Buchanan: Ebb of the Radical Left in Latin America

Ebb of the Radical Left Tide in Latin
America

Paul G. Buchanan

7-16-09

The
military ouster of President Jose Manuel Zelaya in Honduras
is remarkable not because it ended 15 years of elected rule
in Central America and was only the second military coup in
Latin America in the last quarter century (the unsuccessful
coup against Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 2002 being the
other one). It is also remarkable because it is the clearest
sign that the crest of the radical leftist wave has washed
across the Latin American political landscape and is now
ebbing on the shoals of authoritarianism, demagoguery and
ineptitude. To be sure, not all of the Latin American Left
is being swept away with the outgoing political tide--to the
contrary. It is the more militant manifestations—the
Boliviarian revolution in Venezuela and its imitators in
Bolivia, Ecuador and (now) Nicaragua—that have begun to
see their political fortunes wane. That is worth
exploring.

The Latin American Left’s resurgence in the
late 1990s came in response to the excesses of market-driven
economics and the failures of elite-manipulated electoral
politics in the region. It represented the third
manifestation of indigenous socialism, one that differed
significantly from the original version that emerged in the
1930s inspired by the writing of the Peruvian theoretician
Carlos Mariategui and the revolutionary praxis of
Marxist-Leninist, Maoist and Trotskyite groups in the 1960s
through to the 1980s (which continue to exist sporadically
in remnants such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the FARC in
Colombia, both of which are pale versions of their original
selves). As explained in a recent book published by the
Victoria University of Wellington Institute for Linkages
with Latin America (VILLA),[1] the latest version is neither
revolutionary or true to its original form. Whereas in
Mariategui’s vision the emphasis of indigenous socialism
in Latin America was on the development of a socialist
praxis specific to the Latin American context rather than an
adaptation of imported European ideas, and the second
version attempted to adapt foreign armed struggle strategies
to the regional geopolitical landscape, the latest version
places majority import on the indigenous component in
national progressive movements as well as on using electoral
vehicles of political contestation to secure and maintain
popular control of government. Phrased succinctly, the
emphasis of the original version was on homegrown socialism,
not on indigenous issues per se. The emphasis of the
second version was on irregular warfare. In the latest
version the emphasis is on channeling popular/indigenous
rights and grievances, not on socialism. The distinction is
important because in practice the policies and behaviour of
some of the “new” Left, including the likes of Hugo
Chavez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa and Zelaya, are more
national populist than socialist in nature, placing them
closer on the ideological spectrum to Juan Peron and Getulio
Vargas than to Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella or Salvador
Allende.

The latest incarnation of the Latin American
political Left came in three sub-types: corporate,
cooperative and radical. The Concertacion governments
in Chile epitomize the Corporate Left, nominally grouping
Socialists and Social Democrats in ruling coalitions but
which completely adhere to market-driven macroeconomic
policies inherited (then refined) from the dictatorship that
preceded them. Their left orientation is seen along the
margins rather than at the centre of the socioeconomic
model. The Cooperative Left accepts that in an age of
globalization of production and exchange market-driven
macroeconomic policy is the only game in town, but refuses
to extend market prescriptions to social health, welfare and
education policy. Instead, it uses taxation on relatively
unfettered market actors and state partnerships in the
management of strategic assets as redistributive instruments
that fund the provision of public goods to the majority. The
most successful example of this sub-type is the Worker’s
Party government of Luis Ignacio da Silva (Lula) in Brazil.
The Radical Left emphasis its anti-imperialist and
anti-capitalist orientation, places emphasis on direct
action and “popular” mandates, and governs via
ideological patronage lines. It differs from traditional
national populists in that it explicitly calls for
cross-border ideological solidarity as a form of
counter-hegemonic resistance to Western imperialism, which
has led to diplomatic and economic openings with countries
such as China, Iran and Russia as well as the formation of a
regional trade bloc, the Boliviarian Alternative for the
Americas (ALBA), that is posed as an alternative to US
dominated regional trade networks like NAFTA and CAFCA. The
exemplar of this Left sub-type is the Boliviarian Revolution
led by Chavez in Venezuela, but is also manifested in the
approach of Morales in Bolivia and to a lesser degree by
Correa in Ecuador (and, the coup plotters in Honduras argue,
Zelaya as well). Most recently, former Sandinista leader and
current president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, has expressed
a desire to have his country join the Boliviarian
alliance.

