Centrifugal force puts spin on Iran presidential election

Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent for Asia Times/Hong Kong, an analyst for RT and TomDispatch, and a frequent contributor to websites and radio shows ranging from the US to East Asia. Born in Brazil, he's been a foreign correspondent since 1985, and has lived in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Washington, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Even before 9/11 he specialized in covering the arc from the Middle East to Central and East Asia, with an emphasis on Big Power geopolitics and energy wars.
He is the author of 'Globalistan' (Nimble Books, 2007), 'Red Zone Blues' (Nimble Books, 2007), 'Obama does Globalistan' (Nimble Books, 2009) and a contributing editor for a number of other books, including the upcoming 'Crossroads of Leadership: Globalization and the New American Century in the Obama Presidency' (Routledge). When not on the road, he alternates between Sao Paulo, New York, London, Bangkok and Hong Kong.

Campaigning has been extremely lively. Last-minute polls
predict a run off. Yes, this is democracy with Iranian
characteristics; imagine something remotely similar happening in
the neo-medieval House of Saud or the Persian Gulf
petro-monarchies.

The last-minute plot twist has pragmatic conservative Hassan
Rowhani – a former head of the National Security Council
(1989-2005) - being endorsed by reformist former President
Mohammad ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ Khatami and none other than
The Shark himself, also-former-President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who
was disqualified by the Guardian Council. As an extra bonus, what
could be described as the lone reformist candidate, Mohammad Reza
Aref, dropped out.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei may be excused to wonder things
are not exactly going according to script. His script.

The affable Rowhani, 65, is essentially a moderate cleric (the
only one among the candidates, by the way), reform-minded and,
crucially, a close ally of Rafsanjani. Under Khatami, he was a
nuclear negotiator. In three recent debates on national
television, he has promised to avoid “noisy rhetoric” in foreign
policy, to “normalize” relations with the West and even to try to
spring Green movement leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi
Karroubi out of house arrest.

He’s also in favor of freedom of the press. Arguably the whole
reformist movement will vote for him in bulk – especially after
Khatami’s call, which addressed, “In particular those who seek
the dignity and elevation of the nation.”

Here’s Rowhani’s best catch phrase so far, in a debate last
Friday: “It is good to have centrifuges running, provided
people's lives and livelihoods are also running." And his
supporters are wearing purple wristbands – a parallel
reminiscence of the 2009 Green movement. No wonder panic is the
word in selected Tehran corridors. But Tehran, as we all know, is
not Iran.

Pick the leader’s horse

The conservatives, for their part, are split. The former mayor of
Tehran, Mohammad Ghalibaf, also a former head of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, might stand a chance
of at least getting into a runoff with Rowhani because the Sepah
(as the IRGC is popularly referred to) holds him dear.

Yet the front-runner is Iran’s current top nuclear negotiator,
Saeed Jalili, 48. Jalili is also a close ally of Khamenei; he ran
Khamenei’s office from 2001 to 2005 and has already announced he
will "stand up to the West."

The Supreme Leader insisted he has no horse in this race. Word in
the street in Tehran is his candidate is Jalili. Word in rarified
power corridors says his candidate is actually Ali Akbar
Velayati, 68, a former foreign minister for more than 16 years
and currently Khamenei’s top foreign policy adviser. Velayati
promised he would try to end the Syrian tragedy working
side-by-side with the West.

So Velayati would be like the ideal compromise between Rowhani
and Jalili. He’s been on the offensive. In one of the debates
last week he openly dismissed Jalili; “The art of diplomacy is
to preserve our nuclear rights, not to see sanctions
increase.”

The Jalili camp found no better counter-argument than to accuse
Rowhani of having made previous nuclear concessions without
Khamenei’s approval.

As for the immensely turbulent Ahmadinejad years, what all actors
can say is “Thank Allah it’s over.” No more ideology. Apart from
Jalili, all candidates are pragmatists.

Once again; is this democracy? The problem is the West never
bothered to understand how the IRI works. Here’s a fascinating description (in German). One may
not agree with many issues - but if only Western chancelleries
and media would encourage a debate.

You can’t eat a centrifuge

Kaveh Afrasiabi argues this will be a national
referendum on Iran’s nuclear diplomacy. No question. After all,
the Obama administration is also participating in the election
after the president signed yet another executive order, this time
targeting Iran’s currency, the rial.

The White House advertised its new sanctions package as applying
to “foreign financial institutions that purchase or sell
significant amounts of the rial, and to those who hold
significant amounts of the rial in accounts outside Iran.” The
objective is to prevent the rial from being used outside of Iran
(not that it has been, recently).

The bottom line; this is economic war. Not against the leadership
in Tehran (because they can easily dribble it), but against
average Iranians. Food prices - chicken, meat, cooking oil,
already up by more than 60 percent this year - will
skyrocket.

So no wonder Khamenei wants what would be the best of both
worlds; a moderate but loyal president, capable of at least
managing, if not attenuating, the formidable, relentless US/EU
pressure. And then there is hardcore geopolitics – as in Iran
making sure ally Syria recovers at least some stability.

The problem is the Supreme Leader wants no surprises – like
Khatami winning in 1997 and 2001 or, worse still, the Green
movement surge in 2009. There’s no guarantee Purple movement
Rowhani will be a Khamenei puppet.
2009 was a major turning point in the IRI’s history. The system
hemorrhaged credibility – especially in the West, but also in
Iran’s big cities. It increasingly relied on brute force. It
turned even more sharply to the right. And the Sepah sort of took
over – emphasizing Khamenei’s dependence. The ultra-conservatives
monopolize all power while legions of young, well-educated,
middle-class Iranians are totally excluded.

Since 2009 I have chosen to describe the IRI’s system as a
military dictatorship of the ‘mullahtariat’, with the IRGC
controlling much of the economy. But they badly need better
managers; the Ahmadinejad team was a disaster. A less
confrontational foreign policy may translate into a healthier
economy. Turnout in this election once again will be key. The
evidence seems to indicate that for most Iranians a good
affordable meal is as good, if not better, than a centrifuge.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.