NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont05609-0801 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

Allison A.
Ericson and Joseph A. Campagna of Law Offices of Sedon and Ericson, Chelsea,
for

Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund
and Burgess, JJ.

¶ 1.JOHNSON, J. Defendant appeals from the
family court’s decision granting plaintiff’s request for a final
abuse-prevention order. We affirm.

¶ 2.The parties agree on the
following facts. Plaintiff and defendant were involved in a romantic
relationship and lived together for approximately six years. They
separated in February 2006, when plaintiff moved out of defendant’s home.
Following the separation, the parties continued to have numerous disputes about
personal property, including ownership of a horse purchased during the
relationship. On June 4, 2006, plaintiff was invited to defendant’s home
to have dinner and visit the horse. The parties got into an
argument. As plaintiff was leaving, she picked up defendant’s small dog
and took the dog with her to her car. In the confrontation that followed,
defendant kicked the door of plaintiff’s car and used physical force against
plaintiff in an attempt to get his dog back.

¶ 3.Plaintiff sought and
obtained an emergency abuse-prevention order; she then requested that the order
be made permanent. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that, during the
confrontation on June 4, 2006, defendant chased her, grabbed her, kicked the
door of her car, grabbed her by the hair, and hit her in the face with a closed
fist. She testified that defendant’s actions caused her physical pain and
fear. Plaintiff further testified that, following this incident,
defendant called her repeatedly and drove by her house on numerous occasions,
and that she continued to fear him.

¶ 1.When defendant testified, he
conceded that he kicked plaintiff’s car window on the date in question and that
he used physical force against plaintiff, attempting to pry her hands apart to
release the dog and, as a result, placing an elbow on her neck. Defendant
explained that he took this action in an effort to prevent plaintiff from
stealing his dog and that he believed he was justified in doing so.
Defendant further conceded that he drove by plaintiff’s home four to five times
in a single day to keep track of her habits to prove that she was fraudulently
obtaining disability benefits.

¶ 2.In closing argument,
defendant’s attorney argued that defendant was justified in his actions because
he used only the amount of force necessary to protect his personal property,
namely, his dog. According to defendant, plaintiff was therefore not
entitled to relief as provided by the abuse-prevention statute under which the
proceedings were held.

¶ 3.The family court rejected
defendant’s argument, finding that the “[d]efendant
had abused the [p]laintiff on that night in question
regarding the use of physical force in the car” and had caused her to fear
harm, such that the statutory standard for abuse was met. Further, the
court found defendant’s continuing surveillance of plaintiff after the incident
of abuse to be particularly troubling. As a result of defendant’s
“continuing surveillance, telephone callings, and so on,” the court concluded
that plaintiff was in reasonable “fear of further harm,” and that the emergency
abuse-prevention order should therefore be made final. See 15 V.S.A. §
1103(c) (allowing court to issue order to protect the plaintiff if it finds
that “the defendant has abused the plaintiff and that there is a danger of
further abuse”).

¶ 4.On appeal, defendant argues
that he was justified in abusing plaintiff, as defined by 15 V.S.A. § 1101,
because he used only the amount of force necessary to prevent defendant from
stealing his dog. While defendant asserts that the family court erred in
failing to make findings as to whether his use of force was reasonable under
the circumstances, he argues that in any event, it would not be “unreasonable
for him to pull [plaintiff’s] hair or hit [her] in an effort to force her to
drop his dog.” Finally, he asserts that the use of reasonable force to
defend property should be treated as an affirmative defense barring protective
orders under the Abuse Prevention Act and that the court therefore erred in granting
plaintiff’s final order.

