Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
occupied Palestinian territory

Special focus

Photo by Steve Sabella

MAY 2009

Shrinking Space:
Urban Contraction and Rural Fragmentation
in the Bethlehem Governorate
This report on the Bethlehem governorate docu­
ments how the central-urban core is constricted by a

plan­­ning and development at the governorate level. If
Barrier construction goes ahead as planned in the west­

combination of Israeli infrastructure, including the
Barrier, settlements and settlement outposts. In the
eastern governorate, administrative restrictions (Area
C, closed military areas and nature reserves) also limit
the potential for urban expansion, graz­ing, and for

ern part of the governorate, the rural hinterland will
be cut off, reducing access to land and water resources.
Some 21,000 Palestinian residents will face additional
restrictions on access to markets, health services, and
higher education in the Bethlehem urban area.

TIMELINE
1947: UN Partition Plan envisages Bethle­
hem and Jerusalem as belonging to
neither the proposed Arab nor
Jewish state, but a corpus separatum
under international trusteeship.
1948: Bethlehem communities lose land
as a result of 1st Arab-Israeli War:
three refugee camps set up in
Bethlehem for Palestinian refugees.
1967: June War: Israel occupies West
Bank. Bethlehem land annexed to
the Jerusalem municipal boundary
expanded by Israel. Settlement con­­
struction begins.
1993: General closure imposed on West
Bank. Permits required for West
Bank ID holders, including residents
of Bethlehem, to enter East Jeru­
salem & Israel.
Corpus Separatum, 1947

2

1995:

Bethlehem City handed over to the administration of the Palestinian Authority, with the exception
of Rachel’s Tomb area. Of the 658 km2 in the Bethlehem governorate, only 13 percent is under
full or partial Palestinian Authority control: Area A (7.5%, 49.1 km2) and Area B (5.5%, 36.4 km2).
Some 66 percent (434.2 km2) is designated as Area C, where Israel retains security control and
jurisdiction over planning and construction. An additional 19.4 percent (127.7 km2) is designated
as nature reserves, ostensibly handed over to the Palestinian Authority in 1998 but remains under
the effective control of the Israeli authorities.

2000:

Bethlehem 2000: large investment programme to prepare the city for the new millennium. Pope
John Paul II visits in March. Second intifada begins in September. Over the following years, conflict
and the Israeli-imposed closure regime (roadblocks, earth-mounds, etc.) severely undermine the
economy of Bethlehem.

2002:

IDF Operation Defensive Shield: Bethlehem city reoccupied and placed under curfew for a total
of 156 days.

2002:

Barrier construction begins in north Bethlehem governorate.

2004:

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice declared that the route of the Barrier
though the West Bank and East Jerusalem violates international law. The Barrier will intrude
approximately 10 kilometres into the Bethlehem governorate, isolating approximately 74 Km2
of land and water resources. There are now 19 settlements and 16 settlement outposts in the
Bethlehem governorate.

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Territorial
and Administrative
Territorial and
Administrative
Division Division
of the Bethlehem Governorate
of Bethlehem Governorate
For the purpose of this report we have divided the Bethlehem governorate into three areas:
central-urban, western and eastern.
Western Area:

Centre-Urban
Area:
Central-Urban
Area:

Eastern Area:

The fertile Western Bethlehem area is the
governorate's traditional breadbasket. In
recent decades, settlement construction
and expansion has reduced the agricultural space available for Bethlehem farmers.
G reen L
Planned Barrier construction
threatens
in
e
( 1
94
to sever this agricultural hinterland
from
9 A
rmis
tice)
the urban core to the east.

The central-urban area comprises Bethlehem city, Beit Sahur, Beit Jala, and adjacent refugee camps, municipalities and
villages, which form a continuous urban
fabric. It also includes the southern villages
and Beit Fajar, which are separated from
each other and from the urban area in the
OldofCity
north by large tracts
Israeli-administered
Area C.

The eastern governorate comprises an
extensive area of desert and semi-desert
and the Dead Sea. This area is effectively
off-limits to Palestinians, because of
Israeli-administered Area C, nature reserves
and military areas.

Legend
Area A: The Palestinian Authority has security and civil control.
Urban areas.
Area B: The Palestinian Authority has full civil control and joint security responsibility.
Rural communities.
Area C: Israel retains security control and jurisdiction over planning and construction.
(Approximately 66% of Bethlehem governorate)
Settlement Municipal Area
Settlement built-up and outer limits

#

Settlement Outposts (digitized from satellite imagery March 2005)
Closed Military Area (40 % of the governorate and 60 % of Area C)
Israeli Declared Nature Reserves
Under the Wye River Memorandum of 1998, land reserves, were handed over to the
Palestinian Authority (PA) to be set aside as a Green area/Nature Reserves: however,
the PA has not been allowed to utilize this area.
Dead Sea : Around 90 % of the Palestinian Dead Sea coast falls within
the Bethlehem governorate
Constructed Barrier
Planned Barrier, (under construction) If completed as planned, the Barrier will isolate
12 % of the total area of the governorate.
Source: OCHA, JRC, PA- MOPIC

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3

Executive Summary
This report is part of a series by OCHA
examining the impact of Israeli measures, such as
the Barrier, settlements and closures, on Palestinians
in the West Bank.1 It will focus on the Bethlehem
governorate, examining both the contraction of
its central-urban core and the fragmentation of its
eastern and western parts.
The Bethlehem governorate comprises approxi­
mately 660 km2. After four decades of Israeli
occupation only approximately 13 percent of
the Bethlehem governorate’s land is available
for Palestinian use, much of it fragmented.
Furthermore, access to East Jerusalem has been
severely reduced. Israeli measures have led to
this reduction in Palestinian access and space.
These measures include the continued expansion
of Israeli settlements and settlement outposts,
construction of the Barrier, and the zoning of
the majority of the Bethlehem governorate as
Area C, where Israel retains security control and
jurisdiction over planning and construction. The
physical and administrative restrictions allocate
most of Bethlehem’s remaining land reserves for
Israeli military and settler use, effectively reducing
the space available to the Palestinian inhabitants of
Bethlehem.
As a result, Bethlehem’s potential for residential and
industrial expansion and development has been
reduced as well as its access to natural resources.
The traditional mainstays of the Bethlehem
governorate economy, such as work in Israel,
tourism, agriculture, herding and the private sector
have been undermined. Continuation of these Israeli
measures compromises the future economic and
social development of the Bethlehem governorate.
Major factors behind this reality include the
following:

1. Annexation of approximately 10 km2 to
Jerusalem:
In 1967, the Israeli government annexed approxi­
mately 10 km2 of the northern Bethlehem governorate

4

to Israel, including these lands within the newly
expanded Jerusalem municipal boundary. This
annexation is not recognized by the international
community.

