Among the numerous distinctive aspects of the work
of the noted Korean scholar-monk Wonhyo is the broad range of
traditions and texts that he accorded treatment — along with
the unusual level of fairness and seriousness he brought to such works
— an indication of his lack of sectarian bias. Another
distinctive aspect of his work as an exegete is the extent to which
his
"religious"
attitude — his concern for
the nurturance of the faith in the minds of his readers inevitably
rises to the forefront of his works. Thus, what he has to say about
the idea of
"faith"
信 in the context of a Pure Land
work is a matter of considerable interest.

On the other hand, given the way that the Pure Land
tradition is currently perceived by its modern adherents, one might tend
to assume that the notion of
"faith in
other-power"
constitutes the backbone of the arguments made
in seminal Pure Land scriptures such as the Sūtra of
Immeasurable Life (Ch. Wuliangshou jing;
Kor. Muryangsu gyeong;
"Larger
Sukhāvatīvyūha"
). This paper shows, based on Wonhyo's
analysis, how in fact the main form of faith expounded by the sūtra is
something much more like that seen articulated in mainstream Yogācāra
and Tathāgatagarbha texts. The paper also shows how Wonhyo uses
Yogācāra-based hermeneutics to unravel the conundrum of the four kinds
of doubt, dropped, without explanation in the final lines of the
sūtra.

Wonhyo (617-686) is known in East Asia for a
number of especially insightful and influential commentarial works,
with the best-known being his commentaries on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Another area in which Wonhyo made a
major contribution was that of Pure Land, where he wrote definitive
commentaries on both the larger and smaller
Sukhāvatīvyūha (or Amitābha Sūtra and
Sūtra of Immeasurable Life). Spurred by a question put
to me on the role of
"faith in other-power"
in
Wonhyo, I ventured into a study of the larger sūtra along with
Wonhyo's commentary on it (Muryangsu gyeong jongyo;
"Doctrinal Essentials of the Sūtra of Immeasureable
Life"
) based on the fact the this sūtra is one of the most
originary and seminal
"other-power"
Buddhist
texts. It is a locus classicus for the famous eighteenth and
nineteenth vows of Amitābha, in which he promises Pure Land rebirth to
those who chant his name.

In the course of studying Wonhyo's exegesis
alongside the source sūtra, a number of interesting points become
apparent. The first thing that came to my notice was the fact that the
exegesis actually has very little to say about
"other
power"
in an overt manner (although there is room to claim
that it is inferred in various places, depending upon one's
interpretation). Nor does Wonhyo have a great deal to say about faith
in Amitābha. We need not adduce any special implication to these
observations at the moment, since it might yet be argued, after a full
and thoughtful reading of the text, that Wonhyo does not deliberately
ignore, or lightly regard such issues. Nevertheless, we should
acknowledge that the sūtra itself, aside from the section on the
forty-eight vows and its verses of praise also tends to deal with the
matter of faith from through a decidedly Abhidharma/Yogācāra approach,
which is of course Wonhyo's primary hermeneutical background. Hence,
what we tend to see in this commentary is another display of Wonhyo's
characteristic mode of exegetical discourse, which is his own personal
admixture of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha-based interpretation, deeply
imbued by his strong faith-based orientation. In short, it is a mode
of exegesis similar to that seen at work in his commentaries on the
Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, the
Doctrinal Essentials of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, and so
forth.

That the sūtra should end up being subjected to a
treatment from a Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha perspective should certainly
not be regarded as an unnatural or foreign imposition. For, as noted
above, if we pay careful attention to the content of the Sūtra
of Immeasurable Life, aside from its early sections that
describe the Pure Land, and its lists of vows and verses of praise,
most of its explanatory content could just as well be lifted right out
of a standard Yogācāra or Tathāgatagarbha — or even Abhidharma
classic, as the fundamental concepts at work are all the same as those
used in the basic Indian discourse on the nature of consciousness,
affliction, and the paths of correction leading to liberation. What
differs in this case is that there is a special emphasis on such
concepts related to descriptions of the Pure Land and rebirth therein,
such as notions of buddha-bodies. Discussions of reward/response
bodies are central to the text, as are the categories of the three
classes of beings 三聚,1
which are also ubiquitous in Abhidharma, Yogācāra, and Tathāgatagarbha
works. Hence it should not be seen as odd that Wonhyo should select
these topics (about which he knows much, and about which he has much
to say) as the foci of his discussion.

