The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KAMPALA854.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000854
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: PRELEAIDKPKOMOPSETSOERKEUG
SUBJECT: UGANDA/SOMALIA: MILITARY AND CIVILIAN VIEWPOINTS
ON DEPLOYMENT
REF: KAMPALA 842
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
¶1. (C) Summary: Support for Uganda's deployment to Somalia
remains firm among Ugandan military and civilian officials.
During Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary James Swan's
visit to Uganda from May 7-9, the Minister of Defense, Chief
of Defense Forces, and parliamentarians raised a number of
political and security issues. Ugandan officials view their
role in Somalia as long-term and as one of delivering a
government to stabilize the situation. To achieve this
objective, Uganda wants its forces augmented by other troop
contributors, an organized and wide scale humanitarian
effort, and diplomatic pressure on the Transitional Federal
Government to include all societal elements.
Parliamentarians also voiced continued support for the
Ugandan deployment, but urged the U.S. to play a low key role
to preserve Uganda's neutrality as peacekeepers. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) On May 7 and 8, Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant
Secretary James Swan, Ambassador Browning, P/E Chief, and
SIPDIS
DATT discussed Uganda's deployment to Somalia with various
government officials including parliamentarians, the Minister
of Defense, and the Chief of Defense Forces.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
UGANDA COMMITTED TO SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) On May 8, Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga and
Chief of Defense Forces Aronda Nyakarima expressed optimism
that the Somalia problem could be solved. On the military
front, Kiyonga stated that the arrival of other African units
and a transition from an African Union to a United Nations
force were critical elements to stabilizing the security
situation. On the political front, Kiyonga said pressure was
needed to make the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
inclusive. A strong message should be delivered to Eritrea
to stop supporting subversive elements, according to Kiyonga,
and the delivery of humanitarian and development projects
would enhance support for the TFG among the population and
help lower he level of societal tension. DAS Swan informed
Kiyonga that the U.S. would be providing $10 million in
development assistance to Somalia, which would help cover the
costs of the reconciliation conference. The timing may not
yet be right for a donors conference as some countries want
to await the outcome of the reconciliation efforts. The U.S.
also has requested additional funds for Somalia.
¶4. (C) Ambassador Browning asked Kiyonga if Uganda was
reaching out to other potential troop contributors. Kiyonga
said yes, but the negative publicity of the situation was
discouraging other contributors. He stated that the Union of
Islamic Courts was "good" at publicity. He said that Ghana
could deploy if provided more resources, including logistics.
Kiyonga also said that President Museveni raised the issue
of other troop contributors with the African Union's General
Secretary, Alpha Konare, when he visited Kampala in late
SIPDIS
April. According to Kiyonga and General Aronda, the U.N.
wanted peace established before it would come to Somalia.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CONCERNS ABOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR TFG ENEMIES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Al Qaeda cells were recruiting fighters for $50 per
hour during the last spate of serious violence, according to
Kiyonga. He stated that there was a lull in the fighting
when the individual sent to Massawa, Eritrea to get more
funds did not return and there was no money to pay the
mercenaries to continue fighting. Kiyonga stated that the
fighters on the ground in Somalia were able to regroup
quickly and did not need large numbers to create chaos. TFG
President Yusuf is vulnerable and his opponents only have to
be lucky once to kill him. However, Uganda had to be lucky
every day in order to protect him. Kiyonga said that the
TFG's enemies almost captured the commander of the Ethiopian
forces. In addition to Eritrea, Kiyonga said that members of
the Arab League, Sudan, and Egypt were supporting the TFG's
enemies. Kiyonga reported that after President Museveni left
Eritrea in March, President Isaias had "put out the red
carpet" for the TFG's opponents.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CONCERNS ABOUT INTERNAL DYNAMICS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) From Uganda's perspective, there are internal
problems that must be overcome to stabilize the situation in
KAMPALA 00000854 002 OF 003
Somalia, according to Kiyonga. The first problem was
President Yusuf's historically bad relationship with the
Mayor of Mogadishu. A second problem was the presence of
profiteers, such as the former Defense Minister who
controlled the port and airport at Kismayo and who views the
TFG's attempts to gain control over strategic locations as
limiting revenue-making activities. A third obstacle was
that young Somalis do not know what a government was or does
for its people. Uganda wants to create a situation that
demonstrates the benefits of government in terms of law,
order, and prosperity. A fourth reality was that the genuine
resentment of Ethiopia by the Hawiya clan was hindering
progress. Kiyonga hoped that once a Ghanaian battalion
arrived, one Ethiopian battalion could rotate out to lessen
the antagonism. Defense Minister Kiyonga said that he had no
sense of when Ethiopia would pull out.
- - - - - - - - -
CONCERNS ABOUT AU
- - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) General Aronda presented a long list of his
impressions of the situation on the ground in Somalia. He
began with the African Union's shortcomings. First, Aronda
said there was a lack of a serious African Union political
presence in Mogadishu. Second, Uganda agreed with the U.S.
and U.K. to help beef up the AU's strategic planning cell.
