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From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

Thursday, June 9, 2016

The Syrian regime unleashed full military
grade chemical weapons against IS several weeks ago, a move that
occasioned little response from the wider world. The assault
demonstrated that the dismantling of the Syrian chemical arsenal has not
been fulfilled. If repeated, the attack might precipitate a dangerous
escalation of the conflict in which IS accelerates its own pursuit of
WMDs.

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 344, June 7, 2016

On or about April 23, 2016, the Syrian regime launched a serious
chemical attack against IS. The object of the attack was to prevent IS
from occupying two essential military airfields east of Damascus. The
attack involved standard military chemical weapons, probably including
the sarin nerve agent in aerial bombs.

This attack was almost completely ignored by the outside world, but
is nevertheless worthy of note. It marked the renewed use by the Syrian
regime of chemical weapons that are far superior to the chlorine gas it
usually employs (following an unverified deployment of a potent chemical
warfare agent in late 2015). Assad used these military grade weapons to
meet a critical strategic imperative, and his decision to do so was
tolerated by the international community – an instructive result of
which he no doubt took note.

The attack illuminates several points about the ongoing civil war. On
the most practical level, it proves categorically that Assad —
notwithstanding his commitment to eliminate the regime’s entire chemical
weapons arsenal — still possesses chemical weapons of full military
grade. The regime has dodged its commitment to dispose of them by
outmaneuvering inadequate international control mechanisms.

The attack also highlights the weakened position of the US in the
Middle East. Red lines firmly posed by President Obama regarding the use
of chemical weapons in Syria have been proven hollow. The failure of US
policy on this issue, and the collapse of the US-Russian understanding
regarding Syria’s chemical disarmament, are worrying developments.

For its part, Russia appears largely untroubled. It is indifferent to
Syria’s continued use of chemical weapons, effectively offering the
regime passive encouragement. The other strategic actor in Syria – Iran,
along with its Hezbollah proxy – is likely to support the use by the
Syrian regime of chemical weapons. The Russian-Syrian-Iranian radical
axis remains the predominant alliance in the Syrian civil war, and both
outside actors have a practical interest in maintaining a chemical
weapons option for use by the regime.

In September 2015, an agreement was reached between Syria and Russia
stipulating that Russia would supply the regime with military support
for the fight against IS and the rebels. About two years earlier, under
the terms of the Lavrov/Kerry agreement, Syria had undertaken to
dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal. Yet while the dismantling was
allegedly underway, the Syrian regime continued to use non-military
grade toxic chemicals as weapons (for example, chlorine). The Russians
showed no discomfort with this, even taking steps on occasion to obscure
the incidents.

As things stand now, the full extent of the Syrian regime’s residual
chemical weapons arsenal is unknown. The precise details do not really
matter. Russia will probably refrain from supplying chemical weapons
directly to Assad. But Iran – which is heavily invested in the Syrian
civil war and the battle against IS – might fill the gap. Iran possesses
a vast inventory of potent chemical weapons, including nerve agents. It
may well prefer to supply some of that inventory to Assad rather than
lose – together with Hezbollah – more and more military manpower on the
Syrian front.

The destruction of IS is proving to be a long and painful effort for
the Syrian regime. From the regime’s perspective, chemical weapons
constitute an “efficient” alternative to conventional warfare against an
enemy that a) is not yet capable of retaliating in kind; b) is
inadequately prepared to defend itself; and c) continues tenaciously to
pursue strategic assets.

From a purely military standpoint, chemical weapons appear to be a
desirable alternative under these circumstances. International red lines
that were shaky at best have evaporated completely, possibly because
the intended target of the weapons is IS. The lack of any meaningful
international will to interfere with the Syrian regime’s struggle
against an unsavory common enemy simplifies the regime’s decision to
unleash its chemical arsenal.

IS, meanwhile, is trying to advance its own WMD capabilities. There
are concrete indications that the organization is seeking enhanced
capacity, particularly in terms of nerve agents, and is attempting to
procure radiological and biological agents. (It pursues nuclear
terrorism capability as well, but is unlikely to attain it.)

IS’s motivation to employ WMD will probably increase if it is itself
regularly targeted by chemical weapons, and the threat will remain even
if IS suffers heavy losses. IS will likely persist as an extremely
radical terror organization even if it loses its capital, Raqqa. Even in
a weakened state, IS should be expected to attempt to carry out
terrorist operations – including WMD attacks – anywhere it can.

The recent aggressive use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime
against IS is a milestone. It suggests a possible transition to the
repeated, effective, and scarcely acknowledged use of chemical weapons
by the regime – a development that could eventually propel an equivalent
response by IS. Such a transition, if realized, could reshape the
conflict by redefining both the legitimacy and the practicability of
using such weapons.PDF

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler FamilyLt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, a microbiologist, is a senior
research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
Recognized as a top expert on chemical and biological warfare in the
Middle East, he is a former senior intelligence analyst in the Israel
Defense Forces and the Israeli Defense Ministry.

Source: http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/chemical-weapons-change-game-syria/ Follow Middle East and Terrorism on TwitterCopyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.