Minamata is a Japanese city of 34,000 people on the north-west
coast of Kumamoto Prefecture in the island of Kyushu. It lies
astride a small river that empties into Minamata Bay, an arm of
the semienclosed Shiranui (Yatsushiro) Sea. This sea is about 50
miles long and 10 miles wide and is separated from the open ocean
by a chain of small mountainous islands (fig. 2.1).

Minamata disease is the name given to mercury toxicosis
(poisoning) that developed in people who ate contaminated seafood
taken from Minamata Bay and adjacent coastal waters in the period
after World War II. During this time, methyl mercury was dumped
into the sea as an unwanted by-product of acetaldehyde processing
at the Chisso Company Limited industrial plant in Minamata.1

Almost forty years have passed since Minamata disease was
officially recognized in May 1956 but, despite an urgent need for
relief of victims and restoration of fishing grounds, these and
many other issues still remain to be resolved. Although
resolution is complicated by the dispersion and diversity of
victims, the slow and incomplete response is mainly due to the
actions of individuals and organizations that confused and
dragged out the entire recovery process.

This chapter emphasizes the victims' perspective and focuses
on how governmental and corporate evasion of responsibility for
the disaster frustrated attempts at providing needed relief and
restitution.2 It provides clues about what can be done
to speed the recovery of any local community that has been
hollowed out by lingering environmental disaster and offers
guidance to prevent a recurrence of similar situations elsewhere.

It is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the
victims of Minamata disease before proceeding to an analysis of
the disaster response. Victims can be divided into two groups -
primary and secondary. The primary victims suffered physical
disabilities and impair meet, whereas the secondary victims
experienced a variety of other losses (e.g. economic, social,
psychological).

As of 31 March 1993, the official government tally of
confirmed victims was 2,255 (both living and dead) with 2,376
others who are still seeking to be classified as victims.3
The number of persons refused certification has climbed to
12,503. The actual total of victims is undoubtedly larger than
the official figures because an unknown number of people died
from the disease without certification or chose not to apply for
certification. Some physicians estimate that at least half of the
200,000 people who lived along the coast of the Shiranui Sea in
the late 1950s were affected by some form of mercury poisoning.

Patients who died when the disease entered an acute stage
suffered incomparable misery. Others who survived carry severe
physical and psychological scars. Those with minor symptoms such
as ataxia and inertia often also exhibit signs of neurological
disorder together with intellectual impairment. These afflictions
hinder every aspect of their daily lives, including work and
social relations. A large number of children acquired the disease
before birth via transfer across the placenta from the mother.

Sadly, there is no effective means of medication for Minamata
disease. Above all, there is no possibility of recovery for nerve
cells that are destroyed by methyl mercury. Practically no
research on probable means of treatment is under way. The primary
victims of Minamata disease could not seek work and were forced
to bear heavy medical and nursing costs. Usually, these costs
were transferred to the victims' families because mutual aid
among family members is traditional in this community. As a
result, many poor families have had to scrape the bottom of the
barrel just to make ends meet. By the end of 1959, only 43 per
cent of households with Minamata disease patients were receiving
any sort of public assistance. Entire households were faced with
collapse. To make matters worse, the dismal symptoms of Minamata
disease were unprecedented and therefore particularly
threatening. This socalled "strange disease" was feared
by residents of the fishing hamlets, who turned against the
afflicted because they were thought to be carriers of contagion.
The government's practice of disinfecting and isolating patients
in hospitals provided grounds for these fears. Thus, patients
lost the support of a normally friendly and cooperative
community. They were deprived of mutual aid and their families
were ostracized by neighbours.

When the cause of Minamata disease was finally identified,
people who lived near, or fished in, the contaminated area came
under even greater pressure from outsiders. The fact that fish
were the medium by which the disease was spread, crippled the
fisheries. Not only did regional catches decline because of
pollution but sales of locally caught fish were entirely
prohibited. As a result, fishermen became obsessed by the
possibility that the disease might spread and did what they could
to shut the disease out of their lives. Fishing cooperatives
methodically plotted to conceal new cases of poisoning. Families
with disease-afflicted persons became more and more alienated and
isolated.

