(Traduction Israel Shahak)
Nous publions ici l'essentiel d'un texte paru a Jerusalem en fevrier 1982 dans le n° 14 de la revue en
hebreu Kivunim, organe de la World Zionist Organization (Organisation sioniste mondiale). II a ete traduit
en anglais et publie en juin 1982 par Israel Shahak, l'infatigable defenseur israelien des droits de I'homme.
Faute de place, nous n'avons pas reproduit ici les notes en bas de page.
Les premieres pages du texte ne concernent pas directement le Moyen-Orient. L'auteur y constate que
dans le monde d'aujourd'hui la morale ne joue plus guere de role et que ce sont les besoins materiels qui
l'emportent. II affirme aussi que I'URSS utilisera la force nucleaire pour s'imposer. Rappelons une derniere
fois que ce texte a ete publie au debut de 1982.
Depuis 1967, les Soviets ont transforme la maxime de Clausewitz en : "La guerre est la continuation
de la politique par des moyens nucleaires," et ils en ont fait la devise qui guide toute leur politique. Deja, ils
sont aujourd'hui en train de realiser leurs objectifs dans notre region et a travers le monde, et la necessite de
s'y opposer devient l'element majeur dans notre politique de securite interieure et bien entendu celui du reste
du monde libre. C'est la notre defi exterieur majeur.
C'est pourquoi le monde arabo-musulman n'est pas le probleme strategique majeur que nous
affronterons dans les annees quatre-vingts, bien qu'il represente la principale menace contre Israel grace a sa
puissance militaire grandissante. Le monde, avec ses minorites ethniques, ses factions et crises internes, qui
est etonnamment auto-destructeur, comme on peut le voir au Liban, en Iran non-arabe et maintenant aussi en
Syrie, est incapable de surmonter ses problemes fondamentaux et ne constitue pas ainsi une menace reelle a
long terme pour l'Etat d' Israel, mais seulement a court terme ou son pouvoir militaire immediat a une grande
importance. A long terme, ce monde sera incapable d'exister a l'interieur de son cadre actuel dans les zones
qui nous entourent sans devoir subir des transformations revolutionnaires authentiques. Le monde arabo-
musulman est construit comme un chateau de cartes provisoire agence par des etrangers (la France et la Grande
Bretagne dans les annees 1920), sans que les souhaits et les desirs des habitants aient ete pris en compte. Ce
monde a ete divise arbitrairement en 19 Etats, tous produits de combinaisons de minorites et de groupes
ethniques hostiles les uns aux autres de sorte que chaque Etat arabe musulman subit aujourd'hui une
destruction de l'interieur et dans quelques uns d'entre eux une guerre civile fait deja rage. La plupart des
Arabes, 118 sur 170 millions, vivent en Afrique, en majorite en Egypte (45 millions). A part l'Egypte, tous
les Etats du Maghreb forment un melange d' Arabes et de Berberesnon-arabes. En Algerie la guerre civile fait
rage dans les montagnes de Kabylie entre les deux nations du pays. Le Maroc et l'Algerie sont en guerre au
sujet du Sahara espagnol, outre les luttes internes de chacun d'entre eux. L'Islam militant met en danger
l'integrite de la Tunisie et Kaddafi fomente des guerres qui sont destructrices du point de vue arabe, de la part
d'un pays peu peuple et qui ne peut pas devenir une nation puissante. C'est pour cela qu'il avait tente dans le
passe des unifications avec des Etats qui sont plus authentiques, comme l'Egypte et la Syrie. Le Soudan,
l'Etat le plus ecartele dans le monde arabo-musulman d'aujourd'hui est le produit de quatre groupes hostiles
les uns aux autres, une minorite arabo-musulmane sunnite qui gouverne une majorite d'Africains non-arabes,
paiens et Chretiens. En Egypte, il y a une majorite de musulmans sunnites faisant face a une importante
minorite de Chretiens qui est dominante en Haute-Egypte (quelque 7 millions d'entre eux) de sorte que meme
Sadate, dans son discours du 8 Mai, exprima sa peur qu'ils ne reclament un Etat autonome, quelque chose
d'identique a un «second» Liban Chretien en Egypte.
Tous les Etats arabes a l'Est d'lsrael sont dechires et infestes de conflits internes encore plus
nombreux que ceux du Maghreb. La Syrie n'est pas differente fondamentalement du Liban a l'exception du
regime militaire fort qui la gouverne. Mais la guerre civile reelle qui a lieu de nos jours entre la majorite
sunnite et la minorite chiite alaouite regnante (pas plus de 12 % de la population) prouve la gravite du
probleme interieur.
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
L'Irak n'est pas, encore une fois, essentiellement different de ses voisins, bien que sa majorite soit
chiite et que la minorite sunnite soit regnante. Soixante-cinq pour cent de la population n'a pas droit au
chapitre en politique, ou une elite de 20 % tient le pouvoir. En outre, il y a une importante minorite kurde
dans le Nord, et si ce n'etait la fermete du regime, de l'armee et les revenus petroliers, l'etat futur de l'lrak ne
serait pas si different de celui du Liban dans le passe ou de la Syrie aujourd'hui. Les germes de conflit
interieur de guerre civile sont deja visibles aujourd'hui, surtout apres 1' accession de Khomeiny au pouvoir en
Iran, un leader que les chiites en Irak percoivent comme leur chef naturel.
Toutes les principautes du Golfe et 1' Arabie saoudite reposent sur un chateau de sable qui ne contient
que du petrole. Au Koweit, les Koweitis ne representent que le quart de la population. A Bahrain, les chiites
sont a nouveau la majorite, mais ce sont les sunnites qui sont au pouvoir. II en est de meme a Oman et au
Yemen du Nord. Meme au Yemen du Sud marxiste il y a une minorite chiite assez importante. En Arabie
Saoudite, la moitie de la population est etrangere, egyptienne et yemenite, mais une minorite saoudienne
detient le pouvoir.
La Jordanie est en realite palestinienne, gouvernee par une minorite bedouine trans-jordanienne, mais
le plus gros de l'armee et certainement l'administration sont maintenant palestiniens. En fait, Amman est
aussi palestinienne que Naplouse. Tous ces pays ont des armees relativement puissantes. Mais ici aussi il y a
probleme. L'armee syrienne actuelle est en majeure partie sunnite avec un corps d'officiers alaouite ; l'armee
irakienne est aussi chiite avec des commandants sunnites. Cela a une grande signification pour le long terme,
et c'est pourquoi il ne sera pas possible de maintenir la loyaute de l'armee pour une longue duree en dehors du
seul denominateur commun : l'hostilite envers Israel, et meme cela est aujourd'hui insuffisant.
