Manhunt (military)

Manhunting is the deliberate identification, capturing, or killing of senior or otherwise important enemy combatants, classified as high-value targets, usually by special operations forces and intelligence organizations. According to a 2008 study,[1] since 1968, 40% of armed non-state groups met their end because local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members.

The most visible such operations conducted today involve counterterrorist activities. Some involve government-sanctioned targeted killing or extrajudicial execution. Operations to capture terrorists have drawn political and legal controversy. See Legal Issues below. Other military operations, such as hostage rescue or personnel recovery, employ similar tactics and techniques. The primary difference in hostage rescue or personnel recovery is that the person being rescued or recovered wants to be found; while high-value targets want to avoid being found.

British Special Operations Executive planned Operation Foxley, a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler using a sniper team. The operation was not carried out due to debate over the utility of killing Hitler so late in the war.[4]

In 1967, Che Guevara was pursued by the Bolivian military, who were poorly trained and equipped. The U.S. government sent a team of the CIA's Special Activities Division commandos and other operatives into Bolivia to aid the anti-insurrection effort. The Bolivian Army was also trained, advised, and supplied by U.S. Army Special Forces including a recently organized elite battalion of Rangers trained in jungle warfare that set up camp in La Esperanza, a small settlement close to the location of Guevara's guerrillas.[5]Félix Rodríguez, a Cuban exile turned CIA Special Activities Division operative, advised Bolivian troops during the hunt for Guevara in Bolivia.[6] On October 7, an informant apprised the Bolivian Special Forces of the location of Guevara's guerrilla encampment in the Yuro ravine. They encircled the area with 1,800 soldiers, and Guevara was wounded and taken prisoner while leading a detachment with Simeón Cuba Sarabia.[7] On October 9, Bolivian President René Barrientos ordered that Guevara be summarily executed.[8]

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and US officials announced on Apr 19, 2010 that two leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq had been killed in a joint Iraqi-US operation. al-Qaeda leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who led an affiliate group, were killed in the joint raid which took place in Tharthar, west of Baghdad. The house was destroyed and the two bodies were found in a hole in the ground in which they had been hiding. Mr Maliki said, "During the operation computers were seized with e-mails and messages to the two biggest terrorists, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri." In a statement, the commander of US forces in Iraq, Gen Raymond T. Odierno, said: "The death of these terrorists is potentially the most significant blow to al-Qaeda in Iraq since the beginning of the insurgency."[16]

In January 1996, three months later, a booby-trapped cellular phone exploded, killing Hamas member Yahya Ayyash, also known as "The Engineer," who masterminded suicide attacks in which 50 Israelis died and 340 were wounded.

On September 25, 1997, an attempt to kill Khaled Meshal, the Jordanian-based political chief of Hamas, went awry. A struggle ensued. Two Mossad agents were arrested, along with Meshal's driver Mohammed Abu Saif. When Meshal fell ill, Jordanian police suspected he had been exposed to a toxic agent. An international debacle ensued. King Hussein nearly severed relations between Israel and Jordan. U.S. sponsored negotiations with the Palestinians faltered. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was forced to provide an antidote to save Meshal's life, and to release Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, who had been in custody.[17] In the wake of an Israeli investigation,[18]Danny Yatom, director of Mossad, resigns in 1998.[19]

On November 9, 2000, near the West Bank town of Bethlehem, an Israeli Apache helicopter fired a laser-guided missile at the vehicle of Tanzim leader Husayn Abayat, killing him and wounding his deputy.[21]

Similar operations on February 13, 2001 killed Masud Iyyad, a Force 17 officer trying to establish a Hizbullah cell in the Gaza Strip, and PIJ activist Muhammad abd al Al, who according to the IDF was responsible for terrorist acts and was on his way to carry out two major attacks.

Ahmed Yassin was killed in an Israeli attack on March 22, 2004. While he was being wheeled out of an early morning prayer session, an Israeli helicopter gunship fired Hellfire missiles at Yassin and both of his bodyguards. They were killed instantly, along with nine bystanders.[22][23]

Israeli Defense Forces revealed that an April 14, 2008 air strike by an unmanned aerial vehicle killed Ibrahim abu Alba; Palestinian sources confirm his death. A member of the military wing of the Palestinian Democratic Front responsible for operations in northern Gaza, the IDF said Alba was responsible for rocket attacks and a recent infiltration into Israel that had injured three soldiers. The IDF stated Alba was planning another attack when he was killed near Beit Hanoun.[24]

On New Years Day 2009, Israel begins air strikes targeting Hamas in the Gaza Strip after militants repeatedly fire rockets into Israel. On January 1, Nizar Rayyan, a Hamas leader who urged suicide attacks against Israel, is killed in an air strike on his home in the northern Gaza Strip. Rayyan was the most senior Hamas leader to be killed since the death of Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi in April 2004. Rayyan claimed, "we will kill the enemy and take hostages" during a Dec 31, 2008 interview on Hamas’ al-Aqsa television channel. The strike kills at least four other people in the Jabaliya refugee camp, including some members of his family. Subsequent IDF operations target the homes of Hamas leadership.[26]

On December 14, 2006 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that targeted killing is a legitimate form of self-defense against terrorists, and outlined several conditions for its use.[27] This decision, arrived at after four years of deliberation, may establish precedent for international law.

