On War & Stuff

Afghanistan: Hostage to the Surge

“We Americans are spouting ‘COIN doctrinal precepts’ as if they were truth. They are not,” writes a wise commenter at Small Wars Council:

Every war is different. Mao didn’t know it all nor did Galula — or John Boyd. McChrystal’s supposed to be a smart guy; so is Petreaus. Hopefully as both of them gain more Afghan experience they’ll discover that they cannot just shift their Iraq experience and continue the march. Afghanistan is whole different mess and the people and the terrain are very different. Then maybe all the talking heads and unthinking tanks will get on board and realize the same thing. Smart people do a lot of dumb stuff because of the herd effect.

Now, it may be, as one of my visitors pointed out, that things are changing in Kabul, that “there is finally some energy in the process” and that Afghanistan is “finally being treated as a unique location”. But let’s suppose, just for the sake of argument, that it ain’t so — that in fact it’s not fresh thinking that is driving the planning at The Pope’s HQ but memories of that most mythical of military success stories, the Surge. Is there anything, then, anythingat all, that can be learned from Iraq?

Forgive me for being harsh, but I suggest the sooner you forget the damned thing ever happened the better. And it’s not just the obvious differences between the two theatres. It’s the simple fact that the Surge never was a success. In case you still don’t get it, let me put in in italics: The Surge never accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish. Sure, it was an important contributing factor in curtailing the sectarian killing frenzy. And it opened the door for the U.S. to extricate itself from the conflict in a way that politicians in both countries can now call “responsible”. It did not, however, in any meaningful way contribute towards making Iraq a stable country, let alone a democracy, or promoting regional stability, not to mention enticing Iraq to become a U.S. ally. Hell, Iraq was probably closer to America in the 80s during Saddam’s heyday than it is now.

So here’s what I don’t get:

If the strategic goal of the U.S.-led international coalition is not just to find a way out without losing face but to create a stable, terrorism-rejecting Afghanistan that doesn’t threaten its neighbours, why are we wasting time and money on something that already has failed on all counts?

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Jari — It’s the simple fact that the Surge never was a success. In case you still don’t get it, let me put in in italics: The Surge never accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish. Sure, it was an important contributing factor in curtailing the sectarian killing frenzy. And it opened the door for the U.S. to extricate itself from the conflict in a way that politicians in both countries can now call “responsible”. It did not, however, in any meaningful way contribute towards making Iraq a stable country, let alone a democracy, or promoting regional stability, not to mention enticing Iraq to become a U.S. ally. Hell, Iraq was probably closer to America in the 80s during Saddam’s heyday than it is now.

For me, this sound startlingly similar to Ricks’ misunderstanding of the Surge. How can a military enterprise be expected to effect change in a fundamentally independent political system? American operations in 2007-08 were never going to produce political reconciliation, but merely permissive conditions for such developments.

I’d suggest that the term “stable country” is meaningless if a reduction in violence the likes of which we saw during the surge is not a component of it. The Surge didn’t contribute in any meaningful way to that? Iraq was equally stable before the reduction in violence? I don’t think you’re being serious here.

That said, fine, I agree, don’t expect to translate the “lessons of the Surge” directly to Afghanistan (if you can even objectively establish what those lessons were).

Did U.S. operations in 2007-2008 produce conditions conducive to reconciliation? I think this is debatable. They stopped the sectarian killing, for now. But they did nothing to provide breathing space for Arab and Kurdish leaders to solve the Kirkuk conundrum. Mosul remained a cesspool all through the Surge. The Sahwat/SoI solution to the insurgency added another problem — integration of former fighters — on top of an already difficult situation.

What the Surge did was to provide Americans a way to put Iraq behind them without having to feel responsible for the inevitable slaughter that will come later.

That’s what I think anyway. With all due respect to your hard-working soldiers and Marines.

I think I can only add one aspect to your analysis Jari … the Surge achieved success – through the hard work of U.S. forces, the self-interested reaction(s) of Iraqi political operators, and a bit of luck – success for the Bush administration to leave office without the entire “project” collapsing on their watch.

Everyone put in herculean efforts – and made immense sacrifices – to kick the can down the road for someone else to deal with.