Les autres Etats musulmans, face aux Arabes, aussi divises qu'ils soient, partagent le meme sort. La
moitie de la population iranienne parle le persan, 1' autre moitie est d'origine turque. La population turque est
composee d'une majorite de musulmans sunnites (50 %), et deux importantes minorites, 12 millions
d'Alaouites chiites et 6 millions de Kurdes sunnites. En Afghanistan, il y a 5 millions de chiites qui
constituent le tiers de la population. Le Pakistan sunnite a quinze millions de chiites qui mettent en danger
l'existence de l'Etat.
Ce tableau des minorites nationales ethniques s'etendant du Maroc a l'lnde et de la Somalie a la
Turquie indique l'absence de stabilite et une degenerescence rapide de la region entiere. Quand ce tableau est
ajoute au tableau economique, nous voyons comment toute la region est edifiee comme un chateau de cartes,
incapable de resister a ses problemes graves.
Dans ce monde geant mais eclate il y a quelques groupes prosperes et une enorme masse de pauvres.
La plupart des Arabes ont un revenu annuel moyen de 300 dollars. C'est la situation en Egypte, dans les pays
du Maghreb, sauf la Libye, et en Irak. Le Liban est dechire et son economie est en train de tomber en ruines.
C'est un Etat dans lequel il n'y a pas de pouvoir central, mais seulement cinq autorites souveraines de facto
(chretienne dans leNord, soutenue par la Syrie et sous l'autorite du clan des Franjie, a l'Est une zone sous
controle syrien direct, au centre une enclave chretienne controlee par les Phalangistes, dans le Sud et jusqu'au
Litani une region a majorite palestinienne controlee par l'OLP , l'Etat Chretien du Commandant Haddad et un
demi million de chiites. La Syrie est dans une situation encore plus difficile et l'aide qu'elle obtiendra avec
son union avec la Libye ne sera pas suffisante pour affronter les problemes fondamentaux materiels et
l'entretien d'une grande armee. L'Egypte est dans une situation encore pire : des millions de gens sont au
bord de la famine, la moitie de la main d'oeuvre est sans emploi, et le logement est rare dans cette zone la
plus peuplee du monde. A l'exception de l'armee, il n'y a pas un seul ministere fonctionnant efficacement et
l'Etat est dans un etat de banqueroute permanente et dependant entierement de l'assistance etrangere americaine
accordee depuis la paix.
II existe dans les Etats du Golfe, 1' Arabie saoudite, la Libye et 1' Egypte, la plus grande concentration
d'argent et de petrole du monde, mais ceux qui en profitent sont de petites elites qui manquent d'un large
soutien de base et de confiance en soi, ce qu'aucune armee ne saurait garantir. L' Arabie saoudite avec tout son
equipement ne pourrait defendre le regime des vrais dangers interieurs et exterieurs, et ce qui s'est passe a la
Mecque en 1980 en est un exemple parmi d' autres. Une situation triste et explosive entoure Israel et lui pose
des defis, des problemes, des risques mais aussi des occasions d'une portee considerable pour la premiere fois
depuis 1967. II y a de grandes chances que les occasions manquees a ce moment puissent se realiser dans les
annees 1980 a un point et dans des dimensions que nous ne pourrions meme pas imaginer aujourd'hui.
La politique de «paix» et le retour des territoires, sous la pression des Etats-Unis met en peril la
realisation des nouvelles possibilites qui s'offrent a nous. Depuis 1967, tous les gouvernements d'Israel ont
lie nos buts nationaux a des besoins politiques etroits d'une part et, de l'autre, a des opinions interieures
destructives qui ont neutralise nos capacites a l'exterieur eta l'interieur. Le fait de n'avoir pu faire un pas en
direction de la population arabe dans les nouveaux territoires, acquis au cours d'une guerre qui nous a ete
imposee, est l'erreur strategique majeure commise par Israel au lendemain de la Guerre des Six Jours. Nous
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
nous serions epargnes depuis lors le plus amer et le plus dangereux des conflits si nous avions donne la
Jordanie aux Palestiniens qui vivent en Cisjordanie. En faisant cela, nous aurions neutralise le probleme
palestinien que nous affrontons maintenant, et pour lequel nous avons trouve des solutions qui ne sont
vraiment pas du tout des solutions, tel que des compromis territoriaux, ou l'autonomie, ce qui revient en
realite au meme. Aujourd'hui, nous faisons face tout d'un coup a d'immenses possibilites pour changer la
situation en profondeur, et cela nous le ferons dans cette decennie, autrement nous ne survivrons pas en tant
qu'Etat.
Au cours des annees 1980, l'Etat d'Israel devra realiser des changements d'une portee considerable a
l'interieur, dans son regime politique et economique, parallelement a des changements radicaux dans sa
politique etrangere, afin de faire face aux defis globaux et regionaux de cette nouvelle periode. La perte des
champs petroliferes du Canal de Suez, des enormes reserves de petrole, de gaz et d'autres ressources dans la
peninsule du Sinai qui est geomorphologiquement identique aux riches pays producteurs de petrole de la
region, debouchera sur un manque d'energie dans un proche avenir et detruira notre economie interieure : le
quart de notre PNB aussi bien que le tiers du budget sont utilises pour l'achat de petrole. La recherche des
matieres premieres dans le Neguev et sur la cote ne changera pas dans un prochain avenir cet etat de choses.
Recuperer la peninsule du Sinai, avec ses ressources actuelles et potentielles, est done une priorite
politique a laquelle les accords de paix de Camp David font obstacle. La faute incombe bien stir au
gouvernement israelien actuel et aux gouvernements qui ont prepare le chemin pour le compromis territorial,
depuis 1967. Les Egyptiens n'auront pas besoin de respecter les traites de paix apres le retour du Sinai, et ils
feront tout ce qu'ils peuvent pour reintegrer le monde arabe et se rapprocher de l'URSS afin de se procurer de
l'aide et de l'assistance militaire. L'aide americaine n'est garantie que pour une courte periode du fait que les
conditions de la paix et l'affaiblissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique a l'interieur comme a l'exterieur
conduiront a une reduction de l'aide. Sans petrole et le revenu qu'on en tire, avec les enormes depenses
actuelles, nous ne serons pas capables de franchir 1982 dans les conditions actuelles et nous devrons agir afin
de revenir au statu quo qui existait au Sinai avant la visite de Sadate et le traite de paix fautif signe avec lui
en mars 1979.
