ARGENTINA: Government Plans to Roll Out New Inflation Gauge-----------------------------------------------------------EFE News reports that the government plans to start using a new,temporary but "believable" inflation indicator in the next twoweeks in Argentina, National Statistics and Census Institute, orIndec, director Jorge Todesca said.

The statistics agency is "working on some different alternatives"for the inflation gauge, which has been criticized since 2007, Mr.Todesca told the Mitre radio network, according to EFE News.

Indec has not been able to "create a transition structure" betweenincoming and outgoing officials, Mr. Todesca, who was recentlyappointed to his post by new President Mauricio Macri, said, notesthe report.

"We have a legal problem over putting in our own specialists,people who can be trusted, and that takes time," the report quotedMr. Todesca as saying.

The statistics agency has not released figures on the poverty ratein Argentina in some time, with the last reports coming out in thefirst half of 2013, the report notes.

The latest Indec report said consumer prices rose 1.1 percent inArgentina in October, while private economic consulting firmsestimated that prices rose 1.52 percent during the same month,says the report.

Under former President Cristina Fernandez's administration, theIndec reported that the year-on-year inflation rate in October was14.3 percent, while private forecasters put the number at 25.02percent, notes EFE News.

* * *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in Nov. 27,2015, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook onArgentina's Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable. Theoutlook on Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation andrestructured local legislation foreign currency obligations isalso changed to positive from stable. The outlook change is basedon Moody's view that the accession of president-elect MauricioMacri of the Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise theprobability of credit positive policies being implemented,including arriving at a resolution with holdout creditors, one ofArgentina's key credit constraints.

On Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on some of itsdebt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on aUS$539 million interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with acourt- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoffbetween the country and a group of hedge funds seeking fullpayment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001. AU.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be madeunless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got theUS$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able toaccess international credit markets since its US$95 billiondefault 13 years ago.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratingsdowngraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign CurrencyIssuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmedthe (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Carating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuerrating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin AmericaAgente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks andfinancial institutions, both on the global and national scales.The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative fromstable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed thebanks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financialstrength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. hasdowngraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer ratingfrom CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreigncurrency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. Thelong-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have beenconfirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on thelong-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on theshort-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgradedArgentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed couponpayments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after theexpiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30. According toFitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitchhas downgraded the affected securities to 'D'. In addition, Fitchhas affirmed:

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portionof Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 ratingreflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina'srestructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreigncurrency obligations, as compared with the risk of default onother debt instruments issued by Argentina. Argentina's localcurrency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt arerated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's2001 default is rated Ca.

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BANCO DO BRASIL: Fitch Cuts LT FC and LC IDRs to 'BB+'------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on these financialinstitutions:

The rating actions follow Fitch's recent downgrade of Brazil'ssovereign rating to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Negative Outlook and therevision of the country ceiling to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'. Theseactions also reflect factors considered in Fitch's negativeoutlook for the Brazilian banking industry.

In Fitch's view, despite the system's relatively comfortablecapitalization and liquidity ratios as well as adequate loan lossreserves coverage, the deterioration of the macroeconomic backdropresulted in a tough operating environment for Brazilian banksduring the second half of 2015 that is likely to continue during2016. The prospects of a prolonged economic recession, higherunemployment, inflation and interest rates and reduced investmentswill undermine the sector's performance and result in an even moreconservative risk appetite.

The Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and Viability Ratings(VRs) of BIB and Pine were affirmed, while the Outlooks on theirLong-term IDRs were revised to Negative from Stable. The Long-term IDRs of the remaining 17 financial institutions mentionedabove were downgraded, and the Negative Outlook (or NegativeRating Watch) on them, maintained. The VRs of seven of thesefinancial institutions (Bradesco, IU, IUH, SanBra, Safra, ABC andDaycoval) were also downgraded.

1) Federal government-owned banks, BdB, BdA, BNB, BNDES and Caixa,whose IDRs are driven by sovereign support and where the federalgovernment is either the majority or the full owner and the sourceof expected support;

2) Issuers whose IDRs are driven by their VRs and that are ratedabove or equal to the sovereign rating (IUH, IU, Bradesco, Safra,ABC, Daycoval);

3) Issuers whose IDRs are driven by their VRs and that are ratedin the 'BB' category (BIB and Pine); and

4) Issuers whose IDRs are driven by institutional support byparents which are rated above or equal to the sovereign rating(SanBra, BV, Pan, BFRE, BM and BS).

