S Y L L A B
U S

O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

Appellant
insurer challenges adverse summary judgment, arguing that the district court
erred by concluding that a marked police patrol car is not a “motor vehicle”
for purposes of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§
65B.41-.71 (2000). Because we conclude
that applying the plain meaning of the statutory definition of “motor vehicle”
to this case produces an absurd and unreasonable result that plainly departs
from the first stated purpose of the no-fault act, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

On March 17, 2000, a marked police
patrol car, driven by a Rochester police officer and owned by the City of
Rochester, struck and injured a pedestrian.
Appellant Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Company (MSI) insured the
pedestrian as a resident relative under an automobile policy; respondent League
of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust (LMCIT) insured the city under an
automobile policy. Both policies
provided $20,000 in basic economic-loss benefits, and MSI’s policy provided
$60,000 in optional medical-expense benefits.
The pedestrian incurred medical expenses in excess of $20,000.

MSI paid the excess and brought a
declaratory-judgment action against LMCIT for payment of $20,000 of basic
economic-loss benefits on the ground that LMCIT’s policy had a higher priority
for payment. See Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.47 (2000) (providing priority of payment of basic economic-loss
benefits). MSI moved for summary
judgment. The district court denied
MSI’s motion and granted summary judgment to LMCIT, concluding that the
pedestrian was not entitled to benefits under LMCIT’s policy because a marked
police patrol car is not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the Minnesota
No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000). This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by
concluding that a marked police patrol car is not a “motor vehicle” for
purposes of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§
65B.41-.71 (2000)?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment,
this court determines (1) whether there are genuine issues of material fact and
(2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Hertz Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
573 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn. 1998). The
parties agree that there are no disputed facts and that the issue on appeal
involves interpretation of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act
(no-fault act), Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which
appellate courts review de novo. Nathe
Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2000).

LMCIT’s coverage declarations limit
payment for personal-injury claims to “basic Minnesota statutory coverage,” and
the parties do not dispute the district court’s finding that the policy
provides “benefits coverage for qualifying motor vehicles as required by the
[no-fault act].” Thus, the scope of
LMCIT’s policy, and the right of a pedestrian to recover benefits under that
policy, is determined by the provisions of the no-fault act.

The no-fault
act provides:

Every owner of
a motor vehicle of a type which is required to be registered or licensed or is
principally garaged in this state shall maintain during the period in which
operation or use is contemplated a plan of reparation security * * *
[that] shall provide for basic economic loss benefits and residual liability
coverage.

Here, the
parties do not dispute that a marked police patrol car is not required to be
registered under chapter 168. See Minn.
Stat. § 168.012, subd. 1(b) (2000 & Supp. 2001) (providing that “police
patrols * * * , the general appearance of which is unmistakable,
shall not be required to register”).
MSI argues, however, that because the marked police patrol car was a
motor vehicle that was principally garaged in Minnesota, Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.48, subd. 1, requires that it be insured for basic economic-loss benefits. But the statutory definition of “motor
vehicle” is

every vehicle,
other than a motorcycle or other vehicle with fewer than four wheels, which (a)
is required to be registered pursuant to chapter 168, and (b) is designed to be
self-propelled by an engine or motor for use primarily upon public roads,
highways or streets in the transportation of persons or property.

Minn. Stat. §
65B.43, subd. 2. Therefore, no matter
where a vehicle is garaged, it is not within the statutory definition of “motor
vehicle” unless it is required to be registered under chapter 168. And the statutory definition of “motor
vehicle” applies throughout the no-fault act “except where the context clearly
indicates a different meaning.” Minn.
Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 1.

The plain
language of the no-fault act provides that a vehicle can only be a “motor
vehicle” if it is required to be registered under chapter 168, the plain
language of the no-fault act’s right-to-benefits provision uses the statutory
definition, and there is no context in that provision that “clearly indicates a
different meaning.” See Minn.
Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 1. Because
marked police patrol cars are not required to be registered under chapter 168,
the right-to-benefits provision, on its face, does not grant a person the right
to basic-economic-loss benefits for an injury arising out of the use of a
marked police patrol car. See
Minn. Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1.

A marked police patrol car is not
required to be registered under chapter 168
when its general appearance is “unmistakable.” Minn. Stat. § 168.012, subd. 1(b). But “unmarked vehicles used in general police work” must be
registered. Id., subd. 1(c)
(2000 & Supp. 2001). Thus, if a
pedestrian is struck and injured by an unmarked police patrol car, the
pedestrian has the right to basic economic-loss benefits because an unmarked
police patrol car must be registered under chapter 168 and therefore meets the
no-fault act’s statutory definition of “motor vehicle.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.43, subd. 2,
65B.46, subd. 1. Here, under the plain
meaning of the statutory definition of “motor vehicle,” whether a pedestrian
has a right to basic economic-loss benefits under the no-fault act therefore
turns solely on the appearance of a police patrol car.

The first
stated purpose of the no-fault act is

[t]o relieve
the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of automobile accidents
within this state by requiring automobile insurers to offer and automobile
owners to maintain automobile insurance policies or other pledges of indemnity
which will provide prompt payment of specified basic economic loss benefits to
victims of automobile accidents without regard to whose fault caused the
accident.

Minn. Stat. §
65B.42(1) (2000). A police patrol car,
marked or unmarked, is an automobile.
Application of the plain meaning of the statutory definition of “motor
vehicle” to this case produces an absurd and unreasonable result that plainly
departs from the first stated purpose of the no-fault act.

D E C I S I O N

When an injury arises
out of the use of a marked police patrol car, applying the plain meaning of the
statutory definition of “motor vehicle” to deny an injured person the right to
basic economic-loss benefits produces an absurd and unreasonable result that
plainly departs from the first stated purpose of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000). The district court
therefore erred by concluding that a marked police patrol car is not a “motor
vehicle” for purposes of the no-fault act.
Because both MSI and LMCIT’s policies provide the pedestrian with basic
economic-loss benefits, we reverse and remand for the district court to
determine the priority of payment of those benefits.