ThomasLast month, the Fajr Libya Coalition cemented its control over Tripoli after seizing the Tripoli International Airport. Now in a position with significant leverage, the group has demanded that the current government be dissolved and replaced with the General National Congress led by Omar al-Husseini. While other major events around the world--from a destabilizing Ebola outbreak in West Africa to the transpiring situation in Iraq--have captivated our attention, one must ask if our intervention into Libya was even worth it in the first place.

When the Arab Spring ripped through Libya in 2012, Western nations pursued a strategy of regime change thinly veiled as a Responsibility to Protect operation. Leading from behind, President Obama cobbled together an international coalition to establish a No-Fly Zone over an embattled Libya. Empowered by air support, rebel coalitions broke through and succeeded in defeating Gaddafi's military. While a Constitution and Parliament were created, Libya's nascent government struggled to establish an atmosphere of security for the population to live under. Rebel factions clashed with one another over territory and resources, and Eastern Libya declared independence from the government. Islamist organizations took advantage of the power vacuum to consolidate power and use the nation's lawlessness to its advantage.Vast weapons caches left unguarded in the civil war's wake were quickly disseminated across the region. Egyptian Islamists currently combating the military-backed government in Cario have received a copious amount of their weapons from Libya and Tuareg rebels in Mali were emboldened by combat hardened insurgents and weaponry left over from the civil war. As with many conflicts, Libya's instability has not remained localized. Rather, it has been the pinpoint of destabilization across Africa and the Middle East. But what tangible benefits from Libya have we ascertained following our intervention? According to Carl von Clausewitz, war is an extension of foreign policy by other means. Military force should only be utilized to attain a clearly defined national objective, which was absent when we initially established our No-Fly Zone. The language of political leaders was vague and short-sighted. Regime change is only half a policy. There needs to be a coherent plan outlining the steps a country needs to take in days preceding conflict, during conflict, and after conflict. If American leaders have learned anything from our adventure in Iraq, it's that conflict does not end when a government collapses. It continues to exist as competing entities brought together by the desire to defeat a common enemy begin fighting one another over political control. Libya was no different. Much like Syria, various groups had different ideologies dictating their political principles. While many have found common ground, like the National Front and National Centrist parties, others find their positions to be philosophically incompatible. Religious extremism, tribalism, and political heterodoxy once suppressed by Gaddafi's comprehensive control mechanisms have now been allowed to flourish as an incapable central government struggles to coordinate operations and allocate resources to its military.

Revolutions are tricky beasts. On one hand, they carry with them a hope of change. Tunisia has emerged from its political upheaval fairly stable and prosperous. While it faces problems from Islamist groups and chronic unemployment in some areas, its overall future does not seem very bleak. However, most do not end so happily. Too often they are either crushed or bring about even worse situations. In 1975, Pol Pot overthrew Lon Nol's government and established Democratic Kampuchea. The four years his Communist government was in power resulted in the destruction of important aspects of Cambodian culture and a quarter of the population dying from starvation and state executions.

Policymakers and the civilians who elected them must remember that the world is not a domain which is completely malleable to American or even Western interests. There are situations which are out of control for various cultural or political reasons. We should strive to mold situations where can make a difference to our interests and stay out of ones where meddling will only produce negative results. Above all else, we need to avoid creating situations which are out of our control entirely. Gaddafi was a devil who we could influence and even work with, the maelstrom we replaced him with is neither.

Typically, this blog focuses on matters of an international nature. However, the recent events in Saint Louis, Missouri--my home town--have illustrated the extent to which American law enforcement has become militarized across the nation. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Micheal Brown, his death has acted as catalyst for outrage against racist and militaristic procedures commonly enacted by police departments across the nation.

Institutionalized RacismPolice officers have widely implemented policies which disproportionately affect African Americans and other people of color. For example, Caucasians and African Americans are just as likely to possess marijuana. Yet, black males are far more likely to be stopped and arrested for illicit possession of the drug. 50% of SWAT raids--which have become ubiquitous in the post 9/11 era--target people of color, and are primarily conducted in response to drug violations or to serve warrants. According to Time magazine, only 7% of SWAT deployments were made in response to hostage or barricade situations.

Moreover, officers have been held unaccountable for their actions throughout the years, especially in cases where violence is unnecessarily used against black males. Perhaps the greatest example of such institutional racism existing so blatantly in our police departments is present in the death of Eric Garner. Following the asphyxiation of Garner, who was recorded pleading for his life, the NYC Police Commissioner issued a statement in which he posited that video taping police officers constituted interference. No condemnation of the officers' actions, an update on the investigation, or pledge to institute more oversight. Rather, he criticized a system which creates accountability in an officer's interactions with local citizens.

There is no excuse for Anonymous to release the private information of city employees, or for residents to loot and vandalize. But recognize the underlying conditions which have created such violence in Ferguson. When people lose faith in the system which serves them, the creation and perpetuation of radicalism occurs. People are mad because of systemic repression, something that continues to persist decades after Martin Luther King marched on Washington.

Currently, we don't know what happened between the unnamed police officer and Brown. Even if preliminary evidence suggests that the unlawful use of deadly force was used, we will not be given the whole picture until the FBI completes its investigation. But, to a certain extent, that is irrelevant. What's more pertinent is that Ferguson residents have no reason to believe that Darren Wilson was justified in his actions. When governments are responsible for undermining the health of society, it ought to not surprise us when citizens cease to hold faith in their honesty and effectiveness. As the authorities lose their grip on legitimacy, social break down and disorder begin to creep up the spine of society. Therefore, reformation of these institutions is paramount in increasing their overall ability to serve communities across our nation.

