[Editor's note: Please Contact Barbara Atkinson, KU Med's
Executive Vice Chancellor, and tell her that what KU Med is doing to
primates is wrong and to stop wasting our tax money on cruelty and
fraudulent science! She is at (913) 588-1440 and BATKINSON@kumc.edu.

AND

Contact Francis Collins, Director of the National
Institute of Health (KU Med's source of funding) at 301-496-2433 and
francis.collins@nih.gov and tell him to
stop providing public monies to a 'research facility' that was cited for
160 violations of animal welfare laws by the USDA!]

Here is the local media's take on the situation (note that KCTV 5
mistakenly stated that KU Med vivisects chimps. Their victims are
actually macaques and squirrel monkeys):

With respect to the University of Kansas Medical Center's statement
in the KCTV 5 news clip, 'Center officials said they have fixed the
problems, but none of the issues dealt with animal welfare,' it is an
utter fabrication. The University of Kansas Medical Center has blatantly
lied to the media and to the public (who is funding their abject animal
cruelty with millions of tax dollars) throughout our campaign to shut
down their primate vivisection program.

Sorry for the delayed response, but I've been preoccupied
with other animal defense issues.

In light of this 12/31/09 article from the Kansas City
Star, I fully understand why you would deny our request to observe and
document the 'ethical research' funded by our tax money and why you
would also bar the media from entry to your laboratories.

As I'm sure you are aware, Mara Rose Williams of the Star
wrote:

USDA cites KU Medical Center for violation of animal
protection laws

'The University of Kansas Medical Center has been cited
for about 160 violations of federal animal protection laws during
experiments at university laboratories'.

'.The USDA report describes how monkeys that were
afflicted with an infectious disease were left to suffer from extreme
weight loss, vomiting, diarrhea and neurological disorders for at least
a day after they met criteria for euthanization. The monkeys were part
of a study funded by the National Institutes of Health.

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals has called
for the NIH to take back federal grant dollars awarded to KU Medical
Center for that research in which the violations occurred'''

According to the annual report filed with the USDA by the
University of Kansas Medical Center, this facility experiments on and/or
holds captive about 150 primates per year, a relatively small amount.
The report which contains this statistic is a bland one page document
which belies the cruel reality that it represents.

A cross-section of the lives of these animals is
represented by a stack of documents which is just over a foot tall. The
existence of these highly intelligent animals has been reduced to so
much paper and ink. Their identities represented only by numbers, their
passing marked only by the word 'euthanized.'

The University of Kansas Medical Center has become known
for violating the Animal Welfare Act. In fact, recent inspections for
the period from September 2007 to June of 2009 catalogue 58 pages of
violations, many of which involve primates and their deaths. The USDA
inspectors who wrote these documents uncovered heinous acts of cruelty
which prolonged the pain these animals endured. One monkey was allowed
to deteriorate so severely that his/her weight dropped by 26.8%, or just
over '. Another primate, whose skull had been opened to have a recording
chamber put into place, did not receive anything close to adequate
treatment. These recording chambers can harbor serious bacterial
infections which can lead to brain abscesses, and so they are supposed
to be cleaned regularly. The chamber of one animal at this facility had
not been cleaned for three weeks. It is amazing that s/he was still
alive.

Another monkey who died during 2008, #0A0, lost 22% of
his body weight, which should have been sufficient to qualify for
euthanasia. However, the suffering of this animal was allowed to
continue. The USDA report states: 'He was sitting curled up on his perch
while I was hosing his cage and would make a screeching sound. I gave
him a cereal bar, but he was having difficulty picking it up'.

On Thursday, September 2, the issue of the vivisectors' TRO's against
me was meant to be laid to rest.

However, the three vivisectors, who were previously unrepresented,
arrived with an attorney, Tim Keck. He advised David Bell, my attorney,
that he had several witnesses to attest to the stalking allegations in
the TRO's.

I have posted David Bell's well-constructed and powerful argument,
which he has filed with the court as a brief, below. As you will read,
our position is that none of the allegations in the TRO rise to the
level of 'stalking' (and some are false) and that the TRO is an
infringement on my First Amendment rights.

