A Symposium on Citizenship and Military Service

ELLIOTT ABRAMS and ANDREW J. BACEVICH

In October 2000, we served as co-chairs of a conference
titled "Citizens and Soldiers: Citizenship, Culture, and Military Service."[1]
The inspiration for this event can be stated briefly: a decade after the
Cold War, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to sustain
the all-volunteer force, the foundation on which American military power
rests. Although problems with recruiting and retention are commonly attributed
to a booming economy, it was our belief that other factors could well be
of equal or even greater importance. Among the additional factors meriting
consideration, in our view, were a narrowing definition of citizenship
and its responsibilities, changes in American culture, and changes in the
purposes for which the United States employs its military power.

In convening a small group of scholars, military experts, and policy
analysts to address these matters, we identified three sets of issues for
detailed examination:

. The American tradition of the citizen-soldier.
What is the essence of that tradition and how has it changed over time?
What has been the value of that tradition? How has the establishment of
the all-volunteer force affected it? Given the cultural, technological,
and geopolitical changes of recent decades, does the tradition retain relevance
today?

. The identity of the all-volunteer force.
Are members of today's military professionals? Are they citizen-soldiers
like the G.I.s who fought the major wars of the last century? A hybrid
of both? Something altogether different? What are the political and civic
implications of "contracting out" national security to a small cadre of
long-service volunteers?

. Prospects for and alternatives to the all-volunteer
force. Apart from the greater economic opportunity currently available
in civilian life, what other factors may be contributing to the difficulties
that the Pentagon faces in recruiting and retention? What policies should
the Administration consider to sustain, modify, or replace the existing
all-volunteer force?

The essays that constitute this symposium derive from the presentations
made at the conference. In addition to those presentations, the conference
featured extensive give-and-take among participants of diverse background,
experience, and outlook. Although the conference was not intended to reach
a consensus--nor did it do so--the discussion did bring to light certain
insights that we offer here as informal "findings." In doing so we emphasize
that we speak strictly for ourselves, not for other conference participants.

Two convictions underlie our views. The first is that if American military
institutions cannot and should not be isolated from American society, neither
should they be treated as a sociology laboratory or a handy venue through
which to transform that society in accordance with either a liberal or
a conservative agenda. In short, there is a compelling need to extract
the services from the ongoing Kulturkampf in which they have become
increasingly enmeshed since the end of the Cold War.

The second conviction is that an era of high-tech warfare has not obviated
the need for a traditional combat ethos--the mix of physical and mental
toughness, discipline, raw courage, and willingness to sacrifice that was
the hallmark of effective militaries in the wars of the 20th century. Granted,
not all American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the present
century will be required to manifest such qualities in the course of accomplishing
their assigned duties. Indeed, over time the proportion of soldiers who
spend their tours of duty staring at computer screens will continue to
increase while the proportion of those expected as a matter of course to
venture into harm's way will dwindle. But when called upon to fight, that
combat remnant will be required to manifest qualities not dissimilar from
those of the soldiers who landed at Omaha Beach or went to war in the Ia
Drang. Unless it devotes considerable attention to doing so, a society
in the grip of a consumerist mentality and postmodern values is likely
to find it increasingly difficult to sustain such an ethos in even a minority
of its soldiery.

With that as background, our findings include the following:

. First, the mythic tradition of the citizen-soldier
is dead, its fate sealed by changes in the nature of modern war, in
the aims of US national security strategy since the end of the Cold War,
and in the aspirations and expectations of American citizens. Given the
changing relationship between the individual and the state, spurred particularly
by the cultural revolution touched off in the 1960s, the federal government
has effectively forfeited its ability to compel citizens to serve in the
military. Conscription has become and will remain implausible. To an increasing
extent, the individual, not the state, determines the terms under which
service is rendered.

. Second, the identity of the "soldier as warrior"
has become obsolete. It does not adequately describe the actual function--or,
more accurately, the broader range of functions--of American military men
and women in the aftermath of the Cold War. As such, it misleads citizens,
creates false expectations among would-be recruits, and breeds cynicism
among those already in uniform. Certainly, the US military establishment
must retain the ability to "fight and win the nation's wars." But warfighting
as such is not the task immediately confronting those dispatched to succor
hungry Kurds or Somalis, occupy Haiti, separate ethnic groups in the Balkans,
or pursue a "strategy of engagement" in places like the former Soviet bloc,
Central Asia, Latin America, or, indeed, Yemen. Even the limited bombing
campaigns that over the past decade have become the preferred US means
of employing force--although providing airmen personal experiences approaching
something like "combat"--are quite distinct from war as such.

Some more relevant identity--a refashioning of what it means to be an
American soldier--is in order. The reality of US military history offers
a rich trove of experience from which to forge just such an identity. For
the greater part of that history, the American soldier's assigned role
has notbeen the passiveone of holding himself in readiness
to wage war, but the activeone of attending to the nation's existing
priorities. Over time, those priorities changed, but they included fighting
Native Americans, exploring the West, developing the nation's economic
infrastructure, opening markets abroad, governing colonies and protectorates,
advancing the cause of public health, and building the Panama Canal. The
relevance of this history to the current quasi-imperial role of US forces
is all but self-evident. In the experiences of bluejackets and blue-coated
and khaki-clad soldiers of old lies an identity as servants of the nation
that may convey more accurately and more compellingly the vital role that
the present-day military plays, however much traditionalists may bridle
at that role.

