LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY or
CAUFORNJA
THE VICTORY AT SEA
-UTLS
THE
VICTORY AT SEA
BY REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS
U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES OPERATING
IN EUROPEAN WATERS DURING THE GREAT WAR
IN COLLABORATION WITH
BURTON J. HENDRIGK
WITH PORTRAIT AND PLANS
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1920
FIBST EDITION . . . November 1920
Reprinted .... December 1920
Aix RIGHTS RESERVED
Printed by ScueU, Walton A Viney, Ld., London and Aijlesbury, England.
TO
THE GALLANT OFFICERS AND MEN
WHOM I HAD THE HONOUR TO COMMAND
DURING THE GREAT WAR
IN
GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF
A LOYAL DEVOTION TO THE CAUSE
THAT GREATLY LIGHTENED THE
RESPONSIBILITY
BORNE BY
"THE OLD MAN"
PREFACE
THIS is not in any sense a history of the operations of our
naval forces in Europe during the Great War, much less
a history of the naval operations as a whole. That would
require not only many volumes, but prolonged and careful
research by competent historians. When such a work
is completed, our people will realize for the first time the
admirable initiative with which the gallant personnel of
our navy responded to the requirements of an unpre-
cedented naval situation.
But in the meantime this story has been written in re-
sponse to a demand for some account of the very generally
misunderstood submarine campaign and, particularly, of
the means by which it was defeated. The interest of the
public in such a story is due to the fact that during the war
the sea forces were compelled to take all possible precautions
to keep the enemy from learning anything about the various
devices and means used to oppose or destroy the underwater
craft. This necessity for the utmost secrecy was owing to
the peculiar nature of the sea warfare. When the armies
first made use of airplane bombs, or poison gas, or tanks,
or mobile railroad batteries, the existence of these weapons
and the manner of their use were necessarily at once
revealed to the enemy, and the press was permitted to
publish full accounts of them and, to a certain extent, of
their effect and the means used to oppose them. Moreover,
all general movements of the contending armies that resulted
in engagements were known with fair accuracy on both sides
within a short time after they occurred and were promptly
reported to an anxious public.
xii PREFACE
But this situation bore almost no resemblance to the
struggle between the U-boats and the anti-submarine forces
of the Allies. Barring a few naval actions between surface
vessels, such as the battles of Jutland and of the Falkland
Islands, the naval war was, for the most part, a succession of
contests between single vessels or small groups of vessels.
The enemy submarines sought to win the war by sinking
the merchant shipping upon which depended the essential
supplies of the allied populations and armies ; and it was
the effort of the Allies to prevent this, and to destroy
submarines when possible, that constituted the vitally im-
portant naval activities of the war. By means of strategi-
cal and tactical dispositions, and various weapons and
devices, now no longer secret, such as the depth charge,
the mystery ship, hydrophones, mine-fields, explosive
mine nets, special hunting submarines, and so forth, it
was frequently possible either to destroy submarines with
their entire crews, or to capture the few men who escaped
when their boats were sunk, and thus keep from the German
Admiralty all knowledge of the means by which their
U-boats had met their fate. Thus the mystery ships, or
decoy ships, as the Germans called them, destroyed a
number of submarines before the enemy knew that such
dangerous vessels existed. And even after they had
acquired this knowledge, the mystery ships used various
devices that enabled them to continue their successes until
some unsuccessfully attacked submarine carried word of
the new danger back to her home port.
Under such unprecedented conditions of warfare, it is
apparent that the Allied navies could not safely tell the
public just what they were doing or how they were doing it.
All articles written for the press had to be carefully cen-
sored, and all of these interesting matters ruthlessly
suppressed ; but now that the ban has been removed, it
is desirable to give the relatives and friends of the fine chaps
who did the good work sufficient information to enable
them to understand the difficulty of the problem that was
presented to the anti-submarine forces of the Allies, the
PREFACE xiii
manner in which it was solved, and the various means
invented and employed.
The subject is of course largely technical, but an effort
has been made to present the story in such form that the
layman can readily understand it. As it is difficult, if not
quite impossible, for a naval officer to determine just which
of the details that are a part of his daily life, and what in-
cidents of sea experience would interest his civilian friends,
the story has been written in collaboration with Mr.
Burton J. Hendrick, to whom I am greatly indebted for
invaluable assistance ; and who, being an experienced
hand at this writing business, deserves all the credit the
reader may be disposed to accord him for both the form and
such graces of descriptive style as he may be able to detect.
While opinions may differ to a certain extent as to the
influence exerted upon the campaign by the various forms
of tactics, the means and weapons employed, and the
general strategy adopted, I have given what I believe to
be a consensus of the best informed opinion upon these
matters ; and I have taken advantage of all of the informa-
tion now available to insure accuracy in the account of
the conditions that confronted the European naval forces,
and in the description of the various operations that have
been selected as typical examples of this very extraordinary
warfare.
It is probably unnecessary to add that this book is
published with the full approval of the Navy Department.
My correspondence on this subject with the Secretary will
be found in the Appendix.
w. s. s.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE)
I. WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR 1
II. THE RETURN OF THE " MAYFLOWER " . 40
III. THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY. . . 78
IV. AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION . . 99
V. DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION . 141
VI. AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS 168
VII. THE LONDON FLAGSHIP .... 204
VIII. SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE . . 224
IX. THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE
NORTH SEA 244
X. GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN
COAST 266
XI. FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR . 275
XII. THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND. . 289
XIII. TRANSPORTING Two MILLION AMERICAN
SOLDIERS TO FRANCE .... 294
APPENDIX. 816
INDEX . .... 847
THE VICTORY AT SEA
CHAPTER I
WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
I
IN the latter part of March, 1917, a message from the
Navy Department came to me at Newport, where I was
stationed as president of the Naval War College, sum-
moning me immediately to Washington. The inter-
national atmosphere at that time was extremely tense, and
the form in which these instructions were cast showed that
something extraordinary was impending. The orders
directed me to make my visit as unostentatious as possible ;
to keep all my movements secret, and, on my arrival in
Washington, not to appear at the Navy Department, but
to telephone headquarters. I promptly complied with
these orders ; and, after I got in touch with the navy
chiefs, it took but a few moments to explain the situation.
It seemed inevitable, I was informed, that the United
States would soon be at war with Germany. Ambassador
Page had cabled that it would be desirable, under the
existing circumstances, that the American navy be
represented by an officer of higher rank than any of those
who were stationed in London at that time. The Depart-
ment therefore wished me to leave immediately for England,
to get in touch with the British Admiralty, to study the
naval situation and learn how we could best and most
quickly co-operate in the naval war. At this moment we
were still technically at peace with Germany. Mr.
Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, therefore thought it
wise that there should be no publicity about my movements.
I was to remain ostensibly as head of the War College,
2 l
2 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
and, in order that no suspicions should be aroused, my
wife and family were still to occupy the official residence
of its president. I was directed to sail on a merchant
vessel, to travel under an assumed name, to wear civilian
clothes and to take no uniform. On reaching the other
side I was to get immediately in communication with
the British Admiralty, and send to Washington detailed
reports on prevailing conditions.
A few days after this interview in Washington two com-
monplace-looking gentlemen, dressed in civilian clothes,
secretly boarded the American steamship New York. They
were entered upon the passenger list as V. J. Richardson and
S. W. Davidson. A day or two out an enterprising steward
noticed that the initials on the pyjamas of one of these pas-
sengers differed from those of the name under which he was
sailing and reported him to the captain as a suspicious
character. The captain had a quiet laugh over this dis-
covery, for he knew that Mr. Davidson was Rear-Admiral
Sims, of the United States Navy, and that his companion
who possessed the two sets of conflicting initials was
Commander J. V. Babcock, the Admiral's aide. The
voyage itself was an uneventful one, but a good deal of
history was made in those few days that we spent upon
the sea. Our ship reached England on April 9th ; one
week previously President Wilson had gone before Congress
and asked for the declaration of a state of war with
Germany. We had a slight reminder that a war was under
way as we neared Liverpool, for a mine struck our vessel
as we approached the outer harbour. The damage was
not irreparable ; the passengers were transferred to
another steamer and we safely reached port, where I found
a representative of the British Admiralty, Rear-Admiral
Hope, waiting to receive me. The Admiralty had also
provided a special train, in which we left immediately for
London.
Whenever I think of the naval situation as it existed in
April, 1917, I always have before my mind two contrasting
pictures one that of the British public, as represented in
their press and in their social gatherings in London, and
the other that of British officialdom, as represented in my
confidential meetings with British statesmen and British
naval officers. For the larger part the English newspapers
were publishing optimistic statements about the German
1917] THE SUBMARINE PERIL 3
submarine campaign. In these they generally scouted the
idea that this new form of piracy really threatened in
any way the safety of the British Empire. They accom-
panied these rather cheerful outgivings by weekly statistics
of submarine sinkings ; figures which, while not particu-
larly reassuring, hardly indicated that any serious inroads
had yet been made on the British mercantile marine. The
Admiralty was publishing tables showing that four or
five thousand ships were arriving at British ports and
leaving them every week, while other tables disclosed the
number of British ships of less than sixteen hundred tons
and more than sixteen hundred tons that were going down
every seven days. Thus the week of my arrival I learned
from these figures that Great Britain had lost seventeen
ships above that size, and two ships below ; that 2,406
vessels had arrived at British ports, that 2,367 had left,
and that, in addition, seven fishing vessels had fallen
victims to the German submarines. Such figures were
worthless, for they did not include neutral ships and did
not give the amount of tonnage sunk, details, of course,
which it was necessary to keep from the enemy. The
facts which the Government thus permitted to come to
public knowledge did not indicate that the situation was
particularly alarming. Indeed the newspapers all over
the British Isles showed no signs of perturbation ; on the
contrary, they were drawing favourable conclusions from
these statistics. Here and there one of them may have
sounded a more apprehensive note ; yet the generally
prevailing feeling both in the press and in general discus-
sions of the war seemed to be that the submarine cam-
paign had already failed, that Germany's last desperate
attempt to win the war had already broken down, and
that peace would probably not be long delayed. The
newspapers found considerable satisfaction in the fact
that the " volume of British shipping was being
maintained " ; they displayed such headlines as " im-
provement continues " ; they printed prominently the
encouraging speeches of certain British statesmen, and in
this way were apparently quieting popular apprehension
concerning the outcome. This same atmosphere of cheer-
ful ignorance I found everywhere in London society. The
fear of German submarines was not disturbing the London
season, which had now reached its height ; the theatres
4 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
were packed every night ; everywhere, indeed, the men
and women of the upper classes were apparently giving
little thought to any danger that might be hanging over
their country. Before arriving in England I myself had
not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed
the war from the beginning with the greatest interest ; I
had read practically everything printed about it in the
American and foreign press, and I had had access to such
official information as was available on our side of the
Atlantic. The result was that, when I sailed for England
hi March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All the
fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible
that the Germans could win the war. Sea power appar-
ently rested practically unchallenged in the hands of the
Allies ; and that in itself, according to the unvarying
lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of ultimate
victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regu-
larly printed in the American press, and, while such
wanton destruction of life and property seemed appalling,
there was apparently nothing in these figures that was
likely to make any material change in the result. Indeed
it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would
end before the United States could exert any material
influence upon the outcome. My conclusions were shared
by most American naval officers whom I knew, students
of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect for
the British fleet and believed that it had the naval situa-
tion well in hand.
Yet a few days spent in London clearly showed that all
this confidence in the defeat of the Germans rested upon
a misapprehension. The Germans, it now appeared, were
not losing the war they were winning it. The British
Admiralty now placed before the American representative
facts and figures which it had not given to the British
press. These documents disclosed the astounding fact
that, unless the appalling destruction of merchant ton-
nage which was then taking place could be materially
checked, the unconditional surrender of the British Empire
would inevitably take place within a few months.
On the day of my arrival in London I had my first
interview with Admiral Jellicoe, who was at that time the
First Sea Lord. Admiral Jellicoe and I needed no intro-
duction. I had known him for many years and for a
1917] ADMIRAL JELLICOE 5
considerable period we had been more or less regular
correspondents. I had first made his acquaintance in
China in 1901 ; at that time Jellicoe was a captain and
was already recognized as one of the coming men of the
British navy. He was an expert in ordnance and gunnery,
a subject in which I was greatly interested ; and this fact
had brought us together and made us friends. The
admiration which I had then conceived for the Admiral's
character and intelligence I have never lost. He was
then, as he has been ever since, an indefatigable worker,
and more than a worker, for he was a profound student
of everything which pertained to ships and gunnery, and
a man who joined to a splendid intellect the real ability
of command. I had known him in his own home ^vith
his wife and babies, as well as on shipboard among his
men, and had observed at close hand the gracious per-
sonality which had the power to draw everyone to him
and make him the idol both of his own children and the
officers and jackies of the British fleet. Simplicity and
directness were his two most outstanding points ; though
few men had risen so rapidly in the Royal Navy, success
had made him only more quiet, soft spoken, and unosten-
tatiously dignified ; there was nothing of the blustering
seadog about the Admiral, but he was all courtesy, all
brain, and, of all the men I have ever met, there have
been none more approachable, more frank, and more open-
minded.
Physically Admiral Jellicoe is a small man, but as
powerful in frame as he is in mind, and there are few men
in the navy who can match him in tennis. His smooth-
shaven face, when I met him that morning in April, 1917,
was, as usual, calm, smiling, and imperturbable. One
could never divine his thoughts by any outward display
of emotion. Neither did he give any signs that he was
bearing a great burden, though it is not too much to say
that at this moment the safety of the British Empire rested
chiefly upon Admiral Jellicoe's shoulders. I find the
absurd notion prevalent in this country that his change
from Commander of the Grand Fleet to First Sea Lord
was something in the nature of a demotion ; but nothing
could be farther from the truth. As First Sea Lord,
Jellicoe controlled the operations, not only of the Grand
Fleet, but also of the entire British navy ; he had no
6 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
superior officer, for the First Lord of the Admiralty, the
position in England that corresponds to our Secretary of
the Navy, has no power to give any order whatever to
the fleet a power which our Secretary possesses. Thus
the defeat of the German submarines was a direct respon-
sibility which Admiral Jellicoe could divide with no other
official. Great as this duty was, and appalling as was
the submarine situation at the time of this interview,
there was nothing about the Admiral's bearing which
betrayed any depression of spirits. He manifested great
seriousness indeed, possibly some apprehension, but British
stoicism and the usual British refusal to succumb to
discouragement were qualities that were keeping him
tenaciously at his job.
After the usual greetings, Admiral Jellicoe took a paper
out of his drawer and handed it to me. It was a record
of tonnage losses for the last few months. This showed
that the total sinkings, British and neutral, had reached
536,000 tons in February and 603,000 in March ; it
further disclosed that sinkings were taking place in April
which indicated the destruction of nearly 900,000 tons.
These figures indicated that the losses were three and
four times as large as those which were then being pub-
lished in the press. 1
It is expressing it mildly to say that I was surprised by
this disclosure. I was fairly astounded ; for I had never
imagined anything so terrible. I expressed my consterna-
tion to Admiral Jellicoe.
" Yes," he said, as quietly as though he were discussing
the weather and not the future of the British Empire.
" It is impossible for us to go on with the war if losses like
this continue."
" What are you doing about it ? " I asked.
" Everything that we can. We are increasing our anti-
submarine forces in every possible way. We are using
every possible craft we can find with which to fight sub-
marines. We are building destroyers, trawlers, and other
like craft as fast as we can. But the situation is very
serious and we shall need all the assistance we can get."
1 The statements published were not false, but they were inconclusive
and intentionally so. They gave the number of British ships sunk, but
not their tonnage, and not the total losses of British, Allied, and neutral
tonnage.
1917] A CRITICAL SITUATION 7
" It looks as though the Germans were winning the
war," I remarked.
" They will win, unless we can stop these losses and
stop them soon," the Admiral replied.
" Is there no solution for the problem ? " I asked.
" Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe an-
nounced. He described the work of destroyers and other
anti-submarine craft, but he showed no confidence that
they would be able to control the depredations of the
U-boats.
The newspapers for several months had been publishing
stories that submarines in large numbers were being sunk ;
and these stories I now found to be untrue. The Admiralty
records showed that only fifty-four German submarines
were positively known to have been sunk since the begin-
ning of the war ; the German shipyards, I was now in-
formed, were turning out new submarines at the rate of
three a week. The newspapers had also published accounts
of the voluntary surrender of German U-boats ; but not
one such surrender, Admiral Jellicoe said, had ever taken
place ; the stories had been circulated merely for the
purpose of depreciating enemy moral. I even found
that members of the Government, all of whom should
have been better informed, and also British naval officers,
believed that many captured German submarines had
been carefully stowed away at the Portsmouth and Ply-
mouth navy yards. Yet the disconcerting facts which
faced the Allies were that the supplies and communica-
tions of the forces on all fronts were threatened ; that
German submarines were constantly extending their
operations farther and farther out into the Atlantic ; that
German raiders were escaping into the open sea ; that
three years' constant operations had seriously threatened
the strength of the British navy, and that Great Britain's
control of the sea was actually at stake. Nor did Admiral
Jellicoe indulge in any false expectations concerning the
future. Bad as the situation then was, he had every
expectation that it would grow. worse. The season which
was now approaching would make easier the German
operations, for the submarines would soon have the long
daylight of the British summer and the more favourable
weather. The next few months, indeed, both in the
estimation of the Germans and the British, would witness
8 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
the great crisis of the war ; the basis of the ruthless cam-
paign upon which the submarines had entered was that
they could reach the decision before winter closed in. So
far as I could learn there was a general belief in British
naval circles that this plan would succeed. The losses
were now approaching a million tons a month ; it was
thus a matter of very simple arithmetic to determine the
length of time the Allies could stand such a strain.
According to the authorities the limit of endurance would
be reached about November 1, 1917 ; in other words,
unless some method of successfully fighting submarines
could be discovered almost immediately, Great Britain
would have to lay down her arms before a victorious
Germany.
" What we are facing is the defeat of Great Britain,"
said Ambassador Walter H. Page, after the situation had
been explained to him.
In the next few weeks I had many interviews with
Admiral Jellicoe and other members of the Admiralty.
Sitting in conference with them every morning, I became,
for all practical purposes, a member of their organization.
There were no secrets of the British navy which were not
disclosed to their new American ally. This policy was in
accordance with the broad-minded attitude of the British
Government ; there was a general desire that the United
States should understand the situation completely, and
from the beginning matters \vere discussed with the
utmost frankness. Everywhere was manifested a willing-
ness to receive suggestions and to try any expedient that
promised to be even remotely successful ; yet the feeling
prevailed that there was no quick and easy way to defeat
the submarine, that anything even faintly resembling the
much-sought " answer " had not yet appeared on the
horizon. The prevailing impression that any new inven-
tion could control the submarine in time to be effective
was deprecated. The American press was at that time
constantly calling upon Edison and other great American
inventors to solve this problem, and, in fact, inventors in
every part of two hemispheres were turning out devices
by the thousands. A regular department of the Admir-
alty which was headed by Admiral Fisher had charge of
investigating their proposals ; in a few months it had
received and examined not far from 40,000 inventions,
1917] MR. BALFOUR'S ANXIETY 9
none of which answered the purpose, though many of them
were exceedingly ingenious. British naval officers were
not hostile to such projects ; they declared, however, that
it would be absurd to depend upon new devices for defeat-
ing the German campaign. The overshadowing fact a
fact which I find that many naval men have not yet
sufficiently grasped is that time was the all-important
element. It was necessary not only that a way be found
of curbing the submarine, but of accomplishing this result
at once. The salvation of the great cause in which we
had engaged was a matter of only a few months. A
mechanical device, or a new type of ship which might
destroy this menace six months hence, would not have
helped us, for by that time Germany would have won the
war.
I discussed the situation also with members of the
Cabinet, such as Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Sir
Edward Carson. Their attitude to me was very different
from the attitude which they were taking publicly ; these
men naturally would say nothing in the newspapers that
would improve the enemy moral ; but in explaining the
situation to me they repeated practically everything that
Jellicoe had said. It was the seriousness of this situation
that soon afterward sent Mr. Balfour and the British
Commission to the United States. The world does not
yet understand what a dark moment that was in the
history of the Allied cause. Not only were the German
submarines sweeping British commerce from the seas, but
the German armies were also defeating the British and
French on the battlefields in France. It is only when we
recall that the Germans were attaining the high peak of
success with the U-boats at the very moment that General
Nivelle's offensive had failed on the Western Front that
we can get some idea of the real tragedy of the Allied
situation in the spring of 1917.
" Things were dark when I took that trip to America,"
Mr. Balfour said to me afterward. " The submarines were
constantly on my mind. I could think of nothing but the
number of ships which they were sinking. At that time
it certainly looked as though we were going to lose the
war."
One of the men who most keenly realized the state of
affairs was the King. I met His Majesty first in the vesti-
10 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
bule of St. Paul's, on that memorable occasion in April,
1917, when the English people held a thanksgiving service
to commemorate America's entrance into the war. Then,
as at several subsequent meetings, the King impressed
me as a simple, courteous, unaffected English gentleman.
He was dressed in khaki, like any other English officer,
and his manner was warm-hearted, sincere, and even
democratic.
" It gives me great pleasure to meet you on an occasion
like this," said His Majesty, referring to the great Anglo-
American memorial service. " I am also glad to greet an
American admiral on such a mission as yours. And I
wish you all success."
On that occasion we naturally had little time to discuss
the submarines, but a few days afterward I was invited to
spend the night at Windsor Castle. The King in his own
home proved to be even more cordial, if that were possible,
than at our first meeting. After dinner we adjourned to
a small room and there, over our cigars, we discussed the
situation at considerable length. The King is a rapid
and animated talker ; he was kept constantly informed on
the submarine situation, and discussed it that night in all
its details. I was at first surprised by his familiarity
with all naval questions and the intimate touch which he
was evidently maintaining with the British fleet. Yet
this was not really surprising, for His Majesty himself is a
sailor ; in his early youth he joined the navy, in which he
worked up like any other British boy. He seemed almost
as well informed about the American navy as about the
British ; he displayed the utmost interest in our prepara-
tions on land and sea, and he was particularly solicitous
that I, as the American representative, should have com-
plete access to the Admiralty Office. About the submarine
campaign, the King was just as outspoken as Jellicoe and
the other members of the Admiralty. The thing must be
stopped, or the Allies could never win the war.
Of all the influential men in British public life there
was only one who at that time took an optimistic attitude.
This was Mr. Lloyd George. I met the Prime Minister
frequently at dinners, at his own country place and else-
where, and the most lasting impression which I retain of
this wonderful man was his irrepressible gaiety of spirits.
I think of the Prime Minister of Great Britain as a great,
1917] MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S OPTIMISM 11
big, exuberant boy, always laughing and joking, con-
stantly indulging in repartee and by-play, and even in
this crisis, perhaps the darkest one of British history,
showing no signs of depression. His face, which was
clear in its complexion as a girl's, never betrayed the
slightest anxiety, and his eyes, which were always spark-
ling, never disclosed the faintest shadow. It was a picture
which I shall never forget that of this man, upon whose
shoulders the destiny of the Empire chiefly rested, appar-
ently refusing to admit, even to himself, the dangers that
were seemingly overwhelming it, heroically devoting all
his energies to uplifting the spirits of his countrymen,
and, in his private intercourse with his associates, even in
the most fateful moments, finding time to tell funny
stories, to recall entertaining anecdotes of his own political
career, to poke fun at the mistakes of his opponents, and to
turn the general conversation a thousand miles away from
the Western Front and the German submarines. It was
the most inspiring instance of self-control that I have ever
known ; indeed only one other case in history can be
compared with it ; Lloyd George's attitude at this period
constantly reminded me of Lincoln in the darkest hours of
the Civil War, when, after receiving news of such calamities
as Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville, he would entertain
his cabinet by reading selections from Artemus Ward,
interlarded with humorous sayings and anecdotes of his
own. Perhaps Lloyd George's cheerfulness is explained
by another trait which he likewise possessed in common
with Lincoln ; there is a Welsh mysticism in his nature
which, I am told, sometimes takes the form of religious
exaltation. Lloyd George's faith in God and in a divine
ordering of history was evidently so profound that the
idea of German victory probably never seized his mind
as a reality ; we all know that Lincoln's absolute confi-
dence in the triumph of the North rested upon a similar
basis. Certainly only some such deep-set conviction as
this could explain Lloyd George's serenity and optimism
in the face of the most frightful calamities. I attended a
small dinner at which the Premier was present four days
after the Germans had made their terrible attack in March,
1918. Even on this occasion he showed no evidences of
strain ; as usual his animated spirits held the upper
hand ; he was talking incessantly, but he never even
12 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
mentioned the subject that was absorbing the thoughts
of the rest of the world at that moment ; instead he
rattled along, touching upon the Irish question, discussing
the impression which Irish conscription would make in
America, and, now and then, pausing to pass some banter-
ing remark to Mr. Balfour. This was the way that I
always saw the head of the British Government ; never
did I meet him when he was fagged or discouraged, or
when he saw any end to the war but a favourable one.
On several occasions I attempted to impress Mr. Lloyd
George with the gravity of the situation ; he always refused
to acknowledge that it was grave.
" Oh, yes, things are bad," he would say with a smile
and a sweep of his hand. " But we shall get the best of
the submarines never fear ! "
The cheerfulness of the Prime Minister, however, was
exceptional ; all his associates hardly concealed their
apprehension. On the other hand, a wave of enthusiasm
was at that time sweeping over Germany. Americans still
have an idea that the German Government adopted the
submarine campaign as the last despairing gambler's
chance, and that they only half believed in its success
themselves. There is an impression here that the Germans
never would have staked their Empire on this desperate
final throw had they foreseen that the United States would
have mobilized against them all its men and resources.
This conviction is entirely wrong. The Germans did not
think that they were taking any chances when they
announced their unrestricted campaign ; the ultimate
result seemed to them to be a certainty. They calculated
the available shipping which the Allies and the neutral
nations had afloat ; they knew just how many ships their
submarines could sink every month, and from these
statistics they mathematically deduced, with real German
precision, the moment when the war would end. They
did not like the idea of adding the United States to their
enemies, but this was because they were thinking of
conditions after the war ; for they would have preferred
to have had American friendship in the period of read-
justment. But they did not fear that we could do them
much injury in the course of the war itself. This again
was not because they really despised our fighting power ;
they knew that we would prove a formidable enemy on
1917] GERMAN CONFIDENCE 18
the battlefield ; but the obvious fact, to their eyes, was
that our armies could never get to the front in time. The
submarine campaign, they said, would finish the thing in
three or four months ; and certainly in that period the
unprepared United States could never summon any mili-
tary power that could affect the result. Thus from a
purely military standpoint the entrance of 100,000,000
Americans affected them about as much as would a declara-
tion of war from the planet Mars.
We confirmed this point of view from the commanders
of the occasionally captured submarines. These men
would be brought to London and questioned ; they showed
the utmost confidence in the result.
" Yes, you've got ws," they would say, " but what
difference does that make ? There are plenty more sub-
marines coming out. You will get a few, but we can
build a dozen for every one that you can capture or sink.
Anyway, the war will all be over in two or three months
and we shall be sent back home."
All these captives laughed at the merest suggestion of
German defeat ; their attitude was not that of prisoners,
but of conquerors. They also regarded themselves as
heroes, and they gloried in the achievements of their
submarine service. For the most part they exaggerated
the sinkings and estimated that the war would end about
the first of July or August. Similarly the Berlin Govern-
ment exaggerated the extent of their success. This was
not surprising, for one peculiarity of the submarine is
that only the commander, stationed at the periscope,
knows what is going on. He can report sinking a 5,000
ton ship and no one can contradict his statement, for the
crew and the other officers do not see the surface of the
water. Not unnaturally the commander does not depre-
ciate his own achievements, and thus the amount of sunken
tonnage reported in Berlin considerably exceeded the
actual losses.
The speeches of German dignitaries resounded with the
same confidence.
" In the impending decisive battle," said the Kaiser,
" the task falls upon my navy of turning the English war
method of starvation, with which our most hated and
most obstinate enemy intends to overthrow the German
people, against him and his allies by combating their sea
14 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
traffic with all the means in our power. In this work the
submarine will stand in the first rank. I expect that this
weapon, technically developed with wise forethought at
our admirable yards, in co-operation with all our other
naval fighting weapons and supported by the spirit which,
during the whole course of the war, has enabled us to
perform brilliant deeds, will break our enemy's war will."
" In this life and death struggle by hunger," said Dr.
Karl Helfferich, Imperial Secretary of the Interior,
" England believed herself to be far beyond the reach of
any anxiety about food. A year ago it was supposed
that England would be able to use the acres of the whole
world, bidding with them against the German acres.
To-day England sees herself in a situation unparalleled in
her history. Her acres across sea disappear as a result
of the blockade which our submarines are daily making
more effective around England. We have considered, we
have dared. Certain of the result, we shall not allow it
to be taken from us by anybody or anything."
These statements now read almost like ancient history,
yet they were made in February, 1917. At that time,
Americans and Englishmen read them with a smile ; they
seemed to be the kind of German rodomontade with
which the war had made us so familiar ; they seemed to be
empty mouthings put out to bolster up the drooping
German spirit. That the Kaiser and his advisers could
really believe such rubbish was generally regarded as
absurd. Yet not only did they believe what they were
saying but, as already explained, they also had every
reason for believing it. The Kaiser and his associates
had figured that the war would end about July 1st or
August 1st ; and English officials with whom I came in
contact placed the date at November 1st always provided,
of course, that no method were found for checking the
submarine. *
II
How, then, could we defeat the submarine ? Before
approaching this subject, it is well to understand precisely
what was taking place in the spring and summer of 1917 in
1 See Appendices II and III for my cable and letter to the Navy Depart-
ment, explaining the submarine situation in detail.
1917] THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED 15
those waters surrounding the British Isles. What was this
strange new type of warfare that was bringing the Allied
cause to its knees ? Nothing like it had ever been known
in recorded time ; nothing like it had been foreseen when,
on August 4, 1914, the British Government threw all its
resources and all its people against the great enemy of
mankind.
Leaving entirely out of consideration international law
and humanity, it must be admitted that strategically the
German submarine campaign was well conceived. Its
purpose was to marshal on the German side that force
which has always proved to be the determining one in
great international conflicts sea power. The advantages
which the control of the sea gives the nation which pos-
sesses it are apparent. In the first place, it makes secure
such a nation's communications with the outside world
and its own allies, and, at the same time, it cuts the com-
munications of its enemy. It enables the nation dominant
at sea to levy upon the resources of the entire world ; to
obtain food for its civilian population, raw materials for
its manufactures, munitions for its armies ; and, at the
same time, to maintain that commerce upon which its
very economic life may depend. It enables such a power
also to transport troops into any field of action where they
may be required. At the very time that sea power is
heaping all these blessings upon the dominant nation, it
enables such a nation to deny these same advantages to
its enemy. For the second great resource of sea power is
the blockade. If the enemy is agriculturally and indus-
trially dependent upon the outside world, sea power can
transform it into a beleaguered fortress and sooner or later
compel its unconditional surrender. Its operations are
not spectacular, but they work with the inevitable remorse-
lessness of death itself.
This fact is so familiar that I insist upon it here only for
the purpose of inviting attention to another fact which is
not so apparent. Perhaps the greatest commonplace of
the war, from the newspaper standpoint, was that the
British fleet controlled the seas. This mere circumstance,
as I have already said, was the reason why all students of
history were firm in their belief that Britain could never be
defeated. It was not until the spring of 1917 that we
really awoke to the actual situation ; it was not until I
16 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
had spent several days in England that I made the all-
important discovery, which was this that Britain did not
control the seas. She still controlled the seas in the old
Nelsonian sense ; that is, her Grand Fleet successfully
" contained " the German battle squadrons and kept
them, for the greater part of the war, penned up in their
German harbours. In the old days such a display of sea
power would have easily won the war for the Allies. But
that is not control of the seas in the modern sense ; it is
merely control of the surface of the seas. Under modern
methods of naval warfare sea control means far more than
controlling the top of the water. For there is another type
of ship, which sails stealthily under the waves, revealing
its presence only at certain intervals, and capable of shoot-
ing a terrible weapon which can sink the proudest surface
ship in a few minutes. The existence of this new type of
warship makes control of the seas to-day a very different
thing from what it was in Nelson's time. As long as such
a warship can operate under the water almost at will
and this was the case in a considerable area of the ocean
in the early part of 1917 it is ridiculous to say that any
navy controls the seas. For this subsurface vessel, when
used as successfully as it was used by the Germans in 1917,
deprives the surface navy of that advantage which has
proved most decisive in other wars. That is, the surface
navy can no longer completely protect communications as
it could protect them in Nelson's and Farragut's times.
It no longer guarantees a belligerent its food, its munitions,
its raw materials of manufacture and commerce, or the
free movement of its troops. It is obviously absurd to
say that a belligerent which was losing 800,000 or 900,000
tons of shipping a month, as was the case with the Allies
in the spring of 1917, was the undisputed mistress of the
seas. Had the German submarine campaign continued to
succeed at this rate, the United States could not have
transported its army to France, and the food and materials
which we were sending to Europe, and which were essential
to winning the war, could never have crossed the ocean.
That is to say, complete control of the subsurface by
Germany would have turned against England the blockade,
the very power with which she had planned to reduce the
German Empire. Instead of isolating Germany from the
rest of the world, she would herself be isolated.
1817] ENGLAND'S SPECIAL DANGER 17
In due course I shall attempt to show the immediate
connexion that exists between control of the surface and
control of the subsurface ; this narrative will disclose,
indeed, that the nation which possesses the first also
potentially possesses the second. In the early spring of
1917, however, this principle was not effective, so far as
merchant shipping was concerned.
Germany's purpose in adopting the ruthless submarine
warfare was, of course, the one which I have indicated :
to deprive the Allied armies in the field, and their civilian
populations, of these supplies from overseas which were
essential to victory. Nature had been kind to this Ger-
man programme when she created the British Isles.
Indeed this tight little kingdom and the waters which
surround it provided an ideal field for operations of this
character. For purposes of contrast, let us consider our
own geographical situation. A glance at the map discloses
that it would be almost impossible to blockade the United
States with submarines. In the first place, the operation
of submarines more than three thousand miles from their
bases would present almost insuperable difficulties. That
Germany could send an occasional submarine to our coasts
she demonstrated in the war, but it would be hardly possible
to maintain anything like a regular and persistent cam-
paign. Even if she could have kept a force constantly
engaged in our waters, other natural difficulties would
have defeated their most determined efforts. The trade
routes approach our Atlantic sea-coast in the shape of a
fan, of which different sticks point to such ports as Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and the ports of the
Gulf of Mexico. To destroy shipping to American ports
it would be necessary for the enemy to cover all these
routes with submarines, a project which is so vast that it
is hardly worth the trial. In addition we have numerous
Pacific ports to which we could divert shipping in case our
enemy should attempt to blockade us on the Atlantic
coast ; our splendid system of transcontinental railroads
would make internal distribution not a particularly diffi-
cult matter. Above all such considerations, of course, is
the fact that the United States is an industrial and agri-
cultural entity, self-supporting and self -feeding, and, there-
fore, it could not be starved into surrender even though
the enemy should surmount these practically insuperable
3
18 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
obstacles to a submarine blockade. But the situation of
the British Isles is entirely different. They obtain from
overseas the larger part of their food and a considerable
part of their raw materials, and in April of 1917, according
to reliable statements made at that time, England had
enough food on hand for only six weeks or two months.
The trade routes over which these supplies came made the
submarine blockade a comparatively simple matter. In-
stead of the sticks of a fan, the comparison which I have
suggested with our own coast, we now have to deal with the
neck of a bottle. The trade routes to our Atlantic coast
spread out, as they approach our ports ; on the other hand,
the trade routes to Great Britain converge almost to a
point. The far-flung steamship lanes which bring Britain
her food and raw materials from half a dozen continents
focus in the Irish Sea and the English Channel. To cut
the communications of Great Britain, therefore, the sub-
marines do not have to patrol two or three thousand miles
of sea-coast, as would be necessary in the case of the
United States ; they merely need to hover around the
extremely restricted waters west and south of Ireland.
This was precisely the area which the Germans had
selected for their main field of activity. It was here that
their so-called U-boats were operating with the most deadly
effect ; these waters constituted their happy hunting
grounds, for here came the great cargo ships, with food and
supplies from America, which were bound for Liverpool and
the great Channel ports. The submarines that did destruc-
tion in this region were the type that have gained universal
fame as the U-boats. There were other types, which I
shall describe, but the U-boats were the main reliance of the
German navy ; they w r ere fairly large vessels, of about 800
tons, and carried from eight to twelve torpedoes and enough
fuel and supplies to keep the sea for three or four weeks.
And here let me correct one universal misapprehension.
These U-boats did not have bases off the Irish and Spanish
coasts, as most people still believe. Such bases would have
been of no particular use to them. The cruising period of a
submarine did not depend, as is the prevailing impression,
upon its supply of fuel oil and food, for almost any under-
water boat was able to carry enough of these essential
materials for a practically indefinite period ; the average
U-boat, moreover, could easily make the voyage across the
1917] U-BOATS AND THEIR METHODS 19
Atlantic and back. The cruising period depended upon its
supply of torpedoes. A submarine returned to its base only
after it had exhausted its supply of these destructive
missiles ; if it should shoot them all in twenty-four hours,
then a single day would end that particular cruise ; if the
torpedoes lasted a month, then the submarine stayed out
for that length of time. For these reasons bases on the Irish
coast would have been useful only in case they could re-
plenish the torpedoes, and this was obviously an impossi-
bility. No, there was not the slightest mystery concerning
the bases of the U-boats. When the Germans captured
the city of Bruges in Belgium they transformed it into a
headquarters for submarines ; here many of the U-boats
were assembled, and here facilities were provided for
docking, repairing, and supplying them. Bruges was thus
one of the main headquarters for the destructive campaign
which was waged against British commerce. Bruges itself
is an inland town, but from it two canals extend, one to
Ostend and the other to Zeebrugge, and in this way the
interior submarine base formed the apex of a triangle. It
was by way of these canals that the U-boats reached the
open sea.
Once in the English Channel, the submarines had their
choice of two routes to the hunting grounds off the west and
south of Ireland. A large number made the apparently
unnecessarily long detour across the North Sea and around
Scotland, going through the Fair Island Passage, between
the Orkney and the Shetland islands, along the[ Hebrides,
where they sometimes made a landfall, and so around the
west coast of Ireland. This looks like a long and difficult
trip, yet the time was not entirely wasted, for the U-boats,
as the map of sinkings shows, usually destroyed several
vessels on the way to their favourite hunting grounds. But
there was another and shorter route to this area available
to the U-boats. And here I must correct another widely
prevailing misapprehension. While the war was going on
many accounts were published in the newspapers describing
the barrage across the English Channel, from Dover to
Calais, and the belief was general that this barrier kept ttie
U-boats from passing through. Unfortunately this was
not the case. The surface boats did succeed in transporting
almost at will troops and supplies across this narrow pas-
sage-way ; but the mines, nets, and other obstructions that
20 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
were intended to prevent the passage of submarines were
not particularly effective. The British navy knew little
about mines in 1914 ; British naval men had always rather
despised them as the " weapons of the weaker power," and
it is therefore not surprising that the so-called mine barrage
at the Channel crossing was not successful. A large part of
it was carried away by the strong tide and storms, and the
mines were so defective that oysters and other sea growths,
which attached themselves to their prongs, made many of
them harmless. In 1918, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes recon-
structed this barrage with a new type of mine and trans-
formed it into a really effective barrier ; but in the spring
of 1917, the German U-boats had little difficulty in slipping
through, particularly in the night time. And from this
point the distance to the trade routes south and west of
Ireland was relatively a short one.
Yet, terribly destructive as these U-boats were, the
number which were operating simultaneously in this and
in other fields was never very large. The extent to which
the waters were infested with German submarines was
another particularly ludicrous and particularly prevalent
misapprehension. Merchant vessels constantly reported
that they had been assailed by " submarines in shoals," and
most civilians still believe that they sailed together in
flotillas, like schools of fish. There is hardly an American
doughboy who did not see at least a dozen submarines on
his way across the Atlantic ; every streak of suds which was
caused by a " tide rip," and every swimming porpoise, was
immediately mistaken for the wake of a torpedo ; and every
bit of driftwood, in the fervid imagination of trans-Atlantic
voyagers, immediately assumed the shape of a periscope.
Yet it is a fact that we knew almost every time a German
submarine slunk from its base into the ocean. The Allied
secret service was immeasurably superior to that of the
Germans, and in saying this I pay particular tribute to the
British Naval Intelligence Department. We always knew
how many submarines the Germans had and we could
usually tell pretty definitely their locations at a particular
time ; we also had accurate information about building
operations in Germany ; thus we could estimate how many
they were building and where they were building them, and
we could also describe their essential characteristics, and the
stage of progress they which had reached at almost any 'day.
1917] NUMBERS OF U-BOATS ENGAGED 21
It was not the simplest thing to pilot a submarine out of
its base. The Allies were constantly laying mines at these
outlets ; and before the U-boat could safely make its exit
elaborate sweeping operations were necessary. It often
took a squadron of nine or ten surface ships, working for
several hours, to manoeuvre a submarine out of its base and
to start it on its journey. For these reasons we could keep
a careful watch upon its movements ; we always knew
when one of our enemies came out ; we knew which one it
was, and not infrequently we had learned the name of the
commander and other valuable details. Moreover, we
knew where it went, and we kept charts on which we plotted
from day to day the voyage of each particular submarine.
" Why didn't you sink it then ? " is the question usually
asked when I make this statement a question which, as I
shall show, merely reflects the ignorance which prevails
everywhere on the underlying facts of submarine warfare.
Now in this densely packed shipping area, which ex-
tended from the north of Ireland to Brest, there were
seldom more than eight or ten submarines engaged in their
peculiar form of warfare at one time. The largest number
which I had any record of was fifteen ; and this was an
exceptional force ; the usual number was four, six, eight, or
perhaps ten. Yet the men upon our merchant convoys and
troopships saw submarines scattered all over the sea. We
estimated that the convoys and troopships reported that
they had sighted about 300 submarines for every submarine
which was actually in the field. Yet we knew that for
every hundred submarines which the Germans possessed
they could keep only ten or a dozen at work in the open sea.
The rest were on their way to the hunting grounds, or
returning, or they were in port being refitted and taking on
supplies. Could Germany have kept fifty submarines con-
stantly at work on the great shipping routes in the winter
and spring of 1917 before we had learned how to handle
the situation nothing could have prevented her from
winning the war. Instead of sinking 850,000 tons in a
single month, she would have sunk 2,000,000 or 3,000,000
tons. The fact is that Germany, with all her microscopic
preparations for war, neglected to provide herself with the
one instrumentality with which she might have won it.
This circumstance, that so few submarines could accom-
plish such destructive results, shows how formidable was
22 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
the problem which confronted us. Germany could do this,
of course, because the restricted field in which she was able
to operate was so constantly and so densely infested with
valuable shipping.
In the above I have been describing the operations of the
U-boats in the great area to the west and south of Ireland.
But there were other hunting fields, particularly that which
lay on the east coast of England, in the area extending from
Harwich to Newcastle. This part of the North Sea was
constantly filled with ships passing between the North
Sea ports of England and Norway and Sweden, carrying
essential products like lumber and many manufactured
articles. Every four days a convoy of from forty to sixty
ships left some port in this region for Scandinavia ; I use
the word " convoy," but the operation was a convoy only
in the sense that the ships sailed in groups, for the navy was
not able to provide them with an adequate escort seldom
furnishing them more than one or two destroyers, or a few
yachts or trawlers. Smaller types of submarines which
were known as UB's and UC's and which issued from Wil-
helmshaven and the Skager Rack constantly preyed upon
this coastal shipping. These submarines differed from the
U-boats in that they were smaller, displacing about 350 and
400 tons, and in that they also carried mines, which they
were constantly laying. They were much' handier than the
larger types ; they could rush out much more quickly from
their bases and get back, and they did an immense amount
of damage to this coastal trade. The value of the shipping
sunk in these waters was unimportant when compared with
the losses which Great Britain was suffering on the great
trans- Atlantic routes, but the problem was still aserious one,
because the supplies which these ships brought from the
Scandinavian countries were essential to the military opera-
tions in France.
Besides these two types, the U-boats and the UB's and
UC's, the Germans had another type of submarine, the
great ocean cruisers. These ships were as long as a small
surface cruiser and were half again as long as a destroyer,
and their displacement sometimes reached 3,000 tons.
They carried crews of seventy men, could cross the Atlantic
three or four times without putting into port, and some
actually remained away from their bases for three or four
months. But they were vessels very difficult to manage ;
1917] ANTI-SUBMARINE METHODS 28
it took them a relatively long time to submerge, and, for
this reason, they could not operate around the Channel and
other places where the anti-submarine craft were most
numerous. In fact, these vessels, of which the Germans
had in commission perhaps half a dozen when the armistice
was signed, accomplished little in the war. The purpose
for which they were built was chiefly a strategic one. One
or two were usually stationed off the Azores, not in any
expectation that they would destroy much shipping the
fact is that they sank very few merchantmen but in the
hope that they might divert anti-submarine craft from the
main theatre of operations. In this purpose, however, they
were not successful ; in fact, I cannot see that these great
cruisers accomplished anything that justified the expense
and the trouble which were involved in building them.
Ill
This, then, was the type of warfare which the German
submarines were waging upon the shipping of the Allied
nations. What were the Allied navies doing to check them
in this terrible month of April, 1917 ? What anti-sub-
marine methods had been developed up to that time ?
The most popular game on both sides of the Atlantic was
devising means of checking the under-water ship. Every
newspaper, every magazine, every public man, and every
gentleman at his club had a favourite scheme for defeating
the U-boat campaign. All that any one needed for this
engaging pastime was a map of the North Sea, and the
solution appeared to be as clear as daylight. As Sir Eric
Geddes once remarked to me, nothing is quite so deceptive
as geography. All of us are too likely to base our con-
ception of naval problems on the maps which we studied at
school. On these maps the North Sea is such a little place !
A young lady once declared in my hearing that she didn't
see how the submarines could operate in the English
Channel, it was so narrow ! She didn't see how there was
room enough to turn around ! The fact that it is twenty
miles wide at the shortest crossing and not far from two
hundred at the widest is something which it is apparently
difficult to grasp.
The plan which was most popular in those days was to
pen the submarines in their bases and so prevent their
24 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
egress into the North Sea. Obviously the best way to
handle the situation was to sink the whole German sub-
marine fleet ; that was apparently impossible, and the next
best thing was to keep them in their home ports and prevent
them from sailing the high seas. It was not only the man
in the street who was advocating this programme. I had a
long talk with several prominent Government officials, in
which they asked me why this could not be done.
" I can give you fourteen reasons why it is impossible,"
I answered. " We shall first have to capture the bases,
and it would be simply suicidal to attempt it, and it
would be playing directly into Germany's hands. Those
bases are protected by powerful 15-, 11-, and 8-inch guns.
These are secreted behind hills or located in pits on the
seashore, where no approaching vessel can see them.
Moreover, those guns have a range of 40,000 yards, but
the guns on no ships have a range of more than 30,000
yards ; they are stationary, whereas ours would be
moving. For our ships to go up against such emplace-
ments would be like putting a blind prize-fighter up
against an antagonist who can see and who has arms
twice as long as his enemy's. We can send as many
ships as we wish on such an expedition, and they will
all be destroyed. The German guns would probably get
them on the first salvo, certainly on the second. There is
nothing the Germans would so much like to have us try."
Another idea suggested by a glance at the map was the
construction of a barrage across the North Sea from the
Orkneys to the coast of Norway. The distance did not
seem so very great on the map ; in reality, it was two
hundred and thirty miles and the water is from 360 to
960 feet in depth. If we cannot pen the rats up in their
holes, said the newspaper strategist, certainly we can do
the next best thing : we can pen them up in the North
Sea. Then we can route all our shipping to points on
the west coast of England, and the problem is solved.
I discussed this proposition with British navy men and
their answer was quite to the point.
" If we haven't mines enough to build a successful
barrage across the Straits of Dover, which is only twenty
miles wide, how can we construct a barrage across the
North Sea, which is 230 ?"
A year afterward, as will be shown later, this plan came
1917] PROPOSED REMEDIES 25
up in more practical form, but in 1917 the idea was not
among the possibilities there were not mines enough in
the world to build such a barrage, nor had a mine then
been invented that was suitable for the purpose.
The belief prevailed in the United States, and, to a
certain extent, in England itself, that the most effective
means of meeting the submarine was to place guns and
gun crews on all the mercantile vessels. Even some of
the old British merchant salts maintained this view.
" Give us a gun, and we'll take care of the submarines
all right," they kept saying to the Admiralty. But the
idea was fundamentally fallacious. In the American
Congress, just prior to the declaration of war, the arming
of merchant ships became a great political issue ; scores
of pages in the Congressional Record are filled with debates
on this subject, yet, so far as affording any protection to
shipping was concerned, all this was wasted oratory.
Those who advocated arming the merchant ships as an
effective method of counteracting submarine campaigns
had simply failed to grasp the fundamental elements of
submarine warfare. They apparently did not understand
the all -import ant fact that the quality which makes the
submarine so difficult to deal with is its invisibility. The
great political issue which was involved in the submarine
controversy, and the issue which brought the United
States into the war, was that the Germans were sinking
merchant ships without warning. And it was because of
this very fact this sinking without warning that a
dozen guns on a merchant ship afforded practically no
protection. The look-out on a merchantman could not
see the submarine, for the all-sufficient reason that the
submarine was concealed beneath the water ; it was only
by a happy chance that the most penetrating eye could
detect the periscope, provided that one were exposed.
The first intimation which was given the merchantman
that a U-boat was in his neighbourhood was the explosion
of the torpedo in his hull. In six weeks, in the spring
and early summer of 1917, thirty armed merchantmen
were torpedoed and sunk off Queenstown, and in no case
was a periscope or a conning-tower seen. The English
never trusted their battleships at sea without destroyer
escort, and certainly if a battleship with its powerful
armament could not protect itself from submarines, it was
26 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
too much to expect that an ordinary armed merchantman
would be able to do so. I think the fact that few American
armed ships were attacked and sunk in 1917 created the
impression that their guns afforded them some protection.
But the apparent immunity extended to them was really
policy on Germany's part. She expected, as I have said,
that she would win the war long before the United States
could play an effective role in the struggle. It was there-
fore good international politics to refrain from any
unnecessary acts that would still further embitter the
American people against her. There was also a consider-
able pacifist element in our country which Germany was
coddling in the hope of preventing the United States from
using against her such forces as we already had at hand.
The reason American armed merchantmen were not sunk
was simply because they were not seriously attacked ; I
have already shown how easily Germany could have sunk
them if she had really tried. Any reliance upon armed
guards as a protection against submarines would have
been fundamentally a mistake, for the additional reason
that it was a defensive measure ; it 'must be apparent that
the extremely grave situation which we were then facing
demanded the most energetic offensive methods. Yet the
arming of merchant ships was justified as a minor measure.
It accomplished the one important end of forcing the
submarine to submerge and to use torpedoes instead of
gunfire. In itself this was a great gain ; obviously the
Germans would much prefer to sink ships with projectiles
than with torpedoes, for their supply of these latter mis-
siles was limited. 1
In April, 1917, the British navy was fighting the sub-
marine mainly in two ways : it was constantly sowing
mines off the entrance to the submarine bases, such as
Ostend and Zeebrugge, and in the Heligoland Bight-
operations that accomplished little, for the Germans swept
them up almost as fast as they were planted ; and it was
patrolling the submarine infested area with anti-submarine
craft. The Admiralty was depending almost exclusively
upon this patrol, yet this, the only means which then
seemed to hold forth much promise of defeating the sub-
marine, was making little progress.
1 See Appendix IV for my statement to Washington on arming mer-
chant ships.
1917] LACK OF DESTROYERS 27
For this patrol the navy was impressing into service all
the destroyers, yachts, trawlers, sea-going tugs, and other
light vessels which could possibly be assembled ; almost
any craft which could carry a wireless, a gun, and depth
charges was boldly sent to sea. At this time the vessel
chiefly used was the destroyer. The naval war had
demonstrated that the submarine could not successfully
battle with the destroyer ; that any U-boat which came
to the surface within fighting range of this alert and
speedy little surface ship ran great risk of being sunk.
This is the fundamental fact that the destruction of the
submarine was highly probable, in case the destroyer
could get a fair chance at her which regulated the whole
anti-submarine campaign. It is evident, therefore, that
a proper German strategy would consist in so disposing
its submarines that they could conduct their operations
with the minimum risk of meeting their most effective
enemies, while a properly conceived Allied strategy would
consist in so controlling the situation that the submarines
would have constantly to meet them. Frankness compels
me to say that, in the early part of 1917, the Germans
were maintaining the upper hand in this strategic game ;
they were holding the dominating position in the cam-
paign, since they were constantly attacking Allied shipping
without having to meet the Allied destroyers, while the
Allied destroyers were dispersing their energies over the
wide waste of waters. But the facts in the situation, and
not any superior skill on the part of the German navy,
were giving the submarines this advantage. The British
were most heroically struggling against the difficulties
imposed by the mighty task which they had assumed.
The British navy, like all other navies, was only partially
prepared for this type of warfare ; in 1917 it did not
possess destroyers enough both to guard the main fighting
fleet and to protect its commerce from submarines. Up
to 1914, indeed, it was expected that the destroyers would
have only one function to perform in warfare, that of
protecting the great surface vessels from attack, but now
the new kind of warfare which Germany was waging on
merchant ships had laid upon the destroyer an entirely
new responsibility ; and the plain fact is that the des-
troyers, in the number which were required, did not exist.
The problem which proved so embarrassing can be
28 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
stated in the simple terms of arithmetic. Everything, as
I have said, reduced itself to the question of destroyers.
In April, 1917, the British navy had in commission about
200 ships of this indispensable type ; many of them were
old and others had been pretty badly worn and weakened
by three years of particularly racking service. It was the
problem of the Admiralty to place these destroyers in those
fields in which they could most successfully serve the
Allied cause. The one requirement that necessarily took
precedence over all others was that a flotilla of at least
100 destroyers must be continuously kept with the Grand
Fleet, ready to go into action at a moment's notice. It is
clear from this statement of the case that the naval policy
of the Germans, which consisted in holding their high seas
battle fleet in harbour and in refusing to fight the Allied
navy, had an important bearing upon the submarine
campaign. So long as there was the possibility of such
an engagement, the British Grand Fleet had to keep itself
constantly prepared for such a crisis ; and an indispensable
part of this preparation was to maintain always in readi-
ness its flotilla of protecting destroyers. Had the German
fleet seriously engaged in a great sea battle, it would have
unquestionably been defeated ; such a defeat would have
meant an even greater disaster than the loss of the battle-
ships, a loss which in itself would not greatly have changed
the naval situation. But the really fatal effect of such
a defeat would have been that it would no longer have
been necessary for the British to sequestrate a hundred or
more destroyers at Scapa Flow. The German battleships
would have been sent to the bottom, and then these
destroyers would have been used in the warfare against
the submarines. By keeping its dreadnought fleet intact,
always refusing to give battle and yet always threatening
an engagement, the Germans thus were penning up 100
British destroyers in the Orkneys destroyers which
otherwise might have done most destructive work against
the German submarines off the coast of Ireland. The
mere fact that the German High Seas Fleet had once
engaged the British Grand Fleet off Jutland was an element
in the submarine situation, for this constantly suggested
the likelihood that the attempt might be repeated, and
was thus an influence which tended to keep these destroyers
at Scapa Flow. Many times during that critical period
1917] ATTACKS ON HOSPITAL SHIPS 29
the Admiralty discussed the question of releasing those
destroyers, or a part of them, for the anti-submarine
campaign ; yet they always decided, and they decided
wisely, against any such hazardous division. At that
time the German dreadnought fleet was not immeasurably
inferior in numbers to the British ; it had a protecting
screen of about 100 destroyers ; and it would have been
madness for the British to have gone into battle with its
own destroyer screen placed several hundred miles away,
off the coast of Ireland. I lay stress upon this circum-
stance because I find that in America the British Admiralty
has been criticized for keeping a large destroyer force with
the Grand Fleet, instead of detaching them for battle with
the submarine. I think that I have made clear that this
criticism is based upon a misconception of the whole
naval campaign. Without this destroyer screen the
British Grand Fleet might have been destroyed by the
Germans ; if the Grand Fleet had been destroyed, the
war would have ended in the defeat of the Allies ; not to
have maintained these destroyers in northern waters would
thus have amounted simply to betraying the cause of
civilization and to making Germany a free gift of victory.
Germany likewise practically immobilized a considerable
number of British destroyers by attacking hospital ships.
When the news of such dastardly attacks became known,
it was impossible for Americans and Englishmen to believe
at first that they were intentional ; they so callously
violated all the rules of warfare and all the agreements
for lessening the horrors of war to which Germany herself
had become a party that there was a tendency in both
enlightened countries to give the enemy the benefit of the
doubt. As a matter of fact, not only were the submarine
attacks on hospital ships deliberate, but Germany had
officially informed us that they would be made ! The
reasons for this warning are clear enough ; again, the all-
important role which the destroyers were playing in anti-
submarine warfare was the point at issue. Until we
received such warning, hospital ships had put to sea
unescorted by warships, depending for their safety upon
the rules of the Hague Conference. Germany attacked
these ships in order to make us escort them with destroyers,
and thereby compel us to divert these destroyers from
the anti-submarine campaign. And, of course, England
30 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
was forced to acquiesce in this German programme. Had
the Anglo-Saxon mind resembled the Germanic in all
probability we should have accepted the logic of the
situation ; we should have refused to be diverted from
the great strategic purpose which meant winning the war
that is, protecting merchant shipping ; in other words,
we should have left the hospital ships to their fate, and
justified ourselves and stilled our consciences by the
principle of the greater good. But the British and the
American minds do not operate that way ; it was impos-
sible for us to leave sick and wounded men as prey to
submarines. Therefore, after receiving the German warn-
ing, backed up, as it was, by the actual destruction of
unprotected hospital ships, we began providing them with
destroyer escorts. This greatly embarrassed us in the
anti-submarine campaign, for at times, especially during
the big drives, we had a large number of hospital ships
to protect. As soon as we adopted this policy, Germany,
having attained her end, which was to keep the destroyers
out of the submarine area, stopped attacking sick and
wounded soldiers. Yet we still were forced to provide
these unfortunates with destroyer escorts, for, had we
momentarily withdrawn these protectors, the German
submarines would immediately have renewed their attacks
on hospital ships.
Not only was the British navy at that time safeguarding
the liberties of mankind at sea, but its army in France
was doing its share in safeguarding them on land. And
the fact that Britain had to support this mighty army had
its part in making British shipping at times almost an
easy prey for the German submarines. For next in im-
portance to maintaining the British Grand Fleet intact it
was necessary to keep secure the channel crossing. Over
this little strip of water were transported the men and the
supplies from England to France that kept the German
army at bay ; to have suspended these communications,
even for a brief period, would have meant that the Ger-
mans would have captured Paris, overrun the whole of
France, and ended the war, at least the war on land. In
the course of four years Great Britain transported about
20,000,000 people across the Channel without the loss of
a single soul. She accomplished this only by constantly
using many destroyers and other light surface craft as
1917] VAST DUTIES OF BRITISH NAVY 31
escorts for the transports. But this was not the only
responsibility of the kind that rested on the overburdened
British shoulders. There was another part of the seas
in which, for practical and political reasons, the British
destroyer fleet had to do protective duty. In the Mediter-
ranean lay not only the trade routes to the East, but also
the lines of supply which extended to Italy, to Egypt, to
Palestine, and to Mesopotamia. If Germany could have
cut off Italy's food and materials Italy would have been
forced to withdraw from the war. The German and Aus-
trian submarines, escaping from Austria's Adriatic ports,
were constantly assailing this commerce, attempting to
do this very thing. Moreover, the success of the German
submarine campaign in these waters would have compelled
the Allies to abandon the Salonika expedition, which
would have left the Central Powers absolute masters of
the Balkans and the Middle East. For these reasons it
was necessary to maintain a considerable force of des-
troyers in the Mediterranean.
For the British navy it was therefore a matter of choice
what areas she would attempt to protect with her destroyer
forces ; the one thing that was painfully apparent was
that she could not satisfactorily safeguard all the danger
zones. With the inadequate force at her disposal it was
inevitable that certain areas should be left relatively open
to the U-boats ; and the decision as to which ones these
should be was simply a matter of balancing the several
conflicting interests. In April, 1917, the Admiralty had
decided to give the preference to the Grand Fleet, the
hospital ships, the Channel crossing, and the Mediterranean,
practically in the order mentioned. It is evident from
these facts that nearly the entire destroyer fleet must have
been disposed in these areas. This decision, all things
considered, was the only one that was possible ; yet,
after placing the destroyers in these selected areas, the
great zone of trans -Atlantic shipping, west and south of
Ireland, vitally important as it was, was necessarily left
inadequately protected. So desperate was the situation
that sometimes only four or five British destroyers were
operating in this great stretch of waters ; and I do not
think that the number ever exceeded fifteen. Inasmuch
as that represented about the number of German
submarines in this same area, the situation may strike
32 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
the layman as not particularly desperate. But any such
basis of comparison is absurd. The destroyers were oper-
ating on the surface in full view of the submarines ; the
submarines could submerge at any time and make them-
selves invisible ; and herein we have the reason why the
contest was so markedly unequal. But aside from all
other considerations, the method of warfare adopted by
the Allies against the U-boat was necessarily ineffective,
but was the best that could be used until sufficient des-
troyers became available to convoy shipping. The so-called
submarine patrol, under the circumstances which prevailed
at that time, could accomplish very little. This little
fleet of destroyers was based on Queenstown ; from this
port they put forth and patrolled the English Channel
and the waters about Ireland in the hope that a German
submarine would stick its nose above the waves. The
central idea of the destroyer patrol was this one of hunt-
ing ; the destroyer could have sunk any submarine or
driven it away from shipping if the submarine would only
have made its presence known. But of course this was
precisely what the submarine declined to do. It must
be evident to the merest novice that four or five destroyers,
rushing around hunting for submarines which were lying
a hundred feet or so under water, could accomplish very
little. The under- water boat could always see its surface
enemy long before it was itself seen and thus could save
its life by the simple process of submerging. It must also
be clear that the destroyer patrol could accomplish much
only in case there were a very large number of destroyers.
We figured that, to make the patrol system work with
complete success, it would be necessary to have one des-
troyer for every square mile. The area of the destroyer
patrol off Queenstown comprised about 25,000 square
miles ; it is apparent that the complete protection of the
trans -Atlantic trade routes would have taken about
25,000 destroyers. And the British, as I have said, had
available anywhere from four to fifteen in this area.
The destroyer flotilla being so small, it is not surprising
that the German submarines were making ducks and drakes
of it. The map of the sinkings which took place in April
brings out an interesting fact : numerous as these sinkings
were, very few merchantmen were torpedoed, in this month,
at the entrance to the Irish Sea or in the English Channel.
1917] A CRITICAL SITUATION 83
These were the narrow waters where shipping was massed
and where the little destroyer patrol was intended to
operate. The German submarines apparently avoided
these waters, and made their attacks out in the open sea,
sometimes two and three hundred miles west and south
of Ireland. Their purpose in doing this was to draw the
destroyer patrol out into the open sea and in that way to
cause its dispersal. And these tactics were succeeding.
There were six separate steamship " lanes " by which the
merchantmen could approach the English Channel and the
Irish Sea. One day the submarines would attack along
one of these lanes ; then the little destroyer fleet would
rush to this scene of operations. Immediately the Ger-
mans would depart and attack another route many miles
away ; then the destroyers would go pell-mell for that
location. Just as they arrived, however, the U-boats
would begin operating elsewhere ; and so it went on, a game
of hide and seek in which the advantages lay all on the
side of the warships which possessed that wonderful ability
to make themselves unseen. At this period the submarine
campaign and the anti-submarine campaign was really
a case of blindman's buff ; the destroyer could never see
the enemy while the enemy could always see the
destroyer ; and this is the reason that the Allies were
failing and that the Germans were succeeding.
IV
To show how serious the situation was, let me quote
from the reports which I sent to Washington during this
period. I find statements like these scattered everywhere
in my despatches of the spring of 1917 :
" The military situation presented by the enemy sub-
marine campaign is not only serious but critical."
" The outstanding fact which cannot be escaped is that
we are not succeeding, or in other words, that the enemy's
campaign is proving successful."
" The consequences of failure or partial failure of the
Allied cause which we have joined are of such far-reaching
character that I am deeply concerned in insuring that the
part played by our country shall stand every test of analy-
sis before the bar of history. The situation at present
is exceedingly grave. If sufficient United States naval
34 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
forces can be thrown into the balance at the present critical
time and place there is little doubt that early success will
be assured."
" Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment
we are losing the war." 1
And now came another important question : What
should the American naval policy be in this crisis ? There
were almost as many conflicting opinions as there were
minds. Certain authorities believed that our whole
North Atlantic Fleet should be moved immediately into
European waters. Such a manoeuvre was not only im-
possible but it would have been strategically very unwise ;
indeed such a disposition would have been playing directly
into Germany's hands. What naval experts call the
" logistics " of the situation immediately ruled this idea
out of consideration. The one fact which made it im-
possible to base the fleet in European waters at that time
was that we could not have kept it supplied, particularly
with oil. The German U-boats were making a particu-
larly successful drive at tankers with the result that
England had the utmost difficulty in supplying her fleet
with this kind of fuel. It is indeed impossible to exag-
gerate the seriousness of this oil situation. " Orders have
just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in case
of emergency," I reported to Washington on June 29th,
referring to scarcity of oil. " This simply means that the
enemy is winning the war." It was lucky for us that the
Germans knew nothing about this particular disability.
Had they been aware of it, they would have resorted to all
kinds of manoeuvres in the attempt to keep the Grand
Fleet constantly steaming at sea, and in this way they
might so have exhausted our oil supply as possibly to
threaten the actual command of the surface. Fortunately
for the cause of civilization, there were certain important
facts which the German Secret Service did not learn.
But this oil scarcity made it impossible to move the
Atlantic Fleet into European waters, at least at that time.
Since most oil supplies were brought from America, we
simply could not have fuelled our super-dreadnoughts in
Europe in the spring and summer of 1917. Moreover, if
1 For specimens of my reports to the Navy Department in these early
days see Appendices II and III.
1917] DISPOSAL OF AMERICAN FORCE 35
we had sent all our big ships to England we should have
been obliged to keep our destroyers constantly stationed
with them ready for a great sea action ; and this would
have completely fallen in with German plans, for then these
destroyers could not have been used against her sub-
marines. The British did indeed request that we send
five coal-burning ships to reinforce her fleet and give her
that preponderance which made its ascendancy absolutely
secure, and these ships were subsequently sent ; but
England could not have made provision for our greatest
dreadnoughts, the oil burners. Indeed our big ships were
of much greater service to the Allied cause stationed on
this side than they would have been if they had been
located at a European base. They were providing a
reserve for the British fleet, precisely as our armies in
France were providing a reserve for the Allied armies ;
and meanwhile this disposition made it possible for us to
send their destroyer escorts to the submarine zone, where
they could participate in the anti-submarine campaign.
In American waters these big ships could be kept in prime
condition, for here they had an open, free sea for training,
and here they could also be used to train the thousands of
new men who were needed for the new ships constructed
during the war.
I early took the stand that our forces should be con-
sidered chiefly in the light of reinforcements to the Allied
navies, and that, ignoring all question of national pride
and even what at first might superficially seem to be
national interest, we should exert such offensive power as
we possessed in the way that would best assist the Allies
in defeating the submarine. England's naval resources
were much greater than ours ; and therefore, in the nature
of the case, we could not expect to maintain overseas
anywhere near the number of ships which England had
assembled ; consequently it should be our policy to use
such available units as we possessed to strengthen the
weak spots in the Allied line. There were those who
believed that national dignity required that we should
build up an independent navy in European waters, and
that we should operate it as a distinct American unit.
But that, I maintained, was not the way to win the war.
If we had adopted this course, we should have been con-
structing naval bases and perfecting an organization when
36 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
the armistice was signed ; indeed, the idea of operating
independently of the Allied fleet was not for a moment to
be considered. There were others in America who thought
that it was unwise to put any part of our fleet in European
waters, in view of the dangers that might assail us on our
own coast. There was every expectation that Germany
would send submarines to the western Atlantic, where
they could prey upon our shipping and could possibly
bombard our ports ; I have already shown that she had
submarines which could make such a long voyage, and
the strategy of the situation in April and May, 1917,
demanded that a move of this kind be made. The pre-
dominant element in the submarine defence, as I have
pointed out, was the destroyer. The only way in which
the United States could immediately and effectively help
the Allied navies was by sending our whole destroyer
flotilla and all our light surface craft at once. It was
Germany's part, therefore, to resort to every manoeuvre
that would keep our destroyer force on this side of the
Atlantic. Such a performance might be expected to
startle our peaceful American population and inspire a
public demand for protection ; and in this way our
Government might be compelled to keep all anti-sub-
marine craft in our own waters. I expected Germany to
make such a demonstration immediately and I therefore
cautioned our naval authorities at Washington not to be
deceived. I pointed out that Germany could accomplish
practically nothing by sporadic attacks on American
shipping in American waters ; that, indeed, if we could
induce the German Admiralty to concentrate all its sub-
marine efforts on the American coasts, and leave free the
Irish Sea and the English Channel, the war practically
would be won for the Allies. Yet these facts were not
apparent to the popular mind in 1917, and I shall always
think that Germany made a great mistake in not sending
submarines to the American coast immediately on our
declaration of war, instead of waiting until 1918. Such
attacks, at that time, would have started a public demand
for protection which the Washington authorities might
have had great difficulty in resisting, and which might
have actually kept our destroyer fleet in American waters,
to the great detriment of the Allied cause. Germany
evidently refrained from doing so for reasons which I have
1917] HEROIC EFFORTS OF BRITISH NAVY 37
already indicated a desire to deal gently with the United
States, and in that way to delay our military preparations
and win the war without coming into bloody conflict with
the American people.
There were others who thought it unwise to expose any
part of our fleet to the dangers of the European contest ;
their fear was that, if the Allies should be defeated, we
would then need all our naval forces to protect the Ameri-
can coast. This point of view, of course, w r as not only
short-sighted and absurd, but it violated the fundamental
principle of warfare, which is that a belligerent must
assail his enemy as quickly as possible with the greatest
striking power which he can assemble. Clearly our
national policy demanded that we should exert all the
force we could collect to make certain a German defeat.
The best way to fight Germany was not to wait until she
had vanquished the Allies, but to join hands with them
in a combined effort to annihilate her military power on
land and sea. The situation which confronted us in
April, 1917, was one which demanded an immediate and
powerful offensive ; the best way to protect America was
to destroy Germany's naval power in European waters and
thus make certain that she could not attack us at home.
The fact is that few nations have ever been placed in so
tragical a position as that in which Great Britain found
herself in the spring and early summer of 1917. And I
think that history records few spectacles more heroic than
that of the great British navy, fighting this hideous and
cowardly form of warfare in half a dozen places with piti-
fully inadequate forces, but w r ith an undaunted spirit
which remained firm even against the fearful odds which
I have described. What an opportunity for America !
And it was perfectly apparent what we should do. It was
our duty immediately to place all our available anti-
submarine craft in those waters west and south of Ireland
in which lay the pathways of the shipping which meant
life or death to the Allied cause the area which England,
because almost endless demands were being made upon
her navy in other fields, was unable to protect.
The first four days in London were spent collecting all
possible data ; I had no desire to alarm Washington un-
warrantably, yet I also believed that it would be a serious
dereliction if all the facts were not presented precisely as
38 WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR
they were. I consulted practically everyone who could
give me essential details and wrote a cable despatch, filling
four foolscap pages, which furnished Washington with
its first detailed account of the serious state of the cause
on which we had embarked. 1
In this work I had the full co-operation of our Ambas-
sador in London, Mr. Walter Hines Page. Mr. Page's
whole heart and mind were bound up in the Allied cause ;
he was zealous that his country should play worthily its
part in this great crisis in history ; and he worked unspar-
ingly with me to get the facts before our Government.
A few days after sending a despatch it occurred to me that
a message from our Ambassador might give emphasis to
my own. I therefore wrote such a message and took it
down to Brighton, where the American Ambassador was
taking a little rest. I did not know just how strong a
statement Mr. Page would care to become responsible
for, and so I did not make this statement quite as emphatic
as the circumstances justified.
Mr. Page took the paper and read it carefully. Then
he looked up.
" It isn't strong enough," he said. " I think I can do
better than this myself."
He sat down and wrote the following cablegram which
was immediately sent to the President :
*4~ From : Ambassador Page.
To : Secretary of State.
Sent : 27 April 1917.
Very confidential for Secretary and President.
There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue
of the war caused by the increasing success of the German
submarines. I have it from official sources that during
the week ending 22nd April, 88 ships of 237,000 tons allied
and neutral were lost. The number of vessels unsuccess-
fully attacked indicated a great increase in the number of
submarines in action.
This means practically a million tons lost every month
till the shorter days of autumn come. By that time the
sea will be about clear of shipping. Most of the ships are
sunk to the westward and southward of Ireland. The
British have in that area every available anti-submarine
1 See Appendix II.
1917] MR. PAGE'S CO-OPERATION 39
craft, but their force is so insufficient that they hardly
discourage the submarines.
The British transport of troops and supplies is already
strained to the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in
the field is threatened. There is food enough here to last the
civil population only not more than six weeks or two months.
Whatever help the United States may render at any
time in the future, or in any theatre of the war, our help
is now more seriously needed in this submarine area for
the sake of all the Allies than it can ever be needed again,
or anywhere else.
After talking over this critical situation with the Prime
Minister and other members of the Government, I cannot
refrain from most strongly recommending the immediate
sending over of every destroyer and all other craft that
can be of anti-submarine use. This seems to me the
sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous situa-
tion for the Allies that has arisen or could arise.
If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two
or three months the war will be won, and if we can con-
tribute effective help immediately it will be won directly
by our aid. I cannot exaggerate the pressing and increas-
ing danger of this situation. Thirty or more destroyers
and other similar craft sent by us immediately would very
likely be decisive.
There is no time to be lost. PAPE
But Mr. Page and I thought that we had not completely
done our duty even after sending these urgent messages.
Whatever might happen, we were determined that it could
never be charged that we had not presented the Allied
situation in its absolutely true light. It seemed likely that
an authoritative statement from the British Government
would give added assurance that our statements were not
the result of panic, and with this idea in mind, Mr. Page
and I called upon Mr. Balfour, Foreign Secretary, who,
in response to our request, sent a despatch to Washington
describing the seriousness of the situation.
All these messages made the same point : that the
United States should immediately assemble all its de-
stroyers and other light craft, and send them to the port
where they could render the greatest service in the anti-
submarine campaign Queenstown.
CHAPTER II
THE RETURN OF THE " MAYFLOWER :
THE morning of May 4, 1917, witnessed an important
event in the history of Queenstown. The news had been
printed in no British or American paper, yet in some
mysterious way it had reached nearly everybody in the
city. A squadron of American destroyers, which had
left Boston on the evening of April 24th, had already
been reported to the westward of Ireland and was due
to reach Queenstown that morning. At almost the
appointed hour a little smudge of smoke appeared in the
distance, visible to the crowds assembled on the hills ;
then presently another black spot appeared, and then
another ; and finally these flecks upon the horizon assumed
the form of six rapidly approaching warships. The Stars
and Stripes were broken out on public buildings, on
private houses, and on nearly all the water craft in the
harbour ; the populace, armed with American flags, began
to gather on the shore ; and the local dignitaries donned
their official robes to welcome the new friends from over-
seas. One of the greatest days in Anglo-American history
had dawned, for the first contingent of the American
navy was about to arrive in British waters and join hands
with the Allies in the battle against the forces of darkness
and savagery.
The morning was an unusually brilliant one. The
storms which had tossed our little vessels on the seas for
ten days, and which had followed them nearly to the Irish
coast, had suddenly given way to smooth water and a
burst of sunshine. The long and graceful American ships
steamed into the channel amid the cheers of the people
and the tooting of all harbour craft ; the sparkling waves,
the greenery of the bordering hills, the fruit trees already
in bloom, to say nothing of the smiling and cheery faces
40
1917J ARRIVAL OF THE U.S. DESTROYERS 41
of the welcoming Irish people, seemed to promise a fair
beginning for our great adventure. " Welcome to the
American colours," had been the signal of the Mary Rose,
a British destroyer which had been sent to lead the
Americans to their anchorage. " Thank you, I am glad
of your company," answered the Yankee commander ;
and these messages represented the spirit of the whole
proceeding. Indeed there was something in these strange-
looking American ships, quite unlike the British destroyers,
that necessarily inspired enthusiasm and respect. They
were long and slender ; the sunlight, falling upon their
graceful sides and steel decks, made them brilliant objects
upon the water ; and their business-like guns and torpedo
tubes suggested efficiency and readiness. The fact that
they had reached their appointed rendezvous exactly on
time, and that they had sailed up the Queenstown harbour
at almost precisely the moment that preparations had
been made to receive them, emphasized this impression.
The appearance of our officers on the decks in their un-
familiar, closely fitting blouses, and of our men, in their
neat white linen caps, also at once won the hearts of the
populace.
" Sure an' it's our own byes comin' back to us," an Irish
woman remarked, as she delightedly observed the unmis-
takably Gaelic countenances of a considerable proportion
of the crew. Indeed the natives of Queenstown seemed to
regard these American bluejackets almost as their own.
The welcome provided by these people was not of a formal
kind ; they gathered spontaneously to cheer and to admire.
In that part of Ireland there was probably not a family that
did not have relatives or associations in the United States,
and there was scarcely a home that did not possess some
memento of America. The beautiful Queenstown Roman
Catholic Cathedral, which stood out so conspicuously, had
been built very largely with American dollars, and the
prosperity of many a local family had the same trans -
Atlantic origin. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that
when our sailors landed for a few hours' liberty many hands
were stretched out to welcome them. Their friends took
them arm in arm, marched them to their homes, and enter-
tained them with food and drink, all the time plying them
with questions about friends and relatives in America.
Most of these young Americans with Irish ancestry had
42 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
never seen Ireland, but that did not prevent the warm-
hearted people of Queenstown from hailing them as their
own. This cordiality was appreciated, for the trip across
the Atlantic had been very severe, with gales and rain-
storms nearly every day.
The senior officer in charge was Commander Joseph K.
Taussig, whose flagship was the Wadsworth. The other
vessels of the division and their commanding officers were
the Conyngham, Commander Alfred W. Johnson ; the
Porter, Lieutenant-Commander Ward K. Wortman ; the
McDougal, Lieutenant-Commander Arther P. Fairfield ,-
the Davis, Lieutenant -Commander Rufus F. Zogbaum ;
and the Wainwright, Lieutenant -Commander Fred H.
