Dr. Roderic Broadhurst, Associate Professor, Centre for Criminology,
Department of Sociology, The University of Hong Kong. Working paper prepared
in part for the Hong Kong Social Services Council - Social Indicators Project
2000.

Acknowledgements: I am grateful to David Hodson and David Levin for
their thoughtful comments and suggestion on an earlier draft of this paper.
In addition I would like to thank Ms.Candy Leong and Ms. Lena Zhong for
their assistance in obtaining crime data for Macau and Shenzhen.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on crime reported in Hong Kong since post-war 1945
and is not a comprehensive coverage of the crime problem in this unusual
jurisdiction. The main focus is upon describing and explaining the nature
and prevalence of crime as recorded by law enforcement and reported by
crime victims. Explanations of changes in crime are critically reviewed
in conclusion. Consequently discussion of offender populations, the impact
of illegal immigration, the use of imprisonment1
and other sanctions on the nature and extent of crime are not addressed.
These topics warrant fuller treatment than can be attempted in this account.

1Hong Kong has
one of the highest rates of imprisonment in the region at 163 per 100,000
only Singapore at 290, Thailand at 270 and, Mongolia at 253 exceed this
level. Japan [40], Australia [100] Canada [114] and New Zealand [143 per
100,000] and most other Asian countries had much lower rates [APCCA 1998].
Imprisonment rates have declined from levels above 200 per 100,000 during
1991-1996 due to fluctuations in the numbers of illegal immigrants.

Whatever barometer crime may be, its prevention, detection and prosecution
involves substantial public costs and provokes considerable public interest.
The public's fear and perceived risks of crime are influential elements
in the response to crime. These responses may not reflect objective or
actual risks because of distortions and manipulations of the crime experience
by the media and sometimes the relevant agencies. Because the effectiveness
of crime suppression and prevention are one fundamental measure of the
capability of the State, the "crime barometer" is a constructed and contested
artefact of these crime control activities. Pertinent, if flawed,
"crime statistics" represent the "facts" and serve as the
measure of crime. The statistics in turn become phenomena in their own
right and the source for data and speculation on changing patterns of crime.
Nevertheless apart from bureaucratic need, the State's interest in producing
crime statistics is to promote the perception of public order, safety,
predictability of law and to highlight its protective and essential role.

It is generally acknowledged that societies that are stable with low
crime, secure and safe environments and rational means of dealing with
conflicts and "rule" breaking are advanced and 'civilized' societies. In
rational economic terms, such 'rule of law' States, generate sustainable
wealth and attract rather than deter investment [World Bank 1997]. Crime
then is a threat to social order and development as well as a problem of
individual pathology or risk. The level of investment by the state in "law
and order" reflects the political salience of public order and crime issues.
Hong Kong supports a relatively large public2
and private policing establishment. In the last two decades about 12 percent
of annual government expenditure was devoted to the maintenance of security,
an outlay that is exceeded only by spending on health and education.

2About 53,000
officer were employed in 1999 as follows: HKP and Auxiliary 33,244; ICAC
1,287; Correctional Services 7,000; Customs and Excise 5,233; and Immigration
5,713. Thus there is 1 police officer for every 245 persons or 202 in Hong
Kong if auxiliary police strength is included.

The fifth United Nations Criminal Justice System [UNCJS] survey ranked
Hong Kong the sixth highest police to population rate at 640 police per
100,000 in 19943. The UNCJS
survey reported an average rate for developing countries of 283 and 346
per 100,000 for industrialized countries [Newman 1999:124]. However, there
is also a large private security and guarding industry in Hong Kong4.
This suggests very considerable investment in crime prevention and loss
reduction by private enterprises and individuals. This large investment
in public and private policing ranked Hong Kong as one of the top spenders
on criminal justice, exceeding troubled jurisdictions such as Northern
Ireland [Newman 1999:139].

3Hong Kong public
policing levels are, however, well below Singapore at 1075 police per 100,000
and the Russian Federation [1225] but well above Denmark [238], Canada
[249], Australia [275], and USA [300]. The rate exceeds other Asian neighbours
such as Malaysia [430], Philippines [155] and Japan with 207 police per
100,000 population.4In 1999 there
were 722 registered security and guarding companies in Hong Kong employing
approximately 160,000 registered personnel [personal communication Security
and Guarding Services Industry Authority HKSAR]. In comparison, according
to Nalla and Hoffman [1996: cited in Newman 1999] there are about 200 security
companies in Singapore who employ between 15,000-20,000 private police
a ratio of about 2 private police to every public police officer. Hong
Kong's ratio is closer to 5 private police for every public police officer.

