The New Condottieri
and US
Policy: The Privatization of
Conflict and Its Implications

EUGENE B. SMITH

From Parameters, Winter 2002-03, pp. 104-19.

The
mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if anyone
supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or
sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold
amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no fear of God,
and keep no faith with men.
 Machiavelli, The Prince

Machiavellis warning against the privatization of conflict is
almost a cliché of international relations. And yet conflict at the beginning of the 21st
century is in many ways reminiscent of the Italian philosophers time, long before
the emergence of the European state system at Westphalia in 1648. Niche wars, for
instance, are on the rise around the globe, pitting governments and nongovernmental forces
against each other. As new forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, Martin
van Creveld has observed in this regard, they will cause the lines between public
and private, government and people, military and civilian to become as blurred as they
were before 1648.1 Already, the new era is marked by a decrease in conventional
warfare with large armies and an increase in conflicts characterized as Military
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Added to this are a growing number of nations unable to
provide security for their citizens as well as the increasing demands by civilian
leadership around the world for leaner, less expensive military forces. These developments
have fueled a surge of interest in the privatization of conflict. An increasingly
important manifestation of this trend is the private military corporation (PMC), organized
to provide often-specialized military expertise to its clients.

PMCs are different
from other private means of violence in scope, purpose, and legal form. They differ
significantly, for example, from mercenaries,

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the familiar
traditional soldiers for hire. In addition, recent world events in Afghanistan, Colombia,
and the Balkans have publicized another type of privatized means of conflictthe
private army or militia led by a warlord. These organizations, representing a step above
the mercenary, manifest themselves as transnational terrorist groups, drug cartel forces,
and religiously motivated combat groups like the Islamic Brotherhood. A more conventional
means of privatized violence is the private security company that provides personnel and
installation protection at home and abroad. In this hierarchy, the private military
corporation represents the ultimate evolution of private means of violence. A PMC is a
legally chartered company or corporation organized along business lines and engaged in
military operations across the spectrum of conflict.2

The initial task of
this article is to examine this evolution against the historical backdrop of state efforts
to suppress violence. Why, despite these efforts and the time-honored resonance of
Machiavellis warning, have PMCs emerged in the post-Cold War era? In what type of
future operations could these organizations be most effective? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of their use by the United States? The purpose of this article is to provide
answers to these questions.

The Rise and
Demise of Conflict Privatization

The privatization of
conflict is not a new phenomenon; it was widely practiced until the 1800s. As kings and
princes tried to extend their control over new tracts of land, the feudal system of
military service prevented them from raising the required larger armies. This constraint
led them to employ mercenaries.3
Although the use of mercenaries and other privatized means of violence proved successful,
the price for that success was a continuous state struggle to regulate their behavior and
performance. This conflict ultimately was about the authority and legitimacy of the state
versus the very real power of these privatized means to wage war on anyone they chose.

Early
Privatization Trends

The early European
use of organized mercenaries was in the form of private bodies in the 14th century known
variously as Free Companies or Great Companies. These organizations ultimately developed
in Italy as condottieri (literally, military contractors), who offered their
services to the highest bidder. The condottieri system maintained fairly permanent
companies of armed military

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specialists that
were hired out for set periods to various Italian states.4 This practice of offering large private armies for hire
flourished through the 17th century. As early as the 15th century, however, some
sovereigns were already finding these large private armies to be a threat to their own
security. As a consequence, they began to integrate individual mercenaries into their own
armies or hire the services of other army units from another ruler. By the 18th century,
this was a fairly common practice, as the British demonstrated with their use of Hessians
to fight in the American Revolution.

Land warfare was not
the only medium in which the privatization of conflict was practiced. Privateers on the
high seas had a legal standing in international law and were widely used by nations
through the 1800s to bolster their maritime forces. These ships were defined as
vessels belonging to private owners, and sailing under a commission of war
empowering the person to whom it is granted to carry out all forms of hostility which are
permissible at sea by the usages of war.5
Granting such a commission was a relatively easy method for a sovereign to rapidly expand
maritime power in time of war. For example, England effectively countered Spanish naval
superiority in the 16th and 17th centuries through the extensive use of privateers in the
New World. Popularly known as Sea Dogs, such privateers as Francis Drake and
Walter Raleigh plundered Spanish ships in that region and extorted large sums of ransom
from Spanish settlements. In addition to the monetary rewards, both Drake and Raleigh were
knighted for their exploits. In America, privateers were used in the War for Independence
to capture or destroy 600 British ships. The new republic continued the use of privateers
during the War of 1812, employing them to capture 1,300 ships. During the Civil War, the
Confederacy also resorted to this practice.6

