Tuesday, August 30, 2016

The Council of Representatives (CoR) dismissed Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25, complicating the success of anti-ISIS operations and Sunni reconciliation efforts. The removal of Defense Minister Obeidi on the eve of strategic Mosul operations could limit the U.S.’s ability to effectively coordinate with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF now lacks both a Defense and Interior Minister, who share responsibility of the security forces. Efforts to fill the defense ministry will likely further political instability within the Sunni parties, which fractured over Obeidi’s dismissal between parties supportive of Obeidi and those supportive of Sunni CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi, an Obeidi rival. The fracture has already setback government efforts of Sunni reconciliation, a requirement for anti-ISIS operations in Iraq, and could preclude Sunni ability to present and support a nominee. This paralysis could lead to the defense ministry transferring to a candidate more aligned with Iran, which may restrict U.S. involvement in Iraq as the Mosul operation approaches.

The method by which the CoR dismissed Obeidi sets a dangerous precedence of lowering the threshold of support needed to dismiss a minister. The CoR dismissed Obeidi by a simple majority vote, despite the constitutional requirement for an absolute majority. The ruling was based on a Federal Court statement in December 2015 that qualified absolute majority as the “majority of those attending,” which is the definition of a simple majority. Under an absolute majority, the CoR needs at least 165 people to dismiss a minister, while a simple majority could require as little as 83 votes. The Reform Front, former PM Nouri al-Maliki’s support base, is consistently within reach of that minimum.

The Reform Front may attempt to similarly oust other ministers who are allies of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi in order to undermine his premiership, including Kurdish Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari. The CoR questioned Zebari on August 25, after which the Reform Front announced on August 30 that they had requested a no-confidence vote. No date has yet been set for the vote. Zebari’s dismissal could collapse ongoing negotiations regarding Kurdish oil exports and have a similar effect on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, which was primarily obtained due to Zebari’s efforts. Removing Zebari, who is well-liked across the Kurdish parties, could prompt a Kurdish walk out from the Iraqi Government if they see their participation in Baghdad as futile. The political fallout between Arbil and Baghdad, two of the U.S.’s key allies, could complicate operations in Mosul and may accelerate momentum towards a Kurdish independence referendum.

Key Takeaway: Turkey is unraveling America’s anti-ISIS partner in northern Syria in order to position itself as a major power broker in planned operations to retake Raqqa City. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) crossed into Syria to seize the ISIS held border town of Jarablus alongside numerous Turkish- and U.S.-backed Syrian armed opposition groups on August 24. The operation, titled Euphrates Shield, is a turning point in American-Turkish relations and the war against ISIS by fulfilling longstanding American demands for more Turkish involvement in the anti-ISIS fight. Euphrates Shield also aims to prevent the expansion of Kurdish control along the border, however. The U.S. ordered the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Forces (YPG) to withdraw to the east bank of the Euphrates River in accordance with Turkish demands at the start of the operation. Turkey is leveraging Syrian opposition groups it trusts in Jarablus and intentionally sidelining groups that joined the Syrian YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), bringing U.S.- and Turkish- backed opposition factions into direct conflict with the American-backed SDF. The SDF opposed the Turkish incursion and attacked the joint Turkish-Syrian opposition force on August 27. A U.S. defense official announced that the two sides agreed to a “loose” truce on August 30. An unidentified Turkish military source, however, subsequently denied the existence of any such agreement. The Turkish intervention has meanwhile inspired local resistance against the SDF and YPG in Sunni Arab areas including Manbij City, south of Jarablus, and the northern Raqqa countryside. Turkey may exploit this local resistance to unseat the SDF from Manbij City and replace it with a military force that opposes the YPG.

Turkey is unraveling America’s anti-ISIS partner in northern Syria
in order to position itself as a major power broker in planned operations to
retake Raqqa City. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) crossed into Syria to seize the
ISIS held border town of Jarablus alongside numerous Turkish- and U.S.-backed Syrian armed opposition groups on
August 24. The intervention brought the TSK and U.S. backed opposition forces
into direct conflict with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), America’s primary
ally in the anti-ISIS fight. Turkey notified the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition,
the Syrian regime, and Russia
about the offensive, which it titled “Operation Euphrates Shield.” Turkish Special Operations forces led a joint
military force into Jarablus, including an armoredbattalion from Turkey’s Second
Army and as many as 5,000 Syrian
opposition fighters from groups based in the northern Aleppo countryside
including: the Sultan Murad Brigade, Suqour al-Jebel, Jaysh al Tahrir, Jabhat
al Shamiya, Nour al Din al Zenki, Faylaq al-Sham, and Ahrar al Sham. ISIS mounted little
resistance to the attack, instead withdrawing southwest to the town of al
Bab. SDF fighters rejected the Turkish intervention as an “occupation” and attacked
the joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force. The Turkish intervention meanwhile
appears to have emboldened local elements to resist the SDF openly. Sunni Arab elements
in Manbij and the Raqqa countryside issued statements rejecting
the SDF because of the YPG’s goal to establish an independent Syrian Kurdistan. Turkey likely
will continue to advance south in order to unseat the SDF from Manbij and
position loyal Syrian opposition forces as necessary ground partners in the
operation to retake Raqqa City.

