About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Podcast Teaser: The Anthropic Principle

Ever since I’ve heard of the anthropic principle (AP), many years ago, I thought that way too many smart people were endlessly going about a question akin to the old Scholastic issue of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. In our next podcast Julia and I will take on the baffling variety of anthropic principles and comment on some of the bizarre ideas surrounding the issue (there indeed is an issue, though I don’t think the AP makes any contribution to resolve it).

Apparently, the first person to think of something like the AP (though certainly not in the modern context, and not using that term) was Alfred Russel Wallace, the co-discoverer of natural selection with Charles Darwin. He wrote:

“Such a vast and complex universe as that which we know exists around us, may have been absolutely required ... in order to produce a world that should be precisely adapted in every detail for the orderly development of life culminating in

man.”

Wallace’s quote encapsulates what bothers many people about the AP: it seems to imply that life, and in particular human intelligence, is the pinnacle of creation, and that, by implication, there is a creator behind all the fuss. (Which of course immediately brings to mind Douglas Adams’ immortal quote: “In the beginning the Universe was created. This has made a lot of people very angry and has been widely regarded as a bad move.”) As we shall see, however, there is no necessary connection between various forms of the AP and intelligent design (ID).

The first modern author to raise AP-related issues was Robert Dicke in 1961. He noted that the current moment in the history of the universe is not a random sample of all possible historical moments, because the universe was inhospitable to life until relatively recently, and will be again in the distant future. Of course, this observation is rather trivial (a recurring problem with the AP), because it simply restates an obvious fact: life could not have been around before galaxies and planets were in a position to form, and it will not be around once the universe will be so old that stars will be too cold to support the thermodynamics of life. Duh.

It was Brandon Carter in 1973 that introduced the phrase Anthropic Principle, and who distinguished between a weak (WAP) and a strong (SAP) version. Here is the difference:

(Carter) WAP = “We must be prepared to take account of the fact that our location in the universe is necessarily privileged to the extent of being compatible with our existence as observers.”

(Carter) SAP = “The Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it depends) must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some stage. To paraphrase Descartes, cogito ergo mundus talis est. [I think, therefore the world is such as it is.]”

Oh boy, you know we are in trouble when physicists paraphrase philosophers! Carter’s WAP is a truism: it simply says that we have a privileged (i.e., non-random) position in the universe as observers, in virtue of the fact that there can be observers at all only in a small section of space-time. To which the proper comment is: yup. Carter’s SAP, however, is also a truism, because he meant “must” simply as a logical deduction from the fact that we exist, not that we must somehow exist. Again, nothing controversial here, and Carter later regretted the use of both the words “Anthropic” (because he meant the idea to go for any sentient self-aware life form) and “Principle” (a bit too grand a name for the restatement of a pretty obvious truth).

The real trouble arises with the 1986 book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, by John Barrow and Frank Tipler (the latter went on to write such nonsensical books as The Physics of Christianity). They also — very unfortunately — used the terms WAP and SAP, but defined them in crucially different, and much more questionable, ways from Carter. Here it goes:

(B&T) WAP: “The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.”

(B&T) SAP: “The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in its history.”

Notice here that Barrow and Tipler’s WAP is more restrictive than Carter’s, as it talks about carbon-based life forms, not just generic observers. This is often referred to as the (utterly unjustified) idea of “carbon chauvinism.” Also, they introduce talk of probability of cosmological quantities, as if we had any idea of what the respective probability distributions actually look like (we don’t). More importantly, the wording is ambiguous, because to say that the cosmological constants are “restricted” by certain “requirements” begins to smell suspiciously of intelligent design. Sure enough, it is hard not to interpret Barrow and Tipler’s SAP as a thinly disguised form of ID: why else must the universe be such that life has to develop?

But Barrow and Tipler aren’t done with the nonsense, proceeding to propose their Final Anthropic Principle (FAP): “Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out.” Wow. This is very much akin to Teilhard de Chardin’s “omega principle,” a semi-Christian mystical notion aimed at providing a scientific basis for the religiously inspired idea of immortality. Do I smell Templeton prize?

Of course the FAP is what famously led to Martin Gardner’s sarcastic proposal of the Completely Ridiculous Anthropic Principle (CRAP): “At the instant the Omega Point is reached, life will have gained control of all matter and forces not only in a single universe, but in all universes whose existence is logically possible; life will have spread into all spatial regions in all universes which could logically exist, and will have stored an infinite amount of information, including all bits of knowledge which it is logically possible to know. And this is the end.”

Ok, assuming you are not already hopelessly confused (for which state you would have plenty of good reasons), we got one more, John Wheeler’s Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP): “Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being.” Here we have moved from tautology (Carter) through wishful thinking (Barrow and Tipler) to just pure and simple bad logic: Wheeler’s principle obviously begs the question (i.e., it circularly assumes) of how is it possible for observers to be required in order to bring the universe into existence, and yet for those same observers to be part of that very universe. Unless, of course, the “observer” is actually a god existing outside space-time (whatever that means), in which case we are back to ID.

If this were the state of discourse concerning the AP, it would scarcely be worth bothering with. But recently a good number of high-level theoretical physicists jumped into the fray, including Steven Weinberg, Leonard Susskind and Lee Smolin. These are smart people, and we need to seriously entertain why exactly they are wasting neuronal power on any variant of the AP at all.

The answer is that of course discussions about the various APs do pick on one underlying serious question: why are the laws of physics the way they are? (Not to mention that old philosophical chestnut: why is there something instead of nothing?) And of course that’s precisely what fundamental physics is all about.

Still, one would not understand why people like Weinberg and co. bother with the AP if one did not grasp the real debate going on within the fundamental physics community these days: the one about string theory vs. possible alternatives to provide a “final theory of everything,” a theory that, presumably, would tell us why the fundamental physical constants do take the values that they do. [See our recent podcast on the problematic status of string theory for more.]

There are — to simplify grossly — essentially three types of answers currently on the table. String theorists hope that their theory will provide a unification of all forces of nature, a single equation with few if any free parameters, that will therefore show that the universe simply had to have the laws that it does, period. This will cut the legs out from under any non-trivial version of the AP (assuming that there is such a thing), because what sets the whole AP “argument” going is the (completely unproven) idea that the laws of physics and the physical constants could take any of an infinite number of values, thereby resulting in a spooky feeling once we realize that a tiny fraction of those values are compatible with us existing at all (though even that assumption has been questioned to some extent).

The second alternative is to invoke the multiverse, also a concept tightly related to string theory. This is the idea that there are infinite universes “out there,” each characterized by its own set of physical laws and constants. We just happened to be on one of those compatible with life, but this is now entirely unsurprising, as we obviously wouldn’t be having this discussion if our universe were incompatible with our existence. Notice, incidentally, that the multiverse is not at all the same thing as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, with which it is so often confused: the latter simply says that our universe keeps splitting into an infinite number of sub-possibilities where individual events take a different course — but the laws of nature would be the same in all these universes, making the many-worlds interpretation irrelevant to discussions of APs.

Finally, we have Smolin’s controversial idea of cosmic natural selection (CNS), according to which universes with different sets of physical parameters keep being generated and compete for prevalence in the landscape of all possible universes. It has to be noticed that Smolin is one of the most vocal critics of string theory (see his excellent The Trouble with Physics), and that his bet is on a different approach known as loop quantum gravity.

There are many problems with Smolin’s idea of CNS, beginning with the obvious fact that it is not at all clear what the measure of fitness would be for CNS to get going (contra Smolin, in biology, fitness isn’t simply the rate of reproduction, it is the rate of differential reproduction, which implies competition for resources in a common environment — but parallel universes do not share a common environment, by definition). Another serious problem is that any theory of natural selection requires a mechanism of reliable inheritance, and again it is far from being clear how information about physical constants would be inherited from a parent to a baby universe. Moreover, that inheritance has to be imperfect so that variation may arise on which selection can act — and what would the mutation mechanism be, in the case of parallel universes? And what is the “mutation” frequency to new laws of physics, anyway?

There is much, much more that could be said about the AP, but we need to clear up yet another source of confusion before opening the discussion. Contrary to what is often stated, no version of the AP makes any testable prediction (which means that, whatever APs are, they're not science). The two alleged examples often brought up are Steven Weinberg’s prediction of the value of the cosmological constant and Fred Hoyle’s prediction of a particular resonance of Carbon 12, the element on which (terrestrial) life is based. The problem is that both predictions were actually based on standard science, with no need to consider the AP at all. Here I think the conclusive rebuttal goes to Smolin, who in a letter to Susskind puts it this way:

“The logic of [Weinberg-style] arguments is: A implies B; B is observed; B, together with theory C, implies D [therefore, A is true].”

Here A is any form of the Anthropic Principle or the Principle of Mediocrity, together with assumptions about priors, probability distributions on universes etc, plus our own existence, that leads to the conclusion that we should observe B.

B is that galaxies have formed. C is the theory of structure formation, D is that the cosmological constant is not too large.

The fallacy is not to recognize that the first line plays no role in the argument, and the prediction of D is equally strong if it is dropped. One can prove this by noting that if D were not seen, one would have to question the theory C [assuming the observation is correct, as it certainly is here.] One would have no reason to question either A or the assertion that A implies B.”

In other words, the AP adds nothing to the predictions made by good old-fashioned scientific theories, and our understanding of the ultimate question of life, the universe and everything therefore gains precisely nothing by the introduction of the Anthropic Principle. How many angels were dancing on that pin?

168 comments:

There is much, much more that could be said about the AP, but we need to clear up yet another source of confusion before opening the discussion. Contrary to what is often stated, no version of the AP makes any testable prediction

The first modern author to raise AP-related issues was Robert Dicke in 1961. He noted that the current moment in the history of the universe is not a random sample of all possible historical moments, because the universe was inhospitable to life until relatively recently, and will be again in the distant future. Of course, this observation is rather trivial (a recurring problem with the AP), because it simply restates an obvious fact: life could not have been around before galaxies and planets were in a position to form, and it will not be around once the universe will be so old that stars will be too cold to support the thermodynamics of life. Duh.

Actually, Dicke's "Golden Age" is the commonality that is found in all of the illustrated precariouslybalanced constants and conditions that are necessary to life:http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/images/instability.gif

This includes the observed near-"flat", balanced structure of the universe, as well as our own local ecobalances, that exist similarly fixed between diametrically opposing runaway tendencies that send conditions racing to extremes that are equally prohibitive to carbonbased life:http://www.astronomynotes.com/solarsys/s9.htm

And I think that you will also find that this commonality extends to include all similarly evolved galaxies and planets that exist within the galactic and intergalactic "habitable zones":http://www.daviddarling.info/images/galactic_habitable_zone.jpg

So the principle isn't strictly anthropic, although the conditions for life are extremely restricted by the synchronized fine-tuning that derives this commonality.

This commonality indicates that there is a direct connection between the mechanism that defines the structure of the universe, and our existence, in other words, and that commonality most naturally indicates that there may be a bio-oriented cosmological principle in effect that requires carbon based life to appear over a specifically defined region and time in the history of the observed universe.

It is this cosmological principle that is willfully ignored by scientists and people like you, Massimo, for reasons that have nothing to do with science, and logic dictates that this is the reason why physicists have failed to resolve the problem of the near-static yet expanding universe in all their many years of ducking the the obvious call for a bio-oriented cosmological structure principle that actually resolves the problem from first principles. Considering how long and hard that scientists have tried and failed to resolve the problem any other way, one would think that they would be all over this, given even the most remote possibility that it is true, much less, the evidenced plausibility that we are actually faced with, which leaves one thinking that Copernican dogma still rules the minds of scientists who would rather not resolve the problem than admit that we might not be here by accident.

I'm probably just restating your argument, Massimo, but I feel compelled to comment. The problem as I see it is this: how does the existence of humans, in and of itself, count as evidence for some cosmological conclusion? How much does the existence of humans alone tell us about the structure of the universe? Not much, it seems to me.

I would feel differently if it were possible to show that only a very few previous states of the universe could lead to human consciousness. But that's plainly false; take the "Bolzmann brain" idea. Consciousness alone is thermodynamically cheap and easy to generate compared to what we see around us, so lots of different initial configurations could have created consciousness. Therefore the bare existence of human consciousness tells us little about the previous states of the universe.

We have lots of other, better evidence for our cosmology; turning to the AP effectively throws it all out.

Am I the only one who thinks that the notion of some kind of AP is the last bastion of anthropocentrism? All too often you ll hear something like "if the range of the strong nuclear force was a little bit shorter there would be no heavy elements and hence no life"

But guess what else wouldnt exist.Rocks! Ergo the universe is finetuned for the existence of rocks!

Can there be a universe with rocks but no life? Probably. Can there be a universe with no rocks but with life? Probably.Can you prove that the number of possible universes with rocks is larger than the number of possible universes with life? Probably not.You wouldnt know where to start.Why are we assuming that life has the smallest a priori likelihood of existence when theres no way of reliably calculating it? If there were no black holes no one would wonder why it is so and if it was possible in another universe.Can anyone tell me if black holes are more likely to exist than life? Can anyone tell me if life is the most unlikely phenomenon to occur in this or any other universe? Can anyone tell me what the a priori probability of any phenomenon to exist is ? Nope.

Its mostly emotional.Life is sacred to people and therefore they assume its sacred to the universe.Complexity is in the eye of the beholder (yes i know it is also a scientific concept but here its being used out of context as it were).Maybe complex things are less likely to exist but think of the infinite number of simple things that do not exist! Maybe in other universes simple things are less likely to exist.

Think of a universe that is homogeneous down to very small scales.Think of it as an infinite crystal.Now lets assume that some sort of "electron" can move in bands of "energy" analogous to the ones in normal solids.Now lets imagine that through the movement of these particles, consciousness arises just like it does through neuronal interactions in the human brain.No black holes no galaxies no evolution no nothing.Completely static.Is this universe more or less likely than ours? Is it more or less complex? Is it more or less magical?

Thats where the problem lies.People feel life is somehow magical but just like with any other emotion when they put it into words in order to say something that makes sense they have to rationalize it.So they have to find something in the culture that can be used to rationalize it.Science is the obvious answer to us.To some others its religion i suppose.But theres no need for that.Life isnt special within science,its special outside of it, within ourselves.And of course theres nothing wrong with that, as long as we are aware of it.

Massimo: "In other words, the AP adds nothing to the predictions made by good old-fashioned scientific theories, and our understanding of the ultimate question of life, the universe and everything therefore gains precisely nothing by the introduction of the Anthropic Principle."

Well, the Anthropic Principle may not make any new predictions, but neither does "string theory" nor the the notion of the "multiverse." The Anthropic Principle is an interpretation of the scientific data and interpretations hold meaning and value to people.

By the way, how exactly do scientific theories add to our "understanding of the ultimate question of life?"

The way that the AP is typically used by string theorists is as a selection effect, (not a physics principle), where they claim that the AP is predicting there there is a multiverse because an infinite number of universes is the only explanation for ours. They say that there must be at least 10^500 of them to produce one like ours, so the AP is making this prediction via the string "landscape". This is not a falsifiable prediction, which is where people like Massimo get their ideas from, but a final theory or a complete theory of quantum gravity would indeed justify the assumption... if there was such a theory.

But that's not what I'm talking about.

The physics for the AP produces the previously mentioned and precariously balanced habitable zones throughout the observed universe:

http://universe-review.ca/I09-06-habitable.jpg

http://www.geosc.psu.edu/~kasting/PersonalPage/Jpgs/HabitableZone.jpg

The inherent prediction that falls from this is that life in any form will not be found outside of this extremely narrow layer of spacetime, so all that you have to do is find life outside of the habitable zone anywhere else in the universe and you have falsified the prediction and the connection between life and the structure mechanism that defines the AP.

I find the suggestion that "we might not be here by accident" (to quote island) to be a curious one - "curious" in the sense that I'm not sure what it means, or, once I know what it means, whether or not I will care one way or the other.

After all, working backwards from a concrete knowledge of intelligent life (in particular, us) to a more abstract knowledge of physical regularities, it's hard to imagine that the universe (or multiverse, if you prefer) could have been otherwise. It's one of those brute facts (for better or for worse) that we exist, whereas finding the cause(s) of our existence is an intellectual work in progress. We can be very rare (as it now appears, based on my layperson's knowledge of the evidence), yet not be "accidental", if one means by that "extremely unlikely to emerge, anytime, anywhere."

More importantly, if we did know how probable or improbable we (or others like us) are, would that knowledge do anything to relieve our suffering? I strongly doubt it.

And it's in this sense that AP reminds me of ID: both theories seem to thrive in a tunnel. Inside is a specialized language game, which, from the lay person's point of view, may or may not represent the field (i.e. it requires some effort on the part of the lay person to judge the matter, and even then having to resort to rules of thumb). Outside are lots of other facts about the world (not only from science, but also from history, journalism, and personal experience), which suggest that, if we do live a designed or engineered world, then the well secluded Designer/Engineer is cruel and/or incompetent.

In other words, call it "designed" or "anthropic" if you will. But, in terms of what matters most, it seems a lot more like a mixed bag of beauty and horror. No physical calculation or formula seems likely to change that, let alone inspire greater love for it (except, perhaps, inside a physics seminar).

(From Wikipedia:) " - the anthropic principle is the collective name for several ways of asserting that the observations of the physical Universe must be compatible with the life observed in it."Except that life must be compatible with any universe that has some form of it - some individual choice making entity - which arguably would be a necessary component of any conceivable universe. So I suspect that the anthropic principal is mostly put to use in a universe where the suns don't shine.

Scott: "I would feel differently if it were possible to show that only a very few previous states of the universe could lead to human consciousness. But that's plainly false; take the "Bolzmann brain" idea. Consciousness alone is thermodynamically cheap and easy to generate compared to what we see around us, so lots of different initial configurations could have created consciousness. Therefore the bare existence of human consciousness tells us little about the previous states of the universe."

Doesn't the idea of "Boltzmann's brain" imply some kind of immortality?

we got one more, John Wheeler’s Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP): “Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being.” Here we have moved from tautology (Carter) through wishful thinking (Barrow and Tipler) to just pure and simple bad logic: Wheeler’s principle obviously begs the question (i.e., it circularly assumes) of how is it possible for observers to be required in order to bring the universe into existence

As far as we can tell, everything that is written about our universe was discovered using human senses, and the findings were related to human experience. So is it any wonder the universe is not 100% hostile to life as defined by humans. The additional stipulation that observers are required to bring the universe into existence is of course far from nonsense, it is the only answer that makes sense.

