It is important to understand that the Turing Test (TT) is not, nor was
it intended to be, a trick; how well one can fool someone is not a
measure of scientific progress. The TT is an empirical criterion: It
sets AI's empirical goal to be to generate human-scale performance
capacity. This goal will be met when the candidate's performance is totally
indistinguishable from a human's. Until then, the TT simply represents
what it is that AI must endeavor eventually to accomplish scientifically.

Pen-Pals Versus Robots

In my own papers I have tried to explain how trickery, deception and
impersonation have nothing at all to do with the scientific import of
Turing's criterion (Harnad 1989, 1991). AI is not a party game. The
game was just a metaphor. The real point of the TT is that if we had a
pen-pal whom we had corresponded with for a lifetime, we would never
need to have seen him to infer that he had a mind. So if a machine
pen-pal could do the same thing, it would be arbitrary to deny it had a
mind just because it was a machine. That's all there is to it!

This entirely valid methodological point of Turing's is based on the
"other minds" problem (the problem of how I can know that anyone else
but me actually has a mind, actually thinks, actually has intelligence
or knowledge -- these all come to the same thing): It is arbitrary to
ask for more from a machine than I ask from a person, just because it's
a machine (especially since no one knows yet what either a person or a
machine REALLY is). So if the pen-pal TT is enough to allow us to
correctly infer that a real person has a mind, then it must by the same
token be enough to allow us to make the same inference about a
computer, given that the two are totally indistinguishable to us (not
just for a 5-minute party trick or an annual contest, but, in
principle, for a lifetime). Neither the appearance of the candidate nor
any facts about biology play any role in my judgment about my human pen
pal, so there is no reason the same should not be true of my
TT-indistinguishable machine pen-pal.

In fact, one of the reasons no computer has yet passed the TT may be that
even successful TT capacity has to draw upon robotic capacity. A TT
computer pen-pal alone could not even tell you the color of the flower
you had enclosed with its birthday letter -- or indeed that you had
enclosed a flower at all, unless you mention it in your letter. An
infinity of possible interactions with the real world, interactions of
which each of us is capable, is completely missing from the TT (and
again, "tricks" have nothing to do with it).

Is the Total Turing Test Total Enough?

Note that all talk about "percentages" in judging TT performance is
just numerology. Designing a machine to exhibit 100% Turing
indistinguishable performance capacity is an empirical goal, like
designing a plane with the capacity to fly. Nothing short of the TTT or
"total" flight, respectively, meets the goal. For once we recognize that
Turing-indistinguishable performance capacity is our mandate, the
Totality criterion comes with the territory. Subtotal "toy" efforts are
interesting only insofar as they contain the means to scale up to
life-size. A "plane" that can only fall, jump, or taxi on the ground is
no plane at all; and gliding is pertinent only if it can scale up to
autonomous flight.

The Loebner Prize Competition is accordingly trivial from a scientific
standpoint. The scientific point is not to fool some judges, some of
the time, but to design a candidate that REALLY has indistinguishable
performance capacities (respectively, pen-pal performance [TT] or
pen-pal + robotic performance [TTT]); indistinguishable to any judge,
and for a lifetime, just as yours and mine are. No tricks! The real thing!

The only open questions are (1) whether there is more than one way to
design a candidate to pass the TTT, and if so, (2) do we then need a
stronger test, the TTTT (neuromolecular indistinguishability), to pick
out the one with the mind? My guess is that the constraints on the TTT
are tight enough, being roughly the same ones that guided the Blind
Watchmaker who designed us (evolutionary adaptations -- survival and
reproduction -- are largely performance matters; Darwinian selection
can no more read minds than we can).

Let me close with the suggestion that the problem under discussion is
not one of definition. You don't have to be able to define
intelligence (knowledge, understanding) in order to see that people have
it and today's machines don't. Nor do you need a definition to see that
once you can no longer tell them apart, you will no longer have any
basis for denying of one what you affirm of the other.

Footnote

1.
In a nutshell, the symbol grounding problem can be stated
as follows: Computers manipulate meaningless symbols that are
systematically INTERPRETABLE as meaning something. The problem is that
the interpretations are not intrinsic to the symbol manipulating
system; they are made by the mind of the external interpreter (as when
I interpret the letters from my TT pen-pal as meaningful messages).
This leads to an infinite regress if we try to assume that what
goes on in MY mind is just symbol manipulation too, because the thoughts
in my mind do not mean what they mean merely because they are
interpretable by someone ELSE's mind: Their meanings are intrinsic. One
possible solution would be to ground the meanings of a system's symbols
in the system's capacity to discriminate, identify, and manipulate
the objects that the symbols are interpretable as standing for (Harnad
1987), in other words, to ground its symbolic capacities in its robotic
capacities. Grounding symbol-manipulating capacities in
object-manipulating capacities is not just a matter of attaching the
latest transducer/effector technologies to a computer, however. Hybrid
systems may need to make extensive use of analog components and perhaps
also neural nets, in order to connect symbols to their objects (Harnad et
al. 1991; Harnad 1992).