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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2013:
Military Readiness:
Opportunities Exist to Improve Completeness and Usefulness of
Quarterly Reports to Congress:
GAO-13-678:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-678, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Congress and DOD need relevant, accurate, and timely readiness
information to make informed decisions about the use of military
forces, and related resource needs. To that end, Congress requires DOD
to submit a quarterly readiness report addressing various elements
related to overall readiness, personnel, training, and equipment. A
committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO report on the type of readiness
information available to Congress and DOD decision makers and the
reported readiness of U.S. forces. In May 2013, GAO provided a
classified report on readiness trends of DOD forces. For this report,
GAO evaluated (1) the extent to which DOD addressed required reporting
elements in its quarterly readiness reports to Congress, and (2) what
additional information, if any, could make the reports more useful.
GAO analyzed various readiness reports and supporting documentation,
and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found:
In its quarterly readiness reports that covered the period from April
2012 through March 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed
most but not all required reporting elements. Section 482 of Title 10
of the U.S. Code requires DOD to report on 26 elements including
readiness deficiencies, remedial actions, and data specific to the
military services in the areas of personnel, training, and equipment.
In analyzing DOD’s reports, GAO found that DOD addressed 18 of the 26
elements, partially addressed 3 elements and did not report on 5
elements. For the elements partially addressed-—personnel stability,
training operations tempo, and deployed equipment-—reporting was
incomplete because some services reported information and others did
not report. When all the services reported on an element, they at
times did so inconsistently, with varying amounts and types of
information. For example, the services all reported information on
training commitments and deployments, but used different timeframes
when providing information on planned training events in the future.
The services reported differently because DOD has not provided
guidance on the information to be reported. For the elements that DOD
did not address, including borrowed manpower and training funding, GAO
found that information may exist in the department but is not being
reported to Congress. For example, the Army now requires commanders to
report monthly on the readiness impacts of borrowed military manpower
and DOD’s budget requests include data on training funding. However,
DOD has not taken steps to analyze whether this information could be
used to meet the related reporting element. Without issuing guidance
on the type and amount of information to be included by each service
and analyzing alternative information it could provide to meet the
required elements, DOD risks continuing to provide inconsistent and
incomplete information to Congress.
DOD has taken steps to improve its quarterly readiness reports to
Congress, but additional contextual information would provide decision
makers a more complete picture of DOD’s readiness. Over time, based on
its own initiative and congressional requests, DOD has added
information to its reports, such as on operational plan assessments.
In its most recent report, DOD added narrative information detailing
the impact of readiness deficiencies on overall readiness and a
discussion of how the services’ budgets support their long-term
readiness goals. Federal internal control standards state that
decision makers need complete and relevant information to manage
risks, and GAO found several areas where DOD could provide Congress
with more comprehensive and understandable information if it added
some additional context to its reports. For example, in some
instances, the services report significant amounts of quantitative
data, but do not include information on benchmarks or goals that would
enable the reader to determine whether the data indicate a problem or
the extent of the problem. For example, the Marine Corps and Air Force
report mission capable rates for their specific equipment items, but
do not provide information on related goals, such as the percentage of
the inventory that should be kept at various capability levels. In
other instances, the services have not fully explained any connections
between the voluminous data they report on the required elements and
the information DOD provides in the report on unit and overall
readiness ratings. Without providing additional contextual
information, DOD’s quarterly reports may not provide clear information
necessary for congressional oversight and funding decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD analyze alternative sources of information
that could be used to meet the required reporting elements, issue
guidance on the type and amount of information to be included by each
service, and incorporate contextual information to improve the clarity
and usefulness of reported information. DOD generally agreed with the
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-678]. For more
information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD Addressed Most, but Not All, Required Elements in Its Recent
Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress:
DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Quarterly Readiness Reports to
Congress, but Additional Contextual Information Would Be Useful:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Section 482 Required Reporting Elements:
Figures:
Figure 1: Overview of Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress Inputs
and Format:
Figure 2: Overview of the Extent to Which DOD's Four Quarterly
Readiness Reports for the April 1, 2012 through March 31, 2013 Period
Addressed Section 482 Reporting Elements:
Abbreviation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
[End of section]
GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
July 26, 2013:
Congressional Committees:
Congressional and Department of Defense (DOD) officials need relevant,
accurate, and timely information on the readiness status of U.S.
forces to help them make decisions about the deployment and use of
military forces and related resource needs. As a result, the Congress
has enacted laws and DOD has instituted policies that require defense
organizations to collect, analyze, and report readiness information.
