Criminal Reprisals

Kenyan Police and Military Abuses against Ethnic Somalis

Maash Hussein Abikar shows scars left by Kenyan soldiers when he was beaten with a gun butt during a round-up of ethnic Somalis in Wajir in December 2011. He also lost two teeth and now has blurry vision in one eye as a result of the beating.

Military, Police Have Committed Rape, Assault, and Looting in North Eastern Province

Glossary of Abbreviations

AP Administration
Police

CID Criminal
Investigation Department

DO District
Officer

DRA Department
of Refugee Affairs

GIZ Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

GSU General
Service Unit

IED Improvised
explosive device

IPOA Independent
Policing Oversight Authority

KDF Kenya
Defence Forces

KHRC Kenya
Human Rights Commission

KNCHR Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights

KRA Kenya
Revenue Authority

LWF Lutheran
World Federation

MSF Médecins
Sans Frontières

MP Member
of Parliament

MUHURI Muslims
for Human Rights

NFD Northern
Frontier District

NGO Nongovernmental
organization

NSIS National
Security Intelligence Service

OCS Officer
Commanding Station

PPO Provincial
Police Officer

SUPKEM Supreme
Council of Kenya Muslims

TFG Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia

TJRC Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission

UNHCR United
Nations Refugee Agency

UNODC United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Summary

On November 24, 2011 a Kenyan soldier was killed by an
explosive device in Mandera, a town in Kenya’s North Eastern province
near the border with Somalia. In response to the attack at least three separate
forces—the Kenyan police, Kenyan military, and soldiers of the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)—took part in roundups
and beatings of civilians in the area. According to one of the witnesses Human
Rights Watch interviewed,

There was a blast on Thursday in
the middle of town. Immediately the [police] started picking up people around
there. Some school boys were beaten seriously. Some were in the hospital….
I escaped by the skin of my teeth. My neighbors were whipped by the military.
They were beaten seriously. I had rushed to the scene to see what was
happening, and the military surrounded us…. One man was bleeding from the
head, and I took him to the hospital. Some of my boys were bleeding. I’m
a teacher. These were boys of 12, 13, 15 years—young, small boys. The
soldiers were beating people with clubs.

This report documents the abusive response of the Kenyan
military and police to attacks in North Eastern province by militants suspected
of being linked to al-Shabaab, a Somali Islamist armed movement that has been
fighting Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government since 2007. The
incident described above is part of a pattern of violent and indiscriminate
responses by the Kenyan military and police to suspected militant attacks
between November 2011 and March 2012—responses that have involved arbitrarily
rounding up large numbers of ethnic Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees and
subjecting them in some cases to severe mistreatment.

The abuses documented in this report took place in Garissa,
Wajir, and Mandera, as well as in the Somali refugee camps in Dadaab, in
Kenya’s North Eastern province. The abuses include rape and attempted sexual
assault; beatings; arbitrary detention; extortion; the looting and destruction
of property; and various forms of physical mistreatment and deliberate
humiliation, such as forcing victims to sit in water, to roll on the ground in
the sun, or to carry heavy loads for extended periods. Of particular concern is
the report’s finding that the Kenyan military has detained scores of
civilians, despite the fact that it has no legal authority to do so.

The hundreds subjected to abuse during this period included
women, men, and children. The report documents abuses against children as young
as four years old. The father of 15-year-old school boy Abdikadir in Wajir said
that Abdikadir was so traumatized after being beaten by soldiers that he is now
scared of going to school. Before leaving home for school in the morning he
climbs up on a ladder and looks over the wall of the compound to make sure
there are no soldiers around. Several of those Human Rights Watch interviewed
said they still suffered chronic pain as a result of the beatings they
underwent at the hands of the Kenya security forces.

In the most serious incident, in December 2011, Kenyan police
responded to two attacks by suspected militants targeting Kenyan security
officials in Dadaab by brutally beating scores of refugees. Police also raped
and attempted to sexually assault several women in Dadaab. Faartun N. told
Human Rights Watch,

It was the day after an explosion in the market….
They were three policemen who came. They were saying, “Bring us
money” and “Where is your husband?” The three of them started
beating me with a metal stick. They lifted me up to [take me] inside the house.
I shouted, saying that I was a teacher…. Two of them moved out of the
house, leaving behind one who immediately started locking the door and opened
the zipper [of his trousers] while holding my neck in his right hand. I started
screaming and fought back with him. In the process he stripped my underwear off
and pulled me towards himself while standing, and as I struggled, after some
time, I felt his sperms rolling over my thighs.

Hassan R. was attacked by police in the same raid in Dadaab,
on December 20. He told Human Rights Watch,

Six policemen came. They asked me to produce explosives,
but I had nothing to show them. I told them that I am an innocent refugee but
they did not listen to me. They beat me with boots and batons on almost every
part of my body. I got some injuries on my ribs and thighs. I still have some
pain. They also robbed two mobile phones and 5,000 Kenyan shillings [about US$60].
They were saying to me that if I don’t bring the explosives, they would
arrest me. I was detained on the same night in Dadaab main police station. I
paid 7,500 Kenyan shillings [about US$90] to be released. I didn’t file a
police report. I never thought they would listen to me since they are ones who
had detained and beaten me.

The escalation of violence and abuse in North Eastern province
came on the heels of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia in October
2011. The operation, known as Operation Linda Nchi (“Protect the Country”),
included deployment of several thousand Kenyan troops in areas of southern Somalia
controlled by al-Shabaab.

In apparent reaction to Operation Linda Nchi, unknown
assailants, suspected of being al-Shabaab supporters, have launched a series of
attacks within Kenyan territory, targeting the military and police, government
vehicles and installations, and select bars and restaurants. The abuses by the
Kenyan security forces against ethnic Somali Kenyans in North Eastern province
as well as against Somali refugees have all been in direct response to these
attacks. As noted, the police assaults on refugees in the Dadaab refugee camps
followed two incidents in two days in which police were targeted by improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) within the camps; one officer was killed and two
injured. The grenade and explosive attacks that militants have carried out in
North Eastern province since October are crimes under Kenyan law and constitute
abhorrent assaults on Kenyan civilians, local administrative officials, and
security force personnel. But none of this justifies abusive reprisals against
Kenyan citizens and refugees by the security forces.

Both the military and the police are implicated in the
abuses. Not only do the violent and indiscriminate responses of the Kenyan
security forces constitute serious human rights violations, the abuses are also
serving to alienate Kenyans of Somali origin at the very moment when the
security forces most need the trust and confidence of the local population in
order to help identify the militants behind the grenade and IED attacks and
ensure public safety.

In January 2012, responding to the concerns raised by Human Rights
Watch and the Kenyan nongovernmental organization (NGO) Muslims for Human
Rights (MUHURI), the Ministry of State for Defence formed an ad hoc
“board of inquiry” tasked with investigating allegations of abuses
committed by personnel of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Kenya and Somalia.
At the time of this writing the board was actively gathering information from some
victims and community organizations in Kenya. The formation of the board is a
welcome first step, especially given the Kenyan government’s historical
reluctance to acknowledge responsibility for abuses by security forces. If the
board of inquiry is going to break with past impunity, however, it should press
for prosecutions of perpetrators and compensation for the victims, and the
Ministry of State for Defence should publicly report on its findings.

The police, for its part, has pledged to investigate
allegations of police abuse in North Eastern province. Thus far, however, in
contrast with the military, the police has made no efforts to collect
victims’ accounts on the ground. No police have been charged with crimes
or subjected to internal disciplinary measures as a result of their conduct and
crimes in the Dadaab refugee camps or elsewhere in North Eastern province. The
police’s apparent reluctance to investigate the violence follows the
government’s ongoing failure to publish the findings of an October 2010
investigation into a previous Human Rights Watch report on widespread police
abuses against Somali refugees in and around the camps.

Like Hassan R., the victim of beating in Daadab cited above,
many of the victims of police and military abuse interviewed by Human Rights
Watch said they felt there was no point in making formal complaints of abuse to
the authorities because they believed nothing would be done. Abdallah D., an
employee at a state agency who was subjected along with many others to
beatings, kicks, and various forms of humiliation after being arbitrarily and
illegally detained at the military camp at Garissa in November 2011, spoke for
many when he said, “I didn’t make a report … I knew the
police would not help.”

At this writing, the most severe
abuses appear to have been curtailed. However, in March 2012 Human Rights Watch
received further reports of harassment of Somali refugees in Dadaab, including
an incident in late February in which police arbitrarily detained dozens of
refugees and extorted money from them.

A member of parliament (MP) from the border town of Mandera,
Mahmoud Mohammed, criticized the Kenyan security forces in a November 2011
interview with Human Rights Watch for attempting to “correct a wrong with
a wrong.” As Mohammed pointed out, the war in Somalia is likely to
continue—with Kenyan troops integrated into the African Union
peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, as of February 2012—and further fallout in
the form of militant attacks within Kenyan borders can be expected. It is
therefore essential that, the Kenyan police and military prevent and respond to
such attacks through careful policing and intelligence work in collaboration
with local communities in North Eastern province, rather than responding with
random brutality toward civilians. In order to fulfill their obligations under
international human rights law and to begin to regain the confidence of ethnic
Somalis in Kenya, the Kenyan police and military should ensure that any
internal investigations into the abuses feed into prosecutions of those
officers responsible. The Directorate of Public Prosecutions should ensure that
such cases are prosecuted assiduously, putting an end to the impunity that
members of the Kenyan security forces currently enjoy.

International donor governments which support the Kenyan
police and military, including those funding the Security Partnership Project
between the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the Ministry of State for
Internal Security and the Kenyan authorities in Dadaab, should condition
further support on accountability for human rights violations by the security
forces, including the violations documented in this report.

Recommendations

To the Ministry of State for Defence and the Kenya Defence
Forces

Issue clear instructions to all military
personnel that abuse of civilians, including torture, beatings, arbitrary
arrest, and unauthorized searches of homes, are illegal and will not be
tolerated.

Issue clear instructions to all military
personnel that the detention of civilians in military custody is illegal and
will not be tolerated, and display an order to this effect publicly in all
military camps.

Ensure that ongoing investigations into
abuses by military personnel, currently being undertaken by an ad hoc board of inquiry,
result in accountability, through disciplinary actions against military
personnel and, where relevant, turning over of evidence to the Directorate of
Public Prosecutions and/or the military police.

Cooperate fully with any actions taken by
the Kenya Police, the military police and/or the Directorate of Public
Prosecutions to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by military
personnel, including by providing investigating authorities with all relevant
information on command structure and deployment of military personnel during
any operations in the course of which crimes are alleged to have been
committed. Authorize police interrogations of military personnel suspected of
crimes.

Where appropriate in accordance with Kenyan
law, ensure that military police conduct investigations of crimes committed by
military personnel, and ensure that charges are filed before military tribunals
against officers accused of committing crimes in their capacity as Kenya
Defence Forces personnel.

Investigate the role of commanders in
Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera where abuses took place under their command to see
if they ordered or were otherwise implicated in the abuse, or should have known
about the abuse and failed to prevent or investigate it.

Compensate victims who have suffered
physical injury or material loss at the hands of KDF personnel.

Establish a mechanism to receive and
investigate civilian complaints against KDF personnel that is independent of
the military chain of command, such as a civilian oversight body similar to the
Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA).

To the Ministry of State for Internal Security, the Kenya
Police, and the Administration Police

Issue clear instructions to all police
personnel that abuse of civilians, including torture, rape, beatings, arbitrary
arrest, and unauthorized searches of homes, are illegal and will not be
tolerated.

Immediately suspend police officials
suspected of playing a significant role in attacks on refugees at the Dadaab
refugee camps in December 2011, as well as those suspected of playing a
significant role in beatings of civilians in Mandera in November 2011 and Wajir
in December 2011, while investigations are pending.

Establish the envisaged community policing
program in Dadaab, and prioritize the prompt expansion of community policing in
other locations in North Eastern province, including Mandera, Wajir, and
Garissa.

Ensure that sufficient numbers of police
posted to North Eastern province, including among the 349 stationed in Dadaab, are
fluent in Somali in order to facilitate communication with residents.

Increase the proportion of female police
officers stationed in Dadaab.

Ensure that police officers based in Dadaab
receive ongoing training on human rights, including on the specific rights of
refugees, preventing and responding to sexual violence, and the obligation to
conduct effective investigations into allegations of human rights abuses.

Place highly-qualified police investigators,
including Somali speakers, in Dadaab in order to ensure thorough investigations
into crimes committed in the Dadaab refugee camps.

Compensate victims who have suffered
physical injury, including rape and sexual violence, at the hands of the Kenya
Police and Administration Police.

Ensure the restitution of money and property
to refugees who were robbed or had property destroyed by police during the
December 2011 raid.

Ensure that the recently established
Independent Policing Oversight Authority is fully funded, staffed, and
operational.

Publish the findings of the
government’s October 2010 investigation into widespread police abuses
against Somali refugees in and around Dadaab.

To the Criminal Investigation Department
of the Kenya Police

Immediately investigate abuses committed by
police at the Dadaab refugee camps between December 20 and 24, 2011, including
beatings, rape, and looting.

