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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001941
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR: DS/DSS, DS/OP/AF, DS/DSS/ATA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASECNI
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH NIGERIAN POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
¶1. (U) On Friday, July 20, the Abuja RSO met with several
senior level Nigeria Police Force (NPF) officials. The
purpose of this meeting was to obtain information requested
by the Department in preparation for providing the NPF
training under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
The following information is in response to information
requested by DS/DSS/ATA.
¶2. (U) A. LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION AND
RESPONSIBILITIES:
A) What police organizations exist and operate in Nigeria?
Please provide the organizational structure(s), missions
and chains of command, and, if possible, an organizational
chart(s) (National/local Civil Police, Military police or
units, if applicable other law enforcement entities).
Nigeria is a Federal Republic. The Nigeria Police Force is
a centralized police force, serving the entire country.
There are 36 states in Nigeria (plus the Federal Capital
Territory); each state has its own police command, but all
police commands report to the Inspector General of Police
(IGP), who is the senior police official in Nigeria. The
IGP is based in Abuja. A Commissioner of Police leads each
of the state police commands. The state police commands
are aggregated into 7 zones. An Assistant Inspector
General of Police is responsible for supervising all police
commands in his/her zone.
The NPF is a civilian law enforcement agency. The Nigerian
military has decreasing responsibilities for law
enforcement and security in the civilian sector. The NPF
includes the following agencies:
-The Nigeria Police Force (NPF): The primary agency
responsible for law enforcement in Nigeria.
-The Federal Highway Patrol (FHP): Responsible for
patrolling inter-state highways and some VIP/dignitary
security (escort of motorcades).
-The Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC): Responsible for
enforcement of motor vehicle safety regulations, vehicle
inspections and taxation.
-Police Mobile Force (PMF): Responsible for responding to
incidents requiring crowd/riot control and the protection
of Nigerian government facilities.
-There are several specialized units within the NPF, to
include the Bomb Squad, Diplomatic Protection Unit
(responsible for providing security to foreign missions),
Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) and Criminal
Investigations Division (CID).
¶3. (U) HOW DO THE VARIOUS POLICE FORCES AND MILITARY
COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER?
The NPF is responsible to enforce the law in the civilian
sector, to include traditional law enforcement in cities,
towns and rural areas. The NPF also has special units
dedicated to protecting GON civilian facilities, to include
the Presidential Villa, federal offices, airports and
seaports.
The NPF works with the Nigerian military to patrol land
borders and provide oil pipeline security. Military law
enforcement organizations are primarily responsible for
policing on military bases, and ensuring the security of
military officials and facilities. Joint patrols are
occasionally established to confront special threats.
Senior level police officials, to include the IGP, are
selected from NPF career officers. Most senior level NPF
officials have completed advanced degrees, to include law
school.
¶4. (U) CRISIS MANAGEMENT:
The IGP is in charge of all NPF operational efforts in
response to crises with national impact. The NPF will
typically deploy large numbers of officers assigned to the
Police Mobile Force (PMF) to respond to a crisis. The NPF
officials on the panel advised they have experienced the
following problems in responding to a crisis situation:
-Logistics (transportation);
-Inadequate equipment;
-Communications;
-Training.
¶5. (U) INVESTIGATIONS
The NPF Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) is responsible
for gathering intelligence used by the police. The NPF
Criminal Investigative Division (CID) is responsible for
conducting all criminal investigations. CIB and CID are
led by Assistant Inspector Generals of Police (AIGP), who
report directly to the IGP. Each of Nigeria's 36 states
and the FCT has its own separate CIB and CID commands,
which report directly to the Commissioner of Police for the
State. Overall supervision is provided by the NPF CIB and
CID located at NPF Head Quarters in Abuja.
The NPF relays on the use of both evidence and
interrogation in the prosecution of cases. NPF regulations
prohibit the use of force during interrogations.
The CIB is the NPF entity responsible for detecting and
identifying any potential terrorist groups or activities.
This responsibility is also shared by two other GON
agencies that are not part of the NPF, the State Security
Service (SSS) and Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA). The
NPF CID is responsible for investigating and prosecuting
any terrorist acts.
¶6. (U) TERRORIST CASE MANAGEMENT:
The NPF was involved in responding to an aircraft-hijacking
incident in the Republic of Niger in 1995. The NPF sent
several officers to Niger to assist local authorities in
response to the incident, and conducted the investigation
after the incident was resolved.
The NPF officials on the panel advised their agency does
not possess adequate forensic capabilities, equipment and
training required to conduct an investigation of a major
terrorist incident. The NPF officials expressed a strong
interest to receive assistance in this area.
¶7. (U) EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS:
The NPF has several late model Mercedes Benz bomb squad
trucks equipped with bomb handling robots and bomb
containment trailers. However, the NPF officials on the
panel advised they are in dire need of bomb suits,
explosive detectors and portable x-ray devices. The NPF
bomb squad also lacks trained bomb dogs.
The NPF bomb squad has received previous bomb handling
training from the Federal Republic of Germany, and post-
blast investigation from the United States.
The NPF bomb squad does not have significant experience
responding to actual bomb threats requiring them to "render
safe." However, the NPF bomb squad has responded to
numerous industrial accidents involving explosive
chemicals.