Since David was not apprised of the witnesses in advance, Judge
Phelan agreed to continue the hearing until 11/30 at 9AM. Due to the
highly contentious and complex nature of this situation, he has set
aside an entire day for this hearing.

Most TRO hearings are over in about 5 minutes and a vast percentage
of them pertain to domestic violence situations. This is a significant
battle for Constitutional rights and the ability of social justice
activists to exercise their First Amendment rights.

Here is David's
argument, which is long but so powerful that it is well worth the read:

RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTIONS AND SUPPORT IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR ORDER OF PROTECTION

COMES NOW Jason Miller (hereinafter 'Respondent') by and through
counsel, and hereby submits suggestions and support in opposition to
Petitioners' Request for Order of Protection filed against him pursuant
to K.S.A. 60-31a01, et. seq.

ARGUMENT

Respondent's alleged conduct is protected under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the state of
Kansas through the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore any action
brought pursuant to K.S.A. 60-31a01, et. seq., is barred.

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, provides that 'Congress shall make no law ' abridging the
freedom of speech.' Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (U.S. 2003).
The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in
ideas'' even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find
distasteful or discomforting. Id. The First Amendment affords protection
to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech. Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-405 (U.S. 1989). 'The First Amendment
protects [Respondent's] right not only to advocate their cause but also
to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so
doing.' Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (U.S. 1988). First Amendment
standards 'must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than
stifling speech.' Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (U.S.
2010). It is not acceptable for the state to prevent a speaker from
exercising his constitutional rights because of the reaction to him by
others. Beckerman v. Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502, 509 (5th Cir. Miss. 1981).

The Protection from Stalking Act was enacted in order to protect
victims of stalking and to facilitate access to judicial protection for
stalking victims. K.S.A. 60-31a01. As defined by the act, 'stalking'
means an intentional harassment of another person that places the other
person in reasonable fear for that person's safety; 'harassment' means a
knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person
that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and
that serves no legitimate purpose; and all constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.'
K.S.A. 60-31a02.

Three separate Petitions for Protection From Stalking Orders
('Petitions') were filed against Respondent pursuant to K.S.A. 60-31a01,
et. seq. Petitions were filed by (1) Dianne Durham, Ph. D, Kansas
University Medical Center, Otolaryngology Department, Director of
Research ('Durham Petition'); (2) Paul D. Cheney, Ph. D., Kansas
University Medical Center, Department of Molecular and Integrative
Physiology, Director of Research ('Cheney Petition') and (3) Navneet K.
Dhillon, Ph. D., Kansas University Medical Center, Post Graduate
Institute of Medical Education & Research ('Dhillon Petition').
Collectively, Petitions alleged that an order of protection is necessary
to protect from harassment by Respondent. Petitions also stated that
each individual feared for their safety.

Respondent is a known Animal Rights Activist. Approximately six
months prior to filing of the Petitions, Respondent learned through an
Animal Rights Organization called 'Stop Animal Exploitation Now' that
Kansas University Medical Center ('KUMC') was engaged in the practice of
conducting medical experiments on primates. Upon learning of said
experimentation, Respondent conducted his own investigation into the
policies of KUMC as it concerns the treatment of primates. Specifically,
Respondent learned of an article published in the Kansas City Star on
December 31, 2009, which stated that KUMC had been cited for 160
violations of federal animal protection laws during experiments at
university laboratories. The article quoted a USDA report which
described how monkeys that were afflicted with an infectious disease
were left to suffer from extreme weight loss, vomiting, diarrhea and
neurological disorders for at least a day after they met criteria for
euthanization. Upon further inquiry, Respondent became aware that a
federal grant had been awarded to KUMC and that grant monies were being
used for the research in which the violations had occurred.

