As an Anglican I often groan when our bishops make comments on current ethical and political
issues. They are so bland and wishey-washey if not PC. On the other hand when the Catholic bishops
open their mouths, they often give a strong Christian steer on issues such as gay adoption, bio-ethics or the environment.
Why should this be I ask? Peter Bristow's Christian Ethics and the Human Person
(2009) has given me an answer. It is published by a small publishing house and for that
reason may well be overlooked, especially by evangelicals. But it presents a more coherent approach to ethics than
I have met elsewhere, so I hope this extended review may be helpful in formulating a sensible biblical approach
to some of today's issues.

Bristow ascribes the new confidence in the Roman Catholic episcopate to the renewal of Catholic
ethics in the wake of the Second Vatican council in the 1960s. In particular John Paul II, a former teacher
of ethics and philosophy, published a number of encyclicals on ethical issues, such as Veritatis
Splendor 1993 and Evangelium Vitae
1995, which apply his own personalist philosophy to modern issues. Encyclicals are pastoral letters to the bishops
giving them advice on how to deal with particular current problems.

From a traditional perspective there are two main problems with modern approaches to ethics.
The first is divorcing ethics from truth. This leads to a mistaken view of freedom and a radical relativism.
The second key issue is anthropology: who or what is a human being? Scripture views man as a body-soul unity,
so that the soul expresses itself through the body. But modern philosophies tend to a dualistic approach:
that is, they see a human person as a mind or consciousness plus body. The real me is the thinking/feeling
me. The body is incidental to one's personality. This difference in approach has particular relevance
to bioethics.

In the modern era, with the death of God or at least his relegation to the role of a passive
deistic observer, human autonomy has become a central ethical value. Every human being can decide what is
best for him or herself. 'liberté' came first in the slogan for the French revolution, and it remains a
key note of modern ethical debate. One can choose to behave in whatever way one likes, so long as one does
not harm others. Up to a point Christians agree with this. God built a lot of freedom into creation.
Adam was told he could eat of all the trees of the trees of
the garden save one, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The tree of knowledge sets the limits of human
autonomy, the boundaries of behaviour that should not be crossed, the basic rules of behaviour that every human
must conform to. Traditionally these principles have been termed the natural law. When St Paul mentions
that the Gentiles do by nature what the law requires (Romans 2: 14), he is referring to what ethicists understand
by the natural law. Its principles are roughly summed up in the Ten Commandments and in the golden rule,
to do to others as you would like them to treat you.

It is in submitting to the law of God that Christians believe true freedom to be found, 'His
service is perfect freedom.' Bristow sees the Old Testament law as basically a set of external rules, though
the prophet Jeremiah looked forward to a time when it would be written on the heart, that is internalised and integrated
into one's way of life. This is what Jesus proclaims in the Sermon on the Mount. In Matthew 5 he does not
abrogate the law, but rather he extends it to words and thought. In the beatitudes one sees a portrait of
Jesus himself and also what his disciples should be like. The fundamental principles of the Old Testament
law are not abolished, rather they are reaffirmed and transmuted into virtues that need to be cultivated by habitual
practice and the grace of the Holy Spirit. One learns to love one's neighbour by treating him kindly and
developing a positive attitude to him by prayer for him and for oneself.

The work of the Spirit is fundamental, as man cannot fulfil God's law fully without his aid.
Pentecost was the New Sinai. The gift of the Spirit enabled the disciples to live in accordance with their creator's
intentions and fulfil the law. It is by conforming oneself to the divine pattern that someone lives in the
truth, and as Jesus said: 'If you abide in my word, you are truly my disciples, and the truth will set you free.'
(John 8:31-32)

The second major problem with modern secularised approaches to ethics lies in its dualistic anthropology.
This conflicts with both biblical and Thomistic views of man. One of the slogans of the biblical theology
movement of the mid-20th century was that the Bible views
man as a spirit-body unity. Man is not a body with a soul, but a body or a soul, depending on the context.
Thus because the body is inseparable from the soul, the Bible does not affirm the immortality of the soul but the
resurrection of the body. So far so good. But there was a tendency in the biblical theology movement so to downplay
the role of the soul, that one ended up with a near-materialistic anthropology, so that all that mattered was the
body. The nature of the intermediate state between death and resurrection, if there was such a state, also was
unclear. And no ethical implications were drawn from the unity of body and soul.

