It seems that the talk about the influence of
science on theology, and of theology on science, reaches a greater volume with
each passing day. Some of the most creative minds have become involved in this
task; it promises to be the focus of intellectually- respectable reflections on
science and theology. It is especially important that the members of the ASA be
informed and cautious about statements that are currently being made. Several
years ago, I wrote,

The ASA will be walking a philosophical
tightrope between these various pitfalls of pseudoscience, pseudotheology, and
their mystic synthesis in the years ahead. At the same time the ASA is committed
to maintaining the fundamental truths of the biblical revelation. It will be
easy to be misled, to be drawn into visionary expectations without realizing
that one is cutting out the ground from under one's feet. We must exercise great
love, patience, care and discernment if we are to be true to our fundamental
charter of upholding authentic science and authentic biblical theology.1

A great deal of confusion can be avoided if we
are careful about the definition of the terms that are used in such a
discussion. What are we to think of phrases that are constantly being tossed
around like "scientific
reformulations of theology," or "putting
God into science"? Do the authors
really mean that the essentials of theology derived from biblical interpretation
should be changed because of scientific input, or do they mean only that
religious attempts to describe the workings of the natural world need to be
reformulated? Do they really mean that "God"
should be thought of as a mechanism in scientific theory, or do they simply mean
that the search for complete scientific descriptions may fail when no authentic
scientific description is adequate? Do they really believe that a scientific
description that is complete on its own level, without leaving gaps for the
nonscientific intervention of God, actually rules out the existence and activity
of God? Do they adequately discriminate between testable scientific hypotheses
and metaphysical speculations that may arise from someone's involvement in
science, but which do not have the testability demanded by authentic science? Is
the whole affair a battle of words, or is there some really basic substance? The
unwary individual entering this area is well advised to be cautious and not to
assume that what seems to him or her to be the meaning of terms and ideas is
actually what is intended by the various participants in the discussion.

p. 261

Can our theology affect our science? Yes and
no. The answer is yes, if by this question we mean, "Can
theology give us inspiration, motivation, and guidance in carrying out
scientific research and in choosing the problems for such research? Can theology
make us cautious about conclusions for which the support of science is claimed
when they contradict theological insights?"
But the answer is no, if by this question we mean, "Can
theology provide us with scientific mechanisms that we can know are valid and
can accept as givens in our science?"

On the other hand, can our science affect our
theology? Yes and no. The answer is yes, if by this question we mean, "Can
science inform us about the mechanisms of God's activity in the universe and
thus enable us to avoid inappropriate conclusions about such mechanisms? Can
science provide us with a physical framework within which to relate the
spiritual insights given to us through theology?"
But the answer is no, if by the question we mean, "Can
science provide us with theologically valid insights into the character of God
and his relationships with human beings...insights that are either unknown to us
through God's revelation, or that contradict that revelation?"

The most important recognition implicit in
these statements is that all charges that these answers result in a separation,
a compartmentalization of science and theology, are misguided. When properly
expressed, we understand that science can provide us with valid insights into
what reality is like, and that theology can also provide us with valid insights
into what reality is like. Both science and theology provide us with descriptions
of what reality is like, not explanations of what reality is.
Our task is not to keep these insights separate, but to integrate them!
This integration needs to be carried out in such a way that neither the valid
insights of science nor of theology are lost. This is the most authentic simple
formulation of a set of "complementary"
descriptions.

For several years the acceptability of
Christian theology was damaged because it was viewed as being antithetical to a
growing scientific view of the universe. It became part of the post-Christian
subconscious to believe that science had done away with the need for God and
with the intellectual respectability of believing in God. We may have passed
into a post-scientific day, in at least the simplistic sense of this
understanding of science, as the only revealer of truth. But the authority of
science maintains strong public appeal, and today we frequently see this
authority still exalted, now not to directly discredit Christianity, but to
provide insights into "a new and
fuller understanding" of
Christianity than could ever be known from the biblical revelation.