One can postulate an object occupying our local physical space and time, but because it is undetectable, we say it does not exist. But in truth, it does not exist because we do not observe it.

Massimo, on many occasions, you have voiced concerns about people you consider too smart to waste time debating things that are obvious nonsense. Today, you were more charitable towards the misguided, as you explained that these were comments on string theory. My take is you will be OK to call it a science as soon as we have tools that can prove or disprove some of its postulations.

Strings aside, how can you sit there (presumably at some boarding gate by now) and say that the 'PAP' is bad logic and circular in terms of who brought what into existence?

How can existence be anything other than a relative thing? As in something exists for me and you, but not him?

If you want to cling to objectivism - OK - I'm sure someday you will explain why you think stuff exists on its own. If you've addressed this, please let me know.

One's position on existence is central to one's position about an anthropic principle. Those who hold that existence is a function of observer and an observed thing simply see the whole universe as an observed object.

To the argument that we are part of the universe therefore we are not outside it, well, it's hard to draw the line that marks the boundary between self and everything else, but we could start with 'the conscious self' on one side, and anything one is conscious can be defined as the known universe. The question becomes less problematic if we consider that John's universe and Mary's universe differ by the tiniest bit, at least as regards the properties of the universe under consideration in this post.

I think you was too strict with Smolin's CNS. The name "natural selection" does not really means that every feature of Darwin's natural selection has to be there also in Cosmological NS. So your statements on differential reproduction, competition of resources et cetera are fine, but miss the point of the CNS: it is not to prove that a precise Darwin-like mechanism is working also on cosmological scale; it is to give an example of AP which can make testable predictions. To say it better: the point of CNS is to give an example of a conceivable answer to the fine tuning problem which can make testable predictions without relying on any anthropic principle.

I am not the one making the direct analogy with biological natural selection. Smolin's even expressely invokes the biological idea of adaptive landscapes when talking about his theory. If the process he has in mind is not analogous to natural selection then he should use a different name for it.

As for the idea that cns makes predictions, what Smolin is counting as "prediction" doesn't count in my universe, not until we can actually observe and compare other universes.

I didn't know of the Wallace quote, but I'm not surprised. Some years ago I wrote a paper for school which I'd like to share a little:

"The emotional approaches to the study of human origins lead the co discoverer of evolution, Alfred Russell Wallace, to forgo objectivity to the detriment of the science he loved so dearly. Dissecting Wallace’s beliefs was what the Paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould did not have in mind when he wrote the essay “Natural Selection and the Human Brain”. But, in that essay, Gould tells us that Wallace rejected the idea that the human brain could have evolved by the process of natural selection alone. Wallace could not imagine the brain having evolved to encapsulate all the creativity found in the society of his time [Read: England, ca. 1860’s] and still, according to his view, “savages” roamed the earth with the potentiality to produce cultural significant work. In the place of natural selection at the point of human consciousness, Wallace tells us a supernatural force, God, must be the explanation of such an accomplishment. For how, Wallace thought, could you explain such latent potential in the human brain?..."

"Gould’s essay was part of a series of essay’s, printed originally in Natural History [on “Punctuated Equilibrium”]. This theory of course did not reject the science in Darwin’s natural selection but only added a working mechanism for change not readily apparent in geologic time scales. The importance of understanding Wallace’s view on the evolution of the human brain as shown by Gould is because of the fact an agent (i.e. - cell, plant, animal, brain, etc.) can not have foreknowledge of an event that will decide if that agent’s ability to survive in it’s current environment will transcend into another, sometimes sudden and drastically, altered environment. Wallace believed in transcendence in a spiritual way, that for him it was fact that forces unknown at the time could guide nature with an unseen hand. What Gould shows was only the belief of Wallace’s reasoning concerning how consciousness in the human brain must be guided by God, for it does not vary physically from the “savage” to the cultured so therefore he was unable to recognize other influences on adaptation. But, Gould fails [add: was not his motivation for the essay] to mention how Wallace’s theory fit with his beliefs of the “spirit” world found in the mediums and fakers of his day."

Massimo, don't misunderstand me: apart from these few details about Smolin, I fully agree on pretty everything you said on this post.And, more important, Smolin too -- I guess.Moreover, I would not argue about words (in order to call something "natural selection" it has to fulfill this, this and that). So, let me come to your two points. First: Smolin's article I mentioned above says quite precisely in which definite sense his theory can be considered a sort of natural selection (one should not draw consequences just by the name of the theory). Second: there exist testable predictions of Smolin's theory that do not need to measure anything outside our Universe. Such predictions concern: 1) an upper limit on neutron stars' masses; 2) an estimation of the amount of primordial supernovae; 3) which kind of inflationary models have to be allowed in order not to falsify his CNS.

Let me repeat again that I guess Smolin would agree on everything you said in this post about the AP. In fact his CNS theory was drawn just to give an example of a scientific theory which could explain the fine tuning problem without relying on hand-waving "philosophical" arguments. Cheers,

Luke Vogel: "In the place of natural selection at the point of human consciousness, Wallace tells us a supernatural force, God, must be the explanation of such an accomplishment. For how, Wallace thought, could you explain such latent potential in the human brain?..."

On the materialistic worldview, consciousness is causally-inert. With that in mind, I fail to see how consciousness was naturally selected since it could not have possibly conferred any survival benefit.

Paisley said, "Well, the Anthropic Principle may not make any new predictions, but neither does "string theory" nor the the notion of the "multiverse." The Anthropic Principle is an interpretation of the scientific data and interpretations hold meaning and value to people."

So we should allow pointless adages to cloud debate and discussion because it makes a few people feel good?

The Anthropic Principle is not so much an interpretation of scientific data as it is using scientific data to support an agenda. That agenda generally is the need for purpose, or as Kostas said, anthropocentrism. I hold that the obsession or want of purpose is merely another form of anthropocentrism, being that purpose is a psychological obsession that humanity has been battling with since our brains were developed enough to assign different objects a purpose.

Richard Dawkins did a lecture over the purpose of purpose and all the obsession that goes with it, rather fantastic methinks.

Paisley said: On the materialistic worldview, consciousness is causally-inert.

That may describe some versions of materialism (a.k.a. physicalism), although not necessarily all. For example, consider the idea that consciousness is a high-level feature of the brain, which causes intentionality, in the sense of a property of mental states concerning alertness and responsiveness to one's environment. Whether or not the idea is true (or only partly so), I would not describe it as a "causally inert" notion of consciousness, and it seems perfectly compatible with physicalism (or the idea that everything is, or emerges from, or supervenes on, the physical).

On the materialistic worldview, consciousness is causally-inert. With that in mind, I fail to see how consciousness was naturally selected since it could not have possibly conferred any survival benefit.

But jcm suggests that this would not be the case if

consciousness is a high-level feature of the brain, which causes intentionality, in the sense of a property of mental states concerning alertness and responsiveness to one's environment.

When I use the word consciousness, I'm referring to subjective conscious experience. But the definition that jcm has given seems to be getting at something different.

Kristyana: "So we should allow pointless adages to cloud debate and discussion because it makes a few people feel good?"

I think the AP raises some legitimate issues (e.g. the constants of nature) that require some kind of explanation.

Kristyana: "The Anthropic Principle is not so much an interpretation of scientific data as it is using scientific data to support an agenda. The Anthropic Principle is not so much an interpretation of scientific data as it is using scientific data to support an agenda. That agenda generally is the need for purpose, or as Kostas said, anthropocentrism...

Richard Dawkins did a lecture over the purpose of purpose and all the obsession that goes with it, rather fantastic methinks."

jcm: "That may describe some versions of materialism (a.k.a. physicalism), although not necessarily all. For example, consider the idea that consciousness is a high-level feature of the brain, which causes intentionality, in the sense of a property of mental states concerning alertness and responsiveness to one's environment. Whether or not the idea is true (or only partly so), I would not describe it as a "causally inert" notion of consciousness, and it seems perfectly compatible with physicalism (or the idea that everything is, or emerges from, or supervenes on, the physical."

The only attribute that you described above that exhibits causal-efficacy is the generic notion of "responsiveness." The amoeba certainly has the capacity to respond to its environment. Do you believe it is conscious? If not, why not?

I still don't buy Smolin's argument about predictions based on cns. I've read his book, and I'm not convinced. His predictions seem to me to be on the same level of those made by Hoyle and Weinberg based on the anthropic principle: they are probably correct, but derive from standard physics, not from the theory allegedly under test.

Another way to put it is that, for instance, one could derive upper limits to the mass of neutron stars using a variety of theories, none of which relies on cns.

I would say that the amoeba and the human have one thing in common: a behavioral tendency to react to stimuli. While I would not normally describe the amoeba as "conscious", as I would the human, the difference may prove to be more in degree than in kind.

That said, I was partly coming from an everyday use of "conscious", which is practically interchangeable with "awake." The brain might work just as hard in a dreamlike state (which begs the question as to what's the survival benefit of that?), but it's not producing consciousness at that moment. When it does, however, I think it's fair to say that consciousness causes a largely different set of behaviors, relative to sleep or unconsciousness, and is therefore not causally inert.

Admittedly, that's all rather third-person, behavioristic stuff, and I certainly don't deny subjective experience. But we might just be looking at the same feature from different aspects. From one aspect, consciousness may appear causally inert (although that doesn't necessarily deny its physical basis), while from another aspect it appears causally potent.

For the more biological aspect of your comment, I refer you to Stephen Jay Gould and "spandrels." To sum up, he argued that a trait can be a byproduct of evolution (i.e. a physical process) without being a direct product of adaptive selection. Whether he was right or wrong, I see nothing in his proposition that is at odds with materialism.

Notice here that Barrow and Tipler’s WAP is more restrictive than Carter’s, as it talks about carbon-based life forms, not just generic observers. This is often referred to as the (utterly unjustified) idea of “carbon chauvinism.”

There are very good scientific reasons for this that you apparently don't know, yet, you seem to "know" that it is "utterly unjustified".

This is comically common to the AP... ignorance, willful or otherwise... IS NOT AN EXCUSE!

But if I were tell you, would it make a difference?... nope.

If I were to address every single last misguided idea would it make a difference?... nope.

Because your cosmology is the preconceived religious belief known begrudgingly to physicists as Copernicanism, and no amount of facts, observational evidence, or logic will change your meaningless world view.

I have additional confidence in this statement because I have been talking to you on and off about this for a number of years now, and nothing has changed.

It is so easy for you to find "emergent" purpose in nature in the form of teeth, (for an example that you gave long ago)... but it is absolutely impossible for you to fathom that maybe we too are simply necessary to the physical process.

The one word that best describes the way that people think about this subject is...

The literature on AP is indeed muddled and confused, but it is not completely a vacuous concept. Nick Bostrom elucidates this clearly in "Observation selection effects".

If you go fishing with a net that has 6" holes, then you should not be surprised when all your fish are longer than 6", and you should be wary about estimating the number of sub-6" fish in the pond from your observations. The AP, correctly applied, tells us where and to what extent we should be wary about drawing conclusions from the observation of our own existence.

Paisley said: On the materialistic worldview, consciousness is causally-inert.

jcm replied: That may describe some versions of materialism (a.k.a. physicalism), although not necessarily all.

Really? Physicalism holds that consciousness exists but is causally inert? It seems to me that any materialist monist view ought to reject the existence of something that's causally inert. Otherwise it's some kind of Platonism in disguise.

I have yet to hear a convincing argument that consciousness cannot be a property of physical things; and when I said consciousness above, I was referring to the variety of consciousness that can be achieved by physical things.

And Paisley, no, I don't think the Bolzmann brain idea suggests immortality, because Bolzmann brains, if they exist, wouldn't be any more immortal or less physical than we are. It seems to me that you might be able to make a Platonistic argument for immortality based on Bolzmann brains, but you'd have to take some kind of Platonism as a presupposition.

This is, of course, just my understanding of the situation. If any of the above is mistaken, I'd be glad to know.

The point of my first post was that there is an apparent direct connection between the naturally expected cosmological principle that defines the structure of the "flat", balanced, yet *expanding* universe, and our our *homeorhetically* balanced ecosystems, including the entire Venus/Earth/Mars system, as the linked astronomy page describes.

It requires willful ignorance to say that this can't be as relevant to the cosmological constant problem as it appears to be.

The point of my second post was that the physics has predictive capabilities as it applies to the observed universe, via commonly known reasons why the physics isn't strictly anthropic, nor is it limited only to the Earth, but it is highly restricted by the precariously balanced conditions that are common to the universe and our own ecosystem, as well as every other similarly evolved planet in the observed universe. And by similarly evolved, I mean to include the *all* of the anthropic coincidences working simultaneously during the "golden age", so the prediction is that all life is similarly evolved technologically, which explains the Fermi Paradox. All of these predictions fall from the "Goldilocks Enigma" that derives "habitable zones".

Point three... What would it take, Massimo?...

If I tell you in terms that are acceptable to you why the universe appears to be carbon chauvinistic to life... will that do it?

I'm using materialism and physicalism interchangeably here (thus, my use of "a.k.a.", which stands for "also known as"), and I certainly don't mean to suggest that physicalism "holds that consciousness is causally inert" (as Paisley suggested). Quite the contrary. I was willing to entertain that it allows for that thesis, but mainly as a segue to my counter-example (based loosely on Searle), in which consciousness is seen as causally potent, and yet is perfectly compatible with physicalism.

That said, I suspect that Paisley (and perhaps Nick, as well) has in mind epiphenomenalism, which is "is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events." Whether or not it's true, it seems to me to assume physicalism, even though physicalism doesn't logically require epiphenomenalism.

Perhaps some of us are confusing metaphysics with philosophy of mind. While there is certainly an important link between the two (e.g. dualism assumes the reality of non-physical entities), it's not like there's a one-to-one relationship between them, and different philosophy-of-mind varieties can (and do) arise per metaphysical thesis.

once more, please watch the tone. I am not "willfully ignorant," though I may be ignorant of fact X or theory Y (but then again, who isn't?).

Remember, I am *not* paid to run this blog, and I get to whatever points I can at whatever time I can, if I can. If people would like to start contributing financially so that I can make this my full time job... (No, that wouldn't work, I don't think I would enjoy this as a job.)

Ok, even if there is a necessary connection between the large scale structure of the universe and the Venus/Earth/Mars system (which I really doubt) I don't see why this is particularly interesting. Surely the universe could do without the Venus/Earth/Mars system. And moreover, the earth ecosystem could certainly do without Venus and Mars.

The second point is, again, either trivial or a non-sequitur, as with the AP in general. Yes, if things were not the way they are they would be different, in some cases dramatically so. And? Moreover, we have *no* evidence of life outside earth, so to speak of "similarly evolved" life is a bit premature to say to least, no?

jcm: "That said, I was partly coming from an everyday use of "conscious", which is practically interchangeable with "awake." The brain might work just as hard in a dreamlike state (which begs the question as to what's the survival benefit of that?), but it's not producing consciousness at that moment."

I was employing the term "consciousness" in its strictest sense to mean "awareness." Clearly, we are aware of our dreams and therefore conscious during our dreaming state.

jcm: "Admittedly, that's all rather third-person, behavioristic stuff, and I certainly don't deny subjective experience. But we might just be looking at the same feature from different aspects. From one aspect, consciousness may appear causally inert (although that doesn't necessarily deny its physical basis), while from another aspect it appears causally potent."

But what we call the "physical" must necessarily be accessible to the third-person perspective. Subjectivity clearly is not. Therefore, the materialist has no basis for asserting that subjective experiences are physical.

jcm: "For the more biological aspect of your comment, I refer you to Stephen Jay Gould and "spandrels." To sum up, he argued that a trait can be a byproduct of evolution (i.e. a physical process) without being a direct product of adaptive selection. Whether he was right or wrong, I see nothing in his proposition that is at odds with materialism."

That solution is problematic. Why? It implies that organic "robots without consciousness" could be running the world. Besides, why would an evolutionary biologist have to account for the emergence of consciousness when he is willing to concede that an amoeba has some degree of consciousness?

heh... I'm sorry Massimo. I use that phrase generically as it commonly applies to the predetermined mindset of liberal scientists and others who somehow know without proof that the pointed nature of the physics can't mean what it appears to indicate. It was intended to be defining, not insulting, but I'll be careful with stuff like that.

And I don't know whether we could survive without Mars or Venus in the system as you seem to somehow know, (although I seriously doubt it), but the example was meant to be illustrative of the fact that the goldilocks zone is not simply a range of temperatures on a continuous spectrum, but is balanced like the universe between diametrically opposing runaway tendencies that send conditions racing far from those conducive to carbon based life if you fall off of either side of this sliding set point, *like* Mars and Venus have.

Anyway, it's the commonality between the structure of the universe and these local balance points that is "particularly interesting", since it apparently indicates that there may be a connection between the two.

Here I would again say that it requires the willful ignorance of indoctrinated scientists to just blow this apparent connection off like they do when they have failed to produce the expected law of nature any other way in over 50 years of trying to resolve what David Gross calls the "single biggest failure of physics"... and have instead resorted to multiverses and other similar such unobservable nonsense instead.

A) We have a long time unresolved problem that has science stopped dead in its tracks. An expectation for a cosmological principle that defines the structure of the universe from first principles.

B) We have a clear indication for where this principle might be found.

C) Yet, we only get willful ignorance of this apparent connection, rather than to *resort* to connecting the two to resolve the problem from bio-oriented first principles.

So we go another 50 years before somebody breaks down and admits that maybe we should take a serious look?

Paisley: But what we call the "physical" must necessarily be accessible to the third-person perspective.

Not really. For example, according to a dual-aspect thesis, one aspect of the same substance is accessible from a third-person perspective, but another aspect is accessible from a first-person perspective.

It implies that organic "robots without consciousness" could be running the world.

Maybe they are. We can only infer that some others share subjective experiences like our own.

Scott: "Really? Physicalism holds that consciousness exists but is causally inert? It seems to me that any materialist monist view ought to reject the existence of something that's causally inert. Otherwise it's some kind of Platonism in disguise."

