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Supreme Court of India

R.C.Sharma vs Union Of India & Ors on 6 May, 1976

Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 2037, 1976 SCR 580

Author: M H Beg

Bench: Beg, M. Hameedullah

PETITIONER:
R.C.SHARMA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/05/1976
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1976 AIR 2037 1976 SCR 580
1976 SCC (3) 574
ACT:
Service matter-Departmental proceedings-When could be
declared null and void.
Procedure-Time limit in delivering judgment after
hearing arguments-If prescribed by C.P.C.
HEADNOTE:
After holding a departmental enquiry on certain charges
of contravention of Government Servants' Conduct Rules, the
appellant was reduced in rank. His suit for a declaration
that the impugned action was void and inoperative was
dismissed. The High Court dismissed his appeal.
On appeal, it was contended that the departmental
enquiry was vitiated on account of material irregularities,
and that, as a result of excessive delay, between the date
of hearing and delivery of judgment by the High Court, it
did not deal with a number of submissions made by him and
thereby caused prejudice.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
^
HELD: (1)(a) The question whether the appellant was
given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and was
sufficiently heard or hot is largely a question of fact. It
is only when an opportunity denied is of such a nature that
the denial contravenes mandatory provision of law or a rule
of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole
departmental trial. Prejudice to the Government servant from
an alleged violation of a rule must be proved.[583C]
(b) The plea that the appellant had been subjected to
trial on allegations which had been the subject-matter of
previous enquiries overlooks that no charge was framed as a
result of any previous enquiry. If an enquiry was held at a
particular stage, possibly to determine whether regular
proceedings should be drawn up or started, it did not debar
a departmental trial. [583D]
State of Assam & Anr. v. J. N. Roy Biswas AIR 1975 SC
2277 and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC
27, held inapplicable.
(c) It was not shown whether any evidence which the
appellant tried to produce was really wrongly excluded and
at what stage and for what reasons. All these are questions
of fact which should be raised in the departmental trial.
After that if there was any patent error a writ petition
lay. [584A]
(d) A suit challenging a departmental proceeding cannot
be treated as an appeal from the findings in those
proceedings or against a punishment inflicted upon the
Government servant even if these were erroneous. A question
which could affect the result in a civil suit has to be of
such a nature that it goes to the root of the jurisdiction
that the conduct of the departmental trial illegally and
vitiates the result. It is only if the departmental
proceeding is null and void that a plaintiff could obtain
the reliefs he had asked for. [584E-F]
Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. & Anr. [1963] 1 S.C.R.
778 @ 835, 836, referred to.
(e) Unless a point could be raised on behalf of an
appellant which is capable of vitiating the departmental
proceedings there could be no declaration that the
departmental proceedings were null and void. [585H]
581
(2) The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time
limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and
the delivery of a judgment. Nevertheless, an unreasonable
delay between the hearing of arguments and delivery of
judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary
circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written
arguments were submitted. It is not unlikely that some
points which the litigant considered important might have
escaped notice. But, what is more important is that
litigants must have complete confidence in the results of
litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there
excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of
judgments.
JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1155 of
1971.

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 17-11-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal
No. 178/61).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the
judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court given by it on 17th November, 1969, dismissing a
plaintiff's first appeal arising out of an original suit for
a declaration that the order passed by the Commissioner of
Income-tax, Lucknow, on 2nd April, 1956, reducing the
appellant in rank from the post of an Income-tax Officer to
that of an Income-tax Inspector, was void and inoperative.
It appears that the appellant was in service upto 30th April
1958, when he was prematurely retired. The appellant also
claimed Rs. 20,904/-as arrears of salary, but he reduced
this claim to Rs. 16,561.29.

The appellant was originally appointed on 22nd November
1922, as Lower Division Clerk, and, thereafter, promoted as
Income-tax Inspector in 1942. He was promoted to the post of
Income-tax Officer in 1945. His case was that he had worked
to the entire satisfaction of his immediate superior
officers and higher authorities and had earned a number of
certificates highly appreciative of his work. He was
confirmed early in 1952 as an Income-tax Officer. He was,
however, placed under suspension on 30th September, 1953, by
the Commissioner of Income-Tax, U.P., Lucknow, on the basis
of a preliminary enquiry on allegations involving corruption
and violation of service rules.

