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Checks and Balances

Checks and Balances

Restoring Constitutional Confidence

In the infamousDred Scottcase of
1857, the U.S. Supreme Court declared people imported from Africa to be
sub-human and thus not worthy of freedom. This holding involved such a twisting
of the text of the U.S. Constitution that a dissenter wrote: “[W]hen strict
interpretation of the Constitution, according to fixed rules which govern the
interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of
individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a
Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time
being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own
views of what it ought to mean.”[1] Such a hijacking of the Constitution must end.

President Thomas Jefferson wrote that a branch of civil government
that gave itself sole authority to interpret the Constitution was a “despotic
branch.”[2] We have observed the evils that result when our civil
officials fail to faithfully follow their oaths of office by keeping the text
of the U.S. Constitution their foremost human guide: slavery, sterilization,
sodomy, and abortion. We could add to that listtheftthrough
inflation of the money — an evil President Andrew Jackson fought hard against
the U.S. Supreme Court in his day and eventually succeeded in defeating.

In the first article in this series, we addressed the Protestant
Reformation principles which led our founders to make our civil government one
ofLaw rather than ofmen. You cansee that article here. In the second article in the series, we
saw how deviations from the text of the U.S. Constitution has resulted in great
travesties of justice, and you can read thatarticle here. Now we will address how our officials should
hold each other accountable to the U.S. Constitution as the highest human civil
authority in our nation.

III. How Civil Officials
May Hold Each Other Accountable to the Constitution.

As each official at all levels of civil government in the United
States makes a commitment to uphold the U.S. Constitution, an essential aspect
of that commitment must entail that they hold one another accountable to the
Constitution. Likewise, federal and state governments should hold each other
accountable to the Constitution. Within these two jurisdictions, each branch
should hold the others accountable. Below we consider some specific ways that
this accountability has historically been performed and today should be
performed.

A. How Congress and the
President May Hold the Judiciary Accountable to the Constitution.

Notions that any majority of Justices of the Supreme Court
may act as the “ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,”[3] that “the interpretation of the [Constitution] enunciated
by [such a majority] . . . is the supreme law of the land,”[4] and that “[a] decision [of such a majority]” on a
constitutional issue “cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment”[5] subvert stable government and society. Undeniably, “no
amount of repetition of . . . errors in judicial opinions can make the errors
true”,[6] and if the judicial decisions are not true they cannot
“establish Justice.” In addition, if “WE THE PEOPLE” have no alternative to
accepting as “justice” what is untrue, except by amending the Constitution in
each and every instance of judicial fallacy, then those decisions will
undermine “domestic Tranquility”.[7]

If men allow this abuse to continue, eventually not only will the
U.S. Constitution fall into discredit, but constitutionalism itself will sink
into derision. Once “the rule of law” in America is exposed as “the rule of
men,” soon to follow will be the demise of “the Blessings of Liberty for
ourselves and our Posterity.”

1. How the President may
hold the Judiciary accountable.

The Constitution gives the President the duty to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Judicial decisions
are not “Laws” of any kind.

In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that
the decisions of the Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence
of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws. They are often
re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves, whenever they
are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect.

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).

Thus, the President does not have to “faithfully execute[]” court
decisions at all. He only needs to enforce the “Laws” the courts properly
apply. He certainly does not have to enforce decisions that are “either
defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect” when compared to the
Constitution, which he has taken an oath “to the best of [his] Ability, [to]
preserve, protect and defend” against anyone and everyone. U.S. Const. art. II
§ 1, cl. 7.

President
Andrew Jackson had several successful battles with the U.S. Supreme Court over
the proper interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, most notably over the
defeat of the Second National Bank.

If the President refused to enforce an unconstitutional judicial
decision, his action should not be considered areversal. The Judiciary might continue to cite the ruling as a precedent,
but no judge could count on the President’s assistance in imposing the
unconstitutional decision on the litigants, or anyone else.

One particular instrument the President could use toward judicial
accountability would be the United States Marshals Service, “a bureau within
the Department of Justice under the authority and direction of the Attorney
General.”See28 U.S.C.
§ 561(a). The President appoints “by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a United States marshal for each judicial district of the United
States”.See idat §
561(c). So the President may remove (and with the senate’s approvalreplace) the marshals as he sees
fit, if they fail to perform his directions.

