But while some colleagues and the press praised the decision, it’s hardly cause for hoopla. It merely calls belated attention to what the probate courts should already be doing, which is as the Sleeth court wrote, exercising “independent judgment to determine what portion of the attorney’s fees were reasonably incurred. Otherwise, there is no motivation for attorneys to judiciously weigh the cost of their actions against the risks and potential harm to the protected person’s estate.”

But court oversight being what it is, the staggering obviousness of merely requiring a probate court to exercise its statutory discretion to evaluate the reasonableness of attorney’s fees is now cause for celebration. Indeed, referring to a supreme court committee recommending probate reforms, the front page story in this morning’s local paper, “Court of Appeals targets high fees,”quotes a local expert who says the decision is a “roadmap” and that the Court of Appeals has “accomplished (in one) ruling what the probate committee has been trying to do for months.”

So what’s the answer provided by this ‘new’ prophylactic roadmap? Well, as “anciently and well established,” it’s simply “that at all times, the court must be guided by what is in the best interest of the ward,” quoting In re Farson’s Estate, 77 Ariz. 196, 201 (1954).

And so the appellate court argues for greater use of cost-benefit analyses; for prioritizing the best interest of the ward; for more scrutiny of the fee reasonableness factors; and for determining whether there was even a benefit provided to the protected person.

And in a nod to Pyrrhus, the court writes, “Obviously, fiduciaries and their attorneys must avoid the pursuit of pyrrhic victories that accomplish little but to bankrupt the protected person.”

Or as the court also says, “When “winning” a dispute results in lost financial security for the protected person, those seeking an award of attorney’s fees must defend the appropriateness of their decision to pursue such an expensive dispute.”