One fact was clear to all: the natural environment was being
degraded. Evidence of marine pollution was clear before humans
went down with Minamata disease. Fisheries were already in
trouble. Some local fishermen tried to combat declining catches
by turning to new fishing techniques and new locations, but they
met with no success because pollution was widespread. As a
result, many sold their boats and sought employment on shore. A
great number of others moved away from the area. The widespread
migration of victims accounts for the fact that many lawsuits
were brought against Chisso, the prefecture of Kumamoto, and the
national government by persons who lived in Osaka, Tokyo, Kyoto,
Fukuoka, and elsewhere.

Minamata disease is typical of modern industrial pollution in
so far as it manifests a wide geographic spread of impacts and
casualties. Furthermore, like other industrial pollution
disasters, most of the effects are concentrated in lower
socio-economic groups such as labourers from primary industries -
in this case fishermen and their families. But the natural
environment also suffers heavily, and with it a variety of other
groups who have recreation and tourism interests. Public beaches
are particularly impaired, especially those that provide
tidewater fishing, crabbing, and opportunities for leisure
strolls. In other words, Minamata disease affects virtually every
element of the local community. Most of these issues remain to be
resolved before the problems of recovery can be said to have been
properly addressed.

The first signs that something was amiss in the seas near
Minamata appeared around 1949. Dead fish floated on top of the
bay and shellfish emitted a noxious odour when opened. Soon,
catches began to decline. By 1953, local residents reported that
cats "danced" in circles before collapsing into the
bay; seabirds and crows were also observed spiralling
unexpectedly into the sea. Shortly thereafter, the first cases of
human sickness were noted.

The immediate response of the local government and residents
was vigorous and uncontroversial. A research committee was
organized by the city of Minamata. Public health officials and
the local medical association moved quickly to discover the cause
of the disease and to search for preventive measures as well as
appropriate treatments for the victims. Within two or three
months it was clear that the worst-affected areas were fishing
hamlets along the shores of the bay. The symptoms of an
apparently contagious disease were also identified. Emergency
actions were quickly mounted. Patients were admitted to a
hospital isolation ward. Some experts suggested that they might
be suffering from encephalitis japonica - sleeping sickness.
Others thought that a possibly contagious disease was involved,
so the government repeatedly disinfected places associated with
large numbers of cases.

A change in the speed and effectiveness of responses came
about after heavy metal poisoning of fish began to be suspected
as the chief culprit. When industrial effluents from Chisso came
under suspicion, there was a marked slackening of efforts to
identify the disease and prevent its worsening. The entire matter
was put into the hands of prefectural and national governments
rather than local groups. In the process, local citizens lost the
ability to bring about directly a speedy resolution of the
problem. Some of the blame for this unproductive turn of events
must be shared by the residents of Minamata, but it is clear that
the main contributors to disaster were a combination of business
practices that gave priority to production and ignored
environmental pollution, and the principle of governmental
promotion of industries at any cost - including dangerous
pollution.

The city of Minamata grew along with the expansion of Chisso.
Indeed, the city served as a model company town. The penetration
of Chisso's influence and that of affiliated companies is shown
by several statistics. Between 1956 and the early 1970s the
industrial complex occupied 68 per cent of the city's land area
and consumed 93 per cent of its water supply. Chisso-related
businesses accounted for 30 per cent of retail sales, employed 19
per cent of the workforce and commissioned 66 per cent of all the
shipping activity.

By the early 1960s, as Chisso started to invest in
petrochemicals operations elsewhere, it began to reduce its stake
in Minamata. But the company was still a pre-eminent force in the
community (Nakamura 1975). For example, in 1960, despite
privileged exemptions, Chisso accounted for 49 per cent of the
city's total tax revenues (Funaba 1973). Chisso was Minamata's
cashbox (Chisso 1955). Yet the extent of Chisso's influence on
municipal policy was viewed as insufficient by company leaders,
for employees were directed to involve themselves in municipal
affairs and ensure that public policy was in accordance with
Chisso's business operations.

The extent of Chisso's involvement in local government began
during the period of rapid expansion after World War I. In 1925,
the company entered its own candidates in local elections for the
city council. The Plant Manager was among seven people elected to
the council and a former Plant Director was elected Mayor. During
the 20 years from 1950 to 1969, except for one brief period, the
mayoral seat was continuously held by the Chisso Plant Manager.

