Iran Arms Deal Not The First Time Reagan Fell Victim To Aides` Twisted Logic

COMMENTARY

March 23, 1987|By LARS-ERIK NELSON, New York Daily News

In October 1985, President Reagan concluded that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would allow him to test components of his ``Star Wars`` defense system in space. Reagan was guided by flawed advice.

Reagan`s ABM decision, Secretary of State George Shultz wrote in a letter to the Washington Post, was based on a memorandum from the offices of State Department legal adviser Abraham Sofaer.

There is a problem: Judge Sofaer has conceded that his October 1985 memorandum on the treaty was ``not a complete portrayal`` of the obligations undertaken by President Nixon when he signed the treaty with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

Like Lucy in the Peanuts comic strip, Sofaer has yanked the football out just as Shultz tried to kick it.

Specifically, Sofaer confessed in a letter to Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, his memorandum did not study the Nixon administration`s statements to Congress as it sought Senate ratification of the treaty. And the (``Let me make one thing perfectly clear``) Nixon administration made one thing perfectly clear: The ABM treaty banned tests in space.

There can be no doubt on this score. Then-Sen. James Buckley, a New York conservative and brother of columnist William F. Buckley Jr., voted against the ABM treaty specifically because it barred a Star Wars-type defense.

The treaty, Buckley warned in 1972, ``would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser-type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. This technological possibility has been formally excluded by this agreement.``

Sofaer`s October 1985 memorandum never mentioned Buckley`s remarks.

Never mind, says Shultz. The truly important document is Sofaer`s subsequent, August 1986, memorandum, which also concluded that tests in space were permitted. ``The administration stands behind its conclusions and behind Judge Sofaer`s work,`` Shultz wrote in his letter.

Problem: Sofaer doesn`t stand behind his own work. He conceded in his letter to Nunn that his August 1986 analysis was also deficient: It omitted statements supporting the view that space tests were banned.

Problem Two: By August 1986, Reagan had already made his decision that he could violate the traditional understanding of the ABM treaty. He made it in October 1985, on the basis of Sofaer`s first flawed memorandum. The August 1986 memo came after the fact.

Does this begin to sound familiar? October 1985 is when Reagan was making another fateful decision based on defective advice: He agreed to allow Israel to ship weapons to Iran. He was told, wrongly, that it was legal. He was told, also wrongly, that he would be dealing with Iranian moderates.

In the case of Iran, Reagan acted on the basis of flawed intelligence and wishful thinking by his top aides. As the Tower Commission report made clear, Reagan did not have the slightest idea what he was getting himself into when he authorized the Iran arms deal. The briefing papers were vague, no options were offered, no records were kept. Reagan rubber-stamped the decision his aides presented to him.

It is equally clear today -- as Shultz and Sofaer publicly contradict each other -- that Reagan was also fogbound when he decided he could stretch the ABM treaty. The analysis on which he made his decision was misleading and defective, and his aides can`t agree on who argued what and when.

Both issues -- Iranian-sponsored terrorism and nuclear war -- are crucial ones, and both were especially emotional for the president. He wants to free U.S. hostages in Lebanon, and he wants to protect the world from nuclear destruction.

In both cases, his aides` twisted logic, the law and the facts to play to his emotions. In both cases, the president gratefully, blindly, uncritically and uncomprehendingly, approving whatever they told him.