The information on this blog about the corruption in America's courts will disgust and frighten you and propel you into a world of racketeering, greed, larceny, malicious prosecution, and outrageous disdain for due process, the Rule of Law, the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights and Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules and Statutes. This is the Unified Court System of New York State. You will be a victim unless you speak up and protest. by Betsy Combier

Saturday, January 21, 2012

New York City accuses Brooklyn judge of bias

New York City is squaring off against the federal judge who oversaw itsyears-long litigationwith minorityfirefighters, accusing him of bias and a "preoccupation with press coverage."

Throughout the litigation over hiring discrimination, U.S. District Judge Nicholas Garaufis in Brooklyn "displayed a pervasive propensity to excuse shortcomings" in the firefighters' evidence and "discount, or simply ignore," the city's proof, according to the 137-page brief filed by the city Wednesday with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The city is asking the Second Circuit to throw out a sweeping injunction issued by Garaufis last year and order a new trial overseen by a "neutral arbiter."

The lawsuit was filed in 2007 by the U.S. Department of Justice and later joined by a fraternal organization of black firefighters known as the Vulcan Society, and accused the city of systemic discrimination against minorities looking for a job with the New York City Fire Department, or FDNY.

In a series of rulings, Garaufis sided with the plaintiffs and held that, between 1999 and 2007, the department's written examination had "discriminatory effects" on minority applicants.

Following a three-week bench trial in August, he ordered a court-appointed monitor to oversee a "long-term top-to-bottom reassessment" of the city's recruitment process of minority firefighters.

The city has appealed the ruling in an attempt to vacate the injunctive relief.

Now, it is making the judge a focal point of its problems with the court's remedy.

"The picture that emerges is that of a court bound and determined to justify closely supervised 'top-to-bottom' injunctive relief," the city wrote in Wednesday's brief.

'PREOCCUPATION WITH PRESS COVERAGE'

The city accused Garaufis of inserting himself into the case by calling his own witnesses and injecting his own experiences into the proceedings. He also allegedly goaded the city by appointing former Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau -- who has "a long, acrimonious and well-known history of conflict with many city officials directly involved in this case, as well as the city itself" -- as a special master to oversee the city's development of a new firefighter test, according to the brief.

Morgenthau later voluntarily stepped down and was replaced by Debevoise & Plimpton partner and former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Mary Jo White.

But the Morgenthau episode "speaks volumes about the court's lack of detachment," the city wrote. It also pointed out several instances it said were indications that Garaufis was "influenced" by critical statements made by city officials in the press about the case.

"The nature and extent of the foregoing errors, especially the one-sided manner in which the evidence was analyzed, called the district court's impartiality into serious question, as does its preoccupation with press coverage surrounding the case," the city wrote.

Garaufis, through a law clerk, declined to comment on the city's allegations. He was appointed to the federal bench in 2000 by President Bill Clinton.

Darius Charney, a senior staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights representing the Vulcan Society, said he disagreed with the city's portrayal of Garaufis' conduct.

"We think the judge got it right on the law, and his decision was supported by the facts that were in evidence during the three-week trial in August," Charney said.

The firefighter and government plaintiffs' reply brief is due March 2. A spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York declined to comment.

The case is U.S. v. City of New York, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, No. 07-2067.

For the U.S.: Assistant U.S. attorneys Elliot Schachner, Michael Goldberger and David Eskew for the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York; and Eric Bachman, Sharon Seeley, Allan Townsend, Barbara Schwabauer, Jennifer Swedish, Meredith Burrell and Varda Hussain of the U.S. Department of Justice.

For the Vulcan Society: Richard Levy, Dana Lossia and Robert Stroup of Levy Ratner; Anjana Samant and Darius Charney for the Center for Constitutional Rights; and Judith Scolnick of Scott and Scott.

WEISSHAUS v. FAGAN

GIZELLA WEISSHAUS, Plaintiff-Counterclaim-Defendant-Appellant,

v.

