Australian Royal
Commissions and British Tribunals of Inquiry have been, and
continue to be, used as accepted tools of government. They can
investigate and report on major disasters or events that become
matters of public concern as a result for example of some alleged
maladministration in the workings of government. The current Royal
Commissions on the collapse of HIH(1) and also into the
building industry(2) provide the most recent
illustrations of the uses made of such inquiries at the federal
level of government.

To be fully effective
these kinds of public inquiries are often given coercive
powers of summoning witnesses and compelling the production of
documents. However, their undoubted utility
has to be balanced against other considerations such as their
potential to harm the reputations, and intrude on the privacy, of
individuals. This gives rise to the need to adopt safeguards
for witnesses who may be called upon to appear before
them. A related
issue concerns the effect of adopting such safeguards on the costs
and duration of inquiries. A further underlying issue concerns the
appropriateness of using safeguards developed in adversarial proceedings in the
kind of inquisitorial
proceedings that are necessarily involved in public
inquiries.

The paper(3) from which
this brief is drawn attempts to assess the relevance of the
experience generated by British Tribunals of Inquiry for Australian
federal Royal Commissions especially when analysed against the
background of judicial developments in some other jurisdictions
such as New Zealand and Ireland. The experience of those countries
may also provide insights into the law which governs the operation
of Australian federal royal commissions and changes that might be
considered to that law in the future.

Important questions arise regarding
how public inquiries are established and what should be their
composition.

The establishment of British
Tribunals of Inquiry in 1921 in preference to parliamentary
committees of inquiry was, in part, due to the inability of such
committees to examine witnesses on oath. It was also due to the
unhappy experiences which parliamentary inquiries had enjoyed in
the past, essentially as a result of political partisanship. The
former kinds of inquiries have frequently been conducted by senior
judges. The appointment of members of the judiciary attracts
significant advantages to the Executive branch of government since
it bestows on those inquiries what has been described as the
'borrowed authority' of the judiciary. This is perceived as posing
significant dangers for the independence of the judiciary and thus
gives riseto serious questions of
policy which in Australia are governed by constitutional and legal
restraints founded on the separation of judicial
powers.

The increased role of
judges in the judicial review of governmental action under the
recently enacted British Human Rights Act 1998 and the arrangements
for the devolution of authority to the constituent parts of
theUnited
Kingdom, may require a
re-examination of the advisability of appointing existing judges to
Tribunals of Inquiry. One way of maximising the preservation
of the authority and prestige of serving judges both in the United
Kingdom and Australia is to appoint retired
judges.

Significant issues arise concerning
the scope of the investigations undertaken by public inquiries.
What matters are appropriate for such investigation? To what extent
should the inquiries be carried on without the approval of
parliament?

British Tribunals of
Inquiry have been appointed to investigate over a wide range of
incidents and matters including allegations of misconduct against
Ministers of the Crown, civil servants, local authorities and
police. Examples have involved improper gifts to Ministers, the
improper disclosure of budget secrets and the official bank rate,
accusations of brutality against police, disorders in Northern
Ireland ('The Bloody Sunday Affair') and mine disasters. In recent
times they have also involved the shooting of innocent children in
Dunblane Primary School, the abuse of children in North Wales and
the numerous deaths of patients treated by a private doctor. This
gives rise to the issue of which inquiries can legally be held, and
with whose approval, given the implications such inquiries have for
the potential intrusion into the privacy of individuals. A full
list of all British inquiries to date is attached in Schedule 1.
Some statistical information regarding the length of an inquiry,
the number of lawyers and witnesses involved and the volume of
recorded evidence, in relation to three of these inquiries, may be
found in Schedule 2. Australian Royal Commissions and
Commissions of Inquiry under the Royal Commissions Act 1902
(Cwlth) are listed at Schedule 3.

The suggestion put
forward in the paper is that there is considerable merit in
following the British model in two particular respects. The first
is that of requiring parliamentary approval for the appointment of
Tribunals of Inquiry. The second is to ensure that such inquiries
are only permitted to inquire into 'definite matters' of 'urgent
public importance' on the assumption that the primary judgment for
forming an opinion on these matters is vested in the body which
appoints the tribunal. The existing legal prohibition against the
unauthorised delegation of the power to define the scope of a
public inquiry operates as an important brake in limiting the
extent to which Tribunals of Inquiry and Royal Commissions can be
authorised to define their own terms of
reference.

