The first is that it didn't get too preoccupied with al-Qaida and recognised that the country faces "many urgent problems" (to put it mildly) which are inter-related and need to be tackled across a broad front. This is what almost everyone familiar with the country has been saying all along.

The statement at the end of the meeting was short on details but it did identify the areas for attention and set in motion processes for attending to them, including a group to be known as "Friends of Yemen".

Given Yemen's touchiness about national sovereignty and "non-interference" in its internal affairs, this kind of collaborative approach is the right one. But beggars can't be choosers: the regime will face a lot of cajoling and pressure from outside if there is to be any hope of saving Yemen from becoming a failed state.

For example, the conference statement talks of "working on a shared analysis of the challenges facing Yemen, including the conditions conducive to radicalisation and instability". This is absolutely necessary but it won't happen unless the Friends of Yemen (ie external powers) ensure that it does.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been promising a far-reaching "national dialogue" about the country's problems for months. It was due to start on 26 December but has been postponed. On past form, if and when it does get under way, it will disintegrate into factional bickering unless others are on the sidelines to knock heads together.

The other problem here is that if you seriously want to analyse the conditions "conducive" to instability in Yemen, you cannot ignore that the nature of Saleh's regime is one of them.

The conference statement deftly sidesteps any direct talk of political change. It mentions "economic and social reform", as well as two working parties on "economy and governance" and "justice and rule of law". It also talks of sharing analysis on the "barriers to effective aid" (a euphemism for institutionalised corruption).

That is the diplomatic way of putting it. What it means in practice is that Saleh is being asked to change his ways more radically than he has ever done before – which is impossible because it would mean demolishing most of the structures that keep him in power.

Getting the kind of action that is needed from the Saleh regime will require a great deal of international persistence and Saleh is perfectly capable of dragging his feet until the Friends of Yemen get tired. It's also conceivable that al-Qaida might go quiet for a while, causing the world to lose interest in Yemen – but that would be short-sighted and a big mistake.

Saleh is a slippery customer and the only way to make progress is to box him in. But at least Hillary Clinton seems to have got the measure of that.

"Yemen must take ownership of the challenges it faces, and of its internal affairs," she said yesterday, stressing that it's no good if the regime makes promises to reform and then fails to deliver.

Previous offers of aid had floundered because donors couldn't be sure where the money would end up, she said. She also questioned the government's commitment to social reform, pointing out that it had blocked moves by Yemen's parliament to raise the minimum age for female marriage to 17.

"Some might ask," she said, "given the past history, why we should feel compelled to offer more assistance to Yemen. The answer is that we cannot afford inaction."

Despite lip service to the independence and sovereignty of Yemen in yesterday's statement, none of this can be isolated for very long from questions about Yemen's internal politics. Parliamentary elections are looming in April next year (already postponed from April last year). There may be moves to delay them again because of the security situation but, either way, there is little doubt they will bring the country's internal tensions to a new peak.

Then, in September 2013, Saleh himself is required by the constitution to step down, though he may try to extend his stay.

But there's a whiff of Musharraf about Saleh now. He'll talk the talk for a while and promise to get on with things but it may not be long before he's told to go – by his foreign backers, by the Yemeni public, or both.

The only thing that might prevent that is uncertainty – or fear – about what will happen once he's gone. There are no obvious successors apart from his son, Ahmed. Saleh himself has seen to that.