About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

5-minute Philosopher video: Does philosophy make progress?

Our two philosophically inclined robots discuss the perennial question of whether philosophy makes progress, or whether it is stuck into debating the same topics over and over. Hypatia argues that philosophy does progress, and provides some examples. However, this progress is different from that typical of science, and this difference highlights some important distinctions between the two disciplines.

Simplicio: What a nice day Hypatia!

Hypatia: Hello Simplicio, it is a fine day indeed.

S: Yes, and one that brings me to ask you a new question about philosophy, my dear friend.

H: Always glad to oblige your curiosity, Simplicio. What would you like to talk about?

S: Well, recently I have been wondering whether it can be said that philosophy makes progress. You know, science clearly does progress. Scientists discover new things, but philosophers often disagree for centuries on a particular issue, and there doesn't seem to be a way to settle the matter.

H: Yes, that is a good question indeed. I submit to you that philosophy does make progress, but in a way that is very different from science, and that in fact reflects fundamental differences between the two disciplines.

S: Really? I cannot begin to imagine what you mean, Hypatia.

H: You see, Simplicio, philosophy is not about finding out facts about the world. We have science for that, and it works very well. Philosophy is rather about critical and logical analysis of concepts, so progress is made not by discovering new things, but by making increasingly clear the way we think about things.

S: I'm not sure I understand. Could you perhaps give me an example of progress in philosophy?

H: Certainly. Take ethics, for instance, about which we have already talked in the past.

S: You mean when we discussed Sam Harris' book suggesting that science can answer moral questions?

H: Right. We did agree that ethics is not a science, but we also agreed that it can provide logical analyses of moral questions.

S: Yes, but how did ethics, as a branch of philosophy, make progress?

H: Consider one of the most common modern approaches to ethical reasoning, utilitarianism.

S: You mean the doctrine that what matters in ethical judgment are the consequences of one's action, and in particular whether they maximize happiness for the greatest number of people?

H: Right, that is the rough idea. Now, the first philosopher to propose utilitarianism as an ethical theory was Jeremy Bentham, in his book The Principles of Morals and Legislation, published in 1789.

S: Yes, but if I remember correctly, his pupil, John Stuart Mill, published a different book on utilitarianism in 1863.

H: That is very good, Simplicio! The important point is that Mill's book was a better version of utilitarianism compared to the one that Bentham had produced. Bentham had been criticized by other philosophers because of some rather simplistic aspects of utilitarianism, and Mill took those criticisms into account and produced a better version of the theory.

S: I get it! So, that one is the theory that philosophers accept today?

H: Oh no. Many other criticisms have been raised also against John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism, and as a result utilitarians have fine tuned their ideas even more. For instance, one of the most prominent utilitarians today is the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer.

S: Ah, yes, a major figure of the animal rights movement, right?

H: Yes, Singer wrote an influential book back in 1975 entitled Animal Liberation, which applies utilitarianism to the defense of the rights of animals. Singer's version of utilitarianism is much more sophisticated than both Bentham's and Mill's, which is an example of the fact that philosophy makes progress.

S: But will moral philosophers ever reach a final conclusions on these matters?

H: I do not think that is likely, but even science itself often does not reach final conclusions on the big questions. Scientific theories are always tentative and open to revision, and so are philosophical ideas. Truth, my dear Simplicio, simply is not something that human beings can easily achieve.

S: Are there other examples of progress in philosophy, outside of ethics?

H: Of course. In the past we have discussed philosophy of science, and we have seen that some of the original ideas, like those of the logical positivists, or of Karl Popper, were rather simplistic.

S: Right, I remember now. More recent views in philosophy of science, like David Hull's idea that science works as an evolutionary process, or the idea that science is a Bayesian mechanism, are certainly more sophisticated and probably closer to understanding how science works.

H: That is exactly right, Simplicio. And we could go on and talk about progress in philosophy of mind, for instance, or in philosophy of language, and even, perhaps, in metaphysics!

S: It sounds to me like you are somewhat skeptical of metaphysics, my friend! Actually, to a point, so am I, but perhaps we should leave that to another discussion.

Hypatia claims Mill's version of utilitarianism is superior to Bentham's, and cites this as an example of philosophical progress. Swell. Except I can think of several reasons to think the opposite, and I doubt there is anything close to a consensus among moral philosophers about which form of utilitarianism is better.

In fact, all the examples of progress cited in this video beg the question. Hypatia says, without any justification, that such-and-such is better than, more sophisticated or whatever than so-and-so. Therefore there's been progress. But here 'progress' and 'better' and 'more sophisticated' are synonymous.

A beautiful example of the stupidity prevalent among philosophers: http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=Philosophy+faculty+or+PhD&areas0=0&areas_max=1&grain=medium

I also like the comment towards the end, the idea that science is a Bayesian mechanism, are certainly more sophisticated and probably closer to understanding how science works.

This implies that progress in philosophy is like progress in science - that the ideas or theories better reflect reality. It does raise some questions though: is this the only view of progress in philosophy? I'm thinking of the discussion of the moral zeitgeist in The God Delusion, of how morality "progresses" with the implication that an advanced ethic is more humanitarian, not one that is more in touch with reality.

Is progress in philosophy more like progress in science (a better reflection of reality) or like Dawkins' moral zeitgeist (better approximating modern views, not necessarily tied to reality)?

Regarding the utilitarianism discussion earlier in the dialog, since I haven't read any of these early authors, I have no clue whether subsequent writings were just different opinions or what was going on there. Was that progress or just change?

> This implies that progress in philosophy is like progress in science - that the ideas or theories better reflect reality ... s progress in philosophy more like progress in science (a better reflection of reality) or like Dawkins' moral zeitgeist (better approximating modern views, not necessarily tied to reality)? <

Not sure why you think my reference to Bayesianism implies that philosophy makes progress the way science does. Philosophy makes progress by increasing our conceptual understanding, not by discovering facts. It does come to facts when it is a "philosophy of" but it's still mostly about conceptual analysis and much less about empirical evidence.

