Kirthi Jayakumar's Posts - Global Ethics Network2018-02-22T04:43:17ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumarhttp://api.ning.com:80/files/m6qV70thC*f85MZ254TR*Dx4mkdCWU0TNUCBvTRFHM2r59LJvhfnMLfTXY294tUQ1zSrKR1bt4-JN1ehj6cKizFU9s5rU6Eg/935169838.jpeg?width=48&height=48&crop=1%3A1http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blog/feed?user=0iyjccadk44yi&xn_auth=noDo partisan considerations alter how international law is perceived?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-03-30:6428686:BlogPost:209252013-03-30T05:59:22.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>The intricate link binding international law and international relations make the inclusion of objectivity in legal allegiances a difficult task. This is particularly evidenced in the Iraq War that began on March 19, 2003. An invasion spearheaded by the United States, the United Kingdom and their Coalition partners, there have been plenty of moments in the trials and inquiries that reveal a continuing allegiance coloured by partisan considerations.</p>
<p>The Chilcot Iraq Inquiry in London…</p>
<p>The intricate link binding international law and international relations make the inclusion of objectivity in legal allegiances a difficult task. This is particularly evidenced in the Iraq War that began on March 19, 2003. An invasion spearheaded by the United States, the United Kingdom and their Coalition partners, there have been plenty of moments in the trials and inquiries that reveal a continuing allegiance coloured by partisan considerations.</p>
<p>The Chilcot Iraq Inquiry in London is in the final stages of deliberations. With a wide-reaching mandate, the inquiry has been involved in the process of looking at all kinds of “lessons learned” in connection with Iraq, considering the period after Summer 2001, until before the military operations commenced in March 2003, and thereafter, any involvement in Iraq right up to the end of July in 2009 when the inquiry was established.</p>
<p>The mandate does not relate to the question of lawfulness of the use of force in Iraq in March 2003. Nevertheless, there is every reason for the continued subsistence of the question in the backdrop. Several rounds of testimony before the Inquiry were devoted to the issue. Nevertheless, the question of legality itself remains an inconclusive one. For starters, it is difficult to apply international law objectively to the situation in Iraq. When the invasion began, the Attorney General at the time of the invasion, Lord Goldsmith, had explained that the use of force was based on the “revival argument” – an argument that has continuously provided plausible legal cases that the UN Security Council had authorized under Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. The claim was that the Security Council had authorized the use of force in Iraq under the force of law. The authorization of the use of force by the Security Council is one of the only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force – the other being the right to use force in self-defence, subjected to the pre-conditional requirements of necessity and proportionality.</p>
<p>Scholarly views have showed support in both directions: that the law prohibits the use of force against Iraq, or, that the use of force was fully justified under the ambit of International Law.</p>
<p>These arguments, and even the application of international law itself, rise from partisan considerations. There are ambiguities on the questions of what international law requires, what it forbids, how it enforces what it demands, and how it interprets what it lays down. As much as this is the generic case, the case of Iraq also meets the same conflict. The decision to intervene and invade Iraq was a product of a subjective interpretation of what was purported to be a legal basis. The contention that there was a basis for self-defence was augmented further by the supporters of the US stand. Partisan allegiance is therefore the underlying notion: that it colours the legal allegiance is an automatic consequence.</p>
<p> </p>To what extent?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-03-24:6428686:BlogPost:206212013-03-24T06:10:43.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>The reason that most scholars attribute to the “failure” of International Law, is that it is purely consent based. Treaties that bind a state through its consent, ratification and accession alone can be invoked against it. Customary norms that a state does not persistently or subsequently object to are the only things that bind it. Judicial decisions do not hold sway with the principle of stare decisis, as they bind only those states that are party to it. Any source of law, therefore, is…</p>
<p>The reason that most scholars attribute to the “failure” of International Law, is that it is purely consent based. Treaties that bind a state through its consent, ratification and accession alone can be invoked against it. Customary norms that a state does not persistently or subsequently object to are the only things that bind it. Judicial decisions do not hold sway with the principle of stare decisis, as they bind only those states that are party to it. Any source of law, therefore, is only persuasive in value.</p>
<p>And yet, looking at the way international commentators and observers evaluate situations like Iran’s nuclear program, there seems to be a strong reliance on law and legal provisions. To what extent do and can legal obligations extend?</p>
<p>Iran’s case has been scrutinized with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Safeguards Agreement. Iran for its part, insists on retaining its right to enrich its uranium reserves for peaceful purposes. But there is still a question that looms large. If Iran were to withdraw from the NPT, would the Security Council be legally justified to impose obligations under the treaty and agreement on Iran through Chapter VII? For the present, the Security Council has taken a stand that the Iranian nuclear program is a threat to international peace and security – and therefore, it seems clear that nothing could prevent an imposition of obligations under the treaty and agreement.</p>
<p>Even as a non-member, therefore, it is possible that Iran could be subjected to the obligations under the treaty and agreement. While a priori this seems possible, such a move by the Security Council is still a little disquieting. If Iran is withdrawing from the NPT, it is only doing so in accordance with the right accorded under Article X of the NPT. Therefore, if the Security Council takes action against Iran in keeping with the treaty after Iran withdraws, it invariably affects the balance of consensual treaty obligations and respect for state sovereignty.</p>
<p>The UN Charter clearly suggests that the Council would be empowered to impose NPT treaty obligations on Iran. But there is every truth in the fact that this would clash with the country's explicit will not to be bound by the NPT. While it is conceivable and acceptable that decisions of such a kind may appear justifiable from the standpoint of maintaining international peace and security, that a treaty’s obligations can be extended to a state that has explicitly refused to be bound by its provisions goes against pacta sunt servanda – which is the fount of all commitments in international law. The Security Council construes “threat to international peace” rather broadly, over the past two decades, and its composition warrants that a veto can nullify a decision taken in pursuit of peace. Taking all of this into consideration, coupled with the oft-repeated argument that international law is not a law because of the lack of a legislature, an executive and a judiciary, makes one wonder how far legal obligations imposed by international law extend.</p>Droning ontag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-03-17:6428686:BlogPost:202242013-03-17T05:10:20.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>Drones were set out to be a means to avoid collateral damage, but their practical use shows otherwise. While drone strikes are effective in eliminating targets, too many drone attacks without reprieve can incite several political repercussions: by actually making as many terrorists as they kill and by altering perceptions towards the United States – which is increasingly rubbing the people of Pakistan and Yemen (among others) on the wrong side – in the process risking the creation of more…</p>
<p>Drones were set out to be a means to avoid collateral damage, but their practical use shows otherwise. While drone strikes are effective in eliminating targets, too many drone attacks without reprieve can incite several political repercussions: by actually making as many terrorists as they kill and by altering perceptions towards the United States – which is increasingly rubbing the people of Pakistan and Yemen (among others) on the wrong side – in the process risking the creation of more enemies. There is also an increasingly alarming reliance vested in technology – as opposed to time-tested measures of human intelligence. Having become embroiled in the use of drones, the US is deeply entrenched. On the one hand, in Yemen, the United States is backing a very weak government that has to contend with a local affiliate of the Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, the Pakistani military supports US strikes against its enemies while decrying strikes against extremists.</p>
<p>While these drone attacks have succeeded in hitting their targets, there is evidence to show that its very purpose of avoiding unnecessary civilian casualty and collateral damage has been side-stepped. The number of people killed by the strikes, which no doubt includes al-Qaida terrorists and local militants in its fold, inevitably includes some civilians. While estimates vary widely, as many as 3,000 people have died in both countries combined.</p>
<p>The deployment of “signature strikes” or strikes against guerrillas in Pakistan or Yemen appearing to be members of al-Qaida Affiliate groups but who have not been identified individually is detrimental to the fabric of international law. That the US uses force and intervenes in these countries is an open secret, but a dangerous precedent that side-steps Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.</p>
<p>The use of drones is a contentious issue in International Law. Though in principle there is no basis for the acceptance of the use of drones, much less the deployment for targeted killings itself, the US viewpoint has offered up a couple of arguments justifying their conduct.</p>
<p>Depending on the setting against which the targeted killing itself occurs, namely, wartime or peacetime, humanitarian law or human rights law will apply. What is patently obvious is irrespective of the setting, law is flagrantly violated. The only possible exception to the prohibition on the use of force is Article 51 of the UN Charter, but even that sliver of a legal justification does not authorize or legitimize targeted killings.</p>
<p>Targeted killing refers to premeditated, intentional and deliberate deployment of lethal force as a tactic, by a State, its representatives under its authorization or an armed group in the course of an armed conflict, in order to target a specific individual, who is not in the custodial repository of the perpetrator entity itself.</p>
<p>The purported contention backing the use of such a technique, quite simply, is that the Global War on Terror justifies the use of force to target and kill suspected terrorists wherever they may be. With this as a “justification” offered to their conduct, one might be led to evaluate the said conduct against the principles of humanitarian law. However, that cannot be the right course of action since the United States is not in a state of war. An armed conflict as defined under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 among other things includes all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict that may arise between two or more high contracting parties even if a state of war is not recognized. These “parties” are states. The requisite precondition for humanitarian law to apply in a global context is that there should be an international armed conflict between states. The drone attacks that single out terrorists and kills them is not against the backdrop of war.</p>
