SOSCF became aware that father and mother were living together in Keizer
on October 20, 1994. Mother's SOSCF caseworker contacted father's parole officer and
learned that father had delayed getting a sex offender evaluation and that father was
restricted from contact with minor females. SOSCF concluded that father's status as a
sex offender posed a threat to mother's three boys. Father was evicted from the home
and told to have no contact with mother's boys. Father violated the no contact restriction,
and the boys were placed in SOSCF custody on November 8, 1994. In December 1994,
SOSCF obtained a court order prohibiting contact between father and mother's three
boys.

During the evaluation in October 1994, father revealed that he had engaged
in sexual contact with a 15-year-old female five months previously. As a result of this
disclosure, father received a parole sanction of six months incarceration, which he began
serving December 15, 1994. At that time, mother was pregnant. Mother and father were
married in May 1995 while father was in prison. Their daughter, Bryanna, was born on
June 28, 1995. Father, who had been released two weeks earlier, asked for and received
permission to attend the birth. Bryanna was born with a congenital heart defect and was
taken into state custody soon after her birth.

Father resumed working at the fast food restaurant after his release. His
superior was told that father was not allowed to have unsupervised contact with minor
females. In June 1995, father informed his parole officer that he was willing to enter sex
offender treatment but expressed reservations about going into debt in order to pay for
the treatment. The parole officer reported that he believed that father was sincere but
doubted his ability to follow through. In July 1995, father attended a family unity
meeting arranged by SOSCF, where he once again expressed his willingness to enter
treatment. In August 1995, father began treatment with Schaub.

By November 1995, father and mother had sold most of their belongings
and were living in father's car. Mother's three sons and Bryanna were in foster care.
Because father was indigent, his parole officer agreed to transfer father to a new
treatment program. DOC subsidized father's treatment with Doyle beginning in January
1996. On Doyle's recommendation, father was required to quit his fast food restaurant
job because of the potential for contact with minor females. Additionally, father was
required to give up his newly rented apartment because of its proximity to a middle
school. Father found a new apartment and began working the graveyard shift at a
convenience store.

After a period of adjustment, father began to make progress. In May 1996,
Doyle reported that father had completed phase one of his treatment, described as "the
biggest hurdle for many people," by providing a written sexual history and passing the
"sexual history disclosure polygraph with flying colors." Father disclosed that he had
violated the parole condition against contact with minor females by having intimate
contact with more than 15 different partners. Doyle stated that "it appears that this is
indeed a sincere effort on [father's] part to deal with a life long problem of sexual
deviancy, in order to make significant changes within himself[.]" Doyle went on to state
that father's goal from the start of treatment was to be allowed supervised contact with
his children. Based on Doyle's report, DOC extended father's treatment subsidy to June
1996.

Father's second daughter, Gina, was born in November 1996. Gina
remained in mother's custody as part of SOSCF's family reunification plan. Around June
1997, father took Gina to his mother's home in Kansas. There was no court order barring
father's contact with the child at that time. Gina was returned to Oregon, and, in August
1997, she was placed in foster care. Father was ordered to have no contact with her. In
September 1997, SOSCF discontinued all services to parents, except visitation, because
father failed to complete sex offender treatment.

There is little in the record about father's activities during much of 1997. It
appears that father was a self-employed contractor, operating his own construction
company. It is clear that father was not in treatment at any time during 1997. Further, in
spite of SOSCF's requirement to live separately, parents were reportedly living together
off and on. At other times, father lived with friends or in his car. At trial, mother and
father testified that they were not able to maintain separate households because the state
was garnishing so much of their paychecks.

In April 1998, when the state decided to seek termination of father's
parental rights, father entered treatment with Harrington. At that time, father was
working at a family restaurant, and the state was garnishing about 65 percent of his
wages for child support. Father's take home pay, after garnishment, averaged $400 to
$500 a month. One of father's paychecks, for two weeks of work, was zero. Shortly
after reentering treatment, father lost his job because the restaurant where he worked
closed.

Harrington, who met with father four hours a month and charged him $50
an hour (nearly half of father's take home pay), knew that father was having difficulty
paying for treatment but required father to complete and pay for a second disclosure
polygraph. Father did not complete the polygraph test and fell behind in paying for
treatment. Harrington testified that father's progress was unsatisfactory and that father's
failure to pay for treatment indicated that he was not making treatment a priority. When
father began falling behind on his payments to Harrington, he and mother once again
approached SOSCF for financial help. However, the agency informed them that it would
"absolutely not" provide assistance for father's sex offender treatment. Father stopped
seeing Harrington in July 1998. At that time, father owed Harrington over $300.

