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This chapter defends the legitimacy of a certain partiality towards oneself in the assignment of time and resources, based on the idea that self-improvement is a legitimate moral undertaking. The ancient notion that we each have a responsibility for the ‘stewardship’ of our talents suggests that at least some of our personal goals are immune to dissolution in the name of externally defined goals. Scope for the development of talents (following Kant) is inherent to my status as a human being. Self-development is not, however, the same as self-creation: the idea that I have carte blanche to...

This chapter defends the legitimacy of a certain partiality towards oneself in the assignment of time and resources, based on the idea that self-improvement is a legitimate moral undertaking. The ancient notion that we each have a responsibility for the ‘stewardship’ of our talents suggests that at least some of our personal goals are immune to dissolution in the name of externally defined goals. Scope for the development of talents (following Kant) is inherent to my status as a human being. Self-development is not, however, the same as self-creation: the idea that I have carte blanche to determine my own values and structure my life around whatever projects I see as defining who I am. Self-improvement makes sense only within an objective framework of value. Stewarding my individual resources inevitably requires me to take into account the needs of my fellow humans in the wider world.