The notion of faith is approached in the commentary
from a variety of perspectives, with its exact connotations varying
according to the context. Indeed, it is the very complexity of
Wonhyo's treatment of faith that makes this exposition so
interesting. As Ken Tanaka pointed out in a recent paper,2 Wonhyo's explanation
of faith in this work is deeply informed by structure of faith that he
brings from his favorite Tathāgatagarbha works such as the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Awakening
of Mahāyāna Faith [AMF].3 While I think Tanaka is generally correct here, I
would like to develop the analysis of the discussion of faith in a bit
broader manner, by showing other types of faith discourse that can be
identified.

It might be easiest to initiate a discussion of the
notion of faith in this commentary by noting some of the passages
where there is an overt usage of the term sin信 itself,
which are relatively few in number. One such place is in the section
where the numbers of necessary recitations of the Buddha's name for
practitioners of lesser capacities4 (ranging between one and ten) are
distinguished in terms of relative shallowness and depth of faith.

Among the practitioners of inferior capacity
there are two kinds of people, each of which has three additional
characteristics. The three of the first type are: (1) Assuming an
inability to generate [sufficient] merit, they give rise to the mind
of perfect enlightenment. This is the case of direct causation. (2)
One concentrates one's mind on the Buddha for up to ten
recitations. This is the case of auxiliary full-capacity karma. (3)
Vowing to be born in his land. This vow combines with prior practices
to serve as cause. This is the case of persons of indeterminate
nature. The three of the second type are: (1) Hearing the profound
dharma, one has joyous confidence. This item also expresses the case
of direct causes [producing] the mind determined for
enlightenment. (2) One concentrates one's mind on the Buddha for up to
one recitation. This is the case of auxiliary full-capacity
karma. This is in contrast to the situation of the prior person, who,
lacking deep faith, needed ten recitations. Since this person has deep
faith, it is not necessary to do the full ten recitations. (3) With a
fully sincere mind, one vows to be reborn in that land. This vow
combines with prior practices to serve as cause, and this is from the
vantage point of the person with the nature determined for
bodhisattvahood. 5

The term faith also tends to appear, as Tanaka
leads us to notice, in connection with the citation — direct or
indirect, of a Tathāgatagarbha text — most often the AMF. However, if we tried to understand the attitude
taken toward faith in a Wonhyo commentary (and probably in most other
Buddhist texts) only by looking at overt appearances of the term
sin itself, we would be leaving ourselves
open to the danger of missing the most significant portions of
Wonhyo's argument, intended to arouse faith in the mind of the reader
— most of which occur without mention of the term sin. There are, in terms of overall
characterization of both the sūtra and the commentary, large swaths of
text that could be regarded as self-contained Yogācāra discourses,
which also might be taken as discussions of faith, albeit from a
different approach.

As mentioned above, while the role of faith is
taken up directly in the context of areas of discussion such as those
that deal with recitation of the Buddha's name, there is very little
throughout most of the text that emphasizes any special dependence on
"other power"
他力
or reliance on Amitābha's vow. Almost all of the discussions on
practice and realization emphasize the merits resultant of one's own
efforts. When faith is discussed in the context of citations from such
works as the AMF, the type of faith being
emphasized there is clearly the type of faith discussed in that
treatise — a non-dualistic type of faith that implies, most
fundamentally, a severance of the stream of discursive thought. Almost
everything in Wonhyo's text deals with ways in which rebirth in the
Pure Land is contingent upon one's own effort. For example, in the
passage immediately antecedent to the one just cited (which discusses
the case of practitioners of middling capacities), out of five causes,
four are based on one's effort toward cultivation, and only one is
based on one's vow:

