Why Australia must support the war against terrorism

Darryl S. L. Jarvis, The University of Sydney

Much changed on September 11 with the attacks in New York and Washington
D.C. The implications extend far beyond a plummeting Dow Jones, international
angst, and possible global recession. More important have been the dramatic
changes wrought in the fissure lines that define international strategic
alliances and friend from foe. Historically, these have extended from
one national power bloc to another, with terrorist organisations a mere
irritant to inter-state based politics. Clearly, this is no longer the
case. Terrorist security issues are now front and centre, heralding a
new era in security politics.

In part, this explains the condemnation of these activities by virtually
all nation-states; a gut-felt reaction that stems from the challenge
terrorism poses to global order, commercial activities, diplomacy, and
the possibility for democratic state-based outcomes.

Not surprisingly, the response to terrorism is being engineered through
the construction of an international coalition of states, whose objectives
will be pursued through the systematic interdiction of terrorists, their
sponsors, and the funds used to support them. Not unlike the cold war
against communism, this war too will be fought on many fronts, but mainly
through encirclement and the sheer might that the international community
of states will muster. This will be formidable.

Strategies of appeasement abrogate
Australia’s commitments as a member of the community
of states.

There is a danger to the success of this project, however, one experienced
countless times before, and manifested in three forms. The first concerns
appeals to strategies that champion appeasement, pacifism, and for some
even isolationism. That this ‘is not Australia’s problem’,
does not require ‘Australia to be involved to solve it’,
or that active involvement will ‘endanger Australian citizens and
interests’, are well-rehearsed arguments that call for non-engagement
(see, for example, recent letters to the editor in The Australian, The
Age, and speeches made to the recent demonstration held in Sydney
against the ‘US War Against Terrorism’).

Unfortunately, these strategies abrogate Australia’s broader commitments
as a member of the community of states, mortally wound multilaterialism—the
very life blood that advances Australia’s interests as a middle
power—and assume an isolationist age that has long since passed.
Munich in 1938 should have long put to rest appeasement approaches in
the face of persistent international terrorism, and pacifism should rightly
be seen as the lifeblood that will feed and strengthen further terrorist
actions.

The second danger emanates from concerns about being part of a ‘war’ process
whose level of engagement will, we are told, result in unacceptable collateral
damage and the death of innocent civilians. The concern here is with
massive retaliation, the result of which will not succeed in bringing
to justice the terrorists but only dislocate further innocent victims.

The argument is laudatory, but ill conceived, for it assumes a conventional
and indiscriminate response based upon massive retaliation through air
strikes and or land based invasion. However, what we can observe to date
is an extremely circumspect response from the US, dominated by a ‘law
and order’ approach and undoubtedly underwritten with highly focused
special forces operations built around an international coalition for
interdiction. Indeed, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, have explicitly talked down the prospects of an indiscriminate
response, careful to insist that the US does not which to splinter moderate
Islamic states from the international coalition or to wreak harm on innocent
non-combatants. As a sign of this, the US has already distributed food
aid to Afghanistan, signalling that their qualms are not with the Afghani
people, but the Taliban and the terrorists they harbour. Fears about
contributing to ‘indiscriminate slaughter’ and a ‘disproportionate
response’ thus appear ill founded.

Evidence of this can also be found in the October 8th US / British air
and cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan, which have been highly
specific, targeting communication centres in Kabul, commercial airfields,
Al Qaida training camps in Jalalabad, and communications facilities and
power lines in Kabul in an effort to destroy the Taliban’s ability
to govern effectively. The response has been both proportionate and restrained,
attuned to the broader objectives of political destabilisation of the
Taliban.

The third such danger is, perhaps, the more insidious, and has corollaries
with current debates in the criminal justice system that reassign blame
away from perpetrators of criminal activities to systemic causes. Popular
among left intellectuals, for example, is the propensity to criticise
United States foreign policy as itself ‘terrorist’, wreaking
loss of life through orchestrating global poverty that, they insist,
causes the deaths of millions through privation. John Pilger, one such
proponent, notes, for example:

Far from being the world’s predominant terrorists, the Islamic
peoples have been its victims—principally the victims of American
fundamentalism, a crusade whose power, in all its forms—military,
strategic and economic - is the greatest source of terrorism on earth.

The willingness to kill large numbers of non-Americans in pursuit
of its interests has been a feature of U.S. policy, which has long
rested on a foundation of state terrorism (Pilger 2001).

