Since I imagine some have Neil on an ignore list I thought I would offer some history. Below is a history of what has gone on with UN inspections. I think it's relevant in that it describes in detail many things which most people are unaware of.

This was taken from....

http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_102926,001300180003.htm

who took it from the UN lest Neil accuse me of partaking in a conspiracy. I had to format it a bit so I may have messed up a section or two. Enjoy your reading. It's long and short all at the same time.

Given below is the chronology on main events after the cease-fire between Iraq and coalition forces and the inspections of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by United Nations Special Commission.

April 3, 1991
Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Section C, decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept, under international supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometres, and related production facilities and equipment. It also provides for establishment of a system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the ban on these weapons and missiles. Requires Iraq to make a declaration, within 15 days, of the location, amounts and types of all such items.

May 14, 1991
Entry into force of the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq setting out the rights, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and its personnel in Iraq.

June 23-28, 1991
UNSCOM/IAEA inspectors try to intercept Iraqi vehicles carrying nuclear related equipment (Cauldrons). Iraqi personnel fire warning shots in the air to prevent the inspectors from approaching the vehicles. The equipment is later seized and destroyed under international supervision.

June 17, 1991
Security Council resolution 699 (1991), confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have a continuing authority to conduct activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991).

June 28, 1991
Statement by the President of the Security Council deploring Iraq's denial of access to an inspection site and asking the Secretary-General to send a high-level mission to Baghdad immediately.

June 30, 1991
UNSCOM commences its first missile inspection.

July 5, 1991
Report of the high-level mission sent to Iraq containing undertakings by Iraq of full co-operation, including immediate and unimpeded access to sites and the right to stop and inspection vehicles in movement.

August 2, 1991
Iraq declares to the first biological inspection team that it had conducted "biological research activities for defensive military purposes".

August 15, 1991
Security Council resolution 707 (1991), demands that Iraq provide without further delay full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed weapons and programmes, as required by resolution 687 (1991).

September 6, 1991
The first UNSCOM inspection team which intended to use helicopters is blocked by Iraq.

September 23, 1991
Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq's failure to provide unconditional acceptance of resolution 707 (1991).

September 21-30, 1991
IAEA inspectors find large amounts of documentation relating to Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The Iraqi officials confiscate some documents from the inspectors. The inspectors refuse to yield a second set of documents. In response, Iraq refuses to allow the team to leave the site with these documents. A four-day stand-off during which the team remained in the parking lot of the site ensues. Iraq permits the team to leave with the documents following a statement by the President of the Security Council, threatening enforcement action by members of the Council.

September 24, 1991
Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq's detention of an inspection team and reiterated that the Commission is the sole judge of the definition of documents, sites or materials subject to inspection.

September 24, 1991
Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning the use of its own helicopters by the Special Commission and noting a letter from Iraq which the Council considered to be an unconditional acceptance of resolution 707.

October 11, 1991
Security Council resolution 715 (1991), approves the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev. l) and the Director General of the IAEA (S/22872/Rev.1). The Commission's plan also establishes that Iraq shall "accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other personnel designated by the Special Commission".

21 October 1991
Iraq states that it considers the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Plans, adopted by resolution 715 (1991), to be unlawful and states that it is not ready to comply with resolution 715.

February 18, 1992
Special report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM regarding the visit of a special mission to Baghdad on January 27, 1991, recording that Iraq was rejecting any obligations imposed on it by Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).

February 19, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council approving the report of the special mission and expressing grave concern over Iraq's failure to acknowledge its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, and supporting a decision to despatch a further special mission to Baghdad.

February 28, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council, upon receipt of the special Commission's report, reaffirming that it is for UNSCOM alone to determine which items are to be destroyed under resolution 687, and condemning Iraq's failure to provide full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

March 11, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning general and specific obligations of Iraq including those in the weapons areas, under the various Security Council resolutions.

March 12, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council noting a statement made in the Council by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and expressing the view that Iraq had not yet complied fully and unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

March 19, 1992
Iraq declares the existence of previously undeclared ballistic missiles (89), chemical weapons and associated material. Iraq reveals that most of these undeclared items were unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991, in violation of resolution 687 (1991).

April 9, 1992
Iraq calls for a halt of UNSCOM's aerial surveillance flights, making reference to the possibility that the aircraft and its pilot would be endangered.