EDWARD D. FAGAN, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee,

STATE OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, JUDITH N. STEIN, in her official and individual capacity, THOMAS J. CAHILL, in his official and individual capacity, HAL R. LIEBERMAN, in his official and individual capacity, JOHN DOES, 1-20, JANE DOES, 1-20, ALAN W. FRIEDBERG, in his official and individual capacity, MEL URBACH, SAUL E. FEDER, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-3199-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 19, 2012.

Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General;Michael S. Belohavek, Senior Counsel to the Solicitor General; andLaura R. Johnson, Assistant Solicitor General, on behalf ofEric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, for the State of New York, the New York State Office of Court Administration of the Unified Court System, Judith N. Stein, Thomas J. Cahill, Hal R. Lieberman, and Alan W. Friedberg, for Appellees.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREEDthat the judgment of the district court isAFFIRMED.

Appellant Gizella Weisshaus, proceedingpro se,appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing her action against her former (and now disbarred) attorney, Edward D. Fagan, as well as several other defendants, in which she principally accused Fagan of various wrongdoing during the course of their attorney-client relationship, and asserted civil rights claims against all defendants relating to the alleged "whitewashing" of ethics complaints she had filed against Fagan with a state disciplinary authority. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

I. Recusal Decision

Weisshaus first challenges the district court's denial of her recusal motion. "Recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and [we] will reverse a decision denying such a motion only for abuse of discretion."LoCascio v. United States,473 F.3d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The timeliness of a recusal motion is a "serious threshold question," and it is "well-settled that a party must raise its claim of a district court's disqualification at the earliest possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim."Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987). In considering the question of timeliness, "[a] number of factors must be examined, including whether: (1) the movant has participated in a substantial manner in trial or pre-trial proceedings; (2) granting the motion would represent a waste of judicial resources; (3) the motion was made after the entry of judgment; and (4) the movant can demonstrate good cause for delay."Id.at 334 (internal citations omitted).

In this case, Weisshaus's recusal motion was untimely for the reasons articulated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision.See Weisshaus v. New York,No. 08 Civ. 4053(DLC), 2009 WL 4823932 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009). Briefly stated, Weisshaus waited almost nineteen months after filing her complaint to file the recusal motion, at which point the district court had already expended substantial judicial resources overseeing and adjudicating Weisshaus's claims. Moreover, Weisshaus's contention that she had good cause to delay until the other defendants were dismissed from the action is entirely unfounded, as Weisshaus herself concedes that Fagan is "the primary defendant" in this matter and that all facts concerning the district judge's involvement in prior actions involving Fagan and Weisshaus were already known. Although there was no dispositive ruling as to Fagan at the time Weisshaus brought her recusal motion, the district court aptly noted that the motion came on the heels of its direction that Weisshaus submit to a deposition, thus strongly suggesting that the motion was a mere fall-back position in response to an adverse ruling.See In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,45 F.3d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] prompt application avoids the risk that a party is holding back a recusal application as a fall-back position in the event of adverse rulings on pending matters."). The district court, therefore, acted well within its discretion in finding Weisshaus's recusal motion untimely.

Even if the motion had been timely, however, it was wholly without merit for the reasons explained by the district court. Indeed, Weisshaus appears to have abandoned almost all of the arguments she asserted below, contending on appeal only that the district court could not impartially consider Weisshaus's claim that Fagan breached his fiduciary duty by failing to appeal a ruling issued by the district court in an earlier case. This argument is entirely unavailing. Whether Fagan breached his fiduciary by allegedly ignoring his client's request to file an appeal,seePl.'s Br. 11, is an issue divorced from the merits of the underlying case. Moreover, recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is generally limited to those circumstances in which the alleged partiality "stems from an extrajudicial source."United States v. Carlton,534 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Accordingly, "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion," and "opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."Liteky v.United States,510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Because Weisshaus does not and cannot argue that the district court's opinion displayed even a hint of partiality, let alone a "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism," her challenge to the district court's denial of her recusal motion must be dismissed.

