Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un met in Hanoi for the second summit between the two leaders. Despite high expectations leading into the meeting, the summit ended early with no agreement toward denuclearization. With that in mind, we asked our panel of foreign policy experts:

Should the US continue to focus first and foremost on the fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, or should it instead shift the primary focus now to arms limitation and non-proliferation?

10

said the US should continue to focus on the fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea

Some experts believe denuclearization is still a viable long-term goal, but pursuing it should not preclude intermediate steps aimed at arms control and reduction.

15

said the US should shift focus to arms limitation and non-proliferation

Others maintain that denuclearization is an unrealistic goal, and that the US should instead focus on achievable incremental progress with North Korea.

3

provided only written responses and fall into another category

Why keep focus on denuclearization?

“The Trump Administration has tested the theory that jumping to the leader-to-leader level without adequate staff might produce surprisingly positive results. We now know that it won't. What we don't know, however, is how far the two sides can go with a more realistic commitment to doing the hard spade work at the staff level.”

- Peter D. Feaver, professor of political science and public policy, Duke University

“There are no benefits to unilaterally reducing our demands. Best to keep the standards high and consider less maximalist demands in exchange for something.”

“Accepting North Korea as a nuclear state may be inevitable. The best way to limit the size and scope of that program is to push for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.”

Why keep focus on denuclearization?

“The Trump Administration has tested the theory that jumping to the leader-to-leader level without adequate staff might produce surprisingly positive results. We now know that it won't. What we don't know, however, is how far the two sides can go with a more realistic commitment to doing the hard spade work at the staff level. Worth testing that before defining success down all the way to ‘arms limitation and non-proliferation.’”

- Peter D. Feaver, professor of political science and public policy, Duke University

“This should remain the status focus because the end goal remains a de-nuclearized Korean peninsula. A focus on this item does not preclude intermediate steps related to arms control and non-proliferation as well as confidence-building measures, but a deliberate shift away from de-nuclearization undermines goals not only for Korea but in reducing incentives for other states to pursue development of nuclear weapons.”

- Nikolas Gvosdev, professor, National Security Affairs, US Naval War College

“General view: While North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un’s reported demand that all sanctions be lifted was the immediate cause of the summit’s breakdown, this more fundamentally is yet another case of Trumpian diplomatic malpractice. Donald Trump violated the ‘three P’s’ of high-level summit diplomacy – policy, personal and political,’ as laid out pre-summit in my February 7 article in War on the Rocks. Post-failed summit, given Trump’s proclivity to revert to attack mode as well as possibly trying to divert from his political problems at home, we need be concerned and watchful that ‘little rocket man’ insults and ‘fire and fury’ threats may not be far behind.”

- Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science, Duke University

“It's too early to completely abandon Trump's more radical approach. He has to see if his strategy has failed. And the larger nonproliferation community is not ready to accept or normalize DPRK as a nuclear state.”

“The denuclearization effort may well fail, but it's too soon to say it has. There's a capable team headed by Steve Biegun, and let's remember that this is nothing less than an attempt to see if one of the world's strangest and most dangerous regimes is capable of changing its ways.”

- Tod Marshall Lindberg, senior fellow, Hudson Institute

“Accepting North Korea as a nuclear state may be inevitable. The best way to limit the size and scope of that program is to push for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.“

“There are no benefits to unilaterally reducing our demands. Best to keep the standards high and consider less maximalist demands in exchange for something.”

“Shifting focus accepts the North Korean regime indefinitely. Even if we shifted focus to arms limitations, the nature of the North Korean regime (lack of openness) would make such limitations unreliable and potentially disarming. It might also substantially weaken U.S. alliances in Asia.”

- Henry Nau, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University

“There is a serious question about our ability to chew gum and walk as a nation if we cannot focus both on the need for a verifiable denuclearization of North Korea AND arms limitation and non-proliferation. Containment must continue for as long as denuclearization remains elusive. Seeing this through the prism of politics and Trump-hatred, while tempting and simple, is useless. The challenge is the challenge, and will dog this administration as it did the previous ones. More importantly, the focus on the Trump-Kim pageant and the President's own ill-advised personal approach to Pyongyang has obscured a larger problem – i.e., the increasingly obvious collapse of the rules-based system underpinned by the NPT.”

