Arctic Yearbook 2014 - Page 404

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Arctic Yearbook 2014
littoral states, Denmark is currently submitting its claims. Denmark is interested in getting as
much Arctic territory as possible and Copenhagen expects that these issues will be solved
according to a rules-based approach (Government of Denmark et al., 2011: 13–15).
Denmark’s relationship with the four Nordic Arctic nations occurs within a framework of
Nordic cooperation. Denmark supports increased Nordic cooperation in the Arctic, but
concurrently recognizes that its practical value is limited due to the relative isolation of
Greenland. The 2009 Stoltenberg report, published by the Norwegian government as a platform
for additional Nordic cooperation, suggested several options for Nordic cooperation in the
Arctic (Stoltenberg, 2009). However, although the report created a lot of positive buzz among
Danish officials and analysts, its recommendations have met significant practical barriers. The
long distances between Scandinavia and Greenland mean that the Nordic countries are not likely
to provide useful capabilities in case of emergencies. Instead, Denmark sees Canada as the most
likely partner country in that regard. Nordic cooperation plays a more significant role in other
areas like scientific research, education, and health (Government of Denmark et al., 2011: 35–36
& 40). The Ukraine crisis means that Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a
collaboration scheme between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, have come to
play a more important role for each of the five member states (Nilsen, 2014). The collaboration
increases defense efficiency by taking advantage of synergies between the five states, while
functioning as an additional way of integrating non-NATO members Sweden and Finland into
the Western security architecture (Dahl & Järvenpää, 2014: 129–30; Järvenpää, 2014). However,
NORDEFCO mainly focuses on Northern Scandinavia and will not play a significant role in the
Danish Arctic for now.
Russia has been the main cause for concern in Danish Arctic policy, even before the Ukraine
crisis, and a rivalry between Moscow and Washington is the most likely source of conflict in the
region (Jørgensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2009; Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2014; RahbekClemmensen, Larsen, & Rasmussen, 2012). Denmark is not concerned with a possible land-grab
by Russian forces – instead, the main danger is that Denmark will be squeezed between Russia
and the United States in case of a great power rivalry in the High North. Copenhagen is
consequently walking a tight-rope between deterrence and accommodation. Denmark wants to
keep Russia within the well-functioning cooperative order in the Arctic and is willing to
surrender short-term political advantages to achieve that goal. However, Denmark is also wellaware of the need for effective deterrence of Russia. For instance, the recent Danish F-16
exercises in Greenland was as much a test of the aircraft’s ability to act under Arctic conditions
as a clear demonstration of Danish military prowess (Martin, 2014).
Denmark is, together with Canada, generally opposed to increased NATO involvement in the
High North and NATO is largely absent from the Arctic Strategy. Copenhagen has not been as
vocal as Ottawa about its opposition to an increased NATO involvement, but Copenhagen
policymakers believe that an Arctic NATO involvement would be a red flag for Moscow that
would complicate regional governance and increase the likelihood of militarization. Denmark has
contributed with F-16s to NATO’s air-policing operations in Iceland.
Denmark has seen China’s entrance to the Arctic as an opportunity for further cooperation with
Beijing. Denmark has generally supported giving China and other Northeast Asian states a seat
at the Arctic table, including by giving them observer status in the Arctic Council (Government
Rahbek-Clemmensen