This Article considers two important questions in federal anticorruption law. The first is whether the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United may have generative force outside the area of campaign finance. The second question is whether analysis developed in the electoral context should extend to what I call "ordinary corruption": abuse of public office for personal gain derived from the infusion of outside resources into the governmental process. 6 The thesis of the Article is that the concept of corruption found in the campaign finance cases should be limited to those cases. Extending the analysis of Citizens United to "ordinary corruption" - in particular, the extensive federal prosecutorial efforts aimed at it outside the electoral context - would rest on faulty premises, and would have serious negative consequences for the federal anticorruption enterprise. The fact that the Supreme Court views certain forms of questionable conduct as constitutionally shielded from treatment in the electoral context does not mean that analogous forms of conduct outside that area cannot be treated as criminal. Indeed, differences in context call for differences in analysis of what corruption is. Examination of Supreme Court decisions on ordinary corruption shows that the Court has sometimes appeared to hold a unified, narrow view. However, the decision in Evans v. United States 7 embraces a broad view of corruption in construing a key federal statute: the Hobbs Act.