Investigate military officers responsible
for abuses against civilians in Wajir, Garissa, and Mandera. Submit files on
suspected perpetrators to the Ministry of State for Defence without delay,
requesting authorization to interrogate such perpetrators, where appropriate.

Strengthen efforts to identify and bring to
justice perpetrators responsible for grenade and IED attacks in North Eastern province,
through enhanced collaboration with civil society organizations in the province
as well as with the National Security Intelligence Service and the
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit.

To the Department of Refugee Affairs

Expedite plans to re-open a refugee transit
center at the border point at Liboi, where refugees can be screened and
registered before being transported to Dadaab, as agreed in the Security
Partnership Project between the government of Kenya and UNHCR.

To the Directorate of Public Prosecutions

Where appropriate in accordance with Kenyan
law, initiate prosecutions against police and military personnel suspected of
abuses against civilians.

To the Parliament of Kenya

Initiate a parliamentary investigation into
the involvement of police and military personnel in abuses against civilians,
including Somali refugees, in North Eastern province. Ensure that the
investigation seeks to establish any role of military and police commanders and
members of the Provincial Administration, including District Officers, in
coordinating abuses or in failing to prevent or report them.

Ensure that the recently established
Independent Policing Oversight Authority is fully funded.

To International Donors to Kenya’s Security Forces,
Including the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, Sweden,
France, the Netherlands, and the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime

Monitor police and military adherence to
international human rights law and Kenyan law in their treatment of the
civilian population in northeastern Kenya, and publicly condemn abuses.

Fund an independent inquiry, by UNHCR in
conjunction with policing experts or by another agency with the requisite
expertise, into the quality of policing in Dadaab. The inquiry should assess:
whether the numbers of police allocated to Dadaab are sufficient; whether the
quality of policing differs significantly from other parts of the country; the
quality of police relations with refugees and local residents, as well as police
collaboration and information-sharing with other agencies, including the
National Security Intelligence Service; and the ability of the police to
conduct speedy, fair, and independent inquiries into allegations of abuse
against them. The inquiry should make recommendations to improve policing.

Condition support to the Kenyan security
forces, including for KDF troops to be integrated into AMISOM, on
accountability for human rights abuses committed in North Eastern province and
elsewhere in both Kenya and Somalia.

To the United States

Request that the Kenyan government provide
information to the US government in order to identify the military and police
units present in Dadaab, Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera during the period in which
the human rights violations documented in this report took place.

In accordance with the Leahy Law, withhold
training and funding from military and police units found to be responsible for
abuses against civilians in Kenya.

To the United Nations High Commission on Refugees

Ensure that its Memorandum of Understanding
with the Ministry of State for Internal Security include provisions
conditioning provision of material assistance to the police in Dadaab on
accountability for the December 2011 assaults on refugees and other human
rights violations.

In the absence of clear steps by the Kenya Police
to hold officers accountable for crimes committed against refugees in Dadaab,
publicize information collected by UNHCR protection staff on the scale and
nature of abuses.

Increase the presence of UNHCR or NGO
protection staff reporting to UNHCR in the Dadaab refugee camps and ensure that
they maintain regular contact with refugees in order to effectively gather
information on the extent of human rights violations in and around the camps,
including police abuses.

Ensure that victims of abuses at the hands
of the Kenyan police, particularly victims of sexual violence, receive medical,
legal, and psychosocial support.

Establish a permanent mechanism, through or
independently of community policing structures, to allow for meaningful
exchange of information between police, local authorities, local leadership and
refugee leadership, with the objective of building relationships in order to prevent
human rights abuses while enabling better cooperation between refugees and the
police.

To the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers,
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa at the African Commission
on Human and People’s Rights

Conduct a fact-finding mission to Kenya to
investigate the December 2011 assaults on Somali refugees at Dadaab by the
Kenya Police and Administration Police, as well as any subsequent abuses
against refugees.

Call on Kenya to investigate abuses against
refugees, prosecute police officers responsible for these abuses, and
compensate victims.

Methodology

From October 2011 to March 2012, Human Rights Watch
conducted research into human rights violations in Kenya’s North Eastern province,
which borders Somalia and has been affected by Kenya’s intervention in
southern Somalia. Human Rights Watch researchers conducted interviews in
Garissa, Wajir, Dadaab, and Nairobi. We spoke with 55 victims of abuses by the
Kenyan security forces. Twenty were Somali refugees who were mistreated by
police in Dadaab in December 2011. The remaining 35 interviewees were Kenyan
citizens, including 14 who were mistreated by the Kenyan military in Garissa
between November 2011 and January 2012; 12 who were mistreated by the Kenyan
military in Wajir in December 2011; one who was beaten by the police in Wajir,
also in December; and eight who were beaten in Mandera in November 2011. The
victims in Mandera were contacted on the basis of a report by local activists
and were interviewed by telephone; while all were beaten by the Kenyan
military, several also said that the police and Somali Transitional Federal Government
forces were among the perpetrators. In Nairobi, Human Rights Watch researchers
visited Eastleigh, a predominantly ethnic Somali neighborhood, to interview
residents of both Kenyan and Somali nationality about the relationship between
residents and police, but did not speak directly to any victims of recent
abuses.

In all locations, local community organizations and
journalists assisted Human Rights Watch in identifying and contacting victims.
Interviews were conducted in English or in Somali or Kiswahili with the
assistance of interpreters. Many victims requested not to be named in this
report for fear of repercussions; their names have been replaced by pseudonyms.

Human Rights Watch interviewed police and military officials
in Nairobi in order to assess the Kenyan authorities’ responses to
allegations of rights abuses; these officials included the spokespersons of the
Ministry of State for Defence and the Kenya Defence Forces, the deputy
spokesperson of the Kenya Police, a senior secretary at the Ministry of State
for Internal Security, and military officials on the ad hoc board of inquiry
into military abuses. In Garissa and Wajir, Human Rights Watch also interviewed
local police and administrative officials. Officials of the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR),
several Kenyan nongovernmental organizations, and representatives of diplomatic
missions in Nairobi provided additional information, as did several members of
parliament.

Several references in this report to the nature of and
number of casualties in the various grenade and explosive attacks in North
Eastern province are based solely or primarily on news articles. Where
possible, that information has been corroborated by police sources or
witnesses.

Human Rights Watch sent letters
to Kenya’s Minister of State for Defence Yusuf Haji and Minister of State
for Internal Security George Saitoti on March 13 requesting further information
on the police and military’s responses to reports of abuses. As of April 23,
neither ministry had responded to the letters.

I. Background

On October 16, 2011, the
Kenya Defence Forces launched a military campaign within Somalia with the
stated objective of eliminating the threat posed by al-Shabaab, the militant
Islamist armed movement that controls much of south-central Somalia and has
been fighting Somalia’s weak Transitional Federal Government—which
is backed by the United Nations, the United States, and Ethiopia—since
2007. The campaign, known as Operation Linda Nchi (“Protect the
Country”), was apparently triggered by the kidnapping of several foreign
tourists and aid workers from Kenya’s Coast and North Eastern provinces
in 2011, allegedly by Somali militants or pirates. However, for several years
already Kenya had prepared for a possible military intervention in Somalia,
with the goal of creating a “buffer zone” along the border and a
regional authority in Somalia that would be allied to Kenya.[1]

Kenya’s incursion appears to have prompted a decision
by some members or supporters of al-Shabaab to intensify attacks within Kenya.[2]
The day after the incursion began, al-Shabaab responded by threatening to
“strike at the heart of [Kenyan] interests” and make Kenya
“regret and feel the consequences back home.”[3]
The attacks that followed have apparently sought to punish Kenya for the
intervention and force its troops to withdraw from Somalia.

In the early morning hours of October 24, a grenade exploded
in a nightclub in Nairobi’s Central Business District, injuring 12
people.[4] The
evening of the same day, a second grenade exploded at a Nairobi bus stop,
killing one person and injuring 18.[5]

Nairobi residents steeled themselves for the worst,
anticipating attacks along the lines of the July 2010 bombings claimed by
al-Shabaab in Uganda’s capital, Kampala. In those attacks suicide bombers
struck a restaurant and a rugby club where people were watching the televised
World Cup final match, killing 76. However, following the initial attacks in
Nairobi, the militants largely shifted their attention to Kenya’s vast,
remote North Eastern province.[6]

North Eastern province shares a porous 682 kilometer-long
border with Somalia. Its residents are primarily Kenyans of Somali ethnicity.
The province also hosts at least 460,000 Somali refugees who have fled
Somalia’s conflict over the past 20 years, most of whom arrived in the
past five years as Somalia’s conflict re-ignited. Most refugees live in
five camps near the town of Dadaab, 90 kilometers west of the Somali border. Others
are integrated into towns and villages in the region.

The province, which was known during colonial times as the
Northern Frontier District (NFD), has a tumultuous history. In 1960, when
neighboring Somalia gained independence, the British established a commission
to assess the views of NFD residents on possible secession from Kenya and
unification with Somalia.[7] The majority of NFD
residents favored unification with Somalia, but during the negotiations leading
to Kenya’s independence in 1963, the British ultimately disregarded the
NFD residents’ views, ceding to the calls of Kenyan nationalists that the
territory of Kenya retain its colonial boundaries. In response, an armed
secessionist movement started in North Eastern province.

The resulting series of confrontations between Kenyan Somali
secessionists and the Kenyan armed forces was known as the “Shifta
War.”[8] The conflict lasted
throughout the 1960s, until the uprising was brutally suppressed by
Kenya’s security forces.

In 1963 Kenya declared a state of emergency in the region
which lasted for 28 years until 1991.[9] In 1984 Kenyan troops
killed an estimated 2,000 ethnic Somalis in Wajir district in what came to be
known as the Wagalla Massacre. Troops rounded up suspected
“bandits,” forced them to lie down on the Wagalla landing strip,
and fired on them, killing all but a few survivors.[10]
As late as 1990, Kenya subjected its ethnic Somalis to special “screening”
procedures and ordered that those “found to have sympathy with
Somalia” be expelled from the nation in which they held citizenship; it
also issued all ethnic Somalis special pink identity cards to permit easier
identification by security personnel.[11]

A number of Kenyan Somalis interviewed by Human Rights Watch
in North Eastern province acknowledged that in recent years human rights
violations by security personnel have declined.[12]
President Mwai Kibaki’s administration has made some minimal efforts to
develop North Eastern province since coming into power in 2002 (although the
province remains sorely under-resourced), and several Kenyan Somalis have been
appointed to key administration positions.[13]

However, even in the last few years, there have been frequent
incidents of abuse of ethnic Somalis in Kenya by the Kenyan security forces. For
example, the police have conducted periodic raids in Eastleigh, a heavily
ethnic-Somali neighborhood in Nairobi that is home to both Somali nationals and
ethnic Somali Kenyans. Police round-ups and extortion of money from those who
cannot produce Kenyan identity cards have been regular features of Eastleigh
life for many years.[14] There is also frequent
harassment in North Eastern province, including extortion. The speaker of
Kenya’s parliament, Farah Maalim, told Human Rights Watch, “The
police have always treated the population of North Eastern, Somali or Kenyan,
as an ATM.”[15]

Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern province have on several
occasions in recent years been subjected to brutal raids by the security
forces. In October 2008, Kenyan security agents involved in a joint
police-military operation in Mandera, purportedly to disarm rival ethnic Somali
militias, were responsible for torturing, raping, and beating local residents.
Hundreds of residents had to seek medical treatment as a result of injuries
inflicted by Kenyan security agents. Minister of State for Internal Security George
Saitoti promised to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the
attacks, but failed to uphold this promise.[16] In
October 2010 two ethnic Somali chiefs in Buna were tortured by police who
suspected them of hiding Ethiopian rebels.[17] Each
time ethnic Somalis are brutalized in North Eastern province the bitter
memories of the 1984 Wagalla massacre resurface.[18]

In a context of ongoing impunity for past abuses such as those
perpetrated under the state of emergency and the Wagalla massacre, continuing
abuses contribute to a profound sense of alienation among Kenyan Somalis,
especially in North Eastern province. Human Rights Watch interviewed Kenyan
Somalis, including youths too young to remember Wagalla and the state of
emergency, who said they believed they were perceived by members of the
security forces as the enemy, and that they were not considered true Kenyans.
Abusive conduct by the Kenyan security forces since November 2011 has reinforced
this sense of marginalization and increased the risk of radicalization.[19]

The marginalization of Kenyan Somalis does not necessarily
translate, however, into significant support for the brand of violent, radical
Islamism advocated by al-Shabaab. Residents of North Eastern province
interviewed by Human Rights Watch consistently emphasized the lack of popular support
for al-Shabaab across much of the province. As for Somali refugees in Kenya,
many fled abuses by al-Shabaab in areas they control in southern Somalia that
included child recruitment, harsh punishments, and arbitrary killings.[20]
Nonetheless the existence of pockets of radicalism among both Kenyan Somalis
and Somali refugees, coupled with ineffective policing and intelligence work,
has aided those carrying out attacks in North Eastern province.

Attacks against Kenyan Forces and Civilian Targets

Attacks against Kenyan government targets in North Eastern province
began in late October 2011, shortly after the two initial Nairobi grenade
attacks. The United Nations news service IRIN tallied at least 15 incidents
involving grenades or improvised explosive devices in the regions of Garissa,
Wajir, Mandera, and Dadaab in the month of December 2011 alone.[21]
After a peak in December 2011 and January 2012, the frequency of such incidents
diminished in February and March.

