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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000459
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2014
TAGS: PRELUNSCPGOVUNMOVICIZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: PERRICOS PRESSES SECURITY COUNCIL TO
CLOSE UNMOVIC
REF: STATE 34758
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Begin Summary. In his briefing to the UNSC, Acting
UNMOVIC Chairman Demitrius Perricos urged the UNSC to address
UNMOVIC's mandate and discussed in detail his concerns about
the chemical weapons (CW) site at Muthanna. He also
highlighted Iraq's failure to engage thus far on this file.
Almost all UNSC members said it is time to review UNMOVIC's
mandate three years after the overthrow of Saddam's regime
and to close the organization, although there was varying
interest in retaining some of the mission's expertise and
functions. There was some frustration, especially among the
newly elected members, that the UNSC had not acted on the
issue. Council members were generally enthusiastic about
UNMOVIC's plans for a training manual for weapons inspectors,
the organization of its archives, and the possible
publication of the Compendium summary as a UNSC document.
China, France and the UK spoke only briefly. It appears that
they want the P5 to agree to next steps on UNMOVIC before the
full Council substantively addresses the issue. In contrast,
Russian PR Denisov, referring to recent talks between
Perricos and FM Lavrov, proposed UNMOVIC submission to the
UNSC of a complete report on Iraqi disarmament, based upon
the classified ISG report, ISG-UNMOVIC meetings, and
inspection of Iraqi sites. He also urged a transitional
period during which UNMOVIC would help the Iraqis create a
national import/export regime, and called for new inspections
of the WMD sites in Iraq. Ambassador Sanders, noting the
primary focus in Iraq has properly been the electoral process
and government formation, provided an update on efforts to
safeguard Muthanna and said we are not yet ready to publish
the compendium summary as a UNSC document. End Summary.
Perricos Statement
------------------
¶2. (C) Reporting Period - Key Events: Perricos introduced to
the UNSC the SYG's quarterly report on UNMOVIC (S/2006/133),
which covers activities December 1 - February 28. Perricos
said he met with Russian FM Lavrov and DFM Yakovenko in
Moscow in February and Lavrov had reiterated to him that the
Iraq WMD file should be closed with a UNSCR and with Iraqi
involvement. Perricos said that he had told Lavrov UNMOVIC
stands prepared to assist at UNSC invitation and had asked
the UNSC to review UNMOVIC's mandate as soon as possible.
Perricos said the Iraqi authorities have not responded to his
September 2005 letter requesting a dialogue between UNMOVIC
and the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD).
¶3. (C) Compendium Summary: Noting that the summary of the
Compendium was completed and is intended to be a broad view
of lessons learned, and that it carefully avoids the
inclusion of sensitive information, Perricos said the College
of Commissioners wants the summary published as a UNSC
document and asked the UNSC to agree this request.
¶4. (C) Archives: Perricos said the College had an initial
discussion of archiving UNMOVIC's sensitive materials and
thanked the U.S., UK and France for briefing in capitals on
national archive procedures. He said the archives must
balance the competing needs for access of historians and
protection of sensitive information.
¶5. (C) Training: Perricos reported that training continued
during the reporting period. Brazil is currently training
experts in biological weapons (BW) inspection regimes, France
will soon host a training on inspection of ballistic
missiles, and Argentina hosted a training in inspections of
solid propellant production sites in November. Perricos said
UNMOVIC would produce a training manual for weapons
inspectors based on its experiences.
¶6. (C) Dual-Use Goods: Perricos said UNMOVIC staff continue
to look for the import into Iraq of dual-use goods that are
subject to monitoring, under UNSCR 1051 (1996), and rely on
open source material. He pointed to the recent report to the
1540 Committee from Iraq that included a commitment to accede
USUN NEW Y 00000459 002 OF 004
to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He welcomed this
commitment, but questioned whether Iraq has the information
or framework necessary to provide the initial declaration
that the CWC would require. He said UNMOVIC would assist
Iraq to prepare this declaration, if requested.
