WPS4652
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4652
Fiscal Policy Instruments for Reducing
Congestion and Atmospheric Emissions in
the Transport Sector:
A Review
Govinda R. Timilsina
Hari B. Dulal
The World Bank
Development Research Group
Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team
June 2008
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4652
Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on the fiscal policy rather than to reduce emissions and traffic congestion.
instruments commonly used to reduce transport sector Although subsidizing public transportation is a common
externalities. The findings show that congestion charges practice, reducing emissions has not been the primary
would reduce vehicle traffic by 9 to 12 percent and objective of such subsidies. Nevertheless, it is shown that
significantly improve environmental quality. The vehicle transport sector emissions would be higher in the absence
tax literature suggests that every 1 percent increase in of both public transportation subsidies and fuel taxation.
vehicle taxes would reduce vehicle miles by 0.22 to 0.45 Subsidies are also the main policy tool for the promotion
percent and CO2 emissions by 0.19 percent. The fuel tax of clean fuels and vehicles. Although some studies are
is the most common fiscal policy instrument; however very critical of biofuel subsidies, the literature is mostly
its primary objective is to raise government revenues supportive of clean vehicle subsidies
This paper--a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban DevelopmentTeam, Development Research Group--is part of
a larger effort in the department to study climate change mitigation in the transport sector. Policy Research Working Papers
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Produced by the Research Support Team
Fiscal Policy Instruments for Reducing Congestion and Atmospheric
Emissions in the Transport Sector: A Review
Govinda R. Timilsina* and Hari B. Dulal
Development Research Group, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC
20433, USA
Key Words: Transport sector externalities; congestion; emissions; fiscal policy
instruments
We sincerely thank, Roger R. Stough, Christopher J. Sutton, Walter Vergara, Kenneth Chomitz and
Ashish Shrestha for their valuable comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the author only, and do not necessarily represent the World Bank and its affiliated organizations.
*Corresponding Author, tel: 1 202 473 2767; Fax: 1 202 522 1151; e-mail: gtimilsina@worldbank.org
2
1. Introduction
Fiscal instruments are primarily price-based instruments that take advantage of market
mechanisms and work through prices (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). These instruments
include: congestion charge or toll tax, emission and/or pollution tax or charge (e.g.,
carbon tax, sulfur tax), fuel tax (e.g., any excise tax on fuel or a BTU tax), vehicle tax
(e.g., ownership, licensing or registration fee) and subsidies (e.g., subsidies for clean
fuels, efficient vehicles, and public transportation). These instruments are expected to
correct transport sector negative externalities through various means such as cutting
travel demands, switching from private transportation to public transportation,
substituting polluting fuels (e.g., petroleum products) with clean fuels (e.g., ethanol,
hydrogen, compressed natural gas) and encouraging the public to use high-fuel economy
vehicles.
Despite well-established theoretical foundations and a few examples of
implementation, fiscal policies are associated with several issues that require further
investigation before they are recommended for broader implementation. The most
important issue is which fiscal policy instrument would be the most effective and under
what conditions? Are these policies mutually exclusive? If not, what combination of
these instruments would produce the best results? Answering these questions is crucial as
hundreds of cities throughout the globe, mostly in developing countries, are severely
suffering from the negative transport sector externalities and are currently seeking
appropriate instruments to correct them. With these issues in mind, our goal is to review
the following potential fiscal policy instruments: congestion charge; fuel tax; emission
tax; vehicle tax and subsides, while trying to bring their comparative advantages to light1.
1Note that there are other policy instruments, such as regulatory instruments (e.g., fuel economy standards,
vehicle occupancy standards, high vehicle lanes), behavioral instruments (e.g., telecommuting, staggering
work start times; promotion of multiple function trips) and infrastructure investment policies (e.g., bus
rapid transit, metro etc.). This study focuses only on financial instruments for the sack of clarity and
comparability of instruments considered. We leave reviews of other policy instruments for future studies.
3
Existing studies (e.g., Acutt and Dodgson, 1997), have reviewed alternative
policy instruments used to reduce transport sector externalities. These studies however,
focus only on their theoretical aspects and do not provide any quantitative information on
the impacts of these policy instruments. To the contrary, our study discusses policy
instruments that contain numerous examples of their actual implementation. The study
first compares the different types of impacts the fiscal instruments have on vehicle
mileage, congestion, emissions and welfare. Secondly, we compare fiscal policies that
have been introduced throughout different parts of the world in terms of their ability to
contain transport externalities, while providing some insight on how the same fiscal
policy could produce different results in different geographical settings.
We find that the selection of fiscal policy instruments depends on several factors
such as: type of problem (e.g., congestion vs. emissions), severity of problem, flexibility
to achieve the goals, and cost of the policy instruments. Mega-cities with predominantly
private vehicles and with severe congestion problems may prefer congestion charges. On
the other hand, developing cities looking for additional government revenue sources with
no serious congestion or emission problems might consider fuel taxes. Subsidies created
for public transportation are a common and conventional phenomenon in all countries
throughout the world, even though these subsidies are not intended to reduce emissions or
congestions. However, the level of transport sector externalities might have been higher
in the absence of subsidies to public transportation. Moreover, subsidies have played key
roles in promoting clean fuels (e.g., biofuels in the United States) and are expected to
play similar roles in promoting clean vehicles.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses theory, real world
examples, and impacts of congestion charge. Following is a brief review of fuel taxes
including: fuel tax rates, revenue generation and environmental and economic impacts.
Section 4 and 5 present, respectively, vehicle and emission taxes. In Section 6 we have an
in-depth discussion of subsidies in public transportation, clean fuel and clean vehicles.
Section 7 discusses parking charges. Section 8 highlights comparative pictures of the
policy instruments being considered. Section 9 concludes.
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2. Congestion Charges
The main principle of congestion pricing is to impose higher charges on travelers at times
and places when road systems are congested. This reduces both social and environmental
costs imposed by congestion through enhancing traffic flow and decreasing travel
demands and emissions resulting from the idling and slowing of vehicles. Thus,
congestion charges internalize the additional travel cost imposed by motorists on fellow
travelers by altering their travel behavior (Sikow-Magny, 2003). This charge also
encourages people to travel during off-peak hours, through non-congested routes or
through other modes of transportation. It is considered an effective policy instrument in
controlling vehicular emissions because it helps to reduce the number and duration of
trips, alter routes, and offers decreases in speed variation (Daniel and Bekka, 2000).
However, the willingness of motorists to pay congestion charges depends upon their level
of income and their availability of alternative means of transportation (Sharp, 1966).
Congestion pricing is theoretically well-established and implemented in practice
throughout many urban centers, particularly in developed countries.
2.1 Theory of Congestion Charge
The theory of congestion pricing states that the charges imposed should equal the
difference between the social marginal cost and the private cost for the flow, which will
prevail only after imposing the charges (Jansson, 1969). Congestion charges are meant to
internalize their external costs (Teubel, 1998). Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924)
established a foundation to describe misallocation of resources resulting from free access
to public roadways (see Figure 1). As illustrated in Figure 1, the average time taken for a
motorist to travel a particular road segment increases with an increase in traffic flow.
With the increased congestion, average speed decreases and average travel time increases
for the driver. Thus, an increased travel time causes the average and the marginal travel
costs to increase.
5
Source: Walters (1961)
Figure 1.The Pigou-Knight Analysis
Numerous studies (Vickery, 1969; Walters, 1961; Mohring and Harwitz, 1962;
Kraus, 1981) persuaded Pigou to research the roles of taxation in an effort to internalize
congestion externalities. Earlier studies (i.e., studies before nineties) focused mainly on
reducing congestion (e.g., Walters 1961, Vickrey, 1963, Keeler and Small, 1977;
Sullivan, 1983) whereas recent studies equally address both congestion and
environmental pollution (Innes, 1995; Daniel and Bekka, 2000; Parry and Bento, 2002).