Israel's policy of targeted killing has been censured by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in the past. But these actions have been widely discredited as a disproportionate UNHRC bias against Israel. Even the UN Secretary General has expressed disappointment at UNHRC's apparent focus on Israel, while other human rights violations go unaddressed.[28][29]

Elyezer Shkedy, the recently retired Israeli Air Force commander, claims IAF operations only comprised 5% of targeted killings in 2003–04, while in 2007-8, IAF strikes comprised 50–70% of targeted killing operations. “Bystander fatalities” decreased from 50 of 100 Palestinians killed (1:1 ratio), to 1 in 25 (24:1 ratio). In the final months of 2007, 98 terrorists were killed with a single bystander fatality (98:1 ratio). While the IAF does not provide detailed data of these operations, B'Tselem (the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) communications director Sarit Michaeli acknowledges improvements in IAF accuracy.[30]

In the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe War of Independence (Chimurenga War, 1966–1980), the Selous Scout were officially credited with either directly or indirectly being responsible for 68% of all insurgents killed, while losing less than 40 scouts in the process.[32] The Selous Scouts, Grey's Scouts and Tracker Combat Unit were formed to pursue Zambian terrorists deep into the African bush. Their first operational use was in 1967.[33][34]

A Soviet Spetsnaz (special operations) team prepares to seek Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1988.

Soviet Spetznaz and GRU conducted extensive operations against Mujahideen warriors in the mid-1980s. The Afghan resistance movement, assisted by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, People's Republic of China and others, contributed to Moscow's high military costs and strained international relations. The US viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as an integral Cold War struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-Soviet forces through the Pakistani intelligence services, in a program called Operation Cyclone.[35][36] A similar movement occurred in other Muslim countries, bringing contingents of so-called Afghan Arabs, foreign fighters who wished to wage jihad against the atheist communists. Notable among them was a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden, whose Arab group eventually evolved into al-Qaeda.[37][38]

Britain employed groups of Iban and Dayak tribesmen as jungle trackers during the Malayan Emergency, attaching the skilled natives to British forces. The trackers were later formed into the Sarawak Rangers.

Britain developed specialized tactics six months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, under the code name Operation Kratos.[43] The "tactics have been developed to include a specialised response to both the sudden appearance of a suspect where we have intelligence they may be about to commit a deadly attack and for the surveillance of suspects identified through intelligence.... These tactics are only ever used when absolutely necessary."[44]

British Special Air Service forces, operating in concert with United States Special Operations Forces, disrupted suicide bomber networks responsible for over 3000 deaths in Baghdad, Iraq. Over 3500 members of the bomb making networks were captured or killed in an 18-month period from 2007 to 2008. Most of the hundreds of network members killed were members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The SAS suffered 6 killed and over 30 injured, many due to rappelling from helicopters with over 100 pounds of equipment.[45][46]

When Congress creates the Continental Army in 1775, a call is issued to form ten companies of volunteer riflemen from various colonies. Daniel Morgan is selected to lead one of two companies of sharpshooters from Virginia. The sharpshooters are encouraged to shoot enemy officers, noncommissioned officers, and other important "strategic targets" like artillerymen as targets. In the Battle of Cowpens, General Morgan ordered his defending riflemen to "aim for the epaulets," clearly ordering his men to target British officers. After the battle, 39 of 100 British dead were officers—a disproportionate casualty rate.[49]

Fourteen Army Combat Tracker Teams, trained at the British Jungle Warfare Schools in Malaya and New Zealand, were deployed to Vietnam to hunt enemy insurgents.[51]

During the battle of Khe Sanh, military intelligence identifies communications emanating from an area designated Oscar 8.[52] Suspected of being the command post for General Vo Nguyen Giap, Special forces teams and indigenous Hatchet teams are dispatched to capture or kill General Giap following an air strike by B-52 bombers. The mission is unsuccessful, leading to heavy losses on both sides.[53]

A shift in US national security policy began to emerge in the late 20th century, as national leaders began to identify individuals as adversaries, rather than countries. This became evident in the hunts for:

The United States reportedly operates two targeted killing programs employing Predatorunmanned aerial vehicles: The first, conducted by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), carries out surveillance and strike missions in areas recognized as war zones, and thus are an extension of combat operations. The second, not officially acknowledged, is conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in areas outside officially recognized war zones.[68] Manhunting activities accelerated in August–September 2008 along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Officials remarked the rise in attacks by Predator UAVs and Hellfire missiles was due to a desire to strike decisively at al Qaeda senior leaders in the waning months of the Bush administration.[69][70][71][72][73][74][75] In 2009, the Barack Obama administration reaffirmed its commitment to lethal strikes, when CIA Director Leon Panetta confirmed the strikes had been successful to date, and would continue.[76] Since that date, strikes against Pakistan-based high-value targets have trebled.[77] Some question the cost vs. benefit of drone attacks, which admittedly deplete the ranks of senior al Qaeda leaders, but also polarize public opinion.[78][79][80] Strike accuracy appeared to improve in 2008–2009, with collateral damage reduced as frequency of operations increased.[81] See also Drone attacks in Pakistan.