Privateers were
granted their right to wage war through the issue of letters of marque and
reprisal. Besides providing the legal basis for the use of privateers in war, these
documents also empowered private individuals to seek redress during time of peace.
Originally they were issued at a time when few international mechanisms existed to resolve
private disputes. The underlying concept for these letters embodied responsibility and
accountability. If, for example, a French vessel seized a British ship, then a letter of
marque could be granted that would allow the legal seizure of an item of like value from
any French vessel on the high seas.7

On a larger scale
than privateers, merchant or mercantile organizations like the Dutch East India Company,
English East India Company, and Dutch West India Company were European businesses created
in the 16th century with extraordinary powers to explore and exploit overseas territories.
As a general rule, these companies were given a monopoly on trade in a region. The
chartering government then granted the companies broad powers to raise military forces,
negotiate treaties, conduct war, and govern fellow nationals. The capacity of these
organizations to wage war was significant, best demonstrated in the latter part of the
19th century by the direct rule or political control by the British East India Company of
almost all of India south and west of the Punjab.8

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State Suppression
of Private Violence

While the use of
private military corporations in various forms was both attractive and useful for states,
several forces also converged to cause their suppression. To begin with, the growing
structure of states and their armies made the use of private military corporations
unnecessary or unattractive. The increased use of more technologically sophisticated
weapons required dedicated, full-time professionals who were well trained. Training
demanded constant drilling to master the movements required to individually fire a weapon
and maneuver in formation on the battlefield. All this necessitated a degree of discipline
not found previously in any private military corporation. At the same time, state
bureaucracies had developed to a degree where it was possible to recruit, train, pay, and
maintain a full-time force. These two trends made the use of private military corporations
an increasingly less desirable option for states.9

As states matured
and the concept of sovereignty developed, legitimacy was defined more and more by the
ability of states to protect and control their citizens at home and abroad.10 An
immediate result was the withdrawal of the right of private citizens to conduct private
war. The army and navy became the primary manifestation of a states legitimacy and
prestige as the sole holder of the legitimate means to enforce order. Controlnot
moral or legal problemswas thus the major reason that states began to move from
employing privatized means to relying on governmental militaries as their preferred means
for wreaking violence.

Related to that
rationale was the growing inability of states to regulate private military corporations.
Increasingly, the commissioned privateer of today would turn into tomorrows pirate
and embarrass the government that originally had chartered him. The most celebrated
example was Sir Walter Raleigh, who was knighted for his earlier successes against Spain,
but continued to ply his trade after hostilities ceased. Raleigh ultimately was captured
and executed for his adventures.11
On a larger scale, mercantile companies continued to fight each other for economic
ascendancy in often significant military actions, such as the Hudson Bay Companys
conflict with the Montreal-based Northwest Company over control of the fur trade in 1815.
In a similar manner, mercantile companies chartered by different countries would often
fight each other when their respective countries were at peace. The struggle between the
English and French East India Companies in India from 1748 to 1756 is an example.
Moreover, the reverse was also true. Mercantile companies would sometimes observe a
self-imposed truce even when their respective countries fought each other, as did the
three rival East India companies (English, French, and Dutch) in the War of Spanish
Succession (1701-1713).12

Ultimately, the two
trends were mutually reinforcing. The growth of bureaucratically mature states capable of
organizing violence created increasingly strong competition for private military
corporations. At the same time, states began to recognize that their inability to control
the actions of these private

107/08

organizations
challenged state sovereignty and legitimacy. The result was that the utility of the
private military corporation as a tool of state warfare disappeared . . . until recently.

PMCs in the
Post-Cold War Era

The resurgence of
private military corporations can be attributed to several factors that stem from the end
of the Cold War. Chief among them was an increase in regional and intrastate conflict
which resulted throughout the world in failed or failing states unable to field sufficient
armed forces to maintain internal order. At the same time, the end of the bipolar
confrontation led to diminished great power interest in these areas. A parallel
development was a dramatic decrease in the worlds great militaries and a concurrent
demand for improved efficiencies in remaining forces.13 The result
of these trends was twofold. For many fragile states, lacking great power support and
unable to provide security for their citizens, PMCs such as Executive Outcomes (EO)
provided a solution. For the United States, focused on a more efficient, smaller force,
outsourcing and privatization with PMCs like Military Professional Resources Incorporated
(MPRI) was part of the answer. Their employment respectively in Africa and the Balkans is
representative of the range of performance that PMCs offer.