In the first group, Fitch downgraded all five banks' LT FC and LCIDRs, and if existing, senior debt ratings to 'BB+' from 'BBB-',in line with the downgrade of Brazil's IDRs. All five ratings arealigned with Brazil's sovereign ratings, due to the banks' eithermajority or full federal government ownership, their key policyrole in the implementation of government economic guidelines and,in the case of BdB and Caixa, their systemic importance. TheNegative Outlook on the LT IDRs mirrors that on the LT IDRs ofBrazil. The downgrade of the banks' SRs to '3' from '2' and SRFsto 'BB+' from 'BBB-' reflect the reduced capacity of thegovernment to support these banks.

The second group includes issuers with very strong credit profilesbut that are closely linked with the operating environment. Inthe case of Bradesco, IUH and IU, their ratings are driven bytheir VRs, which are rated one-notch above the sovereign,reflecting their very strong credit profile. The VRs of the banksin this group were also downgraded following the sovereign ratingdowngrade as well as their LT FC, LC IDRs, and debt ratings whenapplicable. The LT IDRs of these banks retain their NegativeOutlook, mirroring the sovereign Outlook. Fitch downgradedBradesco, IUH and IU's SRFs to 'BB' from 'BB+', given the reducedcapacity of the sovereign to provide support should it berequired.

Fitch also downgraded Safra's LT IDRs and senior debt ratings to'BB+' from 'BBB-' and maintained the Negative Outlooks on its LTIDRs.

In the third group, BIB and Pine's LT IDRs were affirmed at 'BB'.The IDRs of these banks are driven by their VRs which were alsoaffirmed. The revision of BIB and Pine's Outlooks to Negativefrom Stable reflects Fitch's view that the key credit metrics ofthese two mid-sized banks are highly influenced by the operatingenvironment and could come under further pressure consideringFitch's expectations of continued deterioration of domesticoperating conditions, as evidenced by the negative outlookassigned to the Brazilian banking sector.

In the same group, BV'd IDRs are driven by expected support fromits minority shareholder - BdB. Fitch believes that BV isstrategically important for BdB, and maintains a one-notchdifference between these two banks' IDRs. Therefore, Fitchdowngraded BV's LT IDRs to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Negative Outlook, andaffirmed its VR at 'bb-' and SR at '3'.

Also in this group, Fitch downgraded Pan and its subsidiaries'(BFRE, BM and BS) LT IDRs to 'BB-' from 'BB' and the NegativeRating Watch was maintained. The rating action reflects thedowngrade of Caixa's LT IDRs, as Pan and its subsidiaries' ratingsare based on the extraordinary support they could receive fromCaixa. Extraordinary support could be provided in the form ofcredit lines and long-term funding agreements, as well as a newstrategic orientation, including management proximity, especiallyafter the difficulties faced by Banco BTG Pactual S.A. (BTG, Long-term IDR 'BB-'; Watch Negative), which is Pan's co-controllingshareholder. Pan's VR was affirmed at 'b'; Negative Watch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VIABILITY RATINGS (VRs

The VRs of Sanbra, Safra, ABC and Daycoval are constrained by theoperating environment. These banks' VRs should move in tandemwith the sovereign rating of Brazil. For this reason, all thesebanks' VRs were downgraded to 'bb+' from 'bbb-', reflectingFitch's approach of usually limiting bank ratings to the sovereignrating level.

The VRs of BIB and Pine were affirmed at 'bb', as their key creditmetrics - although under pressure - are still adequate for theirrespective rating levels. Pressures on the corporate sector mayeventually undermine the asset quality of these two banks.Bradesco, IU and IUH's VRs remain one-notch above the sovereignrating due to their strong credit profile. Both banks count ondiversified franchises, strong liquidity and capitalization,resilient profitability, satisfactory asset quality and are D-SIBswith impressive market share in several segments in the Brazilianfinancial services industry.

BdB's VR was affirmed at 'bb+' and reflects its leading franchisein multiple business segments, including lending, insurance, assetmanagement and debit/credit cards, and solid funding andliquidity. BdB's VR is constrained by the operating environmentand should move in tandem with the sovereign rating of Brazil.

BV's VR was affirmed at 'bb-', as its key credit metrics -although under pressure - are still adequate for its respectiverating level. Pressures on BV's corporate exposures mayeventually undermine the asset quality of this bank.

Pan's VR is limited by the still volatile operating performance ofthe bank, its operating losses, improving but still below-averageasset quality ratios, and relatively weak capitalization. Therating was maintained on Rating Watch Negative because of thepotential for material negative effects on its intrinsic profiledue to the difficult situation faced by its co-controller, BTG.