Poteet. On the outbreak of hostilities these vessels, com-
prising our Eighth Destroyer Division, had been stationed
at Base 2, in the York River, Virginia ; at 7 P.M. of April
6th, the day that Congress declared war on Germany, their
commander had received the following signal from the
Pennsylvania, the flagship of the Atlantic Fleet : " Mobilize
for war in accordance with Department's confidential
mobilization plan of March 21st." From that time events
moved rapidly for the Eighth Division. On April 14th, the
very day on which I sent my first report on submarine con-
ditions to Washington, Commander Taussig received a
message to take his flotilla to Boston and there fit out for
" long and distant service." Ten days afterward he sailed,
with instructions to go fifty miles due east of Cape Cod and
there to open his sealed orders. At the indicated spot
Commander Taussig broke the seal, and read the following
document a paper so important in history, marking as it
does the first instructions any American naval or army
officer had received for engaging directly in hostilities with
Germany, that it is worth quoting in full :
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of Naval Operations
Washington, D. C.
Secret and Confidential
To : Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force,
Atlantic Fleet, U.S.S. Wadsworth, Flagship.
Subject : Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great
Britain and Ireland.
1917] COMMANDER TAUSSIG 43
1. The British Admiralty have requested the co-operation
of a division of American destroyers in the protection of
commerce near the coasts of Great Britain and France.
2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente
Powers in every way possible.
3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior
British naval officer present, and thereafter co-operate fully
with the British navy. Should it be decided that your
force act in co-operation with French naval forces your
mission and method of co-operation under French Admiralty
authority remain unchanged.
Route to Queenstown.
Boston to latitude 50 N Long. 20 W to arrive at day-
break then to latitude 50 N Long. 12 W thence to
Queenstown.
When within radio communication of the British naval
forces off Ireland, call G CK and inform the Vice-Admiral at
Queenstown in British general code of your position, course,
and speed. You will be met outside of Queenstown.
4. Base facilities will be provided by the British Admiralty.
5. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear-
Admiral Sims at London and be guided by such instructions
as he may give you. Make no reports of arrival to Navy
Department direct.
JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
No happier selection for the command of this division
could have been made than that of Commander Taussig.
In addition to his qualities as a sailor, certain personal
associations made him particularly acceptable to the British
naval authorities. In 1900, Commander Taussig, then a
midshipman, was a member of the naval forces which the
United States sent to China to co-operate with other powers
in putting down the Boxer Rebellion and rescuing the
besieged legations in Pekin. Near Tientsin this interna-
tional force saw its hardest fighting, and here Commander
Taussig was wounded. While recovering from his injury,
the young American found himself lying on a cot side by
side w r ith an English captain, then about forty years old,
who was in command of the Centurion and chief -of-staff to
Admiral Seymour, who had charge of the British forces.
This British officer was severely wounded ; a bullet had
penetrated his lung, and for a considerable period he was
44 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
unable to lie down. Naturally this enforced companionship
made the two men friends. Commander Taussig had had
many occasions to recall this association since, for his
wounded associate was Captain John R. Jellicoe, whose
advancement in the British navy had been rapid from that
day onward. On this same expedition Captain Jellicoe
became a sincere friend also of Captain McCalla, the
American who commanded the Newark and the American
landing force ; indeed, Jellicoe's close and cordial associa-
tion with the American navy dates from the Boxer expedi-
tion. Naturally Taussig had watched Jellicoe's career
with the utmost interest ; since he was only twenty-one at
the time, however, and the Englishman was twice his age,
it had never occurred to him that the First Sea Lord would
remember his youthful hospital companion. Yet the very
first message he received, on arriving in Irish waters, was
the following letter, brought to him by Captain Evans, the
man designated by the British Admiralty as liaison officer
with the American destroyers :
ADMIBALTY, WHITEHALL
1-5-17.
MY DEAR TAUSSIG :
I still retain very pleasant and vivid recollections of our
association in China and I am indeed delighted that you
should have been selected for the command of the first
force which is coming to fight for freedom, humanity, and
civilization. We shall all have our work cut out to subdue
piracy. My experience in China makes me feel perfectly con-
vinced that the two nations will work in the closest co-opera-
tion, and I won't flatter you by saying too much about the
value of your help. I must say this, however. There is
no navy in the world that can possibly give us more valuable
assistance, and there is no personnel in any navy that will
fight better than yours. My China experience tells me this.
If only my dear friend McCalla could have seen this day
how glad I would have been !
I must offer you and all your officers and men the warmest
welcome possible in the name of the British nation and the
British Admiralty, and add to it every possible good wish
from myself. May every good fortune attend you and
speedy victory be with us.
Yours very sincerely,
J. R. JELLICOE.
1917J U.S. OFFICERS AT CORK 45
At this same meeting Captain Evans handed the Amer-
ican commander another letter which was just as character-
istic as that of Admiral Jellicoe. The following lines
constitute our officers' first introduction to Vice-Admiral
Bayly, the officer who was to command their operations in
the next eighteen months, and, in its brevity, its entirely
business-like qualities, as well as in its genuine sincerity and
kindness, it gave a fair introduction to the man :
ADMIRALTY HOUSE,
QUEENSTOWN,
4-5-17.
DEAR LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER TAUSSIG :
I hope that you and the other five officers in command
of the U.S. destroyers in your flotilla will come and dine
here to-night, Friday, at 7.45, and that you and three others
will remain to sleep here so as to get a good rest after your
long journey. Allow me to welcome you and to thank you
for coming.
Yours sincerely,
LEWIS BAYLY.
Dine in undress ; no speeches.
The first duty of the officers on arrival was to make the
usual ceremonial calls. The Lord Mayor of Cork had
come down from his city, which is only twelve miles from
Queenstown, to receive the Americans, and now awaited
them in the American consulate ; and many other citizens
were assembled there to welcome them. One of the most
conspicuous features of the procession was the moving
picture operator, whose presence really had an international
significance. The British Government itself had detailed
him for this duty ; it regarded the arrival of our destroyers
as a great historical event and therefore desired to preserve
this animated record in the official archives. Crowds
gathered along the street to watch and cheer our officers as
they rode by ; and at the consulate the Lord Mayor, Mr.
Butterfield, made an eloquent address, laying particular
emphasis upon the close friendship that had always pre-
vailed between the American and the Irish people. Other
dignitaries made speeches voicing similar sentiments.
This welcome concluded, Commander Taussig and his
brother officers started up the steep hill that leads to
Admiralty House, a fine and spacious old building.
46 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
Here, following out the instructions of the Navy Depart-
ment, they were to report to Vice-Admiral Bayly for duty.
It is doing no injustice to Sir Lewis to say that our men
regarded this first meeting with some misgiving. The
Admiral's reputation in the British navy was well known to
them. They knew that he was one of the ablest officers in
the service ; but they had also heard that he was an ex-
tremely exacting man, somewhat taciturn in his manner,
and not inclined to be over familiar with his subordinates
a man who did not easily give his friendship or his respect,
and altogether, in the anxious minds of these ambitious
young Americans, he was a somewhat forbidding figure.
And the appearance of the Admiral, standing in his doorway
awaiting their arrival, rather accentuated these precon-
ceptions. He was a medium-sized man, with somewhat
swarthy, weatherbeaten face and black hair just turning
grey ; he stood there gazing rather quizzically at the
Americans as they came trudging up the hill, his hands
behind his back, his bright eyes keenly taking in every detail
of the men, his face not showing the slightest trace of a smile.
This struck our young men at first as a somewhat grim
reception ; the attitude of the Admiral suggested that he
was slightly in doubt as to the value of his new recruits, that
he was entirely willing to be convinced, but that only deeds
and not fine speeches of greeting would convince him. Yet
Admiral Bayly welcomed our men with the utmost courtesy
and dignity, and his face, as he began shaking hands, broke
into a quiet, non-committal smile ; there was nothing about
his manner that was effusive, there were no unnecessary
words, yet there was a real cordiality that put our men at
ease and made them feel at home in this strange environ-
ment. They knew, of course, that they had come to Ireland,
not for social diversions, but for the serious business of
fighting the Hun, and that indeed was the only thought
which could then find place in Admiral Bayly's mind. Up
to this time the welcome to the Americans had taken the
form of lofty oratorical flights, with emphasis upon the
blood ties of Anglo-Saxondom, and the significance to
civilization of America and Great Britain fighting side by
side ; but this was not the kind of a greeting our men
received from Admiral Bayly. The Admiral himself, with his
somewhat worn uniform and his lack of ceremony, formed
a marked contrast to the official reception by the Lord
1917] ADMIRAL BAYLY 47
Mayor and his suite in their insignia of office. Entirely
characteristic also was the fact that, instead of making a
long speech, he made no speech at all. His chief interest
in the Americans at that time was the assistance which they
were likely to bring to the Allied cause ; after courteously
greeting the officers, the first question he asked about these
forces was :
" When will you be ready to go to sea ? "
Even under the most favourable conditions that is an
embarrassing question to ask of a destroyer commander.
There is no type of ship that is so chronically in need of
overhauling. Even in peace times the destroyer usually
has under way a long list of repairs ; our first contingent
had sailed without having had much' opportunity to refit,
and had had an extremely nasty voyage. The fact was
that it had been rather severely battered up, although
the flotilla was in excellent condition, considering its hard
experience on the ocean and the six months of hard work
which it had previously had on our coast. One ship had
lost its fire-room ventilator, another had had condenser
troubles on the way across, and there had been other
difficulties. Commander Taussig, however, had sized up
Admiral Bayly as a man to whom it would be a tactical
error to make excuses, and promptly replied :
; ' We are ready now, sir, that is, as soon as we finish
refuelling. Of course you know how destroyers are
always wanting something done to them. But this is
war, and we are ready to make the best of things and go
to sea immediately."
The Admiral was naturally pleased with the spirit indi-
cated by this statement, and, with his customary con-
sideration for his juniors, said :
" I will give you four days from the time of arrival.
Will that be sufficient ? "
" Yes," answered Taussig, " that will be more than
ample time."
As we discovered afterward, the Admiral had a system
of always " testing out " new men, and it is not improb-
able that this preliminary interview was a part of this
process.
During the period of preparation there were certain
essential preliminaries : it was necessary to make and to
receive many calls, a certain amount of tea drinking was
48 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
inevitable, and there were many invitations to dinners
and to clubs that could not be ignored. Our officers
made a state visit to Cork, going up in Admiral Bayly's
barge, and returned the felicitations of the Mayor and
his retinue.
Naturally both the Americans and their ships became
objects of great interest to their new allies. It was, I
think, the first time that a destroyer flotilla had ever
visited Great Britain, and the very appearance of the
vessels themselves aroused the greatest curiosity. They
bore only a general resemblance to the destroyers of the
British navy. The shape of their hulls, the number and
location of smoke pipes, the positions of guns, torpedo
tubes, bridges, deckhouse, and other details gave them
quite a contrasting profile. The fact that they were
designed to operate under different conditions from the
British ships accounted for many of these divergences.
We build our destroyers with the widest possible cruising
radius ; they are expected to go to the West Indies, to
operate from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in general
to feel at home anywhere in the great stretch of waters
that surround our country. British destroyers, on the
other hand, are intended to operate chiefly in the restricted
waters around the British Isles, where the fuelling and
refitting facilities are so extensive that they do not have
to devote much space to supplies of this kind. The
result is that our destroyers can keep the sea longer than
the British ; on the other hand, the British are faster
than ours, and they can also turn more quickly. These
differences were of course a subject of much discussion
among the observers at Queenstown, and even of animated
argument. Naturally, the interest of the destroyer
officers of the two services in the respective merits of
their vessels was very keen. They examined minutely all
features that were new to them in the design and arrange-
ment of guns, torpedoes, depth charges, and machines,
freely exchanged information, and discussed proposed
improvements in the friendliest possible spirit. Strangely
enough, although the American destroyers carried greater
fuel supplies than the British, they were rather more
dainty and graceful in their lines, a fact which inspired a
famous retort which rapidly passed through the ranks of
both navies.
1917] THE AMERICANS BEGIN WORK 40
** You know," remarked a British officer to an American,
" I like the British destroyers better than the American.
They look so much sturdier. Yours seem to me rather
feminine in appearance."
" Yes," replied the American, " that's so, but you must
remember what Kipling says, ' The female of the species
is more deadly than the male.' '
The work of the Americans really began on the Sunday
which followed their arrival ; by this time they had
established cordial relations with Admiral Bayly and were
prepared to trust themselves unreservedly in his hands.
He summoned the officers on this Sunday morning and
talked with them a few moments before they started for
the submarine zone ; the time of their departure had been
definitely fixed for the next day. In the matter of cere-
monial greetings the Admiral was not strong, but when it
came to discussing the business in hand he was the master
of a convincing eloquence. The subject of his discourse
was the responsibility that lay before our men ; he spoke
in sharp, staccato tones, making his points with the
utmost precision, using no verbal flourishes or unnecessary
words looking at our men perhaps a little fiercely, and
certainly impressing them with the fact that the work
which lay before them was to be no summer holiday.
As soon as the destroyers passed beyond the harbour
defences, the Admiral began, death constantly lay before
the men until they returned. There was only one safe
rule to follow ; days and even weeks might go by without
seeing a submarine, but the men must assume that one
was constantly watching them, looking for a favourable
opportunity to discharge its torpedo. " You must not
relax attention for an instant, or you may lose an oppor-
tunity to destroy a submarine or give her a chance to
destroy you." It was the present intention to send the
American destroyers out for periods of six days, giving
them two days' rest between trips, and about once a
month they were to have five days in port for boiler
cleaning. And now the Admiral gave some details about
the practical work at sea. Beware, he said, about ram-
ming periscopes ; these were frequently mere decoys for
bombs and should be shelled. In picking up survivors
of torpedoed vessels the men must be careful not to stop
until thoroughly convinced that there were no submarines
5
50 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
in the neighbourhood : " You must not risk the loss of
your vessel in order to save the lives of a few people."
The Admiral proclaimed the grim philosophy of this
war when he told our men that it would be their first duty,
should they see a ship torpedoed, not to go to the rescue
of the survivors, but to go after the submarine. The
three imperative duties of the destroyers were, in the
order named : first, to destroy submarines ; second, to
convoy and protect merchant shipping ; and third, to
save the lives of the passengers and crews of torpedoed
ships. No commander should ever miss an opportunity
to destroy a submarine merely because there were a few
men and women in small boats or in the water who might
be saved. Admiral Bayly explained that to do this would
be false economy : sinking a submarine meant saving far
more lives than might be involved in a particular instance,
for this vessel, if spared, would simply go on constantly
destroying human beings. The Admiral then gave a
large number of instructions in short, pithy sentences :
" Do not use searchlights ; do not show any lights what-
ever at night ; do not strike any matches ; never steam
at a slower rate than thirteen knots ; always zigzag,
thereby preventing the submarine from plotting your
position ; always approach a torpedoed vessel with the
sun astern ; make only short signals ; do not repeat the
names of vessels ; carefully watch all fishing vessels they
may be submarines in disguise they even put up masts,
sails, and funnels in this attempt to conceal their true
character." The Admiral closed his remarks with a warn-
ing based upon his estimate of the character and methods
of the enemy. In substance he said that were it not
for the violations of the dictates of humanity and the
well-established chivalry of the sea, he would have the
greatest respect for the German submarine commanders.
He cautioned our officers not to underrate them, and par-
ticularly emphasized their cleverness at what he termed
" the art of irregularity." He explained this by saying
that up to that time he had been unable to deduce from
their operations any definite plan or tactics, and advised
our commanders also to guard against any regularity of
movement ; they should never, for example, patrol from
one corner to another of their assigned squares in the
submarine zone, or adopt any other uniform practice
1917] CRISIS OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 51
which the enemy might soon perceive and of which he
would probably take advantage.
At the very moment that Admiral Bayly was giving
these impressive instructions the submarine campaign had
reached its crisis ; the fortunes of the Allies had never
struck so low a depth as at that time. An incident con-
nected with our arrival, not particularly important in
itself, brought home to our men the unsleeping vigilance
of the enemy with whom they had to deal.
Perhaps the Germans did not actually have advance
information of the arrival of this first detachment of our
destroyers ; but they certainly did display great skill in
divining what was to happen. At least it was a remark-
able coincidence that for the first time in many months a
submarine laid a mine-field directly off the entrance to
Queenstown the day before our ships arrived. Soon
afterward a parent ship of the destroyers reached this port
and encountered the same welcome ; and soon after that
a second parent ship found a similar mine-field awaiting
her arrival. The news that our destroyers had reached
Queenstown actually appeared in the German papers
several days before we had released it in the British and
American press. Thanks to the vigilance and efficiency
of the British mine-sweepers, however, the enemy gained
nothing from all these preparations, for the channel was
cleared of German mines before our vessels reached port.
The night before the destroyers arrived, while some of
the officers of my staff were dining with Admiral Bayly,
the windows were shaken by heavy explosions made by
the mines which the sweepers were dragging out. Admiral
Bayly jokingly remarked that it was really a pity to inter-
fere with such a warm welcome as had apparently been
planned for our crusaders. Even the next night, while
the destroyer officers were dining at Admiralty House,
several odd mines exploded outside the channel that had
been swept the previous day. This again impressed our
men with the fact that the game which they had now
entered was quite a different affair from their peace-time
manoeuvres.
The Germans at that time were jubilant over the progress
of their submarine campaign and, indeed, they had good
reason to be. The week that our first flotilla reached Irish
waters their submarines had destroyed 240,000 tons of
52 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
Allied shipping ; if the sinking should keep up at this
rate, it meant losses of 1,000,000 tons a month and an
early German victory.
In looking over my letters of that period, I find many
references that picture the state of the official mind. All
that time I was keeping closely in touch with Ambassador
Page, who was energetically seconding all my efforts to
bring more American ships across the Atlantic.
" It remains a fact," I wrote our Ambassador, " that at
present the enemy is succeeding and that we are failing.
Ships are being sunk faster than they can be replaced by
the building facilities of the world. This simply means
that the enemy is winning the war. There is no mystery
about that. The submarines are rapidly cutting the
Allies' lines of communication. When they are cut, or
sufficiently interfered with, we must accept the enemy's
terms."
Six days before our destroyers put in at Queenstown I
sent this message to Mr. Page :
Allies do not now command the sea. Transport of troops
and supplies strained to the utmost and the maintenance
of the armies in the field is threatened.
Such, then, was the situation when our little destroyer
flotilla first went to sea to do battle with the submarine.
II
Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, who now became the com-
mander of the American destroyers at Queenstown, so far
as their military operations were concerned, had spent
fifty years in the British navy, forty years of this time
actually at sea. This ripe experience, combined with a
great natural genius for salt water, had made him one
of the most efficient men in the service. In what I have
already said, I may have given a slightly false impression
of the man ; that he was taciturn, that he was generally
regarded as a hard taskmaster, that he never made friends
at the first meeting, that he was more interested in results
than in persons all this is true ; yet these qualities merely
concealed what was, at bottom, a generous, kindly, and
even a warm-hearted character. Admiral Bayly was so
1917] ADMIRAL BAYLY 53
retiring and so modest that he seemed almost to have
assumed these exterior traits to disguise his real nature.
When our men first met the Admiral they saw a man
who would exact their last effort and accept no excuses
for failure ; when admitted to more intimate association,
however, they discovered that this weather-beaten sailor
had a great love for flowers, for children, for animals, for
pictures, and for books ; that he was deeply read in
general literature, in history, and in science, and that
he had a knowledge of their own country and its institu-
tions which many of our own officers did not possess.
Americans have great reason to be proud of the achieve-
ments of their naval men, and one of the most praise-
worthy was the fact that they became such intimate
friends of Admiral Bayly. For this man's nature was so
sincere that he could never bring himself to indulge in
friendships which he deemed unw r orthy. Early in his
association with our men, he told them bluntly that any
success he and they might have in getting on together
would depend entirely upon the manner in which they
performed their work. If they acquitted themselves
creditably, well and good ; if not, he should not hesitate
to find fault with them. It is thus a tribute to our officers
that in a very short time they and Admiral Bayly had
established relations which were not only friendly but
affectionate. Not long after our destroyers arrived at
Queenstown most of the British destroyers left to re-
inforce the hard-driven flotillas in the Channel and the
North Sea, so that the destroyer forces at Queenstown
under Admiral Bayly became almost exclusively American,
though they worked with many British vessels sloops,
trawlers, sweepers, and mystery ships, in co-operation
with British destroyers and other vessels in the north and
other parts of Ireland. The Admiral watched over our
ships and their men with the jealous eye of a father. He
always referred to his command as " my destroyers " and
" my Americans," and woe to anyone who attempted to
interfere with them or do them the slightest injustice !
Admiral Bayly would fight for them, against the combined
forces of the whole British navy, like a tigress for her cubs.
He constantly had a weather eye on Plymouth, the main
base of the British destroyers, to see that the vessels from
that station did their fair share of the work. Once or
54 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
twice a dispute arose between an American destroyer com-
mander and a British ; in such cases Admiral Bayly vigor-
ously took the part of the American. " You did per-
fectly right," he would say to our men, and then he would
turn all his guns against the interfering Britisher. Rela-
tions between the young Americans and the experienced
Admiral became so close that they would sometimes go to
him with their personal troubles ; he became not only
their commander, but their confidant and adviser.
There was something in these bright young chaps from
overseas, indeed, so different from anything which he had
ever met before, that greatly appealed to this seasoned
Englishman. One thing that he particularly enjoyed was
their sense of humour. The Admiral himself had a keen
wit and a love of stories ; and he also had the advantage,
which was not particularly common in England, of under-
standing American slang and American anecdotes. There
are certain stories which apparently only an upbringing on
American soil qualifies one to appreciate ; yet Admiral
Bayly always instantly got the point. He even took a
certain pride in his ability to comprehend the American
joke. One of the regular features of life at Queenstown
was a group of retired British officers fine, white-haired
old gentlemen who could take no active part in the war but
who used to find much consolation in coming around to
smoke their pipes and to talk things over at Admiralty
House. Admiral Bayly invariably found delight in encour-
aging our officers to entertain these rare old souls with
American stories ; their utter bewilderment furnished
him endless entertainment. The climax of his pleasure
came when, after such an experience, the old men would
get the Admiral in a corner, and whisper to him : " What
in the world do they mean ? "
The Admiral was wonderfully quick at repartee, as our
men found when they began " joshing " him on British
peculiarities, for as naval attache he had travelled exten-
sively in the United States, had observed most of our
national eccentricities, and thus was able promptly " to
come back." In such contests our men did not invariably
come off with all the laurels. Yet, despite these modern
tendencies, Admiral Bayly was a conservative of the con-
servatives, having that ingrained British respect for old
things simply because they were old. An ancient British
1917] ADMIRAL BAYLY'S CHARACTERISTICS 55
custom requires that at church on Sundays the leading
dignitary in each community shall mount the reading
desk and read the lessons of the day ; Admiral Bayly
would perform this office with a simplicity and a reverence
which indicated the genuinely religious nature of the
man. And in smaller details he was likewise the ancient,
tradition-loving Briton. He would never think of writing
a letter to an equal or superior officer except in longhand ;
to use a typewriter for such a purpose would have been
profanation in his eyes. I once criticized a certain
Admiral for consuming an hour or so in laboriously penning
a letter which could have been dictated to a stenographer
in a few minutes.
" How do you ever expect to win the war if you use
up time this way ? " I asked.
" I'd rather lose the war," the Admiral replied, but with
a twinkle in his eye, " than use a typewriter to my chiefs ! "
Our officers liked to chaff the Admiral quietly on this
conservatism. He frequently had a number of them to
breakfast, and upon one such occasion the question was
asked as to why the Admiral ate an orange after breakfast,
instead of before, as is the custom in America.
" I can tell you why," said Commander Zogbaum.
" Well, why is it ? " asked the Admiral.
" Because that's what William the Conqueror used to
do."
" I can think of no better reason than that for doing
it," the Admiral promptly answered. But this remark
tickled him immensely, and became a byword with him.
Ever afterward, whenever he proposed to do something
which the Americans regarded as too conservative, he
would say :
" You know that this is what William the Conqueror
used to do ! "
Yet in one respect the Admiral was all American ; he
was a hard worker even to the point of hustle. He insisted
on the strictest attention to the task in hand from his
subordinates, but at least he never spared himself. After
he had arrived at Queenstown, two years before our
destroyers put in, he proceeded to reorganize Admiralty
House on the most business-like basis. The first thing he
pounced upon was the billiard-room in the basement.
He decided that it would make an excellent plotting-room,
56 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
and that the billiard-tables could be transformed into
admirable drawing-boards for his staff ; he immediately
called the superintendent and told him to make the
necessary transformations.
" All right," said the superintendent. " We'll start
work on them to-morrow morning."
" No, you won't," Admiral Bayly replied. " We pro-
pose to be established in this room using these tables
to-morrow morning. They must be all ready for use by
eight o'clock."
And he was as good as his word ; the workmen spent
the whole night making the changes. At the expense of
considerable personal comfort he also caused one half of
the parlour of Admiralty House to be partitioned off as
an office and the wall thus formed covered with war maps.
These incidents are significant, not only of Admiral
Bayly's methods, but of his ideals. In his view, if a
billiard room could be made to serve a war purpose, it
had no proper place in an Admiralty house which was the
headquarters for fighting German submarines. The chief
duty of all men at that crisis was work, and their one
responsibility was the defeat of the Hun. Admiralty
House was always open to our officers ; they spent many
a delightful evening there around the Admiral's fire ;
they were constantly entertained at lunch and at dinner,
and they were expected to drop in for tea whenever they
were in port. But social festivities in the conventional
sense were barred. No ladies, except the Admiral's rela-
tives, ever visited the place. Some of the furnishings
were rather badly worn, but the Admiral would make no
requisitions for new rugs or chairs ; every penny in the
British exchequer, he insisted, should be used to carry on
the war. He was scornfully critical of any naval officers
who made a lavish display of silver on their tables ; money
should be spent for depth charges, torpedoes, and twelve-
inch shells, not for ostentation. He was scrupulousness
itself in observing all official regulations in the matter of
food and other essentials.
For still another reason the Admiral made an ideal com-
mander of American naval forces. He was a strict teeto-
taller. His abstention was not a war measure ; he had
always had a strong aversion to alcohol in any form and
had never drank a cocktail or a brandy and soda in his
1917] ADMIRAL BAYLY AND OUR MEN 57
life. Dinners at Admiralty House, therefore, were abso-
lutely " dry," and in perfect keeping with American naval
regulations.
Though Admiral Bayly was not athletic his outdoor
games being limited to tip-and-run cricket in the Admiralty
grounds, which he played with a round bat and a tennis
ball he was a man of wiry physique and a tireless walker.
Indeed the most active young men in our navy had great
difficulty in keeping pace with him. One of his favourite
diversions on a Saturday afternoon was to take a group on
a long tramp in the beautiful country surrounding Queens -
town ; by the time the party reached home, the Admiral,
though sixty years old, was usually the freshest of the lot.
I still vividly remember a long walk which I took with him
in a pelting rain ; I recall how keenly he enjoyed it and
how young and nimble he seemed to be when we reached
home, drenched to the skin. A steep hill led from the
shore up to Admiralty House ; Sir Lewis used to say that
this was a valuable military asset it did not matter how
angry a man might be with him when he started for
headquarters, by the time he arrived, this wearisome
climb always had the effect of quieting his antagonism.
The Admiral was fond of walking up this hill with our
young officers ; he himself usually reached the top as
fresh as a daisy, while his juniors were frequently puffing
for breath.
He enjoyed testing out our men in other ways ; nothing
delighted him more than giving them hard jobs to do
especially when they accomplished the tasks successfully.
One day he ordered one of our officers, Lieutenant-Com-
mander Roger Williams, captain of the Duncan, a recent
arrival at Queenstown, to cross the Irish Sea and bring
back a ship. The joke lay in the fact that this man's
destroyer had just come in with her steering gear com-
pletely out of commission a circumstance which Admiral
Bayly well understood. Many officers would have
promptly asked to be excused on this ground, but not
this determined American. He knew that the Admiral
was trying to " put something over on him," and he rose
to the occasion. The fact that Queenstown Harbour is
long and narrow, not wide enough for a destroyer to turn
around in, made Commander Williams's problem still more
difficult, but by cleverly using his engines, he succeeded
58 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
in backing out the distance required was five miles ;
he took another mile and a half to turn his ship and then
he went across the sea and brought back his convoy all
without any steering gear. This officer never once men-
tioned to the Admiral the difficulties under which he had
worked, but his achievement completely won Sir Lewis's
heart, and from that time this young man became one of
his particular favourites. Indeed, it was the constant
demonstration of this kind of fundamental character in
our naval men which made the Admiral admire them so.
On occasions Admiral Bayly would go to sea himself
something quite unprecedented and possibly even repre-
hensible, for it was about the same thing as a commanding
general going into the front-line trenches. But the
Admiral believed that doing this now and then helped to
inspire his men ; and, besides that, he enjoyed it he
was not made for a land sailor. He had as flagship a
cruiser of about 5,000 tons ; he had a way of jumping on
board without the slightest ceremony and taking a cruise
up the west coast of Ireland. On occasion the Admiral
would personally lead an expedition which was going to
the relief of a torpedoed vessel, looking for survivors adrift
in small boats. One day Admiral Bayly, Captain Pringle
of the U.S.S. Melville, Captain Campbell, the Englishman
whose exploits with mystery ships had given him world-
wide fame, and myself went out on the Active to watch
certain experiments with depth charges. It was a highly
imprudent thing to do, because a vessel of such draft was
an excellent target for torpedoes, but that only added to the
zest of the occasion from Admiral Bayly's point of view.
" What a bag this would be for the Hun ! " he chuckled.
" The American Commander-in-Chief, the British Admiral
commanding in Irish waters, a British and an American
captain ! "
In our mind's eye we could see our picture in the Berlin
papers four distinguished prisoners standing in a row.
A single fact shpws with what consideration Admiral
Bayly treated his subordinates. The usual naval regula-
tion demands that an officer, coming in from a trip, shall
immediately seek out his commander and make a verbal
report. Frequently the men came in late in the evening,
extremely fatigued ; to make the visit then was a hardship
and might deprive them of much-needed sleep. Admiral
1917] MISS VOYSEY 59
Bayly therefore had a fixed rule that such visits should be
made at ten o'clock of the morning following the day of
arrival. On such occasions he would often be found seated
somewhat grimly behind his desk wholly absorbed in the
work in hand. If he were writing or reading his mail he
would keep steadily at it, never glancing up until he had
finished. He would listen to the report stoically, possibly
say a word of praise, and then turn again to the business
in hand. Occasionally he would notice that his abruptness
had perhaps pained the young American ; then he would
break into an apologetic smile, and ask him to come up
to dinner that evening, and even this was the greatest
honour of all to spend the night at Admiralty House.
These dinners were great occasions for our men, particu-
larly as they were presided over by Miss Voysey, the Ad-
miral's niece. Miss Voysey, the little spaniel, Patrick, and
the Admiral constituted the " family," and the three were
entirely devoted to one another. Pat in particular was an
indispensable part of this menage ; I have never seen any
object quite so crestfallen and woe-begone as this little dog
when either Miss Voysey or the Admiral spent a day or two
away from the house. Miss Voysey was a young woman of
great personal charm and cultivation ; probably she was the
influence that most contributed to the happiness and com-
fort of our officers at Queenstown. From the day of their
arrival she entered into the closest comradeship with the
Americans. She kept open house for them : she was
always on hand to serve tea in the afternoon, and she never
overlooked an opportunity to add to their well-being. As a
result of her delightful hospitality Admiralty House really
became a home for our officers. Miss Voysey had a genuine
enthusiasm for America and Americans ; possibly the fact
that she was herself an Australian made her feel like one of
us ; at any rate, there were certain qualities in our men that
she found extremely congenial, and she herself certainly
won all their hearts. Anyone who wishes to start a burst of
enthusiasm from our officers who were stationed at Queens-
town need only to mention the name of Miss Voysey. The
dignity with which she presided over the Admiral's house,
and the success with which she looked out for his comfort,
also inspired their respect. Miss Voysey was the leader in
all the war charities at Queenstown, and she and the Admiral
made it their personal duty to look out for the victims of
60 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
torpedoed ships. At whatever hour these survivors arrived
they were sure of the most warm-hearted attentions from
headquarters. In a large hall in the Custom House at the
landing the Admiral kept a stock of cigarettes and tobacco,
and the necessary gear and supplies for making and serving
hot coffee at short notice, and nothing ever prevented him
and his people from stationing themselves there to greet
and serve the survivors as soon as they arrived often wet
and cold, and semetimes wounded. Even though the Ad-
miral might be at dinner he and Miss Voysey would leave
their meal half eaten and hurry to the landing to welcome
the survivors. The Admiral and his officers always insisted
on serving them, and they would even wash the dishes and
put them away for the next time. The Admiral, of course,
might have ordered others to do this work, but he preferred
to give this personal expression of a real seaman's sympathy
for other seamen in distress. It is unnecessary to say that
any American officers who could get there in time always
lent a hand. I am sure that long after most of the minor
incidents of this war have faded from my memory, I shall
still keep a vivid recollection of this kindly gentleman,
Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Royal
Navy, serving coffee to wretched British, American, French,
Italian, Japanese, or negro sailors, with a cheering word for
each, and afterward, with sleeves tucked up, calmly washing
dishes in a big pan of hot water.
I have my fears that the Admiral will not be particularly
pleased by the fact that I have taken all these pains to intro-
duce him to the American public. Excessive modesty is one
of his most conspicuous traits. When American correspond-
ents came to Queenstown, Admiral Bayly would receive
them courteously. " You can have all you want about the
navy," he would say, " but remember not a word about
Lewis Bayly." He was so reticent that he was averse to
having his picture taken ; even the moving picture operator
detailed to get an historic record of the arrival of our
destroyers did not obtain a good view of the Admiral, for
whenever Sir Lewis saw him coming he would turn his back
to the camera ! My excuse for describing this very lovable
man, however, is because he became almost an object of
veneration to our American officers, and because, since
for eighteen months he was the commander of the American
forces based on Queenstown, he is an object of legitimate
1917] CAPTAIN E. R. G. R. EVANS 61
interest to the American people. The fact that the Admiral
was generally known to our officers as " Uncle Lewis," and
that some of those who grew to know him best even called
him that to his face, illustrates the delightful relations
which were established. Any account of the operations of
our navy in the European War would thus be sadly incom-
plete which ignored the splendid sailor who was largely
responsible for their success.
Another officer who contributed greatly to the efficiency
of the American forces was Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, R.N.,
who was detailed by Admiral Jellicoe at my request to act
as liaison officer with our destroyers. No more fortunate
selection could have been made. Captain Evans had
earned fame as second in command of the Scott Antarctic
expedition ; he had spent much time in the United States
and knew our people well ; indeed when war broke out he
was lecturing in our country on his polar experiences. A
few days before our division arrived Captain Evans had
distinguished himself in one of the most brilliant naval
actions of the war. He was commander of the destroyer-
leader Broke a " destroyer-leader " being a destroyer of
unusually large size and in this battle three British vessels
of this type had fought six German destroyers. Captain
Evans's ship sank one German destroyer and rammed
another, passing clear over its stern and cutting it nearly in
two. The whole of England was ringing with this exploit,
and it was a decided tribute to our men that Admiral Jellicoe
consented to detail the commander of the Broke. He was
a man of great intelligence, great energy, and, what was
almost equally to the point, he was extremely companion-
able ; whether he was relating his experiences at the South
Pole, or telling us of active life on a destroyer, or swapping
yarns with our officers, or giving us the value of his practical
experiences in the war, Captain Evans was always at home
with our men indeed, he seemed to be almost one of us.
The fact that these American destroyers were placed
under the command of a British admiral was somewhat
displeasing to certain Americans. I remember that one
rather bumptious American correspondent, on a visit to
Queenstown, was loud in expressing his disapproval of this
state of affairs, and even threatened to " expose " us all in
the American press. The fact that I was specifically com-
missioned as destroyer commander also confused the
62 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
situation. Yet the procedure was entirely proper, and, in
fact, absolutely necessary. My official title was " Com-
mander of the U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European
Waters " ; besides this, I was the representative of our
Navy Department at the British Admiralty and American
member of the Allied Naval Council. These duties required
my presence in London, which became the centre of all our
operations. I was commander not only of our destroyers at
Queenstown, but of a destroyer force at Brest, another at
Gibraltar, of subchaser forces at Corfu and Plymouth, of a
mixed force at the Azores, of the American battle squadrons
at Scapa Flow and Berehaven, Ireland, certain naval forces
at Murmansk and Archangel in north Russia, and of many
other contingents. Clearly it was impossible for me to
devote all my time exclusively to any one of these com-
mands ; so far as actual operations were concerned it was
necessary that particular commanders should control them.
All these destroyer squadrons, including that at Queens-
town, were under the command of the American Admiral
stationed in London ; whenever they sailed from Queens -
town on specific duty, however, they sailed under orders
from Admiral Bayly. Any time, however, I could with-
draw these destroyers from Queenstown and send them
where the particular necessities required. My position,
that is, was precisely the same as that of General Pershing
in France. He sent certain American divisions to the
British army ; as long as they acted with the British they
were subject to the orders of Sir Douglas Haig ; but General
Pershing could withdraw these men at any time for use
elsewhere. The actual supreme command of all our forces,
army and navy, rested in the hands of Americans ; but, for
particular operations, they naturally had to take their orders
from the particular officer under whom they were stationed.
Ill
On May 17th a second American destroyer flotilla of six
ships arrived at Queenstown. From that date until July
5th a new division put in nearly every week. The six
destroyers which escorted our first troopships from America
to France were promptly assigned to duty with our forces in
Irish waters. Meanwhile other ships were added. On
May 22nd the Melville, the " Mother Ship " of the de-
stroyers, arrived and became the flagship of all the American
1917] INCREASING AMERICAN FORCES 63
vessels which were stationed at Queenstown. This repair
and supply ship practically took the place of a dockyard, so
far as our destroyer forces were concerned. Queenstown
had been almost abandoned as a navy yard many years
before the European War and its facilities for the repair
of warships were consequently very inadequate. The
Melville relieved the British authorities of many responsi-
bilities of this kind. She was able to do three-quarters of
all this work, except major repairs and those which required
docking. Her resources for repairing destroyers, and for
providing for the wants and comforts of our men, aroused
much admiration in British naval circles. The rapidity
with which our forces settled down to work, and the sea-
manly skill which they manifested from the very beginning,
likewise made the most favourable impression. By July
5th we had thirty-four destroyers at Queenstown a force
that remained practically at that strength until November.
In 1918 much of the work of patrolling the seas and of
convoying ships to the west and south of Ireland the area
which, in many ways, was the most important field of
submarine warfare fell upon these American ships. The
officers and crews began this work with such zest that by
June 1st I was justified in making the following statement
to the Navy Department : " It is gratifying to be able to
report that the operations of our forces in these waters have
proved not only very satisfactory, but also of marked value
to the Allies in overcoming the submarine menace. The
equipment and construction of our ships have proved
adequate and sufficient, and the personnel has shown an
unusually high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope
with the situation presented."
It is impossible to exaggerate the enthusiasm which the
arrival of these vessels produced upon the British public.
America itself experienced something of a thrill when the
news was first published that our destroyers had reached
European waters, but this was mild compared with the joy
which spread all over the British Isles. The feeling of
Americans was mainly one of pride ; our people had not yet
suffered much from the European cataclysm, and despite
the fact that we were now active participants, the war still
seemed very far off and unreal. The fact that a German
victory would greatly endanger our national freedom had
hardly entered our national consciousness ; the idea seemed
64 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
dim, abstract, perhaps even absurd ; but in Great Britain,
with the guns constantly booming almost within earshot of
the people, the horrors of the situation were acutely realized.
For this reason those American destroyers at Queenstown
immediately became a symbol in the minds of the British
people. They represented not only the material assistance
which our limitless resources and our almost inexhaustible
supply of men would bring to a cause which was really in
desperate straits ; but they stood also for a great spiritual
fact ; for the kinship of the two great Anglo-Saxon peoples,
which, although separated politically, had now joined hands
to fight for the ideals upon which the civilization of both
nations rested. In the preceding two years Great Britain
had had her moments of doubt doubt as to whether the
American people had remained true to the principles that
formed the basis of their national life ; the arrival of these
ships immediately dispelled all such misgivings.
Almost instinctively the minds of the British people
turned to the day, nearly three hundred years before, when
the Mayflower sailed for the wilderness beyond the seas. The
moving picture film, which depicted the arrival of our first
destroyer division, and which was exhibited all over Great
Britain to enthusiastic crowds, cleverly accentuated this
idea. This film related how, in 1620, a few Englishmen had
landed in North America ; how these adventurers had laid
the foundations of a new state based on English conceptions
of justice and liberty ; how they had grown great and
prosperous ; how the stupidity of certain British statesmen
had forced them to declare their independence ; how they
had fought for this independence with the utmost heroism ;
how out of these disjointed British colonies they had founded
one of the mightiest nations of history ; and how now, when
the liberties of mankind were endangered, the descendants
of the old Mayflower pioneers had in their turn crossed the
ocean this time going eastward to fight for the tradi-
tions of their race. Had Americans been making this film,
they would have illustrated another famous episode in our
history that antedated, by thirteen years, the voyage of
the Mayflower that is, the landing of British colonists
in Virginia, in 1607 ; but in the minds of the English
people the name Mayflower had become merely a symbol
of American progress and all that it represented. This
whole story appealed to the British masses as one of the
1917] MY GUILDHALL SPEECH, 1910 65
great miracles of history a single, miserable little settle-
ment in Massachusetts Bay expanding into a continent
overflowing with resources and wealth ; a shipload of
men, women, and children developing, in less than three
centuries, into a nation of more than 100,000,000 people.
And the arrival of our destroyers, pictured on the film,
informed the British people that all this youth and energy
had been thrown upon their side of the battle.
One circumstance gave a particular appropriateness to
the fact that I commanded these forces. In 1910 I had
visited England as captain of the battleship Minnesota, a
unit in a fleet which was then cruising in British and
French waters. It was apparent even at that time that
preparations were under way for a European war ; on
every hand there were plenty of evidences that Germany
was determined to play her great stroke for the domina-
tion of the world. In a report to the Admiral command-
ing our division I gave it as my opinion that the great
European War would begin within four years. In a speech
at the Guildhall, where 800 of our sailors were entertained
at lunch by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vezey Strong, I used
the words which involved me in a good deal of trouble at
the time and which have been much quoted since. The
statement then made was purely the inspiration of the
moment ; it came from the heart, not from the head ;
probably the evidences that Germany was stealthily pre-
paring her great blow had something to do with my out-
burst. I certainly spoke without any authorization from
my Government, and realized at once that I had committed
a great indiscretion. " If the time should ever come," I
said, " when the British Empire is menaced by a European
coalition, Great Britain can rely upon the last ship, the
last dollar, the last man, and the last drop of blood of
her kindred beyond the sea." It is not surprising that
the appearance of American ships, commanded by the
American who had spoken these words seven years before,
strongly appealed to the British sense of the dramatic.
Indeed, it struck the British people as a particularly happy
fulfilment of prophecy. These sentences were used as an
introduction to the moving picture film showing the arrival
of our first destroyer division, and for weeks after reaching
England I could hardly pick up a newspaper without these
words of my Guildhall speech staring me in the face.
6
66 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
Of course, any American admiral then commanding
American naval forces in European waters would have
been acclaimed as the living symbol of Anglo-American
co-operation ; and it was simply as the representative of
the American people and the American navy that the
British people received me so appreciatively. At first
the appearance of our uniforms aroused much curiosity ;
our tightly fitting blouses were quite different from the
British sack coats, and few people in London, in fact,
knew who we were. After our photographs had appeared
in the press, however, the people always recognized us
in the streets. And then something quite unusual hap-
pened. That naval and military men should salute my
staff and me was to have been expected, but that civilians
should show this respect for the American uniform was
really unprecedented. Yet we were frequently greeted in
this way. It indicated, almost more than anything else,
how deeply affected the British people were by America's
entrance into the war. All classes and all ages showed
this same respect and gratitude to our country. Neces-
sarily I had to attend many public dinners and even to
make many speeches ; the people gathered on such occa-
sions always rose en masse as a tribute to the uniform
which I wore. Sometimes such meetings were composed
of boy scouts, of schoolboys or schoolgirls, of munition
workers, of journalists, or of statesmen ; and all, irrespec-
tive of age or social station or occupation, seemed delighted
to pay respect to the American navy. There were many
evidences of interest in the " American Admiral " that
were really affecting. Thus one day a message came from
Lady Roberts, widow of the great soldier, Field-Marshal
Earl Roberts, saying that she was desirous of meeting the
" American Admiral." I was very glad to go out in the
country and spend a Sunday afternoon with her. This
charming, white-haired old lady was very feeble, and had
to spend most of her time in a wheel-chair. But her mind
was bright as ever, and she had been following the war
with the closest attention. She listened with keen interest
as I told her all about the submarines, and she asked
innumerable questions concerning them. She was particu-
larly affected when she spoke about the part the United
States was playing in the war, and remarked how much our
participation would have delighted the Field-Marshal.
1917] THE KING AND QUEEN 67
I have already given my first impressions of Their
Majesties the King and Queen, and time only confirmed
them. Neither ever missed an opportunity to show their
appreciation of the part that we were playing. The zeal
with which the King entered into the celebration of our
Fourth of July made him very popular with all our
men. He even cultivated a taste for our national game.
Certain of our early contingents of soldiers encamped near
Windsor ; here they immediately laid out a baseball
diamond and daily engaged in their favourite sport. The
Royal Family used to watch our men at their play, became
interested in the game, and soon learned to follow it. The
Duke of Connaught and the Princess Patricia, his daughter,
had learned baseball through their several years' resi-
dence in Canada, and could watch a match with all the
understanding and enthusiasm of an American " fan."
As our sailors and soldiers arrived in greater numbers, the
interest and friendliness of the Royal Family increased.
One of the King's most delightful traits is his sense of
humour. The Queen also showed a great fondness for
stories, and I particularly remember her amusement at
the famous remark of the Australians perhaps the most
ferocious combatants on the Western Front about the
American soldier, " a good fighter, but a little rough." Of
all the anecdotes connected with our men, none delighted
King George so much as those concerning our coloured
troops. A whole literature of negro yarns spread rapidly
over Europe ; most of them, I find, have long since
reached the United States. The most lasting impression
which I retain of the head of the British Empire is that
he is very much of a human being. He loved just about
the same things as the normal American or Englishman
loves his family, his friends, his country, a good story, a
pleasant evening with congenial associates. And he had
precisely the same earnestness about the war which one
found in every properly constituted Briton or American ;
the victories of the Allies exhilarated King George just as
they exhilarated the man in the street, and their defeats
saddened him just as they saddened the humblest citizen.
I found in His Majesty that same solemn sense of com-
radeship with America which I found in the English
civilians who saluted the American uniform in the street.
As an evidence of the exceedingly cordial relations exist-
ing between the two navies the Admiralty proposed, in the
latter part of May, that I should assume Admiral Bayly's
command for several days while he took a little vacation
on the west coast of Ireland. Admiral Bayly was the
Commander-in-Chief of all the British forces operating on
the Irish coast. This command thus included far more
than that at Queenstown ; it comprised several naval
stations and the considerable naval forces in Irish waters.
Never before, so I was informed, had a foreign naval officer
commanded British naval forces in time of war. So far
as exercising any control over sea operations was concerned,
this invitation was not particularly important. Matters
were running smoothly at the Queenstown station ;
Admiral Bayly's second in command could easily have
kept the machine in working order ; it was hardly likely,
in the few days that I was to command, that any changes
in policy would be initiated. The British Admiralty
merely took this way of showing a great courtesy to the
American navy, and of emphasizing to the world the
excellent relations that existed between the two services.
The act was intended to symbolize the fact that the British
and the American navies were really one in the thorough-
ness of their co-operation in subduing the Prussian menace.
Incidentally the British probably hoped that the publica-
tion of this news in the German press would not be without
effect in Germany. On June 18th, therefore, I went to
Queenstown, and hoisted my flag on the staff in front of
Admiralty House. I had some hesitation in doing this,
for American navy regulations stipulate that an Admiral's
flag shall be raised only on a ship afloat, but Admiral
Bayly was insistent that his flag should come down and
that mine should go up, and I decided that this technicality
might be waived. The incident aroused great interest in
England, but it started many queer rumours in Queens-
town. One was that Admiral Bayly and I had quarrelled,
the British Admiral, strangely enough, having departed
in high dudgeon and left me serenely in control. Another
was that I had come to Queenstown, seized the reins out
of Admiral Bayly's hands, thrown him out of the country,
and taken over the government of Ireland on behalf of the
United States, which had now determined to free the
island from British oppression ! However, in a few days
Admiral Bayly returned and all went on as before.
1917] SINN FEIN HOSTILITY 69
During the nearly two years which the American naval
forces spent in Europe only one element in the population
showed them any hostility or even unfriendliness. At the
moment when these lines are being written a delegation
claiming to represent the " Irish Republic " is touring the
United States, asking Americans to extend their sympathy
and contribute money toward the realization of their pro-
ject. I have great admiration for the mass of the Irish
people, and from the best elements of these people the
American sailors received only kindness. I have therefore
hesitated about telling just how some members of the Sinn
Fein Party treated our men. But it seems that now when
this same brotherhood is attempting to stir up hatred in
this country against our Allies in the war, there is a certain
pertinence in informing Americans just what kind of
treatment their brave sailors met with at the hands of the
Sinn Fein in Ireland.
The people of Queenstown and Cork, as already de-
scribed, received our men with genuine Irish cordiality.
Yet in a few weeks evidence of hostility in certain quarters
became apparent. The fact is that the part of Ireland in
which the Americans were stationed was a headquarters
of the Sinn Fein. The members of this organization were
not only openly disloyal ; they were openly pro-German.
They were not even neutral ; they were working day and
night for a German victory, for in their misguided minds
a German victory signified an Irish Republic. It was no
secret that the Sinn Feiners were sending information to
Germany and constantly laying plots to interfere with the
British and American navies. At first it might be sup-
posed that the large number of sailors and some officers
of Irish extraction on the American destroyers would
tend to make things easier for our men. Quite the con-
trary proved to be the case. The Sinn Feiners appar-
ently believed that these so-called Irish-Americans would
sympathize with their cause ; in their wildest moments
they even hoped that our naval forces might champion it.
But these splendid sailors were Americans before they
were anything else ; their chief ambition was the defeat
of the Hun and they could not understand how any man
anywhere could have any other aim in life. They were
disgusted at the large numbers of able-bodied men whom
they saw in the streets, and did not hesitate to ask some
70 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
of them why they were not fighting on the Western
Front. The behaviour of the American sailors was good ;
but the mere fact that they did not openly manifest a
hatred of Great Britain and a love of Germany infuriated
the Sinn Feiners. And the eternal woman question also
played its part. Our men had much more money than
the native Irish boys, and could entertain the girls more
lavishly at the movies and ice-cream stands. The men
of our fleet and the Irish girls became excellent friends ;
the association, from our point of view, was a very whole-
some one, for the moral character of the Irish girls of
Queenstown and Cork as, indeed, of Irish girls everywhere
is very high, and their companionship added greatly to
the well-being and contentment of our sailors, not a few
of whom found wives among these young women. But
when the Sinn Fein element saw their sweethearts desert-
ing them for the American boys their hitherto suppressed
anger took the form of overt acts.
Occasionally an American sailor would be brought from
Cork to Queenstown in a condition that demanded pressing
medical attention. When he regained consciousness he
would relate how he had suddenly been set upon by half
a dozen roughs and beaten into a state of insensibility.
Several of our men were severely injured in this way. At
other times small groups were stoned by Sinn Fein sym-
pathizers, and there were many hostile demonstrations in
moving-picture houses and theatres. Even more fre-
quently attacks were made, not upon the American sailors,
but upon the Irish girls who accompanied them. These
chivalrous pro-German agitators would rush up and
attempt to tear the girls away from our young men ; they
would pull down their hair, slap them, and even kick
them. Naturally American sailors were hardly the type
to tolerate behaviour of this kind, and some bloody battles
took place. This hostility was increased by one very
regrettable occurrence in Queenstown. An American
sailor was promenading the main thoroughfare with an
Irish girl, when an infuriated Sinn Feiner rushed up,
began to abuse his former sweetheart in vile language,
and attempted to lay hands on her. The American struck
this hooligan a terrific blow ; he fell backward and struck
his head on the curb. The fall fractured the assailant's
skull and in a few hours he was dead. We handed our
1917] SINN FEIN HOSTILITY 71
man over to the civil authorities for trial, and a jury,
composed entirely of Irishmen, acquitted him. The action
of this jury in itself indicated that there was no sympathy
among the decent Irish element, which constituted the
great majority, with this sort of tactics, but naturally it did
not improve relations between our men and the Sinn
Fein. The importance of another incident which took
place at the cathedral has been much exaggerated. It is
true that a priest in his Sunday sermon denounced the
American sailors as vandals and betrayers of Irish woman-
hood, but it is also true that the Roman Catholics of that
section were themselves the most enraged at this absurd
proceeding. A number of Roman Catholic officers who
were present left the church in a body ; the Catholic
Bishop of the Diocese called upon Admiral Bayly and
apologized for the insult, and he also punished the offend-
ing priest by assigning him to new duties at a considerable
distance from the American ships.
But even more serious trouble was brewing, for our
officers discovered that the American sailors were making
elaborate plans to protect themselves. Had this discovery
not been made in time, something like an international
incident might have resulted. Much to our regret, there-
fore, it was found necessary to issue an order that no
naval men, British or American, under the rank of Com-
mander, should be permitted to go to Cork. Ultimately
we had nearly 8,000 American men at this station ;
Queenstown itself is a small place of 6,000 or 7,000, so it
is apparent that it did not possess the facilities for giving
such a large number of men those relaxations which were
necessary to their efficiency. We established a club in
Queenstown, provided moving pictures and other enter-
tainments, and did the best we could to keep our sailors
contented. The citizens of Cork also keenly regretted our
action. The great majority had formed a real fondness
for our boys ; and they regarded it as a great humiliation
that the rowdy element had made it necessary to keep our
men out of their city. Many letters were printed in the
Cork newspapers apologizing to the Americans and calling
upon the people to take action that would justify us in
rescinding our order. The loss to Cork tradesmen was
great ; our men received not far from $200,000 to 8300,000
a month in pay ; they were free spenders, and their pre-
72 THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"
sence in the neighbourhood for nearly two years would
have meant a fortune to many of the local merchants.
Yet we were obliged to refuse to accede to the numerous
requests that the American sailors be permitted to visit
this city.
A committee of distinguished citizens of Cork, led by
the Lord Mayor, came to Admiralty House to plead for
the rescinding of this order. Admiral Bayly cross-ex-
amined them very sharply. It appeared that the men
who had committed these offences against American sailors
had never been punished.
Unless written guarantees were furnished that there
would be no hostile demonstrations against British or
Americans, Admiral Bayly refused to withdraw the ban,
and I fully concurred in this decision. Unfortunately the
committee could give no such guarantee. We knew very
well that the first appearance of Americans in Cork would
be the signal for a renewal of hostilities, and the temper
of our sailors was such that the most deplorable conse-
quences might have resulted. We even discovered that
the blacksmiths on the U.S.S. Melville were surreptitiously
manufacturing weapons which our men could conceal on
their persons and with which they proposed to sally forth
and do battle with the Sinn Fein ! So for the whole period
of our stay in Queenstown our sailors were compelled to
keep away from the dangerous city. But the situation
was not without its humorous aspects. Thus the pretty
girls of Cork, finding that the Americans could not come
to them, decided to come to the Americans ; every after-
noon a trainload would arrive at the Queenstown station,
where our sailors would greet them, give them a splendid
time, and then, in the evening, escort them to the station
and send a happy crowd on their way home.
But the Sinn Feiners interfered with us in much more
serious ways than this. They were doing everything in
their power to help Germany. W r ith their assistance
German agents and German spies were landed in Ireland.
At one time the situation became so dangerous that I had
to take experienced officers whose services could ill be
spared from our destroyers and assign them to our out-
lying air stations in Ireland. This, of course, proportion-
ately weakened our fleet and did its part in prolonging
the war.
CHAPTER III
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
ALL this time that we were seeking a solution for the
submarine problem we really had that solution in our
hands. The seas presented two impressive spectacles in
those terrible months of April, May, and June, 1917. One
was the comparative ease with which the German sub-
marines were sinking merchant vessels ; the other was
their failure materially to weaken the Allied fleets. If
we wish a counter-picture to that presented by the Irish
Sea and the English Channel, where merchant shipping
was constantly going down, we should look to the North
Sea, where the British Grand Fleet, absolutely intact, was
defiantly riding the waves. The uninformed public ex-
plained this apparent security in a way of its own ; it
believed that the British dreadnoughts were anchored
behind booms, nets, and mine-fields, through which the
submarines could not penetrate. Yet the fact of the
matter was that the Grand Fleet was frequently cruising
in the open sea, in the waters which were known to be the
most infested with submarines. The German submarines
had been attempting to destroy this fleet for two and a
half years. It had been their plan to weaken this great
battle force by " attrition " ; to sink the great battleships
one by one, and in this way to reduce the fighting power
of the fleet to such a point that the German dreadnoughts
could have some chances of success. Such had been the
German programme, widely heralded at the beginning of
the war ; nearly three years had now passed, but how
had this pretentious scheme succeeded ? The fact was
that the submarines had not destroyed a single dread-
nought. It was certainly a profitable study in contrasts
that of merchant ships constantly being torpedoed and
that of battleships constantly repelling such attacks.
73
74 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
Certainly a careful study of this situation ought to bring
out facts which would assist the Allies in solving the most
baffling problem of the war.
Yet there was no mystery about the immunity which
these great fighting vessels were enjoying ; the submarine
problem, so far as it affected the battle fleet, had already
been solved. The explanation was found in the simple
circumstance that, whenever the dreadnoughts went to
sea, they were preceded by a screen of cruisers and de-
stroyers. It almost seemed as though these surface craft
were serving as a kind of impenetrable wall against which
the German U-boats were beating themselves in vain. Yet
to the casual observer there seemed to be no reason why
the submarines should stand in any particular terror of the
destroyers. Externally they looked like the least impres-
sive war vessels afloat. When they sailed ahead of the
battle squadrons, the destroyers were ungraceful objects
upon the surface of the water ; the impression which they
conveyed was that of fragility rather than of strength, and
the idea that they could ever be the guardians of the
mighty battleships which sailed behind them at first
seemed almost grotesque. Yet these little vessels really
possessed the power of overcoming the submarine. The
war had not progressed far when it became apparent that
the U-boat could not operate anywhere near this speedy
little surface vessel without running serious risk of de-
struction.
Until the reports of submarine fighting began to find
their way into the papers, however, the destroyer was
probably the one type of warship in which the public had
the smallest interest. It had become, indeed, a kind of
ugly duckling of the Navy. Our Congress had regularly
neglected it ; year after year our naval experts had recom-
mended that four destroyers be built for every battle-
ship, and annually Congress had appropriated for only
one or two. The war had also found Great Britain with-
out a sufficient number of destroyers for the purpose of
anti-submarine warfare. The Admiralty had provided
enough for screening the Grand Fleet in cruising and in
battle, but it had been called upon to divert so many for
the protection of troop transportation, supply ships, and
commerce generally that the efficiency of the fleet had
been greatly undermined. Thus Britain found herself
1917] DESTROYERS v. TORPEDO BOATS 75
without enough destroyers to meet the submarine cam-
paign ; this situation was not due to any lack of fore-
sight, but to a failure to foresee that any civilized nation
could ever employ the torpedo in unrestricted warfare
against merchant ships and their crews.
The one time that this type of vessel had come promin-
ently into notice was in 1904, when several of them attacked
the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, damaging several power-
ful vessels and practically ending Russian sea power in
the Far East. The history of the destroyer, however,
goes back much further than 1904. It was created to
fulfil a duty not unlike that which it has played so glori-
ously in the World War. In the late seventies and early
eighties a new type of war vessel, the torpedo boat, caused
almost as much perturbation as the submarine has caused
in recent years. This speedy little fighter was invented
to serve as a medium for the discharge of a newly per-
fected engine of naval warfare, the automobile torpedo.
It was its function to creep up to a battleship, preferably
under cover of darkness or in thick weather, and let loose
this weapon against her unsuspecting hulk. The appear-
ance of the torpedo boat led to the same prediction as
that which has been more recently inspired by the sub-
marine ; in the eyes of many it simply meant the end of
the great surface battleship. But naval architects, look-
ing about for the " answer " to this dangerous craft,
designed another type of warship and appropriately called
it the " torpedo boat destroyer." This vessel was not
only larger and speedier than its appointed antagonist,
but it possessed a radius of action and a seaworthiness
which enabled it to accompany the battle fleet. Its draft
was so light that a torpedo could pass harmlessly under
the keel, and it carried an armament which had sufficient
power to end the career of any torpedo boat that came
its way. Few types have ever justified their name so
successfully as the torpedo boat destroyer. So completely
did it eliminate that little vessel as a danger to the fighting
ships that practically all navies long since ceased to build
torpedo boats. Yet the destroyer promptly succeeded to
the chief function of the discarded vessel, that of attack-
ing capital ships with torpedoes ; and, in addition to
this, it assumed the duty of protecting battleships from
similar attack by enemy vessels of the same type.
76 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
It surprises many people to learn that the destroyer is
not a little boat but a warship of considerable size. This
vessel to-day impresses most people as small only because
all ships, those which are used for commerce and those
which are used for war, have increased so greatly in dis-
placement. The latest specimens of the destroyer carry
four- or five-inch guns and twelve torpedo tubes, each of
which launches a torpedo that weighs more than a ton,
and runs as straight as an arrow for more than six miles.
The Santa Maria, the largest vessel of the squadron with
which Columbus made his first voyage to America, had a
displacement of about five hundred tons, and thus was
about half as large as a destroyer ; and even at the begin-
ning of the clipper ship era few vessels were much larger.
Previous to 1914 it was generally believed that torpedo
attacks would play a large part in any great naval engage-
ment, and this was the reason why all naval advisers
insisted that a large number of these vessels should be
constructed as essential units of the fleet. Yet the war
had not made much progress when it became apparent
that this versatile craft had another great part to play,
and that it would once more justify its name in really
heroic fashion. Just as it had proved its \vorth in driving
the surface torpedo boat from the seas, so now it developed
into a very dangerous foe to the torpedo boat that sailed
beneath the waves. Events soon demonstrated that, in
all open engagements between submarine and destroyer,
the submarine stood very little chance. The reason for
this was simply that the submarine had no weapon with
which it could successfully resist the attack of the destroyer,
whereas the destroyer had several with which it could
attack the submarine. The submarine had three or four
torpedo tubes, and only one or two guns, and with neither
could it afford to risk attacking the more powerfully armed
destroyer. The U-boat was of such a fragile nature that
it could never afford to engage in a combat in which it
stood much chance of getting hit. A destroyer could
stand a comparatively severe pounding and still remain
fairly intact, but a single shell, striking a submarine, was
a very serious matter ; even though the vessel did not
sink as a result, it was almost inevitable that certain
parts of its machinery would be so injured that it would
have difficulty in getting into port. It therefore became
1917] DESTROYERS v. SUBMARINES 77
necessary for the submarine always to play safe, to fight
only under conditions in which it had the enemy at such
a disadvantage that it ran little risk itself ; and this was
the reason why it preferred to attack merchant and
passenger ships rather than vessels, such as the destroyer,
that could energetically defend themselves.
The comparatively light draft of the destroyer, which
is about nine or ten feet, pretty effectually protects it
from the submarine's torpedo, for this torpedo, to function
with its greatest efficiency, must take a course about
fifteen feet under water ; if it runs nearer the surface than
this, it comes under the influence of the w r aves, and does
not make a straight course. More important still, the
speed of the destroyer, the ease with which it turns, circles,
and zigzags, makes it all but impossible for a torpedo to
be aimed with much chance of hitting her. Moreover,
the discharge of this missile is a far more complicated
undertaking than is generally supposed. The submarine
commander cannot take position anywhere and discharge
his weapon more or less wildly, running his chances of
hitting ; he must get his boat in place, calculate range,
course, and speed, and take careful aim. Clearly it is
difficult for him to do this successfully if his intended
victim is scurrying along at the rate of thirty or forty
miles an hour. Moreover, the destroyer is constantly
changing its course, making great circles and indulging
in other disconcerting movements. So well did the
Germans understand the difficulty of torpedoing a destroyer
that they practically never attempted so unprofitable and
so hazardous an enterprise.
Torpedoes are complicated and expensive mechanisms ;
each one costs about $8,000 and the average U-boat carried
only from eight to twelve ; it was therefore necessary to
husband these precious weapons, to use them only when
the chances most favoured success ; the U-boat com-
mander who wasted them in attempts to sink destroyers
would probably have been court-martialled.
But while the submarine had practically no means of
successfully fighting the destroyer, the destroyer had
several ways of putting an end to the submarine. The
advantage which really made the destroyer so dangerous,
as already intimated, was its excessive speed. On the
surface the U-boat made little more than fifteen miles an
78 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
hour, and under the surface it made little more than seven
or eight. If the destroyer once discovered its presence,
therefore, it could reach its prey in an incredibly short
time. It could attack with its guns, and, if conditions
were favourable, it could ram ; and this was no trifling
accident, for a destroyer going at thirty or forty miles
could cut a submarine nearly in two with its strong, razor-
like bow. In the early days of the war these were the
main methods upon which it relied to attack, but by the
time that I had reached London, another and much more
frightful weapon had been devised. This was the depth
charge, a large can containing about three hundred pounds
of TNT, which, if it exploded anywhere within one hundred
feet of the submarine, would either destroy it entirely or
so injure it that ' the victim usually had to come to the
surface and surrender.
I once asked Admiral Jellicoe who was the real inventor
of this annihilating missile.
" No man in particular," he said. " It came into
existence almost spontaneously, in response to a pressing
need. Gunfire can destroy submarines when they are on
the surface, but you know it can accomplish nothing
against them when they are submerged. This fact made
it extremely difficult to sink them in the early days of
the war. One day, when the Grand Fleet was cruising
in the North Sea, a submarine fired a torpedo at one of
the cruisers. The cruiser saw the periscope and the
wake of the torpedo, and had little difficulty in so manoeuv-
ring as to avoid being struck. She then went full speed
to the spot from which the submarine had fired its torpedo,
in the hope of ramming it. But by the time she arrived
the submarine had submerged so deeply that the cruiser
passed over her without doing her any harm. Yet the
officers and crew could see the submerged hull ; there the
enemy lay in full view of her pursuers, yet perfectly safe !
The officers reported this incident to me in the presence
of Admiral Madden, second in command.
" ' Wouldn't it have been fine,' said Madden, ' if they
had had on board a mine so designed that, when dropped
overboard, it would have exploded when it reached the
depth at which the submarine was lying ? '
" That remark," continued Admiral Jellicoe, " gave us
the germinal idea of the depth charge. I asked the
1917] DEPTH CHARGES 70
Admiralty to get to work and produce a ' mine ' that
would act in the way that Admiral Madden had suggested.
It proved to be very simple to construct an ordinary
steel cylinder filled with TNT ; this was fitted with a
simple firing appliance which was set off by the pressure
of the water, and could be so adjusted that it would
explode the charge at any depth desired. This apparatus
was so simple and so necessary that we at once began to
manufacture it."
The depth charge looked like the innocent domestic ash
can, and that was the name by which it soon came to
be popularly known. Each destroyer eventually carried
twenty or thirty of these destructive weapons at the
stern ; a mere pull on a lever would make one drop into
the water. Many destroyers also carried strange-looking
howitzers, which were made in the shape of a Y, and
from which one ash can could be hurled fifty yards or
more from each side of the vessel. The explosion, when
it took place within the one hundred feet which I have
mentioned as usually fatal to the submarine, would drive
the plates inward and sometimes make a leak so large
that the vessel would sink almost instantaneously. At a
somewhat greater distance it frequently produced a leak
of such serious proportions that the submarine would be
forced to blow her ballast tanks, come to the surface,
and surrender. Even when the depth charge exploded
considerably more than a hundred feet away, the result
might be equally disastrous, for the concussion might
distort the hull and damage the horizontal rudders, making
it impossible to steer, or it might so injure the essential
machinery that the submarine would be rendered help-
less. Sometimes the lights went out, leaving the crew
groping in blackness ; necessary parts were shaken from
their fastenings ; and in such a case the commander had
his choice of two alternatives, one to be crushed by the
pressure of the water, and the other to come up and be
captured or sunk by his surface foe. It is no reflection
upon the courage of the submarine commanders to say
that in this embarrassing situation they usually preferred
to throw themselves upon the mercy of the enemy rather
than to be smashed or to die a lingering and agonizing
death under the water. Even when the explosion took
place at a distance so great that the submarine was not
80 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
seriously damaged, the experience was a highly discon-
certing one for the crew. If a dozen depth charges were
dropped, one after the other, the effect upon the men in
the hunted vessel was particularly demoralizing. In
the course of the war several of our own submarines were
depth-charged by our own destroyers, and from our crews
we obtained graphic descriptions of the sensations which
resulted. It was found that men who had passed through
such an ordeal were practically useless for several days,
and that sometimes they were rendered permanently unfit
for service. The state of nerves which followed such an
experience was not unlike that new war psychosis known
as shell-shock. One of our officers who had had such an
adventure told me that the explosion of a single depth
charge under the water might be compared to the con-
cussion produced by the simultaneous firing of all the
fourteen-inch guns of a battleship. One can only imagine
what the concussion must have been when produced by
ten or twenty depth charges in succession. Whether or
not the submarine was destroyed or seriously injured, a
depth-charged crew became extremely cautious in the
future about getting anywhere in the neighbourhood of
a destroyer ; and among the several influences which
ultimately disorganized the moral of the German U-boat
service these contacts with depth charges were doubtless
the most important. The hardiest under-water sailor did
not care to go through such frightful moments a second
time.
This statement makes it appear as though the depth
charge had settled the fate of the submarine. Yet that
was far from being the case, for against the ash can,
with its 300 pounds of TNT, the submarine possessed
one quality which gave it great defensive power. That
was ability to make itself unseen. Strangely enough,
the average layman is inclined to overlook this fairly
apparent fact, and that is the reason why, even at the
risk of repeating myself, I frequently refer to it. Indeed,
the only respect in which the subsurface boat differs
essentially from all other war vessels is in this power of
becoming invisible. Whenever it descries danger from
afar, the submarine can disappear under the water in
anywhere from twenty seconds to a minute. And its
great advantage is that it can detect its enemy long before
1917] TORPEDOES 81
that enemy can detect the submarine. A U-boat, sailing
awash, or sailing with only its conning-tower exposed,
can see a destroyer at a distance of about fifteen miles if
the weather is clear ; but, under similar conditions, the
destroyer can see the submarine at a distance of about
four miles. Possessing this great advantage, the sub-
marine can usually decide whether it will meet the enemy
or not ; if it decides that it is wise to avoid an encounter,
all it has to do is to duck, remain submerged until the
destroyer has passed on, entirely unconscious of its
presence, and then to resume its real work, which is not
that of fighting warships, but of sinking merchantmen.
The chief anxiety of the U-boat commander is thus to
avoid contact with its surface foe and its terrible depth
charge, whereas the business of the destroyer commander
is to get within fighting distance of his quarry.
Ordinarily, conditions favour the U-boat in this game,
simply because the ocean is so large a place. But there
is one situation in which the destroyer has more than a
fighting chance, for the power of the submarine to keep
its presence secret lasts only so long as it remains out of
action. If it makes no attempt to fight, its presence can
hardly ever be detected ; but just as soon as it becomes
belligerent, it immediately reveals its whereabouts. If it
comes to the surface and fires its guns, naturally it adver-
tises to its enemy precisely where it is ; but it betrays its
location almost as clearly when it discharges a torpedo.
Just as soon as the torpedo leaves the submarine, a wake,
clearly marking its progress, appears upon the surface of
the water. Though most newspaper readers have heard
of this tell-tale track, I have found few who really under-
stand what a conspicuous disturbance it is. The torpedo
is really a little submarine itself ; it is propelled by
compressed air, the exhaust of which stirs up the water
and produces a foamy, soapy wake, which is practically
the same as that produced by the propeller of an ocean
liner. This trail is four or five feet wide ; it is as white
and is as distinct as a chalk line drawn upon a blackboard,
provided the weather is clear and the sun is in the right
direction. Indeed, it is sometimes so distinct that an
easily manoeuvred ship, and even sometimes a merchant-
man, can avoid the torpedo which it sees advancing
merely by putting over the helm and turning out of its
7
82 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
course. But the chief value of this wake to the submarine
hunters is that it shows the direction in which the sub-
marine was located when the torpedo started on its course.
It stands out on the surface of the water like a long,
ghostly finger pointing to the spot where the foe let loose
its shaft.
As soon as the destroyer sees this betraying disturbance,
the commander rings for full speed ; and one of the greatest
advantages of this type of vessel is that it can attain full
speed in an incredibly short time. The destroyer then
dashes down the wake until it reaches the end, which
indicates the point where the submarine lay when it dis-
charged its missile. At this point the surface vessel
drops a depth charge and then begins cutting a circle,
say, to the right. Pains are taken to make this circle so
wide that it will include the submarine, provided it has
gone in that direction. The destroyer then makes another
circle to the left. Every ten or fifteen seconds, while
describing these circles, it drops a depth charge ; indeed,
not infrequently it drops twenty or thirty in a few minutes.
If there is another destroyer in the neighbourhood it also
follows up the wake and when it reaches the indicated
point, it circles in the opposite direction from the first.
Sometimes more than two may start for the suspected
location and, under certain conditions, the water within
a radius of half a mile or more may be seething with
exploding depth charges.
It is plain from this description that the proceeding
develops into an exceedingly dangerous game for the
attacking submarine. It is a simple matter to calculate
the chances of escaping which the enemy has under these
conditions. That opportunity is clearly measured by the
time which elapses from the moment when it discharges
its torpedo to the moment when the destroyer has reached
the point at which it was discharged. This interval
gives the subsurface boat a certain chance to get away ;
but its under-water speed is moderate, and so by the time
the destroyer reaches the critical spot, the submarine has
advanced but a short distance away from it. How far
has she gone ? In what direction did she go ? These
are the two questions which the destroyer commander
must answer, and the success with which he answers them
accurately measures his success in sinking or damaging
,
1917] IMMUNITY OF THE BATTLE FLEET 83
his enemy, or in giving him a good scare. If he always
decided these two points accurately, he would almost
always " get " his submarine ; the chances of error are
very great, however, and that is the reason why the
submarine in most cases gets away. All that the surface
commander knows is that there is a U-boat somewhere
in his neighbourhood, but he does not know its precise
location and so he is fighting more or less in the dark.
In the great majority of cases the submarine does get away,
but now and then the depth charge reaches its goal and
ends its career.
If only one destroyer is hunting, the chances of escape
strongly favour the under-water craft ; if several pounce
upon her at once, however, the chances of escaping are
much more precarious. If the water is shallow the U-boat
can sometimes outwit the pursuer by sinking to the
bottom and lying there in silent security until its surface
enemy tires of the chase. But in the open sea there is
no possibility of concealing itself and so saving itself in
this fashion, for if the submarine sinks beyond a certain
depth the pressure of the water will crush it.
While the record shows that the U-boat usually suc-
ceeded in evading the depth charges, there were enough
sunk or seriously damaged or given a bad shake-up to
serve as a constant reminder to the crews that they ran
great danger in approaching waters which were protected
by destroyers. The U-boat captains, as will appear,
avoided such waters regularly ; they much preferred to
attack their merchant prey in areas where these soul-
racking depth charges did not interfere with their opera-
tions.
It is now becoming apparent why the great battle fleet,
which always sailed behind a protecting screen of such
destroyers, was practically immune from torpedo attack.
In order to assail these battleships the submarine was
always compelled to do the one thing which, above all
others, it was determined to avoid to get within depth-
charge radius of the surface craft. In discharging the
torpedo, distance, as already intimated, is the all-impor-
tant consideration. The U-boat carries a torpedo which
has a much shorter range than that of the destroyer ; it
was seldom effective if fired at more than 2,000 yards,
and beyond that distance its chances of hitting became
84 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
very slight. Indeed, a much shorter distance than that
was desirable if the torpedo was to accomplish its most
destructive purpose. So valuable were these missiles and
so necessary was it that every one should be used to good
advantage, that the U-boat's captain had instructions to
shoot at no greater distance than 300 yards, unless
the conditions were particularly favourable. In the
early days, the torpedoes which were fired at a greater
distance would often hit the ships on the bow or the
stern, and do comparatively little damage ; such vessels
could be brought in, repaired in a short time, and again
put to sea. The German Admiralty discovered that in
firing from a comparatively long distance it was wasting
its torpedoes ; it therefore ordered its men to get so near
the prey that it could strike the vessel in a vital spot,
preferably in the engine-room ; and to do this it was
necessary to creep up within 300 yards. But to get
as close as that to the destroyers which screened the
battleships meant almost certain destruction. Thus the
one method of attack which was left to the U-boat was
to dive under the destroyer screen and come up in the
midst of the battle fleet itself. A few minutes after its
presence should become known, however, a large number of
destroyers would be dropping depth charges in its neigh-
bourhood, and its chances of escaping destruction would
be almost nil, to say nothing of its chances of destroying
ships.
The Germans learned the futility of this kind of an
operation early in the war, and the man who taught them
this lesson was Commander Weddingen, the same officer
who had first demonstrated the value of the submarine
in practical warfare. It was Otto Weddingen who, in
September, 1914, sank the old British cruisers, the Hogue,
the Cressy, and the Aboukir, an exploit which made him
one of the great popular heroes of Germany. A few
months afterward Commander Weddingen decided to try
an experiment which was considerably more hazardous
than that of sinking three unescorted cruisers ; he aspired
to nothing less ambitious than an attack upon the Grand
Fleet itself. On March 18th a part of this fleet was
cruising off Cromarty, Scotland ; here Weddingen came
with the 7-29, dived under the destroyer screen and fired
one torpedo, which passed astern of the Neptune. The
1917] FATE OF THE " U-29 " 85
alarm was immediately sounded, and presently the battle-
ship Dreadnought, which had seen the periscope, started
at full speed for the submarine, rammed the vessel and
sent it promptly to the bottom. As it was sinking the
bow rose out of the water, plainly disclosing the number
C7-29. There was not one survivor. Weddingen's attempt
was an heroic one, but so disastrous to himself and to
his vessel that very few German commanders ever
tried to emulate his example. It clearly proved to the
German Admiralty that it was useless to attempt to
destroy the Grand Fleet with submarines, or even to
weaken it piecemeal, and probably this experience had
much to do with this new kind of warfare that of sub-
marines against unprotected merchant ships which the
Germans now proceeded to introduce.
