The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to address entrenched racial
discrimination in voting, "an insidious and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U. S. 301, 309. Section 2 of the Act, which bans any "standard,
practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color,"
42 U. S. C. § 1973(a), applies nationwide, is permanent, and is not at issue
in this case. Other sections apply only to some parts of the country.
Section 4 of the Act provides the "coverage formula," defining the "covered
jurisdictions" as States or political subdivisions that maintained tests or
devices as prerequisites to voting, and had low voter registration or
turnout, in the 1960s and early 1970s. § 1973b(b). In those covered
jurisdictions, § 5 of the Act provides that no change in voting procedures
can take effect until approved by specified federal authorities in
Washington, D. C. § 1973c(a). Such approval is known as "preclearance."

The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were initially set to
expire after five years, but the Act has been reauthorized several times. In
2006, the Act was reauthorized for an additional 25 years, but the coverage
formula was not changed. Coverage still turned on whether a jurisdiction had
a voting test in the 1960s or 1970s, and had low voter registration or
turnout at that time. Shortly after the 2006 reauthorization, a Texas
utility district sought to bail out from the Act's coverage and, in the
alternative, challenged the Act's constitutionality. This Court resolved the
challenge on statutory grounds, but expressed serious doubts about the Act's
continued
constitutionality. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U. S. 193.

Petitioner Shelby County, in the covered jurisdiction of Alabama, sued the
Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington, D. C., seeking a
declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 are facially unconstitutional,
as well as a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The District
Court upheld the Act, finding that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was
sufficient to justify reauthorizing § 5 and continuing § 4(b)'s coverage
formula. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. After surveying the evidence in the
record, that court accepted Congress's conclusion that § 2 litigation
remained inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the rights of
minority voters, that § 5 was therefore still necessary, and that the
coverage formula continued to pass constitutional muster.

Held: Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula
can no longer be used as a basis [**657] for subjecting jurisdictions to
pre-clearance. [***2] Pp. 9-25.

(a) In Northwest Austin, this Court noted that the Voting Rights Act
"imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs" and
concluded that "a departure [*2616] from the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets."
557 U. S., at 203. These basic principles guide review of the question
presented here. Pp. 9-17.

(1) State legislation may not contravene federal law. States retain broad
autonomy, however, in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative
objectives. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment re serves to the States all powers
not specifically granted to the Federal Government, including "the power to
regulate elections." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461-462. There is
also a "fundamental principle of equal sovereignty" among the States, which
is highly pertinent in assessing disparate treatment of States. NorthwestAustin, supra, at 203.

The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It
requires States to beseech the Federal Government for permission to
implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute
on their own. And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act
applies to only nine States (and additional counties). That is why, in 1966,
this Court described the Act as "stringent" and "potent," Katzenbach,
383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337. The Court nonetheless upheld the Act,
concluding that such an "uncommon exercise of congressional power" could be
justified by "exceptional conditions." Id., at 334. Pp. 9-12.

(2) In 1966, these departures were justified by the "blight of racial
discrimination in voting" that had "infected the electoral process in parts
of our country for nearly a century," Katzenbach, 383 U. S. ___, at 308. At
the time, the coverage formula — the means of linking the exercise of the
unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted it — made sense. The
Act was limited to areas where Congress found "evidence of actual voting
discrimination," and the covered jurisdictions shared two characteristics:
"the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in
the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national
average." Id., at 330. The Court explained that "[t]ests and devices are
relevant to voting discrimination because of their long history as a tool
for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is pertinent for the obvious
reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number
of actual voters." Ibid. The Court therefore concluded that "the coverage
formula [was] rational in both practice and theory." Ibid. Pp. 12-13.

(3) Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Largely because
of the Voting Rights Act, "[v]oter turnout and registration rates" in
covered jurisdictions "now [**658] approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory
evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels." Northwest Austin, supra, at 202. The tests and
devices that blocked ballot access have been forbidden nationwide for over
40 years. [***3] Yet the Act has not eased § 5's restrictions or narrowed the scope
of § 4's coverage formula along the way. Instead those extraordinary and
unprecedented features have been reauthorized as if nothing has changed, and
they have grown even stronger. Because § 5 applies only to those
jurisdictions singled out by § 4, the Court turns to consider that
provision. Pp. 13-17.

(1) In 1966, the coverage formula was "rational in both practice and
theory." Katzenbach, supra, at 330. It looked to cause (discriminatory
tests) and effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the
remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both. By 2009,
however, the "coverage formula raise[d] serious constitutional questions."
Northwest Austin, supra, at 204. Coverage today is based on decades-old data
and eradicated practices. The formula captures States by reference to
literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early
1970s. But such tests have been banned for over 40 years. And voter
registration and turnout numbers in covered States have risen dramatically.
In 1965, the States could be divided into those with a recent history of
voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and those without those
characteristics.
Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is
no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to
treat it as if it were. Pp. 17-18.

(2) The Government attempts to defend the formula on grounds that it is
"reverse-engineered" — Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered
and then came up with criteria to describe them. Katzenbach did not sanction
such an approach, reasoning instead that the coverage formula was rational
because the "formula . . . was relevant to the problem." 383 U. S., at 329,
330. The Government has a fallback argument — because the formula was
relevant in 1965, its continued use is permissible so long as any
discrimination remains in the States identified in 1965. But this does not
look to "current political conditions," Northwest Austin, supra, at 203,
instead relying on a comparison between the States in 1965. But history did
not end in 1965. In assessing the "current need[]" for a preclearance system
treating States differently from one another today, history since 1965
cannot be ignored. The Fifteenth Amendment is not designed to punish for the
past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. To serve that purpose,
Congress — if it is to divide the States — must identify those jurisdictions
to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current
conditions. Pp. 18-21.

(3) Respondents also rely heavily on data from the record com piled by
Congress before reauthorizing the Act. Regardless of how one looks at [**659] that
record, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the
"pervasive," "flagrant," "widespread," and "rampant" discrimination that
clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation
in 1965. Katzenbach, supra, at 308, 315, 331. But a more fundamental [***4] problem
remains: Congress did not use that record to fashion a coverage formula
grounded in current conditions. It instead re-enacted a formula based on
40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day. Pp. 21-22.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address
an extraordinary problem. Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain
federal permission before enacting any law related to voting — a drastic
departure from basic principles of federalism. And § 4 of the Act applied
that requirement only to some States-an equally dramatic departure from the
principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine,
but Congress determined it was needed to address entrenched racial
discrimination in voting, "an insidious and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U. S. 301, 309 (1966). As we explained in upholding the law,
"exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise
appropriate." Id., at 334. Reflecting the unprecedented nature of these
measures, they were scheduled to expire after five years. See Voting Rights
Act of 1965, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438.

Nearly 50 years later, they are still in effect; indeed, they have been
made more stringent, and are now scheduled to last until 2031. There is no
denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these
measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions. By
2009, "the racial gap in voter registration and turnout [was] lower in the
States originally [*2619] covered by § 5 than it [was] nationwide." Northwest AustinMunicipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 203-204 (2009).
Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that African-American voter
turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the six States
originally covered by § 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one
half of one percent. See Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Reported Voting
and Registration, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States (Nov. 2012)
(Table 4b).

At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.
The question is whether the Act's extraordinary measures, including its
disparate treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional
requirements. As we put it a short time [**660] ago, "the Act imposes current
burdens and must be justified by current needs." Northwest Austin,
557 U. S., at 203.

I

A

The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, in the wake of the Civil
War. It provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," and it gives
Congress the "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
[***5]

"The first century of congressional enforcement of the Amendment, however,
can only be regarded as a failure." Id., at 197. In the 1890s, Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia began to enact
literacy tests for voter registration and to employ other methods designed
to prevent African-Americans from voting. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 310.
Congress passed statutes outlawing some of these practices and facilitating
litigation against them, but litigation remained slow and expensive, and the
States came up with new ways to discriminate as soon as existing ones were
struck down. Voter registration of African-Americans barely improved. Id.,
at 313-314.

Inspired to action by the civil rights movement, Congress responded in
1965 with the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 was enacted to forbid, in all 50
States, any "standard, practice, or procedure . . . imposed or applied . . .
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color." 79 Stat. 437. The current version forbids any
"standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(a). Both the Federal Government and
individuals have sued to enforce § 2, see, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U. S. 997 (1994), and injunctive relief is available in appropriate
cases to block voting laws from going into effect, see
42 U. S. C. § 1973j(d). Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is
not at issue in this case.

Other sections targeted only some parts of the country. At the time of the
Act's passage, these "covered" jurisdictions were those States or political
subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to
voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter
registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. § 4(b),
79 Stat. 438. Such tests or devices included literacy and knowledge tests,
good moral character requirements, the need for vouchers from registered
voters, and the like. § 4(c), id., at 438-439. A [*2620] covered jurisdiction could
"bail
out" of coverage if it had not used a test or device in the preceding five
years "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color." § 4(a), id., at 438. In 1965, the
covered States included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Virginia. The additional covered subdivisions included 39
counties in North Carolina and one in Arizona. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App.
(2012).

[**661] In those jurisdictions, § 4 of the Act banned all such tests or devices. §
4(a), 79 Stat. 438. Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures
could take effect until it was approved by federal authorities in
Washington, D. C. — either the Attorney General or a court of three judges.
Id., at 439. A jurisdiction could obtain such "preclearance" only by proving
that the change had neither "the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid.

Sections 4 and 5 were intended to be temporary; they were set to expire
after five years. See § 4(a), id., at 438; Northwest Austin, supra, at 199.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, we upheld [***6] the 1965 Act against
constitutional challenge, explaining that it was justified to address
"voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale."
383 U. S. ___, at 308.

In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another five years, and
extended the coverage formula in § 4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting
test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1968.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, §§ 3-4, 84 Stat. 315. That swept in
several counties in California, New Hampshire, and New York. See
28 CFR pt. 51, App. Congress also extended the ban in § 4(a) on tests and
devices nationwide. § 6, 84 Stat. 315.

In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for seven more years, and extended
its coverage to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50
percent voter registration or
turnout as of 1972. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, §§ 101, 202,
89 Stat. 400, 401. Congress also amended the definition of "test or device"
to include the practice of providing English-only voting materials in places
where over five percent of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other
than English. § 203, id., at 401-402. As a result of these amendments, the
States of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, as well as several counties in
California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota,
became covered jurisdictions. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App. Congress
correspondingly amended sections 2 and 5 to forbid voting discrimination on
the basis of membership in a language minority group, in addition to
discrimination on the basis of race or color. §§ 203, 206, 89 Stat. 401,
402. Finally, Congress made the nationwide ban on tests and devices
permanent. § 102, id., at 400.

In 1982, Congress reauthorized the Act for 25 years, but did not alter its
coverage formula. See Voting Rights Act Amendments, 96 Stat. 131. Congress
did, however, amend the bailout provisions, allowing political subdivisions
of covered jurisdictions to bail out. Among other prerequisites for bailout,
jurisdictions and their subdivisions must not have used a forbidden test or
device, failed to receive preclearance, or lost a § 2 suit, in the ten years
prior to seeking bailout. § 2, id., at 131-133.

