Note: Nearly 12,100 persons are eligible to
practice law in Oregon. Some of them share the same
name or similar names. All discipline reports should
be read carefully for names, addresses and bar numbers.

Baldwin undertook to represent a client in a dissolution
of marriage proceeding. At the time Baldwin was having
a personal and sexual relationship with the client.
Baldwin informed his client that because of their personal
relationship he would not be able to represent her
if the dissolution of marriage proceeding went to trial.
That conversation did not constitute full disclosure
as Baldwin did not fully explain to his client the
potential adverse impact to her of having him represent
her, did not recommend that she seek independent legal
advice to determine if she should give consent and
did not otherwise satisfy the requirements of DR 10-101(B)(2).

GARY L. HILL
OSB #74140
Roseburg
30-day suspension

On Dec. 26, 2003, the Oregon Supreme Court issued
an order dismissing Roseburg attorney Gary Hill’s appeal
of a trial panel opinion suspending Hill from the practice
of law for 30 days. Hill failed to file an opening
brief with the court, resulting in the dismissal. His
suspension was effective Feb. 1, 2004.

Hill was found by the trial panel to have violated
DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice), DR 5-105(E) (current client conflict of
interest) and DR 6-101(A) (incompetence). Hill represented
a friend and his daughter in establishing a joint-guardianship
for the friend’s incapacitated wife. Hill failed to
recognize that the interests of the friend and his
daughter were in likely conflict and accordingly he
failed to advise them to consult with independent counsel.
Hill had his staff prepare the guardianship paperwork
but did not review it prior to it being filed with
the court. The petition did not list all of the necessary
parties and cited statutes that had long-since been
repealed. The petition was not served on all necessary
parties, but it was nevertheless approved by the court,
as presented.

Following establishment of the guardianship, Hill’s
friend approached him to file a dissolution from his
wife, both to prevent the friend’s assets from being
consumed by his wife’s care, and to allow the friend
to marry one of his wife’s care providers. Hill had
his staff prepare the petition, failing to recognize
or advise that a conflict of interest existed between
his friend’s responsibilities as his wife’s guardian
and his interests in petitioning for divorce. Neither
the petition nor the subsequent default pleadings were
reviewed by Hill. Neither informed the court that the
wife was a protected person, and errors in the documents
prevented the disposition of the real property of the
parties. In addition, the co-guardian was not named
as a party to the action as required by procedural
rules. The petition and default were served on the
daughter, but she did not appear. Hill did not advise
the daughter of her likely or actual conflict in acting
as the wife’s guardian and failing to appear or contest
the dissolution.

In determining the appropriate sanction, the trial
panel acknowledged that Hill did not have a dishonest
or selfish motive, cooperated fully with the investigation,
had a good character or reputation and was remorseful
for his conduct.

LLOYD S. KUMLEY
OSB #84127
Salem
Public reprimand

On Aug. 14, 2003, the Oregon Supreme Court reprimanded
Salem attorney Lloyd S. Kumley for violating DR 1-102(A)(3)
(misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(2) (criminal conduct
reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness
and fitness to practice) and ORS 9.160 (holding himself
out as an attorney when he was not authorized to do
so). Kumley’s petition for reconsideration was denied
Nov. 5, 2003.

Kumley was admitted to practice in Oregon in 1984.
In 1992, he transferred to inactive membership status
with the bar. Inactive members are prohibited from
practicing law or from holding themselves out as attorneys.

In early 2000, Kumley took steps toward running for
a seat in the Oregon House of Representatives. In doing
so, he filed a declaration of candidacy and a candidate’s
statement for the State Voters Pamphlet in which he
represented his present occupation to be an 'attorney.' The
information Kumley submitted in the candidate’s statement
for the State Voters’ Pamphlet was also published in
the State Voters’ Pamphlet. Kumley also filed a verified
statement of economic interest in which he represented
that, in the year 1999, he was a self-employed attorney
for a business named 'Lloyd Kumley, Attorney at
Law.'

The court found that Kumley, by choosing to describe
his present occupation as an 'attorney' in
the declaration of candidacy and the statement for
the State Voters’ Pamphlet, represented that he was
an active attorney at that time and knowingly chose
to create a false impression that he presently was
a practicing attorney when he was not. His conduct
constituted misrepresentations and violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
and ORS 9.160. The court also found that Kumley committed
criminal acts, false swearing and other crimes, which
reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness
and fitness to practice law and violated DR 1-102(A)(2).

Marshall prepared a will for a client. The will equally
divided the client’s estate between her daughter, her
son and her granddaughter. One and one-half years later,
Marshall undertook to represent the client’s daughter
for the purpose of having her appointed guardian and
conservator of the client. In the petition for appointment
of guardian and conservator, the client’s daughter
asserted that the client had been in an advancing state
of senility for at least five years. Marshall failed
to obtain consent after full disclosure from the client
and her daughter before undertaking to represent the
daughter in the guardianship and conservatorship matter.