Actually, "eliminative materialism" (a particularly pernicious form of materialism) denies the existence of conscioiusness (i.e. "subjective experience"). That being said, what causal function (with the possible exception of free will) would you ascribe to conciousness that cannot be duplicated mechanically by a computer?

Scott: "I have yet to hear a convincing argument that consciousness cannot be a property of physical things; and when I said consciousness above, I was referring to the variety of consciousness that can be achieved by physical things."

If consciousness (i.e. "subjective awareness") is physical, then it should have a physical property. Please provide me with one physical property that consciousness exhibits. Also, what possible survival benefit does an invisible and undetectable "physical" property confer to a living organism?

Scott: "And Paisley, no, I don't think the Bolzmann brain idea suggests immortality, because Bolzmann brains, if they exist, wouldn't be any more immortal or less physical than we are. It seems to me that you might be able to make a Platonistic argument for immortality based on Bolzmann brains, but you'd have to take some kind of Platonism as a presupposition."

I respectively disagree. As I understand the concept of a "Boltzmann brain," given enough time (eternity is a very long time) and the stochastic fluctuations in the level of entropy in a near-equilibrium state, every possible configuration of matter (i.e. mass/energy, space-time) would continue to play itself out indefinitely, ensuring that "I" (i.e. "yours truly") would reincarnate forever. I would say that qualifies as a form of immortality. The bottom line is an argument for Boltzmann brains is actually an argument for the Anthropic Principle (i.e. the nature of the universe is such that our very existence is necessarily guaranteed, not only in this world...but in worlds to come).

jcm: "Not really. For example, according to a dual-aspect thesis, one aspect of the same substance is accessible from a third-person perspective, but another aspect is accessible from a first-person perspective."

One aspect is physical, the other is mental. Only the physical aspect is accessible to the third-person perspective. The mental aspect is not. So you are not saying anything different here. Besides, "dual-aspect theory" is a pantheistic concept (e.g. Spinoza's God), not a materialistic one. As such, it postulates that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe. I would say that qualifies as a philosophical explanation for the Anthropic Principle.

jcm: "Maybe they are. We can only infer that some others share subjective experiences like our own."

Do you really believe that Barack Obama may be an organic "robot without consciousness?" If so, then I guess you will find the "spandrel" argument for the existence of consciousness to be compelling. I do not. And I suspect the vast majority of human beings (even those in academia) would share my viewpoint on this one.

I would put it like this: some properties are accessible to others, while other properties are only accessible by oneself. We might agree to call the latter (first-person) properties "mental", but I doubt that they are caused by an entirely different substance (e.g. some spooky non-physical entity).

Spinoza may have called his one substance "God" (or "Deus sive Natura" - "God or Nature"), but a physicalist alive today would likely call it something else (e.g. "matter/energy").

As for spandrels, I think we're talking past one another. You said "I fail to see how consciousness was naturally selected since it could not have possibly conferred any survival benefit". I don't recall if Gould addressed consciousness directly. I simply recall that he argued that not all biological traits are naturally selected. Consciousness may be an example (or not).

Ah, of course -- I thought the a.k.a. was modifying "some types of materialism" rather than simply "materialism." A simple misunderstanding.

I see your point in distinguishing philosophy of mind from metaphysics; but it seems to me that epiphenominalism, in positing an acausal entity, can't escape some form of metaphysical dualism. Again, I may be mistaken there.

Hmmm. I can see we are going to be on opposite sides of this debate. I don't find any form of materialism to be particularly pernicious. And I doubt your claim that it denies the existence of consciousness; surely eliminative materialism simply insists that what we experience as consciousness can be explained entirely in terms of physical phenomena.

"That being said, what causal function (with the possible exception of free will) would you ascribe to conciousness that cannot be duplicated mechanically by a computer?"

I think the materialist response to this question would be to say that all properties of consciousness can be duplicated mechanically by a computer.

"If consciousness (i.e. "subjective awareness") is physical, then it should have a physical property."

Is location a physical property? Then consciousness has the physical property of being located in human brains. (And possibly elsewhere.)

"...ensuring that "I" (i.e. "yours truly") would reincarnate forever. I would say that qualifies as a form of immortality."

Only if you go somewhere else for the periods during which you are not incarnated. Otherwise, you are mortal, and those other "yous" aren't really you, in just the same way that two identical twins aren't the same person. Thinking of reincarnation as granting immortality presupposes something that exists independently from one's incarnations and unites them.

"The bottom line is an argument for Boltzmann brains is actually an argument for the Anthropic Principle"

Well, historically speaking, that's not so. Bolzmann brains were explicitly imagined as a means of defeating a particular version of the AP that Bolzmann used. This article explains what I mean quite clearly.

jcm: "I would put it like this: some properties are accessible to others, while other properties are only accessible by oneself. We might agree to call the latter (first-person) properties "mental", but I doubt that they are caused by an entirely different substance (e.g. some spooky non-physical entity)."

Spinoza may have called his one substance "God" (or "Deus sive Natura" - "God or Nature"), but a physicalist alive today would likely call it something else (e.g. "matter/energy")."

I think you are conflating "property dualism" with "dual-aspect theory." While the former may be compatible with materialism (a.k.a. physicalism), the latter is not.

You seem to be implying that Spinoza is employing the term "God" metaphorically, not literally. If so, then I disagree with your interpretation. Spinoza's God is a pantheistic conception of God. The pantheist basically views the universe (or should I say the multiverse?) as a thought-process existing in the divine mind. The thought-process (i.e. nature) and the mind (i.e. God) thinking the thoughts are one. How exactly is this compatible with materialism/physicalism? Does the physicalist actually ascribe conscious intelligence to his conception of "energy?"

jcm: "As for spandrels, I think we're talking past one another. You said "I fail to see how consciousness was naturally selected since it could not have possibly conferred any survival benefit". I don't recall if Gould addressed consciousness directly. I simply recall that he argued that not all biological traits are naturally selected. Consciousness may be an example (or not)."

I understood your argument. You are basically saying that traits are sometimes naturally selected even though they serve no adaptive function whatsoever. However, I do not believe anyone would find this line of reasoning to be a very compelling if they truly understood the implications. If consciousness is merely an evolutionary byproduct of some other biological trait that proved to be adaptive, then this implies that the world (at least in theory) could be populated with human beings who are nothing more than organic "robots without consciousness." For me to accept your spandrel argument would require a suspension of disbelief that I am not willing to take.

still there are predictions from CNS. I think Smolin himself does not faithfully believe in his own CNS. I mean, his point was just to show a theory which does make empirical predictions. Are such predictions not conclusive? Are there other explanations for the same fact(s)? Well, it happens.Still the theory could be at least falsified. And this point makes the CNS quite a different theory with respect to almost any other AP-involving theory, if any.

Let me close, since I think we are discussing about fine nuances. I think we (I mean: me, you and Smolin) share the same suspicion about all various AP arguments. As far as I understand the Smolin CNS was precisely an attempt to bring down to the Earth such AP reasoning.

as a cosmologist, I am always uneasy (to say the least) with the anthropic principle. You rightly stressed that it is (mis)used to support intelligent design. On the other hand, as you certainly know, Dawkins uses it in his book in the exactly opposite way, to explain some features of the universe which may seem highly improbable, by postulating the existence of an infinite number of universes with random physical constants and/or natural laws. (This is actually not his idea, but one of the outcomes of some inflationary cosmological models, as well as of the so-called string theory landscape.) I think both uses of the AP are unwarranted. To me, anthropic considerations are only useful as a (almost tautological) remark that we should not be fooled into giving too much weight to physical facts that are biased by our presence as observers. For example, we should not be too surprised to live in a very old, very cold, very empty universe, because we could only live in such an epoch in the cosmic timeline. Or we should not assume that earth-like planets are necessarily very common in the universe simply because we happen to live on one: we could not live anywhere else, so we cannot make any sensible statistical inference out of this fact. In other words, our existence was not required, and physical laws were not tuned for life; still, there may be some correlation (mind, not causation) between certain physical properties and our existence as observers, and we should take them into account when we draw our conclusions. Whether this is scientifically useful or not in some more profound way, I am not sure. To me, all the recent craze about multiverses sounds very much like giving up any predictive theoretical power, but I may be wrong. (One final thing: I don't think Barrow actually endorses any of the formulations of the AP, I think he was simply attempting a categorization. I would not be so sure about Tipler, though.)

Ok, so after doing some more reading I realize that I was being a bit naive about eliminative materialism, though I still don't find it pernicious. In fact, I think it forces us to consider an interesting and important question: is there anything about our common-sense understanding of consciousness worth holding on to, or should we simply reject it in the same way we might reject the notion of "evil spirits"? I'm not sure about the answer to that question.

Amedeo Balbi said... Dawkins uses it in his book in the exactly opposite way, to explain some features of the universe which may seem highly improbable, by postulating the existence of an infinite number of universes with random physical constants and/or natural laws.

I could be wrong, since it's been a while since I read Dawkins book, but as I recall, he did not use the AP in this manner.

Instead, he incorrectly used it to postulate that the large number of planets and galaxies in the observed universe increases the odds that one of them had to produce life. He is wrong, because this assumed random distribution of potential derives a "mediocre" a priori statistical distribution of values of observables, but this is not what is observed and is the reason for the anthropic physics.

As a cosmologist... one might hope that you'd actually do you own research.

Island: Dawkins uses both. In chapter 4 there are two sections: "The anthropic principle: planetaryversion", which is the one you refer to, and "The anthropic principle: cosmological version", which is the one I was mentioning. Both uses have little scientific meaning, in my opinion, although I must admit that they may seem appealing solutions to some apparent fine tuning of physical conditions in the universe, thus serving as an effective rebuttal of design arguments. But since I think that such fine tuning is ultimately a red herring, I am not convinced we really need the AP.

Thanks for the refreshing my memory Amedeo. I lent my copy to someone who never returned it, so I couldn't check for myself.

I disagree with your assumption that fine tuning is a red herring for the many reasons that I've given in this thread, (which I'd love to see you refute), as well as others, but I'm not fond of the multiverse as a cop-out on first principles either.

Scott: "I think the materialist response to this question would be to say that all properties of consciousness can be duplicated mechanically by a computer."

Agreed. But you are making my point. On the materialist view, electronic robots can theoretically do everything that organic "robots with consciousness" (e.g. human beings) can do. No consciousness is required. Therefore, consciousness has no causal role. Whether or not a "robot" (organic or otherwise) is subjectively aware is inconsequential.

Scott: "Is location a physical property? Then consciousness has the physical property of being located in human brains. (And possibly elsewhere.)"

Yes, location is a physical property. But there is no scientific instrument to objectively detect the location (or presence) of consciousness. You are simply asserting that consciousness is physically located in the brain. You have no scientific evidence to substantiate this claim. (In fact, I do not even think it is possible in theory to substantiate such a claim because you are required to provide objective evidence for something which is inherently subjective.)

Scott: "Only if you go somewhere else for the periods during which you are not incarnated. Otherwise, you are mortal, and those other "yous" aren't really you, in just the same way that two identical twins aren't the same person. Thinking of reincarnation as granting immortality presupposes something that exists independently from one's incarnations and unites them."

Well, this may be true. But then you are simply rejecting the concept of a "Boltzmann brain" and therefore undermining your own argument to account for the Anthropic Principle. Is the material reconstitution of whatever presently constitutes "me" or "you" feasible due to stochastic fluctuations in near-equilibrium states of entropy (which, presumably, are the most-likely states of the universe at any given point in time)? If it is, then this implies that we (i.e. you and I and everyone else) will be reconstituted again and again ad infinitum. (Perhaps, the term "reconstitution" is more appropriate than "reincarnation.") That "I" cease to exist for a short duration is really a moot factor. Remember, time is relative. From my point of view, no time will have elapsed. In fact, most materialists actually believe they "cease to exist" (i.e. lose their subjectivity) each and every night during "dreamless sleep" and come back to existence upon waking. The same difference applies here.

(Actually, the issues you are raising above have many implications that are far beyond the scope of this particular thread.)

Scott: "Well, historically speaking, that's not so. Bolzmann brains were explicitly imagined as a means of defeating a particular version of the AP that Bolzmann used. This article explains what I mean quite clearly."

I already read the article. That is what prompted me to ask you the question. If the idea of Boltzmann brains are truly viable, then this would imply some sort of immortality. (Actually, this notion is not entirely unlike Nietzsche's concept of the "Eternal Return".)

Scott: "Ok, so after doing some more reading I realize that I was being a bit naive about eliminative materialism, though I still don't find it pernicious. In fact, I think it forces us to consider an interesting and important question: is there anything about our common-sense understanding of consciousness worth holding on to, or should we simply reject it in the same way we might reject the notion of "evil spirits"? I'm not sure about the answer to that question."

"Consciousness" is axiomatic (i.e. self-evident). Any attempt to deny its existence presupposes it.

Paisley: "On the materialist view, electronic robots can theoretically do everything that organic "robots with consciousness" (e.g. human beings) can do. No consciousness is required."

This seems incoherent to me. One of the things we do is have consciousness. So electronic robots who do everything that we do must also have consciousness.

"You are simply asserting that consciousness is physically located in the brain. You have no scientific evidence to substantiate this claim."

Are you claiming that we have no scientific evidence that the behaviors that we generally think of as signs of consciousness are governed by the brain? Or, as seems more likely, are you claiming that we have no proof that the behaviors we see as signs of consciousness really are signs of consciousness? The latter is really just a restatement of the problem of other minds, which I don't see as germane to our discussion.

"In fact, I do not even think it is possible in theory to substantiate such a claim because you are required to provide objective evidence for something which is inherently subjective."

Aha! The subjective/objective divide. I think this is the root of our problem. I don't think this is a distinction that holds up in the end unless one resorts to dualism.

"But then you are simply rejecting the concept of a "Boltzmann brain" and therefore undermining your own argument to account for the Anthropic Principle."

I don't follow this. And I'm not "accounting" for it, I'm rejecting it... The foundation of the bolzmann brain idea is that whatever consciousness the AP relies on is entirely physical.

"Remember, time is relative. From my point of view, no time will have elapsed."

You must not have paid attention to my twin example. Two identical twins -- totally identical down to the quantum -- would still not be the same person because they occupy different spatiotemporal locations. If I am reincarnated as a bolzmann brain somewhere that is space-like separate from me, then there can be no causal relationship between my two "selves," and therefore the principle of identity that unites us must be non-physical (i.e. Platonic or otherwise dualistic).

See Massimo, the real danger of the Anthropic Principle is that it will solve the extremely long standing problem of the flat yet expanding universe from first physics principles that will put an end to theoretical physics, something I'd think you'd relish.

http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/krauss06/krauss06.2_index.htmlThe Energy of Space that isn't ZeroThe new results are either telling us that all of science is wrong and we're the center of the universe, or maybe the data is imply incorrect, or maybe it's telling us there's something weird about the microwave background results and that maybe, maybe there's something wrong with our theories on the larger scales. And of course as a theorist I'm certainly hoping it's the latter, because I want theory to be wrong, not right, because if it's wrong there's still work left for the rest of us.--Lawrence Krauss

Not the center of the universe... but close, like others that are quite like us.

Scott: "This seems incoherent to me. One of the things we do is have consciousness. So electronic robots who do everything that we do must also have consciousness."

Okay, let me try a different approach. Materialists have a mechanical view of nature. As such, they view living organisms as "stimulus-response systems" or "information processing systems". (This is more than a metaphor. Materialists truly believe in the prospect of strong AI.) Now, here is my question: At what point in evolutionary history does an organic "information processing system" become conscious (i.e. subjectively aware)? We know that information processing does not require consciousness (does anyone here really believe my personal computer is conscious?). Also, what exactly can an "information processing system with consciousness" do that an "information processing system without consciousness" cannot?

Scott: "Are you claiming that we have no scientific evidence that the behaviors that we generally think of as signs of consciousness are governed by the brain? Or, as seems more likely, are you claiming that we have no proof that the behaviors we see as signs of consciousness really are signs of consciousness? The latter is really just a restatement of the problem of other minds, which I don't see as germane to our discussion."

I am claiming that we can only infer consciousness. There is no scientific evidence that consciousness even exists. Of course, my first-person perspective of my own subjective experiences is proof-positive to me that consciousness exists. But my first-person perspective does not qualify as objective scientific evidence.

Scott: "Aha! The subjective/objective divide. I think this is the root of our problem. I don't think this is a distinction that holds up in the end unless one resorts to dualism."

The subjective/objective duality is based on our first-person experience of the world. There is no question about that. The burden of proof is upon those who insist it is otherwise, not on those who simply acknowledge what is obviously self-evident.

Scott: "I don't follow this. And I'm not "accounting" for it, I'm rejecting it... The foundation of the bolzmann brain idea is that whatever consciousness the AP relies on is entirely physical."

Did you not employ the concept of "Boltzmann brains" to account for why the "constants of nature" (e.g. the cosmological constant) appear to be fine-tuned for the emergence of consciousness?

Scott: "You must not have paid attention to my twin example. Two identical twins -- totally identical down to the quantum -- would still not be the same person because they occupy different spatiotemporal locations. If I am reincarnated as a bolzmann brain somewhere that is space-like separate from me, then there can be no causal relationship between my two "selves," and therefore the principle of identity that unites us must be non-physical (i.e. Platonic or otherwise dualistic)."

But according to the Boltzmann brain scenario (at least as I understand it), the current universe can theoretically play itself out again from the big bang to the present (just like re-running a computer program with the same input data will produce the same output data). Granted, it is highly improbable. But given enough opportunity (and an infinite number of opportunities is more than enough), everything that can possibly happen will happen. To argue that "I" will not exist again seems to me to be an argument against materialism.

I agree, but isn't this also true of causation (i.e. that we can only infer it from conjoined events)? If so (and I believe it is), then science would seem to rest largely (if not entirely) on inference (not that there's anything wrong with that).

There is no scientific evidence that consciousness even exists.

Yet we have social sciences and evidence-based medicine, which depend on subjective reporting for data. (The recent trend in positive psychology and "happiness studies" comes to mind, but also Julia's most recent post here gives an example of an acupuncture study, which depends on subjects' reports of pain relief.)

