CHAPTER IIIPreparing for the Attack

Training

The Marine V Amphibious Corps, under General Holland Smith, was
responsible for supervision of the ship-to-shore amphibious training of all
units scheduled to take part in the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. General
Richardson, commanding general of United States Army Forces in the Central
Pacific Area (USAFICPA), was in charge of the rest of the training of Army
units for this operation in addition to discharging the logistical and
administrative duties of his command.

Before its specific assignment to the Gilberts operation, the 27th Infantry
Division had been conducting preliminary amphibious training for a period of
about eight months.1
The division had been a National Guard unit from New
York State and was called into Federal service in October 1940. Beginning in
March 1942 it was transferred to Hawaii and for the next year and a half served
as base defense force, first in the outer islands and later on Oahu after the
25th Infantry Division was sent to Guadalcanal in November 1942. While in
Hawaii the division was triangularized, losing its fourth regiment, the 108th
Infantry, to the 40th Division. This left it with the 165th, the 105th, and the
106th Infantry Regiments.2

Since November of 1942 the division's commanding general had been General Ralph
Smith. His previous wartime duty had been with Military Intelligence Division
of the War Department General Staff (G-2) and with the 76th Infantry Division
at Fort George G. Meade.3

In spite of the fact that its original duties in the Hawaiian area were largely
defensive in character, the division early commenced to make preparations
against the day when it might be called upon to participate in amphibious
operations. In December 1942 two of its officers were detailed to attend an
amphibious school conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps in San Diego. On their
return an amphibious school was opened in Hawaii. This school, conducted from 7
April to 12 May 1943, was attended by regimental and battalion commanders and
their executive officers, and staff intelligence, operations, and logistics
officers, and others.

Between May and August each battalion landing team was assembled at Schofield
Barracks on Oahu and given instructions in the use of ropes, cargo net climbing
and descending, boat team drill, debarking and deployment from mock-up boats,
passage through wire entanglements and other obstacles, and various other techniques

--44--

peculiar to amphibious warfare. Battalion staffs prepared boat
assignment tables, boat diagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams,
and debarkation and approach schedules. Next, each battalion landing team
received one week's instruction at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center where
a pier was used to simulate a Navy transport, and where a specially constructed
barge was anchored offshore to give the troops experience in embarking and
debarking from a listing vessel.4

In August, when General Richardson assumed command of United States Army Forces
in the Central Pacific Area, steps were taken forthwith to expand the
amphibious training program in the Hawaiian area with special attention given
to the units of the 27th Division scheduled to participate in the forthcoming
Gilberts operation. Construction of three new training centers had already
commenced and before the end of August these were completed and ready for use.
They were located at Waimanalo on the southeastern shore of Oahu, at Kahuku
Point on the northernmost tip of Oahu, and in the Pali region in the central
part of the island. All were equipped with mock-up ships' platforms and other
facilities for specialized amphibious training. It was planned that each combat
team of the 27th Division would be rotated through each of these camps as well
as through the Schofield training area. Each team was to spend three weeks at
each center.5

In addition to this general "preamphibious" training, various specialist
courses were set up. Shore fire control parties were trained by division
artillery for the purpose of directing naval gunfire after hitting the beach.
The division's G-4 (supply) officer, Lt. Col. Charles B. Ferris, set up a
school for transport quartermasters, commencing on 17 September. Officers and
noncommissioned officers were made familiar with the characteristics of Navy
transports by visiting Pearl Harbor, measuring the ships, and observing the
loading of ships. Stowage plans used in the Attu operation were studied and
tentative stowage plans for the forthcoming operation were devised.6

