MI5, Camp Delta, and the story that shames Britain

The IndependentBy George B. MickumMarch 16, 2006

Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna are among eight British residents who
remain prisoners at the U.S. Naval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
They are jailed because British officials rendered them into the hands
of the CIA in Africa, a fact that may explain why the British
government refuses to intercede on their behalf. Bisher and Jamil have
been wrongfully imprisoned now for more than three years. This is the
story of their betrayal by the British government and their appalling
treatment at the hands of the CIA and the U.S. military.

The author, a partner with Washington law firm Keller and Hackman,
represents Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna. This exclusive report is
compiled from conversations with his two clients, their declassified letters
and declassified legal responses, and information provided by the US
Military

Several weeks after 11 September 2001, two MI5 agents arrived at Bisher
al-Rawi's family home to recruit him to work for British Intelligence. The
visit was part of an effort to recruit scores of individuals from London's
Muslim community for reconnaissance work and to assist the war on terror.

ABU QATADA

In particular, MI5 sought contacts with some of the Muslim clerics preaching
in London. Mr al-Rawi was a perfect candidate, educated, fluent in English,
and a friend of a Muslim cleric named Abu Qatada. The agents presented
identification, introducing themselves to Mr al-Rawi as "Alex" and
"Matt". However, they are the same names the agents used
throughout the Muslim community in London.

The agents asked Mr al-Rawi wide-ranging questions, which he answered
candidly. At the end of the meeting, they asked if would agree to speak to
them again.

Two more meetings took place at Mr al-Rawi's family home in London. At the
agents' suggestion, Mr al-Rawi started meeting them at a coffee shop in
Victoria station. Shortly after, the agents asked Mr al-Rawi to work for MI5
on a more formal basis. He agreed. Over the next nine months, meetings took
place in hotel rooms in and around London.

Throughout Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5, his agents pressured him to
accept payment for his services. He refused all such overtures. The only
thing Mr al-Rawi , 38, who is Iraqi born, ever accepted from MI5 was a
mobile telephone. He took it to put an end to the agents' demand for him to
be contactable.

As his work with MI5 continued, Mr al-Rawi became increasingly alarmed about
his relationship with MI5 and his potential exposure. Eventually, he sought
assurances from Matt and Alex that his work as an intermediary between MI5
and Abu Qatada would not get him into trouble. Ultimately, he requested a
meeting with MI5 and a private attorney, suggesting the human rights lawyer
Gareth Peirce. MI5 refused.

To assuage his concerns and convince him to continue working for MI5, the
agents set up the first of two meetings with an MI5 lawyer whom they called "
Simon". Alex and Matt were present at both meetings. Simon introduced
himself to Mr al-Rawi as a lawyer with MI5. He conceded that Simon was not
his real name. Simon assured Mr al-Rawi he was running no risk by working
with MI5 and that MI5 and Simon himself would come to his aid if Mr al-Rawi
found himself compromised. Simon told him that all he needed to do was
record the date and time of his conversations with Simon, and MI5 would be
able to identify and locate Simon. Mr al-Rawi's refusal to insist on a
meeting with a private attorney would have devastating consequences.

Abu Qatada was completely aware of Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5. Mr
al-Rawi carried questions and answers between the parties, served as a
translator, and participated in negotiations with Abu Qatada. "All I
did in Britain was try to help with steps necessary to get a meeting between
Abu Qatada and MI5. I was trying to bring them together. MI5 would give me
messages to take to Abu Qatada, and Abu Qatada would give me messages to
take back to them."

It was during this time that Mr al-Rawi's good friend, Jamil el-Banna, a
Jordanian British resident, became involved. While the British Government
was publicly asserting that Abu Qatada's whereabouts were unknown, Abu
Qatada was actively engaged in a dialogue with British officials that
involved Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna. Mr al-Rawi asked Mr el-Banna to drive
Abu Qatada's wife and son to meet Abu Qatada in London. Mr el-Banna followed
Mr al-Rawi, who led the way on his motorcycle. When Abu Qatada was arrested,
Mr el-Banna taxied his wife and child home at the request of the British
officials on the scene. Mr el-Banna never was arrested: the police thanked
him for his assistance. He was never even questioned because everyone was
aware of his limited involvement. Based on this involvement, he has been
tortured and jailed for three years.

