"The PMOI leaders
must realize that year after year the situation in Iran has changed. Now the
third generation after the revolution is stepping into Iran's social and
political scene. Does the organization and its leaders believe they really
understand their demands and their values clearly? I doubt it."

Introduction

Ebrahim Khodabandeh
was a member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization and the National Council
of Resistance of Iran. In 2003 he was arrested in Syria with a colleague
whilst on an organizational mission to smuggle money and documents out of
Iraq to take to Europe. After seven weeks in a Syrian jail, the men were
transferred to Evin prison in Iran. The two men were immediately put in
contact with their families in Iran and have been allowed frequent home
visits. Neither men have been subjected to ill treatment and are expected to
be tried in the near future on charges relating to smuggling activities.

Recently, Ebrahim
Khodabandeh has spoken about his experiences with the Mojahedin and National
Council of Resistance. Survivors' Report conducted this interview with him
while he is still in prison.

You have worked for
the NCRI in political circles in Europe. Could you explain the kind of work
you undertook and evaluate how effective that work was?

Since the autumn of
1993 - that is when Maryam Rajavi, the president elect of the NCR, moved to
Paris and from the time that the US State Department report first
categorized the PMOI as a terrorist organization - all the PMOI's diplomatic
and international relations have been conducted under the banner of the
Council rather than the Organization. All the PMOI offices were ostensibly
closed and in their place presidential offices of the NCRI were opened and
we introduced ourselves as members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
NCR.

The main purpose of
our activities was to get political support at any possible level for the
Council and its president elect and to get condemnation for the Iranian
regime's violations of human rights. In this of course, the situation of
women in Iran, the imposition of religious codes on society and the lack of
democracy were our wining cards. We introduced the NCR, a coalition
believing in feminism, secularism and pluralism, as the sole alternative to
the Islamic fundamentalist regime of Iran.

After the terrorist
attack of 11th September 2001 in New York, the political
atmosphere in Europe changed completely and maintaining security became the
primary goal. Terrorism was introduced as the immediate challenge facing the
European Union. As a consequence of its sabotage activities inside Iranian
cities conducted from Iraq, the PMOI was listed by the Terrorist Act 2000 in
Britain and later in the European Union as a terrorist organization. The
Organization was politically cornered and its diplomatic activities were
made ever more difficult.

Although the Council
still had some effective support amongst parliamentarians due to their past
connection and also due to their ignorance about events, it did not have any
contact within the British government whatsoever. In fact, all foreign
affairs departments everywhere were closed to its members. On one occasion,
some British Labour MPs were asked why they had once supported the PMOI
which their Government denounces as a terrorist organization. Their answer
was that as MPs in the opposition they had no information about the hard
facts, but that in Government they have access to intelligence which clearly
demonstrates that the Organization is terrorist in nature.

In my opinion, the
only effect our hard work collecting signatures ever had was just to lift
the morale of our supporters to some small extent by advertising the
worldwide support we had gained. This of course was to cover up our weakness
in getting any results from our policy inside Iran of conducting military
operations in the cities. The signatures collected from parliamentarians,
which our department of International Relations had become so expert in, had
no significant value in the real diplomatic world and had no effect on the
policies of statesmen toward the organization in the relevant countries.

The NCRI describes
itself as an alternative to the present ruling regime in Iran. What role
does the NCRI play in Iranian politics today? Do you believe the NCRI can be
instrumental in changing the constitution of Iran into secular democratic
government?

The NCR is certainly
the most organized and the most publicized alternative to the Islamic
Republic outside Iran, so it definitely plays some role in the Iranian
scene, although its effectiveness is deteriorating through time. In my
opinion, they have failed to acknowledge the changes in Iran over the years
since Khomeini's death. They still assess Iran's political scene as they
used to analyze it two decades ago. Imprisonment, apart from all its
hardship, has the benefit that one has enough time to study, think and look
freely at one's past - something I had stopped doing once I joined the
organization - and come to fresh conclusions. I have had the opportunity to
read more books during the one year and nine months I have been in Evin
prison than in my whole life before that. The memoir of my long standing
dear friend from back in Newcastle, Dr Massoud Banisadr and 'Saddam's
Private Army' by my sister-in-law Anne Singleton, fascinated me the most and
opened up my mind.

Everything I have
observed and read about the current situation in Iran was completely outside
my knowledge and expectation. I have been speaking in detail with some
individuals, inside prison as well as outside, who had been sent by the
Organization from Iraq to perform terrorist activities in the cities using
mortars, missiles, bombs and grenades. Those in prison were all treated
equally well regardless of their political stance or their willingness to be
cooperative or not. In these operations, there had been some civilian
casualties. No one understood why the Organization started using violence
again after a long period of military silence and after the political
reforms in Iran had begun bearing fruit.

