“Interfere, Restrict, Control”

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Summary

Civic engagement and political activism have long played an
important role in Bahrain, a Gulf nation 30 kilometers off the coast of Saudi
Arabia that is home to some 1.2 million people.

Since independence from Britain in 1971, social, cultural,
and sports clubs, as well as civil and professional organizations, have been
pivotal in shaping political debate. With political groups of any sort prohibited
until 2001, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have oftenserved
as forums for discussing social, economic, and political issues.

However, government actions
and legislation have often undermined the ability of such groups to function. Despite
a limited flowering of civil society since 2001, civic, political, and labor organizations
have functioned with difficulty, with authorities
harassing, arresting, and prosecuting their leaders and members. This has
intensified in the wake of widespread pro-democracy demonstrations throughout much
of the country in February and March 2011. In particular, the Ministry of Social Development has far exceeded
international standards in its restrictive scope and “routinely exploited
its oversight role to stymie the activities of NGOs and other civil society
organizations.”[1]

Today, freedom of association
is under even greater threat due in part to draft legislation that is
even more restrictive than the current Law of Associations (No. 21/1989), which
authorities use—in the words of one Bahraini activist—“to
interfere, restrict, and attempt to control the activities of civic
organizations.”

This report examines restrictions on civil societies,
political groups, and trade unions in Bahrain through three main lenses:
current laws, the draft laws (where relevant), and applicable international
standards, using case studies as illustration where possible.

Current Laws

The present Law of Associations prohibits civil society organizations from “engaging in politics”
and lets authorities dissolve organizations
more or less at will. Amended in 2002,
it also prohibits activities that could affect “the foundations of the
Islamic faith or the unity of the people or stirs a discord or sectarianism.”

The report finds that authorities use the law to suppress civil
society and restrict freedom of association in three main ways: by arbitrarily
rejecting registration applications and intrusively supervising NGOs; taking
over and dissolving—more or less at will—organizations whose
leaders have criticized government officials or their policies; and severely limiting
the ability of groups to fundraise and receive foreign funding. For example:

In September 2004, authorities dissolved the Bahrain
Center for Human Rights after its president criticized the prime minister;

In September 2010, the Ministry of Social Development replaced the Bahrain
Human Rights Society’s board after its secretary general criticized
authorities for violating the due process rights of detained opposition
activists;

In April
2011, the Ministry of Social Development
dissolved the Bahrain Teachers’ Society after its leaders took part in February-March
2011 pro-democracy protests;

In April 2011,
authorities replaced Bahrain Medical Society’s board members with a
pro-government board;

In November
2011, the ministry canceled the results of Bahrain Lawyers’ Society
election after the group elected perceived government critics to the board.

In the case of political societies, the report shows how authorities have used the current Law for Political
Societies (Law No. 26/2005), the Public Gathering Law of 1973, and the Press
Law of 2002 to prohibit political parties and control their freedom of
association, expression, and peaceful assembly. Authorities do not have to give
a reason when they deny registration to a political society, which can
be suspended if it “violates” legal
or constitutional provisions. Political groups cannot contact political groups
outside Bahrain without official approval and may not accept
“donations” or “benefit” from a foreign person or
entity. Recent restrictive measures highlighted in this report include:

In May 2005, authorities shuttered the offices of the Islamic Action Society (Amal) for 45 days after it held
an event to honor 73 individuals jailed for allegedly planning a coup in 1981;

In March and April 2011, security
forces arrested dozens of protest leaders, including Ibrahim Sharif,
leader of the leftist National Democratic Action Society (Wa’ad) and
Shaikh Muhammad Ali al-Mahfoodh of the Islamic Action Society (Amal).

In April 2011, the Bahrain
Defense Force shut down Wa’ad and blocked its website for more than
two months on charges of “defaming the armed forces and spreading
false news.”

In June 2011, a
special military court convicted Sharif and 20 other protest leaders—seven
in absentia—and sentenced them to prison terms of up to life
imprisonment for offenses relating to the exercise of freedom of
expression, assembly, and association.

In July 2012, a court dissolved the Amal political society for failing
to “convene a general conference for more than four years” and
“taking its decisions from a religious authority who calls openly
for violence and incites hatred.”

Under Bahrain’s Workers
Trade Union Law (33/2002), workers can establish trade unions without prior official
approval, although authorities do not let public sector workers create unions. This
report shows how the law and other government regulations impose numerous
restrictions on the right to strike and prohibit strikes in “vital and
important facilities” such as “security, civil defense, airports,
ports, hospitals, transportations, telecommunications, electricity and water
facilities” and near “bakeries, all means of transporting people
and goods, educational establishments and oil and gas installations.”

In 2011,
King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifaamended the Trade Union Law to
allow more than one trade union federation in Bahrain, a move many unionists consider
to be retribution for the call by
the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU) for
mass labor strikes during the February-March pro-democracy demonstrations in 2011.
After the amendment came into force in March 2012, government loyalists established
the Bahrain Free Labour Unions Federation (BFLUF). The new federation has accused
the GFBTU of being a political tool of the opposition groups. The king’s
amendment also granted the minister of labor the power to decide which trade
union confederation will engage in collective bargaining at the national level
and represent Bahrain in international meetings and events.

Draft Law of Associations

In February 2013, Human Rights
Watch obtained a copy of the 2012 Draft
Law on Civil Organizations and Institutions (Draft Law of Associations) that the government adopted in August 2012. It needs approval from both National Assembly
houses—the elected Chamber of Deputies and appointed Shura
Council—and King Hamad’s signature to become law. It was not clear
at time of writing when the house would approve the law, or when the king would
sign it into law.

The draft law, which the government sent to parliament in
January 2013 without consulting or informing
local organizations, follows years of
failing to pass draft legislation that would liberalize the process of forming
and running civil society organizations.

Several of its provisions are even more draconian than the
current 1989 law. They include increasing
the required number of founding members from 10 to 15. The current law does not
require applicants to provide operation budgets, but the draft law requires an organization
seeking to register to have a “two year operational budget” and to
provide evidence that it has a physical office. Similarly the current law
does not prohibit applicants from seeking to register a dissolved NGO. The draft
law prohibits any effort “to revive another NGO that was dissolved or
merged into another organization.”

International and Bahraini Law

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Bahrain is party, clearly establishes the rights to freedom
of association and participation in public
affairs.

The ICCPR does allow for some narrow restrictions on the
right to freedom of association that are necessary for the protection of “national
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection
of public health or morals” and these
restrictions are subjected to a rigorous test. For example the term
“national security” and “public safety” refer to a
situation involving immediate and violent threat to the entire nation.

Bahraini laws and regulations
do not adequately guarantee the right to freedom of association as set out in
in the ICCPR. Bahraini authorities have decreed and drafted laws that
significantly narrow the opportunities for establishing and operating political
and civic associations and trade unions, and unduly restrict their capacity to
function.

Necessary Steps

Human Rights Watch calls on
the Bahraini government to amend existing laws and draft legislation that allow
the government to control and suppress the legitimate activities of NGOs, labor
unions, and political groups and to prosecute their leaders and members for
exercising their right to freedom of association. These include:

Releasing all leaders and activists with
opposition NGOs and political societies who have been jailed solely for the
exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly, and expunging their convictions.

Amending the 2012 Draft Law of Associations to bring it
into conformity with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) by lifting broad restrictions and prohibitions on the right
to freedom of association except for legitimate reasons defined under
article 22 (2) of the ICCPR.

Amending article 4 (4) of
the Political Societies Law (No. 26/2005) to abolish the overly broad
provision that prohibits establishing political societies on the basis of “class,
sect, geography, profession, religion, language, race or sex.”

Respecting and promoting the rights of workers by amending
the Workers Trade Union Law (Law 33/2002) to allow public sector workers
to create and join trade unions in accordance with Bahrain’s
obligations under the ICCPR.

Human Rights Watch also urges
the government to consult with civil society, including opposition groups and
political societies, when amending current association-related laws and proposing
new legislation. Only by ceasing unjustifiable interference with the exercise
of the right to freedom of association can the government meet its obligations under
international human rights law.

Key Recommendations

To the Government of Bahrain

In order to comply with international obligations regarding
freedom of association:

Remove all unjustifiable restrictions on the
peaceful exercise of the internationally recognized rights to freedom of
association and freedom to participate in public life;

Release all leaders and activists with
opposition NGOs and political societies who have been jailed solely for the
exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly, and expunging their convictions;

Amend article 2 of the Draft Law on Civil
Organizations and Institutions to eliminate restrictions on establishing NGOs
on “a factional or sectarian basis or to achieve objectives contrary to
the provisions of the constitution or legislation in force in the Kingdom of
Bahrain, or the public order and morals, or [if their] activities include
engaging in politics”;

Amend article 8 of the Draft Law on Civil
Organizations and Institutions to specify that the absence of a Ministry of
Social Development response to a registration request by a civic organization
within 60 days means that approval has been given;

Amend article 4 (4) of the Political
Societies Law (No. 26/2005) to eliminate restrictions on establishing political
society on the basis of “class, sect, geography, profession, religion,
language, race or sex”;

Amend the Workers Trade Union Law (Law
33/2002) to allow public sector workers to create and join trade unions; and

Ratify key International Labour Organization
conventions, such as the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

Methodology

Human Rights Watch
researchers visited Bahrain for two weeks in November-December 2011 and again
briefly in February 2013, and met with more than two dozen members of civic
associations, trade unions, and political societies.

During this period Bahrain
did not respond to multiple visa requests by the Human Rights Watch researcher responsible
for this report to visit Bahrain.

Human Rights Watch conducted additional
interviews, most of them in Arabic, via telephone and Skype with approximately 30
other NGO, trade union, and political society leaders and members. All interview subjects consented to take part in our
interviews and were informed that the interviews were to be in a human rights
report. In some cases the report
withholds the identities of sources to protect their safety and privacy. Human
Rights watch did not offer interview subjects any remuneration.

Representatives of the NGOs,
workers’ unions and political societies provided Human Rights Watch with copies
of official documents, without remuneration, pertaining to the cases discussed in
this report. Human Rights Watch also obtained documents available on websites
affiliated with the Bahraini government. All of these documents are on file
with Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch learned
about case studies mentioned in this report from media reports and from members
of NGOs, workers’ unions, and political societies. There may be cases that
Human Rights Watch is not aware of, and thus has not included here.

The report also draws on
accounts, from 1998 to 2013, relating to the cases covered in this report
published by pro-government and independent media in Bahrain as well as
international media.

In February 2013, a delegation of Human Rights Watch met
with the Ministry of Social Development’s officials and discussed some of
the issues raised in this report. On May 13, 2013, Human Rights Watch sent a
letter to the Ministry of Social Development summarizing its findings and
conclusions, and asking for comments and clarifications, to which the ministry
did not respond.

I. Background

Civil Society in Bahrain

Around half of
Bahrain’s population of 1.2 million are Bahraini nationals; the rest are
migrant and expatriate workers.Some 60 percent of Bahraini nationals are Shia Muslims.[2] The ruling Al Khalifa family, who are Sunni
Muslims, control all key political government posts, security positions, and
important economic institutions.

During the 20th
century, civic, political, and trade union organizations played increasingly important
roles in shaping Bahrain, a British protectorate between 1868 and 1971. Since
1995, Bahrain has been home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet.

In 1938, for example, workers
at the Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) organized a strike to protest the
company’s prioritizing foreign workers over Bahrainis when hiring. Bahrainis
advocating for labor rights and a representative government established the
Higher Executive Committee (later the National Union Committee) in 1954. After
protests erupted in 1956, British authorities deported several of the
group’s leaders to the South Atlantic island of St. Helena, where they
spent five years in exile.

The early 1990s witnessed public
demonstrations and petitions calling for greater civil and political rights in
Bahrain and restoration of the National Assembly. The ruling family stood
firmly against reforms, leading to widespread arrests of peaceful protesters as
well as those who clashed with security forces.[3]

After becoming emir in 1999, Hamad
bin Isa Al Khalifa oversaw a number of significant political reforms, including
cancelling in February 2001 the State Security Law, abolishing state security
courts, pardoning hundreds of political prisoners, and issuing amnesties for
exiled political figures.[4]

Since 2001, scores of civic,
labor, and political organizations have emerged in Bahrain. However, the authorities have continued to harass and prosecute
leaders and members of civic and political organizations critical of government
policies, a campaign that has escalated in the wake of the February-March 2011 political
crisis.

On February 14, 2011, thousands of Bahrainis came out in
street demonstrations in several parts of the country demanding greater
political rights and government reform. Security forces used lethal force to suppress
and disperse demonstrators.

Government repression of the civic,
labor, and political organizations intensified after King Hamad declared a three-month state of emergency in mid-March 2011. Security
forces launched a campaign of retribution and arrested thousands who participated
in, or appeared to support, the largely peaceful protests, including leaders of
opposition political groups, civic organizations, and labor unions.
Civilian and special military courts sentenced hundreds
of people accused of involvement with the protests in unfair trials.

Since the 2011 crackdown, authorities have amended a
number of laws that would make it even harder for civic organizations to
operate. This report examines the relevant laws and draft laws that authorities
have used or proposed to further restrict freedom of association in Bahrain.

II. Civil Society
Organizations

Civil society organizations have to report every idea,
thought, and activity to authorities.... All these hinder the abilities
of the societies. There is a huge attack on civil associations in Bahrain.

—Rula al-Saffar,
president of the Bahrain Nursing Society, August 8, 2012.[5]

Civic engagement and political activism in Bahrain predate
independence from British rule in 1971.
For the past several decades, social, cultural, and sports clubs, as well as
civil and professional organizations, have played important roles in shaping political
debate in the country. Given the prohibition on political groups until
2001, NGOs oftenserved as forums for discussing social,
economic, and political issues.[6]

In 1989, the government issued by decree the Law of
Associations, Social and Cultural Clubs, Special Committees Working in the
Field of Youth and Sports, and Private Institutions (Law of Associations No.
21/1989). The law, among other things, prohibits civil society
organizations from “engaging in politics.”[7] In
2002, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa amended the law to also prohibit activities
that could affect “the foundations of the Islamic faith or the unity of
the people or stirs discord or sectarianism.”[8]

The authorities use the law, in the words of one Bahraini
activist, “to interfere, restrict, and attempt to control the activities
of civic organizations.”[9]

Authorities have used this law to clamp down on
organizations arbitrarily, especially targeting those involved in peaceful
dissent, or which have supported political opposition groups. In 2011, authorities
invoked the Law of Associations to dissolve, take over, or suspend organizations
that supported pro-democracy demonstrations that swept the country in February
and March that year. In April 2011, the Ministry of Social Development
dissolved the Bahrain Teachers’ Society and replaced the board of the Bahrain
Medical Society. Both organizations had supported demonstrators’ demands
for greater political rights.

Authorities freely used the provisions of the law against civil
society organizations in earlier periods as well. In January 1998, for example,
the government reacted swiftly when the Bahrain Lawyers’ Society (BLS)
held a seminar in which speakers criticized the government.[10]
The Ministry of Labor and Social Development,
then in charge of civil groups, suspended its board of directors because it had
allegedly “engaged in political activities.”[11]
The society successfully appealed the decision
at an administrative court.

In September 2004, the government dissolved the Bahrain
Center for Human Rights after its then-president, Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja, criticized
the prime minister for his economic policies, alleged corruption, and human
rights abuses.[12] A court
convicted al-Khawaja of “inciting hatred against the regime.”[13]

In August 2007, the Ministry of Social Development threatened
legal action against the Bahrain Women’s Association after the
organization invited women rights activists to Bahrain without getting prior permission
from the ministry.[14]

In August 2010, the ministry threatened to shut down a women’s
shelter managed by the Bahrain Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS) following
an incident in which a migrant domestic worker fled to the shelter from the
home of a high ministry official, claiming she had been abused. The ministry
claimed that the society had not registered the shelter. The head of MWPS
responded with a copy of the government's 2005 authorization of the shelter, and
noted that in previous years the ministry itself had donated funds to support
the shelter.[15]

This chapter examines three main areas regarding restrictions
on freedom of association and suppression of civil society in Bahrain:

Takeover and in some cases dissolution of organizations
whose leaders have criticized government officials or their policies;

Considerable limits placed on the ability of groups to fund
raise and receive foreign funding.