Executive
Outcomes in Africa

Some private
military corporations, like Executive Outcomes, provide security services their employers
cannot perform on their own. Formed in 1989 as an incorporated private security group, EO
was registered in South Africa and Great Britain.14 Initially its employees were drawn almost exclusively from the
ranks of veterans of the South African Special Forces that had been demobilized as a
result of the end of the apartheid regime in that country.15 The company marketed its services as a provider of
military training and peacekeeping services to create a climate for peace and
stability for foreign investment.16
The companys exclusive use of South African military veterans ensured a common
training background, a common military culture, and extensive counterinsurgency
experience. The armaments and equipment used by the company were quite extensive,
including armored personnel carriers, amphibious vehicles, Soviet helicopters and
helicopter gunships, Soviet fighter-bombers, and Boeing 727 transports.17

The companys
first contract was in Angola. The 1992 cease-fire between the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) called for free elections in September of that year. A UN-monitored election
declared MPLA the winner. But UNITA refused to accept the result. Conflict broke out
again, with UNITA quickly controlling 80 percent of the country, including the critical
Soyo oil preserve. Hired by several international oil companies, Executive Outcomes
successfully recaptured and held the area against significant UNITA opposition.18 This action led to a subsequent one-year, $40 million
contract from the

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Angolan MPLA
government in September 1993. Ultimately, the companys operations included training
the MPLAs 16th Brigade soldiers in such skills as motorized infantry tactics,
artillery gunnery, communications, engineering, sabotage, and reconnaissance.19 A major triumph occurred when the 16th Brigade defeated a
strong UNITA force outside the Angolan capitol of Luanda. The operation was jointly
planned by the 16th Brigade and Executive Outcomes and resulted in only four MPLA
casualties. Besides planning and training, Executive Outcomes personnel also participated
in ground and air combat.20 In the end, the PMC was credited with
being a key to the MPLA success in persuading UNITA to sign the Lusaka Protocol ending the
fighting.21 This success led to other contracts in Africa for Executive
Outcomes.

In May 1995, Sierra
Leone hired Executive Outcomes to help fight the insurgent Revolutionary United Front
(RUF). The PMC entered a conflict that since 1992 had created 1.5 million refugees, had
killed at least 15,000 people, and had totally disrupted the countrys economy. The
14,000-man Sierra Leone regular forces were not effective. The soldiers lacked training
and were generally corrupt. These units more often than not fought each other and
sometimes resorted to outright banditry or even rebel activities.22 To aid them, Executive Outcomes mounted a rapid campaign,
defeating insurgent forces throughout the country. These actions forced the RUF to
negotiate with the government for the first time in five years and resulted in countrywide
elections in 1996.23

In both cases,
Executive Outcomes provided contracting governments with capabilities their militaries did
not possess. In the case of Angola, the PMC was predominantly used as a training and
planning cadre with some operational involvement. In Sierra Leone, the company was
initially hired to conduct training, but ended up planning and conducting a more ambitious
and sophisticated campaign for the government because of the lack of a credible military
force. Operations in that case ranged from long-range reconnaissance and aerial
surveillance operations to signals intercept, jamming, and successful counterintelligence.
In addition, the PMC created and trained an effective indigenous force and augmented
direct military operations with a simple but effective civic action program that won over
the local populace and provided the company with valuable human intelligence to supplement
its technical intelligence.24

Although Executive
Outcomes provided valuable services to its contracting governments, the use of the PMC
also generated a substantial amount of concern and outright criticism. Some international
groups speculated that EOs employment represented a new chapter in the exploitation
of African countries by mercantile companiesa return to the practices of the
previous century. The issue was in part tied to the Angolan governments granting
concessions to international oil and diamond companies for their role in facilitating
EOs employment.25 In Sierra Leone, criticism centered on
the possibility that the company might have in fact widened the conflict by arming ethnic
groups in its campaign to subdue the insurgents.26 Moreover, Executive Outcomes was also blamed for upsetting the
bal-

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ance in
civil-military relations, since military leaders were harshly critical of the political
leadership for bringing in the PMC to conduct counterinsurgency operations in lieu of
their own unreliable and even outright criminal formations.27

MPRI in the
Balkans

Other PMCs provide
services that their employers do not want to perform themselves or for political reasons
cannot provide. Founded in 1988 and fueled by the outsourcing and privatization focus of
the US military in the 1990s, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is such
a company. The organization is structured along conventional corporate lines with a Board
of Directors, President, Chief Financial Officer, corporate staff, three operating groups,
and a full time staff of 800. According to its own literature, MPRI provides an extensive
array of services, including training and education, simulation and wargaming support,
equipment fielding support, democracy-transition assistance, peacekeeping and humanitarian
aid, anti-terrorism, force protection, consequence management, and nonmilitary services.28 The companys projects are international and varied.
They include conducting civil-military transition assistance in Nigeria, developing a
National Security Enhancement Plan for Equatorial Guinea, assisting the
Colombian Ministry of Defense with its counter-narcotics program, and executing a
Stability and Deterrence Program for the Republic of Macedonia.29 It was the companys activities in the former
Yugoslavia, however, that first brought world attention to MPRI.