Turkey is leveraging Syrian opposition groups it trusts in Jarablus
and intentionally sidelining groups that joined the Syrian YPG-led SDF. Local SDF
groups from Jarablus declared the formation
of the Jarablus Military Council on August 22 and stated their intent to seize
Jarablus. The leader of the Jarablus Military Council (JMC), Abdussatar
al-Jadir, was assassinated the following
day. The JMC accused Turkish
intelligence and attacked the joint
Turkish/Syrian opposition force on August 27. Turkey launched airstrikes against JMC
and SDF positions south of Jarablus in response and has maintained an active
air campaign targeting the area. The joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force
advanced south, seizing over a dozen villages and reaching the Sajour River by
August 29. The JMC nonetheless continues to marshal support from the Aleppo
countryside. The SDF-linked Manbij Military
Council
announced its support for the JMC on August 27. Prominent Manbij Military
Council (MMC) member Kataib Shams al Shamal deployed to reinforce
the front line south of Jarablus. A delegation of
tribal elders in Manbij later declared
its support for the JMC on August 28. The escalation between the joint Turkish/Syrian
opposition military force and coalescing SDF elements south of Jarablus have redirected
the focus of the SDF’s Sunni Arab fighting force at a time when the U.S.
intended to prepare for operations to retake Raqqa City.

Turkey’s intervention aimed to sideline the SDF and check the YPG’s
rising strength along the Turkish border. Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan stated that Turkey
intended to fight the YPG “with the same determination” as fighting ISIS during
a visit to Gaziantep on August 28. He
also vowed to provide “all necessary
support” to
Syrians living in Gaziantep who wanted to return to Jarablus, indicating his
intent to repopulate Jarablus – and possibly its southern countryside – with
Syrian refugees after finishing clearing operations. He will ensure that the
refugees that resettle in Syria are Sunni Arabs in order to block future Kurdish
activity in the area. Turkey had conditioned its support
for the U.S.-led SDF operation to retake Manbij beginning in April 2016 on the
mandatory withdrawal of the YPG to the east bank of the Euphrates river after
the SDF captured the city, but YPG forces had not withdrawn as of the launch of
Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24, despite seizing the city in early
August. U.S Vice President Joe Biden was in Ankara on August 24 and expressed
strong support for the operation. He also ordered the YPG
to withdraw from Manbij to the eastern bank of the Euphrates, stating that the
group, “will not under any circumstances get American support” if it does not
comply. The YPG’s general command chose to back down rather than confront
Turkey near Jarablus directly, but has not completely withdrawn as ordered. The
YPG released a statement confirming its intent to remain focused on the overall
anti-ISIS fight on August 27, signaling its acquiescence to American demands. Operation
Inherent Resolve spokesman Col. John L. Dorrian confirmed
that the main element of the YPG relocated east of the Euphrates River, but stated that some forces remained
to finish IED clearing operations. The YPG confirmed its presence
near the front line south of Jarablus on August, but claimed the fighters had
crossed back across the river to help evacuate civilians targeted by Turkish
airstrikes. It is unclear whether the YPG is participating actively in clashes
at the time of writing. U.S. secretary of Defense Ashton Carter acknowledged the YPG’s
noncompliance on August 29, stating that the U.S. will “deconflict” and “clarify where the YPG
elements of the SDF are and are not.”