The Hong Kong Police [HKP] and the Independent Commission of Corruption
[ICAC] have regularly polled public opinion and the Hong Kong Crime Victimization
Surveys [HKCVS] measure satisfaction with the services of police. These
polls tend to show a high degree of public confidence in the police and
the anti-corruption body but the victim surveys show considerably less
satisfaction with the police service, especially victims of violent crime5.
Law and order is usually moderately ranked amongst the concerns of Hong
Kong people: housing, the economy [recently youth unemployment], immigration,
environment, health, transport, and education issues as well as relations
with China dominate. Crime does, however, feature at the district level
where public concerns about youth gangs, incivilities, vice, theft and
vandalism are commonplace. The Hong Kong Chinese language press also provides
extensive and often vivid accounts of crime and criminal trials but the
effect on public opinion and attitudes towards crime has not been the subject
of research in Hong Kong6.

5The 1998 HKCVS
showed most victims thought the manner of police was pleasant or satisfactory
although 9.4% did not, especially victims of violence [17.7% thought police
were unpleasant]. Indeed 25.3% of victims of violence considered the police
service "poor" or "very poor" while overall 13.6% of the respondents considered
the police in this light [see Hong Kong 1999:114].6The 1989 HKCVS
asked about support for the abolition of the death penalty: about half
[49.7%] were against abolition, nearly a third [29.9%] were in favour of
abolition and one fifth [20.4%] had no opinion. Younger people [less than
29 years old] were more in favour of abolition than older respondents [Hong
Kong Census and Statistics 1990; Gaylord and Galligher 1994]. The death
penalty was abolished in 1991 although no execution had taken place since
1966.

The nature and prevalence of crime is open to several interpretations
and may be 'read' differently depending on the sources relied upon and
fundamental differences in assumptions about the causes of offending. The
definition of 'crime' is plastic and while police statistics are usually
valid measures of police activity they represent a problematic picture
of the nature and prevalence of crime. Direct surveys of the crime experience
[victim surveys] help compensate for hidden and under-reported offences
but they are also limited in scope and accuracy. However, it is these sorts
of official measures of crime that we largely rely upon to gauge changes
in the risks of victimization, threats to public order, safety and revenues.
Distinctions in the type of crimes or offences, their relative gravity
and frequency also help to qualify the impact of crime. The characteristics
of 'known offenders' and their propensity to re-offend is also highly relevant
to these questions. The extent that these measures reflect [or 'index']
the true level of crime and offending then it is possible to test and 'read'
crime statistics as measures of the relative safety and orderliness of
a jurisdiction. By reading both recorded and random survey measures of
crime this paper aims to describe the extent, nature and recent trends
of crime in Hong Kong.

There are few critical assessments of crime trends in Hong Kong [but
see, Leung 1995, Dobinson 1994, Lo 1993, Traver 1991 and 1994]. Interpretation
of long term trends in reported crime has been hampered by changes in recording
practices, counting rules and the classification of offences. Minimal data
is published on the criminal courts and there is limited information on
the risks of recidivism. Although police records of reported crime are
usually seen as the universe of 'known' crime, other agencies, notably
Customs and Excise, Immigration and the ICAC also contribute to the level
of known crime but are inconsistently included in measures of the "overall"
crime rate. In addition offences routinely categorized as "minor" offences
or misdemeanours are not listed as crime and often excluded in discussions
of the overall crime rate.

Recorded Crime in Hong Kong

However, while there are difficulties reading police statistics it is
possible to gauge approximately the level of crime in Hong Kong. The general
consensus is that Hong Kong has a comparatively low level of crime7
and indeed this fact is frequently stressed in tourism and other promotions
of the city. As the Security Bureau's recent assessment of the 1999 official
crime reports proclaims "[D]espite the economic downturn, Hong Kong remains
one of the safest cities in the world with an overall crime rate lower
than many other metropolitan cities" [HKSAR Security Bureau 1999: www.info.gov.hk/sb].
The overall per capita rate [per 100,000] of reported crime was 1,122 in
1999 and 1,047 in 1998 a decline from the 1,448 recorded in 1994 and well
down on its peak of 1,667 per 100,000 in 1982. Comparative burglary rates
show that just this offence alone in Australia [2,130], New Zealand [2,451],
England and Wales [2,452] and Germany [2,936] exceed the overall crime
rate for Hong Kong. In the USA a rate of 1,041 burglaries per 100,000 accounts
alone for nearly three-quarters of the rate of all crime in Hong Kong.
The burglary rate in Hong Kong was 223 per 100,000 and amongst advanced
countries Japan's burglary rate of 200 is at similar level but both have
rate well above Singapore at 30-44 burglaries per 100,000 population8.

Homicide is regarded a robust temporal measure of violent crime because
it is much less subject to the vagaries of reporting, recording and definitional
changes. Hong Kong homicide data supports the picture of the relatively
low impact of crime [see below]. Hong Kong has a very low rate of 1.23
homicides per 100,000 population especially compared to large cities in
the USA such as New York at 16.1 and Chicago 29.9. However, differences
are less dramatic when compared with Singapore 0.83, Sydney 1.9, London
2.2, and Berlin 3.5 but still significantly lower than nearby cities
Macau 7.3, and Shenzhen 4.59.
Compared to these and other cities Hong Kong's crime rate is relatively
low, especially for offences such as burglary, car theft and robbery, offences
notable for their sensitivity to environmental and situational determinants.
As we shall see this relatively low rate of crime is largely supported
by the results of the periodic crime victim surveys undertaken in Hong
Kong, albeit that the surveys show much higher levels of crime than police
records.

