Kosovo: The Way Out of the Quagmire

Kosovo: The Way Out of the Quagmire

The months following the war in Kosovo have been
marred by brewing hostilities between factions in the province and
a proliferation of problems for America and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping force known as KFOR. Just
this month, nine ethnic Albanians died in violence following a
rocket attack on a United Nations bus in which two Serbs were
killed. Dozens have been arrested in demonstrations in Mitrovica, a
city divided into a fiercely embattled Serbian enclave and the
remaining primarily ethnic Albanian community.

In
the most recent confrontation, U.S., British, and French soldiers
have been targeted by angry crowds on both sides. U.S. soldiers
were pelted with stones and bricks during a house-to-house search
for illegal weapons in the Serbian section; French anti-riot police
were forced to fire tear gas into the crowd and suspend the
search.1 The next day,
ethnic Albanians attempting to storm the bridge leading into the
Serbian enclave clashed with British soldiers. As tensions between
the sides escalate, U.S. and KFOR forces are finding it more than
difficult to keep the peace.

The
problems that underlie the conflicts in the Balkans are deep and
intractable. Gross burden-sharing inequities among the NATO
participants of Operation Allied Force, as well as America's
commitment to the peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and Bosnia, have
significant implications for U.S. national security. The drain on
the U.S. armed forces is severely harming military readiness to
fight and win in other contingencies and retarding the
technological basis upon which national security rests. Further,
the Kosovo engagement, which threatens to become a permanent and
costly commitment for the United States, has wedded the
Administration to its failed policy regarding humanitarian
interventions.

Now,
at a time when America should be pulling back its troops, NATO
Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark is calling for additional
allied troops, with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen at
least considering his request.2 But the
intervention has not dissipated the sectarian hatreds that provoke
the continuing instability in Kosovo, and increasing the size of
KFOR is not likely to change that reality.

The
way out of this morass is to give America's European allies greater
responsibility for the military operations in the Balkans. A
mechanism for doing this already exists within NATO: the Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF). This option was ratified at a NATO summit
in Washington in April 1999. It would allow the United States to
draw down its forces in the Balkans, extricating the military from
the pernicious cycle of over-committing forces and then reacting to
the consequences of that over-commitment that now characterizes
U.S. foreign policy.

EFFECTS OF THE BURDEN-SHARING
IMBALANCE

The
Kosovo engagement demonstrates that the concept of a roughly equal
NATO alliance in which members share the burden of defense--always
an ideal prototype--has in fact no bearing on military realities in
Europe. During the war, for example, U.S. intelligence assets
identified almost all the bombing targets in Serbia and Kosovo, and
U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the strike missions and launched
nearly every precision-guided missile.3 The European
contribution to the allied air campaign was technologically
deficient due to the lack of computerized weapons, night-vision
equipment, and advanced communications resources.

U.S.
Air Force General Michael Short, who oversaw the NATO bombing
campaign, has said that the shortcomings of the European
aircraft--such as a lack of night-vision and laser-guided
weapons--were so glaring that he had curtailed their missions to
avoid unnecessary risk.4 Put simply, the
European allies and Canada have done far too little to reconfigure
their militaries for the realities of the post-Cold War world.

The
war in Kosovo also pointed to specific areas in which European
military hardware capabilities were significantly inferior to
America's: strategic transport and logistics (C-17s, rapid sealift,
inflatable fuel tanks, and forward repair facilities); intelligence
(satellites, sensors, and computers); and high-tech weaponry
(precision-guided explosives and cruise missiles). Due to poor
procurement practices, Western Europe's defense budget--which is
two-thirds that of the United States--produces less than one-fourth
of the deployable fighting strength of the U.S. military.5

Technological deficiencies also arise
because the European states simply do not devote enough of their
resources to defense-related research and development. The United
States spends nearly four times as much as its European allies in
this area.6 Overall, the United
States spent 3.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on
defense in 1998, while France spent 2.8 percent, the United Kingdom
2.7 percent, Italy 2 percent, Germany 1.5 percent, and Spain 1.3
percent of their respective GDPs.7 These two
facts--the technological disparity and the differences in defense
spending--have resulted in the burden-sharing chasm that explained
America's military over-commitment in the Kosovo campaign.

NATO
always has been a two-tier rather than a twin-pillar alliance, with
the United States acting as senior partner in the defense burden.
However, Kosovo shows that this military gap has been widening.
This trend, if left unchecked, will have devastating consequences
for the alliance.

