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Permanent Five Agree on Iran: No Consequences, Please

The UN Security Council Permanent Five have reached an agreement on addressing the Iranian nuclear crisis with a softer draft submitted by France, Germany and Britain. There was a push to reach a consensus among the Council’s Permanent Five before their foreign ministers were to meet in Germany. The original proposal has been effectively watered down beyond usefulness. Perhaps, that is, unless you are running a clandestine nuclear program. The steadfast and persistent objections from China and Russia have once again outlasted and overpowered the resolve of Europe and the United States.

The agreed upon draft extends the original 14-day compliance window to 30-days as well as removes strong language in lieu of a gentler approach to the mullah regime. According to New York Times, China and Russia refused to accept the language that labeled the Iranian duplicitous nuclear quest as a “threat to international peace and security,” on the grounds that such language was a precursor to sanctions.

In a capitulation to the Sino-Russo stance, the language has been amended in the new text to merely acknowledge that the Security Council has a “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and defers responsibility of managing the crisis back to the IAEA body that could not resolve or manage the Iranian nuclear crisis to begin with, or for that matter resolve or manage the North Korean nuclear crisis or proliferation threats, such as the AQ Khan network that served both programs.

Rather than identify the Iranian regime’s nuclear program as a threat and addressing it directly, the Security Council is on a path to consume additional mounds of paper for the purpose of re-stating its responsibilities and abdicating enforcement. The IAEA has no enforcement mechanism.

It is presumed that after the expiration of the new proposed 30-day window for Iranian compliance, the IAEA must then make a determination that Iran is either in compliance, non-compliance or violation of the NPT and additional IAEA demands. The IAEA currently has chosen to categorize Iran as in ‘non-compliance’, having forgone the stronger language of ‘violation’. Will the IAEA summon the fortitude to ever determine that the regime is actually in violation? And if so, will the Security Council then follow suit and ratchet up their language? Will it matter?

Earlier in March, India agreed to a nuclear fuel supply from an international consortium headed by the United States. The consortium, called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, is an effort to curb dangerous proliferation by guaranteeing a safe supply of fuel for nuclear reactors for states that want nuclear power without the threat of clandestine weapons programs.

Yesterday, ahead of the Permanent Five agreement, Iran agreed that an international nuclear fuel supply is a good idea…if the fuel is produced from a facility on Iranian soil. This was stated in yet another rejection of the current state of the Russian Proposal, which exists solely for the purposes of removing uranium enrichment and potential plutonium production from within the control of the mullah regime.

The picture is clear. Russia and China have interests in Iranian trade that preclude it from any action (or wording of statements) that punish (or lead to the punishment of) the Iranian regime. Iran has interests in nuclear technology that reach far beyond nuclear power. In fact, Iran’s claim of nuclear power desires is primarily a front for weapons research. With the staunch, persistent objections of veto-wielding China and Russia leading to inaction at the UN and direct mullah control of the nuclear program within Iran’s borders leading to consistent progress, a nuclear-armed and self sufficient Iran is inevitable short of action taken outside the auspices of the United Nations.

Any efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran appear lost. Prepare to accept a nuclear Iran.

A nuclear Iran already at war with the United States and the rest of the West.