United States Military Assistance and Training

Since the 1930s, the United States has been the armed
forces'
major source of military assistance. Initially, such
assistance
aided in the formation of a fledgling air force, and
emphasis on
this service branch continued through the 1940s. United
States
lend-lease funds granted to Honduras during World War II
were used
primarily for aircraft, engine parts, and support
equipment.
Following the signing of a military assistance agreement
in 1954,
the focus of United States aid shifted toward the army.
New combat
battalions were created, and increasing numbers of
Honduran
military personnel were trained at the United States Army
School of
the Americas. Military assistance funding increased
dramatically
during the 1960s, from US$1.1 million for the years 1953
to 1961 to
US$5.9 million for the years 1962 to 1969.

During the early 1980s, conflict in Central America
increased
Honduras's strategic importance and led the United States
government to maintain a significant military presence in
Central
America as a counterforce against the Sandinista
government of
Nicaragua. Sharp increases in military assistance to
Honduras
followed the buildup of United States troops and equipment
in
Honduras. In 1983 United States forces began a series of
large-
scale maneuvers in Honduras that not only provided joint
training
for United States and Honduran forces but also allowed the
administration of Ronald W. Reagan to skirt congressional
limits on
military aid to that country and the Contras. Throughout
the 1980s,
the United States also built or improved military-related
installations such as airfield, barracks, and radar
stations.

In February 1983, the United States and Honduras
conducted a
joint military exercise called Big Pine, which was the
largest of
its kind ever held in Honduras. A total of 1,600 United
States
military personnel and 4,000 Honduran soldiers
participated in
exercises designed to help Honduras improve its deployment
techniques and logistical support in the field. United
States Army
elements provided mobility for Honduran forces and
logistics and
communications assistance. United States Navy elements
included two
landing ships and two landing craft. United States Air
Force
personnel participated in the coordination of landing and
air
supply operations. A number of training personnel, mostly
from the
United States Army, remained in the country to train the
Honduran
army in infantry tactics. Also during the exercises, a
sizable
radar installation staffed by over fifty United States Air
Force
technicians was placed south of Tegucigalpa.

The number of United States advisers increased further
in mid-
1983 when the United States and Honduras approved a new
training
agreement as an amendment to the 1954 military assistance
agreement. The two countries constructed a military
training
facility, near Puerto Castilla on the Caribbean coast, at
a cost of
some US$250,000. The primary purpose of this facility,
called the
Regional Center for Military Training (Centro Regional de
Entrenamiento Militar--CREM), was to train Salvadoran
ground
forces, although Hondurans also received training. The
center
initially had about 125 United States Army Special Forces
personnel, raising the total number of trainers in the
country to
approximately 270 in July 1983.

Although CREM closed in 1985, United States military
advisers
remained. Between 1983 and 1993, the United States and
Honduras
have carried out an almost continuous string of joint
military
maneuvers on Honduran soil. To facilitate the maneuvers
and
strengthen Honduras's military infrastructure, the
Honduran
government has built a network of roads, improved ports,
and
constructed additional airfields.

Between August 1983 and February 1984, United States
forces
carried out Big Pine II, a considerably more extensive
military
exercise than the earlier Big Pine maneuvers, involving up
to 5,000
United States military personnel. Extensive naval
maneuvers
involved two United States Navy aircraft carrier task
forces,
another task force led by the battleship U.S.S. New
Jersey,
and a landing by the United States Marines on the
Caribbean coast
during portions of the exercises. The purpose, according
to a
senior United States official, was to demonstrate the
ability of
United States military forces to operate in Central
America and to
persuade the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to desist
from
fomenting insurrection in the region.

A simulated defense of Honduras from a mock Nicaraguan
invasion
was staged between February and May 1985. Called Big Pine
III and
Universal Trek, the military exercises involved
thirty-nine United
States warships, as well as 7,000 United States troops and
5,000
Honduran troops. The exercises, which featured a massive
amphibious
landing on the northeastern coast of Honduras, were the
most
intricate peacetime military maneuvers the United States
ever
carried out in Central America. The war games prompted
concern
among some Hondurans that their country's national
sovereignty was
being compromised and that the Honduran people might be
pushed
unwillingly into a regional war. Honduran trade unions
organized
demonstrations that called for the withdrawal of United
States
troops.