2. Construction of Israeli settlements and
related infrastructure:
Israeli settlements were constructed in the section
of Bethlehem annexed into Jerusalem (Har Homa,
parts of Gilo) and more are planned.2 Additional
settlements were constructed in the remaining parts
of the governorate, including the Gush Etzion bloc
in the west,3 Teqoa, Noqedim, Ma’ale Amos in the
east, and Mizpe Shalem in the Dead Sea area. Today,
there are approximately 86,000 Israelis living in 19
settlements in the Bethlehem governorate and in 16
settlement outposts.4 The Palestinian population
constitutes approximately 175,000 persons.5

3. Restrictions on entry into East Jerusalem:
Beginning in the 1990’s, new Israeli measures
further fragmented the Bethlehem governorate
and constrained the movement of its Palestinian
inhabitants. Since the 1993 imposition of a general
closure on the West Bank, residents of Bethlehem
require Israeli-issued permits to enter East
Jerusalem and Israel. These permits are valid for
limited periods and do not allow the passage of
vehicles. The application process has become more
restrictive since the beginning of the second intifada
in 2000.

4. Construction of the Bethlehem bypass
road:
During the 1990’s, the Israeli government altered
the existing Jerusalem-Bethlehem-Hebron transport
axis, Road 60, to facilitate Israeli settler movement.
The new construction consists of a major bypass road,
two tunnels and a bridge. Part of the constructed
Barrier route runs along the new Road 60.The
tunnels checkpoint, subsequently constructed on
this road, controls entry into Jerusalem from the
south-western West Bank.

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5. Designation of 66% of the Bethlehem
governorate as Area C:
Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was
demarcated into three administrative zones A, B
and C.6 Approximately 66 percent of the Bethlehem
governorate was designated Area C, where Israel
retains security control and jurisdiction over
planning and construction. Until today, permits for
Palestinian construction are rarely granted. Area C
includes large tracts of land in the eastern Bethlehem
governorate, which have been designated as
military areas/fire zones and nature reserves where
Palestinian entry and usage is restricted or forbidden.
These administrative restrictions effectively limit
Bethlehemâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s residential and industrial expansion to
the east and south-east. In addition, the majority of
the obstacles to Palestinian movement, roadblocks,
earth-mounds, etc., put in place by the IDF since
September 2000, are also located in Area C.

6. Construction of the Barrier in 2002:
In summer 2002, following a campaign of suicide
bombings by Palestinian militants, the Government
of Israel approved construction of a Barrier with
the stated purpose of preventing such attacks. The
Barrier has compounded the territorial restrictions
in the northern and western parts of Bethlehem.
The completed section of the Barrier in the north,
not only seals the separation of Bethlehem from
East Jerusalem, but prevents the urban growth of
Bethlehem northwards. The western section of the
Barrier, if completed, will further devastate the
governorate. Approximately 64 km2, including some
of the most fertile land in the governorate and nine

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Palestinian communities with approximately 21,000
residents, will be isolated; the latter will face reduced
access to Bethlehem City, the major services centre
for health, education, markets and trade.

The Way Forward
While Israel has the duty to ensure the safety and
security of its citizens in response to attacks by
Palestinians, the steps it takes must be in accordance
with international law and not cause long-term
detriment to the local Palestinian population. In
practice, Israeli measures have radically reduced
the space available to the inhabitants of Bethlehem,
compromising the future economic and social
development of the governorate.
Steps can be taken to prevent further deterioration.
Many of the administrative measures taken by the
Israeli authorities are reversible and the Barrier
route is not yet finished. Actions including halting
construction of the rest of the Barrier in the West
Bank, opening up closed military areas and nature
reserves for sustainable Palestinian development,
along with the international call for a freeze on
settlement activity and related actions like â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;state
landâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; declarations, would restore parts of the
lost space to the governorate and improve the
humanitarian and economic situation in Bethlehem.
In the long term, these types of immediate steps
would contribute to ensuring compliance with
international law and UN resolutions and lay the
groundwork for a durable political solution in the
occupied Palestinian territory.

5

PART 1:
Suffocating the Central-urban Core
The Barrier in
the Rachel’s Tomb area
In the north of the Bethlehem governorate, the
completed Barrier intrudes two kilometres into
Bethlehem City, encircling Rachel’s Tomb, the
traditional burial site of the Biblical matriarch.
The Bilal Mosque, located in the same building
as Rachel’s Tomb, is now inaccessible to Muslim
worshippers.7 The Barrier severs the historic
artery to Jerusalem and pilgrims and other visitors
approaching Bethlehem now enter the city through
a military checkpoint and a concrete wall. The once
thriving commercial and tourist areas in the vicinity
of Rachel’s Tomb have been severely affected with
74 out of 80 shops and commercial establishments
closed or relocated.8 Bethlehem residents also cite
the psychological and social impact of the concrete
wall, especially on children and adolescents.9

Reduced access to land:
Beit Sahur and Beit Jala
Although Beit Jala and Beit Sahur retain something
of their former village character, their agricultural
land is shrinking, as is their potential for residential
and commercial expansion.
Beit Jala lost over 3,000 dunams of land, which was
incorporated into the expanded Jerusalem municipal
boundary in 1967.10 Completion of the Barrier will
isolate an additional 3,200 dunams of land.11 This
includes almost 3,000 dunams of olive groves, fruit
trees and terraces of the only recreational forest in
the area, the Cremisan Monastery and Winery, and
the Al Makhrour lands, whose apricot, olive, fig and
almond trees are an important source of livelihood
for Beit Jala farmers.12
Combined with the land lost to the Jerusalem
municipal boundary, the Barrier will expropriate
or restrict access to almost 50 percent of Beit Jala’s
land: only about 4,500 dunams will remain readily
accessible. In addition to isolating scarce agricultural
resources, open spaces and recreational areas, this

6

will further limit the area for the future urban
expansion of Beit Jala. Much of the town’s available
residential land is privately or church-owned, with
only four to five parcels of publicly-owned space
remaining for building. By necessity, residential
planning now envisages vertical expansion (‘up
rather than out’), an architecture which is at variance
with the traditional character of the town.13
In the case of Beit Sahur, the completed Barrier
isolates olive groves which are now only accessible
through two gates, open to the Palestinian
landowners for limited periods during the
annual olive harvest. The competed Barrier also
compounds the isolation of the small community of
Num’an – whose inhabitants are ‘illegally’ residing
in Jerusalem according to the Israeli authorities (see
box p. 8).