One of the main sources of amphibious training doctrine available at this time
was the War Department Field Manual 31-5, entitled Landing Operations on
Hostile Shores (1941). This was based in large part on a previous Navy
Department publication, Fleet Training Publication 167 (1938), which in turn
originated in earlier studies in amphibious warfare produced by the Marine
Corps in 1934 and 1935.7
In addition, at the suggestion of General Ralph Smith,
General Richardson's headquarters obtained copies of a detailed set of notes
prepared by the 9th Infantry Division covering its training at Navy amphibious
training centers on the east coast of the United States. These items and other
literature obtained from the Marine training base at Camp Elliott, San Diego,
made up the bulk of the theoretical doctrine upon which the training in Hawaii
was based.8

Only one serious shortcoming in the training program was subsequently noted. No
systematic training of Army tanks in conjunction with small infantry units was
attempted. In view of the importance of a smoothly functioning tank-infantry
team

Following this period of shore-based training, the 165th Regimental Combat Team
conducted joint amphibious training on beaches in the Hawaiian area with ships
of Transport Division 20. Adverse weather conditions and poor beaches detracted
somewhat from the success of this program. Also, no fire support or control
vessels were available, thus adding undesirable artificialities to the
maneuvers.10

Finally, after all transports were loaded, last-minute rehearsals were held
between 31 October and 3 November 1943. Admiral Turner's Task Force 52, with
the troops and the equipment of the Northern Attack Force aboard, proceeded
from Pearl Harbor to the vicinity of Maalaea Bay, Maui, on the night of the
31st. Next morning rehearsals were held off the coast of Maui, with simulated
naval gunfire and air support. All troops were landed but no supplies and
equipment were sent ashore for fear of damage to landing craft and equipment,
which could not be repaired before final embarkation for Makin. This exercise
was repeated at daylight on 2 November. Finally, at dawn of 3 November a
full-scale dress rehearsal was held off the coast of Kahoolawe Island employing
actual gunfire and air support. Assault troops were embarked and proceeded to
the line of departure, but did not land because Kahoolawe's beaches were rocky
and therefore dangerous to the safety of landing craft. After the completion of
this final exercise, the task force returned to Pearl Harbor for final loading,
repairs, and briefing before sailing for Makin.11

Meanwhile at Wellington, New Zealand, the 2d Marine Division was carrying on
its own training program. One of its regiments, the 2d Marines, had already
made one amphibious landing at Guadalcanal and the other two, the 6th and 8th
Marines, had participated in the subsequent land fighting on that island. In
the words of General Holland Smith, "They were veterans of a campaign and
needed little training other than amphibious training."12
This the division
got during the month of October as Navy transports were made available.

Final rehearsals of the entire Southern Attack Force, less its escort carriers,
were held at Efate in the New Hebrides between 7 and 12 November. Two separate
landing exercises were conducted at Mele Bay and fire support ships held
bombardment practice on Erradaka Island. Communications equipment was tested
and communications exercises were held at the same time.13
Although this
training was valuable, especially for the personnel who had recently joined the
division to replace losses at Guadalcanal, the rehearsals were still not as
satisfactory as desired, principally because the forces involved had too short
a time to prepare and co-ordinate their plans.14

Logistics

The chief logistical problem in preparing for the Gilberts operation was the
shortage of amphibian tractors in the Pacific Ocean Areas. This vehicle was one
of the few truly amphibian pieces of equipment to be put to extensive use
throughout

--47--

the war in the Pacific. It was capable of about 4.5 knots in the water, and its
tracks enabled it to traverse coral reefs and other obstacles not negotiable by
standard landing craft. About twenty-six feet in length, it could carry (at
this date) upward of twenty troops.