In each of these three areas the report examines current
applicable law, the provisions of the draft law under consideration that relate
to the issue, and applicable international standards. Case studies illustrate how
authorities have used the law to harass and, in some cases, outlaw civic groups
that have been critical of the government or its policies.

Freedom of Association/Civil Society Repression

International

The right to freedom of association is well established
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to
which Bahrain is party. Article 22 of the ICCPR
states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others.”[16] As
such, it is “not something that must first be granted by the government
to citizens.”[17] The ICCPR does allow for some narrow restrictions on
the right to freedom of association but subjects these to a rigorous test, as
defined by the ICCPR in article 22 (2).

No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

The term “national security” refers to “a
political or military threat to the entire nation or that disseminates
propaganda for war.” “Public safety” refers to threats to “the
security of persons (i.e., their lives, physical integrity or health).”[18]

Professor Manfred Nowak, in his authoritative commentary on
the ICCPR, wrote that while article 22 protects associations, states may
require a licensing system, including a registration duty.[19]
Any restriction done for a legitimate reason must still be “proportional
and be oriented along the basic democratic values of pluralism, tolerance,
broad-mindedness and peoples' sovereignty.”[20]

Bahrain has also ratified the Arab League’s Arab
Charter for Human Rights, which affirms that citizens have the right to
“freely form and join associations with others.”[21]

Bahraini Law

Article 27 of Bahrain’s 2002 Constitution guarantees
the freedom to establish associations and unions “under the rules and
conditions laid down by law,” provided their objectives are lawful and
carried out by peaceful means and do not infringe on “the fundamentals of
religion and public order.”[22]

In practice, Bahraini authorities have used loosely worded provisions
of the current Law of Associations and other laws to significantly narrow the
scope for establishing and operating political and civic associations and
restrict their capacity to function. For example,
article 18 of the 1989 Law of Associations says that organizations “may not
get involved in politics” and article 50 says that authorities can
dissolve NGOs if they think the NGOs are “unable to achieve the objectives
[they were] established for... or if they violate the association law, public
order and norms.” Thus the law provides numerous ways for authorities to
interfere arbitrarily with NGO affairs and shut them down.

The law requires that all civil society groups, even
informal ones, register with authorities. Article 89 of the 1989 law stipulates
a fine of 500 Bahraini Dinars (US$1,320) and/or six months' imprisonment for
establishing and operating an unregistered organization.[23]

Article 163 of Bahrain’s penal code also criminalizes
membership in unlicensed organizations in Bahrain or in organizations outside
of the country.[24] In
November 2010, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa signed an amendment to article 89
of the 1989 law specifying penalties of up to one year in prison and/or a fine
of up to 1,000 Bahraini Dinars ($2,640) for anyone who publishes or broadcasts
anything on behalf of an organization operating without a license.[25]

In 2007, the Ministry of Social
Development, which since 2005 has been in charge of implementing the Law
of Associations and overseeing civil society groups’ affairs, announced plans to replace the 1989 Law of Associations.[26] In April 2007, Minister of Social Development Fatima
al-Balooshi said the legislation “will be passed within months.”[27]Al-Wasat, Bahrain’s only independent daily,
published the draft law in September 2009.[28] Authorities after 2007 did not provide
updates on the status of the draft until August 2011, at which time al-Balooshi
said the government was “preparing a final version of the new draft law
for private organizations after inserting draft amendments.”[29]

In May 2012, Human Rights Watch wrote to the ministry
requesting a copy of the draft law, and sent further requests for a copy of the
law after it was reportedly submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. The ministry
did not respond.[30]

On August 12, 2012, the
Bahrain News Agency reported that the Council of Ministers had adopted a draft Law
of Associations.[31] The
process had no transparency whatsoever. Local organizations told Human Rights
Watch that authorities did not consult them ahead of passing the legislation
and that they were not aware of its adoption until media reported it.[32] On
August 15, 2012, Najwa Janahi, director of NGO
affairs in the ministry, claimed that the government had consulted
representatives of civic organizations and experts in 2007, although the 2012 draft
bore little resemblance to the draft of 2007 and is in some respects more
restrictive than the current 1989 law.[33]

During its visit to Bahrain in February 2013, Human Rights
Watch obtained a copy of the draft law adopted by the government and submitted
to the Chamber of Deputies.[34]

The following analysis of
the most problematic restrictions on NGOs is based on
the Draft Law of Associations that Human Rights Watch obtained in February
2013.

Registering and Supervising NGOs

Current Law

Law 21/1989 authorizes Bahraini authorities to control civil
society groups via the registration process and strictly supervise their
activities. All organizations must register with authorities prior to undertaking
activities.

The Ministry of Social
Development is responsible for registering all organizations except
“cultural and artistic associations,” which the Ministry of
Information supervises.[35] Under the current law, the General Organization for
Youth and Sports is responsible for registering and managing “youth and
sports … clubs.”[36]

The government provides funds for NGO activities that the
Ministry of Social Development approves.[37] Once
they do register, NGOs are subject to intense official scrutiny and, if critical
of government officials and policies, are targets of official harassment. The
ministry can rescind an NGO’s status at any time.

The authorities take advantage of the fact that Law 21/1989 contains
broadly worded provisions that allow them to deny an organization’s
request to register if, for example, authorities determine that “society
does not need its services or if there are other associations that fulfill the
society’s need.”[38]

To start the registration process, the applicant has to
submit information about the organization’s founders (at least 10 persons
under the 1989 law); its purpose and geographic area of activities; its sources
of income and internal auditing procedures; conditions for accepting and
dismissing members; and its mechanism to elect board members and dissolve the
organization.[39]

The application is considered rejected if the ministry does
not respond within 60 days.[40]

The applicant can appeal a registration denial to the minister
of social development and subsequently to the High Civil Court. The court reviews
officials' compliance with the formalities of registration under the Law of
Association and tests whether the officials properly used their authority to
deny a registration.[41]

The 1989 law also grants government officials the power to monitor
and intervene in the activities and management of recognized NGOs. For example,
the Ministry of Social Development can decide to merge organizations that it
concludes work to “achieve similar aims.”[42]
Civil society organizations must notify authorities 15 days before holding
general assembly meetings, which authorities can attend.[43]
They must also inform authorities of any decision that the board takes within
15 days of the meeting.[44]

The ministry can also overturn
NGO decisions if authorities consider that they violate the NGO’s bylaws “or
public order and norms.”[45] The law requires NGOs to get permission to
organize any fundraising events, and specifies that a group submit bank account
information to authorities, who can freeze a group’s funds and accounts.[46] Authorities can request that an organization provide
any and all records, documents, and correspondence.[47]

Draft Law

The August 2012 Draft Law of Associations (Draft Law on Civil Organizations and Institutions) that
the government submitted to the National Assembly in January 2013 removed most
of the improved features of the 2007 draft law and maintained many highly restrictive
features of the existing law regarding NGO registration and ministry control
over the affairs of civil society organizations. Some provisions of the new law
are even more burdensome than the current law.

For example, article 2 of the
draft law would add a new provision that would prohibit establishing NGOs on
“a factional or sectarian basis or to achieve objectives contrary to
the provisions of the constitution or legislation in force in the Kingdom of
Bahrain, or the public order and morals, or [if their] activities include
engaging in politics.”[48]

Professor Manfred Nowak, in his commentary on the ICCPR,
wrote that “the principles of equality and the prohibition of
discrimination runs like a red thread throughout the [ICCPR].” Article 26 of the ICCPR, he wrote,
guarantees “equal protection of the law, as well as a general prohibition
of discrimination,”[49] adding that
“the freedom to proclaim political beliefs is principally ensured by the
political freedoms in [articles] 19, 20, 21 [and 25 of the ICCPR].”

The language of article 2 of the 2012 draft law is overly
broad and the words ‘factional or sectarian basis’ would appear to
allow the discriminatory prohibition of NGOs specifically on their political or
religious beliefs.

The Ministry of Social Development
can reject the registration of an NGO if it determines that “[Bahraini]
society does not need its services … or if [the NGO was founded] in order
to revive another NGO that was dissolved or merged into another
organization.”[50]

The 2012 draft law increases the required number of founding
members from 10 to 15.[51]
The draft legislation requires that an organization seeking to register has a
“two year operational budget” and to provide evidence that it has a
physical office.[52]

As in the present law, an
organization’s application is considered rejected if the ministry
does not expressly approve it within 60 days.[53]
The applicant can appeal a denial to a ministerial committee, appointed by the
minister, which should review the appeal within 60 days of receiving it.[54] The
appeal is considered denied if the committee does not respond within 60 days.[55] The
applicant can then appeal the ministerial committee’s denial to the
administrative court within 60 days of learning about the denial.[56]

The draft law also prohibits a member of one NGO from
joining another NGO if the two organizations “conduct similar activities,
unless approved by the minister.”[57]

Nongovernmental organizations must notify authorities 15
days before holding general assembly meetings, which authorities can attend.[58]
Organizations must also inform authorities of any decision that the board takes
within 10 days of the meeting, as opposed to 15 days under the current law.[59]

Under the draft law the ministry retains authority to merge
NGOs “if they work to achieve similar objectives … or to modify
their purposes depending on the needs of the society… or for other
reasons.”[60]
The ministry’s approval is needed if an organization wants to affiliate or
collaborate with an organization outside Bahrain; in this case approval is
automatic if the ministry does not object within 90 days of receiving
notification.[61]

Under article 88
of the draft law NGOs also need prior
permission from “the minister [of social development] and relevant
authorities” to invite foreigners to visit Bahrain for activities such as
conferences and forums.[62] Article 87 (9) stipulates a fine of 1,000
Bahraini Dinars (US$2,640) and/or imprisonment for violating article 88.[63]

Recommended Standards

The Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations,
a handbook published by the Open Society Institute in cooperation with the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), recommends that laws
governing the right of association “should be written and administered so
that it is quick, easy, and inexpensive to establish a civic organization as a
legal person.”[64]

Laws regarding establishment of NGOs should set short time frames
for authorities to review an application “e.g., a maximum of 60 days,”
and failure to do so “should result in presumptive approval.”[65]
Aspiring NGOs should not be required to prove that they are able to accomplish
stated objectives.[66] The ICNL
also recommends that NGOs should be permitted to “embrace all
activities” that “would be legal if engaged in by any individual,”
including politics.[67]

In any case in which the state authority rejects an
application, the ICNL says, “the responsible state agency should be
required to provide a detailed written statement of reasons for refusal”
and “an opportunity to correct any defects in the application,” and
the refusal should be “appealable to an independent court.”[68]

The ICNL recommends that only organizations that have
“significant public benefit activities or [operate] with substantial
public support” be required to file annual financial and activities
reports with a regulatory body, provided that the latter “protect(s) the
legitimate privacy interests of donors and recipients of benefits as well as
the protection of confidential or proprietary information.”[69]

While the ICNL acknowledges that it may be reasonable for a
regulatory body to examine records and activities of organizations
“during ordinary business hours, with adequate advance notice,” it
argues that those powers should not be used to “inhibit the freedom of
association of the individuals” or harass the organization.[70]

The ICNL recommends that authorities set “clear
rules” to allow “but not compel” NGOs to merge, split, or
modify themselves. However, it states that authorities could set conditions on
the ability of NGOs to merge with “for-profit entities.”[71]

The Ministry of Social Development’s restrictive
approach to Bahraini NGOs goes well beyond what international standards
stipulate, as the following case studies illustrate. As one US State Department
report noted, Bahraini civil society activists have complained that the
ministry has “routinely exploited its oversight role to stymie the
activities of NGOs and other civil society organizations.”[72]

Case Studies

The 1989 Law of Associations now in force does not require
authorities to notify aspiring NGOs when they reject an application to
register. Human Rights Watch is aware of several cases—some of which are detailed
below—of authorities refusing to register would-be NGOs that media have
reported or that Bahraini activists brought to Human Rights Watch’s attention.[73]

In the first two cases, the Ministry of Social Development in
2005 refused to register the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR) and
in 2009 rejected the application of the Bahrain al-Nazaha Society. In the case of
the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, the
ministry ordered it to disband a coalition advocating women’s rights.[74] The fourth example looks at the ministry’s attempt
to shut down a shelter managed by the Migrant Workers Protection Society.

1. Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights

The Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR), founded by
a group of young rights activists, submitted its registration application in March
2005. According to one founder, Muhammad al-Maskati, the ministry never
responded to the request, effectively rejecting the application to operate
legally.[75]

The society nevertheless openly carried out activities,
including public events and workshops. In February 2007, the ministry filed a
complaint with the Public Prosecution, which then filed a case against
al-Maskati on charges of “operating an organization without license.”[76] Al-Maskati
told Human Rights Watch that the ministry complained because “our work,
activities, and cooperation with international rights groups increased.”

I believe this advocacy drew the attention of authorities
and they wanted us to stop. The public prosecutor summoned me. During the questioning
the officers asked about our work with international rights groups and human
rights complaints we had sent to different UN agencies.[77]

According to the US State Department, the Ministry of Social
Development rejected BYSHR’s registration application “allegedly because
of its ties to the dissolved Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) and because
some of its members were younger than the 18 [years old].”[78]
Al-Maskati told Human Rights Watch that he was the youngest among the founders and
that he was 18 when the group applied for registration. He agreed that his ties
with the BCHR might have been a factor:

I think that they rejected the registration because of me.
Before we started BYHRS I was actively involved with the Bahrain Center for
Human Rights. When authorities filed the complaint they only targeted me,
although there were many others working with BYHRS.[79]

On April 5, 2010, a minor criminal court fined al-Maskati
500 Bahraini Dinars (US$1,320) for operating an unlicensed organization.[80]
On December 23, 2010, the Court of Appeal upheld the minor court’s ruling
and al-Maskati paid the fine.[81]

The society still monitors
human rights violation in Bahrain and publishes news releases and reports.
Al-Maskati told Human Rights Watch that authorities continue to harass the
group. On October 16, 2012, security forces arrested al-Maskati on charges of
participating in “illegal gathering” in Manama a week earlier. He
was released on bail the following day.[82]

2. Bahrain al-Nazaha Society

On November 1, 2009, a group
of journalists submitted an application to register the Bahrain al-Nazaha
(Integrity) Society. According to its bylaws, the society’s goal was to
monitor elections at the municipal and national levels and internal civil
society organization elections.

The ministry did not respond within 60 days of receiving the
application, effectively rejecting the application. The group appealed to the
ministry, which again did not respond within the 60 day period, thus reaffirming
its denial of the application.[83]
Hussain Mansour, one of the founders, told Human Rights Watch that the group had
no choice but to resort to courts, “The ministry kept procrastinating and
never responded to our letters. It became clear to us that the ministry
didn’t want to register our organization.”[84]

On May 13, 2010, the group filed a lawsuit at the High Civil
Court appealing the ministry’s denial. On June 17, 2010, the
ministry provided a written statement of the reason for its refusal to register
the organization. The letter, signed by Najwa Janahi, director of NGO affairs
in the ministry, said implausibly that “among the purposes of this
association is achieving social goals, therefor the Ministry of Culture and Information
is the specialized authority to register this association.”[85] As
noted, the law designates the Ministry of Information as the relevant authority
solely for groups pursuing cultural and artistic goals.