The simple fact is that the battle fleet was never so safe
as when it was cruising in the open sea, screened by de-
stroyers. ' It was far safer when it was sailing thus
defiantly, constantly inviting attack, than when it was
anchored at its unprotected base at Scapa Flow. Indeed,
until Scapa Flow was impregnably protected by booms
and mines, the British commanders recognized that
cruising in the open sea was its best means of avoiding
the German U-boats. No claim is made that the sub-
marine cannot dive under the destroyer screen and attack
a battle fleet, and possibly torpedo one or more of its
vessels. The illustration which has been given shows that
Weddingen nearly " got " the Neptune ; and had this
torpedo gone a few feet nearer, his experiment might have
shown that, although he subsequently lost his own life,
crew, and ship, he had sunk one British battleship, a pro-
ceeding which, in war, might have been recognized as a
fair exchange. But the point which I wish to emphasize
is that the chances of success were so small that the
Germans decided that it was not worth while to make
the attempt. Afterward, when merchant vessels were
formed into convoys, a submarine would occasionally
dive under the screen and destroy a ship ; but most
such attacks were unsuccessful, and experience taught
the Germans that a persistent effort of this kind would
cause the destruction of so many submarines that their
campaign would fail. So the U-boat commanders left
the Grand Fleet alone, either because they lacked nerve
86 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
or because their instructions from Berlin were explicit to
that effect.
II
Having constantly before my eyes this picture of the
Grand Fleet immune from torpedo attack, naturally the
first question I asked, when discussing the situation with
Admiral Jellicoe and others, was this : " Why not apply
this same principle to merchant ships ? "
If destroyers could keep the submarines away from
battleships, they could certainly keep them away from
merchantmen. It is clear, from the description already
given, precisely how the battleships had been made safe
from submarines ; they had proceeded, as usual, in a
close formation, or " convoy," and their destroyer screen
had proved effective. Thus logic apparently indicated
that the convoy system was the " answer " to the sub-
marine.
Yet the convoy, as used in previous wars, differed
materially from any application of the idea which could
possibly be made to the present contest. This scheme of
sailing vessels in groups, and escorting them by warships,
is almost as old as naval warfare itself. As early as the
thirteenth century, the merchants of the Hanseatic League
were compelled to sail their ships in convoy as a protec-
tion against the pirates who were then constantly lurking
in the Baltic Sea. The Government of Venice used this
same device to protect its enormous commerce. In the
fifteenth century the large trade in wool and wine which
existed between England and the Moorish ports of Spain
was safeguarded by convoys, and in the sixteenth century
Spain herself regularly depended upon massing her ships
to defend her commerce with the West Indies against the
piratical attacks of English and French adventurers.
The escorts provided for these " flotas " really laid the
foundation of the mighty Spanish fleet which threatened
England's existence for more than a hundred years. By
the time of Queen Elizabeth the convoy had thus become
the all -pre vailing method of safeguarding merchant
shipping, but it was in the Napoleonic wars that it had
reached its greatest usefulness. The convoys of that
period were managed with some military precision ; there
were carefully stipulated methods of collecting the ships,
1917] THE CONVOY SYSTEM 87
of meeting the cruiser escorts at the appointed rendezvous,
and of dispersing them when the danger zone was passed ;
and naval officers were systematically put in charge.
The convoys of this period were very large ; from 200
to 300 ships were not an unusual gathering, and some-
times 500 or more would get together at certain important
places, such as the entrance to the Baltic. But these
ships, of course, were very small compared with those of
the present time. It was only necessary to supply such
aggregations of vessels with enough protecting cruisers to
overwhelm any raiders which the enemy might send
against them. The merchantmen were not required to
sail in any particular formation, nor were they required
to manreuvre against unseen mysterious foes. Neither
was it absolutely essential that they should keep con-
stantly together ; and they could even spread them-
selves somewhat loosely over the ocean. If an enemy
raider appeared on the horizon, the escorting cruiser or
cruisers left the convoy and began chase ; a battle ensued,
the convoy meanwhile passing on its voyage unharmed.
When its protecting vessels had disposed of the attackers,
they rejoined the merchantmen. No unusual seamanship
was demanded of the merchant captains, for the whole
responsibility for their safety rested with the escorting
cruisers.
But the operation of beating off an occasional surface
raider, which necessarily fights in the open, is quite a dif-
ferent procedure from that of protecting an aggregation of
vessels from enemies that discharge torpedoes under the
water. As part protection against such insidious attacks
both the merchant ships and the escorting men-of-war of
to-day had in this war to keep up a perpetual zigzagging.
This zigzag, indeed, was in itself an efficacious method of
protection. As already said, the submarine was forced to
attain an advantageous position before it could discharge
its torpedo ; it was its favourite practice to approach to
within a few hundred yards in order to hit its victim in a
vital spot. This mere fact shows that zigzagging in itself
was one of the best methods of avoiding destruction.
Before this became the general rule, the task of torpedoing
a vessel was comparatively easy. All it was necessary for
the submarine to do was to bring the vessel's masts in line ;
that is, to get directly ahead of her, submerge with the
88 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
small periscope showing only occasionally, and to fire the
torpedo at short range as the ship passed by. Except in
the case of very slow vessels, she could of course do this only
when she was not far from the course of her advancing prey
when she first sighted her. If, however, the vessel was
zigzagging, this pretty game was usually defeated ; the
submarine never knew in what direction to go in order to
get within torpedoing distance, and she could not go far
because her speed under water is so slow. The same
conditions apply to a zigzagging convoy. This explained
why, as soon as the merchant vessel or convoy entered the
submarine zone, or as soon as a submarine w r as sighted, it
began zigzagging, first on one side and then on the other,
and always irregularly, its course comprising a disjointed
line, which made it a mere chance whether the submarine
could get into a position from w r hich to fire with any
certainty of obtaining results. A vessel sailing alone could
manoeuvre in this way without much difficulty, but it is
apparent that twenty or thirty vessels, sailing in close
formation, would not find the operation a simple one. It
was necessary for them to sail in close and regular forma-
tion in order to make it possible to manoeuvre them and
screen them with destroyers, so it is evident that the closer
the formation the fewer the destroyers that would be needed
to protect it. These circumstances make the modern con-
voy quite a different affair from the happy-go-lucky pro-
ceeding of the Napoleonic era.
It is perhaps not surprising that the greatest hostility to
the convoys has always come from the merchant captains
themselves. In old days they chafed at the time which was
consumed in assembling the ships, at the necessity for
reducing speed to enable the slower vessels to keep up with
the procession, and at the delay in getting their cargoes into
port. In all wars in which convoys have been used it has
been very difficult to keep the merchant captains in line.
In Nelson's day these fine old salts were constantly breaking
away from their convoys and taking their chances of running
into port unescorted. If the merchant master of a century
ago rebelled at the comparatively simply managed convoy
of those days it is not strange that their successors of the
present time should not have looked with favour upon the
relatively complicated and difficult arrangement required of
them in this war. In the early discussions with these men
1917J MERCHANT CAPTAINS AND CONVOYS 89
at the Admiralty they showed themselves almost unani-
mously opposed to the convoy.
" The merchantmen themselves are the chief obstacle to
the convoy," said Admiral Jellicoe. " We have discussed it
with them many times and they declare that it is impossible.
It is all right for war vessels to manoeuvre in close formation,
they say, for we spend our time practising in these forma-
tions, and so they think that it is second nature to us. But
they say that they cannot do it. They particularly reject
the idea that when in formation they can manoeuvre their
ships in the fog or at night without lights. They believe
that they would lose more ships through collisions than the
submarines would sink."
I was told that the whole subject had been completely
threshed out at a meeting which had been held at the Ad-
miralty on February 23, 1917, about six weeks before
America had entered the war. At that time ten masters of
merchant ships had met Admiral Jellicoe and other mem-
bers of the Admiralty and had discussed the convoy
proposition at length. In laying the matter before these
experienced seamen Admiral Jellicoe emphasized the neces-
sity of good station-keeping, and he described the close
formation which the vessels would have to maintain. It
would be necessary for the ships to keep together, he
explained, otherwise the submarines could pick off the
stragglers. He asked the masters whether eight merchant
ships, which had a speed varying perhaps two knots, could
keep station in line ahead (that is, in single file or column)
500 yards apart, and sail in two columns down the Channel.
" It would be absolutely impossible," the ten masters
replied, almost in a chorus.
A discouraging fact, they said, was that many of the
ablest merchant captains had gone into the navy, and that
many of those who had replaced them could not be de-
pended on to handle their ships in such a formation.
" We have so few competent deck officers that the cap-
tain would have to be on the bridge the whole twenty-four
hours," they said. And the difficulty was not only with
the bridge, but with the engine-room. In order to keep the
ships constantly the same distance apart it would be
necessary accurately to regulate their speed ; the battleships
could do this because they had certain elaborate devices,
which the merchant vessels lacked, for timing the revolu-
90 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
tions of the engines. The poor quality of the coal which
they were obtaining would also make it difficult to maintain
a regular speed.
Admiral Jellicoe then asked the masters whether they
could sail in twos or threes and keep station.
" Two might do it, but three would be too many," was
the discouraging verdict. But the imasters were positive
that even two merchantmen could not safely keep station
abreast in the night-time without lights ; two such vessels
would have to sail in single file, the leading ship showing a
stern light. The masters emphasized their conviction that
they preferred to sail alone, each ship for herself, and to let
each one take her chances of getting into port.
And there the matter rested. I had the opportunity of
discussing the convoy system with several merchant
captains, and in these discussions they simply echoed the
views which had been expressed at this formal conference.
I do not believe that British naval officers came in contact
with a single merchant master who favoured the convoy at
that time. They were not doubtful about the idea ; they
were openly hostile. The British merchant captains are a
magnificent body of seamen ; their first thought was to
serve their country and the Allied cause ; their attitude in
this matter was not obstinacy ; it simply resulted from their
sincere conviction that the convoy system would entail
greater shipping losses than were then being inflicted by the
German submarines.
Many naval officers at that time shared the same view.
They opposed the convoy not only on these grounds ; its
introduction would mean immediately cutting down the
tonnage 15 or 20 per cent., because of the time which would
be consumed in assembling the ships and awaiting escorts
and in the slower average speed which they could make.
Many ship owners and directors of steamship companies
expressed the same opinions. They also objected to the
convoy on the ground that it would cause considerable delay
and hence would result in loss of earnings. Yet the attitude
of the merchant marine had not entirely eliminated the
convoy from consideration. At the time when I arrived the
proposal was still being discussed ; the rate at which the
Germans were sinking merchantmen made this inevitable.
And there seemed to be two schools among Allied naval
men, one of which was opposed to the convoy, while the
1917] DEFECTS OF THE PATROL SYSTEM 91
other insisted that it should be given a trial. The convoy
had one irresistible attraction for the officer which seemed to
counterbalance all the objections which were being urged
against it. Its adoption would mean taking the offensive
against the German submarines. The essential defect of
the patrol system, as it was then conducted, was that it was
primarily a defensive measure. Each destroyer cruised
around in an assigned area, ready to assist vessels in distress,
escort ships through her own " square " and, incidentally,
to attack a submarine when the opportunity was presented.
But the mere fact that a destroyer was patrolling a particular
area meant only, as already explained, that the submarine
had occasionally to sink out of sight until she had passed by.
Consequently the submarine proceeded to operate whenever
a destroyer was not in sight, and this was necessarily most
of the time, for the submarine zone was such a big place and
the Allied destroyer fleet was so pitifully small that it was
impossible to cover it effectively. Under these conditions
there were very few encounters between destroyers and sub-
marines, at least in the waters south and west of Ireland, for
the submarines took all precautions against getting close
enough to be sighted by the destroyers.
But the British and French navies were not the only ones
which, at this time, were depending upon the patrol as a
protection against the subsurface boat. The American
navy was committing precisely the same error off our
Atlantic coast. As soon as Congress declared war against
Germany we expected that at least a few of the U-boats
would cross the Atlantic and attack American shipping ;
indeed, many believed that some had already crossed in
anticipation of war ; the papers were filled with silly stories
about " submarine bases " in Mexican waters, on the New
England coast, and elsewhere ; submarines were even
reported entering Long Island Sound ; nets were stretched
across the Narrows to keep them out of New York Harbour ;
and our coasting vessels saw periscopes and the wakes of
torpedoes everywhere from Maine to Florida. So prevalent
was this apprehension that, in the early days of the war,
American destroyers regularly patrolled our coast looking
for these far-flung submarines. Yet the idea of seeking
them this way was absurd. Even had we known where the
submarine was located there would have been little likeli-
hood that we could ever have sighted it, to say nothing of
92 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
getting near it. We might have learned that a German
U-boat was operating off Cape Cod ; we might have had the
exact latitude and longitude of the location which it was
expected that it would reach at a particular moment. At
the time the message was sent the submarine might have
been lying on the surface ready to attack a passing mer-
chantman, but even under these conditions the destroyer
could never have reached her quarry, for as soon as the
U-boat saw the enemy approaching it would simply have
ducked under the water and remained there in perfect
safety. When all danger had passed it would again have
bobbed up to the surface as serenely as you please, and gone
ahead with its appointed task of sinking merchant ships.
One of the astonishing things about this war was that many
of the naval officers of all countries did not seem to under-
stand until a very late date that it was utterly futile to send
anti-submarine surface craft out into the wide ocean to
attack or chase away submarines. The thing to do, of
course, was to make the submarines come to the anti-
submarine craft and fight in order to get merchantmen.
I have made this point before, and I now repeat the
explanation to emphasize that the patrol system was
necessarily unsuccessful, because it made almost impossible
any combats with submarines and afforded very little
protection to shipping. The advantage of the convoy
system, as its advocates now urged, was precisely that it
made such combats inevitable. In other words, it meant
offensive warfare. It was proposed to surround each con-
voy with a protecting screen of destroyers in precisely the
same way that the battle fleet was protected. Thus we
should compel any submarine which was planning to
torpedo a convoyed ship to do so only in waters that were
infested with destroyers. In order to get into position to
discharge its missile the submarine would have to creep up
close to the rim that marked the circle of these destroyers.
Just as soon as the torpedo started on its course and the
tell-tale wake appeared on the surface the protecting ships
would immediately begin sowing the waters with their
depth charges. Thus in the future the Germans would be
compelled to fight for every ship which they should attempt
to sink, instead of sinking them conveniently in waters that
were free of destroyers, as had hitherto been their privilege.
Already the British had demonstrated that such a screen of
1917] OPPOSITION TO CONVOYS 93
destroyers could protect merchant ships as well as war
vessels. They were making this fact clear every day in the
successful transportation of troops and supplies across the
Channel. In this region they had established an immune
zone, which was constantly patrolled by destroyers and
other anti-submarine craft, and through these the merchant
fleets were constantly passing with complete safety. The
proposal to convoy all merchant ships was a proposal to
apply this same system on a much broader scale. If we
should arrange our ships in compact convoys and protect
them with destroyers we would really create another
immune zone of this kind, and this would be different from
the one established across the Channel only in that it would
be a movable one. In this way we should establish about
a square mile of the surface of the ocean in which submarines
could not operate without great danger, and then we could
move that square mile along until port was reached.
The advantages of the convoy were thus so apparent that,
despite the pessimistic attitude of the merchant captains,
there were a number of officers in the British navy who kept
insisting that it should be tried. In this discussion I took
my stand emphatically with these officers. From the
beginning I had believed in this method of combating the
U-boat warfare. Certain early experiences had led me to
believe that the merchant captains were wrong in under-
estimating the quality of their own seamanship. It was my
conviction that these intelligent and hardy men did not
really know how capable they were at handling ships. In
my discussions with them they disclosed an exaggerated
idea of the seamanly ability of naval officers in manoeuvring
their large fleets. They attributed this to the superior
training of the men and to the special manoeuvring qualities
of the ship. " Warships are built so that they can keep
station, and turn at any angle at a moment's notice," they
would say, " but we haven't any men on our ships who can
do these things." As a matter of fact, these men were
entirely in error and I knew it. Their practical experience
in handling ships of all sizes, shapes, and speeds under a
great variety of conditions is in reality much more extensive
than naval officers can possibly enjoy. I learned this more
than thirty years ago, when stationed on the Pennsylvania
schoolship, teaching the boys navigation. This was one
of the most valuable experiences of my life, for it brought
94 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
me in every-day contact with merchant seamen, and it was
then that I made the discovery which proved so valuable
to me now.
It is true that merchant captains had much to learn
about steaming and manoeuvring in formation, but I was
sure they could pick it up quickly and carry it out success-
fully under the direction of naval officers the convoy
commander being always a naval officer.
The naval officer not only has a group of vessels that are
practically uniform in speed and ability to turn around
quickly, but he is provided also with various instruments
which enable him to keep the revolutions of his engines con-
stant, to measure distances and the like. Moreover, as a
junior officer, he is schooled in manoeuvring these very ships
for some years before he is trusted with the command of one
of them, and he, therefore, not only knows their peculiarities,
but also those of their captains the latter very useful
information, by the way.
Though it was necessary for the merchantmen, on the
other hand, to bring their much clumsier ships into forma-
tion with perhaps thirty entirely strange vessels of different
sizes, shapes, speeds, nationalities, and manoeuvring
qualities, yet I was confident that they were competent to
handle them successfully under these difficult conditions.
Indeed, afterward, one of my most experienced destroyer
commanders reported that while he was escorting a convoy
of twenty-eight ships they kept their stations quite as well
as battleships, while they were executing two manoeuvres
to avoid a submarine.
Such influence as I possessed at this time, therefore, I
threw in with the group of British officers which was advo-
cating the convoy.
There was, however, still one really serious impediment to
adopting this convoy system, and that was that the number
of destroyers available was insufficient. The British,
for reasons which have been explained, did not have the
necessary destroyers for this work, and this was what made so
very important the participation of the United States in the
naval war for our navy possessed the additional vessels
that would make possible the immediate adoption of the
convoy system. I do not wish to say that the convoy
would not have been established had we not sent destroyers
for that purpose, yet I do not see how otherwise it could
1917] INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL JELLICOE 95
have been established in any complete and systematic way
at such an early date. And we furnished other ships than
destroyers, for besides providing what I have called the
modern convoy that which protects the compact mass of
vessels from submarines it was necessary also to furnish
escorts after the old Napoleonic plan. It was the business
of the destroyers to conduct the merchantmen only through
the submarine zone. They did not take them the whole
distance across the ocean, for there was little danger of
submarine attack until the ships had arrived in the infested
waters. This would have been impossible in any case with
the limited number of destroyers. But from the time the
convoys left the home port there was a possibility that the
same kind of attack would be launched as that to which
convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days ; there was the
danger, that is, that surface war vessels, raiders or cruisers,
might escape from their German bases and swoop down
upon them. We always had before our minds the activities
of the Moewe, and we therefore deemed it necessary to
escort the convoys across the ocean with battleships and
cruisers, just as was the practice a century ago. The
British did not have ships enough available for this purpose,
and here again the American navy was able to supply the
lack ; for we had a number of pre -dreadnoughts and cruisers
that were ideally adapted to this kind of work.
Ill
On April 30th I received a message from Admiral Jellicoe
requesting me to visit him at the Admiralty. When I
arrived he said that the projected study of the convoy
system had been made, and he handed me a copy of it. It
had been decided to send one experimental convoy from
Gibraltar. The Admiralty, he added, had not yet definitely
decided that the convoy system should be adopted, but
there was every intention of giving it a thorough and fair
trial. That same evening at dinner I met Mr. Lloyd George,
Sir Edward Carson, and Lord Milner, and once more dis-
cussed w r ith them the whole convoy idea. I found the
Prime Minister especially favourable to the plan and, in
fact, civilians in general were more kindly disposed toward
the convoy than seamen, because they were less familiar
with the nautical and shipping difficulties. which it involved.
96 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
Naval officers were immediately sent to Gibraltar to
instruct the merchant masters in the details of assembling
and conducting vessels. Eight-knot ships were selected for
the experiment, and a number of destroyers were assigned
for their protection. The merchant captains, as was to be
expected, regarded the whole enterprise suspiciously, but
entered into it with the proper spirit.
On May 20th that first convoy arrived at its English
destination in perfect condition. The success with which
it made the voyage disproved all the pessimistic opinions
which the merchant sailors had entertained about them-
selves. They suddenly discovered, as I had contended,
that they could do practically everything which, in their
conferences with the Admiralty, they had declared that
they were unable to do. In those meetings they had
asserted that not more than two ships could keep station ;
but now they discovered that the whole convoy could sail
with stipulated distances between the vessels and keep
this formation with little difficulty. They were drilled on
the way in zigzagging and manoeuvring a practice carried
out subsequently with all convoys and by the time they
reached the danger zone they found that, in obedience to
a prearranged signal, all the ships could turn as a single one,
and perform all the zigzag evolutions which the situation
demanded. They had asserted that they could not sail at
night without lights and that an attempt to do so would
result in many collisions, but the experimental convoy
proved that this was merely another case of self-delusion.
Naturally the arrival" of this convoy caused the greatest
satisfaction in the Admiralty, but the most delighted men
were the merchant captains themselves, for the whole thing
was to them a complete revelation of their seamanly ability,
and naturally it flattered their pride. The news of this
arrival naturally travelled fast in shipping circles ; it com-
pletely changed the attitude of the merchant sailors, and
the chief opponents of the convoy now became its most
enthusiastic advocates.
Outside shipping circles, however, nothing about this
convoy was known at that time. Yet May 20th, the date
when it reached England safely, marked one of the great
turning-points of the war. That critical voyage meant
nothing less than that the Allies had found the way of
defeating the German submarine. The world might still
1917] THE FIRST CONVOY EXPERIMENT 97
clamour for a specific " invention " that would destroy all
the submarines overnight, or it might demand that the
Allies should block them in their bases, or suggest that they
might do any number of impossible things, but the naval
chiefs of the Allies discovered, on May 20, 1917, that they
could defeat the German campaign even without these
rather uncertain aids. The submarine danger was by no
means ended when this first convoy arrived ; many anxious
months still lay ahead of us ; other means would have to be
devised that would supplement the convoy ; yet the all-
important fact was that the Allied chiefs now realized, for
the first time, that the problem was not an insoluble one ;
and that, with hard work and infinite patience, they could
keep open the communications that were essential to vic-
tory. The arrival of these weather-beaten ships thus
brought the assurance that the armies and the civilian
populations could be supplied with food and materials, and
that the seas could be kept open for the transportation of
American troops to France. In fine, it meant that the
Allies could win the war.
On May 21st the British Admiralty, which this experi-
mental convoy had entirely converted, voted to adopt the
convoy system for all merchant shipping. Not long after-
ward the second convoy arrived safely from Hampton
Roads, and then other convoys began to put in from Scan-
dinavian ports. On July 21st I was able definitely to
report to Washington that " the success of the convoys so
far brought in shows that the system will defeat the sub-
marine campaign if applied generally and in time."
But while we recognize the fact that the convoy pre-
served our communications and so made possible the
continuation of the war, we must not overlook a vitally
important element in its success. In describing the work
of the destroyer, which was the protecting arm of the
convoy, I have said nothing about the forces that really
laid the whole foundation of the anti-submarine campaign.
All the time that these destroyers were fighting off the
submarines the power that made possible their operations
was cruising quietly in the North Sea, doing its work so
inconspicuously that the world was hardly aware of its
existence. For back of all these operations lay the mighty
force of the Grand Fleet. Admiral Beatty's dreadnoughts
and battle cruisers, which were afterward supplemented
8
98 THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY
by a fine squadron of American ships, kept the German
surface vessels penned in their harbours and in this way
left the ocean free for the operations of the Allied surface
craft. I have already said that, in April, 1917, the Allied
navies, while they controlled the surface of the water, did
not control the subsurface, which at that time was prac-
tically at the disposition of the Germans. Yet the deter-
mining fact, as we were now to learn, was that this control
of the surface was to give us the control of the subsurface
also. Only the fact that the battleships kept the German
fleet at bay made it possible for the destroyers and other
surface craft to do their beneficent work. In an open sea
battle their surface navies would have disposed of the
German fleet ; but let us suppose for a moment that an
earthquake, or some other great natural disturbance, had
engulfed the British fleet at Scapa Flow. The world
would then have been at Germany's mercy and all the
destroyers the Allies could have put upon the sea would
have availed them nothing, for the German battleships and
battle cruisers could have sunk them or driven them into
their ports. Then Allied commerce would have been the
prey, not only of the submarines, which could have oper-
ated with the utmost freedom, but of the German surface
craft as well. In a few weeks the British food supplies
would have been exhausted. There would have been an
early end to the soldiers and munitions which Britain was
constantly sending to France. The United States could
have sent no forces to the Western Front and the result
would have been the surrender which the Allies them-
selves, in the spring of 1917, regarded as not a remote
possibility. America would then have been compelled to
face the German power alone, and to face it long before
we had had an opportunity of assembling our resources
and of equipping our armies. The world was preserved
from all these calamities because the destroyer and the
convoy solved the problem of the submarine and because
back of these agencies of victory lay Admiral Beatty's
squadrons, holding at arm's length the German surface
ships while these comparatively fragile craft were saving
the liberties of the world.
CHAPTER IV
AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
OUR first division of destroyers reached Queenstown on
a Friday morning, May 4, 1917 ; the following Monday
they put to sea on the business of hunting the submarine
and protecting commerce. For the first month or six
weeks they spent practically all their time on patrol duty
in company with British destroyers, sloops, and other
patrol vessels. Though the convoy system was formally
adopted in the latter part of May, it was not operating
completely and smoothly until August or September.
Many troop and merchant convoys were formed in the
intervening period and many were conducted through the
submarine zone by American destroyers ; but our ships
spent much time sailing singly, hunting for such enemies
as might betray their presence, or escorting individual
cargoes. The early experiments had demonstrated the
usefulness of the convoy system, yet a certain number of
pessimists still refused to accept it as the best solution of
the shipping problem ; and to reorganize practically all
the shipping of the world, scattered everywhere on the
seven seas, necessarily took time.
But this intervening period furnished indispensable
training for our men. They gained an every-day fami-
liarity with the waters which were to form the scene of
their operations and learned many of the tricks of the
German submarines. It was a strange world in which
these young Americans now found themselves. The life
was a hard one, of course, in those tempestuous Irish
waters, with the little destroyers jumping from wave to
wave, sometimes showing daylight beneath their keels,
their bows frequently pointing skyward, or plunged deep
into heavy seas, and their sides occasionally ploughing along
99
100 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
under the foamy waves. For days the men lived in a
world of fog and mist ; rain in those regions seemed to
be almost the normal state of nature. Much has been
written about the hardships of life aboard the destroyer,
and to these narratives our men could add many details
of their own. These hardships, however, did not weigh
heavily upon them, for existence in those waters, though
generally monotonous, possessed at times plenty of interest
and excitement. The very appearance of the sea showed
that our men were engaging in a kind of warfare very
different from that for which they had been trained. The
enormous amount of shipping seemed to give the lie to
the German reports that British commerce had been prac-
tically arrested. A perpetual stream of all kinds of
vessels, liners, tramps, schooners, and fishing boats, was
passing toward the Irish and the English coasts. Yet
here and there other floating objects on the surface told
the story. Now it was a stray boat filled with the sur-
vivors of a torpedoed vessel ; now a raft on which lay
the bodies of dead men ; now the derelict hulk of a ship
which the Germans had abandoned as sunk, but which
persisted in floating aimlessly around, a constant danger
to navigation. Loose mines, bobbing in the water, hinted
at the perils that were constantly threatening our forces.
In the tense imagination of the lookouts floating spars or
other debris easily took the form of periscopes. Queer-
looking sailing vessels, at a distance, aroused suspicions
that they might be submarines in disguise. A phosphor-
escent trail in the water was sometimes mistaken for the
wake of a torpedo. The cover of a hatchway floating on
the surface, if seen at a distance of a few hundred yards,
looked much like the conning-tower of a submarine, while
the back of an occasional whale gave a life-like representa-
tion of a U-boat awash in fact, so life-like was it that on
one occasion several of our submarine chasers on the
English coast dropped depth charges on a whale and
killed it.
But it was the invisible rather than the visible evidences
of warfare that especially impressed our men. The air all
around them was electric with life and information. One
had only to put the receiver of the wireless to his ear to
find himself in a new and animated world. The atmosphere
was constantly spluttering messages of all kinds coming
1917] CONVERSATIONS AT SEA 101
from all kinds of places. Sometimes these were sent by
Admiral Bayly from Queenstown ; they would direct our
men to go to an indicated spot and escort an especially
valuable cargo ship ; they would tell a particular com-
mander that a submarine was lying at a designated lati-
tude and longitude and instruct him to go and " get " it.
Running conversations were frequently necessary between
destroyers and the ships which they had been detailed to
escort. " Give me your position," the destroyer would
ask. " What is the name of your assistant surgeon, and
who is his friend on board our ship ? " the suspicious vessel
would reply such precaution being necessary to give
assurance that the query had not come from a German
submarine. " Being pursued by a submarine Lat. 50 N.,
Long. 15 W." cries of distress like this were common.
Another message would tell of a vessel that was being
shelled ; another would tell of a ship that was sinking ;
while other messages would give the location of lifeboats
which were filled with survivors and ask for speedy help.
Our wireless operators not only received the news of
friends, but also the messages of enemies. Conversations
between German submarines frequently filled the air.
They sometimes attempted to deceive us by false " S.O.S."
signals, hoping that in this way they could get an oppor-
tunity to torpedo any vessel that responded to the call.
But these attempts were unsuccessful, for our wireless
operators had no difficulty in recognizing the " spark " of
the German instruments. At times the surface of the
ocean might be calm ; there would not be a ship in sight
or a sign of human existence anywhere ; yet the air itself
would be uninterruptedly filled with these reminders of
war.
The duties of our destroyers, in these earliest days, were
to hunt for submarines, to escort single ships, to pick up
survivors in boats, and to go to the rescue of ships that
were being attacked. For the purpose of patrol the sea
was divided into areas thirty miles square ; and to each
of these one destroyer, sloop, or other vessel was assigned.
The ship was required to keep within its allotted area,
unless the pursuit of a submarine should lead it into a
neighbouring one. This patrol, as I have described, was
not a satisfactory way of fighting submarines. A vessel
would occasionally get a distant glimpse of the enemy,
102 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
but that was all ; as soon as the U-boat saw the ship, it
simply dived to security beneath the waves. Our de-
stroyers had many chances to fire at the enemy but usually
at very long ranges ; some of them had lively scraps,
which perhaps involved the destruction of U-boats, though
this was always a difficult thing to prove. Yet the mere
fact that submarines were seldom sunk by destroyers on
patrol, either by ourselves or by the Allies, did not mean
that the latter accomplished nothing. The work chiefly
expected of destroyers on patrol was that they should
keep the U-boats under the surface as much as possible
and protect commerce. Normally the submarine sails on
top of the water, looking for its prey. As long as it is
beyond the merchantmen's range of vision, it uses its high
surface speed of about 14 knots to attain a position ahead
of the advancing vessel ; before the surface vessel reaches
a point where its lookout can see the submarine, the U-boat
dives and awaits the favourable moment for firing its
torpedo. It cannot take these preliminary steps if there
is a destroyer anywhere in the neighbourhood ; the mere
presence of such a warship therefore constitutes a con-
siderable protection to any merchant ship that is within
sight. The submarine normally prefers to use its guns
on merchant ships, for the torpedoes are expensive and
comparatively few in number. Destroyers constantly
interfered with these gunning operations. A long distance
shot usually was sufficient to make the under-water vessel
submerge and thus lose its power for doing harm. The
early experiences of our destroyers with submarines were
of this kind ; but the work of chasing U-boats under the
water, escorting a small proportion of the many cargo
ships, and picking up survivors, important as it was, did
not really constitute effective anti-submarine warfare. It
gave our men splendid training, it saved many a merchant
ship, it rescued many victims from the extreme dangers
of German ruthlessness, it sank a small number of sub-
marines, but it could never have won the war.
This patrol by destroyers and light surface vessels has
been criticized as affording an altogether ineffective
method of protecting shipping, especially when compared
with the convoy system. This criticism is, of course,
justified ; still we must understand that it was the only
possible method until we had enough anti-submarine craft
1917] HEADQUARTERS OF CONVOYS 103
to make the convoy practicable. Nor must we forget that
this Queenstown patrol was organized systematically and
operated with admirable skill and tireless energy. Most
of this duty fell at this time upon the British destroyers,
sloops, and other patrol vessels, which were under the
command of Admiral Bayly, and these operations were
greatly aided by the gallant actions of the British Q-ships,
or " mystery ships." Though some of the admirable
exploits of these vessels will be recorded in due time, it
may be said here that the record which these ships made
was not only in all respects worthy of the traditions of
their great service, but also that they exhibited an endur-
ance, a gallantry, and seamanlike skill that has few parallels
in the history of naval warfare.
II
The headquarters of the convoy system was a room in
the British Admiralty ; herein was the mainspring of the
elaborate mechanism by which ten thousand ships were con-
'ducted over the seven oceans. Here every morning those
who had been charged with the security of the Allies' lines
of communication reviewed the entire submarine situa-
tion. Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, R.N., bore
this heavy responsibility, ably assisted by a number of
British officers. Captain Byron A. Long, U.S.N., a
member of my staff, was associated with Admiral Duff
in this important work. It was Captain Long's duty to
co-ordinate the movements of our convoys with the much
more numerous convoys of the Allies ; he performed this
task so efficiently that, once the convoy organization was
in successful operation, I eliminated the whole subject
from my anxieties and requested Captain Long not to in-
form me when troop convoys sailed from the United
States or when they were due to arrive hi France or Eng-
land. There seemed to be no reason why both of us
should lose sleep over the same cause.
The most conspicuous feature of the convoy room was a
huge chart, entirely covering the wall on one side of the
office ; access to this chart was obtained by ladders not
unlike those which are used in shoe stores. It gave a
comprehensive view of the North and South American
coast, the Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles, and a consider-
104 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
able part of Europe and Africa. The ports which it
especially emphasized were Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax,
New York, Hampton Roads, Gibraltar, and Sierra Leone
and Dakar, ports on the west coast of Africa. Thin threads
were stretched from each one of these seven points to
certain positions in the ocean just outside the British
Isles, and on these threads were little paper boats, each
one of which represented a convoy. When a particular
convoy started from New York, one of these paper boats
was placed at that point ; as it made its way across the
ocean, the boat was moved from day to day in accordance
with the convoy's progress. At any moment, therefore,
a mere glance at this chart, with its multitude of paper
boats, gave the spectator the precise location of all the
commerce which was then en route to the scene of war.
But there were other exhibits on the chart which were
even more conspicuous than these minute representations
of convoys. Little circles were marked off in the waters
surrounding the British Isles, each one of which was in-
tended to show the location of a German submarine. From
day to day each one of these circles was moved in accor-
dance with the ascertained positions of the submarine
which it represented, a straight line indicating its course
on the chart. Perhaps the most remarkable fact about
the Allied convoy service was the minute information
which it possessed about the movements of German sub-
marines. A kind of separate intelligence bureau devoted
its entire attention to this subject. Readers of detective
stories are familiar with the phenomenon known as
" shadowing." It is a common practice in the detective's
fascinating profession to assign a man, known as a
" shadow," to the duty of keeping a particular person
under constant observation. With admirable patience
and skill an experienced " shadow " keeps in view this
object of his attention for twenty-four hours ; he dogs
him through crowded streets, tracks him up and down
high office buildings, accompanies him to restaurants,
trolley cars, theatres, and hotels, and unobtrusively chases
him through dense thoroughfares in cabs and automobiles.
" We get him up in the morning and we put him to bed
at night " is the way the " shadow " describes the assiduous
care which he bestows upon his unsuspecting victim. In
much the same fashion did the Allied secret service
1917] SHADOWING THE SUBMARINES 105
" shadow " German submarines ; it got each submarine
"up in the morning and put it to bed at night." That is
to say, the intelligence department took charge of Fritz
and his crew as they emerged from their base, and kept
an unwearied eye upon them until they sailed back home.
The great chart in the convoy room of the Admiralty
showed, within the reasonable limits of human fallibility,
where each submarine was operating at a particular
moment, and it also kept minute track of its performances.
Yet it was not so difficult to gather this information as
may at first be supposed. I have already said that there
were comparatively few submarines, perhaps not more
than an average of eight or nine, which were operating at
the same time in the waters south and west of Ireland,
the region with which we Americans were most concerned.
These boats betrayed their locations in a multitude of
ways. Their commanders were particularly careless in
the use of wireless. The Germanic passion for conversa-
tion could not be suppressed even on the U-boats, even
though this national habit might lead to the most serious
consequences. Possibly also the solitary submarine felt
lonely ; at any rate, as soon as it reached the Channel or
the North Sea, it started an almost uninterrupted flow of
talk. The U-boats communicated principally with each
other, and also with the Admiralty at home ; and, in
doing this, they gave away their positions to the assidu-
ously listening Allies. The radio -direction finder, an
apparatus by which we can instantaneously locate the
position from which a wireless message is sent, was the
mechanism which furnished us much of this information.
Of course, the Germans knew that their messages revealed
their locations, for they had direction finders as well as
we, but the fear of discovery did not act as a curb upon a
naturally loquacious nature. And we had other ways of
following their movements. The submarine spends much
the larger part of its time on the surface. Sailing thus
conspicuously, it was constantly being sighted by mer-
chant or military ships, which had explicit instructions
to report immediately the elusive vessel, and to give its
exact location. Again it is obvious that a submarine
could not fire at a merchantman or torpedo one, or even
attempt to torpedo one, without revealing its presence.
The wireless operators of all merchant vessels were supplied
106 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
at all times with the longitude and latitude of their ships ;
their instructions required them immediately to send out
this information whenever they sighted a submarine or
were attacked by one. In these several ways we had
little difficulty in "shadowing" the U-boats. For ex-
ample, we would hear that the [7-53 was talking just out-
side of Heligoland ; this submarine would be immediately
plotted on the chart. As the submarine made only
about ten knots on the surface, in order to save fuel oil, and
much less under the surface, we could draw a circle around
this point, and rest assured that the boat must be some-
where within this circle at a given time. But in a few
hours or a day we would hear from this same boat again ;
perhaps it was using its wireless or attacking a merchant-
man ; or perhaps one of our vessels had spotted it on the
surface. The news of this new location would justify the
convoy officers in moving this submarine on our chart to
this new position. Within a short time the convoy officers
acquired an astonishingly intimate knowledge of these
boats and the habits of their commanders. Indeed, the
personalities of some of these German officers ultimately
took shape with surprising clearness ; for they betrayed
their presence in the ocean by characteristics that often
furnished a means of identifying them. Each submarine
behaved in a different way from the others, the difference,
of course, representing the human element in control.
One would deliver his attacks in rapid succession, boldly
and almost recklessly ; another would approach his task
with the utmost caution ; certain ones would display the
meanest traits in human nature ; while others let us be
just were capable of a certain display of generosity, and
possibly even of chivalry. By studying the individual
traits of each commander we could often tell just which
one was operating at a given time ; and this information
was extremely valuable in the game in which we were
engaged.
44 Old Hans is out again," the officers in the convoy
room would remark.
They were speaking of Hans Rose, the commander of
the C7-53 ; this was that same submarine officer who, in
the fall of 1916, brought that boat to Newport, Rhode
Island, and torpedoed five or six ships off Nantucket.
Our men never saw Hans Rose face to face ; they had
1917] HANS ROSE 107
not the faintest idea whether he was fat or lean, whether
he was fair or dark ; yet they knew his military charac-
teristics intimately. He became such a familiar personality
in the convoy room and his methods of operation were so
individual, that we came to have almost a certain liking
for the old chap. Other U-boat commanders would appear
off the hunting grounds and attack ships in more or less
easy-going fashion. Then another boat would suddenly
appear, and bang ! bang ! bang ! Torpedo after tor-
pedo would fly, four or five ships would sink, and then this
disturbing person would vanish as unexpectedly as he
had arrived. Such an experience informed the convoy
officers that Hans Rose was once more at large. We
acquired a certain respect for Hans because he was a
brave man who would take chances which most of his
compatriots would avoid ; and, above all, because he
played his desperate game with a certain decency. Some-
times, when he torpedoed a ship, Rose would wait around
until all the lifeboats were filled ; he would then throw
out a tow line, give the victims food, and keep all the
survivors together until the rescuing destroyer appeared
on the horizon, when he would let go and submerge. This
humanity involved considerable risk to Captain Rose,
for a destroyer anywhere in his neighbourhood, as he well
knew, was a serious matter. It was he who torpedoed
our destroyer, the Jacob Jones. He took a shot at her
from a distance of two miles a distance from which a
hit is a pure chance ; and the torpedo struck and sank the
vessel within a few minutes. On this occasion Rose acted
with his usual decency. The survivors of the Jacob Jones
naturally had no means of communication, since the
wireless had gone down with their ship ; and now Rose,
at considerable risk to himself, sent out an " S.O.S." call,
giving the latitude and longitude, and informing Queens-
town that the men were floating around in open boats.
It is perhaps not surprising that Rose is one of the few
German U-boat commanders with whom Allied naval
officers would be willing to-day to shake hands. I have
heard naval officers say that they would like to meet him
after the war.
We were able to individualize other commanders ; the
business of acquiring this knowledge, learning the location
of their submarines and the characteristics of their boats,
108 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
and using this vital information in protecting convoys,
was all part of the game which was being played in London.
It was the' greatest game of "chess" which history has
known a game that exacted not only the most faithful
and studious care, but one in which it was necessary that
all the activities should be centralized in one office. This
small group of officers in the Admiralty convoy room,
composed of representatives of all the nations concerned,
exercised a control which extended throughout the entire
convoy system. It regulated the dates when convoys
sailed from America or other ports and when they arrived ;
if it had not taken charge of this whole system, congestion
and confusion would inevitably have resulted. We had
only a limited number of destroyers to escort all troops
and other important convoys arriving in Europe ; it was
therefore necessary that they should arrive at regular and
predetermined intervals. It was necessary also that one
group of officers should control the routing of all convoys,
otherwise there would have been serious danger of colli-
sions between outward and inward bound ships, and no
possibility of routing them clear of the known positions
of submarines. The great centre of all this traffic was
not New York or Hampton Roads, but London. It was
inevitable, if the convoy system was to succeed, that it
should have a great central headquarters, and it was just
as inevitable that this headquarters should be London.
On the huge chart already described the convoys, each
indicated by a little boat, were shown steadily making
their progress toward the appointed rendezvous. Eight
or nine submarines, likewise indicated on the chart, were
always waiting to intercept them. On that great board
the prospective tragedies of the seas were thus unfolding
before our eyes. Here, for example, was a New York
convoy of twenty ships, steaming toward Liverpool, but
steering straight toward the position of a submarine. The
thing to do was perfectly plain. It was a simple matter
to send the convoy a wireless message to take a course
fifty miles to the south where, according to the chart,
there were no hidden enemies. In a few hours the little
paper boat, which represented this group of ships and
which was apparently headed for destruction, would
suddenly turn southward, pass around the entirely un-
conscious submarine, and then take an unobstructed
1917] A WORLD-WIDE ORGANIZATION 109
course for its destination. The Admiralty convoy board
knew so accurately the position of all the submarines
that it could almost always route the convoys around
them. It was an extremely interesting experience to
watch the paper ships on this chart deftly turn out of the
course of U-boats, sometimes when they seemed almost
on the point of colliding with them. That we were able
constantly to save the ships by sailing the convoys around
the submarines brings out the interesting fact that, even
had there been no destroyer escort, the convoy in itself
would have formed a great protection to merchant shipping.
There were times when we had no escorting vessels to send
with certain convoys ; and in such instances we simply
routed the ships in masses, directed them on courses
which we knew were free of submarines, and in this way
brought them safely into port.
Ill
The Admiralty in London was thus the central nervous
system of a complicated but perfectly working organism
which reached the remotest corners of the world. Wher-
ever there was a port, whether in South America, Aus-
tralia, or in the most inaccessible parts of India or China,
from which merchantmen sailed to any of the other
countries which were involved in the war, representatives
of the British navy and the British Government were
stationed, all working harmoniously with shipping men
in the effort to get their cargoes safely through the danger
zones. These danger zones occupied a comparatively
small area surrounding the belligerent countries, but the
safeguarding of the ships was an elaborate process which
began far back in the countries from which the commerce
started. Until about July, 1917, the world's shipping for
the most part had been unregulated ; now for the first
time it was arranged in hard and fast routes and despatched
in accordance with schedules as fixed as those of a great
railroad. The whole management of convoys, indeed,
bore many resemblances to the method of handling freight
cars on the American system of trans-continental lines. In
the United States there are several great headquarters
of freight, sometimes known as " gateways," places, that
is, at which freight cars are assembled from a thousand
110 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
places, and from which the great accumulations are
routed to their destinations. Such places are Pittsburg,
Buffalo, St. Louis, Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, San
Francisco to mention only a few. Shipping destined for
the belligerent nations was similarly assembled, in the
years 1917 and 1918, at six or eight great ocean " gate-
ways," and there formed into convoys for " through
routing " to the British Isles, France, and the Mediter-
ranean. Only a few of the ships that were exceptionally
fast speed in itself being a particularly efficacious pro-
tection against submarines were permitted to ignore this
routing system, and dash unprotected through the infested
area. This was a somewhat dangerous procedure even
for such ships, however, and they were escorted whenever
destroyers were available. All other vessels, from what-
ever parts of the world they might come, were required
to sail first for one of these great assembling points, or
" gateways " ; and at these places they were added to
one of the constantly forming convoys. Thus all shipping
which normally sailed to Europe around the Cape of Good
Hope proceeded up the west coast of Africa until it reached
the port of Dakar or Sierra Leone, where it joined the
convoy. Shipping from the east coast of South America
ports like Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Buenos Aires, and
Montevideo instead of sailing directly to Europe, joined
the convoy at this same African town. Vessels which
came to Britain and France by way of Suez and Mediter-
ranean ports found their great stopping place at Gibraltar
a headquarters of traffic which, in the huge amount of
freight which it " created," became almost the Pittsburg
of this mammoth transportation system. The four
" gateways " for North America and the west coast of
South America were Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax,
New York, and Hampton Roads. The grain-laden mer-
chantmen from the St. Lawrence valley rendezvoused at
Sydney and Halifax. Vessels from Portland, Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, and other Atlantic points found
their assembling headquarters at New York, while ships
from Baltimore, Norfolk, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
west coast of South America proceeded to the great convoy
centre which had been established at Hampton Roads.
In the convoy room of the Admiralty these aggregations
of ships were always referred to as the " Dakar convoy,"
1917] ATLANTIC CONVOYS 111
the " Halifax convoy," the " Hampton Roads convoy,"
and the like. When the system was completely estab-
lished the convoys sailed from their appointed head-
quarters on regular schedules, like railroad trains. From
New York one convoy departed every sixteen days for
the west coast of England and one left every sixteen
days for the east coast. From Hampton Roads one sailed
every eight days to the west coast and one every eight
days to the east coast, and convoys from all the other
convoy points maintained a similarly rigid schedule. The
dates upon which these sailings took place were fixed,
like the arrivals and departures of trains upon a railroad
time-table, except when it became necessary to delay the
sailing of a convoy to avoid congestion of arrivals. Accord-
ing to this programme, the first convoy to the west coast
left New York on August 14, 1917, and its successors
thereafter sailed at intervals of about sixteen days. The
instructions sent to shipmasters all over the world, by
way of the British consulates, gave explicit details con-
cerning the method of assembling their convoys.
Here, for example, was a ship at New York, all loaded
and ready to sail for the war zone. The master visited
the port officer at the British consulate, who directed
him to proceed to Gravesend Bay, anchor his vessel, and
report to the convoy officers for further instructions. The
merchant captain, reaching this indicated spot, usually
found several other vessels on hand, all of them, like his
ship, waiting for the sailing date. The commander of the
gathering convoy, under whose instructions all the mer-
chantmen were to operate, was a naval officer, usually of
the rank of commodore or captain, who maintained
constant cable communication with the convoy room of
the Admiralty and usually used one of the commercial
vessels as his flagship. When the sailing day arrived
usually from twenty to thirty merchantmen had assem-
bled ; the commander summoned all their masters, gave
each a blue book containing instructions for the manage-
ment of convoyed ships, and frequently delivered some-
thing in the nature of a lecture. Before the aggregation
sailed it was joined by a cruiser or pre-dreadnought battle-
ship of the American navy, or by a British or French
cruiser. This ship was to accompany the convoy across
the Atlantic as far as the danger zone ; its mission was
112 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
not, as most people mistakenly believed, to protect the
convoy from submarines, but 'to protect it from any
surface German raider that might have escaped into the
high seas. The Allied navies constantly had before their
minds the exploits of the Emden ; the opportunity to
break up a convoy in mid-ocean by dare-devil enterprises
of this kind was so tempting that it seemed altogether
likely that Germany might take advantage of it. To
send twenty or thirty merchant ships across the Atlantic
with no protection against such assaults would have
been to invite a possible disaster. As a matter of fact, the
last German raider that even attempted to gain the high
seas was sunk in the North Sea by the British Patrol
Squadron in February, 1917.
On the appointed day the whole convoy weighed anchor
and silently slipped out to sea. To such spectators as
observed its movements it seemed to be a rather limping,
halting procession. The speed of a convoy was the speed
of its slowest ship, and vessels that could easily make
twelve or fourteen knots were obliged to throttle down
their engines, much to the disgust of their masters, in
order to keep formation with a ship that made only eight
or ten ; though whenever possible vessels of nearly equal
speed sailed together. Little in the newly assembled
group suggested the majesty of the sea. The ships formed
a miscellaneous and ill-assorted company, rusty tramps
shamefacedly sailing alongside of spick-and-span liners ;
miserable little two- or three-thousand ton ships attempt-
ing to hold up their heads in the same company with other
ships of ten or twelve. The whole mass was sprawled
over the sea in most ungainly fashion ; twenty or thirty
ships, with spaces of nine hundred or a thousand yards
stretching between them, took up not far from ten square
miles of the ocean surface. Neither at this stage of the
voyage did the aggregation give the idea of efficiency. It
presented about as desirable a target as the submarine
could have desired. But the period taken in crossing the
ocean was entirely devoted to education. Under the
tutorship of the convoy commander, the men composing
the twenty or thirty crews went every day to school.
For fifteen or twenty days upon the broad Atlantic they
were trained in all the evolutions which were necessary
for coping with the submarine. Every possible situation
1917] CONVOY INSTRUCTIONS 113
that could arise in the danger zone was anticipated and
the officers and the crews were trained to meet it. They
perfected themselves in the signal code ; they learned the
art of making the sudden manoeuvres which were instan-
taneously necessary when a submarine was sighted ;
they acquired a mastery in the art of zigzagging ; and
they became accustomed to sailing at night without lights.
The crews were put through all the drills which prepared
them to meet such crises as the landing of a torpedo in
their engine-room or the sinking of the ship ; and they
were thoroughly schooled in getting all hands safely into
the boats. Possibly an occasional scare on the way over
may have introduced the element of reality into these
exercises ; though no convoys actually met submarines
in the open ocean, the likelihood that they might do so
was never absent, especially after the Germans began
sending out their huge under-water cruisers.
The convoy commander left his port with sealed orders,
which he was instructed not to open until he was a hundred
miles at sea. These orders, when the seal was broken,
gave him the rendezvous assigned by Captain Long of the
convoy board in London. The great chart in the convoy
room at the Admiralty indicated the point to which the
convoy was to proceed and at which it would be met by
the destroyer escorts and taken through the danger zone.
This particular New York convoy commander was now
perhaps instructed to cross the thirtieth meridian at the
fifty-second parallel of latitude, where he would be met by
his escort. He laid his course for that point and regulated
his speed so as to reach it at the appointed time. But he
well knew that these instructions were only temporary.
The precise point to which he would finally be directed to
sail depended upon the movement and location of the
German submarines at the time of his arrival. If the
enemy became particularly active in the region of this
tentative rendezvous, then, as the convoy approached it,
a wireless from London would instruct the commander
to steer abruptly to another point, perhaps a hundred
miles to north or south.
" Getting your convoy " was a searching test of destroyer
seamanship, particularly in heavy or thick weather. It was
not the simplest thing to navigate a group of destroyers
through the tempestuous waters of the North Atlantic, with
9
114 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
no other objective than the junction point of a certain
meridian and parallel, and reach the designated spot at a
certain hour. Such a feat demanded navigation ability of a
high order ; and the skill which our American naval officers
displayed in this direction aroused great admiration,
especially on the part of the merchant skippers ; in partic-
ular it aroused the astonishment of the average doughboy.
Many destroyer escorts that went out to meet an incoming
convoy also took out one which was westward bound. A
few mishaps in the course of the war, such as the sinking of
the Justicia, which was sailing from Europe to America,
created the false notion that outward-bound convoys were
not escorted. It was just as desirable, of course, to escort
the ships going out as it was to escort those which were
coming in. The mere fact that the inbound ships carried
troops and supplies gave stronger reasons, from the humane
standpoint, for heavier escorts, but not from the standpoint
of the general war situation. The Germans were not sink-
ing our ships because they were carrying men and supplies ;
they w r ere sinking them simply because they were ships.
They were not seeking to destroy American troops and
munitions exclusively; they were seeking to destroy
tonnage. They were aiming to reduce the world's supply of
ships to such a point that the Allies would be compelled to
abandon the conflict for lack of communications. It was
therefore necessary that they should sink the empty ships,
which were going out, as well as the crowded and loaded
ships which were coming in. For the same reason it was
necessary that we should protect them, and we did this as
far as practicable without causing undue delays in forming
outward-bound convoys. The Justicia, though most people
still think that she was torpedoed because she was un-
escorted, was, in fact, protected by a destroyer escort of
considerable size. This duty of escorting outward-bound
ships increased considerably the strain on our destroyer
force. The difficulty was that the inbound convoy arrived
in a body, but that the ships could not be unloaded and
sent back in a body without detaining a number of
them an undue length of time and time was such an
important factor in this war that it was necessary to
make the " turn-around " of each important transport
as quickly as possible. The consequence was that returning
ships were often despatched in small convoys as fast as
1917] CONVOY FORMATION 115
they were unloaded. The escorts which we were able
to supply for such groups were thus much weaker than
absolute safety required, and sometimes we were even
forced to send vessels across the submarine zone with
few, if any, escorting warships. This explains why certain
homeward-bound transports were torpedoed, and this
was particularly true of troop and munition convoys to
the western ports of France. Only when we could assemble
a large outgoing convoy and despatch it at such a time that
it could meet an incoming one at the western edge of
the submarine zone could we give these vessels the same
destroyer escort as that which we always gave for the loaded
convoys bound for European ports.
As soon as the destroyers made contact with an inward-
bound convoy, the ocean escort, the cruiser or pre-dread-
nought, if an American, abandoned it and started it back
home, sometimes with a westbound convoy if one had been
assembled in time. British escorts went ahead at full
.speed into a British port, usually escorted by one or more
destroyers. This abandonment sometimes aroused the
wrath of the passengers on the inbound convoy. Their
protector had dropped them just as they had entered the
submarine zone, the very moment its services were really
needed ! These passengers did not understand, any more
than did the people at home, that the purpose of the ocean
escort was not to protect them from submarines, but from
possible raiders. Inside the danger zone this ocean escort
would become part of the convoy itself and require pro-
tection from submarines, so that its rather summary
departure really made the merchantmen more secure. As
the convoy approached the danger zone, after being drilled
all the way across the ocean, its very appearance was more
taut and business-like. The ships were closed up into a
much more compact formation, keeping only such distances
apart as were essential for quick manoeuvring. Generally
the convoy was formed in a long parallelogram, the distance
across the front of which was much longer than the depth or
distance along the sides. Usually the formation was a
number of groups of four vessels each, in column or " Indian
file," at a distance of about five hundred yards from ship to
ship, and all groups abreast of each other and about half a
mile apart. Thus a convoy of twenty-four vessels, or six
groups of four, would have a width of about three miles and
11 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
a depth of one. Most of the destroyers were stationed on
the narrow sides, for it was only on the side, or the beam,
that the submarines could attack with much likelihood of
succeeding. It was usually necessary for a destroyer to be
stationed in the rear of a convoy, for, though the speed of
nearly all convoys was faster than that of a submarine
when submerged, the latter while running on the surface
could follow a convoy at night with a fair chance of torpedo-
ing a vessel at early daylight and escaping to the rear if
unhampered by the presence of a rear-guard destroyer. It
was generally impracticable and dangerous for the sub-
marine to wait ahead, submerge, and launch its torpedoes as
the convoy passed over it. The extent to which purely
mechanical details protected merchant ships is not under-
stood, and this inability to attack successfully from the
front illustrates this point. The submarine launches its
torpedoes from tubes in the bow or stern ; it has no tubes
on the beam. If it did possess such side tubes, it could lie
in wait ahead and shoot its broadsides at the convoy as it
passed over the spot where it was concealed. Its length in
that case would be parallel to that of the merchant ships,
and thus it would have a comparatively small part of its
area exposed to the danger of ramming. The mere fact
that its torpedo tubes are placed in the bow and stern
makes it necessary for the submarine, if it wishes to attack
in the fashion described, to turn almost at right angles to the
course of the convoy, and to manoeuvre into a favourable
position from which to discharge its missile a procedure so
altogether hazardous that it almost never attempts it.
With certain reservations, which it is hardly necessary to
explain in detail at this point, it may be taken at least as a
general rule that the sides of the convoy not only furnish
the U-boats much the best chance to torpedo ships, but also
subject them to the least danger ; and this is the reason
why, in the recent war, the destroyers were usually con-
centrated at these points.
I have already compared the convoy system to a great
aggregation of railroads. This comparison holds good of its
operation after it had entered the infested zone. Indeed
the very terminology of our railroad men was used. Every
convoy nearly followed one of two main routes, known at
convoy headquarters as the two " trunk lines." The trunk
line which reached the west coast of England usually passed
1917] TYPICAL CASES lit
north of Ireland through the North Channel and down the
Irish Sea to Liverpool. Under certain conditions these
convoys passed south of Ireland and thence up the Irish
Sea. The convoys to the east coast took a trunk line that
passed up the English Channel. Practically all shipping
from the United States to Great Britain and France took
one of these trunk lines. But, like our railroad systems,
each of these main routes had branch lines. Thus shipping
destined for French ports took the southern route until off
the entrance to the English Channel ; here it abandoned
the main line and took a branch route to Brest, Bordeaux,
Nantes, and other French ports. In the Channel likewise
several " single-track " branches went to various English
ports, such as Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and
the like. The whole gigantic enterprise flowed with a
precision and a regularity which I think it is hardly likely
that any other transportation system has ever achieved.
IV
A description of a few actual convoys, and the experiences
of our destroyers with them, will perhaps best make clear
the nature of the mechanism which protected the world's
shipping. For this purpose I have selected typical instances
which illustrate the every-day routine experiences of
escorting destroyers, and other experiences in which their
work was more spectacular.
One day in late October, 1917, a division of American
destroyers at Queenstown received detailed instructions
from Admiral Bayly to leave at a certain hour and escort
the outward convoy " O Q 17 " and bring into port the
inbound convoy " H S 14." These detailed instructions
were based upon general instructions issued from the
Admiralty, where my staff was in constant attendance and
co-operation. The symbols by which these two groups of
ships were designated can be easily interpreted. The
O Q simply meant that convoy " No. 17 " the seventeenth
which had left that port was Outward bound from Queens-
town, and the H S signified that convoy " No. 14 " was
Homeward bound from Sydney, Cape Breton. Queens-
town during the first few months was one of those places at
which ships, having discharged their cargoes, assembled in
groups for despatching back to the United States. Later
118 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
Milford Haven, Liverpool, and other ports were more often
used for this purpose. Vessels had been arriving here for
several days from ports of the Irish Sea and the east coast
of England. These had now been formed into convoy
" O Q 17 " ; they were ready for a destroyer escort to take
them through the submarine zone and start them on the
westward voyage to American ports.
This escort consisted of eight American destroyers and
one British " special service ship " ; the latter was one of
that famous company of decoy vessels, or " mystery ships,"
which, though to all outward appearances unprotected
merchantmen, really carried concealed armament of
sufficient power to destroy any submarine that came within
range. This special service ship, the Avbrietia, was hardly
a member of the protective escort. Her mission was to
sail about thirty miles ahead of the convoy ; when observed
from the periscope or the conning-tower of a submarine, the
Aubrielia seemed to be merely a helpless merchantman
sailing alone, and as such she presented a particularly
tempting target to the U-boat. But her real purpose in
life was to be torpedoed. After landing its missile in a
vessel's side, the submarine usually remained submerged
for a period, while the crew of its victim was getting off in
boats ; it then came to the surface, and the men prepared
to board the disabled ship and search her for valuables and
delicacies, particularly for information which would assist
them in their campaign, such as secret codes, sailing instruc-
tions, and the like. The mystery ship had been preparing
for this moment, and as soon as the submarine broke water,
the gun ports of the disguised merchantman dropped, and
her hitherto concealed guns began blazing away at the
German. By October, 1917, these special service ships had
already accounted for several submarines ; and it had now
become a frequent practice to attach one or more to a con-
voy, either ahead, where she might dispose of the submarine
lying in wait for the approaching aggregation, or in the
rear, where a U-boat might easily mistake her for one of
those stragglers which were an almost inevitable part of
every convoy.
Trawlers and mine-sweepers, as was the invariable cus-
tom, spent several hours sweeping the Queenstown Channel
before the sailing of convoy " O Q 17 " and its escort.
Promptly at the appointed time the eight American ships
1917] MYSTERY SHIPS 119
sailed out in " Indian file," passing through the net which
was always kept in place at the entrance to the harbour.
Their first duty was to patrol the waters outside for a radius
of twelve miles ; it was not improbable that the Germans,
having learned that this convoy was to sail, had stationed a
submarine not far from the harbour entrance. Having
finally satisfied himself that there were no lurking enemies
in the neighbourhood, the commander of the destroyer
flagship signalled to the merchant ships, which promptly
left the harbour and entered the open sea. The weather
was stormy ; the wind was blowing something of a gale and
head seas were breaking over the destroyers' decks. But
the convoy quickly manoeuvred into three columns, the
destroyers rapidly closed around them, and the whole group
started for " Rendezvous A" this being the designation
of that spot on the ocean's surface where the fourteenth
meridian of longitude crosses the forty-ninth parallel of
latitude a point in the Atlantic about three hundred miles
south-west of Queenstown, regarded at that time as safely
beyond the operating zone of the submarine. Meanwhile,
the " mystery ship," sailing far ahead, disappeared beneath
the horizon.
Convoying ships in the stormy autumn and winter waters,
amid the fog and rain of the eastern Atlantic, was a
monotonous and dreary occupation. Only one or two
incidents enlivened this particular voyage. As the Parker,
Commander Halsey Powell, was scouting ahead at about
two o'clock in the afternoon, her lookout suddenly sighted
a submarine, bearing down upon the convoy. Immedi-
ately the news was wirelessed to every vessel. As soon
as the message was received, the whole convoy, at a signal
from the flagship, turned four points to port. For
nearly two hours the destroyers searched this area for the
submerged submarine, but that crafty boat kept itself
safely under the water, and the convoy now again took
up its original course. About two days' sailing brought
the ships to the point at which the protecting destroyers
could safely leave them, as far as submarines were con-
cerned, to continue unescorted to America ; darkness had
now set in, and, under its cover, the merchantmen slipped
away from the warships and started westward. Mean-
time, the destroyer escort had received a message from
the Cumberland, the British cruiser which was acting as
120 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
ocean escort to convoy " H S 14." " Convoy is six hours
late," she reported, much like the announcer at a railroad
station who informs the waiting crowds that the incoming
train is that much overdue. According to the schedule
these ships should reach the appointed rendezvous at six
o'clock the next morning ; this message evidently moved
the time of arrival up to noon. The destroyers, slowing
down so that they would not arrive ahead of time, started
for the designated spot.
Sometimes thick weather made it impossible to fix the
position by astronomical observations, and the convoy
might not be at its appointed rendezvous. For this
reason the destroyers now deployed on a north and south
line about twenty miles long for several hours. Some-
what before the appointed time one of the destroyers
sighted a faint cloud of smoke on the western horizon,
and soon afterward thirty-two merchantmen, sailing in
columns of fours, began to assume a definite outline. At
a signal from this destroyer the other destroyers of the
escort came in at full speed and ranged themselves on
either side of the convoy a manoeuvre that always ex-
cited the admiration of the merchant skippers. This
mighty collection of vessels, occupying about ten or
twelve square miles on the ocean, skilfully maintaining its
formation, was really a beautiful and inspiring sight.
When the destroyers had gained their designated positions
on either side, the splendid cavalcade sailed boldly into
the area which formed the favourite hunting grounds for
the submarine.
As soon as this danger zone was reached the whole aggre-
gation, destroyers and merchant ships, began to zigzag.
The commodore on the flagship hoisted the signal, " Zig-
zag A," and instantaneously the whole thirty -two ships
began to turn twenty-five degrees to starboard. The great
ships, usually so cumbersome, made this simultaneous
turn with all the deftness, and even with all the grace of
a school of fish into which one has suddenly cast a stone.
All the way across the Atlantic they had been practising
such an evolution ; most of them had already sailed
through the danger zone more than once, so that the
manoeuvre was by this time an old story. For ten or
fifteen minutes they proceeded along this course, when
immediately, like one vessel, the convoy turned twenty
1917] ZIGZAGGING EVOLUTIONS 121
degrees to port, and started in a new direction. And
so on for hours, now a few minutes to the right, now a
few minutes to the left, and now again straight ahead,
while all the time the destroyers were cutting through the
water, every eye of the skilled lookouts in each crew fixed
upon the surface for the first glimpse of a periscope. This
zigzagging was carried out according to comprehensive
plans which enabled the convoy to zigzag for hours at a
time without signals, the courses and the time on each
course being designated in the particular plan ordered, all
ships' clocks being set exactly alike by time signal. Prob-
ably I have made it clear why these zigzagging evolutions
constituted such a protective measure. All the time the
convoy was sailing in the danger zone it was assumed that
a submarine was present, looking for a chance to torpedo.
Even though the officers might know that there was no
submarine within three hundred miles, this was never
taken for granted ; the discipline of the whole convoy
system rested upon the theory that the submarine was
there, waiting only the favourable moment to start the
work of destruction. But a submarine, as already said,
could not strike without the most thorough preparation.
It must get within three or four hundred yards or the
torpedo would stand little chance of hitting the mark in
a vital spot. The commander almost never shot blindly
into the convoy, on the chance of hitting some ship ; he
carefully selected his victim ; his calculation had to in-
clude its speed, the speed of his own boat and that of his
torpedo ; above all, he had to be sure of the direction in
which his intended quarry was steaming ; and in this
calculation the direction of the merchantman formed
perhaps the most important element. But if the ships
were constantly changing their direction, it is apparent
that the submarine could make no calculations which
would have much practical value.
In the afternoon the Aubrietia, the British mystery ship
which was sailing thirty miles ahead of the convoy, reported
that she had sighted a submarine. Two or three destroyers
dashed for the indicated area, searched it thoroughly,
found no traces of the hidden boat, and returned to the
convoy. The next morning six British destroyers and one
cruiser arrived from Devonport. Up to this time the
convoy had been following the great " trunk line " which
122 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
led into the Channel, but it had now reached the point
where the convoys split up, part going to English ports
and part to French. These British destroyers had come
to take over the twenty ships which were bound for their
own country, while the American destroyers were assigned
to escort the rest to Brest. The following conversation
typical of those that were constantly filling the air in
that area now took place between the American flagship
and the British :
Conyngham to Achates : This is the Conyngham, Com-
mander Johnson. I would like to keep the convoy to-
gether until this evening. I will work under your orders
until I leave with convoy for Brest.
Achates to Conyngham : Please make your own arrange-
ments for taking French convoy with you to-night.
Achates to Conyngham : What time do you propose leav-
ing with French convoy to-night ?
Conyngham to Achates : About 5 P.M. in order to arrive
in Brest to-night.
Devonport Commander-in-chief to Conyngham : Pro-
ceed in execution Admiralty orders Achates having relieved
you. Submarine activity in Lat. 48.41, Long. 4.51.
The Aubrietia had already given warning of the danger
referred to in the last words of this final message. It had
been flashing the news in this way :
1.15 P.M. Aubrietia to Conyngham : Submarine sighted
49.30 N 6.8 W. Sighted submarine on surface. Speed is
not enough. Course south-west by south magnetic.
1.30 P.M. Conyngham to Achates : Aubrietia to all men-
of-war and Land's End. Chasing submarine on the surface
49.30 N 6.8 W, course south-west by south. Waiting to
get into range. He is going faster than I can.
2.00 P.M. Aubrietia to all men-of-war. Submarine sub-
merged 49.20 N 6.12 W. Still searching.
The fact that nothing more was seen of that submarine
may possibly detract from the thrill of the experience,
but in describing the operations of this convoy I am not
attempting to tell a story of wild adventure, but merely
to set forth what happened ninety-nine out of a hundred
1917] A SUDDEN CALL 128
times. What made destroyer work so exasperating was
that, in the vast majority of cases, the option of fighting
or not fighting lay with the submarine. Had the sub-
marine decided to approach and attack the convoy, the
chances would have been more than even that it would
have been destroyed. In accordance with its usual prac-
tice, however, it chose to submerge, and that decision
ended the affair for the moment. This was the way in
which merchant ships were protected. At the time this
submarine was sighted it was headed directly for this
splendid aggregation of cargo vessels ; had not the
Aubrietia discovered it and had not one of the American
destroyers started in pursuit, the U-boat would have made
an attack and possibly would have sent one or more ships
to the bottom. The chief business of the escorting ships,
all through the war, was this unspectacular one of chasing
the submarines away ; and for every under-water vessel
actually destroyed there were hundreds of experiences such
as the one which I have just described.
The rest of this trip was uneventful. Two American
destroyers escorted H.M.S. Cumberland the ocean escort
which had accompanied the convoy from Sydney to
Devonport ; the rest of the American escort took its quota
of merchantmen into Brest, and from that point sailed
back to Queenstown, whence, after three or four days in
port, it went out with another convoy. This was the
routine which was repeated until the end of the war.
The " O Q 17 " and the " H S 14 " form an illustration
of convoys which made their trips successfully. Yet
these same destroyers had another experience which pic-
tures other phases of the convoy system.
On the morning of October 19th, Commander Johnson's
division was escorting a great convoy of British ships on
its way to the east coast of England. Suddenly out of
the air came one of those calls which were daily occur-
rences in the submarine zone. The J. L. Luckenback
signalled her position, ninety miles ahead of the convoy,
and that she was being shelled by a submarine. In a few
minutes the Nicholson, one of the destroyers of the escort,
started to the rescue. For the next few hours our ships
began to pick out of the air the messages which detailed
the progress of this adventure messages which tell the
story so graphically, and which are so typical of the events
124 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
which were constantly taking place in those waters, that
I reproduce them verbatim :
8.50 A.M. S.O.S. .7. L. Luckenback being gunned by
submarine. Position 48.08 N 9.31 W.
9.25 Conyngham to Nicholson : Proceed to assistance of
S.O.S. ship.
9.30 Luckenback to U.S.A. : Am manoeuvring around.
9.35 Luckenback to U.S.A. : How far are you away ?
9.40 Luckenback to U.S.A. : Code books thrown over-
board. How soon will you arrive ?
Nicholson to Luckenback : In two hours.
9.41 Luckenback to U.S.A. : Look for boats. They are
shelling us.
Nicholson to Luckenback : Do not surrender !
Luckenback to Nicholson : Never !
11.01 Nicholson to Luckenback : Course south magnetic.
12.36 P.M. Nicholson to Conyngham : Submarine sub-
merged 47.47 N 10.00 W at 11.20.
1.23 Conyngham to Nicholson : What became of steamer ?
3.41 Nicholson to Admiral (at Queenstown) and Conyng-
ham : Luckenback now joining convoy. Should be able
to make port unassisted.
I have already said that a great part of the destroyer's
duty was to rescue merchantmen that were being attacked
by submarines : this Luckenback incident vividly illus-
trates this point. Had the submarine used its torpedo
upon this vessel, it probably would have disposed of it
summarily ; but it was the part of wisdom for the sub-
marine to economize in these weapons because they were
so expensive and so comparatively scarce, and to use its
guns whenever the opportunity offered. The Luckenback
was armed, but the fact that the submarine's guns easily
outranged hers made her armament useless. Thus all the
German had to do in this case was to keep away at a safe
distance and bombard the merchantman. The U-boat
had been doing this for more than three hours when the
destroyer reached the scene of operations ; evidently the
marksmanship was poor, for out of a great many shots
fired by the submarine only about a dozen had hit the
vessel. The Luckenback was on fire, a shell having set
aflame her cargo of cotton ; certain parts of the machinery
1917] AN EXCITING ENCOUNTER 125
had been damaged, but, in the main, the vessel was in-
tact. The submarine was always heroic enough when
it came to shelling defenceless merchantmen, but the
appearance of a destroyer anywhere in her neighbourhood
made her resort to the one secure road to safety diving
for protection. The Nicholson immediately trained her
guns on the U-boat, which, on the second shot, disappeared
under the water. The destroyer despatched men to the
disabled vessel, the fire was extinguished, necessary repairs
to the machinery were made, and in a few hours the
Luckenback had become a member of the convoy.
Hardly had she joined the merchant ships and hardly
had the Nicholson taken up her station on the flank when
an event still more exciting took place. It was now late
in the afternoon ; the sea had quieted down ; the whole
atmosphere was one of peace ; and there was not the
slightest sign or suggestion of a hostile ship. The Orama,
the British warship which had accompanied the convoy
from its home port as ocean escort, had taken up her
position as leading ship in the second column. Without
the slightest warning a terrific explosion now took place
on her starboard bow. There was no mystery as to what
had happened ; indeed, immediately after the explosion
the wake of the torpedo appeared on the surface ; there
was no periscope in sight, yet it was clear, from the posi-
tion of the wake, that the submarine had crept up to the
side of the convoy and delivered its missile at close range.
There was no confusion in the convoy or its escorting
destroyers but there were scenes of great activity. Im-
mediately after the explosion, a periscope appeared a few
inches out of the water, stayed there only a second or
two, and then disappeared. Brief as was this exposure,
the keen eyes of the lookout and several sailors of the
Conyngham, the nearest destroyer, had detected it ; it
disclosed the fact that the enemy was in the midst of the
convoy itself, looking for other ships to torpedo. The
Conyngham rang for full speed, and dashed for the location
of the submarine. Her officers and men now saw more
than the periscope ; they saw the vessel itself. The water
was very clear ; as the Conyngham circled around the
Orama her officers and men sighted a green, shining, cigar-
shaped thing under the water not far from the starboard
side. As she sped by, the destroyer dropped a depth
126 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
charge almost directly on top of the object. After the
waters had quieted down pieces of debris were seen float-
ing upon the surface boards, spars, and other miscel-
laneous wreckage, evidently scraps of the damaged deck
of a submarine. All attempts to save the Orama proved
fruitless : the destroyers stood by for five hours, taking
off survivors, and making all possible efforts to salvage
the ship, but at about ten o'clock that evening she disap-
peared under the water. In rescuing the survivors the
seamanship displayed by the Conyngham was particularly
praiseworthy. The little vessel was skilfully placed along-
side the Orama and some three hundred men were taken
off without accident or casualty while the ship was sinking.
One of the things that made the work of the destroyer
such a thankless task was that only in the rarest cases was
it possible to prove that she had destroyed the submarine.
Only the actual capture of the enemy ship or some of its
crew furnished irrefutable proof that the action had been
successful. The appearance of oil on the surface after a
depth charge attack was not necessarily convincing, for
the submarine early learned the trick of pumping over-
board a little oil after such an experience ; in this way it
hoped to persuade its pursuer that it had been sunk and
thus induce it to abandon the chase. Even the appear-
ance of wreckage, such as arose on the surface after this
Conyngham attack, did not absolutely prove that the
submarine had been destroyed. Yet, as this submarine
was never heard of again, there is little doubt that Com-
mander Johnson's depth charge performed its allotted
task. The judgment of the British Government, which
awarded him the C.M.G. for his achievement, may be
accepted as final. The Admiralty citation for this decora-
tion reads as follows :
" At 5.50 P.M. H.M.S. Orama was torpedoed in convoy.
Conyngham went full speed, circled bow of Orama, saw
submarine between lines of convoy, passed right over it
so that it was plainly visible and dropped depth charge.
Prompt and correct action of Commander Johnson saved
more ships from being torpedoed and probably destroyed
the submarine."
One of the greatest difficulties of convoy commanders,
especially during the first months the system was in
operation, was with '' slacker " merchantmen ; these were
1917] "SLACKER" MERCHANTMEN 127
vessels which, for various reasons, fell behind the convoy,
a tempting bait for the submarine. At this time certain of
the merchant captains manifested an incurable obstinacy ;
they affected to regard the U-boats with contempt, and
insisted rather on taking chances instead of playing the
game. In such cases a destroyer would often have to
leave the main division, go back several miles, and at-
tempt to prod the straggler into joining the convoy, much
as a shepherd dog attempts to force the laggard sheep
to keep within the flock. In some cases, when the mer-
chantman proved particularly obdurate, the destroyer
would slyly drop a depth charge, near enough to give the
backward vessel a considerable shaking up without doing
her any injury ; usually such a shock caused the merchant-
man to start full speed ahead to rejoin her convoy, firmly
believing that a submarine was giving chase. In certain
instances the merchantman fell behind the convoy because
the machinery had broken down or because she had suf-
fered other accidents. The submarines would follow for
days in the track of convoys, looking for a straggler of
this kind, just as a shark will follow a vessel in the hope
that something will be thrown overboard ; and for this
reason one destroyer at least was often detached from
the escorting division as a rear guard. In this connec-
tion we must keep in mind that at no time until the
armistice was signed was any escort force strong enough
to insure entire safety. If we had had destroyers enough
to put a close screen, or even a double screen, around
every convoy, there would have been almost no danger
from submarines. The fact that all escort forces were
very inadequate placed a very heavy responsibility upon
the escort commanders, and made them think twice before
detaching a destroyer in order to protect stragglers.
One late summer afternoon the American converted
yacht Christabel was performing this duty for the British
merchantman Danae, a vessel which had fallen eight miles
behind her convoy, bound from La Pallice, France, to
Brest. It was a beautiful evening ; the weather was
clear, the sea smooth, and there was not a breath of wind.