. Third, the force needed to perform the functions
of a global constabulary ought to be, to the maximum extent possible, unencumbered
by personal responsibilities and obligations. To state the matter simply,
in filling the junior enlisted component of that force, the services should
recruit mostly 19- or 20-year-old single males and few if any parents,
whether single or married, with young children. In short, to the maximum
extent possible, the services should abandon their efforts to make military
service "family friendly." Toward that end, the Marine Corps and the Army
should adopt the policy proposed in 1993 by General Carl Mundy: that is,
enlist only young men and women without family responsibilities. Doing
so will oblige the services to reduce their reliance on young single mothers
to fill their recruiting quotas. Several benefits will accrue as a result.
The number of nondeployables will decline. The perception that women "get
over" when it comes to eligibility for long deployments will dissipate.
The number of children being raised by caregivers in childcare facilities
will diminish.

Of course, since the creation of the all-volunteer force, the services
have found it expedient to do just the opposite, expanding to unprecedented
levels the percentage of female soldiers and of soldiers with children
in the force. The Army in particular has long since concluded that it cannot
fulfill its recruiting missions if it relies on the available pool of single
males without children. The feasibility of the recommendation expressed
above, therefore, rests in part on overturning that perception. Doing so
will require efforts to "de-feminize" the force--instituting policies that
will make military service more attractive to males without creating an
environment antagonistic to women or formally restricting the opportunities
available to those women who do continue to serve.

Our remaining three findings suggest ways to do just that.

. The fourth finding proposes shifting the
"qualifications" debate from gender to standards--from a losing "culture
war" battle to a necessary and winnable struggle to restore military professionalism.
Specifically, the services should open all specialties to women while
simultaneously instituting specialty-specific single performance standards--physical,
mental, psychological--specifying what it takes to be an infantryman,
a fighter pilot, a submariner, a mechanic, etc. The aim here is to eliminate
the existing doublespeak and double standards that are eating away at the
military's tradition of integrity and destroying the confidence of junior
officers in their seniors. In light of the research conducted by Charles
Moskos, Laura Miller, and others, such a policy will not flood infantry
units or submarines with women, few of whom are even interested in combat
specialties. But it could contribute to rejuvenating a profession that
would once again tell the truth about combat standards and manifest a serious
commitment to what it takes to prevail on the battlefield. Such an institution
would be more likely to attract and retain serious, high-minded young people.

. Fifth, in a society in which male adolescents
find it increasingly difficult to discern what it means to be a man or
how to become one, we should promote military service as a rite of passage
to manhood. Young males yearn to leave boyhood behind and to become
men. But in a society in which fathers are increasingly absent, in which
gender roles have blurred, and in which adolescents increasingly trade
activities once thought to be "manly" in favor of becoming mere spectators,
opportunities for the individual to demonstrate to himself that he is indeed
a man have dwindled. The rigor and purposefulness of military service can
offer just the opportunity to do a man's work, something that the Marine
Corps has long recognized and effectively exploited. The other services
and above all the Army need to do the same. There are more than enough
men out there to fill the services' needs.

. Finally, the demise of the citizen-soldier
should not mean that the enlisted force should come predominantly from
the poorest and least educated elements of American society, as is increasingly
the case. Nor should the officer corps be drawn largely from the offspring
of serving officers. Such practices deprive elites of any firsthand knowledge
of military affairs and insulate them from the consequences of their
decisions
about the use of force. Citizens of a democratic superpower should view
the first as an invitation to ill-advised policy and the second as creating
a dangerous gap between those who rule and those who serve. Therefore,
the services should redouble their efforts to provide opportunities
for college-bound youth and college graduates to serve. Offering a
wider range of short-term enlistment options, particularly for those specialties
that do not require lengthy technical training, could well do just that.
In a society where many young people seek an alternative to the consumer
culture, we should promote military service to college students as a way
to serve the nation. The same impulses that lead to joining the Foreign
Service or the Peace Corps should be tapped for recruiting today's military.

We live in an era in which the phrase "military power" conjures up images
of high-tech gadgetry. In fact, however, the resources constituting the
foundation of present-day US military superiority are first of all human
and only secondarily technological. We do not pretend that the findings
offered here or the essays that follow offer the last word on how to preserve
that foundation. But we are convinced of one thing: to pretend that pay
raises, ad campaigns, and new headgear will fend off the forces that threaten
that foundation is an illusion. The all-volunteer force is in jeopardy.
Bold, imaginative, and courageous action will be required to preserve it.

NOTE

1. Sponsoring the event were the Institute for the Study of Economic
Culture and the Center for International Relations, both of Boston University,
and the Ethics and Public Policy Center located in Washington, D.C. The
conference itself was held at the National Press Club in Washington. Select
papers from the conference are published in this issue of Parameters.
A complete transcript of the proceedings is available on the website of
the Ethics and Public Policy Center, www.eppc.org. We would like to express
our gratitude to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for funding this
conference and to Peter Berger, director of the Institute for the Study
of Economic Culture, without whose support the event would not have happened.

Elliott Abrams, president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in
Washington, D.C., served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1981 to 1989.

Andrew J. Bacevich directs the Center for International Relations at
Boston University. From 1969 to 1992, he served as an officer in the US
Army.