The ministry also told the court that because the
association goals included “spreading the culture of integrity,”
“supporting the Bahraini 2030 economic vision,” “drafting an
integrity code of conduct,” and “monitoring … referendums and
elections,” it fell outside the social development
ministry’s authority and that the founders should therefore seek to
register with the Ministry of Information.[86]
Mansour told Human Rights Watch that in court ministry officials argued that
one of the stated missions of the organization, to “promote the culture
of integrity,” meant that it did not fall under the mandate of the social
development ministry but rather the Ministry of Information.[87]

On April 26, 2011, the court agreed with the Ministry of Social
Development that the “main goal of the association… was spreading
the culture of integrity and [drafting] an integrity code of conduct,” and
that therefore the founders should seek to register with the Ministry of
Information.[88] An
appeals court upheld the ruling on June 25, 2012.[89]

Mansour believes there were
other reasons for rejecting the application:

Our stated mission included organizing forums and lectures
to discuss issues on integrity and combating corruption. I think authorities
just did not want to register another rights organization that might challenge
or criticize them.[90]

Mansour provided Human Rights Watch with a copy of the
Ministry of Social Development’s November 2011 decision to approve the
registration of an association that focused on “spreading the culture of
human rights” in its mission statement.

“The goal of both organizations was ‘spreading a
culture of something’ but I believe the other organization was approved
because the founders were pro-government supporters and ours was rejected
because we were not considered government supporters,” Mansour said.[91]
Mansour said that he did not seek to register the organization with the
Ministry of Information.

3. Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society

The Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society (BHRWS) was established
in December 2004 by Faisal Fulad, then a member of the Shura Council, and 12
0thers.[92] The
organization worked on several campaigns on migrant labor rights and frequently
took positions on other human rights issues supporting the government. The
group’s first problem with authorities came after it established, along
with the National Coalition to Stop Violence Against Women, the Respect Movement,
in December 2005 to urge the government to draft a codified family law and
protect domestic workers against abuse. The Ministry of Social Development
effectively disbanded the coalition in July 2006 by requiring that the
coalition register as an NGO. Following the ministry’s obstruction the BHRWS
operated the campaign alone.[93]

4. Migrant Workers Protection Society

The Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS) was established
in February 2005 to “educate the community about issues [facing] migrant
workers” and “assist and protect the migrant workers.”[94] The
organization established a shelter in April 2005 for runaway female domestic
workers.[95]

In August 2010, the Ministry of Social Development informed the
MWPS that the society's shelter was not legally registered and must close. This
followed an incident in which a migrant domestic worker fled to the shelter
from the home of a high ministry official, claiming she had been abused.

The society successfully contested the ministry’s
effort to shut the shelter by providing a copy of the government's 2005
authorization of the shelter and noting that in previous years the ministry had
donated funds to support the shelter.[96]

Takeover and Dissolution of NGOs

Civil society organizations that manage to register in
Bahrain remain vulnerable to government takeover or arbitrary dissolution for violating
such vague prohibitions as “engaging in politics” or—in the
case of one organization—“serving [only] a certain segment of the
society.” Faced with arbitrary enforcement of vaguely worded laws, it is
often simply a matter of time before groups that criticize government policies find
themselves targeted by the authorities.

Current Law

Under the 1989 Law of Associations,
the Ministry of Social Development can dismiss the officers and dissolve the
board of directors of a group, and appoint ministry officials to run the group for
up to one year.[97] In addition, the ministry can cancel results of elections
for officers and boards of directors if authorities consider that the election violated
the association’s bylaws or the Law of Associations.[98]Article 50 enables the ministry to permanently
dissolve or temporarily close organizations if
the group is “unable to achieve its aims,” or violates “the
law, public order and norms.”[99]

Draft Law

Under article 20 of the 2012 Law
of Associations, the Minister of Social Development can take over a
group in vaguely specified or trivial circumstances.[100] The
minister can then appoint an “ad-hoc committee composed of members of the
federation to which the civic organization belongs” or a director or
interim board of the minister’s choice.[101]
The draft law stipulates that the assigned administrator obtain the ministry’s
approval to call for an election “at least a month” before his or
her assignment ends.

The draft legislation improves upon this element of the
current law by giving the NGO a chance to
correct alleged violations of the law and ministerial regulations.[102] The ministry however decides which violations are
correctable and sets a time limit to correct them.

Under the draft legislation the Ministry of Social
Development retains the authority to close any organization and then, within 60
days, seek its permanent dissolution by administrative court order if it
determines that the organization committed violations. These violations include
being “unable to achieve the purposes it was established for… or
exceeded those purposes … or provided its services on factional,
sectarian, or racial basis,” or if the organization violates the Law of
Associations.[103]

The draft law says that the minister’s decision takes
effect as soon as “a registered written order” reaches the NGO. It
also says that the “order shall be implemented by force if necessary.”[104]
The NGO has 15 days to appeal a closure order to an administrative court.[105]

Recommended Standards

The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL),
which provides information on international legal standards for civic
organizations, says that granting the power to ministries and state agencies to
dissolve NGOs will have a “chilling effect on the independence and
activities of civic organizations” and recommends that the law provide
other penalties—for example, fines specific to different types of
violations.[106]

According to the ICNL, termination and dissolution of an NGO
should be “the last resort” and “only for the most serious
and blatant violations, and then, except in cases involving the most urgent
threat of irreparable harm, only after the civic organization has been given an
opportunity to correct its behavior and challenge the allegations.” The
ICNL also recommends that any decision to dissolve an organization should not
be implemented until “the appeal is completed or the time for appeal has
lapsed.”[107]

The ICNL’s view is that civil society organizations “are
key participants in framing and debating issues of public policy” and
they have the right to freely express their views on “state actions, and
policies … to criticize (or praise) state officials and candidates for
political office.”[108]
This recommendation stands in contrast to the broadly worded prohibition in
Bahrain’s current and draft associations laws against any
“involvement in politics.”

Case Studies

The following cases illustrate how
authorities have used provisions of the 1989 Law of Associations to harass and in
some cases close down groups critical of the government or its policies. Such
actions have resulted in some groups ceasing to exist, while others continue to
work in the shadows, vulnerable to harassment and possible prosecution.

These experiences also illustrate the authorities’ arbitrary
and inconsistent interpretation of the term “involvement in politics.”
It appears that when groups support the government and its policies,
authorities welcome their expression of political views while groups critical
of the government face serious consequences.

1. Bahrain Human Rights Society

The Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS) was registered in
May 2001, with a stated mission to use “peaceful and legal means to
promote human rights” and “achieve dignity, justice and
equality.”[109]

In August 2010, two months
ahead of Chamber of Deputies and municipal elections, authorities arrested
leading opposition activists and charged 25 of them (including two in absentia)
on charges such as attempting to change the political system—considered a
terrorism charge. Those detained were denied access to lawyers and family
visits and alleged they had been subjected to torture during interrogation.[110]

On August 28, Abdulla al-Derazi, then secretary general of
BHRS, held a press conference in which he talked about denial of
basic rights of detainees—including access to lawyers and family members
and right to a fair trial—and said that the arrests amounted to “enforced
disappearance.”[111]

On September 1, 2010, the Ministry of Social Development accused
the BHRS of supporting only the country's Shi'a population. “The
activities offered by human rights associations”—the statement
said, clearly referring to the BHRS—“are confined to serving a
certain segment of the citizens.”[112]

A week later, on September 8, the ministry issued an order
dissolving the BHRS board of directors and replacing al-Derazi with a ministry
official to run the organization.[113]
In addition to alleging that the society was not acting impartially, the
ministry listed what it said were administrative “irregularities,”
including failure to call for a general assembly and alleged cooperation with
unspecified “illegal entities.”[114]

On September 22, Fatima al-Balooshi, minister of social
development, claimed that her order came in response to “illegal
activities, particularly secret unlicensed training courses in Bahrain offered
to individuals from neighboring states.”[115]
Al-Balooshi also accused al-Derazi and BHRS board members of arranging the
trainings and contacting the trainees and “hiding the whole issue from
specialized authorities.”[116]
Her statement ignored the fact that her ministry had in fact authorized
the training course in question, a monitoring workshop for human rights
defenders in the Gulf region.[117]

A day after al-Balooshi’s accusation against the BHRS,
the Ministry of Interior announced that it had launched an investigation of individuals
who had undergone “unlicensed training” through the BHRS and would
take legal action against them.[118]
The statement did not identify the individuals but said they were considered
“persona non grata” in Bahrain.

Al-Derazi replied that
the BHRS had complied with all relevant administrative regulations.[119]

In late September 2010, the Ministry of Social
Development filed a lawsuit against the society, seeking a court order forcing
al-Derazi and board members to hand over “all funds, records, books and
documents” to the ministry official serving as interim director.[120]
The society countered by filing a complaint at the high administrative court,
arguing that the ministry’s order was taken “without checking with
the board members of the society about any irregularities or launching an
investigation with the general assembly.” The ministry’s suit
“was entirely founded on rumors and hearsay,” the BHRS said.[121]

On February 9, 2011, just days before street protests rocked
the country, the ministry and BHRS reached an agreement in which the society
withdrew its complaint and the ministry agreed
to appoint a BHRS board member as interim director pending new elections.[122]
On July 23, 2011, al-Derazi was re-elected as secretary-general of the society.[123]

2. Bahrain Center for Human Rights

A group of rights activists
founded the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) in 2002 to promote human
rights and document rights violations. Among the founders was Abd al-Hadi
al-Khawaja, who returned to Bahrain in June 2001 after spending 12 years in
exile.

On September 24, 2004, the BCHR organized a forum on poverty
and economic rights at al-‘Uruba Club. Al-Khawaja, then BCHR president,
criticized Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa for his economic
policies and alleged corrupt practices and human rights violations. A few days
after the event, authorities closed the club and arrested al-Khawaja.
Authorities allowed the club to re-open after 28 days.[124]
On September 27, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs issued an order dissolving
the BCHR, saying that it had committed “actions that are inconsistent
with the Law of Associations of 1989 and the bylaws of the society,” but
not specifying which actions.[125] On
November 21, 2004 a minor criminal court convicted al-Khawaja on charges of
“inciting hatred against the regime” and sentenced him to one-year
imprisonment. Just hours after the court ruling, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
issued a decree pardoning him.[126]

The BCHR challenged the ministry’s decision to
dissolve the organization in court, but in February 2005 the High Civil Court
confirmed the order. In June 2005, a court of appeal upheld the ruling.[127]

The BCHR has continued to operate, though authorities closed its office,
confiscated its funds, and frequently harassed BCHR activists. On September 1,
2010, the pro-government daily Al Watan featured a front-page
article alleging that Nabeel Rajab, who became president of BCHR in 2006, and al-Khawaja, who was then a regional protection coordinator for the Dublin-based Frontline
organization, were linked to a "terrorist network" responsible for
attacking persons and property, as well as plotting to carry out sabotage.[128]

Attacks against
the BCHR intensified after the political unrest of 2011. In May 2012,
authorities detained BCHR president Nabeel Rajab for allegedly
“insulting” the Interior Ministry and calling for the prime
minister’s resignation. At time of writing he was serving a two-year sentence
after being convicted on charges of “illegal gathering.”[129]

On December 17,
2012, security forces arrested Sayed Yusuf al-Muhafadha, acting vice-president
of the BCHR, on charges of “willfully disseminating false news”
after he posted a photo of an injured protester on his Twitter account. He was
released on bail on January 17, 2013, and acquitted on March 11.[130]

3. Bahrain Teachers’ Society

The Bahrain Teachers’ Society
(BTS) established in 2001 with a stated mission to advocate for the interests
of teachers and defend their rights, has around 1,000 members comprising primary
and secondary school teachers as well as university professors.

After five protesters died and hundreds were wounded when
security forces responded with lethal force to peaceful demonstrations in
mid-February 2011, many civil society organizations, among them the BTS,
condemned the attacks.[131] The
BTS also expressed concern for the safety of teachers and students in the
aftermath of the clashes. Jalila al-Salman, BTS vice president, recalled:

The first day of school after the mid-year break was going
to be on February 20. After the incidents of February 14, teachers, students,
and people were scared. Many people contacted us asking whether or not it was
safe to go or send their children to school. We contacted the minister of education
asking him to delay school, but he refused.[132]

On February 20, the BTS joined a general strike called for
by the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), which represents
more than 70 trade unions in Bahrain, demanding that authorities withdraw
security forces from streets and allow for peaceful demonstrations.[133]

As reports of assaults against protesting teachers and
students circulated in late February, the BTS on March 2 called on Minister of
Education Majid bin Ali al-Nuaimi to resign because of what BTS called
“an aggressive campaign” targeting students and teachers.[134]

On March 11, as clashes between protesters and
pro-government groups intensified, the society called on teachers to join a
second GFBTU strike scheduled for March 13.[135]
On March 12 Al-Mustaqleen (Independents), a pro-government parliamentary
faction, called on the government “to investigate the Bahrain
Teachers’ Society … and take legal measures to dissolve it … because
[BTS] is responsible for politicizing the educational process and spreading
chaos and sectarian hatred within schools.”[136]

On April 17, 2011, Abdulla al-Mtaw’a, under-secretary of
the Ministry of Education, said on state-run Bahrain TV, “God afflicted
us with a plague called the Bahrain Teachers’ Society which has bet against
the education process.” He vowed to prosecute teachers and students who participated
in the demonstrations.[137]

Beginning on March 14, 2011,
Bahraini military and security forces arrested thousands of demonstrators and protest
supporters, including BTS leaders and members. On March 23, the minister of education
said the government would take legal action against the BTS:

The society
adopted political stances ... and it became an integral branch of a
political [party] ... it has irregularities and we have called on the ministry
[of social development] to review the registration of the society… We
will also file a complaint with the Office of the Public Prosecution.[138]

I was asked questions such
as: “Why did you issue statements? What is your relationship with Iran?
You want to break down the education [system]?”[140]

Security forces apprehended BTS
President Mahdi Abu Deeb in a pre-dawn raid on the house of a relative on April
6. The same day the Ministry of Social Development dissolved the BTS, saying it
had:

Issued inciting statements
and speeches… to hold strikes… in addition to exploiting school
students at all levels and spreading the concept of demonstration and creating
chaos … [Abu Deeb] gave a number of inciting speeches… which
took on a political nature against the state system and deviated from the goals
of the society.[141]

Seven BTS board members were also arrested but subsequently
acquitted of charges that they had also incited crimes.[142]

Abu Deeb and al-Salman each faced 12 charges, including two
under provisions of the Law of Associations: “involvement in
politics” (article 18), and failure to “work in line with the
purpose of the association…. [and] spending assets of the association on
activities that do not achieve the purpose of the association” (article
89[3]).[143]

On September 25, a special military court found Abu Deeb and
al-Salman guilty and sentenced Abu Deeb to 10 years in prison and al-Salman to 3
years.[144]On
October 21, a civilian court of appeal reduced Abu Deeb’s sentence to five
years and al-Salman’s to six months.[145]The
court of cassation had yet to review the verdict at time of writing.

4. Bahrain Nursing Society

The Bahrain Nursing Society (BNS), a professional
association established in 1991 and registered with the Ministry of Social
Development, has around 500 members. Its stated mission is to
“defend the rights of nurses and spread the culture of health among the
public.”[146]

In March 2007, the general
assembly amended some provisions of its bylaws and sought the approval of the
Ministry of Social Development. The society also scheduled its general assembly
for July 2007.

On July 3, 2007, an official informed the society that the
ministry had “lost” the copy of the amendments and needed a second
copy.[147] This
was at a time when the society sought the ministry’s approval to delay
its board elections from July 1 to July 9, and to apply the proposed amendments
which allowed only members with executive experience to nominate themselves to
the board.