For example, section 482 of Title 10 of the United States Code
requires DOD to report quarterly to Congress on military readiness,
[Footnote 1] which DOD does in its Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress. DOD must report on 26 elements including each readiness
problem and deficiency, key indicators and other relevant information
related to these problems and deficiencies, and planned remedial
actions, as well as service-specific information in the areas of
personnel, training, and equipment such as historical and projected
personnel trends, training operations tempo, and equipment
availability.
The committee report accompanying a proposed bill for the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO
submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the types
of readiness information available to Congress and DOD decision makers
and on the reported readiness of U.S. forces.[Footnote 2] In May 2013,
GAO provided a classified report on the readiness trends of DOD forces
to the defense committees. For this report, we evaluated (1) the
extent to which DOD addressed required reporting elements in its
quarterly readiness reports to Congress, and (2) what additional
information, if any, could make the reports more useful.
For our first objective, we reviewed legislation governing DOD
readiness reporting, including section 482 of Title 10, and
interviewed DOD officials. We analyzed DOD's four most recent
quarterly readiness reports, which covered the period from April 1,
2012 through March 31, 2013, and compared the reported readiness
information in these reports to the Title 10 requirements to identify
any trends, gaps, or reporting inconsistencies.[Footnote 3] We also
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff Readiness
Division, and each of the military services to obtain additional
information and the officials' views of our assessments, as well as
obtain explanations for why certain items were not addressed or not
fully addressed.
For our second objective, we reviewed the types of readiness
information DOD uses internally to manage readiness contained in
documents such as the Joint Force Readiness Review and various service-
specific readiness products and compared their formatting and contents
to the four reports identified above. We reviewed the content of these
reports in the context of federal internal control standards, which
state that decision makers need complete and relevant information to
manage risks.[Footnote 4] We interviewed officials from the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint
Staff Readiness Division, and each of the military services to discuss
the procedures for submitting readiness information for inclusion in
the quarterly readiness reports and the process for compiling the full
report. We also identified adjustments DOD has made to its reports,
including changes the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness made in preparing the January through March
2013 report, and the underlying reasons for these adjustments, as well
as obtained the views of officials as to opportunities to improve the
current reporting.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 through July 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology can be found in
appendix 1.
Background:
Section 482 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires DOD to
report quarterly to Congress on military readiness.[Footnote 5] The
report is due to Congress not later than 45 days after the end of each
calendar-year quarter (i.e. by May 15th, August 14th, November 14th,
and February 14th of each year). Congress first mandated the report in
1996 to enhance its oversight of military readiness, requiring that
DOD describe each readiness problem and deficiency, the key indicators
and other relevant information related to these problems and
deficiencies, and planned remedial actions.[Footnote 6] DOD submitted
its first quarterly report in May 1996. Since that time, Congress has
added additional reporting requirements. Specifically, in 1997, the
initial reporting requirement was expanded to require DOD to include
additional reporting elements in the quarterly reports.[Footnote 7]
Examples of these additional reporting elements include historical and
projected personnel trends, training operations tempo, and equipment
availability. In 2008, an additional reporting element was added to
require the inclusion of an assessment of the readiness of the
National Guard.[Footnote 8] For a listing of the 26 reporting elements
currently required by section 482, see table 1.
Table 1: Section 482 Required Reporting Elements:
Each readiness problem and deficiency identified using internal DOD
assessments.
Planned remedial actions to address readiness problems and
deficiencies.
Key indicators and other relevant information related to each
identified problem and deficiency.
Readiness of the National Guard to support the National Response Plan
in support of civil authorities.
Personnel status, including the extent to which personnel are in
positions outside of their specialty and/or above their grade.
Historical data and projected trends in personnel strength and status.
Recruit quality.
Borrowed manpower[A].
Personnel stability.
Personnel morale.
Recruiting status.
Training unit readiness and proficiency.
Training operations tempo.
Training funding.
Training commitments and deployments.
Deployed equipment.
Equipment availability.
Equipment that is not mission capable.
Age of equipment.
Condition of nonpacing items[B].
Maintenance backlog.
Availability of ordnance and spares.
Status of prepositioned equipment[C].
Overall readiness rating for units rated C-3 or below for the quarter
and each month of the quarter by unit designation and level of
organization.
Resource areas that adversely affected the readiness rating for units
rated C-3 or below.
Reasons why the unit received a readiness rating of C-3 or below.
Source: 10 U.S.C. § 482.
[A] While personnel can, at times, be temporarily diverted from the
normal duties of their assigned positions, DOD does not have a common
definition of borrowed manpower.
[B] According to DOD officials, there is no joint definition of
nonpacing item. The Army defines pacing items as major weapon systems,
aircraft, and other equipment items that are central to the
organization's ability to perform its core functions/designed
capabilities.