Under such conditions a submarine could conceal its
presence only with great difficulty ; and at about 5.30
the lookout on the Christabel detected a wake, some six
hundred yards on the port quarter. The Christabel started
128 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
at full speed ; the wake suddenly ceased, but a few
splotches of oil were seen, and she was steered in the
direction of this disturbance. A depth charge was dropped
at the spot where the submarine ought to have been, but
it evidently did not produce the slightest result. The
Christabel rejoined the Danae, and the two went along
peacefully for nearly four hours, when suddenly a peri-
scope appeared about two hundred yards away, on the
starboard side. Evidently this persistent German had
been following the ships all that time, looking for a favour-
able opportunity to discharge his torpedo. That moment
had now arrived ; the submarine was at a distance where
a carefully aimed shot meant certain destruction ; the
appearance of the periscope meant that the submarine
was making observations in anticipation of delivering this
shot. The Christabel started full speed for the wake of
the periscope ; this periscope itself disappeared under the
water like a guilty thing, and a disturbance on the surface
showed that the submarine was making frantic efforts to
submerge. The destroyer dropped its depth charge, set
to explode at seventy feet, its radio meantime sending
signals broadcast for assistance. Immediately after the
mushroom of water arose from this charge a secondary
explosion was heard ; this was a horrible and muffled
sound coming from the deep, more powerful and more
terrible than any that could have been caused by the
destroyer's " ash can." An enormous volcano of water
and all kinds of debris arose from the sea, half-way between
the Christabel and the spot where it had dropped its
charge. This secondary explosion shook the Christabel
so violently that the officers thought at first that the ship
had been seriously damaged, and a couple of men were
knocked sprawling on the deck. As soon as the water
subsided great masses of heavy black oil began rising to
the surface, and completely splintered wood and other
wreckage appeared. In a few minutes the sea, for a space
many hundred yards in diameter, was covered with dead
fish about ten times as many, the officers reported, as
could have been killed by the usual depth charge. The
Christabel and the ship she was guarding started to rejoin
the main convoy, entirely satisfied with the afternoon's
work. Indeed, they had good reason to be ; a day or
two afterward a battered submarine, the U C-56, crept
1917] ADVENTURE OF THE "FANNING" 129
painfully into the harbour of Santander, Spain ; it was
the boat which had had such an exciting contest with the
Christabel. She was injured beyond the possibility of
repair ; besides, the Spanish Government interned her
for " the duration of the war " ; so that for all practical
purposes the vessel was as good as sunk.
Discouraging as was this business of hunting an invisible
foe, events occasionally happened with all the unexpected-
ness of real drama. For the greater part of the time the
destroyers were engaged in battle with oil slicks, wakes,
tide rips, streaks of suds, and suspicious disturbances on
the water ; yet now and then there were engagements
with actual boats and flesh and blood human beings. To
spend weeks at sea with no foe more substantial than an
occasional foamy excrescence on the surface was the fate
of most sailormen in this war ; yet a few exciting moments,
when they finally came, more than compensated for long
periods of monotony.
One afternoon in November, 1917, an American de-
stroyer division, commanded by Commander Frank Berrien,
with the Nicholson as its flagship, put out of Queenstown
on the usual mission of taking a westbound convoy to its
rendezvous and bringing in one that was bound for British
ports. This outward convoy was the " O Q 20 " and con-
sisted of eight fine ships. After the usual preliminary
scoutings the vessels passed through the net in single file,
sailed about ten miles to sea, and began to take up the
stipulated formation, four columns of two ships each.
The destroyers were moving around ; they were even
mingling in the convoy, carrying messages and giving
instructions ; by a quarter past four all the ships had
attained their assigned positions, except one, the Rent,
which was closing up to its place as the rear ship of the
first column. Meanwhile, the destroyer Fanning was
steaming rapidly to its post on the rear flank. Suddenly
there came a cry from the bridge of the Fanning, where
Coxswain David D. Loomis was on lookout :
" Periscope ! "
Off the starboard side of the Fanning, glistening in the
smooth water, a periscope of the " finger " variety, one
10
180 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
so small that it could usually elude all but the sharpest
eyes, had darted for a few seconds above the surface and
had then just as suddenly disappeared. Almost directly
ahead lay the Welshman, a splendid British merchant
ship ; the periscope was so close that a torpedo would
almost inevitably have hit this vessel in the engine-room.
The haste with which the German had withdrawn his
periscope, after taking a hurried glance around, was
easily explained ; for his lens had revealed not only this
tempting bait, but the destroyer Fanning close aboard
and bearing down on him. Under these circumstances it
was not surprising that no torpedo was fired ; it was
clearly military wisdom to beat a quick retreat rather
than attempt to attack the merchantman. Lieut. Walter
S. Henry, who was the officer of the deck, acted with the
most commendable despatch. It is not the simplest
thing, even when the submarine is so obviously located
as this one apparently was, to reach the spot accurately.
The destroyer has to make a wide and rapid turn, and
there is every danger, in making this manoeuvre, that the
location will be missed. Subsequent events disclosed that
the Fanning was turned with the utmost accuracy. As
the ship darted by the spot at which the periscope had
been sighted, a depth charge went over the stern, and
exploded so violently that the main generator of the
Fanning herself was temporarily disabled. Meanwhile
the Nicholson had dashed through the convoy, made a
rapid detour to the left, and dropped another depth charge
a short distance ahead of the Fanning.
The disturbances made on the water by these " ash
cans " gradually subsided ; to all outward appearances
the submarine had escaped unharmed. The Fanning and
the Nicholson completed their circles and came back to
the danger spot, the officers and crew eagerly scanning
the surface for the usual oil patch and air bubbles, even
hoping for a few pieces of wreckage those splintered
remnants of the submarine's wooden deck that almost
invariably indicated a considerable amount of damage.
But none of these evidences of success, or half-success,
rose to the surface ; for ten or fifteen minutes everything
was as quiet as the grave. Then something happened
which occurred only a few times in this strange war. The
stern of a submarine appeared out of the water, tilted at
1917] A SURRENDER 131
about thirty degrees, clearly revealing its ugly torpedo
tubes. Then came the conning-tower and finally the
entire boat, the whole hull taking its usual position on
the surface as neatly and unconcernedly as though no
enemies were near. So far as could be seen the U-boat
was in perfect condition. Its hull looked intact, showing
not the slightest indication of injury ; the astonished
officers and men on the destroyers could easily under-
stand now why no oil or wreckage had risen to the top,
for the 7-58 they could now see this inscription plainly
painted on the conning-tower was not leaking, and the
deck showed no signs of having come into contact even
remotely with a depth charge. The Fanning and the
Nicholson began firing shells at the unexpected visitant,
and the Nicholson extended an additional welcome in the
form of a hastily dropped " ash can."
Suddenly the conning-tower of the submarine opened
and out popped the rotund face and well-fed form of
Kapitan-Leutnant Gustav Amberger, of the Imperial
German Navy. The two arms of the Herr Kapitan
immediately shot heavenward and the Americans on the
destroyers could hear certain guttural ejaculations :
" Kamerad ! Kamerad ! "
A hatchway now opened, and a procession of German
sailors emerged, one after the other, into the sunshine,
like ants crawling out of their hole. As each sailor reached
the deck he straightened up, lifted his arms, and shouted :
" Kamerad ! Kamerad ! Kamerad ! "
In all four officers and thirty-five men went through
this ceremony. Were they really surrendering themselves
and their boat, or did these gymnastic exercises conceal
some new form of German craftiness ? The American
ships ceased firing ; the Fanning gingerly approached the
submarine, while the Nicholson stood by, all her four-inch
guns trained upon the German boat, and the machine-guns
pointed at the kamerading Germans, ready to shoot them
into ribbons at the first sign that the surrender was not a
genuine one.
While these preliminaries were taking place, a couple
of German sailors disappeared into the interior of the
submarine, stayed there a moment or two, and then
returned to the deck. They had apparently performed a
duty that was characteristically German ; for a few
132 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
minutes after they appeared again, the 7-58 began to
settle in the water, and soon afterward sank. These men,
obeying orders, had opened the cocks and scuttled the
ship this after the officers had surrendered her ! As the
submarine disappeared, the men and officers dived and
started swimming toward the Fanning ; four of them
became entangled in the radio antennae and were dragged
under the waves ; however, in a few minutes these men
succeeded in disentangling themselves and joined the
swimmers. As the thirty-nine men neared the Fanning
it was evident that most of them were extremely wearied
and that some were almost exhausted. The sailors from
the Fanning threw over lines ; some still had the strength
to climb up these to the deck, while to others it was neces-
sary to throw other lines which they could adjust under
their arms. These latter, limp and wet figures, the
American sailors pulled up, much as the fisherman pulls
up the inert body of a monster fish. And now an incident
took place which reveals that the American navjf has
rather different ideals of humanity from the German.
One of the sailors was so exhausted that he could not
adjust the life-lines around his shoulders ; he was very
apparently drowning. Like a flash Elxer Harwell, chief
pharmacist mate, and Francis G. Conner, coxswain, jumped
overboard, swam to this floundering German, and adjusted
the line around him as solicitously as though he had been
a shipmate. The poor wretch his name was Franz
Glinder was pulled aboard, but he was so far gone that
all attempts to resuscitate him failed, and he died on the
deck of the Fanning.
Kapitan Amberger, wet and dripping, immediately
walked up to Lieut. A. S. Carpender, the commander of
the Fanning, clicked his heels together, saluted in the
most ceremonious German fashion, and surrendered him-
self, his officers, and his crew. He also gave his parole
for his men. The officers were put in separate staterooms
under guard and each of the crew was placed under the
protection of a well-armed American Jackie who, it may
be assumed, immensely enjoyed this new duty. All the
" survivors " were dressed in dry, warm clothes, and good
food and drink were given them. They were even supplied
with cigarettes and something which they valued more
than all the delicacies in the world soap for a washing,
1917] A LUCKY SHOT 138
the first soap which they had had for months, as this was
an article which was more scarce in Germany than even
copper or rubber. Our physicians gave the men first aid,
and others attended to all their minor wants. Evidently
the fact that they had been captured did not greatly
depress their spirits, for, after eating and drinking to their
heart's content, the assembled Germans burst into song.
But what was the explanation of this strange proceed-
ing ? The German officers, at first rather stiff and sullen,
ultimately unbent enough to tell their story. Their sub-
marine had been hanging off the entrance to Queenstown
for nearly two days, waiting for this particular convoy
to emerge. The officers admitted that they were getting
ready to torpedo the Welshman when the discovery that
the Fanning was only a short distance away compelled a
sudden change in their plans. Few " ash cans " dropped
in the course of the war reached their objective with the
unerring accuracy of the one which now came from this
American destroyer. It did not crush the submarine but
the concussion wrecked the motors, making it impossible
for it to navigate, jammed its diving rudders, making the
boat uncontrollable under the water, and broke the oil
leads, practically shutting off the supply of this indis-
pensable fuel. Indeed, it would be impossible to conceive
of a submarine in a more helpless and unmanageable
state. The officers had the option of two alternatives :
to sink until the pressure of the water crushed the boat
like so much paper, or to blow the ballast tanks, rise to
the surface, and surrender. Even while the commander
was mentally debating this problem, the submarine was
rapidly descending to the bottom ; when it reached a
depth of two hundred feet, which was about all that it
could stand, the commander decided to take his chances
with the Americans. Rising to the top involved great
dangers ; but the guns of the destroyers seemed less for-
midable to these cornered Germans than the certainty of
the horrible death that awaited them under the waves.
Admiral Bayly came to meet the Fanning as she sailed
into Queenstown with her unexpected cargo. He went on
board the destroyer to congratulate personally the officers
and men upon their achievement. He published to the
assembled company a cablegram just received from the
Admiralty in London :
134 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
Express to commanding officers and men of the United
States ship Fanning their Lordships' high appreciation of
their successful action against enemy submarine.
I added a telegram of my own, ending up with the
words, which seemed to amuse the officers and men :
" Go out and do it again."
For this action the commanding officer of the Fanning,
Lieutenant-Commander Carpender, was recommended by
the Admiralty for the D.S.O., which was subsequently
conferred upon him by the King at Buckingham Palace.
Only one duty remained : the commanding officer read
the burial service over the body of poor Franz Glinder,
the German sailor who had been drowned in his attempt
to swim to the Fanning. The Fanning then steamed out
to sea with the body and buried it with all the honours of
war. A letter subsequently written by Kapitan Amberger
to a friend in Germany summed up his opinion of the
situation in these words :
" The Americans were much nicer and more obliging
than expected."
VI
So far as convoying merchant ships was concerned,
Queenstown was the largest American base ; by the time
the movement of troops laid heavy burdens on the Ameri-
can destroyers Brest became a headquarters almost equally
important.
In July, 1917, the British Government requested the
co-operation of the American navy in the great work which
it had undertaken at Gibraltar ; and on August 6th the
U.S.S. Sacramento reached that port, followed about a
week afterward by the Birmingham flying the flag of Rear-
Admiral Henry B. Wilson. Admiral Wilson remained as
commander of this force until November, when he left to
assume the direction of affairs at Brest. On Novem-
ber 25th Rear-Admiral Albert P. Niblack succeeded to
this command, which he retained throughout the war.
Gibraltar was the " gateway " for more traffic than
any other port in the world. It was estimated that more
than one quarter of all the convoys which reached the
Entente nations either rendezvoused at this point or
1917] THE GIBRALTAR AREA 135
passed through these Straits. This was the great route
to the East by way of the Suez Canal. From Gibraltar
extended the Allied lines of communication to southern
France, Italy, Salonika, Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopo-
tamia. There were other routes to Bizerta (Tunis),
Algiers, the island of Milo, and a monthly service to the
Azores.
The Allied forces that were detailed to protect this ship-
ping were chiefly British and American, though they were
materially assisted by French, Japanese, and Italian
vessels. They consisted of almost anything which the
hard-pressed navies could assemble from all parts of the
world antiquated destroyers, yachts, sloops, trawlers,
drifters, and the like. The Gibraltar area was a long
distance from the main enemy submarine bases. The
enemy could maintain at sea at any one time only a rela-
tively small number of submarines ; inasmuch as the
zone off the English Channel and Ireland was the most
critical one, the Allies stationed their main destroyer force
there. Because of these facts, we had great difficulty in
finding vessels to protect the important Gibraltar area,
and the force which we ultimately got together was there-
fore a miscellaneous lot. The United States gathered at
this point forty-one ships, and a personnel which averaged
314 officers and 4,660 men. This American aggregation
contained a variegated assortment of scout cruisers, gun-
boats, coastguard cutters, yachts, and five destroyers of
antique type. The straits to which we were reduced for
available vessels for the Gibraltar station and the
British navy was similarly hard pressed were illustrated
by the fact that we placed these destroyers at Gibraltar.
They were the Decatitr and four similar vessels, each of
420 tons the modern destroyer is a vessel of from 1,000
to 1,200 tons and were stationed, when the war broke
out, at Manila, where they were considered fit only for
local service ; yet the record which these doughty little
ships made is characteristic of the spirit of our young
officers. This little squadron steamed 12,000 miles from
Manila to Gibraltar, and that they arrived in condition
immediately to take up their duties was due to the excel-
lent judgment and seamanship displayed by their com-
manding officer, Lieutenant-Commander (now Commander)
Harold R. Stark. Subsequently they made 48,000 miles
136 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
on escort duty. This makes 60,000 miles for vessels which
in peace time had been consigned to minor duties ! Un-
fortunately one of these gallant little vessels was subse-
quently cut down and sunk by a merchant ship while
escorting a convoy.
For more than a year the Gibraltar force under Admiral
Niblack performed service which reflected high credit
upon that commander, his officers, and his men. During
this period of time it escorted, in co-operation with the
British forces, 562 convoys, comprising a total of 10,478
ships. Besides protecting commerce, chasing submarines,
and keeping them under the surface, many of the vessels
making up this squadron had engagements with sub-
marines that were classified as " successful." On May 15,
1918, the Wheeling, a gunboat, and the Surveyor and
Venetia, yachts, while escorting a Mediterranean convoy,
depth-charged a submarine which had just torpedoed one
of the convoyed vessels ; we credited these little ships
with sinking their enemy. The Venetia, under the com-
mand of Commander L. B. Porterfield, U.S.N., had an
experience not unlike that of the Christabel, already
described. On this occasion she was part of the escort
of a Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy. A British member of
this convoy, the Surveyor, was torpedoed at six in the
evening ; at that time the submarine gave no further
evidence of its existence. The Venetia, however, was
detailed to remain in the neighbourhood, attempt to
locate the mysterious vessel, and at least to keep it under
the water. The Venetia soon found the wake of the sub-
merged enemy and dropped the usual depth charges.
Three days afterward a badly injured U-boat put in at
Carthagena, Spain, and was interned for the rest of the
war. Thus another submarine was as good as sunk.
The Lydonia, a yacht of 500 tons, in conjunction with the
British ship Basilisk, sank another U-boat in the western
Mediterranean. This experience illustrates the doubt that
enshrouded all such operations, for it was not until three
months after the Lydonia engagement took place that
the Admiralty discovered that the submarine had been
destroyed and recommended Commander Richard P.
McCullough, U.S.N., for a decoration.
Thus from the first day that this method of convoying
ships was adopted it was an unqualified success in defeating
1917] SUCCESS OF CONVOYS 137
the submarine campaign. By August 1, 1917, more than
10.000 ships had been convoyed, with losses of only one-
half of 1 per cent. Up to that same date not a single
ship which had left North American ports in convoy had
been lost. By August llth, 261 ships had been sent in
convoy from North American ports, and of these only
one had fallen a prey to the submarines. The convoy gave
few opportunities for encounters with their enemies. I
have already said that the great value of this system as
a protection to shipping was that it compelled the under-
water boats to fight their deadliest enemies, the destroyers,
every time they tried to sink merchant ships in convoy,
and they did not attempt this often on account of the
danger. There were destroyer commanders who spent
months upon the open sea, convoying huge aggregations
of cargo vessels, without even once seeing a submarine.
To a great extent the convoy system did its work in the
same way that the Grand Fleet performed its indispen-
sable service silently, unobtrusively, making no dramatic
bids for popular favour, and industriously plodding on,
day after day and month after month. All this time the
world had its eyes fixed upon the stirring events of the
Western Front, almost unconscious of the existence of
the forces that made those land operations possible. Yet
a few statistics eloquently disclose the part played by the
convoy system in winning the war. In the latter months
of the struggle from 91 to 92 per cent, of Allied shipping
sailed in convoys. The losses in these convoys were less
than 1 per cent. And this figure includes the ships lost
after the dispersal of the convoys ; in convoys actually
under destroyer escort the losses were less than one-half
of 1 per cent. Military experts would term the convoy
system a defensive-offensive measure. By this they
mean that it was a method of taking a defensive position
in order to force the enemy to meet you and give you an
opportunity for the offensive. It is an old saying that
the best defensive measure is a vigorous offensive one.
Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the Allies had not
prepared for the kind of warfare which the Germans saw
fit to employ against them, we could not conduct purely
offensive operations ; that is, we could not employ our
anti-submarine forces exclusively in the effort to destroy
the submarines. Up to the time of the armistice, despite
138 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
all the assistance rendered to the navies by the best
scientific brains of the world, no sure means had been
found of keeping track of the submarine once he sub-
merged. The convoy system was, therefore, our only
method of bringing him into action. I lay stress on
this point and reiterate it because many critics kept in-
sisting during the war and their voices are still heard
that the convoy system was purely a defensive or passive
method of opposing the submarine, and was, therefore,
not sound tactics. It is quite true that we had to defend
our shipping in order to win the war, but it is wrong to
assume that the method adopted to accomplish this pro-
tection was a purely defensive and passive one.
As my main purpose is to describe the work of the Ameri-
can navy I have said little in the above about the activities
of the British navy in convoying merchant ships. But we
should not leave this subject with a false perspective.
When the war ended we had seventy-nine destroyers in
European waters, while Great Biitain had about 400.
These included those assigned to the Grand Fleet, to the
Harwich force, to the Dover patrol, to Gibraltar and the
Mediterranean, and other places, many of which were
but incidentally making war on the submarines. As to
minor ships trawlers, sloops, Q-boats, yachts, drifters,
tugs, and the other miscellaneous types used in this work
the discrepancy was even greater. In absolute figures
our effort thus seems a small one when compared with
that of our great ally. In tonnage of merchant ships
convoyed, the work of the British navy was far greater
than ours. Yet the help which we contributed was indis-
pensable to the success that was attained. For, judging
from the situation before we entered the war, and knowing
the inadequacy of the total Allied anti-submarine forces
even after we had entered, it seems hardly possible that,
without the assistance of the United States navy, the
vital lines of communication of the armies in the field
could have been kept open, the civil populations of Great
Britain supplied with food, and men and war materials
sent from America to the Western Front. In other words,
I think I am justified in saying that without the co-opera-
tion of the American navy, the Allies could not have won
the war. Our forces stationed at Queenstown actually
escorted through the danger zone about 40 per cent, of
1917] OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 189
all the cargoes which left North American ports. When I
describe the movement of American troops, it will appear
that our destroyers located at Queenstown and Brest did
even a larger share of this work. The latest reports
show that about 205 German submarines were destroyed.
Of these it seems probable that thirteen can be credited
to American efforts, the rest to Great Britain, France,
and Italy the greatest number, of course, to Great
Britain. When we take into consideration the few ships
that we had on the other side, compared with those of the
Allies, and the comparatively brief period in which we
were engaged in the war, this must be regarded as a
highly creditable showing.
I regret that I have not been able to describe the work
of all of our officers and men ; to do this, however, would
demand more than a single volume. One of the disappoint-
ing aspects of destroyer work was that many of the finest
performances were those that were the least spectacular.
The fact that an attack upon a submarine did not result
in a sinking hardly robbed it of its importance ; many
of the finest exploits of our forces did not destroy the
enemy, but they will always hold a place in our naval annals
for the daring and skill with which they were conducted.
In this class belong the achievements of the Sterrett,
under Lieutenant-Commander Farquhar ; of the Benham,
under Lieutenant-Commander D. Lyons ; of the O'Brien,
under Lieutenant-Commander C. A. Blakeley ; of the
Parker, under Lieutenant-Commander H. Powell ; of the
Jacob Jones, under Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Bagley ;
of the Wadsworih, under Lieutenant-Commander Taussig,
and afterward I. F. Dortch ; of the Drayton, under Lieu-
tenant-Commander D. L. Howard ; of the McDougal,
under Commander A. L. Fairfield ; and of the Nicholson,
under Commander F. D. Berrien. The senior destroyer
commander at Queenstown was Commander David C.
Hanrahan of the Gushing, a fine character and one of the
most experienced officers of his rank in the Navy. He
was a tower of strength at all times, and I shall have
occasion to mention him later in connection with certain
important duties. The Chief-of-Staff at Queenstown,
Captain J. R. P. Pringle, was especially commended by
Admiral Bayly for his " tact, energy, and ability." The
American naval forces at Queenstown were under my
140 AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION
immediate command. Necessarily, however, I had to
spend the greater part of my time at the London head-
quarters, or at the Naval Council in Paris, and it was
therefore necessary that I should be represented at
Queenstown by a man of marked ability. Captain Pringle
proved equal to every emergency. He was responsible
for the administration, supplies, and maintenance of the
Queenstown forces, and the state of readiness and efficiency
in which they were constantly maintained was the strongest
possible evidence of his ability. To him was chiefly due
also the fact that our men co-operated so harmoniously
and successfully with the British.
As an example of the impression which our work made
I can do no better than to quote the message sent by
Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly to the Queenstown forces on
May 4, 1918 :
" On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United
States men-of-war at Queenstown, I wish to express my
deep gratitude to the United States officers and ratings
for the skill, energy, and unfailing good-nature which they
have all consistently shown and which qualities have so
materially assisted in the war by enabling ships of the
Allied Powers to cross the ocean in comparative freedom.
" To command you is an honour, to work with you is a
pleasure, to know you is to know the best traits of the
Anglo-Saxon race."
CHAPTER V
DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
MY chief purpose in writing this book is to describe the
activities during the World War of the United States naval
forces operating in Europe. Yet it is my intention also
to make clear the several ways in which the war against
the submarine was won ; and in order to do this it will be
necessary occasionally to depart from the main subject and
to describe certain naval operations of our allies. The
most important agency in frustrating the submarine was
the convoy system. An examination of the tonnage losses
in 1917 and in 1918, however, discloses that this did not
entirely prevent the loss of merchant ships. From April,
1917, to November, 1918, the monthly losses dropped from
875,000 to 101,168 tons. This decrease in sinkings enabled
the Allies to preserve their communications and so win the
war ; however, it is evident that these losses, while not
necessarily fatal to the Allied cause, still offered a serious
impediment to success. It was therefore necessary to
supplement the convoy system in all possible ways. Every
submarine that could be destroyed, whatever the method
of destruction, represented just that much gain to the Allied
cause. Every submarine that was sent to the bottom
amounted in 1917 to a saving of many thousands of tons per
year of the merchant shipping that would have been sunk
by the U-boat if left unhindered to pursue its course.
Besides escorting merchant ships, therefore, the Allied
navies developed several methods of hunting individual
submarines ; and these methods not only sank a con-
siderable number of U-boats, but played an important part
in breaking down the German submarine moral. For the
greater part of the war the utmost secrecy was observed
regarding these expedients ; it was not until the early part
141
142 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
of 1918, indeed, that the public heard anything of the special
service vessels that came to be known as the " mystery " or
" Q-ships " although these had been operating for nearly
three years. It is true that the public knew that there was
something in the wind, for there were announcements that
certain naval officers had received the Victoria Cross, but as
there was no citation explaining why these coveted rewards
were given, they were known as " mystery V.C.'s."
On one of my visits to Queenstown Admiral Bayly showed
me a wireless message which he had recently received from
the commanding officer of a certain mystery ship operat-
ing from Queenstown, one of the most successful of these
vessels. It was brief but sufficiently eloquent.
" Am slowly sinking," it read. " Good-bye, I did my
best."
Though the man who had sent that message was appar-
ently facing death at the time when it was written, Admiral
Bayly told me that he had survived the ordeal, and that, in
fact, he would dine at Admiralty House that very night.
Another fact about this man lifted him above the common-
place : he was the first Q-boat commander to receive the
Victoria Cross, and one of the very few who wore both the
Victoria Cross and the Distinguished Service Order ; and
he subsequently won bars for each, not to mention the Croix
de Guerre and the Legion of Honour. When Captain
Gordon Campbell arrived, I found that he was a Britisher
of quite the accepted type. His appearance suggested
nothing extraordinary. He was a short, rather thick-set,
phlegmatic Englishman, somewhat non-committal in his
bearing ; until he knew a man well, his conversation con-
sisted of a few monosyllables, and even on closer acquaint-
ance his stolidity and reticence, especially in the matter of
his own exploits, did not entirely disappear. Yet there was
something about the Captain which suggested the traits
that had already made it possible for him to sink three
submarines, and which afterward added other trophies to
his record. It needed no elaborate story of his performances
to inform me that Captain Campbell was about as cool and
determined a man as was to be found in the British navy.
His associates declared that his physical system absolutely
lacked nerves ; that, when it came to pursuing a German
submarine, his patience and his persistence knew no
bounds ; and that the extent to which his mind con-
1917] CAPTAIN GORDON CAMPBELL, V.C., D.S.O. U3
centrated upon the task in hand amounted to little less than
genius. When the war began, Captain Campbell, then
about thirty years old, was merely one of several thousand
junior officers in the British navy. He had not distinguished
himself in any way above his associates ; and probably
none of his superiors had ever regarded him as in any sense
an unusual man. Had the naval war taken the course of
most naval wars, Campbell would probably have served
well, but perhaps not brilliantly. This conflict, however,
demanded a new type of warfare and at the same time it
demanded a new type of naval fighter. To go hunting for
the submarine required not only couraefft-^rf /& high order,
but analytical intelligence, patience, and a talent for prepar-
ation and detail. Captain Campbell seemed to have been
created for this particular task. That evening at Queens-
town he finally gave way to much urging, and entertained
us for hours with his adventures ; he told the stories of his
battles with submarines so quietly, so simply and, indeed,
so impersonally, that at first they impressed his hearers as
not particularly unusual. Yet, after the recital was finished,
we realized that the mystery ship performances represented
some of the most admirable achievements in the whole
history of naval warfare. We have laid great emphasis upon
the brutalizing aspects of the European War ; it is well,
therefore, that we do not forget that it had its more exalted
phases. Human nature may at times have manifested itself
in its most cowardly traits, but it also reached a level of
courage which, I am confident, it has seldom attained in any
other conflict. It was reserved for this devastating struggle
to teach us how brave modern men could really be. And
w r hen the record is complete it seems unlikely that it will
furnish any finer illustration of the heroic than that pre-
sented by Captain Campbell and his compatriots of the
mystery ships.
This type of vessel was a regular ship of His Majesty's
navy, yet there was little about it that suggested warfare.
To the outward eye it was merely one of those several
thousand freighters or tramps which, in normal times,
sailed sluggishly from port to port, carrying the larger part
of the world's commerce. It looked like a particularly dirty
and uninviting specimen of the breed. Just who invented
this grimy enemy of the submarine is unknown, as are the
inventors of many other devices developed by the war. It
144 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
was, however, the natural outcome of a close study of
German naval methods. The man who first had the idea
well understood the peculiar mentality of the U-boat com-
manders. The Germans had a fairly easy time in the early
days of submarine warfare on merchant shipping. They
sank as many ships as possible with gunfire and bombs.
The prevailing method then was to break surface, and begin
shelling the defenceless enemy. In case the merchant
ship was faster than the submarine she would take to her
heels ; if, as was usually the case, she was slower, the
passengers and crews lowered the boats and left the vessel
to her fate. In such instances the procedure of the sub-
marine was invariably the same. It ceased shelling,
approached the lifeboats filled with survivors, and ordered
them to take a party of Germans to the ship. This party
then searched the vessel for all kinds of valuables, and, after
depositing time bombs in the hold, rowed back to the sub-
marine. This procedure was popular with the Germans,
because it was the least expensive form of destroying mer-
chant ships. It was not necessary to use torpedoes or even
a large number of shells ; an inexpensive bomb, properly
placed, did the whole job. Even when the arming of
merchant ships interfered with this simple programme, and
compelled the Germans to use long-range gunfire or torpe-
does, the submarine commanders still persisted in rising
to the surface near the sinking ship. Torpedoes were so
expensive that the German Admiralty insisted on having
every one accounted for. The word of the commander
that he had destroyed a merchant ship was not accepted at
its face value ; in order to have the exploit officially placed
to his credit, and so qualify the commander and crew for
the rewards that came to the successful, it was necessary
to prove that the ship had actually gone to the bottom. A
prisoner or two furnished unimpeachable evidence, and, in
default of such trophies, the ship's papers would be accepted.
In order to obtain such proofs of success the submarine had
to rise to the surface and approach its victim. The search
for food, especially for alcoholic liquor, was another motive
that led to such a manoeuvre ; and sometimes mere curi-
osity, the desire to come to close quarters and inspect the
consequences of his handiwork, also impelled the Hun
commander to take what was, as events soon demonstrated,
a particularly hazardous risk.
1917] MYSTERY SHIPS 145
This simple fact that the submarine, even when the dan-
ger had been realized, insisted on rising to the surface and
approaching the vessel which it had torpedoed, offered the
Allies an opportunity which they were not slow in seizing.
There is hardly anything in warfare which is more vulnerable
than a submarine on the surface within a few hundred yards
of a four-inch gun. A single, well-aimed shot will frequently
send it to the bottom. Indeed, a U-boat caught in such a
predicament has only one chance of escaping : that is
represented by the number of seconds which it takes to get
under the water. But before that time has expired rapidly
firing guns can put a dozen shots into its hull ; with modern,
well-trained gun crews, therefore, a submarine which ex-
poses itself in this way stands practically no chance of
getting away. Clearly, the obvious thing for the Allies to
do was to send merchant ships, armed with hidden guns,
along the great highways of commerce. The crews of
these ships should be naval officers and men disguised as
merchant masters and sailors. They should duplicate in
all details the manners and the " technique " of a freighter's
crew, and, when shelled or torpedoed by a submarine, they
should behave precisely like the passengers and crews of
merchantmen in such a crisis ; a part the only part visible
to the submarine should leave the vessel in boats, while
the remainder should lie concealed until the submarine rose
to the surface and approached the vessel. When the enemy
had come within two or three hundred yards, the bul-
warks should fall down, disclosing the armament, the white
battle ensign go up, and the guns open fire on the practically
helpless enemy.
II
Such was the mystery ship idea in its simplest form. In
the early days it worked according to this programme.
The trustful submarine commander who approached a
mystery ship in the manner which I have described promptly
found his resting-place on the bottom of the sea. I have
frequently wondered what must have been the emotions of
this first submarine crew, when, standing on the deck of
their boat, steaming confidently toward their victim, they
saw its bulwarks suddenly drop, and beheld the ship, which
11
146 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
to all outward appearances was a helpless, foundering hulk,
become a mass of belching fire and smoke and shot. The
picture of that first submarine, standing upright in the
water, reeling like a drunken man, while the apparently
innocent merchant ship kept pouring volley after volley
into its sides, is one that will not quickly fade from the
memory of British naval men. Yet it is evident that the
Allies could not play a game like this indefinitely. They
could do so just as long as the Germans insisted on deliver-
ing themselves into their hands. The complete success of
the idea depended at first upon the fact that the very
existence of mystery ships was unknown to the German
navy. All that the Germans knew, in these early days, was
that certain U-boats had sailed from Germany and had not
returned. But it was inevitable that the time should come
when a mystery ship attack would fail ; the German
submarine would return and report that this new terror of
the seas was at large. And that is precisely what happened.
A certain submarine received a battering which it seemed
hardly likely that any U-boat could survive ; yet, almost by
a miracle, it crept back to its German base and reported the
manner of its undoing. Clearly the mystery ships in future
were not to have as plain sailing as in the past ; the game,
if it were to continue, would become more a battle of wits ;
henceforth every liner and merchantman, in German eyes,
was a possible enemy in disguise, and it was to be expected
that the U-boat commanders would resort to every means
of protecting their craft against them. That the Germans
knew all about these vessels became apparent when one of
their naval publications fell into our hands, giving com-
plete descriptions and containing directions to U-boat
commanders how to meet this new menace. The German
newspapers and illustrated magazines also began to devote
much space to this kind of anti-submarine fighting, de-
nouncing it in true Germanic fashion as " barbarous " and
contrary to the rules of civilized warfare. The great
significance of this knowledge is at once apparent. The
mere fact that a number of Q-ships were at sea, even if they
did not succeed in sinking many submarines, forced the
Germans to make a radical change in their submarine
tactics. As they could no longer bring to, board, and loot
merchant ships, and sink them inexpensively and without
danger by the use of bombs, they were obliged not only to
1917] SUCCESSES OF MYSTERY SHIPS 147
use their precious torpedoes, but also to torpedo without
warning. This was the only alternative except to abandon
the submarine campaign altogether.
Berlin accordingly instructed the submarine commanders
not to approach on the surface any merchant or passenger
vessel closely enough to get within range of its guns, but
to keep at a distance and shell it. Had the commanders
always observed these instructions the success of the
mystery ship in sinking submarines would have ended
then and there, though the influence of their presence upon
tactics would have remained in force. The Allied navies
now made elaborate preparations, all for the purpose of
persuading Fritz to approach in the face of a tremendous
risk concerning which he had been accurately informed.
Every submarine commander, after torpedoing his victim,
now clearly understood that it might be a decoy despatched
for the particular purpose of entrapping him ; and he
knew that an attempt to approach within a short distance
of the foundering vessel might spell his own immediate
destruction. The expert in German mentality must
explain why, under these circumstances, he should have
persisted in walking into the jaws of death. The skill
with which the mystery ships and their crews were dis-
guised perhaps explains this in part. Anyone who might
have happened in the open sea upon Captain Campbell
and his slow-moving freighter could not have believed that
they were part and parcel of the Royal Navy. Our own
destroyers were sometimes deceived by them. The
Gushing one day hailed Captain Campbell in the Pargust,
having mistaken him for a defenceless tramp. The con-
versation between the two ships was brief but to the
point :
Gushing : What ship ?
Pargust : Gordon Campbell ! Please keep out of sight.
The next morning another enemy submarine met her
fate at the hands of Captain Campbell, and although the
Gushing had kept far enough away not to interfere with
the action, she had the honour of escorting the injured
mystery ship into port and of receiving as a reward three
rousing cheers from the crew of the Pargust led by Campbell.
A more villainous -looking gang of seamen than the crews
148 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
of these ships never sailed the waves. All men on board
were naval officers or enlisted men ; they were all volun-
teers and comprised men of all ranks ^admirals, captains,
commanders, and midshipmen. All had temporarily
abandoned His Majesty's uniform for garments picked up
in second-hand clothing stores. They had made the some-
what disconcerting discovery that carefully trained gentle-
men of the naval forces, when dressed in cast-off clothing
and when neglectful of their beards, differ little in appear-
ance from the somewhat rough-and-tumble characters of
the tramp service. To assume this external disguise
successfully meant that the volunteers had also to change
almost their personal characteristics as well as their clothes.
Whereas the conspicuous traits of a naval man are neat-
ness and order, these counterfeit merchant sailors had to
train themselves in the casual ways of tramp seamen.
They had also to accustom themselves to the conviction
that a periscope was every moment searching their vessel
from stem to stern in an attempt to discover whether
there was anything suspicious about it ; they therefore
had not only to dress the part of merchantmen, but to
act it, even in its minor details. The genius of Captain
Campbell consisted in the fact that he had made a minute
study of merchantmen, their officers and their crews, and
was able to reproduce them so literally on this vessel that
even the expert eye was deceived. Necessarily such a
ship carried a larger crew than the merchant freighter ;
nearly all, however, were kept constantly concealed, the
number appearing on deck always representing just about
the same number as would normally have sailed upon a
tramp steamer. These men had to train themselves in
slouchiness of behaviour ; they would hang over the rails,
and even use merchant terms in conversation with one
another ; the officers were " masters," " mates," " pur-
sers," and the like, and their principal gathering-place
was not a wardroom, but a saloon. That scrupulous
deference with which a subordinate officer in the navy
treats his superior was laid aside in this service. It was
no longer the custom to salute before addressing the com-
mander ; more frequently the sailor would slouch up to
his superior, his hands in his pockets and his pipe in his
mouth. This attempt to deceive the Hun observer at the
periscope sometimes assumed an even more ludicrous form.
1917] CLEVER CAMOUFLAGE 149
When the sailor of a warship dumps ashes overboard
he does it with particular care, so as not to soil the
sides of his immaculate vessel ; but a merchant seaman
is much less considerate ; he usually hurls overboard
anything he does not want and lets the ship's side take
its chances. To have followed the manner of the navy
would at once have given the game away ; so the sailors,
in carrying out this domestic duty, performed the act
with all the nonchalance of merchant seamen. To have
messed in naval style would also have been betraying
themselves. The ship's cook, therefore, in a white coat,
would come on deck, and have a look around, precisely
as he would do on a freighter. Even when in port officers
and men maintained their disguise. They never visited
hotels or clubs or private houses ; they spent practically
all their time on board ; if they occasionally went ashore,
their merchant outfit so disguised them that even their
best friends would not have recognized them in the
street.
The warlike character of their ships was even more
cleverly hidden. In the early days the guns were placed
behind the bulwarks, which, when a lever was pulled,
would fall down, thus giving them an unobstructed range
at the submarine. In order to make the sides of the ships
collapsible, certain seams were unavoidably left in the
plates, where the detachable part joined the main struc-
ture. The U-boat commanders soon learned to look for
these betraying seams before coming to the surface. They
would sail submerged around the ship, the periscope
minutely examining the sides, much as a scientist examines
his specimens with a microscope. This practice made it
necessary to conceal the guns more carefully. The places
which were most serviceable for this purpose were the
hatchways those huge wells, extending from the deck
to the bottom, which are used for loading and unloading
cargo. Platforms were erected in these openings, and on
these guns were emplaced ; a covering of tarpaulin com-
pletely hid them ; yet a lever, pulled by the gun crews,
would cause the sides of the hatchway covers to fall
instantaneously. Other guns were placed under lifeboats,
which, by a similar mechanism, would fall apart, or rise
in the air, exposing the gun. Perhaps the most deceptive
device of all was a gun placed upon the stern, and, with
150 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
its crew, constantly exposed to public gaze. Since most
merchantmen carried such a gun, its absence on a mystery
ship would in itself have caused suspicion ; this armament
not only helped the disguise, but served a useful purpose
in luring the submarine. At the first glimpse of a U-boat
on the surface, usually several miles away, the gun crew
would begin shooting ; but they always took care that
the shots fell short, thus convincing the submarine that
it had the advantage of range and so inducing it to close.
Captain Campbell and his associates paid as much
attention to details in their ships as in their personal
appearance. The ship's wash did not expose the flannels
that are affected by naval men but the dungarees that
are popular with merchant sailors. Sometimes a side of
beef would be hung out in plain view ; this not only kept
up the fiction that the ship was an innocent tramp, but
it served as a tempting bait to the not too well-fed crew
of the submarine. Particularly tempting cargoes were
occasionally put on deck. One of the ships carried several
papier-mach6 freight cars of the small European type
covered with legends which indicated that they were loaded
with ammunition and bound for Mesopotamia. It is easy
to imagine how eagerly the Hun would wish to sink that
cargo !
These ships were so effectively disguised that even the
most experienced eyes could not discover their real char-
acter. For weeks they could lie in dock, the dockmen
never suspecting that they were armed to the teeth.
Even the pilots who went aboard to take them into harbour
never discovered that they were not the merchant ships
which they pretended to be. Captain Hanrahan, who
commanded the U.S. mystery ship Santee, based on
Queenstown, once entertained on board an Irishman from
Cork. The conversation which took place between this
American naval officer who, in his disguise, was indis-
tinguishable from a tramp skipper of many years' experi-
ence disclosed the complete ignorance of the guest con-
cerning the true character of the boat.
" How do you like these Americans ? " Captain Han-
rahan innocently asked.
" They are eating us out of house and home ! " the
indignant Irishman remarked. The information was a
little inaccurate, since all our food supplies were brought
1917J A TRANSFORMATION SCENE 151
from the United States ; but the remark was reassuring
as proving that the ship's disguise had not been pene-
trated. Such precautions were the more necessary in a
port like Queenstown where our forces were surrounded
by spies who were in constant communication with the
enemy.
I can personally testify to the difficulty of identifying
a mystery ship. One day Admiral Bayly suggested that
we should go out in the harbour and visit one of these
vessels lying there preparatory to sailing on a cruise.
Several merchantmen were at anchor in port. We
steamed close around one in the Admiral's barge and ex-
amined her very carefully through out glasses from a short
distance. Concluding that this was not the vessel we were
seeking, we went to another merchantman. This did not
show any signs of being a mystery ship ; we therefore
hailed the skipper, who told us the one which we had
first visited was the mystery ship. We went back, boarded
her, and began examining her appliances. The crew was
dressed in the ordinary sloppy clothes of a merchant-
man's deck-hands ; the officers wore the usual merchant
ship uniform, and everything was as unmilitary as a mer-
chant ship usually is. The vessel had quite a long deck-
house built of light steel. The captain told us that two
guns were concealed in this structure ; he suggested that
we should walk all around it and see if we could point out
from a close inspection the location of the guns. We
searched carefully, but were utterly unable to discover
where the guns were. The captain then sent the crew to
quarters and told us to stand clear. At the word of
command one of the plates of the perpendicular side of
the deckhouse slid out of the way as quickly as a flash.
The rail at the ship's side in front of the gun fell down
and a boat davit swung out of the way. At the same
time the gun crew swung the gun out and fired a primer
to indicate how quickly they could have fired a real shot.
The captain also showed us a boat upside down on the
deckhouse merchantmen frequently carry one boat in
this position. At a word a lever was pulled down below
and the boat reared up in the air and revealed underneath
a gun and its crew. On the poop was a large crate about
6 X 6 x 8 or 10 feet. At a touch of the lever the sides of
this crate fell down and revealed another gun.
152 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
III
For the greater part of 1917 from twenty to thirty of
these ships sailed back and forth in the Atlantic, always
choosing those parts of the seas where they were most
likely to meet submarines. They were " merchantmen "
of all kinds tramp steamers, coasting vessels, trawlers,
and schooners. Perhaps the most distressing part of
existence on one of these ships was its monotony : day
would follow day ; week would follow week ; and some-
times months would pass without encountering a single
submarine. Captain Campbell himself spent nine months
on his first mystery ship before even sighting an enemy,
and many of his successors had a similar experience.
The mystery boat was a patient fisherman, constantly
expecting a bite and frequently going for long periods
without the slightest nibble. This kind of an existence
was not only disappointing but also exceedingly nerve
racking ; all during this waiting period the officers and
men had to keep themselves constantly at attention ; the
vaudeville show which they were maintaining for the
benefit of a possible periscope had to go on continuously ;
a moment's forgetfulness or relaxation might betray their
secret, and make their experiment a failure. The fearful
tediousness of this kind of life had a more nerve-racking
effect upon the officers and men than the most exciting
battles, and practically all the mystery ship men who
broke down fell victims not to the dangers of their enter-
prise, but to this dreadful tension of sailing for weeks
and months without coming to close quarters with their
enemy.
About the most welcome sight to a mystery ship, after
a period of inactivity, was the wake of a torpedo speeding
in its direction. Nothing could possibly disappoint it
more than to see this torpedo pass astern or forward
without hitting the vessel. In such a contingency the
genuine merchant ship would make every possible effort
to turn out of the torpedo's way : the helmsman of the
mystery ship, however, would take all possible precau-
tions to see that his vessel was hit. This, however, he
had to do with the utmost cleverness, else the fact that
he was attempting to collide with several hundred pounds
of gun-cotton would in itself betray him to the submarine.
1917] "ABANDONING SHIP" 158
Not improbably several members of the crew might be
killed when the torpedo struck, but that was all part of
the game which they were playing. More important than
the lives of the men was the fate of the ship ; if this could
remain afloat long enough to give the gunners a good
chance at the submarine, everybody on board would be
satisfied. There was, however, little danger that the
mystery ship would go down immediately ; for all avail-
able cargo space had been filled with wood, which gave
the vessel sufficient buoyancy sometimes to survive many
torpedoes.
Of course this, as well as all the other details of the
vessel, was unknown to the skipper of the submerged
submarine. Having struck his victim in a vital spot, he
had every reason to believe that it would disappear beneath
the waves within a reasonable period. The business of
the disguised merchantman was to encourage this delusion
in every possible way. From the time that the torpedo
struck, the mystery ship behaved precisely as the every-
day cargo carrier, caught in a similar predicament, would
have done. A carefully drilled contingent of the crew,
known as the " panic party," enacted the r61e of the men
on a torpedoed vessel. They ran to and fro on the deck,
apparently in a state of high consternation, now rushing
below and emerging with some personal treasure, perhaps
an old suit of clothes tucked under the arm, perhaps the
ship's cat or parrot, or a small handbag hastily stuffed
with odds and ends. Under the control of the navigating
officer these men would make for a lifeboat, which they
would lower in realistic fashion sometimes going so far,
in their stage play, as to upset it, leaving the men puffing
and scrambling in the water. One member of the crew,
usually the navigator, dressed up as the " captain," did
his best to supervise these operations. Finally, after
everybody had left, and the vessel was settling at bow
or stern, the " captain " would come to the side, cast
one final glance at his sinking ship, drop a roll of papers
into a lifeboat ostensibly the precious documents which
were so coveted by the submarine as an evidence of success
lower himself with one or two companions, and row in
the direction of the other lifeboats. Properly placing
these lifeboats, after " abandoning ship," was itself one
of the finest points in the plot. If the submarine rose
154 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
to the surface it would invariably steer first for those
little boats, looking for prisoners or the ship's papers ;
the boats' crews, therefore, had instructions to take up
a station on a bearing from which the ship's guns could
most successfully rake the submarine. That this manoeuvre
involved great danger to the men in the lifeboats was a
matter of no consideration in the desperate enterprise in
which they were engaged.
Thus to all outward appearance this performance was
merely the torpedoing of a helpless merchant vessel. Yet
the average German commander became altogether too
wary to accept the situation in that light. He had no
intention of approaching either lifeboats or the ship until
entirely satisfied that he was not dealing with one of the
decoy vessels which he so greatly feared. There was
only one way of satisfying himself : that was to shell the
ship so mercilessly that, in his opinion, if any human
beings had remained aboard, they would have been killed
or forced to surrender. The submarine therefore arose
at a distance of two or three miles. Possibly the mystery
ship, with one well -aimed shot, might hit the submarine
at this distance, but the chances were altogether against
her. To fire such a shot, of course, would immediately
betray the fact that a gun crew still remained on board,
and that -the vessel was a mystery ship ; and on this dis-
covery the submarine would submerge, approach the
vessel under water, and give her one or two more torpedoes.
No, whatever the temptation, the crew must " play
'possum," and not by so much as a wink let the submarine
know that there was any living thing on board. But this
experience demanded heroism that almost approaches the
sublime. The gun crews lay prone beside their guns,
waiting the word of command to fire ; the captain lay on
the screened bridge, watching the whole proceeding
through a peephole, with voice tubes near at hand with
which he could constantly talk to his men. They main-
tained these positions sometimes for hours, never lifting
a finger in defence, while the submarine, at a safe distance,
showered hundreds of shells upon the ship. These horrible
missiles would shriek above their heads ; they would land
on the decks, constantly wounding the men, sometimes
killing whole gun crews yet, although the ship might
become a mass of blood and broken fragments of human
1917] HEROISM OF THE CREWS 155
bodies, the survivors would lie low, waiting, with infinite
patience, until the critical moment arrived. This was the
way they took to persuade the submarine that their ship
was what it pretended to be, a tramp, that there was nothing
alive on board, and that it could safely come near. The
still cautious German, after an hour or so of this kind
of execution, would submerge and approach within a
few hundred yards. All that the watchful eye at the
peephole could see, however, was the periscope ; this
would sail all around the vessel, sometimes at a distance
of fifty or a hundred feet. Clearly the German was taking
no chances ; he was examining his victim inch by inch,
looking for the slightest sign that the vessel was a decoy.
All this time the captain and crew were lying taut, hold-
ing their breath, not moving a muscle, hardly winking an
eyelid, the captain with his mouth at the voice pipe ready
to give the order to let the false works drop the moment
the submarine emerged, the gun crews ready to fire at a
second's warning. But the cautious periscope, having
completed the inspection of the ship, would start in the
direction of the drifting lifeboats. This ugly eye would
stick itself up almost in the faces of the anxious crew,
evidently making a microscopical examination of the
clothes, faces, and general personnel, to see if it could
detect under their tramp steamer clothes any traces of
naval officers and men.
Still the anxious question was, would the submarine
emerge ? Until it should do so the ship's crew was abso-
lutely helpless. There was no use in shooting at the
submerged boat, as shots do not penetrate the water
but bounce off the surface as they do off solid ice. Every-
body knew that the German under the water was debating
that same question. To come up to the surface so near
a mystery ship he knew meant instant death and the
loss of his submarine ; yet to go away under water meant
that the sinking ship, if a merchantman, might float long
enough to be salvaged, and it meant also that he would
never be able to prove that he had accomplished anything
with his valuable torpedo. Had he not shelled the derelict
so completely that nothing could possibly survive ? Had
he not examined the thing minutely and discovered
nothing amiss ? It must be remembered that in 1917 a
submarine went through this same procedure with every
156 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
ship that did not sink very soon after being torpedoed,
and that, in nearly every case, it discovered, after emerg-
ing, that it had been dealing with a real merchantman.
Already this same submarine had wasted hours and
immense stores of ammunition on vessels that were not
mystery ships, but harmless tramps, and all these false
alarms had made it impatient and careless. In most
cases, therefore, the crew had only to bide its time. The
captain knew that his hidden enemy would finally rise.
" Stand by ! "
This command would come softly through the speaking
tubes to the men at the guns. The captain on the bridge
had noticed the preliminary disturbance on the water
that preceded the emergence of the submarine. In a few
seconds the whole boat would be floating on top, and
the officers and crews would climb out on the deck, eager
for booty. And this within a hundred yards of four or
five guns !
" Let go ! "
This command came at the top of the voice, for con-
cealment was now no longer necessary. In a twinkling
up went the battle flag, bulwarks fell down, lifeboats on
decks collapsed, revealing guns, sides dropped from
deckhouses, hen-coops, and other innocent-looking struc-
tures. The apparently sinking merchantman became a
volcano of smoke and fire ; scores of shells dropped upon
the submarine, punching holes in her frail hull, hurling
German sailors high into the air, sometimes decapitating
them or blowing off their arms or legs. The whole horrible
scene lasted only a few seconds before the helpless vessel
would take its final plunge to the depths, leaving perhaps
two or three survivors, a mass of oil and wood, and
still more ghastly wreckage, to mark the spot where
another German submarine had paid the penalty of its
crimes.
IV
It was entirely characteristic of this strange war that
the greatest exploit of any of the mystery ships was in
one sense a failure that is, it did not succeed in destroy-
ing the submarine which attacked it.
1917J THE "DUNRAVEN" 157
On an August day in 1917 the British " merchant
steamer " Dunraven was zigzagging across the Bay of
Biscay. Even to the expert eye she was a heavily laden
cargo vessel bound for Gibraltar and the Mediterranean,
probably carrying supplies to the severely pressed Allies
in Italy and the East. On her stern a 2|-pounder gun,
clearly visible to all observers, helped to emphasize this
impression. Yet the apparently innocent Dunraven was
a far more serious enemy to the submarine than appeared
on the surface. The mere fact that the commander was
not an experienced merchant salt, but Captain Gordon
Campbell, of the Royal Navy, in itself would have made
the Dunraven an object of terror to any lurking submarine,
for Captain Campbell's name was a familiar one to the
Germans by this time. Yet it would have taken a careful
investigation to detect in the rough and unkempt figure
of Captain Campbell any resemblance to an officer of the
British navy, or to identify the untidy seamen as regularly
enrolled British sailors. The armament of the Dunraven,
could one have detected it, would have provided the
greatest surprises. This vessel represented the final per-
fection of the mystery ship. Though seemingly a harmless
tramp she carried a number of guns, also two torpedo
tubes, and several depth charges ; but even from her
deck nothing was visible except the usual merchant gun
aft. The stern of the Dunraven was a veritable arsenal.
Besides the guns and depth charges, the magazine and
shell -rooms were concealed there ; on each side of the
ship a masked torpedo tube held its missile ready for a
chance shot at a submarine ; and the forward deck con-
tained other armament. Such was the Dunraven, plough-
ing her way along, quietly and indifferently, even when,
as on this August morning, a submarine was lying on the
horizon, planning to make her its prey.
As soon as the disguised merchantman spotted this
enemy she began to behave in character. When an
armed merchant ship got within range of a submarine
on the surface she frequently let fly a shot on the chance
of a hit. That was therefore the proper thing for the
Dunraven to do ; it was really all a part of the game
of false pretence in which she was engaged. However,
she took pains that the shell should not reach the sub-
marine ; this was her means of persuading the U-boat
158 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
that it outranged the Dunraven's gun and could safely
give chase. The decoy merchantman apparently put on
extra steam when the submarine started in her direction
at top speed ; here, again, however, the proper manoeuvre
was not to run too fast, for her real mission was to get
caught. On the other hand, had she slowed down per-
ceptibly, that in itself would have aroused suspicion ;
her game, therefore, was to decrease speed gradually so
that the U-boat would think that it was overtaking its
enemy by its own exertions. All during this queer kind
of a chase the submarine and the cargo ship were pepper-
ing each other with shells, one seriously, the other merely
in pretence. The fact that a naval crew, with such a fine
target as an exposed submarine, could shoot with a con-
scious effort not to hit, but merely to lure the enemy to a
better position, in itself is an eloquent evidence of the
perfect discipline which prevailed in the mystery ship
service. Not to aim a fair shot upon the detested vessel,
when there was a possibility of hitting it, was almost too
much to ask of human nature. But it was essential to
success with these vessels never to fire with the intention
of hitting unless there was a practical certainty of sinking
the submarine ; all energies were focussed upon the
supreme task of inducing the enemy to expose itself com-
pletely within three or four hundred yards of the disguised
freighter.
In an hour or two the submarine landed a shot that
seemed to have done serious damage. At least huge clouds
of steam arose from the engine-room, furnishing external
evidence that the engines or boilers had been disabled. The
submarine commander did not know that this was a trick ;
that the vessel was fitted with a specially arranged pipe
around the engine-room hatch which could emit these
bursts of steam at a moment's notice, all for the purpose of
making him believe that the vitals of the ship had been
irreparably damaged. The stopping of the ship, the blow-
ing off of the safety valve, and the appearance of the " panic
party " immediately after this ostensible hit made the
illusion complete. This " panic party " was particularly
panicky ; one of the lifeboats was let go with a run, one fall
at a time, thus dumping its occupants into the sea. Ulti-
mately, however, the struggling swimmers were picked up
and the boat rowed away, taking up a position where a
1917] A CRITICAL SITUATION 159
number of the Dunraven's guns could get a good shot at the
submar ne should the Germans follow their usual plan of
inspecting the lifeboats before visiting the sinking merchant-
man.
So far everything was taking place according to pro-
gramme ; but presently the submarine reopened fire and
scored a shot which gave the enemy all the advantages of
the situation. I have described in some detail the stern of
the ship a variegated assortment of depth charges, shell,
guns, and human beings. The danger of such an una-
voidable concentration of armament and men was that a
lucky shot might land in the midst of it. And this is
precisely what now happened. Not only one, but three
shells from the submarine one after the other struck this
hidden mass of men and ammunition. The first one
exploded a depth charge 300 pounds of high explosive
which blew one of the officers out of the after-control
station where he lay concealed and landed him on the deck
several yards distant. Here he remained a few moments
unconscious ; then his associates saw him, wounded as he
was, creeping inch by inch back into his control position,
fortunately out of sight of the Germans. The seaman who
was stationed at the depth charges was also wounded by
this shot, but, despite all efforts to remove him to a more
comfortable place, he insisted on keeping at his post.
" 'Ere I was put in charge of these things," he said, " and
'ere I stays."
Two more shells, one immediately after the other, now
landed on the stern. Clouds of black smoke began to rise,
and below tongues of flame presently appeared, licking their
way in the direction of a large quantity of ammunition,
cordite, and other high explosives. It was not decoy smoke
and decoy flame this time. Captain Campbell, watching
the whole proceeding from the bridge, perhaps felt some-
thing in the nature of a chill creeping up his spine when he
realized that the after-part of the ship, where men, explo-
sives, and guns lay concealed in close proximity, was on fire.
Just at this moment he observed that the submarine was
rapidly approaching ; and in a few minutes it lay within
400 yards of his guns. Captain Campbell was just about
to give the orders to open fire when the wind took up the
dense smoke of the fire and wafted it between his ship and
the submarine. This precipitated one of the crises which
160 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
tested to the utmost the discipline of the mystery ship.
The captain had two alternatives : he could fire at the
submarine through the smoke, taking his chances of hitting
an unseen and moving target, or he could wait until the
enemy passed around the ship and came up on the other
side, where there would be no smoke to interfere with his
view. It was the part of wisdom to choose the latter course ;
but under existing conditions such a decision involved not
only great nerve, but absolute confidence in his men. For
all this time the fire at the stern was increasing in fierceness ;
in a brief period, Captain Campbell knew, a mass of ammu-
nition and depth charges would explode, probably killing or
frightfully wounding every one of the men who were
stationed there. If he should wait until the U-boat made
the tour of the ship and reached the side that was free of
smoke the chances were that this explosion would take place
before a gun could be fired. On the other hand, if he should
fire through the smoke, there was little likelihood of hitting
the submarine.
Those who are acquainted with the practical philosophy
which directed operations in this war will readily foresee the
choice which was now made. The business of mystery
ships, as of all anti-submarine craft, was to sink the enemy.
All other considerations amounted to nothing when this
supreme object was involved. The lives of officers and
men, precious as they were under ordinary circumstances,
were to be immediately sacrificed if such a sacrifice would
give an opportunity of destroying the submarine. It was
therefore Captain Campbell's duty to wait for the under-
water boat to sail slowly around his ship and appear in
clear view on the starboard side, leaving his brave men at
the stern exposed to the fire, every minute raging more
fiercely, and to the likelihood of a terrific explosion. That
he was able to make this decision, relying confidently upon
the spirit of his crew and their loyal devotion to their
leader, again illustrates the iron discipline which was
maintained on the mystery ships. The first explosion had
destroyed the voice tube by means of which Captain
Campbell communicated with this gun crew. He therefore
had to make his decision without keeping his men informed
of the progress of events information very helpful to men
under such a strain ; but he well knew that these men
would understand his action and cheerfully accept their
1917] A FIGHT TO THE DEATH 161
r61e in the game. Yet the agony of their position tested
their self-control to the utmost. The deck on which they
lay every moment became hotter ; the leather of their
shoes began to smoke, but they refused to budge for to
flee to a safer place meant revealing themselves to the sub-
marine and thereby betraying their secret. They took the
boxes of cordite shells in their arms and held them up as
high as possible above the smouldering deck in the hope of
preventing an explosion which seemed inevitable. Never
did Christian martyrs, stretched upon a gridiron, suffer
with greater heroism.
It was probably something of a relief when the expected
explosion took place. The submarine had to go only
200 yards more to be under the fire of three guns at a range
of 400 yards, but just as it was rounding the stern the
German officers and men, standing on the deck, were greeted
with a terrific roar. Suddenly a conglomeration of men,
guns, and unexploded shells was hurled into the air. The
German crew, of course, had believed that the vessel was a
deserted hulk, and this sudden manifestation of life on board
not only tremendously startled them, but threw them into
a panic. The four-inch gun and its crew were blown high
into the air, the gun landing forward on the well deck, and
the crew in various places. One man fell into the water ;
he was picked up, not materially the worse for his experi-
ence, by the Dunraven's lifeboat, which, all this time, had
been drifting in the neighbourhood. It is one of the
miracles of this war that not one of the members of that
crew was killed. The gashed and bleeding bodies of several
were thrown back upon the deck ; but there were none so
seriously wounded that they did not recover. In the minds
of these men, however, their own sufferings were not the
most distressing consequences of the explosion ; the really
unfortunate fact was that the sudden appearance of men and
guns ,n the air informed the Germans that they had to
deal with one of the ships which they so greatly dreaded.
The game, so far as the Dunraven was concerned, was
apparently up. The submarine vanished under the water ;
and the Englishmen well knew that the next move would be
12
162 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
the firing of the torpedo which could confidently be expected
to end the Q-boat's career. Some of the crew who were
not incapacitated got a hose and attempted to put out the
fire, while others removed their wounded comrades to as
comfortable quarters as could be found. Presently the
wake of the torpedo could be seen approaching the ship ;
the explosion that followed was a terrible one. The con-
cussion of the previous explosion had set off the " open-
fire " buzzers at the gun positions these buzzers being the
usual signals for dropping the false work that concealed the
guns and beginning the fight. The result was that, before
the torpedo had apparently given the Dunraven its quietus,
all the remaining guns were exposed with their crews.
Captain Campbell now decided to fight to the death. He
sent out a message notifying all destroyers and other anti-
submarine craft, as well as all merchant ships, not to
approach within thirty miles. A destroyer, should she
appear, would force the German to keep under water, and
thus prevent the Dunraven from getting a shot. Another
merchant ship on the horizon might prove such a tempting
bait to the submarine that it would abandon the Dunraven,
now nearly done for all on fire at one end as she was and
also sinking from her torpedo wound and so prevent any
further combat. For the resourceful Captain Campbell had
already formulated another final plan by which he might
entice the submarine to rise within range of his guns. To
carry out this plan, he wanted plenty of sea room and no
interference ; so he drew a circle in the water, with a radius
of thirty miles, inclosing the space which was to serve as the
" prize ring " for the impending contest.
His idea was to fall in with the German belief that the
Dunraven had reached the end of her tether. A hastily
organized second " panic party " jumped into a remaining
lifeboat and a raft and rowed away from the sinking,
burning ship. Here was visible evidence to the Germans
that their enemies had finally abandoned the fight after
nearly four hours of as frightful gruelling as any ship had
ever received. But there were still two guns that were con-
cealed and workable ; there were, as already said, two
torpedo tubes, one on each beam ; and a handful of men
were kept on board to man these. Meanwhile, Captain
Campbell lay prone on the bridge, looking through a peep-
hole for the appearance of the submarine, constantly talking
1917] A GRIM STRUGGLE 163
to his men through the tubes, even joking them on their
painful vigil.
" If you know a better 'ole," he would say, quoting
Bairnsfather, " go to it ! "
" Remember, lads," he would call at another time, " that
the King has given this ship the V.C."
Every situation has its humorous aspects. Thus one
gun crew could hardly restrain its laughter when a blue-
jacket called up to Captain Campbell and asked if he could
not take his boots off. He came of a respectable family, he
explained, and did not think it becoming to die with his
boots on. But the roar of the fire, which had now engulfed
the larger part of the ship, and the constantly booming
shells, which were exploding, one after another, like mam-
moth fire-crackers, interfered with much conversation. For
twenty minutes everybody lay there, hoping and praying
that the U-boat would emerge.
The German ultimately came up, but he arose cautiously
at the stern of the ship, at a point from which the guns of
the Dunraven could not bear. On the slim chance that a
few men might be left aboard, the submarine shelled it for
several minutes, fore and aft, then, to the agony of the
watching Englishmen, it again sank beneath the waves.
Presently the periscope shot up, and began moving slowly
around the blazing derelict, its eye apparently taking in
every detail ; he was so cautious, that submarine com-
mander, he did not propose to be outwitted again ! Captain
Campbell now saw that he had only one chance ; the con-
flagration was rapidly destroying his vessel, and he could
spend no more time waiting for the submarine to rise. But
he had two torpedoes and he determined to use these
against the submerged submarine. As the periscope
appeared abeam, one of the Dunraven's torpedoes started
in its direction ; the watching gunners almost wept when it
missed by a few inches. But the submarine did not see it,
and the periscope calmly appeared on the other side of the
ship. The second torpedo was fired ; this also passed just
about a foot astern, and the submarine saw it. The game
was up. What was left of the Dunraven was rapidly sink-
ing, and Captain Campbell sent out a wireless for help. In
a few minutes the U.S. armed yacht Noma and the British
destroyers Alcock and Christopher, which had been waiting
outside the " prize ring," arrived and took off the crew.
1(54 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
The tension of the situation was somewhat relieved when
a " Jackie " in one of the " panic " boats caught sight of
his beloved captain, entirely uninjured, jumping on one of
the destroyers.
" Gawd ! " he shouted, in a delighted tone, " if there
ain't the skipper still alive ! "
" We deeply regret the loss of His Majesty's ship," said
Captain Campbell, in his report, " and still more the
escape of the enemy. We did our best, not only to destroy
the enemy and save the ship, but also to show ourselves
worthy of the Victoria Cross which the King recently
bestowed on the ship."
They did indeed. My own opinion of this performance
I expressed in a letter which I could not refrain from
writing to Captain Campbell :
MY DEAR CAPTAIN :
I have just read your report of the action between the
Dunraven and a submarine on August 8th last.
I have had the benefit of reading the reports of some of
your former exploits, and Admiral Bayly has told me
about them all ; but in my opinion this of the Dunraven
is the finest of all as a military action and the most deserv-
ing of complete success.
It was purely incidental that the sub escaped. That
was due, moreover, to an unfortunate piece of bad luck.
The engagement, judged as a skilful fight, and not mea-
sured by its material results, seems to me to have been
perfectly successful, because I do not think that even
you, with all your experience in such affairs, could con-
ceive of any feature of the action that you would alter if
you had to do it over again. According to my idea about
such matters, the standard set by you and your crew is
worth infinitely more than the destruction of a submarine.
Long after we both are dust and ashes, the story of this
last fight will be a valuable inspiration to British (and
American) naval officers and men a demonstration of
the extraordinary degree to which the patriotism, loyalty,
personal devotion, and bravery of a crew may be inspired.
I know nothing finer in naval history than the conduct of
the after-gun's crew in fact, the entire crew of the Dun-
raven. It goes without saying that the credit of this
behaviour is chiefly yours. . . .
1917] LIEUT. SANDERS AND H.M.S. "PRIZE" 163
With my best wishes for your future success, believe
me, my dear Captain,
Faithfully yours,
WM. S. SIMS.
The records show that the mystery ships sank twelve
submarines, of which Captain Campbell accounted for
four ; yet this was perhaps not their most important
achievement. From the German standpoint they were a
terribly disturbing element in the general submarine
situation. Externally a mystery ship, as already de-
scribed, was indistinguishable from the most harmless
merchantman. The cleverness with which the Allied
officers took advantage of the vicious practices of the
submarine commanders bewildered them still further.
Nothing afloat was sacred to the Hun ; and he seemed to
take particular pride in destroying small vessels, even
little sailing vessels. The Navy decided to turn this
amiable trait to good account, and fitted out the Prize,
a topsail schooner of 200 tons, and placed her under the
command of Lieut. William Sanders, R.N.R. This little
schooner, as was expected, proved an irresistible bait. A
certain submarine, commanded by one of the most experi-
enced U-boat captains, attacked her by gun fire from a
safe distance and, after her panic party had left, shelled
her until she was in a sinking condition ; many of her
crew had been killed and wounded, when, confident that
she could not be a Q-sbip, the enemy came within less
than 100 yards. It was promptly fired on and disap-
peared beneath the surface. The panic party picked up
the German captain and two men, apparently the only
survivors, who expressed their high admiration for the
bravery of the crew and assisted them to get their battered
craft into port. The captain said to Lieutenant Sanders :
" I take off my hat to you and your men. I would not
have believed that any men could stand such gun fire."
For this exploit Lieutenant Sanders was awarded the
Victoria Cross. Within about four days from the time
of this action the Admiralty received an inquiry via
Sweden through the Red Cross asking the whereabouts
of the captain of this submarine. This showed that the
vessel had reached her home port, and illustrated once
more the necessity for caution in claiming the destruction
166 DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION
of U-boats and the wisdom of declining to publish the
figures of sinkings. Unfortunately, the plucky little
Prize was subsequently lost with her gallant captain
and crew.
So great was the desire of our people to take some part
in the mystery ship campaign that I took steps to satisfy
their legitimate ambition. As the Navy had fitted out
no mystery ships of our own, I requested the Admiralty
to assign one for our use. This was immediately agreed
to by Admiral Jellicoe and, with the approval of the Navy
Department, the vessel was delivered and named the
Santee, after our old sailing man-of-war of that name.
We called for volunteers, and practically all the officers
and men of the forces based on Queenstown clamoured for
this highly interesting though hazardous service. Com-
mander David C. Hanrahan was assigned as her com-
mander, and two specially selected men were taken from
each of our vessels, thus forming an exceedingly capable
crew. The ship was disguised with great skill and, with
the invaluable advice of Captain Campbell, the crew was
thoroughly trained in all the fine points of the game.
One December evening the Santee sailed from Queens-
town for Bantry Bay to carry out intensive training. A
short time after she left port she was struck by a torpedo
which caused great damage, but so solidly was her hull
packed with wood that she remained afloat. The panic
party got off in most approved style, and for several
hours the Santee awaited developments, hoping for a
glimpse of the submarine. But the under- water boat
never disclosed its presence ; not even the tip of a peri-
scope showed itself ; and the Santee was towed back to
Queenstown.
The Santee's experience was that of many mystery ships
of 1918. The Germans had learned their lesson.
For this reason it is desirable to repeat and emphasize
that the most important accomplishment of the mystery
ships was not the actual sinking of submarines, but their
profound influence upon the tactics of the U-boats. It
was manifest in the beginning that the first information
reaching Germany concerning the mystery ships would
greatly diminish the chances of sinking submarines by this
means, for it would cause all submarines to be wary of all
mercantile craft. They were therefore obliged largely to
1917] THE GERMANS BECOME WARY 167
abandon the easy, safe, and cheap methods of sinking
ships by bombs or gun fire, and were consequently forced
to incur the danger of attacking with the scarce and
expensive torpedo. Moreover, barring the very few
vessels that could be sunk by long-range gun fire, they were
practically restricted to this method of attack on pain
of abandoning the submarine campaign altogether.
CHAPTER VI
AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
WHO would ever have thought that a little wooden vessel,
displacing only sixty tons, measuring only 110 feet from
bow to stern, and manned by officers and crew very few
of whom had ever made an ocean voyage, could have
crossed more than three thousand miles of wintry sea,
even with the help of the efficient naval officers and men
who, after training there, convoyed and guided them
across, and could have done excellent work in hunting
the submarines ? We built nearly 400 of these little
vessels in eighteen months ; and we sent 170 to such
widely scattered places as Plymouth, Queenstown, Brest,
Gibraltar, and Corfu. Several enemy submarines now lie
at the bottom of the sea as trophies of their offensive
power ; and on the day that hostilities ceased, the Allies
generally recognized that this tiny vessel, with the " lis-
tening devices " which made it so efficient, represented
one of the most satisfactory direct " answers " to the sub-
marine which had been developed by the war. Had it
not been that the war ended before enough destroyers
could be spared from convoy duty to assist, with their
greater speed and offensive power, hunting groups of
these tiny craft, it is certain that they would soon have
become a still more important factor in destroying sub-
marines and interfering with their operations.
The convoy system, as I have already explained, was
essentially an offensive .measure ; it compelled the sub-
marine to encounter its most formidable antagonist, the
destroyer, and to risk destruction every time that it
attacked merchant vessels. This system, however, was
an indirect offensive, or, to use the technical phrase, it was
a defensive-offensive. Its great success in protecting
108
1917] "BLIND MAN'S BUFF" 169
merchant shipping, and the indispensable service which
it performed to the cause of civilization, I have already
described. But the fact remained that there could be
no final solution of the submarine problem, barring break-
ing down the enemy moral, until a definite, direct method
of attacking these boats had been found. A depth charge,
fired from the deck of a destroyer, was a serious matter
for the submarine ; still the submarine could avoid this
deadly weapon at any time by simply concealing its
whereabouts when in danger of attack. The destroyer
could usually sink the submarine whenever it could get
near enough ; it was for the under-water boat, however,
to decide whether an engagement should take place. That
great advantage in warfare, the option of fighting or of
running away, always lay with the submarine. Until it
was possible for our naval forces to set out to sea, find
the enemy that was constantly assailing our commerce,
and destroy him, it was useless to maintain that we had
discovered the anti-submarine tactics which would drive
this pest from the ocean for all time. Though the convoy,
the mine-fields, the mystery ships, the airplane, and several
other methods of fighting the under-water boat had been
developed, the submarine could still utilize that one great
quality of invisibility which made any final method of
attacking it such a difficult problem.
Thus, despite the wonderful work which had been
accomplished by the convoy, the Allied effort to destroy
the submarine was still largely a game of blind man's buff.
In our struggle against the German campaign we were
deprived of one of the senses which for ages had been
absolutely necessary to military operations that of sight.
We were constantly attempting to destroy an enemy
whom we could not see. So far as this offensive on the
water was concerned, the Allies found themselves in the
position of a man who has suddenly gone blind. I make
this comparison advisedly, for it at once suggests that our
situation was not entirely hopeless. The man who loses
the use of his eyes suffers a terrible affliction ; yet this
calamity does not completely destroy his usefulness. Such
a person, if normally intelligent, gradually learns how to
find his way around in darkness ; first he slowly discovers
how to move about his room ; then about his house, then
about his immediate neighbourhood ; and ultimately he
170 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
becomes so expert that he can be trusted to walk alone
in crowded streets, to pilot himself up and down strange
buildings, and even to go on long journeys. In time he
learns to read, to play cards and chess, and not infre-
quently even to resume his old profession or occupation ;
indeed his existence, despite the deprivation of what
many regard as the most indispensable of the senses,
becomes again practically a normal process. His whole
experience, of course, is one of the most beautiful demon-
strations we have of the exquisite economy of Nature.
What has happened in the case of this stricken man is
that his other senses have come to fill the place of the
one which he has lost. Deprived of sight, he is forced to
form his contacts with the external world by using his
other senses, especially those of touch and hearing. So
long as he could see clearly these senses had lain half
developed ; he had never used them to any extent that
remotely approached their full powers ; but now that
they are called into constant action they gradually increase
in strength to a degree that seems abnormal, precisely as
a disused muscle, when regularly exercised, acquires a
hitherto unsuspected vigour.
This illustration applies to the predicament in which
the Allied navies now found themselves. When they
attempted to fight the submarine they discovered that
they had gone hopelessly blind. Like the sightless man,
however, they still had other senses left ; and it remained
for them to develop these to take the place of the one of
which they had been deprived. The faculty which it
seemed most likely that they could increase by stimulation
was that of hearing. Our men could not detect the
presence of the submarine with their eyes ; could they
not do so with their ears ? Their enemy could make
himself unseen at will, but he could not make himself
unheard, except by stopping his motors. In fact, when
the submarine was under water the vibrations, due to the
peculiar shape of its propellers and hull, and to its electric
motors, produced sound waves that resembled nothing
else in art or nature. It now clearly became the business
of naval science to take advantage of this phenomenon to
track the submarine after it had submerged. Once this
feat had been accomplished, the only advantage which
the under-water boat possessed over other warcraft, that
1917] HEARING DEVICES , 171
of invisibility, would be overcome ; and, inasmuch as the
submarine, except for this quality of invisibility, was a
far weaker vessel than any other afloat, the complete
elimination of this advantage would dispose of it as a for-
midable enemy in war.
A fact that held forth hopes of success was that water
is an excellent conductor of sound far better than the
atmosphere itself. In the air there are many cross-
currents and areas of varying temperature which make
sound waves frequently behave in most puzzling fashion,
sometimes travelling in circles, sometimes moving capri-
ciously up or down or even turning sharp corners. The
mariner has learned how deceptive is a foghorn ; when it
is blowing he knows that a ship is somewhere in the
general region, but usually he has no definite idea where.
The water, however, is uniform in density and practically
uniform in temperature, and therefore sound in this
medium always travels in straight lines. It also travels
more rapidly in water than in the air, it travels farther,
and the sound waves are more distinct. American in-
ventors have been the pioneers in making practical use
of this well-known principle. Before the war its most
valuable applications were the submarine bell and the
vibrator. On many Atlantic and Pacific points these
instruments had been placed under the water, provided
with mechanisms which caused them to sound at regular
intervals ; an ingenious invention, installed aboard ships,
made it possible for trained listeners to pick up these
noises, and so fix positions, long before lighthouses or
lightships came into view in any but entirely clear weather.
For several years the great trans -Atlantic liners have
frequently made Nantucket Lightship by listening for its
submarine bell. From the United States this system was
rapidly extending all over the world.
American inventors were therefore well qualified to deal
with this problem of communicating by sound under the
water. A listening device placed on board ship, which
would reveal to practised ears the noise of a submarine at
a reasonable distance, and which would at the same time
give its direction, would come near to solving the most
serious problem presented by the German tactics. Even
before the United States entered the war, American
specialists had started work on their own initiative. In
172 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
particular the General Electric Company, the Western
Electric Company, and the Submarine Signal Company
had taken up the matter at their own expense ; each had
a research department and an experimental station where
a large amount of preliminary work had been done.