582

Charges were framed on 30th December, 1953, by Shri A. K.
Bose, Deputy Director of Investigations, who was appointed
by the Commissioner of Income-tax as the Inquiring Officer.
The preliminary enquiry had been conducted by Shri G. S.
Srivastava, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax,
Meerut.

That first charge was that the appellant had entered
into partnership with others, under the name of Gautam Cycle
Mart, Meerut, in 1939, in contravention of the Government
Servants' Conduct Rules. The second charge was that he had
made various investments in the name of various members of
his family far in excess of and disproportionate to the
known sources of his income. His high standard of living and
expenditure were also mentioned there. The third and the
last charge gave particulars of thirteen assessment cases in
which the appellant was alleged to be either "grossly
negligent, careless, inefficient, and/or corrupt in the
performance of his duties as Income-tax Officer".

The appellant's defences included alleged confused
nature of charges characterized by him as "vague, over-
lapping, intermingled" and wrongly joined together. He also
pleaded that there had been an enquiry in 1949, by Shri A.
R. Sachdeva, Asstt. Inspecting Commissioner, into some of
the matters mentioned in the charges, and about others in
1952 by Shri R. N. Srivastava, another Inspecting
Commissioner, and that the appellant had been exonerated of
the allegations and imputations made against him on each
occasion. One of his defences was that a fresh enquiry into
the same charges was not permissible under the Departmental
rules and was also barred by rules of natural justice. He
also complained of failure to give him opportunity to
produce nine witnesses in his defence with some documents.

It is evident that the questions raised by the
appellant depended on findings of fact. All relevant facts
had been examined by the officer who held the enquiry and by
the punishing authority. No malafides against either the
Inquiring Officer, Shri A. K. Bose, Deputy Director
Investigation, or against the punishing authority was
alleged. There are, however, suggestions that Shri G. S.
Srivastava and Shri R. N. Srivastava, Inspecting Assistant
Commissioners, were pursuing the appellant for some unknown
reason which we do not find stated anywhere. We fail to see
how these two officers, who neither conducted the actual
departmental trial nor could have any influence over the
punishing authority, could cause any miscarriage of justice
or do anything to vitiate the departmental trial merely
because they held preliminary inquiries before framing
charges. The defence of the appellant seemed something
similar to the much too common a defence of the accused in
criminal trials attributing all their misfortunes to the
hostility of the police.

583

The question whether the appellant was given a
reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard or
not is largely a question of fact. It is only when an
opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial
contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of
natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental
trial. Prejudice to the government servant resulting from an
alleged violation of a rule must be proved.

The plea that the appellant has been subjected to trial
on allegations which had been the subject matter of previous
enquiries overlooks that no charge was framed as a result of
any previous enquiry. Therefore, the two authorities cited:
The State of Assam & Anr. v. J. N. Roy Biswas, and R. T.
Rangachari v. Secretary of State, do not help the appellant.
If an inquiry is held, at a particular stage, possibly to
determine whether regular proceedings should be drawn up or
started, it does not debar a departmental trial. That was
the nature of the previous enquiries. It appears that it is
only after the appellant's activities had become more
notorious that further enquiry was undertaken and regular
charges framed. It is possible that the appellant may have
been emboldened by the failure of officers to report earlier
that charges should be framed and tried. In any case, this
could not stand in the way of the first regular enquiry in
the course of which charges were actually framed and fully
enquired into by Officers whose integrity and sense of
justice is not challenged.

