How Science Can Help Us Be More Rational About Morality

What Sam Harris gets wrong about the evolution of moral systems.

We are, as a species, remarkably preoccupied with making rules about how people ought to behave. This moralistic tendency is not an inherently good or bad quality, it's simply a fact of human nature. But it would be nice if people could be more rational in the way that they create moral rules. Although human rationality is foundational in some domains (like science and technology), it often falls by the wayside when it comes to the production of morality.

Research by psychologists like Jonathan Haidt and Robert Kurzban suggests that our brains generate moral beliefs in a passion-fuelled, intuitive manner. And then, after we've experienced these beliefs, we give after-the-fact rationalizations for why we think our beliefs are really based on logic, rather than emotion. For example, let's say that you sense, emotionally and intuitively, that Behavior X is a disgusting act, and that anybody who engages in it ought to be punished. If asked to justify your belief, you might come up with a post hoc rationalization about the negative consequences of Behavior X (e.g., it's bad for society, for one's health, or for the environment; or God will punish us for it), even if you lack good evidence that this causal relationship really exists. That's not to say that we're utterly irrational when it comes to our moralizing; after all, some acts really do harm our health or the environment (for example), and many people weigh such considerations in their moral reasoning. Nevertheless it's clear that when we think moralistically, we often put passion before reason. Or as Haidt says, it's often a case of "the emotional dog and its rational tail".

Not that there's anything wrong in general with passion and intuition. Many of the most satisfying things in life (art, love, sex, food, etc.) would be impossible to enjoy dispassionately. But because the moral beliefs we espouse have grave consequences for both other people and ourselves, morality should not ultimately be just a matter of impulsive intuition, aesthetic judgment or personal taste. Moral rules are, after all, efforts to control the behavior of others (as well as ourselves), and in any culture that values personal freedom, this kind of imposition shouldn't be taken lightly. Cross-culturally, moral beliefs determine who is celebrated, who is ostracized, who is worshipped as a hero and who is put to death. They govern how we think about ourselves--what shames us, what we take pride in--and how others judge us. And moral beliefs don't operate only at an individual level. Whether a society as a whole can provide for its citizens, and compete successfully against other groups, may come down to the content of its moral system.

So how can we become more rational moral thinkers? The problem mentioned above--that of putting passion before reason--is unfortunately not the only, or even the most formidable, obstacle we face. A more fundamental problem is that of deciding how to even define "rationality" in a moral context. To determine whether a moral rule is rational or not, we need to decide what the goal of that rule should be: Who is the rule supposed to benefit? Sam Harris addresses this question in The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. He argues that the goal of a rational moral system should be to promote the general well-being of conscious creatures. The problem with this idea is that it overlooks a principal way in which people were designed, by evolution, to use moral rules.

To understand what Harris' approach is missing, consider the arguments made by Richard Alexander in The Biology of Moral Systems. Alexander notes that people strive for goals that would have promoted their individual genetic fitness (survival and reproduction) in ancestral environments, and that an important way in which they do so is by cooperating in groups of people with whom they share common interests. By cooperating in groups, individuals can achieve their goals better than they could by acting alone, so it's in the individual's interest to cooperate. (Cooperation also presents individuals with dilemmas like the "free rider problem", but we can leave these aside for now). While cooperating in groups, people use moral rules in order to influence the behavior of group members in ways that will promote group success. This, Alexander argues, is a primary evolved function of moral rule-making: it enables individuals to more effectively pursue the interests they share with others in their group. For example, if people are cooperatively building a dam to protect their village from a flood, they might use rules like "all adult villagers should work on the dam for a minimum of X hours per day", "those who contribute above this minimum should be honoured", and "those who contribute below this minimum should be shunned". (Note that the promotion of shared interests is not the only evolved function of moralizing. Another important function is to signal to other people--honestly or not--that you have an altruistic or otherwise upstanding disposition. But that's a topic for another post).

If people use moral rules to better pursue their group interests, then it starts to become clear why Harris' proposal--that rational morality ought to promote the well-being of conscious creatures--will not generally apply. People use morality to pursue their own coalitional interests, not the interests of people in general, let alone conscious life in general. From this perspective, people judge the rationality of a moral rule not by how much it benefits conscious beings, but by how much it benefits their interest group. Now sometimes, the interests of the group may overlap with those of conscious creatures in general. For example, building the dam mentioned above would not obviously harm any conscious entity, and it would benefit the villagers, so it would seem consistent with the goal of promoting the welfare of conscious life. Another example where group interests overlap with those of conscious beings in general would be a group's effort to eradicate a disease like smallpox. However, situations such as these--where everybody has an interest in the same goal, and nobody has an interest in a conflicting goal--do not pose moral dilemmas, because they don't involve conflicts of interest between competing human coalitions.