In addition to specific sensitivities for each institution --please see the individual report of each, available atwww.fitchratings.com. The IDRs of all banks included in thisrelease are sensitive to any further changes in Brazil's sovereignratings and their Outlook.

The prospects of a prolonged economic recession, highunemployment, inflation and interest rates, and reducedinvestments will undermine the banking sector performance and mayresult in an even more difficult operating environment,particularly for mid-sized banks, which have more concentratedbusiness models than their larger counterparts, larger asset andliability concentrations and wholesale funding bases.

Further deterioration in the operating environment could alsonegatively affect the VRs of each of the banks included in thisrelease if and when such deterioration becomes identifiable oneach bank's key credit metrics, such as asset quality,profitability and capitalization.

The ratings on Banrisul continue to reflect its "adequate"business position given its strong presence in the state of RioGrande do Sul. Its "moderate" risk position based ondeteriorating asset quality. Its "adequate" capital and earnings,which stems from a 7.9% forecasted RAC ratio for the next 18months and its "above average" funding, and "adequate" liquidity.

The negative outlook on Banrisul for the next 12 months reflectsthe outlook on Brazil because S&P rarely rates banks above thesovereign ratings. The outlook also reflects the negative trendin Brazil's BICRA and economic risk.

S&P could lower the ratings following a similar rating action onthe sovereign or if S&P negatively revises the BICRA and economicrisk of Brazil. S&P could also lower the ratings if Banrisul'sRAC ratio is consistently below 7%, or if its NPLs and charge offscontinue to rise to consistently above 6% and 4%, respectively.Moreover, a negative rating action would follow significantdeterioration in the bank's funding base as a result ofreputational risks from the potential distress of its shareholder,the state of Rio Grande do Sul. S&P could revise its fundingscore to below average if the SFR reaches consistently below 80%.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if there is a similarrating action on the sovereign, and if S&P revises its trend inBrazil's economic risk and BICRA to stable.

The deterioration of investor's expectations regarding theBrazilian economy will likely contribute to continued volatilityover the short term. Consequently, Fitch expects 2016 to be acontinuation of the very challenging environment for Brazilianasset managers.

In 2015, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM)updated the Brazilian fund industry regulatory framework. A fewchanges were readily incorporated by the participants and havealready changed the industry landscape in a meaningful way.However, other measures still generate uncertainties and arelikely to lead to intense discussions during the adjustmentperiod, which goes until June 30, 2016.

The transaction is a pass-through securitization of a 10-yearamortizing loan originated by Bank of America N.A. ('A+'/OutlookStable) to the Brazilian State of Maranhao ('BB'/OutlookNegative). The loan is guaranteed on an unconditional andirrevocable basis by the Federative Republic of Brazil (Brazil;'BB+'/Outlook Negative).

Payments on the loan are made to a bank account at WilmingtonTrust N.A. (administrative agent; 'A'/Outlook Stable). On thenext day, funds are transferred to an issuer account at the Bankof New York Mellon (indenture trustee; 'AA'/Outlook Stable).Payments are made on the notes immediately thereafter.

Fitch's rating addresses timely payment of interest and principal.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of the senior secured pass-through notes followsFitch's downgrade of Brazil's sovereign long-term Issuer DefaultRatings (IDRs) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', which reflects the economy'sdeeper recession than previously anticipated, continued adversefiscal developments and the increased political uncertainty thatcould further undermine the government's capacity to effectivelyimplement fiscal measures to stabilize the growing debt burden.The Negative Outlook on the notes mirrors the Negative Outlook onthe sovereign IDRs. Under the transaction, Brazil pledges itsfull faith and credit to the loan, and such contingent liabilityranks pari passu with all of its other existing and future foreigncurrency debt.

The rating also considers the timely payments of interest andprincipal due to date. All semiannual payments due until July2015 were made directly by the State of Maranhao. The nextinterest and principal payment date in Jan. 8, 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating assigned to the notes is sensitive to changes in thecredit quality of Brazil as guarantor on an unconditional andirrevocable basis. The transaction's rating is equivalent to thehigher of Brazil's long-term or Maranhao's long-term rating.Brazil's rating remains higher than the long-term rating ofMaranhao.