On this take, the US has realised the effects of its own terrorism;
a kind of Karma has punished the perpetrators of the ‘real’ atrocities.
On trial should be US foreign policy, not Osama Bin Laden: a poor rich
millionaire or modern day Robin Hood pushed to extreme actions. All of
us, instead, should look to the ‘causes of terrorism’, for
it is here where true evil will be found.

This approach is akin to not blaming the rapist, robber, or murderer,
but looking to the extenuating circumstances responsible for constructing
the pathologies that push individuals to commit evil. Proactive international
engagement in the campaign against terrorism, is thus left moot, since
it is really the United States we should be fighting, not the terrorists—the ‘victims’ of
US terrorism. So it is that the faint voices of discontent with United
States foreign policy grow louder with each day out from the attack on
the World Trade Centre and Pentagon.

For Australian defence planners and political decision-makers, the greatest
danger lies in this type of discourse infiltrating debates concerning
how Australia should respond, if we should respond, and in what fashion.
Already there is a growing cry for Australia to back pedal, not to commit
military personnel, equipment, or even render intelligence assistance
to the US. But Australia’s national interests should be viewed
aside from the debate about the rectitude of US foreign policy, as should
the debate about standing firm against terrorism.

Australia’s national interests are rooted in a global economic
and political architecture premised on commercial interaction, orderly
disputation settlement processes, and rule governed behaviour through
the progressive extension of international regimes. Terrorism is antithetical
to this and rightly deserves a strong response to end it.

To that end, Australia has responded proactively, unilaterally invoking
the ANZUS Treaty (Article IV), undertaking to provide whatever assistance
necessary—within our capacity—to support the United States’ war
against terrorism.

Declining a proactive role in
the war against terrorism will serve the interests of the
terrorists.

Frenetic media coverage has likened this commitment to placing Australia ‘on
a war footing’, with the media now on a ‘war watch’ awaiting
the replication of the Gulf War but this time played out against the
Taliban. Again, such assumptions would be wrong. The US ‘war against
terrorism’ will be far from that; more attuned to a prolonged ‘cold
war’ interspersed with infrequent hot flashes at worst.

What are the immediate implications for Australia? Very little. Early
requests from the US, for example, have merely involved the placement
of Australian navy frigates undertaking patrolling responsibilities in
the Persian Gulf. And, apart from on-going intelligence gathering and
sharing responsibilities, Australian has simply been requested to follow
America’s lead with the resumption of defence links with Pakistan
to help bolster the regime. Most recently the Howard Government has confirmed
that a small detachment of Special Air Services personnel will join their
British counterparts and US Delta forces engaged in special operations
in Afghanistan. At worst, we might be asked for significant troop deployment
in support of perimeter security duties, engineers, and logistical support.
In all, these commitments will be less than extensive and far from costly.

What will Australia gain from this? First, it will gain greater access
to senior US policy makers, providing a receptive diplomatic climate
to pursue our regional security concerns. Second, this will assist Australia
to engage the US in our region more thoroughly, providing greater insurance
against the emergence of ‘hot events’ with adverse implications
for Australia’s security. Third, it will exert greater pressure
on Indonesia, with President Bush already suggesting to President Megawati
a need to address the issue of radical Islamic elements in the country,
and to better monitor migratory movements and eradicate Indonesian complicity
in people smuggling—something Australia has been unable to achieve
unilaterally. Fourth, it will remove pressure from Sino - US relations,
and dampen the question of Taiwan, greatly improving the security outlook
in the Pacific, otherwise one of Australia’s most pressing security
concerns. Finally, the US-Australian bilateral relationship with be strengthened
with, one assumes, greater openings for trade negotiations.

There is, in short, much to be gained by standing firm with the Americans,
not least of which will be a multilateral reduction in terrorist threats
for all states.

The alternative approach would endanger Australia’s security.
Declining a proactive role in the war against terrorism will serve the
interests of the terrorists, highlighting disunity in the international
community and fragmenting any response to it. More immediately, Australia
would fail to insure US sponsorship for its security, possibly leading
to reduced US engagement in the region. Trade negotiations would also
prove more difficult, with less than stellar outcomes for Australian
manufacturers and primary producers.

Well we might ponder the rectitude of the foreign policy of the United
States, but we must not fail to meet terrorist violence with force, save
the very structures of the international system will be imperilled.

REFERENCES

Pilger, John (2001) ‘America must Share the Blame for Atrocities’,
Western Daily Press, September 25.

Darryl S .L. Jarvis is Lecturer in Government & International
Relations, School of Economics and Political Science, The University
of Sydney. He teaches units on international relations and international
risk, and is currently completing an edited volume titled Handbook
of International Business Risk: The Asia Pacific, 2002-2003.