<p>The United States lays claim to pursuing its right of self-defence under the ambit of international law. This contention, however, fails. Self-defence can only be indulged in response to an armed attack, with specific reference to the necessity quotient and adherence to proportionality. Self-defence cannot be taken up without informing the UN Security Council. In most instances of the US drone attacks, these essentials have not been adhered to.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>The Slow Climbtag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-03-10:6428686:BlogPost:195262013-03-10T05:30:00.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>Two years since the revolution began, the war is still raging in Syria. On February 12, though, a breakthrough came about when an airfield near Aleppo was captured by a rebel group. For the first time, rebels were able to seize usable warplanes. This not only signifies a triumph on their part, but also marks a change in their approach – as battles in cities have now shifted to attacks on military bases.</p>
<p>About a month ago, rebels in Syria had captured the Taftanaz airfield in northern…</p>
<p>Two years since the revolution began, the war is still raging in Syria. On February 12, though, a breakthrough came about when an airfield near Aleppo was captured by a rebel group. For the first time, rebels were able to seize usable warplanes. This not only signifies a triumph on their part, but also marks a change in their approach – as battles in cities have now shifted to attacks on military bases.</p>
<p>About a month ago, rebels in Syria had captured the Taftanaz airfield in northern Syria. In retaliation, the government forces launched air-attacks on al-Jarrah, in a fashion similar to their actions in response to past instances of rebel capture of airfields. The capture of war planes is a shot in the arm for the Syrian National Council. Thus far, governmental troops have been able to attack ground-based rebel attacks through their use of air-power, but it remains to be seen how these aircrafts will be flown – by the defected pilots or otherwise.</p>
<p>The civil war seems unrelenting, as the death toll is on a steady rise since March 2011. Political efforts are also slowly continuing on the side. Recently, UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’s deputy, Mokhtar Lamani met the rebel Revolutionary Military Council near Damascus, talking with civilian leaders. The SNC’s leader has offered to meet government officials if the regime agrees to releasing 16,000 political prisoners, and renews passports held by Syrians outside the country.</p>
<p>However, the odds against a settlement are slowly lengthening on both sides. There are continued divisions within the coalition, and arming the rebel forces internationally is now a vetoed option. The continued protraction of force and the pursuit of military means by the Syrian government and its opponents is in no one’s interest. Kofi Annan’s original plans as augmented by the Geneva Plan should take root – not only because it is in Syria’s interests internally, but externally as well, seeing as how Russia and the US are in agreement over it.</p>
<p>Only Syria needs to agree to it and accept it.</p>
<p> </p>Double standards, much?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-03-03:6428686:BlogPost:190202013-03-03T03:13:11.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<div>China decided against using an armed drone in Myanmar to kill a drug lord who was wanted for the murder of 13 Chinese sailors. Instead, they captured him alive, and brought him to trial in China. To most of the world, this move was laudable. Compared with the United States of America, China seems to have gotten its respect for sovereignty and territoriality down pat, not to forget its understanding of the need to fair trial.</div>
<div>While it is appreciable in comparison with the US…</div>
<div>China decided against using an armed drone in Myanmar to kill a drug lord who was wanted for the murder of 13 Chinese sailors. Instead, they captured him alive, and brought him to trial in China. To most of the world, this move was laudable. Compared with the United States of America, China seems to have gotten its respect for sovereignty and territoriality down pat, not to forget its understanding of the need to fair trial.</div>
<div>While it is appreciable in comparison with the US approach of drone attacks and targeting terrorists in pursuit of justice and self-defence, China is still far away from the position it should be in, vis-a-vis international human rights. A country that continues to impose heavy curbs on the freedoms of expression, association and religion, opposing the independence of judiciary and freedom of the press, while all the time suppressing human rights defenders and organizations, through extrajudicial measures. China’s history is fraught with human rights violations – the country with an authoritarian rule presently has blood on its hands and incidents like Tiananmen Square, Tibet and Xinjiang in its history books.</div>
<div>On the domestic front, China has heavy limits on the enjoyment of rights, and also allows the continued thriving of a system of forced confessions under torture. And yet, on the international front, China projects itself as one that adheres to international law and respects the core values it is built on, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Perhaps a clever policy to follow in that China can assert that what it does within its own country is nobody’s business, China is forgetting that the birth of the individual as a subject of international law is a sign that the globalization of human rights has indeed occurred.</div>
<div>The people of China for their part are raising flags in pursuit of their concerns, as plenty of protests are mushrooming across the country. </div>
<div>It doesn’t take much of an expert to see the logic behind China’s stand on global political events: as China is deciding coldly against any military intervention in the Middle East, it isn’t projecting a moralist stance in international law, but is preventing its positive role in the creation of a precedent that can be used against itself.</div>A fight to the finish?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-02-24:6428686:BlogPost:181742013-02-24T05:45:41.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>Civil wars are easy to predict. The result is easy to glean well before they come to an end. Whether it was the American Civil War where Jefferson Davis did not doubt that he would lose the war after Atlanta fell, or in the 2011 Libyan case where Muammar Gaddhafi was fighting a lost cause after the NATO intervened, this has been true in most instances.</p>
<p>Following that long line of examples, is Bashar Assad of Syria. A civil war that began with the Arab Spring, the Syrian case is not…</p>
<p>Civil wars are easy to predict. The result is easy to glean well before they come to an end. Whether it was the American Civil War where Jefferson Davis did not doubt that he would lose the war after Atlanta fell, or in the 2011 Libyan case where Muammar Gaddhafi was fighting a lost cause after the NATO intervened, this has been true in most instances.</p>
<p>Following that long line of examples, is Bashar Assad of Syria. A civil war that began with the Arab Spring, the Syrian case is not quite different when compared with the instances that history has to offer in example. As determined as a leader maybe, it is no necessary indication that he will win a civil war. That Assad will not emerge victor, no matter how long drawn the war maybe, is clear. And it isn’t just now: this was clear as early as in February 2011.</p>
<p>And yet, why does he continue to fight?</p>
<p>Primarily, because this is no negotiation table he can get his way out of. Negotiated peace is a good idea on paper, in that it offers the members of the Free Syrian Army a certain amount of power in exchange for peace. This has been manifested in many instances – from Nicaragua to Cambodia. But, in the Syrian case, a state of negotiated peace is not tenable in the eyes of both, Assad and the FSA. For the former, any offer of power-sharing is a dent in his administrative prowess and a decisive defeat. Agreeing for a power-sharing regime would result in his relegation to a minority position. But, for the latter mere power-sharing would not be enough as demands will mount for Assad’s exit. There is also the pressing concern that Sunnis and Christians would not necessarily see eye to eye on power-sharing.</p>
<p>Assad has two choices: ceding power and living in exile, or, fighting tooth and nail right to the finish. Dictators have ceded power when defeat loomed large – but, Assad doesn’t have the luxury of making that choice because a safe exile is not an option open to him – especially since it leaves him vulnerable to prosecution at the hands of the ICC. Having signed the Rome Statute, he has agreed to an international treaty that allows him to be prosecuted if he engages in crimes against humanity – which, as the world knows, he has done. That Assad can be prosecuted for war crimes is not news.</p>
<p>With this, it seems clear that Assad will continue fighting, in the hope of defeating the rebels. It seems clear that Assad will hope for continued support from Iran and Russia.</p>
<p>And that’s where he is wrong. The international community’s continued economic sanctions, coupled with a continued state of war will erode his regime.</p>Chad's Prosecution Chamberstag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-02-17:6428686:BlogPost:170572013-02-17T05:00:00.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>Twenty years after the brutal reign ended, Chad’s ex-dictator, Hissene Habre, is now being prosecuted by the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal. Habre’s exit to Senegal in 1990 came just after his brutal reign drew to an end – a period that was characterised heavily by torture and killings that numbered by the thousands. A domestic Chadian inquiry was instituted, and while in exile, Habre remained at large.</p>
<p>He managed to escape many attempts that were made to initiate trials…</p>
<p>Twenty years after the brutal reign ended, Chad’s ex-dictator, Hissene Habre, is now being prosecuted by the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal. Habre’s exit to Senegal in 1990 came just after his brutal reign drew to an end – a period that was characterised heavily by torture and killings that numbered by the thousands. A domestic Chadian inquiry was instituted, and while in exile, Habre remained at large.</p>
<p>He managed to escape many attempts that were made to initiate trials against him, both in Chad and outside. Efforts began as early as 2000 in Senegal – but the move was immediately resisted by erstwhile President Abdoulaye Wade. Five years later, complaints were filed in Belgium under the ambit of the universal jurisdiction principle – but again, President Wade resisted requests in 2006 for Habre’s extradition. It didn’t help that the African Union kept projecting a campaign against international justice under the allegation that the institution of international criminal justice always appeared to target African leaders. Belgium’s request was lost in this melee.</p>
<p>The ECOWAS piped up with a solution of creating a hybrid tribunal – comprising national and international judges and staff, somewhat like the lines of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to be created in Senegal. While negotiations drew pledges of financial support from several European countries, Senegal withdrew – perhaps cost being a significant factor in it all. President Wade, though, continued his political campaign of resisting any trial of Habre.</p>