A related issue concerns the extent
to which public inquiries can investigate questions of criminal
liability given the serious implications such inquiries can pose
for the holding of a fair trial since the findings of such
inquiries are not legally authoritative and binding. Despite those
implications, the analysis undertaken in this paper suggests that
Tribunals of Inquiry and Royal Commissions can probably be
appointed to inquire into whether individuals have committed
criminal offences in theUnited KingdomandAustralia.
This is subject to some restrictions which flow from the law of
contempt once an individual is formally charged and put on trial.
Although it was different before, the position is now probably the
same inNew Zealandas a result of statutory
changes.

The stages of an inquiry conducted by
a Tribunal of Inquiry have been described in the following terms
and would seem to be equally applicable to inquiries conducted by
Australian Royal Commissions. These consist
of:

a preliminary investigation of the
evidence available

the determination by the tribunal of
what it considers to be evidence relevant to the matters into which
it is obliged to inquire

the service of such evidence on
persons likely to be affected

the public hearing of witnesses in
regard to such evidence

the cross-examination of such
witnesses by or on behalf of persons affected
thereby

the preparation of a report and the
making of recommendations based on the facts established at such a
public hearing.

To what extent should the conduct of
a public inquiry be subject to legal regulation? Tribunals of
Inquiry and Royal Commissions are, for the most part, legally free
to determine their own procedures subject to the need to comply
with the legally enforceable rules of procedural fairness developed
by the courts. The extent of statutory regulation is for the most
part quite small. The rules on procedural fairness have assumed a
greater importance than might have originally been envisaged
because of their evolving and dynamic character. In
theUnited Kingdoma further constraint on the autonomy
enjoyed by Tribunals, which has assumed a growing importance, flows
from the operation of the Human Rights Act
1998.

One of the important issues which
arises from the creation of public inquiries relates to the rights
of witnesses. What, if any, safeguards are needed to protect the
rights of witnesses appearing before such inquiries? To what extent
are the rights of parties and witnesses in ordinary legal
proceedings appropriate for adoption in public inquiries vested
with coercive powers to summon witnesses and require the production
of documents?

The United Kingdom has seen in recent
times the emergence of a debate as to how best to safeguard the
rights of witnesses called to give evidence before public inquiries
including Tribunals of Inquiry armed with coercive powers. The
debate has been characterised by a difference between those who
favour the adoption of the same kinds of safeguards enjoyed by
witnesses in adversarial proceedings, as recommended in the Salmon
Royal Commission Report in 1966(4), and those who argue
that such safeguards are not appropriate to inquisitorial
proceedings, as argued in theScottReportin
1996.(5)

The paper from which this brief is
drawn analyses in detail the way in which both approaches diverge
as regards the circumstances that justify the involvement of
witnesses, giving witnesses notice of adverse matters raised
against them, legal representation of witnesses, and the
cross-examination, examination in chief and re-examination of
witnesses. The Salmon Royal Commission recommended what were
described as six cardinal principles.

Principle 1: Before any person
becomes involved in an inquiry, the Tribunal must be satisfied that
there are circumstances which affect her/him and which the Tribunal
proposes to investigate.

Principle 2: Before any person
who is involved in an inquiry is called as a witness, s/he should
be informed in advance of allegations against her/him and the
substance of the evidence in support of the
allegations.

Principle
3:

(a)
S/he should be given an adequate opportunity of preparing her/his
case and of being assisted by legal
advisers.

(b) Her/his
legal expenses should normally be met out of public
funds.

Principle 4: S/he (the witness)
should have the opportunity of being examined by her/his own
solicitor or counsel and of stating his case in public at the
inquiry.

Principle 5: Any material
witnesses s/he wishes called at the inquiry should if reasonably
practicable, be heard.

Principle 6: S/he should have the
opportunity of testing by cross-examination conducted by her/his
own solicitor or counsel any evidence which may affect
her/him.

