Revision differences

Document history

Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, from launching attacks by sending traffic to unwilling victims ...

Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, from launching attacks by sending traffic to unwilling victims, periodic consent to send needs to be obtained from remote endpoints.

This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.')

New version available: draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-16.txt

2015-08-06

15

Cindy Morgan

IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation::AD Followup from IESG Evaluation

2015-08-06

15

Jari Arkko

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Jari Arkko

2015-08-06

15

Benoît Claise

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Benoit Claise

2015-08-05

15

Joel Jaeggli

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Joel Jaeggli

2015-08-05

15

Terry Manderson

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Terry Manderson

2015-08-05

15

Cindy Morgan

Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown

2015-08-05

15

Stephen Farrell

[Ballot discuss]

Apologies that these discuss points are maybe askingfairly fundamental questions. That could be that thisis really the first of the ...

[Ballot discuss]

Apologies that these discuss points are maybe askingfairly fundamental questions. That could be that thisis really the first of the new security things requiredby rtcweb to get to the IESG. Or maybe I'm misreadingstuff here, if so, sorry;-)

(1) Why call this "consent?" That term is (ab)used inmany ways on the web, and adding another variationwithout a definition that distinguishes this from "clickok to my 200 page anti-privacy policy" or "remember thatexample.com is allowed use my camera/mic" seems like aterrible idea. I also don't see how this can ever besomething to which a normal person can "consent" (i.e.consciously agree while fully understanding) so the termis IMO very misleading, and will I fear be used tomislead further. (See also some of the comments below -I do not think we ought be as fast and loose with thisaleady terribly badly used term.) To summarise: I'd loveif you did s/consent/anything-else/g but if not, pleasedefine consent here in a way that clearly andunambiguously distinguishes this usage from other abusesof the term.

(2) WebRTC does not require STUN or TURN servers forsome calls, even if it does for many. Why is it ok torequire such a server be present in all calls (which Ithink this means) espcially when that means exposingadditional meta-data (calling parties in a case wherethe servers weren't needed and call duration in allcases) to those servers when that is not alwaysnecessary?

(3) (end of p5) You have a MUST NOT here that isdepenedent on current browser implementations. Why isthat an IETF thing and not a W3C thing? But moreinterestingly, can one securely use this protocolwithout the kind of JS vs. browser sandboxing etc that'sneeded in the web? If the answer is "no" then don't youneed to say that this protocol can only safely be usedfor such implementations? (In section 2, which almostbut not quite says that.)

(Was discuss point#4) "Section 8: Where are these 96 bits defined? I thinkthis "requires..." statement needs a precise referenceto the place in some ICE/TURN/STUN RFC where it'sdefined. (And I forget where that is, sorry:-) Thisshould be an easy fix."Alissa gave me the reference [1] sothat's grand. Itmight be an idea to make that clearer if it wasn'tjust me missing it as I read, which is very possible;-)

- abstract: why is only sending "media" mentioned here?What about data channels? And the body of the documentin fact says this all applies to any non-ICE data andnot only media.

- intro: "initial consent to send by performing STUN" Ido not find the word consent in either rfc5245 or 3489,but perhaps it is used somewhere else. Where? And withwhat meaning?

- section 4, 2nd last para - I think the conclusion isbogus. An implementation knows when the keying it'susing can not involve >1 (nominally operating) party.

- 5.1, 3rd para: "Explicit consent to send isobtained..." is misleading. That is not a concept thatan implementation of STUN will embody.

- 5.1, What is the "Note" about TCP for? Why is thisneeded?

2015-08-05

15

Stephen Farrell

Ballot comment and discuss text updated for Stephen Farrell

2015-08-05

15

Alia Atlas

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alia Atlas

2015-08-05

15

Deborah Brungard

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Deborah Brungard

2015-08-05

15

Stephen Farrell

[Ballot discuss]

Apologies that these discuss points are maybe askingfairly fundamental questions. That could be that thisis really the first of the ...

