SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF LEFEBVRE'S THEORY OF
ETHICAL
COGNITION

Department
of Management Science
The George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052
umpleby@gwu.edu

February,
1987

Presented
at a special European meeting of the American Society
for Cybernetics held in St. Gallen, Switzerland, March, 1987.

SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF LEFEBVRE'S
THEORY OF
ETHICAL COGNITION

Stuart A. Umpleby
Department of Management Science
The George Washington University
Washington, DC

ABSTRACT

In a recent
book Vladimir Lefebvre contends that the dominant ethical systems in the
West and the Soviet Union are fundamentally different. However, people on
each side tend to assume that there is only one type of ethical
reasoning. The result is that each side takes actions that are
misunderstood by the other side. With the guidance of Lefebvre's theory
it may now be possible for the West to take actions which, although
counterintuitive in Western thinking, might lead to more success in
negotiations and/or a reduction in armaments.

ALTERNATIVE
EXPLANATIONS OF EAST-WEST TENSION

The United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged
in a "cold war" at least since the end of World War II. Although the
cold war may not be either rational or stable, we can at least be thankful
that the tension has not escalated to a nuclear war. Nevertheless, the
danger inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons and the very large
sums of money that are devoted to military activities suggest that a
change in the current pattern of behavior could be to everyone's
advantage. Efforts to control military spending and to reduce risk
through arms control have not been notably successful. Arms control
agreements have merely resulted in ceilings for the next stage of the arms
race. It may be that the time has come to consider alternative
strategies. That is, rather than trying to limit or manage the arms race,
we might focus our attention on why there is such intense distrust between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Several explanations for the
current conflict have been proposed.

Cultural
differences are one explanation. People in all countries tend to assume
that people in other countries think and act very much like they do.
People in general tend to believe that their behavior is reasonable,
appropriate and good. Hence cultural differences often lead to conflict
because behavior which is different frequently is interpreted as being
bad. Yet cultural differences do not necessarily lead to arms races. If
cultural differences explain the tension between the United States and the
Soviet Union, they must be either unusually strong cultural differences,
or cultural differences of a different kind.

A second explanation for the arms race is that it is the modern version of
nations seeking to establish "spheres of influence." According to this
view each large state attempts to surround itself with allies and to
compete with other large powers for allies. Yet this kind of behavior is

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anachronistic in a world that since World War II has
been moving from political and military competition to economic
competition.

A third way of explaining East-West
conflict is to assert that the military and industrial establishments in
both countries have an interest in continued hostility and military
preparations.

The ideologies of the two countries and
the assumption that these are incompatible is a fourth explanation of the
current conflict. The idea of an international class struggle is still
appealing to many people, but it explains conflict within a country better
than conflict between two superpowers.

These explanations of the conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union are well known and yet the
intensity of the rivalry between the two countries continues to be
puzzling to many people.

A NEW EXPLANATION FOR EAST-WEST TENSION

A new explanation of the conflict between the West and the
Soviet Union has been offered by Vladimir Lefebvre (1982). He suggests
that there are two fundamentally different systems of ethical cognition
and that one is characteristic of the West while the other is
characteristic of the Soviet Union. Lefebvre maintains that people in the
West and in the Soviet Union not only value different things but also have
different ways of valuing. Understanding his theory requires
understanding how he uses the words "compromise" and "conflict".
Compromise and conflict can occur both within an individual and between
individuals. His concept of compromise and conflict between individuals
corresponds to normal usage, but his concept of compromise and conflict
within an individual is unusual.