The approach of
theScottReportstressed the differences between the
inquisitorial function of public inquiries and the adversarial
nature of litigation. In the former:

There is no proceeding on an issue
the subject of a proceeding between parties in any real or
substantial sense: the inquiry directs the inquiry and the
witnesses are of necessity witnesses called by or with the
authority of the inquiry.

There is no plaintiff or defendant,
no prosecutor or defendant.

There are no pleadings to define the
issues to be tried, nor are there any charges, indictments, or
depositions.

An inquiry may take a fresh turn at
any moment. It is therefore difficult for persons involved to know
in advance of the hearing what allegations may be made against
them.

Litigation, on the other hand,
involves each party having a case to be placed before a court for
its consideration and procedures. This is designed to ensure that
the defendant knows the essential nature of the other party's case.
In an inquisitorial inquiry there are only witnesses who have or
may have knowledge of some matters under
investigation.

In the view taken in
theScottReport,
the Salmon principles failed to satisfy three principal objectives
of a public inquiry. These were:

the need to be fair and seen to be
fair to those whose interests, reputations or fortunes may be
adversely affected

the need for proceedings to be
conducted with efficiency and as much expedition as is
practicable

the need for the costs of the
proceedings to be kept within reasonable
bounds.

A recent report prepared by the
British Council of Tribunals(6) and endorsed by the then
British Government seemed to significantly downplay the difference
between the two approaches and appeared to avoid coming down
clearly in favour of one or the other of those approaches. The
hallmark of its approach was flexibility and it believed that it
was wholly impracticable to devise a single set of model rules or
guidelines that will apply to every
inquiry.

Although originally intended as
nonlegally enforceable guidelines, the extent to which the
recommendations to adopt the Salmon principles will be followed in
the future in the United Kingdom may now depend on the extent to
which courts will recognise them as forming part of the common law
rules of procedural fairness. It is true that the Salmon principles
have received legislative and constitutional recognition in other
countries apart from theUnited
Kingdom(7). However the writer of
this paper believes that, overall, the arguments in favour of
leaving the extent of their recognition in the hands of the courts
outweigh those that favour their adoption as a statutory
code.

The Salmon Report dealt with certain
other matters which also deserve consideration
forAustralia.
These included the importance of an inquiry explaining at the
outset how it proposed to interpret the terms of reference of the
inquiry and the procedures it proposed to adopt for the conduct of
the inquiry. They also involved the desirability of avoiding where
possible reliance on hearsay evidence and only relying on evidence
that would have been admissible in ordinary court proceedings, when
reporting on the conduct of individual witnesses. In addition
Australian federal legislation is, with some exceptions, silent on
whether inquiries should be conducted in public. The public nature
of an investigation goes to the heart of one of the advantages of
holding an inquiry, namely, securing the confidence of the public
in the findings of the inquiry. The view expressed in the paper is
that it is desirable to enact provisions similar to those enacted
with respect to British Tribunals of Inquiry that would clarify the
general obligation of Australian federal Royal Commissions to
conduct their inquiries in public. The same applies to legislation
that would define the period during which the law of contempt
operates in relation to the proceedings of such Royal Commissions.
The latter law protects the authority and ability of such inquiries
to perform their appointed task.

Public inquiries give rise to
important questions concerning judicial review. In what
circumstance are, and should, the proceedings of public inquiries
be open to judicial review? What grounds are, and should, be
available to challenge the conduct and findings of such inquiries
in legal proceedings?

The essential assumption which
underpins the overall desirability of leaving the protection of
witnesses to the courts is that judicial review is available for
that purpose. The historical and traditional obstacle in the way of
reviewing their findings has always been the fact that the findings
by bodies that are only appointed to inquire and report have not
been seen as affecting the rights of individuals. It is suggested
in this paper that the obstacle has now lost most of its
force.

The courts inNew Zealandhave in recent times led the way in
subjecting public inquiries to the operation of the normal
principles of administrative law review. This allows challenges in
the courts in relation to Royal Commissions that are based on the
following grounds:

the establishment of the Royal
Commission is beyond the legal power or authority to establish the
Commission

the validity of its terms of
reference

the procedures of the Commission are
contrary to law

the procedures of the Commission do
not comply with the rules of natural
justice

the Commission has made an error of
law, or

the continuation of an inquiry
conducted by a Commission constitutes
contempt.