ARREST IN GAMBIA

Mr al-Rawi then turned his energy to his brother Wahab's long-planned mobile
peanut oil factory, a project in Gambia.

Gambian authorities detained Mr al-Rawi, Mr el-Banna and their friends
immediately after the group landed in Africa. Indeed, shortly after the
arrest, Gambian authorities told the arrested group that the British had
told them to make the arrests.

There is no question that British officials rendered Mr al-Rawi and Mr
el-Banna into the hands of CIA officials in Africa in November of 2002.
During one of Mr el-Banna's more than 100 interrogation sessions, his
interrogator told him his adopted country had betrayed him

A British citizen, Abdullah El Janoudi, who accompanied Mr al-Rawi and Mr
el-Banna to Gambia, confirms that a large American by the name of Lee told
him British officials had the group arrested. He also confirms that during
the interrogations that took place every two days, the CIA continued to
press for incriminating evidence about Abu Qatada that linked him with
al-Qa'ida.

In Africa, the CIA had a complete file on Mr al-Rawi that included his
hobbies, information that can only have come from British Intelligence. Mr
al-Rawi states that "from the very beginning in the Gambia the CIA
said, 'The British told us that one of you was helping MI5.' By the second
day in the Gambia, they [the CIA] were asking me to work for the US in
Britain. I said I would not."

AFGHANISTAN

Although Mr al-Rawi's brother Wahab and another friend were released after a
month and returned to England, Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were rendered at
the end of 2002 in a CIA Gulfstream jet, one of a fleet of jets used by the
CIA in its "extraordinary rendition" programme, in which the US
transports victims to foreign countries for the express purpose of torture.

Mr el-Banna's account of his arrest reads:

Detainee: "When they came and arrested and handcuffed me, they were
wearing all black. They even covered their heads ... They took me, covered
me, put me in a vehicle and sent me somewhere. I don't know. It was at
night. Then from there to the airport right away.

Tribunal president: An airport in Gambia?

Detainee: Yes. We were in a room like this with about eight men. All with
covered-up faces.

Tribunal president: Were you by yourself at that time?

Detainee: Yes. They cut off my clothes.

Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were taken to the notorious "dark prison"
in Kabul, Afghanistan. There, both men were imprisoned underground in
isolation and darkness and tortured over two weeks. They were held in leg
shackles 24 hours a day. They were starved, beaten, dragged along floors
while shackled, and kicked. Round-the-clock screams from fellow prisoners
made sleep impossible.

Subsequently, they were transferred to the US Air Force base at Bagram,
Afghanistan. Although they were chained hand and foot and hooded, while
waiting to be transported, their captors beat them. Mr el-Banna, in
particular, was beaten repeatedly.

In Bagram, they were imprisoned and tortured for another two months. They
were beaten, starved, and sleep deprived. What is particularly noteworthy is
the fact that the only information the interrogators were interested in was
information about Abu Qatada. Over the years, CIA and military interrogators
have repeatedly attempted to suborn testimony from both men, linking Abu
Qatada to al-Qa'ida. Mr el-Banna has repeatedly refused offers of freedom,
money, and passports in exchange for false testimony.

GUANTANAMO BAY

Ultimately, both men were transported to Guantanamo, a trip so harrowing
that a government informer, who was posing as a prisoner and had to be
transported and treated the same as other prisoners, stated in a television
interview that, at the time, he wished someone would shoot him. Forced to
wear darkened goggles, face-masks and earphones, chained at the ankles,
handcuffed behind their backs with thin plastic that caused incredible pain,
and, in some cases, lasting damage, starving and sick prisoners who had been
deprived of sleep were forced to maintain a sitting position, legs forward
and chained without moving for nearly 24 hours.

