If the military organizations are to survive for long on the
field of battle, they must be constantly strengthened by trained men to replace
those lost through rotation, promotion, sickness, or battle. Both in quantity
and quality, the U.S. Army training establishment measured up to the Vietnam war
expansion and the demand for trained replacements. To this end, many training
courses had to be run on three shifts, around the clock. Skilled military
instructors were assigned first to. the classroom, then to Vietnam, then to the
classroom again. Many worked not only their full duty shifts but also added
hours repairing equipment and doing other work which helped ensure that the
training program would go on. At a number of communications training
installations, civilian staff members and civilian instructors also played a
crucial part in the herculean task of meeting the demands for trained
technicians. Their corresponding stability, expertise, and dedication often made
the difference between success and failure when the military staff was riddled
by overseas levies. Together, the civilian and military teams got the job done.

Before the Vietnam war, training in the technical services
such as the Signal Corps had been the responsibility of the chief of the service
concerned. The chief signal officer had under his command the Signal Training
Command at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which directed all Signal Corps field
training activities, including the Signal School at Fort Monmouth, the Signal
Training Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and the Training Command Detachment at
Fort Bliss, Texas. He also held responsibilities for signal research and
development and for signal supply and procurement.

Shortly after assuming his duties in 1961, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara directed a number of special studies aimed at
improving management practices within the Department of Defense. One of these
special studies was Project 80, "Study of the Functions, Organization and
Procedures of the Department of the Army." The study was made by a hand-picked
task force of military

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men and civilians headed by deputy comptroller of the Army
Leonard W. Hoelscher. The study began on 17 February 1961 upon the approval of
the study plan by Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker. As the Hoelscher
committee neared completion of its report, representatives of the deputy chief
of staff for logistics raised strong objections to some features. Brigadier
General James M. Illig and Dr. Wilfred J. Garvin took particular exception to
the technical service chiefs' losing their responsibilities for the technical
training and career management of their personnel. They expressed the view that
combat arms agencies such as the Continental Army Command and the Office of
Personnel Operations could not produce the kind of skilled technicians required
in an era of rapid technological change for service throughout the Army and
Department of Defense.

The Hoelscher committee submitted its report in October 1961
and was disbanded except for a small residual staff. General Decker appointed a
general staff committee under Lieutenant General David W. Traub, Comptroller of
the Army, to study the Hoelscher committee report and recommend what actions the
Army should take. The Traub committee supported the recommendation that
technical training be transferred to the Continental Army Command.

Secretary McNamara pushed for action. At an 8 December 1961
meeting with the, Army technical services chief, he asked for their views on the
broad aspects of the reorganization plan. Chief Signal Officer Major General
Ralph T. Nelson concurred in the recommended changes.

On 16 January 1962, President Kennedy sent the reorganization
recommendations of Secretary McNamara to Congress. Under the provisions of the
McCormick-Curtis amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the
proposals went into effect on 17 February 1962 when Congress failed to exercise
its right to object within thirty days. Secretary McNamara pushed
implementation. On 1 August 1962 the chief signal officer was placed under the
general staff supervision of the deputy chief of staff for operations. The
Signal Corps part of the reorganization was completed on 28 February 1964 when
the chief signal officer was divested of his remaining field activities and was
integrated into the staff of the deputy chief of staff for operations as Chief,
Communications-Electronics, under the provisions of Department of the Army
General Order 28.

The U.S. combat support phase of the Vietnam war began in
late 1961 and the combat phase in mid-1965. Between these two

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crucial dates, direct responsibility for the training of
Signal Corps technicians was transferred from the chief signal officer to the
commander of the Continental Army Command; the procurement and distribution of
Signal Corps equipment was transferred from the chief signal officer to the
commander of the new Army Materiel Command; and the responsibilities for
training publications and technical publications were transferred to the new
Combat Developments Command and Army Materiel Command, respectively.

Among the many schools run by the Continental Army Command
were schools representing most of the branches of the Army with the exception of
those schools in the medical, legal, and intelligence fields which were the
responsibilities of the appropriate Department of the Army staff members. The
schools most closely associated with divisional communications were the
Southeastern Signal School at Fort Gordon, Georgia; the Signal School at Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey; the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the
Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky; and the Infantry School at Fort Benning,
Georgia. All others, including the higher level staff colleges and senior
service schools, had an interest in the quality and utilization of the product
but little part in its development.