Restrictions on agricultural access:
Al Khader and Artas
Al Khader and Artas still have significant tracts
of agricultural land, as do many of the villages in
the southern part of the Bethlehem governorate.
However, future access and usage of agricultural
resources on the part of these villages will be
restricted by construction of the Barrier in the
western part of the Bethlehem governorate. In
recent years, there has been a marked decline in
agriculture as a source of income in the Bethlehem
governorate. In 1998, the total rain fed area was 46
km2 while the irrigated area comprised 0.4 km2: by
2007, the total rain fed area had decreased to 4.3 km2
and the irrigated areas to 0.3 km2. 14
In the case of Al Khader (population approxi­mately
10,000), planned Barrier con­struction will result in
up to 75 percent of its agricultural land isolated
behind the Barrier. Al Khader is known for the
variety and quantity of its grapes, with more than
20,000 dunams dedicated to grape production,
a source of fruit and processed juice for the local
market. In the pre-intifada years, production was

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GIlo Checkpoint15

Palestinians queueing before dawn at the Gilo checkpoint.
Photo by JCTordai
Gilo checkpoint is the main point of access for West Bank Palestinians to enter East Jerusalem and Israel from the
south. It is one of four checkpoints where West Bank Palestinians with Israeli-issued permits are allowed entry
into Jerusalem on foot: West Bank ID card holders are forbidden from driving in Jerusalem or riding a bicycle. West
Bankers enter East Jerusalem for work, tertiary health care, education, family reasons and for worship, all of which
require a permit.16
Workers can obtain permits valid for six months: some 5,330 permits were issued to Bethlehem gover足norate
Palestinians to work inside Israel and settle足ments in 2008.17 Security, age and marital status regulations ex足clude a large
proportion of the work足force, especially the younger and able-bodied.The stipulation that, to obtain a permit, an Israeli
employer must register that his company needs a specific worker also precludes the many workers in Bethlehem who
do not have existing links with Israeli employers.
Despite the number of health centres in Bethlehem, specialised tertiary care such as cardio and neuro-surgery is
only available in Jerusalem, as are facilities for cancer, eye surgery and other conditions.18 Patients can apply for
permits once they have hospital appointments: permits may be valid for as limited a period as the specific day of the
consultation or operation.
There are frequent closures of Gilo and the other checkpoints for reasons of security or for Jewish holidays. In
2008, there were 61 closure days. However, high poverty and unemployment rates in the West Bank, and higher
wage rates inside Israel, mean that on a typical morning up to 600 West Bank labourers are waiting to cross Gilo
checkpoint at the official opening time of 0500 hours, with some arriving as early as 0200 hours to ensure they can
cross the checkpoint and arrive on time to work.19
Those crossing have to pass an initial permit check, metal detectors and an ID card check/fingerprint scanner.20 A
study conducted by UNRWA over three days in January and February 2009 showed the average crossing time was
1 hour 10 minutes with a range from 22 minutes to 3 hours and 9 minutes.21The gate frequently opens late, adding
to the delay and stress. Once through the final check, workers generally have to wait for public transport or for
their Israeli employers to collect them.
Women and the elderly tend to avoid crossing Gilo in the early hours because of the crowding. In February 2009,
the Israeli authorities opened up a special lane for women, children, the elderly and those with medical conditions,
but this only bypasses the first of the three checking procedures.

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7

Nu’man: Living in Limbo

Nu’man (population 173) is a Bethlehem community that was unilaterally absorbed into the expanded
municipal boundary of Jerusalem by the Israeli authorities in 1967. However, the inhabitants were recorded
as residents of the West Bank and issued with West Bank identity cards.
In 1992, the Jerusalem municipality informed the residents that the presence of West Bank identity cardholders in a community inside Jerusalem was illegal. In 1993 and 2007, the residents petitioned the Israeli
Supreme Court for the village to be recognized as part of the West Bank, or, alternatively, for residents
to be issued with Jerusalem identity cards and to receive a master plan and services from the Jerusalem
Municipality.22
Following completion of the Barrier, the village is now surrounded on three sides. A military checkpoint
was established at the entrance to the village in May 2006, at which residents’ names are registered.
Regular delays and humiliation are reported at the checkpoint. The community has no shops, school,
mosque or health facilities. Public transportation has ceased and most service providers are prevented
from entering or no longer come because of delay and harassment at the checkpoint.
Although officially located inside Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Municipality refuses to provide essential
services to the ‘illegal’ residents.The combined restrictions have segregated the village from neighbouring
communities and obstructed normal family life. Young couples are prevented from building in the
community because of the impossibility of receiving construction permits.
In recent years, village land has been confiscated to construct a Border Police Base, the Mazmoriyya
terminal and for part of a settler bypass road to connect Har Homa and the settlements of Teqoa and
Noqedim in the southern Bethlehem governorate.The Jerusalem Municipality Master Plan 2000 envisages
the planned expansion of Har Homa settlement (Har Homa D) on a portion of Nu’man’s land.23

marketed in Israel and to a lesser extent in East
Jerusalem.24 The imposition of Israeli restrictions in
the aftermath of the second intifada25 led to the oversaturation of the local market and a drop in price
from NIS 3.5 to NIS 1 per kilogram.
In Artas (population 3,700), approximately 500
dunams of village land will be isolated to the west
of the planned Barrier route. In February 2009, the
Israeli authorities announced that approximately
1,700 dunams of land near Artas, to the east of the
planned Barrier route, had been designated ‘state
land’, following the rejection of appeals by eight
local Palestinian landowners.26 This land falls within
the municipal boundary of Efrat settlement, and is
intended for its expansion onto its eighth hill, Givat
Eitam, and the construction of 2,500 new housing
units. The fact that the land is located on a hillside
on the ‘Palestinian side’ of the planned Barrier raises

8

concerns of a re-routing further into the Bethlehem
governorate to encompass the new expansion.
In any event, a wedge of Israeli-controlled Area
C, spreading eastwards from this area to the
settlements of Teqoa and Noqedim, place a de facto
obstacle to the expansion of the Bethlehem urban
area southwards.

Area C: Separating the southern villages
and Beit Fajjar
Area C separates the central-urban core from a
number of small villages in the south. This area is
hilly and contains stone-cutting factories, which
are the main source of stone production in the
West Bank. Up to 50 percent of these village lands
are located to the west of the planned Barrier and
the route will prevent direct access to Road 60,
the main transportation artery to Hebron. Further
south, separated by additional tracts of Area C, is

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Restrictions on Access to Religious Sites in Jerusalem

Taxis waiting where the barrier blocks the historic main route from Jerusalem into Bethlehem.
Photo by Patrick Zoll

Because West Bank Palestinians have been required to obtain Israeli-issued permits to enter Jerusalem since 1993,
access to Muslim and Christian places of worship is severely restricted throughout the year. Since the second
intifada, the Israeli authorities have imposed age restrictions on Palestinians wishing to pray at the Al Aqsa Mosque
in Jerusalem during Fridays in Ramadan. In 2008, only men over 50 and women over 45 years of age were allowed to
enter Jerusalem without Israeli-issued permits. Palestinians who did not fit the criteria were not allowed access.
The Palestinian Christian population, many of whom reside in the Bethlehem urban area, also require special
seasonal permits to celebrate religious holidays in Jerusalem. According to the Israeli Governorate Coordination
Liaison Office in Bethlehem, 39,220 such permits were issued during 2008, a decline of almost 30 percent from
the 54,866 permits issued in 2007. Christians require different permits depending on the religious holiday, as each
permit is limited in time.27
In addition, the Barrier has interrupted participation in traditional religious festivals and customs, such as the
Mar Elias feast in August when Christians and Muslims from Bethlehem would visit the Mar Elias monastery, four
kilometres north of the city, and picnic under the olive trees. Also in August, Christians from the Bethlehem area
would walk in a procession to the Church of the Assumption in Gethsamene in Jerusalem to celebrate the feast of
the Virgin Mary. The deteriorating political and economic situation since the beginning of the second intifada has led
to an increase in Christian emigration from Bethlehem, altering the ethnic diversity of the city.28

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9

the important stone-producing centre, Beit Fajjar
(see box below).