Experience so far suggests that
judicial review in theUnited Kingdomis likely, and has already begun, to
follow the same course. The enactment of the British Human Rights
Act has expanded the scope of judicial review by reference to wider
considerations related to the protection of human rights. Such
expansion of judicial review has given rise to some concern. That
concern can only be underlined by the many judicial challenges
launched against the procedures adopted by the second Tribunal of
Inquiry appointed to investigate the 'Bloody Sunday' affair. The
concerns can only be heightened by the fact that the challenges
were launched despite the eminent and distinguished judges who were
themselves appointed to that Tribunal; and also the lengthy period
of time which elapsed before the same Tribunal was able to commence
hearing witnesses.

Developments inAustraliain regard to the availability of
judicial review for Royal Commissions are likely to parallel, if
they have not already done so, those that have taken place
inNew
Zealand. This is complicated by the
existence of possible jurisdictional or procedural drawbacks which,
however, are not thought to be insuperable. Ironically, the
drawbacks stem from statutory reforms that were designed to
streamline the availability of judicial review and overcome the
complexities that attended use of the traditional means by which
courts could provide a remedy for unlawful administrative action.
The federal legislation in point is the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act1977
(Cwlth). In the view advanced in this paper, the significance of
the potential gaps in the jurisdiction which exist under that
legislation is likely to have been reduced, if not eliminated, by
the recent expansion in the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal
Court as a result of insertion of sub-s. 39B(1A) in the Judiciary Act1903 (Cwlth). Under those
provisions the Court is given the jurisdiction to deal with any
matter arising under a law of the
Commonwealth.

The substantive grounds for judicial
review inAustraliaare likely to replicate in large
measure those that exist inNew
Zealand. The Australian High Court has
recognised that injury to reputation is now recognised as a
sufficient interest to attract the operation of the rules of
procedural fairness. There have been decisions of other courts
inAustraliathat have affirmed the ability to
prevent Royal Commissions from exceeding their authority by for
example going beyond their terms of reference. Once it is accepted
that courts can intervene on those grounds it seems difficult to
see at first sight why courts should take any different view in
relation to the similar availability of the other grounds of
challenge under the principles of administrative law. One
Australian judicial decision has, however, highlighted the
difficulty of relying on some of those grounds, at least when it
comes to challenging the establishment of Royal Commissions and the
scope of their inquiries. The Australian courts have recognised
that the application of the ordinary principles of administrative
law to inquisitorial bodies cannot ignore the inquisitorial
character of such bodies.

There remains inAustraliathe further ground of challenge in
relation to federal Royal Commissions based on constitutional considerations.
This, in theory at least, prevents Royal Commissions from inquiring
into matters that lie beyond the reach of federal legislative
powers. But given the wide reach of those powers, and the
difficulty of showing that a matter can never have any relevance to
those powers, the successful establishment of this ground is not
without its difficulties.

The final issue concerns whether
there is a right to appeal against the findings of a public
inquiry.

None of the jurisdictions considered
in this paper make provision for a right of appeal from the
findings of Tribunals of Inquiry in theUnited Kingdom(andIreland)
or Royal Commissions inAustraliaand elsewhere. This is not surprising
given the non-legally binding status of such findings. It is
suggested in this paper that the absence of a right of appeal, when
combined with the immunity enjoyed by such public inquiries from
liability in defamation, may serve as an inducement to find
indirect legal means of challenging findings which damage the
reputation of individuals. This was illustrated by the events that
surrounded the Royal Commission(8) into the crash of an
Air New Zealand aircraft intoMount Erebuson28 November
1979. This inquiry culminated with a
landmark judicial decision which established the application of the
rules of procedural fairness to Royal
Commissions.

The Salmon Commission concluded
against creating a right of appeal from the findings of a Tribunal
of Inquiry. What emerges from the paper, however, is that both for
policy and legal reasons, there will be occasions when it will be
necessary to re-examine the findings of a public inquiry. The
guiding objective should be to identify those occasions with the
least possible judicial intervention. That intervention should be
reserved as an option of last resort given the implications for
cost and delay which that option necessarily
involves.