In 1994, under a
contract signed with the US State Department, MPRI provided 45 border monitors tasked with
reporting on the sanctions against Serbia. The contract lasted 18 months until sanctions
were lifted with the signing of the Dayton Accords in November 1995.30 Also in 1994, the company signed a contract with the
Croatian government to help its military transition from a Warsaw Pact-type force to a
professional, Western-oriented military.31
With the consent of the US government, MPRI set out to retrain the national command and
staff structure of the Croatian army.32
It was the companys alleged involvement in the Croatian militarys
Operation Storm that generated international attention.

Operation Storm was
a well-coordinated offensive against the Serbs in the Krajina region in August 1995. This
large-scale, sophisticated operation collapsed Serbian defenses within a week, resulting
in the recapture of the region. The operation was characterized by US-style combined-arms
maneuver warfare targeted against Serbian operational centers of gravity.33
MPRI received the credit for the operations success and shortly thereafter received
a renewable 13-month contract with Bosnia.

The companys
task in Bosnia was to administer a Train and Equip Program outlined in the
Dayton Accords. The program was specifically designed to enhance the combat capabilities
of the Bosnian army and assist in the fielding of military hardware. The Bosnian minister
in charge stated that he awarded the contract to MPRI because he viewed the company as
second only to

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official US military
assistance.34 The US military could not be the provider
of the training because of its participation in the NATO Implementation Force and
subsequently the Stabilization Force. Although MPRIs contract is with the Bosnian
government, the US State Department monitors the contract through a Military
Stabilization in the Balkans Office headed by an ambassador.35 Throughout that area, the company has been a successful
military trainer for a variety of clients in a wide range of subjects, including command
and staff skills, individual soldier skills, and new equipment fielding skills. MPRI, in
short, has proven to be a reliable supplement to US policy in the Balkans, taking on tasks
that the US military and government either could not do or did not want to do.

Like Executive
Outcomes, however, MPRIs success has not come without criticism. Some observers
believe the use of MPRI is simply a convenient way for the executive branch to avoid
congressional oversight.36 Other comments focus on MPRI as a vehicle
to conduct foreign policy by proxy and therefore an inappropriate use of a corporation
that challenges the states sole legitimate claim to wage war.37 And in Europe, many allies perceive that the US-dominated
role of the PMC in the Balkans has complicated the search for a peaceful solution in that
area.38 Pragmatic concerns also have been raised
that US government officials could lose their neutrality in the eyes of belligerents in
the region and face reprisals based on the actions of MPRI.39

The Future Use
of Private Military Corporations

Sovereigns initially
turned to the use of private military corporations when they lacked the requisite means to
accomplish desired ends. Those organizations represented a convenient way to overcome
strategic mismatches. Now countries are again faced with circumstances in which they lack
the required means to accomplish desired ends. Despite the historical reasons for their
eventual suppression, private military corporations as evidenced by Executive Outcomes and
MPRI once again represent a convenient means to accomplish desired ends. These PMCs have
shown their utility for client states in a variety of ways, from providing local security
and serving as military trainers to actually planning and conducting small-scale military
operations.

Considerations in
the Use of PMCs

The modern use of
PMCs poses several challenges that must be considered. Chief among them is the
emotion-charged issue of using mercenaries. Much of this emotion has grown out
of the various struggles for independence of African nations from colonial powers.
Mercenaries in the classical sense were recruited abroad and then fought to suppress
indigenous liberation movements. These actions were also often linked to violations of the
rules of land warfare. The current definition of a mercenary is found in Article 47 of the
1977 Protocol I addition to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. According to that Protocol, to be
considered a mercenary one must be specifically recruited to fight, take a direct part in
hostili-

111/12

ties, be motivated
essentially by the desire for private gain, and be promised pay in excess of that granted
to a member of the regular armed service.40
Additionally, international law recognizes a role for civilian support specialists on the
battlefield, which specifically precludes their inclusion as mercenaries.41 As a result, there is international recognition that
private military corporations are not mercenaries and in fact are legitimate national
corporations organized in accordance with the legal codes of their respective home
countries. Most important, the United Nations agrees that PMCs do not meet the stated
definition of a mercenary.42

Nevertheless, the
United Nations has raised some concerns that the United States needs to consider regarding
the supervision and monitoring of PMCs in order to avoid any Geneva Convention violations.
These issues can be overcome by several means, most notably using the existing provisions
of the Geneva Convention that require belligerent parties to uphold the provisions of the
convention and provide for mechanisms such as the International Red Cross to monitor
conflicts for adherence to international law. Additionally, there could be a stipulation
in any American contract that the PMC would abide by all international laws regarding
treatment of individuals or face immediate forfeiture of the contract and prosecution
under applicable national and international law. Day-to-day supervision of the activities
of the PMC could be provided by an on-scene contracting officer with broad powers to
withhold payment or terminate the contract for cause should the PMC not act in accordance
with governmental wishes. The government also could deploy an integrated
military-diplomatic plans and operations team with the PMC to provide overall guidance,
just as the Italian states did with their condottieri. Finally the United States could
invite UN observers to monitor the actions of the PMC in order to provide greater
transparency of its actions and thus help allay the concerns of the international
community.

