ASYMMETRICAL THREAT CONCEPT & ITS
REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
By Dr. Michael Rubin

TERRORISM, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE, & U.S. MILITARY PLANNING: THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY & ASYMMETRY -- U.S. MILITARY HISTORY & ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE --
TERRORISM & PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS -- THE VULNERABILITY OF DEMOCRACIES TO TERRORISM -- THE THEORY
THAT THERE HAS BEEN A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS -- THE THREAT POSED BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
-- THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE & THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION WARFARE -- PREEMPTION, MULTILATERALISM, &
DIPLOMACY -- FLEXIBILITY IN INTERPRETING INTERNATIONAL NORMS & THE LAWS OF WARFARE

FULL STORY:
Less than three weeks after al-Qa'ida terrorists crashed hijacked passenger jets into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and a field in rural Pennsylvania, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued his first QDR -- his first Quadrennial
Defense Review Report. [1] He wrote that it was imperative that the U.S. military plan not only for conventional wars, but
that it should also develop strategies to "deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric
warfare to achieve their objectives." [2] Rather than plan for large military operations, or even small wars limited to specific
nation-states, the Pentagon should develop strategies to tackle unconventional threats from both state and non-state
actors who might seek to attack U.S. interests.

Asymmetric threats are not new, nor are strategists' attention to them. In every era, from the pre-modern to the present day,
weak forces utilize surprise, technology, innovative tactics, or what some might consider violations of military etiquette to
challenge the strong. The 1991 Iraq War and subsequent al-Qa'ida terrorism shattered notions that the collapse of the
Soviet Union would usher in an age of peace or an end to history. In order to ensure cohesion in both appropriations and
strategy, Congress in 1996 passed legislation [3] requiring the Pentagon to conduct quadrennial defense reviews. In the
first report the following year, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen identified "asymmetric challenges" and
"asymmetric means" as a major component of future threats. Adversaries, the report found, "are likely to seek advantage
over the United States by using unconventional approaches to circumvent or undermine our strengths, while exploiting our
vulnerabilities." [4]

Identifying the existence of asymmetrical threats is far easier than to define them. While asymmetry focuses on how to
place one strengths against an adversary's weaknesses, even where the overall correlation of forces may favor the
adversary, there remains no consensus about the nature of the asymmetric threat concept. Stephen J. Lambakis, a senior
analyst in Space Power and Policy Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, questions the usefulness of the
concept, given the lack of consensus over its meaning. [5] Such logic, however, falls flat. After all, that there exists no
consensus about the definition of terrorism does not mean that government should not develop counterterrorism
strategies.

Still, the breadth of asymmetrical threats undercuts the notion that there can be any unified response to them. While, in
general terms, the asymmetrical threat concept describes how the weak might battle the strong, discussions diverge when
discussing asymmetrical threats from states versus those posed by non-state actors.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY & ASYMMETRY

Control of technology is among the most important factors in determining state power. History is replete with centralized
states seeking to consolidate control and peripheral forces resisting it. Fracturing of central control marked the decline of
the Abbasid Empire. Authorities might have paid nominal heed to the Caliph in Baghdad, but local dynasties held sway.
They controlled the military necessary both to ensure obedience from local residents and to counter pretensions to
control from Baghdad. These city states and small polities became easy pickings for the Mongol hordes who swept
through Asia and Europe in the Thirteenth Century. No sooner had they departed, though, than centrifugal forces again
fractured Asia and Europe. With no central monopoly over the most advanced weaponry — bows, arrows, and iron —
they could not overcome challenges to control of vast and far-away territories.

The components of military balance-of-power changed, though, in the Fifteenth Century. Governments monopolized
gunpowder technology and found their relative power over the periphery to increase when they controlled artillery which
smaller states could not master or afford. Rulers could control far broader swaths of territory than had earlier been
possible. In the early Sixteenth Century, the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal states — the so-called "Gunpowder Empires"
— together stretched from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia. [6]

Their monopoly faded over time. Both internal and external challenges eroded the empire's control over its periphery. The
Ottoman Sultan lost control over large chunks of North Africa, the Safavid Empire disintegrated into rival states on the
Iranian plateau, and the Mughal Empire disintegrated. European armies, though deficient in numbers, compared to their
Middle Eastern and Asian counterparts, made vast inroads, if not formally colonizing territory, then nevertheless exerting
informal influence over it.