To understand how Lefebvre thinks about compromise and
conflict within an individual, think of a possible conflict between means
and ends. If there is a conflict between means and ends, a person in the
West is considered to be a good person if he thinks about that conflict
and takes it seriously. In the Soviet Union a person is considered to be
a good person if he minimizes or compromises on a difference between means
and ends. In the Soviet Union a good person is one who will pursue a good
end even if the means is bad, whereas in the West a good person is one who
will not use a bad means to achieve a good end. The constitutions of the
United States and the Soviet Union reflect this way of thinking. The
Constitution of the United States lists a series of "thou shalt nots."
The government is not permitted to infringe freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, the right to assemble, etc. The constitution of the Soviet
Union says that the government will guarantee housing, education, and
health care, presumably by any means necessary.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENT ETHICAL
SYSTEMS

These
different ways of thinking can lead to different ways of negotiating.
When a Soviet person begins a negotiation, he often leads off with a
confrontational statement in an effort to present himself as a person of
high ethical status who will not compromise his principles. An American
will often begin a

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negotiation with a conciliatory statement intending to present himself as
a person of high ethical status who is willing to give a little in order
to get a little. Unfortunately each opening statement establishes exactly
the opposite impression as the one intended. Americans come away thinking
that the Soviets are boorish, aggressive, and unwilling to negotiate
seriously. The Soviets conclude that the Americans are weak, unprincipled,
and unprepared to negotiate seriously.

Not only do Americans and Soviets have different ways of
initiating a negotiation, different feelings are also involved. Americans
approach a negotiation by indicating the area in which an agreement might
be possible. They expect the other side to do the same. The region of
overlap then becomes the focus of attention. The rest of the negotiation
is envisioned as a process of clarification, wording, and working out of
details. At the end of the process the negotiators are left with the
satisfying feeling that they have jointly constructed a mutually
acceptable agreement. This cooperatively produced success is interpreted
as a sign that relations are improving and will continue to improve.

When Soviets negotiate, they envision a different process.
One side's opening statement defines issues on which no compromise is
possible. They expect the other side to make a similar statement. A
Soviet negotiator will look closely at what has not been ruled out. He
will then state another issue on which compromise is not possible. He
expects his "opponent" to do likewise. This process continues until a
situation has been defined that neither side has ruled out. This becomes
the de facto agreement. The feelings at the end of a Soviet negotiation
are completely unlike those at the end of an American negotiation. Each
side can feel victorious since it never compromised. At the end of a
Soviet negotiation there is a feeling of exhaustion mixed perhaps with
exhilaration from a long and hard-fought struggle which had a satisfactory
outcome. Rather than a feeling of friendliness among negotiators at the
end of a negotiation, the most that can be achieved in a Soviet
negotiation is grudging respect for a skilled and committed adversary.

Diplomats who have long experience in dealing with the Soviet
Union are familiar with these differences in negotiating styles. But the
majority of the American people are not. They assume that the Soviets are
like us. They wonder why the United States does not have better relations
with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile each new American administration
presents the opportunity for a new group of leaders to experience the
frustration of dealing with the Soviets and the anger that follows. The
Soviets interpret this anger as hostility and feel justified in continuing
their arms buildup.

Because the cultures of the United States and the Soviet Union
are so different, people in each country often have difficulty imagining
how the social and political system of the other country works at all.
Americans believe that centralized planning, the lack of a market
mechanism to set prices, and the suppression of the free flow of
information would create a system so inefficient it would barely be able
to produce anything. Russians believe that a system that permits as much
freedom as occurs in the US would be chaotic, unmanageable and
characterized by uncontrolled violence.

Because a willingness to compromise is associated with low
ethical status in the Soviet Union, conflicts tend to escalate until they
are resolved by a person in authority. Hence the Soviet

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Union through the
Communist Party is organized like one huge pyramid. Every agency of
government, every manufacturing firm, and every club or association has
two chains of command. At each level of organization there are two
officials in charge. One is the normal administrator. The other is a
party official. An administrator never makes a major decision without
consulting with the party official. The fact that a party official is
always nearby insures that a person in authority is close at hand to
resolve disputes which would otherwise escalate without control as each
side demonstrated its high ethical status by refusing to compromise.

