SHELAT, K.S. HEGDE, A.N. GROVER, A.N. RAY, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, D.G. PALEKAR, H.R. KHANNA, K.K. MATHEW, M.H. BEG, S.N. DWIVEDI, A.K. MUKHERJEA AND Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ. W. P. No. 135 of l970:His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadgalvaru and others, Petitioners v. State of Kerala and another, Respondents. W. P. Nos. 351 & 352 of 1972: Shri Raghunath Rao Ganpath Rao and N. H. Nawab Mohammed Iftikhar Ali Khan, Petitioners v. Union of India, Respondent. W. P. Nos. 373 & 374 of 1972 : Shethia Mining and Mfg. Corpn. Ltd. etc., Petitioners v. Union of India and others, Respondents. W. P. No. 400 of 1972: The Oriental Coal Co. Ltd., Petitioner v. Union of India and another, Respondents. Writ Petitions Nos. 135/70, 351-352, 373-374 and 400 of 1972, D/- 24-4-1973. INTRODUCTORY EDITORIAL NOTE It was held by the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, (AIR 1951 SC 458) that an Act of Parliament duly passed under Art. 368 (relating to the amendment of the Constitution would be valid even if it curtailed any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. This view proceeded on the ground that such an Act would not come under the expression "law" in Art. 13 (2), as such expression is only applicable to a legislative measure and not to a Constituent measure, (as an amendment of the Constitution would obviously be). The above view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (AIR 1965 SC 845) But the above view was overruled by the Supreme Court in its later decision in the well-known Golak Nath case, (AIR 1967 SC 1643) in which it was held that the word 'law' in Art 13 (2) would not only cover a 1egislative measure but also a constituent measure so that Parliament had no power under Article 368 to make any law taking away or abridging any of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court in Golak Nath's case also proceeded on the ground that Art. 368 related only to the procedure for amending the Constitution but did not confer on the Parliament any power to do so. The Constitution 24th Amendment Act was passed to get over this decision of the Supreme Court in Golak Nath's case, on both these points. The 24th Amendment expressly empowers the Parliament to amend any provisions of the Constitution including those relating to Fundamental rights and further, makes Art. 19 of the Constitution inapplicable to an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368. But it is plain that so long as Golak Nath's case stands, the above amendment would itself be impeachable on the same ground on which the Supreme Court held in Golak Nath's case that the Parliament has no power of amending the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.

So also Golak Nath's case would come in the way of the validity of all other Constitutional amendments affecting the fundamental rights under Part III. The Constitution 25th, 26th and 29th Amendment Acts, all fell under this category, as they all adversely affected the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. Hence writ petitions were filed by some of the affected persons questioning the validity of the above Constitution Amendment Acts, including the 24th Amendment Act. Hence, the principal question before the Supreme Court in the present case was whether the Golak Nath's case was to be upheld or to be overruled. A Special Bench of 13 Judges unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of the Constitution 24th Amendment Act, 1971 and in doing so, overruled the prior decision of the Supreme Court in Golak Nath's case and cleared the way for upholding the validity of the other Constitution Amendment Acts which were questioned before the Special Bench in the writ petitions. The following summary of the view of the majority of the Special Bench was issued, after the judgments had been delivered. The summary was signed by the following nine Judges. (S. M. Sikri, C. .J, J. M. Shelat, K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover, P. Jaganmohan, Reddy, D G. Palekar, H. R. Khanna, A. K. Mukherjea and Y. V. Chandrachud, JJ.) @page-SC1462 who were the members of the Special Bench. SUMMARY The view by the majority in these writ petitions is as follows : 1. Golak Nath's case is overruled; 2. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution; 3. The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid; 4. Section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid; 5. The first part of Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. The second part, namely, "and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy" is invalid; 6. The Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment Act, 1971 is valid. The Constitution Bench will determine the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 (relating to abolition of privy purses and privileges of princes) in accordance with law. HEAD NOTES Index Note:- (A) Constitution of India, Art.368 (before amendment by 24th Amendment) - Scope - Contains both power and procedure to amend Constitution-All Articles including those relating to fundamental rights can be amended, (AIR 1967 SC 1643, Overruled) provided that the basic structure and framework of the Constitution are not altered - Basic structure and framework -Meaning explained and illustrated "Amendment"- Meaning explained. X-Ref.:- Constitution of India, Art.13. Brief Note:-(A) (Per Majority, Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud, JJ. Contra):- Art. 368 does not enable the Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.

(Per Majority Sikri, C. J. Contra -See pt. (B))-Power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368 (as it stood even before the 24th Amendment) and not elsewhere. Article 368 contained both the power and procedure for amending the Constitution. (Per Majority, Sikri, C. J., Shelat, Hegde, Grover and Mukherjea, - JJ. Contra):-There are no implied limitation on the power of amendment under Article 368. Per Jaganmohan Reddy, J.:- It is not necessary to consider in this case the question of the existence or non-existence of implied or inherent limitations. (Para 1152) Per Sikri, C. J.:- In the Constitution the word "amendment" or "amend" has been used in various places to mean different things. In some articles, the word "amendment" in the context has a wide meaning and in another context it has a narrow meaning. In view of the great variation of the phrases used all through the Constitution it follows that the word "amendment" must derive its colour from Art. 368 and the rest of the provisions of the Constitution. Reading the Preamble, the fundamental importance of the freedom of the individual, indeed its inalienability, and the importance of the economic, social and political justice mentioned in the Preamble, the importance of directive principles, the non-inclusion in Art. 368 of provisions like Arts. 52, 53 and various other provisions, an irresistible conclusion emerges that it was not the intention to use the word "amendment" in the widest sense. It was the common understanding that fundamental rights would remain in substance as they are and they would not be amended out of existence. It seems also to have been a common understanding that the fundamental features of the Constitution, namely, secularism, democracy and the freedom of the individual would always subsist in the welfare State. In view of the above reasons, a necessary implication arises that there are implied limitations on the power of Parliament and that the expression "amendment of this Constitution" has consequently a limited meaning in our Constitution. The expression "amendment of this Constitution' in Art. 368 means any addition or change in any of the provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble and the Directive Principles. Applied to fundamental rights, it would mean that while fundamental rights cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgments of fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest. This meaning would enable Parliament to adjust fundamental rights in order to secure what the Directive Principles direct to be accomplished, while @page-SC1463 maintaining the freedom and dignity of every citizen. The true position is that every provision of the Constitution can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same. The basic structure may be said to consist of the following features: (1) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2) Republican and Democratic form of Government; (3) Secular character of the Constitution. (4) Separation of powers between the legislature the executive and the judiciary (5) Federal character of the Constitution. (Paras 68, 88, 292, 293, 294, 297, 299, 302) Per Shelat and Grover, JJ.:-Though the power to amend cannot be narrowly construed and extends to all the Articles it is not unlimited so as to include the power to abrogate or change the identity of the Constitution or its basic features even if the amending power includes the power to amend Art. 13 (2), the power is not so wide as to include the power to abrogate or take away the fundamental freedoms. (Para 624)

Per Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ.:- The Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of our polity, the unity of the country, the essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Nor has the Parliament the power to revoke the mandate to build a Welfare State and egalitarian society. These limitations are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Despite these limitations, however, there can be no question that the amending, power is a wide power and it reaches every Article and every part of the Constitution. (Para 682) Per Jaganmohan Reddy, J.:- The word amendment in Art. 368 does not include 'repeal'. Parliament could amend Art. 368 and Art. 13 and also all the fundamental rights and though the power of amendment is wide it is not wide enough to include the power of totally abrogating or emasculating or damaging and of the fundamental rights or the essential elements in the basic structure of the Constitution or of destroying the identity of the Constitution. Within these limits, Parliament can amend every article of the Constitution. (Para 1222) Per Khanna, J.:-Amendment of the Constitution necessarily contemplates that the Constitution has not to be abrogated but only changes have to be made in it. The word "amendment" postulates that the old constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. As a result of the amendment, the old constitution cannot he destroyed and done away with, it is retained though in the amended form. The words "amendment of the Constitution" with all their wide sweep and amplitude cannot have the effect of destroying or abrogating the basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution. It would not he competent under the garb of amendment, for instance, to change the democratic government into dictatorship or hereditary monarchy nor would it be permissible to abolish the Lok- Sabha and the Rajya -Sabha. The secular character of the State according to which the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion only cannot likewise be done away with. Provision regarding the amendment of the Constitution does not furnish a presence for subverting the structure of the Constitution nor can Art. 368 be so construed as to embody the death wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may perhaps be called its lawful harakiri. Such subversion or destruction cannot be described to be amendment of the Constitution as contemplated by Art. 368. Subject to the retention of the basic structrue or frame-work of the Constitution, the power of amendment is plenary and includes within itself the power to amend the various articles of the Constitution, including those relating to fundamental rights as well as those which may be said to relate to essential features. No part of a fundamental right can claim immunity from amendatory process by being described as the essence or core of that right. The power of amendment would also include within itself the power to add to, alter or repeal the various articles. (Paras 1437, 1550) Per Ray, J.:-The power to amend is wide and unlimited. The power to amend means the power to add, alter or repeal any provision of the Constitution. There can be or is no distinction between essential and unessential features of the Constitution to raise any impediment to amendment of alleged essential features. Parliament in exercise of constituent @page-SC1464 power can amend any provision of the Constitution. Under Art. 368 the power to amend can also be increased. Amendment does not mean mere abrogation or wholesale repeal of the Constitution. An amendment would leave an

organic mechanism providing the Constitution, organisation and system for the State. Orderly and peaceful changes in a constitutional manner would absorb all amendments to all provisions of the Constitution which in the end would be 'an amendment of this Constitution." (Para 1078) Per Palekar, J.:-An amendment of the Constitution abridging or taking away a fundamental right conferred by Part III of the Constitution is not void as contravening the provisions of Art. 13 (2). The power of amendment can reach all provisions whether important or unimportant, essential or unessential. If the doctrine of unamendability of the core of essential features is accepted, it will mean that we add some such proviso below Art. 368: "Nothing in the above Article will be deemed to authorise an Amendment of the Constitution, which has the effect of damaging or destroying the core of the essential features, basic principles and fundamental elements of the Constitution as may be determined by the Courts". This is quite impermissible. (Paras 1343, 1326) Per Mathew, J.: - The power to amend under Art. 368, as it stood before the 24h Amendment was plenary in character and extended to all the provisions of the Constitution. All the provisions of the Constitution can be amended by way of addition, variation or repeal. The only limitation is that the Constitution cannot be repealed or abrogated in the exercise of the power of amendment without substituting a mechanism by which the State is constituted and organised. (Para 1798) Per Beg, J.:- The word 'amendment' may not include the power of completely abrogating the Constitution at one stroke. It, however, seems wide enough to erode the Constitution completely step by step so as to replace it by another Constitution. (Para 1849) Per Dwivedi J.:- The word 'amendment' in Art. 368 is broad enough to authorise the varying, repealing, or abrogating each and every provision in the Constitution including Part III. (Para 2008) Per Chandrachud, J.:-The power of amendment of the Constitution conferred by Art. 368 as it stood before 24th Amendment was wide and unfettered. It reached every part and provision of the Constitution. AIR 1967 SC 1643, Overruled. (Para 2156) Index Note:- (B) Constitution of India (as amended by Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act (1971) - Expressly empowering Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution and making Article 13 not applicable to such Amendment - Validity- Is valid. X-Ref.:- Constitution of India, Art.13 and Art.368 Brief Note :- (B) The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act (1971) is valid. Per Sikri, C. J.:- The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, in so far as it transfers power to amend the Constitution from the residuary entry (Entry 97, List 1) or Art. 248 of the Constitution to Art. 368, is valid, in other words Art. 368 of the Constitution as now amended by the Twenty-fourth Amendment Act deals not only with the procedure for amendment but also confers express power on Parliament to amend the Constitution. Clause (e) of the proviso to the Article does not give any different power than what is contained in the main article. The meaning of the expression "Amendment of the Constitution" does not change when one reads the Proviso. It the meaning is the same, Art. 368 can only be amended so as not to change its identity completely. The words "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution" are not designed to widen the meaning of the words "amendment of the Constitution". They have the effect of getting

rid of the argument that Art. 248 and Entry 97, List I contain the power of amendment. Similarly, the insertion of the words "in exercise of its constituent power" only serves to exclude Art. 248 and Entry 97, List I and emphasises that it is not ordinary legislative power that Parliament is exercising under Art. 368 but legislative power of amending the Constitution. Article 13 (2) as existing previous to the 24th amendment as interpreted by the majority in Golak Nath's case, (AIR 1967 SC 1643) prevented legislatures from taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. In other words, any law which abridged a fundamental right even to a small extent was @pageSC1465 liable to be struck down. Under Art. 368 Parliament can now amend every article of the Constitution as long as the result is within the limits already laid down (See pt. A). The amendment of Art. 13 does not go beyond the limits laid down because Parliament cannot, even after the amendment, abrogate or authorise abrogation or the taking away of fundamental rights. After the amendment now a law which has the effect of merely abridging a right while remaining within the limits laid down would not be liable to be struck down. The 24th Amendment as so interpreted is valid. (Paras 42, 408, 409, 410) Per Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Jaganmohan Reddy and Mukherjea, JJ.:-The 24th Amendment does no more than clarify in express language that which was implicit in the unamended Art. 368 and it does not or cannot add to the power originally conferred thereunder. The 24th Amendment read as aforesaid (See point 'A') is valid. (Paras 624, 694, 759) Per Ray, J.:-The 24th Amendment made explicit what the judgment in Shankari Prasad's case and the majority judgment in Sajjan Singh case and the dissenting judgment in Golaknath case said, namely, that the Parliament has the constituent power to amend the Constitution. It is valid. (Para 929) Per Palekar, J.:- The structure of Art. 368 is now changed by the 24th amendment and the expanded expression "amendment by way of addition, variation or repeal, any provision of this Constitution" is adopted. The language structure of the original Art. 368 was, however, different and there was no reference to "the provisions" of the Constitution therein. The article commenced with the words "an amendment of this Constitution" without reference to any provisions. Reference to "provisions of the Constitution" having been eschewed, to pad the expression "amendment of the Constitution" by the words "by way of addition, variation or repeal" would have been inappropriate because such padding was likely to give the impression that the intention was to amend by addition to and, alteration and repeal of, the Constitution, considered as a whole. Neither the alteration nor the repeal of the Constitution, as a whole, could have been intended and hence the paddling words would not have commended themselves to the Draftsmen. And because that was not the intention, we have to take the first step of legally construing "this Constitution'' as every provision of the Constitution" and then import the padding words with reference to the provision. Such a construction is perfectly permissible having regard to the general meaning of the word 'amendment'. Since doubts were expressed in the leading majority judgment of six judges in Golak Nath's case in opposition to the view of the other five Judges, who agreed that the word 'amendment' was wide in its application, the 24th amendment had to clarify the position. The 24th Amendment is valid. (Para 1271) Per Khanna, T.:- Section 2 of the Bill which was ultimately passed as the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act has added a clause in Art. 13 that nothing in that article

would apply to any amendment of the Constitution made under Art 368. As a result of Section 8 of the Amendment Act, Art. 368 has been re-numbered as clause (2) thereof and the marginal heading now reads "Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor." Non obstante C1. (1) has been inserted in the article to emphasise the fact that the power exercised under that article is constituent power, not subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, and embraces within itself addition, variation and repeal of any provision of the Constitution. Amendment has also been made so as to make it obligatory for the President to give his assent to the Amendment Bill after it has been passed in accordance with the article. Clause (3) has further been added in Art. 368 to the effect that nothing in Art. 13 would apply to an amendment made under Art. 368. The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act was passed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 368 of the Constitution as it existed before the passing of the said Act. There is no infirmity in the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act. And it is valid. (Para 1521) Per Mathew, J.:-The 24th Amendment did not add anything to the content of Art. 368 as it stood before the amendment; it is declaratory in character except as regards the compulsory nature of the assent of the President to a Bill for amendment. The 24th Amendment is valid. (Para 1798) Per Beg, J.:- The Amendment is valid. (Para 1870) Per Dwivedi J.:-Except as regards the assent of the President to the Bill, @page-SC1466 everything else in the 24th Amendment was already there in the unamended Article 368. Accordingly, the amendment is really declaratory in nature. It removes doubts cast on the amending power by the majority judgment in Golaknath. The 24th Amendment is valid. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the amending power in the unamended Art. 368 was subject to certain inherent and implied limitations. Let us also assume that it was restricted by the provisions of Article 13 (2). The unamended Art. 368 would impliedly read as "subject to Art. 13(2) and any inherent and implied limitations." So the restrictions imposed by Art. 13 (2) and inherent and implied limitations were a part of the body of Art. 368. As Art. 368 is itself liable to amendment, these restrictions are now removed by Parliament for they will fall within the ambit of the word "amendment". The phrase "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" in the newly added clause (l) of Art. 368 is apt to sweep away all those restrictions. In the result, the amending power is now free of the incubus of Art. 13 (2) and inherent and implied limitations, if any. The whole of the 24th Amendment is valid. (Paras 1968, 1970) Per Chandrachud, J.:- The 24th Amendment only declares the true legal position as it obtained before that amendment and is valid. (Para 2156) Index Note:- (C) Constitution of India, Art.13(2) - 'Law' - Meaning of - Does not include constitutional amendments. AIR 1967 SC 1643, Overruled. X-Ref.:- Constitution of India, Art.368. Brief Note: - (C) (Per Hegde, Ray, Jaganmohan Reddy, Palekar; Khanna, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi, Mukherjea and Chandrachud, JJ.):- Law in Article 13 (2) refers to the exercise of an ordinary legislative power and does not include constitutional amendments under Art. 368. AIR 1967 SC 1643, Overruled. Per Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. :- Our Constitution makers by using the expression 'law' in Art. 13 (2) did not intend that that expression should also include the exercise of

Parliament's amending power under Art. 368. In understanding the meaning of the word 'law' in Article 13 (2) we should bear in mind the scope of Art. 368. The two Articles will have to be construed harmoniously. The expression 'law' may mean one of two things, namely, either those measures which are enumerated in Art. 13 (3) as well as statutes passed by legislatures or in addition thereto, constitutional laws (amendments) as well. It is true that Art. 13 (3) contains an inclusive definition of the term 'law' and, therefore, the question whether it includes constitutional amendment also cannot be answered with reference to that clause. All the same, since the expression 'law' can have two meanings, we must take that meaning which harmonises with Art. 368. Article 368 is unambiguous, whereas Art. 13 is ambiguous because of the fact that the word 'law' may or may not include constitutional amendment. Further, when we speak of 'law' we ordinarily refer to the exercise of legislative power. Hence, 'law' in Art. 13 (2) must be construed as referring to the exercise of an ordinary legislative power. An examination of the various provisions of our Constitution shows that it has made a distinction between "the Constitution" and "the laws". The two are invariably treated separately -see Arts. 60, 61, proviso to Art. 73 (1), Article 75 (4) read with the Third Schedule, Art. 76 (2), Art. 124 (6) read with the Third Schedule, Art. 148 (5), Art. 159 and Art. 219 read with the Third Schedule. These provisions clearly establish that the Constitution-makers have not used the expression 'law' in the Constitution as including constitutional law. The expression "law" in Art. 13 (2) even before Article 13 was amended by the 24th Amendment Act, did not include amendments to the Constitution. (Paras 639, 640, 641, 759) Per Ray, J.:-Article 13 (2) relates to laws under the Constitution. Art.368 relates to power and procedure of amendment of the Constitution. Upon amendment of the Constitution the Constitution shall stand amended. The Constitution is self-validating and selfexecuting. Article 13 (2) does not override Art. 368. Art. 13 (2) is not a fundamental right. The Constitution is the touchstone. The constituent power is sui generis. The majority view in Golak Nath case that Art. 13 (2) prevails over Art. 368 was on the basis that there was no distinction between constituent and legislative power and an amendment of the Constitution was 'law' and that such law attracted the opening words of Art. 246 which in its turn attracted the provisions of Art. 13 (2). Parliament took notice of the two conflicting views which had been taken of the unamended Art. 368, took notice of the fact that the preponderating judicial opinion, namely, the decisions in Shankari Prasad @page-SC1467 case, Sajjan Singh case and the minority views of five learned Judges in Golak Nath case were in favour of the view that Art. 368 contained the power of amendment and that power was the constituent power belonging to Parliament. The power under Art. 368 is a constituent power to change the fundamental law, that is to say, the Constitution and is distinct from ordinary legislative power. So long as this distinction is kept in mind Parliament wile have power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution and what Parliament does under Article 368 is not ordinary law, making which is subject to Article 13 (2) or any other Article of the Constitution. The Constitution (24th Amendment) Act made explicit that under Article 368 Parliament has the constituent power to amend the Constitution. (Para 850) Per Jaganmohan Reddy; J.:- Article 13 (2) inhibits only a law made by the ordinary legislative agency and not an amendment under Article 368. Parliament could under Article 368 amend Article 13 and also the fundamental rights. (Para 1174)

Per Palekar, J.:- The Constitution or its amendment is neither a law in force within the meaning of Article 13 (1) continued under Article 372 (1); nor can it be regarded as a law made by the State within the meaning of Article 13 (2). The bar under Article 13 (2) is not merely against 1aw hut a law made by the State. The bar under Article 13 (2) is against concrete instrumentalities of the State, instrumentalities which are capable of making a law in accordance with the Constitution. Article 13 (2) speaks of a law which becomes void to the extent it takes away or abridges a fundamental right as conferred by certain articles or provisions in Part III of the Constitution. Thus it embodies the doctrine of ultra vires well-known in English Law. In other words, it is a law about which one can predicate voidability with reference to the provisions of the Constitution. This is possible only when it is a law made by the organs of the State. When an amendment is made, it becomes part of the Constitution, taking an equal status with the rest of the provisions of the Constitution. Voidability is predicated only with reference to a superior law and not an equal law. An amendment of the Constitution not being liable to be avoided with reference to a superior law is not a law about which you can predicate Voidability and, hence, stands outside the operation of Article 13 (2). (Paras 1279, 1282) Per Khanna, J. :- The word "law" in Article 13 (2) does not include amendment of the Constitution. It has reference to an ordinary piece of legislation. It would also in view of the definition contained in clause (a) of Article 13 (3) include an ordinance, order, byelaw, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. (Para 1550) Per Mathew, J.:-The word 'law' in Article 13 (2) in the context, could only mean an ordinary law. When Article 13 (2) said that the State shall not make any 'law', the meaning of the expression 'law' has to be gathered from the context. Though, analytically, it might be possible to say that the word 'law' would include an amendment of the Constitution also, from the context it would be clear that it only meant ordinary law. A word by itself is not crystal clear. It is the context that gives it the colour. In the setting of Article 13 (2) what was prohibited was that the Parliament shall not pass a law in pursuance of its powers under Chapter I of Part XI or any other provisions enabling it to pass laws, which were legislative in character. The Constitution-makers only wanted to provide against the more common invasion of Fundamental Rights by ordinary legislation. (Para 1595) Per Beg, J.:-Article 13 (2) is meant to deal with ordinary laws or the functions of the Parliament and of State Legislatures in their ordinary law-making capacities. It was not intended to extend its scope indirectly to Article 368 which deals with the amendment of the fundamental law itself of which Article 13 (2) is a part. The language and the context as well as the subject-matter of it, found stated in Article 13 (2) of the Constitution itself, preclude the court from holding that it could possibly operate as a restriction on the powers of amendment of any part of the Constitution contained in Article 368 of the Constitution even before it was amended by the 24th Amendment. (Para 1840) Per Dwivedi, J.:-There is a distinction between 'constitution' and 'law.' Ordinarily a 'constitution' signifies a politico-legal document, On the other hand, in its ordinary sense 'law' signifies a statute or a legislative enactment. Again, a @page-SC1468 'constitution' prescribes the paramount norm or norms, a law prescribes derivative norms. They are derived from the paramount norms. The reckoning of a constitutional amendment in the eye of law is the same as that of a constitution. Therefore ordinarily a constitutional

amendment is not law. Significantly, there is not a whisper of the word 'law' in Article 368. The context of the word 'law' in Article 13 (2) does not show that it includes an amendment of the Constitution made under Article 368. The word 'law' in Article 13 (1) obviously does not include a Constitution. Article 13 (3) (a) provides for an extensive definition of the word 'law' by including things which are not ordinarily regarded as included in it. It mentions an ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law. But it does not include the Constitution which in the ordinary sense does not mean 'law'. A distinction between 'constitution' and 'law' is made in the Constitution itself. Various provisions of the Constitution indicate that the product which comes into being by following the legislative procedure prescribed in Articles 107 to 111 is called 'law'. The heading over Articles 107 and 196 reads as "Legislative Procedure". When the prescribed legislative procedure is followed, the endproduct is law. But when the procedure prescribed in Article 368 is strictly followed, it results in the amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution-makers did not call it 'law'. (Paras 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916) Per Chandrachud J.:- Article 368 avoids with scrupulous care the use of the word 'law' because there is a fundamental distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law. The term 'constitutional law' is never used in the sense of including the laws made under the Constitution. Constitutional law is the fundamental, superior or paramount law. Its authority and sanction are higher than those of ordinary laws. The legislature in a federal Constitution is a subordinate law-making body whose laws are in the nature of bye-laws within the authority conferred by the Constitution. Articles 3, 4. 169, Para 7 of the Fifth Schedule and Paragraph 21 of the Sixth Schedule emphasise an important aspect of the distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law. What is authorised to be done by these provisions would normally fall within the scope of Article 368. In order however to take out such matters from the scope of that article and to place those matters within the ordinary legislative sphere, special provisions are made in these articles that any laws passed thereunder shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368. Article 13 (1) deals with the effect of inconsistency between the provisions of Part III and the pre-Constitution laws and provides that to the extent of such inconsistency the pre-Constitution laws shall be void. Article 13 (2) pursues the same strain of thought by making void post-Constitution laws to the extent of their inconsistency with the provisions of Part III. The pre-Constitution and the postConstitution laws dealt with by the two clauses of Article 13 are in nature and character identical. They are ordinary laws as distinguished from constitutional laws. Article 13 (3) (a) contains an inclusive definition of 'law' as including any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. Constitution is the fundamental or basic law, and that it is a law of superior obligation to which the ordinary law must conform. Unless, therefore, constitutional law was expressly included in Article 13 (3) (a), it would fall outside the purview of Article 13 (2). (Paras 2075, 2076, 2077, 2079) Per Shelat and Grover, JJ.:- The decision in Golak Nath has become academic for even if it be assumed that the majority judgment that the word 'law' in Article 13 (2) covered Constitutional Amendments was not correct, the result on the questions, wider than those raised in Golak Nath now raised before us would be just the same. (Para 624)

Per Sikri C. J.:- "Same result follows in this case even if it be assumed in favour of the respondents that an amendment of the Constitution is not law within Article 13 (2) of the Constitution." (Para 43) Index Note: - (D) Constitution of India (as amended by Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act (1971), S.2 - Validity - The Section amends Article 31 of the Constitution by substituting a new clause (2) and inserting Clause 2-B after Clause 2-A- Under the new Clause 2 the State has power to acquire or requisition property for amount named in the Act Reference to "compensation" is omitted - The adequacy @page-SC1469 of the amount is not justiciable - Under new Clause 2 (B) Article 19 (1) (f) relating to the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is made inapplicable to laws under Article 31, Clause 2Both amendments held valid -Scope and effect of amendments discussed. X-Ref.:- Constitution of India, Art.31. Brief Note:-(D) Section 2 (a) and (b) of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act is valid. Sikri, C. J.:- If we compare Article 31 (2) as it stood before and after the 25th Amendment, the following changes seem to have been effected. Whereas before the amendment Article 31 (2) required the law providing for acquisition to make provision for compensation by either fixing the amount of compensation or specifying the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation should be determined after the amendment Article 31 (2) requires such a law to provide for an "amount" which may be fixed by the law providing for acquisition or requisitioning or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law. The amount, if fixed by the legislature, has also to be fixed according to some principles. These principles cannot be different from the principles which the legislature would lay down. Clause (2-B) in Article 31, the effect of which is to make Article 19 (1) (f) inapplicable, is not an unreasonable abridgment of rights under Article 19 (1) While passing a law fixing principles, the legislatures are bound to provide a procedure for the determination of the amount, and if the procedure is arbitrary that provision may well be struck down under Article 14. Thus interpreted, it cannot be said that the Parliament has exceeded its amending power under Article 368 in enacting Section 2 and the provision is valid. (Paras 414, 421, 428) Per Shelat and Grover. JJ..-Clause (2) of Article 31, as substituted by Section 2 of the 25th Amendment does not abrogate any basic element of the Constitution nor does it denude it of its identity because, (a) the fixation or determination of "amount" under that Article has to he based on some norm or principle which must be relevant for the purpose of arriving at the amount payable in respect of the property acquired or requisitioned: (b) the amount need not be the market value but it should have a reasonable relationship with the value of such property; (c) though the courts are debarred from going into the question of adequacy of the amount and would give due weight to legislative judgment, the examination of all the matters in (a), (b) and (c) above is open to judicial review. As regards clause (2-B) inserted in Article 31 which makes Article 19 (1) (f) inapplicable, there is no reason to suppose that for determination of the amount on the principles laid

down in the law any such procedure will be provided which will be unreasonable or opposed to the rules of natural justice. On the above view Section 2 of the 25th Amendment is valid. (Para 624) Per Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ.:-The newly substituted Article 31 (2) does not destroy the right to property because: (i) the fixation of ''amount'' under that Article should have reasonable relationship with the value of the property acquired or requisitioned; (ii) the principles laid down must be relevant for the purpose of arriving at the "amount" payable in respect of the property acquired or requisitioned; (iii) the "amount" fixed should not be illusory; and (iv) the same should not be fixed arbitrarily. The question whether the "amount in question has been fixed arbitrarily or the same is illusory or the principles laid down for the determination of the same are relevant to the subject matter of acquisition or requisition at about the time when the property in question is acquired or requisitioned are open to judicial review. But it is no more open to the Court to consider whether the "amount'' fixed or to be determined on the basis of the principles laid down is adequate. Clause 2 (b) of the 25th Amendment Act which incorporated Article 31 (2B) is also valid as it did not damage or destroy any essential features of the Constitution. (Para 759) Per Ray, J.:-The 25th Amendment has amended Article 31 (2) and also introduced Article 31 (2B) in order to achieve two objects. The first is to eliminate the concept of market value in the amount fixed for acquisition or requisition of the property. The second @page-SC1470 is to exclude in clause (2B) of Article 31 the applicability of Article 19 (1) (f). Article 31 (2) as it originally stood spoke of compensation for acquisition or requisition of property. The meaning given to compensation by the Court was full market value. There was no scope for giving effect to the word "compensation". There was no flexibility of social interest in Article 31 (2). Every concept of social interest became irrelevant by the scope of Article 13 (2). It is this mischief which was sought to be remedied by the 25th Amendment. If Directive principles are to inter-play with Part III legislation will have to give expression to such law. Parts III and IV of the Constitution touch each other and modify. They are not parallel to each other. Different legislations will bring in different social principles. These will not be permissible without social content operating in a flexible manner. That is why in the 35th Amendment Article 31 (2) is amended to eliminate the concept of market value for property which is acquired or requisitioned. In amending Art. 3l (2) under the 25th Amendment by substituting the word ''amount" for "compensation" the amount fixed is made non-justiciable and the jurisdiction of the Court is excluded because no reasons for fixing such amount would or need appear in the legislation. If any person aggrieved by the amount fixed challenges the amount the Court can neither go into the question of adequacy nor as to how the amount is fixed. If adequacy cannot be questioned any attempt to find out as to why the particular amount is fixed or how that amount has been fixed by law will be examining the adequacy which is forbidden as the constitutional mandate. The correctness of the amount cannot he challenged. The principles specified are not justiciable. The relevancy of the principles cannot he impugned. Nor can the reasonableness of the principles be impeached. The 25th Amendment is valid. (Paras 1067, 1059, 1062, 1063, 1065)

Per Jaganmohan Reddy, J.:- Clause (2) of Article 31 has the same meaning and purpose as that placed by the Supreme Court in the several decisions except that the word 'amount' has been substituted for the word 'compensation' after which the principle of equivalent in value or just equivalent of the value of the property acquired no longer applies. The word 'amount' has no legal concept and, as the amended clause indicates, it means only cash which would be in the currency of the country, and has to be fixed on some principle. Once the Court is satisfied that the amount or the manner of its payment is neither arbitrary nor illusory or where the principles upon which it is fixed are found to bear reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired, the Court cannot go into the question of the adequacy of the amount so fixed or determined on the basis of such principles. On the applicability of Article l9 (1) (f) to clause (2) of Article 31 the word 'affect' makes two constructions possible; firstly, that Article 19 (1) (f) will not be available at all to an expropriated owner, and this, in other words, means that it totally abrogates the right in such cases, and secondly, clause (2-B) was intended to provide that the law of acquisition or requisition will not be void on the ground that it abridges or affects the right under Article l9 (1) (f). The second construction which makes the amendment valid is to be preferred, and clause (2-B) by the adoption of the doctrine or severability in application is restricted to abridgment and not abrogation procedure in respect of a law of acquisition or requisition for the effective exercise of the right under Article 31 (2); for, a reasonable notice, a hearing, opportunity to produce material and other evidence, may be necessary to establish that a particular acquisition is not for public purpose and for providing the value of the property and other matters that may be involved in a particular principle adopted in fixing the amount or for showing that what is being paid is illusory, arbitrary etc. Thus interpreted Section 2 of Twenty-fifth Amendment is valid. (Para 1222) Per Palekar, J.:- An amendment to the Constitution does not become invalid merely because the Constitution authorizes the legislatures to fix an "amount" or to specify the principles on which the "amount" is to be determined instead of fixing the "compensation" or specifying the principles for determining "compensation" Even compensation ultimately is an "amount". All that the amendment has done is to negative the interpretation put by the Supreme Court on the concept of compensation. Clause (2) recognizes the fundamental right to receive an amount in case of compulsory acquisition or requisition and all that it wants to clarify is that the fundamental right is @pageSC1471 not to receive compensation as interpreted by the Supreme Court but a right to receive an amount in lieu of the deprivation which the legislature thinks fit to award. Whether a particular law fixes an amount which is illusory or is otherwise a fraud on power denying the fundamental right to receive an amount specifically conferred by clause (2) will depend upon the law when made and is tested on the basis of clause (2). One cannot anticipate any such matters and strike down an amendment which, in all conscience, does not preclude a fair amount being fixed for payment in the circumstances of a particular acquisition or requisition. The possibility of abuse of a power given by an amendment of the constitution is not determinative of the validity of the amendment. The new clause 2B inserted in Article 31 having the consequence of excluding the application of Article 19 (1) (f) to a law referred to in clause (2) of Article 31 is merely a re-statement of the law laid down by the Supreme Court after the Constitution came into force. The mutual exclusiveness of Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (2) had been

recognized by the Supreme Court in a series of cases. Thus the 25th Amendment is valid. (Paras1329, 1330) Per Khanna, J.:-The amendment in Article 31 (2) made by the Twenty-fifth Amendment by substituting the word "amount" for the word "compensation" is necessarily intended to get over the difficulty caused by the use of the word "compensation". As the said word was held to have a particular connotation and was construed to mean just equivalent or full indemnification, the amendment has replaced that word by the word "amount". In substituting the word "amount" for "compensation" the Amendment has sought to ensure that the amount determined for acquisition or requisition of property need not be a just equivalent or full indemnification and may be, if the legislature so chooses, plainly inadequate. Whatever may be the connotation of the word "amount", it would not affect the validity of the amendment made in Article 31 (2). Another change made in Article 31 (2) is that the law for the purpose of acquisition or requisition shall not be called in question on the ground that the whole or any part of the "amount" fixed or determined for the acquisition of the property is to be given otherwise than in cash. There is no infirmity in the above changes made in Article 31 (2). According to clause (2B) which has been added as a result of the Twenty-fifth Amendment in Article 31, nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in clause (2). The change made by addition of clause (2B) in Article 31 is permissible under Article 368 and the Amendment is valid. (Paras 1523, 1524, 1525) Per Mathew and Beg, JJ.:-Having regard to the neutral and colourless character of the word 'amount' and the express provision excluding judicial review of the question of the adequacy of the amount, the question of reasonableness of the amount or the relevancy of the principles is entirely outside the judicial ken. The word 'amount' in Article 31 (2), as amended, does not convey the idea of any norm. The fixation of the amount or the principle for determining the amount is a matter within the absolute discretion of the Parliament or the State Legislatures. The Court cannot go into the question whether the amount fixed by law or the principle laid down for determining the amount is adequate or relevant. The 25th Amendment is valid. (Paras 1775, 1801) Per Dwivedi, J.:- It will not be proper to import the concept of compensation in Article 31 (2). Section 2 has substituted the word 'compensation' by the word 'amount' at every relevant place in Article 31 (2). The Court should not minimize or neutralize its operation by introducing notions taken from or inspired by the old Article 31 (2) which the words of Section 2 are intended to abrogate and do abrogate. It is not permissible to import the notion of reasonableness in Article 31 (2) as amended by Section 2. The phrase 'principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given' in the old Article 31 (2) is now substituted by the phrase 'amount which may be deter mined in accordance with such principles and given in such a manner as may be specified in such law'. Obviously, where the law fixes the amount, it cannot be questioned in any Court on the ground that it is not adequate, that is, not equal to the value of @page-SC1472 the acquired or requisitioned. The legislative choice is conclusive. It would accordingly follow that the amount determined by the principles specified in the law is equally unquestionable in Courts. The amount fixed by law or determined in accordance with the principles in such a law is now not justiciable even though it may seem to be an 'arbitrary amount' or 'illusory amount' or 'fraudulent amount' by the

measure of compensation. The ouster of judicial oversight does not imply that the legislature would act whimsically. The amended Article 31 (2) does not remove the bar of Article 14. If the amount paid to the owner of property is in violation of the principles of Article 14, the law may even now be struck down. Although the amended Art. 81 (2) will abrogate the right of property, it is constitutional as it falls within the scope of the 24th Amendment which is constitutional. (Paras 1982, l984, 1986) Per Chandrachud, J.:-Section 2 (a) and Section 2 (b) of the 25th Amendment are valid. Though Courts have no power to question a law described in Article 31 (2) substituted by Section 2 (a) of the Amendment Act, on the ground that the amount fixed or determined for compulsory acquisition or requisition is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash, Courts have the power to question such a law if (i) the amount fixed is illusory, or (ii) if the principles, if any are stated, for determining the amount are wholly irrelevant for fixation of the amount; or (iii) if the power of compulsory acquisition or requisition is exercised for a collateral purpose; or (iv) if the law of compulsory acquisition or requisition offends the principles of Constitution other than the one which is expressly excepted under Art. 31 (2-B) introduced by S. 2 (b) of the 25th Amendment Act - namely Article 19 (1) (f); or (v) if the 1aw is in the nature of a fraud on the Constitution. (Para 2l56) Index Note: - (E) Constitution of India (as amended by Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act (1971), S.3 - Article 31-C, inserted by, validity of - First part valid- Second part invalid Law purporting to be made under Article 31-C to give effect to the objects of State Policy mentioned in Article 39 (b) and (c) may be called in question on the ground that it does not in fact give effect to the above objects- Provision making declaration by the Legislature conclusive on the point and barring inquiry by the Court is invalid. X-Ref.:- Constitution of India, Art.31C. Brief Note: -(E) The first part of Section 3 inserting Article 31-C is valid. The second part namely "and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy," is invalid. (X-Ref:-Constitution of India, Article 31-C). Per Ray, J.:- Article 31-C inserted by Section 3 does not delegate or confer any power on State Legislature to amend the Constitution. Article 31-C merely removes the restrictions of Part III from any legislation giving effect to Directive Principles under Article 39 (b) and (c). The power of Parliament and of State Legislatures to legislate on the class of legislation covered by Article 31-C is rendered immune from Articles 14, 19 and 31. The 25th amendment is valid. (Para 1078) Per Palekar J:- The 25th amendment is valid. The State is commanded, in particular, to direct its policy towards securing two aims, one described in (b) and the other in (c) of Article 39. In directing its policy towards securing the aims, the State will evidently have to make laws. A description of such a law is given in the first part of Article 31-C -as a law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles (aims) specified in Article 39 (b) or (c). If a law truly answers that description it will be secure against a challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31; otherwise not. When such a challenge is made, it will be the obvious duty of the Court to ascertain on an objective consideration of the law whether it falls within the description. What the Court will have to consider is whether it is a law which can reasonably be described as a law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the aims of Article 39 (b) or (c). That is an issue which is

distinct from the other issue whether the law does not give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the said aims. A law reasonably calculated to serve a particular aim or purpose may not actually serve that aim or purpose: and it is this latter issue which is excluded from judicial review. In doing so the declaration does no more @page-SC1473 than what the Courts themselves have been always doing viz., that they are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of the legislation. The problems are problems of legislative policy. It is for the legislature to decide what should go into the law to give effect to its policy towards securing its purpose. The legislature will have to consider the divergent views in the matter and make its own choice as to how it can effectuate its policy. The Courts are not concerned with that aspect of the matter and even if a law is considered a failure, Courts cannot refuse to give effect to the same. The declaration does no more than forbid such an enquiry by the Courts which the Courts themselves would not have undertaken. The declaration is only by way of abundant caution. (Para 1,338) Per Mathew, J.:-Article 31-C merely carves out a legislative field with reference to a particular type of law, and exempts that law from the ambit of Article 13 (2) in some respects. Parliament or State legislatures pass a law for giving effect to the Directive Principles specified in Article 39 (b) and (c), not by virtue of Article 31-C, but by virtue of their power under the appropriate legislative entries. What Article 31-C does is to confer Community on those laws from attack on the ground that they violate the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 31. The material portion of Article 31-A Is in' pari materia with the first part of Article 31- C. Article 31-A has been held to be valid. It cannot be said that Article 31C has delegated or, invested the Parliament in its legislative capacity or the State legislatures, with any power to amend the Constitution. Merely because a law pasted by them to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles specified in Article 39 (b) and (c) in pursuance to valid legislative entries in the appropriate Lists in the Seventh Schedule might violate the Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31 and such law is deemed not void by virtue of Article 31-C, it would not follow that Article 31-C has invested the Parliament in its legislative capacity or the State legislatures with power to amend the Constitution. It is by virtue of the 25th Amendment that the law, although it might violate the Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31 is not deemed void. Whenever Parliament or State legislatures pass such a law, the law so passed gets immunity from attack on the ground that it violates the Fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31 by virtue of Article 31-C which in effect has made a pro tanto amendment of Article 13 (2) in respect of that category of laws. It is a mistake to suppose that every time when Parliament in its legislative capacity or a State legislature passes such a law and if the law violates the Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31, it is that 1aw which amends the Constitution and makes it valid. The amendment of the relevant provision of the Constitution, namely Article 13 (2), has already been made by the 25th Amendment. And it is that amendment which confers upon the law immunity from attack on the ground that it violates the Fundamental Rights under the above said articles. It is only a law for giving effect to the State policy towards securing the principles specified in Article 39 (b) and (c) that can contain a declaration that it is for giving effect to such a policy and it is only such a declaration that will bar the scrutiny by the Court of the question that the law does not give effect to the policy. The expression 'no law' in the latter part of Article 31-C can only mean the type of law referred to in the first part. To be more specific the expression 'no law' occurring in the

latter part of the article can only mean 'no such law' as is referred to in the first part. If a declaration is contained in any law which does not give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles specified in these clauses, the Court can go into the question whether the law gives effect to the said policy. Whenever a question is raised that the Parliament or State legislatures have abused their power and inserted a declaration in a law not for giving effect to the State policy towards securing the Directive Principles specified in Article 39 (b) or (c) the Court must necessarily go into that question and decide it. To put it in other words, the legislative jurisdiction to incorporate a declaration that the law gives effect to the policy of the State is conditioned upon the circumstance that the law gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles specified in Article 39 (b) and (c). If this is so, the declaration that the law is to give effect to the Policy of the State cannot her the jurisdiction of the court to go into the question whether the law @page-SC1474 gives effect to the policy. The declaration can never oust the jurisdiction of the Court to see whether the law is one for giving effect to such a policy, as the jurisdiction of the legislature to incorporate the declaration is founded on the law being one to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing these principles. In order to decide whether a law gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles specified in Article. 39 (b) or (c), a Court will have to' examine the pith and substance, the true nature and character of the law as also its design and the subject matter dealt with by it together with its object and scope. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the declaration was merely a pretence and that the real purpose of the law is the accomplishment of some object other than to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles in Article 38 (b) and (c), the declaration would not be a bar to the Court from striking down any provision therein which violates Articles 14, 19 or 31. In other words, if a law passed ostensibly to give effect to the policy of the State is, in truth and substance one for accomplishing an unauthorised object, the Court would be entitled to tear the veil created by the declaration and decide according to the real nature of the law. The declaration visualized in Article 31-C that the law gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution would not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to go into the question whether the law gives effect to the policy. The jurisdiction of Parliament or the State legislatures to incorporate the declaration in a law is conditioned upon the circumstance that the law is one for giving effect to the State Policy towards securing the aforesaid principles. The 25th Amendment is valid . (Paras 1780, 1781, 1782, 1792, 1793, 1802) Per Beg, J.: - Article 31-C has two parts. The first part is directed at removing laws passed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution from the vice of invalidity on the ground that any such law "is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution". The question of relevancy of the law passed to the specified principles could still be examined by Courts although the effect of invalidity for alleged violations of Article 14 or 19 or 31 would vanish so long as the law was really meant to give effect to the principles of Article 39 (b) and (c) In other words, a colourable piece of legislation with a different object altogether but merely dressed up as a law intended for giving effect to the specified principles would fail to pass the test laid down by the first part. The second part of Article 31-C goes on to

provide that, if such a law contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy, it will become immune from judicial review altogether. The declaration by itself would not preclude a judicial examination of the nexus so that Courts can still determine whether the law passed is really one covered by the field carved out by Article 31-C or merely pretends to be so protected by parading under cover of the declaration. Hence both parts of Article 31-C are valid. (Paras 1865, 1868) Per Dwivedi, J.: Section 3, is made under Article 368 as amended by the 24th Amendment. The provisions of Article 31-C fall within the scope of the amended Article 368, and its validity cannot be assailed. The first part retains the Court's power to decide the legal question of the law's relevancy to the principles specified in Article 39 (b) and (c) as well as the factual question of the law's efficacy to subserve the common good or to prevent common detriment. It can test the ends as well as the means of the law. Coming to the second part, it excludes judicial review 'on the ground that the law does not give effect to such policy'. So the law cannot be challenged on the ground that the means adopted by the law are not sufficient to subserve the common good and prevent common detriment. In other words, the sufficiency of the law's efficacy alone is made nonjusticiable. The Court still retains power to determine whether the law has relevancy to the distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources of the community and to the operation of the economic system and concentration of wealth and means of production. If the Court finds that the law has no such relevancy, it will declare the law void if it offends the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 31. Article 31-C is in the nature of a saving clause to Articles 14, 19 and 31. Instead of being @page-SC1475 placed at the end of each of these articles, it is placed at one place for the sake of drafting elegance and economy. As a saving clause, Article 31-C saves certain kinds of laws from destruction at the hands of Articles 14, 19 anti 31. This effect is brought about directly and immediately by the choice of the constituent power expressed in Article 31-C itself and not by the laws which claim its protection. These laws do not expressly or impliedly take away or abridge the rights ill Articles 14, 19 and 31. The constituent power itself has brought about that effect through Article 31-C. There is, therefore, no delegation of the constituent power. Since the laws claiming protection of Article 31-C themselves do not work an amendment in Articles 14, 19 and 31 it is not necessary that they should pass through the procedure prescribed in Article 368. The, 25th Amendment ifs valid in its entirety. (Paras 1988, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000) Per Chandrachud J.: - It cannot be said that Article 31-C delegates the amending power to State Legislatures and empowers them to make amendments to the Constitution without complying with the form and manner prescribed by Article 368. It cannot also be said that the article empowers the Parliament likewise. The true nature and character of Article 31C is that it identifies a class of legislation and exempts it from the operation of Articles 14, 19 and 31. The field of' legislation is not created 17 by Article 31-C. 'The power to legislate exists apart from and independently of it. What the article achieves is to create an immunity against the operation of the specified Fundamental Rights in a pre-existing field of legislation. Clearly the latter part does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Court to determine whether the law is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Art 39. (b) or (c). Laws passed under Art. 31-C can be upheld only and only if there is a direct and reasonable nexus between the law and the Directive Policy of the State expressed in Art. 39 (b) or (c). The law cannot be called in question on

the ground that it does not give effect to such policy but no Court can ever take upon itself the task of finding out whether a law in fact gives effect to its true policy. Therefore, Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which introduces Art 31-C, is valid. Inspite, however , of the purported conclusiveness of the declaration therein mentioned, the Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ascertain whether the law is for giving effect to the policy of the state towards securing the principles specified in Art, 39 (b) or (c). If there is no direct and reasonable nexus between such a law and the provisions of Art. 39 (b) or (c), the law will not, as stated in Art. 31-C, receive immunity from a challenge under Arts. 11,19 and 31. (Paras 2145, 2147, 2148, 2156) Per Jaganmohan Reddy, J.:- It is not necessary to consider the question whether Art. 31-C delegates the power of amendment to the State Legislatures and Parliament or that it does not indicate the subject -matter of legislation as in Article 31-A but merely purports to enable the legislative organs to choose the subject-matter from a field which is as wide and indeterminate as the term operation of the economic system' would denote. Article 31-C lifts the bar of the articles specified therein, and in so far as the subject-matter of the legislation is concerned, though the field is wide.any of the modes to give effect to ditectives can only be a mode permissible within the legislative power conferred on the respective legislative organ under the VII Schedule to the Constitution. Article 31-C has 4 elements : (i) it permits the legislature to make a law giving effect to Art. 39 (b) and Art 39. (c) inconsistent with any of the right conferred by Arts 11,19 and 31 (ii) it permits the legislature to make a law giving effect to Art 39 by and Art 39 taking away any of the rights conferred by Articles 11,19,31 and (iv) it prohibits calling in question in any Court such a law if it contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to the policy of State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 on the ground that it does not give effect to such a policy of the State. The first element seems to have been added by way of abundant caution, for it takes in the other two elements, namely, taking away and abridging of the right conferred by Arts. 14,19 or 31. However it would be ultra vires the amending power conferred by Art. 368, if it comprehends within it the damaging or destruction of these fundamental rights. @page-SC1476 The second element, namely, taking away of these fundamental rights would be ultra vires the amending power, for taking away of these fundamental rights is synonymous with destroying them. As for the third element, namely, abridging of these rights, the validity will have to be examined and considered separately in respect of each of these fundamental rights for an abridgment of the fundamental rights is not the same thing as the damaging of those rights. An abridgment ceases to be an abridgment when it tends to affect the basic or essential content of the right and reduces it to a right only in name. In such a case it would amount to the damaging and emasculating the right itself and would he ultra vires the power under Art. 368. The sweep of Art. 31-C is far wider than Article 31-A, and Art: 14 is excluded in respect of matters where tee protection was most needed for the effectuation of a genuine and bona fide desire of the State contained in the directives of Art. 39 (b) and (c). The only purpose which the exclusion of Art. 14 will serve would be to facilitate arbitrariness, inequality in distribution or to enable the conferment of patronage etc. This right under Art. 14 will only be available to the person or class of persons who would be entitled to receive the benefits of distribution under the law. In fact the availability of Article 14 in respect of laws under Art. 31-C would ensure 'distributive justice', or 'economic justice', which without it would be thwarted. In this

view of Art. 31-C vis-a-vis Art. 14, any analogy between Art. 31-C and Art. 31-A is misconceived, because under the latter provision the exclusion of Art. 14 was necessary to protect the subject-matter of legislation permissible thereunder in respect of compensation payable to the expropriated owner. There is another reason why there can be no comparison between Arts. 31-A and 31-C, because in Art. 31-A the exclusion of Art.14 was confined only to the acquisition etc. of the property and not to the distribution aspect which is not the subject-matter of that Article, whereas, the exclusion of Art. 14 affects distribution which is the subject-matter of Article 39 (b) and (c). Article 31-C protects laws giving effect to the policies in Art. 39 (b) and (c). For achieving these twin objects the rights of the person that have to be abridged could only be those rights in Art. 19 which relates to property and trade, business, profession or occupation. Though the expression 'economic system' is used in Article 39 (c), that Article has not the object of changing the economic system generally, but is confined to only preventing concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. What this clause envisages is that the State should secure the operation of the economic system in such a way as not to result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Where there is already concentration of wealth and means of production which is to the common detriment, the law under Art. 39 (c) would be only to break up or regulate as may be necessary the concentration of wealth and means of production. All other rights are outside the purview of Art. 31-C and in this respect Art. 31-A and Art. 31-C can be said to be similar in scope and no different. Thus the law under Art 31-C will only operate on ''material resources", "concentration of wealth", and "means of production," and if this is so, the rights in Art. 19 (1) (a) to (e) would have no relevance and are inapplicable. With respect to the exclusion of Article 31 by Art.31-C clause (1) of Art. 31 is not in fact affected by Art. 31-C, because under the latter any rights affected must be by law only. Even if Article 31-C was enacted for making laws in furtherance of the directive principles in Art. 39 (b) and (c) affecting property, those laws have to conform to Art. 31 (1) for they would be laws depriving persons of their property. In so far as Art. 31 (2) is concerned, Section 2 of the Twentyfifth Amendment has already abridged the right contained in Art. 31 (2) and a further abridgment of this right authorised by Art. 31-C may amount in a given case to the destruction or abrogation of that right and it may then have to be considered in each case whether a particular law provides for such an amount for the acquisition or requisitioning of the property in question as would constitute an abrogation or the emasculation of the right under Art. 31 (2) as it stood before the Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment. New Art. 31-C is only valid if the words "inconsistent with or takes away or", the words "Art. 14" and the declaration portion "and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy", are severed, and they are severable. What remains @page-SC1477 after severing can be operative and effective on the interpretation given as to the applicability of Arts. 19 and 31, so as to enable laws made under Art. 31-C to further the directives enshrined in Art. 39 (b) and (c). Thus on such construction of Art. 31-C, after severing the portions indicated above, Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment is held valid. (Paras 1193, 1195, 1196, 1203, 1214, 1215, 1288,)

Per Khanna, J.:-Article 31-C is essentially an extension of the principle which was accepted in Art. 31-A. The fact that the provisions of Art. 31-C are more comprehensive and have greater width compared to those of Art. 31-A would not make any material difference. Likewise, the fact that Art. 31-A deals with law providing for certain subjects, while Art. 31-C deals with law giving effect to the policy towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or Cl. (c) of Art. 39, would not detract from the conclusion that Art. 31-C is an extension, of the principle which was accepted in Art-. 81-A. If the amendment of the Constitution by which Art. 8,1-A was inserted was valid, there is no ground as to how the Twenty-fifth Amendment relating, to the insertion of the first part of Art. 81-C can be held to he invalid. The ground which sustained the validity of clause (1) of Art. 0,1-A, would equally sustain the validity of the first part of Art. 31-C. The effect of the second part is that once the declaration contemplated by that article is made, the validity of such a law cannot be called in question in any Court on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14,19 or 31 of the Constitution. The declaration thus gives a complete protection to the' provisions of law containing the declaration from being assailed on the ground of being violative of Arts. 14,19 or 31. However tenuous the connection of a 1aw with the objective motioned in clause (b) and clause (c) of Art. 39 may be and however violative it may be of the provisions of Arts. 14. 19 and 31 of the Constitution, it cannot be assailed in a Court of law on the said ground because of the insertion of the declaration in question in the law. The result is that if an Act contains 100 Sections and 95 of them relate to matters not connected with the objectives mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 but the remaining five sections have some nexus with those objectives and a declaration is granted by the Legislature in respect of the entire Act, the 95 sections which have nothing to do with the objectives of clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39, would also get protection. Such a law if it contains the requisite declaration, would be protected and it would not be permissible to assail it on the ground of being violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution even though such a law strikes at the integrity and unity of the country. Such a law might also provoke the Legislatures of other States to make laws which may discriminate in the economic sphere against the persons hailing from the State which was the first to enact such discriminatory law. There would thus be a chain reaction of laws which discriminate between the people belonging to different States and which in the very nature of things would have a divisive tendency from a national point of view. The second part of Art. 31-C would thus provide the cover for the making of laws with a regional or local bias even though such laws imperil the oneness of the nation and contain the dangerous seeds of national disintegration. The vesting of power of exclusion of judicial review in a legislature including state legislature, contemplated by Article 31-C, strikes at the basic structure of the Constitution. The second part of Art. 31C thus goes beyond the permissible limit of what constitutes amendment under Article 368. Thus the second part of Art. 31-C is liable to be quashed on the following grounds : (1) It gives a carte blanche to the Legislature to make. any law violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 and make it immune from attack by inserting the requisite declaration. Article 31C taken along with its second part gives in effect the power to the Legislature, to amend the Constitution. (2) The legislature has been made the final authority to decide as to whether the law made by it is for the objects mentioned in Art. 31-C. The vice of second part of Art. 31-C lies in

the fact that even if the law enacted is not for the object mentioned in Art. 31-C, the declaration made by the Legislature precludes a party from showing that the law is not for that object and prevents a Court from going into the question as to whether the law enacted is really for that object. The exclusion by the Legislature, including a State Legislature, of even that limited @page-SC1478 judicial review strikes at the basic structure of the Constitution. The second part of Art. 31-C goes beyond the permissible limit of what constitutes amendment under Art. 368. The second part of Art. 31-C can be severed from the remaining part of Article 31-C and its invalidity would not affect the validity of the remaining part. (Paras 1530, 1531, 1541,1548) Per Sikri, C. J.:-In effect, Art. 31-C enables States to adopt any policy they like and abrogate Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution at will. In other words, it enables the State to amend the Constitution. Article 14, for instance, would be limited by the State according to its policy and not the policy of the amending body, i. e. the Parliament and so would be Arts. 19 and 31, while these fundamental rights remain in the Constitution. Parliament cannot under Art. 368 abrogate fundamental rights. Parliament equally cannot enable the legislatures to abrogate them. This provision thus enables legislatures to abrogate fundamental rights and therefore must be declared unconstitutional. Article 31-C cannot be read to he an implied amendment of Art. 368 because it opens with the words "notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 13" and Art. 31-C does not say that "notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 368." What Art. 31-C does is that it empowers legislatures, subject to the condition laid down in Art. 31-C itself, to take away or abridge rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. At any rate, if it is deemed to be an amendment of Art.368, it is beyond the powers conferred by Art. 368 itself. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to constitute another legislature to amend the Constitution, in its exercise of the power to amend Art.368 itself. Section 3 of the Constitution (Twentyfifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is void as it delegates power to legislatures to amend the Constitution. (Paras 445, 448. 472, 473) Per Shelat and Grover, JJ.:- Article 31-C suffers from two kinds of vice which seriously affect its validity. The first is that it enables total abrogation of fundamental rights contained in Arts. 14, 19 and 31 and secondly, the power of amendment contained in Art. 368 is of special nature which has been exclusively conferred on the Parliament and can be exercised only in the manner laid down in that Article. It was never intended that the some could be delegated to any other legislature including the State Legislature. The validity of Art. 31-C cannot be tained. (Paras 621, 622) Per Hegde and Mukherjea, J.:- Clause (3) of the 25th Amendment Act which introduced into the Constitution Art. 31-C is invalid for two reasons i.e. (1) it was beyond the amending power of the Parliament in so far as the amendment in question permits destruction of several basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution and (2) it empowers the Parliament and the State Legislatures to pro tanto amend certain human freedoms guaranteed to the citizens by the exercise of their ordinary legislative power. (Para 759) Index Note:- (F) Constitution of India (as amended by Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act (1971) - Validity - Is valid. X-Ref.:- Constitution of India, Sch.9 Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (35 of 1969)

Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (25 of 1971). Brief Note:- (F) The Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act (1971) is valid. (Per Ray, Palekar, Khanna, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud, JJ.) By the Twenty-ninth Amendment the two Kerala Acts, Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (35 of 1969) and the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (25 of 1971) were included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. Like other Acts included in that Schedule they are immune from challenge by reason of the protection given to the Schedule by Article 31-B. Article 31-B is independent of Art. 31-A and it cannot therefore be said that the protection would not be available unless it is shown that the Acts related to agrarian reforms. (Para 2142) (Per Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Jaganmohan Reddy and Mukherjea, JJ.) The 29th Amendment is valid. However, the question whether the Acts included in the Ninth Schedule by that Amendment or any provision of those Acts abrogates-any of the basic elements of the constitutional structure or denudes them of their identity will have to be examined when the validity of those Acts comes up for consideration. (Para 624) Per Sikri, C. J.:-The effect of the insertion of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (35 of 1969) and the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (25 of l971) in the Ninth Schedule by Section 2 is that the provisions of Article 31-B of the Constitution get attracted. @page-SC1479 Article 368 does not enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights. If this is so, it does not enable Parliament to, do this by any means, including the device of Art. 31- B and the Ninth Schedule. This device of Art. 31B and the Ninth Schedule is bad in so far as it protects statutes even if they take away fundamental rights. Therefore, the twenty-ninth Amendment is ineffective to protect the impugned Acts if they take away fundamental rights. The Constitution Bench will decide whether the impugned Acts take away fundamental rights or only abridge them, and in the latter case whether they effect reasonable able abridgments in the public interest. (Paras 486, 492) Cases Referred : Chronological Paras AIR 1973 SC 106 = (1972) 2 SCC 788, Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India 1787 AIR 1973 SC 689 = (1973) 1 SCC 500 Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 1202 AIR 1972 SC 963 = (1972) 1 SCC 536 Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 315 AIR 1972 SC 1061 = (1972) 2 SCR 33 = 1972 Tax LR 449, Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon 188, 704, 1100, 1378, 1609, 2152 AIR 1972 SC 1168 = (1972 ) 29 STC 206 = 1972 Tax LR 1861, Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayal v. State of U.P. 1763 AIR 1972 SC 2097 = (1972) 2 SCC 364. Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kerala 4, 1346, 2030 AIR 1972 SC 2240 = (1972 ) 2SCC 133, Malmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1201 1972 -1 All ER 801,Cassell &Co. Ltd. v. Broome 1553 AIR 1971 SC 161 = (1971 ) 2 SCR 790,Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras 1182 AIR 1971 SC 481 = (1971) 2 SCR 446, Abbas v. Union of India 1709

void. He further prayed for an appropriate writ or order to issue during the pendency of the petition. This Court issued rule nisi on March 25, 1970. 3. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1971 (Kerala Act No. 25 of 1971) was passed which received the assent of the President on August 7, 1971. The petitioner filed an application for permission to urge additional grounds and to impugn the constitutional validity of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1971 (Kerala Act No. 25 of 1971). 4. In the meantime, the Supreme Court by its judgment dated April 26, 1971 in Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kerala, (1972) SCC 364 - (Civil Appeals Nos. 143, 203-242, 274 and 309 of 1971) D/- 26-4-1971 = (reported in AIR 1972 SC 2097) upheld the majority judgment of the Kerala High Court in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1971 Ker 98 (FB) whereby certain sections of the Act were struck down. 5. The Constitution (Twentyfourth Amendment) Act came into force on November 5, 1971, the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act came into force on April 20, 1972 and the Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act came into force on June 9, 1972. The effect of the Twentyninth Amendment of the Constitution was that it inserted the following Acts in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution: "65. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (Kerala Act 35 of 1969). 66. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Kerala Act 25 of 1971)." 6. The petitioner then moved an application for urging additional grounds and for amendment of the writ petition in order to challenge the above constitutional amendments. 7. The Court allowed the application for urging additional grounds and for amendment of the writ petition on August 10, 1972 and issued notices to the Advocates-General to appear before this Court and take such part in the proceedings as they may be advised. 8. When the case was placed before the Constitution bench, it referred this case to a larger bench to determine the validity of the impugned constitutional amendments. 9. Similar orders were passed in the other writ petitions. 10. The larger bench was accordingly constituted. It was then felt that it would be necessary to decide whether I. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 3 (AIR. 1967 SC 1643) was rightly decided or not. However, as I see it, the question whether Golak Nath's case was rightly decided or not does not matter because the real issue is different and of much greater importance, the issue being, what is the extent of the amending power conferred by Article 368 of the Constitution apart from Art. 13 (2) on Parliament? @page-SC1490 11. The respondents claim that Parliament can abrogate fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom to form associations or unions, and freedom of religion. They claim that democracy can even be replaced and one party rule established. Indeed, short of repeal of the Constitution, any form of Government with no freedom to the citizens can be set up by Parliament by exercising its powers under Art. 368. 12. On the side of the petitioners it is urged that the power of Parliament is much more limited. The petitioners say that the Constitution gave the Indian citizens freedoms which were to subsist forever and the Constitution was drafted to free the nation from any future tyranny of the representatives of the people. It is this freedom from tyranny which, according to the petitioners, has been taken away by the impugned Art. 31C which has

been inserted by the Twenty-fifth Amendment. If Art. 31C is valid, they say, hereafter Parliament and State Legislatures and not the Constitution, will determine how much freedom is good for the citizens. 13. These cases raise grave issues. But however grave the issues may be, the answer must depend on the interpretation of the words in Art. 368, read in accordance with the principles of interpretation which are applied to the interpretation of a Constitution given by the people to themselves. 14. I must interpret Art. 368 in the setting of our Constitution, in the background of our history and in the light of our aspirations and hopes, and other relevant circumstances. No other constitution in the world is like ours. No other constitution combines under its wings such diverse peoples, numbering now more than 550 million, with different languages and religions and in different stages of economic development, into one nation, and no other nation is faced with such vast socio-economic problems. 15. I need hardly observe that I am not interpreting an ordinary statute, but a Constitution which apart from setting up a machinery for government, has a noble and grand vision. The vision was put in words in the Preamble and carried out in part by conferring fundamental rights on the people. The vision was directed to be further carried out by the application of directive principles. Part II-Interpretation of Golak Nath's case. 16. Before proceeding with the main task, it is necessary to ask; what was decided in (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643). In order to properly appreciate that case, it is necessary first to have a look at Sri Sankari Prasad Singh v. Union of India, 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 SCR 933 = (AIR 1965 SC 845). 17. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted inter alia Arts. 31A and 31B in the Constitution was the subject matter of decision in Sankari Prasad's case 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458). The main arguments relevant to the present case which were advanced in support of the petition before this Court were summarised by Patanjali Sastri, J. as he then was, as follows: "First, the power of amending the Constitution provided for under Article 368 was conferred not on Parliament but on the two Houses of Parliament as a designated body and, therefore, the provisional Parliament was not competent to exercise that power under Article 379. Fourthly, in any case Art. 368 is a complete code in itself and does not provide for any amendment being made in the bill after it has been introduced in the House. The bill in the present case having been admittedly amended in several particulars during its passage through the House, the Amendment Act cannot be said to have been passed in conformity with the procedure prescribed in Art. 368. Fifthly, the Amendment Act. in so far as it purports to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, falls within the prohibition of Art. 13 (2)." * * * As stated in the head-note this Court held: "The provisional Parliament is competent to exercise the power of amending the Constitution under Article 368. The fact that the said Article refers to the two Houses of the @page-SC1491 Parliament and the President separately and not to the Parliament,

does not lead to the inference that the body which is invested with the power to amend is not the Parliament but a different body consisting of the two Houses. The words "all the powers conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on Parliament" in Art. 379 are not confined to such powers as could be exercised by the provisional Parliament consisting of a single chamber, but are wide enough to include the power to amend the Constitution conferred by Art. 368." 18. I may mention that Mr. Seervai contends that the conclusion just mentioned was wrong and that the body that amends the Constitution under Art. 368 is not Parliament. 19. The Court further held: "The view that Art. 368 is a complete code in itself in respect of the procedure provided by it and does not contemplate any amendment of a Bill for amendment of the Constitution after it has been introduced, and that if the Bill is amended during its passage through the House, the Amendment Act cannot be said to have been passed in conformity with the procedure prescribed by Art. 368 and would be invalid, is erroneous. Although "Law" must ordinarily include constitutional law, there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law which is made in the exercise of legislative power and constitutional law, which is made in the exercise of constituent power. In the context of Art. 13, "law" must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the constitution made in the exercise of constituent power with the result that Art. 13 (2) does not affect amendments made under Art. 368". 20. Although the decision in Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 89 (AIR 1951 SC 458) was not challenged in Sajjan Singh's case, (1965) 1 SCR 933=(AIR 1965 SC 845) Gajendragadkar, C. J. thought it fit to give reasons for expressing full concurrence with that decision. 21. The only contention before the Court was that "Since it appears that the powers prescribed by Art. 226 are likely to be affected by the intended amendment of the provisions contained in Part III, the bill introduced for the purpose of making such an amendment, must attract the proviso, and as the impugned Act has admittedly not gone through the procedure prescribed by the proviso, it is invalid". According to Gajendragadkar, C J. "that raised the question about the construction of the provisions contained in Art. 368 and the relation between the substantive part of Art. 368 with its proviso." 22. The Chief Justice came to the conclusion that "as a matter of construction, there is no escape from the conclusion that Art. 368 provides for the amendment of the provisions contained in Part III without imposing on Parliament an obligation to adopt the procedure prescribed by the proviso." 23. The learned Chief Justice thought that the power to amend in the context was a very wide power and it could not be controlled by the literal dictionary meaning of the word "amend". He expressed his agreement with the reasoning of Patanjali Sastri, J., regarding the applicability of Art. 13 (2) to Constitution Amendment Acts passed under Art. 368. He further held that when Art. 368 confers on Parliament the right to amend the Constitution, it can be exercised over al] the provisions of the Constitution. He thought that

"if the Constitution-makers had intended that any future amendment of the provisions in regard to fundamental rights should be subject to Art. 13 (2), they would have taken the precaution of making a clear provision in that behalf." 24. He seemed to be in agreement with the following observations of Kania, C. J., in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 at p. 100 = (AIR 1950 SC 27): "the inclusion of Article 13 (1) and (2) in the Constitution appears to be a matter of abundant caution. Even in their absence, if any of the fundamental rights was infringed by any legislative enactment the Court has @page-SC1492 always the power to declare the enactment, to the extent it transgresses the limits, invalid". 25. He was of the view that even though the relevant provisions of Part III can be justly described as the very foundation and the corner-stone of the democratic way of life ushered in this country by the Constitution, it cannot be said that the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens are eternal and inviolate in the sense that they can never be abridged or amended. 26. According to him, it was legitimate to assume that the Constitution-makers visualised that Parliament would be competent to make amendments in these rights so as to meet the challenge of the problems which may arise in the course of socio-economic progress and development of the country. 27. Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, agreed with the Chief Justice that the 17th Amendment was valid even though the procedure laid down in the proviso to Art. 368 had not been followed. But he expressed his difficulty in accepting a part of the reasoning in Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458). He observed as follows: "It is true that there is no complete definition of the word "law" in the article but it is significant that the definition does not seek to exclude constitutional amendments which it would have been easy to indicate in the definition by adding but shall not include an amendment of the Constitution' " (p. 958) 28. He further observed: "The meaning of Art. 13 thus depends on the sense in which the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) is to be understood. If an amendment can be said to fall within the term "law", the Fundamental Rights become "eternal and inviolate" to borrow the language of the Japanese Constitution. Article 13 is then on par with Art. 5 of the American Federal Constitution in its immutable prohibition as long as it stands." (p. 958) 29. According to him, "Our Preamble is more akin in nature to the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) than to the preamble to the Constitution of the United States. It does not make any grant of power but it gives a direction and purpose to the Constitution which is reflected in Parts III and IV. Is it to be imagined that a two thirds majority of the two Houses at any time is all that is necessary to alter it without even consulting the States? It is not even included in the proviso to Art. 368 and it is difficult to think that as it has not the protection of the proviso it must be within the main part of Art. 368." 30. He further observed: "I would require stronger reasons than those given in Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458) to make me accept the view that Fundamental Rights were not really fundamental but were intended to be within the powers of amendment in common with the other parts of the Constitution and without the concurrence of the States." 31. He held:

"What Art. 368 does is to lay down the manner of amendment and the necessary conditions for the effectiveness of the amendment............ The Constitution gives so many assurances in Part III that it would be difficult to think that they were the playthings of a special majority. To hold this would mean prima facie that the most solemn parts of our Constitution stand on the same footing as any other provision and even on a less firm ground than that on which the articles mentioned in the proviso stand.'' 32. Mudholkar, J. although agreeing that the writ petition should be dismissed, raised various doubts and he said that he was reserving his opinion on the question whether Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458) was rightly decided. He thought : "The language of Art. 368 is plain enough to show that the action of Parliament in amending the Constitution is a legislative act like one in exercise of its normal legislative power. The only difference in respect of an amendment of the Constitution is that the Bill amending the Constitution @page-SC1493 has to be passed by a special majority (here I have in mind only those amendments which do not attract the proviso to Art. 368). The result of a legislative action of a legislature cannot be other than 'law' and, therefore, it seems to me that the fact that the legislation deals with the amendment of a provision of the Constitution would not make its result any the less a 'law". 33. He observed: "It is true that the Constitution does not directly prohibit the amendment of Part III. But it would indeed be strange that rights which are considered to be fundamental and which include one which is guaranteed by the Constitution (vide Art. 32) should be more easily capable of being abridged or restricted than any of the matters referred to in the proviso to Art. 368 some of which are perhaps less vital than fundamental rights. It is possible, as suggested by my learned, brother, that Art. 368 merely lays down the procedure to be followed for amending the Constitution and does not confer a power to amend the Constitution which, I think, has to be ascertained from the provision sought to be amended or other relevant provisions or the preamble." 34. Later, he observed: "Above all, it formulated a solemn and dignified preamble which appears to be an epitome of the basic features of the Constitution. Can it not be said that these are indicia of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution?" 35. He posed a further question by observing: "It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Art. 368?" 36. He then stressed the prime Importance of preamble: "The Constitution indicates three modes of amendments and assuming that the provisions of Art. 368 confer power on Parliament to amend the Constitution, it will still have to be considered whether as long as the preamble stands unamended, that power can be exercised with respect to any of the basic features of the Constitution. To illustrate my point, as long as the words 'sovereign democratic republic' are there, could the Constitution be amended so as to depart from the democratic form of Government or its republic character? If that cannot be done, then, as long as the words "Justice, social, economic and political etc.", are there could any of the rights enumerated

in Arts. 14 to 19, 21, 25, 31 and 32 be taken away? If they cannot, it will be for consideration whether they can be modified. "It has been said, no doubt, that the preamble is not a part of our Constitution. But, I think, that if upon a comparison of the preamble with the broad features of the Constitution it would appear that the preamble is an epitome of those features or, to put it differently if these features are an amplification or concretisation of the concepts set out in the preamble it may have to be considered whether the preamble is not a part of the Constitution. While considering this question it would be of relevance to bear in mind that the preamble is not of the common run such as is to be found in an Act of a legislature. It has the stamp of deep deliberation and is marked by precision. Would this not suggest that the framers of the Constitution attached special significance to it?" 37. Coming now to Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643) the petitioner had challenged the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 which included in the Ninth Schedule, among other acts, the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Act 10 of 1953), and the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965. 38. It was urged before the Court that Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 89=(AIR 1951 SC 458) in which the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 and Sajjan Singh's case, (1965) 1 SCR 933= (AIR 1965 SC 845) in which the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act was in question had been wrongly decided by this Court. @page-SC1494 39. Subba Rao, C. J. speaking for himself and 4 other Judges summarised the conclusions at page 815 as follows: "The aforesaid discussion leads to the following results: (1) The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Arts. 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution and not from Art. 368 thereof which only deals with procedure. Amendment is a legislative process. (2) Amendment is 'law' within the meaning of Art. 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if it takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III thereof, it is void. (3) The Constitution (First Amendment) . Act, 1951, Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. 1955, and the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, l964, abridge the scope of the fundamental rights. But, on the basis of earlier decisions of this Court, they were valid. (4) On the application of the doctrine of 'prospective overruling', as explained by us earlier, our decision will have only prospective operation and, therefore, the said amendments will continue to be valid. (5) We declare that the Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein. (6) As the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act holds the field, the validity of the two impugned Acts, namely, the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953, and the Mysore Land Reforms Act X of 1962, as amended by Act XIV of 1965, cannot be questioned on the ground that they offend Articles 13, 14 or 31 of the Constitution." 40. It must be borne in mind that these conclusions were given in the light of the Constitution as it stood then i.e. while Art. 13 (2) subsisted in the Constitution. It was then not necessary to decide the ambit of Art. 368 with respect to the powers of

Parliament to amend Art. 13 (2) or to amend Article 368 itself. It is these points that have now to be decided. 41. It may further be observed that the Chief Justice refused to express an opinion, on the contention that, in exercise of the power of amendment, Parliament cannot destroy the fundamental structure of the Constitution but can only modify the provision thereof within the framework of the the original instrument for its better effectuation. 42. As will be seen later, the first conclusion above, does not survive for discussion any longer because it is rightly admitted on behalf of the petitioners that the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 in so far as it transfers power to amend the Constitution from the residuary entry (Entry 97 List I) or Article 248 of the Constitution to Art. 368, is valid; in other words Art. 368 of the Constitution as now amended by the Twenty-fourth Amendment deals not only with the procedure for amendment but also confers express power on Parliament to amend the Constitution. 43. I will also not discuss the merits of the second conclusion as the same result follows in this case even if it be assumed in favour of the respondents that an amendment of the Constitution is not law within Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution. 44. Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, came to the following conclusions at page 902: "(i) that the Fundamental Rights are outside the amendatory process if the amendment seeks to abridge or take away any of the rights. (ii) that Sankari Prasad's ease 1952 SCR 89=(AIR 1951 SC 458) (and Sajjan Singh's case. (1965) 1 SCR 933 = (AIR 1965 SC 845) which followed it) conceded the power of amendment over Part III of the Constitution on an erroneous view of Arts. 13 (2) and 368. (iii) that the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments being part of the Constitution by acquiescence for a long time, cannot now be challenged and they contain authority for the Seventeenth Amendment; (iv) that this Court having now laid down that Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged or taken away by the exercise of amendatory process in @page-SC1495 Art. 368, any further inroad into these rights as they exist today will be illegal and unconstitutional unless it complies with Part III in general and Art. 13 (2) in particular; (v) that for abridging or taking away Fundamental Rights, a Constituent body will have to be convoked; and (vi) that the two impugned Acts, namely, the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (X of 1953) and the Mysore Land Reforms Act 1961 (X of 1962) as amended by Act XIV of 1965 are valid under the Constitution not because they are included in Schedule 9 of the Constitution but because they are protected by Art. 31-A, and the President's assent." 45. I am not giving his reasons for these conclusions here because they will be examined when dealing with the arguments addressed to us on various points: 46. Wanchoo, J. as he then was, also speaking on behalf of 2 other Judges held that Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 89=(AIR 1951 SC 458) was correctly decided and the majority in Sajjan Singh case, (1965) 1 SCR 933=(AIR 1965 SC 845) was correct in following that decision. 47. Bachawat, J. held: 1) Article 368 not only prescribes the procedure but also gives the power of amendment; 2) Article 368 gives the power of amending each and every provision of the Constitution and as Art. 13 (2) is a part of the Constitution it is within the reach of the amending power;

3) Article 368 is not controlled by Art. 13 (2) and the prohibitory injunction in Art. 13 (2) is not attracted against the amending power. 4) Constitutional amendment under Art. 368 is not a law within the meaning of Art. 13 (2); 5) The scale of values embodied in Parts III and IV is not immortal. Parts III and IV being parts of the Constitution are not immune from amendment under Art. 368. Constitution-makers could not have intended that the rights conferred by Part III could not be altered by giving effect to the policies of Part IV. 6) The Preamble cannot control the unambiguous language of the articles of the Constitution. 48. Regarding the amendment of the basic features of the Constitution, he observed: "Counsel said that they could not give an exhaustive catalogue of the basic features, but sovereignty, the republican form of government, the federal structure and the fundamental rights were, some of the features. The Seventeenth Amendment has not derogated from the sovereignty, the republican form of government and the federal structure, and the question whether they can be touched by amendment does not arise for decision. For the purposes of these cases, it is sufficient to say that the fundamental rights are within the reach of the amending power." 49. Ramaswami, J., held. (1) The amending power under Art. 368 is sui generis; (2) "Law" in Art. 13 (2) cannot be construed so as to include 'law' made by Parliament under Arts. 4, 169, 392, 5th Schedule Part D and 6th Schedule Para 21. (3) The expression "fundamental rights" does not lift the fundamental rights above the constitution itself; (4) Both the power to amend and the procedure to amend are enacted in Art 368. (5) There were no implied limitations on the amending power and all articles of the Constitution were amendable either under the proviso of Art. 368 or under the main part of the Article. (6) The Federal structure is not an essential part of our Constitution; (7) The power of amendment is in point of quality an adjunct of sovereignty. If so, it does not admit of any limitations. 50. In brief 6 Judges held that in view of Art. 13 (2) Fundamental Rights could not be abridged or taken away. Five Judges held that Art. 13 (2) was inapplicable to Acts amending the Constitution. Part III - Interpretation of Art. 368 51. Let me now proceed to interpret Art. 368. Art. 368, as originally enacted, read as follows: "An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a @page-SC1496 majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the bill: Provided that if such amendment seeks- to make any change in (a) Article 54, Article 55, Art. 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or (b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or

