Степанян Դավիթ Stepanyan Ստեփանյան David Давид

Alexander Skakov: Russia will keep increasing military protection of Armenia

How will the Armenian president-initiated
Constitutional referendum affect Russia’s future relations with Armenia?

I
think Russian considers the referendum as Armenia’s internal affairs. It rather
cares for the domestic stability in Armenia. However, the victory of the ruling
party at the referendum does not ensure a long-term victory of the regime or
domestic stability in Armenia. The voting outcome - amid a high percentage of “NO” votes, not
high turnover, and fraud claims – is not impressive enough to speak of
Sargsyan’s ‘double-digit’ victory.
Meantime, the referendum once again proved the weakness of the Armenian
opposition, lack of recognized leaders and alternative program of the country’s
future. For Russia it is easier to work
with the incumbent authorities, as Moscow unlike the West fails to “work” with
opposition forces. Therefore, Moscow
will further build relations with the incumbent regime in Armenia despite its
low public support. The authorities of Armenia in turn will be idling and
counting for Moscow’s support. Meantime, the protesting capacity of the
Armenian public is high enough and a new opposition force will emerge inevitably
– it is a matter of time.

There are views that the Constitutional amendments in
Armenia were “ordered by the West” with far-reaching goals that run contrary to
Russia’s interests, indeed. How
substantiated are these viewpoints?

I
think Armenia and the South Caucasus, generally, are not among the West’s
priorities. Yet, it does not mean that Washington and Brussels are indifferent
to what is taking place in Yerevan. At present, Sargsyan is acceptable to both
Moscow (like any other power in the post-Soviet area) and the West. The latter
cannot “tear” Armenia off Russia, at least, because of the security guarantees
it received form Russia. In addition, Armenia is not Ukraine and the stakes are
not that high here. However, Russia does not want and cannot “tear” Armenia
from the West. Moscow understands that Yerevan is a kind of bridge linking the
West and Russia.

On October 12, EU Council for Foreign Affairs
authorized the European Commission to launch negotiations with Armenia and EU
over a new legally binding document after Yerevan abandoned the talks for the
AA and DCFTA earlier in 2013. Armenia
continues cooperating with the EU in many fields of mutual interests within the
EaP. What do you think of Armenia’s euro-prospects?

It is
more important how Brussels sees these prospects. After a two-year break, the
EU stopped hesitating and shifted from its “either…or” policy to “both…and”
one. In Brussels they have finally decided that Armenia can combine the
cooperation with the EU and the participation in the Eurasian integration
projects. Yerevan has strived for it from the very beginning. Suffice it to say
that Moscow did not oppose such developments either. This time Armenia’s policy
of balancing between the two poles that is criticized by many has brought
fruits. It is evident that the point is
not the boasted “deep and comprehensive” free trade area between Armenia and
EU (Armenia is too small a market for
the EU and can offer a very small volume of goods and services). There are more
important things: energy, transport, standards, relations with neighbors (with
Georgia that signed the EU AA). Visa facilitation is possible as well, though
this will not happen soon due to the terror threat in Europe. As for the EU membership, none of the post-Soviet
countries (except maybe Moldova) will get it in the visible future.

On December 8, seven advanced Mi-24
attack / transport helicopters and Mi-8MT multi-purpose helicopters were
delivered to the Russian airbase "Erebuni" in Armenia from Krasnodar
region. One more lot of helicopters will
be supplied to the air base by the end of the year. Is the recent strain in the
relations with Turkey is behind Russia’s military build-up in Armenia? How long
will this continue?

I don't think the build-up of the air base 'Erebuni'
is connected with the strain in the relations of Russia and Turkey, though
reinforcement of the Armenian-Turkish border in such situation is quite
justified. I think, it is necessary to take into account the Kurdish factor in
Turkey, including in the regions bordering with Armenia, as well as the threat
coming from the 'Islamic State.' After all, Armenia is in the zone which that
'caliphate' claims. Despite the growing
threat from Azerbaijan, the major task of the Russian Armed Forces in Armenia
at present is to neutralize the Turkish factor rather than resist Azerbaijan's
provocations.

Getting
between two fires is not strange to Armenia. There was a similar situation in
early 1990s. Then Armenia and Russia overcame it properly. Although Azerbaijan
is stronger now, despite the crisis elements in its economy, Russia is stronger
and more self-confident too. Therefore, the military build-up in friendly
Armenia will be continuous.

Unlike Yerevan Baku supported Ankara after Turkish forces
shot down the Russian warplane over Syria. This once again dispelled the
illusions about the Russian-Azerbaijani alliance. What do you think of the
prospects of Moscow-Baku relations?

Only partisan and shortsighted
experts cherish such illusions. These
experts may be committed no so much to Baku as to Russian (and even
international) businesses having interests in Azerbaijan. Russia and Azerbaijan have mutually
advantageous economic ties. As for the security (except mutual interest in the
security on the Caspian Sea), foreign policy and integration priorities, and
finally, the civilization vector (‘an
inherited monarchy’ presidency-for-life is impossible in Russia), Russia and
Azerbaijan have no common interests there.
Ankara – Baku relations are harder than it may seem at first sight. The
two countries have very similar challenges (radical Islamism), but the ruling
elites of Turkey and Azerbaijan are not able to meet these challenges
adequately. Ankara is not happy with
Baku’s aspirations for leadership in the region. These countries interests may
not coincide in many issues (for instance in Georgia. Turkey is not happy with
Baku’s efforts to use the oil and gas factor as a method of blackmail. The
partnership of Turkey and Azerbaijan is not balanced and has upward and
downward trends. These are not relations
of “senior and junior brothers.” Yet it
is necessary to take into account that if at any moment Baku takes advantage of
the chaos in the Eurasian region and unleashed large-scale armed attack in the
Karabakh conflict zone, it will be very hard for Moscow to adopt the decision
it has to adopt given its commitments of the ally-state. Yet I do not think
that an armed conflict is possible in the visible future. Furthermore, there is
another factor – Iran – and the growing Russian-Iranian partnership.

The Line of Contact in Karabakh and the
Armenian-Azerbaijani border remain an area of regular civilian and military
casualties. OSCE MG is trying to
organize a meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. What do you
think of that meeting and of Russia’s role in this protracted conflict?

The upcoming meeting of Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham
Aliyev has no prospects, though in the current tense situation any meeting is
good. Amid the regular human deaths on
the line of contact between the Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani troops and on
the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, the Karabakh conflict settlement has no
prospects either. The only thing the
OSCE Minsk Group can and should do now is to stabilize the situation on the
line of contact, stop the provocations, efficiently control the ceasefire and
to unambiguously name the party that violates the ceasefire. For that purpose,
it is necessary to set up a permanent institution of observers. The best
possible option for Russia is to work out a plan to deploy peacekeeping forces
in the region, including not only Russian but also foreign servicemen, as well
as to ensure the security and to stop the incidents. It will be possible to
think about the further steps in the conflict settlement only after stable
security is established, but it's a long shot.