The idea that lax accounting, a violation of security procedures, and/or plain negligence could cause a warhead to disappear from a nuclear superpower's arsenal without notice was one of the scariest scenarios in the immediate post-Cold War period. More than a decade later, it turns out these concerns weren't unfounded. Such a scenario more or less occurred at the end of August. The only surprise was where it happened--not in Russia or one of the former Soviet republics as expected, but in the United States.

On August 30, 2007, crews at Minot Air Base in North Dakota loaded a B-52 strategic bomber with air-launched cruise missiles, which were slated for decommissioning. When the aircraft landed 3 1/2 hours later at Barksdale Air Base in Louisiana, air force personnel realized that (according to estimates) six of these cruise missiles carried actual nuclear warheads. That such a mishap could occur was so hard to believe that it reportedly took almost ten hours for the chain of command to absorb the message and issue the orders that allowed the warheads to be moved to secure storage. [UPDATE 09/23/07: According to a later Washington Post account, it took about hour and a half to secure warheads once they were discovered. However, the total time the warheads had been at Barksdale before they were secured was about ten hours.]

Most U.S. news reports of the incident emphasized that the public was never in danger. The air force continues to maintain that the weapons were in its custody at all times and that it would be impossible for them to "fall into the wrong hands." Others correctly pointed out that even if the plane crashed, the probability of a nuclear explosion was essentially zero--the warheads are designed to withstand such an accident. But that's not the point.

The point is that the nuclear warheads were allowed to leave Minot and that it was surprised airmen at Barksdale who discovered them, not an accounting system that's supposed to track the warheads' every movement (maybe even in real time). We simply don't know how long it would've taken to discover the warheads had they actually left the air force's custody and been diverted into the proverbial "wrong hands." Of course, it could be argued that the probability of this kind of diversion is very low, but anyone who knows anything about how the United States handles its nuclear weapons has said that the probability of what happened at Minot was also essentially zero.

Thus far, the reaction in the United States hasn't been encouraging. The story made a splash in the news, but the public has apparently bought the air force line that there was never a chance of an explosion and that the accident wasn't a big deal. The Pentagon is paying attention (if only because there are still a few people there who remember that nuclear weapons are dangerous), but air force leadership has already started arguing that releasing information about the accident would harm national security by "giv[ing] terrorists insights into how the United States guards and moves weapons." There might be some congressional action, but with the Iraq War taking center stage this fall, it's quite possible that the accident won't get the attention it deserves.

As early comments from knowledgeable people suggest, part of the problem is that the U.S. military no longer takes nuclear weapons seriously--and certainly not as seriously as they took nuclear weapons during the Cold War. I've long argued that in theory this is the right attitude: Indeed, in today's world, nuclear weapons contain no value, rendering them useless and dangerous. But this attitude hasn't translated into bold steps toward radically reducing the U.S. arsenal. The U.S. military, correctly judging that nuclear missions don't give them clout anymore, are trying to come up with different ways to give their nuclear systems some kind of "useful" conventional capability. With no political decision to cut the nuclear weapons forthcoming, they remain in place, sometimes dangerously side-by-side with conventional weapons, hidden from public scrutiny, and increasingly neglected. As the Minot accident demonstrated, this is an accident waiting to happen.

Maybe it's time for the United States to ask itself whether it can handle its nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner.

[UPDATE 09/23/07: The Washington Post published a story with some details about the accident. As it turned out, the loss of the warheads was not noticed for at least 36 hours.]

Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, fired U.S. Air Force's military and civilian chiefs for a series of mishaps related to nuclear weapons in the Air Force's custody. The most serious, of course, was the incident at the Minot Air...

Comments

In the last 72 hours, an even stranger twist to this event is beginning to make its way through the halls of Congress. The Department of Energy is making a renewed, low key pitch on the Congressional staff level for the new Reliable Replacement Warhead Project (RRW) as a result of this “mishap”. A selling point of the RRW is its ability to be tracked in real-time and remotely “deactivated” in the event there is a terrorist attempt to grab the warheads. Only the US Government could take such an incomprehensible, stupid mistake and turn it into a selling opportunity for new weapons. How can you argue with such logic?

In Washington politics, one’s loss (Dept of Defense) is another’s gain (Dept of Energy). That, my friend, is how the game is played. It will be interesting to see if the RRW project, previously seen dead in Congress, is revived. My bet is that it will be.

Walter Pincus’ article in the Washington Post (April 22, 2007) accurately points out the growing lack of Congressional support facing the RRW Project in the FY2007 budget cycle. Various Congressional sponsors have requested external reviews of the program and The House Appropriations Committee directed NNSA to have the JASONs, a group of scientists who advise the government on defense matters, conduct an independent peer review expected by the FY2008 budget debate. The preliminary report from this review is that RRW isn’t needed and the “approved” Life Extension Program (LEP) for America’s nuclear warheads should continue. However, two key elements of the RRW project, remote tracking and remote deactivation, may sway Congressional approval to continuing RRW because of the “B-52 Mistake”. The final JASON report is due October 1, 2007. We’ll see.

