Records. (S)
1954, EAS-A-2869, (S), in Bolschwing, C
55 Ibid. Bolschwing received termination benefits of $400 including a bonus of six months' pay
as well as free transportation on the SS Andrea Doria from Genoa, Italy to New York. Chief, EE
to FUPlans, "Termination of Project Grossbahn," 22 December 1953, (S), in Bolschwing,
, DO Records. At the conclusion of the project, the CIA had 55 reels of microfilm
of Bolschwing reports with an additional ten reels of indexes dating from 1948. See
3 , Records Integration/Projects Officer, "Grossbahn
Memorandum for Record,
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As he left Austria for the United States (under the sponsorship of Roy Goggin,
who had met Bolschwing at the end of the war), the German agent expressed his pleasure.
"I have regarded it an honor to serve the United States and its Government. I feel utmost
gratitude that I am admitted to the United States to become a citizen." 56 After an
uneventful trip, Bolschwing and his family arrived in America and quickly settled in the
new country. Writing from the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York City to his CIA point
of contact, Bolschwing admitted, "I do wish to express my thanks for the excellent
arrangements with the Immigration Authorities. We were called for on the boat and the
Chief Inspector, who was in possession of a Govt. Memorandum signed by Asst.
Commissioner Hogan, personally saw to our immediate being passed through all
formalities." 57 (S)
With a sigh of relief, Headquarters reported the safe arrival of Bolschwing in New
York to Agency personnel in Austria. EE Division stated, "it seems difficult to believe
that the Grossbahn case is at last at an end, and we sincerely hope that he has said a
permanent goodbye to intelligence activities." 58 (S)

Files C
J),"16 January 1956, in Bolschwing, C-
DO Records.
Additional paper records pertaining to Bolschwing are found in DO Records, a
Boxes 9, 13, and 14, C/A ARC. The Bolschwing microfilm is located in DO/IMS, Central Files
Branch. (S)
56 For Bolschwing's sponsorship, see Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief of Mission, Germany,
"GROSSBAHN - Termination," 23 October 1953, EAS-A-2381, (S), in Bolschwing, C
DO Records. Bolschwing's note is located in his 201 file. (S)
57Bolschwing to '2
C_ February
_D 1954, in Bolschwing,
Records. (U)

Throughout late 1945 and early 1946, the Strategic Services Unit received reports
from its stations in Europe about a Jewish underground movement in Europe. Known
collectively as the Brichah, or the Escape, couriers of the Jewish Agency, including
members of the Jewish Brigade serving with the British army, escorted Jews from
Eastern Europe to safety in the West with the goal of bringing them to Palestine. 1 The
estimated one million European Jews who had survived the Holocaust posed a serious
health issue for the Allies, but, more importantly, a resettlement problem. Many had lost
their entire families and few wanted to return to their homes, even if they still existed in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Outbreaks of anti-Semitism in Poland and
'The Jewish struggle to achieve an independent state marked the first step in Great Britain's
lengthy retreat as an imperial power. The Palmach, the strike force of the Haganah, the military
arm of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, and two terrorist organizations, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and
the Lochmei Heruth Israel (respectively called the Irgun and the Stern Gang), caused heavy
losses among British military and security forces between 1944 and 1948. The influx of refugees
from Europe was the visible indicator of tensions between the Jews, the Arabs, and the British in
Palestine. For accounts of British military and intelligence operations in Palestine, see J. Bowyer
Bell, Terror Out of Zion. Irgun, Lehi, and the Palestine Underground 1929-1949 (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1977); Gregory Blaxand, The Regiments Depart: A History of the British Army,
1945-1970 (London: William Kimber, 1971); David A. Charters, The British Army and the
Jewish Insurgency in Palestine 1945-47 (London: MacMillan, 1989); David A. Charters, "British
Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1945-47," Intelligence and National Security 6 (January
1991), pp. 115-40; A.J. Sherman, Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1918-1948 (New
York: Thames and Hudson, 1997); and Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas
Drove the British Out of Palestine (London: Brassey's, 1995). For a description of the Irgun's
war against the British by its leader and later prime minister of Israel, see Menachem Begin, The
Revolt (New York: Nash Publishing, 1977, rev. ed.). (U)
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elsewhere pushed thousands of the remaining Jews from Eastern Europe into the western
Allied occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Zionist movement, which had its
origins decades before the war, now acted as a siren for Jews to leave Europe for the
British Mandate in Palestine. 2 British policy, however, called for the restriction of
Jewish immigration into Palestine. 3 Thus, the movement of these refugees from Europe,

2In 1890, the term "Zionism" was first used to refer to the return of the Jewish people to
Palestine, their Biblical home. After 1896, Zionism also became a political movement under
Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew who worked in Paris. After witnessing growing anti-Semitism
in France, Herzl became imbued with the idea of a national home for the Jews. In 1897, he
founded the World Zionist Organization to push for a Jewish state in Palestine. In the meantime,
Jewish pioneers from Eastern Europe settled in Palestine and formed kibbutzim, or collective
agricultural settlements. After the outbreak of World War I, Arthur James Balfour, the British
Foreign Secretary, wrote a prominent British Jewish leader in 1917 that the British government
advocated "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use
their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object." The Balfour Declaration
became the basis for Jewish claims for independent statehood. In 1922, the League of Nations
granted the British control over Palestine under its mandate system. The British, in turn,
organized the basic governmental structure in Palestine, including a Jewish Agency. Under
David Ben-Gurion, the Jewish Agency acted as a quasi-governmental body in Palestine to
promote Jewish affairs and to formulate domestic and foreign policies. For further details, see
Hershel Edelheit and Abraham J. Edelheit, History of Zionism: A Handbook and Dictionary
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2000); Bernard Reich, Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992); and Bernard Reich and David H. Goldberg,
Political Dictionary of Israel (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2000). (U)
3In 1936, a British Royal Commission was appointed to examine the causes of Arab rioting in
Palestine. Lord Robert Peel, the chairman, recommended that the Mandate be divided into a
Jewish state, an Arab state merged with Transjordan, and a British enclave in Jerusalem. The
British dropped this idea and in 1939, Malcolm MacDonald, the British Colonial Secretary, called
for the establishment of one independent state in Palestine by 1949 under Arab domination.
MacDonald's White Paper restricted the total immigration of Jews to 75,000 over the ten-year
period; a move designed to ensure the Arab majority status in Palestine. Zionists regarded the
White Paper as a betrayal of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate itself. In 1945, after the
revelations of the Nazi concentration camps and the election of the British Labour Party,
Palestinian Jews hoped that the new British Government would abandon the 1939 White Paper.
Instead, Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Ernest Bevin, his Foreign Secretary, reaffirmed the
restricted immigration policies and, in fact, stepped up measures to keep European Jews out of
Palestine. (U)
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either by legal or illegal means, became an important weapon in the Jewish resistance
against the British in Palestine. 4 (U)
As the flood of Jewish refugees poured out of Eastern Europe through Germany
and Austria to Italian ports, American intelligence discovered that the Soviets were trying
to infiltrate these migration channels to smuggle Russian agents into the Middle East.
According to an X-2 report from Paris in February 1946, the Soviets dispatched agents
into the British and American occupation zones in Germany and Austria. Posing as
Jewish victims of Nazi concentration camps, these agents would be processed through
Allied displaced persons channels and infiltrate the secret Jewish smuggling rings. The
Soviet agents planned to spread rumors throughout Europe and in Palestine that the
British hated the Jews and supported the Arabs for control of the Holy Land. Ultimately,
the Soviets wanted to draw the Jews closer to communism and incite them to revolt
against the British in Palestine, according to an intelligence report given to the Americans
by the French. In addition, the report listed the addresses of meeting places and names of
numerous Jews in Austria involved in the smuggling of refugees in that country. 5 (S)