With that in mind, it is suggested in
the paper that a case can be made for improving the mechanisms for
reviewing the findings of public inquiries which, for one reason or
another, subsequently come under question in a way that will
minimise the scope of judicial intervention. One such mechanism
would take the form of suspending judicial review until
governments are given the opportunity to obtain independent advice
from a retired judge or senior practising lawyer on whether a new
inquiry should be established to report on the whole or any part of
the issues canvassed in the earlier
inquiry.

Conclusions

Royal commissions and tribunals of
inquiry have been and continue to be used as an accepted tool of
government.

Their undoubted utility has to be
balanced against other considerations such as their potential to
harm the reputations, and intrude on the privacy, of individuals;
as well as considerations of cost and duration of such
inquiries.

The existence of a unitary system of
government in the United Kingdom reduces but does not eliminate the
potential scope for a judicial challenge against the establishment
of a tribunal of inquiry. The same scope may have increased as a
result of the arrangements for the devolution of authority to
Scotland and Wales which could give rise to the kind of challenges
that are raised on federal grounds in
Australia.

The enactment of the Tribunals of
Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 (UK) was seen as providing a more
satisfactory form of public inquiry than those conducted by
parliamentary committees.

The appointment of existing judges to
Tribunals of Inquiry under the 1921 Act gives rise to serious
questions of constitutional policy which in Australia are governed
by legal restraints founded on the separation of judicial powers.
The increased role of judges in the judicial review of governmental
action under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and the devolution
arrangements may require a re-examination of the advisability of
appointing existing judges to Tribunals of
Inquiry.

There is considerable merit in
following the British example of (i) requiring parliamentary
approval for the appointment of Tribunals of Inquiry with coercive
powers of inquiry; and also (ii) only permitting their
establishment to inquire into 'definite matters' of 'urgent public
importance' on the assumption that the primary judgment for forming
an opinion on these matters is vested in the body which appoints
the tribunal.

The prohibition against unauthorised
delegation operates to limit the extent to which Tribunals of
Inquiry and royal commissions can be authorised to define their own
terms of reference

It is probable that Tribunals of
Inquiry and royal commissions can be appointed to inquire into
whether named individuals have committed criminal offences in the
United Kingdom and Australia, subject to some restrictions which
flow from the law of contempt once an individual is formally
charged and put on trial. The position is now probably the same in
New Zealand as a result of statutory
changes.

Tribunals of Inquiry and royal
commissions are for the most part legally free to determine their
own procedures subject to the need to comply with the legally
enforceable rules of procedural fairness. Those rules have assumed
a greater importance than might have originally been envisaged
because of their evolving and dynamic
character.

It is desirable to enact provisions
similar to those enacted with respect to British Tribunals of
Inquiry that would clarify the general obligation of Australian
federal royal commissions to conduct their inquiries in public. The
same applies to legislation that would define the period during
which the law of contempt operates in relation to the proceedings
of such royal commissions.

The United Kingdom has seen in recent
times the emergence of a debate as to how best to safeguard the
rights of witnesses called to give evidence before public inquiries
including Tribunals of Inquiry armed with coercive
powers.

The debate has been characterised by
a difference between those who favour the adoption of the same
kinds of safeguards enjoyed by witnesses in adversarial proceedings
as recommended in the Salmon Royal Commission Report in 1966 and
those who argue that such safeguards are not appropriate to
inquisitorial proceedings as argued in the Scott Report in
1996.

The paper analyses in detail the way
in which both approaches diverge as regards the circumstances that
justify the involvement of witnesses, giving witnesses notice of
adverse matters raised against them, legal representation of
witnesses, and the cross-examination, examination in chief and
re-examination of witnesses.

The recent report prepared by the
Council of Tribunals and endorsed by the British Government seems
to significantly downplay the difference between the two approaches
and appears to avoid coming down clearly in favour of one or the
other of those approaches. The hallmark of its approach was
flexibility and it believed that it was wholly impracticable to
devise a single set of model rules or guidelines that will apply to
every inquiry.

Although originally intended as
non-legally enforceable guidelines, the extent to which the Salmon
recommendations will be followed in the future may now depend on
the extent to which courts will recognise them as forming part of
the common law rules of procedural
fairness.