Turkey will likely attempt to unseat the SDF’s Manbij Military
Council next. The SDF formed the Manbij Military
Council to
recapture Manbij city on April 5. The SDF’s Manbij Military Council did not
include the original Free Syrian Army-affiliated Manbij Military Council, which
ISIS displaced in 2013. Turkey’s intervention emboldened the original Manbij
Military Council and elements of the local population in Manbij to oppose the
SDF openly. The original Manbij Military Council released a statement on August
28 rejecting the SDF and calling for shared control
with the SDF over Manbij city. Residents of Manbij reportedly also issued a
letter rejecting the
SDF on
August 28. Rising local dissent in Manbij follows a statement by Sunni Arab
tribes in the Raqqa countryside that pledged to fight against the YPG in the area. Turkey may capitalize on
local resistance to the SDF to recapture Manbij and install the original Manbij
Miltiary Council. The commander of the U.S.-and Turkish-backed Sultan Murad Division,
Col. Ahmed Osman, appeared to confirm this possibility. He stated that the
Euphrates Shield offensive was “certainly heading in the direction of
Manbij,” claiming
that the YPG force in the area had not withdrawn from the city. Col. Osman
stated that he expected Turkish-backed opposition groups would be able to seize
Manbij within “a few days.” Turkey expanded its involvement after the SDF began
to resist the intervention and appears willing to sustain an increased
deployment. The TSK sent ten additional tanks and the
same number of armored vehicles on August 25 and another six tanks after
hostilities escalated on August 27. An unnamed Turkish official stated that Turkey
would “continue operations until we are convinced that imminent threats against
the country's national security have been neutralized” on August 25. The
official added that Turkey could be willing to increase its total deployment in
Syria to 15,000. A U.S.
defense official later announced on August 30 that the Turkish and SDF forces reached
a “loose agreement” to cease fighting and instead “focus on the [ISIS]
threat.” It remains unclear if the tentative truce will hold as an unidentified
Turkish military sources and an unidentified Turkish-backed
opposition commander subsequently denied the existence of such an agreement.

Composition of
the joint Turkish-Syrian opposition force

Operation Euphrates Shield demonstrates Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s willingness and ability to use military force to prevent
the creation of an independent Syrian Kurdistan along the Turkish border even
after an aggressive purge of the TSK following the failed July 15 coup
attempt. The total initial Turkish deployment was close to 450 troops including 150 Special
Forces
plus 200 soldiers from the armored units and additional soldiers responsible
for coordinating Turkey’s close
air support and artillery support. Turkish Special Operations Forces under the command of Lieutenant
General Zekai Aksakalli led the operation. LTG Akasakalli had remained loyal to Erdogan
during the coup and was later promoted to the
rank of
Lieutenant General. His Deputy, Brigadier General Salih Terzi was in
operational command of Special Forces along the Syrian border before the coup. Terzi
was allegedly involved in the coup attempt and was killed by pro-Erdogan
security forces that night. The Turkish mechanized component deployed to
Jarablus is meanwhile likely from the Second Army’s, 5th
Armored Brigade, which is based in Gaziantep and deployable on short notice. The
leadership of this mechanized component is unclear. 5th Armored Brigade
Commander Major General Murat Soysal was detained
after the coup attempt and his replacement is unknown at the time of writing. Erdogan’s
confidence in the loyalty and capability of the Turkish Special Forces and
Turkish second Army indicates his success thus far in consolidating the TSK
under his own personal control without completely neutering its combat
effectiveness.

Implications

Turkey’s intervention in Jarablus is a turning point in
American-Turkish relations and the war against ISIS. Erdogan’s willingness to
commit military force to the anti-ISIS fight fulfils longstanding American
demands for Turkey to increase its contribution to the anti-ISIS mission. The
recapture of Jarablus and ongoing operations to clear remaining ISIS-held
portions of the border west of Jarablus have set the desired conditions for an
offensive to retake Raqqa city by eliminating ISIS’s final supply line from
Turkey. The YPG’s decision thus far to avoid open war with the Turkish forces
indicates that the U.S. may be able to refocus the YPG on the planned Raqqa
offensive. The infighting between the joint Turkish-Syrian opposition force and
the Sunni Arab components of the SDF is a major complication, however. American
planning relies on the Sunni Arab component of the SDF to provide the bulk of
the fighting force for the Raqqa offensive, because a YPG-led operation would
likely alienate civilians in the Sunni Arab-majority Raqqa City. A prolonged
clash between the SDF and the joint Turkish/Syrian opposition force would derail
planned operations to retake Raqqa City. Turkey may now offer its own military
support and that of Turkish-backed opposition forces for an operation in Raqqa
as an alternative to the SDF, positioning Turkey as a major power player in
northern Syria.

Monday, August 29, 2016

Russia has altered the security
balance in the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East by establishing
large anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) exclusion zones. Russia’s power projection
in these regions has been further extended by the deployment of the S-400 air
defense system to Crimea in August 2016 and to Syria in November 2015.Advanced air defense systems create A2AD “bubbles” that
prevent Russia’s opponents from establishing air supremacy in strategically
significant theaters. The Baltic States, much of Ukraine and the Black Sea,
northern Poland, Syria and parts of Turkey fall under Russian A2AD bubbles
created by S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. Russia operates advanced air
defense not only within its own territory, but from sites in Syria and occupied
Crimea, as well as cooperatively through the Joint Air Defense Network in
Belarus and Armenia. Russia can use these systems to impede the ability of the
U.S. to defend its NATO allies by disrupting the ability of US air forces to access
conflict zones in the event of a crisis.