Based on news reports and interviews Human Rights Watch has
compiled a list of 24 attacks in North Eastern province from October 2011 through
February 2012 (see Appendix I). The majority of these attacks have targeted
government or security force personnel, vehicles, or buildings. The most common
type of attack has been the use of explosives to target vehicles. In these
attacks the general pattern has been that explosives are buried in the dirt or
sand in areas where police or military vehicles are expected to pass. Police
told Human Rights Watch that in some cases they suspect the explosive devices
are remotely operated; in other cases, they may be triggered by being struck by
a vehicle.[22] At least 11 police,
military, and government vehicles were targeted in this manner between October
and February. In another pattern assailants have, in at least four cases,
thrown grenades at restaurants and bars; at least one grenade attack also
targeted a church compound. Finally, there have been at least seven attacks
involving firearms, including the fatal shootings of two refugee leaders in
Dadaab in late December and early January.

Al-Shabaab has only claimed responsibility for one attack in
North Eastern province, a highly coordinated armed attack in Gerille, a border
garrison in Wajir South district, which took place on January 11.[23]
A number of government officials had traveled there on January 9 for an
exercise involving the issuing of national identity cards, and were lodging in
a government medical dispensary and the adjacent Administration Police camp.
Just after 6 p.m., 50 to 100 attackers surrounded the area and fired on the
camp and the dispensary. They were heavily armed: one survivor, a police
officer, reported that the assailants were using guns, mortars, and
rocket-propelled grenades.[24] Three police officers
and three civilians were killed during the attack, including a woman who was
fetching water near the camp. Two other police were seriously injured. A
district officer from Gerille, a district registration officer from Wajir, and
a driver were abducted and taken across the border into Somalia, where
al-Shabaab paraded them in local towns.[25]

The attacks have resulted in the deaths of at least 20
civilians (including an administrative official and a police reservist), at
least six police officers, and at least one soldier. At least 70 civilians (including
an intelligence official), 15 police officers, and five soldiers have also been
injured in the attacks. They have altered the rhythm of life for residents of
North Eastern province, afflicting the local economy and creating a climate of
ongoing insecurity. The manager of Garissa’s Florida Hotel complained,
“It’s affecting business. We used to stay open until 10:30. Now, by
8 p.m. we have no customers.”[26] A Wajir bar employee
expressed similar dismay at the rate of business after the bar in which he waited
tables was hit by a grenade attack on Christmas Eve, injuring six people.[27]

Response of the Kenyan Security Forces

Residents of North
Eastern province have expressed frustration with what they see as an inadequate
effort on the part of the security forces to prevent such attacks and to
identify and prosecute the perpetrators, which has led residents to feel
particularly vulnerable. A religious leader in Garissa told Human Rights Watch,
“In Somalia, there’s war and so you get a gun and protect yourself.
But here, there’s a government and they don’t protect you.”[28]

The Kenyan government is making some efforts to investigate
attacks in North Eastern; in some instances, criminal investigators and members
of the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit from Nairobi have been dispatched to the
sites of attacks.[29] But so far no one has
been convicted in any of the attacks. In the few cases in which suspects have
been arrested, detained, and interrogated in accordance with proper criminal
procedure, they have subsequently been released due to lack of evidence.[30]
In only one attack in Kenya, the second Nairobi grenade attack in October, has
a suspect been convicted.[31]

Instead of pursuing the perpetrators of the attacks, Kenyan
security forces have regularly rounded up local residents or refugees and beaten
them. These are not isolated incidents. As described in the following chapter,
groups of police and soldiers have conducted these reprisals in at least four
different locations in a coordinated manner following attacks. Thus, as well as
directly impacting the business interest and security of the province, the
attacks have also exposed locals to brutality from Kenyan security officers—the
very people that they should be able to rely on for protection from militant
attacks.

There have been no reported deaths as a consequence of
recent Kenyan police and military abuses in North Eastern province. However, in
other recent actions outside of the province the Kenyan military, in dealing
with the perceived threat from Somali militants, has engaged in the unlawful
use of force against civilians with fatal consequences.[32]
These actions include the shelling of a displaced people’s camp in the
Somali town of Jilib in October 2011, a Kenya air force raid on Hosingow
village in Somalia in December 2011, and the Kenyan navy’s firing on a
fishing boat near Kiunga, on the Kenyan coast near the Somalia border, in early
November. In the latter incident the Kenyan navy apparently mistook a group of
Kenyan fisherman for al-Shabaab members and fired on the boat even after
intercepting it and interviewing its passengers.[33]
Muslim Human Rights Forum, a Kenyan NGO that investigated the incident, found
that the navy killed four civilians, all of them elderly Kenyans.[34]
The attack on the fishing boat produced an outcry from Kenyan media and civil
society organizations. However, the outcry did not trigger an immediate
reaction from the military. While the Ministry of State for Defence board of
inquiry informed Human Rights Watch in January 2012 that it intended to
investigate this incident, no one has yet been held accountable.

The first few attacks on
Kenyan security personnel following the commencement of Operation Linda Nchi
were not followed by brutal crackdowns or reprisals. However, as the number of
attacks on Kenyan security personnel increased in November, civilians,
particularly in North Eastern province, found themselves caught between two
hostile forces: the militants seeking to destabilize Kenya, and the retaliating
Kenyan police and military.

Between mid-November and mid-January Kenyan soldiers
committed abuses, including serious beatings, against hundreds of civilians in
and around the towns of Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera (where Somalia’s
Transitional Federal Government soldiers also crossed the border and
participated in abuses). Dozens of victims were illegally detained, although
the military has no authority under Kenyan law to detain civilians.

Kenyan police, for their part, have been responsible for at
least one beating in Wajir and some involvement in the abuses in Mandera. The
most serious human rights violations committed by the police, in the Dadaab
refugee camps, are discussed in the following chapter.

Military Abuses in Garissa

The first abuses by the military in Garissa took place on
November 11, 2011, according to reports received by Human Rights Watch the
following day. A witness in Garissa informed Human Rights Watch that in the
course of a “security operation,” military personnel were rounding
up residents solely on the basis of their Somali appearance. He said he saw
soldiers picking up suspects at pubs around Garissa, pulling drivers out of
taxis, and forcing them to sit in mud and dirty water outside these locations.
He said, “They were forced to sit in water. They were beaten if they
didn’t have identification. I saw them being beaten…. Police were
moving around town, but it’s the military that is doing this
operation.”[35]

The pattern of abuses increased after November 24 when three
civilians were killed in the course of twin grenade attacks at Kwa Chege
restaurant and at Ngamia Road in Garissa. The day the attacks took place the
military beat and arbitrarily arrested residents, according to a witness.[36]
Two sources in Garissa told Human Rights Watch the operations targeted specific
locations where refugees or other foreigners were believed to live.[37]

The actions of the military over the following days appeared
designed to humiliate victims. For instance, one evening in late November about
a week after the grenade attacks, soldiers entered Garissa Madogo, a
neighborhood a few kilometers west of the bridge leading into Garissa town.
They drove to a cluster of small houses, disembarked, and searched the houses.
A resident told Human Rights Watch, “They were banging on doors and
asking for IDs. They broke down two doors when no one answered. We were caught
by fear and followed whatever we were told.”[38]
After searching these houses the soldiers turned back toward town, but just up
the road, they met a group including two mechanics who were fixing a car, the
car’s owner and its driver, a 17-year-old watchman, and a 21-year-old who
lived nearby.

According to one of the mechanics,

There were about 15 or 16 soldiers from the military camp
in Garissa. They were in helmets and combat uniforms.

We were outside, working on the broken down car. They
asked, “What are you doing here?” We said, “We’re
mechanics. We’re fixing the car.”

They told us to lie down on the ground. We lay down. They
made us roll along the ground. There were two groups of soldiers, one on either
side of a patch of road. We would roll to one side. Then one of the military
guys would step on our heads. Then we would have to roll back, and on the other
side they would also stamp on our heads. The distance [we had to roll] was
about 200 meters. They kept saying “Lie down, roll.”

We did not make a formal complaint. You can’t make a
report against soldiers at the police. The police fear the soldiers, and no
action can be taken against them.

We can’t understand why they did this to us. It was
about a week after one of the explosions. That night, there were no explosions.[39]

The 17-year-old watchman added,

They didn’t ask
us any questions, they just started beating us. They didn’t even ask our
names. They made us lie down and roll. We rolled for about half an hour here in
the road. After the exercises, they left, then came back and started beating us
more. They beat us with fists and kicked us with their boots. I was beaten on
my whole body. There was no place they missed.[40]

During the same period, Abdiaziz M., a 16-year-old school
boy, was assaulted. He saw soldiers near his home while he was standing at the
gate. As Abdiaziz described it,

They called to me, and I tried to go back into the house.
They came in the gate and started beating me. They didn’t say anything.
They didn’t ask for my ID. The only thing they said was
“Come!”

They hit me in the kidneys with a stick and with their
fists. One kicked me; one had a stick. Others surrounded me.

They broke my arm. I had to go to the hospital to get my
arm put in a plaster.[41]

Hanifa R., a government employee, was waking from a nap one
day in late November when soldiers approached her home. She came outside when
she heard voices.

From one vehicle, men were shouting “This is the
house! This is the house!” They were saying “You stupid! Dog!
Trash!” as they were coming into the plot….

They told me to lie down…. They fired a gun into the
air while fighting me to lie down. There were 10 to 15 soldiers. I lay down.

If the soldier had said “Madam, I want to search your
house,” it would have been different, but he was saying, “You dog,
you trash.”

My husband heard them talking to me. He was praying at that
particular time. He came out. They said, “Lie down!”

My husband lay down. Without saying anything, they just
started kicking him, hitting him. One officer was holding a pistol. They fired
it once next to his head. The bullet hit the ground, and dirt flew up over his
head. My young boy who is two years old was standing just next to him. They
said to my husband “We can finish you, and there’s nowhere you can
take us.”

Hanifa’s husband was taken away and interrogated about
“which neighbors were not Kenyans” before he was released. Even
after his return, family members remained traumatized by the incident. Hanifa
told Human Rights Watch, “It was a shock. That night my kids were unable
to go to sleep. The whole night they were crying. We were all afraid they might
come back the next day.”[42]

A number of abuses also took place at Garissa military camp,
where soldiers detained dozens of civilians over a period of weeks in violation
of Kenyan law. At the military camp, as in Garissa Madogo,
“exercises” featured prominently. Abdallah D., an employee at a
state agency, was arrested by soldiers in late November after stopping his
motorbike near the camp to look at a tire puncture. He was one of many victims
to be arrested by soldiers for parking near the military camp, which lies along
the main road through Garissa town—a location where long-distance truck
drivers and others had habitually parked their vehicles with no previous
objections from the military. No signs indicate that parking is prohibited in
the area. But his choice of parking spot exposed Abdallah, like many others, to
abuse. He described his ordeal:

Someone came with a gun and grabbed me by the shirt. It was
three soldiers. They told me to push the bike into the camp.

Inside the main gate, in the field, five soldiers told me
to put my finger on the ground and then spin in circles. They said “Fast,
fast.” Then they told me to put my head on the ground and raise my legs
up. I tried and said, “It’s very hard. I can’t.” So one
of the soldiers started kicking my buttocks. They said I was a criminal because
I was disobeying orders. They said, “This man refused orders. Maybe
he’s al-Shabaab.”

… Everyone had to do exercises. There were four
stages. The first is the finger [standing and spinning in circles with your
finger on the ground]; the second is [standing on] the head; the third is
carrying a heavy load; and the fourth is cutting weeds. Everyone was also
beaten; they were kicked. The others were still there, in the scorching sun,
when I was released. I was there half an hour [before] I showed my [public
service agency] ID and they let me go.

Even the chair of the Garissa Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Dubow Barre Duale—a former military officer and brother to a
member of parliament—was not immune from ill-treatment. In late December
he was sitting in his vehicle next to the Heller petrol station across from the
military camp—not a prohibited parking area—when three soldiers
approached, asked why he was parked there, and snatched his keys from his hand.
In the scuffle they injured his hand, causing him to bleed. According to Duale,

They said, “If you’re man enough, come to the
military camp.” I followed them to the camp. Then they said, “Stop
or we’ll shoot you. You’re al-Shabaab.” I went back to my car
and called the Provincial Police Officer (PPO)…. The PPO came and talked
to the military chiefs—the camp commander, a major and a captain. They
then called me over. When I was coming, they told me to stop and stand two to
three meters from them and identify myself. I said my name and that I’m a
chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and a former military officer. The first
soldier said, “Why didn’t you tell us that at first?” I said,
“Because it makes no difference. Ordinary Kenyans also should not be
harassed.”

My whole hand was bleeding at this point. [The commanders]
gave me the key and said, “Sorry. These young men [soldiers] have made a
mistake.”

