Center for World Conflict and Peace

Thursday, January 7, 2016

Over the past week, Brad Nelson, CWCP President and
Co-Founder (and adjunct professor of political science at Saint Xavier
University) and Yohanes Sulaiman, CWCP Vice President and Co-Founder (and Lecturer
at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani) discussed over e-mail the infamous Islamic
State, or ISIS.

Brad Nelson: We haven't spent much time on the blog
discussing ISIS. Given the plethora of ISIS-related events in the news, it's
about time we do so. So, just to make sure that our readers are all caught up,
let's start with the basics. What is ISIS? How would you define that group? And
how is it different from al-Qaeda?

Yohanes Sulaiman: The more I read about ISIS, the more interesting
I find the group. ISIS is popularly known as a group of radical Jihadists who
rule its territory with terror.

At the same time, I think ISIS is less of a religious-based
terrorist group than the remnants of a deep state that has gone underground.
Unlike al-Qaeda, which to some degree is dominated by religious zealots; for
ISIS, religion is important, but not that important, considering former
Saddam's Iraqi intelligence/military officers basically became the core of this
movement. In fact, I am not sure how important al-Baghdadi is, aside from just
being a "big brother" figure.

As a result, I think we have a different fight going on
here. In the case of al-Qaeda, cut the head and all is gone. I think al-Qaeda
still has not recovered from the assassination of Osama bin Laden. If I am
right, that ISIS is actually a deep state apparatus, then ISIS is far more
dangerous than al-Qaeda, which to some degree is contrary to the common wisdom:
many think ISIS will be destroyed simply because it is too radical for its own
good, while al-Qaeda can survive far much longer.

BN: Here is how I think of ISIS: it's an insurgent group
that's fighting against government and allied forces, as well as other forces
of course, in Iraq and Syria. It's also a state. ISIS has its own governing
body, laws and punishment mechanisms, military force, currency, PR-machine, and
sources of revenue, among other things. Surely, this state has come into
existence illegally and no one recognizes it, but it's there. Lastly, it's a terrorist
organization, as the attacks in Paris, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, and San
Bernadino attest.

Now, it can be argued that ISIS is suffering on all three
dimensions--at least at the moment. It's losing territory and fighters, losing
revenue, as oil facilities have been destroyed, and losing its grip over the
people, as citizens and even some ISIS Jihadis caught in the actual Islamic
State want to leave. Moreover, al-Baghdadi recently put out a video trying to
rally Muslims to fight for ISIS and to launch attacks in their homelands. This
has been viewed by terrorist experts as a sign of ISIS's current desperation.

As we know, ISIS was formally al-Qaeda in Iraq, thus an
off-shoot or affiliate of al-Qaeda Central. The story of ISIS deciding to split
and rebrand itself, as well as the ex-communication of ISIS from the al-Qaeda
family, has typically emphasized ISIS's excessive barbarity--that there were
disagreements over ISIS's austere vision of the world and its willingness to
torture and kill all infidels, even fellow Muslims; ISIS leaders and followers
thought it all necessary, though al-Qaeda saw it as bad for the brand. There's
even the popular argument, put forward by Greame Wood, that ISIS, relative to
al-Qaeda, is much more of an apocalyptic religious cult.

I see it differently. The main difference is that ISIS is far
less religiously pure than al-Qaeda; and relatedly, as a whole, ISIS is not
nearly as ideologically cohesive as many believe. Many of ISIS' followers know
very little about Islam and the Koran. There are even reports of some of the
Paris attackers having "Islam for Dummies" books in their possession.
What ISIS seems to be attracting is a motley crew of the angry, alienated, and
criminal, especially the latter. Terror experts have observed that quite a few
ISIS recruits and foot soldiers are gangsters who dabble in things like the
drug trade and robberies. I see quite a bit of John Mueller's argument about the
centrality of "Thugs, Criminals and Hooligans" in violent incidents--from
his 2000 International Security article and his book Remnants of War--in ISIS.