Shortly after this reauthorization, a Texas utility district brought suit,
seeking to bail out from the Act's coverage and, in the alternative,
challenging the Act's constitutionality. See Northwest Austin,
557 U. S., at 200-201. A three-judge District [***7] Court explained that only a
State or political subdivision was eligible to seek bailout under the
statute, and concluded that the utility district was not a political
subdivision, a term that encompassed only "counties, parishes, and
voter-registering subunits." Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One
v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232 (DC 2008). The District Court also
rejected the constitutional challenge. Id., at 283.

We reversed. We explained that "`normally the Court will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose
of the case.'" Northwest Austin, supra, at 205 (quoting Escambia County v.
McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)). Concluding that "underlying
constitutional concerns," among other things, "compel[led] a broader reading
of the bailout provision," we construed the statute to allow the utility
district to seek bailout. Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 207. In doing so
we expressed serious doubts about the Act's continued constitutionality.

We explained that § 5 "imposes substantial federalism costs" and
"differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all
the States enjoy equal sovereignty." Id., at 202, 203 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We also noted that "[t]hings have changed in the South.
Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity.
Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority
candidates hold office at unprecedented levels." Id., at 202. Finally, we
questioned whether the problems that § 5 meant to address were still
"concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance." Id., at
203.

Eight Members of the Court subscribed to these views, and the remaining
Member would have held the Act unconstitutional. Ultimately, however, the
Court's construction of the bailout provision left the constitutional issues
for another day.

B

Shelby County is located in Alabama, a covered jurisdiction. It has not
sought bailout, as the Attorney General has recently objected to voting
changes proposed from within the county. See App. 87a-92a. Instead, in [**663] 2010,
the county sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in
Washington, D. C., seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5[*2622] of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional, as well as a
permanent injunction against their enforcement. The District Court ruled
against the county and upheld the Act. 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 508 (2011). The
court found that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to
justify reauthorizing § 5 and continuing the § 4(b) coverage formula.

The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit affirmed. In assessing § 5, the
D. C. Circuit considered six primary categories of evidence: Attorney
General objections to voting changes, Attorney General requests for more
information regarding voting changes, successful § 2 suits in covered
jurisdictions, the dispatching of federal observers to monitor elections in
covered jurisdictions, § 5 preclearance suits involving covered
jurisdictions, and the deterrent effect of § 5. See 679 F. 3d 848, 862-863
(2012). After extensive analysis of the record, the court accepted
Congress'[***8] s
conclusion that § 2 litigation remained inadequate in the covered
jurisdictions to protect the rights of minority voters, and that § 5 was
therefore still necessary. Id., at 873.

Turning to § 4, the D. C. Circuit noted that the evidence for singling out
the covered jurisdictions was "less robust" and that the issue presented "a
close question." Id., at 879. But the court looked to data comparing the
number of successful § 2 suits in the different parts of the country.
Coupling that evidence with the deterrent effect of § 5, the court concluded
that the statute continued "to single out the jurisdictions in which
discrimination is concentrated," and thus held that the coverage formula
passed constitutional muster. Id., at 883.

Judge Williams dissented. He found "no positive correlation between
inclusion in § 4(b)'s coverage formula and low black registration or
turnout." Id., at 891. Rather, to the extent there was any correlation, it
actually went the other way: "condemnation under § 4(b) is a marker of
higher black registration and turnout." Ibid. (emphasis added). Judge
Williams also found that "[c]overed jurisdictions have far more black
officeholders as a proportion of the black population than do uncovered
ones." Id., at 892. As to the evidence of successful § 2 suits, Judge
Williams disaggregated the reported cases by State, and concluded that
"[t]he five worst uncovered jurisdictions . . . have worse records than
eight of the covered jurisdictions." Id., at 897. He also noted that two
covered jurisdictions — Arizona and Alaska — had not had any successful
reported § 2 suit brought against them during the entire 24 years covered by
the data. Ibid. Judge Williams would have held the coverage formula of §
4(b) "irrational" and unconstitutional. Id., at 885.

In Northwest Austin, we stated that "the Act imposes current burdens and
must be justified by current needs." 557 U. S., at 203. And we concluded
that "a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." Ibid. These basic
[**664] principles guide our review of the question before us.[*2623][fn1]

A

The Constitution and laws of the United States are "the supreme Law of the
Land." U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. State legislation may not contravene
federal law. The Federal Government does not, however, have a general right
to review and veto state enactments before they go into effect. A proposal
to grant such authority to "negative" state laws was considered at the
Constitutional Convention, but rejected in favor of allowing state laws to
take effect, subject to later challenge under the Supremacy Clause. See 1
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 21, 164-168 (M. Farrand ed.
1911); 2 id., at 27-29,

Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad
autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative
objectives. Indeed, the Constitution provides that all powers not
specifically granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or
citizens. Amdt. 10. This "allocation of [***9] powers in our federal system
preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States."
Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9).
But the federal balance "is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

More specifically, "`the Framers of the Constitution intended the States
to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to
regulate elections.'" Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461-462 (1991)
(quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 647 (1973); some internal
quotation marks omitted). Of course, the Federal Government retains
significant control over federal elections. For instance, the Constitution
authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner for electing Senators
and Representatives. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Arizona v. Inter TribalCouncil of Ariz., Inc., ante, at 4-6. But States have "broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Arizona, ante, at 13-15. And "[e]ach State has the
power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in
which they shall be chosen." Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135,
161 (1892). Drawing lines for congressional districts is likewise "primarily
the duty and responsibility of the State." Perry v. Perez, 565 U. S. ___,
___ (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is
also a "fundamental principle of equal sovereignty" among the States.
Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 ([**665] citing United States v. Louisiana,
363 U. S. 1, 16 (1960); Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845);
and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725-726 (1869); emphasis added). Over a
hundred years ago, this Court explained that our Nation "was and is a union
of States, equal in power, dignity and authority." Coyle v. Smith,
221 U. S. 559, 567 (1911). Indeed, "the constitutional equality of the
States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized." Id., at 580. Coyle concerned the admission of new
States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle [*2624] operated as a
bar on differential treatment outside that context. 383 U. S., at 328-329.
At the same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing
subsequent disparate treatment of States. 557 U. S., at 203.

The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It
suspends "all changes to state election law — however innocuous — until they
have been precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D. C." Id., at
202. States must beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement
laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their
own, subject of course to any injunction in a § 2 action. The Attorney
General has 60 days to object to a preclearance request, longer if he
requests more information. See 28 CFR §§ 51.9, 51.37. If a State seeks
preclearance from a three-judge court, the process can take years.

And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, [***10] the Act applies to only
nine States (and several additional counties). While one State waits months
or years and expends funds to implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor
can typically put the same law into effect immediately, through the normal
legislative process. Even if a noncovered jurisdiction is sued, there are
important differences between those proceedings and preclearance
proceedings; the preclearance proceeding "not only switches the burden of
proof to the supplicant jurisdiction, but also applies substantive standards
quite different from those governing the rest of the nation."
679 F. 3d, at 884 (Williams, J., dissenting) (case below).

All this explains why, when we first upheld the Act in 1966, we described
it as "stringent" and "potent." Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337.
We recognized that it "may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional
power," but concluded that "legislative measures not otherwise appropriate"
could be justified by "exceptional conditions." Id., at 334. We have since
noted that the Act "authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of
state and local policymaking," Lopez, 525 U. S., at 282, and represents an
"extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between
the States and the Federal Government," Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n,
502 U. S. 491, 500-501 (1992). As we reiterated in Northwest Austin, the Act
constitutes "extraordinary legislation otherwise [**666] unfamiliar to our federal
system." 557 U. S. ___, at 211.

B

In 1966, we found these departures from the basic features of our system
of government justified. The "blight of racial discrimination in voting" had
"infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a
century." Katzenbach, 383 U. S. ___, at 308. Several States had enacted a
variety of requirements and tests "specifically designed to prevent"
African-Americans from voting. Id., at 310. Case-by-case litigation had
proved inadequate to prevent such racial discrimination in voting, in part
because States "merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the
federal decrees," "enacted difficult new tests," or simply "defied and
evaded court orders." Id., at 314. Shortly before enactment of the Voting
Rights Act, only 19.4 percent of African-Americans of voting age were
registered to vote in Alabama, only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4
percent in Mississippi. Id., at 313. Those figures were roughly [*2625] 50
percentage points or more below the figures for whites. Ibid.

In short, we concluded that "[u]nder the compulsion of these unique
circumstances, Congress responded in a
permissibly decisive manner." Id., at 334, 335. We also noted then and have
emphasized since that this extraordinary legislation was intended to be
temporary, set to expire after five years. Id., at 333; Northwest Austin,
supra, at 199.

At the time, the coverage formula — the means of linking the exercise of
the unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted it — made sense.
We found that "Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas
where immediate action seemed necessary." Kat-zenbach, 383 U. S. ___, at
328. The areas where Congress found "evidence of actual voting
discrimination" [***11] shared two characteristics: "the use of tests and devices
for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election
at least 12 points below the national average." Id., at 330. We explained
that "[t]ests and devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of
their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is
pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must
inevitably affect the number of actual voters." Ibid. We therefore concluded
that "the coverage formula [was] rational in both practice and theory."
Ibid. It accurately reflected those jurisdictions uniquely characterized by
voting discrimination "on a pervasive scale," linking coverage to the
devices used to effectuate discrimination and to the resulting
disenfranchisement. Id., at 308. The formula ensured that the "stringent
remedies [were] aimed at areas where voting discrimination ha[d] been most
flagrant." Id., at 315.

C

Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Shelby County
contends that the preclearance requirement, even without regard to its
disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments have a good deal
of force. In the covered jurisdictions, "[[**667] v]oter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of
federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels." Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 202. The tests and
devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for
over 40 years. See § 6, 84 Stat. 315; § 102, 89 Stat. 400.

Those conclusions are not ours alone. Congress said the same when it
reauthorized the Act in 2006, writing that "[s]ignificant progress has been
made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority
voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority
voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures,
and local elected offices." § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577. The House Report
elaborated that "the number of African-Americans who are registered and who
turn out to cast ballots has increased significantly over the last 40 years,
particularly since 1982," and noted that "[i]n some circumstances,
minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that surpass those of
white voters." H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 12 (2006). That Report also
explained that there have been "significant increases in the number of
African-Americans serving in elected offices"; more specifically, there has
been approximately a 1,000 percent increase since 1965 in the number of
African-American elected officials in the six States originally covered by
the Voting Rights Act. Id., at 18.
[*2626]

The following chart, compiled from the Senate and House Reports, compares
voter registration numbers from 1965 to those from 2004 in the six
originally covered States. These are the numbers that were before Congress
when it reauthorized the Act in 2006:

See S. Rep. No. 109-295, p. 11 (2006); H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 12. The
2004 figures come from the Census Bureau. Census Bureau data from the most
recent election indicate that African-American voter turnout exceeded white
voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by § 5, with a
gap in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent. See Dept. of
Commerce, Census Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and
Hispanic Origin, for States (Table 4b). The preclearance statistics are also
illuminating. In the first decade after enactment of § 5, the Attorney
General objected to 14.2 percent of proposed voting changes. H. R Rep. No.
109-478, at 22. In the last decade before reenactment, the Attorney [**668] General
objected to a mere 0.16 percent. S. Rep. No. 109-295, at 13.