Father was allowed to participate in supervised visitations with the children
beginning in April 1998, after the agency decided to seek termination. SOSCF
maintained a log, detailing father's interaction with all six of the children, including the
youngest, Glenn II, who was born in June 1998. On the whole, father interacted well
with the children. SOSCF records portray father as generally engaged and well disposed
to each of the children. Father displayed limited parenting skills, and SOSCF workers
corrected him on minor issues, such as engaging in food fights with the older boys and
letting the children drink from the same cup.

In August 1998, one month after father discontinued treatment with
Harrington, the state petitioned to terminate father's parental rights. By the time of trial,
in September 1998, father had found new employment as a manager for a used car lot.
Mother, who works for a grocery store as a cashier, had completed assertiveness training,
parenting classes, and had participated in counseling and psychotherapy.

The trial court denied termination because there was "no evidence of any
improper conduct towards father's children or any other prepubescent child" and because
the evidence presented did "not establish that [father] is a danger to his children, once he
received appropriate treatment[.]" The court further concluded that father is willing to
undergo the required treatment but is unable to pay the costs.

As a preliminary matter, the state's appeal regarding the youngest child,
Glenn II, was dismissed by this court because Glenn II had not been found to be within
the court's jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the state's appeal as to
father's parental rights is limited to his two daughters, Bryanna and Gina. On appeal, the
state argues that father is unfit because he previously engaged in sexual conduct with
minors and failed to adjust his conduct or condition so that his children could be
returned.

The state argues that ORS 419B.504 authorizes the termination of parental
rights on a showing of sexual conduct with any child. The state is correct. This court
has consistently held that a child does not have to remain in an abusive environment until
the state can show abuse of that particular child. See, e.g., State ex rel Juv. Dept. v.
Gohranson, 143 Or App 36, 42, 923 P2d 1259, rev den 324 Or 395 (1996) (evidence that
father sexually abused one of his children was properly considered in termination of
parental rights as to victim's siblings); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Miglioretto, 88 Or App
126, 744 P2d 298 (1987) (same). Here, however, the state has presented no evidence
that father's home was an abusive environment, and, though father has never resided with
Bryanna, he did reside with Gina for a time with no indication of abuse. Additionally,
according to the record, father's six- to seven-year-old son from another relationship
maintained a bedroom in father's home, again with no indication of abuse. Indeed,
SOSCF was well aware of this fact but took no action to prevent it, suggesting that
SOSCF was not concerned that the child was at risk of abuse.

The state's argument appears to be that, because father is a sex offender
who had sexual contact with teenage females, we should infer that father is a threat to his
daughters. On this record, we are unwilling to draw such an inference. In Gohranson
and Miglioretto, the fathers repeatedly victimized their own children in the home.
Father's conduct is not comparable. The record shows that, before parents were married,
and before Bryanna or Gina was born, father pursued relationships with sexually active
teenage females. Although that conduct is egregious, the state has failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that it has been seriously detrimental to Bryanna or Gina.

Even if we were to assume that father's past sexual conduct, and his status
as a sex offender, satisfy the first element of ORS 419B.504, the state has failed to
demonstrate that the integration of the children into father's home is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change. At the heart of the
parties' dispute over the second statutory element is the requirement for courts to consider
whether the parent has failed to make a lasting adjustment "after reasonable efforts by
available social agencies for such extended duration of time that it appears reasonable
that no lasting adjustment can be effected." ORS 419B.504(5).

The state contends that SOSCF is obligated only to "recommend and
encourage" the use of services that will assist a parent to reach a minimum level of
adequacy. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. H., 62 Or App 288, 291-92, 659 P2d 1027
(1983). We find the state's reliance on State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. H. misplaced. There, we
referred to services offered to a parent by the agency such as visitation, parenting classes,
counseling and a psychological evaluation. Here, the trial court found that

"[SO]SCF has provided father with no services--no parent training,
financial assistance, no counseling, homemaking, or treatment service.
Both mother and father requested financial assistance for the payment of
the costs of father's sex offender treatment."

SOSCF appears to argue that, by making sex offender treatment a requirement for
contact between father and his children, the agency has discharged its obligation to
recommend and encourage the use of services. That argument fails.