Thursday, August 25, 2016

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and his entire
cabinet are at risk of a no-confidence vote following Parliament’s ouster of
Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi.

The Situation

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) voted to
withdraw confidence in Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25.

The Reform Front, an opposition
party in the CoR driven by Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has
spearheaded the process to oust Obeidi.

Obeidi attended the CoR on
August 1 for the questioning session, the prerequisite for a vote of
no-confidence. However during the interrogation, Obeidi accused
his rivals within Etihad of corruption during a questioning session on
August 1, including Speaker Juburi. The Federal Court acquitted Juburi
of the corruption charges on August
9. Following Juburi’s acquittal, Obeidi’s rivals requested to proceed to
the vote of no-confidence.

The CoR met on August 23 to consider
the vote of no-confidence. However, the CoR lost quorum when two parties, the
Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI), walked out of the session.

The CoR met on August 25 to
take up the issue again and voted no confidence.

The vote was rendered by a simple majority, while the
Constitution stipulates that dismissing a minister requires a vote of absolute
majority.

The CoR announced
that Obeidi was dismissed; 142 CoR members voted against him, 102 voted
in support, and the rest of the 263 attending CoR members abstained.

142 members was enough for a
simple majority. The Iraqi Constitution (Article
61.8.A) mandates that a minister be dismissed on the basis of an absolute
majority, which is 165 CoR members.

A frequently-citied legal
expert and two State of Law Alliance (SLA) stated
that the requirements for removing a minister is a simple majority, contradicting
the Constitution that states that removing a minister requires an absolute
majority.

Context and Implications

Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and the allied
Reform Front exploited internal rivalries within the Sunni political bloc to oust
Obeidi. The Sunni bloc remains vulnerable to further fracture.

The Sunni political bloc,
Etihad, is not unified. Obeidi’s party, Mutahidun, is a rival to the Iraqi
Islamic party, to which Speaker Salim al-Juburi belongs. Etihad has remained a
fixture in the CoR out of necessity to counter Shi’a political dominance, but
the parties are not cohesive.

Obeidi’s removal was partly a
self-inflicted casualty by Etihad. Obeidi accusations
against his rivals within Etihad, including Speaker Juburi, during his questioning
session on August 1, publically exposed a major rift between
senior Iraqi Islamic Party and Mutahidun leaders, with Mutahidun leader Osama
al-Nujaifi calling for Speaker Juburi’s removal.

The Reform Front is the shadow
political bloc that emerged after the parliamentary crisis in April 2016 in
which a rump Parliament formed and attempted to oust CoR Speaker Juburi. It is covertly led by former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki.

The Reform Front exploited the
internal Sunni political rivalry that led to questioning Obeidi to generate the
necessary support to remove this key minister from PM Abadi’s government.

Maliki has attempted to regain
the premiership by weakening his political rivals. He targeted Obeidi to 1)
dismiss a key ally to Prime Minister (PM) Haidar al-Abadi and 2) weaken Etihad
as a force that could resist his influence in the CoR.

Obeidi’s removal leaves the
Iraqi Sunni political parties significantly weakened within the government.
Speaker Juburi, himself the target of persistent efforts by the Reform Front to
remove him from office, remains weak and vulnerable to a future no-confidence
vote.

Internal Sunni disagreements
and Obeidi’s removal could complicate national reconciliation efforts between
Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’a, essential to long-term success following the potential
recapture of Mosul from ISIS.

The successor Defense
Minister could be a worse partner to the U.S. and anti—ISIS Coalition in Iraq.

Etihad will likely insist that
the Defense Ministry remain a Sunni position. However, the intra-Sunni fighting
will inhibit any consensus on a replacement candidate. Therefore, should a Sunni
candidate become Defense Minister, he will be weaker than his predecessor
because he will lack full political backing from the Sunni parties.

It is possible that a
compromised political figure may take the Defense Ministry, and may be more
receptive to Iranian interests than those of the U.S.

A Reform Front candidate or a
pro-Iranian Defense Minister chosen from a proxy group such as the Badr
Organization may restrict U.S. involvement in Iraq on the eve of major military
operations to retake Mosul.

All ministerial positions – including the Prime
Minister – are at risk if only a simple majority is required for no confidence,
should the judiciary uphold this reading of the constitution.

The precedence of dismissing a
minister with only a simple majority puts all weak ministers and allies of PM
Abadi at risk.

A simple majority can be as low
as 83 CoR members. The Reform Front, a Maliki support base, is in reach of the
numbers to consistently vote out ministers. Maliki could push through the
dismissal of any minister, provided that he is able to exploit political
differences to generate the numbers necessary to balance against opposition
blocs.