As a result, Uganda transferred Director of its Command and
Staff College, Major General Beno Birao, to Addis Ababa to
strengthen planning for AMISOM. (Note: The issue of the AU's
non-payment of the peackeepers' salaries is being raised in
the press and among some political figures in Kampala.
Policymakers are alarmed by the AU's expectation that Uganda
pay first and be re-imbursed later. End Note.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CONCERNS ABOUT YUSUF AND GHEDI
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) Aronda's next issues all related to the TFG. Aronda
advised that Yusuf needed to drop Prime Minister Ghedi, who
is divisive and blocking dialogue. Yusuf himself is
violating the TFG charter and needs to be reined in. Aronda
said that the lack of a Somali transitional force also is
problematic. One needs to be trained and stood up to counter
the negative influence of the militias that report to each
subclan. The Ugandans have asked Yusuf repeatedly for the
plans for the preparation of the reconciliation talks. He
has yet to share them and he was losing credibility on the
issue. Aronda warned that there were signs that Yusuf was
preparing to be a military, rather than civilian leader.
Aronda proposed a contact group of regional presidents to
move him in the right direction. If no action was taken,
Aronda was concerned that Yusuf would institute military
rule. Aronda warned that without an organized humanitarian
intervention, Yusuf could continue to blame others for the
desperate situation. Kiyonga said Uganda sounded out Kenya
about the idea of the Contact Group, but Kibaki was
"unenthusiastic" and the chairmanship of the
Intergovernmental Authority for Development's move to Addis
Ababa could undermine the group.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PLEA FOR MORE INTELLIGENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) Aronda's final pitch was for stronger intelligence
sharing. He said the Ugandans had taken U.S. advice and
named experienced officers to key liaison and planning
positions. Aronda said a Lieutenant Colonel was sent to
Djibouti to serve as a liaison officer to CJTF-HOA and that
Birao's appointment to the AU in Addis Ababa was a sign of
Uganda's commitment to making AMISOM effective. Aronda said
that Uganda appreciated the maps provided by CJTF-HOA, but
was concerned that there was little intelligence sharing on
Somalia with Uganda.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CIVILIAN VIEWS ON SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (SBU) Ugandan parliamentarians continue to support
Uganda's deployment to Somalia. Opposition leader Morris
Onenga Latigo told DAS Swan on May 8 that he had personally
"put his head on the block" within his party to support
Uganda's deployment to Somalia. Latigo expressed
appreciation that Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga came to
him twice to explain the modalities of the Somalia deployment
and keeps him updated on developments. Two weeks ago, he
said, Kiyonga appeared before Parliament to give a situation
update. The MPs have asked to be notified when Ugandan
KAMPALA 00000854 003 OF 003
soldiers were killed so that the member representing the
deceased can ensure the family was properly notified. Even
though the opposition had walked out of parliament during the
period of the vote, opposition MPs participated in committee
and caucus meetings on the issue. Latigo issued a public
statement of opposition support for the deployment. Latigo
stated that the opposition would continue to support the
deployment.
¶12. (SBU) Latigo stated that it was important that AMISON
was to be augmented and that the TFG be pressured to reach
out to all constituencies in Somalia. Latigo said that this
remains a contentious issue among Muslim members of
Parliament. U.S.-trained himself, Latigo also expressed
appreciation for U.S. training for Ugandan soldiers because
he said military officers trained in the United States behave
differently. It will be important to have U.S.-trained
officers in Somalia because they have a different mind-set,
are outward looking, and understand human rights and civilian
control. All of these factors help the military step back
from participating in politics. Latigo said that in his
view, it was very important for the opposition to show
support and understanding for the military.
¶13. (SBU) Latigo was interested in the U.S. position on
independence for Somaliland. He said that Somaliland
"appears to be working" and that the Ugandan MPs had received
a delegation of Somaliland parliamentarians. DAS Swan told
Latigo that discussion of Somaliland's independence need to
be driven by its neighbors and that the issue was presented
regularly at African Union meetings. Latigo expressed
support for Somaliland's independence and said that
Parliament might issue a resolution recognizing the progress
that had been made.
¶14. (SBU) In a separate meeting with northern
parliamentarians (Reftel), DAS Swan heard similar statements
of support for Uganda's deployment to Somalia. However, the
MPs said that the U.S. should not play too public a role on
Somalia. They told DAS Swan that it was better if the U.S.
kept its support for the Ugandan deployment behind-the-scenes
rather than publicize it. Parliamentarians supported
Uganda's deployment because it was an African initiative to
help another African country. They expressed concern about
Uganda's current reliance on Ethiopia as potentially
jeopardizing Uganda's role as a neutral party. Likewise,
Uganda's neutrality could be undermined if it was perceived
to be too close to the United States. Nonetheless, the
parliamentarians appreciated U.S. assistance. They raised
the issue of the African Union's non-payment of AMISOM
salaries.
CHRITTON