Israel a deux voies majeures a travers lesquelles il atteindra cet objectif, l'une directe et 1' autre
indirecte. L'option directe est la moins realiste a cause de la nature du regime et du gouvernement en Israel
aussi bien de la sagesse de Sadate qui obtint notre retrait du Sinai, ce qui fut, au lendemain de la Guerre de
1973, sa plus importante realisation depuis son accession au pouvoir. Israel ne rompra pas unilateralement le
traite, ni aujourd'hui ni en 1982, a moins d'etre fortement contraint economiquement et politiquement et que
l'Egypte fournisse a Israel l'excuse de reprendre le Sinai pour la quatrieme fois de notre courte histoire. Ce qui
reste done, e'est l'option indirecte. La situation economique en Egypte, la nature du regime et sa politique
pan-arabe, amenera apres avril 1982 une situation dans laquelle Israel sera force d'agir directement ou
indirectement afin de reprendre pour longtemps le controle du Sinai en tant que point strategique economique
et reserve d'energie. L'Egypte ne represente pas un probleme strategique militaire du fait de ses problemes
internes et pourrait etre ramenee a sa situation du lendemain de la Guerre de 1967 en pas plus d'une journee.
Le mythe de l'Egypte en tant que puissant leader du monde arabe fut aneanti des 1956 et sans aucun
doute il ne survecut pas en 1967, mais notre politique qui rendit le Sinai fit du mythe un «fait». Cependant,
en realite, la puissance de l'Egypte par rapport a Israel seul et au reste du monde arabe s'est reduite de 50 %
depuis 1967. L'Egypte n'est plus l'avant-garde politique dans le monde arabe et elle est economiquement au
bord de la crise. Sans aide etrangere, la crise eclaterait le lendemain. A court terme, du fait du retour du Sinai,
l'Egypte gagnera plusieurs avantages a nos depens, mais seulement a court terme jusqu'en 1982, et cela ne
changera pas l'equilibre a son avantage, et amenera probablement sa chute. L'Egypte se donne deja, dans sa
politique interieure, l'image d'un cadavre et d'autant plus si Ton tient compte de la montee du conflit entre
musulmans et Chretiens. Depecer territorialement l'Egypte en regions geographiques distinctes, e'est le dessein
politique d'Israel dans les annees 1980 sur son front occidental.
L'Egypte est divisee et morcelee en plusieurs ilots de pouvoir. Si l'Egypte se desintegre, des pays
comme la Libye, le Soudan ou meme les pays plus lointains ne continuerons pas a exister dans leur forme
actuelle et connaitront a leur tour la chute et la dissolution de l'Egypte. La perspective d'un Etat Chretien
copte en Haute-Egypte, parallelement a un certain nombre d'Etats faibles avec un pouvoirtres localise, et sans
un gouvernement centralise comme de nos jours, cette perspective est la cle pour un developpement
historique, qui prit du retard uniquement a cause du traite de paix, mais qui semble inevitable a long terme.
Le front occidental, qui parait en surface plus problematique, est en fait moins complique que le front
oriental, ou la plupart des evenements saillants sont de fraiche date. La dissolution totale du Liban en cinq
provinces doit servir de precedent pour le monde arabe dans sa totalite, y compris l'Egypte, la Syrie, l'lrak et
la Peninsule arabique. La dissolution de la Syrie et plus tard de l'lrak en zones exclusivement ethniques ou
religieuses comme au Liban, est l'objectif principal d'Israel pour le long terme sur son front oriental, tandis
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
que la dissolution du pouvoir militaire de ces Etats constitue un objectif principal dans le court terme. La
Syrie se disloquera en fonction de sa structure ethnique et religieuse en plusieurs Etats comme de nos jours au
Liban, de sorte qu'on aura un Etat alaouite le long de la cote, un Etat sunnite dans la region d'Alep, un autre
Etat sunnite a Damas hostile a son voisin du Nord, et les Druzes qui erigeront un Etat, peut-etre meme sur
notre Golan, et certainement dans le Hauran et dans le Nord du Jourdain. Cet etat des choses sera la garantie
de la paix et de la securite pour le long terme dans la region, et cet objectif est deja aujourd'hui a notre portee.
L'Irak, riche en petrole d'un cote, et dechire interieurement de l'autre, est un candidat garanti pour les objectifs
d'Israel. Sa dissolution est meme encore plus importante pour nous que celle de la Syrie. L'Irak est plus fort
que la Syrie. C'est la puissance irakienne qui constitue dans le court terme le plus grand danger pour Israel.
Une guerre Irak-Iran dechirera l'lrak et provoquera sa chute interieure meme avant qu'il ne soit capable
d'organiser une bataille sur un large front contre nous. N'importe quel conflit inter-arabe nous sera profitable
dans le court terme et raccourcira la voie pour l'objectif encore plus important, celui de la dislocation de l'lrak
en groupes comme en Syrie et au Liban. En Irak, une division en provinces selon des criteres ethnico-
religieux comme en Syrie du temps de l'Empire ottoman est possible. Ainsi, trois (ou plus) Etats existeront
autour des trois importantes villes : Bassorah, Baghdad et Mossoul, et les regions chiites du Sud se
separeront des regions sunnites et kurdes au Nord. II est possible que la confrontation irano-irakienne puisse
approfondir cette polarisation.
La Peninsule arabique est une candidate toute naturelle a la dissolution du fait des pressions
interieures et exterieures, et la chose est inevitable surtout en Arabie Saoudite. Nonobstant le fait que sa
puissance economique, fondee sur le petrole, demeure intacte ou qu'elle puisse diminuer a long terme, les
fissures internes et les depressions sont un developpement evident et naturel a la lumiere de la structure
politique presente.
La Jordanie represente un objectif strategique immediat dans le court terme, mais non dans le long
terme, parce qu'elle ne constitue pas une menace reelle dans le long terme apres sa dissolution, la fin du long
regne du Roi Hussein et le transfert du pouvoir aux Palestiniens dans le court terme.
II n'y a aucune chance pour que la Jordanie puisse continuer d'exister dans le long terme dans sa
structure actuelle et la politique d'Israel, en periode de guerre comme en periode de paix, doit etre orientee
vers la liquidation de la Jordanie sous sa forme actuelle et le transfert du pouvoir a la majorite palestinienne.
Changer le regime a l'Est du Jourdain amenera la fin du probleme des territoires densement peuples dArabes a
l'Est du Jourdain. Que ce soit en periode de guerre ou de paix, Immigration a partir des territoires et leur gel
demographique et economique sont les garanties pour un prochain changement sur les deux rives du Jourdain,
et nous devons etre plus actifs dans l'acceleration de ce processus dans l'avenir le plus proche. Le projet
d'autonomie doit etre aussi rejete, aussi bien que n'importe quel compromis ou division des territoires car,
selon les plans de l'OLP et ceux des Arabes israeliens eux-memes, le plan Shefa'amr de septembre 1980, il
n'est plus possible de continuer a vivre dans ce pays dans la situation actuelle sans la separation des deux
nations, les Arabes vers la Jordanie et les juifs vers les regions a l'Ouest du Jourdain. Une coexistence
authentique et la paix regneront dans le pays seulement quand les Arabes auront compris que, sans un pouvoir
juif s'etendant du Jourdain a la mer ils n'auront ni existence ni securite. lis n'auront une nation a eux et la
securite qu'en Jordanie.
