This
appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench Judgment of Madras High
Court dated September
24, 1993 made in Writ
Appeal No.1055 of 1992.

The
undisputed facts are that the appellant was granted licence in respect of an
extent of 28.70 acres of Government land in Anamallai, Valparaj Taluk of Coimbatore
District for sports and recreation purposes. Notice was issued on May 22, 1992
terminating the licence under Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (for
short, the `Act') which was served on its Secretary on May 23, 1992; the land
was resumed and the possession thereof was taken with the assistance o the
police personnel on the even date. The appellant's writ petition was allowed by
the learned single Judge by his order dated August 17, 1992 in Writ Petition No.7160/92 and giving directions therein.
Feeling aggrieved the respondent-State filed the appeal and the Division Bench
in the impugned Judgment while upholding the termination of the licence under
the Act, recorded a finding that "there is no legal impediment at all for
resumption of possession of the lands by the Government, without seeking any
aid of the provisions of the PPE Act, after the determination of the grant in
the manner provided in the grant itself." Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned
senior counsel, contended that even assuming that the termination of the grant
was in accordance with the grant itself, as found by the Division Bench of the
High Court, resumption of the possession without giving an opportunity to the
appellant and following the procedure prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Public
Premises Act (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975 (for short, the
`Eviction Act') is unauthorised and unwarranted. The finding of the Division
Bench is, therefore, clearly unsustainable in law. Shri Krishnamurthy, learned
counsel for the State, contended that the right of the appellant flows from the
grant under which they came into possession. After determination of the grant
by issuance of the notice in terms of the grant itself, the appellants
thereafter have no right to remain in possession.

Therefore,
the resumption of the possession by the respondents in terms of the grant is
valid in law. In that situation, the need to take resource to the provisions of
the Eviction Act bears no relevance and need not be followed.

The
question is; whether the resumption of possession unilaterally, after
determination of the grant in the manner provided under the grant itself, is
valid in law as was held by the High Court? We think that the view taken by the
High Court is not correct in law. In Bishan Das & Ors. vs. State of Punjab
& Ors. [(1962 2 SCR 69], a Constitution Bench of this Court had considered
the question whether the Government would unilaterally take possession of the
land after termination of the lease. One Ramjidas had built a dharamasala, a
temple and shops appurtenant thereto, after having a licence of land from the
State Government. The lease was terminated and thereafter when the persons in
possession were sought to be dispossessed, without taking any recourse to law,
they filed writ petition under Article 226 but remained unsuccessful. When writ
petition under Article 32 was filed, this Court had considered the question
whether the Government is entitled to resume the land with a minimum use of
force for ejectment without recourse to law.

It was
contended therein that there was no dispute as the question of the fact between
the parties that the petitioners therein had no right and title to the subject
matter in dispute. The writ petition under Article 226 was dismissed on the
ground of the disputed question of fact which was upheld in appeal by the
Division Bench. A writ petition under Article 32 was filed. The right to
possession of land was a fundamental right at that time. It was contended that
the Government terminated the lease, as thereafter they were trespassers and so
they had no right to resist the Government's power to resume the land. This
Court had repelled both the contentions as unsound and ha held that the
Government violated the fundamental right to possession of lead since the
petitioners therein were not trespassers. They remained in possession for long
time.

Pursuant
to the lease, they had constructed dharamasala, temple and shops and managed
them during the life time of the licencee. After his death, the petitioner and
members of the family continued in possession of and in management of the
properties which was an admitted possession. Therefore, they were not mere
trespassers in respect of the said properties. It was held that on the admitted
facts of the case, the petitioners therein could not said to be said in the
trespassers in respect of the dharamasala, temple and shops not could the State
could be said to be the owner of the property, irrespective of whether it was a
trust, public or private having taking the possession unilaterally. It was open
to the State to take appropriate legal action for the purpose. It was also held
that the State could not remove them from possession except under the authority
of law. The same view was reiterated by this Court in State of U.P. & Ors. vs.
Maharaja Dharmander Pd. Singh & Ors. [(1989) 2 SCC 505 at 516) thus:

"A
lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession
extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry of
earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the
expression `re-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra- judicial
possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact
that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better
position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from
the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a `legal' pedigree'. In Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab [(1962) 2
SCR 69] this Court said:

"We
must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the
petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The
argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its
implications and impact on law and order..." Before we part with this
case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case
by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle.

Therefore,
there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of
appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re- entry. Possession can be
resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot
resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is,
accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of
law." In Lallu Yeshwant Singh vs. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. [(1968) 2
SCR 203], a Bench of this Court had considered the same question after
reviewing the case law in that behalf and held that the Government cannot take
possession of the land except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under
the Act. In that case, the recourse to the provisions under Section 9 of the
Specific Relief Act (Section 6 of the present Specific Relief Act, 1963) was
upheld. The question was also considered by this Court by one of us (K. Ramaswamy,
J.) in East India Hotels Ltd. vs. Syndicate Bank [1992 Supp. (2) 29 at 44]. It
was held in paragraph 29, 30 and 32 that:

"They
must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper course. In our
jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an unauthorised occupant can be
ejected only in the manner provided by law. The remedy under Section 6 is
summary and its object is to prevent self help and to discourage people in
adopt any means fair or foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was in
due course of law or with consent.