FRANK LOCASCIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee.

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (I. Leo Glasser, Judge), denying petitioner's amended motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because the District Court acted within its permissible discretion in denying petitioner's recusal motion, and because it properly determined that the alleged death threat to petitioner's counsel was not the cause of any lapse in representation, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.LoCascio v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 2d 333, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29562 (E.D.N.Y., 2005)

DISPOSITION:AFFIRMED.

CASE SUMMARY

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:Petitioner prisoner appealed from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denying petitioner's amended motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under28 U.S.C.S. § 2255.

OVERVIEW:Petitioner's amended motion raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on allegations that petitioner's attorney at his criminal trial altered his defense strategy after receiving a death threat from defendant's co-defendant. The court previously remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing so that the district court could ascertain the existence of the alleged conflict created by the death threat and any resultant lapse in representation. On remand, petitioner's motion to recuse the district court judge under28 U.S.C.S. § 455was denied. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying petitioner's motion, as the judge's rulings did not raise a deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism toward petitioner that would render fair judgment impossible. Additionally, the district court judge did not improperly decide the recusal motion himself, and there was a protracted and unexplained delay in contesting a remark made by the judge until after the judge had denied petitioner28 U.S.C.S. § 2255petition. The district court also properly determined that the alleged death threat to petitioner's counsel did not cause a lapse in representation.

Recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of a district court, and a circuit court of appeals will reverse a decision denying such a motion only for abuse of discretion. Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. Furthermore, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.

Under the objective partiality standard of28 U.S.C.S. § 455(a), a court must determine the existence of the appearance of impropriety not by considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show, but by examining the record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.

In determining the untimeliness of a recusal motion, some relevant factors include whether: (1) the movant has participated in a substantial manner in trial or pre-trial proceedings; (2) granting the motion would represent a waste of judicial resources; (3) the motion was made after the entry of judgment; and (4) the movant can demonstrate good cause for delay.

A judge has an affirmative duty to inquire into the legal sufficiency of such an affidavit and not to disqualify himself unnecessarily, particularly where the request for disqualification was not made at the threshold of the litigation and the judge has acquired a valuable background of experience. To be legally sufficient, an affidavit "must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.

BARBARA UNDERWOOD, Assistant United States Attorney (Thomas Firestone, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel; Roslynn R. Mauskopf, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the brief), New York, NY, for Respondent.

JUDGES:Before: CARDAMONE and STRAUB, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, District Judge.*

*The Honorable John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

OPINION

[*494] Per Curiam:

Petitioner-Appellant [**2] Frank LoCascio appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (I. Leo Glasser,Judge), denying his amended motion to vacate, set aside or correct his life sentence pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 2255. The amended motion raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on allegations that LoCascio's attorney at the criminal trial, Anthony Cardinale, altered his defense strategy after receiving a death threat from LoCascio's co-defendant, John Gotti. We previously remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing so that the District Court could ascertain "the existence of both the alleged conflict created by the death threat and any resultant lapse in representation reflected by the alleged change in Cardinale's conduct of LoCascio's defense."LoCascio v. United States, 395 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 2005).

In accordance with our instructions, the District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which Cardinale was the sole witness. Based on Cardinale's testimony, and applying the legal standards set forth in our remand order, the District Court [*495] denied LoCascio's§ 2255motion. After careful [**3] review of the record and due consideration of Petitioner's arguments, we affirm on the basis of the District Court's finding that any failure to individuate LoCascio was the result of the joint defense strategy between LoCascio and Gotti, not Gotti's alleged death threat against Cardinale.LoCascio v. United States, No. 00 CV 6015(ILG), 462 F. Supp. 2d 333, 338-339 (E.D.N.Y. 2005);seeLoCascio, 395 F.3d at 58. Because the District Court's finding of no causation is sufficient to sustain the judgment, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the questions Cardinale testified he might have asked Sammy Gravano, a goverment witness, constituted a "'plausible alternative defense not taken up by counsel.'"LoCascio, 395 F.3d at 56(quotingUnited States v. Moree, 220 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2000)).1