The Salmon recommendations have
received legislative and constitutional recognition in other
countries apart from the United Kingdom

The writer believes that overall the
arguments in favour of leaving the extent of their recognition in
the hands of the courts outweigh those that favour their adoption
as a statutory code.

The essential assumption which
underpins the overall desirability of leaving the protection of
witnesses to the courts is that judicial review is available for
that purpose.

The courts in New Zealand have in
recent times led the way in subjecting inquisitorial bodies to the
operation of the normal principles of administrative law review and
judicial review in the United Kingdom is likely to follow the same
course.

Developments in Australia in regard
to the availability of judicial review for royal commissions are
likely to parallel, if they have not already done so, those that
have taken place in New Zealand, subject to the existence of
possible procedural drawbacks which however are not thought to be
insuperable.

In Australia there remains an
additional ground of challenge in relation to federal royal
commissions that is based on constitutional considerations but this
ground is not without its difficulties.

The absence of a right of appeal
against the findings of Tribunals of Inquiry and Royal Commissions
may serve as an inducement to find indirect legal means of
challenging findings which damage the reputation of
individuals.

A case can be made for improving the
mechanisms for reviewing the finding of inquisitorial bodies which,
for one reason or another, subsequently come under question in a
way that will minimise the scope of judicial
intervention.

One such mechanism would take the
form of suspending judicial review until governments are given the
opportunity to obtain independent advice from a retired judge or
senior practising lawyer on whether a new inquiry should be
established to report the whole or any part of the issues canvassed
in the earlier inquiry.

Note: This
information was compiled by the writer from the reports of the
above randomly selected inquiries and also, in the case of the last
inquiry, from material supplied by the Lord Chancellors
Department.

SCHEDULE
3Australian Royal Commissions and Commissions
of Inquiry
under the Royal Commissions
Act 1902 (Cwlth)

19012001

Reports column: indicates
the location of the report in the Parliamentary Papers Series, held
at major libraries. The annotation 'tabled not printed' designates
reports presented to Parliament which are not ordered to be printed. Whilst
these are parliamentary papers, they do not form part of the
Parliamentary Papers Series. Some of these items were published
separately, and some have what is known as a List Number which is
relevant only for Parliamentary Library staff. Some unpublished
reports are held by the National Archives of Australia; in some of
these cases, the location symbol NAA is used.

State column: indicates
Royal Commissions which were appointed both by the Commonwealth and
the States/Territories named.

Title

Date
of Letters PatentDate Final Report
Presented

Commissioners

Report
(Year / Volume / Pages)

State

Royal
Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the
arrangements made for the transport of troops returning from
service in South Africa in the S.S. Drayton
Grange

Royal
Commission upon the loyalty to the British Crown of German
Nationals resident in Australia whose property is liable to a
charge created by the Treaty of Peace Regulations made under the
Treaty of Peace (Germany) Act 19191920

7 July
192111 November 1921 [date report
completed]

W. M.
MacFarlane

NAA
A6006, control symbol 1921/12/31

Royal
Commission on the circumstances attending the supposed loss at sea
of the steamship Sumatra

25
July3 August 1923

J. J.
Cohen (Chair), H. Chudleigh, J. Vine-Hall

192324/I/113 [reference only; tabled not
printed]

Royal
Commission in connection with sugar purchases by the Commonwealth
through Mr. W. E. Davies in September and October,
1920

24
August 192327 March 1924

E. F.
Mitchell

192324/II/164757

Royal
Commission in connection with joinery supplied to the War Service
Homes Commissioner in March, 1920

Royal
Commission to inquire into extracts from the reports in
Parliamentary Debates of speeches made by Mr. Scullin in the House
of Representatives on 7th and 19th August,
1924, in relation to land tax matters

9
September 192410 June 1925

D. S.
Edwards

1925/II/103561

Royal
Commission on the finances of Western Australia, as affected by
Federation

Royal
Commission appointed to inquire into statements in the press in
regard to offers alleged to have been made to members to resign
seats in the Federal Parliament