If they moved they were beaten, kicked, hit with blunt objects. The
government informer lasted barely one month in the intolerable conditions in
Guantanamo before demanding freedom. During the first month at Guantanamo in
which both were kept in strict solitary confinement, the pair were
interrogated six hours per day and kept in the interrogation room for 14
hours per day, sometimes in freezing temperatures to induce hypothermia, one
of the many techniques approved for use by the Bush administration. In some
cases they were short-shackled, hands behind heels, for the entire time.

During his lengthy incarceration, Mr el-Banna has repeatedly asked his
interrogators to administer a polygraph test, but the military has refused.
However, the military's unwillingness to give him a lie detector deviates
from standard prison policy. Former interrogators at Guantanamo confirm that
a "passed" polygraph test is a prerequisite to be transferred to
Camp IV, the lowest security prison camp on the base.

Mr el-Banna is in Camp IV. Mr al-Rawi, who also is in Camp IV, had a
polygraph administered, but the military has refused to turn over the
results and there is no mention of it in records produced by the military.

Indeed, the military has taken great pains to prevent any exculpatory
information from creeping into the official records to ensure prisoners have
no chance to exonerate themselves. In Guantanamo, Mr al-Rawi has met perhaps
10 different CIA agents. One agent who went by the name "Elizabeth"
told him: "Don't think that leaving here will come without a price."
Mr al-Rawi said: "She asked me whether I would work with them, and I
said no. [She] suggested, 'How about working with MI5?'"

MI5 MEETINGS

Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5 did not end with his arrest. He has met
MI5 agents at Guantanamo on numerous occasions. He first met an MI5 agent in
the early autumn of 2003, fully shackled. After some perfunctory questions
and answers that confirmed his work with MI5, the agent offered him an
oblique, belated apology: "Sorry about all this." Several months
later, Alex, the MI5 agent with whom Mr al-Rawi worked in London,
interrogated him at Guantanamo. Among other things, Mr al-Rawi told Alex the
Americans wanted him to work for US intelligence.

In January 2004, Martin and Matt, the other two MI5 agents that Mr al-Rawi
worked with in London, met Mr al-Rawi in an interrogation room. During that
meeting, agents proposed that Mr al-Rawi return to working with MI5 upon his
release. He agreed. The following day, the agents told him it would take
them one to six months to get him home.

Former Guantanamo interrogators report that all prisoner interviews with
foreign intelligence officials are videotaped. The trial judge in charge of
both men's cases granted them motion to preserve that specific evidence
along with copious other evidence we have managed to identify.

REVIEW TRIBUNAL

I advised the men more than one month before I travelled to Guantanamo in
September 2004, advising them not to appear before the CSRT (Combatant
Status Review Tribunal) or participate in the process. My letters were not
delivered until after each had participated in his tribunal. I advised them
against participating, among other reasons because the tribunals were
permitted to rely on information obtained under torture. Both men were not
even permitted to review all the evidence against them, and thus had no
chance to defend themselves.

The following testimony from a CSRT proceeding demonstrates the Bush
administration's commitment to providing prisoners with meaningful due
process. In response to the charge "While living in Bosnia, the
detainee associated with a known al-Qa'ida operative" the following
colloquy, which could have been lifted from the pages of The Adventures of
Alice in Wonderland, took place:

Detainee: Give me his name.

President: I do not know.

Detainee: How can I respond to this?

President: Did you know of anybody who was a member ofal- Qa'ida?

Detainee: No, no.

President: I'm sorry, what was your response?

Detainee: No. If you tell me the name, I can respond and defend myself
against this accusation.

President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to respond to
what is on the classified summary.