Of the three variants of contemporary indigenous
socialism in Latin America, it is the radical version that
is in trouble. Although its leaders prefer to blame external
actors for their problems (and there is truth to their
claims that foreign agents actively conspire against them,
as US complicity in the 2002 coup against Chavez
demonstrates), the real blame for their decline rests
squarely with themselves, specifically their behaviour while
in office.

The main reason the radical left is in decline
is that it has an overtly instrumental view of democracy,
particularly the use of elections and constitutions as
foundations for political representation. Having seen the
futility of “war of maneuver” (armed struggle)
approaches to imposing popular rule, in the 1990s an early
2000s the radical left undertook to engage “wars of
position” within extant democratic systems (by focusing on
electoral competition and party politics using connections
with grassroots social movements as the basis for popular
appeal). Once in power, however, they moved to close down
avenues of contestation by using constitutional reforms and
electoral gerrymandering to circumscribe the range of action
available to oppositions. Distribution of public goods and
other social benefits occurs along partisan lines rather
than on the basis of need, and outlets for opposition voice
have been censored using a variety of security laws. The
result is a “closing” of the regime, or put another way,
authoritarianism from within.

To be sure, these regimes
are popularly based. But they are increasingly undemocratic
in nature, preferring instead to adopt Leninist-inspired
vanguardist approaches to governing. That places them at
odds not only with the international community (or at least
advanced capitalist democracies), but also increasingly,
with their own constituents as institutional feedback loops
and other modes of independent redress are manipulated or
shut down. Most importantly, in putting their political
self-interest before the cross-class interest that
supposedly is the basis of their appeal they have
increasingly alienated the very constituency that is the
source of their legitimacy. What started out as
“popular” or “participatory” democracies are
increasingly acting like rule from above.

Another reason
the radical left has begun its decline is managerial
incompetence. Both Venezuela and Ecuador have oil reserves
that generate enough export revenue to pad their treasury
coffers, which allows them to engage in redistributive
policies that generate popular support. Bolivia has natural
gas (and tin) that it uses to the same effect, although
conflicts with elites in the gas exploitation regions
(especially Santa Cruz province) and foreign commercial
partners (especially Brazilians) have proven intractable and
often sparked violent protests. However, overt dependence on
commodity export revenues puts these countries at the mercy
of market demand fluctuations, which when coupled with a
lack of diversification of the national economic base makes
them completely dependent on sustained foreign consumption
for ongoing economic growth and the delivery of public
services and redistributive promises. Moreover, by
demonizing foreign investors and attacking the local
managerial classes as well as domestic oligarchies, these
regimes have not only seen a drop in demand for export
commodities; they have also prompted a massive wave of
capital and intellectual flight out of their countries. That
has in turn led to the deterioration of basic
infrastructure, a decline in production as well as in
research and development, and the rise of corruption as
untrained partisan cronies replace professional managers in
strategic industries.

The result is that it is harder and
harder for these regimes to deliver on their redistributive
promises. The syndrome is most evident in Venezuela, but is
replicated amongst its smaller allies as well. The exception
to the overall trend is Ecuador, where Rafael Correa has
backtracked on some of his more militant projects in order
to maintain a modicum of consensus and peace in his society
while at the same time maintaining sustainable economic
growth.

In addition, the substitution of professionals by
partisan cronies has extended into the militaries of these
countries, leading to growing inter-service cleavages and
strained civil-military relations. Venezuela has seen overt
politization of a largely professional officers corps by
Chavez partisans. Many experienced officers have left the
armed forces, with some now openly in opposition to the
Chavez regime. This has impacted negatively on service
morale and operational readiness in spite of large weapons
purchases from new allies such as Russia and the reported
presence of Cuban military advisors. As a result, it is an
open question in military circles whether key elements in
the armed forces (those with more technical and external
defense orientations) will obey command orders in the event
Chavez is faced with a domestic uprising. To a lesser extent
and with less success, Correa and Morales have also
attempted to promote ideological partisans to command rank.
All of this has not gone unnoticed by the military commands
of traditional adversaries such as Colombia and Chile, who
see in these developments sources of hostility as well as
opportunity.