While the Islamic world never again rose to challenge Europe, within the context of their own societies, Muslim rulers
soon regained advantage over their periphery. The communications revolution swung the balance of power in favor of
the central government. While weak within, for example, the Qajar dynasty in Iran experienced a resurgence of power
when it invested in the telegraph to bolster communications among government officials dispersed across the nation. For
a few decades in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, they consolidated control over restive provinces. They had a
technological advantage and re-established an asymmetric relationship. However, with time, they lost their comparative
advantage. Opponents used the communications technology to coordinate a mass movement to check the government's
power. The result was a period of upheaval and mass movements, culminating in the 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution.
Technology not only enables asymmetry in power relations, but can also be used to overcome it.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

If asymmetry involves merely a conflict of weak against strong, or non-traditional versus traditional, then the American
Revolutionary War is an example of asymmetrical warfare. General George Washington did not confine himself to confront
the British head-on in battle, but rather engaged in guerrilla operations, hit-and-run attacks, and tactical surprise.

Upon winning its independence, the new U.S. government, still weak relative to European powers, sought benefit in its
isolation. Speaking before Congress on December 2, 1823, the nation's fifth President James Monroe outlined what would
become called the Monroe Doctrine: The U.S. would remain neutral with regard to European conflicts, but would consider
any European military involvement among the independent states of the Western hemisphere to be dangerous and
contrary to U.S. peace and safety.

The central government in Washington, D.C., did not envision a role for the U.S.A. as a global power until difficulties
projecting force simultaneously against Cuba and the Philippines during the 1898 Spanish-American War forced
reassessment. As military technology advanced, the security borne by distance declined. Abutting two oceans doubled
naval needs. Throughout the 1930s, the U.S. Navy sought to determine how much force they needed to project power in
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. [7] World War II cemented the United States as a global superpower.

U.S. victory in the war ushered in an era of optimism. The United States was an industrial powerhouse. And, as the nuclear
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated, Washington controlled unrivaled technological superiority. But
outbreak of the Cold War and the 1957 launch of Sputnik shook U.S. confidence. The Soviet Union had not only achieved
technological parity, but also had surpassed it. Throughout the Cold War, both Democrats and Republicans considered
Soviet expansionism an existential threat.

The World War II rocket race between Nazi Germany and the West, and the subsequent Cold War arms race characterized
by the development of bigger nuclear bombs, convinced major powers that military victory depended upon technological
advancement.

But while Washington and Moscow engaged in a race to build larger and more lethal weaponry, insurgents developed their
own doctrine in order to amplify the impact of their inferior forces. After the Japanese invasion of China, revolutionary
leader Mao Tse-Tung sought to trade space for time, forcing his Japanese adversaries to stretch their supply lines thin.
Insurgents elsewhere favored pinpoint attacks on troops or critical infrastructure.

While the U.S. military fought a conventional army that occasionally employed irregular tactics in the Korean War, its
engagement in Vietnam was a different and more formidable experience. Throughout the war, the U.S. maintained air
superiority. Initial U.S. strategy prepared the terrain to maximize U.S. strengths. In 1968, Gen. William Westmoreland
established the Marine base at Khe Sanh to lure Viet Cong and decimate them from above. [8] The tactic had mixed success.
While U.S. forces inflicted high casualties, the Viet Cong consolidated control of the terrain, eventually forcing Khe Sanh's
evacuation. Air power did not substitute for ground control. U.S. airpower may have disrupted Viet Cong supply lines, but
it did not interdict them. Soviet provision of surface-to-air missiles helped to blunt U.S. air superiority at a relatively low
cost. Viet Cong casualties — more than three million killed [9] in comparison to 58,000 American deaths — was a cost
Hanoi considered acceptable. Faced with an opponent willing to suffer so many casualties — a price many Western
countries and democracies were unwilling to pay — Washington could do little, while the Viet Cong could simply achieve
victory by outlasting its opponents. Donald J. Mrozek, a Kansas State University military historian, concluded, "Although
willing to accept the occasional tactical gain, all the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong really needed to accomplish while U.S.
forces remained in Vietnam was to avoid catastrophic loss while ensuring political instability throughout the south." [10]
Only after Hanoi split Saigon from its superpower sponsor did they revert to a conventional, tank-led force to capture the
South.

Chechen nationalists and their foreign supporters pursued the same strategy in their war against Russia. Their willingness
to suffer immense casualties —or, at least to permit the civilian population to suffer — may not have won an independent
state, but they have both denied the Russian military the victory which Moscow sought and eroded international
unwillingness to offer them concession in response to violence. [11] In July and August, 2006, Hezbollah survived a
withering Israeli air bombardment to claim victory amidst the rubble. [12] Careful planning and battlefield preparation,
coupled with a willingness to sacrifice Lebanese infrastructure, paid off for the Iranian-trained group. [13] Had Serb officials
shown the same morbid stamina in Kosovo, they might still control that territory. The question boils down to a battle
between coercion and resilience. While the Serbs and many industrialized societies are unwilling to suffer unlimited civilian
casualties, al-Qa'ida, Hamas, and Hezbollah assign no such value to civilians in their areas of operation or control.

