Wednesday, 13 August 2014

Resolve the border dispute, don’t just “manage” it

By Ajai
Shukla

China-India Brief #33

Centre for Asia and Globalisation

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Available at: http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publication/china-india-brief/china-india-brief-33

The
election of every new government in New Delhi generates speculation over the possibility
of a new Indian approach towards China. Narendra Modi’s election as India’s new
prime minister has occasioned such conjecture, especially given his public
acceptance of the “China model” --- firm governance, infrastructure building
and the creation of manufacturing jobs. In July, Modi had a long and cordial
meeting with China’s president, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the BRICS
summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. Modi’s foreign policy emphasis on India’s
neighbourhood makes it inevitable that China would be high in his priorities.

Like his
predecessors, Modi believes that resolving the Sino-Indian territorial dispute is
an essential pre-requisite for unlocking the full economic potential of the
relationship. “If India and China could amicably resolve the boundary question,
it would set an example for the entire world, on peaceful conflict
resolution," he told Xi in Fortaleza.

The Chinese
president, less keenly focused on the boundary question, invited India to the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November, and to “deepen
its engagement” with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation --- which India
desires. Xi acknowledged Indian concerns about an unfavourable trade balance
with China, endorsing New Delhi’s longstanding plea that facilitating the
import of Indian software services to China would make the trade relationship
more equitable. Like Chinese leaders before him, Xi appeared to regard the
border issue as too complex to tackle successfully; and, therefore, best placed
on the backburner while Sino-Indian relations are taken forward through
commercial ties and people-to-people interaction. This is a mistaken
perception.

Modi correctly
assesses that the poison of mutual suspicion, unless drained, will prevent the relationship
from blooming. As an elected prime minister with years of experience in
democratic politics and in tune with the mood of his people, Modi knows that,
as long as the border remains contested, he will face public scepticism of, and
opposition to, every step that brings India closer to China. As a politician
who has played the nationalist card opportunistically, he understands that his political
opponents will unhesitatingly play the same card against him.

This vulnerability
gets highlighted after every border incident, when the Indian media whips up sentiment
against “Chinese aggression”. This feeds on the angst from India’s humiliating
defeat in 1962, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routed ill-prepared and
badly positioned Indian forces in the disputed regions of Ladakh and the North
East Frontier Province (later Arunachal Pradesh). The Indian narrative, entrenched
in the national psyche, is one of “Chinese deceit” and “back-stabbing”. Few
notice that the 4,057-kilometre Line of Actual Control (LAC) --- the de facto
border --- is one of India’s most peaceful frontiers. Instead, relatively
inconsequential border incidents serve as reminders that China is now unwilling
to settle the border on terms that then premier, Zhou En-lai, had proposed in
the late 1950s; and other leaders had offered into the early 1980s --- viz, an
“east-for-west” swap, with China keeping Aksai Chin while India retains
Arunachal Pradesh, or South Tibet as Beijing calls it. Having hardened that
position, China today demands Indian “concessions in the East”, which is widely
interpreted as a demand for the strategic Tawang area. It would be politically
inconceivable for any Indian leader to hand over to China this tract, thickly
populated by Buddhists of the politically influential, and strongly anti-China,
Monpa tribe. India would see it as loyal Monpas being thrown under the wheels
of the Chinese bus.

Chinese
public opinion plays a smaller role in shaping Zhongnanhai’s position on the
border, since the controlled media can be held off from reporting on this. Yet,
successive Chinese leaders have seen greater benefit in “managing” the border,
rather than resolving the fundamental dispute. True, the LAC has not seen a shot
fired in almost four decades, and peace has been institutionalized through a
series of agreements: the 1993 “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and
Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control”; the 1996 “Agreement on
Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual
Control”; Standard Operating Procedures framed in 2005; and the Border Defence
Cooperation Agreement of 2013. Even so, China is miscalculating in choosing to manage,
rather than resolve, the boundary question.

This is so
for two important reasons. First, Beijing gravely underestimates the Indian
consensus on refusing territorial concessions in Arunachal Pradesh. Second, no
strategic advantage that Beijing could derive from controlling Tawang would
compensate for having a permanently alienated India along the Tibet border. It
would be almost as short sighted as Beijing’s decision to attack India in 1962.
On the other hand, a border settlement with India would dramatically reduce the
likelihood of India joining hands with the US against China; defuse the
permanent threat to China posed by a restive Tibetan exile community in India;
and open the floodgates for Chinese infrastructure companies to participate in
major projects in India.

Notwithstanding
Beijing’s current position, China’s leaders could some day see the advantages
of a comprehensive, “east-for-west”, border settlement. New Delhi is being lax
in failing to prepare Indian public opinion for the jolt of ceding territory to
China and reshaping the map of India. The first step towards this would be to
abandon the Indian narrative of victimhood in 1962. India and its people must
begin to accept the unpalatable truth --- that, through the 1950s, India was
arbitrary, implacable and bull-headed in refusing to mutually delineate the
border, even though it lacked the military muscle to back its stance of “no negotiations
with the Chinese.” While Beijing was short-sighted in choosing war with India,
New Delhi’s provocative “Forward Policy”, which involved pushing troops into
disputed areas, may have left China with little choice.

Who will
bell this Indian cat? Fortunately, there is a convenient narrative that the new
government has at hand --- the Henderson Brooks Report (HBR), which, in the
aftermath of the 1962 defeat, scathingly indicted India’s politico-military
leadership, blaming Indian miscalculation and incompetence more than Chinese deviousness
for the debacle. Disseminating that message across India would be essential for
any territorial give-and-take with China.

Unwisely,
New Delhi has chosen not to bite the bullet. Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, who
had promised earlier this year to make public the Henderson-Brooks report, has
inexplicably changed his mind. Last month, he told parliament that there was no
plan to declassify the report. This is unwise, even though there is no
acceptable border settlement on the table just yet. India’s leaders need time to
prepare public opinion, and New Delhi benefits in no way from maintaining
entrenched animosities.

The leaders
in both capitals need to arrive at a shared vision for settling the border
question. Beijing and New Delhi must work together to overcome the biases of
history and open new vistas for both peoples to usher in an Asian century.

7 comments:

I agree with you that this dispute needs to be settled once for all. However I also believe that both countries have more or less held onto the positions they claimed prior to 1959, except minor territorial gains PLA has made to safeguard bigger strategic vulnerabilities.

It will be impossible for any government to cede the land and change the map of India. All over the world, Akshi Chin is shown as disputed while there could be no people movement in AP due to the existing agreement. China should return the Akshai Chin.-Period. China took Tibet, How much else they want. Most of Tibet's transportation work used to done through India before 1950's. China's intention can be gauged with the kind of land/sea disputes it has all around. China will explode itself oneday due to lack of freedom.

India did not lose the 1962 war. Instead, India successfully replused the Chinese invasion. After China's surprise attack (in which it overwhelmed Indian troops outnumbered 8 to 1), the Indian parliament announced that it would retake every inch of Indian territory. Subsequently, the chinese troops retreated back into Chinese territory. India did not lose any territory in this war. Rather, Indian won the war as it succeeded in retaining its territory.