As for Dawkins' views on morality, I find them - not surprisingly - only slightly less naive than Harris'. I do think ethical theories make progress, in the sense that people discover logic flaws in previous theories and either correct or abandon said theories. So, no, newer versions of utilitarianism are better, not just different.

Massimo, I'm sorry, but the style of dialog you have here is terrible. You have two stiff-talking, polite-talking robots. Simplicio, whose name seems to me to mean "simpleton," is set up as the curious know-nothing to be instructed, but little things Hypatia says somehow manage to ring big bells for him:

"S: You mean the doctrine that what matters in ethical judgment are the consequences of one's action, and in particular whether they maximize happiness for the greatest number of people?"

and

"S: Yes, but if I remember correctly, his pupil, John Stuart Mill, published a different book on utilitarianism in 1863."

and

"S: Ah, yes, a major figure of the animal rights movement, right?"

and

"S: Right, I remember now. More recent views in philosophy of science, like David Hull's idea that science works as an evolutionary process, or the idea that science is a Bayesian mechanism, are certainly more sophisticated and probably closer to understanding how science works."

You are obviously trying your hardest to avoid making the conversation seem like a lecture by giving simplicio random snippets of highly significant knowledge. The resulting conversation is incredibly awkward, because the questioner doesn't make any sense as a character. He comes to learn something, but then somehow just randomly happens to have highly specific pieces of the answer on-hand. Imagine a conversation like this:

Massimo: Hello Ritchie! Excellent day!Ritchie: Yes. The salmon are running.Massimo: And this brings me to my question, is there any valid way to argue that moral truths exist?Ritchie: I am happy to answer your question. I think the arguments favor the notion that one cannot effectively argue that moral truths exist. In particular, recent debates have demonstrated the strength of Moral Error Theory as a stance.Massimo: Moral Error Theory, you mean the stance that moral statements are propositions and that such propositions are always false?Joey: Yes, that's it! Moral Error Theory distinguishes itself from non-cognitivism, which holds that moral claims do not express propositions at all. The latter stance was championed by A.J. Ayer,--Massimo: A.J. Ayer, you mean the influential British logical positivist?Joey: Yes.

well, thanks for the literary critique, but I (and many others who have posted or sent me positive comments about this series) disagree. First off, the structure of the dialog is not that different from that of classic dialogs in the philosophical literature, where there often is a Simplicio-like character that is the obvious foil for the argument. Second, the audience for these videos is people who have rarely if ever given serious thought to philosophy. I post them on YouTube, where the majority audience is. Maybe the RS readership is too sophisticated for this, but I'm having fun anyway!

Massimo, Michael Meadon asked a good question that you didn't answer. In this video, it is implied that sophistication is progress. But that is not true. Today's astrology, theology, and creationism are a lot more sophisticated than those of the middle ages. Would you say that they also make progress? In the same sense that philosophy makes progress?

In this video, your argument is essentially "theory A is better than theory B, because most philosophers agree than A is better than B." That really isn't very impressive. First, do you actually have statistics (poll data...etc) about what "most philosophers" think, or is your judgement anecdotal? Second, does that mean philosophical truth is a matter of vote? Third, how does this exclude the possibility that philosophers are, as a group, delusional? Given that philosophers aren't too keen about using an objective, independently-verifiable benchmark (why?) to evaluate their achievements, I say this possibility is not a trivial issue.

Massimo, I really only mean to suggest that you avoid the awkward dialog where Simplicio happens to have random snippets of important information right on hand. There's unrealistic and then there's incredibly unrealistic. It's a matter of degree here.

On a different note, I think you should have brought up something in the more technical areas of philosophy. Something in an area of philosophy that involves complex notation. Obvious points of progress can be pointed to in areas like Logic (Incompleteness Theorems, say) and Philosophy of Language (vagueness comes to mind).

> In this video, it is implied that sophistication is progress. But that is not true. Today's astrology, theology, and creationism are a lot more sophisticated than those of the middle ages. Would you say that they also make progress? <

No, the implication is that better arguments, as judged by logic and coherence, make for progress in philosophy. In this sense progress in philosophy is more akin (though obviously not identical) to progress in math. Indeed, progress in logic - a branch of philosophy - is even more closely allied to progress in math.

> do you actually have statistics (poll data...etc) about what "most philosophers" think, or is your judgement anecdotal? <

It is my reading of the literature. You don't poll scientists either to see what the consensus is in, say, string theory or evolutionary biology. You read technical reviews.

> does that mean philosophical truth is a matter of vote? <

Obviously not. Though I must add that "consensus," i.e. majority opinion, is the way *any* field measures progress, including science.

> how does this exclude the possibility that philosophers are, as a group, delusional? <

It doesn't. But scientists have been delusional in the past (say, when they were convinced of phlogiston theory, or craniometry as an indication of people's characters). Mathematicians could also all be deluded, for all I know. I mean do *you* understand the proof of Fermat's last theorem? I sure don't.

Re this exchange: "H: You see, Simplicio, philosophy is not about finding out facts about the world. We have science for that, and it works very well. Philosophy is rather about critical and logical analysis of concepts, so progress is made not by discovering new things, but by making increasingly clear the way we think about things."

When are concepts not elements of the factual? At what point on the scale does philosophy fail to determine probability as fact and science takes over to establish factuality? When is a theory, such as of evolution, not a fact - and at what point in the testing or falsification process can or should it become one? And when is the why of factual existence not elemental to a determination of that fact? Etc., etc.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. But let's take the theory of evolution. First off, no scientific theory is ever just a fact. It is a conceptual elaboration of facts. *Evolution* may be a fact, but not the theory that describes it.

Second, philosophers are interested in the structure of the theory, its logic, how it is deployed as a general understanding of the world, etc. Obviously, these problems are informed by factual knowledge, but factual knowledge in no way simply determines scientific theories, let alone philosophical analyses.

