American Airlines, Inc., under 14 CFR 302.12, hereby moves that the enclosed Form 41, Schedule B-7 for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 be accorded confidential treatment and be withheld from public disclosure. The information for which confidential treatment is requested pertains to American's airframes and aircraft engine acquisitions and retirements.

American Eagle Airlines, Inc., under 14 CFR 302.12, hereby moves that the enclosed Form 41, Schedule B-7 for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 be accorded confidential treatment and be withheld from public disclosure. The information for which confidential treatment is requested pertains to American Eagle's airframes and aircraft engine acquisitions and retirements.

We have received a copy of your "formal" complaint against Prospect International Airport Services alleging lack of adequate disability-related training of employees that are contracted to provide passenger services to a coalition of airlines at the San Francisco International Airport. We have had difficulty in reaching you on the telephone to discuss this complaint.

The complaint that you submitted has a number of problems. First, it was not filed with the U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets Office as required under the formal complaint procedures outlined in 14 CFR Part 302. In addition, it does not appear that all the relevant parties have been properly served. Also, the complaint is against the carriers' contract provider and our authority is over the carriers, not their contractor.

Please be advised that our Firm represents Prospect International Airport Services, Inc., a Nevada corporation in regards o a Letter of Complaint dated November 5, 2007 forwarded to your office by each of Abraham Cruz, Wendy Fong, Emmanuel Foronda and Maria Lousia Sarte.

It is the understanding of Prospect that the Complaint has been docketed as received as of February 29, 2008 by the Department of Transportation. While Prospect has not received any notification from the DOT of the docketing of this Complaint, Prospect has been made aware that the Complaint has been docketed by several of the IT Airlines and Prospect has received a copy of the docketed Complaint from one of the IT Airlines with the DOT's docketing stamp on it.

The allegations set forth in the Complaint are wholly without merit. As will be demonstrated herein. Prospect does provide adequate training for its employees, both in writing and in person training. Prospect does not request its employees to push two wheelchairs simultaneously and complies with the recent written direction of Tryg McCoy, Deputy Airport Director of Operations & Security dated September 27, 2007 and Prospect does provide properly maintained and safe equipment. In fact. Prospect's safety record for wheelchair services provided at SFO to the passengers of IT Airlines will clearly demonstrate that Prospect and its employees provide services in an extremely safe maimer. The allegations in the Complaint are groundless and should be dismissed.

I appreciate your assistance in filing our complaint in the DOT Dockets Office. I would like to, however, clarify a misunderstanding in your letter. You informed us in your letter that "the complaint is against the carriers' contract provider and our authority is over the carriers, not their contractor." In fact, our complaint named Prospect Airport Services as well as airlines at SFO's International Terminal as respondents. Enclosed are copies of the original letter and complaint faxed to the airlines.

As someone who has worked at SFO for 9 years, I have been witness to the lack of high standards concerning services provided to disabled and senior passengers. It is my hope that the Department of Transportation will thoroughly investigate our complaint to ensure that all airlines provide adequate and quality service to all passengers.

This letter by Mr. Foronda does nothing more than try to keep alive some allegations which have previously been made and which have no merit or basis in fact Prospect will continue to respond on behalf of itself and each of the individual airlines which it services at this location. In fact, I would like to point out to you that the copy of the letter which was forwarded to Prospect contains a fax number which belongs to SCIU Local 1877. Prospect views this latest letter as another attempt by SCIU Local 1877 to try and obtain some leverage over the contract for the International Terminal at your location.

I would also like to point out to you that this letter is signed by Mr. Foronda who claims to have worked at San Francisco International Airport for nine years and has been a passenger service assistant to disabled and senior passengers during that time. It is quite remarkable that Mr. Foronda would continue to work in a position where he claims that there is a lack of high standards concemmg safety to those variom passengers which he services.

At no time has Prospect ever had an issue with a safety of the airline passengers and its record in that regard is one of the best in the industry. I can only refer you and each of the airlines to the information which is contained in Prospect's detailed Response which sets forth the fact that Prospect has provided services to each of the airlines and their passengers in an extrranely safe and efficient manner. Prospect will continue to provide its services to the airlines and their passengers in this maimer. At the same time. Prospect will continue to respond to these false and baseless allegations on its behalf as well as each of the airlines it services.