9All homicide
rates cited are for 1996, except for Macau and Shenzhen which refer to
1997 and 1995 respectively.

In Table I the 1989 and 1998 recorded crime is described and the proportional
contribution of different types of crime is shown. The most common crimes
recorded by the HKP are burglary, wounding and assault, theft from persons,
criminal damage, shop theft and 'other' thefts. This 'snapshot' shows robbery,
serious narcotic offences, motor vehicle theft and fraud and forgery in
proportional decline whereas thefts [other than burglary], indecent assault
and criminal damage increased their contribution to overall crime. Approximately
20% of reported crime involved violence but this relatively high proportion
is reduced to about 12% if minor offences are included in total crime.
Table Ia shows offences that are classified "minor" and if these are included
the crime 'rate' is about 60% greater than the selected offences used to
calculate official levels of crime. Some of these offences [for example,
possession of narcotics, prostitution-related offences, common assault,
drunkenness and disorderly conduct] are often included in the official
measures of crime in other advanced jurisdictions. If ICAC reports of corruption
are included a further 3,561 offences should be added to 1989 and 2,162
to 1998.

Reported crimes led to the arrest of 43,684 persons in 1989 a
rate of 852 per 100,000 and in 1998 40,422 at 654 per 100,000 persons.
In 1989 juveniles accounted for 17.0% of all arrests but 14.8% in 1998,
while young persons [aged 16-20] accounted for 19.0% in 1989 falling to
16.4% in 1998. Rates of arrest for juveniles and young persons also fell
from 962 to 800 per 10000 for juveniles and from 1,915 to 1,511 per 100,000
young persons.

Table I: Crimes Recorded by HKP 1989 and 1998

1989

1998

No.

%

No.

%

Homicide

107

0.13

66

0.09

Rape and indecent assault

1139

1.4

1304

1.8

Assault police

807

1.0

519

0.7

Assault & Wounding

6986

8.5

7191

10.0

Robbery

6452

7.9

3224

4.5

Criminal Intimidation

512

0.6

978

1.4

Other Violent Crime

1347

1.7

1400

1.9

All violent

17350

21.2

14682

20.4

Detected

8551

(49.3)

7643

(52.1)

Burglary

Theft [snatching, pickpocket & from vehicles]

4985

6.9

7601

9.3

Shop theft

5140

6.3

6032

8.4

Motor vehicle theft

4476

5.5

2449

3.4

Other thefts

12795

15.6

13727

19.1

Fraud & Forgery

1783

2.2

384

0.5

All Property

40086

49.0

39958

55.5

Vice/Brothel Keeping

298

0.4

655

0.9

Abduction/Procuration

601

0.7

183

0.2

Other Against Morality

996

1.2

351

0.5

Serious Narcotics

5040

6.2

2778

3.9

Against lawful authority [escape, resist arrest, false report]

3599

4.4

959

1.3

Serious Immigration offences

1741

2.1

2072

2.9

Criminal damage

4876

6.0

5883

8.2

Disorder/Fighting

1195

1.4

1235

1.7

Unlawful Society

1041

1.3

906

1.3

Misc. Crimes [lending, gambling, public order]

1185

1.4

1276

1.8

Preventive Crime [loitering, weapons, pawning]

3763

4.6

1019

1.4

Other Crime

24308

29.2

17317

24.1

All Crime

81808

100

71962

100

Detected

39170

(47.9)

33139

(46.2)

All crime rate per 10000

1438.7

1076.1

Table Ia: Recorded "minor" offences

1989

1998

No.

%

No.

%

Minor Narcotics [possession]

3775

6.8

6719

14.9

Prostitution related

233

0.4

987

2.2

Pornographic literature

not available

not available

1314

2.9

Hawking

5294

9.5

6427

14.3

Obstruction

26040

46.9

10949

24.4

Common Assault

not available

not available

1469

3.3

Minor Immigration

not available

not available

4050

9.0

Drunk and Disorderly

not available

not available

329

0.7

Other minor offences

18751

33.8

11634

25.9

All "Minor" Offences

55446

100

44952

100

Victims of Crime and Reporting Behaviour

Estimations of the risk of criminal victimization are provided by the
six sweeps of the HKCVS conducted in 1978, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998.
The last survey conducted in January 1999 contacted 17,602 households and
interviewed 49,942 persons 12 years and over from an eligible population
of 5,674,600 persons and 2,000,000 households [or 0.88% of persons]. The
survey scope is confined to crimes against the person or household crimes
and excludes some serious crimes (e.g. corruption and commercial crime).
The HKCVS like other victim surveys is subject to non-sampling error because
it depends on the respondent's willingness to co-operate, honesty and memory
but face-to-face interviews can help to reduce ambiguous and inconsistent
responses about victimization over the past year. Large samples tend to
produce more reliable estimates and the HKCVS sample is very large but
even so for some of the rarer crimes the sample may be too small for reliable
estimation. Repeated surveys provide valuable guidance on trends and the
impact of crime policies.