The Bethlehem Industrial Zone
Because of the physical and bureaucratic constraints
described above, the only available space left for the
residential and industrial expansion of Bethlehem
lies to the south. Some 530 dunams is designated
for the creation of a new zone for light industry
in Khallet al Bad, of which 220 dunams is Waqf
(Islamic endowment) land and 310 dunams private
property. The municipality would have preferred
to locate the industrial zone in Khallet al Louza, in
Area C, but the request was refused by the Israeli
authorities.
This project is a joint venture between the Bethlehem
municipality and the government of France: 40

percent will be dedicated to the Palestinian private
sector; 40 percent French private sector; 10 percent
Palestinian public sector; 10 percent French public
sector. There will be an exhibition area, a training
centre and a design centre for production &
packaging. Environmental regulations will be strict
and the Government of France will intercede with
the Israeli authorities to facilitate the movement of
goods, with plans for special stickers on trucks to
ensure priority access through checkpoints.
The industrial zone will also include a sports
stadium for the governorate on 20 dunams of Waqf
land.29 The Bethlehem slaughterhouse, now located
in the middle of a highly populated area, will also
be moved to the new industrial zone.30

Beit Fajjar31

Beit Fajjar, population approximately 1,800, is located in the south of the Bethlehem governorate. The
community (and nearby communities) largely depends on the 72 stone factories currently located in Beit
Fajjar. There were 150 such factories before the beginning of the second intifada: only 12 of the current
facilities work on a fulltime basis, with the remaining 60 depending on orders. Some have experienced
confiscation of equipment and detention of workers because of Area C restrictions.The last such incident
took place in October 2008 when the IDF confiscated stone-cutting machinery and bulldozers on the
grounds that the area in which the quarry was established is designated as Area C. 32
Over 70 percent of the finished product is exported to Israel, but it has become more difficult and
expensive for the stone to reach this market. Only 47 trucks per day are allowed through the Tunnels
checkpoint. In addition, Beit Fajjar trucks, along with the other 800 trucks per day which use Tarqumiya
Terminal, face considerable trouble because of the limited operation hours and special loading and
unloading procedures.33
Factory owners fear that if the Barrier is constructed as planned the local economy will collapse. The
replacement of the current main crossing point from Road 60, next to Gush Etzion, to the alternative
road through Wadi Saâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ir, which is unsuitable for commercial usage, will double the time it takes to reach
the community and increase transportation and maintenance costs.

10

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PART 2:
The West: Bethlehem’s Shrinking Hinterland
The completed Barrier in the northern Bethlehem
governorate has already affected economic activity
and access to agricultural resources. The planned
Barrier route will follow (approximately) the Green
Line for 12.7 kilometres in the western Bethlehem
governorate. In addition, a more intrusive inner
route reaches approximately ten kilometres
inside the West Bank, to encircle the Gush Etzion
settlement block. Access to Road 60, currently the
main route for the residents of Bethlehem to travel
south to Hebron, will be blocked, necessitating an

alternative transportation route for Palestinians
further east.34
If implemented, this route will isolate Bethlehem’s
rural hinterland, further squeezing the urban area.
Nine Palestinian communities will be isolated on
the western or ‘Israeli side’ of the Barrier, with the
village of Al Walaja encircled within an additional
inner Barrier.35 Proposed settlement and outpost
expansion will further fragment the agricultural
space available to these Palestinian communities.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
and the Occupying Power’s Use of Land and Resources
The Bethlehem governorate is part of the occupied Palestinian territory and is the central territorial link between
East Jerusalem and the southern parts of the West Bank. Under international humanitarian law, it is prohibited for
the occupying power to transfer its own civilians into the occupied territory.36Its authority to use public resources
or to implement permanent changes is limited.37 Although seizure of lands for immediate military purposes is
permitted, confiscation of private property and transfer of ownership to the occupying power is prohibited.38
The UN Security Council has stated that the measures taken by Israel which change the physical character and
demographic composition in the West Bank including the construction of settlements constitutes a violation of
IHL.39

Settlement and settlement outpost expansion
in the Bethlehem Governorate
A recent report by the Israeli organization Peace
Now reveals that the Israeli Ministry of Housing
and Construction is planning to build at least 73,000
housing units in the West Bank, of which 15,000
have been approved.40Plans already reported, if
implemented, would result in two major settlement
schemes in the Bethlehem governorate: (1) the
creation of two large additions to Har Homa
settlement; and (2) a new settlement, Gi’vat Yael, on
lands belonging to the Palestinian communities of
Al Walaja, Battir and Beit Jala. 41

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Settlement and outpost expansion
Peace Now reports plans for an additional 790
housing units in Betar Illit, one of the largest and
fastest-growing settlements in the West Bank.
There are also plans for the construction of 2,500
housing units in Gi’vat Eitam, an extension of Efrat
settlement.42 In February 2009, the Israeli authorities
announced that approximately 1,700 dunams of
land near Artas, to the east of the planned Barrier
route, had been designated ‘state land.’ This land
falls within the existing municipal boundary of

11

Fragmentation and Planned Settlement Expansion
Ramot Allon

Ramat Shlomo

Fragmentation and Planned Settlement Expansion

French Hill
Ramat Eshkol

Updated 15 May 2009

Ma'alot Dafna Hebrew University

Sources:
This map is based on data from the Applied Reserach Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ),
Bimkom, Peace Now and B’Tselem. Much of the settlement expansion is not
yet approved, but indicates future intention.There may be additional plans for
settlement expansion which are unknown to our sources and not indicated on the map.

Efrat settlement, and is intended for its expansion
onto its eighth hill, Gi’vat Eitam.
The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem
has revealed plans for Geva’ot, which currently
hosts 12 families. Initial construction plans are for a
new neighbourhood of 550 apartments, which will
eventually lead to a total planned 5,000 apartments.
In addition, 2,000 new apartments are intended for
the settlement of Bat ‘Ayin, which currently has 120
families.43
There are also plans for the expansion of two
outposts near Efrat: 395 housing units in Gi’vat
Hadagan and 527 units in Gi’vat Hatamar;44 and for
80 housing units between El’azar settlement and the
Derekh Ha’avot outpost.45

Other infrastructure
On 1 January 2009, a seizure order was issued for a
new 2.2 kilometre-long security road between Betar
Illit and Geva’ot settlements. The security road will
be an obstacle for Palestinian residents of Nahalin
trying to access their land and the principal village
well, Ein al-Faras, west of this road.46
In January 2009, seizure orders for security fences
were issued to Husan and Al Jab’a.47 Landowners in
Al Jab’a also received military orders ordering them
to remove agricultural growth from their lands on
the grounds that they were ‘state land’. The IDF
subsequently cleared approximately 300 olive tree
saplings from the area.

