A new study shows that terrorists are better-educated and better off than many of their
countrymen

So far, the U.S. war on terrorism has focused on military
action against identified terrorists and on improvements in
domestic and international security. However, many argue
that longer-term improvements depend on lessening the root
causes of terrorism, especially poverty and low education.
For example, writing in BusinessWeek last December, Laura
D'Andrea Tyson argued: "We live in a world of
unprecedented opulence and remarkable deprivation, a
world so interconnected that poverty and despair in a remote
region can harbor a network of terrorism dedicated to our
destruction. In such a world, our prosperity and freedom at
home increasingly depend on the successful development of
countries like Afghanistan." According to this view, a lasting
reduction in terrorism entails increases in the levels of
income and education in poor countries.

But is this view correct? One hint that it may be wrong is
that the September 11 hijackers came mostly from Saudi
Arabia, a country that has reasonably high levels of per
capita income and schooling. Therefore, terrorists need not
come from the most economically deprived segments of
society. A recent study at Princeton University by Alan
Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, called "Education, Poverty,
Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal
Connection?" argues this point. The paper was scheduled
for presentation at the World Bank's annual conference in
Washington in April but was pulled from presentation in
response to complaints initiated by a Kuwaiti executive
director and later joined by other executive directors. A
source at the Bank confirmed that the paper was withdrawn
in response to this pressure, as well as fears that a
controversial study of terrorist identities would serve to
inflame an already highly sensitive political situation in the
Middle East. The irony is that the annual conference was
created to be a forum in which outside researchers could
participate without fear of censorship. Solving problems,
such as those in the Middle East, depends on having the
reliable information that can come only from this sort of free
scientific inquiry.

One piece of the Krueger-Maleckova evidence involves 129
members of Hezbollah who died in action, mostly against
Israel, from 1982 to 1994. Hezbollah is now designated by
the U.S. as a terrorist organization. Biographical information
from the Hezbollah newspaper al-Ahd indicates that the
fighters who died were, on average, more educated and less
impoverished than the Lebanese population of comparable
age and regional origin.

A similar finding applies on the other side of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to Israeli Jewish extremists who attacked
Palestinians in the West Bank in the late '70s and early '80s.
Many of the extremists were Gush Emunim members. A list
of 27 of the Israeli terrorists reveals a pattern of high
education and high-paying occupations.

Krueger and Maleckova also examine surveys conducted
last December with Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza. These polls tell us about who supports terrorism, as
opposed to who are the terrorists. One set of answers
reveals a high level of support for the general policy of
attacking Israeli targets. This support is stronger among the
literate than the illiterate. In another question, a remarkable
80% of respondents thought that the suicide bombing last
June that killed 21 youths in a Tel Aviv nightclub was not
terrorism. (The respondents recognized overwhelmingly that
this act was regarded as terrorism by international opinion.)
Moreover, the Palestinians' adherence to the view that the
mass murder of civilians was not terrorism was independent
of education and higher among those working than
unemployed. Hence, support for terrorism was not reduced
by increases in education and income.

The same patterns apply outside of the Middle East. For
example, a study by Charles Russell and Bowman Miller
(reprinted in the 1983 book Perspectives on Terrorism)
considered 18 revolutionary groups, including the Japanese
Red Army, Germany's Baader-Meinhof Gang, and Italy's
Red Brigades. The authors found that "the vast majority of
those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadres or
leaders is quite well-educated. In fact, approximately two-
thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some
university training, [and] well over two-thirds of these
individuals came from the middle or upper classes in their
respective nations or areas."

I can only conjecture about why terrorists tend to have
relatively high levels of education and income. One likely
explanation is that the poorest, least-educated persons
make relatively ineffective terrorists. It is also likely that
some forms of education, such as those practiced in the
West Bank and Gaza and other parts of the Middle East,
tend to promote terrorism.

The main message is that it is naive to think that increases
in income and education will, by themselves, lower
international terrorism. The goal of reducing poverty remains
laudable, but on grounds other than fighting terrorism. To
find a lasting solution for the terrorism problem, we have to
continue to look elsewhere.

Robert J. Barro is a professor of economics at Harvard University
and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution
(rjbweek@harvard.edu).

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