First, one leaves home, abandoning desire and
becoming a śramaṇa. This is an expression
of the expedient means of direct causes. Second, one arouses the
enlightened mind. This clarifies direct causes. Third, one focuses
one's thoughts on this Buddha. This shows the practice of
contemplation. Fourth, one develops merit. This clarifies the arousal
of practice. This contemplation and practice contribute to the
completion of karma. Fifth, one vows to be reborn in that land. Based
on the combination of this single vow along with the prior four
practices, one attains birth [in the Pure Land]6

This kind of articulation of practices that lead to
more traditionally accepted forms of Indian Buddhist spiritual
development (as opposed to direct rebirth in the Pure Land) — including
the various means that lead to one's entry into the class of beings
that are determined for liberation, can be seen as another form of
faith discourse, even though the word
"faith"
itself may not be directly mentioned.

As a general principle, in reading Wonhyo's works
— especially from the perspective of his position on the role
of faith — we can identify at least two general types of modes
in which arguments are made for the purpose of stimulating the
confidence of the believer in the guarantee of spiritual
perfection. The first is the mode that dominates the main portions of
any given text, one based on a rigorous, rational logic, within which
Wonhyo usually cites from mainstream Yogācāra/Tathāgatagarbha texts,
most frequently, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra
[YBh]. This mode of exegesis can be seen in
virtually all of Wonhyo's commentaries, with this particular one
being exemplary. Wonhyo, working within an almost exclusively
mainstream Yogācāra framework, by no means denies any Tathāgatagarbha
approaches, which are simply not needed for the moment. (It should be
pointed out, however, that Wonhyo probably does not at all see
himself as moving between two different
"schools,"
or streams of thought, since he basically looks on Yogācāra and
Tathāgatagarbha — along with all other forms of Buddhism
— as being parts of one large continuum). This
"rationalistic"
strain in Wonhyo's writing takes
Yogācāra-type analyses of consciousness, afflictions, and
predilections themselves as arguments that lead to certitude of one's
eventual attainment of liberation. In this sūtra, the focus is on
this inevitability of the eventual attainment of liberation —
or as the case may be, the attainment of the state of
non-retrogression 不退轉 —
equivalent to the entry into the class determined for enlightenment
正定聚. Since these are originally
Abhidharma/Yogācāra categories, it makes perfect sense for Wonhyo to
elaborate on them through citations from these families of texts.

As noted, this kind of rational, expository
discourse is based, far more frequently than any other text, on the
YBh (including both attributed and
unattributed passages). This kind of expository discourse, which tends
to predominate the middle portions of Wonhyo's commentaries, reflects
the logical and systematic Yogācāra approach to the building of
rational confidence (adhimukti信解) in the teachings — in the law of cause
and effect operating through the store consciousness, which can be
gradually cultivated into a pure state through the paths of
practice.

Inevitably, however, when we move toward the
conclusion of any treatise or commentary composed by Wonhyo, we see a
reversion to his characteristic, poetic, non-rational, personal mode,
valorizing faith and stressing the inaccessibility of the most
profound doctrine through discursive thought. While much affinity can
certainly be identified between Wonhyo's personal non-rational,
poetic mode, and the mode of discourse seen in such Tathāgatagarbha
works such as the AMF, there are many other
readily identifiable stylistic and philosophical influences that come
to bear on his approach, not least of which is the strong strain of
Daoist sensibility seen in his more poetically oriented work. Thus,
I'm not sure that it would be accurate to attribute this proclivity
directly to the influence of the AMF itself,
inasmuch as it might be a more general reflection of the unusual
degree of individual faith, religious insight, and literary elegance
that set Wonhyo so profoundly apart from his contemporary Chinese and
Korean colleagues.

In the opening and closing portions of Wonhyo's
essays and commentaries, the Buddhist truth is invariably presented as
something that is ultimately unapproachable through discursive
thinking — through language, being accessed only in the event
of the severance of the flow of language. The flow of language is
something that is severed only in the presence of a profound form of
faith, and again, profound faith is attained in the breakage of the
dependence on language — a situation of unending mutual
reference. Faith, for Wonhyo, in its most profound implications, is
synonymous with the mental state of being able to abide in neither
this nor that...non-duality 無二. A
flourish, expressing the above theme, is standard fare in the opening
and closing passages of all of Wonhyo's complete extant commentaries,
and his commentary on the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life is
no exception.