<p>Belgium then went onto filing a case in 2009 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. This came closely at the heels of Senegal’s continued rejection of every attempt at prosecuting Habre – and the petition sought to ask the ICJ to determine whether Senegal's failure to try Habre or extradite him violated Senegal's obligations under the Convention against Torture. In July last year, the ICJ determined that Senegal was indeed in violation of the convention, and consequently, effectively noted that it had to extradite him to Belgium to try him.</p>
<p>Senegal’s elections changed Wade’s presence as the President, and Macky Sall came into his place. Sall’s resistance was non-existent, as accountability played a significant role in his thought process. In a month’s time, Senegal agreed with the AU to create a special Tribunal to try the case. In December, legislation authorised the Extraordinary African Chambers to comprise Senegalese magistrates, working with a president from elsewhere in Africa.</p>
<p>Just as Guatemala has been in the news for being a first in prosecuting its former national leader in a national court, Chad doesn’t seem to be far away. That the move to try Hissene Habre in its own court, and, the fact that it represents a viable option to the otherwise static debate over justice in Africa, make the trial significant. The trial of Habre is the birth of an African “Pinochet” – the birth of an unhindered future for Africa, where Africa is the solution for Africa’s own problems; the birth of a world where the International Criminal Court and International Law are no longer the neo-colonial elements that intervene to render justice for the region.</p>A law, or not a law. That is the question.tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-02-10:6428686:BlogPost:167282013-02-10T06:03:14.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>That International Law was created to bind civilized states is now an acceptable principle, for the realm it covers is the conduct of states with respect to each other in their interrelations. But what is a state? When is an entity fit to be considered a state? Is it necessary for other states to recognize a state for it to be one? How many recognizing states are enough to make an entity a state?</p>
<p>These questions strike at the very root of international law. It doesn’t help that…</p>
<p>That International Law was created to bind civilized states is now an acceptable principle, for the realm it covers is the conduct of states with respect to each other in their interrelations. But what is a state? When is an entity fit to be considered a state? Is it necessary for other states to recognize a state for it to be one? How many recognizing states are enough to make an entity a state?</p>
<p>These questions strike at the very root of international law. It doesn’t help that divergent practices tend to colour our minds – while on the one hand, Andorra, Lichtenstein and Monaco are all deemed states, while Kosovo, Palestine and Scotland are not considered thus. It is hard to answer this – especially because of the role of vested interests and politics, two factors that obliterate the notion of anarchy and level-playing-fields in international relations.</p>
<p>International Law has often been brought into question – especially as to whether it is a law or not. No matter what arguments maybe advanced in an attempt to punch holes in its existence, the fact is that international law exists: whether in its observations in obedience or in its observations in breach, whether in that states try to justify their conduct in keeping with the law or its interpretation, rather than questioning its existence. That new ‘legal provisions’ under international law are a product of breaches of old ones, is not an acceptable basis to denounce its status as law. After all, human rights laws have evolved by breaching early practices that encouraged the violations of basic human rights, best examples being slavery and torture. </p>
<p>One may argue that a body of legal rules can come into existence only when it is legislated by a legislative body, executed by an executive body and studied and interpreted by a judicial body from time to time. These elements are not entirely absent in international law. The UN makes for a fairly close attempt. The General Assembly is akin to a legislature. The Security Council, the executive wing, and the International Court of Justice forms the judiciary. In addition to this system are several other international organizations that handle different aspects of state conduct and streamlines them through a legal document (or more) of its own.</p>
<p>It may appear like International Law is a prerogative of those in power – there are states that participate in creating the legal order, but subvert it themselves. Though it may appear like this knocks the wind out of the sails of its status as a law, in truth, it remains to be a law – quite like how legislators aren’t necessarily obedient to the laws they make.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the prism of IHLtag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-02-03:6428686:BlogPost:159252013-02-03T04:59:30.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>After Palestine was accepted as a non-member observer state to the United Nations last year, Israel immediately announced that it would construct new settlements in what it continued to recognize as the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to gather that this is the biggest obstacle to peace negotiations between both states.</p>
<p>The Israel-Palestine conflict goes back a long way – involving plenty of questions of legality, each beset with plenty of…</p>
<p>After Palestine was accepted as a non-member observer state to the United Nations last year, Israel immediately announced that it would construct new settlements in what it continued to recognize as the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to gather that this is the biggest obstacle to peace negotiations between both states.</p>
<p>The Israel-Palestine conflict goes back a long way – involving plenty of questions of legality, each beset with plenty of historical, religious and political positions of the conflicting parties. There are complicated and conflicting views that are further buttressed and augmented by the question of demonization and mutual mistrust. In this backdrop, international law can help by being an objective mechanism that can settle the differences between both sides.</p>
<p>International Law has its own means of interpretation – being a body of “soft law” as it is often known. Subject to the interests involved, the practices followed and the methodology used, International Law can involve different “sources” in different cases. The treaties, customary practices and general practices of states that apply to cases are altered by the consent-based system that prevails in international law, for it is only those legal instruments and doctrines that bind a state that it has consented to.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, irrespective of the individual provisions, the way international law works is that it offers legal interpretation of the facts, and, the benefit of precedential rulings – although they are not considered binding in the strictest sense of the term.</p>
<p>The conflict between Israel and Palestine has also involved international law to the extent that both sides have their own contentions under it. Israel claims that it has valid territorial claims in keeping with its historical and religious connections to the land, and in keeping with its recognized security needs – and that the territory it occupies was not under the sovereignty of any state, but came under Israeli control by self-defence. Palestine’s counter is that it was a sovereign state, and that Israel’s claims over the territory are unfounded and unacceptable in that it is occupying another country.</p>
<p>The specific branch of international law that applies to the case in hand is International Humanitarian Law – the branch of law that governs armed conflict. Israel’s occupation of Palestine is belligerent occupation – in that it ousted a sovereign authority, with the aim of satisfying its own sovereign rights. As it stands, a claim by Israel that it has a valid title to the Occupied Palestinian Territories is not valid – both historically and under law. Several states have advanced different arguments, all of which point to the fact that Israel violates International Law and International Humanitarian Law by occupying Palestine. This was accepted and confirmed by the ICJ in 2004. The Security Council has also denounced Israel’s settlements in Palestine as having no legal validity, explaining that it constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in the region. This is as true today as it was in 1979, when it was said. It remains to be seen if Israel will understand its role in the situation and help further justice, rather than hinder it.</p>
<p> </p>Rethinking IHLtag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-01-27:6428686:BlogPost:156472013-01-27T05:02:43.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>Two years have passed, and Syria is still embroiled in the catastrophic civil war that started in 2011. It is no surprise to hear Lakhdar Brahimi’s words against this background: that this year could witness the loss of 100,000 more lives in Syria.</p>
<p>Following closely at the heels of a massacre near a University, this statement just reiterates how helpless the world is about the situation. The massacre itself took place after air strikes on refugee camps and people queuing up for food.…</p>
<p>Two years have passed, and Syria is still embroiled in the catastrophic civil war that started in 2011. It is no surprise to hear Lakhdar Brahimi’s words against this background: that this year could witness the loss of 100,000 more lives in Syria.</p>
<p>Following closely at the heels of a massacre near a University, this statement just reiterates how helpless the world is about the situation. The massacre itself took place after air strikes on refugee camps and people queuing up for food. There was also an incident of shelling of a group of school children near Damascus – somewhere around the time when similar events took place in Connecticut and China.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that in every conflict – be it internal or international, the ones that suffer most are civilians. The reasons are simple: there isn’t as much respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as there is for political interests; this in turn stems from the second reason – where the enforcement of IHL is difficult in a state of war.</p>
<p>In Syria’s case, Russia and China have vetoed Security Council resolutions that sought to examine intervention as a possible course of action, sought to impose sanctions and even beat efforts that sought to bring the situation in Syria to International Criminal Court. Instead of taking steps to condemn the crime, Russia and China have even sold weapons to the Syrian government. Their actions have been criticised, of course. For their part, the Russians argue that they do not intend to tear up contracts made before the outbreak of violence in Syria.</p>
<p>What is happening in Syria is nothing short of a catastrophe. War crimes thrive, unimpeded. There are globally poised enablers that are continuously letting this happen. IHL for the most part is rendered toothless simply because it cannot be enforced on ground. The International Criminal Court cannot pursue suspects without state co-operation or Security Council resolutions. Any obstruction from the governments themselves and other global powers can throw this into serious disarray.</p>Will Afghanistan Descend into a State of Chaos?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-01-23:6428686:BlogPost:151942013-01-23T08:30:00.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>Following the Soviet departure, Afghanistan descended into a state of chaos. Will this happen in 2014, when the US troops draw out of the country finally? Back when the Soviet withdrawal took place, Afghanistan was embroiled in ferocious battles that took place between the warlords and the Taliban. The latter emerged the victor, although warlords still continue to thrive in the region. When the United States’ troops leave Afghanistan, there is a concern that Afghanistan may sink into a state…</p>