On July 13, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had initiated a secret program in 2001 to capture or kill senior al Qaeda leaders. Director Leon Panetta reportedly halted the program, which had not progressed beyond the planning and preparation stages.[82][83][84]

In Afghanistan, Interior Minister General Mohammed Daud Daud expressed opposition to the addition of approximately 50 suspected drug kingpins to a list of individuals approved for capture or killing by U.S. and NATO forces. U.S. officers stated that the list complied with international law and the military's rules of engagement, because it only listed drug lords thought to support the insurgency. A U.S. military spokesman stated that narcotics trafficking was used to finance insurgency.[86]

On May 2, 2011, United States Special Operations Forces, including Navy SEALs and CIA operatives, conducted a daring raid into Abbotabad, Pakistan with the intention to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. Shortly after a helicopter assault into a large compound, bin Ladin was identified and killed. See main article: Death of Osama bin Laden

Contemporary international law provides two distinct normative paradigms which govern targeted killings in situations of law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities. Any targeted killing not directed against a legitimate military target remains subject to the law enforcement paradigm, which imposes extensive restraints on the practice. Even under the paradigm of hostilities, no person can be lawfully liquidated without further considerations.[89]

Spokesmen for the Central Intelligence Agency responded that the Agency "uses lawful, highly accurate, and effective tools and tactics to take the fight to Al Qaeda and its violent allies. That careful, precise approach has brought major success against a very dangerous and deadly enemy." The Department of Defense program, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such, it is an extension of conventional warfare.[68] CIA Director Leon Panetta defended the practice, stating that CIA targets enemies of the United States, "and we have deliberately made sure that only those that represent those kinds of targets are the ones we're going to go after."[92]

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights issued two reports regarding the use of "intrusive means" to counter terrorism, and secret detention.[93][94] Western governments widely criticized the reports as politically motivated and hypocritical, as many of the countries seated on the United Nations Human Rights Committee have questionable human rights histories.

On January 13, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the United States Government, including the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State and Department of Justice. The FOIA request asked the government to disclose the legal basis for its use of predator drones to conduct "targeted killings" overseas. In particular, the ACLU seeks to find out when, where and against whom drone strikes can be authorized, and how the United States ensures compliance with international laws relating to extrajudicial killings.[95] The FOIA request was followed up when the ACLU filed suit on Mar 16, 2010. In particular, the lawsuit asks for information on when, where and against whom drone strikes can be authorized, the number and rate of civilian casualties, and other basic information essential for assessing the wisdom and legality of using armed drones to conduct targeted killings. According to the ACLU, State Department spokesman Harold Koh announced in March 2010 that State will provide a legal justification at a date to be determined.[96]

On March 26, 2010, in a speech before the American Society of International Law, United States Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh formally announced the United States' legal interpretation of international law with respect to targeted killing. Koh first stated that "U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war." He further explained that the United States is in "an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the associated forces" and thus has the lawful right to use force "consistent with its inherent right to self-defense" under international law[97] in response to the 9/11 attacks. Under domestic law, he stated that targeted killings are authorized by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Although he contended that these international and domestic legal grounds "continue to this day," he also provided additional justification for current U.S. actions based on continued attacks and intent by al Qaeda. He concluded that the existence of this "ongoing armed conflict" grants legal authority to the United States to protect its citizens through the use of force, including lethal force, as a matter of self-defense. Koh then addressed specific legal reasoning and standards considered by the United States "when defending itself against high-level leaders planning the attacks." He reiterated the widely accepted conceptualization of an "organized terrorist enemy" as one that does not have conventional forces. Instead, such an enemy plans and executes its attacks while hiding among civilian populations, he said. As such, "that behavior simultaneously makes the application of international law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians." Koh identified three elements related to situational considerations that the United States uses when determining whether a specific targeted drone killing at a particular location will occur:

Willingness and ability of those States to suppress the threat the target poses

Koh stated that the "rules" of targeting operations used by the United States are consistent with principles under the laws of war. He cited two well-known principles that govern the State's use of force during an armed conflict: distinction and proportionality. These principles are designed to protect civilians once armed conflict has begun. They are recognized under customary international law as part of Jus in Bello (conduct during war).

Proportionality: Prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Koh said that the United States adheres to these standards and that the United States takes great care in the "planning and execution to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum."[98]

Government Accountability Office, Combatting Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, GAO-08-622, April 2008

William Safire, "Irregular Warfare," New York Times Magazine, Jun 8, 2008