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skunk-works-digest Friday, August 6 1999 Volume 08 : Number 090
Index of this digest by subject:
***************************************************
Fwd: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
Secrecy, security and the historical record (Was: Rohrabacher...)
Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record (Was: Rohrabacher...)
It's not the place that matters
B-2 Tip Off
Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
Re: B-2 Tip Off
Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
Re: Lor-el
Re: Fwd: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
***************************************************
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 1999 09:51:05 PDT
From: "MIDI MAN"
Subject: Fwd: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
As a final point about RAF Menwith Hill and the NSA's activities on this
excellent mailing list, Can I invite the Americans on this list to indicate
whether or not they are supportive of the activities at this, and other
American/UKUSA establishments. I'd be very interested to hear the
viewpoints (or a simple yes or no) of the American citizens on this very
sensitive topic.
If you are not up to date on this topic, to help you with this, I've
included a recent communication concerning this very issue from a UK based
mailing list.
Many thanks
Rob Burrows
>From: Ian Brown
>Reply-To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
>To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
>Subject: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
>Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 16:37:37 +0100
>
>Wednesday August 4, 1999
>
>PERSPECTIVE ON WORLD AFFAIRS
>
>Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper, the NSA
>
>The top secret agency is spying for the U.S. in ways that
>other nations find increasingly alarming and intrusive.
>
>By SIMON DAVIES
>
>Europe is discretely gearing up for one of the most interesting legal
>battles in
>its history. At stake is the future of the world's most secretive
>intelligence
>organization, America's National Security Agency.
>
>The NSA is in the business of eavesdropping on the world's communications
>networks for the benefit of the United States. In doing so, it has built a
>vast
>spying operation that reaches into the telephone systems of nearly every
>country. Its operations are so secret that this activity, outside the U.S.,
>occurs without any democratic oversight and without any legal basis.
>
>Over the past year, members of the European Parliament have learned, to
>their
>astonishment, that the NSA, in collusion with the British government, has
>created the means to intercept almost every fax, e-mail and telephone call
>within the European Union. The revelation has irritated governments
>throughout
>Europe, culminating in a current Italian judicial inquiry into the legality
>of
>the NSA's activity.
>
>Sketchy details of the NSA's spying in Europe had been common currency here
>for
>decades but had never been formally acknowledged. Attempts by British MPs
>had
>for decades been ignored.
>
>The issue has erupted now because of two recent European Parliament studies
>that
>confirm the existence in Britain of a network of communications
>intelligence
>bases operated by the NSA. The publication last year of the first report,
>"An
>Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control," confirmed for the
>first
>time that the NSA had established a surveillance capacity over the entire
>European communications network. It also described a grid of
>supercomputers,
>known as Echelon, capable of scanning vast areas of the communications
>spectrum
>to detect keywords.
>
>Of particular interest to Parliament was the report's assertion that the
>NSA was
>beefing up its commercial espionage activities. Its claim is that the NSA
>has
>been routinely intercepting sensitive traffic relating to bids, takeovers,
>mergers, investments and tender offers, all for U.S. economic benefit.
>
>Questions have been raised by parliamentarians in Germany, Norway, Denmark,
>Holland and Sweden. Then, in September, the plenary session of the European
>Parliament took the unprecedented step of openly debating the activities of
>the
>NSA. In a consensus resolution, the Parliament fired a shot across the bow
>of
>the spooks by demanding more openness and accountability.
>
>Any thoughts that these matters were simply paranoid musings by fans of
>"The
>X-Files" were scuttled in June when the second report, "Interception
>Capabilities 2000," set out the technical specifications of the
>interception
>system.
>
>The report revealed details of a secret plan to create a "seamless" web of
>telecommunications surveillance across all national boundaries. The
>strategy was
>advised by national security agencies and by the FBI, which instigated with
>Brussels a top-secret planning organization called the International Law
>Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar. In time, two vast systems--one
>designed
>for national security and one for law enforcement--would merge and, in the
>process, would cripple national control over surveillance activities.
>
>The scandal has found its way to Washington. The House Permanent Select
>Committee on Intelligence has ordered the NSA to hand over documents
>relating to
>Echelon. The NSA has for the first time in the committee's history refused,
>claiming attorney-client privilege.