The response of the radical left to internal
political problems is to blame foreign imperialists
(particularly the US) and domestic “traitors” for their
reversal in fortune. As a counter to these purported
destabilizing forces, they have worked to establish closer
cross-national political and military ties amongst
themselves and with the geriatric socialist regime in Cuba.
Cuban health and education specialists are the architects of
the most successful literacy and public health programs in
Venezuela, and have been detailed to help the Morales regime
undertake similar reforms in Bolivia. Although such
humanitarian assistance cannot be faulted even if
politically motivated, it has given rise to the perception
that Cuban interests increasingly influence these regimes.
That view has been accentuated by the formation of
paramilitary militias in support of the Chavez and Morales
regimes along lines originally developed, again, in Cuba. In
turn, Chavez has sent political advisors to Nicaragua and
Honduras in order to assist them with proposed
constitutional reforms, something that was one of the
reasons why the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court were
alarmed by Zelaya’s attempt to hold a referendum on
constitutional revision that would allow his re-election
(currently prohibited by article 239 of the constitution).
Be it accurate or not, the overall impression given by these
actions is one of expanding Stalinization of radical left
governments coupled with their increased meddling in the
internal affairs of their neighbours. Neither is acceptable
in the current political climate.

Even if it was
Zelaya’s ambition to emulate Chavez, he did not have the
support of Congress, the Supreme Court the military or the
public majority (unlike Chavez). The Honduran coup was
therefore not so much about Zelaya and his referendum. His
forced removal was the Honduran elite’s way of drawing a
line in the sand against the perceived
“Boliviarianisation” of the Honduran regime. In doing
so, they exposed Chavez for the paper tiger that he is.
Although he threatened to declare war on Honduras should any
Venezuelans be detained or hurt as a result of the coup, and
was the most vociferous in seeing the malevolent hand of the
US in orchestrating Zelaya’s overthrow, Chavez found
himself without an audience or support on the issue.
Continuing its non-confrontational and egalitarian regional
approach, the Obama administration condemned the coup,
thereby pulling the rug out from under Chavez’s claims
that imperialism was once again at work in the region (in
fact, Chavez was reduced to calling US Secretary of State
Clinton to plead for increased US participation in the
negotiations between Zelaya and his successor on the terms
of any political settlement to the crisis). All other Latin
American governments rejected the call to use force to
restore Zelaya and instead opted to use the offices of the
Organization of American States (OAS) in order to secure a
diplomatic compromise on the matter. The irony of the latter
move is that Venezuela had withdrawn its representatives to
the OAS months earlier claiming that it was an imperialist
tool. Under various protocols associated with the “Defense
of Democracy” provisions of the OAS (first enacted in 1991
and first implemented in Haiti in 1994), every single
country in the Western Hemisphere denounced the coup and
agreed to impose sanctions as outlined in the Act and its
amendments. But none supported a restoration by force (such
as what occurred in Haiti).

While formally denouncing the
coup and engaging in symbolic gestures (such as withdrawing
their ambassadors from Honduras), the OAS and many of its
member states tacitly condoned its anti-Boliviarian thrust
by not immediately implementing the full range of political,
economic and military sanctions available to them. Instead,
the OAS argues that time is needed for diplomatic
negotiations to succeed in resolving the crisis (which are
currently ongoing under the mediation of Nobel Peace
Laureate and former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias). With
the OAS recommendation accepted by virtually all of its
members, Venezuela was left marginalized and unable to
influence the course of debate on the matter. For their
part, the smaller radical left regimes (including Cuba)
moderated their discourse in accord with the broader
regional response. Hence the real purpose of the coup was
served: Chavez has been warned and exposed, leaving him
bereft of majority hemispheric support, isolated from the
mainstream diplomatic approach to the crisis and
marginalized as a regional player.

The regional response
to the coup is the culmination of a decade-long trend in
which non-radical left governments increasingly resented
Venezuelan (and later Bolivian) interference in their
affairs. After an initial period of comradely fraternity,
Lula’s government has distanced itself from Chavez and his
ambitions (as has Argentina). Chile and Peru have protested
Morales’ support for irredentist indigenous movements
along their common borders. Cuba is alleged to have rejected
Boliviarian advances within it, something evident in the
recent purge ordered by Raul Castro of high-level officials
with strong Chavez connections. The bottom line is that
without Latin American Left solidarity, coupled with the
enmity of right-leaning governments such as those of Alvaro
Uribe in Colombia or Vincente Calderon in Mexico, the
radical left has seen its sphere of influence reduced to its
core members.