OAS SA: Gets Creditor Support For $339 Million Invepar Sale-----------------------------------------------------------Jonathan Randles at Law360.com reports that Brazilian constructionfirm OAS SA said that it had reached a deal with creditors toreorganize the company, a plan that would include the sale of thefirm's prized stake in airport and infrastructure manager Inveparfor at least BRL1.35 billion ($339 million).

OAS SA said it plans to sell the Invepar stake to globalinvestment firm Brookfield Asset Management Inc., subject to courtapproval, according to Law360.com. Brookfield had beennegotiating with OAS before the construction firm filed forbankruptcy in April, the report relays.

About OAS S.A.

The OAS Group is among the largest and most experiencedinfrastructure companies in Brazil, focusing on heavy engineeringand equity investments in infrastructure projects located in andoutside Brazil and abroad for both public and private clients.The OAS Group provides services in 22 countries in Latin America,the Caribbean and Africa.

Based in Sao Paulo, Brazil, OAS S.A. is the holding company at theapex of the OAS Group. Its share capital is divided between CMPParticipacoes Ltda. (owned by Mr. Cesar de Araujo Mata Pires),which has a 90% stake, and LP Participacoes e Engenharia Ltd.(owned by Mr. Jose Adelmario Pinheiro Filho, which has a 10%stake.

Amid an investigation into alleged corruption and moneylaundering, and missed interest payments, OAS S.A. and itsaffiliates Construtora OAS S.A., OAS Investments GmbH, and OASFinance Limited on March 31, 2015, commenced judicialreorganization proceedings before the First Specialized BankruptcyCourt of Sao Paulo pursuant to Federal Law No. 11.101 of February9, 2005 of the laws of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

On April 15, 2015, OAS S.A., et al., filed Chapter 15 bankruptcypetitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 15-10937) in Manhattan,in the United States to seek U.S. recognition of the Brazilianproceedings. Renato Fermiano Tavares, as foreign representative,signed the petitions. The cases are assigned to Judge Stuart M.Bernstein. White & Case, LLP, serves as counsel in the U.S. cases.

Fitch has downgraded the Brazilian sovereign's foreign and localcurrency IDRs to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and the country ceiling to'BBB-' from 'BBB'. The Rating Outlook for the sovereign isNegative.

Brazil's rating downgrade reflects the economy's deeper recessionthan previously anticipated, continued adverse fiscal developmentsand the increased political uncertainty that could furtherundermine the government's capacity to effectively implementfiscal measures to stabilize the growing debt burden. TheNegative Outlook highlights continued uncertainty and downsiderisks related to economic, fiscal and political developments. Thedeteriorating domestic backdrop is increasing challenges for theauthorities to take timely corrective policy actions to supportconfidence and improve prospects for growth, fiscal consolidationand debt stabilization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A negative rating action on Petrobras could result from adowngrade of the sovereign and/or the perception of a lowerlinkage between Petrobras and the government.

A positive rating action on Brazil, could lead to a positiverating action on Petrobras.

The Sovereign rating sensitivities include:

-- Failure to arrest the pace of increase in the government debt burden. Crystallization of material contingent liabilities would also be negative.

-- A deeper and more prolonged recession which further undermines government debt dynamics and stokes political and social instability.

-- Erosion of international reserves and deterioration in government debt composition.

The Rating Outlook is Negative. Consequently, Fitch's sensitivityanalysis does not currently anticipate developments with a highlikelihood of leading to a positive rating change. Futuredevelopments that could individually, or collectively, result in astabilization of the Outlook include:

-- An improvement in the political environment that is conducive to improved policy implementation and supports confidence, growth and reform prospects.

-- Fiscal consolidation that leads to greater confidence in the capacity of the government to achieve debt stabilization.

-- Improved investment and growth environment and a reduction in macroeconomic imbalances.

Rumo's ratings reflect the company's strongly leveraged capitalstructure, coupled with predictable cash flow generation throughthe economic cycle and solid business position as a railroad andlogistic operator in the Brazilian infrastructure industry. Fitchsees as credit positive Rumo's part of the Cosan Group (CosanLimited, Foreign Currency and Long-term Currency IDR 'BB'/StableOutlook), which provides reasonable financial flexibility to thecompany. The merger with ALL in April 2015 also brought positiveperspective for the business, as the combined operations willallow Rumo and ALL to benefit from synergies between the twocompanies' logistics business models.

The company's Negative Outlook reflects the challenges Rumo facesto improve its currently aggressive capital structure and tofinance a huge capex plan amid Brazil's deteriorated macroeconomicand debt environment. Another important challenge will be thecompany's ability to consistently capture increasing volumes andpresent a healthier debt maturity schedule in order to improveoperating profitability and smooth current refinancing pressures.