>
>The stand-off may well end the NSA's privileged position. Rep. Bob Barr
>(R-Ga.),
>worried by the potential breach of constitutional privacy rights, has
>introduced
>an amendment to the fiscal 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act requiring
>the
>directors of the CIA and the NSA and Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to submit a
>report
>outlining the legal standards being employed within project Echelon in
>order to
>safeguard the privacy of American citizens.
>
>The NSA's silence has fueled the present inquiry by the Rome judiciary. The
>head
>of the inquiry, Deputy Dist. Atty. Vittorio De Cesare, intends to determine
>the
>extent to which the activities of the NSA may breach Italian law.
>
>Italy's privacy watchdog, Stefano Rodota, has also expressed his concern,
>and
>recently told local media, "The U.S. government [has] not replied to the
>requests for clarifications made explicitly by the European Parliament."
>Rodota
>has motivated his fellow privacy commissioners throughout Europe to
>formally
>investigate the Echelon system.
>
>These recent events have left observers contemplating two distressing
>facts.
>First, national borders have disintegrated. The NSA and its partner
>agencies now
>can intercept any communication worldwide. Second, the distinction between
>traditional police and security agencies has blurred. The future is without
>doubt a seamless, borderless, surveillance web that touches all facets of
>our
>communication.
>
> - - -
>
>Simon Davies Is a Visiting Fellow in the Computer Security Research Centre
>in
>the London School of Economics and Director of the Human Rights Group,
>Privacy
>International
>
> Copyright 1999 Los Angeles Times. All Rights Reserved
>
______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 12:18:40 -0500
From: "Allen Thomson"
Subject: Secrecy, security and the historical record (Was: Rohrabacher...)
This thread is winding near something I've mused about for a while, and I'd
like to solicit others' opinions and comments.
The topic is whether the extreme sort of secrecy associated with black
programs can be shown to be effective as a means of achieving, maintaining
or enhancing national security. For the purpose of the discussion, I'd
propose to define "national security" narrowly as "military superiority over
actual and potential enemies."
The usual reasons given for institution of blackess as a tool in the service
of national security are, as I understand them,
- - To delay enemy research on ways of countering a new capability
- - To delay enemy acquisition of a new capability that might be used against
the US
- - To create uncertainty concerning the US' true capabilities
So, now the question: Does the historical record of the once-black aircraft
(and satellite) programs we all know and love -- U-2, A-11, F-117, B-2,
CORONA, etc -- show that that blackness really did have the desired effects?
Would a lesser degree of secrecy that included technical details and
performance characteristics, but not "fact-of" and budget information, been
adequate?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 13:43:22 -0500
From: "Robert S. Hopkins, III, PhD"
Subject: Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
>So, now the question: Does the historical record of the once-black aircraft
>(and satellite) programs we all know and love -- U-2, A-11, F-117, B-2,
>CORONA, etc -- show that that blackness really did have the desired effects?
>Would a lesser degree of secrecy that included technical details and
>performance characteristics, but not "fact-of" and budget information, been
>adequate?
Although my good friend and colleague Chris Pocock may easily prove
me wrong, the role of the U-2 as an overflight collector was kept
"black" from the American people until May 1960, although the Soviets
sure as heck knew about it on 4 July 1956, and some 20 times
thereafter.
I will never forget being prevented from taking a photograph of the
RC-135 I just landed because it was "classified," yet not six hours
earlier the entire RC-135 was photographed from nose to tail in
excruciating detail by the crew of a Soviet MiG-31 FOXHOUND.
At the roll-out of the B-2 bomber no one was allowed to photograph
the trailing edge because it would reveal its configuration, which
was highly sensitive. I wasn't even at the ceremony but knew exactly
what it looked like by referring to the Northrop "star" made up of
B-2 silhouettes and published in Air Force Magazine for months in
advance.
I think much of this excessive secrecy derives not from a genuine
need to keep material or programs classified, which is a legitimate
operational requirement. Instead, it comes from one of the side
effects of the U-2 program and satellite reconnaissance: Eisenhower
and Kennedy/McNamara knew that the Soviets were aware of U-2
overflights or would be aware of each satellite orbit, and they also
knew that there was largely nothing the Soviets could do about them
(time would change that with the U-2). What these policy makers
agreed upon was that the United States would make it official policy
NOT to admit these overflights (aerial or orbital) were taking place
so as NOT to embarrass the Soviets, thereby possibly escalating the
cold war or its tensions.