¶7. (C) Muthanna: Noting prior efforts to draw UNSC
attention to previously monitored sites in Iraq, Perricos
said he has particular concerns about the CW Muthanna site
and nearby agricultural activities. He discussed in detail
concerns that two bunkers at Muthanna - the contents of which
were not fully determined by UNSCOM and which were sealed in
1994 - pose a threat to human health and farming activities
in the area. He said UNMOVIC last inspected the site in
March 2003, and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) had reported that
the bunkers were breached and scheduled to be re-sealed.
(NB: In 1994, the bunkers were sealed, and Iraq agreed to a
protocol for their management.) Perricos said he understood
from media reports that the Iraqi government was aware of the
situation at Muthanna, but did not have the resources to
address the problem.
¶8. (C) UNMOVIC Mandate: Perricos urged the UNSC to consider
UNMOVIC's mandate as soon as possible and to consider in its
deliberations: criteria for declaring Iraq disarmed, the
value of independent verification, the ISG report, remaining
uncertainty about Iraqi disarmament, and the need for a
transition to include import/export controls.
P-5 Views
---------
¶9. (C) Russian PR Denisov echoed Perricos' interest in
clarifying Iraq's disarmament formally. He asserted that
UNMOVIC inspectors in the pre-war period and the subsequent
ISG report had shown there were no WMD components; no means
of WMD production; and no WMD program in Iraq. He proposed
that UNMOVIC submit to the UNSC a complete report on the
subject and said preparation of the report might require
UNMOVIC to receive the classified version of the ISG report,
to meet with the ISG and to inspect sites in Iraq. He said
the UNSC must be the body to decide on Iraq's disarmament;
the UNSC assumed responsibility for the issue in the early
1990's and must conclude it. He said the UNSC must consider
the unresolved disarmament issues and ensure that Iraq no
longer poses threat. Denisov also supported Perricos' call
for a transitional period that would include the creation of
a national export/import regime, and he welcomed UNMOVIC's
initiative to help Iraq acceded to international
non-proliferation regimes. He said such cooperation from
Baghdad would inspire greater international confidence in the
new Iraqi authorities.
¶10. (C) Chinese DPR Yishan stayed close to China's previous
points on UNMOVIC. He acknowledged the significant changes
in Iraq since UNMOVIC was established and said China is ready
to participate in a UNSC discussion of UNMOVIC's mandate. He
urged early publication of the compendium to reap the full
benefits of UNMOVIC's efforts.
¶11. (C) In a very brief statement, UK Political-Counselor
Johnson said the UK hopes for early, substantive discussions
of UNMOVIC, and supports publication of the Compendium.
¶12. (C) French Political-Counselor de Riviere said the
compendium should be a useful document, but dissemination
must be controlled, given the information's sensitivity. He
said France is interested in continued training of UNMOVIC
experts, which will be useful for long-term expertise.
Consistent with previous French statements, he expressed
concern about previously monitored sites in Iraq and the
threat posed to local populations. He said France is ready
to discuss the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates, but like China and the
UK, did not push the issue.
¶13. (C) Per reftel, Ambassador Sanders explained that the
focus in Iraq has been on the electoral process and
government formation. She said the UNMOVIC/IAEA mandates no
longer make a useful contribution and should be reconsidered
USUN NEW Y 00000459 003 OF 004
at an appropriate time, per UNSCR 1546. She acknowledged the
request to publish the compendium summary as a document of
the UNSC, but said the U.S. is not yet prepared to agree to
this request. Also drawing on reftel, Ambassador Sanders
updated the UNSC on efforts to secure the CW sites at
Muthanna, including U.S. Corps of Engineers plans to
reinforce the two bunkers and to work with the relevant Iraqi
authorities.
E-10 Views
----------
¶14. (C) Peru: PR de Rivero supported UNSC publication of the
compendium summary and expressed bewilderment that the UNSC
had still not addressed UNMOVIC. He said if there is a
raison d'etre for the organization, its mandate should be
revised; otherwise, it should be closed. He expressed
concern about the UNSC's "culture of non-action" and said the
UNSC must revise the mandate or close UNMOVIC; the status quo
is unacceptable.