There is no doubt that these improvements are in large part because of the
Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing
racial discrimination and integrating the voting process. See § 2(b)(1),
120 Stat. 577. During the "Freedom Summer" of 1964, in Philadelphia,
Mississippi, three men were murdered while working in the area to register
African-American voters. See United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 790
(1966). On "Bloody Sunday" in 1965, in Selma, Alabama, police beat
and used tear gas against hundreds marching in support of African-American
enfranchisement. See Northwest Austin, supra, at 220, n. 3 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Today both of those
towns are governed by African-American mayors. Problems remain in these
States and others, but there is no denying that, due to the Voting Rights
Act, our Nation has made great strides.

Yet the Act has not eased the restrictions in § 5 or narrowed the scope of
the coverage formula in § 4(b) along the way. Those extraordinary and
unprecedented features were reauthorized — as if nothing had changed. In
fact, the Act's unusual remedies have grown even stronger. When Congress
reauthorized the Act in 2006, it did so for another 25 years on top of the
previous 40 — a far cry from the initial five-year period. See
42 U. S. C. § 1973b(a)(8). Congress also expanded the prohibitions in § 5.
We had previously interpreted § 5 to prohibit only those redistricting plans
that would have the purpose or effect of worsening the position of minority
groups. See Bossier II, 528 U. S., at 324, 335-336. In 2006, Congress
amended § 5 to prohibit laws that could have favored such groups [*2627] but did not
do so because of a discriminatory purpose, see 42 U. S. C. § 1973c(c), even
though we had stated that such broadening of § 5 coverage would "exacerbate
the substantial federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already
exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5's
constitutionality," Bossier II, supra, at 336 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In addition, Congress expanded § 5 to prohibit any
voting law "that has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing
the ability of any citizens of the United States," on account of race,
color, or language minority status, "to elect their preferred candidates of
choice." § 1973c(b). In light [***13] of those two amendments, the bar that covered
jurisdictions must clear has been raised even as the conditions
justifying that requirement have dramatically improved.

We have also previously highlighted the concern that "the preclearance
requirements in one State [might] be unconstitutional in another." NorthwestAustin, 557 U. S., at 203; see Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S., at 491
(KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("considerations of race that would doom a
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 [of the Voting
Rights Act] seem to be what save it under § 5"). Nothing has happened since
to alleviate this troubling concern about the current application of § 5.
[**669]

Respondents do not deny that there have been improvements on the ground,
but argue that much of this can be attributed to the deterrent effect of §
5, which dissuades covered jurisdictions from engaging in discrimination
that they would resume should § 5 be struck down. Under this theory,
however, § 5 would be effectively immune from scrutiny; no matter how
"clean" the record of covered jurisdictions, the argument could always be
made that it was deterrence that accounted for the good behavior.

The provisions of § 5 apply only to those jurisdictions singled out by §
4. We now consider whether that coverage formula is constitutional in light
of current conditions.

III

A

When upholding the constitutionality of the coverage formula in 1966, we
concluded that it was "rational in both practice and theory." Katzenbach,
383 U. S., at 330. The formula looked to cause (discriminatory tests) and
effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the remedy
(preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both.

By 2009, however, we concluded that the "coverage formula raise[d] serious
constitutional questions." Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 204.
As we explained, a statute's "current burdens" must be justified by "current
needs," and any "disparate geographic coverage" must be "sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets." Id., at 203. The coverage formula
met that test in 1965, but no longer does so.

Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The
formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter
registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have
been banned nationwide for over 40 years. § 6, 84 Stat. 315; § 102,
89 Stat. 400. And voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered
States have risen dramatically in the years since. H. R. Rep. No. 109-478,
at 12. Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence justifying
the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. See, e.g., Katzenbach,
supra, at 313, 329-330. [*2628] There is no longer such a disparity.

In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent
history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those
without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that
distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet
the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.

B

The Government's defense of the formula is limited. First, the Government
contends that the formula is "reverse-engineered": [***14] Congress identified the
jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with criteria to describe them.
Brief for Federal Respondent 48-49. Under that reasoning, there need not be
any logical relationship between the criteria in the formula and the reason
for coverage; all that is necessary is that the formula happen to capture
the jurisdictions Congress wanted to single out.

The Government suggests that Katzenbach sanctioned such an approach, [**670] but
the analysis in Katzenbach was quite different. Katzenbach reasoned that the
coverage formula was rational because the "formula . . . was relevant to the
problem": "Tests and devices are relevant to voting discrimination because
of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate
is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must
inevitably affect the number of actual voters." 383 U. S., at 329, 330.

Here, by contrast, the Government's reverse-engineering argument does not
even attempt to demonstrate the continued relevance of the formula to the
problem it targets. And in the context of a decision as significant as this
one — subjecting a disfavored subset of States to "extraordinary legislation
otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system," Northwest Austin, supra, at 211
— that failure to establish even relevance is fatal.

The Government falls back to the argument that because the formula was
relevant in 1965, its continued use is permissible so long as any
discrimination remains in the States Congress identified back then —
regardless of how that discrimination compares to discrimination in States
unburdened by coverage. Brief for Federal Respondent 49-50. This argument
does not look to "current political conditions," Northwest Austin, supra, at
203, but instead relies on a comparison between the States in 1965. That
comparison reflected the different histories of the North and South. It was
in the South that slavery was upheld by law until uprooted by the Civil War,
that the reign of Jim Crow denied African-Americans the most basic freedoms,
and that state and local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise
citizens on the basis of race. The Court invoked that history — rightly so —
in sustaining the disparate coverage of the Voting Rights Act in 1966. See
Katzenbach, supra, at 308 ("The constitutional propriety of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the
historical experience which it reflects.").

But history did not end in 1965. By the time the Act was reauthorized in
2006, there had been 40 more years of it. In assessing the "current need[]"
for a preclearance system that treats States differently from one another
today, that history cannot be ignored. During that time, largely because of
the Voting Rights Act, voting tests were abolished, disparities in voter
registration and turnout due to race were erased, and African-Americans
attained political office in record numbers. And yet the coverage formula
that Congress [*2629] reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, keeping the
focus on decades-old data [***15] relevant to decades-old problems, rather than
current data reflecting current needs.

The Fifteenth Amendment commands that the right to vote shall not be
denied or abridged on account of race or color, and it gives Congress the
power to enforce that command. The Amendment is not designed to punish for
the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. See Rice v. Cayetano,
528 U. S. 495, 512 (2000) ("Consistent with the design of the Constitution,
the [Fifteenth] Amendment is cast in fundamental terms, terms transcending
the particular controversy which was the immediate impetus for its
enactment."). To serve that purpose, Congress — if it is to divide [**671] the
States — must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that
makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the
past. We made that clear in Northwest Austin, and we make it clear again
today.

C

In defending the coverage formula, the Government, the intervenors, and
the dissent also rely heavily on data from the record that they claim
justify disparate coverage. Congress compiled thousands of pages of evidence
before
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act. The court below and the parties have
debated what that record shows — they have gone back and forth about whether
to compare covered to noncovered jurisdictions as blocks, how to
disaggregate the data State by State, how to weigh § 2 cases as evidence of
ongoing discrimination, and whether to consider evidence not before
Congress, among other issues. Compare, e.g., 679 F. 3d, at 873-883 (case
below), with id., at 889-902 (WILLIAMS, J., dissenting). Regardless of how
to look at the record, however, no one can fairly say that it shows anything
approaching the "pervasive," "flagrant," "widespread," and "rampant"
discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished
the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.
Katzenbach, supra, at 308, 315, 331; Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 201.

But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress did not use the record it
compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It
instead reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical
relation to the present day. The dissent relies on "second-generation
barriers," which are not impediments to the casting of ballots, but rather
electoral arrangements that affect the weight of minority votes. That does
not cure the problem. Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting
such efforts simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on
the § 4 coverage formula, which is based on voting tests and access to the
ballot, not vote dilution. We cannot pretend that we are reviewing an
updated statute, or try our hand at updating the statute ourselves, based on
the new record compiled by Congress. Contrary to the dissent's contention,
see post, at 23, we are not ignoring the record; we are simply recognizing
that it played no role in shaping the statutory formula before us today.

The dissent also turns to the record to argue that, in
light of voting discrimination in Shelby County, the county cannot complain
about the provisions that subject [***16] it to preclearance. Post, at 23-30. But
that is like saying that a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of
stopping all redheads cannot complain about that policy, if it turns out his
license has expired. Shelby [*2630] County's claim is that the coverage formula here
is unconstitutional in all its applications, because of how it selects the
jurisdictions subjected to preclearance. The county was selected based on
that formula, and may challenge it in court.

D

The dissent proceeds from a flawed premise. It quotes the famous sentence
from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), with the following
emphasis: "Let the [**672] end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adaptedto that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Post, at 9 (emphasis in
dissent). But this case is about a part of the sentence that the dissent
does not emphasize — the part that asks whether a legislative means is
"consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution." The dissent
states that "[i]t cannot tenably be maintained" that this is an issue with
regard to the Voting Rights Act, post, at 9, but four years ago, in an
opinion joined by two of today's dissenters, the Court expressly stated that
"[t]he Act's preclearance requirement and its coverage formula raise serious
constitutional questions." Northwest Austin, supra, at 204. The dissent does
not explain how those "serious constitutional questions" became untenable in
four short years.

The dissent treats the Act as if it were just like any other piece of
legislation, but this Court has made clear from the beginning that the
Voting Rights Act is far from ordinary. At the risk of repetition,
Katzenbach indicated
that the Act was "uncommon" and "not otherwise appropriate," but was
justified by "exceptional" and "unique" conditions. 383 U. S., at 334, 335.
Multiple decisions since have reaffirmed the Act's "extraordinary" nature.
See, e.g., Northwest Austin, supra, at 211. Yet the dissent goes so far as
to suggest instead that the preclearance requirement and disparate treatment
of the States should be upheld into the future "unless there [is] no or
almost no evidence of unconstitutional action by States." Post, at 33.

In other ways as well, the dissent analyzes the question presented as if
our decision in Northwest Austin never happened. For example, the dissent
refuses to consider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite NorthwestAustin's emphasis on its significance. Northwest Austin also emphasized the
"dramatic" progress since 1965, 557 U. S., at 201, but the dissent describes
current levels of discrimination as "flagrant," "widespread," and
"pervasive," post, at 7, 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite the
fact that Northwest Austin requires an Act's "disparate geographic coverage"
to be "sufficiently related" to its targeted problems, 557 U. S., at 203,
the dissent maintains that an Act's limited coverage actually eases
Congress's burdens, and suggests that a fortuitous relationship should
suffice. Although Northwest Austin[***17] stated definitively that "current
burdens" must be justified by "current needs," ibid., the dissent argues
that the coverage formula can be justified by history, and that the required
showing can be weaker on reenactment than when the law was first passed.