April 10, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq's threats to the safety and security of UNSCOM's aerial surveillance flights over Iraq and reaffirming UNSCOM's right to conduct such flights (S/23803). Subsequently, Iraq affirms that it does not intend to carry out any military action aimed at UNSCOM's aerial flights.

May 1992
Iraq provides its first full, final and complete disclosures for its prohibited biological and missile programmes. Iraq admits to having had only a "defensive" biological weapons programme.

June 1992
Iraq provides its first full, final and complete disclosure for its prohibited chemical weapons programme.

July 1992
UNSCOM begins the destruction of large quantities of Iraq's chemical weapons and production facilities.

July 6-29, 1992
Iraq refuses an inspection team access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. UNSCOM had reliable information that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities.

July 6, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning refusal by Iraq to permit the UNSCOM inspection team entry into the Ministry of Agriculture and stating that Iraq's denial constituted a material and unacceptable breach of resolution 687 (1991). Access was thereafter obtained. Evidence gathered from the Ministry is consistent with the removal of items during the period the team was denied entry.

October 15, 1992
Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning a high-level statement made in Iraq which appeared to constitute a threat to the security of United Nations inspectors, expressing the Council's concern for the safety of the inspectors and expressing the wish that Iraq cooperate fully with them.

November 23, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning general and specific obligations of Iraq, including those in the weapons areas, under the various Security Council resolutions.

November 24, 1992
Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning statements by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and regretting threats, allegations and attacks made by him regarding the various United Nations operations in Iraq.

January 1993
Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq starts incursions into the demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait and increases its military activity in the no-fly zones.

January 8, 1993
Statement by the President of the Security Council, noting that Iraq's action in prohibiting the use of UNSCOM aircraft is an "unacceptable and material breach" of resolution 687 (1991) and warns Iraq of "serious consequences", were it to continue.

January 11, 1993
Statement by the President of the Security Council reiterating the Statement of 8 January 1993 regarding Iraq's prohibition on the use of UNSCOM aircraft, and again warning of serious consequences that would flow from continuing defiance.

January 19, 1993
Air raids are conducted on sites in southern Iraq by France, the UK and the US. Iraq informs UNSCOM that it will be able to resume its flights.
June-July 1993
Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine test stands.

June 18, 1993
Statement by the President of the Council, expressing deep concern over Iraq's de facto refusal to accept UNSCOM installation of monitoring devices and warning Iraq of the serious consequences of material breaches of resolution 687 (1991). Subsequently, Iraq agrees to the installation of the monitoring cameras.

September 16, 1993
Tripartite report by the Executive Chairman, the leader of the IAEA Action Team and the Director of the Iraqi Military Industrialisation Corporation on measures to implement the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.

October 12, 1993
Second tripartite report on steps to resolve outstanding issues and to implement ongoing monitoring and verification.

November 26, 1993
Iraq accepts resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

February 10, 1994
Joint statement dated February 5, 1994, by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission regarding significant progress made since July 1993 in both the political and technical areas, and expressing readiness to expedite the process establishing ongoing monitoring and verification.

April 29, 1994
Joint Statement issued by the Chairman of the Special Commission, the Head of the IAEA Action Team and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq regarding progress made, in particular in regard to the establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification, and recording Iraq's assurances that it would respect the rights and privileges of the Commission and the IAEA and the Commission's and the IAEA's commitment to exercise their rights and privileges in a manner respecting Iraq's legitimate concerns regarding sovereignty, independence, security and dignity.

June 1994
UNSCOM completes the destruction of large quantities of chemical warfare agents and precursors and their production equipment.

July 20, 1994
Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, transmitting a further joint statement regarding progress made in the implementation of paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

September/October 1994
Iraq sets a deadline of October 10, 1994 for the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), rejects all appeals to withdraw its threat to stop co-operation with UNSCOM, and starts deploying troops in the direction of Kuwait. It leads the US to begin deploying troops to Kuwait.

October 8, 1994
Statement by the President of the Security Council, underlining the complete unacceptability of Iraqi statements threatening to withdraw co-operation with UNSCOM and grave concern over reports regarding the deployment of troops in Iraq in the direction of Kuwait.