(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or (d) the representation of States in Parliament, or (e) the provisions of this article, the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent." 52. It will be noticed that Art 368 is contained in a separate part and the heading is ''Amendment of the Constitution", but the marginal note reads "Procedure for amendment of the Constitution. " 53. The expression "amendment of the Constitution" is not defined or expanded in any manner, although in other parts of the Constitution, the word "Amend" or "Amendment" has, as will be pointed out later, been expanded. In some parts they have clearly a narrow meaning. The proviso throws some light on the problem. First, it uses the expression "if such amendment seeks to make any change in"; it does not add the words "change of", or omit "in", and say "seeks to change" instead of the expression "seeks to make any change in". 54. The articles which are included in the proviso may be now considered. Part V, Chapter I, deals with "the Executive''. Article 52, provides that there shall be a President of India, and Art. 53 vests the executive power of the Union in the President and provides how it shall be exercised. These two articles are not mentioned in the proviso to Art. 368 but Arts. 54 and 55 are mentioned. Article 54 provides: "54. The President shall be elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of (a) the elected members of both Houses of Parliament; and (b) the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States." 55. Article 55 prescribes the manner of election of the President. 56. Why were Arts. 52 and 53 not mentioned in the proviso to Article 368 if the intention was that the States would have a say as to the federal structure of the country? One of the inferences that can be drawn is that the constitution-makers never contemplated, or imagined that Article 52 will be altered and there shall not be a President of India. In other words they did not contemplate a monarchy being set up in India or there being no President. 57. Another article which has been included in the proviso to Article 368 is Art. 73 which deals with the extent of executive powers of the Union. As far as the Vice-President is concerned, the States have been given no say whether there shall be a Vice-President or not; about the method of his election, etc. But what is remarkable is that when we come to Part VI of the Constitution, which deals with the "States", the only provision which is mentioned in the proviso to Art. 368 is Art. 162 which deals with the extent of executive power of States. The appointment of a Governor, conditions of service of a Governor, and the constitution and functions of the Council of Ministers, and other provisions regarding the Ministers and the conduct of government business are not mentioned at all in the proviso to Art. 368. Another article which is mentioned in Cl. (a) of the proviso to Art. 368 is Art. 241 which originally dealt with High Courts for States in Part C of the First Schedule. 58. Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution which deals with the Union Judiciary, and Chapter V of Part VI which deals with the High Courts in the State are included in the @page-SC1497 proviso to Art. 368 but it is extraordinary that Chapter VI of Part VI

which deals with subordinate Judiciary is not mentioned in clause (b). Chapter I of Part XI is included and this deals with the Legislative Relations between the Union and the States, but Chapter II of Part XI which deals with Administrative Relations between the Union and the States, and various other matters in which the States would be interested are not included. Provisions relating to services under the State and Trade and Commerce are also not included in the proviso. 59. This analysis of the provisions contained in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Art. 368 shows that the reason for including certain articles and excluding certain others from the proviso was not that all articles dealing with the federal structure or the status of the States had been selected for inclusion in the proviso. 60. Clause (c) of the proviso mentions the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, cl. (d) mentions the representation of States in Parliament, and cl. (e) the provisions of Art. 368 itself. The provisions of sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) can rightly be said to involve the federal structure and the rights of the States. 61. What again is remarkable is that the fundamental rights are not included in the proviso at all. Were not the States interested in the fundamental rights of their people? The omission may perhaps be understandable because of the express provision of Art. 13 (2) which provided that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention be void, assuming for the present that Art. 13 (2) operates on Constitutional amendments. 62. In construing the expression "amendment of this Constitution" I must look at the whole scheme of the Constitution. It is not right to construe words in vacuum and then insert the meaning into an article. Lord Greene observed in Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, (1948) 2 All ER 995 at p. 998: "The first thing one has to do, I venture to think, in construing words in a section of an Act of Parliament is not to take those words in vacuo, so to speak and attribute to them what is sometimes called their natural or ordinary meaning. Few words in the English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of their context. The method of construing statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which you may have to displace or modify. It is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question : 'In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word?' " 63. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of Lord Greene, in construing the expression "the amendment of the Constitution." 64. Lord Greene is not alone in this approach. In Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium, Ltd. 1967-2 All ER 576 at p. 578, it is observed: "English words derive colour from those which surround them. Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the sentence defined separately by reference to the dictionary or decided cases, and then put back again into the sentence with the meaning which you have assigned to them as separate words, so as to give the sentence or phrase a meaning which as a sentence or phrase it cannot bear without distortion of the English language." 65. Holmes, J. in Towne v. Eisner, (1917) 245 US 418 at p. 425 = 62 Law Ed 372 at p. 376 had the same thought. He observed:

"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 66. What Holmes J. said is particularly true of the word "Amendment" or "Amend''. 67. I may also refer to the observation of Gwyer C. J. and Lord Wright: "A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no @page-SC1498 doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implications of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act". (Per Gwyer C. J.-The Central Provinces and Berar Act, 1939 F.C.R. 18 at p. 42 (AIR 1939 FC 1). ) "The question, then, is one of construction and in the ultimate resort must be determined upon the actual words used, read not in vacuo but as occurring in a single complex instrument, in which one part may throw light on another. The constitution has been described as the federal compact, and the construction must hold a balance between all its parts". (Per Lord Wright-James v. Commonwealth of Australia-1936 A.C. 578 at p. 613). 68. In the Constitution the word "amendment" or '"amend" has been used in various places to mean different things. In some articles, the word "amendment" in the context has a wide meaning and in another context it has a narrow meaning. In Article 107, which deals with legislative procedure, cl. (2) provides that "subject to the provisions of Articles 108 and 109, a Bill shall not be deemed to have been passed by the House of Parliament unless it has been agreed to by both Houses, either without amendment or with such amendments only as are agreed to by both Houses." It is quite clear that the word "amendment" in this article has a narrow meaning. Similarly, in Art. 111 of the Constitution, whereby the President is enabled to send a message requesting the Houses to consider the desirability of introducing amendments, the "amendments" has a narrow meaning. 69. The opening of Art. 4, (1) reads: "4 (1) Any law referred to in Article 2 or Article 3 shall contain such provisions for the amendment of the First Schedule and the Fourth Schedule as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law..." Here the word "amendment" has a narrower meaning. "Law" under Articles 3 and 4 must "conform to the democratic pattern envisaged by the Constitution; and the power which the Parliament may exercise is not the power to override the constitutional scheme. No state can, therefore, be formed, admitted or set up by law under Article 4 by the Parliament which has no effective legislative, executive and judicial organs". (Per Shah J. Mangal Singh v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 109 at p. 112=(AIR 1967 SC 944). (Emphasis supplied). 70. Article 169 (2) reads: "Any law referred to in clause (1) shall contain such provisions for the amendment of this Constitution as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law and may also contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions as Parliament may deem necessary." Here also the word "amendment" has a narrow meaning. 71. Para 7 of Part D, Fifth Schedule, which deals with amendment of the schedule, reads:

"7. Amendment of the Schedule- (l) Parliament may from time to time by law amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any of the provisions of this Schedule and, when the Schedule is so amended, any reference to this Schedule in this Constitution shall be construed as a reference to such schedule as so amended." Here the word "amend" has been expanded by using the expression "by way of addition, variation or repeal", but even here, it seems to me, the amendments will have to be in line with the whole constitution. Similarly, under para 21 of the Sixth Schedule, which repeats the phraseology of para 7 of the Fifth Schedule, it seems to me, the amendments will have to be in line with the Constitution. 72. I may mention that in the case of the amendments which may be made in exercise of the powers under Art. 4, Art. 169, pare 7 of the Fifth Schedule, and para 21 of the Sixth Schedule, it has been expressly stated in these provisions that they shall not be deemed to be amendments of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368. @page-SC1499 73. It is also important to note that the Constituent Assembly which adopted Art. 368 on September 17, 1949, had earlier on August 18, 1949, substituted the following section in place of the old Section 291 in the Government of India Act, 1935: "291. Power of the Governor-General to amend certain provisions of the Act and orders made thereunder. (I) The Governor-General may at any time by order make such amendments as he considers necessary whether by way of addition, modification or repeal, in the provisions of this Act or of any order made thereunder in relation to any provincial legislature with respect to any of the following matters, that is to say: (a) the composition of the Chamber or Chambers of the Legislature; (b) the delimitation of territorial constituencies for the purpose of elections under this Act. ...... ...... ...... ......" Here, the word "amendment" has been expanded. It may be that there really is no expansion because every amendment may involve addition, variation or repeal of part of a provision. 74. According to Mr. Seervai the power of amendment given by Art. 4, read with Arts. 2 and 3, Article 169, Fifth Schedule and Sixth Schedule, is a limited power limited to certain provisions of the Constitution, while the power under Art. 368 is not limited. It is true every provision is prima facie amendable under Art. 368 but this does not solve the problem before us. 75. I may mention that an attempt was made to expand the word "amend" in Art. 368 by proposing an amendment that "by way of variation, addition, or repeal" be added but the amendment was rejected. (C.A.D. Vol. 9 p. 1663). 76. Again, in Art. 196 (2), the word "amendment" has been used in & limited sense. Art. 196 (2) reads: "196. (2). Subject to the provisions of Articles 197 and 198, a Bill shall not be deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council unless it has been agreed to by both Houses, either without amendment or with such amendments only as are agreed to by both Houses." 77. Similar meaning may be given to the word "amendment" in Art. 197 (2), which reads: " 197 (2). If after a Bill has been so passed for the second time by the Legislative Assembly and transmitted to the Legislative Council-

(a) the Bill is rejected by the Council; or (b) more than one month elapses from the date on which the Bill is laid before the Council without the Bill being passed by it; or (c) the Bill is passed by the Council with amendments to which the Legislative Assembly does not agree, the bill shall be deemed to have been passed by the Houses of the Legislature of the State in the form in which it was passed by the Legislative Assembly for the second time with such amendments, if any, as have been made or suggested by the legislative Council and agreed to by the Legislative Assembly." 78. Under Art. 200 the Governor is enabled to suggest the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message. Here again "amendment" has clearly a limited meaning. 79. In Art. 35 (b) the words used are: "Any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall subject to the terms thereof and to any adaptations and modifications that may be made there in under Article 372, continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by Parliament." 80. Here, all the three words are used giving a comprehensive meaning. Reliance is not placed by the draftsman only on the word "amend". 81. Similar language is used in Art. 372 whereby existing laws continue to be in force until "altered or repealed or amended" by a competent legislature or other competent authority. 82. In the original Art. 243 (2), in conferring power on the President to make regulations for the peace and good government of the territories in part D of the First Schedule, it is stated that "any regulation so made @page-SC1500 may repeal or amend any law made by Parliament". Here, the two words together give the widest power to make regulations inconsistent with any law made by Parliament. 83. In Art. 252 again, the two words are joined together to give a wider power. Clause (2) of Art. 252 reads: "252 (2). Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the legislature of that State." 84. In the proviso to Art. 254, which deals with the inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the legislatures of States, it is stated: "Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State." 85. In Art. 320 (5), "all regulations made under the proviso to clause (3)" can be modified "whether by way of repeal or amendment" as both Houses of Parliament or the House or both Houses of the Legislature of the State may make during the session in which they are so laid. 86. I have referred to the variation in the language of the various articles dealing with the question of amendment or repeal in detail because our Constitution was drafted very carefully and I must presume that every word was chosen carefully and should have its proper meaning. I may rely for this principle on the following observations of the United States Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jennison, (1839-42) 10 Law Ed 579; 594 and quoted with approval in William v. United States, (1933) 77 Law Ed 1372 at p. 1380:

"In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used. or needlessly added........" 87. Reference was made to S. 6 (2) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, in which the last three lines read: ".........and the powers of the legislature of each Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the Dominion." Here, the comprehensive expression "repeal or amend" gives power to have a completely new Act different from an existing Act of Parliament. 88. So, there is no doubt from a perusal of these provisions that different words have been used to meet different demands. In view of the great variation of the phrases used all through the Constitution it follows that the word "amendment" must derive its colour from Art. 368 and the rest of the provisions of the Constitution. There is no doubt that it is not intended that the whole constitution could be repealed. This much is conceded by the learned counsel for the respondents. 89. Therefore, in order to appreciate the real content of the expression "amendment of this Constitution", in Article 368 I must look at the whole structure of the Constitution. The Constitution opens with a preamble which reads: "WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political: LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation. In OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this Twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION." 90. This Preamble, and indeed the Constitution was drafted in the light and direction of the Objectives Resolution adopted on January 22, 1947, which runs as follows: @pageSC1501 "(1) THIS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic and to draw up for her future governance a Constitution; (2) wherein the territories that now comprise British India, the territories that now form the Indian States, and such other parts of India as are outside British India and the States, as well as such other territories as are willing to be constituted into the Independent Sovereign India, shall be a Union of them all; and (3) wherein the said territories; whether with their present boundaries or with such others as may be determined by the Constituent Assembly and thereafter according to the law of the Constitution, shall possess and retain the status of autonomous units, together with residuary powers, and exercise all powers and functions of government and administration, save and except such powers and functions as are vested in or assigned to the Union, or as are inherent or implied in the Union or resulting therefrom; and (4) wherein all power and authority of the Sovereign Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of government, are derived from the people; and

(5) wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of India; justice, social, economic and political; equality of status, of opportunity, and before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action, subject to law and public morality; and (6) wherein adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas, and depressed and other backward classes; and (7) whereby shall be maintained the integrity of the territory of the Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea and air according to justice and the law of civilized nations, and (8) this ancient land attains its rightful and honoured place in the world and makes its full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind." 91. While moving the resolution for acceptance of the Objectives Resolution, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: "It seeks very feebly to tell the world of what we have thought or dreamt for so long, and what we now hope to achieve in the near future. It is in that spirit that I venture to place this Resolution before the House and it is in that spirit that I trust the House will receive it and ultimately pass it. And may I Sir, also with all respect, suggest to you and to the House that, when the time comes for the passing of this Resolution let it be not done in the formal way by the raising of hands, but much more solemnly, by all of us standing up and thus taking this pledge anew." 92. I may here trace the history of the shaping of the Preamble because this would show that the Preamble was in conformity with the Constitution as it was finally accepted. Not only was the Constitution framed in the light of the Preamble but the Preamble was ultimately settled in the light of the Constitution. This appears from the following brief survey of the history of the framing of the Preamble extracted from the Framing of India's Constitution (A Study) by B. Shiva Rao. In the earliest draft the Preamble was something formal and read: "We, the people of India, seeking to promote the common good, do hereby, through our chosen representatives, enact, adopt and give to ourselves this Constitution, (Shiva Rao's Framing of India's Constitution-A study - p.127.)" 93. After the plan of June 3, 1947, which led to the decision to partition the country and to set up two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan, on June 8,1947, a joint subcommittee of the Union Constitution, and Provincial Constitution Committees, took note that the Objectives Resolution would require amendment in view of the latest announcement of the British Government. The announcement of June 3 had made it clear that full independence in the form of Dominion Status, would be conferred on India as from August 15, 1947. After examining the implications of partition the sub committee thought that the question of making changes in the Objectives Resolution could @pageSC1502 appropriately be considered only when effect had actually been given to the June 3 Plan, (Special Sub-committee minutes, June 9, 1947. Later on July 12, 1947, the special sub-committee again postponed consideration of the matter. Select Documents II, 20 (ii), p. 617. (Shiva Rao's -Framing of India's Constitution-A Study (p. 127 footnote) ). The Union Constitution Committee provisionally accepted the Preamble as drafted by B. N. Rao and reproduced it in its report of July 4. 1947 without any change, with the tacit recognition at that stage that the Preamble would be finally based on the Objectives Resolution. In a statement circulated to Members of the Assembly on July 18, 1947

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, inter alia, observed that the Preamble was covered more or less by the Objectives Resolution which it was intended to incorporate in the final Constitution subject to some modification on account of the political changes resulting from partition. Three days later, moving the report of the Union Constitution Committee for the consideration of the Assembly, he suggested that it was not necessary at that stage to consider the draft of the Preamble since the Assembly stood by the basic principles laid down in the Objectives Resolution and these could be incorporated in the Preamble in the light of the changed situation, (Shiva Rao's Framing of India's Constitution-A study -pp. 127-128 (also see footnote No. 1 p. 128).) The suggestion was accepted by the Assembly and further consideration of the Preamble was held over. 94. We need not consider the intermediate drafts, but in the meantime the declaration (See Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 8 page 2) was adopted at the end of April, 1949 by the Governments of the various Commonwealth countries and the resolution was ratified by the Constituent Assembly on May 17, 1949 after two days' debate. 95. In the meantime the process of merger and integration of Indian States had been completed and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was able to tell the Constituent Assembly on October 12, 1949, that the new Constitution was "not an alliance between democracies and dynasties, but a real union of the Indian people, built on the basic concept of the sovereignty of the people". (Shiva Rao's Framing of India's Constitution-A Study-pp. 130-132). 96. The draft Preamble was considered by the Assembly on October 17, 1949. Shiva Rao observes that "the object of putting the Preamble last, the President of the Assembly explained, was to see that it was in conformity with the Constitution as accepted". (Shiva Rao's Framing of India's Constitution - A Study -pp. 130-132). "Once the transfer of power had taken place the question of British Parliament's subsequent approval which was visualised in the British Cabinet Commission's original plan of May 1946 could no longer arise. The sovereign character of the Constituent Assembly thus became automatic with the rapid march of events without any controversy, and the words in the Preamble "give to ourselves this Constitution" became appropriate. The Preamble was adopted by the Assembly without any alteration. Subsequently the words and figure "this twenty-sixth day of November 1949" were introduced in the last paragraph to indicate the date on which the Constitution was finally adopted by the Constituent Assembly" (Shiva Rao's Framing of India's Constitution-A Study-pp. 130-132.) (p. 131) 97. Regarding the use which can be made of the preamble in interpreting an ordinary statute, there is no doubt that it cannot be used to modify the language if the language of the enactment is plain and clear. If the language is not plain and clear, then the preamble may have effect either to extend or restrict the language used in the body of an enactment. "If the language of the enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that one is to be preferred which comes nearest to the purpose and scope of the preamble." (see Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India (1970) SCR 732-737 - (AIR 1970 SC 540) ). 98. We are, however, not concerned with the interpretation of an @page-SC1503 ordinary statute. As Sir Alladi Krishnaswami a most eminent lawyer said, "so far as the Preamble is concerned, though in an ordinary statute we do not attach any importance to the Preamble, all importance has to be attached to the Preamble in a Constitutional statute". (Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 10, p. 417). Our Preamble

outlines the objectives of the whole constitution. It expresses "what we had thought or dreamt for so long..' 99. In re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, (1960) 3 SCR 250 at pp. 281-82 = (AIR 1960 SC 845), this was said about the Preamble. "There is no doubt that the declaration made by the people of India in exercise of their sovereign will in the preamble to the Constitution is, in the words of Story, "a key to open the mind of the makers" which may show the general purposes for which they made the several provisions in the Constitution; but nevertheless the preamble is not a part of the Constitution, and, as Willoughby has observed about the preamble to the American Constitution, "it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United States or any of its departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and such as may be implied from those so granted". What is true about the powers is equally true about the prohibitions and limitations." 100. Wanchoo, J. in (1967) 2 SCR 762 at pp. 838 and 9l4 - (AIR 1967 SC 1643) relied on Berubari's case, (1960) 3 SCR 250=(AIR 1960 SC 845) and said: "On a parity of reasoning we are of opinion that the preamble cannot prohibit or control in any way or impose any implied prohibitions or limitations on the power to amend the Constitution contained in Art. 368." 101. Bachawat, J. in this case observed: "Moreover the preamble cannot control the unambiguous language of the articles of the Constitution, see Wynes, Legislative Executive and Judicial powers in Australia, third edition pp. 694-5; in Re Berubari Union & Exchange of Enclaves (1960) 3 SCR 250 = (AIR 1960 SC 845)". 102. With respect. the Court was wrong in holding. as has been shown above, that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution unless the court was thinking of the distinction between the Constitution Statute and the Constitution, mentioned by Mr. Palkhivala. It was expressly voted to be a part of the Constitution. Further, with , aspect, no authority has been referred before us to establish the proposition that "what is true about the powers is equally true about the prohibitions and limitations." As I will show later, even from the preamble limitations have been derived in some cases. 103. It is urged in the written submission of Mr. Palkhiwala that there is a distinction between the Indian Constitution Statute and the Constitution of India. He urges as follows: " "This Constitution" is the Constitution which follows the Preamble. It starts with Article 1 and ended originally with the Eighth Schedule and now ends with the Ninth Schedule after the First Amendment Act, 1951, The way the Preamble is drafted leaves no doubt that what follows, or is annexed to, the Preamble, is the Constitution of India. " 104. He has also urged that the Preamble came into force on No vember 26, 1949 along with Arts. 5, 6, 7 etc. as provided in Art. 394 because Articles 5, 6, 7 and the other Articles mentioned therein could hardly come into force without the enacting clause mentioned in the Preamble having come into force. He says that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution statute and not a part of the Constitution but precedes it. There is something to be said for this contention but. in my view, it is not necessary to base my decision on this distinction as it is not necessary to decide in the present case whether Art.

368 enables Parliament to amend the Preamble. Parliament has not as yet chosen to amend the Preamble. 105. The Preamble was used by this Court as an aid to construction in Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 613 at P. 653 - (AIR 1955 SC 123).After @page-SC1504 referring to Part III, Mahajan, C. J., observed: "We think that the rights described as fundamental rights are a necessary consequence of the declaration in the preamble that the people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental rights have not been put in the Constitution merely for individual benefit, though ultimately they come into operation in considering individual rights They have been put there as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver can have no application to provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter of constitutional policy " 106. Similarly in In re The Kerala Education Bill 1957, 1959 SCR 995 at pp. 1018-1019 = (AIR 1958 SC 956) Das C. J. while considering the validity of Kerala Education Bill 1957 observed: "In order to appreciate the true meaning. import and implications of the provisions of the Bill which are said to have given rise to doubts, it will be necessary to refer first to certain provisions of the Constitution which may have a bearing upon the questions under consideration and then to the actual provision of the Bill. The inspiring and nobly expressed preamble to our Constitution records the solemn resolve of the people of India to constitute (He then sets out the Preamble). Nothing provokes and stimulates thought and expression in people more than education. It is education that clarifies our belief and faith and helps to strengthen our spirit of worship. To implement and fortify these supreme purposes set forth in the preamble, Part III of our Constitution has provided for us certain fundamental rights." 107. In (1965) 1 SCR 933 at p. 968 = (AIR 1965 SC 845) Mudholkar, J. after assuming that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution, observed: "While considering this question it would be of relevance to bear in mind that the preamble is not of the common run such as is to be found in an Act of a legislature. It has the stamp of deep deliberation and is marked by precision. Would this not suggest that the framers of the Constitution attached special significance to it ?" 108. Quick and Garran in their "'Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth ( (1901) p. 284)" adopted the following sentence from Lord Thring's "Practical Legislation, p. 36": "A preamble may be used for other reasons: to limit the scope of certain expressions or to explain facts or introduce definitions." 109. Thornton on "Legislative Drafting" -p. 137-opines that "construction of the preamble may' have effect either to extend or to restrict general language used in the body of an enactment" 110. In Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, 1957 AC 436 at p. 460 the House of Lords considered the effect of the preamble on the interpretation of Princess Sophia Naturalization Act, 1705. It was held that "as a matter of construction of the Act. there was nothing in the Act or its preamble, interpreted in the light of the earlier relevant statutes........capable of controlling and

limiting the plain and ordinary meaning of the material words of the enacting provisions and that the class of lineal descendants "born or hereafter to be born" meant the class of such descendants in all degrees without Any limit as to time" The House of Lords further held that "looking at the Act from the point of view of 1705 there was no such manifest absurdity in this construction as would entitle the court to reject it " 111. Mr. Seervai referred to the passage from the speech of Lord Normand, at p. 467. The passage is lengthy but I may quote these sentences: ''It is only when it conveys a clear and definite meaning in comparison with relatively obscure or indefinite enacting words that the preamble may legitimately prevail........... If they admit of only one construction, that construction will receive effect even if it is inconsistent with the preamble, but if @page-SC1505 the enacting words are capable of either of the constructions offered by the parties, the construction which fits the preamble may be preferred." 112. Viscount Simonds put the matter at page 463 thus: "On the one hand, the proposition can be accepted that "it is a settled rule that the preamble cannot be made use of to control the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous terms". I quote the words of Chitty L. J., which were cordially approved by Lord Davey in Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. Ltd. ((1899) A.C. 143, 185). On the other hand, it must often be difficult to say that any terms are clear and unambiguous until they have been studied in their context." 113. This case shows that if on reading Art. 368 in the context of the Constitution I find the word "Amendment" ambiguous I can refer to the Preamble to find which construction would fit in with the Preamble. 114. In State of Victoria v. The Commonwealth, 45 ALJ 251 which is discussed in detail later, a number of Judges refer to the federal structure of the Constitution. It is in the preamble of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1902 that 'one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth' is mentioned. 115. There is a sharp conflict of opinion in Australia respecting the question whether an amendment can be made which would be inconsistent with the Preamble of the Constitution Act referring to the "Indissoluble" character and the sections which refer to the "Federal" nature of the Constitution. After referring to this conflict, Wynes (Wynes Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia, Fourth Edn. p. 506,) observes: "Apart from the rule which excludes the preamble generally from consideration in statutory interpretation, it is clear that, when all is said and done, the preamble at the most is only a recital of the intention which the Act seeks to effect, and it is a recital of a present (i.e. as in 1900) intention. But in any event the insertion of an express reference to amendment in the Constitution itself must surely operate as a qualification upon the mere recital of the reasons for its creation." 116. I am not called upon to say which view is correct but it does show that in Australia, there is a sharp conflict of opinion as to whether the Preamble can control the amending power. 117. Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States states : ( (1883) Vol. 1) "It (Preamble) is properly resorted to where doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part ; for if they are clear and unambiguous, there seems little room for

interpretation, except in cases leading to an obvious absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention express in the preamble. (p. 444) There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, as stated in the preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has been constantly referred to by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its provisions." (page 444) 118. Story further states at pages 447-448: "And the uniform doctrine of the highest judicial authority has accordingly been, that it was the act of the people and not of the states; and that it bound the latter, as subordinate to the people. "Let us turn," said Mr. Chief Justice Jay, "to the constitution. The people therein declare, that their design in establishing it comprehended six objects: (1) To fore a more perfect union; (2) to establish justice. (3) to insure domestic tranquillity. (4) to provide for the common defence; (5) to promote the general welfare; (6) to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity. "It would" he added, "be pleasing and useful to consider end trace the relations' which each of these objects bears to the others; and to show, that, collectively, they comprise every thing requisite, with the blessing of Divine Providence, to render a people prosperous and happy". In Hunter v. Martin, (1 Wheat, R. 305, 324), the Supreme Court say, (as we have seen,) "the constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the states in @pageSC1506 their sovereign capacities, but emphatically as the preamble of the constitution declares, by the people of the United States; " and language still more expressive will be found used on other solemn occasions." 119. "The Supreme Court of United States (borrowing some of the language of the Preamble to the Federal Constitution) has appropriately stated that the people of the United States erected their constitutions or forms of government to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence". (American Jurisprudence, 2d. Vol. 16 p. 184). 120. In the United States the Declaration of Independence is sometimes referred to in determining constitutional questions. It is stated in American Jurisprudence (2d. Vol. 16 p. 189): "While statements of principles contained in the Declaration of Independence do not have the force of organic law and therefore cannot be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of rights and duties, yet it has been said that it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, and the courts sometimes refer to the Declaration in determining constitutional questions." 121. It seems to me that the Preamble of our Constitution is of extreme importance and the Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble vision expressed in the Preamble. 122. Now I may briefly describe the scheme of the Constitution. Part I of the Constitution deals with "the Union and its Territory". As originally enacted, Art. 1 read as follows: 1. India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. 2. The States and the territories thereof shall be the States and their territories specified in Parts A, B and C of the First Schedule. 3. The territory of India shall comprise (a) the territories of the States; (b) the territories specified in Part D of the First Schedule; and

(c) such other territories as may be acquired. 123. Article 2 enabled Parliament to admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. Articles 3 and 4 dealt with the formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing /States. 124. Part II dealt with "Citizenship". The heading of Part III is "Fundamental Rights". It first describes the expression "the State" to include "the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India" (Art. 12) Article 13 provides that laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights shall be void. This applies to existing laws as well as laws made after the coming into force of the Constitution. For the time being I assume that in Art. 13 (2) the word "law" includes constitutional) amendment. 125. The fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution include right to equality before the law, (Article 14), prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth (Article 15), equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, (Article 16), right to freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably and without arms, to form associations or unions, to move freely throughout the territory of India, to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation' trade or business. (Art.19). Reason" able restrictions can be imposed on the rights under Art. 19 in respect of various matters. 126. Article 20 protects a person from being convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence or to be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. It further provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same @page-SC1507 offence more than once, and no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 127. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 128. Article 22 gives further protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Article 22 (1) provides that "no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the rights to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.'" Article 22 (2) provides that "every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate". 129. Article 22 (4) deals with Preventive Detention. Article 23 prohibits traffic in human beings end other similar forms of forced labour Article 24 provides that "no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment." 130. Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28 deal with the freedom of religion. Article 25 (1) provides that ''subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion." Article 26 enables every religious denomination or

section thereof, subject to public order, morality and health, to establish and manage institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property, and to administer such property in accordance with law. Article 27 enables persons to resist payment of any taxes the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. Article 28 deals with freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. 131. Article 29 (1) gives protection to minorities and provides that "any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same." Article 29 (2) provides that "no person shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them." 132. Article 30 gives further rights to minorities whether based on religion or language to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Article 30 (2) prohibits the State from discriminating against any educational institution, in granting aid to educational institutions, on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. 133. As will be shown later the inclusion of special rights for minorities has great significance. They were clearly intended to be inalienable. 134. The right to property comes last and is dealt with in Art. 31. As originally enacted, it dealt with the right to property and prevented deprivation of property save by authority of law, and then provided for compulsory acquisition for public purposes on payment of compensation. It had three significant provisions, which show the intention of the constitution-makers regarding property rights. The first is Art. 31 (4). This provision was intended to protect legislation dealing with agrarian reforms. The second provision, Art. 31 (5) (a), was designed to protect existing legislation dealing with compulsory acquisition. Some acts, saved by this provision did not provide for payment of full compensation e.g. U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919. The third provision (Art. 31 (6) provided a protective umbrella to similar laws enacted not more than @page-SC1508 eighteen months before the commencement of the Constitution. 135. The fundamental rights were considered of such importance that right was given to an aggrieved person to move the highest court of the land, i.e., the Supreme Court, by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part, and this right was guaranteed. Article 32 (2) confers very wide powers on the Supreme Court, to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. Article 32 (4) further provides that "the right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution." 136. Article 33 enables Parliament by law to "determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to the members of the Armed Forces or the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them."

137. This article shows the care with which, the circumstances in which, fundamental rights can be restricted or abrogated were contemplated and precisely described. 138. Article 34 enables Parliament, by law, to indemnify any person in the service of the Union, or of a state or any other person in connection with acts done while martial law was in force in a particular area. 139. Part IV of the Constitution contains directive principles of State policy. Article 37 specifically provides that "the provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws." This clearly shows, and it has also been laid down by this Court, that these provisions are not justiciable and cannot be enforced by any Court. The Courts could not, for instance, issue a mandamus directing the State to provide adequate means of livelihood to every citizen, or that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community be so distributed as best to subserve the common good, or that there should be equal pay for equal work for both men and women. 140. Some of the directive principles are of great fundamental importance in the governance of the country. But the question is not whether they are important; the question is whether they override the fundamental rights. In other words, can Parliament abrogate the fundamental rights in order to give effect to some of the directive principles? 141. I may now briefly notice the directive principles mentioned in Part IV. Art. 38 provides that "the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life." Now, this directive is compatible with the fundamental rights because surely the object of many of the fundamental rights is to ensure that there shall be justice, social, economic and political, in the country. Article 39, which gives particular directions to the State, reads thus: "39. The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood; (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment; (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength. @page-SC1509 (f) that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.'' 142. Article 40 deals with the organisation of village panchayats. Article 41 deals with the right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases. Article 42 directs that the State shall make provisions for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 43 directs that "the State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural,

industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State . shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas." 143. Article 44 enjoins that the "State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India." Desirable as it is, the Government has not been able to take any effective steps towards the realisation of this goal. Obviously no Court can compel the Government to lay down a uniform form civil code even though it is essentially desirable in the interest of the integrity and unity of the country. 144. Article 45 directs that "the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years." This again is a very desirable directive. Although the Government has not been able to fulfil it completely, it cannot be compelled by any court of law to provide such education. 145. Article 46 supplements the directive given above and enjoins the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. 146. Article 47 lays down as one of the duties of the State to raise the standard of living and to improve public health, and to bring about prohibition. Article 48 directs the State to endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines, and in particular, to take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle. 147. Article 49 deals with protection of monuments and places and objects of national importance. Article 50 directs that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. This objective has been, to a large extent, carried out without infringing the fundamental rights. 148. In his preliminary note on the fundamental rights, Shri B. N. Rau, dealing with the directive principles, observed: "The principles set forth in this part are intended for the general guidance of the appropriate legislatures and Government in India (hereinafter referred to collectively as 'the State'). The application of these principles in legislation and administration shall not be the care of the State and shall not be cognizable by any court." 149. After setting out certain directive principles, he observed: "It is obvious that none of the above provisions is suitable for enforcement by the courts. They are really in the nature of moral precepts for the authorities of the State. Although it may be contended that the Constitution is not the proper place for moral precepts, nevertheless constitutional declarations of policy of this kind are now becoming increasingly frequent. (See the Introduction to the I. L. O. publication Constitutional Provisions concerning Social and Economic Policy, Montreal, 1944). They have at least an educative value." (pages 33-34 Shiva Rao: Framing of Indian Constitution Doc. Vol. II) Then he referred to the genesis of the various articles mentioned in the preliminary note. 150. One must pause and ask the Question as to why did the @page-SC1510 Constituent Assembly resist the persistent efforts of Shri B. N. Rau to make fundamental rights

subject to the directive principles. The answer seems plain enough. The Constituent Assembly deliberately decided not to do so. 151. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, in his note dated March 14, 1947, observed: "A distinction has necessarily to be drawn between rights which are justiciable and rights which are merely intended as a guide and directive objectives to state policy." (page 67 supra) 152. It is impossible to equate the directive principles with fundamental rights though it cannot be denied that they are very important. But to say that the directive principles give a directive to take away fundamental rights in order to achieve what is directed by the directive principles seems to me a contradiction in terms. 153. I may here mention that while our fundamental rights and directive principles were being fashioned and approved of by the Constituent Assembly, on December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration may not be a legally binding instrument but it shows how India understood the nature of Human Rights. I may here quote only the Preamble: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. (emphasis supplied) Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law. Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations. Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge." 154. In the Preamble to the International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural rights 1966, inalienability of rights is indicated in the first Para as follows. "Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." 155. Do rights remain inalienable if they can be amended out of existence? The Preamble, Arts I. 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76 of the United Nations Charter, had provided the basis for the elaboration in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although there is a sharp conflict of opinion whether respect for human dignity and fundamental human rights is obligatory under the Charter (see Oppenheim's International Law; 8th ed. Vol; 1,

pp. 740-41, foot note 3), it seems to me that, in view of Art. 51 of the directive principles, this Court must interpret language of the Constitution, if not intractable, which is after all a municipal law, in the light of the United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration subscribed to by India. Article 51 reads: "51. The State shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace and security; @page-SC1511 (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration." 156. As observed by Lord Denning in Corocraft v. Pan American Airways, (1969) All ER 82 at p. 87. "it is the duty of these courts to construe our legislation so as to be in conformity with International law and not in conflict with it." (See also Oppenheim, supra, pp. 45.46; American Jurisprudence 2d., Vol. 45, p. 351). 157. Part V, Chapter I, deals with the Executive; Chapter II with Parliament, conduct of its business, qualification its members, legislation procedure, etc., Article 83 provides that: "83 (1) The Council of States shall not be subject to dissolution, but as nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire as soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the provisions made in that behalf by Parliament by law. (2) The House of the People, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the House........" Under the proviso, this period can be extended while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation for a period not exceeding in any case beyond a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate. It was provided in Art. 85 (1) before its amendment by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 that the House of Parliament shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sittings in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. 158. Article 123 gives power to the President to promulgate ordinances during recess of Parliament. Chapter IV deals with the Union Judiciary. 159. Part VI, as originally enacted, dealt with the States in Part A of the First Schedule the Executive, the State Legislatures and the High Courts. Article 174 deals with the summoning of the House of Legislature and its provisions are similar to that of Art. 85. Article 213 confers legislative powers on the Governor during the recess of State Legislature by promulgating ordinances. 160. Part XI deals with the relation between the Union and the States; Chapter I regulating legislative relations and Chapter II administrative relations. 161. Part XII deals with Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits. We need only notice Art. 265 which provides that "no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law". 162. Part XIII deals with Trade, Commerce and Intercourse within the Territory of India, Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. (Article 301).

163. Part XIV deals with Services under the Union and the States. Part XVI contains special provisions relating to certain classes - the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes etc. It reserved seats in the House of the People for these classes. Article 331 enables the President to nominate not more than two members of the Anglo-Indian community if it is not adequately represented in the House of the People. Article 332 deals with the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assemblies of the States. In Art. 334 it is provided that the above mentioned reservation of seats and special representation to certain classes shall cease on the expiry of a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution. Article 335 deals with claims of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to services and posts. Article 336 makes special provisions for Anglo-Indian community in certain services, and Art. 337 makes special provisions in respect of educational grants for the benefit of Anglo-Indian community. Article 338 provides for the creation of a Special Officer for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, etc. to be appointed by the President, and prescribes his duties. Article 340 @page-SC1512 enables the President to appoint a Commission to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of India which shall present a report and make recommendations on steps that should be taken to remove difficulties and improve their condition. Article 341 enables the President to specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State. Similarly, Art. 342 provides that the President may specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal comrnunities which shall be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State. 164. Part XVII deals with Official language, and Part XVIII with Emergency Provisions. Article 352 is important. It reads: "352 (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect." Article 353 describes the effect of the Proclamation of Emergency. The effect is that the executive power of the Union shall be extended to the giving of directions to any State as to the manner in which the executive power thereof is to be exercised, and the Parliament gets the power to make laws with respect to any matter including the power to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, etc., notwithstanding that it is one which is not enumerated in the Union list. Article 354 enables the President by order to make exceptions and modifications in the provisions of Arts. 268 to 279. Under Art. 355, it is the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Article 356 contains provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in a State. 165. Article 358 provides for suspension of the provisions of Article 19 during Emergency. It reads: "358. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the

incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect." 166. Article 359 is most important for our purpose. It provides that: "359. (1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force or such shorter period as may be specified in the order. (2) An order made as aforesaid may extend to the whole or any part of the territory of India. (3) Every order made under cl. (1) shall, as soon as may be after it is made, be laid before each House of Parliament." 167. These two Articles, namely Art. 358 and Art. 359 show that the Constitution-makers contemplated that Fundamental rights might impede the State in meeting an emergency, and it was accordingly provided that Art. 19 shall not operate for a limited time, and so also Art. 32 and Art. 226 if the President so declares by order, if it was the design that fundamental rights might be abrogated surely they would have expressly provided it somewhere. 168. I may here notice an argument that the enactment of Arts. 358 and 359 showed that the fundamental rights were not treated as inalienable rights. I am unable to infer this deduction from these articles. In an emergency every citizen is liable to be subjected to extraordinary restrictions. 169. I may notice here some relevant facts which constitute the @page-SC1513 background of the process of drafting the Constitution. The British Parliament knowing the complexities of the structure of the Indian people expressly provided in S. 6 (6) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, that "the powers referred to in subsection (1) of this section extend to the making of laws limiting for the future the powers of the legislature of the Dominion." Sub-section (1) of S. 6 reads: "The legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have full power to make laws for that Dominion, including laws having extra-territorial operation." That S. 6 (1) included making provision as to the Constitution of the Dominion is made clear by S. 8 (1) which provided: "In the case of each of the new Dominions, the powers of legislature of the Dominion shall for the purpose of making provision as to the Constitution of the Dominion be exercisable in the first instance by the Constituent Assembly of that Dominion, and references in this Act to the legislature of the Dominion shall be construed accordingly." (Emphasis supplied) 170. These provisions of the Indian Independence Act amply demonstrate that when the Constituent Assembly started functioning, it knew, if it acted under the Indian Independence Act, that it could limit the powers of the future Dominion Parliaments. 171. No -similar provisions exist in any of the Independence Acts in respect of other countries, enacted by the British Parliament, e.g., Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, Ghana Independence Act, 1957, Federation of Malaya Independence Act, 1957, Nigeria

Independence Act, 1960, Sierra Leone Independence Act, 1961, Tanganyika Independence act, l961, Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, Jamaica Independence Act, 1962. 172. I may mention that the aforesaid provisions in the Indian Independence Act were enacted in line with the Cabinet Statement dated May 16, 1947 and the position of the Congress Party. Para 20 (See Shiva Rao- The Framing of India's Constitution Vol 1 p. 216) of the Statement by the Cabinet Mission provided. "The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal and excluded areas should contain full representation of the interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the protection of minorities, and a scheme for the administration of the tribal and excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the Provincial, Group, or Union Constitution." 173. In clarifying this statement Sir Stafford Cripps at a Press Conference dated May 16, 1946 stated: "But in order to give these minorities and particularly the smaller minorities like the Indian Christians and the Ango-Indians and also the tribal representatives a better opportunity of influencing minority provisions, we have made provision for the setting up by the constitution-making body of an influential advisory Commission which will take the initiative in the preparation of the list of fundamental rights, the minority protection clauses and the proposals for the administration of tribal and excluded areas. This Commission will make its recommendations to the constitution-making body and will also suggest at which stage or stages in the constitution these provisions should be inserted, that is whether in the Union, Group or Provincial constitutions or in any two or more of them." (p. 224 Supra) 174. In the letter dated May 20, 1946, from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to the Secretary of State, it is stated : "The principal point, however. is as stated above, that we look upon this Constituent Assembly as a sovereign body which can decide as it chooses in regard to any matter before it and can give effect to its decisions. The only limitation we recognise is that in regard to certain major communal issues the decision should be by majority of each of the two major communities." (P. 251, Supra) 175. In his reply dated May 22, 1946, the Secretary of State observed : @page-SC1514 "When the Constituent Assembly has completed its labours, His Majesty's Government will recommend to Parliament such action as may be necessary for the cession of sovereignty to the Indian people, subject only to two provisos which are mentioned in the statement and which are not, we believe, controversial, namely, adequate Provision for the protection of minorities and willingness to conclude treaty to cover matters arising out of the transfer of power." (Emphasis supplied) (P. 252, Supra) 176. In the Explanatory statement dated May 22, 1946, it was again reiterated as follows: ''When the Constituent Assembly has completed its labours, His Majesty's Government will recommend to Parliament such action as may be necessary for the cession of sovereignty to the Indian people, subject only to two matters which are mentioned in the statement and which, we believe are not controversial namely; adequate provision for the protection of the minorities (paragraph 20 of the statement) and willingness to conclude a treaty with His Majesty's Government to cover matters arising out of the transfer of power (paragraph 22 of the statement)" (Emphasis supplied) (p. 258 Supra)

177. In pursuance of the above, a resolution for the setting up of an Advisory Committee on fundamental rights was moved by Govind Ballabh Pant In the Constituent Assembly on January 24, 1947. He laid special importance on the issue of minorities. The Advisory Committee met on February 27, 1947 to constitute various sub-committees including the Minorities Sub Committee. The Sub Committee on Minorities met later the same day. A questionnaire was drafted to enquire about political, economic, religious, educational and cultural safeguards. In other words all these safeguards were considered. 178. Divergent views were expressed, and the Minorities Sub-Committee met on April 17, 18 and l9, 1947 to consider this important matter. At these meetings the subcommittee considered the interim proposals of the Fundament al Rights Sub-Committee in so far as these had a bearing on minority rights. These discussions covered such important matters as the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race, religion, caste, etc.; the abolition of untouchability and the mandatory requirements that the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability should be made an offence punishable according to law; freedom to profess, practise and propagate one's religion; the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; the right to be governed by one's personal law; the right to use one's mother tongue and establish denominational, communal or language schools, etc. 179. Having dealt with the question of fundamental rights for minorities, the Minorities Sub-Committee met again on July 21, 1947, to consider the political safeguards for minorities and their representation in the public services. 180. In forwarding the report of the Advisory Committee on the subject of Minority Rights, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, in his report dated August 8, 1947, said. ".........It should be treated as supplementary to the one forwarded to you with my letter No. CA/24/Com./47, dated the 23rd April, 1947 and dealt with by the Assembly during the April session. That report dealt with justiciable fundamental rights these rights, whether applicable to all citizens generally or to members of minority communities in particular offer a most valuable safeguard for minorities over a comprehensive field of social life. The present report deals with what may broadly be described as political safeguards of minorities and covers the following points; (Emphasis supplied) (p. 411,supra) (i) Representation in Legislature; joint versus separate electorates; and weightage. (ii) Reservation of seats for minorities in Cabinets. (iii) Reservation for minorities in the public services. (iv) Administrative machinery to ensure protection of minority rights." 181. Sardar Patel, while moving the report for consideration on August 27, 1947, said: @page-SC1515 "You will remember that we passed the Fundamental Rights Committee's Report, which was sent by the Advisory Committee; the major part of those rights has been disposed of and accepted by this House. They cover a very wide range of the rights of minorities which give them ample protection; and yet there are certain political safeguards which have got to be specifically considered. An attempt has been made in this report to enumerate those safeguards which are matters of common knowledge, such as representation in legislatures, that is, joint versus separate electorate." (Emphasis supplied) (p. 424, Supra)

182. The above proceedings show that the minorities were particularly concerned with the fundamental rights which were the subject-matter of discussion by the Fundamental Rights Committee. 183. The above brief summary of the work of the Advisory Committee and the Minorities Sub-Committee shows that no one ever contemplated that fundamental rights appertaining to the minorities would be liable to be abrogated by an amendment of the Constitution. The same is true about the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly. There is no hint anywhere that abrogation of minorities' rights was ever in the contemplation of the important members of the Constituent Assembly. It seems to me that in the context of the British Plan, the setting up of Minorities Sub-Committee the Advisory Committee and the proceedings of these Committees, as well as the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly mentioned above, it is impossible to read the expression "Amendment of the Constitution" as empowering Parliament to abrogate the rights of minorities. 184. Both sides relied on the speeches made in the Constituent Assembly. It is, however, a sound rule of construction that speeches made by members of a legislature in the course of debates relating to the enactment of a statute cannot be used as aids for interpreting any of provisions of the statute. The same rule has been applied to the provisions of this Constitution by this Court in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Bombay Co. Ltd. (1952) SCR 1112 at p. 1121=(AIR 1952 SC 366). Shastri, C. J., speaking for the Court observed: "It remains only to point out that the use made by the learned Judges below of the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution is unwarranted. That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been generally accepted in England, and the same rule has been observed in the construction of Indian statutes; see AdministratorGeneral of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick, (1895) 22 Ind App 107 (118) (PC). The reason behind the rule was explained by one of us in Gopalan's case, 1950 SCR 88= (AIR 1950 SC 27) thus: "A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord." or, as it is more tersely put in an American case "Those who did not speak ma not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other-United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Association:" This rule of exclusion has not always been adhered to in America, and sometimes distinction is made between using such material to ascertain the purpose of a statute and using it for ascertaining its meaning. It would seem that the rule is adopted in Canada and Australia, see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed. p. 122." 185. In Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (792-922)=(AIR 1967 SC 1643) Subba Rao, C. J., referred to certain portions of the speeches made by Pandit Nehru and Dr. Ambedkar but he made it clear at p. 792 that he referred to these speeches. "not with a view to interpret the provisions of Art. 368, which we propose to do on its own terms, but only to notice the transcendental character given to the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the Constitution." @page-SC1516 Bachawat, J., at p. 922 observed:

"Before concluding this judgment I must refer to some of the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of debates on the draft Constitution. These speeches cannot be used as aids for interpreting the Constitution: see l952 SCR 1112 = (AIR 1952 SC 366). Accordingly I do not rely on them as aids to construction. But I propose to refer to them, as Shri A. K. Sen relied heavily on the speeches of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. According to him, the speeches of Dr. Ambedkar show that he did not regard the fundamental rights as amendable. This contention is not supported by the speeches....." 186. In Madhav Rao v. Union of India, (1971) 3 SCR 9=(AIR 1971 SC: 530) Shah, J., in the course of the judgment made a brief reference to what was said by the Minister of Home Affairs, who was in charge of the States, when he moved for the adoption of Art. 291. He referred to this portion of the speech for the purpose of showing the historical background and the circumstances which necessitated giving certain guarantees to the former rulers. 187. It is true that Mitter, J., in the dissenting judgment, at p. 121, used the debates for the purposes of interpreting Art. 363 but he did not discuss the point whether it is permissible to do so or not. 188. In Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon, (1972) 2 SCR 33 = (AIR 1972 SC 1061) I, on behalf of the majority before referring to the speeches observed at p. 58 that "we are however, glad to find from the following extracts from the debates that our interpretation accords with what was intended." There is no harm in finding confirmation of one's interpretation in debates but it is quite a different thing to interpret the provisions of the Constitution in the light of the debates. 189. There is an additional reason for not referring to debates for the purpose of interpretation. The Constitution, as far as most of the Indian States were concerned, came into operation only because of the acceptance by the Ruler or Rajpramukh. This is borne out by the following extract from the statement of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in the Constituent Assembly on October 12, 1949 (C. A. D. Vol. X, pp. 161-3): "Unfortunately we have no properly constituted Legislatures in the rest of the States (apart from Mysore, Saurashtra and Travancore and Cochin Union) nor will it be possible to have Legislatures constituted in them before the Constitution of India emerges in its final form. We have, therefore, no option but to make the Constitution operative in these States on the basis of its acceptance by the Ruler or the Rajpramukh, as the case may be, who will no doubt consult his Council of Ministers." 190. In accordance with this statement, declarations were issued by the Rulers or Rajpramukhs accepting the Constitution. 191. It seems to me that when a Ruler or Rajpramukh or the people of the State accepted the Constitution of India in its final form, he did not accept it subject to the speeches made during the Constituent Assembly debates. The speeches can, in my view, be relied on only in order to see if the course of the progress of a particular provision or provisions throws any light on the historical background or shows that a common understanding or agreement was arrived at between certain sections of the people (see In re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada) 1932 AC 54 at p. 70 = (AIR 1932 PC 36).) 192. In this connection reference was made to Art. 305 of the draft Constitution which provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 304 of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution relating to the reservation of seats for the Muslims etc.,

shall not be amended during the period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution. Although this draft Article 305 has no counterpart in our Constitution, it was sought to be urged that this showed that every provision of the Constitution was liable to be amended. I have come to the conclusion that every provision is liable to be amended subject to certain limitations and this argument does not affect my conclusion implied limitations. @page-SC1517 193. A very important decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Bribery Commr. v. Pedrick Ranasinghe 1965 AC 172, throws considerable light on the topic under discussion. The import of this decision was not realised by this Court in Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 -(AIR 1967 SC 1643). Indeed, it is not referred to by the minority in its judgments, and Subba Rao, C. J., makes only a passing reference to it. In order to fully appreciate the decision of the Privy Council it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Ceylon Independence Order in Council, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Ceylon Constitution. 194. Part III of the Ceylon Constitution deals with "Legislature". Section 7 provides that "there shall be a Parliament of the island which shall consist of His Majesty, and two Chambers to be known respectively as the Senate and the House of Representatives." Section 18 deals with voting. It reads: "18 Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (4) of Section 29, any question proposed for decision by either Chamber shall be determined by a majority of votes of the Senators or Members, as the case may be, present and voting. The President or speaker or other person presiding shall not vote in the first instance but shall have and exercise a casting vote in the event of an equality of votes." 195. Section 29 deals with the power of Parliament to make laws. It reads. "29. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Order, Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Island (2) No such law shall (a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion, or (b) make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable; or (c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions; or (d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body, so however, that in any case where a religious body is incorporated by law, no such alteration shall be made except at the request of the governing authority of that body: Provided, however, that the preceding provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to any law making provision for, relating to, or connected with, the election of Members of the House of Representatives, to represent persons registered as citizens of Ceylon under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship Act). This proviso shall cease to have effect on a date to be fixed by the Governor-General by Proclamation published in the Gazette. (3) Any law made in contravention of sub-section (2) of this section shall, to the extent of such contravention, be void.

(4) In the exercise of its powers under this section, Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions of this Order, or of any other Order of Her Majesty in Council in its application to the Island: Provided that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the Provisions of this Order shall be presented for the Royal Assent unless it has endorsed on it a certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole number of members of the House (including those not present). Every certificate of the Speaker under this sub-section shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any court of law." 196. According to Mr. Palkhivala, Section 29 (1) corresponds to Arts. 245 and 246, and Section 29 (4) corresponds to Art. 368 of our Constitution, and Sections 29 (2) and 29 (3) correspond to Art. 13 (2) of our Constitution, read with fundamental rights. 197. The question which arose before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was whether S. 41 of the Bribery Amendment Act, 1958 contravened Section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution, and was consequently @page-SC1518 invalid. The question arose out of the following facts. The respondent, Ranasinghe, was prosecuted for a bribery offence before the Bribery Tribunal created by the Bribery Amend ment Act, 1958. Tribunal sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and fine. The Supreme Court on appeal declared the conviction and orders made against him null and inoperative on the ground that the persons composing the Tribunal were not validly appointed to the Tribunal. 198. Section 52 of the Ceylon Constitution provided for the appointment of the Chief Justice and Puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. Section 53 dealt with the setting up of the Judicial Service Commission, consisting of the Chief Justice, a Judge of the Supreme Court, and one other person who shall be, or shall have been a Judge of the Supreme Court. It further provided that no person shall be appointed as, or shall remain, a member of the Judicial Service Commission, if he is a Senator or a Member of Parliament. Section 55 provided for the appointment of other Judicial Officers. Section 55 (1) reads: "55. (1) The appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of judicial officers is hereby vested in the Judicial Service Commission." 199. The Judicial Committee deduced from these provisions thus: "Thus there is secured a freedom from political control, and it is a punishable offence to attempt directly or indirectly to influence any decision of the Commission (Section 56)." (P. 190) 200. The Judicial Committee then described the position of the Bribery Tribunal as follows: "A bribery tribunal, of which there may be any number, is composed of three members selected from a panel (section 42). The panel is composed of not more than 15 persons who are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Minister of Justice (Section 41). The Members of the panel are paid remuneration (section 45)." (p. 192) 201. The Judicial Committee held that the members of the Tribunal held judicial office and were judicial officers within S. 55 of the Ceylon Constitution. They found that there was a plain conflict between Section 55 of the Constitution and Section 41 of the Bribery Amendment Act under which the panel was appointed.

202. Then the Judicial Committee examined the effect of this conflict. After setting out Section 18, Section 29 (l) and Section 29 (2) (a), the Judicial Committee observed: "There follow (b), (c) and (d), which set out further entrenched religious and racial matters, which shall not be the subject of legislation. They represent the solemn balance of rights, between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which inter se they accepted the Constitution; and these are, therefore unalterable under the Constitution" (emphasis supplied) (p. 193) 203. After making these observations, the judicial Committee set out sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitution. The observations, which I have set out above, are strongly relied on by Mr. Palkhivala in support of his argument that Part III similarly entrenched various religious and racial and other matters and these represented solemn balance of rights between the citizens of India, the fundamental conditions an which inter se they accepted the Constitution of India and these are, therefore, unalterable under the Constitution of India. 204. Mr. Seervai, in reply, submitted that the word "entrenched" meant nothing else than that these provisions were subject to be amended only by the procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution. But I am unable to accept this interpretation because in that sense other provisions of the Constitution were equally entrenched because no provision of the Ceylon Constitution could be amended without following the procedure laid, down in S. 29 (4). 205. The interpretation urged by Mr. Palkhivala derives support in the manner the Judicial Committee distinguished McCawley's case (McCawley v. The King, 1920 AC 691 = (AIR 1920 PC 91). I may set out here @page-SC1519 the observations of the Judicial Committee regarding McCawley's case. They observed: "It is possible now to state summarily what is the essential difference between the McCawley case and this case. There the legislature, having full power to make laws by a majority, except upon one subject that was not in question, passed a law which conflicted with one of the existing terms of its Constitution Act. It was held that this was valid legislation, since it must be treated as pro tanto an alteration of the Constitution, which was neither fundamental in the sense of being beyond change nor so constructed as to require any special legislative process to pass upon the topic dealt with." (Emphasis supplied). (p. 198) 206. It is rightly urged that the expression ''which was neither fundamental in the sense of being beyond change" has reference to S. 29 (2) of the Ceylon Constitution. I have no doubt that the Judicial Committee held that the provisions of S. 29 (2) in the Ceylon Constitution were unamendable. I may mention that Prof. SA de Smith in reviewing the book "Reflections on the Constitution and the Constituent Assembly (Ceylon's Constitution)" by L. J. M. Cooray, reads the obiter dicta in 196a AC 172 (193-194) indicating that certain provisions of the Constitution were unalterable by the prescribed amending procedure. 207. It may be that these observations are obiter but these deserve our careful consideration, coming as they do from the Judicial Committee. 208. Why did the Judicial Committee say that the provisions of S. 29 (2) were "unalterable under the Constitution" or "fundamental in the sense of being beyond change"? There is nothing in the language of S. 29 (4) to indicate any limitations on the power of the Ceylon Parliament. It could "amend or repeal" any provision of the

Constitution, which included Section 29 (2) and S. 29 (4) itself. The reason could only be an implied limitation on the power to amend under Section 29 (4) deducible from "the solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which inter se they accepted the Constitution". Unless there was implied a limitation on the exercise of the amending power under Section 29 (4). Section 29 (4) could itself be amended to make it clear that Section 29 (2) is amendable. 209. This case furnishes an exact example where implied limitations on the power to amend the Constitution have been inferred by no less a body than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 210. Mr. Seervai relied on the portion within brackets of the following passage at pp. 197-198; ''These passages show clearly that the Board in McCawley's case, 1920 AC 691 = (AIR 1920 PC 91) took the view which commends itself to the Board in the present case, that (a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its powers to make law. This restriction exists independently of the question whether the legislature is sovereign, as is the legislature of Ceylon, or whether the Constitution is "uncontrolled," as the Board held the Constitution of Queensland to be. Such a Constitution can, indeed, be altered or amended by the legislature, if the regulating instrument so provides that if the terms of those provisions are complied with and the alteration or amendment may include the change or abolition of those very provisions.) But the proposition which is not acceptable is that a legislature, once established, has some inherent power derived from the mere fact of its establishment to make a valid law by the resolution of a bare majority which its own constituent instrument has said shall not be a valid law unless made by a different type of majority or by a different legislative process. And this is the proposition which is in reality involved in the argument." 211. The portion, not within brackets, which has been omitted in Mr. Seervai's written submissions, clearly shows that the Judicial Committee in this passage was not dealing with the amendment of S. 29 (2) of the Ceylon Constitution and had understood McCawley's case, 1920 AC 691 = (AIR 1920 PC 91) as not being @page-SC1520 concerned with the question of the amendment of a provision like S. 29 (2) of the Ceylon Constitution. This passage only means that a legislature cannot disregard the procedural conditions imposed on it by the constituent instrument prescribing a particular majority but may amend them if the constituent instrument gives that power. 212. The next passage, a part of which I have already extracted, which deals with the difference between McCawley's case, 1920 AC 691 = (AIR 1920 PC 91) and Ranasinghe's case, 1965 AC 172 (193-194) shows that the Judicial Committee in the passage relied on was dealing with the procedural part of Section 29 (4) of Ceylon Constitution. It reads: "It is possible now to state summarily what is the essential difference between the McCawley case and this case. There the legislature having full power to make laws by a majority, except upon one subject that was not in question, passed a law which conflicted with one of the existing terms of the Constitution Act. It was held that this was valid legislation, since it must be treated as pro tanto an alteration of the Constitution, which was neither fundamental in the sense of being beyond change nor so constructed as to require any special legislative process to pass upon the topic dealt with. In the present

case, on the other hand, the legislature has purported to pass a law which being in conflict with Section 55 of the Order in Council, must be treated, if it is to be valid, as an implied alteration of the Constitutional provisions about the appointment of judicial officers. Since such alterations, even if express, can only be made by laws which comply with the special legislative procedure laid down in Section 29 (4), the Ceylon legislature has not got the general power to legislate so as to amend its Constitution by ordinary majority resolutions, such as the Queensland legislature was found to have under Section 2 of its Constitution Act, but is rather in the position, for effecting such amendments, that that legislature was held to be in by virtue of its Section 9, namely compelled to operate a special procedure in order to achieve the desired result." (p. 198) 213. I may mention that the Judicial Committee while interpreting the British North America Act, 1867 had also kept in mind the preservation of the rights of minorities for they say In re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, 1932 AC 54 at p. 70 = (AIR 1932 PC 36): "inasmuch as the Act (The British North America Act) embodies a compromise under which the original Provinces agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that the preservation of the rights of minorities was a condition on which such minorities entered into the federation, and the foundation upon which the whole structure was subsequently erected. The process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim or to whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the federation was founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construction of the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 should impose a new and different contract upon the federating bodies." 214. The words of the Judicial Committee in Ranasinghe's case, 1965 AC 172 are apposite and pregnant. "They represent the solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which inter se they accepted the Constitution and these are, therefore, unalterable under the Constitution."It is true that the Judicial Committee in the context of minorities and religious rights in Ceylon used the word "unalterable". But the Indian context is slightly different. The guarantee of fundamental rights extends to numerous rights and it could not have been intended that all of them would remain completely unalterable even if Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution be taken to include constitutional amendments. A more reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole scheme of the Constitution is that some other meaning of "Amendment" is most appropriate. This conclusion is also reinforced by the concession of the Attorney-General and Mr. Seervai that the whole Constitution cannot be abrogated or repealed and a new one substituted. In other words, the expression "Amendment of this Constitution" does @page-SC1521 not include a revision of the whole Constitution. If this is true I say that the concession was rightly made-then which is that meaning of the word "Amendment'' that is most appropriate and fits in with the whole scheme of the Constitution. In my view that meaning would he appropriate which would enable the country to achieve a social and economic revolution without destroying the democratic structure of the Constitution and the basic inalienable rights guaranteed in Part III and without going outside the contours delineated in the Preamble. 215. I come to the same conclusion by another line of reasoning. In a written constitution it is rarely that everything is said expressly. Powers and limitations are implied from necessity or the scheme of the Constitution. I will mention a few instances approved by

the Judicial Committee and this Court and other Courts. I may first consider the doctrine that enables Parliament to have power to deal with ancillary and subsidiary matters, which strictly do not fall within the legislative entry with respect to which legislation is being undertaken. 216. Lefroy in "A short Treatise on Canadian Constitutional Law" (page 94) puts the matter thus: "But when it is (Dominion Parliament) legislating upon the enumerated Dominion subject-matters of Section 91 of the Federation Act, it is held that the Imperial Parliament, by necessary implication, intended to confer on it legislative power to interfere with, deal with, and encroach upon, matters otherwise assigned to the provincial legislatures under S.92, so far as a general law relating to those subjects may affect them, as it may also do to the extent of such ancillary provisions as may be required to prevent the scheme of such a law from being defeated. The Privy Council has established and illustrated this in many decisions." 217. This acts as a corresponding limitation on the legislative power of the Provincial or State legislatures. 218. This Court has in numerous decisions implied similar powers. (See Orient Paper Mills v State of Orissa (1962) 1 SCR 549 = (AIR 1961 SC 1438) Burmah Construction Co. 1973 S C/96 VIII G-6v. State of Orissa, 1962 Supp (l) SCR 242 = (AIR 1962 SC 1320), Navnit Lal Javeri v. Appellate Asst. Commr. of Income Tax, (1965) 1 SCR 909 = (AIR 1965 SC 1375, to mention a few). 219. It often happens that what has been implied by courts in one constitution is expressly conferred in another constitution. For instance, in the Constitution of the United States, clause 18 of Section 8 expressly grants incidental powers. ''The Congress shall have power.........to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." 220. It would not 'be legitimate to argue from the above express provision 'in the United States Constitution that if the constitution-makers wanted to give such powers to the Parliament of India they would have expressly conferred incidental powers. 221. Story says that clause 18 imports no more than would result from necessary implication (see pp. 112 and 113, Vol. 3) if it had not been expressly inserted. 222. In Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, 195$-2 SCR 225 at pp. 236, 237 = (AIR 1955 SC 549) this Court implied that "the President has thus been made a formal or constitutional head of the executive and the real executive powers are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet. The same provisions obtain in regard to the Government of States, the Governor or the Rajpramukh......... " 223. In Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 443 - (AIR 1970 SC 1102) Hegde, J., held that the Governor was essentially a constitutional head and the administration of State was run by the Council of Ministers. 224. Both these cases were followed by another constitution bench in U.N.R. Rao v. Smt Indira Gandhi (1971) 2 SCC 63 = (AII1 1971 SC 1002). 225. This conclusion constitutes an implied limitation on the powers of the President and the Governors. The Court further implied in Ram @page-SC1522 Jawaya Kapur's case,

(1955) 2 SCR 225 = (AIR 1955 SC 549) that the Government could without specific legislative sanction carry on trade and business. 226. To save time we did not hear Mr. Seervai on the last 3 cases just cited. I have mentioned them only to give another example. 227. It may be noted that what was implied regarding carrying on trade was made an express provision in the Constitution by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, when a new Art. 298, was substituted. The Federal Court and the Supreme Court of India have recognised and applied this principle in other cases. i) "A grant of the power in general terms standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implications of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act." (Per Gwyer C. J.: The C. P. & Berar Act, 1939 F.C.R. 18 at p. 42)=(AIR 1939 FC1)). ii) Before its amendment in 1905, Article 31 (2) was read as containing an implied limitation that the State could acquire only for a public purpose (the Fourth Amendment expressly enacted this limitation in 1955). (a) "One limitation imposed upon acquisition or taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking must be for public purpose". (Per Mukherjea, J., Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 at p. 902 = (AIR 1971 SC 41). ) (b) "The existence of a 'public purpose' is undoubtedly an implied condition of the exercise of compulsory powers of acquisition by the State......" (Per Mahajan J.: State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga, 1952 SCR 889 at p. 934 = (AIR 1952 SC 252). ) iii) The Supreme Court has laid down that there is an implied limitation on legislative power: the Legislature cannot delegate the essentials of the legislative functions. "........the legislature cannot part with its essential legislative function which consists in declaring its policy and making it a binding rule of conduct....the limits of the powers of delegation in India would therefore have to be ascertained as a matter of construction from the provisions of the Constitution itself and as I have said the right of delegation may be implied in the exercise of legislative power only to the extent that it is necessary to make the exercise of the power effective and complete. (Per Mukherjea J.: in re The Delhi Laws Act, 1951 SCR 747 at pp.984-5=(AIR 1951 SC 332).) The same implied limitation on the Legislature, in the field of delegation, has been invoked and applied in: Raj Narain Singh v. Patna Administration, (1955) 1 SCR 290 = (AIR 1954 SC 560). Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) 1 SCR 330 = (AIR 1954 SC 465); Vasantlal Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 341=(AIR 1961 SC 4); Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Mills (1968) 3 SCR 251 = (AIR 1968 SC 1232); Garewal v. State of Punjab, 1959 Supp. (1) SCR 792= (AIR 1959 SC 512). iv) On the power conferred by Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution to form a new State and amend the Constitution for that purpose limitation has been implied that the new State must"conform to the democratic pattern envisaged by the Constitution; and the power which the Parliament may exercise.... is not the power to override the constitutional scheme. No State can therefore be formed, admitted or set up by law under Art. 4 by the Parliament which has no effective legislative, executive and judicial organs. (Per Shah J.: Mangal

Singh v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 109 at p. 112 = (AIR 1967 SC 944) (Emphasis supplied). 228. It would have been unnecessary to refer to more authorities but for the fact that it was strenuously urged that there could not be any implied limitations resulting from the scheme of the Constitution. 229. Before referring to a recent decision of the Australian High Court, observations in certain earlier cases may be reproduced here: "Since the Engineers' case (19201 28, CLR 129 a notion seems to have gained currency that in interpreting @page-SC1523 the Constitution no implications can be made. Such a method of construction would defeat the intention of any instrument, but of all instruments, written constitution seems the last to which it could be applied. I do not think that the judgment of the majority of the court in the Engineers' case meant to propound such a doctrine.' (Per Dixon J.: West v. Commr. of Taxation (New South Wales) 56 CLR 657 at pp. 681-2)). "Some implications are necessary from the structure of the Constitution itself, but it is inevitable also, I should think, that these implications can only be defined by a gradual process of judicial decision" (Per Starke J., South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65 CLR 373, 447.) (Emphasis supplied). "The Federal character of the Australian. Constitution carries implications of its own.....Therefore it is beyond the power of either to abolish or destroy the other." (Per Starke J: Melbourne Corporation v. Common. wealth, 74 CLR 31 at p. 70): (Emphasis supplied). "The Federal system itself is the foundation of the restraint upon the use of the power to control the States ........Restraints to be implied against any exercise of power by Common wealth against State and State against Commonwealth calculated to destroy or detract from the independent exercise of the functions of the one or the other........" (Per Dixon 3.: Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth, 74 CLR 31 at pp. 81-2). 230. I may now refer to State of Victoria v. The Commonwealth, (1971) 45 ALRJ 251, 2,52 253 which discusses the question of implications to be drawn from a constitution like the Australian Constitution which is contained in the Commonwealth Act. It gives the latest view of that court on the subject. 231. The point at issue was whether the Commonwealth Parliament, in the exercise of its power under S. 51 (ii) of the Constitution (subject to the Constitution, to make laws with respect to taxation, but so as not to discriminate between States or parts of States) may include the Crown in right of a State in the operation of a law, imposing a tax or providing for the assessment of a tax. 232. Another point at issue was the status of the Commonwealth and the States under the Constitution. and the extent to which the Commonwealth Parliament may pass laws binding on the States, considered generally and historically, and with particular reference to the question whether there is any implied limitation on Commonwealth legislative power. It is the discussion on the latter question that is relevant to the present case. 233. There was difference of opinion among the Judges. Chief Justice Barwick held as follows: "The basic principles of construction of the Constitution were definitely enunciated by the Court in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., (1920) 28 CLR 129, (the Engineers' case) Lord, Selborne's language in Reg. v. Burah (1878) 3

App. Cas. 889 at pp. 904-905, was accepted and applied as was that of Earl Loreburn in Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada (1912) A.C. 571 at p. 583." 234. According to the Chief Justice, the Court in Engineers' case unequivocally rejected the doctrine that there was an 'implied prohibition" in the Constitution against the exercise in relation to a State of a legislative power of the Commonwealth once ascertained in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction, a doctrine which had theretofore been entertained and sought to be founded upon some supposed necessity of 'protection", as it were "against the aggression of some outside and possibly hostile body." The Court emphasized that if protection against an abuse of power were needed, it must be provided by the electorate and not by the judiciary. "The one clear line of judicial inquiry as to the meaning of the Constitution must be to read it naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law which preceded it and then lucet ipsa perse" (P. 253). 235. Now this is the judgment which is relied on by Mr. Seervai and the learned Attorney General. On the other hand, reliance is placed by Mr. Palkhivala on Menzies J' s judgment: @page-SC1524 "Does the fact that the Constitution is "federal" carry with it implications limiting the law-making powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth with regard to the States? To this question I have no doubt, both on principle and on authority, that an affirmative answer must be given. A constitution providing for an Indissoluble federal .Commonwealth must protect both commonwealth and States. The States are not outside the Constitution. They are States of the Commonwealth. S. 106. Accordingly, although the Constitution does, clearly enough, subject the States to laws made by the Parliament, it does so with some limitation.'' (p. 262) 236. After making these observations, the learned Judge examined authorities and he found support in (1947) 74 CLR 31; He then examined various other cases in support of the above principles. 237. The other passages relied on by the petitioners from the judgments of the other learned Judges on the Bench in that case are as follows: Windeyer, J: "In each case an implication means that something not expressed is to be understood. But in the one case, this involves an addition to what is expressed: in the other it explains, perhaps limits, the effect of what is expressed. It is in the latter sense that in my view of the matter, implications have- a place in the interpretation of the Constitution: and I consider it is the sense that Dixon 3. intended when in Australian National Airways Ptv. Ltd. v. The Common wealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29, he said (at p. 85): "We should avoid pedantic and narrow constructions in dealing with an instrument of government and I do not see why we should be fearful about making implications". His Honour, when Chief Justice, repeated this observation in Lamshed v. Lake (1958) 99 C.L.R. 132 at p. 144. I said in Spratt v. Hermes, (1965) 114 C.L.R 226, at p. 272, that it is well to remember it. I still think so. The only amendation that I would venture is that I would prefer not to say "making implications", because our avowed task is simply the revealing or uncovering of implications that are already there.

In Melbourne Corporation v. The Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31, Starke J. said (at p. 70): "The federal character of the Australian Constitution carries implications of its own". (p. 268). ................ "The position that I take is this: The several subject-matters with respect to which the Commonwealth is empowered by the Constitution to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth are not to be narrowed or limited by implications. Their scope and amplitude depend simply on the words by which they are expressed. But implications arising from the existence of the States as parts of the Commonwealth and as constituents of the federation may restrict the manner in which the Parliament can lawfully exercise its power to make laws with respect to a particular subject-matter. These implications, or perhaps it were better to say underlying assumptions of the Constitution, relate to the use of a power not to the inherent nature of the subject-matter of the law. Of course whether or not a law promotes peace, order and good government is for the Parliament, not for a court, to decide. But a law, although it be with respect to a designated subject-matter, cannot be for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth if it be directed to the States to prevent their carrying out their functions as parts of the Commonwealth." .......(p. 269) ...... ...... ...... Gibbs J. ... ... ... ... "The ordinary principles of statutory construction do not preclude the making of implications when these are necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature as revealed in the statute as a whole. The intention of the Imperial legislature in enacting the Constitution Act was to give effect to the wish of the Australian people to join in a federal union and the purpose of the Constitution was to establish a federal, and not a unitary system for the government of Australia and accordingly to provide for the distribution of the powers of government between the Commonwealth and the States who were to be the constituent members of the federation. In some respects the Common-wealth @pageSC1525 was placed in a position of supremacy, as the national interest required, but it would be inconsistent with the very basis of the federation that the Commonwealth's powers should extend to reduce the States to such a position of subordination that their very existence, or at least their capacity to function effectually as independent units, would be dependent upon the manner in which the Commonwealth exercised its powers, rather than on the legal limits of the powers themselves. Thus, the purpose of the Constitution, and the scheme by which it is intended to be given effect, necessarily give rise to implications as to the manner in which the Commonwealth and the States respectively may exercise their powers, vis-à-vis each other"... ... ... (p. 275). 238. Wynes (Wynes Legislative, Executive and Judicial Power) in Australia Fourth Edn. p. 503. in discussing the amendment of the Constitutions of the States of Australia sums up the position thus. I may refer only to the propositions which are relevant to our case. (1) Every State legislature has by virtue of Sec. 5 full powers of amendment of any provision respecting its constitution powers and procedures. (2) But it cannot (semble) alter its "representative" character. (3) The "Constitution" of a Legislature means its composition, form or nature of the House or Houses, and excludes any reference to the Crown.

(6) No Colonial Legislature can forever abrogate its power of amendment and thereby render its Constitution absolutely immutable. A law purporting to effect this object would be void under Sec. 2 of the Act as being repugnant to S. 5 thereof. 239. For proposition (2) above, reference is made in the footnote to Taylor v. The Attorney-General of Queensland. 23 CLR 457. The relevant passages which bear out the second proposition are: "I take the constitution of a legislature, as the term is here used, to mean the composition, form or nature of the House of Legislature where there is only one House, or of either House if the Legislative body consists of two Houses. Probably the power does not extend to authorize the elimination of the representative character of the legislature within the meaning of the Act. (p. 468 per Barton J.) "I read the word "constitution of such legislature,' as including the change from a unicameral to a bicameral system, or the reverse. Probably the "representative" character of the legislature is a basic condition, of the power relied on, and is preserved by the word "such", but, that being maintained. I can see no reason for cutting down the plain natural meaning of the words in question so as to exclude the power of a self-governing community to say that for State purposes one House is sufficient as its organ of legislation." (p. 474 4 per Isaacs J.) For proposition No. 3, see Taylor v. The Attorney-General of Queensland 23 CLR 457 and Clayton v. Heffron, (1960) 105 CLR 214 (251). 240. Then dealing with the Commonwealth Constitution, he states: "Another suggested limitation is based upon the distinction between the covering sections of the Constitution Act and the Constitution itself; it is admitted on all sides that S. 128 does not permit of any amendment to those sections. (And in this respect the Statute of Westminster does not confer any new power of amendment - indeed it is expressly provided that nothing in the statute shall be deemed to confer any power to repeal or alter the Constitution of the Constitution Act otherwise than in accordance with existing law). In virtue of their character of Imperial enactments the covering sections of the Constitution are alterable only by the Imperial Parliament itself. The question is, admitting this principle, how far does the Constitution Act operate as a limitation upon the amending power? It has been suggested that any amendment which would be inconsistent with the preamble of the Act referring to the 'indissoluble' character and the sections which refer to the "Federal" nature of the Constitution, would be invalid. There has been much conflict of opinion respecting this matter; the view here taken is that the preamble in no wise (way) affects the power of alteration." (p. 505) 241. In view of this conflict, no assistance can be derived from academic writing. @pageSC1526 242. The case of Attorney-General of Nova Scotia and the .Attorney General of Canada and Lord Nelson Hotel Company Ltd. (1951) SCR Canada 31 furnishes another example where limitations were implied. The Legislature of the Province of Nova Scotia contemplated passing an Act respecting the delegation of jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada to the Legislature of Nova Scotia and vice versa. The question arose whether, if enacted, the bill would be constitutionally valid since it contemplated delegation by Parliament of powers, exclusively vested in it by S. 91 of the British North America Act to the Legislature of Nova Scotia and delegation by that Legislature of powers, exclusively vested in Provincial Legislatures under S. 92 of the Act, to Parliaments.

243. The decision of the Court is summarised in the headnote as follows: "The Parliament of Canada and each Provincial Legislature is a sovereign body within the sphere, possessed of exclusive jurisdiction to legislate with regard to the subjectmatters assigned to it under S. 91 or S. 92, as the case may be. Neither is capable therefore of delegating to the other the powers with which it has been vested nor of receiving from the other the powers with which the other has been vested." 244. The Chief Justice observed: "The constitution of Canada does not belong either to Parliament, Or to the Legislatures; it belongs to the country and it is there that the citizens of the country will find the protection of the rights to which they are entitled. It is part of that protection that Parliament can legislate only on the subject-matters referred to it by section 91 and that each Province can legislate exclusively on the subject-matters referred to it by Sec. 92. (p. 34) 245. He further observed: "Under the scheme of the British North America Act there were to be, in the words of Lord Atkin in The Labour Conventions Reference (1937) A.C. 326 = (AIR 1937 PC 82), "Watertight compartments which are an essential part of the original structure." (p. 34) 246. He distinguished the cases of In re Gray, (1918) 57 Can SCR 150 and the Chemical Reference, 1943 SCR 1 (Canada) by observing that delegations such as in these cases were "delegations to a body subordinate to Parliament and were of a character different from the delegation meant by the Bill now submitted to the Court." 247. Kerwin, J., referred to the reasons of their Lordships in In Re The Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 AC 935 = (AIR 1919 PC 145) as instructive. After referring to the actual decision of that case, he referred to the observations of Lord Haldane, which I have set out later while dealing with the Initiative & Referendum case and then held: "The British North America Act divides legislative jurisdiction between the Parliament of Canada and the Legislatures of the Provinces and there is no way in which these bodies may agree to a different division." (p. 38) 248. Taschereau, J. observed: "It is a well settled proposition of law that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. None of these bodies can be vested directly or indirectly with powers which have been denied them by the B. N. A. Act, and which therefore are not within their constitutional jurisdiction." (p. 40) 249. He referred to a number of authorities which held that- neither the Dominion nor the Province can delegate to each other powers they do not expressly possess under the British North America Act. He distinguished cases like Hodge v. The Queen, (1883) 9 AC 117. In Re Gray 57 Can SCR 150, Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, 1938 AC 708= (AIR 1939 PC 36) and Chemicals Reference, 1943 SCR I (Canada) by observing: "In all these cases of delegation, the authority delegated its powers to subordinate Boards for the purpose of carrying legislative enactments into operation." (p. 43) 250. Justice Rand emphasized that delegation implies subordination and subordination implies duty.