But the way Thomas Aquinas and John Paul saw the body-soul unity does have profound ethical consequences.
For them the body, through its actions, words and attitudes, expresses the soul. Our actions reflect and
embody the soul. Man can be described as an embodied soul or an ensouled body. The image of God in man is not just
his rationality or emotions, it involves his ability to express himself through his body. This unitary view makes
the body very important, indeed as significant as self-consciousness or the will, which are clearly activities
of the soul. But even when one is not conscious, for example in sleep, the soul is still there.

But a dualistic view of man sees things quite differently. The human person is essentially
its mental faculties: the body is an inessential accessory like the colour of one's car. It can thus be manipulated
at will. This outlook can be traced back to Descartes, who proved to himself that he existed by reasoning 'I think,
therefore I exist.' It has led many fallaciously to conclude the opposite proposition is also true: 'If I
cannot think, I do not exist.' This opens the way to embryo experimentation at one end of life, and euthanasia
at the other. But if one holds to the unity of body and soul, such a conclusion is impossible: as long as
there is a living body there is a living soul, indeed a human person. And if what one proposes in these borderline
situations should not be done to normal subjects, neither should they in these edge-of-life ones. It is a
denial of that person's personhood, of their bearing the image of God.

But it is not just in the sphere of bioethics that the unitary view of man conflicts with modern
thought. Sexual ethics is an even hotter battlefield. The natural law, revelation (Genesis 1 – 2 and
the Pentateuchal law, Jesus) and physiology all point to life-long heterosexual marriage being the Creator's design.
Differentiation of the sexes is built into the human body with the clear aim of procreation and stable loving parenthood.
This should clearly limit the rules of behaviour between the sexes. But if one adopts a dualistic view of the human
person and sees the body and its activities as accessory to the real me, one can treat sexual activity as just
another recreation. Just as I may choose to play football or tennis, give up one sport and take up another,
so I can be equally flexible with my sexual behaviour. Hence there is nothing intrinsically wrong with sex-change
operations, homosexual practice or cohabitation. But if one sees one's sexuality as an intrinsic aspect of
one's personhood, the situation is very different.

There are for example many pragmatic arguments against cohabitation, such as its instability,
its openness to third parties, the potential for exploitation and abuse, which are all more prevalent among cohabiting
couples than among married couples. But a unitary view of human personhood sees a much more fundamental objection.
In marriage the spouses pledge to give themselves totally and unconditionally to each other. This total unconditional
self-giving is expressed bodily in sexual intercourse. But in cohabitation the relationship between the partners
is different. By not marrying they are avoiding total reciprocal commitment. They live together as
long as it is to each one's satisfaction, as long as they are both getting something out of the relationship.
Whereas in marriage the spouses are in it to give themselves to each other, in cohabitation the partners are in
it to take what they want from the other. Obviously these are the poles of the spectrum: most marriages fall
short of the altruistic ideal, and many cohabitees do not exploit each other. But whatever the actual situation
in a cohabiting relationship, it is essentially a false one on a unitary view of man. The bodies of the cohabitees
are declaring in sexual intercourse a total giving of one to the other, but their minds and wills are refusing
to make that commitment. If they wanted to do that, cohabitees would marry not just live together.
They are thus acting a lie.

To sum up. Bristow's book provides a stimulating approach to traditional Christian ethics, which
evangelicals could consult with profit. There is often a suspicion among Protestants that anything Catholics write
is dubious or unsound. Our Puritan forefathers did not think this way, but particularly in the realms of
ethics drew heavily on Roman divines. This is not to say Bristow covers all the ground one would like. The
encyclicals and other papal pronouncements have not just tackled issues of personal and medical ethics, but have
addressed social, political and environmental issues. It would have been helpful if Bristow had explored
how the Pope's personalism impacted his teaching on those areas too. Like many ethicists Bristow makes little
direct use of Scripture in expounding papal teaching: in fact his two chapters on biblical ethics are
rather sketchy. This is in great contrast to the encyclicals of John Paul 2 and Benedict 16, which are shot
through with apt biblical texts. Indeed the first quarter of Veritatis Splendor is a splendid exposition of Matthew 19: 16ff, Jesus' reply to the Rich Young Ruler. John Paul had a much
more direct and energetic style than Bristow, but without the latter it is difficult to appreciate the context
and content of the encyclicals.

