The assembly of the three estates

Besides all this, in ancient times, the general or three estates were
assembled every year (and these days, they meet when required by urgent
necessity) and all the provinces and towns of any size, meaning the burgesses,
nobles and ecclesiastical persons, did they all send their deputies, and there
they did publicly deliberate and conclude matters which concerned the public
state. The authority of this assembly was always such that whatever it decided,
whether it were to establish peace, or declare war, or create a regent in the
kingdom, or impose some new tribute, was held firm and inviolable. And even by
the authority of this assembly, kings themselves, if convicted of loose
intemperance, or incompetence, or even for a charge as great as tyranny, were
removed from the throne. And not only that, but all their descendants also were
excluded from the royal succession, just as their ancestor was, by the same
authority, raised to the throne of the same kingdom. Those whom the consent and
approval of the estates had formerly raised, were by the dissent and
disallowing of the same council, afterwards cast down. Those who, stepping in
the virtuous steps of their ancestors, treated their own election to the throne
as if it had been owed to them by right of inheritance, were driven out and
disinherited for their degenerate ingratitude. For being tainted with
insupportable vices, they made themselves incapable and unworthy of such honor.

This shows that familial succession was tolerated in order to avoid all the
plotting, sneaky and underhanded canvassing for votes, discontent of the
unsuccessful candidates, interregnums, and other troubles resulting from
holding elections. But on the other hand, when these successions brought other
mischiefs more pernicious, when tyranny trampled on the kingdom, and when a
tyrant possessed himself of the royal throne, the medicine proving much worse
than the disease, then the estates of the kingdom lawfully assembled in the
name of all the people, have ever maintained their authority, whether it were
to drive out a tyrant, or other unworthy king, or to establish a good one in
his place. The ancient French had learned that from the Gauls, as Caesar shows
in his commentaries. For Ambiorix, king of the Eburons, (or Leigeons)
confesses, " That such were the condition of the Gaulish empire, that
people lawfully assembled had no less power over the king, than the king had
over the people." This also appears also in Vercingetorix, who gives an
account of his actions before the assembly of the people.

In the kingdoms of Spain, notably Aragon, Valentia, and Catalonia, there is
the very same. For that which is called the Justitia Major in Aragon has
the sovereign authority in itself. And there, the lords who represent the
people proceed so far, that both at the inauguration of the king, as also at
the assembly of the estates, which is observed every third year, they say to
the king these exact words, "We who are as much worth as you, and have
more power than you, choose you king upon these and these conditions, and there
is one between you and us who commands over you, to wit, the Justitia
Major of Aragon, who often refuses that which the king demands, and forbids
that which the king enjoins."

In the kingdoms of England and Scotland the sovereignty seems to be in the
parliament, which heretofore met almost every year. They refer to as
parliaments the assembly of the estates of the kingdom, in which the bishops,
earls, barons, and deputies of towns and provinces deliver their opinions, and
resolve with a joint consent the affairs of state. The authority of this
assembly has been so sacred and inviolable, that the king dare not abrogate or
alter that which had been there once decreed.

It was that which heretofore called and installed in their charges all the
chief officers of the kingdom, even sometimes the ordinary councillors of that
which they call the king's privy council. In some, the other Christian
kingdoms, as Hungary, Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, and the rest, they have their
officers apart from the kings; and histories, together with the examples that
we have in these our times, sufficiently demonstrate that these officers and
estates have known how to use their authority, even to the deposing and driving
out of tyrannical and unworthy kings.

However, we must not think that this cuts too short the wings of royal
authority, or that it is just the same as taking the king's head from his
shoulders.

We believe that God is almighty, neither think we it in any way diminishes
His power because He cannot sin; neither do we say "that His empire is
less to be esteemed, because it cannot be neither shaken, nor cast down"
(??? where is that quote from?). Neither also must we judge a king to be too
much abused, if he be withheld by others from falling into an error, to which
he is over much inclined, or for that by the wisdom and discretion of some of
his counsellors, his kingdom is preserved and kept entire and safe, which
otherwise, by his weakness or wickedness, might have been ruined. Will you say
that a man is less healthy because he is surrounded with discreet physicians
who advise him to avoid all intemperance, and forbid him to eat such foods as
are harmful to the stomach, and who purge him many times against his will. And
when he resists, who will prove his better friends, these physicians who are
studiously careful of his health, or those sycophants who are ready at every
turn to give him that which must of necessity hasten his end? We must then
always observe this distinction: The first are the friends of the king. The
other are the friends of Francis who happens to be king. The friends of Francis
are those who serve him. The friends of the king are the officers and servants
of the kingdom. For, seeing the king has this name, because of the kingdom, and
that it is the people who give being and consistence to the kingdom, and if the
kingdom is lost or ruined, he must needs cease to be a king, or at the least
not so truly a king, or else we must take a shadow for a substance.

Without question, those are most truly the king's friends, who are most
industriously careful of the welfare of his kingdom and his worst enemies are
those who neglect the good of the commonwealth, and seek to draw the king into
the same lapse of error.

And, as it is impossible to separate the kingdom from the people, nor the
king from the kingdom, in like manner, neither can the friends of the king be
disjoined from the friends of the people, and the kingdom.

I say further, that those who, with a true affection, love Francis had
rather see him a king than a subject. Now, seeing they cannot see him a king,
it necessarily follows, that in loving Francis, they must also love the
kingdom.

But those who would be esteemed more the friends of Francis, than of the
kingdom and the people, are truly flatterers, and the most pernicious enemies
of the king and public state.

Now, if they were true friends indeed, they would desire and endeavour that
the king might become more powerful, and more assured in his estate according
to that notable saying of Theopompus, king of Sparta, after the ephores
or controllers of the kings were instituted. "The more," said he,
"are appointed by the people to watch over, and look to the affairs of the
kingdom, the more those who govern shall have credit, and the more safe and
happy shall be the state."