YS: Frankly, I don't think that members of al-Qaeda are more
knowledgeable than ISIS in term of religious instruction. Based on what we know
of their franchise all over the world (e.g. Boko Haram and Jamaah Islamiyah),
most of their recruits don't know much about theology. Exhibit A: there were no
theology students among the 19 suicide attackers on 9/11. Both ISIS and al-Qaeda
dip from the same recruitment pool, and this is why al-Qaeda is losing: ISIS is
flashier and cooler and, more importantly, winning.

The main difference between al-Qaeda and ISIS is that the
former still has religious thinkers on its board because it’s an extremist
fundamentalist group; ISIS, on the other hand, like I mentioned earlier, was
created from the remnants of Saddam Hussein's deep state, and the core of the
deep state (and ISIS) is the secular intelligence apparatus. Thus, you could
have a very high ranking ISIS leader who used to be a high ranking officer in
Saddam's intelligence apparatus, who wasn't religiously observant. In fact, when this former Saddam official was finally captured, the one book that wasn't found
on him was a Qur'an.

BN: So what are your thoughts about the Paris and San
Bernardino attacks? And have the media and analysts missed anything in their
assessments of both incidents?

YS: I think the media has thoroughly dissected these two
cases, from the dysfunctional law enforcement in Belgium to the missing warning
signs in the terrorists’ Facebook posts. My question is that with all the pipe
bombs the two terrorists were supposedly making, why carry out a mass shooting?
I think it was a spur of a moment crime, and they probably had different target
in mind.

And actually this shows that badly planned attacks can still
cause a lot of deaths if the perpetrators have the proper weapon. Acquiring and
shooting guns is relatively easy. But if they decide to bomb a mall or some
other soft location, it would take much more preparation and effort and there
might be a higher risk of arrest.

BN: Here’s what struck me. One of the narratives after both attacks
was that ISIS was now going global. After all, it seemed like ISIS was consumed
with establishing, expanding and consolidating its control over areas in Iraq
and Syria. The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino and the downed Russian airliner,
so went the conventional wisdom, show that maybe ISIS has its eye on local
matters--its caliphate--as well as global bullies and infidels--France, the US
and Russia. Another suggestion has been that ISIS launches these attacks so as
to distract its faithful from the losses it’s suffered in 2015 and to boost
morale. Perhaps, but is ISIS now chewing off more than it can handle? Was it or
is it currently ready for what lies ahead. Arguably, ISIS has provoked--whether
intentionally or unintentionally, or a combination--more countries to take the
ISIS threat more seriously, to the point that we might have already witnessed
the apex of ISIS.

YS: On biting more than it can handle: yes and no. Yes, in that
everyone on the planet is out to get ISIS. While the Taliban or al-Qaeda still,
arguably, receive some tacit support from a state, or at least a powerful
element within the state, ISIS, as far as I know, does not really have a state
supporting them -- well, arguably Syria, where Bashar is currently using ISIS
to tar entire opposition with the same broad brush, or, according to Russia's
insinuations, Turkey, because of getting profit from the illegal oil trade. But
I'd make an argument that it is not so much real support than war
profiting/opportunism, not unlike the dealings between the Serbs, Bosnians, and
Croats militias/criminal gangs during the height of Balkan conflict.

But at the same time, ISIS benefits from the fact that no
country is willing to put boots on the ground, or to strictly target it.
Russia and Syria, I argue, are far more interested in keeping them alive to
become a bogeyman to prop up Bashar's regime. Despite the downing the airliner,
Putin, I think, considers ISIS far more useful alive than dead, at least for
now. Of course, there are repercussions, but Putin is a long-term player, and
he will settle this once he is done with Syria and Turkey. The US? Well, Obama
currently has zero credibility in the region and he'd prefer the Iraqis to do
the heavy lifting, but in the end, despite the Iraqis' gains in the past couple
of weeks, it will not last, simply because Iraq at this point is a quasi-state,
unable to completely impose order. The EU? Not likely. Saudis? They fear Iran
more than ISIS, for sure.