A l'interieur d'Israel, la distinction entre les zones de 1967 et les autres territoires, ceux de 1948, a
toujours ete sans signification pour les Arabes et de nos jours elle n'a plus aucune signification pour nous. Le
probleme doit etre envisage dans sa totalite, sans aucune division, comme celle de 67. II doit etre clair, dans
n'importe quelle situation politique future ou n'importe quelle constellation militaire, que la solution du
probleme des Arabes indigenes viendra seulement quand ils reconnaitront l'existence d'Israel dans des
frontieres sures jusqu'a la riviere du Jourdain et au-dela, en tant que notre besoin existentiel dans cette epoque
difficile, 1' epoque du nucleaire dans laquelle nous entrerons bientot. II n'est plus possible de vivre avec trois-
quarts de population juive sur une bande cotiere dense qui est trop dangereuse a l'ere nucleaire.
La dispersion de la population est done l'objectif strategique interieur du plus grand interet;
autrement, nous cesserons d'exister a l'interieur de n'importe quelle frontiere. La Judee, la Samarie et la
Galilee sont l'unique garantie de notre existence nationale et, si nous ne devenons pas la majorite dans les
regions montagneuses, nous ne regnerons pas dans le pays, et nous serons comme les Croises qui ont perdu le
pays qui n'etait de toute maniere pas le leur, et dans lequel ils n'etaient que des etrangers pour commencer.
Reequilibrer le pays demographiquement, strategiquement et economiquement est aujourd'hui l'objectif le
plus grand et le plus central. Mettre la main sur la ligne de partage des eaux de Bersheeba jusqu'a la Haute
Galilee est l'objectif national engendre par la perspective strategique majeure qui est la colonisation de la
partie la plus montagneuse du pays, aujourd'hui vide de juifs.
Realiser nos buts sur le front oriental depend d'abord de la realisation de notre objectif strategique
interieur. La transformation de la structure politique et economique, capable d'aider a la realisation de ces
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
objectifs strategiques, est la cle de l'achevement du changement entier. Nous avons besoin de passer d'une
economie centralisee dans laquelle le gouvernement a un role central, a un marche libre et ouvert, aussi bien
que de cesser de dependre du contribuable americain pour developper avec nos propres moyens une
authentique infrastructure economique productive. Si nous ne sommes pas capables de realiser ce changement
librement et volontairement, nous y serons forces par les developpements mondiaux, surtout dans les
domaines de 1' economie, de l'energie et du politique, et par notre propre isolement croissant.
D'un point de vue militaire et strategique, l'Occident dirige par les USA est incapable de resister a
l'ensemble des pressions de l'URSS de par le monde, et Israel doit pour cela se tenir seule dans les annees 80,
sans aucune assistance etrangere, militaire ou economique, et ceci est aujourd'hui dans nos possibilites, sans
compromis. Des changements rapides dans le monde vont produire un changement dans la condition des juifs
dans le monde, pour lesquels Israel deviendra non seulement un dernier recours mais aussi la seule alternative
existentielle. Nous ne pouvons pas assurer que les juifs americains et les communautes d'Europe et
d' Amerique latine continueront d'exister dans l'avenir dans la forme actuelle.
Notre existence dans ce pays meme est sure et il n'y a aucune force qui pourrait nous en deloger ni par
la violence ni par la ruse (methode de Sadate). Malgre les difficultes de la politique erronee de «paix» et le
probleme des Arabes israeliens et celui des territoires, nous pouvons traiter efficacement ces problemes dans
un avenir pre visible.
Le commentaire d'Israel Shahak
II faut clarifier trois elements importants pour pouvoir comprendre les possibilites les plus
significatives pour la realisation de ce plan sioniste pour le Moyen-Orient, et aussi pourquoi il doit etre
publie.
Les conditions militaires de ce plan.
Nous n'avons pas mentionne jusqu'ici les conditions militaires de ce plan, mais lors des multiples
occasions ou Ton vient a «expliquer» dans des reunions privees un plan de ce genre a des membres de
l'establishment israelien, cet aspect militaire est alors clarifie. II est suppose que les forces militaires
israeliennes, dans toutes ses branches, sont insuffisantes pour assumer 1' occupation d' aussi vastes territoires
que ceux qui ont ete mentionnes plus haut. En realite, meme en temps de «troubles» palestiniens intenses, les
forces de l'armee israelienne sont trop dispersees. La parade est la methode de gouverner au moyen des «forces
de Haddad» ou des «Associations de villages* : des forces locales soumises a des «chefs» completement
dissocies de la population, n'ayant meme pas derriere eux de structure feodale ou de parti (comme en ont les
Phalangistes, par exemple). Les «Etats» proposes par Yinon sont des «Territoires de Haddad» ou des
«Associations de villages», et leurs forces armees en seraient a n'en pas douter similaires. En plus, la
superiorite militaire israelienne serait dans de telles conditions beaucoup plus grande qu'elle ne Test meme
maintenant, de sorte que tout mouvement de revoke serait «puni» soit par une humiliation massive comme en
Cisjordanie et dans la Bande de Gaza, ou par bombardement et effacement de villes, comme aujourd'hui (Juin
1982) au Liban, ou par les deux. Afin d'y parvenir, le plan, comme il est explique oralement, appelle a
l'etablissement de garnisons a des endroits strategiques entre les mini-Etats, pourvues de forces destructives
mobiles. En fait, nous avons vu quelque chose de similaire dans le territoire de Haddad et nous verrons
certainement le premier exemple de ce systeme fonctionner soit dans le Sud du Liban ou dans tout le Liban.
II est evident que les suppositions militaires enoncees plus haut, et aussi le plan dans sa totalite,
dependent aussi du fait de savoir si les Arabes vont continuer d'etre plus divises que maintenant, et de
l'absence en leur sein de tout mouvement progressiste de masse. II se peut que ces deux conditions soient
ecartees des que le plan sera bien avance, avec des consequences qui sont imprevisibles.
Pourquoi est-il necessaire de publier ce plan en Israel.