The effectiveness of divisional communications depended
heavily on the skills and dedication of the enlisted technicians who installed
and manned the systems that carried the voice of command. The Southeastern
Signal School at Fort Gordon generally taught most of those enlisted military
occupational specialties that fell in the tactical area while the Signal School
at Fort Monmouth taught the strategic and fixed stations skills. (See
Appendix A.) Communications training also went on at a number of Army
training centers. For example, training in military occupational specialty 05B,
radio telephone operator, was conducted under the doctrinal monitorship or
proponency of the Southeastern Signal School at Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort
Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and Fort
Ord, California. Training in other heavy volume military occupational
specialties was conducted under Southeastern Signal School proponency at Fort
Polk, Louisiana; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Fort Dix; Fort Jackson; Fort
Huachuca; and Fort Ord.

When the Vietnam war began, an expanding Army increased its
divisional requirements. The training load doubled. In 1962 the Southeastern
Signal School graduated 16,643 tactical communicators; in 1967 it graduated
42,901. Wartime training under the

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ground rules that were in effect became a mammoth task.

Some of those rules established for the Vietnam war were to
have a distinct impact on the training establishment and differed from those
existing in previous wars. Some of these ground rules were imposed on the Army
and some were, at least partially, self-imposed.

In World War II, the draft period was "for the duration plus
six months." For the Vietnam war, it was for two years. This ground rule for the
Vietnam war further aggravated the training problem because the non-Regular Army
personnel who developed experience in a combat tour did not have enough time
left in the service to man other units or to act as instructors. Nor could a
draftee be sent to a unit outside the combat area for any lengthy period of
on-the-job seasoning after his school training and still have time left for a
Vietnam tour. The training establishment had to train people to fill both
requirements, combat and noncombat. The twelve-month Vietnam tour, coupled with
the loss rate for all other causes, meant a heavy personnel turnover. This, in
turn, meant a quantity requirement against the training establishment,
especially when the Army was expanding rapidly to meet ever-rising strength
levels in Vietnam.

Experienced communications personnel who could be used as
instructors were in short supply. This understrength was further aggravated by a
ground rule which authorized some instructors to be absent for half of each
training day to attend civilian job training under Project Transition. This
well-intentioned project was open to servicemen within six months of the
expiration of their term of service and was designed to provide a more orderly
transition into the civilian job market. The top priority task of training
communicators for the battlefield was degraded by the loss of these experienced
instructors. In 1968 the Southeastern Signal School estimated that over a
hundred thousand hours had been lost to Project Transition at a time when such a
loss could be ill afforded.

The presidential decision not to call up any significant
number of reserve component elements or individuals posed a number of problems.
The impact on the training establishment was felt primarily in the junior
officer and noncommissioned officer areas. Both the instructor corps and the
student support units needed more junior officers and noncommissioned officers
of maturity and experience. The ground rules precluded looking to the reserve
components for assistance.

Another problem was the lack of an adequate ground rule for
the distribution of new equipment. For the training base to develop

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operators and repairmen, it must get a proper portion of the
early production of new items of equipment to use for training. All too often
the training base had to fight tooth and nail for what should have been
recognized as a normal requirement. Similarly, when new items of equipment come
into the inventory to replace older models, the changeover frequently takes many
years. Economic considerations concerning maintaining production lines,
stretching out costs over a number of fiscal years, and getting the most for the
dollar by using the old equipment longer in lower priority units have a degree
of validity. In the training establishment, these ground rules frequently
resulted in having to instruct on more than one generation of equipment at the
same time or in instructing students on a generation of equipment different from
that which their unit of assignment would have. In equipment changeover, the
ground rules on timing were frequently governed more by fiscal considerations
rather than by training and operational needs. Student deferment was another of
the ground rules that affected the training base. The existence of a large
college population meant that the input to the armed forces as a whole was not a
true cross-section of the talent which could have been available. Subtract from
the available input those volunteers accepted by the Air Force, the Navy, and
the reserve components, and a quality problem starts to appear. In training
technicians for the communications field, the quality of input matters.