Soon a special board was created at Washington to study
detection devices, to which each of these companies was
invited to send a representative ; the board eventually
took up its headquarters at New London, and was assisted
in this work by some of the leading physicists of our
universities. All through the summer and autumn of 1917
these men kept industriously at their task ; to such good
purpose did they labour that by October of that year
several devices had been invented which seemed to pro-
mise satisfactory results. In beginning their labours they
had one great advantage : European scientists had already
made considerable progress in this work, and the results
of their studies were at once placed at our disposal by
the Allied Admiralties. Moreover, these Admiralties sent
over several of their experts to co-operate with us. About
that time Captain Richard H. Leigh, U.S.N., who had
been assigned to command the subchaser detachments
abroad, was sent to Europe to confer with the Allied
Admiralties, and to test, in actual operations against sub-
marines, the detection devices which had been developed
at the New London station. Captain Leigh, who after
the armistice became my chief-of-staff at London, was
not only one of our ablest officers, but he had long been
interested in detection devices, and was a great believer
in their possibilities.
The British, of course, received Captain Leigh cordially
and gave him the necessary facilities for experimenting
with his devices, but it was quite apparent that they did
not anticipate any very satisfactory results. The trouble
was that so many inventors had presented new ideas which
had proved useless that we were all more or less doubtful.
They had been attempting to solve this problem ever
since the beginning of the war ; British inventors had
developed several promising hydrophones, but these instru-
ments had not proved efficient in locating a submarine
with sufficient accuracy to enable us to destroy it with
depth charges. These disappointments quite naturally
created an atmosphere of scepticism which, however, did
1917] AMERICAN LISTENING DEVICES 173
not diminish the energy which was devoted to the solu-
tion of this important problem. Accordingly, three British
trawlers and a " P " 1 boat were assigned to Captain
Leigh, and with these vessels he spent ten days in the
Channel, testing impartially both the British and Ameri-
can devices. No detailed tactics for groups of vessels had
yet been elaborated for hunting by sound. Though the
ships used were not particularly suitable for the work in
hand, these few days at sea demonstrated that the American
contrivances were superior to anything in the possession
of the Allies. They were by no means perfect ; but the
ease with which they picked up all kinds of noises, par-
ticularly those made by submarines, astonished everybody
who was let into the secret ; the conviction that such a
method of tracking the hidden enemy might ultimately
be used with the desired success now became more or less
general. In particular the American " K- tubes " and the
" C-tubes " proved superior to the " Nash-fish " and the
" Shark-fin," the two devices which up to that time had
been the favourites in the British navy. The " K-tubes "
easily detected the sound of large vessels at a distance of
twenty miles, while the " C-tubes " were more useful at a
shorter distance. But the greatest advantage which
these new listening machines had over those of other
navies was that they could more efficiently determine not
only the sound but also the direction from which it came.
Captain Leigh, after this demonstration, visited several
British naval stations, consulting with the British officers,
explaining our sound-detection devices, and testing the
new appliances in all kinds of conditions. The net result
of his trip was a general reversal of opinion on the value
of this method of hunting submarines. The British
Admiralty ordered from the United States large quan-
tities of the American mechanisms, and also began manu-
facturing them in England.
About the time that it was shown that these listening
devices would probably have great practical value, the
first " subchasers " were delivered at New London, Conn.
The design of the subchaser type was based upon what
proved to be a misconception as to the cruising possi-
i ^ ic p Doa ^ j a a S p ec i a i type of anti-submarine craft smaller and
slower than a destroyer and having a profile especially designed to resemble
that of a submarine.
174
bilities of the submarine. Just before the beginning of
the Great War most naval officers believed that the limi-
tations of the submarine were such that it could not
operate far from coastal waters. Hardly any one, except
a few experienced submarine officers, had regarded it as
possible that these small boats could successfully attack
vessels upon the high seas or remain for any extended
period away from the.r base. High authorities condemned
them. This is hard to realize, now that we know so well
the offensive possibilities of submarines, but we have
ample evidence as to what former opinions were. For
example, a distinguished naval writer says that at that
time " The view of the majority of admirals and captains
probably was that submersible craft were ' just marvellous
toys, good for circus performances in carefully selected
places in fine weather.' ' He adds that certain very
prominent naval men of great experience declared that
the submarine " could operate only by day in fair weather ;
that it was practically useless in misty weather " ; that it
had to come to the surface to fire its torpedo ; that its
" crowning defect lay in its want of habitability " ; that
" a week's peace manoeuvres got to the bottom of the
health of officers and men " ; and that " on the high seas
the chances [of successful attack] will be few, and sub-
marines will require for their existence parent ships."
The first triumph of Otto Weddingen, that of sinking the
Cressy, the Hogue, and the Aboukir, did not change this
conviction, for these three warships had been sunk in
comparatively restricted waters under conditions which
were very favourable to the submarine. It was not until
the Audacious went to the bottom off the north-west coast
of Ireland, many hundreds of miles from any German
submarine base, that the possibilities of this new weapon
were partially understood ; for it was clear that the
Audacious had been sunk by a mine, and that that mine
must have been laid by a submarine. Even then many
doubted the ability of the U-boats to operate successfully
in the open sea westward of the British Isles. Therefore
the subchaser was designed to fight the submarine in
restricted waters ; Great Britain and France ordered
more than 500 smaller (80-foot) vessels of this type, or of
approximately this type, built in the United States ; and
just before our declaration of war the United States had
1917] CHASERS AND SUBCHASERS 175
designed and contracted for several hundred of a some-
what larger size (the 110-foot chasers) with the original
idea of using them as patrol boats near the harbours and
coastal waters of our own country. Long before these
vessels were finished, however, it became apparent that
Germany could not engage in any serious, extensive
campaign on this side ; it was also evident that any vessel
as small as the subchaser had little value in convoy work,
notwithstanding the excellence of its sea-keeping qualities ;
and we were all rather doubtful as to just what use we
could make of these new additions to our navy.
The work of pushing the design and construction of
these boats reflects great credit upon those who were
chiefly responsible. The designs were drawn and the first
contracts were placed before the United States had declared
war. The credit for this admirable work belongs chiefly
to Commander Julius A. Furer (Construction Corps) U.S.
Navy, and to Mr. A. Loring Swasey, a yacht architect of
Boston, who was enrolled as a lieutenant-commander in
the reserves, and who served throughout the war as an
adviser and assistant to Commander Furer in his specialty
as a small vessel designer, particularly in wood. It speaks
well for the ability of these officers that the small sub-
chasers exhibited such remarkable sea-keeping qualities ;
this fact was a pleasant surprise to all seagoing men, par-
ticularly to naval officers who had had little experience
with that type of craft. The listening devices had not
been perfected when they were designed, and this innova-
tion opened up possibilities for their employment which
had not been anticipated ; for these reasons it inevitably
took a large amount of time, after the subchasers had
been delivered, to provide the hydrophones and all tfce
several appliances which were necessary for hunting sub-
marines. Apparently those who were responsible for con-
structing these boats had a rocky road to travel ; with
the great demand for material and labour for building
destroyers, merchant ships, and for a multitude of war
supplies, it was natural that the demands for the sub-
chasers in the early days were viewed as a nuisance ; the
responsible officers, therefore, deserve credit for delivering
these boats in such an efficient condition and in such a
remarkably short time. That winter, as everyone will
recall, was the coldest in the memory of the present
176 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
generation. Day after day the poor subchasers, coated
with ice almost a foot thick, many with their eng nes
wrecked, their planking torn and their propellers crumpled,
were towed into the harbour and left at the first convenient
mooring, where the ice immediately began to freeze them
in. As was inevitable under such conditions, the crews,
for the most part, suffered acutely in this terrible weather ;
they had had absolutely no training in ordinary seaman-
ship, to say nothing of the detailed tactics demanded by
the difficult work in which they were to engage.
I do not think that the whole lot contained 1 per cent,
of graduates of Annapolis or 5 per cent, of experienced
sailors ; for the greater number that terrible trip in the
icy ocean, with the thermometer several degrees below
zero, and with very little artificial heat on board, was
their first experience at sea. Yet there was not the
slightest sign of whimpering or discouragement. Ignorant
of salt water as these men at that time were, they really
represented about the finest raw material in the nation
for this service. Practically all, officers and men, were
civilians ; a small minority were amateur yachtsmen,
but the great mass were American college undergraduates.
Boys of Yale, Harvard, Princeton indeed, of practically
every college and university in the land had dropped
their books, left the comforts of their fraternity houses,
and abandoned their athletic fields, eager for the great
adventure against the Hun. If there is any man who
still doubts what the American system of higher education
is doing for our country, he should have spent a few days
at sea with these young men. That they knew nothing
at first about navigation and naval technique was not
important ; the really important fact was that their
minds were alert, their hearts filled with a tremendous
enthusiasm for the cause, their souls clean, and their
bodies ready for the most exhausting tasks. Whenever
I get to talking of the American college boys and other
civilians in our navy, I find myself indulging in what may
seem extravagant praise. I have even been inclined to
suggest that it would be well, in the training of naval
officers in future, to combine a college education with a
shorter intensive technical course at the Naval Academy.
For these college men have what technical academies do
not usually succeed in giving a general education and a
1917] OUR BOYS 177
general training, which develops the power of initiative,
independent thought, an ability quickly to grasp intricate
situations, and to master, in a short time, almost any
practical problem. At least this proved to be the case
with our subchaser forces. So little experience did these
boys have of seafaring that, as soon as they had com-
pleted their first voyage, we had to place a considerable
portion in hospital to recover from seasickness. Yet, a
few months afterward, we could leave these same men on
the bridge at night in command of the ship. When they
reached New London they knew no more of seamanship
and navigation than so many babies, but so well were
these boys instructed and trained within a few weeks by
the regular officers in charge that they learned their
business sufficiently well to cross the Atlantic safely in
convoy. The early 80-foot subchasers which we built
for Great Britain and France crossed the ocean on the
decks of ocean liners ; for it would have been a waste of
time, even if international law had permitted it, to send
them under their own power ; but all of the 110-footers
which these young men commanded crossed the ocean
under their own power and many in the face of the fierce
January and February gales, almost constantly tossed
upon the waves like pieces of cork. As soon as they were
sufficiently trained and prepared to make the trip, groups
were despatched under escort of a naval vessel fitted to
supply them with gasolene at sea. Such matters as
gunnery these young men also learned with lightning
speed. The most valuable were those who had specialized
in mathematics, chemistry, and general science ; but they
were all a splendid lot, and to their spirit and energy are
chiefly due their remarkable success in learning their
various duties.
" Those boys can't bring a ship across the ocean ! "
someone remarked to Captain Gotten, who commanded
the first squadron of subchasers to arrive at Plymouth,
after he had related the story of one of these voyages.
" Perhaps they can't," replied Captain Gotten himself
an Annapolis man who admires these reservists as much
as I do. " But they have."
And he pointed to thirty-six little vessels lying at
anchor in Plymouth Harbour, just about a hundred yards
from the monument which marks the spot from which the
13
178 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
Mayflower sailed for the new world all of which were
navigated across by youngsters of whom almost none,
officers or men, had had any nautical training until the
day the United States declared war on Germany.
Capable as they were, however, I am sure that these
reservists would be the first to acknowledge their obliga-
tions to the loyal and devoted regular officers of the Navy,
who laboured so diligently to train them for their work.
One of the minor tragedies of the war is that many of our
Annapolis men, whose highest ambition it was to cross
the ocean and engage in the " game," had to stay on
this side, in order to instruct these young men from civil
life.
I wish that I had the space adequately to acknowledge
the work in organization done by Captain John T. Tomp-
kins ; in listening devices by Rear-Admiral S. S. Robison,
Captains Frank H. Schofield, Joseph H. Defrees, Com-
manders Clyde S. McDowell, and Miles A. Libbey, and
the many scientists who gave us the benefit of their know-
ledge and experience. It is impossible to overpraise the
work of such men as Captains Arthur J. Hepburn, Lyman
A. Cotten, and William P. Cronan, in " licking " the
splendid raw material into shape. Great credit is also
due to Rear-Admiral T. P. Magruder, Captains David F.
Boyd, S. V. Graham, Arthur Crenshaw, E. P. Jessop,
C. M. Tozer, H. G. Sparrow, and C. P. Nelson, and many
others who had the actual responsibility of convoying these
vessels across the ocean.
I assume that they will receive full credit when the
story of the work of the Navy at home is written ; mean-
while, they may be assured of the appreciation of those
of us on the other side who depended so much for success
upon their thorough work of preparation.
II
The sea qualities which the subchaser displayed, and
the development of listening devices which made it possible
to detect all kinds of sounds under water at a considerable
distance, immediately laid before us the possibility of
direct offensive operations against the submarine. It
1917] A CHANGE IN TACTICS 179
became apparent that these listening devices could be
used to the greatest advantage on these little craft. The
tactics which were soon developed for their use made it
necessary that we should have a large number of vessels ;
nearly all the destroyers were then engaged in convoy
duty, and we could not entertain the idea of detailing
many of them for this more or less experimental work.
Happily the subchasers started coming off the ways just
in time to fill the need ; and the several Allied navies
began competing for these new craft in lively fashion.
France demanded them in large numbers to work in co-
operation with the air stations and also to patrol her
coastal waters, and there were many requests from
stations in England, Ireland, Gibraltar, Portugal, and
Italy. The question of where we should place them
was therefore referred to the Allied Naval War Council,
which, at my suggestion, considered the matter, not from
the standpoint of the individual nation, but from the
standpoint of the Allied cause as a whole.
A general survey clearly showed that there were three
places where the subchasers might render the most efficient
service. The convoy system had by this time not only
greatly reduced the losses, but it was changing the policy
of the submarines. Until this system was adopted,
sinkings on a great scale were taking place far out at sea,
sometimes three or four hundred miles west of Ireland.
The submarines had adopted the policy of meeting the
unescorted ships in the Atlantic and of torpedoing them
long before they could reach the zones where the destroyer
patrol might possibly have protected them. But sailing
great groups of merchantmen in convoys, surrounded by
destroyers, made this an unprofitable adventure, and the
submarines therefore had to change their programme.
The important point is that the convoys, so long as they
could keep formation, and so long as protecting screens
could be maintained on their flanks, were virtually safe.
Under these conditions sinkings, as already said, were
less than one-half of 1 per cent. These convoys, it will be
recalled, came home by way of two " trunk lines," a
southern one extending through the English Channel and
a northern one through the so-called " North Channel "
the latter being the passage between Ireland and Scotland.
As soon as the inward-bound southern " trunk-line "
180 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
convoys reached the English Channel they broke up,
certain ships going to Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southamp-
ton, and other Channel ports, and others sailing to Brest,
Cherbourg, Havre, and other harbours in France. In the
same fashion, convoys which came in by way of the North
Channel split up as soon as they reached the Irish Sea.
In other words, the convoys, as convoys, necessarily ceased
to exist the moment that they entered these inland waters,
and the ships, as individual ships, or small groups of ships,
had to find their way to their destinations unescorted by
destroyers, or escorted most inadequately. This was the
one weak spot in the convoy system, and the Germans
were not slow r to turn it to their advantage. They now
proceeded to withdraw most of their submarines from the
high seas and to concentrate them in these restricted waters.
In April, 1917, the month which marked the high tide of
German success, not far from a hundred merchant ships
were sunk in an area that extended about 300 miles west
of Ireland and about 300 miles south. A year afterward
in the month of April, 1918 not a single ship was sent
to the bottom in this same section of the sea. That change
measures the extent to which the convoy saved Allied
shipping. But if we examine the situation in inclosed
waters the North Channel, the Irish Sea, St. George's
Channel, and the English Channel we shall find a less
favourable state of affairs. Practically all the sinkings
of April, 1918, occurred in these latter areas. In April,
1917, the waters which lay between Ireland and England
were practically free from depredations ; in the spring of
1918, however, these waters had become a favourite hunt-
ing ground for submarines ; while in the English Channel
the sinkings were almost as numerous in April, 1918, as
they had been in the same month the year before.
Thus we had to deal with an entirely new phase of the
submarine campaign ; the new conditions made it practi-
cable to employ light vessels which existed in large
numbers, and which could aggressively hunt out the sub-
marines even though they were sailing submerged. The
subchaser, when fitted with its listening devices, met these
new requirements, though of course not to the desirable
degree of precision we hoped soon to attain with still
further improved hydrophones and larger vessels of the
Eagle class then being built.
1917-18] THE OTRANTO BARRAGE 181
The matter was presented to the Allied Naval Council
and, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of all of
the members, they recommended that of the subchasers
then available, a squadron should be based on Plymouth,
where it could be advantageously used against the German
submarines which were still doing great damage in the
English Channel, and that another squadron, based on
Queenstown, should similarly be used against the sub-
marines in the Irish Sea.
I was therefore requested to concentrate the boats at
these tw r o points, and at once acquiesced in this recom-
mendation.
But another point, w r idely separated from British waters,
also made a powerful plea for consideration. In the Medi-
terranean the submarine campaign was still a menace.
The spring and early summer of 1918 witnessed large
losses of shipping destined to southern France, to Italy,
and to the armies at Salonika and in Palestine. Austrian
and German submarines, operating from their bases at
Pola and Cattaro in the Adriatic, were responsible for this
destruction. If we could pen these pests in the Adriatic,
the whole Mediterranean Sea would become an unob-
structed highway for the Allies. A glance at the map
indicated the way in which such a desirable result might
be accomplished. At its southern extremity the Adriatic
narrows to a passage only forty miles wide the Strait of
Otranto and through this restricted area all the sub-
marines were obliged to pass before they could reach the
water where they could prey upon Allied commerce.
For some time before the Allied Naval Council began to
consider the use of the American subchasers, the British
navy w r as doing its best to keep submarines from passing
this point. A defensive scheme known, not very accur-
ately, as the " Otranto barrage " was in operation. The
word " barrage " suggests an effective barrier, but this
one at the base of the Adriatic consisted merely of a few
British destroyers of ancient type and a large number of
drifters, which kept up a continuous patrolling of the
gateway through which the submarines made their way
into the Mediterranean. It is no reflection upon the
British to say that this barrage was unsatisfactory and
inadequate, and that, for the first few months, it formed
a not particularly formidable obstruction. So many
182 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
demands were made upon the British navy in northern
waters that it could not spare many vessels for this work ;
the Italian navy was holding the majority of its destroyers
intact, momentarily prepared for a sortie by the Austrian
battle fleet ; the Otranto barrage, therefore, important as
it was to the Allied cause, was necessarily insufficient. The
Italian representatives at the Allied Council made a strong
plea for a contingent of American subchasers to reinforce
the British ships, and the British and French delegates
seconded this request.
In the spring of 1918 I therefore sent Captain Leigh to
southern Italy to locate and construct a subchaser base
in this neighbourhood. After inspecting the territory in
detail Captain Leigh decided that the Bay of Govino, in
the island of Corfu, would best meet our requirements.
The immediate connection which was thus established
between New London and this ancient city of classical
Greece fairly illustrates how widely the Great War had
extended the horizon of the American people. There was
a certain appropriateness in the fact that the American
college boys who commanded these little ships not much
larger than the vessel in which Ulysses had sailed these
same waters three thousand years before should have
made their base on the same island which had served as
a naval station for Athens in the Peloponnesian War,
and which, several centuries afterward, had been used
for the same purpose by Augustus in the struggle with
Antony. And probably the sight of the Achelleion, the
Kaiser's palace, which was not far from this new American
base, was not without its influence in constantly reminding
our young men of the meaning of this unexpected associa-
tion of Yankee-land with the ancient world.
Ill
By June 30, 1918, two squadrons of American chasers,
comprising thirty-six boats, had assembled at Plymouth,
England, under the command of Captain Lyman A.
Gotten, U.S.N. The U.S. destroyer Parker, commanded
by Commander Wilson Brown, had been assigned to this
detachment as a supporting ship. The area which now
formed the new field of operations was one which was
1918] SUCCESS OF THE CHASERS 183
causing great anxiety at that time. It comprehended
that section of the Channel which reached from Start
Point to Lizard Head, and included such important ship-
ping ports as Plymouth, Devonport, and Falmouth. This
was the region in which the convoys, after having been
escorted through the submarine zone, were broken up,
and from which the individual ships were obliged to find
their way to their destinations with greatly diminished
protection. It was one of the most important sections in
which the Germans, forced to abandon their submarine
campaign on the high seas, were now actively concentrat-
ing their efforts. Until the arrival of the subchasers
sinkings had been taking place in these waters on a con-
siderable scale. In company with a number of British
hunting units, Captain Cotten's detachment kept steadily
at work from June 30th until the middle of August, when
it became necessary to send it elsewhere. The historical
fact is that not a single merchant ship was sunk between
Lizard Head and Start Point as long as these subchasers
were assisting in the operations. The one sinking which
at first seemed to have broken this splendid record was
that of the Stockforce ; this merchantman was destroyed
off Dartmouth ; but it was presently announced that the
Stockforce was in reality a " mystery" ship, sent out for
the express purpose of being torpedoed, and that she
" got " the submarine which had ended her own career.
This happening therefore hardly detracted from our
general satisfaction over the work done by our little
vessels. Since many ships had been sunk in this area
in the month before they arrived, and since the sinkings
started in again after they had left, the immunity which
this region enjoyed during July and August may properly
be attributed largely to the American navy. Not only
were no bona-fide merchant ships destroyed, but no mines
were laid from Start Point to Lizard Head during the time
that the American forces maintained their vigil there.
That this again was probably not a mere coincidence was
shown by the fact that, the very night after these chasers
were withdrawn from Plymouth, five mines were laid in
front of that harbour, in preparation for a large convoy
scheduled to sail the next day.
By the time that Captain Cotten's squadron began
work the hunting tactics which had been developed during
184 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
their training at New London had been considerably im-
proved. Their procedure represented something entirely
new in naval warfare. Since the chasers had to depend
for the detection of the foe upon an agency so uncertain
as the human ear, it was thought to be necessary, as a
safeguard against error, and also to increase the chances
of successful attack, that they should hunt in groups of
at least three. The fight against the submarine, under
this new system, was divided into three parts the search,
the pursuit, and the attack. The first chapter included
those weary hours which the little group spent drifting on
the ocean, the lookout in the crow's nest scanning the
surface for the possible glimpse of a periscope, while the
trained listeners on deck, with strange little instruments
which somewhat resembled telephone receivers glued to their
ears, were kept constantly at tension for any noise which
might manifest itself under water. It was impossible to
use these listening devices while the boats were under way,
for the sound of their own propellers and machinery would
drown out any other disturbances. The three little vessels
therefore drifted abreast at a distance of a mile or two
apart their propellers hardly moving, and the decks as
silent as the grave ; they formed a new kind of fishing
expedition, the officers and crews constantly held taut by
the expectation of a " bite." And frequently their
experience was that of the proverbial " fisherman's luck."
Hours passed sometimes without even the encouragement
of a " nibble " ; then, suddenly, one of the listeners would
hear something which his experienced ear had learned to
identify as the propellers and motors of a submarine. The
great advantage possessed by the American tubes, as
already said, was that they gave not only the sound, but
its direction. The listener would inform his commanding
officer that he had picked up a submarine. " Very faint,"
he would perhaps report, " direction 97 " the latter being
the angle which it made with the north and south line.
Another appliance which now rendered great service was
the wireless telephone. The commanding officer at once
began talking with the other two boats, asking if they had
picked up the noise. Unless all three vessels had heard
the disturbance, nothing was done ; but if all identified it
nearly simultaneously, this unanimity was taken as evi-
dence that something was really moving in the water.
1918]
OBTAINING A FIX
185
When all three vessels obtained the direction as well as
the sound it was a comparatively simple matter to define
pretty accurately its location. The middle chaser of the
three was the flagship and her most interesting feature
was the so-called plotting-room. Here one officer received
constant telephone reports from all three boats, giving the
nature of the sounds, and, more important still, their
directions. He transferred these records to a chart as
soon as they came in, rapidly made calculations, and in a
few seconds he was able to give the location of the sub-
marine. This process was known as obtaining a " fix."
The reports of our chaser commanders are filled constantly
with reference to these "fixes" the "fix" being that
point on the surface of the ocean where three lines, each
giving the direction of the detected sound, cross one
another. The method can be most satisfactorily illus-
trated by the following diagram :
HOW THB LISTENING DEVICES LOCATED A SUBMA.EINB.
In this demonstration the letters A, B, and C, each
represent a subchaser, the central one, B, being the flag-
ship of the division. The listener on A has picked up a
noise, the direction of which is indicated by the line a a.
He telephones by wireless this information to the plotting-
room aboard the flagship B. The listeners on this vessel
186 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
have picked up the same sound, which comes from the
direction indicated by the line b b. The point at which
these two lines cross is the " fix " ; it shows the spot in
the ocean where the submarine was stationed when the
sound was first detected. The reason for having a report
from the third subchaser C is merely for the purpose of
corroborating the work of the other two ; if three observa-
tions, made independently, agree in locating the enemy
at this point, the commanding officer may safely assume
that he is not chasing a will o' the wisp.
But this " fix " is merely the location of the submarine
at the time when it was first heard. In the great majority
of cases, however, the submerged vessel is moving ; so,
rapidly as the men in the plotting-room may work, the
German has advanced beyond this point by the time they
have finished their calculations. The subchasers, which
have been drifting while these observations were being
made, now start their engines at full speed, and rush up
to the neighbourhood of their first " fix." Arrived there,
they stop again, put over their tubes, and begin listening
once more. The chances are now that the noise of the
submarine is louder ; the chasers are getting " warmer."
It is not unlikely, however, that the direction has changed,
for the submarine, which has listening devices of its own
though the German hydrophones were decidedly inferior
to the American may have heard the subchasers and
may be making frantic efforts to elude them. But chang-
ing the course will help it little, for the listeners easily get
the new direction, and send the details to the plotting-
room, where the new " fix " is obtained in a few moments.
Thus the subchasers keep inching up to their prey ; at
each new " fix " the noise becomes louder, until the
hunters are so near that they feel justified in attacking.
Putting on full speed, all three rush up to the latest " fix,"
drop depth charges with a lavish hand, fire the " Y '
howitzers, each one of which carries two depth charges,
meanwhile manning their guns on the chance that the
submarine may decide to rise to the surface and give battle.
In many of these hunts a destroyer accompanies the sub-
chasers, always keeping at a considerable distance, so that
the noise of its propellers will not interfere with the game ;
once the chasers determine the accurate " fix," they wire
the position to this larger ship, which puts on full steam
1918] SUB-OCEAN SOUNDS 187
and dashes with the speed of an express train to the indi-
cated spot, and adds ten or a dozen depth charges to
those deposited by the chasers.
Such were the subchaser tactics in their perfection ; yet it
was only after much experience that the procedure began to
work with clock-like regularity. At first the new world
under the water proved confusing to the listeners at the
tubes. This watery domain was something entirely new in
human experience. When Dr. Alexander Bell invented his
first telephone an attempt was made to establish a com-
plete circuit by using the earth itself ; the result was that a
conglomerate of noises meanings, shriekings, howlings,
and humming sounds came over the wire, which seemed
to have become the playground of a million devils. These
were the noises, hitherto unknown, which are constantly
being given out by Mother Earth herself. And now it was
discovered that the under-ocean, which we usually think of
as a silent place, is in reality extremely vocal. The listeners
at the C- and K-tubes heard many sounds in addition to
the ones which they were seeking. On the K-tubes a
submarine running at full speed was audible from fifteen to
twenty miles, but louder noises could be heard much farther
away. The day might be bright, the water quiet, and there
might not be a ship anywhere within the circle of the
horizon, but suddenly the listener at the tube would hear a
terrific explosion, and he would know that a torpedo, per-
haps forty or fifty miles distant, had blown up a merchant-
man, or that some merchantman had struck a mine. Again
he would catch the unmistakable " chug ! chug ! chug ! "
which he learned to identify as indicating the industrious
and slow progress of a convoy of twenty or thirty ships.
Then a rapid humming noise would come along the wire ;
that was the whirling propeller of a destroyer. A faint
moan caused some bewilderment at first ; but it was
ultimately learned that this came from a wreck, lying at
the bottom, and tossed from side to side by the current ; it
sounded like the sigh of a ghost, and the frequency with
which it was heard told how densely the floor of the ocean
was covered with victims of the submarines. The larger
animal life of the sea also registered itself upon the tubes.
Our listeners, after a little training, could identify a whale
as soon as the peculiar noise it made in swimming reached
the receivers. At first a school of porpoises increased their
188 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
perplexities. The " swish ! swish ! " which marked their
progress so closely resembled the noise of a submarine that
it used to lead our men astray. But practice in this game
was everything ; after a few trips the listener easily dis-
tinguished between the porpoise and the submarine, though
the distinction was so fine that he had difficulty in telling
just how he made it. In fact, our men became so expert
that, out of the miscellaneous noises which overwhelmed
their ears whenever the tubes were dropped into the water,
they were able almost invariably to select that of the
U-boat.
In many ingenious ways the chasers supplemented the
work of other anti-submarine craft. Destroyers and other
patrol boats kept track of the foe pretty well so long as he
remained on the surface ; the business of the chaser, we
must remember, was to find him after he had submerged.
The Commander-in-Chief on shore sometimes sent a radio
that a German had appeared at an indicated spot, and
disappeared beneath the waves ; the chasers would then
start for this location and begin hunting with their listeners.
Aircraft which sighted submarines would send similar
messages ; convoys that had been attacked, individual
ships that had been torpedoed, destroyers which had spotted
their prey, only to lose track of it as soon as it submerged,
would call upon the chasers to take up the battle where
they had abandoned it.
As long as the chasers operated in the waters which I
have indicated, those between Start Point and Lizard Head,
they " got " no submarine ; the explanation was simple,
for as soon as the chasers and British hunting vessels
became active here, the Germans abandoned this field of
operations. This was the reason that the operative area
of the Plymouth detachment was extended. Some of the
chasers were now sent around Land's End and up the north
Cornish coast, where colliers bound from Wales to France
were proving tempting bait for the U-boats ; others
operated farther out to sea, off the Scilly Islands and west
of Brest. In these regions their contacts with the sub-
marine were quite frequent.
There was no U-boat in the German navy which the
Allied forces were so ambitious to " get " as the 7-53. I
have already referred to this celebrated vessel and its still
more celebrated commander, Captain Hans Rose. It was
1918] THE SEARCH FOR U-53 189
this submarine, it will be recalled, which had suddenly paid
a ceremonious visit to Newport, R.I., in the autumn of 1916,
and which, on its way back to Germany, had paused long
enough off Nantucket to sink half a dozen British cargo
ships. It was the same submarine which sank our own
destroyer, the Jacob Jones, by a chance shot with a torpedo.
Thus Americans had a peculiar reason for wishing to see it
driven from the seas. About the middle of August, 1918,
we discovered that the E7-53 was operating in the Atlantic
about 250 miles west of Brest. At the same time we learned
that two German submarines were coming down the west
coast of Ireland. We picked up radio messages which these
three boats were exchanging ; this made it quite likely that
they proposed to form a junction west of Brest, and attack
American transports, which were then sailing to France in
great numbers. Here was an opportunity for the sub-
chasers. The distance 250 miles to sea would be a
severe strain upon their endurance, but we assigned four
hunting units, twelve boats in all, to the task, and also
added to this contingent the destroyers Wilkes and Parker.
On the morning of September 2nd one of these subchaser
units picked up a suspicious sound. A little later the look-
out on the Parker detected on the surface an object that
looked like a conning-tower, with an upright just forward
which seemed to be a mast and sail ; as it was the favourite
trick of the U-53 to disguise itself in this way, it seemed
certain that the chasers were now on the track of this
esteemed vessel. When this mast and sail and conning-
tower suddenly disappeared under the water, these sus-
picions became still stronger. The Parker put on full speed,
found an oilslick where the submarine had evidently been
pumping its bilges, and dropped a barrage of sixteen
depth charges. But had these injured the submarine ?
Under ordinary conditions there would have been no satis-
factory answer to this question ; but now three little wooden
boats came up, advanced about 2,000 yards ahead of the
Parker, stopped their engines, put over their tubes, and
began to listen. In a few minutes they conveyed the dis-
appointing news to the Parker that the depth charges had
gone rather wild, that the submarine was still steaming
ahead, and that they had obtained a " fix " of its position.
But the C/-53, as always, was exceedingly crafty. It knew
that the chasers were on the trail ; its propellers were
190 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
revolving so slowly that almost no noise was made ; the
U-boat was stealthily trying to throw its pursuers off the
scent. For two and a half hours the chasers kept up the
hunt, now losing the faint noise of the U-53, now again
picking it up, now turning in one direction, then abruptly
in another. Late in the afternoon, however, they obtained
a " fix," which disclosed the welcome fact that the sub-
marine was only about 300 yards north of them. In a few
minutes four depth charges landed on this spot.
When the waters had quieted the little craft began listen-
ing. But nothing was heard. For several days afterward
the radio operators could hear German submarines calling
across the void to the U-58, but there was no answer to their
call. Naturally, we believed that this long-sought enemy
had been destroyed ; about a week later, however, our
radios caught a message off the extreme northern coast of
Scotland, from the U-58, telling its friends in Germany that
it was on its way home. That this vessel had been seriously
damaged was evident, for it had made no attacks after its
experience with the subchasers ; but it apparently had as
many lives as a cat, for it was able, in its battered condition,
to creep back to Germany around the coast of Scotland, a
voyage of more than a thousand miles. The subchasers,
however, at least had the satisfaction of having ended the
active career of this boat. It was damaged two months
before the armistice was signed, but it never recovered
sufficiently from its injuries to make another voyage. Yet
I must do justice to Captain Rose he did not command
the U-58 on this last voyage. It was its only trip
during the whole course of the war when he had not
commanded it !
The story of the C7-53 ends with a touch which is char-
acteristically German. It was one of the submarines which
were surrendered to the Allies at the signing of the armistice.
Its first visitors, on this occasion, were the Americans ; they
were eager to read its log-book, and to find out just what
had happened on this final voyage. The book was on
board, and it contained a record of the U-58's voyages from
the day when it was commissioned up to the day when it
was surrendered. Two or three pages only were missing ;
the Germans had ripped out that part which described the
encounter with the American subchasers ! They were
evidently determined that we should never have the satisfac-
1918] ANOTHER U-BOAT HUNT 191
tion of knowing to just what extent we had damaged the
boat ; this was the only revenge they could take on us.
IV
On the morning of September 6th three subchaser units,
under the command of Ensign Ashley D. Adams,
U.S.N.R.F., were listening at a point about 150 miles west
of Land's End. At about eleven-thirty two of these units
detected what was unquestionably the sound of a sub-
marine. Moreover, the usual " fixes " disclosed that the
enemy was close at hand ; so close that two of the units ran
up and dropped their charges. This first attack produced
no result on the submarine ; the depth charge from one of
the howitzers, however, unfortunately landed near one of
the chasers, and, though it injured no one, it put that
particular unit out of commission. However, for two hours
Ensign Adams's division kept closely on the heels of the
quarry, now stopping to obtain a " fix," now running full
speed to catch up with the fleeing prey. At one o'clock
the plotting-room reported that the submerged boat was
just about a hundred yards ahead. The three chasers laid
barrages according to pattern, and the three " Y " guns
shot their depth charges ; the region of the " fix " was so
generously sowed with these bombs that it seemed an im-
possibility that the German could have escaped.
As soon as the tumult quieted down, the chasers put out
their tubes and listened. For twenty minutes not a sound
issued from the scene of all this activity. Then a propeller
was heard faintly turning or attempting to turn. The
noise this time was not the kind which indicated an effort
to steal away furtively ; it conveyed rather the impression
of difficulty and strain. There was a slight grating and
squeaking such as might have been made by damaged
machinery. This noise lasted for a few seconds and then
ceased. Presently it started up again and then once more
it stopped. The submarine was making a little progress,
but fitfully ; she would go a few yards and then pause. A
slight wake now appeared upon the surface, such as a
submerged U-boat usually left when the water was calm ;
the listeners at the tube were pleased to note that the loca-
tion of this disturbance coincided precisely with their " k fix,"
192 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
and thus, in a way, confirmed their calculations. One of
the subchasers promptly ran ahead and began to drop depth
charges on this wake. There was not the slightest doubt
that the surface boat was now directly on top of the sub-
marine. After one of the depth charges was dropped, a
black cylindrical object, about thirty inches long, suddenly
rose from the depths and jumped sixty feet into the air ;
just what this unexpected visitant was no one seems to
know, but that it came from the hunted submarine was
clear.
Under such distressing conditions the U-boat had only a
single chance of saving itself ; when the water was suffici-
ently shallow not deeper than three hundred feet it
could safely sink to the bottom and " play dead," hoping
that the chasers, with their accursed listening devices,
would tire of the vigil and return to port. A submarine, if
in very good condition, could remain silently on the bottom
for two or three days. The listeners on the chaser tubes
presently heard sounds which suggested that their enemy
was perhaps resorting to this manoeuvre. But there were
other noises which indicated that possibly this sinking to the
bottom was not voluntary. The listeners clearly heard a
scraping and a straining as though the boat was making
terrific attempts to rise. There was a lumbering noise,
such as might be made by a heavy object trying to drag
its hulk along the muddy bottom ; this was followed by
silence, showing that the wounded vessel could advance
only a few yards. A terrible tragedy was clearly beginning
down there in the slime of the ocean floor ; a boat, with
twenty-five or thirty human beings on board, was hope-
lessly caught, with nothing in sight except the most linger-
ing death. The listeners on the chasers could follow events
almost as clearly as though the inside of the U-boat could
be seen ; for every motion the vessel made, every effort
that the crew put forth to rescue itself from this living hell,
was registered on the delicate wires which reached the ears
of the men on the surface.
Suddenly sharp metallic sounds came up on the wires.
They were clearly made by hammers beating on the steel
body of the U-boat.
" They are trying to make repairs," the listeners re-
ported.
If our subchasers had had any more depth charges,
1918] A TERRIBLE DEATH 193
they would have promptly put: these wretches out of their
misery, but they had expended all their ammunition.
Darkness was now closing in ; our men saw that their
vigil was to be a long one ; they sent two chasers to Pen-
zance, to get a new supply of bombs, and also sent a radio
call for a destroyer. The spot where the submarine had
bottomed was marked by a buoy ; lanterns were hung
out on this buoy ; and two units of chasers, six boats in
all, prepared to stand guard. At any moment, of course,
the struggling U-boat might come to the surface, and it
was necessary to have forces near by to fight or to accept
surrender. All night long the chasers stood by ; now
and then the listeners reported scraping and straining
noises from below, but these grew fainter and fainter,
seeming almost to register the despair which must be
seizing the hearts of the imprisoned Germans.
At three o'clock in the morning a British destroyer
arrived and presently the two chasers returned from
Penzance with more ammunition. Meanwhile, the weather
had thickened, a fog had fallen, the lights on the buoy
had gone out, and the buoy itself had been pulled under
by the tide. The watching subchasers were tossed about
by the weather, and lost t,he precise bearing of the sunken
submarine. When daylight returned and the weather
calmed down the chasers again put over their tubes and
attempted to " fix " the U-boat. They listened for hours
without hearing a sound ; but about five o'clock in the
afternoon a sharp piercing noise came ringing over the
wires. It was a sound that made the listeners' blood run
cold.
Only one thing in the world could make a sound like
that. It was the crack of a revolver. The first report
had hardly stilled when another shot was heard ; and
then there were more in rapid succession. The listeners
on two different chasers heard these pistol cracks and
counted them ; the reports which these two men inde-
pendently made agreed in every detail. In all, twenty-
five shots came from the bottom of the sea. As there were
from twenty-five to thirty men in a submarine crew the
meaning was all too evident. The larger part of officers
and men, finding themselves shut tightly in their coffin
of steel, had resorted to that escape which was not un-
commonly availed of by German submarine crews in
14
194 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
this hideous war. Nearly all of them had committed
suicide.
Meanwhile, our subchaser detachment at Corfu was
performing excellent service. In these southern waters
Captain C. P. Nelson commanded two squadrons, com-
prising thirty-six vessels. Indeed, the American navy
possessed few officers more energetic, more efficient, more
lovable, or more personally engaging than Captain Nelson.
The mere fact that he was known among his brother
officers as " Juggy Nelson " gives some notion of the
affection which his personality inspired. This nickname
did not indicate, as might at first be suspected, that
Captain Nelson possessed qualities which flew in the face
of the prohibitory regulations of our navy : it was in-
tended, I think, as a description of the physical man.
For Captain Nelson's rotund figure, jocund countenance,
and always buoyant spirits were priceless assets to our
naval forces at Corfu. Living conditions there were not
of the best ; disease was rampant among the Serbians,
Greeks, and Albanians who made up the civil population ;
there were few opportunities for entertainment or relaxa-
tion ; it was, therefore, a happy chance that the com-
mander was a man whose very presence radiated an
atmosphere of geniality and enthusiasm. His conversa-
tional powers for many years had made him a man of
mark ; his story-telling abilities had long delighted naval
officers and statesmen at Washington ; no other selection
for commander could have been made that would have
met with more whole-hearted approval from the college
boys and other high-type civilians who so largely made
up our forces in these flotillas. At Corfu, indeed, Captain
Nelson quickly became a popular favourite ; his mind was
always actively forming plans for the discomfiture of the
German and Austrian submarines ; and all our Allies were
as much impressed with his energy as were our own men.
For Captain Nelson was more than a humorist and enter-
tainer : he was pre-eminently a sailor of the saltest
type, and he had a real barbaric joy in a fight. Even in
his official communications to his officers and men he
1918] THE STRAITS OF OTRANTO 195
invariably referred to the enemy as the " Hun " ; the
slogan on which he insisted as the guiding principle of his
flotilla was " get the Hun before he has a chance to get
us." He had the supreme gift of firing his subordinates
with the same spirit that possessed himself ; and the
vigilance, the constant activity, and the courage of the
subchasers' crews admirably supplemented the sailor-like
qualities of the man who commanded them.
I have already referred to the sea-going abilities of the
subchasers ; but the feat accomplished by those that made
the trip to Corfu was the most admirable of all. These
thirty-six boats, little more than motor launches in size,
sailed from New London to Greece a distance of 6,000
miles ; and, a day or two after their arrival, they began
work on the Otranto barrage. Of course they could not
have made this trip without the assistance of vessels to
supply them with gasolene, make the necessary routine
repairs, care for the sick and those suffering from the
inevitable minor accidents ; and it is greatly to the credit
of the naval officers who commanded the escorting vessels
that they shepherded these flotillas across the ocean with
practically no losses. On their way through the Straits
of Gibraltar they made an attack on a submarine which
so impressed Admiral Niblack that he immediately wired
London headquarters for a squadron to be permanently
based on that port.
As already said, the Otranto Strait was an ideal location
for this type of anti -submarine craft. It was so narrow
about forty miles that a force of moderate size could
keep practically all of the critical zone under fairly close
observation. Above all, the water was so deep nearly
600 fathoms (3,600 feet) that a submarine, once picked
up by the listening devices, could not escape by the method
which was so popular in places where the water was
shallow that of sinking to the bottom and resting there
until the excitement was over. On the other hand, this
great depth made it very difficult to obstruct the passage
by a fixed barrier a difficulty that was being rapidly over-
come by a certain Franco-Italian type of torpedo net.
This barrage, after the arrival of our chasers, was so
reorganized as to make the best use of their tactical and
listening qualities. The several lines of patrolling vessels
extended about thirty-five miles ; there were vessels of
196 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
several types, the whole making a formidable gauntlet,
which the submarines had to run before they could get
from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean. First came a
line of British destroyers ; it was their main duty to act
as protectors and to keep the barrage from being raided
by German and Austrian surface ships a function which
they fulfilled splendidly. Next came a line of trawlers,
then drifters, motor launches, and chasers, the whole being
completed by a line of kite balloon sloops. Practically
all these vessels, British as well as American, were pro-
vided with the American devices ; and so well did these
ingenious mechanisms function that it was practically
impossible for any submarine to pass through the Otranto
barrage in calm weather without being heard. In fact,
it became the regular custom for the enemy to wait for
stormy weather before attempting to slip through this
dangerous area, and even under these conditions he had
great difficulty in avoiding detection.
From July, 1918, until the day of the armistice, our
flotilla at this point kept constantly at work ; and the
reports of our commanders show that their sound contacts
with the enemy were very frequent. There were battles
that unquestionably ended in the destruction of the sub-
marines ; just how much we had accomplished, however,
we did not know until the Austrians surrendered and our
officers, at Cattaro and other places, came into touch with
officers of the Austrian navy. These men, who showed
the most friendly disposition toward their American
enemies, though they displayed the most bitter hostility
toward the r German allies, expressed their admiration
for the work of our subchasers. These little boats, the
Austrians now informed us, were responsible for a mutiny
in the Austrian submarine force. Two weeks after their
arrival it was impossible to compel an Austrian crew to
take a vessel through the straits, and from that time until
the ending of the war not a single Austrian submarine
ventured upon such a voyage. All the submarines that
essayed the experiment after this Austrian mutiny were
German. And the German crews, the Austrian officers
said, did not enjoy the experience any more than their
own. There was practically no case in which a submarine
crossed the barrage without being bombed in consequence ;
the moral of the German crews steadily went to pieces,
1918] AN ONLY SURVIVOR 197
until, in the last month of the war, their officers were
obliged to force them -into the submarines at the point of
a pistol. The records showed, the Austrian high officers
said, that the Germans had lost six submarines on the
Otranto barrage in the last three months of the war.
These figures about correspond with the estimates which
we had made ; just how many of these the British sank
and just how many are to be attributed to our own forces
will probably never be known, but the fact that American
devices were attached to all the Allied ships on this duty
should be considered in properly distributing the credit.
We have evidence conclusive even though somewhat
ludicrous that the American device on a British destroyer
" got " one of these submarines. One dark night this
vessel, equipped with the C-tube, had pursued a submarine
and bombed it with what seemed to have been satisfactory
results. However, I have several times called attention
to one of the most discouraging aspects of anti-submarine
warfare : that only in exceptional circumstances did we
know whether the submarine had been destroyed. This
destroyer was now diligently searching the area of the battle,
the listeners straining every nerve for traces of her foe.
For a time everything was utterly silent ; then, suddenly,
the listener picked up a disturbance of an unusual kind.
The noise rapidly became louder, but it was still something
very different from any noise ever heard before. The
C-tube consisted of a lead pipe practically the same as a
water pipe which was dropped over the side of the ship
fifteen or twenty feet into the sea ; this pipe contained
the wires which, at one end, were attached to the devices
under the water, and which, at the other end, reached the
listener's ears. In a few seconds this tube showed signs
of lively agitation. It trembled violently and made a
constantly increasing hullabaloo in the ears of the listener.
Finally a huge German, dripping with water like a sea lion,
appeared over the side of the destroyer and astounded our
British Allies by throwing up his arms with " Kamerad ! "
This visitant from the depths was the only survivor of
the submarine which it now appeared had indubitably
been sunk. He had been blown through the conning
tower, or had miraculously escaped in some other way
he did not himself know just what had taken place and
while floundering around in the water in the inky dark-
198 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
ness had, by one of those providences which happen so
frequently in war time, caught hold of this tube, and
proceeded to pull himself up hand-over-hand until he
reached the deck. Had it not been for his escape, the
British would never have known that they had sunk the
submarine !
This survivor, after shaking off the water, sat down and
became very sociable. He did not seem particularly to
dislike the British and Americans, but he was extremely
bitter against the Italians and Austrians the first for
" deserting " the Germans, the latter for proving bad
allies.
" How do you get on with the Italians ? " he asked the
British officer.
" Very well indeed," the latter replied, giving a very
flattering account of the Italian allies.
" I guess the Italians are about as useful to you as the
Austrians are to us," the German sea lion replied.
In writing to our officers about this episode, the British
commander said :
" We have found a new use for your listening devices
salvaging drowning Huns."
VI
On September 28, 1918, Captain Nelson received the
following communication from the commander of the
Allied naval forces at Brindisi, Commodore W. A. H.
Kelly, R.N. :
" Can you hold twelve chasers ready to leave Corfu to-
morrow (Sunday) for special service ? They should have
stores for four days. If unavoidable, barrage force may
be reduced during their absence. Request reply. Further
definite orders will be sent Sunday afternoon."
To this Captain Nelson sent an answer which was
entirely characteristic :
" Yes."
The Captain well knew what the enterprise was to
which this message referred. The proposed undertaking
was one which was very close to his heart and one which
he had constantly urged. The Austrian port of Durazzo,
on the Adriatic, at that time was playing an important
1918] ATTACK ON DURAZZO 199
part in the general conflict. It was a base by which Ger-
many and Austria had sent supplies to their ally Bulgaria ;
and in September the Entente had started the campaign
against Bulgaria which finally ended in the complete
humiliation of that country. The destruction of Durazzo
as a base would greatly assist this operation. Several
ships lay in the harbour ; there were many buildings used
for army stores ; the destruction of all these, as well as
the docks and military works, would render the port use-
less. The bombardment of Durazzo was, therefore, the
undertaking for which the assistance of our subchasers
had been requested. It was estimated that about one
hour's heavy shelling would render this port valueless as
an Austrian base ; and to accomplish this destruction
the Italians had detailed three light cruisers, the San
Giorgio, the Pisa, and the San Marco, and the British
three light scout cruisers, the Lowestoft, the Dartmouth,
and the Weymouth. According to the plan agreed upon
the Italian ships would arrive at Durazzo at about ten
o'clock on Wednesday morning, October 2nd, bombard the
works for an hour, and then return to Brindisi ; when
they had finished, it was proposed that the British cruisers
should take their places, bombard for an hour, and like-
wise retire. The duty which had been assigned to the
subchasers in this operation was an important one. The
Austrians had a considerable force of submarines at
Durazzo ; and it was to be expected that they would
send them to attack the bombarding warships. The
chasers, therefore, were to accompany the cruisers, in
order to fight any submarine which attempted to inter-
fere with the game. " Remember the life of these cruisers
depends upon your vigilance and activity," said Captain
Nelson in the instructions issued to the officers who
commanded the little vessels.
At nine o'clock that Sunday evening twelve chasers
slipped through the net at Corfu and started across the
Adriatic ; they sailed " in column," or single file, Captain
Nelson heading the procession in subchaser No. 95, his
second in command, Lt.-Comdr. Paul H. Bastedo, coming
next in chaser No. 215. The tiny fleet hardly suggested
to the observer anything in the nature of military opera-
tions ; they looked more like a group of motor launches
out for a summer cruise. The next morning they arrived
200 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOtS AND SUBCHASERS
at Brindisi, the gathering place of all the Allied vessels
which were to participate in the operation that same
Brindisi (or Brundisium) which was one of the most
famous ports of antiquity, the town from which Augustus
and Antony, in 42 B.C., started on the expedition which,
at the battle of Philippi, was to win them the mastery of
the ancient world. Upon arriving Captain Nelson went
ashore for a council w T ith Commodore Kelly, who com-
manded the British cruisers, and other Allied officers.
When he returned Captain Nelson's face was glowing
with happiness and expectation.
" It's going to be a real party, boys," he informed his
subordinate officers.
Two days were spent at Brindisi, completing prepara-
tions ; on Tuesday evening Captain Nelson called all his
officers for a meeting on board the British destroyer
Badger, to give them all the details of the forthcoming
" party." If there had been any flagging spirits in that
company when the speech began which I do not believe
all depression had vanished when " Juggy " had finished
his remarks ; every officer left with his soul filled by the
same joy of approaching battle as that which possessed
his chief.
At 2.30 Wednesday morning the chasers left Brindisi,
steering a straight course to Durazzo. The night was
very dark ; the harbour was black also with the smoke
from the cruisers and other craft which were making
preparations to get away. After steaming a few hours
the officers obtained with their glasses their first glimpse
of Durazzo ; at this time there were no fighting ships in
sight except the chasers, as the larger ships had not yet
arrived. Captain Nelson knew that there were two or
three Austrian destroyers at Durazzo, and his first efforts
were devoted to attempts to persuade them to come out
and give battle. With this idea in mind, the chasers
engaged in what they called a " war dance " before the
port ; they began turning rapidly in a great circle, but
all to no purpose, for the Austrian ships declined to accept
the challenge. After a time the smoke of the Italian
cruisers appeared above the horizon ; this was the signal
for the chasers to take their stations. Durazzo is located
in an indentation of the coast ; at the southern extremity
of the little gulf the land juts out to a point, known as
1918J ATTACK ON DURAZZO 201
Cape Laghi ; at the northern extremity the corresponding
point is Cape Pali ; the distance between these two points
is about fifteen miles. Two subchaser units, six boats,
were assigned as a screen to the Italian cruisers while the
bombardment was under way. One unit, three boats,
was stationed at Cape Pali, to the north, to prevent any
submarines leaving Durazzo from attacking the British
cruisers, which were to approach the scene of activities
from that quarter, and another unit, three boats, was
stationed off Cape Laghi. Thus the two critical capes
were covered against submarine surprises, and the attack-
ing vessels themselves were effectively screened.
The Italian cruisers sailed back and forth for about an
hour, blazing away at Durazzo, destroying shipping in
the harbour, knocking down military buildings, and
devastating the place on a liberal scale, all the time
screened in this operation by our chasers. Meantime,
unit B, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bastedo,
had started for its station at Cape Pali. The Austrian
shore batteries at once opened upon the tiny craft, the
water in their neighbourhood being generously churned
up by the falling shells. Meanwhile, the British cruisers,
after steaming for a while east, turned south in order to
take up the bombarding station which, according to the
arranged programme, the Italian warships were about to
abandon. The three screening chasers were steaming in
column, No. 129, commanded by Ensign Maclair Jacoby,
U.S.N.R.F., bringing up the rear. Suddenly this little
boat turned to the right and started scampering in the
direction of some apparently very definite object. It
moved so abruptly and hastily that it did not take the time
even to signal to its associates the cause of its unexpected
manoeuvre.
On board No. 215 there was some question as to what
should be done.
"Let's. go," said Commander Bastedo. "Perhaps he's
after a submarine."
No. 215 was immediately turned in the direction of the
busy No. 129, when the interest of its officers was aroused
by a little foamy fountain of spray moving in the water
slightly forward of its port beam. There was no mystery
as to the cause of that feathery disturbance. It was
made by a periscope ; it was moving with considerable
202 AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS
speed also, entirely ignoring the subchasers, and shaping
its course directly toward the advancing British cruisers.
Commander Bastedo forgot all about subchaser A T o. 129,
which apparently was after game of its own, and headed
his own boat in the direction of this little column of spray.
In a few seconds the periscope itself became visible ; Com-
mander Bastedo opened fire at it with his port gun ; at
the second shot a column of water and air arose about six
feet a splendid geyser which informed the pursuer that
the periscope had been shattered. By this time the third
chaser, No. 128, was rushing at full speed. The submarine
now saw that all chance of attacking the British ships had
gone, and turned to the south in an effort to get away
with a whole skin. But the two subchasers, 215 and 128,
quickly turned again and started for their prey ; soon
both w r ere dropping depth charges and shooting their
" Y " guns ; and a huge circle of the sea was a mass of
explosions, whirling water, mighty eruptions of foam,
mist, and debris and in the mass, steel plates and other
wreckage flew from the depths into the air.
" That got him ! " cried the executive officer from the
deck of No. 215, while the crew lifted up its voices in a
shout that was reminiscent of a college yell.
It was not until this moment that Commander Bastedo
and his associates remembered the 129, which, w r hen last
observed, was speeding through the water on an inde-
pendent course of her own. In the midst of the excite-
ment there came a message from this boat :
" Submarine sighted ! "
Then a second afterward came another message.
" My engines are disabled."
In a short time Bastedo had reached the boat.
" Where is the submarine ? "
" We just sank it," was the answer. No. 129 had
dropped eight depth charges, one directly over the Austrian
boat ; in the water thrown up the officers had counted
seven pieces of metal plates, and the masses of oil and
bubbles that presently arose completed the story of the
destruction. Meanwhile, the British cruisers had taken
up their station at Durazzo and were finishing the work
that made this place useless as a military headquarters.
Not a man in the whole American force was injured ; in
a brief time the excitement w r as all over, and the great
1918] SURRENDER OF AUSTRIA 203
ships, screened again by the wasps of chasers, started
back to Brindisi. The impression made upon our Allies
was well expressed in the congratulatory message sent to
me in London by Commodore Kelly, who commanded the
British cruisers in this action.
" Their conduct," he said, " was beyond praise. They
all returned safely without casualties. They thoroughly
enjoyed themselves."
And from the Italians came this message :
" Italian Naval General Staff expresses highest appre-
ciation of useful and efficient work performed by United
States chasers in protecting major vessels during action
against Durazzo ; also vivid admiration of their brilliant
and clever operations which resulted in sinking two enemy
submarines."
The war was now drawing to a close ; a day before the
Allied squadrons started for Durazzo Bulgaria surrendered ;
about two weeks after the attack Austria had given up
the ghost. The subchasers were about this time just
getting into their stride ; the cessation of hostilities,
however, ended their careers at the very moment when
they had become most useful. A squadron of thirty-six
under the command of Captain A. J. Hepburn reached
Queenstown in September, but though it had several
interesting contacts with the enemy, and is credited with
sending one German home badly damaged, the armistice
was signed before it had really settled down to work.
The final spectacular appearance was at Gibraltar, in the
last four days of the war. The surrender of Austria had
left the German submarines stranded in the Adriatic
without a base ; and they started home by way of the
Mediterranean and Gibraltar. A squadron of eighteen
chasers had just arrived at the Azores, on the way to
reinforce the flotilla at Plymouth ; seven of these were at
once despatched to Gibraltar on the chance that they
might bar the passage of these U-boats. They reached
this port at the storm season ; yet they went out in the
hardest gales and had several exciting contacts with the
fleeing Germans. The records show that five submarines
attempted to get through the straits ; there is good evi-
dence that two of these were sunk, one by the British
patrol and one by our chasers.
CHAPTER VII
THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
WHILE our naval forces were thus playing their parts in
several areas, the work of creating the central staff of a
great naval organization was going forward in London.
The headquarters for controlling extensive naval opera-
tions in many widely dispersed areas, like the head-
quarters of an army extending over a wide front, must
necessarily be located far behind the scene of battle.
Thus, a number of remodelled dwelling-houses in Grosvenor
Gardens contained the mainspring for an elaborate
mechanism which reached from London to Washington
and from Queenstown to Corfu. On the day of the armis-
tice the American naval forces in European waters com-
prised about 370 vessels of all classes, more than 5,000
officers, regulars and reserves, and more than 75,000
men ; we had established about forty-five bases and were
represented in practically every field of naval operations.
The widespread activities of our London headquarters on
that eventful day presented a striking contrast to the
humble beginnings of eighteen months before.
From April to August, 1917, the American navy had a
very small staff organization in Europe. During these
extremely critical four months the only American naval
representatives in London, besides the regular Naval
Attach6 and his aides, were my personal aide, Commander
J. V. Babcock, and myself ; and our only office in those
early days was a small room in the American Embassy.
For a considerable part of this time we had no stenographers
and no clerical assistance of our own, though of course the
Naval Attache, Captain W. D. MacDougall, and his per-
sonnel gave us all the assistance in their power. Com-
204
1917-18] COMMANDER BABCOCK 203
mander Babcock had a small typewriter, which he was
able to work with two fingers, and on this he laboriously
pounded out the reports which first informed the Navy
Department of the seriousness of the submarine situation.
The fact that Commander Babcock was my associate
during this critical period was a fortunate thing for me,
and a still more fortunate thing for the United States.
Commander Babcock and I had been closely associated
for several years ; in that early period, when we, in our
two persons, represented the American naval forces at the
seat of Allied naval activity, we not only worked together
in that little room but we lived together. Our office was
alternately this room in the American Embassy and our
quarters in an hotel. I had already noted Commander
Babcock' s abilities when he was on my staff in the Atlantic
Torpedo Flotilla and when he was a student at the Naval
War College ; but our constant companionship through-
out the war, especially during these first few strenuous
months in London, gave me a still greater respect for his
qualities. Many men have made vital contributions to
our success in the war of whom the public scarcely ever
hears even the name. A large part of the initiative and
thinking which find expression in successful military action
originates with officers of this type. They labour day
after day and night after night, usually in subordinate
positions, unselfishly doing work which is necessarily
credited to other names than their own, daily lightening
the burden of their chiefs, and constantly making sugges-
tions which may control military operations or affect
national policy. Commander Babcock is a striking repre-
sentative of this type. My personal obligations to him are
incalculable ; and I am indebted to him not only for his
definite services, but for the sympathy, the encouragement,
and the kindly and calculated pessimism which served so
well to counterbalance my temperamental optimism.
Our relations were so close, working and living together
as we did, that I find it difficult to speak of " Babby's "
services with restraint. But there are particular accom-
plishments to his credit which should go down upon this
popular record. I have described the first consultations
with the British naval chiefs. These were the meetings
which formed the basis of the reports recommending the
conditions upon which the American navy should co-
206 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
operate with the Allies. Commander Babcock was con-
stantly at my elbow during all these consultations, and
was all the time independently conducting investigations
in the several departments of the Admiralty. The original
drafts of all my written and cabled communications to the
department reports which form a connected story of our
participation in the naval war during this period were
prepared by him.
Able as Commander Babcock was, human endurance
still had its limitations. A public-spirited American
business man in London, Mr. R. E. Gillmor, who had
formerly been an officer in the navy, begged to be accepted
as a volunteer ; he brought two of his best stenographers,
English girls, and personally paid their salaries for several
weeks while they were devoting all their time to the
American navy. Subsequently he was enlisted in the
naval reserves and performed very valuable services on
the staff throughout nearly the entire period of the war
until ordered to America, where his technical knowledge
was required in connection with certain important appli-
ances with which he was familiar. His experience as a
business man in London was of great value to our forces,
and his time and energy were devoted to our service with
a zeal and loyalty that endeared him to us all.
Soon afterward a number of Rhodes scholars and other
young Americans then in Europe, G. B. Stockton, E. H.
McCormick, T. B. Kittredge, P. F. Good, R. M. D. Richard-
son, H. - Millard, L. S. Stevens, and J. C. Baillargeon,
joined our forces as unpaid volunteers and gave us the
benefit of their trained minds and European experience.
Two of these, Kittredge and Stockton, both valuable
workers, had been serving under Hoover in Belgium.
They were all later enrolled as reserves and continued
their work throughout the war. Lieutenant Stockton
performed the arduous and important duties of chief
business manager, or executive officer, of headquarters in
a most efficient manner, and throughout the war Kitt-
redge' s previous historical training, European experience,
and fine intellectual gifts made his services very valuable
in the Intelligence Department.
Mr. Page, the American Ambassador, aided and encour-
aged us in all possible ways. Immediately after my
arrival in London he invited me to call upon him and his
1917-18] OUR GROWING FORCES 207
staff for any assistance they could render. In his enthusi-
astic and warm-hearted way, he said : " Everything we
have is yours. I will turn the Embassy into the street
if necessary " ; and throughout the war he was a tower
of strength to the cause. He gave us his time and the
benefit of his great experience and personal prestige in
establishing cordial relations with the various branches of
the British Government and all this with such an absence
of diplomatic formality, such courteous and forceful
efficiency, and such cordial sympathy and genuine kind-
ness that he immediately excited not only our sincere
admiration but also our personal affection.
During all this period events of the utmost importance
were taking place ; it was within these four months that
the convoy system was adopted, that armed guards were
placed on merchant ships, that the first American troops
were escorted to France, and that our destroyers and
other warships began arriving in European waters. In
July it became apparent that the strain of doing the work
of a dozen men, which had been continuous during the
past four months, could no longer be supported by my
aide, Commander Babcock. When the destroyers and
other ships arrived, we went through their lists ; here
and there we hit upon a man whom we regarded as qualified
for responsible staff duty, and transferred him to the Lon-
don headquarters. This proceeding was necessary if our
essential administrative work was to be done. Among
the reserves who were subsequently assigned to our
forces many excellent staff officers also were developed
for handling the work of communications, cipher codes,
and the like. When the Colonel House Commission came
over in October, 1917, I explained our necessities to the
" skippers " of the two cruisers that brought the party,
who promptly gave us all the desks and office equipment
they could spare and sent them to Grosvenor Gardens.
In August, however, additional ships and forces began
to arrive from America, and it became necessary to have
larger quarters than those available in the Embassy for
handling the increasing administrative work. At one time
the British Government contemplated building us a tem-
porary structure near the Admiralty, but this was aban-
doned because there was a shortage of material. We
therefore moved into an unoccupied dwelling near the
208 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
American Embassy that seemed adapted to our needs.
We rented this house furnished, just as it stood ; a first
glimpse of it, however, suggested refined domesticity
rather than naval operations. We quickly cleared the
building of rugs, tapestries, lace curtains, pictures, and
expensive furniture, reduced the twenty-five rooms to
their original bareness, and filled every corner with office
equipment. In a few days the staff was installed in this
five-story residence and the place was humming with the
noise of typewriters. At first we regarded the leasing of
this building as something of an extravagance ; it seemed
hardly likely that we should ever use it all ! But in a few
weeks we had taken the house adjoining, cut holes through
the walls and put in doors ; and this, too, was filled up in
an incredibly short time, so rapidly did the administrative
work grow. Ultimately we had to take over six of these
private residences and make alterations which transformed
them into one. From August our staff increased at a rapid
rate until, on the day the armistice was signed, we had
not far from 1,200 officers, enlisted men, and clerical force,
working in our London establishment, the commissioned
staff consisting of about 200 officers, of which sixty were
regulars and the remainder reserves.
I find that many people are surprised that I had my
headquarters in London. The historic conception of the
commander-in-chief of a naval force located on the quarter-
deck of his flagship still holds the popular imagination.
But controlling the operations of extensive and widely
dispersed forces in a campaign of this kind is quite a
different proceeding from that of directing the naval cam-
paigns of Nelson's time, just as making war on land has
changed somewhat from the method in vogue with Napo-
leon. The opinion generally prevails that my principal
task was to command in person certain naval forces afloat.
The fact is that this was really no part of my job during the
war. The game in which several great nations were engaged
for four years was a game involving organized direction
and co-operation. It is improbable that any one nation
could have won the naval war ; that was a task which
demanded not only that we should all exert our fullest
energies, but that, so far as it was humanly possible, we
should exert them as a unit. It was the duty of the
United States above all nations to manifest this spirit.
1917-18] THE TASK OF AMERICA 209
We had entered the war late ; we had entered it in a con-
dition of unpreparedness ; our naval forces, when com-
pared to those which had been assembled by the Allies,
were small ; we had not been engaged for three years
combating an enemy using new weapons and methods of
naval warfare. It was not unlikely that we could make
some original contributions to the Allied effort ; indeed,
we early did so ; yet it was natural to suppose that the
navies which had been combating the submarines so long
understood that game better than did we, and it was our
duty to assist them in this work, rather than to operate
independently. Moreover, this question as to whether
any particular one of our methods might be better or
might be worse than Great Britain's was not the most
important one. The point was that the British navy
had developed its own methods of working and that it was
a great " going concern." The crisis was so pressing
that we simply did not have the time to create a separate
force of our own ; the most cursory examination of con-
ditions convinced me that we could hope to accomplish
something worth while only by playing the game as it
was then being played, and that any attempt to lay
down new rules would inevitably decrease the effective-
ness of our co-operation, and perhaps result in losing the
war. We can even admit, for the sake of the argument,
that the Americans might have created a better organiza-
tion than the British ; but the question of improving on
their methods, or of not improving on them, was a point
that was not worth considering ; long before we could
have developed an efficient independent machine the war
would have come to an end. It was thus our duty to
take things as they were, to plunge immediately into the
conflict, and to make every ship and every man tell in
the most effective way and in the shortest possible time.
Therefore I decided that our forces should become, for
the purpose of this war, virtually a part of the Allied
navies ; to place at the disposal of the Allies our ships to
reinforce the weak part of their lines ; to ignore such
secondary considerations as national pride, naval prestige,
and personal ambitions ; and to subordinate every other
consideration to that of defeating the Hun. I have
already described how in distributing our subchasers I
practically placed them at the disposal of the Allied
15
210 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
Council ; and this represents the policy that was followed
in all similar matters.
The naval high commands were located at Washington,
London, Paris, and Rome. Necessarily London was the
headquarters of the naval war. Events which had long
preceded the European conflict had made this choice in-
evitable. The maritime development of four centuries
had prepared London for the r61e which she was now
called upon to play. From all over the world naval and
maritime information flowed to this great capital as
though in obedience to the law of gravity. Even in peace
times London knew where every ship in the world was
at any particular time. All other machinery for handling
this great mass of detail was necessarily accumulated in
this great city, and Lloyd's, the world headquarters for
merchant shipping, had now become practically a part
of the British Admiralty. In this war the matter of
information and communications was supremely impor-
tant. Every decision that was made and every order
that was issued, even those that were the least conse-
quential, rested upon complete information which was
obtainable, in time to be useful, only in London. I could
not have made my headquarters in Washington, or Paris,
or Rome because these cities could not have furnished the
military intelligence which was needed as a preliminary to
every act. For the same reason I could not have efficiently
controlled the operations of all our forces from Queenstown,
or Brest, or Gibraltar ; the staff controlling the whole had
necessarily to be located in London, and the tactical com-
mands at these other bases must be exercised by subor-
dinates. The British placed all their sources of informa-
tion and their communications at our disposal. They
literally opened their doors and made us part of their
organization. I sat daily in consultation with British
naval chiefs, and our officers had access to all essential
British information just as freely as did the British naval
officers themselves. On the day of my arrival Admiral
Jellicoe issued orders that the Americans should be shown
anything which they wished to see. With all this infor-
mation, the most complete and detailed in the world,
constantly placed at our disposal, and a spirit of confi-
dence and friendship always prevailing which has no
parallel in history, it would have defeated the whole
1917-18] THE ADMIRALTY 211
purpose of our participation in the war had the American
high command taken up its headquarters anywhere except
in London.
Incidentally, there was an atmosphere in the London
Admiralty which made a strong appeal to anyone who is
interested in naval history. Everything about the place
is reminiscent of great naval achievements. The room in
which our councils met was the same old Admiralty Board
room that had been used for centuries. In accordance
with the spirit of British conservatism, this room is almost
exactly the same now, even in its furnishings, as it was in
Nelson's time. The same old wood carvings hang over
the same old fireplace ; the table at which we sat is the
identical one at which Nelson must have sat many
times, and the very silver inkstand which Nelson used
was used by his successors in this war. The portrait of
this great naval chieftain looked down upon us during our
deliberations. Above the fireplace is painted a huge
compass, and about the centre of this swings an arrow.
This was a part of the Admiralty equipment of a hundred
years ago, though it has no usefulness now except a
sentimental one. In old days this arrow was geared to a
weather vane on the roof of the Admiralty, and it con-
stantly showed to the chiefs assembled in the council
room the direction of the wind a matter of great impor-
tance in the days of sailing ships.
All general orders and plans concerning the naval opera-
tions of British and American forces came from the
Admiralty, and here officers of my staff were constantly
at work. The commanders-in-chief at the various bases
commanded the combined British and American ships
based on those ports only in the sense that they carried
out the general instructions and policies which were
formulated in London. These orders, so far as they
affected American forces, could be issued to the com-
manders-in-chief only after American headquarters in
London had vise"d them. Thus the American staff held
the ultimate command over all the American forces which
were based in British waters. The same was true of those
at Brest, Gibraltar, and other stations. The commanders-
in-chief executed them, and were responsible for the
manner in which the forces were used in combating the
enemy. The operations of which I was the commander
212 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
extended over an immense area. The Plymouth and
Queenstown forces represented only a part of the ultimate
American naval strength in European waters and not the
most important part ; before the war ended, Brest, as I
shall show, developed into a greater naval base than any
of those which we maintained in the British Isles. Con-
voys were not only coming across the Atlantic but they
were constantly arriving from the Mediterranean and from
the South Sea, and it was the duty of headquarters in
London, and not the duty of local commanders, to route
these precious argosies, except in special cases, just before
they reached their port of destination. Not infrequently,
as previously described, it was necessary to change destina-
tions, or to slow down convoys, or to make any number
of decisions based on new information ; naturally only
the centre of information, the Admiralty convoy room,
could serve as a clearing house for such operations. The
point is that it was necessary for me to exercise the chief
command of American forces through subordinates. My
position in this respect was precisely the same as that of
Generals Haig and Pershing ; I had to maintain a great
headquarters in the rear, and to depend upon subordinates
for the actual execution of orders.
The American headquarters in London comprised many
separate departments, each one of which was directly
responsible to me as the Force Commander, through the
Chief of Staff ; they included such indispensable branches
as the office of the Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining,
Chief of Staff ; Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain W. R.
Sexton ; Intelligence Department, Commander J. V.
Babcock, who also acted as Aide ; Convoy Operations
Section, Captain Byron A. Long ; Anti-submarine Section,
Captain R. H. Leigh ; Aviation Section, Captain H. I.
Cone, and afterward, Lieutenant-Commander W. A.
Edwards; Personnel Section, Commander H. R. Stark;
Communication Section, Lieutenant-Commander E. G.
Blakeslee ; Material Section, Captain E. C. Tobey (S.C.) ;
Repair Section, Captain S. F. Smith (C.C.), and after-
ward, L. B. McBride (C.C.) ; Ordnance Section, Com-
mander G. L. Schuyler, and afterward, Commander T. A.
Thomson ; Medical Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell
(M.C.), and afterward, Commander Edgar Thompson
(M.C.) ; Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann ;
1917-18] PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITY 218
and the Scientific Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead,
Ph.D.
I was fortunate in all of my departmental chiefs. The
Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining, would certainly have
been a marked man in any navy ; he had a genius for
detail, a tireless energy, and a mastery of all the problems
that constantly arose. I used to wonder when Captain
Twining ever found an opportunity to sleep ; he seemed
to be working every hour of the day and night ; yet, so
far as was observable, he never wearied of his task, and
never slackened in his devotion to the Allied cause. As
soon as a matter came up that called for definite decision,
Captain Twining would assemble from the several depart-
ments all data and information which were available
concerning the question at issue, spend a few hours study-
ing this information, and then give his judgment an
opinion which was invariably sound and which was adopted
in the vast majority of cases ; in fact, in all cases except
those in which questions of policy or extraneous con-
siderations dictated a different or modified decision. Cap-
tain Twining is a man of really fine intellect combined
with a remarkable capacity for getting things done ;
without his constant presence at my elbow, my work
would have been much heavier and much less successful
than it was. He is an officer of such exceptional ability,
such -matured experience, and such forceful character as
to assure him a brilliant career in whatever duty he may
be called upon to perform. I can never be sufficiently
grateful to him for his loyalty and devotion and for his
indispensable contribution to the efficiency of the forces
I had the honour to command.
In accordance with my habitual practice, I applied the
system of placing responsibility upon my carefully selected
heads of departments, giving them commensurate authority,
and holding them to account for results. Because the task
was such a great one, this was the only possible way in
which the operations of the force could have been success-
fully conducted. I say, successfully conducted, because in
a " business " of this kind, " good enough " and " to-
morrow " may mean disaster ; that is, it is a case of keeping
both information and operations up to the minute. If the
personnel and equipment of the staff are not completely
capable of this, it is more than a partial failure, and the
2H THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
result is an ever-present danger. There were men in this
great war who " went to pieces " simply because they tried
to do everything themselves. This administrative vice
of attempting to control every detail, even insignificant ones,
to which military men seem particularly addicted, it had
always been my policy to avoid. Business at Grosvenor
Gardens developed to such an extent that about a thousand
messages were every day received in our office or sent from
it ; and of these 60 per cent, were in code. Obviously it
was impossible for the Force Commander to keep constantly
at his finger ends all these details. All department heads,
therefore, were selected because they were officers who could
be depended upon to handle these matters and make
decisions independently ; they were all strong men, and
it is to their combined efforts that the success of our opera-
tions was due. You would have to search a long time
among the navies of the world before you could find an abler
convoy officer than Captain Byron A. Long ; an abler naval
constructor than Captain L. B. McBride ; an abler man to
have charge of the finances of our naval forces, the purchase
of supplies and all kinds of material than Captain (S.C.)
Eugene C. Tobey ; abler aviation officers than Captain
H. I. Cone and Lieutenant -Commander W. A. Edwards ;
an abler chief of operations than Captain R. H. Leigh, or an
abler intelligence officer than Commander J. V. Babcock.
These men, and others of the fourteen department heads,
acted as a kind of cabinet. Many of them handled matters
which, though wholly essential to the success of the forces,
were quite outside of my personal knowledge or experience,
and consequently they had to be men in whose ability to
guide me in such matters I could place complete confidence.
As an example of this I may cite one of the duties of Captain
Tobey. Nearly all of the very considerable financial
transactions he was entrusted with were " Greek " to me,
but he had only to show me the right place on the numerous
documents, and I signed my name in absolute confidence
that the interests of the Government were secure.
All cables, reports, and other communications were
referred each day to the department which they concerned.
The head of each department studied them, attended to the
great majority on his own responsibility, and selected the
few that needed more careful attention. A meeting of the
Chief of Staff and all department heads was held each day,
1917-18] A PLANNING SECTION 215
at which these few selected matters were discussed in
council and decisions made. The final results of these
deliberations were the only matters that were referred to
me. This system of subdividing responsibility and author-
ity not only promoted efficiency but it left the Force Com-
mander time to attend to vitally important questions of
general policy, to keep in personal touch with the high
command of the Allied navies, to attend the Allied naval
councils, and, in general, to keep his finger constantly on the
pulse of the whole war situation. Officers of our own and
other navies who were always coming in from the outlying
stations, and who could immediately be placed in touch
with the one man who could answer all their questions and
give immediate decisions, testified to the efficient condition
in which the American headquarters was maintained.
One of our departments was so novel, and performed such
valuable service, that I must describe it in some detail.
We took over into our London organization an idea that is
advantageously used in many American industrial establish-
ments, and had a Planning Section, the first, I think, which
had ever been adopted by any navy. I detached from all
other duties five officers : Captain F. H. Schofield, Captain
D. W. Knox, Captain H. E. Yarnell (who exchanged places
afterward with Captain L. McNamee of the Plans Section
of the Navy Department), and Colonel R. H. Dunlap (of the
Marines), who was succeeded by Colonel L. McC. Little,
when ordered to command a regiment of Marines in France.