These address the need and the effectiveness of taxation in correcting the misallocation of
public resources associated with free access to public roads.
2.2 Congestion Charges in Practice
In order to reduce both the social and environmental costs associated with congestion,
congestion charging systems have been adopted in various parts of the world with
varying degree of success. Congestion charges that increase the cost of travel may
convince motorists to alter their travel behavior, although some diversions of traffic may
take place. The area licensing scheme (ALS), introduced by Singapore in 1975, is
probably the first example of congestion pricing created to alter travel behavior. In this
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system, only those cars with three or fewer people were charged. The charge ranged
between $1.50 to $2.50 per day (Daniel and Bekka, 2000). In September 1998, after 23
years in operation, the ALS was replaced by an electronic version called the Electronic Road
Pricing System (ERP), (Keong, 2002). In 2003, the city of London introduced a congestion
charging scheme in which vehicles entering inside a 22-square km zone comprising core
shopping, government, entertainment and business districts were required to pay a
congestion charge of £5 between 7 AM and 18.30 PM on weekdays. The change has been
increased to £8 since July of 2005 (Schmöcker et. al., 2005).
Table 1 presents congestion pricing schemes introduced in four countries:
Singapore, Norway, the United States and the United Kingdom. Congestion charges are
placed differently, by those who impose the schemes depending on the goals. In
Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the primary objective behind road
pricing is congestion relief, whereas in Norway, initially, it was designed to generate
revenue (currently it is environmental quality and safety). In Singapore and the United
Kingdom, motorists pay charges on a daily basis, unlike the United States and Norway
where motorists pay a toll per passage. In Singapore, charges vary, depending on the
peak and off-peak periods and are reviewed on quarterly basis (de Palma et. al., 2006)2.
2Note that the congestion charge and road pricing are used interchangeably in some literature. In this paper
we have distinguished between the two and focus only on congestion charges, as the purpose of road
pricing could be different from reducing traffic congestion (e.g., revenue generation etc.). We have not
included road pricing literature in this paper.
7
Table 1. Characteristics of Four Real-World Urban Road-Pricing Schemes
Singapore Norway US United Kingdom
(Various Cities) (Various Cities) (London)
Area license Toll rings High occupancy toll Area congestion
& (HOT) lanes pricing
electronic road pricing
Inception year 1975 1986 1995 2003
Objectives ALS (1975­98): congestion Initially revenue Congestion relief Demand
relief generation. management:
RPS (1995­98): familiarize Amendments to primarily
users with link pricing; ERP Road Acts now congestion
(1998-): permit demand relief
control congestion by management to
maintaining enhance
range of speeds environmental
quality, safety
Type(s) of ALS: inbound cordon. Paid Inbound cordons. Link. Per passage. Area licensing
tolling daily Per passage. scheme. Includes
RPS: linear. Per passage parking on public
ERP: CBD cordons and roads. Paid
linear. Per passage. daily
Tolled area or ALS: 7 km2 restricted zone Toll rings Five projects: SR-91 21 km2 charge area
infrastructure successively added and I-15 in around city centre.
in Bergen, Oslo, California, I-10 and
Namsos US 290 in Texas, I-
Trondheim etc. 394 in Minneapolis-
St Paul
Means of ALS and RPS: paper licenses Electronic and Electronic Manual payment
payment with manual enforcement manual by various means
ERP: in-Vehicle Units (IUs)
and smart cards
Time variation ALS: morning peak, Variable tolls in I-10, US 290: flat Flat charge on
extended to evening in 1989 Trondheim & weekdays except
and to inter-peak in 1994; Stavanger. Flat holidays, 7:00­
RPS: morning peak; ERP: tolls elsewhere. 18:30
CBDs 7:30­10, 12­19;
expressways: 7:30­9:30.
Changes in 5 or 30-min.
steps. Reviewed quarterly.
Annual ERP: 35M (1998) Oslo: 143M (2002) Other 4 facilities: Charges: 65M
revenues constant., SR-91: Enforcement:
$32M (2004) 102M
Annual ERP: 3.75M Trondheim: 23M SR-91: $21M (2004) 130M
operating costs (2002)
Source: de Palma et. al., (2006).
A congestion charge not only helps correct transport sector externalities, such as
emissions and congestion, but also generates a significant amount of revenue. For
example, annual revenues generated through congestion charges are much higher than the
annual operating costs in Singapore and Norway (see Table 1).
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2.3. Impacts of Congestion Charges
In addition to alleviating traffic congestion, a congestion charge has several impacts, such
as reducing fuel consumption, and improving environmental quality and social welfare.
In this section, we briefly highlight these impacts.
2.3.1 Impacts on Transportation Services
By definition, the primary objective of a congestion charge is to reduce traffic
congestion. The congestion tax system introduced in London for example, led to the
reduction in city-center traffic by 12%; of which 50-60% shifted to public transport
(Transport for London, 2004). Rich and Nielsen (2007) estimate that annual reductions in
car mileage in Copenhagen would be 7%, 6.5% and 3%, respectively, if congestion
charges are introduced based on km charging, cordon and large toll ring systems. The
reduction in congestion time would be approximately 2-3 times as high as that of car
mileage. It is estimated that daily inbound traffic would be reduced by 5% in New York
if a toll or a variable charge (like MTA) is introduced on the East River Bridge (Zupan et
al., 2003). A London-type congestion charge would reduce daily traffic volume in the
city by 9%; if a full variable pricing is introduced the reduction could reach 13% (Zupan
et al., 2003).
2.3.2 Impacts on Environmental Quality
A congestion charge reduces congestion, and as a result, reduces fuel consumption and
associated emissions from vehicles which help improve environmental quality. Existing
studies have assessed the environmental impacts of either proposed or actually
implemented congestion charges. For example, Prud'homme and Bocarejo (2005)
estimate the total environmental benefits generated by the congestion charge, introduced
in London, at 4.9 million euros per year. The ex-post evaluation of the quantified impacts
9
of the congestion charging scheme in London, conducted by Evans (2007) show that
distance vehicles traveled across London were reduced by approximately 211 million per
year with a £5 charge, and 237 million with an £8 charge. The value of CO2 emissions
saved was £2.3 million to £2.5 million with £5 and £8 charges. Rich and Nielson (2007)
discuss the socio-economic assessment of proposed road user charging schemes in
Copenhagen. They estimate that CO2 emissions in Copenhagen can be reduced anywhere
from 11, 500 tons to 154,000,000 tons annually, depending upon the type of congestion
charge (see Table 2). They also find that the congestion charges, based on distance
traveled (i.e., km charge) could reduce the highest amount of CO2 compared to other
types of congestion charges, such as large toll ring, and small toll ring.
Table 2. Annual Reductions in External Effects in 2005
Km Cordon
External effect charge charge Large toll ring Small toll ring
Reduced CO2 tonnage (×1000) 154,000 138,000 58,000 11,500
Reduced accidents (number) 330 155 298 100
Reduced noise (1000 SBT) 2.7 2.7 1.2 0.2
Reduced wear damage (million
DKK) 12 11 4 1
Source: Rich and Nielsen (2007)
A congestion charge not only reduces traffic congestion, but also reduces carbon
monoxide (CO) and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions proportionately more
than other types of emissions (Abbott et al., 1995; Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). Daniel and
Bekka (1999) estimate the impacts of congestion pricing on emissions of CO, nitrogen
oxide and hydro carbons for an actual metropolitan highway network calibrating
Delaware's household travel demand, and highway traffic count data in EPA's mobile 5a
model. They find that vehicle emissions could be reduced as much as 10% in aggregate
and 30% in highly congested areas through the use of a congestion charge.