[C] DOD positions materiel and equipment at strategic locations around
the world to enable it to field combat-ready forces in days rather
than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be moved from the
United States to the location of a military conflict.
[End of table]
Since DOD provided its first quarterly readiness report in May 1996,
DOD and the services have invested significant resources in upgrading
the systems they use to collect and report readiness information. As a
result, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, and the services have added numerous new readiness
reporting capabilities such as the capacity to assess the ability of
U.S. forces to meet mission requirements in specific operational
plans. In addition, the services have also refined their respective
service-specific metrics to enhance their ability to measure the
readiness of their forces.
The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress is a classified report that
includes a summary of the contents of the report and multiple
classified annexes that provide the required information. The report
is typically hundreds of pages long. For example, the July through
September 2012 Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress totaled 443
pages and the January through March 2013 report is 497 pages long. The
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
assembles and produces the quarterly report to Congress. To do so, it
compiles information from multiple DOD organizations, including the
Joint Staff and military services, and its own information such as a
summary of overall readiness status and prepares a draft report. It
then sends the draft report to DOD components to review it for
accuracy, and coordinates any comments. Once finalized, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness officials
provide the report to the congressional defense committees (see figure
1).
Figure 1: Overview of Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress Inputs
and Format:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Services submit detailed readiness charts and data;
Joint Staff submits summary of Joint Force Readiness Review[A];
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics submits cannibalization rates[B].
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
compiles submissions, adds additional information, such as summary
readiness narrative, and delivers to Congress after vetting with
components.
Congress receives:
Classified Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress:
* summary of contents;
* multiple annexes with detailed personnel, training, and equipment
and other readiness data.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; DOD (seals).
[A] Section 117 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires that
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a quarterly joint
readiness review to assess the capability of the armed forces to
execute their wartime missions based upon their posture at the time
the review is conducted. This review is prepared by the Joint Staff.
[B] Cannibalization is defined as removing serviceable parts from one
piece of equipment and installing them in another.
[End of figure]
We have previously examined the extent to which DOD's quarterly
readiness reports met section 482 reporting elements, and found that
DOD's reports lacked detail, or in some cases, information required by
law. For example:
* In 1998, we reported that DOD's quarterly readiness reports did not
discuss the precise nature of identified readiness deficiencies, and:
* information on planned remedial actions could be more complete and
detailed to include specifics on timelines and funding requirements.
[Footnote 9]
* In 2003, we reported that DOD's quarterly reports still contained
broad statements of readiness issues and remedial actions, which were
not supported by detailed examples. We also identified gaps in the
extent to which DOD addressed the required reporting elements. For
example, DOD was not reporting on borrowed manpower, personnel morale,
and training funding.[Footnote 10]
In both reports, we recommended actions DOD could take to improve its
readiness reporting. Since our 2003 review, DOD has made adjustments
and expanded its readiness reporting to Congress in some areas.
DOD Addressed Most, but Not All, Required Elements in Its Recent
Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress:
In its quarterly readiness reports that covered the period from April
2012 through March 2013, DOD addressed most of the 26 reporting
elements required by section 482 but partially addressed some elements
and did not address some other elements. We found that, for the areas
that were addressed or partially addressed, the services submitted
different amounts and types of information because the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has not provided guidance on the information to
be included in the quarterly reports. Further, we found that
information may exist in the department on some of the reporting
elements DOD did not address, but that DOD has not analyzed
alternative information that it could provide to meet the required
reporting elements.
DOD Addressed Most but Not All Required Reporting Elements in Its
Readiness Reports for the April 2012 through March 2013 Period:
DOD's four quarterly readiness reports that cover the period from
April 1, 2012 through March 31, 2013 mostly addressed the 26 required
reporting elements. In analyzing the three reports that covered the
period from April 1 through December 31, 2012, we found that DOD
addressed 17 elements, partially addressed 3 elements, and did not
address 6 elements. In the January 1 through March 31, 2013 report,
DOD's reporting remained the same except that it addressed an
additional element that had not previously been addressed. As a
result, our analysis for this report showed it addressed 18 elements,
partially addressed 3 elements and did not address 5 elements. Figure
2 summarizes our assessment of the extent to which DOD's quarterly
reports addressed the section 482 reporting elements.
Figure 2: Overview of the Extent to Which DOD's Four Quarterly
Readiness Reports for the April 1, 2012 through March 31, 2013 Period
Addressed Section 482 Reporting Elements:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
DOD-wide:
Each readiness problem and deficiency identified using internal DOD
assessments: Addressed.