4The literature on the fate of the Jews after World War II is extensive, including Thomas Albrich,

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Other reports also discussed Soviet efforts to exploit the Jews. A summary of a
Bern report, for example, highlighted the Soviet penetration of Jewish organizations in
Austria by using the black market to raise funds. 6 Capt. James J. Angleton, the head of
X-2 in Italy, reported on Jewish escape efforts in January 1946. He cited sources that
claimed the Russians were actively assisting the Jews to flee from Poland. Angleton
relayed information that the Russians had provoked the Poles to attack the Jews in an
effort to discredit the Polish Government; to force the British to face the question of a
Jewish homeland in Palestine; and to justify Soviet repression in Poland. 7 In other
dispatches during the first half of 1946, Angleton submitted Italian intelligence reporting
on Jews transiting that country en route to Palestine, including the names of ships that
carried the Jews from Italian ports. 8 (S)
As concern mounted about Soviet efforts to infiltrate the Brichah, X-2 in
Washington proposed that its field stations penetrate the Jewish underground to
determine the extent of the subversive activities. The ideal agent for this mission,
Headquarters stated in early March 1946, would be a noncommunist Jewish refugee

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
willing to go to Palestine. Once recruited, the American agent should be "advised to
participate fully in Communist activities in Austria, Germany, or Italy short of violence."
Of more importance than how the Soviets planned to spread their propaganda in
Palestine, SSU wanted to discover detailed information regarding the escape routes, the
identities of agents and their contacts, the location of their hideouts, the extent of their
finances, and the sources of their falsified documents. Washington felt that this project
could prove critical in understanding the modus operandi of the Soviets, and it
encouraged the field to submit projects for review in Washington. 9 (S)

Project SYMPHONY (U)

Even before Washington sent its message, X-2 in Austria considered the Jewish
Brichah to be a target. Maj. Edward P. Barry, the chief of SCl/A (as X-2 was formally

known in Austria), later recalled, "this office began laying plans for a project which was
to use the present extensive Jewish emigration for a source of CI information.
Preliminary investigations on the subject plainly showed that no one in the American
Forces in Austria had a clear picture of either the procedure or the agencies involved."10
(S)
9 SAINT to SAINT, Austria, AMZON, and Rome, "NKGB Recruiting of Jewish Agents for
Palestine," 12 March 1946, X2TS-2231, (S), in DO Records, C
, Box 4, Folder 10,
CIA ARC. (S)
10 SAINT, Austria to SAINT, "Project SYMPHONY: Direct Overt Contact with Political
Department, Jewish Agency," 10 May 1946, LSX-251, (S), in DO Records, 1
J, Box
4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Born in 1914 in Chicago, Edward P. Barry graduated from
Northwestern University in 1936 after spending a year at the University of Freiburg in Germany.
He joined the US Army in 1941 and rose to lieutenant colonel at the time of his release from SSU
in late 1946. Barry first served with the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps in the Middle East
and in Italy and later transferred to OSS as the head of X-2 in Austria. Following his return to
civilian life, Barry attended law school at the University of Michigan. r:
5
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By early April, Capt. Jules Koenig, a member of X-2's small base in Vienna (the
main office was in Salzburg), submitted a proposal to Headquarters "to use the influx of
Jewish refugees into Austria from Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland for
sources of CI information, for exact data on the Intelligence service of the Jewish Agency
in Austria, and for all intelligence activities run by any persons or organizations who use
this influx into Austria for such purpose." (S)
Koenig, born in Belgium of Polish Jewish parentage, had served with OSS as an
Army officer in the Middle East and in Italy. At the end of the war, he transferred to
Austria and joined X-2 in Vienna. In his new assignment, Koenig observed firsthand the
immigration networks flowing through the Austrian capita1. 12 Koenig emphasized that
the Jewish underground flight was not a new phenomenon. "The exodus of Jews from
Russian-occupied countries," Koenig commented, "is an exact replica of the vast legal or

Folder 46, CIA ARC. (S)
12Jules Koenig (also spelled Konig) was born in Ostend, Belgium, in 1912, the son of Polish
immigrants. He served in the Belgian army at the outbreak of the war and was evacuated to Great
Britain after the fall of France. He worked for the Belgian Red Cross and held a variety of other
jobs until he moved to the United States in 1942. Koenig was employed as a diamond cutter in
New York when he was inducted into the US Army in 1943. Commissioned as a Signal Corps
officer, Koenig joined OSS that same year. He remained in SSU until June 1946 when he returned to the United States and was discharged from the Army. Koenig reentered the diamond
business in New York and was in periodic contact with former members of OSS. Koenig died in
1989. Jules Koenig, OSS Index Card, in WASH-HQ&HQ-DET-PERS-11, DO Records,
•
j Box 19, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. See also various notes on Koenig in DO Records,
3.,Box 4, Folder 10,and DO Records, C
_3, Box 2, Folder 2,CIA ARC. (S)

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illegal emigration movement which began at the ascension of the Nazi Party in Germany
around 1932. Hundreds of thousands of Jews fled Germany to find their way to any
safehaven in Europe or, more importantly, in Palestine." 13 (S)
As the Nazis shut down the legal movement of Jews from Germany and Austria,
underground organizations aided the Jews to escape. Funded by outside groups,
including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (commonly called the
"Joint" or the JDC), the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the
Political Section of the Jewish Agency, and the Aliyah Bet, Jewish agents penetrated the
Third Reich both to rescue the refugees and to collect intelligence during the war. These
personnel later formed the basis for the Brichah in numerous European countries during
194546. 14 According to Koenig, "the various British Intelligence Services freely used
the emissaries of this section [i.e. the Jewish Agency] for penetration, intelligence and
DA [double agent] purposes. The representatives of the AJDC acted as a liaison with the

13 SCl/A, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S),
3 Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
in DO Records, c_
14The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was formed in 1914 to help Palestinian
Jews suffering under the Ottoman Empire during World War I. During the Second World War,
the Joint, under Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz worked with Shaul Meyerov (later known as Shaul
Avigur), the head of the clandestine ha-Mossad le-Ahyah Bet, to smuggle Jews from Europe to
Palestine. In 1939, after the publication of the White Paper, the Haganah, and the Histadrut, the
General Foundation of Jewish Labor, formed the Aliyah Bet (interchangeably called the Mossad)
to resist the British control of Jewish immigration. The Joint raised its funds from American
Jews to finance the escape movement. The Joint and the Aliyah Bet worked with the Jewish
Agency to establish their main posts in Lisbon, Marseilles, Istanbul, and later in Paris. As early
as 1939, Aliyah Bet agents were in contact with Adolf Eichmann, the SS officer in charge of
"Jewish Affairs" in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange the release of some 1,000 Jews from
Austria. In 1944, Saly Mayer, the Joint's representative in Switzerland, provided funds to "buy"
the release of over 1,500 Jews from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Other rescue missions,
including that of Raoul Wallenberg, were the results of efforts by the Joint and Aliyah Bet. (U)
7
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Allied intelligence services and eventually financed this courier-cum-intelligence
service." 15 (5)
In effect, Koenig saw the project, which he dubbed SYMPHONY, as a

continuation of earlier wartime collaboration between the Allies and the Jews, and this
time facing a new threat—the Soviet Union. 16 In his proposal to Headquarters, Koenig