In a society where high ethical status is associated with a
willingness to compromise, there is little need for decisions to be
imposed by a central government. However, in a society where high ethical
status is associated with refusal to compromise and a willingness to be in
conflict with an opponent, a central government with considerable
authority may be necessary to maintain order. Understanding a system of
government requires understanding the culture in which that government is
rooted. Similarly, trying to understand how a government may change is
not possible unless one has some idea of how cultures change.

Lefebvre's work on the ethical systems in the West and the
Soviet Union explains how each system evaluates ethical status and leads
to feelings of guilt and suffering, but it does not contain an explanation
of how ethical systems change. Kohlberg's theory of moral development
does contain an explanation of how people move from one level of moral
development to another, namely by encountering problems that cannot be
successfully solved at the current level of moral development but can be
solved at the next higher level of moral development. Efforts to combine
these two theories might be a fruitful line of inquiry for those
attempting to understand change in Eastern or Western social systems, for
example change from one style of management to another style of
management.

THE NEED FOR KNOWLEDGE TO MANAGE CULTURAL INTERACTION

Coexistence between the Unites States and the Soviet Union
requires that joint decisions be made. The two political and economic
systems are very different in both organizational structure and
practices. The different institutions have their foundations in different
value systems. There is ample evidence that, when people from the United
States and the Soviet Union interact, puzzling and surprising problems
arise due to the different value systems.

The result is that interactions which are on-going tend to be
superficial. Efforts to understand the differences between the two
systems often result in anger, hostility, and the conviction that further
interaction would be fruitless. It is time that we attempt to understand
why these feelings occur, despite sincere efforts on both sides, and begin
to formulate strategies for moving beyond these feelings.

Peaceful coexistence in the long term will require some
important changes in values and social practices. In order to achieve
this change in a manner that is not disruptive it will be necessary to
explicate the value differences. More successful management of the
interaction between the two systems will require more thorough
understanding. The fact of differences can hardly be questioned. Why do
Americans behave as they do? And why do Soviets behave as they
do? Though it may be unpleasant for both sides, an explication is
indispensable. New forms of conduct need to be established based on new
values.

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There are
indications that there is a willingness on both sides to engage in new
conduct. The research described above can contribute to the "new global
political thinking" which has been called for in the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev has declared that there is a need to give up orthodox approaches
of regionalism and narrow class interests. Currently experiments are
underway to increase emigration from the Soviet Union, to permit joint
ventures between East and West not administered by the government, and
even to allow private ownership of some services such as restaurants with
owners allowed to keep profits. If interaction between the two societies
increases in the years ahead, success of joint projects will require
deeper understanding among a larger number of people than currently
exists.

My experience has been that there are major conceptual
difficulties in understanding relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union. My conclusion is that the focus of attention should be not
on the arms race but rather on the cultural and ethical systems underlying
the two societies and that at least a few theories already exist to help
us formulate fruitful methods and lines of inquiry.

Umpleby, Stuart A. "American and Soviet Discussions of the
Foundations of Cybernetics and General Systems Theory," Cybernetics and
Systems: An International Journal, 18:177-193, 1987.

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EXAMPLES OF THE TWO ETHICAL
SYSTEMSCompiled by Stuart A. Umpleby
(11/20/1987)

"In a breathtaking act of loyalty, Molotov quietly abstained
when the Politburo voted to arrest his Jewish wife in a postwar wave of
purges. Molotov defended the betrayal simply: 'Because I am a member of
the Politburo, I must obey party discipline.' Later rulers freed his wife
but stripped Molotov of party membership. That dishonor was later
rescinded, but the man who was once 'the voice of Stalin' lived in
obscurity the rest of his life." Obituary of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, 96,
Newsweek, November 24, 1986, p. 98.

Molotov believed the end justified the means. To aid the
advance of socialism he was willing to sacrifice his wife. The story is
similar to that of Abraham in The Bible. Abraham was willing to sacrifice
his son in order to prove his love for God. t the last moment God told him
not to kill his son.

