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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000568
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOVKDEMSOCINU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: ESTELI
REF: MANAGUA 511
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Meetings with political and economic
leaders in the department of Esteli suggest that the
Sandinistas (FSLN) continue to dominate the city of Esteli
and that this strength, combined with a solid organization,
will be enough to ensure an FSLN victory in the department in
November unless their Liberal opponents form a common front.
Local leaders from all of the Liberal parties called on the
Embassy to force the politicians in Managua to see reason and
form an alliance. Representatives of Herty Lewites,
dissident Sandinista movement believe they could draw away a
significant number of votes from Daniel Ortega were it not
for the fact that the FSLN is able to use its control of
local government and the judiciary to bring strong political
and economic pressure against anyone who dares to openly
support Lewites. PLC mayors opined privately that PLC
caudillo/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman should let
others take over the party (but would not admit this in
public); the PLC departmental leader maintained that Aleman
is the "indispensable" leader of the party and that the USG
should "leave him alone." END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) On March 9-10, poloff and political FSN traveled to
the northwestern department of Esteli, near the Honduran
border, and met local leaders to discuss the political and
economic situation in the department eight months ahead of
November national elections. Among our interlocutors were
representatives of the "Vamos con Eduardo"/National Liberal
Alliance (ALN), the Alliance for the Republic (APRE) and
"Amigos de Alvarado", the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC),
"Movimiento Herty 2006", the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),
Etica y Transparencia, the local chamber of commerce and
ranchers association, the Movimiento Por Nicaragua, and the
PLC mayors of the municipalities of San Nicholas and La
Trinidad. Post will report on social and economic issues
septel. Generally speaking, our interlocutors agreed that
Esteli remains in "pre-campaign" mode and relatively little
new political advertising was visible in the city and
department except at campaign headquarters. Most visible
advertising was for the FSLN.
ESTELI AN FSLN BASTION AND SANDINISTAS SURE TO WIN THERE
UNLESS OPPONENTS UNIFY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) The city of Esteli has a well-earned reputation as a
Sandinista bastion, as the party has not lost an election
there since the establishment of democracy in 1990. However,
the balance of the department of Esteli is not so monolithic,
and as recently as 2000 the PLC won four out of its six
municipalities. In 2004, the PLC ran a poor campaign
countrywide, and the FSLN reversed the previous balance in
Esteli, taking four municipalities and leaving the PLC with
just two. While leaders of each of the liberal factions
(PLC, ALN, APRE) in other departments often claim that their
group can win in November even if the liberal forces remain
divided, every single person emboffs met in Esteli stated
emphatically that the only hope of defeating the Sandinistas
in the department lies in unity. The FSLN is simply too
strong in the departmental capital and too well organized to
be beaten any other way. As an illustration of both the
opportunities for success and the risks of defeat, ALN-PC
leaders in Esteli emphasized that when the democratic forces
were unified and ran a good campaign with good candidates in
2000, they took four of six municipalities and only lost in
the city of Esteli by 2000 votes--their best showing ever in
the departmental capital. But when they were divided in 2004
and the PLC ran a bad candidate in the city, the FSLN won the
municipality by over 13,000 votes. In short, without Liberal
unity, the FSLN wins in Esteli, period.
AS USUAL, DIFFERENT STORIES FROM PRAGMATIC PLC MAYORS AND
DOCTRINAIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (C) As has been the case in many other departments,
emboffs heard very different stories from PLC mayors and the
PLC departmental head. The PLC mayors of the two small
municipalities of San Nicholas (Damacio Machado) and La
Trinidad (Luis Jarquin Laguna) both told emboffs privately
that the PLC should "not be the property of one family" and
that they seek new party leadership and a broad liberal
alliance capable of winning the elections. Both agreed that
Eduardo Montealegre and Jose Antonio Alvarado are good
leaders and should be welcome to join people like Jose Rizo,
Ramiro Sacasa and Francisco Aguirre Sacasa as leaders of a
broad Liberal alliance. Of the two "outsiders", they prefer
Alvarado, claiming that Montealegre has hurt the PLC by
dividing it so sharply. Both mayors promised that the
selection of the PLC presidential candidate by the party
convention in April would be democratic, and not simply
rubber stamp the previous choice ("dedazo") of Arnoldo
Aleman. They also agreed that open, inclusive liberal
primaries involving all contenders would be the best way to
unify the "democratic forces." However, neither was willing
to stick his neck out by publicly challenging Aleman.