Massimo, I think you are wrong, but of course that's ultimately for you to decide here. Evolution is a fact only because the theory tells us so. And not with certainty but with a degree of probability that evolutionary philosophy has helped to establish.And in your above response you have actually shifted from the contention that theories are not facts to saying they're not "ever just a fact" but a conceptual elaboration of such.In what province does that elaboration lie? Only in philosophy?

Massimo, The "philosophy is like math" analogy will get you nowhere. If we were to judge the progress of philosophy by the standard of mathematics, we would have to conclude that philosophy makes no progress, because philosophy, despite it's long history, has yet to produce one single theorem in ethics or whatever other branch of philosophy, while new mathematial theorems are proved by the hundreds, if not thousands, every months. This shows that we can indeed use pure logic to deduce truth of deep insight and beauty and we can be certain that progress is being made, but such things are not coming from philosophy.

In mathematics, no matter how promising or how elegant an attempt at a proof is, if one single error is found, it has to be discarded. There is no partial credit in math. No progress is made by a proof that does not follow logically to its conclusion. If we apply this standard to philosophy, that means we have to discard all philosophy because no philosophical statement ever produced can satisfy a mathematician. Your "philosophy is like math" argument is self-defeating.

Granted some areas of math are not all about proof. Some mathematical problems (for example, partial differential equations) have multiple, if not infinitely many, solutions. Deriving one solution does not solve the problem, but indeed we can say that progress is made. I don't think philosophy is similar to this kind of math either.

Massimo, yes scientists can be delusional, but certainly not all the time. If that were true, we wouldn't be landing on the moon, using CPUs based on quantum effects, or using GPS which depends on relativity. Mathematicians can be delusional too, but again not all the time. Otherwise when mathematical theorems are applied to non-mathematical problems, they would not work. Your agument, however, does not exclude the possibility that philosophers are delusional all the time. Let me say that I am not saying philosophers are delusional. I am merely saying that your argument is very unsatisfying.

Defining things as better because they are more sophisticated does indeed seem question-begging, as the creationism or theology examples show. But on the other hand, if logical flaws are discovered in a concept, it is as disproved as it can be, so that is progress in a similar sense as hypothesis rejection is.

Re the literary criticism: I also find this form of pseudo-dialogue incredibly artificial, stilted and off-putting. That it is "classic" does not necessarily mean that it is attractive or adequate, merely that it is seemingly hallowed by antiquity. You can also put "And" in front of every sentence, use short sentences peppered with "thou" and repeat yourself a lot, and people who like the KJV bible would perhaps feel all fuzzy and warm inside because it sounds so classical and authoritative. But is writing that way actually conductive to making a good argument, or being readable? Does anybody read the bible or Plato today and think: hey, that is incredibly well written and concisely argued/narrated? Well, I certainly don't. We have made another form of progress since then.

Massimo, what I mean is reflected in your comment that: "First off, no scientific theory is ever just a fact. It is a conceptual elaboration of facts."

And what I argued was essentially the same - that a scientific theory IS a fact, but more than that it is a demonstration of why the theory has a factual basis.If you didn't understand my meaning then one answer would be you had no clear understanding of your own.

(But the why of things is something you seldom if ever discuss here, so I'm not surprised.)

And I'm not beating on philosophy, unless you think that yours is the last word on the subject. I'll wager I was reading Hume etal before you read English, but which of us has always understood it best is the question.

Massimo, Ok. Now you said "the parallel between philosophy and math is an analogy", not to be taken literally. So we are still left with the problem: what makes one philosophical argument better, or more sophisticated than the other. As I said, it cannot be logic in its strict sense of the word. In logic, if you have two arguments that try to prove the same thing, they are either both right or or both wrong. One cannot be more logical than the other. Logic does not permit "better" or "more sophisticated". Let's say you have two arguments, A and B. If B is better than A in the sense that B is more logically consistent, logic permits only two possibilities:

1. B is a theorem and A is not a theorem (ie. B is not only more logically consistent, B is perfectly logically consistent), or

2. A and B are both invalid.

Since philosophy has yet to produce a theorem, only 2 is permitted by logic.

Let's formulate it another way: two logical arguments A and B. If A makes one logical error and if B makes two logical errors, B is not better than A. Both are to be discarded. Both are nothing in terms of logic.

What I am trying to say is that the metric of progress in philosophy must be logic plus something else. But you haven't explain what that something else is.

For the record, I am not trying to "beat on philosophy". I simply don't find your arguments satisfying. For all I know philosophy can making great progress.

Oh, I did not mean to say that scientific literature was always, or even only predominantly, well and fluently written. Nor would I claim to be a titan of scientific writing myself.

And I have read a very limited number of philosophical papers, the most obvious example being the Maartens et al. publication that entered the discussion on this blog some time ago, and I found some of them very clearly written and well argued.

But that is one thing. Writing a pseudo-dialogue between Mr/Mrs Perfect and an unrealistically dimwitted but annoyingly eager stooge is another thing altogether. And as for the bible, I am fairly certain that you do not really want to argue that this is beautiful prose, or that Darwin was not an objectively better author:

1:3 And Judah said unto Simeon his brother, Come up with me into my lot, that we may fight against the Canaanites; and I likewise will go with thee into thy lot. So Simeon went with him.1:4 And Judah went up; and the LORD delivered the Canaanites and the Perizzites into their hand: and they slew of them in Bezek ten thousand men.1:5 And they found Adonibezek in Bezek: and they fought against him, and they slew the Canaanites and the Perizzites.1:6 But Adonibezek fled; and they pursued after him, and caught him, and cut off his thumbs and his great toes.

Admittedly I have not read the original, but unless there is a strong reason to suspect that the translators had an inexplicable fondness of randomly cutting up sentences and inserting "and"s, I would not know how it could have been much better.