Current Pentagon programs such as 1033 have funneled weapons to departments across the nation. Law enforcement entities in peaceful suburbs suddenly have the ability to impose martial law and put into action de facto military occupations. Take the Boston Bombings last year. County Sheriffs and local cops were transformed into a freightening force capable of massive destruction. Under the pretext of national security, officers began searching the house of citizens without affiliations to Tsarnaev or his compatriots (granted, while the searches were technically voluntary, it's rather hard to say no when a SWAT team is leveling guns at you face.) Unsurprisingly, in a post-9/11 era, militarizing equipment carries the added effect of militarizing their actions. The essence of policing is radically altered when it occurs through the sight of an assault rifle.

However, reinventing the way officers view their community is necessary as well. Increasingly, the warrior's ethos has been drilled into the minds of police officers. The notion of a community being their charge is supplanted with paranoia of their city's population. Such a mentality has created the perception within officers that their city is tantamount to the streets of Fallujah. The physical mutation of an officer's arsenal is coupled with a psychological overhaul which prepares him to use it as he sees fit. Perhaps the most terrifying aspect of this warrior paradigm is that an officer is constantly equipped with it. Even if legislation were to substantially reduce the amount of arms that departments possess, changing current mentalities is extremely difficult. This requires bottom-top, grass root movements to change how departments operate on a community and state level. Recognizing the importance of legislation on a local level is one way citizens can reform their local and state governments. Next you go to the polls, don't gloss over local issues--chances are, they could affect you.

Accountability and ReformThe first step in changing racist and militaristic policies is to accept they exist. The second is to begin pushing for more oversight of police actions. Body cameras have vastly expanded the ability of citizens to ensure that officers are not abusing their authority. In Rialto, California, the local city council passed an ordinance requiring officers to wear cameras. Since the implementation of the policy, an 88% drop in complaints and a 60% drop in the use of force by officers occurred. Furthermore, removing internal norms which allow for officers to abuse citizens with near impunity need to be removed as well. It's quite common for authorities to turn a blind eye to abuses as they occur, necessitating more civilian supervision of internal investigations. In high profile cases such as the Micheal Brown shooting, bringing in an outside agency to preside over an investigation can go a long way in constructing legitimacy with a disenfranchised population.

ConclusionIf we admit that law enforcement is a legitimate function of the state, then standing by while they are pervaded with racist and militaristic conceptions of policing is to support the oppressive utilization of force. Citizens hold a vested interest in ensuring that institutions responsible for their safety are using constitutionally sanctioned and proportional responses to criminality. As militarization and racism increasingly garner our attention in the media, we ought to take advantage of the momentum created by outrage to push for legislative reform to structural flaws in our law enforcement entities.

I haven't posted in awhile, so it feels good to be back on the blog! --Thomas

Many commentators have speculated on the intent of Chinese foreign policy in the 21st Century. Some, like Robert Kaplan, argue that Chinese irredentism will define their long term goals for decades to come. Others say that China has rather innocuous intentions for its role in Asia. However, the primary concern for Chinese policy makers in the near future will be ensuring domestic harmony is maintained. Increasing instability in Xinjiang, pro-democracy demonstrations, frustration with corruption, access to the internet, and the threat of economic stagnation all loom ominously over China. Such challenges have prompted a balancing act by Chinese leaders to reform its political and economic institutions while simultaneously ensuring that the power of China's Communist Party is retained. The Third Plenum, which occurred last fall, outlined China's reformation strategy. First, leaders have reduced the role of government in certain areas of the economy. Namely, resource allocation is being placed in the hands of the free market. Secondly, the central government has begun to identify and prosecute corrupt officials across all levels of government (which has somewhat ironically reduced their recruitment pool). Yet for all the unprecedented levels of "hands off" policies and officials indicted with corruption charges, a much more sinister element is playing into China's internal security strategy. While officials recognize the need to relieve pressure in some areas, they also intend to couple their PR strategies with more empowered internal security structures. Through a multifaceted approach, PRC leaders are centralizing and normalizing institutional procedures to cope with the threat networks pose to hierarchical structures in an informationalized age.

Shoring up bordersThe past year has seen increased activity in a "problem zone" for Chinese leaders: Xinjiang. The province is the epitome of social dissonance. On one hand, you have the hordes of Han Chinese sent in by Communist leaders to pacify the province through demographic superiority. On the other, there exists a proudly defiant Uyghur population which tightly holds onto religious, cultural and political beliefs despite decades of Chinese occupation. Two completely opposite sides to an ever important province forthe Chinese government. Unlike their Tibetian counterparts, Uyghur dissidents have taken it upon themselves to use violence upon China as opposed to "passive" resistance. Thus far, their measures have largely been relegated to knife attacks against train stations. However, a car bomb that exploded in Tiananmen Square last October was attributed to Uyghur terrorists by the Chinese government.

Increasingly, China has become worried about Uyghurs flowing through the Chinese-Pakistani border. Uyghur terrorist organizations such as the Eastern Turkmenistan Islamic Movement are often based in Pakistan, but remain committed to independence from the auspices of China. Much to the frustration of Chinese officials, Pakistan's commitment to the Sino-Pakistani counterterrorism relationship has been similar to its partnership with America. Half-heartedly, Pakistan conducts token raids against terrorist groups identified by Chinese intelligence operations. Oftentimes, Chinese policymakers run into issues with Pakistan alerting groups before raids occur. So despite internal policing in Xinjiang, Uyghur insurgents still flow through borders along Pakistan, necessitating increased focus on pacifying the province.