The Garissa military camp commander was transferred at the
end of December following complaints from Dubow Duale’s brother, Member
of Parliament Aden Duale, and others, including other area members of
parliament. However, harassment continued under the new camp commander in
January.[44]

On January 11, 2012, a Human Rights Watch researcher
personally witnessed the ill treatment of civilians at the military camp. The
researcher observed soldiers forcing several men to roll in the dirt in a large
field just beyond the entrance to the camp, which is visible from the main road.
Soldiers forced another man to frog-jump across the field and to assume various
gymnastic positions. Military personnel refused entry to Human Rights Watch,
stating, “There are no human rights here.”[45]

Human Rights Watch interviewed several victims upon their
release from the camp the same day. Yusuf Khalif Mohamed, a long-distance truck
driver, said he stopped in Garissa for a soft drink on his way from Mombasa to
Dadaab, where he was to make a food delivery for UNICEF. He parked near the
camp, not knowing parking was prohibited there. A military officer approached
him, told him he had parked illegally, confiscated his driver’s license, and
forced him to come to the camp. There soldiers threw a 20-liter container of
water on him, made him roll on the ground, kicked him on the side, and hit him
on the head with the butt of a gun. Mohamed told Human Rights Watch that one of
them said, “I think you are al-Shabaab. You are bothering us in Somalia,
and now you’ve come to bother us here.”[46]

Abdi E., a taxi driver who was also forcibly taken into the
camp, said,

They told me to roll in their compound. They also told me
to roll [turn around in circles] with my finger on the ground. Then they told
me to stand in a push-up position for 30 minutes…. They poured water on
me…. The soldiers were saying, “We can do whatever we want to you.
We can shoot you. We can arrest you.”[47]

Ali I. was buying goods in a shop across from the military
camp when he was arrested. He said,

Soldiers came and asked “Why are you standing here?
So you’re al-Shabaab.” There were four soldiers. They took me to
the camp. I had come with a vehicle, and they took away my driver’s
license and my ID in order to make me go into the camp.

Once you go in, you become a captive. They kicked me with
their boots and told me to roll around in the hot sun.[48]

When Human Rights Watch inquired about the incident,
military spokesperson Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir initially claimed the individuals
had been detained because they had “attempted to build an illegal
structure [such as a kiosk] next to the military camp.”[49]
However, Human Rights Watch saw no evidence to support this claim.[50]

At least eight men were detained on January 11, all
subjected to similar treatment.[51]

Military Abuses in Wajir

Most abuses in Wajir took place after a military vehicle in
a convoy hit an improvised explosive device on Mandera Road, in a part of Wajir
called Halane Village, on December 11, 2011. At least one soldier was injured
in the explosion.[52]

Soldiers in the convoy secured the area and began rounding
up civilians in the vicinity. According to a local human rights activist,
“They cordoned off the area, arresting and beating everyone around,
especially those wearing kanzus [a garment traditionally worn by Muslim men] or
with beards.”[53] Civilians in the
immediate area of the explosion were not the only ones at risk; soldiers also
fanned out to the nearby neighborhoods, arresting people from the streets or
from within their homes.

Numerous witnesses described how approximately 56 residents,
including men, women, boys, and girls, were gathered by soldiers and forced to
lie down in the gravel road.[54] They were made to roll
from one location in the road to another, as in Garissa, and then to lie on
their backs facing the sun for two to three hours. Many were beaten while being
brought to Mandera Road or because they refused orders to roll or to lie facing
the sun. After several hours, police took charge, taking males (including at
least two children: a 15-year-old and a 16-year-old) into police custody while
releasing females. Those taken into custody were released the following day,
although most of them had to return for several consecutive days for
questioning. To date, no one has been charged with planting the explosive
device.

Ahmed D. lives on Mandera Road near the site of the
explosion. He told Human Rights Watch that shortly after he heard the
explosion,

The military came into my house—three or four
soldiers. They pointed a gun at me. I was told to surrender. They started
ransacking all my rooms. I was with my six kids, who are between ten years and
one and a half, and the kids saw everything….

The soldiers started kicking and slapping me. They took me
out to the road and trampled me on the road. [I was] asking what do they want
from me. They answered only by kicking me, and said, “The people who
burned us are you. You know the people behind the blast. You should bring
them.”

They took me to the place where other people were gathered.
They made us lie on the ground for almost three hours. They told us to roll. If
you fail they will continue kicking us with boots and hitting us with butts of
guns. Some women were there, roughly 10. They also had to roll and were beaten.

The police came and other government officers. Forty-two of
us were taken to Wajir Police Station. They were calling our names,
interrogating us about what happened and where we were…. All of us were
released the next day.

I was told to go to the hospital the next day. I had
internal injuries from being hit with gun butts, and from the slapping and
kicking. I have blood clots in my head. I was told this at the hospital. The
hospital gave me antibiotics and painkillers. I have back, rib, and kidney pain,
and also my manhood. Even there they kicked me. It was seriously swollen. My
buttocks hurt and I can’t sit for too long. I have pain after a few
minutes.[55]

Dakan G., who has long suffered from epilepsy, describes
herself as “about 50” but looks frail beyond her years. Human
Rights Watch visited her in a small hut several minutes’ walk from the
explosion site. She said that on December 11 she had gone to see her mother
about an hour after hearing the explosion but was intercepted by five soldiers.

They grabbed me and started beating me. They slapped me.
They kicked me in the legs. They kicked me down and I fell on my backside. Then
they pulled me along the ground to the place where the other people were.

They continued beating me there. I fainted in that place. A
good Samaritan brought me back home.

I have pain in my throat. They held me by the throat so
that I could not scream while they were beating me. I have pain in my chest and
my back…. I am bedridden now as a result of the beatings. And before
this, [I had] epilepsy at different times, but now it’s continuous. The
time is shorter between episodes.

I would like to see those soldiers taken to court, because
they made me bedridden.[56]

Dakan G. was not the only victim who suffered lasting
physical harm. Abdullahi D., a 50-year-old manual laborer who made bricks for a
living, said,

Up to now I can’t work to support my family because
of the pain. I have seven children, plus my mother and my wife, who depend on
me.

I have pain in my ribs, back, and left leg. A soldier
kicked me four times in the leg. I was slapped in the face. One of my lower
teeth is loose, and I still have pain in the teeth.

Human Rights Watch observed scars up and down his legs, and
a round boot mark imprinted into his back.[57]

Another victim, Maash A., said soldiers hit him in the
mouth, the shoulder, and the eye with the butt of a gun, and stomped on his
legs. He is now missing two teeth, and says the vision in his left eye has
become blurry.[58]

With the assistance of Wajir Paralegal Network, a local NGO,
a number of victims attempted to file complaints with the police. Initially,
the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) turned them away. According to Muhumud B.,
“I went to the police two times and the police turned down my request to
make a statement. They said, ‘This case is not with the police.
It’s with the military, and the police can’t do anything about
it.’”[59] Fifty-four-year-old
Derow A., who was beaten with a gun butt and kicked in the mouth, had a similar
experience—one which brought back bad memories of past abuse. He explained,

In 1984 I was one of the Wagalla victims, and I recalled
that [when I was beaten on December 11]. I was mistreated [at Wagalla]. People
were killed, many of my family members, uncles, cousins. Some were eaten by
hyenas. It [brings] very bad memories when I go back to it.

[After the December 11 beatings] I went to police station
[with other victims] to get a P3 and record a statement, but the police turned
us down.[60] I
didn’t go back again. I was one of the Wagalla victims and up to now
nothing has been done, so this was just like Wagalla.[61]

Eventually, the OCS relented and agreed to take statements.
But by this time several victims, including Muhumud B. and Derow A., had given
up on the idea of filing complaints with the police, whom they saw as unwilling
or unable to take on the military.[62] Ultimately, five to ten
victims filed complaints with the police. They have not yet seen any follow up
from police, although the military board of inquiry, discussed below, visited
Wajir in February and took statements from victims.[63]

The December 11 beatings left an enduring mark on victims.
Abdikadir, a slender 15-year-old school boy who was beaten by soldiers, told
Human Rights Watch he is still afraid of the military.[64]
His father explained that Abdikadir is so traumatized that before going to
school every day, Abdikadir climbs up on a ladder and looks over the wall of
the compound to make sure there are no soldiers around.[65]

Police Abuses in Wajir

The majority of abuses documented by Human Rights Watch in
Wajir were committed by the Kenya Defence Forces, but police also seriously
beat one civilian, Adan Abdirahman Yusuf. Yusuf, a laborer, was arrested
following the detonation of an explosive during Jamhuri Day celebrations on
December 12 outside Wajir Stadium, in which three people, including a National
Security Intelligence Service official, were injured.[66]
He was working near the stadium, repairing a fence. According to Yusuf,
immediately after the explosion, Kenya Police and Administration Police spotted
him in the vicinity and began beating him.[67] He
recounted,

They asked me whether I
had a phone, and I said I don’t carry a phone. They started beating me.
First, they started kicking me. Then they held me up, made me stand up. Then
they wrestled me down. I lay down on my chest. They started beating and kicking
me and using the barrel of their guns [to hit me]. I was hit with a gun on the
head and the back. I was kicked on the lower right side of my chest with a
boot. I was bleeding profusely from the head.

They stopped beating me when I was not able to move. They
dragged me to a vehicle and took me to the police station. The police took me
to the hospital. The hospital could not stitch the wound. It was too wide, and
the skin was too thin. I was only injected with painkillers. I didn’t
even get a bandage and couldn’t even wash my head. They just told me to
sit in the sun so it would dry and clot.

I am suffering from internal pain from the kicks. I
can’t work. I have pain in the kidney and a headache.[68]

Yusuf spent nine nights in police custody before he was
freed on bail. He was charged with three counts of attempted murder. Charges
against him were pending at this writing.

Military and Police Abuses in Mandera

On November 24, a KDF
soldier was killed by an explosive device in Mandera, near the Somalia border. In
response to the attack, at least three separate forces—the Kenyan police,
Kenya military, and soldiers of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia,
who had crossed into Kenya from Somalia—took part in roundups and
beatings of civilians.[69]

According to one witness,

There was a blast on Thursday in the middle of town.
Immediately the [police] started picking up people around there. Some school
boys were beaten seriously. Some were in the hospital…. I escaped by the
skin of my teeth. My neighbors were whipped by the military. They were beaten
seriously. I had rushed to the scene to see what was happening, and the
military surrounded us…. One man was bleeding from the head, and I took
him to the hospital. Some of my boys were bleeding. I’m a teacher. These
were boys of 12, 13, 15 years—young, small boys. The soldiers were
beating people with clubs.[70]

Rahman O. was one of those caught up in the violent police
response to the IED attack. Ten KDF officers entered his house and dragged him
and his children out of bed. They beat him, kicking him in the testicles and
breaking his right hand. Rahman O. told Human Rights Watch that a pregnant
neighbor miscarried after being beaten by soldiers.[71]
Ayan H., a 40-year-old tutor, lost a tooth after being beaten by both KDF and
TFG soldiers. Today, she told Human Rights Watch, she can no longer hear well.[72]

The chair of the Mandera Town Council and nine other local
leaders sent a letter to the ministers for defence and internal security on
November 26 in which they presented a list of 134 persons who had been
victimized on November 24. The letter stated that 115 of them had been
physically assaulted, while others were victims of looting by security forces.
The list of victims of physical assault includes children as young as one month
and adults as old as 62; it documents several cases of broken and dislocated
limbs, and one case of sexual assault.[73]

Mandera West Member of Parliament Mahmoud Mohammed told
Human Rights Watch that about 300 people were arrested to be
“screened” on the day of the explosion; that victims included
women, men, and children; that perpetrators included both police and military;
and that some victims suffered broken limbs. He said that MPs from the region
had asked the government to carry out an inquiry into the abuses, adding,
“The war will likely continue, and they need to avoid responding like
this again…. They cannot correct a wrong with a wrong.”[74]

Loss of Trust in
Security Forces

The result of the repeated beatings and mistreatment of
residents of North Eastern province has been a diminishing trust in the Kenyan
security forces at the very moment when those forces most need the confidence
of the people in order to accomplish their security objectives.