Increasingly, Americans resent being asked
to shoulder more than their fair share of the military burden. Such
inequity is not politically sustainable and is a major portion of
the discontent eating away at the heart of NATO. The burden-sharing
disparity must be reversed if the alliance is to
continue playing a pivotal role in U.S. defense and security
calculations. With the passing of the Cold War, America's
geopolitical interests have changed, but the defense habits of its
allies in Europe have not. The problems in Kosovo make it clear
that a crisis within the alliance will be inevitable if the
burden-sharing issue is not resolved.

THE COSTS OF PEACEKEEPING

The
costs of America's involvement in peacekeeping in the Balkans are
not limited to heavy lifting in military matters. Another
consequence of bearing too large a burden is that the ongoing U.S.
peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Bosnia directly threaten
national security.

The
Balkans operations have tied down 10,000 U.S. troops who will not
be available for other contingencies should they develop. The
troops involved in the peacekeeping operations incur significant
combat readiness deficiencies, including losing their fighting
edge, by being required to perform civilian duties.8 For example, rather
than serving as soldiers and maintaining combat skills, the U.S.
troops in Kosovo have served as de facto mayors, engineers, and
even social workers. Such duties, combined with the long commitment
of time for which peacekeeping is notorious, are blunting U.S.
combat readiness.

The
deterioration of machines has proceeded apace along with the
stagnation of the troops as a direct result of the Kosovo
operation. A spare parts shortage in the armed forces, accompanied
by a lack of funding for technology maintenance and development,
threatens current capabilities.

In
1995, the Pentagon reported that it would have to spend at least
$60 billion a year on procurement of new weaponry.9 The Congressional
Budget Office now says that amount is not enough: The United States
must spend $90 billion a year to reach 1995 readiness targets.10 As one recent
article in The Washington Post noted, "Defense officials say they
would have gotten to a larger procurement figure earlier if not for
higher-than-expected operational and maintenance costs, which have
drained money from modernization accounts."11

The
Pentagon believes it missed its procurement targets for the past
five years because of unexpected costs associated with the military
operations in Kosovo and Bosnia. In other words, the United States
has failed to invest in the modernization of its weaponry for the
past five years because of the high costs of its military
commitment in the Balkans. As Kim Holmes of The Heritage Foundation
puts it, "We have failed to invest in our future security because
the Europeans refuse to pay for theirs now."12 Primary national
security imperatives around the world require that the United
States begin to draw down its forces in the Balkans.

THE KOSOVO QUAGMIRE

Although the war in Kosovo unquestionably
showcased America's military supremacy, it regrettably also
illustrated the serious disconnect between military action and
long-lasting geopolitical goals in the Clinton Administration's
foreign policy. For example, the Administration's commitment to the
war and the peacekeeping campaign is based on the flawed assumption
that peaceful coexistence of the hostile ethnic/religious factions
in the Balkans could be achieved by military force. As President
Bill Clinton told the troops in Macedonia after the end of the
war:

Never forget if we do this here...we can
then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or
central Europe or any other place: If somebody comes after innocent
civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race,
their ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our
power to stop it, we will stop it.13

The
sad fact, however, is that the allied victory in the air campaign
did not stop the killing in Kosovo. The reason: Ethnic and/or
religious harmony has rarely existed in the Balkans. Not
surprisingly, the region remains the seething sectarian cauldron it
was before the intervention in Kosovo began. Keeping the United
States military bogged down indefinitely in this quagmire, in a
peacekeeping operation with no end in sight, is wrong.

Indeed, the most serious problem
confronting the U.S. and KFOR troops is sectarian hostility with
deep historical roots. After suffering mightily under Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian-dominated regime, the
Kosovars found themselves in a far more powerful political
position, and many turned on the Serb minority with a vengeance.
The massacre of Serbs by returning Kosovars provoked another mass
exodus from the province; this time, it is the Serbs who flee to
Serbia. Only around 50,000 of the 200,000 Serbs who lived in Kosovo
before the NATO intervention remain there today. The Serbs have
been the victims of at least 36 percent of the 380-odd murders
committed since KFOR arrived in June 1999.14

This
turn of events means that it is the Serbs who are asking, as did
Kosovar Albanians not many months ago, for protection from the
violence and intolerance. Serb leaders in Kosovo have begun to form
their own national council and self-defense corps in defiance of
the U.N. and NATO. They wish to establish self-rule in areas in
which Serbs are heavily concentrated, primarily in the northern
portion of Kosovo along the border with Serbia proper. Creating
secure Serb enclaves and their own protection force, they argue, is
the only way to protect the Serbian population.15