In situations that do involve coalitional conflict, moral dilemmas cannot be solved by applying the "welfare of conscious creatures" rule. A primary reason why people cooperate in groups is so that they can compete more effectively against external groups, and moral disputes tend to arise out of these coalitional conflicts. In these contexts, you can't resolve moral debates by identifying the solution that would benefit all conscious beings, not only because this will often be difficult if not impossible, but also because that's not the goal that either side in the conflict will actually be fighting for. Consider, for instance, a conflict between loggers and hikers about whether the loggers should be allowed to cut down trees in a particular forest. The hikers might argue that this deforestation is morally wrong because it would deprive families of opportunities to enjoy nature, whereas the loggers might argue that it is morally good because it would create jobs for the support of families. Even if identifying the solution most beneficial to conscious life were possible in this situation, it wouldn't be the goal that either coalition would really be seeking. The loggers would be seeking the solution that most benefited loggers, and the hikers would be seeking the solution that most benefited hikers.

Although it may seem cynical to see morality as a strategy that individuals use to pursue their coalitional interests, this perspective actually points to the most effective way to overcome coalitional moral conflicts: by appealing to the interests of a larger group to which two competing coalitions belong. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett use this strategy in their book The Spirit Level, which focuses on the effects of economic inequality in developed nations. Economic inequality creates coalitional conflict within nations, because it advantages some citizens (the upper class) and disadvantages others (the lower class). The upper class tends to argue that inequality is morally good (e.g., "it's the result of rewarding people who work harder than others"), whereas the lower class tends to say it's bad (e.g., "it's the result of unequal opportunities"). Wilkinson and Pickett make an effort to transcend this coalitional conflict by focusing on inequality's impact on the larger group to which both coalitions belong: they present evidence that developed nations with higher economic inequality score worse on many different indicators of national performance. Their analysis has not been without its critics, and debates about the virtues of reducing inequality will, of course, continue. Still, Wilkinson and Pickett have the right idea about how to be rational about morality, because they attempt to assess the moral value of a practice by demonstrating its statistical relationship with measures of group performance and well-being. In doing so, not only do they appeal to our evolved tendency to make moral judgments in terms of our own coalitional interests, they also show how an appeal to a higher-level coalitional interest (the national interest) can help transcend conflicts between lower-level coalitional interests (socioeconomic classes).

Of course, by focusing on inequality's effects on whole countries, as opposed to just classes within countries, Wilkinson and Pickett don't overcome the coalitional logic of moral rationality; they simply raise it to a higher coalitional level. I doubt that we will ever be able to eliminate people's tendency to base their moral judgments on their own coalitional interests, unless we figure out how to re-engineer the human genome towards this end. What we can do, however, when we observe conflicts of interest between competing moral communities, is to look for higher-level interests that these coalitions have in common, and that could potentially give them reasons to cooperate.

Interesting post. Though I'm not quite as pessimistic about our potential for overcoming coalitional biases. Take animal rights activists, for example. I'm not sure how decreasing the suffering of animals could conceivably be in line with their interests. Same thing goes for people who want to conserve wildlife, protect endangered species, feed the hungry in distant countries, help tsunami victims, help earthquake victims, help counter the AIDS crisis in Africa, etc. One could argue, I suppose, that these people just want to signal their prestige through such acts of altruism/activism. That may be true, but who cares? At the end of the day, they're still doing a good thing and it shouldn't really matter what their deeper (unconscious?) motives are.

Perhaps, then, another strategy that might improve "the wellbeing of conscious creatures" is to simply increase the amount of deference we pay to charitable people: that is, pay them more status points, if you will.

Note how this line of thinking I am taking part in -- how to increase the "wellbeing of conscious creatures" -- is exactly what you are saying human beings will never be able to do. Note also how you overcame this tendency in your blog post by offering ways in which we can actually increase wellbeing in spite of our inherited psychological constraints. Though perhaps your unconscious coalitional interests may lie in increasing the moral status of your tribe of evolutionary psychologists... :) And, come to think of it, my coalitional interests kind of overlap with this project, which might explain why I am writing this comment. Hm... you may be on to something...

Hi Dave, thanks for your comment. Yes, a lot of moralizing certainly focuses on beneficiaries that are not themselves the moralizing individual or his/her coalition. Nevertheless, the adaptations that enable moralizing evolved to benefit the genes of the moralizer. If the fundamental assumptions of evolutionary psychology are to be taken seriously, I don't see how this conclusion can be avoided.

So I'm not saying that an animal rights activist can't genuinely care for the well-being of animals. I'm just saying that the ultimate reason the animal rights activist is promoting the rights of animals is in order to promote the interests of him/herself and other animal rights activists, against the interests of an opposing coalition (composed of people who are opposed to or indifferent about animal rights).

I also think that most people, including many evolutionary psychologists, are not aware of (or are not willing to admit) that their moral beliefs are ultimately in the interest of their own coalition as opposed to some greater, more abstract good. But I don't understand how the evolutionary psychologists can believe this about themselves, knowing what they do about how evolution builds adaptations.

