jeudi, 20 septembre 2018

Is Langley Unleashing Jihad Against China in Xinjiang?

Ex: https://www;strategic-culture.org

One of the early indicators that the Trump administration’s foreign and security policies would not be guided by the President’s own preferences but by those of the supposed “experts” – globalists, neoconservatives, and assorted retreads from the George W. Bush administration – with whom he unwisely has surrounded himself was the announcement of a “new” strategy on Afghanistan in August 2017. It was neither new nor a strategy. President Donald Trump allowed his publicly stated preference to get the hell out to be overruled by the guys with the short haircuts who want to stay in Afghanistan, in effect, forever.

But why? What possible national interest could be advanced from a permanent American military presence in a godforsaken piece of real estate about as remote from the United States as it is possible to get while staying on this planet?

One answer was suggested by Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson (US Army-Ret.), former chief of staff to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, at the August 18, 2018, conference of the Ron Paul Institute. Wilkerson’s description of the subjective thinking of the US military has the ring of truth (presented here in authentic Pentagonese BLOCK LETTERS, emphasis added in bold):

‘HERE IS WHAT THE MOST POWERFUL AND MOST STRATEGICALLY-ORIENTED BUREAUCRACY IN OUR GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY, HAS DECIDED FOR AFGHANISTAN.

‘THERE ARE THREE STRATEGIC REASONS WE WILL BE IN AFGHANISTAN, AS WE HAVE BEEN IN GERMANY SINCE WWII, FOR A VERY LONG TIME—WELL BEYOND THE ALMOST TWENTY YEARS WE HAVE BEEN THERE TO DATE.

‘THESE REASONS HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH STATE-BUILDING, WITH THE TALIBAN, OR WITH ANY TERRORIST GROUP THAT MIGHT BE PRESENT. THESE THINGS ARE ANCILLARY TO OUR REAL OBJECTIVES.

‘THE FIRST REAL OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE HARD POWER DIRECTLY NEAR THE CHINESE BASE ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) IN CENTRAL ASIA.

‘ASK DONALD RUMSFELD HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO GET MAJOR MILITARY FORCES INTO THIS EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT LAND-LOCKED TERRAIN IN THE FALL OF 2001. FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE NOT ABOUT TO DEPART.

‘SECOND, IN AFGHANISTAN WE ARE RIGHT NEXT TO THE POTENTIALLY MOST UNSTABLE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE ON EARTH, PAKISTAN’S. WE ARE NOT ABOUT TO LEAVE THAT EITHER. WE WANT TO BE ABLE TO POUNCE ON THAT STOCKPILE VERY SWIFTLY SHOULD IT BECOME A THREAT.

‘THIRD, WE WANT TO BE ABLE TO MOUNT AND COVER WITH HARDPOWER CIA OPERATIONS IN XINJIANG PROVINCE, CHINA’S WESTERNMOST SECTION. THESE WOULD BE OPERATIONS AIMED AT USING THE SOME 20 MILLION UIGHURS IN THAT PROVINCE TO DESTABLIZE THE GOVERNMENT IN BEIJING SHOULD WE SUDDENLY FIND OURSELVES AT WAR WITH THAT COUNTRY.

‘I WILL WAGER THERE ARE NOT A HANDFUL OF OUR CITIZENS WHO REALIZE THAT WE—OUR MILITARY, THAT IS—PLAN TO BE IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE ENTIRE TIME WE ARE CONSIDERING FOR OUR GRAND STRATEGY—AND PERHAPS BEYOND.’

In short, Xinjiang is an ideal place for the CIA (per Wilkerson) to give Beijing a hotfoot and try to throw an impediment in the way of BRI and thus of Eurasian integration.

Whenever you see western governments and the legacy media wailing about the plight of “persecuted Muslims” somewhere (in a way they never do for Christians anywhere) it should be a tipoff the boys and girls over at Langley are pushing the start button on a jihad against someone for geopolitical reasons having nothing to do with human rights, religious freedom, or other ostensible bleeding heart concerns. That appears to be what we’re seeing today in the strident chorus of alarm from Congress calling for sanctions against Chinese officials.

We’ve seen this movie before. Today we see it against China and Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (the Uyghurs, and connectedly the Rohingya in Myanmar, directed against BRI’s China-Myanmar Economic Corridor through Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal). In the past we saw it in Afghanistan (against the USSR), in the Balkans on behalf of Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians (against the Serbs), in the Caucasus on behalf of the Chechens (against Russia). Of course the successful overthrow and murder of the Libya’s Muammar Kaddafi and the not-yet-abandoned effort to effect regime change in Syria depend heavily on support for various al-Qaeda affiliates and offshoots.

It’s significant that in all of our post-Cold War 1 military interventions every one (except for Bill Clinton’s invasion of Haiti) was ostensibly to free or rescue some suffering Muslims – never mind that in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, etc. we somehow ended up killing large numbers of the supposed beneficiaries. Just imagine how many oppressed Muslims we would need to kill liberating Iran! Meanwhile, as we continue to support the Saudi slaughter in Yemen with a US quasi-alliance with al-Qaeda there, there’s nothing to see, folks . . .

Recognizing these crocodile tears for what they are isn’t to suggest that bad things aren’t happening in Xinjiang. But based on past experience it’s reasonable to think that behind the fog of state-sponsored media propaganda the reality is more complex and involves a substantial element of western intelligence ginning up the jihadis against the kaffir Han as we have against many other targets.

‘Since the early 1990s a number of terror incidents by the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) [also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party] killed several hundred people in China. ETIM is sanctioned by the UN as an al-Qaeda aligned movement. Three years ago China decided to attack the problem at its roots. It prohibited Salafist-Wahhabi Islamic practice, which was only recently imported into the traditionally Sufi Uyghur-Muslim areas, and it tries to weed out any such ideology. It also fears the potential growth of an ethnic-nationalistic Turkic Uyghur movement, sponsored by Turkey, that could evolve into a separatist campaign.

‘People who are susceptible to such ideologies will be put through an reeducation training which includes language lessons in Mandarin and general preparation for the job market. This may not be the way 'western' countries mishandle a radicalization problem, but it is likely more efficient. There surly are aspects of the program that can be criticized. But to claim that these trainings happen in "concentration camps" and for nonsensical reasons is sheer propaganda.’

‘Xinjiang province is larger than Great Britain, France, Spain, and Germany combined. It is a mostly uninhabitable landscape of mountainous and desert terrain with a tiny population of some 24 million of which only 45% are Muslim Uyghurs of Turkic ethnicity. It would be rather unimportant outer province for China were it not at the core of the new Silk road connections.

‘It is a vulnerable point. An established insurgency in the area could seriously interrupt the new strategic communication lines.

‘Chinese strategists believe that the U.S., with the help of its Turkish, Saudi and Pakistani friends, was and is behind the Islamic and ethnic radicalization of the Turkic population in the province. It is not by chance that Turkey transferred Uyghur Jihadis from Xinjiang via Thailand to Syria to hone their fighting abilities. That the New York Times publishes about the Xinjiang re-education project, and also offers the report in Mandarin, will only confirm that suspicion. China is determined to end such interference.’

‘Consider China, which seeks this century to surpass America as the first power on earth. Does Xi Jinping welcome a greater racial, ethnic and cultural diversity within his county as, say, Barack Obama does in ours?

‘In his western province of Xinjiang, Xi has set up an archipelago of detention camps. Purpose: Re-educate his country's Uighurs and Kazakhs by purging them of their religious and tribal identities, and making them and their children more like Han Chinese in allegiance to the Communist Party and Chinese nation.

‘Xi fears that the 10 million Uighurs of Xinjiang, as an ethnic and religious minority, predominantly Muslim, wish to break away and establish an East Turkestan, a nation of their own, out of China. And he is correct.