The mind-nature of sentient beings
interpenetrates without obstruction. It is vast like space, deep like
the great sea. Being vast like space, its essence is equal with no
special marks to be grasped. How could there be a place for purity and
defilement? Being deep like the great sea, its nature is able to
smoothly follow conditions without opposition. How could there be a
moment of movement or stillness? Sometimes, based on the sense fields,
the wind roils the five turbidities which carry the mind
along. Submerged by the waves of suffering it enters the long flow [of
cyclic existence]. Sometimes, based on wholesome roots, one cuts off
the four raging currents and never comes back. He reaches the other
shore and is eternally at peace. If this movement and stillness is all
one great dream, and using enlightenment one says that it is neither
this nor that, then defiled lands and pure lands all come from the one
mind. Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are ultimately not two realms. Yet returning
to the source of great enlightenment one accumulates merit. Going
along with the flow of the long dream, one cannot suddenly awaken, and
hence the incarnations of the sage are distant and proximate. The
teaching that is established is praised and disparaged. Thus the
world-honored Śākyamuni appears in this sahā-world to warn against the five evils and
encourage goodness. Amitābha-tathāgata leads them to paradise, guiding
the three classes of capacities7 to rebirth there. Such kinds of
provisional manifestations cannot be fully explained.8

In this commentary, the most sustained discussion
of faith (broached through its opposite — doubt 疑, 疑惑) occurs in its
final portions, wherein Wonhyo undertakes the explanation of the
meaning the four doubts 四疑惑 regarding the
four kinds of cognition 四智. Wonhyo
devotes a significant portion of his commentary to the explanation of
the meaning of the doubts and the forms of cognition with which they
are associated. From a philosophical perspective I see this as the
most interesting and creative portion of the commentary, since, in the
sūtra itself, these four doubts concerning these four specific
cognitions are mentioned only in a short passage at the very end, with
the sūtra stating:

Then the Bodhisattva Maitreya said to the Buddha,
"World-Honored One, for what reason are some of the
inhabitants of that land in the born in the embryonic state and the
others born by transformation?"
The Buddha replied,
"Maitreya, if there are sentient beings who do various
meritorious deeds aspiring for birth in that land while still
entertaining doubt, such beings are unable to comprehend the
Buddha-cognition: that is, cognition of the inconceivable, cognition
of the unassayable, cognition of the boundless great vehicle, and the
incomparable, unequalled, and unsurpassed supreme cognition. Although
they misunderstand these cognitions, they still believe in retribution
for evil and reward for virtue and so cultivate a stock of merits,
aspiring for birth in that land. Such beings are born in a palace,
where they dwell for five hundred years without being able to behold
the Buddha, hear his exposition of the Dharma, or see the hosts of
bodhisattvas and śrāvakas. For this
reason, that type of birth in the Pure Land is called
'embryonic birth.'
"
9

In spite of the fact that this passage occupies
only seven lines in the source text, its explanation occupies almost
twenty percent of Wonhyo's commentary. Why? Probably because it is a
passage that raises serious questions about faith and rebirth, and is
at the same time wholly unsatisfying and unforthcoming in its
explanation, in the sense that after naming these four distinct kinds
of cognition — which are obviously of critical importance, the
sūtra offers virtually no explanation as to any of their implications
— only that one needs to overcome one's doubt regarding them if
one wants to obtain full, direct rebirth in the Amitābha's
paradise.

