Military

Further Reading

DEEP
OPERATIONS: A LOOK FROM BCTP AT THE PROCESS

Deep
operation planning and execution is generally the first major combat operation
during a division or a corps
BCTP
Warfighter Exercise.
Its success or failure usually sets the tone for the remainder of the
Warfighter.
This article relates some observations made during numerous exercises with
different type divisions and shares some views of the deep battle. Much of
what follows is not published doctrine. Rather, it is the result of BCTP
experience
in the field - what we have seen work well, and not so well. The intent is
to stimulate thought and discussion in the school house and in our doctrinal
literature. The desired end state is to cause units in the field to revisit
their tactics, techniques, and procedures relative to the conduct of deep operations.
This article sets a foundation by reviewing new doctrine and definitions, and
then focuses on the division's deep operation.

DOCTRINAL
CHANGES

Our
improving capability to see, track, attack and kill the enemy is revolutionizing
our ability to fight and win deep. These increasing capabilities cause doctrine
writers to revisit some of our most fundamental warfighting philosophy. In
doing so, the new FM 100-5 (June 1993) introduces new terminology and definitions.
Depth,
as defined by the new FM 100-5, is "the extension of operations in time, space,
resources, and purpose," allowing commanders to press the fight and attack
enemy forces and capabilities simultaneously throughout the battlefield. We
conduct deep operations to limit the enemy's freedom of action and alter his
tempo to our advantage. Instead of isolating the close battle through deep
operations, commanders engage both committed and uncommitted enemy forces as
part of a synchronized attack, limiting their opponents' ability to successfully
prosecute their course of action.

Closely
related to depth
is
the concept of
battle
space.
Battle
space
as
defined in the new FM 100-5 is "determined by the maximum capabilities of a
unit to acquire and dominate the enemy; includes area beyond the area of operations;
it varies over time according to how the commander positions his assets." Battle
space
extends
the previous concept of area of interest to include the third dimension, joint
assets, and national capabilities. Generally, any friendly capability that
can add to the commander's combat power and has the potential to influence
the execution of his mission affects his
battle
space.

DEFINING
THE DEEP OPERATION

What
is a deep operation? It is an ongoing process of targeting, engagement, and
reprioritization of attack guidance. It is a high-risk, high-payoff operation
that, if successful, sets the conditions for the successful prosecution of
the close fight. It has specific definitions for each level of command. FM
71-100 defines the division deep operation for the defense as "...division
deep operations initially focus on interdicting second echelon regiments of
first echelon divisions, then shift to interdicting regimental sized elements
of second echelon divisions. " For the offense, "the primary focus of division
offensive deep operations is to interdict by delaying, disrupting, or diverting
enemy reserves, then shifts to units defending in the third defensive positions."
The focus in both types of divisional missions seems more oriented toward Threat
maneuver forces rather than artillery. Most of our threats, both those modeled
in the BCTP simulation and those considered most dangerous by the intelligence
community, are artillery based. The enemy fire support system is usually cited
as the center of gravity during the IPB process. This disconnect sometimes
causes a lack of focus in the targeting process as units try to execute doctrine
versus focus on the "real threat" as depicted in Corps Battle Simulation (CBS).
But units are improving as they begin to realize what can hurt them the most.
Once the enemy and his intent are defined, all assets contributing to the commander's
battle space must be employed in deep operations planning and execution. In
relation to the battle space of the Army corps, division deep operations are
part of the corps' close operations. As such, they must support the intent
and concept of the corps commander.

Corps
Battlefield Structure

Deep
operations are fought by divisions and corps, not by brigades or battalions.
Brigade and battalion commanders are fully engaged; they have neither the time
nor the visibility of the battlefield to effectively plan and direct a deep
operation in its absolute sense. Certainly a brigade commander will attempt
to delay, disrupt, or destroy uncommitted units, but the division really has
this fight. We have seen an aviation battalion commander unilaterally attempt
to execute his commander's guidance and lose precious division assets with
small return. Some units have attempted to plan and execute at the DIVARTY
or aviation brigade command post - usually with less than optimal synchronization
and target damage. Although not specified by doctrine, the deep operation is
normally planned and executed at the division or corps main command post. Alternatively,
the planning and execution must be done by those commanders and key staff officers
that usually reside at those command posts. We are not specifying the "main"
is the only place, but rather stating that these key individuals must be in
contact with each other and their units, be aware of the battlefield and be
able to transmit decisions into action.

DIVISION
DEEP OPERATIONS

Successful
operations at the division level require the division to give weight to, and
focus on, the main effort.

Schematic
of Weighting the Main Attack

Depending
on METT-T and purpose, deep operations could be the main effort for the division.
As such, deep operations must be considered when organizing the division for
combat. Events within the context of deep operations must have sufficient resources
and time to plan and execute to provide a reasonable chance of success. This
includes, but is not limited to, dedicated fire support, intelligence collection
assets, engineer, signal, and, if applicable, aviation assets. For the period
that a deep operation is being conducted, exercises show that usually it is
the main focus of the unit. The plan, therefore, should reflect that - facilitating
synchronization, focusing the intelligence effort, and generally bringing the
command and staff awareness to the appropriate level. A deep operation is a
combined arms operation.

