CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: The Bluff That Failed; Serbs Around Gorazde Are Undeterred By NATO's Policy of Limited Air Strikes

By MICHAEL R. GORDON,

Published: April 19, 1994

WASHINGTON, April 18—
In conducting limited air strikes last week to defend the Muslim enclave of Gorazde, Western military commanders played the game the way the Serbs had hoped they would -- and lost.

NATO carried out the first two air strikes in its 45-year history, but Britain lost a jet in a third attempt, two of six American bombs dropped were duds, and the moment of decision turned into one of humiliation. As Gorazde's defenses crumbled, it was clear that the raids were little more than a symbolic shot across the bow.

These were the restrictions: Western bombing strikes could be made only on the specific tanks blasting Gorazde or on the nearby command post directing fire. No action that would seriously aggravate Moscow. Nothing that would risk a wider war in the Balkans. No attempt to roll back Serbian gains on Bosnian Muslim territory.

With such powerful political constraints, the policy could work only if the Serbs caved in after the first bombing runs. But the Serbs called the bluff and sent their tanks into Gorazde, and the West held its fire. The result was a humbling moment for NATO as it stood by and watched Serbian tanks roll into an area that the United Nations had declared a "safe area."

By today, chagrined Administration officials were debating the United Nations' restrained approach and plan to recommend to Mr. Clinton Tuesday that he press for a broader use of air power. But it was unclear if the West was prepared to follow through.

The NATO air strikes signaled "more hesitancy than determination," said Frank C. Carlucci, who was Defense Secretary in the Reagan Administration. "It was too little, too late. You do not want to wait until the tanks are inside the city and then say you cannot use air power because the tanks are inside the city."

The West's difficulties go back much further than the current fighting in Gorazde.

The Security Council took on the responsibility of safeguarding Gorazde and six other areas last May when it passed a resolution promising to protect the predominantly Muslim safe areas.

But because it had only a limited number of troops and because the United Nations-imposed arms embargo had locked in the Serbian advantage in heavy weapons, it was clear that the United Nations needed NATO air power to defend the enclaves.

When the Serbs stepped up their attacks on Gorazde, a predominantly Muslim town swollen with refugees, air power was not the main means to protect the enclave: it was the only means. While the United Nations had a handful of observers in the town, it had not stationed peacekeeping forces there. How Much Air Power?

The question was how much air power to use. In principle, there was a wide array of options. Air strikes could have been conducted against Bosnian Serb command posts, logistical and communications sites, ammunition dumps, heavy weapons throughout Bosnia and troops.

With more than 100 aircraft in Italy and on British, French and American aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea, the NATO alliance had the firepower for a sustained air campaign.

But the United Nations commanders in Bosnia, not NATO officials, were calling the shots. Their authority allowed them to order only limited air strikes -- what they call close air support -- to remove the threat to United Nations personnel in Gorazde. Even if they wanted to, they did not have the authority to unleash the decisive and wide-ranging use of force called for in post-Vietnam United States military doctrine.

Even by the limited standards of "close air support," the strikes requested by the United Nations were extremely modest. In opting for pinprick strikes, United Nations commanders operated on the assumption that the Serbs would be impressed by symbolic demonstrations of power. United Nations officials also wanted to entice the Serbs into rejoining the negotiations and assumed that the Serbs would refrain from their customary practice of talking and fighting for territory at the same time.

Neither the United Nations nor NATO nations had laid the political groundwork for a broader use of air power in case the Serbs called their bluff.

But Ratko Mladic, the Serbian commander, was making a different set of calculations. By riding out a few air strikes and pressing their attacks, the Serbs could shrink the Muslim enclave into a defenseless patch of territory that would survive at the sufferance of the Serbs.

The results were evident. The world's mightiest military alliance, in its first air attacks, had played by Marquess of Queensbury rules and had come up short.

In the two air strikes and the third attempted raid over seven days, NATO planes dropped a total of six bombs, two of which failed to explode. The low point came on Saturday, when NATO lost a British Sea Harrier plane in a failed effort to bomb a Serbian tank firing on the town. A French reconnaissance plane was also damaged by Serbian fire. Two British United Nations observers were wounded, and one died.

"There has been no plan, just an ad hoc response," Michael Dugan, a retired general and former Air Force Chief of Staff. "No military power applied in this kind of fashion is going to have much of a political impact. There are few examples in history where raids have had a significant impact, and these two or three attacks do not qualify as a good raid."

For more than two years, the West has wrestled with the question of how to change the Serbs' behavior, following diplomatic pleas with military threats. Now, more than ever, the credibility of NATO and the United Nations is on the line.

Just last week, Manfred Worner, NATO's Secretary General, warned in an interview with Reuters that "NATO would react very forcefully" if the Serbs retaliated.

Michael McCurry, the State Department spokesman, was equally blunt. Asked how NATO would respond if the Serbs fired on the alliance's planes, Mr. McCurry warned ominously, "Let them try."

By staging last week's modest air strikes, NATO has put itself in an awkward position. To protect the Muslim enclaves, it must persuade the Serbs that they face serious harm from NATO airplanes unless they comply with United Nations demands.

"We crossed the bridge, and we started to use force," Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the former Secretary of State, told CBS News on Sunday. "The fact of the matter still is that when we use force, it ought to be in sufficient quantity that there is no doubt whatsoever that we're serious."

Photo: An estimated 2,000 Sarajevans rallied yesterday in support of those trapped in Gorazde, which is being pounded by Serbs. The flags are of Turkey, left, and Saudi Arabia, the Bosnian Government's main backers. (Associated Press)