09TBILISI1131, GEORGIA: RUSSIA KEY TOPIC IN ABKHAZ POLITICS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001131
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2019
TAGS: PGOVPRELPREFMOPSKBTSRUGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA KEY TOPIC IN ABKHAZ POLITICS
REF: A. TBILISI 1035
¶B. TBILISI 1034
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
¶1. (C) Summary and comment. In seeming contradiction to
recent reports of concern in Abkhazia about Russian influence
(ref A), UNOMIG officials, de facto authorities, opposition
journalists, and NGOs in Abkhazia told visiting poloff that
Abkhaz politicians are trying to out-do each other to show
they are the most pro-Russian. However, sources also noted a
growing wariness among Abkhaz that Russian interests in
Abkhazia should be moderated. One long-term observer of
Abkhazia said that even these mild statements of
apprehension, when made to a U.S. official, indicate there is
real concern. Several opposition candidates seem to be
emerging, but no one has yet announced intentions to run in
the December "presidential" elections. NGOs in Abkhazia also
reported on self-proclaimed progress in democratic reforms.
De facto "vice foreign minister" Maxim Gundjia commented on
plans and hopes for Abkhaz economic development. It was
clear that no one in Abkhazia - de facto authorities,
opposition leaders or NGO representatives - was willing to
concede to poloff or publicly any anti-Russian sentiment,
possibly for fear of Russia response. The fact that they
went as far as telling poloff that they wanted to ensure
Abkhaz interests were considered a priority in Abkhazia over
Russian interests is an indication that there is likely more
suspicion and worry over Russian actions in Abkhazia than
they were willing to admit. Whatever the sentiment is
towards Russia among the Abkhaz - anti-Russia, pro-Russia, or
ambivalent - Russia plays a a significant role in their
discussion of their present and future situation. End
summary and comment.
ANTI-RUSSIA OR PRO-RUSSIA?
¶2. (C) During meetings in Sukhumi, UNOMIG officials,
opposition-leaning journalists, and de facto Abkhaz
authorities told visiting poloff that opposition leaders and
de facto authorities continue to be pro-Russia. According to
UNOMIG officials, leaders are trying to outdo each other in
their support for Russia. According to opposition-leaning
journalists, the majority of people do not think that Russia
has too much control over Abkhazia. However, they noted that
the Abkhaz have no illusions about Russia and understand that
Russia wants to protect its own strategic interests in
Abkhazia. All interlocutors admitted that there is a
wariness about allowing Abkhaz and Russian interests to
become too intertwined, and emphasized the importance of
keeping Abkhaz interests above Russian interests. According
to these same sources, people generally appreciate Russian
economic and political support and understand that they have
to rely on Russia now in order to maintain independence.
However, NGOs representatives and de facto "vice foreign
minister" Maxim Gundjia stated emphatically that they would
welcome assistance from the West, and without this
assistance, it will be difficult for Abkhazia to escape the
influence of Russia. A western scholar who has been
conducting civil society dialogue in Abkhazia for 30 years
told poloffs that on a June 10-17 trip to Abkhazia she
observed a definite increase in guardedness among the Abkhaz
towards Russia. She expressed surprised that NGOs and de
facto authorities expressed as much concern as they did, and
took this admission to a U.S. diplomat as a sure sign of a
growing anti-Russian sentiment.
DECEMBER "PRESIDENTIAL" ELECTIONS
¶3. (C) Elections for a new Abkhaz "president" are scheduled
Qto take place in mid-December. As of yet, no one, including
Bagapsh, has announced plans to run. However, most people
assume that Bagapsh, former de-facto "vice-president" Raul
Khajimba, and shady businessman Beslan Butba will likely run
for the position. UNOMIG officials and opposition-leaning
journalists emphasized to poloff that while Bagapsh will
likely be the winner, the Abkhaz are unpredictable, so no one
will really know the outcome until it happens. The success
or failure of current economic projects, such as the railway
and foreign investment (ref A), will play a role in
determining the winner, as will the financial resources of
the candidates. Khajimba is considered to have the least
financial resources available.
WHAT DOES THE OPPOSITION STAND FOR?
¶4. (C) UN officials, de facto authorities, and NGO
representatives told poloff that while there is a nascent
opposition in Abkhazia, none of the leaders' positions differ
much from either each other or the de facto authorities. The
opposition is criticized for only condemning the de facto
authorities, but not presenting any substantive alternative
proposals of their own. Those with whom poloff spoke in
TBILISI 00001131 002 OF 002
Abhazia, noted that the opposition is not united and
constantly contradicts each other. &#x
000A;
DEMOCRATIC REFORMS - PROGRESS MADE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
¶5. (C) Representatives from the Center for Humanitarian
Development (CHD), an NGO in Sukhumi, talked with poloff on
the state of democratic reforms in Abkhazia. CHD
representatives told poloff that democratic institutions are
developing in Abkhazia in a particularly unfriendly
environment, with the West and Georgia working against
Abkhazia, and Russia not caring about democratic reforms.
According to the representative, since Russia and Nicaragua
recognized Abkhaz independence, Abkhazia has gained
confidence in its security situation and now feels that it
can be more bold in instituting reforms and challenging the
de facto authorities. However, the representative was not
able to articulate to poloff any specific gains made in
democratic reforms.
THE STATE OF FREE MEDIA
¶6. (C) The CHD representative outlined what she considered to
be Abkhaz successes in free media. The representative
elaborated that CHD had lobbied for a law, that has since
passed the de facto "parliament," on increasing access to
public information. The representative admitted that the de
facto authorities do pressure journalists, but said that
journalists exaggerate this harassment. UNOMIG officials,
CHD representatives and journalists described to poloff one
incident of harassment in June, in which the two leading
opposition papers were prohibited from using the local
printing house. They do not have the in-house resources to
print the papers, and they are also restricted from sending
the paper to Russia for printing, so this effectively shut
them down. While the de facto authorities posited that this
was strictly a business decision by the management of the
printing house, most others believed that this case did
involve some level of pressure by the de facto authorities on
the printing house.
¶7. (C) Another recent incident involves Butba's television
channel, which is currently only broadcast in Sukhumi. He
sought permission from the de facto authorities to broadcast
across all of Abkhazia, but they denied this request.
Journalists also reported to poloff that they are targets of
other forms of direct pressure from de facto authorities,
including the blocking of publication of certain articles the
authorities deem inappropriate. Furthermore, in Abkhazia
people only have access to Russian and Abkhaz news sources,
and while BBC is occasionally broadcast, it is not translated
into either Russian or the Abkhaz language.
THE SINGAPORE MODEL
¶8. (C) Gundjia told poloff that economic development in
Abkhazia was the de facto authorities' number one priority,
acknowledging that widespread international political
recognition could take 20 years or more. He said Abkhazia is
pursuing the "Singapore Model," defined by Gundjia as a free
economic zone with a transparent and open business
environment. He expressed frustration that non-recognition
by most of the international community has prevented Abkhazia
from being transparent, something he argued it very much
aspires to. He stated that Abkhazia wants to attract more
tourists, Russian and others, and thinks opening clothing
stores would help. (Note: This is undoubtedly a reference
to the recent announcement and then quick rescinding of the
announcement that Bennetton would be opening a store in
Sukhumi - ref B. End note.) Gundjia said Abkhazia would
welcome Georgian and Western business and tourism, which
would benefit everyone. However, he emphatically stated that
Qwould benefit everyone. However, he emphatically stated that
time cannot be turned back, and while Abkhazia will never
again be part of Georgia, he welcomed a future of normal
relations with Georgia as a neighbor.
TEFFT

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