There is no valid reason to insulate the coverage formula from review
merely because it was previously enacted 40 years ago. If Congress had
started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present
coverage formula. It would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish
[*2631] between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old [**673] data, when
today's statistics tell an
entirely different story. And it would have been irrational to base coverage
on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been illegal
since that time. But that is exactly what Congress has done.

* * *

Striking down an Act of Congress "is the gravest and most delicate duty
that this Court is called on to perform." Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142,
148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). We do not do so lightly. That is why,
in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act when asked to do so, and instead resolved the case then before us
on statutory grounds. But in issuing that decision, we expressed our broader
concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could have updated
the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act
leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional. The
formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting
jurisdictions to preclearance.

Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial
discrimination in voting found in § 2. We issue no holding on § 5 itself,
only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula based on
current conditions. Such a formula is an initial prerequisite to a
determination that exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an
"extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between
the States and the Federal Government." Presley, 502 U. S., at 500-501. Our
country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too
much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that
problem speaks to current conditions.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

[fn1] Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were at issue in
Northwest Austin, see Juris. Statement i, and Brief for Federal Appellee
29-30, in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, O. T.
2008, No. 08-322, and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review under
both Amendments in this case.

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion in full but write separately to explain that I
would find § 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as well. The
Court's opinion sets forth the reasons.

"The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address
an extraordinary problem." Ante, at 1. In the face of "unremitting and
ingenious defiance" of citizens' constitutionally protected right to vote, §
5 was necessary to give effect to the Fifteenth Amendment in particular
regions of the country. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309
(1966). Though § 5's preclearance requirement represented a "shar[p]
depart[ure]" from "basic principles" of federalism and the equal sovereignty
of the States, ante, at 9, 11, the Court upheld the measure against early
constitutional [***18] challenges because it was necessary at the time to address
"voting discrimination where it persist[ed] on a pervasive scale."
Katzenbach, supra, at 308.

In spite of these improvements, however, Congress increased the already
significant burdens of § 5. Following its reenactment in 2006, the Voting
Rights Act was amended to "prohibit more conduct than before." Ante, at 5.
"Section 5 now forbids voting changes with `any discriminatory purpose' as
well as voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of
race, color, or language minority status, `to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.'" Ante, at 6. While the pre-2006 version of the Act
went well beyond protection guaranteed under the Constitution, see Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S. 471, 480-482 (1997), it now goes even
further.

It is, thus, quite fitting that the Court repeatedly points out that this
legislation is "extraordinary" and "unprecedented" and recognizes the
significant constitutional problems created by Congress' decision to raise
"the bar that covered jurisdictions must clear," even as "the conditions
justifying that requirement have dramatically improved." Ante, at 16-17.
However one aggregates the data compiled by Congress, it cannot justify the
considerable burdens created by § 5. As the Court aptly notes: "[N]o one can
fairly say that [the record] shows anything approaching the `pervasive,'
`flagrant,' `widespread,' and `rampant' discrimination that faced Congress
in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the
rest of the Nation at that time." Ante, at 21. Indeed, circumstances in the
covered jurisdictions can no longer be characterized as "exceptional" or
"unique." "The extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to
previously uphold § 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer
exists." Northwest Austin, supra, at 226 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
Section 5 is, thus, unconstitutional.

While the Court claims to "issue no holding on § 5 itself," ante, at 24,
its own opinion compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed to
justify "`current burdens'" with a record demonstrating "`current needs.'"
See ante, at 9 (quoting Northwest Austin, supra, at 203). By leaving the
inevitable conclusion unstated, the Court needlessly prolongs the demise of
that provision. For the reasons stated in the Court's opinion, I would find
§ 5 unconstitutional.

In the Court's view, the very success of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
demands its dormancy. Congress was of another mind. Recognizing that large
progress has [***19] been made, Congress determined, based on a voluminous record,
that the scourge of discrimination was not yet extirpated. The question this
case presents is who decides whether, as currently operative, § 5[**675] remains
justifiable,[fn1] this Court, or a Congress charged with the obligation to
enforce the post-Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislation." With
overwhelming support in both Houses, Congress concluded that, for two prime
reasons, § 5 should continue in force, unabated. First, continuance would
facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and second,
continuance would guard against back sliding. Those assessments were well
within Congress' province to make and [*2633] should elicit this Court's unstinting

I

"[V]oting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that."
Ante, at 2. But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best
suited to block that discrimination. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) has
worked to combat voting discrimination where other remedies had been tried
and failed. Particularly effective is the VRA's requirement of federal
preclearance for all changes to voting laws in the regions of the country
with the most aggravated records of rank discrimination against minority
voting rights.

A century after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed
citizens the right to vote free of discrimination on the basis of race, the
"blight of racial discrimination in voting" continued to "infec[t] the
electoral process in parts of our country." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966). Early attempts to cope with this vile infection
resembled battling the Hydra. Whenever one form of voting discrimination was
identified and prohibited, others sprang up in its place. This Court
repeatedly encountered the remarkable "variety and persistence" of laws
disenfranchising minority citizens. Id., at 311. To take just one example,
the Court, in 1927, held unconstitutional a Texas law barring black voters
from participating in primary elections, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536,
541; in 1944, the Court struck down a "reenacted" and slightly altered
version of the same law, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 658; and in
1953, the Court once again confronted an attempt by Texas to "cir-cumven[t]"
the Fifteenth Amendment by adopting yet another variant of the all-white
primary, Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, 469.

During this era, the Court recognized that discrimination against minority
voters was a quintessentially political problem requiring a political
solution. As Justice Holmes explained: If "the great mass of the white
population intends to keep the blacks from voting," "relief from [that]
great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the
people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or by the
legislative and political department of the government of the United
States." Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475, 488 (1903).

Congress learned from experience that laws targeting particular electoral
practices or enabling case-by-case litigation were inadequate to the task.
In the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, Congress authorized [**676] and
then expanded the power of "the Attorney General to seek injunctions [***20] against
public and private interference with the right to vote on racial grounds."
Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 313. But circumstances reduced the ameliorative
potential of these legislative Acts:

"Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes
requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing through
registration records in preparation for trial. Litigation has been
exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample opportunities for
delay afforded voting officials and others involved in the
proceedings. Even when favorable decisions have finally been
obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to
discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have
enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing
disparity between white and Negro registration. Alternatively,
certain local officials have defied [*2634] and evaded court orders or have
simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting
rolls." Id., at 314 (footnote omitted).

Patently, a new approach was needed.

Answering that need, the Voting Rights Act became one of the most
consequential, efficacious, and amply justified exercises of federal
legislative power in our Nation's history. Requiring federal preclearance of
changes in voting laws in the covered jurisdictions — those States and
localities where opposition to the Constitution's commands were
most virulent — the VRA provided a fit solution for minority voters as well
as for States. Under the preclearance regime established by § 5 of the VRA,
covered jurisdictions must submit proposed changes in voting laws or
procedures to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which has 60 days to respond
to the changes. 79 Stat. 439, codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1973c(a). A change
will be approved unless DOJ finds it has "the purpose [or] . . . the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."
Ibid. In the alternative, the covered jurisdiction may seek approval by a
three-judge District Court in the District of Columbia.

After a century's failure to fulfill the promise of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, passage of the VRA finally led to signal improvement
on this front. "The Justice Department estimated that in the five years
after [the VRA's] passage, almost as many blacks registered [to vote] in
Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina
as in the entire century before 1965." Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A
Brief History, in Controversies in Minority Voting 7, 21 (B. Grofman & C.
Davidson eds. 1992). And in assessing the overall effects of the VRA in
2006, Congress found that "[s]ignificant progress has been made in
eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters,
including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter
turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, and
local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965." Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (hereinafter
2006 Reauthorization), § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577. On that [***21] matter of cause and
effects there can be no genuine doubt.
[**677]

Although the VRA wrought dramatic changes in the realization of minority
voting rights, the Act, to date,
surely has not eliminated all vestiges of discrimination against the
exercise of the franchise by minority citizens. Jurisdictions covered by the
preclearance requirement continued to submit, in large numbers, proposed
changes to voting laws that the Attorney General declined to approve,
auguring that barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the
preclearance remedy eliminated. City of Rome v. United States,
446 U. S. 156, 181 (1980). Congress also found that as "registration and
voting of minority citizens increas[ed], other measures may be resorted to
which would dilute increasing minority voting strength." Ibid. (quoting H.
R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 10 (1975)). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 640
(1993) ("[I]t soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the
polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting
practices" such as voting dilution). Efforts to reduce the impact of
minority votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the
ballot, are aptly described as "second-generation barriers" to minority
voting.
[*2635]

Second-generation barriers come in various forms. One of the blockages is
racial gerrymandering, the redrawing of legislative districts in an "effort
to segregate the races for purposes of voting." Id., at 642. Another is
adoption of a system of at-large voting in lieu of district-by-district
voting in a city with a sizable black minority. By switching to at-large
voting, the overall majority could control the election of each city council
member, effectively eliminating the potency of the minority's votes. Grofman
& Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black
Representation in Eight Southern States, in Quiet Revolution in the South
301, 319 (C. Davidson & B. Grofman eds. 1994) (hereinafter Quiet
Revolution). A similar effect could be achieved if the city engaged in
discriminatory annexation by incorporating majority-white areas into city
limits, thereby decreasing the effect
of VRA-occasioned increases in black voting. Whatever the device employed,
this Court has long recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a
discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to vote as certainly as denial
of access to the ballot. Shaw, 509 U. S., at 640-641; Allen v. State Bd. ofElections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555
(1964). See also H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, p. 6 (2006) (although
"[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used in
1965," "the effect and results are the same, namely a diminishing of the
minority community's ability to fully participate in the electoral process
and to elect their preferred candidates").

In response to evidence of these substituted barriers, Congress
reauthorized the VRA for five years in 1970, for seven years in 1975, and
for 25 years in 1982. Ante, at 4-5. Each time, this Court upheld the
reauthorization as a valid exercise of congressional power. Ante, at 5. As
the 1982 reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration date, Congress [***22] again
considered whether the VRA's preclearance mechanism remained an [**678] appropriate
response to the problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions.

Congress did not take this task lightly. Quite the opposite. The 109th
Congress that took responsibility for the renewal started early and
conscientiously. In October 2005, the House began extensive hearings, which
continued into November and resumed in March 2006. S. Rep. No. 109-295, p. 2
(2006). In April 2006, the Senate followed suit, with hearings of its own.
Ibid. In May 2006, the bills that became the VRA's reauthorization were
introduced in both Houses. Ibid. The House held further hearings of
considerable length, as did the Senate, which continued to hold hearings
into June and July. H. R. Rep. 109-478, at 5; S. Rep. 109-295, at 3-4. In
mid-July, the House considered and rejected four amendments, then passed the
reauthorization by a vote of 390 yeas to 33 nays. 152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (July
13, 2006); Persily, The
Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L. J. 174,
182-183 (2007) (hereinafter Persily). The bill was read and debated in the
Senate, where it passed by a vote of 98 to 0. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (July 20,
2006). President Bush signed it a week later, on July 27, 2006, recognizing
the need for "further work . . . in the fight against injustice," and
calling the reauthorization "an example of our continued commitment to a
united America where every person is valued and treated with dignity and
respect." 152 Cong. Rec. S8781 (Aug. 3, 2006).

