“In the varieties of reference, Evans names Wittgenstein as the inspiration behind his seminal proposal about the self-ascription of belief, a proposal that has been developed by contemporary philosophers into the transparency account of self-knowledge (of belief). This prompts the following question: could Wittgenstein be considered a precursor of the contemporary transparency account of self-knowledge? No doubt, the notion of a precursor can be taken in a more or less strict way, but this talk makes a case for a negative answer; namely, that a transparency account of self-knowledge takes ordinary self-ascriptions (e.g. of belief) to be claims about one’s psychological life, whereas Wittgenstein takes them to be one’s psychological life itself, made manifest and presented to others (in public expression). Although the former suggests that the point of the talk is purely exegetical, it is argued that the Wittgensteinian view of self-ascriptions offered here is not an obvious non-starter, which in turn raises a challenge to the contemporary transparency account of self-knowledge.”