Overall 352,200 crimes were estimated for 1998 and 175,400 persons experienced
192,700 criminal events at a rate of 3.4% of persons for personal
crime or 4.1% if minor offences excluded in the 1998 count are included10.
A further 137,900 households experienced 159,500 crimes or a rate of 8.0%
for households in Hong Kong [see Table II]. This is one of the lowest
rates of victimization amongst the industrialized nations participating
in the International Crime Victimization Survey [ICVS; van Dijk and Kesteren
1996; Newman 1999]. About 5% [9,100 persons] of the victims of personal
crime experienced more than 5 victimization events in 1998, illustrating
that some segments of the population are at very high risk. Overall 14.8%
[52,300] of the crimes reported to the survey involved crimes of violence,
39.9% [140,400] theft from persons and 45.3% [159,500] crimes affecting
households [e.g. burglary and theft of cars]. The general trends of personal
crime victimization show decreases in risks compared to previous sweeps
in most age groups except for a significant rise in 1998 reported by the
youngest respondents. Overall women are more at risk of personal theft
and violence but males have higher risks of violent offences in the 12-19
years age group and women in the 40-49 age group. Violent and personal
crime victimization peaks for either sex in the younger 12-19 age groups
[see Hong Kong 1999: Chart 1 Appendix].

10Note 39,000
"minor offences" comprising: 1,400 attempted assault; 15,600 attempted
pick-pocketing, 4,300 common assault with no injury and; 17,700 involving
objects dropped from a height without injury were excluded from the 1998
data and thus the overall rate compared to previous years is artificially
reduced.

Table II: Trends in HKCVS Estimates of Crime
1978-1998

1978

1981

1986

1989

1994

1998

All Personal

% population

2.19

3.92

4.02

2.43

3.32

3.40

% report to police

18.0

37.7

39.1

42.2

38.9

36.3

Crimes of Violence% population

0.98

0.98

0.95

0.67

1.05

0.92

% report to police

28.4

41.2

38.4

44.6

34.5

31.3

Personal Crimes of Theft% population

1.20

2.94

3.01

1.75

2.27

2.47

% report to police

9.5

36.6

39.4

41.3

40.9

38.2

All Household Crimes

% population

4.65

8.64

7.37

6.12

9.34

7.98

% report to police

18.7

15.0

19.6

24.2

22.2

20.7

Source: Hong Kong 1999 Table 73 and Table 84: percent
of population over age 12 and therefore higher than rates per 100,000 total
population used as the denominator in Tables III-V: Rates for 1998 are
depressed because of the exclusion of attempted and common assaults and
other 'minor' offences [Note 10].

The proportion of respondents who claim to have reported offences to
the HKP appears to have peaked in the 1989 sweep, thereafter declining,
especially for crimes of violence. The reporting rates for personal crimes
of theft remain relatively stable at around 2 in 5 cases since the mandatory
requirement to carry a universal identification card for all those over
15 was introduced in 1980. Household crime has a relatively low level of
reporting despite the incentive of insurance but this crime includes a
large number of criminal damage offences, attempted burglary, and other
minor thefts where the victim suffered little or no loss. Generally in
1998 about 20% of victims suffered no loss and 33.5% losses of $150 or
less but for household crimes the proportion resulting in losses of $150
or less was higher at 42.2%. For crimes of violence 80% of victims sustained
no injuries, however, the majority of those victims [63%] who reported
to the police sustained injury indicating the importance of seriousness
and the significance of evidence of an offence [injury, for example] in
reporting behaviour.

People fail to report victimization for many reasons: about half [49.4%]
reflect a "no need to report" attitude and most [34.7%] don't report because
they suffered little or no loss; over a quarter [28.1%] believed
"nothing could be done" due to lack of evidence [15.3%] and that police
cannot or would not help; a further 14.6% attributed not reporting to difficult
procedures or they were "too busy"11
; and a further 7.4% gave other reasons including reporting to someone
else or fear of reprisal. Analysis of victim surveys show that the better-educated
and higher income groups are more likely to report to police. There is
also considerable variation in the levels of reporting depending on the
gravity of the offence and the relationship of the victim to the offender.
Respondents also may tend to over-report they contacted police or assume
the victimization was a private matter [Alvazzi del Frate 1998, van Dijk
and van Kesteren 1996]. The importance of reporting behaviour in understanding
the nature and prevalence of crime is borne out in Tables III-V comparing
police recorded crime rates with estimates from the HKCVS that reflect
the experience [and perception] of criminal victimization for selected
offences.

11A small number
of respondents [2.5%] said they did not report because they were "too busy"
with as many as 10% of snatching victims giving this as the reason for
not reporting.

