At Fanfest, KT got up on stage and talked about the teams problems in Late & Close situations, talking about having poor at bats, expanding the zone, etc. Go the 1:55 Mark of THIS VIDEO

Then of course Gibby made some comments which I discussed in THIS POST

In 2011 they had a .348 BABIP in L&C, vs. league avg .297. The next highest BABIP in L&C was .315

In 2012 they had a .239 BABIP in L&C, vs. league avg .297. The next lowest BABIP in L&C was .258

And while their 2012 K Rate of 24.5% was a little higher than lg. avg 22.8% in such situations, the number 1 & 2 teams in L&C OPS, the Reds and Brewers, both had K rates higher than lg. avg too. (Reds 23.9%, and Brewers 23.3%) And the D Backs 2011 L&C K Rate of 22.5% was higher than league average 21.3%!!

Making more contact, expanding the zone late in games was NOT THE ISSUE !

It's amazing to me that they built an entire series of off season moves based on completely misunderstanding what was happening, and thinking they could address it by getting Gritty clutch players. I know I shouldn't be surprised, but in this day and age, there should be somebodyin the front office pointing this out to them, no ????

What a terrible process.

_________________ Good depth often has to come from within, in the form of younger talent. Depth is hard to build overnight, but it’s easy to deplete. Jeff Sullivan

Here's another example of how terrible the Kevin Towers process is. Deciding that signing Cody Ross was the way to go because both KT and Kendrick wrote down Ross' name when asking themselves which remaining free agent player they'd like to sign.

At Fanfest, KT got up on stage and talked about the teams problems in Late & Close situations, talking about having poor at bats, expanding the zone, etc. Go the 1:55 Mark of THIS VIDEO

Then of course Gibby made some comments which I discussed in THIS POST

In 2011 they had a .348 BABIP in L&C, vs. league avg .297. The next highest BABIP in L&C was .315

In 2012 they had a .239 BABIP in L&C, vs. league avg .297. The next lowest BABIP in L&C was .258

And while their 2012 K Rate of 24.5% was a little higher than lg. avg 22.8% in such situations, the number 1 & 2 teams in L&C OPS, the Reds and Brewers, both had K rates higher than lg. avg too. (Reds 23.9%, and Brewers 23.3%) And the D Backs 2011 L&C K Rate of 22.5% was higher than league average 21.3%!!

Making more contact, expanding the zone late in games was NOT THE ISSUE !

It's amazing to me that they built an entire series of off season moves based on completely misunderstanding what was happening, and thinking they could address it by getting Gritty clutch players. I know I shouldn't be surprised, but in this day and age, there should be somebodyin the front office pointing this out to them, no ????

What a terrible process.

Do you think this is the process or coming up with a justification after they decided who they liked personally.

_________________"Having data available to you is great but using it is even better.”--Craig Breslow

At Fanfest, KT got up on stage and talked about the teams problems in Late & Close situations, talking about having poor at bats, expanding the zone, etc. Go the 1:55 Mark of THIS VIDEO

Then of course Gibby made some comments which I discussed in THIS POST

In 2011 they had a .348 BABIP in L&C, vs. league avg .297. The next highest BABIP in L&C was .315

In 2012 they had a .239 BABIP in L&C, vs. league avg .297. The next lowest BABIP in L&C was .258

And while their 2012 K Rate of 24.5% was a little higher than lg. avg 22.8% in such situations, the number 1 & 2 teams in L&C OPS, the Reds and Brewers, both had K rates higher than lg. avg too. (Reds 23.9%, and Brewers 23.3%) And the D Backs 2011 L&C K Rate of 22.5% was higher than league average 21.3%!!

Making more contact, expanding the zone late in games was NOT THE ISSUE !

It's amazing to me that they built an entire series of off season moves based on completely misunderstanding what was happening, and thinking they could address it by getting Gritty clutch players. I know I shouldn't be surprised, but in this day and age, there should be somebodyin the front office pointing this out to them, no ????

What a terrible process.

Do you think this is the process or coming up with a justification after they decided who they liked personally.

Could be either one, or more likely a bit of both.

Do you think it's better to be executed by a bullet to the head or lethal injection ?

_________________ Good depth often has to come from within, in the form of younger talent. Depth is hard to build overnight, but it’s easy to deplete. Jeff Sullivan

The irony is the expected regression to the mean in L&C situations means that the team should be better, not worse. They might be a team that finishes over .500 in 2013, and who knows...with the crazy wild cards these days, playoffs are not "out of reach"....(poll results notwithstanding

I'm thinking more of opportunity lost. This team could have been poised for a real nice run of division titles and playoff appearances.

Instead we got:

Trading Parker for Cahill instead of a Shortstop or Catcher.....therby forcing their hand with Montero's extension and moving Young and Bauer to get shortstops.

Spending a lot of money on "depth:" and league avg or below players when that money could have been directed at higher impact players more likely to be part of a championship team.

Selling low on Upton and giving up the chance for another high impact player.

etc etc etc etc

This is still potentially actually a pretty good team. But it could have been so much better.

_________________ Good depth often has to come from within, in the form of younger talent. Depth is hard to build overnight, but it’s easy to deplete. Jeff Sullivan

Yup...finished 6th out of 15 in Late and Close OPS, and had a .290 BABIP

Goldy went from a .198 BA and .551 OPS in 2012 to a .259 avg and .912 OPS in 2013

Justin Upton went from .176 BA .462 OPS in 2012 to a .270 BA and a .877 OPS in 2013 (By the way, Justin MUCH better than league avg for his career in this category)

Martin Prado went from a .280 BA .791 OPS in 2012 to a .250 BA and a .631 OPS in 2013

They talked so much about this Late and Close stuff after the this offseason, making me believe it was more than just justification for their moves, and they were SO wrong headed about it, because they don't understand sample size and random variance. They really think they can identify who is clutch and who isn't, and that was at least part of the basis of their moves, when in reality, they have NO ability to predict who will be good in Late and Close situations. None at all. Nobody does. Thats the point....so you don't make moves with that in mind. It's just wrong. There is no certain type of player that gives you an edge there.