Recent events confirm Serbian fears. On
October 27, 1999, a NATO-escorted convoy of Serbs leaving Kosovo
was attacked in downtown Pec, a Kosovar Albanian stronghold.
Apparently provoked when some of the Serb refugees flashed a
three-finger salute symbolizing Serb nationalism, a crowd of 1,500
ethnic Albanians attacked the convoy, burning 19 vehicles and
injuring 18 Serbs. On February 3, eight were killed and 20 wounded
after a night of shootings and arson in the ethnically divided city
of Mitrovica in the Serb-dominated northern part of Kosovo. On
February 13, Mitrovica erupted for the second time in less than two
weeks. Forty arrests were made (39 ethnic Albanians and 1
Serb).

Even
more disturbing, for the first time ethnic Albanians made Western
peacekeepers (French soldiers) the targets of their rioting. On
February 20, in a renewed outbreak of hostilities, hundreds of
Serbs threw bricks and stones at U.S. soldiers before a French
general ordered a retreat.16

Specific political intimidation of the
remaining Serbian leaders in the province has increased as well.
Long-time Milosevic foe Momcilo Trajkovic, described by the head of
the U.N. mission in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, as "one of our [the
West's] most important allies in our efforts to build a tolerant
and multiethnic Kosovo,"17 was shot and
wounded by two ethnic Albanians at his home on November 1.

The
shooting of the moderate Trajkovic sent an unmistakable message
that Serbs are not safe in Kosovo. According to the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees and the previous Yugoslav census, Kosovo is
93 percent Kosovar Albanian and only 5 percent Serb. The dream of a
harmonious multisectarian Kosovo--one of the Administration's
foremost goals in the intervention--is appearing to be less and
less achievable.

The
United States finds itself tied to a failed policy in the
Balkans--a state of affairs that, given the intractable nature of
the problems in the region, is not likely to change. As America
found in Vietnam, military intervention is not the equivalent of
nation building; the costly intervention is doing nothing to change
the hearts and minds of the people in Kosovo and Serbia. The
peacekeeping efforts have not altered the unwillingness of the
Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Kosovars to live together.

THE CJTF OPTION: A WAY OUT OF KOSOVO

Until now, the 19 member states of NATO
had only two options in a military crisis--either advocate the use
of force and commit troops to a full alliance mission or veto NATO
involvement. Such a rigid decision-making structure was bound to
cause political tensions within the alliance for every such
crisis.

In
April 1999, NATO ratified the new Combined Joint Task Force
mechanism as a third option that adds a needed dimension of
flexibility to alliance operations. Through the CJTF mechanism,
states can decline to participate actively in a specific mission if
they do not feel their vital interests are in danger; but their
opting out of a mission would not stop other NATO members from
participating in an intervention if they chose to do so. The CJTF
initiative was a response to European members' complaints that U.S.
dominance of NATO operational decision-making limited their ability
to respond to crises when European interests were involved but U.S.
interests were not paramount.

By
using the CJTF option, the United States would be able to draw down
its forces in the region, thus partially alleviating the
burden-sharing tensions among the NATO members, lessening the
erosion of U.S. military strength, and extricating America from the
consequences of a failed policy. The CJTF mechanism is an important
innovation; it is designed to reduce the need for the United States
to bear the brunt of the alliance's military burden while giving
the Europeans a greater role in the decision-making process.

This
new organizational military structure offers the European countries
the use of American communications, logistics, and
intelligence-sharing support without requiring that U.S. troops be
directly committed to an operation. CJTFs would allow European
"coalitions of the willing" to use NATO's assets on an ad hoc basis
for specific multinational out-of-area missions. They would remain
dependent on NATO headquarters as well as infrastructure and assets
governed by alliance protocols.

Using the CJTF mechanism in Kosovo would
allow the United States to maintain a small presence in the Balkans
(through supplying intelligence and logistics for the European
ground troops) while disengaging from a primary position of
responsibility in KFOR. The European states would wholly command
the new KFOR mission under nominal NATO auspices.