International legal constraints adopted by Western governments shift the balance in favor of resilience and so empower
liberation movements, guerrilla groups, and terrorists. Many African and Middle Eastern states augment their power relative
to Western countries simply by eschewing legal responsibilities. The trend among European Union officials, U.S. military
lawyers, and non-governmental organizations to apply maximal Geneva Convention protections universally, regardless of
enemy combatant adherence to the accords, furthers this trend. If adversaries have no incentive to abide by international
law, knowing that they are afforded universal protection regardless, then there is no consequence to utilizing terror or
endangering the civilian population.

TERRORISM: DEMOCRACY'S ARCHILLES' HEEL

Terrorism becomes a tactic of choice when its potential to achieve political aims outweighs the costs of its use.
Misapplication of international law among Western societies encourages terrorism by decreasing its cost while increasing
its effectiveness. On April 15, 2002, for example, six European Union countries endorsed a United Nations Human Rights
Commission resolution that endorsed the use of violence as a means to achieve Palestinian statehood. [14] The result, in
practice, created a precedent in which terrorists could argue that international humanitarian law justified their embrace of
suicide bombing.

The United Nations' mendacity is enabled by a lack of consensus over the meaning of terrorism. A 1988 study found that
professionals utilized more than 100 different definitions of terrorism. [15] The UN General Assembly defined terrorism, in
part, as "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public," [16] and, in 2005, UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan defined terrorism as any act "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or
non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization
to do or abstain from doing any act." [17] Neither definition, however, enjoys codified status or the status of law.

Terrorism by nature is irregular, although not always asymmetric. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, for example, have, since 2004,
concentrated their attacks on the U.S. military in Iraq, where the concentration of U.S. weaponry and air support gives U.S.
forces a comparative advantage over softer targets elsewhere, like undefended schools, shopping centers, or public
transportation. [18]

Nor are all terrorist groups weak. Terrorism is a tactic. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union sponsored both terrorist and
separatist groups. Analysts might consider the terrorist groups weak only if they took them out of their full context. But, as
proxies of a larger unit, they were no less weak than the states supporting them. The Greek government helped support and
supply the Kurdistan Workers Party [Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK], not because Athens was weak in comparison to
Ankara, but rather because it simply sought to act by terrorist proxy to weaken a competitor. Stephen Sloan, a terrorism
expert at the University of Oklahoma, noted that, while terrorism traditionally aimed at resisting state oppression from within,
today states use terrorism to amplify force. [19] With state sponsorship, terrorists become more lethal.

Terrorism combines surprise and shock to amplify effect and demoralize the broader public. It is asymmetric only so far as it
"attack[s] vulnerabilities not appreciated by the target." [20] The U.S. government remains ill-prepared to counter such
surprise. Most U.S. strategic planning with regard to terrorism focuses on replication of past activities. While a few exercises
had considered the possibility of hijacked aircraft used as weapons, these were exceptions. Indeed, the Defense Department
canceled one drill simulating a hijacked plane crash into the Pentagon because the scenario seemed too far-fetched. [21]
Most thinking was more conventional. U.S. officials increased perimeter security around major public buildings after the 1993
World Trade Center attack and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City two years later.

Many analysts see al-Qa'ida as an asymmetric threat. So too does the Pentagon. [22] But, whether terrorism is
state-sponsored, state-directed or pan-Islamist, its goals are similar and consistent with traditional psychological operations.
Terrorists and traditional state enemies both seek to affect change by demoralizing the public and winning through
psychological operations what they cannot win in conventional battle. Democracies are especially vulnerable because of the
power their public holds. A former North Vietnamese commander explained:

"The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability,
and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because
of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to
mobilize a will to win." [23]

The North Vietnamese strategy was little different than that of Somali militiamen who dragged the body of a mutilated
American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, permitting the international media to broadcast the incident in gruesome
detail, or Hezbollah terrorists who carefully stage-managed the international media during the summer 2006 Lebanon war.
"The camera and computer have become weapons of war," Marvin Kalb, Senior Fellow at Harvard University's Shorenstein
Center, observed in his analysis of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. [24]

How effective a terrorist attack may be is inversely proportional to Washington's own perceptions of its interests. Hezbollah's
1983 suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks succeeded because the Reagan administration judged perseverance in
the peacekeeping operation not worth further casualties. [25] The Clinton administration made similar calculation after Somali
militiamen downed two U.S. MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters on October 3, 1993. Usama bin Ladin acknowledged the issue
when, on May 28, 1998, he told an American interviewer:

"The American soldiers are paper tigers…. After a few blows [in
Mogadishu], they forgot about being the world leader and the
leader of the new world order. They left, dragging their corpses
and their shameful defeat." [26]

Terrorism aims to affect its opponents psychologically more than militarily. Modern media enables this objective. Prior to
establishment of satellite news networks, terrorists seldom enjoyed a sustained global audience, with the Palestinian seizure
and murder of Israeli athletes at the 1973 Munich Olympics perhaps the only exception. The proliferation of satellite
television networks across the globe wins terrorists a global audience for every hijacking, car bomb, or kidnapping.

