The ‘incursion’ by Chinese soldiers in the Depsang Plains in Ladakh in the Western Sector of the disputed Sino-Indian boundary raises some fundamental questions about the nature of the disputed territory and about Indian and Chinese policies.

First, what is the status of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China? The Chinese and the Indian sides do not agree on a common LAC and nor have maps been exchanged of this region. As long as that is the case, ‘incursions’ will take place. Such incursions are normal and have taken place also from the Indian side as then Indian Army Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor admitted several years ago. Chinese official statements that they have not intruded into Indian territory must be seen in this light – as far as they are concerned, they are on ‘Chinese’ territory.

Why have the incursions taken place now? If an Indian Ministry of Defence statement that 500 incursions have taken place since 2010 is to be believed then this means that barring the winter months when most of the disputed territory can be inaccessible, these incursions are pretty much happening all through the year. So there is little if any connection to the fact that Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will be visiting India next month or the fact that a Chinese leadership transition has been underway over the last few months. It is even possible that given that a high-level visit is due, the Chinese will also be just as keen to resolve the matter amicably.

But if incursions are frequent and normal, what explains the fact that this incident has involved so many soldiers (anywhere from 20-50 according to various news reports), that the incursion has been at such a large distance inside ‘Indian territory’ (some 19kms according to the Defence Secretary) and that the Chinese soldiers have camped in the area?

The Chinese have traditionally only intruded into those areas where Indian claims have been the weakest for example into Indian claimed areas north of the MacMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh or possibly, from a military point of view, into areas where the Indians have the least capability in terms of logistics. The choice of the current spot near Daulat Beg Oldi where India built an Advanced Landing Ground for its Air Force, in 2008 might involve each of the above factors including as a reaction to the building of the airstrip. It is just as possible that this is a local level action of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army without permission from higher authorities.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Chinese can stay put in this area for any length of time given the nature of the terrain and weather in this area. Even for the Chinese, as good as infrastructure is on their side of the LAC compared to India, this will be an expensive and difficult operation to sustain. Therefore, it is important for both sides to not let the situation get out of hand. Such tactical moves must be expected but the option to talk and negotiate should not be ruled out. China and India are important global players and cannot afford to tarnish their reputation by getting into a firefight over what is in the larger scheme of things a relatively minor incident.

An old porter who served the Indian Army during the 1962 conflict in the DBO area (photo from August 2007 in the Nubra Valley)

Still, what does this incident say about India’s capabilities? The most important lesson – and this is not a new lesson – is that India’s road, rail and communications infrastructure in its border regions all along the Himalayas is still pretty poor despite efforts in recent years under the government’s accelerated border road building programme. While the Chinese have the advantage of easier terrain on their side, infrastructure building today is no longer the huge technical or financial challenge it was in 1962. But even today, as it was then, there is a lack of coordination between different government ministries and between the state and central governments, on such projects with the different actors also prioritizing the development of India’s border regions differently.

To negotiate successfully, India must do so from a position of strength and the situation on the ground in terms of infrastructure and logistics is not one that we can be confident about and therefore, the military option is not an easy one. Meanwhile, there is genuine disaffection from Ladakh to Arunachal where people say that facilities and access on the Chinese side are so much better than on the Indian side. Lack of infrastructure development in India’s border areas therefore does not only have military implications, it also has political ramifications.

How to interpret Chinese actions? It might seem as if China is opening up multiple fronts at the same time – against Japan and several ASEAN countries in the east and now, with India in the west. It would appear that Beijing believes that none of these countries can do anything but protest. No one is likely to pick an actual military fight with the Chinese and even if they did, they still would not or could not do it all together or simultaneously. So the Chinese continue with their endeavour to change the status quo or the situation on the ground in their favour from the Senkakus to Ladakh. That said, Beijing has managed to get all its neighbours worried about its intentions and its actions make it difficult to cast itself as a responsible actor on the international stage.

jacob sir, i met you first time in bhu when one seminar was held in the foreign language department. i was the student on that time.although i wanted to continue my study but somehow i stopped my study due to bad financial situation. now i am working with a company here in noida. i still want to finish my phd but not in a situation leave my current job. i need your suggestion and want to join ics. i have done my post graduation in chinese and clear the net exam in dec 2012 .
sir, above article is again a master piece written by you.
thank you so much for providing me such a rare information.
shubhesh

Shubhesh, i am going to put your email on the ICS mailing list for events. If you should find time, one of these days to attend an event or to visit the ICS, then perhaps, we can have a chat. just let me know in advance at jabinjacob@gmail.com

Hi Jabin, timely piece on Ladakh incursions, which I think is important for Indians to understand better about the real existing problems on the so called ‘Sino-Indian border’. I read it all and agreed upon what you wrote as China feels that counterparts will do nothing but protest. However, such protest on border incursions are not new and China continues to intrude into Indian territories. So, then, what should India do and what lessons India get from such intrusions.

There is an old Tibetan saying, ‘Neglect the root, and hold the branch’, which I think India continues to do so, when it comes to border issues. In your piece, I did not find even a single word mentioning ‘Tibet’, which so far was a contributing state in the history of Indian border sharing along the Himalayan belt. By sidelining the Tibet issues, as both India and China feels uncomfortable talking about, had convened more than a dozen border talks. But, ended without much concrete result. I believe that as long as Tibet issue remains unresolved, border problems will exist and incursions are bound to happen. Remember Mao’s ‘One palm and Five Fingers’ territorial expansionism thought, it might be rhetoric, but it is still valid in the mindset of chauvinistic Han dominated PRC.

Tenzin, i do not deny that the status of Tibet is at the heart of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute – for the Chinese government it is their inability to pacify and bring Tibetans living in China under absolute and complete control while for the Indian government, it is the inability to handle the loss of a buffer against Chinese power. That said, in my view, I think the New Delhi has, like other governments around the world, resigned itself to the fact that Tibetan independence is an unlikely prospect and that therefore it must deal with the reality of Chinese power. And quite frankly, I also don’t see how anything that the Tibetan movement in exile does is going to bring it closer to realizing Tibetan independence. I see that the Tibetan independence movement’s greatest power lies within China itself and i am not sure that the exile movement really has much control or sway over what goes on in the larger Tibetan community within China – i am happy to be corrected, if wrong. However, the reality of contemporary Chinese and global politics is such that this movement within China can only gain a few concessions at the most in terms of greater autonomy for the Tibetan people.

What a movement by Tibetan people within China could more likely achieve is to change China and the attitudes of Han Chinese from within as part of the Chinese state – to push China towards being a more open society tolerant and accepting of diversity not just of ethnicity but of views. From what i understand of His Holiness, he certainly gets this bigger picture and bigger goal than just Tibetan independence. The question is whether ordinary Tibetans and their temporal leaders also get it.

As for this article, it was intended to explain the subject to a non-English-speaking audience not much inthe know of international affairs or indeed, Sino-Indian relations. They already feel strongly and positively about Tibet but they need to be better aware about the realities of the Sino-Indian relationship itself.