On August 27, the ministry said that the BNS could not
operate with the new amendments until the ministry approved them and published the
approval in the OfficialGazette, the government’s official
newspaper. The society did not hold its general assembly meeting until November
14, 2007, which a ministry representative attended, but due to lack of a quorum
the meeting adjourned to January 8, 2008.[148]

On January 8, the BNS general assembly decided to extend the
tenure of the board of directors until the next elections. Muhammad al-Fardan from
the Ministry of Social Development attended the meeting and “confirmed
the legality of the decisions.”[149]

In June 2008, the society
launched a campaign demanding an increase in nurses’ salaries and
benefits. According to BNS president Rula al-Saffar, the campaign drew the unwanted
attention of authorities:

The campaign was something
new and authorities were not happy with it. In the past, associations used to
be shy to speak out about many issues that affected their members, but we came
and peacefully demanded more rights for our members. Then authorities froze the
bank account of the society and they either tried to discourage or scare nurses
to abandon the campaign and encourage others to sue us.[150]

In July 2008, the
Ministry of Social Development announced that BNS board of directors was “illegitimate”
because the organization had failed to notify authorities about its general
assembly meeting in January 2008 and had not “presented a record of its
activities and [a copy of] its bylaws to the ministry.”[151] Ibrahim al-Dimistani, the group's vice-president,
said the group had “fax” evidence that the ministry had received
all relevant documents.[152]

On August 5, the society set August 24 to hold a new
election. However, on August 11, the ministry unilaterally replaced al-Saffar
with an interim director.[153]
BNS board members rejected the appointed director.[154]

In August 2008, the public prosecution charged al-Saffar and
al-Dimistani with “insulting and defaming” ministry of health
officials, alleging that they had accused the officials of corruption in a
newspaper interview. In April 2009, a court acquitted them of the charge.[155]

Despite the ministry’s objection to the BNS August 2008
general assembly meeting and its dismissal of al-Saffar, the society held
elections on August 26, 2008, and re-elected al-Saffar as president.[156]

In early September 2008,
the Ministry of Social Development froze the BNS’s bank account,
preventing it from accessing its funds. On November 30, the ministry
re-appointed the interim director and once again the BNS board refused to work
with her.[157]
The ministry then again referred the BNS to the Office of the Public
Prosecution, alleging the elected board of directors was
“illegitimate” and had violated “its bylaws and the Law of
Associations.”[158]

The society appealed the
ministry’s decision to appoint an interim director and the
ministry’s objection to the August 2008 general assembly meeting to the
High Civil Court. On October 10, 2010, the court ruled the election legitimate.
However the court upheld the appointment of an interim director.[159] In January 2010, according to al-Dimistani, an
appeals court upheld the ruling.[160] In April 2012, the Court of Cassation upheld the
ruling.[161]

The next confrontation came several months later. Authorities
arrested al-Dimistani on March 17, 2010, after he allegedly provided medical
treatment to a person who had been shot and wounded during an anti-government
demonstration, accusing him of “hiding and harboring a fugitive.”[162] Muhammad
al-Tajir, al-Dimistani’s lawyer, said that authorities did not formally
charge him with any crime.[163] On
March 23, 2010, a Ministry of Interior official telephoned al-Saffar, ordering
her to cancel a party that she had planned to celebrate al-Dimistani’s March
21 release on bail.[164]

A few hours after this phone call, security forces changed
the lock on the doors of the BNS office inside the Salmaniya Medical Complex, effectively
shutting down the organization.[165]

In April 2011, security forces again arrested al-Dimistani
(April 3) and al-Saffar (April 4). They were among 20 doctors, nurses, and
paramedics charged with forcibly taking over the Salmaniya Medical Complex and providing
treatment to patients based on sectarian affiliation.[166]
Both told Human Rights Watch that they were subjected to torture in detention. “I
was handcuffed and blindfolded [and] interrogated for seven days,”
al-Saffar told Human Rights Watch.

The interrogations started
at 3:30 p.m. and went on until 5 or 6 a.m. the next day. I was electrocuted in
my face and my head. They [threatened me, saying], “We are going to rape
you.” I was held in a very cold cell. They turned on the air conditioner,
which made the cell even colder and I had no blanket. They forced me to stand
and sit for long hours on the dirty floor. During the course of my
interrogation [the officer] told me, “I have been waiting for you since
2008.”[167]

She and al-Dimistani were released on bail on August 21 and September
7, respectively. On September 23, 2011, a special military court sentenced
al-Saffar and al-Dimistani each to 15 years in prison.[168] On
June 14, 2012, a civilian court of appeals upheld the convictions of nine
doctors and medical personnel, but reduced al-Dimistani’s sentence to
three years and overturned al-Saffar’s conviction.[169] On
October 1, the Court of Cassation affirmed al-Dimistani’s conviction and his
three-year sentence. Security forces took him into custody in an early morning
raid on his home the next morning.[170] He
remains in detention at the time of writing.

Despite the January 2010 appeals court ruling in favor of
the BNS, the society’s bank account remains frozen by the Ministry of
Social Development.[171]

5. Bahrain Medical Society

Other organizations encountered similar problems with
authorities in the wake of the February-March 2011 political crisis. On April
6, 2011, the Ministry of Social Development suspended the board of directors of
the Bahrain Medical Society (BMS) and appointed an interim manager and board
members.[172]
The ministry claimed that the society had “depart[ed] from the goals that
the society was founded for and engaged in politics.”[173]

The ministry’s decision came in response to statements
0f the BMS and the Bahrain Dental Society during the anti-government demonstrations.
On February 17, the two organizations condemned security forces’
excessive use of force and “preventing health workers from providing care
to the injured.”[174]
Two days later, the organizations jointly criticized a statement of the minister
of health asserting that the “number of wounded [on February 18] was only
seven minor injuries.” The organizations said that the actual number of
casualties that day exceeded 100.[175]

Under the appointed director, Nabeel al-Ansari, the BMS made
a complete volte-face. The new board issued a statement expressing “full
allegiance to the nation and [its] leadership” and “deploring the
recent incidents and the violations made by BMS’s previous board of
directors.”[176]
Al-Ansari called the detained doctors and medical personnel “traitors.”[177]

On April 13, 2012, a year after the government’s
takeover, the BMS held new elections for president and board members. Several
candidates withdrew from the election to protest a decision by the appointed board
allowing non-Bahraini physicians to vote in the election, which they said enabled
the government-supported candidates to win.[178]
BMS bylaws specify that only Bahraini nationals can vote in the general
assembly.[179] The
day before the election, Minister of Social Development Fatima al-Balooshi declared
that “the participation of the foreign doctors in the society’s
election is their natural right because they are serving this country.”[180]

Dr. Jalal al-Mousawi, a candidate for BMS vice-president, told
Human Rights Watch why he withdrew: “We just could not compete in the
election because unlike previous elections, we, independents and opposition, suddenly
became the minority.”[181]

On May 21, a group of BMS members sought an administrative
court order to freeze the elected board and hold a new election.[182] The
ministry defended allowing non-Bahrainis to vote in the election, saying that
it had launched a “comprehensive review” to determine to what extent
Bahrain complies with international human rights treaties, namely the ICCPR.
The ministry said it found “an explicit difference between the
memberships of citizens and non-citizens, which contradicts with provisions of
some treaties that Bahrain has ratified.”[183]
The BMS members noted that Bahrain ratified the ICCPR in 2006 but the ministry
never previously expressed concern about the BMS’s bylaws.[184]
At time of writing the High Civil Court was reviewing the case.[185]

6. Bahrain Lawyers’ Society

The Bahrain Lawyers’ Society (BLS), the official
professional body for lawyers in Bahrain, was established in 1977 and today has
about 200 members. The society publicly criticized the Ministry of Social
Development’s decisions to suspend the board of directors of the Bahrain
Human Rights Society in September 2010, to replace the president of Bahrain
Nursing Society in August 2008, and to dissolve the Bahrain Center for Human
Rights in September 2004.[186]

Authorities moved against the BLS on two occasions. In 1998,
the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, then in charge of civil society groups,
suspended its board of directors because it had allegedly “engaged in
political activities”—an apparent reference to a seminar that the society
had hosted in January 1998.[187]
The society appealed the decision and administrative court ruled in favor of
the society.

In an October 26, 2011 letter to the society, the Ministry
of Social Development asked for documentation to verify the society’s
membership records.[188] On
November 30, the minister of social development canceled by decree the board election
results of November 26 and reinstated the previous board and president to
manage the affairs of the society. Saying that the society “did not comply
with legal procedures,” the ministry also froze the society’s bank
account, according to the newly elected BLS president Hamid al-Mullah.[189]

Al-Mullah said that the BLS in fact notified the ministry
about the November meeting and the election two weeks before they were held. “The
ministry refused to accept the notification letter when we tried to deliver it
in person,” he said, “so we sent it via registered mail and
received delivery confirmation.”[190]

We [didn’t] have all those documents because some of them
date back to 1977, when the society was founded. The ministry has been
supervising all elections and the society has sent membership lists before
every election. They probably have those documents.[191]

On December 25, in response to a Human Rights Watch
statement criticizing the action, the ministry claimed that the society had failed
to inform the ministry and provide it with an updated list of its members
before holding the November 2011 general assembly.[192]

In late
2011, al-Mullah sought a court order to void the ministry’s November 30
appointment of an interim board.[193] Sayed Mohsin al-Alawi, BLS director of culture and media,
told Human Rights Watch that after the six-month term of the interim board
ended in May 2012, the board elected in November 2011 took charge of the
affairs of the society.[194]

According to court records
the society argued that as long as a member paid membership fees “even
just before holding the general assembly” they could vote and nominate
themselves. The High Civil Court disagreed, and on October 24, 2012, ruled in
favor of the ministry, saying that “there were violations in regard to
some members who had the right to vote and nominate… more than one member
paid different membership fees… some of those members had not paid membership
fees for more than a year, some more than five years and others 10
years.”[195] The society was appealing the ruling at time of
writing.

NGO Funding

Groups in Bahrain have two main sources of funding: membership
fees and government funds for NGO activities that the Ministry of Social
Development approves.[196] Sometimes
these funds do not cover operations, and some groups have a policy not to
accept government funds.[197] As
a result, some groups look for alternative sources of income, such as donations
by individuals and foreign grants. Bahraini laws and regulations do not prohibit,
but do significantly curtail, soliciting and receiving foreign funds.

Current Law

Article 21 of the 1989 Law of Associations says that groups
must obtain written permission from a “specialized minister”—in
the case of most NGOs, the minister of social development—to undertake
fundraising.[198] The
law gives the minister the authority to dissolve organizations
if they acquire money from, or send money to, a party outside Bahrain without
written permission.[199]

In January 2006, Minister of Social Development Fatima
al-Balooshi issued Ministerial Decree No. 27 stating that fundraising licenses
are valid only for two months, and that the funds sought must be “linked
to an activity that will be held at a specified time and date or for a special
occasion or to cope with urgent circumstances.” Groups must inform the
ministry how they will collect the money, the name and number of the bank
account, and how they will spend the funds. If the ministry does not respond
favorably within 30 days, the request is considered to be denied.[200] Under
article 9 of the decree, associations must record the name of every donor,
eliminating any chance for anonymous donations.[201] Article
14 grants the Ministry of Social Development power to “confiscate [funds]
and distribute [them] to social activities” it favors if it considers the
organization in question to have violated conditions laid out by the ministry
in the fundraising license.[202]

Draft Law

The 2012 Draft Law of Associations
says that organizations can accept donations and raise funds after
receiving “written permission” from the Ministry of Social
Development and in accordance with the executive regulations of the law.[203] The
draft law permits groups to own property and make
investments “to a necessary extent” provided that they are intended
to advance the organization’s goals and are not intended for profit. The
organizations must inform the ministry about any such investments.[204]

Recommended Standards

Any regulation of NGOs should focus on their conduct, not
their source of funds. So long as an organization is engaged in peaceful
advocacy, including critical dissent, it should be entitled to do so as a
matter of right, regardless of who funds it.[205] The
law should allow for the receipt of donations or contributions from foreign
donors as long as all foreign exchange and customs laws are satisfied and make
all criteria for restrictions transparent.

The International Center for Non-for-Profit Law suggests
that a requirement to secure a license for fundraising “might not be
problematic on its own,” but requiring multiple applications constitutes
a “burdensome and expensive administrative process.”[206] It
recommends that groups “be permitted to engage in all legally acceptable
and culturally appropriate fundraising activities” and that registration
should be required only when the fundraising is “through a public
solicitation.”[207]

The Open Society Institute’s Guidelines for Laws
Affecting Civic Organizations argues that registered NGOs should “be
allowed to receive cash or in-kind donations, transfers, or loans from sources
outside the country so long as all generally applicable foreign exchange and
customs laws are satisfied.”[208]

On September 18, 2012, Bahraini civil society leaders and
political activists attended the 21st session of the UN Human Rights
Council in Geneva where they held side-events to spotlight Bahrain’s
human rights record.

Pro-government media slammed them for “distorting”
the image of Bahrain. Al-Watan’s September 23, 2012 edition of Al-Watan
included a full-page article with a headline that read: “Al-Watan
discloses the list of those who participated in distorting Bahrain’s
image in Geneva.” Accompanying the article were photos of 34 of the activists.

“Public demand is growing to hold accountable individuals
who participated in distorting Bahrain’s image at the end of Human Rights
Council’s session,”the newspaper asserted, citing calls by Shura
Council members “reaffirming that anyone who distorts his country’s
image is a traitor and does not deserve to carry its citizenship.”

III. Political Societies

In 2005 King Hamad signed the
Law for Political Societies (Law No. 26/2005). Political parties remain
prohibited but today 20 licensed political societies operate in the country,
including Islamist and secular, pro-government, and opposition groups.[209]

This section analyzes the
laws that regulate political societies in Bahrain and presents case studies that
show how authorities have used these laws to regulate their right to freedom of
association, expression, and peaceful assembly. Other laws, such as the Public
Gathering Law of 1973 and the Press Law of 2002, also unduly restrict the activities
of political societies as they relate to freedom of assembly and expression.

Legal Standards

International

Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right of citizens
to participate in public affairs and to vote and run for public office in free elections.
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body of independent experts who review
state compliance with the ICCPR, has determined that this article protects the
right to “join organizations and associations concerned with political
and public affairs,” and that “political parties and membership in
parties play a significant role in the conduct of public affairs....”[210]

Bahraini
Law

Article 27 of Bahrain’s
2002 Constitution guarantees the freedom to form associations, “under the
rules and conditions laid down by law,” provided that their objectives
are lawful, carried out by peaceful means, and do not infringe on “the
fundamentals of the religion and public order.”[211]

Between 2001 and 2005, political societies registered under the 1989 Law of
Associations. This law, as noted earlier, prohibits “engaging in politics,”
but authorities waived enforcement of this provision for all political
societies.[212]

In 2004, a group of members
of parliament proposed a draft law of political societies. The opposition groups,
most of which had boycotted the national assembly elections of 2002 after the
king had decreed a new constitution without consulting them, demanded to be
included in drafting the law. According
to Jawad Fairooz, a former Al-Wefaq deputy, the government decided to launch its
own draft political societies law before opposition candidates were elected to the
Chamber of Deputies and would have a say in drafting the law:

In 2005, authorities
realized that the opposition groups were going to participate in the 2006
national elections, so they drafted and passed a number of laws that restrict
the ability of political societies to operate, such as the law on political
societies, the anti-terrorism law, and the amended law on public gatherings.[213]

Opposition political
societies were critical of several provisions of the law, including the
prohibition of receiving “foreign funds or training,” setting the
minimum membership age at 21, and granting the Ministry of Justice authority to
reject applications for registration.[214] The National Assembly passed the draft law in July 2005
without any input from the opposition societies. King Hamad signed the bill into
law on July 23, 2005. On July 29, several thousand people demonstrated to
protest the legislation.[215]

Eventually most opposition
groups accepted the political societies’ law. Matar Matar, a former Al-Wefaq
deputy, explained his society’s decision:

There was concern
that boycotting the law would create tension between the government and the
societies, and worse the government might use [a boycott] as a justification to
crackdown on the societies. For this reason we decided to accept the law.[216]

Some opposition leaders though
defied authorities by establishing political societies without seeking
registration. For instance, Hassan Mushaima and Abduljalil al-Singace split
from Al-Wefaq and established the Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy (Haq)
to protest Al-Wefaq’s decision to abide by the new law and more generally
to operate within the confines of the constitution decreed by the king in 2002.[217]

Under the law, a political
society must have at least 50 co-founders in order to register. The Ministry of
Justice can deny registration by informing the applicants and providing an
explanation or by letting the 60-day deadline pass without a response.[218]

According to the law,
political societies cannot be based on class, sect, geography, profession,
religion, language, race, or sex.[219] This limitation on the themes and interests on which
a political group may be based is too sweeping, especially given a
government’s duties to uphold equality and minority rights under article
27 of the ICCPR.[220]

In effect, this provision
gives authorities grounds to stop citizens from forming a political group that
draws its main inspiration from, for example, religion, the advancement of
women’s interests, or particular regional interests. Any law on political
parties should be drawn so as to allow the state to prohibit political groups
only on the grounds that they advocate violence or the overthrow of democracy.[221]

The government provides
financial allowances to officially registered political societies. However,
several opposition groups told Human Rights Watch that the government halted
their financial allowances before as well as after the pro-democracy
demonstrations in February and March 2011.[222]

Human Rights Watch is not
aware of any case where authorities denied registration to a political society seeking
to register since the law took effect in 2005. Seven opposition societies—Al-Wefaq
National Islamic Society, the National Democratic Assembly Society (al-Qawmi),
the National Democratic Action Society (Wa’ad), the Unity Democratic Gathering Society
(al-Wahdawi), the National Brotherhood Society (al-Akha), the Democratic Progressive
Tribune (al-Taqadumi), and the Islamic Action Society (Amal, dissolved in 2012)—were able to register as of May 2013, although
society leaders told Human Rights Watch that the process took several months.