Democracies are especially susceptible to such media manipulation. In the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, satellite channels
broadcast bombing damage in both Israel and Lebanon. The openness of Israeli society enabled journalists to access better
the Jewish state's internal political debate and hand-wringing. "A closed society conveys the impression of order and
discipline; an open society, buffeted by the crosswinds of reality and rumor, criticism and revelation, conveys the
impression of disorder, chaos and uncertainty, but this impression can be misleading," Kalb observed. [27]

Validation also bolsters terrorism. Terror sponsors and leaders calculate cost and benefit. Every terrorist attack and every
propaganda statement creates forensic evidence which may increase the vulnerability of terrorist leaders or provide
evidence to link them with their sponsors. The willingness of satellite television providers to distribute terror propaganda
both bolsters terrorist propaganda and bestows an image of legitimacy. [28] The Egyptian government's willingness to host
Hezbollah's al-Manar on its Nilesat television provider, alongside the state television of Bahrain, Sudan, Kuwait and
Syria, and the U.S.-funded al-Hurra legitimizes its incitement and support for terrorism, just as the Danish
government's licensing of Roj TV, the PKK's media channel, does. [29] It was to prevent such legitimacy that the French
government eventually removed al-Manar from its Eutelsat. [30]

More serious, the willingness of Western diplomats to negotiate with terrorists or engage with their sponsors bolsters their
legitimacy, validates their tactics, and shields them from consequence. The impact of such engagement creates precedent
which empowers a wide range of terrorist groups. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's decision to welcome
representatives of Hamas to Ankara in February, 2006, undercut Turkish efforts to de-legitimize the PKK, which, like the
Palestinian terrorist groups, justifies its actions in national liberation. [31]

Normal diplomatic practice also shields terrorists. Premature recourse to diplomacy can validate the decision to utilize
terrorism. Diplomats and journalists both condemned Jerusalem's disproportional military response to the conflict initiated
by Hezbollah. Disproportionality, however, is a deterrent to terrorism. Diplomatic linkage between equitable distribution of
casualties and legitimacy of conflict has no basis in international law.

Sympathy for a cause often amplifies concern about disproportionality. Terrorism cannot be successful without
sympathizers. The Beider Meinhof Gang conducted several terrorist operations in the 1970s, but failed to win support. They
may have enjoyed Soviet patronage, but their ideology did not resonate nor could they translate terrorism into recruitment
success. Their membership dwindled as West German authorities captured or killed operatives. In contrast, the Irish
Republican Army, the ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), or, for that matter, Hamas and
al-Qa'ida espouse an ideology popular enough to enable replacement through recruitment. Daniel Byman, Director of
Georgetown University's Security Studies Program was correct to note:

"We continue to pour money into intelligence, homeland defense
and the military, but this spending is primarily to defeat today's
terrorist cells. More spies and better defenses do little to defeat a
hostile ideology." [32]

It is an observation which the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review seconded. "Victory will come when the enemy's extremist
ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters," the report argued. [33]

While it is necessary to combat the ideologies underpinning contemporary terrorism, if the West is to counter the terrorist
challenge, it is also important to treat terrorism as a military matter rather than simply a criminal matter. Such a determination
is important. If terrorism is a criminal problem, then it should be dealt with by law enforcement. This not only makes
prevention difficult, but it also glosses over ideological motivations and the state sponsorship which bolster terrorists'
reach and lethality. If terrorism is just a criminal matter, then states cannot use military force to counter it. The Pentagon
perceives terrorism as a military matter. "This is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas," the QDR declares. The report
continued to argue that defeat of terrorist networks depended upon augmenting human intelligence, surveillance, special
operations, and willingness to conduct irregular warfare. [34]

A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS?

Many of Rumsfeld's arguments appear tied to the idea that there has been a revolution in military affairs. This concept,
which argues that technological advances supplant past emphasis on manpower, received a boost from U.S. dominance
over Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. [35] Many commentators, at the time, expressed concern about the mission: Iraq had
the fifth largest army in the world, raising fears among Americans of a quagmire or, at the least, a high price for success. [36]
U.S. dominance — memorialized with video of precision bombs going down chimneys — reinvigorated the notion that
technology would dominate future warfare.

