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Monday, November 5, 2012

A Region in Turmoil: Threats to Gulf Energy and Shipping

Rather than offering a comprehensive, encyclopedic
threat analysis, this Insight aims to pinpoint the most immediate threats to
the security of Gulf energy and international shipping and the likelihood that
they could become a reality. It constitutes a first attempt at looking at thelikely scenarios
that so far have been given inadequate attention.

In doing so, it also
spotlights an underlying policy dilemma: the contradiction between ensuring
energy security and safe shipping in the short and medium term based on the
status quo in the Gulf, the need to be prepared for likely disruptions of the
flow of oil and gas as a result of domestic and regional developments, and a
long-term anticipation of significant political change in the region.

–questions about the United
States’ ability to be a reliable guarantor and defender of last resort.

These three factors do not
neglect threats from non-state political or criminal actors that may or may not
be supported by failing states. They constitute the most immediate, overarching
dangers to sea lanes connecting the Gulf to the rest of the world.

Iran

Iran’s war games in April
2010 not only highlight the threat thatthe Islamic Republic could pose to international shipping in
case of an Israeli and/or U.S. military attempt to take out Iranian nuclear
facilities. Theyalso
serve as an example of the potential threat by non-state actors that may or may
not have the backing of a state. During the games in the Gulf and the Strait of
Hormuz, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) swarmed, seized, and
destroyed hypothetical enemy vessels. Iran could further target tankers with
coastal anti-ship Silkworm missiles, patrol boats and short-range aircraft
launched from nearby bases, or fast in-shore attack craft packed with
explosives.

Many assume that Iranian
verbal threats to shipping in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as a response
to a possible Israeli and/or U.S. attack are little more than bluster due to
Iran’s interest in keeping sea lanes open for its own exports. Yet this is
questionable. U.S. and European sanctions have already reduced Iranian oil
exports by about two thirds and could force further cutbacks. As a result,
Iran’s vested interest in keeping shipping lanes open has been considerably
reduced. By the same token, the effect of an Iranian attempt to shut down
shipping lanes is to some extent counterbalanced by the building of new
pipelines and theconversion
and expansion of existing ones in the Gulf that circumvent the Strait of
Hormuz. More serious may be the likelihood of Iranian retaliation against Gulf
oil and gas facilities using both conventional military and cyber capabilities.

With the threat of a
unilateral Israeli attack on Iran in advance of the U.S. presidential election
having vanished, the focus is on possible post-election Israeli and/or U.S.
action. In hindsight, the Israeli diplomatic and psychological operations
campaign during the last yearappears to have been primarily aimed at narrowing U.S. options
and achieving a firmer American commitment rather than at preparing the ground
for a unilateral Israeli operation. Israelis and Iranians effectively agree
that while a successful Israeli attack may set back Iranian nuclear efforts, it
would take U.S. involvement to deliver a devastating blow to the Islamic
Republic’s operations. In fact, Iranians may well be willing to pay the price
of an Israeli attack because of the benefits it offers. These benefits include:

– shifting the blame for
economic hardship from the government to Israel and the United States,
particularly in advance of next year’s Iranian presidential election;

– emotive popular support
in the Middle East and North Africa at a time of rising discontent in the Gulf
and elsewhere;

– a distraction from Iran’s
unpopular support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria;

– potential opportunities
to compensate for the ultimate loss of Syria; and

– leveraging rivalry
between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other.

Deep-seated prejudices on both
sides undercut efforts to achieve a negotiated solution. Iran is convinced that
U.S. policy aims at regime change. It further views past offers to reward Iran
for agreeing to comply with international demands as efforts to portray it
as weak and having caved to pressure rather than as an incentive to reduce its
international isolation. For its part, the United States believes that Iran is
not serious about negotiations and that it has Iran increasingly cornered. It
further assumes that it can succeed with a big stick and limited carrot policy
and that Iran will only succumb if it has no choice.

That analysis could prove
correct. The question is whether compromise could not be achieved in a more
equitable way that would allow Iran to save face, help put U.S.-Iranian
relations on a more healthy footing, avert the potential fallout of relying
primarily on a stick, reduce the cost to ordinary Iranians, and remove at an
early stage the threat to international shipping. The proof will be in the
pudding if and when the threat of a U.S. attack becomes imminent.

At that very last
one-minute-to-twelve point, Iran is likely to concede.

Governed by middle-aged
revolutionaries with vested interests that have been accumulated in the more
than three decades since the overthrow of the shah, Iranian leaders effectively
maintain at best a revolutionary façade with their provocative hostility toward
the very existence of Israel and their anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric.
Traditionally a nation of traders, Iranian leaders, when faced with the real
and imminent threat of losing their grip on power or accepting humiliation,
will most likely opt for the latter.