I5 SCl/A, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S),
3 , Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Some 240 Palestinian Jews
in DO Records, 1L
volunteered to parachute into the Balkans in 1943 and the British established training camps in
Cairo and Haifa. The following year, 32 men and women were, in fact, dispatched in joint
British-Allyah Bet missions into Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, and
Yugoslavia. The Nazis captured 12 of the Jewish agents and executed seven, including poet
Hannah Szenes. The most successful of the Palestinian agents, Yesheyahu Trachtenberg, better
known as Shaike Dan, had a remarkable wartime and postwar intelligence career and is
remembered as the savior of thousands of Romanian Jews. (U)
I6Despite opposition from the British who wanted to restrict American intelligence operations,
OSS had a sizeable wartime presence in the Near East Theater of Operations (NETO). With its
headquarters in Cairo and smaller bases in Greece and Turkey, OSS personnel and agents were
scattered throughout the region. Three branches of OSS—Research and Analysis, Secret
Intelligence, and X-2—had a total of six agents in Palestine reporting on both Jewish and Arab
perspectives as well as ties to the Jewish Agency and its missions into Central Europe. In August
1944, OSS agreed to accept reports from the Jewish Agency, but refused to exchange American
intelligence or even acknowledge the Jewish reporting. By the spring of 1945, OSS in
Washington severed its contacts with the Jewish Agency. With the end of the war, the strength of
the NETO mission quickly dropped. From 80 personnel in October 1945, SSU counted only 38
by the following spring. Likewise, the new organization had retained only one agent in Palestine,
an American missionary. Late in 1945, SSU acquired Capt. Nicholas Andronovitch, who had
been the Army G-2's Military Liaison Officer in Jerusalem, as its representative in Palestine.
Andronovitch provided a steady stream of reports as the British Mandate became increasingly
volatile. Both the State Department and the Army commended him for his work when he fmally
returned to the United States in 1949. Born in Russia in 1907, Andronovitch fled after the
Bolshevik Revolution with his mother and sister to Turkey. He entered the United States from
Cuba in 1930 and became an American citizen nine years later. He joined the US Army as an
officer in 1943 and rose to lieutenant colonel. C.

3 For further information on OSS and SSU activities in
Palestine, see War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets, Vol. 2. Introduction by Kermit
Roosevelt (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), p. 47.
'Clandestine Services
C.
Historical Paper C._

8
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visualized SYMPHONY as having several immediate and long-term goals, both of an
overt and covert nature:
•

Immediate Aims (overt): To extract information of CI value from refugees
escaping from Russian-occupied countries: composition, trends and activities of
the Communist parties in those countries; location and identification of
concentration camps in Russia and Russian-dominated countries; identification
of NKVD deserters or NKGB deserters; identification of NKVD agents or
Communist agents sent among the refugees; identification and elimination of
Nazi elements, infiltrating amongst the refugees to escape punishment from the
authorities of their respective countries.

•

Immediate Aims (covert): To ascertain and locate the agents of the Jewish
Agency in Austria who run both the emigration of Jews from Russian-dominated
countries and a highly-efficient intelligence service into those countries; to
ascertain and spot those persons who smuggle Jews out of those countries for
high sums of money and who, being in contact with NKVD officials, also
smuggle war criminals and agents into the Allied-occupied zones, to work either
in Austria or in Palestine.
Immediate Aims (covert): To locate those persons within official organizations,
such as the Hungarian Red Cross, the Austrian Red Cross, the Italian Red Cross,
some so-called repatriation committees with official and semi-official status, the
UNRRA and the (Lublin) Polish repatriation committees, who provide false
papers and identification cards to those smugglers and to the smuggled for the
furtherance of this traffic; to take all measures of security safeguard to eliminate
or neutralize such traffic when it becomes a danger to the security of the Alliedoccupied zones or to its establishments and units.

•

Long-Range Aims: To penetrate those organizations of whatever kind they are—
Jewish, political or of intelligence nature of any country—which send Russiantrained or Russian-inspired agents through this flow of Jewish refugees to further
propaganda or intelligence aims either in Allied-occupied zones of Austria or
Germany, or in Allied countries such as France, Italy, the United States and/or
Palestine. (S)

Capt. Koenig also outlined the structure of the Jewish refugee groups in Austria
and the various international organizations that supported the immigrants as they passed
through the country. In particular, Koenig commented on the role of a young Austrianborn Jew, Arthur Pier, who represented the Jewish Agency in Vienna, but actually served
as the head of the Brichah in Austria. Pier, according to Koenig, claimed to represent
several Jewish newspapers, including the Palestinian Telegraphic Agency. "Officially
Pier is here to collect items of Jewish interest for his newspaper employer, principally
items on atrocities against Jews during the war and after," the American intelligence
officer wrote. "Actually he runs a highly efficient intelligence net, through couriers into
Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. He is also running another net," Koenig
reported, "which tracks down Germans either free or in captivity in Allied-occupied
zones of Germany or Austria, who are suspected or proven to have been committing
atrocities against Jews during the war." Pier then turned these war criminals over to the
Allies while he also collected evidence for the Jewish Agency. 18 (S)
Pier's operational activities in Eastern Europe were of more immediate interest to
Koenig than his Nazi-hunting skills. Koenig told Headquarters that Pier was the key link
to facilitating the movement of Jews from the Russian-dominated countries, and he gave
him the operational codename of CONDUCTOR. After organizing the Jews into small
groups, Pier's agents led them surreptitiously across the border into Austria. The groups
made their way to Vienna where the Joint initially placed them in the city's Rothschild

1 8Ibid . (S)