I believe the NCRI
cannot change anything from outside Iran while insisting on armed struggle
and the total overthrow of the regime entirely by outside forces and by
relying only on foreign support. I believe that a long-standing struggle
has been developed inside Iran and many people have paid the price so that
now we are at the stage that Evin prison today is nothing like the Evin
prison of the 1980s. This struggle, regardless of who sits in the Majlis or
in the government, will continue and will find its way forward. And women
and young people play a decisive role in this movement. I believe the
slogans of the NCR have been masterminded for a western audience rather than
the people inside Iran. Religion has strong roots in Iranian society and it
is a total illusion to think that secularism can be established overnight in
Iran with a bloody revolution.

Why do you think
the MKO has been listed as a terrorist entity?

The organization
announces this as a deal by western countries to appease the religious
dictatorship in Iran and says billions of dollars are at stake. This may or
may not be true. It is possible, as the PMOI insists it is, that other
organizations fit the terrorist category but have not yet been labeled
terrorist. But this does not alter the fact that until the spring of 2001 –
that is when Iran launched 80 missiles at the NLA garrisons in Iraq just
before the presidential election, and consequently the Iraqis stopped MKO
combatants crossing the border to Iran any more - the Mojahedin used to send
operational teams from Iraq to Iranian cities to perform sabotage activities
which clearly endangered the lives of ordinary people. They may call
themselves freedom fighters, but the world today recognizes this sort of
activity as terrorism. We must also take into account the fact that the
organization had stopped its military operations in Iran for a long time and
then these actions were restarted when the results of social and political
reforms, which started just after Khomeini's death, were quite visible.

I should like to ask
the organization whether the Islamic Republic today is the same as in the
1980s. Is the role and power of the Supreme Leader today exactly as it was
15 years ago? Can a person be executed now as easily as those who faced
instant trials and executions when Khomeini was alive? You may have once
thought that the armed struggle was some how justified. Would this apply to
all time and all places regardless of the situation? Britain was a kingdom
at the time of Henry XIII and today still, it is a kingdom. Was the monarch
then the same as the monarch today? You could compare Iran today with
Western Europe or North America which have more than a hundred years
experience of parliamentary democracy and then instantly conclude that the
regime in Iran is not democratic and must be toppled by force. But, if you
see it instead with an open mind and take into account the best interests of
the Iranian people, you will compare Iran today with its past and realize
that it is more or less similar to about 80 percent of the world and realize
that it takes time and needs tranquility to gradually change to better
circumstances.

Personally, I do not
find it important whether the organization has a terrorist identity in the
west or not. In the same way that I do not think all the foreign support the
organization may obtain is of any help. What actually matters lies inside
Iran. The struggle for democracy inside the country is alive and moving and
will find its way forward, and it is up to everyone else to make adjustments
to that fact. The Mojahedin may once have claimed rightly that they led this
struggle, but I can clearly see today that they have been left far behind in
this struggle because they wanted to achieve everything from abroad.

Why do you think
the MKO has been described as a cult? Would you agree with this, and what
assessment can you make as to the danger posed by such a structure?

The exceptional skill
of the organization and its leaders has been to convince all its members and
even the supporters that they are totally incapable personally of
distinguishing between right and wrong in every aspect of life, and that
they should therefore rely entirely on the ideological leadership to guide
them towards the right path. A person under the leadership of Rajavi - who
plays the role of Big Brother in the Organization - must give his whole
heart to him; should only believe in him, hate whoever he hates and love
whoever he loves. A member of the PMOI does not actually care what exactly
is going on in Iran and in Iran's political scene. All that matters to him
is what the leader – to whom everyone must be completely devoted – desires
and demands of him. Ideology in the PMOI is just another name for the leader
and his requirements. So that the person who is more devoted to the wishes
of the leader is said to be more ideological.

When I first arrived
in Evin prison, I had the most tremendous fear of thinking freely on my own
about my own observations. After so many years in the Organization, I had
developed the habit of allowing others to decide for me on every single
matter, and it was quite frightening for me to open up my sealed mind, think
freely, and decide by myself what is right and what is wrong. It took me
more than a year before I slowly managed to come to the decision to try to
analyze the external world independently. For some people, it might even
take much longer than that to realize they are capable of and entitled to
decide for themselves. A member of the PMOI has the potential of doing
absolutely anything demanded by the organization. He could turn up being a
terrorist harming innocent people like the many cases of people who were
sent from Iraq. They were ready to sacrifice themselves just for the sake of
pleasing the leadership without knowing why, for what purpose and based on
what strategy they should do what they had been asked to do. I believe one
has every reason to be alarmed by such capability, and by such power granted
to one individual called the ideological leader.