The CoR also began on August 25
to question Finance
Minister Hoshyar Zebari, the prerequisite for the vote of no-confidence. In
addition, CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi remains a target of Reform Front
animosity and remains vulnerable to a no-confidence vote.

The precedence of simply
majority may also put the position of PM Haidar al-Abadi at risk. However, it
will be more difficult to achieve a consensus on a replacement for PM Abadi,
which would result in the collapse of government and trigger the process to
form a new government.

Iran and the U.S. have also made it clear that
they are not willing to see PM Abadi go, having blocked a previous attempt by
Maliki to oust him in April
2016. He will likely remain in his position, but severely weakened and
robbed of political support from allies.

Moving Forward

Iraq currently has no Minister of Defense or Minister
of Interior.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
are split between the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The ISF currently has
neither minister on the eve of the Mosul operation.

The former Minister of
Interior, Badr Organization member Muhammad al-Ghabban, resigned
on July 5, 2016 following the massive attack killing hundreds of civilians in
Baghdad’s Karrada neighborhood on July 3. The Interior Ministry is currently led
by a deputy minister aligned with the Badr Organization.

A minister is constitutionally deemed
resigned from his position on the date of the withdrawal of confidence. As with
the Minister of Interior, it will be PM Abadi’s responsibility to nominate an
acting Defense Minister until a new candidate is approved. To date, a candidate
for either the Defense or Interior Ministers has not been named.

The U.S. campaign to defeat ISIS by recapturing Mosul
is in jeopardy.

U.S. coordination will continue
through the Joint Operations Command (JOC).
However, Obeidi’s removal will likely diminish the U.S.’s ability to
effectively coordinate with the ISF on the eve of strategic anti-ISIS
operations in Mosul.

Political inability to fill the
vacant position will delay the timeline to recapture Mosul, and remaining
ISIS-held cities in Iraq. The U.S.’s intensive
lobbying effort among political parties to retain Obeidi in his position
failed, highlighting the limits of U.S. diplomatic influence within Iraq’s
shifting political environment.

PM Abadi’s position to resist
pro-Iranian overtures may be limited, especially if a Reform Front candidate, a
pro-Iranian candidate, or a non-professional candidate assumes the Defense
Ministry.

The U.S. may lose its ability
to operate in Iraq if a candidate opposed to the U.S. and Coalition presence in
Iraq assumes the position.

The fracturing of Sunni
political parties will prevent the reconciliation of Sunni populations to the
government, a requirement for strategic success.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and allied tribal fighters recaptured the Waleed Border Crossing on the Syrian-Iraqi Border on August 3. ISIS mounted a counterattack on August 8 - 9 against the Waleed Border Crossing as well as the Tanf Border Crossing in Syria, which is held by the U.S.-backed New Syrian Army. Both attacks were repelled. ISW is thus changing the status of Waleed Border Crossing to ISF Control.

Iraqi Peshmerga affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) launched clearing operations southeast of Mosul on August 14 - 15, seizing at least twelve villages in the Ninewa Plains. The operation originated from positions near the Khazir Military Base between Mosul and Arbil, and progressed south towards the town of Gwer. ISW is thus changing the status of this area from contested to KDP Peshmerga Control.

The ISF recaptured the city of Qayyarah on August 25 following more than a month of operations to secure terrain on the southern and western outskirts of the city after security forces seized the Qayyarah Airbase on July 9. The ISF breached the city limits of Qayyarah on August 23, encountering limited resistance in the southern neighborhoods. The ISF secured the city center and government complex on August 24 and Joint Operations Command announced full control over the city on August 25. ISW is thus changing the status of Qayyarah to ISF Control.

Monday, August 22, 2016

Iraqi Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi faces an upcoming
vote of no-confidence in the Council of Representatives (CoR) following
accusations of corruption from the Reform Front, the opposition bloc driven by
former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The possibility of his dismissal
has fractured the cohesion of the Sunni political blocs, risking the long-term
success of efforts to reconcile and reintegrate Iraqi Sunnis with Baghdad.
Obeidi may need to rely on support from non-Sunni blocs in order to survive the
vote, currently scheduled for August 23. Osama al-Nujaifi - the leader of the
Mutahidun Bloc that includes Obeidi - has reportedly met with Kurdish and Iraqi
Shi’a parties, particularly the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), in
order to broker a political deal to support the embattled minister. It remains
unclear if the Reform Front’s effort to remove Obeidi has the support of the
165 CoR members required to dismiss a minister. This political crisis
nonetheless comes at an inopportune time as the Coalition and the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) set conditions to retake Mosul. Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend
assumed command of Operation Inherent Resolve on August 21 and vowed to retake
Mosul during his one-year term. The successful removal of Obeidi and the likely
follow-up changes to senior leadership in the ISF would complicate this
timeframe.