Table III: HKCVS and HKP Trends for Select
Offences

1978

1981

1986

1989

1994

1998

Rape & Indecent Assault

HKCVS rate

58

32

127

126

165

376

Police rate

34

33

33

41

39

39

Wounding & Assault

HKCVS rate

48

83

225

121

162

181

Police rate

13

99

103

123

107

129

Robbery

HKCVS rate

661

633

284

229

295

200

Police rate

123

160

122

114

103

48

Blackmail

HKCVS rate

17

17

71

33

99

25

Police rate

58

22

12

10

14

7

Criminal Intimidation

HKCVS rate

48

35

145

102

233

251

Police rate

14

10

9

10

14

15

Snatching

HKCVS rate

78

146

172

111

198

129

Police rate

16

39

33

26

27

14

Pick-Pocketing

HKCVS rate

683

1795

1635

784

947

1142

Police rate

23

44

56

17

14

10

Deception/Fraud

HKCVS rate

26

18

96

128

116

112

Police rate

60

85

33

31

53

41

Burglary

HKCVS rate

361

698

659

545

630

576

Police rate

118

206

216

192

223

146

Theft from Vehicle

HKCVS rate

196

322

291

220

431

312

Police rate

45

93

94

91

63

42

Criminal Damage

HKCVS rate

35

74

94

141

408

320

Police rate

40

59

82

96

96

100

Notes: Rates per 100,000 total population are rounded
to the nearest whole number.

Some of the select offences compared in Table III show contradictory
trends and different periods of high and low rates depending on the source.
Except robbery the data shows relatively low rates in 1978 that increase
substantially in the 1980s and then decline or remain below peak levels
but higher than found in 1978. Generally both measures indicate increases
in wounding and assault, criminal damage and burglary and, declines in
robbery. Trends in victim data show steep increases in sexual assaults,
criminal intimidation, theft from vehicles, snatching and pick-pocketing
whereas rates based on police figures show slight increases for sexual
assault, stable rates for intimidation and theft from vehicles but declines
in pick-pocketing. Blackmail and fraud victim rates indicate increases
since 1978 but police rates indicate significant declines.

Trends in Violent and Property Crime

The definition and categorization of violent crime has been subject
to some changes in official recording practices over the period. 'Violent
crime' is defined by police to include: wounding, serious assault, assault
police, criminal intimidation, armed and other robberies, blackmail, arson,
homicide, kidnapping and aggravated burglary [the latter three rare]. These
categories are largely mirrored in the HKCVS that includes rape and indecent
assault, wounding and assault, robbery, blackmail and criminal intimidation.
Table IV compares HKCVS estimates of violent crime and the numbers "known
to police" with police records. Both measures show that the number of crimes
of violence have increased but rates based on police records indicate a
reduced risk of violent crime. The recent decline in police records is
contradicted by the HKCVS which show rates remain high. While police figures
record a peak in 1989 the victim survey shows the estimate for that year
to be the lowest recorded although it was also the year when the HKCVS
reported the highest proportion of victims willing to report to the police.
While in 1989 police reports account for 55% of the violence estimated
by the HKCVS they accounted for only 25% of these offences in 1998.

Table IV: HKCVS and HKP Trends in Crimes of
Violence

1978

1981

1986

1989

1994

1998

HKCVS

36900

40300

43400

31200

52600

58000

% reported to police

28.4

41.2

38.4

44.6

34.5

31.3

estimated number

10480

16603

16665

13915

18147

18154

actual no. of reports to HKP

12422

16094

14085

17350

17232

14682

HKCVS rate

802.7

781.9

785.6

548.7

867.8

867.3

Police rate

228.0

312.2

254.9

305.1

284.3

219.5

Notes: The 1998 HKCVS published estimate 52,300 personal
violence vicitmizations and the 95% confidence interval for was between
46,700-57,800 and the rate total population is 782. This estimate excludes
the 5,700 attempted & "common assaults" dropped from the estimate and
these are included in order to ensure comparability with previous sweeps.
Rates are lower than Table II because the denominator is total population
not the population over 12 years of age.

It is not possible to precisely compare overall property crimes recorded
by police with all property or theft crimes estimated in the HKCVS
and consequently burglary is used as a substitute for trends in property
crime in Table VI. Burglary is highly correlated with changes in police
recorded property and overall crime [see Figure 1 below] and typically
accounts for 25% of all property crime - a proportion that has remained
relatively stable throughout the period. However, in 1992 34% of property
offences were burglaries producing the peak rate [286 per 100,000] and
the highest rate for all property crimes [829 per 100,000] since
levels reached in 1983-1985 [888 per 100,000]. HKCVS estimates show that
burglary rates were highest in 1981 while police records show the rate
was highest in 1994 both measures show significant declines in 1998 but
overall increases since 1978. As with crimes of violence, victim
reporting rates reached about 40% in 1989 but unlike violent crime the
rate has remained at this level [ see Table VI].