10
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Hospital. Pier screened the refugees for information desired by the Jewish Agency and
then prepared to move them to other DP camps in the American zone. Those refugees
intended for Palestine were placed in a camp near Salzburg while those who could not or
did not want to go to the Middle East were sent to other camps in Germany. Koenig
calculated that Pier was responsible for the smuggling of hundreds, if not thousands, of
Jews on a monthly basis into Austria and eventually toward Italy and Palestine. I9 (S)
At first, Koenig posed as a journalist seeking information about the Brichah. As
his questions became more of an intelligence nature, Koenig admitted to Pier that he was
an American intelligence officer. 20 In the meantime, Koenig also wanted to place
American personnel in the Jewish camps in Vienna, principally the Rothschild Hospital
and the Jewish Agency's interrogation center on Alserbacherstrasse. These agents, also
posing as American journalists, would collect intelligence on Soviet order of battle as
well as economic and political information behind the Iron Curtain. US contact with the
19Ibid. In addition to Pier's covert smuggling mission, Koenig discovered numerous illegal
rackets in Austria. The representative of the Free Polish intelligence service in Salzburg also
used the Joint to bring people out of Poland, while Koenig later reported that members of the
French Mission in Budapest were also involved in a smuggling ring. Koenig also described a
Hungarian Jew, named Alfred Schwartz, who had set up his own group, the "Jewish Repatriation
Committee for Hungarian Deported Slave Workers and Concentration Camp Inmates," which
essentially became a black market ring in Vienna. Koenig stated, "there is no doubt that the
Russian intelligence services are using this flow of Jews to infiltrate Jewish or non-Jewish agents
into the Allied zones." More sinister, Koenig uncovered the smuggling of Hungarian non-Jews,
many with Nazi collaborationist backgrounds, from Budapest to Vienna. In some cases, the
operator of this network, Gabor Salzer, circumcised the Nazi escapees so as to pass them as Jews
for migration to Palestine with the connivance of the Soviets. For further details, see SC/A,
Vienna, "Jewish Emigration Racket Run by French Mission, Budapest," 19 April 1946, LVX220, (S); SCl/A, Vienna, "Szak Ladislas, Agent for Political Police, Hungarian State Police," 1
May 1946, LVX-226, (S); SCl/A, Vienna, "Jewish Emigration Racket Run by Alfred Schwartz,"
18 April 1946, LVX-219, (S); SCl/A, Vienna, "Jewish Clandestine Emigration under Salzer," 18
April 1946, LVX-217, (S); and SCl/A, Vienna, "Death of Salzer," 18 April 1946, LVX-218, (S),
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
all in DO Records, C_
20 SAINT, Austria to SAINT, "Project SYMPHONY: Direct Overt Contact with Political
Department, Jewish Agency," 10 May 1946, LSX-251, (S), in DO Records, C
4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
11
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Jewish Agency, Koenig believed, would expand SSU's understanding of the personalities
involved in the illicit smuggling of refugees. This aspect of the project, however, proved
the most difficult given the lack of Americans who could speak Yiddish or Hebrew.
Lastly, Koenig hoped to infiltrate a Jewish agent into the refugee pipeline to assess the
extent of the Soviet penetration of this movement. 21 (S)

LILAC (U)

As he wrote his proposal in April 1946, Koenig already had selected a man to
infiltrate the Jewish smuggling network. According to Koenig's notes, Erich Wendel: had
an extensive background in intelligence as an agent for both the Germans and the British
during the war. Born in 1907 in Austro-Hungary, Wender was a machine construction
engineer who had immigrated to South America in 1928, but returned two years later to
establish his own company in Austria. Arrested by the Gestapo in 1939 as a Jew, he was
not sent to a concentration camp. Instead, the German Abwehr used Wender (known as
Carol Popescu) as an agent in the Middle East. He was dispatched to Istanbul en route to
vria

where he was to collect military information for the Nazis. Wender, however,

turned himself over to the British in Turkey and was doubled. He also became an agent
of the Joint and established a courier network in Eastern Europe. Wender, along with
several other Jews, smuggled letters from the JDC in Istanbul into Hungary while also
providing British feed material to the Germans. 22 (S)
21 SCUA, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S),
in DO Records, C.
J Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
22 SCl/A, Vienna, "Detailed Interrogation Report of Erich Wender @ Carol Popescu, @ Sheliach
Eri. Former GIS and JOINT Agent," 12 April 1946, LVX-207, (S), in DO Records, C
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. See also miscellaneous note cards with information on
Wender in DO Records, E. Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
12
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In all, Wender made some 12 trips from Budapest to Istanbul between 1941 and
1943 when the Germans arrested him for communicating with the enemy. Wender was
held in captivity until early 1944, but was transferred to an insane asylum after he was
declared mentally incompetent following a suicide attempt. When he learned that the
Gestapo planned to interrogate him again, Wender tried to escape from Budpaest, but he
was betrayed to the Germans. He admitted all of his activities on behalf of the Joint to
the Gestapo, and was held in Vienna as a prisoner until the Soviets entered the city in
April 1945. The Russians then used Wender as an interpreter for an intelligence unit
until his release after the German collapse. Wender accepted a position with the Joint in
Vienna, but was later arrested by the American military in Vienna as a black marketeer.23
(S)
On 19 April 1946, X-2 in Austria sent a cable to Washington requesting that
Wender be vetted as an agent for Project SYMPHONY. 24 Koenig, in fact, had already
commented on Wender's potential usefulness to the new project and the need to get him
out of confinement. "Inasmuch as he is a fervent Zionist," Koenig wrote, "and has a very
extensive knowledge of the Joint and Brichard [sic] organizations he may later be
'sprung' and used in project SYMPHONY." 25 Through Koenig's intervention, the US
Army conducted a "mock trial" of Wender, and he was sentenced to 90 days in jail for his
participation in the black market. Rather than being remanded to prison, Koenig took
custody of Wender and informed him that he now worked for American intelligence. In
23thid . (s)
24 Cable, Vienna to Washington, 19 April 1946, Vienna 1056, IN 36089, (S), in DO Records, C
, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
25 SCl/A, Vienna, "Detailed Interrogation Report of Erich Wender @ Carol Popescu, @ Sheliach
Eri. Former GIS and JOINT Agent," 12 April 1946, LVX-207, (S), in DO Records, C
., Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. See also miscellaneous note cards with information on
Wender in DO Records, C._
_a , Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
13
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his new task, Wender, now designated as LILAC, would be Project SYMPHONY's
conduit to collect on the Jewish Agency and penetrations by the Soviets as well as the
British. Capt. Koenig would pay Wender 750 shillings a month and provide some rations
for his work. 26 (S)
Headquarters accepted Koenig's use of Wender as an agent with some reluctance.
"Previous information on subject from British sources," Washington reported, "appears
to corroborate points in subject's story." Aspects of Wender's background raised
questions as to his honesty and willingness to play all sides. "There seems little doubt
that subject is a typical professional agent, and no more reliable than most of that stamp.
There seems little reason to assume that he could be trusted any further than his own
immediate interests lie, or that he would maintain a confidence any longer than it is to his
immediate profit to do so," Headquarters noted. "Contact and use of subject should be
predicated on this basis." 27 (S)
Upon receiving the memorandum from Headquarters, Capt. Koenig met with
Wender and went over some of the points of confusion regarding his relationships during
the war. In responding to Washington, Koenig commented, "it is our opinion that
w ender

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
current right here in Vienna that an honest businessman is as rare as snow in a very hot
place." Koenig felt that he had suitable control over Wender, and that he could provide
American intelligence with the information that it sought. 28 Koenig exerted considerable
effort to glean as many details from Wender about his contacts during the war and how
the Joint operated in Eastern Europe. 29 (S)

