Putin’s Strategy Behind the Food Ban

The consensus around Russia’s ban of food imports from the US and EU is that Russia is only hurting itself. As a NY Times editorial, aptly named “Russia Sanctions Itself,” stated, “No doubt many producers in these countries will feel the loss of $30 billion in food exports to Russia, but the overall effect on their large and diversified economies will be marginal. Russia, by contrast, imports about 40 percent of its food needs in terms of value, and the Russian agriculture minister has acknowledged that the sanctions would cause a spike in inflation.” If this is the case, then what’s Putin’s strategy behind the food ban?

Writing in Slon, Maksim Samorukov takes a stab at Putin’s possible strategy. In 2013, the EU exported 10.5 billion euros of food to Russia, about 10 percent of its total agricultural exports, making it the second largest market after the US. It’s a growing market, Samorukov states, because Russia imports three times more from Europe than it did ten years ago. Moreover, these exports are important to balance trade in Russian oil and gas. Nevertheless, 10.5 billion euros doesn’t seem like a lot when spread over 28 EU countries. Nevertheless, some countries will be more affected than others as this chart shows.

And this is perhaps what Putin is banking on. Europe’s agricultural lobby will put pressure on their governments and countries like Spain, which has the most to lose with Russia’s food ban, will break the solidarity of the EU. It’s wishful thinking, for sure, but here’s what Samorukov argues:

The food ban will hit European farmers, and their discontent might force governments to weaken their resolve. Samorukov writes, “Farmers in Europe are very organized people, with extensive experience in lobbying and a tradition of organizing mass demonstrations at the slightest threat to their welfare. You can always find a group of fishermen or peasants at the official European Union buildings in Brussels expressing their indignation at the next food policy. And if it comes to any major changes in agricultural policy, then there is bound to be a crowd of many thousands. . .” Moreover, these farmers will have the sympathy of the population, adding to the political pressue. Putin is essentially counting on European democracy to work in his favor.

The EU’s pocket book is squeezed on both sides. There’s the “pampered” farmers in western Europe that refuse to accept any reduction of agricultural subsidies on one side, and the poorer famers from eastern Europe on the other. Until now, according to Samorukov, famers in the east were getting fewer subsidies than their counterparts in the west. But now the EU will have to pay those famers equally to alleviate the pain of the Russian food ban. “A unified EU budget, where agrarian subsidies make up almost half of expenses, cannot support such a burden.” Putin, therefore, is hoping that the EU financial woes will play to his advantage as well.

Samorukov concludes:

Russian ban on European food seems to have been invented in the hope to take advantage of these difficulties in the EU’s agricultural sector and try to split the unity of the Union. For example, the countries of southern Europe, that have little enthusiasm for sanctions against Russia, joined the them solely to not betray European solidarity. And now the imposition of sanctions would mean they would not only have possible problems with the flow of tourists, but also tangible losses to their already problematic and large agricultural sector.

Samorukov, however, doubts this will work:

The Kremlin certain in its cynicism, as usual, underestimates the principles of Western leaders and their willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of the idea of ​​European solidarity, especially when it comes to such lawlessness as the revision of the borders. But still the impact on agriculture was the best choice from the viewpoint of the proportion of losses and effect.

There’s also the shooting down of MH17 by Russian backed separatists. This changed everything, and explains Europe’s suddenly discovered resolve.

Though Samorukov doesn’t make the argument, I think there’s a possible third idea behind Putin’s thinking: the long term goal of reducing Russian dependence on the West. This project of import substitution coincides with the nationalist fervor that has characterized Putin’s third term. In the short term, Russia will likely increase its exports from places like Brazil. In the long term Putin is banking on the food ban to invigorate Russia domestic agricultural production. Russian consumers will certainly feel the pinch of this policy, but as Samorukov states, the Kremlin can reassert that Russia is a besieged fortress and its people must sacrifice for the sake of sovereignty. But this mobilization can’t last forever. The question is whether Putin’s strategy will pay some geopolitical dividends before the nationalist mobilization peters out.

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Diplomatic wrangling between Russian and Britain continues as no resolution over the Andrei Lugovoi extradition seems in sight. Writing in the Russian weekly Ekspert, Andrei Gromov argues that the whole mess lies with the British, who has gone “beyond the framework of legal and diplomatic logic.” Gromov sees British demands as nothing less than a provocation. “Why has Britain decided to escalate tension? What kind of game is it playing?” he rhetorically asks. Not to leave us wondering to long, Gromov gives us four reigning theories.