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1After concluding that LoCascio had failed to demonstrate a basis for relief based on the alleged actual conflict of interest, in accordance with the remand from this Court, the District Court stated that "[o]bedience to the teachings ofStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), drives meas wellto the conclusion that this motion must be denied."LoCascio, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 341(emphasis added). TheStricklandtest for ineffectiveness of counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and prejudiced the client, that is, that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. However, prejudice is presumed where a defendant shows an actual conflict that adversely affected his counsel's performance.Id.at 692;LoCascio, 396 F.3d at 56. TheStricklandstandard of prejudice therefore did not apply in this case, but it was referred to only after Judge Glasser had already determined that no relief was warranted under the proper standard applicable to an alleged actual conflict of interest. Therefore, the reference to the alternative holding underStricklanddoes not require a remand.

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[**4] Following remand, just three days before the evidentiary hearing was scheduled to begin, LoCascio filed a motion to recuse or disqualify Judge Glasser pursuant to28 U.S.C. §§ 144and455. The supporting affidavits, filed by LoCascio and hishabeascounsel, pointed to the following as evidence of Judge Glasser's alleged personal bias and prejudice: (1) the fact that Judge Glasser held Cardinale in summary contempt during the criminal trial; (2) Judge Glasser's repeated denial of LoCascio's pre-trial, trial, and post-conviction motions, and in particular, his denial of LoCascio's motion to amend the§ 2255petition on the ground that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was "meritless"; and (3) Judge Glasser's comment to an interviewer that he was not intimidated during the criminal trial. Judge Glasser denied the motion, which LoCascio now challenges on appeal.

2See, e.g.,United States v. LoCascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993)(affirming judgment of conviction against challenges to the District Court's impanelment of an anonymous sequestered jury, disqualification of defense attorneys, admission of expert testimony on crime families, giving of certain jury instructions on murder and murder conspiracy, refusal to sever LoCascio's trial, and denial of motion for new trial);United States v. Gotti, 166 F.3d 1202 (Table), 1998 WL 870230, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 1998)(unpublished disposition) (affirming the District Court's denial of a subsequent motion for new trial and stating, "Judge Glasser carefully considered, and ultimately rejected, each of these contentions . . . . Although LoCascio attempts to recast some of these arguments before this court, we are not persuaded that we should disturb any of Judge Glasser's carefully reasoned holdings on this appeal"),aff'g171 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

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LoCascio contends [**7] that Judge Glasser's comment to an interviewer following the criminal trial manifests his "dismissive attitude about the threat of bombs planted in his chambers[, which] would certainly lead any objective observer to question his ability to disassociate his own personal feelings from those that frightened Anthony Cardinale." LoCascio's argument is based on the following exchange:

[Interviewer:] Did . . . you feel intimidated during the trial?

Judge Glasser:No.

We see nothing in Judge Glasser's one-word response that might indicate a "dismissive attitude" about bomb threats, or raise any doubt in the mind of a reasonable person as to his ability to decide the present case fairly.SeeUnited States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2000)(stating thatHN2under the objective partiality standard of28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the Court must determine "the existence of the appearance of impropriety . . . not by considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show[,] but by examining the record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding [**8] all the relevant facts would recuse the judge" (second alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted)),cert. denied,529 U.S. 1061, 120 S. Ct. 1571, 146 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2000). If anything, Judge Glasser's remarkconfirmshis capacity to disassociate his own personal feelings and focus solely on the merits of the case before him.

