09TBILISI1120, GEORGIA: DEFENSE MINISTER SIKHARULIDIZE MEETS A/S

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cablesIf you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TBILISI1120.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001120
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: PRELPGOVMOPSRSGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DEFENSE MINISTER SIKHARULIDIZE MEETS A/S
GORDON
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. On June 10, Defense Minister Sikharulidze
and EUR Assistant Secretary Gordon discussed the state of the
Georgian military, progress on reform, NATO prospects,
bilateral cooperation, the Geneva process, and UNOMIG
negotiations. Sikharulidze made clear that Russia poses a
bigger threat than ever, with an ever-expanding military
presence in the regions, and Georgia was orienting its
restructuring efforts to defend against that threat, even
while downsizing. He sought more clarity on the way forward
for NATO membership and hoped for more bilateral cooperation
with NATO allies, explaining that other countries would look
to the U.S. as a trendsetter in this regard. A/S Gordon
expressed strong support for Georgia's military reform
efforts and NATO aspirations, noting that every country has
the right to defend itself, and welcomed Georgia's
willingness to contribute to the effort in Afghanistan. End
summary.
STATE OF THE MILITARY AND REFORM
¶2. (C) Minister Sikharulidze told A/S Gordon about the
consolidation of the Russian military presence in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Although the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
had signed MOUs with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of
Internal Affairs to limit military presence near the
boundaries, those documents only covered the areas outside
the disputed regions; no mechanism existed to control the
Russian buildup. He noted the presence of roughly 8,000
Russian troops, 1,500-1,800 border guards, and a steadily
increasing military infrastructure including stockpiles of
equipment and supply lines, explaining that Russia sought to
decrease the time it would take to change from a defensive to
an offensive posture. Sikharulidze also noted that Georgia
is seeing patterns of behavior on the part of the Russians
similar to those of last year, such as significant military
exercises. He noted talk in the media about "unfinished
business," and said that Russia would only understand clear
and explicit messages about its activities. He professed a
lack of understanding in the decision making process inside
Russia, with considerable room for misunderstanding, and said
those clear messages were therefore critical to ensure Russia
did not undertake anything rash.
¶3. (C) Sikharulidze also outlined Georgia's defense
priorities, which involve restructuring the military while
maintaining readiness in the face of the Russian threat. The
restructuring effort focuses on personnel management,
resource management, training, and doctrine development,
combined with improvements in command-and-control, anti-tank
and air defense capabilities. The August war taught Georgia
a number of lessons, including the need for better
command-and-control and intelligence analysis. At the same
time, Sikharulidze said that the Ministry faced an additional
seven percent reduction in its budget, and the military was
planning a gradual reduction in its forces, down to an
authorized force level of less than 31,000 troops. (Note:
The following day, post learned that the Minister revised
this figure downward even further, to less than 30,000. End
note.) He explained that the government had not yet made
this information public, because it did not want the decision
to be interpreted the wrong way politically. A/S Gordon
Qto be interpreted the wrong way politically. A/S Gordon
acknowledged that, while there is clearly no military
solution to the current conflicts, every country has the
right to self-defense. He welcomed Georgia's willingness to
contribute to the effort in Afghanistan, which is a priority
for President Obama, and noted the involvement would be good
for bilateral cooperation in general.
NATO AND BILATERAL COOPERATION
¶4. (C) A/S Gordon said that Georgia's NATO aspirations are in
a pretty good place, with the NATO-Georgia Council in place
and Annual National Plan on track. Sikharulidze acknowledged
that different paths were in principle possible to accede to
NATO, but suggested it would be helpful for all allies to be
in consensus on this point; he noted that France and Germany
seemed still to believe that a Membership Action Plan was
required. Although Gordon admitted that there was still work
to do among the allies in reaching a common understanding on
Georgia's path to membership, he reaffirmed that Georgia
would join when three conditions were met: when Georgia was
ready, when Georgia had something to offer the alliance, and
when there is a consensus among members states that the time
was right.
¶5. (C) The Minister expressed interest in enhanced
TBILISI 00001120 002 OF 002
cooperation with NATO allies on a bilateral basis, explaining
that NATO itself can help on certain technica
l elements, but
direct bilateral engagement is crucial. He said that in
general bilateral relationships were in good shape, although
in one case -- the Netherlands -- programs had ended after
the August war. Noting that Georgia is cooperating with
France to send Georgian forces with a French unit to
Afghanistan, Sikharulidze said Georgia might approach the
U.S. for assistance with transportation. Most importantly,
however, Sikharulidze said that all other partners look to
the United States as a trendsetter. He explained that the
Russian factor plays a tremendous role, with countries not
wanting to jeopardize their relationship with Russia; he said
the Dutch even admitted that their decision to halt programs
stemmed in large part from this concern. A/S Gordon noted
that only a few countries had backed out of the recent PfP
exercises. Sikharulidze confirmed this and pointed out that
another exercise was planned for the fall of 2009; he hoped
such exercises would become routine. Gordon said the United
States remained committed to the fall exercise, which would
be oriented toward the Afghanistan mission. Sikharulidze
added he would also like to see exercises dedicated to
homeland defense, which is the main function of the Ministry,
and reiterated that the United States would once again set
the trend for such cooperation.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that the United States has been
actively involved in assisting the Georgian military in its
training efforts, including in particular accepting several
Georgian students for a full course of study at the service
academies. A/S Gordon asked how else the U.S. could help,
and the Minister explained that any assistance on the
academic side would be useful. Georgia would focus on the
infrastructure necessary to improve training, such as
buildings, but help in such areas as curriculum development
would be welcome. The Ambassador noted that additional IMET
funds could help in this regard.
POLITICAL ISSUES
¶7. (C) Regarding the Geneva process, Sikharulidze explained
that, although it has not yet produced any serious results,
it offers a better format for talks than any that previously
existed, because it makes clear that Russia is a party to the
conflict. He suggested that the process deserves some more
time, although there may eventually come a point when it no
longer makes sense to cntinue. He noted that Russia is
trying to undermine the format by elevating the breakaway
territories to an equal footing with the full participants,
but would probably like to put an end to the process.
Regarding UNOMIG, Sikharulidze admitted that the mission is
important, but described it as weak. He said it would not be
worth sacrificing the principle of territorial integrity for
the sake of keeping it.
¶8. (U) A/S Gordon did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable before he departed Tbilisi.
TEFFT

The information recorded on this site has been extracted from http://Wikileaks.org (Georgia) database..

We wish to express our gratitude to Julian Assange and his team for making this data available as it is an important public record.

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.