The Nigerian military does not typically provide the NPF
with assistance in response to explosive incidents.
¶8. (U) POST BLAST INVESTIGATION:
The Post Blast Investigations (PBI) unit is a part of the
Nigeria Police Bomb Squad and CID units. Bomb Squad units
are strategically located throughout Nigeria, to include
Lagos and Abuja.
The NPF Bomb Squad PBI unit has not conducted any
significant investigations in the past 36 months.
¶9. (U) URBAN PATROL AND POLICING:
The sizes of NPF police jurisdictions varies. There are 37
NPF state police commands. A Commissioner of Police
supervises each police command. Each command has several
different zones (supervised by a Deputy Commissioner of
Police), usually defined by the geographic boundaries of
cities or local area governments. Each zone has several
areas, further broken into districts. Districts are
supervised by District Police Officers (DPO). The officers
serving in a district are assigned to a post or beat.
The Nigerian Police lacks adequate resources (vehicles,
communications, etc.) to effectively respond to an
overwhelming crime situation. Many local area, city and
state governments seek to reduce these inadequacies by
providing the NPF with additional patrol cars, boats, etc.
The NPF has not received any outside training in hostage
negotiation, roadblocks and response to high threat crimes
in progress. The NPF officials on the panel expressed a
strong interest to receive additional training in these
areas.
¶10. (U) LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEMS:
All NPF recruits are required to have completed secondary
school (the equivalent of U.S. High School) before
acceptance into the service. The recruitment process
included a written examination and medical examination
before initial training. The NPF does not conduct any
physical fitness examination on potential recruits. All NPF
recruits must be able to speak and read English.
The major NPF training academies are located in Ikeja
(Lagos), Jos, Kano, Kaduna and Enugu.
The NPF does not receive regular training from foreign law
enforcement agencies. The NPF has received training in the
past, to include bomb handling training from the Federal
Republic of Germany and post blast investigation from the
United States. Several senior level NPF officers have
attended training in the United States hosted by the FBI.
The NPF officials on the panel admitted there are serious
inadequacies in their training program, especially in the
area of firearms training. Most recruits are lucky if they
have the opportunity to fire more than a dozen rounds while
in training. There is no requirement to pass with a
minimum score, and targets are hardly every evaluated.
¶11. (U) CRISIS REACTION TEAMS (SWAT):
The NPF does not have a dedicated Crisis Reaction Team. In
the event of a crisis situation, the NPF draws officers
from regular police units. These NPF officers do not
receive any special Crises Reaction training or equipment.
The NPF officials on the panel expressed a strong interest
in receiving assistance in this area.
¶12. (U) CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL BORDERS:
Nigeria's borders are protected by joint patrols of the NPF
and Nigerian Military. The NPF has dedicated units
assigned to protecting seaports and airports. Special NPF
marine units patrol waterways, and enforce maritime law in
cooperation with the Nigerian Navy and Coast Guard. Like
most other NPF units, these units are ill prepared,
equipped and trained to adequately perform their duties.
¶13. (U) PERSONAL PROTECTION OPERATIONS:
The NPF has a large number of officers assigned to VIP and
dignitary protection. Most of these officers are assigned
to CIB or PMF. The NPF only protects persons inside
Nigeria. NPF officers are assigned to current and former
high-level GON officials. The NPF also provides security
for any foreign government official upon request. The
protection services provided by the NPF includes crowd
control, motorcade escort and the manning of security
posts.
The NPF regularly provides security for high-level official
USG visits. This support has been invaluable.
The NPF officers on the panel expressed a strong interest
in learning proper motorcade procedures, site advance work
and close quarters protection operations.
¶14. (U) INSTALLATION SECURITY:
The NPF Police Mobile Force is responsible for manning
security posts at GON facilities. The NPF does not conduct
any threat/risk analysis of these facilities.
The NPF officials on the panel expressed a strong interest
in receiving training in these areas.
¶15. (U) ASSISTANCE:
The NPF has not received any significant hands on training
or assistance from other countries.
¶16. (U) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD):
The NPF does not have the capability to respond to a WMD
scenario. The NPF does not have an emergency plan,
equipment, logistics or training to respond to a WMD
incident.
The NPF officials expressed a strong interest in receiving
training and assistance in this area.
¶17. (U) MEDICAL SERVICES:
The NPF officials on the panel characterized their medical
emergency disaster plan as inadequate. Nigeria lacks
adequate medical facilities and response services.
The NPF officials on the panel expressed a strong interest
in receiving additional training and assistance in this
area.
¶18. (U) RSO COMMENTS:
The Abuja RSO has worked with the Nigerian Police Force and
other security agencies for the past two and a half years.
The level of support provided by the host country law
enforcement and security services has been phenomenal.
Although the NPF seriously lacks adequate resources to
effectively respond to an overwhelming responsibility, they
consistently provide the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Nigeria
everything they have to ensure the security of Mission
personnel, facilities and high-level USG visits.
After two decades of neglect under military rule, Nigeria's
civilian law enforcement and security services are in dire
need of training assistance in all areas.
Jeter