Without the support of the marshals, the Judiciary would be
severely handicapped. “It is the primary role and mission of the United States
Marshals Service to provide for the security and to obey, execute, and enforce
all orders of the United States District Courts [and] the United States Court
of Appeals”.See idat §
566(a).

The marshals are governed by this rule: “Except as otherwise
providedby lawor Rule
of Procedure, the United States Marshals Service shall execute alllawfulwrits, process, and orders
issuedunder the
authority of the United States, and shall command all
necessary assistance to execute its duties.” Idat §566(c)(emphasis added).

So if the President determines that some judicial “writ[],
process, [or] order[ is not ]issued under the authority of the United States”
because it violates the Constitution; and if, as part of his duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed” he commands the Marshals Service not to
execute such “writ[], process, [or] order[]”; then the Service will thereby be
excused by the law of the Constitution (as understood by the President) from
doing so. Judicial supremacy becomes a pipe dream without Presidential
cooperation.

The Supreme Court may try to circumvent such a Presidential
move by “appoint[ing] [its own] marshal, who shall be subject to removal by the
Court,” not the President.See id at § 672(a). Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 withMyers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 162-63 (1926). But in the face of the President’s adamant refusal to
assist, the Supreme Court would probably not adequately perform its business
with this slender force. One may “[s]erve and execute all process orders issued
by the Court” without necessarily seeing them obeyed.

Similarly, other efforts made by the Supreme Court would prove
ineffective. The Court may try to enjoin the President or his subordinates.See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475
(1867); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868). The Court may hold him
in contempt. But its citations would only be overturned by executive pardons.SeeU.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
cl. 1.

Indeed, as the Court has already conceded, “[t]he executive power
is vested in a President, and as far as his powers are derived from the
Constitution, he is beyond the reach of any department except the mode
prescribed by the Constitution through the impeachment power.” Kendall v.
United Statesex rel.Stokes,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838).

2. How Congress may hold
the Judiciary accountable.

“Whatever functions Congress are, by the Constitution, authorized
to perform, they are, when the public good requires it, bound to perform.”
United States v. Marigold,50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 567 (1850).

Congress may choose several various approaches to prevent judges
from misconstruing the Constitution. One option is to simply prevent them from
hearing certain constitutional issues in the first place. This remedy would affect
the federal court as a whole. Another option is for Congress to remove judges
from the bench for lack of “good behavior” or to impeach and convict them for
violating the law. This second remedy would expel specific federal judges who
have displayed a disposition toward unconstitutional opinions and orders.

a. Limiting the
Judiciary’s jurisdiction.

The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
“[i]n all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be party.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. On
all other matters, however, the Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate and make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. “In all the
other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make.”Id.

The Supreme Court early recognized that Congress had this
constitutional power when it wrote:

[T]he political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial
power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress. If congress
has given the power to this Court, we possess it, not otherwise: and if
congress has not given the power to us, or to any other Court, it still remains
at the legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, and it would,
perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to
every subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant.

InEx parteMcCardle, the
Supreme Court went so far to subordinate itself to the jurisdictional
limitations of Congress that it adjusted its response to a particular case
while on appeal. It declared:

We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the
Legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and its
power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given
by express words.

What, then, is the effect of the repealing Act upon the case
before us? We cannot doubt to this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 318 (1868) at 514.

In addition to granting Congress the power to limit the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Constitution gives Congress the power to
create or eliminate inferior courts. “The judicial power of the United States,
shall be vested in one Supreme Court,and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).

[I]f the Constitution had ordained and established the inferior
courts, and distributed to them their respective powers, they could not be
restricted or devested by Congress. But as it has made no such distribution . .
. having a right to prescribe, Congress may also withhold from any court of its
creation jurisdiction of any of the [constitutionally] enumerated
controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as
the statute confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction
exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all.

The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of
the United States, but has not prescribed how much of its [sic] shall be
exercised by the [inferior courts]; consequently, the statute which does prescribe
the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the Constitution,
unless it confers powers not enumerated therein.

Another check on an unconstitutional abuse by Congress would be
for the Supreme Court to resist the limitation and rule anyway. Other elected
officials, including the President, would have to examine the dispute and
determine which view of the Constitution appears most accurate.

InUnited States v.
Klein, Congress created a limitation that the Court believed denied
parties their constitutional protections and took a constitutionally granted
power away from the President. The Court refused to follow the limitation.Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).