Government penetration was not the only way that the Chisso
company seized control of the local community. By identifying
themselves as "Chisso of Minamata," corporate leaders
also encouraged the belief that the firm and the community shared
a "mutual destiny." These and other manoeuvres explain
Chisso's success in taking control of the municipality but they
do not account for their irresponsibility as managers of the
local environment and the health of residents. From the outset,
the company had a history of inflicting damage on the
environment.

In 1925, fishermen from Minamata demanded restitution from
Chisso for damage caused by water pollution. They were fobbed off
with a mimaikin - a consolation payment - and were
required to drop all further complaints. But the pollution did
not cease and further complaints were lodged in 1943 and 1954. In
each case, Chisso used its power to limit compensation to small
sums.

Local residents were also aware of other environmental
problems that were traceable to actions taken by Chisso. These
included dumping of effluent in the city's harbour that caused it
to silt up and hampered shipping. Smoke, dust, noise, and
vibrations were also widespread. Hazardous gases inflicted losses
on crops and trees.

Complaints about pollution were always handled directly by the
company without the intervention of the Minamata city government.
As a result, there was no tradition of assistance to citizens by
the local government. What might otherwise have surfaced as a
social problem that would have necessitated the formulation of
public policy was diverted into a series of private arrangements
between the corporation and affected individuals. This means of
responding to industrial pollution laid the groundwork for the
later poor handling of Minamata disease.

Measures to prevent further outbreaks of Minamata disease
should have been taken once the cause was identified, but no such
action occurred. When it became clear that contaminated fish and
shellfish were the principal carriers of toxins, a comprehensive
ban on fishing should have been adopted immediately. Instead, the
Kumamoto prefectural government argued that it was unlawful to
impose a ban because not all the seafood in the bay was poisoned.
Hence, the government requested fishermen to refrain voluntarily
from fishing in the bay or selling catches from it. But fishermen
who contravened the ban were not penalized, nor were they
supervised. In time, the area of polluted waters expanded and the
disease spread along the entire coastal region of the Shiranui
Sea. Though there was public pressure to change existing laws and
institute a compulsory ban, nothing was done to amend the
legislation.

Here was a failure of government. Fishermen were asked to
accept unilateral self-restraint, whereas Chisso's dumping
operations were given implicit approval. In the process, no
thorough warning of the dangers of consuming contaminated seafood
was provided for local citizens. Daily catches continued to be
distributed and the number of infected people rose. Had a proper
ban been imposed at the outset, it is probable that the disease
would have been checked in its early stages. Even today, no such
action has ever been taken, though court battles to apportion
responsibility for the failure are in progress. So far, three
verdicts have been handed down in the lower courts, two of which
hold government administrators negligent.

Early investigations of Minamata disease were conducted by the
School of Medicine at Kumamoto University. These soon disclosed
that toxins in seafood from the bay were responsible, but the
precise causes were not readily identifiable. Chisso and
government officials took the position that, without conclusive
proof of a particular cause or causes, no effective public action
could be taken. Thus, researchers were forced to undertake a
laborious series of trial-and-error tests of every possible
toxin. During this period, the Mayor of Minamata formally
notified the Ministry of Health and Welfare that agrochemicals
used in farming might be implicated. This action was without
scientific foundation and is representative of many attempts to
redirect attention away from Chisso's effluents.

Late in 1959, the medical research group concluded that a
particular type of organic mercury was the toxin that gave rise
to Minamata disease. Fishermen and local residents readily
embraced this conclusion and generated sufficient pressure to
compel Chisso to stop dumping wastes into the sea. But the
corporation contested the validity of the research and insisted
that the mechanisms that caused the formation of methyl mercury
be elucidated. Their spokespeople offered various
counter-arguments. Though these were often voiced by university
professors who served as paid consultants to the company, the
arguments were based on fraudulent information and lacked a sound
scientific footing. None the less, they delayed official
identification of methyl mercury as the offending substance,
thereby frustrating causal linkage of Chisso and the disease.
Paradoxically, Chisso's own research had come to the conclusion
that mercury pollutants were responsible for Minamata disease,
but the results of this work were withheld from the public. All
these manoeuvres slowed effective responses to the disease.

Public attention was also diverted by the settlement of
actions against Chisso brought by the fishing industry and
disease victims. At this time (December 1959) there was a general
sense that the disease was abating and no longer much of a social
problem, so attention again shifted to other matters.

In 1963, the medical research group at Kumamoto University
finally released an official report announcing that the causative
substance of Minamata disease was methyl mercury found in
industrial wastes discharged by the Chisso plant. Both the
company and the government appeared unconcerned. Their stance was
that Minamata disease had been resolved as a social problem.