The LVT (sometimes called the "Alligator") had been first designed by one
Donald Roebling, a retired manufacturer, for rescue work in the Everglades of
Florida. Shortly thereafter the vehicle was brought to the attention of Marine
officers stationed at Quantico, Virginia, who set about adapting it to military
purposes. By 1940, under Marine Corps pressure, the Navy Department set aside
funds for further development and by the outbreak of the war the amphibian
tractor's utility both as a troop carrier and as a cargo carrier for amphibious
landings had been satisfactorily demonstrated.15
At Guadalcanal a few were
used logistically to carry supplies and ammunition directly from shipboard to
inland dumps, to move guns, and to evacuate the wounded.16

Early during the planning stage for the Gilberts, it was realized that
certainly at Tarawa and possibly at Makin standard landing craft could not pass
through the protective wire and log barricades that were known to have been
erected to seaward on the reefs and beaches. Also, there was some doubt as to
whether there would be enough water over the reef at Tarawa to permit Higgins
boats to get through. Experiments in breaking up such barricades as were
expected in the Gilberts were made with these amphibian tractors and turned out
favorably.17

Steps were then taken to procure enough amphibian tractors to carry the assault
troops ashore at both Tarawa and Makin. At Efate the 2d Marine Division had on
hand about one hundred tractors, of which seventy-five were considered to be
operational. These were old models (LVT(1)'s), unarmored and susceptible to
mechanical failure. The division requested the assignment of a hundred new
models (LVT(2)'s) from San Diego. The request was granted but sufficient
transport to carry the vehicles into the combat area could not be provided. In
the end, naval authorities released three LST's to do the job and fifty
additional amphibian tractors reached the 2d Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalion
at Samoa just before it set sail for Tarawa. Thus, for the attack on Betio, the
marines had a total of 125 amphibian tractors which, excluding those earmarked
for purely logistical duties, was sufficient to make up the first three waves
of the assault.18

The 27th Division received forty-eight LVT's for use at Makin. These were not
delivered at Oahu until 29 October, only thirteen days before sailing for the
island. Before the 29th only one tractor had been available for training.
Nevertheless, a provisional company from Headquarters, 193d Tank Battalion, had
been organized on 21 October to operate these vehicles and was felt to be
trained sufficiently to warrant use in the operation.19

Another amphibious development introduced into the Central Pacific Area during
the Gilberts operation was the extensive employment of pallets for unloading
supplies. Pallets had been employed

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by the 7th Infantry Division in the Aleutians and had been reported upon
favorably by that division after its arrival in the Hawaiian Islands. Pallets
are sledlike structures to which supplies are strapped. Those used in the
Aleutians had measured about four by six feet and were smooth-bottomed, like
toboggans. Experiments were conducted on Oahu both with this type and with one
that had runners attached. The toboggan type was found to be more satisfactory
on rough coral, while the sled type was discovered to be better on sand and
finger coral. Fifteen hundred pallets of the toboggan type and 350 of the sled
type were built for the Makin operation.20
In the end, the assault force
palletized virtually all of its supplies with the exception of 55-gallon
drums.21
These pallets, heavily loaded with supplies, could be unloaded from
landing craft by tractor and moved to inland dumps so rapidly that under ideal
conditions a lighter could be unloaded in an estimated one twelfth of the time
taken by the standard manhandling method.22

In the Gilberts operation, this technique of palletization was used to an
appreciable degree only at Makin. The 2d Marine Division constructed few
pallets. However, the one battalion commander at Tarawa who reported on the
subject considered that the employment of pallets there would have been
feasible, and the transport quartermaster of Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps
later commented favorably on the experiment conducted by Army troops at
Makin.23

Troops, supplies, and equipment of the Northern Attack Force were loaded in the
Hawaiian area aboard four APA's and one AKA.24
Three LST's carried between
them the forty-eight amphibian tractors assigned to the assault force and a
company of medium tanks was carried aboard the LSD Belle Grove. These four
amphibious vessels also carried between them 791 troops. All of the transports
were combat loaded--this is to say, each tactical unit was embarked aboard a
single ship with its supplies and equipment stowed in inverse order to their
probable tactical employment during the landing. High-priority material was
normally stowed near the top and center of ships' holds; low-priority near the
bottom and on the outside. Thus, the 1st Battalion Landing Team of the 165th
Regimental Combat Team, consisting of 1,044 officers and men with their
essential supplies and equipment, was loaded aboard the Neville; 2d Battalion
Landing Team, numbering 1,219, aboard Leonard Wood. In addition, each of these
vessels carried shore parties from the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and sundry
other personnel including air liaison parties, shore fire control parties,
observers, and newspaper correspondents. The attack cargo ship Alcyone carried,
in addition to its load of supplies and equipment, miscellaneous units of the
165th Regimental Combat Team such as the Service Company, the Cannon Company,
27th Division Quartermaster Company Detachment, 27th Division Signal Company
Detachment--in all 288.25