With respect to the study of consciousness, it seems to me that specialists (e.g. cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists) can do no better than to draw inferences from the correlations of first- and third-person data, and (with another nod to Julia's latest post) try to tease out the essentials from the incidentals.

jcm: "I suppose you're right. I've played somewhat fast and loose with the terminology. Since, as I mentioned earlier, I have in mind John Searle's thesis in mind, I think I should just refer you to him"

Just for the sake of clarity. Are you saying that you subscribe to John Searle's "biological naturalism" solution to the mind/body problem, rather than "property dualism" or "dual-aspect theory?"

jcm: "I agree, but isn't this also true of causation (i.e. that we can only infer it from conjoined events)? If so (and I believe it is), then science would seem to rest largely (if not entirely) on inference (not that there's anything wrong with that)."

Yeah, that's the problem of induction,. I guess you could argue that science is ultimately based on faith (i.e. belief without sufficient evidence.) All we have are observations and correlations. If you can live with that, I can too.

jcm: "Yet we have social sciences and evidence-based medicine, which depend on subjective reporting for data. (The recent trend in positive psychology and "happiness studies" comes to mind, but also Julia's most recent post here gives an example of an acupuncture study, which depends on subjects' reports of pain relief.)"

Yeah, but the very fact that we divide the sciences between the natural or physical sciences and the social sciences presupposes some kind of dualism. The basic implication seems to be that the hard sciences are real science; the soft sciences are not.

jcm: "With respect to the study of consciousness, it seems to me that specialists (e.g. cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists) can do no better than to draw inferences from the correlations of first- and third-person data, and (with another nod to Julia's latest post) try to tease out the essentials from the incidentals."

Agreed. That's the best they can do. But the bottom line is that even neuroscientists disagree amnong themselves on the ontological nature of consciousness.

jcm: "Subscribe" might be too strong a word. Let's just say that, while deep down I'm agnostic on the subject, what I've read so far of Searle's (e.g. the essay I linked to above) seems plausible to me."

Okay. Well, Searle says that consciousness is causally reducible to neurobiology but it is not ontologically reducible to neurobiology. Despite his objections, biological naturalism really does appear to be epiphenomenalism under a different guise.

Paisley: "There is no scientific evidence that consciousness even exists."

jcm: "Yet we have social sciences and evidence-based medicine, which depend on subjective reporting for data. (The recent trend in positive psychology and 'happiness studies' comes to mind, but also Julia's most recent post here gives an example of an acupuncture study, which depends on subjects' reports of pain relief.)"

Paisley: "Yeah, but the very fact that we divide the sciences between the natural or physical sciences and the social sciences presupposes some kind of dualism. The basic implication seems to be that the hard sciences are real science; the soft sciences are not."

There is nothing unscientific about using subjective reports. It's just that the resulting inferences as limited to what people report. I don't see that the division between the natural or physical sciences and the social sciences presupposes any kind of dualism. For example, a social scientist could certainly take a physicalist perspective. Though my background in this is limited, the logical positivists and B.F. Skinner come to mind.

Incidentally, the term "hard" science always strikes me as ironic, since another meaning of the word "hard" is "difficult". Surely, the so-called "soft" sciences are every bit as difficult.

Paisley: "what exactly can an "information processing system with consciousness" do that an "information processing system without consciousness" cannot?"

I don't know exactly what an information processing system with consciousness can do that an information processing system without consciousness cannot. No one does, because we know almost nothing about what consciousness is. But can we infer from that lack of knowledge that consciousness must not be material? I don't think so.

What counts as objective scientific evidence? Are you claiming that scientists are somehow perceiving the world from a non-first-person perspective? What could that mean?

I'm not denying the existence of first-person experience, I'm denying the existence of "objective" experience, in the sense that all such experience ultimately reduces to the subjective experiences of many individuals. There's only one kind of experience, and it's first-person. Or -- if there is a second kind of experience, that would entail some form of dualism, it seems to me. Because if you're not experiencing the physical world, what are you experiencing?

"Did you not employ the concept of "Boltzmann brains" to account for why the "constants of nature" (e.g. the cosmological constant) appear to be fine-tuned for the emergence of consciousness?"

No I didn't. I said that bolzmann brains show that many different possible "tunings" of the constants of nature could generate flashes of consciousness, and therefore the bare existence of consciousness places few constraints on the values of those constants. I could be wrong, but that's what I understand the canonical bolzmann brain argument to be.

"But according to the Boltzmann brain scenario (at least as I understand it), the current universe can theoretically play itself out again from the big bang to the present (just like re-running a computer program with the same input data will produce the same output data)."

This doesn't seem to me to be related to bolzmann brains in any particular way. I think the bolzmann brain argument works whether or not there are many universes or just one.

"To argue that "I" will not exist again seems to me to be an argument against materialism."

Paisley on Searle: Despite his objections, biological naturalism really does appear to be epiphenomenalism under a different guise.

I disagree, since he argues that consciousness is causally effective - it's just so at a higher level than neurons and synapses.

Of course, if one insists that consciousness must operate independently of any "microstructural base" (particularly, a physical one) in order to qualify as causally effective, then it isn't. But I can think of no good reason to do so.

The religion of physicalism seems to be that everything is composed out of stuff, which I take it is held to be matter and/or energy. OK, if that's the case then I agree that there is a problem with consciousness, no matter if you side with Searle's anti-AI stance or Chalmers' more recent pro-AI noise.

But in the world of math, we are told to nail our definitions before proceeding. So if the quantum folks are talking about stuff being composed of information, and being paid decent salaries to do same, why aren't physicalists changing the definitions?

And if physicalists do have thoughts of allowing information into the Parthenon of stuff, then why all this talk of consciousness and dualism? Doesn't dualism get to take a break until stuff (once again) is figured out?

Chalmers tries to address some of this but waffles. I suspect because he is more interested in consciousness than information, but for a zombie-lover he turns out to be as human-centric as the next. He does not seem to have spent much time developing ideas of what a collective consciousness might be, describing functional equivalence to individual consciousness.

I think he spent more time on quantum consciousness, which I guess is OK if you buy into the notion of sub-atomic observers in our brains triaging countless 'facts' pitched their way by other observers. While this idea is too quantum-religious for my taste - 'tis cool nonetheless.

Nick Barrowman: "There is nothing unscientific about using subjective reports. It's just that the resulting inferences as limited to what people reports."

Yes, you are correct. Science does employ subjective reports (e.g. neuroscientists rely upon subjective reports to identify the neural correlates of consciousness.) However, my original point was that there is no scientific instrument to objectively measure the presence of consciousness. And although subjective data may be used in science, subjective data itself does not qualify as objective evidence for the existence of consciousness.

Nick Barrowman: "I don't see that the division between the natural or physical sciences and the social sciences presupposes any kind of dualism. For example, a social scientist could certainly take a physicalist perspective. Though my background in this is limited, the logical positivists and B.F. Skinner come to mind."

Agreed. There are definitely social scientists who subscribe to materialism. But why does academia break down the sciences into these two basic groups? It appears to me that designating one group as the "natural or physical" sciences implies that the other group is not (i.e. not natural or physical).

Also, B. F. Skinner (one of the chief exponents of behaviorism) holds that mental states have no causal role. (This is what I have argued previously in this thread. ..that consciousness has no causal role on the materialist worldview...it is merely an epiphenomenon or byproduct.)

Nick Barrowman: "Incidentally, the term "hard" science always strikes me as ironic, since another meaning of the word "hard" is "difficult". Surely, the so-called "soft" sciences are every bit as difficult."

But the designations "hard science and soft science" are apparently used to suggest that the social sciences (i.e. the soft sciences) are not really scientific.

DaveS, I take it that your problem with physicalism is that it's unclear just what definition of "physical" it is working with. Fair enough, although I interpret this more as a commitment to the sciences, for which defining the physical (or, if you prefer, the natural) is a work-in-progress. This may seem unusual for a metaphysical doctrine (which, traditionally, is often hidebound to a putatively eternal, usually otherworldly, religious creed). I suppose it is unusual, but (speaking as someone who is normally skeptical of metaphysics) I actually see that as a good thing.

jcm - agreed but would add that any system of thought which tries to transcend time, as the more abstruse constructs in the Eastern metaphysical realm try to do, does so at its peril. But that's a knock on all systems of thought. They have the bad luck to have shelf lives, like anything else.

It's not that you can't devise a strategy for transcending time using geometrical devices or something that gives credence to the claim that this or that theory is eternal. I see the problem of shelf life as twofold:

(1) Conquer four dimensions, and you will need to grapple with a fifth and sixth at some point, and newly discovered constraints that are imposed.

(2) Imagining humans are the only creatures out there shaping human destiny is a path with blinders on - blinders that can easily be taken off with the following subscription:

"Anything that I can conceive of is possible"

So extra-human entities could be shaping limits in dims 5 & 6 as well.

"And if physicalists do have thoughts of allowing information into the Parthenon of stuff, then why all this talk of consciousness and dualism? Doesn't dualism get to take a break until stuff (once again) is figured out?"

But I think the very notion of "allowing information in" forces a discussion of dualism, because as far as I can tell, it could only mean one of two things:

1. It could mean some variety of Platonic dualism, in which "information" is held to exist independently of any material representation of that information, in the same commonsense way that 3 is often held to exist independently of three apples, three cars, three Empire State Buildings, etc. In this case, "information" shares much with another word based on the same Latin root: "form" (cf. "Platonic form").

2. It could mean that the material world can be thought of as a collection of information about the relative states of quanta of matter, energy and their interactions. But this just seems to me to take something we already know exists -- matter -- and give it a new name, in a relatively uninformative way. In this view, "information" is really just another word for "causation." It might be more convenient to think about matter as information in this way, but it's essentially a notational convenience, rather than a brand new ontological framework.

So unless there's another alternative that I'm missing, any debate about whether, or how, to allow information into the pantheon of stuff is really a closeted debate about dualism.

DaveS: "Chalmers tries to address some of this but waffles. I suspect because he is more interested in consciousness than information, but for a zombie-lover he turns out to be as human-centric as the next. He does not seem to have spent much time developing ideas of what a collective consciousness might be, describing functional equivalence to individual consciousness.

Chalmers appears to subscribe to some form of "dual-aspect theory" or "neutral monism" based on "information," where information has both a physical aspect and a mental aspect. But he needs to flesh out his postion more fully.

Scott: "I don't know exactly what an information processing system with consciousness can do that an information processing system without consciousness cannot. No one does, because we know almost nothing about what consciousness is. But can we infer from that lack of knowledge that consciousness must not be material? I don't think so."

But the issue you are objecting to is my claim that consciousness is causally inert on the materialist worldview. That is why I am asking you exactly what causal role do you believe consciousness plays.

The reason why I have argued that consciousness is nonphysical is based on the experiential knowledge of our first-person perspective. We know that consciousness is subjective, not objective. And the only basis we have for identifying anything as physical is its objectivity. Physicalism holds that the only real things in the world are those things which are described by the language of physics. However, the language of physics does not describe consciousness. Moreover, there is no place in physics for consciousness to have any causal role...the only exception being certain interpretations of quantum mechanics (but these interpretations undermine materialism).

Scott: "What counts as objective scientific evidence?"

That which can be corroborated by the third-person perspective. My first-person perspective of my own subjectivity does not qualify as objective scientific evidence for the existence of consciousness. Why? Because my subjectivity cannot be verified by you or anyone else. Put simply, mental states are private, not public.

Scott: "I'm not denying the existence of first-person experience, I'm denying the existence of "objective" experience, in the sense that all such experience ultimately reduces to the subjective experiences of many individuals."

Does the term "objective experience" refer to some kind of "collective consciousness?"

Scott: "There's only one kind of experience, and it's first-person. Or -- if there is a second kind of experience, that would entail some form of dualism, it seems to me. Because if you're not experiencing the physical world, what are you experiencing?"

Dualism (as I basically understand the term) is the view that the mental (i.e the subjective) and the physical (i.e. the objective) are not ontologically reducible to each other.

Scott: "This doesn't seem to me to be related to bolzmann brains in any particular way. I think the bolzmann brain argument works whether or not there are many universes or just one."

This is related to statistical thermodynamics as formulated by Ludwig Boltzmann and how it applies to the postulate of the second law of thermodynamics (i.e. the universe is moving from a state of low entropy to a state of high entropy). The main question that statistical thermodynamics answers is: Why isn't the universe presently in a state of maximum entropy (this would appear to the natural state)? The answer is that the present state of the universe is the result of a stochastic or random fluctuation from the maximum entropy state (or near-equilibrium state). The bottom line is that this same fluctuation (however improbable) will play itself out again and again ad infinitum because it will have an infinite number of opportunities to do so. IOW, the next instantiation will be no different than the present one. This necessarily includes the spatial and temporal aspects because they are part of the same continuum of mass/energy. So, if everything will materially play itself again and again ad infinitum, then I will relive my life again and again ad infinitum. This is definitely a form of immortality...a form that doesn't particularly appeal to me. In fact, it sounds like a materialistic hell (a.k.a. Nietzsche's Eternal Return).

Incidentally, if the oscillating universe holds true (i.e. the big crunch holds sway over heat death), then the same thing applies.

'Pantheon' is better than 'Parthenon' so thanks for that. But, in deference to Greece's wish to stick around for a bit more time, will stick with Athena's Temple.

any debate about whether, or how, to allow information into the pantheon of stuff is really a closeted debate about dualismWhile your approach of looking at info and twisting (?) it back into an argument about dualism is thought-provoking, it sounds tortured as well. I guess I see stuff having 3 levels

Matter: What we ordinarily call stuff

Energy: Stuff that seems to be in perpetual motion

Information: Stuff sent from a sender to a receiver.

The distinctions are not trivial and highly informative. Because when all matter and energy is viewed as information, you need to quit using words like 'objective' and 'existence'. Yeah there's a brand new ontological framework, if you are forced to say something exists .....only insofar something else is concerned. Everything has context (including theories), and is subject to state and local taxes, etc...

You talk about causal. I'm not as confident talking about how A causes B to do anything when B clearly has choices. It's not just flow of time that isn't clear-cut it's this - when A sends info to B, B receives it and acts on it in terms of the 'strength' of the info vis a vis what B already has in its pocket.

In other words you drop your cell phone, the reason it falls to the ground is the relative power of the info that planet earth is exuding, tending to blot out other choices the cell phone has based on the influences it receives.

I think the concept of strength is equally problematic as the concept of time, meaning A's gravity forcing B to drop cannot always be true, and this is not due to things like wind gusts, but also due to failures on the part of earth, or sudden gains on the part of the cell phone. There is just so much more required connectivity in ordinary assumptions that it seems that strength needs to be factored into any informational equation, using a metric that allows a baseball score to be converted into a hockey score with ease.

While Chalmers says he is nowhere on consciousness, I disagree. He has defined very well what it isn't. Not quite sure but I think he is OK with anything being conscious. He is much more receptive to information than I initially thought from the skimmings I have done, but I will now shoot myself in the foot and opine that there is some personal shit going on that doesn't allow him to continue in Hofstadter's path, call everything information, and look at everything we do and believe in this recast light.

If I'm wrong about the influence of Hofstadter (Chalmers was his student at IU) then another reason Chalmers may not be so quick to hop on the info bandwagon is that it may just seem like a fashionable thing to do in light of the research dollars courtesy mostly Blackberry going into the study of quantum computing, quantum information, and so forth. Based on what I've seen on the internet, Chalmers needs to be the fashion designer not the shopper.

But best I can tell right now the worst he has said about information is that is too speculative.

Paisley: It appears to me that Searle is attempting to salvage free will (defined here as "causa sui") in a strictly naturalistic (i.e. materialistic) world. It can't be done.

If Searle wrestles with the topic of free will, he does not (as far as I can tell) do so explicitly in his essays on biological naturalism (e.g. the one I linked to earlier, or this one). However, according to his Wikipedia entry:

"Searle thinks whether we really have free will or not is an open question, but considers its absence highly unappealing because it makes the feeling of freedom of will an epiphenomenon, which is highly unlikely from the evolutionary point of view given its biological cost. He also says that all rational activity presupposes free will."

Assuming this is an accurate description of his position, whether or not he succeeds in defending it is a side matter. The only reason that I introduced Searle into this conversation is because, as I understand him, he believes that, contra ephiphenomalism, consciousness is causally active. For example, he says "The essence of consciousness, that it is subjective qualitative, first personal and intrinsically intentional does not prevent it from being an ordinary part of the physical world with spatial locations and extensions and cause and effect relations, just like anything else." [emphasis mine]

Of course, Searle could be wrong about that. But I doubt that he would agree with you that his thesis is "epiphenomenalism under a different guise" - at least not with respect to the causal efficacy of consciousness (which is where I came in).

I've always felt that free will be bogus if you think of us as machines, and we think of machines as machines, but there has got to be a host of arguments using machines that blow away the idea that machines only do what you tell them to do, therefore anyone holding machines gods and humans as living things at different levels has no room at the table for free will.

At least that's where I was, but consider ye this.

(1) A machine says "I have free will" and spits out random results. As long as you can't figure out the algorithm, it might as well have free will, who's to say no?

(2) Ever program a computer, and 80% of the 1st week of that program's life it was was pretty much giving you whatever results it wanted to? I know it was a bug, and that's human error, but the point is you didn't know what you were telling it to do. Something else was at the controls in that period, call it a getting to know each other period, or gestation of human mastery over machine, but you could build a case that the machine was having none of you misguided commands and was spitting out what it chose. This one's a tough sell I know, because your forensic analysis on the programs and results and the machine results are predicatable.

But the major point is that people are intimately involved with what machines do. So free will can be allocated to any entity you like if you subscribe to it in people.

But be real clear about your definition of people. How bound are they to their electronic devices and gods as regards this question - weakly? tightly? not at all?

I happened to have been reading an essay on emergence, as it bears on religion, and this quote struck me as also pertinent to this conversation:

================Reductionist understandings of how minds work are fascinating, butthey are also irrelevant to what it’s like to be minded. While we don’t know what it’slike to be a bat, we know what it’s like to be a human, and it entails a whole virtualrealm that doesn’t feel material at all. The beauty of the emergentist approach tomind is that it suggests that to experience our experience without awareness of itsunderlying mechanism is exactly what we should expect from an emergent property.The outcome has been given reverent names, like spirit or soul, names that conjureup the perceived absence of materiality. But we need not interpret this as evidence ofsome parallel transcendental immaterial world. We can now say that the experienceof soul or spirit as immaterial is simply a reflection of the way the process ofemergence progressively distances each new level from the details below.================

I'm aware of philosophical objections to this view (including how it relates to the free will problem), and (despite some hunches) I don't know whether or not it's true (particularly in its strong form). But I find it appealing enough.