<p>Following the Soviet departure, Afghanistan descended into a state of chaos. Will this happen in 2014, when the US troops draw out of the country finally? Back when the Soviet withdrawal took place, Afghanistan was embroiled in ferocious battles that took place between the warlords and the Taliban. The latter emerged the victor, although warlords still continue to thrive in the region. When the United States’ troops leave Afghanistan, there is a concern that Afghanistan may sink into a state of disarray. Defeating the Taliban was concluded as being an “impossible” feat, about two years ago.</p>
<p>This consequently brought about a cache of wary efforts towards finding means and ways to deal with them, engaging them politically. The efforts have sped up now, with the US government being keen on leaving the country behind in a state that would have some sense of political achievement following the military intervention. Talks with the Taliban took place a while back in Chantilly, France. A High Peace Council Proposal called A Road Map for 2015 was leaked, bearing the date November 2012. Both these events offer a window into the upside and the downside to negotiations.</p>
<p>The rounds in Chantilly gave the Taliban room to express its views publicly, albeit only representing a current position that is not necessarily going to remain the same. The Taliban spokesmen who represented Mullah Omar, professed willingness to work with other Afghan Parties, and suggested a proclivity towards accepting the governmental structure as it stands now, and accepting girls’ schools, if run in an ‘Islamic Way’. The flipside, though, comes in the form of a stubborn demand that they wish to rewrite the Constitution, “accept” the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and what appears a rather imminent possibility – to strive towards dominating the newly established Afghan institutions.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, despite all shortcomings one might be reading into the lines, it is definitely a positive fact that through these negotiations, the Taliban went public with their stance. This is in itself, a bright spot in the peace process. Behind the scenes, it appears, drawing from the High Peace Council Roadmap that was leaked, that the Chantilly talks were deeply embedded in a bunch of background negotiations. The Roadmap speaks of different stages in the peace process: An end to cross-border shelling of villages; The release of designated Taliban from Pakistani prisons; Giving the Taliban positions in the power structures of the state; A Taliban announcement of severing ties with the al-Qaeda and the renewal of negotiations for safe passage. Save for the announcement relating to the al-Qaeda, most else was achieved considerably. Pakistan’s government did release a few Taliban prisoners just before the Chantilly rounds. What is also encouraging is that the Taliban did indicate considerable flexibility on other critical issues towards internal reconciliation.</p>
<p>Much of what the roadmap speaks of comprises proposals for agreements between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Most of these pivot towards ending violence, reintegrating ex-combatants and security sector reform. Much of this could have been non-controversial, except that some of these provisions can raise flag for Afghanistan’s neighbours, and opposition groups. Including the Taliban in ministerial positions and governmental offices in pursuit of the request for their inclusion in the power structure of the state could wind up resulting in a de facto handing of power. By this, the proposal will risk alienating many political parties and much of civil society. Strengthening the ANSF, as well, can become a reason to polarize the polity on the grounds of ethnicity. The roadmap has also mentioned the need for regular monitoring and consultations with countries that have a significant influence over the Taliban, either directly or through Pakistan. But what it forgets is the need for consultations with Afghanistan’s neighbours – they have a stake in the process and the outcome, too.</p>One step at a timetag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-01-16:6428686:BlogPost:152292013-01-16T08:55:40.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>January 3 this year marked a milestone in Palestine’s history. After being officially recognized as a state in November 29, January 3 witnessed the signing of Decree #1 for 2013, by Mahmoud Abbas, acting in his capacities as the President of State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was a simple signature, but one that signifies a historically huge achievement for the country, nonetheless.</p>
<p>The decree creates a five-year…</p>
<p>January 3 this year marked a milestone in Palestine’s history. After being officially recognized as a state in November 29, January 3 witnessed the signing of Decree #1 for 2013, by Mahmoud Abbas, acting in his capacities as the President of State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was a simple signature, but one that signifies a historically huge achievement for the country, nonetheless.</p>
<p>The decree creates a five-year interim period pursuant to the Declaration of Principles signed on the White House lawn in September 1993, noting that the Palestinian Authority has been absorbed and replaced by the State of Palestine proclaimed in November 1988. Article 1 of the decree explains that “Official documents, seals, signs and letterheads of the Palestinian National Authority official and national institutions shall be amended by replacing the name ‘Palestinian National Authority’ whenever it appears by the name ‘State of Palestine’ and by adopting the emblem of the State of Palestine.” Article 4 states “All competent authorities, each in their respective area, shall implement this Decree starting from its date.” </p>
<p>This officially projects that the State of Palestine has officially come to be. This signals the end of the three-titled Palestinian head – bearing the nomenclature of the President of the State of Palestine, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and President of the Palestinian National Authority. The PLO will, however, continue to represent Palestinians everywhere. The Palestinians living in the State of Palestine will be governed by the Government of Palestine. All of them will have official and new State of Palestine passports, and be represented by the State of Palestine. </p>
<p>This change, however, hasn’t been noticed much – but that isn’t too much of a worrisome fact either, since silent acceptance is a better prospect than furious rejection. This still does, however, portend a bright future for Palestine. As it stands, the State of Palestine still exists on the soil of Palestine in varying degrees under belligerent occupation by Israel. Having resolved to contribute to the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the attainment of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and fulfils the vision of two States, an independent, sovereign, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security with Israel, on the basis of the pre-1967 borders, the world needs to continue by translating words into action. Now that Palestine is recognized globally as a state under the United Nations, the occupation of one state by another state is not permissible in keeping with the dictates of the UN Charter.</p>
<p>Work needs to be put in to ensure that the occupation ends. </p>
<p> </p>Making a lasting political solutiontag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2013-01-10:6428686:BlogPost:151372013-01-10T15:02:58.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p class="body">Less than a week ago, Syrian President Bashar Assad addressed his country via television, denouncing his opponents as enemies of God, and puppets of the West. 21 months of civil war that has wiped 60,000 lives single-handedly has ut life in his country into a state of disarray. Assad has spoken out with his perspectives on the issues in his country after speaking to the Russian media in November last year, and after nearly eight months of speaking in Syria. …</p>
<p class="body">Less than a week ago, Syrian President Bashar Assad addressed his country via television, denouncing his opponents as enemies of God, and puppets of the West. 21 months of civil war that has wiped 60,000 lives single-handedly has ut life in his country into a state of disarray. Assad has spoken out with his perspectives on the issues in his country after speaking to the Russian media in November last year, and after nearly eight months of speaking in Syria. </p>
<p class="body">This time, Assad has a plan that claims that his army will stop military operations, but continue to retain the right to defend state interests, provided other countries ceased to arm terrorist groups. He then said that a national dialogue conference will follow, where the government, civil society and political parties will meet in a bid to seek an agreement on a national charter to be put to a referendum. This would then be followed by parliamentary elections leading to the formation of a new government.</p>
<p class="body">Almost immediately after they were announced, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) rejected the proposals, asserting that the President wanted only solutions that would continue to have him in a position of control. The SNC was not willing to accept anything besides Assad’s departure. One other group, the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change in Syria (NCB) — which, incidentally, is tolerated by the regime — says that it will not enter into talks unless the violence comes to an end. The UN Secretary General expressed disappointment that the Assad plan in rejects the UN proposal for a transitional governing body.</p>
<p class="body">Assad’s proposal shows that he has recognized that only a political solution will help. It doesn’t help that he decided to speak ill of the opposition – it might just catalyse stronger feelings of antagonism. Nevertheless, it is true that weapons have been given to the insurgents – but none of the countries that gave these weapons might agree comfortably to the prospect of representative democracy in Syria.</p>
<p class="body">With the West viewing Syria’s case as transitory, and that Assad has to step down, Russia’s calls for political reform and a new political solution are not coming to bear fruit. The real and the best solution must come from the Syrian people themselves. Until that voice is heard, all else has less bearing.</p>
<p class="body"> </p>Intervening in Malitag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-12-31:6428686:BlogPost:147882012-12-31T05:22:17.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/is-there-a-responsibility-to-protect-the-dr-congo" target="_blank">Last Post</a>, I spoke about the DR Congo vis-a-vis Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds. This post focuses on Mali.</p>
<p>When a bunch of junior soldiers seized control of Mali’s Presidential Palace, declaring the government dissolved and its constitution suspended, the world didn’t sit up and take notice. When there was a spate of destruction directed at…</p>
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/is-there-a-responsibility-to-protect-the-dr-congo" target="_blank">Last Post</a>, I spoke about the DR Congo vis-a-vis Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds. This post focuses on Mali.</p>
