The US secretaries of state and defense
met with their Japanese counterparts in
Washington, DC, at the Security Consultative
Committee (more commonly known as the "2+2
meeting") last month. The joint statement released
after the session on February 19 applauds the
cooperation between the two countries, reaffirms
the significance of the US-Japan security
relationship to the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and articulates a
set of common strategic goals for the alliance.
The joint declaration also notes Japan's efforts
to take a more active role in international
security affairs.

Few disagree with the
significance of this joint statement. The contrast
between it and the one issued at the end of the
last 2+2 meeting in December 2002 is clear. While
the 2002 joint statement merely took note of
US-Japan cooperation in the "war on terrorism" and
provided a check list of security issues that
require cooperation between Tokyo and Washington,
the 2005 statement sets the future direction of
the US-Japan alliance.

It is also
noteworthy that the joint statement includes
common strategic objectives that have not been
explicitly discussed within the alliance framework
in the past. The inclusion of Taiwan and
China-related issues is particularly interesting.
The normalization of Japan-Russia relations (with
the resolution of the Northern Territories issue
as a requisite) was also named for the first time
as a common strategic goal for the US-Japan
alliance. The joint statement also called for a
comprehensive discussion of the division of roles
and missions between Japan and the United States,
including the realignment of US Forces in Japan
(USFJ). While the statement says this should occur
in an expeditious manner, it did not set a
specific deadline.

What do all these
developments mean?

First and foremost, they show that the
US-Japan alliance continues to evolve. The joint
statement celebrated the maturity that the
alliance has achieved since the end of the Cold
War and signals that Tokyo and Washington will
work to ensure that their bilateral alliance
adjusts to changes in the international security
environment. Further, it not only clarified what
was set forth in the 1996 Tokyo Declaration, but
also went a step further - declaring that the
US-Japan alliance is on the path to become a
global strategic partnership that reaches well
beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

Second, the joint statement is an effort by
both governments to "lock in" the progress that
has been made within the alliance to date.
Observers of the US-Japan security relationship
are keenly aware that much of Japan's recent
security-policy changes would not have been
possible without Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi's leadership. With the end of Koizumi's
term approaching, both sides need prepare for his
departure. Washington and Tokyo have laid the
foundation upon which Koizumi's successor will
have to operate - preventing a potential
regression of Japanese security policy following
Koizumi's departure.

Third, the joint statement signals that Tokyo
is consolidating its national-security policy
priorities around the US-Japan alliance. As
distinct from the revised 1997 US-Japan
Guidelines, Japan did not try to skirt the issue
of Taiwan and was willing to articulate security
concerns vis-a-vis China, both directly
(highlighting China's military activities) and
indirectly (note the reference to "destabilizing
sales and transfers of arms and military
technology"). Japan appears less hesitant to more
closely align itself with Washington on these
issues. Efforts within Japan over the past year to
articulate its national security strategy,
including the final report from the Council on
Defense and National Security (or Araki
Commission) and the revision of the National
Defense Program Guidelines, were contributing
factors.

Overall, the statement seems to
confirm that the relationship between Washington
and Tokyo has never been better. Some in the US
have talked about "Japan surpassing", applauding
Japan for exceeding the expectations of the United
States. Down the road, however, many challenges
remain.

Some of the challenges will be
external. For instance, coping with China, which
often perceives moves by the US-Japan alliance as
a threat to its sovereignty, will be strenuous. A
former senior US government official recently
noted that the joint statement could complicate
the alliance's short-term relations with China.
Indeed, China has already taken issue with the
reference to Taiwan, claiming that it represents
an "interference in internal affairs". The Chinese
media have argued that the statement is intended
to contain China and is an excuse for the military
expansion of the US-Japan alliance. China may have
overreacted, but it is unclear how Japan and the
US can build a "cooperative relationship" with an
increasingly powerful yet suspicious China.

The real challenge is whether Tokyo can
overcome internal political hurdles to continue
developing its national security strategy.
Negotiations over the realignment of US Forces in
Japan is the first real test. The two governments
so far have failed to finish implementation of the
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
process, which is meant to reduce the burden to
Japan of US bases on Okinawa. The process has been
bogged down by complex political factors,
including difficult negotiations between central
and local authorities. A more comprehensive
realignment of US forces across Japan that
involves several prefectures - some of which have
powerful and vocal governors, such as Tokyo's
Ishihara Shintaro - will be even more politically
taxing for the Japanese government. Since progress
on this issue is expected to come sooner than with
other issues, Washington will use it as a test of
Tokyo's intentions. And it is doubtful that
Koizumi, who is expected to be consumed for the
remainder of his term with the privatization of
the postal system and with pension reform, is
willing to spend the political capital required
for the successful conclusion of these bilateral
consultations.

The joint Security
Consultative Committee statement sets ambitious
goals for the US-Japan alliance. However, the
devil is always in the details. Over the months
and years to come, Tokyo must be ready to show
political courage to uphold its end of the bargain
and honor the spirit of the joint declaration.
Washington must reciprocate by showing patience
and sensitivity to political dynamics within
Japan.

Yuki Tatsumi is a
research fellow of the East Asia Program of the
Henry L Stimson Center in Washington, DC. She
concurrently serves as adjunct fellow of the
International Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in in
Washington. She can be reached atyukitatsumi@hotmail.com.

Note: Many commentaries on the
2+2 meeting, including this one, make reference to
the inclusion of Taiwan and China-related issues
in the joint declaration. Without disputing the
significance, it is important to recognize what
was actually said (and not said). One common
strategic objective was to "encourage the peaceful
resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait
through dialogue". Another was to "encourage China
to improve transparency of its military affairs".
Both were preceded by the objective to "develop a
cooperative relationship with China". This hardly
constitutes "a demonstration of Japan's
willingness to confront the rapidly growing might
of China", as a pre-release Washington Post
analysis of an early version of the text
proclaimed. This premature (not to mention
inaccurate) reporting has caused both
misinterpretation and overreaction, with Beijing
objecting to another alleged "interference in its
internal affairs", and Taipei euphorically
applauding the "fact" that "Japan has become more
assertive". - Ralph A Cossa, president of Pacific Forum CSIS(Center
for Strategic and International Studies, which
gave permission for publication of this
article.