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
collect information on the Jewish Agency. 31 Through various means (including
telephone taps and mail intercepts), Koenig discovered that the Hungarians were
particularly active in penetrating Jewish groups in Austria as were the Soviets. 32 On 22
April, for example, SCI in Vienna sent a report to Washington noting that Russian
officers had visited Jewish camps in both the American and British zones. While
inspecting the Bindermichl camp near Linz, one of Pier's agents, a man named Simon
Wiesenthal, recognized a Soviet officer as a NKVD officia1. 33 Furthermore, Koenig's
Situation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia," 4 May 1946, LVX-234, (S), all in DO Records, C._
Box 4, Folder 11, CIA ARC. (S)
The
British
in Austria were especially interested in Pier's activities and sought to arrest those
31
involved in the clandestine Jewish immigration. See SCUA, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY:
British Interest in Jewish Emigration," 13 May 1946, LSX-256, (S), and SCl/A, Vienna, "Project
SYMPHONY: British Interest in Jewish Emigration," 25 May 1946, LSX-277, (S), both in DO
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Koenig also reported on Pier's efforts to
Records,. C_
counteract the collection of information by the British. See SCVA, Vienna, "Project
SYMPHONY: Robert Heller @ Valko, British Agent," 14 May 1946, (S); and SCUA, Vienna,
"Project SYMPHONY: Anglo-Russian Cooperation against Jewish Immigration in Austria," 28
May 1946, LSX-282, (S), all in DO Records, C_
., Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
32Transcripts of telephone taps and letter intercepts done by the Civil Censorship Group Austria
(US) are found in the files. These records were provided to John G. Heyn, the head of X-2 in
Vienna. See also SCl/A, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Activities of Hungarian Political Police
in Vienna," 13 May 1946, LSX-255, (S); SCl/A, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Official Cable
from ACC Hungary regarding Jewish Immigration," 13 May 1946, LSX-248, (S); SCUA, Vienna,
"Project SYMPHONY: Jewish Agency, Budapest, and Penetration of Russian Intelligence," 15
May 1946, LSX-257, (S); SCl/A, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Activities of the Hungarian
Political Police in Vienna," 21 May 1946, LSX-274, (S); SCl/A, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY:
Newspaper `Vilagossag' Article on Budapest Jewish Council," 24 May 1946, LSX-533, (S), all in
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
DO Records, C_
33 SCVA, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Russian Interest in Jewish Emigration," 22 April 1946,
LVX-224, (S), in DO Records, ,C
J, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA. This same document is
3, DO Records. Following his liberation from
found in Simon Wiesenthal,
Mauthausen concentration camp at the end of the war, Wiesenthal worked with the Americans to
round up German war criminals. As an employee of the US War Crimes Office in Linz,
Wiesenthal focused his efforts on apprehending Adolf Eichmann, the "Architect of the Final
Solution." He also established the Jewish Central Committee for the US Zone in Austria in Linz,
coming in frequent contact with Arthur Pier whom he had met in Vienna in December 1945. The
two men organized a joint operation to track down Eichmann through his supposed widow in Alt
Aussee as well as a girlfriend in Urfahr. While these missions failed, Wiesenthal and Pier kept
interest in Eichmann's whereabouts, which would eventually lead to his capture in South
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report noted that, during a Soviet visit to a Jewish DP camp in the British zone, Pier had a
copy of a telegram from the British headquarters in Austria in his possession, leading
Koenig to suspect that Pier had penetrated the British military itself. 34 (S)
On 25 April 1946, US military police in Vienna conducted a "surprise" raid on
Jewish DP camps looking for evidence of black market dealings, foreign currency, and
unauthorized US Army materia1. 35 The Army also searched Pier's apartment where it
found a box of microfilmed OSS records as well as forged border-crossing permits. The
fact that Pier had the OSS records in his possession raised eyebrows in Vienna and
Washington, but fears were laid to rest when the documents were found to pertain to war
America. For further details on Wiesenthal's work after the war and his connections with Arthur
Pier, see Alan Levy, The Wiesenthal File (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1994) and Hella Pick, Simon Wiesenthal: A Life in Search of Justice (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1996). (S)
34 Koenig later reported that Pier had access to all of the British intercept files on his activities
and those of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. See SCUA, Vienna, "Project
SYMPHONY: Telephone Intercepts by British," 7 June 1946, LSX-302, (S), in DO Records, Job
78-03069R, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. In mid-June 1946, Koenig reported to Washington that
he had learned from Pier that the Jewish Agency had a source in the British headquarters. Pier
stated that Betty Thompson O'Donnell, a linguist and a member of the General Staff Intelligence
(B) of the British Troops Austria in Vienna, provided information to the Jews. See SCUA,
Vienna, Project SYMPHONY: Betty Thompson O'Donnell," 20 June 1946, LSX-342, (S), in DO
, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA. In August of that year, Evylyn M. Williams,
Records, E_
the Austrian Desk Officer at Headquarters, recommended that the British be informed of
O'Donnell's work for the Jewish Agency. Williams remarked, "it is my opinion, as the staff
member most exposed to the information coming in from the SYMPHONY Project, that most of
the information is garbled, and of most uncertain accuracy. In the long run," she wrote, "there
seems to be little gained by clutching this small piece of information about Miss O'Donnell to us
and not passing it to the British." Williams felt that the O'Donnell lead could either be
misinformation provided by the Jewish Agency or that she could have been a British-controlled
source. See Untitled Memorandum, E.M. Williams, 16 August 1946, (S), in DO Records,
, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA. Williams, born in 1915, had served as a civilian employee for
the War Department from April 1941 until July 1942. She later served in Europe with X-2 as an
officer in the Women's Army Corps. Williams joined SSU in Washington in January 1946 as a
civilian and was assigned to the Austrian Desk during the spring and summer of 1946. She
transferred to the State Department. C

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
crimes. OSS had apparently borrowed the documents from the Jewish Agency during the
war and microfilmed them. The Americans then provided a copy of the microfilm to the
Jewish Agency. 36 (S)
During the raid, the military police also arrested a man who turned out to be the
long-awaited Soviet that Pier had offered the Americans in April. In his proposal to
Washington, Capt. Koenig wrote, "information of high intelligence value is being
promised by the Jewish Agency people. For instance," Koenig wrote, "the Jewish
Agency people are arranging the desertion of a Jewish NKVD major in Vienna around
the middle of May 1946." According to Koenig, Pier would allow American intelligence
"to hold this Russian officer at its disposal until such time that his detention will not be
necessary any more." As it turned out, Pier had not told Koenig that he already had
Michael Pines, also known as Stefan Janeczak, until the Army arrested him for
possession of an illegal firearm. Pines, a Polish Jew, had served in the Polish army and
the Soviet NKVD during the war. At the time of his desertion in December 1945, he was
the head of the Polish Security Police in Danzig. He barely escaped and settled in
Munich where he worked as a doctor in a Jewish displaced persons camp. After his
arrest, Koenig managed to have Pines "sprung" from American confinement and
interrogated him. 37 (S)

By early May 1946, Capt. Koenig had already provided a good deal of
information about the Brichah at a time when the American military governments in both
Austria and Germany were just beginning to realize the dynamics of the Jewish
underground and the sensitive nature by which the United States had to handle these
refugees. 38 Koenig's contacts with the Jewish Agency expanded when he met with
Gideon Ruffer, the roving representative of the Agency's Political Department in Europe
who also observed the Nuremberg trials. Ruffer, who later turned out to be Gideon
Rafael, sought to establish formal ties between the Jewish Agency and American
intelligence, but Capt. Koenig stated that he could only discuss local issues. 39 He would,
however, pass on information from the Jewish Agency to his superiors. Ruffer, in turn,
presented his version of the history of the Jewish Agency's relations with the OSS and
British intelligence during the war. 40 (S)
NKVD," 14 May 1946, LSX-262, (S), in DO Records, C

, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA
ARC. (S)
-10 enable Washington to understand the terminology used by the underground Jewish
movement, Koenig sent Washington a list of the various organizations and special designations.
See SCl/A, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Hebrew Nomenclature," 13 May 1946, LSX-247,
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
(S), in DO Records,
39Born in Berlin 1913, Gideon Rafael escaped to Palestine in 1934 where he worked with the
Haganah in the unsuccessful negotiations with the Nazis to rescue thousands of Jews. He later
worked with the Jewish Agency in Europe to recover lost Jewish property and then served at the
United Nations as the JA's representative during the partition talks in 1947. Rafael held senior
positions in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, including four years as its Director-General and five
years as Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom. He died in 1999. See Reich and Goldberg,
Political Dictionary of Israel, p. 320, and Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of
Israeli Foreign Policy, A Personal Memoir (New York: Stein and Day, 1981). See also Gideon
3 , DO Records. (S)
Rafael, C..
40In 1948, Rafael wrote an account of cooperation between the Jewish Agency and the American
services. Unfortunately, a copy of this account was not placed C
_a A chronology of

j

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Ruffer offered to allow Americans to use Jewish couriers in Eastern Europe on
the condition that any intelligence obtained would be credited to the Political Department
of the Jewish Agency. (Ruffer had mentioned that both the British and the Americans
had exploited the Jews during the war for information, but did not credit them). When
Ruffer asked Koenig what sort of intelligence he wanted, the American replied that he
actually sought counterintelligence information. Specifically, Koenig told the Jewish
representative that he wanted to know if foreign powers were targeting the United States
either through military or political means or by subverting the Jewish immigration
channels. Koenig also mentioned that he was interested in "any intelligence about war
criminals which would be uncovered by the Jewish Agency representatives and would
benefit either the War Crimes Board or the State Department." 41 (S)

Caution Signs (U)

While Koenig maintained a hands-off approach as far as Pier's activities in
Austria were concerned, his affiliation as an American intelligence officer actually aided
the Vienna International Committee for Jewish Displaced Persons and Ex-Concentration

contact between the Jewish Agency, primarily Theodor Kollek and Reuben Zaslani (later known
as Reuven Shiloah), and the OSS is located in Theodor Kollek, IC
DO Records. A
1945 plan, formulated by Zaslani and Kollek, called for the Jewish Agency to work with OSS to
ferret "out everything possible on Nazi personnel and activities with special reference to war
criminals." (S)
41 SAINT, Austria to SAINT, "Project SYMPHONY: Direct Overt Contact with Political
Department, Jewish Agency," 10 May 1946, LSX-251, (S), in DO Records,
1, Box
4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Ruffer was also involved in complicated negotiations with the
Hungarians to permit the emigration of Jews from that country as well as the recovery of stolen
Jewish assets. See SCl/A, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Trip to Budapest by Mr. Ruffer,
Roving Representative of Political Dept., Jewish Agency," 27 May 1946, LSX-279, (S), in DO
Records, C
D., Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
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Camp Inmates, the official name for Pier's goup. 42 On 27 May, two men in civilian
clothes reported to the Rothschild Hospital in Vienna where they claimed to be captains
in the Hungarian Political Police. They showed Pier their identity cards and weapons
permits and said that they were assigned to arrest German and Hungarian war criminals,
They were in the country illegally because Hungary did not have a war crimes mission in
Austria. In turn, they sought help from Pier's Brichah to locate the war criminals and to
bring them back to Hungary. Pier provided them with false DP identification cards and
he then notified Capt. Koenig. After further talks, Pier concluded that the two
Hungarians were relatively low-level police officials who undertook this mission on their
own volition. They did not appear to be dispatched from the Political Police headquarters
in Budapest. Pier assigned one of his men, dressed in a British army uniform, to escort
the Hungarians and to help them arrest the suspects. Simon Wiesenthal later joined the
expedition, and he introduced the Hungarians to the head of the war criminal section of
the Austrian State Police. The Austrians, without consulting the Western Allies, also
provided several officers to help the Hungarians. As it turned out, the wanted war
criminals had already evaded the Jewish-Hungarian-Austrian teams; thus, Pier escorted
the two Hungarian officers back to the border. 43 (S)
Capt. Koenig, in the meantime, complained about the US Government's lack of
support for the Jewish refugees. After a discussion with the SSU's section responsible

42For example, Pier sought to use the Americans to "wipe out these rackets which soil the name
of the regular Emigration Movement." In particular, Pier used the American military to arrest
members of the rightwing Jewish Betar group which furnished members to the violently antiBritish organization in Palestine, the Irgun Zvai Leumi. See SCUA, Vienna, "Project
SYMPHONY: Arrest of Mandel Laszlo," 13 June 1946, LSX-314, (S), and SCUA, Vienna,
"Mandel Laszlo," 20 June 1946, LSX-344, (S), both in DO Records C
__j , Box 4,
Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
43 SCUA, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Illegal Activities of Hungarian Police in Austria," 10
June 1946, LSX-315, (S), in DO Records, C_
2, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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for intelligence on Hungary, Koenig described the problems that the JDC faced in helping
Jews in that country. Because the Russians refused to allow American citizens to staff
the Joint or any of the other relief organizations in Hungary for fear that these individuals
were American intelligence officers, the Jewish organizations in that country had no
oversight from their main offices. Instead of supporting all Jews, the Joint in Budapest
dissolved into a racket where only the favored few obtained supplies. Money, food, and
supplies were squandered, giving the organization a poor name. Compounding these
problems, Koenig told Headquarters that the American element of the Allied Control
Commission in Hungary "has taken a completely biased attitude toward Jewish
emigration. They are influenced by the completely wrong connections they have made
among Hungarian circles and now are cooperating actively with the Russians in their
program to stop any emigration toward the US Zone of Austria." 44 (S)

Headquarters Has Doubts (U)

By mid-1946, Headquarters questioned aspects of Vienna's reporting on the
Jewish underground. In one example, Pier had told Capt. Koenig that a US Army officer
assigned to the Allied Control Commission in Hungary was "on more than friendly terms
with NKVD officers in Budapest." When the report arrived in Washington, SSU wanted
to know the identity of the officer and the validity of the information. "This is an
example, again, of odds and ends of information which come to us with no indication as
to what development will be made, or what information or corrective action may result
44 SCUA, Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Joint and ACC, Budapest," 20 June 1946, LSX-345,

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
from the information. If any service to US organizations can be rendered through
information which we obtain," Headquarters chided, "it is important that this be done."45
(S)
Koenig's close ties to the Brichah in Austria also concerned Washington lest it
affect relations with the British after they launched a major operation in Palestine,
including a raid on the Jewish Agency's headquarters, in June 1946. This led
Washington to advise X-2 in Austria, "things of this nature may explain to you why we
have felt that caution should be exercised in our activities in a certain project." 46 It also
became more apparent to Washington officials that Koenig actually worked with a
clandestine organization that operated against official US military government policies
designed to staunch the flow of refugees from Eastern Europe into the American zones of
Germany and Austria. (S)
Coupled with growing anxiety that American intelligence be caught supporting a
subversive element, SSU had nagging doubts about Arthur Pier, the chief agent in Project
SYMPHONY. Responding to Vienna's trace request, the SSU station in Cairo replied
that it could find no information on the man. In fact, Cairo confirmed that Pier never

