Condemning
in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons and toxic
chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing
grave concern that civilians continue to be killed and injured by
chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic,

Reaffirming
that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of
international law and reiterating
that those individuals, entities, groups or governments responsible
for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,

Recalling
the decision of the OPCW Executive Council EC-86/DEC.9 dated
13 October 2017, which encouraged States Parties to share,
according to their national laws and as appropriate, information
related to cases of developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling,
retaining, transferring, or using chemical weapons by non-state
actors, as well as domestic investigations conducted with regard to
chemical weapons, including information on any subsequent criminal or
other legal proceedings undertaken,

Welcoming
full and profound cooperation extended by the government of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the FFM and JIM in establishing facts related
to the incidents with chemical weapons in Um-Housh and Khan Shaykhun,

Noting
that the government of the Syrian Arab Republic called upon the FFM
and JIM to conduct the investigation at the scene in Khan Shaykhun
and granted access to its Shayrat airbase, thus enabling the JIM and
OPCW experts to verify its premises by taking environmental samples
for the presence of traces of sarin as it was allegedly delivered
from there and used in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, interviewing in
this regard the airbase staff, examining logbooks and aircraft
stationed there,

Expressing
its regret that the FFM and JIM failed to visit Khan Shaykhun and to
collect environmental samples at Shayrat airbase although the
necessary security and technical conditions, as the Council learnt,
were in place,

Expressing
also its regret that the samples the FFM relied on in the course of
investigation lacked full chain of custody envisaged in the working
instruction of the OPCW Technical Secretariat "Chain of Custody
and Documentation for OPCW Samples On-site",

Recalling
that resolution 2319 encouraged the JIM to consult appropriate United
Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular
the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and
1267/1989/2253
ISIL
(Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange
information on non-state actors' perpetration, organization,
sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons
in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Recalling
that resolution 2319 reaffirmed the JIM's ability to examine
additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared
by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the JIM,

Recalling
further
that the United Nations Secretary-General in his letter to the
President of the Security Council on 27 August 2015 committed to
undertake the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff of the
JIM to provide the relevant requisite skill sets on the basis of
professional expertise and experience, with due regard to the
importance of recruiting staff on as wide geographical basis as
possible, which fully applies to the FFM, as provided in its terms of
reference and the CWC,

Noting
that the FFM continues to examine other allegations of chemical
weapons use in Syria, unfortunately once again in a remote mode,
which does not allow to ensure the necessary quality of the
investigation,

Expressing
further alarm that chemical weapons have been used in Syria by
non-state actors and that the so-called Islamic State (also known as
ISIL or Da'esh), the Al Nusrah Front and other non-state actors used
or have shown obvious intent to develop, acquire, manufacture,
possess, transport, transfer, or use chemical weapons,

Reaffirming
that no party in the Syrian Arab Republic should use, develop,
produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons,

Having
considered
the seventh and the previous reports of the JIM,

Proceeding
from the understanding that in view of the experience gained, there
is the need for further improvements and update of the JIM's mandate
as it was envisaged in paragraph 1 of resolution 2319,

1. Decides
to renew the mandate of the JIM, as set out in resolution 2319 and in
this resolution, until 16 May 2018 with a possibility of further
extension and update by the Security Council if it deems necessary;

2. Reaffirms
paragraphs 1-4, 6-9, and 12 of resolution 2235 as amended, where
appropriate, by this resolution;

3. Requests
the JIM to dispatch as soon as possible an investigative team to the
site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun to conduct full-scale
investigation using the whole spectrum of relevant methods;

4. Urges
all parties in Syria and Member States with relevant capabilities to
facilitate without any further delay free and safe access for JIM's
experts to the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and adjacent
areas;

5. Requests
the JIM to dispatch immediately another investigative team to Shayrat
airbase in the Syrian Arab Republic to collect environmental samples
in order to verify the allegations that sarin used in Khan Shaykhun
had been stored at the airbase;

6. Requests
the JIM in the light of paragraph 8 of its seventh report to
reevaluate its earlier assessments and conclusions, paying special
attention to the incident with chemical weapons in the town of Sarmin
since the JIM itself described as "improbable" the
eventuality in which a chlorine-filled barrel bomb, dropped from a
helicopter, could have impacted through the ventilation shaft with a
matching dimension;