Coincidentally, a new outbreak of organic mercury poisoning
occurred soon thereafter in the Agano river basin of Niigata
Prefecture (1965). Again the pollutants were dumped by industry
and again the offending corporation - the Showa Denko K.K. -
refused to admit that it was the perpetrator. But this time
public concern for environmental pollution had grown and the
national government was compelled to investigate the disease
fully. These events led to publication of an official statement
about the cause of the original Minamata disease. This was
described as "methyl mercury compounds produced in the
acetaldehyde acetic facilities of Chisso at Minamata."

Little by little, the cause of Minamata disease had come to be
recognized officially, but the entire process took 12 years after
human symptoms initially appeared. During this period, government
agencies and leaders delayed official recognition and afflicted
persons went uncompensated. Governmental controls and regulations
on industrial wastes were sidestepped without any serious effort
to come to grips with the problem.

In early 1957, the Minamata Fishermen's Cooperative called on
Chisso to cease dumping mercury-contaminated wastes into the bay.
The request contained two parts: (a) that "the release of
polluted water into the sea be stopped" and (b) that
"adequate waste water treatment facilities be installed and
that evidence identifying the harmless nature of waste water
after treatment be submitted." Had these proposals been
accepted, the source of pollution would have been eliminated and
further spread of the disease retarded. But Chisso flatly
rejected the Cooperative's request and failed to accelerate the
installation of improved waste water treatment facilities. By
now, local residents were choosing to avoid seafood from the bay
and the number of new cases of poisoning was declining. The
corporation was thus able to argue that matters were under
control and the fishermen's pleas could safely be ignored.

A new round of anxiety about the disease began in 1958 when
additional cases were verified in villages at the southern end of
Minamata. Chisso responded by re-routing the discharge of
effluents from the bay to the lower reaches of the Minamata
River. Soon thereafter, more new cases of the disease developed
in the estuary. At this point, most observers would have
concluded that the disease agents were closely connected with the
effluents, but Chisso did not. From start to finish they offered
stopgap measures and failed to take any definitive steps against
pollution by the industrial wastes.

The following year (1959), new cases of disease sprang up in
coastal regions all along the Shiranui Sea. Fishermen staged a
large-scale protest against Chisso and demanded that the
corporation "discontinue the release of effluents until
facilities for treatment and purification are completed."
Sentiment in the prefectural Assembly began shifting to the side
of the fishermen and the Governor called for a special Assembly
session to resolve the matter. However, the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) stepped in to declare
that "the problem of industrial waste had been
resolved." Chisso was to be allowed to continue operations
if it ceased dumping wastes into the Minamata River and quickly
completed water treatment facilities.

To the untutored eye, Chisso might have appeared to have taken
some kind of countermeasures against pollution. By the end of
1959 they had completed two waste treatment facilities, neither
of which was effective in removing organic mercury compounds
dissolved in water. Aware of these shortcomings, the corporation
never channelled any waste water from the acetaldehyde process
into them. Yet, at the formal opening ceremonies, the President
of Chisso made the gesture of drinking a cup of water that had
supposedly undergone treatment! It had not, but the prefectural
Governor and the other guests believed the ruse. In fact, the
fishermen, the residents of Minamata, and onlookers everywhere
were brainwashed by an effective but misleading public relations
campaign.

Chisso thereafter dumped waste water from the acetaldehyde
process into a collection pool and recirculated it for reuse,
without taking all the steps necessary to stop the flow of methyl
mercury. This did not occur until 1968, when the acetaldehyde
process was changed. Gradually, methyl mercury was eliminated as
a by-product. But a vast amount of mercury-tainted sediment had
already been discharged into the sea, where it continued to
contaminate fish and shellfish.4

After the prompt admission of patients to hospitals at the
initial stages of the Minamata disaster, there were few new
developments in the arena of relief. Medical costs were privately
borne at first, until patients began to be admitted to the
Minamata Municipal Hospital in 1958. State relief for bedridden
victims did not arrive for a period of five years. A special wing
of the Municipal Hospital was opened in July 1959 to provide
treatment for Minamata disease victims, but there were
insufficient beds and at least 19 verified cases were cared for
at home. Infants with the congenital form of Minamata disease
endured lengthy delays before they were verified as official
cases, because the medical diagnosis of these cases was slow.
Many affected infants received no assistance.

