Nicomachean Ethics

Book 2, Chapter 1

VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and
moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to
teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue
comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is
formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also
plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that
exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone
which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even
if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be
habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in
one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary
to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive
them, and are made perfect by habit.

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the
potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the
senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these
senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to
have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as
also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn
before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by
building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing
just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the
citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every
legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this
that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is
both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the
lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding
statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad
builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there
would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or
bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the
acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and
by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to
feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of
appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered,
others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the
appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of
like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain
kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences
between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one
kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or
rather all the difference.

Book 2, Chapter 2

Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like
the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in
order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we
must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these
determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced, as we
have said. Now, that we must act according to the right rule is a common
principle and must be assumed -- it will be discussed later, i.e. both what the
right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must be
agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be
given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the
accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters
concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any
more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the
account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not
fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case
consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of
medicine or of navigation.

But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we
can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things to
be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of
health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of
sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength,
and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys
the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and
preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the
other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not
stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears
nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man
who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent,
while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way
insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect,
and preserved by the mean.

But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the
same as those of their destruction, but also the sphere of their actualization
will be the same; for this is also true of the things which are more evident to
sense, e.g. of strength; it is produced by taking much food and undergoing much
exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So
too is it with the virtues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate,
and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and
similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things
that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it
is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against
them.

Book 2, Chapter 3

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that
ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in
this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is
self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible
and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is
pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains;
it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the
pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in
a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in
and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.

Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every
passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason
also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also
by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of
cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.

Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative to
and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made worse or
better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by
pursuing and avoiding these -- either the pleasures and pains they ought not or
when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other
similar ways that may be distinguished. Hence men even define the virtues as
certain states of impassivity and rest; not well, however, because they speak
absolutely, and do not say 'as one ought' and 'as one ought not' and 'when one
ought or ought not', and the other things that may be added. We assume, then,
that this kind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures
and pains, and vice does the contrary.

The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with
these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance,
the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the
injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and
the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to
the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble
and the advantageous appear pleasant.

Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is
difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we
measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of
pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these;
for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our
actions.

Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use
Heraclitus' phrase', but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is
harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason
also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures
and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly
bad.

That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the
acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done
differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which
it actualizes itself -- let this be taken as said.

Book 2, Chapter 4

The question might be asked, what we mean by saying that we must become just
by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just
and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as, if they do
what is in accordance with the laws of grammar and of music, they are
grammarians and musicians.

Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do something that is
in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or at the suggestion of
another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when he has both done something
grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accordance
with the grammatical knowledge in himself.

Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the
products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough
that they should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in
accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not
follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a
certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge,
secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and
thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These
are not reckoned in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except the bare
knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has
little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for
everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from often doing just and
temperate acts.

Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just
or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just
and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them.
It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is
produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no
one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they
are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like
patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they
are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course
of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of
philosophy.

Book 2, Chapter 5

Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the
soul are of three kinds -- passions, faculties, states of character -- virtue
must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence,
envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general
the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things
in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming
angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in
virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with
reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and
well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other
passions.

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not
called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the
ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor
blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor
is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain
way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed.

Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of
choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be
moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved
but to be disposed in a particular way.

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called
good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the
passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or
bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither
passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of
character.

Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.

Book 2, Chapter 6

We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also
say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or
excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the
excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of
the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the
eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both
good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the
attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man
also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him
do his own work well.

How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain also
by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything
that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal
amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and
the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in
the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is
one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is
neither too much nor too little -- and this is not one, nor the same for all.
For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in
terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is
intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate
relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a
particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer
will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is
to take it, or too little -- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in
athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of
any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this --
the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.

If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well -- by looking to the
intermediate and judgling its works by this standard (so that we often say of
good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add
anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art,
while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their
work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature
also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean
moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in
these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and
confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may
be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel
them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both
intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with
regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue
is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure,
and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success;
and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue.
Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is
intermediate.

Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of
the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the
limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason also
one is easy and the other difficult -- to miss the mark easy, to hit it
difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic
of vice, and the mean of virtue;

For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a
mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational
principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess
and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices
respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions,
while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect
of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean,
with regard to what is best and right an extreme.

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names
that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of
actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by
their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies
of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one
must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things
depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in
the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally
absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there
should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a
mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of
deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage
because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we
have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they
are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and
deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.

Book 2, Chapter 7

We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it to
the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those which are general
apply more widely, but those which are particular are more genuine, since
conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with
the facts in these cases. We may take these cases from our table. With regard to
feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed,
he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name),
while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and
falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains -- not
all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains -- the mean is temperance,
the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are
not often found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call
them 'insensible'.

With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess
and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall
short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in
taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. (At
present we are giving a mere outline or summary, and are satisfied with this;
later these states will be more exactly determined.) With regard to money there
are also other dispositions -- a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man
differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with
small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency,
niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode
of their difference will be stated later. With regard to honour and dishonour
the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of 'empty vanity', and
the deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality was related to
magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state
similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small honours while that
is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour as one ought, and
more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called
ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person
has no name. The dispositions also are nameless, except that that of the
ambitious man is called ambition. Hence the people who are at the extremes lay
claim to the middle place; and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate
person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious
man and sometimes the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will be stated
in what follows; but now let us speak of the remaining states according to the
method which has been indicated.

With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean.
Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we call the
intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean good temper; of the
persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his
vice irascibility, and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of person,
and the deficiency inirascibility.

There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to one
another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned with
intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with truth
in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind is
exhibited in giving amusement, the other in all the circumstances of life. We
must therefore speak of these too, that we may the better see that in all things
the mean is praise-worthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but
worthy of blame. Now most of these states also have no names, but we must try,
as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and
easy to follow. With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort
of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which
exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and
that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it
mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the
intermediate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is
buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls
short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness. With regard to the
remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the
man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness,
while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a
flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and
is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.

There are also means in the passions and concerned with the passions; since
shame is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the modest man. For even in
these matters one man is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed, as for
instance the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who falls short
or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person
is modest. Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these
states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of
our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is pained
at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all
good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he
even rejoices. But these states there will be an opportunity of describing
elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has not one simple meaning, we
shall, after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how
each of them is a mean; and similarly we shall treat also of the rational
virtues.

Book 2, Chapter 8

There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving
excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean, and all are
in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the
intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the extremes; as
the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so
the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient
relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions. For the brave man
appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man;
and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the
insensible man, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent, and the liberal man
prodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the prodigal. Hence also
the people at the extremes push the intermediate man each over to the other, and
the brave man is called rash by the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and
correspondingly in the other cases.

These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety is
that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate; for these
are further from each other than from the intermediate, as the great is further
from the small and the small from the great than both are from the equal. Again,
to the intermediate some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of rashness
to courage and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the
greatest unlikeness to each other; now contraries are defined as the things that
are furthest from each other, so that things that are further apart are more
contrary.

To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more
opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a
deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and not insensibility, which is a
deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, that is more opposed to
temperance. This happens from two reasons, one being drawn from the thing
itself; for because one extreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we
oppose not this but rather its contrary to the intermediate. E.g. since rashness
is thought liker and nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we oppose
rather the latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate
are thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from the thing
itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we ourselves
more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate. For instance, we
ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily carried
away towards self-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to
the mean, then, rather the directions in which we more often go to great
lengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the more contrary
to temperance.

Book 2, Chapter 9

That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it
is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and
that it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in
passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy
task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g.
to find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so,
too, any one can get angry -- that is easy -- or give or spend money; but to do
this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right
motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy;
wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.

Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what is the
more contrary to it, as Calypso advises --

Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.

For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to
hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as people say,
take the least of the evils; and this will be done best in the way we describe.
But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily
carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will
be recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves
away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by
drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are
bent.

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against;
for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel towards pleasure as
the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all circumstances repeat
their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray.
It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter up) that we shall best be able to
hit the mean.

But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for or
is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how
long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and
call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call
them manly. The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed,
whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man
who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what
point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is
not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is
perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the
decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate
state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards
the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit
the mean and what is right.