"The announcement [on Saturday] by the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, that he will redeploy his troops in Lebanon ... should not be seen as a way to delay a meaningful withdrawal ... Mr Assad is now in the process of complying with the 1989 Taif accord, which calls for a redeployment to the Lebanese border and then a negotiated withdrawal ... He is also implementing UN resolution 1559, which calls for a prompt withdrawal. If he has been vague about the timing, so too were the Taif accord and the UN ...

"Mr Assad's decision means that for the first time in almost 30 years, there will be no Syrian presence in the heart of Lebanon. This should have gone down well in many capitals ... but it hasn't ... [George Bush] has made it clear that he is prepared to stake political capital on forcing a withdrawal ... But withdrawing an army is not an operation that can be completed in 24 hours. After all, it took years for the US to extricate itself from Vietnam and it will not leave Iraq any quicker."

"A new chapter was [on Saturday] opened in the Middle East, particularly in Syrian-Lebanese relations. Mr Assad gave an optimistic and a reasonable shove to Arab and international efforts to defuse tension in Lebanon ...

"The immediate result of the speech was to throw the ball into the UN's court, asking the world body to say 'whether an immediate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon would not have a negative impact on Lebanon' ... It has long been clear ... that peace, stability and ... reconciliation in Lebanon required [Syria's] comprehensive participation ... That commitment to maintain Lebanon's independence and integrity [has] not come easily."

Jordan Times Editorial, March 7

"Mr Assad's adroit performance ... [may] stop some of the widespread criticism targeting his country. Still, Damascus left major issues unattended to. To begin with, there was no mention of a timetable for the withdrawal ... Second, by announcing that troop withdrawal means redeployment to Syria's border with Lebanon, Damascus makes it understood that its armed forces will [be] ready and able to re-enter ... whenever it deems that its own security is threatened ... Also there was no mention of any withdrawal of the Syrian intelligence networks ...

"Damascus should not leave anything to imagination, not at crucial moments like the one it is facing now ... Mr Bush [should] assume a less belligerent posture ... Democracy and the rule of law cannot be brought by the barrel of a gun."

Rami G Khouri Daily Star, Lebanon, March 7

"Mr Assad's speech should be seen as the first salvo in round two of the current confrontation between Syria and its critics ... Now the more difficult challenges rise to the fore, at a time when the opposition in Lebanon may start to fragment over the next wave of demands, and Syria and its allies start to fight back politically.

"A key element in the Syrian strategy ... is to make limited concessions to relieve the pressure on Damascus, gain some time, and allow the context of the political face-off to evolve in its favour ... [But] the likely outcome of Saturday's speech is that it will anger most of those who oppose Syria in Lebanon and the west. This in turn will increase the pressures on, and isolation of, [Damascus]."

Gulf News Editorial, United Arab Emirates, March 7

"Mr Assad understands ... the US will continue to maintain its pressure on Syria until the situation explodes. This attitude is similar to the one the US had taken against Saddam Hussein and Iraq over the issue of WMD. Even if Mr Assad were to announce an immediate and complete withdrawal, the US would not be satisfied and continue to ask Syria to do more.

"Washington will make excuses by using issues such as Syria's human rights record, its alleged support for terrorism ... of course, in line with Israeli terms and conditions, as pretexts to implement its hidden agenda ... What has happened in Iraq would be repeated in Syria. We hope, however, that such is not the case. But this is what Syria believes."

Amir Taheri New York Post, March 7

"Lebanon's cedar revolution ... could, and must, become a prelude to the liberation of Syria from half a century of despotic rule ... That change could come in two ways. The first is through violence.

"The Syrian regime is based on the Alawite community, some 11% of the population, and deeply resented by the Sunni Muslim majority ... That majority might try to use violence to assert its rights. This in turn could provoke a bloody repression. The second way - the way to bring about change in Syria without massive bloodshed - requires a direct US commitment with support from key Arab countries ...

"An 'Arab formula' is already under discussion to help the emergence of a transition government in Damascus with the aim of leading Syria to free, multi-party elections within a year or so ... For such a formula to succeed, the Bush administration should provide the big-power support needed to encourage advocates of change within the Syrian regime to make a move. The situation is too delicate to be left either to the UN or to the Europeans."