Changes in methods of investigating Minamata disease and
standards for treatment also had repercussions for victims. In
the beginning, widespread epidemiological testing was carried out
to identify causes of the disease. But once it was understood
that heavy metal contamination of food supplies was involved,
broad screening procedures halted and individual cases were
turned over to local physicians. By this means, acute cases who
manifested chronic symptoms became the standard for diagnosis and
many persons with less advanced forms of the disease were left
unattended.

Over the years since 1956, the government has gradually
implemented more comprehensive measures for addressing Minamata
disease. For example, medical treatment costs and a monthly
allowance for nursing are provided to patients who manifest
disease symptoms but have yet to be verified officially as
victims. There is also a new medical examination and management
programme that is aimed at improving health and sanitation among
populations at risk. It remains to be seen whether the programme
will be effective in addressing the needs of Minamata disease
victims. Already, it is clear that there is bureaucratic pressure
to reduce the number of persons who apply for certification as
victims, so the programme may serve to deter people who should be
receiving treatment.

Efforts by victims to secure reparations from Chisso and the
government continued throughout the four decades after 1956 but
little was achieved. The mimaikin contract has already been noted
as an example of the corporation's efforts to appear magnanimous
without either admitting responsibility or incurring substantial
costs.5 Because of being ostracized by the community,
victims found themselves in a weak position to contest such
attempted resolutions of their plight. Had it not been for the
timely occurrence of the "second Minamata disease" in
Niigata, the policy of "stonewalling" might have worked
for Chisso. But it was not until 1973 that a workable system of
reparations by the company was agreed to - 17 years after the
disease was officially recognized.

Reparations are tied directly to the disease certification
process, because only persons who have been officially certified
can qualify for assistance. This leaves many sufferers outside
the aid system. They include victims who are refused
certification, those still being processed, and those who have
yet to apply. Standards for certification are very strict and are
closely tied to the appearance of Hunter and Russell's syndrome.6
By 1970, no more than 121 persons had been certified as victims.
Since then, victims who were refused certification have made
appeals against the screening methods. However, despite an
apparent brief easing of standards, the new examination system
which was established in 1977 - has resulted in a near-total
refusal of certification to applicants.

Frustrated first by Chisso and then by official procedures for
determining who may be counted as a victim, aggrieved citizens
redoubled their efforts to claim reparations from both the
company and the government. The number of plaintiffs in all
regional courts eventually exceeded 2,000 persons. Soon, the
courts desired to pass their own judgement on Minamata disease,
and a new category of victims came into being - those that were
certified by court order rather than medical evidence.

Part of the reason that Chisso and the government dragged
their feet in paying reparations was that the financial burdens
of the disease were mounting up to impressive proportions. The
combined total of reparations to victims and the sludge-removal
project in Minamata Bay ate into corporate funds and made it
difficult for Chisso to continue operating. The prospect of
industrial closings and the advent of widespread public support
for pollution prevention in Japan spurred the government to come
to the company's aid. Bonds were issued by the Kumamoto
prefectural government, and the capital thereby raised was lent
to Chisso to subsidize reparations. It was further agreed that
Chisso would have to repay the prefecture ¥150 billion by the
end of 1992, with further sums to follow as additional
reparations were settled.

The fishermen's place of work was directly contaminated by
mercury, but at first - apart from increasing the number of
artificial reefs and expanding areas open to fishing - nothing
was done to help them. These measures proved ineffective and the
local fishing industry faced imminent ruin. Kumamoto Prefecture
then decided to encourage fishermen to convert their operations
from taking local inshore finfish to deep-sea fishing for squid
and cuttlefish. But the labour force was unfamiliar with the
larger vessels, as well as the equipment necessary, and most
fishermen did not want to spend a long time on the open sea. As a
result, this effort foundered. Several other ideas for rescuing
the fishing industry were tried without success, but the level of
activity was sufficient to convince the national government and
the Japanese parliament (Diet) that the issue was being attended
to. Most of the draft ideas were, in fact, abandoned without
being implemented.