A
VIEW OF DEEP OPERATIONS

The
deep fight at the division level is a precisely planned and executed operation
designed to delay, disrupt, or destroy an opponent's ability to influence the
close fight with uncommitted forces or resources. The division deep fight is
not always a function of depth in relation to the FLOT. The targets are those
enemy capabilities that present the greatest threat to friendly operations
within the division commander's battle space. It is not limited to only the
2d echelon regiments of the lead division. Instead, the deep attack should
focus on the enemy's center of gravity at the level that the division commander
wants to influence. In the case of an attack against an artillery heavy mechanized
force, the center of gravity may be the DAG, AAG, or AGRA as opposed to an
echeloned maneuver force or an operational reserve. Once destroyed or defeated
(the definitions of which are another discussion), the focus of the deep fight
could shift toother high payoff targets, such as maneuver formations, command
and control nodes, or any other asset or resource whose destruction directly
contributes to the accomplishment of the division commander's mission and protection
of his force. In a BCTP
environment,
if the deep attack is early and decisive, chances for a successful outcome
of the battle are significantly improved. A successful deep fight for a division
is one that is synchronized and has shaped the battlefield in such a way as
to allow ground maneuver brigade commanders to fight and win the close fight.
FM 71-100 lists a variety of units available to the division commander to conduct
the deep attack. In reality, he has four assets he can use to conduct his deep
attack: ground maneuver, air maneuver, field artillery, and electronic warfare
(EW) units. Use of the Air Force for the division is generally limited to "push"
CAS and can be easily integrated into the fire support plan. Principal users
of air power for deep operations are the corps and higher commanders.

Deep
ground maneuver is a difficult mission and, potentially, a costly one. Although
the impact on the morale and will to fight of an enemy is severe and damaging,
ground maneuver forces are generally not committed in this role. There are
more efficient methods to accomplish the same end.

Command,
control and communications countermeasures (C3CM) disrupt the enemy's command
and control process, increase his decision times and reduce his ability to
react and concentrate forces. EW units employ C3CM in deep operations for jamming,
deception, and detecting and tracking high payoff targets. C3CM are generally
not effective when employed separately. Effectiveness of EW units is significantly
enhanced when they are employed in conjunction with deep air maneuver and/or
deep fires.

Field
artillery is a deep strike option anytime, and under any weather condition.
Divisional artillery has the capability today to reach out to the 30-km mark
with its organic MLRS battalion or battery, or M198 battery in the case of
light divisions. That reach will increase by approximately 50 percent in the
very near future. When coupled with an efficient sensor, a timely sensor-to-shooter
link, and positioning well forward on the battlefield, this system can significantly
extend a division commander's battle space.

Air
maneuver units possess the capability to strike rapidly and deep, and bring
the fight into the third dimension. When combined with an efficient field artillery
system, effective C3CM and near real-time intelligence with enhanced capabilities
to detect and track high payoff targets, aviation assets provide a decisive
deep strike option for the division commander, and become the force of choice
for deep operations.

DECIDE-DETECT-TRACK-DELIVER-ASSESS
METHODOLOGY

Successful
deep operations require focusing the intelligence collection and targeting
effort. The decide-detect-track-deliver-assess methodology was designed to
support this. It is an integral part of the planning process and is dynamic
in that it occurs both simultaneously and sequentially. The purpose is to identify
enemy targets for possible engagement and to determine the best mix of sensor
and attack systems. How the division fights deep is a direct result of decisions
made during the decide function of the process.

Targeting
Process

There
are two objectives in the targeting process. The first is to provide the commander
with direct targeting information for immediate engagement with fire and maneuver
in the close fight. The second is to collect and correlate information from
all sources to develop targets for deep operations. During the decide function,
a firm grasp of the commander's intent and concept is essential because the
decisions made here provide the framework and battle focus for the synchronization
of the division assets for the deep operations. Intelligence assets are identified,
high value and, subsequently, high payoff targets are determined, along with
NAIs, TAIs, and decision points. Target selection standards identifying the
accuracy requirements for attackable targets are determined, and the attack
guidance matrix is developed. Trigger points and attack timings are determined,
BDA requirements are identified, and the collection plan is finalized. Organic
sensors are tasked, and nonorganic support requirements are identified and
requested. With the planning complete and the assets ready, the next function
is to detect,
with the critical subfunction, track.
The G2 is the principal figure in this. Collection management is focused on
situation development and detection of high payoff targets identified in the
decide function. Target detection is accomplished using all available assets
in the division. Those assets include FISTs, COLTs, target acquisition radars,
unmanned aerial vehicles, air defense artillery radars, aerial fire support
officers, EH-60 "Quickfix" radio intercept, direction finder and jammer, TRQ-32
"Teammate" radio intercept and direction finder, TLQ-17 "Trafficjam" radio
intercept and jammer, and TSQ-114 "Trailblazer" radio intercept and direction
finder.

