American Bar Association Publishes Opinion on Investment Court System

As most of you know, the proposal for an Investment Court System emanates from the European Union and aims at replacing the traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanisms (ISDS). The Investment Court System finds its roots in a public consultation initiated by the European Commission on ISDS in the context of the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). At the time, the European Commission received nearly 150,000 responses, an overwhelming majority of which opposed the traditional ISDS mechanisms that were being contemplated during the TTIP negotiations. Most criticisms viewed the traditional ISDS mechanisms as a threat to democracy, to public policy, to public finance and to the sovereign’s right to regulate. Many also expressed concerns on the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.

In light of the treaties currently embracing or contemplating the new Investment Court System (i.e. TTIP (to the extent that it is ever signed); the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA); and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement), the Report addresses key issues with respect to (among other things) the composition of the Court, the enforcement of its awards, and its adherence to procedural rules.

Issues regarding the composition of the Investment Court

The Investment Court System envisages the creation of both a Tribunal of First Instance and an Appeal Tribunal composed of judges whose number varies according to the investment treaty or free trade agreement at issue (for instance CETA provides that the tribunal will comprise of 15 judges, while the EU-Vietnam FTA provides for 9 judges). In addition, the provisions of the treaty or FTA at issue should also contain rules on the background and professional qualifications that potential judges should meet.

The Report notes, however that meeting these requirements does not in itself ensure that a judge will have the requisite background to decide an investment case, which may well touch on issues of regulatory or constitutional law. The Report also laments that, unlike the Rome Statute creating International Criminal Court, no specific provision is foreseen to ensure the diversity of the Investment Court’s composition with respect to region of origin, ethnicity or gender.

The Report also criticizes the fact that the judges will be appointed (and re-appointed) to the Investment Court by state parties through a “Committee” that meets in non-public sessions. According to the ABA, these factors raise concerns regarding a potential judicial bias in favour of state parties over individual investors. The Report consequently recommends that a more transparent and consultative process be used and that the Court require judges to be independent of any treaty party. It notes, however, that limiting judges to one term would be the only way to ensure that a judge remains free from any possible reappointment pressures from state parties.

The Report also highlights that the Investment Court tribunals hear cases in panels of three judges appointed rotationally by the President of the Tribunal so as to ensure a random and unpredictable composition. Each panel comprises a national of an EU Member State, a national of the other treaty party, and a national of a third country who acts as its chair. This system of pre-selection represents a major shift from the prior ISDS practice of convening ad-hoc panels. It also explicitly departs from the WTO dispute settlement process (where the disputing parties select the members of their panels based on proposals put forward by the WTO Secretariat), as the Investment Court System does not offer the opportunity for the parties to raise concerns about members of a particular panel before the adjudicative process begins. Given that the WTO process of pre-selection has reduced the number of potential panelist challenges, the Report suggests that a similar consultative step should also be adopted by the Investment Court System in order to reduce the likelihood of parties bringing challenges later in the proceedings.

Issues regarding the enforcement of the decisions rendered by the Investment Court

The Report points out that an important issue regarding the Investment Court System concerns the question of whether the Investment Court should be seen as an arbitral body (in which case the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards applies to the enforcement of the awards rendered by the Investment Court) or whether the Investment Court is a court whose judgments will need to be recognised and enforced before domestic courts.

In this regard, the Report suggests curing this uncertainty by clarifying “specifically and unequivocally” the nature of the Investment Court, as well as the basis upon which awards issued through this mechanism may nonetheless be enforced as ICSID awards.

Issues regarding procedural rules

On the issue of procedural rules, the Report asserts that the TTIP, CETA and EU-Vietnam FTA’s procedural provisions tend to favour the governmental party to a dispute over the private one. The Report highlights that those treaties do not include many of the basic procedural provisions governing the daily operations of the tribunals, such as its ability to consider parallel proceedings or ex-parte motions, or to issue interim decisions and recommendations. Furthermore, those treaties do not address how the tribunals should handle evidentiary matters.

Importantly, the Report notes that the Investment Court proposal omits to designate a place of arbitration. This omission is particularly problematic as this information is crucial for the enforcement of the Investment Court’s decisions.

In view of those uncertainties, the Report recommends that the Investment Court adopt a standardized approach regarding all such procedural rules.

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Overall, the Report acknowledges the substantial effect that the Investment Court System would have on adjudicating investment treaty disputes. The Report nevertheless asserts that the current provisions are incomplete “inchoate and often, incoherent“, and would benefit from the inclusion of additional rules and guidelines in order (i) to avoid the perception of bias; (ii) to increase transparency; and (iii) to ensure the application of the rule of law. Consequently, the Report concludes that unless steps are taken to address these concerns, the abandonment of the arbitration system in favour of the Investment Court System is to be avoided.

5 Comments

Quentin Decleve

The answer to your question is to be found in the respective treaty (BIT or FTA) at issue.

With respect to the treaties currently embracing or contemplating the new Investment Court System (i.e. the TTIP, the CETA and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement), my understanding is that the only clear legal source applicable to the substance of an upcoming dispute will be the treaty itself.

As things stand, the TTIP, the CETA or the EU-Vietnam FTA do not provide for an explicit governing law applicable to the substance of the disputes and nor do they identify a specific national law. They only refer to the treaty itself. Indeed, all that is mentioned in the CETA is the fact that the tribunals shall apply the respective treaty “in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and other rules and principles of international law applicable between the Parties.” (see Article 8.31 CETA).

As default rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention will also apply. Article 42 of the ICSID Convention provides, for instance, that where the parties do not identify a choice of applicable law, the arbitral tribunal “shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.”

However, to add to the confusion, the TTIP, the CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA also provide for an express limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Investment Court to make any assessment of the domestic law of the parties.

I agree that all this I very confusing and will need to be addressed and clarified before the Investment Court System becomes fully applicable.

I hope this answers your question.

Quentin

Anonymous

Dear Quentin, Thank you for your contributions , shoul I sait that ICSID considers that umbrella Claus apples International law which it may be as hypothetical law that no international law of contract exist, (Serbia loan 1929). On the other hand arbitrotar apples FET as autonomy rules for enforcement verdic, so BIT dose not raise as applicable rules.

Anonymous

That is to say that arbitrator make all necessary to avoid the contract as a applicable law (Abou Dhabi case 1950) and to create a hypothetical law from the expectations of losses due to breach of FET as a autonomous rule to order compensations for bad treatment of the investor .