The Western Bethlehem Villages:
Another closed military area?
In January 2009, the Israeli authorities issued military
orders declaring the area between the Barrier and the
Green Line in Hebron and parts of the Salfit, Ramallah,
Jerusalem and northern Bethlehem governorates a
closed military area (‘seam zone’). These are the first
such orders to be issued since October 2003, when all
of the land between the Barrier and the Green Line in
the Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya governorates was
designated ‘closed’.
‘Seam zone’ residents are physically separated
from the rest of the West Bank and from health,
education and commercial services which are
generally located to the east of the Barrier. Children,
patients and workers have to pass through gates to
reach schools, medical facilities and workplaces
and to maintain family and social relations.48 The
comparative table opposite demonstrates how
dependent the inhabitants of the western villages
are on the Bethlehem urban area for essential
services and economic activity.
If a similar closed area is declared once the Barrier
is complete in the western Bethlehem area, this will
constitute the largest ‘seam zone’ area in the West

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UN OCHA oPt

Bank in terms of the number of Palestinians who
will be isolated. Nine Palestinian communities of
approximately 21,000 residents are located within
this area and already face restrictions to agricultural
and grazing land as a result of settlements and
related restrictions.
If the regime in the northern West Bank is a
guide, the closed area designation will also affect
Bethlehem residents who reside on the ‘Palestinian
side’ of the Barrier. Farmers from Al Khader,
Artas and other communities will require IDFissued 'visitor' permits to access their land behind
the Barrier. In the northern West Bank, permit
requirements have become more stringent over the
years. Those applying for, or renewing, fixed-period
permits are required to pass security checks and to
prove a connection to their land by providing valid
ownership or land taxation documents, which are
not easily obtainable.49
For the minority granted permits, access is through
one of the approximately 70 designated Barrier gates
and checkpoints, which open on a daily, weekly and/
or seasonal basis. Permit-holders must queue for

13

their documents to be inspected and their persons
and belongings searched before being allowed to
access their land, and there are also restrictions on
the passage of vehicles, agricultural equipment and

materials. The restrictions resulting from the permit
and gate regime severely curtail the opportunity
available for cultivation with negative impact on
agricultural practice and rural livelihoods.

Landscaped terracing in Husan.
Photo by JCTordai
International Court of Justice advisory opinion
In July 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion to the General Assembly on the route of
the Barrier inside the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) in which it concluded that while Israel has the obligation
to protect its citizens from acts of violence, the measures it takes must conform to international law and its
obligations as an occupying power. Accordingly, it concluded that given the extensive damage and harm of the
Barrier route inside the oPt, the construction was illegal and must stop. The court also called on Israel to dismantle
existing parts, cancel all administrative regulations, and provide reparations to those damaged. This opinion was
overwhelmingly reaffirmed by the General Assembly.50
Excerpts from its conclusion:
‘The fact remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian
population. It has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens. The measures
taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with the applicable international law.’ (Para. 141)
‘…Cessation of these violations entails in practice the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that structure situated
within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. All legislative and regulatory acts
adopted with a view to its construction and to the establishment of its associated regime, must forthwith be
repealed or rendered ineffective, except in so far as such acts, by providing for compensation or other forms of
reparation for the Palestinian population, may continue to be relevant for compliance by Israel…’ (Para. 151)

Clinics: No health facilities.
Schools: High School in Beit Jala or Bethlehem
Garbage: Dumped in Dar Salah on other side of
planned Barrier route.
Palestinian Authority Police: Coordination with
Israeli authorities & IDF escort needed for armed
Palestinian Police to enter village.

Economic: No market for products Approx.4-5000 dumums of
inside enclave.
village land on other side of the
Basic needs: 4 small shops. Meat
planned Barrier route.
and dairy products from Bethlehem.
Movement: Approx. 1,200 go to
Bethlehem or Hebron daily.

Battir
3,967

Demolished:
None.
Pending demolition
orders:
7 houses.

Clinics: Clinic. Doctor present six times a week.
Schools: High School
Garbage: Dumped in Yatta on other side of
projected Barrier route.
Palestinian Authority Police: As above.

Economic: No market for products Approx. 3000 dunums of village
inside enclave.
land on other side of the planned
Basic needs: Approx. 20 small
Barrier route.
shops. Meat & dairy products from
Bethlehem & Hebron.
Movement: Approx. 2,000 go to
Bethlehem or Hebron daily.

Clinics: Clinic. Doctor is present 4 days a week.
Only first aid equipment available.
Schools: High School
Garbage: Dumped in Yatta on other side of the
planned Barrier route.
Palestinian Authority Police: As above.

Economy: No market for products
inside the enclave.
Basic needs: Around 160 small
shops. Meat and dairy products from
Bethlehem.
Movement: Approx. 2,000 people
go to Bethlehem or Hebron daily.

Approx 2,500 dunums of village
land on the other side of planned
Barrier route.
Other: Limited possibilities for
natural growth except for vertical
expansion.

Approx. 2,000 dunums of village
land on the other side of the
projected Barrier.
Other: Untreated sewage spills
onto land from Beitar Illit
settlement.
Other: Limited possibilities for
natural growth except for vertical
expansion.

Will not loose land to Barrier.
Other: Untreated sewage spills
onto land from Beitar Illit
settlement. Spring & 15 dunums of
land contaminated.
Other: High Voltage lines
connecting settlements to be
constructed around the village.

Clinics: Clinic. Doctor and nurse once a week.
Clinic very basic (project ends 12.2009).
Schools: Primary school up to 6th grade. After that
the children walk 10-12 km to Al Arub School.
Garbage: No garbage collection. Burnt on outskirts
of village.
Palestinian Authority Police: As above.

Economy: No market for products
inside the enclave.
Basic needs: One small grocery
shop.
Movement: Approx. 600 people go
to Bethlehem or Hebron daily.

Will not loose land to Barrier.
Other: No posibility for
expansion. Children move away to
marry.

Clinics: Simple room serves as a clinic. Doctor once
a week.
Schools: High School in Surif
Garbage: Burnt on the outskirts of the village.
Palestinian Authority Police: As above.

Economy: No market for their
products inside the enclave.
Basic needs: 5 small shops.
Movement: Approx. 200 go to
Bethlehem or Hebron daily.

Approx. 900 dunums will be
located to the west of the
projected Barrier.