October 15, 1994
Security Council resolution 949 (1994), demands that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. Iraq thereafter withdraws its forces and resumes its work with the Commission.

October 15, 1994
Letter from the Representatives of Iraq and of the Russian Federation, transmitting a Joint Communique containing Iraq's announcement that it had withdrawn its troops to rearguard positions.

March 1995
Iraq provides the second Full, Final and Complete Disclosures of its prohibited biological and chemical weapons programmes.

July 1, 1995
As a result of UNSCOM's investigations and in the light of irrefutable evidence, Iraq admits for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons programme but denies weaponization.

July 1995
Iraq threatens to end all co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA if there is no progress towards the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo by August 31, 1995.

August 1995
Iraq provides the third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited biological weapons programme.

August 8, 1995
General Hussein Kamel, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialisation Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programmes, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Hussein Kamel had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programmes. Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare programme than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation, hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by Hussein Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programmes which subsequently leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq also informs UNSCOM that the deadline to halt its co-operation is withdrawn.

November 1995
Iraq provides second Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited missile programme.

November 1995
The Government of Jordan intercepts a large shipment of high-grade missile components destined for Iraq. Iraq denies that it had sought to purchase these components, although it acknowledged that some of them were in Iraq. UNSCOM conducts an investigation, which confirms that Iraqi authorities and missile facilities have been involved in the acquisition of sophisticated guidance and control components for proscribed missiles. UNSCOM retrieves additional similar missile components from the Tigris river, which had been allegedly disposed of there by Iraqis involved in the covert acquisition.

March 1996
UNSCOM teams are denied immediate access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams enter the sites after delays of up to 17 hours.

March 19, 1996
Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing the Council's concern at Iraq's denial of access, which it terms a clear violation of Iraq's obligations under relevant resolutions. The Council also demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection.

March 27, 1996
Security Council resolution 1051(1996), approves the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq and demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the mechanism and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director-General of the IAEA.

May-Jun 1996
UNSCOM supervises the destruction of Al-Hakam, Iraq's main facility for the production of biological warfare agents.

June 1996
Iraq denies UNSCOM teams access to sites under investigation for their involvement in the "concealment mechanism" for proscribed items.

June 12, 1996
Security Council resolution 1060 (1996), terms Iraq's actions a clear violation of the provisions of the Council's resolutions. It also demands that Iraq grant immediate and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection by UNSCOM.

June 13, 1996
Despite the adoption of resolution 1060 (1996), Iraq again denies access to another inspection team.

June 14, 1996
Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council condemns the failure of Iraq to comply with resolution 1060 (1996). The Council also asks that the Executive Chairman visit Baghdad with a view to securing access to all sites which the Commission designates for inspection.

June 19-22, 1996
The Executive Chairman visits Baghdad. UNSCOM and Iraq agree on a Joint 1996 Statement and a Joint Programme of Action (S/1996/463). The Chairman establishes modalities for inspection of so-called "sensitive sites", in order to take into account Iraq's legitimate security concerns.

June 22, 1996
Iraq provides the fourth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited biological weapons programme.

June 1996
Iraq provides third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited chemical weapons programme. The progress achieved in verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the Security Council.

July 1996
Iraq provides the third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited missile programme. The results achieved by the Commission verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the Security Council.

August 23, 1996
Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council strongly reaffirms its full support of the Commission in the conduct of its inspections and other tasks and expresses its grave concern at Iraq's failure to comply fully with resolution 1060 (1996). The Council also states that Iraq's failure to grant immediate unconditional and unrestricted access to sites and its attempts to impose conditions on the conduct of interviews with Iraqi officials constitute a gross violation of its obligations. The Council also reminds Iraq that only full compliance with its obligations would enable the Executive Chairman to present a report in accordance with section C of resolution 687 (1991).

December 30, 1996
Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council deplores the refusal of Iraq to allow the Special Commission to remove certain missile engines from Iraq for analysis, and demands that Iraq allow such removal.

February 1997
Iraq allows UNSCOM to remove the missile engines.

June 1997
Iraq interferes with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews.

June 18, 1997
Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing serious concern at Iraq's actions endangering the Commission's helicopters, deploring such incidents and demanding that Iraq permit UNSCOM to carry out its air operations anywhere in Iraq without interference of any kind.