I received a copy of the 10 page fax that has been sent to all of you from the SEIU 's fax number and I would like to address this. Our company has done business at the San Francisco International Airport since September 2000. We have been a good vendor, doing our best to provide responsive service to our customers in an international environment that has many varied needs. We have been a good employer, abiding by the QSP, and addressing employee concerns as they are brought to us. We have negotiated a contract with the SEIU, which we now work under. We have abided by the one passenger, one wheelchair rule once it was instated. We have addressed every Issue that has ever been brought to us and responded appropriately. This DOT complaint was brought forward last November, when Union negotiations were very heated. At that time, I had our attorney respond to the DOT and to each one of you. Your airlines were assured that we would represent them In this response. It is very sad that the SEIU would be faxing this complaint as if it was new or ongoing. I can assure it is not. I have also asked our attorney to respond on our behalf and I am attaching his letter to mine.

Prospect is a quality company. It was started by my father over forty years ago and our reputation is exemplary. Safety is a priority and we care deeply about the customers and passengers we service. I am sure there Is a motive In sending out negative, untrue allegations at this time. Everyone is aware that this contract is being bid out. I want to assure you that your business is important to us and we will do our best for you every single day as we have in the past.

The City of Houston and the Greater Houston Partnership respectfully submit this answer in support of the application of Continental Airlines, Inc. for the U.S.-Brazil combination frequencies that become available on June 1, 2009, which Continental proposes to utilize for daily flights between Houston and Rio de Janeiro (with single flight number service behind Houston to New Orleans). Houston enthusiastically welcomes Continental’s plans for this service, strongly supports the application, and urges that it be granted promptly.

Delta hereby files this Motion to Withhold From Public Disclosure certain commercially and competitively sensitive information contained in Delta's Form 41 Schedule B-7, Airi'rame and Aircraft Engine Acquisitions and Retirements, for the quarter ending September 30, 2008.

On behalf of Alaska Airlines, Inc., I would request a postponement of the submission deadline for EAS proposals from Dec 10, 2008 until Jan 10, 2009. The person at Alaska in charge of preparing Alaska's submission is currently immersed in finalizing Alaska's 3rd Q Form 41 submissions and one other high priority project. Alaska is planning to use 3rd Q data so that its proposal reflects the Alaska's most current cost information. Basing our proposal on the most current cost data should also benefit the Department in analyzing Alaska's proposal.

We would also mention that the submission date in prior years for the SE EAS proposals has generally been at the end of January. Therefore, even the January 10 date Alaska is proposing would still provide for an earlier than usual submission date.

In submitting this request so quickly after the issuance of the EAS RFP, Alaska also trusts that no other person will be inconvenienced. Alaska would also be pleased to answer any questions you may have concerning this request.

By Order 2008-11-6 we requested proposals for EAS at Cordova, Gustavus, Petersburg, Wrangell, and Yakutat, Alaska, no later than December 10. By email dated November 13, 2008, Alaska Airlines, Inc., requested an extension to January 10, to file a proposal.

We have decided to grant Alaska Airline's request, as the additional amount of time is not unreasonable. All parties must now file competitive proposals for EAS at one or more of these five communities no later than January 10, 2009.

As we do in all cases when a non-incumbent is selected, we stated in the selection order that we expected Piedmont and Mesaba to coordinate the transition in EAS responsibilities. After issuance of that order, on October 28 Piedmont informed us, as well as Mesaba and the community, that it would continue to provide its service in the Williamsport-Philadelphia market on a subsidy-free basis. The staff contacted Mesaba officials for their reaction to Piedmont’s announcement, and they informed us that they would not inaugurate service as long as Piedmont remained in the market.

In light of these developments, we will vacate our decision to select Mesaba to provide replacement service at Williamsport, and will terminate the subsidy rate for Piedmont’s service beyond the 90-day notice period. We will rely on Piedmont’s subsidy-free service to meet Piedmont’s EAS needs. In that regard, should Piedmont decide at some point in the future to suspend service at Williamsport, it would first have to file a 90-day notice of its intent to suspend service and be subject to being held in until we could secure replacement service.

