Pakistan, India and Islam

The saving of Pakistan?

General Musharraf is waging a welcome war at home

HIS supporters sometimes call him the second Jinnah, meaning that Pervez Musharraf is the man to re-found Pakistan, restore it to its original secular traditions and purge it of the corruption that has brought the country to its knees, and of the extremists that have brought it to the brink of war with India over disputed Kashmir (see article). Such talk is an exaggeration: military dictators, after all, tend to attract sycophants. But since September 11th, this one has found the courage to side unequivocally with America against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and now to call a halt to the Talibanisation of Pakistan. He knows that Pakistan's survival is at stake.

His speech on January 12th, nominally to the nation, but in reality also to India and to the world, could well come to be seen as one of the turning-points in Pakistan's brief and unfortunate history. In the bluntest of terms, Mr Musharraf aligned his country with the international mainstream, rejecting terrorism and theocracy, and excoriating those who have perverted Islam for their own ends. Five of the most notorious Islamic groups have now been banned; hundreds of their followers have been rounded up; mosques have been told that they will be monitored and closed down if they allow the pulpit to be used for promoting terror; religious schools are to be brought into the education system.

Mr Musharraf understands better than anyone how dangerous the Islamic extremists are, and how close they brought Pakistan to disaster with their unsuccessful attempt to blow up India's Parliament last month. “Every one of us is fed up with it,” he said, with a military man's directness. And he was right: his speech was applauded across the country. Fears that the army would not support a crackdown are likely to prove as wide of the mark as concerns about the decision to abandon the Taliban. Pakistan's army is nothing if not professional.

Unwisely conjured into being in the 1980s by General Zia ul-Haq, who flirted recklessly with fundamentalism, the Islamists were nurtured by Pakistan's far-too-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) throughout the successive weak and corrupt civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s. Their activities are the reason why Pakistan was increasingly approaching the status of a failed state, a pariah nation the world was ready to give up on. The world is already starting to revise its opinion, as Mr Musharraf's albeit undemocratic political firmness has been matched with competent economic management. At the end of last year, the IMF and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors both pronounced themselves pleased with Pakistan's economic progress, rescheduling much of its debt, and extending fresh credits. Much work remains to be done: Pakistan may be cracking down on the militants themselves, but the general has so far said nothing about purging the ISI, the army, the state-run educational institutes, the judiciary and the civil service of those who have supported, and still support, Islamisation. Until this is done, militant influence will endure.

Given the world-shaking events occurring in and around his country, it would not have been surprising if Mr Musharraf had taken the opportunity to shelve plans for the restoration of democracy, which he has committed himself to deliver by October. But so far at least he has not, and he and his close associates insist that the deadline will be met. The men in khaki will hardly bow out, though. The general himself will remain as president, a post to which he has no title except might. The government will answer to him, and be dismissed by him. Real power will rest less with parliament than with a beefed-up National Security Council, composed of military men and civilians. If the model sounds reminiscent of Turkey's qualified democracy that is no coincidence. As a child, the future President Musharraf lived for seven years in Ankara, where his father was an embassy attaché. Kemal Ataturk's conception of the army as custodian of a secular Islamic democracy must surely appeal to him. Turkey offers a much more attractive model of Islam for Pakistan than do its neighbours, Iran and Afghanistan.

And then there's Kashmir

None of this brave experiment will count for anything, however, should Pakistan stumble into war with India. It is a prospect that, thankfully, looks daily more remote, though India has deliberately chosen not to lessen the tension by acknowledging more generously Mr Musharraf's words and deeds. But until India and Pakistan can tackle Kashmir, the root cause of their cross-border animosity, such crises will periodically recur, to the detriment of both countries' stability.

The outlook there is considerably less cheering. India, as the injured party, seems to be in no mood for negotiation and feels profoundly mistrustful that Pakistan will deliver a genuine end to terrorism. Its soldiers are still spoiling for a fight and its politicians face a sensitive election soon in Uttar Pradesh, the country's largest state, where softness on Pakistan is a sure-fire vote-loser. Behind the relatively moderate figure of the prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, lurk more bellicose ones, such as L. K. Advani, the interior minister.

Too many Indians subscribe to the view that there are only problems in Kashmir because Pakistan has fomented them. Pakistan does bear a considerable share of the blame. But so, too, does India. It has not ruled Kashmir well, and the root cause of much of the discontent is that it never made good on the undertakings given to Kashmiris at the time of India's independence in 1947, that their accession to India would be confirmed by a plebiscite. Its soldiers have committed appalling human-rights abuses there. It has consistently subverted Kashmiri state governments when they have appeared too sympathetic to separatism, and it has shown no real enthusiasm for a negotiated settlement.

General Musharraf may be about to confirm the wisdom of the old adage that the worst thing you can do for someone is to grant them their wish. If he does succeed in bringing the terrorists under control, India will lose its best excuse for refusing to tackle the Kashmir question. One day, it might even have to keep its promise of 54 years ago, and let Kashmir vote.