<p>When a bunch of junior soldiers seized control of Mali’s Presidential Palace, declaring the government dissolved and its constitution suspended, the world didn’t sit up and take notice. When there was a spate of destruction directed at cultural property in the country, a little hue and cry began. And slowly, as the rebels from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad declared the secession of a new state, as the Al-Qaeda came in through associated Islamist groups and sidelined the rebels, Mali slowly descended into a mess. In this backdrop, the recent UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter signals a possibility that there may be room for military intervention.</p>
<p>The text of the resolution holds that the regional powers and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should work with the UN Secretary General in drawing up a “detailed and actionable” plan within 45 days, which would function as a sine qua non for the passage of a further resolution authorising intervention. The African Union is endeavouring to encourage political engagement, while its Peace and Security Council has readmitted Mali after the suspension imposed on March 22 deposed the then President Amadou Toumani Toure. But is an intervention feasible?</p>
<p>For starters, the Malian government is weak, as is its military powers. Secondly, the military’s own justification for the coup, i.e., that the civilian government had failed to defeat the secessionist groups in northern Mali, was a weak claim in itself. There is a considerable flow of weapons from Libya, which could make any military action in Mali futile. Islamist group Ansar Dine has now merged with Tuareg fighters, and has declared northern Mali an Islamic state with the approval of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The group already has a track record of imposing a very rigid form of the Sharia law and of destroying world heritage sites in areas it controls. In addition, the International Criminal Court has launched an investigation into allegations of severe brutality particularly against women. Without a decisive direction and stringent action, military intervention could destroy the fabric of Malian society through civil war.</p>
<p>Read <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Post 1</a>, <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">Post 2</a>, <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/grounds-that-should-underlie-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 3</a>, <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/r2p-and-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 4</a>, <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/syria-and-the-prospect-of-intervention?xg_source=activity" target="_blank">Post 5</a> and <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/is-there-a-responsibility-to-protect-the-dr-congo" target="_blank">Post 6</a> of this Series.</p>Is there a Responsibility to Protect the DR Congo?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-12-26:6428686:BlogPost:145632012-12-26T05:00:00.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/syria-and-the-prospect-of-intervention?xg_source=activity" target="_blank">Last Post</a>, I spoke about Syria. In today's post, I will be speaking about the DR Congo.</p>
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<p>Over the past few years, one thing has become clear in foreign policy. When a people find themselves in a predicament where they are oppressed and deprived of their rights, external help comes to them sometimes, from other states in the world.…</p>
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/syria-and-the-prospect-of-intervention?xg_source=activity" target="_blank">Last Post</a>, I spoke about Syria. In today's post, I will be speaking about the DR Congo.</p>
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<p>Over the past few years, one thing has become clear in foreign policy. When a people find themselves in a predicament where they are oppressed and deprived of their rights, external help comes to them sometimes, from other states in the world. Sometimes, this help comes in the form of intervention using military force, although technically forbidden by law. It legitimizes itself through the epithet of “Responsibility to Protect”, or R2P. Sometimes, this help comes in the form of monetary assistance and rehabilitation. But sometimes, there is no help at all.</p>
<p>The Responsibility to Protect has evolved as an important doctrine of sorts in contemporary international relations. The principle, endorsed in 2005 during the UN World Summit, essentially calls on the international community to use all “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means … to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” This responsibility to protect is proactive and continuous. Military force cannot be used except as a last resort, after all other peaceful options have been tried, and have failed.</p>
<p>Primarily deemed Kofi Annan’s greatest successes, the Responsibility to Protect was assumed as a core value when the West intervened in Libya this year. Eyebrows were raised worldwide when Libya was taken into consideration, but Bahrain and Syria have been given the cold shoulder. The Libyan situation was the cynosure of all eyes as allegations were rife that the pursuit was nothing short of a quest for regime change. Aside of the issues shrouding the modality of operation, the Responsibility to Protect has been an accepted norm internationally, and has been supported as bring the right means to handle global issues.</p>
<p>But strangely, the world has been stunningly silent in questioning the non-invocation of the doctrine to handle the situation in DRCongo. The international community has the same responsibility to protect the people of DRCongo- over 6 million DRCongolese civilians have died, and statistics reveal that as many as half of the death toll comprise children. It has been a whole 15 years since this horrific scheme of events began. Over 400,000 women have been raped. As mentioned by the American Journal of Public Health, on an average, 48 women are raped per hour in DRCongo, and the toll of women who were victims of sexual violence in 2007, toll up to about 4,00,000. Women are afraid to speak up, to speak out and to be heard. Elections are held from time to time, but women are afraid to participate for fear of being subjected to horrors for their campaigns of denouncing the horrific sexual violence that is being perpetrated by and large in the region.</p>
<p>DRCongo is in shambles. Women wear scars of sexual violence- the worst weapon of war. The people of DRCongo still find themselves picking the pieces of their broken lives. The story of the lives of these people would shock anyone’s conscience. The absence of justice and attention is nothing short of shocking. The world was completely deaf to the pleas of the people in DRCongo. Unarmed ordinary people were dying. Women were raped. The country’s backbone was shattered. But the world was quiet. Deathly quiet.</p>
<p>Is this because the world is too apathetic to the situation? Or is this because the world has decided to remain indifferent?</p>
<p>Today, DRCongo stands in a precarious condition- where the crisis has gone far beyond the threshold of a turnaround. The situation has spiralled out of control. The people of DRCongo are paying the price for the inertia that the world wielded in its conduct towards the country.</p>
<p>In 2006, the United States passed the Public Law 109-456 a legislation seeking to address the situation in DRCongo. But five years have passed, and implementation is far from materializing. Five years of inertia has cost DRCongo dearly. The state is abundantly rich in mineral resources. Better known to the world as conflict minerals, these resources are mined by DRCongolese civilians, who often work with their bare hands. The monetary return for them is frugal, though the plundering corporations and governments ramble about in wealth. The sword of rape and death hang above the heads of the ordinary DRCongolese civilian, while the world around them uses laptops and cell phones fashioned out of industries that use these conflict minerals.</p>
<p>DRCongo’s present state of instability easily benefits those who exploit its wealth. Documentation and statistical records maintained by the United Nations suggests the massive exploitation of DRCongo’s mineral wealth by Rwanda, Uganda, various rebel groups and private actors. Specifically, in its 2001 Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, its 2006 Resolution 1653 and 2008 Final Report of the Group of Experts, the United Nations has explained the fact that Rwanda’s economic power in the region has a lot to do with the trade in illicit minerals out of DRCongo.</p>
<p>To DRCongo, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and ICESCR, the Geneva Conventions and all of International Humanitarian Law, truly, make no difference and do not matter at all. There is precious little that a legal document could serve for the people, when it is devoid of any form of political will or military power backing it up. What use is empty rhetoric when implementation is severely lacking?</p>
<p>Rehabilitating the destroyed state is going to take a lot, easily. DRCongo is fragile, and cannot be strengthened unless it can give its people their basic needs and protection. This cannot take place until DRCongo has a unified army that remains confined to the rubric of discipline, and remains subjugated to a civilian rule. The army must necessarily be comprised of individuals who conform to a value system, and must necessarily be rid of those who are guilty of human rights abuses. There should be a military tribunal that would mandate the performance of duties on part of the army, and would keep the army confined within the borders of decency and good conduct.</p>
<p>With this, DRCongo could have a proper government in place, one that would proactively engage in the upkeep of its people by ensuring them their dues, in keeping with international standards. On a larger scale, DRCongo must compulsorily indulge in regional diplomacy with all stakeholders to usher in peace. Rwanda must be pressurized for the return of its refugees, and offer political space for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. DRCongolese mineral wealth must rightfully benefit the people in DRCongo, and all policy must look towards this direction. It doesn’t help that the minerals benefit only corporations and governments outside, for the present, so it is necessary that those who loot these resources need to be made accountable on all fronts.</p>
<p>Non-action in DRCongo has not been because of a lack of warning, or a lack of information, or a lack of necessary resources. Non-action, instead, has come to be owing to the strategic, considerations coloured by political and economic policies of those that had plenty to gain out of exploiting the state’s mineral wealth. With the cold shoulder from the rest of the world, it became increasingly easy to capitalize on the confluence of mineral wealth and political repression. It is unfortunate that the strategic interests of the world precede action in pursuit of humanitarian considerations.</p>
<p>By ignoring this responsibility to protect, this obligation on our part, this duty we owe to our counterparts in the DRCongo, we have not just violated an international norm. We are guilty of having been complicit in the worst crime against humanity. Our silence and inert stance in the sidelines watching the Rape of DRCongo has been the worst crime against our own conscience.</p>