In response to this passage, Wonhyo carries
through with the kind of erudite analysis that once again shows his
scholarly mastery of the tradition, along with his philosophical
insight, by working out a detailed explanation of the four doubts and
their associated cognitions. This section of his commentary makes for
a fascinating study of Wonhyo in a number of ways. First, as we will
show later, it contains the kind of mixture typical of Wonhyo's
discourse as was mentioned above, starting with a detailed
investigation and analysis of supporting Yogācāra doctrines, and
concluding with a non-dualistic faith-oriented summary conjoined with
a citation from the AMF. More importantly though,
Wonhyo shows his mettle as a commentator by picking up a passage that
while apparently packed with implications, has, in essence, been
unfairly dropped on the reader at the end of the text, offering
virtually nothing in the way of explanation of its meaning. In the
other major pre-Wonhyo commentary on the Sūtra of Immeasurable
Life, the commentator, Huiyuan, simply ignores this
passage. Given the prominence of this matter as the conclusion to the
Sūtra of Immeasurable Life, we should certainly be
justified in asking how Huiyuan could simply ignore such an obvious
imposition. No disparagement of Huiyuan's philological or
philosophical abilities is intended here, since, with the benefit of
digital search capabilities, it is quite reasonable to go ahead and
surmise that he simply could not come up with even a clue as to what,
in the known East Asian Buddhist corpus, he might be able to link this
discussion — as these four terms do not appear anywhere else in
the extant corpus, other than in the Sūtra of Immeasurable
Life itself — and in Wonhyo's commentary. So it is
unlikely than any commentator — especially Huiyuan —
would have been able to treat them by simply locating them
elsewhere. This is especially the case with Huiyuan, since, as I noted
in a recent article dealing with Huiyuan-Wonhyo comparisons,10 Huiyuan (or whoever he was) was writing almost a full
century before Wonhyo, which means that he was working long before
Xuanzang's translations of the Yogācāra texts — most
importantly the YBh, were available. Wonhyo, on the
other hand, has the advantage of not only having these texts
available, but a mastery of them that seems to come close to
memorization. Thus, with his philosophical insights into the
implications of these four cognitions, along with a commensurate
overall grasp on the Mahāyāna tradition (especially Yogācāra), he
emerges with an impressive explanation.

Wonhyo clarifies the matter by matching up the
four cognitions from the closing passages of the Sūtra of
Immeasurable Life with the four cognitions, taught in Yogācāra
to be the result of the purification of consciousness attained in the
transformation of the bases (āśraya-paravṛtti轉衣
).11 The four associations made are:

The cognition of the inconceivable 不思議智 is associated with the Yogācāra
"cognition with unrestricted activity"
成所作智 (the cognition that results from the
transformed function of the five sense consciousnesses). Wonhyo
explains that this is because one is able to apprehend phenomena with
a level of effectiveness that that would normally be considered
inconceivable, such as knowing the affairs of all the worlds in the
ten directions.

The cognition of the unassayable 不可稱智 is associated with the Yogācāra
"marvelous observing cognition"
妙觀察智 (the cognition that results from the transformed
function of the sixth, thinking consciousness). This consciousness is
capable of evaluating unassayable objects, referring to all phenomena,
which like the contents of a dream, are neither existent nor
inexistent.

The cognition of the breadth of the great
vehicle 大乘廣智 is associated with the
"cognition of intrinsic equality"
平等性智 (the cognition resultant from the
transformed function of the seventh, ego-consciousness). Since one is
able to see to the sameness in nature, one is not tricked into the
prejudices of the lesser vehicles, or trapped in the doctrines of
either self or selflessness.

Finally, the incomparable,
unequaled, unsurpassed supreme cognition 無等無倫最
上勝智者 is associated with the Yogācāra
"mirror
cognition"
大圓鏡智 (the
cognition resultant from the transformed function of the eighth,
ālayavijñāna). The implications of this
cognition are special for Wonhyo, and he so he explicates it at some
length.

This can be schematized
as follows:

Sūtra of Immeasurable Life (無量壽經)

Yogācāra (唯識)

cognition of the inconceivable 不思議智>

cognition with unrestricted activity 成作事智

cognition of the unassayable 不可稱智

marvelous observing cognition 妙觀察智

cognition of the breadth of the great vehicle 大乘廣智

cognition of intrinsic equality 平等性智

incomparable, unequaled, unsurpassed supreme cognition 無
等無倫最上勝智

mirror cognition 大圓鏡智

Wonhyo then proceeds to explain how doubt arises
in regard to each of these cognitions. As we will see, these doubts
are all quite discursive in character,12 the kind of
doubts that might be called failed attempts at thinking these
cognitions through logically. The first doubt, in regard to the
cognition with unrestricted activity 成作事智
(in this discussion, Wonhyo dispenses with the terminology
of the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life, working instead with
the standard Yogācāra terminology) arises from an apparent
contradiction seen in the sūtra's claim for rebirth in the Pure Land
by virtue of a mere ten repetitions of the Buddha's name.

