The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy

THE CoNClUSIoN oF THE PolISH SOLIDARITY CRISIS in late 1981 left
the Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty very like the man after
whom it had been named: Both had become mannequins propped up by
a fading imperial power desperate to preserve its role in world affairs. Following the heady successes at bloc integration in the early 1970s, mounting domestic problems in the USSR itself had prompted Moscow to reevaluate its East European commitments consistent with a narrower, less
internationalist perception of Soviet interests. By the end of that decade,
the sudden collapse of relations with the United States, economic stagnation, declining international prestige, and a military stalemate in the
mountains of Afghanistan had combined to weaken the Kremlin's hand
in world affairs. In the process, the crisis-prone region of Eastern Europe
had become as much a liability as an asset. Economic mismanagement,
dissident activism, and emergent nationalism compounded in the 1970s
to create a considerable burden on Soviet resources. In the face of perennial legitimacy crises, its local regimes had become too reliant on the
trump card of Soviet military might to preserve communist rule. This was
particularly true of Poland, the country that Moscow had long regarded
as the keystone of the socialist edifice in Eastern Europe.

Consequently, at the outset of the 1980s, the prospect of bold military
strikes into the region no longer appeared to be consistent with Soviet
national interests, even if it meant the loss of this most important European client-state. Years before Mikhail Gorbachev would initiate his historic "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, Moscow was already cognizant of the need to base the future of European socialism on regime
legitimacy rather than on Soviet bayonets. The Kremlin accordingly relinquished its earlier insistence on enforced orthodoxy and gradually began
to search for a new paradigm of limited diversity in bloc relations. Increasingly permissive Soviet leaders provided greater political autonomy
to their client-states, eager to encourage resolution of internal problems
without resort to Soviet assistance. In the wake of the Polish crisis of
1980-81, a policy of greater forbearance in the bloc commanded support
at every level of the Soviet Party bureaucracy. Though still unaware of
their accomplishment, the Polish people had forced the Soviet colossus
into an imperial retreat from which it would never recover.

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