Planned remedial actions: Addressed in the January through March 2013
report but not addressed in earlier reports.
Key indicators and other relevant information related to each
identified problem and deficiency: Addressed.
Readiness of the National Guard to support the National Response Plan
in support of civil authorities: Addressed.
Service specific:
Personnel:
Extent that personnel are in positions outside of their specialty
and/or above their grade:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Not addressed;
Navy: Not addressed.
Historical data and projected trends in personnel strength and status:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Recruit quality:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Borrowed manpower:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Not addressed;
Navy: Not addressed.
Personnel stability:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Personnel morale:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Not addressed;
Navy: Not addressed.
Recruiting status:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Training:
Training unit readiness and proficiency:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Training operations tempo:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Training funding:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Not addressed;
Navy: Not addressed.
Training commitments and deployments:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Logistics:
Deployed equipment:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Not addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Equipment availability:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Equipment that is not mission capable:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Age of equipment:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Condition of nonpacing items:
Army: Not addressed;
Air Force: Not addressed;
Marine Corps: Not addressed;
Navy: Not addressed.
Maintenance backlog:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Availability of ordnance and spares:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Status of prepositioned equipment:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Units below C-3[A]:
Overall readiness rating for the unit for the quarter and each month
of the quarter:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Resource areas that adversely affected the unit’s readiness rating:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
Reasons why the unit received a readiness rating of C-3 or below:
Army: Addressed;
Air Force: Addressed;
Marine Corps: Addressed;
Navy: Addressed.
[A] Units report an overall readiness category level (C-level) that
reflects their current status of resources (personnel and equipment)
and training versus requirements for wartime missions the units are
designed to perform. A unit reporting C-3 possesses the required
resources and is trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of
the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed and would
require significant compensation for deficiencies. A unit reporting C-
4 requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime
mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its
wartime mission(s) with resources on hand.
[End of figure]
We assessed elements as being addressed when the information provided
in the report was relevant to the reporting elements set out in
section 482. For example, for training unit readiness and proficiency,
each of the services provided their current and historical training
readiness ratings. Similarly, for recruit quality, each of the
services provided high school graduation rates of recruits.
In Addressing Some Reporting Elements, DOD Reported Incomplete or
Inconsistent Information:
For some of the elements, DOD reported information that was incomplete
or inconsistent across the services. Specifically, as shown below, for
the three required reporting elements that DOD partially addressed,
the information was incomplete, with only some services providing
information on personnel stability, training operations tempo, and
deployed equipment:
* Personnel stability: The Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy provided
information on retention rates, but the Army did not provide any
information on this element.
* Training operations tempo: The Marine Corps and Navy provided
information on the pace of training operations, but the Army and Air
Force did not provide any information on this element.
* Deployed equipment: The Navy provided information on the number of
ships deployed, but the other three services did not provide any
information on this element.
Further, in instances when the services reported information on a
required element, they sometimes did so inconsistently, with varying
amounts and types of information. For example:
* The Air Force and Marine Corps both reported information on the age
of certain equipment items, but they did not report the same amount
and type of information. The Air Force reported the average age of
equipment by broad types of aircraft (e.g., fighters, bombers), while
the Marine Corps reported average age of specific aircraft (e.g., F/A-
18, MV-22), as well as the age of its oldest equipment on hand,
expected service life, and any impact of recapitalization initiatives
on extending the expected service life of the equipment.
* The services all reported information on training commitments and
deployments, but did not report the same amounts and types of
information. First, the services used different timeframes when
providing information on training commitments and deployments. The
Army provided planned training events for fiscal years 2012 through
2018, the Air Force and Marine Corps provided planned training events
for fiscal years 2012 through 2014, and the Navy did not provide any
information on planned training events in the future. Second, the Air
Force and the Navy provided information on the number of training
events executed over the past two years, while the Army and Marine
Corps did not.
We found that the services have submitted different amounts and types
of information to meet reporting elements because the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has not provided guidance on the information to
be included in the quarterly reports. Service officials told us they
have received informal feedback from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense regarding the data and charts they submit for inclusion in the
quarterly readiness reports. For example, they have received informal
suggestions for changes to how the readiness information is presented.
However, service officials explained that they have not received clear
guidance or instructions on the type and amount of information to
present. As a result, the services have used their own judgment on the
scope and content of readiness information they provide to meet the
required reporting elements.
Because the services report different types and amounts of information
and DOD has not clarified what information should be reported to best
address the required elements, the users of the report may not be
getting a complete or consistent picture of the key indicators that
relate to certain elements.