251. Justice Fauteux, as he then was, first referred to the following @page-SC1527 observations of Lord Atkin in Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, 1937 AC 326 at p. 381 =(AIR 1937 PC 82). "No one can doubt that this distribution (of powers) is one of the most essential conditions, probably the most essential condition, in the interprovincial compact to which the British North America Act gives effect.' He then observed: "In the result, each of the provinces, enjoying up to the time of the union, within their respective areas and quoad one another, and independent, exclusive and over-all legislative authority, surrendered to and charged the Parliament of Canada with the responsibility and authority to make laws with respect to what was then considered as matters of common interest to the whole country and retained and undertook to be charged with the responsibility and authority to make laws with respect to local matters in their respective sections. This is the system of government by which the Fathers of Confederation intended - and their intentions were implemented in the Act-to "protect the diversified interests of the several provinces and secure the efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the union." (p. 56) 252. In the case just referred to, the Supreme Court of Canada implied a limitation on the power of Parliament and the Legislatures of the Provinces to delegate legislative power to the other although there was no express limitation, in terms, in Sections 91 and 92 of the Canadian Constitution. This case also brings out the point that delegation of law making power can only be to a subordinate body. Applying the ratio of this decision to the present case, it cannot be said that the State Legislatures- or Parliament acting in its ordinary legislative capacity, are subordinate bodies to Parliament acting under Article 368 of the Constitution. Therefore it is impermissible for Parliament under Art. 368 to delegate its functions of amending the Constitution to either the State legislatures or to its ordinary legislative capacity. But I will refer to this aspect in greater detail later when I refer to the case in re the Initiative and Referendum Act. 253. In Canada some of the Judges have implied that freedom of speech and freedom of the Press cannot be abrogated by Parliament or Provincial legislatures from the words in the Preamble to the Canadian Constitution i.e. "with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom" Some of these observations are "Although it is not necessary, of course, to determine this question for the purposes of the present appeal, the Canadian Constitution being declared to be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, I am also of opinion that as our constitutional Act now stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this right of discussion and debate. (Per Abbot J.: Switzmen v. Elbling, 1957 Can S.C. 285 at 328). "I conclude further that the opening paragraph of the preamble to the B.N.A. Act 1867 which provided for a 'Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom', thereby adopted the same constitutional principles and hence S. 1025 A is contrary to the Canadian Constitution, and beyond the competence of Parliament or any provincial legislature to enact so long as our Constitution remains in its present form of a constitutional democracy." (Per O'Halloran J. A. - Rex v. Hess (1949) 4 D.L.R. 199 at p. 208). "In Re Alberta Legislation, (1938) 2 D.L.R 81, S.C.R. l00, Sir Lyman P. Duff C.J.C. deals with this matter. The proposed legislation did not attempt to prevent discussion of affairs in newspapers but rather to compel the publication of statements as to the true and exact

objects of Governmental policy and as to the difficulties of achieving them. Quoting the words of Lord Wright M. R. in James v. Commonwealth of Australia, (1936) A.C. 578 at p. 627 freedom of discussion means 'freedom governed by law, he says at p. 107 D.L.R, p. 133 S.C.R.: "It is axiomatic that the practice of this right of free public discussion of public affairs, notwithstanding its incidental mischiefs, is the breath of life for parliamentary institutions." He deduces authority to protect it from the principle that the powers requisite for the preservation of the @page-SC1528 constitution arise by a necessary implication of the Confederation Act as a whole." (Per Rand J.: Samur v. City of Quebec (1953) 4 D.L.R. 641 at p. 671) (Emphasis supplied) 254. It is, however, noteworthy that the Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the Union of India conceded that implications can arise from a Constitution but said that no implication necessarily arises out of the provisions of Article 368. 255. I may now refer to another decision of the Judicial Committee in Liyange's case, (1967) 1 AC 259 which was relied on by Mr. Seervai to show that an amendment of the Constitution cannot be held to be void on the ground of repugnancy to some vague ground of inconsistency with the preamble. 256. The Parliament of Ceylon effected various modifications of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, 1962. The appellants were convicted by the Supreme Court of Ceylon for various offenses like conspiring to wage war against the Queen, etc. 257. The two relevant arguments were: "The first is that the Ceylon Parliament is limited by an inability to pass legislation which is contrary to fundamental principles of justice. The 1962 Acts' it is said, are contrary to such principles in that they not only are directed against individuals but also ex post facto create crimes and punishments, and destroy fair safeguards by which those individuals would otherwise be protected. The appellants' second conception is that the 1962 Acts offended against the Constitution in that they amounted to a direction to convict the appellants or to a legislative plan to secure the conviction and severe punishment of the appellants and thus constituted an unjustifiable assumption of judicial power by the legislature, or an interference with judicial power, which is outside the legislature's competence and is inconsistent with the severance of power between legislature, executive, and judiciary which the Constitution ordains." (p. 283) 258. Mr. Seervai relies on the answer to the first contention. According to Mr. Seervai, the answer shows that constituent power is different from legislative power and when constituent power is given, it is exhaustive leaving nothing uncovered. 259. The Judicial Committee after referring to passages from "The Sovereignty of the British Dominions" by Prof. Keith, and "The Statutes of Westminster and Dominion Status" by K. C. Wheare, observed at page 284: "Their Lordships cannot accept the view that the legislature while removing the fetter of repugnance to English law, left in existence a fetter of repugnance to some vague unspecified law of natural justice. The terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act and

especially the words "but not otherwise" in Section 2 make it clear that Parliament was intending to deal with the whole question of repugnancy ......." 260. The Judicial Committee referred to the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, and the Legislative Power of Ceylon and observed: "These liberating provisions thus incorporated and enlarged the enabling terms of the Act of 1865, and it is clear that the joint effect of the Order in Council of 1946 and the Act of 1947 was intended to and did have the result of giving to the Ceylon Parliament the full legislative powers of a sovereign independent State (See Ibralebbe v. The Queen, (1964) AC 900)." 261. Mr. Seervai sought to argue from this that similarly the amending power of Parliament under Article 368 has no limitations and cannot be limited by some vague doctrine of repugnancy to natural and inalienable rights and the Preamble. We are unable to appreciate that any analogy exists between Mr. Palkhivala's argument and the argument of Mr. Gratien. Mr. Palkhivala relies on the Preamble and the scheme of the Constitution to interpret Article 368 and limit its operation within the contours of the Preamble. The Preamble of the Constitution of India does not seem to prescribe any vague doctrines like the law of natural justice even if the latter, contrary to many @page-SC1529 decisions of our Court, be considered vague. 262. The case, however, furnishes another instance where implied limitations were inferred. After referring to the provisions dealing with "judicature" and the Judges, the Board observed: "These provisions manifest an intention to secure in the judiciary a freedom from political, legislative and executive control. They are wholly appropriate in a Constitution which intends that judicial power shall be vested only in the judicature. They would be inappropriate in a Constitution by which it was intended that judicial power should be shared by the executive or the legislature. The Constitution's silence as to the vesting of judicial power is consistent with its remaining, where it had, laid for more than a century, in the hands of the judicature. It is not consistent with any intention that henceforth it should pass to or be shared by, the executive or the legislature." 263. The Judicial Committee was of the view that there "exists a separate power in the judicature which under the Constitution as it stands cannot be usurped or infringed by the executive or the legislature". The Judicial Committee cut down the plain words of Section 29 (1) thus: "Section 29 (1) of the Constitution says: "Subject to the provisions of this Order Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Island". These words have habitually been construed in their fullest scope. Section 29 (4) provides that Parliament may amend the Constitution on a two-thirds majority with a certificate of the Speaker. Their Lordships however cannot read the words of Section 29 (1) as entitling Parliament to pass legislation which usurps the judicial power of the judicature-e g., by passing an Act of attainder against some person or instructing a judge to bring in a verdict of guilty against some one who is being tried-if in law such usurpation would otherwise be contrary to the Constitution." (p. 289) 264. In conclusion the Judicial Committee held that there was interference with the functions of the judiciary and it was not only the likely but the intended effect of the impugned enactments, and that was fatal to their validity.

265. Their Lordships uttered a warning which must always be borne in dealing with constitutional cases, "what is done once, if it be allowed, may be done again and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances. And thus judicial power may be eroded. Such an erosion is contrary to the clear intention of the Constitution". This was in reply to the argument that the Legislature had no such general intention to absorb judicial powers and it had passed the legislation because it was beset by a grave situation and it took grave measures to deal with it, thinking, one must presume, that it had power to do so and was acting rightly. According to their Lordships that consideration was irrelevant and gave no validity to acts which infringed the Constitution. 266. McCawley v. The King. 1920 AC 691 c (AIR 1920 PC 91), was strongly relied on by Mr. Seervai, The case was on appeal from the decision of the High Court of Australia, reported in 26 CLR 9. Apart from the questions of interpretation of sub-S. (6), Section 6 of the Industrial Arbitration Act,. 1916 and the construction of the Commission which was issued, the main question that was debated before the High Court and the Board was whether the Legislature of Queensland could amend a provision of the Constitution of Queensland without enacting a legislative enactment directly amending the Constitution. The respondents before the Board had contended as follows: "But an alteration to be valid must be made by direct legislative enactment. The Constitution can be altered but cannot be disregarded. So long as it subsists it is the test of the validity of legislation. The High Court of Australia so decided in Cooper's case, (1907) 4 CLR 1304 (p. 695). 267. The appellants, on the other hand, had contended that "the Legislature of Queensland has power by ordinary enactment passed by both houses and assented to by the Governor in the name of the Crown, to alter the constitution of Queensland, including the judicial institutions of the State and the tenure of the judges @page-SC1530 ......All the laws applying to Queensland which it is competent to the Queensland Legislature to alter can be altered in the same manner by ordinary enactment." 268. There was difference of opinion in the High Court. Griffith, C. J., was of the opinion that the Parliament of Queensland could not merely by enacting a law inconsistent with the Constitution Act of 1867 overrule its provisions, although it might with proper formality pass an Act which expressly altered or repealed it. Isaacs and Rich JJ., with whom the Board found themselves in almost complete agreement, held to the contrary. The Board, in dealing with the question, first referred to the "distinction between constitutions the terms of which may be modified or repealed with no other formality than is necessary in the case of other legislation, and constitutions which can only be altered with some special formality, and in some cases, by a specially convened assembly." 269. Then Lord Birkenhead, L. C., observed at page 704: "Many different terms have been employed in the text-books to distinguish these two contrasted forms of constitution. Their special qualities may perhaps be exhibited as clearly by calling the one a controlled and the other an uncontrolled constitution as by any other nomenclature. Nor is a constitution debarred from being reckoned as an uncontrolled constitution because it is not' like the British constitution, constituted by historic development but finds its genesis in an originating document which may contain some conditions which cannot be altered except by the power which gave it birth. It is of the greatest importance to notice that where the constitution is uncontrolled the

consequences of its freedom admit of no qualification whatever. The doctrine is carried to every proper consequence with logical and inexorable precision. Thus when one of the learned Judges in the Court below said that, according to the appellant, the constitution could be ignored as if it were a Dog Act, he was in effect merely expressing his opinion that the constitution was in fact controlled. If it were uncontrolled, it would be an elementary commonplace that in the eye of the law the legislative document or documents which defined it occupied precisely the same position as a Dog Act or any other Act, however humble its subject-matter." 270. Then, the Judicial Committee proceeded to deal with the Constitution of Queensland and held that it was an uncontrolled constitution. Later, their Lordships observed: "It was not the policy of the Imperial Legislature, at any relevant period, to shackle or control in the manner suggested the legislative powers of the nascent Australian Legislatures. Consistently with the genius of the British people what was given was given completely and unequivocally, in the belief fully justified by the event, that these young communities would successfully work out their own constitutional salvation." (p. 706) 271. Mr. Seervai sought to deduce the following propositions from this case: Firstly- (1) Unless there is a special procedure prescribed for amending any part of the Constitution, the constitution was uncontrolled and could be amended by an Act in the manner prescribed for enacting ordinary laws, and therefore, a subsequent law inconsistent with the Constitution would pro tanto repeal the Constitution: Secondly - (2) A constitution largely or generally uncontrolled may contain one or more provisions which prescribe a different procedure for amending them than is prescribed for amending an ordinary law, in which case an ordinary law cannot amend them and the procedure must be strictly followed if the amendment is to be effected; Thirdly- (3) Implications of limitation of power ought not to be imported from general concepts but only from express or necessarily implied limitations (i. e. implied limitation without which a constitution cannot be worked); and Fourthly- (4) colonial legislatures power of legislation as far back as 1865-S. 2-refused to put limitations of vague character, like general principles of law, but limited those limitations to objective standards like @page-SC1531 statutes and provisions of any Act of Parliament or order or regulation made under the Acts of Parliament." 272. I agree that the first and the second propositions are deducible from McCawley's case but I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that the third proposition enunciated by him emerges from the case. The only implied limitation which was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the Queensland legislature should first directly amend the Constitution and then pass an act which would otherwise have been inconsistent if the constitution had not been amended. It appears from the judgment of Isaac, J., and the Board that two South Australia Judges had earlier held that the legislation must be "with the object of altering the constitution of the legislature". Lord Selborne. when Sir Roundall Palmer, and Sir Robert Collier expressed dissent from their view and recommended the enactment of a statute like the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. 273. The fourth proposition states a fact. The fact that British Parliament in 1865 refused to put so called vague limitations does not assist us in deciding whether there cannot be implied limitations on the amending power under Art. 368.

274. I shall examine a little later more cases in which limitations on law-making power have been implied both in Australia, U.S.A. and in Canada. McCawley's case is authority only for the proposition that if the constitution is uncontrolled then it is not necessary for the legislature to pass an act labelling it as an amendment of the constitution; it can amend the constitution like any other Act. 275. Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan, (1982) AC 526, was concerned really with the interpretation of-Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and its impact on the powers of the legislature of the New South Wales. The Constitution Act, 1902, as amended in 1929, had inserted Section 7A, the relevant part of which reads as follows: "7A. (1) The- Legislative Council shall not be abolished nor, subject to the provisions of sub-section 6 of this section, shall its constitution or powers be altered except in the manner provided in this section. (2) A Bill for any purpose within sub-s. 1 of this section shall not be presented to the Governor for His Majesty's assent until the Bill has been approved by the electors in accordance with this section, (5) If a majority of the electors voting approve the Bill, it shall be presented to the Governor for His Majesty's assent. (6) The provisions of this section shall extend to any Bill for the repeal or amendment of this section, but shall not apply to any Bill for the repeal or amendment of any of the following sections of this Act, namely, Sections 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22." 276. Towards the end of 1930 two bills were passed by both Houses of the New South Wales legislature. The first Bill enacted that Section 7-A above referred. to was repealed, and the second Bill enacted by clause 2, sub-e. 1: "The Legislative Council of New South Wales is abolished." 277. The contentions advanced before the Judicial Committee were: "The appellants urge: (1) That the King, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly, had full power to enact a Bill repealing Section 7A. (2) That sub-s. 6 of S. 7-A of the Constitution Act is void, because: (a) The New South Wales Legislature has no power to shackle or control its successors, the New South Wales constitution being in substance an uncontrolled constitution; (b) It is repugnant to Section 4 of the Constitution Statute of 1855; (c) It is repugnant to Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. For the respondents it was contended : (1) That Section 7-A was a valid amendment of the constitution of New South Wales, validly enacted in the manner prescribed, and was legally binding in New South Wales. (2) That the legislature of New South Wales was given by Imperial statutes plenary power to alter the constitution, powers and procedure of such legislature. (3) That when once the legislature had altered either the constitution or powers and procedure, then the constitution and powers and procedure as they previously existed @page-SC1532 ceased to exist, and were replaced by the new constitution and powers. (4) That the only possible limitations of this plenary power were: (a) it must be exercised According to the manner and form prescribed by any Imperial or colonial law, and (b) the legislature must continue a representative legislature according to the definition of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. (5) That the addition of S. 7-A to the Constitution had the effect of: (a) making the legislative body consist thereafter of the King, the Legislative Council, the Assembly and

the people for the purpose of the constitutional enactments therein described, or (b) imposing a manner and form of legislation in reference to these constitutional enactments which thereafter became binding on .the legislature by virtue of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, until repealed in the manner and mode prescribed. (6) That the power of altering the constitution conferred by Section 4 of the Constitution Statute, 1855, must be read subject to the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and that in particular the limitation as to manner and form prescribed by the 1865 Act must be governed by subsequent amendments to the constitution whether purporting to be made in the earlier Act or not." (p. 537) 278. The Judicial Committee considered the meaning and effect of Section 5 of the Act of 1865, read in conjunction with Section 4 of the Constitution Statute. It is necessary to bear in mind the relevant part of Section 5 that reads as follows: "Section 5: Every colonial legislature and every representative legislature shall, in respect to the colony under its jurisdiction, have, and be deemed at all times to have had, full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers, and procedure of such legislature; provided that such laws shall have been passed in such manner and form. as may from time to time be required by any Act of Parliament, letters patent, Order in Council, or colonial law, for the time being in force in the said colony." 279. The Judicial Committee interpreted Section 5 as follows: "Reading the section as a whole, it gives to the legislatures of New South Wales certain powers, subject to this, that in respect of certain law, they can only become effectual provided they have been passed in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act still on the statute book. Beyond that, the words "manner and form" are amply wide enough to cover an enactment providing that a Bill is to be submitted to the electors and that unless and until a majority of the electors voting approve the Bill it shall not be presented to the Governor for His Majesty's assent." 280. The Judicial Committee first raised the question: "could that Bill, a repealing Bill, after its passage through both chambers, be lawfully presented for the Royal assent without having first received the approval of the electors in the prescribed manner?", and answered it thus: "In their Lordships' opinion, the Bill could not lawfully be so presented. The proviso in the second sentence of Section 5 of the Act of 1865 states a condition which must be fulfilled before the legislature can validly exercise its power to make the kind of laws which are referred to in that sentence. In order that Section 7-A may be repealed (in other words, in order that that particular law "respecting the constitution, powers and procedure" of the legislature may be validly made) the law for that purpose must have been passed in the manner required by Section 7-A, a colonial law for the time being in force in New South Wales." 281. This case has no direct relevance to any of the points raised before us. There is no doubt that in the case before us, the impugned constitutional amendments have been passed according to the form and manner prescribed by Article 368 of our Constitution. It is, however, noteworthy that in contention No. (4), mentioned above, it was urged that notwithstanding the plenary powers conferred on the Legislature a possible limitation was that the legislature must continue a representative legislature according to the definition of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. This is another illustration of a limitation implied on amending power. @page-SC1533

282. I may also refer to some of the instances of implied limitations which have been judicially accepted in the United States. It would suffice if I refer to Cooley on Constitutional Limitations and Constitution of the United States of America edited by Corwin (1952). 283. After mentioning express limitations, imposed by the Constitution upon the Federal power to tax, Cooley on 'Constitutional Limitations' (page 989) states: ".......but there are some others which are implied, and which under the complex system of American government have the effect to exempt some subjects otherwise taxable from the scope and reach, according to circumstances, of either the Federal power to tax or the power of the several States. One of the implied limitations is that which precludes the States from taxing the agencies whereby the general government per forms its functions. The reason is that, if they possessed this authority, it would be within their power to impose taxation to an extent that might cripple, if not wholly defeat, the operations of the national authority within its proper and constitutional sphere of action." 284. Then he cites the passage from the Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, (l8l6-19) 4 Law Ed 579 (607). 285. In "Constitution by the United States of America'' by Corwin, (1952) page 728-729 it is stated: "Five years after the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland that a State may not tax an instrumentality of the Federal Government, the Court was asked to and did re-examine the entire question in Osborn v. Bank of the United States. In that case counsel for the State of Ohio, whose attempt to tax the Bank was challenged, put forward two arguments of great importance. In the first place it was "contended, that, admitting Congress to possess the power, this exemption ought to have been expressly asserted in the act of incorporation; and, not being expressed, ought not to be implied by the Court." To which Marshall replied that "It is no unusual thing for an act of Congress to imply, without expressing' this very exemption from state control, which is said to be so objectionable in this instance. Secondly the appellants relied greatly on the distinction between the bank and the public institutions such as the -mint or the post-office. The agents in those offices are, it is said officers of Government, * * * Not so the directors of the bank. The connection of the Government with the bank, is likened to that with contractors." Marshall accepted this analogy, but not to the advantage of the appellants. He simply indicated that all contractors who dealt with the Government were entitled to immunity from taxation upon such transactions. Thus not only was the decision of McCulloch v. Maryland reaffirmed but the foundation was laid for the vast expansion of the principle of immunity that was to follow in the succeeding decades." 286. We need not examine the exact extent of the doctrine at the present day in the United States because the only purpose in citing these instances is to refute the argument of the respondents that there cannot be anything like implied limitations. 287. The position is given at p. 731, as it existed in 1952, when the book was written. Corwin sums up the position broadly at p. 736:. "Broadly speaking, the immunity which remains is limited to activities of the Government itself, and to that which is explicitly created by statute e. g. that granted to federal securities and to fiscal institutions chartered by Congress. But the term, activities, will be broadly construed." 288. Regarding the taxation of States, Cooley says at pp. 995-997:

"If the States cannot tax the means by which the national Government performs its functions, neither, on the other hand and for the same reasons, can the latter tax the agencies of the State Governments. The same supreme power which established the departments of the general government determined that the local governments should also exist for their own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in their common interest without them. Each of these several agencies is confined to its own sphere, and all @page-SC1534 are strictly subordinate to the constitution which limits them, and independent of other agencies, except as thereby made dependent. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which can be made to admit of any interference by Congress with the secure existence of any State authority within its lawful bounds. And any such interference by the indirect means of taxation is quite as much beyond the power of the national legislature as if the interference were direct and extreme. It has, therefore, been held that the law of Congress requiring judicial process to be stamped could not constitutionally be applied to the process of the State Courts; since otherwise Congress might impose such restrictions upon the State Courts as would put an end to their effective action, and be equivalent practically to abolishing them altogether. And a similar ruling has been made in other analogous cases. But 'the exemption of State agencies and instrumentalities from national taxation is limited to those which are of a strictly governmental character, and does not extend to those which are used by the State in the carrying on of an ordinary private business.' 289. I may mention that what has been implied in the United States is the subject-matter of express provisions under our Constitution (See Arts. 285, 287, 288 and 289). 290. It was urged before us that none of these cases dealt with implied limitations on the amending power. It seems to me that four cases are directly in point. I have referred already to: The Bribery Commr. v. Pedrick Ranasinghe, 1965 AC 172 Mangal Singh v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 109 at p. 112 = (AIR 1967 SC 944); Taylor v. AttorneyGeneral of Queensland, 23 CLR 457 and I will be discussing shortly In re The Initiative and Referendum Act, l919 AC 935=(AIR 19l9 PC 145). 291. What is the necessary implication from all the provisions of the Constitution? 292. It seems to me that reading the Preamble, the fundamental importance of the freedom of the individual, indeed its inalienability, and the importance of the economic, social and political justice mentioned in the Preamble, the importance of directive principles, the non-inclusion in Article 368 of provisions like Arts. 52, 53 and various other provisions to which reference has already been made an irresistible conclusion emerges that it was not the intention to use the word "amendment" in the widest sense. 293. It was the common understanding that fundamental rights would remain in substance as they are and they would not be amended out of existence. It seems also to have been a common understanding that the fundamental features of the Constitution, namely, secularism, democracy and the freedom of the individual would always subsist in the welfare state. 294. In view of the above reasons, a necessary implication arises that there are implied limitations on the power of Parliament that the expression "amendment of this Constitution" has consequently a limited meaning in our Constitution and not the meaning suggested by the respondents. 295. This conclusion is reinforced if I consider the consequences of the contentions of both sides. The respondents, who appeal fervently to democratic principles, urge that

there is no limit to the powers of Parliament to amend the Constitution. Article 368 can itself be amended to make the Constitution completely flexible or extremely rigid and unamendable. If this is so, a political party with a two-third majority in Parliament for a few years could so amend the Constitution as to debar any other party from functioning, establish totalitarianism, enslave the people, and after having effected these purposes make the Constitution unamendable or extremely rigid. This would no doubt invite extraconstitutional revolution. Therefore, the appeal by the respondents to democratic principles and the necessity of having absolute amending power to prevent a revolution to buttress their contention is rather fruitless, because if their contention is accepted the very democratic principles, which they appeal to, would disappear and a revolution would also become a possibility. @page-SC1535 296. However, if the meaning I have suggested is accepted a social and economic revolution can gradually take place while preserving the freedom and dignity of every citizen. 297. For the aforesaid reasons, I am driven to the conclusion that the expression "amendment of this Constitution" in Art. 368 means any addition or change in any of the provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble and the Directive Principles. Applied to fundamental rights, it would mean that while fundamental rights cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgments of fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest. 298. It is of course for Parliament to decide whether an amendment is necessary. The Courts will not be concerned with the wisdom of the amendment. 299. If this meaning is given it would enable Parliament to adjust fundamental rights in order to secure what the Directive Principles direct to be accomplished, while maintaining the freedom and dignity of every citizen. 300. It is urged by Mr. Seervai that we would be laying down a very unsatisfactory test which it would be difficult for the Parliament to comprehend and follow. He said that the constitution-makers had discarded the concept of "due process" in order to have something certain, and they substituted the words ''by authority of law" in Article 21. I am unable to see what bearing the dropping of the words "due process" has on this question. The Constitution itself has used- words like "reasonable restrictions" in Article 19 which do not bear an exact meaning, and which cannot be defined with precision to fit in all cases that may come before the Courts, it would depend upon the facts of each case whether the restrictions imposed by the legislature are reasonable or not. Further, as Lord Reid observed in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 (64-65). "In modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist. The idea of negligence is equally insusceptible of exact definition, but what a reasonable man would regard as fair procedure in particular circumstances and what he would regard as negligence in particular circumstances are equally capable of serving as tests in law, and natural justice as it has been interpreted in the Courts is much more definite than that" (emphasis supplied).

301. It seems to me that the concept of amendment within the contours of the Preamble and the Constitution cannot be said to be a vague and unsatisfactory idea which Parliamentarians and the public would not be able to understand. 302. The learned Attorney - General said that every pro provision of the Constitution is essential; otherwise it would not have been put in the Constitution. This is true. But this does not place every provision of the Constitution in the same position. The true position is that every provision of the Constitution- can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the constitution remains the same. The basic structure may be said to consist of the following features: (l) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2) Republican and Democratic forms of Government. (3) Secular character of the Constitution; (4) Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; (5) Federal character of the Constitution. 303. The above structure is built on the basic foundation, i. e., the dignity and freedom of the individual. This is of supreme importance. This cannot by any form of amendment be destroyed. 304. The above foundation and the above basic features are easily discernible not only from the preamble but the whole scheme of the @page-SC1536 Constitution, which I have already discussed. 305. In connection with the question of abrogation of fundamental rights, Mr. Seervai boldly asserted that there was no such thing a natural or inalienable rights because the scheme of Part III itself shows that non-citizens have not been given all the fundamental freedoms, for example, Article 19 speaks of only citizens. He says that if there were natural rights, why is it that they were not conferred on non-citizens The answer seems to be that they are natural rights but our country does not think it expedient to confer these fundamental rights, mentioned in Article 19, on non-citizens. Other rights have been conferred on noncitizens because the constitutionmakers thought that it would not be detrimental to the interests of the country to do so. 306. He then said that even as far as citizens are concerned, there is power to modify those rights under, Article 33 of the Constitution, which enables Parliament to modify rights in their application to the Armed Forces. This power has been reserved in order to maintain discipline among the armed forces, which is essential for the security of the country. But it does not mean that the rights cease to be natural or human rights. He then said that similarly, Article 34 restricts fundamental rights while martial law is in force in an, area. This again is-a case where the security of the country is the main consideration. Citizens have to undergo many restrictions in the interest of the country. 307. He then pointed out Articles 358 and 359 where certain right; are suspended during Emergency These provisions are again based on the security of the country. 308. He also relied on the words "rights conferred" in Article 13 (2) and "enforcement of any right' conferred by this Part" to show that they were not natural or inalienable and could not have been claimed by them. There is no question of the sovereign people claiming them from an outside agency. The people acting through the Constituent Assembly desired that the rights mentioned in Part III shall be guaranteed and therefore, Part III was enacted. In the context 'conferred' does not mean that some superior power

had granted these rights. It is very much like a King bestowing the title of "His Imperial Majesty' on himself. 309. I am unable to hold that these provisions show that some rights are not natural or inalienable rights. As a matter of fact, India was a party to the Universal Declaration of Rights which I have already referred to and that Declaration describes some fundamental rights as inalienable. 310. Various decisions of this Court describe fundamental rights as 'natural rights' or 'human rights'. Some of these decisions are extracted below. ''There can be no doubt that the people of India have in exercise of their sovereign will as expressed in the Preamble, adopted the democratic ideal, which assures to the citizen the dignity of the individual and other cherished human values as a means to the full evolution and expression of his personality, and in delegating to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary their respective powers in the Constitution reserved to themselves certain fundamental rights so-called, I apprehend, because they have been retained by the people and made paramount to the delegated powers, as in the American Model." (Per Patanjali Sastri, J., in 1950 SCR 88 (198-199) = (AIR 1950 SC 277) (emphasis supplied). (ii) ''That article (Article 19) enumerates certain freedoms under the caption "right to freedom'' and deals with those great and basic rights which are recognised and guaranteed as the natural rights inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country" (Per Patanjali Sastri, C. J. in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, 1954 SCR 587 (596) = (AIR 1954 SC 92). (emphasis supplied). "I have no doubt that the framers of our Constitution drew the same distinction and classed the natural right or capacity of a citizen 'to acquire, hold and dispose of property' with other natural rights and. freedoms inherent in the status of a free citizen and embodied them in @page-SC1537 Article 19 (1).......(ibid, p. 597)" (emphasis supplied). "For all these reasons, I am of opinion that under the scheme of the Constitution, all those broad and basic freedoms inherent in the status of a citizen as a free man are embodied and protected from invasion by the State under clause (1) of Article 19..." (ibid p. 600) (emphasis supplied)." (iii) "The people, however, regard certain rights as paramount, because they embrace liberty of action to the individual in matters of private life, social intercourse and share in the Government of the country and other spheres. The people who vested the three limbs of Government with their power and authority, at the same time kept back these rights of citizens and also sometimes of non-citizens, and made them inviolable except under certain conditions. The rights thus kept back are placed in Part III of the Constitution, which is headed 'Fundamental Rights', and the conditions under which these rights can be abridged are also indicated in that Part" (Per Hidyatullah J. in Ujjambai v. State of U. P., (l963) 1 SCR 773 (926-7)=(AIR 1962 SC 1621)), (emphasis supplied). The High Court of Allahabad has described them as follows: (iv) "....man has certain natural or inalienable rights and that it is the function of the State, in order that human liberty might be preserved and human personality developed, to give recognition and free play to those rights....." "Suffice it to say that they represent a trend in the democratic thought of our age." Motilal v. State of U. P., ILR (1951) 1 All 269 (387-8) = (AIR 1951 All 257) (FB) (emphasis supplied).

311. Mr. Seervai relied on the observations of S. K. Das, J., in Basheshar Nath v. C. I. T., 1959 Supp (1) SCR 528 (605) = (AIR 1959 SC 149): "I am of the view that the doctrine of 'natural rights' affords nothing but a foundation of shifting sand for building up a thesis that the doctrine of waiver does not apply to the rights guaranteed in Part III of our Constitution." 312. I must point out that the learned Judge was expressing the minority opinion that there could be a waiver of fundamental rights in certain circumstances. Das, C. J., and Kapur, J., held that there could be no waiver of fundamental rights founded on Article 14 of the Constitution, while Bhagwati and Subba Rao, JJ. held that there could be no waiver not only of fundamental rights enshrined in Article 14 but also of any other fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. 313. Article 14 has been described variously as follows: (1) "as the basic principle of republicanism" (per Patanjali Sastri C. J. in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 (293) =(AIR 1952 SC 75) ). (2) "as a principle of republicanism" (per Mahajan, J., Ibid, p. 313); (3) "as founded on a sound public policy recognised and valued in all civilized States." (Per Das C. J., in 1959 Supp (1) SCR 528 (551) = (AIR 1959 SC 149); (4) "as a necessary corollary to the high concept of the rule of law", (per Subba Rao, C. J. in Satwant Singh v. Passport Officer, New Delhi, (1967) 3 SCR 525 (542) = (AIR 1967 SC 1836); (5) "as a vital principle of republican institutions." (American Jurisprudence, Vol. 16, 2d. p. 731, Article 3913). 314. How would this test be operative vis-a-vis the constitutional amendments made hitherto? It seems to me that the amendments made by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, in Articles 15 and 19, and insertion of Article 31-A (apart from the question whether there was delegation of the power to amend the Constitution, and apart from the question as to abrogation), and the amendment made by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act in Art. 31 (2), would be within the amending power of Parliament under Art. 368. 315. Reference may be made to Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1973) 1 SCC 536 (546) = (AIR 1972 SC 963), where this Court repelled the argument of the learned counsel that the amendments made to Section 26 and 27 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir @page-SC1538 were bad because they destroyed the structure of the Constitution. The argument of the learned counsel was that fundamentals of the Jammu and Kashmir State Constitution had been destroyed. This argument was refuted in the following words. "But the passage cited by him can hardly be availed of by him for the reason that the amendment impugned by him, in the light of what we have already stated about the nature of the explanation to Art. 370 of our Constitution, does not bring about any alteration either in the framework or the fundamentals of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution. The State Governor still continues to be the head of the Government aided by a council of ministers and the only change effected is in his designation and the mode of his appointment. It is not as if the State Government, by such a change, is made irresponsible to the State Legislature, or its fundamental character as a responsible Government is altered. Just as a change in the designation of the head of that Government was earlier brought about by the introduction of the office of Sadar-i-Riyasat, so too a

change had been brought about in his designation from that of Sadar-i-Riyasat to the Governor. That was necessitated by reason of the Governor having been substituted in place of Sadar-i-Riyasat. There is no question of such a change being one in the character of that Government from a democratic to a non-democratic system." 316. Before parting with this topic I may deal with some other arguments addressed to us. Mr. Seervai devoted a considerable time in expounding principles of construction of statutes, including the Constitution. I do not think it is necessary to review the decisions relating to the principles of interpretation of legislative entries in Art. 245 and Art. 246 of the Constitution. The Federal Court and this Court in this connection have followed the principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee in interpreting Sections 91 and 92 of the Canadian Constitution. I have no quarrel with these propositions but I am unable to see that these propositions have any bearing on the interpretation of Article 368. The fact that legislative entries are given wide interpretation has no relevance to the interpretation of Article 368. The second set of cases referred to deal with the question whether it is legitimate to consider consequences of a particular construction. 317. He referred to Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositors, 1913 AC 107 (117-118). This decision does not support him in the proposition that consequences of a particular construction cannot be considered, for Lord Macnaghten observed at p. 117: "Now it is ''the universal cure", as Lord Wensleydale observed in Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61, 106, that in construing statutes, as in construing all other written instruments the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." 318. Then he observed at p. 118: "In the absence of a preamble there can, I think, be only two cases in which it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be strewn either that the words taken in their natural sense lead to some absurdity or that there is some other clause in the body of the Act inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the enactment in question construed in the ordinary sense of the language in which it is expressed." Lord Atkinson observed at pp. 121-122 : "It is no doubt well established that, in construing the words of a statute susceptible of more than one meaning, it is legitimate to consider the consequences which would result from any particular construction for, as there are many things which the Legislature is presumed not to have intended to bring about, a construction which would not lead to any one of these things should be preferred to one which would lead to one or more of them. But, as Lord Halsbury @page-SC1539 laid down in Cooke v. Charles A. Vogeler Co., 1901 AC 102 at p 107, a Court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision of a statute, except so far as it may help it in interpreting what the Legislature has said. If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning, the Legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced though it should lead to absurd or - mischievous results. If the language of this sub-section be not controlled by some of the other provisions of the statute, it must, since its language is plain and unambiguous, be enforced, and your Lordships' House sitting judicially is not

concerned with the question whether the policy it embodies is wise or unwise, or whether it leads to consequences just or unjust, beneficial or mischievous. " 319. The next case referred to is Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, (1887) 12 AC 575 (586), but this case is explained in Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, 1939 AC 117 (132-133) = (AIR 1939 PC 53). The Judicial Committee first observed: "It was rightly contended on behalf of the appellant that the Supreme Court and the Board have no concern with the wisdom of the Legislature whose Bill is attacked; and it was urged that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the views of members of the Court as to the serious consequences of excessive taxation on banks to lead to a conclusion that the Bill is ultra vires. Their Lordships do not agree that this argument should prevail in a case where the taxation in a practical business sense is prohibitive." 320. Then their Lordships made the following observations on the decision of the Judicial Committee in (1887) 12 AC 575 (586): "That case seems to have occasioned a difficulty in the minds of some of the learned Judges in the Supreme Court. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Quebec Act in that case was attacked on two specific grounds, first, that the tax was not "taxation with the Province," and secondly, that the tax was not a "direct tax". It was never suggested, and there seems to have been no ground for suggesting, that the Act was by its effect calculated to encroach upon the classes of matters exclusively within the Dominion powers. Nor, on the other hand, was there any contention, however faint or tentative, that the purpose of the Act was anything other than the legitimate one of raising a revenue for Provincial needs... It was never laid down by the Board that if such a use was attempted to be made of the Provincial power as materially to interfere with the Dominion power, the action of the province would be intra vires. 321. This case further shows that serious consequences can be taken into consideration. 322. I agree with the observations of Lord Esher in Queen v Judge of City of London Court; (1892) 1 QB 273 (290), cited by him. These observations are: "If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. In my opinion, the rule has always been this. If the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear, and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude that the legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation." 323. He then relied on the observations of Lord Greene, M. R., in Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary Mines Ltd., (1948) l Ch 145 (159). "There is one rule, I think, which is very clear - and this brings me back to where I started, the doctrine of absurdity that although the absurdity or the non-absurdity of one conclusion as compared with another may be of assistance, and very often is of assistance, to the Court in choosing between two possible meanings of ambiguous words, it is a doctrine which has to be applied with great care, remembering that judges may @page-SC1540 be fallible in this question of an absurdity, and in any event must not be applied so as to result in twisting language into a meaning which it cannot bear; it is a doctrine which must not be relied upon and must not be used to re-write the language in a way different from that in which it was originally framed." Earlier, he had said at p. 158: " "Absurdity" I cannot help thinking, like public policy, is a very unruly horse...."

324. As I read Lord Greene, what he meant to say was that "absurdity" was an unruly horse, but it can be of assistance, and very often is of assistance, in choosing between two possible meanings of ambiguous words, and this is exactly the use which this Court is entitled to make of the consequences which I have already mentioned. Mr. Seervai referred to State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, 1953 SCR 254 at p. 264= (AIR 1953 SC 10). Das J., observed: ''We are in agreement with learned counsel to this extent only that if the language of the article is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning then the duty of the Court is to adopt that meaning irrespective of the inconvenience that such a construction may produce. If, however, two constructions are possible, then the Court must adopt that which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well established provisions of existing law nugatory." 325. He also referred to the following passage in Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinghji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (1962) 1 SCR 896 at p 899=(AIR 1961 SC 1549): "It is one of the well established rules of construction that 'if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature.' It is equally well settled principle of construction that: 'where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty'." 326. What he urged before us, relying on the last two cases just referred to, was that if we construed the word "amendment" in its narrow sense, then there would be uncertainty, friction and confusion in the working of the system, and we should therefore avoid the narrow sense. 327. If Parliament has power to pass the impugned amendment acts, there is no doubt that I have no right to question the wisdom of the policy of Parliament. But if the net result of my interpretation is to prevent Parliament from abrogating the fundamental rights, and the basic features outlined above, I am unable to appreciate that any uncertainty, friction or confusion will necessarily result. 328. He also drew our attention to the following observations of Hegde; J., in Budhan Singh v. Nabi Bux, (1970) 2 SCR 10 at pp. 15, 16 =(AIR 1970 SC 1880): "Before considering the meaning of the word "held", it is necessary to mention that it is proper to assume that the law-makers who are the representatives of the people enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable. The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words, as observed by Crawford in his book on Statutory Construction the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the law-makers. In the

absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature @page-SC1541 there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent." 329. I am unable to appreciate how these observations assist the respondents. If anything, these observations are against them for when I come to the question of interpretation of the 25th amendment I may well approach the interpretation keeping those observations in mind. 330. Both Mr. Seervai and the learned Attorney General have strongly relied on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Federal Courts and the State Courts on the interpretation of Article V of the Constitution of the United States and some State Constitutions. Mr. Palkhiwala, on the other hand, relied on some State decisions in support of his submissions. 331. Article V of the Constitution of the United States differs greatly from Article 368 of our Constitution. For facility -of reference Article V is reproduced below: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." 332. It will be noticed that Article V provides for two steps to be taken for amending the Constitution. The first step is proposal of an amendment and the second step is ratification of the proposal. The proposal can be made either by two thirds of both Houses of Congress or by a convention called by the Congress on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of several States. 333. Congress determines which body shall ratify the proposal. It can either be the legislatures of three fourths of the States or by conventions in three fourth of the States. 334. If a proposal is made by a Convention and ratified by three fourths of the States in conventions it can hardly be doubted that it is amendment made by the people. Similarly if a proposal is made by the Congress and ratified by conventions there cannot be any doubt that it is the people who have amended the Constitution. Proposal by Congress and ratification by three fourths legislatures of the States can in this context be equated with action of the people. But what is important to bear in mind is that the Congress, a federal legislature, does not itself amend the Constitution. 335. In India, the position is different. It is Parliament, a federal legislature, which is given the power to amend the Constitution except in matters which are mentioned in the proviso. I may repeat that many important provisions including fundamental rights are not mentioned in the proviso. Can we say that an amendment made by Parliament is an amendment made by the people? This is one of the matters that has to be borne in mind while considering the proper meaning to be given to the expression "amendment of this Constitution" in Art. 368 as it stood before its amendment by the 24th Amendment.

336. Article V of the U. S. Constitution differs in one other respect from Art. 368. There are express limitations on amending power. The first, which has spent its force, was regarding the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article and the second relates to deprivation of a State's suffrage in the Senate without its consent. Apart from the above broad differences in Art. V as compared to Art. 368, the Constitution of India is different in many respects which has a bearing on the extent of the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution. In brief they are: the background of the struggle for freedom, various national @page-SC1542 aspirations outlined during this struggle, the national objectives as recited in the Objectives Resolution dated January 22, 1947 and the Preamble, the complex structure of the Indian nation consisting as it does of various peoples with different religions and languages and in different stages of economic development. Further the U. S. Constitution has no Directive Principles as has the Indian Constitution. The States in U. S. have their own Constitutions with the right to modify them consistently with the federal Constitution. In India the States have no power to amend that part of the Indian Constitution which lays down their Constitution. They have legislative powers on certain specified subjects the residuary power being with Parliament. 337. I may before referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States say that that court has hitherto not been confronted with the question posed before us: Can Parliament in exercise of its powers under Art. 368 abrogate essential basic features and one fundamental right after another including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of life? The American decisions would have been of assistance if this fundamental question had arisen there and if the power to amend the Federal Constitution had been with two thirds majority of the Congress. 338. The question before the Court in Hawke v. Sminth, (1919) 64 Law Ed. 871 was whether the States while ratifying proposals under Article V of the Constitution were restricted to adopt the modes of ratification mentioned in Article V, i.e. by the legislatures or by conventions therein, as decided by Congress, or could they ratify a proposed amendment in accordance with the referendum provisions contained in State Constitutions or statutes. 339. The Court held that "the determination of the method of ratification is the exercise of a national power specifically granted by the Constitution" and "the language of the article is plain, and admits of no doubt in its interpretation." The Court also held that the power was conferred on the Congress and was limited to two methods: by action of the legislatures of three fourths of the states, or conventions in a like number of states. 340. The Court further held that the power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution had its source in the Federal Constitution and the act of ratification by the state derived its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the state and its people had alike assented. 341. This case is of no assistance to us in interpreting Art. 368 of the Constitution. 342. I may now refer to decision of the Supreme Court, Rhode Island v. Palmer, (1919) 64 Law Ed 948. This case was concerned with the validity of the 18th Amendment and of certain general features of the National Prohibition Law known as Volstead Act. No reasons were given by the Court for the conclusions arrived at. The conclusions which

may have some relevance for us are conclusions 4 and 5. The learned counsel sought to deduce the reasons for these conclusions from the arguments addressed and reported in 64 L. Ed. 946 and for the reasons given by the learned Judge in 264 Fed. Rep. 186 but impliedly rejected by the Supreme Court by reversing the decision. 343. Counsel sought to buttress this argument by citing views of learned American authors that the arguments against the validity of the 18th Amendment were brushed aside although no reasons are given. I have great respect for the Judges of the Supreme Court of United States, but unless the reasons are given for a judgment it is difficult to be confident about the ratio of the decision. Apart from the decision, I would be willing to hold the 18th Amendment valid if it had been enacted -by our Parliament and added to our Constitution, for I would discern no such taking away of Fundamental Rights or altering the basic structure of the Constitution as would place it outside the contours of the Preamble and the basic features of the Constitution. 344. United States of America v. William H. Sorague, (1930) 75 Law Ed 640 was concerned with the validity of the 18th Amendment. The @page-SC1543 District Court had held in 44F (2d 967) that the 18th Amendment had not been properly ratified so as to become part of the Constitution. It was the contention of the respondents before the Supreme Court that notwithstanding the plain language of Article V, conferring upon the Congress the choice of method of ratification, as between action by legislatures and by conventions, this Amendment could only be ratified by the latter. The respondents urged that there was a difference in the kind of amendments, as, e.g. "mere changes in the character of federal means or machinery, on the one hand, and matters affecting the liberty of the citizen on the other."There was no question as to ambit of the power of amendment. In other words, there was no question that the subject-matter of amendment, namely, prohibition, fell within Article V of the Constitution. 345. The Court held that the choice of the mode rested solely in the discretion of the Congress. They observed: "It was submitted as part of the original draft of the Constitution to the people in conventions assembled. They deliberately made the grant of power to Congress in respect to the choice of the mode of ratification of amendments. Unless and until that Article be changed by amendment, Congress must function as the delegated agent of the people in the choice of the method of ratification." 346. The Court further held that the 10th Amendment had no limited and special operation upon the people's delegation by Article V of certain functions to the Congress. 347. I am unable to see how this case helps the respondents in any manner. On the plain language of the article the Court came to the conclusion that the choice of the method of ratification had been entrusted to the Congress. We are not concerned with any such question here. 348. Mr. Seervai urged that the judgment of the District Court showed that the invalidity of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution could be rested on two groups of grounds; group A consisted of grounds relating to the meaning of the word "amendment" and the impact of the 10th Amendment or the nature of the federal system on Art. V of the Constitution, and that Article V by providing the two alternative methods of ratification by convention and legislature showed that the convention method was essential for valid ratification when the amendment affected the rights of the people. Group B consisted of

the grounds on which the District Court declared the 18th amendment to be invalid and those were that "the substance of an amendment and therefore of course of an entirely new Constitution, might have to conform to the particular theories of political science, sociology, economics, etc. held by the current judicial branch of the Government." 349. He then pointed out that grounds mentioned in Group B. which were very much like Mr. Palkhiwala's arguments, were not even urged by counsel in the Supreme Court, and, therefore we must regard these grounds as extremely unsound. I, however, do not find Mr. Palkhiwala's arguments similar to those referred to in Group B. It is true articles like Marbury's ''The Limitations upon the Amending Power, - 33 Harvard Law Rev. 232", and McGoveney's "Is the Eighteenth Amendment void because of its content?" (20 Col. Law Rev. 499), were brought to our notice but for a different purpose. Indeed the District Judge criticised these writers for becoming enmeshed "in a consideration of the constitutionality of the substance of the amendment" - the point before us. As the District Judge pointed out, he was concerned with the subject-matter of the 18th Amendment because of the relation between that substance or so subject-matter and the manner of its adoption. (p. 969) 350. I do not propose to decide the validity of the amendment on the touchstone of any particular theory of political science, sociology, economics. Our Constitution is capable of being worked by any party having faith in democratic institutions. The touchstone will be the intention of the Constitution-makers, which we can discern from the constitution and the circumstances in which it was drafted and enacted. @page-SC1544 351. A number of decisions of State Courts were referred to by both the petitioners and the respondents. But the State Constitutions are drafted in such different terms and conditions that it is difficult to derive any assistance in the task before us. Amendments of the Constitution are in effect invariably made by the people. 352. These decisions on the power to amend a Constitution are not very helpful because "almost without exception amendment of a State constitution is effected, ultimately, by the vote of the people. Proposed amendments ordinarily reach the people for approval or disapproval in one of two ways; by submission from a convention of delegates chosen by the people for the express purpose of revising the entire instrument, or by submission from the legislature of propositions which the legislature has approved, for amendment of the constitution in specific respects. However, in some states constitutional amendments may be proposed by proceedings under initiative and referendum, and the requirements governing the pat-age of statutes by initiative and referendum are followed in making changes in the state constitutions." (American Jurisprudence, Vol. 16. 2d. p. 201). In footnote 9 it is stated: "Ratification or non-ratification of a constitutional amendment is a vital element in the procedure to amend the constitution." (Towns v. Suttles 208 Ga 838, 69 SE 2d 742) The Question whether the people may by the terms of the constitution, delegate their power to amend to others - for example, to a constitutional convention - is one on which there is a notable lack of authority. An interesting question arises whether this power could be delegated to the legislature, and if so, whether the instrument which the legislature would then be empowered to amend would still be a constitution in the proper sense of the term."

353. This footnote brings out the futility of referring to decisions to interpret a constitution, wherein power to amend has been delegated to Parliament. 354. That there is a distinction between the power of the people to amend a Constitution and the power of the legislature to amend the same was noticed by the Oregon Supreme Court in Ex Parte Mrs. D. C. Kerby, 36 ALR 1451, one of the cases cited before us by the respondent. McCourt, J. speaking for the Court distinguished the case of Eason v. State in these words: "Petitioner cites only one authority that has any tendency to support the contention that a provision in the bill of rights of a constitution cannot be amended - the case of Eason v. State, supra. Upon examination that case discloses that the Arkansas Constitution provided that the legislature might, by the observation of a prescribed procedure, amend the Constitution without submitting the proposed amendment to a vote of the people of the state, and the Bill of Rights in that Constitution contained a provision not found in the Oregon Constitution, as follows: "Everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government." The court held that the clause quoted exempted the provisions in the Bill of Rights from the authority delegated to the legislature to amend the Constitution, and reserved the right to make any such amendment to the people themselves, so that the case is in fact an authority in support of the right of the people to adopt such an amendment. The case is readily distinguished from the instant case, for every proposed amendment to the Oregon Constitution, in order to become effective, must be approved by a majority vote of the people, recorded at a state election, and consequently, when approved and adopted, such an amendment constitutes a direct expression of the will of the people in respect to the subject embraced by the particular measure, whether the same be proposed by initiative petition or by legislative resolution." 355. No report of the decision in Eason v. State is available to me but it appears from the annotation at page 1457 that it was conceded that a constitutional provision might be repealed if done in the proper manner, viz., by the people, who have the unqualified right to act in the matter. The Court is reported to have said: @page-SC1545 "And this unqualified right they can constitutionally exercise by means of the legislative action of the general assembly in providing by law for the call of a convention of the whole people to reconstruct or reform the government, either partially or entirely. And such convention, when assembled and invested with the entire sovereign power of the whole people (with the exception of such of these powers as have been delegated to the Federal government), may rightfully strike out or modify any principle declared in the Bill of Rights, if not forbidden to do so by the Federal Constitution." 356. Both sides referred to a number of distinguished and well-known authors. I do not find it advantageous- to refer to them because the Indian Constitution must be interpreted according to its own terms and in the background of our history and conditions. Citations of comments on the Indian Constitution would make this judgment cumbersome. I have had the advantage of very elaborate and able arguments on both sides and I must apply my own mind to the interpretation. 357. The learned Attorney-General brought to our notice extracts from 71 Constitutions. I admire the research undertaken but I find it of no use to me in interpreting Art. 368. First the language and the setting of each Constitution is different. Apart from the decisions of the Courts in United States there are no judicial decisions to guide us as to the meaning of

the amending clauses in these constitutions. Further, if it is not helpful to argue from one Act of Parliament to another (see Commr. of Stamps, Straits Settlements v. Oei Tjong Swan, 1933 AC. 378 at p. 389), much less would it be helpful to argue from one Constitution to another different Constitution (see Bank of Toranto v. Lambe, (1887) 12 AC 575 at P. 587). 358. During the course of the arguments I had drawn the attention of the Counsel to the decision of the Supreme Court of Ireland in State (at the prosecution of Jeremiah Ryan) v Captain Michael Lennon, 1935 Ir. R. 170 and the respondents place great reliance on it. I may mention that this case was not cited before the Bench hearing Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643). On careful consideration of this case, however, I find that this case is distinguishable and does not afford guidance to me in interpreting Article 368 of the Constitution. 359. In order to appreciate the difference between the structure of Art. 50 of the Irish Constitution of 1922 and Article 368 of the Indian Constitution, it is necessary to set out Article 50, before its amendment. It reads: "50. Amendments of this Constitution within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty may be made by the Oireachtas but no such amendment, passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, after the expiration of a period of eight years from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, shall become law, unless the same shall, after it has been passed or deemed to have been passed by the said two Houses of the Oireachtas, have been submitted to a Referendum of the people, and unless a majority of the voters on the register shall have recorded their votes on such Referendum, and either the votes of a majority of the voters on the register, or two-thirds of the votes recorded, shall have been cast in favour of such amendment. Any such amendment may be made within the said period of eight years by way of ordinary legislation, and as such shall be subject to the provisions of Art. 47 hereof." 360. It will be noticed that after the expiry of the period of eight years mentioned in the article, the amending power was not with the Oireachtas as every amendment had to be first passed by the two Houses of the Oireachtas and then submitted to a referendum of the people, and the condition of the referendum was that a majority of the voters on the register shall have recorded their votes on such referendum, and either the votes of a majority of the voters on the register, or two-thirds of the votes recorded shall have been cast in favour of such amendment. So, in fact, after the expiry of the first eight years, the amendments had to be made by the people themselves. In @page-SC1546 our Article 368 people as such are not associated at all in the amending process. 361. Further, the Irish Constitution differed from the Indian Constitution in other respects. It did not have a Chapter with the heading of fundamental rights, or a provision like our Art. 32 which is guaranteed. The words "fundamental rights" were deliberately emitted from the Irish Constitution (see foot note 9 page 67, The Irish Constitution by Barra O' Briain, 1929). At the same time, there was no question of any guarantee to any religious or other minorities in Ireland. 362. It will be further noticed that for the first eigth years an amendment could be made by way of ordinary, legislation, i. e., by ordinary legislative procedure. The sixth amendment had deleted from the end of this article the words "and as such shall he subject to the provisions of Article 47 which provided for a referendum hereof." In ether

words, for the first eight years it was purely a flexible constitution, a constitutional amendment requiring no special procedure. 363. With these differences m mind, I may now approach the actual decision of the Supreme Court. 364. The High Court and the Supreme Court were concerned with the validity of the Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Act, 1931 (No. 37 of 1931) having regard to the provisions of the Constitution. The validity of that Act depended on the validity of the Constitution (Amendment No. 10) Act, 192P, No. 8 of 1928, and of the Constitution (Amendment No. 16) Act, 1929, No. 10 of 1929. 365. The Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Act 1931 was passed as an Act of the Oireachtas on October 17, 1931 i.e. some 11 months after the expiry of the period of 8 years mentioned in Article 50 of the Constitution, as originally enacted. It was not submitted to a referendum of the people. It was described in its long title as an "Act to amend the Constitution by inserting therein an Article making better prevision for safeguarding the rights of the people and containing provisions for meeting a prevalence of disorder." But there is no doubt that it affected various human rights which were granted in the Irish Constitution. 366. The Constitution (Amendment No. 10) Act No. 8 of 1928 removed Articles 47 and 48 of the Constitution and also the words "and as such shall be subject to the provisions of Article 47 thereof" from the end of Article 50 as originally enacted. Constitution (Amendment No. 16) Act No. 10 of 1929 purported to amend Article 50 of the Constitution by deleting the words "eight years" and inserting in place thereof the words "sixteen years', in that Article. 367. The impugned amendment was held valid by the High Court. Sullivan P. J. interpreted the word ''amendment" in Art. 50 widely relying on Edwards v. Attorney General for Canada, 1930 AC 124. Meredith J. relied on the fact that the width of the power of amendment for the period during the first eight years was coextensive with the period after eight years and he could find no distinction between Articles of primary importance or secondary importance. O'Byrne J. could not see any distinction between the word "amendment" and the words "amend or repeal." 368. In the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice first noticed "that the Constitution was enacted by the Third Dail, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, and not by the Oireachtas, which, in fact, it created." He read three limitations in the Constitution. The first he described as the over-all limitation, thus: "The Constituent Assembly declared in the forefront of the Constitution Act (an Act which it is not within the power of the Oireachtas to alter, or amend, or repeal), that all lawful authority comes from God to the people, and it is declared by Article 2 of the Constitution that "all powers of government and all authority, legislative, executive and judicial in Ireland are derived from the people of Ireland...." (p. 204) 369. The limitation was deduced thus: "It follows that every act, whether legislative, executive or judicial, in order to be lawful under the @page-SC1547 Constitution, must be capable of being justified under the authority thereby declared to be derived from God."

370. Now this limitation in so far as it proceeds from or is derived from the belief in the Irish State that all lawful authority comes from God to the people, can have no application to our Constitution. 371. The second limitation he deduced from Section 2 of the Irish Free State Act and Article 50 of the Irish Constitution. It was that any amendment repugnant to the Scheduled Treaty shall be void and inoperative. 372. The third limitation was put in these words: "The Third Dail Eireann has, therefore, as Constituent Assembly, of its own supreme Authority, proclaimed its acceptance of and declared, in relation to the Constitution which it enacted, certain principles, and in language which shows beyond doubt that they are stated as governing principles which are fundamental and absolute (except as expressly qualified), and, so, necessarily, immutable. Can the power of amendment given to the Oireachtas be lawfully exercised in such a manner as to violate these principles which, as principles, the Oireachtas has no power to change? In my opinion there can be only one answer to that question, namely, that the Constituent Assembly cannot be supposed to have in the same breath declared certain principles to be fundamental and immutable, or conveyed that sense in other words, as by a declaration of inviolability, and at the same time to have conferred upon the Oireachtas power to violate them or to alter them. In my opinion, any amendment of the Constitution, purporting to be made under the power given by the Constituent Assembly, which would be a violation of, or be inconsistent with, any fundamental principle so declared, is necessarily outside the scope of the power and invalid and void." (p. 209) 373. He further said that these limitations would apply even after the expiry of eight years. He said: "I have been dealing with limitations of the power of amendment in relation to the kinds of amendments which do not fall within the scope of the power and which are excluded from it always, irrespective of the time when, i.e. within the preliminary period of eight years or after, or the process by which, the amendment is attempted." (p. 209) 374. He then approached the validity of the 16th Amendment in these words: ''Was, then, the Amendment No. 16 lawfully enacted by Act No. 10 of 1929? There are two principal grounds for impeaching its validity; the first, the taking away whether validly or not, in any case the effective removal from use, of the Referendum and the right to demand a Referendum; the second, that the Amendment No. 16 is not within the scope of the power of amendment, and therefore the Oireachtas was incompetent to enact it " (P. 212) 375. He thought: "The Oireachtas, therefore, which owes its existence to the Constitution, had upon its coming into being such, and only such, power of amendment' (if any) as had been given it by the Constituent Assembly in the Constitution, that is to say, the express power set out in Article 50, and amendments of the Constitution could only be validly made within the limits of that power and in the manner prescribed by that power." (p. 213) 376. He then observed: ''Now, the power of amendment is wholly contained in a single Article, but the donee of the power and the mode of its exercise are so varied with regard to a point of time as to make it practically two separate powers, the one limited to be exercised only during the preliminary period of eight years the other, a wholly different and permanent power, to

come into existence after the expiry of that preliminary period and so continue thereafter." (p. 213) 377. After referring to the condition (it shall be subject to the provisions of Article 47) he thought: "The Constituent Assembly, even during the preliminary period, would not relax the ultimate authority of the people, and expressly reserved to the people the right to intervene when they considered it necessary to restrain the action of the Oireachtas @page-SC1548 affecting the Constitution. The frame of this provision makes it clear to my mind that, even if, by amendment of the Constitution under the power, Article 47 might cease to apply to ordinary legislation of the Oireachtas, the provisions of that clause were declared, deliberately, expressly and in a mandatory way, to be kept in force and operative for the purpose of amendments of the Constitution during the preliminary period of eight years." (p. 213) 378. According to him "the permanent power of amendment, to arise at the expiry of the period of eight years, is a wholly different thing both as to the donee of the power and the manner of its exercise " 379. He held that it was not competent for the Oireachtas to remove from the power granted to it by the Constituent Assembly the requisites for its exercise attached to it in the very terms of donation of the power. He observed: "That provision of the Statute, No. 8 of 1928, was bad, in my opinion, as being what is called in the general law of powers 'an excessive execution.' It was outside the scope of the power. We have not keen referred to, nor have I found, any precedent for such a use of a power. I do not believe that there can be a precedent because it defies logic and reason. It was, therefore, invalid in my opinion." (p. 216) 380. Regarding the substitution of "sixteen years" for the words "eight years" he said: "If this amendment is good there is no reason why the Oireachtas should not have inserted or should not even yet insert, a very much larger term of years or, indeed, delete the whole of Article 50 from the words "by the Oireachtas" in the second line to the end of the Article." (p. 216) 381. Later he observed: "The attempt to take from the people this right, this exclusive power and authority and to confer on the Oireachtas a full and uncontrolled power to amend the Constitution without reference to the people (even though for a period of years, whether it be until 1938 or Tibb's Eve, a matter of indifference in the circumstances) was described- by counsel in, I think accurate language, as a usurpation, for it was done in my opinion without legal authority." (p. 217) 382. He then repelled the argument that Section 50 conferred the power to amend the Article itself. His reasons for 'this conclusion are summarised thus at page 219: "In my opinion, on the true interpretation of the power before us, upon a consideration of express prohibition, limitations and requirements of the clause containing it, the absence of any express authority, the donation of the effective act in the exercise of the power to the people as a whole, the relevant surrounding circumstances to which I have already referred and the documents and their tenor in their entirety, there is not here, either expressly or by necessary implication, any power to amend the power of amendment itself."

383. I cannot agree with the learned Attorney-General that the sole basis of Kennedy C. J.'s decision was that Article 50 did not contain an express power of amending the provisions of Article 50 itself. He gave various reasons which I have referred to above. 384. Fitz Gibbon J. held that the word "amendment" was wide enough to include a power to amend or alter or repeal and there is no express prohibition in Article 50 itself that any article of the Constitution including Article 50 could not be amended. The only limitation that he could find was that the provisions of the Scheduled Treaty could not be amended. He observed: "I see no ground for holding that either of these Articles could not have been amended by the Oireachtas subject to a Referendum of the people after the period of eight years, and, if so, it follows that the same amendment, e. g., the deletion of the word "no" in Article 43 could be made "by way of ordinary legislation" within that period, or within sixteen years, after eight had been altered to sixteen". (p. 228) 385. In other words, according to him, if the Oireachtas subject to a referendum of he people mentioned in Article 5O could amend any Article, so could Oireachtas during the period @page-SC1549 Of eight years. But he noticed that in other Constitutions, there are articles, laws or provisions which are specifically described as "Fundamental" e.g., Sweden, or "Constitutional" e.g., Austria. Czechoslovakia and France, in respect of which the Constitution expressly restricts the power of amendment, but in the Constitution of the Saorstat there is no such segregation, and the power of amendment which applies to any Article appears to me to be equally applicable to all others, subject, of course, to be restriction in respect of the Scheduled Treaty. He later observed: "Unless, therefore, these rights appear plainly from the express provisions of our Constitution to be inalienable, and incapable of being modified or taken away by any legislative act, I cannot accede to the argument that the Oireachtas cannot alter, modify, or repeal them. The framers of our Constitution may have intended 'to bind man down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution," but if they did, they defeated their object by handing him the key of the padlock in Article 50". (p. 234) 386. Murnaghan J. stressed the point that "this direct consultation of the people's will does indicate that all matters, however fundamental, might be the subject of amendment. On the other hand the view contended for by the appellants must go to this extreme point, viz., that certain Articles or doctrines of the Constitution are utterly incapable of alteration at any time even if demanded by an absolute majority of the voters." 387. This observation really highlights the distinction between Article 50 of the Irish Constitution and Art. 368 of the Indian Constitution. As I have already observed, there is no direct consultation of the people's will in Article 368 of our Constitution. 388. The only limitation he could find in Article 50 was that the amendment to the Constitution must be within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty. 389. As I have observed earlier, I find Article 50 of the Irish Constitution quite different in structure from Article 368 of the Indian Constitution and 1 do not think it is permissible to argue from Article 50 of the Irish Constitution to Article 368 of the Indian Constitution. Be that as it may, if I had to express my concurrence, I would express concurrence with the view of the learned Chief Justice in so far as he said that the Oireachtas could not increase its power of amendment by substituting sixteen years for the words "eight years".

390. I had also invited attention of Counsel to Moore v. Attorney-General for the Irish Free State, 1935 AC 484, and the respondents rely heavily on it; In this case the validity of the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933 (Act 6 of 1933) was involved. It was alleged that this amendment was no bar to the maintenance by the petitioners, who were the appellants, of their appeal before the Judicial Committee, as it was void. 391. On May 3, 1933, the Oireachtas passed an Act, No. 6 of 1933, entitled the Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act, 1933. That Act, by Section 2, provided that Section 2 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) Act, 1922, should be repealed, and, by Section 3 that Article 50 of the Constitution should be amended by deleting the words "within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty." 392. Finally, on November 15, 1933, the Oireachtas, enacted the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933, amending Article 66 of the Constitution so as to terminate the right of appeal to His Majesty in Council. 393. The validity of the last amending Act depended on whether the earlier Act, No. 6 of 1933, was valid, namely, that which is directed to removing from Article 50 the condition that there can be no amendment of the Constitution unless it is within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty. 394. It appears that Mr. Wilfrid Greene, arguing for the petitioners, conceded that the Constitution (Amendment No. 16) Act, 1929 was regular and that the validity of the subsequent amendments could not be attacked on the ground that they had not been submitted to the people by referendum. @page-SC1550 395. It is true that the Judicial Committee said that Mr. Greene rightly conceded this point but we do not know the reasons which impelled the Judicial Committee to say that the concession was rightly made. In view of the differences between Article 50 of the Irish Constitution and Article 368 of our Constitution, this concession cannot have any importance in the present case. The actual decision in the case is of no assistance to us because that proceeds on the basis that the Statute of Westminster had removed the restriction contained in the Constitution of the Irish Free State Act, 1922. 396. Mr. Greene challenged the validity of Act No. 6 of 1933 by urging: "The Constitution derived its existence not from any legislature of the Imperial Parliament but solely from the operations of an Irish body, the Constituent Assembly, which is called in Ireland the Third Dail Eireann. This body, it is said, though mentioned in the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, was in fact elected pursuant to a resolution passed on May 20, 1922, by the Second Dail Eireann, an Irish Legislative Assembly. The Third Dail Eireann was thus, it was alleged, set up in Ireland by election of the people of Ireland of their own authority as a Constituent Assembly to create a Constitution, and having accomplished its work went out of existence, leaving no successor and no body in authority capable of amending the Constituent Act. The result of that argument is that a Constitution was established which Mr. Greene has described as a semi-rigid Constitution - that is, "one capable of being amended in detail in the different articles according to their terms, but not susceptible of any alteration so far as concerns the Constituent Act, unless perhaps by the calling together of a new Constituent Assembly by the people of Ireland. Thus the articles of the Constitution may only be amended in accordance with Article 50, which limits amendments to such as are within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty. On that view Mr. Greene argues that 'he law No. 6 of 1933 is ultra vires and hence that the amendment No. 22 of 1933 falls with it." (p. 496)

397. Mr. Greene referred their Lordships to, State (Ryan) v. Lennon, 1935 Irish Reports 170. In that case Chief Justice Kennedy is reported to have expressed a view which corresponds in substance to that contended for by Mr. Greene. 398. Now it is these contentions which I have just set out and which their Lordships could not accept. They observed: "In their opinion the Constituent Act and the Constitution of the Irish Free State derived their validity from the Act of the Imperial Parliament, the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922. This Act established that the Constitution, subject to the provisions of the Constituent Act, should be the Constitution of the Irish Free State and should come into operation on being proclaimed by His Majesty, as was done on December 6, 1922. The action of the House of Parliament was thereby ratified."(p. 497) 399. The position was summed up as follows: "(1) The Treaty and the Constituent Act respectively form parts of the Statute Law of the United Kingdom, each of them being parts of an Imperial Act. (2) Before the passing of the Statute of Westminster it was not competent for the Irish Free State Parliament to pass an Act abrogating the Treaty because the Colonial Laws Validity Act forbade a dominion legislature to pass a law repugnant to an Imperial Act. (3) The effect of the Statute of Westminster was to remove the fetter which lay upon the Irish Free State Legislature by reason of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. That Legislature can now pass Acts repugnant to an Imperial Act. In this case they have done so." (p. 498) 400. I think that summary makes it quite clear that it was because of the Statute of Westminster that the Irish Free State Parliament was enabled to amend the Constitution Act. Part IV - Validity of 24th Amendment 401. Now I may deal with tile question whether the Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. It reads thus: @page-SC1551 "..................... ... (2) In Article 13 of the Constitution, after clause (3), the following clause shall be inserted, namely: "(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368." (3) Article 368 of the Constitution shall be re-numbered as clause (2) thereof, and (a) for the marginal heading to that article, the following marginal heading shall be substituted, namely: "Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor."; (b) before clause (2) as so renumbered, the following clause shall be inserted, namely: "(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article."; (c) in clause (2) as so re-numbered, for the words "it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill,", the words "it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon" shall be substituted; (d) after clause (2) as so re-numbered, the following shall be inserted, namely:"(3) Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article." 402. According to the petitioner, the 24th Amendment has sought to achieve five results:

(i) It has inserted an express provision in Article 368 to indicate that the source of the amending power will be found in that Article itself. (ii) It has made it obligatory on the President to give his assent to any Bill duly passed under that Article. (iii) It has substituted the words "amend by way of addition, variation ...or repeal" in place of the bare concept of "amendment" in the Article 368. (iv) It makes explicit that when Parliament makes a constitutional amendment under Article 368 it acts "in exercise of its constituent power." (v) It has expressly provided, by amendments in Articles 13 and 368, that the bar in Art 13 against abridging or taking away any of the fundamental rights should not apply to any amendment made under Article 368." 403. Mr. Palkhivala did not dispute that the amendments covered by- (i) and (ii) above were within the amending power of Parliament. I do not find it necessary to go into the question whether Subba Rao, C. J., rightly decided that the amending power was in List I, Entry 97, cr Article 248, because nothing turns on it now. 404. Mr. Palkhivala rightly conceded that Parliament could validly amend Article 368 to transfer the source of amending power from List I, Entry 97 to Article 368. 405. Mr. Palkhivala however contended that "if the amendments covered by (iii) and (iv) above are construed as empowering Parliament to exercise the full constituent power of the people themselves, and as vesting in Parliament the ultimate legal sovereignty of the people, and as authorising Parliament to alter or destroy all or any of the essential features, basic elements and fundamental principles of the Constitution (hereinafter referred to "essential features"), the amendments must be held to be illegal and void." He further urges that "if the amendment covered by (v) is construed as authorising Parliament to damage or destroy the essence of all or any of the fundamental rights, the amendment must be held to be illegal and void." He says that the 24th Amendment is void and illegal for the following reasons: "A creature of the Constitution, as the Parliament is, can have only such amending power as is conferred by the Constitution which is given by the people unto themselves. While purporting to exercise that amending power, Parliament cannot increase that very power. No doubt, Parliament had the power to amend Article 368 itself, but that does not mean that Parliament could so amend Article 368 as to change its own amending @pageSC1552 power beyond recognition. A creature of the Constitution cannot enlarge its own power over the Constitution, while purporting to act under it, any more than the creature of an ordinary law can enlarge its own power while purporting to act under that law. The power of amendment cannot possibly embrace the power to enlarge that very power of amendment, or to abrogate the limitations, inherent or implied, in the terms on which the power was conferred. The contrary view would reduce the whole principle of inherent and implied limitations to an absurdity." 406. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the 24th Amendment does enlarge the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution, if Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 =(AIR 1967 SC 1643), limited it, and as Article 368 clearly contemplates amendment of Article 368 itself, Parliament can confer additional powers of amendment on it.

407. Reliance was placed on Ryan's case, 1935 Ir R 170 and Moore's case, 1935 AC 484. I have already dealt with these cases. 408. It seems to me that it is not legitimate to interpret Article 368 in this manner. Clause (e) of the proviso does not give any different power than what is contained in the main article. The meaning of the expression "Amendment of the Constitution" does not change when one reads the proviso. If the meaning is the same, Article 368 can only be amended so as not to change its identity completely. Parliament, for instance, could not make the Constitution uncontrolled by changing the prescribed two thirds majority to simple majority. Similarly it cannot get rid of the true meaning of the expression "Amendment of the Constitution" so as to derive power to abrogate fundamental rights. 409. If the words "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution" are designed to widen the meaning of the words "Amendment of the Constitution" it would have to be held void as beyond the amending power. But I do not read these to mean this. They have effect to get rid of the argument that Article 248 and Entry 97, List I contains the power of amendment. Similarly, the insertion of the words "in exercise of its constituent power" only serves to exclude Article 248 and Entry 97, List I and emphasize that it is not ordinary legislative power that Parliament is exercising under Article 368 but legislative power of amending the Constitution. 410. It was said that if Parliament cannot increase its power of amendment clause (d) of Section 3 of the 24th Amendment which makes Article 13 inapplicable to an amendment of the Constitution would be bad. I see no force in this contention. Article 13 (2) as existing previous to the 24th Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643), prevented legislatures from taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Article 13. in other words, any law which abridged a fundamental right even to a small extent was liable to be struck down. Under Article 368, Parliament can amend every article of the Constitution as long as the result is within the limits already laid down by me. The amendment of Article 13 (2) does not go beyond the limits laid down because Parliament cannot even utter the amendment abrogate or authorise abrogation or the taking away of fundamental rights. After the amendment now a law which has the effect of merely abridging a right while remaining within the limits laid down would not be liable to be struck down. 411. In the result, in my opinion, the 24th Amendment as interpreted by me is valid. Part V. - Validity of Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971. 412. Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 enacted as follows: (a) for clause (2) the following clause shall be substituted, namely. "(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be -determined in accordance with @page-SC1553 such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law, and no such law shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash: Provided that in making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in cl. (1) of Article 30, the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined

under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause." (b) after clause (12A), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:"(2B) Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in clause (2) " 413. There cannot be any doubt that the object of the amendment is to modify the decision given by this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India. (1970) 3 SCR 530=(AIR 1970 SC 564), where it was held by ten Judges that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act violated the guarantee of compensation under Article 31 (2) in that it provided for giving certain amounts determined according to principles which were not relevant in the determination of compensation of the undertaking of the named Banks and by the method prescribed the amounts so declared could not be regarded as compensation. 414. If we compare Art. 31 (2) as it stood before and after the 25th Amendment, the following changes seem to have been effected. Whereas before the amendment, Art. 31 (2) required the law providing for acquisition to make provision for compensation by either fixing the amount of compensation or specifying the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation should be determined after the amendment Art. 31 (2) requires such a law to provide, for an "amount" which may be fixed by the law providing for acquisition or requisitioning or which may he determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law. In other words, for the idea that compensation should be given, now the idea is that an "amount" should be given. This amount can be fixed directly by law or may be determined in accordance with such principles as may be specified. 415. It is very difficult to comprehend the exact meaning which can be ascribed to the word "amount". In this context, it is true that it is being used in lieu of compensation, but the word '"amount" is not a legal concept as "compensation', is. 416. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edn. p. 57, the word "amount" has the following meaning: "Amount (amount sb. 1710. (f. the vb.) 1. The sum total to which anything amounts up; spec. the sum of the principal and interest 1796. 2. fig. The full value, effect, or significance 1732. 3. A quantity or sum viewed as a total 1833." 417. According to Third New International p. 72, "amount" means: "amount 1 a: the total number of quantity; AGGREGATE (the amount of the fine is doubled); SUM, NUMBER (add the same amount to each column) (the amount of the policy is 10,000 dollars) b: the sum of individuals (the unique amount of worthless IOU's collected during each days business-R. L. Taylor) c: the quantity at hand or under consideration (only a small amount of trouble involved) (a surprising amount of patience) 2: the whole or final effect, significance, or import (the amount of his remarks is that we are hopelessly beaten) 3: accounting: a principal sum and the interest on it syn see SUM." 418. I have also seen the meaning of the word "amount" in the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1 p. 289, but it does not give me much guidance as to the meaning to be put in Article 31 (2), as amended The figurative meaning, i. e, the full value, I cannot give because of the deliberate omission of the word "compensation" and substitution of the word "amount" in lieu thereof. @page-SC1554

419. Let us then see if the other part of the article throws any light on the word "amount". The article postulates that in some cases principles may be laid down for determining the amount and adequate amount or an inadequate amount. So this shows that the word "amount"here means something to give in lieu of the property to be acquired but this amount has to and can be worked out by laying down certain principles. These principles must then have a reasonable relationship to the property which is sought to be acquired. If this is so, the amount ultimately arrived at by applying the principles must have some reasonable realationship with the property to be acquired; otherwise the principles of the Act could hardly be principles within the meaning of Article 31 (2). 420. If this meaning is given to the word "amount", namely, that the amount given in cash or otherwise is of such a nature that it has been worked out in accordance with the principles which have relationship to the property to be acquired, the question arises: what meaning is to be given to the expression "the amount so fixed". The amount has to be fixed by law but the amount so fixed by law must also be fixed in accordance with some principles beacause it could not have been intended that if the amount is fixed by law, the legislature would fix the amount arbitrarily. It could not, for example, fix the amount by a lottery. 421. Law is enacted by passing a bill which is introduced. The Constitution and legislative procedure contemplate that there would be discussion and in debate, the Government spokesman in the legislature would be able to justify the amount which has been fixed. Suppose an amendment is moved to the amount fixed. How would the debate proceed? Can the Minister say -"This amount is fixed as it is the Government's wish." Obviously not. Therefore, it follows that the amount, if fixed by the legislature, has also to be fixed according to some principles. These principles cannot be the different from the principles which the legislature would lay down. 422. In this connection it must be borne in mined that Article 31 (2) is still a fundamental right. Then what is the change that has been brought about by the amendment ? It is no doubt that a change was intended. It seems to me that the change effected is that a person whose property is acquired can no longer claim that full compensation or just compensation but he can still claim that the law should lay down principles to determine the amount which he is to get and these principles must have a rational relation to the property sought to be acquired. If the law were to lay down a principle that the amount to be paid in lieu of a brick of gold acquired shall be the same as the market value of an ordinary brick or a brick of silver it could not be held to be a principle at all. Similarly if it is demonstrated that the amount that has been fixed for the brick of gold is the current value of the an ordinary brick or a brick of silver the amount would be illegal. If I were to interpret Art. 31 (2) as meaning that even an arbitrary or illusory or a grossly low amount could be given, which would shock not only the judicial conscience but the conscience of every reasonable human being, a serious question would arise whether Parliament has not exceeeded its amending power under Art 368 of the Constitution. The substance of the fundamental right to property, under Art. 31, consists of three things: one, the property shall be acquired by or under a valid law; secondly, it shall be acquired only for a public purpose and thirdly, the person whose property has been acquired shall be given an amount in lieu thereof, which, as I have already said, is not arbitrary, illusory or shocking to the judical conscience or the conscience of mankind. I have already held that Parliament has no power under Art 368 to abrogate the fundamental rights but can amend

or regulate or adjust them in its exercise of amending powers without destroying them. Applying this to the fundamental right of property, Parliament cannot empower legislatures to fix an arbitrary amount or illusory amount or an amount that virtually amounts to confiscation, taking all the relevant circumstance of the acquisition into consideration. @page-SC1555 Same considerations apply to the manner of payment I cannot interpret this to mean that an arbitrary manner of payment is contemplated. To give an extreme example, if an amount is determined or fixed at Rs. 10,000/-, E legislature cannot lay down that payment will be made at the rate of Rs. 10/per year or Rs. 10/- per month. 423. Reference may be made to two cases that show that if discretion is conferred it must be exercised reasonably. 424. In Roberts v. Hopwood, 1925 AC 578 at p. 590, it was held that the discretion conferred upon the Council by Section 62 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, must be exercised reasonably. The following observations of Lord Buckmaster are pertinent: "It appears to me; for the reasons I have given, that they cannot (could not) have brought into account the consideration which they say influenced them, and that they did not base their decision upon the ground that the reward for work is the value of the work reasonably and even generously measured but that they took an arbitrary principle and fixed an arbitrary sum; which was not a real exercise of the discretion imposed upon them by the statute." 425. I may also refer to Lord Wrenbury's observations at p. 613: "I rest my opinion upon higher grounds. A person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does riot empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so-he must in the exercise of his discretion do not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must, by use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs. He must act reasonably." 426. In James Leslie Williams v. Haines Thomas, 1911 AC 381, the facts are given in the headnote as follows: "Under Section 4 of the New South Wales Public Service Superanuation Act, 1903; the plaintiff was awarded by the Public Service Board a gratuity of '23£ l0s 1d. per mensem, calcu1ated for each year of service from December 9, 1875 the date of his permanent employment, upto December 23, 1895; and upon his claming to have his service reckoned up to August 16, 1902, was awarded a further gratuity of one penny in respect of each year subsequent to December 23, 1895, up to August 16, 1902, the date of the commencement of the Public Service Act of that year." 427. The Judicial Committee held the award to be illusory. The Judicial Committee observed: ".........it seems to their Lordships to be quite plain that an illusory award such as this-an award intended to be unreal and unsubstantia1- though made under guise of exercising discretion, is at best a colourable performance, and tantamount to- a refusal by the Board to exercise the discretion entrusted to them by Parliament". (p. 385) 428. Although I am unable to appreciate the wisdom of- inserting clause (2B) in Article 3l, the effect of] which is to make Article l9 (l) (f) inapplicable, I cannot say that it is an, unreasonable abridgment of rights under Article 19 (1) (f). While passing a law fixing principles the legislatures are bound to provide a procedure for the determination of the

amount, and if the procedure is arbitrary that provision may well be struck down under Articles 14. 429. In view of the interpretation which I have placed on the new Article 31 (2) as amended it, cannot be said that Parliament has exceeded its amending power under Article 368 in enacting the new Article .31 (2) 430. For the reasons aforesaid I hold that Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment ) Act, 1971, as interpreted by me, is valid. VALIDITY OF SECTION 3OF THE CONSTITUTION (TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1971. 431. Section 3 of the twenty-fifth amendment, reads thus: "3. After Article 31-B of the Constitution, the following article shall be inserted namely:" 31-C Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified @page-SC1556 in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy: Provided that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent." 432. It will be noted that Article 31-C opens with the expression "notwithstanding anything contained in Article. 13". This however cannot mean that not only fundamental rights like Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 31 are excluded but all fundamental rights belonging to the minorities and religious groups are also excluded. The article purports to save laws which a State may make towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or (c) of Article 39 from being challenged on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, 19 or 81. This is the only ground on which they cannot be challenged. It will be noticed that the article provides that if the law contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy, it shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. In other words, once a declaration is given, no Court can question the law on the ground that it has nothing to do with giving effect to the policy; whether it gives effect to some other policy is irrelevant. Further, a law may contain some provisions dealing with the principles specified in cl. (b) or (c) of Article 39 while other sections may have nothing to do with it, yet on the language it-denies any Court power or jurisdiction to go into this question. 433. In the face of the declaration, this Court would be unable to test the validity of incidental provisions which do not constitute an essential and integral part of the policy directed to give effect to Article 39 (b) and Article 39 (c). 434. In Akadasi. Padhan v. State of Orissa, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 691=(AIR 1963 SC 1047), Gajendragadkar, C. J., speaking for the Court, observed: "A law relating to a State monopoly cannot, in the context, include all the provisions contained in the said law whether they have direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said expression should be construed to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a law is passed creating a

State monopoly, the court should enquire what are the provisions of the said law which are basically and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly. It is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article l9 (6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Art. 19 (6). 435. These observations were quoted with approval by Shah, J., speaking on behalf of a larger Bench in (1970) 3 SCR 530-582=(AIR 1970 SC 564). After quoting the observations, Shah, J., observed: "This was reiterated in Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa, (1969) 3 SCR 374=(AIR 1969 SC 1081); Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCR 400=(AIR 1970 SC 129) and Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. State of Punjab, (1969) 3 SCR 447= (AIR 1969 SC 1100)". 436. While dealing with the validity of the Bombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949), this Court in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, 1951 SCR 682= (AIR 1951 SC 318), struck down two provisions on the ground that they conflicted with the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article- 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. These provisions were Sections 23 (a) and 24 (1) (a), which read: "23. No person shall (a) commend, solicit the use of offer any intoxicant or hemp, or...... @page-SC1557 24 (1). No person shall print or publish in any newspaper news-sheet, book leaflet, booklet or any other single or periodical publication or otherwise display or distribute any advertisement or other matter(a) which commends, solicits the use of, or offers any intoxicant or hemp......" 437. Section 23 (b) was also held to be void. It was held that "the words "incite" and "encourage" are wide enough to include incitement and encouragement by words and speeches and also by acts and the words used in the section are so wide and vague that the clause must be held to be void in its entirety." 438. Section 23 (b) reads as follows: "23. No, person shall(a)..................... (b) incite or encourage any member of the public or any class of individuals of the public generally to commit any act, which frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, or ......." 439. Mr. Palkhivala contends, and I think rightly, that this Court would not be able to strike these provisions down if a similar declaration were inserted now in the Bombay Prohibition Act that this law is for giving effect to Article 47, which prescribes the duty of the State to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks. If a similar provision were inserted in the impugned Kerala Acts making it a criminal offence to criticise, frustrate or defeat the policy of the Acts, the provisions would be protected under Art. 31C. 440. The only so-called protection which is given is that if the legislature of a State passes such a law it must receive the President's assent. It is urged before us that it is no protection at all because the President would give his assent on the advice of the Union Cabinet.

