We have designed our activities to
achieve the following two immediate goals:

raise money for food and medical relief

increase U.S. public awareness of the situation
in North Korea

Our fundraising efforts begin with a decision
about how to make the best use of the money we raise. For legal and
strategic reasons, we only collect donations to pass along to other organizations
active in North Korean hunger relief. We consider the following factors
when selecting an organization to work with as our donor-target:

What is the organization's relationship with
North Korea?

What kind of work is the organization doing
in North Korea?

Is the philosophy and approach of the organization
in harmony with HRFNK's philosophy and approach?

Will the general public in the U.S. recognize
the name of the organization?

Does the organization have a dedicated fund
for North Korean relief? Can we negotiate so that they will establish
one?

What percentage of donated funds go to cover
the organization's institutional overhead costs? Can we negotiate
to ensure that 100% of our donations are used in direct relief?

For our first two years we channeled all our
funds through the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). We elected
to work with AFSC for several reasons: AFSC has been working continually
with North Korea since 1980; AFSC's approach to relief work is based on
a philosophy of human dignity and social justice, and is widely respected
in the NGO community; and AFSC has good name recognition among the general
public in the U.S. We were also able to gain AFSC's assurances that they
would establish a dedicated fund for North Korean relief, and that
they would use 100% of the funds we raised in their relief efforts (rather
than taking a percentage to cover their institutional overhead).
Starting in 1998, HRFNK has made the decision to include medical relief
as one of our fundraising goals, so we are now also collecting donations
made out to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Note that by negotiating with existing NGOs to establish
dedicated NK funds and to reduce the institutional cut, HRFNK has an impact
on the approach these NGOs take to NK relief.

Fundraising, Part II: Double-Cropping

Many Americans are hesitant to donate money
to NK relief not just because of their concerns about the political and/or
military situation in the DPRK, but also because they believe in taking
care of poverty "at home" first. HRFNK has pioneered a fundraising
strategy to alleviate these concerns, and to begin to win the confidence
of the local donor public. We call this strategy "Double Cropping."
Double Cropping is based on the agricultural practice of getting two harvests
from a single field. In our Double Cropping strategy, we perform
volunteer service in local organizations dedicated to addressing the needs
of hungry people in the Bay Area (for example, sorting food in the San
Francisco and Alameda County Food Banks, or serving lunch at the St. Anthony
Foundation dining hall), and then, as in the more familiar "walk-a-thon"
model, we ask for sponsors to donate money in recognition of our hours
worked (or meals served). The donations are dedicated to NK relief.
This strategy also helps to spread the awareness of the NK crisis to a
wider public: many of the people who volunteer with us are primarily concerned
with the problem of local hunger, and through Double Cropping they learn
about North Korea.

Fundraising, Part III: Larger Donations

Every dollar we raise is of value.
Our grassroots fundraising efforts (primarily collecting pledges through
fasting and volunteer work) establishes that there is a wide community
of people concerned enough about the hunger crisis in North Korea to donate
money for relief. Grassroots fundraising, however, demands a great
deal of effort for a relatively small monetary return. We have elected
to seek larger donations from individuals and businesses as part of our
fundraising strategy. In 1997, HRFNK identified San Francisco Bay
Area business owners who were likely to have some interest in Korea (mostly
Korean and Korean-American business owners), and explained our philosophy
and process, and requested donations. Several of these larger donors
were persuaded in part by the evidence provided by our grassroots efforts
that there is a public interest in NK relief. These larger donors
require careful and considerate treatment, however. First, most will
need to know they are making tax-deductible donations; we were able to
provide them with the charitable I.D. number of our donor-target organizations.
Secondly, the larger donors are likely to inquire more closely to the exact
use of funds; it is essential to have good factual information about the
use of funds and the donor-target organizations available. Thirdly,
some larger donors will desire more information about the current situation
in North Korea, and may need to be persuaded that donations to your organization
will be efficacious. Finally, larger donors may appreciate public
acknowledgment of their generosity; if possible, it would be wise to include
a list of significant donors in your publicity materials. (We have
taken a cue from the arts, listing donors according to their level of commitment:
$1,000 - $5,000 "Donors"; $5,000 - $10,000 "Supporters"; etc.) Significant
donors also deserve a written acknowledgment, as well as a follow-up report
on the outcome of their donations, when possible.

Working for a Bigger Impact, Part I:
Media

We have found that television, radio, and
newspaper coverage is very helpful both in encouraging people to participate
and in generating donations. We send out press releases to local
media announcing our activities and event. One effective strategy
is to try to link the interest of our local story to the wider national
and international stories about NK. We also do whatever we can to
persuade the media to include a contact address (for information and donations)
in the story. (Many of the local event calendars (radio and newspaper)
have long lead times; we have not always been as effective as we would
like to be in meeting those deadlines.)

Working for a Bigger Impact, Part II:
Collaborating with Other Groups

The San Francisco Bay Area has a number
of groups working in various ways on the NK issue. To the extent
possible, we attempt to maintain communication with them and try to make
optimal use of the various human resources available in each group.
(Needless to say, this is not always easy.) It can be particularly
effective to collaborate in fundraising itself: sharing lists, sharing
letters, and pooling donations to make a greater impact.

Working for a Bigger Impact, Part III:
The Political Environment

HRFNK has chosen to take an apolitical
stance in order to facilitate our humanitarian work. We hope, however,
that the educational aspect of our current work will lay the groundwork
for productive public discussion of some pressing issues (for example,
the embargo). We see our current fundraising work as fitting
into a longer-term mission of forging more trusting relationships between
the people of the U.S. and the people of the DPRK. These relationships
will be affected by, and can themselves affect, the political climate and
political structure of international relations between the two countries.
Keeping these broader goals in mind helps us to make smaller decisions
about our current fundraising strategy.