‘What China is doing is brutalitarian. But what China is saying with its ruthless policy is that diversity—religious, racial, cultural—can break us apart as it did the USSR. And we are not going to let that happen.

‘Do the Buddhists of Myanmar cherish the religious diversity that the Muslim Rohingya of Rakhine State bring to their country?”

If Donald Trump really were master of his own house, maybe he could move forward on his pledge of an America First, national interest-based policy that finds “common ground” (as articulated at the same Ron Paul Institute conference by Colonel Doug Macgregor (US Army-Ret.)) with countries like Russia and China we continue to treat as adversaries.

jeudi, 09 mars 2017

Turkey and ISIL: Anti-Chinese cooperation

If the “Islamic State” would have managed to quickly capture the territories controlled by Afghan-Pakistani Taliban and make these territories a part of their proclaimed “caliphate”, the threat of destabilization would be right on China’s doorstep

The latest months showed how deeply Turkey is absorbed by everything that has to do with ISIL. Turkey was behind the stage of the events developing around the “Islamic State” for a long time, aiding its activities only indirectly or unofficially. However, an official statement was made in autumn 2015 in Istanbul, which could be viewed as a sort of Turkish declaration regarding the “Islamic State”.

The statement was made by the head of National Intelligence Organization of Turkey Hakan Fidan, who usually doesn’t make public appearances. Fidan stated: ” ‘Islamic State’ is a reality. We must acknowledge that we can’t eradicate such a well-organized and popular organization such as the “Islamic State”. Which is why I urge our Western partners to reconsider their former notions of the political branches of Islam and put aside their cynical mindset, and together frustrate the plans of Vladimir Putin to suppress the Islamic revolution in Syria.”

Based on the reasoning above, Hakan Fidan makes the following conclusion: it is necessary to open an office or a permanent embassy of ISIL in Istanbul — “Turkey strongly believes in this“.

The story with the date of the statement of National Intelligence Organization head is a curious one. First it appeared in online media on October 18, 2015, but didn’t get much attention back then. The statement of Hakan Fidan became famous after it got republished on the websites of news agencies on November 13 — on the eve of Paris terror attacks, which happened on the night between November 13 and November 14.

It so happened that Turkey urged the West to recognized a quasi-state, which, on its part, refuses to recognize the right of other states for existence. In essence, we see a call to accept the demands of ISIL as a global terrorist. Its demand is well-known — an oath of allegiance to it as the new caliphate.

What does the live participation of Turkey in the life of the “Islamic State” promise to the Islamic world and its neighbors (including Russia)? This question becomes more important in this very moment, after thousands of refugees were transported not without Turkey’s participation from the Middle East to Europe, after the incident with the Russian plane, which was bombing ISIL, downed by Turkey, after the far-reaching claims of Turkish officials. In this regard it is worth to recall another important aspect of Middle Eastern politics.

The fall of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and the destruction of Gaddafi’s state in Libya in the beginning of the “Arab Spring” almost collapsed the economic communication of these countries with China. China’s economic presence in these countries was rapidly growing. This way, it is understandable that the events of the “Arab Spring” created a barrier for the Chinese economic expansion to Middle East and Africa, which threatened the United States. In other words, “Arab Spring” was also an effective tool in the hands of the USA in its global competition with People’s Republic of China.

Now, studying the connections between Turkey and ISIL, it is necessary to discuss what the expansion of the “Islamic State” means for China.

In autumn 2015 media reported that Turkish intelligence agencies are preparing terrorists among Chinese Uighurs. One could think that the reason here is the traditionally strong ties between Turkic peoples, as well that Turkey is interested in strengthening its influence over the Easternmost part of the Turkic world – Turkestan. All of this is, of course, true. But this isn’t everything that this is about. It is also about Uighur groups being trained and becoming battle-hardened in the ranks of ISIL. There is more and more evidence of the presence of such groups in Syria.

Therefore, ISIL is a new tool, improved after the “Arab Spring“, capable of destabilizing the primary competitor of the USA — China. If the “Islamic State” would have managed to quickly capture the territories controlled by Afghan-Pakistani Taliban and make these territories a part of their proclaimed “caliphate”, the threat of destabilization would be right on China’s doorstep. The capabilities of the caliphatist organization which would have appeared this way — with the prospect of Uighurs joining it — would have made such destabilization inevitable.

However, ISIL failed to quickly advance into the Afghan-Pakistan area. Recall what The Daily Beast newspaper wrote in October 2015 in an article titled “A Taliban-Russia Team-Up Against ISIS?” The newspaper wrote that the representatives of Taliban went to China several times to discuss the problem of Xinjiang Uighurs living in southern Afghanistan. The Daily Beast quoted one of Taliban representatives: “We told them they (to Uyghurs – Author) are in Afghanistan, and we could stop them from making anti-Chinese activities“.

Experts insist that Pakistan (the intelligence agencies of which played a decisive part in creating Taliban) significantly reorients from USA to China. Because the prospects of surrendering its own and Afghani Pashtun areas to the “Islamic State”, which won’t stop at that, is unacceptable for Pakistan. This is what, obviously, caused the turn of Pakistan towards China. And this turn was so drastic that its consequences create a new threat to the USA of expanding China’s influence.

During the Xiangshan Security Forum, which took place in October 2015, Pakistani Minister of Defense, Water and Power Khawaja Muhammad Asif announced the banishment of Uighur militants of the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement”. He said: “I think there (were) a small number in tribal areas, they’re all gone or eliminated. There are no more there.” Asif added to this that Pakistan is ready to fight against the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement”, because this is not only in the interests of China, but in Pakistan’s own interests.

Next, in the first half of November 2015, Chinese newspaper China Daily announced that the Chinese state company China Overseas Port Holding received 152 hectares of land on lease in Gwadar port from Pakistani government for 43 years (!). Perhaps it is time to admit that China has almost reached the Arabian sea through the strategically important Pakistani region Balochistan (that is where Gwadar is) and that the planned expansion of ISIL to the east didn’t make it in time to prevent this? It is obvious that the struggle of the USA against China will continue on this direction, which is why China hurries to secure the reached results and create its own economic zone near the Strait of Hormuz.

China Daily wrote: “As part of the agreement, the Chinese company, based in Hong Kong, will be in full charge of Gwadar Port, the third-largest port in Pakistan.”

There is a noteworthy detail in this story: Gwadar is considered to be the southern tip of the large Chinese-Pakistani economic corridor. This corridor starts in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of People’s Republic of China. This means that the necessity to destabilize China from there becomes more acute for its competitors.

Since Pakistan and Talibs refuse to radicalize Chinese Uighurs (more than 9 million of whom live in China), this role goes to, on the one hand, Turkey as the Turkic patron of Uighurs, one the other hand — to ISIL as Islamist ultra-radicals. Next, if this Afghan-Pakistani corridor for supplying radical groups to China is blocked for now, it means there is a need for another one. Which one? Obviously, the Turkic world — from Turkey to Turkic countries of Central Asia and Chinese Uighurs. It is more than likely that Russian Volga region and North Caucasus will have to be made a part of the corridor which Turkey and ISIL need to communicate with Uighurs.

Chinese media point out to this since the end of 2014. Back then the news website Want China Times published an article titled ” ‘East Turkestan’ separatists get trained in ISIL and dream of returning to China“. The website referred to the data already published by the Chinese news outlet Global Times. According to this data, Ethnic Uighur radicals flee from the country to join ISIL, receive training and fight in Iraq and Syria. Their goals are to win wide acknowledgement among international terrorist groups, establish contact channels and acquire real combat experience before bringing their knowledge back to China.

Global Times reported, citing Chinese experts, that Xinjiang Uighurs join ISIL either in Syria and Iraq, or in the divisions of ISIL in South-East Asian countries. Next the publication informed that, since the international community launched the anti-terrorist campaign, ISIL now avoids recruiting new members right on its “base”, preferring to separate them by sending to smaller cells in Syria, Turkey, Indonesia and Kyrgyzstan.