Monday, August 15, 2016

Outgoing Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Commander Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland gave his final briefing
on August 10 where he discussed the pace of operations to retake Mosul. Gen.
MacFarland remarked that the fast pace of operations to retake Mosul “is not a
bad problem to have,” downplaying humanitarian concerns that the Iraqi
Government will be ill-prepared to handle the wave of refugees from Mosul,
which is estimated to have nearly one million still residing in the city. An accelerated
timeline for Mosul may also limit how many forces are prepared for operations
to retake and hold the city, as Gen. MacFarland stated that the holding force
alone would require “thousands” of police forces, but that only a portion had
been generated so far. The quickened timeline is likely a result of political
pressure on both the U.S. Government, in the wake of a presidential election,
and the Iraqi Government, as Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s position remains
tenuous. The pace may also be an effort to preclude Popular Mobilization
participation in operations in northern Iraq and particularly in Mosul. The
militias may perceive stalled operations as invitation to lend support, despite
Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials’ objections to their presence. U.S.
Presidential Envoy Brett McGurk met with senior security and political leaders
in Baghdad and Arbil from August 11 to 13 to touch on force composition in
Mosul, as the Coalition will continue to try and set the terms of militia
participation in Ninewa as the operation for Mosul nears.

PM Abadi improved his credibility in the Iraqi Government
when the Council of Representatives (CoR) approved five ministers, including
for the coveted position of Oil Minister, on August 15 in a partial Cabinet
reshuffle. The ministers are career technocrats, and the extent of their
political loyalties remains unknown. The ease in which the ministers were
approved suggests that PM Abadi had secured the support of political parties
prior to the CoR session, in comparison with the massive blow-back in April
when he attempted to pass a similar roster of ministers. It is unclear,
however, what deals PM Abadi made to secure these reforms. Former PM Nouri
al-Maliki and the Reform Front did not protest the reshuffle, even though he
had the support base within the CoR to undermine the vote. Maliki may be
focused on guaranteeing support within the CoR to dismiss Defense Minister
Khalid al-Obeidi rather than distancing possible allies by frustrating attempts
for reforms. Obeidi, whom Maliki unsuccessfully tried to dismiss in April 2015,
may face a vote of no-confidence on August 23.

Thursday, August 11, 2016

Preparations for
conventional conflict between Russia and Ukraine are accelerating and the
likelihood of open war is increasing rapidly. Russia has prepositioned military
forces along all of its common borders with Ukraine: to the north in Bryansk district,
to the east near Rostov, to the south in Crimea, and to the west in
separatist-controlled Moldovan territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin has escalated
hostilitiesafter claiming that
Ukrainian forces entered Crimea on 07 AUG. On 11 AUG, he mobilized additional
forces in the separatist republics and to the south in Crimea. In response, Ukraine
is beginning to redeploy forces to adjust to Russia’s deployments, which may
leave Ukrainian forces engaged in combat with Russian proxy forces in Donbas without access to adequate support and vulnerable to offensive operations. Russia has not
yet articulated any clear political objectives or demands, making it impossible
to determine on what negotiated basis the looming conflict might be resolved. Putin
may be seeking to trigger a political crisis in Kyiv designed to topple
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. The situation for now, however, is moving
clearly in the direction of open conflict between Ukrainian and Russian forces in
Donbas or elsewhere in Ukraine.Russia began rapidly
moving forces into Crimea and the Black Sea on 11 AUG:

The Ukrainian Armed forces claimed
that Russian troops stationed along the de-facto Ukraine-Crimea border have
been reinforced by additional men and vehicles and have begun digging trenches.

There have been reports of Russian convoys moving through Kerch
at the crossing point between Russian and Crimea, in Krasnodar,
and moving north through Krymsk
towards Crimea.

Russia continued efforts
to disrupt internet access in northern Crimea.

Russia has been
engaged in a steady buildup around Ukraine:

Russia escalated
its military buildup on Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern borders in
August.

The Moldovan Foreign Ministry strongly condemned aggressive
military exercises held on Ukraine’s western border with Russian regular forces
and separatist troops in the pro-Russia separatist region of Transnistria on 08
AUG. (LINK: link
to .md site.

Ukraine took steps to
adjust to Russia’s redeployments as the international community examines the
sides’ competing claims on 11 AUG:

U.S.
and EU
officials noted the lack of independent verification of Russia’s claims about
the alleged 07-08 AUG infiltration.

Russia’s proxies in
eastern Ukraine escalated rhetoric and offensive operations on 11 AUG in what
may be an attempt to exploit Ukraine’s military focus on other fronts.