David Bohm is a brilliant physicist, who
started his career in the 1950s and grew up in a Jewish household. His name has
been linked in science with the attempt to develop a theoretical perspective to
replace traditional quantum theory. He has been successful in providing a
variety of stimulating perspectives different from those of the traditional
theory, which when put into theoretical form, are able to predict the same
experimental results as those predicted by the usually accepted quantum theory.
To date, however, no uniquely testable situation has been devised that is able
to discriminate between Bohm's theory and traditional quantum theory, and his
ideas remain speculative and generally unaccepted.

The motivation for this book, however, is the
examination of the claim that Bohm's ideas are based upon his metaphysical and
religious convictions, that, as stated on the cover jacket, he takes "the
theories and concepts of religion as hypotheses for physics,"
and that his "religious
convictions provide the motivation to pursue the physical theories and
hypotheses." A basic question is,
"Can one develop Bohm's
metaphysics into a theology?"
And...just what would this mean?

The author of this analysis is Kevin J.
Sharpe, professor in the Graduate School of the Union Institute, Cincinnati,
where his specialty is in science and religion. He has served as Executive
Officer of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, and is also the
founding editor of Science & Religion News. He provides a detailed
analysis of many aspects of Bohm's thought and of the analysis that has been
made of them, developing 19 pages of notes, and providing 45 pages of
references. In the comments that follow, the quotations are from Sharpe's
writing in this book unless specifically indicated otherwise.

Sharpe's comments about Bohm's ideas in the
Preface are promising. He says that "Bohm's
writings move from physics to history, education to philosophy of science,
biology to religion, art to linguistics."
What characterizes Bohm's thought is his opposition to thinking about the world
as a machine, which takes form in his "organismic"
approach. Sharpe quotes Ian Barbour's characterization of an organismic
approach: "(1) the organism is a
whole, an integral whole, (2) a hierarchy of levels makes up the organism, and
(3) the organism influences its parts."
The essence of the perspective can be summed up in, "The
whole is greater than the sum of its parts."
Once one realizes that this use of the word "organism"
does not necessarily imply a living entity, this description seems sound
and has been widely accepted by many. There is absolutely nothing in it that
necessitates "a scientific
reformulation of theology."
Sharpe points out that many with a mystical or Eastern religious perspective
have embraced Bohm's views, but his critique is that "excessive
and uncritical enthusiasm typifies this interest."

p.
262

Bohm's principle initial attack was directed
against the accepted probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. He
attempted to replace such an interpretation with a deterministic description
involving "hidden variables,"
which would remove the appearances of probability if they were known. "So
far there is no conclusive experimental support for the superiority of Bohm's
approach over the usual one. Subsequently, Bohm and others have attempted to
develop forms of this theory further and with different emphases, while
retaining the initial goals. The
hidden variables theory then took on the `quantum potential' name by members of
the Birkbeck School. (Birkbeck College in the University of London is where Bohm
and many of his coworkers have held positions)."
The quantum potential is an additional term, added to the basic classical
equation, which gives a clear picture of events at the quantum level. The
quantum potential emphasizes quantum wholeness, need not vanish for particles
far apart, and depends on the whole system. Bohm believes "everything
connects to everything else, that one of the world's basic properties is its
wholeness." Still, "members
of the Birkbeck School acknowledge that the existence of the quantum potential
is an assumption with no solid foundation."
Although it is very much alive today, and gives the same predictions as the
usual quantum physics, "the
Birkbeck theory leads to no new experimental results and has no experimental
support to help it lever out the usual theory."

Why then, all of the talk about "new
physics and new religion"? In
further elaborations of his theory, Bohm "expresses
his philosophical or metaphysical ideas, one of whose themes is the unending
depth of nature.... Such continuing thrusts into controversial physics may
appear as a guiding light for many philosophical, religious, or spiritual
people. Like the hidden variables theories, however, the world of physics does
not thoroughly support them."
Sharpe is very fair in his comments, balancing each set of positive or
supporting arguments with corresponding negative or non-supporting arguments. In
this case he points out that Bohm himself gives the warning. "We
may want to think of everything connected to everything else regardless of their
separations in time and space. The evidence, however, does not support doing
this." And...we might ask at this
point...even if the world of physics did support them, would there be any
necessary profound significance or relevance for theology?

