Campus Watch demands academic integrity in North American Middle East studies (MES) programs. It reviews and critiques MES bias with the aim of improving education – keeping watch on scores of professors at hundreds of universities. Our campus networks, research specialists and advocates confront the anti-Western politicization of scholarship, intolerance of alternative views, and apologetics for Islamism. Campus Watch respects free speech for all – but insists upon reciprocity.

Impact: Victor Davis Hanson, The Hoover Institution – “Campus Watch sheds light on often volatile and intemperate proclamations.” New York Times – Campus Watch monitoring is responsible for “damaging open inquiry and expression.” Ruth Wisse, Harvard – “[MES] benefit[s] from the presence of Campus Watch.”

Danielpipes.org is one of the most accessed sources of specialized information on the Middle East and Muslim history, with over 69 million page views. Daniel Pipes is founder and president of the Middle East Forum – he has served in five presidential administrations and authored sixteen books on the Middle East, Islamism and related topics. The site offers an archive of his writings, along with video and audio of his latest media appearances, and translations of his works in 38 languages.

Islamist Watch unveils and combats internal Islamist forces that exploit the freedoms of Western democracy to undermine from within. Lawful Islamists – in the media, courts, schools, public squares, and ballot boxes – seek the spread of Shari’a as governing law, although it is incompatible with Western democracy. Islamist Watch aims to make Islamists in suits and ties no more acceptable than ones wearing suicide vests – by countering corporate and governmental support, tracking tainted campaign contributions, and enhancing the presence and influence of anti-Islamist Muslims.

The Israel Victory Project steers U.S. policy toward backing an Israel victory over the Palestinians to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Decades of what insiders call “peace processing” have left matters worse than when they started. The time has come for a new approach, a complete re-thinking of the problem that draws on Israel’s earlier and successful strategy of deterrence. Stop pressuring Jerusalem to compromise and make “painful concessions.” Instead, support Israeli victory, convincing Palestinians and others that the Jewish state will endure.

Impact: Launched the bipartisan Congressional Israel Victory Caucus (CIVC) and the Knesset Israel Victory Caucus (KIVC), with 32 and 26 members respectively; influenced President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and order the U.S. embassy moved there (according to The Guardian, Al-Monitor, and NPR).

Jihad Intel provides local law enforcement with tools to detect and prevent Islamist terrorism. At the behest of Islamists and leftists, references to Islam have been removed from law enforcement and national security training materials. Law enforcement needs to know what to look for while searching apartments, cars, computer hard-drives and personal effects of prisoners. Jihad Intel’s gratis database provides them with background, image identifiers and intelligence for over 150 Islamic terror groups, including 87 image identifiers for ISIS.

The Legal Project protects the public discussion of Islam and related topics – if Islamism can not be discussed, it can not be reformed. The project provides a lifeline to the growing number of individuals whose livelihood and freedom are threatened by predatory Islamist lawsuits and malign government policies. It maintains a legal defense fund and a database of pro-bono/reduced-rate attorneys; raises public awareness of the issue; and educates policy-makers on how they can protect this vital speech.

Impact:Djemila Benhabib, author – “From now on freedom of expression will be better off in our democratic society. In helping me, the Middle East Forum's Legal Project has played such an important part in that matter.”

The Washington Project works to translate the Forum’s ideas into U.S. policy. It identifies American interests toward the Middle East, Israel and Islamism, and influences policy-makers through intensive educational efforts in the capital. The project currently focuses on reforming UNRWA by re-defining a “Palestine refugee”; designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization; and finding support for an Israel victory over the Palestinians.

Impact: Held 157 separate meetings in the last year with members of Congress of their staff – impacting UNRWA’s policies, countering Muslim Brotherhood infiltration, and helping to prevent unilateral Palestinian statehood in Obama’s final days.

The Forum sponsors webinars, in-person briefings, and conference calls featuring its staff and fellows, former government officials, scholars, journalists, and others with insights into the Middle East and Islamism. Speakers delve deep into critical issues, surpassing what is found in mass media – and always with an eye toward American interests. Most briefings occur along the New York-Philadelphia-Washington, D.C. corridor.

The Education Fund is a project of the Forum established in 2008 that disburses about $2 million annually in separately earmarked funds to researchers, writers, anti-Islamist Muslims, investigators and activists who work to further the Forum’s mission – promoting American interests in the Middle East and protecting Western values from Middle Eastern threats.

Funds go to some 80 recipients, individuals and organization alike, in the United States and around the world, including: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Some of their efforts are kept confidential to prevent their being exposed to danger.