However, while Pakistan is the primary hub for Uyghur insurgents, the small border shared between China and Afghanistan is also becoming increasingly important to Chinese leaders. The Wakhan Corridor connecting the two nations is largely inhospitable, making border control difficult. Hence, China's stake in Afghanistan's post-2014 future. While America's Asian presence has typically been construed by analysts as a challenge to Chinese interests, a small troop presence left by the United States as laid out by the Bilateral Security Agreement would ultimately benefit stability in Xinjiang. Therein lies China's impetus for participating in negotiations between American and Afghan leaders. Continued US commitment to security in Afghanistan would act as a buffer between Xinjiang-bound insurgents seeking to traverse the Tajikistan-Afghan border in order to reach the Wakhan and China. Given Afghanistan's importance to Chinese security, it would not be surprising if China attempted to partially fill the void if American forces withdrew. Not only because a crumbling Afghan government would lack the capability to secure the Wakhan corridor, but because another power may fill the void in place of China. Both Pakistan and India would facilitate or ignore insurgency groups hostile to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. While measures implemented by China would not include the deployment of combat forces, a growth in intelligence sharing, arms sales, and financial aid could occur. Beijing's primary goal would be to draw Afghanistan into its own sphere of influence, as opposed to either India's or Pakistan's.

Cracking Skulls, Taking NamesIn order to quell unrest, China has launched a massive crackdown within Xinjiang. Details are still coming out of the woodwork, which are few and far between due to heavy restrictions China places on media access to the region, but so far it appears as if the Uyghur population has suffered heavily under Chinese policing. Ramadan, for example, has been banned by Chinese politicians in Xinjiang. Students at Kashgar Normal University were forced to eat lunch with their professors and kept in class until they drank 1/4 of a water bottle. Some initiatives have even been framed with positive titles. 'Project Beauty' literally sends out gun-toting 'fashion' police officers to man check points and detain women whose dress is too Islamic. The heavy handedness of China's policies has reinforced its image as a colonizer, as opposed to an inclusive government seeking to cooperate with Uyghur concerns. The resulting negation of Chinese propaganda efforts has led to an ideological defeat for China. Like many repressive strategies, the utilization of security instruments against indigenous populations without broad societal engagement has served to increase tensions.

However, because governments adjacent to Xinjiang have very little sympathy for the Uyghur cause, a large insurgency has been unable to develop. Even Pakistan, which shelters many groups, has showed little interest in truly provoking Chinese leaders by heavily supplying Uyghur militants. This could be one reason why many terrorist attacks only feature knives, militant groups lack sufficient armaments to launch military attacks against well-equipped Chinese paramilitary forces. The risk of losing any weapons is too high compared to the gain, so knives are used instead. The lack of weapons Kyrgyz forces found on Uyghur militants underscores this possibility. Following the end of combat, soldiers found that only one member had a weapon. If this is the case, then aforementioned border control and isolation strategies by China are likely working.

Alternatively, much of the unrest could be spontaneous riots that occur from rapidly forming and horizontally-structured groups angered by restrictive rules regarding religion. In other words, hierarchical terrorist organizations such as the Eastern Turkmenistan Islamic Movement are not responsible for the majority of attacks. However, Nuramet Sumet, the mastermind behind the recent Elixku Township attack, did have connections with ETIM. Therefore, it's very possible that terrorist groups are at the very least fomenting, if not planning, these attacks. So far, I'm more inclined to believe that unrest in Xinjiang is primarily caused by preexisting organizations taking advantage of tensions as opposed to unorganized rioters.

Outside of hostility in Xinjiang, China still has to contend with other forces within its borders. CCTV cameras cover almost every inch of public life in cities. Demonstrations are quickly suppressed, with police officers promptly whisking protesters away to detainment facilities in armored cars. Though state television frequently likes to divert focus on foreign threats such as the United States and Japan, much of it is smokescreen to maintain nationalism. Chinese leaders are cognizant of their nation's history. As Henry Kissinger points out in On China, Chinese history is cyclical. A central authority claims the 'mandate from heaven' and rules for a period of time, but ultimately collapses as internal dissatisfaction with the reigning entity grows. After a period of disunity, a different authority rises to unify the country.

Historically, China's greatest enemy is itself. Chinese citizens expect their government to reflect the exceptional nature of their culture*. If it fails to fulfill that, then the right to govern is subsequently revoked. The creation of a National Security Council, which is focused primarily on internal security, best reflects the ongoing efforts of leaders to centralize and increase the ability of the government to police its population. With economic growth slowing and an increasing housing bubble becoming more apparent, Chinese leaders have steadily increased internal security expenditures in order to deal with potential uprisings, protests, or revolutions which may occur in times of hardship.

The Great Wall of China--Internet EditionInformation is power. As General Mattis once remarked, an individual with education is even more dangerous than a Marine and his rifle (Blasphemy against the Corps?) Like the Pentagon, China has kept a close eye on unfolding instability in the Arab world. While causes of the Arab Spring are certainly not mypotic, widespread dissemination of information played a crucial role in fomenting and organizing unrest. As such, China has taken to tightening the rope around internet access. Internet rumors spread across popular social media sites like Weibo have been met with arrests, for example. Meanwhile, China has begun implementing stricter rules regarding apps in order to curb 'terrorism.' Notice, however, that these policies are not just applied to Xinjiang, but all of China. There is a present concern that volatility could spread across the nation, with social media tools acting as a force multiplier for divergent political thought. So called efforts to diminish "cultural pollution" effectively ban foreign dramas and TV shows--which may carry explicit or implicit political messages which contradict the Communist Party.

The "Great Firewall of China" (aka Golden Shield Project) enables Chinese leaders to manipulate the flow of information within the country. For example, a citizen searching "democracy" would likely run into cute characters telling them that they shouldn't be thinking about such crazy notions or simply a page with no results shown. Of course, bypassing the wall is certainly possible. Internet users can utilize Tor obfsproxy bundles in conjunction with private obfsproxies, though the Golden Shield actively seeks out the TLS fingerprints of Tor's proxy servers in order to shut them down. Alternatives include the use of steganography, packet fragmentation, and various proxy programs. However, regardless of circumvention methods, the government has succeeded in denying access to restricted materials for the majority of its citizens.

ConclusionThough undergoing reforms to its political and economic policies, internal security mechanisms are being strengthened in order to deal with widespread or isolated incidents of unrest as they pop up. Border control, internal policing capability, and information restriction are all being used as tools to ensure that the state's control is not challenged in the near future.

