This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at
the same time purports to account for "everything". But are there
really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of

- misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this;
- as yet potential understanding
- a total lack of understanding.

That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a certain
*material* form which is universal, but it is subject to interpretation,
that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person, and different people at
different times will ascribe different meanings to it. But the meaning
of the word "material" is what is outside of consciousness and
independent of activity. The independent existence of the material world
is what makes science possible.

And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so
if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need
to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be
mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.)
I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your
schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns.

By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a sensation
which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate and mediated.
This is what I take to be the core meaning of "dual-stimulation." Were
you to be subject to an unmediated sensation (maybe soon after you were
born) then it would have no meaning for you and would therefore be no
sensation at all. But if it has a meaning, that is because of the
mediation of the sensation by aspects of your consciousness.

Here of course the mediation being talked of is not artefact-mediation. :)
Andy

Ah! I see!
As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature
or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both
immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone
saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is
appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky,
that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially
productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in
the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with
artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost.
Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were
referring to you used some expression other than "mediation."
Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do
what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever -
but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can
choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce
them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as
well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects,
their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So
communication as much as miscommunication takes place through
everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I
am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too
mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So
all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis
which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh?
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
Huw Lloyd wrote:
If you want to study how action changes then you need to study
the history and production of the action. Under such
circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the
production of) actions become more obviously false. If one
has simplified, through "clarity", the action away from its
genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept
cannot mediate an action.
The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an
elegant way to demonstrate this.
Best,
Huw
On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
he, he, Huw!
For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very
problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I
really
don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being
used to
obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to
separation.
I really don't know what you are referring to with product and
history. Perhaps you could explain?
Andy

*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
Huw Lloyd wrote:
I agree about precision, but not with a call for
"clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or
reification of the
need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
typologies or
other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and
perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases
such as
these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements
between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally
appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one
needs to
obfuscate (see darkly) too.
I think it is this "need for simplification" which
leads me to
disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why
separate
the act from its production and history? Of
course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from
modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem.
Best,
Huw
On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT
tradition
specifically, as opposed to the English language
in general,
mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
course, every
action
is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive
contexts,
"mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite
legitimately,
but with no special significant for the use of
CHAT. In social
theory, for example, mediation of activities by other
activities
or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of
actions by
artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if
the topic is
psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
central, that I
prefer to spell it out and use the term
"artefact-mediated" rather
than the vague term "mediated".
I have come across usages like "mediated by
such-and-such a
concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use
words to
mean what
you like, but I find a formulation like this in
the context of
CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of
"mediation" in
the most general sense in a way which obscures the
fact that a
concept is not immediately present in any act of
communication or
any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*.
Artefacts,
such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
concept, can of
course mediate an act of communication. But the
point is
that a
word is not universally and unproblematically a
sign for
any one
concept. It means different things to different
people.
Concepts
are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their
materiality,
but particular in their meaning. So when we have a
concept
in mind
when we use a word in communication, the
communication is
mediated
by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake
not to be
aware
of that.
So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always
used in
qualified
way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
Andy
PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
comment, too.