[Ballot discuss]

Apologies that these discuss points are maybe askingfairly fundamental questions. That could be that thisis really the first of the new security things requiredby rtcweb to get to the IESG. Or maybe I'm misreadingstuff here, if so, sorry;-)

(1) Why call this "consent?" That term is (ab)used inmany ways on the web, and adding another variationwithout a definition that distinguishes this from "clickok to my 200 page anti-privacy policy" or "remember thatexample.com is allowed use my camera/mic" seems like aterrible idea. I also don't see how this can ever besomething to which a normal person can "consent" (i.e.consciously agree while fully understanding) so the termis IMO very misleading, and will I fear be used tomislead further. (See also some of the comments below -I do not think we ought be as fast and loose with thisaleady terribly badly used term.) To summarise: I'd loveif you did s/consent/anything-else/g but if not, pleasedefine consent here in a way that clearly andunambiguously distinguishes this usage from other abusesof the term.

(2) WebRTC does not require STUN or TURN servers forsome calls, even if it does for many. Why is it ok torequire such a server be present in all calls (which Ithink this means) espcially when that means exposingadditional meta-data (calling parties in a case wherethe servers weren't needed and call duration in allcases) to those servers when that is not alwaysnecessary?

(3) (end of p5) You have a MUST NOT here that isdepenedent on current browser implementations. Why isthat an IETF thing and not a W3C thing? But moreinterestingly, can one securely use this protocolwithout the kind of JS vs. browser sandboxing etc that'sneeded in the web? If the answer is "no" then don't youneed to say that this protocol can only safely be usedfor such implementations? (In section 2, which almostbut not quite says that.)

(4) Section 8: Where are these 96 bits defined? I thinkthis "requires..." statement needs a precise referenceto the place in some ICE/TURN/STUN RFC where it'sdefined. (And I forget where that is, sorry:-) Thisshould be an easy fix.

(5) Why is it ok to approve this while thertcweb-security-arch and rtcweb-security are stilldeveloping? There are section-specific references herealong the lines of: "doing this is ok because of sectionx.x" of both of those drafts. Why is it ok to approvethis now, when the underlying architecture and overallsecurity model on which this depends are still in-flux?I'm not asking about editorial changes here nor abouttiming, but about why it's ok to approve this when thebasic security concepts have yet to undergo IETF lastcall, and so could change significantly. I do not thinkit would be acceptable for a comment/discuss on thesecurity documents to be received with "yes, but youapproved consent-freshness and so we implemented anddeployed that so you're too late to make thatcomment/discuss and expect some change."

2015-08-05

15

Stephen Farrell

[Ballot comment]

- abstract: why is only sending "media" mentioned here?What about data channels? And the body of the documentin fact says this ...

[Ballot comment]

- abstract: why is only sending "media" mentioned here?What about data channels? And the body of the documentin fact says this all applies to any non-ICE data andnot only media.

- intro: "initial consent to send by performing STUN" Ido not find the word consent in either rfc5245 or 3489,but perhaps it is used somewhere else. Where? And withwhat meaning?

- section 4, 2nd last para - I think the conclusion isbogus. An implementation knows when the keying it'susing can not involve >1 (nominally operating) party.

- 5.1, 3rd para: "Explicit consent to send isobtained..." is misleading. That is not a concept thatan implementation of STUN will embody.

- 5.1, What is the "Note" about TCP for? Why is thisneeded?

2015-08-05

15

Stephen Farrell

[Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Stephen Farrell

2015-08-04

15

Ben Campbell

[Ballot comment]This looks good overall. I have a few minor comments:

-- General:

After re-reading this, and the relevant parts of rtcweb-security-architecture, I think a ...

[Ballot comment]This looks good overall. I have a few minor comments:

-- General:

After re-reading this, and the relevant parts of rtcweb-security-architecture, I think a novice reader might find the meaning of "consent" a bit vague, especially in terms of how it might differ from "reachability". Can you offer an example of when an otherwise reachable peer might choose to withdraw consent?

-- section 1, first paragraph:

I think readers are going to stumble over why we think a device that plans to attack a peer is going to worry about consent. This makes more sense in section 2. It might be helpful to move (or copy) the bit about "... deployments of WebRTC..." and "... malicious javascript" forward to the intro.

- 4, 3rd paragraph:

Should the reader infer that the receipt of a package that is strongly assured to have come from a party implies consent from that party? If so, it might be worth an explicit mention.

-- 5.1, first paragraph:

The normative MUST feels wrong here, (and is probably redundant with other normative language further down in the section.) For example, could a sender just choose to stop sending?

-- 5.1, 5th paragraph:

From the next paragraph, I infer that you mean consent expires after 30 seconds when you have been sending binding request every few seconds, not 30 seconds after sending any particular binding request. If that's correct it might be helpful to add a few words to that effect.