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2.3.3 Impacts on Economy and Welfare
A large number of studies have analyzed the economic and welfare impacts of congestion
charges (see e.g., Walters, 1961; Weitzman, 1974; Richardson, 1974; Arnott et. al., 1994;
Parry and Bento, 2002; Santos and Rojey, 2004; Eliasson and Mattson, 2006). Whether
or not a congestion charge improves welfare depends on several factors, including the
definition of welfare itself. Studies conducted as early as the 1960s have showed that
congestion charges can increase welfare (see e.g., Walters, 1961; Weitzman, 1974). This
is because a congestion charge ensures a more efficient use of existing infrastructure
while generating revenues, which then can be invested in the road and public transport
system surplus (Eliasson and Mattson, 2006). However, the welfare of those who use the
roadscan decline if the revenue generated from such charges is not returned to them
(Glazer and Niskanen, 2000). Parry (2002) finds that, under ideal congestion pricing, a
congestion tax imposed uniformly across freeway lanes can achieve more than 90% of
the maximum efficiency gains.
Existing studies such as Richardson (1974) and Arnott et al. (1994) argue that
congestion charging could be regressive because it benefits higher income groups that the
value time gained, and believe it worth the charge and thus, the people with small
economic margins are worse off. As congestion charges disproportionately impact the
travel choice of lower income households, revenue redistribution is the key to
acceptability of congestion charging schemes. Evans (1992) argues that low-income
groups can benefit from congestion charges if the revenue generated is invested in public
transportation. This is because low-income groups use public transportation more often
than higher income groups, and thus will profit more from the revenues generated
through congestion charging. There are several proposals (Goodwin, 1989; Small, 1992;
Verhoef et. al., 1997) put forward to enhance acceptability of congestion-pricing
schemes. Small (1992) proposes reimbursing the travelers as a group to offset the
regressive taxes and using revenue to fund new transportation services. Verhoef et al.
(1997) suggest considering the motorists' preference while recycling revenues generated
through congestion charges to the economy (e.g., investment in new roads, reduction of
11
fuel taxes). Different schemes for recycling congestion tax revenues obviously have
different implications for different travelers. Eliasson and Mattson (2006), for example,
show that women and low-income groups benefit the most when the revenue is used for
improving public transport. The net benefit will be equal for men, and women on
average, and benefit high income groups if revenues are used for tax cuts. The
distribution impacts of congestion pricing depends upon where different population
groups live and work, their mode of transportation for commuting, and the ways in which
revenues collected are allocated (Santos and Rojey, 2004). Parry and Bento (1999) show
that the net effect of a revenue-neutral tax on congestion can stimulate labor force
participation at the margin. De Borger and Mayeres, (2007) argue that the better welfare
improvement is possible only when the government differentiates variable car taxes
between periods to capture greater differences in congestion between peak and off-peak
periods. De Palma et al. (2006) find that welfare gains tend to increase with an increase in
proportion of a transport network that is priced. They argue that, in order to stop
extensive traffic diversions in places where only a small fraction of transport network is
tolled, charges need to be set at relatively low levels.
3. Fuel Taxes
A fuel tax is a levy on the consumption of fuel in proportion to its pre-tax price (Gupta
and Mahler, 1994). Traditionally it is introduced for several purposes, such as to raise
government revenue with low administrative costs; to conserve foreign exchange, and to
generate revenue to finance road maintenance, etc. (Gupta and Mahler, 1994). Fuel tax
can, however, act as a pricing instrument to correct transport sector externalities, such as
congestion and environmental pollution (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). In the short-run, a
fuel tax results in an increase in fuel price, which in turn, discourages utilization of
vehicles and thus over-consumption of fuel and release of emissions. In the long-run, fuel
taxes also alter consumers' purchasing behavior, thereby causing them to switch to more
fuel-efficient methods (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). Unlike other taxes, the fuel tax is
administratively simple and well-established in principle. The fuel tax considers
externalities that are not directly priced (Ubbels, 2002).
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3.1 Fuel Tax Rates and Revenues
Table 3 compares fuel tax rates in Western Europe, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries and selected developing countries. In
OECD countries, tax rates vary from 50 cents per liter in Switzerland to $1.03 per liter in
Portugal. These tax rates are 5 to 10 times higher than that in the United States, where the
average fuel tax was 10 cents per liter in 2005. Although the fuel tax is one of the policy
instruments, it is not necessary that it always provides desired results. How effective a
fuel tax would be depends on price elasticity, the fuel use, and other factors such as other
policy instruments superseding the fuel tax (Bonnel, 1995). For example, despite low fuel
taxes, private vehicle use is relatively smaller in Switzerland as compared to other
European cities. Bern and Zurich have a lower rate of private car use than Lyon,
Grenoble, Montpellier in France, Cardiff and Liverpool in Great Britain, Oslo in Norway,
and Bologna and Milan in Italy where the fuel tax is among one of the highest in Western
European countries. Other policy instruments, particularly, private car control measures
over the past 20 years, are mainly responsible for decreased car use in Bern and Zurich
(Bonnel, 1995).
It becomes evident from Table 3 that fuel tax rates in Western Europe are
significantly higher than those in North America and other OECD countries. In most
countries, fuel taxes provide more revenue than taxes on products such as tobacco and
alcoholic beverages (Gupta and Mahler, 1994). In developing countries like Niger,
Nicaragua, South Korea, and Côte d'Ivoire, fuel taxation accounts for more than 20% of
total state revenue. The contribution of fuel tax toward governmental revenue is also
fairly high in industrialized countries (See table 4). As in developing countries, fuel taxes
in developed countries also account for substantial portions of state revenue. The fuel tax
accounted for 10% of state revenue in the Netherlands, 12% percent in France, 17%
percent in Spain, 17% in Japan, and 12% in the United States in 2004 (Metschies, 2005).
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Table 3. Gasoline Taxes in Selected Countries in 2005
Country Cents/liter Country Cents/liter
Western Europe Developing Countries
Portugal 103 Kenya 47
Netherlands 100 Malawi 50
United Kingdom 97 Mali 71
Belgium 94 Mauritius 29
Italy 90 Morocco 65
Germany 90 Niger 57
France 89 Nicaragua 24
Finland 85 Pakistan 17
Sweden 80 Panama 09
Norway 74 Senegal 65
Spain 72 Sri Lanka 27
Denmark 70 Turkey 99
Austria 68 India 42
Ireland 62 Ghana 04
Luxembourg 60 China 03
Switzerland 50 Brazil 39
Other OECD Countries Albania 78
Japan 46 Colombia 27
New Zealand 42 Costa Rica 33
Australia 35 Bolivia 09
Canada 26 Chile 40
Mexico 21
USA 10
aexpressed in purchasing power parity at 2000 constant price.
