1. An appellate court reviews the district court's decision on a suppression motion using a
bifurcated standard. Without reweighing the evidence, the appellate court reviews the
district court's findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent
evidence. The appellate court then reviews the ultimate legal conclusion regarding the
suppression of the evidence using a de novo standard.

2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights
provides protection identical to that provided under the Fourth Amendment.

3. A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A traffic
infraction provides an objectively valid reason to effectuate a traffic stop, even if the stop
is pretextual. When a law enforcement officer makes a traffic stop, the driver and any
passengers in the vehicle are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

4. The United States Supreme Court has held that once an officer lawfully detains a vehicle
for a traffic violation, the officer may order the driver and the passengers out of the
vehicle without any reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle pose a safety
risk.

5. Kansas law is clear that a traffic stop, like any investigative detention, must be reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. A
law enforcement officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has
produced a valid license and proof that he or she is entitled to operate the car, the driver
must be allowed to proceed on his or her way, without being subject to further delay by
the officer for additional questioning, unless there is reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity or consent to the continuation of the stop.

6. The United States Supreme Court has held that in a traffic-stop setting, an officer's
inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the
encounter into something more than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop.

7. Once a law enforcement officer has lawfully stopped a person, the officer may conduct a
patdown for firearms or other dangerous weapons when the officer reasonably suspects
that his or her personal safety requires it.

8. Consent is not a necessary prerequisite to an officer-safety patdown for weapons. As long
as the officer reasonably suspects that his or her personal safety requires it, the officer may
conduct a patdown without the consent of the suspect. An officer-safety patdown is not
the same as a search of the suspect which requires either probable cause to search or
consent.

9. Generally, a patdown maneuver only allows an officer to pat down a person's outer
clothing without placing the officer's hands inside any pockets or under the outer surface
of any garment, unless and until a weapon is found.

MALONE, J.: Cornell Golston appeals his conviction of one count of felony possession of
marijuana. Golston claims the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence.
Golston was the passenger in a vehicle initially stopped for a traffic infraction, and the police
detained the driver and Golston while they waited for a drug dog to arrive. Golston argues that
his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because
the officers lacked reasonable suspicion specific to Golston to justify the length of his detention.
Golston further argues that he was subjected to an illegal patdown for officer safety, which led to
the discovery of marijuana in his shoe.

Some background information is necessary to understand the facts. Over a 2-year period,
Wichita Police Officer Brad Elmore had received information from several citizens complaining
about drug activity at the Amoco gas station located at 2001 E. 21st Street North in Wichita.
Elmore had arrested several persons who either worked at that Amoco or who were frequently
seen at that Amoco. One of the persons Elmore had arrested was Umana Smith. Smith was an
Amoco cashier and Blood gang member whom Elmore had arrested for possession of cocaine and
marijuana.

On July 30, 2003, Elmore recognized Smith's car in the Amoco parking lot and he began
conducting surveillance of the station for possible drug activity. At about 10:30 p.m., Elmore
noticed a vehicle pull into the station driven by a man wearing Blood gang member colors, who
was later identified as Billy Anderson. Elmore recognized the passenger of the vehicle, Samuel
Cobos, as a documented gang member. Elmore ran a check on the license plate of the vehicle and
discovered it was a rental car, which he considered a possible indicator of drug-related activity.
The two men entered the Amoco for about 5 minutes and left without purchasing gas.

Elmore followed Anderson and Cobos to an apartment complex where Cobos exited the
vehicle and contacted four or five individuals who appeared to be waiting for him in the parking
lot. From past experience, Elmore knew that drug dealers often completed deals in parking lots.
Shortly thereafter, Anderson left the apartment complex without Cobos, and Elmore followed
Anderson back to the Amoco. Anderson briefly entered the Amoco and then returned to the
vehicle with another man later identified as Golston. Anderson and Golston left the Amoco, again
without purchasing gas.

Elmore followed Anderson and Golston as they left the Amoco. He observed Anderson's
vehicle rapidly pick up speed to approximately 50 m.p.h. in a 35-m.p.h. zone, and the vehicle also
crossed the center line for approximately 200 feet. Elmore then radioed uniformed officer
Eduardo Padron to stop the vehicle for the traffic infractions. Elmore advised Padron of his
observations that evening and his suspicion of possible drug activity.