The minister of justice can
seek a court order to shut down a political society for up to three months if
the latter “violates provisions of the constitution, the [political
societies] law, or any other law.”[223] The court must rule within 30 days, during which time
the society is suspended.[224] The minister can also seek a court ruling to dissolve
a political society if the violation is “serious,” a term the law
does not define.[225] Under these provisions, authorities can seek the
dissolution of any political society at any time, as they did with the Islamic
Action Society (Amal) in June 2012. Persons who violate any provision of the
law face up to three months imprisonment or fines of up to Bahraini Dinars 500
($1,320).[226]

The law prohibits political
groups from using public buildings such as schools and religious places for
their activities, or from contacting political groups outside Bahrain without
prior approval.[227] Political parties may not accept
“donations” or “benefit” from a foreign person or
entity.

Opposition groups say the law’s
vague language and intense governmental scrutiny impede their ability to
operate. According to Jawad Fairooz, a
former Al-Wefaq deputy:

Authorities can interpret the provisions the way they like.
Now they can say this conversation that I’m having with [Human Rights Watch]
has benefited me because [this foreign organization] reports on my issues. So
they can say that my group has violated the law.[228]

Opposition groups allege that
authorities enforce the law in a discriminatory manner. One opposition leader who
asked not to be named out of concern for his security said that while
authorities strictly monitor every move of the opposition, they turn a blind
eye to activities of pro-government groups. “They play double standards,”
this person said. “They have denied us permits for demonstrations
claiming that we used places of worship, but it’s completely fine for
pro-government groups,” referring to demonstrations in al-Fatih mosque in
2011.[229]

Restrictions
on Political Societies

In August 2010, two months
before scheduled national and municipal elections, authorities arrested scores
of leaders and activists affiliated with unregistered parties and shut down
websites and suspended newsletters of registered political societies.[230]

By September 2010, security
forces had arrested dozens, including 25 opposition activists, whom they charged
with plotting to topple the government, a violation of Bahrain's 2006
counterterrorism law. A Human Rights Watch investigation found that most of the
charges, including “spreading false information” and “inciting
hatred of the government,” were related to their political views and
writings.[231]

Restrictions on Peaceful Assembly

On February 14, 2011, tens of
thousands of Bahrainis took part in street demonstrations throughout much of
the country demanding greater political rights and government reform. Security
forces used lethal force to suppress and disperse demonstrators. In mid-March King
Hamad declared a three-month state of emergency under which security forces
launched a campaign of retribution and arrested thousands who participated in
or appeared to support the protests, including leaders of registered political
societies. Authorities also again blocked websites of political societies.

On April 7, 2011, authorities
shut down for several months the National Democratic Action Society (Wa’ad),
a registered political group representing secular and leftist critics of the
government.[232]

Among those arrested were Wa’ad
leader Ibrahim Sharif and Shaikh Muhammad Ali al-Mahfoodh, leader of the
Islamic Action Society (Amal). On June 22, 2011, a special military court
convicted Sharif and 20 others and sentenced them to long prison terms. Sharif
was sentenced to five years. In October 2011, a military court sentenced Shaikh
al-Mahfoodh to 10 years imprisonment, reduced on appeal to five years.

Human Rights Watch examined trial
verdicts and other court documents in those cases and concluded that these defendants
were charged and convicted solely of offenses related to speeches they
made, meetings they attended, documents found on their computers, and calls
they made for peaceful street protests.[233]

The
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
appointed to investigate the government’s response to pro-democracy
demonstrations in February and March 2011, concluded that many detainees—including
opposition society leaders and activists—were subjected to torture and
coerced into signing confessions, which were used to secure their convictions. The
report said “there was a more discernible pattern of mistreatment with
regard to … the 14 political leaders,” adding that the
ill-treatment was “to obtain statements or confessions incriminating [themselves]”
or for “retribution and punishment.”[234] A High Court of Appeal, and
later the Court of Cassation, upheld the convictions and sentences against all the
political leaders.[235]

Restrictions on the right of legally
recognized political societies to exercise the right to peaceful assembly
continued in the aftermath of the political turmoil of 2011.

On June 19, 2012, Al-Wefaq leaders requested permission to
hold a gathering on June 22 in the al-Bilad al-Qadeem area in Manama. A day
before the planned demonstration, the Ministry of Interior denied the request,
claiming that it would “disrupt public security and harm the interests of
people.” Jawad Fairooz told Human Rights Watch that authorities had
previously allowed them to demonstrate in the same area, but that the ministry had
rejected four gathering requests from Al-Wefaq that week. “This seems to
be a trend towards imposing more restrictions of freedom,” he said.

A ministry statement on June 21 said it had permitted
Al-Wefaq to hold “27 rallies [and 20 gatherings] since the beginning of
2012,” suggesting there should be a limit on the number of demonstrations
per year.[236]

Hani al-Shaikh, a member of the National Democratic Action
Society political bureau, confirmed that in June 2012 authorities revived the
policy of routinely denying permission for political rallies, saying:

Authorities increasingly prevent opposition societies from
holding rallies and gatherings. They used to deny permit for areas they
consider “vital for the public life” which included some streets.
However, they have gradually expanded this definition to include many areas of
the capital as well as surrounding villages.[237]

On
May 7, 2013, the Chamber of Deputies passed
an amendment to the Public Gathering Law to severely limit the right to
peaceful public assembly. Under the new amendments, demonstration organizers would
have to deposit a security check of up to 20,000 Bahraini Dinars (US$53,000) in
order to hold a public gathering and authorities can reject protest permissions
for vague terms including demonstrations that might “ threaten or restrict
the freedom of others… and might harm the economic interests if the
country.” The new amendments would ban demonstrations near
“hospitals, airports, embassies, consulates, economic, and lively places,
and places that has security nature.”[238]The new amendment needs approval from the Shura Council and King
Hamad’s signature to become law.

The ICCPR makes clear that restrictions on peaceful
demonstrations should be imposed only if found to be “necessary in a
democratic society” to safeguard “national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Any restrictions
must also be proportional and non-discriminatory. [239]

Restrictions on Freedom of
Expression

Bahrain’s Press Law (Law 47/2002) restricts coverage
of topics that might, in the view of authorities, “harm the ruling
system, its religion, and [disturb] public decency.”[240]
It also prescribes a minimum six months imprisonment for criticizing the king and
up to five years for second-time offenders.[241]
The law prohibits distributing any publication without receiving written
approval from authorities, a provision that authorities have used to ban
political societies from publishing in print and on the Internet.[242]

The Penal Code contains other articles that restrict the
freedom of expression and information. For example, article 134 (A) sets
a minimum of three months imprisonment and/or fines for anyone who fails to
obtain government permission to attend meetings abroad to discuss Bahraini
affairs that might “undermine financial confidence in the state” or
who “exercises ... activities that are harmful to the national
interests.”[243]
In November 2008, Interior Minister Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa threatened
to prosecute rights activists and opposition figures who had held meetings in
Washington, DC.[244]

In September 2010, the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) blocked
websites, newsletters, and blogs of at least three opposition political
societies. On September 3, the IAA blocked the website of Al-Wefaq.[245]
Abdullah Yateem, the general director of press and publications at the
authority, said that Al-Wefaq had violated laws and regulations without
specifying any provisions that the group had allegedly violated.[246]
Al- Wefaq leaders believe that IAA’s decision was related to the
group’s plan to launch an audiovisual service on its website in the
run-up to elections.[247]
Authorities only lifted these sanction on Al-Wefaq in November 2011, after the
elections. Opposition newsletters of Al-Wefaq, the Islamic Action Society, and
Wa’ad are still banned.

In
September 2010, municipal officials ordered Wa’ad Party candidate Munira
Fakhro to remove billboards with the slogan “Enough to Corruption,”
saying it was “a breach of the law,” although they did not indicate
which law. A court ruled on October 4 that the signs did not violate any law,
but the government appealed.[248]
On October 14, 2010, the Third High Court of Appeal upheld the ruling.[249]

According to Fadhel Abbas, secretary general of the United National
Democratic Assembly, a registered opposition political society, authorities
were not happy with the content of his group’s monthly newsletter, Al-Badeel.
The issue published in July 2010 contained articles discussing alleged corruption
in government institutions and sectarian discrimination.[250]
Although authorities have not canceled Al-Badeel’s license, Abbas told
Human Rights Watch in August 2012 he had no plan to resume publication. “We
are sure they will ban it because they will not be happy with the content,”
he said.[251]

Since
the suppression of street demonstrations beginning in March 2011, authorities
have further restricted the right of political societies to freedom of
expression. On April 7, 2011, the Bahrain Defense Force suspended the National
Democratic Action Society, shut down its offices, and blocked its website
“until further notice” after the group posted an article that the
BDF charged was “defaming the armed forces and spreading false news that
foment sedition and drives wedges among citizens.”[252]
The ban was lifted when Wa’ad agreed to participate in the
government-sponsored National Dialogue in July 2011.[253]

During
the 10-week state of emergency, from March 15 to June 1, 2011, several offices
and homes of leaders of political societies were either attacked by unknown
assailants or raided by security forces who broke doors, windows, and furniture
and confiscated documents and computers.[254]
At midnight on March 25, for a second time that month, unknown assailants
attacked the house of Wa’ad leader Munira Fakhro in A’ali, south of
Manama. She told a local newspaper:

We heard the sound of two explosions. I and members of my
family went to look for the source of the sound and we found that the
[assailants] had broken the back door and the window of my house. They
then had thrown the bombs which resulted in damages to the house. [255]

At
the same time government media, including the state-run Bahrain News Agency, and
pro-government groups launched a smear campaign labeling leaders of opposition
political societies as “traitors” and “pro-Iran.” A banner
from of Al-Asala Islamic Group, a pro-government political society, read:
“The diseased spots in the body of the nation must be eradicated.”[256]
The banner contained pictures of Wa’ad leader Ibrahim Sharif, as well as leaders
of unlicensed opposition groups, including Hassan Mushaima, Abduljalil al-Singace,
and Abd al-Wahab Hussein.

The
BICI called on the government to relax “censorship and [allow] the opposition
greater access to television broadcasts, radio broadcasts and print
media.”[257]
In January 2012, Al-Wefaq submitted an application to launch a satellite TV
channel in Bahrain.[258]
Authorities had not responded to the request as of May 2013.[259]
In November 2011, Al-Wefaq requested a license to publish a daily newspaper but
the official response was not encouraging, “They said we needed to do
many things, among them establishing a company with an investment of at least
one million dinars ($2,639,000),” Jawad Fairooz said. “Frankly, we
don’t have the financial ability to shoulder it.”[260]

On November 6, 2012, the Ministry of Interior summarily
revoked the citizenship of the 31 people, including Jawad Fairooz, leaving the
majority of those affected stateless.[261]

On April 23, 2013 the Public Prosecution held Fadhel Abbas,
secretary general of the United National Democratic Assembly, for 48 hours on
charges of “inciting hatred against the regime” in a speech he gave
at a press conference on April 20. The Public Prosecution released him on April
25.[262]

Article 19 of the ICCPR protects the “freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.” Any restrictions on this right must be provided by
law and strictly necessary to “respect the rights or reputations of
others” or “for the protection of national security or of public
order or public health and morals.”[263]

The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) determined that
“all public figures, including those exercising the highest political
authority such as heads of state and government, are legitimately subject to
criticism and political opposition” and therefore the need for
“uninhibited expression” in public debate concerning public figures
is very high. It also says that “prohibitions of displays of lack of
respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are
incompatible with the Covenant” except in very limited circumstances.[264]

National Dialogue of 2011

In July 2011, in the
aftermath of the suppression of pro-democracy protests, the government sponsored
what it called a National Dialogue which it said aimed at presenting “the
people’s views and demands for further reform.”[265]

Al-Wefaq and the National
Democratic Action Society participated but complained about insufficient representation:
all opposition groups combined were given only 35 seats out of more than 300
seats.[266]

The national dialogue recommendations
submitted to the government included further restrictions on the activities of
political societies, such as prohibiting “any activity that might harm
the economy and public interest,” “using religion for political gains,”
and “discussing sectarian issues.”[267] The government commission assigned to implement the
recommendations of the National Dialogue reported that the government has
drafted an amendment to the political societies law, but at time of writing the
government had not submitted the amendment to the National Assembly.[268]

Disbanding
the Islamic Action Society (Amal)

The Islamic Action Society
(Amal) was founded in 2002 under the provisions of the Law of Associations.
Authorities renewed the society’s license after the Law of Political
Societies took effect in 2005. Prior to the widespread suppression of
opposition activities in 2011, Amal had about 2,000 members. It traces its
roots to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which had been
accused of planning a coup to topple the government in 1981.[269] Among the society’s stated objectives are the
establishment of a “pluralist political system … and protecting its
Arab and Islamic identity.”[270]

In May 2005, authorities closed Amal’s offices for 45
days after it had organized a ceremony honoring 73 individuals who had been
prosecuted for allegedly planning a coup in 1981.[271]

On December 19, 2007, security forces raided Amal’s
offices, claiming they were suspicious that weapons were hidden there. No
weapons were found.[272]
A few weeks earlier, authorities had arrested two members and charged them with
stealing police weapons; they were subsequently acquitted.[273]

In May 2008, the Ministry of Justice canceled the
society’s general assembly, saying the group violated the law by holding the
event in Ma’tam al-Huda, in the village of al-Sar, which the ministry
considered a place of worship, and stopped the state’s BD 1,000 (US
$2,640) monthly financial allowance.[274]

As part of government’s ban on publications of
opposition groups ahead of the October 2010 Chamber of Deputies elections, on
September 30 authorities canceled the license of the society’s newsletter
and blocked its website.[275] In
December 2010, the Ministry of Justice froze Amal’s bank accounts without
notice or explanation. [276]

Following the February and
March 2011 demonstrations, security forces arrested dozens of Amal members,
including 23 high ranking members.[277] On April 14, 2011, the Ministry of Justice announced
that it would seek a court order to dissolve Al-Wefaq and Amal, accusing both
groups of violating “the Constitution and being involved in acts that
damaged the public peace and national unity…”[278] The next day authorities dropped the case after the United
States publicly urged the government to reverse its decision.[279]

Authorities tried 23 Amal members
before a special military court on charges that included “inciting hatred
against the regime,” “broadcasting false and tendentious news and
rumors,” and “calling for protests.”[280] On October 4, 2011, the military court sentenced Shaikh
al-Mahfoodh and four others to 10 years imprisonment and nine others to 5 years
imprisonment. The rest were acquitted.[281] The High Court of Appeal confirmed the convictions
but reduced the sentence of Shaikh al-Mahfoodh and three others from ten years
to five years.[282]

On June 3, 2012, the Ministry
of Justice sought a court order to dissolve Amal, accusing the groups of
“flagrant and continuous violations,” such as failing to
“convene a general conference for more than four years,”
“taking its decisions from a religious authority that calls openly for
violence and incites hatred,” and “failing to submit a copy of its
annual budget as per the [political societies] law’s provisions.”[283]

On June
19, the Administrative Court held the first session on the ministry’s complaint;
the judge adjourned the hearing to October 7, but without prior notice subsequently
moved up the date of the hearing and on July 9 ordered the dissolution of Amal
for violating provisions of the Political Societies’ law.[284] On April 15, 2013, the Court
of Appeal upheld the ruling.[285]

On April 26, 2013, security
forces raided the Sanabis home of an Amal leader, Hisham al-Sabagh, and
arrested him. His brother Nadir al-Sabagh told Al-Wasat newspaper that
authorities allowed his family to see Hisham only after 12 days in detention. At
time of this writing, authorities had not allowed Sabagh’s lawyers to see
him and had not charged him with any crimes.[286]

IV. Trade Unions

Under Bahraini law private sector
workers and employees can establish trade unions without prior official
approval, simply by notifying authorities. Public sector trade unions are not
permitted but public sector, workers can join private sector unions.