In the long course of the legislative process, Congress "amassed a sizable
record." Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U. S. 193, 205[*2636] (2009). See also 679 F. 3d 848, 865-873 (CADC 2012)
(describing the "extensive record" supporting Congress' determination that
"serious and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered
jurisdictions"). The House and Senate Judiciary Committees held 21 hearings,
heard from scores of witnesses, received a number of investigative reports
and other written documentation of continuing discrimination in covered
jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled filled more
than 15,000 pages. H. R. Rep. 109-478, at 5, 11-12; S. Rep. 109-295, at 2-4,
15. The compilation presents countless "examples of flagrant racial
discrimination" since the last reauthorization; Congress also brought to
light systematic evidence that "intentional racial discrimination in voting
remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5
preclearance is still needed." 679 F. 3d, at 866.

After considering the full legislative record, Congress made the following
findings: The VRA has directly caused significant progress in eliminating
first-generation barriers to ballot access, leading to a marked increase in
minority voter registration and turnout and the number of minority elected
officials. 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(1). But despite this progress,
"second generation barriers
constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the
electoral process" continued to exist, as well as racially polarized voting
in the covered jurisdictions, [***23] which increased the political vulnerability of
racial and language minorities in those jurisdictions. §§ 2(b)(2)-(3),
120 Stat. 577. Extensive "[e]vidence of continued discrimination," Congress
concluded, "clearly show[ed] the continued need for Federal oversight" in
covered jurisdictions. §§ 2(b)(4)-(5), id., at 577-578. The overall record
[**679] demonstrated to the federal lawmakers that, "without the continuation of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority citizens
will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will
have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by
minorities in the last 40 years." § 2(b)(9), id., at 578.

Based on these findings, Congress reauthorized pre-clearance for another
25 years, while also undertaking to reconsider the extension after 15 years
to ensure that the provision was still necessary and effective.
42 U. S. C. § 1973b(a)(7), (8) (2006 ed., Supp. V). The question before the
Court is whether Congress had the authority under the Constitution to act as
it did.

II

In answering this question, the Court does not write on a clean slate. It
is well established that Congress' judgment regarding exercise of its power
to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial
deference. The VRA addresses the combination of race discrimination and the
right to vote, which is "preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886). When confronting the most constitutionally
invidious form of discrimination, and the most fundamental right in our
democratic system, Congress' power to act is at its height.

The basis for this deference is firmly rooted in both constitutional text
and precedent. The Fifteenth Amendment, which targets precisely and only
racial discrimination in voting rights, states that, in this domain,
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."[fn2] In choosing this language, the [*2637] Amendment's framers
invoked Chief Justice Marshall's formulation of the scope of Congress'
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause:

"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainlyadapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).

It cannot tenably be maintained that the VRA, an Act of Congress adopted
to shield the right to vote from racial discrimination, is inconsistent with
the letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment, or any provision of the
Constitution read in light of the Civil War Amendments. Nowhere in today's
opinion, or in Northwest Austin,[fn3] is there
clear recognition [**680] of the transformative effect the Fifteenth Amendment aimed
to achieve. Notably, "the Founders' first successful amendment told Congress
that it could `make no law' over a certain domain"; in contrast, the Civil
War Amendments used "language [that] authorized transformative new federal
statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality" and provided
"sweeping enforcement powers . . . to enact `appropriate' legislation
[***24] targeting state abuses." A. Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 361,
363, 399 (2005). See also McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 182 (1997)
(quoting Civil War-era framer that "the remedy for the violation of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts.
The remedy was legislative.").

The stated purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to arm Congress with
the power and authority to protect all persons within the Nation from
violations of their rights by the States. In exercising that power, then,
Congress may use "all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted" to the constitutional ends declared by these Amendments. McCulloch,
4 Wheat., at 421. So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free
from racial discrimination, we ask not whether Congress has chosen the means
most wise, but whether Congress has rationally selected means appropriate to
a legitimate end. "It is not for us to review the congressional resolution
of [the need for its chosen remedy]. It is enough that we be able to
perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it
did." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 653 (1966).

Until today, in considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court
has accorded Congress the full measure of respect its [*2638] judgments in this
domain should garner. South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies the standard of
review:
"As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination
in voting." 383 U. S., at 324. Faced with subsequent reauthorizations of the
VRA, the Court has reaffirmed this standard. E.g., City of Rome,
446 U. S., at 178. Today's Court does not purport to alter settled precedent
establishing that the dispositive question is whether Congress has employed
"rational means."

For three reasons, legislation reauthorizing an existing statute is
especially likely to satisfy the minimal requirements of the rational-basis
test. First, when reauthorization is at issue, Congress has already
assembled a legislative record justifying the initial legislation. Congress
is entitled to consider that preexisting record as well as the record before
it at the time of the vote on reauthorization. This is especially true
where, as here, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the statute's
constitutionality and Congress has adhered to the very model the Court has
upheld. See id., at 174 ("The appellants are asking us to do nothing less
than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach . . ., in which
we upheld the constitutionality of the Act."); Lopez v. Monterey County,
525 U. S. 266, 283 (1999) (similar).

Second, the very fact that reauthorization is necessary arises because
[**681] Congress has built a temporal limitation into the Act. It has pledged to
review, after a span of years (first 15, then 25) and in light of
contemporary evidence, the continued need for the VRA. Cf. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003) (anticipating, but not guaranteeing,
that, in 25 years, "the use of racial preferences [in higher education] will
no longer be necessary").
[***25]

Third, a reviewing court should expect the record supporting
reauthorization to be less stark than the record originally made. Demand for
a record of violations equivalent to the one earlier made would expose
Congress to a catch-22.
If the statute was working, there would be less evidence of discrimination,
so opponents might argue that Congress should not be allowed to renew the
statute. In contrast, if the statute was not working, there would be plenty
of evidence of discrimination, but scant reason to renew a failed regulatory
regime. See Persily 193-194.

This is not to suggest that congressional power in this area is limitless.
It is this Court's responsibility to ensure that Congress has used
appropriate means. The question meet for judicial review is whether the
chosen means are "adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in
view." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880). The Court's role, then,
is not to substitute its judgment for that of Congress, but to determine
whether the legislative record sufficed to show that "Congress could
rationally have determined that [its chosen] provisions were appropriate
methods." City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 176-177.

In summary, the Constitution vests broad power in Congress to protect the
right to vote, and in particular to combat racial discrimination in voting.
This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Congress' prerogative to use any
rational means in exercise of its power in this area. And both precedent and
logic dictate that the rational-means test should be easier to satisfy, and
the burden on the statute's challenger should be higher, when what is at
issue is the reauthorization of a remedy that the Court has previously
affirmed, and that Congress found, from contemporary evidence, [*2639] to be working
to advance the legislature's legitimate objective.

III

The 2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act fully satisfies the
standard stated in McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 421: Congress may choose any
means "appropriate" and "plainly adapted to" a legitimate constitutional
end. As we shall see, it is implausible to suggest otherwise.

A

I begin with the evidence on which Congress based its decision to continue
the preclearance remedy. The surest way to evaluate whether that remedy
remains in order is to see if preclearance is still effectively preventing
discriminatory changes to voting laws. See City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 181
(identifying "information on the number and types of submissions made by
covered jurisdictions and the number and nature of objections interposed by
the Attorney General" as a primary basis for upholding the 1975
reauthorization). On that score, the record before Congress was huge. In
fact, Congress found there were more DOJ objections between 1982 [**682] and 2004
(626) than there were between 1965 and the 1982 reauthorization (490). 1
Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued Need, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
109th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 172 (2006) (hereinafter Evidence of Continued
Need).

All told, between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting
[***26] changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory. H. R.
Rep. No. 109-478, at 21. Congress found that the majority of DOJ objections
included findings of discriminatory intent, see 679 F. 3d, at 867, and that
the changes blocked by preclearance were "calculated decisions to keep
minority voters from fully participating in the political process." H. R.
Rep. 109-478, at 21. On top of that, over the same time period the DOJ and
private plaintiffs succeeded in more than 100 actions to enforce the § 5
preclearance requirements. 1 Evidence of Continued Need 186, 250.

In addition to blocking proposed voting changes through preclearance, DOJ
may request more information from a jurisdiction proposing a change. In
turn, the jurisdiction may modify or withdraw the proposed change. The
number of such modifications or withdrawals provides an
indication of how many discriminatory proposals are deterred without need
for formal objection. Congress received evidence that more than 800 proposed
changes were altered or withdrawn since the last reauthorization in 1982. H.
R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 40-41.[fn4] Congress also received empirical studies
finding that DOJ's requests for more information had a significant effect on
the degree to which covered [*2640] jurisdictions "compl[ied] with their
obligatio[n]" to protect minority voting rights. 2 Evidence of Continued
Need 2555.

Congress also received evidence that litigation under § 2 of the VRA was
an inadequate substitute for preclearance in the covered jurisdictions.
Litigation occurs only after the fact, when the illegal voting scheme has
already been put in place and individuals have been elected pursuant to it,
thereby gaining the advantages of incumbency. 1 Evidence of Continued Need
97. An illegal scheme might be in place for several election cycles before a
§ 2 plaintiff can gather sufficient evidence to challenge it. 1 Voting
Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act — History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 92 (2005) (hereinafter Section 5
Hearing). And litigation places a heavy financial burden on minority voters.
See id., at 84. Congress also received evidence
that preclearance lessened the litigation burden on covered jurisdictions
themselves, because the preclearance process is far less costly than
defending against a § 2 claim, and clearance by DOJ substantially [**683] reduces
the likelihood that a § 2 claim will be mounted. Reauthorizing the Voting
Rights Act's Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives and Views From the
Field: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 13, 120-121 (2006). See also Brief for States of New York,
California, Mississippi, and North Carolina as Amid Curiae 8-9 (Section 5
"reduc[es] the likelihood that a jurisdiction will face costly and
protracted Section 2

The number of discriminatory changes blocked or deterred by the
preclearance requirement suggests that [***27] the state of voting rights in the
covered jurisdictions would have been significantly different absent this
remedy. Surveying the type of changes stopped by the preclearance procedure
conveys a sense of the extent to which § 5 continues to protect minority
voting rights. Set out below are characteristic examples of changes blocked
in the years leading up to the 2006 reauthorization:

• In 1995, Mississippi sought to reenact a dual voter registration
system, "which was initially enacted in 1892 to disenfranchise Black
voters," and for that reason, was struck down by a federal court in
1987. H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 39.

• Following the 2000 census, the City of Albany, Georgia, proposed
a restricting plan that DOJ found to be "designed with the purpose
to limit and retrogress the increased black voting strength . . . in
the city as a whole." Id., at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).