When Padron stopped the vehicle, he recognized Golston from prior dealings and he knew
Golston was a documented gang member. Padron approached Anderson and obtained his driver's
license. Another officer arrived at the scene and recognized Anderson from a prior stop involving
drugs within the last 2 weeks. Padron ran Anderson's and Golston's names through the Wichita
Police Department's Special Police Information Data Entry Retrieval (SPIDER) system, which
confirmed that both men were documented gang members and that Anderson was on supervised
release from prison. Before returning to the vehicle with the citation for the traffic infractions,
Padron called for a drug dog. Padron approached Anderson and asked for consent to search the
vehicle, but Anderson refused. Padron informed Anderson that he had already called for a drug
dog and he would have to wait.

Before the drug dog arrived, Padron asked Anderson and Golston to step out of the
vehicle. Padron was concerned that Anderson or Golston, as known gang members, might have
weapons to protect any drugs or money they might be carrying. Padron informed Golston that he
was going to pat him down for officer safety. Golston responded, "Go ahead and check my
pockets; I ain't got nothing on me." While performing the patdown, Padron noticed something in
Golston's pants pocket. Padron requested permission to go into Golston's pocket, and Golston
consented. Padron retrieved a large wad of money, which he immediately returned to Golston's
pocket. As he continued with the patdown, Padron observed a plastic baggie sticking out of
Golston's shoe. Padron asked Golston what was in his shoe, and Golston responded he had "a
little weed." Padron pulled the baggie out of Golston's shoe and arrested him.

The State charged Golston with felony possession of marijuana after a prior conviction.
Golston subsequently file a motion to suppress the evidence. The district court held an evidentiary
hearing on the motion, combined with a bench trial. Elmore, Padron, and Golston testified.
Golston testified that the stop lasted for 20 to 30 minutes before Padron asked him to exit the
vehicle. Golston also testified that Padron had stuck his finger into Golston's shoe while patting
him down without Golston's permission. According to Golston, only after Padron pulled the
plastic baggie out of his shoe did Golston make the statement that it contained weed.

The district court found the initial stop was justified by the traffic infractions. To the
extent that Golston's testimony differed from Padron's, the district court found Padron more
credible. The district court determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion to continue the
stop based on the totality of the circumstances, including Amoco's reputation as a place where
illegal drug activity occurs, the movement of the individuals in the vehicle to several different
locations in a short period of time, and the additional information gained after the stop. The
district court further found that Padron legally conducted a patdown of Golston for officer safety
and that Padron discovered the baggie because it was in plain view. Accordingly, the district court
denied Golston's motion to suppress the evidence. The district court found Golston guilty as
charged and imposed a presumptive sentence. Golston appeals.

Golston claims the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence.
Specifically, Golston argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion specific to Golston to justify the length of his detention. Golston also
claims that he was subjected to an illegal patdown for officer safety because: (1) Padron did not
reasonably fear for his safety; (2) Golston's consent to the patdown was invalid; and (3) Padron's
patdown exceeded the scope of a patdown for weapons.

An appellate court reviews the district court's decision on a suppression motion using a
bifurcated standard. Without reweighing the evidence, the appellate court reviews the district
court's findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. The
appellate court then reviews the ultimate legal conclusion regarding the suppression of evidence
using a de novo standard. State v. Woolverton, 284 Kan. 59, 70, 159 P.3d 985
(2007).

Was Golston lawfully detained?

Golston argues that he was unlawfully detained while the police waited for a drug dog to
arrive. Padron did not testify how long the traffic stop lasted, but Golston testified the stop lasted
for 20 to 30 minutes before Padron asked him to exit the vehicle. Golston does not claim that he
ever requested to leave the scene of the traffic stop. However, the State does not dispute that
both Anderson and Golston were being detained until a drug dog could arrive to investigate for
drugs.