So, who is really kept in the dark by these secrecy efforts? Who
really benefitted from these secrecy efforts? As Ike said during an
NSC meeting, the U.S. needed these flights in peacetime to prevent
their need in wartime. Why couldn't he have said that to the American
people four years earlier? I can't think of a more receptive American
public.
DrBob
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 1999 12:04:50 -0700
From: "A.J. Craddock"
Subject: Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record (Was: Rohrabacher...)
"National Security"
Has this ever been defined by the Supreme Court?
My recollection (from Andrew Weiner's "Blank Check") is that there was a
test case (name eludes me) that never made it to the Supreme Court, but
languished in the Lower Courts due to challenges from Government lawyers.
Is this still the case?
Or am I completely wrong?
Tony Craddock
________
At 12:18 PM 8/5/99 -0500, Allen Thomson wrote:
>This thread is winding near something I've mused about for a while, and I'd
>like to solicit others' opinions and comments.
>
>The topic is whether the extreme sort of secrecy associated with black
>programs can be shown to be effective as a means of achieving, maintaining
>or enhancing national security. For the purpose of the discussion, I'd
>propose to define "national security" narrowly as "military superiority over
>actual and potential enemies."
>
>The usual reasons given for institution of blackess as a tool in the service
>of national security are, as I understand them,
>
>- To delay enemy research on ways of countering a new capability
>
>- To delay enemy acquisition of a new capability that might be used against
>the US
>
>- To create uncertainty concerning the US' true capabilities
>
>So, now the question: Does the historical record of the once-black aircraft
>(and satellite) programs we all know and love -- U-2, A-11, F-117, B-2,
>CORONA, etc -- show that that blackness really did have the desired effects?
>Would a lesser degree of secrecy that included technical details and
>performance characteristics, but not "fact-of" and budget information, been
>adequate?
>
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 15:18:19 -0400
From: "Andrew Morris"
Subject: It's not the place that matters
US citizen here, and I can understand the frustration of Brits or
any nation who feels that they are complicit in what may be
construed as immoral or illegal. But least we forget (and today
everyone's memories grow shorter and shorter), as British citizens
were you upset that CIA/NSA had huge listening posts in Iran
before the Shah's fall or in Turkey? Were you outraged by that?
While I can imagine some NSA types padding their own wallets with
strategic investments relating to data intercepts, the US economy
is not prospering because of SIGINT from the EU.
Up until recently the NSA was forbidden by law to eavesdrop on the
US mainland. So we did not have to worry as much about big
brother listening in on us, as much as big brother listening in on
the world. Recent changes to the law I understand allow the NSA
to conduct "tests" of surveillance assets within the US.
The BIG question is the value of intelligence, in whatever form
you get it(HUMINT, SIGINT, etc). It is better to have and not
need it than need it and not be able to get it (Iraq). Trust (?)
within the democratic nations of the world must allow for those
who CAN, to look/listen over the wall, or into a window, or onto a
fax or cell call, for the benefit of those who cannot. Provided
there is some reciprocal sharing of info.
There is some nominal oversight of the US Intelligence community
by elected officials, but again trust that they hear what they
need to, to provide informed oversight is another matter.
Well that's my two pence worth.
Cheers,
Andy Morris
- -----Original Message-----
From: owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com
[mailto:owner-skunk-works@netwrx1.com]On Behalf Of MIDI MAN
Sent: Thursday, August 05, 1999 12:51 PM
To: skunk-works@netwrx1.com
Subject: Fwd: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
As a final point about RAF Menwith Hill and the NSA's activities
on this
excellent mailing list, Can I invite the Americans on this list to
indicate
whether or not they are supportive of the activities at this, and
other
American/UKUSA establishments. I'd be very interested to hear the
viewpoints (or a simple yes or no) of the American citizens on
this very
sensitive topic.
