City of Richmond Hill v. Maia

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 30, 2017

CITY OF RICHMOND HILL et al.v.MAIA.

Hunstein, Justice.

Following
the suicide death of her 14-year-old daughter, Appellee Laura
Lane Maia filed an action against the mayor and city council
of the City of Richmond Hill (collectively, "the
City") and Douglas Sahlberg, individually and in his
capacity as an officer with the Richmond Hill Police
Department (collectively "Appellants"), alleging
wrongful death and associated claims.[1] In response, Appellants
moved for summary judgment, asserting that Appellee could not
prove proximate cause; the trial court denied the motion. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment in a
plurality decision. See Mayor of City of Richmond Hill et
al. v. Maia, 336 Ga.App. 555 (2) (784 S.E.2d 894)
(2016). We granted certiorari to review division (2) of the
decision below; for the reasons discussed herein, we conclude
that Appellee cannot demonstrate proximate cause and,
therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

On
February 14, 2011, Appellee's daughter, Sydney Sanders,
attempted suicide by cutting herself in the neck, chest, and
abdomen, and she was subsequently taken to the hospital for
medical treatment. Officers with the Richmond Hill Police
Department ("RHPD"), including Officer Douglas
Sahlberg, responded to the hospital to investigate, and
Sanders's injuries were photographed by the
officers.[2] Later that month, Sahlberg accessed those
photographs on his work computer and showed them to his
daughter, K.S., who was a classmate of Sanders; shortly
thereafter, K.S. was seen using her cell phone to show the
images to other classmates, and Sanders was distraught and
mortified to discover that the photographs had been shared.
On April 5, 2011, the date on which Sanders would eventually
take her life, RHPD responded to a "suspicious
person" call at Sanders's home. Officers discovered
Sanders - who had stayed at home from school that day - alone
with her boyfriend without permission; officers also observed
an unopened condom fall out of the boy's trousers. Later
in the day, Sanders lamented to her mother how she felt
humiliated and belittled by the responding officers and
wondered, in light of the dissemination of the injury photos,
what further information the officers would disclose. In a
subsequent conversation with her softball coach, Sanders went
on a "rampage, " venting her frustration about the
"photos going around the school, " about school
gossip, about disappointing her mother, and about her
struggles with both her boyfriend and sister. Despite
Appellee's attempt to keep Sanders supervised, Sanders
was left at home alone that evening, and she took her own
life.

In her
subsequent complaint, Appellee averred, inter alia, that
Salhberg had a duty to keep the injury photographs
confidential, that he had breached that duty, that Sahlberg
should have known that the publication of the photographs
created a reasonable apprehension that Sanders would further
harm herself, and that Sanders's death was caused by
Sahlberg's negligent conduct. Appellants subsequently
moved for summary judgment, asserting that Appellee could not
demonstrate causation because, under Georgia law, suicide is
generally an independent act which breaks the chain of
causation from the events preceding the death; Appellants
also averred that the exceptions to the general rule
regarding suicide are inapplicable in this case. In response,
Appellee argued that the question of proximate cause, even in
suicide cases, turns on the question of the foreseeability of
harm and that such an issue is a jury question. The trial
court denied the motion with a one-page order and granted a
certificate of immediate review. A divided Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that, because "Sanders's
suicide was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
Sahlberg's negligent conduct, [Sanders's] act of
suicide was not an intervening act that would preclude
Sahlberg's breach of duty from constituting the proximate
cause of that injury." Maia, 336 Ga.App. at
563. Appellants contend that the Court of Appeals misstated
and misapplied the law; Appellee argues, however, that the
foreseeability test adopted below is sound. Because Georgia
law generally deems suicide an unforeseeable intervening
cause that breaks any causal connection between alleged
negligent conduct and the resulting death, and, because the
narrow exceptions to that rule do not apply here, we agree
with Appellants.