Leader of the pro-Russia Donetsk People’s Republic
Alexander Zakharchenko announced that the “terrorist state” of Ukraine is
preparing an offensive against separatist forces in Donbas. (warning: link to.ru site)

Separatist forces began to rapidly increase the intensity of
their shelling of Ukrainian positions during the night of the AUG 11 near the
key port city of Mariupol according to unconfirmed local sources. (link,link,link)

Preparations for
conventional conflict between Russia and Ukraine are accelerating and the
likelihood of open war is increasing rapidly. Russia has prepositioned military
forces along all of its common borders with Ukraine: to the north in Bryansk district,
to the east near Rostov, to the south in Crimea, and to the west in
separatist-controlled Moldovan territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin has escalated
hostilitiesafter claiming that
Ukrainian forces entered Crimea on 07 AUG. On 11 AUG, he mobilized additional
forces in the separatist republics and to the south in Crimea. In response, Ukraine
is beginning to redeploy forces to adjust to Russia’s deployments, which may
leave Ukrainian forces engaged in combat with Russian proxy forces in Donbas without access to adequate support and vulnerable to offensive operations. Russia has not
yet articulated any clear political objectives or demands, making it impossible
to determine on what negotiated basis the looming conflict might be resolved. Putin
may be seeking to trigger a political crisis in Kyiv designed to topple
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. The situation for now, however, is moving
clearly in the direction of open conflict between Ukrainian and Russian forces in
Donbas or elsewhere in Ukraine.

Russia began rapidly
moving forces into Crimea and the Black Sea on 11 AUG:

The Ukrainian Armed forces claimed
that Russian troops stationed along the de-facto Ukraine-Crimea border have
been reinforced by additional men and vehicles and have begun digging trenches.

There have been reports of Russian convoys moving through Kerch
at the crossing point between Russian and Crimea, in Krasnodar,
and moving north through Krymsk
towards Crimea.

Russia continued efforts
to disrupt internet access in northern Crimea.

Russia has been
engaged in a steady buildup around Ukraine:

Russia escalated
its military buildup on Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern borders in
August.

The Moldovan Foreign Ministry strongly condemned aggressive
military exercises held on Ukraine’s western border with Russian regular forces
and separatist troops in the pro-Russia separatist region of Transnistria on 08
AUG. (LINK: link
to .md site)

Ukraine took steps to
adjust to Russia’s redeployments as the international community examines the
sides’ competing claims on 11 AUG:

U.S.
and EU
officials noted the lack of independent verification of Russia’s claims about
the alleged 07-08 AUG infiltration.

Russia’s proxies in
eastern Ukraine escalated rhetoric and offensive operations on 11 AUG in what
may be an attempt to exploit Ukraine’s military focus on other fronts.

Leader of the pro-Russia Donetsk People’s Republic
Alexander Zakharchenko announced that the “terrorist state” of Ukraine is
preparing an offensive against separatist forces in Donbas. (warning: link to.ru site)

Separatist forces began to rapidly increase the intensity of
their shelling of Ukrainian positions during the night of the AUG 11 near the
key port city of Mariupol according to unconfirmed local sources. (link,link,link)

Russia intensified its air
operations in and around Aleppo City after Syrian opposition groups lifted
the regime’s blockade of the city’s eastern districts on August 6,
demonstrating its continued commitment to bolster the regime in the Syrian
Civil War. Russia continued to conduct strikes in Aleppo from July 28 – August 9
in support of the regime campaign to besiege Aleppo City and force the
surrender of the primary stronghold of opposition factions acceptable to the West
in Northern Syria. The opposition reestablished its ground line of
communication (GLOC) leading out of the city on August 6, dealing a significant
setback to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his attempt to capture Syria’s
largest urban and commercial center. Russian warplanes subsequently intensified
their airstrikes against opposition targets in eastern Aleppo City and villages
along the M5 Aleppo – Damascus Highway in the southern Aleppo countryside, preventing
civilians and humanitarian organizations from using the newly-established GLOC
into the city. The targeted strikes also constrained the movement of opposition
forces as they attempted to further consolidate control in the southwestern
districts of Aleppo City. Russia’s continued use of air power against critical
infrastructure and densely-populated terrain in Aleppo City follows U.S.
President Barack Obama’s statement on August 4 that Russia’s “direct
involvement” in support of regime operations to besiege the city has raised
“very serious questions” about its commitment to a political resolution of the
Syrian Civil War. Russia continues to prioritize the pursuit of pro-regime
military objectives despite a recent proposal
for partnership with the U.S. against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. Russia is
likely to continue to wage its air campaign in order to bolster pro-regime
forces attempting to encircle the city, the surrender of which would pose an
existential threat to the viability of the acceptable Syrian opposition in
Northern Syria.