Alex, as I said, this is entirely a matter of taste. You are simply too sophisticated for these dialogs. Don't read them.

optical, you have a pretty narrow conception of logic, as you seem to refer to classical modal logic, where your argument would hold. But there are several types of logic, and some do allow for contradictions to be unresolved (e.g., paraconsistent logics). Philosophy is based on rational analysis, that it on whatever combination of formal and informal logic one can bring to bear. It is about reasonable arguments, and reasonable people can disagree, and it may not be easy to point out where the flaw is. Which is why philosophy is a technical field that requires significant expertise to handle.

Baron, glad you were reading Hume while I was in the cradle, though I'm not sure what that has to do with anything.

I said: "no scientific theory is ever just a fact. It is a conceptual elaboration of facts."

To which you replied: "I argued was essentially the same - that a scientific theory IS a fact, but more than that it is a demonstration of why the theory has a factual basis."

How is it, exactly, that we are arguing the same thing if I say that scientific theories are NOT just facts and you insist that they ARE? And your additional clause ("it is a demonstration of") needs to be unpacked to make sense to me, at the moment it's a bit vague.

Your arguments A and B, though both invalid, are not necessarily equally useless. The reason for this will shed light on other metrics by which philosophy is judged. Because the contents of philosophical arguments are not merely symbols, but meaningful propositions, invalid arguments can still be interesting, and knowledge can be gained from them. Perhaps argument B is invalid in a way that highlights a flawed fundamental assumption most people have. Many times invalid arguments are used to illustrate a fallacy. For example, to illustrate the straw man fallacy, the following invalid argument might be presented:

1. optical says that philosophy is not at all like mathematics.2. Philosophy is like mathematics in that it involves premises.3. Therefore, optical is wrong.

Premise 1 attributes a position to you that is more extreme than the position you actually has, and then falsifies that position. That position may be false, but that does not mean your actual position is false.

The same goes for your argument against massimo. You attribute to massimo a position that he does not actually have, and then you falsify it. He stated clearly that philosophy is not identical to mathematics, but merely similar in certain respects. You falsify the position that philosophy is not like mathematics with regard to certainty of proofs. It is true that philosophy is not like mathematics in that respect, but that is not what massimo was claiming.

I think Massimo's philosophy-is-like-math remark is valid in the manner in which he was stating it. One might argue, however, that faulty frameworks are more often tolerated in philosophy than in math. I myself would argue that the faulty premises of many fields of philosophy make many "advancements" mere elaborations of faulty positions. For example, Singer's elaborations on Utilitarianism are not advancements in knowledge because Utilitarianism is completely false. Imagine if 20% of mathematicians mostly worked under the assumption that Fermat's Last Theorem is wrong, and their work hinged on that belief. It's like that in lots of philosophy. Most moral philosophy can be understood as the elaboration of a fundamentally flawed doctrine.

Non-moral philosophy is mostly not like this, though. Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Logic--these are fields with higher standards of reasoning, where genuine advancements are more likely to be made. I hope that, in the future, moral philosophy essentially dies out and philosophers choose to work in other areas of philosophy, like Philosophy of Science.

Well, utilitarianism is a species of moral realism, which is generally a tough position to defend. The most common incarnation of it that I am familiar with is the Harris/Pigliucci method of just saying "well let's say 'good' means 'makes people happy' and leave it at that." This is equivocation, as Julia has pointed out rather well:

you seem to think that I am a moral realist in a much stronger sense than I am. Are you a mathematical realist? Do you think that mathematical objects are "out there somewhere"? I don't, but I do think that mathematical truths are objective.

I take a *similar* (not identical!) position about ethics. I don't think it makes any sense to say that utilitarianism, or whatever other ethical theory, is wrong (or right). That's why I think Harris's contention that science can settle moral questions is inane.

But I do think that ethical theories are frameworks that allow people to think about morality. One can then discuss specific moral issues within a given framework (say, utilitarianism, or virtue ethics), or discuss the framework itself (metaethics).

Do you think the acquisition of additional empirical/scientific knowledge is also crucial for the advancement of philosophy? For example, should data from psychology concerning human morals immediately impact the assumptions made by moral philosophers? Or is such knowledge only valid in the field of psychology?

I am not a mathematical realist, but I assert that mathematical tools can be used to determine how things are in a way that ethical tools can't. Mathematical abstractions can, conveniently, be used to model things that go on in the real world. Ethical abstractions, in my view, cannot.

I also, with much respect and willingness to elaborate, think you are still guilty of equivocating on the term "morality." When you say "ethical theories are frameworks that allow people to think about morality," you are stepping away from your definition of morality as "that branch of philosophy that deals with the maximization of human welfare and flourishing" (http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=11135).

Your stance sounds much more reasonable than it used to, to me, but also much less like that of a moral realist. A moral realist, in my mind, is someone who thinks moral statements have coherent meanings and that they can be true, not just within some preferred framework, but within a definitive framework. Your last post on this thread makes me wonder whether you would hold to such a stance. From your standpoint, it seems to me that you could say

"From a utilitarian point of view, donating money to Oxfam is good, objectively."

but I don't think you could say

"It is an objective fact that donating money to oxfam is good, period."

--

A little tangent:

Although I think you are not as conscious as you could be of equivocation in your meta-ethical argumentation, I think Harris is particularly guilty of equivocation, and it doesn't endear me to the moral realist standpoint. Harris's misuse of the term "science" is not his only point of equivocation, or even his most important one. Harris equivocates over the meaning of the term "good" in some of his footnotes, as when he says that evidence is considered good in science. Yes, but in science evidence is "good" in the sense that it points to the truth--not in the sense that it maximizes happiness! I also recall a taped conference with Harris and other psychologists in which he asked what our moral terms should mean; in doing so, he revealed that we do not necessarily mean "would maximize happiness" when we say "should," since "should" is a moral term. If we already used moral terms in the way he thinks we do, such a question would be unnecessary.

On contestable issues (not questions like "does God exist") equivocation is Harris's only mode of argumentation.

I think people equivocate without intending to sometimes, because they strive to give ambiguous words unambiguous definitions. When a word like "morality" is given a precise definition, equivocation is hard to avoid, because the word has so much baggage.