The NCRI has been
described as the political wing of the MKO. Can you explain what that means
and what role the NCRI has in relation to the MKO particularly in the light
of the MKO's involvement in armed attacks.

The simple fact is,
that there are some individuals and some organizations affiliated to the
Council which differ ideologically from the Mojahedin. Nevertheless, the
higher fact is that all these bodies have more or less agreed to the
domination of the PMOI over the Council's policies. Therefore, in real terms
one should say that the political stance of the NCR is no different from
that of the PMOI. The Council is chaired by Massoud Rajavi the Supreme
Leader of the Mojahedin and Commander-in-Chief of the NLA, and is also
financed by the Mojahedin. The members of the Council - other than the
Mojahedin – are, at least as far as the methods of struggle against the
Iranian Regime are concerned, sympathizers of the PMOI. Therefore, the
Council has always served the Organization to take away its bitterness and
present a more acceptable face to the outside world. The Council of course
has always unequivocally approved the Organization's armed attacks inside
the country.

The NCRI has stated
it believes in regime change. Can you explain how it hopes to achieve that
regime change?

Right up to the verge
of the allied invasion of Iraq, the strategy of the organization to topple
the Iranian regime was based on the National Liberation Army, which was
situated in Iraqi territory. All of us believed that one day, when the time
was ripe, the NLA would make its final victorious move towards Tehran and
would overthrow the regime and establish a democratic state. Now the Army
has been disarmed it is practically ineffective and no means of armed
struggle remains. I was arrested in Syria before the outcome of the war in
Iraq was known to me, and at present I have no idea how the organization
hopes to achieve regime change. In my opinion, the regime in Iran today
cannot and must not be changed through the kind of bloody revolution which
is promised by the organization. Enormous changes have occurred in Iran
through all these years, and despite anything that may happen in future in
the political scene and whoever might be in government or sit in parliament
(Majlis), reform, both political and social, will be carried forward and no
one can stop that.

Some months ago, I was
watching a women's program on one of the state television channels. It
broadcast an interview with a woman who had been a member of parliament more
than five years ago. She described how she, along with some of her
colleagues in the Iranian Parliament, tried to pass a bill to bring an end
to men's absolute right to divorce their wives, and on the other hand give
some rights to women, such as the right to apply to the court to divorce
their husbands. She explained what obstacles they had faced and how
difficult it had been for them to persuade others to even talk about it. She
eventually managed to win some support in the media, mobilized some women's
organizations, and forced parliament to discuss the issue. It seemed rather
obvious that the Guardian Council would overrule the legislation even though
the Majlis might approve it. Instead, thanks to the atmosphere created by
media reports and the support of even some of the clergy, the legislation
finally came into effect and made a big change to the life of the Iranian
women.

It may not look like a
big deal compared to the laws of Western Europe, but it was worthy to fight
for this step forward. The woman of course did not qualify for the next
parliamentary election, but other women took her place. According to the
teachings of the PMOI, she is a traitor because she sat in the regime's
Majlis and legitimized it and therefore is liable for assassination.
According to instructions issued by the PMOI to Iranian women, she should
have immediately left her family and moved to Iraq to join the NLA. There
she should have devoted herself to the leadership and then come back to Iran
to perform a sabotage operation with a grenade and a cyanide capsule and
then eventually been martyred in the path of Rajavi. However, I could not
resist admiring her courage and her will to struggle and to stand up for
women's rights and face tremendous hardship and accept all sorts of risks,
in order to struggle in an arena that most men might not be prepared to set
foot in. She received neither applause for her efforts, nor gained any
advantage for herself. And when she was arrested once and put in jail, no
one committed self-immolation. But I think that Iran needs more of these
types of women. If people like her can influence parliament and state
television, no matter how hard that may be, and can be effective socially
and politically, what can justify taking mortars
onto the streets.

I see many
similarities between the hardliners in Iran and the PMOI. Through the years
they have served each other in many ways. Certainly they owe much of their
success to the implied cooperation between them. Unfortunately because of
this, the movement to introduce reform in Iran has had to challenge both
parties. It is true to say that today neither of these two could exist
without the other.

I therefore suggest
that it would be much wiser to take one little step to where you know it is
safe to put your foot, which would definitely be a step forward, rather than
to jump to a place you do not know or how you will eventually land.
Certainly, change in Iran will not come about overnight. It will take time,
effort, patience, and hard continuous work inside Iran over the long-term in
order to achieve peace, freedom and justice.

How would you
describe the quality and breadth of the MKO's political activities in the
West in the past decade?