La raison de la publication est la nature double de la societe israelo-judaique : une grande etendue de
liberie et de democratic, surtout pour les juifs, combinee a l'expansionnisme et la discrimination raciale. Dans
une telle situation, l'elite judeo-israelienne (du fait que les masses suivent la tele et les discours de Begin) a
besoin d'etre persuadee. Les premiers pas dans ce processus de persuasion sont d'ordre oral, comme on l'a
indique plus haut, mais il vient le temps ou cela devient insuffisant. Le materiel ecrit doit etre produit au
benefice de «persuadeurs» et «explicateurs» plus stupides (par exemple les officiers de rang moyen qui sont,
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
d'habitude, remarquablement stupides). lis «l'apprennent» alors plus ou moins et le prechent aux autres. II
faut remarquer qu'Israel, et meme le Yishouv (l'ensemble des juifs en Palestine des annees 1920), a toujours
marche de cette facon. Je me rappelle moi-meme bien (avant d'etre «en opposition*) comment la necessite de
la guerre avec l'Egypte m'aete expliquee, a moi et a d' autres un an avant la guerre de 1956, et comment la
necessite de conquerir «le reste de la Palestine occidentale quand nous en aurons l'occasion» etait expliquee
dans les annees 1965-67.
Pourquoi suppose-t-on qu'il n'y ait pas de risque particulier venant de l'exterieur concernant la
publication de tels plans ?
De tels riques peuvent venir de deux sources, pour autant que 1' opposition principale interieure
demeure tres faible (une situation qui pourrait changer du fait de la guerre contre le Liban) : le monde arabe, y
compris les Palestiniens, et les Etats-Unis. Le monde arabe s'est montre nettement incapable d'une analyse
minutieuse et rationnelle de la societe judeo-israelienne, et les Palestiniens n'ont pas ete dans l'ensemble
meilleurs que le reste. Dans une telle situation, meme ceux qui sont en train de crier contre les dangers de
l'expansionnisme israelien (qui sont assez reels), le font non a partir de connaissance effective et detaillee,
mais par croyance dans le mythe. Un bon exemple en cela, c'est la croyance tres persistante en l'existence d'un
inscription, qui n'existe pas, sur le mur de la Knesset, du verset de la Bible qui decrit Israel comme s'etendant
du Nil a l'Euphrate. Un autre exemple, ce sont les declarations persistantes et completement fausses qui sont
faites par quelques-uns des leaders arabes les plus importants, au sujet des deux raies bleues du drapeau
israelien qui symboliseraient le Nil et l'Euphrate, alors qu'ils sont en fait repris des raies du chale de prieres
juif (Talit). Les specialistes israeliens supposent qu'en fin de compte les Arabes ne feront pas attention a leurs
discussions serieuses sur l'avenir, et la guerre du Liban leur a donne raison. Alors pourquoi ne pourraient-ils
pas continuer avec leurs vieilles methodes de persuasion des autres Israeliens ?
Une situation fort similaire se retrouve aux Etats-Unis, au moins jusqu'a maintenant. La plupart des
commentateurs plus ou moins serieux prennent leurs informations sur Israel, et l'essentiel de l'opinion qu'ils
s'en font, de deux sources. La premiere consiste en articles de la presse americaine «liberale», rediges presque
totalement par des admirateurs juifs d'Israel qui, meme s'ils se montrent critiques de quelques aspects de
l'Etat d'Israel, pratiquent loyalement ce que Staline avait l'habitude d'appeler «la critique constructive)). (En
fait, ceux d'entre euxqui se targuent d'etre «anti-staliniens» sont en realite plus staliniens que Staline, avec
Israel comme leur Dieu qui n'a pas failli). Dans le cadre de ce culte critique, Israel est cense avoir toujours de
«bonnes intentions)) et ne «fait que des erreurs», de sorte qu'un tel plan ne pourrait etre l'objet de discussion -
exactement comme les genocides bibliques commis par des juifs ne sont pas mentionnes. L'autre source
d' information, leJerusalem Post, adopte une politique similaire. Ainsi, tant que la situation existe dans
laquelle Israel est reellement une «societe fermee» au reste du monde, parce que le monde veut fermer ses
yeux, la publication et meme le commencement de la realisation d'un tel plan est realiste et faisable.
17juinl982
Gazette du Golfe et des banlieues (premiere serie), n°4, mai 1991.
Publication originale: Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Special Document, No 1)
Oded Yinon, Israel Shahak, Interlink Pub Group Inc; Paperback - 1 June, 1982 ISBN: 0937694568. Seems
to be out of print.
Traduction d'abordparue dans La Revue d'etudes palestiniennes, N° 5, Paris, automne 1982, p. 73-84.
«««««««««««ooo>»»»»»»»»»
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
La version anglaise de notre ami Israel Shahak, qui a traduit de
I'hebreu:
The Zionist Plan for the
Middle East
I fan slated and edited by Israel Shahak
Publisher's Note
The Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds it
compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special Documents, with
Oded Yinon's article which appeared in Kivunim (Directions), the journal of the
Department of Information of the World Zionist Organization. Oded Yinon is
an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the Foreign Ministry of
Israel. To our knowledge, this document is the most explicit, detailed and
unambiguous statement to date of the Zionist strategy in the Middle East.
Furthermore, it stands as an accurate representation of the "vision" for the
entire Middle East of the presently ruling Zionist regime of Begin, Sharon and
Eitan. Its importance, hence, lies not in its historical value but in the
nightmare which it presents.
The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must 1)
become an imperial regional power, and 2) must effect the division of the
whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states.
Small here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state.
Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel's
satellites and, ironically, its source of moral legitimation.
This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist
strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has
been a recurrent theme. This theme has been documented on a very modest
scale in the AAUG publication, Israel's Sacred Terrorism (1980), by Livia
Rokach. [See below ] Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former Prime
Minister of I srael, Rokach's study documents, in convincing detail, the Zionist
plan as it applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties.
The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out
to the minutest detail. The second and more barbaric and encompassing
Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of
this plan which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well,
in fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding
their desire for a strong and independent Lebanese central government. More
accurately, they want a Lebanese central government that sanctions their
regional imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They also
seek acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other
Arab governments as well as by the Palestinian people. What they want and
what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab fragments
that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his
essay, "A Strategy for Israel in the 1980's," talks about "far-reaching
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
opportunities for the first time since 1967" that are created by the "very
stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel."
The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very
much an active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times of contlict, such
as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled "Israel
Talks of a New Exodus" is included in this publication to demonstrate past
Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides
the main Zionist document we present, other Zionist planning for the de-
Palestinization of Palestine.
It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982, that
the "far-reaching opportunities" of which Zionist strategists have been thinking
are the same "opportunities" of which they are trying to convince the world
and which they claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion. It is also
clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of Zionist plans, but the
priority target since their viable and independent presence as a people
negates the essence of the Zionist state. Every Arab state, however, especially
those with cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target sooner or
later.
Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy
elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian strategy, unfortunately,
suffers from ambiguity and incoherence. There is no indication that Arab
strategists have internalized the Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead,
they react with incredulity and shock whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This
is apparent in Arab reaction, albeit muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The
sad fact is that as long as the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken
seriously Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will be the
same.
Khalil Nakhleh
July 23, 1982
Foreword by Israel Shahak
The following essay represents, in m y opinion, the accurate and detailed
plan of the present Zionist regime (of Sharon and Eitan) for the Middle East
which is based on the division of the whole area into small states, and the
dissolution of all the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military
aspect of this plan in a concluding note, Here I want to draw the attention of
the readers to several important points:
1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down, by Israel,
into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli strategic thinking, For
example, Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha'aretz (and probably
the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the "best" that
can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: "The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite
state, a Sunni state and the separation of the Kurdish part" {Ha'aretz
6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old.
2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is
very prominent, especially in the author's notes. But, while lip service is paid
to the idea of the "defense of the West" from Soviet power, the real aim of
the author, and of the present Israeli establishment is clear: To make an
Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of Sharon is to
deceive the Americans after he has deceived all the rest. [Rememberthese
prophetic lines have neen written 20 years ago! ggb ]
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the notes and in
the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel.
Much of it is pure fantasy. But, the plan is not to be regarded as not
influential, or as not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows
faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-1933, which were
swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi movement, and determined their aims
for East Europe. Those aims, especially the division of the existing states,
were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the global scale
prevented their consolidation for a period of time.
The notes by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I did not
add any notes of my own, but have put the substance of them into this
foreward and the conclusion at the end. I have, however, emphasized some
portions of the text.
I srael Shahak
June 13, 1982
A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties
by Oded Yinon
This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in Kivunim (Directions), A
Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14, Winter, 5742,
February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal,
Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid.
Published by the Department of Publicity/The World Zionist
Organization, Jerusalem.
At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need of a
new perspective as to its place, its aims and national targets, at home and
abroad. This need has become even more vital due to a number of central
processes which the country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are
living today in the early stages of a new epoch in human history which is not
at all similar to its predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different
from what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an understanding of
the central processes which typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and
on the other hand we need a world outlook and an operational strategy in
accordance with the new conditions. The existence, prosperity and
steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend upon its ability to adopt a new
framework for its domestic and foreign affairs.
This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already
diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle.
The dominant process is the breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook
as the major cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western
civilization since the Renaissance. The political, social and economic views
which have emanated from this foundation have been based on several
"truths" which are presently disappearing -- for example, the view that man as
an individual is the center of the universe and everything exists in order to
fulfill his basic material needs. This position is being invalidated in the
present when it has become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos
does not meet Man's requirements, his economic needs or his demographic
constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human beings and
economic and energy resources which do not grow proportionally to meet the
needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
Western Society, [1] i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless consumption.
The view that ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but
rather his material needs do -- that view is becoming prevalent today as we
see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing. We are losing the
ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they concern the simple
question of what is Good and what is Evil.
The vision of man's limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face
of the sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world order around
us. The view which promises liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in
light of the sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under
totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and social justice have
been transformed by socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing
stock. There is no argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear
that they have not been put into practice properly and the majority of
mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the opportunity for equality
and justice. In this nuclear world in which we are (still) living in relative peace
for thirty years, the concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no
meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds a military and political
doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and
necessary in order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to
survive after it, not to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it. [2]
The essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West,
are undergoing a change due to political, military and economic
transformations. Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR has
transformed the epoch that has just ended into the last respite before the
great saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional
global war, in comparison with which the past world wars will have been mere
child's play. The power of nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their
quantity, their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside down
within a few years, and we must align ourselves so as to face that in Israel.
That is, then, the main threat to our existence and that of the Western world.
[3] The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the
need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third World,
are transforming the world we know, given that one of the major aims of the
USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over the gigantic resources in
the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority of
world minerals are located. We can imagine the dimensions of the global
confrontation which will face us in the future.
The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral
rich areas of the Third World. That together with the present Soviet nuclear
doctrine which holds that it is possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear
war, in the course of which the West's military might well be destroyed and its
inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main
danger to world peace and to our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have
transformed Clausewitz' dictum into "War is the continuation of policy in
nuclear means," and made it the motto which guides all their policies. Already
today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and throughout the
world, and the need to face them becomes the major element in our country's
security policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That is our
major foreign challenge. [4]
The Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem
which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main
threat against Israel, due to its growing military might. This world, with its
ethnic minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly self-
destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria,
is unable to deal successfully with its fundamental problems and does not
therefore constitute a real threat against the State of Israel in the long run,
but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great import.
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present framework
in the areas around us without having to go through genuine revolutionary
changes. The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of cards put
together by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties), without
the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into account. It
was arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorites
and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that every Arab
Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in
some a civil war is already raging. [5] Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of
170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of
Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war raging in
the Kabile mountains between the two nations in the country. Morocco and
Algeria are at war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the
internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of
Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which are destructive from the Arab point
of view, from a country which is sparsely populated and which cannot become
a powerful nation. That is why he has been attempting unifications in the past
with states that are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn
apart state in the Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to
each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over a majority of non-
Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem
majority facing a large minority of Christians which is dominant in upper
Egypt: some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8,
expressed the fear that they will want a state of their own, something like a
"second" Christian Lebanon in Egypt.
All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled
with inner conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria is
fundamentally no different from Lebanon except in the strong military regime
which rules it. But the real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni
majority and the Shi'ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population)
testifies to the severity of the domestic trouble.
Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors, although
its majority is Shi'ite and the ruling minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the
population has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the
power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it
weren't for the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues,
Iraq's future state would be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of
Syria today. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today
already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom
the Shi'ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.
All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate
house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis constitute only
a quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the Shi'ites are the majority but are
deprived of power. In the UAE, Shi'ites are once again the majority but the
Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the
Marxist South Yemen there is a sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half
the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds
power.
Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin
minority, but most of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now
Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of
these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a
problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer
corps, the Iraqi army Shi'ite with Sunni commanders. This has great
significance in the long run, and that is why it will not be possible to retain the
loyalty of the army for a long time except where it comes to the only common
denominator: The hostility towards Israel, and today even that is insufficient.
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem states share a
similar predicament. Half of Iran's population is comprised of a Persian
speaking group and the other half of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey's
population comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and two
large minorities, 12 million Shi'ite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In
Afghanistan there are 5 million Shi'ites who constitute one third of the
population. In Sunni Pakistan there are 15 million Shi'ites who endanger the
existence of that state.