It’s not about politics as all. The issue is about solving a murder on British soil.

Gordon Brown is making a name for himself. A spat with Russia is a way to assert his authority.

The new British cabinet are a bunch of diplomatic amateurs. This is especially the case for Foreign Secretary David Miliband.

Lastly, the incident is part of a deeper diplomatic game played by both the US and Britain against Russia.

So basically it all boils down to: they are sincere, they are dumb, they are out to get us. But such superficial explanations aren’t enough. For Gromov the real issue is economics. Especially Britain’s efforts to close its own domestic gap between consumption and production of hydrocarbons. Russia is one of the few places ripe for British investment and corporate expansion. In the end, according to Gromov, it all amounts to international capitalist warfare. The British want access to Russian oil and gas fields but without having to let Russian companies have a stake in Britain.

Another Charge and a Party

This doesn’t mean that the other issues don’t continue with a life of their own. Russian prosecutors have added another crime to Berezovsky’s laundry list. Now he’s accused of embezzling $13 million from the Russian bank SBS-Agro to buy property on the French Riviera. The charges allow Russia to increase its claims that Britain is “maintaining double standards in its failure to hand over Berezovsky while demanding that Russia extradite Andrei Lugovoi.”

Russia’s claims of “double standards,” however, holds less and less water when Andrei Lugovoi is shown on Russian television attending the graduation of Moscow Higher Military Command School as an honorary guest. It might be wise to keep this guy out of the public eye at least for appearance sake.

Bizarre Logic

According the St. Petersburg Times, Russia’s take on the Litvinenko murder has the eerie echo of the Kirov murder. Sergei Kirov was the head of the Leningrad Party organization and a member of Stalin’s inner circle. Historians recognize his murder in 1934 as the impetus for unleashing Stalin’s terror. Most believe that Stalin ordered Kirov’s murder, though there is no evidence whatsoever to support this. Sound familiar? Just like in 1934 when Stalin pointed to Trotskyists and other foreign agents, says Ira Straus, the Kremlin is using the tactic of saying that Litvinenko’s murder is a plot devised by Berezovsky-British agents. Oh I see, we are supposed to walk away with the idea that Putin=Stalin. And he accuses Russia of “bizarre logic”!?
Western Complexes

For his part as elder statesman, Gorbachev is peddling the idea that Russia’s tensions with the West are part of Washington’s “victory complex.” And while Putin’s methods were “even authoritarian to some extent,” he nevertheless had the same goals: “moving toward democracy and market economics.” When added to Putin’s view that Britain’s suggestion that Russia change its constitution as “a rudiment of colonial thinking” and that it “still has the last century thinking on its brain,” it sounds as if both Gorby and Putin think Britain and the US need a good psychiatrist.

Ghosts of Beslan

The US and Britain aren’t the only one’s having to deal with ghosts. The Mothers of Beslan have obtained a videotape that gives new evidence that the Russian security forces triggered the Beslan massacre. The Russian authorities have maintained that the raid was initiated by terrorists’ bomb blasts from inside the school. In the video one Russian security officer offers a contrary version.

One of the officers, identified as Bagatir Nabiyev, tells the official that the terrorists’ bombs could not have gone off inside the gymnasium because in this case the hostages’ bodies would have been riddled with shrapnel from the bombs. He also says a hole in the wall came from an explosion outside, and not inside the gymnasium.

“So there were no explosions on the premises?” the official asks, according to the transcript.

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Stalin never posed with his shirt off, but Putin’s topless poses while fishing in Siberia certainly smacks of a “socialist realism” for post-Soviet Russia. The Putin cult is no secret. Nashi’s reverence for Putin approaches the Komsomol’s love of Lenin. The new recommended history textbook, which will be introduced to Russian high schools next year, places Putin as the alpha and omega of the 21st century Russian state. If Putin’s political prowess, intellect, quick wit, and athleticism hasn’t built him up as the New Postmodern Russian Man, his pecks certainly will.

