June 18, 2014

Back in Houston after a long trip to Turkey, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands speaking about various commodity and clearing related issues, plus some R&R. Last stop on the tour was Chicago, where the Chicago Fed put on a great event on Law and Finance. Clearing was at the center of the discussion. Trying to be objective as possible, I think I can say that my critiques of clearing have had an influence on how scholars and practitioners (both groups being well-represented in Chicago) view clearing, and clearing mandates in particular. There is a deep skepticism, and a growing awareness that CCPs are not the systemic risk safeguard that most had believed in the period surrounding the adoption of Frankendodd. Ruben Lee’s lunch talk summarized the skeptical view well, and recognized my role in making the skeptic’s case. His remarks were echoed by others at the workshop. If only this had penetrated the skulls of legislators and regulators when it could have made a major difference.

And the hits keep on coming. Since about April 2010 in particular, the focus of my criticism of clearing mandates has been on the destabilizing effects of rigid marking-to-market and variation margin by CCPs. I emphasized this in several SWP posts, and also my forthcoming article (in the Journal of Financial Market Infrastructure, a Risk publication) titled “A Bill of Goods.” So it was gratifying to read today that two scholars at the LSE, Ron Anderson and Karin Joeveer, used my analysis as the springboard for a more formal analysis of the issue.

The Anderson-Joeveer paper investigates collateral generally. It concludes that the liquidity implications of increased need for initial margin resulting from clearing mandates are not as concerning as the liquidity implications of greater variation margin flows that will result from a dramatic expansion of clearing.

Some of their conclusions are worth quoting in detail:

In addition, our analysis shows that moving toward central clearing with product specialized CCPs can greatly increase the numbers of margin movements which will place greater demands on a participant’s operational capacity and liquidity. This can be interpreted as tipping the balance of benefits and costs in favor of retaining bilateral OTC markets for a wider range of products and participants. Alternatively, assuming a full commitment to centralized clearing, it points out the importance of achieving consolidation and effective integration across infrastructures for a wider range of financial products. [Emphasis added.]

Furthermore:

A system relying principally on centralized clearing to mitigate counter-party risks creates increased demand for liquidity to service frequent margin calls. This can be met by opening up larger liquidity facilities, but indirectly this requires more collateral. To economize on the use of collateral, agents will try to limit liquidity usage, but this implies increased frequency of margin calls. This increases operational risks faced by CCPs which, given the concentration of risk in CCPs, raises the possibility that an idiosyncratic event could spill over into a system-wide event.

We have emphasized that collateral is only one of the tools used to control and manage credit risk. The notion that greater reliance on collateral will eliminate credit risk is illusory. Changing patterns in the use of collateral may not eliminate risk, but it will have implications for who will bear risks and on the costs of shifting risks. [Emphasis added.]

The G-20 stampede to impose clearing focused obsessively on counterparty credit risk, and ignored liquidity issues altogether. The effects of clearing on counterparty risk are vastly overstated (because the risk is mainly shifted, rather than reduced) and the liquidity effects have first-order systemic implications. Moving to a system which could increase margin flows by a factor of 10 (as estimated by Anderson-Joeveer), and which does so by increasing the tightness of the coupling of the system, is extremely worrisome. There will be large increases in the demand for liquidity in stressed market conditions that cause liquidity to dry up. Failures to get this liquidity in a timely fashion can cause the entire tightly-coupled system to break down.

As Ruben pointed out in his talk, the clearing stampede was based on superficial analysis and intended to achieve a political objective, namely, the desire to be seen as doing something. Pretty much everyone in DC and Brussels drank the Klearing Kool Aid, and now we are suffering the consequences.

Samuel Johnson said “Marry in haste, repent at leisure.” The same thing can be said of legislation and regulation.

Having read your posts on this over the years, it seems that there should be an equivalent principle in regulating financial markets to the ban in physics on perpetual-motion machines. Something about conservation of risk, obviously, but the exact statement would require some heavy-duty thinking. If such a thing has already been articulated, then it needs better marketing, as the laws of thermodynamics have received over the decades.