In his brief to this Court, LoCascio cites another remark as constituting grounds for recusal, specifically, Judge Glasser's comment during a January 2003 scheduling hearing that he may institute disbarment proceedings against Cardinale. LoCascio did not raise this argument in his recusal motion to the District Court. Although we are not required to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, we do so here to dispel any insinuation of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Glasser.SeeGreene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994)(stating that a panel may, in its discretion, consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal "if the elements of the claim were fully set forth and there is no need for additional fact finding"). First, we find that the comment, read in context,3cannot reasonably [*497] be [**9] construed as exhibiting personal animosity towards Cardinale or LoCascio (neither of whom was present), or displaying hostility towards LoCascio's claim. Rather, Judge Glasser was simply noting some issues that might require further consideration, for purposes of setting a briefing schedule on LoCascio's motion. In any event, because the comment revealed neither "an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source" nor "such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible," it did not warrant disqualification.Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555;seeid.at 556.

THE COURT:. . . It's a very discrete issue raised by this motion, the issue, permission or what you want to call it to amend the pleading and to conduct some hearing in open court. That's what it's about. I don't know why it should take 90 days to respond to a motion to amend the complaint whether I grant it. I granted [the government's] request for 90 days but when I got [the] letter [from Mr. White, petitioner's counsel], I was compelled to ask myself does the government need 90 days? You don't have to review the entire transcript of this trial to respond to this motion.

MR. BOURTIN [Assistant U.S. Attorney]:Not the entire transcript, but certainly some significant portions of it.

THE COURT:That would be something that you may want to do should a hearing be held, should Mr. White's motion for a hearing be granted. You may want an opportunity to examine the transcript about the cross-examination by Mr. Cardinale for purposes of ascertaining whether there's any merit to the motion and for the purpose of preparing cross-examination. Reading the testimony doesn't take three months to review. There's also a rather interesting issue, I think, Mr. LoCascio is represented by two lawyers at trial, the second one being a very experienced and able lawyer, John Mitchell which may have some bearing upon Mr. LoCascio's - Mr. Cardinale - well, I suppose he's well aware of the fact should he testify to what it is he says he's testifying, there may be some proceeding which would be instituted by me to have him disbarred at the very least but I don't think we need three months to do that.

THE COURT:You have the transcripts. You have the record of that trial. It would seem to me 45 days is more than enough, give you an opportunity to read that cross-examination. . . .

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[**10] Second, although LoCascio now contends that Judge Glasser's "threat" against Cardinale is indisputable proof of the lingering "friction between these two formidable forces," the record shows that LoCascio did not seek Judge Glasser's recusal at any reasonable time following the January 2003 hearing. As we have made clear,HN3"recusal motions are to be made 'at the earliest possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim.'"Gil Enters., Inc. v. Delvy, 79 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1996)(quotingApple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987)). There are at least two reasons for this rule: "First, a prompt application affords the district judge an opportunity to assess the merits of the application before taking any further steps that may be inappropriate for the judge to take. Second,a prompt application avoids the risk that a party is holding back a recusal application as a fall-back position in the event of adverse rulings on pending matters."Id.(quotingIn re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1995)). Here, LoCascio made no mention of the above [**11] remark untilafterthe District Court had denied his motion to amend andafterit had denied his§ 2255petition. This protracted and unexplained delay provides yet another reason for rejecting this new ground for relief.See id.;United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1977),cert. denied,435 U.S. 933, 98 S. Ct. 1508, 55 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1978);see alsoApple, 829 F.2d at 334(holding thatHN4in determining [*498] the untimeliness of a recusal motion, some relevant factors include "whether: (1) the movant has participated in a substantial manner in trial or pre-trial proceedings; (2) granting the motion would represent a waste of judicial resources; (3) the motion was made after the entry of judgment; and (4) the movant can demonstrate good cause for delay" (citations omitted)).