441. Article 31C in its nature differs from Art. 31A, which was inserted by the Fourth Amendment. "31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or (b) the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property, or (c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations, or (d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers managing directors, directors or managers of corporations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or (e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31: Provided that............." 442. In Art 31A the subjectmatter of the legislation is clearly provided, namely, the acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein. (Art. 31A (a) ). Similarly, the subject-matter of legislation is specifically provided in cls. (b), (c) and (d) of Art. 31A. But in Art. 31C the sky is the limit because it leaves to each State to adopt measures towards securing the principles specified is cls. (b) and (c) of Art. 39. The wording of Arts. 39 (b) and 39 (c) is very wide. The expression "economic system" in Art 39 (c) may well include professional and other services. According to Encyclopedia Americanna (1970 Ed. Vol. 9, p. 600) "economic systems are forms of social organization for producing goods and services and determining how they will be distributed." It would be difficult to resist the contention of the State that each provision in the law has been taken for @page-SC1558 the purpose of giving effect to the policy of the State. 443. It was suggested that if the latter part of Art 31C, dealing with declaration, is regarded as unconstitutional, the Court will be entitled to go into the question whether there is any nexus between the impugned law and Art. 39 (b) and Article 39 (c) I find it difficult to appreciate this submission. There may be no statement of State policy in a law. Even if there is a statements of policy in the Preamble, it would not control the unambiguous. But assuming that there is a clear statement it would be for the State legislature to decide whether a provision would help to secure the objects. 444. The Courts wil be unable to separate necessarily incidental provisions and merely incidental. Further, as I have pointed out above, this question is not justiciable if the law contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to such a policy. According to Mr. Palkhivala Art .31-C has four features of totalitarianism: (1) There is no equality. The ruling party could favour its own party members, (2) There need not be any freedom dpf speech, (3) There need be no personal liberty which is covered by Art. 19(1)(b), and (4) The property will be at the mercy of the State. In other words, confiscation of property of an individual would be permissible.

445. It seems to me that effect, Art 31C enables States to adopt any policy they like and abrogate Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution at will. In other words, it enables the State to amend the Constitution. Article 14, for instance, would be limited by the State according to its policy and not the policy of the amending body, i.e. the Parliament, and so would be Arts. 19 and 31, while these fundamental rights remain in the Constitution. It was urged that when an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature delegates a legislative power within permissible limits the delegated legislation derives its authority from the Act of Parliament. It was suggested that similarly the State law would derive authority from Article 31-C. It is true that the State law would derive authority from Art. 31-C but the difference between delegated legislation and the State law made under Art. 31-C is this It is permisible, within limits, for a legislature to delegate its functions, and for the delegate to make law. Further the delegated legislation would be liable to be challenged on the ground of violation of fundamental rights regardless of the validity of the State Act. But a State legislature cannot be authorised to amend the Constitution and the State law deriving authority from Art. 31C cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes Articles 14, 19 and 31. 446. It will be recalled that Art. 19 deals not only with the right to property but it guarantees various rights: freedom of speech and expression: right to assemble peaceably and without arms: right to from associations or unions: right to move freely throughout the territory of India; right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. I am unable to appreciate the reason for giving such powers to the State legislature to abrogate the above freedoms. In effect, Parliament is enabling State legislatures to declare that "a citizen shall not be free; he will have no freedom of speech to criticise the policy of the State; he shall not assemble to protest against the policy; he shall be confined to a town or a district and shall not move outside; his State; a resident of another State shall not enter the State which is legislating; he shall not, if lawyer, defend people who have violated the law. It could indeed enable legislatures to apply one law to political opponents of the ruling party and leave members of the party outside the purview of the law. In short, it enables a State Legislature to set up complete totalitarianism in the State. It seems that its implications were not realised by Parliament though Mr. Palkhiwala submits that every implication was deliberately intended. 447. I have no doubt that the State legislature and Parliament in its ordinary legislative capacity will not exercise this new power conferred on them fully but I am concerned with the amplitude of the power conferred by Art. 31C and not with what the legislatures may or may not do under the powers so conferred. @page-SC1559 448. I have already held that Parliament cannot under Art. 368 abrogate fundamental rights. Parliament equally cannot enable the legislatures to abrogate them. This provision thus enables legislatures to abrogate fundamental rights and therefore must be declared unconstitutional. 449. It has been urged before us that S. 3 of the 25th amendment Act is void as it in effect delegates the constituent amending power to State legislatures. The question arises whether Art. 368 enables Parliament to delegate its function of amending the Constitution to another body. It seems to me clear that it does not. It would be noted that Art. 368 of this introduction of a bill for the purpose in either Art.368 of this constitution itself provides that amendent may initiated only by the introduction of a bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament. In other words, Art. 368 does not contemplate any other

mode of amendment by Parliament and it does not equally contemplate that Parliament could set up another body to amend the Constitution. 450. It is well settled in india that Parliament cannot delegate its essential legislative functions. See: (1) Per Mukherjea J. in re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912. (1951) SCR 747 at 984-5 = (AIR 1951 SC 332). (2) Raj Narain Singh v. Patna Administration, 1955 (1) SCR 290 = (AIR 1954 SC 569) (3) Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1955 (1) SCR 380 = (AIR 1954 SC 569) (4) Vasantlal Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, 1961 (1) SCR 341 = (AIR 1961 SC 4) (5) The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Mills, 1968 (3) SCR 251= (AIR 1968 SC 1232) (6) Garewal v. State of Punjab 1959 Supp. (1) SCR 792 = (AIR 1959 SC 512) 451. It is also well settled in countries, where the courts have taken a position different than in Indian courts, that a legislature cannot create another legislative body. Reference may be made here to In re Initiative and Referendum Act. 1919 AC 935 and AttorneyGeneral of Nova Scotia v. Attorney-General for Canada, 1951 SCR (Canada) 31. I have discussed the latter case while dealing with the question of implied limitation. Initiative and Referendum case is strongly relied on by Mr. Palkhivala to establish that an amending power cannot be delegated. In this case the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was concerned with the interpretation of Section 92, head 1, of the British North America Act, 1867, which empowers a Provincial Legislature to amend the Constitution of the Province, "excepting as regards the office of the Lieutenant-Governor". The Legislative Assembly of Manitoba enacted the Initiative and Referendum Act, which in effect would compel the Lieutenant Governor to submit a proposed law to a body of voters totally distinct from the legislature of which he is the constitutional head, and would render him powerless to prevent it from becoming an actual law if approved by these voters. 452. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reported in 27 Man. L. R. 1, which report is not available to me, but the summary of the reasons of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal are given at page 936 of (1919) A. C., as follows: "The British North America Act, 1867, declared that for each Province there should be a Legislature, in which S. 92 vested the power of lawmaking; the legislature could not confer that power upon a body other than itself. The procedure proposed by the Act in question would not be an Act of a Legislature within S. 92, would be wholly opposed to the spirit and principles of the Canadian constitution, and would override the Legislature thereby provided. Further, the power to amend the Constitution given by S. 92, head 1, expressly excepted "the office of the Lieutenant-Governor". Section 7 of the proposed Act, while preserving the power of veto and disallowance by the Governor-General provided for by Ss. 55 and 90 of the Act 1867, dispensed with the assent of the Lieutenant-Governor provided for by Ss. 56 and 90 of that Act; even if S. 7 was not intended to dispense with that assent, S.11 clearly did so. The proposed Act also violated the provisions of S.54 (in conjunction with S.90) as to money bills." @page-SC1560 453. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held at page 944:

"Their Lordships are of opinion that the language of the Act cannot be construed otherwise than as intended seriously to affect the position of the Lieutenant-Governor as an integral part of the Legislature, and to detract from rights which are important in the legal theory of that-position. For if the Act is valid it compels him to submit a proposed law to a body of voters totally distinct from the Legislature of which he is the Constitutional head, and renders him powerless to prevent it from becoming an actual law if approved by a majority of these voters. It was argued that the words already referred to, which appear in S. 7, preserve his powers of veto and disallowance. Their Lordships are unable to assent to this contention. The only powers preserved are those which relate to Acts of the Legislative Assembly, as distinguished from Bills, and the powers of veto and disallowance referred to can only be those of the Governor-General under S. 90 of the Act of 1867, and not the powers of the Lieutenant Governor, which are at an end when a Bill has become an Act. Section 11 of the Initiative and Referendum Act is not less difficult to reconcile with the rights of the Lieutenant-Governor. It provides that when a proposal for repeal of some law has been approved by the majority of the electors voting, that law is automatically to be deemed repealed at the end of thirty days after the clerk of the Executive Council shall have published in the Manitoba Gazette a statement of the result of the vote. Thus the Lieutenant Governor appears to be wholly excluded from the new legislative authority." 454. I have set out this passage in extenso because this deals with one part of the reasoning given by the Court of Appeal. Regarding the other part i.e whether the Legislature could confer that power on a body other than itself, the Judicial Committee observed at page 945: "Having said so much, their Lordships, following their usual practice of not deciding more than is strictly necessary, will not deal finally with another difficulty which those who contend for the validity of this Act have to meet. But they think it right, as the point has been raised in the Court below, to advert to it. Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusts the legislative power in a Province to its Legislature, and to that Legislature only. No doubt a body, with power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed by a Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek the assistance of subordinate agencies, as had been done when in Hodge v. The Queen, (1883) 9 AC 117 the Legislature of Ontario was held entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by 'he Act to which it owes its own existence. Their Lordships do no more than draw attention to the gravity of the constitutional questions which thus arise. (Emphasis supplied). 455. It is interesting to note that this position was indicated by Sir A. Hobhouse, a member of the Judicial Committee, while (1883) 9 AC: 117 was being argued. This appears from Lefroy on Canadian Federal System at p. 387: "Upon the argument before the Privy Council in (1883) 9 AC 117 Mr. Horace Davey contended that under this sub-section, (Sec. 92 (l) of Canadian Constitution) provincial legislatures "could do what Lord Selborne, no doubt correctly, said in The Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 AC 889 at 905, the Indian legislature could not do-abdicate their whole legislative functions in favour of another body." But, as Sir A. Hobhouse remarked, this

they cannot do. "They remain invested with a responsibility. Everything is done by them, and such officers as they create and give discretion to." 456. The learned Attorney-General submitted that this case decided only that in the absence of clear and unmistakable language in S. 92, head 1, the power which the Crown possesses through a person directly representing the Crown cannot be abrogated. It is true that this was the actual decision but the @page-SC1561 subsequent observations, which I have set out above, clearly show that the Judicial Committee was prepared to imply limitations as the Court of Appeal had done on the amending power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by S. 92, head 1. 457. The Attorney General said that the scope of this decision was referred to in Nadan v. The King, 1926 AC 482, where at p. 495 reference is made to this case in the following words: "In the case of In re Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 AC 935 Lord Haldane, in declaring the judgment of the Board referred to "the impropriety in the absence of clear and unmistakable language of construing S. 92 as permitting the abrogation of any power which the Crown possesses through a person directly representing it"; an observation which applies with equal force to S. 91 of the Act of 1867 and to the abrogation of a power which remains vested in the Crown itself. 458. But this passage again dealt with the actual point decided and not the obiter dicta. 459. The first pare of the headnote in Nadan's case, 1926 AC 482 gives in brief the actual decision of the Privy Council as follows: "Section 1025 of the Criminal Code of Canada, if and so far as it is intended to prevent the King in Council from giving effective leave to appeal against an order of a Canadian Court in a criminal case, is invalid. The legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada as to criminal law and procedure, under S. 91 of the British North America Act, 1867, is confined to action to be taken in Canada. Further, an enactment annulling the royal prerogative to grant special leave to appeal would be inconsistent with the Judicial Committee Acts. 1833 and 1844, and therefore would be invalid under S. 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. The royal assent to the Criminal Code could not give validity to an enactment which was void by imperial statute, exclusion of the prerogative could be accomplished only by an Imperial statute." 460. For the aforesaid reasons I am unable to agree with the Attorney General and I hold that the Initiative and Referendum Act case shows that limitations can be implied in. an amending power. 461. Mr. Seervai seeks to distinguish this case on another ground. According to him, these observations were obiter dicta, but even if they are treated as considered obiter dicta, they add nothing to the principles governing delegated legislation, for this passage merely repeats what had been laid down as far back as 1878 in (1878) 5 Ind App 178 = 3 AC 889 at pp. 904 and 905, where the Privy Council in a classical passage, observed: "But their Lordships are of opinion that the doctrine of the majority of the Court is erroneous, and that it rests upon a mistaken view of the powers of the Indian Legislature, and indeed of the nature and principles of legislation. The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same

nature, as those of Parliament itself. The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act. of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions." 462. Mr. Seervai further says that having laid down the law as set out above, the Privy Council added: "Their Lordships agree that the Governor-General in Council could @page-SC1562 not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Council's Act. 463. We are unable to agree with him that then obiter dicta of the Judicial Committee deals with the same subject as Burah's case. Burah's case, (1878) 5 Ind App 178 = 3 AC 889, was not concerned with the power to amend the Constitution but was concerned only with Legislature. This clearly appears from the passage just cited from Lefroy. The Governor-General in Council had no power to amend the Government of India Act, under which it functioned. 464. Reference was also made to the observations of one of us in AIR 1968 SC 1232, where I had observed as follows: " Apart from authority, in my view Parliament has full power to delegate legislative authority to subordinate bodies. This power flows, in my judgement, form Art. 246 of the Constitution. The word "exclusive " means exclusive of any other legislation and not exclusive of any subordinate body. There is, however, one that is also contained in Article 246. Parliament must pass a law in respect of an item or items of the relevant list. Negatively this means that Parliament cannot abdicate its functions." 465. Reference was also invited to another passage where I had observed: " The case of 1919 AC 935 provides an instance of abdication of functions. By a legislature. No inference can be drawn from this case that delegations of the type with which we are concerned amount to abdication of functions." 466. It is clear these observations are contrary to many decisions of this Court and, as I said, I made these observations apart from authority. 467. But neither this Court nor the Judicial Committee in 15 Ind App 178 = 3 AC 889 were concerned with an amending power, and the importance, of the above observations of the Privy Council has in the fact that even in exercise of its amending power the legislature could not "create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence," and the fact that in Canda the doctrine of limited delegated legislation does not prevail as it does in India. 468. It has been urged before us that in fact there has been no delegation of the amending powers to the State legislatures by Art. 31C, and what has been done is that Art. 31C lifts the ban Imposed by Part III from certain laws. I am unable to appreciate this idea of the

lifting of the ban. Fundamental rights remain as part of the Constitution and on then face of them they guarantee to every citizen these fundamental rights. But as soon as the State legislates under Art. 31C, and the law abrogates or takes away these constitutional rights, these fundamental rights cease to have any effect. The amendment is then made not by Parliament as the extent of the amendment is not known till the State legislates. It is when the State legislates that the extent of the abrogation or abridgment of the fundamental rights becomes clear. To all intents and purposes it seems to me that it is State legislation that effects an amendment of the Constitution. F it be assumed that Article 31C does not enable the States to amend the Constitution then Art. 31C would be ineffective because the law which in effect abridges or takes away the fundamental rights would have been passed not in the form required by Art. 368, i.e. by 2/3rd of the majority of Parliament but by another body which is not recognised in art. 368, and would be void on that ground. 469. The learned Solicitor General, relying on Mohammed Samsudeen Kariapper v. S. S. Wijesinha, 1668 AC 717 urged that there can be implied amendment of the Constitution and Art. 31C may be read as an implied amendment of Art368. What the Judicial Committee decided in this case was that a bill having received a certificate in the hands of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in favour therof in the House of Representatives amounted to no @page-SC1563 less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members of the House in effect amounted to a bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of the order, and the words "amendment or repeal" included implied amendment. 470. Menzies, J., speaking for the Judicial Committee, observed: " Apart form the proviso to subsection (4) therefore the board has found no reason for not construing the words " amend or repeal" in the earlier part of Section 29 (4) as extending to amendment or repeal by inconsistent law........... A bill which, if it becomes an Act, does amend or repeal some provision of the order is a bill "for the amendment or repeal of a provision of the order." (p. 743) "The bill which became the Act was a bill for an amendment of Section 24 of the Constitution simply because its terms were inconsistent with that section. It is the operation that the bill will have upon becoming law which gives it its constitutional character, not any particular label which may be given to it. A bill described as one for the amendment of the Constitution, which contained no operative provision to amend the Constitution would not require the prescribed formalities to become a valid law whereas a bill which upon its passing into law would, if valid, alter the Constitution would not be valid without compliance with those formalities." 471. We are not here concerned with the question which was raised before Judicial Committee because no one has denied that Art. 31C is an amendment of the Constitution. The only question we are concerned with is whether Art. 31C can be read to be an implied amendment of Article 368, and if so read, is it valid, i.e., within the powers of Parliament to amend Art. 368 itself. 472. It seems to me that Article 31C cannot be read to be an implied amendment of Art. 368 because it opens with the words "notwithstanding anything contained in Article 368." What Article 31C does is that it empowers legislatures, subject to the condition laid down in Art. 31C itself, to take away or abridge rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. At any rate, if it is deemed to be an amendment of Art. 368 itself/ Article 368 does not enable

Parliament to constitute another legislature to amend the Constitution, in its exercise of the power to amend Art. 368 itself. 473. For the aforesaid reasons I hold that S. 3 of the Constitution ( Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act 1971 is void as it delegates power to legislatures to amend the Constitution. PART VII- TWENTY-NINTH-AMENDMENT 474. The Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) reads: "2. Amendment of Ninth Schedule " In the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, after entry 64 and before the Explanation, the following entries shall be inserted, namely" "65. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment ) Act, 1969 (Kerala Act 35 of 1969). 66. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment ) Act, 1971 (Kerala Act 25 of 1971)." 475. The effect of the insertion of the two Kerala Acts in the Ninth Schedule is that the provisions of Art. 31-B get attracted. Article 31-B which was inserted by S. 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment ) Act 1951, reads: "insertion of new article 31B. 5. After article 31A of the Constitution as inserted by Section 4, the following article shall be inserted, namely: "31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A, none of the Acts and regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule not any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and @page-SC1564 Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force." 476. The First Amendment had also inserted Art. 31-A and the Ninth Schedule including 13 State enactments dealing with agrarian reforms. 477. Before dealing with the points debated before us, it is necessary to mention that a new Art. 31-A was substituted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, for the original article with retrospective effect. The new article contained original Art. 31A (1) as clause (a) and added clauses (b) to (e) and also changed the nature of the protective umbrella. The relevant part of Art. 31-A (1) as substituted has already been set out. 478. Under Art. 31-A as inserted by the First Amendment a law was protected even if it was inconsistent with or took away or abridged any rights conferred by any provisions of Part III. Under the Fourth Amendment the protective umbrella extended to only Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31. The Seventeenth Amendment further amended the definition of the word "estate" in Art. 31A. It also added seven Acts to the Ninth Schedule. 479. The argument of Mr. Palkhivala, on this part of the case, was two-fold. First, he contended, that Art. 31B, as originally inserted, had intimate relations with agrarian reforms, because at that stage Art. 31-A dealt only with agrarian reforms. The words 'without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Art. 31A". according to him, poined, to this connection. He, in effect, said that Art. 31-B having this original meaning did not change the meaning or its scope when a new Art. 31-A containing clauses (b) to (e) were included.

480. I am unable to accede to these contentions. The ambit of Article 31-B has been determined by this Court in three decisions. In State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh. 1952 SCR 889 at pp. 914, 915 = (AIR 1952 SC 252) Patanjali Sastri, C. J., rejected the limited meaning suggested above by Somayya, J. and abserved: "There is nothing in Art. 31-B to indicate that the specific mention of certain statutes was only intended to illustrate the application of the general words of Article 31-A. The opening words of Article 31-B are only intended to make clear that Article 31-A should not be restricted in its application by reason of anything contained in Article 31-B and are in no way calculated to restrict the application of the latter article or of the enactments referred to therein to acquisition of "estates.' 481. He held that the decision in Sibnath Banerji's case, 1945 FCR 195 = (AIR 1945 PC 156) afforded no useful analogy. 482. In 1952 SCR 1020 at p. ·1037 = (AIR 1952 SC 252) Mahajan, J., repelled the argument in these words: ''In my opinion the observations in Sibnath Banerji's case far from supporting the contention raised negatives it Article 31-B specifically validates certain acts mentioned in the Schedule despite the provisions of Art. 31-A and is not illustrative of Art. 31-A, but stands independent of it." 483. In N. B. Jeejeebhoy v. Asst. Collector, Thana, (1965) 1 SCR 636 at p. 648 = (AIR 1965 SC 1096) to which decision I. was a party, Subba Rao, C. J. observed that "Article 31 -B is not governed by Art. 31-A and that Art. 31-B is a constitutional device to place the specified statutes beyond any attack on the ground that they infringe Part III of the Constitution." 484. I may mention that the validity of the device was not questioned before the Court then. 485. But even though I do not accept the contention that Art. 31-B can be limited by what is contained in Art. 31-A, the question arises whether the Twenty-Ninth Amendment is valid. 486. I have held that Art. 368 does not enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights. If this is so, it does not enable Parliament to do this by any means, including the device of Art. 31-B and the Ninth Schedule. This device of Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule is bad in so far as it protects statutes even if they take away fundamental rights. @page-SC1565 Therefore, it is necessary to declare that the TwentyNinth Amendment is ineffective to protect the impugned Acts if they take away fundamental rights. 487. In this connection I may deal with the argument that the device of Art. 31B and the Ninth Schedule has up till now been upheld by this Court and it is now too late to impeach it. But the point now raised before us has never been raised and debated before. As Lord Atkin observed in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v.' Attorney-General for Canada, 1931 AC 310 at 317: "Their Lordships entertain no doubt that time alone will not validate an Act which when challenged is found to be ultra vires; nor will history of a gradual series of advances till this boundary is finally crossed avail to protect the ultimate encroachment." 488. If any further authority is needed, I may refer to AttorneyGeneral for Australia v. The Queen and the Boilermakers' Society of Australia, 1957 AC 288 at p. 328. The Judicial Committee, while considering the question whether certain sections of the

Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-1952 were ultra vires inasmuch as the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had been invested with the executive powers along with the judicial powers, referred to the point why for a quarter of century no litigant had attacked the validity of this obviously illegitimate union and observed: "Whatever the reason may be, just as there was a patent invalidity in the original Act which for a number of years went unchallenged, so for a greater number of years an invalidity which to their Lordships as to the majority of the High Court has been convincingly demonstrated, has been disregarded. Such clear conviction must find expression in the appropriate judgment." 489. We had decided not to deal with the merits of individual cases and accordingly Counsel had not addressed any arguments on the impugned Acts passed by the Kerala State Legislature. It would be for the Constitution Bench to decide whether the impugned Acts take away fundamental rights. If they do, they will have to be struck down. If they only abridge fundamental rights, it would be for the Constitution Bench to determine whether they are reasonable abridgments essential in the public interest. 490. Broadly speaking, constitutional amendments hitherto made in Art. 19 and Art. 15 and the agrarian laws enacted by various States furnish illustrations of reasonable abridgment of fundamental rights in the public interest. 491. It was said during the arguments that one object of Art. 31-B was to prevent timeconsuming litigation, which held up implementation of urgent reforms. If a petition is filed in the High Court or a suit is filed in a subordinate court or a point raised before a magistrate, challenging the validity of an enactment, it takes years before the validity of an enactment is finally, determined. Surely, this is not a good reason to deprive persons of their fundamental rights. There are other ways available to the Government to expedite the decision. It may for example propose ordinary legislation to enable parties to approach the Supreme Court for transfer of such cases to the Supreme Court for determination of substantial questions of interpretation of the Constitution. PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS 492. To summarize, I hold that: (a) Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643), declared that a Constitutional amendment would be bad if it infringed Article 13 (2), as this applied not only to ordinary legislation but also to an amendment of the Constitution. (b) Golak Nath's case, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643). did not decide whether Article 13 (2) can be amended under Article 368 or determine the exact meaning of the expression "amendment of this Constitution" in Article 368. (c) The expression "amendment of this Constitution" does not enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights or to completely change the fundamental features of the Constitution so as to destroy its identity. Within these limits Par1iament can amend every article. @page-SC1566 (d) The Constitution (Twentyfourth Amendment) Act, 1971, as interpreted by me, has been validly enacted. (e) Article 368 does not enable Parliament in its constituent capacity to delegate its function of amending the Constitution to another legislature or to itself in its ordinary legislative capacity.

(f) Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, as interpreted by me, is valid. (g) Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is void as it delegates power to legislatures to amend the Constitution. (h) The Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1971 is ineffective to protect the impugned Acts if they abrogate or take away fundamental rights. The Constitution Bench will decide whether the impugned Acts take away fundamental rights or only abridge them. and in the latter case whether they effect reasonable abridgments in the public interest. 493. The Constitution Bench will determine the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 in accordance with this judgment, and the law. 494. The cases are remitted to the Constitution Bench to be decided in accordance with this judgment, and the law. The parties will bear their own costs. SHELAT AND GROVER, JJ.:-495. All the six writ petitions involve common questions as to the validity of the 24th, 25th and 29th amendments to the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out the facts which have already been succinctly stated in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. 496. It was considered, when the larger bench was constituted, that the decision of the questions before US would hinge largely on the correctness or otherwise of the decision of this Court in I. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643 ), according to which it was held, by majority, that Article 13 (2) of the Constitution was applicable to constitutional amendments made under Article 368 and that for that reason the fundamental rights in Part III could not be abridged in any manner or taken away, The decision in Golak Nath has become academic, for even on the assumption that the majority decision in that case was not correct, the result on the questions now raised before us, in our opinion, would just be the same. The issues that have been raised travel far beyond that decision and the main question to be determined now is the scope, ambit and extent of the amending power conferred by Article 368. On that will depend largely the decision of the other matters arising out of the 25th and the 29th amendments. 497. The respective positions adopted by learned counsel for the parties diverge widely and are irreconcilable. On the side of the petitioners, it is maintained inter alia that the power of the amending body (Parliament) under Article 368 is of a limited nature. The Constitution gave the Indian citizens the basic freedoms and a polity or a form of government which were meant to be lasting and permanent. Therefore, the amending power does not extend to alteration or destruction of all or any of the essential features, basic elements and fundamental principles of the Constitution which power, it is said, vests in the Indian people alone who gave the Constitution to themselves, as is stated in its Preamble. 498. The respondents, on the other hand, claim an unlimited power for the amending body. It is claimed that it has the full constituent power which a legal sovereign can exercise provided the conditions laid down in Article 368 are satisfied. The content and amplitude of the power is so wide that, if it is so desired, all rights contained in Part III (Fundamental Rights) such as freedom of speech and expression; the freedom to form associations or unions and the various other freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 (1) as also the right to freedom of religion as contained in Articles 25 to 28 together with the protection of interests of minorities (to mention the most prominent ones) can be

abrogated and taken away. Similarly, Article 32 which confers the right to move this Court, if any fundamental right is breached, can he repealed or abrogated. The directive principles in Part IV can be altered drastically or even abrogated. It is claimed that democracy can be replaced by any other form of government which may be wholly undemocratic, the federal structure can be replaced by a unitary system by abolishing all the States and the @page-SC1567 right of judicial review can be completely taken away. Even the Preamble which declares that the People of India gave to themselves the Constitution, to constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic for securing the great objectives mentioned therein can be amended; indeed it can be completely repealed. Thus, according to the respondents, short of total abrogation or repeal of the Constitution, the amending body is omnipotent under Article 368 and the Constitution can, at any point of time, be amended by way of variation, addition or repeal so long as no vacuum is left in the governance of the country. 499. These petitions which have been argued for a very long time raise momentous issues of great constitutional importance. Our Constitution is unique, apart from being the longest in the world. It is meant for the. second largest population with diverse people speaking different languages and professing varying religions. It was chiselled and shaped by great political leaders and legal luminaries, most of whom had taken an active part in the struggle for freedom from the British yoke and who knew what domination of a foreign rule meant in the way of deprivation of basic freedoms and from the point of view of exploitation of the millions of Indians. The Constitution is an organic document which must grow and it must take stock of the vast socio-economic problems, particularly, of improving the Jot of the common man consistent with his dignity and the unity of the nation. 500. We may observe at the threshold that we do not propose to examine the matters raised before us on the assumption that Parliament will exercise the power in the way claimed on behalf of the respondents nor did the latter contend that it will be so done. But while interpreting constitutional provisions it is necessary to determine their width or reach; in fact the area of operation of the power, its minimum and maximum dimensions cannot be demarcated or determined without fully examining the rival plaints. Unless that is done, the ambit, content, scope and extent of the amending power cannot be properly and correctly decided. 501. For our purposes it is not necessary to go prior to the year 1934. It was in that year that the Indian National Congress made the demand for a Constituent Assembly as part of its policy. This demand was repeated in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1937 by the representatives of the Congress. By what is known as the Simla Conference 1945 the Congress repeated its stand that India could only accept the Constitution drawn by the people. After the end of World War II the demand was put forward very strongly by the Indian leaders including, Mahatma Gandhi. Sir Strafford Cripps representing Britain had also accepted the idea that an elected body of Indians should frame the Indian Constitution.* In September 1945 the newly elected British Labour Government announced that it favoured the creation of a constituent body in India. Elections were to be held so that the newly elected provincial legislatures could act as electoral bodies for the Constituent Assembly. A parliamentary delegation was sent to India in January 1946 and this was followed by what is known as the Cabinet Mission. There were a great deal of difficulties owing to the differences between the approach of the Indian National

Congress and the Muslim League led by Mr. M. A. Jinnah. The Cabinet Mission devised a plan which was announced on May 16, 1946. By the end of June, both the Muslim League and the Congress had accepted it with reservations. The Constituent Assembly was elected between July-August 1946 as a result of the suggestion contained :D the statement of the Cabinet Mission. The Atlee Government's efforts to effect an agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League having failed, the partition of the country came as a consequence of the declaration of the British Government on June 3, 1947. As a result of that declaration certain changes took place in the Constituent Assembly. There was also readjustment of representation of Indian States from time to time between December 1946 and November 1949. Many smaller States merged into the provinces, many unite 1 to form unions of States and some came to be administered as commissioner's provinces. There was thus a gradual process by which the Constituent Assembly became fully representative of the various communities and interests, political, intellectual, social and cultural. It was by virtue of Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act. @page-SC1568 1947 that the Constituent Assembly was vested with the legal authority to frame a Constitution for India. * The facts have been taken mainly from the Indian Constitution, Cornerstone of a Nation. by Granvil1e Austin. 502. The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly took place on December 9, 1946 when the swearing-in of members and election of a temporary president to conduct the business until the installation of a permanent head, took place. On December 13, 1946 Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru moved the famous "Objectives Resolution" giving an outline, aims and objects of the Constitution. This resolution was actually passed on January 22, 1947 by all members of the Constituent Assembly (standing) and it declared among other matters that all power and authority of the sovereign Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of Government are derived from the people. By November 26, 1949, the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly had concluded and the Constitution had been framed. As recited in the Preamble it was on that date that the people of India in the Constituent Assembly adopted, enacted and gave to themselves "this Constitution" which according to Article 393 was to be called "The Constitution of India". In accordance with Article 394 that Article and the other Articles mentioned therein were to come into force at once but the remaining provisions of the Constitution were to come into force on the 26th day of January, 1950. 503. Before the scheme of the Constitution is examined in some detail it is necessary to give the Pattern which was followed in framing it. The Constituent Assembly was unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern "suitable to the genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole". The Assembly had before it the experience of the working of the Government of India Act 1935, several features of which could be accepted for the new Constitution. Our Constitution borrowed a great deal from the Constitutions of other countries, e.g., United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland, United States of America and Switzerland. The Constitution being supreme all the organs and bodies owe their existence to it. None can claim superiority over the other and each of them has to function within the four-corners of the constitutional provisions. The Preamble embodies the great purposes, objectives and the policy underlying its provisions apart from the basic character of the State which was to come into existence i.e., a Sovereign Democratic Republic. Parts III and IV which embody the fundamental

rights and directive principles of state policy have been described as the conscience of the Constitution.* The legislative power distributed between the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures cannot be so exercised as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights contained in Part III. Powers of the Union and the States are further curtailed by conferring the right to enforce fundamental rights contained in Part III by moving the Supreme Court for a suitable relief. (See generally, Kania, C. J. in A. K. Gopalan v. The State (1950) SCR 88 at pp. 96-97 = (AIR 1950 SC 27). Art. 32 itself has been constituted a fundamental right. Part IV containing the directive principles of State policy was inspired largely by similar provisions in the Constitution of the Eire Republic (1937). This Part, according to B. N. Rao, is like an Instrument of Instructions from the ultimate sovereign namely, the people of India.** The Constitution has all the essential elements of a federal structure as was the case in the Government of India Act 1935, the essence of federalism being the distribution of powers between the federation or the Union and the States or the provinces. All the legislatures have plenary powers but these are controlled by the basic concepts of the Constitution itself and they function within the limits laid down in it (Per Gajendragadkar C. J. in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964. (1965) 1 SCR 413 at p. 445 = (AIR 1965 SC 745). All the functionaries, be they legislators, members of the executive or the judiciary, take oath of allegiance to the Constitution and derive their authority and jurisdiction from its provisions. The Constitution has entrusted to the judicature in this country the task of construing the provisions of the Constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights. (Ibid p. 446). It is a written and controlled Constitution. It can be amended only to the extent of and in accordance with the provisions contained therein, the principal provision being Article 368. Although our Constitution is federal in its structure it provides a system @page-SC1569 modelled on the British parliamentary system. It is the executive that has the main responsibility for formulating the governmental policy by "transmitting it into law" whenever necessary. "The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State." R. S. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR. 225 at p. 236 = (AIR 1955 SC). With regard to the civil services anti the Position of the judiciary the British model has been adopted inasmuch as the Appointment of judges both of the Supreme Court of India and of the High Courts of the States is kept free from political controversies. Their independence has been assured. But the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as it obtains in England does not prevail here expect to the extent provided by the Constitution. The entire scheme of the Constitution such that it ensures the sovereignty and integrity of the country as a Republic and the democratic way of life by parliamentary institutions based on free and fair elections. * The Indian Constitution by Granville Austin p. 50. ** B. N. Rao, India's Constitution in the Making p. 393 504. India is a secular State in which there is no State religion. Special provisions have been made in the Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion and the freedom to manage religious affairs as also the protection of interests of minorities. The interests of scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes have received special treatment. The Rule of law has been

ensured by providing for Judicial review. Adult suffrage, the acceptance of the fullest implications of democracy" is one of the most striking features of the Constitution. According to K. M. Pannikar, "it may well be claimed that the Constitution is a solemn promise to the People of India that the legislature will do everything possible to renovate and reconstitute the society on new principles. *" * Hindu Society at crossroads ( By K.M.Panikar) at pages 63-64. 505. We may now look at the Preamble. It reads: We, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all; FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION." It may be mentioned that this Preamble and indeed the whole Constitution was drafted in the light of and directions contained in the "OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION" adopted on January 22, 1947. 506. According to Granville Austin,* directive principles of State policy set forth the humanitarian socialist precepts that were the aims of the Indian social revolution. Granville Austin, while summing up the inter-relationship of fundamental rights and directive principles, says that it is quite evident that the fundamental rights and the directive principles were designed by the members of the Assembly to be the chief instruments in bringing about the great reforms of the social revolution. He gives the answer to the question whether they have helped to bring the Indian society closer to the Constitution's goal of social, economic and political justice for all in the affirmative.** Das, C. J., in Re: Kerala Education Bill 1957, (1959) SCR 995 at p. 1020 - (AIR 1958 SC 956) made the following observations with regard to Parts III and IV: *Cornerstone of a nation (Indian Constitution) by Granville Austin, p. 75. ** Indian Constitution (Cornerstone of a nation) by Granville Austin, p. 113. "While our Fundamental Rights are guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, Part IV of it on the other hand, lays down certain directive principles of State policy. I he provisions contained in that part are not enforceable by any court but the principles therein laid down are, nevertheless, fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall @pageSC1570 be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. Article 39 enjoins the State to direct its policy towards securing, amongst other things, that the citizens, men and women, equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood". Although in the previous decisions of this Court in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, (1951) SCR 525 at p. 531 = (AIR 1951 SC 226) and Mohd. Hanif Qureshi v. The State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 629 = (AIR 1958 SC 731) it had been held that the directive principles of State policy had to conform to and run subsidiary to the Chapter of Fundamental Rights, the learned Chief Justice was of the view which may be stated in his own words:"Nevertheless in determining the scope and ambit of the Fundamental Rights relied oh By or on behalf of any person or body the Court may not entirely ignore these directive

principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution but should adopt the principle of harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible". 507. The first question of prime importance involves the validity of the Constitution Amendment Act 191(hereinafter called the 24th Amendment). It amended Article 368 of the Constitution for the first time. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the Bill relating to the 24th Amendment, the result of the judgment of this Court in Golak Nath's case (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643) has been that Parliament is considered to have no power to take away or curtail any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution even if it becomes necessary to do so for giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy and for attainment of the Objectives set out in the Preamble to the Constitution.. It became, therefore, necessary to provide expressly that Parliament has the power to amend any provision of the Constitution including the provisions contained in Part III. 508. Article 368 is in a separate Part i.e., Part XX. Its marginal note before the 24th Amendment was "Procedure for amendment of the Constitution". I' provided in the substantive portion of the Article how the Constitution "shall stand amended" when "An Amendment of this Constitution" was initiated by the introduction of a Bill in either House of Parliament. The following conditions had to be satisfied : (i) The Bill had to be passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting. (ii) The Bill had to be presented for the assent of the President and his assent had to be obtained. Under the proviso, it was necessary to obtain ratification of legislatures of not less than one half of the States by Resolutions before presenting the Bill to the President for assent if the amendment sought to make any change in the Articles, Chapters etc. mentioned in cls. (a) to (e). Clause (e) was "the provisions of this Article". 509. The 24th Amendment made the following changes: (i) The marginal heading has been substituted by Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor." (ii) Article 338 has been re-numbered as clause (2). (iii) Before clause (2), the following clause has been inserted:"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its Constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article". (iv) In clause (2) as renumbered, for the words "it shall be presented to President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill the words "it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and there" upon have been substituted. (v) A new clause (3) has been inserted namely: "(3) Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article". It may be "mentioned that by the 24th Amendment clause (4) has been inserted in Article 13 itself. It is: "(4) Nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368".

510. On behalf of the petitioners. Mr. Palkhivala stated that he need not: for the purposes of this case dispute the @page-SC1571 24th Amendment so far as it leads to the following result : (i) The insertion of the express provision in Article 868 that the source of the amending power is the Article itself. (ii) The President is bound to give assent to any Bill duly passed under -that Article. The following three results have, however, been the subject of great deal of argument :(i) The substitution of the words in Article 368 "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal............ in place of the concept 'amendment'. (ii) Making it explicit in the said Article that when Parliament makes a constitutional amendment under the Article it acts "in exercise of its constituent power". (iii) The express provision in Article 13 and 368 that the bar in the former Article against abridging or taking away any of the Fundamental Rights should not apply to an amendment made under the latter Article. In the judgment of Chief Justice Subba Rao with whom four learned Judges agreed in Golak Nath's case the source of the amending power was held to reside in Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I to the Seventh Schedule. Whether that view is sustainable or not need not be considered here now owing to the concession made by Mr. Palkhivala that by amendment of Art. 368 such a power could be validly located in that Article even if it be assumed that it did not originally reside there. The real attack, therefore, is directed against the validity of the 24th amendment in so far as the three results mentioned above are concerned. It has been maintained that if the effect of those results is that the Parliament has clothed itself with legal sovereignty which the People of India alone possess, by taking the full constituent power, and if the Parliament can in exercise of that power alter or destroy all or any of the 'essential features' of the Constitution the 24th Amendment will be void. The fundamental rights embodied in Part III are a part of the 'essential features' and if their essence or core can be damaged or taken away the 24th amendment will be void and illegal. 511. The position taken up on behalf of the respondents is that so far as Article 368 is concerned, the 24th Amendment has merely clarified the doubts cast in the majority judgment in Golak Nath. That Article, as it originally stood, contained the constituent power by virtue of which all or any of the provisions of the Constitution including the Preamble could be added to, varied or repealed. In other words, the power of amendment was unlimited and unfettered and was not circumscribed by any such limitations as have been suggested on behalf of the petitioners. Therefore, the crux of the matter is the determination of the true ambit, scope and width of the amending provisions contained in Art. 368 before the changes and alterations made in it by the 24th Amendment. If the Article conferred the power of the amplitude now covered by the 24th Amendment nothing new has been done and the amendment cannot be challenged. If, however, the original power though having the constituent quality was a limited one, it could not be increased. In other words the amending body cannot enlarge its own powers. 512. What then is the meaning of the word "amendment" as used in Article 368 of the Constitution. On behalf of the respondents it has been maintained that "amendment" of this Constitution can have only one meaning. No question, can arise of resorting to other aids in the matter of interpretation or construction of the expression "amendment". On the

other hand, the argument of Mr. Palkhivala revolves on the expression "amendment" which can have more than one meaning and for that reason it is essential to discover its true import as well as ambit by looking at and taking into consideration other permissible aids of construction. No efforts have been spared on both sides to give us all the meanings of the words "amendment" and "amend" from the various dictionaries as also authoritative books and opinions of authors and writers. 513. It is more proper, however, to look for the true 'meaning of the word "amendment" in the Constitution itself rather than in the dictionaries. Let us first analyse the scheme of Article 368 itself as it stood before the 24th Amendment. (i) The expression "amendment of the Constitution" is not defined or explained in any manner although in other parts of the Constitution the word "amend" as will be noticed later, has been expanded by use of the expression @page-SC1572 "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal". (ii) The power in respect of amendment has not been conferred in express terms. It can be spelt out only by necessary implication. (iii) The proviso uses the words "if such amendment seeks to make any change in". It does not use the words "change of' or "change'' simpliciter. (iv) The provisions of the Constitution mentioned in the proviso do not show that the basic structure of the Constitution can be changed if the procedure laid down therein is followed. For instance, clause (a) in the proviso refers to Articles 54 and 55 which relate to the election of the President. It is noteworthy that Article 52 which provides that there shall be a President of India and Article 53 which vests the power of the Union in the President and provides how it shall be exercised are not included in clause (a). It is incomprehensible that the Constitution makers intended that although the ratification of the legislatures of the requisite number of States should be obtained if any changes were to be made in Arts. 54 and 55 but that no such ratification was necessary if the office of the President was to be abolished and the executive power of the Union was to be exercised by some other person or authority. (v) Another Article which is mentioned in clause (a) is Article 73 which deals with the extent of the executive power of the Union. So far as the Vice President is concerned there is no mention of the relevant Articles relating to him. In other words the States have been given no voice in the question whether the office of the Vice-President shall be continued or abolished or what the method of his election would be. (vi) The next Article mentioned in clause (a) is 162 which deals with the extent of the executive power of the States. The Articles relating to the appointment and conditions of service of a Governor, constitution and ''functions of his council of ministers as also the conduct of bussiness are not mentioned in clause (a) or any other part of the proviso. (vii) Along with Articles 54, 55, 73 and 162, Article 241 is mentioned in clause (a) of the proviso. This Article dealt originally only with the High Courts for States in Part C of the First Schedule. (viii) Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution deals with the Union Judiciary and Chapter V of Part VI with the High Courts in the States. Although these have been included in clause (b) of the proviso it is surprising that Chapter VI of Part VI which relates to Subordinate Judiciary is not mentioned at all, which is the immediate concern of the States.

(ix) Chapter I of Part XI which deals with legislative relations between the Union and the States is included in clause (b) of the proviso but Chapter II of that Part which deals with Administrative Relations between the Union and the States and various other matters in which the States would be vitally interested are not included. (x) The provisions in the Constitution relating to services under the State as also with regard to Trade and Commerce are not included in the proviso. (xi) Clause (c) of the proviso mentions the lists in the Seventh Schedule. Clause (d) relates to the representation of States in Parliament and clause (e) to the provisions of Article 368 itself. 514. The net result is that the provisions contained in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso do not throw any light on the logic, sequence or systematic arrangement in respect of the inclusion of those Articles which deal with the whole of the federal structure. These clauses demonstrate that the reason for including certain Articles and excluding others from the proviso was not that all Articles dealing with the federal structure or the States had been selected for inclusion in the proviso. The other unusual result is that if the fundamental rights contained in Part III have to be amended that can be done without complying with the provisions of the proviso. It is difficult to understand that the Constitution makers should not have thought of ratification by the States if such important and material rights were to be abrogated or taken away wholly or partially. It is also interesting that in order to meet the difficulty created by the omission of Articles 52 and 53 which relate to there being a President in whom the executive functions of the Union would vest, the learned Solicitor General sought to read by implication the inclusion of those Articles because, according to him, the question of election cannot arise with which Arts. 54 and 55 @page-SC1573 are concerned if the office of President is abolished. 515. We may next refer to the use of the words "amendment" or "amended" in other articles of the Constitution. In some articles these words in the context have a wide meaning and in another context they have a narrow meaning. The group of articles which expressly confer power on the Parliament to amend are five including Article 368. The first is Article 4. It relates to laws made under Articles 2 and 3 to provide for amendment of the First and the Second Schedules and supplemental, incidental and consequential matters. The second Article is l69 which provides for abolition or creation of Legislative Councils in States. The third and the fourth provisions are paras 7 and 21 of the 5th and 6th Schedules. respectively which have to be read with Art. 244 and which deal with the administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas. The expression used in Arts. 4 and 169 is "amendment". In paras 7 and 21 it is the expanded expression "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" which has been employed. Parliament has been empowered to make these amendments by law and it has been expressly provided that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368. 516. It is apparent that the word "amendment" has been used in a narrower sense in Article 4. The argument that if it he assumed that Parliament is invested with wide powers under Article 4 it may conceivably exercise power to abolish the legislative and the judicial organs of the State altogether was refuted by this court (in) Mangal Singh v. Union of India, (1967)) 2 SCR 109 at p. 112 = (AIR 1967 SC: 944) by saying that a State cannot be formed, admitted or set up by law under Article 4 by the Parliament which does not conform to the democratic pattern envisaged by the Constitution. Similarly any law

which contains provisions for amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of abolition or creation of If legislative councils in States is only confined to that purpose and the word "amendment" has necessarily been used in a narrow sense. But in Paras 7 and 21 the expanded expression is employed and indeed an attempt was made even in the Constituent Assembly for the insertion of a new clause before clause (1) of draft Article 304 (Present Article 388). The amendment* (No. 3239) was proposed by Mr. H. V. Kamath and it was as follows:* Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 9, p.1663. "Any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, in the manner provided in this article". Mr. Kamath had moved another amendment in draft Article 304 to substitute the words "it shall upon presentation to the President receive his assent". Both these amendments were negatived by the Constituent Assembly. It is noteworthy that the 24th amendment as now inserted has introduced substantially the same amendments which were not accepted by the Constituent Assembly. 517. The Constituent Assembly must be presumed to he fully aware of the expanded expression, as on September 17, 1949 it had substituted the following section in place of the old Section 291 of the Government of India Act 1935 by means of Constituent Assembly Act 4 of 1949:"291. Power of the Governor-General to amend certain provisions of the Act and order made thereunder :"(l) The Governor-General may at any time by Order make such amendments as he considers necessary whether by way of addition, modification. or repeal, (emphasis supplied) in the provisions of this Act or of any Order made thereunder in relation to any provincialLegislature with respect to any of the following matters, that is to say, (a) ......................." The word "amendment" has also been used in certain Articles like Article 107 dealing with legislative procedure and Article 111 which enables the President to send a message requesting the Houses to consider the desirability of introducing amendments etc., "Amendment" as used in these Articles could only have a limited meaning as is apparent from the context. On behalf of the petitioners a great deal of reliance has been placed on the contrast between the use of the word "amendment" in Articles 4 and 169 and paras 7 and 21 of the 5th and 6th Schedules which use the composite expression "amend by way of addition variation or repeal." It is pointed out that in Article 368 it is only the word @page-SC1574 "amendment" which has been used and if the Constitution-makers intended that it should have the expanded meaning then there was no reason why the same phraseology would not have been employed as in paras 7 and 21 or as has been inserted now by the 24th amendment. The steps in this argument are: (i) The contrast in the language employed in the different provisions of the Constitution in respect of amendment; (ii) conferment of the wider power for the purpose of the 5th and 6th Schedules which empower the Parliament to alter and repeal the provisions of those Schedules relating to the institutions contemplated by them, the law making authority set up under them and the fundamental basis of administration to be found in the two Schedules. (iii) the wide language, used in paras 7 and 21 of the two Schedules was meant for the purpose that at a proper time in the future or whenever considered necessary the entire

basic structure of the Schedules could be repealed and the areas and tribes covered by them could be governed and administered like the rest of India. (iv) the use of the word "amendment" simpliciter in Article 368 must have a narrower meaning than the composite expression "amend" or ''amendment" by way of addition, variation or repeal and must correspond to the meaning of the word "amend" or "amendment" in Articles 4 and 169. (v) The power of amending the Constitution is not concentrated in Article 368 alone but it is diffused as it is to be found in the other Articles and provisions mentioned. The reason why it was added that no law passed by the Parliament under those provisions shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purpose of Article 368 was only meant to clarify that the form and manner prescribed by Article 368 was not to be followed and the Parliament could, in the ordinary way, by following the procedure laid down for passing legislative enactments amend the Constitution to the extent mentioned in those Articles and provisions. 518. The learned Advocate General of Maharashtra, who appears for respondent No. 1, has laid a great deal of emphasis on the fact that Article 368 is the only Article which is contained in a Separate part having, the title. "Amendment of the Constitution." It is under that article that all other provisions including Articles 4,169 and paras 7 and 21 of the 5th and 6th Schedules respectively can be amended. The latter group of Articles contain a limited power because those Articles are subordinate to Article 368. This is illustrated by the categorical statement contained in each one of those provisions that no such law amending the Constitution shall be deemed to be an amendment thereof for the purpose of Article 368. As regards the composite expression "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" employed in paras 7 and 21 of the two Schedules, it has been pointed out that Clause (2) in which the words "amendment of this Constitution" are used clearly shows that addition, variation or repeal of any provision would be covered by the word "amendment". According to the learned Attorney General the word "amendment" must mean, variation addition or repeal. He has traced the history behind paras 7 and 21 of Schedules 5 and 6 to illustrate that the expression "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" has no such significance and does not enlarge the meaning of the word "amendment'. Our attention has been invited to a number of Articles in the Constitution itself out of which mention may be made of Articles 320 (5) and 392 (1) where the expressions used were "such modification, whether by way of repeal or amendment' and "such adoption whether by way of modification, addition or omission". It has been urged that the expression "amendment of this Constitution" has acquired substantive meaning over the years in the context of a written Constitution and it means that any part of the Constitution can be amended by changing the same either by variation, addition or repeal. 519. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar who was not only the Chairman of the Drafting Committee but also the main architect of the Constitution made it clear* that the articles of the Constitution were divided into different categories the first category was the one which consisted of articles which could be amended by the Parliament by a bare majority the second set of articles were such which required the two-third majority. This obviously had reference to the group of articles consisting of Articles 4, 169 and @page-SC1575 paras 7 and 21 of the two Schedules and Article 368 respectively. The scheme of the amending provisions outlined by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar seems to indicate that the Constitution makers had in mind only one distinction between the amending power

conferred by the other Articles and Article 368. No such distinction was present to their mind of the nature suggested by the learned Advocate-General that the amending power conferred by Articles other than Article 368 was of a purely subordinate nature. In one sense the power contained in the first group of Articles can be said to be subordinate in that those Articles themselves could be amended by the procedure prescribed by Article 368. But that Article itself could be amended by the same procedure. It would not, therefore, be wrong to say that the amending power was of a diffused kind, and was contained in more than one provision of the Constitution. It appears that the statement in the articles and provisions containing the amending power other than Art. 368 that any amendment made under those articles would not amount to an amendment under Article 368 merely embodied the distinction emphasised by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar that one category could be amended by the Parliament by a bare majority and all the other articles could be amended by the said body but only by following, the form and manner prescribed by Article 368. Although prima facie it would appear that the Constitution makers did not employ the composite expression in Article, 368 for certain reasons and even rejected Mr. Kamath's amendment which pointedly brought to their notice that it was of material importance that the expanded expression should be used, it may not be possible to consider this aspect as conclusive for the purpose of determining the meaning of the word "amendment" in Article 368. * Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 9, page 1661. 520. According to Mr. Palkhivala there can be three possible meanings of amendment :(i) to improve or better; to remove an error; the question of improvement being considered from the stand point of the basic philosophy underlying the Constitution but subject to its essential features. (ii) to make changes which may not fall within (i) but which do not alter or destroy any of the basic features, essential elements or fundamental principles of the Constitution. (iii) to make any change whatsoever including changes falling outside (ii). He claims that the preferable meaning is that which is contained in (i) but what is stated in (ii) is also a possible construction. Category (iii) should be ruled out altogether. Categories (i) and (ii) have a common factor, namely that the essential features cannot be damaged or destroyed. 521. On behalf of the respondents it is not disputed that the words "amendment of this Constitution" do not mean repeal or abrogation of this Constitution. The amending power, however is claimed on behalf of the respondents to extend to addition, alteration, substitution, modification, deletion of each and every provision of the Constitution. The argument of the Attorney General is that the amending power in Article 368 as it stood before the 24th amendment and as it stands now has always been and continues to be the constituent power, e.g., the power to deconstitute or reconstitute the Constitution or any part of it. Constitution at any point of time cannot be so amended by way of variation, addition or repeal as to leave a vacuum. in the government of the country. The whole object and necessity of amending power is to enable the Constitution to continue and such a constituent power unless it is expressly limited in the Constitution itself, can by its very nature have no limit because if any such limit is assumed, although not expressly found in the Constitution the whole purpose of an amending power will be nullified. It has been pointed out that the Constitution First Amendment Act which was enacted soon after the Constitution of India came into force, certain provisions were inserted, others

substituted or omitted and all these were described as amendments of the articles mentioned therein. In the context of the constitution, amendment reaches every provision including the Preamble and there is no ambiguity about it which may justify having resort to either looking at the other Articles for determining the ambit of the amendatory, power or taking into consideration the Preamble or the scheme of the Constitution or other permissible aids to construction. 522. A good deal of reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on Article 5 of the Constitution of the United States, hereinafter called the @page-SC1576 'American Constitution' which deals with amendment and its interpretation by the American Courts. Reference has been made to the writings of authors and writers who have dealt with the meaning of the word "amendment" in the American Constitution. It has been argued that in Article 5 of that Constitution the word used is "amendments" and our Constitution makers had that word in mind when they employed the expression "amendment of this Constitution" in Article 368. We propose to refer to the decisions from other countries including those of the Supreme Court of the United States later. We wish to observe, at this stage, that our founding fathers had primarily the Constitutions of Canada, Australia, Eire, U. S. A. and Switzerland in view apart from that of Japan. The whole scheme and language of Article368 is quite different from the amending provisions in Constitutions of those countries. For instance, in U. S. A., Eire, Australia, Switzerland and Japan the people are associated in some manner or the other directly with the amending process. It would be purely speculative or conjectural to rely on the use of the word "amend" or "amendment" in the Constitution of another country unless the entire scheme of the amending section or article is also kept in mind. In India Parliament is certainly representative of the people but so are similar institutions in the countries mentioned above and vet there is a provision for ratification by convention or referendum or submission of the proposed law to electors directly Another way of discovering the meaning on which both sides relied on is to refer to the various speeches in the Constituent Assembly by the late Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and late Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. The position which emerges from an examination of their speeches does not lead to any clear and conclusive result. Their speeches show that our constitution was to be an amendable one and much rigidity was not intended. Pandit Nehru time and again emphasised that while the Constitution was meant to be as solid and as permanent a structure as it could be, nevertheless there was no permanence in the constitution and there should be certain flexibility, otherwise it would stop a nation's growth. Dr. Ambedkar, while dealing with draft Article 25 corresponding to the present Article 32, said that the most important Article without which the constitution would be a nullity and which was the very soul of the Constitution and the heart of it was that Article. But what he said at a later stage appears to suggest that that article itself could be amended and according to the respondents even abrogated. This illustration shows that nothing conclusive can emerge by referring to the speeches for the purpose of interpretation of the word "amendment". 523. It is not possible to accept the argument on behalf of the respondents that amendment can have only one meaning. This word or expression has several meanings and we shall have to determine its true meaning as used in the context of Article 368 by taking assistance from the other permissible aids to construction. We shall certainly bear in mind the well known principles of interpretation and construction, particularly, of an

instrument like a Constitution. A Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense. A broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it. Gwyer, C. J., In Re C. P. and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Motor Lubricants Taxation Act 1938, 1939 FCR 18 = (AIR 1939 FC 1) adopted the words of Higgins, J., of the High Court of Australia from the decision in Attorney General for New South Wales v. The Brewery Employees' Union of New South Wales, (1908) 6 CLR 469 at pp. 611612, according to which even though the words of the Constitution are to be interpreted on the same principles of interpretation as are applied to any ordinary law, these very principles of interpretation require taking into account the nature and scope of the Act remembering that "it is a constitution a mechanism under which laws are to be made and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be, 1939 FCR 18 at p. 37 = (AIR 1939 FC 1)." The decision must depend on the words of the Constitution as provisions of no two constitutions are in identical terms. The same learned Chief Justice said that the "grant of the power in general terms standing by itself would no doubt be construed in the wider sense, but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implication of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the. Act."* The @page-SC1577 observations of Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia, 1936 AC 573 at P. 613, were also quoted in the aforesaid judgment of the Federal Court of India at page 73 : * Ibid, p. 42. "The question, then, is one of construction and in the ultimate resort must be determined upon the actual words used read not in a vacuo but as occurring in a single complex instrument, in which one part may throw light on another. The Constitution has been described as the federal compact, and the construction must hold a balance between all its parts." Apart from the historical background and the scheme of the Constitution the use of the Preamble has always been made and is permissible if the word "amendment" has more than one meaning. Lord Green in Bidie v; General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, (1948) 2 All ER 995 pointed out that the words should never be interpreted in vacuo because few words in the English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of their context. The method which he preferred was not to take the particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which may have to be displaced or modified. To use his own words "it is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question: In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word?" We shall first deal with the Preamble in our Constitution. The Constitution makers gave to the preamble the pride of place. It embodied in a solemn form all the ideals and aspirations for which the country had struggled during the British regime and a Constitution was sought to be enacted in accordance with the genius of the Indian people. It certainly represented an amalgam of schemes and ideas adopted from the Constitutions of other countries. But the constant strain which runs throughout each and every article of the Constitution is reflected in the Preamble which could and can be made sacrosanct. It is not without significance that the Preamble was passed only after draft articles of the Constitution had been adopted with such modifications as were approved by the

Constituent Assembly. The preamble was, therefore, meant to embody in a very few and well defined words the key to the understanding of the constitution. 524. It would be instructive to advert to the various stages through which the Preamble passed before it was ultimately adopted by the Constituent Assembly. In the earlier draft of the Union Constitution the Preamble was a somewhat formal affair. The one drafted by B. N. Rau said: "We, the People of India, seeking to promote the common good, do hereby, through our chosen representatives, enact, adopt and give to ourselves this Constitution." The Union Constitution Committee provisionally accepted the draft Preamble of B. N. Rau and reproduced it in its report of July 4, 1947 without any change with the tacit recognition, at that stage, that the Preamble would finally be based on the Objectives Resolution. 525. On July 18, 1947, Pandit Nehru in a statement observed that the Preamble was covered more or less by the Objectives Resolution which it was intended to incorporate in the final Constitution. Three days later, while moving the report of the Union Constitution Committee, he suggested that it was not at that stage necessary to consider the Preamble since the Assembly stood by the basic principles laid down in the Objectives Resolution and these could be incorporated in the Preamble later. This suggestion was accepted and further consideration of the Preamble was held over. 526. The Drafting Committee considered the Preamble at a number of its meetings in February 1948. The Committee omitted that part of the Objectives Resolution which declared that the territories of India would retain the status of autonomous units with residuary powers. By this time the opinion had veered round for a strong centre with residuary powers. The Drafting Committee felt that the Preamble should be restricted "to defining the essential features of the new State and its basic socio-political objectives and that the other matters dealt with in the Resolution could be more appropriately provided in the substantial parts of the Constitution." Accordingly it drafted the Preamble, which substantially was in the present form. 527. Meanwhile important developments had taken place in regard to the Indian States. With the completion @page-SC1578 of the process of merger and integration of the Indian States the principle had been accepted (i) of sovereign powers being vested in the people, and (ii) that their constitutions should be framed by the Constituent Assembly and should form integrated part of the new Constitution. On October 12, 1949, Sardar Patel declared in the Assembly that the new Constitution was "not an alliance between democracies and dynasties, but a real union of the Indian people, built on the basic concept of the sovereignty of the people." 528. The draft preamble was considered by the Assembly on October 17, 1949. The object of putting the Preamble last, the President of Assembly explained, was to see that it was in conformity with the Constitution as accepted. Various amendments were at this stage suggested, but were, rejected. One of such was the proposal to insert into it the words. "In the name of God". That was rejected on the ground that it was inconsistent with the freedom of faith which was not only promised in the Preamble itself but was also guaranteed as a fundamental right.* * Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 10, pp. 432-442. 529. An amendment was- moved in the Constituent Assembly to make it clear beyond all doubt that sovereignty vested in the people. It was not accepted on the short ground that

"the Preamble as drafted could convey no other meaning than that the Constitution emanated from the people and sovereignty to make this Constitution vested in them.** ** The Framing of India's Constitution by B. Shiva Rao, p. 131. 530. The history of the drafting and the ultimate adoption of the Preamble shows : (1) that it did not "walk before the Constitution?" as is said about the preamble to the United States Constitution; (2) that it was adopted last as a part of the Constitution; (3) that the principles embodied in it were taken mainly from the Objectives Resolution; (4) the Drafting Committee felt it should incorporate in it "the essential features of the new State"; (5) that it embodied the fundamental concept of sovereignty being in the people. 531. In order to appreciate how the preamble will assist us in discovering the meaning of the word "amendment employed in Article 368, we may again notice the argument presented by the respondents that the amending body can alter, vary or repeal any provision of the Constitution and enact it and apply that process to the entire Constitution short of total repeal and abrogation. It is maintained on behalf of the Respondents that by virtue of the amending power even the preamble can be varied, altered or repealed. Mr. Palkhivala, however, relies a great deal on the preamble for substantiating the contention that ''amendment" does not have the widest possible meaning as claimed by the respondents and there are certain limitations to the exercise of the amending power and, therefore, the expression "amendment" should be construed in the light of those limitations. All the elements of the Constitutional structure, it is said, are to be found in the preamble and the amending body cannot repeal or abrogate those essential elements because if any one of them is taken away the edifice as erected must fall. 532. The learned Advocate General of Maharashtra, says that the preamble itself is ambiguous and it can be of no assistance in that situation. It has further been contended that the concepts recited in the preamble, e.g., human dignity, social and economic justice are vague; different schools of thought hold different notions of their concepts. We are wholly unable to accede to this contention. The preamble was finalised after a long discussion and it was adopted last so that it may embody the fundamentals underlying the structure of the Constitution. It is true that on a concept such as social and economic justice there may be different schools of thought hut the Constitution makers knew what they meant by those concepts and it was with a view to implement them that they enacted Parts III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) - both fundamental in character - on the one hand, basic freedoms to the individual and on the other social security, justice and freedom from exploitation - by laying down guiding principles for future governments. 533. Our Court has consistently looked to the preamble for guidance and given it a transcendental position while interpreting the Constitution or other @page-SC1579 laws. It was so referred in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka's case 1955 SCR 613 at p. 653 = (AIR 1955 SC 123). Bhagwati, J., in Basheshar Nath v. Commr. of Income-tax, Rajasthan, (1959) Supp (1) SCR 528 - (AIR 1959 SC 149), when considering the question of waiver of a fundamental right referred to the preamble and to the genesis of declaration of fundamental rights which could be traced to the report of the Nehru Committee of 1928. He proceeded to say "the object sought to be achieved was, as the preamble to the Constitution states.

............." In Re Kerala Education Bill 1957, 1959 SCR 995 = (AIR 1958 SC 956) this Court referred to the preamble extensively and observed that the fundamental rights were provided for "to implement and fortify the supreme purpose set forth in. the preamble" The court also made use of the "inspiring and nobly expressed preamble to our Constitution" while expressing opinion about the legality of the various provisions of the Kerala Education Bill 1957. It is unnecessary to multiply citations from judgments of this Court in which the preamble has been treated almost as sacrosanct and has been relied on or referred to for the purpose of interpreting legislative provisions. In other countries also following the same system of jurist prudence the preamble has been referred to for finding out the constitutional principles underlying a Constitution. In Rex v. Hess, (1949) Dom LR199 it p. 208 it was said : "I conclude further that the opening paragraph of the preamble to the B. N. A. Act 1867, which provided for a "Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom" thereby adopted the same constitutional principles and hence Section 1025-A is contrary to the Canadian Constitution and beyond the competence of Parliament or any provincial legislature to enact so long as our Constitution remains in its present form of a Constitutional democracy." In John Switzman v. Freda Elbling & Attorney General of the Province of Quebec, (1957) Canada LR 285 at p. 326 (SC), Abbot, J., relied on the observations of Duff, C. J., in an earlier decision in Re Alberta Statutes, 1938 SCR 100 (Canada) which was affirmed in Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada, 1939 AC; 117 = (AIR 1939 PC 53) that view being that the preamble of the British North America Act showed plainly enough that the Constitution of the Dominion was to be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. The statute contemplated a Parliament working under the influence of public opinion and public discussion. In McCawley v. The King, 1920 AC 691 at p. 711 = (AIR 1920 PC 91) Lord Birkenhead (Lord Chancellor) while examining the contention that the Constitution Act of 1867 (Queensland, Australia) enacted certain fundamental organic provisions of such a nature which rendered the Constitution stereotyped or controlled proceeded to observe at page 711:"It may be premised that if a change so remarkable were contemplated one would naturally have expected that the legislature would have given some indication, in the very lengthy preamble of the Act, of this intention. It has been seen that it is impossible to point to any document or instrument giving to, or imposing upon the Constitution of Queensland this quality before the year 1867. Yet their Lordships discern nowhere in the preamble the least indication that it is intended for the first time to make provisions which are sacrosanct or which at least can only be modified by methods never previously required." 534. In re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, (1960) 3 SCR 250 = (AIR 1960 SC 845) an argument had been raised that the preamble clearly postulated that the entire territory of India was beyond the reach of Parliament and could not be affected either by ordinary legislation or even by constitutional amendment. The Court characterized that argument as extreme and laid down the following propositions: 1. A preamble to the Constitution serves as a key to open the minds of the makers, and shows the general purposes for which they made the several provisions in the Constitution; 2. The preamble is not a part of our Constitution;

3. It is not a source of the several powers conferred on government under the provisions of the Constitution; 4. Such powers embrace those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution "and such as may be implied from those granted"; 5. What is true about the powers is equally true about the prohibition and limitations; 6. The preamble did not indicate the assumption that the first part of preamble @pageSC1580 postulates a very serious limitation on one of the very important attributes of sovereignty, viz., ceding territory as a result of the exercise of the sovereign power of the State of treaty-making and on the result of ceding a part of the territory. 535. On behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed on this case for the proposition that no limitation was read by virtue of the preamble. A careful reading of the judgment shows that what was rejected was the contention that the preamble was the source of power. Indeed, it was held that the preamble was not even a part of the Constitution and that one must seek power and its scope in the provisions of the Constitution. The premise for the conclusion was that a preamble is not the source of power since it is not a part of the Constitution. The learned Advocate General of Maharashtra has himself disputed the conclusion in the aforesaid judgment that the preamble is not a part of the Constitution. It is established that it was adopted by the Constituent Assembly after the entire Constitution had been adopted. 536. Mr. Palkhivala has given an ingenious explanation as to why the preamble cannot be regarded as a part of our Constitution. He makes a distinction between the concept of the Constitution and the concept of the Constitution's statutes. The last words in the preamble "This Constitution is the Constitution which follows the preamble", according to Mr. Palkhivala. It starts with Article 1 and ended originally with the Eighth Schedule and now ends with the Ninth Schedule after the First Amendment Act 1951. It is sought to be concluded from this that the way in which the preamble has been drafted, indicates that what follows or is annexed to the preamble is the Constitution of India. It is further argued that: "The Constitution statute of India consists of two parts - one, the preamble and the other, the Constitution The preamble is a part of the Constitution statute, but is not a part of the Constitution. It precedes it The preamble came into force on November 6, 1949 and not 26th January, 1950 as contended on behalf of Respondent No. 1." 537. There is a clear recital in the preamble that the people of India gave, to themselves this Constitution on the 26th day of November 1949. Even if the preamble was actually adopted by the Constituent Assembly at a later date, no one can question the statement made in the Preamble that the Constitution came into force on the date mentioned therein. The preamble itself must be deemed by a legal fiction to have come into force with effect from 26th November, 1943. Even if this is a plausible conclusion, it does not appear to be sufficient to support the observations in the Berubari case that the preamble was not a part of the Constitution. To our mind, it hardly makes any substantial difference whether the preamble is a part of the Constitution, or not. The preamble serves several important purposes. Firstly, it indicates the source from which the Constitution comes viz., the people of India. Next it contains the enacting clause which brings into force the Constitution. In the third place, it declares the great rights and freedoms which the people of India intended to secure to all citizens and the basic type of government and polity which was to be established From all these, if any provision in the Constitution had to be

interpreted and if the expressions used therein were ambiguous, the preamble would certainly furnish valuable guidance in the matter, particularly when the question is of the correct ambit, scope and width of a power intended to be conferred by Article 368. 538. The stand taken up on behalf of the respondents that even the preamble can be varied, altered or repealed, is an extraordinary one. It may be true about ordinary statutes but it cannot possibly be sustained in the light of the historical background, the Objectives Resolution which formed the basis of the preamble and the fundamental position which the preamble occupies in our Constitution. It constitutes a land-mark in India's history and sets out as a matter of historical fact what the people of India resolved to do for moulding their future destiny. It is unthinkable that the Constitution makers ever conceived of a stage when it would be claimed that even the preamble could be abrogated or wiped out. 539. If the preamble contains the fundamentals of our Constitution, it has to be seen whether the word amendment in Article 36x should be so construed that by virtue of the amending power the Constitution can be made to suffer a complete loss of identity or the @page-SC1581 basic elements on which the constitutional structure has been erected, can be eroded or taken away. While dealing with the preamble to the United States Constitution it was observed by Story (Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 1833 edition, Volume I), that the preamble was not adopted as a mere formulary; but as a solemn promulgation of a fundamental fact, vital to the character and operations of the Government. Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution and not substantially to create them.* * Story, para 462 at p. 445. 540. Now let us examine the effect of the declarations made and the statements contained in the preamble on interpretation of the word 'amendment" employed in Article 368 of the Constitution. The first thing which the people of India resolved to do was to constitute their country into a Sovereign Democratic Republic. No one can suggest that these words and expressions are ambiguous in any manner. Their true import and connotation is so well-known that no question of any ambiguity is involved. The question which immediately arises is whether the words "amendment or amended" as employed in Article 368 can be so interpreted as to confer a power on the amending body to take away any of these three fundamental and basic characteristics of our polity. Can it be said or even suggested that the amending body can make institutions created by our Constitution undemocratic as opposed to democratic; or abolish the office of the President and, instead, have some other head of the State who would not fit into the conception of a 'Republic'? The width of the power claimed on be half of the Respondents has such a large dimension that even the above Part of the preamble can be wiped out from which it would follow that India can cease to be a Sovereign Democratic Republic and can have a polity denuded and Republic and can have a polity denuded of sovereignty, democracy can character. 541. No one has suggested - it would be almost unthinkable for anyone to suggest - that the amending body acting under Article 368 in our country will ever do any of the things mentioned above, namely change the Constitution in such a way that it ceases to be a Sovereign Democratic Republic. But while examining the width of the power, it is essential to see its limits, the maximum and the minimum; the entire ambit and magnitude of it and it is for that purpose alone that this aspect is being examined. While

analysing the scope and width of the power claimed by virtue of a constitutional provision, it is wholly immaterial whether there is a 1ikehood or not of such an eventuality arising. 542. Mr. Palkhivala cited example of one country after another in recent history where from a democratic constitution the amending power was so utilized as to make that country wholly undemocratic resulting in the negation of democracy by establishment of rule by one party or a small oligarchy. We are not the least impressed by these instances and illustrations. In the matter of deciding the questions which are before us we do not want to be drawn into the political arena which, we venture to think, is "out of bounds" for the judiciary and which tradition has been consistenty followed by this Court. (See Wanchoo, J., as he then was in Golak Nath, (1967) 2 SCR 762 at p. 850 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643)). 543. Since the respondents themselves claim powers of such wide magnitude that the results which have been briefly mentioned can flow apart from others which we shall presently notice, the consequences and effect of suggested construction have to be taken into account as has been frequently done by this Court. Where two constructions are possible the court must adopt that which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well-established provisions of existing law nugatory, (AIR 1953 SC 10); Director of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (1962) (1) SCR p. 896 - (AIR 1961 SC 1549). 544. In Don John Francis Douglas Liyange v. The Queen, 1967-I AC 259, Lord Pearson declined to read the words of Section 29 (1) of the Ceylon Constitution as entitling the Parliament to pass legislation which usurped the judicial power of the judicature by passing an Act of Attainder against some persons or instructing a Judge to bring in a verdict of guilty against someone who is being tried - if in law such usurpation @pageSC1582 would otherwise be contrary to the Constitution. 545. In Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition), Chapters deals with restrictive construction end the very first section contains discussion on the question whether the consequences of a particular construction being adopted can be considered and examples have been given from cases decided in England with reference to the consequences. According to American jurisprudence, Vol. 50, 1962 Reprint at pp. 372, 373 there are cases in which consequences of a particular construction are in and of themselves, conclusive as to the correct solution of the question. 546. The learned Advocate-General of Maharashtra has contended that the proper way of construing an amending provision is not to take into consideration any such speculation that the powers conferred by it, would be abused. It has also been said that any court deciding the validity of a law cannot take into consideration extreme hypothetical examples or assume that a responsible Legislature would make extravagant use of the power. Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, (1887) 12 AC 575 at pp. 586-587. 547. According to Mr. Palkhivala, the test of the true width of a power is not how probable it is that it may be exercised but what can possibly be done under it, that the abuse or misuse of power is entirely irrelevant; that the question of the extent of the power cannot be mixed up with the question of its exercise and that when the real question is as to the width of the power, expectation that it will never be used is as wholly irrelevant as an imminent danger of its use. The Court does not decide what is the best

and what is the worst. It merely decides what can possibly be done under a power if the words conferring it are so construed as to have an unbounded and limitless width, as claimed on behalf of the respondents. 548. It is difficult to accede to the submission on behalf of the respondents that while considering the consequences with reference to the width of an amending power contained in a Constitution any question of its abuse is involved. It is not for the courts to enter into the wisdom or policy of a particular provision in a Constitution or a statute. That is for the Constitution makers or for the Parliament or the legislature. But that the real consequences can be taken into account while judging the width of the power is well settled. The Court can not ignore the consequences to which a particular construction can lead while ascertaining the limits of the provisions granting the power. According to the learned Attorney-General the declaration in the preamble to our Constitution about the resolve of the people of India to constitute it into a Sovereign, Democratic Republic is only a declaration of an intention which was made in 1947 and it is open to the amending body now under Article 368 to change the Sovereign Democratic Republic into some other kind of polity. This by it self shows the consequence of accepting the construction sought to be put on the material words in that article for finding out the ambit and width of the power conferred by it. 549. The other part of the Preamble may next be examined. The Sovereign Democratic Republic has been constituted to secure to all the citizens the objectives set out. The attainment of those objectives forms the fabric of and permeates the whole scheme of the Constitution. While most cherished freedoms and rights have been guaranteed the government has been laid under solemn duty to give effect to the Directive Principles. Both Parts III and IV which embody them have to be balanced and harmonised - then alone the dignity of the individual can be achieved. It was to give effect to the main objectives the Preamble that Parts III and IV were enacted. The three main organ of government legislative, executive and judiciary and the entire mechanics their functioning were fashioned in the light of the objectives in the Preamble, the nature of polity mentioned therein and the grand vision of a united and free India in which every individual high or low will partake of all that is capable of achievement. We must, therefore' advert to the background in which Parts III and IV came to be enacted as they essentially form a basic element of the Constitution without which its identity will completely change. 550. It is not possible to go back at any length to the great struggle for freedom from British Rule and the attainment of independence. The British executive's arbitrary acts, internments and deportations without trial and curbs on the liberty of the press and individuals @page-SC1583 are too well known to every student of Indian history to be specifically mentioned. This was before some essential rights based on British Common law and jurisprudence came to be embodied in various Parliamentary enactments. According to B. N. Rau,* human rights, with few exceptions, were not guaranteed by the Constitution (Government of India Act). Shiva Rao has in his valuable study** given the various stages beginning with 1895 Constitution of India Bill framed by the Indian National Congress which envisaged a Constitution guaranteeing a number of freedoms and rights. Two events at a later stage exercised a decisive influence on the Indian leaders. One was the inclusion of a list of fundamental rights in the Constitution of Irish Free State in 1921 and the other, the problem of minorities." ***

* Year Book of Human Rights 1947. ** Framing of India's Constitution (B. Shiva Rao). *** Ibid, p. 172. 551. The next steps were the report of the Nehru Committee in l928, the reiteration of the resolve at the Session of the Indian National Congress at its Karachi Session in March 1931 and omitting some details, the deliberations of the Sapru Committee appointed by the All India Parties Conference (1944-45). The British Cabinet Mission in 1946 recommended the setting up of an Advisory Committee for reporting inter alia on fundamental rights. Before reference is made to the Objectives Resolution adopted in January 22, 1947 it must be borne in mind that the post war period in Europe had witnessed a fundamental orientation in juristic thinking, particularly in West Germany, characterized by a farewell to positivism, under the influence of positivist legal thinking. During the pre-war period most of the German Constitutions did not provide for judicial review which was conspicuously absent from the Weimar Constitution even though Hugo Preuss, often called the Father of that Constitution, insisted on its inclusion. After World War II when the disastrous effects of the positivist doctrines came to be realized there was a reaction in favour of making certain norms immune from amendment or abrogation. This was done in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The atrocities committed during Second World War and the worldwide agitation for human rights ultimately embodied in the U. N. Declaration of Human Rights on which a number of the provisions in Parts III and IV of our Constitution are fashioned must not be forgotten while considering these matters. Even in Great Britain, where the doctrine of the legal sovereignty of Parliament has prevailed since the days of Erskine, Blackstone, Austin, and lastly Dicey, the new trend in judicial decisions is to hold that there can be at least procedural limitations (requirement of form and manner) on the legislative powers of the legislature. (This follows from the decisions in Moore v. The Attorney General for the Irish Free State, (1935) AC 484, Attorney General for New South Wales v. Trethown, (1932) AC 526). The Objectives Resolution declared, inter alia, the firm and the solemn resolve to proclaim India as Independent Sovereign Republic and to draw up for her future governance a Constitution. Residuary powers were to vest in the States. All power and authority of the Sovereign Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of government, were derived from the people and it was stated: "(5) Wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of India, justice, social, economic and political; equality of status, of opportunity, and before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action, subject to law and public morality, and (6) wherein adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas, and depressed and other backward classes; and (7) whereby shall be maintained the integrity of the territory of the Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air according to justice and the law of civilised nations, and." 552. It may be recalled that as regards the minorities the Cabinet Mission had recognised in their report to the British Cabinet on May 6, 1946 only three main communities; general, Muslims and Sikhs. General community included all those who were nonMuslims or non Sikhs. The Mission had recommended an Advisory Committee to be set

up by the Constituent Assembly which was to frame the rights of citizens, minorities, tribals and excluded areas. The Cabinet Mission statement had actually provided for the cession of sovereignty to the Indian people subject only to two @page-SC1584 matters which were, (1) willingness to conclude a treaty with His Majesty's Government to cover matters arising out of transfer of power and (2) adequate provisions for the protection of the minorities. Pursuant to the above and paras 5 and 6 of the Objectives Resolution the Constituent Assembly set up an Advisory Committee on January 24, 1947. The Committee was to consist of representatives of Muslims, the depressed classes or the scheduled castes, the Sikhs, Christians Parsis, Anglo-Indians, tribals and excluded areas besides the Hindus.* As a historical fact it is safe to say that at a meeting held on May 11, 1949 a resolution for the abolition of all reservations for minorities other than the scheduled castes found whole hearted support from an overwhelming majority of the members' of the Advisory Committee. So far as the scheduled castes were concerned it was felt that their peculiar position would necessitate special reservation for them for a period of ten years. It would not be wrong to say that the separate representation of minorities which had been the feature of the previous Constitutions and which had witnessed so much of communal tension and strife was given up in favour of joint electorates in consideration of the guarantee of fundamental rights and minorities rights which it was decided to incorporate into the new Constitution. The Objectives Resolution can be taken into account as a historical fact which moulded its nature and character. Since the language of the Preamble was taken from the resolution itself the declaration in the Preamble that India would be a Sovereign, Democratic Republic which would secure to all its citizens justice, liberty and equality was implemented in Parts III and IV and other provisions of the Constitution. These formed not only the essential features of the Constitution but also the fundamental conditions upon and the basis on which the various groups and interests adopted the Constitution as the Preamble hoped to create one unified integrated community. The decision of the Privy Council in The Bribery Commr. v. Pedrick Ranasinghe, 1965 AC 172 at pp. 193-194 will require a more detailed discussion in view of the elaborate arguments addressed on both sides based on it. But for the present all that need be pointed out is that the above language is borrowed mainly from the judgment of Lord Pearce who, after setting out Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitutional Order which gave Parliament the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Island, said with regard to clause (2) according to which no law could prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion. * Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 2 pages 330-349 "There follow (b), (c) and (d), which set out further entrenched religious and racial matters, which shall not be the subject of legislation. They represent the solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which inter se they accepted the Constitution; and these are therefore unalterable under the Constitution". Another apposite observation in this connection was made in re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, (1932) AC 54 at p. 70 while interpreting 'the British North America Act 1867. It was said that inasmuch as the Act embodied a compromise under which the original provinces agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that the preservation of the rights of minorities was a condition on which such minorities

entered into the federation and the foundation upon which the whole structure was subsequently erected. 553. Our Constitution is federal in character and not unitary. In a federal structure the existence of both the Union and the States is indispensable and so is the power of judicial review. According to Dicey :** ** Law of the Constitution by A.V. Dicey page 144. "A federal State derives its existence from the Constitution, just as a corporation derives its existence from the grant by which it is created. Hence every power, executive, legislative or judicial, whether it belong to the notion or to the individual State, is subordinate to and controlled by the Constitution."* The object for which a federal State is formed involves a Division of authority between the national government and the separate States.* Federalism can flourish only among communities imbued with a legal spirit and trained to reverence the law. Swiss federalism, according to Dicey, "fails, just where one would expect it to fail, in maintaining that @page-SC1585 complete authority of the courts which is necessary to the perfect federal system".** The learned Advocate General of Maharashtra while relying a great deal on Dicey's well known work in support of his other points, has submitted that although he was one of the greatest writers on the law of English Constitution, his book was concerned with two or three guiding principles which pervade the modem Constitution of England. The discussion of federal government in his book was a subordinate part and the discussion was designed to bring out sharply the two or three guiding principles of the English Constitution by contrast with the different principles underlying the Constitution of the federal government Reliance has been placed on Professor Wheare's statement in his book*** that the Swiss Courts are required by the Constitution to treat all 1aws passed by the federal assembly- as valid though they may declare Cantonal laws to he void and that does not constitute such a departure from the federal principle that the Swiss people cannot be regarded as having a federal Constitution and a federal government. Switzerland is probably the only country having a federal Constitution where full-fledged right of judicial review is not provided. We are unable to understand how that can have any relevancy in the presence of judicial review having been made an integral part of our Constitution. * Ibid, page 151. ** Ibid, page 180 *** Federal Government, 4th Edn. (1963) 554. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the scheme of Article 368 itself contains intrinstic pieces of evidence to give a limited meaning to the word "amendment". Firstly, Article 368 refers to "an amendment of this Constitution", and the result of the amendment is to be that the "Constitution shall stand amended". As the Constitution has an identity of its own, an amendment, made under a power howsoever widely worded cannot be such as would render the Constitution to lose its character and nature. In other words, an amendment cannot be such as would denude the Constitution of its identity. The amending power is conferred on the two Houses of Parliament, whose identity is clearly established by the provisions in the Constitution. It must be the Parliament of the Sovereign Democratic Republic. It is not any Parliament which has the amending power, but only that Parliament which has been created by the Constitution. In other words, it must continue to be the Parliament of a sovereign and democratic

republic. The institution of States must continue to exist in order that they may continue to he associated with the amending power in the cases falling under the proviso. If the respondents are right the proviso can be completely deleted since Article 368 itself can be amended. This would be wholly contrary to the scheme of Article 368 because two agencies are provided for amending the provisions covered by the proviso. One agency cannot destroy the other by the very exercise of the amending power. The effect of limitless amending power in relation to amendment of Article 368 cannot be conducive to the survival of the Constitution because the amending power can itself be taken away and the Constitution can he made literally unamendable or virtually unamendable by providing for an impossible majority. 555. While examining the above contentions, it is necessary to consider the claim of the respondents that the amending body under Article 368 has the full constituent power. It has been suggested that on every occasion the procedure is followed as laid down in Article 368 by the two Houses of Parliament and the assent of the President is given there is the reproduction of the functions of a Constituent Assembly. In other words, the Parliament acts in the same capacity as a Constituent Assembly when exercising the power of amendment under the said Article. This argument does not take stock of the admission made on behalf of the respondents that the entire Constitution cannot be repealed or abrogated by the amending body. Indisputably, a Constituent Assembly specially convened for the purpose would have the power to completely revise, repeal or abrogate the Constitution. This shows that the amending body under Article 368 cannot have the same powers as a Constituent Assembly. Even assuming that there is a reference on the nature of power between enacting a law and making an amendment, both the powers are derived from the Constitution. The amending body has been created by the Constitution itself. It can only exercise those powers with which it has been invested. if that power has limits, it can be exercised only within those limits. @page-SC1586 556. The respondents have taken up the position that even if the power was limited to some extent under Article 368, as it originally stood, that power could be enlarged by virtue of clause (e) of the proviso. It must be noted that the power of amendment lies in the first part of Article 368. What clause (e) in the proviso does is to provide that if Article 368 is amended, such an amendment requires ratification by the States, besides the larger majority provided in the main part. If the amending power under Article 368 has certain limits and is not unlimited, Article 368 cannot be so amended as to .remove these limits nor can it be amended so as to take away the voice of the States in the amending process. If the Constitution makers were inclined to confer the full power of a Constituent Assembly, it could have been easily provided in suitable terms. If, however, the original power was limited to some extent, it could not be enlarged by the body possessing the limited power. That being so, even where an amending power is expressed in wide terms, it has to be exercised within the framework of the Constitution. It cannot abrogate the Constitution or frame a new Constitution or alter or change the essential elements of the Constitutional structure. It cannot be overlooked that the basic theory of our Constitution is that "Pouvoir Constituent", is vested in the people and was exercised, for and on their behalf by the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution. 557. To say, as has been said on behalf of the respondents, that there are only two categories of Constitutions, rigid or controlled and flexible or uncontrolled and that the

difference between them lies only in the procedure provided for amendment is an oversimplification. In certain Constitutions there can be procedural and/or substantive limitations on the amending power. The procedural limitations could be by way of a prescribed form and manner without the satisfaction of which no amendment can validly result. The form and manner may take different forms such as a higher majority either in the houses of the concerned legislature sitting jointly or separately or by way of a convention, referendum etc. Besides these limitations there can be limitations in the content and scope of the power. To illustrate, although the power to amend under Article 5 of the U. S. Constitution resides ultimately in the people, it can be exercised in either of the modes as might be prescribed by the Congress viz, through ratification by the State legislatures or through conventions, specially convened for the purpose. The equal suffrages in the Senate granted to each of the States cannot be altered without the consent of the State. The true distinction between a controlled and an uncontrolled Constitution lies not merely in the difference in the procedure of amendment, but in the fact that in controlled Constitutions the Constitution has a higher status by whose touch-stone the validity of a law made by the legislature and the organ set up by it is subjected to the process of judicial review. Where there is a written Constitution which adopts the preamble of sovereignty in the people there is, firstly, no question of the law-making body being a sovereign body, for that body possesses only those powers which are conferred on it. Secondly, however representative it may be, it cannot be equated with the people. This is especially so where the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, for such a Bill imposes restraints on that body, i.e., it negates the equation of that body with the people. 558. Before concluding the topic on the interpretation or construction of the words "amendment of this Constitution" in Article 368, it is necessary to deal with some American decisions relating to Article 5 of the American Constitution on which a great deal of reliance was placed on behalf of the respondents for establishing that the word "amendment" has a precise and definite meaning which is of the widest amplitude. The first relates to the 18th amendment, known as the National Prohibition cases in the State of Rhode Island v. A. Mitchel Palmer, (1919) 64 Law Ed 946. In that case and other cases heard with it, elaborate arguments were addressed involving the validity of the 18th amendment and of certain features of the National Prohibition Law, known as Volstead Act, which was adopted to enforce the amendment. The relief sought in each case was an injunction against the execution of that Act. The Court merely stated its conclusions and did not give any reasons- a matter which was profoundly regretted by Chief Justice White. From the conclusions stated and the opinion of the Chief Justice it appears that a good deal of controversy centered on Section 2 of @page-SC1587 the amendment which read "Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation". In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Mckenna it was said that the constitutional validity of the 18th amendment had also been attacked and although he dissented in certain other matters he agreed that the 18th amendment was a part of the Constitution of the United States. The learned Advocate General of Maharashtra has placed a great deal of reliance on this decision. His argument is that though the judgment in the Rhode island case (1919) 64 Law Ed 946 gives no reasons, yet it is permissible to look at the elaborate briefs filed by the counsel in several cases and their oral arguments in order to understand what was argued and what was decided.