Paisley: "But the issue you are objecting to is my claim that consciousness is causally inert on the materialist worldview. That is why I am asking you exactly what causal role do you believe consciousness plays."

And I again have to reply that I do not know, because I don't know what consciousness is, nor do I believe that anyone does -- yet. I am simply arguing that if consciousness is causally inert, that's dualism in my book. Acausal entities that really do exist cannot be physical in any meaningful sense.

I was writing a point-by-point response to you but I realized that we are really starting to talk in circles. You keep restating your argument, and I keep restating mine; so why don't we try something different: I'll restate your argument, and you restate mine. Then we'll see where the confusion is coming from.

My understanding of your argument is as follows: There are two kinds of evidence: objective and subjective. We have subjective evidence that we are conscious, and we have objective evidence about the laws of physics. These two kinds of evidence are irreducible, and therefore consciousness cannot be described in (i.e. reduced to) purely physical terms.

Is that right? I think this is a logically-sound argument given the initial two premises.

"While your approach of looking at info and twisting (?) it back into an argument about dualism is thought-provoking, it sounds tortured as well."

Fair enough, although to me it feels quite intuitive.

"The distinctions [between Matter, Energy and Information] are not trivial and highly informative."

Certainly not! But nonetheless, matter, energy and information are all completely interchangeable; the distinction isn't an ontological one -- unless of course you've adopted a dualistic view of information. That's my point.

"Yeah there's a brand new ontological framework, if you are forced to say something exists .....only insofar something else is concerned."

I don't see the connection between this idea and information. Isn't this attitude perfectly compatible with a traditional physicalist ontology? (Note that I'm adopting "physicalist" since that seems to be the preferred nomenclature here, but I don't mean anything different by it than I did by "materialist.")

"You talk about causal. I'm not as confident talking about how A causes B to do anything when B clearly has choices."

But aren't those choices themselves caused? In other words, isn't B caused to have those choices? And what governs B's "decision" if not cause? Turning to a more intuitive example, I'm perfectly content with the notion that people are caused to have choices, and indeed would not be dismayed to find that people's decisions are themselves governed exclusively by deterministic cause and effect -- though I remain agnostic on the latter.

I see what you mean in the sense that there's a basic philosophical problem with the notion of causality; but I don't see how that problem can be brought to bear on matters of ontology, except in a very vague "nothing is certain" kind of way.

Also, I don't really follow what you're saying about "strength."

I'm interested that you bring up Hofstadter, because my feelings about his approach to these questions is that he's desperately trying to have and eat his ontological cake simultaneously. This is connected to my conversation with Paisley about "immortality" -- fundamentally, I feel that any principle of identity based exclusively on formal analogy is a form of closeted Platonism.

I should emphasize that I'm fine with that -- despite my extended defense of physicalism here, I'm not really for it and against Platonism. I just think that there are certain things one has to give up if one wants to embrace physicalism; and if one does so, then physicalism is both self-consistent and consistent with the (entirely physical) existence of qualia and first-person consciousness.

Scott: "My understanding of your argument is as follows: There are two kinds of evidence: objective and subjective. We have subjective evidence that we are conscious, and we have objective evidence about the laws of physics. These two kinds of evidence are irreducible, and therefore consciousness cannot be described in (i.e. reduced to) purely physical terms.

Is that right? I think this is a logically-sound argument given the initial two premises."

Yes, that is right. I would also hasten to add that we have evidence that consciousness is causally efficacious based on our first-person experience of free will.

Scott: "And I again have to reply that I do not know, because I don't know what consciousness is, nor do I believe that anyone does -- yet. I am simply arguing that if consciousness is causally inert, that's dualism in my book. Acausal entities that really do exist cannot be physical in any meaningful sense."

But this is basically the materialistic position, not the dualistic position. Materialists are ones who hold that consciousness is causally inert by characterizing it as being simply an epiphenomenon (i.e. a causally inert byproduct) of an underlying configuration of electrochemical processes mechanically playing themselves out.

jcm: "Assuming this is an accurate description of his position, whether or not he succeeds in defending it is a side matter."

But it is not a side matter (Searle himself said "all rational activity presupposes free will"). If free will is purely illusory (as materialists would have us believe), then consciousness is causally inert. That is why Searle appears to me to be making some kind of attempt to reconcile free will with the deterministic framework of the naturalistic world.

jcm: "The only reason that I introduced Searle into this conversation is because, as I understand him, he believes that, contra ephiphenomalism, consciousness is causally active. For example, he says "The essence of consciousness, that it is subjective qualitative, first personal and intrinsically intentional does not prevent it from being an ordinary part of the physical world with spatial locations and extensions and cause and effect relations, just like anything else." [emphasis mine]

Of course, Searle could be wrong about that. But I doubt that he would agree with you that his thesis is "epiphenomenalism under a different guise" - at least not with respect to the causal efficacy of consciousness (which is where I came in)."

I agree that Searle would object to my characterization of his biological naturalism as being nothing more than "epiphenomenalism under a different guise." However, despite his objections, that is exactly what it is. He first describes consciousness as causally reducible to neurobiology (which implies that volitions and intentions are purely illusory). Next, he describes consciousness as not being ontologically reducible to neurobiology (which implies that consciousness is nonphysical). That description qualifies as epiphenomenalism.

jcm: "I'm aware of philosophical objections to this view (including how it relates to the free will problem), and (despite some hunches) I don't know whether or not it's true (particularly in its strong form). But I find it appealing enough."

Strong emergence is typically defined by the saying "the whole is greater than the some of its parts." This form of emergence smacks of something magical.

At what point in evolutionary history does consciousness emerge according to Ursula Goodenough? Apparently, somewhere between the first self-replicating molecular systems in the so-called primordial soup and the first single-cell organism. With that answer in mind, one has to wonder why she is making all this hoopla about emergence. It would seem to me to be far more convincing (and far more in tune with our religious inclinations) to simply postulate that consciousness is fundamental.

Ok, good. Then I assert that your argument is circular. One of your initial premises is that we have two kinds of evidence that do not reduce to one another. I understand you, therefore, to be constructing an argument for dualism on the basis of an initial premise that is already dualistic.

As an alternative, I offer the premise that there is only one kind of evidence: evidence gathered by embodied consciousnesses with sensory organs and tools they construct and interpret for that purpose. The difference between our first-person experience of (say) red and our experience of red through an instrument is equivalent to the difference between hearing a vibration and feeling it -- a mere difference of instrumentation.

"Materialists are ones who hold that consciousness is causally inert by characterizing it as being simply an epiphenomenon (i.e. a causally inert byproduct) of an underlying configuration of electrochemical processes mechanically playing themselves out."

Again, this is becoming remarkably circular. We're back to my first post: surely you aren't claiming that all materialists are epiphenomenalists. Are you?

There is a lot to digest in what you raised. To expand on why a new ont. framework is required, it is because the existing (sic) one is built on things that are going the way of all flesh

- the concept of existence (as in objective) and not relative to anything else

- the concept of forward motion of time being the only game in town

Want to check out Searle some more, because in the past I've been quite critical of his work (not out loud mind you). So don't want to screw up a response based on skimming

The strength thing only makes sense if you subscribe to a theory of information so I'll let it go at information sent from A, B, C, and D hits E. What does E do? I think you need a concept called 'strength' to determine (e.g.) which way E reacts.

Scott: "Ok, good. Then I assert that your argument is circular. One of your initial premises is that we have two kinds of evidence that do not reduce to one another. I understand you, therefore, to be constructing an argument for dualism on the basis of an initial premise that is already dualistic."

My argument is not circular.

1) We have two kinds of evidences - namely, objective and subjective.

2. a.) What we call the physical is based on objective evidence.

2. b.) What we call the mental is based on subjective evidence.

3) Therefore, there is no objective evidence that the mental is physical.

Previously, you stated that "I think this is a logically-sound argument given the initial two premises." Are you suggesting that the first two premises (one and two) are not valid? If so, why?

Scott: "As an alternative, I offer the premise that there is only one kind of evidence: evidence gathered by embodied consciousnesses with sensory organs and tools they construct and interpret for that purpose. The difference between our first-person experience of (say) red and our experience of red through an instrument is equivalent to the difference between hearing a vibration and feeling it -- a mere difference of instrumentation."

Data generated by scientific instruments are publicly available. That is, they are objective and therefore amenable to corroboration by the third-person perspective. Subjective experiences clearly are not.

Scott: "Again, this is becoming remarkably circular. We're back to my first post: surely you aren't claiming that all materialists are epiphenomenalists. Are you?"

I have repeatedly asked you what causal role (with the exception of free will) does consciousness play in the world. You explicitly stated that you do not know. Therefore, I think it is safe to conclude that you have no idea why consciousness was naturally selected.

A gala event with Rod Laver and Mr. Connors? A new ball, or one with the felt stripped off? A golf ball that is used for in place of a tennis ball by mischievous 6 year-olds? The sport itself - wrapped into a virtual ball because it is found to be as drug-friendly as the next sport?

Just not clear on what you mean by tennis ball.

Some philosophers use language to clarify and work things out, and others think that language gets in the way of understanding.

Paisley: "Previously, you stated that 'I think this is a logically-sound argument given the initial two premises.' Are you suggesting that the first two premises (one and two) are not valid? If so, why?"

No. I am suggesting that any self-consistent version of physicalist monism would hold premise 1 to be false because it is inherently dualistic. Your line of argument "proves" dualism by assuming it in different terms.

"Data generated by scientific instruments are publicly available."

And there may exist, at some point in the future, scientific instruments that make data about peoples' consciousness publicly available.

"That is, they are objective and therefore amenable to corroboration by the third-person perspective."

What on earth is the third-person perspective if not the first-person perspective of someone else?

And if by "third-person perspective" you mean the first-person perspective of someone else, why is their perspective any more objective than mine?

And even if by "third-person perspective" you mean the first-person perspectives of many people, how can that be ontologically distinct from the first-person perspectives that compose it?

"Subjective experiences clearly are not."

There is something about subjective experience that is definitely not publicly available -- I'll grant you that. But that something is not consciousness itself, but the quale of consciousness. That is, at least from a materialist perspective, everything about someone else's consciousness can be known through instruments except its quale. But I think the argument for dualism from qualia also fails, for reasons I'll explain if you like.

"I have repeatedly asked you what causal role (with the exception of free will) does consciousness play in the world. You explicitly stated that you do not know. Therefore, I think it is safe to conclude that you have no idea why consciousness was naturally selected."

Hahaha, yes, that's so. So you're saying that my ignorance proves that consciousness cannot be physical. Is that right?

DavidS: "A gala event with Rod Laver and Mr. Connors? A new ball, or one with the felt stripped off? A golf ball that is used for in place of a tennis ball by mischievous 6 year-olds? The sport itself - wrapped into a virtual ball because it is found to be as drug-friendly as the next sport?

Just not clear on what you mean by tennis ball."

I can see that you are very confused.

DavidS: "Some philosophers use language to clarify and work things out, and others think that language gets in the way of understanding.

Who's right? Both are."

Regulation tennis balls as defined by the "International Tennis Federation" have very strict physical criteria.

Paisley to me: At what point in evolutionary history does consciousness emerge according to Ursula Goodenough? Apparently, somewhere between the first self-replicating molecular systems in the so-called primordial soup and the first single-cell organism.

Gosh, I sure doubt it. But then I tend to think that "consciousness" loses meaning the further we get away from our own species.

IOW, the more I think about it, the more that the term "consciousness" strikes me as a surrogate for "what it feels like to be human" (at least for most humans). Theoretically, it might be that another species (biological or artificial) approximates that feeling. But (at least judging from outward appearances) I have yet to encounter such a specimen.

Scott to Paisley: So you're saying that my ignorance proves that consciousness cannot be physical. Is that right?

I must admit, whether you intend it or not, Paisley, that's what I get from your arguments, as well. (Although I have a hunch that Scott is being humble. All of us are ignorant to some degree. That doesn't necessarily mean that we don't already possess enough information on which to base an educated guess, by current standards.)

I also get a moral judgment - as if you believe that it's really "pernicious" (as in "dangerous" in some way) to assume that physicalism is true. Am I correct in that impression? or am I being overly sensitive?

Scott: "No. I am suggesting that any self-consistent version of physicalist monism would hold premise 1 to be false because it is inherently dualistic."

Agreed. The only way for materialism to maintain self-consistency is to deny the reality of subjectivity. This is exactly the tack that eliminative materialism takes.

If acknowledging the reality of my own subjectivity is inherently dualistic, then I plea guilty as charged.

Scott: "And there may exist, at some point in the future, scientific instruments that make data about peoples' consciousness publicly available."

The point is that right now there is none. There is absolutely no objective evidence that consciousness is physical...none, zilch, nada.

Scott: "What on earth is the third-person perspective if not the first-person perspective of someone else?"

This is not difficult. The third-person perspective is objective. The first-person perspective is subjective. Objective data is public. Subjective data is private. The physical (i.e. what is objective) is available for public viewing. The mental (i.e. what is subjective) is not.

Scott: "There is something about subjective experience that is definitely not publicly available -- I'll grant you that. But that something is not consciousness itself, but the quale of consciousness. That is, at least from a materialist perspective, everything about someone else's consciousness can be known through instruments except its quale. But I think the argument for dualism from qualia also fails, for reasons I'll explain if you like."

Qualia are subjective experiences. Just in case there is any confusion. I am employing the term consciousness to mean specifically "awareness."

Scott: "Hahaha, yes, that's so. So you're saying that my ignorance proves that consciousness cannot be physical. Is that right?"

I am saying that the burden of proof is on individuals like yourself who assert the subjective is objective.

Your review of the development of ideas associated with AP covers the ground very nicely, Massimo. Strange and unwarranted extravagances of the kind put forward by Smolin are not uncommon among theoretical physicists, though.Wheeler and Penrose are other examples. If properly regarded as "science fiction" writers who happen to use the very simple language of mathematics to produce their works it should come as no great surprise that their grasp on (empirical) reality tends to be weak.With regard to the issue of the apparent "fine tuning" which lies at the heart of the AP debate, however, I believe that the observations regarding the "Wow" numbers should not be lightly dismissed.

In chapter 11 of my book "Unusual Perspectives", extends the usual analysis "downstream" to provide, within the context of the unique properties and timely abundances of the chemical elements, very compelling evidence of further "fine tuning" that not only allows, but essentially makes inevitable, the observed exponential development of technology for which our particular species has been the vehicle.Several ways to account for the indisputable "fine tuning" have been proposed.1. Superstitionists have seized upon the evidence to support the idea of a deity or "higher intelligence". Adding any such homunculus, of course, makes for a very extravagant hypothesis.2. The existence of a multiplicity of universes each with a different set of physical properties. So one of them had to get lucky, right? This is favoured by many of those theoretical physicists who choose not to just stick their heads in the sand to avoid the implications of interpretation 1. Also very extravagant.3. The "anthropic cosmological principle", the non-superstitious version of which seems to boil down to "we're here, because we're here...This self-selection interpretation roughly corresponds to the Douglas Adams "puddle parable". Essentially tautologous.4. The Everett "many worlds" model, inspired by the "Schrodinger's cat" kind of dilemma that arises from quantum mechanics. This can be viewed as continual bifurcations of our universe producing a multiplicity of "parallel universes"A far more economical model, derived from consideration of the gross evolutionary patterns that we observe in biology and, more recently, technology, is presented in "Unusual Perspectives" which is available for free download from the eponymous website.

Paisley: "I am saying that the burden of proof is on individuals like yourself who assert the subjective is objective."

Ah, so we're arguing about burden of proof. Fair enough. But you're misstating my argument again. I can't tell whether you're doing so on purpose or not, because I've repeated it so many times. But I suppose it's possible that you still don't understand what I'm saying, so I will repeat myself yet again.

You believe that the burden of proof lies on me because you believe that I am asserting that your subjective experience is non-existent or otherwise illusory. But you are mistaken in both beliefs.

I am not denying the reality of subjectivity -- yours or anyone else's. I am denying that there is any such thing as "objectivity" independent of the individual subjectivities that compose it.

I believe that the burden of proof lies on those who claim that the "objective" is ontologically irreducible to the subjective. You have not yet taken up that burden.

jcm: "Gosh, I sure doubt it. But then I tend to think that "consciousness" loses meaning the further we get away from our own species."

The point is that Ursula Goodenough (the author of the article you presented on "emergence") ascribed some form of rudimentary consciousness to autocells (the hypothetical precursors to the first one-celled organisms from which all other life forms evolved).

jcm: "IOW, the more I think about it, the more that the term "consciousness" strikes me as a surrogate for "what it feels like to be human" (at least for most humans)."

Are you seriously implying that all other animals (with the exception of human beings) lack inner experiences (i.e. consciousness)?

jcm: "I must admit, whether you intend it or not, Paisley, that's what I get from your arguments, as well. (Although I have a hunch that Scott is being humble. All of us are ignorant to some degree. That doesn't necessarily mean that we don't already possess enough information on which to base an educated guess, by current standards.)

Whether or not Scott's admission to ignorance is based on humility is irrelevant. The point is that his ignorance on the subject matter does not qualify as objective evidence that consciousness is physical.

jcm: "I also get a moral judgment - as if you believe that it's really "pernicious" (as in "dangerous" in some way) to assume that physicalism is true. Am I correct in that impression? or am I being overly sensitive?

I previously stated that eliminative materialism is a particularly pernicious form of materialism. Perhaps, the term irrational would have been a better word choice.

Also, on the materialist worldview, all human beings reduce to electrochemical processes mechanically playing themselves out. Therefore, moral and ethical behavioral (or the lack thereof) must ultimately be characterized as purely illusory by virtue of the fact that electrochemical processes (which are determining all of our behavior) are completely amoral. IOW, your attempt to make me feel guilty only serves to undermine the deterministic worldview of materialism. Why should I feel guilty if everything I have ever done could not have been otherwise?