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<p>Read Read <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Post 1</a>, <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">Post 2</a>, <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/grounds-that-should-underlie-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 3</a>, <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/r2p-and-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 4</a> and <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/syria-and-the-prospect-of-intervention?xg_source=activity" target="_blank">Post 5</a> in this series.</p>Syria and the Prospect of Interventiontag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-12-18:6428686:BlogPost:148232012-12-18T05:30:00.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/r2p-and-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">last post</a>, I spoke about the relationship between R2P and Humanitarian Intervention. This post takes a look at Syria and evaluates the prospect of intervention.</p>
<p>Traditional international law restricts arbitrary conduct of states in their relations with each other. States are expected to respect the sovereign rights of other states by ensuring that they do not violate…</p>
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/r2p-and-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">last post</a>, I spoke about the relationship between R2P and Humanitarian Intervention. This post takes a look at Syria and evaluates the prospect of intervention.</p>
<p>Traditional international law restricts arbitrary conduct of states in their relations with each other. States are expected to respect the sovereign rights of other states by ensuring that they do not violate their independence by interfering with it – both in terms of territorial integrity and in political independence. This sovereign power of a state implies its ability to determine its stand with respect to its internal affairs, and its external affairs. The respect for sovereignty of every state in international relations, in an ideal setting, hopes for anarchy – everyone is an equal. Within the international domain, sovereignty implies that a state can do anything, but subject to the fact that it must respect and not violate the sovereignty of others. Sovereignty in the internal context implies that a state can do anything it wishes within its domestic domain, without anyone hindering its actions.</p>
<p>This latter dimension to sovereignty is easily a hot favourite, especially among despotic governments that enjoy the right to wield power over its people. They can oppress, and none can question. They can abuse, and none can question. They can violate, and none can question. No external power can intervene.</p>
<p>Were actual International Relations transpiring in a vacuum, the above would transpire without restrictions. But, in reality, that absolution does not exist. Non-intervention as a principle is both impossible and non-existent. The need to interact in one way or the other, the need to indulge in relations for trade, commerce and politics and the obligation to offer aid and help in the face of challenges have broken the watertight norms of non-intervention. In fact, non-intervention itself cannot exist – you may explicitly intervene and prohibit or facilitate, or implicitly intervene by doing nothing and allowing something to continue. It is as simple as saying that you remain complicit by silence.</p>
<p>Taking shape in the form of intervention that is justified on humanitarian grounds, the advent of state policies involving action in other states has carved a spot for itself in international practice. As Noam Chomsky noted, the first thing about humanitarian intervention is that it exists. Putting this in view with the fact that intervention exists in every form, it implies that a state that is not actively involved in “stopping” atrocities from happening, is being complicit with the occurrence of the atrocities themselves, by not doing anything to fight it.</p>
<p>In reality, though, that is not so. States do not intervene in every other state – questions of cost-benefit analyses, practicality and feasibility in terms of available infrastructure and resource-challenges to states, and the propensity for the loss of lives are spokes in their wheels. But this does not mean that a state is necessarily complicit in allowing a crime to unfold – for instance, the double intervention in Serbia under Clinton’s regime, while Rwanda was ignored – that doesn’t mean that Rwandan lives were less precious to the West, in comparison with Serbian lives. The motives underlying the choice to intervene or not to intervene in one or another state are plenty.</p>
<p>Typically, the humanitarian principles are often seen as the basis, the forerunner reason for the intervention itself. But, these are not the only considerations. How best a state will be served in terms of its national interests through the intervention and the extent of costs it will incur in tandem with the benefits that can accrue to it are major factors. No state is easily, completely giving in its ways, and nor can it expectably be thus. National interests are subjective to the leader of the nation, for it is in his line of sight that the future of the nation is considered.</p>
<p>Coming to a relevant case at hand, Syria, the Assad government has taken to the path of brutal violence in repressing the opposition movement. The conflict runs deeper than just a people versus government deal – with the government being a representative scion of Syria’s Alawite minority and the rebellious movements being based primarily on the Sunni majority. That the Assad regime has obviously failed to suppress the rebellion, and to prevent it from growing larger is a given. But, the rebellion is not nearing success just yet.</p>
<p>As much as the international community appears to be wringing its hands in despair at the crisis, Syria’s situation is not without the involvement of external actors. Iran is actively involved in offering the Assad regime advisers and other support. Russia has supplied arms, while China and Russia have fought resolutions authorizing humanitarian intervention. Saudi Arabia and Qatar actively support the rebellion in Syria, while Turkey and Jordan have provided sanctuary for the opposition. The Assad regime has been condemned aplenty – and rumours are rife of an Al-Qaeda support system for Syria. Syria’s state of affairs began unravelling nearly two years ago. But the West has not intervened – by choice. Mounting costs and results that don’t take place until months of effort, plenty of lives and money have gone into it are valid considerations – getting rid of Assad appears a tougher task than that of getting rid of Gaddhafi.</p>
<p>But who gets to decide which place is ripe for intervention and which place isn’t?</p>
<p>Read <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Post 1</a>, <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">Post 2</a>, <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/grounds-that-should-underlie-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 3</a> and <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/r2p-and-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 4</a> in this series.</p>R2P and Humanitarian Interventiontag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-12-09:6428686:BlogPost:138812012-12-09T14:47:37.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/grounds-that-should-underlie-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">last post</a>, I spoke about the grounds that should underlie any policy of Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds. This post will address the overlapping ideals of the Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention.</p>
<p>In 2005, a doctrine called the Responsibility to Protect had evolved at the behest of the UN General Assembly. Five years before…</p>
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/grounds-that-should-underlie-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">last post</a>, I spoke about the grounds that should underlie any policy of Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds. This post will address the overlapping ideals of the Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention.</p>
<p>In 2005, a doctrine called the Responsibility to Protect had evolved at the behest of the UN General Assembly. Five years before that, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan made his agitated plea to the General Assembly: If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of human rights?</p>
<p>In response to his own plea, Kofi Annan explained that in such situations, national sovereignty needs to be weighed and balanced against individual sovereignty – which meant, in effect, that individual sovereignty had, and continues to take primacy over state sovereignty. This paved the way for the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. The norm contends that a state has a duty overruling the individual sovereignty quotient, to protect its people from mass atrocities. The norm further adds that the International Community has the duty to protect a people from mass atrocities. When the state fails to do the needful, the international community has to intervene to protect the suffering masses. The application of R2P, as it has come to be known, has put a caveat on the abusive use of national sovereignty by dictatorial regimes as a shield to holding them accountable for gross violations against their own people.</p>
<p>But R2P is still a norm, and Humanitarian Intervention has not been legalized. Where does R2P end, and where does Humanitarian Intervention begin? Are they different, or are they the same?</p>
<p>The UN Charter in article 2 (4) prohibits as a general principle the use or resort to force to resolve problems or disputes between states. Article 51 of the Charter is the only exception to article 2 (4) of the Charter where a state acts in self defence. Nevertheless, the rights of a country to intervene to protect its citizens abroad have been invoked in many instances since 1945 to justify the use of force in some instances. On the one hand, such intervention is acceptable if undertaken with the consent of the state concerned. But, there have been instances where intervention has been forceful and without the authority of the countries concerned – such as the Belgian Intervention in the Congo in 1960 during the Stanleyville civil disturbances presumably to protect Belgian citizens, the intervention by France and Britain in Egypt in 1956, the Stanleyville intervention in 1964 by Belgium and the US, the US intervention in Dominican Republic in 1965, the Israelis in Entebbe airport in 1976, US invasion of Grenada in 1983, the US invasion of Panama in 1989, US landing in Liberia in 1990 to evacuate US citizens and Belgian, French and US landing in Kanombe Airport in Rwanda in 1994 to evacuate their citizens .</p>
<p>The radical individualization of international law, the gradual birth of the individual as a subject of international Law has slowly allowed for a liberal interpretation in favour of authorizing humanitarian intervention. This perspective views an attack on the citizens of a country abroad as an attack for the purposes of the exception to article 2(4) of the UN Charter to be invoked. Though, technically, the protection or rescue of nationals in danger or threat of danger abroad does not strictly fit as an exception to article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it is justified under the principle of necessity. It goes without saying, thus, that the intervention should be limited to the mission and commensurate with the means needed to rescue them.</p>
<p>Considering this, one can say that Humanitarian Intervention derives normative acceptability and permission from the “Responsibility to Protect” principle. That national sovereignty should be no basis for a country to indulge in unabashed autocide and mass atrocities against its own people is a premise that is oft cited when humanitarian intervention is taken up. This principle is morally valid in theory. National sovereignty does not, and should not provide a dictatorial regime any protection to unleash mass atrocities against its own people.</p>
