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Founded in 1948, the Stanford Law Review is a general-interest academic legal journal. Each year the Law Review publishes one volume, which appears in six separate issues between November and May. Each issue contains material written by student members of the Law Review, other Stanford law students, and outside contributors, such as law professors, judges, and practicing lawyers. Approximately 2,600 libraries, attorneys, judges, law firms, government agencies, and others subscribe to the Law Review. The Law Review also hosts lectures and an annual live symposium at Stanford Law School.

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Terms Related to the Moving Wall

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Complete: Journals that are no longer published or that have been
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Abstract

In this essay, Akhil and Vikram Amar attack the constitutionality of the current presidential succession statute, which places the Speaker of the House and the Senate President pro tempore first and second in line, respectively, if there is neither a President nor a Vice President. Relying on the words of the Framers, the text and logic of the Constitution, and various practical and ethical concerns, the Amars conclude that federal legislators are not "Officers" under the Succession Clause and thus ineligible for the line of succession. Finally, the Amars suggest that an updated succession statute should provide for a prompt national election after succession, and should iron out various other wrinkles in the current succession statute.