What
is meant by due course of law? Due course of law in each particular case means
such an exercise of the powers by duly constituted tribunal or court in
accordance with the procedure established by law under such safeguards of the
protection of individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according to the
rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence
for the enforcement and protection of private rights.

To
give such proceedings any validity, there must thus be a tribunal competent by
its constitution, that is by law of its creation, to pass upon the subject
matter of the suit or proceeding; and, if that involves merely a determination
of the personal liability of the defendant, it must be brought within its
jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary
appearance.

Due
course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present
before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life,
liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony
or otherwise and to have the right determination of the controversy by proof,
every material fat which bears on the question of fact or liability be
conclusively proved or presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course
of law in a comprehensive sense.

It is
thus clear that the course have viewed with askance any process other than
strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing a person in occupation of
immovable property against his consent. The reason is obvious that it aims to
preserve the efficacy of law and peace and order in the society relegating the
jurisprudential perspectives to a suit under Section 6 of the Act and restitute
possession to the person dispossessed, irrespective of the fact wether the has
any title to possession or not." The reason is obvious that law attempts
to preserve order in the society relegating that the jurisprudential perception
stood under Section 6 of the Act irrespective of the possession of the person
"dispossessed in respect of the fact whether in possession or not."
In paragraph 29, this Court approved the dictum of the Privy Council in Midnapur
Zamindary Co. Ltd. vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy [AIR 1924 PC144] and held that
persons are not persons are not permitted to take forcible possession. They
must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper course. In our
jurisprudence governed by the rule of law even an unauthorised occupant can be
ejected only in the manner provided by law. The remedy under Section 6 is of
summary trial and its object is to prevent self-help and to discourage people
to adopt any means fair on foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was
in due course of law or with consent.

Law
makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespasseres.
Law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. Law does
not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in
actual possession without having recourse to a court. The object thereby is to
encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted, a
person in lawful possession to have his removed from possession, according to
proper from and to prevent them from going with a high band and eject such
person.

Undoubtedly,
the true owner is entitled to retain possession even though he had obtain it by
force or by other unlawful means but that would not be a ground to permit the
owner to take law into his own hands and eject the person in juridical
possession or settled possession without recourse to law.

Thus,
it could be seen that even after determination of the licence under the
Government Grants Act, the Government is entitled resume possession but
resumption of possession does not mean unilaterally taking the possession
without recourse to law. The Eviction Act contemplates such a procedure.
"Premises" defined under Section 3(d) of the Act means and land or
any building or a part of a building or but and enclosed etc. Section 4
prescribes procedure of issuance of a notice of show cause before eviction
giving an opportunity and thereafter taking action under Section 5 of the Act.
Unfortunately, on the facts of the case on hand, the respondent, has not
adopted the procedure prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Eviction Act
after determination of the licence granted under the Government Grants Act. The
High Court, therefore, was not right in its conclusion that the procedure
prescribed under PPE Act is not applicable to the grants made under the
Government Grants Act since the appellants remained in settled possession since
a long time pursuant to the grant. After determination of the grant, though
they have no right to remain in possession, the State cannot take unilateral
possession without taking recourse to the procedure, provided under the Act. It
is, therefore, clear that it would have been open to the respondent to have a
notice issued to the appellant and give time to vacate the premises within 10
days or 15 days and, therefore, could leave resumed possession with minimal use
of police force. We cannot give and direction in this case since possession was
already resumed. We have directed not to create third party right in the
property. We are not inclined to interfere with the order.

Shri Sorabjee
contended that the appellant is entitled to notice before the order of
termination of grant made and so the action is bad in law and so the appellant
is entitled to restitution of the property. We are not inclined to agree with
him. The recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution, to establish title would
not be proper remedy. In this case, we are not inclined to go into the question
for the reason that the High Court has held that the writ petition is not
maintainable. After termination of the licence by the Government under the
Government Grants Act, the Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 cannot go
into its correctness and adjudicate in the proceedings under Section 3 thereof.
In our view, the Division Bench of the High Court is right in its finding. The
Government having determined the licence, the Estate Officer cannot go into the
question of legality of the termination of the licence under the Crown
(Government) Grants Act to take further steps under Section 4 and 5 of the Act.
In that view of the situation in this case, we think that it is not necessary
for the State Government to nominate the Estate Officer and for the Estate
Officer to give notice under Sections 4 and 5. There is not need for State to
file a suit for eviction. But notice in compliance of principles of natural
justice should have been given giving reasonable time of 10 or 15 days to
vacate the premises and to deliver vacant and peaceful possession;

thereafter,
the Government would be free to resume possession. Since possession was already
taken, through we are not approving of the manner in which the same was taken,
we do not think that in this matter notice afresh need be given to the
appellant. It may be open to the appellant to avail of any remedy available in
law.