45 SAINT to SAINT, Austria, "Project SYMPHONY," 27 June 1946, X-4960, (S), and SO/A,
Vienna, "Project SYMPHONY: Capt. (USA) Levitan, ACC Hungary," 10 May 1946, LSX-245,
, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. In response to
(S), both in DO Records, E
Washington's concerns, Security Control (the successor to X-2) in Austria stated that it had
contacted both the G-2 of the US Forces in Austria as well as the American military mission in
Budapest informing both organizations of the allegations against the US Army officer. See
Security Control Division, Austria to Richard Helms, Acting Chief, FBM, "Project
SYMPHONY," 13 August 1946, LSX-393, (S), in DO Records, L.
J, Box 4, Folder
10, CIA ARC. (S)
46 SAINT to SAINT, Austria, "Newspaper Clippings," 1 July 1946, (S), in DO Records, C.
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
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worked for the British Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) and that his press card
was false. As a result, Cairo Station advised Vienna to proceed with caution. 47 (S)

Closing the Project (U)

On 12 July 1946, Richard Helms, who had just been named as the acting chief of
Foreign Branch M, sent a cable to Vienna. Helms said that while Washington had no
objections to continuing the project, Headquarters needed more information about
SYMPHONY's value and its overall potential as a project. 48 By this time, the project's
case officer, Capt. Jules Koenig, had already returned to the United States for
demobilization, leaving the project without any American control. Over a month later, in
late August, John Q. Heyn, the acting head of the Security Control in Austria, provided
this update:
The project continues to lie idle for lack of a case officer. In the meantime,
additional thousands of emigrants are pouring out of Poland into Austria. The
original plan for operating the project, by planting six Yiddish speaking
interrogators in the Rothschild Institute in Vienna, is as impossible to carry out
today as it was in the beginning. Reason: There are no American Yiddish
speaking interrogators to be had. CONDUCTOR is as anxious as ever to
cooperate in removing non-bona fide Jewish elements from the stream of
immigration. The control feature of the project remains as it was; fear to in any
way offend US authorities lest the entire emigration be closed down.
CONDUCTOR has made every effort in the past to fulfill our requirements.
However, direction is needed and having received no replacement for Konig, [sic]
Vienna is over-taxed. The Chief of Mission has expressed an interest in the
positive information available through CONDUCTOR. We shall try to maintain
47 Cable, Cairo to Washington, 27 June 1946, Cairo 321, IN 38715, (S), in response to SAINT,
Vienna to SAINT, Cairo, "Arthur Pier," 22 April 1946, (S), both in DO Records,
Box 4, Folder 11, CIA ARC. (S)
48 Cable, Washington to Vienna, 12 July 1946, Washington 1669, [no OUT number listed], (S), in
DO Records, C
, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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the contact in order to keep the avenue open to the wealth of fresh CE and
positive information that these emigrants are bringing out with them. 49 (S)
By the time that it received this monthly report from Austria, Headquarters had
lost interest in Project SYMPHONY. On 19 September, Helms and Evelyn M. Williams,
the Austrian Desk Officer, sent a lengthy review of the project to Austria for the
mission's comments. "It is our feeling," they wrote, "that this case should be neither
continued nor reinstated under circumstances attendant in the past. If [original emphasis]
the case is developed at all, it should be on the basis of the most secure covert penetration
of the agency concerned (by covert penetration we mean without the knowledge of any of
its officials or personnel) instead of the open collaboration of the past." 50 (S)
The 16-page review was scathing in its criticism of the project. Headquarters felt
that the two main agents had significant black marks in their past, especially Wender who
had made a fortune as a courier between Turkey and Eastern Europe during the war.
After questioning Capt. Koenig upon his return to Washington before his release from the
Army, Headquarters learned that Koenig's description of Pier had proven misleading. It
turned out that Koenig and Pier had met each other during the war and not, as Koenig had

49 SAINT, Austria to SAINT, "Station Activities, Month of August 1946," 31 August 1946, LSX_ 1, Box 368, Folder 3, CIA ARC. At the time of the
A-21, (S), in DO Records, C_
report, Security Control in Vienna had only one officer assigned while the main base in Salzburg
counted only seven personnel, including secretaries and a guard. Born in 1906, John G. Heyn
studied to be a conductor of opera and symphony in Germany in the late 1920s and worked in
Germany until 1935. He entered the Army as a private in 1942 and was commissioned a second
lieutenant in October 1945. Heyn served with the Counter Intelligence Corps in Egypt, Palestine,
Italy, and then Austria. Upon his release from the military in January 1946, Heyn joined SSU as
X-2's chief in Vienna and remained in Austria until December of that year. E

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
suggested, in Vienna. Likewise, Headquarters also learned to its dismay that Capt.
Koenig had himself been affiliated with the Jewish Agency prior to his joining the
Army. 51 (S)
For his part, Pier operated in a conspiratorial manner while the Brichah "has been
more and more associated with, if not actually sponsoring, certain terroristic groups in a
desperate effort to attain its aims." Pier's own methods, as seen by Washington, were
"strong-arm and unethical." Those who opposed him were simply "taken care of" or
"liquidated." Koenig's own sympathies for the plight of the Jewish refugees and his
growing reliance on Pier for intelligence appeared to give sanction to the illegalities
being committed by the Jewish underground in Austria. 52 (S)
Pier also had not lived up to his offer to arrange the desertion of Michael Pines,
the NKVD major mentioned in Koenig's project proposal in April. Instead, the Polish
Jew was arrested by Army authorities during the roundup of illegal immigrants in Vienna
and held on weapons charges. The information that he subsequently provided did not
justify Koenig's obtaining Pines's release from jail and his removal to Munich. 53 (S)
Two other incidents raised questions about the security of the project. In midMay, Capt. Koenig met a man who claimed to be a Russian scientist employed by the
Soviet military in Austria. This man, known as Donsky, wanted to leave Austria as
quickly as possible with his wife to travel to Palestine. While Donsky stated that he
would not reveal all of his information about his work for fear of being branded a traitor,
he offered to supply general details about life in the Soviet Union. Koenig agreed to this
proposal and began to make arrangements to have Donsky transported by an Army plane

5 l Ibid. (S)
5 211) id . (S)

53 Ibid. (S)
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to Italy. When Headquarters learned about Koenig's steps on behalf of the Russian, it
ordered its Vienna representative to drop all contact with him. SSU feared that Donsky's
supposed defection was a ruse orchestrated by the Soviets to catch the United States in an
unfriendly act toward its ally. Likewise, Koenig's withholding of Pier's alleged source in
the British headquarters in Austria became a matter of contention between SSU officials
in London, Vienna, and Washington. 54 (S)
Altogether, Helms and Williams felt that the intelligence procured by Project
SYMPHONY had been low grade and could be procured through the open press. The
Brichah had been the main beneficiary of the exchange, and it appeared that Koenig had
fallen under Pier's sway. The balance sheet of what Pier had gained by his affiliation
with X-2 in Vienna far outweighed any benefits to the United States. Even more
troubling, Koenig's work had, no doubt, come to the attention of the British in both
Austria and Palestine. The diplomatic ramifications if the British exposed the American
operation would be simply too great. The review advised the abandonment of Project
SYMPHONY as it had been first conceptualized and evolved over time. While
Headquarters did not rule out a new covert project to penetrate the Jewish immigration, it
did not seem feasible given the circumstances. 55 (S)