¶ 5.Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Act was passed by the
Legislature in 1980, in the wake of growing national consciousness of the need
for civil legal protections for domestic-violence victims. See S. Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for
Battered Women, 23 St. LouisU. Pub. L. Rev. 7, 10
(2004); J. Wesley, Breaking the Vicious Circle: The
Lawyer’s Role, 6 Vt.
L. Rev. 363, 374 (1981). The statute addresses the pattern of controlling
behavior that distinguishes intimate abuse from other forms of violence by
providing a unique legal remedy, injunctive in nature, aimed at ending the
cycle of domestic violence before it escalates. See J. Wesley, supra
at 374; Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 164 (N.D. 1995) (explaining that
domestic violence is “a pattern of assaulting and controlling behavior
committed by one household member against another” (quotation omitted)).
Abuse-prevention orders are unique in that they are intended to provide
immediate relief from intrafamily violence as well as
to protect victims from future abuse, rather than to hold perpetrators liable
for past acts of violence. As such, to obtain relief under the
abuse-prevention statute, a plaintiff need prove only: (1) that a family or
household member abused her by “[a]ttempting to cause
or causing [her] physical harm,” placing her “in fear of imminent serious
physical harm,” or stalking her; and (2) that there is a danger of future abuse.
15 V.S.A. §§ 1101(1), 1103(c). Limiting the
elements to be proven in this way is in keeping with the statute’s remedial
purpose: to provide prompt relief to victims of domestic abuse through
“inexpensive and uncomplicated proceedings.” Benson v. Muscari, 172 Vt.
1, 6, 796 A.2d 1291, 1296 (2001) (quotation omitted).

¶ 6.In matters of personal
relations, such as abuse prevention, the family court is in a unique position
to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the strength of evidence at
hearing. Begins v. Begins, 168 Vt.
298, 301, 721 A.2d 469, 471 (1998). As such, we review the family
court’s decision to grant or deny a protective order only for an abuse of
discretion, upholding its findings if supported by the evidence and its
conclusions if supported by the findings. Wright v. Bradley, 2006
VT 100, ¶ 9, 180 Vt.
383, 910 A.2d 893.

¶ 7.Abuse-prevention
proceedings, by nature, concern disputes among family or household
members. See 15 V.S.A. § 1103(a). Thus, at hearing, the parties
present evidence of the circumstances of the dispute that led to the alleged
incident of abuse that is the threshold requirement for relief under 15 V.S.A.
§ 1101. In any contested case before the court, the defendant necessarily
argues either: (1) that the abuse claimed by plaintiff did not occur, or (2)
that defendant was justified in abusing plaintiff. With regard to the
latter, courts frequently hear testimony from defendants that the alleged act
of violence was provoked by plaintiff’s own actions—e.g., name-calling,
infidelity, or striking first—and that the plaintiff is therefore undeserving
of a protective order. See P. Roestenberg, Representing
Children When There Are Allegations of Domestic Violence, 28 Nov. Colo. Law. 77, 78 (stating that “many batterers will minimize their abuse,
contend that it occurred in self-defense, or argue that it resulted from the
victim’s provocation”). While the court considers such testimony
in assessing the totality of the circumstances, it does so with its statutory
duty in mind—to determine whether the plaintiff is in need of legal protection
from intimate abuse, rather than to decide which party was to blame for the
dispute that led to the act of violence triggering the abuse-prevention petition.

¶ 8.In the case before us,
defendant testified that he kicked plaintiff’s car door, grabbed her wrists,
and threw an elbow in her neck in the process. He further admitted that
he drove by her house four to five times in one day to monitor her
whereabouts. Given defendant’s admissions and plaintiff’s testimony
regarding the dog incident, and defendant’s later stalking-like behavior, the
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant posed a future
threat of harm to plaintiff. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the court
neither ignored the testimony that plaintiff precipitated the argument by
grabbing his dog nor was required to deny plaintiff’s request for relief even
if it found defendant’s version of events credible. The court was
required to order appropriate protections for plaintiff if it found both that
plaintiff was abused and in danger of future abuse, and it did so here.[1] See 15
V.S.A. 1103(c) (“the court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to
protect the plaintiff” upon finding that defendant abused her and that there is
a danger of future abuse).