DOD Did Not Report on Some Elements, Although Relevant Information May
Be Available:
For its three quarterly readiness reports that covered the period from
April 1 through December 31, 2012, DOD did not provide any information
on 6 of the 26 required elements, although in its January through
March 2013 report DOD did provide information on 1 previously
unaddressed element, specifically planned remedial actions. The
required elements that remain unaddressed are personnel serving
outside their specialty or grade, personnel morale, training funding,
borrowed manpower, and the condition of nonpacing items. We found
instances where information may exist within the department for some
of these elements DOD did not report on. For example:
* Extent to which personnel are serving in positions outside their
specialty or grade: The Navy internally reports fit and fill rates,
which compare personnel available by pay grade and Navy skill code
against the positions that need to be filled. Such information could
potentially provide insight into the extent to which the Navy fills
positions using personnel outside of their specialty or grade.
* Personnel morale: We found multiple data sources that provide
information related to this required reporting element. For example,
DOD's Defense Manpower Data Center conducts a series of Web-based
surveys called Status of Forces surveys, which include measures of job
satisfaction, retention decision factors, and perceived readiness.
Also, DOD's Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Customer Satisfaction
Surveys regularly provide information on retention decision
indicators. Finally, the Office of Personnel Management conducts a
regular survey on federal employees' perceptions of their agencies
called the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey; the results of this
survey are summarized in an Office of Personnel Management report, and
provide insights into overall job satisfaction and morale at the
department level.
* Training funding: DOD's fiscal year 2014 budget request contained
various types of information on training funding. For example, the
request includes funding for recruit training, specialized skills
training, and training support in the Marine Corps and similar
information for the other services.
* Borrowed manpower: We found that the Army now requires commanders to
report on the readiness impacts of borrowed military manpower in
internal monthly readiness reports. Specifically, on a quarterly
basis, beginning no later than June 15, 2013, senior leaders will
brief the Secretary of the Army on borrowed manpower with a focus on
training and readiness impacts.[Footnote 11]
For the condition of nonpacing items element, officials from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
noted that there is not a joint definition of nonpacing items across
the services. The Army defines pacing items as major weapon systems,
aircraft, and other equipment items that are central to the
organization's ability to perform its core functions/designed
capabilities, but service officials reported that they do not collect
any information related to nonpacing items.
As noted previously, section 482 requires that DOD address all 26
reporting elements in its quarterly readiness reports to Congress.
When asked why DOD did not provide information on certain required
reporting elements, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness cited an analysis included in
the implementation plan for its readiness report to Congress in 1998.
This analysis concluded that DOD could not provide the required data
at that time because, among other reasons, they lacked the metrics to
capture the required data.[Footnote 12] In the 1998 implementation
plan, DOD noted that addressing the section 482 reporting elements was
an iterative process, recognizing that the type and quality of
readiness information was likely to evolve over time as improvements
to DOD's readiness reporting and assessment systems came to fruition.
DOD stated that it intended to continue to review and update or modify
the readiness information as necessary to improve the report's utility
in displaying readiness. However, since it issued its initial
implementation plan, DOD has not analyzed alternative information,
such as Navy fit and fill rates or satisfaction survey results, which
it could provide to meet the required reporting elements. DOD
officials told us they intend to review the required reporting
elements to determine the extent to which they can address some of the
elements that they have consistently not reported on and, if they
still cannot address the elements, to possibly request congressional
modifications on the required content of the reports. However, they
said that they had not yet begun or set a specific timetable for this
review. Without analyzing alternative information it could provide to
meet the required reporting elements, DOD risks continuing to provide
incomplete information to Congress, which could hamper its oversight
of DOD readiness.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Quarterly Readiness Reports to
Congress, but Additional Contextual Information Would Be Useful:
DOD has taken steps to improve the information in its Quarterly
Readiness Reports to Congress over time. However, we found several
areas where additional contextual information, such as benchmarks or
goals, and clear linkages between reported information and readiness
ratings, would provide decision makers a more complete picture of
DOD's readiness.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Add Information to Its Quarterly Readiness
Reports to Congress:
Over time, based on its own initiative and specific congressional
requests for information, DOD has added information to its reports.
For example, in 2001, it added data on cannibalizations--specifically
the rates at which the services are removing serviceable parts from
one piece of equipment and installing them in another. This
information was added in response to a requirement in the 2001
National Defense Authorization Act that the readiness reporting system
measure "cannibalization of parts, supplies, and equipment."[Footnote
13] In 2006, DOD added capability-based assessment data from the
Defense Readiness Reporting System and detailed information on
operational plan assessments. Operational plan assessments gauge
combatant commands' ability to successfully execute key plans and
provide insight into the impact of sourcing and logistics shortfalls
and readiness deficiencies on military risk. In 2009, it added brigade
and regimental combat team deployment information.
