Before the 39th Signal Battalion could make much progress toward training Vietnamese
communications personnel, optimistic plans looking toward an early military
solution of the war were wrecked by current events. In November 1963, South
Vietnam's first president, Ngo Dinh Diem, was assassinated and his government
overthrown. There followed a series of rapidly changing governments, producing
a state of disorganization that seriously weakened the South Vietnamese efforts
against the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, in early 1964, Hanoi decided to infiltrate
North Vietnamese Regular Army troops into South Vietnam to defeat the disorganized
and confused South Vietnamese. Hanoi also started to equip the Viet Cong with
modern automatic weapons.

The Tonkin Gulf incidents of early August 1964 marked the first direct engagements
between North Vietnamese and U.S. forces and, according to General William C.
Westmoreland, "represented a crucial psychological turning point in the
course of the Vietnam War." By December 1964 the North Vietnamese had infiltrated
no less than 12,000 troops, including a North Vietnamese Army regiment, into
South Vietnam. At the same time a Viet Cong division had been organized and
was engaged in combat operations. In order to bolster the faltering South Vietnamese
forces, the United States deployed additional advisers and support units. The
Republic of South Vietnam forces were increased by 117,000 men during 1964,
attaining a strength of over 514,000. Their effectiveness, however, decreased
markedly. Through the last half of that year US troop strength increased rapidly.
The number was approximately 16,000 in June of 1964 when General Westmoreland
assumed the responsibilities of Commander, United States Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam. By the year's end, US troops in Vietnam numbered about 23,000.

[17]

Satellite Communications Come to Vietnam

The inadequacy and unreliability of the meager radio circuits linking Vietnam
with Hawaii and Washington became painfully evident during the 1964 Gulf of
Tonkin incidents. In the first week of August the engagement of US Navy vessels
by North Vietnamese torpedo boats resulted in a flurry of telephone calls and
messages between Saigon and Washington. The long-haul high-frequency radio circuits,
hampered by severe sunspot activity and occasional transmitter failure in Saigon,
were simply not capable of carrying the load. The WET WASH cable project, which
would subsequently bring highly reliable services into Southeast Asia, was not
yet complete.

An experimental satellite ground terminal, with an operating team under Warrant
Officer Jack H. Inman, was rushed to Vietnam to bolster communications capabilities.
The terminal, which provided one telephone and one teletype circuit to Hawaii,
became operational in late August 1964. Signals were relayed from Saigon to
Hawaii through a communications satellite launched into a stationary orbit some
22,000 statute miles above the Pacific Ocean. This experimental synchronous
communications satellite system, dubbed SYNCOM, was the first use of satellite
communications in a combat zone. The satellite ground terminal in Vietnam, which
was operated by the US Army's Strategic Communications Command, provided the
earliest reliable communications of high quality into and out of Vietnam.

The SYNCOM satellite communications service was improved in October 1964 with
a newer terminal that provided one telephone and sixteen message circuits. These
"space age" communications means immediately proved their worth. The
Command History, 1964, of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
states: "Since October the . . . [satellite terminal] has handled a remarkable
volume of operational traffic." And further: "It appears that satellite
communications are here to stay and will increase MACV [Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam] capability in the future."

System Problems, Further Plans, and Control
Matters

Communications deficiencies within Vietnam became more apparent as the hard-pressed
signalmen struggled to provide the communications service required by the new
buildup. As early as mid­1963 it was recognized that the single 72-channel tropospheric
scatter link between Saigon and Nha Trang did not have sufficient

[18]

FIRST SATELLITE TERMINAL, BA QUEO, NEAR SAIGON. This station linked Vietnam
with Hawaii in first use of satellite communications in a combat zone.

capacity to pass the required traffic from Nha Trang, where two other 72-channel
systems from Pleiku and Qui Nhon converged for interconnections to the south.
The BACK PORCH sites had been chosen as a compromise between the ease of maintaining
site protection and securing the radio propagation characteristics required
for operation. As a result some links performed poorly, the poorest link being
the saturated one between Saigon and Nha Trang.

Another shortcoming of the long-lines systems which steadily became more apparent
was the lack of adequate facilities to control, test, and interconnect circuits,
that is, the lack of technical control facilities at the channel breakout or
switch locations such as Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon. Colonel Thomas W.
Riley, Jr., who was the US Army, Vietnam, Signal Officer in 1965, later recalled:
"It was ironical that such big costly refined . . . links as . . . provided
at Pleiku-involving a . . . [multimillion dollar] installation connecting Nha
Trang to the east with . . . [Ubon, Thailand] to the west-came together at Pleiku
in a shed." As

[19]

more and more tails using mobile equipment were installed, branching off the BACK
PORCH commercial grade system, various technical difficulties were encountered.
Among these were differences in the voice channel electrical current levels where
the circuits interconnected, and differences in the signaling frequencies that
are employed to ring the telephone of the distant person who is being called.
Without adequate technical control facilities at the circuit interconnecting points
it was difficult to "match" electrically the incompatible equipment.
Also, where circuits had to be rerouted or activated in support of fast-moving
operations, the inadequate technical control facilities could not respond rapidly.
Furthermore, the mobile equipment was not designed to operate at the low noise
levels associated with more sophisticated high quality "commercial"
grade systems. These differences of channel levels, system noise levels, and ringing
frequencies, and the lack of adequate technical control facilities all made for
a system of degraded quality. Since high-speed data can pass only over high quality
communications systems, it was becoming increasingly important to provide noiseless,
error-free circuits so that data traffic could be accurately received at the distant
end.