The beatings have also further increased the sense of
marginalization of the Kenyan Somali population. In the letter that local
Mandera leaders sent to the ministers for defence and internal security in
November, they stated: “On daily basis security men were being killed by
thugs in other regions of Kenya and yet the population dwelling within that
[sic] environs are not collectively punished. Does this mean Somalis are all
naturally threat [sic] to the security of this nation? Does it signify that we
are all Alshabab or their sympathizers?”[75]

Young people interviewed by Human Rights Watch placed a
particular emphasis on the breakdown of trust between residents and members of
the security forces. A youth leader in Garissa complained, “Freedom of
movement has been altered. After 9 p.m. it’s risky for people to move
around, because they’re afraid of the Kenyan security forces, not
al-Shabaab.”[76] He added,

Young people have started saying that if today they were
given the opportunity to decide between [living under] al-Shabaab and the
Kenyan military, they would choose al-Shabaab. The military doesn’t
usually have contact with the civilian population, so they use a lot of force.
You can’t even talk back to them. They don’t even ask you
questions.[77]

Yassin B., a 16-year-old boy in Wajir whose father, mother,
18-year-old-sister, and 16-year-old cousin were all beaten on December 11,
said: “Now people fear the military. If they see a military car coming,
everybody locks the doors.”[78]

III. Police Abuses against Somali Refugees in
Dadaab

The Dadaab refugee camps in North Eastern province host more
than 460,000 refugees, most of them Somali. The camps already faced serious
security and human rights problems prior to Operation Linda Nchi, but these
have been exacerbated as a result of Kenya’s intervention in Somalia.[79]

Even before October 2011 Human Rights Watch and other
organizations had documented a range of concerns over police abuses of Somali
refugees. In 2007 Kenya formally closed its border with Somalia, also shutting
down a refugee transit center at Liboi, a Kenyan town 15 kilometers from a main
border crossing. The transit center had served as a legitimate point of entry
for asylum seekers who were screened and then transported to the camps at Dadaab,
80 kilometers away. Following its closure, police, in violation of Kenyan and
international law, began intercepting asylum seekers who had crossed into
Kenya, accusing them of “unlawful entry.”[80]
Many were forced to pay large bribes to the police in order to secure access to
Dadaab.[81] Others were unlawfully
returned to Somalia or arbitrarily detained and wrongfully charged with
immigration offences in Kenya.[82]

In a 2010 report Human
Rights Watch exposed widespread police violence, including rape, against
refugees between 2008 and 2010.[83] Two women refugees interviewed for the report
told Human Rights Watch they had been raped by police while on the way to
Dadaab, while a third said she was raped in Dadaab.[84] In January 2011 Human Rights Watch also documented
the case of a woman who was raped by police at Dadaab police station that
month.[85]While the number of reported rapes by police in
Dadaab does not indicate a widespread phenomenon, the police response is
telling: in both cases of police rape within Dadaab known to Human Rights
Watch, suspects were transferred out of the camps, not prosecuted.[86] Refugees have also reported beatings by the
police, both on the way to Dadaab—in some cases because they have been
unable to pay bribes—and in the camps.[87]

Human Rights Watch has also documented the failure of Kenyan
police to provide adequate protection to refugees, including their failure to
investigate and prosecute sexual violence within the refugee population, which
is prevalent.[88] Inadequate policing
allows common crime of all kinds to flourish; for instance, refugees have
recently reported armed men stealing their food at night.[89]
Refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Dadaab in April 2011 said they
did not go to the police when they were victims of crime because they believed
the police would do nothing.[90]

In May 2011 UNHCR signed a memorandum of understanding for a
“Security Partnership Project” with the Kenyan government. The
project aims, in part, to “reinforce the security environment in the
refugee camps and surrounding hosting areas with an enhanced police presence as
well as through community policing.” Over the course of 2011, 92
additional police officers were deployed to Dadaab, bringing the total to 349;
a further 108 officers are to be deployed, according to the agreement.[91]
However, the introduction of a community policing program, under which refugees
would work closely with the police to help provide security in the camps, did
not go forward as planned due to increased insecurity, including attacks on
police officers.[92]

A significant police presence is clearly important in Dadaab,
but for many refugees police are currently part of the problem of insecurity,
not part of the solution.[93] Accountability,
including prosecutions of police who committed the assaults against refugees
documented in this chapter as well as monitoring and prosecution of extortion,
will be necessary in order to build trust between refugees and the police.

Increasing Insecurity in Dadaab

In 2011 there were increasing forays into Kenya by groups of
Somalis trying to kidnap foreigners. As with the piracy in the Gulf of Aden,
the main motive of these groups was mercenary, to extract ransom payments,
rather than political.[94]

Security sharply deteriorated in Dadaab beginning in
September 2011 when a Kenyan driver working for CARE, an international NGO, was
abducted. His abduction was followed in October by the abductions of Spanish
aid workers working for the international NGO Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF).[95] Al-Shabaab did not claim
responsibility, but the kidnappings were among the justifications that Kenya
put forward for its intervention in Somalia.

In October 2011 Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs
(DRA) suspended registration of new arrivals in Dadaab, supposedly in response
to insecurity, and registration had not yet been resumed at this writing. However,
Somalis continue to arrive at Dadaab and, absent registration, many new
arrivals live on the outskirts of the camps with no formal addresses. There is
no process to screen them in order to determine who may pose a security risk.[96]

Once the campaign of attacks against the police and military
in North Eastern province accelerated, Dadaab was an easy target.
Administration Police officers regularly escort UNHCR staff and humanitarian
agencies during their work in the camps because of the risk of both common
crime and abduction. Twice in November, police vehicles escorting UN staff were
targeted by explosives; on the second occasion, two police officers were
injured.[97]

As a result of the attacks, UNHCR, along with a number of
other agencies, suspended most activities within the camps. Among the programs
that were put on hold was a nascent protection monitoring system established by
UNHCR in partnership with the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, a Kenyan NGO, which
placed staff in the camps to document and respond to refugees’ protection
concerns. No protection monitors were in the camps for the whole of November
and December 2011.[98] The security concerns of
the agencies were real; however, their near-absence from the camps rendered
refugees more vulnerable to abuses from both militants and the Kenyan security
forces.

In the absence of a formal community policing program UNHCR began
organizing refugees to carry out their own patrols at Dadaab, which UNHCR
officials saw as a means to empower refugees and to demonstrate their ability
to play a positive role in ensuring security.[99]
However, on December 29 and January 1, gunmen shot dead two refugee leaders who
played key roles in Community Peace and Security Teams, a pre-existing
initiative coordinated by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). The shooting demonstrated
the risks for refugees wishing to take responsibility for security in Dadaab.[100]

The December 2011 Police Raid on Somali Refugees

December saw three explosions in rapid succession in the
Dadaab refugee camps. The first explosion was on December 5 in Ifo 2 West camp.
An Administration Police officer was killed and three others were injured.[101]
Following the explosion several refugees in the area ululated, apparently
celebrating the death of the Administration Police officer.[102]
Infuriated police arrested approximately 100 refugees; journalists reported
that some of them were beaten.[103]

On December 19, 2011, another explosion, this time in
Dadaab’s Hagadera camp, killed a police officer and injured two others.
The following morning saw yet another explosion in Ifo camp.

The third Dadaab explosion, while it did not result in any
casualties, triggered a brutal crackdown by police. Hours after the attack, in
what appears to be a planned response intended to punish the refugees, rather
than an instant, spontaneous reaction, police officers descended on refugees’
homes and market stalls.

Over the next four days police beat scores of refugees,
causing many to seek medical attention according to multiple witnesses,
including a health worker based at a local hospital that treated dozens of
victims.[104] Children, including a
four-year-old and a mentally ill 12-year-old, and pregnant women were among the
victims.[105] Police raped at least
one refugee woman, and attempted to rape others. They looted shops and stole
money from refugees; a representative of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
(SUPKEM) who visited Dadaab a few days after the incident found that police
broke into over 20 shops in Hagadera.[106]
Citizen Rights Watch, a Garissa-based NGO that also visited Dadaab just after
the incident, documented over 50 cases of refugees who had money or property
looted or destroyed,[107] while the member of
parliament from Dadaab, Farah Maalim, told Human Rights Watch that police
“looted 38 million Kenyan shillings [about USD$450,000] worth of money
and goods in a matter of hours.”[108]

Faartun N. was one of the women raped by police during the
raid. She told Human Rights Watch,

It was the day after an explosion in the market …
They were three policemen who came. They were saying, “Bring us
money” and “Where is your husband?”

The three of them
started beating me with a metal stick. They lifted me up to [take me] inside
the house. I shouted, saying that I was a teacher. They then spoke in a
language that was neither Swahili nor English. Two of them moved out of the
house, leaving behind one who immediately started locking the door and opened
the zipper [of his trousers] while holding my neck in his right hand. I started
screaming and fought back with him. In the process he stripped my underwear off
and pulled me towards himself while standing, and as I struggled, after some
time, I felt his sperms rolling over my thighs.

The police spent about 40 minutes in my compound: searching
the rooms, beating me and at last raping me. I got some head injuries, back
pain, and shoulder pain. I still feel the pain… I got treatment from GIZ
[Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, German Agency
for International Cooperation] in Ifo, who examined me and gave me some
medication.[109]

There were six policemen who came into the house. They did
not ask us anything, but started beating us with batons.

At first, one of them entered and slapped me heavily on the
face. He asked me to go into the bathroom. I refused to do so. He then threw me
on the ground and started unzipping [his trousers]. I screamed, and then my
mother who was hiding inside the house, jumped out and shouted at the
policeman. He turned to my mother and beat her with a stick … Five other
policemen entered and also beat us, and entered the houses searching, and then
went out… They were only asking us to show them al-Shabaab.[110]

Amaal Y. said police tried to lift her veil and drag her
into a room, but she fought them off. She and her four-year-old son were
nonetheless “beaten mercilessly.” Both had marks on their backs a
month after the beatings. According to Amaal, “My child also suffered
from the beatings and still has pain. He cries at night and gets psychological
trauma whenever he sees police.”[111]

Some refugees were taken into custody. Mahamud O. told Human
Rights Watch that after being beaten with the butt of a gun, boots, and sticks,
he was taken into custody and held in Dadaab police station for two nights. He
had to pay a bribe of 12,000 Kenyan shillings (around USD$140) to secure his
release.[112]

Refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were
not certain who, if anyone, was coordinating the police attacks. However, the
SUPKEM representative who interviewed victims several days after the attacks
told Human Rights Watch, “People said the DO [District Officer] from
Dadaab was there during the operation. He was telling refugees, ‘What
we’ve done here is something very small. You’ll see what we can do.
You should go back to your country. No one here will assist you.’”[113]

Police told Human Rights Watch that those who were
victimized should have gone to the police station to report the abuses; but
most didn’t, for obvious reasons. Hassan R. was attacked by police on
December 20. He told Human Rights Watch,

Six policemen came. They asked me to produce explosives,
but I had nothing to show them. I told them that I am an innocent refugee but
they did not listen to me. They beat me with boots and batons on almost every
part of my body. I got some injuries on my ribs and thighs. I still have some
pain. They also robbed two mobile phones and 5,000 Kenyan shillings. They were
saying to me that if I don’t bring the explosives, they would arrest me.
I was detained on the same night in Dadaab main police station. I paid 7,500 Kenyan
shillings to be released.

I didn’t file a police report. I never thought they
would listen to me since they are ones who had detained and beaten me.[114]

Similarly, Najib A., beaten at Hagadera camp on December 20,
said,

There were four policemen who came and harassed me to
search for weapons in my house. They beat me with big sticks. The four of them
beat me mercilessly … I didn’t file a report with the police. The
thought of reporting to the very people who beat me never came into my mind.[115]

Najib A. still had bruises on his arms and legs from the
beatings when Human Rights Watch interviewed him a month later.

The assault on the refugees led to a dramatic deterioration
in relations between refugees and the police. A youth leader in Garissa who was
in contact with youth in Dadaab told Human Rights Watch that police seemed to
enjoy absolute impunity, operating out of the confines of Kenyan law:
“It’s like the police have created their own immune country from
Kenya.”[116] The resulting sense of
overwhelming insecurity, said another youth activist, led some refugees to
“[run] back to Somalia because they could not withstand the beatings,”
although the number of refugees who left for such reasons appears to be
minimal.[117]

The message of the police raid was clear. Ayaan I., who was
kicked in the forehead and the kidneys by a police officer while others
searched her house, reported, “They told us to go back to Somalia.”[118]

Further Arrests and Extortion of Somali Refugees

Media reports on police
behavior in Dadaab, along with private high-level UNHCR demarches toward the
Kenyan government, provided a sobering reminder to the Kenyan authorities that
brutality toward refugees had not gone unnoticed. However, Human Rights Watch
is unaware of any public statements from the international community condemning
the assaults.[119]

Reports of police brutality diminished after the December
assaults were exposed. However, abuses toward the refugees continued. On
February 29, after police found an explosive in the camps, dozens of refugees
were rounded up and arbitrarily detained solely on the basis of their presence
in the area. Several refugees told Human Rights Watch that those detained were
forced to pay bribes in exchange for their release.[120]
Eventually, all were released without charge. In March Human Rights Watch
received reports of police extorting money from butchers and looting pharmacies
in Hagadera camp.[121]

IV. Response of the Kenyan Authorities to Abuses
by the Security Forces

To date, the response of the Kenyan authorities to human
rights violations in North Eastern province has been inadequate. The military
has taken some encouraging steps, establishing an ad hoc “board of
inquiry” to look into allegations of abuses; thus far the board has
interacted effectively and respectfully with civil society organizations and
victims, according to the latter. For their part, police officials told Human
Rights Watch that the police were looking into allegations of rights abuses,
but did not provide further detail, and victims contacted by Human Rights Watch
had had no interactions with police investigators seeking information about the
alleged crimes.

As of March 2012, more than four months after the first
abuses, no security officer has been charged. The police’s reluctance to
investigate the violence follows the government’s ongoing failure to
publish what it says was an independent October 2010 investigation into Human
Rights Watch reporting on widespread police abuses against Somali refugees in
and around the camps.

