Traffic externalities such as congestion, air pollution, unacceptably high noise levels, accident rates and road maintenance costs are increasingly becoming problematic in most countries. Due to financial and geographical limitations, and the fact that even the expansion of the existing infrastructure may not lead to efficient use of transportation networks, it is envisaged that road pricing can be used as a tool to achieve a more efficient use of the existing infrastructure. Tolls will be employed to influence the behaviour of network users so as to achieve a desired network routing (e.g., to minimize congestion and air pollution in the resulting traffic equilibrium). Traditionally, the computation of tolls that minimizes a certain objective (such as congestion or accident rates) is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem. Our main interest is to analyse from game theoretical perspective a more general and realistic situation where various actors or stakeholders such as, the Federal government, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Environment, and private insurance companies, ask for various – usually conflicting – road pricing schemes in order to meet or satisfy their different goals. This means that the game (and the computation of optimal tolls) will be formulated as a multi-level optimization problem. With the present project we intend to investigate when and how a “cooperative” solution concept in form of a common road pricing scheme can be found. We expect that this study leads to “fair tolling schemes” that can also be used in a future Dutch tolling system (Anders Betalen voor Mobiliteit or ABvM).