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Primary Documents - British Military Report on the Russian Capture of Erzerum, 16 February 1916

Reproduced below is the
text of the British military report, written by the British observer with
Russian forces Morgan Price, detailing the Russian success in seizing
control of Erzerum from Turkish control
on 16 February 1916.

The Russian Capture of Erzerum,
16 February 1916, by Morgan Price, British Military Observer with the Russian
Army

This success had been due to errors by the Turks, who did not feel insecure in
Armenia, and would take risks to save Baghdad.

They must have been ill-informed
as to the nature of the Russian reinforcements, for in December they gave leave
of absence to a number of officers in the Erzerum garrison, while they made no
haste to send back to Erzerum the heavy artillery from the Dardanelles.

Instead,
they concentrated all their efforts on Mesopotamia, where they succeeded in
surrounding General Townsend in Kut, and in threatening the whole British
expedition with breakdown. Thus it was clear that a Russian offensive on the
Caucasus front would not only relieve the situation in Mesopotamia, but would
stand a good chance of driving the Turks back on their last line of defence
round the fortress of Erzerum, and possibly even of taking it.

The Russians were
now superior by about 50,000 men along the whole of the Asiatic front from the
Black Sea to Persia. This enabled them to undertake flanking movements, which
always count for so much in Asiatic warfare.

In Asia, with its wide expanses,
the chances of an enemy digging himself into positions which cannot be
outflanked are very much less than in Europe. Everything, therefore,
favoured an
offensive in the direction of Erzerum, and a series of manoeuvres and flanking
movements in the mountains and valleys at the headwaters of the Araxes and the
Euphrates.

The eastern approach to Erzerum lies along the Passan plain. Its outer chain of
forts lies on the Deve-Boyun, a range of rolling hills from 7,000 to 8,000 feet
high, dividing the head-waters of the Araxes from those of the western
Euphrates.

Bounding the Passan and upper Euphrates plain on the south is the
great range of the Palan-teken, rising to 10,000 feet, and running east and west
like most of the ridges of Armenia outside the volcanic zone.

To the north of
the plain lies a confused area, where volcanic effusions have overlaid the
original plateau ranges. To the east, not far from the Russo-Turkish frontier,
lie the masses of the Djelli-Gel and Kodjut-Dag, which to the west merge into
the great uplift of the Kargar-bazar.

Further west still rise the Giaur and
Dumlu Dags, between which and the Kargar-bazar is the only gap in the whole
length of the mountain wall that shields Erzerum on the north. This gap is the
defile of Gurji-Bogaz, and the road through it, at the height of 7,000 feet, is
the only approach to Erzerum from this side.

Coming up from the south and
passing through this defile, one enters the valley of the Tortum River and
descends into the relative depression of Olti Chai and the middle Chorokh. The
problem for the Turks was to hold the approaches to Erzerum along the Passan
plain on the east (this was effected by the 9th and part of the 10th Army
Corps), and to block tile narrow gap in the mountains on the northeast (this was
done by the 11th Army Corps, which had entrenched itself some months previously
on the mountain mass of the Gey Dag, just southwest of Olti).

To the south of
Erzerum, across the Palan-teken, lay a part of the 10th Army Corps, protecting
the road leading into the Van basin and on to Mesopotamia.

The Russian plan, worked out by General
Yudenich, the Grand Duke Nicholas's
commander in the field, was to attack the Turkish positions in three columns.

The 2nd Turkestan Army Corps at Olti in the Chorokh depression was to attack the
Turks guarding the Gurji-Bogaz defiles in the positions on the Gey Dag, and by
this demonstration to draw off their strength from the Passan plain, where the
main blow was to be struck by the 1st Army Corps, which was to make a frontal
attack on the Azap Keui positions between Hassan Kaleh and the old Russo-Turkish
frontier.

These positions had been carefully prepared for some months, and had
all the signs of permanent field-fortifications. To make them untenable, a third
force, the 4th Rifle Division, was to be sent into the mountain country of the Djelli-Gel, to hold the line between the 1st Army Corps and the Turkestans, and
to threaten the flanks of the Turks at Azap Keui and on the Gey Dag.

It is
interesting to note that this was the same sort of plan as that which Enver
Pasha adopted, when he attacked the Russians just twelve months before. He,
however, demonstrated on the Passan plain, and made his main attack on the Olti
and Chorokh basins.

His plan ultimately failed, because he could not guarantee
supplies to his advanced forces in the country that they had occupied. But the
Russians were brilliantly successful, because they had given the necessary
attention to roads and transport for their main advance along the Passan plain.