The vast majority of the air carriers filing international tariffs are large operators with revenues in excess of several million dollars each year. Small air carriers operating aircraft with 60 seats or less and 18,000 pounds payload or less that offer on-demand air-taxi service are not required to file such tariffs.

Part 221 of the Department’s Economic Regulations set forth specific technical and substantive requirements governing the filing of tariff material with the DOT Office of International Aviation’s Pricing and Multilateral Affairs Division. A carrier initiates an electronic tariff filing whenever it wants to amend an existing tariff for commercial and competitive reasons or when it desires to file a new one. Electronic tariffs filed pursuant to part 221 are used by carriers, computer reservation systems, travel agents, DOT, other government agencies and the general public to determine the prices, rules and related charges for international passenger air transportation. In addition, DOT needs U.S. and foreign air carrier passenger tariff information to monitor international air commerce, carry out carrier route selections and conduct international negotiations.

The Joint Applicants request authorization to display SAS’ “SK” designator code on flights operated by them as United Express carriers between points in the United States. Attached hereto as Attachment A is a list of initial markets where code-share services will be operated. The Joint Applicants hereby notify the Department that they intend to begin code-share services with SAS as soon as the necessary regulatory approvals are obtained.

The Joint Applicants have entered into code-share agreements with SAS which provides for their operation of certain United Express flights to carry the “SK” designator code.

While IAPA endorses and supports the collective passenger needs identified relating to Airline On-Board, Terminal and Extended Tarmac Delays, the 400,000 member Association is disappointed that the full Task Force was unable to reach a consensus to incorporate time-specific trigger thresholds for informing passengers of flight status updates, including real-time departure and arrival expectations which, in turn, would afford passengers options for deplaning, returning to the gate, rebooking alternatives, canceling reservations and/or communicating with family or business contacts.

IAPA has actively participated in working group assignments, believing that this Model Contingency Planning "tool" would afford each stakeholder guidelines upon which to adapt their respective passenger need responsibilities, including "trigger" thresholds, with the full recognition that strict time-specific trigger standards cannot be uniformly applied or mandated. However, IAPA believes that such "model" time-specific trigger thresholds are essential for prompting customer contact to address passenger needs. Consequently, IAPA respectfully requests Secretary Peters to consider the inclusion of such guidelines to ensure stakeholder accountability for the expressed intent of recognizing passenger needs during Lengthy Airline On-Board Ground Delays.

The International Airline Passengers Association supports the Plan's comprehensive passenger need requirements relating to Lengthy Airline On-Board Ground Delays. However, the 400,000 member Association is disappointed that Task Force members were unable to reach a consensus to incorporate time-specific trigger event thresholds for communicating real-time departure and arrival updates which, in turn, would afford delayed passengers options for deplaning, returning to the gate, rebooking alternatives, and/or communicating with family or business contacts.

The main component that is missing from the Report, in our opinion, is a set of timelines by which the airlines and airports would be expected by the Department to report their progress in implementing the Report’s recommendations. We understand the reluctance of many participants to agree to anything that appears to be regulatory or mandatory, but without such timelines, the risk exists that the Report will simply become “another government study,” to be shelved with all the others and largely ignored.

For that reason, we strongly urge the Secretary to add to the Report her call for the airlines and airports to report to the Department every six months (from issuance of the Report) on their achievements in developing actual (or modifying existing) contingency plans to address the issues raised in the Report. These progress reports, or a summary of their contents, should be promptly published so that consumers and other interested parties can evaluate the commitment and the progress being made toward real solutions. The time for serious and forceful action on treatment of passengers has come.

The main missing component is timelines by which airlines and airports would be expected to report progress in implementing the Report. We strongly urge the Secretary to issue a call for airlines and airports to make progress reports every six months. Publication of these reports will inform interested parties regarding the commitment and progress being made toward real solutions.