7. Decides
that the JIM in conducting its investigations must be guided by high
standards established by the CWC and, accordingly, use the whole
spectrum of relevant methods envisaged in the above-mentioned
Convention and in particular Part XI of its Annex on implementation
and verification, which includes investigation, sampling,
interviewing witnesses and collection of evidence and information on
the site of an incident;

8. Requests
the JIM in addition to provisions of paragraph 7 above to make use of
the recommendations contained in its fourth and fifth reports
(paragraph 49 and paragraph 11 respectively) in order to ensure full
scale, professional and high quality investigations;

9. Directs
the JIM in the course of its investigations to make full use of
evidence collected by the FFM in accordance with the CWC high
standards, as referred to in paragraph 7 above;

10. Requests
the JIM to retain its findings and the findings of the FFM, not based
on the results of on-site investigation, as well as remotely
collected evidence and information until such time, when full-scale
and high quality investigation on the site of an incident becomes
possible;

11. Decides
that any JIM's investigation shall indispensably involve collection
and analysis of additional information and evidence that was not
obtained or prepared by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the
JIM, including all information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic
as well as others pertaining to activities of non-state actors with
regard to using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling,
retaining or transferring chemical weapons;

12. Calls
on
the JIM and FFM to engage into the closest cooperation on all the
identified cases of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic in order for the investigation to be as full and
comprehensive as possible, with the involvement of all the necessary
procedures and methods;

13. Reiterates
its support expressed in paragraph 5 of resolution 2209 for the OPCW
Executive Council decision of 4 February 2015 to entrust the OPCW FFM
with the task "to study all available information relating to
allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria" and underlines
that paragraph 5 or other provisions of its resolution 2235 do not
affect this tasking and do not limit it to determination that a
specific incident in Syria involved or likely involved the use of
chemical weapons only;

14. Urges
the FFM to timely inform the JIM through the Director General of the
OPCW Technical Secretariat, in accordance with the JIM's mandate as
the OPCW-UN joint instrument, on the inability to organize an on-site
inspection within the process of investigating a chemical incident in
order to make the UN Security Council be aware of the problem;

15. Requests
the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to urgently
provide the JIM, in the case of a necessity, with technical experts
possessing protective gear and special equipment, who would be able
to work on the site of an incident as a part of the JIM's team, to
collect samples as well as process them in accordance with the
standard OPCW procedures of collecting and analyzing authentic
samples including, where applicable, their express analysis;

16. Encourages
the JIM to consult and cooperate with appropriate United Nations
counterterrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253
ISIL
(Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange
information on non-state actors' perpetration, organization,
sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons
in the Syrian Arab Republic;

17. Invites
the UN Secretary-General to ensure recruiting personnel for the JIM
in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2235 on as wide
geographical basis as possible and recommends the Director General of
the OPCW Technical Secretariat to review the composition of the FFM
in the light of paragraph 8 of its terms of reference;

18. Calls
on
all other states to cooperate fully with the JIM and in particular to
provide it and the FFM with any relevant information they may possess
pertaining to individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were
perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in use of
chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;

19. Requests
the UN Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General
of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, to submit to the Security Council,
for its authorization, within 20 days of the adoption of this
resolution, recommendations on possible additional measures, if
necessary, on strengthening the JIM in the light of this resolution,
and expresses
its intent to respond to the recommendations within five days of
their receipt;

20. Requests
the JIM to submit to the Council and the OPCW Executive Council by 1
February 2018 and 1 May 2018 the reports on the results of its
investigations conducted in full accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8
above;

21. Requests
the JIM to collect and analyze information on trends in the
activities of non-state actors involving preparations for use and
actual use of chemical weapons and submit to the Council relevant
analytical reports in the middle and at the end of its new term;

Reaffirming that proliferation of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its
gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (“the DPRK”) on September 2, 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) 2321 (2016), 2356
(2017), and 2371 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international
efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region
and beyond,

Underlining once
again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian
concerns of the international community and expressing great concern
that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by
diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK who have
great unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that
the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized
the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a
clear threat to international peace and security,

Underscoring its
concern that developments on the Korean Peninsula could have dangerous,
large-scale regional security implications,

Underscoring
its
commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence of all States in accordance with the Charter, and recalling the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing
also
its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation, and reiterating its welcoming ofefforts by Council members as well as
other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through
dialogue,

Underlining the
need to ensure international peace and security, and ensure lasting stability in
north-east Asia at large and to resolve the situation through peaceful,
diplomatic and political means,

Acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1.Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted
by the DPRK on September 2 of 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the
Security Council's resolutions;

2.Reaffirms its
decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use
ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately
suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this
context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile
launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately
cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner;

Designations

3.Decides that the measures
specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the
individual and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any
individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to
entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and decides
furtherthat
the measures specified in paragraph 8(e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also
apply to the individual listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals
acting on their behalf or at their direction;

4.Decides to adjust the measures
imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of
additional WMD-related dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods, and
technology, directs the Committee to
undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within
fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the
Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days
of receiving that report, and directs
the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve months;

5.Decides to adjust the measures
imposed by paragraph 8(a), 8 (b) and 8(c) of resolution 1718 (2006) through the
designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment,
goods, and technology, directs the
Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security
Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee
has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the
measures within seven days of receiving that report, and directs the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve
months;

6.Decides to apply the measures
imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2016) on vessels transporting
prohibited items from the DPRK, directs
the Committee to designate these vessels and to report to the Security Council
within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the
Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days
of receiving that report, and directs
the Committee to regularly update this list when it is informed of additional
violations;

Maritime Interdiction of Cargo
Vessels

7.Calls upon all
Member States to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the
high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe
that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer or
export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this
resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those
provisions;

8.Callsupon all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraph
7 above, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high
seas, decides that the flag State
shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for
the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 18 of
resolution 2270 (2016), and decides
further that, if a flag State neither consents to inspection on the high
seas nor directs the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port
for the required inspection, or if the vessel refuses to comply with flag State
direction to permit inspection on the high seas or to proceed to such a port,
then the Committee shall consider designating the vessel for the measures
imposed in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 12 of
resolution 2321 (2016) and the flag State shall immediately deregister that
vessel provided that such designation has been made by the Committee;

9.Requires any Member State, when
it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State of a vessel pursuant to
paragraph 8 above, to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing
relevant details regarding the incident, the vessel and the flag State, and requests the Committee to release on a
regular basis information regarding these vessels and flag States involved;

10.Affirms that
paragraph 7 contemplates only inspections carried out by warships and other
ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government
service and authorized to that effect, and underscores that it does not
apply with respect to inspection of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity
under international law;

11.Decides that all Member State
shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities
incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels
flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to
or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied,
sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK;

12.Affirms that paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 apply only with respect to the
situation in the DPRK and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights
or obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982, with respect to any other situation and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be
considered as establishing customary international law;

Sectoral

13.Decides that all Member States
shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK,
through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all condensates
and natural gas liquids, and decides that
the DPRK shall not procure such materials;

14.Decides that all Member States
shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK,
through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined
petroleum products, decides that the
DPRK shall not procure such products, decides
that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the
direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their
territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products
in the amount of up to 500,000 barrels during an initial period of three months
beginning on 1 October 2017 and ending on 31 December 2017, and refined
petroleum products in the amount of up to 2,000,000 barrels per year during a
period of twelve months beginning on 1 January 2018 and annually thereafter,
provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of
the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum
products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b)
the supply, sale, or transferof refined
petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with
the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities
prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013),
2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution,
including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting
on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,
directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of
sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are
exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to
generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or
other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this
resolution, directs the Committee Secretary to notify all Member
States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied,
or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate amount for the
period between 1 October 2017 and 31 December 2017 has been reached, and again
notify all Member States when 90 percent and 95 percent of such aggregate
amount has been reached, directs
the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States
when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or
transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have
been reached, also directs the
Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States
when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or
transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have
been reached, and further directs the
Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States
when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or
transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been
reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying,
or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the
year, directs the Committee to make
publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum
products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source
country, directs the Committee to
update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from
Member States, calls upon all Member
States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for
refined petroleum products established by this provision, directs the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation
efforts of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global
compliance, and requests the
Secretary General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide
additional resources in this regard;

15.Decides that all Member States
shall not supply, sell, or transfer to the DPRK in any period of twelve months
after the date of adoption of this resolution an amount of crude oil that is in
excess of the amount that the Member State supplied, sold or transferred in the
period of twelve months prior to adoption of this resolution, unless the
Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil is
exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the
DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited
by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution;

