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Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan

Ms. Kelberer is a Fulbright Specialist in Belgium and recently completed a research consultancy with the Jordan INGO Forum on the Jordan Compact. She is a co-founder of the Pardee School Initiative on Forced Migration and Human Trafficking and works as an independent consultant for the International Center for Conciliation and the EU Jean Monnet Migration Innovation grant.

Since 2003, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been severely tested by armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria, taking in hundreds of thousands of refugees and experiencing economic and demographic shocks as a result. Jordan now hosts more than 654,000 Syrian refugees registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);1 the 2015 census estimated that there were 1.26 million Syrians living in the country.2 Approximately 79 percent of the registered Syrian refugees live outside of Jordan’s two refugee camps for Syrians, Zaatari and al-Azraq.

Over the past six years, more than 5.3 million Syrians have fled the violence and deprivation of the civil war. The vast majority — 4.91 million people — have settled in just three host states: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.3 The arrival of so many in such a short time has had significant effects on the political, economic and social climates of the host states. While the long-term impact of these trends has yet to fully manifest itself, small countries like Jordan and Lebanon will be affected for years and even decades to come, if history is any indication.

The vast majority of Syrian refugees in the region live outside of camps and are classified as "urban," "non-camp" or "self-settled." The majority of non-camp refugees live in towns and cities, which offer better access to services, more economic opportunity, and the ability to move around and integrate themselves into the local community.4 Urban refugees face significant barriers to accessing aid, as they are more difficult for organizations to identify and reach; they live alongside other marginalized groups; and they often do not register with UNHCR or other agencies for fear of identification, among other issues. Urban refugees also have more direct impact on the host society’s infrastructure, services and economy than refugees in camps, and this can lead to a lower standard of living for the host community.

Jordan is the third-largest regional host state, but — after Lebanon — second in terms of the demographic impact of Syrians on the country. Of the 9.6 million inhabitants of Jordan, including nationals and the foreign born, Syrians make up between 6.8 and 13 percent.5 Resources to expand access to services, housing and employment have not kept up with rising demand. The government estimates that, as of 2016, it has spent $8.6 billion in direct costs for hosting Syrian refugees since the onset of the crisis — approximately 16 percent of the annual budget.6

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-197 for Jordan, published jointly by the UNHCR and the government, has called for $7.68 billion in aid over three years.8 Yet appeals for international donations have met an average of only 60 percent of total needs from 2014 to 2016. As of October 2017, only 42 percent of the UNHCR’s appeal for Jordan had been fulfilled, a shortfall of nearly $700 million.9 Funding deficits, coupled with competition over jobs and resources, and infrastructure degradation, have heightened intercommunal tensions.10 It is in this context that the government of Jordan has shaped its policies toward Syrian refugees. Yet, contrary to expectations, in 2016 Jordan surprised many observers when it announced the terms of what would become known as the Jordan Compact, a commitment to granting Syrians access to work permits and expanding educational opportunities for refugees.11 This had previously been a political nonstarter.

Jordan’s policy concessions achieved their intended goals: at the 2016 London conference, nearly $1.4 billion in grants were pledged, 37 percent higher than the $988 million originally pledged.12 Additionally, Jordan received access to $923 billion in loans, many of them at concessional rates previously unavailable to a middle-income country. This raised Jordan’s access to development financing to $1.8 billion in 2016.13 In June 2016, the EU also announced the initial terms of the trade deal promised under the Jordan Compact, giving manufacturers who employ certain quotas of Syrian refugee workers tariff relief, among other benefits.14

The Jordan Compact was declared a success on many levels by humanitarian organizations, donor states and the government of Jordan. With enhanced access to work and education, Syrian refugees could begin to support themselves and contribute to the economy. They would also enjoy additional protections and labor rights under the migrant-work-permit system and the Ministry of Labor. In addition, the government received significantly higher levels of direct budget transfers from the international community as well as taxes from Syrians and their employers. Some hailed the Jordan Compact as a model for the long-awaited "sustainable refugee response," a silver bullet to address the issue of ineffective injections of short-term emergency aid into refugee situations that are increasingly non-camp, urban and protracted.

Jordan’s abrupt change of policy regarding Syrians’ ability to work in the country reflects a shift in its rent-seeking strategy for humanitarian aid in the context of an evolving market. Major donor states to UNHCR — chief among them the United States, the European Union, individual European and Arab countries, and Canada — have significant influence over how humanitarian funding is allocated and which crises and host countries receive more resources and attention.15 Yet host countries are far from passive recipients of either aid or refugees, particularly experienced host states like Jordan. Their various policy strategies adopted in the attempt to attract higher levels of funding reveal them as important actors in aid negotiations, with greater agency than is commonly portrayed.

REFUGEE POLICY

Jordan’s decision to offer refugees work rights surprised many observers. Until 2016, refugee work rights were not on the table in discussions between the government of Jordan and international stakeholders.16 As recently as June 2015, mention of work rights in even informal conversations with government ministries could lead to an abrupt end to meetings.17 Perceptions are widespread that Syrians working informally take Jordanian jobs. Therefore, granting Syrians the right to work was considered unacceptable in a country where the native unemployment rate officially stands at 12-14 percent as of June 2017 and is much higher among women and youth.18

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