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Thursday, October 5, 2017

Russia Hedges in Iraqi Kurdistan

By Bradley Hanlon with Genevieve
Casagrande

Key Takeaway:Russia will not act
decisively either against or in support of the movement for Kurdish
independence in Iraq. Russia will instead posture as neutral regarding the potential
declaration of independence by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) given Moscow’s
competing interests and partnerships with Iran, Turkey, and KRG President
Masoud Barzani. Russia will nonetheless position itself to seize low-risk opportunities
as the U.S., Turkey, and Iran take steps to isolate Iraqi Kurdistan.

Russia will only play a peripheral role in
Iraqi Kurdistan amidst the potential declaration of independence by the KRG.Moscow willcontinue to remain neutral regarding the crisis in order to position
itself to take advantage of U.S. policies that may alienate Barzani and
Iraqi Kurds. Russia is poised to seize economic opportunities with the KRG,
but only those that pose little risk to its relationship to Iran or Turkey.
These opportunities may position Russia to play an increased role in
post-ISIS Iraq in the future, however.

Russia’s vested interests in Kurdistan are
primarily economic.Russia has
entered into a number of energy agreements with the KRG including the
funding of gas pipelines, exploration and investment in oil blocks, and pre-financing of oil exports. Moscow also has political interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and maintains historical relations with the Barzani family as Masoud
Barzani’s father, Mustafa Barzani, lived in exile in the Soviet Union in
the 1940s and 50s. Russia will nonetheless seek to balance the protection
of these interests with the promotion of Moscow’s role as a security guarantor
and economic partner in Iraq, particularly in the event of an outbreak of
violence in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Moscow’s policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan will
remain patient, opportunistic, and reactionary. Russia has set conditions forfuture cooperationwith both Arbiland Baghdad in recent months. As a result, the
Kremlin simply has to wait for opportunities to arise within the
Government of Iraq or the KRG. Russia’s neutrality will prevent the
alienation of any potential or current allies, allowing Moscow to
capitalize on the outcome of conflict, while avoiding blame for any
potential violence. Russia is posturing to compete with the U.S. as an ally of Barzani, for example. However, the U.S. remains
far closer to Barzani as of October 2017.

Russia is unlikely to use military force
in Iraqi Kurdistan,despite
recent deployments and exercises by Iran, Turkey, and Iraqi Security Forces along the Turkish and Iranian borders
with northern Iraq. Instead, Russia may seek to increase diplomatic
engagement with Iraq, Iran, Turkey, or the KRG in order to secure the
Kremlin’s energy interests in the case of an outbreak of violence. Russia
may also increase diplomatic engagement in anticipation of one of these
actors becoming the key powerbroker in Kurdistan as a result of the
conflict.