The Uighur problem caused the complication in the Turkish-Chinese relations in summer 2015.

Everything started in Thailand. The authorities made the decision to deport over 100 Uighurs to China. On the night between July 8 and July 9, Turkish Uighurs attacked Chinese embassy in Istanbul, protesting against this decision.

In response, Thailand authorities changed their position and declared that Uighur emigrants will not be deported to China without evidence pointing to their criminal activity. Instead… they will be deported directly to Turkey! This wasn’t a novel decision, deportations of Uighurs to Turkey happened before. A total of 60 thousand Uighurs live in Turkey. This means that we are not talking about separate cases of deportation here, but about consistent concentration of Uighur groups scattered around Asian countries in Turkey.

In July the Arab news website “Al-Qanoon” quoted Tong Bichan, a high-ranking China’s Public Security Ministry official. He said: “The Turkish diplomats in Southeast Asia have given Turkish ID cards to Uyghur citizens of Xinjiang province and then they have sent them to Turkey to prepare for war against the Syrian government alongside ISIL.”

Finally, only recently the propagandist resource of the “Islamic State” posted a song in Chinese language. The song contains the call to wake up, adressed to Chinese Muslim brothers. Such calls are a part of the anti-Chinese campaign launched by ISIL. Another video of caliphatists features an 80-year old Muslim priest from Xinjiang urging his Muslim compatriots to join ISIL. The video then shows a classroom of Uighur boys, one of whom promises to raise the flag of ISIL in Turkestan.

All of this leads to the conclusion that among the goals ISIL tries to reach in cooperation with Turkey is the warming up and launching of the “Chinese Spring” in quite observable terms. Such a goal demands “cooperators” to use the territories near China — first and foremost, Turkic states of Central Asia. For example, Kyrgyzstan in this regard is clearly supposed to become the place of accumulation and training of radical groups.

The large world-rebuilding Middle Eastern war is seeking its way towards East, in the direction of China. Which means that new large phases of this war are not too far ahead.

This is the translation of an article (first published in “Essence of Time” newspaper issue 160 on December 30, 2015) by Maria Podkopayeva of a series on rebuilding of Middle East and Africa by the West. This rebuilding was launched to give rise to the most violent and bloody regime, such as IS “caliphate”, which is supposed to eventually attack and conquer Russia, China and Europe.

We encourage republishing of our translations and articles, but ONLY with mentioning the original article page at eu.eot.su (link above).

mardi, 02 février 2016

China’s Counter-Terrorism Calculus

China’s growing global footprint, escalating conflicts and the spread of terrorism in theaters ranging from Syria to Afghanistan and Southeast Asia have created openings for non-state actors to target Chinese interests and citizens overseas. Accompanying China’s growing global footprint and the spread of terrorism in theaters ranging from Syria to Afghanistan and Southeast Asia have created openings for non-state actors to target Chinese interests and citizens overseas. Traditionally, militant groups within China arose from independence movements with ethnically-linked narratives. Their suppression within China, as well as China’s growing international exposure, led some of these groups to build relationships with international terrorist groups abroad: while they could not survive wholly within China, they found breathing room in the form of operational space with co-ethnics outside of the country. This is primarily the case for Uighur movements commonly referred to by the catch-all name “East Turkistan Independence Movement(s), or (ETIM).”

Given China’s rising engagement in the Middle East—from President Xi Jinping’s series of state visits this January, to a role in the Iran nuclear deal, to a growing military footprint on the peripheries of the region boosted by the recent commitment to building a base in Djibouti—an assessment of non-state terrorist threats, particularly from Al-Qaeda and its sub-affiliate, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and the Islamic State (IS) and its “Provinces,” to China, as well as Chinese perceptions of them, is appropriate. This assessment is useful in understanding the differences in costs to China’s human security versus national security objectives. As such, the knowledge of how non-state actors influence Chinese policy and actions is relevant for governments and analysts in assessing China’s foreign policy, as well as providing opportunities for engagement on issues of overlapping concern.

Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Threats to China

Al-Qaeda / Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)

Anti-Chinese Uighur militants shifted from operating under the umbrella of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan to forming the TIP in 2006 (China Brief, May 23, 2014). Since then, the TIP has become part of Al-Qaeda’s structure. Although it is not an Al-Qaeda “affiliate” on the level of AQIM in Northwest Africa, Al-Shabaab in East Africa, AQAP in Yemen and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, the TIP now operates alongside Jabhat Al-Nusra and can be considered a “sub-affiliate.” Moreover, before the TIP adopted the Syrian war as its own cause in 2013 (in part to seek reciprocal support from jihadists for its goals in Xinjiang), leading Al-Qaeda figures, such as the late Khalid Al-Husaynan and late Abu Yahya Al-Libi, issued statements in support of the TIP (Terrorism Monitor, May 24, 2015). More recently, in 2015, Abdullah Al-Muhyasini, a Saudi preacher close to Jabhat Al-Nusra, also issued statements supporting the TIP (Islom Awazi, December 2, 2015). Al-Qaeda affiliates, such as AQIM and Al-Shabaab, have formally promoted the TIP and its cause to “liberate East Turkistan,” while the TIP, in turn, has also issued statements in support of mainstream Al-Qaeda figures, such as a eulogy for AQIM sharia official Abu al-Hassan Rashid al-Bulaydi on January 7, 2016.

Beyond its propaganda with Al-Qaeda, the TIP has often claimed responsibility for major operations domestically in China, including:

Bus-bombings in several cities before the Beijing Olympics in 2008;

A truck hit-and-run on pedestrians and mass stabbing attack in Kashgar on Ramadan Eve in 2011;

A low-sophistication suicide car-bombing in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in October 2013;

A mass stabbing at the Kunming Train Station in March 2014;

An apparent double-suicide bombing (or suitcase bombing) at Urumqi Train Station in April 2014; and

Car-bombings and explosions killing at an Urumqi market in May 2014 (Terrorism Monitor, May 24, 2015)

However, as TIP’s propaganda and fighters have shifted their focus from Afghanistan—and even Xinjiang—to Syria, the TIP has become involved in “cheerleading” attacks in Xinjiang than masterminding them. Rather, the “masterminding” of the most recent attacks in China appears to have been carried out by loosely inter-connected cells across the country. These cells have some coordination with each other as well as with Turkey-based Islamist organizations that run fake passport schemes and assist Uighur men and their families migrate from China through Southeast Asia to Turkey (and sometimes to the TIP or other settlements under rebel control in northwestern Syria) (Today’s Zaman, January 14, 2015; Yenisafak.com, June 30, 2014).

While the TIP may be primarily a propaganda platform for recent attacks in Xinjiang, Istanbul-based East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA) also praises—or at least justifies—attacks. These include the aforementioned attacks as well as others that the TIP has not claimed, such as the assassination of the pro-Chinese Communist Party leading imam at the Id Kah mosque in Kashgar in 2014, and a large-scale attack at a coal mine in Xinjiang in October 2015 (SCMP, July 30, 2014). Either these attacks occurred outside the scope of the TIP or were so locally ordered and executed (and minimally reported on outside of China) that the foreign-based TIP did not take notice.

The Islamic State

The Islamic State brought China into its focus in 2015, although a predecessor to the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) featured at least one Chinese fighter in its propaganda as early as 2013 (YouTube, March 18, 2013) The Islamic State’s more recent focus on the Uighurs may have been a reaction to the increasing numbers of Uighurs—reportedly up to 1,000 fighters—fighting in the TIP (and therefore with Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra). The Islamic State’s promotion of the status and cause of Uighurs in its ranks included:

Two videos and tweeted photos of an elderly Uighur man who made “hijra” (exodus or migration) from Xinjiang to Syria with his family (shanghaiist.com, June 4, 2015);

Suicide attack “martyrdom” claims of Uighurs (and other Central Asians) in Syria and Iraq; and

An Islamic State-produced nasheed (Islamic chant) in Mandarin Chinese, which represented a general outreach to Chinese Muslims, including Huis, Kazakhs, and possibly Uighurs who speak Mandarin more fluently than Uighur (although the quality of this nasheed was lower than typical Arabic language ones.