In compiling its January through March 2013 Quarterly Readiness Report
to Congress, DOD made several structural changes to expand its
reporting on overall readiness. Specifically, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense added narrative information and other sections,
and made more explicit linkages between resource needs and readiness
deficiencies in order to convey a clearer picture of the department's
readiness status and concerns. In that report, DOD added:
* Narrative information detailing the impact of readiness deficiencies
on overall readiness.
* Discussions of how the military services' fiscal year 2014 budgets
support their long-term readiness goals.
* Examples of remedial actions to improve service readiness.
* A section highlighting significant changes from the previous quarter.
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that they plan to
sustain these changes in future quarterly readiness reports to
Congress.
Additional Contextual Information in the Quarterly Reports Would Be
Useful:
We found several areas where adding contextual information to the
quarterly readiness reports, such as benchmarks or goals, and clearer
linkages between reported information and readiness ratings, would
provide Congress with a more comprehensive and understandable report.
Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need
complete and relevant information to manage risks.[Footnote 14] This
includes providing pertinent information that is identified and
distributed in an understandable form.
In some instances, the services report significant amounts of
quantitative data, but do not always include information on benchmarks
or goals that would enable the reader to distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable levels in the data reported. For example,
when responding to the required reporting element on equipment that is
not mission capable:
* The Marine Corps and Air Force report mission capable rates for all
of their equipment, but do not provide information on related goals,
such as the percentage of each item's inventory that should be kept at
various mission capability levels.
* The Navy reports on the number of ships that are operating with a
mechanical or systems failure. While the Navy explains that this may
or may not impact the mission capability of the vessel, it does not
provide what it considers an acceptable benchmark for the number of
ships that operate with these failures or the number of failures on
each ship.
In the absence of benchmarks or goals, the reader cannot assess the
significance of any reported information because it is not clear
whether the data indicate a problem or the extent of the problem.
In other instances, the services have not fully explained the
voluminous data presented on the required reporting elements or set
the context for how it may or may not be connected to the information
DOD provides in the report on unit equipment, training, and personnel
readiness ratings and overall readiness. For example:
* The services provide detailed mission capable rate charts and
supporting data for dozens of aircraft, ground equipment, and other
weapons systems. For example, for the January through March 2013
readiness report, the services collectively provided 130 pages of
charts, data, and other information on their mission capable equipment
rates; this accounted for over 25 percent of the entire quarterly
report. However, the services do not explain the extent to which these
mission capable rates are, or are not, linked to equipment readiness
ratings or overall readiness that is also presented in the quarterly
reports.
* In the area of training, the Navy provides data showing the number
of training exercises completed over the past two years, but does not
provide any explanation regarding how this information affects
training readiness ratings that are also presented in the quarterly
reports.
* In the area of logistics, although the Army and the Air Force
provide depot maintenance backlogs, they do not explain the effect the
backlogs have on unit readiness that is also discussed in the report.
Specifically, those services do not explain whether units' readiness
is affected or could be affected in the future because maintenance was
not accomplished when needed.
Without providing additional contextual information, such as
benchmarks and clearer linkages, it is unclear how, if at all, the
various data on the required elements affected unit and overall
readiness.
Conclusions:
To oversee DOD's efforts to maintain a trained and ready force, and
make decisions about related resource needs, congressional decision
makers need relevant, accurate, and timely readiness information on
the status of the military forces. DOD continues to address many of
the required reporting elements in its quarterly readiness reports to
Congress and has periodically revised the content of the information
it presents, which is an important step to making the reports more
useful. However, as reflected in its more recent reports for 2012 and
2013, DOD has not always reported or fully reported on some elements,
and sometimes presents detailed readiness data without sufficient
context on how this information relates to or affects the information
it provides on overall readiness or readiness in specific resource
areas, such as equipment, personnel, and training. Without further
analyzing whether information is available within the department to
address the elements that it is not currently addressing, DOD cannot
be sure that it has the information it needs to enhance the quality of
its reporting or present options to the Congress for adjusting
reporting requirements. Furthermore, unless DOD provides guidance to
the services on the amount and types of information to be included in
the quarterly reports, including requirements to provide contextual
information such as criteria or benchmarks for distinguishing between
acceptable and unacceptable levels in the data reported, DOD is likely
to continue to be limited in its ability to provide Congress with
complete, consistent, and useful information.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the information available to Congress in its quarterly
readiness reports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to take the following three actions:
* Analyze alternative sources of information within DOD that it could
provide to meet required reporting elements that DOD has not addressed
in past reports;
* Issue guidance to the services on the type and amount of information
to be included in their submissions for the quarterly readiness
report; and:
* Incorporate contextual information in the quarterly readiness
reports such as clear linkages between reported information on the
required elements and readiness ratings, and benchmarks for assessing
provided data to enable the reader to distinguish between acceptable
and unacceptable levels in the data reported.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two
recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. DOD's
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD provided
technical comments during the course of the engagement, and these were
incorporated as appropriate.