Another legal
consideration is that US neutrality laws prohibit an American from being hired in the
United States to participate in armed conflict with a party at peace with America.43 But since the government is hiring the PMC to act as its
agent, there should be no violation of the neutrality laws. Tied closely to international
recognition of US neutrality is a concern about who is responsible for the actions of the
PMCthe PMC itself, the country where it is based, or

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the contracting
state. Once again, the answer is relatively straightforward. Generally speaking, the state
where the PMC is based will not be liable for the actions of a private entity, unless that
country clearly permits internationally recognized illegal acts to occur. An exception
would be when the PMC is acting for the government where it is based.44

Far more significant
from an American policy perspective is the issue of presidential versus congressional
powers in making war and regulating commerce. Currently two mechanisms provide guidance,
the Constitution and the US law embodied in the Arms Export Control Act, under Title 22 of
the United States Code.45 The Constitution in Article I, Section 8,
grants Congress the power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land and water. This specified congressional power
provides a potential means to regulate any action by a PMC, and if used would overcome
concerns that a President is attempting to circumvent the wishes of Congress in either
foreign affairs or warmaking.46 Arms control laws currently require firms
engaged in training foreign militaries or providing services to foreign militaries to
register and pay a fee. The State Departments Office of Defense Trade Controls
monitors the firms for compliance with the law and current US policy. In the case of MPRI,
however, some critics argue that although it follows this procedure, the existing control
mechanism is inadequate and allows the President to circumvent the intent of Congress.47 These two concerns could be overcome with congressional
legislation that reintroduces the granting of letters of marque and reprisal and which
provides guidelines for the oversight of PMCs, either by the arms export regimes in place
at the State Department or by establishing new ones that could include direct
congressional oversight.

Why the United
States Should Use PMCs

Four competing
developments affect the ability of the US military to support the national security
strategy of global engagement. The first concerns the increased requirements for homeland
defense. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) considered defense of the United
States as the primary mission for the Department of Defense.48 Military forces for this mission have not yet been
specified, but at the very least there will be a requirement to task either the active or
reserve component, or both, to support homeland defense.49

The second
development is that the national military strategy requires a full-spectrum force in order
to achieve American strategic objectives in the world.50 The QDR approached force planning with the explicit realization
that it must provide over time a richer set of military options across the
operational spectrum than is available today.51 No one has
yet outlined how the US military will match means with the potentially endless objectives
that can be associated with full-spectrum dominance.

The most immediate
result is that this full-spectrum force has been under increasing strain in recent
yearsthe third major development affecting US

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military
capabilities.52 Over the past decade, General
Henry H. Shelton noted before leaving office as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
our response to the strategic environment has placed a wide range of demands on the
US military. Increases in missions and requirements coupled with decreases in structure
and procurement have stretched elements of the force and resulted in imbalance between
strategy, force structure, and resources.53

Many of these new
missions have come at the lower end of the operational spectrum, the result of the fourth
post-Cold War development, the rise of ethnic conflict, failing states, and transnational
threats. Failed and failing states are, in particular, fertile breeding grounds for
terrorists, organized crime, arms trafficking, genocide, and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.54 In the wake of the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks, the US defense strategy recognized that failed and failing states pose
a major threat to Americas stability and security, thus potentially placing more
demands on US military forces.55 Moreover, the United Nations conducted 31
peace operations between 1990 and 1999, generally in response to failing states.56 And most trends indicate that the number of failing
states will increase.57

These post-Cold War
developments present risks for the United States as it pursues military objectives across
the operational spectrum in support of global engagement. Simply put, military means are
not sufficient to allow full and efficient implementation of the US national security
strategy.58 If the risk is to be mitigated, the
United States must find alternative approaches. One such approach is the increased use of
PMCs.

Peace operations
represent an area of extensive activities in which PMCs could be used with maximum
benefit. Using our current force structure for peace operations presents challenges in
terms of training and providing the right type of units for the mission, since the force
is sized, organized, and trained to support two major theater wars at the upper end of the
operational spectrum. From this perspective, peace operations are non-core activities;
consequently, training in the required skills occurs only as required. Providing the right
type of units for peace operations has been difficult, often requiring units to
retool in order to provide the desired capabilities.59 The United States could overcome these difficulties by
specifically contracting PMCs to provide a tailored force that could expand and contract
to meet the ebb and flow of the mission. Just as Executive Outcomes demonstrated in
Angola and Sierra Leone, PMCs can provide capabilities such as planning, security, force
protection, logistics, engineering, medical support, and aviation and ground
transportation.60 Equally important, as MPRI demonstrated,
a PMC can also provide a reconnaissance and surveillance capability to monitor cease-fire
and truce implementation in disengagement zones like the Sinai or along borders in the
Balkans.