As a result of both these technical problems and the requirements generated
by the buildup, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, by October 1964 had validated
requirements to the joint Chiefs of Stafffor additional communications
service. These requirements became known as Phase I of the Integrated Wideband
Communications System. A wideband communications system as described in the
Military Assistance Command Vietnam History of 1965 is "a communications
system which provides numerous channels of communication on a highly reliable
basis; included are multi­channel telephone cable, troposcatter, and multi-channel
line of sight radio systems such as microwave."

This communications project would include the establishment of a BACK PORCH
type of system in Thailand. The Vietnam portion as visualized by the planners
would provide support for up to 40,000 US troops by upgrading the existing fixed
tropospheric scatter communications; by improving service in the Saigon area;
by establishing an additional link north to bypass the system between Saigon
and Nha Trang, extending additional channels north from the Saigon area and
from the Da Nang area still further north to Phu Bai; and by installing adequate
technical control facilities throughout the system.

By December 1964 the Defense Communications Agency had prepared a plan and
forwarded it through the joint Chiefs of Staff

[20]

to the Secretary of Defense for approval. According to this plan the wideband
system would become a part of the Defense Communications System under a Defense
Communications Agency control center located in Saigon. The authority to validate
customer requirements for the use of circuits was vested with the communications-electronics
staffs of the US military assistance commands in Vietnam and Thailand.

The Department of Defense, while the plan was being studied, decided to use
permanent, fixed installations rather than large transportable shelters for
the system. This decision would require construction of buildings and other
facilities in Southeast Asia to house the equipment. The decision was made on
the basis that time was the critical factor-the system was needed right then­and
the contractors were promising that the system could be operational one year
after contract award if commercial equipment and prefabricated buildings were
used. The use of "transportables," that is, commercial equipment installed
in large vans similar to the equipment used on BACK PORCH, was considered; it
was estimated, however, that transportables would require more time to manufacture
and put into operation than a fixed system and that they would be more costly.

The plan called for the system to be operational by 1 December 1965, an early
date that proved altogether too optimistic. For example, the plan was not approved
for contracting action until the Department of Defense approved it as a "Telecommunications
Program Objective" in August 1965. The US Army, which was designated as
the contracting agency, awarded the contract for the Vietnam portion of the
system to Page Communications Engineers, Inc., in September 1965. The system
would be operated by the US Army Strategic; Communications Command, which was
originally activated on I April 1962 by combining the US Army Signal Engineering
Agency and the US Army Communications Agency. This was in line with its mission
as the Army's single operator of those portions of the worldwide Defense Communications
System assigned as an Army responsibility.

Organizational and control arrangements changed during this period. The US
Army Support Croup, Vietnam, was redesignated as the US Army Support Command,
Vietnam, in March 1964, when the dual-hat status of the Army component command
signal officer also changed. Previously, he had served both as the Army Support
Group Signal Officer and as the Commanding Officer, 39th Signal Battalion. But
following the reorganization, the positions were allocated separately; according
to personnel lists of

[21]

March 1964, Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. Velie became Signal Officer of the Army
Support Command and Major Leo T. White became Commanding Officer, 39th Signal
Battalion.

Also in 1964 the command and control arrangements for the big Strategic Army
Communications Station, Vietnam, were affected by the creation and expansion
of the US Army Strategic Communications Command and its Pacific subcommand headquartered
in Hawaii. In November 1964 the station was redesignated Strategic Communications
Facility, Vietnam, and at about the same time control of the facility passed
from US Army Support Command, Vietnam, to US Army Strategic Communications Command,
Pacific. These changes in 1964 marked the beginning of a division of control
over Army communications in Vietnam between the Army Strategic Communications
Command and the Army component command signal troops.

By the spring of 1965 the combat situation had deteriorated further. The casualties
of the South Vietnamese Army were mounting to the point that the equivalent
of almost one infantry battalion a week was being lost. In March the United
States sent Army airborne and Marine combat troops to defend US air bases in
Vietnam against enemy attack. In order to support these forces, it was necessary
to deploy a logistical command and other combat support troops. An additional
signal unit, the 41st Signal Battalion, and Headquarters, 2d Signal Group, were
alerted for movement to Vietnam.

By mid-1965 it had been decided to commit substantial numbers of US fighting
troops along with other combat support organizations. The emphasis was on the
introduction of infantry, armor, and artillery elements. As General Westmoreland
relates in his report on the war in Vietnam: "There were inadequate ports
and airfields, no logistic organization, and no supply, transportation, or maintenance
troops. None the less, in the face of the grave tactical situation, I decided
to accept combat troops as rapidly as they could be made available and to improvise
their logistic support." By the end of 1965 US strength in Vietnam stood
at 184,000 men.

The 2d Signal Group Arrives

The first of the additional Signal Corps troops to reach Vietnam was the advance
party of Headquarters, 2d Signal Group, commanded by Colonel James J. Moran,
which arrived from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in May 1965. Five companies of
the 41st

[22]

Signal Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James G. Pelland, arrived in
late June, and the rest of the battalion was in Vietnam by 14 July 1965. A separate
company, the 593d Signal Company, arrived in Saigon on 13 July 1965. By mid-July
the 2d Signal Group had reached an authorized strength of about 2,900 officers
and men.