June 21, 1997
Iraq again blocks UNSCOM's teams from entering certain sites, which have been designated by UNSCOM for inspection.

June 21, 1997
Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), condemns Iraq's actions and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM's team immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews by UNSCOM. The Council also calls for an additional report on Iraq's co-operation with the Commission and suspends the periodic sanctions reviews.

September 1997
Iraq provides fifth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited biological weapons programme. An international panel of experts is convened in New York to discuss Iraq's declaration. The panel unanimously finds Iraq's declaration to be incomplete, inadequate and technically flawed.

September 13, 1997
One of UNSCOM's personnel is manhandled by an Iraqi officer on board one of the Commission's helicopters while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of the unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive", that was designated for inspection. Two days later, Iraq again failed to freeze movement inside another "sensitive site" designated for inspection.

September 17, 1997
The President of the Security Council makes a statement to the media, which, inter alia, deplores the incidents and urges Iraq to cooperate fully with UNSCOM.

September 17, 1997
While seeking access to a site for inspection declared by Iraq to be "sensitive", UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape the movement of files, the burning of documents and dumping of ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.

September/October 1997
UNSCOM inspection teams are prevented from inspecting three sites designated for inspection, on the basis that the sites are "presidential sites", which Iraq claims are out of bounds to UNSCOM's inspectors.

October 23, 1997
Security Council resolution 1134 (1997), demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission, continues the suspension of the periodic sanctions reviews and foreshadows additional sanctions pending a further report on Iraq's co-operation with UNSCOM.

October 1997
UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional, large quantities of chemical weapons related equipment and precursors chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that part of the equipment had been used for CW production. Only in May 1997, on the basis of UNSCOM's investigations, did Iraq admit that some of the equipment had indeed been used in the production of VX.

October 27, 1997
The Executive Chairman sends a letter to Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, suggesting the agenda for forthcoming meetings in Baghdad. The letter proposes that Iraq address important outstanding issues, including warheads, VX and the biological weapons area. It also mentions the need to review the "modalities for inspection of sensitive sites" to ensure that inspections are conducted in a credible manner.

October 29, 1997
The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, sends a letter to the President of the Security Council, informing the Council of policy decisions taken by the Government of Iraq. The letter includes a decision not to deal with personnel of United States nationality working for UNSCOM, a demand that all personnel of United States nationality working with UNSCOM leave Iraq by a given deadline, and a request that UNSCOM withdraw its "cover" for the "spy plane" U-2, provided by the United States.

October 29, 1997
Statement by the President of the Security Council condemning Iraq's decision and terming it "unacceptable". The statement also demands that Iraq cooperate fully, without restrictions or conditions with UNSCOM, and warns of the serious consequences of Iraq's failure to comply immediately and fully with its obligations under relevant resolutions.

November 12, 1997
Security Council resolution 1137 (1997), condemns the continued violation by Iraq of its obligations, including its unacceptable decision to seek to impose conditions on co-operation with UNSCOM. It also imposes a travel restriction on Iraqi officials who are responsible for or participated in the instances of non-compliance.

November 13, 1997
Iraq requires the personnel of United States nationality working for UNSCOM to leave Iraq immediately. The Executive Chairman decides the majority of the UNSCOM personnel should withdraw temporarily from Iraq. A skeleton staff remains in Baghdad to maintain UNSCOM's premises and equipment.

November 13, 1997
Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council condemns the unacceptable decision of Iraq in expelling personnel of UNSCOM of a specified nationality, demands Iraq to rescind its decisions of October 29, 1997 and demands that Iraq cooperate fully with UNSCOM.

November 20, 1997
Following intensive diplomatic activity an agreement is reached between Iraq and the Russian Federation whereby Iraq accepts the return of the Commission with its full complement of staff to resume its work in Iraq. The Commission's personnel, who had been temporarily withdrawn to Bahrain, return to Iraq on 21 November and resume their inspection activities the following day.

November 21, 1997
An Emergency Session of the Special Commission is held in New York in order to discuss and advise on ways to make the work more effective. The report of the Emergency Session is submitted to the Security Council.