¶15. (C) Tanzanian PR Mahiga said the bulk of UNMOVIC's work
is completed with only a few exceptions. He also welcomed
plans to develop a training manual for weapons inspectors,
which could be used by the UN and other organizations, and
the compendium's near-completion. He queried the
proliferation risk posed by Iraqi scientists and the value of
training UNMOVIC staff, if the organization will soon close.
(Note: Perricos subsequently answered that the U.S. and EU
are funding programs to re-tool Iraqi scientists. He said he
had no details about these programs, but that he would
welcome such information. Perricos said UNMOVIC would
continue to train its experts, until the UNSC revises or ends
its mandate. He said the training would be useful, if the
UNSC asks UNMOVIC to continue or if UNMOVIC experts become
part of a UN roster, as many UNSC members have previously
suggested would be useful. End Note.)
¶16. (C) Congolese Minister-Counselor Okio said the UNSC
should review UNMOVIC's mandate, since the work it was
mandated to do had been completed, and should decide if there
are additional tasks for UNMOVIC. He echoed Perricos'
concerns about Muthanna and questioned whether the Iraqis
created a national monitoring system or were otherwise
cooperating with UNMOVIC. (Note: Perricos said he had no
additional information about the NMD and reiterated that he
had received no Iraqi response to his September 2005 letter.
End Note.)
¶17. (C) Greek Minister Counselor Papadopoulou said Athens
looks forward to the compendium and UNMOVIC's training
manual. She also welcomed UNMOVIC's work on its archives.
She said she expects the UNSC to discuss UNMOVIC's mandate
sooner rather than later and that retention of lessons
learned should be part of this discussion.
¶18. (C) Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng expressed concern about
UNMOVIC's "legal limbo" since March 2003 and repeated UNSC
commitments to address the issue. He said the UNSC must
decide on Iraq's disarmament and UNMOVIC's mandate. He urged
a transition period when UNMOVIC could help the new Iraqi
government and expressed support for UNSC publication of the
compendium summary. He welcomed UNMOVIC willingness to help
Iraq accede to the CWC and urged the UNSC to consider how
best to use UNMOVIC expertise. He suggested the organization
could be retained as a standby, permanent inspection unit.
He expressed concern about the Muthanna site and the need for
the Iraqi authorities to implement the appropriate protocols.
¶19. (C) Japanese DPR Kitaoka said UNSC discussion of
UNMOVIC's mandate is long overdue, and his government stands
ready to participate in the discussion. He welcomed UNMOVIC
efforts on its archives and the compendium.
¶20. (C) Slovak PR Burian welcomed UNMOVIC efforts to close
the Iraq WMD file and U.S. efforts to address concerns about
Muthanna; he urged the Iraqis also to take the necessary
steps. As Chair of the 1540 Committee, he urged Iraq to
accede to the CWC and all other non-proliferation instruments
USUN NEW Y 00000459 004 OF 004
and advised the UNSC to draw lessons from UNMOVIC for other
UN bodies, including his own committee.
¶21. (C) Danish DPR Faaborg-Andersen said, given the current
circumstances, a review of the UNMOVIC mandate is long
overdue, and consultations should begin, with an eye to
closing UNMOVIC in consultation with Iraqi authorities. He
also said the UNSC should consider what UNMOVIC expertise
might be retained.
¶22. (C) Qatari Minister-Counselor Al-Bader supported closure
of UNMOVIC, given the lack of Iraqi threat, and said Iraq
needs rebuilding more than anything else. He asked how
UNMOVIC's training is funded. (Note. Perricos subsequently
recalled that all UNMOVIC activities, including training, are
funded by the OFF escrow account. End Note.)
¶23. (C) Argentine PR Mayoral agreed that the UNMOVIC/IAEA
mandates should be reviewed, since the issue has been
outstanding for some time, and with the new constitutionally
elected government, it is time to move ahead.
BOLTON