Marshall prepared a will for another client. The will
directed the client’s son and step-daughter to act
as co-personal representatives of the client’s estate.
Later that same year, while the client was still alive,
Marshall undertook to represent the step-daughter.
In connection with that representation, Marshall prepared
a petition to probate the client’s will, contending
that the step-daughter should be named sole personal
representative. Marshall failed to obtain consent after
full disclosure from the client and his step-daughter
before undertaking to represent the step-daughter.

In four matters, the court appointed McGraw as successor
conservator or personal representative. In the other
two matters, McGraw was representing a conservator
or personal representative.

In all six matters, over the course of a number of
years, McGraw failed to respond to numerous court inquiries
and failed to comply with statutory reporting requirements.

The trial panel acknowledged that Oregon case law
supported the imposition of a suspension. However,
it reprimanded McGraw because there was evidence that
he accepted the court’s appointment in difficult cases
with little hope of adequate compensation for his time
and effort.

One of McLaughlin’s clients invested funds in a company
that was trying to develop and market some computer
technology. The client sought McLaughlin’s advice on
how to preserve that technology, given that it was
an asset in a pending Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding.
For several months thereafter, the client had a reasonable
expectation that McLaughlin was representing him with
regard to that matter.

McLaughlin’s client formed a new corporation for the
purpose of developing and marketing the computer technology.
The parties involved in that corporation agreed that
McLaughlin would become president. As president, McLaughlin
was obligated under the law to act solely in the interests
of the corporation. By agreeing to become an officer
in the corporation, McLaughlin entered into a business
transaction with his client when the client expected
McLaughlin to exercise his professional judgment for
the client’s protection. McLaughlin spoke with his
client about his new role and sent him a letter confirming
their conversation. While that letter generally informed
the client that McLaughlin’s participation in the corporation
could create a conflict of interest between them, neither
the conversation nor the letter constituted full disclosure
because McLaughlin did not fully explain to his client
the potential adverse impact on him of McLaughlin becoming
president of the corporation.

After McLaughlin agreed to and did become president
of the corporation, the client expected McLaughlin
to exercise his judgment to protect the client’s interests
in the corporation. McLaughlin failed to fully explain
to his client that the structure of the corporation
was such that McLaughlin’s interests as president potentially
differed from the client’s.

NAME WITHHELD
Dismissed

On Dec. 26, 2003, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed
disciplinary charges brought by the bar against a lawyer
who was accused of practicing law while suspended.

The disciplinary proceedings alleged that the lawyer
violated DR 3-101(B) (practicing law in violation of
a jurisdiction’s regulations), DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct
involving dishonesty or misrepresentation), ORS 9.160
(unlawful practice of law) and ORS 9.527(1) (conduct
that would result in denial of admission) when she:
practiced law during a period of time when she had
been suspended for failure to pay a quarterly installment
of her Professional Liability Fund assessment; represented
to courts, clients and opposing counsel that she was
qualified to practice law during her period of suspension;
and represented in her application for reinstatement
to the bar that she had not practiced law during her
suspension.

In dismissing the charges, the court found that the
notices of suspension issued by the PLF in the course
of its installment payment program did not comply with
the requirements of ORS 9.200(1). Accordingly, the
court concluded that the lawyer’s suspension was void
and could not have served as the basis for a claim
that the lawyer violated DR 3-101(B) or ORS 9.160 by
practicing law while suspended. Similarly, the void
suspension could not have supported a claim that the
lawyer violated DR 1-102(A)(3) or ORS 9.527(1) by representing
to others that she was qualified to practice law or
by representing in her reinstatement application that
she had not practiced law during the period of her
suspension.

For a number of years, the lawyer, through a business
separate from his law practice, invested funds on behalf
of a Nevada client. The client then requested that
the lawyer liquidate the investments he had made on
her behalf. She ultimately filed a lawsuit against
the lawyer because he did not liquidate all of the
assets in her account in a timely manner.

The parties eventually settled the lawsuit. As part
of the settlement, the lawyer executed an affidavit
in which he represented that his conduct with respect
to his client’s funds constituted misappropriation
and defalcation of her funds and a breach of his fiduciary
duties to her. At the time the lawyer signed the affidavit,
he knew that this representation was false. This affidavit
was intended to be held by the client and submitted
to a bankruptcy court should the lawyer file for bankruptcy
protection before he satisfied the terms of the settlement.
The lawyer never filed for bankruptcy protection and
eventually satisfied the settlement agreement.