December 3, 1997
Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Emergency Session of the Commission. The Council also stresses that the effectiveness and speed with which UNSCOM might accomplish its responsibilities was determined by the degree to which Iraq co-operated in disclosing the full extent and disposition of its proscribed programmes, and in granting UNSCOM unimpeded to all sites, records and individuals. The Council further welcomes the progress achieved by UNSCOM and the IAEA in the various disarmament areas.

December 17, 1997
The Executive Chairman returns to New York from Iraq and reports, inter alia, to the Council that Iraq would not permit the Commission's inspectors into a category of sites (Presidential and Sovereign) hitherto not identified to the Council or the Commission as being off-limits to inspection.

December 22, 1997
The President of the Security Council issues a statement in which members of the Council call upon the Government of Iraq to cooperate fully with the Commission and stress that failure by Iraq to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any site is unacceptable.

January 13, 1998
The Executive Chairman reports to the Council that during the first day of an inspection, Iraq announced that it was withdrawing its co-operation with the inspection team on the pretext that the team had too many individuals of US or UK nationality (S/1998/27 of 13 January 1998).

January 14, 1998
Iraq continues to block the work of the inspection team.

January 14, 1998
The President of the Security Council issues a statement terming Iraq's actions unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions and reiterates its demand that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately without conditions.

January 22, 1998
Following a visit to Iraq, the Executive Chairman reports to the Council that, despite the Council's Statement on the need for unrestricted access to all sites, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq continues to assert that Iraq would not permit access to eight so-called Presidential sites.

February 5, 1998
Early Feb Two technical evaluation meetings (TEMS) take place in Baghdad, reviewing 1998 the position with respect to the chemical weapons agent VX. and missile warheads. The report of the outcome of the meetings is submitted to the Council (document S/1998/176). Despite Iraq's assertions and it having had a full opportunity to present its views on all matters pertaining to the two issues, the team of UNSCOM international experts conclude unanimously that Iraq has still not provided sufficient information for the Commission to conclude that Iraq had undertaken all the disarmament steps required of it in these areas. The Commission's experts provide the Council with an oral briefing of the outcome on these two TEMS in March 1998.
February 15-18, 1998
In order to understand the scope (size and perimeters) of the eight Presidential sites which Iraq had decided to declare off-limits to the Commission's inspectors, the Secretary-General decides to despatch a technical survey team to Iraq. The report of this mission is forwarded to the Council under cover of a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council.

February 20-23, 1998
The Secretary-General visits Iraq. As a result of his meetings, the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq agree on the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MO.) which was signed on 23 February. The Secretary-General secures Iraq's reconfirmation of its acceptance of all relevant resolutions of the Council and the reiteration of its undertaking to cooperate fully with the Commission and the IAEA. In the Memorandum, Iraq also undertakes to accord to UNSCOM and the IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in conformity with the resolutions of the Council. For its part, the United Nations reiterates the commitment of all member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. The Memorandum also includes an undertaking by the Commission to respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity. The Memorandum also provides for the establishment of special procedures which would apply to initial and subsequent entries for the performance of the tasks mandated at the eight Presidential sites. The Memorandum. also makes provisions for the appointment of a Commissioner to head the Special Group established for the mandated tasks at Presidential sites. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala is appointed to this position by the Secretary-General.

March 2, 1998
Security Council resolution 1154 (1998) endorses the provisions of the MOU.

March 9, 1998
In pursuance of the MOU, procedures for initial and subsequent entry to the sites are drawn up and presented to the Council (document S/1998/208).

March 20-27, 1998
The Commission and Iraq conduct a further technical evaluation meeting (TEM) in Vienna dealing with all aspects of Iraq's biological weapons programme.

April 4, 1998
The initial entry to the eight Presidential sites is completed by mission UNSCOM 243.

April 8, 1998
The report of the biological weapons TEM is transmitted to the Council. As with the other TEMs, the experts unanimously conclude that Iraq's declaration on its biological weapons programme is incomplete and inadequate.

April 15, 1998
The report of the Special Group on the visit to Presidential sites is submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General.

April 16, 1998
The Commission's semi-annual consolidated report is submitted to the Council.

May 6, 1998
The Executive Chairman informs the Council that its requirements with respect to access to sites are sufficiently implemented to allow for the termination of the travel ban called for in resolution 1137 (1998).