I am simply elaborating on why I associate moral realism with equivocation.

My problem with the proposition you bring up is the use of the term rational. In philosophy, I think of "rationality" as "the use of reasoning" and think of a "rational belief" as "a belief that one is apt to come to if one applies reasoning to a problem."

It seems confused, to me, to say that an action can be "rational." At the very least, we must admit that the manner in which the term is being used is totally different if it is applied to an action. Economists say behavior is "rational" if it maximizes personal happiness, but that doesn't change my view that the term is being used in a totally different way.

SJK to Richie: The purpose of ethics is not to model how things are in the world, but rather to guide actions.

Right, but towards what aim? I happen to think that those who answer something along the lines of "towards the maximization (or optimization) of human welfare and flourishing" have the right idea. But how can I prove it?

However popular the idea may be (or become), it seems to me like one of Hume's "passions", or Smith's "moral sentiments", which either resonates with someone or it does not. If it does not, then what are the chances of instilling it in another through rational discourse alone? Perhaps it makes more sense to simply treat it as a brute fact (albeit, one that might be cultivated, like language, during the developmental years), which reason alone does not provide, but instead serves.

Massimo, to quote from Wikipedia, 'Misunderstanding of the difference between fact and theory sometimes leads to fallacy in rhetoric, in which one person will say his or her claim is factual whereas the opponent's claim is just theory. Such statements indicate confusion as to the meanings of both words, suggesting the speaker believes that fact means "truth," and theory means "speculation."'

And so when you now say scientific theories are "not just facts," do you perhaps mean they're not just the truth? Or not factual at all?

(And by the way, it's a deliberate inaccuracy on your part to have me claiming theories are just facts, when I clearly stated they are more than that.)

SJK: That was a useful explanation. Thanx. This is what I am coming from: it is unclear to me why Massimo said many times that philosophical reasoning is like math. In my opinion, it is nothing like math. It is as far away from math as I can tell. Granted, Massimo said that philosophy is like math in some ways. But in what ways? It cannot be that they both use logic. Every field uses logic to some extent. Computer science uses logic. Every discipline of science uses logic.

Massimo wrote "Philosophy is based on rational analysis, that it on whatever combination of formal and informal logic one can bring to bear. It is about reasonable arguments, and reasonable people can disagree"

That sounds more like science than math. Scientists would find this position very familiar, but not mathematicians. The whole premise of math is that mathematicians cannot disagree on the validity of a proof. In practice, they can disagree, but not indefinitely.

Again, I appreciate your comments. I am not coming here to attack philosophy once in a while. That would be pointless. I am really trying to understand what Massimo is trying to say.

While I can sort of sympathize with the critiques of the video as far as its lack of literary merit, I think it's a little inane and petty - even frivilous - to even bring it up. I mean, it's a 5-minute animation of cute, steam-punk robots discussing philosophy; how much sophistication were you expecting? Talk about not seeing the forest for the trees...

Unsophisticated from an English major's perspective though it may be, it's nonetheless an excellent piece of clear, effective communication expressed in a well-chosen medium. The good professor had some ideas to share with his audience, he shared them, shared them well, and we understand what he's getting at - whether we agree or not. What other criteria do we need to judge it by?

As for the rightness or wrongness of his argument, I think he makes a good case. There is such a thing as philosophical progress, very different though it is from, say, scientific progress. Where the logic and coherence of a new theory is better than that of an old one, one has improvement. One also has improvement when said new theory has a greater correspondence to reality - that is, when it does a better job of elaborating facts (newly or previously discovered) and explaining their relationship or connection to each other.

as I explained before, this isn't my full time job, I try to be timely with moderation, but you know, my actual job gets in the way...

I do not think I misrepresented what you said, I quoted you directly, and added the your disclaimer parenthetically.

As for theories vs. facts, here is my take, which is pretty standard in philosophy of science:

Theories are not facts, they are conceptual constructs to account for the nature of reality, based on the available facts.

Facts, ideally, are just pieces of information. Unfortunately, the issue is more complicated because facts become facts only within a particular theoretical framework - as even Darwin readily admitted. Philosophers call this the theory-dependency of data.

This means that facts themselves are in fact already a mix of "facts" in the naive sense and theory. Not a problem, as long as one is aware of it.

Truth is a different matter, and how you think about truth depends on what your theory of it is. A common view in philosophy is the correspondence theory. I tend to lean more toward a perspectival account, as detailed here:

> Massimo said that philosophy is like math in some ways. But in what ways? It cannot be that they both use logic. Every field uses logic to some extent. Computer science uses logic. Every discipline of science uses logic. <

Yes, but in very different ways. Just pick up a philosophy paper, compare it with a math paper, then compare both of them with a science paper. They are different, even they all use reason (or logic in the broad sense).

Philosophers often refer to what they do as "analysis," the term referring to conceptual analysis, obviously based on reason, and yes, informed by empirical evidence when pertinent. But again, the difference with science is obvious to anyone who has read a paper in both fields.

> That sounds more like science than math. <

No, because in science the role of empirical evidence is central, in philosophy is peripheral. As I wrote before, there is no sharp line of discontinuity among all these disciplines, which used to go under the general umbrella of scientia. But that doesn't mean there are no differences. And in my view philosophy is closer to the math / logic and of the continuum than to the science end. But it occupies somewhat of a middle ground between those.

Do they really use logic in different ways, or do they just apply them to different subject matters? If one uses ((A->B)&(B->C))->(A->C) in a discussion of Philosophy of Language or Walrus Behavior, one is still using the same hammer, just whacking different nails.

> I am not a mathematical realist, but I assert that mathematical tools can be used to determine how things are in a way that ethical tools can't. <

I really don't think that's relevant to this discussion. Lots of math has nothing to do with how things are in the physical world, and yet the results seem objective anyway.