¶5. (C) By contrast, PLC department head for Esteli Gabriel
Rivera Zeledon, a die-hard Arnoldista, was every bit as
doctrinaire as his counterparts in other parts of the
country. Zeledon stuck to the party line, blaming the GON
and the media for all of the PLC's electoral setbacks,
proclaiming that the party's relatively strong performance in
the March 5 Atlantic coast elections showed that it (and its
leader) are "indispensable" to defeating the FSLN, and
declaring that corrupt individuals utterly beholden to Aleman
(such as Enrique Quinonez, Noel Ramirez, and Haroldo
Montealegre) would be ideal presidential candidates. Zeledon
had nothing but scorn for Montealegre, portraying him as a
spoiler who could never win on his own, but who could hand
victory to the FSLN by dividing the Liberal vote.
MONTEALEGRE ENJOYS SOLID STRUCTURE AND POPULAR SUPPORT, BUT
CAN'T WIN ALONE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) Raul Herrera, the departmental coordinator of the
"Vamos con Eduardo" movement, told emboffs that after a year
of work in Esteli, the group and the ALN have developed a
solid organization. Herrera asserted that the ALN has
managed to co-opt whole elements of the PLC party structure,
something denied by the PLC, but confirmed by other
interlocutors. Numerous local business leaders have declared
their support for Montealegre and are providing much of the
funding for the ALN's efforts in the department. Herrera
noted that Montealegre has campaigned vigorously and
regularly throughout the department and reported that the
candidate had recently held a successful fund raising dinner
in the city with 500 attendees.
¶7. (C) Despite this progress, Herrera admitted that the ALN
will never be able to defeat the FSLN alone in Esteli. He
noted that the ALN still maintains fairly good relations with
local PLC voters and some officials, and he believes that
unity is still possible--if the problems could be worked out
in Managua. He added that while Montealegre is very popular
with the liberal base, persuading long-time PLC voters to
switch from the PLC's slot on the ballot (casilla number one)
to the ALN's (casilla number nine) is a tough sell.
Nonetheless, Herrera regarded the ALN's performance on the
Atlantic Coast as a major success, considering that it was
the result of only two months of campaigning, and saw the
outcome as strengthening the hand of Montealegre in any
efforts to bring the PLC to terms.
APRE HOPELESS AND LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ALVARADO, BUT
SOME KEY ACTORS LIKE HIM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) Although emboffs found no evidence of any significant
popular support for Jose Antonio Alvarado in Esteli, the APRE
candidate does enjoy the support of certain well-placed
individuals and organizations in the department. As noted
above, the two PLC mayors preferred Alvarado over
Montealegre. Additionally, Alvarado enjoys the support of
many local government workers from ministries he formerly
headed (particularly the ministries of Health and Education),
and is supported by the influential head of the Esteli
ranchers association, Perfecto Rodriguez. However, beyond
this limited circle, Alvarado was rarely even mentioned by
anyone unless prompted by emboffs. By contrast,
Montealegre's name came up spontaneously in virtually every
conversation, positively or negatively depending on who was
speaking.
¶9. (C) As for APRE, Alvarado's current political vehicle,
Jorge Ali Lopez (also the local "Amigos of Alvarado"
representative) and other local APRE officials conceded that
their party had performed extremely badly in the Atlantic
Coast elections. They attributed this defeat to the lack of
resources provided by the national APRE leadership for the
elections and, when pressed by emboffs, admitted that they
too received virtually no political guidance or financial
support in Esteli. The APRE officials argued that
negotiation with the PLC would be necessary and that no one
could beat the FSLN alone, but they admitted that it would be
most effective for Montealegre and Alvarado to join forces
first in order to be in a stronger position vis a vis the PLC.