On January 13th the Russian advance began. The 2nd Turkestan Army Corps attacked
the Turkish 11th Army Corps, which was strongly entrenched on the Gey Dag west
of Olti. The Russian losses were heavy, and they did not succeed in dislodging
the Turks; but the real object of the attack was obtained by causing the Turks
to draw off forces for the defence of the northeast (Gurji-Bogaz) gateway to
Erzerum, and by masking the main blow, which was delivered on the Passan plain.

Information brought by airmen,
who flew over Erzerum during these days, showed that Abdulla Kerim Pasha, the Turkish commander, had withdrawn one
regiment to the north to protect his left flank in the defiles.

This gave the
necessary opportunity for the Russian 1st Army Corps to carry the main Turkish
position, and on January 13th the Azap Keui line was attacked.

In spite of the
withdrawal of a regiment, the Turks made a very stubborn resistance, and for
three days there was severe fighting With great losses on both sides. But on
January 15th the 4th Composite Division, which had been given the task of
connecting the 2nd Turkestans with the 1st Army Corps, crossed the high rugged
country of the Djelli Gel at a level of 9,000 feet, and joined up with the
Turkestans in the valleys of the upper Olti Chai.

The Turkish 11th Army Corps
on the Gey Dag, and the 9th and 10th in the Passan plain, were thus in danger of
being outflanked. Moreover, the Russians had so severely pounded the Azap Keui
positions that they were now practically untenable.

So on January 16th Abdulla
Kerim Pasha ordered a general retreat to the last line of defence on the Erzerum
forts.

Then followed what is frequently met with in Turkish retreats, and is very
characteristic of that race. The Turk has all the stubbornness and endurance of
a highlander and an agriculturist. He does not see at once when he is outmastered: but when he does, then the untrained Oriental comes out strong in
him; he throws everything away and bolts in a general sauve qui peut.

In this
case he just ran till he reached Erzerum. The Russians reached Kupri Keui on the
18th, and the next day were in Hassan Kaleh, thus getting into their hands the
whole of the east Passan plain and the basin of the Araxes right up to the outer
forts of Erzerum.

On January 19th the last Turkish column was seen disappearing
behind the rolling banks of the Deve-Boyun. The Cossacks pursued right up to the
outer chain of forts tinder cover of darkness, and cut off 1,000 prisoners.

Next
day field artillery shelled the outer forts, and so after thirty-nine years
Erzerum saw a Russian shell again within its precincts.

Up to this time it was not really part of the Russian plan to attack Erzerum. The original plan was to break the Turkish line on the Passan plain, and to put
such pressure on the Turks along the whole line from the Chorokh to Bitlis that
the pressure on the English at Baghdad would be relieved.

The extraordinary
success of the advance in the second week of January took no one more by
surprise than the Russians themselves. The Grand Duke Nicholas would not believe
the news when he heard that Hassan Kaleh and Kupri Keui had fallen.

Indeed, it
was not until January 23rd that General Yudenich informed him that he thought
it possible to take Erzerum, and asked for permission to work out a plan. This
was done in the next few days.

Meanwhile, information which strengthened this
decision came to hand in the shape of a wireless telegram, intercepted between Abdulla Kerim Pasha and Enver Pasha, in which it was stated that "the condition
of the 3rd Army is serious; reinforcements must be sent at once, or else
Erzerum cannot be held."

On January 31st a demonstration was made from Hassan Kaleh by the Russians
against the outer forts of the Deve-Boyun to test the strength of the Turks. The
bombardment continued all day, and by evening it was seen that the Turks had
poured water down the slopes in front of the forts, which on freezing covered
the mountain sides with icy sheets.

According to accounts given me by some
officers, as the sun was setting that evening the sign of a cross appeared in
the clouds of white smoke that accompanied the bombardment and lay over the
forts.

During the first week of February heavy artillery was brought up, and the
Russian dispositions were made and developed with extraordinary skill. General Paskevitch, when he captured Erzerum in 1828, confined his attentions solely to
the approach from the Passan plain. Meeting with slight Turkish resistance and
with primitive forts, he had no great difficulty in breaking through the Deve-Boyun.

He had not to trouble about the defiles and the northern approaches
to Erzerum, nor had he to force a passage across immense mountainous tracts of
snowy wastes in order to keep his line of advance intact. But in these days the methods of
modern warfare have to some degree overcome nature.

The Gurji-Bogaz defiles were now passable for artillery,
and
moreover the Turks had built two forts there. On their extreme left wing a whole
Turkish Army Corps held positions far away in the isolated valleys of the upper
Chorokh Su, where it had before been impossible to keep and feed a battalion.