In his final argument, LoCascio asserts that Judge Glasser should have referred the recusal motion to a different judge instead of deciding it himself. However, as LoCascio acknowledges in his brief, the mere filing of an affidavit of prejudice does not require referral.SeeApple, 829 F.3d at 333. "On the contrary, we have held thatHN5a judge [**12] has an affirmative duty to inquire into the legal sufficiency of such an affidavit and not to disqualify himself unnecessarily, particularly 'where the request for disqualification was not made at the threshold of the litigation and the judge has acquired a valuable background of experience.'"Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978)(quotingRosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1966)),cert. denied,439 U.S. 1072, 99 S. Ct. 844, 59 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1979). To be legally sufficient, an affidavit "must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment."Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1968)(internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed above, we find that nothing in LoCascio's affidavit even approached this standard. Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Glasser properly discharged his duty in declining to refer the recusal motion to another judge.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Sunny Shue, died Saturday June 26, 2010. Video that Sunny did on April 9 2010, asking for protection from Judge Joseph Golia. Wednesday...

September 2, 2009 Hearing With Senator John Sampson on Judicial Accountability in New York State

We went to a Hearing with Senator John Sampson on September 24, 2009 on the New York Judicial Syatem. A few people were able to speak, and many others signed up to speak at a later date...that Sampson never scheduled.

First published in print: Monday, January 11, 2010
Here we thought that the first order of business this year for state Senate Democratic leader John Sampson would be to help regain that institution's credibility by passing radical ethics reforms.

The need for them would seem to be brutally obvious, in the wake of the conviction of former Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno on federal corruption charges and Governor Paterson's calls for requiring state officials members to disclose their outside income. First, though, Mr. Sampson has joined a large Manhattan law firm where one of the founding partners is on the board of the state Trial Lawyers Association.
That's right. Mr. Sampson now works not only for the people of New York, but also for the firm of Belluck & Fox, according to a New York Post report.

His salary in the former position is a matter of public record, of course -- $88,500. His salary in his new job, however, is something Mr. Sampson isn't about to disclose.

Just as New Yorkers need to learn more about legislators' outside interests, Mr. Sampson offers them less.

Imagine, then, what people might think if this is one more year when the Legislature fails to pass ethics laws. Or if it does, only a watered down version of what's need to clean up an institution where criminal indictments and convictions have become too commonplace?

What were Mr. Sampson's priorities, they might wonder -- transparency in government, or shielding from both his own finances and Belluch & Fox's clients?

The same questions might be asked as well of Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, who holds a position of counsel to another Manhattan law firm, Weitz & Luxenberg. Little is known by the public about that arrangement, too, thanks to the alarmingly inadequate financial disclosure requirements for legislators that Mr. Silver seems to think are entirely adequate. We know he works for that particular firm, one of the largest tort law firms in New York, but we don't know what the nature of his work is, or on whose behalf he does it.

That will become all the more relevant in the event someone else in the Legislature tries to push for rewriting the state's medical malpractice laws or otherwise changing tort laws this session. Two of the most powerful people in state government work for law firms closely associated with the leading opponent of such legislation, namely the Trial Lawyers Association.

In Mr. Silver's case, he rather famously said of his legal work a half-dozen years ago, "I don't think it's a conflict. How many times do you want to hear this?"

In Mr. Sampson's case, the word comes from his office that his outside work won't interfere with his official duties.

Not exactly endorsements of ethics reform, are they?

THE ISSUE:

The state Senate Democratic leader has another job, too, not that he wants to talk about it.

THE STAKES:

When ethics reform is a major issue, how serious is he about stronger financial disclosure requirements?

Electronic Libraries and FOIA Links

Accountability is the Key

Westchester Guardian TV

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Victims-of-Law

Who is a Victim-of-Law?Victims-of-Law are persons who have been subjected to tyrannical or arbitrary rulings or edicts in violation of constitutional and civil rights under the democratic maxim reminiscent of our Republic -- the "Rule of Law"

The victims of unethical and corrupt lawyers, judges and employees of the state and federal judiciary demand accountability from those who abuse the power of office while they remain absolutely immune. The media as well as the legislative and executive branches of government traditionally ignore these abuses. The judicial branch itself hurls insults at the victim claiming they are nothing more than a 'disgruntled litigant' while ignoring substantive allegations.