One of the main contentions raised was that 'the 18th amendment was not in fact an amendment for an amendment is an alteration or improvement of that which is already there in the Constitution and that term is not intended to include any addition of a new grant of power. The judgment shows that this argument was not regarded even worth consideration and was rejected outright. Now it is significant that most of the Justices including the Chief Justice who delivered judgments dealt only with the questions which had nothing to do with the meaning of the word "amendment". It is not possible to derive much assistance from this judgment. 559. In J. J. Dhillon v. R. W. Gloss (1921) 65 Law Ed 994 it was observed that an examination of Art. 5 discloses that it was intended to invest Congress with a wide range of power in proposing amendments. However the following observations are noteworthy and have been relied upon in support of the case of the petitioners that according to the United State Constitution it is the people who get involved in the matter of amendments. "A further mode of proposal -as yet never invoked - is provided. which is that on application of two-third of the States Congress shall call a convention for the purpose. When proposed in either mode amendments to be effective must be -ratified by the legislatures or by convention in three fourths of the States as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress". Thus the people of the United States by whom the Constitution was ordained and established have made it a condition for amending that instrument that the amendment be submitted to representative assemblies in the several States and be ratified in three-fourths of them. The plain meaning of this is (a) that all amendments must have the sanction of- the people of the United States the original fountain of power acting through representative assemblies and (b) that ratification by these assemblies in three-fourths of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people's will and be binding on all. 560. Although all the amendments were made by the method of ratification by the requisite number of State legislatures the convention mode: was adopted when the 18th amendment was repealed by the 21st amendment. An other case United States of America William H. Sprague (1931) 75 Law Ed 640 (644) Will be discussed more fully while considering the question of implied limitations. All that it establishes, for the purpose of meaning of amendment is that one must look to the plain language of the Article conferring the power of amendment and not travel outside it. Article 5 it was said container procedural provisions for constitutional change by amendment without any present limitation whatsoever except that no State might be deprived of equal representation in the Senate without its consent. Mr. Justice Douglas while delivering the opinion of the court in Howard Joseph Whitehill v. Wilson Elkins (1967) 19 Law Ed 2d 228 stated in categorical terms that the Constitution prescribes the method of 'alteration" by amending process in Article 5 and while the procedure for amending it is restricted there is no restraint on the find of amendment that may be offered. Thus the main submission, be half of the- counsel for the respondents has been that Article 5 of the United States Constitution served as a model for Article 368 of our Constitution. 561. Article V provides different modes of amendment. These may be analysed as follows: The proposals can be made (1) By two thirds of both Houses of the Congress or

(2) By a Convention for proposing amendments to be called by the Congress on the application of legislatures of two-thirds of the States. @page-SC1588 The ratification of the proposals has to be made by (1) Legislatures-of three fourths of the States or (2) by Conventions in three fourths thereof (as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress). In Hawke v. Smith, (1919) 64 Law Ed 871 the question raised was whether there was any conflict between Article 5 of the U. S. Constitution which gave power to the Congress to provide whether the ratification should be by State Legislatures or Conventions and the Constitution of Ohio as amended. The Supreme Court held that Article 5 was grant of authority by the people to Congress. The determination of the method of ratification was the exercise of the national power specifically granted by the Constitution and that power was limited to two methods, by the State Legislatures or by Conventions. The method of ratification, however, was left to the choice of Congress. The language of the Article was plain and admitted of no doubt in its interpretation. In that case the Constitution of Ohio even after amendment which provided for referendum vested the legislative power primarily in a General Assembly consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Though the law making power of a State was derived from the people to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution had its source in that Constitution. The act of ratification by the State derived its authority from the federal Constitution.. Therefore, in order to find out the authority which had the power to ratify, it was Article 5, to which one had to turn and not to the State Constitution. The choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from conflicting action in the several States. 562. On behalf of the respondents it is claimed that these decisions establish that the power of amendment conferred by Article 5 was of the widest amplitude, it could be exercised through the representatives of the people, both in the Congress and the State Legislatures. In the case of Article 368 also Parliament consists of representatives of the people and the same analogy can be applied that it is a grant of authority by the people to the Parliament. This argument loses sight of the fact that under the American theory of government, power is inherent in the people including the right to alter and amend the organic instrument of government. Indeed, practically all the State Constitutions associate the people with the amending process. The whole basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of some of the State Supreme Courts is that it is the people who amend the Constitution and it is within their power to make the federal Constitution or unmake it. The reason is quite obvious. So far as Article 5 of the American Constitution is concerned, out of the alternative methods provided for amendment, there is only one in which the people cannot get directly associated, whereas in the others they are associated with the amending process, e.g., proposal of amendment by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and its ratification by conventions in three-fourths of the States or a proposal of amendment by a convention called on the application of two-thirds of the State Legislatures and its ratification by either convention in three-fourths of the States or by the Legislature of the same number of States. 563. The meaning of the words amendment of this Constitution" as used in Article 368 must be such which accords with the true intention of the Constitution makers as ascertainable from the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, its structure and framework and the intrinsic evidence in various Articles in.

eluding Art. 368. It is neither possible to give it a narrow meaning nor can such a wide meaning be given which can enable the amending body to change substantially or entirely the structure and identity of the Constitution. Even the concession of the learned Attorney General and the Advocate General of Maharashtra that the whole Constitution cannot be abrogated or repealed and a new one substituted supports the conclusion that the widest possible meaning cannot be given to it. 564. Coming to the question of what has been called 'inherent and implied limitations' to the amending power in Article 368 of our Constitution, Mr. Palkhivala has maintained that inherent limitations are those which inhere in any authority from its very nature, character and composition whereas implied limitations are those which are not expressed but are implicit in the scheme of the @page-SC1589 Constitution conferring the power. He maintains that the rule is established beyond cavil that in construing the Constitution of the United States, what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed".* Although the courts have rejected in various cases a plea that a particular inherent or implied limitation should be put upon some specific constitutional power, no court, says Mr. Palkhivala, has ever rejected the principle that such limitations which are fairly and properly deducible from the scheme of the Constitution should be read as restrictions upon a power expressed in general terms. Several decisions of our court, of the Privy Council, Irish courts, Canadian and Australian courts have been cited in support of the contention advanced by him. The approach to this" question has essentially to be to look at our own decisions first. They fall in two categories. In one category are those cases where limitations have been spelt of constitutional provisions: the second category consists of such decisions as have laid down that there is an implied limitation on legislative power. * American Jurisprudence (2d), Vol. 16, p. 251. 565. Taking up the cases of the first category, before 1955, Art. 13 (2) was read as containing an implied limitation that the State could acquire property only for a public purpose. (The Fourth Amendment expressly enacted this limitation in 1955). It was observed in Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (1950) SCR 869 at p. 902 = (AIR 1951 SC 41) that one limitation imposed upon acquisition or taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking must be for a public purpose. Mahajan J., (later Chief Justice) said in the State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh (l952) SCR 889 at p. 934 = (AIR1952) SC 252) that the existence of a public purpose is undoubtedly an implied condition of the exercise of compulsory power of acquisition by the State. The power conferred by Arts. 3 and 4 of the Constitution to form a new State and amend the Constitution for that purpose has been stated to contain the implied limitation that the new State must conform to the democratic pattern envisaged by the constitution and the power which Parliament can exercise is not the power to override the constitutional scheme (1967) 2 SCR 109 at p. 112 = (AIR 1967 SC: 944). It may be mentioned that so far as Art. 368 is concerned there seems to have been a good deal of debate in Golak Nath's case on the question whether there were any inherent or implied limitations. Dealing with the argument that in exercise of the power of amendment Parliament could not destroy the structure of the Constitution but it could only modify the provisions thereof within the framework of its original instrument for its better effectuation, Subba Rao C. J. observed that there was no necessity to express any opinion on this all important question owing to the view which was being taken with regard to the meaning

of the word "law" in Art. 18 (2). But it was recognised that the argument had considerable force. Wanchoo J. (as he then was) considered the question of implied limitations at some length but felt that if any implied limitation that basic features of the Constitution cannot be changed or altered, were to be put on the power of amendment, the result would be that every amendment made in the Constitution would involve legal wrangle. On the clear words of Art. 368 it was not possible to infer any implied limitation on the power of amendment. Hidayatullah J., ''later Chief Justice) discussed the Question of implied limitations and referred in the spate of writings on the subject. He expressed no opinion on the matter because he felt that in our Constitution Art. 1.3 (2) took in even constitutional amendments. Bachawat J., disposed of the matter by saying that the argument overlooked the dynamic character of the Constitution. Ramaswami T., clearly negatived the argument based on implied limitations on the ground that if the amending power is an adjunct of sovereignty it does not admit of any limitation. 566. The cases which fell in the second category are decidedly numerous. It has been consistently laid down that there is an implied limitation on the legislative power, the legislature cannot delegate the essentials of the legislative function Mukherjea J. (who later became (Chief Justice) in Re. Delhi Laws Act 1912 case (1951) SCR 747 at pp. 984.985= AIR 1051 SC 332) stated in clear language that the right of delegation may be implied in the exercise of legislative power only to the extent that it is necessary to make the exercise of the @page-SC1590 power effective and complete. The same implied limitation on the legislature, in the field of delegation, has been invoked in Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman Patna Administration, (1955) 1 SCR 290 = (AIR 1954 SC 569); Hari Shankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) 1 SCR 380 = (AIR 1954 SC 465); Vasantlal Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay (1961) 1 SCR 341 = (AIR 1961 SC 4), The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Mills (1968) 3 SCR 251 = (AIR 1968 SC 1232) and Grewal D. S. v. State of Punjab (l959) Supp (1) SCR 792 = (AIR 1954 SC 512,. Implied limitations have also been placed upon the legislature which invalidates legislation usurping the judicial power: See for instance Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality (1970! 1 SCR 388 at pp.392, 393 = (AIR 1970 SC 192) and Municipal Corporation of the (City of Ahmedabad v. New Shrock Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. (1971) 1 SCR 288at pp. 294-297 = (AIR 1970 SC 1292). 567. Before we go to cases decided by the courts in other countries it may be useful to refer to some of the constitutional provisions which are illustrative of the concept of implications that can be raised from the language and context thereof. The first provision in point is Art. 368 itself. It has been seen at the stage of previous discussion that the power to amend is to be found in that Article only by implication as there is no express conferment of that power therein. The learned Solicitor General made a concession that various Articles are included by implication in the clauses in the clauses of the proviso by reason of the necessity for giving effect to the express power contained therein e. g. Arts. 52 and 53, must be so read as to impliedly include the power to amend Arts. 54 and 55 which are not expressly mentioned in clause (a) of the proviso. It has been implied that the President has been made a formal or a constitutional or a constitutional head of the executive and the real executive power vests in the council ministers and the Cabinet (1955) 2 SCR 255 = (AIR 1955 SC 549). Article 53 declares that the executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President; Art. 74 provides for a council of ministers headed by the Prime Minister to aid and advise the President in exercise of his functions.

Article 7.5 says that the Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and the other ministers shall be appointed by him on the advice of the Prime Minister. The ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President and the council of ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People. Although the executive power of the President is apparently expressed in unlimited teens, an implied limitation has been placed on his power on the ground that he is a formal or constitutional head of the executive and that the real executive power vests in the council of ministers. This conclusion which is based on the implications of the Cabinet System of government can be said to constitute an implied limitation on the power of the President and the Governors. 568. It may be mentioned in all fairness to the Advocate-General of Maharashtra that the Court did not desire him to address in detail about the President or the Governor being a constitutional head and the implications arising from the system of Cabinet Government. The decisions thereon are being referred to for the purpose of noticing that according to them the President or the Governor though vested with full executive powers cannot exercise them personally and it is only the council of ministers which exercises all the executive functions. This is so notwithstanding the absence of any express provisions in the Constitution to that effect. 569. Next, reference may be made to the decisions of the Privy, Council relied on by one side or the other for deciding the question under consideration. The Advocate-General of Maharashtra laid much stress on the principle enunciated in Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 AC 889 at pp. 904-5 (PC), which according to him, has been consistently followed by the Federal Court and this court. The principle is that when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have bell exceeded the court must look to the terms of the instrument "by which affirmatively, the legislative powers were created and by which, negatively, they were restricted. If what has been clone is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited..............it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions or restrictions". The ratio of that decision @page-SC1591 is that conditional legislation is to be distinguished from delegation of legislative power and that conditional legislation is v. within the power of the legislature in the absence of any express words prohibiting conditional legislation. The oft-quoted words about the affirmative conferment of power and absence of express restriction the power are used only to repel the contention that conditional legislation was barred by implication. It is significant that if (l878) 3 AC 889 (PC) is to be treated as laying down the principle that the powers in a Constitution must be conferred only in affirmative words the argument of the respondents itself will suffer from the infirmity that it is only by necessary implication from the language of Article 368 (before the 24th Amendment) that the source of the amending power can be said to reside 'in that Article.' There were no such words in express or affirmative terms which conferred such a power. Indeed in Golak Nath's case (l967) 2 SCR 762, = (AIR 1967 SC 1643) there was a sharp divergence of opinion on this point. Subba Rao, C. J., with whom four other judges agreed held that the source of the amending power \was to be found in the provisions conferring residuary provisions namely Article 248 read with Entry 97 in the Seventh Schedule. The other six Judge including Hidayatullah, J., were, of the view that the power was to be found in Article 368 itself.

570. In The Initiative and Referendum Act 1919 AC 935 = (AIR 1919 PC 145) the position briefly was that the British North America Act 1867, Sec. 92 head 1, which empowered a Provincial Legislature to amend the Constitution of the Province, "excepting as regards the office of the Lieutenant-Governor," excluded the making of a law which Crown Possessed through the Lieutenant Governor who directly represented the Crown. The Legislative Assembly of Manitoba passed the Initiative and Referendum Act. It compelled the Lieutenant Governor to submit a proposed law to a body of voters totally distinct from the legislature of which he was the constitution head. The Privy Council was of the opinion that under the provisions of that law the Lieutenant Governor was rendered powerless to prevent a proposed law when passed accordance with the act from becoming actual law. The language of the Act could not be construed otherwise than as intended, seriously affecting the position of the Lieutenant Governor as an integral part of the legislature and to detract from the rights which were important in the legal theory of that position. Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusted the legislative power in a Province to its legislature and that legislature only. A body that has power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it, the power being so ample as that enjoyed by a Provincial legislature in Canada, could while "preserving its own capacity intact seek the assistance of a subordinate agency ........but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence." (Ibid at page 945). 571. This case is more in point for consideration of validity of that part of the 25th Amendment which inserted Article 31-C but it illustrates that an implied limitation was spelt out from the constitutional provisions of the British North America Act 1867 which conferred legislative power on the legislatures of Provinces as constituted by that Act. 572. McCawley v. The King, 1920 AC 691 = (AIR 1920 PC 91) was another case involving constitutional questions. The legislature of Queensland (Australia) had power to include in an Act a provision not within the express restrictions contained in the Order in Council of 1959). But inconsistent with the term of the Constitution of Queensland, without first amending the term in question under the powers of amendments given to it, the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 contained provisions authorising, the Government in Council to appoint any Judge of the Court of Industrial Arbitration to be a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. After explaining the distinction between a controlled and an uncontrolled Constitution their Lordships proceeded to examine the contention that the Constitution of Queensland could not be altered merely by enacting legislation inconsistent with its article; it could only be altered by an Act which in plain and unmistakable language referred to its asserted the intention of the legislature to alter it, and consequentially gave effect to that intention by its operative provisions. That argument was repelled by saying (Ibid page 706): It was not the policy of the Imperial Legislature at any relevant period @page-SC1592 to shackle or control in the manner Suggested, the legislative power of the Nascent Australian Legislations". Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 was held to have clearly conferred on the colonial legislatures a right to establish courts of judicature and to abolish and reconstitute them A question had been raised that the Constitution Act of 1867 enacted certain fundamental organic provisions of such a nature as to render the Constitution controlled. It was said that if a change of that nature vas contemplated, there would have

been some indication in the very lengthy preamble of the Act, of that intention. Their Lordships could observe nowhere in the preamble the least indication that it was intended for the first time to make provisions which were sacrosanct, or which at least could only be modified by methods never previously required. It was finally held that the legislature of Queensland was the master of its own household except in so far as its power had in special cases been restricted. No such restriction had been established and none in fact existed. 573. The Advocate-General of Maharashtra has- sought to deduce the following propositions from the dissenting judgment of Isaacs and Rich, JJ., of the Australian High Court which was approved by the Privy Council in the above case: (1) Unless there is a special procedure prescribed for amending any part of the Constitutions, the Constitution is uncontrolled and can be amended by the manner laid down for enacting ordinary law and therefore, a subsequent law inconsistent with the Constitution would pro-tanto repeal the Constitution. (2) A Constitution largely or generally uncontrolled may contain one or more provisions which prescribe a different procedure for amending them. In that case an ordinary law cannot amend them and the procedure must be strictly followed if the amendment is to be effected. (3) The implication on limitation of power ought not to be imported from general concepts but only from express or necessarily implied limitations. (emphasis supplied) (4) While granting powers to the colonial legislatures, the British Parliament as far back as 1865 refused to put limitations of vague character, but limited those limitations to objective standards e.g., statutes, statutory regulations, etc., to objective standards. 574. We have already repelled at an earlier stage the contention that the only distinction between a controlled and an uncontrolled Constitution is that in the former the procedure prescribed for amending any part of the Constitution has to be strictly followed. The second proposition is of a similar. nature and can hardly be disputed. As regards the third and fourth propositions all that need be said is that implied limitation which wag sought in McCawley's case by counsel for the respondents was that the Queensland legislature should first amend the Constitution and then pass an Act which would otherwise have been inconsistent, for the Constitution had not been amended. That contention in terms was rejected. The Constitution in McCawley's case was uncontrolled and therefore the Queensland legislature was fully empowered to enact any constitution breaking law. Moreover Lord Birkenhead in an illuminating passage in McCawley's case 1920 AC 691 at pp. 703-4 = (AIR 1920 PC 91) has himself referred to the difference of view among writers upon the subject of constitutional law which may be traced "mainly to the spirit and genius" of the nation in which a particular Constitution has its birth". Some communities have "shrunk from the assumption that a degree of wisdom and foresight has been conceded to their generation which will be, or may be, wanting to their successors': Those who have adopted the other view probably believed that "certainty and stability were in such a matter the supreme desiderata". It was pointed out that different terms had been employed by the text book writers to distinguish between those two contrasted forms of Constitution. It was added: "Their special qualities may perhaps be exhibited as clearly by calling the one a controlled and the other an uncontrolled Constitution as by any other nomenclature".

Lord Birkenhead did not make any attempt to define the two terms "controlled" and "uncontrolled" as precise legal terms, but merely used them as convenient expressions . 575. The next case of importance is 1932 AC 526. The Constitution Act, 1902, @pageSC1593 enacted by the legislature of New South Wales, was amended in 1929 by adding Section 7-A which provided that no Bill for abolishing the Legislative Council should be presented to the Governor for His Majesty's assent until it had been approved by a majority of the electors voting upon a submission made in accordance with the section. The same provision was to apply to a Bill for repealing that section. In 1930 two Bills were passed by the Legislature. One was to repeal Section 7-A and the other to abolish the Legislative Council Neither of the two Bills had been approved in accordance with Section 7-A. Reference was made to Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, which conferred on the Legislature of the State full power to make laws inter alia in respect of the Constitution in such "manner and form" as might from time to time be provided by any Act of Parliament, Letters Patent Colonial law in force in the colony etc. It was held that the whole of S. 7-A was within the competence of the legislature of the State under S. 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. The provision that the Bills must be approved by the electors before being presented was a provision as to form and manner and accordingly the Bills could not lawfully be presented unless and until they had been approved by a majority of the electors voting. A number of contentions were raised, out of which the following may be noted: (a) The Legislature of New South Wales was given by the Imperial Statutes plenary power to alter the Constitution, powers and procedure of such Legislature. (b) When once the Legislature had altered either the Constitution or powers and procedure, the Constitution and powers and procedure as they previously existed ceased to exist and were replaced by the new Constitution and powers. 576. According to their Lordships the answer depended entirely upon a consideration of the meaning of Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act read with Section 4 of the Constitution statute assuming that the latter section still possessed some operative effect. The whole of Section 7-A was held to be competently enacted. The Privy Council, however, held that the repealing Bill after its passage through both Chambers could not be lawfully presented for the Royal assent without having first received the approval of the electors in the prescribed manner. In order to be validly passed, the law must be passed in the manner prescribed by Section 7-A which was in force for the time being. Trethowan's case (supra) fully illustrates how the Privy Council enforced such limitations even though they were of a procedural nature which had been provided in a constitutional statute relating to the form and manner in which any such statute could be altered or repealed. 577. These decisions, in particular, (Trethowan's case) illustrate that the Privy Council has recognised a restriction on the legislative powers of a sovereign legislature even though that is confined only to the form and manner laid down in a Constitution for amending the Constitution Act. In a country which still sticks to the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, limitations of any other nature would be regarded as somewhat nonconformist and unorthodox. 578. The decision of the Privy Council in 1965 AC 172 has been heavily relied on by both sides. On behalf of the petitioners support has been sought from the observations relating to rights regarded as fundamental, being unalterable. What had happened there

was that by virtue of Section 41 of the Bribery Amendment Act 1956, a provision was made for the appointment of a Bribery Tribunal which was in conflict with the requirement in Section 55 of the Ceylon Constitution (Order in Council 1946), hereinafter called the 'Ceylon Constitution Act', according to which the appointment of Judicial Officers was vested in the Judicial Service Commission. Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitution Act provided by sub-section (1) that subject to the provisions of the Order, the Parliament had the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the island. By sub-section (2) it was provided that no such law shall (a) prescribe or restrict the free exercise of any religion etc. This was followed by clauses (b), (c) and (d) which set out further religious and racial matters, which according to their Lordships, could not be the subject of legislation. In the words of their Lordships "they represent the solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which inter se they accepted the Constitution; and these are therefore unalterable under the Constitution". By sub- section (3) @page-SC1594 any law made in contravention of sub-section (2) was to be void to the extent of such contravention. Subsection (4) may he reproduced below: (4) In the exercise of its powers under this section? Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions of this Order, or of any other Order of Her Majesty in Council in its application to the Island: Provided that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of this Order shall be presented for the Royal Assent unless it has endorsed on it a certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not less shall two-thirds of the whole number of Members of, the House (including those not present). Every certificate of the Speaker under this sub-section shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any Court of Law". The Bribery Amendment Act 1958 had not been enacted in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitution Act. As it involved a conflict with the Constitution, it was observed that a certificate of the Speaker as required by sub-section (4) was a necessary part of the Act making process. The point which engaged the serious attention of the Privy Council was that when a sovereign Parliament had purported to enact a Bill and it had received the Royal Assent, could it be a valid Act in course of whose passing there was a procedural defect, or was it an invalid Act which Parliament had no power to pass in that manner? A distinction was made while examining the appellant's arguments between Section 29 (3) which expressly made void any Act ''passed in respect of the matters entrenched in and prohibited by Section 29 (2); whereas Section 29 (4) made no such provisions but merely couched the prohibition in procedural terms. Reliance had been placed on behalf of the appellant Bribery Commissioner on the decision in McCawley's case. It wa5 pointed out that McCawley's case so far as it was material, was in fact,- opposed to the appellant's reasoning. It was distinguished on the ground that the Ceylon legislature had purported to pass a law which being in conflict with Section 55 of the Ceylon Constitution Act, must be treated, if it was to be valid, as an implied alteration of the constitutional provisions about the appointment of judicial officers. It was held that such alterations, even if expressed, could only be made by laws which complied with' the special 1egislative procedure laid down in Section 29 (4). The Ceylon Legislature did not have thee general

power to legislate so as to amend its Constitution by ordinary majority resolutions such as the Queensland Legislature was found to have under Section 2 of its Constitution Act. 579. The learned Advocate-General of Maharashtra has referred to the arguments in Ranasinghe's case and has endeavoured to explain the observations made about the entrenched provisions being unalterable by saying that the same were obiter. According to him it was not the respondent's case that any provision was unamendable. The references to the solemn compact etc., were also obiter because the appeal did not raise any question about the rights of religion protected by sub-section (2) of Section 29 and the issues were entirely different. It is claimed that this decision supports the position taken up on behalf of the respondents that it is only the form and manner which is material in a controlled Constitution and that the above decision is an authority for the proposition that in exercise of the amending power a controlled Constitution can he converted into an uncontrolled one. Any implied limitations on Parliament's amending power here can be abrogated by an amendment of Article: 368 itself and the amending power can be enlarged by an exercise of that very power. According to Mr. Palkhivala this argument is wholly fallacious. Firstly, the observation of the Privy Council* is merely on the form and manner of amendment and has nothing to do with substantive limitations on the power of amendment. Placing limits on the amending power cannot be confused with questions of special legislative process which is also referred to by their Lordships.** Secondly, the Ceylon Constitution authorised the Parliament to amend or repeal the Constitution, which power is far wider than the power of amendment simpliciter conferred by Article 368. It is suggested that Ranasinghe's case is a direct authority against the respondents since it held the religious and racial @page-SC1595 rights to be unalterable, which clearly implies that Parliament had no competence to take away those rights even in exercise of its power to amend the Constitution by following the prescribed form and manner in sub-section (4) of Sec. 29 of the Ceylon Constitution Act.. The material importance of this case is that even though observations were made by their Lordships which may in a sense be obiter those were based on necessary implications arising from Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitution Act and were made with reference to interpretation of constitutional provisions which had a good deal of similarity (even on the admission of the Advocate-General of Maharashtra) with some parts of our Constitution particularly those which relate to fundamental rights. * Ibid page 198. ** Ibid portions D to E 580. Don, John Francis Douglas Liyange v. The Queen, 1967 AC 259 is another decision on which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners. The Ceylon Parliament passed an Act which substantially modified the Criminal Procedure Code inter alia by purporting to legalise an ex-post facto detention for 60 days of any person suspected of having committed an offence against the State. This class of offenses for which trial without a jury by three Judges nominated by the Minister for Justice could be ordered was widened and arrest without a warrant for waging war against the Queen could be effected. New minimum penalties for that offence were provided. The Privy Council held that the impugned legislation involved a usurpation and infringement by the legislature of judicial powers inconsistent with the written Constitution of Ceylon which' while not in terms vesting judicial functions in tee judiciary, manifested an intention to secure in the judiciary a freedom from political, legislative and executive control and in

effect left untouched the judicial system established by the Charter of Justice of 1833. The legislation was struck down as void. Their Lordships observed inter alia that powers in case of countries with written Constitutions must be exercised in accordance with the terms of the Constitution from which they were derived. Reference was made to the provisions in the Constitution for appointment of Judges by the Judicial Service Commission and it was pointed out that these provisions manifested an intention to secure in the judiciary a freedom from political, legislative and executive control. It was said that these provisions were wholly appropriate in a Constitution which intended that judicial power shall vest only in the judicature. And they would be inappropriate in a Constitution by which it was intended that judicial power should be shared by the executive or the legislature. 581. There seems to be a good deal of substance in the submission of Mr. Palkhivala that the above decision is based on the principle of implied limitations; because otherwise under Section 29 (1) of the Ceylon Constitution Act Parliament was competent to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the island subject to the provisions of the Order. Strong observations were made on the true nature and purpose of the impugned enactments and it was said that the alterations made by them in the functions of the judiciary constituted a grave and deliberate incursion in the judicial sphere. 582. The following passage is noteworthy and enligtening. "If such Acts as these were valid the judicial power could be wholly absorbed by the legislature and taken out of the hands of the judges. It is appreciated that the legislature has no such general intention. It was beset by a grave situation and it took grave measures to deal with it, thinking, one must presume, that it had power to do so and was acting rightly. But that consideration is irrelevant, and gives no validity to acts which infringe the Constitution. What is done once, if it be allowed, may be done again and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances. And thus judicial power may be eroded. Such an erosion is contrary to the clear intention of the Constitution." 583. Mohamed Samsudden Kariapper v. S. S. Wijesinha, 1968 AC 717 has been cited on behalf of the State of Kerala for the proposition that judicial power could, by an amendment of our constitution, be transferred to the legislature thus negativing the principle of implied limitation. In that case a report has been made under the Commission of Inquiry Act about certain allegations of bribery having been proved against some members of the Parliament of whom the appellant was one. Under a certain Act @pageSC1596 civil disabilities on persons to whom the Act applied were imposed. It also contained a provision that in the event of inconsistency with existing law, the Act should prevail. The appellant challenged the validity of that Act on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Constitution and was usurpation of the judicial power. It may be mentioned that the Speaker had in accordance with the proviso to Section 29 (4) of the Constitution of Ceylon, endorsed a certificate under his hand on the bill for imposition of civic disabilities (Special Provisions) Act. The Privy Council held that the said Act was an exercise of legislative power and not the usurpation of judicial power. The Constitution of Ceylon was a controlled constitution and the Act was an inconsistent law, the Act was to be regarded as amending the, constitution unless some provisions denying the Act constitutional effect was to be found in the constitutional restrictions imposed on the power of amendment. Apart from the proviso to Section 29 (4) of the Constitution Act, there was no reason for not construing the words "amend or repeal" in that provision

as extending to amendment or repeal by inconsistent law. The Act, therefore, amended the constitution. Finally upon the merits it was observed that in view of the conclusion that the Act was a law and not an exercise of judicial power it was not necessary to consider the question whether Parliament could, by a law passed in accordance with the proviso to Section 29 (4), both assume judicial power and exercise it in the one law. 584. The above decision can certainly be invoked as an authority for the proposition that even in a controlled constitution where the form and manner had been followed of amending it, an Act, which would be inconsistent with it and which did not in express terms state that it was an amending Act, would have the effect of altering the constitution. But it does not support any suggestion, as has been made on behalf of the respondents, that judicial power could, by an amendment of our constitution, be transferred to the legislature. Moreover, as expressly stated by their Lordships, the Ceylon Constitution empowered the Parliament "to amend or repeal" the constitution and therefore, there can be no comparison between the scope of the Ceylon Parliament's amending power and that of the amending body under Article 368. 585. We may next deal with the Australian decisions because there has been a good deal of discussion in them about implied limitations which can arise in the absence of express limitations. The subject-matter of most of the decisions has been the Commonwealth's taxing power. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution grants power to legislate with regard to taxation to the Commonwealth in wide terms but with certain express reservations, viz., that duties of customs should be uniform, that the taxing laws must not discriminate between States, nor must revenue laws give preference to one State over another State. Section 114 bars the Commonwealth from taxing property of any kind belonging to a State. In Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., (1920) 28 CLR 129 the High Court of Australia accepted the principles of construction of a constitution laid down by the Privy Council in (1878) 3 AC 889 and Attorney General of Ontario v. Attorney General of Canada, 1912 AC 571 viz., that the only way in which a court can determine whether the prescribed limits of legislative power had been exceeded or not was "by looking to the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively, the legislative powers are created, and by which negatively, they are restricted," and nothing was to be read into it on ground of policy of necessity arising or supposed to arise from the nature of the federal form of government nor were speculations as to the motives of the legislature to be entered into by the Court. These words would apparently appear to reject any proposition as to implied limitations in the constitution against an exercise of power once it is ascertained in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction. Such an interpretation of the Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR 129 supposed to have buried for ever the principle of implied limitations, has not been unanimously accepted nor has the above criterion laid down been adhered to. In Attorney General of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees Union, (1908) 6 CLR 469 at pp. 611-612, Higgins, J., cautioned that "although the words of the constitution are to be interpreted on the same principles of interpretation as are applied to any ordinary law, these very principles of interpretation compel us to take into account the nature and scope of the Act....to remember that it is a constitution, a mechanism @page-SC1597 under which laws are to be made, and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be". Sir Owen Dixon in Australian Railways Union v. Victorian Rly., Commrs., (1930) 44 CLR 319 (390) and later in West v. Commr. of Taxation, (1937) 56 CLR 657 (682) formulated

what in his view was the basic principle laid down in Engineer's case (Supra) and made observations relating to reservations of qualifications, which he thought had been made, concerning the prima facie rule of Interpretation which that decision laid down. In Ex parte Professional Engineers Association, (1959) 107 CLR 208 (239) he once again adverted to the Engineers' case and suggested that perhaps "the reservations and qualifications therein expressed concerning the federal power of taxation and laws directed specially to the States and also perhaps the prerogative of the Crown received too little attention." The question as to implied limitations was directly raised and decided in the Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth, (1947) 74 CLR 31. It was held that Section 48 of the Banking Act, 1945, prohibiting banks from conducting banking business for a State and for any authority of the State, including a local government authority was invalid. Two contentions were raised in that case: (1) that the impugned Act was not a law on banking within Section 51 (xiii) because it was not a law with respect to banking, and (2) that the grant of power in Section 51 (xiii) must be read subject, to limitations in favour of the State because it appears in a federal constitution, so that even if Section 48 could be treated as a law with respect to banking, it was still invalid since its operation interfered with the States in the exercise of their governmental functions. The second contention was accepted by the majority. Latham, C. J., stated that laws which discriminated against States or which unduly interfered with States in the exercise of their functions of government were not laws authorised by the constitution, even if they were laws with respect to a subject-matter within the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament. Rich, J., held that the constitution expressly provided for the continued existence of the States and that, therefore, any action on the part of the Commonwealth, in purported exercise of its constitutional powers, which would prevent a State from continuing to exist or function as such was necessarily in valid because of inconsistency with the express provisions of the Constitution. Stark, J., said that the federal character of the Australian constitution carried implications of its own, that the government was a dual system based upon a separation of organs and of powers and, consequently, maintenance of the States and their powers was as much the object of the constitution as maintenance of the Commonwealth and its powers. Therefore, it was beyond the power of either to abolish or destroy the other. 586. The same contention was raised in a recent case of Victoria v. The Commonwealth, (1971) 45 ALJ 251, where the Pay-roll Tax Act, 1941 and the Pay-roll Tax Assessment Act, 1941-1969 were impugned. These Acts were passed by the Commonwealth Parliament for financing the provisions of the Child Endowment Act, 1941 and casting the burden on employers by taxing wages paid by them. The Crown in right of a State was in each State a considerable employer of labour, and in some States of industrial labour. The Crown in right of a State was included in the definition of 'employer' for the purpose of the Act. The question raised for decision was about the constitutional validity of the Act in so far as it purported to impose upon the State of Victoria an obligation to payroll tax rated to the amount of salaries and wages paid to its public servants employed in certain department named in its statement of claim. The contention raised by the State of Victoria as summarised by Barwick, C. J. was that though the impugned Act fell under the enumerated power of taxation in Section 51 of the Constitution Act, that section did not authorise the imposition of a tax upon the Crown in the right of a State because there was an implied constitutional limitation upon that Commonwealth power operating

universally, that is to say, as to all the activities of a State. The point most pressed, however, was in a somewhat limited form, viz., that the legislative power with respect to taxation did not extend to authorise the imposition of a tax upon "any essential governmental activity" of a State and therefore, at the least, the power under Section 51 did not authorise a tax upon the State in respect of wages paid to its civil servants. In other words such a limitation, whether of universal or of limited operation, was derived by implication from the federal nature @page-SC1598 of the constitution, . and therefore, to levy a tax rated to the wages paid to its servants employed in departments of governments, so trenched upon the governmental functions of the State as to burden, impair arid threaten the independent exercise of those functions. All the seven judges agreed, firstly, that the Act was valid, and secondly upon the proposition laid down in the Engineers' case (Supra) as also in certain other decisions that where a power was granted to the Commonwealth by a specific provision such as Section 51 (ii) the Commonwealth could pass a law which would bind the States as it would bind individuals. The difference amongst the judges, however, arose as regards the question of implied limitation on such a power, however, expressly granted. Barwick C. J. and Owen J. were of the view that a law which in substance takes a State or its powers or functions of government as its subject-matter is invalid because it cannot be supported upon any granted legislative power but there is no implied limitation on a Commonwealth legislative power under the constitution arising from its federal nature. McTiernan J., was also of the view that there was no necessary implication restraining the Commonwealth from making the law. However, Menzies, Windeyer, Walsh and Gibbs, JJ., held in categorial terms that there is an implied limitation on Commonwealth legislative power under the Constitution on account of its federal nature. According to Menzies, J., a constitution providing for indissoluble federal Commonwealth must protect both Commonwealth and States. The States were not outside the Constitution. Accordingly although the Constitution clearly enough subjected the States to laws made by Commonwealth Parliament it did so with some limitation. Windeyer, J., read the Melbourne Corporation case (Supra) as confirming the principle of implication and added that the Court in reading the Constitution "must not shy away from the word 'implication' and disavow every concept that it connotes." Walsh, J., rejected the contention that it was inconsistent with the principles of construction laid down in Engineers' case that the ambit of power with respect to enumerated subject matter should be restricted in any way otherwise than by an express provision specially imposing some defined limitation upon it and observed: "There is a substantial body of authority for the proposition that the federal nature of the Constitution does give rise to implications by which some limitations are imposed upon the extent of the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to subject the States to its legislation". According to Gibbs, J., the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation did not preclude the making of implications when they were necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature as revealed in the statute as a whole. The intention of the Imperial Parliament in enacting the Constitution was to give effect to the wishes of the Australian people to join in a federal union and to establish a federal and not a unitary system. In some respects the Commonwealth was placed in a position of supremacy as the national interest required but it would be inconsistent with the very basis of federation that the Commonwealth's power should extend to reducing the states to such a position of

subordination that their very existence as independent units would be dependent upon the manner in which the Commonwealth exercises its powers, rather than on the legal limits of the powers themselves. He proceeded to say: "Thus, the purpose of the Constitution, and the scheme by which it is intended to be given effect, necessarily give rise to implications as to the manner in which the Commonwealth and the States respectively may exercise their powers, vis-a-vis each other". 587. The Advocate General of Maharashtra does not dispute that there are necessary implications in a federal constitution such as, for example, that any law violating any provision of the Constitution is void even in the absence of an express declaration to that effect. Again it is a necessary implication of a republican constitution that the sovereign of a foreign State - United Kingdom - cannot place Indian territory in groups by Orders in Council as provided in the Fugitive Offenders Act, and, therefore, that Act is inconsistent with the Republican Constitution of India' arid is not continued in force by Article 372., see State of Madras v. C. G. Menon, (1955) 1 SCR 280 = (AIR 1954 SC 517). But he maintains that the principle of Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 AC.889 is not in any way displaced. Burah's case, according to him, laid down principles of @page-SC1599 interpretation and in doing so the Privy Council itself enunciated the doctrine of ultra vires which is a necessary implication of an Act of the British Parliament creating, bodies or authorities with limited powers An attempt has been made to show that the judgment of Chief Justice Barwick in the above Australian decision stated the basic principle of construction correctly and those principles are applicab1e to our constitution also since the decision was based on (1878) 3 AC 889 which has been consistently followecl by this Court. We have already dealt with that decision and we are unable to agree that (1878) 3 AC 889 stands in the way of drawing implications where the purpose of the constitution and the scheme by which it is intended to be given effect, necessarily give rise to certain implications. 588. Turning to the Canadian decisions we need refer only to those which have a material bearing on the questions before us. In The Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. The Attorney General of Canada, 1951 Can LR 31 the constitutionality of an Act respecting the delegation of jurisdiction from the Parliament of Canada to the Legislature of Nova Scotia and vice versa was canvassed. The Supreme Court of Canada held that since it contemplated delegation by Parliament of powers exclusively vested in it by Section 91 of the British North America Act to the Legislature of Nova Scotia; and delegations by that Legislature of powers exclusively vested in Provincial Legislature under Section 92 of the Act to Parliament, it could not be constitutionally valid. The principal ground on which the decision was based was that the Parliament of Canada and each Provincial Legislature is a sovereign body within its sphere possessed of exclusive jurisdiction to legislate with regard to the subject-matter assigned to it under Section 91 or Section 92 as the ease may be. Neither is capable, therefore, of delegating to the other to powers with which it has been vested nor of receiving from the other the power with which the other has been vested. The learned Chief Justice observed that the constitution of Canada "does not belong either to the Parliament Or to the Legislatures; it belongs to the country and it is there that the citizens of country will find the protection of the rights to which they are entitled".

Although nothing was expressly mentioned either in Section 91 or Section 92 of the British North America Act a limitation was implied on the power of Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures to delegate legislative power. Mention may also he made of John Switzman v. Freda Elbling, 1957 Can LR(SC) 285 at p. 32, (to which we have already referred while dealing with the question of the use of the preamble). In that case the validity of the Act respecting, communistic propaganda of the Province of Quebec was held to be ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature. Abbot, I., after referring to various decisions of the Privy Council as also of the Supreme Court of Canada* said that the Canada Election Act, the provisions of the British North America Act which provided for Parliament meeting at least once a year and for the election of a new Parliament at least every five years and the Senate and House of Commons Act, were examples of enactments which made citizens statutory provisions for ensure, the exercise of the right of public debate and public discussion. "Implicit in all such, legislation is the right of candidates for Parliament or for a Legislature and of citizens generally, to explain, to criticize, debate and discuss in the freest possible manner such matters as the qualifications the policies, and the political economic and social principles advocated by such candidates or by the political parties or groups of which they may be member''. That right could not be abrogated by a Provincial Legislature and its power was limited to what might be necessary to protect purely private rights. He was further of the opinion that according to the Canadian Constitution, as it stood, Parliament itself could not abrogate this right of discussion and debate. * See in particular the observation of Duff C. J. in Alberta Statutes Case (1938) SCR (Canada) 100 at pp. 132-133. 589. The Advocate General of Maharashtra has pointed out that these decisions relate to the legislative competence of provincial legislatures to affect civil liberties like freedom of speech religion or to legislate in respect of criminal matters they are not relevant for the purpose of determining the amending power under the Constitution. So far as the civil rights are concerned in Canada it is noteworthy according to the Advocate General, that the Canadian Bill of @page-SC1600 Rights 1960 makes the rights therein defeasible by an express declaration that an Act of Parliament shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights. It has also been submitted that the well known writers of constitutional law both of Australia and Canada have not attached any significance or accepted the principle of implied limitations.* The opinions of authors and writers have been cited before us so extensively, by both sides, that we find a great deal of conflict in their expression of opinion and it will not be safe to place any reliance on them. The Judges who have read limitations by implication are well known and of recognised eminence and it is not fair to reject their views for the reasons suggested by the Advocate General. * See W. A. Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers in Australia and Bora Laskin, The Canadian Constitutional Law. 590. We need hardly deal at length with the Irish decisions. The principle emerging from the majority decision in The State (at the prosecution of Jermiah Ryan) v. Captain Michael Lenons, (1935) Ir. Rep. 170 that under Section 50 of the 1922 Constitution (which provided for constitutional amendment by ordinary legislation during the first period of years which was subsequently extended to 18 years) an ordinary law inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution had the effect of amendment of the

constitution, caused considerable debate. During the controversy it was Strongly urged that the power of Constitutional amendment was not identical with pouvoir constituent; that it was not within the competence of agencies invested with the power of constitutional amendment to drastically revise the structural organisation of a State, to change a monarchical into a republican and a representative into a direct form of government. The argument was based on the conception underlying Article 2 of the French Law of 1884 which provided that the republican form of government could not be made subject of constitutional amendment. Section 50 of that constitution, in particular, was criticized as being too plain for the first period of 8 years and too rigid for the period following it.* After the 1937 constitution which became a model for our constitution makers the trend of judicial thinking underwent a transformation and instead of treating an Act inconsistent with the constitution as having the effect of impliedly amending the constitution such an Act was regarded as invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with the constitution. See Edmund Burke v. Lenon, (1940) Ir Rep 136 and Margaret Buckley v. Attorney General of Eire, 1950 Ir Rep 67. The 1922 Constitution was considered to be of such "light weight" that there were no fewer than 27 Acts expressed to be Acts impliedly amending that Constitution** within a period of 15 years. During the period 1922-27 the Judges were used to the British idea of sovereignty of Parliament and notions of fundamental law were foreign to their training and tradition. The 1937 Constitution is more rigid than its predecessor though Article 51 permits the Oireachtas to amend the Constitution during the first three years by ordinary-legislation. Such legislation, however, is expressly excepted unlike Article 50 of the 1922 Constitution from the amending power. Mention may be made of The State v. Minister for Justice, 1967 Ir Rep 108 in which it was held that the provisions of Section 13 of the Lunatic Asylums (Ireland) Act 1875 which prevented an accused person from appearing before the District Court on the return date of his remand constituted interference with an exercise of judicial power to administer justice. This case and similar cases e.g., 1950 Ir Rep 67 may not afford much assistance in determining the question about implied limitation to the amending power in a constitution because they deal with the question mostly of repugnancy of ordinary legislation to constitutional provisions. The main decision however, was in Ryan's case 1935 Ir Rep 170 in which Kennedy, C. J., drew various implications from the Constitution but the majority of Judges declined to do so and read the word "amendment" as wide enough to allow the repeal of a number of articles, however important in substance they might be. It is equally unnecessary to deal with the argument on behalf of the respondents that the Privy Council in Moore v. Attorney General of Irish Free State, 1935 AC 484 rejected the contention of the counsel based on the reasoning of Kennedy, C. J. Moore's case was @page-SC1601 decided principally on the effect of the passing of the statute of Westminster as is clear from the summing up of the position by their Lordships.*** * Leo Kohn The Constitution of the Irish Free State pp. 257-259. ** See Generally J. M. Kelly, Fundamental Rights on the Irish Law and Constitution (1968) 1-17). *** Ibid, p. 498. 591. As regards the position in the United States of America a great deal of reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on United States of America v. William H. Sprague, (1931) 75 Law Ed 640. According to that decision the choice between

submission of a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution to State Legislatures and submission to State Conventions under Article 5 of the Constitution was in the sole discretion of Congress irrespective of whether the amendment was one dealing with the machinery of government or with matters affecting the liberty of the citizen. It was argued that amendments may be of different kinds, e.g., mere changes in the character of federal means of machinery on the one hand, and matters affecting the liberty of the citizen, on the other. It was said that the framers of the Constitution accepted the former sort to be ratified by the legislature whereas they intended that the latter must be referred to the people because not only of lack of power in the legislature to ratify but also because of doubt as to their truly representing the people. The Court observed that where the intention was clear there was no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition and it had been repeatedly and consistently declared in earlier decisions that the choice of mode rested solely in the discretion of the Congress. It is sought to be concluded from this decision that the Supreme Court of the United States refused to read any implications of the nature argued in that case. 592. Mr. Palkhivala says that the decision in (1931) 75 Law Ed 640 (Supra) has no relevance to the questions before us. All that it laid down was that the Congress had the sole discretion to decide whether a proposed amendment should be submitted to State Legislatures or to the State conventions. The language of Article 5 itself shows that sole discretion in this matter is conferred on the Congress irrespective of whether the amendment deals with the machinery of government or with matters affecting the rights and liberties of the citizen. Sprague's case. it is suggested, was merely a fresh attempt after the decision of the Supreme Court in (1919) 64 Law Ed 946 to argue that the 18th amendment which introduced prohibition was unconstitutional since it was ratified by the State Legislatures and the attempt rightly failed. For the reasons suggested by Mr. Palkhivala, which appear to have a good deal of substance we are unable to derive any help from U. S. v. W. H. Sprague, (1931) 75 Law Ed 640. 593. The Advocate General of Maharashtra has invoked another principle to the effect that unless the power of amendment is co-extensive with the judicial power of invalidating laws made under the Constitution the judiciary would be supreme, therefore, the power of amendment should be co-extensive with judicial power. This follows from what has been repeatedly held by this Court that under our Constitution none of the three great departments of the State is supreme and it is only the Constitution which is supreme and which provides for a government of laws and not of men. The reply of Mr. Palkhivala is that if the constitution is supreme, as it is' it necessarily follows that there must be limitation on the amending power because if there are no limitations the legislature would be supreme and not the Constitution. If the legislature's power of amending Constitution were co-extensive with the judicial power of invalidating laws made under the Constitution, the legislature can bend the Constitution to its wheel in every way which will lead to a result contrary to what has been provided in the Constitution, namely, that there are three great departments of the State and no one can have supremacy over the other. When the judiciary places a limitation on the amending powers, says, Mr. Palkhivala, only as a matter of true construction the consequence is not that the judiciary is supreme but that the Constitution is supreme. It is claimed that on his arguments the legislature, executive and judiciary remain coordinate which is the correct position under the Constitution. If the respondent's argument is accepted the amending power is absolute

and limitless. It can make the judiciary and the executive completely subordinate to it or take over their powers. 594. We are unable to see how the power of judicial review makes the judiciary supreme in any sense of the word. This power is of paramount importance in a federal Constitution. @page-SC1602 Indeed it has been said that the heart and core of a democracy lies in the judicial process; (per Bose, J., in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, (1956) SCR 267 = (AIR 1956 SC 479) ). The observations of Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of Madras v. V. G. Row, (1952) SCR 597 = (AIR 1952 SC 196) which have become locus classicus need alone be repeated in this connection. Judicial review is undertaken by the Courts "not out of any desire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusador's spirit, hut in discharge of a duty plainly laid upon them by the Constitution." The respondents have also contended that to let the court have judicial review over constitutional amendments would mean involving the court in political questions. To this the answer may be given in the words of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank.of New South Wales, 1950 AC 235 at p. 310:"The problem to be solved will often be not so much legal as political, social or economic, yet it must be solved by a court of law. For where the dispute is, as here, not only between Commonwealth and citizen but between Commonwealth and intervening States on the one hand and citizens and States on the others it is only the Court that can decide the issue, it is vain to invoke the voice of Parliament." There is ample evidence in the Constitution itself to indicate that it creates a system of checks and balances by reason of which powers are so distributed that none of the three organs it sets up can become so predominant as to disable the others from exercising and discharging powers and functions entrusted to them. Though the Constitution does not lay down the principle of separation of powers in all its rigidity as is the case in the United States Constitution but it envisages such a separation to a decree as was found in Ranasinghe's case 1965 AC 172. The judicial review provided expressly in our Constitution by means of Arts. 226 & 32 is one of the features upon which hinges the system of checks and balances. Apart from that, as already stated the necessity for judicial decision on the competence or otherwise of an Act arises from the very federal nature of a Constitution. (Per Haldane, L. C.' in Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., (1914) AC 287 and Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36 at p. 58). The function of interpretation of a Constitution being thus assigned to the judicial power of the State, the question whether the subject of a law is within the ambit of one or more powers of the legislature conferred by the constitution would always be a question of interpretation of the Constitution. It may be added that at no stage the respondents have contested the proposition that the validity of a constitutional amendment can be the subject of review by this Court. The Advocate General of Maharashtra has characterised judicial review as undemocratic. That cannot, however, be so in our Constitution because of the provisions relating to the appointment of judges, the specific restriction to which the fundamental rights are made subject, the deliberate exclusion of the due process clause in Article 21 and the affirmation in Article 141 that judges declare but not make law. To this may be added the none too rigid amendatory process which authorises amendment by means of 2/3 majority and the additional requirement of ratification.

595. According to the learned Attorney General the entire argument on the basis of implied limitations is fundamentally wrong. He has also relied greatly on the decision in Burah's case, (1878) 3 AC 889, and other similar decisions. It is pointed out that there can be no inherent limitation on the power of amendment having regard to the purpose for which the power is needed. The argument about the non-amendability of the essential framework of the Constitution is illusive because every part of a constitution document admits of the possibility of imperfect drafting or ambiguity. Even basic concepts or ideals undergo progressive changes. It has been strenuously urged that the constitution read as a whole did not contemplate the perpetuation of the existing social and economic inequalities and a duty has been cast on the State to organise a new social order. The Attorney General quoted the opinion of several writers and authors in support of his contention that there must be express words of limitation in a provision which provides for amendment of the Constitution from which it follows that no implied limitations can be read therein. 596. The correct approach to the question of limitations which may be implied in any legislative provisions including a constitutional document has to be made from the point of view of interpretation. @page-SC1603 It is not a novel theory or a Doctrine which has to be treated as an innovation of those who evolve heterodox methods to substantiate their own thesis. The argument that there are no implied limitations because there are no express limitations is a contradiction in terms. Implied limitations can only arise where there are no express limitations. The contention of the learned Attorney General that no implications can be read in an amending power in a Constitution must be repelled in the words of Dixon, J., in West v. Commr. of Taxation (N. S. W.), (1936-37) 56 CLR 657: "Since the Engineers' case a notion seems to have gained currency that in interpreting the Constitution no implications can be made. Such a method of construction would defeat the intention of any instrument; but of all instruments a written Constitution seems the last to which it could be applied." 597. We are equally unable to hold that in the light of the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution the relevant provisions thereof and the context in which the material expressions are used in Article 368 no implied limitations arise to the exercise of the power of amendment. The respondents do not dispute that certain limitations arise by necessary implication e.g., the Constitution cannot be abrogated or repealed in its entirety and that India's polity has to be of a Sovereign Democratic Republic. apart from several other implications arising from Article 368 which have been noticed. 598. The argument that the Nation cannot grow and that the objectives set out in the Preamble cannot be achieved unless the amending power has the ambit and the width of the power of a Constituent Assembly itself or the People themselves appears to be based on grounds which do not have a solid basis. The Constitution makers provided for development of the country in all the fields social, economic and political. The structure of the Constitution has been erected on the concept of an egalitarian society. But the Constitution makers did not desire that it should be a society where the citizen will not enjoy the various freedoms and such rights as are the basic elements of those freedoms, e.g., the right to equality, freedom of religion etc., so that his dignity as an individual may be maintained. It has been strongly urged on behalf of the respondents that a citizen cannot have any dignity if he is economically or socially backward. No one can dispute such a statement but the whole scheme underlying the Constitution is to bring about

economic and social changes without taking away the dignity of the individual. Indeed, the same has been placed on such a high pedestal that to ensure the freedoms etc., their infringement has been made justiciable by the highest court in the land. The dictum of Das, C. J., in Kerala Education Bill case, paints the true picture in which there must be harmony between Parts III and IV, indeed the picture will get distorted and blurred it any vital provision out of them is cut out or denuded of its identity. 599. The basic structure of the Constitution is not a vague concept and the apprehensions expressed on behalf of the respondents that neither the citizen nor the Parliament would be able to understand it are unfounded. If the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, the relevant provisions thereof including Article 368 are kept in mind there can be no difficulty in discerning that the following can be regarded as the basic elements of the constitutional structure. (These cannot be catalogued but can only be illustrated). 1. The supremacy of the Constitution. 2. Republican and Democratic form of Government and sovereignty of the country. 3. Secular and federal character of the Constitution. 4. Demarcation of power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 5. The dignity of the individual secured by the various freedoms and basic rights in Part III and the mandate to build a welfare State contained in Part IV. 6. The unity and the integrity of the nation. 600. The entire discussion from the point of view of the meaning of the expression "amendment" as employed in Article 368 and the limitations which arise by implications levels to the result that the amending power under Art. 368 is neither narrow nor unlimited. On the footing on which we have proceeded the validity of the 24th Amendment can be sustained if Article 368, as it originally stood and after the amendment, is read @page-SC1604 in the way we have read it. The insertion of Articles 13 (4) and 368 (3) and the other amendments made will not affect the result, namely, that the power in Article 368 is wide enough to permit amendment of each and every Article of the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal so long as its basic elements are not abrogated or denuded of their identity. 601. We may next deal with the validity of the Constitution (25th Amendment) Act. Section 2 of the Amending Act provides :"2. In Article 31 of the Constitution, (a) for clause (2), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:"(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of 'the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash: Provided.............. (b) after clause (2-A), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:(2-B) Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in clause (2)". As stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill (No. 103 of 1971) the word "compensation" was sought to be omitted from Article 31 (2)

and replaced by the word "amount". It was being clarified that the said "amount" may be given otherwise than in cash. It also provided that Article 19 (1) (f) shall not apply to any law relating to acquisition or requisitioning of property for a public purpose. The position of the respondents is that "compensation" had been given the meaning of market value or the just equivalent of what the owner had been deprived of according to the decisions of this Court. See State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Bannerji, (1954) SCR 558 = (AIR 1954 SC 170). That had led to the 4th Amendment Act 1955. The later decisions Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras (1965) SCR 614 = (AIR 1965 SC 1017) and Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India, (196,) 1 SCR 255 = (AIR 1967 SC 637) had continued to uphold the concept of "compensation" i.e., just equivalent of the value of the property acquired in spite of the amendments made in 1955. In State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, (1969) 3 SCR 341 = (AIR 1969 SC 634) the decision in Metal Corporation of India (1967) 1 SCR 255 = (AIR 1967 SC 637) was overruled which itself was virtually overruled by R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 530 = (AIR 1970 SC 564). According to the Advocate General of Maharashtra, if Shantilal Mangaldas etc., had not been overruled by R. C. Cooper v. Union of India there would have been no necessity of amending Article 31 (2). 602. The first question that has to be determined is the meaning of the word "amount'. Unlike the word "compensation" it has no legal connotation.. It is a neutral, colourless word. The dictionary meanings do not help in arriving at its true import as used in a constitutional provision. It can be anything from one paisa to an astronomical figure in rupees. Its meaning has, therefore, to be ascertained by turning to the context in which it is used and the words preceding it as well as following it. 603. The scheme of Article 31 (2) now is:(1) The property has to be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned.. (2) It has to be for a public purpose. (3) It has to be by a law. (4) The law must provide for an amount which may be: (i) fixed by such law or (ii) which may be determined in accordance with such principles as may be specified in such law. (5) The law shall not be questioned in a Court on the ground: (i) The amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or (ii) the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash. It is significant that the amount can be determined in accordance with specified principles, if it is not fixed by the law itself. Moreover, its adequacy cannot be questioned in a court. The use of the word "principles" and the question of inadequacy can only arise if the amount has some norm. If it has no norm no question of specifying any principles arises nor can there he any occasion for @page-SC1605 the determination of its adequacy. The very fact that the court is debarred from going into the question of adequacy shows that the "amount" can be adequate or inadequate. Even if it is inadequate, the fixation or determination of that amount is immune from any challenge. It postulates the existence of some standard or norm without which any enquiry into adequacy becomes wholly unnecessary and irrelevant. Moreover, either method of giving an amount must bring about the same result. In other words, if Rs. 1000/- is the amount to be given for acquisition of a property, it must be either fixed or must be determinable by

the principles specified in the event of its not being fixed. It could not be intended that the two alternative modes should lead to varying results, i.e., it could be fixed at Rs. 1000/but if the principles are specified they do not yield that figure. 604. The Advocate General of Maharashtra says that the right of the owner is just what the government determines it to be. It can give what it pleases and when it chooses to do so. Such an argument is untenable and introduces an element of arbitrariness which cannot be attributed to the Parliament. 605. In Shantilal Mangal Das, which, on the submission of the Advocate General, enunciated the correct principles relating to Article 31 (2) as it then stood, it was laid down that something fixed or determined by the application of specified principles which was illusory or could in no sense be regarded as compensation was not bound to be upheld by the Courts, "for to do so would be to grant a charter of arbitrariness and permit a device to defeat the constitutional guarantees". It was added that the principles could be challenged on the ground that they were irrelevant to the determination of compensation but not on the plea that what was awarded was not just or fair compensation. Thus it was open to the courts to go into the question of arbitrariness of the amount fixed or its being illusory even under the law laid down in Shantilal Mangaldas (supra). The relevance of the principles had also been held to be justiciable. R. C. Cooper's case did not lay down different principles. But the observations made therein were understood to mean that the concept of just equivalent not accepted in Shantilal's case was restored. The amendment now made is apparently aimed at removing that concept and for that reason the word "amount" has been substituted in place of "compensation". This is particularly so as we find no reason for departing from the well-settled rule that in such circumstances the Parliament made the amendment knowing full well the ratio of the earlier decisions. 606. The Advocate General of Maharashtra has submitted that the fixing of the amount or alternatively specifying the principles for determining that amount is entirely within the judgment of the legislature and the whole object of the amendment is to exclude judicial review which had been introduced by the Courts on the basis of the concept of compensation. But even then the members of the legislature must have some basis or principles before them to fix the amount as the same cannot be done in an arbitrary way. He, however, gave an unusual explanation that in the Cabinet system of government it is for the government to determine the amount or specify such principles as it chooses to do. The legislators belonging to the ruling party are bound to support the measure whether the basis on which the amount has been determined is disclosed to them or not. It is wholly incomprehensible how there can be any legislative judgment or decision unless there is room for debate and discussion both by members of the ruling party and the opposition. For any discussion on the "amount" fixed or the principles specified the entire basis has to be disclosed. There can be no basis if there is no standard or norm. 607. The learned Solicitor General agrees that Article 31(2) after amendment still binds the legislature to provide for the giving to the owner a sum of money either in cash or otherwise. In fixing the "amount"' the legislature has to act on some principle. This is not because of any particular obligation arising out of Article 31 (2) but from the general nature of legislative power itself. Whatever, the subject or the nature of legislation it always proceeds on a principle it is based on legislative policy. The principle may include considerations of social justice. Judicial review on the ground of inadequacy of the "amount" and the manner of payment is excluded by express language. No other question

is excluded. The expropriated owner still @page-SC1606 continues to have a fundamental right. This argument is not quite the same as that of the learned Solicitor General. 608. It is true that the "amounts" to be paid to an owner may not be the market value. The price of the property might have increased owing to various factors to which no contribution has been made by the owner. The element of social justice may have to be taken into consideration. But still on the learned Solicitor General's argument, the right to receive the "amount" continues to be a fundamental right. That cannot be denuded of its identity. The obligation to act on some principle while fixing the amount arises both from Article 31 (2) and from the nature of the legislative power. For, there can be no power which permits in a democratic system an arbitrary use of power. If an aggrieved owner approaches the court alleging that he is being deprived of that right on the grounds now open to him, the Court cannot decline to look. into the matter. The Court will certainly give due weight t0 legislative judgment. But the norm or the principles of fixing or determining the "amount" will have to be disclosed to the Court. It will have to be satisfied that the "amount" has reasonable relationship with the value of the property acquired or requisitioned and one or more of the relevant principles have been applied and further that the "amount" is neither illusory nor it has been fixed arbitrarily, nor at such a figure that it means virtual deprivation of the right under Article 31 (2) The question of adequacy or inadequacy; however' cannot be gone into. 609. As to the mode or payment there is nothing to indicate in the amended Article that any arbitrary manner of payment is contemplated. It is weld known that a discretion has to be exercised reasonably. 610. As regards clause (2-B) inserted in Article 31 which makes Article 19 (1) (f) inapplicable there is no reason for assuming that a procedure will be provided which will not be reasonable or will be opposed to the rules of natural justice. Section 2 of the 25th Amendment can be sustained on the construction given to it above. 611. We now come to the most controversial provision of the 25th Amendment, namely, Section 3 which inserted the following Article :"3l -C. Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy : Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article, shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent". According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in Bill No. 106 of 1971, the new Article has been introduced to provide that if any law is passed to give effect to the Directive Principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 and contains a declaration to that effect, such law shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it takes away or abridges any of the rights contained in Articles 14, 19 or 31 and shall not be questioned on the ground that it does not give effect to these principles. For this provision to apply in case of laws made by State legislatures, it is necessary that the

relevant Bill should be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent. 612. Article 39 contains certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. It enjoins the State inter alia to direct its policy towards securing: "39 (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; (c) That the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;" 613. These provisions together with the other provisions of the Constitution contain one of the main objectives, namely, the building of a welfare State and an egalitarian social order in our country. As stated before, the fundamental rights and the directive principles have been described as the "conscience of our Constitution". The Constitution makers had, among others, one dominant objective in view and that was to ameliorate and improve the lot of the common @page-SC1607 man and to bring about a socio-economic transformation based on principles of social justice. While the Constitution makers envisaged development in the social, economic and political fields, they did not desire that it should be a society where a citizen will not have the dignity of the individual. Part III of the Constitution shows that the founding fathers were equally anxious that it should be a society where the citizen will enjoy the various freedoms and such rights as are the basic elements of those freedoms without which there can be no dignity of the individual. Our Constitution makers did not contemplate any disharmony between the fundamental rights and the directive principles. They were meant to supplement one another. It can well be said that the directive principles prescribed the goal to be attained and the fundamental rights laid down the means by which that goal was to be achieved. While on behalf of the petitioners greater emphasis has been laid on the fundamental rights, counsel for the respondents say that the fundamental rights should be subordinate to the directive principles. The Constituent Assembly did not accept such a proposal made by B. N. Rau. It has been suggested that a stage has been reached where it has become necessary to abrogate some of the basic freedoms and rights provided the end justifies the means. At an earlier stage in the development of our constitutional law a view was taken that the Directive Principles of State Policy had to conform and run subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, but Das, C. J., in Kerala Education Bill, 1957, laid down the rule of harmonious construction and observed that an attempt should be made to give effect to both the fundamental rights and the directive principles. 614. According to Mr. Palkhivala, Article 31-C destroys several essential features of the Constitution. He says that there is a vital distinction between two cases (a) where fundamental rights are amended to permit laws to be validly passed which would have been void before the amendment and (b) the fundamental rights remain commended, but the laws which are void as offending those rights are validated by a legal fiction that they shall not be deemed to be void. He further points out that on the analogy of Article 8l-C it would be permissible to have an omnibus Article that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution no law passed by Parliament or any State legislature shall be deemed to be void on any ground whatsoever. Article 31-C according to him, gives a blank charter not only to Parliament but all the State Legislatures to amend the Constitution. On the other hand, the argument on behalf of the respondents is that Article 31-C is similar to Articles 31-A and 31-B and that the object of inserting the Article is to free certain kinds

of laws from the limitation on legislative power imposed by conferment of fundamental rights by Part III of the Constitution. As those rights were justiciable under Article 32, says the Advocate General of Maharashtra, the only way of doing so was to exclude judicial review of legislation in respect of those laws. If Article 31-A is valid, there is no reason or justification for saying that Article 31-C suffers from all the vices pointed out by Mr. Palkhivala. 615. According to the Solicitor General, Article 31-C protects only law and not mere executive action. Law can be made by either Parliament or the State Legislatures. Article ST-C has been enacted for the purpose of achieving the objectives set out in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. The law enacted under it will operate on ''material resources", "concentration of wealth" and "means of production". The legislative effort would generally involve (i) nationalisation of material resources of the community and (ii) imposition of control on the production, supply and distribution of the products of key industries and essential commodities. It, therefore, impinges on a particular kind of economic system only. 616. The question of the validity of Article 31-C to our mind has to be examined mainly from two points of view; the first is its impact on the various freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, the abrogation of the right of equality guaranteed by Article 14 and the right to property contained in Article 31. The second is whether the amending body under Article 368 could delegate its amending power to the legislatures of the Union and the States. Alternatively, whether the Parliament and the State Legislatures can, under Article 31 (C), amend the Constitution without complying with the form and manner laid down in Article 368. Now it is quite @page-SC1608 obvious that under Article 31-C a law passed by the Parliament or the State Legislatures shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 so long as the law is declared to be one for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) and clause (c) of Article 39. If Article 81-C is aimed at the removal of a particular economic system, as suggested by the Solicitor General, it is difficult to understand why the freedoms contained in clauses (a) to (d) of Article 19 as also the right of equality under Article 14 had to be taken away. The power of enacting Constitution breaking laws has been entrusted even to a small majority in a State Legislature. Mr. Palkhivala points out that the freedom of the Press, for instance, can be destroyed under Article 31-C as the respondents claim the right to nationalise any industrial or economic activity. Moreover, a person can be put in prison for commending a policy contrary to the Government's policy. Such legislation cannot be challenged as Article 19 (1) (a) will not apply and Art. 21 permits deprivation of personal liberty according to procedure established by law. The case in the State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, (1951) SCR 682 = (AIR 1951 SC 318) is in point. Commending the use of an intoxicant had been made an offence. It was struck down by this Court as violative of Article 19 (1) (a). If Article 31-C is constitutional, such a provision made in a law enacted under it relation to matters falling within Article 39 (a) and (b) would be valid. As a matter of fact no cogent or convincing explanation has been given as to why it was necessary to take away all the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 and for the abrogation of the prized right of equality under Article 14 of which has been described as the basic principle of republicanism. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (per Patanjali Sastri, C. J.), 1952 SCR 284 at p. 293. (Ibid p. 313 Mahajan, J.) =

(AIR 1952 SC 75). This Article combines the English doctrine of the rule of law and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the American Constitution. Basheshar Nath v. Commr. of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan, (per Das, C. T.), (1959) Supp 1 SCR 528 at p. 551= (AIR 1959 SC 149! It follows, therefore' that Article 31-C impinges with full force on several fundamental rights which are enabled to be abrogated by the Parliament and the State Legislatures. 617. As regards the question of delegation of amending power, it is noteworthy that no amendment has been made in Article 368 itself to enable delegation of constituent power. The delegation of such power to the State Legislatures, in particular, involves serious consequences. It is well settled that one legislature cannot create another legislative body. This has been laid down very clearly in two decisions of the Privy Council. In the Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 AC 935 = (AIR 1919 PC 145), which has already been discussed by us no doubt was entertained that a body that had the power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it, even though, the power was so ample as that enjoyed by a provincial legislature in Canada, could not create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owed it; own existence. Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney General of Canada, 1951 Can LR 31 is another direct authority for the view that the Parliament of Canada or any of the legislatures could not abdicate their powers and invest for the purpose of legislation bodies, which by the very terms of the British North American Act were not empowered to accept such delegation and to legislate on such matters. The distinction made by counsel on behalf of the respondents and the cases relied on by them have been fully discussed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and we need not go over the same ground. 618. The only way in which the Constitution can be amended, apart from Articles 4, 169 and the relevant paras in Schedules V and VI of the Constitution, is by the procedure laid down by Article 368. If that is the only procedure prescribed, it is not possible to understand how by ordinary laws the Parliament or the State Legislatures can amend the Constitution, particularly, when Article 368 does not contemplate any other mode of amendment or the setting up of another body to amend the Constitution. The other difficulty which immediately presents itself while examining Article 31-C is the effect of the declaration provided for in the Article. It is possible to fit in the scheme of Article 31C any @page-SC1609 kind of social or economic legislation. If, the courts are debarred from going into the question whether the laws enacted are meant to give effect to the policy set out in Article 39 (b) and (c), the Court will be precluded from enquiring even into the incidental encroachment on rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 31. This is not possible with regard to laws enacted under Article 31-A. Those laws can be sustained if they in. fringe the aforesaid Articles only to the extent necessary for giving effect to them. Although on behalf of the respondents it is said that the Court can examine whether there is any nexus between the laws made under Article 31-C and Article 39 (b) and (c), there would hardly be any law which can be held to have no nexus with Article 39 (b) and (c), the ambit of which is so wide. 619. The essential distinction between Articles 31-A and 31-C is that the former is limited to specified topics; whereas the latter does not give the particular subjects but leaves it to the legislatures to select any topic that may purport to have some nexus with the

objectives in Article 39 (b) and (c). In other words, Article 31-C deals with objects with unlimited scope. 620. The arguments that Article 31-C- lifts the ban placed on State Legislature and Parliament under Articles 14, 19 and 31 and further that it may be considered as an amendment of Art. 368, have been discussed by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment delivered today and we adopt, with respect, his reasoning for repelling them. 621. In our judgment Article 31-C suffers from two kinds of vices which seriously affect its validity. The first is that it enables total abrogation of fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 19 and 31 and, secondly, the power of amendment contained in Article 368 is of special nature which has been exclusively conferred on the Parliament and can be exercised only in the manner laid down in that Article. It was never intended that the same could be delegated to any other legislature including the State Legislatures. 622. The purpose sought to be achieved by Article 31-C may be highly laudable as pointed out by the learned Solicitor General, but the same must be achieved by appropriate laws which can be constitutionally upheld. We have no option, in view of what has been said except to hold that the validity of Article 31-C cannot be sustained. 623. The last matter for determination is the validity of the 29th Amendment Act, 1972. The challenge is only against the inclusion of two Acts, namely, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1969 and a similar Kerala Act of 1971 in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. 624. The main argument on behalf of the petitioners has been confined to the relationship between Article 31-A and Article 31-B. It has been contended that Article 31-B is intimately linked with Article 31-A and, therefore, only those legislative enactments which fall under Article 31-A can be included in the 9th Schedule under Article 31-B. This matter is no longer open to argument as the same stands settled by a series of decisions of this Court. See 1952 SCR 889 = (AIR 1952 SC 257); Visweshwar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1020 = (AIR 1952 SC 252) and N. B. Jeejeebhoy v. Asst. Collector, Thana, (1965) 1 SCR 636 = (AIR 1965 SC 1096). In all these cases it was held that Article 31-B was independent of Article 31-A. A matter which has been settled for all these years cannot be re-opened now. It will still be open, however, to the Court to decide whether the Acts which were included in the Ninth Schedule by 29th Amendment Act or any provision thereof abrogates any of the basic elements of the constitutional structure or denudes them of their identity. Our conclusions may be summarised as follows : 1. The decision in Golak Nath has become academic, for even if it be assumed that the majority judgment that the word law' in Article 13 (2), covered constitutional amendments was not correct, the result on the questions, wider than those raised in Golak Nath, now raised before us would be just the same. 2. The discussion on the 24th Amendment leads to the result that (a) the said amendment does no more than to clarify in express language that which was implicit in the unamended Article 368 and that it does not or cannot add to the power originally conferred thereunder; (b) though the power to amend cannot be narrowly construed and extends to all the Articles it is not unlimited so as to include the power to abrogate or @page-SC1610 change the identity of the Constitution or its basic features;

(c) even if the amending power includes the power to amend Article 13 (2), a question not decided in Golak Nath, the power is not so wide so as to include the power to abrogate or take away the fundamental freedoms; and (d) the 24th Amendment Act, reads as aforesaid, is valid. 3. Clause (2) of Article 31, as substituted by Section 2 of the 25th Amendment, does not abrogate any basic element of the Constitution nor does it denude it of its identity because (a) the fixation or determination of "amount" under that Article has to be based on some norm or principle which must be relevant for the purpose of arriving at the amount payable in respect of the property acquired or requisitioned; (b) the amount need not be the market value but it should have a reasonable relationship with the value of such property; (c) the amount should neither be illusory nor fixed arbitrarily; and (d) though the courts are debarred from going into the question of adequacy of the amount and would give due weight to legislative judgment, the examination of all the matters in (a), (b) and (c) above is open to judicial review. 4. As regards clause (2-B) inserted in Article 31 which makes Article 19 (1) (f) inapplicable, there is no reason to suppose that for determination of the amount on the principles laid down in the law any such procedure will be provided which will be unreasonable or opposed to the rules of natural justice. 5. On the above view Section 2 of the 25th Amendment is valid. 6. The validity of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment which introduced Article 31-C in the Constitution cannot be sustained because the said Article suffers from two vices. The first is that it enables abrogation of the basic elements of the Constitution inasmuch as the fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 19 and 31 can be completely taken away and, secondly, the power of amendment contained in Article 368 is of a special nature which has been exclusively conferred on Parliament and can be exercised only in the manner laid down in that Article. The same could not be delegated to any other legislature in the country. Section 3, therefore, must be declared to be unconstitutional and invalid. 7. The 29th Amendment is valid. However, the question whether the Acts included in the Ninth Schedule by that amendment or any provision of those Acts abrogates any of the basic elements of the constitutional structure or denudes them of their identity will have to be examined when the validity of those Acts comes up for consideration. 625. The petitions are remitted to the Constitution Bench to be decided in accordance with this judgment and the law. The Constitution Bench will also decide the validity of the 26th Amendment in the light of our judgment. HEGDE AND MUKHERJEA, JJ. 626. In these writ petitions questions of great constitutional importance have arisen for consideration. Herein we are called upon to decide the constitutional validity of the 24th, 25th, 26th and 29th Amendments to the Constitution. We have had the advantage of hearing long and illuminating arguments covering over 65 working days. We have been referred to numerous decisions of this Court and of the Courts in England, United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Ireland and Ceylon. Our attention has also been invited to various writings of jurists, present and past, of several countries. For paucity of time, we have not taken up the question of the validity of the 26th Amendment. That question can be conveniently considered later after this bench decides certain fundamental questions of law arising for decision. For the same

reason we have also refrained from going into the merits of various writ petitions at this stage. At present we are merely deciding the scope and validity of the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments to the Constitution. 627. In order to decide the validity of the Amendments referred to earlier, it is necessary to go into the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under Article 368 of the Constitution as it stood prior to its amendment by the 24th Amendment Act which came into force on November 5, 1971. Article 868 is the only article found in Part XX of the Constitution. The title of that part is "Amendment of the Constitution" Its marginal note as it originally stood read "Procedure for amendment of the Constitution". The Article read thus: "An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction @pageSC1611 of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority, of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill : Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in(a) Article 54, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or (b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI or (c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or (d) the representation of States in Parliament or (e) the provisions of this article, the amendment' shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent." 628. The petitioners' learned Counsel, Mr. Palkhivala, advanced twofold arguments as to the scope of that Article. His first contention was that in the exercise of its powers under Article 368 as it stood before its amendment, it was impermissible for Parliament to take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. His second and more comprehensive argument was that the power conferred on the Parliament under Art. 368 did not permit it to damage or destroy any of the basic or fundamental features or essential elements of the Constitution. The arguments on these two aspects naturally ran into each other. But for a proper legal approach, it is necessary to keep them apart as far as possible. Hence while considering the correctness of the first contention, we shall not take into consideration the importance of the Fundamental Rights. On this aspect, our approach to Article 368 will be purely based on the language of Article 368 and Article 13. The importance or transcendental character of the Fundamental Rights as well as the implied or inherent limitations on the amending power, if any will be considered while dealing with the second of the two alternative contentions advanced by Mr. Palkhivala. 629. We shall first take up the question whether by the exercise of the power of amendment conferred by Article 368, as it originally stood, Parliament could have taken away any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III. According to Mr. Palkhivala, Article 368 as it stood before its amendment merely laid down the procedure for amendment; the power to amend the Constitution must be found somewhere else in the Constitution; the power to be exercised by Parliament under Article 368 is legislative in character and the resulting product is 'law'; hence such a law in view of Article 13(2)

which says "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void," cannot validly take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights. He further contended that the word 'law' in Article l3 (I) means and includes not merely legislative enactments but also constitutional measures. The Counsel urged, there is no reason why a different meaning should be given to the word 'law' in Article 13 (2). A more important argument of his was that the power to amend the Constitution, even if, it is assumed to be contained in Article 368, is by no means an exclusive power because in certain respects and subject to certain conditions, the Constitution can also be amended by Parliament by a simple majority by enacting a law in the same manner as other legislative measures are enacted. In this connection he drew our attention to Articles 4,169, Paragraph 7 of the Vth Schedule and Paragraph 21 of the VIth Schedule. Counsel urged that if the amendment of the provisions of the Constitution referred to therein is considered as the exercise of constituent power and consequently such an amendment is not a "law" within the meaning of that expression in Article 13, then Parliament by a simple majority of the members present and voting (if the rule regarding the quorum is satisfied) can take away or abridge any of the Fundamenta1 Rights of certain sections of the public in this country. 630. On the other hand, the learned Attorney General, the learned Advocate-General for the State of Maharashtra, appearing for the State of Kerala @page-SC1612 and the other Counsel appearing for the various States contended that a plain reading of Article 368 shows that the power to amend the Constitution as well as the procedure of amendment are both contained in that Article; once the form and the manner laid down in that Article have been complied with, the result is the amendment of the Constitution. According to them, the expression "an amendment of this Constitution" in Article 368 means an amendment of each and every provision or part of the Constitution; once the form and manner provided in Article 368 have been complied with, the amended Article is as effective as the original Article itself; and, therefore, as in the case of original Article, the validity of the amended Article also cannot be challenged. They further contended that 'law' in Article 13 means only legislative enactments or ordinances, or orders or bye-laws or rules or regulations or notifications or customs or usages having the force of law in the territory of India and that expression does not include a constitutional law, though in a comprehensive sense, a constitutional law is also a law. They further contended that the word 'law' in Article 13 must be harmoniously construed with Art. 368 and, if it is so construed, there is no room for doubt that the expression 'law' in Article 13 does not include a constitutional law. They repudiated the contention of Mr. Palkhivala that there was any constitutional law as such in force when the Constitution came into force. Hence according to them the expression law' in Article 13 (2) does not take in the amendment of the Constitution. According to them, laws enacted under Article 4, Article 169, Paragraph 7 of Schedule V and Paragraph 21 of Schedule VI are not to be deemed as amendments to the Constitution as is laid down in those provisions, though in fact they do amend the Constitution in certain respects and they are no different from the other legislative measures enacted by Parliament; hence the laws enacted under those provisions cannot take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights. We have now to see which one of these lines of reasoning is acceptable.