For evangelical readers I think that potentially the most valuable aspect of this book is in
its relating Old Testament law and New Testament ethical teaching via the virtues. Too often discussions
of biblical issues are a sort of casuistry. In what circumstances is divorce permissible, or can one ever
lie? It is a sort of legalism whereby we say 'What can I get away with? What is the minimum God will accept?' Law
without virtue becomes dry and arbitrary. Law provides the skeleton of an ethic, it is the virtues which provide
the flesh and skin and make it attractive. We should not be aiming at the minimum, but as Jesus said 'Be perfect,
as your heavenly Father is perfect.'(Matt 5: 48). Bristow compares the relationship between biblical law and virtue
to a chess game. The laws of chess are unchangeable, but how well one plays the game depends on one's skill as
a chess player, and that can always be improved. As St Paul put it: 'Not that I ...am already perfect, but I press
on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his own.' (Philippians 3: 12).

Vatican II called for the renewal of Catholic moral theology and, after several false starts in the post-conciliar
years-associated primarily with the mutiny against Catholic sexual ethics-the task finally got underway seriously
with moralist John Paul II on the papal chair. As Fr. Peter Bristow puts it, "John
Paul II has taken forward philosophical and theological anthropology to a remarkable degree. It has enabled him
to re-affirm and explain for our time the universal binding force of the natural moral law and underpin the existence
of moral absolutes in the face of a growing relativism. He has also challenged the widespread culture of death
by upholding the intrinsic and equal value of every human life from conception"
(p. 19).

What has been lacking, however, is a good English introduction to John Paul's moral thought, one that clarifies
the sometimes turgid language in which he formulated his insights, as well as one that shows how those groundbreaking
insights fit into and contribute to the renewal of Catholic moral theology. Bristow fills that gap with his introduction
to John Paul's moral thought, a work that belongs in every priest's library as well as a standard text in Catholic
universities and seminaries.

The book is divided into four major sections. Part I is an introduction to fundamental moral theology (with a focus
on the renewal of natural moral law). Part II thoroughly critiques the errors of revisionism, the primary degradation
of contemporary Catholic moral theology. Part III focuses on the special perspective that Christianity brings to
ethics. Part IV explains contemporary Catholic sexual ethics (with particular attention to Humanae Vitae), in a manner faithful to its tradition yet
wholly imbued with a personalistic focus.

As an introduction to moral theology, this book provides a solid update for those who have already studied moral
theology, as well as a solid foundation for those just starting out in that field. The presentation on sexual ethics
is particularly valuable, both because sexual morality has been the locus of enormous controversy as well as because
John Paul II contributed so mightily to its personalistic renewal. The book also puts Catholic moral theology into
dialogue with both utilitarianism and Kantianism. In the larger public square, Catholic moral theology's main opponents
are variations of utilitarianism (especially in social policy) and procedural formalism devoid of deeper content
(particularly in bioethics). Anybody who is going to talk about moral issues with the modern world needs to know
those perspectives—and why they are wrong. Bristow also
devotes a full chapter to a critique of the notion of freedom that sees free choice, rather than what is chosen,
as determinative of moral goodness. Obviously, such notions of "good" and "right" underlie much of secular sexual ethics, particularly the American abortion liberty. Pace many
contemporary views, however, the book shows how, far from being an impoverishment of freedom, the Christian notion
of freedom fosters human flourishing. "[The Thomistic and Catholic
account of freedom may be called...freedom for excellence, because the human inclinations and appetites lead you,
when guided by reason and law, harmoniously to your overall fulfillment"
(p. 166).

If John Paul taught us one thing morally, it is that moral theology is not about law as much as about the human
person called to be fully alive in God. For those charged with helping their brothers in this task, this book will
be very valuable.