These men made it their business to advise the Commander-
in-Chief on any questions that might arise. All were
graduates of the Naval War College at Newport, and they
applied to the consideration of war problems the lessons
which they had learned at that institution. The business
of the Planning Section was to make studies of particular
problems, to prepare plans for future operations, and also to
criticize fully the organization and methods which were
already in existence. The fact that these men had no
administrative duties and that they could therefore devote
all their time to surveying our operations, discovering mis-
takes, and suggesting better ways of doing things, as well
as the fact that they were themselves scholarly students of
naval warfare, made their labours exceedingly valuable. I
gave them the utmost freedom in finding fault with the
existing regime ; there was no department and no office,
216 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
from that of the Commander-in-Chief down, upon whose
activities they were not at liberty to submit the fullest and
the frankest reports. If anything could be done in a better
way, we certainly wanted to know it. Whenever any
specific problem of importance came up, it was always
submitted to these men for a report. The value of such a
report depended upon the completeness and accuracy of the
information available, and it was the business of the Intelli-
gence Department of the staff to supply this. If the desired
information was not in their files, or the files of the Allied
admiralties, or was not up to date, it was their duty to obtain
it at once. The point is that the Planning Section had no
other duties beyond rendering a decision, based upon a
careful analysis of the facts bearing upon the case, which
they submitted in writing. There was no phase of the naval
warfare upon which the officers of the Planning Section did
not give us reports. One of their favourite methods was to
place themselves in the position of the Germans and to decide
how, if they were directing German naval operations, they
would frustrate the tactics of the Allies. Their records
contain detailed descriptions of how merchant ships could
be sunk by submarines, and these methods, our officers
believed, represented a great improvement over those used
by the Germans. Indeed, I think that many of these
reports, had they fallen into the hands of the Germans,
would have been found by them exceedingly useful. There
was a general impression, in our own navy as well as in the
British, that most of the German submarine commanders
handled their boats unskilfully and obtained inadequate
results. All these documents were given to the responsible
men in our forces, as well as to the British, and had a con-
siderable influence upon operations. The British also
established a Planning Section, which worked harmoniously
with our own.
A subject upon which our Planning Section liked to specu-
late was the possible sortie of the German fleet. The
possibility of a great naval engagement filled the minds of
most naval officers ; and, after we had sent five of our
battleships to reinforce Admiral Beatty's fleet, this topic
became even more interesting to American naval men.
Would the Germans ever come out ? What had they to
gain or to lose by such an undertaking ? What were their
chances of victory ? Where would the engagement be
1917-18] ADMIRAL BEATTY AS A FIGHTER 217
fought, and what part would the several elements of
modern naval warfare play in it : mines, submarines, battle-
cruisers, airplanes, dirigibles, and destroyers ? These
were among the questions with which the Planning Section
busied itself, and this problem, like many others, they
approached from the German standpoint. They placed
themselves in the position of the German High Command,
and peered into the Grand Fleet looking for a weakness,
which, had they been Germans, they might turn to account
in a general engagement. The only weak spot our Planning
Section could find was one which reflected the greatest
credit upon the British forces. The British commander,
Admiral Sir David Beatty, was a particularly dashing and
heroic fighter ; could not these splendid qualities really be
turned to the advantage of the Germans ? That Admiral
Beatty would fight at the first opportunity, and that he
would run all justifiable risks, if a chance presented of
defeating the German fleet, was as well known to the Ger-
mans as to ourselves. The British Admiral, it was also
known, did not entertain much respect for mines and tor-
pedoes. All navies possessed what was known as a
" torpedo flag." This was an emblem which was to be
displayed in case torpedoes were sighted, for the purpose of
warning the ships to change course or, if necessary, to desist
from an attack. It was generally reported that Admiral
Beatty had ordered all these torpedo flags to be destroyed ;
in case he once started in pursuit of the German fleet, he
proposed to take his chances, dive straight through a school
of approaching torpedoes, or even to rush full speed over a
mine-field, making no efforts to avoid these hidden dangers.
That he would probably lose some ships the Admiral well
knew, but he figured and probably correctly that he
would certainly have enough vessels left to annihilate the
enemy. Still, in the judgment of our Planning Section,
Admiral Beatty 's assumed attitude toward " torpedo flags "
gave the Germans their only possible chance of seriously
injuring the Grand Fleet. They drew up a plan of attack
on the Scapa Flow forces based upon this assumption.
Imagining themselves directors of the German navy, they
constructed large numbers of torpedo boats, submarines,
and mine-fields and stationed them in a particularly
advantageous position ; they then proposed to send the
German fleet in the direction of Scapa Flow, draw the Grand
218 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
Fleet to the attack, and then lead it in the direction of the
torpedoes and mines. Probably such a scheme would never
have succeeded ; but it represented, in the opinion of our
Planning group, Germany's only chance of crippling the
Grand Fleet and winning the war. In other words, had my
staff found itself in Germany's position, that is the strategy
which it would probably have used. I gave this report
unofficially to the British Admiralty simply because I
thought it might afford British officers reading that would
possibly be entertaining. It is an evidence of the co-
operation that existed between the two forces, and of the
British disposition to accept suggestions, that this document
was immediately sent to Admiral Beatty.
II
The fact that I was able ultimately to create such an
organization and leave the administration of its individual
departments so largely to their respective heads was
especially fortunate because it gave me time for what was
perhaps the most important of my duties. This was my
attendance at the meetings of the Allied Naval Council, not
to mention daily conferences with various officials of the
Allies. This naval council was the great headquarters for
combined Allied operations against the enemy on the sea.
It was not officially constituted by the Allied governments
until November 29, 1917, but it had actually been in con-
tinuous operation since the beginning of the war, the heads
of the Allied admiralties having met frequently in con-
ference. At these meetings every phase of the situation
was discussed, and the methods finally adopted represented
the mature judgment of the Allied naval chiefs who partici-
pated in them. Without this council, and without the
co-operation for which it stood, our efforts would have been
so dispersed and would have so overlapped that their
efficiency would have been greatly decreased. This inter-
national naval conference not only had to decide questions
of naval strategy, but it also had to concern itself with a
multitude of practical matters which have little interest for
the public, but which are exceedingly important in war.
In this struggle coal, oil, and other materials played a part
almost as important as ships and men ; these materials,
1917-18] THE ALLIED NAVAL COUNCIL 219
like ships and men, were limited in quantity ; and it was
necessary to apportion them as deliberately and as econom-
ically as the seemingly more important munitions of war-
fare. The Germans were constantly changing their tactics ;
sometimes they would make their concentrations in a
certain area ; while at other times their strength would
appear in another field far distant from the first. These
changes made it necessary that we should in each case
readjust our forces to counteract the enemy's tactics. It
was a vital necessity that these readjustments should be
made immediately when the enemy's changes of tactics
became known. It is evident that the element necessary
to success was that the earliest and most complete possible
information should be followed by prompt decision and
action ; and it is manifest that these requirements could
have been satisfied only by a council which was fully
informed and which was on the spot momentarily ready to
act. The Allied Naval Council responded to all these
requirements. One of my first duties, after my arrival,
was to attend one of these councils in Paris ; and immedi-
ately afterward the meetings became much more frequent.
Not only were the proceedings interesting because of
the vast importance of the issues which were discussed,
but because they brought me into intimate contact with
some of the ablest minds in the European navies. Over
the first London councils Admiral Jellicoe presided. I
have already given my first impressions of this admirable
sailor ; subsequent events only increased my respect for
his character and abilities. An English woman once
described Admiral Jellicoe as " a great gentleman " ; it
is a description upon which I can hardly improve. The
First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, though he was by profession
an engineer and had been transferred from the business
of building roads and assuring the communications behind
the armies in France to become the civilian head of the
British navy, acquired, in an astonishingly short time, a
mastery of the details of naval administration. Sir Eric
is a type of man that we like to think of as American ;
perhaps the fact that he had received his business training
in this country, and had served an apprenticeship on the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, strengthened this impres-
sion. The habitues of the National Sporting Club in
London of whom I was one used to look reproachfully
220 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
at the giant figure of the First Lord ; in their opinion he
had sadly missed his calling. His mighty frame, his hard
and supple muscles, his power of vigorous and rapid
movement, his keen eye and his quick wit these qualities,
in the opinion of those best qualified to judge, would
have made this stupendous Briton one of the greatest
heavyweight prize-fighters in the annals of pugilism.
With a little training I am sure that Sir Eric would even
now make a creditable showing in the professional ring.
However, the paths of this business man and statesman
lay in other fields. After returning from America he had
had a brilliant business career in England ; he repre-
sented the type which we call " self-made men " ; that
is, he fought his way to the top without the aid of influ-
ential friends. His elevation to the Admiralty, in
succession to Sir Edward Carson, was something new in
British public life, for Sir Eric had never dabbled in
politics, and, until the war started, he was practically
unknown in political circles. But this crisis in British
affairs made it necessary for the Ministry to " draft " the
most capable executives in the nation, irrespective of
political considerations ; and Sir Eric, therefore, quite
naturally found himself at the head of the navy. In a
short time he had acquired a knowledge of the naval
situation which enabled him to preside over an inter-
national naval council with a very complete grasp of all
the problems which were presented. I have heard the
great naval specialists who attended say that, had they
not known the real fact, they would hardly have suspected
that Sir Eric was not a naval man. We admired not
only his ability to direct the course of discussion, and
even to take an important part in it, but also his skill at
summing up the results of the whole proceeding in a few
terse and masterly phrases. In fine, the First Lord was
a man after Roosevelt's heart big, athletic, energetic,
with a genius for reaching the kernel of a question and of
getting things done.
When it came to facility of exposition, however, we
Anglo-Saxons made a poor showing in comparison with
most French naval officers and in particular with Admirals
Lacaze and de Bon. Both these gentlemen represented
the Gallic type in its finest aspects. After spending a
few moments with Rear- Admiral Lacaze, it was easy to
1917-18] THE FRENCH ADMIRALS 221
understand the real affection which all French naval
officers felt for him. He is a small, slight man, with a
grey, pointed beard, and he possesses that earnestness of
spirit, that courtesy of manner, and that sympathy and
charm which we regard as the finest attributes of the
cultured Frenchman. Admiral Lacaze has also a genuine
French facility of speech and that precision of statement
which is so characteristic of the French intellect. A
slight acquaintance would make one believe that Admiral
Lacaze would be a model husband and father, perhaps
grandfather ; it was with surprise, however, that I learned
that he was a bachelor, but I am sure that he is that kind
of bachelor who is an uncle to all of the children of his
acquaintance. As Minister of Marine he was the pre-
siding officer of the council when it met in Paris.
In Vice-Admiral de Bon, chief of the French naval staff,
Admiral Lacaze had a worthy colleague ; he was really a
man of heroic mould, and he certainly looked the part.
His white hair and his white beard, cut square, gave at
first glance an impression of age ; yet his clear, pink skin,
not ruffled by a trace of wrinkle, his erect figure, his
bright blue eyes, the vigour of his conversation and the
energy of his movements, betokened rather perpetual
youth. Compared with the naval forces of Great Britain,
the French navy was of inconsiderable size, but in Admiral
de Bon it made a contribution to Allied naval strength
which was worth many dreadnoughts. The reputation of
this man has scarcely reached this side of the Atlantic ;
yet it was the general opinion of practically all naval men
that his was the keenest mind at the Allied Naval Council.
It was certainly the most persuasive in argument, and
the one that had most influence in determining our con-
clusions. Not that there was anything about this great
French sailor that was arrogant or offensively self-asser-
tive. On the contrary, his manner was all compact of
charm and courtesy. He was about the most persuasive
person I have ever met. Whenever an important matter
arose, there was some influence that made us turn instinc-
tively to Admiral de Bon for enlightenment ; and, when
he rose to talk, the council hung upon his every word.
For the man was a consummate orator. Those who
understood French even slightly had little difficulty in
following the Admiral, for he spoke his delightful language
222 THE LONDON FLAGSHIP
with a precision, a neatness of phrase, and a clearness of
enunciation which made every syllable intelligible. So
perfect did these speeches seem that one would have
suspected that Admiral de Bon had composed them at
his leisure, but this was not the case ; the man apparently
had only to open his mouth, and his speech spontaneously
flowed forth ; he never hesitated for a word. And his
words were not only eloquent, but, as I have said, they
were full of substance. The charm which he manifested
on these public occasions he carried likewise into his
domestic life. Whenever the council met in Paris the
Admiral's delightful wife and daughters entertained us at
luncheon an experience which caused many of us to
regret that it did not always meet in that city.
The other two members of this interesting group were
Rear-Admiral Funakoshi, representing the Japanese navy,
and Vice-Admiral di Revel, representing the Italian.
The Japanese was also naval attache at London, and the
popularity which he had acquired in this post he also
won in the larger field. In some respects, he was not like
the conventional notion of a Japanese ; physically he did
not fulfil the accepted role, for he was tall and heavily
built ; nor was there anything about him that was " in-
scrutable " ; the fact was that he was exceedingly frank
and open, and apparently loved nothing so much as a good
joke. The remark of a London newspaper that Admiral
di Revel, the Italian, " unlike Admiral Sims, looks every
inch the sailor," caused Admiral Funakoshi much amuse-
ment ; he could not resist the temptation to chaff me
about it. We all became so well acquainted that, in our
lighter moments, we did not mind having a little fun at
one another's expense ; and in these passages the Japanese
representative did not always make the poorest showing.
The Italian, di Revel, was a source of continual delight.
Someone remarked that he was in reality an Irishman
who had escaped into Italy ; and this facetious charac-
terization was really not inapt. His shock of red hair, his
reddish beard, and his short, stocky figure almost per-
suaded one that County Cork was his native soil. He
delivered his opinions with an insistence which indicated
that he entertained little doubt about their soundness ;
he was not particularly patient if they were called in
question ; yet he was so courteous, so energetic, and so
1917-18] THE ALLIED NAVAL COUNCIL 223
entertaining that he was a general favourite. That his
Government appreciated his services is shown by the fact
that it made di Revel a full admiral, a rank which is rarely
bestowed in Italy.
Such, then, were the men who directed the mighty forces
that defeated the German submarines. The work at the
councils was arduous, yet the opportunity of associating
with such men in such a task is one that comes to few
naval officers. They all worked with the most indomit-
able spirit ; not one of them ever for a moment showed
the slightest discouragement over a situation which was
at times disquieting, to say the least ; not one faltered
in the determination to force the issue to the only logical
end. History has given few examples of alliances that
worked harmoniously. The Allied Naval Council did its
full share in making harmonious the Allied effort against
the submarine.
CHAPTER VIII
SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
IT is not improbable that I have given a false impression
concerning the relative merits of the several methods
which were developed for fighting the submarine. De-
stroyers, patrol boats, subchasers, and mystery ships all
accomplished great things in solving the most baffling
problem presented by the war. The belief is general that
the most successful hunter of the submarine was the
destroyer, and, so far as absolute figures are concerned,
this is true. Destroyers, with their depth charges and
their gunfire, sank more U-boats than any other agency.
One type of craft, however, proved a more destructive
enemy of the submarine than even the destroyer. That
was a warship of whose achievements in this direction
little has so far been heard. The activities of the German
submarine have completely occupied public attention ;
and this is perhaps the reason why few newspaper readers
have suspected that there were other than German and
Austrian submarines constantly operating at sea. Every-
one has heard of the U-boats, yet how many have heard
anything of the H-boats, the E-boats, the K-boats, and
the L-boats ? The H-, E-, and K-boats were British sub-
marines, and the L-boats were American submarines. In
the destruction of the German under-water craft these
Allied submarines proved more successful than any kind
of surface ship. The Allied destroyers, about 500 in
number, sank 34 German submarines with gunfire and
depth charges ; auxiliary patrol craft, such as trawlers,
yachts, and the like, about 3,000 in number, sank 31 ;
while the Allied submarines, which were only about 100
in number, sank 20. Since, therefore, the Allies had
about five times as many destroyers as submarines at
224
1917-18] SUBMARINES OF THE ALLIES 225
work, it is evident that the record of the latter vessels
surpasses that of the most formidable surface anti-sub-
marine craft.
Thus the war developed the fact that the most deadly
enemy of the submarine is the submarine itself. Under-
water warfare is evidently a disease in which like cures like.
In a way this is the most astonishing lesson of the naval
operations. It is particularly interesting, because it so
completely demolishes all the ideas on this subject with
which we entered the war. From that day in history
when the submarine made its first appearance, the one
quality which seemed to distinguish it from all other kinds
of warship was that it could not be used to fight itself.
Writers were fond of pointing out that battleship could
fight battleship, that cruiser could fight cruiser, that
destroyer could fight destroyer, but that submarine could
not fight submarine. This supposed quality, which was
constantly emphasized, was what seemed to make the
introduction of this strange vessel such a dangerous thing
for the British Empire. For more than a hundred years
the under-water boat was a weapon which was regarded
as valuable almost exclusively to the weaker sea powers.
In the course of the nineteenth century this engine of sea
fighting made many spectacular appearances ; and signi-
ficantly it was always heralded as the one effective way
of destroying British domination at sea.
The inventor of the modern submarine was an under-
graduate of Yale named David Bushnell ; his famous
Turtle, according to the great British authority, Sir William
White, formerly Chief Naval Constructor of the British
navy, contained every fundamental principle of " buoy-
ancy, stability, and control of depth " which are found
in the modern submarine ; "it cannot be claimed," he
said in 1905, " that any new principle of design has been
discovered or applied since Bushnell. . . . He showed the
way to all his successors. . . . Although alternative
methods of fulfilling essentials have been introduced and
practically tested, in the end BushnelPs plans in substance
have been found the best." The chief inspiration of
Bushnell's work was a natural hostility to Great Britain,
which was at that time engaged in war with his own
country ; his submarine, invented in 1777, was intended
to sink the British warships which were then anchored
16
226 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
off the American coast, break the communications of
Great Britain with her revolting colonies, and in this way
win our liberty. Bushnell did not succeed in this am-
bitious enterprise for reasons which it is hardly necessary
to set forth in this place ; the fact which I wish to empha-
size is that he regarded his submarine as an agency which
would make it possible for the young United States, a
weak naval power, to deprive Great Britain, the dominant
sea power, of its supremacy. His successor, Robert
Fulton, was inspired by a similar ambition. In 1801
Fulton took his Nautilus into the harbour of Brest, and
blew a merchant vessel into a thousand pieces ; this
dramatic experiment was intended to convince Napoleon
that there was one way in which he could destroy the
British fleet and thus deprive England of her sea control.
Dramatic as this demonstration was, it did not convince
Napoleon of the value of the submarine ; Fulton there-
fore took his ship to England and exhibited it to William
Pitt, who was then Prime Minister. The great statesman
was much impressed, but he did not regard the submarine
as an innovation that should arouse much enthusiasm in
England. " If we adopt this kind of fighting," he said,
" it will be the end of all navies."
Despite his own forebodings, Pitt sent Fulton to St.
Vincent, who was then the First Lord of the Admiralty.
" Pitt is the biggest fool in the world," remarked the
head of the victorious British navy. " Why does he
encourage a kind of warfare which is useless to those who
are the masters of the sea, and which, if it succeeds, will
deprive them of this supremacy ? "
The reason for St. Vincent's opposition is apparent.
He formed the conception of the submarine which has
prevailed almost up to the present time. In his opinion,
a submarine was a vessel which could constantly remain
under the surface, approach great warships unseen and
blow them to pieces at will. This being the case, a nation
which possessed two or three successfully working engines
of this kind could apparently wipe out the entire British
fleet. It therefore needed no argument to show that this
was a weapon which was hardly likely to prove useful
to the British navy. If the submarine could fulfil its
appointed mission, it would give the control of the sea
to that nation which used it successfully ; but since Great
1917-18J HISTORY OF THE SUBMARINE 227
Britain already controlled the sea, the new type of war
craft was superfluous to her. In the hands of a weak
naval power, however, which had everything to gain and
nothing to lose, if might supply the means of overthrow-
ing the British Empire. Could one submarine destroy
another, it would present no particular menace, for then,
in order to control the sea, it would merely be necessary
to build a larger under-water fleet than that of any pro-
spective enemy : but how could vessels which spent all
their time under the water, in the dark, ever get a chance
to come to blows ? From these considerations it seemed
apparent to St. Vincent and other British experts of his
time that the best interests of the British Empire would
be served, not by developing the submarine, but by
suppressing it. Fulton's biographer intimates that the
British Government offered Fulton a considerable amount
of money to take his submarine back to America and
forget about it ; and there is a letter of Fulton's to Lord
Granville, saying that " not for 20,000 a year would I
do what you suggest." But there seemed to be no market
for his invention, and Fulton therefore returned to America
and subsequently gave all his time to exploiting the
steamboat. On the defensive powers of the under-water
vessel he also expressed the prevailing idea. " Sub-
marine," he said, " cannot fight submarine."
The man who designed the type of submarine which
has become the standard in all modern navies, John P.
Holland, similarly advocated it as the only means of
destroying the British navy. Holland was an American
of Irish origin ; he was a member of the Fenian brother-
hood, and it was his idea that his vessel could be used to
destroy the British navy, blockade the British coast, and,
as an inevitable consequence, secure freedom for Ireland.
This is the reason why his first successful boat was known
as the Fenian Ram, despite the fact that it was not a
" ram " at all. And the point on which Holland always
insisted was that the submarine vessel was a unique vessel
in naval warfare, because there was no " answer " to it.
' There is nothing that you can send against it," he glee-
fully exclaimed, " not even itself."
Parliamentary debates in the late nineties indicated
that British naval leaders entertained this same idea. In
1900, Viscount Goschen, who was then the First Lord of
228 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
the Admiralty, dismissed the submarine as unworthy of
consideration. " The idea of submarine navigation," he
said, " is a morbid one. We need pay no attention to the
submarine in naval warfare. The submarine is the arm
of weaker powers." But Mr. Arnold-Forster, who was
himself soon to become a member of the Admiralty, took
exception to these remarks. " If the First Lord," he
said, " had suggested that we should not build submarines
because the problems which control them are not yet
solved, I should have hesitated to combat his argument.
But the First Lord has not said so : he has said that the
Admiralty did not care to undertake any project for sub-
marines because this type of boat could never be anything
but the arm of the feeble. However, if this boat is made
practical, the nation which possesses it will cease to be
feeble and become in reality powerful. More than any
other nation do we have reason to fear the submarine.
It is, therefore, not wise to wait with indifference while
other nations work at the solution of this problem with-
out trying to solve it ourselves." " The question of the
best way of meeting submarine attack," said Viscount
Goschen at another time, " is receiving much considera-
tion. It is in this direction that practical suggestions
would be valuable. It seems certain that the reply to
this weapon must be looked for in other directions than
in building submarine boats ourselves, for it is clear that
one submarine cannot fight another."
This prepossession dominated all professional naval
minds in all countries, until the outbreak of the Great
War. Yet the war had lasted only a few months when
the idea was shown to be absurd. Practical hostilities soon
demonstrated, as already said, that not only was the sub-
marine able to fight another boat of the same type, but
that it was the most effective anti-submarine agency
which we possessed so effective that the British Admir-
alty at once began the design of a special type of hunting
submarine having a high under-water speed.
The fact is that the popular mind, in its attitude toward
this new type of craft, is still too much under the spell of
Jules Verne. There is still the disposition to look upon
the submarine as an insidious vessel which spends practi-
cally all of its time under the water, stealthily slinks along,
never once betraying its presence, creeps up at will to its
1917-18] SUBMERGING 229
enemy and discharges its torpedo. Yet the description
which these pages have already given of its operations
shows the falsity of this idea. It is important that we
should keep constantly in mind the fact that the sub-
marine is only occasionally a submarine ; and that for
the greater part of its career it is a surface boat. In the
long journeys which the German U-boats made from the
Heligoland Bight around Scotland and Ireland to those
great hunting grounds which lay in the Atlantic trade
routes, they travelled practically all the time on the surface
of the water. The weary weeks during which they cruised
around, looking for their victims, they also spent almost
entirely on the surface. There were virtually only two
circumstances which compelled them to disappear beneath
the waves. The first of these was the occasion on which
the submarine detected a merchant ship ; in this case
it submerged, for the success of its attempt to torpedo
depended entirely upon its operating unseen. The second
occasion which made it necessary to submerge was when
it spied a destroyer or other dangerous patrolling craft ;
the submarine, as has been said, could not fight a vessel
of this type with much chance of success. Thus the
ability to submerge was merely a quality that was utilized
only in those crises when the submarine either had to
escape a vessel which was stronger than itself or planned
to attack one which was weaker.
The time taken up by these disappearances amounted
to only a fraction of the total period consumed in a cruise.
Yet the fact that the submarine had to keep itself momen-
tarily ready to make these disappearances is precisely the
reason why it was obliged to spend the larger part of its
time on the surface. The submarine has two sets of
engines, one for surface travel and the other for subsurface
travel. An oil-engine propels it on the top of the water,
but this consumes a large amount of air, and, for this
reason, it cannot be used when travelling under the sur-
face. As soon as the vessel dives, therefore, it changes
its motive power to an electric motor, which makes no
inroads on the oxygen needed for sustaining the life of
its crew. But the physical limitation of size prevents
the submarine from carrying large storage batteries, which
is only another way of saying that its cruising radius
under the water is extremely small, not more than fifty
230 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
or sixty miles. In order to recharge these batteries and
gain motive power for subsurface travel, the submarine
has to come to the surface. Yet the simple fact that the
submarine can accomplish its destructive work only when
submerged, and that it can avoid its enemy only by diving,
makes it plain that it must always hold itself in readiness
to submerge on a moment's notice and remain under water
the longest possible time. That is, its storage batteries
must always be kept at their highest efficiency ; they must
not be wasted by unnecessary travelling under the water ;
the submarine, in other words, must spend all its time
on the surface, except those brief periods when it is
attempting to attack a merchant ship or escape an enemy.
Almost the greatest tragedy in the life of a submarine is
to meet a surface enemy, such as a destroyer, when its
electric batteries are exhausted. It cannot submerge, for
it can stay submerged only when it is in motion, unless it
is in water shallow enough to permit it to rest on the
bottom. Even though it may have a little electricity,
and succeed in getting under water, it cannot stay there
long, for its electric power will soon be used up, and there-
fore it is soon faced with the alternative of coming to the
surface and surrendering, or of being destroyed. The
success of the submarine, indeed its very existence, depends
upon the vessel spending the largest possible part of its
time upon the surface, keeping its full supply of electric
power constantly in reserve, so that it may be able to
dive at a moment's notice and to remain under the water
for the maximum period.
This purely mechanical limitation explains why the
German submarine was not a submarine in the popularly
accepted meaning of that term. Yet the fact that this
vessel remained for the greater part of its existence on
the surface was no particular disadvantage, so long as it
was called upon to contend only with surface vessels.
Even with the larger part of its decks exposed the U-boat
was a comparatively small object on the vast expanse of
the sea. I have already made clear the great disadvan-
tage under which destroyers and other patrolling vessels
laboured in their attempts to "hunt" this type of enemy.
A destroyer, small as it is, was an immensely larger object
than the under-water boat, and the consequence was that
the lookout on a submarine, proceeding along on the
1917-18] FIGHTING QUALITIES OF SUBMARINES 231
surface, could detect the patrolling vessel long before it
could be observed itself. All the submarine had to do,
therefore, whenever the destroyer appeared on the horizon,
was to seek safety under water, remain there until its
pursuer had passed out of sight, and then rise again and
resume its operations. Before the adoption of the convoy
system, when the Allied navies were depending chiefly
upon the patrol that is, sending destroyers and other
surface craft out upon the high seas to hunt for the enemy
the enemy submarines frequently operated in the same
areas as the patrol vessels, and were only occasionally
inconvenienced by having to keep under the water to
conceal their presence. But let us imagine that the
destroyer, in addition to its depth charges, its torpedoes,
its guns, and its ability to ram, had still another quality.
Suppose, for a moment, that, like the submarine, it could
steam submerged, put up a periscope which would reveal
everything within the radius of a wide horizon, and that,
when it had picked up an enemy submarine, it could
approach rapidly under the water, and discharge a torpedo.
It is evident that such a manoeuvre as this would have
deprived the German of the only advantage which it
possessed over all other war craft its ability to make
itself unseen.
No destroyer can accomplish any such magical feat as
this : indeed, there is only one kind of vessel that can do
so, and that is another submarine. This illustration im-
mediately makes it clear why the Allied submarine itself
was the most destructive enemy of the German submarine.
When Robert Fulton, John P. Holland, and other authori-
ties declared that the under-water vessel could not fight
its own kind, it is evident that they had not themselves
foreseen the ways in which their inventions were to be
used. They regarded their craft as ships that would sail
the larger part of the time under the waves, coming up
only occasionally to get their bearings and to take in a
fresh supply of air. It was plain to these pioneers that
vessels which spent practically all their time submerged
could not fight each other, for the sufficient reason that
they could not see each other ; a combat under these
conditions would resemble a prize-fight between two blind-
folded pugilists. Neither would such vessels fight upon
the surface, for, even though they were supplied with guns
232 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
things which did not figure in the early designs of sub-
marines one boat could decline the combat simply by
submerging. In the minds of Fulton and Holland an
engagement between such craft would reduce itself to
mutual attempts to ram each other under the water, and
many fanciful pictures of the early days portrayed exciting
deep-sea battles of this kind, in which submarines, looking
like mighty sea monsters, provided with huge glaring
headlights, made terrific lunges at each other. None of
the inventors foresaw that, in such battles as would
actually take place, the torpedo would be used, and that
the submarine which was defeated would succumb to one
of those same stealthy attacks which it was constantly
meditating against surface craft.
Another point of the highest importance is that in a
conflict of submarine against submarine the Allied boats
had one great advantage over the German. Hans Rose
and Valentiner and Moraht and other U-boat commanders,
as already explained, had to spend most of their time on
the surface in order to keep their batteries fully supplied
with electricity, in readiness for the dives that would be
necessary when the Allied destroyers approached. But
the Allied submarine commander did not have to main-
tain this constant readiness ; the reason, it is hardly
necessary to say, is that the Allied submarine had no
surface enemies, for there were no German surface craft
operating on the high seas ; the Grand Fleet at Scapa
Flow was carefully attending to that very essential detail.
Occasionally, indeed, our submarines were attacked by
our own destroyers, but accidents of this kind, though
uncomfortably frequent, were not numerous enough to
interfere with the operation I have in mind. The state-
ment seems almost like a contradiction in terms, yet it is
entirely true, that, simply because the Allied submarines
did not have to hold themselves constantly ready to sub-
merge, they could in fact spend a considerable part of
their time under the water, for they were not compelled
to economize electric power so strictly. This gave them
a great advantage in hunting the U-boats. British and
American submarines could fully charge their batteries,
drop under water and cruise around with enough speed
to maintain a horizontal position at " periscope depth,"
that is, a depth just sufficient to enable them to project
1917-18] SUBMARINE HAUNTS 233
the periscope above the water whenever desired. This
speed was so very slow about one mile an hour that it
could be kept up an entire day without exhausting the
electric batteries.
The net result was this : The German submarine neces-
sarily sailed most of the time on the surface with its conning-
tower and deck exposed, whereas the Allied submarine
when on its hunting grounds, spent all of the daylight
hours under water, with only the periscope visible from
time to time for a few seconds. Just as the German
U-boat could " spot " an Allied destroyer at a great
distance without being itself seen, so could the periscope
invariably see the German submarine on the surface long
before this tiny object came within the view of a U-boat
conning-tower. Our submarine commander could remain
submerged, sweep the ocean with his periscope until he
had picked up the German enemy ; then, still under water,
and almost invariably unseen, he could steal up to a
position within range, and discharge a torpedo into its
fragile side. The German submarine received that same
treatment which it was itself administering to harmless
merchantmen ; it was torpedoed without warning ; inas-
much, however, as it was itself a belligerent vessel, the
proceeding violated no principle of international law.
II
The Allied submarines, like many other patrol craft,
spent much of their time in those restricted waters which
formed the entrances to the British Isles. Their favourite
places were the English Channel, St. George's Channel,
which forms the southern entrance to the Irish Sea, and
the northern passage-way between Scotland and Ireland.
At these points, it may be remembered, the cargo ships
could usually be found sailing singly, either entirely un-
escorted, or escorted inadequately, while on their way
to join a convoy or to their destinations after the dispersal
of a convoy ; these areas were thus almost the only places
where the German submarines had much chance of attack-
ing single vessels. The territory was divided into squares,
each one of which was indicated by a letter : and the
section assigned to each submarine was known as its
234 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
" billet." Under ordinary circumstances, the Allied
submarine spent all its time, while patrolling, on its own
particular " billet " ; only in case the pursuit of an enemy
led it outside the " square " was it permissible to leave.
Allied submarines also hunted the U-boats in the North
Sea on the routes which the latter had to take in coming
out or returning through the passages in the German
mine-fields of the Heligoland Bight, or through the Skager
Rack.
As previously explained, in the daytime the Allied sub-
marine remained under the water, its periscope exposed
for a short time every fifteen minutes or so, sweeping
the sea for a distance of many miles. As soon as darkness
set in, the boat usually emerged, began taking in new
air and recharging its batteries, the crew seizing the
opportunity to stretch their legs and catch a welcome
glimpse of the external world. The simple fact that the
Allied submarines spent the larger part of their time under
water, while the German spent the larger part of their
time on the surface, gave our boats a great military advan-
tage over the foe, but it likewise made existence in our
submarine service more arduous. Even on the coldest
winter days there could be no artificial heat, for the
precious electricity could not be spared for that purpose,
and the temperature inside the submarine was the tem-
perature of the water in which it sailed. The close atmos-
phere, heavily laden also with the smell of oil from the
engines and the odours of cooking, and the necessity of
going for days at a time without a bath or even a wash,
added to the discomfort. The stability of a submerged
submarine is by no means perfect ; the vessel is constantly
rolling, and a certain number of the crew, even the experi-
enced men, are frequently seasick. This movement
sometimes made it almost impossible to stay in a bunk
and sleep for any reasonable period ; the poor seaman
would perhaps doze off, but a lurch of the vessel would
send him sprawling on the deck. One could hardly write,
for it was too cold, or read, for there was little light ;
and because of the motion of the vessel, it was difficult to
focus one's eyes on the page. A limited amount of smok-
ing was permitted, but the air was sometimes so vitiated
that only the most vigorous and incessant puffing could
keep a cigarette alight. One of the most annoying things
1917-18] DANGERS AND DISCOMFORTS 235
about the submarine existence is the fact that the air
condenses on the sides as the coldness increases, so that
practically everyth ng becomes wet ; as the sailor lies in
his bunk this moisture is precipitated upon him like rain-
drops. This combination of discomforts usually produced,
after spending a few hours under the surface, that mental
state commonly known as " dopey."
The usual duration of a " cruise " was eight days, and
by the end of that time many of the crew were nearly
" all in," and some of them entirely so. But the physical
sufferings were the least discomfiting. Any moment the
boat was likely to hit one of the mines the Germans were
always planting. A danger which was particularly vexa-
tious was that a British or an American submarine was
just about as likely to be attacked by Allied surface craft
as the Germans themselves. At the beginning, recog-
nition signals were arranged by which it was expected
that an Allied under-water craft, coming to the surface,
could make its identity known to a friendly warship ;
sometimes these signals succeeded, but more frequently
they failed, and the attacks which British and American
destroyers made upon their own submarines demonstrated
that there was no certainty that such signals would offer
any protection. A rather grim order directed all destroyers
and other patrol craft to sink any submarine on sight,
unless there was positive information that a friendly
submarine was operating in the neighbourhood. To a
large extent, therefore, the life of our submarine sailors
was the same as that of the Germans. Our men know
how it feels to have a dozen depth charges explode around
them, for not infrequently they have had to endure this
sort of thing from their own comrades. Mistakes of this
sort, even though not very numerous, were so likely to
happen at any time that whenever an Allied submarine
saw an Allied destroyer at a distance, it usually behaved
just as a German would have behaved under the same
conditions : it dived precipitately to the safety of deep
water. Our men, that is, did not care to take the risk of
a discussion with the surface craft ; it was more prudent
to play the part of an enemy. One day one of the Ameri-
can submarines, lying on the surface, saw an American
destroyer, and, cheered in their loneliness by the sight of
such a friendly vessel, waited for it to approach, making
286 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
all the identification signals carefully set down in the
books. Instead of a cordial greeting, however, about
twenty rounds of projectiles began falling about the
L-boat, which as hastily as possible dropped to sixty feet
under the surface. In a few minutes depth charges began
exploding around him in profusion, the plates of the vessel
shook violently, the lights went out, and the end seemed
near. Making a last effort, the American submarine rose
to the surface, sent up all the recognition signals the
officers could think of, and this time with success. The
destroyer approached, the commander shouting from the
bridge :
" Who are you ? "
" American submarine A L-10."
" Good luck, old man," came a now familiar voice from
the bridge. " This is Bill."
The commander of the destroyer and the commander of
the submarine had been room-mates at Annapolis !
In other ways our submarine force passed through the
same experiences as the Germans. Its adventures shed
the utmost light upon this campaign against merchant-
men which the Germans had depended upon to win the
war. The observer at the periscope was constantly
spotting huge Allied merchantmen making their way into
port. The great ships sailed on, entirely oblivious of the
periscope and the eye of the British or American watcher
fixed upon them.
" How easy to sink her ! " the observer would say to
himself. This game in which the Germans were engaged
was a dangerous one, because of Allied anti-submarine
craft ; but, when it came to attacking merchant ships,
it was the easiest thing in the world. After a few weeks
in a submarine, it grew upon our men that the wonder
was not that the Germans had sunk so many merchant
ships, but that they had sunk so few. Such an experience
emphasized the conviction, which was prevalent in both
the British and American navies, that the Germans were
not particularly skilful at the occupation which seemed to
be so congenial to them. Indeed, there are few things in
the world that appear so absolutely helpless as a great
merchant ship when observed through the periscope of an
under-water boat.
Whenever an Allied submarine met its enemy the con-
1917-18] THE "E-35" 237
test was usually a short one. The issue, one way or the
other, was determined in a few minutes. On rare occa-
sions there were attempts to ram ; almost invariably,
however, it was the torpedo which settled the conflict.
If our boat happened to be on the surface when it sighted
the German, which, however, was very seldom the case,
the first manoeuvre was to dive as quickly and as unosten-
tatiously as possible. If it succeeded in getting under
before the U-boat discovered its presence, it then crept
up, guided only by the periscope, until it had reached a
spot that was within range. The combat, as was the case
so frequently in this war, was one-sided. The enemy
submarine seldom knew its assailant was anywhere in the
neighbourhood ; a merchant ship, from its relatively high
bridge, could sometimes see the torpedo approach and
turn out of its way ; but it was almost impossible to see
a wake from the low conning-tower or periscope of a sub-
marine, and no one except the observer had a glimpse of
the surface. The small size of the submarine was in itself
a great protection ; we launched many torpedoes, but
only occasionally scored a hit. The missile would usually
pass a few feet ahead or astern, or would glide over or
under the submerged hulk, perhaps a few inches only
saving it from destruction. Once an American torpedo
hit its enemy squarely on the side but failed to explode !
If the torpedo once struck and functioned, however, it
was all over in a few seconds. A huge geyser of water
would leap into the air ; and the submarine would some-
times rise^at the same time, or parts of it would fly in a
dozen directions ; then the waters would gradually sub-
side, leaving a mammoth oil patch, in which two or three
members of the crew might be discovered struggling in
the waves. Most of the men in the doomed vessel never
knew what had struck them.
Thus, early one evening in May, 1918, the E-35, a
British submarine, was patrolling its billet in the Atlantic,
about two hundred miles west of Gibraltar. About two
or three miles on the port beam a long, low-lying object
was distinguished on the surface ; the appearance was
nondescript, but, to the practised eye at the periscope, it
quickly took shape as an enemy submarine. As the sea
was rather rough, the E-35 dived to forty feet ; after a
little while it ascended to twenty-six, put up the periscope,
238 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
and immediately saw, not far away, a huge enemy sub-
marine proceeding north at a leisurely pace, never once
suspecting that one of its own kind was on its trail. In
order to get within range and cut the German off, the
Britisher dived again to forty feet, went ahead for twenty
minutes with all the speed it could muster, and again came
near enough to the surface to put up its periscope. Now
it was directly astern ; still the British submarine was not
near enough for a sure shot, so again it plunged beyond
periscope depth, coming up at intervals during the next
hour, each time observing with satisfaction that it was
lessening the distance between itself and its prey. When
the range had been decreased to two hundred and fifty
yards, and when the E-35 had succeeded in getting in
such a position that it could fire its torpedo, the missile
was launched in the direction of the foe. But this was
only another of the numerous occasions when the shot
missed. Had the German submarine been a surface
ship, it would have seen the wake and probably escaped
by flight ; but still it sailed nonchalantly on its way,
never suspecting for a moment that a torpedo had missed
its vitals by only a few feet. Soon the E-35 crept still
closer, and fired two torpedoes simultaneously from its
bow tubes. Both hit at the same time. Not a glimpse of
the German submarine was seen from that moment. A
terrific explosion was heard, a mountain of water rose in
the air, then in a few seconds everything was still. A
small patch of oil appeared on the surface ; this gradually
expanded in size until it covered a great area ; and then
a few German sailors came up and started swimming
toward the British vessel.
We Americans had seven submarines based on Bere-
haven, Ireland, whose " billets " were located in the
approaches to the Irish Sea. The most spectacular
achievement of any one of our boats was a curious mix-up
with a German submarine, the details of which have never
been accurately ascertained, but the practical outcome of
which was indisputably the sinking of the German boat.
After a week's hard work on patrol, the A L-2 was running
back to her base on the surface when the lookout sighted
a periscope. The A L-2 at once changed her course, the
torpedo was made ready to fire, when the quiet of the
summer afternoon was rent by a terrific roar and explosion.
1918] GERMANS FEAR OF OUR SUBMARINES 239
It was quite apparent that something exceedingly dis-
tressing had happened to the German submarine ; the
American turned, and made a steep dive, in an attempt
to ram the enemy, but failed. Listening with the hydro-
phone, the A L-2 could hear now the whirring of pro-
pellers, which indicated that the submarine was attempting
to gain surface and having difficulty in doing so, and now
and then the call letters of the German under-water
signal set, which seemed to show that the vessel was in
distress and was sending appeals for aid. According to
the Admiralty records, a German submarine operating
in that area never returned to port ; so it seems clear
enough that this German w r as lost. Commander R. C.
Grady, who commanded the American submarine division,
believes that the German spotted the American boat
before it was itself seen, that it launched a torpedo,
that this torpedo made an erratic course (a not infre-
quent trick of a torpedo) around our ship, returned
and hit the vessel from which it started. There are
others who think that there were two German sub-
marines in the neighbourhood, that one fired at our boat,
missed it, and that its torpedo sped on and struck its
mate. Probably the real facts about the happening will
never be explained.
Besides the actual sinkings to their credit, the Allied
submarines accomplished strategic results of the utmost
importance. We had reason to believe that the Germans
feared them almost more than any other agency, unless
it was the mine. " We got used to your depth charges,"
said the commander of a captured submarine, " and did
not fear them ; but we lived in constant dread of your
submarines. We never knew what moment a torpedo
was going to hit us." So greatly did the Germans fear
this attack that they carefully avoided the areas in which
the Allied under-water boats were operating. We soon
learned that we could keep any section free of the Germans
which we were able to patrol with our own submarines. It
also soon appeared that the German U-boats would not
fight our subsurface vessels. At first this may seem
rather strange ; certainly a combat between two ships
of the same kind, size, and armament would seem to be
an equal one ; the disinclination of the German to give
battle under such conditions would probably strike the
240 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
layman as sheer cowardice. But in this attitude the
Germans were undoubtedly right.
The business of their submarines was not to fight war-
ships ; it was exclusively to destroy merchantmen. The
demand made upon the U-boat commanders was to get
" tonnage ! tonnage ! " Germany could win the war in
only one way : that was by destroying Allied shipping to
such an extent that the Allied sea communications would
be cut, and the supplies of men and munitions and food
from the United States shut off. For this tremendous
task Germany had an inadequate number of submarines
and torpedoes. Only by economizing to the utmost
extent on these vessels and these weapons could she
entertain any hope of success. Had Germany possessed
an unlimited quantity of submarines and torpedoes, she
might perhaps have profitably expended some of them in
warfare on British " H-boats " and American " L-boats " ;
or, had there been a certainty of " getting " an Allied
submarine with each torpedo fired, it would have been
justifiable to use these weapons, small as was the supply.
The fact was, however, that the Allies expended many
torpedoes for every submarine sunk ; and this was clearly
a game which Germany could not afford to play. Evi-
dently the U-boats had orders to slip under the water
whenever an Allied submarine was seen ; at least this
was the almost invariable procedure. Thus the Allied
submarines compelled their German enemies to do the
one thing which worked most to their disadvantage : that
is, to keep submerged when in the same area with our
submarines ; this not only prevented them from attacking
merchantmen, but forced them to consume their electric
power, which, as I have already explained, greatly dimin-
ished their efficiency as attacking ships.
The operations of Allied submarines also greatly
diminished the value of the " cruiser " submarines which
Germany began to construct in 1917. These great sub-
surface vessels were introduced as an " answer " to the
convoy system. The adoption of the convoy, as I have
already explained, made it ineffective for the Germans to
hunt far out at sea. Until the Allies had put this plan
into operation, the relatively small German U-boats could
go two or three hundred miles into the Atlantic and pick
off almost at will the merchant ships, which were then pro-
1918J OCEAN-GOING SUBMARINES 241
ceeding alone and unescorted. But now the destroyers
went out to a point two or three hundred miles from
the British coast, formed a protecting screen around the
convoy, and escorted the grouped ships into restricted
waters. The result of this was to drive the submarines
into these coastal waters ; here again, however, they had
their difficulties with destroyers, subchasers, submarines,
and other patrol craft. It will be recalled that no
destroyer escort was provided for the merchant convoys
on their way across the Atlantic ; the Allies simply did
not have the destroyers for this purpose. The Germans
could not send surface raiders to attack these convoys in
mid-ocean, first, because their surface warships could not
escape from their ports in sufficient numbers to accomplish
any decisive results, and, secondly, because Allied surface
warships accompanied every convoy to protect them
against any such attack. There was only one way in
which the Germans could attack the convoys in mid-
ocean. A fleet of great ocean-going submarines, which
could keep the sea for two or three months, might con-
ceivably destroy the whole convoy system at a blow.
The scheme was so obvious that Germany in the summer of
1917 began building ships of this type. They were about
300 feet long, displaced about 3,000 tons, carried fuel and
supplies enough to maintain themselves for three or four
months from their base, and, besides torpedoes, had six-inch
guns that could outrange a destroyer. By the time the
armistice was signed Germany had built about twenty of
these ships. But they possessed little offensive value
against merchantmen. The Allied submarines and
destroyers kept them from operating in the submarine
zone. They are so difficult to manoeuvre that not only
could they not afford to remain in the neighbourhood of
our anti-submarine craft, but they were not successful
in attacking merchant vessels. They never risked tor-
pedoing a convoy, and rarely even a single vessel, but
captured a number by means of their superior gunfire.
These huge " cruiser submarines," which aroused such
fear in the civilian mind when the news of their existence
first found its way into print, proved to be the least
harmful of any of the German types.
The Allied submarines accomplished another result of
the utmost importance. They prevented the German
17
242 SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
U-boats from hunting in groups or flotillas. All during
1917 and 1918 the popular mind conjured up frightful
pictures of U-boat squadrons, ten or fifteen together, lying
in wait for our merchantmen or troopships. Hardly a
passenger crossed the ocean without seeing a dozen German
submarines constantly pursuing his ship. In a speech
which I made to a group of American editors who visited
England in September, 1918, I touched upon this point.
" I do not know," I told these journalists, " how many
submarines you gentlemen saw on the way over here, but
if you had the usual experience, you saw a great many.
I have seen many accounts in our papers on this subject.
If you were to believe these accounts, you could only con-
clude that many vessels have crossed the ocean with diffi-
culty because submarines were so thick that they scraped
all the paint off the vessels' sides. All of .these accounts
are, of course, unofficial. They get into the American
papers in various ways. It is to be regretted that they
should be published and thereby give a false impression.
Some time ago I saw a letter from one of our men who
came over here on a ship bound into the English Channel.
This letter was written to his girl. He said that he
intended to take the letter on shore and slip it into a
post box so that the censor should not see it. The censor
did see it and it eventually came to me. This man was
evidently intent on impressing on his girl the dangers
through which he had passed. It related that the vessel
on which he had made the voyage had met two or three
submarines a day ; that two spies were found on board
and hanged ; and it said, ' When we arrived off our port
there were no less than eighteen submarines waiting for
us. Can you beat it ? '
Perhaps in the early days of the war the German U-boats
did hunt in flotillas ; if so, however, they were compelled
to abandon the practice as soon as the Allied submarines
began to operate effectively. I have already indicated
the circumstances which reduced their submarine opera-
tions to a lonely enterprise. In the open sea it was im-
possible to tell whether a submarine was a friend or an
enemy. We never knew whether a submarine on the
surface was one of our own or a German ; as a result, as
already said, we gave orders to attack any under-water
boat, unless we had absolute knowledge that it was a
1918] GERMAN LIMITATIONS 248
friend. Unquestionably the Germans had the same
instructions. It would therefore be dangerous for them
to attempt to operate in groups, for they would have no
way of knowing that their supposed associate was not an
Allied or an American submarine. Possibly, even after
our submarines had become exceedingly active, the Ger-
mans may have attempted to cruise in pairs ; one explana-
tion of the strange adventure of the A L-2, as said above,
was that there were two U-boats in the neighbourhood ;
yet the fact remains that there is no well-established case
on record in which they did so. This circumstance that
they had to operate singly was a strategic point greatly
to our advantage, especially, as I shall describe, when we
began transporting American troops.
CHAPTER IX
THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA
WAS there no more satisfactory way of destroying sub-
marines than by pursuing them with destroyers, sloops,
chasers, and other craft in the open seas ? It is hardly
surprising that our methods impressed certain of our
critics as tedious and ill-conceived, and that a mere glance
at a small map of the North Sea suggested a far more
reasonable solution of the problem. The bases from which
the German submarines found their way to the great
centres of shipping were Ostend and Zeebrugge on the
Belgian coast, Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven on the Ger-
man coast, and the harbour of Kiel in the Baltic Sea.
From all these points the voyage to the waters that lay
west and south of Ireland was a long and difficult one ;
in order to reach these hunting grounds the German craft
had either to pass through the Straits of Dover to the
south, or through the wide passage-way of the North Sea
that stretched between the Shetland Islands and Norway,
and thence sail around the northern coast of Ireland. We
necessarily had little success in attempting to interfere
with the U-boats while they were making these lengthy
open-sea voyages, but concentrated our efforts on trying
to oppose them after they had reached the critical areas.
But a casual glance at the map convinced many people
that our procedure was a mistake. And most newspaper
readers in those days were giving much attention to this
map. Many periodicals, published in Great Britain and
the United States, were fond of exhibiting to their readers
diagrams of the North Sea ; these diagrams contained one
heavy black bar drawn across the Straits of Dover and
another drawn across the northern passage from Scotland
to Norway. The accompanying printed matter informed
244
1917-18]
AMATEUR PROPOSALS
245
the public that these pictures illustrated the one effective
" answer " to the submarine. The black bars of printer's
ink represented barrages of mines and nets, which, if
they were once laid between the indicated spots, would
blow to pieces any submarine which attempted to force
a way across. Not a single German U-boat could there-
fore succeed in getting out of the North Sea. All the
trans-Atlantic ships which contained the food supplies
and war materials so essential to Allied success would thus
be able to land on the west coast of England and France ;
the submarine menace would automatically disappear
U.S. Minefields _
British Minefields
THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE
Just how many German submarines were sunk in attempting to get by this barrage will never
be known, for it did its work silently without any observers. It was probably a contributory
cause of the mutiny which demoralized the German fleet in the autumn of 1918.
and the war on the sea would be won. Unfortunately, it
was not only the pictorial artists employed on newspapers
and magazines who insisted that this was the royal road
to success. Plenty of naval men, in the United States and
in Europe, were constantly advancing the contention,
and statesmen in our own country and in Allied countries
were similarly fascinated by this programme. When I
arrived in London, in April, 1917, the great plan of con-
fining the submarines to their bases was everywhere a
lively topic of discussion. There was not a London club
in which the Admiralty was not denounced for its stupidity
in not adopting such a perfectly obvious plan. The way
246 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
to destroy a swarm of hornets such was the favourite
simile was to annihilate them in their nests, and not to
hunt and attack them, one by one, after they had escaped
into the open. What the situation needed was not a long
and wearisome campaign, involving unlimited new con-
struction to offset the increasing losses of life and shipping,
and altogether too probable defeat in the end, but a swift
and terrible blow which would end the submarine menace
overnight.
The naval officers who expressed fears that, under the
shipping conditions prevailing in 1917, such a brilliant
performance could not possibly be carried out in time to
avoid defeat, merely gained a reputation for timidity and
lack of resourcefulness. When the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, in 1915 declared that the
British fleet would " dig the Germans out of their holes
like rats," his remarks did not greatly impress naval
strategists, but they certainly sounded a note which was
popular in England. One fact, not generally known at
that time, demonstrated the futility of the whole idea.
Most newspaper critics assumed that the barrage from
Dover to Calais was keeping the submarines out of the
Channel. That the destroyers, aircraft, and other patrols
were safely escorting troopships and other vessels across
the Channel was a fact of which the British public was
justly proud. Yet it did not necessarily follow that the
submarines could not use the Channel as a passage-way
from their German bases to their operating areas in the
focus of Allied shipping routes. The mines and nets in
the Channel, of which so much was printed in the first
three years of the war, did not offer an effective barrier to
the submarines. This was due to various reasons too
complicated for description in a book of this untechnical
nature. The unusually strong tides and rough weather
experienced in the vicinity of the Straits of Dover are well
known. As one British officer expressed it at the time,
" our experience in attempting to close the Strait has
involved both blood and tears " blood because of the
men who were lost in laying the mines and nets, and tears
because the arduous work of weeks would be swept away
in a storm of a single night. In addition, at this stage of the
war the British were still experimenting with mines ; they
had discovered gradually that the design which they had
1917-18] THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED 247
used up to that time the same design which was used in
the American navy was defective. But the process of
developing new mines in war-time had proved slow and
difficult ; and the demands of the army on the munition
factories had prevented the Admiralty from obtaining a
sufficient number. The work of the Dover patrols was a
glorious one, as will appear when all of the facts come to
public knowledge. But in 1917 this patrol was not pre-
venting the U-boats from slipping through the Channel.
The Straits of Dover, at the point w r here this so-called
barrage was supposed to have existed, is about twenty
miles wide. The passage-way between Scotland and
Norway is 250 miles wide. The water in the Channel
has an average depth of a few fathoms ; in the northern
expanse of the North Sea it reaches an average depth
of 600 feet. Mining in such deep waters had never been
undertaken or even considered before by any nation.
The English Channel is celebrated for its strong tides and
stormy weather, but it is not the scene of the tempestuous
gales which rage so frequently in the winter months in
these northern waters. If the British navy had not
succeeded in constructing an effective mine barrier across
the English Channel, what was the likelihood that success
would crown an effort to build a much greater obstruction
in the far more difficult waters to the north ?
The one point which few understood at that time was
that the mere building of the barrage would not in itself
prevent the escape of submarines from the North Sea.
Besides building such a barrage, it would be necessary to
protect it with surface vessels. Otherwise German mine-
sweepers could visit the scene, and sweep up enough of the
obstruction to make a hole through which their submarines
could pass. It is evident that, in a barrage extending 250
miles, it would not be difficult to find some place in which
to conduct such sweeping operations ; it is also clear that it
would take a considerable number of patrolling vessels to
watch such an extensive barrier and to interfere with such
operations. Moreover, we could not send our mine-layers
into the North Sea without destroyer escort ; that is, it
would be necessary to detach a considerable part of our
forces to protect these ships while they were laying their
mines. Those responsible for anti-submarine operations
believed that in the spring and summer of 1917 it would
248 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
have been unwise to detach these anti-submarine vessels
from the area in which they were performing such indis-
pensable service. The overwhelming fact was that we
needed all the surface craft we could assemble for the convoy
system. The destroyers which we had available for this
purpose were entirely inadequate ; to have diverted any of
them for other duties would at that time have meant
destruction to the Allied cause. The object of placing the
barrage so far north was to increase the enemy's difficulty
in attempting to sweep a passage through it and facilitate
its defence by our forces. The impossibility of defending a
mine barrier placed too far south was shown by experience
in that area of the North Sea which was known as the
" wet triangle." By April, 1917, the British had laid more
than 30,000 mines in the Bight of Heligoland, and were then
increasing these obstructions at the rate of 3,000 mines a
month. Yet this vast explosive field did not prevent the
Germans from sending their submarines to sea. The enemy
sweepers were dragging out channels through the mine-
fields almost as rapidly as the British were putting new
fields down ; we could not prevent this, because protecting
vessels could not remain so near the German bases without
losses from submarine attacks. Moreover, the Germans also
laid mines in the same area in order to trap the British
mine-layers ; and these operations resulted in very con-
siderable losses on each side. These impediments made the
egress of a submarine a difficult and nerve-racking process ;
it sometimes required two or three days and the assistance
of a dozen or so surface vessels to get a few submarines
through the Heligoland Bight into open waters. Several
were unquestionably destroyed in the operation, yet the
activity of submarines in the Atlantic showed that these
mine-fields had by no means succeeded in proving more than
a harassing measure. It was estimated that the North Sea
barrage would require about 400,000 mines, far more than
existed in the world at that time, and far more than all our
manufacturing resources could then produce within a
reasonable period. I have already made the point, and
I cannot make it too frequently, that time is often the essen-
tial element in war and in this case it was of vital import-
ance. Whether a programme is a wise one or not depends
not only upon the feasibility of the plan itself, but upon
the time and the circumstances in which it is proposed. In
1917-18] A NEW TYPE OF MINE 249
the spring of 1917 the situation which we were facing was
that the German submarines were destroying Allied shipping
at the rate of nearly 800,000 tons a month. The one thing
which was certain was that, if this destruction should con-
tinue for four or five months, the Allies would be obliged to
surrender unconditionally. The pressing problem was to
find methods that would check these depredations and that
would check them in time. The convoy system was the
one naval plan the point cannot be made too emphatically
which in April and May of 1917 held forth the certainty
of immediately accomplishing this result. Other methods
of opposing the submarines were developed which magnifi-
cently supplemented the convoy ; but the convoy, at least
in the spring and summer of 1917, was the one sure method
of salvation for the Allied cause. To have started the
North Sea barrage in the spring and summer of 1917 would
have meant abandoning the convoy system ; and this
would have been sheer madness.
Thus in 1917 the North Sea barrage was not an answer to
the popular proposal " to dig the Germans out of their holes
like rats." We did not have a mine which could be laid in
such deep waters in sufficient numbers to have formed any
barrier at all ; and even if we had possessed one, the con-
struction of the barrage would have demanded such an
enormous number that they could not have been manufac-
tured in time to finish the barrage until late in the year
1918. Presently the situation began to change. The prin-
cipal fact which made possible this great enterprise was the
invention of an entirely new type of mine. The old mine
consisted of a huge steel globe, filled with high explosive,
which could be fired only by contact. That is, it was
necessary for the surface of a ship, such as a submarine, to
strike against the surface of the mine, and in this way start
the mechanism which ignited the explosive charge. The
fact that this immediate contact was essential enormously
increased the difficulty of successfully mining waters that
range in depth from 400 to 900 feet. If the mines were laid
anywhere near the surface, the submarine, merely by diving
beneath them, could avoid all danger ; if they were laid any
considerable depth, it could sail with complete safety above
them. Thus, if such a mine were to be used at all, we should
have had to plant several layers, one under the other, down
to a depth of about 250 feet, so that the submarine, at
250 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
whatever depth it might be sailing, would be likely to strike
one of these obstructions. This required such a large
number of mines as to render the whole project impossible.
We Americans may take pride in the fact that it was an
American who invented an entirely new type of mine and
therefore solved this difficulty. In the summer of 1917
Mr. Ralph C. Browne, an electrical engineer of Salem, Mass.,
offered a submarine gun for the consideration of Commander
S. P. Fullinwider, U.S.N., who was then in charge of the
mining section of the Bureau of Ordnance. As a submarine
gun this invention did not seem to offer many chances of
success, but Commander Fullinwider realized that it com-
prised a firing device of excellent promise. The Bureau of
Ordnance, assisted by Mr. Browne, spent the summer and
autumn experimenting with this contrivance and perfecting
it ; the English mining officers who had been sent to
America to co-operate with our navy expressed great
enthusiasm over it ; and some time about the beginning of
August, 1917, the Bureau of Ordnance came to the con-
clusion that it was a demonstrated success. The details of
Mr. Browne's invention are too intricate for description in
this place, but its main point is comprehensible enough.
Its great advantage was that it was not necessary for the
submarine to strike the mine in order to produce the desired
explosion. The mine could be located at any depth and
from it a long " antenna," a thin copper cable, reached up
to within a few feet of the surface, where it was supported
in that position by a small metal buoy. Any metallic
substance, such as the hull of a submarine, simply by
striking this antenna at any point, would produce an
electric current, which, instantaneously transmitted to the
mine, would cause this mine to explode. The great
advantage of this device is at once apparent. Only about
one fourth the number of mines required under the old con-
ditions would now be necessary. The Mining Section
estimated that 100,000 mines would form a barrier that
would be extremely dangerous to submarines passing over
it or through it, whereas, under the old conditions, about
400,000 would have been required. This implies more than
a mere saving in manufacturing resources ; it meant that
we should need a proportionately smaller number of mine-
laying ships, crews, officers, bases, and supplies all those
things which are seldom considered by the amateur in
1917-18] SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN FAILING 251
warfare, but which are as essential to its prosecution as the
more spectacular details.
I wish to emphasize the fact that, in laying such a barrage,
it was not our object to make an absolute barrier to the
passage of submarines. To have done this we should have
needed such a great number of mines that the operation
would have been impossible. Nor would such an absolute
barrier have been necessary to success ; a field that could be
depended upon to destroy one-fourth or one-fifth of the
submarines that attempted the passage would have repre-
sented complete success. No enemy could stand such
losses as these ; and the moral of no crew could have lasted
long under such conditions.
Another circumstance which made the barrage a feasible
enterprise was that by the last of the year 1917 it was realized
that the submarine had ceased to be a decisive factor in
the war. It still remained a serious embarrassment, and
every measure which could possibly thwart it should be
adopted. But the writings of German officers which have
been published since the war make it apparent that they
themselves realized early in 1918 that they would have to
place their hopes of victory on something else besides the
submarine. The convoy system and the other methods of
fighting under-water craft which I have already described
had caused a great decrease in sinkings. In April of 1917
the losses were nearly 900,000 tons ; in November of the
same year they were less than 300,000 tons. 1 Meanwhile,
the construction of merchant shipping, largely a result of the
tremendous expansion of American shipbuilding facilities,
was increasing at a tremendous rate. A diagram of these,
the two essential factors in the submarine campaign, dis-
closed such a rapidly rising curve of new shipping, and such
a rapidly falling curve of sinkings, that the time could be
easily foreseen when the net amount of Allied shipping, after
the submarines had done their worst, would show a promis-
ing increase. But, as stated above, the submarines were
still a distinct menace ; they were still causing serious
losses ; and it was therefore very important that we should
leave no stone unturned toward demonstrating beyond a
shadow of doubt that warfare as conducted by these craft
could be entirely put down. The more successfully we
1 Complete statistics of shipping losses, new ship construction for 1917
and 1918, will be found in Appendices VIII and IX.
252 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
demonstrated this fact and the more energetically we
prosecuted every form of opposition, the earlier would the
enemy's general moral break down and victory be assured.
In war, where human lives as well as national interests are
at stake, no thought whatever can be given to expense.
It is impossible to place a value on human life. Therefore,
on November 2, 1917, the so-called " Northern Barrage "
project was officially adopted by both the American and the
British Governments. When I say that the proposed mine-
field was as long as the distance from Washington to New
York, some idea of its magnitude may be obtained. No-
thing like it had ever been attempted before. The com-
bined operations involved a mass of detail which the lay
mind can hardly comprehend. The cost $40,000,000 is
perhaps not an astonishing figure in the statistics of this
war, but it gives some conception of the size of the under-
taking.
II
During the two years preceding the war Captain Reginald
R. Belknap commanded the mine-laying squadron of the
Atlantic fleet. Although his force was small, consisting
principally of two antiquated warships, the Baltimore and
the San Francisco, Captain Belknap had performed his
duties conscientiously and ably, and his little squadron
therefore gave us an excellent foundation on which to
build. Before the European War the business of mine-
laying had been unpopular in the American navy as well
as in the British ; such an occupation, as Sir Eric Geddes
once said, had been regarded as something like that of
*' rat catching " ; as hostilities went on, however, and the
mine developed great value as an anti-submarine weapon,
this branch of the service began to receive more respectful
attention. Captain Belknap's work not only provided the
nucleus out of which the great American mine force was
developed, but he was chiefly responsible for organizing
this force. The " active front " of our mine-laying
squadron was found in the North Sea ; but the sources
of supply lay in a dozen shipyards and several hundred
manufacturing plants in the United States.
1917-18] MANUFACTURING THE MINES 253
We began this work with practically nothing ; we had
to obtain ships and transform them into mine-layers ; to
enlist and to train their crews ; to manufacture at least
100,000 mines ; to create bases both in the United States
and Scotland ; to transport all of our supplies more than
3,000 miles of wintry sea, part of the course lying in the
submarine zone ; and we had to do all this before the real
business of planting could begin. The fact that the Navy
made contracts for 100,000 of these new mines before it
had had the opportunity of thoroughly testing the design
under service conditions shows the great faith of the Navy
Department in this new invention. More than 500 con-
tractors and sub-contractors, located in places as far west
as the Mississippi River, undertook the work of filling this
huge order. Wire-rope mills, steel factories, foundries,
machine shops, electrical works, and even candy makers,
engaged in this great operation ; all had their troubles
with labour unions, with the railroads, and with the weather
that was the terrible winter of 1917-18 ; but in a few
months trainloads of mine cases great globes of steel
and other essential parts began to arrive at Norfolk,
Virginia. This port was the place where the mine parts
were loaded on ships and sent abroad. The plant which
was ultimately constructed at this point was able to
handle 1,000 mines a day ; the industry was not a popular
one in the neighbourhood, particularly after the Halifax
explosion had proved the destructive powers of the
materials in which it dealt. In a few months this estab-
lishment had handled 25,000,000 pounds of TNT. The
explosive was melted in steel kettles until it reached about
the density of hasty pudding ; with the aid of automatic
devices it was then poured into the mine cases, 300 pounds
to a case, and thence moved on a mechanical conveyor
to the end of the pier. Twenty-four cargo vessels, for
the most part taken from the Great Lakes, carried these
cargoes to the western coast of Scotland. Beginning in
February, 1918, two or three of these ships sailed every
eight days from Norfolk, armed against submarines and
manned by naval crews. The fact that these vessels
were slow made them an easy prey for the under-water
enemy ; one indeed was sunk, with the loss of forty-one
men ; regrettable as was this mishap, it represented the
only serious loss of the whole expedition.
254 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
The other vital points were Newport, Rhode Island,
where the six mine-layers were assembled ; and Fort
William and Kyle of Lochalsh on the western coast of
Scotland, which were the disembarking points for the
ships transporting the explosives. Captain Belknap's
men were very proud of their mine-layers, and in many
details they represented an improvement over anything
which had been hitherto employed in such a service. At
this point I wish to express my very great appreciation
of the loyal and devoted services rendered by Captain
Belknap. An organizer of rare ability, this officer deserves
well of the nation for the conspicuous part which he
played in the development of the North Sea Mine Barrage
from start to finish. Originally, these mine-layers had
been coastwise vessels ; two of them were the Bunker Hill
and the Massachusetts, which for years had been " outside
line " boats, running from New York to Boston ; all had
dropped the names which had served them in civil life and
were rechristened for the most part with names which
eloquently testified to their American origin Canonicus,
Shawmut, Quinnebaug, Housatonic, Saranac, Roanoke,
Aroostook, and Canandaigua. These changes in names
were entirely suitable, for by the time our forces had
completed their alterations the ships bore few resem-
blances to their former state. The cabins and saloons
had been gutted, leaving the hulls little more than empty
shells ; three decks for carrying mines had been installed ;
on all these decks little railroad tracks had been built on
which the mines could be rolled along the lower decks to
the elevators and along the upper mine deck to the stern
and dropped into the sea. Particularly novel details,
something entirely new in mine-layers, were the elevators,
the purpose of which was to bring the mines rapidly from
the lower decks to the launching track. So rapidly did
the work progress, and so well were the crews trained,
that in May, 1918, the first of these ten ships weighed
anchor and started for their destination in Scotland.
Already our navy had selected as bases the ports of Inver-
ness and Invergordon, on Moray Firth, harbours which
were reasonably near the waters in which the mines were
to be laid. From Invergordon the Highland Railway
crosses Scotland to Lochalsh, and from Inverness the
Caledonian Canal runs to Fort William. These two
1917-18] TRANSPORTING THE MINES 255
transportation lines the Highland Railway and the
Caledonian Canal served as connecting links in our com-
munications. If we wish a complete picture of our opera-
tion, we must call to mind first the hundreds of factories
in all parts of our country, working day and night, making
the numerous parts of these instruments of destruction
and their attendant mechanisms ; then hundreds of freight
cars carrying them to the assembling plant at Norfolk,
Virginia ; then another small army of workmen at this
point mixing their pasty explosive, heating it to a boiling
point, and pouring the concoction into the spherical steel
cases ; then other groups of men moving the partially
prepared mines to the docks and loading them on the
cargo ships ; then these ships quietly putting to sea, and,
after a voyage of ten days or two weeks, as quietly slipping
into the Scottish towns of Fort William and Kyle ; then
trains of freight cars and canal boats taking the cargoes
across Scotland to Inverness and Invergordon, where the
mines were completed and placed in the immense store-
houses at the bases and loaded on the mine -layers as the
necessity arose. Thus, when the whole organization was
once established on a working basis, we had uninterrupted
communications and a continuous flow of mines from
the American factories to the stormy waters of the
North Sea.
The towns in which our officers and men found them-
selves in late May, 1918, are among the most famous in
Scottish history and legend. Almost every foot of land
is associated with memories of Macbeth, Mary Queen of
Scots, Cromwell, and the Pretender. " The national
anthem woke me," says Captain Belknap, describing his
first morning at his new Scottish base. " I arose and
looked out. What a glorious sight ! Green slopes in all
freshness, radiant with broom and yellow gorse ; the
rocky shore mirrored in the Firth, which stretched, smooth
and cool, wide away to the east and south ; and, in the
distance, snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the entrance
to Munlochy Bay, we had a view along the sloping shores
into the interior of Black Isle, of noted fertility. Farther
out were Avoch, a whitewashed fishing village, and the
ancient town of Fortrose, with its ruined twelfth-century
cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden House, where
Bonnie Prince Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial,
256 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
but softened in outline by the morning haze, the Royal
Burgh of Inverness covered the banks and heights along
the Ness River, gleaming in the bright sunshine. And how
peaceful everywhere ! The Canandaigua and the Sonoma
lay near by, the Canonicus farther out, but no movement,
no signal, no beat of the engine, no throbbing pumps."
The reception which the natives gave our men was as
delightful as the natural beauty of the location. For miles
around the Scots turned out to make things pleasant for
their Yankee guests. The American naval forces stationed
at the mining bases in those two towns numbered about
3,000 officers and men, and the task of providing relaxa-
tions, in the heart of the Highlands, far removed from
theatres and moving-picture houses, would have been a
serious one had it not been for the cordial co-operation
of the people. The spirit manifested during our entire
stay was evidenced on the Fourth of July, when all the
shops and business places closed in honour of American
Independence Day and the whole community for miles
around joined our sailors in the celebration. The officers
spent such periods of relaxation as were permitted them
on the excellent golf links and tennis courts in the adjoin-
ing country ; dances were provided for the men, almost
every evening, the Scottish lassies showing great adapta-
bility in learning the American steps. Amateur theatricals,
in which both the men from the warships and the Scottish
girls took part, cheered many a crew after its return from
the mine-fields. Baseball was introduced for the first
time into the country of William Wallace and Robert
Burns. Great crowds gathered to witness the matches
between the several ships ; the Scots quickly learned the
fine points and really developed into " fans," while the
small boys of Inverness and Invergordon were soon play-
ing the game with as much enthusiasm and cleverness as
our own youngsters at home. In general, the behaviour
of our men was excellent and made the most favourable
impression.
These two mine-assembly bases at Inverness and Inver-
gordon will ever remain a monumental tribute to the loyal
and energetic devotion to duty of Captain Orin G. Murfin,
U.S. Navy, who designed and built them ; originally the
bases were intended to handle 12,000 mines, but in reality
Captain Murfin successfully handled as many as 20,000 at
1917-18] MINE-LAYING IN THE NORTH SEA 257
one time. It was here also that each secret firing device
was assembled and installed, very largely by reserve per-
sonnel. As many as 1,200 mines were assembled in one
day, which speaks very eloquently for the foresight with
which Captain Murfin planned his bases.
Ill
But of course baseball and dancing were not the serious
business in hand ; these Americans had come this long
distance to do their part in laying the mighty barrage which
was to add one more serious obstacle to the illegal German
submarine campaign. Though the operation was a joint
one of the American and British navies, our part was
much the larger. The proposal was to construct this
explosive impediment from the Orkney Islands to the
coast of Norway, in the vicinity of Udsire Light, a distance
of about 230 nautical miles. Of this great area about 150
miles, extending from the Orkneys to 3 degrees east longi-
tude, was the American field, and the eastern section,
which extended fifty nautical miles to Norway, was taken
over by the British. Since an operation of this magni-
tude required the supervision of an officer of high rank,
Rear-Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had extended experi-
ence in the ordnance field of the navy, came over in March,
1918, and took command. The British commander was
Rear-Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N.
The mines were laid in a series of thirteen expeditions, or
" excursions," as our men somewhat cheerfully called them.
The ten mine-layers participated in each " excursion," all
ten together laying about 5,400 mines at every trip. Each
trip to the field of action was practically a duplicate of the
others ; a description of one will, therefore, serve for all.
After days, and sometimes after weeks of preparation the
squadron, usually on a dark and misty night, showing no
lights or signals, would weigh anchor, slip by the rocky
palisades of Moray Firth, and stealthily creep out to sea.
As the ships passed through the nets and other obstructions
and reached open waters, the speed increased, the gunners
took their stations at their batteries, and suddenly from a
dark horizon came a glow of low, rapidly moving vessels ;
18
258 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
these were the British destroyers from the Grand Fleet
which had been sent to escort the expedition and protect it
from submarines. The absolute silence of the whole pro-
ceeding was impressive ; not one of the destroyers showed
a signal or a light ; not one of the mine-layers gave the
slightest sign of recognition ; all these details had been
arranged in advance, and everything now worked with
complete precision. The swishing of the water on the sides
and the slow churning of the propellers were the only sounds
that could possibly betray the ships to their hidden enemies.
After the ships had steamed a few more miles the dawn
began to break ; and now a still more inspiring sight met our
men. A squadron of battleships, with scout cruisers and
destroyers, suddenly appeared over the horizon. This fine
force likewise swept on, apparently paying not the slightest
attention to our vessels. They steamed steadily southward,
and in an hour or so had entirely disappeared. The ob-
server would hardly have guessed that this squadron from
Admiral Beatty's fleet at Scapa Flow had anything to do
with the American and British mine-layers. Its business,
however, was to establish a wall of steel and shotted guns
between these forces and the German battle fleet at Kiel.
At one time it was believed that the mine forces on the
northern barrage would prove a tempting bait to the Ger-
man dreadnoughts ; and that, indeed, it might induce the
enemy to risk a second general engagement on the high seas.
At any rate, a fleet of converted excursion steamers,
laying mines in the North Sea, could hardly be left exposed
to the attacks of German raiders ; our men had the satis-
faction of knowing that while engaged in their engrossing
if unenviable task a squadron of British or American
battleships for Admiral Rodman's forces took their
regular turn in acting as a " screen " in these excursions
was standing a considerable distance to the south, prepared
to make things lively for any German surface vessels which
attempted to interfere with the operation.
Now in the open seas the ten mine-layers formed in two
columns, abreast of each other and five hundred yards apart,
and started for the waters of the barrage. Twelve de-
stroyers surrounded them, on the lookout for submarines,
for the ships were now in the track of the U-boats bound for
their hunting ground or returning to their home ports. At
a flash from the flagship all slackened speed, and put out
1917-18] "FIRST MINE OVER" 259
their paravanes those under-water outrigger affairs which
protected the ships from mines ; for it was not at all
unlikely that the Germans would place some of their own
mines in this field, for the benefit of the barrage builders.
This operation took only a few minutes ; then another
flash, and the squadron again increased its speed. It
steamed the distance across the North Sea to Udsire Light,
then turned west again and headed for that mathematical
spot on the ocean which was known as the " start point "
the place, that is, where the mine-laying was to begin. In
carrying out all these manoeuvres sighting the light on
the Norwegian coast the commander was thinking,
not only of the present, but of the future ; for the time
would come, after the war had ended, when it would
be necessary to remove all these mines, and it was there-
fore wise to " fix " them as accurately as possible in
reference to landmarks, so as to know where to look for
them. All this time the men were at their stations,
examining the mines to see that everything was ready,
testing the laying mechanisms, and mentally rehearsing
their duties. At about four o'clock an important signal
came from the flagship :
" Have everything ready, for the squadron will reach
4 start point ' in an hour and mine-laying will begin."
Up to this time the ships were sailing in two columns ;
when they came within seven miles of " start point,"
another signal was broken out ; the ships all wheeled like a
company of soldiers, each turning sharply to the right, so
that in a few minutes, instead of two columns, we had eight
ships in line abreast, with the remaining two, also in line
abreast, sailing ahead of them. This splendid array,
keeping perfect position, approached the starting point like
a line of racehorses passing under the wire. Not a ship was
off this line by so much as a quarter length ; the whole
atmosphere was one of eagerness ; the officers all had their
eyes fixed upon the stern of the flagship, for the glimpse of
the red flag which would be the signal to begin. Suddenly
the flag was hauled down, indicating :
" First mine over."
If you had been following one of these ships, you would
probably have been surprised at the apparent simplicity of
the task. The vessel was going at its full speed ; at
intervals of a few seconds a huge black object, about five
260 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
feet high, would be observed gliding toward the stern ; at
this point it would pause for a second or two, as though
suspended in air ; it would then give a mighty lurch, fall
head first into the water, sending up a great splash, and then
sink beneath the waves. By the time the disturbance was
over the ship would have advanced a considerable distance ;
then, in a few seconds, another black object would roll
toward the stern, make a similar plunge, and disappear.
You might have followed the same ship for two or three
hours, watching these mines fall overboard at intervals of
about fifteen seconds. There were four planters, each of
which could and did on several trips lay about 860 mines in
three hours and thirty-five minutes, in a single line about
forty-four miles long. These were the Canandaigua, the
Canonicus, the Housatonic, and the Roanoke. Occasionally
the monotony of this procedure would be enlivened by a
terrible explosion, a great geyser of water rising where a
mine had only recently disappeared ; this meant that the
" e g>" as * ne sailors called it, had gone off spontaneously,
without the assistance of any external contact ; such
accidents were part of the game, the records showing that
about 4 per cent, of all the mines indulged in such initial
premature explosions. For the most part, however, nothing
happened to disturb the steady mechanical routine. The
mines went over with such regularity that, to an observer,
the whole proceeding seemed hardly the work of human
agency. Yet every detail had been arranged months before
in the United States ; the mines fell into the sea in accord-
ance with a time-table which had been prepared in Newport
before the vessels started for Scotland. Every man on the
ship had a particular duty to perform and each performed
it in the way in which he had been schooled under the
direction of Captain Belknap.