The Forum supplements its writings with in-depth webinars, briefings and conference calls. Non-partisan specialists take on the Middle East's most controversial and difficult issues with an eye toward American interests – questioning assumptions, provoking thought, and offering new solutions.

The Forum’s activism gets things done – in Congress, on campus, in court, in corporate boardrooms, and beyond. Forum activists have held 157 meetings with members of Congress or their staff, impacting UNRWA’s policies and Muslim Brotherhood infiltration, and promoting Israel victory. It has also won legal victories over Islamists; exposed Islamist-tainted politicians; persuaded corporations to end funding of Islamist groups; and uncovered San Francisco State University’s malign relationship with a Hamas-linked West Bank university.

Middle East Forum activists launch public campaigns to expose, embarrass and pressure Islamist-tainted politicians and corporations, and biased educational institutions, after friendly educational entreaties are refused.

Impact: We were twice attacked by one of the world’s largest charities after we launched a campaign against the Silicon Valley Community Foundation to stop its donations to Islamist groups. Our evidence shows SVCF supporting organizations that “regularly give platforms to speakers who incite hatred against women, Jews, Christians, and the LGBTQ community.”

The Forum Blog brings experts together, virtually, at one convenient blog-like site – a daily must-read for folks seriously interested in the Middle East, and the go-to gathering place when major events occur. A diverse range of specialists participate as members. They review, analyze and debate a wide array of issues, from major regional developments to boutique issues. Entries are short, interesting and controversial, educating policy-makers and the general public.

Full-text of every Quarterly issue since its founding in 1994. A valuable resource for historians and researchers. Read an interview with Charles Krauthammer from 1994; an article by Bernard Lewis from 1998; and commentary by Michael Rubin from 2007.

The Middle East Quarterly, founded in 1994, has become America's most authoritative journal of Middle Eastern affairs. Policymakers, opinion-makers, academics, and journalists turn first to the Quarterly, for in-depth analysis of the rapidly-changing landscape of the world's most volatile region.

The Quarterly, a peer-reviewed publication, welcomes submissions of original articles, and will consider pre-publication of chapters from forthcoming books. Priority is given to timely articles impacting today's critical issues. Detailed guidelines are provided.

Daniel Pipes is founder and publisher of the Quarterly; Efraim Karsh is its editor. They lead the Quarterly’s 17-member Board of Editors, which includes professors, think-tank experts, and former government officials.

Over the past year, Forum experts were quoted 1,226 times by 93 publications, from Agence France Press to The Washington Post. President Daniel Pipes was mentioned in The Economist; and interviewed by media in France, Germany, Italy and Russia; director Gregg Roman and fellow Raymond Stock appeared on Al-Jazeera; fellow Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi was quoted in the New York Times, the Jerusalem Post and the Washington Post, and on CNN; Campus Watch director Winfield Myers was quoted in the Los Angeles Times.

The Forum has been led by Daniel Pipes since its founding in 1994. Its global staff – working 24/7/365 from Philadelphia, as well as Atlanta, Boston, Jerusalem, San Francisco, Tel Aviv, and Washington, D.C. – includes scholars, authors, former government officials, political activists, attorneys, editors, and development professionals.

Tehran Is Winning the War for Control of the Middle East

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is aggressively challenging Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. But is he up to the task?

Saudi Arabia appears to be on a warpath across the Middle East. The Saudi-orchestrated resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, and Saudi officials' bellicose rhetoric after the launch of a ballistic missile targeting Riyadh from Yemen, appear to herald a new period of assertiveness against Iranian interests across the Middle East.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's sudden moves on a variety of fronts may superficially have the feel of Michael Corleone's swift and simultaneous strikes at his family's enemies in the closing frames of The Godfather. Unlike in the film, however, the credits are not about to roll. Rather, these are the opening moves in an ongoing contest — and it is far from clear that the 32-year-old crown prince has found a formula to reverse Iran's advantage.

Let's take a look at the track record so far. The confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is taking place across a swath of the Middle East in which, over the last decade, states have partially ceased to function — Iraq and Lebanon — or collapsed completely, as in the case of Syria and Yemen. A war over the ruins has taken place in each country, with Riyadh and Tehran arrayed on opposing sides in all of them.

Throughout the region, the advantage is very clearly with the Iranians.

So far, in every case, the advantage is very clearly with the Iranians.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah vanquished the Saudi-sponsored "March 14" alliance of political groups that aimed to constrain it. The events of May 2008, when Hezbollah seized west Beirut and areas around the capital, showed the helplessness of the Saudis' clients when presented with the raw force available to Iran's proxies. Hezbollah's subsequent entry into the Syrian civil war confirmed that it could not be held in check by the Lebanese political system.