An even bigger show of force occurred in Honduras
during
Operation Solid Shield in May 1987. This exercise
simulated a
United States response to a request from Honduras to help
fight a
Nicaraguan invasion, and it coincided with larger United
States
military exercises carried out on the Puerto Rican island
of
Vieques and at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Honduran
phase of
this operation involved more than 7,000 United States
military
personnel as well as 3,000 Honduran soldiers. As part of
the
exercises, a combined air and sea landing in Honduras was
undertaken by a brigade of 3,000 helicopter assault troops
from the
101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and a
marine
amphibious unit of 1,800 from Camp Lejeune. These
maneuvers tested
the ability of the army, navy, marine corps, air force,
and coast
guard to mobilize and operate together in a large-scale
operation,
which was also meant to help train and build a logistical
infrastructure for the Contras based in Honduras. Daniel
José
Ortega Saavedra, who was then the president of Nicaragua,
accused
the United States of planning an invasion of his country.

During the early 1990s, Honduras continued to serve as
a
military outpost for the United States. The Enrique Soto
Cano Air
Base, located about ninety kilometers northwest of
Tegucigalpa near
Comayagüela, is operated by the Honduran air force but
functions as
the nerve center of intelligence gathering,
communications, and
logistical support for United States military operations
in
Honduras. While billing it as a temporary site, the
Pentagon,
beginning in 1983, began spending hundreds of millions of
dollars
in order to transform the once-sleepy facility into the
most
advanced base in Central America. The United States
extended the
airstrip to handle any military aircraft belonging to the
United
States and installed sophisticated listening devices and
radar to
track the communications and movements of El Salvador's
leftist
guerrillas and to coordinate air strikes against them. The
base
also handled communications with the Contra rebels who
were
attempting to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government.

As of 1993, the huge base was home for Joint Task Force
Bravo
(JTFB), a contingent of 1,100 United States troops that
rotate
through on a temporary basis, and about 600 Honduran
soldiers.
JTFB, which is a joint command of the United States Army
and the
United States Air Force, coordinates military operations,
as well
as the joint operations, with Honduran forces. The United
States
has never paid base rights because the facility is
officially on
temporary loan from the Honduran government. Upkeep of the
Enrique
Soto Cano Air Base costs the United States about US$50
million a
year.

The three elements of the United States military
assistance
program for Honduras come under IMET, MAP, and the FMS.
Under the
IMET program, Honduras received US$14.2 million between
1962 and
1986; it received an additional US$5.8 million between
1987 and
1991. During the 1980s, the IMET program provided military
education to 9,500 Honduran military officers at bases in
the
United States and other locations. During the same period,
El
Salvador was the only Latin American country to receive
more
military training than Honduras under the IMET program. In
addition
to the IMET training at the United States Army School of
the
Americas (in Panama before 1985, thereafter at Fort
Benning,
Georgia), Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) of the United
States Special
Forces entered the country for short periods to train
Honduran
soldiers in counterinsurgency tactics and other military
skills.

MAP grants to Honduras totaled US$257.2 million between
1962 and
1986; additional MAP grants totaling US$140 million were
made
available from 1987 to 1989. FMS credits totaled US$44.4
million
from 1978 to 1983, and although Honduras did not receive
FMS
credits between 1983 and 1990, it did receive US$51
million in
credits during 1991 and 1992.

Other United States military-related programs also
aided
Hondurans during the 1980s. Under the Overseas Security
Assistance
Management Program, the United States stationed military
managerial
personnel in Honduras and authorized nearly US$2 million
each year
for this program. Honduras also benefited from United
States
Department of Defense military construction grants, which
financed
the construction and maintenance of military airfields,
radar
stations, ammunition storage warehouses, training
facilities, and
a strategic road network. The United States military
retains access
and usage rights to many of these facilities. In just a
two-year
period--1987 and 1988--about US$8.2 million was spent for
United
States military construction in Honduras.

In 1985 Honduras and El Salvador were exempted by the
United
States Congress from the prohibition of using United
States aid for
foreign police forces. As a result, Fusep has been the
beneficiary
of US$2.8 million in training, riot-control gear,
vehicles,
communications equipment, and weapons. Aid to the Honduran
police
has also been provided under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
program,
which is managed by the United States Department of
State's Bureau
of Diplomatic Security. Other police training has been
sponsored by
the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance
Program (ICITAP), which is managed by the United States
Department
of Justice.

Between 1983 and 1990, forty-seven United States
military
personnel died in Honduras as a result of accidents and
shootings.
During the same period, several bombings, some claimed by
leftist
guerrillas, wounded about a dozen American soldiers
stationed in
Honduras.

As recently as August 1993, United States and Honduran
troops
and naval elements carried out joint exercises in various
parts of
Honduras under the code name Cabañas 93. The operation
tested the
coastal patrolling, drug interdiction, parachuting, and
psychological warfare capabilities of the two armies.