Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding
Judge; Halbrooks,
Judge; and Wright,
Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WRIGHT, Judge

Appellants challenge their
convictions of conspiracy and attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, arguing
that (1) there was no probable cause to support the search warrant for their
residence; (2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by (a) calling a
witness solely to impeach him with an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement,
(b) urging the jury to use a statement introduced for impeachment as
substantive evidence, and (c) making statements about "taking responsibility"
to the jury; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.
We affirm.

FACTS

On November 17, 2003,
appellants Kathleen Black and Walter Combes visited four stores in Willmar for
the purpose of purchasing pseudoephedrine products. With their friend, Bonita Ertl, the three
entered stores individually or in a pair, each purchasing two or three boxes of
cold or allergy medication containing pseudoephedrine. They then returned to their red pickup truck
in the parking lot before traveling together to another store.

Loss-prevention employees at
Target noticed Black, Combes, and Ertl, and notified the local drug task
force. Task-force officers arrived in the area
and began observing the red pickup truck.
A local police officer stopped the truck for an illegal turn, identified
the occupants as Combes, Black, Ertl, and a minor child, and released them with
a warning. Task-force officers followed
the truck to a residence in Watkins shared by Black and Combes and observed the
three adults enter the house.

Task-force
agent Brian Cruze had received information earlier about Black and Combes that suggested their involvement
in manufacturing methamphetamine. After joining the task-force team
observing the couple that day, Agent Cruze returned to Willmar and obtained a
search warrant for the residence. Agent Cruze
and other officers executed the search warrant at the Black-Combes residence on
the evening of November 17.

At
the time of the search, Black, Combes, and Leslie Bollin, an acquaintance, were present at the residence. Officers recovered a vial containing .2 grams
of methamphetamine from Black. Bollin
admitted that he had been using methamphetamine at the Black-Combes residence
that afternoon.

The search also yielded more than 1,000
pseudoephedrine pills along with large quantities of blister packs used to
store the pills. Many of the blister
packs were empty, but at least 26 still contained pseudoephedrine pills. In addition, officers recovered a jar
containing several hundred pseudoephedrine pills. Along with pseudoephedrine, police recovered a
lithium battery package and a receipt indicating that the battery pack was purchased on November 17. Police seized
solvents and other chemicals used in methamphetamine manufacture, as well as a
liquid propane gas tank that had been altered in a manner consistent with use
for manufacturing methamphetamine. Another
tank tested positive for the presence of anhydrous ammonia, a chemical used to
manufacture methamphetamine.

Black
and Combes moved to suppress evidence obtained from the search of their
residence for lack of probable cause.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motions. The matter proceeded to a joint trial, and a
jury convicted Combes of conspiracy and attempted manufacture of methamphetamine. Black was convicted of conspiracy and
attempted manufacture of methamphetamine, and possession of
methamphetamine. These appeals followed.

D E C I S I O N

I.

Black and Combes argue that the
district court erred by not suppressing evidence obtained during the search of
their home because there was no probable cause for the search. Probable cause exists if an affidavit sets
forth competent evidence sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to
believe that evidence of a crime will be found at the location to be
searched. State v. Bagley, 286 Minn. 180, 192, 175
N.W.2d 448, 456 (1970).

The task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him [or
her], including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.

We review the district court's determination of probable cause to issue a search
warrant to ascertain whether there is a substantial basis to conclude that
probable cause exists. State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 787-88
(Minn. 1999).
In determining whether a warrant is supported by
probable cause, we do not review the district court's decision de novo. Id.
at 787. Rather, we give
great deference to the issuing court's probable-cause determination. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802,
804 (Minn. 2001); State v. McCloskey,
453 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn.
1990).

Here,
an affidavit from Agent Cruze accompanied the search-warrant application. The search-warrant affidavit established that
in 1999 police began receiving information suggesting that Black and Combes
manufactured methamphetamine at their residence. A confidential informant advised police in
December 2002 that Combes was supplying methamphetamine to another
individual. Police received an anonymous
tip in January 2003 describing strange odors emanating from the residence. In May 2003, another confidential informant
advised police that Black and Combes had admitted making methamphetamine at
their residence. This informant also corroborated
the first informant's statement about Combes supplying another individual with methamphetamine. Finally, the search-warrant affidavit
described the multiple purchases of pseudoephedrine that Black and Combes made on
November 17.