Notes*Chinese and American culture are quite similar in that both claim to be exceptional. The primary difference is that China tends to internalize its exceptionalism, whereas America actively exports it. Hence, the disparate foreign policies of our two nations throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

Once again, whatever hope the world held for settled peace between Palestine and Israel has been obliterated in a blaze of bullets, bombs, and kidnappings. Yet another cycle of reaction-counterreaction violence has gripped Israel and Gaza, with the violent murders of three Israeli teenagers precipitating this current bout of violence. While many commentators may wish to see Israel supplant Hamas once and for all, it's likely that Operation Protective Edge will end without a fundamental change to the status quo in either Gaza or Israel. Like Operations Pillar of Defense and "Hot Winter" which proceeded it, this operation is likely to have no clear winner or loser. Rather, both sides will eventually begin backing down to prevent tensions from reaching critical-mass, which would force both combatants to begin making major moves.

A History of the Israeli-Gaza conflictThe roots of this violent tale derive from a feud between the Fatah party and a radical political party supported by Iran, called Hamas. Hamas wished not only to obtain complete independence, but also to reclaim all of Israel for a Palestinian state. Their irredentist goals were disputed by the more moderate Fatah party, which sought to seek out a compromise with Israel and live in peaceful, if uneasy, coexistence. Following Hamas' victory in 2006 legislative elections, factional fighting between the Fatah and Hamas broke out. Saudi Arabia managed to broker peace between Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. However, tensions continued to brew until they reached a head in the summer of 2007, as both sides began to increase the tempo of operations against one another. On June 14, Abbas declared a state of emergency, dismissed Haniyeh from his position, and dissolved the unity government. Both Gaza and the West Bank were ruled by martial law, under the direct auspices of Presidential Abbas. However, Palestinian Authority forces proved unable to maintain control of the Gaza Strip. By June 15, Hamas had obtained mostly undisputed control of the territory.

What makes the conflict finicky is the lack of a clean political divide. There exists a somewhat sizable Hamas supporting base in the West Bank, and Fatah supporters still exist in Gaza. Each party merely outnumbers the other in their respective territories, enabling each to establish political dominance. As such, it becomes dangerous to identify with your territory's minority party. Following Hamas' success in unseating the Palestinian Authority, factional fighting began occurring within territories, not between them. Each side is preoccupied with quelling internal dissidents and consolidating power, with Israel serving as a physical buffer between both territories.

Why Hamas and Israel do not want this to pass the 'rubicon'In political science parlance, 'passing the rubicon' refers to a point where conflict is inevitable between two actors. Neither Hamas nor Israel wish to pass the rubicon, as neither have an interest in seeing conflict escalate to the level of a Third Intifada. Gazans, racked by economic destitution due to the Israeli blockade, are primarily concerned with social and economic revitalization in the strip. Hamas rose to political prominence partially because of its emphasis on social welfare programs. Many in America and elsewhere hold a myopic view of Hamas, as if its only element is militancy. In reality, it's actually a multifaceted organization responsible for a wide range of projects. Aside from its vitrolic Islamist pursuits, the group also routinely builds hospitals, schools, and shelters. They also host community organizations, increase social capital, and possess public relations departments to work with citizen's needs. Their political base was build upon social activism, and Gazans increasingly want them to return to their roots. Without broad-based support of confrontation with Israel, Hamas will likely stick to rhetoric and sporadic missile attacks.

As a former Israeli Admiral noted after Operation Pillar of Defense, while military operations come with military gains, they can also come with political consequences. Following Operation Cast lead from late 2008 to early 2009, Israel experienced severe condemnation from the international community. While Israel is no stranger to criticism, their position is severely undermined when the IC works overwhelmingly against it. Furthermore, it's likely that Netanyahu does not want to be drawn into a close-quarters ground war. The confined spaces of Gaza constrain the maneuverability of Israeli forces, and conflict is an economically poor decision at this point. It's ultimately better for Israel if deescalation occurs in the near future. With that said, Netanyahu has also declared Israel's intent to resist international admonishment of its actions. The mobilization of 40,000 soldiers along Israel's border with Gaza is meant a clear warning sign to Hamas: We don't want ground operations, but we will launch incursions if necessary.

ConclusionWhile both sides may be exchanging blows, it's likely that conflict will begin tapering off in the near future. Israel does not want to get bogged down in moral condemnation and street-to-street fighting, and Hamas lacks broad domestic support for internal confrontation with Israel. However, should conflict continue to escalate, no one should question Israeli resolve to step in and target Hamas with ground forces.

The developing situation in Iraq has taken another negative turn, as reports have surfaced that the Iraqi and Syrian governments have been cooperating with one another to strike the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. There have been two confirmed joint operations: the first was when Syrian and Iraqi forces worked with one another to strike ISIS positions last week, the second was more recent when a Syrian strike on an Iraqi border town which killed 57 occurred. On one hand, I don't think anyone should be surprised. Iraq and Syria both share both a common enemy and religious orientation, which naturally makes a cooperative relationship appear beneficial to their respective securities. However, while this may result in tactical victories, pursuing stronger ties with Damascus and Tehran will ultimately prove to be strategically foolish for Baghdad.

During the last iteration of civil strife in Iraq, security was restored not only due to a surge in American forces from 2007-08, but also the Anbar Awakening. Following the initial invasion of Iraq, a political vacuum emerged that coalition forces were unable to fill. The result was Al-Qaeda flowing into the country, quickly establishing links with Sunni tribes. However, in 2005, the Sons of Iraq formed as a counter movement to Al-Qaeda and Sunni militias that were fighting against America and the nascent Iraqi government. Within a year, the Sons of Iraq was a nation-wide movement. As violence steadily increased throughout 2006, ﻿Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi﻿ established the Anbar Awakening Council to unite Sunni tribes against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was ultimately integral in ending the civil war in Iraq. Following our withdraw from Iraq in 2011, the Sons of Iraq were slowly disbanded. While this was a sensible move, because no country should have two religiously distinct armies, Maliki failed to provide ample job opportunities for returning members. As a result, many former members were left unemployed by 2013. Furthermore, his increasingly sectarian policies served to ostracize the Sunni community. After America withdrew, there was a purge of Sunni officers among the upper echelons of Iraq's military command structure. Many Sunnis not only feel as if the Army's composition does not adequately reflect their demographic, but also that Maliki was persistently using their sect as a scapegoat.

