While Sderot sustained rocket attacks for
eight years until the military and political conditions "were ripe"
for a retaliatory strike in Gaza, Tel Aviv will not sustain such attacks
for eight days; not even for eight hours.

In order to put an immediate end to missile attacks on central
Israel - regardless of where they originated: Syria, Lebanon, or Gaza
- we will see massive retribution that will make Operation Cast Lead appear
like a tiny scratch in the Middle East's violent history.

In order to find a defensive solution for Gaza-region residents,
Israeli officials wracked their brains for about six years until "the
need arouse" and the budget was found for the Iron Dome project,
which may prove itself in the next decade. Maybe. Meanwhile, central Israel
is already protected by the best anti-missile systems in the world.

The Juniper Cobra drill that recently got underway expresses
not only America's diplomatic and military commitment to defend Israel
from long-range missiles; it also constitutes an impressive display of
cutting edge technologies only possessed by a few states.

This includes the American THAAD missiles, which became
operation only two years ago and are meant to intercept ballistic missiles
at a 200-kilometer range, beyond the atmosphere, as well as exotic long-range
radar systems and satellite-based sensors.
Yet despite all of the above, the quantity of missiles in the enemy's
arsenal at this time is so great that missiles will be landing in central
Israel; this will certainly be the case if we see a surprise attack like
we experienced in 1973. There will be attempts to hit strategic sites
and crowded population centers. The Syrian missiles and the advanced rockets
held by Hezbollah are much more accurate than Hamas' rockets, not to mention
Iran's capabilities.

It is doubtful whether all our strategic sites, both military
and civilian, are properly reinforced to ensure that our critical systems
will not be paralyzed. There is also no solution for civilians in case
of direct hits. Secure rooms are meant to protect against shrapnel, not
against missiles with huge warheads. Just like what happened around Gaza,
residents in central Israel will feel as though they're taking part in
a bingo contest, of an immensely more murderous scope.

It is no coincidence that Hamas is making every effort to
produce or smuggle rockets with a 70-kilometer range. Bringing such missiles
into the Gaza Strip is also one of Iran's greatest challenges in the region.

Israel's enemies are counting on Goldstone: They will fire
missiles at Tel Aviv, and the world will stop Israel from punishing them
for deterrence purposes. Yet they're wrong.

Israel would not be able to afford to wait
for its ground forces to successfully operate in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza,
or any other site in order to curb the fire. Time is a critical element,
and a successful ground operation is a matter of days or weeks, which
means more casualties and more critical hits sustained by the home front.
The hundreds of rockets that will penetrate through the Israeli-American
defense systems will require Israel to respond immediately.

And here the formula is cruel and simple: The more effective
the rocket terror war will be, the less "proportional" the response
would be.

Under such circumstances, we will see a massive retaliatory
blow, from the air and from the ground, targeting various infrastructures
and sites and being painful enough to prompt the enemy to hold its fire.
If the world expects Israel to only hit military targets and chase every
rocket or launching site, it expects Israel to commit suicide.

The more painful the blow to the enemy's critical sites,
the greater the chance it will be convinced to hold the fire sooner.

Facts and Logic About the Middle East
P.O. Box 590359
San Francisco, CA 94159