Before we analyze Golston's specific claims, we note that the Kansas Supreme Court has
already addressed the facts of this case regarding the driver, Anderson, in State v.
Anderson, 281
Kan. 896, 136 P.3d 406 (2006). In Anderson, the court concluded that Padron
properly stopped
the car for the traffic infractions and had reasonable suspicion to continue the stop after returning
Anderson's driver's license and issuing the citation:

"The State asserts that the officers had ample information to support a reasonable
suspicion that Anderson was engaged in illegal drug activity; thus they were permitted to extend
Anderson's detention beyond the conclusion of the traffic stop to allow time for the drug dog sniff
of the truck. We agree. As stated by the Court of Appeals:

"'In the instant case, at the conclusion of the traffic stop, the officers had the
following
information: Anderson, along with documented gang member Cobos, had been at the Amoco
station where there was suspected drug activity and there had been numerous arrests of
individuals leaving the station; the Amoco station's cashier was a documented Bloods gang
member and had been convicted the previous year for possession of drugs; after leaving the
Amoco station, Anderson went momentarily to the parking lot of an apartment complex where
his truck was immediately surrounded by four Hispanic men . . .; Anderson was wearing Bloods
gang colors and was a documented gang member; Anderson was on parole; [one officer] had
observed Anderson speeding and driving left of the center line; during a previous stop, [another
officer] had learned that Anderson was carrying $4,000 on his person; and [that officer]
previously received information that narcotics detectives were looking into Anderson's activities
relating to narcotics trafficking.

"'We believe that the combination of the above factors would cause an officer to be
reasonably suspicious of drug activity in this case and would warrant further detaining Anderson.
Importantly, an officer "does not have to know that the defendant committed a crime.
Merely
pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be suspicious is enough to
conduct
a Terry stop." State v. Finley, 17 Kan. App. 2d 246, 251, 838 P.2d 904,
rev. denied 251 Kan. 940
(1992). Although the officers had not observed any unlawful conduct [other than the traffic
infractions] by Anderson, they were able to point to several facts which would cause a reasonable
person to suspect that possible drug activity was taking place. Therefore, the officers were
justified in detaining Anderson after the conclusion of the traffic stop.' [State v.]
Anderson, 34
Kan. App.2d [375] at 386-87[, 119 P.3d 1171 (2006)]." Anderson, 281 Kan. at
903-04.

Golston concedes that the Kansas Supreme Court has already determined that the officers
acted lawfully in stopping Anderson, the driver, and detaining him until the drug dog arrived.
However, Golston attempts to distinguish Anderson by arguing that the Supreme
Court in that
case did not expressly address reasonable suspicion as to the passenger of the vehicle. Golston
contends that even if the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop as to
Anderson, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion specific to Golston to justify the length of his
detention. Golston asserts that the officers' knowledge of his gang membership was insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

We begin our analysis by examining the applicable Constitutional provisions. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[t]he right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides protection identical to that
provided under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, Syl. ¶ 3,
72 P.3d 570
(2003).

A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v.
Slater,
267 Kan. 694, 696-97, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999). A traffic infraction provides an objectively
valid
reason to effectuate a traffic stop, even if the stop is pretextual. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S.
806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). When a law enforcement officer makes a
traffic stop, the driver and any passengers in the car are seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. A passenger, therefore, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a stop.
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, 127 S. Ct. 2400
(2007).

Once an officer lawfully detains a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may order the
driver out of the vehicle without any reasonable suspicion that the driver poses a safety risk.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977).
In Maryland
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997), the Supreme
Court
applied the same rule to passengers. However, an officer may conduct a safety patdown for
firearms or other dangerous weapons, sometimes called a frisk, only when the officer reasonably
suspects that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968); see K.S.A. 22-2402.

Kansas law is clear that a traffic stop, like any investigative detention, must be reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. State
v.
Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, Syl. ¶ 3, 960 P.2d 200 (1998). A law enforcement officer
conducting a
routine traffic stop may request a driver's licence and vehicle registration, run a computer check,
and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he or she is
entitled to operate the car, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his or her way, without being
subject to further delay by the officer for additional questioning. 265 Kan. 238, Syl. ¶ 4.
However,
if an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity, such as drug possession
or trafficking, the officer may detain the driver for further questioning or investigation. State
v.
DeMarco, 268 Kan. 727, 734, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). The officer may also extend the
duration of
the traffic stop if the driver consents to the continuation. State v. Thompson, 284
Kan. 763, 774-76, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007).