Rumo's ratings also consider the announcement of a BRL350 millionto BRL650 million capital increase proposal, announced December3rd. The proceeds of the transaction will enhance Rumo'sconsolidated liquidity, but will not materially change leveragemeasures. Rumo's ability to begin the deleveraging process as of2017, when the greatest part of the medium-term capex program isexpected to be finished, is crucial for the maintenance of therating at the 'BB-' category.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

HIGH LEVERAGE; SLIGHT DECLINE IS EXPECTED BEYOND 2017

Rumo's leverage is high for the rating category. Fitch expectsthe company to post a net adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio,according to Fitch's methodology, in the 6.3x - 6.5x range during2015 and 2016 due to the additional debt taken on to finance thecapex plan. Fitch expects a decline to below 6.0x from 2017onwards, when the company is expected to fully benefit fromcapacity increase and operating margins expansion. The agencyexpects a gradual decline to below 6.0x just after 2017, when thecompany will be fully benefiting from the additional capacity andthe expected operating margin expansion. On a pro forma basis,considering the latest-12-month (LTM) ended Sept. 30, 2015, thecombined entity's net adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio, according toFitch's methodology, peaked at 8.2x. This figure comparesunfavorably to 6.6x in 2014 and 4.3x in 2013.

FCF WILL REMAIN NEGATIVE IN THE FOLLOWING YEARS

Despite the positive trend in Rumo's funds from operations (FFO)going forward, the expected substantial expansion capex plan willprevent the company from generating positive free cash flow (FCF).Rumo is expected to invest about BRL7.4 billion up to 2019, whichshould result in volume increases of 8% - 10% per year, during theperiod. According to Fitch's projections, Rumo's consolidatedfree cash flow is not expected to turn positive before 2018, andwill be financed by long term debt.

SOLID BUSINESS POSITION

The ratings incorporate Rumo's solid business position as the solerailroad transportation operator in the South and Mid-Westernregions of Brazil, areas with high growth potential due to stableglobal demand for grains. Although ALL faced some operatingchallenges during 2014 and 2015, the long-term fundamentals of itsbusinesses remain strong. The company's operating model hasdemonstrated resilience against adverse global economic conditionsthrough several cycles. The company has shown an ability toincrease cargo volumes in the last years during diverse economicscenarios. Fitch understands that the merger with ALL's operationwill strengthen the consolidated business profile as it willcombine important operational logistics assets and new businessopportunities with Cosan Group's rail operation.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuerinclude:

-- Mid-single digit revenues growth from 2015 to 2018;

-- EBITDA margin of about 41% in 2015; gradual increase to 49% in 2017 considering synergies and scale gains;

-- Capex of BRL2.8 billion during the second half 2015 and 2016; and BRL4.6 billion from 2017 to 2019;

-- Adjusted net debt to EBITDAR, according to Fitch' calculation, at the range of 6.0x - 6.5x in 2015 and 2016 and below 6.0x from 2017 onwards.

-- Inability to improve operational cash flow generation through increasing volumes of at least 8% per year and EBITDA margin expansion up to 2017;

-- Failure to roll over short-term debt and finance the huge capex in the medium term at competitive credit lines.

LIQUIDITY

On Sept. 30, 2015, Rumo's liquidity was tight, presenting a weakcash-to-short-term debt (including BRL537 million of rental andconcession obligations) coverage ratio of 0.4x. The capitalincrease proposal of up to BRL650 million should contribute toimprove the debt coverage ratios and reduce the refinancingpressures. During this period, consolidated cash and marketablesecurities where approximately BRL949 billion and consolidatedtotal debt was BRL12.8 billion, including BRL1.8 billion of rentaland concession obligations.

Fitch believes Rumo will be able to properly raise medium to long-term debt during the next 12 months, which will also softencurrent refinancing risks. The ratings incorporate that Rumo willachieve healthier cash to short-term debt ratios during theinvestment period; a large part should be financed by credit linesat Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES).

SUL AMERICA S.A: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'-----------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has downgraded Bradesco Seguros S.A.'s (BradescoSeguros) Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating to 'BBB-' from'BBB'. At the same time, Fitch has downgraded Sul America S.A.'s(SASA) long-term local- and foreign-currency Issuer DefaultRatings (IDRs) to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The Rating Outlook on BradescoSeguros' IFS and SASA's long-term IDRs is Negative. A full list ofrating actions follows at the end of the release.