Also impacting the debate was the notion of Fourth Generation Warfare. A construction first voiced in 1989, military expert
William S. Lind led a team of Army and Marine officers who posited that there had been three distinct generations of
warfare, emphasizing, in turn, manpower, firepower, and maneuver. They argued that ideology and/or technology would
underpin a fourth generation in warfare, and predicted that this could blur both chain of command and the distinction
between civilian and military. Maneuver would trump logistics which, they argued, would become less important than the
ability of troops to live off the land. Whereas troop concentration was once an asset, Lind and his colleagues theorized
that, in the future, it could become a liability, more vulnerable to attack. Rather than destroy opponents on the battlefield,
a new generation of enemies might try to collapse their adversaries from within. [37] In such an age, the idea of front and
rear lines may be outdated. [38]

While the Fourth Generation Warfare theory fits events ranging from the rise of al-Qa'ida to the Iraqi insurgency, critics
point out that the generation division is artificial, somewhat arbitrary, and that it does not elucidate strategies to conduct
war against non-conventional forces. Nor are many Fourth Generation ideas new. Sun Tzu, the Sixth Century B.C. military
strategist, described similar strategies in The Art of War. [39] Ancient Greeks, Persians, and later the Mongol hordes
mastered the art of demoralizing enemies to collapse societies from within. [40] More recently, Western states and their
proxies eschewed convention and logistics. In 1948, for example, the Philippine Constabulary formed Force X, a group
which infiltrated Panay as a fake Huk unit, with the aim to sabotage the Huk rebellion from within by sabotaging
ammunition while conducting surveillance. The British conducted similar operations during the Malaya Emergency and in
Kenya during the Mau Mau insurgency. [41] Defenders of the Fourth Generation thesis may conclude that the attrition that
characterized early and mid-Twentieth Century warfare will not reoccur, [42] but this may be a hasty conclusion. Stalemate
and attrition characterized the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), even though both sides enjoyed highly educated publics whose
militaries had access to missiles, jets, and chemical weaponry. Between 1998 and 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought to a
stalemate in a border war that cost, according to some estimates, 70,000 lives. [43]

Nor is irregular warfare necessarily superior to traditional methods. In his analysis of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Andrew
Exum, a U.S. Army Ranger platoon leader in both Afghanistan and Iraq, noted that Hezbollah's decentralization prevented
its units from supporting each other in the same way that the more structured Israeli Defense Forces did. [44]

Former West Point Professor and American Enterprise Institute military historian Frederick W. Kagan issued an important
correction to the popular, but mistaken, notion that technology can alter the human investment necessary in warfare. He
observed that, between 1989 and 2003, there were eight major U.S. military operations, five of which resulted in longterm
deployments in hostile or semi-hostile environments. Such commitments require large ground forces, irrespective of
technological advances. [45] "Military planning during Donald Rumsfeld's terms as Secretary of Defense rested on three
basic assumptions about the nature of future conflict," Kagan wrote.

"Future wars will be short, sharp affairs; their outcomes will
turn heavily on the opponents' relative levels of technology;
and the United States can and should rely increasingly on
using indigenous forces instead of its own ground troops.
All three assumptions have been badly undermined by
recent operations." [46]

The casualty rates subsequent to George W. Bush's declaration of the end of major combat in Iraq [47] show Kagan to be
correct. While U.S. forces defeated the Iraqi army in just three weeks at a cost of 158 Coalition lives, the battle against
insurgents, terrorists, and militias has since cost more than 20 times as many U.S. lives.

While Rumsfeld directed the Pentagon to expand Special Operations Forces and Psychological Operations and Civil
Affairs units and tasked the Air Force to establish an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron, [48] such technological
prowess has yet to neutralize the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs), relatively low-technology devices responsible for the bulk of U.S. casualties.

THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT

While a disparate network of adversaries may utilize low-technology remedies to neutralize U.S. power in Iraq, opposing
states may pursue other means to neutralize U.S. military might. In the wake of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Pentagon's Strategy Directorate tasked RAND scholars Bruce W. Bennett, Christopher P. Twomey, and Gregory F.
Treverton to identify asymmetric threats facing the United States. They agreed that airpower was the United States' chief
military asset and focused upon how adversaries might counter it. They predicted adversaries might use a combination of
theater missiles and chemical or biological weapons. North Korea, for example, might utilize SCUD missiles equipped with
chemical or biological payloads. Other threats they listed included mines, diesel submarines, terrorism, and information
warfare. [49]

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review updated concern about asymmetric challenges to recognize that the most lethal
challenges might not come directly from states, but, rather, that there might be "conflicts in which enemy combatants are
not regular military forces of nation-states" and in which adversaries conduct "catastrophic terrorism employing weapons
of mass destruction." [50]

Such concern about weapons of mass destruction has grown with time. International inspections do not provide a credible
antidote. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein managed to hide a covert nuclear program for more than a decade, despite
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Hans Blix, who had certified Baghdad's compliance at the time,
later admitted that "the IAEA was fooled by the Iraqis." [51]

Nor do multilateral organizations provide security. In 2006, Charles Primmerman, Assistant Head of the Sensor Systems
Division at the Pentagon-funded Lincoln Laboratory, analyzed asymmetric threats to the United States. While most
revolved around weapons of mass destruction, Primmerman suggested an adversary's pursuit of asymmetric strategies
might include not only use of a weapon of mass destruction, but also deception. On one hand, this might include
insincere treaty negotiation as cover to develop such weapons, something the Soviet Union did with regard to biological
weapons and the Islamic Republic of Iran did with regard to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards Agreement. On the
other hand, he suggested, an adversary might turn such weaponry against its own citizens for the purpose of blaming the
other party. [52] An adversary absorbing a conventional air strike on its nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons facilities
might, for example, spread contamination in order to blame the attacker for killing its civilians.