For China, the recruitment of TIP jihadists—China’s traditional opponent—into Islamic State represents an evolved and hitherto unknown threat. While these recruits arguably make the TIP weaker, higher levels Uighur militancy in the Islamic State is a “devil that China does not know.” It is possible that the Islamic State could generate traction within China where, since 2006, the TIP has not—that is, if the Islamic State has the tools to be as effective in social media and propaganda outreach in a more closed media environment like China as compared to Europe.

The Islamic State has also likely begun to compete with the TIP in recruiting Uighurs along the trafficking networks in Southeast Asia that assist Uighurs to travel to Turkey and Syria. Four Uighurs stood trial in Indonesia in 2015 for trying to meet with the Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) in Sulawesi, which is a militant group based in Central Sulawesi, whose leader, Santoso, pledged loyalty to Al-Baghdadi in 2014 (Jakartapost, December 1, 2015). In addition, numerous Islamist organizations in Indonesia have expressed support for the Islamic State and served as feeders for Islamic State recruitment in Syria and Iraq. One man known as Alli, was part of a group of three Uighur militants arrested outside of Jakarta in December 2015 with a bomb-making manual and lists of jailed Indonesian terrorists, as well as Indonesians in Syria who joined the Islamic State. Counterterrorism officials suspected members connected to this cell were involved in the Erawan Shrine bombing in Bangkok, Thailand on August 17, 2015 (Bangkok Post, December 26, 2015). Alli was also reported to be part of the network of Al-Raqqa-based Indonesian Islamic State militant Bahrun Naim before Naim masterminded a series of attacks in Jakarta on January 14, 2016 (Jakarta Globe, December 24, 2015; Time.com, December 28, 2015).

Assessment of Threats

TIP / Al-Qaeda

Despite the increasing numbers of attacks by networks of Uighur militants in China, the threat to China from such attacks remains an issue of human security—not national security. The rising death toll of Chinese citizens in these attacks are “only” in the several hundreds each year. Even if they were in thousands, however, this would hardly lead China to yield to the demands of groups like the TIP and ETESA for the construction of an Islamic state and ending, among other policies:

The migration of Han Chinese from eastern China to Xinjiang;

Use of Chinese language in schools in Xinjiang;

Encouragement of inter-marriage between Han and Uighurs and job offers for Uighur women in eastern China (where presumably they would assimilate or marry Han Chinese);

Restrictions on offspring (Uighurs and most Chinese minorities have, however, had fewer restrictions as part of the former “one-child policy” than Han families); and

Beyond attacks in China, what also could place pressure on China are actions by states. Thus, TIP, ETESA and other Islamist organizations have adopted a “Palestine strategy” of framing China’s rule in Xinjiang as an “occupation,” delegitimizing Chinese sovereignty, and ultimately seeking an international referendum on Xinjiang’s status (presumably parts of northwestern Xinjiang where Han already far outnumber Uighurs would not be included in such a vote). [1] This strategy may be of greater relevance to China as a state than the human security losses as resulting from Uighur militancy (China Brief, May 23, 2014). While the prospects of any such referendum occurring in the near-term future is highly unlikely, there is some evidence that this narrative is finding sympathetic ears:

Then Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan called Chinese rule in Xinjiang a “genocide” in 2009 (Hurriyet, July 14, 2009);

The TIP held territory in northwestern Syria as part of the coalition with Jabhat Al-Nusra with support from Turkey or Turkey-based organizations, which furthered support and recognition of the TIP from supporters of Jabhat Al-Nusra around the Muslim world; [2] and

The prospect of re-shaping the borders in the Middle East that could lead to new conceptions of sovereignty and statehood—not only in that region but elsewhere throughout the Islamic World, including Central Asia and Xinjiang

Thus, it is the mobilization potential of groups like the TIP or ETESA, which merge pan-Islamist themes with Uighur nationalism while accepting—and even promoting—violent struggle, or “jihad” (even though ETESA may not directly participate in it) that may become the broader national security issue for China to deal with in the future. In fact, China’s counterterrorism success in preventing the TIP from gaining the traction to begin a full-blown insurgency in Xinjiang capable of anything beyond a few sporadic albeit deadly attacks may have forced the TIP and ETESA to become increasingly close in their respective “cheerleading” and “advocacy” roles.

The Islamic State

Despite the Islamic State’s overall expansion beyond Iraq and Syria in 2015, its direct threat to China is still low compared to other regions. The Islamic State announced it killed Chinese and Norwegian hostages in its magazine, Dabiq, in November 2015 after having first offered them for “sale.” But the focus of its propaganda in terms of killing hostages is still mostly on Westerners or, in some cases, their allies, such as the Japanese (SCMP, November 20, 2015). Moreover, closer to China’s borders, Southeast Asian jihadists are not yet sufficiently unified for the Islamic State to announce a Province in South East Asia, despite the bayat (pledges) to Islamic State leader Abubakar Al-Baghdadi from several Indonesian and Philippine factions since 2014. Nonetheless, in terms of logistics the Islamic State has funding and immigrant support networks in the Persian Gulf region, Malaysia, Hong Kong and even Japan that can facilitate its “infrastructure-building” in Southeast Asia ahead of a possible Province announcement in 2016 (isisstudygroup, October 15, 2015).

In addition, while the TIP has focused on appealing to recruits from the Chinese Hui and Chinese Kazakh minorities more than the Islamic State, the Islamic State does not appear to have any “local” traction within China. The Islamic State’s apparent hacking of the prestigious Tsinghua University’s website on January 18, 2016 highlights the possibility of the “Islamization” of anti-government sentiment in China, which could lead to the growth in support for the Islamic State in the same way it has in Europe. [3] Some elites, including dissidents from Muslim minority communities, may also have sympathies for the Islamic State for religious, ideological or political reasons (SCMP, January 18).

While Islamic State consolidation in Southeast Asia and a smattering of support for it from within China would certainly be of concern within Chinese borders, no prospective Southeast Asian provinces or domestic pro-Islamic State movement would comprise a national security threat to major Chinese diplomatic or trade interests for the foreseeable future – even if they could harm the human security of Chinese nationals. Rather, China is likely more concerned about the arrival of the Islamic State in Afghanistan via its Khorasan Province, which subsumed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and is intended to include Xinjiang and to subsume all of Central Asia. [4] Khorasan province does not appear to be more powerful than the Taliban or likely to control large tracts of territory in Afghanistan, but even fighting between Khorasan Province and the Taliban and Al-Qaeda or the Afghan government could further destabilize and complicate the economic and political situation in Afghanistan. This, in turn, would undermine Chinese strategic interests in Afghanistan and objectives of China’s New Silk Road and One Belt, One Road plan road at a time when China is considering elevating trade with Iran following the U.S. “Iran Deal” and its international profile with expected visits of President Xi to Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2016 (SCMP, January 15).

Conclusion

The threat of non-state actors to China such as the TIP, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State can influence Chinese state policies, priorities and objectives. Thus, even though this article assesses that these threats mostly concern the human security rather than the national security of China and its citizens, they do indirectly affect China’s power projection, counter-terrorism calculus and foreign policy. These threats also have the potential to affect China’s level of engagement abroad, including its use of special forces overseas, new counter-terrorism laws, pressure relationships with allies (such as Pakistan to crack down on anti-Chinese militancy), tacit support to other governments’ foreign policies (such as Russia’s airstrikes in Syria), and its academic understandings and trainings in counterterrorism studies. Thus, the role of non-state actors is relevant not only in terms of security affairs but also in broader diplomacy, relationships, and engagement with China.