> I also, with much respect and willingness to elaborate, think you are still guilty of equivocating on the term "morality." When you say "ethical theories are frameworks that allow people to think about morality," you are stepping away from your definition of morality as "that branch of philosophy that deals with the maximization of human welfare and flourishing" <

Not really. We want to think about morality *because* it helps us to maximize human welfare and flourishing. I don't think of ethics as a spectator sport.

> A moral realist, in my mind, is someone who thinks moral statements have coherent meanings and that they can be true, not just within some preferred framework, but within a definitive framework. <

Well, I'm not that kind of realist. But I'm certainly no anti-realist, if by that one means that morality is only about emotions (Julia, for instance) or entirely arbitrary (postmodernism crap).

Massimo, OK, "so the acts of observing and theorizing are both matters of perspective - which makes scientific knowledge contingent."

And it also makes philosophical knowledge contingent on the degree to which that philosophy meets the standards of the science that philosophy gave birth to. And still is the mother to for that matter, which makes science additionally contingent on the degree to which it takes mama's ever evolving (or ever loving?) advice.

Massimo said: But I'm certainly no anti-realist, if by that one means that morality is only about emotions (Julia, for instance) or entirely arbitrary (postmodernism crap).

Morality may not be only about emotions, but assuming that we agree with Hume that "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger" (which you've cited this line here before), doesn't it follow that morality takes certain emotions for granted (e.g. that scratching one's finger is more desirable than destroying the world)? If so, then isn't morality (or moral philosophy) rather like a technology for reconciling competing emotions (both internally and externally)? Anyway, that's more or less how this layperson thinks about the matter.

Optical: "do you actually have statistics (poll data...etc) about what "most philosophers" think, or is your judgement anecdotal?"

Massimo: "It is my reading of the literature. You don't poll scientists either to see what the consensus is in, say, string theory or evolutionary biology. You read technical reviews."

But, Massimo, as someone who's written a great deal about cognitive biases and illusions, you're of course well aware that they apply to you too. Frankly, "my reading of the literature" does not cut it. False consensus effect. Attentional bias. Flawed memory. Confirmation bias. Semmelweis reflex. etc. etc. etc.

yes, of course morality is *also* a matter of emotion (though for Hume it was *only* that). I see moral reasoning just like any other kind of reasoning: it helps us analyze and filter our emotions. Sometimes emotional responses are appropriate, at other times they are not, and thinking about them may help us make better judgments.

I'm not sure why people keep bringing up Chalmers' PhilPapers survey. It is entirely informal and didn't follow any standard protocol in social science, so it's got the same value as a Fox or CNN poll of their viewers.

And my assessment is based on reading the technical literature, which is what scholars in all disciplines, including the science do.

I agree with Massimo that reading the literature can be a good way of figuring out what is mainstream in a discipline. Reading anthologies is a particularly good way of doing this, because anthologies are generally edited under the guiding supposition that the volume should contain influential, significant, wide-ranging texts that readers ought to know about to get around in the field. I work in English, and I know that most English professors will not deny that we can know objective truth if you ask them in person. In anthologies, however, you can see that many of them really do think truth is basically subjective.

--

Massimo, when you earlier said

"But I do think that ethical theories are frameworks that allow people to think about morality. One can then discuss specific moral issues within a given framework (say, utilitarianism, or virtue ethics), or discuss the framework itself (metaethics)."

I would now suppose that the first sentence could be paraphrased as "But I do think that theories about the maximization of happiness can allow people to think about the maximization of happiness." I would sure hope that they do, but if you are using the word "morality" as you do here, you are using it differently from how it is frequently used, not just by laymen, but by philosophically astute intellectuals. Stanford Phil defines it thus:

"The term “morality” can be used either

- descriptively to refer to a code of conduct put forward by a society or,some other group, such as a religion, oraccepted by an individual for her own behavior or- normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons."

This leaves you to establish that a code of conduct centered on the maximization of happiness is a code of conduct that would be adopted by all rational persons. Although I have read all of your posts on morality and responded to them, I do not recall you explaining how a code of conduct centered on the maximization of happiness is more rational than another sort of code of conduct.

Sam Harris has a theory that I call "closet utilitarianism," which is the theory that virtually everyone means "maximizes happiness" when they say "good," and so on with other terms. He once said, and I quote,

"It is true that many people believe that 'there are non-consequentialist ways of approaching morality,' but I think that they are wrong. In my experience, when you scratch the surface on any deontologist, you find a consequentialist just waiting to get out. For instance, I think that Kant’s Categorical Imperative only qualifies as a rational standard of morality given the assumption that it will be generally beneficial (as J.S. Mill pointed out at the beginning of Utilitarianism). Ditto for religious morality. This is a logical point before it is an empirical one, but yes, I do think we might be able to design experiments to show that people are concerned about consequences, even when they say they aren’t. While my view of the moral landscape can be classed as 'consequentialist,' this term comes with fair amount of philosophical baggage, and there are many traditional quibbles with consequentialism that do not apply to my account of morality."

I myself think it is incredibly immature for Harris to act like the results have come in, and in his favor, just because he boastfully says he thinks tests could be performed to see whether he's right. And his personal psychoanalyses of the Kantians he has met are just irrelevant; I can picture him torturing a poor Kantian, saying "but why do rights MATTER!? Why do rights MATTER!?" I think closet utilitarianism, as a theory, is strongly underjustified. Do you agree with Sam? Do you think that everyone really just thinks happiness is good, when you get down to it? This would clarify our discussion a lot.

again, I agree with your analysis of Harris. However, to me moral reasoning is prescriptive, and yet it is not compelling. One can argue that people ought to behave in a certain matter IF they care about human and their own flourishing (not a utilitarian argument, incidentally). If they don't care, I chalk them up as being either psychopaths or dishonest postmodernists.

again, I agree with your analysis of Harris. However, to me moral reasoning is prescriptive, and yet it is not compelling. One can argue that people ought to behave in a certain matter IF they care about human and their own flourishing (not a utilitarian argument, incidentally). If they don't care, I chalk them up as being either psychopaths or dishonest postmodernists.