Since the scriptures say that the seeds of good and
evil action do not disappear or fade away over time,13 so how
could it be possible for someone to suddenly extinguish all
afflictions and enter into the non-retrogressing, determined class of
beings? The counter response says that such a rationale fails to take
into account the great authoritative power possessed by the buddhas,
whereby they are able to treat the great as small, and the heavy as
light. Two real-life examples are provided. One is that of a great
pile of firewood, which, although it might have taken several thousand
years to accumulate, can be burnt up in a single day if it is set
afire. The other example is that of a handicapped person who cannot
walk more than a couple of hundred yards in a single day, and for whom
therefore the completion of a long journey in a single day is an
apparent impossibility. But if this person avails himself to a ride on
a swift boat supported by a strong tailwind, he might accomplish the
long journey in a single day (in the modern day, no doubt a fast
automobile would work in this kind of simile). Therefore one should
have confidence of the great abilities of this boatman (the
Buddha).

The second doubt, that concerning the marvelous
observing wisdom 妙觀察智, arises in
response to statements in the sūtras that say such things as,
"One marvelously observes that all phenomena are neither
existent nor inexistent, yet while avoiding both extremes, one should
not stick to the middle either."
One then thinks that when
assaying things, it is clear that heavy things sink, and light things
rise. But if we say that light things don't rise, and heavy things
don’t sink, then language is rendered into meaninglessness. It is the
same with causation. If one says that there is really no inexistence,
one directly falls into the perspective of existence. If one says that
there is really no existence, then one falls into the view of
inexistence. If one claims inexistence without allowing for existence,
or claims existence without allowing for inexistence, it is same as
saying that the heavy does not sink, and the light does not rise,
which is to fall into nonsensical talk. A similar example is raised
with the notion of dependent arising, which is seen as either being
existent or empty — or else one has no recourse but to attach
to the middle, which is in this case, absurdity. Hence there is the
need to establish cognition of the unassayable, which implies the
disclosure of the deep profundity of all phenomena which is removed
from language and severs discursive thought 離言絶慮
, which does not seek evaluation through discursive thought,
and does not attach to the meanings of words. As in the Diamond
Sūtra, words cannot be avoided as the basis for communication,
but they also cannot be attached to. This constitutes the resolution of the
second doubt.

The third doubt, arising in the context of the
wisdom of intrinsic equality, has as its starting point such
scriptural passages as that seen in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra
that say
"All sentient beings are possessed of
mind, and all those who have mind, attain perfect
enlightenment."
(T 374.12.524c8)
This ends up
leading some people into confusion, as they might end up thinking:

If tathāgatas and sentient beings all possess the
buddha-nature, given the fact that they completely save all sentient
brings and make them attain perfect enlightenment, even though
sentient beings are extremely great in number, eventually this number
must be exhausted, which means that the last buddha will have no
access to the merit of saving others. Not having others to save, he
will not be able to become a buddha. Lacking in this merit, he will
not be able to save others, and this results in contradiction.
(T
1747.37.131a12)

The making of this kind of
erroneous discrimination is tantamount to debunking the great vehicle,
and nonbelief its broad doctrine of intrinsic equality.

The
"vast great vehicle
cognition"
大乘廣智 is
established to counter this kind of narrow-minded attachment. It is
called
"vast"
because there is no one who is not
carried by the Buddha's wisdom. Since the universe is limitless,
sentient beings are numberless. Since the three times lack border,
cyclic existence lacks beginning and end. Since sentient beings lack
beginning and end, the buddhas also lack beginning and end. If we
admit that buddhas have a beginning and attainment, that would mean
that before this there were no buddhas, and thus no holy teaching, no
hearing of it, no elocution and no cultivation — yet they
become buddhas. This means that there is an effect without a cause,
which is of course, untenable.