Source: IEA (2006) for OECD countries and Metschies (2005) for developing countries
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Table 4. Fuel Tax Revenues as Part of Total State Revenues
Country Percentage Country Percentage
Western Europe Developing Countries
Portugal 13 Kenya 9
Netherlands 10 Malawi 18
United Kingdom 14 Mali 10
Belgium 7 Mauritius 7
Italy 13 Morocco 11
Germany 8 Niger 20
France 12 Nicaragua 20
Finland 8 Pakistan 1
Sweden 6 Panama 2
Norway 8 Senegal 9
Spain 17 Turkey 18
Denmark 6 India 15
Austria 6 South Korea 33
Ireland 9 Brazil 5
Switzerland 7 Albania 24
Other OECD Countries Côte d'Ivoire 20
Japan 17 Costa Rica 17
New Zealand 2 Eritrea 1
Australia 9 Chile 12
Canada 6
Mexico 1
USA 12
Source: Metschies (2005)
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3.2 Impacts of Fuel Tax on Travel Demand, Fuel Consumption and
Emissions
Although the fuel tax is introduced mainly to generate government revenues, it could
have significant impact toward the reduction of emissions and traffic congestion. A
number of existing studies (e.g., Eltony, 1993; Hirota et al., 2003; Sterner, 2006)
demonstrate how the fuel tax reduces travel demand, fuel consumption, and emissions.
Employing an econometric model for household gasoline demand in Canadian provinces
for 1969-1988, Elton (1993) finds that a 10% increase in the fuel price would cause 75%
of households to reduce their vehicle travel within one year after the fuel price increase.
As a result, 15% of households shifted from large to small vehicles, and 10% of
households switched from less fuel-efficient to more efficient vehicles. Using the data
from 68 large cities worldwide, Hirota et al. (2003) demonstrate that for every 1%
increase in the fuel tax, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) could be reduced by 0.042%. Fuel
taxes have played an important role in restraining growth in transport sector fuel
consumption and associated carbon emissions in OECD countries. Sterner (2006)
calculates that had the different OECD countries introduced a gasoline tax at the level of
EU countries, such as Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, gasoline
consumption would have been reduced by 57% in the United States; 36% on average in
Canada, Australia and New Zealand; 34% in Japan and 44% in the OECD as a whole.
Since CO2 emissions are directly linked with fuel consumption, this would translate into a
substantial reduction in CO2 emissions from the transport sector. Sterner also estimates
that if all OECD countries had a low gasoline tax as does the United States, the total
OECD gasoline consumption would have been 31% higher. These findings demonstrate
the positive impacts of fuel taxes in fuel consumption and atmospheric emissions from
the transport sector.
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3.3. Fuel Tax Impacts on Welfare and Economy
Economic intuition suggests that a fuel tax will cause welfare loss unless the
environmental quality improved by the tax acknowledges welfare measures. Much of the
burden (i.e., welfare cost) are found to be born by low-income households. Nelson et al.
(2003), for example, find that motorists in the lowest quartile in the Greater Washington
metro area pay $141 million per year in gasoline taxes, yet still suffer from a negative
travel-related welfare change. They argue that welfare loss among the lowest income
groups, is mainly because they value travel time improvements less than higher-income
travelers and suffer from increased crowding on transit networks under a gas tax policy.
Using the econometrically-based multi-market simulation model, Bento et al. (2005)
demonstrate a considerable heterogeneity regarding the impacts of a gas tax on the
poorest households. They find that the distributional impacts of a gas tax increase on the
households with annual income less than $25,000 is higher than for those households with
incomes greater than $75,000 in the United States.
Some options exist designed to mitigate part, or even the whole losses of welfare
caused by a fuel tax. Proost and Dander (2002), for example, show that if the revenue
generated through gasoline taxes is recycled to cut labor taxes, it would improve the
welfare effects. Parry and Bento (2002) find that the deadweight costs of the fuel taxes on
labor force participation of those that are at the fringe can be reduced if the revenues
collected through congestion taxes are used to reduce distortionary labor taxes.
Existing literature illustrates that government spending of fuel tax revenues
further worsens the economic inefficiency. For example, Wiese, et al. (1995) show that
with an increase in the allocation of motor-fuel tax revenue for the general use by the
government, the absolute and relative burden of the lowest income household also
increases, and the policy becomes more regressive.
Since an introduction of the fuel tax reduces welfare, a removal or a decrease of
the fuel tax would alternately produce the opposite impact. Uri and Boyd (1998) show,
17
for example, that a reduction of 4.3 cents/gallon in the excise tax on gasoline and diesel
fuel would result in an increase in welfare by approximately $3.59 billion in the United
States although such a cut would lead to a decrease of $2.37 billion in state revenue.
There also exists some literature that finds fuel taxes progressive (Hughes, 1986,
Casler and Rafiqui, 1993). Hughes (1986) shows that the net effects of taxes on
petroleum are progressive in their distributional impacts and can be used to increase both
equity and allocative efficiency. Casler and Rafiqui (1993) argue that taxes on transport
fuel are far less regressive than they are perceived to be. Toeing follows the same line,
Poterba (1991) argues gasoline tax to be far less regressive than conventional analyses
suggest.
4. Vehicle Taxes
Depending upon the transportation policies adopted by countries or the local jurisdiction,
a vehicle tax could be a non-recurrent payment in connection with its purchase and
registration (e.g., turnover tax, registration tax, registration fees). Alternatively, it could
be periodically charged to the vehicle as a tax on the ownership or tenure (e.g., vehicle
tax, insurance tax) (Kunert and Kuhfeld, 2007). In addition to acquisition and ownership
taxes, usage dependent taxes, fuel taxes, and value-added taxes are also imposed in many
European and Asian countries. These taxes or charges may represent a significant burden
on the acquisition and ownership of new vehicles by motorists. A vehicle tax can also be
interpreted as a policy instrument designed to reduce emissions and congestion,
discouraging use of private vehicles; moreover it could substitute private vehicles with
public transportation services.
Several factors are taken into consideration while creating vehicle taxes.
Analyzing vehicle related charges and taxes in twenty-seven European countries, Kunert
and Kuhfeld (2007) find that a broad range of factors are taken into consideration while
imposing vehicle related taxes and charges in Europe. In Denmark, ownership tax is
based on the fuel economy, whereas in Germany, it depends on emission standards. In
18
Sweden and the Netherlands, vehicle gross weight and fuel type are the criteria used to
impose vehicle ownership tax. Vehicle ownership tax in France and the United Kingdom
is based on CO2 emissions. In most European countries, vehicle ownership taxes depend
on the engine model, the engine capacity, the fuel type, and the vehicle age or vehicle
gross weight (Hirota et. al., 2003). In Asia, vehicle ownership tax includes road tax, the
re-registration fee, and the rate often depends upon engine capacity. In Thailand and the
Philippines, the vehicle ownership taxes are based on vehicle gross weight; while in
Malaysia they are based on engine capacity (Hirota et. al., 2003).
In some countries, such as Singapore, vehicle taxes have been used as the primary
measure for discouraging private transportation and thereby reducing air pollution and
congestion. Policies such as high vehicle ownership taxes, including the Additional
Registration Fee (ARF), the Excise Duty and the annual Road Tax, and the Vehicle
Quota System (VQS) have successfully contained congestion and other traffic externality
problems in Singapore (Ang, 1996; Willoughby, 2000). These fiscal instruments
significantly discouraged private vehicle ownership in the country during the 1970s and
1980s (Barter, 2005). Since 1990, the VQS has also been applied to discourage private
vehicle ownership3. During 1990 - 2002, the VQS succeeded in bringing down the
average annual motor vehicle population growth rate to 2.8% from 4.2% (Santos et. al.,
2004). Similarly, a strong growth in the vehicle fleet, especially private cars and
motorcycles, was successfully curbed through a registration tax (FTR) and an annual
license fee (ALF) in Hong Kong (Khan, 2001).
4.1 Reductions in Vehicle Mileage, Fuel Consumption and Emissions
3VQS system requires new vehicle owners first to secure a 10-year Certificate of Entitlement (CoE). It is to
be purchased through an open auction out of a quota pre-established by the government. The Quota
Premium has risen steadily through 1994 and reached above US$27,000 equivalent for medium-sized
cars and above US$45,000 for larger cars (Willoughby, 2001).