Police Response

Police have repeatedly pledged to look into the abuses and
to hold accountable those responsible. In November Human Rights Watch contacted
North Eastern Provincial Police Officer Leo Nyongesa concerning police
involvement in abuses at Mandera. Nyongesa assured Human Rights Watch that the
abuses would be investigated and he repeated these assurances in January. [122]
As of April, no one had been charged, and no formal police inquiry into the
abuses had been initiated.[123] A senior official at
the Ministry of State for Internal Security told Human Rights Watch in April
that he would commit to ensuring that an inquiry took place, and suggested it
might be carried out by administrative officials.[124]

It is not the first time that police have pledged to address
allegations of mistreatment. In 2010, in response to Human Rights Watch’s
report Welcome to Kenya, the Ministry of State for Internal Security
established a team consisting of a representative of the Supreme Council of Kenya
Muslims, two women representatives (one from the Dadaab area and one from a
national women’s organization), a youth representative from Dadaab, and a
representative of the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, which it tasked with
investigating allegations of abuse.[125] In September and
October 2010 the team conducted an investigation and drafted a report which was
submitted to the Ministry of State for Internal Security, but never made
public.[126] The ministry did not
respond to repeated requests from Human Rights Watch in 2011 for a copy of the
report.[127] A member of the team
told Human Rights Watch that the team found significant evidence of human
rights abuses by members of the security forces, but that the ministry did not
take any action to hold perpetrators accountable.[128]

Broader Police Reform Issues

Kenya is currently
undergoing a series of police reforms, in line with both the August 2010
constitution and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of February 2008,
which put an end to the 2007-2008 post-election violence. One outcome is the
National Police Service Bill, passed in August 2011 but not yet published. When
implemented, the bill, known as the Police Act, will merge the Kenya Police and
the Administration Police, two units that previously responded to separate
administrative hierarchies. It will also replace the current Commissioner of
Police and the Administration Police Commander with an Inspector General of
Police, with authority over both branches, and will impose new restrictions on
the use of force.[129] Civil society organizations have recently
expressed concerns that the government’s inexplicable delay in publishing
the bill means the new structures may not be in place before the next general
elections, scheduled for March 2013.[130]

A second bill, the National Police Service Commission Bill,
passed in September 2011, creates a civilian board to oversee appointments,
promotions, transfers, and dismissals from the police force. The commission
will be empowered to receive complaints from the public and to recommend
remedies or to refer such complaints to the proposed Independent Policing
Oversight Authority, the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission,
the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission.[131] However, members of the
commission have not yet been selected due to internal squabbles within the
panel designated to name commissioners, raising concern from donors over Kenya’s
commitment to police reform.[132]

Police vetting is also planned. Vetting of senior officers
was initiated in May 2011. The process was intended to evaluate
professionalism, integrity, track record, and psychological fitness in order to
inform decisions on promotion, demotion, redeployment, or dismissal of senior police
officers.[133] However the process was
suspended after strong objections from civil society that stakeholders in the
police reform process were not consulted and that the vetting, carried out by
the police themselves, lacked transparency.[134] Police
vetting is to resume once the National Police Service Commission is
operational.[135] Human Rights Watch has
recommended that the vetting process be conducted in a manner that allows for
input from citizens, with the opportunity for individuals and civil society
organizations to bring forward complaints concerning the behavior of individual
officers.

Most critical to accountability may be the Independent
Policing Oversight Authority, established by law in November 2011, but not yet
operational. The IPOA is mandated to hold the police accountable to the public
and to ensure independent oversight of complaints. According to the law
establishing the IPOA, it will “investigate any complaints related to
disciplinary or criminal offences committed by any member of the Service,
whether on its own motion or on receipt of a complaint, and make recommendations
to the relevant authorities, including recommendations for prosecution,
compensation, internal disciplinary action or any other appropriate relief, and
shall make public the response received to these recommendations.” It is
also to “monitor and investigate police operations affecting the
public.”[136] At this writing, a
selection panel had put forward names of candidates to serve on the IPOA; they
were awaiting approval by parliament, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila
Odinga.[137] The United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which provides funding and technical support
for a number of security and justice initiatives in Kenya, has undertaken
initiatives aimed at ensuring the IPOA is independent and effective.

Several residents of North
Eastern province interviewed by Human Rights Watch called for the need for
greater investment in community policing, including making an effort to ensure
that some police officers who are from the region are placed there. According
to Abdullahi Salat, the Garissa chair of SUPKEM, “There’s a lack of
collaboration between police and the community. The [police chief] won’t
go to the community and talk to people. There are no Somali CID [criminal investigation]
officers here. All locals [police from North Eastern province] were transferred
[to other regions of Kenya] two or three years ago. People want them
transferred back.”[138] A senior police official confirmed to Human
Rights Watch that Kenyan Somali police were transferred out of the region
several years ago, saying the move took place “because of fears of
government that they might collude.”[139] However, a Ministry of State for Internal
Security official told Human Rights Watch the transfers were part of a broader
policy, following the county’s 2007-2008 post-election violence, to move
police out of their areas of origin in an attempt to decrease tribalism among
the police.[140]

Kenya does have a community policing program, established in
2005 and supported by several bilateral donors and NGOs. The program identifies
community members from the village to the district level who liaise directly
with the police, providing information on crime and meeting regularly to
discuss local crime-prevention strategies. Its implementation has varied from
district to district; there are no recent or large-scale studies on its
effectiveness, but supporters of the program argue that, where both police and
community members are committed to the concept, it has reduced crime and
improved information-sharing.[141] According to UNHCR, the
police planned to initiate the program in Dadaab in 2011, but it was suspended
due to security concerns related to Operation Linda Nchi and the attacks on
police targets in Dadaab; it may be piloted in Dadaab in 2012.[142]
Other areas of North Eastern province should also be prioritized for enhanced
community policing efforts.

Military Response

In November 2011 Human Rights Watch addressed a letter to
Minister of State for Defence Yusuf Haji raising concern about three incidents
implicating the Kenyan Defence Forces: the attack on a fishing boat at Kiunga;
the mistreatment of civilians in Garissa in mid-November; and an attack on a
displaced persons camp in Jilib, Somalia.[143] Haji did
not respond to the letter. However, after Human Rights Watch issued a press
release in January detailing further abuses, military officials contacted Human
Rights Watch and said that, in response to allegations put forward by Human
Rights Watch and a Mombasa-based organization, Muslims for Human Rights, the
Ministry of State for Defence had decided to establish a “board of
inquiry” to look into the abuses.

The board, whose members
also described their role as that of a “fact-finding tribunal,” is
conducting an internal inquiry. At this writing, it has interviewed victims and
civil society organizations in Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera. (It also contacted
Human Rights Watch in Nairobi for further information on abuses.) However,
members stressed the purely internal nature of their mission: they will report
back to the Ministry of State for Defence, rather than publish their findings.
The ministry has not responded to a query from Human Rights Watch as to what
action it will take if evidence of abuses is corroborated.[144] In April the chair of the board told Human
Rights Watch that he had been transferred to another position, and his
replacement had not yet been appointed, stalling the board’s
investigations.[145]

The military has taken several other actions that indicate
it recognizes rights abuses have taken place. For instance, the Garissa
military camp commander was transferred to another location at the end of
December 2011 in response to complaints, though he received no disciplinary
sanctions, and his departure did not put an end to abuses in Garissa.[146]
In Wajir, a local activist told Human Rights Watch that the military apologized
in a media briefing for the December 11 beatings, stating that the reaction of
military personnel was excessive.[147] But when another report
of a military apology circulated in the Kenyan media in March, the military
denied that it had apologized, stating that it was still investigating the
incidents.[148]

Even though the military has demonstrated some willingness
to respond to criticism in the wake of serious human rights violations, no
military officers have yet been charged. This is, in part, the fault of Kenyan
police procedures. According to police, when civilians file a police statement
accusing a military officer of a crime, local police may begin investigations
into the alleged incident. However, they may not directly summon a military
official for interrogation, as they would with a civilian suspect. Rather, a
file must be submitted to the Criminal Investigation Department headquarters in
Nairobi, which must then request authorization from the Ministry of State for
Defence to interrogate the suspect. If it is determined that the alleged crime
was committed in the officer’s official capacity as a KDF member, the
ministry refers the case to the military police for further investigations; if
the alleged crime was committed in the officer’s personal capacity, the
case continues through civilian channels, involving further investigation by
the police, and prosecution by police prosecutors (for most crimes) or State
Counsel (for murder and a few other serious charges).[149]
The lengthy, unwieldy procedure may deter complaints and means they can be held
up by inaction from either the police or the military.

However, most victims are unlikely to even take the initial
step of filing a police report against a military officer. Kenyans see the
military as “above” the police and therefore untouchable. As one
victim said, “You can’t make a report against soldiers at the
police [station]. The police fear the soldiers, and no action can be taken
against them.”[150]

Unfortunately, the experiences of a few bold victims who
have filed such complaints, as in Wajir, where victims were initially turned
away by police, would suggest that this perception of military-police relations
is justified.[151] Further reforms may be
needed, such as the establishment of a military oversight authority, to
facilitate the filing of charges against military personnel.

Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by Neela Ghoshal,
researcher in the Africa Division at Human Rights Watch, and edited by Leslie
Lefkow, deputy director in the Africa Division. It was reviewed by Gerry
Simpson, senior researcher and advocate in the Refugee Policy Division; Meghan
Rhoad, researcher in the Women’s Rights Division; Letta Tayler,
researcher in the Terrorism/Counterterrorism Division; Zama Coursen-Neff,
deputy director in the Children’s Rights Division; Clive Baldwin, senior
legal advisor; and Tom Porteous, deputy Program director. Additional editorial
assistance was provided by Jamie Vernaelde. Grace Choi and Fitzroy Hepkins provided
production assistance.

Human Rights Watch is grateful to the many victims of abuses
by police and soldiers in North Eastern province who shared their stories with
us, and to the activists and community-based organizations in North Eastern
province, including the Wajir Paralegal Network, the Wajir Human Rights
Network, and Citizen Rights Watch (Garissa), who assisted us in reaching out to
victims. We are also grateful to UNHCR and to the officials at the Kenya Police,
the Ministry of State for Defence, and the Ministry of State for Internal
Security who took time out of their schedules to discuss these cases with us.

The following list includes all attacks in North Eastern province
between October 2011 and February 2012 that appear to be related to Operation
Linda Nchi. The list has been compiled based on media reports and Human Rights
Watch interviews with witnesses and Kenyan security personnel; it is not an exhaustive
list.[152]

October 23: Suspected al-Shabaab members shot and
killed Jamaludin Hajj Abbas, a chief (Kenyan local administrative official) in
Mandera.[153]

October 28: A vehicle belonging to Kenya’s
General Service Unit (GSU), the paramilitary police, exploded after striking a
landmine or other explosive device near Garissa. Three officers were injured.[154]

November 5: A police vehicle escorting a UN convoy
struck a landmine in Dadaab. The mine did not detonate.[155]

November 5: Unknown assailants killed at least two
civilians and injured at least two others in a grenade attack on a house
located within a church compound in Garissa. A second unexploded grenade was found
nearby.[156]

November 8: Gunmen attacked an Administration Police
security base near El Wak in Mandera. No casualties were reported.[158]

November 15: A remote-controlled bomb hit a police
vehicle escorting a UN convoy in Dadaab. Two police officers and two private
security guards were injured.[159]

November 24: A landmine or IED explosion in
Mandera’s Mlima Fisi area killed one KDF soldier and injured four others.[160]

November 24: Unknown assailants killed at least three
civilians and injured more than 27 in two grenade attacks in Garissa. One of
the attacks, which killed two, took place at “Kwa Chege,” a local
bar. The other, which killed the third civilian, took place at Ngamia Road,
where laborers had gathered near a tea stall.[161]

December 5: An explosion struck a police convoy
escorting UN officials in Ifo 2 West camp, Dadaab. The attack killed at least one
Administration Police officer and injured three others.[162]

December 11: An explosive device hit a convoy of KDF
soldiers in Wajir, injuring at least one soldier.[163]

December 11: An explosion at Mandera’s Border
Point Three killed an Administration Police officer and injured three others.[164]

December 12: An IED explosion in Wajir injured a
National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) official and two women activists
from the Wajir Peace Committee. The IED hit the car in which they were
traveling, which belonged to the NSIS Wajir office. The attack took place just
outside Wajir Stadium, following Jamhuri Day celebrations.[165]

December 15: Unknown assailants attacked two
locations in Garissa, the Florida Hotel and the prison officers’ mess, with
grenades, injuring four civilians.[166]

December 19: An explosion in Hagadera camp, Dadaab,
killed one police officer and injured two others.[167]

December 19: Unknown assailants shot at close range two
barbers in Garissa town. One died as a result of his injuries.[168]

December 20: An IED exploded near a police vehicle in
Ifo camp, Dadaab. No injuries were reported.[169]

December 24: Unknown assailants threw grenades at the
Ngamia Bar in Wajir injuring six civilians.[170]

January 3: An explosive went off just after the passage
of a Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) vehicle in Mandera. No casualties were
reported.[174]

January 11: Al-Shabaab attacked the Administration Police
camp and government dispensary in Gerille, near Wajir, killing three police
officers, a police reservist, and two civilians. The attackers seriously
injured two other police officers. They also abducted a district officer, a
district registration official, and a driver whom they took to Somalia. They subsequently
released the driver.[175]

February 3: Unknown assailants shot and killed three
Somali citizens and injured a fourth in in Garissa.[176]

Appendix II: Human Rights Watch Letter to the
Minister of State for Defence

March
13, 2012

Honorable
Yusuf Haji

Minister
of State for Defence

Ulinzi House, Lenana Road

Nairobi,
Kenya

Delivered
by hand, by fax to +254 02737322, and by email to info@mod.go.ke

Re: Operation “Linda
Nchi” and Forthcoming HRW Report

Dear Hon. Haji,

On
behalf of Human Rights Watch, I am writing to express our appreciation of the
initiative undertaken by the Ministry of State for Defense to establish a board
of inquiry into human rights violations committed by Kenya Defence Forces
personnel in the context of Operation Linda Nchi. I understand that this board
met with our researcher in Nairobi, Neela Ghoshal, on January 26, 2012, to
discuss concerns raised in a letter from Human Rights Watch’s Africa
Director Daniel Bekele on November 18, 2011, and in a Human Rights Watch press
release published on January 12, 2012; and that the board has also traveled to
locations in North Eastern province to interview victims and local civil
society organizations about abuses. We welcome this initiative to investigate
the allegations and look forward to further cooperation on these important
issues.