If you are not up to date on this topic, to help you with this,
I've
included a recent communication concerning this very issue from a
UK based
mailing list.
Many thanks
Rob Burrows
>From: Ian Brown
>Reply-To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
>To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
>Subject: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
>Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 16:37:37 +0100
>
>Wednesday August 4, 1999
>
>PERSPECTIVE ON WORLD AFFAIRS
>
>Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper, the NSA
>
>The top secret agency is spying for the U.S. in ways that
>other nations find increasingly alarming and intrusive.
>
>By SIMON DAVIES
>
>Europe is discretely gearing up for one of the most interesting
legal
>battles in
>its history. At stake is the future of the world's most secretive
>intelligence
>organization, America's National Security Agency.
>
>The NSA is in the business of eavesdropping on the world's
communications
>networks for the benefit of the United States. In doing so, it
has built a
>vast
>spying operation that reaches into the telephone systems of
nearly every
>country. Its operations are so secret that this activity, outside
the U.S.,
>occurs without any democratic oversight and without any legal
basis.
>
>Over the past year, members of the European Parliament have
learned, to
>their
>astonishment, that the NSA, in collusion with the British
government, has
>created the means to intercept almost every fax, e-mail and
telephone call
>within the European Union. The revelation has irritated
governments
>throughout
>Europe, culminating in a current Italian judicial inquiry into
the legality
>of
>the NSA's activity.
>
>Sketchy details of the NSA's spying in Europe had been common
currency here
>for
>decades but had never been formally acknowledged. Attempts by Bri
tish MPs
>had
>for decades been ignored.
>
>The issue has erupted now because of two recent European
Parliament studies
>that
>confirm the existence in Britain of a network of communications
>intelligence
>bases operated by the NSA. The publication last year of the first
report,
>"An
>Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control," confirmed
for the
>first
>time that the NSA had established a surveillance capacity over
the entire
>European communications network. It also described a grid of
>supercomputers,
>known as Echelon, capable of scanning vast areas of the
communications
>spectrum
>to detect keywords.
>
>Of particular interest to Parliament was the report's assertion
that the
>NSA was
>beefing up its commercial espionage activities. Its claim is that
the NSA
>has
>been routinely intercepting sensitive traffic relating to bids,
takeovers,
>mergers, investments and tender offers, all for U.S. economic
benefit.
>
>Questions have been raised by parliamentarians in Germany,
Norway, Denmark,
>Holland and Sweden. Then, in September, the plenary session of
the European
>Parliament took the unprecedented step of openly debating the
activities of
>the
>NSA. In a consensus resolution, the Parliament fired a shot
across the bow
>of
>the spooks by demanding more openness and accountability.
>
>Any thoughts that these matters were simply paranoid musings by
fans of
>"The
>X-Files" were scuttled in June when the second report,
"Interception
>Capabilities 2000," set out the technical specifications of the
>interception
>system.
>
>The report revealed details of a secret plan to create a
"seamless" web of
>telecommunications surveillance across all national boundaries.
The
>strategy was
>advised by national security agencies and by the FBI, which
instigated with
>Brussels a top-secret planning organization called the
International Law
>Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar. In time, two vast
systems--one
>designed
>for national security and one for law enforcement--would merge
and, in the
>process, would cripple national control over surveillance
activities.
>
>The scandal has found its way to Washington. The House Permanent
Select
>Committee on Intelligence has ordered the NSA to hand over
documents
>relating to
>Echelon. The NSA has for the first time in the committee's
history refused,
>claiming attorney-client privilege.
>
>The stand-off may well end the NSA's privileged position. Rep.
Bob Barr
>(R-Ga.),
>worried by the potential breach of constitutional privacy rights,
has
>introduced
>an amendment to the fiscal 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act
requiring
>the
>directors of the CIA and the NSA and Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to
submit a
>report
>outlining the legal standards being employed within project
Echelon in
>order to
>safeguard the privacy of American citizens.
>
>The NSA's silence has fueled the present inquiry by the Rome
judiciary. The
>head
>of the inquiry, Deputy Dist. Atty. Vittorio De Cesare, intends to
determine
>the
>extent to which the activities of the NSA may breach Italian law.