28
May4 September 1928

E.
Scholes

192628/IV/123545

Royal
Commission on the finances of South Australia, as affected by
Federation

28
July 192822 August 1929

J.
Cook (Chair), A. E. Barton, H. R. Brookes

1929/II/220148

Royal
Commission on the coal industry

3
June21 November 1929

C. G.
W. Davidson (Chair), H. W. Gepp, L. K.
Ward

192931/II/88188

Royal
Commission appointed to inquire into allegations affecting members
of the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts in
connexion with claims made by broadcasting companies against the
Commonwealth Government

15
May8 August 1930

G. J.
Dethridge

192931/III/62938

Royal
Commission on Jacob Johnson

29
August 19311 October 1931 [date report
completed]

G. S.
Beeby

NAA
A432, control symbol 1929/170 Part 8 Attachment
2

Royal
Commission on performing rights

19
September 193224 May 1933

L.
Owen

193234/IV/11631220

Royal
Commission on taxation

6
October 193228 November 1934

D. G.
Ferguson (Chair), E. V. Nixon

193234/IV/224996,
193437/III/19172118

Royal
Commission on mineral oils and petrol and other products of mineral
oils

Royal
Commission on alleged improper practices and improper refusal to
co-operate with the Victoria Police Force on the part of persons
employed in the Postmaster-Generals Department
inVictoriain
relation to illegal gambling

23 May
196223 May 1963

R.L.Taylor

196263/V/397-554

Royal
Commission on loss of H.M.A.S. Voyager

14
February26
August 1964

J. A.
Spicer

19646566/XIII/289341

Royal
Commission on the statement ofLieutenant CommanderCabbanand
matters incidental thereto

31 May 1967-13 March 1968

S.C.Burbury(Chair),K.W.Asprey,G.A.G.Lucas

1968/1/9671245

Title

Date of Letters PatentDate Final Report
Presented

Commissoners

Report (Year / Volume
/

Place
Number)

State

Royal
Commissions into exploratory and production drilling for petroleum
in the area of theGreat
Barrier Reef

Royal
Commission to inquire into and report upon certain incidents in
which Aborigines were involved in the Laverton area [WA Royal
Commission with a Commonwealth nominee and costs shared by
Commonwealth and WA Governments]

23
April 1975-13April
1976

G.D.Clarkson(Chair),E.F.Bridge,E.F.Johnston

WA
Parl Papers 1976, Vol 8.

WA

Royal
Commission onNorfolk Island

15 May 1975-16 November 1976

J. A.
Nimmo

1976/21/4

Title

Date
of Letters PatentDate Final Report
Presented

Commissioners

Report
(Paper No. / Year)

State

Australian Royal Commission of inquiry into
drugs

13
October 197716 September 1980

E. S.
Williams

275/1979, 2529/1980,
226/1980

VIC,
QLD, WA, TAS

Royal
Commission of inquiry into matters in relation to electoral
redistribution Queensland, 1977

24 April 197815 August 1978

D. G.
McGregor

263/1978

Commission of inquiry into the efficiency and administration of
hospitals

HIH Royal Commission,29 August 20014 April
2003 [deadline for final report],Commissioner N. J. Owen.

Royal Commission into the building and
construction industry August 200124 February 2003 [deadline for
final report],Commissioner T. R. H. Cole.

Published in full by Federation Press:
Professor Geoffrey Lindell, Tribunals of Enquiry and Royal
Commissions, Law and Policy
Paper no. 22, 2002, Centre for International & Public
Law/Federation Press, Sydney, 2003, ISBN 1 86287 456 5/PB. For
details see http://www.fedpress.aust.com,
phone (02) 9552 2200.

Royal
Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, 1966, report of the Commission
under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Salmon,
H.M.S.O., London, 1966.

Report
of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual Use
Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions: return to an address of the
Honourable House of Commons dated 15th February 1996, Sir
Richard Scott, in 6 vol., H.M.S.O., London, 1996.

Council on Tribunals:
Advice to the Lord Chancellor on the procedural issues arising in
the conduct of public inquiries set up by Ministers (July
1996).

For full details see Federation Press
publication, op. cit. at 3.

Report
of the Royal Commission into the crash on Mount Erebus, Antarctica,
of a DC10 aircraft operated by Air New Zealand Limited,
Commissioner Hon. P. T. Mahon, Govt Printer, Wellington,
1981.

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