Based on this reasoning, all buddhas
lack a beginning. Yet even though they lack a beginning, there is not
one buddha who was not originally a sentient being. And even though
they were all originally sentient beings, their development lacks a
beginning. Based on this, we can conjecture that sentient beings must
be endless. Yet even though they are truly endless, there is not a
single one of them that does not eventually become a buddha. And even
though they all eventually become buddhas, their development is
endless. Therefore one should believe in the wisdom of intrinsic
equality in nature. There are none who are not saved, yet there is no
limit to their number. It is based on this that the vast great vehicle
cognition is established, and this resolves the third
doubt.
(T
1747.37.131a26)

The fourth doubt is
constituted by confusion as to whether it is really possible for the mirror
cognition to perfectly illuminate all referents. This doubt arises
when one thinks that since the universe is limitless, its worlds are
also limitless, and since its worlds are limitless, sentient beings
are also limitless. Since sentient beings are limitless, their mental
functions, faculties, desires, and temperaments and so forth are also
without limit. This being the case, how could one possibly have
exhaustive knowledge of everything? And would one come to know all
these things through gradual cultivation, or would one come to know
them suddenly without cultivation?

If it is the case that we come to
know them suddenly, without cultivation, then all unenlightened
worldlings should also experience this kind of cognition, given the
fact that no special causes seem to be required. If it is the case that one finally attains full cognition
after a period of gradual cultivation, then it would not be the case
that all objects are limitless, since to be limitless and yet be
exhaustible is contradictory. In this case practitioners would advance
and then regress without arriving to a state of completion. How could
they attain universal cognition, known as the all-inclusive cognition
一切種智?

The unequalled, most excellent cognition 無等無倫最上勝智 that is named in the Sūtra
of Immeasurable Life is established in order to overcome these
two obstacles. The argument for the acceptance of this cognition has a
special dimension not seen in the above three, since Wonhyo says that
"One should merely have faith, as it cannot be met
through reason. It exists beyond the two truths, residing in
non-duality."
(T 1747.37.131b9 )
As compared with the
explanation of the prior three doubts, this is a noticeably different
approach, as it is the first time that he has declared an explanation
to be beyond the purview of reason. As perhaps the astute Wonhyo
student might anticipate, he continues the elaboration of this concept
by relying on tropes from the AMF — the One
Mind, activated enlightenment, and intrinsic enlightenment:

How does one generate faith in this cognition?
For example, in the way that, worlds, limitless as they may be, do not
exist outside the universe. In the same way, a myriad objects, without
limit, are all contained within the One Mind. The buddha-cognition,
free from marks, returns to the mind-source. The cognition and the one
mind, combining together, are not two. With activated enlightenment,
one returns to intrinsic enlightenment, and hence there is not a
single object that exists outside of this cognition. Through this
reasoning, there is no object that is not exhausted and yet there is
not such thing as a limit. Using limitless cognition, one illuminates
limitless objects. As the AMF says:

All objects are originally the one mind, free from
conceptualization. Because sentient beings deludedly perceive
objective realms, the mind has limitation. Since one gives rise to
deluded conceptions, one is unable to assay the dharma-nature, and is
thus unable to apprehend it. Since all buddha-tathāgatas are free from
the mark of the subjective perceiver, there is no place where their
cognition does not reach. Since their minds are authentic, they are
identical with the nature of all phenomena. Its own essence clarifies
all deluded phenomena. Possessing the function of great cognition, and
numberless expedient means, they are able to show the significance of all
phenomena according to what all sentient beings should be able to understand. Hence it is called
"all inclusive
cognition."
.
(131b15-20)

He then wraps up, in a manner comparable to his
conclusion in other commentarial works, in a total-faith mode, fully
acknowledging the limitations of what can be apprehended through
language and discursive thought. He sums up the entire content of his
exegesis, along with what he takes to be the bottom line of
the sūtra itself, but simplifying the whole matter into one basic
common denominator, which we can paraphrase by saying:
"Look, if all of this is too complicated and unwieldy, just
know this: if you can fully submit yourself to the Buddha with a mind
of complete faith, that will take care of everything."