The establishment of a cabinet dominated by Hezbollah in December 2016, and the appointment of Hezbollah's ally, Michel Aoun, as president two months earlier, solidified Iran's grasp over the country. Riyadh's subsequent withdrawal of funding to the Lebanese armed forces, and now its push for Hariri's resignation, effectively represent the House of Saud's acknowledgement of this reality.

In Syria, Iran's provision of finances, manpower, and know-how to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has played a decisive role in preventing the regime's destruction. The Iranian mobilization of proxies helped cultivate new local militias, which gave the regime access to the manpower necessary to defeat its rivals. Meanwhile, Sunni Arab efforts to assist the rebels, in which Saudi Arabia played a large role, ended largely in chaos and the rise of Salafi groups.

In Iraq, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has developed an officially-sanctioned, independent military force in the form of the 120,000-strong Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). Not all the militias represented in the PMU are pro-Iranian, of course. But the three core Shiite groups of Kataeb Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq answer directly to the IRGC.

Iran also enjoys political preeminence in Baghdad. The ruling Islamic Dawa Party is traditionally pro-Iranian, while the Badr Organization controls the powerful interior ministry, which has allowed it to blur the boundaries between the official armed forces and its militias — thus allowing rebranded militiamen to benefit from U.S. training and equipment.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has been left playing catch up: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited Riyadh in late October to launch the new Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council, the first time an Iraqi premier had made the trip in a quarter-century. But it is not clear that the Saudis have much more up their sleeve than financial inducements to potential political allies.

In Yemen, where the Saudis have tried their hand at direct military intervention, the results have been mixed. The Houthis and their allies, supported by Iran, have failed to conquer the entirety of the county and have been kept back from the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait as a result of the 2015 Saudi intervention. But Saudi Arabia is bogged down in a costly war with no end in sight, while the extent of Iranian support to the Houthis is far more modest.

This, then, is the scorecard of the Saudi-Iranian conflict. So far, the Iranians have effectively won in Lebanon, are winning in Syria and Iraq, and are bleeding the Saudis in Yemen.

In each context, Iran has been able to establish proxies that give it political and military influence in the country. Tehran also has successfully identified and exploited seams in their enemy's camp. For example, Tehran acted swiftly to nullify the results of the Kurdish independence referendum in September and then to punish the Kurds for proceeding with it. The Iranians were able to use their long-standing connection to the Talabani family, and the Talabanis' rivalry with the Barzanis, to orchestrate the retreat of Talabani-aligned Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk in October — thus paving the way for the city and nearby oil reserves to be captured by its allies.

The Saudis have little more than financial inducements to win potential political allies.

There is precious little evidence to suggest that the Saudis have learned from their earlier failures and are now able to roll back Iranian influence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is no better at building up effective proxies across the Arab world, and has done nothing to enhance its military power, since Mohammed bin Salman took the reins. So far, the crown prince's actions consist of removing the veneer of multiconfessionalism from the Lebanese government, and threatening their enemies in Yemen.

Those may be important symbolic steps, but they do nothing to provide Riyadh with the hard power it has always lacked. Rolling back the Iranians, directly or in alliance with local forces, would almost certainly depend not on the Saudis or the UAE, but on the involvement of the United States — and in the Lebanese case, perhaps Israel.

It's impossible to say the extent to which Washington and Jerusalem are on board with such an effort. However, the statements last week by Defense Secretary James Mattis suggesting that the United States intends to stay in eastern Syria, and by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel will continue to enforce its security interests in Syria, suggest that these players may have a role to play.

Rolling back the Iranians will ultimately depend on the involvement of the United States.

Past Saudi behavior might encourage skepticism. Nevertheless, the Iranians here have a clearly visible Achilles' heel. In all the countries where the Saudi-Iran rivalry has played out, Tehran has proved to have severe difficulties in developing lasting alliances outside of Shiite and other minority communities. Sunnis, and Sunni Arabs in particular, do not trust the Iranians and do not want to work with them. Elements of the Iraqi Shiite political class also have no interest of falling under the thumb of Tehran. A cunning player looking to sponsor proxies and undermine Iranian influence would find much to work with — it's just not clear that the Saudis are that player.

Mohammed bin Salman, at least, appears to have signaled his intent to oppose Iran and its proxies across the Arab world. The game, therefore, is on. The prospects of success for the Saudis will depend on the willingness of their allies to engage alongside them, and a steep learning curve in the methods of political and proxy warfare.

Jonathan Spyer, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is director of the Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).