Tactical nuclear weapons also enhance threats. The Soviet Union's collapse and the subsequent deterioration in Russian
conventional forces led Moscow to place greater emphasis on Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. Analysts might consider
this an asymmetric strategy. It amplified Russian prestige and influence beyond what its economic and military strength
might normally presage. Indeed, Russian threats to deploy extra missiles in Belarus have caused European Union
bureaucrats to reconsider the desire of Poland and the Czech Republic to host early warning sites and anti-ballistic
missiles shields. [53] However, Moscow's strategic calculations have wider repercussions on other nations' threat
perceptions and create a cascading threat. Gunnar Arbman, Director of Research at the Swedish Defense Research Agency,
and Charles Thornton, a research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies, explain, "The deterioration of
its conventional forces means Russia must rely more heavily on its tactical nuclear weapons; and yet, the deteriorated state
of the military's morale, readiness, and reliability means that there is an increased internal threat of the accidental or
unauthorized launch, or the proliferation of a nuclear weapon." [54]

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recognized that possession of weapons of mass destruction was an attractive
asymmetric strategy for U.S. adversaries. "They may brandish nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to ensure regime
survival, deny the United States access to critical areas, or deter others from taking action against them," the report read. [55]
Technological advancement increases the threat, not because weapons may get more sophisticated, but rather because
they become more accessible. [56]

SURPRISE & DOMINANCE

Surprise enhances the effectiveness of asymmetric challenge. History is replete with weaker powers seeking to transform
surprise attack into advantage. [57] Japan, for example, launched surprise attacks against both Russia in 1904 and the
United States in 1941. The 1950 Chinese intervention in Korea surprised Western officials, as did the 1965 Pakistani
incursion into Kashmir. Few in London expected Argentina's 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands.

The Peoples' Republic of China continues to embrace surprise as mechanism to sidestep comparative weakness on other
fronts. Michael Pillsbury, a former Pentagon official and expert on Chinese military doctrine, noted that Beijing's strategic
thinkers consider the Israeli destruction of the Egyptian Air Force in the opening hours of the 1967 Six-Day War to be a
model of inferior forces triumphing over the superior because of surprise. The Chinese Navy, likewise, sees submarine
warfare as a means to enable its inferior forces to, by stealth, triumph over the superior. [58]

Interwoven into surprise is mastery of the information battlefield. Chang Mengxiong, former Senior Fngineer of the
Chinese military's Beijing Institute of System Engineering, argued that the key to Chinese success in Twentyfirst Century
asymmetric warfare would be Beijing's development of technologies to attack satellites, electronic warfare aircraft, and
ground command sites. [59] Dominance of the information battlefield might level the playing field and might enable
smaller, weaker militaries to enhance their range of operation.

Here space technology may coincide with others aspects of battle strategy. Chief among Beijing's political and, perhaps,
military objectives are reunification with the island nation of Taiwan. However, the Peoples' Republic lacks the naval
assets to ensure victory. [60] Here, Beijing might use satellite technology to overcome its relative weaknesses. This is
reflected in Chinese naval doctrine. "The mastery of outer space will be a prerequisite for naval victory, with outer space
becoming the new commanding heights for naval combat," writes the Chinese Naval Research Institute's Captain Shen
Zhongchang. [61] In this context, the destruction on January 18, 2007, of a Chinese weather satellite by a Chinese
anti-satellite missile is worrisome. [62]

Chinese military thinkers have argued that their strategy should center less on conventional battles, where troop
concentrations are susceptible to remote attack, and more on striking enemy information systems, while ensuring
Beijing's capacity for information warfare. [63] While anti-satellite weaponry might be one method to level or establish
dominance over the information field, it is not the only mechanism. Chinese strategist Chen Hu'an explains, "The
operational objectives of the two sides on attack and defense are neither the seizing of territory nor the killing of so many
enemies, but rather the paralyzing of the other side's information system and the destruction of the other side's will to
resist." [64] U.S. defense strategists are particularly concerned about electromagnetic pulse weapons. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review explains, "Expanded reliance on sophisticated electronic technologies by the United States,
and its allies and partners increases their vulnerability to the destructive effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP), the energy
burst given off during a nuclear weapons explosion." [65] Less destructive strategies might involve increasingly
sophisticated efforts to disrupt computer networks, especially given greater U.S. reliance on net-centric warfare. [66]

PREEMPTION OR DIPLOMACY?