The Workers Trade Union Law
(Law 33/2002) permits workers to form and join unions and established the
General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU).[287] Until late 2011, the GFBTU served as the sole
umbrella organization for trade unions in Bahrain, and the law allowed only one
trade union per company.

In October 2011, King Hamad
issued a decree amending Law 33/2002 to allow the establishment of more than
one trade union in a company and more than one trade union federation in
Bahrain. The GFBTU understood this as
permitting the establishment of an explicitly pro-government trade union
federation in retribution for GFBTU’s support for protesters’
calls for greater political rights and calling general strikes in February and
March 2011. After the amendment became effective in March 2012, pro-government
unionists established the Bahrain Free Labour Unions Federation. The new
federation has accused the GFBTU of being a political tool of the opposition
groups, saying that it “distorts Bahrain's reputation regionally and
internationally.”[288]

Private
and public sector firms fired approximately 4,500 employees after the declaration
of emergency law in March 2011.[289] By November 2012, most
workers had been reinstated, although in many cases not to the positions and jobs
from which they had been dismissed.[290] According to the GFBTU, more than 300 were still waiting to be
reinstated.[291]

Legal Standards

International

Article 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees individuals
“the right to freedom of association with others.”[292]Bahrain. a member of the International
Labour Organization (ILO), has ratified four core ILO conventions, including
both conventions relating to elimination of forced and compulsory labor, and
those on the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation, but not Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organise or Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining.[293]

Article 2 of the ILO’s
Convention 87 states that “workers and employers, without distinction
whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of
the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without
previous authorization.” The ILO requires governments to refrain from
punishing workers for trying to organize unions and enforce mechanisms that
deter employers from taking action against union organizers.

Bahraini Law

Article 27 of the Bahraini Constitution states that the right to form trade unions
for “lawful objectives and by peaceful means is guaranteed under the
rules and conditions laid down by law, provided that the fundamentals of the
religion and public order are not infringed.”[294] Article 10 of Law 33/2002 states that workers of
“any particular establishment or sector … can form their own trade
union.”[295] The law requires only that those wishing to establish
a trade union should provide the Ministry of Labor with names of the founding
members and bylaws of the union.[296]

Restrictions on Trade Unions

Freedom to Form and Join Unions

Immediately after the law came
into effect authorities denied public sector
workers the right to establish or join unions, insisting that article 10 of the
law does not cover them, although authorities later said that public sector
workers can join private sector unions.[297]

In
September 2004, the GFBTU and a dozen trade unions filed a lawsuit challenging
the Civil Service Bureau’s interpretation of the law. In February 2005,
an administrative court dismissed the case, saying it fell outside of its
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal agreed.[298]

In
June and October 2005, the GFBTU filed two complaints with the ILO protesting
the government’s repeated refusal to register six trade unions in the
public sector.[299] Those were the Post Office Workers, Water and
Electricity Workers, Public Works Workers, Healthcare Workers, Social Insurance
Workers, and Retirement Fund Workers.[300]

In
response to an ILO inquiry, the government said in 2006 that an amendment to
the law to grant public workers the right to form trade unions was before the Chamber
of Deputies.[301] In February 2013, Ministry of Labor officials told
Human Rights Watch that the draft amendment was still before the Chamber of
Deputies.[302] GFBTU leaders said they were not aware of such a draft
amendment.[303]

In
March 2007, the Civil Service Bureau threatened to take disciplinary actions
against any workers in the public sector who attempt to establish trade unions,
reiterating that public sector workers do not have the right to establish their
own trade unions but can join unions in the private sector.[304]

Restrictions on the Right to Strike

Law
33/2002 bans unions from “engaging in political activities” and
imposes numerous restrictions on the right to strike. According to article 21,
trade union members can strike only if 75 percent of the general assembly of
the particular union approves the action and after they fail to resolve issues
with their employer. Before going on strike they must give two weeks’
notice to the employer and also notify the Ministry of Labor.

The
law bans strikes in “vital and important facilities” such as
“security, civil defense, airports, ports, hospitals, transportations,
telecommunications, electricity, and water facilities.”[305] In November 2006, the prime minister issued an edict
prohibiting strikes in additional sectors on the grounds that strikes in those
facilities would “endanger national security and disrupt daily life of
people.” The added facilities included “bakeries, all means of
transporting people and goods, educational establishments and oil and gas installations.”[306]

In
2007, the GFBTU filed complaints with the ILO protesting the prime minister’s
edict. The government responded that the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of
Association allows governments to regulate and prohibit strikes, saying it
exercised its authority to ban strikes in facilities deemed essentials and that
their interruption “would lead to the disruption of everyday life.”[307]

In
2008, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association called on the
government to amend its trade union law and the prime minister’s ruling by
providing a more limited definition of “essential services.” The
existing list was “broader than the definition of essential services in
the strict sense of the term,” the committee concluded.[308] The committee said that the government can only
ban strikes in essential services -- “that is, services the interruption
of which would endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or
part of the population.” The committee further said that in order to
prohibit a strike authorities need to establish “the existence of a clear
and imminent threat to the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or
part of the population.”[309] As of February 2013 the government had not
responded to the ILO communication.

Retribution after the 2011 Demonstrations

In
the wake of the government's suppression of demonstrations in March 2011, the
federation called for a general strike on March 13, claiming the situation on
the streets made it too dangerous for employees to go to their jobs. Private
and public sector businesses subsequently dismissed thousands of workers
suspected of participating in or otherwise supporting the demonstrations. Employers frequently claimed
that they fired workers because they did not show up for work.

A
Human Rights Watch investigation in July 2011 found that private and public
sector companies had violated Bahraini labor laws as well as international
standards, “in particular those prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of political opinion.”[310] The summary dismissals
of workers appeared to be “punishment for having participated in or
otherwise supported pro-democracy demonstrations.”[311]

The
BICI investigation reported that according to government officials, 2,462
private sector and 1,945 public sector employees were fired following the March
2011 clampdown on protesters and concluded that many workers were fired despite being
absent for periods that were shorter than “the periods proscribed as
punishable” by the law.[312] The commission also concluded
that in some sectors dismissals were “motivated by retaliation against
employees suspected of being involved in the demonstrations.”[313]

The
BICI called on authorities to ensure that workers had not been dismissed
because of the exercise of their right to freedom of expression, opinion,
association or peaceful assembly.[314]In response to the
government’s claim that the strikes called for by the GFBTU were unlawful because they were not related to labor issues, the
commission said it appeared those strikes “occurred…within the permissible
bounds of the law.”[315]

In
August 2011, King Hamad ordered the reinstatement of dismissed employees.[316] Many private and public sector employers did
not comply with the call. In November 2011, the government agreed to form
a tripartite labor committee (comprising representatives of the ILO, the GFBTU,
and the Ministry of Labor) under the auspice of ILO to address the issues.
Under the terms of the agreement announced on March 11, 2012, all workers in
the public and private sectors would be reinstated by no later than May 30, 2012.[317]

On
December 31, 2011, the government announced that it would reinstate all public
sector employees who had been dismissed for exercising their right to freedom
of expression. The same announcement also said that authorities
“negotiated with the private companies” and that the cases of
dismissed workers would be resolved “soon.”[318] However, as of June 10 2013 the GFBTU estimated that more
than 300 employees in both the public and private sectors have not been
reinstated in their jobs.[319]

In April 2011, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/CIO)
filed a complaint with the US Department of Labor alleging that Bahrain
had violated provisions of the US-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement. The US
Labor Department December 2012 report found that Bahrain had “acted
inconsistently with its commitments to … ensure that its laws recognize
and protect freedom of association and the elimination of employment
discrimination [and are] consistent with internationally recognized labor
rights.”[320] In May 2013, the US government requested talks with
the Bahraini government to discuss the steps Bahrain has taken to address the
issues raised in the Labor Department report.[321]

The 2011 Amendment Affecting
Trade Union Rights

On
October 9, 2011, King Hamad issued Royal Decree No. 35, amending some provisions
of the Workers Trade Union Law. Labor Minister Jameel Humaidansaid
the amendment would enable more federations “to defend the interests [of
workers] and it will prevent union monopoly that could be exercised if there is
only one union in the establishment.”[322] The Chamber of Deputies approved the amendment
on January 31, 2012, and the Shura Council passed it on March 26, 2012. Under
the new provisions, two or more trade unions in similar industry can establish
a trade union federation if the majority members of general assemblies of the
two unions approve. The decree prohibits establishing unions on religious and
ethnic bases.

Bahraini
authorities had a different position prior to the events of February and March
2011. In its Universal Periodic Submission to the UN Human Rights
Council in 2008, the governmentargued that “trade union pluralism
can weaken and split the trade union movement,” and that “all
States tend to place restrictions on pluralism and limit the number of trade
unions and federations, placing them under the umbrella of a single entity so
they can address economic challenges.”[323]

In
the context of government accusations that the GFBTU was effectively a wing of
the opposition, it appeared that the authorities intended the new decree to
weaken the GFTBU. A union leader put it this way:

In principle trade union
pluralism is welcome and it is good when it is for the interest of the workers.
However I fear that the purpose of this amendment is to serve a blow to the
[GFBTU] by paving the way to create a trade union federation that is
pro-government.[324]

The
Brussels-based International Trade Union Confederation expressed concern that
the new amendment might be used to cancel registrations of “existing
trade unions by falsely claiming that they were formed on sectarian
lines.”[325]

In
a letter to the Shura Council on February 16, 2012, the GFBTU urged rejection
of the amendment:

In terms of timing this amendment
came in the wake of targeting the trade unions and [aims] to fragment the
unity between the trade unions.…This [amendment] should have been a
subject of consultation between the government, represented by the Ministry of
Labor, and workers, represented by the GFBTU.[326]

The
new amendment also grants the minister of labor the power to decide which trade
union confederation will represent Bahrain in international meetings and events,
and engage in collective bargaining at the national level.[327] The GFBTU also rejected these provisions, saying that
the federation representing the majority of workers should represent the
country and engage in collective bargaining.

The
amendment bans anyone found guilty of violating any law from holding trade
union office for five years. The GFBTU considered this an “explicit
intervention” in the affairs of trade unions and argued that only the
unions’ general assembly should have the right to discipline its members.[328]

In a June 2011 complaint filed with the ILO, the GFTBU said
it feared that authorities might use the amendment to oust trade union leaders
who participated in the protests of February and March 2011.[329] According to the GFTBU, 65
unionists were among those fired by private and public firms following the
February and March demonstrations.[330] As of June 10, 2013, the private and public companies had
not reinstated 17 of the dismissed unionists.[331] Some trade union leaders told
Human Rights Watch that in the wake of crushing the demonstrations, authorities
did not bring charges against them for “inciting illegal
demonstrations.” One union leader told Human Rights Watch that
authorities have told him that his case has been “shelved,” but that
“they can revisit the case at any time.”[332]

In
June 2012, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association called on
Bahrain to amend this provision of the king’s decree which bans anyone found
guilty of violating any law from holding trade union office for five years and
“in the meantime, confirm that this provision cannot be used for convictions
relating to the exercise of legitimate trade union activity or the exercise of
the right to peaceably demonstrate.”[333]

Soon
after the amendment became effective in March 2012, at least 10 new trade
unions and one new trade union federation quickly emerged.[334] On July 18, six trade unions that had withdrawn from
the GFBTU, accusing it of becoming a political tool of the opposition,
established the Bahrain Free Labour Unions Federation (BFLUF). The six trade
unions were from Aluminum Bahrain (Alba), Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco),
Bahrain Airport Services (BAS), Bankers Union, Gramco, and the Gulf
Petrochemical IndustriesCo. (GPIC).[335] All are large firms in which the government holds substantial
or even controlling interest.[336]

On
July 31, 2012 the BFLUF accused the Ministry of Labor of
“procrastination” for refusing to accept the documents that would officially
establish the new trade federation. The same day, the prime minister issued a directive
calling for “speeding up” measures to register the BFLUF.[337] One week later, the minister of labor met with the BFLUF
board members to congratulate them on the establishment of the new federation.[338]

V. Recommendations

To the National Assembly and the Government of Bahrain

On the Draft Law on Civil Organizations and
Institutions

Release
of all individuals in Bahrain who have been imprisoned solely for exercising
their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, including
leaders of opposition political societies and NGOs.

Amend article
2 to eliminate restrictions on establishing
NGOs on “a factional or sectarian basis or to achieve objectives contrary
to the provisions of the constitution or legislation in force in the Kingdom of
Bahrain, or the public order and morals, or [if their] activities include
engaging in politics”;

Specify that any language on “public
order or morals” should be interpreted in a narrow and proportionate
fashion, in conformity with article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the authoritative commentary of the UN Human Rights
Committee.

Amend article 3 to reduce the required
number of founders.

Amend article 6 to eliminate the requirement
to provide a two-year budget when applying for registration.

Remove article 7, which prohibits a member of one NGO
to become a member of another NGO if the organizations conduct similar
activities unless approved by the Minister of Social Development.

Amend article 8 to indicate that the absence
of a Ministry of Social Development response to a request for registering civic
organizations within 60 days signifies approval; require the Ministry of Social
Development to provide a written statement detailing reasons for rejecting any
NGO application and ensure that the NGO has an opportunity to correct any defects
in its application.

Amend
article 16 to remove restrictions on conditions for affiliating or collaborating
with foreign NGOs.

Permit NGOs to engage in any fundraising
activity including public campaigns unless specifically prohibited by law. Do not
require permission to engage in specific actions on fundraising, and require at
most annual or bi-annual reporting.

Amend article 17 to permit receipt of
donations or transfers from foreign donors without government’s approval,
as long as all regulations regarding transparency and customs declarations for monetary
transfers are met.

Amend article
20 and 27 to eliminate the authority of the Ministry of Social Development to:

Appoint
a temporary board of management to NGOs; and

Attend
board meetings and require notifications of meetings.

Amend article 22 to eliminate the Ministry
of Social Development’s authority to merge NGOs “if they work to
achieve similar objectives… or to modify their purposes depending on the
needs of the society… or for other reasons.” The law should allow rather
than force NGOs to merge.