KEY RATING DRIVERSBradesco Seguros

The downgrade of Bradesco Seguros' IFS rating results from thedowngrade of the long-term Local Currency IDR of its parent BancoBradesco S.A. (Bradesco, long-term local currency IDR 'BBB-'/Outlook Negative; for further information, see Fitch TakesActions on Financial Institutions Following Brazilian SovereignDowngrade', dated Dec. 17, 2015, at 'www.fitchratings.com'), whichin turn reflects the downgrade of Brazil's sovereign ratings. TheNegative Outlook on Bradesco Seguros' IFS mirrors that on itsparent's long-term local currency IDR. The downgrade reflects thereduced capacity of Bradesco to support Bradesco Seguros ifneeded.

Fitch considers Bradesco Seguros as a 'core subsidiary' ofBradesco, and therefore its ratings are equalized to those of itsparent. This is based on the strategic importance of the insuranceoperations, which are a key and integral part of the group'sbusiness, common branding, and high contribution of BradescoSeguros to group profits (29% in the first six months of 2015 andin 2014, and 31% in 2013). Bradesco Seguros has maintained solidprofitability through the cycles, thanks to good technical resultsand solid financial income. Its average operating ratio andaverage ROA were 76.0% and 2.5%, respectively, in 2014 and thefirst half of 2015.

SASA

SASA's IDRs are constrained by Brazil's ratings, therefore thedowngrade of the sovereign ratings have led to their downgrade.The close link between the ratings of SASA and the sovereign is aresult of the full concentration of SASA's operations in Braziland its very large Brazilian government securities holdings, whichmade up almost 67% of its total securities and corresponded to1.8x its total equity at September 2015. Exceptional notching fora ring-fenced regulatory environment was applied between theimplied insurance operating company and holding company IDRs.Notching was compressed by one relative to standard notching, assovereign-related risks have so far not affected SASA's key creditmetrics, which remain stable and adequate for its ratings. As ofSeptember 2015, SASA's profitability remained solid, as evidencedby an average operating ratio and an average ROA of 94.6% and2.9%, respectively, broadly unchanged from 2014. During the sameperiod, leverage remained relatively high but stable, withoperating leverage averaging 3.6x, the same as in 2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Bradesco Seguros: Bradesco Seguros' ratings are linked to those ofBradesco. Therefore, any change in the bank's ratings would affectthe insurer's ratings, as would a change in the bank's willingnessto provide support, which Fitch considers highly unlikely.

SASA: In case of an additional downgrade to Brazil's sovereignratings, SASA's IDRs would be subject to a review that couldresult in a range of rating actions from affirmation to a two-notch downgrade based on Fitch's insurance rating criteria thatallows flexibility as to how sovereign considerations are factoredinto insurance rating notching. The ultimate decision would bedriven by the rationale for the sovereign rating action andFitch's view of how this impacts SASA's operating environment,investment risk and overall creditworthiness. In addition, asustained and material deterioration in profitability,characterized by an ROA below 0.5%; the deterioration of theliabilities/equity ratio to above 5.0x; an increase in thefinancial leverage (financial debt/equity) to above 25% for asustained period; a fall in the interest coverage ratio to below2.0x; or a significant reduction in the holding's liquidity, couldnegatively affect the ratings.

Considering the new captive finance criteria in S&P's assessmentof Unicomer's financial risk profile (FRP), S&P expects its debtto EBITDA will remain below 2.0x. S&P also expects the companywill post free operating cash flow of about $8.4 million onaverage in the next two years, due to the company's high workingcapital needs and its expansion program. A significant portion ofUnicomer's debt is associated with its captive finance division,which supports more than 60% of the company's sales of productsand services in stores. The credit quality of Unicomer's captivefinance unit underscores a high-risk asset quality, which ismitigated by the captive finance division's debt to equity of 3x-5x, which S&P expects to remain in that range in the next 12months. Before the release of the new captive finance criteria,S&P included the high-risk asset quality in the comparative ratinganalysis (CRA) because S&P viewed Unicomer's operations as morevolatile than those of other companies with lower debt-ladencredit divisions. Given that S&P is already incorporating thisassumption in its FRP, CRA is now "neutral".

S&P assess Unicomer's captive finance risk position as "negative,"which is a rating weakness for the company. This assessmentreflects the company's captive finance unit's operation incountries with a high country risk, which makes Unicomer's assetsmore vulnerable.