1.
"It is well established that to recover for injuries
caused by another's negligence, a plaintiff must show
four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and
damages." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Johnson v. American Nat. Red Cross, 276 Ga. 270, 272
(578 S.E.2d 106) (2003). "[A] plaintiff must prove that
the defendant's negligence was both the 'cause in
fact' and the 'proximate cause' of the injury,
" Atlanta Obstetrics & GynecologyGroup, P.A. v. Coleman, 260 Ga. 569, 569 (398 S.E.2d
16) (1990). "Inextricably entwined with concepts of
negligence and proximate cause is a notion of
foreseeability." Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute,
Inc., 188 Ga.App. 106, 115 (372 S.E.2d 265) (1988). To
that end, the well-established doctrine of intervening causes
states that

there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened
between the act of the defendant and the injury to the
plaintiff, an independent act or omission of someone other
than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by
defendant, was not triggered by defendant's act, and
which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury.

As the
Court of Appeals correctly recognized below, it has long been
the rule in Georgia that, generally speaking, suicide is
deemed an unforeseeable intervening cause of death which
absolves the tortfeasor of liability. Maia, 336
Ga.App. at 562 (quoting Dry Storage Corp. v.
Piscopo, 249 Ga.App. 898, 900 (550 S.E.2d 419) (2001)).
See also Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680 (79 SE
564) (1913) (concluding that threatening letter sent by
business partners may have contributed to decedent's
state of mind at the time of his suicide but that the suicide
could not have been "said to be the legal and natural
result of the acts of the defendants"); Appling v.
Jones, 115 Ga.App. 301 (1) (154 S.E.2d 406) (1967)
(physical precedent only) (recognizing the "practically
unanimous rule" that suicide "is a new and
independent agency which does not come within and complete a
line of causation from the wrongful act to the death and
therefore does not render defendant liable for the
suicide"). Though it is true that, generally speaking,
the foreseeability of an intervening cause maintains the
causal connection between the original wrongful conduct and
the subsequent injury, see, e.g., Williams v. Grier,
196 Ga. 327, 336 (26 S.E.2d 698) (1943), we stress that the
usual foreseeability principle does not apply to
cases involving suicide because suicide is generally deemed
an unforeseeable intervening cause as a matter of law, and
the Court of Appeals's apparent reliance on the general
foreseeability principle in its decision below was
error.[3] Instead, Georgia law has carved out two
deviations from the general rule that suicide breaks the
causal connection between an alleged negligent act and the
resulting death: the so called rage-or-frenzy exception and
the special-relationship exception.[4]

Regarding
the first exception, "[w]here the tortfeasor's
wrongful act causes the injured party to kill himself during
a rage or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable
impulse, the wrongful act is considered to be the proximate
cause of the suicide." Dry Storage Corp. v.
Piscopo, 249 Ga.App. at 900.[5] This is so because, in such
circumstances, the resulting act of suicide "is not a
voluntary one, but is involuntary, and is not an act which
breaks the causal connection between the homicide and the act
which caused the injury." Elliot v. Stone Baking
Co., 49 Ga.App. 515, 515 (176 SE 112) (1934). In
Elliot, the Court of Appeals applied this
rage-or-frenzy exception in a case where a decedent became
"mentally irresponsible and insane" as a result of
a head injury caused by a car accident, and, "while in
this insane condition and as a result of this condition, he
killed himself by shooting himself in the head." 49
Ga.App. at 516. The rage-or-frenzy exception sets a high bar,
and is not met simply by evidence of depression or anger, see
Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga.App. at 900, or
by evidence that a decedent was "'dazed, '
'stunned, ' 'shocked, ' 'extremely
irrational' and 'violent.'"
Appling, 115 Ga.App. at 304. Instead, it requires a
showing that the suicide was a product of insanity, delirium,
an uncontrollable impulse, or was accomplished without
conscious volition to produce death.[6]Id.