"FDR thought he could charm, outwit and patronize Joseph
Stalin. In both Ike and Kennedy there was some hint of feeling that
Khrushchev could be, if not charmed, at least cajoled and favorably
impressed into accepting our general outlook on the world... Khrushchev
turned out to be and behave like a brute at his Vienna conference with
Kennedy. He went home with a sense that the American president was a
pushover. Kennedy went home knowing he had to take action to overcome
that impression. Plenty of trouble followed." Meg Greenfield, "Close
Encounters at the Summit," Newsweek, November 18, 1985, p. 114.

In his book, Manipulated Science, Mark Popovsky
describes a fire in a classified scientific research lab in the Soviet
Union. When the firemen arrived at the laboratory to put out the fire, the
guards at the door would not admit them because they did not have security
clearances. An intense argument ensued between the firemen and the
guards. Finally the firemen went around to the side of the building and
entered through a window. The guards did not stop them because their job
was to guard the front door. A later board of inquiry ruled that both the
guards and the firemen had acted appropriately. Both sides had been
uncompromising in carrying out their duty.

Ligachev, at the time chief Soviet propagandist and a
spokesman for the conservative faction within the Politburo which prefers
a slower pace of change:

"Today we must also mention the need to improve the atheistic upbringing
of young people, of university students. Occasionally, some people who
come across violations of the standards of socialist morality begin to
consider the expediency of being tolerant toward religious ideas, of
returning to religious morality. They forget the elementary Marxist truth
that religion is not in any way the source of morality in the individual.
It is not religion which gave the people their moral standards, which have
now become universal. These

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standards were developed
and strengthened by the masses in the course of their centuries-long
struggle against the oppression and domination of the wealthy and against
the immorality and cruelty of an exploitative society. Communist morality
has significantly enriched these common human norms. For this reason we
have no reason to narrow our moral conceptions, to move them backwards
into the past. Yet, this precisely is what some of today's supporters of
religious mysticism and contemporary God-search are demanding.

"A scientific-materialistic and scientific-atheistic outlook has long
become established in the minds of the majority of the Soviet people,
under the conditions of the freedom of conscience which prevails in our
society. This does not suit our ideological opponents in the West. They
are hurling heaps of slanders at the Soviet system, claiming that the USSR
is suppressing the freedom of religion and is persecuting believers. Some
state leaders in the capitalist countries have allowed themselves to be
dragged into such unseemly petty intrigues. All of these are lies,
however. In our country both believers and nonbelievers enjoy equal and
extensive constitutional rights."
Ye. K. Ligachev in a speech to a group of educators, Kommunist 15
(1986): 17.

"In Tashkent, Gorbachev criticized communists and high
officials 'who say they defend our morality and ideals but in fact help
promote backward views and themselves take part in religious
ceremonies.'" Newsweek, June 22, 1987, p. 39.

Below are quotes used in a class on Soviet Civilization taught
by Uri Olkhovsky -- a faculty member at GWU, a Soviet émigré and a strong
opponent of the USSR.

Lenin, "Promises are like pie crusts -- made to be broken."

Stalin, "Words must have no relations to actions -- otherwise what kind of
diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a
mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible
than dry water or iron wood."

"A treaty is a means to gather strength." The source here might be
Lenin. He might be speaking about the treaty of Best-Litovsk, which he
alone advocated within the Politburo. The treaty took the USSR out of
World War I, though at the cost of a great deal of lost territory. Lenin
won the argument because the USSR was not able to continue the war. He
wanted to turn the attention of the Communist Party to consolidating power
at home. The USSR took back the lost territory and more at the end of
World War II.

Lenin in 1920: "We repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural
ideas or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely
subordinate to the interests of class war. Everything is moral that is
necessary for the annihilation of the old exploiting social order and for
uniting the proletariat."

