Professor Hervé Causse released a book of over 800 pages: Droit bancaire et financier (Banking and Financial Law).

Typically, there are "Banking Law" on one side and "Financial Law" on the other, each giving rise to separate books, Banking Law having long since detached from the Commercial Law and do having never really left Civil Law, Financial Law being more subject recently of books.

Typically, there are the "Banking Law" on one side and the "Financial Law" on the other, each giving rise to separate books, banking, having long since detached from the Commercial Law and do having never really left the Civil Law, financial law being more subject recently of books.

In the books of "Banking Law", we find the contracts, transactions (credit), mechanisms (like money), institutions (such as the National Central Bank) and sometimes specific repressive rules.
In the books of "financial law", first of all, we meet financial market, financial transactions (like all securities transactions or takeovers bids), the economy is much more present, the US Law being at home because of extraterritoriality as either model, repressive rules slipping everywhere, to the heart of what appears to be today a branch of law.

The important work of Hervé Causse goes further and corresponds to reality: it merges the Banking and Financial Law.

He does it because his work is based on the life of the sector, that is to say the professionals. In fact, professionals work in banks. Then he describes those who admit and control their activities, that is to say the authorities of supervision and regulation. He goes on to describe to the reader the instruments, financial prowess that the bankers invent.

Thus sucked by financial reality, what is left of the civil commitment of Banking Law? To take just one example, when the author discusses the concept of "banking service" from that of "financial service", he finds the uncertainty of this notions. The Banking Law is thus trying to forget the Civil Code, the “deposition” techniques being one example.

Thanks to the book of Hervé Causse, the reader understands that the rules now being written by those designing financial regulation, these rules must find their bones in the financial regulatory system.

Before the rules called Basel III shall apply in Switzerland in 2015, the "Département Fédéral de Finance" (Swiss Federal Department of Finance) of the "Conseil Fédéral Suisse" (Swiss Federal Council) has developed a draft of an ordinance that was subject to public consultation on August 28, 2012. Another text will present later rules about systemic banks. The order will be applicable on the 1st January 2013. But banks, like any anticipator market agent, have not already internalized the rules of Basel III ? In addition, it seems that the criterion of systemic continues to be the size of the agent, but it is not so evident.

Rating agencies are in the eye of the cyclone, due to the ambiguity of the situation: by their status, they are simple operators but by their role are almost regulators. Governing the markets, the banks can not for the moment dispense with them. However, the rating market is oligopolistic. On August 1, 2012, the association of German public banks complained that the prices practiced by rating agencies are monopoly pricing. What is remarkable is that this a complaint is made not to the European Competition Authority, the Commission, but to the European Banking Authority (EBA). Thus, regulation is a tool and a wider tool more than is the competition.

What is called the "Libor" is a contraction of "London InterBank Exchange Rate". Each morning, the banks reported Libor rates and all of the exchanges are backed with these statements. It is therefore the confidence that we make to them that holds the system. In a declarative system, it was easy for the Barclays Bank to report an inaccurate Libor, upward or downward, according to trade that it wanted to do. This is legally of course a price manipulation, which was sanctioned by the "Financial Securities Authority - FSA" on June 27, 2012, inflicting Bank fined nearly £ 60 million. But it is especially throughout the system of credibility of this Bank, and banks, which is undermined, since everything is based on the statements. We understand that therefore all managers are laid off, etc. Will that be enough to keep a system purely declarative?

On 6 June 2012, the European Commission has extended the authorization given to France, Belgium and Luxembourg to bring their State guaranty to Dexia Bank SA and DLC. Further, the Commission agreed to raise the ceiling of the guaranty, joint but non several, of EUR 15 billion which brings the ceiling allowed to EUR 55 billion. But the permission is only until September 30. This might coincide with the time where the Commission will take a position on the plan of "orderly resolution" of this systemic bank. It justifies its flexibility itself in its exemption from the prohibition of State aids, by the fact that it is a systemic bank and that a resolution plan will be submitted soon, but it raises in advance competition problems.This justifies all the more draft texts on the mechanisms which must be specific to the systemic failing financial institutions.