Three terms describing Bohm's concepts are
unbroken wholeness, implicate order, and holomovement. "The
holomovement model for reality comes from the properties of a holographic image
of an object.... any portion of a hologram contains information on the whole
object imaged." The major
contribution to the hologram involves movement; thus the term holomovement
emphasizes the dynamic nature of interactions. "The
holomovement is the basis for reality and is an unbroken and undivided whole.
All forms of it merge; we cannot separate them."
Reality needs to be described as an implicate order, meaning that "everything
folds into everything...any portion of implicate reality involves every other
portion and contains the total structure of the universe, the whole."
The implicate order unfolds into what we recognize as the explicate order. At
this point, half way through the book, enters the first use of the word God, "In
most contexts the implicate order does not fully become an explicate order ...
This contrasts with the Cartesian view where some all-including intelligence
(God) can in principle embrace everything at any moment."

The author continues with a discussion of the
five major ingredients in Bohm's metaphysics: reality has an endless depth;
parts of reality relate to each other; reality is constantly in movement; the
movement of reality is creative; and reality divides into levels that are in
systems of hierarchies.

To these may then be added Bohm's religious
ideas, influenced at least to some extent by an interest in Eastern mysticism:
consciousness is a material process in the implicate order; the consciousness of
humanity is one; the holomovement is the life energy; consciousness is affected
by fragmentation that is the source of human self-deception; and the
significance of "the beyond."

Beyond the explicate and the implicate, beyond
the holomovement, there is something about which we can say nothing except that
it is. We cannot in any way approach, measure, or know it. It eludes the grasp
of thought, but is the source for all. For Bohm, the beyond is the domain of the
sacred, the spirit, the holy, God. Compassion, intelligence, love, insight, he
believes, comes from this beyond.

We are limited in how much we can know and
understand, but insight can come from the beyond to change brain matter.

For Bohm insight is the supreme intelligence.
To move toward relieving the chaos of fragmentation in our world requires
insight to reorder people's minds. In particular, several close insightful
people need to set up a single mind from their collective individual minds.

p. 263

Finally, we come to the bottom line.

To perceive what is beyond the implicate and
explicate orders and therefore beyond thought, Bohm states that thought must
go.... To do this is the first step of religion; it is the aim of meditation.
Meditation transforms our minds and moves them beyond the implicate order.
According to Bohm, consciousness can break free of its constraints by leaving
thought behind to become something quite new.

Sharpe considers whether process philosophy
might be an adequate way to describe Bohm's ideas, but concludes that it
probably is not. He considers Capra's attempts to relate quantum theory with
Eastern mysticism2 and decides that it is a case of
Capra's religious belief influencing his science. Finally he argues that Bohm is
using his religious ideas in physics. This is especially true of his idea of "undivided
wholeness," which "has
its roots in religion or mysticism, and it may or may not be useful in physics."
Stephen Hawking has been especially critical of such an approach, and Sharpe
quotes Hawking as saying, "(it)
is absolute rubbish ... The universe of Eastern mysticism is an illusion.... A
physicist who (tries) to link it with his (or her) own work has abandoned
physics."3

Sharpe's comments at this point are
perceptive:

Bohm proposes it as a physical theory,
but it is still subject to the testing ground of physics. Religion can make a
second contribution: it can strengthen believers' dedication, enthusiasm, and
tenacity to try to have their ideas accepted as physical theory.... Many
religions, including Christianity, have much to say about the nature and
direction of the physical world. They should not be afraid of bringing these
ideas in appropriate forms, to the sciences. As hypotheses they are still, of
course, in need of factual support.

Whether or not Christianity has anything to
say about the nature of the physical world can certainly be debated. But note
that all of these comments have to do with the use of religious ideas to guide
scientific theory. They do not become accepted science because of their
religious appeal. They are valid only if they result in science that can be
experimentally tested. Nor do they deal with the issue of science leading to
changes in theology.