--49--

Supplies Palletized for the Gilberts operation. Method of loading and strapping (above);
an LVT towing a loaded pallet during the actual operation (below).

--50--

Besides their troops, each of the three attack transports was loaded with the
following supplies and equipment: all Table of Basic Allowance equipment and
individual and organizational property for the units aboard except for certain
items, such as chemical warfare equipment, that were ordered left behind; 10
days' rations plus 2 days' K rations carried by each individual on board; one
5-gallon container of water per man on board; 7 days' motor fuel for bulldozers
and other vehicles aboard, 5 units of fire for all weapons, 10 days' medical
supply for all units, and 7 days' supply of ordnance cleaning and preserving
materials, and spare gun parts. Average poundage per soldier on these three
ships came to 1,322. The Alcyone, the only attack cargo ship assigned to the
Northern Attack Force, carried in addition to the troops mentioned, the
following supplies and equipment: 24 days' B rations for the entire force;
approximately 3,000 5-gallon cans of water; sufficient gasoline for 8 days'
operation for all motor vehicles; approximately 18,750 gallons of white
gasoline; over 70,000 gallons of diesel oil; 28,200 gallons of high-octane
gasoline for the amphibian tractors; 7,684 gallons of motor oil; 3,655 pounds
of grease; 5 units of fire for all weapons on board; 5 units of fire for one
battery of 105-mm. howitzers; 4 units of fire for the weapons of the medium
tanks carried aboard the Belle Grove; 4 units of fire for the two .30-caliber
and one .50-caliber machine guns on each of the amphibian tractors carried
aboard the 3 LST's; slightly more than 30 days of medical supplies; 30 days of
maintenance for all items in ordnance; about 1.5 tons of chemical warfare
supplies; approximately 30 days' quartermaster supplies for the entire force;
30 days' signal supplies; and 30 days' engineer maintenance for an engineer
combat battalion and 20 days' maintenance requirements for an infantry division
less the combat battalion.26

The 2d Marine Division, loading in New Zealand, experienced somewhat more
difficulty than did the 165th Regimental Combat Team. This was because in many
cases ships assigned to the division failed to arrive in Wellington until just
before the scheduled time for loading. Before their actual arrival, division
headquarters had little information about ships' characteristics. Not knowing
in many cases the names of the ships or even the type of ships to be assigned,
Marine planners had no reliable information on such vital matters as the size
of ships' holds and hatches, troop spaces, and so forth. Hence, loading plans
could be only tentative and had to be revised at the last minute as individual
vessels put in their appearance at Wellington.27

Nevertheless, the ships were combat loaded in a manner at least satisfactory
enough to elicit no adverse comment from the division commander. Thirteen
APA's, three AKA's and one LSD completed loading and left Wellington on 1
November 1943.28
In addition, three LST's carrying amphibian tractors met the
division at Samoa.

