The application of evolutionary perspectives to analyzing sex differences in aggressive behavior and dominance hierarchies has been found useful in multiple areas. We draw attention to the parallel of gender differences in the worsening health status of restructuring societies. Drastic socio-economic changes are interpreted as examples of hierarchy disruption, having differential psychological and behavioral impact on women and men, and leading to different changes in health status.

Climate engineering (CE), the intentional modification of the climate in order to reduce the effects of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations, is sometimes touted as a potential response to climate change. Increasing interest in the topic has led to proposals for empirical tests of hypothesized CE techniques, which raise serious ethical concerns. We propose three ethical guidelines for CE researchers, derived from the ethics literature on research with human and animal subjects, applicable in the event that CE research progresses beyond computer (...) modeling. The Principle of Respect requires that the scientific community secure the global public's consent, voiced through their governmental representatives, before beginning any empirical research. The Principle of Beneficence and Justice requires that researchers strive for a favorable risk–benefit ratio and a fair distribution of risks and anticipated benefits, all while protecting the basic rights of affected individuals. Finally, the Minimization Principle requires that researchers minimize the extent and intensity of each experiment by ensuring that no experiments last longer, cover a greater geographical extent, or have a greater impact on the climate, ecosystem, or human welfare than is necessary to test the specific hypotheses in question. Field experiments that might affect humans or ecosystems in significant ways should not proceed until a full discussion of the ethics of CE research occurs and appropriate institutions for regulating such experiments are established. (shrink)

It has long been recognized that the amplitude of the P300 component of event–related brain potentials is sensitive to the degree to which eliciting stimuli are surprising to the observers (Donchin, 1981). While Squires et al. (1976) showed and modeled dependencies of P300 amplitudes from observed stimuli on various time scales, Mars et al. (2008) proposed a computational model keeping track of stimulus probabilities on a long–term time scale. We suggest here a computational model which integrates prior information with short–term, (...) long–term, and alternation–based experiential influences on P300 amplitude fluctuations. To evaluate the new model, we measured trial–by–trial P300 amplitude fluctuations in a simple two–choice response time task, and tested the computational models of trial–by–trial P300 amplitudes using Bayesian model evaluation. The results reveal that the new digital filtering (DIF) model provides a superior account of the trial–by–trial P300 amplitudes when compared to both, Squires et al.’s (1976) model, and Mars et al.’s (2008) model. We show that the P300–generating system can be described as two parallel first–order infinite impulse response (IIR) low–pass filters and an additional fourth–order finite impulse response (FIR) high–pass filter. Implications of the acquired data are discussed with regard to the neurobiological distinction between short–term, long–term, and working memory as well as from the point of view of predictive coding models and Bayesian learning theories of cortical function. (shrink)

Some types of solar radiation management (SRM) research are ethically problematic because they expose persons, animals, and ecosystems to significant risks. In our earlier work, we argued for ethical norms for SRM research based on norms for biomedical research. Biomedical researchers may not conduct research on persons without their consent, but universal consent is impractical for SRM research. We argue that instead of requiring universal consent, ethical norms for SRM research require only political legitimacy in decision-making about global SRM trials. (...) Using Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane's model of global political legitimacy, we examine several existing global institutions as possible analogues for a politically legitimate SRM decision-making body. (shrink)

This event-related brain potential (ERP) study aimed at bridging two hitherto widely separated domains of cognitive neuroscience. Specifically, we combined the analysis of cognitive control in a cued task-switching paradigm with the fundamental question of how uncertainty is encoded in the brain. Two functional models of P3 amplitude variation in cued task-switching paradigms were put to an empirical test: (1) According to the P3b surprise hypothesis, parietal P3b waveforms are related to surprise over switch cues. (2) According to the P3a (...) entropy hypothesis, frontal P3a waveforms are associated with entropy over switch outcomes. In order to examine these hypotheses, we measured the EEG while sixteen healthy young participants performed cued task-switching paradigms closely modeled to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. We applied a factorial design, with number of tasks (two vs. three viable tasks), cue explicitness (task cuing vs. transition cuing), and cue contingency (prospectively-signaled cuing vs. feedback-based cuing) as independent variables. The ERP results replicated the commonly reported P3b effect associated with task switches, and further showed that P3a amplitudes were related to the entropy of switch outcomes, thereby supporting both hypotheses. Based on these ERP data, we suggest that surprise over task switches, and entropy over switch outcomes, constitute dissociable functional correlates of P3b and P3a ERP components in task-switching paradigms, respectively. Finally, a theoretical integration of the findings is proposed within the framework of Sokolov’s (1966) entropy model of the orienting response. (shrink)

p. 13: But if Mayr himself was an unconscious 'physicalist', why did he argue so forcefully against the machine theory of life? In part his dissatisfaction with this approach can be explained as a residue of earlier experiences. When he started to argue for the autonomy of biology in the early 1960s, the unique, emergent characteristics of organisms were ignored by the philosophy of science which was dominated by physics (Greene 1994; Hull 1994). In this situation Mayr not only criticised (...) this particular neglect as reductionism, but questioned the usefulness of the physicalist approach for biology in general. In recent decades this situation has clearly changed and this was also due to Mayr's relentless fight for the recognition of the unique aspects of biology. Nevertheless he stuck to his broad rejection and ignored developments toward a more sophisticated view (cf. Emmeche, Koppe and Stjernfelt 1997). But there is probably more to it. His second motivation is an emotional aversion against connotations and implications of the word 'machine'. The view that organisms-including humans!-are 'survival machines', 'robot vehicles' programmed to preserve their genes conveys a deterministic and mechanistic view that is perceived by many persons as a gross 'narcissistic insult' (Freud 1917, pp. 6, 7). It is a view that Mayr definitely did not appreciate. (shrink)