In its overall comments, DOD noted that the goal of DOD is to provide
the most accurate and factual representation of readiness to Congress
through its quarterly reports and their ability to accomplish this
relies upon our recommendations, which should facilitate improvements.
DOD stated that our recommendations will be incorporated in the
ongoing process of producing the quarterly readiness reports and will
hopefully improve the ability to interpret the product while assisting
the services in relaying their readiness concerns.
DOD also provided detailed comments on each of our recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to analyze alternative sources of information
within DOD that it could provide to meet required reporting elements
that DOD has not addressed in past reports. DOD stated the iterative
process that is used to improve quarterly readiness reports to
Congress will continue to seek alternative sources of information that
could provide a more holistic picture of readiness across the force
and that improvements in reporting capabilities and adjustments to
reported readiness information should be available to provide all of
the information required by section 482 of Title 10. DOD noted that it
provides information on one required element, training funding, within
its annual budget requests. DOD stated it will investigate ways to
incorporate surrogate methods of reporting in future reports.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to issue guidance to the services on the type and amount of
information to be included in their submissions for the quarterly
readiness report. DOD stated that it will continue to issue guidance
to the individual services regarding types and amounts of information
that may improve the readiness analysis and advance the comparative
nature of separate services. DOD stated that the individual services
may use distinct measures to determine specific levels of their
readiness and the ability to compare these measures may not be
possible or occur quarterly. Where feasible, DoD stated it will
continue to attempt to align information and improve the clarity of
readiness throughout the department.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to incorporate contextual information in the quarterly
readiness reports such as clear linkages between reported information
on the required elements and readiness ratings, and benchmarks for
assessing provided data to enable the reader to distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable levels in the data reported. DOD stated
that a concerted effort is made to continuously improve the quality of
analysis as well as assist with the explanation of linkages between
raw data and readiness. DOD stated that this effort is tempered with
the need to reduce the volume of information and provide sound
examination of the effects of this data on the force. DOD noted a
succinct version of readiness is provided in the executive summary
included in recent reports. DOD also noted that a longer narrative
supplement will continue to be provided in an attempt to enhance the
clarity of the linkages and judgment of acceptability regarding the
reported readiness across the force.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Secretary
of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and appropriate
congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable James Inhofe:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dick Durbin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Pete Visclosky:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)
addressed required reporting elements in its quarterly readiness
reports to Congress, we reviewed legislation governing DOD readiness
reporting, including provisions in Title 10, and interviewed DOD
officials. We analyzed the four most recent Quarterly Readiness
Reports to Congress that covered the period from April 1, 2012 through
March 31, 2013 and compared the reported readiness information in
these reports to the Title 10 requirements to identify any trends,
gaps, or reporting inconsistencies.[Footnote 15] Specifically, we
developed an evaluation tool based on Title 10 section 482 reporting
requirements to assess the extent to which the April through June
2012, July through September 2012, October through December 2012, and
January through March 2013 Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress
addressed these elements. Using scorecard methodologies, two GAO
analysts independently evaluated the quarterly readiness reports
against the elements specified in section 482. The analysts rated
compliance for each element as "addressed" or "not addressed." After
the two analysts completed their independent analyses, they compared
the two sets of observations and discussed and reconciled any
differences. We also interviewed officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint
Staff Readiness Division, and each of the military services and
obtained additional information and the officials' views of our
assessments, as well as explanations of why certain items were not
addressed or not fully addressed.
To determine what additional information, if any, could make the
reports more useful, we reviewed the types of readiness information
DOD uses internally to manage readiness contained in documents such as
the Joint Force Readiness Review and various service-specific
readiness products, and compared their formatting and contents to the
four reports identified above. We reviewed the content of these
reports in the context of federal internal control standards, which
state that decision makers need complete and relevant information to
manage risks.[Footnote 16] This includes pertinent information that is
identified and distributed in an understandable form. We interviewed
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff Readiness Division, and each
of the military services and discussed the procedures for compiling
and submitting readiness information for inclusion in the quarterly
readiness reports, changes in the reports over time, and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense's process for compiling the full report. We
also identified adjustments DOD has made to its reports, including
changes the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness made in preparing the January through March 2013 report, and
the underlying reasons for these adjustments, as well as obtained the
views of officials as to opportunities to improve the current
reporting.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 through July 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Readiness and Force Management:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
July 15, 2013:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 22548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-13678, 'Military Readiness: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Completeness and Usefulness of Quarterly Reports to Congress,' dated
June 19, 2013 (GAO Code 351821).