Of course, the question is what ISIS itself thinks. I think
the leadership believes that ISIS is in quite desperate straits. The terror
attacks are calculated to inspire, to get more recruits on board, and at the
same time broaden their appeals (to e.g. Boko Haram or al Shabaab) as to
supplant al-Qaeda. It’s probably the case that the rank and file are
over-confident in their abilities to withstand any attacks from the infidels --
e.g. they believe that they are impervious to bullets, etc., thus willingly
approve the leaders' decision as actually a way to broaden the scope of their
attacks.

BN: Well, ISIS does receive a material boost from Turkey, as
black market oil, much like Putin suggested, has found its way into Turkey; not
to mention, there's the distinct possibility that Turkey, whether knowingly or
not, gives ISIS sanctuary on its turf. Syria, and to extent Russia, has helped
ISIS for more than a year by not targeting the group, focusing instead on the
so-called "moderates" and their strongholds. But there's no
cooperation between Assad and ISIS, as has been rumored by
conspiratorial-types. Max Abrahms has addressed this repeatedly on his Twitter
feed.

Anyway, one of the things that your comment assumes is that
ISIS leadership has sanctioned and thought-through all of the recent attacks. I
don't think so. In fact, the evidence to date indicates it's ISIS sympathizers
and followers who are acting on their own. That matters. It matters because it
means that ISIS isn't necessarily directing events, like some evil mastermind;
rather, events are being thrust upon them, from all sorts of directions.

YS: I do agree that ISIS isn't necessarily directing events
but at the same time, it does actively encourage its supporters to hit soft
targets, meaning that ISIS does sanction any attacks committed by its
supporters.

BN: Okay, last topic, which concerns the dreaded questions
about prognostication. Put simply, where is ISIS a year from now? For instance,
what does the group look like, in terms of its organization/structure, its
power, its ability to launch attacks globally, its state in Iraq/Syria, and so
on?

YS: It depends on several factors: whether the US-Iran deal
holds or collapses, Russia's commitments in Syria, and the Saudis-Iran
relationship.

The Iran deal most likely holds and I think, regardless who
succeeds Obama, it would be a bad policy to reverse it, despite that the
enforcement mechanism is purely minimal -- because like it or not, there's no
other option except to bomb Iran to stone age. Plus, Iran does matter to ensure
stability in the region, well except to Saudi Arabia.

Russia will keep attacking but they are not specifically
targeting ISIS. Rather, Moscow would prefer to focus on anti-Assad groups,
which to some degree might cause many groups to gravitate further to ISIS.

So it is a very mixed bag. ISIS’s ability to launch
global attacks is based on whether it remains a credible actor, in the sense
that they are viewed within Jihadi circles as winning, victorious—which, in
turn, helps the group to attract more support and fighters. But once ISIS is
seen as losing, not dissimilar to al Qaeda, it would lose its ability to launch
global attacks. Since it is getting harder and harder to gain spectacular
victories like the battle for Mosul, they will up their push to persuade their
sympathizers to launch more attacks.

To answer your question: the group will probably be hemmed in,
but it will end up like the Taliban: entrenched in areas that are difficult to
control effectively. ISIS has suffered a lot of turnover in its leadership due
to deaths, so it will end up having lots of battlefield commanders, who are
more interested in short term victories.

BN: I tend to agree with your overall point: that the war in
Syria and Iraq will remain frozen conflict and ISIS will have a continued, but
gradually shrinking, strong on-the-ground presence, or strongholds, in both
countries. Of course, a key is how much turf ISIS loses this year. Mostly
thanks to the Kurds, ISIS lost about 25% of its occupied territory in 2015; how
much more does it lose in 2016? I'm interested to see how ISIS reacts to, and is
impacted by, a steady stream of battle losses--if that indeed comes to pass.
Does it violently lash out even more in the West to compensate for the losses?
Do radical Islamists, seeing that victory for ISIS isn't inevitable anymore,
gravitate back to al-Qaeda?