The 2d Signal Group, upon its arrival, assumed command of the 39th Signal Battalion,
taking over in fact all the missions previously assigned that battalion, such
as the tasks of providing signal maintenance support and operation of the signal
supply system in Vietnam. Later, these supply and maintenance missions were
turned over to the 1st Logistical Command. Upon acquiring its second signal
unit, the 41st Signal Battalion, in mid-1965, the 2d Signal Group made it responsible
for all. area communications in the northern half of the Republic of Vietnam
in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones, while assigning responsibility to the
39th Signal Battalion for the southern half of Vietnam in the III and IV Corps
Tactical Zones. The 362d Signal Company was also placed directly under the 2d
Signal Group to operate the tropospheric scatter system throughout thecountry.
The groupwas assigned to US Army Support Command, Vietnam, and subsequently
to US Army, Vietnam, when the latter was established on 20 July 1965, replacing
the Support Command. The US Army, Vietnam, was also commanded by General Westmoreland,
who served concurrently as Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

These new Regular Army signal units immediately went to work to improve the
existing communications and establish communications for new base areas. For
example, by mid-July mobile equipment was provided to support the new logistical
base being established at Cam Ranh Bay. A 12-voice channel radio relay link
was installed to connect Cam Ranh with Nha Trang. A one-position tactical switchboard
was put into operation, a mobile communications message center was installed,
and high-powered radios linked Cam Ranh into radio nets in Vietnam. In just
a few weeks the small switchboard at Cam Ranh had to be replaced with another
mobile manual board that was much larger-a 3-position switchboard capable of
serving 200 subscribers. Microwave teams with mobile equipment had arrived in
Nha Trang to start installation of a 45-channel microwave link between Cam Ranh
Bay and Nha Trang. By the end of October 1965 arrangements had been made to
ship a fixed-plant, automatic dial telephone exchange to Cam Ranh Bay. The fixed
automatic dial telephone equipment

[23]

MAN-PACKED RADIO OPERATED BY COMBAT SIGNALMAN IN 1965

required a dust-free, humidity-controlled environment for operation, hence
special building construction was required.

Colonel Moran's 2d Signal Group was also busily engaged in providing communications
support to the combat troops, both to those that were already in Vietnam and
to those that were being sent to the country. The group was alerted on 12 August
1965 to provide communications support to the famous 173d Airborne Brigade for
an important Vietnam highlands operation in the Pleiku area. The next day the
necessary equipment and Signal Corps troops were airlifted to Pleiku, and by
evening on 14 August communications got into operation, linking the 173d's operating
area into the large fixed backbone system at Pleiku.

Equipment and personnel also had to be redistributed to support arriving units.
During the week of 15-21 August, twenty-four tons of signal equipment were moved
to the I and II Corps Tactical Zones by special airlift, while an additional
twenty-eight tons were awaiting movement. By early September 1965 US Army, Vietnam,
had established priorities for providing communications support throughout the
country. First priority would go to the

[24]

combat units, second to combat support elements, and third to logistic and administrative
elements.

Command and Control Arrangements

During this period General Westmoreland's joint headquarters was establishing
and refining command control arrangements in Vietnam. The final arrangement
provided that the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, exercise
tactical control over the US forces through the III Marine Amphibious Force
in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone, through the I Field Force in the II Corps
Tactical Zone, and through the II Field Force in the III Corps Tactical Zone.
Both field force headquarters were modified US Army Corps headquarters. A senior
US adviser was responsible for controlling and coordinating US advisory and
support troop efforts in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. The Seventh Air Force controlled
all US Air Force units, while United States Army, Vietnam, controlled all Army
support and logistical units. The I Field Force, initially designated Task Force
Alpha, was activated in August 1965, II Field Force headquarters during the
spring of 1966.

When Task Force Alpha was activated in August, no signal organization to support
it in central Vietnam was available. Interim communications support was provided
for Task Force Alpha, head­quartered at Nha Trang, by the 2d Signal Group. But
on 15 September 1965 the organic 54th Corps Signal Battalion of Task Force Alpha
started to arrive and by 1 October began to relieve the 2d Signal Group. The
final elements of the 54th closed into Vietnam in October, thus freeing the
overtaxed communicators of the 2d Signal Group to work in other areas in Vietnam.
Initial communications support for II Field Force at Long Binh, fifteen miles
northwest of Saigon, also had to be provided by the 2d Signal Group during the
spring of 1966 until the 53d Signal Battalion arrived to provide the needed
support.

Additional Communications Control Elements
Enter Vietnam

Changes were being made, meanwhile, in higher level communications control,
direction, and operations responsibilities. In line with plans for the integrated
wideband system that called for establishment of a Defense Communications Agency
center in Vietnam, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the manning of the
Defense Communications Agency, Support Center, Saigon, on 29 April 1965. The
support center would provide "system con-

[25]

trol and engineering support" to both the military assistance command in
Vietnam and that in Thailand. The center itself would also be subject to the authority
of Defense Communications Agency, Southeast Asia Region, located at Clark Air
Force Base in the Philippines. The first Support Center elements arrived in Vietnam
during May 1965. In early June US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, assigned
to the center additional tasks, including operational direction and restoration
authority for all Defense Communications circuits in Vietnam. The Vietnam circuits
included those passing over the BACK PORCH system, which would be integrated into
the new wideband system as part of the world­wide Defense Communications System.
This new mission also required that the Defense Communications Agency element
in Vietnam supervise and restore defense circuits which passed over the mobile
tails, down to and including the subscribers' instrument, controlled by the Army
component signal troops under the 2d Signal Group.

