Dancing with Dictators: Anti-Terrorism Campaign Missing the Beat

Permissions: This work is protected by copyright and may be linked to without seeking permission. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. Please contact mpub-help@umich.edu for more information.

The arrest of a key Al Qaeda leader in Karachi, Pakistan, and some suspected
operatives outside of Buffalo, NY in mid-September have helped the Bush
administration blunt criticism that the war against terrorism is not
progressing well. With these arrests, the trail in Afghanistan and Pakistan
is expected to heat up. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one of the top Al Qaeda
men picked up in Karachi, is now in US custody. He is a valuable quarry
for the interrogators. If he chooses to talk, we could be nearing another
round of spectacular arrests. President Bush could then argue that he
is far from distracted from his campaign against terrorism. That he
would be encouraged to pursue his objectives of regime change in Iraq
seems almost certain.

The latest high-profile arrests in Karachi and elsewhere have caused
a ripple of excitement in Pakistan as well. President Bush applauded
these arrests, which means kudos for the beleaguered and autocratic
Musharraf government. It also means that in concert with the CIA, the
authorities in Pakistan will intensify their search for the remaining
Al Qaeda operatives and leaders hiding in the country. At the same time,
Al Qaeda could order its men to think of better ways of blending into
Pakistan's major cities and farmlands. Could this mean that we would
have to wait a little longer to hear the next success involving the
arrest of Al Qaeda men? Probably.

Even if the United States and its allies were to pick up one Al Qaeda
terrorist after another, the campaign against terrorism will prove both
long and frustrating. Indeed, the power of terrorists and their supporters
will remain largely unchallenged as long as Pakistan and Afghanistan
are not effectively (a) cleansed of what is a gargantuan ideological
apparatus and (b) put firmly on rails to democracy. Thus far, we haven't
seen any progress in this direction, at least in Pakistan. Hence there
is a growing pessimism among thinking Pakistanis about the outcome of
President Bush‘s war against terrorism. In Afghanistan too, alienation
is on the upsurge.

Most Pakistanis are depressed to see how the post -9/11 situation has
impacted their country. Emboldened by US backing, General Musharrf,
the military dictator, has now started hammering two mainstream political
parties. He has unilaterally amended the constitution, appointed himself
the country‘s president and its army chief for the next five years and
given the military an overarching role in the national affairs. On the
other hand, he has also taken on the country‘s extremist religious groups,
much to the pleasure of his supporters in the Bush administration. The
latter is seen as his contribution to the US-led campaign against terrorism.
His actions, largely ignored by the United States, will no doubt add
to political instability in Pakistan. A politically unstable Pakistan
would certainly be a setback for the campaign against terrorism. Clearly,
the United States has short-term objectives in Pakistan. If it were
genuinely concerned with the restoration and strengthening of democracy,
it would have restrained General Musharraf, who is often referred to
by the US officials as the most dependable ally.

In the past, American leaders have argued that it is much better to
work with dictators than unstable democracies in the Third World. The
same mindset lingers on. The New York Times calls this phenomenon dancing
with dictators. “Like his predecessors, President Bush is falling for
the illusion that tyrants make great allies. If he is not careful, The
United States will be mopping up for years from the inevitable foreign
policy disasters that come of befriending autocrats who maintain a stranglehold
on their own people.” We find it odd to see the United States prop up
dictators in poor countries as opposed to its support for democracy
in Germany and Japan after World War II.

After initial misgivings, most Pakistanis supported General Musharraf‘s
decision to join the US-led coalition against terrorism. Contrary to
the perception here in the United States, they have opted for this road
because of their opposition to religious extremism. They dreaded the
Talbanization of their society. Deep down, however, they knew that both
the United States and General Musharraf were bound together by a marriage
of convenience. One was looking for legitimacy and an end to international
alienation; the other for bases and logistical support for launching
strike against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This is revisiting the mid-80s,
when a similar military dictator ruled Pakistan and was the recipient
of enthusiastic US support. General Musharraf is different in that he
shares America's disgust for the radical Islamists. In the 80s, General
Ziaul Haq helped trigger a revivalist Islamic fervor, a force that the
Americans found handy for against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Ironically,
the blank checks Washington wrote to General Ziaul Haq then helped nurture
what later became Al Qaeda.

What hurts most people in Pakistan is the manipulative and transient
role of the United States. Ignoring people and befriending repressive
regimes is a recipe for disaster especially in present times when Muslim
societies are challenged by powerful religious groups that seek to replace
a corrupt and dictatorial ruling elite. There are three specific dangers
in Pakistan at this point in time, dangers that can impede the anti-terrorism
campaign.