¶ 10.In contrast to criminal or
tort actions, abuse-prevention proceedings did not exist at common law, but are
based entirely in statute. The statute does not contemplate defense of
property as an affirmative defense to relief from abuse because it is based on
public policy considerations having nothing do with private property rights and
everything to do with protecting victims from intimate abuse.[2]
Abuse-prevention actions are remedial in nature, and thereby focus solely on
the plaintiff’s need for immediate and prospective protection from the defendant
rather than the defendant’s liability for abusing the plaintiff. See Rapp
v. Dimino, 162 Vt. 1, 4, 643 A.2d 835, 836-377 (1993)
(holding that abuse-prevention statute “focuses on fast, temporary relief to
family members in immediate danger” rather than resolving parties’ custody,
support or property claims). Whereas it makes sense to allow common-law
defenses to crimes and torts that derive from the common law, the policies
underpinning the abuse-prevention statute, and the protections offered by it,
represent a stark departure from the common-law perspective on intimate
relationships. Compare Note, Common Law Crimes in the United States,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 1332, 1332 (1947) (majority of states retain English
common-law principles to some degree within their criminal statutes) with R.
Siegel,“The Rule of Love”: Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L. J. 2117, 2122-23 (1996)
(under Anglo-American common law, husband had right to use physical force to
the extent necessary to command wife’s obedience and chastise her for
“misbehavior”). By attempting to import the common-law
defense-of-property doctrine into the abuse-prevention setting, defendant
equates apples with oranges. In essence, defendant’s argument boils down
to a recharacterization of an assertion commonly made
by defendants in abuse-prevention proceedings: plaintiff brought the violence
upon herself and is therefore undeserving of relief from abuse. The
critical question in such proceedings, however, is not who was at fault,
but who, if anyone, is in need of protection.

¶ 11.To be clear, we do no
violence to the common-law property regime by our decision today; rather, we
hold that the common-law defense of property is wholly irrelevant to a
determination of whether an alleged victim of domestic violence requires
protection from abuse. It is the dissent’s interpretation of the Abuse
Prevention Act that would undoubtedly reap the more significant change to Vermont law. The
dissent would amend the domestic-violence statute so as to incorporate
incompatible common-law principles. In so doing, it would turn a simple,
straightforward proceeding focused on the plaintiff’s need, if any, for legal
protection, into a contest over such peripheral issues as who precipitated the
violent actions at issue and whether the actor was justified in his actions,
thereby eviscerating the statute’s protections entirely.

¶ 12.As we have stressed in the
past, remedial statutes, such as the Abuse Prevention Act, must be liberally
construed to “suppress the evil and advance the remedy” intended by the
Legislature.” Dep’t of Corrections v. Human Rights Comm’n,
2006 VT 134, ¶ 7, 181 Vt.
225, 917 A.2d 451 (quotations omitted). Construing the
abuse-prevention statute in a way that gives credence to the gender-biased myth
that domestic-violence victims provoke, and therefore deserve their abuse,
would in no way serve its legislative purpose of providing victims with prompt,
uncomplicated relief from abuse. See Heck, 529 N.W.2d at
164 (discussing legislature’s intent to counteract myth that “victims provoke
or deserve the violence”); In re Marriage of Ieronimakis,
831 P.2d 172, 192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming
that “[t]he belief that domestic violence is usually precipitated by the victims[‘] provocations” is pervasive in society and still
operates in the judiciary’s handling of domestic violence). On the record
before us, we discern no abuse of discretion by the family court. There
was ample evidence, in fact an admission, that defendant abused plaintiff as
defined by the abuse-prevention statute, and further, that plaintiff was in
reasonable fear of future harm.

Affirmed.

FOR THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Associate Justice

¶ 13.BURGESS, J., dissenting.
Just to be clear: the majority holds that when an ill-meaning relative, or past
or present disgruntled lover, dating partner, roommate or housemate enters your
home and, in front of you, grabs your property and runs off with it, or even
destroys it, you may not lawfully resist. If you do, says
the majority, you are liable to be branded an abuser by the court and subjected
to a relief-from-abuse order. This flies in the face of common sense and
the centuries old recognition of our right to defend property at common law.[3]

¶ 14.Without any express
revocation of that common-law rule by the Legislature, the majority
nevertheless reads the Abuse Prevention Act to enjoin anyone who would
physically oppose the wrongful taking of her property by a “family or household
member,” a class so broadly defined as to include all relatives and any and all
past and current roommates, co-occupants, dates and sexual partners. 15 V.S.A. §§ 1101 (1), (2). Rather than allowing the
use of reasonable force against tortious interference
with our personal property as a defense to a claim for relief from abuse, the
majority understands the Legislature intended for us just to bleat like
sheep. I respectfully dissent from such an absurd application of the
statute.

