Monthly Newsletter

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of the Strategic Studies InstituteArea(s) of Expertise: Strategic theory and practice; national security and strategic planning; National Security Law

Phone: (717) 245-4212

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., became the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute in May 2000. He held the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research Chair at the U.S. Army War College. His Army career included a combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command and staff assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts and Assessments Division and the Conventional War Plans Division of the Joint Staff, he collaborated in the development of documents such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Military Net Assessment, national security directives, and presidential decision directives. He also was Director of Military Requirements and Capabilities Management at the U.S. Army War College. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College. He holds an MBA from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and a J.D. from Widener University School of Law. He is a member of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey bars. He has published extensively in the areas of national security and military strategy formulation, future military requirements and strategic planning.

SSI books and monographs by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

April 01, 2000

Authored by COL Thomas Jordan, Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has launched an ambitious planning initiative that could have a major impact upon how resources are allocated among the military departments and the combatant commands. This monograph addresses how well Theater Engagement Planning methodology has been designed and implemented and offers recommendations to improve the existing process.

August 01, 1998

Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.
The lynch-pin in the power projection strategy of the United States is a completely transformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The authors recommend that USACOM should be further transformed into a "Joint Forces Command." Their analysis exposes the need for a significant review of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and a reexamination of some of the fundamental tenets underlying the structure and command.

June 01, 1998

Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Steven Metz.
Nonlethal technology, concepts and doctrine may provide the Army a way to retain its political utility and military effectiveness in a security environment characterized by ambiguity and the glare of world public opinion. To explore this, the Army is undertaking programs and initiatives which may make it the driving force in nonlethality.

June 01, 1997

Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr..
Professor Douglas Lovelace articulates the exigent need to begin preparing the U.S. armed forces for the international security environment which will succeed the post-Cold War era. He defines national security interests, describes the future international security environment, identifies derivative future national security objectives and strategic concepts, and discerns the military capabilities

August 01, 1996

Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr..
The increased unification the Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to bring to the Department of Defense was considered too extreme by some, but insufficient by others. Professor Douglas Lovelace assesses many of the act's major provisions.

March 01, 1996

Authored by Dr. William T. Johnsen, Dr. Douglas V. Johnson, II, Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Steven Metz, LTC James Kievit.
Armies historically have been criticized for preparing for the last war. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. Army has broken this pattern and created a force capable of winning the next war. But, in an era characterized by a volatile international security environment, accelerating technological advances (particularly in acquiring, processing, and disseminating information), the emergence of what some are calling a "revolution in military affairs," and forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources, it seems ill-advised to plan only for the "next Army."

October 01, 1995

Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.
The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level.

September 01, 1995

Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.
The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans.

August 01, 1995

Authored by Dr. Steven Metz, Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Douglas V. Johnson, II, Dr. William T. Johnsen, LTC James Kievit.
For nearly two centuries, the principles of war have guided practitioners of the military art. During the last 55 years the principles of war have been a key element of U.S. Army doctrine, and recently they have been incorporated into other Service and Joint doctrines. The turn of the 21st century and the dawn of what some herald as the "Information Age," however, may call into question whether principles originally derived in the 19th century and based on the experience of "Industrial Age" armed forces still hold. Moreover, despite their long existence, the applicability of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare has not been the subject of detailed analysis or assessment.