The subsequent history of the fishermen's attempts to gain
reparations is similar to that of the Minamata disease victims.
Initially, Chisso refused to respond to their appeals (1958).
After mercury pollution was identified as the disease's cause, a
new round of appeals for aid was submitted by the fishermen (July
1959). In the end, the mayor's office negotiated a token payment
from Chisso that was not to be considered reparation for problems
related to Minamata disease. As more and more cases of disease
appeared, relations between the fishermen and the corporation
deteriorated to the point where the fishermen stormed Chisso's
Minamata plant, thereby propelling the dispute into a major
political problem. But once again the outcome was payment of
limited reparations by the company, this time brokered by the
Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture.

The vitality of the local community in Minamata was slowly
sapped by repeated failures to arrive at a solution to the
problems of Minamata disease. However, it was also the local
citizens who helped to drag out the process of settlement. Chisso
held the reins of political power in Minamata but, in disputes
with people affected by Mina mate disease, they could count on
local residents to come to their aid. Workers from Chisso and
affiliated companies turned their backs on the victims because
they believed that their own livelihoods were threatened by any
assault on the corporation. With a majority of the citizens
behind them, Chisso commanded public officials and other local
influentials. As a longestablished local institution, the company
took advantage of their ties geographical, economic, and familial
to the area and were able to suppress victims' appeals. Though
their claims for reparations were relatively modest, protesters
were effectively penned into an isolated group. For example, when
fishermen protested to Chisso in 1959, the Mayor and Chairman of
Minamata City Council headed a delegation of 28 groups that
lobbied the Governor against stopping industrial discharges from
Chisso because that action "signed certain death for the
local community." They followed this up with a request for
the prefecture to provide "ample defense against acts of
violence" and implored the Ministry of Health and Welfare to
ignore arguments that might implicate Chisso as a cause of the
disaster.

Although victims' protests grew throughout the 1960s into a
fully fledged social movement - complete with support from
external interest groups Chisso's appeal to the existence of a
"shared destiny" between the citizens and the company
was a formidable obstacle. Even as late as 1968, when official
recognition of the causes of Minamata disease had been secured,
Chisso was able to bring together more than 2,500 persons
representing 53 local groups in support of a concerted effort to
rebuild the Chisso Minamata plant. At this time, the President of
Chisso attempted to dampen the exultation of victims about the
progress they were making in seeking commitments from the
corporation by making a statement that "plant reconstruction
depended on whether cooperation could be won from labor unions
and the local community."

Again, in 1971, when local groups were battling in direct
negotiations for reparation, the Mayor of Minamata pronounced
that he "would defend Chisso even in the eyes of national
consensus." (He later explained that he was forced to make
this statement "for the sake of creating and maintaining
jobs for the people.") Yet again, in 1975, Minamata City
Council officially requested both the state and the prefecture to
mitigate Chisso's burden of work for the removal of contaminated
sludge from Minamata Bay. And once more, in 1977, an organization
created and funded by the City Council campaigned to collect
signatures in support of reconstruction of the Chisso plant.

In short, the carefully cultivated myth of "shared
destiny" between city and company had taken deep root in the
community. Opponents of "mutuality" were discriminated
against and suppressed. The victims - not the disease - were now
seen as the threat. They also became scapegoats for the
community's problems. In this curious and troubling inversion of
reality, Minamata disease itself became a taboo subject.

If something truly effective is to be done about the lingering
impact of Minamata disease, a start must be made on fashioning a
new concept of the community. The conception of "shared
destiny" that served the interests of Chisso and many of its
workers in earlier decades must be dismantled. It will be
necessary to free the residents of Minamata from dependence on a
single corporation and to diversify the economic foundations of
the community. So far, existing approaches have not produced a
solution to the ills that still blight the lives and landscape in
Minamata. This alternative remains to be tried.

The victims of Minamata disease offer the following lessons to
the world:

1. Industrial pollution causes disease, destroys
ecosystems, and produces other types of irreparable damage.
This means that complete recovery from industrial pollution
is impossible. Accordingly, waste material that is produced
as a result of industrial operations must not be dumped into
any environmental sink until it is harmless.

2. The world's chemical industry is currently dumping
newly created substances whose effects are not fully
understood. Because it takes considerable time before the
presence and effects of toxic substances can be identified,
it is necessary to prevent the spread of pollution at the
source.

3. Industrial degradation of the environment produces
effects that can spread rapidly. It is, therefore, necessary
to monitor the effect of pollutants and measure the damage,
otherwise relief of victims and restoration of the
environment will be delayed.