While there may be no unified asymmetric threat, technological advancement coupled with access to and lethality of
weapons mandate that every state be prepared to counter threats before they develop fully. No longer can states count
on strategic depth to absorb a first blow. Nor, in an age of ideological terror, can strategists assume that mutually
assured destruction is an adequate deterrent to the use of nuclear weapons.

The White House outlined its concern about the threat posed by terrorists utilizing weapons of mass destruction in its
2002 National Security Strategy. "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroad of radicalism and
technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence
indicates that they are doing so with determination," the President wrote in a letter accompanying its unveiling. [67]
The strategy emphasized pre-emption. "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they
are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends… We
cannot let our enemies strike first." [68]

The 2002 National Security Strategy was controversial from its inception because critics saw it as blurring the
line between defense and aggression. Many analysts pointed out that U.S. justification for its own first strikes might
create a precedent for other countries to stage surprise attacks. "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,"
Oxford University Professor Adam Roberts told the Washington Post. "I have to say it puzzles America's allies
that that danger doesn't seem to be fully grasped." [69] Indeed, much of the international hostility toward U.S. policy
in Iraq reflected less disagreement about the perceived danger posed by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein than the fear
that successful regime change in Iraq might create a precedent for forceful regime change. The subsequent difficulties
encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq, however, cooled enthusiasm for preemption. The 2006 National Security
Strategy emphasized multilateralism, with chapters emphasizing the strengthening of alliances, cooperation to
defuse regional conflicts, and development of common agendas "with the other main centers of global power." [70]

Diplomacy is important, but the rush to abandon preemption in favor of multilateral affirmation can be irresponsible.
If citizens elect political leadership transparently and democratically, then it is the responsibility of that government
to guarantee their security, not multilateral organizations whose officials are not directly accountable to any citizenry.
The 1981 Israeli air strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor illustrates this issue. The United Nation Security Council
"strongly" condemned Israel's actions [71] and, yet, hindsight shows that the Israeli leadership made the correct
decision. International organizations often discuss problems, but they seldom solve them. There is often an inverse
relationship between the size of any coalition or multilateral organization, and its effectiveness.

Governments should always first consider the diplomatic option to counter a threat. The costs incumbent in
diplomacy are almost always lower than those expended in military conflict. However, diplomacy misapplied can
amplify rather than resolve asymmetric threats, especially if they legitimize terrorist violence.

The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, for example, arms and provides safe-haven to the PKK. While Iraqi
Kurdish leader Masud Barzani condemns terrorist violence, he ties any peshmerga crackdown on the PKK to Turkish
political concessions. It is a strategy of blackmail. Should Ankara make political concessions in the face of terror,
then it legitimizes Barzani's support for terrorism and will likely convince the Iraqi Kurdish leader that his best
asymmetric strategy is further terror support.

Both Tehran and Damascus have sought to leverage hostage-taking into diplomatic concession, [72] and the
Palestinian Authority under Yasir Arafat's leadership was quite transparent in its strategy. In a public 1996
conference, Palestinian Authority Planning Minister Nabil Sha'ath said that Israel should not dismiss any Palestinian
demands since, "We will return to violence. But this time it will be with 30,000 armed Palestinian soldiers…." [73]

While Primmerman spoke of treaty violation as an asymmetric strategy, insincere engagement is as much a threat.
For more than a decade, the foundation of European policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran has been critical
dialogue. In a February 9, 2002, interview, EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten explained, "There is more to
be said for trying to engage and to draw these societies into the international community than to cut them off." [74]
European officials saw in Iranian President Muhammad Khatami a worthy partner who spoke the words they wanted
to hear. Between 2000 and 2005, EU trade with Iran almost tripled. Instead of liberalizing society or curtailing its terror
support, Tehran invested the resulting hard currency windfall in a clandestine nuclear program. The lesson is clear:
Conditioning rogue regimes to expect reward for defiance exacerbates rather than mitigates conflict.

Despite the high-minded rhetoric of the United Nations and other international bodies, coercion — the threat of force
and, if necessary, its use — will remain a critical element of U.S. foreign policy. [75] If states are to counter threats,
they must remain willing to use brute force, even if it means engaging in a war of attrition or multiyear
counterinsurgency. Any conflict from which a state shirks will become the asymmetric strategy of choice for its
adversary. The idea that the long war can be abandoned with a turn of phrase is both naïve and dangerous.

CONCLUSIONS

While the Bush administration and its policies are unpopular through much of the world, [76] the necessity for
Washington to address asymmetric threats will transcend administrations. Whereas once the Pentagon concerned
itself with fulfilling the ability to fight two major wars simultaneously, [77] today it must also worry about
counteracting and, if necessary, preempting weapons of mass destruction attacks against U.S. targets. [78] It must be
prepared to face well-developed militaries — for example, to defend Taiwan against Chinese invasion — and also
counter uncompromising ideologies. Distance is no longer a defense nor, as the 9/11 terrorist attack showed, is an
adversary's lack of ballistic missile capability.