In Arizona v. Johnson, __ U.S. __, __L. Ed. 2d __, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009),
the United
States Supreme Court addressed the detention and patdown of a passenger during a routine traffic
stop under facts similar to Golston's case. In Johnson, three officers from Arizona's
gang task
force were on patrol in a neighborhood associated with the Crips gang. At approximately 9 p.m.,
the officers stopped a vehicle after a license plate check revealed the vehicle's registration was
suspended for an insurance-related violation. The officers did not have reasonable suspicion of
any other criminal activity. One of the officers ordered the driver out of the vehicle and ordered
all the passengers to keep their hands visible. A female officer noted the defendant, who was the
back-seat passenger, kept his eyes on the officers, was wearing clothing she considered consistent
with Crips membership, and had a police scanner in his pocket. In response to the officer's
questions, the defendant provided his name and date of birth but said he had no identification with
him. The defendant further indicated that he was from Eloy, Arizona, a place the officer knew was
a home to the Crips gang, and that he had served time in prison.

Although not related to the scope of the stop for the registration violation, the officer
decided she wanted to question the defendant further about his gang membership. She asked the
defendant to step out of the car, and he complied. Based on her observations and the defendant's
answers to her prior questions, the officer suspected the defendant might have a weapon.
Accordingly, she frisked him for officer safety. During the frisk, she felt a gun near the defendant's
waist. The defendant began to struggle, but the officer handcuffed him.

As a result of the incident, the State of Arizona charged the defendant with illegal
possession of a weapon. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful
search. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the stop was lawful and the officer had
cause to suspect the defendant was armed and dangerous. A jury convicted the defendant of the
gun-possession charge.

A divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction.
State v. Johnson, 217 Ariz. 58, 170 P.3d 667 (Ariz. App. 2007). The majority
recognized that the
defendant was lawfully seized when the officers stopped the car. However, the majority reasoned
that prior to the frisk the detention had evolved into a consensual encounter. Absent reason to
believe the defendant was involved in criminal activity, the court held that the officer had no right
to pat the defendant down for weapons, even if the officer had reason to suspect the defendant
was armed and dangerous. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.

In a unanimous opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Arizona Court of Appeals. 129 S. Ct. at 785, 788. The Supreme Court held that, in a traffic-stop
setting, "it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry to a
vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the
vehicle is involved in criminal activity." 129 S. Ct. at 784. The Court recognized that traffic stops
are fraught with dangers to police officers. However, if officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation, the risk of harm for officers, drivers, and passengers is reduced. 129 S.
Ct. at 786. After reviewing its prior decisions in Mimms, Wilson, and Brendlin,
the Court
determined that in a routine traffic stop, the driver and all passengers are seized from the time the
officers initiate the stop until the stop has concluded. The Court stated:

"A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a
traffic
violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and
remains
reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further
need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. [Citation
omitted.] An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this
Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something more than a lawful seizure, so
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. [Citation omitted.]
(Emphasis added.) 129 S. Ct. at 788.

As for the patdown, the Supreme Court determined that to justify a patdown of the driver
or a passenger during a traffic stop, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person
subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous. The Court held that under the circumstances the
officer's patdown of the defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. 129
S. Ct. at 787-88.

Johnson is distinguishable from Golston's case in one important way.
Johnson involved a
routine traffic stop for a registration violation. Without engaging in any significant analysis, the
Supreme Court apparently determined that an officer asking a passenger for his name, birth date,
and identification, questioning him about his gang membership, ordering him out of the vehicle,
and patting him down for officer safety did not "measurably extend the duration of the stop." See
129 S. Ct. at 787-88. Here, the evidence is undisputed that Golston's detention was
extended
beyond the conclusion of the traffic stop. After Padron issued the citation to Anderson and he
refused consent to search the vehicle, Padron informed Anderson that he would have to wait for a
drug dog to arrive. Golston testified that the stop lasted for 20 to 30 minutes before Padron asked
him to exit the vehicle. Because the State does not dispute that both Anderson and Golston were
detained beyond the duration of the traffic stop, Padron needed reasonable suspicion to justify the
length of the stop as to both suspects.