<p>However, reality shows that it would be naïve to claim that foreign intervention is prompted by Western leaders’ concern about protecting civilian lives, and solely by this responsibility to protect. States are driven by many concerns that include a cost-benefit analysis of sorts, explaining what they can gain from an intervention – since they certainly are investing plenty into the process. This can easily lead to a state of hypocrisy and double-standards regarding military intervention. People have asked of the US, for instance, why they chose Bosnia and Slovakia but did nothing for Rwanda.</p>
<p>This has a lot to do with the fact that neither R2P nor Humanitarian Intervention has any legal streamlining behind them. R2P being a norm, gives way for policy and national vested interests to overrule pressing concerns elsewhere. No legal sanction for either principle implies a scenario that is bereft of any constant yardsticks for practice to adhere to. Until the two principles are co-opted into a legal document that authorizes and regulates their use in International Practice, this state of discretion-based conduct will prevail.</p>
<p> Read <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Post 1,</a> <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">Post 2</a> and <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/grounds-that-should-underlie-humanitarian-intervention" target="_blank">Post 3</a> of this series.</p>
<p> </p>Grounds that should underlie Humanitarian Intervention.tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-12-03:6428686:BlogPost:139172012-12-03T05:30:00.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>In the last <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">post</a>, I spoke about the principles that should ideally underlie an endeavour of humanitarian intervention, and perhaps, manifest in any overarching legislation that aspires to cover the issue.</p>
<p>Primarily, an intervention on humanitarian grounds must pursue a <b>“just cause”</b>. A situation warranting intervention could be anything from a state representing…</p>
<p>In the last <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">post</a>, I spoke about the principles that should ideally underlie an endeavour of humanitarian intervention, and perhaps, manifest in any overarching legislation that aspires to cover the issue.</p>
<p>Primarily, an intervention on humanitarian grounds must pursue a <b>“just cause”</b>. A situation warranting intervention could be anything from a state representing the proclivity towards large-scale human rights abuses, genocide, ethnic cleansing, or a state where such things have already begun taking place, or a situation where the state has collapsed and its people are in danger. It is necessary to evaluate the facts particular to each situation - only when a state is found either incapable, or capable but unwilling, to rise to the challenge and to help its people, that external intervention would be justified.</p>
<p>Secondly, there should be an <b><i>authority to authorize intervention</i></b>. Prior to authorization, as much as possible, it would be vital to keep the analysis of each situation as objective as possible. It is not that a state evaluating the situation under the aegis of the Security Council should be totally apathetic to what its own interests are, while deciding whether a case is fitting enough to warrant intervention. A state may well do so, but must not allow its own vested interests to outweigh a genuine case made for intervention. In the event that the Security Council is either not able to act, or does not act quickly enough, the onus could fall on the General Assembly, which could deal with the issue in the course of an emergency situation, in keeping with the Uniting for Peace Resolution.</p>
<p>Thirdly, there <b><i>must necessarily be a bona fide intention while intervening</i></b>. There have been instances of intervention on humanitarian grounds have been perceived as nothing more than a quest for regime change - such as the Western Interventions in Iraq and Libya. There is every truth in that a state itself being an inanimate entity, acts through its leaders. Leaders represent the “intention” of the state they lead, which, for all practical purposes, is a psychological factor that cannot quite be culled out or understood in complete sense. There is no sure fire method to keep the intent on the good side. There is seldom possibility of complete detachment to the cause, and it is not a completely rigid rule that a state can indulge in humanitarian intervention only if it is completely disinterested. Being a psychological facet, intentions are often mixed. A state that is bound to intervene in another state is obviously putting in resources that do impinge on its economic abilities, and naturally, would be more willing to intervene when it has multiple reasons for it, and reasons that would, in some way, benefit it. The preponderance of probability is the guiding factor, and as long as the major intention is to avert disaster and alleviate the victims of the disaster, a state could be permitted to intervene in another state.</p>
<p>There should be a <b><i>probability of success, or</i></b> <b><i>reasonable success</i></b> in either bringing the crisis to a halt, or, in averting the further mounting of tensions. If there is every sign to suggest that the proposed intervention has a tendency to make matters worse and increase the conflict, it cannot be taken forwards. Sometimes, it is not possible to accurately predict the plausible outcome of intervention. In such events, it is essential to ensure that all activity in pursuit of the intervention keep close to permitted standards, and not descend into a catalyst that would worsen the situation on ground.</p>
<p>The <b><i>intervention should be peaceful, using force only as the last resort</i></b>. Non-military options need to be exhausted entirely, and only when they fail to achieve results, should force be contemplated. However, where the situation is so pressing, where danger is so imminent, and there is neither any time nor room to try every other measure first, force may be permitted to be used. To work effectively, the yardstick for permitted modalities of operation would necessitate a definitive and concrete enumeration of the constituents of the term “humanitarian” under the rubric of the law. In general parlance, the term implies any content comprising the right ethics, concerns, affections and actions towards one’s fellowmen. Naturally, using military force could wind up claiming more civilian lives than intended, and thus, a standard must be set.</p>
<p>If there is a need to use force, it should be <b><i>proportionate force</i></b>. The only acceptable form of force till date is the use of force in self-defence, countering an armed attack. Per Article 51, the force used as self-defence must essentially be proportionate to the force that was used in the armed attack. This is an oft-emphasized rule, be it in customary law or in judicial opinion. As to what is proportionate, only an analysis of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case could prove useful in determining the quantum of force to be used.</p>
<p>The fact is that humanitarian intervention is here to stay- and instead of the attaining absolute good by trying to rid international relations of it, it makes more sense to allow the lesser evil of streamlined and legally regulated humanitarian intervention to continue. It is high time that a legal instrument be drawn up to govern humanitarian intervention. When humanitarian intervention is accommodated under the rubric of the law with a clearly enunciated ‘expected yardstick’ to adhere to, its practical implementation can be subjected to control, and can be streamlined to bring in good results.</p>
<p></p>
<p>Read <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Post 1</a> and <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/legally-regulate-rather-than-outlaw" target="_blank">Post 2</a> of this series.</p>Legally Regulate, rather than Outlawtag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-11-26:6428686:BlogPost:134872012-11-26T17:33:52.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Last Post</a>, I spoke about Humanitarian Intervention and explained that though law does not permit it, practice shows that it does exist.</p>
<p>Having established the fact that Humanitarian Intervention does indeed exist, the issue now is not whether a state should intervene or not, rather, what the state that intervenes should conform to. Over the last 40 years, a number of…</p>
<p>In my <a href="http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/humanitarian-intervention-exists" target="_blank">Last Post</a>, I spoke about Humanitarian Intervention and explained that though law does not permit it, practice shows that it does exist.</p>
<p>Having established the fact that Humanitarian Intervention does indeed exist, the issue now is not whether a state should intervene or not, rather, what the state that intervenes should conform to. Over the last 40 years, a number of governments have justified unilateral military action with reference to the “customary law” of military humanitarian intervention in one form or another, and without exception, the international community has refused to recognize these actions as legitimate. But this “customary law” is not “written” or “codified” and offers no guidance to the manner in which the intervention itself should be conducted.</p>
<p>The conspicuous lack of legally “binding” material governing humanitarian intervention has led to a situation of marked chaos. Article 2(4) does not suffuse any intervention on humanitarian grounds with legality. In the <b><i>Nicaragua Case</i></b>, the ICJ explicitly ruled that the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure respect for human rights. The ICJ added that that there is no general right of intervention in international law, and therefore, intervention violated international law. Scholarly writings and perspectives are divided on the legality of intervention on humanitarian grounds, and the law as it stands notes that any military intervention on humanitarian or related grounds, violates international law.</p>
<p>Even in practice, many states are both wary, and uncomfortable with the way Humanitarian Intervention can go, in practice. In theory, the ideals are lofty, the intentions are creditable and the proposed methods are fantastic. But when they translate into practice, the issues at stake are plenty – the collateral damage is heavy, the basic essence of a state’s existence is assaulted by the damage to its sovereign and territorial integrity, and there is always a sense of “how much is enough”, that stands out as a niggling feeling when it comes to morals.</p>
<p>So why not “outlaw” humanitarian intervention altogether, then? For the simple reason that one of the special characteristics of International Law lies in that violations of law may lead to the formation of a new law, so that an international custom could be intentionally created. The ground reality outweighs the dictates of the legal regime, and therefore, it is time that humanitarian law be legally regulated, instead of outlawed.</p>
<p>Self-defence, the only legally recognized exception to the prohibition on the use of force is governed by a five-pronged procedural mandate that functions as a precondition. A similar legal framework propping humanitarian intervention would be in order, to bridle the implementation under the rubric of the law.</p>
<p>A proper course of action within the framework of the law should essentially provide for a mandate that requires adherence to six principles.</p>
<p>The legal instrument must ideally mandate:</p>
<ol>
<li>Just cause.</li>
<li>Prior and mandatory authorization from a multilateral body</li>
<li>Bona fide intention.</li>
<li>Probability of Success.</li>
<li>It must not involve the use of force, except as a last resort.</li>
<li>If force is used, it must be necessary and proportionate to the degree of graveness in the situation.</li>
</ol>