"I agree Frank, This thing almost makes me wonder; why was the B-52 incident made public in the first place? was it just a set up to give the RRW another chance in congress? Pathetic."

People who know and are involved in loading nuclear weapons say there's NO way this thing could be an "accident". Kinda like accidentaly going to work naked. Is it possible? Sure. What would have to occur for it to happen? Quite a lot.

I honestly don’t believe in a “great conspiracy” here. I think it was a really stupid mistake that “fell through the cracks” in procedure. While all this got a media blitz for a day or so, the issue has died away in the mainstream. No announced review by the US Strategic Command or big-time Congressional investigations. Even the Commander-in-Chief wasn’t notified until a day after the flight and the Military Times story broke. All this sure makes the US Air Force look bad but I don’t think the Defense Department is pushing RRW as a result. The US Energy Department wants this project because it’s what the Nuclear Labs do; design, build and support nuclear weapons. That’s where the push is coming from. The USAF is really in a flux on nuclear weapons in general. What the Air Force wants is to be relevant in today’s new security world. It wants weapons and systems to combat our enemies and nuclear weapons as a deterrent don’t really fit in that mix. The USAF would give up land based ICBMs in a heartbeat if it meant fielding new bombers, long range UACV, Global Strike Weapons, and the satellites networks that control intelligence, communications, and reconnaissance. If the US Navy wants the nuclear deterrence mission with its Trident fleet, so much the better. In the last nuclear review, no one in the Air Force was particularly interested in even keeping the B-83 bomb in the inventory. It just seems too “Cold War” for the Air Force planners. They favored an expanded LEP for the B-61-7 and developing new versions for this weapon, as was done for the B-61-11 deep-penetration version, deeming it more versatile in today’s world.

"I honestly don’t believe in a “great conspiracy” here. I think it was a really stupid mistake that “fell through the cracks” in procedure. "

Frank:

What I'm hearing (and what I'm leaning towards as well) is that the mission was flown intentionally for whatever reason and then someone decided "accidental flight" would generate less bad publicity than "George Bush is flying nukes around the world" or some other knee-jerk reaction.

Let’s play the guessing game here. If the Pentagon is relatively indifferent to the RRW project and this “B-52 Mistake” wasn’t a campaign for new nuclear weapons, what then? OK, let’s say the US has developed a unique satellite capability that can actually identify and track a captive nuclear weapon on an airborne platform from space. Let’s say the flight to Barksdale AFB was an active test of this system. If so, why even advertise the ruse? Why fly from Minot to Barksdale when a mission originating from Minot AFB could just have easily returned to there with tighter security? Or perhaps, the W-80-1 warheads have a new global tracking system now innate to the weapon and there is a project to develop “remote deactivation” on the W-80 series to guard from terrorism if the warhead is ever compromised. While the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) is scheduled for surplus, the W-80-1 warhead will continue for the next few years as a payload on the older, non-stealthy ALCM. The question of course is why advertise the test as a “mistake”? Of course, perhaps the purpose was to test the system in such a way to “leak” the results to Russia to make them aware we can now track individual bombers and inventory their nuclear payloads in flight from space. “Bears” beware! Or maybe, just maybe, this was a huge screw-up. The requisition to move six ACM from Minot to Barksdale, work order number 27282726-523 looked like 27282726-528 on the smudged paperwork and the missiles were sent out to in “528 configuration”, W-80 loaded.

I still subscribe to the “stupid mistake that fell through the cracks in procedure” theory.

I guess what it comes down to is you have the guys in the trenches so to speak who are actually involved with moving nukes etc. saying there's no way this could happen and some guy flying a desk telling a reporter it was an "accident". Maybe it was a mistake, maybe a mistake sounds more paletable than the idea that the US flew a mission intentionally with nukes on board. Who knows.

Frank,
I find the Air Force indifference about the B-83, our only remaining "high yield" weapon to be disturbing. Even more so the willingness to only keep nuclear weapons that can be actually "used" in the post cold-war world. The B-61 is an archaic design and the "dial-a-yield" option on both the B-83 and B-61 is only for tactical use- it has no strategic or deterrent value whatsoever. If anything, the USAF should get rid of ALL its free fall and air launched nuclear weapons and only keep ICBM's. Nuclear weapons greatest strength is their deterrent value, yet it seems the US wants to actually use them in tactical roles. This is insanity. As for me, I would propose a law both in Russia and the US that would ensure strategic-only use of nuclear weapons; I would propose a ban on yields lower than 1 or perhaps even 3 Megatons, a ban on dial-a-yield features and lastly that all weapons be 95% fusion (as opposed to the current 15% or less, so that if God forbid there ever is an exchange, the human race would still have a chance of survival) The US already has the design for such a device: the 5 megaton W-71 95% clean warhead with a weight of 1300kg . (Larger weapon size also has the advantage of fewer needed and harder for someone to steal)
At this point however, Russia is the only one who might actually follow this course, as it still actually believes in deterrence.