A synthesis of unemployment and marginalization provided the perfect pool for recruitment by ISIS and other terrorist groups operating in Syria. As a result, by early 2014, ISIS managed to seize Fallujah and Ramadi. Maliki's lethargic military response, inability to protect Sunni populations from abuse, and belligerent sectarian remarks only served to worsen the situation. Sunnis increasingly viewed the Iraqi government as a hateful, inept entity. As VICE News reported, many citizens in captured cities feel safe under ISIS, which they could not say when the military handled the security situation. While we may not like Al-Qaeda, their affiliates, or their breakaways, we should sympathize with the yearning many Sunnis have to live peaceful, safe lives--even if that's under a Wahabbist terrorist group they don't particularly agree with.

Now, Iraq's government is coordinating with an unpopular Shiite regime to kill Sunnis. Instead of decrying Syria's actions against Iraqi citizens, it appears as if Maliki was complicit in their attack. This will only further reinforce present resentment in Sunni populations, making a fruitful counter-insurgency strategy even more difficult to implement. Without a wide attempt at reapprochement between the Iraqi government and Sunni tribes, combating the insurgency will be unnecessarily long, casualty-intensive, and destabilizing for the entire region. Further worries stem from Baghdad's ties with Tehran. Several articles have surfaced alleging that Iran has deployed 500 members of the elite Quds Force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' commanding officer to assist Iraq in its defense of Baghdad. Not does this supplement Maliki's blatant sectarian policies, but it also allows Iran far more influence in the Middle East. Maliki's actions signify a realignment that leaves Iraq even closer to Iran's political clout.

But Iraq is not the only actor that can be blamed, America's dithering policy in Syria ultimately allowed for Jihadist organizations like ISIS to become so large and well-equipped. If America had initially worked more closely with the Free Syrian Army, then perhaps the situation in both Iraq and Syria would be different. Now, it appears as if we've passed the golden opportunity to fund religiously moderate Syrian groups, and we're certainly reaping the consequences of that failure. If we intend on ensuring that the epicenter of the world's energy market remains somewhat stable, then it is necessary that we increase our involvement with Syria's opposition. For his part, it seems as if Obama has begun to do just that by proposing 500 million dollars in aid to Syrian rebels. However, without Iraq agreeing to domestic policy reforms, it appears as if a great deal of developments in both Syria and Iraq will happen outside of our control.

As turmoil in Iraq continues to develop, ISIS militants inch close and closer towards the heartland of oil in Southern Iraq. The threat became fully apparent on Wednesday, when ISIS militants attempted to seize control of Iraq's largest oil refinery, but were repelled by security forces at the facility. Uncertainty regarding Iraq's future has resulted in economic reverberations in the United States. The DOW Jones dropped 102 points on June 12, and oil prices have crawled up to $115 per barrel.

Hikes in oil prices have affected Americans at the pump, we've now reached a national average of 4 dollars per gallon of gas, which is the point where Americans begin feeling the heat from prices. Relatively speaking, Americans are insulated from increasing costs that naturally stem out of crisis. Due to laws that developed out of the 1973 oil crisis, American crude can only be sold so long as the Federal government deems it consistent with our national interests. Regardless of if it is a positive policy on balance, this means that oil prices are naturally lower in America vis-a-vis Europe. Gas prices in the Europe are routinely higher than in America and regularly reach as high as 10 dollars in some places during times of economic distress. While many champion the American oil boom as being a remedy to the problem of having the world's energy supply situated in the most politically volatile country on earth, the International Monetary Fund has said that international oil prices are more closely tied into Iraq's oil output than America's (partially due to the aforementioned restrictions on exports).

Luckily, it seems as if the American economy will be able to withstand the increasing turmoil in Iraq. Macroeconomic Advisers, a Saint Louis-based economic consulting firm, has not revised its forecast for the American economy. Even a draconian increase in oil prices--say, $10 per barrel--would only slow down economic growth by two- or three-tenths of a percentage. This would translate to an unfortunate reduction in the speed at which our economy expands, and a slower decrease in the unemployment rate. But overall, the transpiring events in Iraq thus far hardly represent a major threat to the American economy. With that said, if Iraq is unable to get a handle on the advance of ISIS militants, then America could be faced with a major crisis. Ifinsurgents managed to take most or even all of Iraq's oil fields, then prices could skyrocket exponentially. This, of course, would have an enormous impact on global financial institutions. To use a point of comparison, the 1973 oil crisis set off an era of stagnation in the Soviet Union, stagflation in America and Europe, and (more positively) resulted in Japan shifting its economy from oil intensive industries to electronic based ones. Granted, as a qausi-state actor, ISIS would more than likely continue to sell oil from refineries that it seizes. But as we've seen in Libya, reinvigorating oil industries ravaged by conflict can be extremely difficult. Further, it's questionable if the United States and its allies would do business with a terrorist state.

Therefore, it is essential that America ensure that Baghdad is able to regain control over renegade provinces. Most importantly, policies promoting sectarian divides between Sunni's and Shiites need to be implemented. However, building intelligence architecture, providing greater air power, division-level planners and advisers, and SOF should be offered as well.