-- 5.1, 6th paragraph:

Does the "MUST NOT" refer to the general interval between checks prior to randomization, or to the specific interval between a pair of checks after randomization?

Nits:

-- 2, 2nd paragraph: "verify peer's consent"

Missing article (or "verify peer consent")

-- 5.1, paragraph 3:

s/sending an stun binding/sending a stun binding

-- 5.1, 7th paragraph: "Each STUN binding request for consent MUST use a new STUN transaction identifier for every consent binding request..."

That's sort of redundant. I suggest something to the effect of "each consent binding request MUST use a new stun transaction identifier. "

2015-08-04

15

Ben Campbell

[Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Ben Campbell

2015-08-04

15

Alvaro Retana

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana

2015-08-04

15

Spencer Dawkins

[Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Spencer Dawkins

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Kathleen Moriarty

2015-07-28

15

Barry Leiba

[Ballot comment]A couple of very minor comments only:

FWIW, I think rtcweb-security-arch need only be an informative reference; it seems only explanatory. I ...

[Ballot comment]A couple of very minor comments only:

FWIW, I think rtcweb-security-arch need only be an informative reference; it seems only explanatory. I also think that about RFC 6263.

-- Section 5.1 --

A full ICE implementation obtains consent to send using ICE. After ICE concludes on a particular candidate pair and whenever the endpoint sends application data on that pair consent MUST be maintained following the procedure described in this document.

I don't understand the "MUST" here, given that Section 4 says this is "an optional extension". Why "MUST", then, rather than "can be"?

2015-07-28

15

Barry Leiba

[Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Barry Leiba

2015-07-16

15

Alissa Cooper

Ballot has been issued

2015-07-16

15

Alissa Cooper

[Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Alissa Cooper

IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-15, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments:

We understand ...

(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-15, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments:

We understand that, upon approval of this document, there are no IANA Actions that need completion.

While it's often helpful for a document's IANA Considerations section to remain in place upon publication even if there are no actions, if the authors strongly prefer to remove it, IANA does not object.

If this assessment is not accurate, please respond as soon as possible.

The IESG has received a request from the Real-Time Communication inWEB-browsers WG (rtcweb) to consider the following document:- 'STUN Usage for Consent Freshness' <draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-15.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicitsfinal comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to theietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-07-16. Exceptionally, comments may besent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain thebeginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

This document was previously last called on May 1 and has been updated as a result of comments submitted during that last call.

Abstract

To prevent WebRTC applications, such as browsers, from launching attacks by sending media to unwilling victims, periodic consent to send needs to be obtained from remote endpoints.

This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 ...

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Whyis this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in thetitle page header?

Proposed Standard is requested, and standards track is noted in theheader.

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document AnnouncementWrite-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recentexamples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approveddocuments. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

In WebRTC contexts, peers send media traffic to each other. To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer is willing to receive traffic. This is performed both when the session is first established to the remote peer and periodically for the duration of the session. This document defines a method for confirming consent using a new STUN usage.

Working Group Summary

Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough?

One of the consistent issues within the WebRTC ecosystem isthe extent to which requirements from deployed systems impactthe working of the protocol. In this context, discussion of howICE-lite entities should behave consumed a good bit of time, butI believe that the document represents the WG's general understanding.

After a set of external reviews by directorates the documented wasupdated and a new working group last call issued. No new issueswere identified during the final working group last call.

Document Quality

Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review, what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type review, on what date was the request posted?

The document was reviewed by a number of implementorsand implementations are planned or under way. This document didnot require expert review of the type mentioned above, but ChristerHolmberg's review is called out in the document for its thoroughness.

Personnel

Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area Director?

Ted Hardie is the Document Shepherd; Richard Barnes is theResponsible Area Director.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed bythe Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not readyfor publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded tothe IESG.

The document was re-reviewed and the mailing list traffic from the workinggroup last call forward reviewed to ensure that issues raised were addressed.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth orbreadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No conerns.

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or frombroader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review thattook place.

Because this describes a security mechanism, additional review would be welcome, but a number of security folks are authors orreviewers.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherdhas with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or theIESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortablewith certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there reallyis a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues andhas indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail thoseconcerns here.

No specific concerns.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPRdisclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

Yes.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPRdisclosures.