Russia also intensified its air
operations against opposition targets in Idlib Province after an unidentified
opposition group downed
an Mi-8 Russian helicopter near the town of Saraqeb in northern Idlib on
August 1, killing
the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter
marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in
Syria on September 29, 2015. Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes
against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb from
August 1 - 2 and targeted neighborhoods in Saraqeb from August 5 – 7. Local
activistsources also reportedthat
Russian jets droppedincendiary
munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting
that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition
forces in the province. Russia will likely continue to target core opposition-held
terrain in Idlib Province in order to disrupt Idlib-based opposition forces
massed in Aleppo. Russia also conducted airstrikes against ISIS-held terrain near
the city of Palmyra in eastern Homs Province on August 7 following pro-regime deployments to
Aleppo City from the Palmyra area. Russia likely aims to prevent ISIS advances
against pro-regime forces in Palmyra as the regime is redeploying forces away
from the area.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Wednesday, August 10, 2016

Russian President
Vladimir Putin has positioned Russian forces rhetorically and militarily to stage
a large-scale operation in Ukraine. In response to claims that Ukrainian
military intelligence staged an attempted infiltration of Crimea 07-08 AUG,
Putin stated that Russia is obligated to respond. Putin cited this incident and
a failed assassination attempt in separatist-held Luhansk 07 AUG as evidence
that Ukraine is unwilling to settle the conflict in Eastern Ukraine through
peaceful negotiation. Russia previously positioned troops and military hardware
on Ukraine’s northern and eastern border, as well as in Crimea. Putin may use
this incident to justify military escalation in Ukraine as an ostensibly
defensive operation.

Russia’s security service arrested Ukrainian security officials as
they attempted to enter Crimea, which resulted in clashes on 07, 08 AUG.

Russia claimed that Ukrainian security forces attempted to enter Crimea on the night of 07 AUG with 20 improvised explosive devises and mines before being detained (link).

Russian security services stated that a Russian soldier was
killed by Ukrainian fire on 07 AUG near the de-facto Ukraine-Crimea border and
that Ukrainian infiltrators killed an FSB officer during clashes on 08 AUG.
Russia reported that ten other Russians were injured in the clashes.(link - link - warning: linkto .RU website)

Russian security forces claimed to have detained at least one member of Ukrainian intelligence as well as six “local agents” near the town of Armyansk. (warning: link to .RU website)

Russia has been
framing this incident as an attack that demands a reaction, while Ukraine
denies that the incident took place:

The State Council of Russian-occupied Crimea referred to
these actions as a “declaration of war” (link)

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the
purported attack on Crimea by Ukrainian military intelligence “will not go
unanswered” (link).

Putin directly addressed “European and American
counterparts” and stated that Ukraine was not interested in resolving the
conflict through negotiation. (link)

Putin cited an earlier failed assassination attempt against
the leader of the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic as further evidence of
Ukraine’s unwillingness to resolve the conflict peacefully. (link)

The Ukrainian government repeatedly denied Russia’s claims
and issued a warning that Russia is planning to use this to escalate
militarily. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko described Putin’s claims as
“cynical and insane.” (link
- link
- link)

Russia has escalated
military activity in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 07-10 AUG:

Deputy Chairman of the Meljis Crimean Tartar self-governing
body warned on 07 AUG that Russia was moving military personnel and hardware
into the northern Crimean towns of Armyansk and Dzhankoy. (link)

After the warning was issued, internet access in the north
of Crimea was restricted. (link)

The leader of Russian proxy forces in separatist-held
Donetsk ordered officials to not go on vacation and adhere to a strict curfew in
response to heightened threat environment in Donbas. (link)

There has been a report of a large military convoy of
Russian forces moving towards Debaltseve in Eastern Ukraine on 10 AUG. (link)

Russia has expanded its
military presence to Ukraine’s south, east, and northern borders in recent
months in an effort to draw out Ukrainian forces, possibly setting the stage
for expanded operations.

On 04 MAY, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced
the creation of three new divisions in Russia’s Western and Southern Military
Districts. (warning: link to .RU site)

The 150th division near Rostov, which borders
Ukraine to the East, will consist of 10,000 soldiers.

Two other divisions were created in Smolensk, on the border
with Belarus, and Voronezh, on the border with Ukraine.

Russia moved two motor rifle brigades to Ukraine’s northern
border in JUN 2016, one to Klintsy in the Bryansk region, 30 km from the
Ukrainian border, one to Valuyki in the Belgorod region, 20km from Ukraine. (link)

Russia may use this to
legitimize escalating militarily in Ukraine while framing the escalation as a
defensive measure.