Several airports have already moved forward in implementing many of the measures in the Model Plan, even prior to its issuance. Both Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport and Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport held “diversion workshops” over the last few months to work with their hub airlines and smaller airports that could be affected by delays and diversions. ACI-NA is also planning a series of workshops across the country to brief member airports about the Model Plan and the importance of collaboratively working with airlines, community organizations and federal officials at their airport in the development of contingency plans.

As was amply demonstrated during the Task Force deliberations, only through such successful collaboration, including cooperation from officials with the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Protection will meaningful progress be made in addressing extended tarmac delays.

The Task Force successfully produced a Plan that addresses the majority of issues raised by industry and passenger advocates. We believe it will facilitate better planning, communication and coordination.

Several airports, including DFW and ATL, have already implemented measures in the Plan, even prior to its issuance. ACI-NA is also planning workshops about the Plan and collaborating with airlines, community organizations, FAA, TSA and CBP. Only through such collaboration will meaningful progress be made.

Traditional aircraft deicing can result in significant reductions in ramp operating capacity, whereas periods of lightning results in zero ramp operating capacity. Additionally, the impact of weather is becoming more significant as average passenger load factors grow. This is due to the growing volume of passengers that need to be accommodated as a result of cancelled or delayed flights due to inclement weather. As such, I would recommend that the Federal Aviation Administration be tasked with convening a Task Force to explore the impact of inclement weather on Irregular Operations as well as developing solutions that might address this issue.

In summary, I believe that the Task Force has made a significant contribution to the development of contingency plans for lengthy airline on-board ground delays and that the Flying Public will benefit greatly from the Task Force/s efforts. Finally/opportunities for continued progress exist and can be effectively addressed through similar efforts.

Much has been learned through this effort. First is the recognition that all service providers need to actively participate throughout Irregular Operations events. Additionally, that Communication, Collaboration and Coordination (C3) across all service providers is essential. Also recognized was the need to develop an Irregular Operations Planning Process which engages all service providers prior to! during and after an event.

In our view, the development of a model plan should include permissive language, as it is necessary for the appropriate actors (such as airlines and airports) to develop a contingency plan that can be fashioned to the individual requirements of that carrier or airport. As the discussions of the Task Force have shown, each incident has its own unique circumstances. Each airport and each air carrier have their own unique and separate operational requirements. No one plan can be developed that can adequately address the needs of each and every passenger, carrier or airport. The use of permissive language allows each air carrier to take the Task Force's model and develop their own contingency plan. As the Secretary and the Department consider the recommendations of the Task Force, maximum flexibility should be ensured for the carriers and airports to develop a response plan that best fits their operating circumstances.

This is particularly important for the NACA carriers. The Task Force model plan does not provide any definitions for terms such as "airlines." During our deliberations, NACA raised the issue of what the definition of"airlines" was to entail. After some discussion and further consideration by the Department, it is our understanding that "airlines" refers to all air carriers that are licensed to operate under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Administration's regulations.

While NACA does not object to the broad use of the term "airline," it is important to note that not all Part 121 certificated carriers are alike. This is particularly true for many of the passenger carriers of NACA that operate as public charter or ACMI operators. After reading the Task Force report, there is an implication that all airlines have the same type of operations and capabilities. A reading of the Task Force report is heavily weighted towards the operations of the regularly scheduled passenger carriers.

NACA emphasizes that the development of a model plan should include permissive language, as it is necessary for the appropriate actors (such as airlines and airports) to develop a contingency plan can be fashioned to the individual requirements of that carrier or airport. No one plan can be developed that can adequately address the needs of each and every passenger, carrier or airport. The use of permissive language allows each air carrier to take the Task Force’s model and develop their own contingency plan. As the Secretary and the Department consider the recommendations of the Task Force, maximum flexibility should be ensured for the carriers and airports to develop a response plan that best fits their operating circumstances. This is particularly important for the NACA carriers. While charter and ACMI operators are extremely customer focused, they have completely different type of operational structure from the legacy carriers. Maximum flexibility must be afforded for these carriers to develop their plans.