Dr. John M. Grondelski
Bern, Switzerland

The review first appeared in the August/September issue of Homiletic & Pastoral Review and is reproduced with permission.____________________________________________________

In 1990, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published guidance on the relationship between theologians
and the Magisterium in its Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian. The CDF called on theologians to function "in communion
with the Magisterium, which has been charged with the responsibility of preserving the deposit of faith" (6), and to offer the People of God "a teaching which
in no way does harm to the doctrine of the faith" (11). These guidelines have proved
controversial, not least among moral theologians. James Keenan and Peter Black, for example, have criticised those
who "look more for consistency with previous teachings than to the
critical tradition itself" (Studia Moralia 2001, p.326), describing them as "colleagues who have left
our enterprise" (ibid.). Contrastingly, Peter Bristow's analysis of postconciliar
moral thought in Christian Ethics and the Human Person exemplifies
the theologian's responsibility to gain "an ever deeper understanding
of the Word of God ... handed on faithfully by the Church's living Tradition under the guidance of the Magisterium" (CDF 1990, no. 21). By following this method, Bristow has produced a study which is both commendable
in its manner of doing theology and perceptive in its evaluation of contemporary ethical stances.

A notable achievement of the book is to discern the crucial role played by conflicting views of the human person
in determining attitudes to a wide range of ethical questions. The basic antithesis is between the person as a
unified subject consisting of body and soul, and a post-Cartesian view which holds that the mind can be asserted
over against the truth about man, that truth being revealed in and through the body and illuminated by reason.
Bristow demonstrates consistently that the former view underlies the teaching of the Church and of those theologians
who cooperate with it constructively, and that the latter is the source of much dissent and of the relativism which
undermines the truth about man. This is a leitmotif found in numerous chapters, including those on Natural Law,
moral revisionism and Humanae Vitae. In the case of Paul VI's
encyclical, Bristow points out that a true appreciation of the conjugal act "depends
on the understanding that the human person is a unity of body and spirit, so that where the body acts the spirit
is also present and vice versa" (p. 346). That is precisely what the advocates of
mind-body dualism fail to see. They do not see that the contraceptive act results in "a bodily union, but not a fully personal one, in the sense that the whole person is not being given
to the other" (ibid.). The body may be given, but the full commitment of openness
to fecundity is withheld. We thus have a false language of the body, as John Paul II would put it.

Bristow's linking of Humanae Vitae and John Paul II's Theology
of the Body highlights another important contribution of this book, namely the sense it gives of a living, organic
continuity in the moral teaching of the Church. Defenders of Humanae Vitae have long pointed out that it is consistent with traditional doctrine, and as such is an instrument of
communion with those who have gone before us. Though true, this presents Humanae Vitae as a terminus from which we look back. Bristow also sees the encyclical as a salient contribution which
itself is capable of being unpacked and enriched by thinkers of subsequent generations who share Paul VI's commitment
to authentic Magisterium. John Paul II's Theology of the Body provides such an enrichment, as Bristow makes clear
in his comments on what remained to be clarified about the mystery of spousal love in the wake of Humanae Vitae: "A fuller... and
deeper treatment was needed, and this was forthcoming in the 'theology of the body' at the beginning of John Paul
II's pontificate" (p. 337). Bristow's chapter on the Theology of the Body provides
an admirable summary of this fuller and deeper treatment.

Such weaknesses as there are in Christian Ethics and the Human Person do not detract noticeably from its overall effectiveness. Chapter 4, which is devoted to "Contemporary Personalism", could benefit from a simpler
or more streamlined presentation of what is essentially a solid argument. And some terms (such as "Natural Law") are used a number of times before being fully
defined, although the definitions are illuminating when they are given. Such minor caveats apart, Bristow has managed
to point contemporary Catholic ethics in a convincing direction, one which is truly in and of the Church. As such
his book is warmly to be recommended.

Father Peter Bristow has done a great service in his book Christian Ethics and the Human Person. Its overall purpose
is to fill the need for a presentation of Catholic moral thought as renewed in the second half of the twentieth
century by Vatican II, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, John Paul’s encyclicals Veritatis Splendor and Evangelium Vitae, and the personalistic theology/philosophy that underlay those great encyclicals. Bristow offers
readers an accurate and comprehensive account of John Paul’s moral thought. His is a most helpful volume.

– William May, author of Catholic
Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, is Professor of Moral Theology
at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America

In his latest volume theologian Fr Bristow explains Christian ethics opposite personhood, focusing
on Church teaching and urging the progress of moral renewal. He addresses themes such as the pursuit of happiness,
considers specifics such as bio-ethics, and explains the contrast with ‘revisionism’. While this is not always an easy work to read it repays the attention given to it and those catechists
and teachers involved in teaching life in Christ and who value guidance on how to live practically can benefit
greatly from his work, which offers a trustworthy path through the area and demystifies the main concepts.