===============H O N D U R A S===============

HONDURAS: Real GDP Growth Projected at 3.5 Percent, IMF Says------------------------------------------------------------The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)completed the second review of Honduras's performance under aneconomic program supported by a three-year Stand-By Arrangement(SBA) and a two-year arrangement under the Stand-By CreditFacility (SCF). This blended program was approved on December 3,2014 in the amount of SDR 129.5 million (then about US$188.6million), the equivalent of 100 percent of Honduras' quota in theIMF. With the completion of the review, the authorities haveaccess to resources in the total amount of SDR 51.8 million (aboutUS$71.2 million); however the authorities plan to continuetreating the arrangements as precautionary. The Board decisionwas taken on a lapse of time basis (a process where the Boardagrees that a proposal can be approved without convening formaldiscussions) on December 17, 2015.1

Macroeconomic performance continues to be better than envisaged inthe program. In 2015, real GDP growth is projected at 3.5percent, led by a broad expansion across sectors and supported byfavorable terms of trade, growth in trading partners and strongcapital inflows. Inflation through October remained low at 2.5percent, owing to a better monetary and fiscal policy mix as wellas the effects of lower fuels prices. In addition, overallinvestor confidence, as measured by declining spreads on externaldebt, has improved. For 2016, the outlook remains just aspositive, with inflation low at about 5 percent and real GDPgrowth projected at 3.5 percent.

Program implementation for the second review has been strong. All2015 end-June performance criteria and indicative targets weremet, most with significant margins. On the structural side, Juneand September 2015 benchmarks were broadly observed. Theauthorities are pressing ahead with structural reforms, includingthe introduction of a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), and anoverhaul of tax administration.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onJuly 22, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on theRepublic of Honduras to 'B+' from 'B'. The outlook is stable.S&P affirmed its short-term foreign and local currency sovereigncredit ratings on Honduras at 'B'. S&P also raised the transferand convertibility assessment to 'BB-'.

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JAMAICA: IDB OKs US$175MM Loan for Modernization of Container Port------------------------------------------------------------------The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved its largestsingle non-sovereign guaranteed transaction in Jamaica with asenior secured loan of up to US$175 million for Kingston FreeportTerminal Limited, to finance the optimization and expansion ofKingston's container terminal capacity in Jamaica.

The IDB loan will help finance the deepening of the navigationchannel from 13.5 to 14.2 meters, reinforcing part of the existingquay and acquiring new equipment to expand the terminal capacityfrom 2.8 million to 3.2 million TEU per year. The upgrades willincrease the Port's competitiveness, enabling it to handle agrowing volume from Asia, North America and Europe.

"The Project will increase the Port's capacity, and itsmodernization will enable it to handle larger container ships andmove more cargo. The improvements will increase KingstonTerminal's competitiveness and its ability to handle the expectedgrowing volume of trade once the expansion of the Panama Canal isfinalized," said Jean-Marc Aboussouan, Chief of the InfrastructureDivision in the IDB's Structured and Corporate Finance Department.

The investments will be implemented under a 30-year concessioncontract to a French consortium led by CMA CGM, the third largestcontainer shipping company in the world, and CMA TerminalsHolding, a large worldwide port operator worldwide. The contractprovides for management of the improvements and operation andmaintenance of the container terminal.

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As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issuerating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in twotranches. The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in2028. The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaicaowes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016budget.

The ratings affirmation follows CdM's proposed exchange offeringsubsequent to Fitch's expectation that the company would not beable to meet its next coupon payment due in May 2016. According toFitch's methodology, the proposed offering imposes a materialreduction in terms vis-a-vis the original terms of the 2018 notes,resulting in a distressed debt exchange.

The offering proposes to voluntarily exchange US$217 millionsenior notes due 2018 for new USD119.5 million senior secured PIKtoggle notes due 2021 plus additional secured notes in the amountof accrued and unpaid interest plus USD97.8 million junior non-interest bearing 2045 notes. The offering is contingent to theconsent of more than 50% of the holders of the existing note.

If successful, the exchange offering will result in a recovery ofapproximately 101% of the principal in the form of deeplysubordinated quasi-equity instruments depending on holders'election to early tender. Note holders validly tendering theexisting notes may, as part of the exchange offer, elect to sellthe junior notes portion of their exchange consideration to asubsidiary of CdM's parent company, Frontera Copper Corp, equal toa 2% recovery of this instrument.