Georgia
courts have also deviated from the general rule that suicide
absolves an alleged tortfeasor of liability in cases
involving a special relationship between the tortfeasor and
decedent, such as where a tortfeasor owes the unusual duty to
prevent the decedent from harm. As Judge Dillard recognized
in his dissent below, this special duty may arise in cases
involving a doctor-patient or hospital-patient relationship.
See, e.g., Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga.App. 472 (1)
(552 S.E.2d 865) (2001); Brandvain, 188 Ga.App. at
114-118; Misfeldt v. Hosp. Auth. of City of
Marietta, 101 Ga.App. 579, 583-584 (115 S.E.2d 244)
(1960). This special relationship may also exist between a
police officer or jailer and his detainee or prisoner,
because a duty to protect arises under such circumstances.
See Kendrick v. Adamson, 51 Ga.App. 402, 402 (180 SE
647) (1935) ("A sheriff owes to a prisoner placed in his
custody a duty to keep the prisoner safely and free from
harm, to render him medical aid when necessary, and to treat
him humanely and refrain from oppressing him."). See
also Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga.App. 321 (3) (124
S.E.2d 409) (1962) (recognizing that Kendrick v.
Adamson establishes that "a special relationship
exists between an officer and the prisoner in his
custody"). The language of these decisions is clear: the
duty is not owed to the public at large, but, instead, the
duty is owed specifically to prisoners or detainees.

We note
that the Court of Appeals has failed to consistently
recognize the special-relationship exception as a general
matter, see, e.g., Dry Storage Corp. v. Pisciopo,
249 Ga.App. at 900 (implying that the rage-or-frenzy
exception is the lone exception to the general rule regarding
suicide), and, further, has failed to apply the
special-relationship exception as it specifically pertains to
law enforcement, even in cases involving jail suicides, see
Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga.App. 187 (2) (581 S.E.2d
272) (2003) (addressing only the rage-or-frenzy exception in
case involving suicide of prisoner). See also Tucker v.
Pearce, 332 Ga.App. 187, 191-193 (771 S.E.2d 495) (2015)
(relying on Harvey and applying only rage-or-frenzy
exception in jail suicide case), aff'd on other grounds,
Pearce v. Tucker, 299 Ga. 224 (787 S.E.2d 749)
(2016). To the extent that these decisions and others fail to
identify and apply the special-relationship exception, they
are disapproved.

2.
Though questions of proximate cause are generally left to a
jury, the law in this area is clear and the facts of this
case are plain; as such, this Court may resolve the question
of proximate cause as a matter of law. See, e.g., McAuley
v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3 (5) (303 S.E.2d 258) (1983). As
discussed above, subject to narrow exceptions - which
Appellee does not squarely argue to applicable - suicide is
an intervening act which breaks the connection between an
alleged negligent act and the resulting death, thus absolving
the tortfeasor of liability.

As
applied in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly noted
that "Sahlberg was not a medical professional, nor was
Sanders in his custody or care." Maia, 336
Ga.App. at 563. Though the Court of Appeals intimated that
Sahlberg owed a general duty to protect both the general
public and Sanders, there is no evidence that Sahlberg owed a
specific duty to Sanders to protect her from harm; in fact,
the only allegation is that Sahlberg was negligent in his
treatment of the injury photos, not that Sahlberg owed or
violated some duty to protect Sanders. At the time of the
alleged negligent conduct and at the time of the subsequent
suicide, Sahlberg had no ability to supervise Sanders, to
make decisions about her healthcare, or to exercise custody
or control over her. Maia, 336 Ga.App. at 578-579
(Dillard, J., dissenting). As such, the special-relationship
exception does not apply here. Likewise, neither
Sanders's continued distress regarding the disclosure of
the photos nor her subsequent "rampage" wherein she
ranted to her softball coach about the various stressors in
her life, is sufficient to evidence that Sanders killed
herself during a rage or frenzy, or in response to an
uncontrollable impulse. See Elliot, supra. In fact,
the record indicates that Sanders's final conversation
with her mother was calm and rational. Accordingly, this
exception does not apply.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;We
agree with Judge Dillard that "Sahlberg&#39;s flagrant
violation of RHPD&#39;s policy regarding confidentiality was
undoubtedly wrongful and it may indeed have been a factor in
Sanders&#39;s tragic decision to take her own life."
Maia, 336 Ga.App. at 579 (Dillard, J., dissenting).
However, under longstanding Georgia law, Sanders's
suicide acted as an intervening cause that extinguished any
...

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