19
Car-related taxes play an important role in reducing over all VMT and CO2 emissions.
Hirota et al., (2003) using data from 68 large cities, 49 OECD countries and 19 non-
OECD countries in Asia show that for every 1% increase in ownership tax, VMT
decreases by 0.22% and for every 1% increase in acquisition tax, VMT decreases by
0.45%. However, for a 1% increase in acquisition and ownership taxes, CO2 emissions
decreased by 0.19% and 0.19% respectively. Although higher acquisition and ownership
taxes discourage vehicle ownership, it might not if the acquisition and ownership taxes of
used vehicles remain low. People may respond to higher taxes and fees by buying older,
less fuel efficient models (Pritchard and DeBoer, 1995).
5. Emission Taxes4
An emission tax refers to a levy charged directly on effluents, or on a fuel in proportion
to contents of emission causing elements of the fuel. For example, a NOx (Oxides of
Nitrogen) tax is charged based on the amount of NOx released from a vehicle. A carbon
tax, on the other hand, is levied for fuels in proportion to their carbon contents. Similarly,
a sulfur tax is also levied for fuels based on their sulfur contents. In general, if the content
of a fuel (e.g., carbon, sulfur) is primarily responsible for the emissions, the tax is based
in proportion to that content. On the other hand, if the source of emissions is not only the
content of the fuel, but also other factors, the emission charge is then directly applied to
the emissions. For example, NOx is released not only due to the oxidation of nitrogen
present in a fuel (i.e., fuel NOx), but also in the atmospheric nitrogen (i.e., thermal NOx).
Three types of emission taxes are normally found either proposed or introduced in
order to reduce transport sector emissions. These are: (i) taxes on local air pollutants such
as suspended particulate matters (SPM), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), (ii) taxes
4Literature on emission taxes to reduce transport sector externalities is limited. There are two reasons
behind this. First, in contrast to a stationary source, monitoring of emissions is expensive for mobile
sources and hence the emission tax might not be the preferable instrument to reduce transport
externalities. Secondly, emission taxes when applied to a fuel (e.g., carbon or sulfur taxes) might be
interpreted as fuel taxes and included in the fuel tax category.
20
on local, as well as regional air pollutants, such as NOx, SOx (e.g., sulfur tax) and (iii)
taxes on GHG emissions (e.g., carbon tax). The first types of taxes are not common. The
second types of taxes are found introduced in a number of cities, such as Tokyo.
Moreover, a reduction in the sulphur content of fuel is important not only to reduce SO2
emissions, but also to improve the effectiveness of catalysts used to reduce NOx
(Sheffield et. al., 2001). Mobile sources are subject to the sulphur emissions charges in
Japan. The Japanese government has levied sulphur emissions charges to compensate
victims of SO2 pollution-related diseases.
The carbon tax is the most widely discussed policy instrument in literature due to
overwhelming interest by researchers on climate change. A carbon tax can be introduced
uniformly to all types of energy consumers (e.g., households, industry, government etc.)
and hence literature on carbon tax that is focuses specifically on the transport sector
emissions is not common. Some studies (e.g., Timilsina & Shrestha, 2002) which provide
information on the sectoral impacts of a carbon tax could shed light on its impacts on
transport sector emissions. One should, however, be cautious while interpreting these
results because the transport sector in most CGE models does not account for private
transportation but for the household sector. Speck (1999) finds impacts of the carbon tax
to be moderate based on the type of fuel (transport or heating) that is being taxed. Barker
and Köhler (1998) argue that the taxation of transport fuels possesses, although weak, a
progressive outcome for most European Union countries. They suggest that the overall
weak regressive effect of carbon taxes is due to taxes on domestic energy used for
heating.
6. Subsidies
A subsidy is a traditionally-used, and probably the most common, fiscal instrument in the
transport sector, particularly in developing countries. A subsidy can be provided to public
transportation (e.g., bus, railway and water transportation), clean fuels (e.g., ethanol, bio-
diesel) and clean vehicles (e.g., fuel cell and hydrogen cars, CNG bus, etc.).
21
While subsidies for public transportation could reduce both emissions and
congestion, subsidies for cleaner fuels and vehicles do not necessarily help reduce neither
congestion nor the number of cars on the roads. However, clean fuel and vehicle
subsidies can help reduce emissions in the transport sector.
6.1 Subsidies on Public Transportation
Switching to public transportation (e.g., rail, bus) from private transportation (e.g., car) is
considered an effective policy instrument designed to reduce transport sector
externalities, mainly congestion and emissions problems. Subsidies on public
transportation could be the main fiscal instrument that triggers a change from one mode
of transportation to another.
Public transportation has already been subsidized in many countries around the
world for several reasons. For example, only 25% of the total capital and operating
expenses in the United States and 50% in Europe are covered by fares for public transit
(Brueckner, 1987). In developing countries, public transport subsidies are necessary
mainly because drivers, in low-income households, can neither afford to own private
vehicles, nor pay the actual fare if public transportation is not subsidized (Cropper and
Bhattacharya, 2007). Public transportation subsidies can thus be interpreted as
environmental policy instruments from two angles. First, existing subsidies could have
contributed to both reducing emissions and congestion because some users of public
transportation could have used private transportation and thus increased emissions or
worsened congestion in the absence of such subsidies. For example, Cropper and
Bhattacharya (2007) find that removal of the bus subsidy (i.e., a 30% increase in fares)
would reduce bus commuters by 10-11% in Mumbai, India. Second, additional subsidies
on purely environmental grounds could help reduce emissions and congestion by
encouraging travelers to switch to public transportation from private transportation. Note
that an increase in public transport subsidies would reduce fares of public transportation
thereby increasing ridership (De Witte et. al., 2006). With increases in public transport
ridership, there will be fewer cars on the roadways, which will result in the reduction in
total atmospheric emissions from the transport sector (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997).
22
Subsidies in public transportation could have both short- and long-term effects. In
the short-term these subsidies will help reduce the use of private vehicles as well as
congestion and emissions. Whereas in the long-term, they could reduce ownership of
private vehicles and further reduce the externalities. Based on evidence regarding the
relationship between public transport generalized costs and car ownership, Goodwin
(1992) argues that increased public transport subsidies coupled with better service quality
will certainly result in the reduction of car ownership and increase the public transport
demand .
6.2 Subsidies on Clean Fuel
Subsidies are key fiscal policy instruments designed to promote clean fuel, particularly
the use of biofuels. Subsidies on biofuels are common practice in countries where their
production is significant (e.g., Brazil, United States, and Germany). In India, sugar mills
interested in setting up ethanol production facilities, receive subsidized loans for 40% of
project costs from the government. Ethanol subsidies are directed towards consumers in
Brazil. Sales taxes are lower for hydrous ethanol (containing water) and E25 (25 percent
ethanol) than gasoline (Coyle, 2007). In the European Union, twenty one countries grant
a tax exemption (full or partial) for each liter of biodiesel supplied on the market,
whereas twenty countries grant tax exemptions on bioethanol (Kutas et. al., 2007).
Biofuel subsidies are often justified on the basis of their alleged positive effects on
climate, energy, and agricultural policy goals (Henke et. al., 2005).