• In 2001, the mayor and all-white five-member Board of Aldermen
of Kilmichael, Mississippi, abruptly canceled the town's election
after "an unprecedented number" of African-American candidates
announced they were running for office. DOJ required an election,
and the town elected its first black mayor and three black aldermen.
Id., at 36-37.

• In 2006, this Court found that Texas' attempt to redraw a
congressional district to reduce the strength of Latino voters bore
"the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an
equal protection violation," and ordered the district redrawn in
compliance with the VRA. League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 440 (2006). In response, [*2641] Texas sought to
undermine this Court's order by curtailing early voting in the
district, but was blocked by an action to enforce the § 5
preclearance requirement. See Order in League of United LatinAmerican Citizens v. Texas, No. 06-cv-1046 (WD Tex.), Doc. 8.

• In 2003, after African-Americans won a majority of the seats on
the school board for the first time in history, Charleston County,
South Carolina, proposed an at-large voting mechanism for the board.
The proposal, made without consulting any of the African-American
members of the school board, was found to be an "`exact replica'" of
an earlier voting scheme that, a federal court had determined,
violated the VRA. 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 483 (DDC 2011). See also S.
Rep. No. 109-295, at 309. DOJ invoked § 5 to block the proposal.

• In 1993, the City of Millen, Georgia, proposed to delay the
election [**684] in a majority-black district by two
years, leaving that district without representation on the city
council while the neighboring majority white district would have
three representatives. 1 Section 5 Hearing 744. DOJ blocked the
proposal. The county then sought to move a polling place from a
predominantly black neighborhood in the city to an inaccessible
location in a predominantly white neighborhood outside city limits.
Id., at 816.

• In 2004, Waller County, Texas, threatened to prose cute two
black students after they announced their intention to run for
office. The county then at tempted to reduce the availability of
early voting in that election at polling places near a historically
black [***28] university. 679 F. 3d, at 865-866.

• In 1990, Dallas County, Alabama, whose county seat is the City
of Selma, sought to purge its voter rolls of many black voters. DOJ
rejected the purge as discriminatory, noting that it would have
disqualified many citizens from voting "simply because they failed
to pick up or return a voter update form, when there was no valid
requirement that they do so." 1 Section 5 Hearing 356.

These examples, and scores more like them, fill the pages of the
legislative record. The evidence was indeed sufficient to support Congress'
conclusion that "racial discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions
[remained] serious and pervasive." 679 F. 3d, at 865.[fn5]

Congress further received evidence indicating that formal requests of the
kind set out above represented only the tip of the iceberg. There was what
one commentator described as an "avalanche of case studies of voting rights
violations in the covered jurisdictions," ranging from "outright
intimidation and violence against minority voters" to "more subtle forms of
voting rights deprivations." Persily 202 ([*2642] footnote omitted). This evidence
gave Congress ever more reason to conclude that the time had not yet come
for relaxed vigilance against the scourge of race discrimination in voting.

True, conditions in the South have impressively improved since passage of
the Voting Rights Act. Congress noted this improvement and found that the
VRA was the driving force behind it. 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(1). But
Congress also found that voting discrimination had evolved into subtler
second-generation barriers, and that eliminating preclearance would risk
loss of the gains that had been made. §§ 2(b)(2), (9). Concerns of this
order, the Court previously found, gave Congress adequate cause to
reauthorize the VRA. City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 180-182 (congressional
reauthorization of the [**685] preclearance requirement was justified based on "the
number and nature of objections interposed by the Attorney General" since
the prior reauthorization; extension was "necessary to preserve the limited
and fragile achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of
voting discrimination") (internal quotation marks omitted). Facing such
evidence then, the Court expressly rejected the argument that disparities in
voter turnout and number of elected officials
were the only metrics capable of justifying reauthorization of the VRA.
Ibid.

B

I turn next to the evidence on which Congress based its decision to
reauthorize the coverage formula in § 4(b). Because Congress did not alter
the coverage formula, the same jurisdictions previously subject to
preclearance continue to be covered by this remedy. The evidence just
described, of preclearance's continuing efficacy in blocking constitutional
violations in the covered jurisdictions, itself grounded Congress'
conclusion that the remedy should be retained for those jurisdictions.

There is no question, moreover, that the covered jurisdictions have a
unique history of problems with racial discrimination in voting. Ante, at
12-13. Consideration of this long history, [***29] still in living memory, was
altogether appropriate. The Court criticizes Congress for failing to
recognize that "history did not end in 1965." Ante, at 20. But the Court
ignores that "what's past is prologue." W. Shakespeare, The Tempest, act 2,
sc. 1. And "[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it." 1 G. Santayana, The Life of Reason 284 (1905). Congress was especially
mindful of the need to reinforce the gains already made and to prevent
backsliding. 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(9).

Of particular importance, even after 40 years and thousands of
discriminatory changes blocked by preclearance, conditions in the covered
jurisdictions demonstrated that the formula was still justified by "current
needs." Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.

Congress learned of these conditions through a report, known as the Katz
study, that looked at § 2 suits between 1982 and 2004. To Examine the Impact
and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.,
1st Sess., pp. 964-1124 (2005)
(hereinafter Impact and Effectiveness). Because the private right of action
authorized by § 2 of the VRA applies nationwide, a comparison of § 2
lawsuits in covered and noncovered jurisdictions provides an appropriate
yardstick for measuring differences between covered and noncovered
jurisdictions. If differences in the risk of voting discrimination between
covered and noncovered jurisdictions had disappeared, one would [*2643] expect that
the rate of successful § 2 lawsuits would be roughly the same in both
areas.[fn6] The study's findings, however, indicated that racial
discrimination in voting remains "concentrated in the jurisdictions singled
[**686] out for preclearance." Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.

Although covered jurisdictions account for less than 25 percent of the
country's population, the Katz study revealed that they accounted for 56
percent of successful § 2 litigation since 1982. Impact and Effectiveness
974. Controlling for population, there were nearly four times as many
successful § 2 cases in covered jurisdictions as there were in noncovered
jurisdictions. 679 F. 3d, at 874. The Katz study further found that § 2
lawsuits are more likely to succeed when they are filed in covered
jurisdictions than in noncovered jurisdictions. Impact and Effectiveness
974. From these findings — ignored by the Court — Congress reasonably
concluded that the coverage formula continues to identify the jurisdictions
of greatest concern.

The evidence before Congress, furthermore, indicated that voting in the
covered jurisdictions was more racially polarized than elsewhere in the
country. H. R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 34-35. While racially polarized voting
alone
does not signal a constitutional violation, it is a factor that increases
the vulnerability of racial minorities to discriminatory changes in voting
law. The reason is twofold. First, racial polarization means that racial
minorities are at risk of being systematically outvoted and having their
interests underrepresented in legislatures. Second, "when [***30] political
preferences fall along racial lines, the natural inclinations of incumbents
and ruling parties to entrench themselves have predictable racial effects.
Under circumstances of severe racial polarization, efforts to gain political
advantage translate into race-specific disadvantages." Ansolabehere,
Persily, & Stewart, Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012
Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act, 126 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 205, 209 (2013).

In other words, a governing political coalition has an incentive to
prevent changes in the existing balance of voting power. When voting is
racially polarized, efforts by the ruling party to pursue that incentive
"will inevitably discriminate against a racial group." Ibid. Just as
buildings in California have a greater need to be earthquake-proofed, places
where there is greater racial polarization in voting have a greater need for
prophylactic measures to prevent purposeful race discrimination. This point
was understood by Congress and is well recognized in the academic
literature. See 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(3), 120 Stat. 577 ("The
continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each of the jurisdictions
covered by the [preclearance requirement] demonstrates that racial and
language minorities remain politically vulnerable"); H. R. Rep. No. 109-478,
at 35; Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial
and Language Minorities, in Quiet Revolution 21, 22.

The case for retaining a coverage formula that met needs on the ground was
therefore solid. Congress might
have been charged with rigidity had it afforded covered [*2644] jurisdictions no way
out or ignored jurisdictions that needed superintendence. Congress, however,
responded to this concern. Critical components of the congressional design
are the statutory provisions allowing jurisdictions to "bail out" of
preclearance, and for court-ordered "bail ins." See Northwest Austin,
557 U. S., at 199. [**687] The VRA permits a jurisdiction to bail out by showing
that it has complied with the Act for ten years, and has engaged in efforts
to eliminate intimidation and harassment of voters. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(a)
(2006 ed. and Supp. V). It also authorizes a court to subject a noncovered
jurisdiction to federal preclearance upon finding that violations of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have occurred there. § 1973a(c) (2006
ed.).

Congress was satisfied that the VRA's bailout mechanism provided an
effective means of adjusting the VRA's coverage over time. H. R. Rep. No.
109-478, at 25 (the success of bailout "illustrates that: (1) covered status
is neither permanent nor over-broad; and (2) covered status has been and
continues to be within the control of the jurisdiction such that those
jurisdictions that have a genuinely clean record and want to terminate
coverage have the ability to do so"). Nearly 200 jurisdictions have
successfully bailed out of the preclearance requirement, and DOJ has
consented to every bailout application filed by an eligible jurisdiction
since the current bailout procedure became [***31] effective in 1984. Brief for
Federal Respondent 54. The bail-in mechanism has also worked. Several
jurisdictions have been subject to federal preclearance by court orders,
including the States of New Mexico and Arkansas. App. to Brief for Federal
Respondent 1a-3a.

This experience exposes the inaccuracy of the Court's portrayal of the Act
as static, unchanged since 1965. Congress designed the VRA to be a dynamic
statute, capable of adjusting to changing conditions. True, many covered
jurisdictions have not been able to bail out due to recent acts of
noncompliance with the VRA, but that truth reinforces the congressional
judgment that these jurisdictions were rightfully subject to preclearance,
and ought to remain under that regime.

IV

Congress approached the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA with great care
and seriousness. The same cannot be said of the Court's opinion today. The
Court makes no genuine attempt to engage with the massive legislative record
that Congress assembled. Instead, it relies on increases in voter
registration and turnout as if that were the whole story. See supra, at
18-19. Without even identifying a standard of review, the Court dismissively
brushes off arguments based on "data from the record," and declines to enter
the "debat[e about] what [the] record shows." Ante, at 20-21. One would
expect more from an opinion striking at the heart of the Nation's signal
piece of civil-rights legislation.

I note the most disturbing lapses. First, by what right, given its usual
restraint, does the Court even address Shelby County's facial challenge to
the VRA? Second, the Court veers away from controlling precedent regarding
the "equal sovereignty" doctrine without even acknowledging that it is doing
so. Third, hardly showing the respect ordinarily paid when Congress acts to
implement the Civil War Amendments, and as just stressed, the Court does not
even deign to grapple with the legislative record.

A

Shelby County launched a purely facial challenge to the VRA's 2006
reauthorization. "[*2645] A facial challenge to [**688] a legislative Act," the Court has
other times said, "is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno,
481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987).

"[U]nder our constitutional system[,] courts are not roving commissions
assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws." Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 610-611 (1973). Instead, the "judicial Power" is
limited to deciding particular "Cases" and "Controversies." U. S. Const.,
Art. III, § 2. "Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others,
in other situations not before the Court." Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 610. Yet
the Court's opinion in this case contains not a word explaining why Congress
lacks the power to subject to preclearance the particular plaintiff that
initiated [***32] this lawsuit — Shelby County, Alabama. The reason for the Court's
silence is apparent, for as applied to Shelby County, the VRA's preclearance
requirement is hardly contestable.