Spray contact hitter Martin Prado CAREER in L&C is .264/.328/.386, while all or nothing strikeout prone slugger Justin Upton is .278/.356/.501

Just one of the many things Towers got wrong.

_________________ Good depth often has to come from within, in the form of younger talent. Depth is hard to build overnight, but it’s easy to deplete. Jeff Sullivan

Kevin Towers, the Diamondbacks’ general manager, had tried to rid his team of hitters prone to strikeouts. Over three off-seasons, he shed Young, Adam LaRoche, Mark Reynolds, Kelly Johnson (a new Yankee) and Justin Upton. The team’s strikeouts fell, but home run production all but disappeared.

Last season, the Diamondbacks hit only 130 home runs, the fewest in franchise history, despite the presence of Paul Goldschmidt, who tied for the league lead with 36. Only two Diamondbacks teams had ever scored fewer runs: the 1998 expansion team and the 2004 group that lost 111 games.

_________________“I don't like losing a ballgame any more than a salesman likes losing a sale.” ― Early Wynn

In the early 2010s, the rich lord of the S.S. Diamondback brought in a captain for their ship named Towers. He was an egregious man, and though he was thought to be a poor supplier prone to fits of hysteria, he had a reputation on the sea of being a shrewd importer/exporter. His resume was well tenured with a lengthy voyage on the S.S. Padre. The rich lord, fat and sleepy, with a hint of illness of the mind himself, hired Towers on his word. This caricature of a man would bring brevity and esteem to his ship unlike those timid, pragmatic fools Byrnes and DiPoto, and ultimately bring profit to the enterprise. This pleased the lord's bottom line.

Sadly, the rich lord who purchased this blowhard of the sea failed to make any proper inspections of the man's previous ship. Had he asked about the condition of the S.S. Padre when Towers was relieved of his duty as Captain, he would have been alerted to the damage of the hull due to Towers' reckless navigation. He would have seen the neglected screws loose both in the internal mechanisms as well as in his new Captain's head. He would have heard stories about the cost of the ship's resources denting the profit margin due to Towers' penchant for burning through supplies.

In the first year, the S.S. Diamondback seemed to bear fruit and reap profit. The ship ran soundly and everyone aboard was happy. The employees of the ship performed up to expectations and the passengers applauded with delight at the entertainment. The rich lord behind his large desk rubbed his belly and fingers in gleeful delight.

Unfortunately, the next year proved to be disappointing. Returns on profit did not bear the same gains that was expected. The lord was befuddled. Towers too, stared the cold melancholy of death at sea in the eyes. In a fit of hysteria, Captain Towers decided to drastically change course. His first mate and others in the control room pleaded with him to stick to what was drafted by the crew. Maybe the course was not always going to be ideal, but it is the route they chose and it projected to be very gainful for reaping great harvest. They must stick with it for the sake of keeping both the ship afloat and the resources in in healthy stock. Towers refused to listen and set the S.S. Diamondback onto a collision course with danger.

Over the next couple years, what was once a luxury liner that produced profitable cargo and entertainment, became a Carnival cruise of horrors. Captain Towers' insistence of changing course resulted in average returns, the levels of which were more fortuitous than expected. These average returns wired to the rich lord have been satisfactory enough to warrant Towers' continuance in command. The rich lord could be free to whip his subservient subjects back home without nary a worry that his ship was losing him money or prestige as a businessman. Yet that did not tell the story of the impending doom on board. Towers' hysteria had gone into full psychosis, and had been impervious to any challenge. When a deckhand crossed him, he was thrown overboard. The engineers that run the ship? They were replaceable if they looked at him funny.

The S.S. Diamondback was treading the water for several years despite the Captain's order to abandon all pre-established routes. But such aimless wandering on the high seas caught up to the crew and the state of the ship. The pressure of the ship's hull was eroded. Slowly, the ship began sinking. The fate of the crew on board would survive if the ship were to get to shore to recalibrate and make repairs. If Towers were to be checked for worms, or thrown in the brig. Unfortunately, so many changes of course has resulted in a complete loss of direction. No one on board, including Captain Towers, had any sense in hell where they were or where they were going. They seemed to even be going in circles.

The paying passengers, once abounding in fun and gay festivities were quelled. Some were oblivious to the bloodshed going on up on the top deck, but others were calling for a mutiny to relieve Towers of his command before it was too late. Unfortunately the ship's damage was already done. It was already sinking. The lifeboats had been scrapped. Most of the rations had been depleted. They were given away for perishable goods that Towers spent freely on in previous fits of hysteria.

The S.S. Diamondback sunk into the ocean by the middle of the decade. It was the worst casualty since 2004. Some survived, clinging to the driftwood like hope in a new tomorrow, a new beginning. They vowed that when the S.S. Diamondback would be rebuilt, how ever long it took, this time there would be a sound, sensible man in charge. The rich lord was disappointed by the loss of his ship. He grieved momentarily, then wrote it off as a deductible.

As for Captain Towers? When asked of his leadership in those final moments before the S.S. Diamondback capsized and disappeared underneath the big blue water, some of the survivors recalled Towers used his last breaths as Captain not to save the lives of other crew, but to rearrange the deck chairs.

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