Ankara Is Moving Towards Reconciliation With The Kurds — But Not Because Of The Chaos In Iraq

Late last week, the Turkish government submitted a bill to the
Grand National Assembly advancing the stalled-but-ongoing process
toward resolution of the country’s longstanding Kurdish Issue.

The bill arrived after a long period of dormancy in the process.
Since the negotiations with jailed Kuridstan Worker's Party (PKK)
leader Abdullah Öcalan began, Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip
Erdoğan has faced mass social protests, corruption allegations,
and contentious local elections.

The government recommences the process at a time when Iraq is
melting down and the Turkey-Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq
(KRG) relationship looks stronger than ever. This fact has not
escaped commentators. The Wall Street
Journal reported on the new bill and
implicitly connected it to Turkey’s increasingly important
relationship with the Iraqi Kurds.

But that explanation is a bit too neat. And it elides some of the
complexities in both the bill and in the Turkey-KRG relationship.

Advertisement

First, the bill explicitly grants targeted legal immunity to any
government appointees tasked with negotiations on behalf of the
Turkish state. If Erdoğan’s purges in the judiciary and police
force were not enough, this article represents another swipe at
the Gülen Movement — which has generally opposed negotiations
with PKK insurgents.

In 2012, Gülenist prosecutors sought to bring criminal charges
against intelligence chief and top Erdoğan adviser Hakan Fidan.
Erdoğan countered by ramming through immunity from prosecution
for Fidan. The immunity article formally extends protection to
anyone involved in the negotiations, and is nothing more than a
preemptive step to discourage Gülenist machinations.

Second, the government — in a very preliminary fashion — has
launched the process of bringing PKK fighters down from the
mountain and reintegrating them into society.

This is a commendable — if long-overdue — measure from Erdoğan.
Some analysts may see it as a genuine step forward, motivated by
the crumbling of Iraq.

But observers should avoid the temptation to connect this part of
the bill to the ongoing Iraq crisis. The AKP government is
advancing this bill at a time when Turkey's relationship with the
KRG is evolving precipitously. But the two are not necessarily
related.

Former president and prime minister Turgut Özal famously viewed
relations with the KRG as a powerful antidote to Turkey’s Kurdish
Issue. In response to Kurds in Turkey clamoring for a state, Özal
believed Turkey could strengthen its position if it could point
to a self-governing Kurdish region in Iraq.

Relations with the KRG would not facilitate a solution— they
would obviate the need for one.

Moreover, the KRG’s relationship with the PKK is complex. The KRG
has not worked especially hard to oust PKK fighters from the
Qandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, Barzani
cultivated the Turkish relationship well before the Kurdish Issue
solution process began.

Since the Syrian civil war loosed the Syrian Kurds from
centralized control, Barzani has worked to expand KDP influence —
opening low-intensity conflict with Salih Muslim, leader of the
PKK-aligned Syrian Kurdish PYD.

Finally, in a mildly surprising departure from the AKP’s usual
lockstep messaging, debate has burbled up from the circle around
the Prime Minister.

Hüseyin Çelik, former Education Minister and Erdoğan’s close
ally, said recently that if the crisis in Iraq
leads to the state’s failure, the Kurds have a right to
self-determination. Days later, Ibrahim Kalın — adviser to
Erdoğan and frequent designee to explain government positions in
English — wrote an impassioned defense of a unified
Iraq. It would be
strange if the government initiated domestic legislative action
in response to the Iraq turmoil without first settling on a
unified position on the crisis.

More likely, the bill on the Kurdish Issue solution is tied
directly to the worst-kept secret in Turkey: Erdoğan’s upcoming
presidential bid.

During his tenure, Erdoğan has
often made small but flashy gestures toward solving the Kurdish
Issue during election season. The Prime Minister still commands a
tricky coalition of allies. It includes urban Kurds, who want to
see progress on a solution, and religious nationalists, who will
bristle at concessions that seem too swift or numerous.

Erdoğan plainly wants to win the presidency on a single ballot,
and he needs both of these voter groups' support to do so. Hence,
this bill.

It signals to Kurdish supporters that he is serious, if
deliberate, in his efforts to solve the long-running conflict. To
conservative nationalists, it indicates that the Prime Minister
will make no immediate sweeping changes and will pair attention
to security with any conflict de-escalation.

As much as Erdoğan benefits from cracking down on free media,
weakening Turkey’s institutions, and concentrating power in his
person, bills like this one are the primary reason Erdoğan
continues to rule Turkey. No other Turkish politician has
deciphered how to command such an effective — and impressively
stable —coalition. The
joint opposition’s management of Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu’s
presidential campaign inspires precisely zero confidence that it
is any closer than it has been over the last decade to offering a
viable political alternative.

Thus, we can expect more artful
baby steps toward a solution to the Kurdish Issue in the coming
years under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Dov Friedman is a graduate student at Yale University's
Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. He is currently in
Kurdistan researching foreign policy in emerging energy states
with support from the Coca-Cola World Fund. Follow him on
Twitter @DovSFriedman.