In 1983-1985, drought in sub-Saharan Africa was a topic of
world-wide concern as it had been in 1968-1973. In both cases, it
was only after several years of deficient rainfall and poor
harvests that the resilience of the people was sapped and the
human suffering became dramatic enough to capture widespread
attention. In 1983-1985, however, many of the public and private
aid organizations had sufficient presence in the field to fully
recognize the extent of the problem as it developed. Memories of
the 1968-1973 drought in the Sahel helped give credibility to
field reports, and past experience facilitated communication and
cooperation among relief agencies. While the severity of the
situation and the difficulties of responding effectively cannot
be overestimated, it is clear that the response of the
international community was a considerable improvement over the
relief efforts of 1973-1974.

These periodic severe imbalances between food production and
human requirements are usually termed "natural
disasters", and it is generally assumed that the problem
will disappear once nature returns to "normal". Those
who have worked in the sub-Saharan zone known as the Sahel
realize that the problem will not disappear with the first
growing season with adequate rains. Even a cursory review of
basic facts will quickly indicate that millions of people are
caught in a spiral of poverty and malnutrition.

Since 1975 more than US$1,000 million in development
assistance has been provided annually to the eight member
countries of CILSS (the Permanent Interstate Committee for
Drought Control in the Sahel). This unique political group,
formed after the 1968-1973 drought to rationalize development
efforts, includes-from east to west-the countries of Chad, Niger,
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Mali, Mauritania, Senegal,
the Gambia, and Cape Verde. While the first priority of CILSS is
to attain self-sufficiency in food production, after ten years
there is little to suggest that this objective is being achieved.

Improvements in health care, education, nutrition, the
standard of living, and life expectancy have also been sporadic
at best. Given the relatively large influx of development
assistance and the fact that 80 per cent of the population is
directly dependent on agriculture, one must wonder whether the
natural resource base is sufficient to even begin to meet human
needs for food, clothing, and shelter during any but the best
years.

These were the general concerns that led me to undertake the
present study. I have focused on the efforts of the United
Nations system partly because of the need to make the vast
subject more manageable and partly because of my familiarity with
the UN system. In many ways the UN efforts are a microcosm of all
aid flowing to the Sahel, for the diversity and interactions of
UN organizations and their funding sources reflect virtually all
possible development topics and methodologies. Hence much of the
present monograph is devoted to documenting the diverse UN
activities and their respective modes of operation.

Similarly, the thematic focus of the report is on natural
resources development because the vast majority of the population
are, and will continue to be, directly dependent on the existing
soil, water, and vegetation resources for their livelihood. There
seemed to be a need to question whether aid programmes have been
able to develop stronger, sustainable production systems, or
whether they have contributed to the region's instability by
permitting much higher human and animal populations which are
then destined to decline precipitously during periods of
unfavorable climatic conditions.

As the study progressed, two serious limitations became
apparent. The first was a lack of scientific data to evaluate
either the trends in resource quality or the effects of different
development activities on the resource base. This difficulty can
be ascribed partly to the limited research capability in the
Sahelian countries, partly to a justifiable emphasis on
development rather than scientific studies, and partly to the
problem of gaining access to scattered research that does not
find its way into the mainstream of science. The problem of
access was also the basis of the second major limitation, namely
that each of the parties involved in development assistance has
reasons to restrict access to its detailed project reports. Thus
it has proved nearly impossible to evaluate the impact of
development projects on the natural resource base in the way
originally envisaged, and consequently more attention has been
paid to political and administrative questions. I have provided
some discussion of assistance to the Sahel from sources outside
the UN system and of sectors not related to natural resources,
but this is primarily to provide context and contrast.

The completion of a manuscript, particularly one with a
relatively long gestation period, leaves one with innumerable
debts of gratitude but limited space for acknowledgement. Dr.
Walther Manshard stands out as pillar of support and inspiration;
and his secretary for several years, Mrs. Phyllis Talley, helped
type an earlier version of the manuscript. Dr. Stephen Preston,
Dr. Kenton Miller, and Dr. Asit Biswas provided much of the
initial feedback which eventually led to this publication. Among
others, Dr. Jack Mabbutt, Dr. Brian Spooner, and Dr. Douglas
Johnson provided guidance and insights gained from their
extensive work in arid lands. A number of libraries and
documentation centres have humoured me in my quest for non -
existent or simply obscure references; these have included the
OECD Development Centre in Paris, the Sahel Documentation Center
at Michigan State University, the Office of Arid Lands Studies at
the University of Arizona, and most recently the Documents
Library at the University of California at Berkeley. The staff at
the United Nations' Dag Hammarskj÷ld Library in New York were
extremely helpful in guiding me through the UN documentation
system and providing me with a pleasant nook in which to work;
Mr. Nick Christonikos deserves special mention in this regard.
Similarly, the staff of the United Nations University liaison
office twice helped with extended stays in New York, and M. E.
Leung provided assistance and support that has not been and
cannot be fully acknowledged. The UNU staff in Tokyo have also
been most supportive, despite my difficulty in meeting
self-imposed deadlines. Sumiko Yokoyama and Motoko Kuroda still
hold warm spots in my heart for typing and retyping the first
version of this report. Kathleen Landauer has kept the
administrative problems at bay and provided some early and
crucial enthusiasm. At Berkeley, Dr. Louise Fortman graciously
read through the manuscript, while Rosemary Warden deserves
credit for cleverly converting my hard-copy writings and
revisions into an organized, electronic form. Finally, thanks
must be given to my wife and friends who have been given
additional burdens or been forced to adapt to my schedule so that
I could work on this project.

This preface would hardly be self-respecting or complete
without the acknowledgement that, in the final analysis, what I
have written is solely my responsibility. Inevitably, dealing
with such a complex topic will result in some omissions or errors
in interpretation, but these should not obstruct the broader
picture. I only hope that this work will help lead to a more open
and realistic debate on UN development assistance, and to clearer
links between development assistance and an improvement in the
lives of the people of the Sahel.