This Congressional approach to constitutional accountability by
limiting the jurisdiction of the Court would be most effective when there is
widespread abuse in the Judiciary and swift action is needed. When the abuse is
with only one judge or a handful of judges, the next approach would probably be
preferable.

b. Removing judges for lack
of “good Behaviour” or for subverting the Constitution.

The Constitution does not guarantee any judge an appointment for
life. Rather, it states that “[t]he judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good Behaviour”. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 1. In addition, the Constitution states that “all civil officers of the
United States[] shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. Const. art.
II, § 4.

Justice
Samuel Chase was impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives for allegedly
partisan leanings in his court decisions but was ultimately acquitted by the
U.S. Senate.

If judges may hold their office only “during good Behaviour”, then
they may be removed for conduct that constitutes less than “good Behaviour.”

When it comes to “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”, the Constitution
gives the procedure to follow for removal (“Impeachment . . . and Conviction”),
but does not fully define “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” To understand this
phrase as the Founders understood it, we have to investigate the history behind
its use in Common Law practice.

The phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” embraces a host of
improper conduct. Blackstone described the need of impeachment for “a
prosecution of the already known and established law.” 4 Sir William
Blackstone, Commentaries *256. A judge’s violation of the “Supreme Law of the
Land” meets that requirement. So while an impeachable offense would include
crimes, it would not be limited to crimes.

“No one has as yet been bold enough to assert that the power of
impeachment is limited to offenses positively defined in the statute-book of
the Union as impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors.” 1 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States(Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833),ante note 121, § 797, at 581.

“Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no
previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official
misconduct.”Ibid.,§799, at
583.

The view that judges may be impeached for unconstitutional
opinions, not merely crimes, has long legacy in our English Common Law
tradition. “[I]f the judges mislead their sovereign by unconstitutional
opinions . . . these imputations have properly occasioned impeachments; because
it is apparent how little the ordinary tribunals are calculated to take into
cognizance of such offenses, or to investigate and reform the general policy of
the state.” 2 Richard Woodeson, Laws of England611-12 (1792).

Justice Joseph Story confirmed that this practice has carried into
our own impeachment system.

In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments, it will
be found that many offenses, not easily discernible by law, and may of a purely
political character, have been deemed high crimes and misdemeanors worthy of
this extraordinary remedy. Thus, . . . judges . . . have . . . been impeached .
. . for misleading their sovereign by unconstitutional opinions, and for
attempts to subvert the fundamental laws, and introduce arbitrary power.

1 J. Story, Commentaries, § 800, at 584 (footnote omitted).

Subverting the Constitution was apparently within the definition
of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” as the Founders understood it. At the Federal
Convention, George Mason argued that the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”
should be added to this provision so that it would be understood to include
subversions of the Constitution. “Why is the provision restrained to Treason
& bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many
great and dangerous offenses. . . . Attempts to subvert the Constitution will
not be Treason as above defined.”Debates
of the Federal Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison, Documents
Illustrative of the Formulation of the Union of American States (1927) at 691.

By impeaching and convicting errant judges so they are removed
from the federal courts, Congress would provide a healthy Constitutional check
to the wayward Judiciary.

B. How State Officials may
hold the Judiciary Accountable to the Constitution.

The Constitution requires “the members of the several state
legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United
States and of the several states, [to] be bound by oath or affirmation, to
support this Constitution”. U.S. Const. art VI. As a result, state
constitutions require state officials to take an oath or affirmation to support
the United States Constitution.

A detailed look into how each elected official of a state may seek
to uphold the Constitution against a wayward Judiciary would take volumes, and
would vary somewhat within each state jurisdiction. But having already
considered examples of how the executive officer and legislative officers of
the federal government may act, it would not be hard to imagine how similar
checks could be applied on a state level. For example, although a state
legislature could not impeach and convict federal judges who rule contrary to
the Constitution, they may be able to remove state judges subverting it.

Two particular options available to the state governments should
be addressed. The first option is an appeal to theDoctrine of Interposition, which
could be raised by a civil official, federal or state, but is particularly
applicable in a controversy between the federal government and the state
governments because of early Supreme Court rulings involving the doctrine. The
second option is a refusal by state court judges to follow federal precedents
and orders that conflict with the Constitution — also an act of interposition.

1. How the State May Raise
the Doctrine of Interposition.

The Bill of Rights from the Constitution declares, “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const.
amend. X.

