Abstract
In April 2000, delegates gathered in Nairobi, Kenya, to consider the worldwide
ban on ivory trade governed by the Convention of International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). A point of contention during the
meeting was the inequity created by a uniform ivory trade policy, given the
significant differences in the size and health of elephant populations in
several African countries. Ultimately, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and
Zimbabwe backed away from their efforts for limited ivory trade and, on April
17, 2000, the delegates agreed to reinstate a ban on ivory trade. A similar
ban on the trade of rhino horns has been in place since 1977. This paper looks
at alternatives to these one-size-fits-all international trade bans for ivory
and rhino horns and explores the economics of the decision-making process
of poachers under strict enforcement policies. By understanding poacher's
decision-making process, local officials can design anti-poaching policies
that can optimize conservation given local conditions.
First, this paper provides a brief background on poaching activity in Africa
and describes some successful examples of anti-poaching policies. Second,
it develops an expected utility model for an individual poacher. This model
illustrates the key factors in the poacher's decision-making process. Third,
this theoretical model is slightly modified to examine the effects of corruption.
Fourth, several of the key assumptions and variables of the model are discussed
including the value of a statistical life and the overestimation of low probability
events. Finally, the paper offers some concluding thoughts.