Table V: HKCVS and HKP Trends in Burglary

1978

1981

1986

1989

1994

1998

HKCVS

16600

36000

36400

31000

38200

38500

% report

33.6

27.9

32.8

41.1

40.3

40.4

estimated reports

5578

10044

11939

12741

15395

15600

actual no. of reports to HKP

5412

10592

11942

10913

13509

9765

HKCVS rate

361.1

698.5

658.9

545.2

630.2

575.7

Police rate

117.7

205.5

216.2

191.9

222.9

146.1

Notes: the 1998 HKCVS estimate calculates a 95% confidence
interval of between 34,300-42,800 burglary victimizations and in 1994
the 95% confidence interval was estimated at 34,000 - 42,500 burglaries;
rates per 100,000 total population.

Explaining Changes in Crime in Hong Kong

Hong Kong's low rate of crime is a useful source of civic pride but
why crime is low is also topic of considerable interest. Criminologists
are equally concerned to understand the conditions that produce low risks
of crime as they are to understand those that engender high risks of crime
[see Clinard 1978]. Yet even if low levels of crime prevail we know that
crime is not distributed equally or randomly: some citizens have much higher
risks than others. Distinctions between acquisitive, violent and public
order offences are also important and vary the risks. Temporal changes
in the risk of crime are also relevant and reflect wider changes in the
society, economy and regulatory environment. Leung [1995], Dobinson [1994]
and Traver [1991] have noted the shifting trends in reported crime rates
since the 1950s, especially the rise in the 1970s and 1980s and relative
stability thereafter. However, these studies pre-date the subsequent
falls in recorded crime since 1995 [see Figure 1]12.

12Leung, Dobinson
and Traver, however, did not employ multivariate or correlation techniques
to explore potential relationships and were dependent on a single descriptive
measure [reported crime] to discuss these changes and their significance.
Correlations, between the offence categories in Figure 1 and total crime
are not unexpectedly highly significant with violent crime accounting for
less of the variance than property crime: burglary alone accounted
for 94% of the variance and robbery only 36%. A correlation between robbery
and property and burglary offences, however, was not found and this is
supported by the results of tests [including Spearman's Rank Order] on
the HKCVS and HKP comparisons. HKCVS burglary and robbery rates are negatively
correlated and HKP burglary and robbery rates are positively correlated,
however, neither are significant HKCVS and HKP burglary rates are
significantly correlated [r = 0.85] but robbery is not [r = 0.69]. Robbery
is, however, very significantly but negatively correlated with assault
and wounding [r = 99], showing the decline in robbery has been associated
with a concordant rise in assaults.

Figure 1 shows the overall violent crime reported to the HKP had increased
from about 160 per 100,000 in 1970 to about 340 in 1990 declining in 1999
to 230 but this trend is contradicted by the HKCVS. The rate peaked at
410 in the mid-1970s but the highest rates according to the HKCVS occurred
in the 1990s. Property crime [burglary, 'theft from person' and 'other
theft'] has also increased from about 360 per 100, 000 in 1970 to 780 in
1990, however the rate peaked in the mid-1980s and also in 1992 at around
880 then declining to 560 per 100,000 in 1999. Estimates derived from the
HKCVS, on the other hand, show significant increases in violent crime
rates in the 1990s but burglary an uneven decline since 1981 [see Table
IV and V].

Several reasons have been suggested to account for the lower than expected
levels of crime in a densely populated urban environment such as Hong Kong.
The protective value of cultural and ethnic homogeneity combined
with the preservation of traditional Confucionist values and extended kinship
structures may be significant but also may be weakening. A compliant pro-social
society and a government hostile to crime and corruption13
also favour control over crime even in popular cultures that romanticize
Triads. The presence of a large police force with extensive powers of "stop
and search" and strict gun laws combined with compulsory identity cards14
also contribute to lower levels of crime. High levels of natural or informal
surveillance, substantial investment in private policing and a relatively
small enclosed jurisdiction are also highly advantageous. In situational
crime prevention terms the urban structure of Hong Kong facilitates the
presence of capable guardians and reduces the opportunity for crime [with
notable exceptions in some of the older and poorer housing estates] despite
the availability of attractive targets in such a wealthy city [see Felson
1998]. These advantages may produce the displacement of crime to more vulnerable
neighbours such as Shenzhen and Macau - jurisdictions with significantly
higher levels of lethal violence and property crime15.

13Selective enforcement
policies are necessary but have variable impact on measurement. For example
the suppression of counterfeit products and other copyright offences is
a relatively recent phenomena and many other offences are conditional on
law enforcement activity. Thus it is necessary to keep in mind that crime
reports are not equivalent to a measure of general compliance with laws.14From 1980 it
became compulsory to carry a universal identification card for all residents
over the age of 15 and in 1987 the document was upgraded to make it more
difficult to forge. Its introduction had any immediate impact on reporting
behaviour, since loss or theft of the card and its replacement is mandatory.
Citizens are required by law to carry the card and present it on police
demand.15In 1998 Macau
recorded a property crime rate of 1,340, a violent crime rate of 305 and
an overall crime rate of 1,971 per 100,000 compared to Hong Kong's property
crime rate of 543, violent crime 220 and overall rate of 1,047 per 100,000.
Over the period 1981-1998 Macau's property crime rate was significantly
higher than Hong Kong but since 1995 rates are more than twice that of
Hong Kong while violent crime rates have been more or less equivalent until
1994; thereafter rates in Macau increased and rates fell in Hong Kong.
The 1998 the homicide rate in Macau was 5.9 compared to 0.96 per 100,000
in Hong Kong and in 1999 it was 9.5 compared to 0.92 per 100,000 in Hong
Kong. Detailed crime data is not available for Zhenshen but Tan and Xue
[1997] report a very rapid rise in homicide from 1.38 in 1990 to 4.49 per
100,000 in 1995.