In September 1965 the Defense Communications Agency, Support Center, Saigon,
was redesignated Defense Communications Agency, Southeast Asia Mainland Region.
As a part of the Defense Communications Agency organizational structure, the
region came under the Pacific area office located in Hawaii. By the end of 1965
the strength of the Southeast Asia Mainland Region had grown from eight men
to 100.

In May 1965 Department of the Army directed that those facilities and personnel
which would become a part of the Defense Communications System be transferred
from US Army, Pacific, to the Army's Strategic Communications Command. This
directive was in line with the Strategic Communications Command's mission to
operate the Army's portion of the Defense Communications System. In July 1965
the command established an organization to operate the backbone system in Southeast
Asia, namely, the US Army Strategic Communications Command, Pacific, Southeast
Asia, located in Saigon. Subordinate elements of this new organization were
formed in both Vietnam and Thailand and were charged with the actual operation
of the system. Elements of the command's 11th Signal Group stationed at Fort
Lewis, Washington, arrived in Vietnam in June 1965 to establish the headquarters
oŁ the Strategic Communications Command in Southeast Asia. Colonel Henry Schneider
was designated as commander of all the Strategic Communications Command's troops
in Southeast Asia, while Lieutenant Colonel Jerry J. Enders, who arrived with
the unit from Fort Lewis, was designated to command the Vietnam element. Ar-

[26]

rangements were made for turning over the Defense Communications System facilities
of the tropospheric scatter systems operated by the 2d Signal Group for BACK PORCH
and WET WASH and those at Green Hill in Thailand and Saigon in Vietnam.

Not until 19 August1965 did the 2d Signal Group turn over to the Strategic
Communications Command in Vietnam the responsibility for operation of these
systems, along with the transfer of 121 officers and men. These developments
increased the command's problems and widened the split in Army communications
operations in Vietnam between the Army's Strategic Communications Command's
organizations and the area support signal units of the 2d Signal Group under
the Army component headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.

A like transfer occurred in Thailand. The US Army's 379th Signal Battalion,
which had been organized in Thailand in April 1965, assigned one officer and
71 enlisted men to the Strategic Communications Command element in Thailand
in September 1965. The 379th provided mobile communications support to US forces
in Thailand similar to that provided by the 39th Signal Battalion in Vietnam.

The Army's Strategic Communications Facility, Vietnam, continued to remain
directly under the Hawaii-based Strategic Communications Command, Pacific, headquarters
until November 1965, when the station was assigned to the Strategic Communications
Command element in Vietnam and was redesignated US Army Strategic Communications
Command Facility, Phu Lam. This vital gateway station continued to handle most
of the communications passing into and out of Vietnam. The preponderance of
the traffic flowed over the high quality circuits of the WET WASH undersea cable
to the Philippines.

Earlier at the Phu Lam facility, on 23 March 1965, the first manual data relay
center had been activated. At that time the data relay had three connected stations,
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, Tan Son Nhut Air Base on the outskirts
of Saigon, and the Army's 27th Data Processing Unit in Saigon. The station relayed
11,000 cards on its first day of operation. At the end of 1965 the station was
processing approximately 400,000 cards per month from seven connected stations.

Early in 1965 the Phu Lam message relay with its twenty-five active circuits
also was processing over 250,000 messages per month. By September the station
began to experience extreme difficulty in Handling the message traffic. The
backlog of service messages became critical when at times up to 1,000 were awaiting
ac-

[27]

tion. Because of the deteriorating situation at Phu Lam, the only Defense Communications
System message relay facility in Vietnam, an interim tape relay facility, using
large transportable vans capable of terminating eighteen circuits, was deployed
to Vietnam. These Strategic Communications Command contingency or emergency assets,
which arrived in Nha Trang on 25 October, were operational by 3 November 1965.
By the close of the year these two major message relays at Saigon and Nha Trang
were processing over half a million messages per month out of and into Vietnam
over circuits of the Defense Communications System.

More Mobile Radio, More Fixed Radio, and
Cable

As more troops were deployed throughout the Republic of Vietnam, it became
apparent that the existing BACK PORCH system and the planned Integrated Wideband
Communications System could not support the critical circuit needs in Vietnam.
Contingency transportable tropospheric scatter equipment was provided to Vietnam
beginning in March 1965 when six Army mobile terminals arrived. These were used
to establish additional circuits north from Saigon to Pleiku through a single
relay point situated near the summit of the 7,000-foot mountain, Niu Lang Bian,
which stood a few miles to the north of Dalat in the south central highlands.
Initially installed as a 24-channel system, its capacity was increased in late
summer to forty-eight voice channels when two terminals of another system were
redeployed to provide the additional channelizing equipment.

Six larger tropospheric scatter terminals similar to those of the BACK PORCH
system were also deployed and operational by the end of 1965. Using their transportable
antennas these terminals established twenty-four voice channel links between
Pleiku and Da Nang, Vung Tau and Cam Ranh Bay, and between DA Nang and Ubon,
Thailand. These systems, along with other tails provided by the 2d Signal Group,
had added approximately 35,000 voice channel miles to the Vietnam communications
system during the last half of 1965. (Map 3) None of these statistics on facilities,
however, included the numerous systems installed by the 2d Signal Group in direct
support of combat operations.