The devices of the engineer and transport services had made all this possible. The Russians therefore were threatened with the danger that, if they should make
a frontal attack on the Deve-Boyun forts and carry them, the Turks in the upper
Chorokh might suddenly make a great counter-move, break into the Olti
depression, reach the Kars plateau, and so get into the rear of the whole
Russian army, as they did in December, 1914.

This in fact is exactly what Abdulla Kerim Pasha tried to do. He ordered Halid
Bey (the exceedingly brave, if somewhat rash, commander of the frontier regiment
which had retreated from before Artvin through Southern Lazistan when the Azap
Keui positions were captured) to call up reinforcements from Baiburt, break
through the narrow Tortum valley and cut off the 2nd Turkestan Army Corps at
Olti.

During the first ten days of February severe fighting took place on the
passes of the Kabak-tepe east of Igdir, and on more than one occasion Halid Bey
seemed on the point of outflanking General Prejvalsky.

By February 10th,
however, the Russian Turkestans had succeeded in repulsing hint and were secure
in the Tortum valley, and it was safe for General Yudenich to begin his advance
on Erzerum.

The plan was to form the whole of the Russian forces in this part of Armenia
into a great semicircular line stretching from the Upper Chorokh Su across the
great volcanic chains of the Dumlu and Giaur Dags and the Kargar-bazar, across
the Passan plain, and the heights of the Palan-teken to the valley of Khunus.

The line was some 130 miles long, and it had to be covered by two Army Corps and
some detached forces. All the different sections of the line had to keep in
touch with each other, and to advance over snowbound plateau or icy mountain skree, whichever fell to their lot, thus gradually converging upon the great
fortress, and threatening to surround it.

The object of General Yudenich, in
this most ably conceived and brilliantly executed plan, was to force Abdulla
Kerim Pasha either to evacuate Erzerum, or else to be locked up in it with no
hope of relief.

It is safe to say that the struggle was much greater in this operation with the
natural enemies, cold and hunger, than it was with the Turks. The Russian troops
had to cross mountain ranges with deep snow-drifts at 10,000 feet, and to go for
at least three days cut off from supplies of food, with nothing but the few
crusts of bread they could carry with them.

No other race of human beings,
except those accustomed to the cold of sub-arctic climates like that of Russia,
could have performed this feat. The Anatolian Turk is in no degree inferior to
the Russian in physical endurance, but he lacks the habit of husbanding his
resources.

The Russian, whenever he gets the smallest chance, sets himself down
in some little hollow, and somehow or other makes himself a cup of tea by
burning bits of grass or moss. But the Turkish soldier literally goes without
anything for two or three days, and then eats a whole sheep or a perfect
mountain of "pilaff," so that he cannot move for hours.

Moreover, the Turkish
army has in it Arabs and Syrians, who can ill endure a winter campaign in
Armenia.

On February 11th the order for the general Russian advance was given. The Elizabetopol and Baku regiments attacked Forts Chaban-dede and Dolan-gyoz
respectively.

The latter fort is situated on a little knoll which juts out into
the Passan plain, and is, as it were, the advanced guard of the outer chain. By
5 a.m. on the 12th Dolan-gyoz was surrounded, but the battalion of Turks
holding the fort managed to retreat to the Uzun Ahmet fort, a powerful redoubt
which rests upon a trapeze-like rocky mass with cliffs on three sides.

At the
same time the 2nd Turkestans, advancing through the defiles of the Gurji-Bogaz,
surrounded the advanced fort of Kara-gyubek. Two outposts were already in the
hands of the Russians; but the main struggle was yet to come.

On the Kargar-bazar heights to the north all through the day and night of the
10th and 11th of February the 4th Composite Division attacked the Turks across
snow-fields and skrees of rock. The summit of the range was in the hands of the
Russians, but the Turks held stubbornly on to the snow-fields to the west of
the summit which connected Forts Chaban-dede and Tufta.

Here they had made
snow-trenches, which were invisible to the naked eye at a distance of more than
a hundred yards. On the night of the 12th the right wing of the 39th Division
was ordered to attack Fort Chaban-dede, which, with Tufta, was the key to
Erzerum.

The Baku regiment, which had taken Dolan-gyoz, now joined the
Elizabetopols, and together they advanced from the village of Buyuk Tuy on the
Passan plain up the rocky valley of the Tuy towards the towering cliffs, on
which Fort Chaban-dede rested.