Division
Intelligence Assets

Tracking
takes
on special importance when focusing on the short dwell, high payoff targets
which must be attacked rapidly. It is during this subfunction that fire support
officers, division fire support coordinators, field artillery intelligence
officers, S2s, G2s, and Field Artillery brigade, DIVARTY and battalion S3s
must ensure they clearly understand the commander's intent for fires relative
to the deep fight. Many times we see divisions doing the detect
function
very well. Time passes, and the enemy pops up where he is not expected. The
G2 loses the HPT until it is too late. The importance of the tracking
subfunction
cannot be overemphasized.

The
deliver
function,
with the critical subfunction assess, executes the target attack guidance as
developed and refined above, and provides the feedback necessary to continue
the targeting process. It has three key elements: target attack, selection
and protection of the attack force, and target damage assessment (TDA). Regardless
of the means selected, attack of the target must satisfy the attack guidance.
Selection and detection of the attack force is METT-T dependent and is derived
from mission analysis and planning. If indirect fire is the force of choice,
then force protection considerations may include survivability moves, artillery
raids, or position improvement through the use of dedicated engineer assets.
If aviation is the force of choice, then availability of SEAD, both EW and
indirect fire, route planning, and time of day (or night) are critical considerations.
TDA can be active, through the use of organic sensors or "eyes on target,"
or passive, such as the cessation of fires from an attacked area. In any case,
the importance of TDA cannot be overstated. Not meeting the target damage criteria
could cause the division battle plan to change. If target damage is important
to the commander for decisionmaking, then make it a priority intelligence requirement
(PIR).

Arguably,
the greatest challenge of the deep operations is synchronization of assets
concentrated at the decisive time and place, while protecting the combat power
of the division for future operations. To improve the synchronization of the
attack, many units use a deep battle cell. Although not fully resourced in
personnel and equipment, if properly equipped with TACFIRE and secure communications
equipment, this cell facilitates the control a commander has over his deep
operations and allows him to more efficiently employ a major part of his division's
combat power. Key players in the cell are a fire support element representative,
intelligence analyst, G2, G3 and an aviation unit representative. At corps
level, the corps artillery commander is the deep battle coordinator. At division,
usually the chief of staff is the deep battle coordinator, although other options
are the aviation brigade commander or the division artillery commander.

BATTLEFIELD
DELINEATION

A
recurring point of contention in dealing with deep operations is delineation
of the battlefield. Is the battlefield marked in relation to one commander's
area of operations? Or is this dependent on mission or lack of mission of the
enemy force? Or can the battlefield be defined in relation to a subordinate
commander's capability to find and engage the enemy? In the context of the
linear battlefield, this discussion usually focuses on the fire support coordination
line (FSCL) as a boundary between corps close and deep, further identified
as the limit of the division deep fight. Doctrinally a permissive fire support
coordination measure, the FSCL is usually characterized as a restrictive measure
limiting corps and division commanders in the type of attacks they can conduct
and dividing the battlefield responsibilities for the close and deep fight.
The FSCL, as described in FM 101-5-1, is "a permissive measure established
by the appropriate ground commander, coordinated with the appropriate air component
commander and other supporting commanders, to facilitate the attack of targets
beyond the line while ensuring proper coordination of fires not under the ground
commander's control inside the line." It is not intended to be restrictive
in nature or a boundary between the ground campaign and the air campaign, or
the extent in depth of the corps boundary. For a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is the establishment of the FSCL by the land component commander
beyond the battle space of the division commander and possibly, the corps commander,
units design their own control measures to divide battlefield responsibilities
for deep and close. Some examples external to the corps are the Reconnaissance
and Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL) in Europe, and the Deep Battle Synchronization
Line (DBSL) in Korea. Neither term is doctrinal in its origin, yet both theaters
have a clear understanding of what they mean in their respective theaters.
Doctrinal control measures (phase lines) with a locally defined purpose within
the corps can further divide the close and deep responsibilities. One corps
uses a Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) to delineate the corps and major
subordinate commands areas of responsibilities relative to deep operations,
intelligence collection, and fires. This line requires divisions (MSCs) to
coordinate with the corps prior to conducting deep operations beyond the BCL.
Conversely, the corps is required to coordinate with the major subordinate
command before conducting operations within the BCL. The BCL is a measure which
has been used successfully in several
Warfighter
exercises.

CONCLUSIONS

BCTP's
experience
indicates that the successfully executed deep fight, planned using the
decide-detect-track-deliver-assess
methodology,
considering all division assets which are organized for combat with the deep
fight in mind: with execution controlled in the main command post, or at a
location with the key players and communications links in place; followed up
by aggressive target damage assessment which serves as the input for another
iteration of the targeting process, is the first step in synchronizing the
battlefield and sets the conditions for success in the overall battle.

This
has been a brief synopsis of a difficult and complex operation. Our goal has
been to give the reader some areas to think about, consider for reinforcement
training, or just to gauge his own operation, for future needs.