On 7 June 2012, in Copenhague, at the Institute of International Finance (IIF) analysed the impact of the new regulatory regime on banks, credit and systemic risk and the new challenges facing Europe. He took act that Zero growth is expected, european unemployemt is at 10%, many firms have difficulties to finance new projects and spending for innovation is down. I said that European leaders need to do more, even if they have already done much. They are obtaining a new fiscal compact, which requires very strict rules on government deficits and agreed on a close coordination of our national economic policies, notably though the "European semester" including a collective right to review the annual budget of each Member State before it is finalised. But to restore the citizens’ trust, Regulation must be developped.

The European Parliament, which according to the co decision procedure, must vote the text of directive, until the Council of European Ministers doing it, examined the draft of the Directive on Basel III standards on May 14, 2012. On prudential standards, he planned to leave the States free to adopt higher minimum requirements. In addition, it imposed that the bonus paid to the CEO didn't attain a higher price than their fixed compensation.

Prudential rules on the own funds of banks adopted by the Basle Committee are biding as soon as they will be transposed in a binding legal text.
The new rules of Basel III must take the force of a European directive. This gives rise to a new discussion, nor between the central bank governors (as in Basel), but between Finance Ministers of the European Union member states, in Brussels. On this occasion, each State defends the interest of its banks; the rule advocated by him corresponds to its banking structure or its type of banking business. In any case, the banks, anticipating the application of Basle III, have already integrated the prudential requirements in their accounts, hoping that their State will preserve it.

After the close of financial markets , the Charmain of JP Morgan, Jamie Dimon, announced on 10 may 2012, the loss of 2 billion dollars on hedging activities. The announcement was carried out by a conference call, the Chairman saying the past that this is the result of errors of assessment and in the future that losses may increase. Commentators have pointed out that it made less legitimate criticism that this Chairman has always made on the regulation of banking of the Dodd-Frank Act and the ban of trading for own account, the press considered moreover that the manager has more shown by such a result the need of constraint to exercise in the future on banks. But should we have to confuse ad hoc case and the general rule to adopt? Is relevance of a critic and special case in which is described that is one was critical can be remain relevant?

The financial crisis and the banking technology shows that the "trading" is specific. This is why the Basel Committee estimates that it appropriate to regulate banks trading activity in a specific way. But it is difficult to characterize the activity of "trading" and actual banking activity itself.
Trading is limited to negotiation; it justifies less equity as security, since it does not present credit risk. But this characterization even is questionable. This is why a consultation opened on May, 3 by the Basel Committee, and the qualification, and the classification of operations, and the measures of prevention of risks to be taken by specific prudential measures. Responses can be made until September 7, 2012.

The European Commission published on April 11, 2012, a follow-up and summary report of on the application of the third directive "Anti-Money Laundering " which gives a community value to on international standards adopted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This is to protect the financial system against the money laundering. The report assesses the effectiveness of the application of the directive and points out the need for change. The Commission requests that the standards for the detection of risk of money laundering are better targeted and oriented in the gambling sector. It also suggests that tax offences be regarded as offences of money laundering. As individuals, the report requires to banks and other professionals to increase their due diligences requirements. It also covers the "persons politically exposed", that is - to say those may be corrupt. The report finally requests a special assessment on the application of the Directive to independent legal professionals, including lawyers, subject to the legal obligation to report .

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors

ENGLISH

While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimestake an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequencesthat differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.

The subject of neutrality brings to my mind a certain number of preliminary ideas and reminiscences.

First of all, the image of Buddha comes to mind, because it alone expresses the extent to which neutrality is an endless subject, since by thinking about the fact that he isn’t thinking about anything, Buddha is still thinking about something. It also makes me think of contemporary music’s constant attempts to attain a form of neutrality: yet this goal remains unattainable, because it is evident that the search for the neutral, in a sound or a timbre, can probably never be found.

On May 20, 2011, a colloquium was held in Paris on the question of How should the Audit be regulated?, organized by The Journal of Regulation, l’Ecole de droit de la Sorbonne, and KPMG France, one of the Journal’s privileged partners. The participants were Jean-Luc Decornoy, Nathalie de Basaldua, Alain Couret, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Christine Thin, Stephen Haddrill, Claude Cazes, Etienne Wasmer, and Mara Cameran. The reflections and discussions bore upon the European Commission’s Green Paper on Audit Policy. The colloquium’s ambition was to discuss the methodological links that must guide the future of the Audit, both in relation to financial regulation and competition, and also to analyze what the inspirations for audit reform should be, especially by using the available economic studies. Each participant agreed that the most important goal was to ensure that the audit is of very high quality, and everything ought to converge towards this goal.