Major questions
still exist, of course, in terms of oversight and capabilities, particularly in terms of
any United Nations peace operation. The UN probably would be reluctant to use any national
PMCs in peace operations, especially

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those that required
the imposition of a peace settlement on belligerents in support of a UN Chapter VII
mandate. But more limited use of PMCs in smaller-scale UN peace operations might be
possible.61 In such operations, as an example, the
United States could provide close supervision of the contracted PMC by deploying the
integrated military-diplomatic plans and operations team mentioned earlier. Similarly, UN
or other international organizations could be invited to send observers, providing
transparency in operations and ensuring that all applicable provisions of the Geneva
Convention are followed.

Humanitarian
operations offer some of the same challenges and opportunities as peace operations. A key
factor in humanitarian efforts is rapid intervention, something that has often proved
elusive for the United States with the constraints not only of the normal decisionmaking
procedures, but of the force generation process as well.62 To overcome these roadblocks to rapid intervention, the
United States could maintain contingency contracts with a PMC to ensure a rapid response
once approval is obtained. And in fact a contingency contract with a PMC for such missions
could ensure faster decisions, particularly if the contract already had congressional
approval. In any event, the PMC would have to provide planning expertise, air and ground
transportation, engineering, medical, and security capabilities. In planning for all this,
a PMC with a contingency humanitarian intervention contract could also conduct preliminary
coordination with appropriate national donors as well as nongovernmental organizations to
provide the required assistance.63

A more problematic
area but one worthy of consideration is that of dealing with such transnational threats as
criminal groups, terrorists, and drug cartels. These gray-area threats increasingly
represent a sophisticated networked enemy that mixes criminal enterprise and armed
conflict, and they pose a growing strategic threat to America.64 Dealing with these threats abroad may involve large-scale
operations such as those currently being conducted successfully in Afghanistan. Its
more likely, however, that these types of threats will call for paramilitary operations
that the US government may be unequipped to fight.65 In such circumstances, a PMC could be given a contract and
congressionally approved letter of marque and reprisal to hunt down and eliminate or
capture those

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associated with the
threat. For such missions the PMC would have to provide the C4ISR,66 security, aviation, and logistical capabilities similar
to those demonstrated by Executive Outcomes during its Sierra Leone and Angolan contracts.
Most important, the letter of marque and reprisal would have to be coordinated in most
circumstances with the host country. Absent such coordination, the ensuing criticism would
far exceed that concerning MPRI operations in the Balkans.

Offensive
information warfare is another example of how the US military lacks the required force
structure because the requisite capability represents a non-core activity. This
capability, known in the civil community as hacking, phreaking, and other terms for arcane
computer skills, also poses cultural problems for the US military. The hacker community is
somewhat anarchistic, with individuality being a key motivator. That cultural norm is at
odds with a traditional military approach, making the acquisition of new and evolving
skills difficult. The US military could hire specialized PMCs for specific offensive
information campaigns, providing a surge capability instead of attempting to maintain
limited-use, cutting-edge skills in the regular force, far removed from its core activity.67

Finally, asymmetric
warfare is an area where by definition it is almost impossible to maintain appropriate
forces.68 Defensively this is an area where
vulnerabilities are rarely recognized until an attack has occurred. As a consequence, it
is difficult in most cases to respond quickly and with the appropriate capabilities.
Offensively, even after a target has been identified, a capability may be required that is
not in the current inventory and would take too long to create. Executive Outcomes
provision of sophisticated surveillance, signals intercept, and jamming capabilities in
Sierra Leone is illustrative of a PMCs providing the client state with asymmetric
capabilities against its enemies. This approach could keep the US military from trying to
defend against all threats or to maintain capabilities across the entire spectrum
regardless of risk or cost.

Conclusion

The United States
continues to pursue a national strategy of engagement and needs the ability to generate
forces that can respond across the spectrum of conflict. Either a large force must be
maintained or alternate solutions must be found. Private military corporations provide the
United States the ability to respond across the spectrum of conflict by contracting out
for required non-core or emerging capabilities. Their use for peace and humanitarian
operations, as well as to provide cutting-edge capabilities for combating transnational
threats, conducting offensive information operations, or facing asymmetric threats at the
lower end of the conflict spectrum represents untapped potential. This is a pattern in
state affairs that is not entirely new; indeed, it is one that has been used successfully
by states for ages. Rather than a usurper of state legitimacy, the PMC can become an
extension of the United States as a tool to further American strategic interests.

