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Thursday, 5 May 2016

Balancing Germany: The Need for a St Malo 2.0

Vienna, Austria. 5 May. Back in
1998 at St Malo in France Britain and France came together to create a
leadership framework for the future of a NATO-friendly EU security and defence.
They need to do so again and urgently. A senior French official warned the
other day that if Britain left the EU France would be surrounded by herbivores,
i.e. countries with no strategic tradition or culture, and no willingness to
resort to the hard stuff. Equally, something has to give; Europe’s ‘non-defence’
of Europe cannot go on like this. Forget all the drivel you may have heard
about European defence budgets being stabilised. This is what academics call
counter-intuitive and what I call a complete load of bollocks. Given the adverse
change in the global balance of power if Europeans are to play an appropriate
role in their own defence a complex mix of three things must now happen:
Europeans must spend more on defence, Europeans must do more defence together,
and Europeans must find a better balance between the two. There are two
distinct schools of thought emerging about how to achieve such a balance; one
German and the other (sort of) British and French.

Let me deal with German ambitions
first. Last year German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leye gave a speech
calling for the creation of a European Army. In July (conveniently after the
Brexit vote) Germany will reveal its plans in a new defence White Paper in
which it will call for a European Defence Union (EDU) organised around (and by)
Germany. Berlin is already in the process of acquiring the Dutch armed forces,
which are well on the way to becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Bundeswehr. There is certainly some logic to this as the Netherlands is fast
becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of Germany.

However, Germany’s ambitions are not
simply about defence. Indeed, they are part
of a wider political stratagem to bolster the EU and impose some form of leadership
and discipline at a critical moment in the political evolution of the EU. Look
around the EU institutions and one will find Germans carefully inserted into almost
all the key posts, often just below the political radar. It is not a
conspiracy. Rather, the stratagem reflects Berlin’s legitimate concerns about the
EU’s loss of political momentum and the need to hold things together.

And, at one level of European
defence Germany is right. Too many Europeans have become serial free-riders. As
the world becomes more tense and dangerous the refusal of Europeans to face up
to the hard defence choices they need to make is not only undermining NATO but
warping the defence policy of an over-stretched America. Germany is certainly genuine
in its desire for a more effective and efficient European defence effort,
albeit within the EU framework.

The problem with Germany’s big
defence plan is that Berlin’s ambitions are not reinforced by Germany’s defence
reality. Last year the British spent some $58bn on defence, and the French
$48bn, but Germany only $36bn. Future defence spending plans show Britain re-emerging
as Europe’s leading military power (Russia excluded).

Moreover, for all the firm
rhetoric that will be written into the German White Paper about how modern
Germany is willing to use force if needs be, Germany remains essentially and
instinctively a defence herbivore rather than a carnivore. In other words, German
leadership of European defence would ensure Europeans remain a herd of cows,
rather than a pack of fast-hunting wolves.

The Dutch are proof of that; once
carnivores, now herbivores. Indeed, at one time one of the most robust and Atlanticist
of the smaller European powers, the Dutch were willing and able to deploy
forces at the sharp-end of military operations.
Today the Dutch armed forces have been reduced to what in effect is a
small but expert group of peacekeepers, with a few Commandos and Special Forces
thrown in to keep the Americans sort of happy.

The cruncher is this; if Germany
becomes THE framework nation for driving forward European defence there may
well be in time more Europeans under arms than exists today, but they will not
be able to do very much. Indeed, the very idea of a European Defence Union is
to a large extent counter-bollocks. For such a ‘Union’ to work one would need
either a European Government or a German Empire, neither of which is desirable nor
practicable. Certainly, an EDU would do little to assuage American concerns
about a lack of burden-sharing and thus do little to reinforce NATO.

And here’s the ultimate paradox;
much of the rationale for an EDU in the German White Paper will be for enhanced
European crisis management that may in time lead to the formation of a European
Army. However, in the absence of a ‘Government’ i.e. a unitary decision-maker
who can decide quickly how and when to use such a force, it would probably
never be used for crisis management, and only used during an existential crisis
for which it was not designed.

Implicit in EDU is a recognition that
Britain and France have lost control of European defence and its development.
Brexit has not helped. But here’s the thing; it is power that drives defence planning
not rhetoric, but Britain and France need to get their strategic act together. Indeed, not only is there a need for a St Malo
2.0 to ensure Britain and France re-exert their influence over European defence,
should Britain leave the EU the need for a St Malo 2.0 will be even greater. And,
should Britain remain in the EU a St Malo 2.0 would also be vital in saving
Germany from itself by helping to re-establish the political power balance on
which Europe is still founded and which German plans for a German-centric EDU
threaten to render unstable.

It is therefore time for a St
Malo 2.0. Now that is real
counter-bollocks! Anyone for more grass?

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.