Appalled by federal funding contributing to the unethical treatment
of animals at KUMC, Respondent engaged in a proactive, peaceable
campaign in order to make the public aware of such transgressions.
Respondent took numerous measures to bring the matter to the attention
of the public, and to voice his displeasure with KUMC's policies,
including, but not limited to: (1) organizing a protest at 39th Street
and State Line; (2) making numerous blog postings regarding KUMC's
unethical animal treatment; (3) visiting neighborhoods and businesses
surrounding KUMC to educate the public about KUMC's research policies;
(4) organizing a rally at 47th Street and Main Street; and (5) writing
President Barack Obama to voice his displeasure with KUMC's use of its
research grant.

Nevertheless, and despite Respondent's efforts, KUMC continued its
medical research practices. However, three KUMC employees filed
Petitions for Temporary Orders of Protection against Respondent. Durham
Petition alleged three incidents of stalking attributable to Respondent:
(1) a protest on a sidewalk outside of her home; (2) receiving
threatening voice mail messages on her office phone; and (3) posting of
the video of the protest outside her home on Respondent's website.
Cheney Petition alleged the following incidents of stalking: (1)
Respondent and associates came to his home and posted stickers with
messages such as 'Animal Murder;' (2) Respondent circulated fliers to
Petitioner's neighbors and outside KUMC condemning Petitioner's role in
animal research; (3) Respondent sent an email to Petitioner directing
him to Respondent's website; and (4) Petitioner received phone calls at
work and at home 'believed to be' connected to Respondent. Dhillon
Petition also alleged three incidents of stalking: (1) Petitioner
received an email from Respondent which described her as an 'animal
torturer;' (2) Petitioner was sent an email containing a link to
Respondent's website; and (3) fliers were distributed at KUMC condemning
the actions of Petitioner for her role in unethical animal research.

Respondent denies ever placing any telephone calls to any of
Petitioners. However, assuming arguendo the content of the Petitions to
be true, not only was the content of the Petitions insufficient to issue
a Temporary Order of Protection, but ordering the enforcement of
Petitions violated Respondent's First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.

Respondent's alleged conduct not only serves a legitimate purpose but
is also constitutionally protected activity, and therefore any order
issued pursuant to K.S.A. 60-31a01, et. seq., is barred. Respondent's
purpose in protesting outside homes of Petitioners, distributing
informational fliers regarding the nature of animal research occurring
at KUMC, and directing Petitioners to his website was to both educate
the public as to research tactics being used at KUMC and call for a
change of research tactics being used at publically-funded KUMC.

While there may be debate as to whether Respondent's tactics in
attempting to bring about policy change are effective, there is no
debate that Respondent is within his First Amendment rights to advocate
for his cause in the manner that he did. While a majority of people may
find his tactics discomforting, his expressive conduct is still
constitutionally protected. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358
(U.S. 2003). Respondent's actions were targeted and specific, and
evidenced a strategy to voice his concerns regarding KUMC in a manner
well within the law.

Petitioners are state employed medical researchers engaged in
conducting experiments upon primates. They no doubt have experienced
public outrage on other occasions, deserved or not, as a result of their
research methods. The article in the Kansas City Star citing 160 USDA
violations of the treatment of animals used for research initially
brought such transgressions to the public's attention. A reasonable
person in Petitioners position would expect to receive aggressive
criticism from many animal rights activists, considering past
demonstrations across the United States by animal rights advocates, and
the fact that public funds contributed to the research.

Durham Petition cites one instance of harassment being a
demonstration which was held by Respondent outside of Petitioner's home.
However, Petitioner was not even home during the time that the
demonstration was held, which took place outside her home and on a
public sidewalk. Additionally, peaceful picketing and protesting is not
considered harassment, but is expressive conduct constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d
685, 689 (8th Cir. Mo. 2008); See also Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192
F.3d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1999).

Furthermore, Petitioner's presence did not, and would not, matter to
Respondent. Respondent did not engage in the demonstration to harass or
torment petitioner, but instead to voice his displeasure with the State,
and the State's employees, regarding their treatment of animals, as is
his constitutional right. Furthermore, the posting of video of the
demonstration on Respondent's own personal website cannot be considered
stalking of Petitioner; Respondent did not even notify Petitioner that
such video was posted. It would vastly expand the definition of stalking
if posting of one's personal video, containing no footage of an alleged
stalking victim, on one's own personal website could be deemed to
qualify as an act of stalking within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-31a01, et.
seq.