Jacob Zenn is a Fellow of Eurasian and African Affairs at The Jamestown Foundation. Mr. Zenn graduated as a Global Law Scholar from Georgetown Law in 2011 and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Nanjing Center for Chinese-American Studies in Nanjing, China in 2007.

Notes

Author’s Interview, ETESA supporter in USA, 2015

The start of the Russian bombing campaign in northwestern Syria in late 2015 appears, however, to have led to more than 30 TIP deaths and the destruction of TIP’s main headquarters as well as settlements where militants were living with their families.

samedi, 12 septembre 2015

Global Gladio: NATO Terror Network Reaches into Asia

Ex: http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com

NATO terror network implicated in Bangkok blasts, appears to have been running Uyghur terrorists through Asia, into Turkey and onward to fight NATO's proxy war in Syria.

September 4, 2015 (Tony Cartalucci - LD) - An unprecedented blast in Bangkok, Thailand last month left 20 dead and over 100 injured. The blast was the latest in a string of violence carried out by US-backed proxy Thaksin Shinawatra, who himself was ousted from power in 2006 and finally had his political party removed from power completely in 2014 after massive street demonstrations and a military coup toppled the regime headed by his own sister, Yingluck Shinawatra.

Image: NATO created and funded the Grey Wolves terrorist network during the Cold War as part of its stay behind networks. Instead of fighting non-existent Soviet invaders, they were used instead to kill NATO's political enemies by the thousands. Today, the Grey Wolves are represented by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the third largest in Turkey's parliament. They are reported to operate globally, including terrorist training camps in Xinjiang, China.

While the blast represented an escalation in violence, it should be remembered that terrorist networks operating in support of Shinawatra have carried out egregious acts of violence in the past, including fielding up to 300 armed militants in Bangkok's streets in 2010 leading to weeks of gunbattles between Thai troops and Shinawatra's armed supporters, leaving almost 100 dead and culminating in city-wide arson.

As for bombings themselves, while generally these networks have used grenades to attack institutions and individuals perceived as enemies of Shinawatra and his foreign sponsored agenda, precisely the same pipe bombs used in the August blast have been implicated in explosions in 2010 and 2014 where bomb makers accidentally killed themselves while assembling devices. In February 2015, a double pipe bombing would be carried out just down the street from where the most recent blast occurred. The devices used were linked to the 2010-2014 incidents.

Recent evidence has emerged as several suspects have been identified and arrested, suggesting this network includes NATO's "Grey Wolves" and several other Uyghur groups long backed, funded, and directed by the US as a means of eliminating its enemies across Eurasia and up to and including China. In addition to carrying out attacks in Thailand, they appear to have also been moving militants from across Asia and feeding them into NATO's proxy war in Syria.

Images: The US State Department's NED refers to China's Xinjiang region as "East Turkistan," a fictional realm that does not exist. The US seeks to either destabilize or carve off a vast sum of Chinese territory through supporting terrorism in western China.

On the very same day when the deportations occurred, Thursday July 9th, protests broke out in Turkey, both in Ankara the capital, and in Istanbul at the Thai consulate. Leading the protests in Ankara was the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), a US-funded, Washington D.C. and Munich based political front that specializes in supporting terrorism under the guise of defending "human rights."

Image: Thailand's consulate in Istanbul Turkey was destroyed on the same day Thailand deported Uyghur terror suspects back to China. One may find it difficult to speculate who on Earth currently possesses the operational capacity to organized a same-day retaliation anywhere in the world besides a handful of actors - NATO among them.

WUC admits that violence broke out among the mobs it was leading in Ankara but denied any affiliations with the protesters in Istanbul who attacked the consulate and destroyed it on the same day, in the same country, over the same alleged grievances. WUC itself suggested it was the work of the "Grey Wolves," an organization they admit was "clandestinely funded by the US government."

The Grey Wolves are comprised of Turks and Uyghurs, and throughout the Cold War served as part of NATO's "stay behind networks" referred to as Gladios. They were used to purge NATO's enemies from Turkey in bloody violence that would leave over 6,000 dead. Since the Cold War, the Grey Wolves have set up operations internationally, including terrorist training camps in Xinjiang, China - all indicating that NATO's Gladio has gone global.

Image: The US-based and funded World Uyghur Congress admits it led mobs on the same day the Thai consulate was attacked. Their mobs in Ankara also turned violent, however Turkish police were able to maintain control. While WUC claims they have no ties to the Grey Wolves they claim were likely behind the consulate attack, they admit they, like WUC itself, have been funded by the US government.

The FCCT is a group of foreign journalists from several of the most prominent Western news networks including the BBC, CNN, Reuters, the New York Times, Associated Press, and Agence France-Presse. They have systematically manipulated events in Thailand in efforts to support the regime of Thaksin Shinawatra. The goal of the FCCT's recent presentation was to help deflect as much blame as possible from Thaksin Shinawatra over the bombings and to suggest Thailand faces "international terrorism."

Despite the detailed presentation the FCCT provided and the immediate headlines across the Western media attempting to sell the theory to the public, no mention ever was made of the Grey Wolves' NATO or US funding. Similarly, no mention has been made by the Western media regarding US funding and support behind many, if not all Uyghur opposition groups both in Xinjiang and beyond.

What is clear is that Thailand has inadvertently stumbled upon a highly organized, well-funded, international criminal and terrorist network operating from Xinjiang, China, across Southeast Asia, and as far as Turkey and Syria. This terrorist pipeline appears to have been "tapped" by those seeking to undermine the Thai government, causing its toxic contents to spill over into the ongoing crisis already racking Thailand.

That the Grey Wolves, Uyghur opposition front, and Thaksin Shinawatra are all backed by the US and instruments of US global hegemony, indicates that such instruments often share resources when necessary and are even used interchangeably. NGOs created and maintained in Thailand to support the regime of Shinawatra now cover for Uyghur terrorism, and Uyghur terrorism used against China and Syria is now used to strike hard at Shinawatra's political foes.

America's One-Size-Fits All Global Terror Racket

NGOs the United States funds and directs in Thailand, and primarily used to undermine the current government and defend the remnants of Shinawatra's political front, were quick to not only condemn the Thai government for deporting terror suspects back to China, but have since then attempted to justify the bombing as Thailand's deserved return for doing business with China. One Bangkok Post op-ed penned by a former Reuters employee titled, "Should Regime Not Deported Uighurs?" attempted to argue that:

In retrospect, should Thailand not have expelled the Uighurs to China? Or to be more precise, should the ruling junta, which is not fully recognised by the democratic world, have been less responsive to Chinese demands?National interest always comes first in a country's diplomacy. But being so accommodating to a superpower's demands, making Thailand the target of an international outcry and what is looking increasingly like an international terror attack, does not bode well for the country in the long term.

The ransacking of the Thai consulate in Istanbul failed to alert the Thai security services that the anger was real and long-lasting, and could possibly turn into a calamity

It should be noted that the author uses the term "international" to describe what is exclusively the US and Europe's "recognition" and "outcry."

This op-ed and many like it pervading the Western media are sending a message to the Thai government that failure to comply to the demands of the "international community" will result in terrorism - whether it is a mob destroying your consulates abroad, or bombs exploding in the heart of your nation's capital. And while this "international community" has many terrorist proxies to use against Thailand, it appears they have selected their "Uyghurs" to stand in the front ranks.

Ousted-exiled dictator Thaksin Shinawatra most likely still possesses the terrorist networks and paramilitary organizations he created and eagerly used during his time in power. However, by using them, he would only further justify the current government's moves to permanently uproot Shinawatra from Thailand's political landscape. Just as NGOs assigned by the West to support Thaksin Shinawatra have now become instrumental in justifying and manipulating the recent Bangkok bombing, the West's terrorist networks used to destabilize nations elsewhere from China to Syria have had terrorism in Thailand apparently outsourced to them.