Land affected

* Based on interviews with village councils

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15

The impact of the Barrier on women in Husan51
Husan (population 5,500) is one of nine Bethlehem communities which will be isolated by the planned Barrier
route in the western Bethlehem governorate. Husan has already lost much of its agricultural land due to settlement
construction and expansion. Commercial agriculture has been undermined, with many households now only
cultivating for domestic consumption. A study surveying 172 women in the community to determine the potential
impact on their lives if the Barrier is completed as planned, found the following:
•

There is a close relationship between Husan and Bethlehem city, with most services provided in the urban area.
The majority (96.5%) of the women cannot obtain all needed domestic products inside the community. Most
women fear that access will become more difficult following completion of the Barrier in their area.

•

The Barrier will likely cause an increase in male unemployment and poverty. Of the husbands who used to
work in Israel, the women interviewed reported a decrease of 67.5% since the Barrier was completed in the
northern part of the Bethlehem governorate.

•

The vast majority of the women (96.9%) interviewed had given birth in facilities in Bethlehem City.The majority
(87.8%) responded that doctors are unavailable in case of a night-time emergency.

•

Of the 42 women pursuing higher education, 28 study outside the community. On completion of the Barrier
these women will face difficulty reaching schools and universities because it is unacceptable for women living
in rural areas to arrive home late, whatever the obstacle (lack of transportation, flying checkpoints, detours,
etc).

•

87.5% of the women reported that their children go to Bethlehem city for supplementary educational courses,
especially to prepare for the high school matriculation exam (tawjihi), when good grades are essential for future
education and careers.

•

Due to ongoing construction, villagers have had to alter their route to reach Bethlehem city, adding to travel
time and transportation costs. Only 55.8% of those surveyed visit relatives outside the community, due to
difficulties experienced in travelling to and from the community.

•

As wives customarily move to their husband’s location upon marriage, the majority (98.3%) preferred that their
daughters married in Husan, instead of the neighbouring villages or Bethlehem city, to ensure that they remain
in easy contact.

PART 3:
Administrative Constraints in the east
The Dead Sea, military areas and
nature reserves
Large tracts of land in the eastern Bethlehem gover­
norate have been designated by Israel as military
areas/fire zones or nature reserves, where Palestinian
entry and usage is forbidden or restricted.52 Although
the Judean Desert presents a challenge to the
expansion of Bethlehem to the east and south-east,
these restrictions block the potential for important
economic activities such as grazing (See box

16

Bethlehem bedouins). The niche but profitable ecotourism market – highlighting the desert landscapes
and habitats of Wadi Qadron and Wadi Khreitun and
the monastery of Mar Saba – are underexploited.
Lack of access by Palestinians to the 32 kilometres of
the Dead Sea coastline, which forms the most easterly
part of the Bethlehem governorate, also limits the
possibility of industrial and tourism development of
this unique attraction. 53

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Bethlehem Bedouins 54

Photo by JCTordai
Small communities of herding Bedouin reside in the south-east of the Bethlehem governorate on the borders of the
desert. The groups are largely settled, living in tents, shacks or basic cement houses, with few community members
moving with the flocks for seasonal grazing.
The Bethlehem Bedouins are under pressure: some communities face demolition of their dwellings and animal
shelters for lack of Area C building permits: their herding lands are encroached on the IDF or have been designated
by Israel as nature reserves. A series of droughts and a worldwide increase in fodder prices have contributed
to marginalizing herding as a way of life. Water has become expensive due to the drought and transportation
costs over difficult roads. Communities that largely relied on rainwater in the past now need to purchase water
throughout the year for people and livestock. Reduced access to grazing areas has caused greater dependence on
fodder, but fodder prices have also increased, and herders are going deeper into debt. These pressures lead herders
to sell their flocks, thus threatening their ability to continue living on these lands.
The community of Rashayida in the southern Bethlehem governorate has 50 families, of which 47 are registered as
refugees with UNRWA.They were displaced from near Ein Gedi in 1948. Some 30 structures have been demolished
by the IDF in the last two years because of lack of building permits. This community reports a decline in the
number of small ruminants from 8,000 three years ago to fewer than 5,000 today.The cost of trucking water to the
community is 25 NIS per cubic metre of water.

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17

Settlements and Bypass Road 356
The Eastern Gush Etzion settlements, Teqoa and
Noqedim, and Ma’ale Amos further south, also
constitute a check on the expansion of Bethlehem
eastwards: in 2004, a new bypass road was con­
structed for the benefit of these settlements to ensure
easier access to Jerusalem.
In addition, continuing attempts by settlers to reoccupy the site of the former Shdema military base
to the east of Beit Sahur, represent an obstacle to the
municipality’s plans for developing recreational and
health services. The area known as Ush Ghurab was
vacated by the IDF in April 2006, but a group called
‘The Committee for a Jewish Shdema’ is attempting to

claim the site, with the intention of establishing a
settlement there. The land was not returned to the
Beit Sahur municipality and technically remains a
closed area. However, lacking available public space,
in 2007, the municipality constructed a public park
on approximately 100 dunams of the site, which
includes sports facilities, a climbing tower and a
cafeteria. The project was partially funded by USAID,
which inaugurated the site in February 2008.
The municipality has plans for a paediatric hospital at
the site to be built and funded by Cure International,
a US-based charity. The hospital, which plans to
be in operation by Christmas 2009, would have 65
beds, and would cater for children with physical
disabilities from all over the West Bank.55

Young men performing dabka, the traditional Palestinian folk dance.
Photo by Patrick Zoll
Bethlehem, the birthplace of Jesus, is twinned with
52 cities worldwide. Tourism and pilgrimages are the
mainstay of the economy, providing employment in
hotels, restaurants, travel agencies, and in souvenir
and handicraft workshops. As part of the Bethlehem
2000 project, designed to prepare the city for the new
millennium and the expected dividends of the Oslo
peace process, some $300 million was invested in the
area. Instead, tourism declined dramatically with the
beginning of the second intifada in September 2000,
the closure regime, the reoccupation of Bethlehem
in 2002, construction of the Barrier and the lack of
permits issued to local tourist guides. In 2004, the
total number of people employed in hotels was 95
compared to 393 in 2000.
Tourist numbers increased markedly in 2008 with
over 800,000 foreign tourists, mainly due to an
appeal by churches and related organisations for
pilgrims to visit Bethlehem. However, much of
this increase is attributable to the overflow from
hotels in Jerusalem, with tourists paying brief visits
to Bethlehem and only about 45 percent staying
overnight and contributing to the local economy.56
Moreover, Bethlehem benefits little from domestic