SOME DISSIDENT FSLN SUPPORT FOR HERTY, BUT FSLN DRIVING IT
UNDERGROUND
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) Local leaders of the dissident Sandinista alliance
supporting Herty Lewites told emboffs that their candidate
enjoys widespread popularity in both urban and rural areas of
Esteli, and is capitalizing on local weariness with Daniel
Ortega and his clique. However, they stated that much of
this support has been driven underground by the FSLN. Noting
that die-hard supporters of Ortega control the mayoral
offices in four of the six Esteli municipalities, the Lewites
camp reported that the FSLN is able to bring strong political
and economic pressure on anyone who dares to openly support
Lewites. Local government workers who support Lewites lose
their jobs, university students are threatened with the loss
of their scholarships, and business leaders are pressured
with the loss of operating licenses and government contracts,
as well as politically-motivated judicial processes against
them. These credible allegations were supported by numerous
other interlocutors unaffiliated with the Lewites movement,
including Movimiento Por Nicaragua, Etica y Transparencia,
the ALN, APRE, and PLC, and the chamber of commerce.
¶11. (C) There is no doubt that the fact that Esteli has been
such a symbolic FSLN bastion for so long is the reason that
the FSLN is pressuring the Lewites camp so hard there--the
Sandinistas do not want to take any chances in such an
important fiefdom. Because of the newness of Lewites'
movement and the strength and determination of the FSLN in
Esteli, most interlocutors doubted that Lewites would make
much of a dent in the "captive" FSLN vote on election day.
Indeed, many people on the right still regard his candidacy
as an FSLN ploy and fear that it will only serve to "waste"
independent votes that would otherwise go to Montealegre or a
hypothetical anti-FSLN coalition.
IN A SURPRISE, SANDINISTA CSE OFFICIAL AGREES TO MEET EMBOFFS
AND LETS SLIP COMMENT ON VENEZUELAN INK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶12. (C) Much to emboffs surprise, Antonio Benavides, the
Esteli departmental representative of the Supreme Electoral
Council (CSE), agreed to a meeting. Benavides is a
Sandinista appointee, and a member of the FSLN's departmental
campaign structure, and his counterparts in other departments
had previously refused to meet emboffs. During the meeting,
Benavides poured on the charm, bemoaning the politicization
of the CSE and other state institutions and piously
proclaiming that the work of the electoral branch of
government should be totally apolitical and administrative.
He blamed the electoral law for the CSE's politicization,
noting that it requires virtually all electoral officials to
be party affiliates. Benavides also proclaimed that his work
in Esteli is utterly impartial and that he is doing all he
can to ensure that all eligible voters had identification
cards (cedulas) on election day.
¶13. (C) Virtually all other interlocutors across the
political spectrum, however, described Benavides as a
hard-line FSLN militant who has participated in shenanigans
to tilt the vote towards the FSLN over the years and has
actively obstructed the efforts of non-FSLN voters to obtain
cedulas. However, when emboffs questioned Benavides'
assertions that everything had gone smoothly in the recent
Atlantic coast elections, noting, among other problems, that
the ink used to mark the thumbs of those who had voted was
not very effective, Benavides acknowledged that the ink had
been problematic. In a comment that he may not have intended
to let slip, the CSE official stated that the problem might
lie in the CSE's switch to a new ink supplier for the
Atlantic Coast elections. While the Mexican ink used in the
2004 municipal elections was indeed effective, Benavides
noted that this time the CSE had used ink from Venezuela. As
post reported in reftel, the ink used on the Atlantic Coast
was very weak, faded quickly, and could be washed off.
ESTELI: DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING PROFILE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶14. (U)
Total Population (2003 est.): 214,399
Total Urban Population: 124,705
Total Rural Population: 89,694
Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections
PLC: 24,521
FSLN: 39,748
APRE: 3,069
CCN: 517
PLI: 197
AC: 122
PLN: 823
PRN: 803
MSL: 137
COMMENT: DIVISION MAY SPELL DEFEAT--AND THE PROBLEM IS IN
MANAGUA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶15. (C) Esteli is a textbook case for highlighting the
dangers of a divided liberal camp confronting the FSLN in
November. While it is theoretically possible that either the
ALN or PLC could capture enough of the liberal and
independent vote to block or limit an FSLN victory in other
departments, in an FSLN bastion like Esteli, division
virtually guarantees a Sandinista triumph there. Even if the
liberals manage to unify and field strong presidential and
vice presidential candidates, they might still lose in
Esteli. Although liberal unity remains problematic as long
as Arnoldo Aleman continues to control the PLC, post will
continue to drive home the message to all interlocutors that
continued infighting in Managua (particularly between the
Montealegre and Alvarado camps) is frustrating the desire of
voters and party activists in the departments for unity, and
playing into the hands of pact masters Aleman and Ortega.
TRIVELLI