Paisley: I didn't pick up on Goodenough's attribution of "rudimentary consciousness to autocells". (BTW, the essay was co-authored with anthropologist Terrence Deacon, author of "The Symbolic Species.") Suffice it to say that, whatever inner experiences single-celled organisms have (if any), I tend to doubt that they have much in common with mine.

Which brings me to this:

me: "IOW, the more I think about it, the more that the term "consciousness" strikes me as a surrogate for "what it feels like to be human" (at least for most humans)."

you: Are you seriously implying that all other animals (with the exception of human beings) lack inner experiences (i.e. consciousness)?

Back up one sentence in my previous post ('But then I tend to think that "consciousness" loses meaning the further we get away from our own species.') and you might answer your own question. IOW, how does one leap from "the further away from our own species" to "all other animals...lack inner experiences"? In any case, just to clear this up...

If I'm not mistaken, there is plenty of outward evidence of consciousness in other animals. It's not human consciousness, of course (which is so bound up with our linguistic and cultural idiosyncrasies), but, especially among our closer relatives, it's apparently there, nonetheless.

jcm: "I didn't pick up on Goodenough's attribution of "rudimentary consciousness to autocells". (BTW, the essay was co-authored with anthropologist Terrence Deacon, author of "The Symbolic Species.") Suffice it to say that, whatever inner experiences single-celled organisms have (if any), I tend to doubt that they have much in common with mine."

Goodenough was referencing Deacon's work on autocells (the precursors to single-cell organisms) which he described as having the emergent property of teleodynamics (i.e., purposive or intentional behavior). If you believe you have the capacity for purposive or intentional behavior, then you share something with autocells.

What do you mean by "objective" here? Made of objects that really do exist? Or knowable in a way that is irreducible to or otherwise transcends subjective ways of knowing? In the first case, I agree. In the second case, I disagree.

And how can a physical world exist independently of observers if those observers are part of that physical world? I don't see how the above could describe a coherent version of physicalism, at least as applied to our universe.

Paisley said: If you believe you have the capacity for purposive or intentional behavior, then you share something with autocells.

For that matter, I acknowledged earlier that "the amoeba and the human have one thing in common: a behavioral tendency to react to stimuli."

That said, when I say that "'consciousness' loses meaning the further we get away from our own species", I do not mean to suggest that there's no continuity between us and our phylogenetic relatives (which would suggest to me an anti-evolutionary stance). But, if we're talking about very distant relatives, then I think there are empirical reasons to doubt that we "have much [emphasis added] in common" - no less so with respect to mindedness, or "inner experience", as with any other trait.

But I should add that I'm even less of biologist than I am a philosopher. (I'm really just a working stiff with a casual interest in these topics.)

Scott to Paisley: What do you mean by "objective" here? Made of objects that really do exist? Or knowable in a way that is irreducible to or otherwise transcends subjective ways of knowing? In the first case, I agree. In the second case, I disagree.

Perhaps the confusion here is that you, Scott, are talking epistemology (i.e. what we know or can know), whereas Paisley is talking ontology (a branch of metaphysics, concerning what does and does not really exist).

If so, then I would agree that what we commonly call "objective" experience is really more like "inter-subjective" experience, as in "capable of being shared with and validated by other subjects, regardless of their prior beliefs." That is in a different category (viz. an epistemological one) than the (ontological) claim of a reality that depends on subjects (or observers) like ourselves (or perhaps a divine Subject) in order for it to exist.

So what if one doubts the existence of a divine Subject? and what if one also seriously considers the implications of scientific discovery, which now paints the picture of a universe in which subjects like ourselves are both rare and recent? What does that worldview say about the ontological status of subjective experience?

I suppose it doesn't say much, ontologically speaking, unless one also accepts (as I do) that subjects emerge from objects, life from non-life, and consciousness from non-consciousness. In that case, subjective experience is no more real than its absence, and it may not accurately represent what else exists or happens in the world. (Indeed, sometimes that inaccuracy is intentional, like when we indulge in fantasy.) But, as a special property of certain real entities, is it any less real than any other property of real entities?

jcm: "Perhaps the confusion here is that you, Scott, are talking epistemology (i.e. what we know or can know), whereas Paisley is talking ontology (a branch of metaphysics, concerning what does and does not really exist)."

Thanks for this. You're definitely right to raise that distinction, which is what I had in mind when I said "ways of knowing." But I think it's a bit more complex than you suggest here, because Paisley's original argument, as I understand it, is an argument that conflates the two. That is, it takes an epistemological distinction between subjective and objective and uses it to argue for an ontological bifurcation. Perhaps that's the real problem in the first place, and I've been arguing the long way around -- I'm not sure.

I'll have to give your last long paragraph some thought. I certainly don't mean to suggest that the ontological reality of the physical world is contingent on subjective observers. But this conversation has led me to greater clarity about the overall view that I am defending (though not necessarily adopting). It goes something like this: Objective knowledge reduces to subjective knowledge, and subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things.

Scott: That is, it takes an epistemological distinction between subjective and objective and uses it to argue for an ontological bifurcation.

To be fair, I may have done something likewise when I introduced Searle's distinction between "first-" and "third-person ontology." In any case, I think you're right to question such bifurcations.

I certainly don't mean to suggest that the ontological reality of the physical world is contingent on subjective observers.

I didn't think so. I just wanted to bring that out, since Paisley seemed to characterize one of your statements that way.

Objective knowledge reduces to subjective knowledge, and subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things...Does that jibe with what you're saying?

I would agree that it's problematic to speak of "knowledge" of any kind as something external to subjects (i.e. even if it's stored in books or electronic devices, it still must be interpreted by a subject - preferably more than one - before I would call it "knowledge"). I would also agree that it's problematic to speak of subjects as being non-physical (if that means "outside of the causal nexus", whatever we choose to call the substance or medium of that nexus - matter, energy, information, or something else).

That said, let's remove the instances of "subjective" and "physical" from your proposition immediately above, since I have no quarrel with those, and just analyze the following: "knowledge reduces to local representations of other things." In this form, I think the proposition begs the question of whether or not "knowledge" necessarily represents "other things", or whether or not the term is broad enough to include "affects", in the psychological sense of feelings or emotions. After all, this how we normally use the term "subjective", to describe information about internal states or events, and I certainly wouldn't want us to leave those out of the picture.

jcm: "In this form, I think the proposition begs the question of whether or not "knowledge" necessarily represents "other things", or whether or not the term is broad enough to include "affects", in the psychological sense of feelings or emotions."

Yes, good question. A similar question was running through my head as I was typing that up, which I left out to keep things simple. (A venial sin, I hope.) Specifically, I was thinking to myself that surely "consciousness" must include some forms of "self-consciousness," which I think is related to your point about affect, right?

This also makes me think of Hofstadter and "strange loops" -- and to be honest, that is where I feel that physicalism is on shakier ground, because there's something rather "spooky" about self-reflexive constructions of that kind. Granting myself license to speculate a bit, this is why I have some sympathy for Platonism. I think that Goedelian arguments for mathematical Platonism, though they don't quite constitute proof, can be quite persuasive.

Scott: "What do you mean by "objective" here? Made of objects that really do exist? Or knowable in a way that is irreducible to or otherwise transcends subjective ways of knowing? In the first case, I agree. In the second case, I disagree."

What I mean is that the physical world exists whether or not there are any observers to observe it.

jcm: "For that matter, I acknowledged earlier that "the amoeba and the human have one thing in common: a behavioral tendency to react to stimuli."

Yes, you did. And more to the point, you defined behavioral responses to stimuli as the causal role of consciousness.

jcm: "That said, when I say that "'consciousness' loses meaning the further we get away from our own species", I do not mean to suggest that there's no continuity between us and our phylogenetic relatives (which would suggest to me an anti-evolutionary stance)."

Agreed. It would be an anti-evolutionary stance. However, the implication of upholding the evolutionary stance is clear: There is a continuity of consciousness that extends along the entire phylogenetic scale.

jcm: "But, if we're talking about very distant relatives, then I think there are empirical reasons to doubt that we "have much [emphasis added] in common" - no less so with respect to mindedness, or "inner experience", as with any other trait."

But you have already conceded the point that you share some form of conscious intelligence with all life forms (as well as with pre-life forms such as autocells). The bottom line is that you are flirting dangerously close with pansychism (the view that the fundamental constituents of nature have some form of rudimentary consciousness).

Panpsychism does not go far enough. All objects in the universe must have some level of consciousness.

I say this because if its any other way, you will have to defend some artificially imposed and obviously human-centric blurry border between your favorite life-form or natural thing and some excluded entity operating at a lower level. It doesn't work, Paisley.

What I mean is that the physical world exists whether or not there are any observers to observe it.

How so, knowing what we know today? Here is what we know today:

- We don't know what 'physical' means, but we know our current accepted definition fails

- We don't know what 'exists' means, but Albert Einstein gave us an idea of relativity that can be applied just as easily to existence, making all existence subjective.

Paisley: But you have already conceded the point that you share some form of conscious intelligence with all life forms (as well as with pre-life forms such as autocells).

I'm sorry I gave you that impression, because I don't believe that stimulus-responsiveness is an even nearly sufficient qualifier for consciousness - at least not in any common sense of the word.

In other words, as far as shared behavioral traits go, I conceded a very a minimal one with respect to amoebas or single-celled organisms, and no more.

The bottom line is that you are flirting dangerously close with pansychism (the view that the fundamental constituents of nature have some form of rudimentary consciousness).

I would say that the implication of an emergent, evolutionary stance is that nature (which is firstly and still vastly lifeless) holds the potential for life, and that unconscious life holds the potential for conscious life. But that is a far more modest claim than the pansychist one, which suggests that all nature is fundamentally conscious en large and from the get-go.

DaveS: "Panpsychism does not go far enough. All objects in the universe must have some level of consciousness.

I say this because if its any other way, you will have to defend some artificially imposed and obviously human-centric blurry border between your favorite life-form or natural thing and some excluded entity operating at a lower level. It doesn't work, Paisley."

What lower entity (or entities) do you believe panpsychism excludes?

DaveS: "How so, knowing what we know today? Here is what we know today:

- We don't know what 'physical' means, but we know our current accepted definition fails"

I believe you are taking my quote out of context. Perhaps, I shall qualify it to clear up any misconceptions: "What I mean is that the physical world, ON THE MATERIALIST VIEW, exists whether or not there are any observers to observe it."

jcm: "I'm sorry I gave you that impression, because I don't believe that stimulus-responsiveness is an even nearly sufficient qualifier for consciousness - at least not in any common sense of the word.

I am employing the term consciousness to mean "awareness." (This is actually one of Wikipedia's definitions of the term.) So, the question I am asking you is: "Do you believe a stimulus-response system has some level of awareness?" (Note: I am not asking you if it has human consciousness.)

Previously, we had the following exchange:

Me: "If you believe you have the capacity for purposive or intentional behavior, then you share something with autocells."

You: "For that matter, I acknowledged earlier that "the amoeba and the human have one thing in common: a behavioral tendency to react to stimuli."

It now appears that you backpedaling. Just for clarity. Do you believe that autocells exhibit purposive and intentional behavior? (Exhibiting purposive or intentional behavior presupposes some level of "awareness.")

Hi Paisley: I messed up the link between the 1st and 2nd paragraph. Will restate my most recent Para2:

You want panpsychism because if its any other way, you will have to defend some artificially imposed.....

Re your restatement, OK - even if you restrict to the materialist view, it still fails because

- it can't be proven to exist

- its constituent particles have been proven to not exist independently of observers

What you think is the very real and physical world from trees and license plates to weather and news reports is at best an apparition that has purpose for you only when you interact with it in some manner.

jcm: "I would say that the implication of an emergent, evolutionary stance is that nature (which is firstly and still vastly lifeless) holds the potential for life, and that unconscious life holds the potential for conscious life. But that is a far more modest claim than the pansychist one, which suggests that all nature is fundamentally conscious en large and from the get-go."

Then you have to account for how insentient bits of matter in motion give rise to sentient bits of matter in motion without invoking magic. (The term "emergence" is simply a euphemism for magic.) Moreover, you have yet to povide any plausible explanation for why consciousness was naturally selected in light of the fact that the materialist worldview precludes consciousness from having any causal role. (The only causal role you ascribed to consciousness was "responsiveness" to environmental stimuli. However, you now seem to be recanting this statement.)

Scott: "But I think it's a bit more complex than you suggest here, because Paisley's original argument, as I understand it, is an argument that conflates the two. That is, it takes an epistemological distinction between subjective and objective and uses it to argue for an ontological bifurcation. Perhaps that's the real problem in the first place, and I've been arguing the long way around -- I'm not sure."

And you are still failing to grasp the distinction between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective. Mental phenomena are subjective because they are only available to the first-person perspective (IOW, they are private). Physical phenomena are objective because they are available to the third-person perspective (IOW, they are public).

Conventionally, we identify objective phenomena as the physical and subjective phenomena as the mental. Moreover, physicalism holds that the only real things in the world are those things described by physics. Unfortunately, physics describes only those things which are physical (hence the name "physics"). Therefore the burden of proof is upon the physicalist to demonstrate that the subjective is in fact objective by providing the nonphysicalist with one physical property of consciousness. If the physicalist cannot do that, then we can safely conclude that physicalism is a worldview that is ultimately based on faith.

Scott: "Objective knowledge reduces to subjective knowledge, and subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things."

You appear to be making some kind of category mistake here. Scientific knowledge is considered to be objective because the knowledge is not dependent upon the subjectivity of any one individual. IOW, experimental results are available to the public and can be verified by others.

Also, even if we assume (for the sake of argument) that "subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things," this still does not mean the subjective itself is physical. Do "physical representations of other physical things" (e.g. paintings, photos, video images, etc.) have subjective awareness?

DaveS: "Hi Paisley: I messed up the link between the 1st and 2nd paragraph. Will restate my most recent Para2:

You want panpsychism because if its any other way, you will have to defend some artificially imposed.....

Re your restatement, OK - even if you restrict to the materialist view, it still fails because

- it can't be proven to exist

- its constituent particles have been proven to not exist independently of observers

What you think is the very real and physical world from trees and license plates to weather and news reports is at best an apparition that has purpose for you only when you interact with it in some manner."

I think you may still be misunderstanding me. I am not necessarily defending panpsychism. I am simply questioning the materialist worldview. What I am arguing is that if you take the materialist worldview to its logical conclusion by asking when exactly did consciousness emerge in evolutionary history, then you are left basically with two options: eliminativism or panpsychism. And since eliminativism (the unintelligible view that consciousness itself is illusory) is clearly irrational, then the only viable alternative is panpsychism.

Just for clarity. Do you believe that autocells exhibit purposive and intentional behavior? (Exhibiting purposive or intentional behavior presupposes some level of "awareness.")

To be precise, you're asking my opinion about "hypothetical entities" that, according to Goodenough & Deacon, "can be said to be ‘end-directed’ (toward a specific configuration),to have features with ‘functions’ (e.g. to maintain the autocell architecture andpotential), and even to be about something (to the extent that their features exist‘with respect to’ environmental factors conducive to making autocells with thesesame features)."

That said, my opinion is: autocells seem a plausible first step from non-life to life. But, more to the point, I interpret Goodenough & Deacon to be saying that:

A) self-replication is a feature of all biological cells;

B) an entity must exhibit a certain degree of goal-seeking behavior (at least in our universe) in order to self-replicate; and

Does that mean that all self-replicating entities are aware of their goals? Or does such awareness require a more complex physical arrangement than an autocell would (or a single-celled organism does) provide?

BTW, I thought your choice of "spooky" to describe Hofstadter's account of physicalism was ironic, in that "spook" (at least in its early, literal form) connotes a "ghost" or "spirit", as in a non-physical entity.

jcm: "Does that mean that all self-replicating entities are aware of their goals? Or does such awareness require a more complex physical arrangement than an autocell would (or a single-celled organism does) provide?

My hunch is the latter."

You seem to be evading the question. The question is not whether these entities are aware of their goals, but rather if they are simply aware.

If your answer is "no," then apparently you believe that living organisms can exhibit teleogical behavior without having consciousness. That is interesting. How exactly does that work? Does the "end-directedness" result from a higher source that is conscious? Moreover, if this is your position, then you still have yet to provide some kind of plausible explanation for why consciousness was naturally selected. Evidently, you believe that neither "purposive or intentional behavior" nor "responsiveness to environmental stimuli" require consciousness. So, why was consciousness naturally selected?

The question is not whether these entities are aware of their goals, but rather if they are simply aware.

No, and I don't think Goodenough & Deacon meant to imply that autocells are aware, either. As they say later in that same essay:

"Traits common to all organisms include such non-depressing and religiously fertile capacities as end-directedness and identity maintenance; traits common to all animals include awareness and the capacity for pleasure and suffering; traits common to social beings include co-operation and meaning making; traits common to birds and mammals include bonding and nurturance; traits common tohumans include language and its capacity to share subjective experiences, and thus to know love."

IOW, they describe a sort of hierarchy, as novel, often more complex, traits emerge from earlier, often simpler ones. Sounds like Evolution 101 to me.

Moreover, given their physicalist assumptions (which I share and you apparently do not), it seems highly unlikely that organisms (let alone hypothetical proto-organisms) that lack the physical "equipment" of awareness (e.g. brains, nerves, eyes, and ears) could be aware of anything.

As for an "origin story" of that equipment (and all the rest of it), I'll leave that to the experts (e.g. evolutionary biologists, neuroscientists, linguists, anthropologists, and philosophers).

I see no particular reason why the private/public distinction you're making must translate into an ontological distinction. Are secrets ontologically distinct from public knowledge? I've never heard anyone argue that before, nor do I have a clear idea how such an argument would unfold.

So I feel you must mean something more specific by "private." I suggested "qualia" earlier, which I understand to be the quintessential private knowledge, but you didn't take that up. What do you mean by private?

"Scientific knowledge is considered to be objective because the knowledge is not dependent upon the subjectivity of any one individual."

Correct. It's dependent on the subjectivity of many individuals. What's my category mistake?

"Also, even if we assume (for the sake of argument) that "subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things," this still does not mean the subjective itself is physical."

Ok -- then what is "the subjective itself" independent of subjective knowledge? It seems to me that, absent precise definitions, "knowledge" and "awareness" are virtual synonyms.