The personnel system managers at Department of the Army level
maintained a strong emphasis on limiting the number of military occupational
specialties and related special skill or training identifiers. This policy led
to problems, especially in the communications field. The training base would
provide specialized training of individuals to meet battlefield requirements,
only to have the individual end up in the wrong location. The personnel system
could not identify the individuals well enough to get them to where the need
existed. This difficulty was noted by the Continental Army Command Training
Liaison Team which visited Vietnam in August-September 1967. Colonel Edward E.
Moran, the signal representative on one of the early liaison teams, stated in
his trip report that procedure was required whereby individuals who received
specialized post-military occupational specialty functional training could be
identified in Vietnam and be assigned to units requiring those specialized
skills. Instances were noted where jobs requiring specialized training were
filled by untrained personnel, while trained individuals were assigned
elsewhere.

Shortly after the combat phase of the Vietnam war began, liai-

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son between Continental Army Command schools and battlefield
elements was established by a number of methods. One was visits by the training
liaison teams. Colonel Moran's trip report stated that the purposes of his trip
and its overall objectives were to establish a responsive system of feedback
data from the field to responsible schools, determine the quality of and
specific deficiencies found in school graduates, ascertain potential problem
areas, and gather data which would be directly applicable to courses of
instruction.

Liaison visits were as effective as the power of observation
and analysis of the team members, the effort expended, and the cooperation of
the host command. Colonel Moran's summary comments reflect the effectiveness of
this early liaison visit.

Colonel Moran's team found that Continental Army Command
Signal School graduates performed well in Vietnam. The speed with which they
became fully effective on the job depended directly upon their training on
specific equipment makes and models in use in Vietnam, the extent to which their
training was systems oriented, and the length of time between completion of
schooling and reporting to unit assignments in Vietnam. In the great majority of
cases one week or less of on-the-job training was sufficient.

The types and items of equipment used in Vietnam in some
cases had been phased out of school courses in favor of newer equipment. Colonel
Moran recommended that older equipment be reinstated in pertinent courses until
its use had been discontinued in Vietnam. In other instances, greater emphasis
should have been placed on specific aspects of training to increase early
effectiveness on the job.

Communications systems training should be emphasized, Colonel
Moran found, and the requirement to fight as infantry as well as perform as
technicians should be impressed upon the signal school student during training.

The team found signal units generally up to authorized
personnel strength, although critical shortages existed in a number of specific
military occupational specialties. In many instances, school graduates with
post-military occupational specialty graduation functional training were not
assigned to units requiring the training. Cable splicer, 36E, school graduates
were not available on requisition. A course in Vietnam was necessary to fill
this need.

The team thought the U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters
bimonthly publication, "Command Communications," established

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in September 1966, was an effective organ for feedback on
communications experience.

Certain revisions or changes in emphasis of school courses
were indicated. For example, the fixed station technical controller, 32D, needed
to be trained in specific facility control operations as performed in Vietnam.
Particularly important were circuit standards, equipment interfacing, local
operation procedures, restoring circuitry, and operation of the AN/MRQ-73.
Communications center specialist, 72B, training required greater emphasis upon
perforated tape reading, message transmission rather than reception, message
format, and classified material accounting.

Another liaison channel was initiated on 22 August 1967 by
Brigadier General William M. Van Harlingen when he wrote to Major General Walter
B. Richardson, the commander of the U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Gordon.
General Van Harlingen stated that since arriving in Vietnam he had felt a need
for exchanging information with the Southeastern Signal Corps School, from his
viewpoint both as the 1st Signal Brigade commander and as the assistant chief
of staff for communications-electronics for U.S. Army, Vietnam. He had some
unusual problems in training because of the environment and because of much new
equipment being put to its first large-scale use. On both counts General Van
Harlingen suggested an informal monthly information exchange with the school.
General Richardson enthusiastically endorsed the recommendation.