May 14, 1998
Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council welcomes the improved access provided to the Special Commission and the IAEA by Iraq, following the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998. The Council expresses the hope that the agreement by the Government of Iraq to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA would reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate and detailed information in all areas of concern.

June 3-4, 1998
At the Council's request, experts from the Commission's New York Headquarters staff provide a technical briefing to Council members in informal session. At the conclusion of the meeting the Executive Chairman circulates to Council members for information an informal paper on disarmament issues which the Commission deems necessary to be completed and verified for the formulation of a report pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

June 14, 1998
The Executive Chairman agrees on a schedule for work on certain outstanding disarmament issues with the Deputy Prime Minister covering the following six weeks.

July 10-15, 1998
A team of UNSCOM international experts meets with their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad to give Iraq an account of the Commission's VX. findings.

July 14, 1998
As a consequence of the high-level talks between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman in June 1998, a team of UNSCOM international biological experts is assembled in Baghdad to review, for the third time, Iraq's declaration on its biological weapons programme. The experts conclude that the declaration is not verifiable.

August 3, 1998
During a visit to Baghdad, the Executive Chairman is told by the Deputy Prime Minister that he must certify to the Security Council that the requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991) have been met. The Chairman responds that he is not in a position to do so. The Deputy Prime Minister suspends the talks.

August 5, 1998
The Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath Party Command decide to halt cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA pending Security Council agreement to lift the oil embargo, reorganise the Commission and move it to either Geneva or Vienna. In the interim, Iraq would, on its own terms, permit monitoring under resolution 715 (1991).

August 6, 1998
The Executive Chairman briefs the Security Council on Iraq's position and the results of his talks in Baghdad. The Security Council's President terms Iraq's actions "totally unacceptable".

August 12, 1998
The Executive Chairman informs the Security Council that, in addition to halting all disarmament activities, Iraq's actions with respect to monitoring have impinged on the effectiveness of the monitoring system and the Commission could not continue to provide the Security Council with the same level of assurances of Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to re-establish its proscribed weapons programmes.

August 18, 1998
In a letter from the President of the Council, the Security Council reiterates its support for UNSCOM in the full implementation of its mandate and notes that Iraq is obliged to provide UNSCOM with co-operation necessary for it to undertake activities, including inspections.

August 19, 1998
The Executive Chairman proposes, in a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister that Iraq and the Special Commission resume the full range of activity. This is rejected by the Deputy Prime Minister in remarks to the press stating that Iraq does not trust the Executive Chairman or the elements dominating UNSCOM and that it does not believe that there is any use in resuming work with them.

September 3, 1998
The Executive Chairman briefs the Security Council on the status of UNSCOM's work in Iraq, including three incidents where Iraq has placed further limits on the Commission's rights and activities with respect to monitoring.

September 9, 1998
Security Council resolution 1194 (1998) unanimously condemns Iraq's decision to suspend co-operation with UNSCOM, terming Iraq's actions a totally unacceptable contravention of Iraq's obligations; demands Iraq rescind its decision and decides not to conduct the 60-day sanctions reviews until Iraq does so and the Commission reports to the Council that it is satisfied that it has been able to exercise its full range of activities, including inspections.

September 24-25, 1998
The Commission holds a second international expert meeting in New York to discuss the results of 1998 analyses conducted on remnants of Iraq's missile warheads.

October 6, 1998
The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council.

October 13, 1998
The Executive Chairman briefs the Council on the Commission's semi-annual report.

October 22-23, 1998
The Commission convenes a further international expert meeting to discuss the 1998 analysis of samples taken from remnants of Iraq's special warheads. The report of the meeting which is submitted to the Council.

October 31, 1998
Iraq announces that it will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM and its Chairman and to halt all UNSCOM's activities inside Iraq, including monitoring. The Security Council, in a statement to the press, unanimously condemn Iraq's decision to cease all co-operation with UNSCOM.

November 4, 1998
The Executive Chairman informs the Council that, as a result of Iraq's actions, the Commission is not in a position to provide the Council with any level of assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to retain and not to re-establish proscribed activities.

November 5, 1998
Security Council resolution 1205 (1998) unanimously condemns Iraq's actions and demands that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally its decisions of October 31 and August 5.

