Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops
at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the
Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops,
infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops fought bravely,
but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he
did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood of the
slaughtered for two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five
hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty
killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people
that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners ." Subsequently Forrest made a
report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to
Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold.
It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's
command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall
into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by Federal troops
before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be
reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my
views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth. I then
ordered the abandonment of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at
all hazards. This was essential because New Berne was a port into which
blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River
long before my promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement
strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the
time. By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten
thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back badly
before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed
best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of
that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of
the Arkansas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the
campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to
where it belonged and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his
part in the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get
back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith returned
until long after the movements of May, 1864 , had been begun. The services of
forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all
that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It is
but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from
Washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I
make no criticism on this point. He opposed the expedition..

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to
justify me in fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left
Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock.
Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On
the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May,
and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the
James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the
task given him. He was also notified that reinforcements were being collected
in Washington City, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back
into the trenches at Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his
forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified
to move in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from
the Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have been
obviated by moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and
intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to
five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of Lee's army was the
first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily
follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. If the
Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water Lee could
have moved a part of his forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the
south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too,
I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the
James River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of
March to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer
with the Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few days
before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in
the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been
commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the
Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train
approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of
the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction
the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There was
but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few
minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our
train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the
train. I was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby
personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I
had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure
any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and
truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded
successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near
the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview
with the President before reaching the James River. He had of course become
acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the
line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I explained to him that it
was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory
we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the Northern States. These
troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining
still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold
them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:wtj" Oh, yes ! I see that. As we say out West, if a man
can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does. "

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness
campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a
digression further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable
E. B. Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some
distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and , I think, to
Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a
literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a
history of the war when it was over. He assured meand I have no doubt
Swinton gave him the assurancethat he was not present as a correspondent
of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to have him (Swinton )
accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent,
restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. We
received Richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no
war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the
Confederates. It was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be
privileged spies of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my
headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all
events he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some
paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either
expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the
character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of our introduction
to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us, however, for a time at
least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of
the 5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer
at my headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal instructions
for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of
these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly
after the second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my
tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both his
staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent,
thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump a little to one
side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel
T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning
against the stump, listening to the conversation between Meade and myself. He
called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the
man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what
he was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the " historian," and his
replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned
against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General
Meade came to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested
Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him
to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but
that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain
of punishment.