A common refrain you'll come across both in life and on the internet, is the belief that American power renders the threat emanating from [insert geopolitical monster of the week here] either of little importance to our overall interests or, less often, irrelevant. This rather naive view of strategic success is rather akin to believing that global interactions are nothing more than a large scale version of the card game War, in which powers stack up their respective militaries in a line and proceed to duke it out until the country with the highest value is left standing. No doubt, American conventional superiority has ensured us a remarkable degree of security. However, casting power as a surety for strategic success is fallacious. Asymmetrical strategy, for example, hinges upon the belief that lesser powers can obtain victory over stronger opponents--an idea that has been validated in both theory and practice.

Such asymmetric strategies are being employed by our competitors, like China, Iran, and Russia. All three have a very robust anti-access/area denial capability which can disrupt NATO/multilateral operations in event of war. Most notably, China's huge reserve of ballistic/cruise missiles, submarines, and mines enable it to effectively carve out an inaccessible area of ocean up to the first island chain. Despite our ability to best China's fleet in a conventional, World War Two-style naval engagement, they have created a strategy that can target our weaknesses: everything from gaps in our missile defense to our cyber infrastructure.

However, Iran and Russia are not to be ignored. NATO's ability to respond to rapid territorial aggression in Eastern Europe by Moscow would be severely hampered by a flurry of ballistic missiles launched at incoming supply lines. Though it has been over a decade since Operation Mellinium Challenge 2002, both Iran's ability to close down the Strait of Hormuz--if only temporarily--and America's vulnerabilities in littoral areas remain apparent, even as we continue forward with programs designed to help us "win" in such environments.

But perhaps more broadly, we've seen less capable nations match or exceed our own geopolitical influence on a regional level. In rather Cold War-esque fashion, some of the biggest strategic victories are being won under the veil of political subversion, covert operations, and back door economic support. Arguably, NATO remains far more vulnerable to a Ukraine-style invasion of a member state than a conventional invasion envisioned by the strategists of Cold War-era battle plans. The Baltic states all possess significant ethnic Russian populations, with a large portion feeling closer to Moscow than their respective governments. Should Russia arm internal dissidents in Baltic, how would NATO respond? Potentially with a prolonged insurgency against ethnic insurgents, which would enable Russia to wage war against the alliance via prolong. However, would they retaliate against Russia, risking a conventional conflict and its associated economic impacts? It's a question that I cannot begin to answer, but I will say that America did not attack the Soviet Union over its support of North Vietnam (which included shooting down U.S. aircraft). But at the same time, South Vietnam was not a NATO member.

Iran has created a regional network of non-state and state alliances, which has enabled it exert a large degree of influence in the Middle East. Hezbollah, one of the major non-state actors engaging in conflict within Syria, is funded and guided by Iran. With the help of tactical advice, training, and weapons shipments from Iran (coupled with war's version of natural selection), Syria's third-rate army has evolved into a resilient and effective force that has achieved several strategic victories against opposition forces. On a more economic level, Iran's tanker fleet has circumvented oil embargoes on Syria, which has kept the regime's war machine rolling on. In terms of political subversion, Iran was responsible for backing the 2007 coup that supplanted the Palestinian Authority with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, a major setback for Israeli security and American political interest in the territories. In Iraq, Iran has reportedly deployed 500 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to the country and dispatched the Quds Force's leading general to coordinate the defense of Baghdad.

Conventional power is important, but it does not always translate into strategic success. Asymmetrical opponents have devised dangerous ways to defeat our military forces. But perhaps more imminent, regional powers have been expanding their influence in ways America cannot match without risking the very likely possibility that our efforts will backfire. As these situations continue to develop, citizens and policymakers alike will have to remember that threats don't always come in the form of armies and terrorists--it's the ghosts fomenting unrest in the corner that can pose the true threat.

Since the interim agreement with Iran over its nuclear weapons program last November, there has been a mainstream dearth of reporting concerning the prospect of Iranian proliferation in the Middle East. The most recent announcement by Itai Brun, Israel's senior military intelligence analyst, that Iran has upheld its side of the nuclear deal has largely gone unreported by CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. However, while these mainstream titans have been sleeping, Clifford May may has met this piece of what should be celebrated news with a criticism of American diplomatic efforts with Iran. For the purposes of this post, I will be addressing four arguments posited by May: First, that the Iranian nuclear deal is analogous with the North Korean nuclear deal. Second, the Syrian red line debacle has severely impacted Iran's calculus on reaching the weaponization precipice. Third, Iran's release of hostages stemmed out of fear that Reagan would utilize military strikes if the did not comply with our negotiation demands. Fourth, American support of the Palestinian Unity government will impact their nuclear calculus.

North Korean Nuclear ProliferationIn his harangue of American diplomatic efforts with Iran, May draws parallels with North Korea and Iran. May argues that much like Bush's attempt at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Obama will fail to prevent Iran's nuclear machinations from reaching fruition, due to our lack of a credible deterrent. However, this is an incorrect comparison for three reasons. First, no organization closely monitored the freeze of North Korea's plutonium enrichment program following the Agreed Framework negotiations. North Korea consistently worked against verification efforts, resulting in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting in 1996 that it had been unable to verify their declarations. By 2000, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohammed El Baradei, stated that little had been gleaned by the Agency since the initial agreement in 1994, because of uncooperative behavior on behalf of the DPRK. In stark contrast, Iran has worked closely with the IAEA on verification efforts, more so than either Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-Il. In fact, the IAEA has been able to verify the initial declarations made by Iran over its nuclear stockpile. Secondly, Iran and North Korea are two separate nations, with two very different views on international engagement. Iran is a cosmopolitan nation that has a history of international engagement since the 1990s, whereas North Korea is a hermit nation that has formal, close relations with no nations outside of China and perhaps Russia. Their respective security situations--outside of being an enemy of America--are also different: the foremost concern of North Korea is maintaining internal security, whereas Iran is primarily concerned with establishing a sphere of influence within the Middle East. Finally, the failures of both the Agreed Framework and Six Power Talks were not because of an excess of "carrots", but a lack thereof. What May fails to realize is that immediately after the Agreed Framework, America began to heavily sanction North Korea over its missile program. This helped to sour the deal, reducing North Korean incentive to cooperate with the United States and international community. Thus, the resulting decade saw tensions ebb and flow, until a crisis in 2002 over North Korean uranium enrichment ultimately led to the Six Power Talks. In 2005, North Korea declared that it would forgo the development of nuclear weapons in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, immediately after this, America decided to increase sanctions, which once again reduced the impetus for North Korea to comply with expectations. To put it this way, North Korea presumably agreed to international pressures because it expected to achieve increased economic security. When this did not happen, what reason did North Korea's leadership have to continue playing along with American demands? None--because we established a precedent in which we would increase pressure, regardless if they complied or not.