Most analysts agree that Pakistan has now become a regrouping center
for fleeing Al Qaeda and Taliban hands. Al Qaeda has blended into Pakistan‘s
major cities, while some Taliban leaders are said to have found refuge
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This is happening against the
backdrop of an alliance among Pakistan‘s powerful religious groups and
parties, some of which have links with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. And,
most importantly, the 10,000 madrassa or seminaries that provided training
to Taliban soldiers are still in existence. One year later, the speed
of United States‘ military operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban
has indeed surprised the world. Realistically speaking, however, this
victory has only disrupted these groups. The bigger battle in what is
regarded as the War of Ideas is yet to come. The elimination of these
10,000 seminaries as a worthy objective of war against terrorism is
nowhere in sight. This is the first danger. Some people believe that
a failure in this regard is in fact a failure in addressing terrorism
in its broader and deeper dimensions. Are the Saudis still sending in
their petro-dollars to underwrite these religious schools? And if they
aren‘t, can this be verified? It is one thing to detect this money when
it is headed to the US or Europe. It is another if it arrives through
clandestine channels into a poor country. So the question of whether
the Global Terror University has shut its campus in Afghanistan and
Pakistan draws a blank.

Doesn‘t US policy seem politically naïve and morally obtuse in
my part of the world? General Musharraf faces life threats from the
extremists. He does not appear in public. He has to look over his shoulder
wherever he goes. With the extremists‘ infrastructure largely intact
in Pakistan, we can expect a showdown sooner rather than later. Whatever
the nature of US support, he cannot risk confrontation with the religious
right. Pakistanis are generally apprehensive about this, for they recognize
the extent and influence of the militant Islamists. The second danger
is the growing political instability that has been engendered by General
Musharraf‘s quest for the perpetuation of his rule. Thus far, Pakistan‘s
political parties have steered clear of the religious groups. We cannot
rule out their joining of hands in ousting the military dictator. This
would be catastrophic in terms of Pakistan‘s role against terrorism.
The third danger is, of course, the ongoing tension between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir. All of these dangers can have serious ramifications
for the current war against terrorism.

Now let‘s look at post-9/11 Afghanistan, especially the status of the
War of Ideas. The military campaign remains open ended. Afghanistan
is still a victim of warlordism. Pushtuns, being a majority ethnic group,
feel largely alienated. The impression that the balance of power remains
tilted in favor of smaller northern ethnic groups, who are disproportionately
represented in the Karzai government, is widespread. The bombing of
a marriage party by US war planes and the discovery of mass graves have
angered the Pushtuns. Instability stalks the land. The assassination
bid on President Karzai has had a dispiriting impact. In this daunting
environment we see, at best, feeble attempts at nation building or state
building. The United States is seeking now to build a national army
out of ragtag ordinary Afghans. Instead of sending more weapons and
Green Berets to train these men, how about sending in educators, doctors,
agronomists, entrepreneurs and engineers? They could offer skills and
resources to rebuild homes, businesses, schools, clinics. This is the
only way to fight terrorist diasporas in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Sending experts to rebuild Afghanistan would also counter the perception
in the region that the current war is a mandate for expanding the use
of American power. A vigorous US involvement in reforming these two
countries would do the job. In Pakistan's case, it is not so much the
US money as the support for democratic people that would yield results.
Regardless of the latest high-profile Al Qaeda arrests, what we are
witnessing already is a tapering off of US economic and political commitment.

While military
operation against the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda is expected
to continue with rigor, we have yet to see a vigorous move aimed at
choking off Pakistan‘s labyrinthine seminaries, the birthplace of the
Taliban. The international community is facing the realization that
most terrorist acts across the world have had something to do with one
or another fanatical labyrinth in Pakistan. And yet there are no remedial
initiatives. Daniel Pipes argues in his Militant Islam Reaches America
that, like it or not, the United States is now a party to the difficult
task of modernizing Islam globally. He argues that this is the ultimate
aim of the war against terrorism. Whether we accept his argument or
not, there is an agreement that the schools that produced the despicable
Taliban mindset ought to go. General Musharraf has ostensibly agreed
to eliminate threats emanating from these seminaries. But is Washington
monitoring progress in that regard? The prosecution of the war against
extremism has a number of essential dimensions, including a spirited
secular thrust in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Democracy can alone provide
the right environment for the strengthening and success of a tolerant
culture.

For a nation that loves freedom and democracy, the United States has
an unsavory reputation of supporting dictators. Whatever civil society
exists in Muslim countries, the United States has failed to make a lasting
connection with it.

Javed
Nazir is the visiting Howard R. Marsh Professor of journalism (Communication
Studies), an International Institute Sponsored research scholar. He
is the former editor of The Frontier Post, an English-language newspaper
published in Peshawar, Pakistan.