The Russian media is abuzz with opinions of Putin’s photos. Though criticism of the pictures exists, it appears that most Russians, especially women, have greeted them with approval. As the Associated Pressreports, when Yevgeniya Albats said that the photos were “unbecoming of a Russian leader,” she received a barrage of emails from women expressing their love for their presidential Adonis. It’s too bad they also didn’t focus on her silly claim that “the photos were mean to enhance Putin’s personal appeal to voters–a strong signal that he doesn’t plan to relinquish power.” With a approval rating hovering at a consistent 70%, one doubts that topless photos are necessary even if Putin desired to stay on. Sergei Markov of Moscow’s Institute for Political Research summed it up simply: “He’s cool. That’s been the image throughout the presidency, cool.”

But most of today’s English reporting on Putin pics is buzz about the buzz. More specifically Komsomolskaya pravda’s article “Be Like Putin!” The article provides seven exercises for the aspiring Putinite to become just like Vlad. And they say that fizkul’turа is dead.

And the Russian media is having fun with it. In a headline, Argumenty i Fakty declared “Putin’s Torso has subdued Europe“. Numerous Russian news sites are translating articles from the Western press that look to find the hidden geopolitical meaning of Putin’s chest. London Times’ Michael Grove admitted that Putin’s chest was Russia’s secret weapon, making a direct connection between Russia’s asserting of its military muscle and Putin showing his. Grove writes:

As Putin’s careful release of the pictures of his own taut form demonstrate, the deployment of male nudity is, above all, a power play. On one level Vlad is showing us all that he’s a remarkably fit man for his age (54) and that, unlike in the decadent West, Russia’s leaders remain the physical embodiment of their nation’s vigour – classical champions in the manner of those Roman emperors who would renew their mandate to rule on the battlefield or even in the gladiatorial ring. His bare-chested peacockery is, in that respect, in line with the broader cult of Putin as his nation’s silverback – the leader of the band.

The body of the President is a testament to the body of of the country. If Putin is strong, the Russian state is strong. In the quick click of a camera, Putin’s two bodies, his corporal and symbolic, merge into one.

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Are Putin and his cohort afflicted with trauma? This is the question Richard Lourie poses in an interesting column in the Moscow Times. Lourie rhetorically asks, why does an administration with 70 percent approval use such force against a small and politically insignificant opposition.Was it yet another sign of the “turn toward authoritarianism or pre-election jitters?” Lourie writes that:

It was a bit of both, but behind both lies a deeper cause. President Vladimir Putin and his generation were shaped by the traumatic collapse of the Soviet Union, just as previous generations were shaped by revolution, terror or war. Their own personal relationship to the Soviet Union and its demise — their sense of loss, regret and acrimony — is dwarfed by the sheer magnitude of the event itself. Their shock resulted from seeing that something as mighty and gigantic as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could vanish so suddenly and so easily. The Titanic of empires, it was the biggest ship of state that ever sank.

Putin’s often quoted and often misunderstood remark that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” should be understood as much psychologically as politically. People will argue for years to come about the cause of its demise, but for people like Putin who were on board the ship of state as it began sinking, the one lasting lesson is that if something so seemingly invincible as the Soviet Union can go down so swiftly, there’s no reason the same thing can’t happen with the new Russia, which is smaller and less fearsome.

A great deal of Putin’s behavior — the brutality in Chechnya, the fear of a Ukraine-style revolution and nongovernmental organizations, the centralization of authority, the control of the media and the beating of demonstrators — makes more sense if seen as a pattern stemming from the trauma of the fall of the Soviet Union. Putin himself said in his book “First Person”: “[M]y mission, my historical mission — and this will sound lofty, but it’s true — consisted of resolving the situation in the Northern Caucasus … and Chechnya [which is] a continuation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. … If we don’t put an immediate end to this, Russia will cease to exist.”

Lourie states, and I emphasize, that while trauma provides another layer for understanding, it is no excuse for these acts. Given my own recent work on the trauma of the Russian Civil War in the Komsomol, Lourie’s thesis jives well. As many Soviet psychologists in the 1920s noted, the “traumatic neurosis” caused by the violence and brutality of the Civil War prevented veterans from adjusting to peaceful conditions.One Russian historian recently argued that the “war syndrome” infected the Bolshevik Party so much that it contributed to the Terror of the 1930s. Could a trauma from the collapse of the Soviet system explain Putin’s governance?