This is the peerless, unequalled, superior
cognition. Since there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing that it
doesn't see. In this way it corrects the fourth doubt. If you are
unable to grasp the point, it is like words grasping meanings —
limited
and limitless — none escape error. It is indeed based on the approach
that denies a limit that one provisionally posits limitlessness. If
one is unable to resolve these four doubts, even if one manages to
be born in that land, one only resides at its outer edge. If there is
someone like this, even if s/he is unable to understand the world
of the prior four cognitions, but is able to humbly yield even though his/her
mind's eye is not yet opened, and with faith, think only of the tathāgata
with wholehearted submission; this kind of person, according to
his level of practice will be born in that land, and not reside in
its border land.14 Those born stuck at the edge form a single class of
beings who are not counted among the nine grades.15 Thus, one should not deludedly give rise to
doubt.
(131b21-29; emphasis mine.)

Thus, while Wonhyo has not taken up the matter of
"faith in other power"
in a formal sense as a topic
for elaboration, it would seem that in terms of his final assessment
of the point of the sūtra, indeed, something very much like faith in
other power is the final solution.

1. The
three classes of beings are the correctly determined 正定聚, wrongly determined 邪定聚
and indeterminate 不定聚. [back]

2. "Won-hyo's Commentary on the Larger
Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra: Implications for Korean Influence
on Japanese Pure Land Buddhism." Eleventh Biennial Conference
of the International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies, September
12-14, 2003; The Institute of Buddhist Studies at the Graduate
Theological Union, Berkeley, California.[back]

3. In rendering the
title of the Dasheng qixin lun as Awakening of
Mahāyāna Faith, as opposed to Hakeda's
"Awakening of
Faith in Mahāyāna"
I am following the position put forth by
Sung Bae Park in Chapter Four of his book Buddhist Faith and
Sudden Enlightenment. There he argues that the inner discourse
of the text itself, along with the basic understanding of the meaning
of mahāyāna in the East Asian Buddhist
tradition does not work according to a Western theological
"faith in..."
subject-object construction, but
according to an indigenous East Asian essence-function 體用 model. Thus,
mahāyāna should not be interpreted as a
noun-object, but as a modifier, which characterizes the type
of faith.[back]

4. Interestingly,
faith is not even mentioned in the immediately antecedent discussion
of the practice and attainments of the practitioners of superior and
middling capacities.[back]

7. Three kinds of Pure
Land practitioners explained in the Sūtra of Immeasurable
Life who are reborn in the Pure Land of Amitābha Buddha: the
superior, the middling, and the inferior. These are mentioned in the
passages cited below:

The superior 上輩 are those who enter the saṃgha， arouse the intention for enlightenment,
maintain steadfast mindfulness of the Buddha of Infinite Life,
cultivate meritorious virtues, and vow to be reborn in his Pure
Land.

The middling 中輩 are
those who arouse the intention for enlightenment, maintain steadfast
mindfulness of the Buddha of Infinite Life, maintain pure precepts,
erect stūpas and images, give offerings
of food to the clergy, and vow to be reborn in his Pure Land.

The inferior 下輩 are those who arouse
the intention for enlightenment, maintain steadfast mindfulness up to
ten times, and vow to be reborn in the Pure Land.

12. Since, in the
Yogācāra scheme of mental factors, the factor of faith 信 is considered to function in the domain of the
sixth, thinking consciousness, it makes sense that the activity of
doubt should be fully discursive in character.[back]

13. In Yogācāra, it is a fundamental tenet of the teaching of
the ālayavijñāna that not one iota of the
potential energy of the seeds is lost, or fades in potency.[back]

14. 邊地. The border land to
Amitābha's Pure Land, where the lax and haughty 懈慢, are detained for 500 years, also called 胎宮 womb-palace and 邊界 border-realm.[back]

15. Or
"nine classes."
Buddhist scriptures commonly define
such things as afflictions, heavenly rebirths, faculties of sentient
beings and so forth into nine categories, which are the three
categories of superior, middling, and inferior 上中
下, further divided into the same three, resulting in
nine.[back]