No disclosures have been filed.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with othersbeing silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

Consensus appears general.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separateemail messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in aseparate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

There are no threatened appeals or other discontent of which I amaware.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in thisdocument. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-DraftsChecklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to bethorough.

This document passes ID-nits, with only one warning of an unused reference.This can be removed by the RFC Editor, I believe, and need not holdthe document.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal reviewcriteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

As noted above, these reviews do not apply to this document.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified aseither normative or informative?

Yes.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready foradvancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normativereferences exist, what is the plan for their completion?

All normative references are at appropriate levels for advancement.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure.

None needed for this document.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of anyexisting RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listedin the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are notlisted in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to thepart of the document where the relationship of this document to theother RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

It will not change the status of any existing RFC.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerationssection, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of thedocument. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makesare associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearlyidentified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include adetailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, thatallocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and areasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

This document makes no requests of IANA.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for futureallocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would finduseful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

This document makes no requests of IANA.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the DocumentShepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formallanguage, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

This document does not use a formal grammar.

2015-06-22

15

Tirumaleswar Reddy.K

New version available: draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-15.txt

2015-06-10

14

Tero Kivinen

Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed: Has Issues. Reviewer: Steve Hanna.

2015-06-08

14

Tirumaleswar Reddy.K

New version available: draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-14.txt

The IESG has received a request from the Real-Time Communication inWEB-browsers WG (rtcweb) to consider the following document:- 'STUN Usage for Consent Freshness' <draft-ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness-11.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicitsfinal comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to theietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-05-15. Exceptionally, comments may besent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain thebeginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract

To prevent sending excessive traffic to an endpoint, periodic consent needs to be obtained from that remote endpoint.

This document describes a consent mechanism using a new Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) usage.

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 ...

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Whyis this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in thetitle page header?

Proposed Standard is requested, and standards track is noted in theheader.

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document AnnouncementWrite-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recentexamples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approveddocuments. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

In WebRTC contexts, peers send media traffic to each other. To prevent attacks on peers, endpoints have to ensure the remote peer is willing to receive traffic. This is performed both when the session is first established to the remote peer and periodically for the duration of the session. This document defines a method for confirming consent using a new STUN usage.

Working Group Summary

Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough?

One of the consistent issues within the WebRTC ecosystem isthe extent to which requirements from deployed systems impactthe working of the protocol. In this context, discussion of howICE-lite entities should behave consumed a good bit of time, butI believe that the document represents the WG's general understanding.

Document Quality

Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review, what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type review, on what date was the request posted?

The document was reviewed by a number of implementorsand implementations are planned or under way. This document didnot require expert review of the type mentioned above, but ChristerHolmberg's review is called out in the document for its thoroughness.

Personnel

Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area Director?

Ted Hardie is the Document Shepherd; Richard Barnes is theResponsible Area Director.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed bythe Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not readyfor publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded tothe IESG.

The document was re-reviewed and the mailing list traffic from the workinggroup last call forward reviewed to ensure that issues raised were addressed.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth orbreadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No conerns.

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or frombroader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review thattook place.

Because this describes a security mechanism, additional review would be welcome, but a number of security folks are authors orreviewers.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherdhas with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or theIESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortablewith certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there reallyis a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues andhas indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail thoseconcerns here.

No specific concerns.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPRdisclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

Yes.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPRdisclosures.

No disclosures have been filed.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with othersbeing silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

Consensus appears general.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separateemail messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in aseparate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

There are no threatened appeals or other discontent of which I amaware.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in thisdocument. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-DraftsChecklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to bethorough.

This document passes ID-nits, with only one warning of an unused reference.This can be removed by the RFC Editor, I believe, and need not holdthe document.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal reviewcriteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

As noted above, these reviews do not apply to this document.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified aseither normative or informative?

Yes.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready foradvancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normativereferences exist, what is the plan for their completion?

All normative references are at appropriate levels for advancement.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure.

None needed for this document.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of anyexisting RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listedin the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are notlisted in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to thepart of the document where the relationship of this document to theother RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

It will not change the status of any existing RFC.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerationssection, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of thedocument. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makesare associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearlyidentified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include adetailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, thatallocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and areasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

This document makes no requests of IANA.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for futureallocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would finduseful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

This document makes no requests of IANA.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the DocumentShepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formallanguage, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.