“This goal is still possible, if not probable; focusing on vertical and horizontal limits could still be a fallback stance.”

Why shift focus to arms control?

“North Korea has no incentive to give up its nuclear weapons. . . . [T]he Kim regime believes (with good reason) that those weapons are its primary deterrent against a regime change effort by the U.S. or any other state. It is therefore a waste of resources to try to come up with ever more creative ways to gain denuclearization. . . .”

“Denuclearization is an end point that both have broadly agreed to. Trust building and many incremental steps are required to make it there. Requiring denuclearization first, and giving it such significance, repeats the mistakes of the past and fails to understand North Korea's security problematic.”

“The two issues are related. That said, between North Korea's existing nuclear stockpile and the dangers of nuclear arms races and the expansion of the number of countries developing weapons of mass destruction, the latter issue is more important.”

- Dan Drezner, professor of international politics, The Fletcher School of Tufts University

Why shift focus to arms control?

“I don't understand the question. The difference between the two choices is not clear. In any case there can never be a "fully verifiable" disarmament agreement with a country as big (size in which to hide things) and a regime as secretive and dishonest as North Korea.”

“North Korea needs a deterrent or at least thinks that it does (after regime change in Iraq and Libya) and won’t give up the weapons so the premise of denuclearization is a non-starter.”

-JoshuaBusby, associate professor of public affairs, University of Texas-Austin

“Denuclearization is an end point that both have broadly agreed to. Trust building and many incremental steps are required to make it there. Requiring denuclearization first, and giving it such significance, repeats the mistakes of the past and fails to understand North Korea's security problematic.”

-Bridget L. Coggins, associate professor of political science, University of California, Santa Barbara

“Can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Also, this is a reasonable first-step in the process.”

-Michael C. Desch, chair and professor, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame

“The two issues are related. That said, between North Korea's existing nuclear stockpile and the dangers of nuclear arms races and the expansion of the number of countries developing weapons of mass destruction, the latter issue is more important.”

-Dan Drezner, professor of international politics, The Fletcher School of Tufts University

“There is a low likelihood that the United States can convince the North Korean regime that fully verifiable denuclearization is worth the risk. Nuclear weapons are a tool of providing security. What would it take to convince the North Koreans that their security will be enhanced through denuclearization? Surely, it would take extraordinary steps on behalf of the United States and its allies - measures that are unlikely to pass muster either in U.S. domestic politics or with key constituencies in South Korea and Japan. As such, the goal must be to make the best of a bad situation: a nuclear North Korea.”

-Peter D. Harris,assistant professor, Colorado State University

“More realistic.”

-Michael C. Horowitz, professor of political science and economics, director, Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania

“North Korea has no incentive to give up its nuclear weapons. Its nuclear status is a done deal, and the Kim regime believes (with good reason) that those weapons are its primary deterrent against a regime change effort by the U.S. or any other state. It is therefore a waste of resources to try to come up with ever more creative ways to gain denuclearization; the U.S. simply cannot control that process or achieve that outcome. It's also a mistake to argue that we'd be setting a precedent by changing our approach. That precedent has already been set by our continuing recognition and assistance programs to two other states that don't follow NPT guidelines, namely Israel and India (and to some extent, a third, Pakistan). And any incentive that other states have to go nuclear is going to be set more by North Korea's achievements on the ground, than by U.S. efforts to undo what North Korea has done. The facts speak louder than the words, and we already shot ourselves in the foot once by accepting Qaddafi's promise that Libya would not go nuclear, and then cooperating in ousting him, and letting him be murdered, anyway. But the Kim regime does need things from the US, ranging from recognition to economic assistance, that can be fairly easily given (or withdrawn, if the regime does not live up to its promises). And the U.S. would be better off if the Kim regime stopped further nuclear and missile developments at home, and stopped supplying foreign regimes like Iran and Pakistan with missiles and technology for WMDs (and a whole host of other smuggled goods abroad, like drugs). We might be able to make headway there in limiting North Korea's future choices.”