631. The question whether Fundamental Rights can be abridged by Parliament by the exercise of its power under Article 368 in accordance with the procedure laid down therein came up for consideration before this Court very soon after the Constitution came into force. The validity of the Constitution (1st Amendment) Act, 1951 came up for the consideration of this Court in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458). In that case the scope of Article 368 vis-a-vis Article 13 (2) was debated. This Court rejecting the contention of the petitioners that it was impermissible for Parliament to abridge any of the Fundamental Rights under Article 368, held that "although law' must ordinarily include constitutional law, there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law which is made in exercise of legislative power, and constitutional law, which is made in exercise of constituent power." This Court held that "in the context of Article 13, 'law' must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power, with the result that Article 13 (2) does not affect the amendments made under Article 368". In that case this Court also opined that the power to amend the Constitution was explicitly conferred on Parliament by Article 368 and the requirement of a different majority was merely procedural. It rejected the contention that Article 368 is a complete code by itself and upheld the contention of the Government that while acting under Article 368, Parliament can adopt the procedures to be adopted, except to the extent provided in Article 368, in enacting other legislative measures. 632. The power of Parliament to abridge Fundamental Rights under Article 368 was again considered by this Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 SCR 933 = (AIR 1965 SC 845). In that case two questions were considered viz., (1) Whether the amendment of the Constitution in so far as it purported to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution was within the prohibition of Article 13 (2), and (2) Whether Articles 31-A and 31-B (as amended by the 17th Amendment Act) sought to make changes in Article 132, Article 136 and Article 226 or any of the Lists in the VIIth Schedule and therefore conditions prescribed in the proviso to Art. 368 had to be satisfied. It is clear from the judgment of the Court that the first question was not debated @page-SC1613 before the Court though the majority Judges as well as the minority Judges did consider that question evidently without any assistance from the bar. On both those questions Chief Justice Gajendragadkar speaking for himself and Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal, JJ., concurred with the view taken by this Court in Sankari Prasad's case. But Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) and Mudholkar, J., doubted the correctness of that decision on the first question but concurred with the view taken by the majority of Judges on the second question. Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ., agreed in dismissing the writ petitions as the petitioners had not challenged the correctness of the decision of this Court in Sanksri Prasad's case on the first question. 633. The question whether any of the Fundamental Rights can be abridged or taken away by Parliament in exercise of its power under Article 368 again came up for consideration before this Court in I. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 = (AIR 1967 SC 1643). This case was heard by Full Court of eleven Judges. In that case by a majority of six to five this Court came to the conclusion that Sankari Prasad's case as well as Sajjan Singh's case were not correctly decided. The majority held that the expression 'law' in Article 13 (2) includes constitutional amendments as well. The minority agreeing with the earlier decisions held that the expression law' in Article 13 (2) does not include

constitutional amendments. Five of the majority Judges namely Subba Rao, C. J., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ., held that Article 368 in terms only prescribed the various steps in the matter of amendment and that the Article assumes the existence of the power to amend somewhere else in the Constitution.. According to them the mere completion of the procedural steps mentioned in Article 368 cannot bang about a valid amendment of the Constitution. In their opinion, the power to amend cannot be implied from Article 368. They declined to infer such a Power by implication in Article 368 as they thought it was not necessary since Parliament has under Article 248 read with Item 97 of List I of the VIIth Schedule plenary power to make any law including the law to amend the Constitution subject to the limitations contained therein. They observed that the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution may be derived from Article 245, Article 246 and Article 248 read with Item 97 of List I. The remaining six Judges held that the power of amendment is not derived from Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I of the VII Schedule. Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) and Bhargava, Mitter and Bachawat, JJ., held that the power to amend is to be found in Article 368 and Ramaswami, J., held that Article 368 confers on Parliament the right (power) to amend the Constitution. Hidayatullah, J. (as he there was) held that Article 368 outlines a process, which, if followed strictly, results in the amendment of the Constitution, that article gives the power to no particular person or persons, and that the power of amendment, if it can be called a power at all, is a legislative power but it is sui generis and exists outside the three Lists in Schedule VII of the Constitution. This reasoning of Hidayatullah, J., may be reasonably read to suggest that the power of amendment is necessarily implied m Article 368. The majority of the Judges who held that it was impermissible for Parliament to take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights by an amendment of the Constitution did not proceed to strike down the 1st, 4th and 17th Amendments. Five of them relied on the doctrine of "Prospective Overruling" (Subba Rao, C. J., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.) and Hidayatullah, J., relied on the doctrine of acquiescence to save those amendments. Evidently in an attempt to get over the effect of the decision in Golak Nath's case, Parliament has enacted the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, and the same has been ratified by more than one half of the Legislatures of the States. 634. Now, turning back to the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, we shall first deal with the contention of the Union and some of the States that once the "form and manner" prescribed in Article 368 are complied with, the Constitution stands amended and thereafter the validity of the amendment is not open to challenge. This contention does not appear to be a tenable one. Before a Constitution can be validly amended, two requirements must be satisfied. Firstly, there must be the power to amend the provision sought to be amended; and secondly, the "form and the manner" prescribed in Article must be satisfied. If the power to amend the Article is wanting, the fact that @pageSC1614 Parliament has adhered to the form and manner prescribed in Article 368 becomes immaterial. Hence the primary question is whether Parliament has power to abridge or take away any of the Fundamental Rights prescribed in Part III of the Constitution? 635. In order to find out whether Parliament has the power to take away or abridge any of the Fundamental Rights in exercise of its power under Article 368, we must first ascertain the true scope of that Article. As seen earlier in Sankari Prasad's case this Court ruled that the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Article 368. The same view was

taken by the majority of Judges in Sajjan Singh's case as well as in Golak Nath's case. We respectfully hold that view to tee the correct view. As mentioned earlier, Part XX of the Constitution which purports to deal with amendment of the Constitution contains only one Article, i.e., Art. 368. The title of that Part is "Amendment of the Constitution". The fact that a separate part of the Constitution is reserved for the amendment of the Constitution is a circumstance of great significance - see Don John Francis Douglas Liyanage v. The Queen, (1967) 1 AC 259 at p. 287 and State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, 1958 SCR 533 = (AIR 1957 SC 912). The provisions relating to the amendment of the Constitution are some of the most important features of any modern Constitution. All modern Constitutions assign an important place to the amending provisions. It is difficult to accept the view expressed by Subba Rao, C. J. and the learned Judges who agreed with him that the power to amend the Constitution is not to be found even by necessary implication in Article 368 but must be found elsewhere. In their undoubtedly difficult task of finding out that power elsewhere they had to fall back on Entry 97 of List I, Lists I to III of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution merely divide the topics of legislation among the Union and the States. It is obvious that these Lists have been very carefully prepared. They are by and large exhaustive. Entry 97 in List I was included to meet some unexpected and unforeseen contingencies. It is difficult to believe that our Constitution-makers who were keenly conscious of the importance of the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution and debated that question for several days, would have left this important power hidden in Entry 97 of List I leaving it to the off chance of the courts locating that power in that Entry. We are unable to agree with those learned Judges when they sought to place reliance on Article 245, Article 246 and Article 248 and Entry 97 of List I for the purpose of locating the power of amendment in the residuary power conferred on the Union. Their reasoning in that regard fails to give due weight to the fact that the exercise of the power under those articles is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." Hardly few amendments to the Constitution can be made subject to the existing provisions of the Constitution. Most amendments of the Constitution must necessarily impinge on one or the other of the existing provisions of the Constitution. We have no doubt in our minds that Article 245 to Article 248 as well as the Lists in the VIIth Schedule merely clear with the legislative power and not with the amending power. 636. Now coming back to Article 368, it may be noted that it has three components, firstly, it deals with the amendment of the Constitution secondly, it designates the body or bodies which can amend the Constitution, and lastly, it prescribes the form and the manner in which the amendment of the Constitution can be effected. The Article does not expressly confer power to amend; the power is necessarily implied in the Article. The Article makes it clear that the amendment of the Constitution can only be made by Parliament but in cases falling under the proviso, ratification by legislatures of not less than one half of the States is also necessary. That Article stipulates various things. To start with, the amendment to the Constitution must be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for that purpose in either House of Parliament. It must then be passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting and if the amendment seeks to make any change in the provisions mentioned in the proviso, it must be ratified by not less than one-half of the State Legislatures. Thereafter, it should be presented to the

President for his assent. It further says that upon such assent being given to the Bill "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance @page-SC1615 with the terms of the. Bill. To restate the position Article 368 deals with the amendment of the Constitution. The Article contains both the power and the procedure for amending the Constitution. No undue importance should be attached to the marginal note which says "Procedure for amendment of the Constitution". Marginal note plays a very little part in the construction of a statutory provision. It should have much less importance in construing a constitutional provision. The language of Article 368 to our mind is plain and unambiguous. Hence we need not call into aid any of the rules of construction about which there was great deal of debate at the hearing. As the power to amend under the Article as it originally stood was only implied, the marginal note rightly referred to the procedure of amendment. The reference to the procedure in the marginal note does not negative. the existence of the power implied in the Article. 637. The next question is whether the power conferred under Art. 368 is available for amending each and every provision of the Constitution. The Article opens by saying "An amendment of this Constitution" which means an amendment of each and every provision and part of the Constitution. We find nothing in that Article to restrict its scope. If we read Article 368 by it self, there can be no doubt that the power of amendment implied in that Article can reach each and every Article as well as every part of the Constitution. 638. Having ascertained the true scope of Article 368, let us now turn to Article 13. A great deal of reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the expression 'law' found in Article 13 (l) and (2). As seen earlier, the two Judges in Sajjan Singh's case as well as the majority of Judges in Golak Nath's case opined that 'law' in Art. 13 (2) also includes constitutional law i.e., and we see no substance in the contention that the amendment of a Constitution is not law'. The Constitution is amended by enacting Amendment Acts. The Constitution is not only a law hut the paramount law of the country. An amendment of that law must necessarily be a law. The fact that the word law' is not used in Article 368 is of little significance. For that matter Article 110 also does not provide that a Bill when assented to by the President becomes law. The amend ment of a Constitution is initiated by a Bill and it goes through the procedure laid down in Article 368 supplemented wherever necessary by the procedure prescribed in Article 107: see Sankari Prasad's case. The Hill when passed by both the Houses of Parliament and, in matters coming under the proviso to Article 368, after securing the necessary ratification by the State legislatures, is presented to the President for his assent. The procedure adopted is the same as that adopted in enacting an ordinary statute except to the extent provided in Article 368. Even if it had been different, there can be hardly any doubt that the amendment of a Constitution is law'. In Sankari Prasad's case, Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court had no doubt in ruling that the expression 'law' must ordinarily include constitutional law: The same view was taken by all the Judges in Sajjan Singh's case and also by most of the Judges in Golak Nath's cases. 639. But the question still remains whether our Constitution makers by using the expression 'law' in Article 13 (2) intended that, that expression should also include the exercise of Parliament's amending power under Article 368. We have earlier explained the scope and extent of Article 368. In understanding the meaning of the word 'law' in Article 13(2) we should bear in mind the scope of Article 368. The two Articles will have

to be construed harmoniously. The expression 'law' may mean one of two things, namely, either those measures which are enumerated in Article 13 (3) as well as statutes passed by legislatures or in addition thereto constitutional laws (amendments) as well. In this connection reference may be made to a passage in Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. XVI Title Constitutional Law Article I, p. 20), which says: ''The term 'Constitution' is ordinarily employed to designate the organic law in contradistinction to the term 'law' which is generally used to designate statutes or legislative enactments. Accordingly, the term 'law' under this distinction does not include a constitutional amendment. However, the term 'law' may, in accordance with the context in which it is used, comprehend or include the constitution or, a constitutional provision or amendment." 640. It is true that Article l3 (3) contains an inclusive definition of the @page-SC1616 term 'law' and therefore, the question whether it includes constitutional amendment also cannot be answered with reference to that clause. All the same, since the expression 'law' can have two meanings, as mentioned earlier, we must take that meaning which harmonises with Article 368. As mentioned earlier, Article 368 is unambiguous, whereas Article 13 is ambiguous because of the fact that the word 'law' may or may not include constitutional amendment. Further, when we speak of 'law' we ordinarily refer to the exercise of legislative power. Hence, law' in Article 13 (2) must be construed as referring to the exercise of an ordinary legislative power. 641. An examination of the various provisions of our Constitution shows that it has made a distinction between "the Constitution" and "the laws". The two are invariably, treated separately - see Articles 60, 61, proviso to Article 73 (1), Article 75 (4) read with the Third Schedule, Article 76 (2); Article 124 (6) read with the Third Schedule, Article 148 (5), Article 159 and Article 219 read with the Third Schedule. These provisions clearly establish that the Constitution makers have not used the expression 'law' in the Constitution as including constitutional law. 642. Mr. Palkhivala contended that the term 'law' in Article 13 (1) includes constitutional law also. Wanchoo, J., speaking for himself and on behalf of two other Judges in Golak Nath's case held that on the day the Constitution came into force, no constitutional law was in force. Therefore in his view, the term law' in Article 13 (1) can only refer to legislative measures or ordinances or byelaws, rules, regulations, notifications, customs and usages. Mr. Palkhivala contended that the said finding is not correct. In that connection he referred to the treaties and agreements entered into between the former Rulers of the Indian States and the Central Government as well as to certain other measures which were in force when the Constitution came into force which, according to him, are 'constitutional laws' and, on that basis, he contended that certain constitutional laws were in force on the day when the Constitution came into force. We are not satisfied that this contention is correct. Under Article 395 the Indian Independence Act, 1947 as well as the Government of India Act, 1935, were repealed. The laws which were continued under Article 372 after the Constitution came into force did not operate on their own strength. For their validity they had to depend on Article 372 and that Article made it clear that those laws will continue to be in force "subject to the other provisions of the Constitution". Anyway it is not necessary to decide the question whether those laws are constitutional laws. Article 13 (1) does not refer to laws' as such. It refers to 'laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution". It

identifies certain laws and determines the extent of their validity. The scope of Article 13 (1) does not bear on the interpretation of the expression law' in Article 13 (2). 643. We shall now examine the contention of Mr. Palkhivala based on Articles 4, 169, Paragraph 7 of Schedule V and Paragraph 21 of Schedule VI. He contended and we have no doubt that he did so rightly, - that the Constitution can be amended not only under Article 568 but also under Article 4, Article 169, Paragraph 7 of Schedule V and Paragraph 21 of Schedule VI. Amendments under these provisions can be effected by Parliament by a simple majority vote of the members present in the House and voting, if the prescribed quorum is there. If the two Houses do not agree on any amendment under those provisions, the same has to be decided by a joint sitting of the two Houses as provided in Article 108. That is because of the express exclusion of the application of Article 368 to the amendments made under those provisions. According to Mr. Palkhivala, by the exercise of its power under the aforementioned provisions, Parliament can in certain respects take away or abridge the Fundamental Rights of a section of the people of this country. He painted a gloomy picture as to what can happen by the exercise of power by Parliament under those provisions. It is true that the power conferred under the aforementioned provisions is amending power but those provisions make it clear that the exercise of the power under those provisions shall not be "deemed to be the amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368". 644. This brings us to a consideration, what exactly is the intent of the expression "No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of @page-SC1617 this Constitution for the purpose of Article 368". There can be little doubt that these words merely mean that the form and manner prescribed in Article 368 need not be complied with. Once this position is accepted, any law made under those provisions takes the character of an ordinary law and that law becomes subject to the other provisions of the Constitution including Article 13 (2). 645. Counsel on either side took us though the debates of the Constituent Assembly relating to Article 368. Naturally each one of them relied on those passages from the speeches of the various members who took part in the debate and, in particular, on the speeches of late Prime Minister Nehru and the then Law Minister Dr. Ambedkar, which supported their contention. Having gone through those speeches, we feel convinced that no conclusive inference can be drawn from those speeches as to the intention of those speakers. Hence, we need not go into the question at this stage whether it is permissible for us to place reliance on those speeches for finding out the true scope of Article 368. 646. Mr. Palkhivala placed a great deal of reliance on the stages through which the present Article 13 passed. It is seen from the Constituent Assembly records that when the Constituent Assembly was considering the provision which resulted in Article 13 (2), Mr. Santhanam one of the members of the Constituent Assembly moved an amendment to make it clear that the expression 'law' in Article 13 (2) does not include an amendment of the Constitution under draft Article 304 (present Article 868) and that the amendment was accepted by Sardar Patel, Chairman of the Advisory Committee. On the basis of that decision, Sir B. N. Rau, the Constitutional Adviser redrafted the concerned provision by specifically excluding from its operation amendments of the Constitution. When this matter went before the Drafting Committee consisting of eminent lawyers, they redrafted the clause thus:

"The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of contravention be void." 647. In other words, the drafting committee deleted from Sir B. N. Rau's draft those words which specifically excluded from the operation of the clause amendments of the Constitution. From these circumstances, Mr. Palkhivala seeks to draw the inference that the Constituent Assembly finally decided to bring within the scope of Article 13 (2) constitutional amendments also. We are unable to accept this contention. It is not clear why the drafting committee deleted the reference to the amendment of the Constitution in Article 13 (2). It is possible that they were of the opinion that in view of the plain language of the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution i.e., draft Article 304, it was unnecessary to provide in Art. 13 (2) that the amendment of the Constitution does not come within its scope. 648. It is true that this Court has characterised the Fundamental rights as "paramount" in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 at p. 198 = (AIR 1950 SC 27) as "sacrosanct" in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951 SCR 525 = (AIR 1951 SC 226) as "rights reserved by the people" in Pandu M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha (1959) Supp 1 SCR806 = (AIR 1959 SC 395) as "inalienable and inviolable" in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U. P., (1963) 1 SCR 778 = (AIR l962 SC 1621) and as "transcendental" in several other cases. In so describing the Fundamental Rights in those cases, this Court could not have intended to say that the Fundamental Rights alone are the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution. Mr. Palkhivala conceded that the basic elements and fundamental features of the Constitution are found not merely in Part III of the Constitution but they are spread out in various other parts of the Constitution. They are also found in some of the Directive Principles set out in Part IV of the Constitution and in the provisions relating to the sovereignty of the country, the Republication and the Democratic character of the Constitution. According to the Counsel, even the provisions relating to the unity of the country are basic elements of the Constitution. 649. It was urged that since even amendment of several provisions of minor significance requires the concurrence of the legislatures of the majority of the States it is not likely that the Constitution makers would have made the amendment of the provisions relating to Fundamental Rights a plaything of the @page-SC1618 Parliament. This argument, however, does not lead to any definite conclusion. It is not unlikely that the Constitution makers thought that the states are specially interested in the provisions mentioned in the proviso to Article 368, so that the amendment of those provisions should require ratification by the legislatures of majority of the States. When the language of Article 368 is plain, as we think it is, no question of construction of that Article arises. There is no need to delve into the intention of the Constitution makers. 650. Every Constitution is expected to endure for a long time. Therefore, it must necessarily be elastic. It is not possible to place the society in a straitjacket. The society grows, its requirements change. The Constitution and the laws may have to be changed to suit those needs. No single generation can bind the course of the generations to come. Hence every Constitution wisely drawn up provides for its own amendment. We shall separately consider the contention of Mr. Palkhivala that our Constitution embodies certain features which are so basic that no free and civilised society can afford to discard

them and in no foreseeable future can those features become irrelevant in this country. For the present we shall keep apart, for later consideration, Mr. Palkhivala's contention that the Parliament which is only a constituted body cannot damage or destroy the essential features of the Constitution. Uptil now we have merely confined our attention to the question as to the scope and reach of Article 368. This Court has always attached great importance to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under our Constitution. It has given no less importance to some of the Directive Principles set out in Part IV. The Directive Principles embodied in Part IV of the Constitution or at any rate most of them are as important as the rights of individuals. To quote the words of Granville Austin (The Indian Constitution - Corner Stone of a Nation, page 50): "The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document. The majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of social revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement yet despite the permeation of the entire Constitution by the aim of national renaissance the core of the commitment to the social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. These are the conscience of the Constitution." Therefore to implement the duties imposed on the State under Part IV, it may be necessary to abridge in certain respects the rights conferred on the citizens or individuals under Part III, as in the case of incorporation of clause 4 in Article 15 to benefit the backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the amendment of Article 19 (2) with a view to maintain effectively public order and friendly relations with foreign States. Hence we are unable to construe the amending power in a narrow or pedantic manner. That power, under any circumstance, must receive a broad and liberal interpretation. How large it should be is a question that requires closer examination. Both on principle as well as on the language of Article 368, we are unable to accede to the contention that no right guaranteed by Part III can be abridged. 651. This Court is always reluctant to overrule its earlier decisions. There must be compelling reasons for overruling an earlier decision of this Court. As seen earlier, there are already conflicting decisions as to the scope of Article 368. As far back as 1951, in Sankari Prasad's case this Court took the view that the power of amendment conferred under Article 368 included within itself the power to abridge and take away the Fundamental Rights incorporated in Part III of the Constitution. The correctness of that view was not challenged in several other decisions. The same view was taken in Sajjan Singh's case. That view was negatived in Golak Nath's case by a very narrow majority. Bearing in mind the disastrous effect that decision would have had on many important laws that had been enacted by the Union and the States between the years 1951 to 1967, this Court by relying on the doctrine of prospective overruling and the doctrine of acquiescence did not invalidate those laws. 652. One other circumstance of great significance is that the 1st Amendment to the Constitution was carried out by the provisional Parliament which consisted of the very members who were the members of the Constituent Assembly. It should be remembered that members of the Constituent Assembly continued as the members of the provisional @page-SC1619 Parliament till the General Election in 1952. They must have been aware of the intention with which Article 368 was enacted. These are important circumstances. The interpretation we place on a constitutional provision, particularly on a provision of such great importance as Article 368 must subserve national interest. It must be such as to

further the objectives intended to be achieved by the Constitution and to effectuate the philosophy underlying it. To quote the memorable words of Chief Justice Marshall we must not forget that we are expounding a Constitution. 653. We now come to the second contention of Mr. Palkhivala that the word 'amendment' has a limited meaning and Article 368 does not permit any damage to or destruction of the basic or fundamental features or essential elements of the Constitution. Mr. Palkhivala urged that the word "amendment" or "amend" ordinarily means 'to make certain changes or effect some improvements in a text'. Those words do not, according to him, except under special circumstances mean the widest power to make any and every change in a document, including a power to abrogate or repeal the basic features of that document. The same, he contended, is true of a power to amend a statute or a Constitution. In support of his contention, he invited our attention to the various meanings given to the word "amendment" or "amend" in several dictionaries. He further urged that in construing the meaning of the word "amendment" in Article 368, we must take into consideration the donee to whom the power to amend the Constitution is granted, the atmosphere in which the Constitution came to be enacted, the consequences of holding that power is unlimited in scope as well as the scheme of the Constitution. He urged that in the final analysis, the duty of the Court is to find out the true intention of the founding fathers and therefore the question before us is whether the founding fathers intended to confer on Parliament, a body constituted under the Constitution, power to damage or destroy the very basis on which our Constitution was erected. On the other hand it was contended on behalf of the Union of India, State of Kerala as well as the other States that the power of amendment conferred under Article 368 is of the widest amplitude. It brooks no limitation. It is a power which can be used to preserve the Constitution, to destroy the Constitution and to re-create a new Constitution. It was contended that the society can never be static, social ideals and political and economic theories go on changing and every Constitution in order to preserve itself needs to be changed now and then to keep in line with the growth of the society. It was further contended that no generation can impose its will permanently on the future generations. Wise as our founding fathers were, wisdom was not their sole monopoly. They themselves realised it. They knew that in a changing world, there can be nothing permanent and, therefore, in order to attune the Constitution to the changing concepts of politics, economics and social ideas, they provided in Article 368 a machinery which is neither too flexible nor too rigid and makes it possible to so reshape the Constitution as to meet the requirements of the time. According to them by following the form and manner prescribed in Article 368, Parliament can exercise the same power which the Constituent Assembly could have exercised. We have now to consider which one of the two contentions is acceptable. 654. While interpreting a provision in a statute or Constitution the primary duty of the court is to find out the legislative intent. In the present case our duty is to find out the intention of the founding fathers in enacting Article 368. Ordinarily the legislative intent is gathered from the language used. If the language employed is plain and unambiguous, the same must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences that may arise. But if the language employed is reasonably capable of more meanings then one, then the Court will have to call into aid various well settled rules of construction and, in particular, the history of the legislation-to find out the evil that was sought to be remedied and also in some cases the underlying purpose of the legislation - the legislative scheme and the

consequences that may possibly flow from accepting one or the other of the interpretations because no legislative body is presumed to confer a power which is capable of misuse. 655. It was conceded at the bar that generally speaking, the word "amendment" like most words in English or for that matter in any language, has @page-SC1620 no precise meaning. Unlike "sale" or "excise", it is not a term of law. It is capable of receiving a wide meaning as well as a narrow meaning. The power to amend a Constitution in certain contexts may include even a power to abrogate or repeal that Constitution. It may under certain circumstances mean a power to effect changes within narrow limits. It may sometimes mean a power that is quite large but yet subject to certain limitations. To put it shortly, the word "amendment" without more, is a colourless word. It has no precise meaning. It takes its colour from the context in which it is used. It cannot be interpreted in vacuo. Few words in English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of the context. As observed by Holmes, J., in Towne v, Eisner, (1918) 245 US 418 at p. 425: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to circumstances and the time in which it is used". We must read the word "amendment" in Article 368 not in isolation but as occurring in a single complex instrument. Article 368 is a part of the Constitution. The Constitution confers various powers on legislatures as well as on other authorities. It also imposes duties on those authorities. The power conferred under Article 368 is only one such power. Unless it is plain from the constitutional scheme that the power conferred under Article 368 is a super power and is capable of destroying all other powers, as contended on behalf of the Union and the States, the various parts of the Constitution must be construed harmoniously for ascertaining the true purpose of' article 368. 656. In our Constitution unlike in the Constitution of the United States of America the words "amendment" and "amend" have been used to convey different meanings in different places. In some Articles they are used to confer a narrow power, a power merely to effect changes within prescribed limits - see Articles 4, 107 (2), 111, 169 (2), 196 (2), 197 (2) and 200. Under Paragraph 7 of the Fifth Schedule as well as Paragraph 21 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, a much larger power to amend those Schedules has been conferred on Parliament. That power includes power to amend '`by way of addition, variation or repeal". Similar is the position under the repealed Article 243 (2), Articles 252 (2) and 350 (5). It is true that the power to amend conferred under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules is merely a power to amend those Schedules but if the Constitution-makers were of the opinion that the word "amendment" or "amend" included within its scope, unless limited otherwise, a power to add, vary, or repeal, there was no purpose in mentioning in those Articles or parts "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal". In this connection it may also be remembered that the Constituent Assembly amended Section 291 of the Government of India Act, 1935 on August 21, 1949 just a few days before it approved Article 368 i.e., on September 17, 1949. The amended Section 291 empowered the Governor General to amend certain provisions of the 1935 Act "by way of addition modification or repeal". From these circumstances, there is prima facie reason to believe that our Constitution makers made a distinction between a mere power to amend and a power to amend by way of "addition, modification or repeal". It is one of the accepted rules of construction that the Courts should presume that ordinarily the

legislature uses the same words in a statute to convey the same meaning. If different words are used in the same statute, it is reasonable to assume that, unless the context otherwise indicates, the legislature intended to convey different meanings by those words. This rule of interpretation is applicable in construing a Constitution as well. 657. Now that we have come to the conclusion that the word "amendment" in Article 368 is not a word of precise import and has not been used in the various Articles and parts of the Constitution to convey always the same precise meaning, it is necessary to take the aid of the other relevant rules of construction to find out the intention of the Constitution makers. 658. The question whether there is any implied limitation on the amending power under Article 368 has not been decided by this Court till now. That question did not come up for consideration in Sankari Prasad's case. In Sajjan Singh's case neither the majority speaking through Gajendragadkar C. J. nor Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) went into that question. But Mudholkar J. did foresee the importance of that aspect. He observed in the course of his judgment; @page-SC1621 "We may also have to bear in mind the fact that ours is a written Constitution. The Constituent Assembly which was the repository of sovereignty could well have created a sovereign Parliament on the British model. But instead it enacted a written Constitution, created three organs of State, made the Union executive responsible to Parliament and the State executive to the State Legislatures, erected a federal structure and distributed legislative power between Parliament and the State Legislatures; recognised certain rights as fundamental and provided for their enforcement, prescribed forms of oaths of office or affirmations which require those who subscribe to them to owe true allegiance to the Constitution and further require the members of the Union Judiciary and of the higher judiciary in the States, to uphold the Constitution. Above all, it formulated a solemn and dignified preamble which appears to be an epitome of the basic features of the Constitution. Can it not be said that these are indicia of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution? It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368"? 659. For the first time in Golak Nath's case the contention that the power of amendment under Article 368 is subject to certain inherent and implied limitations was urged. Subba Rao, C. J., speaking for himself and four of his colleagues, while recognising the force of that contention refrained from pronouncing on the same. Wanchoo, J., (as he then was) speaking for himself and two other Judges opined that the power under Article 368 is a very wide power but it may not include a power to abrogate the Constitution. He did explain what he meant by "abrogate the Constitution". Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) did not address himself to that question. Bachawat, J., side-stepped that question by saying that the impugned amendments did not destroy any basic feature of the Constitution. The only Judge who rejected the contention that there are inherent or implied limitations on the amending power was Ramaswami, J. From the above discussion it is seen that in cases that came up for consideration before this Court in the past, several Judges did consider the possibility of having some limitation on the amending power under Article 368 though they did not definitely pronounce on that question.

660. One of the well-recognised rules of construction is the rule laid down in Heydon's case. What was the mischief that the Constitution-makers intended to remedy? What was the purpose intended to be achieved by the Constitution? To answer this question it is necessary to make a brief survey of our Nationalist movement ever since 1885 and the objectives sought to be achieved by that movement. 661. The objectives underlying our Constitution began to take their shape as a result of the forces that operated in the National struggle during the British rule when the British resorted to arbitrary acts of oppression such as brutal assaults on unarmed satyagrahis, internments, deportations, detention without trial and muzzling of the press. The harshness with which the executive operated its repressive measures strengthened the demand for constitutional guarantees of Fundamental Rights. As far back as 1895, the Constitution of India Bill, prepared by some eminent Indians, envisaged for India a Constitution guaranteeing to everyone of our citizens freedom of expression, inviolability of one's house, right to property, equality before the law, equal opportunity of admission to public offices, right to present claims, petitions and complaints and right to personal liberty. After the publication of the Montague-Chelmsford Report, the Indian National Congress at its special session held in Bombay in August 1918 demanded that the new Government of India Act should contain "Declaration of Rights of the people of India as British citizens". The proposed declaration was to embody among other things, guarantees in regard to equality before the law, protection in respect of life and liberty, freedom of speech and press and right of association. In its Delhi Session in December of the same year, the Congress passed another resolution demanding the immediate repeal of all laws, regulations and ordinances restricting the free discussion of political questions and conferring on the executive the power to arrest, detain, @page-SC1622 intern, extern or imprison any British subject in India outside the process of ordinary Civil or Criminal law and the assimilation of the law of sedition to that of England. The Commonwealth of India Bill, finalised by the National Convention in 1926 embodied a specific declaration of rights visualising for every person certain rights in terms practically identical with the relevant provisions of the Irish Constitution. The problems of minorities in India further strengthened the general argument in favour of inclusion of Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution. In its Madras Session in 1927, the Indian National Congress firmly laid down that the basis of the future Constitution must be a declaration of Fundamental Rights. In 1928, the Nehru Committee in its report incorporated a provision for enumeration of such rights, recommending their adoption as a part of the future Constitution of India. The Simon Commission rejected the demand on the plea that an abstract declaration of such rights was useless unless there existed "the will and the means to make them effective". In 1932, in its Karachi Session, the Indian National Congress reiterated its resolve to regard a written guarantee of Fundamental Rights as essential in any future constitutional set up in India. The demand for the incorporation of the Fundamental Rights in the constitutional document was reiterated by the Indian leaders at the Round Table Conferences. The Joint Select Committee of the British Parliament rejected those demands. The Sapru Committee (1944-45) was of the opinion that in the peculiar circumstances of India, the Fundamental Rights were necessary not only as assurance and guarantees to the minorities but also prescribing a standard of conduct for the legislatures, governments and the courts. The Committee felt that it was for the Constitution-making body to enumerate first the list of Fundamental Rights and

then to undertake their further division into justiciable and non-justiciable rights and provide a suitable machinery for their enforcement. 662. The atrocities committed during the Second World War and the world wide agitation for human rights, the liberties guaranteed in the Atlantic Charter, the U. N. Charter and the declaration of Human Rights by the Human Rights' Commission strengthened the demand for the incorporation of fundamental rights in our Constitution. The British Cabinet Mission in 1946 recognised the need for a written guarantee of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of India. It accordingly recommended the setting up of an advisory committee for reporting, inter alia, on Fundamental Rights. By the Objectives Resolution adopted on January 22, 1947, the Constituent Assembly solemnly pledged itself to draw up for India's future governance a Constitution wherein "shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people of India justice, social, economic and political, equality of status, of opportunity and before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action subject to law and public morality and wherein adequate safeguard would be provided for minorities, backward and tribal areas and depressed and other backward classes". The close association between political freedom and social justice has become a common concept since the French Revolution. Since the end of the first World War, it was increasingly recognised that peace in the world can be established only if it is based on social justice. The most modern Constitutions contain declaration of social and economic principles, which emphasise, among other things, the duty of the State to strive for social security and to provide work, education and proper condition of employment for its citizens. In evolving the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles, our founding fathers, in addition to the experience gathered by them from the events that took place in other parts of the World, also drew largely on their experience in the past. The Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights mainly proceed on the basis of human Rights. Representative democracies will have no meaning without economic and social justice to the common man. This is a universal experience. Freedom from foreign rule can be looked upon only as an opportunity to being about economic and social advancement. After all freedom is nothing else but a chance to be better. It is this liberty to do better that is the theme of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution. 663. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in January, 1947, is a definite landmark. It is a precursor to the preamble to our Constitution. It sets out in detail the objectives that were before our Constitution @page-SC1623 makers. Those objectives have now been incorporated in the preamble to our Constitution which reads: "WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation, IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949 do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION." 664. From the preamble it is quite clear that the two primary objectives that were before the Constituent Assembly were (1) to constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic

Republic and (2) to secure to its citizens the rights mentioned therein. Our founding fathers, at any rate, most of them had made immense sacrifices for the sake of securing those objectives. For them freedom from British Rule was an essential step to render social justice to the teeming millions in this country and to secure to one and all in this country the essential human rights. Their constitutional plan was to build a welfare state and an egalitarian society. 665. Now that we have set out the objectives intended to be achieved by our founding fathers, the question arises whether those very persons could have intended to empower the Parliament, a body constituted under the constitution to destroy the ideals that they dearly cherished and for which they fought and sacrificed. 666. If the nature of the power granted is clear and beyond doubt the fact that it may be misused is wholly irrelevant. But, if there is reasonable doubt as to the nature of the power granted then the Court has to take into consideration the consequences that might ensue by interpreting the same as an unlimited power. We have earlier come to the conclusion that the word "amendment" is not an expression having a precise connotation. It has more than one meaning. Hence it is necessary to examine the consequence of accepting the contention of the Union and the States. Therefore let us understand the consequences of conceding the power claimed. According to the Union and the States that power inter alia, includes the power to (1) destroy the sovereignty of this country and make this country a satellite of any other country, (2) substitute the democratic form of government by monarchical or authoritarian form of government; (3) break up the unity of this country and form various independent States; (4) destroy the secular character of this country and substitute the same by a theocratic form of Government; (5) abrogate completely the venous rights conferred on the citizens as well as on the minorities; (6) revoke the mandate given to the States to build a Welfare State; (7) extend the life of the two Houses of Parliament indefinitely and (8) amend the amending power in such a way as to make the Constitution legally or at any rate practically unamendable. In fact, their contention was that the legal sovereignty, in the ultimate analysis rests only in the amending power. At one stage, Counsel for the Union and the States had grudgingly conceded that the power conferred under Article 368 cannot be used to abrogate the Constitution but later under pressure of questioning by some of us they changed their position and said that by 'abrogation' they meant repeal of the Constitution as a whole. When they were asked as to what they meant by saying that the power conferred under Article 368 cannot be used to repeal the Constitution, all that they said was that while amending the Constitution, at least one clause in the Constitution must be retained though every other clause or part of the Constitution including the preamble can be deleted and some other provisions substituted. Their submission in short was this that so long as the expression the "Constitution of India" is retained, every other article or part of it can be replaced. They tried to tone down the effect of their claim by saying that, though legally, there is no limitation on the amending power, there are bound to be political compulsions which make it impermissible for Parliament to exercise its amending power in a manner unacceptable to the people at large. The strength of political reaction @page-SC1624 is uncertain. It depends upon various factors such as the political consciousness of the people, their level of education, strength of the various political organisations in the country, the manner in which the mass media is used and finally the capacity of the government to suppress agitations. Hence the peoples' will to resist an unwanted

amendment cannot be taken into consideration in interpreting the ambit of the amending power. Extralegal forces work in a different plane altogether. 667. We find it difficult to accept the contention that our Constitution makers after making immense sacrifices for achieving certain ideals made provision in the Constitution itself for the destruction of those ideals. There is no doubt as men of experience and sound political knowledge, they must have known that social, economic and political changes are bound to come with the passage of time and the Constitution must be capable of being so adjusted as to be able to respond to those new demands. Our Constitution is not a mere political document. It is essentially a social document. It is based on a social philosophy and every social philosophy like every religion has two main features, namely, basic and circumstantial. The former remains constant but the latter is subject to change. The core of a religion always remains constant but the latter is subject to change. The core of a religion always remains constant but the practices associated with it may change. Likewise, a Constitution like ours contains certain features which are so essential that they cannot be changed or destroyed. In any event it cannot be destroyed from within. In other word, one cannot legally use the Constitution to destroy itself. Under Article 368 the amended Constitution must remain 'the Constitution' which means the original Constitution. When we speak of the 'abrogation' or 'repeal' of the Constitution, we do not refer to any form but to substance. If one more of the basic features of the Constitution are taken away to that extent the Constitution is abrogated or repealed. If all the basic features of Constitution are repealed and some other provisions inconsistent with those features are incorporated, it cannot still remain the Constitution referred to in Article 368. The personality of the Constitution must remain unchanged. 668. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the power to amend the Constitution is conferred on Parliament, body constituted under the Constitution. The people as such are not associated with the amendment of the Constitution. From the preamble we get that it is the people of this country who conferred this Constitution on themselves. The statement in the preamble that the people of this country conferred the Constitution on themselves is not open to challenge before this Court. Its factual correctness cannot be gone into by this Court which again is a creature of the Constitution. The facts set out in the preamble have to be accepted by this Court as correct. Anyone who knows the composition of the Constituent Assembly can hardly dispute the claim of the members of that Assembly that their voice was the voice of the people. They were truly the representatives of the people, even though they had been elected under a narrow franchise. The Constitution framed by them has been accepted and worked by the people for the last 23 years and it is too late in the day now to question, as was sought to be done at one stage by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra, the fact that the people of this country gave the Constitution to themselves. 669. When a power to amend the Constitution is given to the people, its contents can be construed to be larger than when that power is given to a body constituted under that Constitution. Two-thirds of the members of the two Houses of Parliament need not necessarily represent even the majority of the people of this country. Our electoral system is such that even a minority of voters can elect more than two-thirds of the members of the either House of Parliament. That is seen from our experience in the past. That apart, our Constitution was framed on the basis of consensus and not on the basis of majority votes. It provides for the protection of the minorities. If the majority opinion is taken as

the guiding factor then the guarantees given to the minorities may become valueless. It is well known that the representatives of the minorities in the Constituent Assembly gave up their claim for special protection which they were demanding in the past because of the guarantee of Fundamental Rights. Therefore the contention behalf of the Union and the States that the two-thirds of the members in the two Houses of Parliament are always authorised speak on behalf of @page-SC1625 the entire people of this country is unacceptable. 670. The President of India under Article 60 of the Constitution is required to take an oath before he assumes his office to the effect that he will "to the best of his ability preserve, protect and defend the Constitution". Somewhat similar oaths have to be taken by the Governors of States, Ministers at the Centre and in the States, Judges of the superior courts and other important functionaries. When the President of India is compelled to give assent to a constitutional amendment which might destroy the basic features of the Constitution, can it be said that he is true to his oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" or does his oath merely mean that he is to defend the amending power of Parliament? Can the amending power of Parliament be considered as the Constitution? The whole scheme and the structure of our Constitution proceeds on the basis that there are certain basic features which are expected to be permanent. 671. Implied limitations on the powers conferred under a statute constitute a general feature of all statutes. The position cannot be different in the case of powers conferred under a Constitution. A grant of power in general terms or even in absolute terms may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment or may be qualified by the implications of the context or even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the statute. In Re The Central Provinces and Berar (Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938), 1939 FCR 18 = (AIR 1939 FC 1), Sir Maurice Gwyer, C. J., observed at p. 42: "A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implications of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act." 672. Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia, 1936 AC 578 at p. 613 stated the law thus: "The question, then, is one of construction, and in the ultimate resort must be determined upon the actual words used, read not in vacuo but as occurring in a single complex instrument, in which one part may throw light on another. The Constitution has been described as the federal compact, and the construction must hold a balance between all its parts." 673. Several of the powers conferred under our Constitution have bees held to be subject to implied limitations though those powers are expressed in general terms or even in absolute terms. The executive power of the Union is vested in the President and he is authorised to exercise the same either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Under Article 75, it is the President who can appoint the Prime Minister and the Ministers are to hold office during his pleasure. Despite this conferment of power in general and absolute terms, because of the scheme of the Constitution, its underlying principles and the implications arising from the other provisions in the Constitution, this Court has held in several cases that the President is a

constitutional head and the real executive power vests in the Cabinet. Similarly though plenary powers of legislation have been conferred on the Parliament and the State legislatures in respect of the legislative topics allotted to them, yet this Court has opined that by the exercise of that power neither Parliament nor the State legislatures can delegate to other authorities their essential legislative functions nor could they invade on the judicial power. These limitations were spelled out from the nature of the power conferred and from the scheme of the Constitution. But, it was urged on behalf of the Union and the States that, though there might be implied limitations on other powers conferred under the Constitution, there cannot be any implied limitations on the amending power. We see no basis for this distinction. The amending power is one of the powers conferred under the Constitution whatever the nature of that power might be. That apart, during the course of hearing the learned Solicitor-General had to concede that there are certain implied limitations on the amending power itself. The amending power of Parliament in certain respects is subject to the express limitations placed on it by the proviso to Article 368. Article 368 prescribes that if Parliament wants to amend Article 54, the Article dealing with the election of the President, the amendment in question must be @page-SC1626 ratified by the legislatures of not less than one half of the States. No such express limitation is placed on the amending power of Parliament in respect of Article 52 which provides that there shall be a President of India. If it be held that Article 52 can be amended without complying with the requirements of the proviso to Article 368, the limitation placed on Parliament in respect of the amendment of Article 54 becomes meaningless. When this incongruity was pointed out to the learned SolicitorGeneral, he conceded that in view of the fact that before Article 54 can be amended, the form and the manner laid down in proviso to Article 368 has to be followed, it follows as a matter of implication that the same would be the position for the amendment of Article 52. The only other alternative inference is that Article 52 can never be amended at all. It is not necessary to go into the other implications that may arise from the language of Article 368. 674. From what has been said above, it is clear that the amending power under Article 368 is also subject to implied limitations. The contention that a power to amend a Constitution cannot be subject to any implied limitation is negatived by the observations of the Judicial Committee in Bribery Commr. v. Rana Singhe, 1965 AC 172. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Liyange's case (supra) which held that Ceylon Parliament was incompetent to encroach upon the judicial power also lends support to our conclusion that there can be implied limitations on the amending power. 675. In support of the contention that there can be no implied limitations on the amending power, our attention was invited to writings of various jurists of eminence. Most of the writings relate to the amending power under Article 5 of the United States Constitution. It is true that in the United States most of the writers are of opinion that there is no implied limitation on the amending power under the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States has not specifically pronounced on this question. The only case in which the question of implied limitation on the amending power under the United States Constitution came up for consideration was Rhode Island v. Palmer, (1919) 64 Law Ed 946. In that case the Supreme Court of United States rejecting the contention that the 18th Amendment -National Prohibition Amendment- was outside the a amending power under Article 5 because of implied limitations on that power, held that the

Amendment was valid. The Supreme Court, however, did not discuss the question of implied limitations on the amending power as such. In fact the judgment that was rendered in that case gave no reasons. Only certain questions were formulated and answered. It is not clear from the judgment whether the particular limitation pleaded was rejected or whether the plea of implied limitation on the amending power was rejected though writers of most text books have taken the view that the court rejected the plea of implied limitations on the amending power. It may be noted that in the United States not a single human right has been taken away or even its scope narrowed. There the controversy centered round two questions viz., (1) abolition of slavery and (2) prohibition of sale and consumption of liquor. We will not be justified in expounding our Constitution on the basis of the controversies relating to those issues. Article 5 of the U. S. Constitution is not similar to Article 368 of our Constitution. In the former Article, there is an express limitation on the amending power i.e., regarding the representation of the States in the Senate. Further the amendment under Article 5 of the United States Constitution can be proposed either by the Congress or by State Conventions. They may be ratified either by a minimum of 3/4th of the State Legislatures or by Conventions held in at least 3/4th of the States. Whether a particular amendment should be ratified by the State Legislatures or by the State Conventions is entirely left to the discretion of the Congress. As held by the United States Supreme Court, the decision of the Congress on that question is final. The Constitution makers must have proceeded on the basis that the Congress is likely to require the amendment of basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution to be ratified by State Conventions. The scheme of no two Constitutions is similar. Their provisions are not similar. The language employed in the amending clauses differ from Constitution to Constitution. The objectives lying behind them also are bound to differ. Each country has its own needs, its own philosophy, its own way of life and above all its own problems. Hence in our opinion, we will be clouding the issues, if we allow ourselves to be @page-SC1627 burdened either by the writings of the various writers on other Constitutions or by the decisions rendered on the basis of the provisions of the other Constitutions, though Counsel on either side spared no efforts to place before us various opinions expressed by various writers as well as the decisions rendered by several courts including the State Courts in United States of America. 676. The rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in R. v. Burah, (1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC) that "if what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited it is not for any Court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions" was heavily relied on by Mr. Seervai. That decision, however, has been confined to the interpretation of conditional legislations and the rule that it laid down has not been applied while considering the question whether there are any implied limitations on any of the powers conferred under a statute or Constitution. 677. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the Union and the States that if we come to the conclusion that there are implied or inherent limitations on the amending power of Parliament under Art. 368 it would be well nigh impossible for Parliament to decide beforehand as to what amendments it could make and what amendments it is forbidden to make. According to the Counsel for the Union and the States, the conceptions of basic elements and fundamental features are illusive conceptions and their determination may

differ from judge to judge and therefore we would be making the task of Parliament impossible if we uphold the contention that there are implied or inherent limitations on the amending power under Article 368. We are unable to accept this contention. The broad contours of the basic elements or fundamental features of our Constitution are clearly delineated in the preamble. Unlike in most of the other Constitutions, it is comparatively easy in the case of our Constitution to discern and determine the basic elements or the fundamental features of our Constitution. For doing so, one has only to look to the preamble. It is true that there are bound to be border line cases where there can be difference of opinion. That is so in all important legal questions. But the courts generally proceed on the presumption of constitutionality of all legislations. The presumption of the constitutional validity of a statute will also apply to constitutional amendments. It is not correct to say that what is difficult to decide does not exist at all. For that matter, there are no clear guidelines before the Parliament to determine what are essential legislative functions which cannot be delegated, what legislations do invade on the judicial power or what restrictions are reasonable restrictions in public interest under Arts. 19 (2) to 19 (6) and yet by and large the legislations made by Parliament or the State legislatures in those respects have been upheld by courts. No doubt, there were occasions when courts were constrained to strike down some legislations as ultra vires the Constitution. The position as regards the ascertainment of the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution can by no means be more difficult than the difficulty of the legislatures to determine beforehand the constitutionality of legislations made under various other heads. Arguments based on the difficulties likely to be faced by the legislatures are of very little importance and they are essentially arguments against judicial review. 678. Large number of decisions rendered by courts in U. S. A., Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Ceylon and Ireland, dealing with the question of implied limitations on the amending power and also as regards the meaning of the word "amendment" were read to us at the hearing. Such of those that are relevant have been considered by the learned Chief Justice in the judgment just now delivered. We entirely agree with the views expressed by him and cannot usefully add to the same. 679. It was contended on behalf of the Union and the States that, the Constitution should not be treated as something sacred. It should be regarded just in the same way as we retard other human institutions. It should be possible to alter every part of it from time to time so as to bring it in harmony with the new and changed conditions. In support of this contention we were invited to the writings of the various writers such as Burgess, Bryco, Wills, Orfield, Weaver, Livingston etc. It was further urged that the Constituent Assembly, knowing that it will disperse, @page-SC1628 had arranged for the recreation of a Constituent Assembly under Article 368 in order to so shape the Constitution as to meet the demands of the time. However attractive these theories may sound in the abstract, on a closer examination it will be seen that they are fallacious, more particularly in a constitutional set up like ours. We have earlier noticed that under our electoral system, it is possible for a party to get a 2/3rd majority in the two Houses of Parliament even if that party does not get an absolute majority of votes cast at the election. That apart, when a party goes to election, it presents to the electorate diverse programmes and holds out various promises. The programmes presented or the promises held out need not necessarily include proposals for amending the Constitution. During the General

Elections to Parliament in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967, no proposal to amend the Constitution appears to have been placed before the electorate. Even when proposals for amendment of the Constitution are placed before the electorate as was done by the Congress Party in 1971, the proposed amendments are not usually placed before the electorate. Under these circumstances, the claim that the electorate had given a mandate to the party to amend the Constitution in any particular manner is unjustified. Further a Parliamentary Democracy like ours functions on the basis of the party system. The mechanics of operation of the party system as well as the system of Cabinet government are such that the people as a whole can have little control in the matter of detailed lawmaking."......on practically every issue in the modern State, the serried millions of voters cannot do more than accept or reject the solutions offered. The stage is too vast to permit of the nice shades of quantitative distinction impressing themselves upon the public mind. It has rarely the leisure, and seldom the information to do more than indicate the general tendency of its will. It is in the process of law-making that the subtler adjustments must be effected." (Laski: A Grammar of Politics; Fifth Edn. pp. 313-314). 680. The assertion that either the majority of members of Parliament or even 2/3rd members of Parliament speak on behalf of the nation has no basis in fact. Indeed it may be possible for the ruling party to carry through important constitutional amendments even after it has lost the confidence of the electorate. The members of Lok Sabha are elected for a term of five years. The ruling party or its members may or may not enjoy the confidence of the electorate throughout their term of office. Therefore it will not be correct to say that whenever Parliament amends the Constitution, it must be held to have done it as desired by the people. 681. There is a further fallacy in the contention that whenever Constitution is amended, we should presume that the amendment in question was made in order to adopt the Constitution to respond to the growing needs of the people. We have earlier seen that by using the amending power, it is theoretically possible for Parliament to extend its own life indefinitely and also, to amend the Constitution in such a manner as to make it either legally or practically unamendable ever afterwards. A power which is capable of being used against the people themselves cannot be considered as a power exercised on behalf of the people or in their interest. 682. On a careful consideration of the various aspects of the case, we are convinced that the Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic elements or Fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of our policy, the unity of the country, the essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Nor has the Parliament the power to revoke the mandate to build a Welfare State and egalitarian society. These limitations are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Despite these limitations, however, there can be no question that the amending power is a wide power and it reaches every Article and every part of the Constitution. That power can be used to reshape the Constitution to fulfil the obligations imposed on the State. It can also be used to reshape the Constitution within the limits mentioned earlier, to make it an effective instrument for social good. We are unable to agree with the contention that in order to build a Welfare State, it is necessary to destroy some of the human freedoms. That, at any rate is not the perspective of our Constitution. Our Constitution envisages that the State should without delay make available to all the citizens of this country the real benefits of those freedoms @page-SC1629 in a

democratic way. Human freedoms are lost gradually and imperceptibly and their destruction is generally followed by authoritarian rule. That is what history has taught us. Struggle between liberty and power is eternal. Vigilance is the price that we like every other democratic society have to pay to safeguard the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. Even the best of governments are not averse to have more and more power to carry out their plans and programmes which they may sincerely believe to be in public interest. But a freedom once lost is hardly ever regained except by revolution. Every encroachment on freedoms sets a pattern for further encroachments. Our constitutional plan is to eradicate poverty without destruction of individual freedoms. 683. In the result we uphold the contention of Mr. Palkhivala that the word "amendment" in Article 368 carries with it certain limitation and, further, that the power conferred under Article 368 is subject to certain implied limitations though that power is quite large. 684. Next, we shall take up for consideration the contentions of Mr. Palkhivala regarding the validity of the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments. 685. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that in enacting the 24th Amendment Act, the Parliament has exceeded its powers. It has purported to enlarge its limited power of amendment into an unlimited power by the exercise of which it can damage or destroy the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution. It was said that such an exercise is an unlawful usurpation of power. Consequently, the 24th Amendment Act is liable to be struck down. To pronounce on that contention, it is necessary to examine at the very outset whether the 24th Amendment Act has really enlarged the powers of the Parliament. If we come to the conclusion that it has not enlarged the power of the Parliament, as we think it has not, the various contentions of Mr. Palkhivala do not arise for consideration. 686. Now let us see what is the true effect of he Constitution 24th Amendment Act, 1971. That Act amended Article 13 and Article 368. By that Act one more sub-article has been added to Article 13 viz., sub-article (4) which reads thus : "Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368". 687. Section 3 of that Act which amends Article 368 reads: "Article 368 of the Constitution shall be renumbered as clause (2) thereof and (a) for the marginal heading to that article the following marginal heading shall be substituted, namely :"Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor." (b) before clause (2) as so re-numbered, the following clauses shall be inserted, namely: "Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution. Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article." (c) in clause (2) as so re-numbered, for the words "it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill", the words "it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon" shall be sustituted ; (d) after clause (2) as so re-numbered, the following clause shall be inserted, namely "(3) Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this Article." 688. The material changes effected under this Act are:

1. Addition of clause (4) to Article 13 and clause (3) to Article 368; 2. Change in the marginal heading; 3. Specific mention of the fact that the power is conferred on the Parliament to amend the Constitution; 4. The power conferred on the Parliament is claimed to be a constituent power; 5. That power is described as a power to "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal of any provision of this Constitution" and 6. Making it obligatory for the President to give assent to the Bill amending the Constitution. 689. In our opinion the 24th amendment has not made any material change in Article 368 as it stood originally. It is true the original Article did not say specifically that the power to amend rested with Parliament. On the other hand, while setting out the procedure of amendment, it referred to the @page-SC1630 functions of the two Houses of Parliament and the President. Because of the fact that Parliament was not specifically referred to in Article 368, as it originally stood, the learned Advocate General of Maharashtra wanted us to spell out that the power conferred under Article 368, as it originally stood was not conferred on Parliament as such but on the two Houses of Parliament. We have earlier rejected that contention. We agree with the learned Attorney General that the power in question had been conferred on Parliament. Article 79 says that "There shall be a Parliament for the Union, which shall consist of the President and two Houses to be known respectively as the Council of States and the House of the People". Whether an enactment refers to the three components of Parliament separately or whether all the three of them are compendiously referred to as Parliament, in law it makes no difference. In Sankari Prasad's case, in Sajjan Singh's case as well as in Golak Nath's case each one of the Judges who delivered judgments specifically mentioned that the power to amend the Constitution was vested in Parliament though there was difference of opinion on the question whether that power could be traced to Article 368 or Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I. There is no ground for taking a different view. 690. We have already come to the conclusion that Article 368 as it originally stood comprehended both power as well as procedure to amend the Constitution. Hence the change effected in the marginal note has no significance whatsoever. The marginal note as it stood earlier was in a sense incomplete. The expression 'constituent power' is used to describe only the nature of the power of amendment. Every amending power, however large or however small it might be, is a facet of a constituent power. The power, though described to be 'constituent power', still continues to be an 'amending power'. The scope and ambit of the power is essentially contained in the word 'amendment'. Hence, from the fact that the new article specifically refers to that power as a constituent power, it cannot be understood that the contents of the power have undergone any change. The power conferred under the original Article being a limited power to amend the Constitution, the constituent power to amend the Constitution referred to in the amended Article must also be held to carry with it the limitations to which that power was subject earlier. There is also no significance in the substitution of the expression "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal of ally provision of this Constitution" found in the amended Article in the place of the expression "amendment of the Constitution" found in the original Article. Every power to amend a statute must necessarily include within itself some power to make addition, variation or repeal of any provision of the statute. Here again, the power

conferred under the original Article being a limited one, that limitation will continue to operate notwithstanding the change in the phraseology. The words 'addition, variation or repeal' only prescribe the modes or manner by which an 'amendment' may be made, but they do not determine the scope of the power of 'amendment'. The original Article 368 mentioned that after the bill for amendment of the Constitution is passed by the two Houses of Parliament in the manner prescribed in Article 368 "it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the bill." The amended Article makes a change. It prescribes that when the Bill is presented to the President, he "shall give his assent to the Bill." Some comment was made at the bar about the inappropriateness of commanding the President to give his assent to the Bill. That is a question of propriety. The substance of the matter is that when the Bill is presented to the President, he shall not withhold his assent. This change cannot be said to have damaged or destroyed any basic element of the Constitution. In fact Article 111 which deals with the assent to the Bills specifically prescribes that when a money Bill, after having been passed by the Houses of Parliament is presented to the President he "shall not withhold assent therefrom". Hence it cannot be said that the change made in Article 368 relating to the assent of the President has any great importance in the scheme of our Constitution. In fact under our Constitution the President is only a constitutional head. Ordinarily he has to act on the advice of the cabinet. There is no possibility of the Constitution being amended in opposition to the wishes of the cabinet. 691. The only change that remains to be considered is as to the @page-SC1631 exclusion of the application of Article 13 to an amendment of the Constitution. We have earlier come to the conclusion that Article 13 as it stood earlier did not bar the amendment of the Constitution. Articles 13 (4) and 368 (3) make explicit what was implicit. 692. It was contended that by means of the 24th Amendment Parliament intended to and in fact purported to enlarge its amending power. In this connection reliance was placed on the statement of objects and reasons attached to the Bill which resulted in the 24th Amendment. The power of Parliament does not rest upon its professed intention. It cannot acquire a power which it otherwise did not possess. We are unable to accept the contention that clause (e) to the proviso to Article 368 confers power on Parliament to enlarge its own power. In our judgment the power to amend the Constitution as well as the ordinary procedure to amend any part of the Constitution was and is contained in the main part of the Article. The proviso merely places further restrictions on the procedure to amend the Articles mentioned therein. Clause (e) to the proviso stipulates that Article 368 cannot be amended except in the manner provided in the proviso. In the absence of that clause, Article 368 could have been amended by following the procedure laid down in the main part. At best clause (e) of the proviso merely indicates that Article 368 itself comes within its own purview. As we have already seen, the main part of Article 368 as it stood earlier, expressly lays down only the procedure to be followed in amending the Constitution. The power to amend is only implied therein. 693. It is difficult to accept the contention that an implied power was impliedly permitted to be enlarged. If that was so, there was no meaning in limiting that power originally. Limitation on the power to amend the Constitution would operate even when Article 368 is amended. A limited power cannot be used to enlarge the same power into an absolute power. We respectfully agree with the observation of Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in

Golak Nath's case that what Parliament cannot do directly, it also cannot do indirectly. We have earlier held that the "amendment of this Constitution" means the amendment of every part of the Constitution. It cannot be denied that Article 368 is but a part of the Constitution. Hence, the mere fact that the mover of the 24th Amendment Act, in the Statement of Objects and Reasons laid claim to certain power does not go to show that Parliament either endorsed that claim or could have conferred on itself such a power. It must be deemed to have exercised only such power as it possessed. It is a well accepted rule of construction that if a provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations the Court must accept that interpretation which makes the provision valid. If the power conferred on Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 368 as it stood originally is a limited power, as we think it is, Parliament cannot enlarge the scope of that powersee Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales, 6 CLR 469; Ex Parte Walsh and Johnson; In Re Yates, 37 CLR 36 at p. 67 and Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth, 83 CLR 1. 694. For the reasons mentioned heretofore, the scope of Parliament's power to amend the Constitution or any part thereof must be held to have remained as it was before the 24th Amendment notwithstanding the alterations made in the phraseology of Article 368. The 24th Amendment made explicit, what was impicit in the unamended Art. 368. In this view of the matter the 24th Amendment must be held to be valid. 695. This takes us to the validity of the Constitution 25th Amendment Act. It is necessary to examine the scope and effect of that Act for deciding the question whether that Act or any one of its provisions can be held to be outside the amending power of the Parliament. That Act has three sections. We are not concerned with the first section which sets out the short title. Clause (a) of the second section amends, Article 31 (2). Clause (b) of that section incorporates into the Constitution Article 31 (2-B). Section 3 introduces into the Constitution a new Article viz., Article 31-C. 696. Let us first take up the newly substituted Article 31 (2) in the place of the old Article 31 (2) and examine its scope. To do so, it is necessary to examine the history of that Article. 697. Article 31 (2) has undergone several changes. As originally enacted it read thus: "No property, moveable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any @pageSC1632 company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken post session of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given." 698. That Article was amended firstly by the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955 and, thereafter, by the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act, 1971. At a later stage, it will be necessary for us to compare Article 31 (2) as it stood after the Fourth Amendment Act and as it stands after the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act. Hence we shall quote them side by side : Article 31 (2) as substituted by the 4th Amendment Act, 1955 Article 31 (2) as substituted by the 25th Amendment Act, 1971 No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired

or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate. No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash: Provided that in making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1) of Article 30, the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause." 699. For finding out the true scope of Article 31(2), as it stands now, the learned Advocate General of Maharashtra as well as the Solicitor General has taken us through the history of this Article. According to them the Article as it stands now truly represents the intention of the Constitution makers. In support of that contention, we were asked to go through the Constituent Assembly debates relating to that article. In particular, we were invited to go through the speeches made by Pandit Nehru, Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, Dr. Munshi and Dr. Ambedkar. In our opinion, it is impermissible for us to do so. It is a well settled rule of construction that speeches made by members of a legislature in the course of debates relating to the enactment of a statute cannot be used as aids for interpreting any of the provisions of the statute. The same rule is applicable when we are called upon to interpret the provisions of a Constitution. This Court ruled in State of Travancore Cochin v. Bombay Go. Ltd. 1952 SCR 1112 = (AIR 1952 SC 366) that speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot be used as aid for interpreting the Constitution.. In the course of his judgment Patanjali Sastri C. J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed at p. 1121 of the Report : @page-SC1633 "It remains only to point out that the use made by the learned Judges below of the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution is unwarranted. That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been generally accepted in England, and the same rule has been observed in the construction of Indian Statutes -See Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Nath Mallick, (1895) 22 Ind App 107, 118 (PC). The reason behind the rule was explained by one of us in Gopalan's case 1950 SCR 88 = (AIR 1950 SC 27) thus: "A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the Bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord", or as it is more tersely put in an American case-

"Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other - United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897) 189 U. S. 290 at p. 318." 700. No decision of this Court dissenting from the view taken in the above case was brought to our notice. But it was urged that this Court had ignored the rule laid down in Bombay Co.'s case (supra) in Golak Nath's case as well as in what is popularly known as the Privy Purse case (1971) 3 SCR 9 = (AIR 1971 SC 30). We do not think that this statement is accurate. In Golaknath's case, Subba Rao C. J. referred to certain portions of speeches made by Pandit Nehru and Dr. Ambedkar. But he made it clear at p. 792 of the Report, the specific purpose for which he was referring to those speeches. This is what he stated: "We have referred to the speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Ambedkar not with a view to interpret the provisions of Art. 368 which we propose to do on its own terms, but only to notice the transcendental character given to the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the Constitution." 701. Bachawat J. in the course of his judgment also referred to some of the speeches made during the debates on Article 368. But before doing so this is what he observed at p. 922 of the report: "Before concluding this judgment I must refer to some of the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of debates on the draft Constitution. These speeches cannot be used as aids for interpreting the Constitution - See 1952 SCR 1112 = (AIR 1952 SC 366). Accordingly I do not rely on them as aids to construction. But I propose to refer to them, as Shri A. K. Sen relied heavily on the speeches of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. According to him, the speeches of Dr. Ambedkar show that he did not regard the fundamental rights as amendable. This contention is not supported by the speeches.........." 702. From these observations, it is clear that the learned Judges were not referring to the speeches as aids for interpreting any of the provisions of the Constitution. 703. Now, let us turn to this Court's Judgment in the Privy Purse case (1971) 3 SCR 9 = (AIR 1971 SC 530). Shah, J. (as he then was) in the course of his judgment (at p. 83 of the report) quoted a portion of the speech of the Home Minister Sardar Patel not for the purpose of interpreting any provision of the Constitution but for showing the circumstances which necessitated the giving of certain guarantees to the former rulers. That speech succinctly sets out why certain guarantees had to be given to the rulers. Hence it is not correct to say that Shah J. speaking for himself and six other Judges had used the speech of Sardar Patel in aid of the construction of any of the articles of the Constitution. It is true Mitter J. in his dissenting judgment (at p. 121 of the report) used the speech of Shri T. T. Krishnamachari in aid of the construction of Art. 363 but the learned Judge nowhere in his judgment discussed the question whether the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly were admissible in aid of interpreting any provision of the Constitution. 704. Before concluding the discussion on this topic, it is necessary to refer to one more decision of this Court i. e. Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (1972) 2 SCR 33 = (AIR 1972 SC 1016). In that case this Court was called upon to decide whether the provisions in the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 providing for the levy of tax on the capital value of @page-SC1634 agricultural property were constitutionally sustainable. By a majority of four against

three, this Court upheld the levy. Sikri, C. J., who spoke for himself and two other judges after sustaining the validity of the provision on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution as well as the decided cases referred to some of the speeches made during the debates in the Constituent Assembly in support of the conclusion already reached by him. Before referring to those speeches this is what the learned Judge observed at p. 58: " We are, however, glad to find from the following extracts from the debates that our interpretation accords with what was intended" 705. From this it is clear that the learned Judge did not seek any aid from the speeches for the purpose of interpreting the relevant provision. It is necessary to note that the learned judge did not dissent from the view earlier taken by this Court in Bombay Co. Ltd's case (supra). Hence the law as laid down in Bombay Co's case is binding on us and its correctness was not challenged before us. 706. The learned Advocate General of Maharashtra is right in his contention that for finding out the true scope of Article 31(2), as it stands at present, it is necessary for us to find out the mischief that was intended to be remedied by the present amendment. In other words, we must find out what was the objective intended to be achieved by that amendment. The original Article 31(2) first came up for consideration by this Court in State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella Banerjee, 1954 SCR 558 = (AIR 1954 SC 170) wherein Patanjali Sastri C. J. speaking for the Court observed: "While it is true that the legislature is given the discretionary power of laying down the principles which should govern the determination of the amount to be given to the owner for the property appropriated, such principles must ensure that what is determined as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within the limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution allows free play to the legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable. Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the Court. This, indeed, was not disputed." 707. We are told that Article 31 (2) came to be amended by means of the 4th Amendment Act in view of the decision of this Court in Mrs. Bela Bannerjee's case. The scope of the article as amended by the 4th Amendment Act was considered by this Court in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras (1965) 1 SCR 614 = (AIR 1965 SC 1017). Therein Subba Rao J. (as he then was) speaking for a bench consisting of himself, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal and Sikri JJ. observed (at p. 626): "The fact that Parliament used the same expressions namely "compensation" and "Principles" as were found in Article 31 before the Amendment is a clear indication that it accepted the meaning given by this Court to those expressions in Mrs. Bela Bannerjee's case. It follows that a Legislature in making a law of acquisition or requisition shall provide for a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of or specify the principles for the purpose of ascertaining the "just equivalent" of what the owner has been deprived of. If Parliament intended to enable a Legislature to make such a law without providing for compensation so defined, it would have used other expressions like "price", "consideration" " etc. Proceeding further the learned Judge observed:

"The real difficulty is, what is the effect of ouster of jurisdiction of the court to question the law on the ground that the "compensation" provided by the law is not adequate? It will be noticed that the law of acquisition or requisition is not wholly immune from scrutiny by the Court. But what is excluded from the court's jurisdiction is that the said law cannot be questioned on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate. It will further be noticed that the clause excluding the jurisdiction of the court also used the word "compensation" indicating thereby that what is excluded from the court's jurisdiction is the adequacy of the compensation fixed by the legislature. The argument that the word "compensation" means a just equivalent for the property acquired and, therefore, the court can @page-SC1635 ascertain whether it is a "just equivalent" or not makes the amendment of the Constitution nugatory. It will be arguing in a circle. Therefore, a more reasonable interpretation is that neither the principles prescribing the "just equivalent" nor the "just equivalent'' can be questioned by the Court on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation fixed or arrived at by the working of the principles. To illustrate; a law is made to acquire a house, its value at the time of acquisition has to be fixed; there are many modes of valuation namely estimate by the engineer, value reflected by comparable sales, capitalisation of rent and similar others. The application of different principles may lead to different results. The adoption of one principle may give a higher value and the adoption of another principle may give a lesser value. But nonetheless they are principles on which and the manner in which compensation is determined. The court cannot obviously say that the law should have adopted one principle and not the other, for it relates only to the question of adequacy. On the other hand, if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the property acquired or to the value of the property at or about the time it is acquired it may be said that they are not principles contemplated by Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.......In such cases the validity of the principles can be scrutinized. The law may also prescribe a compensation which is illusory; it may provide for the acquisition of a property worth lakhs of rupees for a paltry sum of Rs. 100. The question in that context does not relate to the adequacy of the compensation for it is no compensation at all. The illustrations given by us are not exhaustive. There may be many others falling on either side of the line. But this much is clear. If the compensation is illusory or if the principles prescribed are irrelevant to the value of the property at or about the time of its acquisition, it can be said that the legislature committed a fraud on power, and therefore, the law is bad. It is a use of the protection of Article 31 in a manner which the Article hardly intended." (emphasis supplied). 708. The principles that emerge from the decision in Vajravelu's case are: (1) compensation means just equivalent of the value of the property acquired; (2) principles prescribed must be principles which provide for compensation, (3) adequacy of compensation fixed or to be determined on the basis of the principles set out cannot be gone into by the Court; (4) the principles fixed must be relevant to the property acquired or to the value of the property at about the time it is acquired; (5) the compensation fixed should not be illusory and (6) courts have power to strike down a law on the ground of fraud on power if the principles fixed are irrelevant or if the compensation granted is illusory. 709. The next decision cited to us is the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India Ltd., (1967) 1 SCR 255 = (AIR 1967 SC 637). It is a decision of a

Division Bench consisting of Subba Rao, C. J. and Shelat, J. As that decision was overruled by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, (1969) 3 SCR 341 = (AIR 1969 SC 634) it is not necessary to refer to its ratio. 710. This takes us to the decision of this Court in Shantilal's case. This case related to the acquisition of some landed property on behalf of the Borough Municipality of Ahmedabad for making town planning scheme under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1955. Sections 53 and 57 of that Act fixed certain principles for the determination of compensation for the land acquired. The High Court of Gujarat declared that those provisions were ultra vires in so far as they authorised the local authority to acquire land under a Town Planning Scheme and as a corollary to that view declared invalid the City Wall Improvement Town Planning Scheme No. 5 framed in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act. In doing so they purported to follow the decision of this Court in Vajravelu Mudaliar's ease. A Constitution Bench of this Court reversed the decision of the Gujarat High Court. In that case Shah J. speaking for the Court elaborately reviewed the earlier decisions of this Court bearing on Article 31(2). After doing so, he observed at p. 365 of the report: "Reverting to the amendment made in cl. (2) of Article 31 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. 1955, it is clear that adequacy of compensation fixed by the Legislature or awarded according to the principles specified by the @page-SC1636 Legislature for determination is not justiciable. It clearly follows from the terms of Article 31(2) as amended that the amount of compensation payable if fixed by the Legislature, is not justiciable because the challenge in such a case, apart from a plea of abuse of legislative power, would be only a challenge to the adequacy of compensation. If compensation fixed by the Legislature - and by the use of the expression "compensation" we mean what the legislature justly regards as proper and fair recompense for compulsory expropriation of property and not something which by abuse of legislative power though called compensation is not a recompense at all or is something illusory - is not justiciable, on the plea that it is not a just equivalent of the property compulsorily acquired is it open to the courts to enter upon an enquiry whether the principles which are specified by the Legislature for determining compensation do not award to the expropriated owner a just equivalent? In our view, such an enquiry is not open to the Court under the statutes enacted after the amendments made in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. If the quantum of compensation fixed by the Legislature is not liable to be canvassed before the Court on the ground that it is not a just equivalent, the principles specified for determination of compensation will also not be open to challenge on the plea that the compensation determined by the application of those principles is not a just equivalent. The right declared by the Constitution guarantees that compensation shall be given before a person is compulsorily expropriated of his property for a public purpose. What is fixed as compensation by statute, or by the application of principles specified for determination of compensation is guaranteed; it does not mean however that something fixed or determined by the application of specified principles which is illusory or can in no sense be regarded as compensation must be upheld by the Courts for, to do so, would be to grant a charter of arbitrariness and permit a device to defeat the constitutional guarantee. But compensation fixed or determined on principles specified by the Legislature cannot be permitted to be challenged on the somewhat indefinite plea that it is not a just or fair

equivalent. Principles may be challenged on the ground that they are irrelevant to the determination of compensation, but not on the plea that what is awarded as a result of the application of those principles is not just or fair compensation. A challenge to a statute that the principles specified by it do not award a just equivalent will be in clear violation of the constitutional declaration that inadequacy of compensation provided is not justiciable." (emphasis supplied) 711. The Advocate General of Maharashtra contended that if only this decision had not been indirectly overruled by the Bank Nationalisation case R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 530 = (AIR 1970 SC 564), there would have been no occasion to further amend Article 3l (2). That being so, it is necessary to find out clearly as to what are the principles enunciated in this decision. This decision firmly laid down that any arbitrary fixation of recompense is liable to be struck down by the court as an abuse of legislative power. It further laid down that the principles laid down may be challenged on the ground that they are not relevant for the purpose of determining the recompense payable to the owner of the property acquired. If the recompense fixed or determined is either not arbitrary or illusory or if the principles fixed are relevant to the purpose of acquisition or requisition of the property in question, the courts cannot go into the question of adequacy of the payment. 712. Then came the Bank Nationalisation case. The majority judgment in that case was delivered by Shah, J. (as he then was). In that judgment he referred somewhat extensively to the decision in Shantilal Mangaldas's case and other cases rendered by this Court. He did not purport to deviate from the rule laid down in Shantilal's case. The ratio of that decision relating to Article 31 (2) is found at p. 598 of the report. The learned Judge observed: "Both the lines of thought (in Vajravelu's case and Shantilal's case) which converge in the ultimate result, support the view that the principle specified by the law for determination of compensation is beyond the pale of challenge, if it is relevant to the determination of @page-SC1637 compensation and is a recognised principle applicable in the determination of compensation for property compulsorily acquired and the principle is appropriate in determining the value of the class of property sought to be acquired. On the application of the view expressed in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case or in Shantilal Mangaldas's case, the Act in our judgment is liable to be struck down as it fails to provide to the expropriated banks compensation determined according to relevant principles." Proceeding further the learned Judge observed at p. 599: "We are unable to hold that a principle specified by the Parliament for determining compensation of the property to be acquired is conclusive. If that view be accepted, the Parliament will be invested with a charter of arbitrariness and by abuse of legislative process, the constitutional guarantee of the right to compensation may be severely impaired. The principle specified must be appropriate to the determination of compensation for the particular class of property sought to be acquired. If several principles are appropriate and one is selected for determination of the value of the property to be acquired, selection of that principle to the exclusion of other principles is not open to challenge for the selection must be left to the wisdom of the Parliament." 713. It is clear from the passages we have quoted above that this case also emphasised that the power of the Parliament to fix the compensation for the property acquired is not

an arbitrary power. Further, the principles prescribed for determining the compensation must be relevant to the subject-matter of acquisition or requisition. That decision also laid down that both the questions whether the compensation has been fixed arbitrarily or whether the principles laid down are irrelevant are open to judicial review. 714. Let us now examine Art. 31 (2) as it stands now in the light of the decisions already referred to. The only material changes made in that Article under the 25th Amendment Act are : (1) in place of the word 'compensation', the word 'amount' has been used and (2) an additional clause viz., "or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash" has been added. 715. We are not concerned in this case as to the effect of the additional clause. No arguments were advanced on that aspect. All that we are concerned with is as to what is the effect of the substitution of the word "amount" in place of the word "compensation". As seen earlier, the word "compensation" has been interpreted in the venous decisions referred to earlier as "just equivalent" of the value of the property taken. That concept has now been removed. In other respects, the Article has not been altered. It remains what it was. We have earlier noticed that the decisions of this Court have firmly laid down that while examining the validity of law made under Article 31 (2) as it stood after it was amended under the 4th Amendment Act, it was open to the Court to go into the questions whether the compensation had been fixed arbitrarily and whether the same was illusory. Those decisions further ruled that the Court can go into the relevance of the principles fixed. Parliament would have undoubtedly known the ratio of those decisions. That is also the legal presumption. Hence if the Parliament intended to take away the judicial review in any respect other than relating to the adequacy of the amount fixed, it would have expressed its intention by appropriate words. We find no such words in the Article as it stands. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that it has accepted the interpretation placed by this Court in all respects except as regards the concept of compensation. That this is the mischief which the 25th Amendment seeks to remedy by amending Article 31 (2) is also clear from the language of the amended Article itself. It says that the law shall not be called in question on the ground that the amount fixed or determined is not adequate. What is an adequate amount? An amount can be said to be adequate only when the owner of the property is fully compensated, that is when he is paid an amount which is equivalent in value to the property acquired or requisitioned. And that is also what is connoted by the concept of 'compensation' as interpreted by this Court. Therefore, stated briefly, what the 25th Amendment makes non-justiciable is an enquiry into the question whether the amount fixed or determined is an equivalent value of or 'compensation' for the property acquired or requisitioned. @page-SC1638 716. The word "amount" is a neutral word. Standing by itself, it has no norm and is completely colourless. The dictionary meaning of the word appropriate to the present context is "sum total or a figure". We have to find out its connotation from the context. In so doing, we have to bear in mind the fact that Article 31 (2) still continues to be a fundamental right. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate General of Maharashtra and the learned Solicitor General that the right of the owner at present is just to get whatever the Government pleases to give, whenever it pleases to give and however it pleases to give. A position so nebulous as that cannot be considered as a right much less a fundamental right, which Article 31 (2) still claims to be.