Hi Dr. Price, thanks for the reply. I agree with you that the logic of gene-selfishness is ineluctable, which means that ultimately there must be some selfish basis for our moralizing. However, there are some who would disagree with both of us and argue that a kind of group selection scenario (either cultural or multilevel) played a role in the evolution of our moral intuitions -- actually, I'd be interested in your opinion on this at some point. Nevertheless, I think there is enough potential for ingroup expansion, even with our selfish genes, to allow for some realization of Sam Harris's vision: that is, if I can come to see all conscious creatures as part of my coalition, I can fight for global welfare without defying my moral adaptations. I think Peter Singer's work testifies to this possibility. Anyways, good brain food and look forward to future posts.

The Cree, the Ojibway, the Blackfoot, the Dene, the Sioux, among many other nations before colonization all had different moral teachings all from different spiritual beliefs and they harmonized with each other in mutual respect. Occasionally, someone would disrespect the other either in-group or out-group and things would escalate. They would rarely escalate to killing each other because the concept of life was a sacred principle for all of these groups that all would respect. So there was some universal moral teachings the people honored. There was no class systems among some while it is true that others did classify their membership based on a hierarchical structure. The people were born into these systems and enculturated in it. There were at times special events that would happen where a person was born with cognitive behavioral deficits and the people had to morally adjust due to anti-social characteristics. They either banished them or the had to kill them. Other teachings made them sacred people who could heal the people. At other times, the person would just leave. As an Ojibway, I can tell you that there was no agency involved in these egalitarian societies and the moral teachings served their purposes, the create balance and harmony between oneself and others including out-groups. Colonization changed all of that. The resources became scarce and the moral teachings became corrupted due to over hunting and over fishing. The moral rules changed especially when the missionaries came, moral justification became rampant and our societies are now very sick as a result and consequence to colonization. Things like the Indian Residential School have corrupted the children and we now live in the wake of multi-generational dysfunction. Can you explain how moral teachings serve the individual while this psychopathic, self-centred, individualistic behavior runs rampant in our societies today destroying and corrupting our youth? How does your model fit into this equation? I do not believe life was heavenly in the old days before colonization, but the systems never recorded the use of jails and prisons. I would rather agree to Sam Harris’s idea of moral truth because it is truth, undeniable truth. That is how the moral truths were developed eons and eons ago, before the great corruption came. For one, the people would never agree to build a dam as that would be counter-intuitive to the balance and harmony of the eco-systems that care for us poor two leggeds. We would just go away and find another sacred place to live. If some came that was their choice if others stayed that too was their choice. But in every decision, the teachings, the people, the children foremost, the flying creatures and the creepy crawlies, the four legged ones and all other relations were considered before anything happened. It was your idea that corrupted the children of the earth I think. If I understand your words correctly.

What I am saying is that we have been here for eons and eons. We have always said that we will negotiate a treaty with the newcomers and it will be based on mutual respect, not favoring one over the other other, but so that all, ALL will flourish! That never happened. For our part, we still beleive that can happen, for the colonizers, they do not have the faith that it can happen. Faith and trust are what is needed in the belief of a sacred treaty for that is what a treaty is, it is sacred and to be revered honestly with moral teachings where everyone is taught in their own cultural ways that honor the treaty. Treaties are what kept the harmony for the most part back in the day. We still believe that this can happen and we have always said it can happen and we hope that it will happen for the sake of our children, seven generations!

I am resending this as I am not certain it came through the first time I sent it. With all due respect, here it is again. What I am saying is that when we struck a treaty, we understood that all was sacred including the very words and agreements in our treaties. This was to be honored in a sacred way. It is what kept the harmony and allowed everyone to flourish. That is what the intention was with the newcomers, the colonizers, our treaty would allow everyone, EVERYONE to flourish. This did not happen. There was no faith and trust in the treaties and there was corruption within them which originated on the part of the colonizers. We have always believed in our teachings and have always pointed to our treaties and have honored them even to the death of us, for it would be better to die than to corrupt the sacred treaty. that made it very advantageous to exploit the First Nations of Canada. Nevertheless, here we still are and we still point to the treaties. This principle defies the individualism inherent in your teaching. The teachings of respect and our sacred law keep us here, I think that is why we do not go away. We do not operate as individuals in a collective, we are all connected and that is the truth that we understand. I think again, Sam Harris has a good grasp on this truth. With all due respect to your teachings, I humbly submit my words.

one rule that i hate is that as soon as you grow up you must "leave your home" !!!!! this is a horrible rule and no doubt you will defend this rule "why"? kids yell and scream when they're 3 then, they "grow up!". i obsess literally about this because it bothers me. i see people on television being called "cling on kids" and/or "moochers"

I think you're somewhat missing the point Harris is trying to make. You're discussing the way we come to view an action as morally right or wrong, while Harris is attempting to answer the philosophical question about why an action is objectively right or wrong, irrespective of the whims of any one person or group.

I'd also like to point out that in the 2nd half of your article you end up advocating essentially the same idea Harris is advocating. You say "the most effective way to overcome coalitional moral conflicts: by appealing to the interests of a larger group to which two competing coalitions belong." I would say "conscious beings" is a group to which every coalition belongs.