The disciplinary board, applying Nevada law under
the applicable choice of law rule, concluded that the
bar failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the lawyer’s conduct violated the Nevada disciplinary
rule.

SHAWN M. SORNSON
OSB #91438
Salem
30-day suspension

On Jan. 11, 2004, the disciplinary board approved
a stipulation for discipline suspending Salem attorney
Shawn M. Sornson for 30 days for violation of DR 1-102(A)(4)
(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)
and DR 2-106(A) (charging or collecting an illegal
or excessive fee). The suspension was effective Feb.
15, 2004.

In March 1997, Sornson’s law firm was retained to
file a petition for the appointment of guardian and
conservator. A petition was filed and the court appointed
a guardian and conservator. Sornson was thereafter
assigned responsibility for the case. Annual accountings
needed to be filed within 30 days after each anniversary
of the appointment of the conservator.

Between 1998 and 2002, Sornson failed to timely file
the accountings or request extensions of time to do
so. He and his law firm collected attorney fees for
legal services without court approval. On multiple
occasions, the court asked Sornson to provide information
and to take certain actions. Sornson failed to submit
timely and complete information to the court. Some
of the information Sornson submitted to the court was
not accurate. Sornson did not confirm the accuracy
of the information before submitting it to the court.

Sornson was admitted to practice in Oregon in 1991.
He had no prior record of discipline.

JAMES T. WILKERSON
OSB #93522
San Carlos, Calif.
Form B resignation

Effective Dec. 16, 2003, the Oregon Supreme Court
accepted the Form B resignation of San Carlos, Calif.
lawyer James T. Wikerson. At the time of the resignation,
Wilkerson was being investigated for alleged violations
of DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice), DR 1-103(C) (failure to cooperate), DR
6-101(A) (failure to provide competent representation),
DR 6-101(B) (neglect), DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentional
failure to carry out a contract of employment) and
DR 9-101(C)(4) (failure to promptly deliver client
property as requested by a client) involving his handling
of a probate matter.

Wilkerson was admitted to practice in Oregon in 1993.
He had a prior record of discipline. Wilkerson represented
in his resignation that his client files will or have
been delivered to the clients.

CLARK WILLES
OSB #86316
Corvallis
Public reprimand

On Dec. 22, 2003, the disciplinary board approved
a stipulation for discipline reprimanding Corvallis
attorney Clark Willes for violating DR 1-102(A)(4)
(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)
and DR 6-101(B) (neglect of a legal matter).

Between 1998 and 2003, Willes represented several
clients in defense of criminal charges. In these matters,
Willes was either late or failed to appear for scheduled
pre-trial or other status conferences. As a result,
the court was required to reschedule the matters.

In August 2002, Willes was appointed to represent
a client in obtaining DNA testing in connection with
an earlier criminal conviction. As of October 2002,
Willes had neither notified his client of the appointment,
nor taken any action on the client’s behalf. The client
contacted the court regarding the status of his request
for counsel. The court notified the client of Willes’ appointment.
The client sent Willes two letters seeking confirmation
of Willes’ appointment and information on his matter.
After receiving no response, the client concluded that
no appointment had been made and filed a mandamus action
against the judge. In January 2003, after the court
informed Willes of the mandamus action, Willes contacted
his client and commenced work on the matter.

Between 1989 and mid-2001, Leutjen represented a client
in various legal matters. In 1993, Leutjen borrowed
a total of $400,000 from the client. The loans were
not secured and the promissory notes did not specify
a due date for repayment. Leutjen orally discussed
with the client some adverse impact on her of loaning
funds to him, but failed to disclose all of the potential
adverse impact and otherwise failed to obtain her consent
after full disclosure.

After Leutjen borrowed funds from his client and while
he was indebted to her, he undertook to represent her
in various matters. In connection with that legal work,
the exercise of Leutjen’s professional judgment on
behalf of his client was or reasonably may have been
affected by his own financial or personal interests.
Leutjen failed to obtain consent after full disclosure
from his client before undertaking to represent her
in those matters.

At the end of 1993, the client agreed to forego collecting
interest payments from Leutjen in connection with the
funds he had borrowed from her. In exchange, Leutjen
agreed not to charge the client for any legal work
that he did for her, her family or her estate in the
future. For the years 1995 through 2001, the value
of the work that Leutjen performed for his client or
her family was less than the value of the interest
payments waived by the client, to the point that Leutjen
charged his client a clearly excessive fee.

The stipulation noted that the client sustained actual
and substantial injury in that she did not get a fair
rate of return on the funds she loaned to Leutjen and
that he remains indebted to her for $370,000. In mitigation,
the stipulation states that Leutjen did not have a
prior disciplinary record, cooperated in the bar proceeding,
was remorseful and had signed a stipulated judgment
agreeing to reimburse his client.