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UN OCHA oPt

tourism with only 65,000 Palestinians visiting in
2008, or from Palestinian citizens of Israel, with
approximately 15,000 visits the same year.
In addition, the benefits of tourism are confined to a
small number of pilgrimage sites in the Bethlehem
urban area, in particular, the Church of the Nativity
and the Shepherdsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Fields. Few foreign tourists
visit historic sites and monuments within the city
of Bethlehem itself, or nearby historic attractions,
such as Solomonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Pools in Artas. The landscaped
terraces in the western Bethlehem governorate,
such as Al Makhrour and Wadi Fukin,57 are virtually
unknown to foreign tourists, as is the desert and
semi-desert in the east. The festivals which celebrate
the products characteristic of local villages - the
lettuce in Artas; apricots in Beit Jala; fakkus in Beit
Sahour; grapes in Al Khader; aubergines in Battir;
and an annual olive festival in Bethlehem city itself
- are also largely unattended by foreign tourists. In
any case, continuing administrative and physical
restrictions, including ongoing Barrier construction,
make it difficult to develop a holistic approach to
tourism and heritage conservation at the Bethlehem
governorate level.58

19

Conclusion
The space available to the Palestinian population in
the Bethlehem governorate has been significantly
constricted by Israeli measures such as the continued
expansion of Israeli settlements and their outposts,
construction of the Barrier, and the zoning of the
majority of the Bethlehem governorate as Area C,
(entailing strict Israeli building regulations). These
measures have reduced Bethlehem’s development
space, limited its access to resources, severed
Bethlehem’s historic links to Jerusalem and
restricted the urban area’s potential for residential
and industrial expansion. The traditional mainstays
of the Bethlehem governorate economy such as
work in Israel, tourism, agriculture herding and the
private sector have been undermined. Continuation
of these Israeli measures, compromises the future
economic and social development of the Bethlehem
governorate.
While Israel has the duty to ensure the safety and
security of its citizens in response to attacks by
Palestinians, the steps it takes must be in accordance
with international law and not cause long-term
detriment to the local Palestinian population. In

20

practice, however, most of this Israeli infrastructure,
in particular settlements and settlement outposts
and the Barrier have been constructed for the
benefit of the Israeli population and not the local
Palestinian community.
Steps can be taken to prevent further deterioration.
Many of the administrative measures taken by the
Israeli authorities are reversible and the Barrier
route is not yet finished. Actions such as halting
construction of the rest of the Barrier in the West
Bank, opening up closed military areas and nature
reserves for sustainable Palestinian development,
along with the international call for a freeze on
settlement activity and related actions like ‘state
land’ declarations, would restore parts of the
lost space to the governorate and improve the
humanitarian and economic situation in Bethlehem.
In the long term, these types of immediate steps
would contribute to ensuring compliance with
international law and UN resolutions and lay the
groundwork for a durable political solution in the
occupied Palestinian territory.

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UN OCHA oPt

End notes
1 An earlier OCHA report on Bethlehem highlighted the
consequences of the closure regime on the Bethlehem
urban area, OCHA-UNSCO: Costs of Conflict: The
Changing Face of Bethlehem, December 2004.
2 Regarding settlements, Article 49 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention prohibits the Occupying Power
from transferring its civilian population into the
territory it occupies. The illegal status of Israeli
settlements has been confirmed by the United
Nations Security Council in Resolution 465 (1980)
and the International Court of Justice in 2004. For
settler expansion plans see map: Fragmentation and
planned settlement expansion. P. 12
3 The Gush Etzion bloc includes a small portion of
land which was Jewish-owned before 1948.
4 Settler population statistics, The Applied Research
Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) Geopolitical Status of
Bethlehem Governorate, July 2007, p. 10.
5 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)
2007 census cites 176, 235 for the Palestinian
population of Bethlehem.
6 Under the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II), originally
designated for a five year period, full security and
civil control was transferred to the Palestinian
Authority for Palestinian areas designated as Area A.
Full civil and joint security control with Israel was
set up in Area B. Together, Areas A and B comprised
approximately 40 percent of West Bank territory.
Israel retained security control and jurisdiction over
planning and construction in Area C, approximately
60 percent of the West Bank.
7 The Oslo Agreement states that ‘…while the Tomb,
as well as the main road leading from Jerusalem to
the Tomb… will be under the security responsibility
of Israel, the free movement of Palestinians on the
main road will continue. (Oslo II Agreement, Annex
1, Article V, Section 7).
8

See OCHA: Bethlehem: Costs of Conflict, p. 11.

9

According to Mr. Zougbhi Zoughbi, the Director
of the Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre, ‘the
Barrier cuts off families from lands and orchards
which their forefathers have tended for generations.
The lack of available land for residential building and

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UN OCHA oPt

for public parks adds to the feeling of hopelessness for
the future.’ (Interview, 3 December 2008). According
to the Governor of Bethlehem, Mr. Salah Al-Tamari,
the concrete wall ‘has a negative impact on young
people. It’s an ugly structure which blocks hope
– you can’t keep hope alive with a ten metre wall.’
(Interview, 4 December 2008).
10 1 dunam = 1000 m2
11 ARIJ: The Strangulation of Beit Jala City, April
2008.
12 World Vision International has launched a campaign
to try to halt the loss of the Al Makhrour land to
Beit Jala farmers. See http://meero.worldvision.org/
video/againstthewall.mov
13 Interview with architect Ms. Samia Zeit Khailieh,
Beit Jala municipality, 18 December 2008.
14 PCBS: Change of Area of Cultivated Lands (Km2)
by Irrigated Area and Governorate 2004-2007. The
Ministry of Agriculture concurs with the PCBS
findings regarding a reduction in dependency on
agriculture. (Interview, 23 March, 2009).
15 Information supplied by the UNRWA West Bank
Operations office and the World Council of Churches,
Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine
and Israel (EAPPI).
16 Although Bethlehem has a well established
university, it does not provide degrees in subjects
such as medicine, engineering or law.
17 Statistics from the Bethlehem Governorate
Coordination and Liaison Office. This number
includes renewals of existing permits.
18 On average, 3,000 patients are referred by the
Palestinian Ministry of Health to East Jerusalem
hospitals each year and many more non-referrals
seek care there annually. OCHA: The Humanitarian
Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian
Communities: Update No. 7, East Jerusalem, June
2007, p. 25.
19 EAPPI: Special Report, Checkpoint 300, Key
Findings Based on Statistical Data from 2008,
January 2009. According to EAPPI, about 2,500
people, mainly workers, cross in the morning hours.