So far, the investigation suggests this network has been in Thailand for years, long before the deportation of Uyghurs in July. Evidence also suggests a link between the uncovered terror network and previous terror networks uncovered at the height of Shinawatra's violence in 2010 and 2014. A large amount of forged Turkish passports and ties to Uyghur trafficking networks appear to implicate the terror network in what Syrian and Chinese authorities have attempted to expose for years now - a terror pipeline feeding militants from all over the globe first into Turkey where they are armed, trained, and staged, then into Syria to fight NATO's proxy war against the government in Damascus.

Do Business With China and Die

It should be stated that the vast majority of China's Uyghurs do not support the aspirations of the terrorists and US-funded fronts which claim to represent them. Forty-five percent of Xinjiang's population - some 10 million people - are Uyghurs. It is likely that if even half of them supported violent separatism, they would have already gained their "independence."

In reality, Uyhgurs are perhaps the first and foremost victims of US-backed terrorism in Xinjiang and beyond. Those who seek to live in peace and stability with their Chinese compatriots, and who condemn the means and methods of US-backed groups are themselves attacked. The most prominent example of this is that of Imam Jume Tahir, 74 years old, hacked to death in front of China's largest mosque by terrorists.

The imam had openly condemned US-backed violence and in particular called for street clashes with Chinese police to end.

Image: Uyghurs in China who attempt to lead normal lives often find themselves the primary target of US-backed terrorism. The mosque pictured above, the 600 year old Kah Mosque, saw the murder of its imam, Jume Tahir, by US-backed terrorists for the "crime" of condemning violent protests.

Dilxat Raxit, a spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress, an exile group based in Germany, condemned the harsh sentences for the defendants in the imam’s murder, saying they would do little to stem the rising tide of Uighur discontent.

“The Chinese government should examine the roots of the problems, which are caused by coercive policies that Uighurs find unbearable,” he wrote. “It should respect the Uighur religion and traditional way of life, and stop provocations to avoid triggering new turmoil.”

Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the exiled political organization World Uyghur Congress, told Reuters that local Uighurs, “suspected that he had a special relationship with China’s Ministry of Public Security” and that he helped the authorities monitor Uighur religious activity. His support for Beijing most likely bred resentment among Kashgar’s Uighurs, many of whom disdain the central government.

No where can it be found in WUC's many US-funded press releases, congressional assemblies, or publications anything even closely resembling condemnation for the murder of an unarmed elderly man who advocated non-violence. WUC's message, like that of the Western media in the wake of the Bangkok blast is simple - do business with China and you will die.

America's Grand Strategy in Asia in One Word - Primacy

In this it is clear that "Uyghur terrorism" is simply another attempt to conceal what is essentially yet another tool devised to achieve and maintain American global hegemony. Looking at a map of China, it is clear why this otherwise minuscule, obscure ethnic group has been propelled to center stage by American interests.

Image: The US has much to gain by backing separatists in western China.

The Xinjiang region along with Tibet, if successfully destabilized or carved off from China, would sever Beijing's long-laid plans to construct a modern-day Silk Road. It would deprive China of both its territory, its resources, and drive tens of millions of its people eastward from their homes in a refugee crisis that would strain the very stability of Chinese society.

And because the US-Uyghur cause is not genuine nor enjoys popular support even in Xinjiang, it is no surprise that those willing to participate can be persuaded to fight overseas in other projects of American hegemony - essentially as mercenaries.

The use of minority groups to divide and destroy a targeted nation is a tactic as old as empire itself. And while the Western media works ceaselessly to explain how various organizations, advocacy groups, and militant fronts all operate in an apparent vacuum, only "coincidentally" propelling US foreign policy forward, it is clear through both a study of history and current US policy papers that global hegemony is still at the very heart of Western ambitions globally and includes all forms of coercion, from propaganda to paramilitary groups.

In one of the most recent US policy papers on the subject, published this year by the influential Council on Foreign Relations - a corporate-funded think tank that represents the collective interests of some of the most powerful Western corporate-financier interests on Earth - the goal of maintaining "primacy in Asia" is literally spelled out.

Because the American effort to 'integrate' China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.

The report was written by US political administrator and political lobbyist Robert Blackwill who has throughout his career played a role in grooming prospective client regimes in Asia through which the US planned to maintain its regional primacy. Among these client regimes was Thaksin Shinawatra himself. The use of violence and terrorism by Shinawatra to take and maintain control over Thailand is well documented. To think that the US would simply abandon its aspirations to control Thailand, or other nations throughout Southeast Asia vis-a-vis China would be misguided. What would be predictable would be instead an increase in terrorism and political destabilization.

Thailand is now being coerced through a concerted campaign of propaganda and organized violence, seized on by Shinawatra's supporters who are eagerly exploiting the socioeconomic and political damage the recent bombing has incurred, while so-called "rights" advocates invent creative defenses for otherwise indefensible violence directed at entirely innocent people.

Dismantle the Pipeline

Gladio was successful throughout the Cold War because those among NATO who employed such tactics did so within their borders. "Global Gladio" has networks stretching around the world, vulnerable to police and military operations carried out by host countries.

While the bombing in Bangkok appears to have been aimed at the government for its continued attempts to remove Shinawatra from power and divest from American interests by moving closer to China, the bombing itself stands as the single greatest example of just why Thailand has chosen to change tack in the first place. Accelerated military and counter-terrorism cooperation with China will now be necessary to ensure the peace and security of both nations. As long as one serves as a base of operations for terrorism aimed at the other, neither will be safe.

For Thailand specifically, it is clear that Shinawatra's political existence was meant to infiltrate and overwrite Thailand's current political order. While threats and terrorism are being used to coerce Thailand into accommodating Shinawatra, it should be noted that by doing so, violence, division and destruction are all that await Thailand as a guarantee. The slow, patient dismantling of his political networks, along with a measured pivot toward Beijing appears to be Thailand's best bet.

For the rest of the world - NATO's "Gladio" networks are vast and varied. From Ukraine to Syria to Thailand, the most violent and criminal elements in any given society have been organized by the West in a bid to divide, destroy, and dominate the planet. From the original Gladio program in Western Europe, the means of expertly manipulating these criminal gangs has been perfected. Increasing awareness of how Gladio works will not only better arm society to take action against it, but perhaps even dissuade eager criminal elements from joining organizations that are essentially cannon fodder for NATO.

Al Qaeda in China, Islamic Insurgency in Uighur-Xinjiang, China and the US-Saudi-Israeli Plan for the Middle East

Named after Israel’s minister of foreign affairs at the time of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and occupation of Beirut, with about 25 000 dead, this divide-and-rule geostrategy plan for the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) lives on.

Already victims of this strategy since 2011 – operated by Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia – we have the divided and weakened states of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Egypt and even Tunisia can also possibly be added to the list. Others can be identified as likely short-term target victim countries.

In February 1982 the foreign minister Oded Yinon wrote and published ‘A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties‘, which outlined strategies for Israel to become the major regional power in the Middle East. High up the list of his recommendations was to decapitate and dissolve surrounding Arab states into sub-nations, warring between themselves. Called the peace-in-the-feud or simply divide and rule, this was part of Yinon’s strategy for achieving the long-term Zionist goal of extending the borders of Israel, not saying where but potentially a vast region. His strategy was warmly and publicly supported by leading US policy makers with close ties to Israel, like Richard Perle, by the 1990s.