It's also important to remember that America's previous military attempt to rescue the hostages, Operation Eagle Claw, was a massive failure. So it wouldn't make sense for Iran to believe that outcome would be any different under Reagan as opposed to Carter--neither were responsible with crafting military operations, their main role as Commander-in-Chief is create policy goals for the military to reach and sanction operations. Even with Reagan's plans to beef up security spending, the Iranian hostage crisis did not make up a major plank in his 1980 presidential platform, he instead emphasized the need for a strong nation defense against the Soviet Union and advocated for a shift to supply side economics. Therefore, it's questionable that Reagan's election played a significant role in Iran's calculus.

America's Support of the Palestinian UnityContrary to what May asserted, America will not be using its tax dollars to fund Hamas. Both Hamas and Fateh have agreed that the unity government will not be composed of Hamas members, but rather independent technocrats until elections can be held. Given the massive unpopularity of Hamas in Gaza, it's unlikely that they will be able to establish a monopoly on influence in Palestine's new government. Therefore, this would represent a step towards deradicalization in Gaza and undermine Iran's influence there. Instead of Hamas controlling all political operations within the territory, the significantly more moderate and less violent Fatah party will have shared power. Furthermore, it's not as if America is throwing its political weight behind Hamas. John Kerry stated that funding will be based on the actions of the Palestinian Unity government. This is a perfectly valid position to take: we're neither preemptively increasing our support of Palestine nor condemning it to failure. Instead, we are proceeding normally. If Israel's security is substantially diminished by this development, then we can easily pull back our funding of the government.

Of course, all of this presumes that a unity government will, in fact, stay erected. Fatah and Hamas entities have agreed upon establishing a unity government in the past. However, plans always fall through. My guess would be that Hamas recognizes the threat it presents to its power hold in Gaza. But with conditions deteriorating, relations with Iran dwindling, and internal unrest increasing, they very well may believe that they must give up some power in order to retain any at all. The Syrian Red Line DebacleOut of all the arguments made by May, this easily holds the most weight. Last summer, America failed to go through with a red line we set against Assad: to not cross the chemical threshold. While I myself believe that it was a stupid position to take in the first place, it does not change our original threat to utilize force against Assad should he deploy chemical weapons.

However, credibility is situational, not categorical. The actions of a nation in one situation do not necessarily reflect its willingness to take action in another. Take the Cuban missile crisis. Following our successful gamble, no one in Washington suddenly questioned the Soviet Union's willingness to respond against American aggression in Berlin. Not every crisis or transgression rates the same to countries, and chemical weapons use in Syria is no different. For the United States, upholding the Convention on Chemical Weapons is a low priority. In the 1980s, we aided Saddam Hussein in the manufacturing of chemical weapons to use against Iran, and then subsequently gave him the tactical intelligence to effectively employ them. Syria's chemical weapons has never been a major issue for the American foreign policy establishment: we've never put in place massive sanctions on Syria for its arsenal, never held meetings to dismantle infrastructure (prior to the August attacks, at least), or launched cyber attacks to dismantle Syrian chemical weapons infrastructure. Unlike Syria, Congress is out for blood in regards to Iran's nuclear program. Senators from both parties have tried to undercut American diplomatic efforts in order to place even more stringent sanctions against Iran. The is very little doubt that congress would impede Obama's attempts to strike Iran. All of this signals a much stronger resolve to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Iranian government, because the stakes of nuclear proliferation are significantly higher than that of chemical weapons use.

Given that a sizable portion of Ukraine's economy relies on international trade (much of which is transported via sea lanes), and the potential for amphibious operations on its coastline, it would seem pertinent that Kiev develop a maritime strategy. Perhaps not today, as their foremost concern should be quelling rebellion in Eastern Ukraine. However, definitely as time goes on they will need to adopt sufficient counter-measures. Similar to the proposals I have offered for Georgia, it would probably be within Ukraine's interests to adopt a strategy based around Anti-Access/Area Denial.

As we've seen, A2/AD strategies have been employed effectively on a theoretical level. In 2002, General Paul Van Riper utilized an anti-access strategy during Operation Millennium Challenge, a wargame aimed at reaffirming American network-centric warfare capabilities. However, it really illustrated major flaws in our ability to counter threats in littoral areas. In 2010, a RAND Corporation simulation revealed that China could establish aerial dominance over Taiwan by using ballistic and cruise missiles to strike a devastating decapitating strike at American air and naval bases in the region. Bernard Cole reaffirms China's Anti-Access capability in his 2011 book, The Great Wall at Sea, where he details the aspects of Chinese naval strategy, which incorporates submarines, mines, missiles, and aircraft to keep America outside of the second island chain.