The trajectory of ISIS’s success or failure, as you
suggested, will be shaped by a number of factors. Especially in light of this past weekend's news, one of the things I'm looking at is the Sunni-Shia divide, with
Saudi Arabia and Iran as the leaders of each sect, each of which is seeking to
be the regional hegemon in the Middle East. This divide has shaped--really,
prolonged--the conflict in Syria. As you know, the tit-for-tat confrontation
between Riyadh and Tehran has escalated because of the execution of a Shia
cleric by Saudi Arabia--which has triggered Shia protests throughout the Middle
East, the complete diplomatic estrangement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and a
deterioration between Saudi Arabia’s allies, like Bahrain and Sudan and the
UAE, and Iran. These events will probably only serve to intensify the violence
in the Middle East and make it even more difficult to stop and solve the civil
war in Syria. How all of this impacts ISIS will be something to watch going
forward.

BN: What's your take on how the current Iran-Saudi Arabia
spat will impact ISIS?

YS: My gut feeling is that al-Qaeda is on life-support, with
very little initiatives, and out-staged by ISIS. Even al-Qaeda’s affiliates in
Syria were defeated/absorbed by ISIS. There are still other branches, but they
are all doing their own thing with little to no coordination from above. Many
of its affiliates are still aligned with al-Qaeda simply because of old
connections. I would even question whether the head organization could survive
at this rate without its alliance with the Taliban. So I am not sure that even
with the defeat of ISIS, the jihadist community would flock back to al-Qaeda.

ISIS, I think, will try to remain relevant by trying to do
more attacks, especially on Western targets. But with the recent Paris attack,
I think Western intelligence agents are starting to wise up. It will be very
difficult, not impossible but harder, to pull off another Paris.

Still, I think people are underestimating ISIS’s ability to
survive even if Iraq/Syria is pacified. After all, there are still plenty of
failed states in the region: Libya, Sinai Peninsula, and Yemen. Granted, if
ISIS headquarters does move, it will likely be a much different organization, one
that’s most likely not staffed by former Iraqis intelligence personnel. Alas,
that’s part of the adaptation that terror groups face.

The current Iran-Saudi Arabia spat, I think, will have a
greater impact on the stability of Iraq, simply because I doubt the Saudis are
content to see an Iranian dominated regime standing next door. Upping its game to
undermine Iran’s position in Iraq, if this comes to reality, will give much
needed breathing room for ISIS.

BN: You hit on an important point regarding the whack-a-mole
element to today's terrorism, which is abetted by so many weak and failing
states in close proximity to each other. If ISIS gets really squeezed in Iraq
and Syria, it wouldn't surprise me to see its leadership and foot soldiers
gravitate to another landing spot. ISIS has already made in-roads in
Afghanistan and Libya. My guess is Libya, since the group would face a tough
fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

That said, the Saudi Arabia-Iraq imbroglio makes me question
how committed Riyadh is to containing and eliminating ISIS. As you mentioned
above, Iran is the regime's biggest threat and that's what the royal family is
most concerned about. By inflaming the rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia made
just made it easier on itself to get distracted from the global terrorism
issue. In fact, at this moment, it's become a distracting issue for all sorts
of players in the Middle East: local states are taking sides in the dispute and
outside states are seeking to ways to de-escalate the Riyadh-Tehran, as well as
the more general Sunni-Shia, tensions. In my view, the pressure has been
markedly reduced on ISIS right now.

YS: The Saudi philosophy is always "the enemy of my
enemy is my friend," and thus it is willing to fund radical movements or
even armed insurgencies that could bite it in the rear in the future. Granted,
the the US also has this problem (e.g. funding the Mujahedeen back in the 1980s).
But while the US has wised up in the past couple of years, the Saudis seems to
have learned nothing—or maybe they just think that someone else will clean
their mess, I don't know. But my gut feeling is that they will try to increase funding
to the Syrian rebels, regardless of their ideological affiliations, and since
the rebels' loyalties themselves are very fluid, it won't surprise me that some
of the money simply ends up in ISIS coffers--and thus, like you said, helping
putting off the pressure on ISIS. Obviously ISIS doesn't have much love for the
Saudis ruling family, but they hate the Shiites more. And I think the Saudis
think they can just kick that can down the road further.