Wednesday, October 28, 2015

The Blue Ribbon Study Panel Report on Biodefense

#10,669

Of the myriad large-scale disaster scenarios out there, the two I take most seriously are a highly pathogenic biological threat (either natural or manmade), and a massive grid-down scenario (again . . . either natural or manmade).

Both have the potential to affect whole nations, if not the entire world, and both are very difficult to adequately plan for.

A focus on weapons such as bombs and nuclear missiles has left the US government ill-prepared to deal with bioterror attacks and even natural threats such as Ebola, according to a group of former government officials.

In a report released on 28 October, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense panel lays out 33 recommendations for the US government to improve its biosecurity policy. Chief among them are the creation of a centralized biosecurity office and a greater emphasis on detecting biological threats through intelligence gathering and surveillance.

While an `intentional release’ of a bio-engineered pathogen might sound the stuff of fiction, the tools and knowledge required to create enhanced or synthetic life forms becomes more affordable and accessible every year. What once might only have been possible in a multi-million dollar lab can now be done on a limited budget in a basement somewhere.

But even if you discount a deliberate attack, we’ve seen a rash of lab accidents involving `select agents’ – like Anthrax, Ebola, H5N1, and even Smallpox – over the past couple of years, many involving government labs. How many others that have gone unreported is unknown.

While none have escaped the confines of the lab, the threat of an accidental release is quite real.

And of course nature’s laboratory is open 24/7 as well, experimenting, evolving, and constantly coming up with new and challenging biological threats. We’ve seen an explosion in novel viruses over the past 3 years, and it is likely just a matter of time before one of them is ready for prime time.

All of which makes a consolidated and comprehensive bio-defense policy badly needed and long overdue.