¶ 15.The injustice resulting from
this interpretation is particularly manifest when one
considers its application to our related rights of self-defense and defense of
others. Would the majority subject us to a relief-from-abuse order for
defending ourselves and our dear ones from attack? Apparently
so. As with defense of property, these rights are also long
established at common law,[4]
but are not acknowledged in the Abuse Prevention Act. Therefore,
according to the majority’s reasoning, we must passively, albeit painfully,
yield to assault by family or household members lest we be judicially branded
an abuser and issued a restraining order for fighting back.[5]

¶ 16.The majority’s concern that
we not lend credence to a myth of provocation in domestic violence is entirely
misplaced here, since plaintiff’s own undisputed testimony presented the facts
necessary for the defense.[6]
According to her version of events, she took her ex-boyfriend’s dog without
permission and ran with it into her car, where, despite defendant’s demand that
she let the dog go, she refused to give up the dog even when defendant pulled
her hair. Plaintiff testified further that she still would not relinquish
the dog until a blow by defendant stunned her into releasing it, at which point
the owner desisted. Thus, plaintiff described herself as committing the
tort of conversion, see Economou v.
Carpenter, et al., 124 Vt. 451, 454 (1965) (defining conversion as an overt
exercise of dominion over another’s property “in exclusion and defiance of the
owner’s right to possession although he does nothing more than detain the
property against the owner’s rightful demand”), and described defendant as
employing the force necessary to regain his dog. SeeState v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424, 428 (1836)
(reiterating that resort to force in defense of property is limited to “such
force as may be necessary”).

¶ 17.Without addressing
defendant’s claim, the family court summarily entered a finding of abuse based
only on the fact that defendant “caused physical harm” to plaintiff.
Defendant readily admitted injuring plaintiff, but asserted that his actions
were justified by her refusal to give up his dog. Contrary to the
majority’s understanding, plaintiff’s proof of a prima facie case for abuse did
not automatically preclude a valid defense, but shifted the burden to defendant
to prove defense of property. See Vermont Structural Steel Co. v.
Brickman, 126 Vt.
520, 524, 236 A.2d 658, 661 (1967) (after plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, burden shifts to defendants to prove their defense). Plaintiff’s
own testimony was sufficient for that purpose. It was error to reject the
defense out of hand, and the matter should be remanded for a factual and legal
determination on defendant’s claim.[7]

¶ 18.It has long been “unquestionabl[e]” that a person in possession of property
may then and there fend off “a purely wrongful taking or conversion,” and that
“if one takes another’s property from his possession without right and against
his will, the owner . . . may protect his possession or retake the property by
the use of necessary force.” Stanley v. Payne, 78 Vt. 235, 240-41 (1905); see also Barrows v. Fassett, 36 Vt.
625, 628-30 (1864) (holding that property just taken from one’s lawful
possession may be immediately regained “with a reasonable degree of force,”
that being “no greater force than was justifiable and necessary for the
protection of his possession and in self-defense”).[8] These
principles have been the law of Vermont
since its days as an independent republic. See 1 V.S.A. § 271, first enacted as
R. 1787, p. 30 (providing that: “[s]o much of the common law of England as is
applicable to the local situation and circumstances and is not repugnant to the
constitution or laws shall be laws in this state and courts shall take notice
thereof and govern themselves accordingly”).

¶ 19.Defense of property is
instinctive. That we know from the time we are toddlers that we need not
tolerate an unrighteous taking of our things by another is reflected in the
Vermont Constitution’s recognition that “possessing and protecting property”
are among our “natural, inherent, and unalienable rights.” Vt.Const.,
Ch. I, Art.
1. While the Legislature retains the prerogative to alter or abrogate the
common law, “the rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful
implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language.” E.B. & A.C. Whiting & Co. v. City of Burlington,
106 Vt. 446,
464, 175 A. 35, 44 (1934).

¶ 20.The majority posits that a
claim of defense of property is not available in response to an action for a
relief-from-abuse order under the Abuse Prevention Act, but that is not what
the statute says. An action for relief from abuse may be entirely
statutory, but the statute professes no such “clear and unambiguous” revocation
of the common-law rule. Id.
Nor is the principle of defense of property in the slightest way incompatible
or inconsistent with the legislative goal of preventing abuse of one relative
or household member by another. See State v. Hazelton, 2006 VT
121, ¶ 29, 181 Vt. 118, 915 A.2d 224 (“The common law is changed by statute
only if the statute overturns the common law in clear and unambiguous language,
or if the statute is clearly inconsistent with the common law.”) (citation omitted).