This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India
and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a rapid
degeneration in the entire region. When this picture is added to the economic
one, we see how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to
withstand its severe problems.
In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a
huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly income
of 300 dollars. That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries
except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling
to pieces. It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de
facto sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians
and under the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian
conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south
and up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO
and Major Haddad's state of Christians and half a million Shi'ites). Syria is in
an even graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain in the future
after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with the basic
problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the
worst situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor force is
unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely populated area of
the world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating
efficiently and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends
entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the peace. [6]
In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest
accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those enjoying it are tiny
elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence, something that no
army can guarantee. [7] The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend
the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in
Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad and very stormy situation surrounds
Israel and creates challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching
opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that opportunities
missed at that time will become achievable in the Eighties to an extent and
along dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.
The "peace" policy and the return of territories, through a dependence
upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option created for us. Since
1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our national aims down to
narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive
opinions at home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad.
Failing to take steps towards the Arab population in the new territories,
acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is the major strategic error
committed by Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have
saved ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had
given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing
that we would have neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays
face, and to which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at all,
such as territorial compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the
same thing. [8] Today, we suddenly face immense opportunities for
transforming the situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming
decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state.
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
I n the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of I srael will have to go
through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime
domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand
up to the global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the
Suez Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other
natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is geomorphologically identical
to the rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain
in the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our
present GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil.
[9] The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the
near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources
is therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the
peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course with the present Israeli
government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of
territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians
will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they
will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in
order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only
for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S.
both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and
the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be
able to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act
in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to
Sadat's visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March
1979. [10]
Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one
direct and the other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because
of the nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of
Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of
1973, his major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally
break the treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed
economically and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take
the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is
left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the
nature of the regime and its pan-Arab policy, will bring about a situation after
April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order to
regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the
long run. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem due to its
internal conflicts and it could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in
no more than one day. [11]
The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was
demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy,
as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into "fact." In reality,
however, Egypt's power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of
the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no
longer the leading political power in the Arab World and is economically on the
verge of a crisis. Without foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. [12]
In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several
advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and that will
not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will possibly bring about
its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse,
all the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-Christian rift.
Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the
political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls
apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not
continue to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt
alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a
centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development
which was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable
in the long run. [ 13]
The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in
fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that
make the headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon's total
dissolution into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world
including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following
that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or
religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary target on the
Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of
those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in
accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in
present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its coast,
a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to
its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in
our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of
affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run,
and that aim is already within our reach today. [14]
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is
guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's targets. Its dissolution is even more
important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short
run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-
Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it
is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of inter-
Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the
more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in
Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/ religious lines as in
Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist
around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in
the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that
the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization. [15]
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due
to internal and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in
Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains
intact or whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and
breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of the present
political structure. [16]
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not
in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after its
dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the
transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.
There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present
structure for a long time, and Israel's policy, both in war and in peace, ought
to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the
transfer of power to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the
river will also cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely
populated with Arabs west of the J ordan. Whether in war or under conditions of
peace, emigrationfrom the territories and economic demographic freeze in
them, are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river,
and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest
future. The autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any
compromise or division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and
those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa'amr plan of September
1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the present situation
without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land
only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan
and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A nation of their own
and security will be theirs only in Jo rd an. [17]
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of '67 and the territories
beyond them, those of '48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and
nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen
in its entirety without any divisions as of '67. It should be clear, under any
future political situation or mifitary constellation, that the solution of the
problem of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the
existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as
our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall
soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish
population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.
Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the
highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea,
Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if
we do not become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the
country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not
theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing
the country demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and
most central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from
Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the major
strategic consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the country
that is empty of J ews today. [18]
Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization
of this internal strategic objective. The transformation of the political and
economic structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is
the key to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized
economy in which the government is extensively involved, to an open and
free market as well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to
developing, with our own hands, of a genuine productive economic
infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely and voluntarily,
we shall be forced into it by world developments, especially in the areas of
economics, energy, and politics, and by our own growing isolation. [19]
From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is
unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world,
and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign
assistance, military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with
no compromises. [20] Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a
change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a
last resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews,
and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the
present form in the future. [21]
Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that
could remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat's method).
Despite the difficulties of the mistaken "peace" policy and the problem of the
Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these
problems in the foreseeable future.
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
Conclusions - by Israel Shahak
Three important points have to be clarified in order to be able to
understand the significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist plan for
the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.
The Military Background of The Plan
The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but
on the many occasions where something very like it is being "explained" in
closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is
clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches,
are insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as
discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian "unrest" on the
West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The
answer to that is the method of ruling by means of "Haddad forces" or of
"Village Associations" (also known as "Village Leagues"): local forces under
"leaders" completely dissociated from the population, not having even any
feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for example). The
"states" proposed by Yinon are "Haddadland" and "Village Associations," and
their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli military
superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that
any movement of revolt will be "punished" either by mass humiliation as in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and obliteration of cities,
as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan,
as explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal
places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary mobile
destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in Haddadland
and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of this system
functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan
too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they
are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among
them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan
will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be foreseen.
Why it is necessary to publish this in I srael?
The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish
society: A very great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews,
combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the
Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin's speeches) has
to be persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as
indicated above, but a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written
material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid "persuaders"
and "explainers" (for example medium-rank officers, who are, usually,
remarkably stupid). They then "learn it," more or less, and preach to others.
It should be remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties,
has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I was
"in opposition") the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a
year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of conquering "the rest of
Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity" was explained in the
years 1965-67.
Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the
publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled
opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
consequence of the war on Lebanon) The Arab World, including the
Palestinians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far
quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society,
and the Palestinians have been, on the average, no better than the rest. In
such a situation, even those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli
expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not because of factual
and detailed knowledge, but because of belief in myth. A good example is
the very persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset
of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the
persistent, and completely false declarations, which were made by some of
the most important Arab leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag
symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from the
stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that,
on the whole, the Arabs will pay no attention to their serious discussions of
the future, and the Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they
not continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?
In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now.
The more or less serious commentators take their information about Israel,
and much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles
in the "liberal" American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of
Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state,
practice loyally what Stalin used to call "the constructive criticism." (In fact
those among them who claim also to be "Anti-Stalinist" are in reality more
Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In
the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has
always "good intentions" and only "makes mistakes," and therefore such a
plan would not be a matter for discussion--exactly as the Biblical genocides
committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The
Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation
exists in which Israel is really a "closed society" to the rest of the world,
because the world wants to close its eyes, the publication and even the
beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.