Before proceeding to this latter topic, Sharpe
takes a break to consider the relationship between science and theology in
general. He points out three common categories into which most such
relationships can be placed: conflict, compartmentalization, and complementarity.

Sharpe is uneasy about complementarity and
complains, "Writers often use
complementarity carelessly. They seldom ask the key question: 'Does this model
for the science-theology relation picture them as necessary and also as
relevant for each other?'"He
is anxious that science and theology not be pushed further apart, and argues, "To
avoid this means emphasizing the relevance of science and theology for each
other and actively exploring their points of contact. Conflicts need resolving,
but not in ways that make them more irrelevant for each other" Most
advocates of complementarity would agree with him, expressing their concern by
their insistence on the need to integrate the two kinds of descriptions.

Sharpe next finds several problems with
MacKay's model4for complementarity,
concluding that his model is confusing. He is mistaken, in my opinion, when he
says of MacKay that "complementarity
for the science-theology relation also suggests they are completely different
and mutually irrelevant," or that
MacKay's "hierarchical
complementarity stops theology from giving a science data, direction toward
worthwhile areas of study, or criteria for accepting or rejecting a physical
theory." Sharpe states that he
does "not want to undermine the
importance of MacKay's ideas,"
but concludes with the curious complaint, "MacKay
also assumes theology and science have the same subject matter, namely, the
world we experience. His removal of the other-world from the subject matter of
theology is an example of the evangelical movement's adoption of secular
thinking."

Passing from MacKay's complementarity with the
parting remark that it does not make science and theology relevant for each
other, Sharpe proceeds to the complementarity picture of Reich.5Here again some dubious critiques are offered, e.g., "Using
a scientific explanation for a situation virtually rules out a theological one.
The same holds in reverse."
Perhaps a misuse of "explanation"
at this point, instead of the more appropriate "description,"
leads to this mistaken conclusion, but it does not adequately describe
complementary scientific and theological descriptions. When Sharpe says, "In
general, I seek to understand the relevance of science and theology for each
other, and their integration," I
would agree completely. But then I can't imagine why he also says, "An
evangelist's insistence that God stopped a hurricane hitting an area may
conflict with a meteorologist's explanation."

p.264

As an alterative to complementarity, Sharpe
proposes "a ladder model.""Science and theology are the two
vertical poles of the ladder... The rungs depict what science and theology have
in common in their knowledge and assumptions."
Sharpe feels that Bohm's integration of his physics and religious beliefs "typify
the ladder model." It is
interesting that he then concludes by saying,

My hope is that the ladder model upholds the
intentions of the complementarity model. First, science and theology have the
real world as a common reference. The challenge is to admit this and to
investigate the extent of their similarities. Second, they are different
because their definitions and the way they use concepts are not the same.
These points are probably what MacKay intended with his model.

I would simply say that MacKay not only
intended this, but actually achieved it.

In the final chapter of the book, Sharpe
indicates that he intends to discuss several "questions
raised by Bohm's physics and metaphysics for Christian theology."
In an amazing illustration of the language mysticism with which this review
started, Sharpe turns to quote from Barbour and Russell,6
saying that Bohm's work

...is ripe for theological
interpretation, because concepts such as cosmos, wholeness, fragmentation, and
implicate order are extended as integrating metaphors to all of experience.
Through it can come new language for God and human nature, for estrangement
and community, for religious experience in contemporary culture.

What are these striking advances that come to
us through Bohm's metaphysics? Sharpe names three: (1) Bohm's theology assumes
there is a beyond completely inaccessible to us; (2) is the holomovement a
product of the creator God, or is it the same as the creator God; (3) is there a
purpose or development in the movement of the holomovement? He says that Bohm's
perspective encourages interdisciplinary studies because it says no one
perspective can provide the complete understanding, and each depends on the
others.