The Russian soldiers were clad in white coats, so
that in the darkness and against the snow they were invisible. Silently creeping
up the rocky slopes to the fort, they got to within 250 yards of it before the
Turkish searchlights discovered them.

At once from the Uzun Ahmet and Chaban-dede
forts a murderous cross-fire was poured upon them, which in two hours caused
them to lose one-third of their number. However, one battalion of the Elizabetopols pushed right up, till they got underneath the cliffs of Fort
Chaban-dede.

Here the guns from the fort could not fire at them, the angle being
too high: but the guns from Uzun Ahmet could still rake their lines. At this
moment also the 108th regiment of the 11th Turkish Army Corps on the Olugli
heights at the head of the Tuy defile began a flanking movement.

The right wing
of the Elizabetopol regiment was exposed, and as there was no sign of the 4th
Division, whose appearance alone could fill the gap, the position was critical.

The 4th Division was in fact at this moment struggling under almost more
terrible conditions at the height of 10,000 feet on the Kargar-bazar. The men
were engaged not with the Turks but with the frost and snow.

During the nights
of the 12th and 13th they lost 2,000 of their number from frost-bite alone. In
addition to their sufferings from cold, they had the Herculean task of carrying
their artillery across the snow and rocks which alone was enough to account for
their delay.

Accordingly, there was nothing for the Elizabetopol and Bakintsi
regiments to do but to retreat to the bottom of the Tuy valley, where respite
could be obtained, and this they did on the morning of the 13th. All that day
they waited in vain for the 4th Division; but when evening came and no one
appeared, it was seen to be useless to wait any longer, for time only aided the
Turks, whose reinforcements were being hurried up from Erzerum.

So it was
decided that the Derbent regiment, which had hitherto been held in reserve,
should come up on the right wing and try to turn the flank of the 108th Turkish
regiment, which was now occupying the heights of the Sergy-kaya, a desolate
knoll on the rocky mass of Olugli.

At 7 p.m. the advance began. The Derbent regiment left its position in the
rear, and crossing in the darkness the head of the Tuy valley, ascended a defile
and reached the snow-fields round the Olugli mass. Immense difficulty was
experienced in the advance. The snow lay in drifts often five to six feet deep,
and in places the soldiers in order to move had to take off their coats and walk
on them in the snow, throwing them forward every three feet to avoid sinking in
up to their necks.

In this way they advanced painfully all night. The Turks,
suspecting nothing, were lying in their snow trenches, their attention chiefly
concentrated on how to prevent themselves from freezing to death. At last
daylight began to break upon this arctic scene, and through scuds of snow broken
by the icy wind, the Turks saw a chain of dark forms slowly closing in on them.

They could hardly believe their eyes, for it seemed to them impossible that a
human army with rifles and ammunition could cross the country that lay in front
of them.

By 5.30 a.m. the Turks saw that their trenches on the Sergy-kaya were being
surrounded from the northeast and east, and only a narrow neck of snow-field to
the south connected them with the fort of Chaban-dede. So they hastily left
their trenches and retreated as fast as the drifts would allow them across the Olugli snow-field till they reached the fort.

Chaban-dede was now surrounded on
the northeast, but the retreat of the Turkish garrison was not cut off on the
south and west, and the Turks with characteristic stubbornness and bravery
continued their deadly cross-fire from Forts Uztin Ahmet and Chaban-dede, as if
nothing had happened.

Thus the Derbent regiment had by this
manoeuvre gained
important ground; but the Russians had not yet broken the Turkish cordon that
united the forts, nor did the three regiments of the 39th Division dare to
advance farther for fear of becoming separated from the Russians to the right
and left of them, and so giving the Turks a chance to break through in a
counter-attack.

But what had happened meanwhile to the 4th Composite Division and the and
Turkestans? They alone could save the situation by piercing the plateau between
Forts Chaban-dede and Tufta, and so joining up with the Derbent regiment on the
heights of Olugli. The critical question was whether they had been equal to
their stupendous task of penetrating the 50 miles of rugged snow-bound ridges
and plateau. The morning of February 14th showed that they had accomplished this
task, and so sealed the fate of Erzerum.

During the previous day the 4th Composite Division had been finishing the
transport of their artillery to the summit of the Kargar-bazar ridge. The guns
had again been dismembered, and carried to positions whence they could drop
shells on the Turks defending the right flank of Fort Tufta.

The Turkestans had
also prepared their artillery to sweep the fort from the north. On the morning
of February the 14th the infantry of the 4th Division descended the northwestern
slopes of the Kargar-bazar, sliding down the snow on their coats to the open
plateau, out of which the Tuy River rises.

