The articles and essays in this blog range from the short to the long. Many of the posts are also introductory (i.e., educational) in nature; though, even when introductory, they still include additional commentary. Older material (dating back mainly to 2005) is being added to this blog over time.

Julian Baggini's Thought Experiments: Torture (1)

It's
hard to know what to say to someone who says that “all torture is
indefensible”. Or, rather, you don't know where to begin.

The
same is true for this position as it's put by Julian Baggini:

“The
first [strategy] is to insist that the torture is in principle wrong.
Even if it would save thousands of lives, there are some moral lines
that cannot be crossed.”

All
you can now ask is: Why is
torture wrong... “in principle”? This isn't to say that torture is right. It's only to ask for reasons as to why it's wrong. It really is that simple.

Could
it be that many people adopt this position without advancing
arguments to defend it? (I suppose, in certain respects, that's
understandable.*)

Torture
Saves Lives

If
it's deemed to be an almost factual matter (even if only factual in
theory, as it were) that if x is tortured, then he'll tell the authorities where the bomb is and thus many lives will be saved. Does that mean that torturing
that person seems preferable to allowing many innocent people to die? (Especially since those deaths can be averted.)

This
is even more the case if the person being tortured is guilty in some
way: say, if he's a terrorist who's already killed many innocent
people.

We
must now ask a simple question:

Why
is wrong to torture this one individual if such a thing will save
many lives?

Of
course it's sometimes argued that "torture is ineffective". (Actually,
that's not true – it's sometimes effective.) We can also
say that the victim of torture may be innocent and so on. However,
these possibilities are being discounted here. The issue is about
torturing a person who's known to be guilty; or who's known to have
knowledge of the bomb's whereabouts.

(In
any case, arguing about the efficacy of torture can be seen as a
practical position; not necessarily a moral or philosophical one.)

So,
again, let's say that he's guilty and that the torture will result
in lives being saved. After all, let's remember that some acts of
torture have indeed saved lives in cases like this. Torture sometimes
works.

However,
even if torture works (however that's cashed out), it may still be
deemed to be wrong.

That
Slippery Slope Again

People
who're against torture may say that torture will “inevitably go
on” on a wider scale if it were legalised. However, that can happen even if it's
proscribed. Indeed that's obviously happened on many occasions.
(This discounts the reality of torture being “officially denied”
yet practiced by various authorities or governments.)

It
could even be argued that official torture (as it were) will set
limits on when and why torture is acceptable; whereas as if it's deemed
unacceptable in all cases, it may encourage various authorities to
use it willy-nilly. After all, there's a monumental difference
between torturing someone in order to save hundreds of lives and
torturing someone to gain secrets. (Or even torturing a petty
criminal in order to get him to tell you what another petty criminal is
planning.)

This
may lead one to the conclusion that when torture can be shown to save
many lives, it should be allowed. Though when it's used for petty or
insignificant political reasons, it shouldn't. (Of course arguments
will need to be advanced as to how these distinctions can be made.)
And, again, if torture is rejected (at least officially) out of hand,
then these distinctions become irrelevant if all acts of torture are seen as being as bad
as each other.

Incidentally,
it can never be said that legalised torture will "inevitably lead" to
anything specific. It depends. And the total prohibition of torture
may lead to more gratuitous torture, not less.

Moral
Self-Indulgence

The
case of what Julian Baggini calls “moral self-indulgence” is also
interesting – especially in the case of torture.

Although
Baggini doesn't say this, it also appears to be similar – or the
same – as moral grandstanding.

To
put that simply: it's not important to the self-indulgent moralist
whether or not lives are saved; or even what the arguments are on
both sides of the debate. What's important to the moral grandstander
is to take a strong or absolute moral stance on the matter. Or, in
some cases, what matters is how such a person is seen by others (or
how he sees himself).

Let's
not forget here that moral absolutes have also been the domain of the
intolerant and dangerous. And that can just
as much apply to those who take an absolute position on torture
(or on another “human rights” issue) as it can apply to those who
take an absolute position on abortion or blasphemy.

The bottom line (as stressed by Baggini) is that “the charge of
indifference to the lives of those left to die as a result is hard to
shake”. In other words, one's moral scruples or absolutes
(depending on how you look at it) are going to result in many deaths
– at least on the scenarios outlined above.

Political
Selectivity on Torture

From
a purely political perspective, many on the Left only protest against
torture when it's carried out by “capitalist states” (such as the US
and UK). They virtually never protest about torture in Iran,
Pakistan, Cuba, Venezuela, etc. And, similarly, many left-wingers (or at
least communists) rarely – if ever - protested against torture when
it was carried out by the many communist states which existed in the
20th century.

Similarly,
many conservatives or right-wingers only protest against torture when
it's carried out by communist or Muslim states. They virtually never
protest about torture when carried out by regimes they're
ideologically or politically happy with (e.g. Pinochet's Chile and specifically their own
countries).

In
other words, one's prior politics is determining which acts of
torture - or which regimes - one speaks out
against.

To
add to the political nature of this debate, it can also be said that
once you've established an argument that successfully puts the case
for torture (if any argument can ever be entirely successful on this
- or on any - subject), then the same argument or defence can – or
could - be used by literally anyone else or by any regime whatsoever.

What
I mean by that is once you've argued for your own favoured state (or
favoured government or institution) using torture, then states (or
governments or institutions) you don't politically favour can use
exactly the same arguments in their own defence when they too use
torture.

***********************************************

*)
To play the devil's advocate: there are examples of psychological
and physical pressure which even some – or many - human rights
activists would happily engage in. For example, when you shout in someone's ear-hole. Or when you deny someone food for 24 hours. Or indeed
even when you deny someone a single meal.

All
three can be deemed to be torture. Mild - or even very mild – torture,
sure ; though still torture.

1 comment:

Great stuff until "Many on the left" Apart from your obvious bias letting you down it is plain that if you object to torture where you actually are you stand a better chance of being heard than you do on the other side of the world. Did you ask "many on the left" if they objected to torture in their own country and also in Whereveristan? :-)