717. It is difficult to believe that Parliament intended to make a mockery of the fundamental right conferred under Article 31 (2). It cannot be that the Constitution while purporting to preserve the fundamental right of the citizen to get an "amount" in lieu of the property taken for public purpose has in fact robbed him of all his right. 718. Undoubtedly Article 31 empowers the legislature to acquire or requisition the property of a citizen for an amount". What does the word "amount" mean in that Article? As we have already said, that word by itself does not disclose any norm. But then the word "amount" is followed by the words ''which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate." 7l9. If the expression "amount" has no norm and is just what the Parliament stipulates, there can he no question of prescribing principles for determining that "amount" nor is there any scope for finding out its adequacy. The legislatures are permitted under the amended Article 31 (2) either to fix the "amount" to be paid in lieu of the property acquired or to lay down the principles for determining that "amount". These two alternative methods must bring about nearly the same result. If the relevancy of the principles fixed can be judicially reviewed - as indeed they must be-in view of the decisions referred to earlier, we fail to see how the fixation of the "amount" which is the alternative method of determining the recompense to be paid in lieu of the property taken is excluded from judicial review. 720. The word "fixed" in Article 31 (2) connotes or postulates that there must be some standard or principle by the application of which the legislature calculates or ascertains definitely the amount. In Bouyiar's Law Dictionary; (1946) at p. 421, the word 'fix' is defined thus: "To determine; to settle. A Constitutional provision to the effect that the General Assembly shall fix the compensation of officers means that it shall prescribe or 'fix' the rule by which such compensation is to he determined". (See also Fraser Henlein Pvy Ltd. v. Cody, (1945) 70 CLR 100 at p. 128, cited in Saunders, Words and Phrases: Legally Defined Vol. 2, p. 258 (1969)). This being the meaning of the word 'fix,' it would be necessary for the legislature to lay down in the law itself or otherwise indicate the principles on the basis of which it fixes the amount for the acquisition or requisitioning of the property. If this construction is placed on the first mode of determining the amount then there would be no difference between this method and the other method hereby the legislature lays down the principles and leaves it for any other authority to determine the amount in accordance with such principles. Whether the legislature adopts one or the other method, the retirement of Article 31 (2) would be the same, namely, there must be principles on the basis of which the amount is determined. Such an amount may be determined either by the legislature or by some other authority authorised by the legislature. The content of the right in article 31 (2) is not dependent upon whether the legislature chooses one or the other method of determining the amount. There is no contradiction between these two methods. It is true that in both cases, the judicial review is necessarily limited the cause it cannot extend to the examination of the adequacy of the amount fixed or to be determined. It was conceded on behalf of the contesting respondents that is that the court can go into the question whether the "amount" fixed is illusory. This very concession shows the untenability of the contention advanced on behalf of the Union. For determining whether the @page-SC1639 "amount" fixed is

illusory or not, one has first to determine the value of the property because without knowing the true value of the property, no court can say that the "amount" fixed is illusory. Further, when Article 31 (2) says that it is not open to the court to examine whether the "amount" fixed or determined is adequate or not, it necessarily means that the "amount" payable has to be determined on the basis of principles relevant for determining the value of the property acquired or requisitioned. There can be no question of adequacy unless the "amount' payable has been determined on the basis of certain norms and not arbitrarily, without having regard to the value of the property. 721. Further, Article 31 (2) provides for fixing or determining the amount for the acquisition or requisitioning of the property. The State action is still described as 'acquisition or requisition' and not 'confiscation'. Therefore, the principles for fixing or determining the amount must be relevant to the 'acquisition or requisition', and not to 'confiscation'. The amount fixed or determined should not make it appear that the measure is one of confiscation. The principles for fixing, or determining the amount may be said to be relevant to the acquisition or requisition when they bear reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired or requisitioned. 722. Further there is practical difficulty in accepting the contention that the word "amount" in the context in which it is used, has no norm. The amount has to be fixed by the legislatures which means by the members of the legislatures. When a law for acquisition of certain types of property is enacted, it is not as if the members of the legislature - each and every one of them who participates in the making of the law would first go and inspect the property to be acquired and then assess the value of that property. In the very nature of things, the "amount" payable has to be determined on the basis of certain principles. If that be so, as it appears to us to be obvious, then the legislators must have some principles before them to determine the amount. In this connection the Advocate-General of Maharashtra tried to give an explanation, which appears to us to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable. His contention was that our democracy is worked on the basis of party system. The ruling party has the majority of the members of the legislature behind it. Therefore, the members of the opposition party need not know the basis of fixation of the value of the property acquired. Even the members of the ruling party need not be told about the basis on which the value is fixed. The option before them is either to accept the amount fixed by the cabinet or by the Minister concerned or to reject the proposal and face the consequences. If this is the true position, it is, in our opinion, a negation of parliamentary democracy. Our democracy like all true parliamentary democracies is based on the principles of debate and discussion. As far as possible decisions in the legislatures are arrived at on the basis of consensus. Our Constitution does not provide for one party rule where there is no room for opposition. Opposition parties have an important role to play under our Constitution. Members belonging to the opposition parties have as much right to participate in making laws as the members belonging to the ruling party. Further, the learned Advocate General is not correct in his assumption that the function of the members belonging to the ruling party is to blindly support a measure sponsored by the executive. They also have a right, may, a duty to mould every measure by debate and discussion. If the question of fixation of "amount" under Article 31 (2) is considered as the exclusive function of the executive, then, not only the judicial review will be taken away, even the legislature will not have the opportunity of examining the correctness or appropriateness of the "amount" fixed. A

power so arbitrary as that can speedily degenerate into an instrument of oppression and is likely to be used for collateral purposes. Our Constitution has created checks and balances to minimise the possibility of power being misused. We have no doubt that the theory propounded by the Advocate General of Maharashtra will be repudiated by our legislatures and the cabinets as something wholly foreign to our Constitution. 723. If we bear in mind the fact that the "amount" in question is to be paid in lieu of the property taken, then, it follows that it must have a reasonable relationship with the value of the property taken. It may not be the market value of the property taken. The market value of a property is the result of an inter-anion of various forces. It may @pageSC1640 not have any reasonable relationship with the investment made by its successive owners. The price of the property acquired might have shot up because of various contributions made by the society such as improvements effected by the State in the locality in question or the conversion of a rural area into an urban area. It is undoubtedly open to the State to appropriate to itself that part of the market value of a property which is not the result of any contribution made by its owners. There may be several other relevant grounds for fixing a particular "amount" in a given case or for adopting one or more of the relevant principles for the determination of the price to be paid. In all these matters the legislative judgment is entitled to great weight. It will be for the aggrieved party to clearly satisfy the Court that the basis adopted by the legislature has no reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired or that the "amount" to be paid has been arbitrarily fixed or that the same is an illusory return for the property taken. So long as the basis adopted for computing the value of the property is relevant to the acquisition in question or the amount fixed can be justified on any such basis, it is no more open to the court to consider whether the amount fixed or to be determined is adequate. But it is still open to the court to consider whether the "amount" in question has been arbitrarily determined or whether the same is an illusory return for the property taken. It is also open to the court to consider whether the principles laid down for the determination of the amount are irrelevant for the acquisition or requisition in question. To put it differently, the judicial review under the amended Article 31 (2) lies within narrow limits. The court cannot go into the question whether what is paid or is payable is compensation. It can only go into the question whether the "amount" in question was arbitrarily fixed as illusory or whether the principles laid down for the purpose of determining the "amount' payable have reasonable relationship with the value of the property acquired or requisitioned. 724. If the amended Art. 31 (2) is understood in the manner as laid down above, the right to property, cannot be said to have been damaged or destroyed. The amended Article 31 (2) according to us fully protects the interests of the individual as well as that of the society. Hence its validity is not open to challenge. 725. Now, let us turn to Article 31 (2-B). It says that "Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in clause (2)". This provision has no real impact on the right conferred under Article 31 (2). Article 31 (2) empowers the State to compulsorily acquire or requisition property for public purpose. When property is acquired or requisitioned for public purpose, the right of the owner of that property to hold or dispose of that property is necessarily lost. Hence there is no antithesis between Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (2). That being so, the only assistance that the owner of the property acquired or requisitioned would have obtained from Article

19 (1) (f) read with sub-article (5) of that article would be the right to insist that the law made under Article 31 (2) as it stood before its recent amendment, should have to conform to some reasonable procedure both in the matter of dispossessing him as well as in the matter of determining the "amount" payable to him. In a way, those rights are protected by the principles of natural justice. 726. For the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that Section 2 of the 25th Amendment Act, 1971 is invalid. 727. This takes us to Section 3 of the 25th Amendment Act which now stands as Article 31-C of the Constitution. This Article empowers the Parliament as well as the Local Legislatures to enact laws giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39, completely ignoring in the process, Articles 14, 19 and 31. Further it lays down that if the law in question contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy, that law shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. The proviso to that Article prescribes that where such a law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of Article 31-C shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This Article has two parts. The first part says that laws enacted by Parliament as well as by the Local Legislatures for giving @page-SC1641 effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl. (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13 and the second part provides that no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 do not prescribe any subject-matter of legislation. They contain certain objectives to be achieved. The methods to be adopted to achieve those objectives may be numerous. Those clauses cover a very large field of social and economic activities of the Union and the Stales. Clause (b) of Article 39 says that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and clause (c) of that Article says that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. These two provisions lay down a particular political philosophy. They in conjunction with some other provisions of the Constitution direct the State to build a Welfare State. 728. No one can deny the importance of the Directive Principles. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles constitute the 'conscience' of our Constitution. The purpose of the Fundamental Rights is to create an egalitarian society, to free all citizens from coercion or restriction by society and to make liberty available for all. The purpose of the Directive Principles is to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution. Through such a social revolution the Constitution seeks to fulfil the basic needs of the common man and to change the structure of our society. It aims at making the Indian masses free in the positive sense. 729. Part IV of the Constitution is designed to bring about the social and economic revolution that remained to be fulfilled after independence. The aim of the Constitution is

not to guarantee certain liberties to only a few of the citizens but for all. The Constitution visualizes our society as a whole and contemplates that every member of the society should participate in the freedoms guaranteed. To ignore Part IV is to ignore the sustenance provided for in the Constitution, the hopes held out to the Nation and the very ideals on which our Constitution is built. Without faithfully imply meeting the Directive Principles, it is not possible to achieve the Welfare State contemplated by the Constitution. A society like ours steeped in poverty and ignorance cannot realize the benefit of human rights without satisfying the minimum economic needs of every citizen of this country. Any Government which fails to fulfill the pledge taken under the Constitution cannot be said to have been faithful to the Constitution and to its commitments. 730. Equally, the danger to democracy by an over emphasis on duty cannot be minimised. Kurt Reizler, a German Scholar, from his experience of the tragedy of the Nazi Germany warned: "If ......these duties of man should be duties towards the "public welfare" of the "society" and the State, and rights are made conditional on the fulfilment of these duties, the duties will uproot the rights. The rights will wither away .... (the) State can use the allegedly unfulfilled duties to shove aside the rights. - Any Bill of Rights that makes the rights conditional on duties towards society or the State, however strong its emphasis on human dignity, freedom, God or whatever else, can be accepted by any totalitarian leader. He will enforce the duties while disregarding the right". 731. Indeed the balancing process between the individual rights and the social needs is a delicate one. This is primarily the responsibility of the "States and in the ultimate analysis of the courts as interpreters of the Constitution and the laws. 732. Our founding fathers were satisfied that there is no antithesis between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. One supplement the other. The Directives lay down the end to be achieved and Part III prescribes the means through which the goal is to be reached. Our Constitution does not subscribe to the theory that end justifies the means adopted. The Counsel for the petitioners urged that the @pageSC1642 Fundamental Rights are not the cause of our failure to implement the Directive Principles. According to him, it is not the Constitution that has failed us; but we have failed to rise up to its expectations. He urged that the attack against Fundamental Rights is merely an alibi and an attempt to find a scapegoat on the part of those who were unable or unwilling to implement the Directives. These allegations are denied on behalf of the Articles in Part III of the Constitution have placed impediments in the way of the States, in implementing the Directives. These controversies are not capable of being decided by courts. 733. There is no doubt that the power conferred under Article 31-C, if interpreted in the manner contended on behalf of the Union and the States would result in denuding substantially the contents of the right to equality, the right to the seven freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19 and the right to get some reasonable return by the person whose property is taken for public purpose. Unlike Article 31-A, Article 31-C is not confined to some particular subjects. It can take in a very wide area of human activities. The power conferred under it, is an arbitrary power. It is capable of being used for collateral purposes. It can be used to stifle the freedom of speech, freedom to assemble peaceably, freedom to move freely throughout India, freedom to reside and settle in any part of

India, freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property and freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. The power conferred under that provision is a blanket power. Even a small majority in a legislature can use that power to truncate or even destroy democracy. That power can be used to weaken the unity and integrity of this country. That Article is wholly out of tune with our Constitution. Its implications are manifold. There is force in the contention of the petitioners that this Article has the potentiality of shaking the very foundation of our Constitution. 734. What is the nature of the power conferred under Article 31-C? It is claimed to have empowered Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact laws pro tanto abrogating Articles 14, 19 and 31. A power to take away directly or indirectly a right guaranteed or a duty imposed under a Constitution by an ordinary law, is a power to pro tanto abrogate the Constitution. If the legislature is empowered to amend the Constitution by ordinary legislative procedure, any law enacted by it, even if it does not purport to amend the Constitution, but all the same, is inconsistent with one or more of the provisions of the Constitution has the effect of abrogating the Constitution to the extent of inconsistency. That position is clear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in McCawley v. The King, 1920 AC 691. In other words, the power conferred under that Article is a power to amend the Constitution in certain essential respects while enacting legislations coming within the purview of that Article. It is a power not merely to abridge but even to take away the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 31 by ordinary law. Further that power is conferred not only on the Parliament but also on the State Legislatures. 735. Article 368 specifically provides that amendment of the Constitution can be done only in the manner provided therein. It is true that there are provisions in the Constitution under which the Parliament can amend some parts of the Constitution by ordinary law see Articles 2 to 4, Article 169, Paragraph 7 of Schedule V and Paragraph 21 of Schedule VI. But these provisions clearly provide that the laws enacted under those provisions "are not to be deemed as amendments to the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368". There are also some transitional provisions in the Constitution which can be changed by the Parliament by law. Leaving aside for separate consideration Article 31-A, which was first introduced by the 1st Amendment Act, 1951, there is no provision in the Constitution apart from Article 31 (4) which permitted the State legislatures to enact laws contravening one or more of the provisions in Part III. Article 31 (4) relates to legislations pending before the State Legislatures at the time the Constitution came into force. Their scope was known to the Constitution-makers. That provision was enacted to protect certain Zamindari Abolition laws which were on the anvil. But it must be remembered that the original provisions in the Constitution were not controlled by Article 368. That Article is as much a creature of the Constitution as the other Articles are. The form @page-SC1643 and manner prescribed in Article 368 did not govern the procedure of the Constituent Assembly. The mandates contained in Article 368 are applicable only to the amendments made to the Constitution. The power to amend the Constitution was exclusively given to the Parliament and to no other body. The manner of exercising that power is clearly prescribed. Article 31-C gives a very large power to the State Legislatures as well as to Parliament to pro tanto amend the Constitution by enacting laws coming within its ambit. To put it differently, Article 31 C permits the State Legislatures and the Parliament to enact Constitution-breaking laws by a simple majority vote of the members present and voting, if the rule regarding quorum is satisfied.

736. It cannot be said that Article 31-C is similar to Articles 4,169, Paragraph 7 of Sch. V and Paragraph 21 of Sch. VI. Each one of those Articles makes it clear that the laws passed under those Articles are not to be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368. Those laws cannot affect the basic features of the Constitution. They operate within narrow fields. 737. The learned Advocate-General of Maharashtra contended that Article 31-C lifts the ban placed on the State Legislatures and Parliament under Articles 14, 19 and 31. It is true that there are several provisions in the Constitution which lift the ban placed by one or the other Article of the Constitution on the legislative power of the State Legislatures and Parliament e.g. Arts. 15 (4), 16 (3), 16 (4), 16 (5), 19 (2) to 19 (6), 22 (3), 22 (6), 23 (2), 28 (2), 31 (4), 31 (6) etc. Each one of these Articles lifts the limitations placed on the legislative power of the legislatures by one or more of the provisions of the Constitution particularly those contained in Part III. But when the limitation is so lifted, there will be no conflict between the law enacted and Article 13. In such a situation, there is no occasion for providing that the law enacted will not be deemed to be void notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13. The laws made under the provisions set out earlier cannot in their very nature take away any of the fundamental features of the Constitution. They can merely modify one or other of those features. Article 31-C proceeds on the basis that the laws enacted under that Article are in conflict with Article 13 and are prima facie void. Otherwise there was no purpose in providing in that Article "Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or cl. (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31 ......." Hence the contention that limitations imposed by Articles 14, 19 and 31 on the legislative power of the Union and the States are lifted to the extent provided in Article 31-C cannot be accepted. 738. It is true that there is some similarity between the laws made under Article 31-A and those made under Article 31-C. The scope of the latter article is much wider than that of the former. The character of the laws made under both those Articles is somewhat similar. It was urged that if laws made under Article 31-A, without more, are valid even if they take away or abridge the rights conferred under Articles 14, 19 and 31, for the same reason, laws made under Article 31-C must also be held valid. It was contended, now that this Court has upheld the validity of Article 31-A, we should also uphold the validity of Article 31-C. In that connection, reliance was placed on the following observations of Brandies, J., of the United States Supreme Court in Lesser v. Garnett, (1921) 66 Law Ed 595 = 258 US 13. "This Amendment (19th Amendment) is in character and phraseology precisely similar to the 15th. For each the same method of adoption was pursued. One cannot be valid and the other invalid. That the 15th is valid .....has been recognised and acted upon for half a century...... The suggestion that the 15th was incorporated in the Constitution not in accordance with law, but practically as a war measure which has been validated by acquiescence cannot be entertained." 739. These observations do not lay down any principle of law. The validity of the 19th Amendment was upheld on various grounds and not merely because the 15th amendment was upheld.

740. The laws enacted under Article 31-A by their very nature can hardly abrogate the rights embodied in Articles 14, 19 and 31. Those laws can encroach upon the rights guaranteed under @page-SC1644 Articles 14, 19 and 31 only to the extent necessary for giving effect to them. The laws made must be those made under the topics of legislation mentioned in Article 31-A. Hence the encroachment of the rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 must necessarily be incidental. If the encroachment is found to be excessive, the same can be struck down. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision of this Court in Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, (1963) Supp 3 SCR 691 = (AIR 1963 SC 1047). Therein the validity of a provision of a statute enacted under Article 19 (6) (ii) i.e., law providing for State monopoly in Kendu Leaves, came up for consideration. The question for decision before the Court was whether that law can not unreasonably encroach upon the right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g). That question was answered by Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, thus: ""A law relating to" a State monopoly cannot, in the context include all the provisions contained in the said law whether they have direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said expression should be construed to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a law is passed creating a State monopoly, the Court should enquire what are the provisions of the said law which are basically and essential, necessary for creating the State monopoly. It is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article 19 (6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Article 19 (6). In other words the effect of the amendment made in Article 19 (6) is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that means that it is only the provisions of the law which are integrally and essentially connected with the creation of the monopoly that are protected. The rest of the provisions which may be incidental do not fall under the latter part of Article 19 (6) and would inevitably have to satisfy the test of the first part of Article 19 (6)." 741. The same principle was reiterated by the full Court in the Bank Nationalisation case. 742. As far back as in 1951 this Court ruled in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, 1951 SCR 682 = (AIR 1951 SC 318) that merely because law was enacted to implement one of the Directive Principles, the same cannot with impunity encroach upon the Fundamental Rights. The ratio of Akadasi Pradhan's case would be equally applicable in respect of the laws made under Article 31-A which speaks of the "law providing for the" topics mentioned therein. But that ratio cannot be effectively applied when we come to laws made under Art. 31-C. The reach of Article 31-C is very wide. It is possible to fit into the scheme of that Article almost any economic and social legislation. Further, the Court cannot go into the question whether the laws enacted do give effect to the policy set out in Article 39 (b) and (c). We were told on behalf of the Union and the States that it is open to the courts to examine whether there is a nexus between the laws made under Article 31-C and Article 39 (b) and (c) and all that the Courts are precluded from examining is the effectiveness of the law in achieving the intended purpose. But, such a power in its very nature is tenuous. There can be few laws which can be held to have no nexus with Article 39 (b) and (c). At any rate, most laws may be given the appearance of aiming to achieve the objectives mentioned in Article 39 (b) and (c). Once that facade is

projected, the laws made can proceed to destroy the very foundation of our Constitution. Encroachment of valuable constitutional guarantees generally begins imperceptibly and is made with the best of intentions but, once that attempt is successful further encroachments follow as a matter of course, not perhaps with any evil motives, and may be, out of strong convictions regarding the righteousness of the course adopted and the objectives intended to be achieved but they may all the same be wholly unconstitutional. Lord Atkin observed in Proprietary Articles Traders Association v. Attorney General for Canada, 1931 AC 311 at p. 317 = (AIR 1931 PC 94). "Both the Act and the sections have a legislative history which is relevant to the discussion. Their Lordships entertain no doubt that time alone will not validate an Act which when challenged is found to be ultra vires; nor will a history of a gradual series of advances till this boundary is finally crossed avail to protect @page-SC1645 the ultimate encroachment." 743. The observation of Lord Atkin "nor will a history of a gradual series of advances till this boundary is finally crossed avail to protect the ultimate encroachment" is extremely apposite for our present purpose. The First Amendment Act permitted enactment of Constitution breaking laws in respect of one subject; the Fourth Amendment Act enlarged that field and permitted the Legislatures to make laws ignoring Articles 14, 19 and 31 in respect of five subjects. Now the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has finally crossed the boundary. 744. It cannot be said that under Article 31-C Parliament merely delegated its own amending power to State Legislatures and such a delegation is valid. The power conferred on Parliament under Article 368 in its very nature is one that cannot be delegated. It is a special power to be exclusively exercised by Parliament and that in the manner prescribed in Article 368. The State Legislatures are not institutions subordinate to Parliament. Parliament as well as State Legislatures in their respective allocated fields are supreme. Parliament cannot delegate its legislative powers - much less the amending power - to the State Legislatures. The question whether the legislatures can confer power on some other independent legislative body to exercise its legislative power came up, for consideration before the Judicial Committee in Re the Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 AC 935 at p. 945 = (AIR 1919 PC 145). Therein Viscount Haldane speaking for the Board observed: "Section 92 of the Act of 1867 (British North American Act) entrusts the legislative power in a Province to its legislature and to that legislature only. No doubt a body, with a power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed by a Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek the assistance of subordinate agencies, as had been done when in Hodge v. The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 117 the Legislature of Ontario was held entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence. Their Lordships do no more than draw attention to the gravity of the Constitutional questions which thus arise. 745. In Queen v. Burah, (1878) 5 Ind App 178 at p. 194, (PC) the Judicial Committee observed:

"Their Lordships agree that the Governor General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils' Act." 746. We respectfully agree with these observations. From these observations it follows that Parliament was incompetent to create a new power - a power to ignore some of the provisions of the Constitution -and endow the same on the State Legislatures. That power was exclusively conferred on Parliament so that the unity and integrity of this country may not be jeopardised by parochial considerations. The Constitution makers were evidently of the opinion that the sovereignty of the country, the democratic character of the polity, and the individual liberties etc., would be better safeguarded if the amending power is exclusively left in the hands of the Parliament. This exclusive conferment of amending power on the Parliament is one of the basic features of the Constitution and the same cannot be violated directly or indirectly. Article 31-A made a small dent on this feature and that went unnoticed. That provision is now protected by the principle of stare decisis. Public interest will suffer if we go back on these decisions and take away the protection given to many statutes. Now, to use the words of Lord Atkin in the Proprietary Articles Traders Association's case, the, boundary line has been crossed' and a challenge to the very basic conceptions of the Constitution is posed. Hence the neglect or avoidance of the question in previous cases cannot be accepted as a sound argument. 747. In Queen v. Kirby, (1956) 94 CLR 395, Dixon, C. J., observed: These cases, and perhaps other examples exist, do no doubt add to the weight of the general considerations arising from lapse of time, the neglect or avoidance of the question in previous cases and the very evident desirability of leaving undisturbed assumptions that have been accepted as to the validity of the provisions in question. At the same time, the Court is not entitled to place very great reliance upon the fact that, in @page-SC1646 cases, before it where occasions might have been made to raise the question for argument and decision, this was not done by any member of the Court and that on the contrary all accepted the common assumption of the parties and decided the case accordingly. Undsirable as it is that doubtful questions of validity should go by default, the fact is that, the Court usually acts upon the presumption of validity until the law is specifically challenged." 748. Similar was the view expressed by Viscount Simonds speaking for the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General of Common Wealth of Australia v. The Queen, (1957) 95 CLR 529 at p. 547": "It is therefore asked and no one can doubt that it is a formidable question, why for a quarter of a century no litigant has attacked the validity of this obviously illegitimate unions. Why in Alexander's case (1918) 25 CLR 434 itself was no challenge made? How came it that in a series of cases, which are enumerated in the majority and the dissentient judgments it was assumed without question that the provisions now impugned were valid ? It is clear from the majority judgment that the learned Chief Justice and the Judges who shared his opinion were heavily pressed by this consideration. It could not be otherwise. Yet they were impelled to their conclusion by the clear conviction that consistently with the Constitution the validity of the impugned provision could not be sustained. Whether the result would have been different if their validity had previously been judicially determined after full argument directed to the precise question and had not rested on

judicial dicta and common assumption it is not for their Lordships to say. Upon a question of the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to matters of far reaching constitutional importance they would imperatively require the assistance of the High Court itself. But here no such question arises. Whatever the reason may be, just as there was a patent invalidity in the original Act which for a number of years went unchallenged, so far a greater number of years an invalidity which to their Lordships as to the majority of the High Court has been convincingly demonstrated, has been disregarded. Such clear conviction must find expression, in the appropriate judgment." 749. The contention that Article 31-C may be considered as an amendment of Article 368 is not tenable. It does not purport to be so. That Article does not find a place in Part XX of the Constitution. It is not shown as a proviso to Article 368, the only Article which deals with the amendment of the Constitution as such. Article 31-C does not say that the powers conferred under that Article are available "notwithstanding anything contained in Article 368" or "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution". There is no basis for holding that the Parliament intended that Article 31-C should operate as an amendment of Article 368. We have earlier come to the conclusion that the State Legislatures cannot be invested with the power to amend the Constitution. 750. If the purpose of Art. 31-C is to secure for the Government, the control of means of production in certain economic spheres exclusively or otherwise, the same can be achieved by the exercise of legislative power under Article 31 (2) or under Article 31 (2) read with Article 19 (6) (ii). If on the other hand, the object is to reduce the existing economic disparity in the country, that object can be achieved by exercising the various under the Constitution, in particular by the exercise of the power to tax, a power can be exercised without discriminating against any section of the people. One of the basic underlying principles of our Constitution is that every governmental power, which includes both the power of the executives as well as of the legislatures, must be so exercised as to give no room for legitimate complaint, that it was exercised with an evil eye or an uneven hand. 751. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that Article 31-C permits the destruction of some of the basic features of our Constitution and consequently, it is void. 752. Lastly, we come to the validity of the 29th Amendment Act, 1972. Contentions relating to the Amendment Act of the Constitution lie within narrower limits. The only plea taken two Acts included in the IXth Schedule to the Constitution by means of the 29th Amendment Act does not satisfy the requirements of Article 31-A (1) (a), the @page-SC1647 said provision does not get the protection of Article 31-B. 753. As a result of the 29th Amendment Act, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (Kerala Act 33 of 1969) and Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Kerala Act 25 of 1971) were added as items 65 and 66 in the IXth Schedule of the Constitution. The IXth Schedule is an appendage to Article 31-B, which says: "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations

shall subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force." 754. The learned Counsel for the petitioners did not challenge the validity of Article 31B. Its validity has been accepted in a number of cases decided by this Court. His only contention was that before any Act or any provision in an Act, included in the IXth Schedule can get the protection of Article 31-B, the Act or the provision in question must satisfy the requirements of one or the other of the provisions in Article 31-A. For this contention of his, he relied on the opening words of Article 31-B namely "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A". He urged that, if Article 31-B had been an independent provision having no connection whatsoever with Article 31-A as contended on behalf of the contesting respondents, there was no occasion for using the words referred to earlier in Article 31-B. He also attempted to trace the history of Articles 31-A and 31-B and establish that there is link between those two Articles. Though there is some force in those contentions, the question of law raised is no more res integra. It is concluded by a series of decisions of this Court and we see no justification to reopen that question. 755. In State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga, (1952) 3 SCR 889 = (AIR 1952 SC 252), a contention similar to that advanced by Mr. Palkhivala was advanced by Mr. Somayya. That contention was rejected by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., speaking for the Court with these observations: "Mr. Somayya, however, submitted that the opening words of Article 31-B, namely "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A" showed that the mention of particular statutes in Article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule was only illustrative, and that, accordingly, Article 31-B could not be wider in scope. Reliance was placed in support of this argument upon the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Banerji's case, 1945 FCR 195 = (AIR 1945 PC 156). I cannot agree with that view. There is nothing in Article 31-B to indicate that the specific intention of certain statutes was only intended to illustrate the application of the general words of Article 31-A. The opening words of Article 31-B are only intended to make clear that Article 31-A should not be restricted in its application by reason of anything contained in Article 31-B and are in no way calculated to restrict the application of the latter article or of the enactments referred to therein to acquisition of "estates". 756. In Visweshwar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1020 = (AIR 1952 SC 252), Mahajan, J. (as he then was) reiterated the same view. He observed : "It was contended that Article 31-B was merely illustrative of the rule stated in Article 31-A and if Article 31-A had no application, that article also should be left out of consideration............... On the basis of the similarity of the language in the opening part of Article 31-B with that of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A", it was urged that Article 31-B was merely illustrative of Article 31-A and as the latter was limited in its application to estates as defined therein, Article 31-B was also so limited. In my opinion, the observations in Sibnath Banerjee's case far from supporting the contention raised, negatives it. Article 31B specifically validates certain Acts mentioned in the Schedule despite the provisions of Article 31-A, but stands independent of it. The impugned Acts in this situation qua the acquisition of the eight malguzari villages cannot be questioned on the @page-SC1648

ground that it contravenes the provision of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution or any of the other provisions of Part III." 757. A similar view was expressed by this Court in N. B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector, Thana Prant, Thana, (1965) 1 SCR 639 = (AIR 1965 SC 1096) Therein Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed thus: "The learned Attorney General contended that Article 31-A and Article 31-B should be read together and that if so read Article 31-B would only illustrate cases that would otherwise fall under Article 31-A and, therefore, the same construction as put upon Article 31-B should also apply to Article 31-A of the Constitution. This construction was sought to be based upon the opening words of Article 31-B, namely "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A". We find it difficult to accept this argument. The words "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions" indicate that the Acts and regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule would have the immunity even if they did not attract Article 31-A of the Constitution. If every Act in the 9th Schedule would be covered by Art. 31-A, this article would become redundant. Indeed some of the Acts mentioned therein, namely, Items 14 to 20 and many other Acts added to the 9th Schedule, do not appear to relate to estates as defined in Article 31-A (2) of the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that Article 31-B is not governed by Article 31-A and that Article 31-B is a constitutional device to place the specified statutes beyond any attack on the ground that they infringe Part III of the Constitution...." Several other decisions of this Court proceed on the basis that Article 31-B is independent of Article 31-A. It is too late in the day to reopen that question. Whether the Acts which were brought into the IXth Schedule by the 29th Amendment Act or any provision in any of them abrogate any of the basic elements or essential features of the Constitution can be examined when the validity of those Acts is gone into. 758. For the foregoing reasons, we reject the contention of the petitioners that before an Act can be included in the IXth Schedule, it must satisfy the requirements of Article 31A. 759. In the result we hold: (1) The power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 as it stood before its amendment empowered the Parliament by following the form and manner laid down in that Article to amend each and every Article and each and every Part of the Constitution. (2) The expression "law" in Article 13 (2) even before Article 13 was amended by the 24th Amendment Act, did not include amendments to the Constitution. (3) Though the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is a very wide power, it does not yet include the power to destroy or emasculate the basic elements or the fundamental features of the Constitution. (4) The 24th Amendment Act did not enlarge the amending power of the Parliament. It merely made explicit what was implicit in the original Article. Hence it is valid. (5) (A) The newly substituted Article 31 (2) does not destroy the right to property because (i) the fixation of "amount" under that Article should have reasonable relationship with the value of the property acquired or requisitioned; (ii) the principles laid down must be relevant for the purpose of arriving at the "amount" payable in respect of the property acquired or requisitioned; (iii) the "amount' fixed should not be illusory and

(iv) the same should not be fixed arbitrarily. (5) (B) The question whether the "amount" in question has been fixed arbitrarily or the same is illusory or the principles laid down for the determination of the same are relevant to the subjectmatter of acquisition or requisition at about the time when the property in question is acquired or requisitioned are open to judicial review. But it is no more open to the court to consider whether the "amount" fixed or to be determined on the basis of the principles laid down is adequate. (6) Clause 2 (b) of the 25th Amendment Act which incorporated Article 31 (2-B) is also valid as it did not damage or destroy any essential features of the Constitution. (7) Clause (3) of the 25th Amendment Act which introduced into the Constitution Article 31-C is invalid for two reasons i.e., (1) it was beyond the amending power of the Parliament in so far as the amendment in question permits destruction of several basic elements or @page-SC1649 fundamental features of the Constitution and (2) it empowers the Parliament and the State Legislatures to pro tanto amend certain human freedoms guaranteed to the citizens by the exercise of their ordinary legislative power. (8) The 29th Amendment Act is valid but whether the Acts which were brought into the IXth Schedule by that Amendment or any provision in any of them abrogate any of the basic elements or essential features of the Constitution will have to be examined when the validity of those Acts is gone into. 760. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these cases uptill this stage. RAY, J :- 761. The validity of the Constitution 24th, 25th and 29th Amendment Acts is challenged. The Constitution, 24th Amendment Act amended Article 368. Article 368 in the unamended form speaks of "Amendment of this Constitution", and how the Constitution shall stand amended. The Constitution 24th Amendment Act enacts that Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Article. The other part of the amendment is that nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment under Article 368. The Constitution 25th Amendment Act has amended Article 31 (2) and also Article 31 (2 A). The effect of these two amendments with regard to Articles 31 (2) and 3l (2A) is two-fold. First, no property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of law which provides for an amount which may be fixed by law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles.. Secondly, nothing in Article 19 (1) (f) shall affect any 1aw as is referred to in Article 31 (2). The second part of the Constitution 25th Amendment Act is introduction of Article 31-C which enacts that notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 13 no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing principles prescribed in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. By the Constitution 29th Amendment Act the Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1969 and the Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1971 have been introduced into the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. 762. The principal question which falls for determination is whether the power to amend is under any express limitation of Article 13 (2). Another question is whether there are

implied and inherent limitations on the power of amendment. Can there be any implied or inherent limitation in the face of any express power of amendment without any exception ? Questions have been raised that essential features of the Constitution cannot be amended. Does the Constitution admit of distinction between essential and nonessential features? Who is to determine what the essential features are ? Who is the authority to pronounce as to what features are essential? The pre-eminent question is whether the power of amendment is to be curtailed or restricted, though the Constitution does not contain any exception to the power of amendment. The people gave the Constitution to the people. The people gave the power of amendment to Parliament. Democracy proceeds on the faith and capacity of the people to elect their representatives and faith in the representatives to represent the people. Throughout the history of mankind if any motive power has been more potent than another it is that of faith in themselves. The ideal of faith in ourself is of the greatest help to us. Grote the historian of Greece said that the diffusion of constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community but throughout the whole is the indispensable condition of a Government at once free and peaceable. By Constitutional morality Grote meant a paramount reverence for the forms of the Constitution, with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen amidst the bitterness of party contest that the forms of the Constitution will not be less sacred in the eyes of opponents than in his own. The question @page-SC1650 is "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? or he that made the eye, shall he not see?" 763. The real question is whether there is any power to amend the Constitution and if so whether there is any limitation on the power. The answer to this question depends on these considerations. First, what is the correct ratio and effect of the decision in I. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762=(AIR 1967 SC 1643). Second, should that ratio be upheld. Third, is there any limitation on the power to amend the Constitution. Fourth, was the 24th Amendment validly enacted. If it was, is there any inherent and implied limitation on that power under Art. 368 as amended. 764. The scope and power under Article 368 as it stood prior to the Constitution (24th) Amendment Act to amend the Constitution falls for consideration. 765. Two principal questions arise. First, is the Constitution as well as an amendment to the Constitution law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). Second, is there any implied and inherent limitation on the power of amendment apart from Article 13 (2). 766. Mr. Palkhivala contends that the unamended Article 368 was subject to Article 13 (2). It is said that amendment of the Constitution is law, and therefore, any law which contravenes fundamental rights is void. It is also said that Article 368 does not prevail over or override Article 13. The four bars under Article 13 are said to be these. The bar is imposed against the State, that is to say the totality of all the forces of the State. Second, all categories of law are covered by-the bar, whether they are constitutional amendments or bye-laws or executive Orders and Notifications. Third, all laws m force under Article 372 and all laws to be brought into force at any future date are brought within the scope of this bar. Fourth, the effect of the bar is to render the law void. 767. Mr. Palkhivala said that the preamble makes it clear that the object of the Constitution is to secure basic human freedoms, and this guarantee will be meaningless if the Legislature against whom the guarantee is to operate is at liberty to abrogate the guarantees. It is said that law is comprehensive enough to include both ordinary law and

constitutional law. The various forms of oath in the Third Schedule of the Constitution refer to "Constitution as by law established." It is, therefore, submitted by the petitioner that the Constitution itself was originally established by law and every amendment has likewise to be established by law in order to take effect. It is emphasised that the constitutional amendment is a law, and therefore, the word 'law" in Article 13 (2) includes constitutional amendments. 768. The Attorney-General and Mr. Seervai said that the Constitution is the supreme higher law. An amendment to the Constitution is in exercise of constituent power. The amending power is not a legislative power. Law in Article 13 (2) embodies the doctrine of ultra vires to render void any law enacted under the Constitution. 769. This Court in Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, 1952 SCR 89 = (AIR 1951 SC 458) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 SCR 933 = (AIR l965 SC 845), examined the power to amend the Constitution. 770. In Shankari Prasad case the Constitution First Amendment Act was challenged. The principal contention was that the First Amendment in so far as it purported to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution fell within the prohibition of Article 13 (2) of the Constitution. 771. The unanimous view of this Court in Shankari Prasad case, was that although law must ordinarily include constitutional law there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law which is made in exercise of legislative power and constitutional law which is made in exercise of constituent power. In the absence of a clear indication to the contrary it is difficult to hold that the framers of the Constitution intended to make the fundamental rights immune of constitutional amendment. The terms of Article 368 are general to empower Parliament to amend the Constitution @page-SC1651 without any exception. Article 13 (2) construed in the context of Art. 13 means that law in Article 13 (2) would be relatable to exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendment to the Constitution. 772. The Constitution Fourth Amendment Act came into existence on 5 October,1963. The Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act came into force on 20 June, 1964. By the Seventeenth Amendment Act, Art. 31-A clause (1) was amended by inserting one more proviso. A fresh sub-cl. (a) was substituted for original sub-cl. (a) of clause (2) of Article 31 retrospectively. 44 Acts were added in the Ninth Schedule. The validity of the Seventeenth Amendment was challenged before this Court in Sajjan Singh case. 773. The main contention m Sajjan Singh case, was that the power prescribed by Article 226 was likely to be affected by the Seventeenth Amendment, and therefore, it was necessary that the special procedure laid down in the proviso to Article 368 should have been followed. The Seventeenth Amendment Act was said to be invalid because that procedure was not followed. 774. The majority view of this Court in Sajjan Singh case was that Article 368 plainly and unambiguously meant amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. The word "law" in Article 13 (2) was held not to take in the Constitution Amendment Acts passed under Article 368. It was also said that fundamental rights in Art. 19 could be regulated as specified in cls. (2) to (6) and, therefore, it could not be said to have been assumed by the Constitution makers that fundamental rights were static and incapable of expansion. It was said that the concept of public interest and other important considerations which are the basis of clauses (2) to (6) in Article 19 "may change and may even expand". The

majority view said that "The Constitution makers knew that Parliament could be competent to make amendments in those rights (meaning thereby fundamental rights) so as to meet the challenge of the problem which may arise in the course of socio economic progress and the development of the country." 775. The minority view in Sajjan Singh case doubted the correctness of the unanimous view in Shankari Prasad case. The doubt was a question as to whether fundamental rights could be abridged by exercise of power under Article 368. The minority view in Sajjan Singh case was that the rights of society are made paramount and are placed above those of the individual. But the minority view was also that though fundamental rights could be restricted under clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 there could be no "removal or debilitation" of such rights. 776. In Golak Nath case the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 was challenged as violative of fundamental rights and as not being protected by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951, the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act, 1955 and the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964. The validity of the Mysore Land Reforms Act. 1962 as amended by Act 14 of 1965 was also challenged on the same grounds. The Punjab Act and the Mysore Act were included in the Ninth Schedule. It was common case that if the Seventeenth Amendment Act adding the Punjab Act and the Mysore Act in the Ninth Schedule was valid the two Acts could not be impugned on any ground. 777. The majority decision of this Court in Golak Nath case was that an amendment of the Constitution was law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). There were two reasonings in the majority view arriving at the same conclusion. The majority view where Subba Rao, C. J., spoke was as follows : The power to amend the Constitution is derived from Articles 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution and not from Article 368. Article 368 deals only with procedure. Amendment is a legislative process. Amendment is law within the meaning of Article 13. Therefore, if an amendment takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution it is void. The Constitution First Amendment Act, the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act and the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act @page-SC1652 abridged the scope of fundamental rights. On the basis of earlier decisions of this Court the Constitution Amendment Acts were declared to be valid. On the application of the doctrine of prospective overruling the amendments will continue to be valid. Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision (meaning thereby the decision in Golak Nath case) to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights. The Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act holds the field. Therefore, the Punjab Act and the Mysore Act cannot be questioned. 778. The concurring majority view of Hidayatullah, J. was this. The fundamental rights are outside the amendatory process if the amendment seeks to abridge or take away any of the rights. The First, the Fourth and the Seventh Amendment Acts being Part of the Constitution by acquiescence for a long time cannot be challenged. These Constitution Amendment Acts contain authority for the Seventeenth Amendment Act. Any further inroad into fundamental rights as they exist on the date of the decision will be illegal and unconstitutional unless it complies with Part III in general and Article 13 (2) in particular. The constituent body will have to be convened for abridging or taking away fundamental rights. The Punjab Act and the Mysore Act are valid not because they are included in the

Ninth Schedule of the Constitution but because they are protected by Article 31-A and the assent of the President. 779. The two views forming the majority arrived at the same conclusion that an amendment of the Constitution being law within the meaning of Article 13 (2) would be unconstitutional if such an amendment abridged any fundamental right. The leading majority view did not express any final opinion as to whether fundamental rights could be abridged by Parliament exercising its residuary power and calling a Constituent Assembly "for making a new Constitution or radically changing it." The concurring majority view held that the fundamental rights could be abridged by suitably amending Art.368 to convoke Constituent Assembly. The concurring majority view was that a Constituent Assembly could be called by passing a law under Entry 97 of List I and then that Assembly would be able to abridge or take away fundamental rights. 780. The minority view of five learned Judges expressed in 3 judgments as against the majority view of six learned Judges in Golak Nath case was this. 781. Wanchoo, J. spoke for himself and two concurring learned Judges as follows. Article 368 contains both the power and the procedure for amendment of the Constitution. It is incomprehensible that the residuary power of Parliament will apply to amendment of the Constitution when the procedure for amendment speaks of amendment by ratification by the States. When an entire part of the Constitution is devoted to amendment it will be more appropriate to read Article 368 as containing the power to amend because there is no specific mention of amendment in Article 348 or in any Entry of List I. The Constitution is the fundamental law and without express power to effect change legislative power cannot effect any change in the Constitution. Legislative Acts are passed under the power conferred by the Constitution. Article 245 which gives power to make law for the whole or any part of India is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. If however, power to amend is in Article 248 read with the residuary Entry in List I that power is to be exercised subject to the Constitution and it cannot change the Constitution which is the fundamental law. It is because of the difference between the fundamental law and the legislative power under the Constitution that the power to amend cannot be located in the Residuary Entry which is law making power under the Constitution. 782. Article 368 confers power on Parliament subject to the procedure provided therein for amendment of any provision of the Constitution. It is impossible to introduce in the concept of amendment, any idea of improvement. The word "amendment" must be given its full meaning. This @page-SC1653 means that by amendment an existing Constitution or law can be changed. This change can take the form either of addition to the existing provisions, or alteration of existing provisions and their substitution by others or deletion of certain provisions altogether. An amendment of the Constitution is not an ordinary law made under the powers conferred under Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution, and, therefore, it cannot be subject to Article 13 (2). It is strange that the power conferred by Article 368 will be limited by putting an interpretation on the word "law" in Article 13 (2) which will include constitutional law also. The possibility of the abuse of any power has no relevance in considering the question about the existence of the power itself. The power of amendment is the safety valve which to a large extent provides for stable growth and makes violent revolution more or less unnecessary.

783. The two other supporting minority views were these. Bachawat, J. arrived at these conclusions. No limitation on the amending power can be gathered from the language of Article 368. Therefore, each and every part of the Constitution may be amended under Article 368. The distinction between the Constitution and the laws is so fundamental that the Constitution is not regarded as a law or a legislative Act. It is because a Constitution Amendment Act can amend the Constitution that it is not a law and Article 368 avoids all reference to law making by Parliament. As soon as a Bill is passed in conformity with Article 368 the Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. Amendment or change in certain Articles does not mean necessarily improvement. 784. Ramaswami. J. expressed these views. The definition of law in Article 13 (3) does not include in terms a constitutional amendment though it includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage. The language of Article 368 is perfectly general and empowers Parliament to amend the Constitution without any exception whatever. If it had been intended by the Constitution makers that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III should be completely outside the scope of Article 368 it is reasonable to assume that they would have made an express provision to that effect. The expression "fundamental" does not lift the fundamental rights above the Constitution itself. In a matter of constitutional amendment it is not permissible to assume that there will be abuse of power and then utilise it as a test for finding out the scope of amending power. 785. The majority view in Golak Nath case was that an amendment of the Constitution pursuant to Article 368 is law within the meaning of Article 13 (2), and, therefore, an amendment of the Constitution abridging fundamental rights will be void. The majority view was on the basis that there was, conflict between Article 13 (2) and Article 368 and this basis was the result of the nature and quality of fundamental rights in the scheme of the Constitution. 786. It is, therefore, to be seen at the threshold as to whether there is any conflict between Art. 13 (2) and Article 368, namely, whether amendment of Constitution is law within the meaning of law in Art. 13 (2). Article 368 provides in clear and unambiguous terms that an amendment bill after compliance with the procedure stated therein and upon the President giving assent to such bill the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the bill. This constitutional mandate does not admit or provide any scope for any conflict with any other Article of the Constitution. This is the fundamental law. No other Article of the Constitution has limited its scope. The moment the President gives his assent to an amendment bill the amendment becomes a part of the Constitution. There cannot be a law before the assent of the President. Therefore, the validity of any such supposed law cannot arise. An amendment of the Constitution becomes a part of the fundamental law. The legality of an amendment is no more open to attack than of the Constitution itself. The opening part of unamended Art. 368, viz., "An Amendment of this Constitution may be initiated" and its @page-SC1654 concluding part before the proviso viz., ''The Constitution shall stand amended show clearly that the whole Constitution can be amended and no part of line Constitution is excluded from the amendment. Herein lies the vital distinction between the Constitution and the ordinary law. 787. The distinction lies in the criterion of validity. The validity of an ordinary law can be questioned. When it is questioned it must be justified by reference to a higher law. In the case of the Constitution the validity is inherent and lies within itself. The validity of

constitutional law cannot be justified by reference to another higher law. Every legal rule or norm owes its validity to some higher legal rule or norm. The Constitution is the basic norm. The Constitution generates its own validity. It is valid because it exists. The Constitution is binding because it is the Constitution. Any other law is binding only if and in so far as it is in conformity with the Constitution. The validity of the Constitution lies in the social fact of its acceptance by the community. The constitutional rules are themselves the basic rules of the legal system. The Constitution prevails over any other form of law not because of any provision to that effect either in the Constitution or elsewhere but because of the underlying assumption to that effect by the community. If Parliament passes a law under any of the items in the Union List abridging a fundamental right and also provides in that law itself that it shall not be invalid notwithstanding anything in Article 13 or Part III of the Constitution, yet the law made by Parliament will be invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with Part III of the Constitution. It will be invalid because Article 13 occurs in the Constitution which is supreme. The impugned Act cannot enact that it will be valid notwithstanding the Constitution. 788. The real distinction is that Constitutional law is the source of all legal validity and is itself always valid. Ordinary law on the other hand must derive its validity from a higher legal source, which is ultimately the Constitution Law in Article 13 (2) of the Constitution could only mean that law which needs validity from a higher source and which can and ought to be regarded as invalid when it comes in conflict with higher law. It cannot possibly include a law which is self validating and which is never invalid. The definition of law in Article 13 enumerates more or less exhaustively all forms of law which need validation from higher source and which are invalid when they are in conflict with the Constitution. The definition does not mention constitutional amendment. It is because an amendment being the Constitution itself can never be invalid. An amendment is made if the procedure is complied with. Once the procedure is complied with it is a part of the Constitution. 789. The expression "law" has been used in several Articles in Part III of the Constitution. These are Articles 17, 19 clauses (2) to (6), 21, 22, 25, 26, 31, 33, 34 and 35. To illustrate, Article 17 states that untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. Article 17 also states that the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. The word "law" in Article 17 does not mean the Constitution. The Constitution leaves the matter of enforcement and punishment to law. 790. The foundation of the majority view in Golak Nath case that Article 13 (2) takes in constitutional law within its purview is that an amendment is a legislative process and is an exercise of legislative power. The majority relied on the decision in Mocawley v. The King, 1920 A. C. 691 (AIR 1920 PC 91) and the Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe, 1965 AC 172, in support of the view that there is no distinction between ordinary legislation and constitutional amendment. The basis of the unanimous decision in Shankari Prasad case, was on the distinction between legislative power and the constituent power. Therefore, the majority view in Golak Nath case overruled the view in Shankari Prasad case. Article 13 (2) expressly declares that law taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III shall be void. This principle embodies the doctrine of ultra vires in a written Constitution. @page-SC1655 The observation of Kania. C. J., in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 = (AIR 1950 SC 27), that Article 13 (2) was

introduced ex majore cautela because even if Art. 13 were not there any law abridging or taking away fundamental rights would be void to the extent of contravention or repugnancy with fundamental rights in Part III refers to the doctrine of ultra vires which is a necessary implication of our Constitution. Therefore, there is no distinction between Article 13 (2) which expressly affirms the doctrine of ultra vires and the necessary implication of the doctrine of ultra vires which has been applied to every part of our Constitution. If the express doctrine of ultra vires prevented an amendment of Part III of the Constitution contrary to its terms, equally an amendment of other parts of' the Constitution contrary to their terms would be prevented by the implied doctrine of ultra vires. The result would be that an amendment of the Constitution which contravened the terms of the existing Constitution would be void. This would result in absurdity. That is why Article 368 expressly provides for the amendment of the Constitution. 791. Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of the petitioner submitted that Constitution amendment was law within Article 13 (2) and was void to the extent to which it contravened the fundamental rights and Article 368 did not prevail over or override Art. l 3 for these reasons. Reference was made to the form of oath in the Third Schedule which uses the words "Constitution as by law established". This is said to mean that our Constitution was originally established by law and, therefore, every amendment thereto was likewise to be established by law. Article 13 (l) is also said to cover constitutional law because though Article 395 repealed the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the Government of India Act, 1935 the constitutional laws of the Indian Princely States or some other constitutional laws of British India were in existence. Therefore, the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) will also include constitutional law. The word "law" in Article 13 (2) will in its ordinary sense embrace constitutional law, and there is no reason for reading the word "law" in a restricted sense to confine it to ordinary laws. The real question is not whether there are any words of limitation in Article 368 but whether there are any words of limitation in Article 13 (2). It was amplified to mean if a limitation has to be read in either of the two Articles 368 and 13 (2) there is no reason why it should be read in such a way as to enable Parliament to take away or abridge fundamental rights. 792. In Article 368 the word "law" is not used at all. Consequently the language of Article 368 raises no question about the applicability of Article 13 (2). It is inconceivable that constitutional laws of Indian Princely States or Constitutional laws of British India exist as constitutional laws after the coming into existence of our Constitution. Our Constitution is the only fundamental law. All other laws which continue under our Constitution are ordinary laws. The fundamental error in including amendment of the Constitution in law under Article 13 (2) is by overlooking the vital difference between the constituent and the legislative powers and in wrongly equating these powers. The definition of "State" in Art. 12 includes Parliament. Part V of the Constitution contains provisions relating to the powers of the three organs of the Union Government. Chapter II of Part V relates to the legislative power of Parliament. Under Article 79 Parliament is the Union Legislature provided for by the Constitution. Therefore, law in Article 13 (2) must mean a law of Parliament functioning under Chapter II of Part V. It cannot mean the Constitution itself or an amendment of the Constitution. The reason is that the Constitution with its amendment is the supreme authority and the three organs of the State derive their powers from this supreme authority.

793. The word "law" when used in relation to constitutional law which is fundamental law and ordinary law is not a mere homonym. If the word "law" here is not a mere homonym then it is a mistake to think that all the instances to which it is applied must possess either a single quality or a single set of qualities in common. There is some @page-SC1656 general test or criterion whereby the rules of the fundamental law or the rules of the system of ordinary laws are tested and identified. When the word "law" is spoken in connection with constitutional law it cannot have the same meaning as ordinary law. It is not arbitrary to use the word "law" in relation to constitutional law in spite of its difference from ordinary law. 794. Mr. Palkhivala contended that constitutional laws of Princely States and of British India prior to our Constitution survived as laws in force under Article 372. Article 372 became necessary to make a provision similar to Section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 following the repeal of the 1935 Act and the Indian Independence Act, 1947. The purpose of Article 372 is to negative the possibility of any existing law in India being held to be no longer in force by reason of the repeal of the law authorising its enactment. A saving clause of the type of Article 372 is put in to avoid challenge to laws made under the repealed Constitution. The total volume of law in the then British India had the legal authority up to 14 August 1947 by reason of the Government of India Act 1935. The Government of India Act, 1935 with adaptations and the Indian Independence Act, 1947 preserved the authority of those laws up to 25 January, 1950. In so far as it is indisputable that the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Indian Independence Act, 1947 were repealed, the repeal of those Acts was repeal of constitutional law represented by those Acts. By our Constitution there was a repeal of all other constitutional laws operating in our country. There was repeal of "Constitution" in Princely States. 795. A distinction arises between the provisions of a Constitution which are described as constitutional law and provisions of a statute dealing with a statute which is treated to have constitutional aspects. An example of the latter type is a statute which provides for the judicature. Mr. Seervai rightly said that the two distinct senses of constitutional law are mixed up in the contention of Mr. Palkhivala. In the first sense, constitutional law is applicable to a provision of the Constitution, and in the second sense, to a law enacted under the Constitution dealing with certain classes of subject-matter. Laws of the second class fluctuate. An amendment of the Constitution becomes a part of the Constitution itself. Mr. Seervai rightly contended that in order to show that law in Article 13 (2) includes amendment of the Constitution it is also necessary to show that the expression "laws in force" in Art. 13 (1) includes constitution amendments or the Constitution itself. It is impossible to accept the submission that the word "law" in Article 13 (2) includes the Constitution. The Constitution itself cannot include the Constitution. It is the Constitution which continues the laws in force. Therefore, law in Article 13 is law other than the Constitution and a fortiori it is other than amendment to the Constitution. 796. In non-British territory on the Constitution coming into force the Constitution of Princely States lost its character as constitutional law in the strict sense. It is in that strict sense that Wanchoo, J., rightly said in Golak Nath case, that on our Constitution coming into existence no other constitutional law survived. Article 393 of our Constitution says that the Constitution may be called the "Constitution of India". The Preamble recites that the People in the Constituent Assembly gave this Constitution meaning thereby the Constitution of India. Therefore, the people gave themselves no other Constitution. All

other laws whatever their previous status as strict constitutional law became subordinate laws subject to the provisions of our Constitution and this position is clear from the language of Article 372. 797. In a broad sense law may include the Constitution and the law enacted by the legislature. There is however a clear demarcation between ordinary law in exercise of legislative power and constitutional law which is made in exercise of constituent power. Therefore, a power to amend the Constitution is different from the power to amend ordinary law. It was said by Mr. Palkhivala that legislative power is power to make law and constituent power is the power to make or amend constitutional law and since law in its @page-SC1657 ordinary sense includes constitutional law the legislative power is the genus of which the constituent power is the species. The difference between legislative and constituent power in a flexible or uncontrolled Constitution is conceptual depending upon the subject-matter. A Dog Act in England is prima facie made in exercise of legislative power. The Bill of Rights was made in the exercise of constituent power as modifying the existing constitutional arrangement. But this conceptual difference does not produce different legal consequences since the provisions of a Dog Act inconsistent with the earlier provisions of the Bill of Rights would repeal those provisions pro tanto. In a rigid or controlled Constitution the distinction between legislative power and constituent power is not only conceptual but material and vital in introducing legal consequences. In a controlled Constitution it is not correct to say that legislative power is the genus of which constituent power is the species. The question immediately arises as to what the differential is which distinguishes that species from other species of the same genus. It would be correct to say that the law making power is the genus of which legislative power and constituent power are the species. The differential is found in the different procedure prescribed for the exercise of constituent power as distinguished from that prescribed for making ordinary laws. The distinction between legislative power and constituent power is vital in a rigid or controlled Constitution, because it is that distinction which brings in the doctrine that a law ultra vires the Constitution is void, since the Constitution is the touchstone of validity and that no provision of the Constitution can be ultra vires. 798. The legislatures constituted under our Constitution have the power to enact laws on the topics indicated in Lists I to III in the Seventh Schedule or embodied specifically in certain provisions of the Constitution. The power to enact laws carries with it the power to amend or repeal them. But these powers of legislatures do not include any power to amend the Constitution, because it is the Constituent Assembly which enacted the Constitution and the status given by Article 368 to Parliament and the State legislatures, is the status of a Constituent Assembly. The distinct on between the power to amend the Constitution and the ordinary power to enact laws is fundamental to all federal Constitutions. When Parliament is engaged in the amending process it is not legislating. It is exercising a particular power which is sui generis bestowed upon it by the amending clause in the Constitution. Thus an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 is constituent law and not law within the meaning of Article 13 (2) and law as defined in Article 13 (3) (a). 799. The procedure that Bill for amendment of the Constitution has to be introduced in either House of Parliament and passed by both houses does not alter the status of Parliament to amend the Constitution as a Constituent Assembly and does not assimilate

it to that or the Union Legislature. At this stage it may be stated that in Shankari Prasad case it was said that law in a general sense may include the Constitution and the procedure of amendment is assimilated to ordinary legislative procedure. Assimilation of procedure does not make both the procedures same. Nor are the two separate powers to be lost sights of. The Constituent Assembly which was summoned on 19 December, 1946 to frame a Constitution was also invested after independence with legislative power. It framed the Constitution as the Constituent Assembly. It enacted ordinary laws as legislature Under Article V of the American Constitution the Congress functions not as a legislature but as a Constituent Assembly. In Australia when a Bill for amendment has to be passed by Commonwealth Parliament and then has to be submitted to the verdict of the electorate the process is not ordinary legislative process of the Commonwealth Parliament. In our Constitution when the amendment falls within the proviso to Art. 368 it requires that the amendment must be ratified by at least one half of the State legislatures and the process is radically different from ordinary legislative procedure. The Union legislature acting under Chapter II of Part V has no connection with the State Legislatures. Therefore, when @page-SC1658 amendment is effected under the proviso to Article 368 Parliament does not act as a Union legislature. The feature that in the passage of the bill for amendment of the Constitution the House of Parliament has to adopt the procedure for ordinary legislation has little bearing. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to leave to the Union legislature the power to effect amendments of the Constitution it would have been sufficient to insert a provision in Chapter II of Part V in that behalf without enacting a separate part and inserting a provision therein for amendment of the Constitution. 800. Under clause (e) of Article 368 the Article itself can be amended. Therefore, an amendment of Article 368 providing that provisions in Part III can be amended will be constitutional. If it was intended by Article 13 (2) to exclude Part III altogether from the operation of Article 368 clause (e) would not have been enacted. The Constituent Assembly thus enacted Article 368 so that the power to amend should not be too rigid nor too flexible. Clause (e) of Article 368 requires an amendment to be ratified by not less than half the number of States. The title of Part XX and the opening words of Article 368 show that a provision is being made for "amendment of this Constitution" which in its ordinary sense means every part of the Constitution. This would include Art. 368 itself. There is no limitation imposed upon or exception made to the amendments which can be made. It is not permissible to add to Article 368 words of limitation which are not there. 80l. The initiative for an amendment of the Constitution is with Parliament and not with the States. A bill for amendment is to be introduced in either House of Parliament. Again, a bill must be passed by each House by not less than two thirds of the members present and voting, the requisite quorum in each House being, a majority of its total membership. In cases coming under the proviso the amendment must be ratified by the legislatures of not less than half the number of States. Ordinary legislative process is very different. A bill initiating a law may be passed by majority of members present and voting at a sitting of each House and at a joint sitting of House, the quorum for the meeting of either House being one tenth of, the total members of the House. 802. The legislative procedure is prescribed in Articles 107 to 111 read with Article 100. Article 100 states "save as otherwise provided in the Constitution all questions at any sitting of either House or joint sitting shall be determined by a majority of votes of the

members present and voting". Though Art. 368 falls into two parts the Article is one integral whole as is clear from the words "the amendment shall also require to be ratified". The first part of Article 368 requires that a bill must be passed in each House (l) by majority of the total membership of that House and (2) by a majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that House present and voting. These provisions rule out a joint sitting of either House under Article 108 to resolve the disagreement between the two Houses. Again, the majority required to pass a bill in each House is not a majority of members of that House present and voting as in Article 100 but a majority of the total membership of each House and a majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that House present and voting. These provisions are not only important safeguards when amending the Constitution, but also distinguishing features of constituent power as opposed to legislative power. Under the first part of unamended Article 368 when a bill is passed by requisite majority of each House the bill must be presented for the President's assent. 803. Parliament's power to enact laws is not dependent on State legislatures, nor can it be frustrated by a majority of State legislatures. The provisions in the proviso to Article 368 for ratification by the legislatures of the State constitute a radical departure from the ordinary legislative process of Parliament. State legislative process of ratification cannot possibly be equated with ordinary legislative process. If the bill is not ratified the bill fails. If it is ratified it is @page-SC1659 to be presented to the President for his assent. If the President assents the procedure prescribed by Article 368 comes to an end and the consequence prescribed comes into operation that the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the bill. But the result is not law, but a part of the Constitution on and no court can pronounce any part of the Constitution to be invalid. 804. The exercise of the power of ratification by the State legislatures is constituent power and not ordinary 1aw making power. It cannot be said that Article 368 confers constituent power under its proviso but not under the main part. If the procedure has been followed the invalidity of an amendment cannot arise. 805. The provisions in Arts. 4, 169, paragraph 7 (2) of the Fifth Schedule and paragraph 21 (2) of the Sixth Schedule were referred to for the purpose of showing that the word "law" is used in those provisions relating to amendments to the Constitution. It is, therefore, said that similar result will follow in the case of all amendments. These four provisions confer on Parliament limited power of amendment. There are two features common to all these provisions. First they confer on Parliament a power to make a law which inter alia provides for the specific class of amendments. Second, each of these provisions states that "no such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368." The power to amend under any of these four provisions is a specific power for specific amendments and not a legislative power contained in the Legislative List or Residuary Legislative List. 806. The amendment under Article 4 follows a law providing for the formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries and names of existing States. It is obligatory on Parliament to make amendment of Schedules 1 and 4 and it is necessary to make amendments which are supplemental, incidental and consequential. In making such a law in so far as it affects the State but not Union territory a special procedure has to be followed.

807. Under Article 169 which provides for the abolition or creation of a State legislative Council Parliament has power to make a necessary law on a resolution being passed by the State Legislative Assembly for such abolition or creation by a majority of the membership of the Assembly and by majority of not less than two thirds of the members present and voting. If Parliament makes such a law that law must make the necessary amendments to the Constitution. 808. Schedules 5 and 6 provide for the administration of the Scheduled and Tribal areas which are governed by Part X and not by Part XI by which the Union and the States are governed. The Schedules provide a mode of governance of those areas which is radically different from the Government of the States and the Union. Part X of the Constitution unlike Part XI is not "subject to the provisions of this Constitution". Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 and paragraph 21 of Schedule 6 confer on Parliament a power to amend the schedules by law but no special procedure is prescribed for making such a law. 809. No question relating to those four provisions, however arises in the present case. In Article 368 the word "law" is not used at all. These four provisions for amendment deal with matters in respect of which it was considered desirable not to impose requirements of Article 368, and, therefore, it became necessary expressly to provide that such amendments shall not be deemed to be amendments of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368. These four provisions indicate the distinction between the constituent power and the legislative power. If the power of amendment was located in the residuary Entry No. 97 in the Union List it would not have been necessary to grant that power of amendment again in these four provisions. These four provisions indicate that the Constitution makers intended to confer on Parliament power to make amendments in the provisions of the Constitution and having provided for a particular procedure to be followed in respect of matters covered by those four provisions it conferred a general power on Parliament to make an @page-SC1660 amendment to the other Articles after complying with the requirements of Article 368. 810. The majority view in Golak Nath case, said that Parliament could call a Constituent Assembly either directly under the residuary power or pass a law under the Residuary Entry to call a Constituent Assembly for amendment of fundamental rights. Of the two views forming the majority one view did not express any opinion as to whether such a Constituent Assembly could take away or abridge fundamental rights but the other view expressed the opinion that such a Constituent Assembly could abridge fundamental rights. The majority view in Golak Nath case was that Parliament is a constituted body and not a constituent body and a constituted body cannot abridge or take away fundamental rights. The majority view indicates that a constituent power was required to amend the fundamental rights. 811. The majority view has totally ignored the aspect that constituent power is located in Article 368, and, therefore, amendment under that Article is not a law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). If Parliament is a constituted body as was said by the majority view in Golak Nath case, it would be difficult to hold that such a body could bring about a Constituent Assembly The well-known principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be achieved indirectly will establish the basic infirmity in that majority view. If fundamental rights can be abridged by Parliament calling a Constituent Assembly under the Residuary Entry such Constituent Assemb1y will be a body different from Parliament

and will frame its own rules of business and Article 368 cannot have any application. That will have a strange and startling result. 812. In the scheme of the Constitution containing Article 368 a Constituent Assembly will be called extra constitutional means and not one under the Constitution. A Constitution can be amended only in accordance with the process laid down in the Constitution. No other method is constitutionally possible than that indicated in the provision for amendment of the Constitution. Once the Constitution has vested the power to amend in the bodies mentioned therein that is the only body for amending the Constitution. The people who gave the Constitution have expressed how it is to be changed. 813. The distinction between constituent and legislative power is brought out by the feature in a rigid Constitution that the amendment is by a different procedure than that by which ordinary laws may be altered. The amending power is, therefore, said to be a recreation of the Constituent Assembly every time Parliament amends the Constitution in accordance with Article 368. 814. The two decisions in McCawley v. The King, l920 A.C. 691= (AIR 1920 PC 91), and Bribery Commr. v. Pedrick Ranasinghe, 1965 A. C. 172 on which the majority view in Golak Nath case relied to hold that amendment to the Constitution is an ordinary legislative process do not support that conclusion. The difference between flexible or uncontrolled and rigid or controlled Constitutions in regard to amendment is that there may be special methods of amendment in rigid or controlled Constitution. In a rigid Constitution amendment is not by exercise of ordinary legislative power. The power to amend is, therefore, described in a rigid Constitution as constituent power because of the nature of the power. In a flexible Constitution the procedure for amendment is the same as that of making ordinary law. A Constitution being uncontrolled the distinction between legislative and constituent powers gets obliterated because any law repugnant to the Constitution pro tanto repeals a Constitution as was held in McCawley case, Dicey in his Law of the Constitution (10th Ed.) illustrates the view by his opinion that if the Dentists Act said anything contrary to the Bill of Rights which can be described as constitutional document the Dentists Act would prevail. In a flexible or unwritten Constitution the word constitutional law is imprecise as it is used in respect of subject matter of law, e.g. a law dealing with the legislature. In a rigid or written Constitution whatever is in the Constitution would be the law of the Constitution. @page-SC1661 815. In McCawley case, the validity of the appointment of McCawley as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland was challenged as void on the allegation that Section 6 subsection (6) of the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution Act of Queensland 1867. The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 by Section 6 subsection (6) authorised the Governor to appoint any Judge of the Court of Industrial Arbitration to be a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland and provided that a Judge so appointed shall have the jurisdiction of both offices and shall hold office as a Judge of the Supreme Court during good behaviour. The sub-section further provided that Judge of the Court of Industrial Arbitration shall hold office for seven years. The Governor in Council by commission reciting Section 6 sub-section (6) appointed McCawley who was a Judge and the President of the Court of Industrial Arbitration to be a fudge of the Supreme Court during good behaviour. By Ss. 15 and 16 of the Constitution Act of 1867 the period during which Judges of the Supreme Court were to

held office was during good behaviour. The contention was that the appointment of McCawley under the Industrial Arbitration Act 1916 for a limited period of seven years was invalid since the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution Act 1867 and further that the Act of 1916 could not repeal or modify the provisions of the Constitution Act. 816. The Privy Council held that the Legislature of Queensland had power both under the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 Section 5 and apart therefrom under clauses 2 and 22 of the Order-in-Council of 1859, Section 7 of the Act 18 & 19 Vict C. 54 and Sections 2 and 9 of the Constitution Act of 1867 to authorise the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court for a limited period. Section 7 of the Act 18 & 19 Vict. C. 54 intended an order in Council to make provision for the government of the Colony and for the establishment of a legislature. The Order-in-Council 1859 by clause 2 gave full power to the legislature of the Colony to make further provision in that behalf. The Order-in-Council of 1859 by clauses 22 gave the legislature full power and authority from time to time to make laws altering or repealing all or any of the provisions of this Order in the same manner as any other laws for the good Government of the colony. 817. Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act gave the legislature full power to alter the Constitution. 818. Section 2 of the Constitution Act of 1867 gave the legislature power to make laws for the peace welfare and good government of the Colony. Section 9 of the Constitution required a two-thirds majority of the legislative Council and Legislative Assembly as a condition precedent of the validity of legislation altering the constitution of the Legislative Council. Section 6 sub-section (6) which authorised an appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court only during the period during which the person appointed was a Judge of the Court of Industrial Arbitration was found to be valid legislation. It was found that the Constitution of Queensland was a flexible as distinct from rigid Constitution. Power to alter the Constitution by ordinary law was also said to exist both in virtue of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 Section 5 and independently of that Act in virtue of clause 22 of the Order in Council 1859 and Sections 2 and 9 of the Constitution Act of 1867. 819. The decision in McCawley case shows that unless there is a special procedure prescribed for amending any part of the Constitution the Constitution is uncontrolled and can be amended by the manner prescribed for enacting an ordinary law and therefore a subsequent law inconsistent with the Constitution would pro tanto repeal the Constitution. The decision also established that a Constitution largely or generally uncontrolled may contain one or more provisions which prescribe a different procedure for amending the provisions of the Constitution. If this is prescribed the procedure for amendment must be strictly followed. 820. The legislature of Queensland was found to be master of its own household except in so far as its powers were restricted in special @page-SC1662 cases. No such restriction was established in the case before the Privy Council. The legislature had plenary power there. The legislature e was not required to follow any particular procedure or to comply with any specified conditions before it made any law inconsistent with any of the provisions of constitutional document. 821. The contention of the respondent in McCawley case was that the Constitution of Queensland was controlled and that it could not be altered merely by enacting legislation inconsistent with its Articles but that it could be altered by an Act which in plain and

unmistakable intention of the legislature to alter consequently gave effect to that intention by operative, provisions. The Judicial Committee thought this Constitution would amount to a Constitution which was neither controlled nor uncontrolled. It was not controlled because the future generation could by a merely formal Act correct it at pleasure. It was said to be not uncontrolled because the framers prescribed to their successors a particular mode by which they are allowed to effect constitutional changes. Section 22 of the Order in Council conferred power and authority on legislature from time to time to make laws altering or repealing all or any of the provisions of the Order in Council in the same manner as any other laws for the good government of the country. The Constitution Act of 1867 was contended to enact certain fundamental organic provisions of such a nature as to render the Constitution controlled. It was found impossible to point to any document or instruction giving or imposing on the Constitution of Queensland such a quality. The decision in McCawley case related to uncontrolled Constitution which gave the legislature full power to make laws except on one subject and, therefore, a law made by the legislature under such a Constitution could pro tanto conflict with and repeal the Constitution. That is not our Constitution. 822. In Ranasinghe case, 1965 AC 172 the validity of the appointment of Bribery Tribunal was challenged. The Supreme Court of Ceylon took the view that the Bribery Tribunal was not appointed by the Judicial Service Commission in accordance with the provisions of Section 55 of the Ceylon Constitution Order in Council. It was, therefore, not lawfully appointed. It was common ground that the appointment of the Bribery Tribunal was not in accordance with Section 55 of the Ceylon Constitution Order in Council, 1946. Section 55 vested in the Judicial Service Commissioner the appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of Judicial Officers, viz., Judges of lesser rank. The removal of Judges of the Supreme Court could be by the Governor General on an address of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 823. Section 29 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council provided in sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) as follows: "29 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Order, Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Island. (2) No such law shall - (a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... (3) Any law made in contravention of sub-section (2) of this section shall to the extent of such contravention be void. (4) In the exercise of its powers under this section Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions of this Order, or of any other Order of Her Majesty in Council in its application to the Islands: Provided that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of this Order shall be presented for the Royal Assent unless it has endorsed on it a certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members of the House (including those not present). Every certificate of the Speaker under this sub-section shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any court of law".

824. The Judicial Committee found that there was a conflict between section 55 of the Ceylon Constitution Order and Section 41 of the @page-SC1663 Bribery Amendment Act. The Privy Council found that Section 29 (4) of the order was attracted but the requirements of Section 29 (4) had not been complied with and, therefore, the appointment of the Bribery Tribunal was invalid. The certificate of the Speaker under the proviso to Section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution order was an essential part of the legislative process. There was no such certificate in the case of the legislation under which the appointment of the impugned Tribunal was made. The Judicial Committee said that a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law making that are imposed by the regulating instrument. This restriction exists independently of the question whether the legislature is sovereign as the legislature of Ceylon or whether the Constitution is uncontrolled as happened in McCawley case with regard to the Constitution of Queensland. 825. The Judicial Committee said "A Constitution can, indeed, be altered or amended by the legislature if the regulating instrument so provides and if the terms of those provisions are complied with; and the alteration or amendment may include the change or abolition of these provisions. But the proposition which is not acceptable is that a legislature, once established, has some inherent power derived from the mere fact of its establishment to make a valid law by the resolution of a bare majority which its own constituent instrument has said shall not be valid law unless made by a different type of majority or by a different legislative process". 826. It was contended that just as the legislature of the Colony of Queensland had power by mere majority vote to pass an Act that was inconsistent with the provisions of the existing Constitution of that Colony as to the tenure of Judicial Office so the legislature of Ceylon had no less power to depart from the requirements of a section such as Section 55 of the Ceylon Constitution, notwithstanding the wording of Sections 18 and 29 (4). Section 18 in effect says that a legislation can be passed by a majority of votes subject to the provisions in Section 29 (4) of the Constitution. The Judicial Committee said that in McCawley case the legislature had full power to make laws by a majority except upon one subject that was not in question and the legislation was held to be valid because it was treated as pro tanto an alteration of the Constitution which was neither fundamental in the sense of being beyond change nor so constituted as to require any special process to pass a law upon the topic dealt with. The word "fundamental" in the sense of "being beyond change" refers to express limitations as to power or manner and for from change. These words do not mean as Mr . Palkhivala contended that there are fundamental features of the Constitution which cannot be amended. 827. The legislature purported to pass a law which being in conflict with section 55 of the Order in Council must be treated if it is to be valid as an implied alteration of the constitutional provisions about the appointment of judicial officers. Such alterations could only be made by laws which complied with the special legislative procedure laid down in S. 29 (4). The provisions in Section 29 (4) were found not to confer on the Ceylon legislature the general power to legislate so as to amend the Constitution by ordinary majority resolution which the Queensland legislature was found to have under Section 2 of the Queensland Constitution Act. 828. Ranasinghe case, 1965 AC 172 shows that Parliament which by its own Act imposed procedural conditions upon the legislative process is no more limited or non-sovereign

than a legislature which has such conditions imposed on it by the constitutional instrument. A constitutional instrument which places procedural restraints upon the forms of law making places the legislature under a compulsion to obey them. In McCawley case it was said that the Colonial Legislature with plenary powers could treat the constitutional document which defined its powers as if it were a Dog Act. This proposition as a result of Ranasinghe case is narrowed to the extent that where provisions for procedural special majority are laid down in the constitutional document they cannot be treated as a provision in the Dog Act might be. @page-SC1664 829. These decisions indicate the distinction between procedural and substantive limitations on the legislative process. In Ranasinghe case the issue was one of' personal liberty in the sense that the respondent claimed the right not to be imprisoned except by a valid law. No question was raised about the right of religion protected by Sections 29 (2) and (3) of the Ceylon Constitution. It was also not the respondent's case there that any provision was unamendable. It would be unusual for the Privy Council to say by way of an obiter dictum that a provision was not amendable contrary to the respondent's submission. Though the Privy Council did not use the words "legislative and constituent" in distinguishing ordinary law from laws amending the Constitution, the Privy Council in referring to the Ceylon Constitution instrument showed that the familiar distinction is the basis of the judgment. 830. The Privy Council in dealing with Section 29 took note of the special heading under which Section 29 appears in the Constitution. That special heading is "legislative power and procedure". The opening words of Section 29 are that subject to the provisions of this order Parliament shall have powers to make laws. These are similar to the opening words in Article 245 of our Constitution. Section 18 of the Ceylon Constitution prescribes the ordinary legislative procedure for making laws by a bare majority unless otherwise provided for by the Constitution, which is to be found in Section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution. Our Constitution in Article 100 makes an identical provision for ordinary legislative procedure. Section 29 (2) confers rights of freedom of religion and Sec. 29 (3) states that no laws shall be made prohibiting or restricting such freedom. Part III of our Constitution contains among other fundamental rights, rights to freedom of religion. Section 29 (3) expressly makes laws in contravention of Section 29 (2) void to the extent of contravention. Article 13 (2) of our Constitution expressly makes law which takes away or abridges fundamental rights void to the extent of the contravention. Section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution dealing with the amendment of the Constitution does not expressly make void a law amending the Constitution. 831. It follows from McCawlay case, and Ranasinghe case, that a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law making imposed upon it which regulate its power to make law. The Ceylon legislature had no general power to legislate so as to amend its general power by ordinary majority resolutions such as Queensland legislature was found to have under Section 2 of the Queensland Constitution. Peace, order and good government in Section 29 (1) of the Ceylon Constitution is not the same as amendment contemplated in S. 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution. In Ranasinghe case the Judicial Committee referred to the social compact. The compact is this. The inhabitants of Ceylon accepted the Ceylon Constitution on the footing that the various rights conferred, liabilities imposed and duties prescribed under the law cannot be altered in the ordinary course of legislation by a bare majority. But if all these were to be changed then such a

change could only be made under the strongest safeguard of the amending process which in the case of Ceylon was not less than two-third of the absolute membership. These rights are the solemn compact. These valuable rights are conferred on the people. Under ordinary law by ordinary majority they cannot be taken away. 832. The absence of an express provision in Section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution that an amendment of the Constitution in contravention of the terms of that sub-section shall be void need not support the conclusion that such an amendment was valid. Section 29 (1) of the Ceylon Constitution is expressed to be "subject to the provisions of this Order" and any power under Section 29 (4) is expressly subject to the proviso there. The Privy Council held that the opening words of Section 29 introduced into the Constitution of Ceylon the necessarily implied doctrine of ultra vires. The proposition will apply directly to the same opening words of our Article 245. The Privy Council accepted the distinction made in McCawley case between controlled and uncontrolled Constitutions by emphasising the observation in @page-SC1665 Mccawlay case with reference to Section 9 of the Queensland Constitution. The description of Section 29 (2) of the Ceylon Constitution as an entrenched provision means that it can be amended but only by special procedure in Section 29 (4). That is the meaning of the word "entrenched". This meaning alone is consistent with the clear language of the amending power and also with the decision. Section 29 (4) does not limit the sovereignty of the Ceylon legislature because the legislature can always pass the amendment after getting two-thirds majority and the certificate. 833. Counsel for the respondent in Ranasinghe case stated that there was no limitation except the procedure and even that limitation could be removed by amendment complying with sub-section (4). The Privy Council affirmed that position. There is nothing to prevent by appropriate amendment a deletion of Section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution which would then empower Parliament to achieve the power to amend by an ordinary majority. Section 29 (l) is not legislative power alone but a composite power when read along with Section 29 (4) in the context of the Ceylon Constitution. It includes both legislative and constituent power. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 29 are not the grant of power but limitation on power. Its terms show that limitation is at any rate on the legislative power of enacting laws contrary to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 29. If section 29 (l) is a composite legislative and constituent power and sub-sections (2) and (3) are a restraint on legislative power the constituent power under sub-section (4) remains unaffected. The sequitur is that S. 29 (4) is consistent only with the view that so far as amendment of sub-sees. (2) and (3) is concerned amendment is permitted and there is no limitation on constituent power under S. 29 (4). The Privy Council took the widest view of the amending power. In fact the narrower view was not argued. 834. Our Constitution in Article 13 (2) by its express declaration with reference to law and the State widely defined has no higher efficacy in rendering a law in contravention of its terms void than the opening words of Article 245 have in rendering a law void in contravention of term mentioned therein. Therefore, in treating Article 13 (2) as having that effect in regard to constitutional amendment the majority judgment in Golak Nath case, was inept. In rejecting the distinction between legislative and constituent powers the leading majority view in Galak Nath case was induced by the absence of the use of the

labels but the same concepts were clearly indicated by the Privy Council by wholly describing the characteristic features of legislative and constituent powers. 835. If Article 368 had begun with a non obstante clause it could not have been said that amendment under Article 368 would be law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). The Attorney General rightly said that there is no non obstante clause in Article 368 because of the quality of amending power and because the amending power is a constituent power and not ordinary legislative power. This is the position of the amending clause in a written Constitution. When the power under Article 368 is exercised Parliament acts as a recreation of Constituent Assembly. Therefore, such power cannot be restricted by or widened by any other provision. As soon as an amendment is made it becomes a part of the Constitution. An amendment prevails over the Article or Articles amended. The fact that Article 368 confers constituent powers is apparent from the special conditions prescribed in the Article. Those conditions are different from ordinary law making process. Article 368 puts restraints on the ordinary law making process and thus confers constituent power. The Constituent Assembly was fully aware that if any limitation was to be put on the amending power the limitation would have to be expressly provided for. Article 305 of the Draft Constitution provided reservation of seats for certain sections of people in the legislature for 10 years. This reservation was not accepted by the Constituent Assembly. This shows that if the Drafting Committee or the Constituent Assembly wanted to exclude fundamental rights from the operation of Article 368 corresponding to Article 304 in the Draft Constitution they could have expressly done so. @page-SC1666 836. In Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 271 = (AIR 1967 SC 1335) it was said there was a distinction between deprivation of fundamental rights by force of a constitutional provision itself and such deprivation by an order made by President in exercise of a power conferred on him under constitutional provision. The dissenting view in Ghulam Sarwar case was that an order of the President was not a law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). In Mohd. Yakub v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1968) 2 SCR 227 = (AIR 1968 SC 765) the majority view of the Constitution Bench was that an order of the President under Article 359 was not law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). There is no distinction between Article 358 and Article 359 (1). Article 358 by its own force suspends the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19. Article 359 (1) on the other hand does not suspend any fundamental rights of its own force but it gives force to order by the President declaring suspension of the enforcement of any fundamental right during the period of emergency. In Mohd Yakub case it was said that it could not mean that an order under Article 359 (1) suspending the enforcement of a particular fundamental right had still to be tested under the very fundamental right which it suspended. Mohd. Yakub case establishes that the expression "law" in Article 13 (2) is not all embracing in spite of the exclusive definition of law in Article 13 (3) (a). 837. The word "law" appears in various Articles of our Constitution but not in Article 368. The reason is that the power under Article 368 is not a power to make ordinary laws under the Constitution but is the constituent power. There could be no law within the meaning of Article 13 (2) at any stage before the amendment became a part of the Constitution under Article 368. There is no hiatus between an amendment being a law and thereafter a part of the Constitution. Immediately upon the passage of the Bill for the amendment the Constitution stands amended.