Cheney Petition states that Respondent circulated fliers with
Petitioner's picture and messages such as 'animal murderer,' and sent
Petitioner an email directing Petitioner to Respondent's website. The
Court has continuously recognized the right of activists to spread their
message through distribution of informational documents. See Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 358 (U.S. 1997)('Leafletting and
commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that
lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is
at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a
traditional public forum.'). Additionally, speech that may be offensive
to one's audience is afforded protection under the First Amendment. See
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)('The right to free speech, of
course, includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their
views, and may not be curtailed simply because the speaker's message may
be offensive to his audience').

Factually speaking, Petitioner may be an 'animal murderer' in the
sense that, through the course of his employment by the State,
Petitioner does cause the death of countless animals. While Respondent's
choice of words may not have been extremely tactful, Respondent is again
within his First Amendment right to choose the manner in which he
advocates for his cause. As our society has become ever more fast-paced
and ever-changing, it sometimes takes an extreme and exaggerated
statement to get the public's attention. Respondent was simply trying to
advocate for his cause by drawing attention to KUMC's research policies
by using an attention-grabbing statement. Respondent's First Amendment
rights cannot be usurped simply because Petitioner takes offense to his
message. Additionally, simply making Petitioner aware of Respondent's
website is not an act of stalking, and Petitioner can exhibit free will
in choosing not to view the website which Respondent suggested.

The allegations contained in Dhillon Petition simply cannot support
an Order of Protection. Petitioner was sent two emails by Respondent.
Petitioner had the choice of whether to even view those emails in the
first place. Petitioner also cites the distribution of fliers at KUMC
condemning the institutions research methods. However, Petitioner simply
being aware of the fliers is once again unjustifiable to sustain an
Order of Protection.

In Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (U.S. 1994), a Florida
state court issued an injunction, applicable to antiabortion protesters,
which in part restricted the use of 'images observable' to clinic
patients. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that broad
prohibition on all 'images observable' burdens more speech than
necessary to achieve the purpose of limiting threats to clinic patients
or their families, as all would be necessary to avoid seeing the images
would be for the clinic to close its curtains. Id. at 73. Thus, the
Court held that the 'images observable' restriction violates the First
Amendment. Id.

Likewise, since Petitioner's only reported conduct is being made
aware, and ultimately viewing, images she finds offensive, an Order of
Protection in this case would operate much like an 'images observable'
restriction, which violates the First Amendment. Petitioner had the
option of whether to view the emails she received. Petitioner could
simply delete the email, thus 'closing the curtain' on any allegedly
offensive material. Such an act would sufficiently address the situation
without unnecessarily burdening Respondent's First Amendment rights.

Additionally, Petitioners state that they fear for their safety.
However, none of Petitioners have ever had physical contact with
Respondent. Respondent has never physically threatened Petitioners,
either in person, by computer message, or by phone message. Once again,
Respondent denies ever making any telephone calls to Petitioners' home
or place of employment.

Petitioners in this case are state employees attempting to use an
order, which is meant to protect innocent people from dangerous and
violent offenders, to stifle criticism of their state-endorsed animal
research methods. Respondent's alleged conduct is protected under the
First Amendment. Respondent was simply advocating for policy change in
as lawful and peaceable way as he knew, and so as to draw attention to
his cause. No doubt this is a delicate balance to strike. However, when
there is doubt as to whether speech is protected under the First
Amendment, the benefit of the doubt must be given to protecting speech
rather than stifling it. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(U.S. 2010). Here, benefit of the doubt must be given to protect
Respondent's First Amendment rights, especially since an order under
K.S.A. 60-31a01, et. seq., could have criminal consequences for
Respondent.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully
prays that the Court deny Petitioners Request for an Order of Protection
against him, and for such other and further relief that the Court deems
just and proper upon these premises.