The Belligerents and the Cluster Munitions Used

The conflict in Georgia highlights the nature of the global
problem of cluster munitions. Both sides employed the weapon, causing civilian
casualties, yet their military profiles and histories with the weapon are quite
different. This case underlines the risks of continued production, transfer, and
stockpiling. Whoever the user, and whatever the type used, cluster munitions
pose unacceptable risks to civilians and must be eliminated.

Russia produces and exports its own cluster munitions and
has stockpiles of millions of submunitions of various types. It has used
cluster munitions previously, notably in Chechnya. Georgia does not manufacture
its own cluster munitions but is an importer that received the models it used
in this conflict from Israel. It has a smaller arsenal than its larger neighbor
and claims that it now possesses only one active type. Human Rights Watch is
not aware of any evidence that Georgia used the weapon prior to the August 2008
conflict.

Between the two of them, Russia and Georgia also employed
cluster munitions that exemplify the variety of the weapon, including both
air-dropped and ground-launched models delivered from bombs, rockets, and
missiles.

Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

The two parties to this conflict have participated in the
worldwide use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. At
least 77 states stockpile cluster munitions, amounting to caches of at least
hundreds of millions of individual submunitions. Thirty-four countries have
produced more than 210 different types of cluster munitions, both air- dropped
and surface-launched, including projectiles, rockets, missiles, bombs, and
other dispensers. At least 13 countries have transferred more 50 different
types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries as well as non-state
armed groups.[36]
At least 15 states and a small number of non-state armed groups have used
cluster munitions in at least 32 countries and disputed territories.[37]

Russia

Russia has not made information regarding national
stockpiles or inventories readily available to the international community, but
it is known to be a major producer, exporter, and stockpiler of cluster
munitions. Several Russian companies are associated with the production of
cluster munitions: Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped
bombs), Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm
artillery projectiles), and Splav State Research and Production Enterprise
Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets and missiles).[38] Cluster
munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at
least 29 countries: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cuba, Egypt, Georgia,[39]
Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Moldova,
Mongolia, North Korea, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sudan, Syria, Uganda,
Ukraine, and Yemen.[40]

Russia’s own stockpiles are estimated to be in the
hundreds of millions or more of submunitions. The following chart, which draws
on information from open sources, lists current Russian stockpiles for which
Human Rights Watch has evidence.

Georgia is not the first location where Russia has used
cluster munitions. It repeatedly used cluster munitions in Chechnya between
1994 and 1996 and again in 1999. The attacks led to at least 636 casualties,
including 301 deaths, according to Handicap International.[42]
The attack on the Grozny market on October 21, 1999, probably the most
high-profile one in Chechnya, caused more than 100 deaths according to HALO
Trust, a UK-based demining organization.[43] All but 24 of the
636 documented casualties came during strikes, not afterwards. Not all
post-conflict casualties, however, may have been reported.[44]
Russian forces made use of multiple types of cluster munitions: air-dropped
bombs, tactical missiles, and multiple rockets systems.[45]
HALO Trust confirmed that the Grozny attack was by an SS-21 missile, a
precursor of the Iskander.[46]
Russia directed many of its cluster attacks at civilian areas.[47]
The Soviet Union also used cluster munitions in Afghanistan during the conflict
that lasted between 1979 and 1989.[48]

Georgia

According to then-Georgian First Deputy Minister of Defense
Batu Kutelia, interviewed by Human Rights Watch in October 2008, M85s are the
only submunitions that Georgia currently stockpiles for active use.[49]
He said Georgia bought its M85s from an Israeli company. Although the ministry
would not release the name of the company, Israel Military Industries is the
only known Israeli manufacturer of the weapon. Israel Military Industries also
made the M85s used by Israel during its 2006 war with Lebanon. Those
submunitions had high failure rates and caused civilian casualties and
socioeconomic harm.[50]

In 2004 Jane’s Information Group reported that the
Georgian Air Force also had KMGU and RBK-500 cluster bombs, both of which can
carry a variety of submunitions.[51]
The Georgian Ministry of Defense told Human Rights Watch in February 2009 that
it still has RBK-500 cluster munitions and BKF blocks of submunitions that are
delivered by KMGUs, but that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated
for destruction.[52]
Kutelia said its air force planes are not fitted for delivering these
air-dropped weapons.[53]
Human Rights Watch is not aware of any evidence that Georgia used cluster
munitions before the 2008 conflict. Georgia is also not known to have produced
or transferred cluster munitions.

Cluster Munitions Used in Georgia and their Submunitions

During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russia used two types of
submunitions, the AO-2.5 RTM (carried in RBK bombs) and 9N210 (carried in
Uragan rockets), and Georgia used one, the M85 (carried in Mk.-4 rockets).
According to a Dutch investigation discussed later, Russia also used the
surface-to-surface Iskander missile carrying unknown types of submunitions.[54]
Human Rights Watch researchers found physical evidence of each of these
weapons, including submunitions and the canisters they were carried in, in the
towns and villages they visited. All these types, like most cluster munitions,
endanger civilians because of their broad area effect and the fact that they
leave unexploded duds after the conflict.

