"Fisher Controls has determined that the subject items were provided with parts that were not properly processed per active valve requirements specified by the Duke Energy Order DP16655. Specifically, Fisher provided commercial grade bearings and thrust bearings instead of commercial grade dedicated items per EPRI 5652.

"We are reviewing the situation and will pursue a corrective action investigation to prevent problems like this in the future.

"Arrangements have been made with Duke Energy to retrofit the correctly processed parts on the subject serial numbers. This is a formal notification; Duke Energy was notified of this situation on October 28, 2008."

"On 20 Nov 08 at 1230, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable due to a report that a non-running Control Room supply fan discharge damper was found partially open. Per the System Operating Procedure, the idle fan's discharge damper must be fully closed to assure operability. With the damper not closed, reasonable assurance that CREFS would fulfill its safety function could not be established.

"With the Idle Control Room supply fan discharge damper not in the closed position, some portion of the air discharged from the operating Control Room supply fan will go backwards through the idle supply fan to the suction side of both supply fans. The CREFS fan discharges to the Control Room supply fan suctions. With CREFS in this as-found line-up, there is no assurance that the flow through CREFS is high enough to meet the design requirements assumed in control room occupant dose calculations.

"The Control Room supply fans and discharge dampers are required support features for CREFS at CNS. This is a single train system and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) an 8 hour report is required due to the fact that at the time of discovery this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

"The damper was returned to a fully closed position at the time of discovery, and CREFS was returned to operable status."

"The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable on 11/20/08 at 1657 EST due to a Group 4 isolation signal generated during scheduled surveillance testing in accordance with PNPS [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] Procedure 8.M.2-2.5.3, Attachment 1. The HPCI testing was stopped to determine the cause of the isolation which was not part of the planned evolution. HPCI isolation was reset and HPCI was restored to standby lineup at 1804 EST. This event is an eight-hour notification. Efforts are ongoing to determine the cause of the error during testing.

"This event had no adverse effect to the health and/or safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the loss of a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."