Amend article 58 to eliminate the Ministry
of Social Development’s authority to temporarily shut down NGOs and
ensure that temporary closures occur only by judicial order and in response to
serious violations of the law and;

Guarantee the right of temporarily closed
NGOs to rectify the violation and appeal the closure.

Amend article 87 (1) of the draft law and
article 163 of the Penal Code to abolish fines and prison terms for conducting
peaceful and noncriminal activities on behalf of unregistered as well as
registered NGOs.

Amend article 87 (9) to abolish fines and
prison terms for inviting foreigners to visit
Bahrain for activities such as conferences and forums without prior permission
from relevant authorities.

Amend article 5 to reduce the minimum age for
membership in political societies from 21 to 18.

Amend article 22 to remove suspending political
societies for 30 days while pending trial for violating Bahraini laws by;

Making clear that temporary closures occur only
by judicial order and in response to serious violations of the law; and

Guaranteeing
the right of temporarily closed political societies to rectify the violation
and to appeal the closure.

Implement the recommendation of the Bahraini
Independent Commission of Inquiry which advised “relaxing censorship and
allowing the opposition greater access to television broadcasts, radio
broadcasts and print media.”

On Trade Unions

Respect
the right of workers to establish and join the trade union(s) of their choice
and peacefully assemble and associate with others without government
interference.

Amend the Workers Trade Union Law (Law
33/2002) to allow public sector workers to create and join trade unions.

Ratify key International Labour Organization
conventions including the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

On the United Nations Special Rapporteur

Respond positively to the requests of the
United Nations special rapporteurs on torture, the rights to freedom
of peaceful assembly and of association and the situation of human rights
defenders to visit Bahrain.

To Member States of the United Nations Human Rights
Council

Adopt
a resolution at the 24th session of the Human Rights Council in September
2013 that: expresses concern about the situation of human rights in Bahrain and
the government’s lack of cooperation with Special Procedures of the Human
Rights Council; calls for the implementation of the recommendations of the
Bahrain International Commission of Inquiry (BICI) and for Bahrain to swiftly
facilitate access to Special Procedures and to engage with the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and asks the OHCHR to report back
on the implementation of these requests.

To the United States

Actively and publicly press for the
immediate and unconditional release of all individuals in Bahrain who have
been imprisoned solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression,
association and assembly, including leaders of political societies and
NGOs.[339]

Publicly
urge Bahraini authorities to revise the Draft Law on Civil Organizations
and Institutions and amend the Political Societies Law and the Workers
Trade Union Law to bring the legislation into line with international
standards in order to allow for
freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly.

Speak out
against Bahrain’s intimidation and harassment of civil society
organizations and activists. Conduct an assessment of the Bahraini
government’s steps to uphold the rights to freedom of assembly,
expression, and association under international law and publicize the findings.

Step up strategic and
public contacts with Bahraini civil society in Bahrain and abroad.

Call on
Bahraini authorities to cooperate with and grant immediate access to the United
Nations special rapporteurs on torture, freedom of assembly and association,
and human rights defenders.

Urge Bahrain to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights (OHCHR) to establish an office in Bahrain with a mandate to
assist, monitor and report on human rights developments.

Seek a dedicated UN Human
Rights Council (HRC) debate about continued violations of basic human
rights in Bahrain and support an HRC resolution requesting that the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights keep the Council informed about
Bahrain’s progress in release of prisoners, accountability for
crimes and legal reforms.

To the member states of the European Union

In line with
commitments made in the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy,
the European Union (including EU Member
States, European EAS, European Commission, and European Parliament) should:

Actively and
publicly press for the immediate and unconditional release of all
individuals in Bahrain who have been imprisoned solely for exercising
their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, including
leaders of political societies and NGOs, some of whom are dual citizens of
Bahrain and EU member states.

Publicly
urge Bahraini authorities to revise the Draft Law on Civil Organizations
and Institutions and amend the Political Societies Law on Political
Societies and the Workers Trade Union Law to bring the legislation into
line with international standards in
order to allow for freedom of association, expression, and peaceful
assembly.

Speak out
against Bahrain’s intimidation and harassment of civil society
organizations and activists. Conduct an assessment of the Bahraini
government’s steps to uphold the rights to freedom of assembly,
expression, and association under international law and publicize the findings.

Step up strategic and
public contacts with Bahraini civil society in Bahrain and abroad.

Call on
Bahraini authorities to cooperate with and grant immediate access to the United
Nations special rapporteurs on torture, freedom of assembly and association,
and human rights defenders.

Urge Bahrain to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights to establish an office in Bahrain with a mandate to assist,
monitor and report on human rights developments.

Seek a dedicated UN Human
Rights Council (HRC) debate about continued violations of basic human
rights in Bahrain and support an HRC resolution requesting that the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights keep the Council informed about
Bahrain’s progress in release of prisoners, accountability for
crimes and legal reforms.

Acknowledgements

Mariwan R. Hama, Arthur Koenig Fellow at Human Rights Watch,
researched and wrote this report. Joe Stork, deputy director at Human Rights
Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Division, and Danielle Haas, senior
editor in the Program Office, edited the report. Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor,
provided legal review. A Bahraini lawyer who preferred not to be named also reviewed
the report. Researcher Faraz Sanei and Salma Abdou and Shannon Mich, interns
with the Middle East and North Africa Division, provided research assistance. Grace
Choi, publications director, and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager, prepared the
report for publication.

Human Rights Watch thanks Sayed Mohsin al-Alawi from the Bahraini
Lawyers’ Society, Sayed Yusuf
al-Muhafadha of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Muhammad al-Maskati
of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, Jalila Salman, vice president of
the Bahraini Teachers’ Society and Matar Matar and Jawad Fairooz from Al Wefaq
Society for sharing their experience with us and their invaluable assistance
during the research phase for this of this report.

Appendix: Letter from Human Rights Watch to
Minister of Social Development Dr. Fatima Al-Balooshi, May 13, 2013

May 13, 2013

Dr. Fatima Al-Balooshi

Minister of Human Rights and Social Development

Kingdom of Bahrain

Your Excellency,

I am writing to request information regarding the legal
restrictions faced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Bahrain. Human
Rights Watch has conducted research on this topic during trips to Bahrain in
2011 and in February 2013, when we met with members of civil society and the
Ministry of Social Development. On the basis of this research, we are preparing
a report that sets out our conclusions and concerns.

Our findings indicate that your government’s
restrictive approach to Bahraini NGOs violate international standards by:
arbitrarily rejecting registration applications and imposing intrusive
governmental supervision of NGOs; taking over and in some cases dissolving
organizations whose leaders have criticized government officials or their
policies; and placing substantial limits on the ability of groups to fund raise
and receive foreign funding. While the current NGO law guarantees the freedom
to establish associations, our findings indicate that in practice the
authorities have used the loosely worded provisions of the law to significantly
narrow the scope for establishing and operating civic organizations and
restrict their capacity to function.

We would appreciate responses from your office to the
questions below by May 31, 2013 in order to be able to reflect your
government’s perspective in our report and in our public comments when
releasing the report. We plan to release the report in Bahrain on June 20,
2013.

The following questions relate to the current Law of
Associations, Social and Cultural Clubs, Special Committees Working in the Field
of Youth and Sports, and Private Institutions (Law of Associations No. 21/1989)and its implementation in practice by the authorities.

Denial of Registration

We understand that registration of NGOs is mandatory under
the Law of Associations, and that under article 11 an application is considered
rejected if the ministry does not respond within 60 days.

Human Rights Watch is aware of other cases where
registration was denied on different grounds. The Ministry of Social
Development in 2005 refused to register the Bahrain Youth Society for Human
Rights (BYSHR). According to the US State Department, the Ministry of Social
Development rejected BYSHR’s registration application “allegedly
because of its ties to the dissolved Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) and
because some of its members were younger than the 18 [years old].” One of
the group’s founders told Human Rights Watch that he was the youngest
among the founders and that he was 18 when the group applied for registration.

We understand that applicants are allowed to challenge the
ministry’s decision to reject an application at court, but that under
article 12 (2) the court reviews officials' compliance with the formalities of
registration under the Law of Association and tests whether the officials
properly used their authority to deny a registration. We understand that the
current Law of Associations does not require authorities to notify NGOs when
they reject an application to register.

How many NGOs have applied for registration and whose registration
has been denied? We would appreciate if you could provide us with a list of the
organizations that have attempted to register since the Ministry of Social
Development took charge of managing NGOs in 2005 but have been denied
permission or ruled ineligible, including specific reasons for the refusal in
each case.

In cases where NGOs’ registration applications have been
denied, and the applicants challenged the denial in court, we would appreciate
if you could provide, in each case, the name of the organization, and the
courts’ decision on its challenge, or the current status of its challenge
before the courts?

Have the authorities notified any applicants whose requests to
register NGOs were rejected? If so, how many, and did the notifications include
a reasoned explanation for the denial or rejection of the application?

Have the authorities reconsidered the application of BYSHR to
register as an NGO? If so, when, and what was the result? Which member(s) of
the group were younger than 18 at the time it initially sought to register?

Prohibited Activities, Imposition of Control and
Dissolution

Our findings indicate that registered NGOs are subject to
overbroad prohibitions on their activities and are vulnerable to government
takeover or arbitrary dissolution. Article 18 of the Law of Associationssays
that organizations “may not get involved in politics.” Under
articles 23, 47, and 50 of the Law of Associations, the Ministry of Social
Development can appoint ministry officials to take over NGOs for up to one
year, cancel results of elections, and permanently dissolve or temporarily close
organizations if the group is “unable to achieve its aims.” Article
50 says that authorities can dissolve NGOs if they think the NGOs are
“unable to achieve the aims [they were] established for... or if they
violate the association law, public order and norms.”

For instance, in September 2010, the Ministry of Social
Development dissolved the board of directors of the Bahrain Human Rights
Society (BHRS) and replaced its president with a ministry official because,
according to a ministry statement on September 1, 2010, it was “serving a
certain segment of the citizens.” A few days earlier, in a press
conference on August 28, the BHRS’s director had criticized the government’s
denial of basic rights to detainees arrested in August 2010, and had said that
the arrests amounted to “enforced disappearance.”

What procedures does the ministry use to determine when an
organization’s activities violate article 18 of the Law of Associations?
In particular, how does the ministry decide if an organization’s
activities are “political?”

In each case where NGOs have been found to be unlawfully
participating in “politics,” we would appreciate if you could
provide the name of the NGO, the specific banned activity it engaged in, the
specific penalty that was imposed, and the date.

How does the ministry determine if an NGO is “unable to
achieve” its “aims” or “objectives,” or violates
relevant laws? In each case where the authorities have dissolved an NGO on
these bases, please provide the name of the NGO, the prohibited activity it
engaged in, whether it was dissolved temporarily or permanently, the duration
of the temporary dissolution (where appropriate), and the date it was
dissolved.

In each case since 2005 where the ministry has appointed
ministry officials to take over an NGO’s board, please provide the name
of the NGO, the number of board members and directors that the ministry
assigned to it, and the justification for taking control of the board.

In each case where the ministry has cancelled the results of an
NGO’s internal elections, please provide the name of the NGO, the date of
the election result that was cancelled, and the reasons for which the ministry
cancelled their elections.

Limitations on Fundraising

Our research indicates that while Bahraini laws and
regulations do not prohibit fundraising activities, they significantly curtail
soliciting and receiving domestic and foreign funds. Article 21 of the Law of
Associations prohibits any types of fundraising without written permission from
authorities. According to a January 2006 Ministry of Social Development Decree
(No. 27) NGOs must inform the ministry how they will collect money, the name
and number of the bank account, and how they will spend the funds. If the
ministry does not respond favorably within 30 days, the request is considered
denied. Under article 9 of the decree, associations must
record the name of every donor, eliminating any chance for anonymous donations.
Article 14 of the Ministerial Decree grants the ministry power to
“confiscate [funds] and distribute [them] to social activities” it
favors if it considers the organization in question to have violated conditions
laid out by the ministry in the fundraising license.

How many fundraising requests has the ministry rejected since
2005? We would appreciate if you could provide us with a list of those
organizations whose requests have been denied, including specific reasons for
the refusal in each case.

Has the ministry imposed any administrative or disciplinary
measures on any organization for having received funds from abroad without
permission? If so, in each case, please provide the name of the organization,
the measures imposed against it, including the amount of funding confiscated or
assets frozen, and the reasons for imposing these measures under the law.

Has the ministry imposed any administrative or disciplinary
measures on any organization for having collected funds from local sources
without permission? If so, in each case, please provide the name of the
organization, the measures imposed against it, including the amount of funding
confiscated or assets frozen, and the reasons for imposing these measures under
the law.

Draft Law of Association

On August 12, 2012, the Bahrain News Agency reported that
the Council of Ministers had adopted a draft NGO law.

Our research indicates that authorities did not consult
civil society organizations ahead of adopting the legislation and that civic
organizations were not aware of its adoption until media reported it. On
August 15, 2012 Najwa Janahi, director of NGO affairs in the Ministry of Social
Development, claimed that the government had consulted with representatives of
civic organizations and experts in 2007.

We are concerned that the draft law passed by the Council of
Ministers in 2012 and submitted to the National Assembly in January 2013
appears more restrictive than the 2007 draft, and in some respect more
restrictive than the 1989 law currently in place.

For example, article 2 of the new draft law would allow the
authorities to prohibit establishing NGOs for reasons that appear excessively
broad and vague, such as “to achieve objectives contrary to the
provisions of the constitution or legislation in force in the Kingdom of
Bahrain, or the public order and morals, or [if their] activities include
engaging in politics.”

Under article 8 the Ministry of Social Development would be
able to reject the registration of an NGO if it determines that
“[Bahraini] society does not need its services… or if [the NGO was
founded] in order to revive another NGO that was dissolved or merged into
another organization.”

Other restrictions in the draft law appear unduly
restrictive and in some cases to lack any clear relationship to reasonable
oversight requirements. For instance, article 6 would require an organization
seeking to register to have a “two-year operational budget” and to
provide evidence that it has a physical office.

According to article 7 a member of one NGO would not be able
to join another NGO if the two organizations “conduct similar activities,
unless approved by the minister.” Under article 88 of the draft law NGOs
would also need prior permission from “the minister [of social development]
and relevant authorities” to invite foreigners to visit Bahrain for
activities such as conferences and forums.

Under article 17 NGOs would be able to accept donations and
raise funds only after receiving “written permission” from the
Ministry of Social Development and in accordance with the executive regulations
of the law.

Finally, article 58 would allow the ministry to close any
organization that it determines to have committed violations, and to seek its
permanent dissolution within 60 days by administrative court order. The article
also says that the “order shall be implemented by force if
necessary.”

What are the specific steps the ministry took in order to
consult with stakeholders, especially civil society organizations, before
adopting the draft law of associations?

What are the criteria that the government would use to
determine whether an NGO’s proposed activities are against
“public order and morals” or would constitute engaging in
politics, such that the NGO’s request to register would be denied
under article 2?

What are the criteria that the government would use to
determine that an NGO’s services are not needed by Bahraini society
such that the NGO’s request to register would be denied under
article 8?

Please explain the rationale or need for the following
provisions:

The provision of article 8 that would deny registration
to an NGO that the government deems to have been dissolved or that merged
into another NGO?

The provision of article 6 that would prohibit a
member of one NGO from joining another NGO that conducts similar
activities, without prior approval?

The provision of article 88 requiring prior approval for
NGOs to invite foreigners to events?

Article 17 of the draft law says that NGOs would be able
to raise funds after receiving “written permission” from your
ministry and in accordance with executive regulations. Can you tell us
whether or not Decree No. 27 of 2006 will remain in force if the draft law
is approved by the parliament and signed into law by the King?