16.Decides that the DPRK shall not
supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its
nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, textiles (including but not
limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products), and that
all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating
in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case
basis in advance,and further decides
that for such sales, supplies, and transfers of textiles (including but not
limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products) for which
written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution,
all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up
to 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification
provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 135
days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

17.Decides that
all Member States shall not provide work authorizations for DPRK nationals in
their jurisdictions in connection with admission to their territories unless
the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of
DPRK nationals in a member state’s jurisdiction is required for the delivery of
humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with
the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution,
and decides that this provision shall
not apply with respect to work authorizations for which written contracts have
been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution;

Joint Ventures

18.Decides that States shall prohibit, by their
nationals or in their territories, the opening, maintenance, and operation of all
joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing, with DPRK entities or
individuals, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the
DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities, in particular those
that are non-commercial, public utility infrastructure projects not generating
profit, have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis,
furtherdecides that States shall close any such existing joint venture or
cooperative entity within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution if such
joint venture or cooperative entity has not been approved by the Committee on a
case-by-case basis, and States shall close any such existing joint venture or
cooperative entity within 120 days after the Committee has denied a request for
approval, and decides that this
provision shall not apply with respect to existing China-DPRK hydroelectric power
infrastructure projects and the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project
solely to export Russia-origin coal as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution
2371 (2017);

Sanctions
Implementation

19.Decides
that Member States shall report to
the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and
thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken
in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, requests
the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring
groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and
submitting such reports in a timely manner;

20.Calls
upon all Member States to redouble
efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371
(2017), and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so,
particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the
transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

21.Decides
that
the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718
(2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and
further decides that the mandate of
the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009)
and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with
respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

22.Decides to authorize all Member
States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or
unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or
destination States for disposal)of
items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution that are identified
in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations
under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540
(2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

23.Emphasizes the
importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to
ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or
entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth
in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, or any person
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection
with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by
reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

Political

24.Reiterates
its
deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected
to, condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have
great unmet needs, and emphasizes the necessity of the DPRK respecting
and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;

25.Regrets
the DPRK’s massive diversion of its scarce
resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive
ballistic missile programs, notes the findings of the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of
the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care,
including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under -five
children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population
suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, expresses
deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are
subjected;

26.Reaffirms
that
the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution
are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian
population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities,
including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian
assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),
2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017)
and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental
organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the
benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and decides that the
Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures
imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption
is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for
any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

27.Emphasizes that
all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii)
and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the
diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations;

28.Reaffirms
its
support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates
its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19
September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the
Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a
peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each
other ’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties
undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

29.Reiterates
the
importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in
north-east Asia at large, expresses its commitment to a peaceful,
diplomatic, and political solution to the situation, and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to
facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses
the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and
beyond;

30.Urges further work to reduce
tensions so as to advance the prospects for a comprehensive settlement;

31.Underscores the
imperative of achieving the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner;

32.Affirms
that
it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to
strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of
the DPRK’s compliance, and, in this regard, expresses its determination to
take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test
or launch;

33.Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

PAK YONG SIK

Description:
Pak Yong Sik is a member of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Military
Commission, which is responsible for the development and implementation
of the Workers’ Party of Korea military policies, commands and controls
the DPRK’s military, and helps direct the country’s military defense
industries.

AKA:
n/a

Identifiers:
YOB: 1950; Nationality: DPRK

·

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1.CENTRAL
MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF KOREA (CMC)

a.Description: The
Central Military Commission is responsible for the development and
implementation of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s military policies, commands and
controls the DPRK’s military, and directs the country’s military defense
industries in coordination with the State Affairs Commission.

b.AKA: n/a

Location:
Pyongyang, DPRK

2.ORGANIZATION
AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT (OGD)

a.Description: The
Organization and Guidance Department is a very powerful body of the Worker’s
Party of Korea. It directs key personnel appointments for the Workers’ Party of
Korea, the DPRK’s military, and the DPRK’s government administration. It
also purports to control the political affairs of all of the DPRK and is
instrumental in implementing the DPRK’s censorship policies.

b.AKA: N/A

c.Location: DPRK

3.PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION DEPARTMENT
(PAD)

a.Description:
The Propaganda and Agitation Department has full control over the media,
which it uses as a tool to control the public on behalf of the DPRK leadership.
The Propaganda and Agitation Department also engages in or is responsible for
censorship by the Government of the DPRK, including newspaper and broadcast
censorship.