The United States
need not succumb to Machiavellis dire predictions noted at the beginning of this
article. Adequate supervision and oversight can be

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provided for PMCs to
mitigate domestic and international concerns. Control and oversight can be maintained by
deploying an integrated military-diplomatic plans and operations team with the PMC and by
inviting outside observers to monitor adherence by the corporation to applicable Geneva
Convention protocols. Contracts can be written to ensure they are executed in the best
interests of the United States and are fully compliant with international laws.
Congressional concerns can be addressed by actively exercising the constitutional
provision to grant letters of marque and reprisal and by requiring that such letters be
granted prior to any commitment of PMCs for offensive actions.

Strategy is the
calculated relationship of ends and means. The use of PMCs would ultimately help the
United States to avoid a mismatch of these two variables. Additionally, these
organizations would mitigate risk by allowing America to achieve military strength focused
on core capabilities instead of trying to create a force spread so thin across the
operational spectrum that it is in danger of inadequacy or indecisiveness at every point
on that spectrum.

NOTES

The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dr. David Jablonsky in the research and
preparation of this article.

2. See Kevin A.
OBrian, PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military
Companies, Defence and International Security,145 (February 2000),
62, for a complete hierarchy and associated definitions of nongovernmental security
forces.

8. Ibid., pp. 32,
35-37, 39-41. Military power was granted for primarily defensive purposes against pirates,
other Europeans, or natives. A clear exception was the Dutch West India Company, which was
established solely for the purpose of waging war on Spain in its American Empire.

9. See Chapter 4 in
Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976),
for a summary of the forces and trends that led to regular standing armies as opposed to
contracting out for military power. See Thomson, p. 145, for additional information on the
growing ability of a states military and bureaucracy.

10. Thomson, p. 68.

11. See ibid., pp.
23, 44-54, and 69-70, for a detailed account of the significant and widespread problem of
piracy, its impact on the economies of maritime nations, and the inability of nations to
control their own privateers.

12. Ibid., pp.
59-61. The war between the Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest Company would end only in
1821 when the two companies merged.

13. The United
States has reduced its Army by approximately one third from the height of the Cold War
while the Soviet Union/Russia has gone from an army of 5,227,000 in 1987 to a force of
approximately 1,240,000 in 1997. NATO countries conducted similar reductions, with the
result that the United Kingdom now has an army that is at its lowest since it fought at
Waterloo. Likewise, France went from a 1987 high of 547,000 to a force of 381,000. David
Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1998), pp. 27-28.

14. David Isenberg, Soldiers
of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile Of Todays Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms
(Washington: Center for Defense Information, November 1997), internet,
http://www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/merc1.html, accessed 2 November 2001. The company
ceased operations under the name Executive Outcomes in 1999. For details of its demise see
Khareen Pech, Executive Outcomes, in Peace, Profit or Plunder? The
Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy
Mason (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), p. 96.

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15. Members were
drawn from the Reconnaissance Commandos, Parachute Brigade, and the 32d Battalion. See
Shearer, p. 41.

16. Executive
Outcomes Mission Statement, ibid., p. 40.

17. Ibid., p. 41,
and Isenberg, p. 9.

18. It is generally
reported that oil companies hired Executive Outcomes, but at least one report has the
Angolan government hiring the company to retrieve the province. For an account claiming it
was the Angolan government, see Shearer, p. 46. For accounts claiming it was a British oil
company, see Pech, pp. 85-86, and Herbert Howe, Private Security Forces and African
Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes, in The Journal of Modern African
Studies, 36 (June 1998), 311. The latter two accounts cite interviews with company
members and intelligence community sources.

19. The contract was
originally to train 5,000 troops and 30 pilots as well as direct front-line operations
against UNITA. See Howe, p. 312, and Shearer, p. 46, for details of the Angolan operation.

20. Executive
Outcomes personnel helped recapture the diamond areas of Cafunfo in July 1994 and the Soyo
oil installations in November 1994. Pilots flew combat sorties in Mi-8 and Mi-17
helicopters as well as Mig-23 fighters. See Howe, p. 312.

25. For criticism of
Executive Outcomes as the vanguard for economic exploitation, see Jakkie Cilliers and
Richard Cornwell, AfricaFrom the Privatization of Security to the
Privatization of War, in Cilliers and Mason, pp. 229-33, and Pech, pp. 83-90. See
Taulbee, p. 446, for a more balanced view.

26. Executive
Outcomes armed and trained the Kamajors in a classic counterinsurgency tactic of
empowering other suppressed ethnic groups; nonetheless, see Cilliers and Cornwell, p. 235,
for their concern that Executive Outcomes actions widened the conflict.