There has been a tremendous growth in the Ethanol market in the United States in
the past two decades from 550 millions gallon in 1984 (Rask, 1998) to 3,600 million
gallons in 2004 (Shapouri and Gallagher, 2005). Along with increases in production, the
number of ethanol producing plants has also increased. They increased from fewer than
20 in 1980 to more than 80 in 2004 (Shapouri and Gallagher, 2005). However, unlike in
Brazil, where ethanol accounts for about 30% of gasoline demand, its share is only 2% of
the total transport fuel demand in the United States (Fulton, et. al., 2004).
23
There are several major subsidies and incentives introduced by federal and state
governments in the United States. The federal incentives include: Biodiesel Blenders tax
credit, smaller producer tax credits Federal Bio-based products preferred procurement
program, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Energy Systems and Energy
Efficiency Improvements Program, and the USDA Value-Added Producer Grant
Program. It is argued that without the existing federal and state subsidies, which average
about $0.8 per gallon, ethanol production in the United States would not be economically
viable (Saitone et al., 2007). The total cost of ethanol subsidized both by the federal and
the state government was estimated to be $5.1 billion in 2006.
With changes in market conditions, the institutional structure surrounding ethanol
has also changed substantially. Following Schumacher (2006), Tables 5(a) and 5(b)
highlight the federal and state-level subsidies and other incentives for transportation of
clean fuel in the United States.
Table 5: Federal and State Level Subsidies on Clean Fuels in the United States
Table 5(a): Federal Level Subsidies
Subsidy Description
Biodiesel Blender Tax Credit Producers receive a tax credit of $1.00 per gallon of biodiesel
produced from virgin oil, which could be either animal fats or
oilseeds.
Smaller Producer Tax Credit Producers with less than 60 million gallons of biodiesel or
ethanol per annum can receive a tax credit of $0.10 per gallon
for the first 15 million gallons of production, with a maximum
tax credit being $1.5 million per year.
Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Tax credit is equal to 30% of the cost of alternative refueling
Tax credit property, maximum amount being $30,000 for businesses and
$1000 for individuals using alterative fuels such as Biodiesel
blends of B20 or more and ethanol blends of E85 or greater
USDA Renewal Energy Projects generating energy from renewal sources (including
Systems and Energy biodiesel and ethanol) can get grants of up to $500,000 and loan
Efficiency Improvement guarantees of up to $10,000,000. However, grant requests are
Programs limited to 25% and loan guarantees are limited to 50% of the
total project costs.
24
Table 5 (b): State Level Subsidies
Subsidy Description
Montana
Biodiesel Production Tax credit equal to 15% of the cost to compensate for depreciation of
Facility Tax Credit equipments in the construction and facilities to be used for the
production of biodiesel
Biodiesel Production Producers receive $0.10 for each gallon of biodiesel produced that
Incentive represents an increase over the previous year's production. However,
this incentive is available only for the first three years of a production
facility's operation and is scheduled to expire on July 1, 2010
Refund for taxes paid A refund of $0.02 per gallon is paid to the distributor and $0.01 to the
on biodiesel by a retailer for the previous quarter, if biodiesel was produced entirely from
distributor or retailer ingredients produced in the state of Montana
Alternative Fuel 50% of the cost (up to $500) of converting vehicle that runs on fuel
Conversion Tax Credit blended with a minimum of 85% methanol or ethanol
Idaho
Biodiesel Production Tax deduction for distributors of biodiesel produced from oilseeds or
Tax Deduction animal fats. However, It is provided in the form of a reduced tax rate,
Program $0.225 per gallon as opposed to $0.25 per gallon for petroleum and
diesel and is not applied to more than 10% of the volume of biodiesel
Wyoming
Ethanol Credit A $0.40 per gallon credit for ethanol producers if 25% of their feedstock
Program purchases are produced in Wyoming. However, there is a ceiling of $2
million per year for individual producers
North Dakota
Biodiesel Tax Credit A biodiesel tax credit of 10% per year up to five years for costs incurred
to develop or modify a facility to produce or blend biodiesel. However,
the amount received as a tax credit cannot exceed $50,000 per year and a
cumulative maximum of $250, 000
Ethanol production Facilities that produce fewer than 15 million gallons receive a maximum
incentive programs of $900,000. The incentive, however, decreases once the facility exceeds
the ceiling of 15 million gallons. After 15 million gallons, they qualify
for a maximum of $450, 000.
Iowa
Ethanol Infrastructure Up to $325,000 for eligible facilities that convert or build infrastructure
Cost-Share Program required to distribute E85 fuel. Retailers can claim an ethanol tax credit
of $0.025 per gallon for every gallon of ethanol blended fuel that they
sell in excess of 60% of their total volume
Illinois
Clean school bus Rebates of up to 80% or maximum $4000 towards the purchase of
program alternative fuel vehicles. Sales or use tax exemption on biodiesel blends
of 10% or more
Minnesota
Ethanol production A $0.20 per gallon incentive to ethanol producers; however, a producer
incentive program cannot receive more than $3 million under this program
25
Some environmentalists and economists argue against the ethanol subsidy, citing
its dire effects for both the economy and the environment (Stiglitz, 1998). Pimentel
(2003) argues that subsidized ethanol production is not only environmentally deleterious,
but also ethically questionable because corn production causes more total soil erosion
than any other crop and also increases environmental degradation. Pimentel further
argues that diverting human food resources to the costly inefficient production of fuel
raises an ethical question as more than half of the world's population is malnourished.
6.3 Subsidies on Clean Vehicles
Subsidies or some form of financial incentives are necessary to encourage automobile
buyers to purchase low carbon-emitting vehicles such as hybrid cars. In many countries,
electric vehicles and vehicles fueled by alternate fuels are subsidized by the government.
For example, Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai Tianjin, Shenzhen, Xi'an,
Chongqing and Changchun have begun a program called `National Clean Vehicle
Action' since 1999 to combat vehicular pollution and also to reduce oil dependency. This
program was introduced to encourage the use of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) in transport. Local governments provide financial support to
this program. In 1998, the Shanghai Municipal Government provided 9 million Yuan and
exempted import duty on equipment to build LPG stations (Zhao, 2006).
Subsidies can facilitate market penetration of High Efficiency Vehicles (HEV)
such as hybrids. According to Maclean and Lave (2003), a hybrid vehicle needs to be
driven for 14 years or 313,000 kilometers before customers begin to enjoy true financial
benefits. In the United States and Japan, the governments offer consumer tax deductions
for the purchase or conversion of an approved clean fuel vehicle. The federal government
in the United States offers consumers tax deductions ranging from $2,000 to $50,000
towards incremental expenditure increases for the purchase or conversion of an approved
clean fuel vehicle (Perkins, 1998). In Japan, a separate reduction in the acquisition tax for
vehicles that meet certain emission targets exists (Hirota et. al., 2003). Like the United
States and Japan, Malaysia also provides financial incentives to encourage the use of
26
clean fuel vehicles. The Malaysian government provides public service vehicles in urban
areas using natural gas to ease the strain of road taxes: monogas vehicles receive a 50%
discount and bi-fuel or dual fuel vehicles receive a 25% discount (Hirota et. al., 2003). In
Finland, sales tax is lower for low-emission vehicles. In the Netherlands, although the car
purchase tax is 45.2%, there are fixed allowances of 1,540 euros for LPG cars (Potter and
Parkhurst, 2005).
There exists a consensus among existing studies that subsidies are necessary to
promote clean vehicles. Rubin and Leiby (2002) argue that, without subsidies, no
substantial hybrid penetration is possible; they estimate that a permanent subsidy of
$1600 per vehicle would ensure a market share of hybrid vehicles at about 45%, while a
$4000 subsidy could increase the share to 90% in the United States. Using the MARKAL
model, Ichinohe and Endo (2006) show that the share of hybrid passenger cars in 2030
could be 62% and the peak total subsidy required to achieve that share would be $1.23
billion per year in 2020 to reduce energy related annual CO2 emissions 8% below the
1990 level through 2030 in Japan. Based on a survey conducted to study the rebound and
other possible affects of tax rebates among 367 buyers of the hybrid second-generation
Toyota Prius car in Switzerland in the first 9 months after the market entry, Haan et. al.