The Constitution does not give exclusive power to the federal
judiciary to interpret the Constitution, nor does it prohibit states from
interpreting the Constitution. To the contrary, the Constitution requires state
officials to take oaths to support the Constitution. They are not required to
take oaths to uphold the decisions of the federal courts.

Therefore, when a case arises that strips a state of a portion of
her reserved sovereignty, that state as the aggrieved party could simply refuse
to acquiesce in and to apply the judiciary’s decision.

InWorcester v.
Georgia, the federal court voided the convictions of missionaries who had
resided among the Cherokee Indians without a state license. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832). Although Georgia had participated in the litigation, Georgia’s
Governor refused to release the missionaries until they agreed to leave the
state. When President Andrew Jackson[8] supported Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court proved powerless,
or at least reluctant, to do anything about this exercise of interposition.[9] The Doctrine of Interposition arose formally as a
defined doctrine out of this case.

The doctrine [of Interposition means] that a state, in the
exercise of its sovereignty, may reject a mandate of the federal government
deemed to be unconstitutional or to exceed the powers delegated to the federal
government. The concept is based on the 10th Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States reserving to the states powers not delegated to the United
States. . . . Implementation of the doctrine may be peaceable, as by
resolution, remonstrance or legislation, or may proceed ultimately to nullification
with forcible resistance.

“The Constitution does contemplate and provide for the contingency
of adverse state interposition or legislation to annul or defeat the execution
of national laws.”In ReCharge
to Grand Jury, Fed. Case No. 18,274 [2 Spr. 292].

Recently, however, the Judiciary has begun to shun theDoctrine of Interposition as an
antebellum doctrine, calling it “without substance.”[11] Their remarks only expose once again their desire to
avoid accountability to the Constitution, as they refuse to recall how our
country became free from the tyranny of Great Britain by an act of
interposition.

The Court’s ruling inEx
parte Youngdescribed how unconstitutional laws and usurping officials should
be treated. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). These principles apply to officials of both
the federal and state governments.See,
e.g., Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 386 (1902). If the Court
were consistent, it would have to be held to the same standard when it issued
unconstitutional rulings and orders.

The [judicial decision] to be enforced is alleged to be
unconstitutional; and if it be so, the use of the name of the [United States]
to enforce an unconstitutional [decision] . . . is a proceeding without the
authority of, and one which does not affect, the [United States] in its
sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a [group of justices] in attempting, by the use of the name of the [United
states], to enforce a [judicial decision] which is void because unconstitutional.
If the [judicial decision] . . . be a violation of the Federal Constitution,
the [errant justices], in proceeding under such [decision], come[] into
conflict with the superior authority of the Constitution, and [they are] in
that case stripped of [their] official or representative character and [are]
subjected in [their] person[s] to the consequences of [their] individual
conduct. The [United States] has no power to impart to [them] any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the Constitution.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123.

From a strategic standpoint, for a state to effectively hold the
federal courts accountable to the Constitution through an act of interposition,
the strategy should be for as many state officials to stand together in the
controversy as possible. At the very least, the Governor of the state, as the
executive officer, should give full support to any other state officials under
attack by unconstitutional orders or precedents. State governors usually have
control over state national guards and state police, who can see that
unconstitutional orders are not enforced. If a state makes a strong stand, the
President of the United States will have to examine the Constitution and
determine which side is in the right before or if he intervenes. Congress may
also intervene to help the state.

Whatever the outcome, a state official who takes his oath
seriously cannot follow the crowd if the crowd is leading him off the cliff of
constitutional disintegration. To do so would be nothing less than treason
against “the Supreme Law of the Land.” As the Court wrote inCohens v. Virginia, “We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” 19
U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 378 (1821).

2. How State Judges May
Challenge Unconstitutional Federal Court Rulings and Orders.

“This Constitution, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land;
and thejudges in every
state shall be bound thereby”. U.S. Const. art. VI
(emphasis added). Under this article, state judges have an obligation to uphold
the Constitution against all other competing legal authorities.

On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken the position
that any of its decisions that “state a rule based upon the Constitution of the
United States” is “under the Supremacy Clause, . . . binding upon state
courts.”See Henry v.
City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 n. 1 (1964) (per curiam). This doctrine is constitutionally incoherent.
If it were true that Court rulings had the same authority as the Constitution
under the Supremacy Clause, then how could the Court ever overrule any of its
previous decisions that “state[] a rule based upon the Constitution”? And yet,
the Court has often overruled its decisions.See,
e.g., Payne v. Tennesee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–30 & n.1 (1991).

