John F. Kennedy Administration:
Memorandum on Implications of
U.S. Security Assurances to Israel

(August 7, 1963)

This is a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of
Defense McNamara addressing the question of a U.S. security assurance
to Israel.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA), I-25160/63, dated 17 July 1963,subject as above. Because
of the interrelationships in the several questions posed in the letter
by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, dated 15 May 1963,1 the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have been developed to address the central issue of US assurances to Israel
touching on the points raised in the letter while discussing that issue.

2. Joint planning with the Israeli military staffs would facilitate
early entry of US forces into the area and coordination of operations
in the event of a US decision to intervene militarily on the side of
Israel. However, such planning is not essential to assist Israel effectively
in resisting Arab aggression. At the present time, it is estimated that
the Israeli forces have the capability of defeating aggression by any
combination of Arab states which might oppose them. Israel is vulnerable
to air attack due to the proximity of Arab airfields and the short warning
time available. Therefore, the most effective military support which
US forces could provide to Israel in the event of Arab aggression would
be to attack the facilities from which Arab air attacks might be launched.
Similar considerations would apply in the future should the United Arab
Republic attain an operational surface-to-surface missile capability.
Coordination of US air strikes with those of the Israeli air forces
can be undertaken rapidly even in the absence of advance bilateral planning.
Coordination of ground force operations would be more difficult; however,
the qualitative superiority of Israeli ground forces not only reduces
the necessity for advance bilateral planning, but also makes it doubtful
that intervention with US ground forces on the side of the Israelis
would be required at any point to prevent significant loss of Israeli
territory. Should they be required, however, US ground forces and/or
amphibious elements could be introduced into the Middle East area within
approximately 30 hours.

3. US contingency plans are in being which provide for military operations
incident to the Arab-Israeli situation ranging from a show of force,
through naval blockade and counter air operations, to amphibious and
airborne assault. These plans are adaptable not only to the support
of either side against the other as an aggressor, but also to the support
of a United Nations or other combined effort to enforce a halt in hostilities.
In addition, US-UK military studies for Arab-Israeli contingencies have
been prepared which could form the basis for coordinated military operations.
Depending on the degree of advance warning, US air and naval forces
could undertake counter air operations almost immediately, and in any
case within 72 hours of order of execution. However, the Egyptian Air
Force has the capability to carry out a damaging surprise air attack
against Israel provided the Egyptian air staff could plan and initiate
such a move without Israeli detection. Joint US-Israeli military planning
would not degrade this Egyptian capability except for any possible deterrent
effect that knowledge of such planning might have. However, acquisition
of Hawk missiles from the United States beginning in FY 1965 will increase
Israeli capability to withstand such attack.

4. US security interests in the Middle East are primarily to maintain
access to the area, insure the availability of Middle East oil to Western
Europe on acceptable terms, and generally to promote stability in the
area. The main threat to these interests comes from attempted communist
penetration of the area. If the United States accedes to Israeli pressures,
the Arab states would probably turn increasingly to the Soviet Union
for support, thus reversing recent favorable trends in the Middle East,
particularly in Iraq. On the other hand, there is considerable sympathy
for Israel in the United States. In these circumstances and in consideration
of the military factors involved, US assurances to either party in the
Arab-Israeli dispute should not be given beyond those contained in the
statement of the President at his press conference on 8 May 1963. Additionally,
the President's statement acts as a deterrent, while giving assurance,
to both parties.

5. US capabilities to come to their assistance should be well known
to the Israelis. Also, Israel has been able to fill most of her weapons
requirements from Western European sources. Therefore, Israeli pressures
on the United States are most probably politically motivated. In this
connection, Israeli dissatisfaction with the public assurance given
in the President's statement of 8 May could stem in part from recognition
of the warning implied therein against Israeli aggression. Israel has
demonstrated an ability to protect classified information. However,
if the foregoing speculation on Israeli motives is correct, it could
be part of the Israeli design to leak information to the Arabs on the
nature and extent of joint planning. To this extent, therefore, such
planning with Israel does entail a security risk.

6. Should there be overriding political reasons for continuing discussions
with Israel of US security assurances and military support, it is recommended
that they be conducted as political discussions in order to avoid any
connotation of joint military planning against the Arabs. In such discussions,
the United States could provide the Israeli side with the US estimate
of Arab capabilities and generalized information on US capabilities
to assist in the event of Arab aggression, emphasizing the US intention
to act in the first instance in support of UN efforts to prevent or
halt the aggression. In return, the United States should receive more
information on Israeli plans for force development, and assurances that,
in the event of political turmoil in neighboring Arab states, Israel
would not seize the west bank of the Jordan or undertake other pre-emptive
action without prior consultation with the United States.

7. In lieu of involvement on a military level with either side, the
United States should continue efforts to impress both sides with the
futility of seeking military solutions to their differences. Although
final settlement of the major issues is not foreseeable in the near
future, the United States should continue to promote negotiated settlement
of lesser issues on a piecemeal basis. In particular, the Arab refugee
problem should be susceptible to US leverage in view of US financial
support to the UN Relief and Works Agency.

8. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. No US security assurance to Israel be given beyond that enunciated
by the President on 8 May 1963.
b. Joint contingency planning with Israel not be undertaken.
c. Present US arms policy in the Middle East be continued.
d. The United States continue to seek peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli
issues on a piecemeal basis.