I
am writing to follow up on the activities of the board of inquiry, as well as
to seek further information on steps taken to ensure accountability for human
rights violations committed by the Kenyan military. We understand the
board is conducting a purely internal inquiry. We are eager to know what steps
the Ministry of State for Defence will take if the inquiry finds evidence of
human rights violations committed by military personnel. Further, have any
military personnel thus far been disciplined in relation to infractions
committed in the course of Operation Linda Nchi, either in Kenya or in Somalia?

I
would also like to request further information pursuant to our letter of
November 18. That letter raised concerns about possible violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law by Kenyan armed forces during
three incidents connected to Operation Linda Nchi. We inquired what steps the
Kenyan government is taking to investigate the incidents and its response in
the event of any finding of wrongdoing. We understand that the establishment of
the board of inquiry is one concrete action taken; however, other unanswered
questions remain. We therefore enclose those questions, once again, in annex to
this letter, in the hope that you may be able to provide specific responses to
each question.

Finally,
Human Rights Watch is in the process of drafting a detailed report about abuses
by both the Kenyan security forces and by al-Shabaab and its sympathizers in
the context of Operation Linda Nchi. Several dozen victims spoke to us about
serious abuses by the military, including being beaten, being forced to roll in
a gravel road, and being forced to lie in the sun for hours, and we will
include a number of their statements in the upcoming report. In the spirit of
constructive collaboration, we would be pleased to submit to you those
statements in advance of publication, at your request. The number of cases and
the severity of the abuses—which in some cases resulted in lasting
physical harm—require an urgent and serious response. Our findings
suggest that military personnel may have committed crimes under Kenyan law,
most notably assault. We would welcome further details about what steps are
being taken, beyond the establishment of a board of inquiry, to ensure that
perpetrators are held accountable.

We
would greatly appreciate your response, which may be sent to our researcher in
Nairobi, Ms. Neela Ghoshal at K-rep Building, 2nd Floor, Wood
Avenue, Nairobi, Kenya. Please respond by March 27, 2012, so that
we can ensure our upcoming report accurately reflects steps being taken by the
Ministry of State for Defence to ensure accountability and an end to abuses.
Ms. Ghoshal is also available to meet with you or with relevant Ministry of
Defence officials to discuss our concerns in greater detail.

On
October 30, 2011, the Kenyan air force carried out an attack with aerial
bombardment that struck an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp on the
outskirts of the town of Jilib in Somalia. The international humanitarian
organization Médecins Sans Frontières reported treating 45
wounded people, including 31 children, and confirmed five civilian deaths
following the aerial bombardment.

On
November 1, Kenyan Armed Forces spokesperson Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir stated that
the Kenyan air force attack at Jilib had only killed members of the Islamist
militant group al-Shabaab. A Department of Defence statement claimed that any
civilian casualties might be due to the fact that “[u]pon the aerial
attack an Al Shabaab driver drove off a technical battle wagon … [that]
exploded while at the camp causing the reported deaths and injuries.”
However, a civilian wounded in the attack told Human Rights Watch that she had
seen a dark green plane drop one bomb on the camp. She said the plane then
turned around, came back and dropped another bomb on the camp that wounded her,
and started firing machinegun rounds.

International
humanitarian law requires all parties to an armed conflict to only target
combatants and never civilians. Attacks that do not distinguish between combatants
and civilians are indiscriminate, and are a serious violation of the laws of
war. Civilians have reported that al-Shabaab members were expected at
the IDP camp. But a camp resident told Human Rights Watch that al-Shabaab
members were not present at the time of the bombing as they were praying at a
mosque in Jilib town, along with many of the town's male residents. Al Shabaab
unlawfully places civilians at risk whenever they place their fighters inside
the IDP camp. However, under the laws of war this would not justify
indiscriminate bombing of the camp by Kenyan forces.

On
November 2, Prime Minister Raila Odinga publicly promised that there would be
investigations into any civilian deaths that occurred as a result of the
military operation. Governments have a responsibility to investigate credible
reports of violations of international humanitarian law and appropriately
prosecute those responsible.

1.What
investigations have the Kenyan armed forces undertaken thus far into possible
violations of the laws of war that occurred in the Jilib IDP camp as a result
of the military operation?

2.What
steps have been taken to hold accountable any military personnel found to be
responsible for serious violations of the laws of war and to prevent such
violations in the future?

3.What
compensation is the Kenyan government planning on offering to civilians for
loss of life, injury, and property damageif investigations
determine Kenyan responsibility for unlawful attacks?

4.More
generally, what precautions are the Kenyan forces taking during their military
operations to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law? What
training in international humanitarian law have the Kenyan forces engaged in
Somalia received?

II. Possible Unlawful Attack near Kiunga,
Kenya

On
the night of November 3 the Kenyan navy intercepted a fishing boat near Kiunga,
on the Kenyan coast near the Somalia border. According to research conducted by
the Muslim Human Rights Forum (MHRF) and shared with Human Rights Watch, the
fishing boat voluntarily came to shore. Navy personnel searched and
interrogated the persons on the fishing boat. The passengers, all of whom were
Kenyans from Ngomeni, explained that they were returning from two months at
sea, and had been carried by the tides toward Somalia, but were trying to make
their way back to Ngomeni, near Malindi. The navy instructed the fishing boat
to remain anchored for the night and promised to escort it to Ngomeni the next
morning. At approximately 1 a.m. on November 4, the navy ship approached and
fired on the fishing boat, which remained anchored off the shore of Kiunga.

According
to MHRF, four civilians were killed, all of them elderly Kenyans: Mohamed
Masuo, 85, Haji Omar Mote, 73, Isa Yusuf, 61, and Salim Chechemeyo, 60. The
remaining fishermen swam to shore and were detained by the Kenyan armed forces
at Ishakani. At least two of them had gunshot wounds. At the army base, they
were allegedly severely beaten by Kenyan military personnel before being
transferred to police custody and eventually released.

This
account calls into question the version of events put forward by the Ministry
of Defence. According to a statement by Major Chirchir on November 4, the
fishing boat was fired upon after it refused an order from the navy ship to
stop for identification.

International
humanitarian law applies at sea and prohibits deliberate attacks on civilians.
It requires that warring parties take all feasible precautions to ensure that
objects attacked are valid military targets. International human rights law,
which was also applicable, permits the use of lethal force outside of
zones of armed conflict only when it is strictly and directly necessary to save
human life.

1.What
investigations, if any, have been undertaken into the conduct of navy personnel
on the navy ship that fired on the fishing boat near Kiunga? Have any navy
personnel been disciplined or otherwise held accountable?

2.What
investigations have been undertaken into allegations of mistreatment of
fishermen detained at Ishakani?

3.What
compensation is the Kenyan government planning on offering to civilians for
civilian loss of life, injury, and property damagefor unlawful attacks or
use of force?

III. Possible Arbitrary Detention and
Mistreatment in Garissa, Kenya

Human
Rights Watch has received reports that Kenyan military personnel have been
engaged in arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of civilians in Garissa, near
the Somali border. A witness told Human Rights Watch that on November 11,
military personnel detained individuals solely on the basis of their Somali
appearance. The witness saw military personnel picking up suspects at pubs
around Garissa, including DRC Pub and Locus; he later drove to Town Club and
saw military personnel detaining additional suspects there, as well as pulling
drivers out of taxis. The witness stated that those picked up by military
personnel were forced to sit in mud and dirty water outside these locations.
According to the witness, a number of them were beaten by military personnel
while being interrogated. Most were then released after interrogation, but some
were detained. The witness also heard reports that people were detained and
beaten in Village Takwa.

Both
international humanitarian and human rights law prohibits discrimination on the
basis of ethnicity and national origin. Detention on such a basis is a
violation of international law, as is all mistreatment of persons in custody.

1.On
what legal basis did the military detain and interrogate civilians at Garissa?

2.What
investigations have been undertaken into allegations of mistreatment of
detained persons in Garissa?

3.What
compensation is the Kenyan government planning on offering to civilians for
injuryfrom mistreatment?

Appendix III: Human Rights Watch Letter to the
Minister of State for Internal Security

March
13, 2012

Honorable
George Saitoti

Minister
of Internal Security and Provincial Administration

Office
of the President

Harambee
House, Harambee Avenue

Nairobi,
Kenya

Delivered
by hand and by email to Permanent Secretary Mutea Iringo,
emuteairingo@yahoo.com

Re:
Operation “Linda Nchi” and Forthcoming HRW Report

Dear
Hon. Saitoti,

Human
Rights Watch has been investigating allegations of abuses by the Kenyan
security forces and by al-Shabaab and its sympathizers in North Eastern
Province in the context of Operation Linda Nchi, and we aim to publish a report
of our findings. We would like to share our preliminary findings with you
before publication of the report. We would also like to engage in a
constructive dialogue with the Ministry of Internal Security, in advance of
publication, in order to ensure that our recommendations are relevant and that our
conclusions reflect the perspectives of the Kenyan security forces.

Human
Rights Watch has noted with great concern the deterioration of the security
situation in North Eastern Province over the past year, and the increasing
number of incidents targeting the police and government officials as well as
civilians. We have attempted to compile a list of relevant incidents (annexed to
this letter). We recognize that these issues present significant challenges for
the Kenyan police and we would welcome any information or analysis of specific
incidents that can be shared with us. Specifically, we would be interested in
any reports of the investigations conducted into the killings of police
officers in Dadaab refugee camp on December 5 and 19 or the attacks on two
refugee community leaders on December 29 and January 1. We would also welcome
the opportunity to learn more about the police strategy to respond to
increasing insecurity in Dadaab in future.

Human
Rights Watch is also concerned about human rights violations committed by
Kenyan police officers in the Dadaab refugee camps following the attacks on
police in late 2011. As you are aware, following improvised explosive device
(IED) explosions in Dadaab on December 5, December 19, and December
20—condemnable attacks, in which police officers were killed and
injured—the police in Hagadera and Ifo camps carried out a retaliatory
raid targeting refugees. Dozens were reportedly beaten and subjected to other
abuses by police. In January 2012 we interviewed 20 Somali refugees who were
victims of police abuse between December 21 and 24, 2011. Their statements
suggest that police in Dadaab may be responsible for a number of crimes under
Kenyan law, including rape, attempted sexual assault, assault, theft, and
extortion. Of the seven women, eleven men, and two minors (both boys) whom we
interviewed—nine from Hagadera camp and eleven from Ifo camp—we
found that one had been raped by police; three were victims of attempted sexual
assault; nineteen were beaten, including a mentally disabled child; nine were
victims of theft; and three had household or business goods destroyed by the
police.

We
have received assurances from police officials to the effect that there is or
will be an internal inquiry into these abuses, as well as into police abuses of
ethnic Somalis in other locations in North Eastern Province, including Mandera,
where residents reported being mistreated by the police in November 2011.

However,
we are unaware of any cases in which police officers have been held
accountable, either through criminal proceedings or disciplinary measures, for
misconduct in relation to policing operations in Dadaab or elsewhere in North
Eastern Province.

We
would greatly appreciate your responses to the following questions.

1.Have
any individuals been arrested or charged with the attacks on police officers in
Dadaab on December 5, December 19, and December 20?

2.What
measures does the Ministry of Internal Security plan to take to respond to the
increasing insecurity in the Dadaab refugee camps?

3.Have
any police officers alleged to have committed rape or other attacks on refugees
in Dadaab been formally charged with crimes or subjected to disciplinary
measures? If so, we would be grateful for any details you are able to provide.

4.What
steps has the Ministry taken to investigate the allegations of violations by
police officers and to identify the officers who are most responsible?

On
the basis of our research, Human Rights Watch intends to issue a report in
which we will make recommendations to the government of Kenya about the most
effective way to prevent and ensure accountability for such abuses.

We
would greatly appreciate your responses to the above questions for inclusion in
our report. Responses may be sent to our researcher in Nairobi, Ms. Neela
Ghoshal, at K-rep Building, 2nd Floor, Wood Avenue, Nairobi,
Kenya. Please respond by March 27, 2012, so that we can ensure our
upcoming report accurately reflects steps being taken by the Ministry to ensure
accountability and an end to abuses.

Ms.
Ghoshal is also available to meet with you or with relevant Ministry officials
to discuss our concerns in greater detail, and would be happy to use the
opportunity of such a meeting to share with you the full testimonies we have
collected from victims in Dadaab.