Creating a CJTF for Kosovo and another
CJTF for Bosnia would give the Europeans greater flexibility to act
in light of their specific interests in the Balkans--interests the
United States may not share in every case. Such geopolitical
considerations differ for the countries of Western Europe that
border on this tumultuous region. The European-controlled CJTFs
would effectively buttress alliance unity by making NATO more of a
true partnership in burden-sharing. It also would extricate the
United States from a region in which it has no real stake but which
threatens military readiness and national security.

Critics may charge that the CJTF option
would destroy U.S. credibility and leadership in the alliance. By
drawing down forces in the region, they will contend, the United
States would endanger its leadership position around the globe.
Regardless of whether the Kosovo engagement was the product of a
miscalculation of Serbian resolve at meetings in Rambouillet to
establish peace, they argue that America should stay the course in
Kosovo or risk losing credibility. Such an argument has not been
heard since the heyday of the Vietnam War.

The
harsh reality is that staying in Kosovo to maintain international
credibility and continue the Administration's current policy could
well lead to a significant military and geopolitical disaster for
America. The United States stands to lose far more long-term
credibility by continuing to support this dubious and open-ended
intervention than it does by making a strategic reappraisal of the
cost of its involvement.

America must cut its losses in the Balkans
that affect military readiness and U.S. national security; the CJTF
mechanism would allow the U.S. military to draw down its forces
while beginning to balance burden-sharing within the alliance.

WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO

Since Congress has a role to play in
funding peacekeeping operations, it should encourage the
Administration to seek a coherent alternative to its policy that
has locked U.S. troops in costly, open-ended peacekeeping
commitments in both Kosovo and Bosnia. Such an alternative exists
in the CJTF option within NATO.

To
fully assess the threat that Kosovo-like operations pose to U.S.
security and how CJTFs would provide a workable alternative,
Congress should consider conducting staff investigations or
convening public hearings on the Kosovo intervention. It should
seek testimony from across the political spectrum, including from
military experts and other officials involved in the intervention,
that could shed light on such topics as the decision-making
process, what is currently transpiring in Kosovo, the problems the
U.S. military faces, and alternatives to the status quo.

For
example, despite the best of intentions, this military action in
Kosovo has failed to avert humanitarian catastrophe, promote
sectarian harmony, clarify Kosovo's status, advance military
readiness, or promote larger U.S. security interests. Moreover, the
Administration's serious intelligence and decision-making errors
during the war have aggravated America's relationships with many
other countries. These facts highlight the problems of
disproportionate burden-sharing in NATO operations.

Such
Kosovo hearings should provide clear answers to fundamental
questions about the wisdom and consequences of continuing the
direct U.S. involvement on the ground. Armed with these facts,
Congress should consider calling for a phased withdrawal of U.S.
troops from the Balkans and urging the Administration to consider
using the Combined Joint Task Force mechanism within NATO as a way
to strengthen the alliance relationship and draw down U.S.
commitments.

Although the Clinton Administration is
unlikely to seek the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Kosovo during
its remaining months in office, the next Administration should be
prepared to use the information gleaned in the hearings to
implement a concrete plan that would extricate the United States
military from open-ended commitments in the Balkans.

CONCLUSION

The
Clinton Administration gained a false peace in Kosovo--a lull in
the fighting that will last, at best, only as long as peacekeepers
remain. The Economist observed last year that, "As for Kosovo, the
`peace' that NATO has secured is still punctuated by massacres--of
Serbs now, not Albanians--and even optimists admit that full-scale
blood-letting will resume unless outside troops keep the combatants
apart, certainly for years, maybe for decades."18

But
as the British found in Cyprus, although the alliance may strive to
keep the combatants apart, doing so will not mitigate the hatreds
that enflame their hostilities. The sectarian hatreds are the
primary reason for the instability in Kosovo, and they have not
been lessened or remedied by the intervention. As long as this
remains the case, the problems in the Balkans will remain
intractable.

John C. Hulsman,
Ph.D., is Senior European Policy Analyst in the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.

3.William Drozdiak, "U.S.
Allies' Air Power Was Lacking in Conflict," The Orlando
Sentinel, July 11, 1999.

4.Ibid.

5.Bruce Clark, "Armies
and Arms," The Economist, April 24, 1999.

6.Kenneth I. Juster, "The
Mistake of a Separate Peace," The Washington Post, August 9,
1999, p. A15. Kenneth Juster is a Washington, D.C., lawyer and
served as a senior official in the State Department during the Bush
Administration.

7.William Cohen,
Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report
to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense,
March 1999, p. III-4.