Next Sharpe gives a summary of Russell's7 evaluation of Bohm's perspective, which is too extended to be
summarized here. When Russell proposes that Bohm's ideas could provide a new way
of understanding a divine purpose in the world, Sharpe replies, "I
am not as optimistic about this as is Russell because no strong picture of a
purpose for the universe shines out of Bohm's writings."
After giving Russell's interpretation of God's activity in nature, Sharpe
comments,

Unfortunately, Russell does not make it
clear how God acts in or on the world, be it within the implicate order or
otherwise. Neither is it clear what God does in these assumed actions.
Further, suppose God's actions occur in otherwise unused levels in Bohm's
infinity of levels. It would then be difficult to avoid a situation in which
God is irrelevant for explanations.

In perhaps the strangest section of the book,
Sharpe next considers "God in
Bohm's Metaphysics." Using
Russell once again as a reference, Sharpe says that Russell

also looks at defining God to be the
implicate order or the holomovement ... God so defined, Russell notes, need
not be personal... On balance, Russell concludes, Bohm is probably
closest to a panentheistic image of God. God contains the universe.

Sharpe, however, is quick to point out,

Russell has an incorrect understanding of
the divine in Bohm's metaphysics. Bohm does not believe God is the
holomovement or that God contains the holomovement, but rather he thinks the
divine is beyond the holomovement, beyond all implicate orders. God is beyond
them in ways that defy our ideas. In Bohm's scheme, the holomovement is part
of the created order.

Sharpe then introduces the thought of Peters,8
who felt that the "idea of a
single reality probably attracts Bohm. Bohm would thereby deny two points: he
would not make a distinction between God and the universe, and he would deny
that the universe depends entirely on God."
But again Sharpe disagrees. "Peters'
interpretation of Bohm appears incorrect ... he errs in saying Bohm thinks there
is only one reality ... Bohm's response to Peters makes this point quite clear:
that the universe is not divine is especially important."
Sharpe summarizes by stating that "Religious
thinkers will and have equated the implicate order, the holomovement, with God,
despite Bohm's intentions." To
top it off he says, "Bohm might
respond that the beyond is not a concept; it is a reality experienced through
meditation and insight, in ways words cannot describe. I disagree."

p.
265

The final section of the book is entitled, "A
Holomovement Theology." At last
we hope to find something positive that science is contributing to theology.
Sharpe concludes the section by saying,

Although Bohm does not think God is the
holomovement, I found this idea a useful starting point from which to begin a
theology.

He considers the holomovement idea as a model
for God.

There are two traditional ways of talking of
God as creator. The first is that God created out of nothing at the beginning.
The second is that God continually creates the world and all that is in it,
moment by moment. Both forms of creative activity are present in the
holomovement model of God.

Well and good. What has been shown at most is
that the holomovement model may be considered in such a way as to be consistent
with the traditional ways of talking about God as creator. What new insights has
the science given us?

The holomovement model says how this
mechanism works, thereby describing how God operates. Scientific laws are
descriptions of the way God works. They do not have any power themselves, nor
do they refer to Platonic-like powers that exist as part of or at another
level from the world. They describe the action of God.

We can agree with this statement totally. We
agreed with this statement on biblical grounds long before the holomovement
model came along. What new insights has science given us?

Another attribute of the holomovement God is
that God is personal ... we can move quite beyond Russell's conclusion that
the holomovement God need not be personal .... God has to do with all personal
traits. It also is possible to think of God as transcending personal
attributes .... Thus God could relate to us personally. Whether this happens
and, if it does, what form the relation takes, are subjects for theology to
ponder.

Well and good. We believed this on the basis
of the biblical revelation a long while ago. What new insights has science given
us?

Now, science has given us new insights
about many things that the biblical revelation did not do. It has informed us in
many ways of how God acts in the world and of the ways in which God's actions
are carried out, and it has helped us to understand some of the theological
terms of the biblical revelation in physical terms that describe the outliving
of those terms in the natural world. But science does not provide us with the
basis for reformulating theology.

This is a valuable book to read or to share
with someone else if they really believe that there are bright new days on the
horizon when our biblical concepts of God and His relationship to us and the
world will all be reworked in a scientific mode. Careful understanding of
exactly what these revolutionary advances of science are should be a compelling
antidote to non-biblical excesses.9