The Ukrainian Navy already fields anti-ship missiles. The P-500 Bazalt is one example of this. For Ukraine, the goal should be to convert a substantial number of these missiles to be able to launch from terrestrial platforms. Land based cruise missiles would be more difficult for the Russian Navy to counter, as compared to relatively defenseless boats in harbor. But more ingredients must be added to this maritime strategy. The use of mines could be employed by Ukraine to defend its territorial waters from Russian intrusion, as well. During World War Two, mines laid in the Pacific Ocean from April, 1945, to Japan's surrender were responsible for 670 damaged or sunk ships. Of the 18 ships sunk or seriously damaged since World War Two, 15 incidents have been from mines. Therefore, mines should play a critical role in Ukrainian naval defense. Next, Ukraine should also further integrate naval special warfare units into its maritime strategy. Using SOF to sabotage naval bases could put a serious dent into Russia's ability to effectively operate. Moreover, these units can also be used to conduct anti-piracy operations, which would help strengthen its relationship with NATO. Finally, Ukraine still needs ships to guard SLOCs from harassment, conduct patrols, and act as visual deterrents. These ships do not have to be large, expensive pieces of equipment. Patrol or missile boats should suffice.

Of course, there are a couple of issues with the strategy I mentioned. First, Georgia's air defense corps was already an effective body prior to the South Ossetian conflict in 2008. This is one reason why I originally argued for Georgia to adopt an A2/AD strategy: they already had a body of soldiers capable of fulfilling an air defense role, so expanding that into anti-ship would not outside the realm of possibilities. Ukraine's entire military, on the other hand has fair quite poorly against Russia's exertion of force against them these past few months. It was quite evident that if they had to, Russian forces could perform quite well against their Ukrainian counterparts stationed in the Crimean Peninsula. Secondly, there is an issue of if this strategy is economical or not. While missiles are certainly less expensive than ships, one has to factor in R&D, platform, mine, and missile production costs associated with developing an Anti-Access/Area Denial force. If it does break the bank, then a reevaluation of the aforementioned strategy would be needed.

Ukraine is not an economic, military, or political powerhouse. They have a number of short comings that must be factored into analyses of their situation. Especially as it pertains to their potential strategic options. They cannot afford a ship-for-ship strategy against Russia. It is simply impossible for them to do so, and trying that out would take away resources that could be devoted towards other procurement and development programs. At the same, though, they cannot afford to ignore Russia's looming presence in the Black Sea. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that A2/AD will be the most efficient model for maritime defense against future Russian encroachment.

I apologize for not posting this yesterday. My family and I drove up to the great Northern state of Wisconsin yesterday. By the time we got up there, it was nearly midnight and I was too tired to get on the internet.

Perhaps a more overlooked facet of international relations is the effect climate change has in altering the global security environment. Despite what Ken Ham or Rick Perry would have you believe, climate change is actively reshaping entire geographic regions. Thawing Arctic ice is an example of this trend, which creates new sea lanes for ships to sail through during summer month. These rather staggering changes are also becoming more accommodating to installations capable of accessing oil deep below the Arctic ice, changing regional geopolitical calculations. America has had to rethink its Arctic strategy from the occasional nuclear submarine to deploy a sizable security force capable of conducting a wide array of operations, from search and rescue to search and destroy.

However, climate change is somewhat of a double edged sword. While the West will no doubt jump at the chance to shorten the distance cargo ships have to sail, and Russia in particular must be quite overjoyed at the chance to further cement their position as a global energy mogul, there are also a host of challenges riding on the coattails of global climate change. On balance, these challenges will ultimately outweigh the benefits that some point to as a sort of indication that climate change is a net positive force.

Global increases in temperature have had a disastrous effect in Africa, for example. Desertification has rampantly thrashed sub-Saharan and Saharan Africa, resulting in frequent droughts, diminished bodies of water, and decreased crop outputs. Subsequently, increased poverty and radicalization have both occurred, creating terrorist breeding grounds out of affected nations. Individuals who find themselves in dire situations often turn to drastic measures, figuring they have nothing else to lose. Given that Americans live in a nation where the government pays farmers not to sell food, it is unsurprising that we are insulated from sudden changes in the international food market. However, temperature variations of even half a degree can cause catastrophic effects on crop yield. In food sensitive environments, a slightly hotter year can devastate a nation's agricultural sector. Therefore, African and Middle Eastern nations are especially susceptible to these negative effects of climate change. Take the 2011 Arab Spring, which up-seated the political status quo throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa. High cost of food was a major point of anger for anti-government protestors in the Arab world. This isn't a new event, either. In the 17th century, for example, lower temperatures caused widespread food shortages throughout Europe, which contributed to political tumult throughout the era.

In the Pacific, island nations are increasingly becoming more and more vulnerable to rising sea levels. Kiribati is expected to become completely submerged underwater before 2040, making the nation's number one goal to find somewhere else to live when their habitat disappears. Micronesia's islands are becoming saturated with salty water, making agriculture increasingly difficult. Increased rates of hurricanes will continue to lay waste to both human and economic security through out the region. Areas of China contend with increased rates of malaria and schistosomiasis due to climate change, an issue that will become more ubiquitous world-wide as time goes on.

Both natural disaster and conflict arising from climate change result in migration, which can further deteriorate conditions within a state or its regional neighbors. Population hegiras often put stress on a nation's economy. If desertification produces 500,000 internally displaced refugees, what is a nation to do with them? How does a government pay, feed, house, and find jobs for half a million people? Such conditions can serve to undermine an already failing economy. Further, if these refugees are fleeing from resource scare environments, it's likely that the place they're headed to is no land of milk and honey. Areas may already struggle to provide enough resources to its own residents, let alone tend to a humanitarian crisis. Moreover, peace in many countries is maintained by a very, very fragile sectarian or ethnic balance between two or more groups. Thus, sudden disruptions in demographics could result in increased political tensions, or even conflict. If ethnic group A already hates ethnic group B, how would they react to having to provide for their care? These are some of the issues I wish to explore in depth, as I think that they'll become increasingly more salient as time goes on. Even if NASA's draconian predictions prove to be incorrect (which is possible), it's obvious that climate change is altering the security environment. Thus, nations must be prepared to deal with these changes in the most effective way possible.