SHAFER V. SOUTH CAROLINA[Syllabus] The South Carolina Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, when it declared that case inapplicable to South Carolina's current sentencing scheme.

ALABAMA V. SHELTON[Syllabus] Under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 40, a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged.

SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA[Syllabus] Neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner on retrial when he was given a life sentence at his first trial.

KELLY V. SOUTH CAROLINA[Syllabus] Petitioner was entitled to a jury instruction that he would be ineligible for parole under a life sentence.

ALABAMA V. BOZEMAN[Syllabus] The literal language of Art. IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers-which provides that a State that obtains a prisoner for trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, Art. IV(c), and if it returns him to his original place of imprisonment prior to that trial, charges "shall" be dismissed with prejudice, Art. IV(e)-bars further criminal proceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial.

UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON[Syllabus]Whether a federal criminal defendant's term of supervised release commences on the date of his actual release from prison or on the earlier date on which he should have been released in accordance with a retroactively applied change in the law.

ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS[Syllabus] The post-removal-period detention statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, implicitly limits an alien's detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States, and does not permit indefinite detention; the application of that limitation is subject to federal court review.

SMITH V. DOE[Syllabus] Because Alaska's "Megan's Law" is nonpunitive, its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES[Syllabus]Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that the district court properly imposed a ''tail "" of supervised release following incarceration after revoking Petitioner' s initial term of supervised release, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution."

STENBERG V. CARHART[Syllabus]1. Whether the Eighth Circuit's adoption of a broad unconstitutional reading of Nebraska's ban on partial -birth abortion, which directly conflicts with the narrower constitutional construction of similar statutes by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and that of the State officials charged with enforcement of the statute, violates fundamental rules of statutory construction and basic principles of federalism in contradiction of the clear direction of this Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services? 2. Whether the Eighth Circuit misapplied this Court's instructions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey by finding that a law banning cruel and unusual methods of killing a partially-born child, is an ""undue burden"" on the right to abortion?"

MASSARO V. UNITED STATES[Syllabus]Whether a federal criminal defendant, whose new appellate counsel fails to raise, on direct appeal, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, is procedurally barred from asserting that constitutional claim in a habeas corpus proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255.

WEEKS V. ANGELONE[Syllabus]1. Is there any ""compelling"" reason to review the Fourth Circuit's application of this Court's recent decision in Buchannan V. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), to the facts of petitioner's case, which are substantially indistinguishable from those in Buchanan?"

FISCHER V. UNITED STATES[Syllabus]1. Whether Medicare payments to a hospital for services provided to Medicare patients qualify as ""benefits"" to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title 18 U.S.C. 666 so as to federalize crimes of theft, embezzlement, and bribery involving the hospital?"

LOPEZ V. DAVIS[Syllabus]Whether the director of the Bureau of Prisons has the authority to categorically deny consideration for eligibility for early release as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 3621(e) (2) (B) to an inmate convicted of a nonviolent offense after the inmate has completed the requisite residential substance abuse program.

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GARNER&NBSP; V.&NBSP; JONES[Syllabus]1. Whether the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution bars the State from applying its amended regulation governing the reconsideration schedule for life-sentenced inmates who have been denied parole, when the amendment has no effect on the sentence imposed, the substantive formula for the consideration of the prisoner for parole, or the determination of the prisoner's eligibility for parole, or whether the change creates only ""the most speculative and attentuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment."" 2. Whether the decision below conflicts with the decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals and the appellate courts of the several states as to the meaning and import of this Court's decisions in California Dep't of Corrections V. Morales and Lynce v. Mathis.

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EWING V. CALIFORNIA[Syllabus] The California Court of Appeal's decision that Ewing's sentence under the State's three strikes law is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is affirmed.

UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ-SALAZAR[Syllabus]Whether a defendant is entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction when he uses a peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror whom the district court erroneously failed to remove for cause, and he ultimately exhausts his remaining peremptory challenges.

EDWARDS V. CARPENTER[Syllabus]Whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "" cause"" for the procedural default of another habeas claim when the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted."

RING V. ARIZONA[Syllabus]Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, and is, accordingly, overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, see 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.