(2007) finds that the tax rebates incentives could lead to significant increases in sales in
Swiss cantons having tax rebates. Similarly, Potoglou and Kanaroglou (2007), using the
Nested Logit (NMNL) model, find that the reduced monetary costs, purchase tax reliefs
and low emission rates are the factors that would encourage households to buy cleaner
vehicles within the metropolitan area of Hamilton, Canada. Carlsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2002) show that battery-powered cars cannot compete with conventional
gasoline powered cars in the Swedish transport sector unless an unanticipated major
breakthrough in battery technology occurs, thereby implying for a subsidy for electric
vehicles. According to Funk and Rabl (1999), as the social cost of the Electric Vehicle
(EV) is at least 50% more than that of gasoline-powered cars, the cost of air pollution
associated with cars using gasoline alone is not enough to give the EV a clear advantage
against all conventional cars.
27
7. Parking Charges
Parking charges can also be interpreted as an instrument to reduce transport sector
externalities as it could discourage driving through increasing the costs of car use.
Moreover, in areas where parking charges are levied, it could lead to an increase in the
use of public transportation (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997). Feeney (1989) shows that an
increased parking cost and decreased availability may have five major effects on
motorists: (1) change their parking location, (2) change starting time of their journey, (3)
change the mode used, (4) change trip destination and (5) abandon the trip altogether.
Willson and Shoup (1990) estimate that an increase in parking charges for all employees
in government offices in Ottawa, Canada not only led to a 20% reduction in single car
trips, but also forced a model shift. Through simulation studies of five British cities,
Dasgupta et al. (1994) demonstrate that doubling the parking charges reduces car share of
central area trips by 13%, from 56% to 43%.
8. Policy Implications
8.1 Single or multiple policy instruments?
As there is no single policy that fits all prescriptions when it comes to designing
appropriate fiscal instruments to combat transport sector externalities, many cities around
the world, particularly in developing countries, are experiencing difficulty in trying to
determine appropriate sets of policy instruments to reduce the transport sector
externalities. Existing literature (e.g., Molina and Molina, 2004) suggests that urban air
pollution originating from transport activities cannot be solved through one specific
strategy; instead, it requires a mix of policy measures that best suit each city's specific
circumstances. For example, as marginal decisions to travel are directly affected by a set
of taxes and charges such as fuel taxes, road pricing, and other road usage related
charges, imposition of fuel taxes alone may only account for some externalities but not
all. Although fuel taxes, to some extent, can be justified as road use charges, they are
28
relatively blunt instruments and may not account for marginal congestion costs. In
congested urban conditions, fuel consumption per km increases as a result of which
marginal congestion costs can exceed fuel taxes by a factor of 20 or more (Newbery,
2001). Imposing vehicle ownership taxes may discourage car ownership, but not its use
by motorists. In order to discourage both car ownership and usage, it may be necessary to
implement car ownership taxes and other vehicle use related charges concurrently (Faiz
et.al. 1990). Thus, a well-designed tax on vehicle ownership and use and on fuel
consumption would be more affective than the introduction of these instruments in
isolation
8.2 Which Policy Instruments and Where?
Some governments favor policy instruments which fulfill multiple objectives. For
example, the New Zealand government favors a combination of energy taxes, fuel taxes
and carbon taxes (Scrimgeour, et. al., 2005). However, some argue that fiscal policy
instruments that directly address externalities would be the most efficient ones, for
example, congestion tax or charge to reduce congestion or emission tax to reduce
emissions. An energy tax could encourage energy conservation, reduce emissions and
increase government revenues; however, an energy tax is always more costly than the
emission tax if the primary objective of the tax is to reduce emissions (e.g., Goulder,
1995; Timilsina and Shrestha, 2007). This is because an energy tax is an indirect
instrument and an emission tax is a direct instrument designed to reduce emissions.
Selection of fiscal instruments to reduce transport sector externalities within cities
depends upon the specific situation of the city. Kingham et al. (1999), for example,
cautioned the use of fuel taxes alone to reduce transport. They argue that, although fuel
taxes could be effective in terms of smoothing traffic flows, reducing congestion and
emissions, an increasing fuel prices, they will have limited impact if not accompanied by
alternative modes of incentives. More specifically, in a city where a public transport
system is weak, a fuel tax does not necessarily result in switching to public transportation
from private transportation. Hence, a fiscal policy instrument which works in one country
29
may not necessarily work in others with a different socioeconomic and cultural context.
For example, policy instruments, like Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) which was viewed
as very successful in Singapore, might not work in countries like India or Indonesia.
Although this policy is easy to comprehend and relatively cheaper to enforce in
developed countries like Singapore and the United States, it might be expensive because
of socio-economic and political settings in developing countries (Chin, 1996). In low-
income countries with low administrative capacities, an instrument with smaller or no
monitoring costs (e.g., fuel tax, emission tax) would be more effective than those
requiring large monitoring or administrative and compliance costs (Gwilliam and Shalizi,
1996).
Some existing studies, such as Michaelis and Davidson (1996), Acutt and
Dodgson (1997), Sterner (2006) argue that fuel taxes tend to be the most effective ones
when it comes to reducing CO2 emissions. This is true only when the fuel tax is designed
in proportion to the carbon contents of the fuel used. If the fuel tax is designed based on
its heat content or refinery gate price, it would not be effective to reduce emissions;
instead, it would be effective to generate revenues. Newbery (2001) suggests that fiscal
taxes on road transport fuels are the most important energy taxes that can be justified as a
second-best mechanism for charging for road use and environmental damage.
8.3 Basis for a Policy Instrument: Efficiency or Equity?
Fiscal policy instruments are normally compared based on their overall economic or
welfare effects. However, there is no consensus in the literature on the basis at which the
instruments are compared. What should be the basis for the comparison of policy
instruments: efficiency or equity? Or any other criteria such as implementation,
administration and compliance costs? Using the model of a discrete choice of vehicle
bundle and the continuous choice of vehicle-miles-traveled, West (2004), demonstrates
that taxes on vehicle engine size, which is the basis for vehicle ownership taxes in many
countries, or subsidies to new vehicles are significantly more regressive than gas or
mileage taxes. This implies the use of efficiency as a yardstick for comparing the
30
instruments. On the other hand, Aasness and Larsen (2003) argue that some
environmental taxes levied on specific consumer goods lead to a more equal distribution
than others. They state that a differentiated, empirically-based tax system may attain both
environmental targets and distributional goals. Following the equity argument, lower
taxes on bus rides, bicycles, and mopeds, whereas higher taxes on air flights, taxis, and
automobiles have positive environmental effects as well as inequality reduction potential.
Taxes (e.g., congestion changes, emission taxes) have a greater potential to reduce
emissions and congestion, however, one of the major challenges facing implementation
of these instruments is how to ensure that transportation costs to low-income travelers are
not disproportionately high. Faiz et al. (1990) suggests that it is not easy to establish
economically-justified and socially-acceptable motor vehicle control measures in
developing countries because the magnitude of the problem and its consequences are not
yet well understood. According to the equity principle, in developing countries where low
income households cannot afford private vehicles, the wealthy should bear a relatively
larger share of the tax burden than the poor. On the contrary, in high-income countries,
where fuel use for road transportation is not a luxury good, ability to pay the principle
does not hold true (Rietveld and Van Woudenberg, 2005). Jacobsen et al. (2003) find that
higher taxes on private transport (registration duty and petrol tax) would be one way to
balance the distributional impact of other environmental taxes.