It is essential to empower the victims of legal abuses. Our strength is in our numbers thus the more people that demand their constitutional and civil rights the quicker they will be attained.

What most people do not comprehend is that judges are immune from civil lawsuits. If a judge unlawfully imprisoned someone or maliciously denied due process in a case that cost a litigant millions of dollars, it doesn't matter. There is no redress for the aggrieved person.

The emotional and physical health problems inherent in these abuses are now coming to light but the judicial branches throughout our country continue to avoid or deliberately ignore what they have helped to create.

This website hopes to publish documented proof of many of the deliberate violations of the 'rule of law, the doctrine upon which our Constitutional Republic is based.

This website hopes to publish documented proof of many of the deliberate violations of the 'rule of law, the doctrine upon which our Constitutional Republic is based.

What is the "Rule of Law"? Equality and the Law

The right to equality before the law, or equal protection of the law as it is often phrased, is fundamental to any just and democratic society. Whether rich or poor, ethnic majority or religious minority, political ally of the state or opponent--all are entitled to equal protection before the law.

The democratic state cannot guarantee that life will treat everyone equally, and it has no responsibility to do so. However, writes constitutional law expert John P. Frank, "Under no circumstances should the state impose additional inequalities; it should be required to deal evenly and equally with all of its people."

No one is above the law, which is, after all, the creation of the people, not something imposed upon them. The citizens of a democracy submit to the law because they recognize that, however indirectly, they are submitting to themselves as makers of the law. When laws are established by the people who then have to obey them, both law and democracy are served.

The Supreme CourtThe Framers considered the rule of law essential to the safekeeping of social order and civil liberties. The rule of law holds that if our relationships with each other and with the state are governed by a set of rules, rather than by a group of individuals, we are less likely to fall victim to authoritarian rule. The rule of law calls for both individuals and the government to submit to the law's supremacy. By precluding both the individual and the state from transcending the supreme law of the land, the Framers constructed another protective layer over individual rights and liberties. --Reprinted from U.S. Dept. of State

Judicial Immunity is AbsoluteIn an unprecedented degree of 'abuse of power' judges decreed themselves absolutely immune from civil suit when they are "acting maliciously and corruptly." In 1996 the 104th Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act amending the Civil Rights statute to give further immunities to malicious and corrupt judges.

Sec. 309. Prohibition against awards of costs, including attorney's fees, and injunctive relief against a judicial officer.28 USC 2412 note.>> for Costs.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no judicial officer shall be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, in any action brought against such officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.(b) Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights.--Section 722(b) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988(b)) is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof "except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction".

(c) Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights.--Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1983) is amended by inserting before the period at the end of the first sentence: ``, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable''.

Advocate for truth and An End To Judicial Immunity

About Betsy Combier

Reporter, paralegal, advocate,I will investigate, search on the internet and in all data bases for information that will help a person in need of resolution to a problem.I believe in substantive and procedural due process for all individuals, groups and organizations and trademarked the term "e-accountability" to describe the purpose of my work. I am the parent of four daughters.

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Who is John Libecci?

On Sunday, August 16, 2009, a friend of a friend called me at approximately 2:10PM, a Mr. John Libecci. Mr. Libecci is, I understand, a private investigator who knows a friend of mine socially. I asked whether he could help me find out some information involving my federal court case filed in United States District court on June 8, 2009 involving the Surrogate Court and my mother's Will. After I told him about the property being taken by the court, he told me that the court never takes property without a reason; after I told him that the Will was never probated since I filed the Will (of my mom) on March 17, 1998), Mr. Libecci told me that "obviously the Will was not done right", and said that he worked for the Courts and the Judges. He would not tell me what he did for the Court and the judges, then hung up. If anyone has information about Mr. John Libecci please email me at betsy@parentadvocates.org. You may send me any information anonymously.