¶ 21.As the majority points out,
this remedial legislation should be liberally construed to accomplish its
purpose of providing protection to victims of abuse, but defense of property
and self-defense cannot fall under any rational definition of “abuse.”
Nor, as imagined by the majority, is the judicial resolution of often-heard
allegations of blame an impediment to the relief afforded by the statute.
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, defense of property confuses
no apples with oranges in the context of relief-from-abuse proceedings.
If one is injured while unlawfully meddling or attempting to abscond with
another’s property, he has no “need of legal protection,” as cast by the
majority. Ante, ¶ 10. On the other
hand, if one claims, but fails to prove, defense of property to justify
physical aggression, a restraining order is warranted. These are not
overly burdensome or complicated inquiries, but are typical of disputes handled
by the trial court.

¶ 22.This Court ordinarily avoids
construing a statute in an absurd manner. See State v. Longley,
2007 VT 101, ¶ 10, __ Vt. __, 939 A.2d 1028 (noting that a “presumption obtains
against a statutory construction that would lead to absurd results”) (citation
omitted). On this occasion, however, the majority would read the Act to
reduce us to waiting for the police or to summoning lawyers while a jilted
lover, dissatisfied date or malicious housemate drives away with our car,
smashes our television, vandalizes our home or harms our pets. It is
ridiculous to imagine that the Legislature intended to subject persons to an
injunction for defending against the wrongful taking or damage of their
possessions by family or household members. Even though the statutory
term “abuse,” defined as “attempting to cause or causing physical harm” or
threatening “imminent serious physical harm,” 15 V.S.A. §§ 1101(1)(A),
(B), does not expressly allow for protection of property, it is equally absurd
to conclude that the Legislature meant to treat defense of property as an abuse
to be curtailed. Concluding otherwise, absent any express repeal of the
common-law rule in this regard, would also countenance repeal by doubtful
implication, an approach not favored by our law. City
of Burlington, 106 Vt. at 464, 175 A. at 44.

¶ 23.The majority’s reading of
the statute renders our property and our persons literally defenseless against
predation by relatives, past and present cohabitants, domestic partners and
sexual intimates. Moreover, the majority’s understanding must also
suppose a legislative intent to single out and sacrifice the sanctity of
property and persons of family and households. While leaving other citizens
free to defend themselves, their property and their loved ones without
sanction, the majority’s construction denies these rights as between family and
household members. This distinction, required under the majority’s
analysis, is patently irrational and unfair. Such a “construction as this
one, leading to a most unjust and unreasonable result, cannot be interpolated
by this Court.” Swanton v. Highgate,
131 Vt. 318,
324, 305 A.2d 586, 590 (1973). I dissent from doing so and am
authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins in
this dissent.

_______________________________________

Associate Justice

[1]The
dissent entirely misapprehends the nature and purpose of the domestic violence statute.
By recognizing a common-law defense of property in this context, the dissent
eliminates any protection against an intimate partner’s violence that is
expressly granted by the statute. The dissent fails to take account of
the findings of the trial court, which are against defendant in this case, and
the conclusion of the court, based on those findings, that
a prima facie case was made out that plaintiff was in need of further
protection under the statute. There can be no reversible error under these
circumstances.

Contrary to the dissent’s assertions,
family members acting solely in self-defense or taking reasonable measures to
secure their property against a clear invasion need not fear being “branded an
abuser” or being “subject to a relief-from-abuse order” as a result of our
decision. Post, ¶ 16. If the
evidence presented to the trial court establishes that the defendant’s actions
were entirely defensive in nature, and that the plaintiff has no reason to fear
future abuse or harassing behavior, the court cannot statutorily grant relief
to the plaintiff. Trial courts are no strangers to situations in which an
abuser files for a protective order against a victim who acted in
self-defense. In such cases, courts do not grant protection to the
abuser, because evidence of the nature of the relationship presented at hearing
establishes that the abuser does not reasonably fear violence from the
victim. Here, the court exercised its discretion appropriately in
determining that plaintiff was reasonably in fear of future harm, given
defendant’s stalking-like behavior, which went above and beyond his physically
aggressive response to plaintiff taking the dog to her vehicle.
Consequently, plaintiff was entitled to protection under the statute.