Furthermore, the mobile systems were all stopgap measures. Additional circuits
of the fixed type were required to support the expanding effort, particularly
for the low priority logistical forces and their complex widespread operations.
By the end of 1965, the US joint headquarters in Saigon had forwarded three
require-

[28]

MOBILE TROPOSPHERIC SCATTER ANTENNA ON NUI LANG BIAN NEAR DALAT was installed
and defended by US Army Signalmen in late 1965.

ments packages to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, which, as conceived by
the US Military Assistance Command and component communications planners, would
provide the necessary long-lines support in Vietnam. The first package forwarded
in October was an addition to the programmed wideband system and was later called
Integrated Wideband Communications System, Phase 11; it was designed to support
up to 200,000 troops. The second requirements package, sent in November 1965,
requested a coastal submarine cable system to supplement the integrated wideband
system. The third package, forwarded to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, in
December 1965, was designed to support up to 400,000 troops.

[29]

MAP 3

This final major addition to the integrated system was later called Integrated
Wideband Communications System, Phase III. The system would provide commercial
grade service using fixed-plant equipment and construction techniques.

[30]

More Buildup and Combat Needs

As the troop buildup continued, from late summer until the end of the year
the 2d Signal Group found it more and more difficult to provide enough communications
support. By July there were three US Army combat brigades in Vietnam: the 173d
Airborne Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson, had arrived
in May of 1965; the other two, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division
and the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, had arrived in July US and
other Free World Military Assistance Forces began to arrive in division-size
units along with all required communications support. The first complete US
Army division to reach Vietnam was the 1st Cavalry Division, Airmobile, which
arrived in September 1965. The US Army's 1st Infantry Division, whose commander
was Major General Jonathan O. Seaman, the Republic of Korea Capital Division,
and a Korean Marine brigade all arrived in October. By December the lead element,
the 3d Brigade, of the US Army's 25th Infantry Division was in Vietnam. Although
the planners were allotting a US Army combat area signal company and a signal
support company for each division-size force, these units were not initially
available. The signal troops already in Vietnam would have to improvise the
needed support. Communications service into the system of Vietnam was provided
by installing mobile radio relay links connected to the backbone system. Only
limited telephone and message service could be made available. The divisions
had to install and operate a good portion of their communications, using the
organic capability of their division signal battalions, until Army signal support
units arrived.

The organic 121st Signal Battalion of the US 1st Infantry Division was one
of those that initially had to provide all communication services to its division
without the supplemental benefit of Army area type signal support. At first,
the 121st was located in a staging area near Bien Hoa, but as the division spread
out, so did the signal battalion. The battalion headquarters and two of its
three signal companies moved to the division base camp in Di An, approximately
fifteen miles northwest of Saigon. Company B, the forward communications company,
deployed its three platoons with the far-Hung Big Red One infantry brigades
north of DI An.

From this configuration, the organic 121st Signal Battalion operated and maintained
all of the communications support for the division. The signalmen installed
the myriad command and control as well as administrative telephone and message
circuits that

[31]

tied together the five major base camps of the division. They also operated the
overloaded switchboards and overworked message centers at these base camps. And
because the 1st Infantry Division was engaged in active combat from the first
day of its arrival, the 121st Signal Battalion supported all combat operations
by running the division's command and control radio nets and providing essential
combat telephone and message circuits from each infantry brigade or battalion
command post back to the main base camp at DI An.

It was not until May 1966, some seven months after the 121st Signal Battalion
became operational in Vietnam, that assistance arrived in the form of the 595th
Signal Company. This recently arrived unit of the 2d Signal Group immediately
helped relieve the pressure on the 1st Infantry Division's communicators by
taking over their switchboard and multichannel radio operations at DI An. The
pattern of communications support, as it rapidly evolved in the 1st Infantry
Division area, would continue throughout the Vietnam War: the organic signal
unit, in this case the 121st Signal Battalion, provided the command and control
communications so essential to the field commander and supported the combat
operations, while the supporting Army area signal unit provided the administrative
or general-user communications, tying the base camps together and affording
entry into the countrywide Defense Communications System.

While the 1st Cavalry Division and its organic 13th Signal Battalion, commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Tom M. Nicholson, were deploying to the An Khe area in
the Vietnamese Central Highlands, midway between Pleiku and Qui Nhon, the 586th
Signal Support Company arrived in Vietnam. The company was immediately attached
to the 41st Signal Battalion and sent to An Khe to support the 1st Cavalry Division.
This attachment proved wise because the airmobile division, newest of Army divisions
along with its completely equipped but lightweight signal battalion, was about
to be tested under fire in the fully developed airmobile concept. The men of
the 13th Signal Battalion soon had much more on their minds than installing
base camp wire systems and operating switchboards at An Khe, their base of operations.

In October 1965 the North Vietnamese concentrated three regiments of their
best troops in the Central Highlands in an area between the Cambodian border
and the Special Forces camp at Plei Me. On 19 October the enemy opened his campaign
with an attack on the Plei Me camp, which lays twenty-five miles southwest of
Pleiku. The North Vietnamese commander attacked with one

regiment, holding the bulk of his division-size force in reserve. With the
aid Of concentrated tactical air strikes, the South Vietnamese Army in the area
repelled the attack. On 97 October General Westmoreland directed the 1st Cavalry
Division into combat, its mission to seek out and destroy the enemy force in
western Pleiku Province. Thus began the month-long campaign known as the Battle
of the Ia Drang Valley.