The Aftermath (U)

The Vienna base, reprimanded as a result of the Washington review,
acknowledged in early October that Project SYMPHONY and the use of Pier had come
54 Ibid. The cables and reports pertaining to the Donslcy case were removed from the Project
SYMPHONY file and replaced with extracts. A summary of the case is found in the project's
review. (S)
55 Ibid. (S)
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to an end. Despite promises made to Army officials to continue to exploit the Jewish
Brichah, a lack of case officers effectively closed that approach. 56 While SSU was able
to provide some information to the military, the G-2, or intelligence staff, of the United
th
States Forces in Austria, supported by the 430 Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment,

hereafter furnished the bulk of the reporting on the Jewish underground following Project
SYMPHONY's demise. 57 The Central Intelligence Group, which assumed SSU's
foreign operations in the fall of 1946, dropped contact with Erich Wender after a final
report in October 1946. 58 (S)
Arthur Pier, however, did not drop out of sight. In late January 1947, Pier met
with a CIG officer in Vienna and complained that the United States had "cooled off
toward him." Pier, in turn, was told that he had not been forthright in providing

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
information to the United States and that there was no way that the large numbers of Jews
coming from Eastern Europe could not escape without some type of cooperation on the
part of the Soviets. The American representative informed Pier that the US Army's
Counter Intelligence Corps was now responsible for collection of information from
refugees. In order for Pier to continue to work for the Americans, he had to agree not to
impose any demands on the Army. Pier again stated that he wanted to cooperate with the
Americans, but "was not in a position to engage in straight intelligence." After this point,
Pier was turned over to Harris Greene, the deputy chief of the CIC office in Salzburg c
. 59 Pier's performance as a
source for the Army also proved disappointing. 60 (S)

12 March 1947, KEL-2228, (S), and C
to C_
FBK, "Arthur Pier
(Austrian National)," 8 May 1947, both in DO Records, C
, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA
ARC. The fact that an American intelligence officer actually told Fier why he had been
dismissed created additional consternation in Washington. See C_
3 to
Commanding Officer, Austria, "Arthur Pier," 8 May 1947, (S), in DO Records, C_
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Annotations on this document indicate that this document was not
sent to the field. Harris C. Greene 3 in Austria for several years
with CIC. Born in 1921, Greene graduated from Boston University in 1943 and entered the US
Army that same year. He served in Italy with a signals intelligence unit and transferred to CIC in
the summer of 1945. Following his discharge from the Army in 1946, he remained as a civilian
employee in charge of special operations in Land Salzburg.

1

nIdentity unknown] to Chief of Mission and Chief, SC, "Arthur Pier, Former Chief
SYMPHONY Agent," 6 March 1947, MAS-003-306, (S); and Extract,
Log, 13 March
1947 entry, 17 March 1947, MAS-023-317, (S), both in DO Records, C.
z , Box 4,
Folder 10, CIA ARC. Pier had reported only one time to the CIC in February 1947 and failed to
tell his handlers that he had picked up a Soviet lieutenant colonel and his wife who had defected
through Jewish channels. (S)
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The Deeper Significance of SYMPHONY (U)

Pier's departure from Austria to Palestine in the summer of 1947 ended the shortlived relationship between American intelligence and the Brie. hah. 61 Arthur Pier,
however, remained active in intelligence circles long after the formation of the State of
Israeli in 1948. He took the name of Asher Ben-Nathan (also known as Ben-Natan) and
served as chief of the Operations branch of the Political Department of the Foreign
Ministry (HaMahlaka HaMedinet), the intelligence wing of the Israeli Foreign Service,
under Boris Guriel. Ben-Nathan operated at first in Israel and then moved his operations
to Paris. Competition among the intelligence services (including the Political Division,
the Shin Bet or the General Security Service, and Israeli military intelligence), however,
pitted Guriel and Ben-Nathan against Reuven Shiloah, who had been named by Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion as the Adviser on Special Duties to the Foreign Minister and
the chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the Intelligence Services. After months
of haggling, Shiloah persuaded Ben-Gurion to place all intelligence under his control as
the head of HaMossad LeTeum, better known as the Mossad or the Institute for
Coordination. The Mossad assumed the collection of foreign intelligence and disbanded
the Foreign Ministry's Political Department. Shiloah, in effect, fired the Political
Department's head, Guriel, leading to the "spies's revolt" in March 1951 where Ben-

6 lArmy intelligence reported that Pier paid a visit to Salzburg immediately prior to his return to
Palestine. As the Army noted, Pier had reportedly grown rich through his work in Austria
according to those who opposed him. See Extract, Headquarters, USFA, Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, USFA Intelligence Summary No. 110, 11 July 1947, (S), in DO Records, .[
Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)
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Nathan and other members of the Political Department resigned en masse and destroyed
their records as opposed to turning them over to the new Mossad. 62 (U)
Ben-Nathan's self-imposed exile from intelligence did not last long. In 1953,
Ben-Gurion appointed Ben-Nathan as the general manager of the Israeli-owned Red Sea
Incoda, a meat and shipping company, in the French colony of Djibouti on the Horn of
Africa. The company ostensibly purchased beef and lamb in Ethopia for ritual slaughter
and export to Israel. In reality, Ben-Nathan's mission was to monitor shipping
movements into the Red Sea and to ensure that Israel's maritime lifeline remained
unobstructed by the Arabs. In September 1956, Ben-Nathan received an urgent message
to leave for Paris where he served as an Israeli representative with the French and British
Governments as the three countries plotted to seize the newly nationalized Suez Canal
Company from Nasser's Egyptian regime. Ben-Nathan's main role, as opposed to
planning the military campaign, was to arrange for the transfer of French nuclear
technology to Israel, thus allowing it to become the first nuclear power in the Middle
East. Ben-Nathan went on to hold positions of power in the Israeli Government,
including head of the Israeli Defense Ministry's purchasing mission to West Germany in
1957, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense from 1959 until 1965, Israel's first
ambassador to West Germany from 1965 to 1969, Israel's ambassador to France from
1970 to 1975, political adviser to the Defense Minister from 1975 to 1977, and counselor

62 For more details on Asher Ben-Nathan, see Itzhak Ben, ed., Who's Who in Israel and Jewish
Personalities All Over the World (Tel Aviv: Who's Who in Israel Publishers, 1999); Ian Black
and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: The Untold History of Israeli Intelligence (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1991); Haggai Eshed, Reuven Shiloah: The Man Behind the Mossad Secret
Diplomacy in the Creation of Israel, trans. by David and Leah Zinder (London: Frank Cass,
1997), Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato: Presidio Press,
1992); and Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Prince a Spy: The Complete History of Israel's
Intelligence Community (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990). Both cl