I said "subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things." I did not say "all physical representations of other physical things constitute subjective awareness." So I don't understand how this question is relevant.

jcm: "IOW, they describe a sort of hierarchy, as novel, often more complex, traits emerge from earlier, often simpler ones. Sounds like Evolution 101 to me.

I believe teleological explanations (what they are calling the "non-depressing and religiously fertile capacities as end-directedness and identity maintenance") is anathema to scientific materialism in general and to Darwinian evolution in particular. IOW, modern science seeks explanations based on efficient causation, not final causation (i.e. teleology).

Be that as it may, Terrence Deacon ascribes nerve cells with sentience. Why? Because he believes they have the third-order emergent phenomenon he dubs teleodynamics - the same phenomenon that he believes originated with the hypothetical autocells. (see pg. 148 of "The Re-emergence of Emergence" by Clayton and Davies)

Having said that, let us now assume (for the sake of argument) that you are correct in your interpretation of Goodenough and Deacon - that the hypothetical autocells and the first single-cell organisms were insentient (i.e. without any awareness). If that interpretation is correct, then "teleological causality" (that is the term that Deacon employs) does not require any consciousness whatsoever and you have yet to provide me with one causal role of consciousness. (Remember, you are taking issue with me because I stated that consciousness is causally inert on the materialist view.)

Scott: "I see no particular reason why the private/public distinction you're making must translate into an ontological distinction."

I am making the distinction between the private and the public in order to help you understand the difference between the "first-person subjective" and the "third-person objective." Evidently, I am not succeeding and it would appear that we might be coming to an impasse because I am running out of options.

Scott: "So I feel you must mean something more specific by "private." I suggested "qualia" earlier, which I understand to be the quintessential private knowledge, but you didn't take that up. What do you mean by private?

The term "qualia" refers to subjective experiences. Our subjectivity is private, not public. You cannot experience my subjective experiences and I cannot experience yours. Now, having provided you with that explanation, what specifically are you not grasping here?

Your mistake is that you are conflating subjective phenomena and objective phenomena. Subjective phenomena are private and are not available for viewing by others. Objective phenomena are public and are availabe for viewing by others.

Scott: "I said "subjective knowledge reduces to local physical representations of other physical things." I did not say "all physical representations of other physical things constitute subjective awareness." So I don't understand how this question is relevant."

The relevance is that "physical respresentations of other physical things" do not "constitute subjective awareness." IOW, your argument that "awareness" of the "physical representations of other physical things" somehow demonstrates that "awareness" itself is physical is clearly fallacious.

Reread nearly :) all of your comments. In violent agreemnt with most of them. My issue was a general one not necessarily related to only your posts. It was the idea that I see myself as a physicalist, but cannot subscribe to a definition of physical things that includes on matter and energy but not information.

If I did not see things this way, then would agree that the materialist/physicalist worldview seems to be a dead-end.

Paisley: "You cannot experience my subjective experiences and I cannot experience yours. Now, having provided you with that explanation, what specifically are you not grasping here?"

What I'm not grasping is why this is evidence for an ontological conclusion.

Paisley: "Subjective phenomena are private and are not available for viewing by others. Objective phenomena are public and are availabe for viewing by others."

Are all objective phenomena public? Are they all available for viewing by others? And is everything that is not available for viewing by others non-physical?

Paisley: "your argument that "awareness" of the "physical representations of other physical things" somehow demonstrates that "awareness" itself is physical is clearly fallacious."

My assertion was that subjective awareness is a particular kind of physical representation. But that is not my argument; that's simply the view I'm defending. My argument is that your argument against physicalism begs the question.

Having heard a bit more, and with the help of jcm's observations, I even understand the specific way in which it begs the question: you claim there are two kinds of knowledge, subjective and objective. Then, I claim there's only one kind of knowledge. Then, you claim that I'm wrong because there exist "objective phenomena" and "subjective phenomena," and that they are irreducible. But that's not a statement about knowledge, that's a statement about what exists. So you're using a dualistic ontology to support your claim that there are two kinds of knowledge, which is then supposed to support your claim that physicalism fails. But in fact, physicalism fails only because you assume from the beginning that it fails, by adopting a dualistic ontology.

Scott: "Are all objective phenomena public? Are they all available for viewing by others? And is everything that is not available for viewing by others non-physical?

Do you truly not understand the difference between the subjective and the objective? If this is indeed the case, then there is no point in continuing this discussion.

Scott: "My assertion was that subjective awareness is a particular kind of physical representation.

Your assertion was that subjective awareness "reduces to local physical representation of other physical things" (your words, not mine). And my counterargument remains essentially the same: "Awareness" of the "physical representations of other physical things" (regardless of whatever particular kind of physical thing that representation is) does not demonstrate that "awareness" itself is physical.

Scott: "Having heard a bit more, and with the help of jcm's observations, I even understand the specific way in which it begs the question: you claim there are two kinds of knowledge, subjective and objective. Then, I claim there's only one kind of knowledge. Then, you claim that I'm wrong because there exist "objective phenomena" and "subjective phenomena," and that they are irreducible. But that's not a statement about knowledge, that's a statement about what exists. So you're using a dualistic ontology to support your claim that there are two kinds of knowledge, which is then supposed to support your claim that physicalism fails. But in fact, physicalism fails only because you assume from the beginning that it fails, by adopting a dualistic ontology.

I will restate my argument for the last time. Wikipedia defines physicalism as "a philosophical position holding that everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties." Since you are defending physicalism and therefore asserting that consciousness is physical, then you should be able to provide me with one physical property that subjective awareness displays. Hitherto, you have failed to meet this challenge.

I said "Are all objective phenomena public? Are they all available for viewing by others? And is everything that is not available for viewing by others non-physical?"

You replied "Do you truly not understand the difference between the subjective and the objective?"

That wasn't really an answer to my question, so I'll explain my point more clearly with an example.

When was Shakespeare born? You can't answer that question precisely, and neither can I, because the body of historical evidence available to us is incomplete. So Shakespeare's birth date is not available for "viewing" either directly or indirectly by anyone now living.

I do not therefore conclude that Shakespeare's birth was not a physical event. Do you? If not, then you must agree with me that the answer to all three of my questions is no. But the answers to all three would have to be yes for your argument to work.

Paisley:Having read some Deacon on the side, I tend to doubt that he literally (as opposed to metaphorically) ascribes "sentience" (as I understand the term) to autocells (or even single-celled organisms), and the essay that I cited (which he co-authored) appears to contradict that idea, but then I also agree that we're getting too far afield.

Which brings me to this:

you have yet to provide me with one causal role of consciousness

For that matter, I'm not sure that I could provide you with a causal role for digestion. I understand it as something that organisms (or at least animals) do, and I assume that it plays some causal role. But if I fail to provide such an example, would you expect me to conclude from that failure that digestion is a non-physical process?

jcm: "Having read some Deacon on the side, I tend to doubt that he literally (as opposed to metaphorically) ascribes "sentience" (as I understand the term) to autocells (or even single-celled organisms), and the essay that I cited (which he co-authored) appears to contradict that idea, but then I also agree that we're getting too far afield.

I just cited a source written by Terrence Deacon in which he ascribes sentience to nerve cells. That trumps your opinion on what you think he might have meant.

Also, you have failed to explain why purposive behavior and intentionality does not presuppose consciousness?

jcm: "But if I fail to provide such an example, would you expect me to conclude from that failure that digestion is a non-physical process?"

Paisley: I just cited a source written by Terrence Deacon in which he ascribes sentience to nerve cells.

Here's the quote you referred to:

"In a sense, each nerve cell is sentient in some small way by virtue of its necessary functional organization and incompleteness. This fact creates, among the linked neurons, an affordance to one another that involves them in first-, second-, and third-order processes of a higher rank than that which is internally regulated within each alone."

Firstly, he says this only about nerve cells, not about all cells (or autocells), and he brackets that statement with "in a sense" and "in some small way", although it's not clear to me how "by virtue of its necessary functional organization and incompleteness" supports even a modest or metaphoric interpretation of "sentient."

Whatever Deacon means, I highly doubt that cells are sentient in the strong, literal sense of "capable of experiencing things through its senses".

Digestion can be objectively studied. Consciousness cannot.

Humans study both of these processes via other humans (i.e. neither is studied strictly introspectively). If that's what you mean by "objectively" (i.e. inter-subjectively), then I have to disagree with you.

I said: Whatever Deacon means, I highly doubt that cells are sentient in the strong, literal sense of "capable of experiencing things through its senses".

I should qualify that statement as referring to individual cells, removed from their context within the nervous system.

When put in those terms, Deacon's statement makes a little more sense to me, assuming he's referring to the capacity of nerve cells to produce sentience when linked up in a particular way, performing "first-, second-, and third-order processes of a higher rank than that which is internally regulated within each alone".

If so, then that's just typical emergence talk - in the strong sense of the "whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

Scott: "When was Shakespeare born? You can't answer that question precisely, and neither can I, because the body of historical evidence available to us is incomplete. So Shakespeare's birth date is not available for "viewing" either directly or indirectly by anyone now living."

Agreed. We do not know Shakespeare's date of birth.

Scott: "I do not therefore conclude that Shakespeare's birth was not a physical event. Do you?

What is at issue here is Shakespeare's DATE OF BIRTH, not whether Shakespeare's birth was a physical event.

Scott: "If not, then you must agree with me"

It is becoming abundantly clear to me that you truly do not understand the difference between the subjective and the objective. The reason Shakespeare's birth date is in doubt is because there is no conclusive, objective, historical evidence to establish it. If there were, then there would be no controversy. However, the reason there is a mind/body problem is because there is no objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is physical...none, zilch, NADA!

jcm: "Firstly, he says this only about nerve cells, not about all cells (or autocells),"

Yes, in that source, he is specifically referring to "nerve cells." But that is exactly what I stated before. You are giving the impression that I somehow misrepresented what he said. That Deacon ascribes sentience to nerve cells would seem to suggest that he also ascribes sentience to autocells and the first single-cell organisms. Why? If autocells and the first single-cell organisms were sentient, then all subsequent cells (this would necessarily include nerve cells) would also be sentient because all subsequent cells would have evolved from these predecessors.

jcm: "and he brackets that statement with "in a sense" and "in some small way", although it's not clear to me how "by virtue of its necessary functional organization and incompleteness" supports even a modest or metaphoric interpretation of "sentient."

The phrase "in some small way" makes it abundantly clear to me that he supports the idea that nerve cells have some rudimentary form of sentience (no one here is claiming that cells have the intellectual capacity to do astrophysics).

jcm: "Whatever Deacon means, I highly doubt that cells are sentient in the strong, literal sense of "capable of experiencing things through its senses".

I believe that Deacon meant exactly what he stated..."each nerve cell is sentient in some small way" (his exact words). Also, you have failed to explain why purposive behavior and intentionality do not presuppose consciousness (this is the third time that I am raising this issue).

jcm: "Humans study both of these processes via other humans (i.e. neither is studied strictly introspectively). If that's what you mean by "objectively" (i.e. inter-subjectively), then I have to disagree with you."

The objective is observable by other observers. My subjective awareness can NOT be observed by you or anyone else. This is not difficult.

jcm: "If so, then that's just typical emergence talk - in the strong sense of the "whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

There are two types of emergence - namely, weak and strong. Weak emergence is that which is normally invoked in science and is reducible to its fundamental constituents. Strong emergence is not reducible to its fundamental constituents.(The type of emergence you are referring to is strong emergence). There is no scientific evidence for strong emergence. The only time that it is even raised is in regards to consciousness.

Deacon's apparent "panpsychism" is actually more in tune with reductionistic science because it would only have to invoke weak emergence. IOW,the collective consciousness of a sentient life-form would be the sum (not greater than the sum) of its parts...which are also conscious. On your view, insentient bits of matter in motion magically (that is the appropriate adverb) give rise to sentient bits of matter in motion.

On your view, insentient bits of matter in motion magically (that is the appropriate adverb) give rise to sentient bits of matter in motion.

Sentience does not occur outside of a physical (most likely animal) body. That is my view.

I also trust that biologists and physicians know more of the details of how animal bodies produces sentience (and mental processes, in general), although I understand that their knowledge of the subject is far from complete.

Lastly, I don't think sentience is any more "magical" than any other bodily function (e.g. digestion or respiration), although that is your word choice, not mine.

Paisley, I've been following this discussion closely, as it concerns several points that have been of great interest to me but seem to be rarely addressed. As I indicated earlier, I tend to agree with your analysis. Do you know of any good references on these questions?

Paisley: "What is at issue here is Shakespeare's DATE OF BIRTH, not whether Shakespeare's birth was a physical event."

But do you not see the analogy? You keep asking me to name one physical property that consciousness has, and claim that because I can't, it must not be physical. But I can't name one physical property that Shakespeare's birth has -- at least not on the basis of any direct evidence. I can't say when or where it occurred; I can't say whether it began with a breech or a cephalic presentation; nor can I tell you how long it lasted or who assisted. Nor can anyone else, I expect, at least without guesswork.

Nonetheless, we can place certain reasonable limits on what Shakespeare's birth could have been like. For example, we know that historically, most mothers in the sixteenth century died after giving birth by Cesarean section. So we can guess (without knowing for certain) that Shakespeare probably was not delivered by Cesarean section, given that his mother survived his birth. We cannot know this beyond a reasonable doubt, but if we apply the simplifying assumption that his mother was like most other mothers of the time, the conclusion is reasonable.

Likewise, we can place certain reasonable limits on what consciousness could be like, even in the absence of direct evidence. For example, we know that many behaviors previously thought of as signs of consciousness can be duplicated by physical computation systems. So if we apply the simplifying assumption that the remaining behaviors are "like" the others, at least in the very general sense that they do not require an entirely different ontological basis to function, then we can reasonably conclude that they can also be duplicated by physical computation systems.

"there is no objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is physical...none, zilch, NADA!"

You're saying that as though you think I would disagree with you.

Are you saying there is objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is not physical? Is there even subjective evidence that subjective awareness is not physical?

Scott in response to Paisley: Paisley: "there is no objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is physical...none, zilch, NADA!"

Scott: "You're saying that as though you think I would disagree with you."

Scott, if by "objective" Paisley means "inter-subjective" - which is the meaning that (I think) you and I agreed to earlier - and we look to those research communities who study subjective awareness (or the mind, in general) on the basis of physicalist assumptions (e.g. scientists and some philosophers of mind) - then I should think that there is quite a lot of objective evidence in this regard.* Perhaps you will conclude (or already have) that these fields have yet to "establish" the physical basis of subjective awareness. But I think that depends on how high one sets the bar for "establishment."

If one has a strong, prior objection to physicalism (e.g. a fear of determinism or human chauvinism), I expect the bar to be held very high indeed - perhaps impossibly high, as appears to be the case with creationists and evolution.**

* Two popular books on the topic that readily come to mind - partly because they explicitly address the metaphysical implications of this research - are: The Blank Slate by cognitive scientist Steven Pinker and Descartes' Error by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. Also, virtually any book by philosopher Daniel Dennett is relevant.

** There is some real-world overlap in this analogy, epitomized by Dr. Michael Egnor, a neurosurgeon who rejects evolutionary theory and (like Paisley) has gone on the attack against "materialism" in the study of the mind. Perhaps his most vocal opponent is neurologist Dr. Steven Novella, whose blog I casually follow. For example, if you have some time, I recommend that you read this entry and see if you recognize any similarities to this thread.

I said: Two popular books on the topic that readily come to mind - partly because they explicitly address the metaphysical implications of this research - are...

Actually, it's been a while since I've ready these books, and they may not have said anything explicit about the metaphysical implications of their work (i.e. even if I came away with that message). So, suffice it to say that these authors are no dualists (at least with respect to the causal explanation of mental processes).

jcm: "Sentience does not occur outside of a physical (most likely animal) body. That is my view.

Your view (as stated previously) is non-reductive supervenient physicalism - a view which is inherently self-contradictory. If mental events do not reduce to physical events, then mental events are not physical. IOW, non-reductive physicalism is an oxymoron.

jcm: "I also trust that biologists and physicians know more of the details of how animal bodies produces sentience (and mental processes, in general), although I understand that their knowledge of the subject is far from complete."

Richard Dawkins (probably the world's most noted evolutionary biologist) stated in his video lecture entitled "The Purpose of Purpose" (link courstesy of Kristyana) that he believes whales are conscious but doubts that bats are. (I am not sure where he stands on cats and dogs.) Incidentally, he ascribes "neo purpose" (i.e. intelligence) to human beings, maggots, and computers. Evidently, he believes that intelligent behavior in living organisms does not require consciousness.

Scott: "Likewise, we can place certain reasonable limits on what consciousness could be like, even in the absence of direct evidence. For example, we know that many behaviors previously thought of as signs of consciousness can be duplicated by physical computation systems. So if we apply the simplifying assumption that the remaining behaviors are "like" the others, at least in the very general sense that they do not require an entirely different ontological basis to function, then we can reasonably conclude that they can also be duplicated by physical computation systems."

It is not reasonable to conclude that subjective awareness can be generated by a computer program. Those who believe that it can are simply deluding themselves.

Scott: "Are you saying there is objective evidence to establish subjective awareness is not physical?"

Yes. That there is no objective evidence to establish that subjective awareness is physical qualifies as objective evidence (in and of itself) to establish that subjective awareness is not physical.

Scott: "Is there even subjective evidence that subjective awareness is not physical?"

Yes. I have subjective evidence that subjective awareness is not objective (i.e. physical).

Still not hearing anything at all that makes sense of any phrase containing the word "objective".

I'll tell you what I think it means. An object is a contract between 2 or more entities to define the borders of a third entity, or object. Only then do you get your tennis balls and other "real things" in the world.

You get them via "senses" or ways one interacts with others. Ergo "nonsense" - that which one does NOT sense.

But back to 'objective', the main reason objectivity cannot exist is because the "subject object" (if you will) can exist only in relation to one or more external objects. Making it impossible to talk about objects with no context whatsoever.

Based on experiences in the East, Lennon (I think) was able to conclude that "nothing is real" in the Lucy song, and onboard these kinds of ideas into a 1960s and 70s consciousness. He may not have known it at the time, but work done in the West later proved his his thesis correct.

And Shakespeare's birth? Without trusted observers or accounts, it is fair to say he may or may not have been born, and could be a figment of our imagination in the need to account for his works, or was even an alien life sent to us by literary gods.