838. The historical background of Article 13 (2) throws some light on the question as to whether Article 13 (2) prevails over Article 368. On 17 March, 1947 the Constitutional Adviser Sir B. N. Rau had addressed a letter to the members of Central and Provincial legislatures. A questionnaire was annexed to that letter. Question No. 27 was "What provisions should be made regarding amendments to the Constitution". A note was appended to that question which will be found in Shiva Rao Framing of India's Constitution referred to as Shiva Rao Vol. II pp. 448-451. The methods of amendment of Constitution in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, United States of America, Switzerland and Ireland were elucidated in that note. The note also drew attention that the fact that in various Constitutions express limitations were put on amending certain provisions of the Constitution. The portion of the note relating to the Constitution of Australia indicated such limitations. 839. The draft report of the sub-Committee on fundamental rights dated 3 April 1947 contained an annexure which dealt with fundamental rights. See Shiva Rao Vol. II p. 137 seq. Clause 2 of the annexure was as follows: "Any law or usage in force within the territories of the Union immediately before the commencement of this Constitution and any law which may hereafter be made by the State inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter/Constitution shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency". 840. The Constitutional Adviser suggested that the word "Constitution" was preferable to the word "chapter" because the entire Constitution was to prevail over law. 841. On 23 April, 1947 the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights presented an interim report addressed to the President of the Constituent Assembly containing an annexure providing for justiciable fundamental rights. See Shiva Rao Vol. II pp. 294-296 seq. Clause 2 of the Annexure to that report was as follows: "All existing laws, notifications, regulations, customs or usages in force within the territories of the Union inconsistent with the rights guaranteed under this part of the Constitution shall stand abrogated to the extent of such inconsistency nor shall the Union @page-SC1667 or any unit make any law taking away or abridging any such right". 842. Clause 2 of the annexure to the interim report was discussed in the Constituent Assembly on 29 April, 1947. Shri K. Santhanam moved an amendment to clause 2. The amendment was as follows: In clause 2 for the words "nor shall the Union or any unit make any law taking away or abridging any such right" the following be substituted: "Nor shall any such right be, taken away or abridged except by an amendment of the Constitution". The amendment was accepted as will appear in Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. III p. 416. 843. In October, 1947 the Draft Constitution was prepared by the Constitutional Advisor. Clause 9 (2) of the said Draft Constitution which later on corresponded to Article 13 (2) of our Constitution was as follows: "Nothing in this Constitution shall be taken to empower the State to make any law which curtails or takes away any of the rights conferred by Chapter II of this Part except by way of amendment of this Constitution under S. 232 and any law made in contravention of this sub-section shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void". 844. It will be seen that cl. 9 (2) in the Draft Constitution included the qualification "except by way of amendment of the Constitution under section 232". Clause 232 in the Draft Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Advisor became Article 304 in the

Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee and eventually became Article 368 of our Constitution. In Shiva Rao, Vol. III p. 325 it appears that the Drafting Committee on 30 October, 1947 at a meeting gave a note forming the minutes of that meeting that clause 9 (2) should be revised as follows : "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this sub-section shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void". 845. No reason is recorded in these minutes as to why the resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly by passing Shri Santhanam's amendment was disregarded. No indication was given in the forwarding letter of Dr. Ambedkar in the Note appended thereto as to why the amendment of Shri Santhanam which had been accepted by the Constituent Assembly was deleted. Nor does the Draft Constitution indicate either by sidelines or in any other manner that the decision of the Constituent Assembly had been disregarded. 846. This history of the formation and framing of Article 13 (2) shows that the intention of the Constituent Assembly was that Article 13 (2) does not control the Article relating to the amending of the Constitution. It must be assumed that the Drafting Committee consisting of eminent men considered that an express exclusion of the amending Article from the operation of the clause corresponding to Article 13 (2) was unnecessary and the fear that that Article would cover the amending Article was groundless. It also appears that no discussion took place after the Draft Constitution had been presented to the Constituent Assembly by Dr. Ambedkar on the deletion or disregard of Shri Santhanam's amendment. The history of Article 13 (2) shows that the Constituent Assembly clearly found that it did not apply to an amendment of the Constitution. 847. The distinction between constituent and legislative power in a written Constitution is of enormous magnitude. No provision of the Constitution can be declared void because the Constitution is the touchstone of validity. There is no touchstone of validity outside the Constitution. Every provision in a controlled Constitution is essential or so thought by the framers because of the protection of being amendable only in accordance with the Constitution. Every Article has that protection. The historical background of Article 13 (2) indicates that the Constitution-makers dealt separately with legislative power by providing for the same in Part XI and entrusted the constituent power to authorities mentioned in Article 368 and that authority has the same power as the Constituent Assembly because it has not put any fetter upon it. The draft Article 305 which provided for a limitation as to time @page-SC1668 for amendment of certain matters was eventually deleted. If the framers of the Constitution wanted to forbid something they would say so. 848. The vitality of the constituent power not only indicates that the Constitution is in the words of Maitland the supreme potestas but also the fact that the amending power is put in a separate Article and Part of the Constitution establishing that it deals with a topic other than legislative power and the power is meant to be exhaustive leaving nothing uncovered. The very fact that amending power is not put in any legislative power or is not attached to a subject which is the subject-matter of legislative power leaving aside the four sets of provisions, namely, Articles 4, 169, paragraph 7, Schedule 5 and paragraph 21, Schedule 6 containing specific power of amendment shows that that amending power was meant to be exhaustive and plenary. If a power of amendment without any express

limitation was given it was because a legal constitutional way of bringing a change in the Constitution was desirable or necessary. Otherwise there would be no legal way of effecting the change. It cannot be attributed to the framers of the Constitution that they intended that the Constitution or any part of it could be changed by unconstitutional or illegal methods. 849. If an amendment of the Constitution is made subject to Article 13 (2) the necessary conclusion then is that no amendment of the Constitution is possible. The opening words of Article 245 which deals with legislative power indicate that any law made under Article 246 (1) read with List I of the Seventh Schedule is subject to the limitations on legislative power imposed by all the Articles in the Constitution. These limitations cannot be altered or amended in exercise of legislative power, if the power of amendment is said to be located in the Residuary Entry 97 in List I. The history of residuary power in the Government of India Act. 1935 whose scheme was adopted in the Constitution shows that the topic of amendment was not only present to the mind of the Constituent Assembly but also that the Constituent power could not reside in the residuary power. 850. The conclusions on the question as to whether Article 13 (2) overrides Article 368 are these. Article 13 (2) relates to laws under the Constitution. Laws under the Constitution are governed by Article 13 (2). Article 368 relates to power and procedure of amendment of the Constitution. Upon amendment of the Constitution the Constitution shall stand amended. The Constitution is self validating and self executing. Article 13 (2) does not override Art. 368. Article 13 (2) is not a fundamental right. The Constitution is the touchstone. The constituent power is sui generis. The majority view of Golak Nath case, that Article 13 (2) prevails over Article 368 was on the basis that there was no distinction between constituent and legislative power and an amendment of the Constitution was law and that such law attracted the opening words of Article 245 which in its turn attracted the provisions of Article 13 (2). Parliament took notice of the two conflicting views which had been taken of the unamended Article 368, took notice of the fact that the preponderating judicial opinion, namely, the decisions in Shankari Prasad case, Sajjan Singh case and the minority views of five learned Judges in Golak Nath case were in favour of the view that Article 368 contained the power of amendment and that power was the constituent power belonging to Parliament. Wanchoo, J. rightly said in Golak Nath case that the power under Article 368 is a constituent power to change the fundamental law, that is to say, the Constitution and is distinct from ordinary legislative power. So long as this distinction is kept in mind Parliament will have power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution and what Parliament does under Article 368 is not ordinary law making which is subject to Article 13 (2) or any other Article of the Constitution. This view of Wanchoo. J., was adopted by Parliament in the Constitution 24th Amendment Act which made explicit that under Article 368 Parliament has the constituent power to amend this Constitution. 851. In order to appreciate and assess Mr. Palkhivala's other contention @page-SC1669 of implied and inherent limitations on the amending power, it is necessary to find out the necessity and importance of the amending power to arrive at the true meaning of the expression "amendment". 852. Mr. Palkhivala made these submissions. The word "amendment" means on the one hand not the power to alter or destroy the essential features and on the other there are inherent and implied limitations on the power of amendment. It is imperative to consider

the consequences of the plea of limited power and also of the plea of limitless power. The test of the true width of a power is not how probable it is that it may be exercised but what can possibly be done under it. The hope and expectation that it will never be used is not relevant. Reliance is placed on the observations in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed. (1969) pp. 105-106 that it is important to consider the effects or consequences which would result from it, for they often point out the real meaning of the words, before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of more than one meaning. The reasonableness of the consequences which follow from a particular construction on the one hand and the unreasonable result on the other are the two alternatives in the quest for the true intention of Parliament. Crawford Construction of Statutes (1940 Ed.) pp. 286-290 was referred to for the proposition that where the statute is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning, the construction which tends to make the statute unreasonable should be avoided. Uncertainty, friction or confusion on a construction is to be avoided because preference is to be given to the smooth working of the statute. The Court adopts which is just reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of these things. It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended the legislation to produce inequitable results. Usurpation of power contrary to the Constitution is to be avoided. 853. Reliance was placed by Mr. Palkhivala on American Jurisprudence 2d. Vol. 16, Article 59 at pp. 231-232, Article 72 at p. 251. Article 287 at pp. 270-71 and Article 88 at pp. 273-74 in support of these propositions. First, questions of constitutional construction are in the main governed by the same general principles which control in ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments particularly statutes. External aids or arbitrary rules applied to the construction of a Constitution are of uncertain value and should be used with hesitation and circumspection. Second, Constitutions are general and many of the essentials with which Constitutions treat are impliedly controlled or dealt with by them and implication plays a very important part in constitutional construction. What is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. Third, a Court may look to the history of the times and examine the state of things existing when the Constitution was framed and adopted. The Court should look to the nature and object of the particular powers, duties and rights in question with all the light and aids of the contemporary history. Fourth, proceedings of conventions and debates are of limited value as explaining doubtful phrases. Similarly, the opinions of the individual members are seldom considered as of material value. 854. Mr. Palkhivala said that the word "amend" may have three meanings. First it may mean to improve or better to remove an error, the quality of improvement being considered from the stand point of the basic philosophy underlying the Constitution. Second, it may mean to make changes which may not fall within the first meaning but which do not alter or destroy any of the basic essential or any of the essential features of the Constitution. Third, it may mean to make any changes in the Constitution including changes falling outside the second meaning. The first meaning was preferred. The second was said to be a possible construction. The third was ruled out. 855. The crux of the matter is the meaning of the word "amendment". The Oxford Dictionary meaning of the word is to make professed improvements in a measure before Parliament formally, to alter in detail, though practically it may be to alter its principle, so as to thwart it. The @page-SC1670 Oxford Dictionary meanings are also alteration of a

bill before Parliament; a clause, paragraph, or words proposed to be substituted for others, or to be inserted in a bill (the result of the adoption of which may even be to defeat the measure). In Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Volume 3 the meanings of the word "amend" "amendment" are change or alteration. Amendment involves an alteration or change, as by addition, taking away or modification. A broad definition of the word "amendment" will include any alteration or change. The word "amendment" when used in connection with the Constitution may refer to the addition of a provision on a new and independent subject, complete in itself and wholly disconnected from other provisions, or to some particular article or clause, and is then used to indicate an addition to, the striking out, or some change in that particular article or clause. 856. The contention that the word "amendment" in Article 368 should bear a limited meaning in view of the expression "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any of the provisions of this Schedule" occurring in paragraphs 7 and 21 in Schedules 5 and 6, is unsound for the following reasons. 857. First, the power of amendment conferred by the four provisions, namely, Article 4 read with Articles 2 and 3, Article 169, paragraphs 7 and 21 in Schedules 5 and 6 is a limited power. It is limited to specific subjects. The exercise of the power of amendment under those four provisions, if treated by Articles themselves, is an uncontrolled power since the power can be exercised by an ordinary law. But as a part of the Constitution the power is a subordinate power because these Articles themselves are subject to the amending provisions of Article 368. Article 368 is the only provision of the Constitution which provides for the amendment of this Constitution which means the Constitution of India and every part thereto. It may be mentioned that in construing Art. 368 the title of the part "Amendment of the Constitution" is an important aid to construction. The marginal note which speaks of the procedure of amendment is not complete by itself because the procedure when followed results in the product, namely, an amendment of the Constitution which is not only a matter of procedure. 858. Second, these four provisions which are in the same terms, namely, "no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purpose of Article 368" show that but for these terms the amendment would have fallen within Article 368 and was being taken out of it. This is an important consideration particularly in connection with Schedules 5 and 6 which provide that Parliament may, from time to time by law, amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any of the provisions of this Schedule. These provisions show that an amendment by way of addition, variation or repeal will also fall within the amendment of the Constitution provided for in Article 368 but is being taken out of Article 368. This express exclusion contains intrinsic evidence that the meaning of the word "amendment" in Article 368 includes amendment by way of addition, alteration or repeal. 859. Third, paragraphs 7 and 21 in Schedules 5 and 6 which provide that Parliament may from time to time by law, amend by way of addition, variation or repeal indicate the necessity of amendments from time to time. The expression "by way of" does not enlarge the meaning of the word "amendment" but clarifies. The expression "by way of" shows that the words addition, variation or repeal are substitutes of the word "amendment" and are forms of intention. The whole Schedule cannot be repealed either by paragraph 7 or by paragraph 21, because Art. 244 provides for the administration of Scheduled Areas and tribal areas on the application of the two respective Schedules. The words "from time

to time" also indicate that because of subject-matter amendments may be from time to time. The history behind the two Schedules originates in Sections 91 and 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935 dealing with excluded areas and partially excluded areas. 860. Fourth, reference was made to Section 9 (1) (c) of the @page-SC1671 Indian Independence Act, 1947 which empowered the Governor-General to make omissions from, additions to and adaptations and modification to the Government of India Act, 1935. The Government of India Third Amendment Act, 1949 amended Section 291 of the 1935 Act and empowered the Governor-General to make such amendments as he considers necessary whether by way of addition, modification or repeal. It was, therefore said that when our Constitution did not use the expression "by way of addition, modification or repeal" the word "amendment" in Article 368 will have a narrower meaning. The expression "amendment" has been used in several Articles of the Constitution. These are Articles 4 (1) and (2), 108 (4), 109 (3), and 4, 111, 114 (2), 169 (2), 196 (2), 198 (3) and 14), 200, 201, 204 (2), 207 (1), (2), 240 (2), 274 (1), 304 (b) and 349. In every case amendment is to be by way of variation, addition or repeal. Again, different expressions have been used in other Articles. In Article 35 (b) the words are alter, repeal. In Article 243 (1) the words are repeal or amend. In Article 252 (2), the expression is amend or repeal. In Article 254 (2) proviso the words are add to, amending, variation or repeal. In Article 320 (5) the words are such modifications whether by way of repeal or amendment. In Article 372 (1) the words are altered or repealed or amended. In Article 372 (2) the words are such adaptations and modifications by way of repeal or amendment. In Article 392 (l) the expression is such adaptations by way of modification, addition or omission. Again, in Article 241 (2) the words are modification or exceptions. In Article 364 the words used are exceptions or modifications. In Art. 370 (1) (d) and (3) the words are modifications and exceptions. Again, in Schedule 5, paragraph 5 (1) and Schedule 6, paragraphs 12 (a), (b), 19 (1) (a) the words used are exceptions or modifications. Modifications in Art. 370 (1) (d) must be given the widest meaning in the context of a Constitution and in that sense it includes an amendment and it cannot be limited to such modifications as do not make any radical transformation. 861. The several Constitution Amendment Acts show that amendments to the Constitution are made by way of addition, substitution, repeal. The Attorney-General is right in his submission that the expression "amendment of this Constitution" has a clear substantive meaning in the context of a written Constitution and it means that any part of the Constitution can be amended by changing the same either by variation addition or repeal. 862. The words ''Amendment of this Constitution may be initiated" and the words "Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" in Article 368 indicate that the word "amendment" is used in an unambiguous and clear manner. The Attorney-General said that our Constitution is not the first nor is the last one to use the word "amendment". The American Constitution in 1787 used the word "amend." Several Constitutions of other countries have used the word "amend". The word "amend" is used in a Constitution to mean any kind of change. In some Constitutions the words alteration or revision have been used in place of the word amend or along with the word amendment. Sometimes alteration and revision of the Constitution are also spoken of as amendment of the Constitution.

863. Constitutional provisions are presumed to have been carefully and deliberately framed. The words alterations or amendments, the words amendments or revisions, the words revision and alteration are used together to indicate that these words have the same meaning in relation to amendment and change in Constitution. 864. The meaning and scope of amending power is in the object and necessity for amendment in a written Constitution. 865. The various amendments which have already been carried out to our Constitution indicate that provisions have been added, or varied or substituted. The Attorney-General gave two correct reasons for the object and necessity of the power of amendment in a written Constitution. First, the object and necessity of amendment in a written Constitution means that the necessity is for changing @page-SC1672 the Constitution in an orderly manner, for otherwise the Constitution can be changed only by an extra constitutional method or by revolution. Second, the very object of amendment is to make changes in the fundamental law or organic law to make fundamental changes in the Constitution, to change the fundamental or the basic principles in the Constitution. Otherwise there will be no necessity to give that importance to the high amending power to avoid revolution. 866. The object of amendment is to see that the Constitution is preserved. Rebellion or revolution is an illegal channel of giving expression to change. The "consent of the governed" is that each generation has a right to establish its own law. Conditions change. Men change. Opportunities for corresponding change in political institutions and principles of Government therefore arise. An unamendable Constitution was the French Constitution which by an amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1884 declared that the National Assembly shall never entertain a proposal for abolition of the republican form of Government. The United States Constitution provided that no amendment could be made prior to 1808 affecting the First and Fourth Clauses of Section 9 of Article 1, relative to the prohibition of the importation of slaves, and that no State without its consent shall be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate. These are examples of limiting the sovereign power of the people to change the Constitution. 867. An unamendable Constitution is said to be the worst tyranny of time. Jefferson said in 1789 that each generation has a right to determine a law under which it lives. The earth belongs in usufruct to the living. The dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The machinery of amendment is like a safety valve. It should not be used with too great facility nor should be too difficult. That will explode and erode the Constitution. 868. Most Constitutions are rigid in the sense that they are amendable only by a different process than that by which ordinary laws may be altered. Thus they distinguish clearly between the constituent power and the legislative power, each being exercisable by different organs according to different processes. Chief Justice Marshall said that the opponents of change want changes just as much as any one else. They want however to determine what the changes shall be. 869. Amendment is a form of growth of the Constitution inasmuch as amendment means fundamental changes. The Constitution devises special organs or special methods to amend or change the fundamental principles that create the Government. The methods of amendment may be by ordinary law making body as in Great Britain or by the ordinary law making body with special procedure or unusual majority or by special organs of Government created for the purpose such as constitutional convention or by the electorate

in the form of referendum or of initiating a referendum. In case a written Constitution makes no provision for amendment it is usually held that the national law making body by ordinary procedure may amend the Constitution. If a Constitution provides the method of amendment that method alone is legal. Any other method of amendment would be a revolution. The deliberative and restrictive processes and procedure ensure a change in the Constitution in an orderly fashion in order to give the expression to social necessity and to give permanence to the Constitution. 870. The people expressed in the Preamble to our Constitution gave the Constitution including the power to amend the Constitution to the bodies mentioned in Article 368. These bodies represent the people. The method to amend any part of the Constitution as provided for in Article 368 must be followed. Any other method as for example convening Constituent Assembly or Referendum will be extra constitutional or revolutionary. In our Constitution Art. 368 restricts only the procedure or the manner and form required for amendment but not the kind or the character of the amendment that may be made. There are no implied limitations to the amending power. The @pageSC1673 Attorney-General summoned up pithily that the Constitution acts not only for the people but on the people. 871. The Attorney-GeneraI relied on several American decisions in support of these propositions. First, the word "amendment" does not mean improvement. The view in Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal 118 of a single learned Judge that amendment means improvement was not accepted in Edwards v. Lesseur, 33 South Western Reporter 1130. Second, ratification by people of States would be void when a federal amendment proposed by Congress is required to be ratified by the legislatures of the States. Ex parte Dillon Federal Reporter No. 262 p. 563. The legislature is a mere agency for ratification of a proposed amendment. Ex parte Dillon did not accept the view of the learned single Judge in 33 South Western Reporter 1130, that amendment means only improvement. Third, the argument that the word "amendment" carries its own limitations regarding fundamental principles or power of State or control of the conduct of the individuals by devising a method of referendum by State legislatures is adding a new method of amendment. This is not permissible. Feigenapan v. Bodine, 264 Federal Reporter 186. The only method of amendment is that prescribed by the Constitution. The theory of referendum by State legislatures is not valid. Fourth the assumption that ratification by State legislatures will voice the will of the people if against the prescribed method of amendment and grant of authority by the people to Congress in the manner laid down in Article V of the American Constitution. It is not the function of Courts or legislative bodies to alter the method which the Constitution has fixed. Ratification is not an act of legislation. It derives its authority from the Constitution. Hawks v. Smith, (1920) 253 US 221; Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 US 368, Leser v. Garnett, (1921) 258 US 130. Fifth, the power of amendment extends to every part of the Constitution. In amending the Constitution the General Assembly acts in the character and capacity of a convention expressing the supreme will of the sovereign people and is unlimited in its power save by the Constitution. Ex parte Mrs. D. C. Kerby American Law Reports Annotated, Vol. 36, p. 1451. Sixth, the argument that amendments which touch rights of the people must be by convention is rejected by Supreme Court in American Article V of the American Constitution is clear in statement and meaning and contains no ambiguity. Where the intention is clear there is no room for construction. Rhode Island v. Palmer, (1919) 253

US 350; U. S. v. Sprague, (1930) 282 US 716. Seventh, principles of the Constitution can be changed under Article V Scheneiderman v. United States of America, (1942) 320 US 118. Eight the Constitution provides the method of alteration. While the procedure for amending the Constitution is restricted there is no restraint on the kind of amendment that may be made. Whitehill v. Elkins, (1967) 389 US 54. 872. Except for special methods of amendment in a rigid or controlled Constitution although the methods may vary in different Constitutions and except for express limitations, if any, in rigid or controlled Constitutions, the meaning and scope of the amending power is the same in both the flexible and rigid forms. 873. The flexible Constitution is one under which every law of every description can be legally changed with the same ease and in the same manner by one and the same body. Laws in a flexible Constitution are called constitutional because they refer to subjects supposed to affect the fundamental institutions of the State, and not because they are legally more sacred or difficult to change than other laws. 874. A rigid Constitution is one under which certain laws generally known as constitutional or fundamental laws cannot be changed in the same manner as ordinary laws. The rigidity of the Constitution consists in the absence of any right of the legislatures when acting in its ordinary capacity to modify or repeal definite laws termed constitutional or fundamental. In a rigid Constitution the term "Constitution" means a particular enactment belonging to the Articles of the Constitution which cannot be legally changed with the same ease and in the same manner as ordinary laws. @page-SC1674 875. The special machinery for constitutional amendment is the limitation of the power of the legislature by greater law than by the law of the ordinary legislation. The Constituent Assembly knowing that it will disperse and leave the actual business of legislation to another body, attempts to bring into the Constitution that it promulgates as many guides to future action as possible. It attempts to arrange for the "recreation of a constituent assembly" whenever such matters are in future to be considered, even though that assembly be nothing more than the ordinary legislature acting under certain restrictions. There may be some elements of the Constitution which the constituent assembly wants to remain unalterable. These elements are to be distinguished from the rest. The Fifth Clause in the United States Constitution is that no State without its own consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. The Attorney General rightly said that just as there are no implied limitations in flexible Constitutions similarly there are no implied limitations in a rigid Constitution. The difference is only in the method of amendment. Amendment can be made by ordinary legislature under certain restrictions, or by people through a referendum or by majority of all the units of a federal State or by a special convention. 876. In a rigid Constitution the legislatures by reason of their well matured long and deliberately formed opinion represent the will of the undoubted majority. But even such will can be thwarted in the amendment of the organic law by the will of the minority. In case where the requisite majority is not obtained by the minority thwarting an amendment, there is just as much danger to the State from revolution and violence as there is from what is said to be the caprice of the majority. The safeguards against radical changes thus represent a better way and a natural way of securing deliberation, maturity and clear consciousness of purpose without antagonising the actual source of power in the democratic State.

877. The term "amendment" connotes a definite and formal process of constitutional change. The force of tradition and custom and the judicial interpretation may all affect the organic structure of the State. These processes of change are the evolution of Constitution. 878. The background in which Article 368 was enacted by the Constituent Assembly has an important aspect on the meaning and scope of the power of amendment. 879. On 12 November, 1946 Sir B. N. Rau Constitutional Adviser prepared a brochure containing Constitution of the British Commonwealth Countries and the Constitutions of other countries. Different countries having different modes of amendments were referred to. In the same volume the fundamental rights under 13 heads were extracted from 13 selected countries like U. S. A., Switzerland, Germany. Russia, Ireland, Canada, Australia. Two features follow from that list. First, there is no absolute standard as to what constitutes fundamental right. There is no such thing as agreed fundamental rights of the world. Second, fundamental rights which are accepted in our Constitution are not superior to fundamental rights in other Constitutions nor can it be said that the fundamental rights are superior to Directive Principles in our Constitution. 880. On 17 March, 1947 a questionnaire was circulated under the subject as to what provisions should be made regarding the amendment of the Constitution. The draft clause of amendment to the Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Adviser at that time indicates that an amendment may be initiated in either House of the Union Parliament and when the proposed amendment is passed in each House by a majority of not less than two thirds of the total number of members of that House and is ratified by the legislatures of not less than two thirds of the units of the Union, excluding the Chief Commissioners' Provinces, it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given the amendment shall come into operation. There were two explanations to that clause. 881. On 29 April, 1947 Shri Santhanam's amendment to the draft clause was accepted. The amendment @page-SC1675 was "that this clause also if necessary may be amended in the same way as any other clause in the Constitution." In June, 1947 the drafting of the amending clause started. Originally it was numbered 232. Eventually, Articles 304 and 305 came into existence in place of draft Art. 232. The first draft of the amendment clause was given by Sir B. N. Rau in March, 1947. By June, 1947 and thereafter he recommended the procedure favoured by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and Sir Gopalswami Ayyangar, namely, passage by two thirds majority in Parliament and ratification by like majority of Provincial legislatures. On 21 February, 1948 the draft Constitution was ready. Draft Articles 304 and 305 related to amendment. Article 305 provided for reservation of seats in for minorities for ten years unless continued in operation by an amendment of the Constitution. 882. The following features emerge. First, the Constituent Assembly made no distinction between essential and non-essential features. Secondly, no one in the Constituent Assembly said that fundamental rights could not be amended. The framers of the Constitution did not have any debate on that. Thirdly, even in the First Constitution Amendment debate no one doubted change of amendment of fundamental rights. At no stage it appeared that fundamental rights are absolute. While a Constitution should be made sound and basic it should be flexible and for a period it should be possible to make necessary changes with relative facility.

883. Certain amendments to Article 304 were proposed. One proposed amendment No. 118 was that amendment was to be passed in two Houses by a clear majority of the total membership of each House. Another proposed amendment No. 210 was that for a period of three years from the commencement of the Constitution, any amendment certified by the President to be not one of substance might be made by a simple majority. This also stated that it would include any formal amendment recommended by a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court on the ground of removing difficulties in the administration of the Constitution or for the purpose of carrying out the Constitution in public interest. The third proposed amendment No. 212 was that no amendment which is calculated to infringe or restrict or diminish the scope of any individual rights any rights of a person or persons with respect to property or otherwise, shall be permissible and any amendment which is or is likely to have such an effect shall be void and ultra vires of any legislature. It is noteworthy that this amendment was withdrawn. See Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. IX p. 1665. 884. In the first category the framers devised amendment by Parliament by a simple majority. These are Articles 2 and 4 which deal with States. As far as creation or reconstitution of States is concerned, it is left to Parliament to achieve that by a simple majority. Again, draft Article 148A which eventually became Article 169 dealing with Upper Chambers in the States gave Parliament power to abolish the Upper Chambers or to create new Second Chambers. Schedules 5 and 6 were left to be amended by Parliament by simple majority. The second category of amendment requires two thirds majority. It is in that connection that the statement of Dr. Ambedkar "If the future Parliament wishes to amend any particular Article which is not mentioned in Part III or Article 304 all that is necessary for them is to have the two thirds majority then they can amend it" was invoked by Mr. Palkhivala to support his submission that Part III was unamendable. That is totally misreading the speech. The speech shows that some Articles would be amendable by bare majority, others would require two thirds majority and the third category would require two thirds majority plus ratification by the States. 885. Proceedings in the Constituent Assembly show that the whole Constitution was taken in broad perspective and the amendments fell under three categories providing for simple majority, or two thirds majority or two thirds majority and ratification by the States. These different procedures were laid down to avoid rigidity. @page-SC1676 886. The Constitution First Amendment Act which added Art. 15 (4), substituted words in Articles 19 (2) and Article 19 (6), inserted Article 31A indicates interesting features. The two criticisms at that time were as to what was the hurry and secondly that the Government was trying to take more power to itself. The answers are that a Constitution which is responsive to the people's will and their ideas and which can be varied here and there, will command respect and people will not fight against change. Otherwise, if people feel that it is unchangeable and cannot be touched, the only thing to be done by those who wish to change it is to try to break it. That is a dangerous thing and a bad thing. 887. In this background there is no doubt about the meaning and scope of Article 368. The Attorney-General rightly said that if there be any doubt contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. In Mcpherson v. Blacker, (1891) 146 U. S. 1 = 36 L. Ed. 869, it is said that where plain and clear words occur there is no difficulty but where there is doubt and ambiguity contemporaneous and practical exposition is a great weight. In Automobile Transport

(Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1963) 1 SCR 491= (AIR 1962 SC 1406), this Court took notice of the feature that Constitution makers had deep knowledge of Constitutions and constitutional problems of other countries. 888. Mr. Seervai relying on British Coal Corpn. v. King, 1935 AC 500 = (AIR 1935 PC 158) submitted that in interpreting a constituent or organic statute that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of powers must be adopted. A strict construction applicable to penal or taxing statute will be subversive of the real intention of Parliament if applied to an Act passed to ensure peace, order and good Government. Largest meaning is given to the allocated specific power. If there are no limitations on the power it is the whole power. Grant of power of amendment cannot be cut down except by express or implied limitations. The conclusion is that the meaning of the word amendment is wide and not restricted. 889. The contention of Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of the petitioner is that under Article 368 as it stood prior to the amendment there were implied and inherent limitations on the power of amendment. It was said that the word "amendment" would preclude the power to alter or destroy the essential features and the basic elements and the fundamental principles of the Constitution. This contention was amplified as follows. The Constitution is given by the people unto themselves. The power to decide upon amendment is given to the 5 year Parliament which is a creature of the Constitution. Article 368 does not start with the non obstante clause. Article 368 uses the word "amendment" simpliciter. Less significant amendment powers in other parts of the Constitution use the words "add, alter, repeal or vary" in addition to the word "amendment" as will appear in Articles 31B, 35 (b), 252 (2), 372, 372A (2) paragraph 7 Schedule 5 paragraph 21, Schedule 6. Article 368 talks of an amendment of this Constitution and does not extend the amending power to "all or any of the provisions of this Constitution.'' On a wide construction of the word "amendment" all fundamental rights can be taken away by the requisite majority whereas much less significant matters require the concurrence of at least half the States under the proviso to that Article. 890. The basic human freedoms are all of the most fundamental importance to all the States and all the citizens. Article 32 is no less important to the citizens of States than Article 226. The Preamble is not a part or provision of the Constitution. Therefore, the Preamble cannot be amended under Article 368. The nature and the contents of the Preamble are such that it is incapable of being amended. If the Preamble is unalterable it necessarily follows that those features of the Constitution which are necessary to give effect to the Preamble are unalterable. Fundamental rights are intended to give effect to the Preamble. They cannot, therefore be abridged or taken away. The provisions 0f Article 368 @page-SC1677 themselves can be amended under that very Article. If the word "amendment" is read in the widest sense Parliament will have the power to get rid of the requisite majority required by Article 368 and make any constitutional amendments possible by bare majority. Parliament can provide that hereafter the Constitution shall be unamendable. Parliament can reduce India to a status which is neither sovereign nor democratic nor republic and where the basic human rights are conspicuous by their absence. 891. Mr. Palkhivala submits that the principle of inherent or implied limitations on power to amend the controlled Constitution stems from three basic features. First, the ultimate legal sovereignty resides in the people. Second, Parliament is only a creature of the

Constitution. Third power to amend the Constitution or destroy the essential features of the Constitution is an application of ultimate legal sovereignty. 892. Mr. Palkhivala enumerated 12 essential features. These were as follows: (1) The supremacy of the Constitution. (2) The sovereignty of India. (3) The integrity of the country. (4) The democratic way of life. (5) The republican form of Government (6) The guarantee of basic human rights elaborated in Part III of the Constitution. (7) A secular State. (8) A free and independent judiciary. (9) The dual structure of the Union and the States. (10) The balance between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. (11) A Parliamentary form of Government as distinct from the presidential form of Government. (12) Article 368 can be amended but cannot be amended to empower Parliament to alter or destroy any of the essential features of the Constitution make the Constitution literally or practically unamendable, make it generally amendable by a bare majority in Parliament, confer the power of amendment either expressly or in effect on the State Legislatures and delete the proviso and deprive the States of the power of ratification which is today available to them in certain broad areas. 893. The Constitution 24th Amendment Act was impeached by Mr. Palkhivala on three grounds. First, by substituting the words "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" in place of the word '"amendment" in Art. 368 the power was widened. Second, the 24th Amendment made explicit that when Parliament makes a constitutional amendment under Article 368 it acts in exercise of constituent power. Third, it had provided by amendment in Articles 13 and 368 that the power in Article 13 (2) against abridging or taking away of the fundamental rights shall not apply to any amendment under Art. 368. The Constitution 24th Amendment Act is, therefore, to be construed as empowering Parliament to exercise full constituent power of the people and to vest in Parliament the ultimate legal sovereignty of the people as authorising Parliament to alter or destroy all or any of the essential features basic elements and fundamental principles of the Constitution. Likewise, Parliament is construed by the Constitution 24th Amendment Act to be authorised to damage or destroy the essence of all or any of the fundamental rights. Therefore, the amendment must be illegal and invalid. 894. In the alternative it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if the Constitution 24th Amendment is valid it can be only on a reading down of the amended provisions of Articles 13 and 368 which reading would preserve the original inherent and implied limitations. Even after the Constitution 24th Amendment Act Parliament will have no power to alter or destroy the essential features of the Constitution and secondly, fundamental rights are among the essential features of the Constitution and, therefore, the essence of any of the fundamental rights cannot be altered or destroyed or damaged even when they are sought to be abridged. 895. The Attorney General stressed the background in which Article 368 was enacted by the Constituent Assembly to show that any limitation on the amending power was never in controversy. The only controversy was regarding the degree of flexibility of an amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. Our @page-SC1678 Constitution has adopted three methods of amendment of the Constitution. Certain provisions of the Constitution may be amended by a simple majority in Parliament. Others may be amended by two-thirds majority. The third category relates to provisions where amendments must be ratified by one half of the States. This scheme strikes a good balance by protecting the rights of the States while leaving the remainder of the

Constitution easy to amend. Of the three ways of amending the Constitution two are laid down in Article 368 itself and the third is provided for in about 24 other Articles. 896. The Constitutional Adviser incorporated in his draft Constitution prepared by him in October 1947 a recommendation contained in the supplementary Report of the Union Constitution Committee. Following the recommendation of the Advisory Committee he included, a proviso that the provisions in the Constitution relating to the reservation of seats for the Muslims, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the Indian Christians and the Sikhs, either in the Federal Parliament or in any Provincial Legislature, should not be amended before the expiry of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution. 897. The Drafting Committee in February, 1948 considered the provisions for amendment. It made three material changes in the provisions made by the Constitutional Adviser. First, the Committee framed a self contained and independent Article regarding the reservation of seats in the legislatures for minorities. These provisions could not be amended for a period of ten years and would then cease to have effect unless continued in operation by an amendment of the Constitution. The second proposed change gave a limited power of initiating constitutional amendments to the State legislatures. This power related to two matters. These were the methods of choosing Governors and the establishment or abolition of Legislative Councils in the States. The third amendment suggested was that changes in any of the legislative lists (not merely federal List) should receive ratification of at least one half of the Provincial legislatures and one third of the legislatures of Indian States. 898. The entire history of the power of amendment of the Constitution shows first that the Draft Constitution eliminates the elaborate and difficult procedures such as a decision by convention or a referendum. The powers of amendment are left with the legislatures of the Union and the States. Secondly, it is only for amendments of specific matters that the ratification by the State legislatures is required. All other Articles are left to be amended by Parliament with only limitation of majority of not less than a two-thirds of the members of each House present and voting and the majority of the total membership of each House. Thirdly, the provisions for amendment of the Constitution were made simple and not difficult when comparison is made with the American and the Australian Constitutions. 899. The theory of inherent and implied limitations on the amending power is based on the assumption of a narrow and restricted meaning of the word amendment to suggest that the basic features or the essential features and the democratic republican character of the Constitution cannot be damaged and destroyed. Emphasis is laid on the Preamble of the Constitution to suggest that inherent and implied limitations all spring from the Preamble. The Preamble is said not to be a part of the Constitution. The Preamble is said to be unalterable. Therefore, it is contended that other provisions which gave effect to the Preamble cannot be amended. 900. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Berubari case, (1960) 3 SCR 250 = (AIR l960 SC 845) in support of the proposition that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution. The conclusion drawn is that no amendment of the Constitution inconsistent with the Preamble can be made. The Preamble is said to be an implied limitation on the power of amendment. This Court in Berubari case said that the Preamble has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power, because such powers are expressly

granted in @page-SC1679 the body of the Constitution. This Court said "what is true about the powers is equally true about prohibitions and limitations". In Berubari case it was suggested that the Preamble to the Constitution postulated that like a democratic republican form of the Government the entire territory of India was beyond the reach of Parliament and could not be affected either by ordinary legislation or even by constitutional amendment. The Preamble was invoked to cut down the power to cede territory either by ordinary law or by amendment of the Constitution. This Court said that the Preamble is, in the words of Story "a key to open the minds of the makers, but nevertheless the Preamble could not be said to postulate a limitation on one of the very important attributes of sovereignty". This Court rejected the theory that the Preamble can impose serious limitations on the essential attribute of sovereignty. The suggested limitation that the Preamble affirmed the inviolability of the territory of India so that the power of amendment should be implied limited to exclude the ceding territory is negatived by this decision. 901. The petitioner's contention that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution is nullified by the petitioner's reference to and reliance on the Preamble as the source of all inherent limitations. The Berubari case held that Article 1 could be amended under Article 368 and a part of the territory of India could be ceded by such amendment. The Preamble did not limit the power to cede territory by amendment of Article 1. 902. In the Berubari case there is an observation that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution. The Preamble was taken up by the Constituent Assembly at the end as it had to be in conformity with the Constitution. The Preamble was debated and voted upon and the motion "The Preamble stand part of the Constitution" was adopted. Therefore, Mr. Seervai rightly contended that the Preamble is an integral part of the statute. The Preamble can be repealed (See Craies on Statute 6th Ed. page 200 seq. and Halsbury Laws of England. 3rd Ed. Vol. 36 p. 370). 903. In Gopalan case 1950 SCR 88 = (AIR 1950 SC 27) an argument was advanced on the Preamble that the people gave themselves guaranteeing to the citizens fundamental rights, and, therefore, the provisions of Part III must be construed as being paramount to the legislative will as otherwise the fundamental rights to life and personal liberty would have no protection against legislative action. Patanjali Sastri. J. said that the high purpose and spirit of the Preamble as well as the constitutional significance of a declaration of Fundamental Rights should be borne in mind. The language of the provisions, it was said there, could not be stretched in disregard of the cardinal rule of interpretation of any enactment, constitution or other, that its spirit no less than its intendment should be collected primarily from the natural meaning of the words used. The words "procedure established by law" in Article 21 must be taken to refer to a procedure which had a statutory origin. The word "law" was said not to mean the immutable and universal principles of natural justice. The reasoning given by Patanjali Sastri, J. was "no procedure is known or can be said to have been established by such vague and uncertain concepts as the immutable and universal principles of natural justice". This Court in Gopalan case refused to read due process as an implication of the Constitution. 904. In the Kerala Education Bill 1957 case 1959 SCR 995 = (AIR 1958 SC 956) Das, C. J. referred to the Preamble and said "to implement and fortify the supreme purpose set forth in the Preamble, Part III of our Constitution has provided for us certain fundamental rights". In the same case, Das, C. J. said "so long as the Constitution stands as it is and is

not altered, it is inconceivably the duty of this Court to uphold the fundamental rights and thereby honour our sacred obligation to the minority community who are of our own." This observation shows that fundamental rights can be amended and the Preamble does not stand in the way. 905. In Basheshar Nath v. C.I. T. Delhi (1959) Supp. 1 SCR 528 = (AIR 1959 SC 149), Bhagwati, J. referred @page-SC1680 to the Preamble in discussing the question of waiver of fundamental right and compared our Preamble to the Preamble to the United States Constitution. The Preamble to the American Constitution is without the Bill of Rights and the Bill of Rights which became part of the United States Constitution substantially altered its character and broadly speaking, differed in no way, in principle, from our fundamental rights. 906. The Preamble is properly resorted to where doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part. If the enacting words are clear and unambiguous, there is little room for interpretation, except the cases leading to an obvious absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention expressed in the Preamble. This is the view of Story. The Preamble can never be resorted to enlarge the powers confided to the general government. The Preamble can expound the nature, extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution and not substantively create them. 907. The decisions of this Court in Gopalan case, the Coal Bearing Areas Act case (1962) 1 SCR 44 - (AIR 1961 SC 954) and State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain (1965) l SCR 276 = (AIR 1965 SC 1296) are that if the language of the enactment is clear the Preamble cannot nullify or cut down the enactment. The Judicial Committee in Secy. of State for India v. Maharajah of Bobbili ILR 43 Mad 529 = (AIR 1919 PC 52) said that the legislature may well intend that the enacting part should extend beyond the apparent ambit of the Preamble or the immediate mischief. See also Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanovar 1957 A.C. 436. The American decision in Henning Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1905) 197 U.S. 11 indicates that power is not conferred by the Preamble but must be found in the Constitution. 908. The Preamble may be relevant in the case of an ambiguity in an enactment in a statute. A statute does not contain an amending power for the simple reason that the statute can be amended under legislative power. The Attorney General rightly said that the Preamble in a Constitution refers to the frame of the Constitution at the time of the Preamble, and, therefore, it can possibly have no relevance to the constituent power in the future, when that Constitution itself can be changed. The position would be the same so far as the Preamble is concerned whether the constituent power is exercised by the amending body provided for by the people themselves in the Constitution or by referendum if so provided for in the Constitution. The Attorney General supported this submission by relying on the views of Canaway and Wynes on the similar interpretation of Section 128 of the Australian Constitution. 909. Canaway in the Failure of Federalism in Australia in discussing Section 128 of the Australian Constitution under the heading "Alteration of the Constitution" expresses the view that the section must be read as a substantive grant of power to alter the Constitution and that the negative form of the section in no way detracts from the amplitude of that power. Canaway further says that it is not permissible to refer to the Preamble in connection with the effect of Section 128 and if nevertheless such reference is made there is nothing adverse to the conclusion that there is full power of amendment. The Preamble

recites a preliminary agreement to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth. Section 128 of the Australian Constitution forms an integral part of the Constitution. As from the time of the agreement it must have been contemplated that the Constitution should be alterable to the full extent of power conferred by that section. Therefore, the word "alter" in Section 128 of the Australian Constitution is not restricted by any reference to the Preamble. 910. Wynes in Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia 4th Ed. at pp. 505506 expresses the view that apart from the rule which excludes the Preamble generally from consideration in statutory interpretation it is clear that, when all is said and done, the Preamble at the most is only a recital of a present intention. The insertion of an express @page-SC1681 reference to an amendment in the Constitution itself is said to operate as a qualification upon the mere recital of the reasons for its creation. 911. At the second reading of the Draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly a resolution was adopted that the Preamble do form part of our Constitution. The Preamble is a part of the Constitution. On 26 November, 1949 certain Articles of the Constitution were brought into force. Article 393 did come into force on 26 November, 1949. Therefore, the Preamble did not come into force on 26 November, 1949. As regards general laws the position is that the Preamble has been treated as part of the statute. 9l2. Clear constitutional provisions are imperative both on the legislatures and the Courts. Where a constitutional provision is comprehensive in scope and leaves no room for interpretation the Court is without power to amend, add to or detract from a constitutional provision or to create exceptions thereof by implication (See Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 16 p. 65). Where the people express themselves in careful and measured terms in framing the Constitution and they leave as little as possible to implications, amendments or changes in the existing order or conditions cannot be left to inserting implications by reference to the Preamble which is an expression of the intention at the time of the framing of the Constitution. Therefore, the power to amend the Constitution is not restricted and controlled by the Preamble. 913. The contention that essential features are not amendable under Article 368 as it stood before the Constitution 24th Amendment Act is not only reading negative restrictions on the express power of amendment but is also putting the clock back. One of the salutary principles of construction of a statute is to be found in R. v. Burah (1878) 3 AC 889. It was a case to determine whether the prescribed limitations of a colonial legislature had been exceeded. The Judicial Committee said that a duty must be performed by looking to the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively legislative powers are created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. "If what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited, it is not for any court of justice to enquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions". The maxim Expressum facit cessare tacitum was similarly applied in Webb v. Outrim, 1907 AC 81 (89). The theory of implied and inherent limitations can be best described as a subtle attempt to annihilate the affirmative power of amendment. Lord Halsbury in Fielding v. Thomas, 1896 AC 600 said that if the legislature had full power to make laws it was difficult to see how the power was taken away. The power is always sufficient for the purpose. Lord Dunedin in Whiteman v. Sadler 1910 AC 514 said "express enactment shuts the door to further implication".

914. It was said that the essential features could be amended by way of improvement but could not be damaged or destroyed. It was said India could not be converted into a totalitarian dictatorship. The entire approach of the petitioner to the power of amendment contained in Art. 368 ignores the fact that the object of the Constitution is to provide for the organs of State like the judicature, legislature and the executive for the governance of the country. Apart from the essential functions of defence against external aggression and of maintenance of internal order a modern State is organized to secure the welfare of the people. India is a sovereign democratic republic which means that Parliament and State legislatures are elected on adult universal suffrage. The country is governed by the Cabinet system of government with ministries responsible to the House of the People and to the legislative Assemblies respectively. In a democracy the determination of policies to be pursued can only be determined by a majority vote cast at election and then by a majority of the elected representatives in the legislature. Holmes, J., said "In a democracy the people have the right to embody their opinion in law". 915. The argument that if unbridled power were conferred the @page-SC1682 Constitution could be subverted or destroyed is not supported by actual experience in India. Mr. Seervai emphasised that since 1951 when Shankari Prasad case recognised unlimited power of amendment till Golak Nath case in 1967 the normal democratic process of the departments of the State functioned as provided by the Constitution. Elections have been held as provided by the Constitution. If any body or organised party were bent upon subverting our free Constitution, then even if there were no power of amendment, Parliament has powers which would enable such destruction to be brought about. Great and wide powers are conferred for the governance of great sovereign countries and such powers cannot be withheld on the ground that they may be used externally or oppressively. Well-settled principles of construction in interpreting constitutions preclude limiting the language of the Constitution by political, juristic or social concepts independently of the language of the Constitution to be interpreted. This Court in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 8 = (AIR 1959 SC 648) relied on the test laid down in (1878) 5 Ind App 179 that the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively the powers are created. and by which they are negatively restricted are to be looked into. The Judicial Committee in Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada 1912 AC 571 tersely stated the legal principle as follows: "If the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids". This is the golden rule of construction of a written Constitution. 916. In Gopalan case, 1950 SCR 88 = (AIR 1950 SC 27) this Court was invited to read into the Constitution implications derived from the "spirit of the Constitution". Kania, C. J. said that to strike down the law on an assumed principle of construction would be "to place in the hands of the Judiciary powers too great and too indefinite either for its own security or the protection of private rights". Kania, C. J. also said that a large and liberal interpretation should be given to the Constitution. That does not mean that a Court is free to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory. This Court in Keshavan Madhavan Menon v. State of Bombay 1951 SCR 228 = (AIR 1951 SC 128) rejected the contention that the spirit of the Constitution should be invoked in interpreting the Constitution. In Benoari Lal Sharma case, 72 Ind App 57 = (AIR 1945 PC 48) the Privy Council reversed the Judgment of the Federal Court observing that questions of jurisprudence or policy were not relevant to the

construction of power conferred in an affirmative language and not restricted in any negative terms. 917. A Constitution is essentially a frame of government laying down governmental powers exercisable by the legislature, executive and the judiciary.. Even so other provisions are included in the Constitution of a country which provisions are considered by the framers of that Constitution to have such special importance that those should be included in the Constitution or organic law. Thus all provisions of the Constitution are essential and no distinction can be made between essential and non-essential features from the point of view of amendment unless the makers of the Constitution make it expressly clear in the Constitution itself. The Attorney General rightly said that if the positive power of "amendment of this Constitution" in Article 368 is restricted by raising the walls of essential features or core of essential features, the clear intention of the Constituent Assembly will be nullified and that would make a mockery of the Constitution and that would lead to destruction of the Constitution by paving the way for extra constitutional or revolutionary changes in the Constitution. The theory of implied and inherent limitations cannot be allowed to act as a boa constrictor to the clear and unambiguous power of amendment. 918. If there is no express prohibition against amendment in Article 368 the omission of any such restriction did not intend to impose any restriction. When certain restrictions are imposed it is not intended that other undefined restrictions, should be imposed by implication. The general rule is not to import into @page-SC1683 statutes words which are not found there. Words are not to be added by implication into the language of a statute unless it is necessary to do so to give the paragraph sense and meaning in its context. If a matter is altogether omitted from a statute it is not allowable to insert it by implication. Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, effect is to be given to it whatever may be the consequences. The words Of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. Where the reading of a statute produces an intelligible result there is no ground for reading any words or changing any words according to what may be supposed intention of the legislature. If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance to the proper performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation the courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers the details to be carried out. The implication is to empower the authority to do that which is necessary in order to accomplish the ultimate object. 919. The implication sought to be raised by Mr. Palkhivala is for the purpose of reading negative words into Article 368 to destroy the positive power to amend. The provisions of our Constitution in the light of historical background and special problems of the country will show that no provision can be considered as nonessential. The Constitution-makers did not think so. The Attorney General rightly contended that no one has the power or authority to say that any single provision is more essential than another or that the amending power under Article 368 does not operate on any provision on the ground of alleged essentiality when Article 368 provides amendment of this Constitution which obviously means the whole Constitution including every provision. In a Constitution different methods of amendment may be laid down depending upon the degree of importance attached to particular parts of the Constitution. Apart from the language of

Article 368 the draft Constitution as it emerged through the Constituent Assembly shows that no provision of the Constitution was excepted from the amending power. 920. The provisions for the purpose of amendment were divided into four categories. The first two categories are to be found in Art. 368. Certain provisions require ratification by the requisite number of States as are mentioned in the proviso. Other provisions which do not fail within the proviso are amendable by a double majority provided there. The third category consists of Articles 4, 169, 240 (1), paragraph 7 Schedule 5, and paragraph 21 Schedule 6. The fourth category consists of provisions which were said by the Attorney General confer enabling power on Parliament to change the provisions by the expression "unless Parliament otherwise provides" or similar expression. He gave the examples which are Articles 73 (2),100 (3), 105 (3), 118 (2). 120 (2), 125, 133 (3), 171 (2), 189 (3),194 (3), 210 (2), 283(1) and (2), 285 (1) and (2), 343 (3), 345, 348 (1). 921. The character of the visions which are amendable under the proviso to Article 368 itself shows that the petitioner's submission that essential features are unamendable is a baseless vision. Article 54 speaks of the method of election of the President. This may be changed. The manner or scale of representation of the different States in regard to the election of the President may also be changed. The executive power of the Union and the States may be changed. Chapter IV of Part V (the Union Judiciary), Chapter V of Part VI (the High Courts in the States) are also mentioned in Article 368 as liable to be changed. Article 141 may also be changed. Chapter I of Part XI and the Seventh Schedule (legislative relations between Union and the States) may be changed. The representation of the States in Parliament (Articles 80 and 81) may be changed. The number of representation may be increased or reduced. The method of election of such representatives as Parliament may by-law prescribe and the number of the members of the House of the People may be increased or reduced. The method of election to the House of People may be changed. Finally the provisions of Article 368 itself, @pageSC1684 which is the most important part of the Constitution may be changed. 922. To find out essential or non-essential features is an exercise in imponderables. When the Constitution does not make any distinction between essential and non-essential features it is incomprehensible as to how such a distinction can be made. Again, the question arises as to who will make such a distinction. Both aspects expose the egregious character of inherent and implied limitations as to essential features or core of essential features of the Constitution being unamendable. Who is to judge what the essential features are? On what touchstone are the essential features to be measured? Is there any yardstick by which it can be gauged? How much is essential and. how much is not essential? How can the essential features or the core of the essential features be determined? If there are no indications in the Constitution as to what the essential features are the task of amendment of the Constitution becomes an unpredictable and indeterminate task. There must be an objective data and standard by which it can be predicated as to what is essential and what is not essential. If Parliament cannot judge these features Parliament cannot amend the Constitution. If, on the other hand amendments are carried out by Parliament the petitioner contends that eventually court will find out as to whether the amendment violates or abridges essential features or the core of essential features. In the ultimate analysis it is the Court which will pronounce on the amendment as to whether it is permissible or not. This construction will have the

effect of robbing Parliament of the power of amendment and reposing the final power of expressing validity of amendment in the courts. 923. Mr. Palkhivala said that though the essential features could be amended the core of essential features could not be amended. He said that there was no esoteric test to find out what is essential and what is not essential and if no precise definition could be given that was no reason to hold that the essential features and the core of essential features could be amended. It was said that the appreciation of the trained judicial mind is the only way to find out what essential features are. 924. Mr. Seervai rightly contended that there is no foundation for the analogy that just as Judges test reasonableness in law, similarly the judicial mind will find out the essential features on the test of reasonableness. Reasonableness in law is treated as an objective criterion because reason inheres in man as rational being. The citizen whose rights are affected applies reason and when he assails a law he possesses a standard by which he can persuade the Court that the law is unreasonable. The legislature which makes a law has the standard of reasonableness and has the further qualification to apply the standard because of familiarity with the needs, desires and the wants of the people whom the legislature represents. As regards the Judge not only does he share the reasonableness of the reasonable man but his trained mind enables him to see certain aspects clearly. The process of judicial review of legislation as laid down by Courts is that the Court will start with the presumption that laws enacted are reasonable. The objective standard is reasonableness. That is why in the law of contract reasonable price is to be ascertained by the Courts. In the law of torts the Courts find out what reasonable care is. In the law of property reasonable conduct is found out by the Courts to avoid evil consequences. Reasonableness is to be judged with reference to the right which is restricted when Article 19 is considered. 925. The American Courts evolved a test of reasonableness by the doctrine of substantive due process which means not that the law is unreasonable but that on political, social and economic grounds the majority of Judges consider that the law ought not be permitted to be made. The crucial point is that in contradistinction to the American Constitution where rights are couched in wide general terms leaving it to the Courts to evolve necessary limitations our Constitution limited it by precise words of limitation as for example in Articles 19 and 21. In Article 21 the Constitution-makers substituted "procedure established by law" for the @page-SC1685 words "due process of law". The reason for the change was that the procedure established by law was specific. The framers of the Constitution negatived the vague indefinite reasonableness of laws on political, social and economic grounds. In Gopalan case due process was rejected. by clearly limiting the rights acquired and by eliminating the indefinite due process. The Constitution makers freed judicial review of subjective determination. Due process as a test of invalidity of law was deliberatively withheld or denied. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation. The Courts are equally not concerned- with the wisdom and policy of amendments to the Constitution. 926. Reliance was placed by Mr. Palkhivala on Ridge v. Baldwin 1964 A.C. 40 where it is said that opinions that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless, are tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist. In the same case it was said that the idea of negligence is equally insusceptible of exact definition, but what a reasonable man

would regard as fair procedure in particular circumstances and what he would regard as negligence in particular circumstances are equally capable of serving as tests in law. Extracting those observations it was said by Mr. Palkhivala that though the border-line between essential features and non-essential features could not be stated or it was not possible to specify exhaustively the amendment which could be invalid on that principle yet there was no reason why the principle of inherent and implied limitations to amend our Constitution should not be accepted. Inherent and implied limitations cannot originate in an oracle when the Constitution does not contain any express prohibition against amending any provision. When Article 368 speaks of changes in the provisions of the Constitution as are set out in clauses (a) to (d) of the proviso it is manifest that the makers of the Constitution expressed their intention with unerring accuracy that features which can broadly be described as federal features, and from that point of view "Essential features" could be amended. In the face of these express provisions it is impossible to hold that the Constitution does not contemplate an amendment of the so-called essential features of the Constitution. The proviso confers that power with relation to the judiciary, the executive and the legislature, none of which could be said to be inessential. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that the Constitution contained any provision which was inessential. It need be hardly said that amendment not only means alteration, addition or repeal of provision but also deletion of some part, partial repeal and addition of a new part. 927. It was said that if our Parliamentary system was changed to a Presidential system it would be amending the core of our Constitution. But such a change is permissible under Article 368. Whether the people would adopt such an amendment is a different matter and does not fall for consideration here. The core of the federal form of Government in our country is greater power in the Union Parliament than States for preserving the integrity of the country. There can be changes by having a confederation or by conferring greater power on the Centre. These contentions about unamendability of essential features do not take into consideration that the extent and character of any change in the provisions of the Constitution is to be determined by legislatures as amending bodies under Article 368 and as representatives of the people in a democracy and it is not the function of the Courts to make any such determination. 928. Mr. Palkhivala contends that the Constitution 24th Amendment Act is unconstitutional because Parliament cannot exceed the alleged implied and inherent limitations on the amending power as it stood before the 24th Amendment. The 24th Amendment has substituted the marginal note "Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor" for the original note "procedure for amendment of the Constitution". This change is due to the fact that according to the leading majority judgment in Golak Nath case the unamended Article dealt only with the procedure for amendment and that the power of amendment was in the residuary @page-SC1686 power of legislation. The 24th Amendment has declared that the power to amend the Constitution is in Art. 368. That was the view of this Court in earlier decisions. That was the minority view in Golak Nath case. By amendment that view has become the constitutional mandate. 929. The other change as a result of the 24th Amendment is that "Parliament may in the exercise of its constituent power amend" in place of the words "amendment of this Constitution may he initiated." The reasons for this change are to give effect to the

decisions of this Court in Shankari Prasad case which in considering the validity of the First Amendment recognised and affirmed the vital distinction between constitution power and legislative power and decided that the word "law" in Article 13 (2) applied to the exercise of legislative power and did not apply to an amendment of the Constitution. In Sajjan Singh case the same distinction was upheld by the majority of this Court. In Golak Nath case the majority and the concurring judgment denied the distinction between legislative and constituent power and held that Article 13 (2) applied to an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 because there was no distinction between legislative and constituent power. As a consequence the leading majority judgment in Golak Nath case held that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights. The dissenting judgments in Golak Nath case upheld the vital distinction between legislative and constituent powers and held that the decision in Shankari Prasad case and the majority decision in sajjan Singh case were correct and that Parliament had power to amend the fundamental rights since an amendment of the Constitution was not law within the meaning of Article 13 (2). These features give the reason why the expression "Parliament may in the exercise of constituent power" was introduced by the 24th Amendment. Parliament took notice of two conflicting views and the unamended Art. 368. Parliament took notice of the preponderating judicial opinion in favour of the view that Article 368 contained the power of amendment and that power was a constituent power. Wanchoo, J. held that the power under Article 368 is constituent power to change the fundamental law, that is to say the Constitution. The constituent power under the Constitution belonged to Parliament because the Constitution gave it. The 24th Amendment made explicit what the judgment in Shankari Prasad case and the majority judgment in Sajjan Singh case and the dissenting judgments in Golak Nath case said. namely, that Parliament has the constituent power to amend the Constitution. 930. The unamended Article used the words "An amendment of this Constitution". The 24th Amendment used the words "Parliament may........amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution." This has been done because the leading majority judgment in Golak Nath case expressed the view that there is considerable force in the argument that the expression "amendment" in Article 368 has a positive and negative content in exercise of which Parliament cannot destroy the structure of the Constitution but it can only modify the provisions thereof within the framework of the original instrument for its better effect. This observation in Golak Nath case raised a doubt as to the meaning of the word "amendment''. The 24th Amendment has expressly clarified that doubt. 931. The leading majority judgment and the concurring judgment in Golak Nath case both held that the fundamental rights could not be amended by Parliament. The leading majority judgment with reference to the meaning of the word "amendment" and without deciding the matter observed that there was great force in the argument that certain fundamental features e. g. the concept of federalism, the institutions of the President and the Parliamentary executive could not be absolished by amendment. Shankari Prasad case, Sajjan Singh case and the dissenting minority judgment in Golak Nath case took the view that every provision of the Constitution could be amended in exercise of constituent power. As a necessary corollary, the 24th Amendment excludes the operation of Article 13 by amending Article 13 by a @page-SC1687 new sub-article (4) that nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution under Article 368. The

amendment of Article 13 by an insertion of sub-article (4) is also reinforced by the opening words introduced in Article 368 by the 24th Amendment, viz., notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, which would certainly exclude Article 13. The Constitution 24th Amendment Act raises three aspects. First, does the word "amend" include abrogation or repeal of the whole Constitution? Does amendment mean that there is some feature of the Constitution which cannot be changed. Secondly, what light does the proviso to Art 368 throw on the nature of the amending power and on the doctrine of inherent and implied limitations on the amending power that essential features of the Constitution cannot be damaged or destroyed. Thirdly, does clause (e) of the proviso to Article 368 enable Parliament and the requisite majority of the States to increase the power of amendment that was conferred by Article 368. 932. Article 368 in the unamended form contained power as well as self executing procedure which if followed by the prescribed authorities would result in an amendment of the Constitution. Both the Attorney General and Mr. Seervai rightly said that the words "Constitution shall stand amended" in Article 368 will exclude a simple repeal that is without substituting anything in place of the repealed Constitution. If the Constitution were totally repealed and a vacuum was created it could not be said that the Constitution stands amended. The Constitution means the mode in which a State is constituted or organised specially as to the location of sovereign power. The Constitution also means the system or body of fundamental principles according to which the nation, State and body politic is constituted and governed. In the case of a written Constitution the Constitution is more fundamental than any particular law and contains a principle with which all legislation must be in harmony. Therefore, an amendment of the Constitution is an amendment of something which provides a system according to which a State or nation is governed. An amendment of the Constitution is to make fundamental changes in the Constitution. Fundamental or basic principles can be changed. There can be radical change in the Constitution like introducing a Presidential system of Government for a cabinet system or a unitary system for a federal system. But such amendment would in its way bring all consequential changes for the smooth working of the new system. 933. However radical the change the amendment must provide for the mode in which the State is constituted or organised. The question which was often put by Mr. Palkhivala drawing a panorama of a totalitarian State in place of the existing Constitution can be simply answered by saying that the words "The Constitution shall stand amended" indicate that the Constitution of India is being referred to. The power of amendment is unlimited so long as the result is an amended Constitution, that is to say, an organic instrument which provides for the making, interpretation and implementation of law. 934. The theory of unamendability of so-called essential features is unmeritorious in the face of express provisions in Article 368 particularly in clauses (a) to (d) of the proviso. Clauses (a) to (d) relate to 66 Articles dealing with some of the most important features of the Constitution. Those Articles relate to the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. The legislative relations between the Union and the States and the distribution of legislative power between them are all within the ambit of amendment. 935. The question which was raised by Mr. Palkhivala as to whether under proviso (e) to the unamended Article 368 the power of amendment could be increased is answered in the affirmative. The reasons broadly stated are three.

936. First, under Article 368 proviso (e) any limitation on the power of amendment alleged to be found in any other Article of the Constitution can be removed. The full magnitude of the power of amendment which would have existed but @page-SC1688 for the limitation could be restored and the power of amendment increased. In Golak Nath case the majority view was that Article 13 (2) operated as a limitation on the power of amendment. The 24th Amendment took note of that decision and removed all doubts by amending Art. 13 (2) and providing a new sub-article (4) there and also by amending Art. 368 to the effect that Article 13 (2) shall not apply to any amendment of the Constitution. If the express limitation which had been judicially held to constitute a bar to the amendment of fundamental rights could be removed by amending Article 368 under clause (e) to the proviso any other alleged implied limitation can be similarly removed. 937. Secondly, judicial decisions show that by amending the Article conferring the power of amendment a greater power to amend the Constitution can be obtained than was conferred by the original Article. In Ryan case, 1935 Ir. Rep. 170 all the learned Judges excepting the Chief Justice held that by first amending Section 50 of the Irish Constitution which conferred the power of amendment subject to certain restrictions thereon so as to remove the restrictions contained in that section, the Irish Parliament effectively increased its power in the sense that an amendment could be made which those express restrictions would have prohibited. Again, in Ranasinghe case, 1965 AC 172, it was said that a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law making that are imposed by the instrument which regulates its power. This restriction created by the instrument exists independently of the question whether the legislature is sovereign or whether the Constitution is uncontrolled. The Judicial Committee held that "such a Constitution can indeed, he altered or amended by the legislature if the regulating instrument so provides and if the terms of those provisions are complied with and the. alteration or amendment may include the change or abolition of those very provisions." Thus a controlled Constitution can be converted into an uncontrolled Constitution vastly increasing the power of amendment. 938. Thirdly, the power to amend the amending Article must include the power to add, alter or repeal any part of that Article and there is no reason why the addition cannot confer a power of amendment which the authorities named in Article 368 did not possess. By the exercise of the amending power provision can be made which can increase the powers of Parliament or increase the powers of the States. Again, by amendment future amendments can be made more difficut. The picture drawn by Mr. Palkhivala that a future amendment would be rendered impossible either by absolutely forbidding amendment or by prescribing an impractically large majority does not present any legal impediment to such an amendment. The safeguard against such action is external. The contingency of any such amendment being proposed and accepted is extremely remote because such an amendment might sow the seeds of revolution which would be the only way to bring about the change in the Constitution. The Solicitor General rightly said that the effect of the amendment is that "it shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill". The product is not required to be "this Constitution". It will not be identically the old Constitution. It will be a changed or amended Constitution and its resemblance will depend on the extent of the change. More rigid process like referendum or initiative or greater majority or ratification by a larger number of States might be introduced by amendment.

939. It is important to note that proviso (e) to Article 368, namely, the power to amend Article 368 is unlike perhaps some Constitutions which were before the Constituent Assembly when our Constitution was framed. Neither the American nor the Australian Constitution provided for any power to amend the amending provision itself. The Attorney General rightly contended that this force fully expresses a clear and deliberate intention of the Constituent Assembly that apart from providing for a less rigid amending formula the Constituent Assembly took care to avoid the controversy in America as to whether express limitation on Article V of the @page-SC1689 American Constitution itself regarding equal suffrage of the States in the Senate could be amended or the controversy in Australia as to whether Section 128 of the Australian Constitution itself could be amended as there was no express limitation on such amendment. The Constituent Assembly provided in clause (e) to Art. 368 express and specific power of amendment of Article 368 itself. 940. The amplitude of the amending power in our Constitution stands in bold relief in comparison with Article V of the American Constitution, Section 128 of the Australian Constitution and Section 50 of the Irish Constitution none of which confers such a power. Dr. Wynes in his Legislative Powers in Australia 4th Ed. p. 505 expresses the view that though Section 128 is negative in form but the power of amendment extends to alteration "of this Constitution" and this power is implied by its terms. Dr. Wynes also states that by the consent of the States the last part of Section 128 could be amended. This is only to illustrate as to how other Constitutions are understood by jurists in their countries. Our Article 368 contains no express limitation on the power of amendment. The provision of clause (e) in the proviso to Article 368 is not limited to federal features. 941. The words '"amendment of this Constitution" in Section 50 of the Irish Constitution which formed the subject of decision in Ryan case, 1935 Ir. Rep. 170, were read by Kennedy, C. J.. in his dissenting view to mean that if power to amend Section 50 itself was intended to be given the framers of the Constitution would have said so. Mr. Palkhivala relied on this dissenting view. Other learned Judges who formed the majority held that the words "amendment of this Constitution" conferred power to amend that Section 50 as well. If no intention to amend that section itself is expressed there is nothing which can be implied was the dissent. Therefore, it would follow even according to the dissent that no implied limitations on the power of amendment can be read in Section 50 if an express power of amendment has been conferred by the Constitution. 942. Mr. Palkhivala contended that the people reserved the power to themselves to amend the essential features of the Constitution and if any such amendment were to be made it should be referred to the people by referendum. It was said that the Constitution makers did not intend that essential features should be damaged or destroyed even by the people, and therefore, the Constitution did not provide for referendum. The other contention on behalf of the petitioner was that referendum was not provided for because it might have been difficult to have the Constitution accepted on those terms. The second view would not eliminate the introduction of referendum as a method of amendment. If a referendum were introduced by an amendment people would have complete power to deal with essential features. The other question would be as to whether the Preamble and the fundamental rights would be a limitation on the power of the people. On behalf of the petitioner it was said that it was not necessary to decide the questions. Both the Attorney General and Mr. Seervai correctly said that the submissions made on behalf of the

petitioner indicated that if essential features could be amended by the people the very fact that the Constituent Assembly did not include referendum as one of the methods of amendment and that the Constitution makers excluded no part of the Constitution from amendment established that the amendment of a written Constitution can be legally done only by the method prescribed by the Constitution. If the method of referendum be adopted for purpose of amendment as suggested by Mr. Palkhivala that would be extraconstitutional or revolutionary. The amending body to amend the Constitution represents the will of the people. 943. Therefore, as long as Article 368 may be amended under proviso (e) any amendment of the Constitution by recourse to referendum would be revolutionary. Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of the petitioner did not rely on the majority decision in Golak Nath case that the fundamental rights could be abridged or taken away only by convening a Constituent Assembly, but based his argument on @page-SC1690 a theory of legal sovereignty of the people. The Constitution is binding on all the organs of Government as well as on the people. The Attorney General rightly submitted that the concept of popular sovereignty is well settled in parliamentary democracy and it means that the people express their will through their representatives elected by them at the general election as the amending body prescribed by the Constitution. 944. Are fundamental rights unamendable? Mr. Palkhivala contended that apart from Article 13 (2) fundamental rights are based on Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are natural rights, and, therefore, they are outside the scope of amendment. In Golak Nath case the majority view declined to pronounce any opinion on alleged essential features other than fundamental rights. The concurring view was that fundamental rights were unamendable because they were fundamental. Wanchoo, J. for himself and two other learned Judges and Ramaswami, J. rightly rejected the theory of implied limitations. The three reasons given by Wanchoo, J. are these. First, the doctrine of essential and non-essential features would introduce uncertainty. Secondly, constituent power of amendment does not admit of any impediment of implied restrictions. Thirdly because there is no express limitation there can be no implied limitation. 945. Mr. Seervai correctly contended that there is intrinsic evidence in the provisions of Part III itself that our Constitution does not adopt the theory that fundamental rights are natural rights or moral rights which every human being is at all times to have simply because of the fact that as opposed to other beings he is rational and moral. The language of Article 13 (2) shows that these rights are conferred by the people of India under the Constitution and they are such rights as the people thought fit to be in the organised society or State which they were creating. These rights did not belong to the people of India before 26 January 1950 and could not have been claimed by them. Article 19 embodies valuable rights. Rights under Article 19 are limited only to citizens. Foreigners are human beings but they are not given fundamental rights because these rights are conferred only on citizens as citizens. 946. Article 33 enacts that Parliament may by law modify rights conferred by Part III in their application to Armed Forces. Parliament may restrict or abrogate any of the rights conferred by Part III so as to ensure the proper discharge of the duties of the Armed Forces and the maintenance of discipline among them. Therefore, Article 33 shows that citizens can be denied some of these rights. If these are natural rights these cannot be abrogated. Article 34 shows that Parliament may by law indemnify any person in respect

of any act done by him in connection with the maintenance or restoration of order in any area where martial law was in force or validate any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, forfeiture ordered or other act done under martial law in such area. Article 34 again shows restriction on rights conferred by Part III while martial law is in force in any area. The dominant concept is social good. Where there is no restraint the society fails. 947. Articles 352 and 358 also illustrate as to how while the proclamation of emergency is in operation provisions of Article 19 are suspended during emergency. The framers of the Constitution emphasised the social content of those rights. The basic concept of fundamental right is therefore a social one and it has a social function. These rights are conferred by the Constitution. The nature of restriction on fundamental rights shows that there is nothing natural about those rights. The restrictions contemplated under Article 19 (2) with regard to freedom of speech are essential parts of a well organised developed society. One must not look at location of power but one should see how it acts. The restrictions contemplated in Article 19 are basically social and political. Friendly relations with foreign states illustrate the political aspect of restrictions. There are similar restrictions on right to move freely. The protection of Scheduled Tribes is also reasonable in the interest of society. This Court in @page-SC1691 Basheshar Nath v. C I. T., Delhi, (l959) Supp 1 SCR 528 = (AIR 1959 SC 149) said that there are no natural rights under our Constitution and natural rights played no part in the formulation of the provisions therein. 948. Articles 25 and 26 by their opening words show that the right to the freedom of religion is subject to the paramount interest of society and there is no part of the right however important to devotee which cannot and in many cases have not been denied in civilised society. 949. Subba Rao, C. J. in Golak Nath case equated fundamental rights with natural rights or primordial rights. The concurring majority view in Golak Nath case, however, said that there is no natural right in property and natural rights embrace the activity outside the status of citizen. Fundamental rights as both the Attorney General and Mr. Seervai rightly contended are given by the Constitution, and, therefore, they can be abridged or taken away by the people themselves acting as an organised society in a State by the representatives of the people by means of the amending process laid down in the Constitution itself. There are many Articles in Part III of our Constitution which cannot in any event be equated with any fundamental right in the sense of natural right. To illustrate Article 17 deals with abolition of untouchability. Article 18 speaks of abolition of titles. Article 20 deals with protection in respect of conviction for offences. Article 23 refers to prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour. Article 24 deals with prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc. Article 27 speaks of freedom as to liability for taxes levied for promotion of any particular religion. Article 28 contemplates freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. Article 29 deals with protection of interests of minorities. Article 31 (2) prior to the Constitution 25th Amendment Act spoke of payment of just equivalent for acquisition or requisition of property. Article 31 (4) deals with legislation pending at the commencement of the Constitution. Articles 31 (5) and (6) save certain types of Laws. Article 31A saves laws providing for acquisition of estates etc. Article 32 confers right to move the Supreme Court.

950. The Constitution is the higher law and it attains a form which makes possible the attribution to it of an entirely new set of validity, the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people. Invested with statutory form and implemented by judicial review higher law becomes juristically the most fruitful for people. There is no higher law above the Constitution. 951. Mr. Palkhivala relied on an Article by Conrad on Limitation of Amendment Procedure and the Constitutional Power. The writer refers to the West German Provincial Constitution which has expressly excluded basic rights from amendment. If that is so the question of basic rights being unamendable on the basis of higher law or natural law does not arise. The conclusion of the writer is that whereas the American Courts did not consider declaring a constitutional norm void because of a conflict with higher law the German Jurisprudence broadened the concept of judicial review by recourse to natural law. The post-war Constitution of West Germany distinguished between superior and inferior constitutional norms in so far as certain norms are not subject to amendment whereas others are. 952. The Attorney General relied on Friedmann Legal Theory 5th Ed. pp. 350 seq. to show that there was a revival of natural law theory in contemporary German Legal Philosophy: This theory of natural law springs from the reaction against the excesses of the Nazi regime. The view of Friedmann is that natural law may disguise to pose itself the conflict between the values which is a problem of constant and painful adjustment between competing interests, purposes and policies. This conflict is resolved by ethical or political evolution which finds place in legislative policies and also on the impact of changing ideas on the growth of law. 953. Fundamental rights are social rights conferred by the @page-SC1692 Constitution. There is no law above the Constitution. The Constitution does not recognise any type of law as natural law. Natural rights are summed up under the formula which became common during the Puritan Revolution namely life, liberty and property. 954. The theory of evolution of positive norms by supra-positive law as distinguished from superior positive law had important consequences in the post-war revival of natural law in some countries particularly Germany. Most of the German Constitutions from the early 19th Century to the Nazi Regime did not provide for judicial review. Under the Weimar regime, the legislature reigned supreme and legal positivism was brought to an extreme. The reaction after World War II was characterised by decreases of legislative power matched by an increase of judicial power. It is in this context that Conrad's writing on which Mr. Palkhivala relied is to be understood. The entire suggestion is that norms not only be judged by a superior law namely conditional law but by natural law to broaden the scope of judicial review. The acceptance of the doctrine of judicial review has been considered as a progress in constitutional theory made between Declaration of Independence and the Federal Convention at Philadelphia 955. On the one hand there is a school of extreme natural law philosophers who claim that a natural order establishes that private capitalism is good and socialism is bad. On the other hand, the more extreme versions of totalitarian legal philosophy deny the basic value of the human personality as such. Outside these extremes, there is a far greater degree of common aspirations. The basic autonomy and dignity of human personality is the moral foundation of the teaching of modern natural law philosophers like Maritain. It is in this context that our fundamental rights and Directive Principles are to be read as

having in the ultimate analysis a common good. The Directive Principles do not constitute a set of subsidiary principles to fundamental rights of individuals. The Directive Principles embody the set of social principles to shape fundamental rights to grant a freer scope to the large scale welfare activities of the State. Therefore, it will be wrong to equate fundamental rights as natural, inalienable, primordial rights which are beyond the reach of the amendment of the Constitution. It is in this context that this Court in, (l959) Supp. 1 SCR 528 = (AIR 1959 SC 149) said that the doctrine of natural rights is nothing but a foundation of shifting sand. 956. Mr. Seervai rightly said that if the power of amendment of the Constitution is coextensive with the power of the judiciary to invalidate laws, the democratic process and the co-ordinate nature of the great departments of the State are maintained. The democratic process is maintained because the will of the people to secure the necessary power to enact laws by amendment of the Constitution is not defeated. The democratic process is also