What due process guarantees, if any, do NGOs have if the
minister decides to close them? Can they, for example, challenge
such a ministerial decision and continue operating, prior to being closed
for up to 60 days before the minister needs to seek a court order for
their permanent dissolution under article 58?

In order to be able to reflect your responses in our report,
we look forward to receiving them by May 31, 2013. We also reiterate our
interest in arranging a meeting to discuss these issues in person.

171, entered into force March 23,
1976. Bahrain ratified the ICCPR in 2006.

[17] Public Interest Law Initiative, Enabling Civil Society: Practical
Aspects of Freedom of Association Source Book (Budapest, Public Interest
Law Initiative, Columbia University Budapest Law Center, 2003).

[19] Ibid. The International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), which provides information on the legal
issues for civic organizations, says that that the
ICCPR does not require individuals to ”form legal entities in order to exercise their freedoms of
expression, and association.” Leon E. Irish, Robert Kushen, and Karla W.
Simon, Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations (New York: Open
Society Institute, 2004), p. 21.

[23] Law No 21/1989, art. 89(2), Translation provided by the International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law. Article 87 (1) stipulates
a fine of 1,000 Bahraini Dinars ($2,640) and/or imprisonment for establishing
and operating an unregistered organization. Draft Law on Civil Organizations and Institutions, art. 87 (1)

[24] Law No 1 5/1976, Penal Code, art. 163: Any person who joins the
aforesaid societies, organizations, and institutions, shall be liable for
imprisonment for a period of no more than 3 months or a fine not exceeding 30
Dinars. The same penalty shall apply to any citizen residing in the State of
Bahrain for joining or participating in any manner without a Government license
in any of the aforesaid organizations, which are based outside the country.

[29] “Al-Balooshi: Banning the mix of political and human rights
work ... and setting regulations for associations’ external
relations, (البلوشي:
منعالجمعبينالعملينالسياسيوالحقوقي...
وضوابطلعلاقةالجمعياتبالخارج),” Al-Wasat,
August 18, 2011, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3267/news/read/583979/1.html (accessed April
3, 2012). In July 2011, the government sponsored what it called a National
Dialogue which it said aimed at presenting “the people’s views and
demands for further reform.” The vast majority of the 350
participants were government supporters. With regard to civic
organizations the participants proposed a “National Strategy for
NGOs” which specified that organizations should “should not combine
political and human rights activities.” See “National
Dialogue; Outcomes,” The National Dialogue http://www.nd.bh/en/index.php/the-dialogue/executive-summary-of-outcomes#social,
(accessed March 16, 2013).

[30] Human Rights Watch wrote to the ministry requesting a copy of the
draft law on May 14, 2012. Human Rights Watch sent follow-up emails to
the ministry on May 30, June 13, August 7, August 14, August 29, September 4,
September 10, October 9 October 29, 2012.

[33] “Janahi: the Ministry of Social Development discussed the
[draft] Law on Associations with NGOs in workshops and meetings, ( جناحي:
«التنمية»
ناقشت «قانون
المنظمات» مع
الجمعيات
خلال ورش العمل
واللقاءات,” Al-Wasat,
August 15, 2012, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3630/news/read/694587/1.html,
(accessed March 16, 2013).

[34] The “Draft Law on Civil Organizations and Institutions,”
on file with Human Rights Watch, was signed by Prime Minister Khalifa bin
Salman Al Khalifa and sent to the Chamber of Deputies on January 14, 2013. Human
Rights Watch requested a copy at a meeting with ministry officials on February
27, 2013, but the officials would not provide it. Human Rights Watch
subsequently received a copy from a Bahraini civil society activist.

[35] According to documents published by the Official Gazette
between 1991 and 2003 the Ministry of Information registered 18 cultural and
artistic associations; The First Theater, Jazeera Theater, Bahrain Archeology
and History Association, Bahraini Family of Intellectuals and Writers’
Association, Bahrain Fine Arts Association, Bahrain Contemporary
Arts Association, the Media Association of the Gulf Cooperation States, Bahrain
Music and Popular Arts Association, Bahrain Club for Cinema, Bahrain Pottery
Association, Al-Sawari Theater, Bahrain Bookstores Association, the Popular
Heritage Association, Bahrain Gratification Association, the Popular
Poems Association, Bahrain Journalists Association, the Private Cultural Forum
Association, and the Bahrain Internet Association.

[49] Article 26 of the ICCPR says: “All persons are equal before
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
See: Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. CCPR Commentary (Kehl Am Rhein, Germany: N.P. Engel,
2005), p. 597, 600.

[73] In addition to the cases of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human
Rights and the Bahrain al-Nazaha Society, the Ministry of Social Development
refused to register the Kindergarten Association in
2010. Al-Salam Society for Human Rights which applied for registration in
2009 never received a response from the Ministry of Social Development,
according to Hadi al-Mousawi, one of the founders.

[74] Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society has no relationship
whatsoever with Human Rights Watch and has frequently advocated positions
reflecting the views of the government of Bahrain.

[85] Ministry of Social Development letter to founding members of the Bahrain
al-Nazaha Society, June 17, 2010, copy is on file with Human Rights Watch.

[86] Defense Memorandum of the Ministry of Social Development to the
High Civil Court, December 5, 2010, Copy is on file with Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch, phone conversation with Hussain Mansour, October 31, 2012.
Also see: “Case of establishing al-Nazaha Society by a group of
journalists adjourned, (إرجاءقضيةإنشاءجمعيةنزاهةمنقبلمجموعةصحافيين),” Al-Wasat,
May 6, 2012, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3529/news/read/660974/1.html (accessed May 18, 2012).

[88] “Verdict in High Court of Appeal, first district, Case No.
17/2011/1706/1, June 25, 2012. Section on the ruling on the High Civil
Court, Case No. 02/2010/5088/2, April 26, 2011. Copy on file with Human Rights
Watch.

[89] Verdict in High Court of Appeal, first district, Case No.
17/2011/1706/1, June 25, 2012. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.

[97] Law No 21/1989, article 23 states that the “specialized
minister” can replace managers and boards of directors when “the
number of the board of directors becomes less than the number needed for the
legal quorum or if the general assembly doesn’t convene for two
consecutive years without a reason acceptable by the specialized administrative
authority.”

[100] The circumstances are: a) if the members of board director was
less than the number needed for the legal quorum and it was not possible to
meet the legal quorum; b) It the general assembly did not hold meeting for two
consecutive years without a justification that the minister accepts; c) if the
organization committed a violation which requires taking this action and the
minister didn’t have another solution. Draft Law on Civil Organizations and
Institutions, art. 20.

[110] Human Rights Watch, No Justice in Bahrain: Unfair Trials
in Military and Civilian Courts, February 28, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/02/28/no-justice-bahrain-0.
The trials started on October 28, 2010, but the king freed the 23 defendants on
February 22, 2011, after mass protests broke out in Bahrain.

[113] Decree No. 63 of 2010 in regard to appointing an interim director
to administer Bahrain Human Rights Society, signed by Minister of Social
Development Fatima al-Balooshi, November 8, 2010. Copy of the decree is on file
with Human Rights Watch.

[121] “The Bahrain for Human Rights: The decision of the
Development violates Associations Law and the International Covenant, (البحرينيةلحقوقالإنسان: قرارالتنميةمخالفلأحكامقانونالجمعياتوالعهدالدولي),” Al-Wasat,
October 8, 2010, http://www.alwasatnews.com/2954/news/read/482793/1.html (accessed May 18, 2012).

[123] On November 30, 2011 Al-Derazi resigned and in February 2012 the
society elected Salman Kemal al-Din as secretary general. “Al-Derazi
elected secretary general of the Bahraini for Human Rights and al-Gayeb as his
deputy, (الدرازيأميناًعاماًلـالبحرينيةلحقوقالإنسانوالغائبنائباًله),” Al-Wasat,
July 24, 2011, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3242/news/read/574015/1.html (accessed May 21, 2012).

[131] Between February 17 and March 23, 2011, the BTS issued 13
statements condemning the security forces’ attacks on demonstrators and
supported the protesters’ demand for a constitutional monarchy. Copies of
BTS’s statements on file with Human Rights Watch.

[133] The BTS is not officially part of the GFBTU. According to al-Salman, more than 9,000 teachers (nearly 90 percent
of all teachers) participated in the strike. The
GFBTU’s strike lasted one day but the teachers, led by BTS, continued to
strike until February 24, 2012. For details of the GFBTU’s strike, see:
“Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, November 23,
2011, para 1340.

[135] Statement Number 11, Bahrain Teachers’ Society, March 13,
2011; Statement issued by the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, (بيانصادرعنالاتحادالعاملنقاباتعمالالبحرين); http://www.bhteachers.org/portal/news.php?action=view&id=60 (accessed May 24, 2012), On March
23 the BTS ended its strike and told teachers: “Everyone has the
right to assess his situation and … can take a decision that is suitable
for him.” Statement Number 13, Bahrain
Teachers’ Society, March 23, 2011.

[139] Al-Salman remained in jail until August 21; was re-arrested in a
pre-dawn raid on October 18 and held for two more weeks; and once again
arrested November 17, 2012 and held for 17 days. Human Rights Watch
correspondence with Jalila al-Salman, December 6, 2012.

[147] Verdict in High Civil Court, Case No. 02/2008/8983/8. The court
document provides detail accounts of the correspondents between the Ministry of
Social Development and the Bahrain Nursing Society, copy is on file with Human
Rights Watch.

[153] Decree No. 32 of 2008 in regard to appointing an interim director
to Bahrain Nursing Society, signed by Fatima al-Balooshi, minister of social
development, and August 11, 2008. Copy of the decree is on file with Human
Rights Watch.

[154] The Public Prosecution Office later
filed a lawsuit against al-Saffar and al-Dimistani charging them with having
“performed the affairs of the society while they had been prohibited from
doing so” when the ministry of Social Development appointed an interim
director. In July 2011, the Second District Criminal Court sentenced al-Saffar
and al-Dimistani to one month in prison. In December 2012 the Court of Appeal
upheld the sentences. Authorities arrested al-Saffar but released her shortly
afterwards because she had already served the time of her sentence after she was
arrested in the
government crackdown on demonstrations in March 2011. Human Rights Watch
interview with Rula al-Saffar, Manama, November 26, 2011.

[157] Decree No. 43 of 2008 in regard to renewing
the appointment of an interim director to Bahrain Nursing Society, signed by
Fatima al-Balooshi, minister of Social Development, November 30, 2008. Copy of
the decree is on file with Human Rights Watch.

[159] The court said that the Bahrain Nursing Society violated article
23 of the Law of Associations (No 21/1989) by failing to hold the general
assembly meeting for two consecutive years and that according to article 30 of
the Law of Associations Minister of Social Development had the authority to
assign an interim. Verdict in High Civil Court, Case No. 02/2008/8983/8, copy
on file with Human Rights Watch.

[185] On March 31, 2013, the court ordered the BMS to provide a list
member who had attended election on April 13, 2012 to determine if there were
non-Bahraini among them as well is doctors who are members of other
organizations. High Civil Court, Case No. 02/2012/7873/5, March 31, 2013.
Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.

[186] “Hilal calls on the Ministry of Development to cancel its
decision to reinstate former board of Lawyers, (هلال
يطالب
التنميةبإلغاء
قرارها
بتعيين
الإدارة
السابقة لـ المحامين),” Al-Wasat,
December 11, 2011, http://alwasatnews.com/3382/news/print/614108/1.html (accessed December 16, 2011).

[188] Copy of the ministry’s correspondence with Bahrain
Lawyers’ Society on file with Human Rights Watch.

[189] Decree No. 57 of 2011 in regard to cancelling the general assembly
of Bahrain Lawyers’ Society, signed by Fatima al-Balooshi, minister of
Social Development, November 30, 2011. Human Rights Watch, telephone
conversation with Hamid al-Mullah, October 25, 2012.

[203] Draft Law on Civil Organizations and Institutions, art. 17.
It was unclear at the time of writing if the executive regulations pertaining
to the existing Law 89 (Decree No. 27 of 2006) would
also apply once the draft law goes into effect.

[219] Ibid., art 4 (4). The article also prohibits the formation of
political parties on the bases of “discrimination on the bases or sex,
origin, language, religion or faith”.

[220]Article
27 of the ICCPR states “In those States in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their
own language.” International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A., art. 27.

[222] Wa’ad officials told Human
Rights Watch that the group received 1,000 Bahraini Dinars (US$ 2,640) per
month but the government halted the stipend in April 2011. Amal had been
receiving 1,000 Bahraini Dinars per-month but the Ministry of Justice halted
the allowance in October
2010. Other opposition
groups also told Human Rights Watch that in the wake of the pro-democracy
demonstrations in February 2011 the government has halted provision of
stipends. Human Right Watch
contacted opposition groups about the financial allowance s they receive from
the government. On May 21, 2013, the Minister of Justice said at a
parliamentary session that his ministry had “halted the financial
allowances of some societies because they deviated from the purposes they were
established for” without naming those political societies. See:
“Minister of Justice: We paid 1,5 million dinars allowance to [political]
societies until December 2012, (وزير
العدل: دفعنا 1.5 مليون
دينار لتمويل الجمعيات
حتى ديسمبر 2012),”
Al-Wasat, May 22, 2013, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3910/news/read/774280/1.html (accessed June 3, 2013).

[228] Human Rights Watch, phone conversation with Jawad Fairooz, a
former Al-Wefaq deputy, August 12, 2012. Human Right Watch also documented that
some of those arrested in late 2010 were questioned about communications with
HRW. See Human Rights Watch, No Justice in Bahrain: Unfair Trials in
Military and Civilian Courts, February 28, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/02/28/no-justice-bahrain-0.

[262] “The Public Prosecution Office releases Fadhel Abbas and
subjects him to a travel ban,( النيابة
تخلي سبيل فاضل
عباس بضمان محل
إقامته),” Al-Wasat, April 25, 2013, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3883/news/read/767166/1.html
(accessed May 7, 2013). He told Human Rights Watch as of June 5, 2013
that he does not know whether the Public Prosecution Officer has referred his
case to the criminal court. Human Rights Watch, phone conversation with Fadhel
Abbas, secretary general of the United National Democratic
Assembly, June 5, 2013.

[266] Aurore Cloe Dupuis “Bahrain’s main opposition
group to quit national dialogue,” France 24, July 17, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110717-bahrain-main-opposition-shiite-group-quit-national-dialogue-reform (accessed August 10, 2012). In February 2013 the opposition
groups, pro-government groups and the Bahraini government launched a new round
of negotiations aimed at addressing the political crisis. After many rounds of
talks the pro-government groups and the government have yet to agree to some
opposition demands including having a representative of the royal family
participate in the negotiations and conducting a
popular referendum to ratify the outcome.

[282] The court also reduced the sentences of three Amal members from
five years to one year; reduced the sentences of two members from five year to six months and one month respectively; and acquitted
another one. See: “Court reduces the punishment of Amal members, (المحكمة
تُخفض عقوبة
كوادر أمل),” al-Wasat, November 29, 2012, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3736/news/read/719353/1.html
(accessed, December 3, 2012).

[298] International Federation for Human Rights and Arab Institute for
Human Rights. “Freedom of Association in the Arabian Gulf: The case of
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Yemen,” http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/etude.pdf (accessed August 6, 2012).

[327] “His Majesty issues decrees,” Bahrain News Agency,
October 9, 2011, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/475817 (accessed June 25, 2012). On June 2, 2013, the
Cabinet amended article 8 of the Trade Union Law to add that the Minister of
Labor should get approval from the Council of Ministers before deciding which
workers’ unions will represent Bahrain in international
trade union gatherings. See: “ Premier Chairs Cabinet
Meeting, Bahrain News Agency, June 2, 2013, http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/563600
(accessed June 3, 2013).

[334] Human Rights Watch interview with Salman al-Mahfoodh, secretary
general of GFBTU, Manama, February 28, 2013. The number of newly established
trade unions is based on media reports compiled by Human Rights Watch.