It is not unexpected that widely differing views were voiced on a number of the issues brought before the Task Force. Yet we believe that the Task Force presentation and discussion process has worked to better bring the parties together in their understanding of the human and operational issues involved when lengthy airline on-board ground delays regrettably occur, as they will for reasons beyond anyone’s control and despite the best efforts of airlines, airports and the government agencies involved in air transportation. The RAA and its member airlines believe that the approaches and guidelines presented in this National Task Force report provide the information and support necessary to facilitate improvements to the care provided to airline passengers when these events occur.

1. Contingency plans for lengthy onboard delays must reflect the network nature of the U.S. domestic airline system;
2. Regional airline responses to such delays must be extensively coordinated with those of their major airline partners;
3. Since most lengthy on-board ground delays result from weather events or other ATC-related situations, the FAA’s role is significant in their resolution;
4. TSA and CBP policy and practice also impacts how delay or diversion situations can be handled;
5. In allocating scarce airport resources, regional airlines most not be disadvantaged by their typically limited airport presence during planning exercises or during delay or diversion situations.

I am signing The Tarmac Delay Task Force plan on behalf of the Washington Airports Task Force with reservations, as the plan is seriously deficient in a number of areas. The plan provides a useful recommendation for airline, airport and federal agencies working to handle tarmac delays. The plan correctly and consistently stresses the need for a team approach by all aviation stakeholders at an airport and its diversionary sites and stresses the need for situational awareness. However, the plan is silent on a number of important aspects of tarmac delays.

1. Nowhere does the report define an “extended tarmac delay,” nor does it require each airport team to provide a definition for its own location. How can one manage what one cannot measure?
2. The report recommends no limit on the time a passenger can be confined in a delayed aircraft.
3. The report is not framed against the bigger issue. It does not, for example, acknowledge in a preamble the underlying cause of tarmac delays, which is the nation’s failure to implement FAA plans to provide adequate air traffic control (Next Gen) and airport capacity to meet our travel demands. (Implementation of these improvements will create jobs and generate a major economic magnifier. It is thus surprising that they are not being vigorously pursued by the Congress and the White House.)
4. The plan does not offer recommendations on how to prevent or at least minimize such delays
from occurring.

The Task Force staff has imposed an arbitrary limitation of 100 words on our Coalition's comments to be presented personally to you along with the final version of the Task Force report. Even though our passenger coalition has endured its minority and greatly outnumbered position among the Task Force's membership, our recommendations will not be included in the executive summary to be presented to you because we have exceeded that number of words. In fact, we had condensed our comments (below) to the greatest extent possible, consistent with our raising three issues for your personal attention.

Although the Task Force Report includes information that could be useful to local airport committees developing contingency plans to respond to long on-board tarmac delays, CAPBOR is opposed to your release of the Report as drafted, for three reasons. First, the Report does not recognize the right of passengers to be deplaned after a tarmac delay of any number of hours, assuming the option of being deplaned can be achieved safely. In our view, tarmac strandings after a certain amount of time constitute involuntary passenger imprisonment, and we ask you specifically to override the Task Force majority view in this regard.

Second, the FAA will not agree to consider tasking its Air Traffic Control staff with minimizing the queuing on tarmacs for excessive periods of time of departing airline aircraft by imposing "gate holds" when a substantial delay is certain or highly probable. FAA regulations defer all such decisions to the airline, no matter how long the pre-departure delay will be. FAA's mindset continues to be centered on the movement of "aluminum tubes," without any apparent regulatory interest in the passengers trapped on board. We ask that you ask the FAA Acting Administrator to reconsider various FAA positions in Chapter 5.

Third, airline passengers are concerned that you will not require the industry to implement contingency plans when the final Task Force Report is issued. As one commenter noted, "By allowing airlines to provide lip service to guidelines [in the Task Force Report] that they 'should' but are not 'required' to adhere to makes this entire document useless to the traveling public...."

ACAA applauds the Department for inviting multiple aviation parties to participate in the Task Force meetings. As a result, the Task Force addressed the views of all parties.

However, the Department also needs to ensure that passengers traveling on all carriers at an airport are provided similar protections. Moreover, the FAA should not impose longer air traffic delays on carriers with a few flights per day than it does on carriers with hundreds of flights at the same airport. By taking these steps, all passengers and communities will be provided support and protections when delays occur.