Almost immediately, thanks to the helicopter, the division commander, Major
General Harry W. O. Kinnard, was able to send a division forward tactical operation
center to Pleiku. And hot on its heels followed troops and equipment of the
13th Signal Battalion in heavy-lift cargo helicopters. The battalion rapidly
installed a combat radio relay system from the division forward to each of the
deployed brigade headquarters-a definite asset throughout the long battle. By
means of the system each brigade had direct telephone and message contact with
both the division forward tactical operations center and the division base at
An Khe. Sole-user command and control circuits were extended from the I Field
Force headquarters at Nha Trang to General Kinnard's division forward operations
center at Pleiku. The U.S. Air Force liaison officer at the forward command
post in Pleiku was also provided with sole­user circuits. These sole-user circuits
proved invaluable during the last and most intense phases of the la Drang battle.

[33]

Shortly after the start of the operation to relieve the besieged Plei Me Special
Forces Camp, it was found that the infantry units, the companies and battalions
in contact with the enemy, were having difficulty maintaining communications with
their higher headquarters. It did not take long to pinpoint the problem; the short­range,
man-packed voice radios in use simply could not cope with the great distances
and the fact that the jungle undergrowth of the Central Highlands absorbed electrical
energy.

Fortunately the 1st Cavalry Division's 13th Signal Battalion had prepared for
this very contingency while still testing the air­mobile concept at Fort Benning,
Georgia. The problem was solved by placing specially configured combat voice
radios in the US Army's Caribou aircraft and orbiting the craft and their radios
above those ground units that were using the small portable sets. The result
was an airborne relay that could automatically retransmit up to six combat radio
nets over far greater distances than the ground range of the radios. Thus at
la Drang the units on the ground were served by the 13th Signal Battalion's
airborne relay twenty-four hours a day for the last twenty-eight days of the
campaign. The optimum altitude turned out to be nine to ten thousand feet above
ground, effectively extending the range of the small combat radios fifty to
sixty miles, even when the radios were operating in the most dense undergrowth.
However, this method of communications, while highly successful in the la Drang
area, is very costly in manpower and equipment and raises many radio frequency
interference problems.

As the enemy withdrew his assault regiment from Plei Me, it suffered severe
casualties from air strikes and the pursuing air cavalry. But when the 1st Cavalry
Division put a blocking force behind the withdrawing enemy, only a few miles
from the Cambodian border, the North Vietnamese commander committed his remaining
two regiments in an attempt to redeem his earlier failure at Plei Me by destroying
a major US unit-the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, barely thirty days in
Vietnam. The 3d Brigade, however, commanded by Colonel Harold G. Moore, Jr.,
decisively defeated each enemy regiment in turn and the combined efforts of
the division literally swept the la Drang valley clear of North Vietnamese.

As in almost all combat action in the Vietnam War, the la Drang campaign was
not an Army effort alone, but rather a combined air and ground effort. Usually
tactical fighter aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy were used in direct
support of combat operations. Here for the first time in the Vietnam conflict,
the US

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Air Force strategic bombers, the huge B-52s, were used in general support of the
ground combat commander's scheme of maneuver. Hitherto communications had not
been good enough to permit the close coordination required to employ bombing missions
when friendly troops were going to be anywhere in the vicinity. But now direct
links between the field commander and his higher headquarters and the direct lines
to the US Air Force's Direct Air Support Center, greatly reduced the reaction
time. The field commanders of the 1st Cavalry Division could now use the awesome,
destructive power of B-52 air strikes as part of the normal planned air missions
and for the first time this strategic weapon would be used tactically.

The classic campaign of the la Drang valley during the last months of 1965
proved the soundness of the airmobile concept: ground soldiers, aviators, and
communicators were successfully molded into a potent, flexible, fighting force.

As US Army and other combat units continued to pour into the country, adding
to the communications load of the 2d Signal Group, welcome assistance arrived
when the 578th Signal Construction Company landed at Cam Ranh Bay and was attached
to the 41st Signal Battalion. Help also came from the 228th Signal Company,
attached to the 39th Signal Battalion, which was stationed in the newly established
logistical area at Long Binh near Bien Hoa. The 228th provided additional multichannel
radio relay capability in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. But there were
still not enough communications. Brigadier General John Norton, General Westmoreland's
deputy commander of the US Army, Vietnam, was emphatic on that score. In the
late summer of 1965 he stated in a command report:

Communications continues to be a major command problem. I estimate our capability
by 31 December will be 1,735 channels, which, considering customer needs, will
make an average deficit of 30%. On some major axes, the deficit will be higher,
such as Saigon-Nha Trang (61%), and Nha Trang-Qui Nhon (50%) .

In November 1965 the 1,300-man 69th Signal Battalion (Army) commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Charles R. Meyer, arrived, along with the 580th Signal Company (Construction).
The 69th Signal Battalion took over operation of all local communications support
in the Saigon-Long Binh area. Besides providing area signal support for the
numerous troop units, the 69th directly supported the headquarters of the US
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, US Army, Vietnam, and the US Army's 1st
Logistical Command. To assist in this massive effort, the 593d Signal

[35]

SOLDIER DIRECTS LANDING OF RESUPPLY HELICOPTER DURING IA DRANG BATTLE

Company, which had been providing communications support in the Saigon area,
was attached. The 580th Signal Company, which was capable of installing large
fixed cable systems, was also attached.