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Preliminary Air and Naval Action

Well before the crystallization of plans for the invasion of the Gilberts,
bombers of the Seventh Air Force had commenced to harass those islands as well
as nearby Nauru. In January and February reconnaissance missions were sent over
the Gilberts and on 20 April a flight of twenty-two B-24's took off from
Funafuti for a thousand-mile run to Nauru. There, in spite of heavy
interception, they hit the runway recently constructed by the Japanese as well
as the local phosphate plant. Two days later twelve B-24's struck Tarawa with
moderate success.29

At this time Funafuti and Canton were the only two Allied bases within range of
the Gilberts, and these were so far away as to make regular bombing runs
difficult and hazardous. Hence, in order to strengthen American control of
air approaches to these islands, the Joint Chiefs in July authorized the
seizure of other islands for the construction of new airfields from which to
conduct neutralization and reconnaissance.30
Accordingly, early in August,
Admiral Nimitz ordered three Marine defense battalions to "occupy, organize,
and defend the atolls of Nukufetau and Nanomea at the earliest practicable date
. . . and to construct airfields thereon."31
These two islands, both in the
Ellice group, were respectively about 600 miles south and 350 miles east of
Tarawa. An advance survey party landed at Nanomea Atoll on 18 August to
determine whether it was occupied by the enemy and, after reconnoitering, to
select a site for an airfield. No Japanese were discovered on the atoll, and
ten days later the advance party was followed ashore by the forward echelon of
the 7th Marine Defense Battalion and detachments from two naval construction
battalions. Meanwhile, on 22 August, an advance party of the 2d Marine Airdrome
Battalion landed at Nukufetau, and was followed five days later by the
remainder of the battalion and elements of a naval construction battalion. The
Marine contingent at Funafuti was strengthened and naval construction troops
sent there. All units began at once the construction of new airfields and the
improvement and enlargement of existing facilities.

The transformation of these atolls into air bases progressed rapidly. By 7
September a 5,000-foot airstrip was ready for use at Nanomea, and by the end of
the month a full squadron of planes was operating from there. Work at Nukufetau
was somewhat slower, but the strip was ready for use by 9 October.32

On 11 August a small task force was sent by General Richardson to develop Baker
Island, a U.S. possession about 480 miles due east of the Gilberts. This
expedition was composed of the 804th Aviation Engineer Battalion, a provisional
antiaircraft artillery battalion, a provisional air service support squadron, a
fighter squadron, and miscellaneous service elements. The force carried
equipment and supplies sufficient to construct, operate, and maintain a base
for ninety days. It arrived at Baker on 1 September. A week later a strip
capable of supporting fighter planes was already in use.33

Thus, on the eve of the invasion of the Gilberts, the Seventh Air Force had
five

--52--

bases within bombing range of those islands. Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Nanomea
each had two bomber squadrons; on Canton were stationed one bomber squadron,
one fighter-bomber squadron, and one fighter squadron; Baker had one fighter
squadron.34
Advance headquarters of the Seventh Air Force was opened at
Funafuti on 6 November, and at approximately the same time Admiral Hoover's
flagship Curtiss anchored in the lagoon.35

The first air attack in the Gilberts operation occurred on 13 November when
eighteen B-24's took off from Funafuti to bomb Tarawa. They dropped about
fifteen tons of bombs on the target, starting a large fire but causing no other
observable damage. Although no enemy interception was met, antiaircraft fire
was unusually heavy. On the next day nine B-24's bombed Tarawa again, causing
some damage to the airstrip. The same day, the first strike was launched
against Mille Atoll, the nearest of the Marshalls. Of the twenty planes that
started for Mille, only nine reached the target. They dropped four tons of
bombs on the airfield. Although antiaircraft fire from both Tarawa and Mille
was heavy, there was still no interception by enemy planes. On 15 November the
strikes were extended to include Jaluit in the Marshalls. Seventeen bombers hit
that atoll, causing damage to the seaplane base and sinking ships in the
lagoon. Another strike by eight B-24's was conducted against Mille and Makin
the same day. The airfield at Mille was again damaged and again there was no
air opposition.