November 15, 1998
Press Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council takes note of Iraq's statement of 14 November to cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the IAEA. The Council members underline that their confidence in Iraq's intentions needs to be established by unconditional and sustained co-operation with the Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities. The Council members also reaffirm their readiness to proceed with the comprehensive review once the Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the Special Commission and the IAEA that Iraq has returned to full co-operation on the basis of resolution 1194 (1998) and the Council President's letter of October 30 to the Secretary-General.

December 3, 1998
The Special Commission submits the first of a series of weekly reports on its activities during the period 17 November to 2 December 1998. The report covers inspection activities during that period and also provides an account of correspondence exchanged with Iraq regarding matters such as the provision of documents, clarifications on a number of points previously raised with Iraq and asking that Iraq provide new substantial information on its biological weapons programme.

December 9, 1998
The Special Commission submits its second weekly report to the Security Council describing monitoring activities and the difficulties encountered in the course of those activities, including blockage at a site.

December 15, 1998
The Special Commission reports to the Security-General concerning UNSCOM's activities and the status of Iraq's co-operation with the Commission in the period since 14 November 1998. The Executive Chairman concludes that Iraq did not provide the full co-operation it had promised on 14 November 1998.

December 16, 1998
The Special Commission withdraws its staff from Iraq.

January 1999
The Council discusses informal proposals submitted by France Russia and Canada including on ways to re-establish dialogue and co-operation between Iraq and the United Nations.

January 25, 1999
The Executive Chairman submits a report to the President of the Security Council on disarmament and monitoring.

January 30, 1999
Through a note, the President of the Security Council announces that the Security Council has decided that it would be useful to establish three panels to, inter alia, provide the Council with recommendations on how to re- establish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.

March 27, 1999
The Chairman of the Panels forwards the reports of the Panels to the President of the Security Council.

April 9, 1999
The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council.

June 30, 1999
Richard Butler completes his two year tenure as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.

October 8, 1999
The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council.

December 17, 1999
Security Council adopts resolution 1284 replacing UNSCOM by the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

(Courtesy United Nations)

Neil Mick

02-15-2003, 10:19 PM

lest Neil accuse me of partaking in a conspiracy.
I resent your implication.

You should have a care, Eric: we live close to each other, and it is well conceivable that we may train together, someday. It would be a shame that the first time we actually practice, this issue of etiquette should come to mind.

This post comes close to getting personal.

We live in difficult times, IMM, we are entering an artifically manufactured war, against a desperate and starving people. Frankly, the world events frighten me.

Recently, the invective has increased, over in political discussion. Personally, I don't care what you call my opinions, but I expect the same measure of respect, I give you.

Regarding your history, it's minus a few facts (see my rebuttal on the other thread).

Regarding those who "ignore" me, well: their loss, their gain.

BTW, do you really need to resort to re-posting misinformed info, rather than simply rebut...? What is the point of this thread?

Erik

02-16-2003, 11:27 AM

ou should have a care, Eric: we live close to each other, and it is well conceivable that we may train together, someday. It would be a shame that the first time we actually practice, this issue of etiquette should come to mind.
This has a very interesting tonality to it. Have I just been threatened? It would certainly be a shame if that was the case and I hope I've misinterpreted your post. I've been to North Bay Aikido. I've found it to be a warm and welcoming place. In fact, Glen Kimoto and I are graduates of the same high school. To meet under that tonality is one I suggest that neither of us should want.

As to etiquette, I've read many statements which basically state that President Bush is a money-grubbing, war-monger solely out to avenge his father. Those of us who might agree with him on this matter are ill-informed, brain-washed, and lack compassion for the people of Iraq. Did you read many of the signs in the peace marches? Many of them were vicious personal assaults on the man's character. I've always found it interesting that many who proclaim peace are just as often filled with anger and hatred.

There are many things I disagree with in regards to President Bush. Almost his whole domestic policy in fact. But I have little doubt that the man is a straight-shooter. If he takes us to war with Iraq it's because he believes, based on the information that he has, that it's the best and most effective course of action in terms of ending the problem of Saddam. And, he is a very real and dangerous problem.

I would add that I wonder if Clinton or Gore were taking us to war, which is possible had they been in office at this time, if we would have had the same level of resistance by the public. I would argue that almost the entire resistance to war is based on Bush, not on the facts.