As for the denial of the opportunity to produce nine
witnesses in defence, all that is suggested is that these
witnesses could only state what opinions they had formed
about the work, efficiency, and integrity of the appellant.
They could not say anything about the particular instances
which formed the subject matter of the charges against the
appellant. It is not uncommon for astute Govt. servants,
facing such enquiries, to give long lists of witnesses and
documents so as to either prolong an enquiry or to prepare
grounds for future litigation. Unless the exclusion of
evidence is of a kind which amounts to a denial of natural
justice or would have affected the final decision it could
not be material. In the case before us, it has not even been
shown how the witnesses whose production was said to have
been disallowed could help the appellant's case on specific
charges. Indeed, we do not know whether any evidence which
the appellant tried to produce was really wrongly excluded
and at what stage and for what reasons. All these are
questions of fact which should be, initially, raised in the
departmental trial. After that, if there was any patent
error a writ petition lay. Finally, the
584
trial Court and the High Court had considered at some length
all relevant questions raised.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has handed over a
very carefully and laboriously prepared statement of facts
of the case to show us that the evidence did not support the
charges levelled against the appellant. It was also
submitted that, apart from the charges relating to
partnership in the Gautam Cycle Mart, no other charge was
found substantiated. Furthermore, it was submitted that,
after the inquiring officer had found that the Gautam Cycle
Mart was started in 1942 and not in 1939, the appellant
should have been given a further opportunity to meet a new
case. No rule was cited in support of such a technical
objection to the nature of the charge which would cover the
starting of the Gautam Cycle Mart at any time subsequent to
1939 also. In any case, it was for the appellant to satisfy
the Departmental authorities, which had looked into the case
upto its final stages, that he had suffered some injustice
which to be set right. He had been given a second
opportunity by the punishing authority before it inflicted
the punishment of demotion. Nothing further was required by
law. And, it was probably because the appellant was absolved
of charges involving corruption in the discharge of his
duties that he was given the lesser punishment of demotion
and neither dismissed nor removed from service.

A suit challenging the validity of departmental
proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal from the findings
in the departmental proceedings or the punishment inflicted
upon the Govt. servant even if these are erroneous. A
question which could effect the result in a civil suit has
to be of such nature that it goes to the root of the
jurisdiction and the conduct of the department trial and
vitiates the result. It is only if the departmental
proceeding in null and void that a plaintiff in such a suit
could obtain the relief he had asked. We are unable to see
what point had been raised by the appellant which could have
had that effect upon the departmental proceedings.

"A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is
improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe
certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But it
does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision
upon an incorrect determination of any question that it
is empowered or required (i.e.) has jurisdiction to
determine".

The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or
decision is that it binds, whether it be right or
wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial
or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached
otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous
determination relates to a mauer on which the
jurisdiction of that body depends. These princi ples
govern not onnly the findings of inferior courts
stricto strictio also the findings of administrative
bodies which are deemed be acting in a judicial
capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested
with power to err within the limits of their
jurisdiction; and provided that they keep within those
limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid
unless set aside on appeal".

Learned Counsel for the appellant said all that could
possibly be said on behalf of his client. He pointed out
that the High Court had given its judgment eight months
after it had heerad argumenst. He urged that the result was
that the High Court did not deal with a number of
submissions made because they had, apparently, been
forgotten. The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time
limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and
the delivery of a judgment. Nevertheless, we think that an
unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery
of a judgment, unless explained by exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when
written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that
some points which the litigant considers importan may have
escaped notice. But, what is more important is the litigants
must have complete confidence in the results of litigation.
This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive
delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of
judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only
be done but must manifestly appear to be done.

On 4th March, 1971, however, the High Court refusing
the certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this
Court observed that questions had been attempted to be
raised before it in asking for certification which had not
been argued at the time when the first appeal was heard by
the High Court. We find that one of the learned Judges who
dismissed the application for a certificate of fitness of
the case had also heard the arguments in the first appeal.
There is no affidavit before us that any particular points
argued before the Division Bench had not been referred to or
dealt with by the Bench. Moreover, the Division Bench had
probably not dealt with all arguments on questions of fact
because it did not consider it necessary to do so. After
all, it was not hearing an appeal against the findings of
the departmental authorities. It pointed this out.
Furthermore, after hearing the arguments of the learned
Counsel for the appellant, we are ourselves unable to see
any point which could be raised on behalf of the appellant
capable of vitiating the departmental proceedings. Unless
such a point could be raised, there could be no declaration
that the departmental proceedings were null and void.

There is also an application before us for revocation
of grant of special leave to appeal by this Court on the
ground that some material
586
facts were suppressed or misrepresented for the purpose of
obtaining special leave. Although the special leave petition
does not state that all the points sought to be raised by it
were not argued before the Division Bench, this is not
enough to merit cancellation of the special leave to appeal
which was granted by this Court. At the time of grant of
special leave, the order refusing grant of certificate of
fitness of the case for appeal to this Court must have been
before this Court. We are unable now to see the point on
which special leave was granted. But, that too would not, by
itself, merit a revocation of special leave at this stage
after hearing arguments.

We, therefore, dismiss both the appeal and the
application for revocation of special leave. Parties will
bear their own costs.