On 16 November the air offensive moved farther west, to Kwajalein Atoll. Of
twenty planes assigned the mission that day, only one reached the primary
target. The others turned back and dropped their bombs on Jaluit, in the
Marshalls, and Tarawa and Little Makin, in the Gilberts. The same day six
B-24's set out for Maloelap, but were unable to drop their bombs because of
poor weather. For the first time, enemy fighters arose to intercept the attack.
On 17 November, the day immediately preceding the scheduled arrival of the
American carrier force in the target area, twenty bombers hit Tarawa, Mille,
and Maloelap. Considerable damage was reported to have been done to the
airfields at Tarawa and Mille. At Maloelap the bombers were intercepted by
Japanese fighters and in the ensuing action one B-24 was badly damaged and
crashed at Baker Island on its return flight.

In all, the heavy bombers of the Seventh Air Force had flown 141 bombing
sorties against the Gilberts and Marshalls between 13 and 17 November. They
dropped about 173 tons of bombs and destroyed at least five enemy aircraft. Of
course, it is impossible to calculate the extent of the damage done to the
airfields and defense installations in the Gilberts, since the same area was
later covered by carrier aircraft and then by naval guns just before the
invasion.36

While the bases for the air offensive against the Gilberts were being built and
reinforced, other preliminary moves against the targets were taking place. A
fast carrier task force (Task Force 50) under command of Admiral Pownall was
organized early in September to strike the Gilberts in order to "decrease enemy
pressure on our holdings in the Ellice Islands," which the Japanese had bombed
from Tarawa and Makin. This force was to destroy

--53--

aircraft and installations at Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama and to conduct
such reconnaissance as was possible.37

The naval force that approached the Gilberts during the night of 17-18
September consisted of three carriers, three cruisers, and eleven destroyers.
It was to be supported by twenty-four B-24's flying from Canton and Funafuti
and fourteen flying from Guadalcanal. The planes of the first group were to
attack Tarawa just before dawn on 18 September; those from Guadalcanal were to
hit Nauru at the same time. Twenty-eight photo-reconnaissance planes from Canton
and Funafuti were to join the task force in the area of Tarawa and combine
bombing runs on that island with their photographic mission.

Arriving near Tarawa during the early morning hours of 18 September, the
carriers launched their first flight at approximately 0330, hoping to take
advantage of moonlight for their initial runs. There was not enough light,
however, and the planes had to hover over the island until daybreak. Between
then and 1822 of the same day six separate attacks were made against Tarawa,
during which eighty tons of bombs were dropped and all visible installations
strafed. One attack was launched against Makin at daylight and another against
Apamama later in the morning.

The airfield at Nauru was reported to be neutralized. At Tarawa considerable
quantities of fuel and ammunition were destroyed, several buildings were
wrecked, and a small freighter was sunk. At Makin three large flying boats were
set on fire, and some damage was done to shore installations. The most
important single achievement of the strike was the photographic coverage of
Tarawa and Makin by both carrier- and land-based aircraft. At Tarawa opposition
from antiaircraft artillery was intense, but at Makin it was extremely weak. No
fighter interception was encountered at either target, but two Japanese medium
bombers were shot down northwest of Makin.

The carrier force retired to the south during the night. Next day the attack
was continued by twenty B-24's from Canton and Funafuti. The bombers were
intercepted by enemy fighters over Tarawa, where the airfield had been repaired
during the night. Of the eighteen Japanese fighters that rose to meet the
attackers, six were definitely destroyed and four more listed as probably
destroyed. During these two days of operations American losses were five
planes, one of them a bomber that crash-landed at Nanomea on its return from
the second flight.

The raid on the Gilberts was followed eighteen days later by a naval carrier
strike against Wake. Led by Rear Adm. Alfred E. Montgomery, USN, Task Force 14,
the largest carrier striking force yet assembled in the Pacific, hit Wake on 5
and 6 October. Sixty-seven Japanese planes were reported destroyed in the air
and on the ground, and shore installations were heavily damaged.38

Then, commencing on 13 November, the land-based bombers of Admiral Hoover's
Task Force 57 made nightly attacks on Tarawa and Makin as well as on Nauru and
islands in the central Marshalls. A total of sixty-six planes participated in
these raids before November 20.39