4. When a local community has no control over business
operations that affect its environment, the possibility
exists that the environment will be destroyed.

5. Any business that destroys the environment must bear
the responsibility of making reparations to the victims and
making good the environmental destruction.

Students of natural disasters have observed that communities
typically move through characteristic stages of recovery after a
major catastrophe. The last of these is a period marked by
symbolic construction projects and other initiatives that
memorialize the event and attest to the onset of a "new
beginning." On a recent trip to Minamata (November 1992),
participants in the Second Minamata International Conference
(itself intended to be a therapeutic response to the community's
problems) were taken on a tour of several such facilities. These
included a waterfront park on reclaimed land that covered the
site of Chisso's sludge-dumping operations; an ornamental bamboo
garden and display centre that is intended both to demonstrate
the aesthetic possibilities of landfills and to showcase a
valuable but neglected bamboo handicrafts industry; and the newly
opened Minamata Disease Data Hall, which contains officially
selected photographs and other displays of information about the
disease and its consequences.

To some extent, the existence of these projects reflects
growing community willingness to reject Minamata's pariah status
among Japanese cities and to fashion a new collective self-image
and a new economic base in the manner suggested by Maruyama.
However, it will probably be a long time before Minamata
completes the intended transition from troubled industrial city
to showplace centre of disaster tourism, traditional handicrafts,
and ecodevelopment. The psychological and political gap that
separates victims and non-victims is wide. Many victims are
deeply suspicious of the motives of government and industry
leaders who are promoting the community's new image. The
existence of a privately supported "Disease Victims
Museum," which contests official versions of local history,
is only one indicator of the differences. Other signs of disunity
emerged in a flurry of critical comments about the recovery
process that were delivered by local citizens in the
international conference audience. Such public displays of
discord are unusual at conferences in Japan. Though invited by
the conference organizers, representatives of the Chisso
Corporation were notably absent.

It is probably too early to tell whether these recent
developments signal the beginning of the end of Minamata's long
struggle with the consequences of its namesake disease. What
seems amply clear is that the recovery process has entered a new
stage. At the very least, denial and foot-dragging have been
replaced by recognition and willingness to make a start on the
process of community regeneration. The need to face up to the
realities of industrial hazard as soon as possible and to begin a
broad search for appropriate solutions is one of the
indispensable lessons of Minamata.

Minamata Fishermen's Cooperative calls for end to dumping
of industrial wastes in local waters and treatment of
wastes before discharge.

1958

Chisso re-routes waste water produced in the acetaldehyde
plant from Minamata Bay to a point near the Minamata
River estuary. Pollution spreads across a large part of
the Shiranui Sea.

1959

Organic mercury is identified as the substance that
causes the disease. Fisherman adopt violent tactics in
effort to stop dumping of industrial waste and to support
demands for reparations. Symptoms of Minamata disease
develop in a laboratory cat that was directly
administered effluent from Chisso's plant in tests
conducted at Chisso's research laboratory, but no
official announcement is made. Mimaikin contract
(simple expression of sympathy with little financial
reimbursement) is concluded between Chisso and families
of victims. (Contract later annulled in the First Lawsuit
against Chisso, 1969-1973.)

1965

Cases of organic mercury poisoning in humans living in
Niigata Prefecture are officially recognized in the
so-called second Minamata disease.

1968

Operations at Chisso's acetaldehyde-processing plant
cease. The government releases an official judgement that
"Chisso (is) the cause."

1969

Victims and families bring civil action against Chisso
seeking compensation. This becomes known as the First
Lawsuit against Chisso.

1973

First Lawsuit against Chisso is decided in favour of the
plaintiffs. An agreement on reparations is concluded
between the victims and Chisso, constituting what was to
become the retribution system that has continued to
operate ever since.

Victims and families bring civil action against Chisso,
the national government, and the Kumamoto prefectural
government. This becomes known as the Third Lawsuit.

1987

The Third Lawsuit is decided in favour of the plaintiffs.
It cites the national government and Kumamoto prefectural
government as negligent about their responsibilities for
protecting the public. The defendants (Chisso, Kumamoto
prefectural government, national government) appeal
against the decision.

1987

The former President of Chisso and the Plant Manager are
found guilty of professional negligence leading to
involuntary manslaughter.

1992

The Environmental Agency of Japan initiates a
comprehensive programme for the relief of Minamata
disease.