Yours
sincerely,

Leslie
Lefkow

Deputy
Director, Africa Division

[1]Human
Rights Watch, “You Don’t Know Who to Blame”: War Crimes in
Somalia, August 2011, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/08/14/you-don-t-know-who-blame.

[2]
The origin and organization of the attacks in Kenya are unclear. Al-Shabaab has
only claimed credit for one attack mentioned in this report, in Gerille on
January 11, 2012, and disavowed responsibility for other recent attacks; see
“Nairobi grenade attack: Al-Shabab denies Kenya blast,” BBC News
Online, March 2, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17338125 (accessed
March 19,2012). Some analysts suggest that al-Shabaab has leadership and
support within Kenya, and that it has recruited youth through the Muslim Youth
Centre at Pumwani mosque, as well as among ethnic Somali communities. See
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance
with resolution 1916 (2010), S/2011/433, July 18, 2011,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 (accessed March 19,
2012). But Kenya and Tanzania’s coastal Muslim communities are currently
seen as potential targets for radicalization and recruitment. Most of the
attacks within Kenya have not resulted in arrests and prosecutions which might
provide insight into their organization, and Kenyan police and intelligence
have not publicly presented an overarching theory about the organization or
coordination of the attacks. The only person to have been convicted to date,
following a grenade attack in Nairobi, is a convert to Islam from Kenya’s
Luhya ethnic group; he has claimed to be an al-Shabaab member. See International
Crisis Group, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, Crisis Group Africa
Briefing No. 85, Nairobi/Brussels, January 25, 2012, pp. 5-8. The International
Crisis Group suggests the attacks carried out in North Eastern province may be
a joint operation between Somalis and Kenyan Swahili Muslims, who can more
easily escape scrutiny.

[6]
In March, however, grenade attacks took place in Nairobi (killing at least five
people) and in Mombasa (killing at least one person); al-Shabaab claimed credit
for the attacks. Leila Aden, “Five Dead, 21 Injured in Nairobi
Attack,” Somalia Report, March 10, 2012, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3044,
and Maureen Mudi, “Kenya: We Did It, Say Al Shabaab,” The Star (Nairobi),
April 1, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201204021446.html (accessed April
16, 2012).

[7]
The newly independent Somalia consisted of the former Italian Somaliland and
the former British Somaliland.

[17]
Boniface Ongeri and Martin Mutua, “MPs want action taken over chiefs
torture,” The Standard (Nairobi), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/archives/editorial/InsidePage.php?id=2000022116&cid=159&
(accessed January 15, 2012); Human Rights Watch interviews, Lensayo (upper
Eastern province), December 15, 2010. According to the Standard, medical
reports showed that Yussuf had a cracked pelvic bone and a ruptured bladder
after his private parts were crushed.

[18]
Kenya established a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
following the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Its mandate includes
investigating and holding public hearings on human rights abuses committed in
Kenya from 1963 to 2008. In May 2012 the TJRC is to publish a report based on
its investigations, in which it can recommend further steps for accountability.
The TJRC’s first public hearings in April 2011 were in Wajir and included
extensive testimony on the Wagalla massacre. Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission, “TJRC told of Gross Human Injustices in Wagalla,” April
26, 2011, http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=237:tjrc-told-of-gross-human-injustices-in-wagalla&catid=1:tjrc-news&Itemid=187
(accessed April 18, 2012).

[23]
Local officials, including an Administration Police officer, told Human Rights
Watch that the Kenyan security forces were poorly prepared to prevent or
respond to the attack, thereby putting civilians at risk. The day before the
attack, Administration Police in Gerille had received word of a group of 50
people moving toward the town. Both police and a local chief alerted officials
in Wajir, but no reinforcements arrived. Human Rights Watch interviews with a
journalist and a police official, Garissa, January 12, 2012, the representative
of a human rights organization, Wajir, January 16, 2012, and an Administration
Police officer, Wajir, January 17, 2012.

[32]
Human Rights Watch has reported on violations of international humanitarian law
by the Kenya Defence Forces within Somalia, including the Jilib air strike and
another airstrike on the village of Hosingow in December 2011, which hit a duksi
(Koranic school) and killed an estimated 11 civilians. See “Kenya:
Investigate Bombing of Somali Village,” Human Rights Watch news release,
December 21, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/21/kenya-investigate-bombing-somali-village,
and “Kenya: Respect Law in Somalia Military Operations,” Human
Rights Watch News release, November 19, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/18/kenya-respect-law-somalia-military-operations.

[33]
Human Rights Watch interview with Al-Amin Kimathi, director of Muslim Human
Rights Forum, Nairobi, November 14, 2011. The military spokesperson, Maj.
Emmanuel Chirchir, told media the fishing boat was fired upon after it refused
an order from the navy ship to stop for identification, but survivors said they
had followed orders to stop. Alloys Musyoka, “Kenyan forces kill four
fishermen in a mistaken Al Shaabab attack,” The Kenya Radar (Nairobi),
November 4, 2011, http://www.kenyaradarlive.co.ke/?p=6358 (accessed March 16,
2012).

[34]
The victims were Mohamed Masuo, 85, Haji Omar Mote, 73, Isa Yusuf, 61, and
Salim Chechemeyo, 60. The remaining fishermen swam to shore and were detained
by the Kenyan armed forces. At the army base, they were allegedly severely
beaten by Kenyan military personnel before being transferred to police custody
and eventually released. Human Rights Watch interview with Al-Amin Kimathi,
November 14, 2011. See also Human Rights Watch letter to Minister of State for
Defence Yusuf Haji, November 18, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/node/103030.

[50]
A youth activist had witnessed several of the arrests, and corroborated the
claims of the victims. He said, “I saw three drivers being asked to roll
yesterday. I saw water being poured on them, then they had to roll back. They
parked their cars near Heller [petrol station]. Each driver was asked to get
out of his car. The military took their keys. I saw this happen. They were told
to follow the soldiers into the camp to get their keys back.” Human
Rights Watch interview with a youth leader, Garissa, January 12, 2012.

[54]
Based on the accounts of various victims, those victims at the scene number
about 56: Forty-two men who were subsequently taken into police custody;
approximately 10 women, who were released around 3:30 p.m.; and four workers
from the city council, who were also released without being taken into police
custody.

[60]
The P3 form, officially known as the Kenya Police Medical Examination form, is
provided at police stations and is used to request an examination by a medical
officer in order to determine the injuries sustained by a complainant in an assault
case.

[66]
Jamhuri Day marks Kenya’s establishment as a republic on December 12,
1962, and its independence one year later.

[67]
Kenya has two police corps that operate under different command structures. The
Kenya Police, sometimes referred to as the “regular police,” is
headed by Commissioner of Police Mathew Iteere. The Administration Police, a
separate department that respond directly to the provincial administration, is
headed by AP Commander Kinuthia Mbugua. Both departments are under the Ministry
of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security.

[69]
Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Mandera residents, February 2012.
Regarding the participation of TFG forces, a police official told Human Rights
Watch, while denying the involvement of Kenyan troops, that “someone else’s
military” was responsible for the abuses in Mandera, an apparent
reference to TFG forces based in Bula Hawo, one kilometer from Mandera, across
the Somali border. Human Rights Watch interview with a police official, date
and location withheld. See also Adow Jubat, Cyrus Ombati, and agencies,
“Somalia: Kenyan troops destroy Al Shabaab camps,” The Standard (Nairobi),
November 25, 2011, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/InsidePage.php?id=2000047276
(accessed February 10, 2011). The article cites the Mandera Town Council chair,
Khalif: “As leaders we wonder what the role of TFG soldiers is. Whenever
there is an explosion in Mandera, which is a town in Kenya, they (TFG) join the
KDF in harassing the people… how can a foreign force assault our people?”

[73]
Letter from Mohamed A. Khalif, chair of Mandera Town Council, and other Mandera
leaders to Minister of State for Internal Security George Saitoti and Minister
of State for Defence Yusuf Haji, November 26, 2011, on file with Human Rights
Watch.

[79]
Dadaab initially consisted of three camps, Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera,
designed to accommodate a total of 90,000 refugees. By July 2011 the camps
housed nearly 400,000. Overcrowding contributed to insecurity: police told
Human Rights Watch that congestion made it impossible for them to access some
areas of the camps, while new arrivals were forced to seek shelter on the
informal outskirts of the camps, where the absence of both policing and
lighting facilitated crime. In August 2011, two new camps, Ifo Extension and
Kambios, were opened, although Kambios is not considered an
“authorized” camp by the government of Kenya and only hosts 12,000 refugees.
Human Rights Watch interviews, Dadaab, April and August 2011; Médecins
Sans Frontières, “Dadaab Refugee Camps – Back to Square
One,” February 21, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201202220863.html
(accessed March 16, 2012).

[80]
Under Kenya’s Refugee Act, asylum seekers have the right to freely enter
Kenya; they must formally claim asylum within 30 days after entry. Refugees
Act, Act. No, 13 of 2006, section 11 (1), http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php.
See also UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
entered into force 1954, April 22, 1954, acceded to by Kenya on May 16, 1966,
art. 31.

[91]
UNHCR, “Kenya: Enhanced Security Partnership Project (SPP)
2011-2012,” http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2958.pdf
(undated; posted online in November 2011). UNHCR pays the salaries and other
recurrent costs of Kenyan police in Dadaab, and has also constructed housing
for them.

[92]
Human Rights Watch interview with a UNHCR official, Nairobi, March 7, 2012. The
Kenya Police has a Community Policing Directorate, but government-supported
community policing initiatives have been implemented inconsistently, and not at
all in Dadaab. In the absence of community policing, refugees and aid agencies
have established their own efforts to provide security, such as through the
Community Peace and Security Teams, discussed below.

[116]
Human Rights Watch interview with a youth leader, Garissa, January 12, 2012.
The youth leader further explained that Kenyan police in Dadaab and elsewhere
in North Eastern province conduct themselves in a manner that suggests they do
not feel bound by the laws of Kenya.

[119]
See “Refugees injured in Dadaab crackdown,” IRIN, December
22, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/node/466733. William Garvelink and Farha Tahir
noted in a recent briefing paper that the international community “has
remained noticeably silent on the deteriorating conditions in Dadaab and the
abuse of Somali refugees.” Garvelink and Tahir, “The Dadaab Refugee
Complex: A Powder Keg and It’s Giving Off Sparks,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, March 2, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/node/480280
(accessed March 14, 2012). According to a UNHCR official, the agency approached
government officials privately to raise concerns; Human Rights Watch interview
with a UNHCR official, Nairobi, January 4, 2012.

[120]
Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with refugees in Dadaab, March 1 and
March 5, 2012.

[121]
Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with refugees in Dadaab, March 3 and
March 13, 2012.

[122]
Human Rights Watch interviews with Leo Nyongesa, by telephone, November 26,
2011, and in Garissa, January 12, 2012. Nyongesa told Human Rights Watch in
January, “I’ve instructed officers to uphold discipline, work
within the law, and not use excessive force. If officers are behaving like
this, we will deal with the officer concerned. That officer will carry their
own cross.”

[140]
Human Rights Watch interview with Shadrack Mwadime, Nairobi, April 13, 2012. During
Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence, at least 1,133 people were
killed and over 650,000 displaced as a result of ethnic clashes and police violence
following a disputed election result. See Human Rights Watch, Ballots to
Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance,
March 17, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets.

[152]
For instance, IRIN reported on an IED attack in Mandera in December 26, but
Human Rights Watch found no further details: “KENYA-SOMALIA: Paying high
price for military incursion,” IRIN, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94641.
Other attacks are described in a more exhaustive list provided by the website
Critical Threats; Human Rights Watch has not verified all the cases included on
that list. Critical Threats, http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/timeline-operation-linda-nchi-october-24-2011
(accessed February 9, 2012).

[153]
Email communication from a journalist to Human Rights Watch, February 9, 2012;
letter from Mohamed A. Khalif, chair of Mandera Town Council, and other Mandera
leaders to Minister of State for Internal Security George Saitoti and Minister
of State for Defence Yusuf Haji, November 26, 2011, on file with Human Rights
Watch. The letter puts forth that Abbas was killed by al-Shabaab members.

[166]
Human Rights Watch interviews with a victim and the manager of the Florida Hotel,
Garissa, January 12, 2012.

[167]Cyrus Ombati, “Explosion in Dadaab, two
shot in Garissa,” The Standard (Nairobi), December 20, 2011,
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/agriculture/InsidePage.php?id=2000048640&cid=4&
(accessed April 16, 2012).

[168]
Ibid., and “Garissa gunshot victim succumbs to injuries,” The
Standard (Nairobi), December 21, 2012, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000048712&cid=4&story=Garissa%20gunshot%20victim%20succumbs%20to%20injuries
(accessed April 16, 2012). One journalist who reported on the crime said the
victims seemed to have been targeted because they were non-Muslims, but another
said the crime may have been motivated by theft. Human Rights Watch interviews,
January 2012.

[169]
Cyrus Ombati, “Explosion in Dadaab, two shot in Garissa,” http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/agriculture/InsidePage.php?id=2000048640&cid=4&;
“KENYA-SOMALIA: Paying high price for military incursion,” IRIN,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=94641.