27. The military
would ultimately stage a coup, drive the democratically elected government out of the
country, and make a deal with the RUF. See Shearer, p. 68, and Ian Douglas, Fighting
for DiamondsPrivate Military Companies in Sierra Leone, in Cilliers and Mason,
pp. 186-89.

28. For details of
MPRIs organization, number of employees, and capabilities, see the company website
at http://www.mpri.com, accessed 7 December 2001.

36. See, for
example, Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, The Military as BusinessMilitary
Professional Resources, Incorporated, in Cilliers and Mason, p. 119.

37. See, for
example, Isenberg, p. 18.

38. Shearer, p. 61.

39. Cilliers and
Douglas, p. 121.

40. Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Adopted on 8 June 1977 by the
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, internet, http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/94.shtml,
accessed 29 January 2002.

42. In 1997, the UN
Special Rapporteur for Mercenaries noted that private military corporations cannot
be strictly considered as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status; 20
February 1997 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Rights of Peoples to
Self-Determination. For a complete discussion of the legal status see Shearer, pp.
16-22.

43. See Thomson, pp.
78-79, for a succinct discussion of US neutrality laws.

44. Sandoz, pp.
212-13.

45. For the text of
the regulations, see Rules and Regulations, Federal Register, 62 (247),
24 December 1997, pp. 67274-78. For a discussion of this law, see Sandoz, pp. 216-17.

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46. Matt Gaul,
Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern
Marque and Reprisal Clause, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, June 1998,
internet, http://faculty.lls.edu/~manheimk/ns/gaul2.htm, accessed 19 October 2001.

49. The QDR
discusses homeland defense in several different sections but fails to identify specific
forces required. See pages 18-20 for an overall discussion, page 30 allocates primary
responsibility to the reserve components, and page 42 discusses protecting bases of
operation at home and abroad in general terms.

50. General Shelton
wrote in Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on page 62 of
the QDR: In my view, maintaining a credible military capacity to respond to multiple
crisis worldwide is absolutely fundamental to Americas global leadership role.

57. Thirty-six
recent future studies all indicate that the number of failing and failed states will
increase. See Sam J. Tangredi, The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a
Consensus View, in Flournoy, p. 33.

60. See Spinelli, p.
287, for a discussion of desired peace support capabilities in a military context. A PMC
could easily adapt these desired capabilities.

61. Of the 15
current UN Peace Operations, seven are below the 250-personnel mark and an additional
three are at around 1,000 military personnel. UN Background Note, United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, 15 January 2002, internet,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu-mission/body.htm, accessed 24 February 2002.

62. Rapid action has
proven elusive for the UN as well. A UN rapid reaction force has been proposed many times,
but to date has not been organized. See UN Department of Peacekeeping, Annual Update
On the United Nations Standby Arrangements System, 20 December 2001, internet,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/0AnnualUpdate.html, accessed 25 February 2002. A PMC
would still offer advantages to the United States even if the long-awaited UN rapid
intervention force were ever to be formed, since the United States would be expected to
contribute forces anyway and these forces would still represent high-demand, low-density
skills and units not normally maintained in the force structure in sufficient quantities
or at all. For the type of skills and units, see Cherry, pp. 106-07.

63. Partnerships
between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and PMCs have already occurred as
humanitarian relief organizations search for security in increasingly hostile regions. See
Christopher Spearin, A Private Security Panacea? A Response to Mean Times on
Securing the Humanitarian Space, internet,
http://www.cfc-pec.gc.ca/OtherAnnualEvents/Chris_Spearin.htm, accessed 29 October 2001.
See also The Privatization of Security in Africa, 12 March 1999, internet,
http://www.gca-cma.org/esecurity.htm, accessed 29 October 2001.

64. Steven Metz, Armed
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post Modern Warfare
(Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000), pp. 56-59.

65. These threats
represent groups that exist in the war and crime cell of Robert Bunkers
four-cell matrix used to describe the operational environment. The four cells are:
war, crime, peace, and war and crime. The
United States in particular has been challenged in combating this type of phenomena.
Robert J. Bunker, Failed State Operational Environment Concepts, Military
Review, 77 (September-October 1997), 2, internet,
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/sepoct97/bunker.htm, 23 August 2001.

67. See Metz, pp.
19-21, for comments on how privatization allows acquisition of non-core capabilities and
pp. 76-77 and 88-90 for discussions on the slowness of militaries to acquire new and
innovative technologies.

68. Defined as
attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses
using methods that differ significantly from the United States expected method of
operations. See Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S.
Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, Pa.: US
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), p. 5, quoting the 1999 Joint
Strategy Review.

Lieutenant Colonel
Eugene B. Smith is assigned to C-3, Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, located
forward in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. He is an ROTC graduate of Mississippi State
University and has commanded units through battalion level. Lieutenant Colonel Smith holds
masters degrees in management from Webster University and in strategic studies from
the US Army War College.