You imply you're describing the differences between yourself and Harris yet this is exactly what Harris argues throughout his book.

While in the same period philosophy has given you: some minor tweaks to Utilitarianism.

Which of these two things better represents "progress"? Science and technology give human beings knowledge and choices which they didn't have previously and it has a goal (whether stated or not) of gaining understanding and control of matter and energy to the greatest extent possible.

Philosophy on the other hand gives you something to talk about over a glass of wine in your leisure hours, as far as I know it doesn't have any particular goal and one should not expect progress from it. After all what choice has it given you since 1789 that you didn't have previous to that?

Massimo and I are disagreeing on a different point in Harris's argument, which is generally structured like this:

1. Moral statements are really statements about the maximization of well-being.2. Scientific research can be used to determine which actions maximize well-being.Conclusion: Scientific research can determine the correctness of moral statements.

I think 1 is simply false. I used to think Massimo thought it was true, but now I am not sure what his position is.

But in any case, I think the dispute between you and Massimo has mostly been about 2.

I was referring to one narrow claim you made just now. Perhaps you saw my name and immediately thought I was going to reopen an old science vs philosophy debate - not so, I have several obsessive interests :)

To distinguish yourself from Harris, you said, "to me moral reasoning is prescriptive, and yet it is not compelling. One can argue that people ought to behave in a certain matter IF they care about human and their own flourishing (not a utilitarian argument, incidentally). If they don't care, I chalk them up as being either psychopaths or dishonest postmodernists."

Far from being a point of dispute or disagreement, Harris spent some time making this very argument. I can't imagine how you think that this somehow distinguishes you from Harris, and it was this point and this point alone which I commented on.

I'm assuming it was an honest mistake or slip of the tongue and wanted to correct the record but if you really think that he argued something different, I'd be happy to dig up the quotes & chapter citations.

your comment is so off the mark that it is hardly worth a response. But I'm in a good holiday mood, so here we go. The dialog makes perfectly clear that philosophy is *not* about factual discoveries, so your entire analogy is simply irrelevant. Moreover, how about we also count the bad stuff that was brought to humanity courtesy of science, beginning with global pollution, atomic weapons and biological warfare? Or does that burst your scientistic bubble?

Richtie, to be clear, I do agree with some version of (1). I just don't think that (1) need to be understood within the confines of utilitarianism. A virtue ethicist, for instance, would have no problem with that statement, though s/he would probably talk about eudaimonia, a more nuanced concept than just happiness.

1. Moral statements are really statements about the maximization of well-being.2. Scientific research can be used to determine which actions maximize well-being.Conclusion: Scientific research can determine the correctness of moral statements.

I think 1 is simply false. I used to think Massimo thought it was true, but now I am not sure what his position is.

But in any case, I think the dispute between you and Massimo has mostly been about 2.

I can understand the confusion giving the long (long!) debates we had about (2) but I was really not bringing it up again. I was joining you in seeking clarification about point (1) which, let's face it, was also a point that we disagreed about earlier and I'm happy to let them remain but fond memories. (Oh those elysian definitional debates of yore.)

I just thought that Massimo had Harris's position backwards and thought I'd jump in with a simple clarification. I didn't expect the Spanish Inquisition!

I must praise you for debating philosophy with people you have never met on Christmas Eve. This is a sort of intellectual dedication and love of knowledge I have to admire.

Thameron--

You ask, "After all what choice has it given you since 1789 that you didn't have previous to that?"

You apparently think that a field does not make progress unless it brings us technological advances. I presume, then, you think that Mathematics has made no advancements since the development of differential equations, since the vast majority of mathematical research is absolutely useless.

Philosophy has made advancements because it has given us knowledge. This is all the progress it needs to bring us for us to say that it "makes progress."

You may be right about the ambiguity associated with rationality. I don't think I intend to use "rational" in the same way as economists. Also, I asked if you would grant that ethical tools can assist with making rational decisions. Based on your definition of rational, I think it makes sense to say that ethical tools, like the principle of utility, or the categorical imperative (just examples), can serve as reasons that lead to decisions about what one ought to do. If you do not think decisions can be rational in this same sense, then I am inclined to disagree.

jcm-

"...towards what aim? I happen to think that those who answer something along the lines of 'towards the maximization (or optimization) of human welfare and flourishing' have the right idea. But how can I prove it?"

I am not sure that one can prove it. One can maybe argue for it. For instance, one can argue that

That argument establishes a minimum requirement of morality that is something like the principle of utilitarianism. It is somewhat informal, but properly formalized it is valid. So, to resist the conclusion one must say which premise is false. I think emotions play a significant role in one's support for each premise, if indeed one supports each premise. The argument is not a "proof", but merely provisional reasons to adopt at minimum a utilitarian harm principle when reasoning about morality.

I think I agree with you that if someone just has no desire to be moral, the no rational argument will influence him/her otherwise. I'm not sure that's a huge problem though. I want to be moral, so I am receptive to moral reasons.

Massimo: Sometimes emotional responses are appropriate, at other times they are not, and thinking about them may help us make better judgments.

I agree, although it begs the question: how does one define "appropriate" or "better judgments"?

Here, again, I believe that emotion plays a significant role - if only as a means of choosing certain goals or desirable outcomes (e.g. scratching one's finger vs. destroying the world). Once we have those in mind (and thereby take such motives for granted in our moral discourse), then the idea of "pure reason" seems to make some sense.

But all bets are off, once sociopaths, alien species, and Republicans are involved. (OK, I admit, that last part was uncalled-for. :-) Merry Xmas.)

Well you posed the question of whether or not philosophy makes progress and my response simplified would be - in comparison to science and technology the 'progress' of philosophy approaches zero. Not to mention 'progress' really only makes sense in terms of a goal and philosophy seems to lack a clear goal.

Occasionally skeptics will ask the believers in the supernatural to present their best case for its existence. Are the minor changes to the philosophy of Utilitarianism the strongest case for progress in philosophy?