The spherical mine case, which contains the explosive
charge and the mechanism for igniting it, is only a part of
the contrivance. While at rest on board the ship this case
stands upon a box-like affair, about two feet square, known
as the anchor ; this anchor sinks to the bottom after launch-
ing and it contains an elaborate arrangement for maintain-
ing the mine at any desired depth beneath the surface.
The bottom of the " anchor " has four wheels, on which it
runs along the little railroad track on the launching deck to
the jumping-off place at the stern. All along these railroad
1917-18] THE GROWING MINEFIELD 261
tracks the mines were stationed one back of another ; as
one went overboard, they would all advance a peg, a mine
coming up from below on an elevator to fill up the vacant
space at the end of the procession. It took a crew of hard-
working, begrimed, and sweaty men to keep these mines
moving and going over the stern at the regularly appointed
intervals. After three or four hours had been spent in this
way and the ships had started back to their base, the decks
would sometimes be covered with the sleeping figures of
these exhausted men. It would be impossible to speak too
appreciatively of the spirit they displayed ; in the whole
summer there was not a single mishap of any importance.
The men all felt that they were engaged in a task which had
never been accomplished before, and their exhilaration
increased with almost every mine that was laid. " Nails
in the coffin of the Kaiser," the men called these grim
instruments of vengeance.
IV
I have described one of these thirteen summer excursions,
and the description given could be applied to all the rest.
Once or twice the periscope of a submarine was sighted
without any disastrous results but in the main this
business of mine-laying was uneventful. Just what was
accomplished the chart makes clear. In the summer and
autumn months of 1918 the American forces laid 56,571
mines and the British 13,546. The operation was to have
been a continuous one ; had the war gone on for two years
we should probably have laid several hundred thousand ;
Admiral Strauss's forces kept at the thing steadily up to the
time of the armistice ; they had become so expert and the
barrage was producing such excellent results that we had
plans nearly completed for building another at the Strait
of Otranto, which would have completely closed the Adriatic
Sea. Besides this undertaking the American mine-layer
Baltimore laid a mine-field in the North Irish Channel, the
narrow waters which separate Scotland and Ireland ; two
German submarines which soon afterward attempted this
passage were blown to pieces, and after this the mine-field
was given a wide berth.
262 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
Just what the North Sea barrage accomplished, in the
actual destruction of submarines, will never be definitely
known. We have information that four certainly were
destroyed, and in all probability six and possibly eight ; yet
these results doubtless measure only a small part of the
German losses. In the majority of cases the Germans had
little or no evidence of sunken submarines. The destroyers,
subchasers, and other patrol boats were usually able to
obtain some evidences of injury inflicted ; they could often
see their quarry, or the disturbances which it made on the
surface ; they could pursue and attack it, and the resultant
oil patches, wreckage, and German prisoners and some-
times the recovered submarine itself or its location on the
bottom would tell the story either of damage or destruc-
tion. But the disconcerting thing about the North Sea
barrage, from the viewpoint of the Germans, was that it
could do its work so secretly that no one, friend or enemy,
would necessarily know a thing about it. A German
submarine simply left its home port ; attempting to cross
the barrage, perhaps at night, it would strike one of these
mines, or its antenna ; an explosion would crumple it up
like so much paper ; with its crew it would sink to the
bottom ; and not a soul, perhaps not even the crew itself,
would ever know what had happened to it. It would in
truth be a case of " sinking without a trace " though an
entirely legitimate one under the rules of warfare. The
German records disclosed anywhere from forty to fifty sub-
marines sunk which did not appear in the records of the
Allies ; how these were destroyed not a soul knows, or ever
will know. They simply left their German ports and were
never heard of again. That many of them fell victims to
mines, and some of them to the mines of our barrage, is an
entirely justifiable assumption. That probably even a
larger number of U-boats were injured is also true. A
German submarine captain, after the surrender at Scapa
Flow, said that he personally knew of three submarines,
including his own, which had been so badly injured at the
barrage that they had been compelled to limp back to
their German ports.
The results other than the sinking of submarines were
exceedingly important in bringing the war to an end. It
was the failure of the submarine campaign which defeated
the German hopes and forced their surrender : and in this
1917-18] DEMORALIZED GERMANS 263
defeat the barrage was an important element. That sub-
marines frequently crossed it is true ; there was no expect-
ation, when the enterprise was started, that it would abso-
lutely shut the U-boats in the North Sea ; but its influence
in breaking down the German moral must have been great.
To understand this, just place yourself for a moment in the
position of a submarine crew. The width of this barrage
ranged from fifteen to thirty -five miles ; it took from one to
three hours for a submarine to cross this area on the surface
and from two to six hours under the surface. Not every
square foot, it is true, had been mined ; there were certain
gaps caused by the spontaneous explosions to which I have
referred ; but nobody knew where these openings were, or
where a single mine was located. The officers and crews
knew only that at any moment an explosion might send
them to eternity. A strain of this sort is serious enough
if it lasts only a few minutes ; imagine being kept in this
state of mind anywhere from one to six hours ! Submarine
prisoners constantly told us how they dreaded the mines ;
going through such a field, I suppose, was about the most
disagreeable experience in this nerve-racking service. Our
North Sea barrage began to show results almost immediately
after our first planting. The German officers evidently
kept informed of our progress and had a general idea of the
territory which had been covered. For a considerable time
a passage-way, sixty miles wide, was kept open for the Grand
Fleet just east of the Orkney Islands ; the result was that
the submarines, which had hitherto usually skirted the
Norwegian coast, now changed their route, and attempted
to slip through the western passage-way a course that
enabled them to avoid the mine-field. When the entire
distance from the Orkneys to Norway had been mined,
however, it became impossible to " run around the end."
The Germans were now obliged to sail boldly into this
explosive field, taking their chances of hitting a mine.
Stories of this barrage were circulated all over Germany ;
sailors who had been in contact with it related their ex-
periences to their fellows ; and the result was extremely
demoralizing to the German submarine flotilla. The North
Sea barrage was probably a contributory cause of the
mutiny which demoralized the German fleet in the autumn
of 1918.
I think I am therefore justified in saying that this enter-
264 AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN NORTH SEA
prise was a strong factor in overcoming the submarine
menace, though the success of the convoy system had
already brought the end in sight, and had thus made it
practicable to assign, without danger of defeat, the tonnage
necessary to lay the barrage and maintain and augment
it as long as might be necessary. The Germans saw the
barrage not only as it was in the autumn of 1918, but as it
would be a few months or a year hence. We had started
a steady stream of mines from hundreds of factories in
the United States to our Scottish bases ; these establish-
ments were constantly increasing production, and there was
practically no limit to their possible output. We had
developed a mine-laying organization which was admittedly
better than any that had been hitherto known ; and this
branch of the service we could now enlarge indefinitely. In
time we could have planted this area so densely with
explosives that it would have been madness for any sub-
marines even to attempt a passage. To be sure, the
Pentland Firth, between the Orkneys and Scotland, was
always open, and could not be mined on account of its
; wift tides, but besides being a dangerous passage &t
best it was constantly patrolled to make it still more
dangerous.
The loyal devotion to duty and the skilful seamanship
which our officers displayed in this great enterprise were not
only thoroughly in keeping with the highest traditions of the
navy, but really established new standards to guide and
inspire those who will follow us. These gallant officers who
actually laid the mines are entitled to the nation's grati-
tude, and I take great pleasure in commending the work of
Captain H. V. Butler, commanding the flagship San
Francisco ; Captain J. Harvey Tomb, commanding the
Aroostook ; Captain A. W. Marshall, commanding the
Baltimore ; Commander W. H. Reynolds, commanding the
Canandaigua ; Captain T. L. Johnson, commanding the
Canonicus ; Captain J. W. Greenslade, commanding the
Housatonic; Commander D. Pratt Mannix, commanding
the Quinnebaug ; Captain C. D. Stearns, commanding the
Roanoke ; Captain Sinclair Gannon, commanding the
Saranac ; and Captain W. T. Cluverius, commanding the
Shawmut.
This splendid squadron, of which the flagship was the
San Francisco,was organized by Captain R. R. Belknap and,
1918] CAPTAIN BELKNAP, U.S.N. 265
by order of the Secretary of the Navy, was placed under
his direct command ; and he was therefore responsible for
all preparations, tactics, general instructions, special in-
structions for each mine-laying " excursion," the intricate
navigation required, and in fact all arrangements necessary
for the successful planting of the mines in their assigned
positions.
CHAPTER X
GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN COAST
IT was in the summer of 1918 that the Germans made their
only attempt at what might be called an offensive against
their American enemies. Between the beginning of May
and the end of October, 1918, five German submarines
crossed the Atlantic and torpedoed a few ships on our coast.
That submarines could make this long journey had long
been known. Singularly enough, however, the impression
still prevails in this country that the German U-boats were
the first to accomplish the feat. In the early autumn of 1 91 6
the [7-53 commanded by that submarine officer, Hans
Rose, who has been previously mentioned in these pages
crossed the Atlantic, dropped in for a call at Newport, R.I.,
and, on the way back, sank a few merchant vessels off
Nantucket. A few months previous the so-called merchant
submarine Deutschland had made its trip to Newport News.
The Teutonic press, and even some Germanophiles in this
country, hailed these achievements as marking a glorious
page in the record of the German navy. Doubtless the real
purpose was to show the American people how easily these
destructive vessels could cross the Atlantic ; and to impress
upon their minds the fate which awaited them in case they
maintained their rights against the Prussian bully. As a
matter of fact, it had been proved, long before the Deutsch-
land or the C7-53 had made their voyages, that submarines
could cross the Atlantic. In 1915, not one but ten sub-
marines had gone from North America to Europe under
their own power. Admiral Sir John Fisher tells about this
expedition in his recently published memoirs. In 1914, the
British Admiralty had contracted for submarines with
Charles M. Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel
Company. As international law prohibited the construc-
tion of war vessels by a nation in wartime for the use of a
266
1917-18] TRANS-ATLANTIC SUBMARINES 267
belligerent with which it was at peace, the parts of ten sub-
marines were sent to Canada, where they were put together.
These submarines then crossed the Atlantic under their own
power, and were sent from British ports to the Dardanelles,
where they succeeded in driving Turkish and German ship-
ping out of the Sea of Marmora. Thus a crossing of the
Atlantic by American-built submarines manned by British
crews had been accomplished before the Germans made
their voyages. It was therefore not necessary for the two
German submarines to cross the Atlantic to prove that the
thing could be done ; but the Germans doubtless believed
that this demonstration of their ability to operate on the
American coast would serve as a warning to the American
people.
We were never at all deceived as to what would be the
purpose of such a visit after our entrance into the war. In
the early part of 1917 the Allies believed that a few German
U-boats might assail our coast, and I so informed the Navy
Department at Washington. My cables and letters of 1917
explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in
such a gesture. Strategically, as these despatches make
clear, such attacks would have no great military value. To
have sent a sufficient number of submarines to do any con-
siderable damage on the American coast would have been a
great mistake. Germany's one chance of winning the war
with the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such
an extent that the communications of the Allies with the
outside world, and especially with the United States, would
be cut. The only places where the submarine warfare could
be conducted with some chance of success were the ocean
passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in
that area south and south-west of Ireland in which were
focussed the trade routes for ships sailing from all parts of
the world and destined for British and French ports. With
the number of submarines available, the Germans could
keep enough of their U-boats at w r ork in these areas to
destroy a large number of merchant ships. Germany thus
needed to concentrate all of her available submarines at
these points ; she had an inadequate number for her pur-
pose ; to send any considerable force three thousand miles
across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the
real scene of warfare and would make her submarine
campaign a failure. The cruises of submarines on the
268 GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT AMERICAN COAST
American coast would have been very much longer and
would have been a much more serious strain on the sub-
marines than were the shorter cruises in the inshore waters
of Europe. As has already been explained, the submarine
did not differ from other craft in its need for constant
repairs and careful upkeep, except that perhaps it was a
more delicate instrument of warfare than any other naval
craft, and that it would require longer and more frequent
periods of overhaul. Any operations carried out three
thousand miles from their bases, where alone supplies,
spare parts, and repair facilities were available, would have
soon reduced the submarine campaign to comparative use-
lessness ; each voyage would have resulted in sinking a
relatively small amount of shipping ; a great number of
submarines would be out of commission at all times for
repairs, or would be lost through accidents. The Germans
had no submarine bases in American waters and could
establish none. Possibly, as the newspaper writer has
pointed out, they might have seized a deserted island off
the coast of Maine or in the Caribbean, and cached there a
reservoir of fuel and food ; unless, however, they could also
have created at these places adequate facilities for repairing
submarines or supplying them with torpedoes and am-
munition, such a place would not have served the purpose
of a base at all. Comparatively few of the German sub-
marines could have made the cruise to the American coast
and operated successfully there so far away from their bases
for any considerable time. In the time spent in such an
enterprise, the same submarine could make three or four
trips in the waters about the British Isles, or off the coast of
France, and could sink four or five times the tonnage which
could be destroyed in the cruise on the Atlantic coast. In
the eastern Atlantic, the submarine could seek its victims
in an area comprising a comparatively few square miles, at
points where shipping was so dense that a submarine had
only to take a station and lie in wait, and be certain, within
a short time, of encountering valuable ships which it could
attack successfully with its torpedoes. If the U-boats
should be sent to America, on the other hand, they would
have to patrol up and down three thousand miles of coast,
looking for victims ; and even when they found them the
ships that they could sink would usually be those engaged
in the coastwise traffic, which were of infinitely less military
1917-18] SUBMARINE THREAT TO AMERICA 269
importance than the transports which were carrying food,
munitions, and supplies to the Allies and which were being
sunk in the eastern Atlantic.
Anything resembling an attack in force on American
harbours was therefore improbable. Yet it seemed likely
from the first that the Germans would send an occasional
submarine into our waters, as a measure of propaganda
rather than for the direct military result that would be
achieved. American destroyers and other vessels were
essential to the success of the whole anti-submarine cam-
paign of the Allies. The sooner they could all be sent into
the critical European waters the sooner the German cam-
paign of terrorism would end. If these destroyers, or any
considerable part of them, could be kept indefinitely in
American waters, the Germans might win the war. Any
manoeuvre which would have as its result the keeping of
these American vessels, so indispensable to the Allies, out
of the field of active warfare, would thus be more than
justified and, indeed, would indicate the highest wisdom on
the part of the German navy. The Napoleonic principle of
dividing your enemy's forces is just as valuable in naval as
in land warfare. For many years Admiral Mahan had been
instructing American naval officers that the first rule in
warfare is 'not to divide your fighting forces, but always to
keep them together, so as to bring the whole weight at a
given moment against your adversary. Two of the
fundamental principles of the science of warfare, on land
and sea alike, are contained in the maxims : Keep your own
forces concentrated, and always endeavour to divide those
of the enemy. Undoubtedly, the best method which
Germany could use to keep our destroyers in our own waters
would be to make the American people believe that their
lives and property were in danger ; they might accomplish
this by sending a submarine to attack our shipping off New
York and Boston and other Atlantic seaports, and possibly
even to bombard our harbours. The Germans doubtless
believed that they might create such alarm and arouse such
public clamour in the United States that our destroyers and
other anti-submarine craft would be kept over here by the
Navy Department, in response to the popular agitation to
protect our own coast. This is the reason why American
headquarters in London, and the Allied admiralties, ex-
pected such a visitation. The Germans obviously endeav-
270 GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT AMERICAN COAST
cured to create the impression that such an attack was likely
to occur at any time. This was part of their war propa-
ganda. The press was full of reports that such attacks were
about to be made. German agents were continually
circulating these reports.
Of course it was clear from the first, to the heads of the
Allied navies and to all naval authorities who were informed
about the actual conditions, that these attacks by German
submarines on the American coast would be in the nature
of raids for moral effect only. It was also quite clear from
the first, as I pointed out in my despatches to the Navy
Department, that the best place to defend our coast was in
the critical submarine areas in the European Atlantic,
through which the submarines had to pass in setting out for
our coast, and in which alone they could have any hope of
succeeding in the military object of the undersea campaign.
It was not necessary to keep our destroyers in American
waters, patrolling the vast expanse of our three thousand
miles of coastline, in a futile effort to find and destroy such
enemy submarines as might operate on the American coast.
So long as these attacks were only sporadic and carried out
by the type of submarine which used its guns almost ex-
clusively in sinking ships, and which selected for its victims
unarmed and unprotected ships destroyers and other anti-
submarine craft would be of no possible use on the Atlantic
coast. The submarine could see these craft from a much
greater distance than it could itself be seen by them ; and
by diving and sailing submerged it could easily avoid them
and sink its victims without ever being sighted or attacked
by our own patrols, however numerous they might have
been. Even in the narrow waters of the English Channel,
up to the very end of the war, submarines w r ere successfully
attacking small merchant craft by gunfire, although the
density of patrol craft in this area was naturally a thousand
times greater than we could ever have provided for the vast
expanse of our own coast. Consequently, so long as the
submarine attacks on the American coast were only spor-
adic, it was absolutely futile to maintain patrol craft in
those w r aters, as this could not provide any adequate
defence against such scattered demonstrations. If, on the
other hand, the Germans had ever decided to commit the
military mistake of concentrating a considerable number of
submarines off our Atlantic ports, we could always have
1917-18] DEFENCE OF AMERICAN COAST 271
countered such a step by sending back from the war
zone an adequate number of craft to protect convoys in and
out of the Atlantic ports, in the same manner that convoys
were protected in the submarine danger zone in European
waters. This is a fact which even many naval men did not
seem to grasp. Yet I have already explained that we knew
practically where every German submarine was at any given
time. We knew whenever one left a German port ; and
we kept track of it day by day until it returned home. No
U-boat ever made a voyage across the Atlantic without our
knowledge. The submarine was a slow traveller, and re-
quired a minimum of thirty days for such a trip ; normally,
the time would be much longer, for a submarine on such a
long voyage had to economize oil fuel for the return trip and
therefore seldom cruised at more than five knots an hour.
Our destroyers and anti-submarine craft, on the other hand,
could easily cross the Atlantic in ten days and refuel in
their home ports. It is therefore apparent that a flotilla of
destroyers stationed in European waters could protect the
American coast from submarines almost as successfully as
if it were stationed at Hampton Roads or Newport. Such
a flotilla would be of no use at these American stations
unless there were submarines attacking shipping off the
coast ; but as soon as the Germans started for America a
fact of which we could always be informed, and of which, as
I shall explain, we always were informed we could send our
destroyers in advance of them. These agile vessels would
reach home waters about three weeks before the submarines
arrived ; they would thus have plenty of time to refit and
to welcome the uninvited guests. From any conceivable
point of view, therefore, there was no excuse for keeping
destroyers on the American side of the Atlantic for " home
defence." Moreover, the fact that we could keep this close
track of submarines in itself formed a great protection
against them. I have already explained how we routed
convoys entering European waters in such ways that they
could sail around the U-boat and thus escape contact. I
think that this simple procedure saved more shipping than
any other method. In the same way we could keep these
vessels sailing frm American ports outside of the area in
which the submarines were known to be operating in our
own waters.
Yet the enemy sent no submarines to our coast in 1917 ;
272 GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT AMERICAN COAST
why they did not do so may seem difficult to understand, for
that was just the period when a campaign of this kind might
have served their purpose. During this time, however, we
had repeated indications that the Germans did not take
the American entrance into the war very seriously ; more-
over, looking forward to conditions after the peace, they
perhaps hoped that they might soon be able once again
to establish friendly relations. In 1917 they therefore
refrained from any acts which might arouse popular hatred
against them. We had more than one indication of this
attitude. Early in the summer of 1917 we obtained from
one of the captured German submarines a set of the orders
issued to it by the German Admiralty Staff. Among these
was one dated May 8, 1917, in which the submarine com-
manders were informed that Germany had not declared war
upon the United States, and that, until further instructions
were received, the submarines were to continue to look
upon America and American shipping as neutral. The
submarine commanders were especially warned against
attacking or committing any overt act against such
American war vessels as might be encountered in European
waters. The orders explained that no official confirmation
had been received by the German Government of the news
which had been published in the press that America had
declared war, and that, therefore, the Germans, officially,
were ignoring our belligerence. From their own standpoint
such a policy of endeavouring not to offend America, even
after she became an enemy, may have seemed politically
wise ; from a military point of view, their failure to attempt
the submarine demonstration off our coast in 1917 was a
great mistake ; for when they finally started warfare on
our coast, the United States was deeply involved in hos-
tilities, and had already begun the transportation of the
great army which produced such decisive results on the
Western Front. The time had passed, as experience soon
showed, when any demonstration on our coast would
disturb the calm of the American people or affect their will
to victory.
In late April, 1918, I learned through secret-service
channels that one of the large submarines of the Deutschland
class had left its German base on the 19th of April for a long
cruise. On the 1st of May, 1918, 1 therefore cabled to the
Department that there were indications that this sub-
1918] THE " U-151 " IN U.S. WATERS 278
marine was bound for our own coast. A few days after-
ward I received more specific information, through the
interception of radio despatches between Germany and the
submarine ; and therefore I cabled the Department, this
time informing them that the submarine was the C7-151,
that it was now well on its way across the Atlantic, and that
it could be expected to begin operations off the American
coast any time after May 20th. I gave a complete des-
cription of the vessel, the probable nature of her cruise, and
her essential military characteristics. She carried a supply
of mines, and I therefore invited the attention of the De-
partment to the fact that the favourite areas for laying
mines were those places where the ships stopped to pick
up pilots. Since at Delaware Bay pilots for large ships
were taken on just south of the Five Fathom Bank Light,
I suggested that it was not unlikely that the U-151 would
attempt to lay mines in that vicinity. Now the fact is
that we knew that the C7-151 intended to lay mines at this
very place. We had obtained this piece of information
from the radio which we had intercepted ; as there was a
possibility that our own cable might fall into German hands,
we did not care to give the news in the precise form in which
we had received it, as we did not intend that they should
know that we had means of keeping so accurately informed.
As had been predicted, the U-151 proceeded directly to the
vicinity of this Five Fathom Bank off Delaware Bay, laid
her mines, and then, cruising northward up the coast, began
her demonstration on the 25th of May by sinking two small
wooden schooners. These had no radio apparatus, and it
was not until June 2nd that the Navy Department and the
country received the news that the first submarine was
operating. On June 29th I informed Washington that
another U-boat was then coming down the west coast of
Ireland, bound for the United States, and that it would
arrive some time after July 15th. Complete reports of
this vessel were sent from day to day, as it made its slow
progress across the ocean. On July 6th I cabled that still
another U-boat had started for our coast ; and the progress
of this adventurer, with all details as to its character and
probable area of operations, were also forwarded regularly.
From the end of May until October there was nearly always
one submarine operating off our coast. The largest number
active at any one time was in August, when for a week or
19
274 GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT AMERICAN COAST
ten days three were more or less active in attacking coast-
wise vessels. These three operated all the way from Cape
Hatteras to Newfoundland, attempting by these tactics to
create the impression that dozens of hostile U-boats were
preying upon our commerce and threatening our shores.
These submarines, however, attacked almost exclusively
sailing vessels and small coastwise steamers, rarely, if ever,
using torpedoes. A number of mines were laid at different
points off our ports, on what the Germans believed to be the
traffic routes ; but the information which we had concern-
ing them made it possible to counter successfully their efforts
and, from a military point of view, the whole of the sub-
marine operations off our coast can be dismissed as one of
the minor incidents of the war, as the Secretary of the Navy
described it in his Annual Report. The five submarines
sunk in all approximately 110,000 tons of shipping, but the
vessels were, for the most part, small and of no great
military importance. The only real victory was the des-
truction of the cruiser San Diego, which was sunk by a mine
which had been laid by the 7-156 off Fire Island.
CHAPTER XI
FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
THE Allied navies were harrowing the submarines not
only under the water and on the surface, but from the air.
In the anti-submarine campaign the several forms of air-
craft airplane, seaplane, dirigible, and kite balloon
developed great offensive power. Nor did the fact that
our fighters in the heavens made few direct attacks which
were successful diminish the importance of their work.
The records of the British Admiralty attribute the destruc-
tion of five submarines to the British air service ; the French
Admiralty gives the American forces credit for destroying
one on the French coast. These achievements, compared
with the tremendous efforts involved in equipping air
stations, may at first look like an inconsiderable return ;
yet the fact remains that aircraft were an important ele-
ment in defeating the German campaign against merchant
shipping.
Like the subchaser and the submarine, the seaplane
operated most successfully in coastal waters. I have
already indicated that one advantage of the convoy system
was that it forced the U-boats to seek their victims closer
to the shore. In our several forms of aircraft we had still
another method of interfering with their operation in such
quarters. In order to use these agencies effectively we
constructed aircraft stations in large numbers along the
coast of France and the British Isles, assigned a certain
stretch of coastline to each one of these stations, and kept
the indicated area constantly patrolled. The advantages
which were possessed by a fleet of aircraft operating at a
considerable height above the water are at once apparent.
The great speed of seaplanes in itself transformed them into
formidable foes. The submarine on the surface could make
a maximum of only 16 knots an hour, whereas an airplane
275
176 FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
made anywhere from 60 to 100 ; it therefore had little
difficulty, once it had sighted the under-water boat, in
catching up with it and starting hostilities. Its great speed
also made it possible for an airplane or dirigible to patrol
a much greater area of water than a surface or a sub-surface
vessel. An observer located several hundred feet in the
heavens could see the submarine much more easily than
could his comrades on other craft. If the water were clear
he could at once detect it, even though it were submerged ;
in any event, merely lifting a man in the air greatly extended
his horizon, and made it possible for him to pick up hostile
vessels at a much greater distance. Moreover, the air-
plane had that same advantage upon which I have laid
such emphasis in describing the anti-submarine powers of
the submarine itself: that is, it was almost invisible to its
under-water foe. If the U-boat were lying on the surface, a
seaplane or a dirigible was readily seen ; but if it were sub-
merged entirely, or even sailing at periscope depth, the
most conspicuous enemy in the heavens was invisible.
After our submarines and our aircraft had settled down to
their business of extermination, existence for those Germans
who were operating in coastal w r aters became extremely
hazardous and nerve-racking ; their chief anxiety was no
longer the depth bomb of a destroyer ; they lived every
moment in the face of hidden terrors ; they never knew
when a torpedo would explode into their vitals, or when an
unseen bomb, dropped from the heavens, would fall upon
their fragile decks.
I have said that the destructive achievements of aircraft
figure only moderately in the statistics of the war ; this was
because the greater part of their most valuable work was
done in co-operation with war vessels. Aircraft in the
Navy performed a service not unlike that which it performed
in the Army. We are all familiar with the picture of
airplanes sailing over the field of battle, obtaining informa-
tion which was wirelessed back to their own forces, " spot-
ting " artillery positions, and giving ranges. The seaplanes
and dirigibles of the Allied navies performed a similar
service on the ocean. To a considerable extent they be-
came the " eyes " of the destroyers and other surface craft,
just as the airplanes on the land became the " eyes " of
the army. As part of their equipment all the dirigibles
had wireless telegraph and wireless telephone ; as soon as
1918] HOW AIRSHIPS WORKED 277
a submarine was " spotted." the news was immediately
flashed broadcast, and every offensive warship which was
anywhere in the neighbourhood, as well as the airplane
itself, started for the indicated scene. There are several
cases in which the sinking of submarines by destroyers was
attributed to information wirelessed in this fashion by
American aircraft ; and since the air service of the British
navy was many times greater than our own, there are many
more such " indirect sinkings " credited to the British effort.
The following citation, which I submitted to the Navy
Department in recommending Lieutenant John J. Schieffelin
for the Distinguished Service Medal, illustrates this co-
operation between air and surface craft :
This officer performed many hazardous reconnaissance
flights, and on July 9th, 1918, he attacked an enemy sub-
marine with bombs and then directed the British destroyers
to the spot, which were successful in seriously damaging
the submarine. Again, on July 19th, 1918, Lieutenant
Schieffelin dropped bombs on another enemy submarine,
and then signalled trawlers to the spot, which delivered a
determined attack against the submarine, which attack
was considered highly successful and the submarine seri-
ously damaged, if not destroyed. This officer was at all
times an example of courageous loyalty.
Besides scouting and " spotting " and bombing, the
aerial hunters of the submarine developed great value in
escorting convoys. A few dirigibles, located on the flanks
of a convoy, protected them almost as effectively as the
destroyers themselves ; and even a single airship not
infrequently brought a group of merchantmen and troop-
ships safely into port. Sometimes the airships operated
in this way as auxiliaries to destroyers, while sometimes
they operated alone. In applying this mechanism of
protection to merchant convoys, we were simply adopting
the method which Great Britain had been using for three
years in the narrow passages of the English Channel.
Much has been said of the skill with which the British navy
transported about 20,000,000 souls back and forth between
England and France in four years ; and in this great move-
ment seaplanes, dirigibles, and other forms of aircraft played
an important part. In the same way this scheme of pro-
278 FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
tection was found valuable with the coastal convoys,
particularly with the convoys which sailed from one French
port to another, and from British ports to places in Ireland,
Holland, or Scandinavia. I have described the dangers in
which these ships were involved owing to the fact that the
groups were obliged to break up after entering the Channel
and the Irish Sea, and thus to proceed singly to their
destinations. Aircraft improved this situation to a con-
siderable extent, for they could often go to sea, pick up the
ships, and bring them safely home. The circumstance that
our seaplanes, perched high in the air, could see the sub-
marine long before they had reached torpedoing distance,
and could, if necessary, signal to a destroyer for assistance,
made them exceedingly valuable for this kind of work.
Early in 1918, at the request of the British Govern-
ment, we took over a large seaplane base which had been
established by the British at Killingholme, England, a
little seacoast town at the mouth of the Humber River.
According to the original plan we intended to co-operate
from this point with the British in a joint expedition against
enemy naval bases, employing for this purpose especially
constructed towing lighters, upon which seaplanes were to
be towed by destroyers to within a short flying distance of
their objectives. Although this project was never carried
out, Killingholme, because of its geographical location,
became a very important base for seaplanes used in escort-
ing mercantile convoys to and from Scandinavian ports,
patrolling mine-fields while on the lookout for enemy sub-
marines and making those all-important reconnaissance
flights over the North Sea which were intended to give
advanced warning of any activity of the German High Seas
Fleet. These flights lasted usually from six to eight hours ;
the record was made by Ensign S. C. Kennedy and C. H.
Weatherhead, U.S.N., who flew for nine hours continuously
on convoy escort duty. For a routine patrol, this compares
very favourably indeed with the flight of the now famous
trans-Atlantic NC-4>.
I can no better describe the splendid work of these en-
thusiastic and courageous young Americans than by quoting
a few extracts from a report which was submitted to me by
Ensign K. B. Keyes, of a reconnaissance flight in which he
took part, while attached temporarily to a British seaplane
station under post-graduate instruction. The picture given
1918] ENSIGN KEYES REPORTS 279
by Ensign Keyes is typical of the flights which our boys
were constantly making :
On June 4, 1918, we received orders to carry out a recon-
naissance and hostile aircraft patrol over the North Sea and
along the coast of Holland. It was a perfect day for such
work, for the visibility was extremely good, with a light
wind of fifteen knots and clouds at the high altitude of about
eight or ten thousand feet.
Our three machines from Felixstowe rose from the water
at twelve o'clock, circled into patrol formation, and pro-
ceeded north-east by north along the coast to Yarmouth.
Here we were joined by two more planes, but not without
some trouble and slight delay because of a broken petrol
pipe which was subsequently repaired in the air. We again
circled into formation, Capt. Leckie, D.S.O., of Yarmouth,
taking his position as leader of the squadron.
At one o'clock the squadron proceeded east, our machine,
being in the first division, flew at 1,500 feet and at about
half a mile in the rear of Capt. Leckie's machine, but keeping
him on our starboard quarter.
We sighted nothing at all until about half-past two, when
the Haaks Light Vessel slowly rose on the horizon, but near
this mark and considerably more to the south we discovered
a large fleet of Dutch fishing smacks. This fleet consisted
of more than a hundred smacks.
Ten minutes later we sighted the Dutch coast, where we
changed our course more to the north-east. We followed
the sandy beaches of the islands of Texel and Vlieland until
we came to Terschelling. In following the coast of Vlieland
we were close enough to distinguish houses on the inside of
the island and even to make out breakers rolling up on the
sandy beach.
At Terschelling we proceeded west in accordance with our
orders, but soon had to turn back because of Capt. Leckie's
machine which had fallen out of formation and come to the
water. This machine landed at three fifteen and we con-
tinued to circle around it, finding that the trouble was with
a badly broken petrol pipe, until about fifteen minutes
later, when we sighted five German planes steering west, a
direction which would soon bring them upon us.
At this time Capt. Barker had the wheel, Lt. Galvayne
was seated beside him, but if we met the opposing forces he
280 FIGHTING' SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
was to kneel on the seat with his eyes above the cowl, where
he could see all the enemy planes and direct the pilot in
which direction to proceed. I was in the front cockpit with
one gun and four hundred rounds of ammunition. In the
stern cockpit the engineer and wireless ratings were to
handle three guns.
We at once took battle formation and went forward to
meet the enemy, but here we were considerably surprised
to find that when we were nearly within range they had
turned and were running away from us. At once we gave
chase, but soon found that they were much too fast for us.
Our machine had broken out of the formation and, with
nose down, had crept slightly ahead of Capt. Leckie, and we
being the nearest machine to the enemy, I had the satis-
faction of trying out my gun for a number of rounds. It
was quite impossible to tell whether I had registered any
hits or not.
Our purpose in chasing these planes was to keep them
away from the machine on the water which, if we had not
been there, would have been shot to pieces. Finding that
it was useless to follow them, as they could easily keep out
of our range, we turned back and very shortly we were again
circling around our machine on the water.
It was not long before the enemy again came very close,
so we gave chase the second time. This time, instead of
five machines as before, there were only four, and one small
scout could be seen flying in the direction of Borkum.
It was the fourth time that we went off in pursuit of the
enemy that we suddenly discovered that a large number of
hostile planes were proceeding towards us, not in the air
with the other four planes but very close to the water.
There were ten planes in this first group, but they were
joined a few minutes later by five more.
We swung into battle formation and steered for the
middle of the group. When we were nearly within range
four planes on the port side and five planes on the starboard
side rose to our level of fifteen hundred feet. Two planes
passed directly beneath us firing upward. Firing was
incessant from the beginning and the air seemed blue with
tracer smoke. I gave most of my time to the four planes
on our port side, because they were exactly on the same
level with us and seemed to be within good range, that is
about two hundred yards. When we had passed each other
1918] AN UNEQUAL FIGHT 281
I looked around and noticed that Lt. Galvayne was in a
stooping position, with head and one arm on his seat, the
other arm hanging down as if reaching for something. I
had seen him in this position earlier in the day so thought
nothing of it. All this I had seen in the fraction of a second,
for I had to continue firing. A few minutes later I turned
around again and found with a shock that Lt. Galvayne was
in the same position. It was then that the first inkling of
the truth dawned upon me. By bending lower I discovered
that his head was lying in a pool of blood.
From this time on I have no clear idea of just what our
manoeuvring was, but evidently we put up a running fight
steering east, then circled until suddenly I found our
machine had been cut off from the formation and we were
surrounded by seven enemy seaplanes.
This time we were steering west or more to the south-
west. We carried on a running fight for ten miles or so
until we drove the seven planes off. During the last few
minutes of the fight our engine had been popping altogether
too frequently and soon the engineer came forward to tell
us that the port engine petrol pipe had broken.
By this time I had laid out Lt. Galvayne in the wireless
cockpit, cleaned up the second pilot's seat, and taken it
myself.
The engagement had lasted about half an hour, and the
closest range was one hundred yards while the average range
was two hundred. The boat w r ith Ensign Eaton in it
landed between the Islands of Texel and Vlieland, while
the other boat, which had not taken any part in the fight,
was last seen two miles off Vlieland and still taxiing in
toward the beach.
We descended to the water at five forty-five, ten miles
north-west of Vlieland. During the ten minutes we were on
the water I loosened Lt. Galvayne's clothing, made his
position somewhat easier, and felt for his heart which at
that time I was quite sure was beating feebly.
When we rose from the water and ascended to fifteen
hundred feet, we sighted two planes which later proved to
be the two Yarmouth boats. We picked them up, swung
into formation, and laid our course for Yarmouth.
At ten minutes to seven we sighted land and twenty
minutes after we were resting on the water in front of
Yarmouth slipway.
282 FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
We at once summoned medical aid but found that nothing
could be done. The shot had gone through his head,
striking the mouth and coming out behind his ear, tearing
a gash of about two inches in diameter.
The boat had been more or less riddled, a number of
shots tearing up the top between the front cockpit and the
beginning of the cowl.
The total duration of the flight was seven hours and ten
minutes.
American naval aviation had a romantic beginning ; in-
deed, the development of our air service from almost
nothing to a force which, in European waters, comprised
2,500 officers and 22,000 men, is one of the great accom-
plishments of the war. It was very largely the outcome of
civilian enterprise and civilian public spirit. In describing
our subchasers I have already paid tribute to the splendid
qualities of reserve officers ; and our indebtedness to this
type of citizen was equally great in the aviation service. I
can pay no further tribute to American youth than to say
that the great aircraft force which was ultimately assembled
in Europe had its beginnings in a small group of undergrad-
uates at Yale University. In recommending Mr. Trubee
Davison for a Distinguished Service Medal, the commander
of our aviation forces wrote : " This officer was responsible
for the organization of the first Yale aviation unit of twenty-
nine aviators who were later enrolled in the Naval Reserve
Flying Corps. . . . This group of aviators formed the
nucleus of the first Naval Reserve Flying Corps, and, in
fact, may be considered as the nucleus from which the
United States Aviation Forces, Foreign Service, later grew."
This group of college boys acted entirely on their own initia-
tive. While the United States was still at peace, encouraged
only by their own parents and a few friends, they took up the
study of aviation. It was their conviction that the United
States would certainly get into the war, and they selected
this branch as the one in which they could render greatest
service to their country. These young men worked all
through the summer of 1916 at Port Washington, Long
Island, learning how to fly : at this time they were an
entirely unofficial body, paying their own expenses. Ulti-
mately the unit comprised about twenty men ; they kept
constantly at work, even after college opened in the fall of
1916-17] GROWTH OF OUR AIR FORCE 288
1916, and when war broke out they were prepared for they
had actually learned to fly. When the submarine scares
disturbed the Atlantic seaboard in the early months of the
war these Yale undergraduates were sent by the department
scouting over Long Island Sound and other places looking
for the imaginary Germans. In February, 1917, Secretary
Daniels recognized their work by making Davison a member
of the Committee on Aeronautics ; in March practically
every member of the unit was enrolled in the aviation
service ; and their names appear among the first one hun-
dred aviators enrolled in the Navy a list that ultimately
included several thousand. So proficient had these under-
graduates become that they were used as a nucleus to train
our aircraft forces ; they were impressed as instructors at
Buffalo, Bayshore, Hampton Roads, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Key West and Moorhead City.
They began to go abroad in the summer of 1917, and they
were employed as instructors in schools in France and
England. These young men not only rendered great
material service, but they manifested an enthusiasm, an
earnestness, and a tireless vigilance which exerted a won-
derful influence in strengthening the moral of the whole
aviation department. " I knew that whenever we had a
member of the Yale unit," says Lieutenant-Commander
Edwards, who was aide for aviation at the London head-
quarters in the latter part of the war, " everything was
all right. Whenever the French and English asked us to
send a couple of our crack men to reinforce a squadron, I
would say, ' Let's get some of the Yale gang.' We never
made a mistake when we did this."
There were many men in the regular navy to whom the
nation is likewise indebted. Captain T. T. Craven served
with very marked distinction as aide for aviation on the
staff of Admiral Wilson, and afterward, after the armistice
was signed, as the senior member of the Board which had
been appointed to settle all claims with the French Govern-
ment. Lieutenant (now Commander) Kenneth Whiting
was another officer who rendered great service in aviation.
Commander Whiting arrived in St. Nazaire, France, on the
5th of June, 1917, in command of the first aeronautic de-
tachment, which consisted of 7 officers and 122 men.
Such were the modest beginnings of American aviation in
France. In a short time Commander Whiting was assigned
284 FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
to the command of the large station which was taken over
at Killingholme, England, and in October, 1917, Captain
Hutch I. Cone came from the United States to take charge
of the great aviation programme which had now been
planned. Captain Cone had for many years enjoyed the
reputation of being one of the Navy's most efficient admin-
istrators ; while still a lieutenant-commander, he had held
for a considerable time the rank of rear-admiral, as chief of
the Bureau of Steam Engineering ; and in 1917 he was com-
manding naval officer of the Panama Canal, a position which
required organizing ability of the highest order. It was at
my request that he was ordered abroad to organize our
European air forces. Captain Cone now came to Paris and
plunged into the work of organizing naval aviation with all
his usual vigour.
It subsequently became apparent, however, that London
would be a better place for his work than Paris, and Captain
Cone therefore took up his headquarters in Grosvenor
Gardens. Under his administration naval aviation foreign
service grew to the proportions I have indicated and in-
cluded in France six seaplane stations, three dirigible
stations, two kite balloon stations, one school of aerial gun-
nery, one assembly and repair base, and the United States
Naval Northern Bombing Group. In the British Isles
there were established four seaplane stations and one kite
balloon station in Ireland ; one seaplane station and one
assembly and repair base in England ; and in Italy we
occupied, at the request of the Italian Government, two
seaplane stations at Pescara and Porto Corsini on the
Adriatic. From these stations we bombed to good effect
Austrian naval bases in that area. To Lieutenant-Com-
mander J. L. Callan, U.S.N.R.F., is due much of the credit
for the cordial relations which existed between the Italians
and ourselves, as well as for the efficient conduct of our
aviation forces in Italy under his command.
Probably the most completely equipped aviation centre
which we constructed was that at Pauillac, France, under
the command of Captain F. T. Evans, U.S.N. ; here we
built accommodation for 20,000 men ; we had here what
would have eventually been a great airplane factory ; had
the war continued six months longer, we would have been
turning out planes in this place on a scale almost large
enough to supply our needs. The far-sighted judgment and
1918] CAPT. CONE AND LIEUT. EDWARDS 285
the really extraordinary professional ability of civil engin-
eers D. G. Copeland and A. W. K. Billings made such work
possible, but only, I might add, with the hearty co-operation
of Lieutenant-Commander Benjamin Briscoe and his small
band of loyal and devoted co-workers. Another great
adventure was the establishment of our Northern Bombing
Group, under the command of Captain David C. Hanrahan,
U.S.N. ; here we had 112 planes, 305 officers, and more than
2,000 enlisted personnel, who devoted all of their attention
to bombing German submarine bases at Zeebrugge and
Ostend. This enterprise was a joint one with the marines
under the command of Major A. A. Cunningham, an ex-
perienced pilot and an able administrator, who performed
all of his various duties not only to my entire satisfaction
but in a manner which reflected the greatest credit to him-
self as well as to the Marine Corps of which he was a worthy
representative. Due to the fact that the rapidity of our
construction work had exceeded that with which airplanes
were being built at home, we entered into an agreement with
the Italian Government whereby we obtained a number of
Caproni planes in exchange for raw materials. Several of
these large bombing airplanes were successfully flown over
the Alps to the fields of Flanders, under the direction of
Lieutenant-Commander E. O. MacDonnell, who deserves
the greatest credit for the energetic and resourceful manner
in which he executed this difficult task/
In September, 1918, Captain Cone's duties took him to
Ireland ; the ship on which he sailed, the Leinster, was tor-
pedoed in the Irish Sea ; Captain Cone was picked up
unconscious in the water, and, when taken to the hospital,
it was discovered that both his legs were broken. It was
therefore necessary to appoint another officer in his stead,
and I selected Lieutenant W. A. Edwards, who had served
with credit on the destroyer Gushing, and who, for some
time, had been second in command to Captain Cone in the
aviation section. It was almost unprecedented to put at
the head of such an important branch a young lieutenant
who had only been out of the naval academy for a few
years ; ordinarily the duties would have required a man of
Admiral's rank. Lieutenant Edwards, however, was not
only extremely capable, but he had the gift of getting along
splendidly with our Allies, particularly the British, with
whom our intercourse was necessarily extensive, and with
28<J FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
whom he was very popular. He remained in charge of the
department for the rest of the war, winning golden opinions
from his superiors and his subordinates, and the Distin-
guished Service Order from King George.
The armistice was signed before our aviation work had
got completely into running order. Yet its accomplish-
ments were highly creditable ; and had the war lasted a
little longer they would have reached great proportions.
Of the thirty-nine direct attacks made on submarines, ten
were, in varying degrees, " successful." Perhaps the most
amazing hit made by any seaplane in the war was that
scored by Ensign Paul F. Ives ; he dropped a bomb upon a
submarine, striking it directly on its deck ; the result was
partly tragical, partly ludicrous, for the bomb proved to be
a " dud " and did not explode ! In commenting upon this
and another creditable attack, the British Admiralty wrote
as follows :
I beg to enclose for your information reports of attacks
made on two enemy submarines on the 25th March by
Pilot Ensign J. F. McNamara, U.S.N., and Pilot Ensign
P. F. Ives, U.S.N.
The Admiralty are of opinion that the submarine attacked
by Pilot Ensign McNamara was damaged and that the
attack of Pilot Ensign Ives might also have been successful
had not his bombs failed to explode, which was due to no
fault of his own.
I should add that Wing Commander, Portsmouth Group
has expressed his appreciation of the valuable assistance
rendered by the United States Pilots.
At the cessation of hostilities we had a total of more than
500 planes of various descriptions actually in commission, a
large number of which were in actual operation over the
North Sea, the Irish Sea, the Bay of Biscay, and the Adria-
tic ; our bombing planes were making frequent flights over
enemy submarine bases, and 2,500 officers and 22,000 en-
listed men were making raids, doing patrols, bombing sub-
marines, bombing enemy bases, taking photographs, making
reconnaissance over enemy waters, and engaging enemy
aircraft. There can be no doubt but that this great force
was a factor in persuading the enemy to acknowledge
defeat when he did.
1918] EXPLOIT OF ENSIGN HAMMON 287
A few simple comparisons will illustrate the gigantic task
which confronted us and the difficulties which were success-
fully overcome in the establishment of our naval aviation
force on foreign service. If all the buildings constructed
and used for barracks for officers and men were joined end
to end, they would stretch for a distance of twelve miles.
The total cubic contents of all structures erected and used
could be represented by a box 245 ft. wide, 300 ft. long, and
1,500 ft. high. In such a box more than ten Woolworth
buildings could be easily placed. Twenty-nine telephone
exchanges were installed, and in addition connections were
made to existing long-distance lines in England and France,
and approximately 800 miles of long-distance lines were
constructed in Ireland, so that every station could be com-
municated with from London headquarters. The lumber
used for construction work would provide a board-walk one
foot wide, extending from New York City to the Isle of
Malta a distance of more than 4,000 miles.
When we consider the fact that during the war naval
aviation abroad grew in personnel to be more than one-half
the size of the entire pre-war American navy, it is not at all
astonishing that all of those regular officers who had been
trained in this service were employed almost exclusively in
an administrative capacity, which naturally excluded them
from taking part in the more exciting work of bombing sub-
marines and fighting aircraft. To their credit be it said
that they chafed considerably under this enforced restraint,
but they were so few in number that we had to employ them
not in command of seaplanes, but of air stations where they
rendered the most valuable service.
For the reserves I entertain the very highest regard and
even personal affection. Collectively they were magnificent
and they reflected the greatest credit upon the country they
served so gallantly and with such brilliant success. I know
of no finer individual exploit in the war than that of Ensign
C. H. Hammon who, while attached to our Air Station at
Porto Corsini, took part in a bombing raid on Pola, in
which he engaged two enemy airplanes and as a result had
his plane hit in several places. During this engagement a
colleague, Ensign G. H. Ludlow, was shot down. Ensign
Hammon went to his rescue, landed his boat on the water
just outside of Pola harbour, picked up the stricken aviator,
and flew back to Porto Corsini, a distance of seventy-five
288 FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
miles. A heavy sea made it highly probable that his frail
boat, already damaged by his combat with the enemy,
would collapse and that he would be drowned or captured
and made a prisoner of war. For this act of courageous
devotion to duty I recommended Ensign Hammon for the
Congressional Medal of Honour.
The mention of this officer calls to my mind the exploits
of Lieutenant-Commander A. L. Gates, who was the second
of only three officers attached to the Naval Forces in
Europe whom I recommended for the Congressional Medal of
Honour. The citation in the case of Gates reads as follows
and needs no elaboration to prove the calibre of the man :
" This officer commanded the U.S. Naval Air Station,
Dunkirk, France, with very marked efficiency and under
almost constant shell and bomb fire from the enemy. Alone
and unescorted he rescued the crew of a British airplane
WTecked in the sea off Ostend, for which he was awarded the
Distinguished Flying Cross by the British Government.
This act of bravery was actually over and above the duties
required of this officer and in itself demonstrates the highest
type of courage. Lieutenant -Commander Gates took part
in a number of flights over the enemy lines and was shot
down in combat and taken prisoner by the enemy. He
made several heroic and determined attempts to escape.
During all of his service this officer was a magnificent ex-
ample of courage, modesty, and energetic devotion to duty.
He at all times upheld the very highest traditions of the
Naval Service."
Volumes could well be written about the work of these
splendid young Americans of how Ensign Stephen Potter
shot down in flames an enemy seaplane from a position over
Heligoland Bight ; unfortunately he made the supreme
sacrifice only a month later when he in turn was shot down
in flames and fell to his resting-place in the North Sea ; and
of De Cernea and Wilcox and Ludlow. Theirs was the
spirit which dominated the entire Force and which made it
possible to accomplish what seemed at times to be almost
the impossible. It was the superior " will to victory "
which proved to be invincible.
CHAPTER XII
THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND
BESIDES transporting American troops, the Navy, in one
detail of its work, actually participated in warfare on the
Western Front. Though this feature of our effort has
nothing to do with the main subject, the defeat of the sub-
marine, yet any account of the American navy in the war
which overlooks the achievements of our naval batteries
on land would certainly be incomplete. The use of naval
guns in war operations was not unprecedented ; the British
used such guns in the Boer War, particularly at Ladysmith
and Spion Kop ; and there were occasions in which such
armament rendered excellent service in the Boxer Rebellion.
All through the Great War, British, French, and Germans
frequently reinforced their army artillery with naval batter-
ies. But, compared with the American naval guns which
under the command of Rear-Admiral Charles P. Plunkett
performed such telling deeds against the retreating Germans
in the final phases of the conflict, all previous equipment of
naval guns on shore had been less efficient in one highly
important respect.
For the larger part of the war, the Germans had had a
great gun stationed in Belgium bombarding Dunkirk.
The original purpose in sending American naval batteries to
France was to silence this gun. The proposal was made in
November, 1917 ; but, rapidly as the preparations pro-
gressed, the situation had entirely changed before our five
fourteen-inch guns were ready to leave for France. In the
spring of 1918 the Germans began the great drive which
nearly took them to the Channel ports ; and under the con-
ditions which prevailed in that area it was impossible to send
our guns to the Belgian coast. Meanwhile, the enemy had
stationed a gun, having a range of nearly seventy -five miles,
in the forest of Compiegne ; the shells from this weapon, con-
20 289
290 THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND
stantly falling upon Paris, were having a more demoralizing
effect upon the French populace than was officially admitted.
The demand for the silencing of this gun came from all sides ;
and it was a happy coincidence that, at just about the time
when this new peril appeared, the American naval guns
were nearly ready to be transported to France. Encouraged
by the success of this long-range gun on Paris, the Germans
were preparing long-range bombardments on several sections
of the front. They had taken huge guns from the new
battle-cruiser Hindenburg and mounted them at convenient
points for bombarding Dunkirk, Chalons-sur-Mame, and
Nancy. In all, the Allied intelligence departments reported
that sixteen guns of great calibre had left Kiel in May, 1918,
and that they would soon be trained upon important
objectives in France. For this reason it was welcome news
to the Allies, who were deficient in this type of artillery,
that five naval fourteen -inch guns, with mountings and
ammunition and supply trains, were ready to embark for
the European field. The Navy received an urgent request
from General Pershing that these guns should be landed at
St. Nazaire ; it was to be their main mission to destroy the
" Big Bertha " which was raining shells on Paris, and to
attack specific points, especially railroad communications
and the bridges across the Rhine.
The initiative in the design of these mobile railway
batteries was taken by the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy
Department, under Rear-Admiral Ralph Earle, and the
details of the design were worked out by the officers of that
bureau and Admiral Plunkett. The actual construction
of the great gun mounts on the cars from which the guns
were to be fired, and of the specially designed cars of the
supply trains for each gun, was an engineering feat which
reflects great credit upon the Baldwin Locomotive Works
and particularly upon its president, Mr. Samuel M. Vauclain,
who undertook the task with the greatest enthusiasm. The
reason why our naval guns represented a greater achieve-
ment than anything of a similar nature accomplished by the
Germans was that they were mobile. Careful observations
taken of the bombardment of Dunkirk revealed the fact
that the gun with which it was being done was steadily
losing range. This indicated that the weapon was not a
movable one, but that it was firmly implanted in a fixed
position. The seventy-five mile gun which was bombard-
1918] OUR REPLY TO "BIG BERTHA" 291
ing Paris was similarly emplaced. The answering weapon
which our ordnance department now proposed to build was
to have the ability to travel from place to place to go to
any position to which the railroad system of France could
take it. To do this it would be necessary to build a mount-
ing on a railroad car and to supply cars which could carry
the crews, their sleeping quarters, their food and ammuni-
tion ; to construct, indeed, a whole train for each separate
gun. This equipment must be built in the United States,
shipped over three thousand miles of ocean, landed at a
French port, assembled there, and started on French rail-
roads to the several destinations at the front. The Baldwin
Locomotive Works accepted the contract for constructing
these mountings and attendant cars; it began work February
13, 1918 ; two months afterward the first mount had been
finished and the gun was being proved at Sandy Hook,
New Jersey ; and by July all five guns had arrived at St.
Nazaire and were being prepared to be sent forward to the
scene of hostilities. The rapidity with which this work was
completed furnished an illustration of American manu-
facturing genius at its best. Meanwhile, Admiral Plunkett
had collected and trained his crews ; it speaks well for the
moral of the Navy that, when news of this great operation
was first noised about, more than 20,000 officers and men
volunteered for the service.
At first the French, great as was their admiration for these
guns and the astonishingly accurate marksmanship which
they had displayed on their trials, believed that their rail-
road beds and their bridges could not sustain such a weight ;
the French engineers, indeed, declined at the beginning to
approve our request for the use of their rails. The constant
rain of German shells on Paris, however, modified this
attitude ; the situation was so urgent that such assistance
as these American guns promised was welcome. One
August morning, therefore, the first train started for Helles
Mouchy, the point from which it was expected to silence the
" Big Bertha." The progress of this train through France
was a triumphant march. Our own confidence in the French
road bed and bridges was not much greater than that of the
French themselves ; the train therefore went along slowly,
climbed the grades at a snail's pace, and took the curves with
the utmost caution. As they crossed certain of the bridges,
the crews held their breath and sat tight, expecting almost
292 THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND
every moment to crash through. All along the route the
French populace greeted the great battery train with one
long cheer, and at the towns and villages the girls decorated
the long muzzle of the gun with flowers. But there were
other spectators than the French. Expertly as this
unusual train had been camouflaged, the German airplane
observers had detected its approach. As it neared the
objective the shells that had been falling on Paris ceased ;
before the Americans could get to work, the Germans had
removed their mighty weapon, leaving nothing but an
emplacement as a target for our shells. Though our men
were therefore deprived of the privilege of destroying this
famous long-range gun, it is apparent that their arrival
saved Paris from further bombardment, for nothing was
heard of the gun for the rest of the war.
The guns proved exceedingly effective in attacking
German railroad centres, bridges, and other essential
positions ; and as they could be fired from any point of the
railroad tracks behind the Western Front, and as they could
be shifted from one position to another, with all their
personnel and equipment, as fast as the locomotives could
haul them, it w r as apparent that the more guns of this design
that could be supplied the better. These qualities were at
once recognized by the Army, which called upon the Navy
for assistance in building a large number of railway batter-
ies ; and if the war had continued these great guns would
soon have been thundering all along the Western Front.
From the time the naval guns were mounted until the
armistice Admiral Plunkett's men were busy on several
points of the Allied lines. In this time the five naval guns
fired 782 shells at distances ranging from 18 to 23 miles.
They played great havoc in the railroad yards at Laon,
destroying large stretches of track that were indispensable
to the Germans, and in general making this place practically
useless as a railroad centre. Probably the greatest service
which they rendered to the cause of the Allies was in the re-
gion north of Verdun. In late October three naval batteries
were brought up to Charny and Thierville and began bom-
barding the railroad which ran through Montmedy, Lon-
guyon, and Conflans. This was the most important line of
communication on the Western Front ; it was the road over
which the German army in the east was supplied, and there
was practically no other line by which the great German
1918] OUR LARGE CALIBRE GUNS 298
armies engaging the Americans could escape. From
October 23rd to the hour when the armistice was signed our
fourteen-inch guns were raining shells upon this road. So
successful was this bombardment that the German traffic
was stopped, not only while the firing was taking place, but
for several hours each day after it had ceased. What this
meant to the success of the Allied armies the world now
knows. The result is perfectly summed up in General
Pershing's report :
" Our large calibre guns," he says, " had advanced and
were skilfully brought into position to fire upon the im-
portant lines at Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans ; the
strategical goal which was our highest hope was gained.
We had cut the enemy's main line of communications and
nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army
from complete disaster."
These guns were, of course, only one of many contributing
factors, but that the Navy had its part in this great achieve-
ment is another example of the success with which our two
services co-operated with each other throughout the war
a co-operation which, for efficient and harmonious devotion
to a common cause, has seldom, if ever, been equalled.
CHAPTER XIII
TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO
FRANCE
IN March, 1918, it became apparent that the German sub-
marine campaign had failed. The prospect that confronted
the Allied forces at that time, when compared with the
conditions which had faced them in April, 1917, forms one
of the most impressive contrasts in history. In the first
part of the earlier year the cause of the Allied Powers, and
consequently the cause of liberty throughout the world,
had reached the point almost of desperation. On both
land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future in
their hands. In Europe the armies of the Central Powers
were everywhere in the ascendant. The French and British
were holding their own in France, and in the Somme cam-
paign they had apparently inflicted great damage upon the
German forces, yet the disintegration of the Russian army,
the unmistakable signs of which had already appeared, was
bringing nearer the day when they would have to meet the
undivided strength of their enemy. At the time in
question, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were con-
quered countries, and Italy seemed unable to make any
progress against the Austrians. Bulgaria and Turkey had
become practically German provinces, and the dream of a
great Germanic eastern empire was rapidly approaching
realization. So strong was Germany in a military sense,
so little did she apprehend that the United States could ever
assemble her resources and her men in time to make them
a decisive element in the struggle, that the German war
lords, in their effort to bring the European conflict to a
quick conclusion, did not hesitate to take the step which
294
1918] SUBMARINE MENACE VANISHING 295
was destined to make our country their enemy. Probably
no nation ever adopted a war measure with more confidence
in its success. The results which the German submarines
could accomplish seemed at that time to be simply a matter
of mathematical calculation. The Germans estimated
that they could sink at least 1,000,000 tons a month, com-
pletely cut off Great Britain's supplies of food and war
materials, and thus end the war by October or November
of 1917. Even though the United States should declare
war, what could an unprepared nation like our own accom-
plish in such a brief period ? Millions of troops we might
indeed raise, but we could not train them in three or four
months, and, even though we could perform such a miracle,
it was ridiculous to suppose that we could transport them
to Europe through the submarine danger zone. I have
already shown that the Germans were not alone in thus
predicting the course of events. In the month of April,
1917, 1 had found the Allied officials just about as distressed
as the Germans were jubilant. Already the latter, in sink-
ing merchant ships, had had successes which almost equalled
their own predictions ; no adequate means of defence
against the submarine had been devised ; and the chiefs of
the British navy made no attempts to disguise their appre-
hension for the future.
Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in
Allied councils in April, 1917 ; yet one year later the naval
situation had completely changed. The reasons for that
change have been set forth in the preceding pages. In that
brief twelve months the relative position of the submarine
had undergone a marked transformation. Instead of being
usually the pursuer it was now often the pursued. Instead
of sailing jauntily upon the high seas, sinking helpless
merchantmen almost at will, it was half-heartedly lying in
wait along the coasts, seeking its victims in the vessels of
dispersed convoys. If it attempted to push out to sea, and
attack a convoy, escorting destroyers were likely to deliver
one of their dangerous attacks ; if it sought the shallower
coastal waters, a fleet of yachts, sloops, and subchasers
was constantly ready to assail it with dozens of depth
charges. An attempt to pass through the Straits of Dover
meant almost inevitable destruction by mines ; an attempt
to escape into the ocean by the northern passage involved
the momentary dread of a similar end or the hazard of
296 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
navigating the difficult Pentland Firth. In most of the
narrow passages Allied submarines lay constantly in wait
with their torpedoes ; a great fleet of airplanes and dirig-
ibles was always circling above ready to rain a shower of
bombs upon the under-water foe. Already the ocean floor
about the British Isles held not far from 200 sunken sub-
marines, with most of their crews, amounting to at least
4,000 men, whose deaths involved perhaps the most hideous
tragedies of the war. Bad as was this situation, it was
nothing compared with what it would become a few months
or a year later. American and British shipyards were
turning out anti-submarine craft with great rapidity ; the
industries of America, with their enormous output of steel,
had been enlisted in the anti-submarine campaign. The
American and British shipbuilding facilities were neutral-
izing the German campaign in two ways : they were not
only constructing war vessels on a scale which would soon
drive all the German submarines from the sea, but they
were building merchant tonnage so rapidly that, in March,
1918, more new tonnage was launched than was being
destroyed. Thus by this time the Teutonic hopes of ending
the war by the submarine had utterly collapsed ; if the
Germans were to win the war at all, or even to obtain a
peace which would not be disastrous, some other programme
must be adopted and adopted quickly.
Disheartened by their failure at sea, the enemy therefore
turned their eyes once more toward the land. "The destruc-
tion of Russian military power had given the German
armies a great numerical superiority over those of the Allies.
There seemed little likelihood that the French or the British,
after three years of frightfully gruelling war, could add
materially to their forces. Thus, with the grouping of the
Powers, such as existed in 1917, the Germans had a tremen-
dous advantage on their side, for Russia, which German
statesmen for fifty years had feared as a source of inex-
haustible man-supply to her enemies, had disappeared as a
military power. But a new element in the situation now
counterbalanced this temporary gain ; that was the daily
increasing importance of the United States in the war.
The Germans, who in 1917 had despised us as an enemy,
immediate or prospective, now despised us no longer.
The army which they declared could never be raised and
trained was actually being raised and trained by the millions.
1918] DIMINISHING GERMAN HOPES 297
The nation which their publicists had denounced as lacking
cohesion and public spirit had adopted conscription simul-
taneously with their declaration of war, and the people
whom the Germans had affected to regard as devoted only
to the pursuit of gain and pleasure had manifested a unity
of purpose which they had never before displayed, and had
offered their lives, their labours, and their wealth without
limit to the cause of the Allies. Up to March, 1918, only a
comparatively small part of this American army had
reached Europe, but the Germans had already tested its
fighting quality and had learned to respect it. Yet all these
manifestations would not have disturbed the Germanic
calculations except for one depressing fact. Even a nation
of 100,000,000 brave and energetic people, fully trained and
equipped for war, is not a formidable foe so long as an
impassable watery gulf of three thousand miles separates
them from the field of battle.
For the greater part of 1917 the German people believed
that their submarines could bar the progress of the American
armies. By March, 1918, they had awakened from this
delusion. Not only was an American army millions strong
in process of formation, but the alarming truth now
dawned upon the Germans that it could be transported to
Europe. The great industries of America could provide
munitions and food to supply any number of soldiers inde-
finitely, and these, too, could be brought to the Western
Front. Outwardly, the German chiefs might still affect to
despise this new foe, but in their hearts they knew that it
spelt their doom. They were not now dealing with a corrupt
Czardom and hordes of ignorant and passionless Slavs,
who could be eliminated by propaganda and sedition ;
they were dealing with millions of intelligent and energetic
freemen, all animated by a mighty and almost religious
purpose. Yet the situation, desperate as it seemed, held
forth one more hope. If the German armies, which still
greatly outnumbered the French and British, could strike
and win a decisive victory before the Americans could
arrive, then they might still force a satisfactory peace. " It
is a race between Ludendorff and Wilson " is the terse and
accurate way in which Lloyd George summed up the
situation. The great blow fell on March 21, 1918 ; the
British and the French met it with heroism, but it was quite
evident that they were fighting against terrible odds. At
298 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
this time the American army in France numbered about
300,000 men ; it now became the business of the American
navy, assisted by the British, to transport the American
troops who could increase these forces sufficiently to turn
the balance in the Allies' favour.
The supreme hour, to which all the anti-submarine labours
of the preceding year were merely preliminary, had now
arrived. Since the close of the war there has been much
discussion of the part which the American navy played in
bringing it to a successful end. Even during the war there
was some criticism on this point. There were two more or
less definite opinions in the public mind upon this question.
One was that the main business of our war vessels was to
convoy the American soldiers to France ; the other empha-
sized the anti-submarine warfare as its most important duty.
Anyone would suppose, from the detached way in which
these two subjects have been discussed, that the anti-sub-
marine warfare and the successful transportation of troops
were separate matters. An impression apparently prevails
that, at the beginning of the war, the American navy could
have quietly decided whether it would devote its energies to
making warfare on the submarine or to convoying Amer-
ican armies ; yet the absurdity of such a conception must
be apparent to anyone who has read the foregoing pages.
The several operations in which the Allied navies engaged
were all part of a comprehensive programme ; they were all
interdependent. According to my idea, the business of
the American navy \vas to join its forces whole-heartedly
with those of the Allies in the effort to win the war. Any-
thing which helped to accomplish this great purpose became
automatically our duty. Germany was basing her chances
of success upon the submarine ; our business was therefore
to assist in defeating the submarine. The cause of the
Allies was our cause ; our cause was the cause of the Allies ;
anything which benefited the Allies benefited the United
States ; and anything which benefited the United States
benefited the Allies. Neither we nor France nor England
were conducting a separate campaign ; we were separate
units of an harmonious whole. At the beginning the one
pressing duty was to put an end to the sinking of merchant-
men, not because these merchantmen were for the larger
part British, but because the failure to do so would have
meant the elimination of Great Britain from the war, with
1918] OUR GROWING EXPERIENCE 299
results which would have meant defeat for the other Allies.
Let us imagine, for a moment, what the sequence of events
would have been had the submarine campaign against mer-
chant shipping succeeded ; in that case Britain and France
would have been compelled to surrender unconditionally
and the United States would therefore have been forced to
fight the Central Empires alone. Germany's terms of peace
would have included the surrender of all the Allied fleets ;
this would eventually have left the United States navy to
fight the German navy reinforced by the ships of Great
Britain, Austria, France, and Italy. In such a contest we
should have been outnumbered about three or four to one.
I have such confidence in the power and purpose of America
as to believe that, even in a single-handed conflict with
Germany, we should have won in the end ; but it is evident
that the problem would have been quite a different one
from that of fighting in co-operation with the Allies against
the Germanic foe.
Simply as a matter of self-interest and strategy it was
certainly wisdom to throw the last ounce of our strength into
the scale of the Allied navies ; and it was therefore inevitable
that we should first of all use our anti-submarine craft to
protect all shipping sailing to Europe and to clear the sea of
submarines. In doing this we were protecting the food
supply not only of Great Britain, but of France and our
other Allies, for most of the materials which we sent to our
European friends were transported first to England and
thence were shipped across the Channel. Moreover, our
twelve months' campaign against the submarine was an
invaluable preliminary to transporting the troops. Does
any sane person believe that we could have put two million
Americans into France had the German submarines main-
tained until the spring and summer of 1918 the striking
power which had been theirs in the spring of 1917 ? Merely
to state the question is to answer it. In that same twelve
months we had gained much experience which was exceed-
ingly valuable when we began transporting troops in great
numbers. The most efficacious protection to merchant
shipping, the convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard
to our military transports. Those methods which had
been so successfully used in shipping food, munitions, and
materials were now used in shipping soldiers. The section
of the great headquarters which we had developed in London
300 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
for routing convoys was used for routing transports, and
the American naval officer, Captain Byron A. Long, who
had demonstrated such great ability in this respect, was
likewise the master mind in directing the course of the
American soldiers to France.
In other ways we had laid the foundations for this, the
greatest troop movement in history. In the preceding
twelve months we had increased the oil tankage at Brest
more than fourfold, sent over repair ships, and augmented
its repair facilities. This port and all of our naval activities
in France were under the command first of Rear- Admiral
Wm. B. Fletcher, and later Rear- Admiral Henry B. Wilson.
It was a matter of regret that we could not earlier have made
Brest the main naval base for the American naval forces in
France, for it was in some respects strategically better
located for that purpose than was any other port in Europe.
Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the
Channel Brest would have provided a better base than
either Plymouth or Queenstown. A glance at the map
explains why. To send destroyers from Queenstown to
pick up convoys and escort them into the Channel or to
French ports and thence return to their base involved a
long triangular trip ; to send such destroyers from Brest
to escort these involved a smaller amount of steaming and a
direct east and west voyage. Similarly, Queenstown was
a much better location for destroyers sent to meet convoys
bound for ports in the Irish Sea over the northern " trunk
line." But unfortunately it was utterly impossible to use
the great natural advantages of Brest in the early days of
war ; the mere fact that this French harbour possessed
most inadequate tankage facilities put it out of the question,
and it was also very deficient in docks, repair facilities, and
other indispensable features of a naval base. At this time
Brest was hardly more than able to provide for the require-
ments of the French, and it would have embarrassed our
French allies greatly had we attempted to establish a large
American force there, before we had supplied the essential
oil fuel and repair facilities. The ships which we did send
in the first part of the war w r ere mostly yachts, of the
" dollar-a-year " variety, which their owners had gener-
ously given to the national service ; then* crews were largely
of that type of young business man and college under-
graduate to whose skill and devotion I have already paid
1918] FILTHY GERMAN SHIPS 801
tribute. This little flotilla acquitted itself splendidly up
and down the coast of France. Meanwhile, we were con-
structing fuel-oil tanks ; and as soon as these were ready
and repair ships were available, we began building up a
large force at Brest a force which was ultimately larger
than the one we maintained at Queenstown ; at the height
of the troop movements it comprised about 36 destroyers,
12 yachts, 3 tenders, and several mine-sweepers and tugs.
The fine work which this detachment accomplished in
escorting troop and supply convoys is sufficient evidence of
the skill acquired by the destroyers and other vessels in
carrying out their duties in this peculiar warfare.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, a great
organization had been created under the able direction of
Rear- Admiral Albert Cleaves for maintaining and adminis-
tering the fleet of transports and their ocean escorts. Also,
as soon as war was declared the work was begun of convert-
ing into transports those German merchant ships which had
been interned in American ports. The successful com-
pletion of this work was, in itself, a great triumph for the
American navy. Of the vessels which the Germans had
left in our hands, seventeen at New York, Boston, Norfolk,
and Philadelphia, seemed to be adapted for transport
purposes, but the Germans had not intended that we should
make any such use of them. The condition of these ships,
after their German custodians had left, was something
indescribable ; they reflected great discredit upon German
seamanship, for it would have been impossible for any
people which really loved ships to permit them to deterior-
ate as had these vessels and to become such cesspools of
filth. For three years the Germans had evidently made no
attempt to clean them ; the sanitary conditions were so
bad that our workmen could not sleep on board, but had to
have sleeping quarters near the docks ; they spent weeks
scrubbing, scraping, and disinfecting, in a finally successful
effort to make the ships suitable habitations for human
beings. Not only had the Germans permitted such liners as
the Vaterland and the Kronprinzessin Cecilie to go neglected,
but, on their departure, they had attempted to injure them
in all conceivable ways. The cylinders had been broken,
engines had been smashed, vital parts of the machinery had
been removed and thrown into the sea, ground glass had
been placed in the oil cups, gunpowder had been placed in
302 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
the coal evidently in the hope of causing explosions when
the vessels were at sea and other damage of a more subtle
nature had been done, it evidently being the expectation
that the ships would break down when on the ocean and
beyond the possibility of repair. Although our navy yards
had no copies of the plans of these vessels or their machinery
the Germans having destroyed them all and although
the missing parts were of peculiarly German design, they
succeeded, in an incredibly short time, in making them
even better and speedier vessels than they had ever been
before.
The national sense of humour did not fail the transport
service when it came to rechristening these ships ; the
Princess Irene became the Pocahontas, the Rhein the Sus-
qfiehanna ; and there was also an ironic justice in the fact
that the Vaterland, which had been built by the Germans
partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war,
actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way
which the Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the
American and the British mercantile marines were supple-
menting this German tonnage. The first troops which we
sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships of
the United Fruit Company ; and when the German blow
was struck, in March, 1918, both the United States and
Great Britain began collecting from all parts of the world
vessels which could be used as troop transports. We called
in all available vessels from the Atlantic and Pacific coasts
and the Great Lakes ; England stripped her trade routes to
South America, Australia, and the East, and France and
Italy also made their contributions. Of all the American
troops sent to France from the beginning of the war, the
United States provided transports for 46*25 per cent., Great
Britain for 51*25, the remainder being provided by France
and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the
armistice, American vessels carried 42' 15 per cent., British
55' 40 per cent. 1
Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of
troops which was even more fundamental than those which
I have named. The basis of all our naval operations was
the dreadnoughts and the battle -cruisers of the Grand
Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated,
1 These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Navy for 1919, page 207.
1918] BRITISH AND AMERICAN FLEETS UNITED 303
which made possible the operation of all the surface ships
that destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had
the Grand Fleet suddenly disappeared beneath the waves,
all these offensive craft would have been driven from the
seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication would have
been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's
favour. From the time the transportation of troops began
the United States had a squadron of five dreadnought
battleships constantly with the Grand Fleet. The following
vessels performed this important duty : the New York,
Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach ; the
Wyoming, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H.
Christy ; the Florida, Captain Thomas Washington, after-
ward Captain M. M. Taylor ; the Delaware, Captain A. H.
Scales ; the Arkansas, Captain W. H. G. Bullard, afterward
Captain L. R. de Steiguer ; and the Texas, Captain Victor
Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned
preponderance, and made it practically certain that
Germany would not attempt another general sea battle.
Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the American
squadron performed excellent service and made the most
favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies.
Under the general policy of co-operation established
throughout our European naval forces these vessels were
quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so far as con-
cerned their military operations. This was, of course,
wholly essential to efficiency a point the layman does not
always understand so essential, in fact, that it may be
said that, if the Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day
after our vessels joined, the latter might have decreased
rather than increased the fighting efficiency of the whole ;
for, though our people and the British spoke the same
language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods
of communication by signals, were wholly different. It
was therefore our duty to stow our signal flags and books
down below, and learn the British signal language. This
they did so well that four days after their arrival they went
out and manoeuvred successfully with the Grand Fleet. In
the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics
and fire control, and in every other way conformed to the
established practices of the British. Too great praise
cannot be given the officers and men of our squadron, not
only for their efficiency and the cordiality of their co-
304 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
operation, but for the patience with which they bore the
almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long
vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy
forces. Just how well our ships succeeded in this essential
co-operation was expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty
in the farewell speech which he made to them upon the day
of their departure for home. He said in part :
" I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman,
the captains, officers, and ships' companies of the magnifi-
cent squadron, for the wonderful co-operation and the
loyalty you have given to me and to my admirals ; and the
assistance that you have given us in every duty you had to
undertake. The support which you have shown is that of
true comradeship ; and in time of stress, that is worth a
very great deal.
" You will return to your own shores ; and I hope in the
sunshine, which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines
there, you won't forget your ' comrades of the mist ' and
your pleasant associations of the North Sea. . . .
" I thank you again and again for the great part the
Sixth Battle Squadron played in bringing about the greatest
naval victory in history. I hope you will give this message
to your comrades : ' Come back soon. Good-bye and good
luck!'"
But these were not the only large battleships which the
United States had sent to European waters. Despite all
the precautions which I have described, there was still one
danger which constantly confronted American troop
transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were
crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000
a month, and were accomplishing most decisive results
upon the battlefield. A successful attack upon a convoy,
involving the sinking of one or more transports, would have
had no important effect upon the war, but it would probably
have improved German moral and possibly have injured
that of the Americans. There was practically only one
way in which such an attack could be made ; one or more
German battle-cruisers might slip out to sea and assail one
of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for such a
possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful
dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland the Nevada, Captain
1918] LINES OF TRANSPORT sod
A. T. Long, afterward Captain W. C. Cole ; the Oklahoma,
Captain M. L. Bristol, afterward Captain C. B. McVay ;
and the Utah, Captain F. B. Bassett, the whole division
under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers.
This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme south-
western coast. For several months our dreadnoughts lay
here, momentarily awaiting the news that a German raider
had escaped, ready to start to sea and give battle. But the
expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful
squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason
why the Germans never attempted the adventure.
II
A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter
will help the reader to understand why our transports were
able to carry American troops to France so successfully
that not a single ingoing ship was ever struck by a torpedo.
This diagram makes it evident that there were two areas of
the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach
its European destination. The line of division was about
the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest
representing its most familiar landmark. From this point
extending southward, as far as the forty-fifth parallel, which
corresponds to the location of the city of Bordeaux, is a
great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes
the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge
indentation with which our school geographies have made
us Americans so familiar, and which has always enjoyed
a particular fame for its storms, the dangers of its coast,
and the sturdy and independent character of the people on
its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls
attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel
to the fifty-second ; it comprises the English Channel,
and includes both the French channel ports, the British
ports, the southern coast of Ireland, and the entrance to the
Irish Sea. The width of this second section is very nearly
the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 miles.
Up to the present moment this narrative has been con-
cerned chiefly with the northernmost of these two great sea
pathways. Through this one to the north passed practically
all the merchant shipping which was destined for the Allies.
21
806 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
Consequently, as I have described, it was the great hunting
ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had
little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918,
there was comparatively little activity in that part of the
ocean. For every ship which sailed through this bay I
THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN
This diagram explains why the American navy succeeded in transporting more than 2,000,000
American soldiers to France without loss because of submarines. The Atlantic was divided
into two broad areas shown by the shaded parts of the diagram. Through the northern area
were sent practically all the merchant ships with supplies of food and materials for Europe.