As this liaison grew, detailed reports from the battle area
came to the school and equally detailed replies returned. In a 13 October 1967
letter, General Van Harlingen discussed difficulties in maintaining the
AN/GRC-106 radios. The deadline rate increased from 14.43 percent for the
January-June period to 16.6 percent for the June-September period. A shortage of
repair parts contributed to approximately 50 percent of that rate during the
first period but to less than 5 percent in the second period. The shortage of
qualified single sideband radio repairmen was most critical at that time.
General Van Harlingen sent a technical assistance team from General Dynamics to
the field to survey the training problem, give remedial operator and maintenance
training, and observe repair shop procedure. The team would also give command
staff orientation and evaluate the effectiveness of the new equipment training
team and the utilization of repairmen trained by the team. He hoped also to
receive an interim report on 1st Logistics Command repair facilities before 15
October and to include it in his next letter. In early September a member of
General Van Harlingen's staff

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attended a Distribution and Allocation Committee meeting at
the office of the Army deputy chief of staff for logistics. At that meeting,
representatives supported a recommendation to divert two hundred AN/GRC-106's
plus a few AN/GRC-142's and 122's and AN/VSC-3's to Continental Army Command for
immediate distribution to the schools. The hope was that this equipment would
improve both operator and maintenance training.

In his reply on 26 October 1967, General Richardson indicated
that the Signal School at Fort Gordon recognized the difficulty in maintaining
the radio set AN/GRC-106. There was a high deadline rate for the training
equipment; of the twenty-two sets on hand, only eleven were working. To
compensate, Continental Army Command had allocated thirty more sets for the
school from current production runs. This action supported his view that if the
Signal School was to provide trained, qualified men for new equipment, it must
receive its training allocation from early production runs.

In another letter on 15 May 1968, General Van Harlingen noted
that a Continental Army Command liaison team had recently completed its
quarterly visit to Vietnam. Colonel Theodore F. Schweitzer, the director of
instruction at the U.S. Army Signal Center and School at Fort Monmouth, was the
signal representative on the team. The team visited Military Assistance Command,
his headquarters, each field force, five divisions, two separate infantry
brigades, and the 1st Signal Brigade and several of its units throughout the
command. Colonel Schweitzer met and discussed signal training with commanders,
staffs, and enlisted communications specialists in all these organizations. He
made the following general observations: Enlisted and officer students did not
receive sufficient instruction on the Army Equipment Records System (TAERS).
Students being trained on communications equipment normally mounted on a vehicle
with a power generator as a part of the total package should receive training in
1st echelon maintenance of the vehicle, trailer, and power generator.
Maintenance personnel in general were well trained in circuitry, in reading
schematics, and in repairing equipment once the fault was found, but they should
be better trained to identify and isolate trouble. There was a lag in receipt of
trained operators and maintenance personnel for new equipment being introduced
into Vietnam, but Southeast Asia Signal School was training selected cadre
personnel from units already in the country. Carrier wave, Morse code, was not
being used in any unit contacted, so continuing training in Morse code for the
05B and 05C should be studied to determine if it could

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be eliminated. Communications officers (MOS 0200) were
particularly well trained to perform the communications functions within the
combat battalions, but they were also required in most cases to perform as duty
officers in the battalion tactical operations centers and were not trained in
that area.

Colonel Schweitzer found the most frequent complaint about
newly arrived radio relay and carrier attendants (MOS 31M) was that their school
training barely prepared them for the job in Vietnam. They were weak in
knowledge of erecting and connecting the antenna; many indicated that training
in antenna erection consisted of observing demonstrations. Personnel also needed
training on the new AACOMS pulse code modulated (PCM) equipment and in the
maintenance of the vehicles and generators associated with radio relay
equipment.

Colonel Schweitzer noted several deficiencies in the training
of radio teletypewriter operators (MOS 05C). Personnel arriving in Vietnam
lacked knowledge in the fundamentals of HF operation. They were unfamiliar with
space diversity operation, and their knowledge of antennas was generally poor.
Most needed additional training on the KW-7 security equipment.

Colonel Schweitzer concluded that with these exceptions the
training of communications personnel appeared to be satisfactory for operations
in Vietnam. General Van Harlingen agreed with the observations and
recommendations. This comprehensive report of the Continental Army Command
liaison team was studied in depth at the Signal School. The school was already
aware of a number of the problem areas and had made progress toward eliminating
them.