Not saying y'all are working through some important philosophical issues. me just thinks the ground doth shake too much when you tread on 'subjective' and 'objective'.

Just for the record: I never stated the above as my view, whereas I did state my view plainly in my last reply:

"Sentience does not occur outside of a physical (most likely animal) body."

Furthermore, according to my view, mental events are physical events, in that they depend on a physical body capable of producing them (e.g. one with a brain) in order to occur. Take away the physical body capable of producing mental events, and no more mental events.

jcm: "Scott, if by "objective" Paisley means "inter-subjective" - which is the meaning that (I think) you and I agreed to earlier..."

Ha, yes, thanks for keeping me honest. That is indeed the definition that I'm inclined to accept, and I don't mean to back-track when I say I'm not disagreeing with Paisley on that point. But...

"...and we look to those research communities who study subjective awareness (or the mind, in general) on the basis of physicalist assumptions..."

This is the key point -- physicalism is indeed an assumption which then enables us to draw certain kinds of reasonable conclusions about consciousness. The problem at hand really is whether or not to make that assumption; and my argument is very simply that belief in the existence and causal efficacy of consciousness does not -- absent further evidence -- contradict the physicalist assumption.

"...then I should think that there is quite a lot of objective evidence in this regard."

But taken as evidence of physicalism, based on the assumption of physicalism, it counts as evidence only in a circular argument.

To be as clear as possible -- and perhaps I have failed on this point heretofore -- I doubt there are any non-circular empirical (i.e. based on experience, subjective, inter-subjective, objective, what have you) arguments that can decisively resolve this problem. Even if we constructed machines that could fool the Voight-Kampff test (so to speak), people could still doubt that they had consciousness, because people can doubt that other people have consciousness. I just don't happen to think that the possibility of such doubt is grounds for an ontological conclusion.

I would be more persuaded by Paisley's argument if we had been struggling to create objects that appear to be conscious and failing for centuries. (Even so, his argument wouldn't be any less circular.) But bona-fide attempts to model consciousness only began a few decades ago. So does it surprise me that we don't have conscious machines yet? No. In five-hundred years, if we don't, then I might be persuaded -- if I weren't dead. In the meanwhile, let the research money flow.

BTW: Of the authors you mention I've only read Dennett -- another figure who, like Hofstadter, I think occasionally tries to have and eat his ontological cake. (For example: "substrate independence" is just another word for Platonism as far as I can tell.) I'll have to check out the others some time.

If we agree to accept the epistemological view of methodological naturalism, then I think we also agree to accept the "physicalist assumption" to some degree - even if we personally reject the ontological view of metaphysical naturalism. (See here for some definitions.)

That said, I just want to highlight one section of that blog entry that I linked to earlier, by neurologist Dr. Steven Novella:

==================If the mind is completely a product of the material function of the brain then:- There will be no mental phenomena without brain function.- As brain function is altered, the mind will be altered.- If the brain is damaged, then mental function will be damaged.- Brain development will correlate with mental development.- We will be able to correlate brain activity with mental activity – no matter how we choose to look at it.

All of these predictions have been resolved in favor of materialism. “Every single one!” Dualism makes predictions too – that some mental function will be documented to exist separate from brain function. The evidence for this? None. =====================

Now I should stress that I am only a casual consumer of science reporting, and am not qualified to judge the full accuracy of Novella's claims above. But I'll just say this much: it jibes with my lay person's knowledge of the relevant field(s) (e.g. neuroscience and cognitive science) from other sources.

More to the point, if Novella's claims are accurate, and continue to gain support in the future, then would you not agree that physicalist (or materialist) assumptions have been validated to some degree (if not ontologically, then at least methodologically)? and in a way that is significantly more impressive than a mere circular argument?

I would agree that there will always be gaps in our knowledge, and those who (for whatever prior ideological reasons) find physicalism upsetting will probably always find an excuse to insert mysterious and spooky forces into those gaps. But then I think we should feel no guilt in dismissing their special pleading in favor of theories that can generate testable and falsifiable hypotheses - especially if they pass the test - repeatedly.

Going a bit further than you might be comfortable with, Scott, I also think we should feel no guilt in expressing preference for metaphysical propositions that are harmonious with our knowledge - so long as we bear in mind that they are highly speculative (e.g. that nature probably did not select us for our ability to glean metaphysical Truths), and that we should have the integrity and humility to let go of them should our knowledge prove to contradict them. (Yes, there is an ethical/normative overtone to that last clause.)

jcm: "Just for the record: I never stated the above as my view, whereas I did state my view plainly in my last reply:"

Just for the sake of clarity. Did you or did you not make the argument that consciousness is a strong emergent property and that it supervenes on the physical? If you did not make this argument, then what exactly is your objection to my assertion that consciousness is causally inert on the materialist view? (The supervenient theory of mind was specifically formulated to give consciousness "downward causation.")

I asked Paisley, ""Do you know of any good references on these questions?"

Paisley, you replied: "What are the questions?"

I believe it was your statement that got the ball rolling here: "On the materialistic worldview, consciousness is causally-inert. With that in mind, I fail to see how consciousness was naturally selected since it could not have possibly conferred any survival benefit."

The questions (and related arguments) that interest me are:

* Is consciousness (understood as subjective experience) causally inert?* Does materialism (and related positions) imply that consciousness is causally inert?* If consciousness is indeed causally inert, then how and why does it exist?

This last question relates, in part, to natural selection. As I see it, consciousness is unique in that it is a characteristic of (at least some) living things that is apparently not the product of natural selection.

jcm: "There is some real-world overlap in this analogy, epitomized by Dr. Michael Egnor, a neurosurgeon who rejects evolutionary theory and (like Paisley) has gone on the attack against "materialism" in the study of the mind. Perhaps his most vocal opponent is neurologist Dr. Steven Novella, whose blog I casually follow. For example, if you have some time, I recommend that you read this entry and see if you recognize any similarities to this thread.

I read Novella's article on his blog entitled "Intelligent Design of the Brain." There Novella makes the following challenge: "Name one prediction of strict materialism that has been falsified."

I will take that challenge. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines materialism as "a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter."

Materialism is making the prediction that "all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter." This claim has been falsified by experiments in quantum physics. Quantum jumps are physical events which have no physical cause and therefore no physical explanation. The deterministic theory of materialism has been falsified by quantum indeterminacy. The prevailing scientific theory holds that nature is fundamentally indeterminate.

Incidentally, Daniel Dennett (the philosopher whom you are endorsing) is an "eliminative materialist" who denies the existence of subjective experiences. Evidently, strict adherence to the materialist assumption (that only the objective is real) leads to some very irrational positions.

He is claiming that there is evidence to establish that mental states reduce to brain states because there is evidence to establish that mental states are correlated to brain states. But this does not logically follow. Correlation does not imply causation, let alone identification. There is not a shred of evidence to establish that mental states are identical to physical states.

"If we agree to accept the epistemological view of methodological naturalism, then I think we also agree to accept the "physicalist assumption" to some degree - even if we personally reject the ontological view of metaphysical naturalism. (See here for some definitions.)"

Yes I think that's so.

"...one section of that blog entry that I linked to earlier, by neurologist Dr. Steven Novella"

Yes, I didn't have a moment to read that earlier but I've read it now and I think you're right that there's a fair bit of compelling evidence that minds are brains. It seems to me that the advantage of making the physicalist assumption -- even just methodologically, as you say above -- is that you get to exert the full explanatory power of that evidence. There is, in other words, a compelling pragmatic reason to adopt physicalism -- at least if you're a neuroscientist!

"More to the point, if Novella's claims are accurate, and continue to gain support in the future, then would you not agree that physicalist (or materialist) assumptions have been validated to some degree (if not ontologically, then at least methodologically)? and in a way that is significantly more impressive than a mere circular argument?"

I would agree that the explanatory power of the assumption justifies its use. But there's really nothing to gain by claiming that the assumption validates itself -- why bother? Why not just make the assumption and get on with things?

I also have a complaint about that post, in that I think it adopts a rather naive view of falsification that I just don't think holds up under close scrutiny. But that's a debate for another day.

"Going a bit further than you might be comfortable with..."

Actually I am pretty comfortable with what you say; and I think "metaphysical propositions that are harmonious with our knowledge" really captures the kind of justification I'm talking about above -- not a validation, but a concordance. As I've thought to myself several times throughout this conversation, there is an important aesthetic component to judgments like these.

I would agree that the explanatory power of the assumption justifies its use. But there's really nothing to gain by claiming that the assumption validates itself -- why bother? Why not just make the assumption and get on with things?

Well, if it is true that dualism makes predictions that continuously fail, whereas physicalism makes predictions that continuously succeed, then it seems to me that physicalism is a demonstrably safer assumption - if only on a pragmatic basis (e.g. insofar as it makes a difference in how medicine approaches mental disorders). Of course, the same logic would apply if the opposite were true, so it's up to science to verify the premises.

I started to respond at length to your comment about falsification (inasmuch as it relates to my statements above), but then came to the conclusion that you're probably wiser to put it off.

So, I'll just say that, however flawed a human endeavor science may be (which, by the way, Novella acknowledges elsewhere), I can't bring myself to ignore what it has to say about topics like these (particularly from those fields most relevant - in this case, neuroscience and cognitive science). As Massimo often suggests, it owes more to philosophy than many scientists seem willing to acknowledge, but then philosophy without science strikes me as ungrounded.

I believe consciousness is causally efficacious. This belief is based on my first-person experience of free will. Of course, there are those who assert that free will is purely illusory. However, the burden of proof is upon those who assert that free will is illusory, not on those who trust their first-person experiences. To date, I have never been presented with evidence that proves we have no free will. Having said that, if free will is illusory, then it logically follows that consciousness is causally inert. Awareness in and of itself has no causal role.

Yes. Materialism does imply that consciousness is causally inert because materialism is a deterministic view which precludes the possibility of free will.

Nick Barrowman: "If consciousness is indeed causally inert, then how and why does it exist?"

This is a good question and one that I have posed on this thread. Hitherto, no response was forthcoming.

Nick Barrowman: As I see it, consciousness is unique in that it is a characteristic of (at least some) living things that is apparently not the product of natural selection.

I basically agree. However, I would slightly qualify your statement. Consciousness is the characteristic of all living things. IMHO, materialism either implies "eliminativism" (the view that denies the existence of subjective experiences themselves) or "panpyschism" (the organic view of the world that posits consciousness as a fundamental aspect of nature.)

Nick Barrowman: "Do you know of any good references on these questions?"

Yes. I would suggest you view the website of PBS's television series "Closer To Truth" produced by Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn. It is basically a central repository of video interviews with prominent scientists, philosophers, and theologians on the topics of "cosmology, consciousness, and God." Here is the link.

Also, there is a "Skeptics' Guide to the Universe" weekly podcast that I recently discovered on the "Neurologica Blog" site (courtesy of "jcm") in which Dr. Steven Novella (skeptic) interviews Dr. B. Alan Wallace (ex-Buddhist monk, author, and president of a consciousness studies institute in California). I am familiar with Wallace's work and he raises some of the same issues I have on this thread. Here is the link.

Here's another gem from NeuroLogica — not just for Novella's post (which is more of a neuroscience report related to the study of consciousness), but also for the comments, which mirror (and, in some places, go deeper than) the discussion here (e.g. concerning the philosophical implications of physicalism/materialism).

It occurred to me, in my last reply to Scott, I could have been clearer. (In other words, it appears in retrospect that I restated what he said, and then went off on a tangent about the relationship between science and philosophy.) To restate, any philosophy of mind that ignores or dismisses what the most relevant sciences have to say on the matter is, in my opinion, a non-starter. In this case, of course, I'm talking about dualism.

And, unless there is some third option that I'm unaware of, I think that leaves us with physicalism (or materialism*) as the reigning (i.e. scientifically validated) paradigm, from which all debates about its philosophical implications ought to begin.

That said, I hardly think that I've demonstrated the causal efficacy of consciousness here, other than to restate what other folks have said before (e.g. Searle's idea of a multi-level description - mental/intentional and non-mental/neuronal - of the same causal system).

In that same vein, here's one more quote, culled from the comments on that NeuroLogica post that I cited earlier - this one from the blogger himself:

"...with regard to the “why are we all not just zombies” question, there may be a reason, but there does not have to be. Self awareness can be an emergent property – it’s just what happens when you have a complex nervous system that needs to pay attention and be motivated to take certain actions."

Of course, we did not choose to be a species with "a complex nervous system." But just as it's a brute fact that we are, it also seems a brute fact that, unless we "pay attention" to our environments and motivate ourselves "to take certain actions" in response to them, that we will not survive for very long (given the familiar perils of life in human form). Consciousness, in this sense (i.e. attentiveness, dilemma resolution, and bodily coordination in novel situations), might just be a necessary, emergent property of complex forms like ourselves.

Which begs the question: can a humanoid zombie accomplish the same tasks that we can? It seems easy to imagine so (as many writers have), but the reality may be quite different. Whatever the answer may be, and whatever its logical implications for one's preferred definition of "free will", wishful thinking cannot settle the matter.

* I still think that "materialism" is a somewhat outdated term, but it's hard to avoid it in this context - especially since brains are composed of matter, although (like the rest of the body) it requires energy in order to function.

jcm: "To restate, any philosophy of mind that ignores or dismisses what the most relevant sciences have to say on the matter is, in my opinion, a non-starter. In this case, of course, I'm talking about dualism."

Why are you singling out dualism? Do you actually believe that materialists are incapable of dismissing scientific evidence?

jcm: "And, unless there is some third option that I'm unaware of, I think that leaves us with physicalism (or materialism*) as the reigning (i.e. scientifically validated) paradigm, from which all debates about its philosophical implications ought to begin."

What kind of nonsense is this? To begin with, there is no physical evidence whatsoever that consciousness (subjective awareness) is physical...NONE. Your failure to acknowledge this point does not change the fact. Moreover, science has never proven that nature is fundamentally physical. Quite the opposite. Materialism was rendered obsolete long ago by the theory of relativity and quantum physics. I am simply throwing you a bone by allowing you to identify the physical as the objective.

jcm: "In that same vein, here's one more quote, culled from the comments on that NeuroLogica post that I cited earlier - this one from the blogger himself:

"...with regard to the “why are we all not just zombies” question, there may be a reason, but there does not have to be. Self awareness can be an emergent property – it’s just what happens when you have a complex nervous system that needs to pay attention and be motivated to take certain actions."

This statement is question-begging. That is, it presupposes consciousness in order explain why there is consciousness. Having said that, Novella went on record and explicitly stated in the Wallace interview that "subjective experiences do NOT have a physical existence (emphasis mine)" and that "neuroscientists have characterize it [consciousness] as an illusion." No further commentary is necessary.

Neurologist Dr. Steven Novella claims: "The materialist hypothesis— that the brain causes consciousness — has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated." If one wishes to dispute that claim, then I recommend taking it to the source (viz. Novella). [This thread has already diverged far enough from the topic of the original post.]

But if one accepts the claim as a starting premise (as I do), then does it logically follow that "consciousness is physical" (to use Paisley's words)? As usual, it depends on one's definition of "physical".

For example, given that the brain is a physical entity and that consciousness is a function of the brain, then I think it is fair to say that consciousness is a physical function. But does that make consciousness a "thing", as in an object with independent existence? Of course not, and neither are other bodily functions (e.g. digestion or respiration).

I can see how that conclusion might upset some people - say, if they are strongly attached to a prior belief that consciousness is a manifestation of a disembodied (perhaps immortal) soul - also not a "thing" in the physical sense, but a real entity with independent existence. I sympathize with them to some degree (as a former adherent of a theistic religion, which features such a belief). But then (if I ever truly held that) I abandoned it a long time ago, and don't mind recommending it to others.

But then (if I ever truly held that) I abandoned it a long time ago, and don't mind recommending it to others.

I worded that poorly. That is to say: I don't mind recommending that others do as I did and abandon the belief in a disembodied soul (or to "give up the ghost", so to speak). It probably won't change your life as much as you think (e.g. you won't suddenly drop dead or turn to a life of crime and debauchery), although you might a gain a new appreciation for the meat between your ears (and all the rest of it, for that matter).

jcm: "Neurologist Dr. Steven Novella claims: "The materialist hypothesis— that the brain causes consciousness — has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated." If one wishes to dispute that claim, then I recommend taking it to the source (viz. Novella). [This thread has already diverged far enough from the topic of the original post.]"

I wish to dispute that claim and I am taking it with you because you are the one who is presenting Novella's views as your counterargument. (By the way, whether consciousness is fundamental is the directly relevant to the AP - the topic of this thread).

Novella has no evidence whatsoever that the "brain causes consciousness." Neuroscience has established correlations between mental states and brain states. But correlations do not imply causation. And even if they did, all you would have established is that brain states influence mental states, not that the physical generates consciousness. Moreover, even if the physical generates consciousness, it does not logically follow that consciousness is physical (which is the assertion you are making).

Also, Novella states the following (this is from that same article on his Neurologica blog - "Intelligent Design of the Brain"): "Theories that are falsified are either modified or discarded. A “preponderance of evidence” cannot rescue a theory that has been disproven even by a single piece of incompatible evidence."

jcm: "But if one accepts the claim as a starting premise (as I do), then does it logically follow that "consciousness is physical" (to use Paisley's words)? As usual, it depends on one's definition of "physical"."

Okay. So, what is you definition of "physical?"

jcm: "For example, given that the brain is a physical entity and that consciousness is a function of the brain, then I think it is fair to say that consciousness is a physical function. But does that make consciousness a "thing", as in an object with independent existence? Of course not, and neither are other bodily functions (e.g. digestion or respiration)."

I am still waiting for you to define the "physical." Until then, I do not know what your basis is for asserting that anything is physical. Also, please state the functions of "awareness." IOW, what exactly does "awareness" do? Or, more specifically, what causal role does "awareness" play in the world?

jcm: "I can see how that conclusion might upset some people - say, if they are strongly attached to a prior belief that consciousness is a manifestation of a disembodied (perhaps immortal) soul - also not a "thing" in the physical sense, but a real entity with independent existence."

Previously, you implied that consciousness is not a "thing." If you do not believe that consciousness is "bits of matter in motion," then what is your basis for calling it physical?