Airlines recognize that despite their best efforts extended onboard ground delays will occur periodically for reasons beyond anyone’s control. What is important, however, is that customers are properly cared for during those events, and the contingency planning guidelines facilitate that care. The document reflects the ability of airlines and other stakeholders to work collaboratively to improve customer service and overcome sharply disparate views on many elements of the document. The success of the Task Force clearly demonstrates that not every problem requires a new law or regulation to solve, especially when it comes to operational and customer-service issues.

The Airport community has always been a willing partner in proving quality customer service. As such, there is an associated cost with those services that airports may be expected to provide. Depending on the type of use and lease agreements airports have with airlines, there may be a need to either make Delay Committee responsibilities and services part of tenant rates and charges, or they may need to invoice the involved carrier on a case by case basis. In either case, the service provided will make the passenger and overall flying experience less stressful.

Northwest hereby files this Motion to Withhold From Public Disclosure certain commercially and competitively sensitive information contained in Northwest's Form 41 Schedule B-7, Airframe and Aircraft Engine Acquisitions and Retirements, for the quarter ending September 30, 2008.

"Akron-Canton Airport doesn't offer a direct flight to Washington, DC. The airport hopes to hear from the US Department of Transportation soon whether US Airways will get a coveted opening at Ronald Reagan National Airport for a direct flight from Akron, said spokeswoman Kristie Van Auken."

We have tentatively decided to award Spirit the seven frequencies at issue here, along with underlying economic authority, to provide combination services in the Ft. Lauderdale-Medellin market. We also tentatively conclude that the record in this proceeding supports the selection of American for backup authority to the primary award to Spirit.

We tentatively conclude that Spirit’s proposal for the first-ever nonstop Ft. Lauderdale-Medellin service would introduce beneficial competition in the South Florida-Medellin market by establishing first-time U.S.-flag competition with the double-daily Miami-Medellin services of American, while also providing competition with Avianca’s daily Miami-Medellin service. Specifically, Spirit’s proposed service would offer the significant South Florida-Medellin traffic base an attractive alternative option to the existing services of American and Avianca from Miami, providing competition for Medellin traffic between the two airports. In addition, the record indicates that a large population that is geographically located in the vicinity of Ft. Lauderdale could potentially benefit from the availability of more convenient Medellin service from Ft. Lauderdale rather than Miami. Spirit’s proposal would also provide new competition in the overall U.S.-Medellin market, as American and Avianca have long been primarily the only carriers that have offered U.S.-Medellin service. Moreover, an award to Spirit would improve the overall U.S.-Colombia market structure by promoting a wider variety of U.S.-Colombia services, enhancing the competitive stance of a newer entrant carrier against a more established incumbent.

By comparison, American’s proposal, which would add a third daily flight to its already existing twice-daily Miami-Bogota service, offers markedly fewer competitive benefits. Also, while we recognize that the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale-Bogota market is the largest overall U.S.-Colombia O&D market, and that it is larger than the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale-Medellin market, it also currently enjoys far more service. There is also substantially more U.S.-Bogota service available overall, with U.S. and foreign carriers together providing an average of more than 12 daily nonstop flights in the U.S.-Bogota market, as compared to only four daily nonstop U.S.-Medellin flights. In addition, U.S.-Bogota services will soon be increasing to an average of more than 14 flights a day, when Delta institutes its New York (JFK)-Bogota service and JetBlue institutes its Orlando-Bogota service, on or before December 18, 2008 and February 15, 2009, respectively.

We have reviewed American’s arguments concerning its proposed greater capacity and its more extensive connecting services at Miami. However, in this case we have tentatively determined that the valuable competitive benefits of Spirit’s first-ever U.S.-flag competition to American’s Miami-Medellin service, as well as the positive effect that it would have on the overall U.S.-Colombia market structure, outweighs the benefits of adding a third daily flight in a market that already has considerable service, including service to on-line connecting points.

We direct any interested parties having objections to our tentative findings and conclusions set forth in this order and in ordering paragraphs 1 through 2 above, to file their objections in the above-captioned dockets no later than seven calendar days from the date of service of this order; answers thereto shall be filed no later than four calendar days thereafter.