AO-2.5 RTM Submunition

The air-dropped AO-2.5 RTM submunition used by Russia is an
antipersonnel and anti-materiel weapon. It is designed to attack both troops
and equipment with its blast and fragmentation. The silver submunition has
spherical ends and a spin, or separation, ring around the middle. The latter
consists of a circular metal band with five semicircular pieces attached. The
submuntion weighs 2.5 kilograms and measures 90 by 150mm. Upon impact, it
splits into two halves before detonating. It has a kill radius of 30 meters for
materiel and 20 meters for personnel. In Georgia, Russia delivered these
submunitions by RBK series bombs. The RBK-250 contains 60 bomblets, and the
RBK-500 series contains 108 bomblets.[55]

9N210 Submunition

The ground-launched 9N210 submunition used by Russia is also
an antipersonnel and anti-materiel weapon. It is designed to attack both troops
and most types of equipment with its blast and fragmentation. The silver
submunition consists of a soda can-sized cylinder with six flat fins at the
tail end and weighs 1.8 kilograms. A hard plastic-like core just inside the
cylinder contains 370 metal fragments, which spray out in every direction upon
detonation. The fragments are identical small cylinders, measuring six
millimeters in length and having a six millimeter diameter. The 9N210, which
has an explosive mass of 0.3 kilograms, has a self-destruct device that is
supposed to detonate the submunition within 110 seconds if it does not explode
on impact.[56]
As shown during this conflict, however, it often fails. In one area being
cleared in Ruisi, NPA reported a 35 percent dud rate.[57]
In Georgia, Russia delivered its 9N210s in 220mm surface-to-surface Uragan
(Russian for Hurricane) rockets, each of which carry 30 of these submunitions.[58]

Iskander Missile

According to a Dutch investigative report into an attack on
Gori, Russia also used at least one surface-to-surface Iskander (also called
SS-26) missile carrying submunitions. Little is know about this weapon, except
that it is in Russia’s arsenal and, according to the Dutch report,
carries 20 submunitions.[59]
Russia has denied using the Iskander in this conflict, but as will be explained
below, both Human Rights Watch and the Dutch investigative team found evidence
of the weapon.

M85 Submunition

The ground-launched M85 submunition used by Georgia is a
type of Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) bought from Israel.
It is an antipersonnel and anti-armor weapon, designed to attack troops and
armored vehicles, including tanks, with blast, fragmentation, and a penetrator.
This black, cylindrical-shaped submunition with one open end is often said to
resemble a battery or light socket. It is topped with a red or white ribbon[60]
that unfurls upon discharge, releasing a firing pin that arms the submunition
and directing the open end with a shaped charge downwards.[61]
The shaped charge is a concave copper cone that turns into a molten slug and
pierces armor when it hits perpendicular to its target. The outside
fragmentation shell, which consists of a series of stacked rings, is designed
to shoot out metal shards and kill people. In Georgia, Mk.-4 160mm rockets
delivered 104 M85s each.[62]
The GRADLAR 160 multiple launch rocket system launched the Mk.-4s, which have
an outside range of 45 kilometers.[63]

M85s come in two models, with and without self-destruct
devices. Human Rights Watch found many unexploded M85s in Georgia, and they
were only of the non-self-destruct variety. Then-First Deputy Minister of
Defense Kutelia said Georgian military deminers also found primarily
non-self-destruct models, but he could not explain their presence. He claimed
Georgia bought M85s exclusively with self-destruct mechanisms from Israel.

The 2006 Lebanon war demonstrated that M85s have
unacceptably high dud rates regardless of the type. Many military experts had
argued the self-destruct version was one of the most reliable and sophisticated
submunitions in existence.[64]
In testing, the M85 has a 1.3 to 2.3 percent reported failure rate. Based on a
study of strike locations where the self-destruct models landed in Lebanon,
however, weapons experts and United Nations (UN) deminers estimated that the
self-destruct M85s had an actual failure rate of 10 percent or higher.[65]

[39]
The Georgian Ministry of Defense reports having RBK-500 cluster munitions and
BKF blocks of submunitions that are carried in KMGUs, but it told Human Rights
Watch that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated for destruction.
Response of Georgian Ministry of Defense to Human Rights Watch Questions,
February 12, 2009.

[59]
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Report of the Storimans Investigative
Mission,” p. 6. See also Human Rights Watch telephone interview with
Adriaan Jacobovits, former ambassador and head of Storimans Investigative
Mission, November 19, 2008.

[60]
Human Rights Watch has not been able to determine the significance of the
difference between the red and white ribbons. This conflict was the first in
which it saw the red ribbons. British forces used white-ribboned versions in
Iraq, and the Israelis did the same in Lebanon. Norway possesses, but has not
used, the red-ribboned variety. The Georgian Ministry of Defense told Human
Rights Watch it knows of “no technical difference” between the two
models. Response of Georgian Ministry of Defense to Human Rights Watch Questions,
February 12, 2009.

[64]
Military experts from numerous countries that stockpile the M85 or variants of
it have made this claim in discussions with Human Rights Watch during sessions
of the CCW in recent years.

[65]
For a detailed discussion of the M85 with self-destruct device and its failure
in Lebanon, see C. King Associates, Ltd., Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment, and Norwegian People's Aid, M85: An Analysis of Reliability
(Norway: Norwegian People's Aid, 2007). See also information provided by Ove
Dullum, Chief Scientist, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, April 19,
2007; Chris Clark, program manager, Mine Action Coordination Center–South
Lebanon, "Unexploded Cluster Bombs and Submunitions in South Lebanon:
Reliability from a Field Perspective," presented at the International
Committee of the Red Cross Expert Meeting, Montreux, Switzerland, April 18-20,
2007; email communication from Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer,
Mine Action Coordination Center–South Lebanon, to Human Rights Watch,
January 16, 2008. For further information on the use and failure of M85s in
Lebanon, see Human Rights Watch, Flooding South Lebanon, pp. 30-32,
45-48.