transparently crafted for political effect, to condemn the "General Betray Us" adver- tisement; this ploy forced Senate Demo- crats either to cast a vote that would alien- ate one of their party's most important grassroots organizations or to cast one that would appear to question Petraeus's integ- rity. Obama skipped the vote. Some of Petraeus's aides took note of his decision disapprovingly. This year, Obama twice telephoned the General and expressed support, and he also praised Petraeus pub- licly. Still, he was not among those sena- tors who made regular visits to Iraq. Late last spring, after Obama emerged as the presumptive Democratic nominee, Mc- Cain criticized him for failing to visit the war front or to consult with Petraeus. (McCain had been an early supporter of increased troop deployments to Iraq, a view that brought him into a natural alli- ance with Petraeus.) Obama scheduled travel to Mghanistan and Iraq; he was ac- companied by two Senate colleagues who are military veterans, Chuck Hagel, a Re- publican, of Nebraska, and Jack Reed, a Democrat, of Rhode Island. For Petraeus, because "the clock ran out" at the September, 2007, hearing, he recalled, the Senator's arrival offered "an opportunity" to answer Obamà s ques- tion about the way out of Iraq. The main briefing for the three senators took place in a conference room at the U.S. Embassy complex. Petraeus and Crocker had mounted large storyboard charts on easels; for about thirty minutes, Petraeus ticked off bullet points with his laser pointer. The General later described to me what he sought to convey to Obama about the prospective pace of U.S. troop reductions: "There are very rigorous plans. And they're being executed. And we ac- tually met the goals that were in much of the security lines for the summer of2008. Here's what they are for the summer of 2009-and for the end state, the eventual d " en state. Petraeus spoke about the Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who had called a series of ceasefires against U.S. troops during 2007 and 2008. Some analysts have ar- gued that Sadr's pullback did more to re- duce violence in Iraq than U.S. actions. Petraeus told the three senators, he re- called, that these ceasefires had not been undertaken "out of the goodness of their heart" but because U.S. and Iraqi forces had struck at Sadr's militias and killed many of his commanders and recruits as well as Iranian fighters who worked with him. This battlefield action, rather than Sadr's ceasefires, had deepened and sus- tained the lull in Iraq's violence this sum- mer, Petraeus argued. The General also reviewed classified charts that outlined the Joint Campaign Plan's priorities, divisions of labor, and timetables. The plan's basic prescription, he said, is to move successfully through Iraq's national elections, scheduled for late 2009, and then to begin a major transi- tion: to get U.S. forces as quicldy as pos- sible to a role of pure overwatch. Exactly when this might be achieved, though, and how many troops might be required to .. MtlL'lIt; "And is that your card?" make it work, is deliberately omitted from the plan. The biggest difference between Obamàs goals for Iraq and the current Joint Campaign Plan is the Senator's pledge to withdraw all American "combat brigades" within sixteen months. (Under his plan, a "residual" U.S. force would re- main, to support Iraqi troops and conduct counterterrorism operations.) By contrast, in the Petraeus-authored design, which McCain has endorsed unequivocally, U.S. troop reductions would not be firmly dictated by any timetables but would be "conditions-based." As the briefing ended and a discussion with the senators began, Petraeus made clear that he hoped to make further troop reductions in the near future, but he reiterated his belief that military commanders in Iraq needed flexibility to manage the pace of these reductions. Reed cited the declaration made only days before by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki, effectively endorsing Obamà s withdrawal deadlines. "You're going to have timelines-that's what the Iraqi po- liticalleaders will say to their publics," Reed told Petraeus, as he recalled the thrust of his remarks. "The reality here is there will be some type of timeline or deadline"-and Petraeus and other com- manders needed to start adjusting to that. Obama told Petraeus, in Reed's recol- lection, "that his responsibility as a pro- spective President was not limited to Iraq alone." Among other American interests that had to be considered, Obama said, was a need to rebalance American forces in the region to reinforce the war in M- ghanistan. This would soon be Petraeus's responsibility, as CENTCOM commander, but the General did not declare his views on that subject. Immediately after his meetings with Petraeus, Obama described for Terry Moran, of ABC News, what he consid- ered to be the critical issue discussed in the briefing. "The question for me was: Does he consider the gains reversible when it comes to AI Qgeda in Iraq, or some of the Shia militias?" Obama said. "And, if so, what kinds of resources are required to make sure that we reach a tipping point where they can't reconstitute themselves? And I think what came out of the conver- sation was a sense that this is not a science. I , " t s an art. Obama also said he refused "to get