<p>The six grounds that should in effect be the key drivers behind intervention on humanitarian grounds will be discussed in the next post.</p>
<p> </p>Humanitarian Intervention Existstag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-11-19:6428686:BlogPost:131822012-11-19T05:36:53.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>“Humanitarian intervention” is a mechanism relied upon to prevent or stop a gross violation of human rights in a state, where either the state is incapable of doing the needful for its people, or, where the state is unwilling to do the needful for its people or may be the perpetrator of human rights abuses against its people. In terms of the intent, it differs from illegal intervention in that the ultimate gain of a humanitarian intervention is for the people of the state intervened into.…</p>
<p>“Humanitarian intervention” is a mechanism relied upon to prevent or stop a gross violation of human rights in a state, where either the state is incapable of doing the needful for its people, or, where the state is unwilling to do the needful for its people or may be the perpetrator of human rights abuses against its people. In terms of the intent, it differs from illegal intervention in that the ultimate gain of a humanitarian intervention is for the people of the state intervened into. Practice thus far shows that most states would ideally prefer to secure UN authorization for intervention on the basis of humanitarian considerations.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Although technically, the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by one state in violation of another state’s political independence and territorial integrity under Article 2(4), the shades of black and white on paper have been merged and painted into gray in reality. Despite the prohibition, the intervention of one state in the territorial sovereignty or political independence of another state has happened plenty of times. There have been instances of covert intervention through coercive policies through withholding privileges or benefits, in a bid to make another state change its political or economic policy. These forms of intervention have remained untouched by <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml">Article 2(4)</a> because of the “force” element as required by the article’s oft accepted interpretation, being conspicuous by its absence. However, the evolution of intervention on humanitarian grounds when it involves military force, would be tantamount to a violation of Article 2(4). The only exception on paper, to Article 2(4) is <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml">Article 51</a>, which allows self-defence in response to an armed attack- also echoed under the portals of customary international law and judicial opinion. However, with the Security Council authorizing some interventions on humanitarian grounds, and with some other instances of unilateral and unauthorized interventions, reality has suggested the evolution of what should reasonably be accepted as another exception.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Many scholars identify the 1990s as a ‘decade of humanitarian intervention’. The UN has authorized intervention for humanitarian grounds in Yugoslavia in 1999, Somalia in 1992, and Sierra Leone in 1999. During the 1990s, even when the specific action was not authorized by the Security Council, intervention occurred, such as the establishment of no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq in 1991 and 1992, the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs by the NATO in 1995, and the NATO’s Kosovo campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. Some instances of intervention though unauthorized, have been declared legitimate- like the NATO Intervention in Kosovo, in 1999. More recently, the military intervention in Libya, though frowned upon by several states in the international community, can be said to be “lawful” since it was authorized by the Security Council in Resolution 1973, in ostensible exercise of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>There are arguments in support of humanitarian intervention- “<i>We can’t stand and watch when a state is faced with an extreme humanitarian crisis.” “How can we let mass slaughter happen? How can we let people die?</i>” But, most times, this implies the invasion of a sovereign state- an issue which has its own arguments in its support- “<i>How can we justify invading a sovereign state even if it is for humanitarian purposes?” “Who has the right to decide if a situation is ripe enough to warrant an intervention?” “What principles govern the modality of intervention?”</i> The scholarly arguments on both sides- from those supporting and those against humanitarian intervention, have considerable weight, and the debate can go on for years.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>With the Responsibility to Protect being endorsed in the World Summit, 2005, the importance of humanitarian intervention was amplified- if the international community has an obligation, a responsibility to protect, how else can they act on this responsibility, but by intervention? The “Responsibility to Protect” notes that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility. A state is obligated to take care of its people, and owes its people that. But when a state fails or refuses to do this, per the Responsibility to Protect, the state’s responsibility can be said to “devolve” on the international community. This makes the consideration of humanitarian intervention in terms of state sovereignty out of step with the realities of international relations and international law. However, reality warrants such a consideration, since, no matter how much one may say that sovereignty cannot be violated, there is a general consensus amongst most members of the international community that states do not have the right to do whatever they want to the humans living within their boundaries. Therefore, a state cannot simply subject its people to wanton human rights abuses, violence and massacre and lay claim that what it does is its own business. From a moral standpoint, side-stepping sovereignty itself is acceptable in the wake of a greater concern where people are subjected to gross human rights abuses.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>As Noam Chomsky put it, <i>The first thing about Humanitarian Intervention is that it exists</i>.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>Is the Al-Qaeda rising, again?tag:www.globalethicsnetwork.org,2012-11-13:6428686:BlogPost:133112012-11-13T05:12:20.000ZKirthi Jayakumarhttp://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profile/KirthiJayakumar
<p>When the Arab Spring began, there was a lot of speculation as to the future of the Al Qaeda. Most believed that the organization would die down when the first waves of the revolutions in the Middle East came about, as the Al Qaeda was still nursing wounds from the death of its leader Osama bin Laden. The Arab Spring was perceived as a new channel for the angst of the disgruntled youth in the Middle East, who were otherwise becoming recruits in the Al Qaeda – being disillusioned with the lack…</p>
<p>When the Arab Spring began, there was a lot of speculation as to the future of the Al Qaeda. Most believed that the organization would die down when the first waves of the revolutions in the Middle East came about, as the Al Qaeda was still nursing wounds from the death of its leader Osama bin Laden. The Arab Spring was perceived as a new channel for the angst of the disgruntled youth in the Middle East, who were otherwise becoming recruits in the Al Qaeda – being disillusioned with the lack of education, employment and empowerment.</p>
<p>This would have been the case had there been success in the reinstatement of a regime of the people, for the people and by the people. So far, Tunisia has been the only country that made a comfortable transition to a post-revolution regime. Egypt had toppled Mubarak, and in Libya, Gaddhafi was killed, but both countries have suffered in a post-revolution setting, as leadership remains a much contested issue. Syria still continues in a state of chaotic conflict. Somalia’s al-Shabab, an affiliate of the Al Qaeda has possibly found a schism developing in its midst. Mali is now on the brink of chaos, and is the subject of the UN and ECOWAS attention in what maybe a possible case of intervention. The continued Islamist presence in the region is cause for concern, reminiscent of the time when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996.</p>
<p>As Mali stands on the brink of a possible intervention, militants have threatened to march on Bamako, and have begun building their forces up. It appears that there are militants coming in from every quarter. Mali’s situation began with Gaddhafi’s fall. As the dictator was slain, a hoard of well-armed Tuareg fighters came into Mali, reigniting a separatist rebellion in the North. Earlier this year, a couple of Malian soldiers of the lower ranks managed to successfully topple the government in Mali, simply because, among other reasons, they were fed up of the Tuaregs who had gained strength while they themselves only wielded poor weapons. When Mali’s military was distracted with the coup, the Tuareg rebels went on a rampaging offensive, happily seizing vast portions of territory in the north and declaring an independent state of Azawad. Soon after, the gains made by the Tuareg movement were violently usurped by an Islamist faction known as Ansar Eddine, linked to AQIM. This faction now holds in its control some of the most significant northern towns. Its militant hardliners are seeking to impose a puritanical version of Islam on the local population. Cultural property has taken a beating in the process, and a harsh implementation of Islamic justice that includes stoning and amputations as means of punishment has been introduced. There is no doubt that this will not remain confined to Northern Mali.</p>
<p>A plethora of affiliated groups in Mali have actually gone onto reviving the Al-Qaeda’s presence in North Africa – which up until now, had been idle because of the long-drawn and unwinnable war with Algeria. The AQIM wields a certain Algeria-centric policy which has been its Achille’s heel – that the Algerian fighters dominating the scene have narrowly focused on overthrowing the Algerian regime and implementing an Islamic state is reason enough for its myopia. More recently, Algeria has announced that the AQIM was neutralized – and is on its way to a more regional phase.</p>
<p>With this development, there is a new trend. Many militant groups in Africa are beginning to see their role in both, a regional and global setting, and are discarding their heretofore religious considerations – like the Boko-Haram in Nigeria and the al-Shabaab in Somalia – and are working to become stronger limbs of the Al-Qaeda. This is a paradigm shift that has both, ideological and operational connotations.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that the advance of the Al-Qaeda affiliates into Mali has had much to do with the Arab Spring – though this should not shoot down the value of these revolutions for the people behind them. Most terror outfits have begun aligning themselves with the Al-Qaeda in a manner to project a newfound allegiance of unshakeable faithfulness. Most countries where the al-Qaeda is resurgent are fragile, and either on the brink of failure, or have already failed as states. The repertoire is huge – it includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and now, Mali. Besides the growing power of the outfit, these countries have the common thread of governance problems, resource scarcity, humanitarian crises, poverty and conflict connecting them.</p>
<p>Expenditure for military purposes wouldn’t make much of a difference in making the region inhospitable to the Al-Qaeda. A wholesome approach that involves all actors alone can free the vulnerable myriads.</p>
<p> </p>