I will gladly reign in my sarcastic comments. I would also suggest that you take a hard look at your writing style and how much venom has been unleashed over the past few months.

You want to be a proponent of peace then show it in your words.
We live in difficult times, IMM, we are entering an artifically manufactured war, against a desperate and starving people. Frankly, the world events frighten me.
This is an opinion. What I think you are missing is that there is a case to be made for not going to war and there is a case that can be made for going to war. The case for going to war is a strong one.
What is the point of this thread?
To show people the history of UN inspections. To show people that Saddam has lied time and time and time again. To show people why there are ongoing sanctions against Iraq. To show people that the only reason there are UN inspectors in Iraq is because there are 150,000 US troops in the region. To show people that Bush's predecessor reacted remarkably similar at times. To show that there just may be some merit in going to war with Iraq.

People need actual history and to understand that it's about more than has been presented.

Steven

02-16-2003, 12:04 PM

*** Sigh ***

I think you both need a time-out. Now go to your rooms and stay there until further notice. And turn off your computers.

Erik

02-16-2003, 12:12 PM

*** Sigh ***

I think you both need a time-out. Now go to your rooms and stay there until further notice. And turn off your computers.
Yup! :)

Give me a few minutes and consider it done.

Neil Mick

02-16-2003, 08:57 PM

Have I just been threatened? It would certainly be a shame if that was the case and I hope I've misinterpreted your post.
Threatened? Hardly: and I apologize if that was the inference.

I merely meant what I said (and your last post reinforced)...that should we ever train, that no thoughts of political differences should enter into our practice. So, let's keep the allegations of conspiracy out of the conversation, pls.

BTW, I rarely accuse anyone of being "ill-informed, brain-washed, and lack compassion for the people of Iraq." I've said that the mainstream media does not present a complete picture of the event.

MISinformed, is not the same as ILL-informed. Just as, for instance, your chronology is mis-informing.

You see, Eric: contrary to what you might think, I do not accept any info because I agree, or disagree. When I saw your posting, I thought: hmm, am I wrong?

And so, I checked some of the dates in the chronology. While they are accurate, in several places they neglect to add the whole picture...the actions of other nations at the time, the bombings, etc.

It's like listening to 1/2 a phone conversation and assuming you know what's going on. In essence, misinformation.

Just back from the SF march, and 3hrs of driving. I'm wiped. Time to turn off the computer, go to my room. time out :)

Michael Neal

02-16-2003, 09:14 PM

Erik, my hat is off to you for putting the hours of effort into countering Neil's arguments. I wish I had that kind of patience.

Erik

02-17-2003, 12:18 AM

Threatened? Hardly: and I apologize if that was the inference.

I merely meant what I said (and your last post reinforced)...that should we ever train, that no thoughts of political differences should enter into our practice.
For me, on the mat, it never does. No problems here. The tonality of the post just came off in a way that left me wondering. I would be very surprised if we don't meet on the mat someday.

opherdonchin

02-17-2003, 08:00 AM

I would add that I wonder if Clinton or Gore were taking us to war, which is possible had they been in office at this time, if we would have had the same level of resistance by the public.Clinton was a staunch supporter of the United Nations and worked hard (and was largely succesful) at 'selling' American foreign policy to the world at large. As a result, if he had chosen to go to war with Iraq, he is likely to have done the necessary foot work to line up an international coalition ahead of time. This would likely have significantly addressed anti-war feelings at home as well.

Bush, on the other hand, began his presidency with a series of snubs at the international community in general, and Europe and the United Nations in particular. His efforts to 'sell' the war have been fairly minimal and have been characterized by being long on rhetoric and short on facts. He is asking the world (and his country) to trust that he is a 'straight shooter,' despite a wide-spread perception on the left (based on specific decisions made early in his presidency) that he is not really all that straightforward with the public.

I'm not arguing for or against war, but I think it's actually sobering to stop and think about how this whole thing might have been different under a different administration.

Erik

02-18-2003, 10:01 PM

Erik, my hat is off to you for putting the hours of effort into countering Neil's arguments. I wish I had that kind of patience.
Thank you, but I too have given up. It was a long weekend, I had the time, and took it. I can't write a book every time he posts, particularly when one is already written which does the job and does it well.

If you have not read Pollack's book "Threatening Storm: The case for invading Iraq" I recommend it.