Whether that would truly
remove the threat to international shipping would remain a question.
Anti-Western resentment among Iran’s elite would be deepened. Popular sentiment
would be split between those that share that resentment and those that see
opportunity in taking advantage of the regime’s weakness.Such developments
could make potential change messier, more volatile, and ultimately more
dangerous. Alternatively, an international effort to resolve the nuclear issue
that is not aimed at weakening Iran could avert the Islamic Republic from
turning into a cornered cat that jumps in unexpected ways, thus easing a potential
process of change.

I include the threat of
cyber warfare as a function of the dispute with Iran. For instance, cyber
attacks earlier this year temporarily knocked out a large number of computers
related to Iran’s nuclear program, and there were subsequent attacks on
state-owned Saudi oil company Aramco and Qatari natural gas producer RasGas.
The cyber attacks underscore the emergence of a new battleground with
implications that go far beyond the confines of this Insight, including the
need to protect critical infrastructure that is owned and/or operated not only
by state and public entities but also by the private sector. Potential
responses range from hard power attacks against infrastructure to what
strategists call “active defense,” or counter cyber warfare. Ultimately,
responses will involve multi-sector cooperation and the development of national
and international legislation.

Popular unrest in
major oil and gas producing nations

Unelected Arab monarchs of
oil and gas producing states pride themselves on having so far largely managed
widespread discontent bubbling at the surface with a combination of financial
handouts, artificial job creation, social investment, and repression. In
the cases of Jordan and Morocco, both countries resorted to elections and a
modicum of reform.

Yet, in the shadow of the
escalating civil war in Syria, it is politically unreformed monarchies such as
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Jordan in charge of increasingly
liberalized economies that threaten to move into the front lines of the
region’s convoluted transition from autocracy to more open societies and
political systems. The rulers’ expected resistance to real change at whatever
cost poses a potential threat to their ability to continue to produce oil and gas
at current levels and maintain the security of international shipping in the
region. That risk is heightened by the hostility between Iran and the
conservative Arab Gulf states as well as the manipulation of sectarian
identities by pitting Sunnis against Shiʿa in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

To be sure, the situations
in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Jordan differ substantially from
one another. Yet, individually and taken together they feed the worst fear of
monarchs and their Western backers: a successful popular revolt in one monarchy
will open the door to serious challenges to autocratic royal rule in the rest
of the region’s mostly energy-rich monarchies. Spanning the differing
circumstances is a deeply felt sense of social, economic, and political
disenfranchisement that fuels the discontent in all three nations. This
discontent cannot be exclusively addressed by employment of police and
security forces, handouts, and social investment.

The facts on the ground
deny the notion that Middle Eastern and North African revolts threaten
republics rather than monarchies. That is true only if monarchs leverage the
one real asset they have: a degree oflegitimacy that gives them the temporary benefit of the doubt.
That benefit will hold true only if monarchs truly address real concerns rather
than hide behind security forces. This is in contrast to the
republican leaders in the region who have so far been deposed in part because
they had lost all legitimacy and protesters were unwilling to give them a last
chance.

So far, there is no
indication that Arab monarchies have understood this need for change. Bahrain
is a revolt calling for regime change in waiting; Saudi Arabia is heading for a
similar fate in its economically most vital region, the Eastern Province;[1] Kuwait is hanging in the balance with the position of the
emir increasingly dependent on whether he can credibly demonstrate his
sincerity in wanting to root out corruption; and Jordan has said ‘a’ but has
yet to say ‘b’ by paying lip service to reform without enacting it and
announcing elections on the basis of a controversial election law. The future
of Sultan Qaboos in Oman is also uncertain; witness his crackdown on critics
who remain unconvinced by initial reforms.

Unwillingness to separate
domestic Shiʿi concerns from the interests of Iran is a misreading of a reality
in which the Shiʿa view themselves first and foremost as nationals of the
states of which they are citizens. That fact was more than evident in the Iran-Iraq
war during the 1980s when Iraqi Shiʿa were the ones that fought Saddam
Hussein’s war against Iran. The Shiʿa occupy a strategic geography in the
Middle East where the region’s energy and water resources are concentrated. Addressing their justified grievances, including an end to job and religious
discrimination,is
key to ensuring energy security and the safety of international shipping. The
same is true for Jordan, where the recent discovery of an al-Qaʿida-linked
terrorist plot focuses attention on security and threatens to undermine the
urgent, equally important emphasis on reform.