I srael Shahak
June 17, 1982
J erusalem
About the Translator
Israel Shahak (1933-2001) was a professor of organic chemistly at
Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli League for
Human and Civil Rights. He published The Shahak Papers, collections of key
articles from the Hebrew press, and was the author of numerous articles and
books, among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State, Israel's Global Role: Weapons
for Repression, published by the AAUG in 1982.
Notes (Yinon article)
1. American Universities Field Staff. Report No. 33, 1979. According to this research, the population
of the world will be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today's world population can be broken down as follows:
China, 958 million; India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil
and J apan, 110 million each. According to the figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in
2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million each. The population of the Third World will then be 80%
of the world population. According to J ustin Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world population will
not reach 6 billion because of hunger.
THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE
2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two American Sovietologists: Joseph D.
Douglas and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press,
1979). In the Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year which detail
the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal of documentation translated into English and
published by the U.S. Air Force, including USAF: Marxism- Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View,
Moscow, 1972: USAF: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The
basic Soviet approach to the matter is presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in
Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts (New York, Praeger,
1963).
3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world can be drawn from the book by
Douglas and Hoeber, ibid. For additional material see: Michael Morgan, "USSR's Minerals as Strategic
Weapon in the Future," Defense and Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit.
General George S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United
States For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy,
(Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
5. Elie Kedourie, "The End of the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 4,
1968.
6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram, 12/30/79, Al Ba'ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are
20 years old and younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed,
33% live in urban areas, Oded Yinon, "Egypt's Population Problem," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15,
Spring 1980.
7. E. Kanovsky, "Arab Haves and Have Nots," Thejerusalem Quarterly, No.l, Fall 1976, Al Ba'ath,
Syria, 5/6/79.
8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that the Israeli government is in fact
responsible for the design of American policy in the Middle East, after June '67, because of its own
indecisiveness as to the future of the territories and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the
background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years later for the Camp David agreements and the
peace treaty with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime
Minister Eshkol in which he did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new territories but exactly
on the same day the government resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the Arab
resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position but contrary to its decision of J une 19,
did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to support 242 in the Security Council on the
basis of its earlier understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At that point it was already too
late to change the U.S. position and Israel's policy. From here the way was opened to peace agreements
on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma'ariv
1979) pp. 226-227.
9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe Arens argued in an interview
(Ma'ariv, 10/3/80) that the Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before the Camp David
agreements and was itself surprised by the cost of the agreements, although already during the
negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and the serious error involved in not having
prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for the withdrawal from
the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That same person said two
years earlier that the government of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck.
He was referring to the Camp David agreements (Ha'aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace
negotiations neither an expert nor an economics advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself,
who lacks knowledge and expertise in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan
rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the respect of the U.S. towards us. See
Ha'aretzl/5/79. Jerusalem Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior consultant in the Treasury,
strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha'aretz, 5/5/79. Ma'ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters
concerning the oil fields and Israel's energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government
advisor on these matters, Ma'ariv Weekly, 12/12/78. The Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp
David agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the seriousness of our condition
from the point of view of oil supplies more than once... see Yediot Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai
even admitted that the government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the Camp David
and Blair House negotiations. Ha'aretz, 8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give
the army preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly
obtained. See former Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El
Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military
budget will receive first priority, despite the peace. This is what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has
stated in his cabinet's programmatic document which was presented to Parliament, 11/25/78. See English
translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10. According to these sources, Egypt's military budget
increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged
that the Egyptians plan to increase their military budget by 100% in the next two years; Ha'aretz, 2/12/79
and Jerusalem Post, 1/14/79.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt's ability to reconstruct its economy by
1982. See Economic Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, "The Arab Republic of Egypt"; E. Kanovsky,
"Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East," Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June 1977;
LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAELI EN
Kanovsky, "The Egyptian Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors," Occasional Papers, June
1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and
research carried out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by the
British scientist, Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS;
Security Arrangements in Sinai., .by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The Military Balance and the
Military Options after the Peace Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No. 4, Dec. 1978, as well
as many press reports including El Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations between Copts and Moslems see the series of
articles published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on the
rift between Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London, 6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart,
Middle East I nternmational, London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian, London,
12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El
Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by
Ha'aretz, 3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times, London, 3/26/80;
Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times, 3/30/80.
15. J. -P. Peroncel-Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review,
Summer 1979; Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha'aretz, 9/21/79)
Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian Affairs, London, J uly 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, "The Rich Arab States in Trouble," The New York Review of Books, 5/15/80;
Arab Press Service, Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as well as El Ahram,
11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly
Review, I DF, J an. -Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan's policies and problems see El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof.
Elie Kedouri, Ma'ariv 6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post, 5/31/79; El Watan El
Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas, 11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth
Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa'amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in Ha'aretz,
9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80. For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see
Amos Ben Vered, Ha'aretz, 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma'ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO's position towards Israel
see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an interview, Al Rai AI'Am, Kuwait
4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, "The Palestinian Problem," Survival, ISS, London J an. Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, "The
Palestinian Myth," Commentary, Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary Jan.
75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, "Samaria -- The Basis for Israel's Security," Ma'arakhot 272-273,
May/June 1980; Ya'akov Hasdai, "Peace, the Way and the Right to Know," Dvar Hashavua, 2/23/80.
Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth -- An Israeli Perspective," Ma'arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak
Rabin, "Israel's Defense Problems in the Eighties," Ma'arakhot October 1979.
19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime's Pliers (Shikmona, 1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance
Israel, Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, "The Lessons of the Past," The Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur
Ross, "OPEC's Challenge to the West," The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, "Oil and the
Decline of the West," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report--"Our Armed Forees-Ready or Not?"
U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; Stanley Hoffman, "Reflections on the Present Danger," The New
York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold Lavedez "The illusions of SALT" Commentary Sept.
79; Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," Commentary March 1980; Robert Tucker, "Oil and American
Power Six Years Later," Commentary Sept. 1979; Norman Podhoretz, "The Abandonment of Israel,"
Commentary J uly 1976; Elie Kedourie, "Misreading the Middle East," Commentary J uly 1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya'akov Karoz, Yediot Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of
anti-Semitic incidents recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany,
France, and Britain the number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in that year. In the U.S.
as well there has been a sharp increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that article. For the
new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, "The New Anti-Semitism," The New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara
Tuchman, "They poisoned the Wells," Newsweek 2/3/75.
Le texte d'Oded Yinon est souvent cite, mais rarement reproduit en entier. II
a disparu de plusieurs sites ou il etat cense se trouver. Voir, en dernier lieu,
Published by the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.,
Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982, Special Document No. 1, (ISBN 0-937694-56-
8)