Black and Combes argue that the
district court erred in finding probable cause because much of the information
in the search-warrant application was stale, there was no nexus between the
residence and the alleged criminal activity, and the reliability of the
informants could not be determined from the information in the search-warrant
application. None of these arguments is supported
by the record.

When considered in its totality, the
information in the search-warrant application was not stale. To prevail over a claim of staleness, there
must be proof of facts "so closely related to the time of the issue of the
warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time." State
v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S. Ct. 138, 140 (1932)). Any
staleness in the background information provided by the confidential informants
was cured by the observations of Black and Combes purchasing large quantities
of pseudoephedrine at four different stores on the day that the search warrant
was issued.

The search-warrant application also
established a sufficient nexus between the Combes-Black residence and
methamphetamine manufacture. Minnesota
courts require "a direct connection, or nexus, between the alleged crime and
the particular place to be searched, particularly in cases involving the search
of a residence for evidence of drug activity."
Id.
at 747-48. And "there must be
specific facts to establish a direct connection between the alleged criminal
activity and the site to be searched." Id. at 749. Here,
information from confidential informants, an anonymous tip, and police
observation of Black and Combes returning home with large quantities of
methamphetamine precursors provided the issuing judge with specific facts
establishing a direct connection between the alleged criminal activity and the
residence.

Finally, the warrant application
discussed the reliability of both informants, noting that information provided
by one informant led to an earlier arrest and that information provided by the
other informant soon would result in charges against seven individuals for controlled
substance crimes. Such information is precisely
the type that the Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged can be used to
establish the reliability of confidential informants. Wiley,
366 N.W.2d at 269 n.1. Accordingly, the
district court did not err when it found probable cause for the search.

II.

Black and Combes argue that the prosecutor engaged
in several types of misconduct that resulted in an unfair trial.
But neither Black nor Combes objected to the prosecutor's conduct at trial. We review unobjected-to error under the
plain-error standard and may correct such error if it implicates the fairness and
the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 31.02; State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). The plain-error standard is met only when the
error is plain and affects a defendant's substantial rights by affecting the
outcome of the case. Griller,
583
N.W.2d at 740-41.

A.

First, Black and Combes argue that the prosecutor called Bollin
as a rebuttal witness solely for the purpose of impeaching Bollin with an
inadmissible hearsay statement that he gave to Agent Cruze during the execution
of the search warrant. A party
may not introduce hearsay, which is otherwise inadmissible, under the guise of impeachment because of the risk that
the jury, even if properly instructed, will consider the prior statement as
substantive evidence. Oliver v. State, 502 N.W.2d 775, 777-78 (Minn.
1993); State v. Dexter, 269
N.W.2d 721, 721-22 (Minn.
1978).

Our review of the record establishes
that there was no prosecutorial misconduct here. On the day of the search, Bollin told Agent
Cruze that Combes had asked Bollin about the availability of anhydrous ammonia
and that Combes had provided Bollin with methamphetamine. At trial, the prosecutor made a good-faith
effort to offer, through Bollin, testimony consistent with that statement. The prosecutor offered Bollin use-immunity
and provided Bollin a transcript of the statement to refresh his recollection. Despite these efforts, Bollin had difficulty reading
the statement, and he could not remember what he said to Agent Cruze because
Bollin had been under the influence of methamphetamine at the time. At the end of the direct examination, Bollin
denied that Combes had inquired about anhydrous ammonia or given him
methamphetamine. The prosecutor subsequently
called Agent Cruze to testify about the contents of Bollin's prior statement. This series of events establishes that the
prosecutor did not call Bollin solely for impeachment. Thus, appellants' claim of prosecutorial
misconduct on this ground fails.

B.

Second, Black and Combes argue that,
during closing argument, the prosecutor impermissibly asked jurors to use an
out-of-court statement made by Ertl as substantive evidence even though it was
introduced at trial solely for impeachment purposes. Ertl testified that she purchased nine or ten
packages of pseudoephedrine for her personal use and stored them at the
Black-Combes residence for her convenience.
As an impeachment witness, Agent Cruze testified that Ertl previously
told him that she bought 14 or 15 packages of pseudoephedrine, that Combes paid
for the pseudoephedrine, and that the medication was not for her personal use.