The last signal unit to arrive during 1965 was the 518th Signal Company, which
reached Vietnam in late December. This company, capable of operating mobile
tropospheric scatter and microwave equipment, relieved the 362d Signal Company
of the responsibility for the operation of the mobile tropospheric scatter and
microwave systems in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones in the South. With
these additions Colonel Moran's 2d Signal Group had grown to a strength of nearly
6,000 by the end of the year. (Chart 1)

Even so, adequate communications service could not keep pace with the growing
number of "customer" requirements. At the end of 1965 General Norton
in his quarterly report continued to list inadequate communications:

The inadequacies of some major axes of long lines communications in USARV
still remain alarmingly high: Saigon-Nha Trang 52%, and Nha Trang-Qui Nhon 50%.
Programmed installation of multichannel equipment has proceeded as planned,
and every measure available to the command is being taken to obviate the situation.

[36]

CHART 1-SIGNAL ORGANIZATION IN VIETNAM, DECEMBER
1965

Impact of Circuit Shortages on Telephone
Systems

The lack of voice channels especially affected the telephone system, particularly
long-distance service within Vietnam. By July 1965 there were approximately
fifty military telephone exchanges in operation and most of these were manual,
using a conglomeration of equipment which required operator assistance to reach
any party. The 2d Signal Group at that time started to rearrange the limited
trunking under a program that required switchboard operators at the numerous
switchboards located throughout the country to place all long-distance calls
through eight exchanges: at the US Miilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam, headquarters
in Saigon, and at Tan Son Nhut, Can Tho, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Qui

[37]

Nhon, Pleiku, and Da Nang. This arrangement proved ineffective, however, because
of the lack of trunk circuits and the ever-increasing number of manual switchboards
that were being connected into the system. The inadequate trunking between switchboards
grew worse as more and more general-user circuits (trunks between telephone exchanges)
came to be required as sole-user on so-called dedicated circuits to support high-priority
combat operations. Even as late as April 1968 approximately 85 percent of the
total channels available were tied up on a sole-user basis. These dedicated circuits
provided direct communication between two facilities, such as between the operations
center at the US Military Assistance Command headquarters and the operations center
of a field force headquarters. The US Air Force relied heavily on dedicated circuits
and systems to provide and coordinate air support.

The state of general-user telephone service in Vietnam during the mid-1960s
is best described in a report prepared by the joint Logistic Review Board. It
states in part:

Operators were too busy to monitor effectively their circuits. Pick-up times
of 3 to 5 minutes were common on the busy boards during peak traffic hours.
Thus, not only were subscribers forced to route their own calls, but after completion
of the call through the first operator, if the distant operator failed to answer,
the calling party could not flash the operator back but was disconnected to
join the queue again, . . . This led to the situation where, while one staff
officer was tying up the operator by demanding an explanation of slow service,
several other staff officers were cranking their generator handles furiously
trying to get the attention of the same operator so that they, too, could discuss
his reasons for being asleep at his job.

Automatic Telephone and Secure Voice Switch
Plans

As early as mid-1964 the US Military Assistance Command headquarters and service
component staffs had recognized the need for an integrated telephone network
in Vietnam, including the need for direct distance dialing through automatic
long-distance switches to be located at DA Nang, Pleiku, Nha Trang, and Tan
Son Nhut. The rapid buildup overtook these early efforts. In September 1965,
General Westmoreland's joint headquarters in Saigon restated a requirement for
a general-user automatic telephone system for South Vietnam. As a result, following
a conference in Hawaii at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific,
the Pacific area headquarters of the Defense Communications Agency was asked
to develop a plan for automatic telephone service for Southeast Asia. The conferees
had established a need for fifty-four fixed automatic dial telephone exchanges.
Of these the

[38]

Army would be responsible for seventeen in Vietnam and nine in Thailand. To tie
these telephone exchanges together the conferees decided that nine long-distance
switching centers were required. Tentatively the centers would be at DA Nang,
Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Saigon, and Can Tho in Vietnam, and at Ubon, Korat,
and Bangkok in Thailand. These would be automatic tandem switches-providing direct
distance dialing service much like the commercial system in the United States-designed
to make most efficient use of the scarce long-distance trunks.

Earlier, in May of 1965, the Army Signal Corps planners in Vietnam and at
US Army, Pacific, headquarters in Hawaii had realized that automatic dial telephone
exchanges were needed immediately in South Vietnam. A proposal was promptly
made to the Department of the Army in Washington that, as an interim measure,
fifteen 400-line transportable dial telephone exchanges be provided. As stated
in the 1965 History of US Army Operations in Southeast Asia:

[the staff at Headquarters, US Army, Pacific] realizing that procurement of
fixed plant equipment and the construction necessary to house such equipment
would be unable to keep pace with the expanding communication requirement, developed
criteria for a model transportable dial central office, and recommended that
. . . [Department of the Army] expedite design, procurement, and fabrication
of the transportable offices for early shipment to ... [Southeast Asia].

As a result of these actions Department of the Army in late 1965 ordered shipment
of two fixed dial telephone exchanges, one of 2,400 lines for Cam Ranh Bay and
another of 1,200 lines for Qui Nhon, and approved procurement of twelve more
fixed dial exchanges and six 600-line transportable exchanges. In addition six
large Army manual switchboards, modified for use as manual long­distance switchboards,
were scheduled to arrive by January 1966, and would provide long-distance service
until the automatic tandem switches became available.