>
>Italy's privacy watchdog, Stefano Rodota, has also expressed his
concern,
>and
>recently told local media, "The U.S. government [has] not replied
to the
>requests for clarifications made explicitly by the European
Parliament."
>Rodota
>has motivated his fellow privacy commissioners throughout Europe
to
>formally
>investigate the Echelon system.
>
>These recent events have left observers contemplating two
distressing
>facts.
>First, national borders have disintegrated. The NSA and its
partner
>agencies now
>can intercept any communication worldwide. Second, the
distinction between
>traditional police and security agencies has blurred. The future
is without
>doubt a seamless, borderless, surveillance web that touches all
facets of
>our
>communication.
>
> - - -
>
>Simon Davies Is a Visiting Fellow in the Computer Security
Research Centre
>in
>the London School of Economics and Director of the Human Rights G
roup,
>Privacy
>International
>
> Copyright 1999 Los Angeles Times. All Rights
Reserved
>
______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 16:50:15 -0400
From: "Andrew Morris"
Subject: B-2 Tip Off
My brother is a McDonnell-Douglas>Boeing engineer and some years
back before the B-2 went public, he said he and others at Douglas
Long Beach were tipped off as what was coming.
Like many firms, Douglas readily hired job-shopper engineers, free
lancers who are hired on as contract workers on a project.
Apparently as engineering work on the B-2 wound down, some
engineers left to job-shop, and some wound up at Douglas.
The Douglas guys only later figured out the connection between
these Northrop engineers and the
YB-49A tee-shirts they all seemed to be sporting at work. When
the B-2 rolled out there was a collective Ahhhh Ha!
Andy Morris
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 14:21:18 -0700
From: JAZ
Subject: Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
I believe that part of the reasoning for excessive secrecy is the fact that
with a little bit of information and a good technical background, you can
learn a lot more than you are supposed to learn.
Supposedly, some years ago a group of soviet engineers were given a tour of
an aircraft factory. They wore shoes with sticky material on them and from
the metal particles they picked up they improved the metal alloys in their
next generation of military aircraft.
They hadn't been shown anything secret, yet they 'picked' up secret
information.
Any time you have even minimal disclosure of information, you risk exposure.
If you tour a military facility and notice that a certain door has five
dead bolt locks on it, it gives you a pointer to further research. Every
piece of information is part of a puzzle and if you have enough disparate
pieces you can build a model of the whole.
Then you have the ability to develope counter measures and defeat the
program before it is operational, or to develope your own version of it.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 16:36:53 -0500
From: "Allen Thomson"
Subject: Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
Robert S. Hopkins, III, PhD said, in part,
>I think much of this excessive secrecy derives not from a genuine
>need to keep material or programs classified, which is a legitimate
>operational requirement. Instead, it comes from one of the side
>effects of the U-2 program and satellite reconnaissance: Eisenhower
>and Kennedy/McNamara knew that the Soviets were aware of U-2
>overflights or would be aware of each satellite orbit, and they also
>knew that there was largely nothing the Soviets could do about them
>(time would change that with the U-2). What these policy makers
>agreed upon was that the United States would make it official policy
>NOT to admit these overflights (aerial or orbital) were taking place
>so as NOT to embarrass the Soviets, thereby possibly escalating the
>cold war or its tensions.
I'd maintain that the use of non-acknowledgement to achieve a desired
political result -- not escalating tensions in the case of the U-2,
establishing the right of passage through space in the case of CORONA -- is
another, highly justifiable use of blackness. Not, ironically and as you
say, that it really kept "fact-of" secret from the opposition, but that it
enabled convenient fictions to be politely maintained.
But the U-2 and CORONA are the only aerospace examples that I can think of
where this really applies. Perhaps non-acknowledgement of submarine
incursions into Soviet territorial waters for purposes of intelligence
collection might also fit into this category.
Any other examples, or ones where ultrasecrecy demonstrably worked on its
own terms and to good effect?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 1999 14:47:05 -0700
From: INFORMATION RESTRICTED
Subject: Re: B-2 Tip Off
Not surprising, while I was in the Long Beach facility, as a Technician
for an outside company, not related in any way with the plant nor with
anything they do there, I was told about things "not to be released for
another twelve years" (from '96), and allowed to see photos of aircraft
and models. They're not to tight lipped there. The best part was when
the their boy sent me to a radio-communications rom(about as far off
from my equipmant as toilet paper) and asked if this was my stuff. Well
gosh, I don't know, could be, I better inspect it carefully in case it's
on of our odd models I don't know about. Are these numbers frequencies?