Finally, during the two days before the landings, both Navy and Army planes
delivered last-minute softening-up blows. The

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Nauru Island under attack by Liberator bombers of the Seventh Air Force.

first strike was against Nauru. At 0300 on 18 November one group of Admiral
Pownall's task force launched eighteen fighter planes for a dawn strike against
that island. They were followed, three hours later, by twenty more fighters and
then, at intervals of two to three hours, by dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and
more fighters. All day long these planes bombed and strafed Nauru. By the day's
end about ninety tons of bombs had been dropped. Installations on the island
were reported to have been severely damaged. One Japanese ship was left
burning, and three or four medium bombers were destroyed on the ground. Four or
five enemy fighters sought to intercept the attack, but all were shot down.40

The carrier attack on Nauru was followed next day with strikes by land-based
planes. Seventh Air Force bombers, accompanied by Navy photo-reconnaissance
aircraft, bombed both airfields and shipping, causing considerable damage and
removing Nauru as a threat to operations in the Gilberts.41

At the same time the Gilberts themselves were brought under heavy aerial
attack. On 19 November, nineteen B-24's from Nukufetau and Funafuti dropped
about ten tons of bombs on Tarawa, causing fires throughout the area and
damaging the airfields. Twelve more planes, from Nanomea, dropped
twenty-three tons on

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TABLE IAMMUNITION EXPENDED BY JAPANESE ON TARAWA AND MAKIN13-19 November 1943

TYPE OF AMMO.

ROUNDS EXPENDED

ROUNDS REMAINING

TARAWA

127-mm. AA (a)

1,437

3,290

75-mm. AA (a)

1,312

1,345

13-mm. AA (a)

51,160

14,903

8-inch

46

(b)

14-cm.

106

(b)

MAKIN

13-mm. MG (a)

9,100

2,400

(a) Minimum rounds expended.
(b) Not available.

Source: CINPAC-CINCPOA Translation 10018, Summary of the American Army
Counterattack in the Gilbert Area of November 1943, Imperial Headquarters, Army
Department, dated January 1944; PACMIRS Captured Japanese Document MR-50
(D-65), Military Action in the Gilbert Islands (Girubato shoto ni okeru sento),
translated by Joseph Guilfoyle, filed in OCMH.

Makin.42
Planes from the Northern and Southern Carrier Groups released
ninety-five tons of bombs on Makin and sixty-nine on Betio Island. One enemy
plane was shot down by the Northern Carrier Group off Makin while three were
disposed of near Tarawa. Cruisers and destroyers of the Southern Carrier Group
moved close to Tarawa shortly before noon on 19 November and, between air
strikes, bombarded ground defenses.

The same day the Interceptor Carrier Group of Admiral Pownall's task force
moved into position northwest of Makin and, from a point about midway between
the Gilberts and the Marshalls, launched a series of attacks against Jaluit and
Mille. One hundred and thirty tons of bombs were dropped on these two atolls.
Power stations at both places were destroyed, hangars burned, and other
buildings hit. Runways were rendered unserviceable at Mille and three vessels
in the lagoon were damaged. Seven aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

Although it is impossible to determine the exact amount of damage wrought by
this pre-D-Day bombardment, one certain fact emerges--the Japanese wasted a
considerable amount of their precious ammunition against these aerial attacks.
Whatever else the preliminary bombardment may or may not have accomplished, it
wreaked havoc on the enemy's ammunition supply. (Table 1, above.)