One other variant of the decadent Left is
the Kirchner/Fernandez government in Argentina. Originally
of the cooperative left variety, the Peronist governments of
Norberto Kirchner and his successor, wife Cristina
Fernandez, also sought to impose constitutional reforms and
use executive decrees to increase (their) executive power
vis a vis the national congress, courts and provincial
governments. Fernandez precipitated months of conflict with
farmers and urban workers when she attempted to unilaterally
impose export taxes on a range of wage goods, then
nationalized private pension programs in order to use their
cash reserves as a stop-gap to the loss of export revenues
resulting from the farmer’s strikes. In June 2009 the
Kirchner/Fernandez government’s attempt to manipulate
congressional elections by bringing them forward from
November backfired when voters overwhelmingly rejected their
preferred ticket, leaving Fernandez as a lame duck
president, Norberto Kirchner discredited as Peronist party
president, the party itself seriously divided and with
opposition control (including opposition Peronists) of
Congress and most provincial governorships. Whatever their
ambitions, the Kirchner-Fernandez alliance has only served
to destroy the Peronist Party as a unified political agent.
They are in no position to support their radical
counterparts.

In contrast, where the corporate and
cooperative Left is in power, things are going relatively
smoothly. Brazil, Chile, El Salvador (where a former FMLN
supporter has recently been elected into the presidency) and
Uruguay, as well as the more traditional left-leaning APRA
government in Peru, are all riding a wave of relative
economic growth in spite of the global recession. Brazil and
Chile are economic powerhouses (albeit on different scale),
Uruguay is regarded as the most peaceful and stable country
in South America, and Peru has largely recovered from the
horror days of Alberto Fujimori (who is now in jail). All of
these governments have refused the authoritarian temptation
of trying to use the good economic moment in order to re-jig
the constitutional framework in order to perpetuate
themselves in power. Instead, they have reaffirmed their
commitment to democracy in principle as well as practice,
thereby allaying elite fears while at the same time
underscoring their commitment to popular voice exercised
within democratic institutional channels. With elections
coming up over the next year in several of these countries,
it will be interesting to see if they are rewarded for that
approach.

The lessons for the contemporary Latin American
Left should be clear. In the present context the legitimacy
of the political left lies not just in its popular appeal
but also in its democratic credentials. Authoritarianism,
whether imposed by coup or internal manipulation, is a
discredited form of governance in the region, something that
even the coup-mongerers in Honduras recognized by using
minimal force, then immediately retreating to the barracks
and returning government to Zelaya’s
congressionally-approved successors. No matter how
justifiable the Left ideological project, using
authoritarian means to achieve it undermines claims of
governmental legitimacy. It is certainly true that the likes
of Chavez, Correa and Morales have their share of disloyal
opponents at home and abroad plotting their overthrow, but
in using authoritarian measures to safeguard against that
possibility they have only reinforced their opponents claims
against them. They need to be better than their opponents if
they are to have long-term prospects, and better means more
than simply staying in power. Only Correa appears to
understand this fact.

There are three options for the
radical left at this juncture in Latin America’s political
history: they can either re-establish their democratic
credentials by re-opening their political systems so that
oppositions can have a chance to legitimately compete
against them based on policy differences and their own
success in delivering on their ideological promises; they
can turn into full-fledged dictatorships; or they can suffer
Zelaya’s fate, but in far bloodier fashion. The first
option may open them to electoral defeat; the second will
leave them in disgrace, and the third will erase any gains
made under their rule. The first option allows them to
contest their ideas and record with a view towards better
adapting their policies to the requirements of national
circumstance and the impact of externalities; the second
will confirm suspicions and unify external and internal
opposition to them. That could result in the third option,
which will result in widespread violence and the return to
the unhappy days of military/economic elite rule. Of the
three alternatives, only one allows the radical left to
compete for power again in the event they lose office. For
that reason alone, it is the only viable choice, especially
since the non-radical left has proven to be quite successful
under such
conditions.

A member of
the www.kiwipolitico.com collective,
currently on leave from the University of Auckland, Paul G.
Buchanan writes on matters of comparative, international and
military politics. His article “Lilliputian in Fluid
Times: New Zealand Foreign Policy after the Cold War” will
be published later this year by Political Science
Quarterly.

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