The southern area, extending roughly from the forty-fifth to the forty-ninth parallel, was used
almost exclusively for troopships. The Germans could keep only eight or ten U-boats at the
same time in the eastern Atlantic ; they thus were forced to choose whether they should devote
these boats to attacking mercantile or troop convoys. The text explains why, under these
circumstances, they were compelled to use nearly all their forces against merchant ships and
leave troop transports practically alone.
suppose that there were at least 100 which came through the
Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my first report to
the Department I described the principal scene of sub-
marine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from
the French island of Ushant which lies just westward of
Brest to the tip of Scotland, and that remained the chief
scene of hostilities to the end. Along much of the coastline
1918] MEN, FOOD AND MUNITIONS 807
south of Brest the waters were so shallow that the sub-
marines could operate only with difficulty ; it was a long
distance from the German bases ; the shipping consisted
largely of coastal convoys ; much of this was the coal trade
from England ; it is therefore not surprising that the
Germans contented themselves with now and then planting
mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy
was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the
Atlantic at one time it would have been sheer waste of
energy to have stationed them off the western coast of
France. They would have put in their time to little
purpose, and meanwhile the ships and cargoes which they
were above all ambitious to destroy would have been safely
finding their way into British ports.
The fact that we had these two separate areas and that
these areas were so different in character was what made it
possible to send our 2,000,000 soldiers to France without
losing a single man. From March, 1918, to the conclusion
of the war, the American and British navies were engaged in
two distinct transportation operations. The shipment of
food and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on
an even larger scale. With the passing of time the mechan-
ism of these mercantile convoys increased in efficiency, and
by March, 1918, the management of this great transporta-
tion system had become almost automatic. Shipping from
America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in
two great " trunk lines," one of which ran through the
English Channel and the other up the Irish Sea. But when
the time came to bring over the American troops, we
naturally selected the area to the south, both because it was
necessary to send the troops to France and because we had
here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of
submarines. Our earliest troop shipments disembarked at
St. Nazaire ; later, when the great trans -Atlantic liners,
both German and British, were pressed into service, we
landed many tens of thousands at Brest ; and all the largest
French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A
smaller number we sent to England, from which country
they were transported across the Channel into France ;
when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a ship
of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of Amer-
ican soldiers ; but, on the whole, the business of transporta-
tion in 1918 followed simple and well-defined lines. We
808 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
sent mercantile convoys in what I may call the northern
" lane " and troop convoys in the southern " lane." We
kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct ; and
this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a
pretty problem.
For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in
the open Atlantic an average of only about eight or ten of her
efficient U-boats at one time. The German Admiralty thus
had to answer this difficult question : Shall we use these
submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack troop
convoys ? The submarine flotilla which was actively
engaged was so small that it was absurd to think of sending
half into each lane ; the Germans must send most of their
submarines against cargo ships or most of them against
troopships. Which should it be ? If it were decided to
concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies,
which the German chiefs had declared to their people could
never get to the Western Front, would reach France and
furnish General Foch the reserves with which he might crush
the German armies before winter. If, on the other hand,
the Germans should decide to concentrate on troopships,
then the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied
cause would flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain
and thence to the European nations. Whether it were more
important, in a military sense, to cut the Allies' commercial
lines of communication or to sink troop transports is an
interesting question. It is almost impossible for the Anglo-
Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter,
apart from the human factors involved. The sinking of a
great transport, with 4,000 or 5,000 American boys on
board, would have been a dreadful calamity and would have
struck horror to the American people ; it was something
which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we
did prevent. Considered as a strictly military question,
however and that was the only consideration which
influenced the Germans it is hard to see how the loss of one
transport, or even the loss of several, would have materially
affected the course of the war. In judging the purely
military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that
the Allied armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day ;
thus the sinking of an American transport once a week
would not have particularly affected the course of the war.
The destruction of merchant shipping in large quantities,
1918] THE GERMAN DILEMMA 309
however, represented the one way in which the Germans
could win. There were at least a hundred merchant ships
to every one of our troopships ; if a considerable number of
the former could be sunk, Germany would have scored a
decisive advantage. From the declaration of submarine
warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been
for " tonnage " ; by March, 1918, as already said, the
chances of destroying sufficient tonnage to win had become
extremely slight ; yet it still represented the one logical
mission of the submarine.
The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercan-
tile convoys or troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let
us suppose for a moment that the Germans had changed
their programme, had taken their group of operating sub-
marines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed
them to the south, in the track of the troop transports.
What would the results have been ? " Lane," though a con-
venient word for descriptive purposes, is hardly an accurate
one ; for this ocean passage-way was really about 200 miles
wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched across
that expanse and hunting for troopships. At this rate the
Germans would have had about one submarine for every
twenty miles. Instead of finding themselves sailing amid
a swarm of surface ships, as they were when they were
stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or the
English Channel, the submarines would have found them-
selves drifting on a great waste of waters. Our troop
convoys averaged not more than three a week even in the
busiest period ; in all probability the submarines would
therefore have hung around for a month without catching
a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil
should finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely
that the submarine would ever have found a favourable
opportunity to attack. We must keep in mind that the
convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain limits,
the location of submarines from day to day ; any time one
was located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wire-
less to the convoy would have conveyed this information
and directed it to reach the coast of France by another
route.
At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for
transporting troops. Ships which made less than twelve
knots an hour were not deemed safe for such precious car-
310 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
goes ; when the need for troops became more and more press-
ing and when our transport service had demonstrated great
skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used ; but the
great majority of our troop transports were those which
made twelve knots or more. Now one of the greatest protec-
tions which a ship possesses against submarine attack is un-
questionably high speed. A submarine makes only eight
knots when submerged and it must submerge immediately
if its attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a
mile of its quarry when it discharges its torpedo ; and most
successful attacks were made within three hundred yards.
Now take a pencil and a piece of paper and figure out what
must be the location of a submarine, having a speed of
eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve
knots and more, if it hopes to approach near enough to
launch a torpedo. A little diagramming will prove that the
U-boat must be almost directly in line of its hoped-for
victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the god of
Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood
of sinking its prey would still be very remote. Like all
convoys, the troopships began zigzagging as soon as they
entered the danger zone ; and this in itself made it almost
impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and take
good aim. I believe that these circumstances in themselves
the comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of
the " lane " in which they travelled, the high speed which
they maintained, and their constant zigzagging, would have
defeated most of the attempts which the Germans could
have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of
them would have reached their destinations unharmed
without any other protection, still this risk, small as it was,
could not be taken ; and we therefore gave them one other
protection greater than any of those which I have yet
mentioned the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or
five large troopships would be surrounded by as many as
ten or a dozen destroyers. Very properly, since they were
carrying human cargoes, we gave them an escort at least
three times as large per vessel as that given to large mercan-
tile convoys of twenty or more vessels ; and this fact made
them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome
U-boat commanders.
When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they intro-
duce an element which they call the factor of safety. It is
1918] "THE FACTOR OF SAFETY" 311
their usual procedure to estimate the greatest weight which
their structure may be called upon to bear under any con-
ceivable circumstances and then they make it strong enough
to stand a number of times that weight. This additional
strength is the " factor of safety " ; it is never called into
use, of course, but the consciousness that it exists gives the
public a sense of security which it could obtain in no other
way. We adopted a similar policy in transporting these
millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a large
margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution
to assure the lives of our soldiers ; we heaped one pre-
cautionary measure on another. From the embarking of
the troops at New York or at Hampton Roads to the dis-
embarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, or
at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard
was omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished
the protection of some of the mercantile convoys and
properly so. This was done whenever the arrival of a troop
convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant convoy.
Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were
attended by a cruiser or a battleship whose business it was
to protect them against a German raider which might
possibly have made its escape into the ocean ; the work
performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of which
were American, was for the most part unobtrusive and
unspectacular, but it constitutes a particularly fine example
of efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven,
Ireland, as described above, we had stationed three power-
ful American dreadnoughts, momentarily prepared to rush
to the scene in case one of the great German battle-cruisers
succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the most
minute precautions were taken by the transports.
The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw any-
thing overboard which might betray the course of a convoy ;
the cook's refuse was dropped at a particular time and in a
way that would furnish no clue to a lurking submarine ;
even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first pierced with
holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck
a match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable
offence. It is thus apparent why the Germans never
" landed " a single one of our transports. The records
show only three or four cases in which even attempts were
made to do this ; and those few efforts were feeble and in-
312 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
effectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences
with phantom submarines ; indeed I don't suppose that
there is a single one of our more than 2,000,000 troops who
has not entertained his friends and relatives with accounts
of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats.
But the Germans made no concerted campaign against
our transports ; fundamental conditions, already described,
rendered such an offensive hopeless ; and the skill with
which our transport service was organized and conducted
likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the
German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the
American transports alone ; or at least not to attack except
under very favourable circumstances, and this belief is
rather confirmed by a passage in General Ludendorff's
memoirs. " From our previous experience of the sub-
marine war," General Ludendorff writes, " I expected
strong forces of Americans to come, but the rapidity with
which they actually did arrive proved surprising. General
von Cramon, the German military representative at the
Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up and
asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships ;
public opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral
von Holtzendorff could only reply that everything was being
done to reduce enemy tonnage and to sink troopships. It
was not possible to direct the submarines against troop-
ships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of
Europe anywhere between the north of England and
Gibraltar, a front of some fourteen hundred nautical miles.
It was impossible effectively to close this area by means of
submarines. One could have concentrated them only on
certain routes ; but whether the troopships would choose
the same routes at the same time was the question. As soon
as the enemy heard of submarines anywhere he could always
send the ships new orders by wireless and unload at another
port. It was, therefore, not certain that by this method
we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships. The
destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have
been undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been
set back in an undesirable manner ; and in that way the
submarine war would have become diverted from its
original object. The submarine war against commerce was
therefore continued with all the vigour possible."
Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty,
1918] FAILURE OF GERMAN PROMISES 313
as I have said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant
shipping and leave the American troopships practically
alone at least those bound to Europe. Unfortunately,
however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to
provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they
were unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time
in the " turn around " was the all-important consideration
in getting the troops over, the transports were sent back
through the submarine zone under the escort of armed
yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under these
conditions the transports could be attacked with much less
risk, as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed,
though of these happily only three were sunk.
Ill
The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by
the quotation from General Ludendorff's book, was an
extremely unhappy one. They had blatantly promised the
German people that their submarines would prevent the
transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they
had ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary
America could ever organize an army ; after we adopted
conscription and began to train our young men by the
millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this army
could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the
German military chieftains were not alone. No such army
movement had ever before been attempted. The discour-
aging forecast made by a brilliant British naval authority in
July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many military people
on both sides of the ocean. " I am distressed," he said,
" at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to pro-
vide enough shipping to bring the American army over in
hundreds of thousands to France, and, after theyare brought
over, to supply the enormous amount of shipping which
will be required to keep them full up with munitions, food,
and equipment."
It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted
as gospel the promises of their Admiralty ; therefore their
anger was unbounded when American troops began to
arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the most
embarrassing questions. What had become of their sub-
314 TRANSPORTING AMERICAN SOLDIERS
marines ? Had the German people not been promised that
their U-boats would sink any American troopships that
attempted to cross the ocean ? As the shipments increased,
and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began
to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in
Germany waxed even more fierce and abusive. Von
Capelle and other German naval chiefs made rambling
speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their people
that the submarines would certainly win the war speeches
that were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American
soldiers in France. The success of our transports led
directly to the fall of Von Capelle as Minister of Marine ;
his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was evidently
driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to
make one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new
minister, of course, knew that he could accomplish no
definite results ; but the sinking of even one transport with
several thousand troops on board would have had a tre-
mendous effect upon German moral. When the great
British liner Justicia was torpedoed, the German Admiralty
officially announced that it was the Leviathan, filled with
American soldiers ; and the jubilation which followed in
the German press, and the subsequent dejection when it
was learned that this was a practically empty transport,
sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of
this kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral
von Mann, therefore, took several submarines away from
the trade routes and sent them into the transport zone.
But they did not succeed even in attacking a single east-
bound troopship. The only result accomplished was the
one which, from what I have already said, would have been
expected ; the removal of the submarines from the com-
mercial lane caused a great fall in the sinking of merchant
ships. In August, 1918, these sinkings amounted to
280,000 tons ; in September and October, when this futile
drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell
to 190,000 and 110,000 tons.
Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of
our troop convoys and the commanding officers of the troop
transports, as well as the commanders of the cruisers and
battleships that escorted them from America to the western
edge of the submarine zone. The success of their valuable
services is evidence of a_high degree not only of nautical
1918] WHAT AMERICA DID 315
skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable sea-
manship displayed under the very unusual conditions of
steaming without lights while continuously manoeuvring
in close formation. Moreover, their cordial co-operation
with the escorts sent to meet them was everything that
could be desired. In this invaluable service these com-
manding officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of
the admirable petty officers and men whose initiative,
energy, and devotion throughout the war enabled us to
accomplish results which were not only beyond our ex-
pectations but which demonstrated that they are second to
none in the world in the qualities which make for success in
war on the sea.
On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on
the ocean was an achievement of the American navy.
Great Britain provided a slightly larger amount of tonnage
for this purpose than the United States ; but about 82 per
cent, of the escorting was done by our own forces. The
cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost
entirely American ; and the destroyer escorts through the
danger zone were likewise nearly all our own work. And
in performing this great feat the American navy fulfilled its
ultimate duty in the war. The transportation of these
American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On
the battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that
aroused the admiration of their brothers in the naval
service. When we were reading, day by day, the story
of their achievements, when we saw the German battle lines
draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the
German Government raised its hands in abject surrender,
the eighteen months' warfare against the German sub-
marines, in which the American navy had been privileged
to play its part, appeared in its true light as one of the
greatest victories against the organized forces of evil in
all history.
THE END
APPENDIX I
OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH
"THE VICTORY AT SEA"
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
14 June 1919.
From : Rear- Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activi-
ties of the U.S. Navy during The Great War.
Reference (a) : Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy of the United States.
1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request
authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activi-
ties of the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during
The Great War.
2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the Amer-
ican people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during
the war. It will be a popular presentation written in a non-
technical style, illustrated with photographs taken in Europe
and various diagrams indicating the nature of our activities.
[s] WM. S. SIMS.
9 July 1919.
APPROVED.
[s] Josephus Daniels.
HWS-MEF 2nd Indorsement.
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
From : Director of Naval Intelligence. 11 July 1919.
To : President Naval War College.
1. Forwarded.
[s] A. P. NIBLACK.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1919.
MY DEAR ADMIRAL :
I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of
316
APPENDIX I 317
your plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations
of the naval forces under your command during the great war.
I am happy that you are going to undertake this, because I
am sure it will be of great value to the Navy and of interest to
the world.
With sentiments of esteem and high regard,
Sincerely yours,
[s] JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
P.S.
Of course any facilities or assistance that the Navy Depart-
ment can render you will be at your disposal.
Rear- Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N.,
President Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island.
Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534
" (2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under
the Navy Department shall publish or cause or permit to be
published, directly or indirectly, or communicate by interviews,
private letters, or otherwise, except as required by his official
duties, any information in regard to the foreign policy of the
United States, or concerning the acts or measures of any
department of the Government or of any officer acting there-
under, or any comments or criticisms thereon ; or the text of
any official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject
whatever, or furnish copies thereof to any person, without the
express permission of the Navy Department.
" (4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting
officers from forwarding to the department, through official
channels, well-considered comment and suggestions with a
view to promoting the efficiency of the service and the public
interests ; on the contrary, such suggestions are invited, but
they should be in regard to things or methods and not a criticism
of persons, and should in all cases be accompanied by a well-
digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, if approved
by the department, will be entered on the officer's record and
he will be duly notified to that effect."
APPENDIX II
FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Sent April 14, 1917.
Through : State Department.
File No. 25-9-2.
The situation is as follows :
The submarine issue is very much more serious than the
people realize in America. The recent success of operations
and the rapidity of construction constitute the real crisis of the
war. The moral of the enemy submarines is not broken, only
about fifty-four are known to have been captured or sunk and
no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. The reports of
our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated
concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy moral
and results are [not] very satisfactory.
Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including
the Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually
imperilled.
German submarines are constantly extending their operations
into the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrol-
ling. Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-
five admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in
some armies there is insubordination.
The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in
February was 536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the
first ten days of April 205,000 tons. With short nights and
better weather these losses are increasing.
The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape
of some raiders during the long nights, but the chances are
better now.
The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be
sunk, this in order to draw destroyers away from operations
against submarines to convoy hospital ships ; in this way
causing a large demand for large convoy forces in all areas not
before necessary, and also partially immobilizing the main fleet.
On account of the immense theatre and the length and
318
APPENDIX II 319
number of lines of communication, and the material deteriora-
tion resulting from three years' continuous operation in distant
fields with inadequate base facilities, the strength of the naval
forces is dangerously strained. This applies to all of the sea
forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The enemy has six large
and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers ; the latter carry
eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes and
guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed
at a rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and
insure defeat of the submarine campaign immediate active
co-operation absolutely necessary.
The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of
all lines of communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I
very urgently recommend the following immediate naval
co-operation.
Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by
small anti-submarine craft ; the former to patrol designated
high seas area westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with
an advance base at Bantry Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol
for destroyers : small craft should be of light draft with as
high speed as possible but low speed also useful. Also repair
ships and staff for base. Oil and docks are available but I
advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main fleet
must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the
British main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available
for this force.
At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in
this area, except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be
based on Brest for moral effect against anticipated raids by
heavy enemy ships in the channel out of reach of the British
main fleet.
The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant
tonnage and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine
craft to reinforce our advanced forces. There is a serious
shortage of the latter craft. For towing the present large
amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous areas sea-going
tugs would be of great use.
The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with
the utmost despatch in order to break the enemy submarine
moral and accelerate the accomplishment of the chief American
objective.
It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying
raids on our coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and
to keep our forces from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic
through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of main-
taining submarine bases and the focussing of shipping on this
side will restrict such operations to minor importance, although
820 APPENDIX II
they should be effectively opposed, principally by keeping the
Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have
been anchored as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not
more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom
to set depth until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after
they have been laid.
So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines
out of sight of landmarks or lights on account of danger to
themselves if location is not known. Maximum augmentation
merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work where most
effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.
Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply
in this country for three weeks. This does not include the
supply in retail stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for
the United States.
SIMS.
APPENDIX III
FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED
NAVAL SITUATION
LONDON, ENGLAND.
April 19, 1917.
From : Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams
concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S.
Naval co-operation.
1 . Reception :
My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial
and significant of the seriousness of present situation and the
importance to be attached to the United States' entry into the
war.
I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a
member of Admiral Jellicoe's staff, and the Admiral of the Port,
the former having been sent by the Admiralty to escort me to
London. A special train was provided which made a record
run, and within a few hours after arrival in London I was
received by the First Sea Lord and his principal assistants in
a special conference.
2. Conferences :
More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full
statement of the true situation, particularly (as it developed
later) on account of its seriousness, combined with a natural
reluctance against appearing to seek assistance, and a hesitancy
in taking chances of allowing information indirectly to reach
the enemy, and thereby improve enemy moral.
I therefore positively took the position that I must be con-
sidered a part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was
essential to safe and efficient co-operation that I be trusted
with a full knowledge of the exact situation.
They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial
War Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as
22 321
322 APPENDIX III
regards the military situation and rate of destruction of
merchant shipping.
I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both
at his office and residence, and also have been given entire
freedom of the Admiralty and access to all Government Officials.
I have freely consulted with such officials as the following :
Prime Minister.
First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson).
Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet
officials.
First Sea Lord, and his assistants.
Chief of Naval Staff.
Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelli-
gence, Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining,
etc.
3. General Statement of the Situation :
Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which
from intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine
campaign against merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved
itself into the real issue of the war and, stated briefly, the
Allied Governments have not been able to, and are not now,
effectively meeting the situation presented.
4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and
supplies to all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are
threatened, and the " Command of the Sea " is actually at stake.
5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the
submarine menace have been greatly altered. My convictions
and opinions, as probably those of the Department also, had
been largely based upon Press reports and reports of our
Attaches and other professional Americans who have been
abroad during the War. All of this information has been
either rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form
that it would be of minimum assistance to enemy moral.
6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government
has experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London,
and even in the Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have
been remarkable and unexpected leakages of information
throughout the war. Certain neutral legations of smaller
countries are now under strong suspicion.
7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being
waged is in itself excellent evidence of the importance attached
to it by the enemy, and of the degree to which they counted,
and still are counting, upon it.
The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as
reliable as can be) that the enemy really reckoned that the
Allies would be defeated in two months through shortage of
supplies.
APPENDIX III 323
8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now
coming on we may expect even more enemy submarine success.
9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday
in conference in the Admiralty as to what greater extent
destroyers and auxiliaries of the Fleet may be utilized without
endangering its power in the remote possibility of another
fleet engagement.
The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not
occur, but there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and
of course, in any case, the possibility must be adequately and
continuously provided against.
General discussion of situation :
10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the
situation with a view of obtaining the maximum information
consistent with the importance of the time element. I was
also somewhat deterred by a natural reluctance to alter so
radically my preconceived views and opinions as to the situation.
11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy
diversions such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical
area in which the war's decision will be made is in the eastern
Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications.
The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of
construction, allowing liberal factors for errors of information,
renders it inevitable that the main submarine effort must
continue to be concentrated in the above critical area.
12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is
relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which
the enemy can maintain in it. For example, with the present
Admiralty policy (explained below) they are forced to cover
all the possible trade routes of approach between the north
of Scotland and Ushant.
13. From consideration of the above and all other essential
information available, it is apparent that the enemy could not
disperse his main submarine campaign into other quarters of
the Globe without diminishing results in this and all areas to a
degree which would mean failure to accomplish the Mission of
the submarine campaign, which can be nothing else than a
final decision of the war.
14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated
upon the Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for
failing to produce more substantial and visible results. One
of the principal demands is for convoys of merchant shipping,
and more definite and real protection within the war zone.
The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is
simply that the necessary vessels are not available, and further
that those which are available are suffering from the effects
of three years of arduous service.
324 APPENDIX III
15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping
is not directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and
from these convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer
is the same the area is too large ; the necessary vessels are
not available.
16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of
Shipping as to the practicability and advisability of attempting
some approach to such a plan in case the United States is able
to put in operation sufficient tonnage to warrant it.
17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the
Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion.
They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach
to the United Kingdom and Channel, changing their limits or
area periodically if necessity demands.
Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another
to the north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the
Irish Sea and Channel. Individual ships coming into any of
these areas of approach are instructed, generally before sailing,
to cross the twentieth meridian at certain and different latitudes
and thence steer certain courses to port.
At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of
approach free of submarines under such conditions as to lead
them to concentrate shipping therein, but invariably the enemy
has become aware of the course pursued.
18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is
communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation
by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured
the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant
code is being continually changed, and at all times it cannot be
counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense
difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over
the world in touch with changes is apparent.
19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant
Captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting
contempt, or at least indifference, for Admiralty instruc-
tions. The American Liner New York upon which I took
passage furnishes a typical example. She was instructed
to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about
nine P.M., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous
area.
20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with
Merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most
unanimous demand is " Give us a gun and let us look out for
ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for
merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any
considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling
their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers.
APPENDIX III 825
With this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a
little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently
well steam in open formations.
21. The best protection against the submarine menace for
all classes of ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and
ZIGZAGGING, not more than fifteen minutes on a course.
Upon this point no one disagrees, but on the contrary there is
absolutely unanimity of opinion.
22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly
destroyers, and until the enemy submarine moral is broken,
there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue
upon which there is also complete unanimity increased number
of merchant bottoms, preferably small.
" More Ships ! More Ships ! More Ships ! " is heard on
every hand.
23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty
have been unable completely to convince some members of the
Cabinet that the submarine issue is the deciding factor in the
War. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe
in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real
physical ways.
24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me
the opinion that it ought to be possible to find physical means
of absolutely sealing up all escape for submarines from their
own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, mines,
obstructions, etc.) inherently involve the added necessity of
continuous protection and maintenance by our own Naval
forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally con-
vinced the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions
by describing the situations into which we would be led :
namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we would
have to match the forces the enemy brought against them, until
finally the majority if not all of our forces would be forced into
dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual
torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable
to the enemy.
25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and
always can, force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade,
the weather is a serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors
obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions,
only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few
hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chafe
through. In this respect we could be of great assistance, i.e.
in supply of moorings and buoys.
26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely
sealed against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of
escape to the north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields,
826 APPENDIX III
and have succeeded in unknown ways in evading and cutting
through nets and obstructions.
27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid,
and in fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the
enemy decides that the necessity or return will justify the risk.
Hence the suggestion that two divisions of our fast Dread-
noughts might be based upon Brest, primarily for the resulting
moral effect against such possible raids.
I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that
while he thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the
Channel by heavy enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet
(North of Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless the possi-
bility existed and was principally thwarted on moral grounds,
that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the opposition which
would be encountered. He agreed with others, including the
First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces
to those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the
French and British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the
possibility of such raids.
28. Submarine Losses :
It has been found necessary to accept no reports of submarine
losses as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or
the submarine itself is definitely located by dragging. No
dependence even is placed upon evidence of oil on the surface
after a submarine has been attacked and forced down, as there
is reason to believe that when an enemy submarine dives to
escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the particular purpose
of conveying the impression that she has been sunk and thereby
avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of
damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more
than was anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a
recent occasion a British submarine was mistaken for an enemy
and though struck by several shells, dived and escaped to port.
The submarine losses which are certain since outbreak of
war are as given in attached cablegram.
It is estimated that between thirty and forty submarines
operate at a time in the waters surrounding the British Islands
and French Coast. At least one is now known to be on White
Sea trade lanes.
29. Best anti-submarine weapons :
One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers
and patrol craft against submarines is the so-called " Depth
Charge," sample and drawings of which have been forwarded
by our Naval Attache. These are merely explosive charges
designed to explode at a certain depth, formerly eighty feet,
now about one hundred feet. They are dropped overboard
where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and
APPENDIX III 827
are counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize if they do
not actually cause serious damage.
Howitzers and Bomb-throwers of large calibre are under
construction, designed to throw similar depth charges to dis-
tances of about 2,000 yards. Details will be forwarded.
30. Torpedo Protection :
This subject may be summed up by the statement of the
Captain of a British Dreadnought who said in effect that after
a year's experience he did not fear being sunk by a torpedo.
Unless struck by several the worst to be anticipated is damage
to shafts or rudder, thus necessitating towing. Cruisers have
often been struck and been able to reach port. Vital water-
tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea.
Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious
opinion that the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable.
This is probably to be explained by the fact that they carry
very few supplies ; that they have their storage spaces com-
partmented or filled with wood or other water- excluding
material ; and that when in port, they quarter their crews in
barracks, and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum
amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points,
however, are not positively known.
On the contrary, all vessels of the British Fleet must be kept
fully supplied and fuelled at all times for extended cruising.
This is particularly true of Battle- cruisers and Cruisers.
31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are
convinced that the enemy have no unusual methods of pro-
tection, or in fact any " surprises " in ordnance or other fighting
equipment.
32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes
is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING.
33. It is a common experience of the Naval as well as Mer-
chant service that torpedo wakes are reported where none
exist. Many reports are received of torpedoes barely missing
ships. This was true in the Jutland Battle. The Captain on
one Battleship said that he received numerous reports of tor-
pedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of which
he had reason to believe did not exist.
Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are
easily mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the
danger of torpedoes is present. This accounts for many reports
by passengers on liners and other merchant craft of seeing
many torpedoes just miss their mark.
|> 34. Submarine versus Submarine:
There has always been opposition to using submarines against
submarines, principally on the grounds that the possibilities of
their accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify
328 APPENDIX III
the risk involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to
friends.
The Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare believes, however,
that such operations promise well, and the experiment is now
being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from
the Grand Fleet. Some enemy submarines have been destroyed
by this method, usually torpedoed. One valuable feature of
this method lies in the fact that as long as our submarines are
not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe in
assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this
certainty is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down
more, and to take much greater precautions against detection.
This is an advantage of no small account.
In addition to the possible offensive work that may be
accomplished by our submarines on such duty, the plan fur-
nishes us with more reliable information as to the limitations
and capabilities of enemy vessels under the actual conditions
existing in the areas in which they operate. Without this
knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to
conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected
effort.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX IV
THE QUESTION OF ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS
i
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Through Admiralty. From Queenstown.
Sent : June 28, 1917.
Admiralty for Secretary Navy Washington, providing it meets
Admiralty's full approval.
From Admiral Sims.
Referring to Department's opinion, reported in last two
cables, to the effect that adequate armament and trained crews
constitute one of the most effective defensive anti-submarine
measures, I again submit with all possible stress the following
based on extended [Allied] war experience. The measures
demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be assured, are not
defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantman's inherent
weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defence
against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily
the enemy method of attack against armed ships. In this area
alone during the last six weeks thirty armed ships were sunk
by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although three of
these were escorted each by a single destroyer. The result
would of course have been the same no matter how many guns
these ships carried or what their calibre. Three mystery ships,
heavily manned by expert naval crews with much previous
experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed
without warning. Another case within the month of mystery
ship engaging submarine with gunfire at six thousand yards
but submarine submerged and approached unseen and tor-
pedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heaviest
batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by
Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their
men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively
small number American ships, especially liners, is believed here
to be due to the enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will
succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful
gun attacks from advantageous sun position against armed
329
330 APPENDIX IV
ships without ship being able to see submarine. I submit that
if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by offensive
measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction
of shipping and avoidance of anti-submarine craft. Enemy
submarines are now using for their final approach an auxiliary
periscope less than two inches in diameter. This information
just acquired. All of the experience in this submarine campaign
to date demonstrates that it would be a seriously dangerous
misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any
armament on merchantmen is any protection against sub-
marines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British
have now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum
practicable extent, convoys from sixteen to twenty ships. This
is an offensive measure against submarines, as the latter will
be subject to the attack of our anti-submarine craft whenever
they come within torpedoing distance of convoyed merchantmen.
Moreover it permits of concentrated attack by our forces
and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various
routes of approach.
Concerning Department's reference to a scheme for protection
of merchant shipping which will not interfere with present
escort duties, I submit that the time element alone prevents
utilization of any new anti-submarine invention. The cam-
paign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into
effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on
maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad
weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest
effort may be anticipated in July and August. I again submit
that protection of our coastlines and of Allied shipping must
necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be
effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force sub-
marines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters
should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, the
maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is opera-
ting, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.
SIMS.
APPENDIX V
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
LONDON,
June 29, 1917.
From : Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European
Waters.
To : Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject : General report concerning military situation.
1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable des-
patches which, in view of the importance of the time element,
have been made full and detailed.
2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I
consider that the military situation is very grave indeed on
account of the success of the enemy submarine campaign.
If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past
four months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to
dire straits indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an
unsatisfactory peace.
The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the
rate of building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great
that the efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by
lack of oil. Orders have just been given to use three-fifths
speed, except in cases of emergency. This simply means that
the enemy is winning the war.
3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches
have been because of my conviction that measures of co-
operation which we may take will be inefficient if they are not
put into operation immediately, that is, within a month.
There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy
submarine effort will occur between now and the first of
November, reaching its height probably during the latter part
of July, if not earlier.
4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine
menace except through well-established methods of warfare
based upon fundamental military principles.
5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of
331
382 APPENDIX V
concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy
and not by the Allies.
6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concen-
trating his. The enemy's submarine mission is and must
continue to be the destruction of merchant shipping. The
limitations of submarines and the distances over which they
must operate prevent them from attacking our naval forces,
that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage
anti-submarine craft with guns ; they must use torpedoes. If
they should do so to any considerable extent their limited supply
would greatly reduce their period of operation away from base,
and the number of merchantmen they could destroy. Their
object is to avoid contact with anti-submarine craft. This
they can almost always do, as the submarine can see the surface
craft at many times the distance the surface craft can see a
periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter.
Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the anti-submarine
craft because of the great danger of the depth charges. Our
tactics should therefore be such as to force the submarine to
incur this danger in order to get within range of merchantmen.
7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only
course for us to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of
convoy. This will be purely an offensive measure, because if
we concentrate our shipping into convoys and protect it with
our naval forces we will thereby force the enemy, in order to
carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces which are not
embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great
danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are
wearing down their personnel and material in an attempted
combination of escorting single ships, when they can be picked
up, and also of attempting to seek and offensively engage an
enemy whose object is to avoid such encounters. With the
convoy system the conditions will be reversed. Although the
enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never
know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to
their destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to
work on a deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil
supplies and energy, while the enemy will be forced to disperse
his forces and seek us. In a word, the handicap we now labour
under will be shifted to the enemy ; we will have adopted the
essential principal of concentration while the enemy will lose it.
8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system
made by the British Admiralty shows clearly that while we
may have some losses under this system, owing to lack of
adequate number of anti-submarine craft, they nevertheless
will not be critical as they are at present.
9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed
APPENDIX V 333
as a whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on
our own coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses
no unusual characteristics different from those of other naval
craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a
limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is
the same for the submarine as it is for other craft. As long
as we maintain control of the sea as far as surface craft are
concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy establishing
submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.
10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be
led or forced into diverting part of his submarine effort to the
United States coast, or to any other area distant from the
critical area surrounding the coast of France and the United
Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign would at once be won.
The enemy labours under severe difficulties in carrying out his
campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the material
limitations and the distances they must operate from their
bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of
the United States coastline and the distances between its
principal commercial ports preclude the possibility of any
submarine effort in that part of the world except limited
operations of diversion designed to affect public opinion, and
thereby hold our forces from the vital field of action.
11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of
course, considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely
dispersed ports of origin of merchant shipping ; the difficulty
of communication by cable ; the time involved by communi-
cations by mail ; and the difficulties of obtaining a co-operation
and co-ordination between Allied Governments.
As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has
definitely reached the decision to put the convoy system into
operation as far as its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton
Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and Scandinavian countries
are already in operation. Convoys from New York will be put
in operation as soon as ships are available. The British navy
is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently
recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling
convoys from New York.
12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote,
but, of course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity
for escorting cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is
even greater, however, for anti-submarine craft in the sub-
marine war zone.
13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen
is not a solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single
purpose of forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of
guns and bombs. The facts that men-of-war cannot proceed
834 APPENDIX V
safely at sea without escort, and that in the Queenstown avenue
of approach alone in the past six weeks there have been thirty
armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the submarine
at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A
great mass of other evidence and war experience could be
collected in support of the above.
14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great sub-
marine activity. Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen
of the largest and latest submarines have been operating, of
which ten to thirteen were operating in the critical area to the
west and south-west of the British Isles. The above numbers
are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of submarines, and
submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are working
to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the
week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees.
Three merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton
Roads, the last one, consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed
on the 19th of June. One hundred and sixteen moored mines
have been swept up during the week.
Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in
waters surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported
during the week three by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by
mystery ships, one by French gunboat, three by submarines,
nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by seaplane, and one by
merchant vessel.
There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-
submarine craft based on Queenstown.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
\
APPENDIX VI
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY
From : Secretary of Navy.
To : Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. Melville.
Received : July 10, 1917.
The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of
State is quoted for your information and guidance as an index
of the policy of the Department in relation to the co-operation
of our naval forces with those of our Allies. Quote : After careful
consideration of the present naval situation taken in connection
with possible future situations which might arise, the Depart-
ment is preparing to announce as its policy, in so far as it relates
to the Allies. First, the most hearty co-operation with the
Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or
other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own
home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the
Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present
war period. Third, the realization that while a successful
termination of the present war must always be the first Allied
aim, and will probably result in diminished tension throughout
the world, the future position of the United States must in no
way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting
fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main military
role of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the
line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim
there will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged :
minor craft and major craft, and two roles of action, first,
offensive and, second, defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the role
set forth in paragraph four, the Department cannot too strongly
insist on its opinion that the offensive must always be the
dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But
as the primary role in all offensive preparations must perforce
belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces
as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan
of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need.
Sixth, pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Depart-
333
336 APPENDIX VI
ment announces as its general plan of action the following :
One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, composed
of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries in any
number not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of
action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties which
would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two,
its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division
from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing
to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but
co-operating unit when, after joint consultations of all Admir-
alties concerned, the emergency is deemed to warrant it and
the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications
due to the increase of fighting ships in European waters will
stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to
discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote
11009.
(Sd) JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
APPENDIX .VII
COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY
4
Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding
U.S. Destroyer Forces
European Waters.
LONDON,
July 16, 1917.
From : Vice-Admiral Sims.
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war,
and allied subjects.
1. The Department's cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a
letter which had been addressed to the Secretary of State
concerning naval policy in relation to the present war, was
received on July 10th.
In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth
therein, I wish to indicate the general policy which has hereto-
fore governed my recommendation.
2. I have assumed that our mission was to promote the
maximum co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common
enemy.
All of my despatches and recommendations have been based
on the firm conviction that the above mission could and would
be accomplished, and that hence such questions as the possi-
bility of post war situations, or of all or part of the Allies being
defeated and America being left alone, were not given consider-
ation in fact, I cannot see how we could enter into this war
whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed to diminish
in any way the chances of Allied success.
3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind
is that we should look upon our service as part of the combined
Allied service, of which the British Grand Fleet is the main
body, and all other Allied naval forces disposed throughout
the world, as necessary branches thereof.
This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or
reserve of the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and
would lead to utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots
23 337
338 APPENDIX VII
and to strengthen Allied lines, both offensively and defensively,
wherever necessary.
Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our
fleet, and it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and
caution should be felt in its adoption.
4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish
our mission without in any way involving the so-called dis-
integration of our fleet as a whole.
In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to
project, or prepare to project, our maximum force against the
enemy offensively.
5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy
is depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines
of communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.
A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the
main fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means
as coastal raids, threats of landing operations, air raids, and
attacks on hospital ships, which last necessitates destroyer
escort for such vessels.
The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity con-
centrated primarily on the most vital lines of communications,
is nevertheless carried out in such a manner as to lead the
Allies to disperse, and not concentrate, their inadequate anti-
submarine Forces.
The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times,
and hence provide against, the possibility of another main
fleet action.
6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of sub-
marines available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the
Allies' communications, for both Army and Navy as well as
civil needs, shows clearly that the enemy must direct his main
effort in certain restricted areas.
These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included
approximately in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the
north of Scotland. The most effective field for enemy activity
is, of course, close into the Irish Sea and Channel approaches,
where all lines must focus.
But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally
well out to sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of
scattering the limited anti-submarine forces available.
It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but
must remain, in European waters, in so far as success or failure
is concerned.
7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the
-question of logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our
main strength against the enemy, would be to move all our
iforces, including the battleship fleet, into the war area.
APPENDIX VII 339
8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected
by the submarine, such a movement by the battleships would
necessitate a large force of light craft much larger than our
peace establishment provided. In addition to all destroyers,
adequate protection of the fleet would require all other available
light craft in the service, or which could be commandeered and
put into service that is, submarines, armed tugs, trawlers,
yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and mine-
sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be
used as protective or offensive screens.
9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the
submarine campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in
what way our battleships could be supplied in case they were
sent into the war area. This refers particularly to oil-burning
vessels. It would therefore seem unwise to recommend such
a movement until we could see clearly far enough ahead to
ensure the safety of the lines of communication which such a
force would require.
10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the
decision were made to move the battleships into the war area,
it would unavoidably be greatly delayed both in getting together
the necessary screening forces and also in getting such craft
across the Atlantic.
In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the
movements of the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has
become so intensive, and the available anti-submarine craft
have been so inadequate to meet it, that the necessity for
increasing the anti-submarine forces in the war area to the
maximum possible extent has become imperative.
11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the
stronger British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not
seem a disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area
all the light craft pf every description which would necessarily
have to accompany the fleet in case it should be needed in this
area.
Such movements of the light craft would not in any way
separate them strategically from the battleships, as they would
be operating between the enemy and our own main body and
based in a position to fall back as the main body approached,
or to meet it at an appointed place. This advance of light
forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to our
heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the
active war zone.
12. Another very important consideration is the fact that,
pending the movement of the battleships themselves, all of
the light forces would be gaining valuable war experience and
would be the better prepared for operations of any nature in
340 APPENDIX VII
the future, either in connection with the fleet itself or independ-
ently.
It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegra-
tion of our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation
with the British Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our
battleship fleet. These would merely constitute units advanced
for purpose of enemy defeat, and which would always be in a
position to fall back on the main part of our Fleet, or to join it
as it approached the war zone.
It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917,
that all coal -burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for
distant service in case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might
be deemed advisable in connection with unexpected enemy
developments.
It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire
fleet providing adequate lines of communications could be
established to ensure their efficient operation. At the present
time there is a sufficient coal supply in England to supply
our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil would be a very
difficult problem as it must be brought in through the sub-
marine zone.
When notified that the Chester, Birmingham, and Salem were
available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after
consultation with the Admiralty, that they join the British
Light Cruiser Squadrons in the North Sea, where there is always
a constant demand for more ships, especially to oppose enenty
raiding and other operations aimed at dispersing the Allied
sea forces.
In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar
situation, and also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities
of the seven gunboats of the Sacramento class, it was recom-
mended that they be based on Gibraltar for duty in assisting
to escort convoys clear of the Straits, and particularly as this
would release some British destroyers which are urgently
needed in critical areas to the northward.
13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to
the Secretary of State, refers in the first statement to an
adequate defence of our own home waters. It would seem to
be sound reasoning that the most effective defence which can
be afforded to our home waters is an offensive campaign against
the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in other words,
that the place for protection of home waters is the place in
which protection is necessary that is, where the enemy is
operating and must continue to operate in force.
As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered
that home waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone
in fact are being attacked solely in that zone, and must continue
APPENDIX VII 341
to be attacked therein if the enemy is to succeed against us as
well as against the European Entente.
The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited,
and the difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully
as difficult for submarine as for surface craft.
The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route
and in operating as far from their bases as they now do are
prodigious.
Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable,
except by very limited numbers for brief periods, purely as
diversions.
In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent
of our coastline, and the distances between our principal ports,
it is a safe assumption that if we could induce the enemy to
shift the submarine war area to our coasts his defeat would be
assured, and his present success would be diminished more than
in proportion to the number of submarines he diverted from
the more accessible area where commerce necessarily focuses.
14. The Department's policy refers to willingness to extend
hearty co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint
operations, and also to its readiness to consider any plans which
may be submitted by the joint Allied Admiralties.
15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-
operation, to discusssplans with the various Admiralties, except
in one way and that is, to establish what might be termed an
advance headquarters in the war zone composed of Department
representatives upon whose recommendations the Department
can depend.
I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in
the army that is, the General Headquarters in the field being
the advance headquarters of the War Department at home,
and the advance headquarters must of necessity be left a certain
area of discretion and freedom of action as concerns the details
of the measures necessitated by the military situations as they
arise.
16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements
which enter into military warfare, and hence delays in com-
munications by written reports, together with the necessity for
secrecy, render it very difficult to discuss plans at long range.
The enemy secret service has proved itself to be of extraordinary
efficiency.
Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon dis-
cussion of military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The
necessary inadequacy of written or cable communications
needs no discussion. The opportunities for misunderstandings
are great. It is difficult to be sure that one has expressed
clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence phrases in a letter
342 APPENDIX VII
are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot explain
themselves.
17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and
perhaps of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination
and co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass
of information in this connection which it is practically im-
possible to impart except by personal discussion.
It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved
if any one of the Allies Italy, France, England, or the United
States were selected to direct all operations, the others merely
keeping the one selected fully informed of their resources
available, and submitting to complete control and direction
in regard to the utilization of these resources.
18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes
necessary to decide as to the best location in which to establish
such advanced headquarters, or what might be called an
advance branch war council at the front that is, an advanced
branch upon whose advice and decisions the War Council
itself largely depends.
I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must
have been brought to bear upon the Department from all of the
Allies, and from various and perhaps conflicting sources.
I also realize that my position here in England renders me
open to suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the
British viewpoint of the war. It should be unnecessary to
state that I have done everything within my ability to main-
tain a broad viewpoint with the above stated mission constantly
in mind.
19. From the naval point of view it would seem evident that
London is the best and most central location in the war area
for what I have termed above the Advance Branch of our
Naval War Council.
The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the
brunt of the naval war, and hence all naval information
concerning the war therefore reaches and centres in London.
It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters
staff, or parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other
Allied Admiralties at any time.
I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly
impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the
functions of such an advanced branch of the Department.
As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some
time that I have been approaching a state in which it would be
physically impossible to handle the work without an increase
of staff.
The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within
range of possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve
APPENDIX VII 343
disaster to our ships, due to the physical impossibility of
handling the administrative and other work with the thorough-
ness which is essential to safety.
20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be
required is approximately as follows. More officers could be
well employed with resulting increase of efficiency :
(1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a con-
tinuous estimate of the situation, based upon all
necessary information. He would be given the
freedom of the Operations Department of the British
and French Admiralties.
(2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for
duties in connection with shipping and convoy to
handle all the numerous communications in relation to
the movements of American shipping, particularly
military shipping, and also other shipping carrying^
American troops.
(3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in
connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations
in order to insure perfect co-operation in that field of
work between our service and other Allied Services.
(4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in
connection with general military intelligence. He
should be in constant touch with the Secret Service
Departments of the Admiralties to insure that all
military intelligence, which in any way affects the
Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and
promptly acted upon.
(5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the
line in my own office in connection with general
administrative questions in addition to the one now
available. The necessity for these additional officers
is imperative.
(6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes
and communications both with the Department at
home, the Allied Admiralties, and with the various
bases of our Forces in the war area. (At present
Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London,,
and Paris.)
(7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial
matters connected with our naval organization abroad.
This officer should be in addition to Paymaster Tobey,
who is performing necessary and invaluable service on
my staff in connection with all logistic questions.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX VIII
MONTHLY LOSSES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1917, FROM
ENEMY ACTION
During the twenty-one months of unrestricted submarine
warfare from February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive, 3,843
merchant vessels (British fishing vessels included) of a total
gross tonnage of 8.478,947 have been sunk by enemy action, a
monthly average of 183 vessels totalling 403,760 gross tons.
The October tonnage losses show a decrease from this average
of 291,333 gross tons, or 72 per cent.
The following gives the tonnage losses by months from
February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive :
Period.
British
Merchant
Vessels.
Other Allied
Merchant
Vessels.
Neutral
Merchant
Vessels.
British
Fishing
Vessels.
Total.
1917
February
313,486
84,820
135,090
3,478
536,334
March .
353,478
81,151
165,225
3,586
603,440
April .
545,282
134,448
189,373
5,920
875,023
May .
352,289
102,960
137,957
1,448
594,654
June .
417,925
126,171
139,229
1,342
684,667
July
364,858
111,683
70,370
2,736
549,647
August .
329,810
128,489
53,018
242
511,559
September
196,212
119,086
29,941
245
345,484
October
276,132
127,932
54,432
227
458,723
November
173,560
87,646
31,476
87
292,769
December
253,087
86,981
54,047
413
394,528
Period.
British
Merchant
Vessels.
Other Allied
Merchant
Vessels.
Neutral
Merchant
Vessels.
British
Pishing
Vessels.
Total.
1918
January
179,973
87,078
35,037
375
302,463
February
226,896
54,904 36,374
686
318,860
March .
199,458
94,321
51,035
293
345,107
April .
215,453
50,879
11,361
241
277,934
May .
192,436
80,826
20,757
504
294,523
June
162,990
51,173
38,474
639
253,276
July
165,449
70,900
23,552
555
260,456
August .
145,721
91,209
41,946
1,455
280,331
September
136,864
39,343
10,393
142
186,742
October
57,607
41,308
13,512
112,427
344
APPENDIX IX
TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED BY ALLIED AND
NEUTRAL NATIONS SINCE AUGUST, 1914
Construction of merchant shipping is shown in the following
table, which gives tonnage completed since the beginning of the
war for the United Kingdom, United States, and for other
Allied and Neutral Nations.
Period.
United
Kingdom.
Groas tons.
United
States.
Gross tons.
Other Allied
and Neutral.
Gross tons.
World Total.
Gross tons.
1914
1915
1916
1917
675,610
650,919
541,552
1,163,474
1 20,000 *
225,122
325,413
1,034,296
217,310
325,959
821,036
505,585
1,012,920
1,202,000
1,688,000
2,703,355
1918 1st quarter
2nd
3rd
October .
320,280
442,966
411,395
136,100
328,541
559,939
834,250
357,5321
220,496
240,369
232,127
50,000
869,317
1,243,274
1,477,772
543,632
1918 (10 months)
1,310,741
2,080,262
742,992
4,133,995
1 Estimated.
345
INDEX
Aboukir, Hague and Crcssu torpedoed
by U-29, 84, 174
Achates, with convoy, 122
Active, flagship of Vice-Adm. Bayly, 58
Adams, Ensign Ashley D., in charge of
subchaser units, 191
Aircraft against submarines, 275
Aleock, goes to relief of sinking mystery
ship Dunraven, 163
Allied Naval Council, value of, 218
Amberger, Kapitan-Leutnant Gustav,
of L/-58, captured, 131 ; comment
on treatment, 134
American forces in European waters,
204
Anti-submarine craft, use of, 26
Anti-submarine devices, search for, 8
Arkansas, on duty with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Arming of merchant vessels, 25
Aroostook, mine-layer, 254, 264
Aubrielia, mystery ship, heading con-
voy, 118; sights submarine, 121
Audacious, sunk by mine, 174
Aviation, naval, development of, 282 ;
extent at time of armistice, 286
Babcock, Commr. J. V., sails with
Adm. Sims as aide, 2 ; at London
headquarters, 205, 212, 214
Badger in bombardment of Durazzo,
200
Bagley, Lt.-Commr. D. W., highly
commended, 139
Baillargeon, J. C., volunteers services
at London headquarters, 206
Baldwin Locomotive Works, con-
structors of the U.S. mobile railway
batteries, 290
Balfour, Arthur James, discussion of
submarine situation with, 9 ; with
Commission to the United States,
9 ; advises Washington of critical
submarine situation, 39
Baltimore, converted as mine-layer,
252,261,264
Basilisk, assisted by yacht Lydonia,
sinks submarine, 136
Bassett, Capt. F. B., commanding the
Utah, 305
Bastedo, Lt.-Commr. Paul H., in bom-
bardment of Durazzo, 199, 201
Vice-Adm. Lewis, letter of
welcome to Commr. Taussig, 45 ;
welcome to Americans at Queens-
town, 46 ; instructs Americans as
to duties, 49 ; characteristics, 52 ;
meets Fanning and congratulates
officers and men on capture of sub-
marine crew, 133 ; message com-
mending American forces at Queens-
town, 140 ; introduces Capt. G.
Campbell of the " mystery ship,"
142 ; has difficulty in identifying
one such ship, 151
Beach, Capt. E. L., with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Beatty, Adm. Sir David, attitude
toward torpedo flags, 217 ; farewell
speech to American Squadron, 304
wai vz
Bayly,
welc
Belknap, Capt. Reginald R., command-
ing mine-laying squadron, 252, 260,
264
Benham, highly commended, 139
Berrien, Commr. Frank D., command-
ing destroyer division, 129 ; highly
commended, 139
" Big Bertha," American naval guns
sent to destroy, 290
Billings, A. W. K., great work in con-
nection with air service, 285
Birmingham, at Gibraltar, 134
Blakely, Lt.-Commr. C. A., highly
commended, 139
Blakeslee, Lt.-Commr. E. G., at Lon-
don headquarters, 212
Blue, Capt. Victor, with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Boyd, Capt. David F., good work in
convoying subchasers, 178
Brest, as destroyer base, 134, 300
Brindisi, rendezvous for attack on
Durazzo, 200
Briscoe, Lt.-Commr. Benjamin, work
on air service stations, 285
Bristol, Capt. M. L., commanding the
Oklahoma, 305
British Admiralty, commends work of
U.S. aviation pilots, 286
British Fleet, not in control of the
seas, 16 ; at Scapa Flow, 28
Broke, sinks two German destroyers, 61
Browne, Ralph C., new type of sub-
marine mine, 250
Bruges, submarine base, 19
Bullard, Capt. W. H. G., with the
Grand Fleet, 303
Bumstead, Prof. H. A., at London
headquarters, 213
Bunker Hill, converted as mine-layer,
254
Bushnell, David, inventor of submarine ,
225
Butler, Capt. H. V., with mine-laying
squadron, 264
Callan, Lt.-Commr. J. L., in charge of
U.S. air forces in Italy, 284
Campbell, Capt. Gordon, at Queens-
town, 58 ; exploits with mystery
ships, 142 ; with " mystery ship
Pargusl, 147 ; technique of opera-
tion, 148 ; heroism on Dunraoen,
157 ; letter from Adm. Sims on Dun-
raven exploit, 164
Canandaigua, mine-layer. 254, 260, 264
Canonicus, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Carpender, Lt. A. S., in command of
Fanning, when submarine crew was
captured, 132 ; receives D.S.O., 134
Carson, Sir Edward, discussion of sub-
marine, 9 ; of convoy system, 95
Cecil, Lord Robert, on submarine
situation with, 9
Centurion, in China, commanded by
Jellicoe, 43
Chrislabel, encounter with submarine,
127
Christopher, goes to relief of sinking
mystery ship Dunraven, 163
347
348
INDEX
Christy, Capt. H. H., with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., " digging the
rats out of their holes," 246
Clinton-Baker, Rear-Adm., in com-
mand of British mine-laving opera-
tions, 257
Cluverius, Capt. W. T., with mine-
laying squadron, 264
Cole, Capt. W. C., commanding the
Nevada, 305
College boys and subchasers, 168
Commerce" raiders, guarding against,
94, 112
Cone, Capt. Hutch I., at London head-
quarters, 212, 214 ; organizer Ameri-
can air forces, 284 ; severely injured
on torpedoed Leinsler, 285
Conner, Francis G., jumps overboard
from Fanning to save drowning
German from crew of submarine, 132
Convoy of shipping to Scandinavia, 22
Convoy system, ancient use of, 86 ;
merchant captains hostile to, 88,
93 ; Gibraltar experiment, 96 ; mer-
chant captains won over, 96 ; the
headquarters and staff, 103 ; details
of operation, 103, 108 ; routing of
the convoys, 110, 116 ; actual con-
voys described, 117 ; success of
system, 136; relative parts taken by
Great Britain and the United States,
138 ; most important agency in
winning the war, 141
Conyngham, in first American destroyer
contingent, 42 ; with convoy, 122,
124 ; destroys submarine, 125
Copeland, D. G., great work in con-
nection with air service, 285
Corfu, subchaser base established at,
182 ; detachment performing excel-
lent service, 194
Cork, American destroyer officers make
state visit to, 48 ; sailors not per-
mitted to visit, 71
Gotten, Capt. Lyman A., with sub-
chasers, arrives at Plymouth, 177 ;
work in training subchaser crews,
178 ; commanding subchaser squad-
rons, 182
Craven, Capt. T. T., great service in
aviation, 283
Crenshaw, Capt. Arthur, good work in
convoying subchasers, 178
Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue torpedoed
by [7-29, 84, 174
Cronan, Capt. William P., work in
training subchaser crews, 178
Cumberland, escorting convoy, 119, 123
Cunningham, Major A. A., command-
ing Marine Corps aviation in Nor-
thern Bombing Group, 285
Cashing, at Queenstown, 139 ; deceived
by" mystery ship," 147
Danae, attempt to torpedo, 128
Daniels, Secretary of War, instructs
Adm. Sims to sail for England, 1
Dartmouth, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Davis, in first American destroyer con-
tingent, 42
Dayison, Trubee, organizer Yale avia-
tion unit, recommended for Distin-
guished Service Medal, 282
De Bon, Vice-Adm., Chief of French
Naval Staff, 221
De Steigner, Capt. L. R., with the
Grand Fleet, 303
Decatur, at Gibraltar, 135
Defrees, Capt. Joseph H., work on
listening devices, 178
Delaware, on duty with Grand Fleet,
303
Depth charge, origin of, 78 ; effects of
on submarines, 79
Destroyers, scarcity of in British navy,
28 ; a new type of war vessel, their
history, 75 ; size and armament,
76 ; high efficiency, 76 ; how sub-
marines are attacked, 82 ; use of in
convoying merchant vessels, 95
Destroyers, American, arrive in Queens-
town, 40 ; copy of sailing orders, 43 ;
compared with British, 48 ; why
placed under British Admiral at
Queenstown, 61 ; number of at
Queenstown, 63 ; enthusiasm of
British public on arrival, 63 ; " the
return of the Mayflower," 64 ; in
action, 99 ; duties of, 101
Deutschland, " merchant " submarine,
visits Newport News, 266
Di Revel, Vice-Adm., Italian Member
Allied Naval Council, 222
Dortch, Lt.-Commr. I. F., highly com-
mended, 139
Draylon, highly commended, 139
Duff, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander L., in
charge of convoy system, 103
Duncan, American destroyer.at Queens-
town, 57
Dunlap, Col. R. H., at London head-
quarters, 215
Dunraven, mystery ship, heroism of
captain and crew, 157 ; given Vic-
toria Cross, 163, 164
Durazzo, bombardment of, 199
Earle, Rear-Adm., in charge of design
of mobile railway batteries for
Western Front, 290
Edwards, Lt.-Commr. W. A., at Lon-
don headquarters, 212, 214 ; com-
mands Yale aviation unit, 283 ;
succeeds Capt. Cone in charge of
aviation section, 285
Evans, Capt. E. R. G. R., British liaison
officer with American destroyers, 44 ;
exploit as commander of destroyer
Broke, 61
Evans, Capt. F. T., in command of
U.S. aviation centre at Pauillac,
France, 284
Fairfield, Commr. Arthur P., with first
American destroyer contingent, 42 ;
highly commended, 139
Fanning, captures crew of submarine,
129
Farquhar, Lt.-Commr., highly com-
mended, 139
Fenian Ram, Holland's submarine, 227
Fighting submarines from the air, 275
Fisher, Adm. Sir John, in charge of de-
partment for investigating anti-
submarine devices, 8 ; tells of Ameri-
can-built submarines, first to cross
Atlantic, 266
Fletcher, Rear-Adm. Wm. B., com-
manding Brest naval base, 300
Florida, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Foster, Arnold-, on building of sub-
marines, 228
Fullinwider, Commr. S. P., efforts in
perfection of new submarine mine,
250
Fulton, Robert, efforts in developing
the submarine, 226
INDEX
349
Funakoshi, Rear-Adm., Japanese mem-
ber Allied Naval Council, 222
Purer, Commr. Julius A., work in de-
velopment of subchasers, 175
Gannon, Capt. Sinclair, with mine-
laying squadron, 204
Gates, Lt.-Commr. A. L., exploits at
Dunkirk, 288
Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the
Admiralty, 219
George, King, meeting with, 9 ; popu-
lar with American sailors, 67
George, Lloyd, optimistic regarding
submarine situation, 10 ; on convoy
system, 95
German interned ships converted into
transports, 301
Gibraltar, co-operation of American
navy with British in operations at,
134
Gillmor, R. E., volunteers services at
London headquarters, 206
Gleaves, Rear-Adm. Albert, organiza-
tion for transport fleet, 301
Glinder, Franz, drowned when crew
surrendered to Fanning, 134 ; buried
with honours of war, 134
Good, P. F., volunteers services at
London headquarters, 206
Goschen, Viscount, deemed submarine
useless, 227
Graham, Capt. S. V., good work in
convoying subchasers, 178
Grand Fleet, British, protected by
destroyers, 73 ; immune from tor-
pedo attack, 85
Greenslade, Capt. J. \V., with mine-
laying squadron, 264
Hammon, Ensign C. H., exploit at
Pola, 287
Hanrahan, Commr. David C., highly
commended, 139; commanding Amer-
ican mystery ship Sanlee, 166 ;
in command of Northern Bombing
Group, 285
Harwell, Elxer, jumps overboard from
Fanning to save drowning German
from crew of submarine, 134
Helfferich, Dr. Karl, on effectiveness
of the submarine, 14
Henry, Lt. Walter S., on Fanning, 130
Hepburn, Capt. Arthur J., work in
training subchaser crews, 178 ; com-
manding squadron of subchasers,
reaches Queenstown, 203
Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir, torpedoed
by L7-29, 84, 174
Holland, John P., designer of the
modern submarine, 227
Hope, Rear-Adm., receives Adm. Sims
on arrival, 2
Hospital ships, torpedoing of, 29
Housalonic, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Howard, Lt.-Commr. D. L., highly
commended, 139
Hughes, Capt. C. F., with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Inventions, anti-submarine, search for,
8
Inverness and Invergordon, mine-
assembly bases at, 256
Ives, Ensign Paul F., drops a " dud "
on deck of submarine, 286
Jacob Jones, torpedoed by U-53, 107 ;
highly commended, 139
Jacoby, Ensign Maclair, at bombard-
ment of Durazzo, 201
Jellicoe, Adm., character and abilities,
5 ; statement of tonnage lost to
submarines, 6 ; in conference with,
8 ; wounded in Boxer Rebellion,
43 ; letter of welcome to Commr.
Taussig, 44 ; difficulty in having
convoy system adopted, 89, 95 ;
presides over Allied Naval Council,
219
Jessop, Capt. E. P., good work in con-
voying subchasers, 178
Johnson, Cqmmr. Alfred W., with
first American destroyer contingent,
Johnson, Capt. T. L., with mine-laying
squadron, 264
Juslicia, torpedoing of, 114 ; tor-
pedoing announced as that of
Leviathan by German Admiralty, 314
Kelly, Commodore, in bombardment
of Durazzo, 198 ; congratulates
subchasers in this action, 203
Kennedy, Ensign S. C., record seaplane
night, 278
Keyes, Ensign K. B., extracts from
seaplane llight report, 278
Keys, Adm. Sir Roger, reconstructs
submarine barrage, 20
Killingholme, England, U.S. air
station at. 278, 284
Kittredge, T. B., volunteers service at
London headquarters, 206
Knox, Capt. D. W., at London head-
quarters, 215
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, converted into
transport, 301
Lacaze, Adm., French Minister of
Marine, 221
Leigh, Capt. Richard H., experiments
with listening devices, 172 ; sent to
Italy to construct subchaser base,
182 ; at London headquarters, 212,
214
Libbey, Commr. Miles A., work in per-
fection of listening devices, 178
Listening devices, development of , 171 ;
especially advantageous on sub-
chaser, 178 ; method of operation
on subchasers, 184 ; of great value
in the Otranto barrage, 196 ; tube
climbed by submarine survivor, 197
Little, Col. L. McC., at London head-
quarters, 215
London headquarters, 204, 210 ; dif-
ferent departments of, 212 ; work
of the Planning Section, 215
Long, Capt. A. T., commanding the
Nevada, 305
Long, Capt. Byron A., at headquarters
of convoy system, 103 ; at London
headquarters, 212, 214 ; routing
American troops to France, 300
Loomis, Coxswain David D., lookout
on Fanning when submarine crew
was captured, 129
Lord Mayor of Cork, welcomes Ameri-
cans at Queenstown, 45
Lowestoft, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Luckenback, shelled by submarine, 123
Ludlow, Ensign G. H., wounded,
rescued from water, 287
Lydonia, assists in sinking submarine,
136
Lyons, Lt.-Commr. D., highly com-
mended, 139
350
INDEX
MacDonnell, Lt. - Commr. E. O., in
chaise of flying Caproni bombers
from Italy to" Flanders, 285
MacDougall, Capt. W. D., at London
headquarters, 204
McBride, Capt. L. B., at London head-
quarters, 212, 214
McCalla, Capi.., meets Adm. Jellicoe in
China, 44
McCormick, E. H., volunteers services
at London headquarters, 206
McCullough, Commr. Richard P.,
recommended for decoration, 136
McDougal, in first American destroyer
contingent, 42 ; highly commended,
139
McDowell, Commr. Clyde S., work on
listening devices, 178
McGrann, Commr. W. H., at London
headquarters, 212
McNamee, Capt. L., at London head-
quarters, 215
McVay, Capt. C. B., commanding the
Oklahoma, 305
Magruder, Rear- Adm. T. P., good work
in convoying subchasers, 178
Mannix, Commr. D. Pratt, with mine-
laying squadron, 264
Marshall, Capt. A. W., with mine-
laying squadron, 264
Mary Rose, welcomes American des-
troyers at Queenstown, 41
Massachusetts, converted as mine-layer,
254
Melville, " Mother Ship " of the des-
troyers at Queenstown, 58, 62
Millard, H., volunteers services at
London headquarters, 206
Milner, Lord, on convoy system, 95
Mine barrage, at first not effective
against submarines, 20, 24
Mine barrage in North Sea, American,
245 ; immensity of, 252 ; how laid,
257
Mine laying by German submarines,
51,273,274
Mines, Americans perfect new type,
250 ; immense organization of supply
and transport, 252
Moewe, commerce raider, 95
Murfin, Capt. Orin G., designer and
builder of mine-assembly bases in
Scotland, 256
Mystery ships, greatly aid in com-
bating the submarine, 103 ; ac-
companying convoy, 118 ; method
of operating, 118 ; operations of,
142 ; technique, 148 ; difficulty of
identifying, 151 ; number in opera-
tion, 152 ; heroic fight of the Dun-
raoen, 157 ; exploit of Prize, 165 ;
American ship Santee, 166 ; Stock-
force destroys submarine, 183
Nautilus, submarine of Robert Fulton,
226
Naval guns, German, bombarding
Dunkirk and Paris, 290
Naval guns, U.S., used on the Western
Front, 289
Nelson, Capt. C. P., good work in con-
voying subchasers, 178 ; command-
ing subchaser squadrons at Corfu,
194 ; in bombardment of Durazzo,
199, 200
Neptune attacked by C7-29, 84, 85
Nevada, guarding transports, 304
New York, on duty with Grand Fleet,
303
Niblack, Rear-Adm. Albert P., com-
manding forces at Gibraltar, 134:
asks that subchasers be sent to
Gibraltar, 195
Nicholson, in submarine chase, 123 ;
on convoy duty, 129 ; assists Fan-
ning in capture of submarine and
crew, 130 ; highly commended, 139
Noma, goes to relief of sinking mystery
ship Dunraven, 163
Northern Bombing Group, established,
284, 285
O'Brien, highly commended, 163
Oil, scarcity of, for Great Britain's
fleet, 34 "
Oklahoma, guarding transports, 305
Orama, torpedoed, 125
Ostend, bombing of submarine base
at, 285
Otranto barrage, the, 181, 195
Page, Ambassador Walter Hines, asks
that high naval representative be
sent to England, 1 ; states that
England faces defeat by submarines,
8 ; on critical submarine situation,
38 ; advised of submarine peril,
52 ; a tower of strength, 207
Pargust, " mystery ship," destroys
submarine, 147
Parker, in hunt for submarine, 119 ;
highly commended, 139 ; support-
ing ship for subchasers at Plymouth,
182 ; seriously damages the C7-53, 189
Pauillac, France, U.S. aviation centre
at, 284
Pennsylvania, transmits mobilization
orders to destroyer division, 42
Pershing, Gen., request for naval
guns at St. Nazaire, 290 ; report of
their skilful use, 293
Pescara, Italy, U.S. seaplane station
at, 284
Pisa, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Pitt, William, early opinion of the sub-
marine, 226
Planning Section at London head-
quarters, 215
Pleadwell, Capt. F. L., at London head-
quarters, 212
Plunkett, Adm. Charles P., command-
ing naval guns on Western Front,
289 ; aids in designing mobile rail-
way batteries, 290
Plymouth, subchaser base at, 182
Pocahonlas, converted from German
liner to transport, 302
Porter, in first American destroyer con-
tingent, 42
Porto Corsini, Italy, U.S. seaplane
station at, 284
Poteet, Lt.-Commr. Fred H., with first
American destroyer contingent, 42
Potter, Ensign Stephen, fight with
enemy seaplane, 288
Powell, Lt.-Commr. Halsey, of de-
stroyer Parker, 119 ; highly com-
mended, 139
Princess Irene, converted into trans-
port, 302
Pringle, Capt. J. R. P., at Queenstown,
58 ; commended by Adm. Bayly,
139
Prize, mystery ship, damages sub-
marine and captures captain and
two of crew, 165
Q-ships, see Mystery ships
INDEX
351
Queenstown, a destroyer base, 32 ;
arrival of first American destroyers,
40 ; officially welcomes the Ameri-
cans, 45
Quinnebaug, mine-layer, 254, 264
Rent, in westbound convoy, 129
Reynolds, Commr. W. H. f with mine-
laying squadron, 264
Rhein, converted into transport, 302
Richardson, R. M. D., volunteers ser-
vices at London headquarters, 206
Roanoke, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Roberts. Lady, requests Adm. Sims
to call, 66
Robison, Rear-Adm. S. S., work on
listening devices, 178
Rodgers, Rear-Adm. Thomas S., com-
manding Dreadnought division in
Bantry Bay, 305
Rodman, Adm. Hugh, commanding
American squadron with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Rose, Hans, humane commander of
the C7-53, 106 ; Allied forces am-
bitious to capture, 189 ; not on
C7-53 when depth charged, 190 ;
visits Newport, and sinks merchant-
men off Nantucket, 266
Royal Family, interested in American
sailors, 67
Sacramento, at Gibraltar, 134
San Diego, sunk by mine off Fire Island,
274
San Francisco, converted as mine-layer,
252, 264
San Giorgio, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Son Marco, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Sanders, Lt. William, commanding
mystery ship Prize, 165 ; awarded
Victoria Cross, 165
Santa Maria, compared in size to
modern destroyer, 76
Santee, U.S. mystery ship, 150, 166
Saranac, mine-layer, 254, 264
Scales, Capt. A. H., with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Schieffelin, Lt. John J., recommended
for Distinguished Service Medal, 277
Schofield, Capt. Frank H., work on
listening devices, 178 ; at London
headquarters, 215
Schuyler, Commr. G. L., at London
headquarters, 212
Schwab, Charles M., fabricates sub-
marines for the Allies, 266
Seaplane base at Killingholme, Eng-
land, taken over by U.S., 278
Seaplane stations of U.S. forces in
Europe, 284
Sexton, Capt. W. R., at London head-
quarters, 212
Shawmut, mine-layer, 254, 264
Sims, Adm., ordered to England, 1 ;
notifies Washington that war is being
lost, 33 ; of the oil scarcity, 34 ;
favours using U.S. naval forces in
conjunction with Allies, 35 ; first
report of critical submarine situa-
tion, 37 ; extent of duties in Euro-
pean waters, 62 ; significance of the
Guildhall speech, 65 ; reception ac-
corded by British people, 66 ; meets
Lady Roberts, 66 ; first foreign naral
officer to command British forces in
war, 68 ; works for adoption of con-
voy system, 93, 95 ; congratulates
officers and men of Fanning on cap-
ture of submarine and crew, 134 ;
has difficulty in identifying a " mys-
tery ship," 151 ; letter to Capt.
Campbell on Dunraven exploit,
164 ; warns Navy Department or
German submarines visiting U.S.
coast, 267
Sinn Fein, controversy with American
sailors, 69 ; in league with Germany,
Smith, Capt. S. F., at London head-
quarters, 212
Sparrow, Capt. H. G., good work in
convoying subchasers, 178
Stark, Commr. Harold R., brings small
destroyers from Manila to Gibraltar,
135 ; at London headquarters, 212
Stearns, Capt. C. D., with mine-laying
squadron. 264
Sterrett, highly commended, 139
Stevens, L. S., volunteers services at
London headquarters, 206
Slockforce, mystery ship, destroys sub-
marine, 183
Stockton, G. B., volunteers services at
London headquarters, 206
Strauss, Rear-Adm. Joseph, in com-
mand of U.S. mine-laying operations.
257
Subchasers, number built and bases
used, 168 ; mobilized at New London,
Conn., 173 ; great numbers ordered
by Great Britain and France, 174,
179 ; hardships of the new crews,
176 ; trip from New London to
Corfu, 195 ; an influence in the
breakdown of Austria, 196 ; in
attack on Durazzo, 198 ; con-
gratulated on exploits of Durazzo
by British Commodore and Italian
Naval General Staff, 203
Submarine against submarine, 224 ;
method of attack, 233
Submarine sinkings, gravity of, con-
cealed by British, 2, 6 ; losses of
shipping, 51, 141
Submarines, American built, first to
cross Atlantic, 267 ; really sub-
mersible surface ships, 229 ; how
operated, 229 ; an American inven-
tion, 225
Submarines, American, their part in
the war, 224 ; attacked by des-
troyers through error, 236 ; the base
at Berehaven, 238 ; witnesses U-
boat destroy itself, 239
Submarines, British, the H-, E-, and
K-boats, 224 ; destroy a U-boat, 238
Submarines, enemy, winning the war,
4, 7 ; number of, destroyed, 7 ;
officers exaggerate sinkings, 13 ;
difficulty of blockading the United
States, 17 ; cruising period de-
pendent upon supply of torpedoes,
19 ; mines and nets not effective
against, 19 ; number operating
simultaneously, 20, 21,31 ; erroneous
impression as to numbers operating,
20 ; every movement charted by
Allies, 21, 271, 273 ; three different
types of, 22 ; plans to pen in the
bases, 23 ; playing hide and seek
with destroyers, 33 ; on American
coast, 36, 266 ; amount of shipping
destroyed, 51 ; how attacked by
destroyer, 82 ; method of attack
on battleships, 84 ; operating on
American coast impracticable, 91 ;
individual locations and movements
352
INDEX
plotted each day, 104 ; destroyed by
depth charges, 126, 128, 130. 136 ;
decoying by " mystery ship, 142,
183 ; not taken seriously until after
Weddingen's exploit, 174 ; concen-
trated in enclosed waters, 180 ; the
Otranto barrage, 181 ; sinkings pre-
vented by subchasers, 183 ; now
located by listening devices, 184 ;
17-53 seriously damaged by destroyer
Parker, 189 ; suicide of entire crew
of a depth charged submarine, 193 ;
two submarines sunk by subchasers
in bombardment of Durazzo, 202 ;
Germans have difficulty in reaching
home after Austrian surrender,
203 ; number destroyed by Allies
and how, 224 ; U-boat destroys
itself, 239 ; the cruiser submarines,
240 ; -their various bases, 244 ;
effectiveness of American North Sea
mine barrage, 245 ; lay mines on
American coast, 273, 274 ; aircraft
an important factor against, 275 ;
number sunk about British Isles,
296 ; forced to choose between
transports and merchantmen, 306
Surveyor, yacht, assists in sinking sub-
marine, 136
Surveyor, merchantmen torpedoed
while being convoyed, 136
Susquehanna, converted from German
liner to transport, 302
Swasey, A. Loring, services in design-
ing of subchasers, 175
Taussig, Commr. Joseph K., in charge j
of first American destroyer con-
tingent, 42 ; copy of sailing orders,
42 ; previous record, 43 ; welcoming
letters from Admirals Jellicoe and
Bayly, 44, 45 ; reports to Vice-
Adm. Bayly at Queenstown, 46 ;
highly commended, 139
Taylor, Capt. M. M., with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Texas, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Thompson, Commr. Edgar, at London
headquarters, 212
Thomson, Commr. T. A., at London
headquarters, 212
Tobey, Capt. E. C., at London head-
quarters, 212, 214
Tomb, Capt. J. Harvey, with mine-
laying squadron, 264
Tompkins, Capt. John T., work in
organization of subchaser fleet, 178
Torpedo, track or wake made by, 81 ;
effective range of, 83 ; duration of
submarine's voyage dependent on
number carried, 19 ; supply limited,
26 ; cost of, 77
Torpedo-boat, invention of, 76
Tozer, Capt. C. M., good work in con-
voying subchasers, 178
Transporting armies to France, 294 ;
nationality of ships and percentage
carried, 302
Turtle, first submarine, 225
Twining, Capt. N. C., at London head-
quarters, 212, 213
U-29, torpedoes Hague, Cressy and
Aboukir, and is later sunk by Dread-
nought, 84, 85
17-53, operates off American coast,
106 ; torpedoes the Jacob Jones,
107 ; seriously damaged by depth
charges, 188; surrendered after
armistice, 190 ; after visiting New-
port, R.I., sinks several merchant-
men, 266
[7-58 depth charged and crew captured
by Fanning and Nicholson, 131
C7-151, lays mines off American coast,
273
17-156, lays mines off American coast,
274
C7C-56, practically destroyed by depth
charge from Chrislabel, 128
Ulali, guarding transports, 305
Vaterland, converted into transport,
301
Vauclain, Samuel M., great help in
turning out mobile railway batteries,
290
Venetia, assists in sinking submarine,
136 ; seriously damages another, 136
Voysey, Miss, niece of Vice-Adm.
Bayly, and charming hostess, 59
Wadsworth, in first American destroyer
contingent, 42 ; highly commended,
Wainwright, in first American des-
troyer contingent, 42
Washington, Capt. Thomas, with the
Grand Fleei, 303
Weatherhead, Ensign C. H., makes
record seaplane flight, 278
Weddingen, Commr. Otto, torpedoes
Hague, Cressy and Aboukir, and is in
turn sunk by battleship Dreadnought,
84, 174
Welshman, narrow escape from being
torpedoed, 130, 133
Wegmouth, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Wheeling, depth charges submarine, 136
White, Sir William, on the submarine,
225
Whiting, Commr. Kenneth, great
service in aviation, 283
Wiley, Capt. H. A., with the Grand
Fleet, 303
Wilhelm, Kaiser, on effectiveness of the
submarine, 13
Wilkes, on submarine hunt with Parker,
189
Williams, Lt. -Commr. Roger, at
Queenstown, 57
Wilson, Rear-Adm. Henry B., com-
mander of forces at Gibraltar, 134 ;
at Brest, 134 ; commanding Brest
naval base, 300
Wireless telegraphy, of the submarines
and destroyers, 100 ; messages
reveal locations of submarines, 105
Wortman, Lieut.-Commr. Ward K.,
with first American destroyer con-
tingent, 42
Wyoming', on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Y-euns, or howitzers, for hurling
depth charges, 79
Yachts, good service on French coast,
301
Yale aviation unit, organization of,
282 ; renders great service, 283
Yarnell, Capt. H. E., at London head-
quarters, 215
Zeebrugge, bombing of submarine base
at, 285
Zigzagging, efficacious protection
against submarines, 87, 120
Zogbaum, Lt. - Commr. Rufus F.,
with first American destroyer con-
tingent, 42
-J
A 000 684 342 9
This label most not be removed from this book, nor the
figures thereon altered.
For use when
Itiued a*
an extra.