-Kimberly Marten, department chair and professor of political science, Barnard College, Columbia University

“Denuclearization is currently unrealistic given the value of nuclear weapons to the Kim regime and the reason North Korea developed them in the first place - regime survival. This is especially the case after the example we set with Libya. Fortunately, the U.S. is already quite safe vis-à-vis North Korea given our nuclear and conventional deterrent. So we don’t need denuclearization to satisfy our vital national interests but can work on other margins, including testing, production, missiles, and non-proliferation concerns.”

-Will Ruger, vice president for research and policy, Charles Koch Institute

“CVID [Complete Verifiable Irreversible Denuclearization] a bridge too far; to mix metaphors, grab potential bird in hand with long term goal of denuclearization.”

-James Steinberg, professor of social science, international affairs, and law, Maxwell School of Syracuse University

“Full denuclearization is not on the cards as long as Kim is in power, which could be a very long time.”

-Angela Stent, director, Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University

“The U.S. long-term strategy should continue to focus on fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, but the more immediate and primary U.S. focus should be on making real progress on arms limitation and non-proliferation efforts.”

“Kim will not denuclearize, in my opinion. Pushing harder risks conflict and frankly just hurts the North Korean people.”

-A. Trevor Thrall, senior fellow, Cato Institute

Why other?

“It should not focus on the nuclear issue at all. Seek to normalize N[orth] K[orea] (with aid of S[outh] K[orea]) and worry about nukes later. Remarkable that nothing like this option is offered in the question.”

“A better stance would to work with regional allies to achieve a deterrent posture that could minimize the effect of North Korean nuclear weapons on the regional balance and regional politics.”

- Jeremy Shapiro, research director, European Council on Foreign Relations

“Neither of the above. North Korea has no intention of denuclearizing. The U.S. must build a strong counterweight to Kim.”

- Thomas Wright, director, Center on the United States and Europe; senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy, The Brookings Institution

Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un met in Hanoi for the second summit between the two leaders. Despite high expectations leading into the meeting, the summit ended early with no agreement toward denuclearization. With that in mind, we asked our panel of foreign policy experts:

Should the US continue to focus first and foremost on the fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, or should it instead shift the primary focus now to arms limitation and non-proliferation?

10

said the US should continue to focus on the fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea

Some experts believe denuclearization is still a viable long-term goal, but pursuing it should not preclude intermediate steps aimed at arms control and reduction.

15

said the US should shift focus to arms limitation and non-proliferation

Others maintain that denuclearization is an unrealistic goal, and that the US should instead focus on achievable incremental progress with North Korea.

3

provided only written responses and fall into another category

Why keep focus on denuclearization?

“There are no benefits to unilaterally reducing our demands. Best to keep the standards high and consider less maximalist demands in exchange for something.”

“The Trump Administration has tested the theory that jumping to the leader-to-leader level without adequate staff might produce surprisingly positive results. We now know that it won't. What we don't know, however, is how far the two sides can go with a more realistic commitment to doing the hard spade work at the staff level.”

- Peter D. Feaver, professor of political science and public policy, Duke University

“Accepting North Korea as a nuclear state may be inevitable. The best way to limit the size and scope of that program is to push for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.”

Why keep focus on denuclearization?

“The Trump Administration has tested the theory that jumping to the leader-to-leader level without adequate staff might produce surprisingly positive results. We now know that it won't. What we don't know, however, is how far the two sides can go with a more realistic commitment to doing the hard spade work at the staff level. Worth testing that before defining success down all the way to ‘arms limitation and non-proliferation.’”