8.4 Are Policy Instruments Introduced in Developed Countries Applicable
to Developing Countries?
As the severity of the impact of air pollution increases, assimilative capacity of the
environment, public attitudes, and degree of urbanization, transportation systems, and
economic conditions, developing countries are confronted with the daunting task of
answering a very basic question: What strategies should be adopted, how soon, and at
what cost? (Faiz et.al.1990). Although developing cities have taken steps towards vehicle
use restrictions, new technologies, privatization, transit management, transit service
31
innovation, and transportation pricing, very few, however, have taken concrete steps
towards actually solving the problem (Gakenheimer, 1999).
Existing literature (e.g., Kathuria, 2002a) points out that it is extremely important
to discourage ownership of private vehicles in developing countries. With rapid
population growth, growth in disposable income, and out-migration of rural population,
the cities in developing worlds are going to witness rapid surges in urban transportation
demands. Between 370 and 600 new vehicles are being registered every day in Delhi,
India. In an advent of such a rise in the number of vehicles, improvement in air quality is
an illusive dream (Kathuria, 2002a).
As many large cities in the developing world are the centers of education,
research, and innovation, the decline in mobility significantly damages the roles that they
play. Thirty-five percent of Bangkok's gross city product is lost in congestion
(Gakenheimer, 1999). He argues that countries in the developing world need to resort to
assertive policies of congestion pricing and various kinds of ownership/use charges. In
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, area licensing schemes resembling Singapore's have been
repeatedly proposed. Although assertive policies of pricing have not appeared on a long-
term basis in the lower income countries, with the passage of time and growth of the
congestion problem, it may become a real possibility.
According to Eskeland and Jimenez (1992), price-based instruments are superior
and provide greater certainty in reducing transport sector externalities. In developing
countries, where the buses and taxis account for the greater percentage of public
transportation, market-based solutions such as fiscal incentives can prompt car owners to
convert their vehicles to run on alternative fuels such as LPG, CNG, or alcohol. Faiz etal.
(1990) argues that higher taxes and license fees on the use of old, polluting vehicles can
discourage the ownership of polluting vehicle fuels. Musgrave and Musgrave (1989)
recommend the fuel tax because of the low enforcement costs and because user fraud is
difficult to accomplish. However, even though the fuel tax is administratively simple to
implement and targets most important emissions effectively, it is not sufficient enough to
32
base the entire policy framework for emission reductions (Johnstone and Karousakis,
1999).
There is a rapid growth in the number of motor vehicles in much of the
developing world. In most countries, the growth is taking place at more than 10% a year
and the doubles within 7 years (Gakenheimer, 1999). Thus, relying on single instruments,
specifically command and control instruments (CAC), may be insufficient in controlling
emissions from transport sectors in developing countries. Using the ambient air pollution
data collected from the busiest intersection in Delhi, India, Kathuria (2002a) empirically
demonstrates that CAC measures have not led to concomitant improvement in ambient
air quality in the city.
Eskeland and Jimenez (1992) argue that, although there are no rigorous studies of
pollution control in developing countries, there exists convincing casual evidence that
regulations to protect the environment are ineffective or unnecessarily costly. The
developing countries that have heavily relied on regulatory measures, containing
vehicular emission through CAC instruments might be an uphill task. With the rapid
increase in the number of vehicles, unless the enforcement standards are made more
stringent, a regulatory approach based on emissions standards alone is bound to result in
greater pollution (Kathuria, 2001b).
As there is no certainty about where the growth of motorization in developing
countries will attenuate, its rapid growth shall continue for years to come. In order to
avoid high economic and social impacts costs, Gakenheimer, (1999) suggest that actions
to confront costs must be high yield ones. Faiz et al. (1990) argue that the promising way
to control the increase in vehicle emissions within developing countries is through traffic
management, and with administratively simple policy measures. It is not very difficult to
formulate and implement policy instruments geared at changing vehicle use and fuel
consumption patterns.
33
9. Concluding Remarks
This study presents a review of various types of fiscal policy instruments used to reduce
transport sector externalities, particularly traffic congestion and atmospheric emissions.
Four tax instruments: congestion charge, fuel tax, vehicle tax, and emission tax and three
subsidy policies: subsidies on public transport, clean fuels and clean vehicles are
discussed in terms of their theoretical basis and examples of their introduction in practice.
Their impacts, particularly, on transport demand, vehicular pollution and economics and
welfare are reviewed.
Our study finds that, although there is rich literature on policy instruments written
to reduce transport sector externalities, implementation of these policies are limited to a
few cities, such as Singapore, London, New York and Stockholm. Research on the
congestion charge began in the early half of the 20th century with the pioneering works of
Arthur Pigou, but it was not introduced in practice until the mid seventies in Singapore.
Congestion charges seem to produce desired impacts in reducing vehicle mileages and
also reducing vehicle emissions, to some extent. However, whether or not a congestion
charge improves welfare is still debatable as some studies find welfare improving,
whereas others find the opposite. It tends to depend on various factors such as the of
networks charged, revenue neutrality of the tax, population groups that are being charged
for using networks, the mode of transportation used for commuting, and the ways in
which revenues collected are ultimately allocated. Besides the congestion charge, vehicle
taxes are seen as playing a successful role in containing private vehicles in some cities,
such as Singapore and Hong Kong.
Fuel taxes are not found to have been introduced to reduce transport sector
externalities, instead they have been primarily aimed at raising government revenues. It is
estimated that fuel taxes contribute as much as 20% of total government revenues in
some countries, such as, Niger, Nicaragua, South Korea and Côte d'Ivoire. Still, fuel
taxes are interpreted as policy instruments used to reduce transport sector externalities
34
because the level of the externalities would be higher than in the scenario without such
taxes.
The emission tax is an area where literature has rapidly grown over the past 25
years, however, the focus is mainly on carbon tax due to overwhelming interests by
researchers on climate change. Besides the carbon tax, sulfur tax and NOx tax are also
proposed, however, emission taxes are rarely used to reduce transport sector emissions
because of monitoring costs.
Three types of subsidies are discussed in the literature and are also introduced in
practice: subsidies for public transportation, clean fuel and vehicles. Subsidies on public
transportation are traditional practices both in developed and developing countries. Public
transportation subsidies are not originally intended to reduce emissions. They are actually
meant to cover operating costs of public transportation. Nevertheless, public
transportation subsidies can be interpreted as instruments to reduce the transport sector
externalities as the level of externalities would be higher in the absence such subsidies.
Subsidies have been used as primary incentives to promote clean fuels, particularly
biofuels. Biofuels subsidies are provided either producers (e.g., ethanol producers in the
United States) or consumers (e.g., Brazil). However, it is not clear what type of subsidy
(producer or consumer or mixed) would be the most effective. Moreover, some studies
criticize that biofuel subsidies, particularly in the developed countries, are not
environmentally and ethically justifiable. Subsidies for cleaner vehicles (e.g., electric
vehicles, hybrid vehicles, CNG buses) are becoming popular in many countries, such as
China, India, the United States and Japan. Unlike subsidies for biofuels, no existing
studies are arguing against clean vehicle subsidies.
Existing literature also highlights a number of factors to be considered while
designing fiscal policy instruments to reduce transport sector externalities, particularly if
fiscal policy instruments already introduced in industrialized countries can be replicated
in developing countries. These factors include, among others, efficiency, equity, existing
transportation system and institutional capacity.
35
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