[2]
In fact, the dynamics of domestic violence provide their own salient public
policy argument against allowing an affirmative defense of property in
abuse-prevention proceedings. The hallmark of domestic violence is control
of the victim by the abuser, which commonly includes economic control.
See E. Meahan Richmond, The Interface of Poverty
and Violence against Women: How Federal and State Welfare Reform Can Best
Respond, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 569, 573 (2001) (“[E]conomic
control is an important component of the batterer’s system of maintaining power
over the victim. Abusers prefer their victims to be economically
dependent because such dependence gives the abuser complete power in the
relationship.” (quotation omitted)); see also National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, The Problem: What is Battering, http://www.ncadv.org/learn/TheProblem_100.html (last
visited April 10, 2008) (indicating that abusers often exercise control over
many aspects of the victim’s life including finances and access to property).
Thus, in a situation where the abuser is rather likely to have physical
control, if not legal control, of the victim’s property, it would undoubtedly
undermine the purpose of the Abuse Prevention Act to engage in a contest over
whose property is whose and who was justified in physically defending which
property against the other. Again, the explicit purpose of the statute is
to provide a quick and relatively easy mechanism by which domestic violence
victims can access legal protection from abuse.

[3]
See
William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *121 (memorializing the common-law rule that
“in defense of my goods or possession, if a man endeavours
to deprive me of them, I may justify laying hands upon
him to prevent him; and in case he persists with violence, I may proceed to
beat him away”).

[4]See Howland v. Day, 56
Vt. 318, 319 (1883) (upholding as correct a jury instruction that “[w]hen one person
is assaulted unlawfully by another, the person assaulted has the right to
defend himself, and he has a right to do so to an extent that will make the defence effective.”); see also Mellen
v. Thompson, 32 Vt. 407, 410, 1859 WL 5487 (1859) (holding that “every man is legally justified in the reasonable use of
force for the prevention of unlawful violence to another’s
person”).

[5]
Under the Act, a plaintiff must first prove an initial “abuse”as
a necessary predicate to an immediate or ongoing “danger of further
abuse” required for a temporary or final relief from abuse order. 15
V.S.A. §§ 1104(a) and 1103(c) (emphasis added). The majority reads the
statute to mean that a “defendant’s actions . . . entirely defensive,” can
constitute the predicate “abuse,” ante, ¶ 11 n.1, while positing that no
defendant is at risk of a restraining order without a threat of “future
abuse.” Id.
But when could it be said that one who defends herself and her own against
attack once would not do so again and thus, according to the majority, present
a “danger of further abuse?” Or, following this logic further, having
once defended against attack, a victim may not physically resist again or her
successive defense, as perceived by the majority, will present a serial “abuse”
and thus a threat of “further abuse” under the statute. Either way, the
majority’s construction is unlikely to be a reflection of legislative
intent.

[6] Claims of provocation
are best decided case by case. Common experience in family and district
court demonstrates that relatives, roommates, housemates, dates and lovers are,
in fact, quite capable of unjustified aggression, despite the majority’s
characterization of that reality as mythical.

In any event, plaintiff’s testimony obviates the
majority’s worry that legitimate abuse claims could be sidetracked by contests
over title to property. It was undisputed that defendant owned the dog
and plaintiff did not. Notwithstanding the majority’s suggestion that an
aggressor’s domination over another’s property might somehow deter or demean a
victim’s claim of title, ante, ¶ 13 n.2, no law favors physical control
of property over testimony of contrary ownership. In any event, such
competing claims are resolved daily in the trial courts.

[7]
Absent any culpability on the part of defendant for his exercise of force to
recover his dog, it is unclear that plaintiff could satisfy her burden to prove
that defendant unlawfully “abused” her in the first instance. Without
such an initial instance of abuse, there may be no predicate “abuse” in
evidence to make defendant’s alleged stalking afterwards a “further
abuse” as required for a final relief-from-abuse order under 15 V.S.A. §
1103(c) (emphasis added).

[8]CfBowman v.
Brown, 55 Vt.184, 185 (1882) (stating the equally ancient rule that when
one’s property is discovered already in the possession of another, the owner
may not break the peace and “ ‘fight himself’ into
legal possession,” but must resort to legal process to regain possession).