Existing note holders that do not participate in the exchange willremain outstanding and subject to existing terms, but subject toan as yet unspecified amendment of the existing note indentures.The ratings continue to reflect pressure on liquidity to servicedebt if the exchange is unsuccessful.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The successful completion of the exchange will result in the IDRsbeing downgraded to Restricted Default 'RD'. Shortly after thedistressed debt exchange is completed, the IDRs will be re-ratedand raised to a performing level, which usually is still in thelow speculative grade. The tender expiration date is Jan. 20,2016.

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PUERTO RICO: Doesn't Get Ch. 9 Access in Budget Bill----------------------------------------------------Carmen Germaine at Law360.com reports that the omnibus spendingbill unveiled by lawmakers ignored Puerto Rico's pleas for accessto Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection or emergency cash to make debtpayments, but it did provide the island with Medicarereimbursements projected to bring in $900 million over a decade.

The appropriations bill released does not contain any provisionsgranting Puerto Rico access to Chapter 9 of the U.S. BankruptcyCode, which allows municipalities to restructure their debtthrough the courts, nor did it provide any cash to help theterritory make coming payments on its $73 billion debt load orprovide new tax credits, according to Law360.com.

Pedro Pierluisi, the territory's nonvoting congressionalrepresentative, slammed the omissions in a statement, saying thatallowing the territory to access Chapter 9 would not costtaxpayers, the report notes. Puerto Rico is currently barred fromaccessing the bankruptcy provision under a 1984 amendment to theBankruptcy Code, the report relays.

"Honesty requires me to note that the objections to this provisioncame exclusively from Republicans," the report quoted Mr.Pierluisi as saying. "If members of Congress believe that theyare somehow helping Puerto Rico's creditors by opposing efforts toenable Puerto Rico to restructure a portion of its debts, I thinkthey are making a terrible miscalculation," Mr. Pierluisi added.

The report relays that Mr. Pierluisi cited Congressional BudgetOffice reports estimating that the discharge reimbursement wouldprovide the territory with an additional $618 million between 2016and 2025, and that the bonus payments would provide $266 million,for a total of nearly $900 million in benefits to Puerto Ricanhospitals over the next decade.

If the Medicare amendments are signed into law with the spendingbill, they would both become effective on Jan. 1, 2016, the reportdiscloses.

The Obama administration had called for health care reform as partof a strategy to help the island cope with the mounting debt andavoid a humanitarian crisis, the report relates. Theadministration's plan also urged Congress to grant Puerto Ricoaccess to even broader bankruptcy protections than Chapter 9, torequire the territory to implement strong fiscal oversight, and toextend the earned income tax credit to Puerto Rican citizens.

Bills to allow Puerto Rico access to Chapter 9 are currentlyfloating in both the House and Senate, but Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, blocked a bid by Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., to take upand pass the Senate bill, notes the report.

The report says Senate Republicans on Dec. 9 introducedlegislation that would provide financial relief for the territoryin the form of payroll taxes and new authority to borrow funds,but it didn't include an option pushed by Democrats to allowPuerto Rico access to a restructuring regime.

Puerto Rico's attempt at creating its own restructuring regime,the Recovery Act, was invalidated by the First Circuit in Julyafter a challenge from investment firms holding $2 billion inbonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, thereport relays. The case is currently on appeal to the SupremeCircuit.

The commonwealth defaulted on its obligations on the debt inAugust, but made a scheduled $355 million payment on principal andinterest on certain bonds that came due Dec. 1 to avoid anotherdefault, the report discloses.

Lawmakers have until Dec. 22 to pass the more than 2,000-pagebill, after the U.S. House of Representatives voted to extendstopgap government spending authority past Dec. 16. Final votes onthe bill are expected Dec. 25, the report adds.

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As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onSept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered itsratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, wherethey had been placed with negative implications July 20. Theoutlook is negative.

PUERTO RICO: Indicates Debt Default is On the Horizon-----------------------------------------------------Law360.com reports that Puerto Rico's governor said that thecommonwealth will default on its debt for the second time in thelast five months and ripped congressional lawmakers for notpassing legislation that would give the territory access to theU.S. bankruptcy system.

Gov. Alejandro Garcia-Padilla said that Congress through itsinaction "had opted for the U.S. commonwealth to default on itsobligations and unfold into chaos," according to Law360.com.

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As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America onSept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered itsratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, wherethey had been placed with negative implications July 20. Theoutlook is negative.

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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicativeprices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outsidesources during the prior week we think are reliable. Thosesources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The MondayBond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Pricesfor actual trades are probably different. Our objective is toshare information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buyor sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entityaffiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in theissuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

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