Troubleshooting by maintenance personnel was considered the
most important aspect of all maintenance training. The trend was toward less
theory anti more training with the actual equipment to be used on the job.
Evaluations during training were planned to determine any deficiencies. The lag
in the arrival of operators and maintenance personnel trained for new equipment
continued to be a problem and was constantly addressed by the school. Training
on pulse code modulated equipment appeared to be the major area of concern. The
school's main problem in this area was the lack or the late receipt of
sufficient quantities of new equipment to conduct adequate training. As a part
of the effort to do everything possible to relieve that problem and to provide
the 31 M course the minimum equipment required, the school consolidated the PCM
equipment available in that course.

Liaison by correspondence continued periodically for several

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years. Further liaison came by way of senior members of the
Signal Corps who spoke to graduating officer classes at the Southeastern Signal
School. These occasions provided excellent opportunities for personal exchanges
of views with the school staff on training problems related to tactical
communications and frequently resulted in further discussions by correspondence.

Major General William B. Latta, commander of the U.S. Army
Electronics Command, visited Fort Gordon as a graduation speaker and examined
the training being conducted. He later indicated to Colonel Moran that training
for the radio relay specialist, 31 M, was lacking in three respects. The, course
was too short, even though it had been increased from twelve to fourteen weeks.
Too much time was lost in the three-week training on pulse code modulated
equipment and the losses from three-shift operation. The practical work was
conducted on a parade ground and did not give the necessary training for field
conditions. General Latta recommended a two-week period in the field. System
training was a necessity for the radio relay specialist. On-the-job training was
cited by General Latta as essential "to polish previously attained knowledge and
skills." It was not acceptable to prepare men only as apprentices for further
training in their units.

Many other means were used to make school training as
relevant as possible. The rotation of enlisted instructors between combat duty
and classroom duty provided realism. Incorporation of lessons learned and other
operational reports from Vietnam into the training program was pushed. Exit
interviews made by Vietnam veterans upon completing their tours were analyzed
for their contribution. Major Clark Jonathan Bailey II, signal officer of the 11
th Armored Cavalry Regiment, pointed out in his interview that he, the
regimental officers, and the noncommissioned officers all felt that the military
occupational specialty training was not adequate. He specifically cited the
radio mechanic/radio repairman, MOS 31B, and the radio teletypewriter operator,
05C. Men in these specialties were trained to repair components but they did not
understand nor could they analyze communications systems. Major Bailey also
noted that they did not seem to understand the basic principles of how to
overcome adverse communications conditions and made little effort to correct
problems before calling for a repairman.

Within the limitations of their funds, equipment,
instructors, and facilities, the schools and training centers tried to respond
to the field. One limitation on their ability to respond was a 10 percent
restriction on changes in course content. Any greater change

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BRANT HALL, new home of avionics maintenance courses at
Fort Gordon.

required Continental Army Command approval. The time required
to process change requests and the questionable technical capability of the
command to evaluate them provided difficulties for the schools. Another source
of conflict in the repair field was with the Army Materiel Command over the
adequacy and timeliness of technical manuals. Some of these difficulties could
possibly be attributed to the newness of the responsibilities assigned by the
Project 80 reorganization, but improvement in these areas remained a high
priority from the viewpoint of the schools throughout the war.

On 12 September 1966, Continental Army Command issued a
letter, "Policy Guidance-Electronics Training." This letter presented a training
formula that applied primarily to the repair field. In this formula the
available time (for enlistments and training) and the average aptitude of
trainees were, for the moment, constants; the method of training was the only
variable to manipulate. The letter went on to give specific Department of
Defense guidance and objectives, but what it all added up to was a major
challenge to the training establishments. Through the dedication of many
individuals, the training establishment overcame limitations in the areas of
equipment, personnel, facilities, and funds to meet and support the Vietnam war
requirements.

One view of the lessons which should have been learned by the
training establishment from these experiences is summed up in the

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following statement made by a senior officer who served at one of the signal schools during the Vietnam war period:

From the viewpoint of a service school official, my priority
list for three changes to improve on Vietnam War school experiences would be:

2. Greater Course Revision Authority: During time of war, the
service school commandant must have greater responsibility for the adequacy of
his instruction and greater authority to change it. I would propose 20%
authority in course length and 40% authority in course content.

3. Higher Officer and Instruction Priority: In time of war,
there are few stateside missions higher in real priority that of preparing troops
for combat. Upon completing their combat duty, top performers from the combat
zone must be brought back to the school system where their influence can be
magnified.