Putin's Navy, Ch&aacute;vez's Ambition, and the Caribbean Adventure

About the Authors

Mackenzie EaglenResearch Fellow for National Security Studies, Allison Center for Foreign Policy StudiesDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

Almost half a century after the Cuban missile crisis, the
Russian navy is coming to the Americas. While the mood in
Washington is far from panicked, neither is it mirthful. There is a
sense of discomfort and dissatisfaction with the voyage of the
Russian flotilla and concern about where U.S.-Russian and
hemispheric relations are headed.

In the coming weeks, media attention will focus on the passage
of the Russian squadron into Caribbean waters, where in November it
will conduct joint exercises with the Venezuelan navy. Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez extols growing military ties with
Russia as a means to escape from under the thumb of U.S. hegemony
and to build a multi-polar world. Subsequently, one can count on
Chávez to maximize the publicity value of the Russian
fleet's presence in American waters and to continue flaunting his
anti-American agenda and growing connections with Russia.
Incidentally, state and municipal elections will take place on
November 23 in Venezuela. For the Russians, the naval maneuvers
appear to be a form of payback for U.S. support for the democratic
nation of Georgia and for the presence of U.S. warships in the
Black Sea.

Showing the Russian Flag (Again)

On September 22, four surface warships departed from Russia's
Northern Fleet home base in Severomorsk for the 15,000-mile journey
to the warm waters of the Caribbean. The fleet is led by the
nuclear-powered guided missile battle cruiser PyotrVelikiy (Peter the Great).When fully armed, it is a
formidable warship able to carry at least 400 missiles and
anti-submarine warfare weapons, including 20 P-700 Granit (SS-N-19
"Shipwreck," according to NATO), which are heavy supersonic
anti-ship cruise missiles with a maximum range of 300 nautical
miles. The SS-N-19 can be armed with either a 750-kilogram
conventional or a 500-kiloton nuclear warhead. The battle cruiser
can carry three helicopters and has an endurance of 60 days and a
maximum speed of 32 knots.

Sailing with the battle cruiser is a destroyer, the Admiral
Chabanenko, whose main armament consists of eight supersonic
anti-ship cruise missiles of the P-270 Moskit (SS-N-22 "Sunburn")
type with ranges of approximately 120 kilometers and capable of
carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads.

This Russian naval force is accompanied by two support ships and
may be soon joined by a Russian patrol ship from its Baltic
Fleet.

Russian officials claim the joint maneuvers were planned at
least a month before the Russian invasion of Georgia and have only
defensive and deterrent missions. Yet to drive home the point of
tighter Russian-Venezuelan military relations, Chávez met
with Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev September 25-26 in
Russia, winning a promise of a $1 billion credit for arms
purchases, deepened energy cooperation, and, potentially,
"peaceful" nuclear cooperation. This new deal comes on top of
multi-billion-dollar arms commitments agreed to in July.

No Panic in the Pentagon

The Russian naval exercises in Caribbean waters come on the
heels of the recent deployment of two TU-160 Russian strategic
bombers-escorted by NATO fighter jets-to Venezuela. While the
temporary presence of this naval force in the Caribbean constitutes
a symbolic challenge to the U.S. traditional naval hegemony in the
region, the Pentagon understands that the effort to fly the Russian
flag in the Caribbean is more gesture than strategy, more symbolism
than substance. However, Russia is likely to pursue a permanent
naval base in Venezuela and revive an electronic intelligence
collection facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

U.S. military leaders, notably Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have recently tried to downplay
tensions between the U.S. and Russian militaries. Admiral Mullen
told the Los Angeles Times editorial board on September 22
that it is in the best long-term interest of both countries to
eventually resume military exercises and visits. The dispatch of
the Russian fleet, however, is not being interpreted as a
conciliatory gesture.

U.S. Southern Command, the Fourth Fleet, and the
Caribbean

Current U.S. maritime strategy looks to working with
international partners as the basis for global maritime security.
It is employing naval forces to build confidence and trust among
nations through collective maritime security efforts that focus on
common threats and mutual interests. Toward these ends, in July,
the U.S. re-established the Fourth Fleet.

The establishment of the Fourth Fleet highlights the importance
of the Caribbean region to the U.S. and is contributing to security
and stability through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Southern Command's focus on engagement, investment, and partnership
with countries underscores the United States' shared interests and
lasting commitment to the region.

For the past six months, however, Chávez, Fidel Castro,
and others have equated this minor realignment of U.S. naval forces
in the Caribbean-the standing up of the Fourth Fleet-with a renewed
plan for Latin American interventions; even land-locked Bolivia's
Evo Morales railed against "the fourth fleet of intervention."
Chávez and his ilk obtain nationalist mileage and unflagging
media coverage when they warn about U.S. efforts to destabilize or
invade their countries. Gringo-bashing remains a crudely
transparent tool for personal aggrandizement and creating
polarized, fear-ridden societies like in Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua,
or Venezuela.

Yet for all the media hoopla, which has rapidly subsided, the
reestablishment of the Fourth Fleet hardly constituted aggressive
military posturing. Rather, it involved the creation of a new
two-star admiral position, re-assignment of less than 100 mainly
planning and administrative personnel, and no increase in warships
beyond those already assigned to the fleet's home harbor at
Mayport, Florida.

Chávez and others continue to cling to old geopolitical
expressions rarely used in Washington. For instance, Admiral James
Stavridis, commander of U.S. Southern Command, notes that the
Caribbean, along with the Gulf of Mexico, is not our "back yard"
but a "shared home." Indeed, the Caribbean is an international
maritime space vital to the economic health and vitality of the
U.S. and 23 other sovereign nations, large and small, that border
it. Over its waters flow the life substances of modern global
economies: manufactures, energy products, food stuffs, and tourists
valued in the trillions of dollars. Approximately 6 million barrels
of oil enter the U.S. through the Gulf of Mexico every day. The
security challenges are significant but have not-at least until
now-involved confrontations between rival navies. The real security
challenges include:

Preventing illicit maritime activity;

Combating narcotics trafficking;

Preventing transnational terrorism;

Dealing with illegal mass migration; and

Developing responses to natural disasters and humanitarian
crises.

The mission of Southern Command and a forward-looking
interagency, military-civilian strategy is to use a mix of "soft"
and "hard" power to meet these 21st century threats.

MeetingGeopolitical and Transnational
Challenges

The approach of the Russian squadron is not a cause for undue
concern. It is, nonetheless, emblematic of the growing complexity
of the challenges-both geopolitical and transnational-the U.S.
faces closer to home in vital Caribbean waters. The dispatch of the
Russia squadron is a throwback to an age of non-cooperative power
rivalries and zero-sum global confrontation.
Subsequently, the White House, Pentagon, and Congress need to do
the following:

Remain vigilant and monitor closely the return of Russian
military assets to the Western Hemisphere.

Consider a bipartisan response to the creation or
reestablishment of permanent Russian bases or intelligence
facilities in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba.

Redouble U.S. diplomatic efforts to work with Brazil, Chile,
and others to avoid injecting a competitive arms race and a hostile
military presence into South America.

Congress specifically should do the following:

Lend greater attention to the Caribbean and to the resources
and program for our vital "Third Border."

Ray Walser, Ph.D.,
is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America and Mackenzie M. Eaglen is
Senior Policy Analyst for National Security in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.