If, as you say, it isn't for the gaining of knowledge and isn't for the giving of additional choices then that would seem to put philosophy in the category of entertainment and I don't think the word progress is applicable to that. Change certainly but progress? No.

I would never try to make the case that all of the choices that science and technology give us are beneficial ones. Indeed one of the choices it gave us was whether or not to sterilize the biosphere, but the understanding it has given us of our place in the universe is not quite so controversial. It was science that made clear the story of how we got here tying together cosmology, astronomy, chemistry and biology. Science is a tool and I have a great deal of regard for the power of that tool, but I do not have a similar regard for the hands that are presently holding it.

Some of the remarks here seem to border on solipsism, or perhaps I should say: the perfect solution fallacy - as if every advance in philosophy is completely useless unless it is a 100% certain decisively correct answer to a given problem. That, however, cannot be expected of any human endeavor.

An important distinction from various other fields, like the aforementioned theology, is that there can be no doubt that the subject matter actually exists. It is interesting to examine questions like "how can we know things?" or "is there a rational basis for morals?", and if you examine them, you are doing philosophy, whether you like it or not.

But Massimo:

Moreover, how about we also count the bad stuff that was brought to humanity courtesy of science, beginning with global pollution, atomic weapons and biological warfare? Or does that burst your scientistic bubble?

This is a populist argument "against science" that I have often heard from much less reasonable people and still completely fail to understand. Science is purely about generating knowledge, not about deciding what we do with it. In principle, we could still be living in a feudal subsidence-agriculture, if "we" preferred that, while inventing combustion engines and nuclear fission reactors etc. as mere proof of concept, never actually to be used on a large scale outside of the ivory tower.

Now I can be mistaken, but I am not sure if the first person to research nuclear reactions did that with the specific aim of building a nuclear bomb, or if the various persons who invented explosives did so with the specific aim of building rockets and cannons, or blowing up fortifications. It was curiosity, trying to find things out, and then a potential use presented itself. But finding out how to make things go boom does not compel you to use it on others.

Japan is the iconic example of a nation that decided to phase out firearms after they had already been introduced and used extensively, either because they were considered dishonorable or because they realized that they would destroy the feudal system, depending on how cynical you want to see it. Of course, that worked only because they could isolate themselves so well from foreign powers.

In that sense, I would argue strongly that the real reason for our problems is not (proto-)scientists poking around and finding out things that could be abused, but competition. The fiercer the competition between companies in a free market or between entire nations after the advent of global trade and colonialism, the more strategies that give you a massive short-term benefit but are non-sustainable in the long run get rewarded.

If Thameron is going to argue that science is valuable, in part, because of the way it has allowed for the improvement of human lives, it is reasonable for Massimo to bring up the ways in which it has allowed for the damaging of human lives. Massimo did not give an irrational response, only a pertinent one.

Alex, believe me, I have the utmost respect for science as a quest for knowledge, but see Ritchie's comment above in defense of my response to Thameron.

Also, let's not forget that our choices of what is interesting to research do depend, in part, on our values, so that no scientist who works in areas that can potentially be exploited for the worse can claim purity as if there were no social context.

Thameron, you insist in equating progress with the narrow conception of technological / factual progress, missing the point of my post. Changes to utilitarianism have not been "minor," and they are just one example of progress in philosophy, but the crucial point is that the very meaning of the term "progress" is different between the two disciplines, and to keep comparing them is to make what philosophers call a category mistake. Otherwise known as mixing apples and oranges.

Okay, I fully understand the current context in which you wrote this, but you simply hear this criticism so often that it jars - especially from our dear colleagues in the humanities. And you are doing it again. Why, of course a scientist can generally claim purity (unless they are actually working in a weapons research program), because it may not be obvious how you can abuse the results before it happens. For a modern example, just think of lasers: there are myriads of peaceful, industrial or analytic uses, and currently every sensible person would presumably argue that they are immensely unpractical as weapons, requiring insane amounts of energy to work.

But what if today's research lays the groundwork for a devastating weapon in 2100? Should all scientists studying the use of lasers in surgery drop out now and burn their notes because somebody might use their results in a few decades for nefarious purposes? Are Watson & Crick morally responsible for genetically manipulated super-bio-weapons, because without their work they would not have become possible? Come on.

It should be obvious that this whole "science has caused our modern problems" approach is as inane as "science is more useful than philosophy". We want to find things out. If we are trying to find out very general things, we are doing philosophy, whether you consider it useless or not (or math). If we are trying to find things out about the specific world around us, and if we are using reliable methods for that, we are doing science, end of story. The only way to avoid science from finding new and exciting ways to shoot ourselves into the foot would be to stay ignorant.

Alex, look back at Oppenheimer's essentially moral dilemma with the work he did in 1944, reorganizing the Los Alamos laboratory to focus on implosion rather than the gun-type design for atomic weapons. He was under no illusion that he could justify the work as simply "proof of concept" and he wasn't the only one involved that wrestled with those issues. That's all I was trying to point out, that it's seldom possible to do research in a moral vacuum.

Alex, again, my comment was within a particular context, as you acknowledged. However, there is also a broader comment to be made, which is that science is never detached from social context and value choices. Of course many times these value biases are harmless, and at any rate cannot be avoided (so they are not the scientist's "fault"), but I find it increasingly risible when my colleagues argue that some scientific question is "intrinsically interesting," as if they were gods making absolutely objective choices dictated by pure reason.

> Are Watson & Crick morally responsible for genetically manipulated super-bio-weapons, because without their work they would not have become possible? Come on. <

I'm surprised you wrote this, because you are clearly more thoughtful than that. Of course W&C are not responsible for bio-weapons. But *somewhere* along the line that lead to research on bio-weapon, some scientist ought to have understood where he was going, and that's where moral responsibility comes in. And I'm pretty sure that line was crossed much earlier than someone entering a lab labelled "Biological Weapons."