I would say that under
the leadership of Massoud Rajavi the organization has always performed
superbly tactically but extremely naïvely and ineffectively strategically.
In short-term projects, both military and political, they have managed to
produce amazing results. But they have always failed to predict or control
the outcome of their actions in the long-term. That is why, even though
immense energy has been expended and many achievements have been obtained,
the organization always somehow lands back at square one. I believe that it
is time for the leadership to review the past two decades and learn some
lessons. Political achievement can fade in a matter of days if it is not
part of a realistic overall strategy. The PMOI leaders must realize that
year after year the situation in Iran has changed. Now the third generation
after the revolution is stepping into Iran's social and political scene.
Does the organization and its leaders believe they really understand their
demands and their values clearly? I doubt it.

The more I think about
it, even though the Machiavellian policy of the organization brought it some
short-term successes from time to time, it has never got to the roots of the
problem. Nor did that policy help out the organization with its internal
conflicts, nor disguise its lack of clear policy for the struggle toward
democracy in Iran.

How would you
characterize your current involvement with the NCRI and MKO?

I am not sure that I
understood the question rightly. Anyway, until now I had devoted my whole
life to the organization. To me the NCR, the PMOI, or the NLA did not really
matter. All I had faith in was Rajavi, whom I worshiped like a God. I never
allowed myself to think of him as a person who could ever make any mistakes.
I did not allow myself to think freely. I could say that I sort of switched
off my mind to everything and only ever believed what he said. It was much
easier for me to continue that way, just as some long term prisoners decide
not to think about what has happened in the past quarter of a century.

However, I eventually
decided that I would begin to think freely. It was not an easy experience
and it could have been rather dangerous mentally. All through the time that
I have spent in prison I was never was afraid of being tortured or executed,
but I always had the fear of making mistakes. When I at last concluded that
the organization and its decision makers have made mistakes, I could not
force myself to remain silent for the sake of stopping the regime taking
advantage of what I say. I hope that one day I will have the opportunity to
discuss these matters directly with them, face to face. My advice to my
friends in the organization would be that they should not ignore their
criticisms of the organization and they should be brave enough to express
their thoughts and take them up until they reach some final and decisive
conclusions.

Can you say how
much support the MKO has inside Iran. In your experience do they have the
same level of support inside Iran as outside?

It would be very
difficult for me to answer this question since I have no means of surveying
public opinion on the organization. It is too hard to estimate the quantity
of support they enjoy outside Iran let alone inside Iran. All I can say is
that the situation in Iran has changed to such a great extent over the years
that it does notnow warrant the armed
struggle that the organization is so insistent on. Many young people in
Iran, at least in the cities, have access to the Internet, satellite
television and foreign radio broadcasts and publications. The criticisms
made against the regime in the publications outside Iran are often repeated
in even sharper tones in the papers inside Iran. Many Iranians have managed
to travel abroad, and many Iranians who left the country because of the
situation prevailing in the 1980s are now moving back to Iran. These people
of course bring new demands and expectations with themselves. The
organization's policy has always been to stop Iranians returning back to
their own country and even label it a betrayal of the Iranian revolution. I
totally reject this attitude and I think that on the contrary, Iranians
should be encouraged to come back to Iran and this would certainly enhance
the movement for reform and democratization of the political systems inside
Iran.

None of the families
that I have met approve of the organization's armed struggle, particularly
because all of its operations have been launched from Iraq with the aid of
Saddam Hussein's army. The people inside Iran have strong feelings against
Iraq's toppled dictator. I believe the organization's cooperation with the
former regime in Iraq has damaged the image of the organization to a very
great extent.

If Iranians do not
accept the MKO's claims to support democracy, do you think this means that
Western politicians are being deceived?

I would categorize
Western politicians in two groups. Ineffective ones such as those in
parliament and effective ones like those in the Foreign Office. The first
group could be easily deceived since they are not necessarily expert in
every field and do not have access to enough information. However, I believe
that if all the parliamentarians in the world supported the NCR it would not
make much difference to the political situation in Iran. The second group
could not easily be deceived, but they do follow their short-term interests.
In the West, this group has its own relations with the Islamic Republic and
from time to time, they have found the NCR a useful tool. The NCR gained its
relative popularity among Western public opinion in the past due to the
mistakes made by Iranian diplomats rather than its own efforts; the sort of
mistakes they no longer commit, having gained in maturity and experience
through the years. Support for the NCR among western politicians has, as a
result, gradually declined. Unfortunately, as the Iranian regime has moved
towards moderation and self-control the PMOI has shifted to a more extremist
policy. After the horrifying events of September 11th, it was
possible for the Islamic Republic to take advantage of the PMOI's mistakes
and to corner them politically on the international scene.