- Peter D. Feaver, professor of political science and public policy, Duke University

“This should remain the status focus because the end goal remains a de-nuclearized Korean peninsula. A focus on this item does not preclude intermediate steps related to arms control and non-proliferation as well as confidence-building measures, but a deliberate shift away from de-nuclearization undermines goals not only for Korea but in reducing incentives for other states to pursue development of nuclear weapons.”

- Nikolas Gvosdev, professor, National Security Affairs, US Naval War College

“General view: While North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un’s reported demand that all sanctions be lifted was the immediate cause of the summit’s breakdown, this more fundamentally is yet another case of Trumpian diplomatic malpractice. Donald Trump violated the ‘three P’s’ of high-level summit diplomacy – policy, personal and political,’ as laid out pre-summit in my February 7 article in War on the Rocks. Post-failed summit, given Trump’s proclivity to revert to attack mode as well as possibly trying to divert from his political problems at home, we need be concerned and watchful that ‘little rocket man’ insults and ‘fire and fury’ threats may not be far behind.”

- Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science, Duke University

“It's too early to completely abandon Trump's more radical approach. He has to see if his strategy has failed. And the larger nonproliferation community is not ready to accept or normalize DPRK as a nuclear state.”

“The denuclearization effort may well fail, but it's too soon to say it has. There's a capable team headed by Steve Biegun, and let's remember that this is nothing less than an attempt to see if one of the world's strangest and most dangerous regimes is capable of changing its ways.”

- Tod Marshall Lindberg, senior fellow, Hudson Institute

“Accepting North Korea as a nuclear state may be inevitable. The best way to limit the size and scope of that program is to push for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.“

“There are no benefits to unilaterally reducing our demands. Best to keep the standards high and consider less maximalist demands in exchange for something.”

“Shifting focus accepts the North Korean regime indefinitely. Even if we shifted focus to arms limitations, the nature of the North Korean regime (lack of openness) would make such limitations unreliable and potentially disarming. It might also substantially weaken U.S. alliances in Asia.”

- Henry Nau, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University

“There is a serious question about our ability to chew gum and walk as a nation if we cannot focus both on the need for a verifiable denuclearization of North Korea AND arms limitation and non-proliferation. Containment must continue for as long as denuclearization remains elusive. Seeing this through the prism of politics and Trump-hatred, while tempting and simple, is useless. The challenge is the challenge, and will dog this administration as it did the previous ones. More importantly, the focus on the Trump-Kim pageant and the President's own ill-advised personal approach to Pyongyang has obscured a larger problem – i.e., the increasingly obvious collapse of the rules-based system underpinned by the NPT.”

“This goal is still possible, if not probable; focusing on vertical and horizontal limits could still be a fallback stance.”

Why shift focus to arms control?

“North Korea has no incentive to give up its nuclear weapons. . . . [T]he Kim regime believes (with good reason) that those weapons are its primary deterrent against a regime change effort by the U.S. or any other state. It is therefore a waste of resources to try to come up with ever more creative ways to gain denuclearization. . . .”

“Denuclearization is an end point that both have broadly agreed to. Trust building and many incremental steps are required to make it there. Requiring denuclearization first, and giving it such significance, repeats the mistakes of the past and fails to understand North Korea's security problematic.”

“The two issues are related. That said, between North Korea's existing nuclear stockpile and the dangers of nuclear arms races and the expansion of the number of countries developing weapons of mass destruction, the latter issue is more important.”

- Dan Drezner, professor of international politics, The Fletcher School of Tufts University

Why shift focus to arms control?

“I don't understand the question. The difference between the two choices is not clear. In any case there can never be a "fully verifiable" disarmament agreement with a country as big (size in which to hide things) and a regime as secretive and dishonest as North Korea.”

“North Korea needs a deterrent or at least thinks that it does (after regime change in Iraq and Libya) and won’t give up the weapons so the premise of denuclearization is a non-starter.”

-JoshuaBusby, associate professor of public affairs, University of Texas-Austin

“Denuclearization is an end point that both have broadly agreed to. Trust building and many incremental steps are required to make it there. Requiring denuclearization first, and giving it such significance, repeats the mistakes of the past and fails to understand North Korea's security problematic.”

