Tuesday, 14 May 2013

Nawaz Sharif is back

by Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 14th May 13

Pakistan’s army would have noted how distressingly
unpredictable politics can be. In early 2000, having just been booted out as
prime minister by his army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif
contemplated life in prison, a lenient sentence from complaisant judges who had
earlier hanged Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. But then Saudi Arabia gave Mr Sharif asylum, General Musharraf’s hubris brought down his regime, and Benazir Bhutto’s assassination
and her husband’s ineptitude reopened the doors of opportunity. Nawaz Sharif
must be chortling at the thought that amongst those watching his resurrection is General Musharraf, under house arrest in Islamabad. The wheel has turned full circle.

Pakistan-sceptics --- a group that should logically
include everyone familiar with that country’s modern political history --- will
say that the wheel will inevitably turn again. Given Mr Sharif's animosity with the
military; his stated aim to improve relations with India; and the likelihood
that the new prime minister will prove unable to resolve Pakistan’s deep-rooted
economic, social, ethnic and security problems, there is every likelihood that
the new PM and his Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), or PML(N), will soon be publicly
reviled, allowing Pakistan’s khaki-clad saviours to intervene again.

But the last five years have eroded this
logic. Firstly, a new political consensus to block the army from politics is
evident from the fact that the immeasurably incompetent Pakistan People’s Party
Parliamentarians (PPPP) government completed its full five-year term. On
several occasions when President Zardari defied the generals, Mr Sharif prevented them from
driving a wedge between the two main parties. Secondly, the generals today need
political cover from a popular elected government for their intensifying confrontation
with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the “bad Taliban” that the military
is fighting in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Thirdly, as was
evident from the rambunctious “jalsas”
or jamborees across Pakistan last month, the aam Pakistani (and especially the aam Punjabi) has taken to the tamasha
of electoral politics in a manner that does not brook denial. Finally, since
October 12, 1999, when General Musharraf overthrew Mr Sharif, the judiciary and media have
become powerful pro-democracy players that pack real power on the Pakistani
street.

There is, however, a new cloud over that
sunny scenario for democracy. The emergence of Imran Khan and his Pakistan
Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) transforms a two-major-party political landscape into a
three-major-party one. Given that the PTI is supported by young Pakistan, Mr Khan will
only grow in strength in the years to come. So far his conservative,
anti-American stance aligns with the military’s outlook and he has never said
anything to disturb the generals. The appointment of Pakistan’s most visceral
anti-India and pro-military hawk, Shireen Mazari, as PTI Spokesperson is
worrying for those who wonder which is the real Imran Khan: the polished,
western-oriented liberal; or the jehadi-hugging, America-bashing, military
proxy?

Either way, Imran Khan presents Nawaz
Sharif with his first dilemma. The PTI has emerged the largest party in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Mr Khan has declared that he would not join forces with the
PML(N). This is hardly surprising given the two parties’ similar, conservative
outlooks and agendas; Mr Khan would calculate that, in alliance, the larger PML(N)
would swallow the PTI, buying its members with money or position. Either Mr Sharif must allow the
strategic Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to be governed by the PTI, which would constrain
Islamabad’s freedom to target the jehadi networks entrenched there.
Alternatively Sharif would have to cobble together a weak coalition under the PML(N)
to rule in Peshawar. That would allow him to claim political influence beyond
his Punjabi heartland, but the coalition would face crippling opposition from
the powerful PTI.

Mr Sharif would do well in conceding Peshawar
to Imran Khan. Over the coming months, Pakistan’s new political masters will
learn, like the army before them, that compromise and negotiations with the
pan-Islamist jehadis the Tribal Areas are destined to fail. It is important
that Mr Khan and the PTI be a part of this learning process, given that the PTI’s
election manifesto blamed every problem in the Tribal Areas on the “American
war on terror.” As an opposition politician, Mr Khan would need only to find fault
with the way the government was pursuing talks. As the chief minister in
Peshawar (were he not to shirk that challenge) he would confront the truth
that jehadi terrorism in the Tribal Areas feeds on a range of factors that
include the American presence in Afghanistan, but also issues that are deeply
embedded within the fabric of modern-day Pakistan and the ideologies and
practices of its establishment.

More than any Pakistani leader before him,
Nawaz Sharif comes to power with a positive mandate on India. This reflects a
growing belief within Pakistan in better relations with India, a sentiment that
easily survived vocal Indian hostility last December at the mutilation of two
Indian soldiers on the Line of Control. Only right wing Pakistani nutcases like
Zahid Zaman have openly attacked Sharif (Zaman tweet: “Understandably, Indians
are extremely happy on NS win. He is an army hater, wants to investigate and
put on trial Generals for hurting India.”) But then Zaman’s credibility can be
gauged from his theory that “The nuclear weapons of non-Muslim countries
will either become unusable or explode on their own territories.”

New Delhi must cautiously welcome Mr Sharif’s
overtures, not only because an unequivocal Indian embrace would be a kiss of
death in Pakistan. Behind Mr Sharif’s “peace with India” stance there remain
unanswered questions about his role in the Kargil conflict and his family’s
links with the Jamaat-ud-Daawa and Jaish-e-Muhammad. While this must be kept in
mind, it must also be remembered that --- like in the case of Musharraf --- a
hand of friendship extended from Pakistan is valuable only if the other hand
holds and brings along with it the hard line elements that have prevented peace
so far.