- 7 -

"When are you going to stop
killing people?" Lady Astor bluntly asked Joseph Stalin in 1931, when he
was liquidating the kulaks (wealthy farmers) in his drive to collectivize
the land. His reply: "When it is no longer necessary."

Khrushchev in 1955: "We wish to live in peace, tranquility. But if
anyone believes that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of
Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for
that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle."

Brezhnev in 1968: "Our party has always warned that in the ideological
field, there can be no peaceful coexistence, just as there can be no class
peace between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie."

Source of quotes (according to Olkhovsky): Primer on Communism, by
Overstreet and Overstreet.

See also Stefan T. Possony for more quotes.

"I once heard someone say morality was method. Do you hold
with that? I suppose you wouldn't. You would say that morality was
vested in the aim, I expect. Difficult to know what one's aims are,
that's the trouble, specially if you're British." John LeCarre,
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. p. 70.

In the movie Platoon Sergeant Elias represented the first
ethical system, while Sergeant Barnes represented the second ethical
system. The main character in the movie was torn between the two and felt
that the two were battling for his soul. This idea is expressed most
clearly in a voice-over in the final scene when the central character is
in a helicopter composing a letter.

"Apocalypse Now is Coppola's long Conradian voyage into the
dark heart of war, and what he finds at the end of his journey is Kurtz
bunkered away in his temple headquarters. Kurtz is Coppola's symbol for
the American experience in Vietnam. During one of Willard's meetings with
him, Kurtz tells him a story about an incident some years back in which
all the children in a village were given vaccination shots by the
Americans. All had gone smoothly, the Americans assumed, until they
returned to the scene and in the center of the village was a pile of tiny,
severed arms. 'I then realized,' Kurtz says, 'like I was shot, like I was
shot with a diamond, a diamond bullet right through the forehead. And I
thought, my god, the genius of that, the genius...the will to do that.
Perfect, genuine, complete, crystalline, pure. And then I realized that
they were stronger than we. Because they could stand it.'

"What makes Brando's Kurtz such a great, tragic character -- the single
most compelling figure in the Vietnam war movies -- is that he is a man, a
model soldier, broken in two by the awareness that he cannot commit the
sins that the war requires him to commit; that for a moral man to embrace
murder and genocide, to have the strength to win against his enemies, is
to embrace immorality and, therefore, to lose himself.

- 8 -

"Kurtz longs for a life without
moral distinctions, without judgment, 'because it's judgment that defeats
us,' and the impossibility of attaining what he desires leaves him
fractured, deranged.

"...The Robert De Niro character in `The Deer Hunter' is an attempt to
forge a hero -- a modern-day Natty Bumppo -- along these conventional
lines, but part of Cimino's point is that, in this context, a hero is an
anachronism, a noble freak. Even his friends think he's weird.” Hal
Hinson, "Vietnam: The Movies' Coming of Age," The Washington Post,
July 5, 1987, F1.

This movie review is superb. In terms of Lefebvre's theory the American
soldiers in Viet Nam, who were raised with the first ethical system, felt
compelled to adopt the second ethical system in an effort to win the war.
Some soldiers were psychologically destroyed by the conflict between the
two systems. One could also say that the U.S. lost the war in Viet Nam
because the U.S. government was unable to impose the second ethical system
on the American people. If the Soviets are forced to pull out of
Afghanistan, will it be because the war is too costly economically and in
terms of international prestige or because the Soviet people refuse to
accept the morality of the war?

"'An important aspect of the cultural liberalization currently
underway in the Soviet Union is a quest for values and religious
moralities,' said Josephine Woll, an Associate Professor of Russian at
Howard University. Dr. Woll, speaking at the Kennan Institute on February
4, 1987, after returning from a recent trip to Moscow, said that this new
attention to values is being discussed in cultural circles in Moscow and
among university students." Meeting Report, Kennan Institute for
Advanced Russian Studies, The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.