This regional balkanization plan is centred on the exploitation of ethnic, religious, tribal and national divisions within the Arab world. Yinon noted the regional landscape of the MENA was “carved up” mainly by the US, Britain and France after the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1917. The hastily traced and arbitrary borders are not faithful to ethnic, religious, and tribal differences between the different peoples in the region – a problem exactly reproduced in Africa, when decolonization started in the 1950s and 1960s. Yinon went on to argue this makes the Arab world a house of cards ready to be pushed over and broken apart into tiny warring states or “chefferies” based on sectarian, ethnic, national, tribal or other divisions.

Central governments would be decapitated and disappear. Power would be held by the warlord chiefs in the new sub-nations or ‘mini-states’. To be sure, this would certainly remove any real opposition to Israel’s coming regional dominance. Yinon said little or nothing about economic “collateral damage”.

To be sure, US and Saudi strategy in the MENA region is claimed to be entirely different, or in the Saudi case similar concerning the means – decapitating central governments – but different concerning the Saudi goal of creating a huge new Caliphate similar to the Ottoman empire. Under the Ottomans nations did not exist, nor their national frontiers, and local governments were weak or very weak.

ISLAMIC INSURGENCY IS WELL KNOWN IN CHINA

China knows plenty about Islamic insurgency and its potential to destroy the nation state. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, some 25 years ago, China had an “Islamic insurgency” threat concentrated in its eastern resource-rich and low population Xinjiang region. Before that, since the early days of the Peoples’ Republic in the 1950s, China has addressed Islamic insurgency with mostly failed policies and strategies but more recently a double strategy of domestic or local repression, but aid and support to Islamic powers thought able to work against djihadi insurgents – outside China – has produced results.

The Chinese strategy runs completely against the drift of Western policy and favours Iran.

A report in ‘Asia Times’, 27 February 2007, said this: “Despite al-Qaeda’s efforts to support Muslim insurgents in China, Beijing has succeeded in limiting (its) popular support….. The latest evidence came when China raided a terrorist facility in the country’s Xinjiang region, near the borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan. According to reports, 18 terrorists were killed and 17 were captured”.

Chinese reporting, even official white papers on defence against terror are notoriously imprecise or simply fabricated. The official line is there is no remaining Islamic insurgency and – if there are isolated incidents – China’s ability to kill or capture militants without social blowback demonstrates the State’s “hearts and minds” policy in Xinjiang, the hearth area for Chinese Muslims, is working.

Chinese official attitudes to Islamic insurgency are mired with veils of propaganda stretching back to the liberation war against anti-communist forces. These featured the Kuomintang which had a large Muslim contingent in its Kuomintang National Revolutionary Army. The Muslim contingent operated against Mao Zedong’s central government forces – and fought the USSR. Its military insurgency against the central government was focused on the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang and continued for as long as 9 years after Mao took power in Beijing, in 1949.

Adding complexity however, the Muslim armed forces had been especially active against the Soviet Union in the north and west – and by 1959 the Sino-Soviet split was sealed. Armed hostilities by Mao’s PLA against the Red Army of the USSR broke out in several border regions, with PLA forces aided by former Muslim insurgents in some theatres. Outside China, and especially for Arab opinion, Mao was confirmed as a revolutionary nationalist similar to non-aligned Arab leaders of the period, like Colonel Husni al-Zaim of Syria and Colonel Nasser of Egypt.

CHINA’S THREAT TO WESTERN STRATEGY IN THE MENA

Especially today, some Western observers feign “surprise” at China’s total hostility towards UN Security Council approval for “surgical war” strikes against Syria. The reasons for this overlap with Russia’s adamant refusal to go along with US, Saudi Arabian, Turkish and French demands for a UNSC rubber stamp to trigger “regime change” in Syria but are not the same. For China the concept of “regime change” with no clear idea – officially – of what comes next is anathema.

As we know, when or if al Assad falls, only chaos can ensue as the country breaks apart, but this nightmare scenario for China is brushed aside by Western politicians as a subject for “later decision”.

China’s successful efforts to keep the global jihad from spreading into its territory is surely and certainly taken as a real challenge by Saudi-backed insurgents in western China. Various reports indicate the al-Qaeda organization trains about 1 000 mostly Xinjiang-origin Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims every year. Located in camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kirgizstan and elsewhere, this terror training has continued since at least the mid-1990s, for a total of more than 15 years.

The focus on Xinjiang, formerly called Turkestan is no accident. The region’s Russian influence is still strong, reinforced by Muslim migration from Russia in the 19th century, accelerated by the Russian Civil War and 1917 revolution. During China’s warlord era preceding Mao’s rule, the USSR armed and supported the Muslim separatist East Turkestan Republic which only accepted Mao’s rule when the PRC under the Chinese communists was fully established in 1949. The longstanding East Turkestan jihadi movement (ETIM) is highly active today after being relaunched in the early 2000′s, especially since the Iraq war of 2003. It however mainly acts in “external theatres” such as Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. The Baluchi of Pakistan have long-term rebellious relations with the central government in Islamabad, and are allied with Kurd nationalists in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey.

The US Council on Foreign Relations in a 29 May 2012 briefing on Xinjiang noted that since the Chinese Qing dynasty collapse of 1912, the region has experienced various types of semi-autonomy and on several occasions declared full independence from China. The Council for example notes that in 1944, factions within Xinjiang declared independence with full support from the USSR, but then cites US State Dept. documents claiming that Uighur-related terrorism has “declined considerably” since the end of the 1990s and China “overreacts to and exaggerates” Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang.

Notably, the US has declassified the ETIM Islamic movement – despite its terror attacks – as a terrorist organization. The ETIM was defined as such during the Bush administration years, but is no longer listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in the State Dept. FTO list as from January 2012.

China has fully recognized the Islamic insurgency threat, with its potential for drawing in hostile foreign powers seeking to destroy national unity and break the national government. Its concern, shared by Indian strategists and policy makers is to “stop the rot” in the MENA.

THE CHINESE STRATEGY

Unofficially, China regards the US and Saudi strategy in the MENA and Central Asia as “devil’s work” sowing the seeds of long-term insurgency, the collapse of the nation state and with it the economy. The US link with and support to Israel is in no way ignored, notably Israel’s Yinon plan for weakening central governments and dissolving the nation state right across the MENA.

China’s main concern is that Central Asian states will be affected, or infected by radical Islamic jihadi fighters and insurgents drifting in from the West, from the Middle East and North Africa. These will back the existing Islamic insurgent and separatist movement in resource-rich Xinjiang. To keep Central Asian states from fomenting trouble in Xinjiang, China has cultivated close diplomatic ties with its neighbors, notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which has a secretariat concerned with counter-insurgency issues.

US analysts however conclude, very hastily, that China “instinctively supports the status quo” and therefore does not have an active international strategy to combat djihadi violence and anarchy outside China. US analysts say, without any logic, that China will respond to and obediently follow initiatives from Washington and other Western powers – as it has starkly not done in the UN Security Council when it concerns the Western powers’ long drawn out attempt to repeat, for Syria, their success in 2011 for getting UNSC approval to the NATO war in Libya!

China was enraged, and regarded it as betrayal when its support for limited action by NATO in Libya – a rare instance of China compromising on nonintervention – turned into an all-out “turkey shoot” to destroy the Gaddafi clan. Libya was handed over to djihadi militants, who subsequently declared war against central government, an accelerating process resulting in Libya, today, having no central government with any real authority. That experience certainly hardened Beijing’s responses on Syria.

Post-Mao China has restored the concept of Chinese cultural continuity, with a blend of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist strands which had been been weakened but not completely destroyed in the years of ideologically-driven Communism. For the Communists of Mao’s era “history was bunk”, not even a mixed bag but an unqualified evil that must be smashed. The Chinese attitude to radical Islam as embodied in the ideologies of Wahabism and Salafism is the same – they are treated as a denial of world history and its varied cultures, with immediate and real dangers for China. Its counter-insurgency strategy against Islamic radicals is the logical result.