Low crime rates in the late 1950s and 1960s have also been attributed
to the focus on public order by police during the colonial "garrison" phase
rather than crime suppression. In addition extensive corruption within
the police and other government agencies during this period also reduced
public confidence and willingness to report. Improvements in relations
with China in the 1970s enabled policing priorities to shift to more conventional
policing roles and together with the creation of the Fight Crime Committee
[1973] and the ICAC [1974] combined to provide the basis for an improvement
in the public response to crime. Anti-corruption measures and consensus
policing styles where promoted. The symbiosis between police and triads
was broken as the campaign against corruption succeeded but led to increases
in street and property crime and declines in levels of detection. Conscious
efforts were made to de-colonise and re-legitimate policing and the 1978
HKCVS reflects, amongst other measures, the effects of these changes in
governance. Greater efforts at community involvement in crime prevention
led to positive increases in the public's willingness to report crime [Lethbridge
1985, Vagg 1991, Lo 1993, Gaylord and Traver 1995, Leung 1995]. This greater
willingness to report crime to police has been assumed to translate into
higher rates of crime but recent HKCVS data suggests some regress in the
willingness of citizens to report.

Traver [1991] and Leung [1995] venture some explanation for the observed
changes in recorded crime for 1957-1990 [see Traver 1991] and the causes
of the rise in property and violent crime. The rises in police recorded
violent crime from the mid-1970s, however, were not sustained although
the HKCVS suggests this may be partially the result of a decreased willingness
on the part of victims of violence to report. Traver [1991] drawing upon
strain theories applies the notion of relative deprivation to account for
the continued rise in property crime in the 1970s and 1980s despite substantial
improvement in the general standard of living. He explains the continued
increases in property crime as a shift from 'need' to 'greed' and the stability
of crime rates [either violent or property] in the 1980s and 1990s arising
from better distribution of the benefits of economic growth in the 1980s
and early 1990s. However, since the 1990s both HKP recorded property and
violent crime have decreased but the HKCVS show neither have declined [see
Table II. Traver [1991] suggests that the effects of industrialization
and urbanization weaken social control, especially informal mechanisms,
and is partly responsible for the increases in known crime. The very low
rates of recorded crime observed in the period 1957-1964 do not generally
reflect pre-war or early post-war trends when rates for both property and
violent crime were higher16.
The process of industrialization begun in the pre-war was given impetus
by the Korean conflict and so increases in crime are not fully consistent
with the timing of socio-economic development.

16Rates for robbery
were between 2.5-4.8 and burglary 40-55 per 100,000 in the period 1957-1964
[Dobinson 1994:20].

Leung [1995] draws on theories of modernization and development to explain
the rise from the 1970s onwards and the apparent steady nature of reported
criminal activity during the late 1980s and early 1990s17.
He is troubled to explain why crime was low during the worst phases of
industrialization but become higher after the "....most challenging and
disruptive period of its economic development" [Leung 1995: 110]. However,
this assumes that industrialization produces more crime and that the worst
effects of economic re-structuring occurred in the 1950s and 1960s but
very significant re-structuring also occurred in the 1980s as capital and
industry shifted to less costly operations in China and it can be argued
this was, at least, as disruptive. This apparent paradox is resolved by
arguing that the official record was greatly depressed in the 1950s and
1960s by the nature of the colonial [corrupt] policing institutions relationship
to the community. The rapid localization and re-orientation of police from
"force to service" improved public confidence and thus the increases in
crime from the 1970s onwards are attributed to re-legitimization of government
via policing strategies.

17Leung relies
on Clifford's [1973] African examples to argue that modernization generates
wealth and thus greater opportunities for theft causing crime rates to
increase in developing countries. Historical studies of European crime
suggest that urbanisation and development reduces violent crime but enhance
acquisitive crimes [Johnson and Monkkonen 1996], however, despite numerous
studies no clear conclusion has been reached on the effects of socio-economic
development on crime [Alvazzi del Frate 1998, Newman 1999].