Besides these large requirements for general-user service, there was also
an urgent need for certain subscribers to be able to discuss classified matters
over the telephone system. Installation of a secure voice switchboard was begun
in Saigon on 22 September 1965 and the board became operational on 18 October
when the first subscribers were tied in. By December 1965 this system, which
consisted of seventeen subscribers in Vietnam, was completed. Voice-scrambling
to frustrate enemy interceptions had hitherto been limited to a few fixed installations
because of the complex and costly equipment. But there was a pressing need for
its appli-

[39]

cation to mobile radio, too. In the mid-1960s, secure voice equipment was for
the first time programmed for the voice radios used by US combat troops. The 2d
Signal Group, whose many varied tasks included the distribution and maintenance
of US Army cryptographic material and equipment in Vietnam, began instruction
on the repair of combat voice security equipment in early Au­gust 1965.

Fragmented Communications Control Is United

During the fall of 1965, as the overtaxed US Army Signalmen toiled to provide
the best communications support possible with their limited resources, it became
more and more apparent that the command and control arrangements over US Army
Signal troops and systems in Vietnam were not responsive to operational requirements
because they were not unified or single. These arrangements, as previously discussed,
charged two separate US Army Strategic Communications elements in Vietnam, both
under command of their headquarters in Hawaii and both subject to Defense Communications
Agency direction, with responsibility for long-lines circuits in Vietnam. Neither
of these elements was operationally under General Westmoreland. Moreover, the
2d Signal Group, which was responsive to the US Military Assistance Command
and which came under the command and control of Commanding General, United States
Army, Vietnam, had responsibility for the tails of the long-lines system over
which numerous Defense Department circuits were extended to the customers. In
short, the circuits and systems were intertwined but their command and control
were divided.

Major General Walter E. Lotz, Jr., who served as General Westmoreland's communications-electronics
staff officer from September 1965 to August 1966, described this fragmentation.
He said:

A number of sites were occupied jointly by . . . [US Army Strategic Communications
Command and 2d Signal Group] units. When failures occurred in circuits transiting
the systems of both, each unit pointed its finger at the other. . . . When a
facility failed, determination of what circuits had been affected was primarily
determined by the complaints of the operators at the circuit ends, rather than
from circuit records, . . . , . . . when circuits also traversed cable systems
installed by base commanders, problems were further compounded. As a result
of these frustrations, I wrote a message which General Westmoreland dispatched
to the Army Chief of Staff, recommending common command and control of the .
. . [US Army Strategic Communications Command and United States Army, Pacific]
theater Signal elements in South Vietnam.

[40]

General Westmoreland's message, dispatched to General Harold K. Johnson, Army
Chief of Staff, on 19 October 1965, after outlining the fragmentation of the organization
and control of the US Army Signal troops in Vietnam, declared:

Consider it urgent to resolve fragmentation of command and control of Army
Signal Units in . . . {Republic of Vietnam] to ensure communications system
is responsive to operational requirements, has unity of management and control
and efficiently utilizes marginally adequate resources. . . . I believe extraordinary
measures required. Signal Officer, . . . [US Army Vietnam] should exercise operational
control over all . . . [US Army Vietnam and Strategic Communications Command]
elements in . . . [the Republic of Vietnam].

A Department of the Army team, headed by Major General John C. F. Tillson
III, which included representatives from Head­quarters, US Army, Pacific, at
once hurried to Vietnam in November to examine the situation and discuss the
matter with General Westmoreland. As a result, on 1 December 1965 the Department
of the Army placed the Strategic Communications Command's elements in Vietnam
under the operational control of the Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam. The
Department of the Army further directed the Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific,
General John K. Waters, and Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications
Command, Major General Richard J. Meyer, to provide a plan whereby all Army
Signal elements down to field force level would be placed under a US Army Signal
Command, Vietnam.

Summary, 1962-1965

From the time the 39th Signal Battalion arrived in Vietnam in 1962 through
the turbulent year of 1965, the US Army Signal Corps troops were continually
responding to changing situations and requirements. Even from the early days
in 1962 much of the communications support had to be improvised. Although plans,
concepts, and programs were taking shape during the first big buildup year of
1965, actual resources in the theater remained limited and the communicators
were hard pressed to provide adequate service to the customers. There was no
established commercial system in Vietnam to fall back on, as there had been
in Europe in World War II. In October 1944, only four months after the Allied
troops invaded Europe, the rehabilitated civil system yielded about 3,000 circuits,
totaling over 200,000 circuit miles, supplemented by about 100,000 circuit miles
of new construction built by the signal forces of the US Army.

[41]

BUNKERED COMMUNICATIONS SITE IN THE A SHAD VALLEY as portrayed by Signal
soldier-artist.

[42]

By the endof 1965, however, Army signalmen were being trained and new
units formed in the United States for deployment to Vietnam. These would be available
in increasing numbers to upgrade and expand the improvised communications support
then available in Vietnam. At the same time, as communications resources built
up, the divided or fragmented control over US Army communications was being corrected.
The logistical and administrative troops, who were most affected by the lack of
adequate communications services, would benefit. And although the over-all communications
did not meet all theater requirements, combat operations were sufficiently supported
in every undertaking. General Westmoreland stated in a personal message to all
of the communicators in South Vietnam during the fall of 1966:

The communications system, despite the handicap of having to provide more service
than in any previous war and of operating under severe geographical and tactical
equipment limitations, has responded brilliantly to the burgeoning requirements
of a greatly expanding fighting force. No combat operation has been limited
by lack of communications. The ingenuity, dedication, and professionalism of
the communications personnel are deserving of the highest praise.