In 1968 the Utah Supreme Court stood against the usurpations of
the Warren U.S. Supreme Court, declaring:

The United States Supreme Court, as at present constituted, has
departed from the Constitution as it has been interpreted from its inception
and has followed the urgings of social reformers in foisting upon this Nation
laws which even Congress could not constitutionally pass. It has amended the
Constitution in a manner unknown to the document itself. While it takes
three-fourths of the states of the Union to change the Constitution legally,
yet as few as five men who have never been elected to office can by judicial fiat
accomplish a change just as radical as could three-fourths of the states of
this Nation. As a result of the recent holdings of that Court, the sovereignty
of the states is practically abolished, and the erstwhile free and independent
states are now in effect and purpose merely closely supervised units in the
federal system.

We do not believe that justices of once free and independent
states should surrender their constitutional powers without being heard from.
We would betray the trust of our people if we sat supinely by and permitted the
great bulk of our powers to be taken over by the federal courts without at lest
stating reasons why it should not be so. By attempting to save the dual
relationship which has heretofore existed between state and federal authority,
and which is clearly set out in the Constitution, we think we act in the best
interest of our country. . . .

When we bare our backs to receive the verbal lashes, we will try
to be brave; and should the great court of these United States decide that in
our thinking we have been in error, then we shall indeed feel honored, for we
will then be placed on an equal footing with all those great justices who at
this late date are also said to have been in error for so many years.

Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).

In 2003 Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama stood against an
unconstitutional federal court’s order when he refused to remove a Ten
Commandment’s monument from the State Judicial Building. As Chief Justice,
Judge Moore had legal sway over the building authority. Only when Chief Justice
Moore was reprehensibly removed from office was the monument ejected.

Critics of such actions by state judges have said that in
disobeying an order by a federal court, those state judges have violated
standards of professional responsibility. In Chief Justice Moore’s case, he was
accused of violating Alabama’s Canon of Judicial Ethics.

“A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”Alabama
Canon of Judicial Ethics, Canon 2, § a (2001).

Critics argue that by opposing the federal court, a state judge
causes the public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary to dissolve.

Nothing could be further from the truth. As we have already
discussed, deviance from the Constitution is what causes the public to lose
confidence in the Judiciary and the justice system. Besides that, even if a
state’s canon of judicial ethics were to require a judge to follow a
unconstitutional order, that canon would be trumped by the Constitution, which
states that “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,anything in theConstitution orlaws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.
Const., art. VI (emphasis added).

Through the examples of state judges with constitutional fidelity,
other civil officials may grow inspired to restrain judicial usurpation. If
other civil officials do unite with these state judges in defense of the
Constitution, strategic success will likely increase. Yet whether success seems
sure or suspect, the state judge should first seek alliance from the Supreme
Judge of the Earth who does right.[12] The federal
Judiciary may seem a colossal giant, but “the battle is the Lord’s”. ISamuel17:47.
God “maketh the judges of the earth as vanity.” (See Isaiah40:23.)

IV. Conclusion

When a government official is ordered by the Judiciary to
fulfill an action that the government official believes is contrary to the U.S.
Constitution, that official must remember and act upon four realities:

He must first remember his oath before God to uphold the
Constitution, not the opinions of the Judiciary; he must second remember that
the Constitution is “the Supreme Law of the Land”, not the Court; he must third
remember the admonition of the Lord to “[r]ender to Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s”[13]; and then fourth
remember that in the United States, Caesar is the Constitution. If he does
this, the Constitution will persevere, and so will “the Blessings of Liberty
for ourselves and our Posterity.”

8.President
Andrew Jackson had several battles with the U.S. Supreme Court where he
successfully asserted the responsibility and authority of the other branches of
government to interpret the Constitution of the United States and not to rely
upon the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court as the final arbiters of that
document. When vetoing the Second National Bank, which he believed was an
instrument of government-sanctioned theft through inflation in the money, he
disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that the bank was
constitutional, saying in his veto message of 1832 that

“If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of
this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this
Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be
guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an
oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he
understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty
of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide
upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to
them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be
brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges,
and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the
Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the
Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.”