Although both men never were anywhere near Afghanistan or Iraq, never were
involved in any wrongful activity, never possessed a weapon of any kind,
they were powerless to defend themselves against the charge that they had
associated with Abu Qatada, "a known al-Qa'ida operative", even
though Abu Qatada has never been charged with any crime or been shown to be
a member of or involved in al-Qa'ida. But, the full extent of both men's
betrayal by MI5 does not end here.

At the tribunal, Mr al-Rawi testified under oath about his relationship with
MI5 and his role as a liaison between MI5 and Abu Qatada. He informed the
tribunal that MI5 had expressly approved of his role: "During a meeting
with British Intelligence, I had asked if it was OK for me to continue to
have a relationship with Abu Qatada. They assured me it was."

Mr al-Rawi requested that the MI5 agents Alex, Matt, and Martin appear
before the tribunal to confirm his work with MI5 and Abu Qatada. Very much
out of character, the tribunal president recognised the obvious importance
of such testimony and "determined that these three witnesses were
relevant". He instructed the military prosecutor to make inquiries and
to determine whether the British Government would make the witnesses
available .

The British Government not only refused to allow the witnesses to appear, it
refused to confirm the accuracy of Mr al-Rawi's account, thereby ensuring
both men's fate and consigning them to indefinite imprisonment. The
following account is taken from Mr al-Rawi's CSRT:

President: Detainee has requested three witnesses who would testify that he
supported the British Intelligence Agency. We have contacted the British
Government and at this time, they are not willing to provide the tribunal
with that information. The witnesses are no longer considered reasonably
available, so I am going to deny the request for those three witnesses.

Later in the proceeding, the president issued the following clarification: "
The British Government didn't say they didn't have a relationship with you,
they just would not confirm or deny it. That means I only have your word."

Mr el-Banna's CSRT hearing was so procedurally defective that it would make
good farce were the result not so devastating. The only evidence considered
by the tribunal was that he drove Abu Qatada's wife and son to visit him
during the time British authorities were engaged in discussions with him. In
fact, his CSRT hearing was postponed and reconvened three times on 25
September, 28 September, 2 October and 9 October 2004 to allow the
military's prosecuting attorney to collect and present additional evidence
to the tribunal.

At the conclusion, Mr el-Banna's personal representative, a soldier and
non-lawyer who could be compelled under the CSRT rules to testify against
him courageously dissented from the tribunal's conclusion, including a
formal statement in the CSRT record: "The personal representative
states that the record is insufficient to prove that the detainee is an
enemy combatant."

Although Mr al-Rawi disclosed his involvement with MI5 during our first
meeting in 2004, he has been loath to go public with this information. But
there are few options left available to both men.

Congress voted to ban torture by an overwhelming majority in December 2005,
but President Bush signed the bill into law with a clarifying "signing
statement" that allows him to ignore it whenever he chooses. Of more
immediate concern is Congress's recent legislative reversal of the Supreme
Court's decision to allow prisoners at Guantanamo to file petitions for
habeas corpus . In response to the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act,
the US government moved quickly to dismiss all of the habeas cases filed by
prisoners at Guantanamo, including those filed by Mr al-Rawi and Mr
el-Banna.

NO RETURN

Neither man can return to the UK because their visas have expired. The
British Government adamantly refuses to reissue them visas or allow them to
return home on humanitarian grounds. If the cases are dismissed, the US
military intends to transfer Mr al-Rawi to Iraq and Mr el-Banna to Jordan.
There, each will be jailed with the host country's pro-American
acquiescence. Recent reconnaissance indicates the US government is
negotiating with foreign governments to jail prisoners from Guantanamo
indefinitely.

Why the British Government has treated these two men as it has, I cannot
say. What seems most likely is that they were simply expendable pawns in
Great Britain's and America's attempt to create a case against Abu Qatada

My security clearance allows me to review all of the classified evidence in
the cases, including all the evidence the tribunal relied upon to conclude
that Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were enemy combatants. There is no evidence
in the record, classified or unclassified, which supports the military's
determination that these are enemy combatants. None.