Recently, we held that

"[t]he state is required to make a reasonable effort to assist parents in
making the adjustments to enable them to become minimally adequate
parents. The type and sufficiency of efforts that the state is required to
make and whether the types of actions it requires parents to make are
reasonable depends on the particular circumstances." State ex rel SOSCF
v. Frazier, 152 Or App 568, 582, 955 P2d 272, rev den 327 Or 305 (1998)
(citations omitted).

Accordingly, we examine the particular circumstances of this case to determine if no
effort at all by SOSCF was reasonable in this case. Our analysis of whether SOSCF has
made reasonable efforts to help father make lasting adjustments begins in June 1995,
when the agency took custody of Bryanna, because it was from that moment on that
father was faced with the possibility of having his parental rights terminated.

In Frazier, we held that the state was not obligated to provide required
therapy at no cost where the record showed that father never requested assistance and had
failed to take advantage of "significant opportunities to develop and demonstrate his
parenting skills and to improve his mental condition." 152 Or App at 583. In contrast,
the record here reflects that both father and mother repeatedly asked SOSCF for help in
paying the cost of sex offender treatment and that SOSCF repeatedly denied their
requests. In addition, father has shown a strong and consistent interest in becoming an
adequate parental resource for his children. Father took steps to locate his daughter from
a previous relationship, and he has maintained a parental relationship with his son from a
another relationship. In addition, father requested permission to attend his daughter's
birth and participated in a subsequent family unity meeting. He voluntarily took part in
group therapy while incarcerated and entered treatment three times with the stated goal of
reunifying his family. Finally, he participated in visitation when SOSCF permitted it,
and nothing in the visitation reports suggest that father is incapable of providing minimal
care for his children.

The record before us indicates that father's financial resources were
extremely limited. He was classified as indigent in December 1995. In July 1996, he
was $345 behind in paying child support. In September 1996, he was $800 behind in his
rent and delinquent on child support and treatment payments. The trial court found that
each time father began treatment he was forced to quit due to his lack of financial
resources. Most recently, father was unable to pay for treatment because of wage
assignments to the state for the support of his children while they were in state custody.
See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Boren, 105 Or App 599, 609, 806 P2d 149 (1991) (the state
has the burden of establishing how much a parent with a meager income can reasonably
be required to pay for care and maintenance of a child in state custody). Yet, the SOSCF
caseworker responsible for father's children was unaware that the state was garnishing
both parents' wages for child support.

The record supports the trial court's finding that the cost of treatment
presents an insurmountable barrier to the integration of children into father's home. If
sex offender treatment is a requirement for family reunification, it follows that a realistic
reunification plan must provide an opportunity for the parent to complete the required
treatment successfully. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude
that SOSCF failed to make reasonable efforts in assisting father to make the lasting
adjustments necessary to integrate his children into his home. For the reasons discussed
above, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the state's termination petitions.

Affirmed.

1. Mother had four sons when she met father. At that time, her oldest son was
in the custody of his natural father.

2. The State Office for Services to Children and Families (SOSCF) was
previously known as Children's Services Division (CSD). The name was changed in
1993 when the dependency code was amended. Oregon Laws 1993, ch 33, § 108.
Reference to "CSD" appears throughout the record; however, to avoid confusion, we use
"SOSCF" to refer to the agency.

4. Father complained that the group size was too small, consisting of only two
people. He also objected to certain intervention techniques. At one point Schaub
prevented father from recording a treatment session.

"The rights of the parent or parents may be terminated as provided in
ORS 419B.500 if the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit by
reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child and
integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable
within a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.
In determining such conduct and conditions, the court shall consider but is
not limited to the following:

"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the
parent of such nature and duration as to render the parent incapable of
providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time.

"(2) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel or sexual nature.

"(3) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating liquors or controlled
substances to the extent that parental ability has been substantially
impaired.

"(4) Physical neglect of the child.

"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the circumstances of the
parent, conduct, or conditions to make the return of the child possible or
failure of the parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts
by available social agencies for such extended duration of time that it
appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be effected.

"(6) Criminal conduct that impairs the parent's ability to provide
adequate care for the child."

7. The state emphasizes that four of father's alleged victims were under 12
years of age. However, the record shows that father himself was pre-adolescent at the
time. According to expert testimony, father is not considered a pedophile.