Hmmmmmm, I better makes extensive notes and ask back at the plant. Nope,
not mine, onward!
Andrew Morris wrote:
>
> My brother is a McDonnell-Douglas>Boeing engineer and some years
> back before the B-2 went public, he said he and others at Douglas
> Long Beach were tipped off as what was coming.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 17:20:58 -0500
From: "Robert S. Hopkins, III, PhD"
Subject: Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
>Supposedly, some years ago a group of soviet engineers were given a tour of
>an aircraft factory. They wore shoes with sticky material on them and from
>the metal particles they picked up they improved the metal alloys in their
>next generation of military aircraft.
>
>They hadn't been shown anything secret, yet they 'picked' up secret
>information.
A good example, and I agree with your assessment that minimal
disclosure can lead to significant intelligence gains to the
detriment of the United States.
I would like to point out, however, that in the example you offer the
guests at the aircraft factory were "soviet engineers." I may be
cynical, but I would dare say that American engineers from a
competing company, or even American citizens would have been denied
such a tour because of "security concerns." Therein lies the
contradiction: from whom is material being kept secret?
DrBob
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 17:25:50 -0500
From: "Robert S. Hopkins, III, PhD"
Subject: Re: Secrecy, security and the historical record
>But the U-2 and CORONA are the only aerospace examples that I can think of
>where this really applies. Perhaps non-acknowledgement of submarine
>incursions into Soviet territorial waters for purposes of intelligence
>collection might also fit into this category.
>
>Any other examples, or ones where ultrasecrecy demonstrably worked on its
>own terms and to good effect?
The D-21 program, the RB-45 and RB-47 overflights of the USSR during
the 1950s, overflights of the People's Republic of China (U-2s,
RB-57s, RF-101s, etc.), any SIGINT (especially COMINT) flights,
particularly against Cuba, Nicaraugua, Indonesia, the Philippines
(yes), PIE FACE C-97 and the "Berlin for lunch bunch" C-130s. The
aviation list is actually quite long; we are only beginning to learn
about more.
DrBob
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 06 Aug 99 05:37:40 GMT
From: betnal@ns.net
Subject: Re: Lor-el
On 8/5/99 7:06AM, in message
<000501bedf4b$a6a4c4f0$9686cd80@anmorris.adm.buffalo.edu>, "Andrew Morris"
wrote:
> Lor-el was Superman's father I think!
>
>
Lor-el? It was JOR-EL. What has happened to American education today?!?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 06 Aug 1999 02:47:18 -0700
From: patrick
Subject: Re: Fwd: Europe Blows Whistle on That Great Eavesdropper
FWIW.....so if we really were capable of doing all this eavesdropping in
Europe or just England do you really think that after that expense the NSA
wants to to know what brand of tea evryone uses or which BBC channel they
might tune in to? I suspect its a large net that is capable of looking for
something specific in a broad area. But to monitor all calls or most
calls? Why go to the trouble? Britains just aren't that much interesting
to listen too. But all the calls going in or out of a dozen embassies?
Now that would be worth the expense/effort.
patrick
------------------------------
End of skunk-works-digest V8 #90
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If you want to subscribe something other than the account the mail is
coming from, such as a local redistribution list, then append that address
to the "subscribe" command; for example, to subscribe "local-skunk-works":
subscribe local-skunk-works@your.domain.net
To unsubscribe, send mail to the same address, with the command:
unsubscribe
in the body.
Administrative requests, problems, and other non-list mail can be sent
to georgek@netwrx1.com.
A non-digest (direct mail) version of this list is also available; to
subscribe to that instead, replace all instances of "skunk-works-digest"
in the commands above with "skunk-works".
Back issues are available for viewing by a www interface located at:
http://www.netwrx1.com/skunk-works
If you have any questions or problems please contact me at:
georgek@netwrx1.com
Thanks,
George R. Kasica
Listowner