The State argues that under the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable
suspicion specific to Golston to justify the length of his detention. We agree. Although Golston
had been in the car for only a brief period of time before the stop, Padron still had reason to
suspect that Golston was engaged in drug activity, based largely on the information Elmore had
gathered. At the time the duration of the car stop was extended, Padron knew the following
information about Golston: (1) He had just come from an Amoco known for drug activity and
where several arrests for drug-related crimes had occurred over the past 2 years, (2) he was in the
SPIDER database as a documented gang member, (3) he was with Anderson who was on
supervised release from prison and had been involved in a prior stop involving drugs within the
last 2 weeks, and (4) Anderson had just driven Cobos from the Amoco to a suspected drug deal
and it now appeared that Anderson was driving Golston from the Amoco to another possible drug
deal.

As the court stated in Anderson, an officer "does not have to know
that the defendant
committed a crime. Merely pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be
suspicious is enough to conduct a Terry stop." 281 Kan. at 904. Under the totality of
the
circumstances, Padron could point to several facts which would cause a reasonable person to
suspect that Golston was involved in drug activity along with Anderson. Thus, we conclude that
Golston was lawfully detained by Padron for the duration of the stop.

Was the patdown lawful?

Golston argues that he was subjected to an illegal patdown for three reasons. First,
Golston argues that Padron did not reasonably fear for his safety. As we have stated, once a law
enforcement officer has lawfully stopped a person, the officer may conduct a patdown for firearms
or other dangerous weapons when the officer reasonably suspects that his or her personal safety
requires it. K.S.A. 22-2402(2); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Thus, in order for Padron to
pat down
Golston for officer safety, Padron needed reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances that Golston posed a possible threat to officer safety.

Here, at the time Padron conducted the officer-safety patdown, he knew the following
facts about Golston: (1) He was in the SPIDER database as a documented gang member, (2) he
was with a known gang member who was on supervised release from prison and had been
involved in a prior stop involving drugs within the last 2 weeks, (3) he had just come from an
Amoco known for drug activity and where several arrests for drug-related crimes had occurred
over the past 2 years. Padron had several articulable reasons to be concerned that Golston, as a
known gang member, might have a weapon to protect any drugs or money he might be carrying.
Considering all the evidence,we have no difficulty concluding that Padron reasonably
feared for
his safety when he patted down Golston for weapons.

Second, Golston argues that his consent to the patdown was not voluntary. However,
Golston's argument is misplaced. Consent is not a necessary prerequisite to an officer-safety
patdown for weapons. As long as the officer reasonably suspects that his or her personal safety
requires it, the officer may conduct apatdown without the consent of the suspect.
K.S.A. 22-2402(2). An officer-safety patdown is not the same as a search of the suspect, which
requires
either probable cause to search or consent.

Third, Golston argues that Padron's patdown exceeded the scope of a patdown for
weapons. Generally, apatdown maneuver only allows an officer to pat down a
person's outer
clothing without placing the officer's hands inside any pockets or under the outer surface of any
garment, unless or until a weapon is found. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Golston argues
that when
Padron found the baggie in Golston's shoe, he was acting beyond the limited scope of an
officer-safety patdown.

Here, Padron testified that while he was conducting the patdown he observed a plastic bag
sticking out of Golston's shoe. Padron asked Golston what was in his shoe, and Golston
responded he had a little weed. Padron then pulled the baggie out of Golston's shoe and arrested
him. Although Golston testified that Padron stuck his finger into Golston's shoe as part of the
patdown without Golston's permission, the district court found Padron's testimony more credible.
This court does not reweigh the evidence, and Padron's testimony provides substantial competent
evidence that Padron observed the baggie in plain view while conducting the patdown. See
Woolverton, 284 Kan. at 70.

Finally, Golston maintains that Padron's question about what was in Golston's shoe
constituted a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966). However,
Golston
admits that he failed to raise this argument before the district court. Generally, issues not raised to
the district court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. State v. Shopteese,
283 Kan.
331, 339, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007). Accordingly, we will not consider Golston's argument that his
rights under Miranda were violated.