21

20 According to EAPPI, on an average day, only two of
the three metal detectors and between three and five
of the 12 ID booths function. Ibid.
21 UNRWA West Bank Operations Office. According to
EAPPI, ‘on a normal day it takes about 1.5 hours to
pass if one queues at 4:30.’
22 The latter case is still pending.
23 Al Haq: Al Nu’aman Village: a Case Study of Indirect
Forcible Transfer, 2006.
24 The average cost of producing one kilogram of grapes
was NIS 2.5, while its selling price inside Israel was
as high as NIS 5 per kilogram.
25 Restrictions included the Barrier, lack of access to
Israeli markets, increased difficulty in reaching
land inside the boundary of settlements, and settler
harassment.
26 Over the years, the Government of Israel has
designated large tracts of the West Bank as ‘state
land’ and allocated this land for the construction of
settlements.
27 According to the Israeli authorities, a series of
goodwill measures will permit the ‘unlimited
entrance of Palestinian Christians from Judea and
Samaria (the West Bank) into Israel for participation
in religious ceremonies and family visits’ during
the period 1 April and 15 May 2009. Almost 10,000
permits were issued for this purpose in Bethlehem.
IDF Spokesperson, 6 April 2009.
28 For additional information see OCHA, Costs of
Conflict, 2004.
29 There were plans in the 1990s to build the stadium on
Bethlehem land near Tantur, unilaterally annexed to
Israel by the expanded Jerusalem municipal boundary,
but this was refused by the Israeli authorities.
30 Interview with Dr. Victor Batarseh, Mayor of
Bethlehem, 3 December 2008, and Dr. Samir
Hazbun, Head of Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce,
4 December 2008.
31 Interview with the Head of Beit Fajjar municipality,
Mr. Ahmad Abdallah Jaber Thawabteh and staff, 5
April 2009.
32 The machinery is still in the custody of the IDF. In
some cases, it has been impounded for up to eight
years before a heavy fine is imposed on the owners.

22

33 Products must be placed on wooden bases. The
highest of the stacked products should not exceed
more than 160 cm. Beit Fajjar businesses have
problems meeting this requirement as their stone and
marble do not fit onto these wooden bases.
34 The diversion of Palestinian traffic eastward will
presumably result in more costly and time consuming
journeys for residents of Bethlehem to reach Hebron,
including the students enrolled in the Polytechnic
University and Al Arrub Agricultural School and the
estimated 2,400 patients who visit Al Ahli Hospital
and the Governmental Hospital in Hebron annually.
35 In previous official Barrier routes, the Palestinian
communities of Battir, Husan and Nahalin were also
enclosed within an inner barrier, although this had
disappeared on the most recent official route, as
published on the website of the Ministry of Defence
in April 2006. See www.seamzone.mod.gov.il.
36 Paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, 12 August 1949: ‘The Occupying Power
shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies.’
37 See for example Articles 46 and 55 of Convention
(IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18
October 1907; see also, Article 47 of the IV Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, and
Pictet, Commentary to the IV Geneva Convention:
“Consequently, occupation as a result of war, while
representing actual possession to all appearances
cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of
territory.” page 275.
38 Ibid.
39 S/Res/465 (1980) Adopted by the Security Council
at its 2203rd meeting on 1 March 1980.
40 Peace Now: Ministry of Housing’s Plans for the West
Bank, March 2009, p 1. Under the Road Map, the
Government of Israel made commitments to halt all
settlement expansion, including natural growth, and
to dismantle the settlement outposts created since
March 2001. This commitment was reconfirmed at
the Annapolis summit in November 2007.
41 The number of housing units planned for G’ivat Yael,

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varies from ‘ up to 10,000 housing units’ (Jerusalem
Deputy Mayor and Chairman of the Jerusalem Planning
and Construction Committee, Yehoshua Pollak,
quoted in Meron Rappaport: Committee approves
construction of three new Jewish neighbourhoods in
East Jerusalem’, Ha’aretz, 10 May 2007; to 13,600
housing units (Ir Amin: Jerusalem in the shadow of the
disengagement from Gaza, August 2005; to as much
20,000 housing units, ARIJ, Geopolitical Status of
Bethlehem Governorate, p.16
42 Peace Now: Ministry of Housing’s Plans for the West
Bank, March 2009, pp.7-9.
43 B’Tselem: Settlement expansion plans, 27 February
2009.
44 Peace Now: Ministry of Housing’s Plans for the West
Bank, p.5.
45 Amos Harel: Defence Minsiter is likely to approve
80 housing units in settlement, Ha’aretz, 23 March
2008.
46 Peace Now: New Land Seizure Orders Issued During
the Gaza Operation, February 2009, p.1.
47 Ibid. The community of Husan filed an objection to the
seizure order and, according to the lawyer concerned,
the order expired without being implemented.
48 OCHA Special Focus: Three years later: the
Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier since the
International Court of Justice Opinion. July 2007.
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ICJ4_Special_
Focus_July2007.pdf. In the northern West Bank,
residents of the ‘Seam Zone’ require ‘permanent
resident’ permits to continue to live in their own
homes. The Israeli authorities have stated that this
requirement will not be introduced in the Bethlehem
governorate.
49 According to a UNOCHA-UNRWA survey of 67
localities in the northern West Bank, fewer than
20 percent of those who used to farm their lands
in the closed area before completion of the Barrier
are now granted permits. UNOCHA/UNRWA
Special Focus: The Barrier Gate and Permit
Regime Four Years On: Humanitarian Impact in the
Northern West Bank, November 2007. (http://www.
ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_SpecialFocus_
BarrierGates_2007_11.pdf). This figure was
replicated in a follow-up survey of the same
communities in May-June 2008.

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50 A/RES/ES-10/15 Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly, ‘Advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem’ 2
August 2004.
51 From ‘The Impact of the Expansion and Annexation
Wall on Women in Hussan village - Bethlehem
Governorate’ by Nisreen Adnan Shqueir, MA Thesis
for Masters Degree in International Cooperation and
Development, Bethlehem University, 2008. Used
with permission of the author.
52 See OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians
of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the
West Bank, July 2007, pp. 42-45. Under the Wye
River Memorandum of 1998, some 16,665 hectares
of West Bank land reserves, principally in the eastern
Bethlehem governorate, was handed over to the
Palestinian Authority (PA) to be set aside as a green
area/nature reserve: however, the PA has not been
allowed to utilize this area. (Interview with Mr. Salah
Al-Tamari, Governor of Bethlehem, 4 December
2008.)
53 ‘It is important to emphasize that the Dead Sea is
a unique natural phenomenon. Israel exploits this
resource intensively, particularly in the section to
the south … both for its chemical industry (the Dead
Sea Works) and for tourism. These two economic
activities create numerous jobs and significant
foreign currency earnings.’ B’Tselem, Land Grab,
May 2002, p.96.
54 UNRWA West Bank Operations Office.
55 Interview with Mayor of Beit Sahur, Mr. Hani al
Hayek, 18 December 2008.
56 Interview with Mr. Majed N. Ishaq, Ministry of Tour­
ism and Antiquities, Bethlehem, 4 December 2008.
57 The ancient farming terraces have been described
as a ‘unique cultural landscape deserving of world
heritage status’ according to Gidon Bromberg, Israeli
director of Friends of the Earth Middle East. Rory
McCarthy: Israeli barrier and settlement to leave
West Bank village with nowhere to go, Guardian, 30
October, 2006.
58 Interview with Mr. Issam Juha, Director, Centre
for Cultural Heritage Preservation, 18 December
2008.

23

Expansion of Beitar Illit settlement with the lands of Wadi Fukin below.
Photo by JCTordai

UNITED NATIONS

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
occupied Palestinian territory