-Bridget L. Coggins, associate professor of political science, University of California, Santa Barbara

“Can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Also, this is a reasonable first-step in the process.”

-Michael C. Desch, chair and professor, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame

“The two issues are related. That said, between North Korea's existing nuclear stockpile and the dangers of nuclear arms races and the expansion of the number of countries developing weapons of mass destruction, the latter issue is more important.”

-Dan Drezner, professor of international politics, The Fletcher School of Tufts University

“There is a low likelihood that the United States can convince the North Korean regime that fully verifiable denuclearization is worth the risk. Nuclear weapons are a tool of providing security. What would it take to convince the North Koreans that their security will be enhanced through denuclearization? Surely, it would take extraordinary steps on behalf of the United States and its allies - measures that are unlikely to pass muster either in U.S. domestic politics or with key constituencies in South Korea and Japan. As such, the goal must be to make the best of a bad situation: a nuclear North Korea.”

-Peter D. Harris,assistant professor, Colorado State University

“More realistic.”

-Michael C. Horowitz, professor of political science and economics, director, Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania

“North Korea has no incentive to give up its nuclear weapons. Its nuclear status is a done deal, and the Kim regime believes (with good reason) that those weapons are its primary deterrent against a regime change effort by the U.S. or any other state. It is therefore a waste of resources to try to come up with ever more creative ways to gain denuclearization; the U.S. simply cannot control that process or achieve that outcome. It's also a mistake to argue that we'd be setting a precedent by changing our approach. That precedent has already been set by our continuing recognition and assistance programs to two other states that don't follow NPT guidelines, namely Israel and India (and to some extent, a third, Pakistan). And any incentive that other states have to go nuclear is going to be set more by North Korea's achievements on the ground, than by U.S. efforts to undo what North Korea has done. The facts speak louder than the words, and we already shot ourselves in the foot once by accepting Qaddafi's promise that Libya would not go nuclear, and then cooperating in ousting him, and letting him be murdered, anyway. But the Kim regime does need things from the US, ranging from recognition to economic assistance, that can be fairly easily given (or withdrawn, if the regime does not live up to its promises). And the U.S. would be better off if the Kim regime stopped further nuclear and missile developments at home, and stopped supplying foreign regimes like Iran and Pakistan with missiles and technology for WMDs (and a whole host of other smuggled goods abroad, like drugs). We might be able to make headway there in limiting North Korea's future choices.”

-Kimberly Marten, department chair and professor of political science, Barnard College, Columbia University

“Denuclearization is currently unrealistic given the value of nuclear weapons to the Kim regime and the reason North Korea developed them in the first place - regime survival. This is especially the case after the example we set with Libya. Fortunately, the U.S. is already quite safe vis-à-vis North Korea given our nuclear and conventional deterrent. So we don’t need denuclearization to satisfy our vital national interests but can work on other margins, including testing, production, missiles, and non-proliferation concerns.”

-Will Ruger, vice president for research and policy, Charles Koch Institute

“CVID [Complete Verifiable Irreversible Denuclearization] a bridge too far; to mix metaphors, grab potential bird in hand with long term goal of denuclearization.”

-James Steinberg, professor of social science, international affairs, and law, Maxwell School of Syracuse University

“Full denuclearization is not on the cards as long as Kim is in power, which could be a very long time.”

-Angela Stent, director, Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, Georgetown University

“The U.S. long-term strategy should continue to focus on fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, but the more immediate and primary U.S. focus should be on making real progress on arms limitation and non-proliferation efforts.”

“Kim will not denuclearize, in my opinion. Pushing harder risks conflict and frankly just hurts the North Korean people.”

-A. Trevor Thrall, senior fellow, Cato Institute

Why other?

“It should not focus on the nuclear issue at all. Seek to normalize N[orth] K[orea] (with aid of S[outh] K[orea]) and worry about nukes later. Remarkable that nothing like this option is offered in the question.”