Friday, December 28, 2012

The following is a brief summary
of the final chapter of the book The Lebanese Connection; Civil War,
And The International Drug Trafficby Jonathan Marshall, a fellow at “Stanford
Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures” of Stanford
University. The book is a detailed account of the drug trade in Lebanon from
1970-1990 and is based on newly declassified reports and studies of the DEA and
the FBN; US anti drug agencies. The book is currently banned in Lebanon. The
ban has acted as the primary impetus behind this series, which comes to an end
with this final installment. I suspect that the Lebanese authorities banned the
book in an effort to shield many of the names, organizations and even foreign
parties that the book implicates as sponsors of drug trafficking and willing
participants in the all pervasive corruption that transformed Lebanon into a
narco state.

“ Money is power in Lebanon. Money
buys guns and guns are power. It’s like gang warfare in LA”

LA
Times Apr 17, 1990

All modern
states have a relatively healthy segment that is labeled as the underground
economy. That is a fact of life even in
the most advanced of economies that boast a strong law enforcement culture. In
many of these economies the underground sector is at times estimated to account
for about 20% of the official GDP statistic. Lebanon is a state that is
moderately prosperous and that surpasses the above yardsticks. It has been
estimated that the illicit drug trade has at times accounted for over 40% of
its GDP.

The Federal
Bureau of Narcotics of the US, FBN, has described Lebanon as a narco state as
early as 1950. Three factors that are often named as the fundamental reasons
for this development are its geographical location, the general proclivity of
its residents to commerce in addition to its weak governmental institutions.
Confessionalism promoted a stagnant political structure rife with corruption.
(Another argument in favour of secularism).

It is true
that the drug trade did help a large number of Lebanese earn a decent living
but even if one is to put aside the ethical and moral arguments connected to
the drug trafficking one still has to confront the unquestionable economic fact
that the drug trade has warped the macro economy of Lebanon. The drug trade
became the “Dutch Disease” of Lebanon; the growth of one sector at the expense
of other sectors in the economy. It also cemented the dependence on
international trade and gave other countries, such as Egypt and the US, an
opportunity to make demands of the Lebanese authorities to fight drugs. It
legitimized to an extent foreign interference in Lebanese domestic affairs.

The case of
drug trade in Lebanon and their role in both fueling and promoting the civil
war has also been used extensively as a case that supports ; at least partially
the “greed or grievance” debate. This was the idea popularized by Paul Coltier
of the World Bank as an explanation of civil conflicts the world over. He proposes
that “civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially viable” and
that rebellions are not social protests but rather “the ultimate manifestation
of organized crime”.

The above
does not explain fully the Lebanese civil war but it sure explains the absolute
need for a viable financial resource if a militia is to launch successful
activities. This was the role of drugs in Lebanon especially between 1970 and
1990. Drugs became the Lebanese primary export commodity and the struggles
between various militias were in essence a fight over port outlets and other
means that enhance rent expropriation from primary commodities. As you can see,
some have used the above “logic” to make the case that drugs were not a means
but an end in themselves; drugs initiated conflict and did not only fuel it.
Above all it is clear that a most crucial ingredient in transforming a society
into a narco state, besides its geography, proclivity to commerce and social
injustice is the inability of the state to govern.A weak, ineffective and corrupt political
structure might be in the final analysis the largest contributor to the
creation of civil conflict and the rise of dependence on revenue from the drug
trade. The above idea was put best by Brian Evans when he said that civil war
in Lebanon was “not caused by the emerging drug economy any more than the drug
economy was caused by the advent of the war. Rather, they were mutually
reinforcing trends”.

Allow me to
conclude this series by remembering the word of George Santayana that “Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

The following is a list of the names of Lebanese politicians
and some high ranking officials that have been implicated by the evidence; and
not a court of law; as having been involved in the drug trade:

Bechara Khoury

Riad Solh

Sabri Hamadeh

Ibrahim Haidar

Ahmad Al Asad

Camille Chamoun

Abdallah Yafi

Sami Solh

Naif Al Masri

Suleiman Frangieh

Tony Frangieh

Danny Chamoun

Bashir Gemayel

Walid Jumblatt

Samir Geagea

Chief of National Police Farid Chehab

Head of Customs Police Edmond Azizeh

Customs DirectorSalhab

Genderarie ChiefNawfal

In addition to scores of Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli, Armenian
and European individuals and organizations.