The heavy expenditure of 13-mm. machine gun ammunition was particularly
important since these weapons were to form the main basis of ground fire
defense. It is clear that the Japanese recognized the seriousness of the
problem. One of their dispatches sent back to Tokyo warned, "We must quickly
replenish ammo for the 13 mm. MGs on both Tarawa and Makin."43

Movement Overseas

Following the final rehearsal at Maui on 4 November the Northern Attack
Force had returned to Pearl Harbor, where most of the troops debarked for a
week's rest

and rehabilitation. Part of the task force had already left for the Gilberts.
On 31 October six LST's, escorted by a destroyer, had left Oahu carrying part
of the garrison troops that would occupy Makin after its capture. Five days
later, as soon as refueling could be completed after the return from the
rehearsal, the three LST's carrying amphibian tractors and the special landing
groups that would man them departed for Makin with a destroyer escort. They
traveled by a shorter route than the first convoy and were scheduled to arrive
at their destination at precisely the same time as the main body of the assault
force, which was to leave Pearl Harbor on the afternoon of 10 November.44
Although the Northern Attack Force, the Northern Carrier Group, and the
Interceptor Carrier Group all departed from the Hawaiian Islands at the same
time, they did not travel together; the two carrier groups moved along a course
parallel to that followed by the Northern Attack Force but about 300 miles to
the northwest. The two routes of approach changed approximately 800 miles east
of the Gilberts, with the Northern Attack Force turning to meet the Southern
Attack Force, the two carrier groups diverging and moving directly to their
assigned stations.

Meanwhile, following rehearsals in Efate, the Southern Attack Force, composed
of transports, fire support ships, and auxiliaries, sortied from that island on
13

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Briefing Troops on scale models of Butaritari. This training during the voyage
to Butaritari facilitated the landings.

November. It was followed by the fast battleships, cruisers, and carriers of
the Southern Carrier Group. Two days later, on 15 November, the Relief Carrier
Force, composed of two carriers, three cruisers and four destroyers, left
Espiritu Santo, also in the New Hebrides. The last-named force moved almost
directly north, toward Nauru. The Southern Carrier Group and the Southern
Attack Force moved along courses roughly parallel to each other, which brought
them to points just south of Funafuti, where all ships refueled. From there the
courses diverged, the Southern Carrier Group going directly to its appointed
area west of Apamama and Tarawa, and the Southern Attack Force moving in a
northerly direction to a rendezvous on 18 November with the Northern Attack
Force coming from Pearl Harbor.45
Thereafter, ships of the two convoys moved
along parallel courses toward the Gilberts to the northwest, the Northern
Attack Force pulling slightly to the north as the islands were approached.

Late on the afternoon of 18 November the northern LST group, still ahead of the
rest of the assault force, had been discovered by Japanese planes. One enemy
bomber attacked the little convoy but was driven off by antiaircraft gunfire.
On 19 November at 1435 another Japanese plane

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appeared overhead, but just as it was about to launch an attack, four U.S.
fighter planes arrived on the scene and shot it down in flames. A more
determined attack on the LST's was made after dark when two other Japanese
bombers swooped low over the slow-moving vessels. The first, hit by ships'
antiaircraft fire, burst into flames and fell into the sea, just missing the
bow of one of the vessels. Burning gas lighted up the entire convoy for several
minutes. Soon afterwards the second enemy plane left without inflicting any
damage.46

Aboard the transports, troops were undergoing their final briefing. At the last
minute (on 19 November) General Ralph Smith decided to make one minor revision
in the landing plan for the 165th Infantry on Makin. He requested permission to
land one infantry company and one shore fire control party on the northeast tip
of Butaritari on the afternoon of D Day and to land the balance of the
battalion and one shore fire control party on the south end of Kuma Island on
the morning of D plus 1.47
The object of this scheme was to set up a second
envelopment of the Japanese--to catch the enemy as he was pushed eastward by
the main attack or as he attempted to move across the reef to Kuma Island.48
Whatever merit the plan may have had, it went untested. On General Holland
Smith's advice, Admiral Turner turned down the request and reaffirmed his
intention to go through with the original landing plan.

In the early hours of 20 November the two attack forces reached their separate
destinations. The transports moved toward their debarkation areas and the fire
support ships moved into shore for the initial bombardment. In the dim light of
the early morning, the invasion of Butaritari and Betio begun.