Alabama is home to Selma, site of the "Bloody Sunday" beatings of
civil-rights demonstrators that served as the catalyst for the VRA's
enactment. Following those events, Martin Luther King, Jr., led a march from
Selma to Montgomery, Alabama's capital, where he called for passage of the
VRA. If the Act passed, he foresaw, progress could be made even in Alabama,
but there had to be a steadfast national commitment to see the task through
to completion. In King's words, "the arc of the moral universe is long, but
it bends toward justice." G. May, Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights
Act and the Transformation of American Democracy 144 (2013).

History has proved King right. Although circumstances in Alabama have
changed, serious concerns remain. Between 1982 and 2005, Alabama had one of
the highest rates of successful § 2 suits, second only to its VRA-covered
neighbor Mississippi. 679 F. 3d, at 897 (Williams, J., dissenting). In other
words, even while subject to the restraining effect of § 5, Alabama was
found to have "deni[ed] or abridge[d]" voting rights "on account of race or
color" more frequently than nearly all other States in the Union.
42 U. S. C. § 1973(a). This fact prompted the dissenting judge below to
concede that "a more narrowly tailored coverage formula" capturing Alabama
and a handful of other jurisdictions with an established track record of
racial discrimination in voting "might be defensible." 679 F. 3d, at 897
(opinion of Williams, J.). That is an understatement. Alabama's sorry
history of § 2 violations alone provides sufficient justification for
Congress' determination in 2006 that the State should remain subject to §
5's preclearance requirement.[**689][*2646][fn7]

A few examples suffice to demonstrate that, at least in Alabama, the
"current burdens" imposed by § 5's preclearance requirement are "justified
by current needs." Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 203. In the interim
between the VRA's 1982 and 2006 reauthorizations, this Court twice
confronted purposeful racial discrimination in Alabama. In Pleasant Grove v.
United States, 479 U. S. 462 (1987), the Court held that Pleasant Grove — a
city in Jefferson County, Shelby County's neighbor — engaged in purposeful
discrimination by annexing all-white areas while rejecting the annexation
request of an adjacent black neighborhood. The city had "shown unambiguous
opposition to racial
integration, both before and after the passage of the federal civil rights
laws," and its strategic annexations appeared to be an attempt "to provide
for the growth of a monolithic white voting block" for "the impermissible
purpose of minimizing future black voting strength." Id., at 465,471-472.

Two years before Pleasant Grove, the Court in Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U. S. 222 (1985), struck down a provision of the Alabama Constitution
that prohibited individuals convicted of misdemeanor offenses "involving
moral turpitude" from voting. Id., at 223 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The provision violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, the Court unanimously [***33] concluded, because "its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race[,]
and the [provision] continues to this day to have that effect." Id., at 233.

Pleasant Grove and Hunter were not anomalies. In 1986, a Federal District
Judge concluded that the at-large election systems in several Alabama
counties violated § 2. Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 640 F. Supp. 1347,
1354-1363 (MD Ala. 1986). Summarizing its findings, the court stated that
"[f]rom the late 1800's through the present, [Alabama] has consistently
erected barriers to keep black persons from full and equal participation in
the social, economic, and political life of the state." Id., at 1360.

Although the Dillard litigation resulted in overhauls of numerous
electoral systems tainted by racial discrimination,
concerns about backsliding persist. In 2008, for example, the city of
Calera, located in Shelby County, requested preclearance of a redistricting
plan that "would have eliminated the city's sole majority-black district,
which had been created [**690] pursuant to the consent decree in Dillard."
811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (DC 2011). Although DOJ objected to the plan,
Calera forged ahead with elections based on the unprecleared voting changes,
resulting in the defeat of the incumbent African-American councilman who
represented the former majority-black district. Ibid. The city's defiance
required DOJ to bring a § 5 enforcement action that ultimately yielded
appropriate redress, including restoration of the majority-black district.
Ibid.; Brief for Respondent-Intervenors Earl Cunningham et al. 20.

A recent FBI investigation provides a further window into the persistence
of racial discrimination in state politics. See United States v. McGregor,
824 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1344-1348[*2647] (MD Ala. 2011). Recording devices worn by
state legislators cooperating with the FBI's investigation captured
conversations between members of the state legislature and their political
allies. The recorded conversations are shocking. Members of the state Senate
derisively refer to African-Americans as "Aborigines" and talk openly of
their aim to quash a particular gambling-related referendum because the
referendum, if placed on the ballot, might increase African-American voter
turnout. Id., at 1345-1346 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id.,
at 1345 (legislators and their allies expressed concern that if the
referendum were placed on the ballot, "`[e]very black, every illiterate'
would be `bused [to the polls] on HUD financed buses'"). These conversations
occurred not in the 1870's, or even in the 1960's, they took place in 2010.
Id., at 1344-1345. The District Judge presiding over the criminal trial at
which the recorded conversations were introduced commented that the
"recordings
represent compelling [***34] evidence that political exclusion through racism
remains a real and enduring problem" in Alabama. Id., at 1347. Racist
sentiments, the judge observed, "remain regrettably entrenched in the high
echelons of state government." Ibid.

These recent episodes forcefully demonstrate that § 5's preclearance
requirement is constitutional as applied to Alabama and its political
subdivisions.[fn8] And under our case law, that conclusion should suffice to
resolve this case. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 24-25 (1960)
("[I]f the complaint here called for an application of the statute clearly
constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should have been an end
to the question of constitutionality."). See also Nevada Dept. of HumanResources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 743 (2003) (SCALIA, J., dissenting)
(where, as here, a state or local government raises a facial challenge to a
federal statute on the ground that it exceeds Congress' enforcement powers
under the Civil War Amendments, the challenge fails if the opposing party is
able to show that the statute "could constitutionally be applied to some
jurisdictions").

This Court has consistently rejected constitutional challenges to
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' enforcement powers under the Civil
War Amendments upon finding that the legislation was constitutional [**691] as
applied to the particular set of circumstances before the Court. See UnitedStates v. Georgia, 546 U. S. 151, 159 (2006) (Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) validly abrogates state sovereign immunity
"insofar as [it] creates a private cause of action . . . for conduct that
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment");
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 530-534 (2004) (Title II of the ADA is
constitutional "as it applies to the class of cases implicating the
fundamental right of access to the courts"); Raines, 362 U. S., at 24-26
(federal statute proscribing deprivations of the right to vote based on race
was constitutional as applied to the state officials before the Court, even
if it could not constitutionally be applied to other parties). A similar
approach is warranted here.[*2648][fn9]

The VRA's exceptionally broad severability provision makes it particularly
inappropriate for the Court to allow Shelby County to mount a facial
challenge to §§ 4(b) and 5 of the VRA, even though application of those
provisions to the county falls well within the bounds of Congress'
legislative authority. The severability provision states:

"If any provision of [this Act] or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of [the Act]
and the application of the provision to other persons not similarly
situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
42 U. S. C. § 1973p.

In other words, even if the VRA could not constitutionally be applied to
certain States — e.g., Arizona and Alaska, see ante, at 8 — § 1973p calls
for those unconstitutional applications to be severed, leaving the Act in
place for jurisdictions as to which its application does not transgress
constitutional limits.

Nevertheless, the Court suggests that limiting the jurisdictional scope of
the VRA in an appropriate case would be "to try our hand [***35] at updating the
statute." Ante, at 22. Just last Term, however, the Court rejected this very
argument when addressing a materially identical severability provision,
explaining that such a provision is "Congress' explicit textual instruction
to leave unaffected the remainder of [the Act]" if any particular
"application is unconstitutional." National Federation of IndependentBusiness v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (plurality opinion) (slip
op., at 56) (internal quotation marks omitted); id., at ___ (GINSBURG, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(slip op., at 60) (agreeing with the plurality's severability analysis). See
also Raines, 362 U. S., at 23 (a statute capable of some constitutional
[**692] applications may nonetheless be susceptible to a facial challenge only in
"that rarest of cases where this Court can justifiably think itself able
confidently to discern that Congress would not have desired its legislation
to stand at all unless it could validly stand in its every application").
Leaping to resolve Shelby County's facial challenge without considering
whether application of the VRA to Shelby County is constitutional, or even
addressing the VRA's severability provision, the Court's opinion can hardly
be described as an exemplar of restrained and moderate decisionmaking. Quite
the opposite. Hubris is a fit word for today's demolition of the VRA.

B

The Court stops any application of § 5 by holding that § 4(b)'s coverage
formula is unconstitutional. It pins this result, in large measure, to "the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty." Ante, at 10-11, 23. In
Katzenbach, however, the Court held, in no uncertain terms, that the
principle "applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to theUnion, and not to the remedies for local
evils which have subsequently appeared." 383 U. S., at 328-329 (emphasis
added).
[*2649]

Katzenbach, the Court acknowledges, "rejected the notion that the [equal
sovereignty] principle operate[s] as a bar on differential treatment outside
[the] context [of the admission of new States]." Ante, at 11 (citing
383 U. S., at 328-329) (emphasis omitted). But the Court clouds that once
clear understanding by citing dictum from Northwest Austin to convey that
the principle of equal sovereignty "remains highly pertinent in assessing
subsequent disparate treatment of States." Ante, at 11 (citing
557 U. S., at 203). See also ante, at 23 (relying on Northwest Austin's
"emphasis on [the] significance" of the equal-sovereignty principle). If the
Court is suggesting that dictum in Northwest Austin silently overruled
Katzenbach's limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to "the admission
of new States," the suggestion is untenable. Northwest Austin cited
Katzenbach's holding in the course of declining to decide whether the VRA
was constitutional or even what standard of review applied to the question.
557 U. S., at 203-204. In today's decision, the Court ratchets up what was
pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to the equal
sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of Katzenbach. The Court does so
with nary an explanation of why it finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any
discussion [***36] of whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels adherence to
Katzenbach's ruling on the limited "significance" of the equal sovereignty
principle.

Today's unprecedented extension of the equal sovereignty principle outside
its proper domain — the admission of new States — is capable of much
mischief. Federal statutes that treat States disparately are hardly
novelties. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. § 3704 (no State may operate or permit a
sports-related gambling scheme, unless that State conducted such a scheme
"at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August
31, 1990"); 26 U. S. C. § 142(l)
(EPA required to locate green [**693] building project in a State meeting specified
population criteria); 42 U. S. C. § 3796bb (at least 50 percent of rural
drug enforcement assistance funding must be allocated to States with "a
population density of fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile or a State
in which the largest county has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand
people, based on the decennial census of 1990 through fiscal year 1997"); §§
13925, 13971 (similar population criteria for funding to combat rural
domestic violence); § 10136 (specifying rules applicable to Nevada's Yucca
Mountain nuclear waste site, and providing that "[n]o State, other than the
State of Nevada, may receive financial assistance under this subsection
after December 22, 1987"). Do such provisions remain safe given the Court's
expansion of equal sovereignty's sway?