There is no unified asymmetric threat, however. All states and adversaries will adjust their strategies to maximize
advantage and minimize weakness. A Chinese attack on U.S. satellites, communications infrastructure, or shipping
might look very different from an al-Qa'ida or Hamas attack on tourists, shopping malls, or military bases.

While a dictatorship's unity of purpose and a terrorist group's decentralization might appear advantageous against
the inefficiency of democracy, democratic governance is itself an asymmetric advantage. Few individuals relish
dictatorship. Decision-making in Beijing and Moscow, Pyongyang, and Havana may be streamlined, but they fear
their own citizenry in a way democracies do not. Communication and lines-of-control in democracies tend to be more
flexible than in terrorist groups. Democracies can fight either regularly or irregularly; terrorist groups have no such
choice and, when successful, have difficulty controlling territory.

While the U.S. Army today teaches that victories combine both military and political components, [79] Washington
should recognize that an opponent's strategy will incorporate non-military components as well. Information warfare
and influence operations should be an important component of any strategy to counter asymmetric threats. While, in
the U.S. context, free speech should be absolute, politicians should recognize some responsibility for how foreign
audiences interpret their words.

If there is any unifying concept that democracies might consider to counter the asymmetric threats they face, it is
flexibility. If opponents eschew international norms and the laws of warfare without consequence, can Western
nations afford to abide by their most liberal interpretations? Perhaps, rather than hold states unilaterally to the
broadest interpretations of international and humanitarian law, Western governments must calibrate their
interpretations to those of their adversaries. Ironically, this is not an innovation, but, rather, the original intent of the
Geneva Conventions.

[7] For an excellent review of the history of U.S. defense posture, see: Gary J. Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly, "Numbers Matter" in Schmitt and Donnelly, eds. Of Men and Material: The Crisis in Military Resources. (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 2007), pp. 5-29.

[8] Donald J. Mrozek, "Asymmetric Response to American Air Supremacy in Vietnam," in: Lloyd J. Matthews, ed. Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1988), pp. 96.

[9] "Vietnam-anniversaire." Agence France Presse, April 4, 2005.

[10] Mrozek, 103.

[11] For an example of weakening consensus, see: Richard Pipes, "Give the Chechens a Land of their Own." The New York Times, September 9, 2004.

[15] Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6, as cited in Jeffrey Record. Bounding the Global War on Terrorism. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), p. 6. For the 1974 International Association of Chiefs of Police definition and the 1976 National Advisory Committee on Justice, Criminal Standards, and Goals definition, see: Stephen Sloan, "Terrorism and Asymmetry," in Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically, p. 174.

[24] Marvin Kalb. "The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict." Faculty Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 2007.

[38] This was the conclusion in the official U.S. army history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. See: Col. Gregory Fontenot, Lt. Col. E.J. Degen, and Lt. Col. David Tohn. On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), pg. 414.

[63] Chen Hu'an. "The Third Military Revolution." Contemporary Military Affairs, March 11, 1996, as reproduced in Michael Pillsbury, ed. Chinese Views of Future Warfare. (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), p. 391.

Dr. Michael Rubin, a Ph.D. in History (Yale University) and a specialist in Middle Eastern politics, Islamic culture and Islamist
ideology, is Editor of the Middle East Quarterly and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. Dr Rubin is author of Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2001) and is co-author, with Dr. Patrick Clawson, of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005). Dr. Rubin served as political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad (2003-2004); staff
advisor on Iran and Iraq in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (2002-2004); visiting lecturer in the Departments of
History and International Relations at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2001-2002); visiting lecturer at the Universities of
Sulaymani, Salahuddin, and Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan (2000-2001); Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy (1999-2000); and visiting lecturer in the Department of History at Yale University (1999-2000). He has been a fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relations, the Leonard Davis Institute at Hebrew University, and the Carnegie Council on Ethics and
International Affairs.

As regards the preparation of his presentation, "Asymmetrical Threat Concept and ItsReflections on International Security,"
Dr. Rubin is grateful for the useful comments and insights provided by AEI colleagues Dan Blumenthal, Tom Donnelly,
Frederick W. Kagan, and Gary Schmitt.

Dr. Rubin's analysis of asymmetrical warfare was originally presented, on May 31, 2007, to the Strategic Research and Study
Center (SAREM) under the Turkish General Staff, Istanbul, Turkey, and can be found on the Internet website maintained by
the Middle East Forum, a think tank which seeks to define and promote American
interests in the Middle East, defining U.S. interests to include fighting radical Islam, working for Palestinian Arab acceptance
of the State of Israel, improving the management of U.S. efforts to promote constitutional democracy in the Middle East,
reducing America's energy dependence on the Middle East, more robustly asserting U.S. interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia,
and countering the Iranian threat.

Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
June 1, 2007

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