The
prosecutor made two references to Ertl's out-of-court statement during closing
argument. First, he compared Ertl's trial
testimony with her statement to Agent Cruze and asked the jury, "Are you going
to believe her or not?" This was a
permissible use of impeachment testimony and cannot be construed as prosecutorial
misconduct. Later, however, the
prosecutor impermissibly characterized Ertl's out-of-court statement about the
number of boxes she purchased as substantive evidence of how much was purchased. While erroneous, this reference was so
fleeting as to be harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 (stating that any
error which does not affect substantive rights shall be disregarded). As such, the error does not offer a basis for
reversal.

C.

Third,
Black and Combes challenge the prosecutor's statements during his opening and
closing arguments about "taking responsibility." In reviewing a prosecutor's statements, we examine
the arguments "as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that
may be taken out of context or given undue prominence." State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993). A prosecutor may talk about accountability, "in
order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for
the defendant, but the prosecutor should not emphasize accountability to such
an extent as to divert the jury's attention from its true role of deciding
whether the state has met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 109 (Minn. 1985).

Examining
the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments as a whole, there were a total
of three brief references to "taking responsibility" in more than fifteen pages
of argument. Along with these statements
about responsibility, the prosecutor also reminded the jury that it was
important to listen to the judge about how to apply the law to the facts. Compared with the prosecutor's arguments in Montjoy, where the supreme court found
no prosecutorial misconduct, the statements here were much more innocuous. In Montjoy,
the prosecutor referred to a "rule of accountability" and the jurors' role in
maintaining the integrity of the entire justice system. Id. at 108-09. The brief references in this case about "taking
responsibility for your actions" were insufficient even to establish a theme
and did not distract the jury from its role.
Our review of the record establishes that the statements about "taking
responsibility" do not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct or plain
error.

III.

Black
and Combes were convicted of conspiracy and attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. They challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
related to the criminal-agreement and intent elements of those offenses.

In
considering a claim of insufficient evidence, our review is limited to an
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to
reach a guilty verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
1989). We assume the jury believed the evidence
supporting the verdict and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore,
438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.
1989). We will not disturb the verdict
if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.
Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 476-77 (Minn.
2004).

When
a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the sufficiency of that
evidence warrants particular scrutiny. State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2004). A conviction is supported by circumstantial
evidence when the evidence as a whole excludes all reasonable inferences except
the guilt of the defendant. State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 26 (Minn. 2004).

The
essential elements of conspiracy are "(1) an agreement with another to commit a
crime, and (2) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89,
104 (Minn.
1980). The essential elements of attempt
are "(1) an intent to commit a crime, and (2) a substantial step taken toward
the crime's commission." Id. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to
prove each element of conspiracy and attempt.
Black and Combes jointly occupied the residence in Watkins where large
quantities of pseudoephedrine, equipment consistent with methamphetamine manufacture,
and certain precursor chemicals were found.
Black and Combes went together to Willmar to purchase pseudoephedrine, although
they entered the stores separately. This
evidence, in combination with Agent Cruze's testimony that methamphetamine
production generally is a group activity, is sufficient to support the jury's
finding of a criminal agreement and intent to manufacture methamphetamine. This same evidence, particularly the discovery
by police of a 500-day supply of pseudoephedrine that already had been removed
from its packaging, also supports the conclusion that Black and Combes had not
only engaged in an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy, but had taken
a substantial step toward completing the crime of manufacture.

Black
and Combes presented evidence that the pseudoephedrine supply was for personal
use to treat their allergies and that the many chemicals and blister packs in
the house were used for craft projects.
But the jury was free to reject the credibility of testimony offered by defense
witnesses, including Combes and Ertl, regarding the defense theory. See State v.
Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 374 (Minn.
2005) ("Witness credibility determinations are strictly the domain of the
jury."). Deferring to the jury's
credibility determinations, as we must, there is sufficient evidence to support
the convictions.