Leung [1995:110] argues that before the 1970s "...the government preoccupation
with controlling political opposition and the police's connection with
the triads had the effect of masking, and hence artificially deflating,
the extent of criminal activity in society. Since that time...the police
have had to adopt more stringent measures against criminal activities in
order to boost their image and enhance their legitimacy in a context of
mounting public discontent with civil service corruption. The public's
confidence in the police subsequently increased, and crime reporting increased
with it. The higher crime rates since the mid-1970s are to a significant
extent a reflection of the public's greater willingness to report crime."
However, data from the HKCVS sheds doubt on arguments dependent on shifts
in the willingness of Hong Kong citizens to report crime. Substantial increases
in the willingness to report crime appear to have occurred between 1979
and 1981 but are mostly limited to violent or personal theft crimes. Police
recorded violent crime rates actually peaked in 1974 before increases in
the willingness to report violent crime are observed. Indeed declinesin
the willingness to report household crime, especially burglary, are observed
during this period and increases in the reporting of burglary are not noted
until 1989. In addition the HKCVS trend data indicate real increases in
crime occurred irrespective of changes in reporting rates.

These studies of crime trends rely on the recorded rises in property
crime to explain the presumed effects of modernization but other explanations
are possible. Changes in the proportions of the relevant high risk delinquency
age group 15-24 may be crucial. The proportion of the total population
in the 15-24 age group has fallen substantially from 22.7% of the total
population in 1981 to 13.3% in 1998. During the 1960s and 1970s this age
cohort grew from a 11.8% of the population in 1961 to 19.4% in 1971 but
began to decrease in the late 1980s as the post war baby-boom eased. In
other words much of the "rise" and "fall" in crime rates was sympathetic
with changing demographics, in particular the increasing proportion of
high risk young males in the population in the 1970s and 1980s and the
subsequent decline in the proportion of young males from the late 1980s
onwards. This is reflected in the per capita decline in juvenile convictions
which have fallen from about 98 in 1981 to about 30 per 100,000 in the
late 1990s. Some of the decline in juvenile conviction rates can be attributed
to the expansion of young offender diversion schemes particularly from
the mid-1980s onwards.

Conclusion

By comparing the two leading sources of information on crime trends
differences have emerged that challenge assumptions about the effect of
economic growth on crime in Hong Kong. The response to crime shows less
dependence on the level of economic development than previously thought
and a close relationship between the presumed effects of modernization
and crime have not emerged, in part because fundamental shifts and shocks
in Hong Kong's economy, demography and social development have occurred
in complex ways. The data does not support a linear relationship between
crime and economic growth and at its peak crime remained well below most
comparable societies.

Previous research has given ample attention to the influence of the
role of government and the policing institution on crime rates to the extent
that these are seen as decisive in constructing them. The public order
focus attributed to police in the pre-reform period was more episodic than
dominant and much less of a distraction to crime control than other researchers
have supposed. Despite imperial origins, policing in Hong Kong followed
the example of the British constabulary in stressing deference to the rule
of law, the vigorous suppression of serious crime, and the preference for
prevention and peace-keeping over pro-active crime control. This ideology
was influential and widely endorsed within the policing institution particularly
as the professionalism and localization of police in Hong Kong begun in
the 1930s continued more vigorously in the post-war18.
Although this professionalism appears at odds with the systemic corruption
and associations with organized crime evident in the 1960s it is not clear
that this amounted to a symbiotic relationship and that this suppressed
reported crime to the extent relied upon by Vagg [1991] and others.
It is also noteworthy that efforts to eliminate corruption in the Royal
Hong Kong Police in the early 1970s coincided with dramatic efforts to
reform New Scotland Yard similarly racked by systemic corruption and scandal
[Cox, Shirley and Short 1977]. The Hong Kong police have, at least since
the post-war, been a quasi-independent agency in the tradition of
the Anglo-Saxon model of policing albeit configured in the style of a gendamerie.
This serves to limit manipulation of police and crime trends for partisan
purposes and contributed significantly to both stability in a rapidly changing
society and the orderly transfer of sovereignty. This ethos may change
but it is likely that crime [statistics] will remain the focus of contested
interpretations of Hong Kong's prospects for stability and a key test of
the success of "one country two systems".

18Local Cantonese
comprised 76.5% of the HKP in 1946/47 up from the 41% prior to the Japanese
occupation but under-represented in the Officer [inspector and above] ranks.
By 1961/62 Cantonese comprised 84.7% of the HKP but remained under-represented
in the Officer grades, however, by 1992 the HKP was 96.7% Cantonese and
the majority of Officers were Cantonese [Gaylord and Traver 1995].

We may conclude from this brief examination of crime trends that Hong
Kong as with many rapidly developing economies periodically experienced
relatively sharp 'shock' increases in crime but has generally sustained
a low risk of crime over much of the post-war period. The fluctuations
in police recorded crime are to a degree less significant when read along
with the data from the HKCVS. Thus theorizing based on partial data is
a problem that can only be overcome by a thorough examination of as many
sources as possible. While still too little is known about the nature of
crime or offenders and the relative impact of cultural, situational and
institutional factors on crime trends it is possible to list the factors
that appear to have contributed to low levels of crime in post-war Hong
Kong. Amongst these an environment highly favourable to natural and informal
surveillance, cultural homeogeniety and, high levels of public and private
investment in policing appear significant. A challenge remains in unraveling
which of these factors and others are crucial in protecting modern cities
and societies from the costs of crime.