Of gravest concern, Congress relied on our pathmarking Katzenbach decision
in each reauthorization of the VRA. It had every reason to believe that the
Act's limited geographical scope would weigh in favor of, not against, the
Act's constitutionality. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison,
529 U. S. 598, 626-627 (2000) (confining preclearance regime to States with
a record of discrimination bolstered the VRA's constitutionality). Congress
could hardly have foreseen that the VRA's limited geographic reach would
render the Act constitutionally suspect. See Persily 195 ("[S]upporters of
the Act sought to develop an evidentiary record for the principal purpose of
explaining why the covered jurisdictions should remain covered, rather than
justifying the coverage of certain jurisdictions but not others.").

In the Court's conception, it appears, defenders of the VRA could not
prevail [*2650] upon showing what the record overwhelmingly bears out, i.e., that
there is a need for continuing the preclearance regime in covered States. In
addition, the defenders would have to disprove the existence
of a comparable need elsewhere. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61-62 (suggesting that
proof of egregious episodes of racial discrimination in covered
jurisdictions would not suffice to carry the day for the VRA, unless such
episodes are shown to be absent elsewhere). I am aware of no precedent for
imposing such a double burden on defenders of legislation.

C

The Court has time and again declined to upset legislation of this genre
unless there was no or almost no evidence of unconstitutional action by
States. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 530 (1997)
(legislative record "mention[ed] no episodes [of the kind the legislation
[***37] aimed to check] occurring in the past 40 years"). No such claim can be made
about the congressional record for the 2006 VRA reauthorization. Given a
record replete with examples of denial or abridgment of a paramount federal
right, the Court should have left the matter where it belongs: in Congress'
bailiwick.

Instead, the Court strikes § 4(b)'s coverage provision because, in its
view, the provision is not based on "current conditions." Ante, at 17. It
discounts, however, that one such condition was the preclearance remedy in
place in the covered jurisdictions, a remedy Congress designed both to catch
discrimination before it causes harm, and to guard against return to old
[**694] ways. 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(3), (9). Volumes of evidence supported
Congress' determination that the prospect of retrogression was real.
Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to
stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a
rainstorm because you are not getting wet.

But, the Court insists, the coverage formula is no good; it is based on
"decades-old data and eradicated practices." Ante, at 18. Even if the
legislative record shows, as engaging with it would reveal, that the formula
accurately
identifies the jurisdictions with the worst conditions of voting
discrimination, that is of no moment, as the Court sees it. Congress, the
Court decrees, must "star[t] from scratch." Ante, at 23. I do not see why
that should be so.

Congress' chore was different in 1965 than it was in 2006. In 1965, there
were a "small number of States . . . which in most instances were familiar
to Congress by name," on which Congress fixed its attention. Katzenbach,
383 U. S., at 328. In drafting the coverage formula, "Congress began work
with reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority
of the States" it sought to target. Id., at 329. "The formula [Congress]
eventually evolved to describe these areas" also captured a few States that
had not been the subject of congressional factfinding. Ibid. Nevertheless,
the Court upheld the formula in its entirety, finding it fair "to infer a
significant danger of the evil" in all places the formula covered. Ibid.

The situation Congress faced in 2006, when it took up reauthorization of
the coverage formula, was not the same. By then, the formula had been in
effect for many years, and all of the jurisdictions covered by it were
"familiar to Congress by name." Id., at 328. The question before Congress:
Was there still a sufficient basis to support continued application of the
preclearance remedy in each of those already-identified places? There was at
that point no chance that the [*2651] formula might inadvertently sweep in new areas
that were not the subject of congressional findings. And Congress could
determine from the record whether the jurisdictions captured by the coverage
formula still belonged under the preclearance regime. If they did, there was
no need to alter the formula. That is why the Court, in addressing prior
reauthorizations of the VRA, did not question the continuing "relevance" of
the formula.

Consider once again the [***38] components of the record before Congress in 2006.
The coverage provision identified a
known list of places with an undisputed history of serious problems with
racial discrimination in voting. Recent evidence relating to Alabama and its
counties was there for all to see. Multiple Supreme Court decisions had
upheld the coverage provision, most recently in 1999. There was extensive
evidence that, due to the preclearance mechanism, conditions in the covered
jurisdictions had notably improved. And there was evidence that
pre-clearance was still having a substantial real-world effect, having
stopped hundreds of discriminatory voting changes in the covered
jurisdictions since the last reauthorization. In addition, there was
evidence that racial polarization in voting was higher in covered
jurisdictions [**695] than elsewhere, increasing the vulnerability of minority
citizens in those jurisdictions. And countless witnesses, reports, and case
studies documented continuing problems with voting discrimination in those
jurisdictions. In light of this record, Congress had more than a reasonable
basis to conclude that the existing coverage formula was not out of sync
with conditions on the ground in covered areas. And certainly Shelby County
was no candidate for release through the mechanism Congress provided. See
supra, at 22-23, 26-28.

The Court holds § 4(b) invalid on the ground that it is "irrational to
base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have
been illegal since that time." Ante, at 23. But the Court disregards what
Congress set about to do in enacting the VRA. That extraordinary legislation
scarcely stopped at the particular tests and devices that happened to exist
in 1965. The grand aim of the Act is to secure to all in our polity equal
citizenship stature, a voice in our democracy undiluted by race. As the
record for the 2006 reauthorization makes abundantly clear,
second-generation barriers to minority voting rights have emerged in the
covered jurisdictions as attempted substitutes for the first-generation
barriers that
originally triggered preclearance in those jurisdictions. See supra, at 5-6,
8, 15-17.

The sad irony of today's decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why
the VRA has proven effective. The Court appears to believe that the VRA's
success in eliminating the specific devices extant in 1965 means that
preclearance is no longer needed. Ante, at 21-22, 23-24. With that belief,
and the argument derived from it, history repeats itself. The same
assumption — that the problem could be solved when particular methods of
voting discrimination are identified and eliminated — was indulged and
proved wrong repeatedly prior to the VRA's enactment. Unlike prior statutes,
which singled out particular tests or devices, the VRA is grounded in
Congress' recognition of the "variety and persistence" of measures designed
to impair minority voting rights. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 311; supra, at
2. In truth, the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle
second-generation barriers is [***39] powerful evidence that a remedy as effective
as preclearance remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent
backsliding.

Beyond question, the VRA is no ordinary legislation. It is extraordinary
because [*2652] Congress embarked on a mission long delayed and of extraordinary
importance: to realize the purpose and promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.
For a half century, a concerted effort has been made to end racial
discrimination in voting. Thanks to the Voting Rights Act, progress once the
subject of a dream has been achieved and continues to be made.

The record supporting the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA is also
extraordinary. It was described by the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee as "one of the most extensive considerations of any piece of
legislation that the United States Congress has dealt with in the 27½ years"
he had served in the House. [**696]152 Cong. Rec. H5143 (July 13, 2006) (statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
After exhaustive evidence-gathering and deliberative process, Congress
reauthorized the VRA, including the coverage provision, with overwhelming
bipartisan support. It was the judgment of Congress that "40 years has not
been a sufficient amount of time to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination
following nearly 100 years of disregard for the dictates of the 15th
amendment and to ensure that the right of all citizens to vote is protected
as guaranteed by the Constitution." 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(7),
120 Stat. 577. That determination of the body empowered to enforce the Civil
War Amendments "by appropriate legislation" merits this Court's utmost
respect. In my judgment, the Court errs egregiously by overriding Congress'
decision.

* * *

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

[fn1] The Court purports to declare unconstitutional only the coverage
formula set out in § 4(b). See ante, at 24. But without that formula, § 5 is
immobilized.

[fn2] The Constitution uses the words "right to vote" in five separate
places: the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments. Each of these Amendments contains the same broad
empowerment of Congress to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the
protected right. The implication is unmistakable: Under our constitutional
structure, Congress holds the lead rein in making the right to vote equally
real for all U. S. citizens. These Amendments are in line with the special
role assigned to Congress in protecting the integrity of the democratic
process in federal elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4 ("[T]he Congress may
at any time by Law make or alter" regulations concerning the "Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives."); Arizona
v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., ante, at 5-6.

[fn3] Acknowledging the existence of "serious constitutional questions," see
ante, at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted), does not suggest how those
questions should be answered.

[fn4] This number includes only changes actually proposed. Congress also
received evidence that many covered jurisdictions engaged in an "informal
consultation process" with DOJ before formally submitting a proposal, so
that the deterrent effect of preclearance was far broader than the formal
submissions alone suggest. The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance:
Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pp. 53-54 (2006). All agree that an unsupported assertion about "deterrence"
would not be sufficient to justify keeping a remedy in place in perpetuity.
See ante, at 17. But it was certainly reasonable for Congress to consider
the testimony of witnesses who had worked with officials in covered
jurisdictions and observed a real-world deterrent effect.

[fn5] For an illustration postdating the 2006 reauthorization, see SouthCarolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (DC 2012), which involved a
South Carolina voter-identification law enacted in 2011. Concerned that the
law would burden minority voters, DOJ brought a § 5 enforcement action to
block the law's implementation. In the course of the litigation, South
Carolina officials agreed to binding interpretations that made it "far
easier than some might have expected or feared" for South Carolina citizens
to vote. Id., at 37. A three-judge panel precleared the law after adopting
both interpretations as an express "condition of preclearance." Id., at
37-38. Two of the judges commented that the case demonstrated "the
continuing utility of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in deterring
problematic, and hence encouraging non-discriminatory, changes in state and
local voting laws." Id., at 54 (opinion of Bates, J.).

[fn6] Because preclearance occurs only in covered jurisdictions and can be
expected to stop the most obviously objectionable measures, one would expect
a lower rate of successful § 2 lawsuits in those jurisdictions if the risk
of voting discrimination there were the same as elsewhere in the country.

[fn7] This lawsuit was filed by Shelby County, a political subdivision of
Alabama, rather than by the State itself. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to
judge Shelby County's constitutional challenge in light of in stances of
discrimination statewide because Shelby County is subject to § 5's
preclearance requirement by virtue of Alabama's designation as a covered
jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the VRA. See ante, at 7. In any event, Shelby
County's recent record of employing an at-large electoral system tainted by
intentional racial discrimination is by itself sufficient to justify
subjecting the county to § 5's preclearance mandate. See infra, at 26.

[fn8] Congress continued preclearance over Alabama, including Shelby County,
after considering evidence of current barriers there to minority voting
clout. Shelby County, thus, is no "redhead" caught up in an arbitrary
scheme. See ante, at 22.

[fn9] The Court does not contest that Alabama's history of racial
discrimination provides a sufficient basis for Congress to require Alabama
and its political subdivisions to preclear electoral changes. Nevertheless,
the Court asserts that Shelby County may prevail on its facial challenge to
§ 4's coverage formula because it is subject to § 5's preclearance
requirement by virtue of that formula. See ante, at 22 ("The county was
selected [for preclearance] based on th[e] [coverage] formula."). This
misses the reality that Congress decided to subject Alabama to preclearance
based on evidence of continuing constitutional violations in that State. See
supra, at 28, n. 8.