Description

First published in 1990. The aim of this thesis is to show that the way to understand the central claims of Kant’s ethics is to accept the idea that morality is a distinctive form of rationality; that the moral "ought" belongs to a system of imperatives based in practical reason; and that moral judgment, therefore, is a species of rational assessment of agents’ actions. It argues, in effect, that you cannot understand Kant’s views about morality if you read him with Humean assumptions about rationality. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy.

About the Series

This set reissues 6 books on the German philosopher Immanuel Kant originally published between 1938 and 1990. The volumes examine Kant’s most well-known essays, including the Critique of Pure Reason, and attempt to explain Kant’s arguments by expressing them in a more modern idiom. This set will be of particular interest to students of philosophy.