This strategy ensures closer Tehran-Beijing relations, usually described by Western analysts as a “balancing act” between ties to Washington and growing relations with Iran. China and Iran have developed a broad and deep partnership centered on China’s oil needs, to be sure, but also including significant non-energy economic ties, arms sales, defense cooperation, and Asian and MENA geostrategic balancing as a counterweight to the policies and strategies of the United States and its local allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Chinese attention now focuses the Washington-Riyadh axis and its confused and dangerous MENA region geostrategy, resulting in a de facto proliferation of Islamic djihadi insurgents and the attack on the basic concept of the nation state across the region. The Chinese view is that Iran’s version of “Peoples’ Islam” is less violent and anarchic, than the Saudi version.

OPPOSING THE WASHINGTON-RIYADH AXIS

Both Chinese and Indian strategists’ perceptions of the US-Saudi strategy in the MENA, and other Muslim-majority regions and countries is that it is dangerous and irresponsible. Why the Western democracies led by the US would support or even tolerate the Saudi geostrategy and ignore Israel’s Yinon Plan – as presently shown in Syria – is treated by them as almost incomprehensible.

China is Tehran’s largest trading partner and customer for oil exports, taking about 20% of Iran’s total oil exports, but China’s co-operation is seen as critical to the Western, Israeli and Arab Gulf State plan to force Iran to stop uranium enrichment and disable the capacity of its nuclear program to produce nuclear weapons. Repeated high-level attempts to “persuade Beijing” to go along with this plan, such as then-US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s 2012 visit to Beijing, however result each time in Chinese hosts politely but firmly saying no. This is not only motivated by oil supply issues.

Flashpoints revealing the Chinese-US divide on Iran crop up in world news, for example the US unilateral decision in January 2012 to impose sanction on Chinese refiner Zhuhai Zenrong for refining Iranian oil and supplying refined products back to Iran. This US action was described by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman as “totally unreasonable”. He went on to say that “China (has) expressed its strong dissatisfaction and adamant opposition”.

At the same time, China’s Xinhua Agency gave prominence to the statement made by Iran’s OPEC delegate Mohamed Ali Khatibi: “If the oil producing nations of the (Arab) Gulf decide to substitute Iran’s oil, then they will be held responsible for what happens”. Chinese analysts explained that China like India was irritated that Iranian oil sanctions opened the way for further de facto dominance of Saudi Arabia in world export supplies of oil, as well as higher prices.

Iran is however only the third-largest supplier of oil to China, after Angola and Saudi Arabia, with Russia its fourth-largest supplier, using EIA data. This makes it necessary for China to run sustainable relations with the Wahabite Kingdom, which are made sustainable by actions like China’s Sinopec in 2012 part-funding the $8.5 billion 400 000 barrels-per-day refinery under construction in the Saudi Red Sea port city of Yanbu.

The Saudi news and propaganda outlet Al Arabiya repeatedly criticises China and India for their purchase of Iranian oil and refusal to fully apply US-inspired sanctions. A typical broadside of February 2013 was titled “Why is China still dealing with Iran?”, and notably cited US analysts operating in Saudi-funded or aided policy institutes, such as Washington’s Institute for Near East Policy as saying: “It’s time we wised up to this dangerous game. From Beijing’s perspective, Iran serves as an important strategic partner and point of leverage against the United States”. US analysts favourable to the Saudi strategy in the MENA – described with approval by President Eisenhower in the 1950s as able to establish a Hollywood style Saudi royal “Islamic Pope” for Muslim lands from Spain to Indonesia – say that Iran is also seen by China as a geopolitical partner able to help China countering US-Saudi and Israeli strategic action in the Middle East.

A 2012 study by US think tank RAND put it bluntly: “Isolated Iran locked in conflict with the United States provides China with a unique opportunity to expand its influence in the Middle East and could pull down the US military in the Gulf.” The RAND study noted that in the past two decades, Chinese engineers have built housing, bridges, dams, tunnels, railroads, pipelines, steelworks and power plants throughout Iran. The Tehran metro system completed between 2000 and 2006 was a major Chinese engineering project.

THE BIG PICTURE

China’s Iran policy and strategy can be called “big picture”. Iranian aid and support to mostly but not exclusively Shia political movements, and insurgents stretches from SE Asia and South Asia, to West and Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Caspian region, and SE Europe to the MENA. It is however focused on the Arabian peninsula and is inevitably opposed to Saudi geostrategy. This is a known flashpoint and is able to literally trigger a third world war. Avoiding this is the big picture – for China.

Li Weijian, the director of the Research Center of Asian and African Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies puts it so: “China’s stance on the Iranian nuclear issue is not subject to Beijing’s demand for Iranian oil imports, but based on judgment of the whole picture.” China is guided in foreign relations by two basic principles, both of them reflecting domestic priorities. First, China wants a stable international environment so it can pursue domestic economic development without external shocks. Second, China is very sensitive to international policies that ‘interfere in or hamper sovereign decisions”, ultimately tracing to its experience in the 19th and 20th centuries at the hands of Western powers, and the USSR, before and after the emergence of the PRC. It adamantly opposes foreign interference in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

This includes radical Islamist or djihadi interference, backed by any foreign power. While China has on occasions suspected Tehran of stirring Islamic insurgency inside its borders it sees the US-Saudi geostrategy of employing djihadists to do their dirty work as a critical danger, and as wanton interference. Indian attitudes although not yet so firm, are evolving in the same general direction. Both are nuclear weapons powers with massive land armies and more than able to defend themselves.

Claims by Western, mostly US analysts that China views Iran as exhibiting “unpredictable behaviour” in response to US-led sanctions and that Iran is “challenging China’s relations with its regional partners” can be dismissed. In particular and concerning oil, China is well aware that Iran will need many years of oil-sector development to return to anything like pre-Islamic revolution output of more than 5 million barrels a day. Unless oil sanctions are lifted, Iran’s oil output will go on declining, further increasing the power of the Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia, and Shia-governed but insurgency threatened Iraq to dictate export prices.

China dismisses the claim that its policies have hampered US and other Western political effort to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.

China’s distaste for toppling almost any central government, even those run by dictatorial strongmen springs from a deep sense of history – marked by insecurity about the uncertain political legitimacy of governments arising from civil war and revolution – like the PRC. At its extreme, this Chinese nightmare extends to fears that if the US-Saudi geostrategy can topple governments in the Middle East almost overnight, what will stop them from working to bring down China’s government one day? Unlike almost all MENA countries minus the oil exporters, China has scored impressive victories in the fight against poverty. Its economy although slowing creates abundant jobs and opportunity.

For China, this is the only way to progress.

HARDENING POLICIES AND POSITIONS

The emerging Chinese anti-Islamist strategy also underlines a menacing reality for the US and other Western powers. China rejects the belief there is still only one superpower in today’s world—the USA. The USA’s weakened economy and uncontrollable national debt, its confused and cowardly drone war, its slavish support to Israeli and Saudi whims do not impress China – or India.

To be sure China’s classic-conventional weapons development programs lag far behind the US. The Chinese military strategy for pushing back US dominance focuses global reach ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, drones, submarines, and military space and cyberwarfare capabilities.

With the PLA it possesses the biggest land army in the world. No US warmonger, at least saner versions would “take on China”.

China has invested heavily in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as Iran. It does not want to see its investment effort destroyed by deliberately promoted Islamic anarchy. Also, its Middle Eastern presence will continue due to the fact that while US dependence on oil imports is declining, China overtook the US as the world’s largest oil importer on a daily basis, this year, several years ahead of analysts’ consensus forecasts.

The likely result is that China is now poised and almost certain to strengthen relations with Iran. The intensifying Syrian crisis as well as the dangerously out of control US-Saudi-Israeli djihadi strategy, of fomenting sectarian conflict and destroying the nation state in the MENA, will likely prompt China to soon take major initiatives.