Initially, I was in favor of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) project because it promised a “modern” inventory of nuclear weapons and because of that reliability a much reduced stockpile. Numbers were batted around that the post-2012 inventory of 5500-6000 warheads might fall as low as 2500. Later, as information began to filter down in public discussions my opinion changed. It became obvious to me the new RRW weapon with its GPS accuracy and low to very low yield was a warhead being built with use in mind rather than deterrence. I am troubled by all this and I hope there are additional governmental conversations on this issue before we commit to this strategy.

US land-based ICBMs are unique. In one sense, they are designed to never be used. It is no national secret the Minuteman III force, especially when armed with the three W-78 warhead package, targeted Soviet (now Russian) ICBM silos with particular interest in the SS-18s. If the Soviets ever launched an attack on the United States, destruction of the Minuteman fleet was an absolute necessity. The role of the Minuteman was to withstand the attack and retain as many operational missiles as possible. While the submarines would launch the reprisal attack, the remaining Minuteman force would serve as a deterrent to any third-party to discourage any farther adventurism. Even if the Soviets could destroy 90% of the MMIII inventory, the remaining warheads would still be a powerful deterrent, to say China. Once the Soviet ICBMs were launched, the American Minuteman had no targets anyway. That was the old Cold War strategy for “riding out the storm”.The US Air Force isn’t really interested in the deterrent role in today world for reasons we discussed.

The B-83 interestingly was first designed to attack silo launching facilities from the B-52 platform. The parachute and retarded delivery on the B-83 was supposed to “skip” the bomb against concrete facets and detonate on delay to pattern the bombs on Soviet silo sites. The B-61 design is the oldest nuclear weapon in the entire inventory and still considered the most versatile. I think all the testing on the B-61-3 and -4 versions help the dynamics because these versions were designed for supersonic release. Today, there are really no “strategic” or “tactical” nuclear weapons. No American President is going to release control of B-61 bombs to a battlefield commander for use. Any B-61 dropped from either a bomber (B-2) or a tactical fighter (say the F-15E) will be done so only with White House approval.

I disagree somewhat on the deterent effect of small, highly accurate nuclear weapons. What is more likely to deter an adversary, one that they know you could never use unless the WWIII balloon was going up, or one that could be used with relatively little political fallout (note, I said "relatively")?

As for the Minuteman fleet unless Russia timed all the impacts to a window of mere seconds most of the silos would be empty. Minuteman was and is a very fact reaction missile. The Trident fleet was the backup. Ironically the D-5 is a hard target capable weapon.

History would somewhat argue the deterrent point. The US having atomic bombs didn’t deter the North Koreans from attempting to reunite their country in 1950. Egypt didn’t not fear a nuclear Great Britain in the Suez Crisis of 1956. It was widely known Israel had a nuclear capability by November, 1965. It didn’t prevent the “Six Day War” in 1967 or the Yon Kippur conflict in 1973. In our Viet Nam war, Hanoi didn’t seem concerned by American nuclear supremacy. Iraq; the same. One could argue that the Soviet Union played the role of nuclear surrogate to these situations but to be honest had the US decided to drop a nuclear device on the city of Hanoi, the Soviet Union would not have traded general war with the United States and the loss of Moscow in return. I really don’t think the size of the weapon, kilotons or megatons, really matters in today’s world. Deterrence is about being so strong the other side won’t risk war to achieve its goals. Nuclear weapons are only one tool in deterrence and a poor threat for the most part. Never think the use of even a “small” nuclear weapon won’t have repercussions. So far two nations, both possessing nuclear arms, have never gone to war. I think that’s why so many watch Pakistan and India with such trepidation. It’s a mistake waiting to happen.

Actually, the Trident D-5 missile really isn’t a “hard target weapon” by itself. The numerous W-76-0 warhead is actually a soft target weapon all the way; with only air-burst capability suitable for destroying a city, airbase, or perhaps a mobile ICBM garrison in open ground, but not silo complexes. However, the new rebuilt W-76-1 just now entering the fleet is far more accurate, has less yield, and fused for optional ground strike. The 400 or so W-88s are indeed a silo killer (and just about anything else… a terrifying weapon) all the way.

Walter Pincus of the Washington Post co-wrote this article (September 23rd 2007) on the “B-52 Mistake” we’ve been discussing. I have always considered his work knowledgeable, accurate and very reliable. Interesting read.

If the US was going to launch a limited nuclear military strike on Iran, the ACM and the B-52 would be the last weapon system used. The B-2 would be the weapon “du jour”. The American command structure would want to have a “human hand” in the equation until the last faithful moment. Just my opinion.

You may believe what you want. Just so you know, I work in the WSA at Minot AFB and maintain the AGM-129 missile,and with the information that you present here more than 75% of it is wrong. So if you are going to go around discussing things at least get the facts right. The missiles sent were indeed grey, but if you believe the ACM(AGM-129) to be grey than you need to be quite and crawl back into whatever bull crap whole you came out of. You can't even get the missiles straight let alone what actually happened, so stop spreading ignorance. You'll just make yourself look stupid. Now as to what actually happened, I can neither confirm nor deny any information other than what has been released by the President of the United States. Just trust that we know what we are doing, and believe in American troops to protect this country's freedom with our lives, we would let ourselves die first before endangering the lives of civilians, so stop making our job harder by doubting us and our abilities.