The U.S. protective
umbrella

Leaving aside the
consequences of U.S. military budget cuts, political developments in the Middle
East and North Africa are certain to impact America’s security umbrella for the
Gulf. Potential conflict with Iran is closely tied to domestic stability in the
minds of Gulf rulers. The perception of the Iranian threat is thus one of
endangering domestic stability rather than international shipping. As a result,
Gulf opposition to Iranian nuclear ambitions is tempered by concerns about the
possible domestic fallout of military action against the Islamic Republic. In
response, Gulf states have responded to Shiʿi unrest with force and to Iran’s
nuclear policy by opting for international and regional security arrangements
as well as massive arms purchases. Both approaches have so far aggravated
rather than alleviated the threats. The Gulf’s newfound focus on nuclear energy
raises the specter of a future potential nuclear arms race that would further
complicate ensuring energy security and safe international shipping.

The ability of the United
States to act as the region’s defensive umbrella by emphasizing defense and
deterrence could be affected by a potential eruption of popular discontent in
the Gulf. Gulf leaders could prove reluctant to reinforce perceptions that they
are out of touch with public sentiment and dependent on the United States in
maintaining their grip on power.

This is all the more true
given that the United States will have to balance its interests in the Gulf
with those in the wider Middle East and the Muslim world, all the more because
unrest in Saudi Arabia, Islam’s heartland, will resonate more than events in
other Middle Eastern countries across Islamic nations. The most obvious way of
compensating for political vulnerabilities would be the expansion of the Gulf’s
security umbrella to include the military capabilities of other interested
parties such as China and India. Asian powers are, however, years away from
being able to provide significant support.

Conclusion

Like everything else in the
Middle East, nothing can be looked at in isolation. Threats and opportunities
are interlinked. The security of energy and international shipping is
determined by a multitude of often equally significant factors, among which
those examined above are first and foremost.

This Insight has addressed
the fundamentals of current policies and as a result offers few, if any,
short-term solutions. Yet, it is one that aims to fashion a potential framework
for the creation of a long-term stable environment that could be adopted by
cautious, at times tacit, incremental steps. Changing current policies and
their underlying assumptions is the equivalent of trying to change the
direction of a super tanker in the Suez Canal. The question is not whether
disruptions are avoidable but how they can be managed and compensated as part
of a longer-term effort to create the circumstances that are likely to reduce
fundamental risks.

Contemporary history
illustrates that disruptions are manageable. Libyan oil production all but
dried up during the NATO-backed rebellion against the regime of Muammar
Qaddafi, depriving Germany of one quarter of its oil and state-owned Italian oil
company ENI of an even greater chunk. The disruption prompted a delay in the
European Union’s imposition of oil sanctions against Syria and a delay for
long-term contracts affected by its measures against Iran. The Libyan
disruption prompted the International Energy Agency to tap into its
reserves—only the fourth time it has done so since its founding in 1974.

Events of the last two
years also illustrate the need to plan for a potential post-revolt future in
Gulf energy-producing nations. Post-Qaddafi officials made a point of stressing
that contractors from countries that supported the ousted Libyan leader or
opposed the NATO intervention were less likely to be awarded contracts. The
Libyan prosecutor’s office has been investigating possible irregularities in
crude sales to oil giants China International United Petroleum & Chemical
Co., or Unipec, and PetroChina Co. as part of a broader probe into Qaddafi-era
oil deals despite the fact that China was less resistant to Western demands for
intervention than it is in the case of Syria.

James M. Dorsey is a
senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University in Singapore and is the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East
Soccer.

[1] The fact that
deep-seated criticism of the Saudi royal family goes far beyond the Shiʿi
minority is evident in social media, which has recently shown an outpouring of
hard-hitting criticism of the country’s rulers.

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About Me

James M DorseyWelcome to The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer by James M. Dorsey, a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Soccer in the Middle East and North Africa is played as much on as off the pitch. Stadiums are a symbol of the battle for political freedom; economic opportunity; ethnic, religious and national identity; and gender rights. Alongside the mosque, the stadium was until the Arab revolt erupted in late 2010 the only alternative public space for venting pent-up anger and frustration. It was the training ground in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where militant fans prepared for a day in which their organization and street battle experience would serve them in the showdown with autocratic rulers. Soccer has its own unique thrill – a high-stakes game of cat and mouse between militants and security forces and a struggle for a trophy grander than the FIFA World Cup: the future of a region. This blog explores the role of soccer at a time of transition from autocratic rule to a more open society. It also features James’s daily political comment on the region’s developments. Contact: incoherentblog@gmail.comView my complete profile