From here they moved on to the
northwest and reached the foot of the Grobovoye heights, which form the eastern
side of the Gurji-Bogaz defile. This is the north-eastern "gateway" to Erzerum
through which the and Turkestans were to advance, and which the Turkish 10th
Army Corps was defending from Forts Kara-gyubek and Tufta.

The plan was that the
Turkish positions on the Grobovoye heights, connecting Forts Kara-gyubek and
Tufta, should be attacked simultaneously by the Turkestans coming through the
northern defiles, and by the 4th Division coming down from the Kargar-bazar on
the south.

The critical moment for the Russians had arrived.

Would these forces unite and press their attack together, or had one of them
failed and been overwhelmed in the snowfields or defiles? About midday the
artillery of the 4th Division began to drop shells on the Turkish snow-trenches
on the Grobovoye heights. The bombardment went on for half an hour and then
stopped, the commanders waiting in suspense to hear whether there was any reply
from their comrades, the Turkestans, who should by this time be attacking from
the north.

Hope was beginning to wane, and they were faced by the prospect
either of a single-handed encounter with a greatly superior enemy or of a
disastrous retreat. But about one o'clock a faint rumble was heard, and a few
minutes later shells were seen dropping on the Grobovoye heights. They were
Russian shells, yet not fired by the 4th Division. T he situation was saved, for
the Turkestans had forced their way through the Gurji-Bogaz defile, capturing
Fort Kara-gyubek, and pressing on to the Grobovoye heights and towards Fort
Tufta.

The Turks now on the Grobovoye heights were in danger of being surrounded from
the north, south and east. They could see that Kara-gyubek was already in
Russian hands. The left wing of the 4th Division, moreover, was pressing on to
the heights of Kuni-tepe, a mass lying north of the Olugli and commanding Fort
Tufta from the south.

This they occupied at three o'clock, and the Turks on the Grobovoye heights retired at once on Fort Tufta. In another half-hour the
Turkestans appeared upon the sky-line; and here, on this desolate Grobovoye
height, at this historic moment, they greeted their brothers of the 4th
Division.

The gap in the Russian line was now filled; the mountains and the
snowfields had been overcome, and it was now only a question of a few hours
before the Turks would be overcome too.

Just as this memorable meeting was taking place, the Russian artillery
observation posts at Ketchk noticed a great stir in the Turkish lines
surrounding Fort Tufta. The Staff of the 10th Army Corps knew that the game was
up, and, to escape being surrounded, at once began the evacuation of Fort Tufta.

That night also Abdulla Kerim Pasha ordered the evacuation of all the forts of
the Deve-Boyun. The reserves of the 11th Army Corps were the first to leave,
followed by those of the 9th. Then explosions in Forts Kaburgar, Ortayuk, Uzun
Ahmet and Sivishli were observed from the Russian lines.

The evacuation of Fort Chaban-dede was begun at 2 p.m., and by four o'clock the Russians were in
possession of all the forts of the Deve-Boyun, while the 4th Composite Division
and the Turkestans were pouring into the Erzerum plain, in the hope of cutting
off the Turkish retreat. But here they met with less success.

The 4th Division,
with orders to advance south, were ten miles ahead of the Turkestans, who had
orders to advance west. The confusion caused by columns crossing on the march
gave a good start to the Turks, who had speedily evacuated the forts, as soon as
danger was imminent. Yet one of their divisions, the 34th, was captured at Ilidja, and a large part of their artillery was lost.

It is curious that the Russians lost much less in the operations before Erzerum
than they did in the fighting before the Azap Keui positions in the previous
month, when they lost not less than 30,000 killed and wounded in four days'
fighting.

But in the five days' fighting along the whole length of the Erzerum
forts from the Deve-Boyun to the Gurji-Bogaz defiles their losses were not more
than 12,000, a large part of which were deaths or injuries due to exposure.

The capture of the great fortress, hitherto considered impregnable, sent a
thrill through the whole continent. Every bazaar from Shiraz to Samarkand, from
Konia to Kuldja, began talking of the great Urus, who had taken Erzerum from the
Osmanli.

Russian military prestige in the East had fallen very low since the
Sarikamish battle and Enver Pasha's advance into the Caucasus in December, 1914. But the Dardanelles expedition had given the Turks something else to think of
than conquering the Caucasus, and had thus afforded the Russians the necessary
respite to prepare for their' attack on Erzerum which in its turn saved the
British from being driven completely out of Mesopotamia.

The capture of Erzerum was the
first great success that came to the Allies in Asia. It might be regarded
as the turning point of the war in the East.