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. It is
the goal of DoD to provide the most accurate and factual
representation of readiness to Congress through its quarterly reports.
The ability to accomplish this relies upon these GAO recommendations
which should facilitate improvements. The recommendations will be
incorporated in the ongoing process of producing these reports and
will hopefully improve the ability to interpret the product while
assisting the Services in relaying their readiness concerns.
Enclosed is the Department's position on GAO recommendations. If
questions should arise, please have your action officers contact Lt
Col Gregory Keeton at (703) 693-0006.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Laura J. Junor:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Readiness:
Attachment: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated June 19, 2013:
GAO-13-678 (GAO Code 351821):
"Military Readiness: Opportunities Exist To Improve Completeness And
Usefulness Of Quarterly Reports To Congress"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: To improve the information available to Congress in
its quarterly readiness reports, GAO recommends that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to take the following action:
Analyze alternative sources of information within DoD that it could
provide to meet required reporting elements that DoD has not addressed
in past reports.
DoD Response: Partially concur. The iterative process that is used to
improve quarterly readiness reports to Congress will continue to seek
alternative sources of information that could provide a more holistic
picture of readiness across the force. Improvements in reporting
capabilities and adjustments to reported readiness information should
be available to provide all of the information required by section 482
of Title 10. However, the Training Funding reporting element is
included in the annual Presidential Budget. DoD will investigate ways
to incorporate surrogate methods of reporting in future reports.
Recommendation 2: To improve the information available to Congress in
its quarterly readiness reports, GAO recommends that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to take the following action:
Issue guidance to the services on the type and amount of information
to be included in their submissions for the quarterly readiness report.
DoD Response: Concur. DoD will continue to issue guidance to the
individual services regarding types and amounts of information that
may improve the readiness analysis and advance the comparative nature
of separate services. The individual services may use distinct
measures to determine specific levels of their readiness and the
ability to compare these measures may not be possible or occur
quarterly. Where feasible, DoD will continue to attempt to align
information and improve the clarity of readiness throughout the
department.
Recommendation 3: To improve the information available to Congress in
its quarterly readiness reports, GAO recommends that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to take the following action:
Incorporate contextual information in the quarterly readiness reports
such as clear linkages between reported information on the required
elements and readiness ratings, and benchmarks for assessing provided
data to enable the reader to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable levels in the data reported.
DoD Response: Concur. A concerted effort is made to continuously
improve the quality of analysis as well as assist with the explanation
of linkages between raw data and readiness. This is tempered with the
need to reduce the volume of information and provide sound examination
of the effects of this data on the force. By providing an executive
summary in recent reports, a succinct version of readiness is
provided. A longer, narrative supplement will continue to be provided
in an attempt to enhance the clarity of the linkages and judgment of
acceptability regarding the reported readiness across the force.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant
Director; Richard Burkard; Randy Neice; Amie Steele; Shana Wallace;
Chris Watson; and Erik Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] 10 U.S.C. § 482.
[2] H.R. Rep. No. 112-479, at 128 (2012).
[3] At the time of our review, DOD had compiled the report covering
January to March 2013 and expected to provide it to Congress by the
end of July 2013. DOD officials stated that the content and structure
of this draft report provided a valid basis for our assessment.
[4] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[5] 10 U.S.C. § 482.
[6] Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 361 (1996).
[7] Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 322 (1997).
[8] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 351 (2008).
[9] GAO, Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details
on Deficiencies and Solutions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-68] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
30, 1998).
[10] GAO, Military Readiness: New Reporting System is Intended to
Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning is Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-456] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 28, 2003).
[11] Secretary of the Army, Memorandum on Special Duty (Borrowed
Military Manpower and Troop Diversion), Temporary Suspension of
Certain Army Policy Constraints and Temporary Delegation of Certain
Exception and Other Approval Authorities. Mar. 11, 2013.
[12] Department of Defense, Expanded Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress Implementation Plan. Feb. 17, 1998.
[13] Pub. L. 106-398, § 1 [Div. A. Title III, § 371], 2000 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 117(c)).
[14] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[15] At the time of our review, DOD had compiled the report covering
January to March 2013 and expected to provide it to Congress by the
end of July 2013. DOD officials stated that the content and structure
of this draft report provided a valid basis for our assessment.
[16] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[End of section]
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