Ethics depends upon our understanding of human nature, and the book begins accordingly, showing
that our reason can know Truth and Goodness as absolutes, that human act is genuinely free, and that morality’s
aims include virtue and dignity. The Church’s teaching that the person is a union of spiritual soul and material
body, has an incomparable value and is a ‘gift’
to others, has been enhanced by John Paul II’s use of a personalist philosophy. This highlights our personal obligation
to seek self-realisation, involving experience, subjective self-knowledge and self-possession, and relational realities
such as reciprocity. Hence morality is not so much about ‘rule-keeping’ as it is about authentic personal development.

It follows that embedded within our finite, God-given human nature are its natural goods. Accessible
to reason, they underpin ‘natural law’. These
goods refer, for example, to the preservation of life and to self-giving in friendship. Genuine human freedom is
inherently directed towards them: this is what our freedom is for
— tohave the opportunityto pursue them, and so seek fulfilment. Hence objective
right reason, and law attuned to truth, actually increase rather than curtail freedom since they assist the pursuit.
(So it was that G.K.Chesterton once famously said that the Law may mean walls, ‘but
they are the walls of a playground’). This understanding flows through to the ‘three sources’ of moral act, namely: the chosen object itself,
the intention, and the circumstances; since it is being contrary to natural law goods that makes an object wrong.

The Content of Faith

Revelation completes reason’s analysis of Truth, disclosing the context in which we actually
live, from the Fall to a transcendent eternity. Within this perspective of a Christian worldview we see how the
Decalogue expounds natural law, affirming each person’s intrinsic dignity, and protecting the essential rights
we have - to life, to choose a state of life, and so on. Again, the presentation made by Fr Bristown emphasises
that this is a matter of personal development — God has provided us with a law of loving liberty within which to
pursue goods.

The New Law, delivered through the perfect life and sacrifice of our Lord, a life made possible
by his immaculate Mother, perfects the Old’s permanent content, demanding our interior conversion to a life of
self-donation and moral excellence — hence the Beatitudes. (It also supersedes the Old in terms of the gifts of
liturgy, sacraments and grace, as the ongoing support for us to meet these higher demands). Here, at the summit,
we learn that the dynamic behind our staggering new responsibilities are the three divine virtues and other gifts
infused into our souls by the Holy Spirit. We see the vital role that these virtues play in our lives, and that
they are orientated towards objective, unchangeable goods, and are not simply ‘values’, namely subjectively-assumed priorities.

Revisionism

The work includes important discussions of ideas collectively labelled ‘moral revisionism’ which are shown to conflict with rational Christian
ethics. Bristow argues that, in revisionist ethics, the individual is seen dualistically, with a spotlight on consciousness
alone. There is scant recognition of personalism, and that we self-determine by our acts. Moral absolutes and the
natural law, and authentic freedom within these, are replaced instead by a two-tier system where imprecise ideals
such as ‘being for God’ are separated from concrete
events. Since the latter level is isolated it degenerates into moral autonomy where I (or, more often, the powerful)
decide what right and wrong are. The moral object of acts is
usually overlooked in favour of a mix of intention and circumstances. The book concludes that this moral system
cannot deliver either the authentic moral progress of persons or, therefore, genuine social betterment or the advancement
of the Church.

Practical Solutions in Life

Finally, Fr Bristow applies the relevant truths of faith and reason to some lively current issues,
to indicate the ways to happiness. Since masculinity and femininity are intrinsic ways of being human, acts related
to them will be right in their conformity to our natural goods. The body is united to the soul, and hence the former
must be treated consistently with the goods of the whole person; this principle exposes particularly clearly the
illicitness of objectifying bodies for domination. And there is the necessity of chastity, where self-mastery integrates
desire into self-giving, a vivifying ingredient for marriage just as it is for a vital, outwardly-committed celibacy.
Bristow shows how the sexual act is enshrined as a conjugal reality based on the total and mutual self-giving that
only the marital state, with its full unity and complementarity, can make authentically possible.

With these and other practical points the author encourages us to live life to the full, secure
in the knowledge of what constitutes right and wrong, and of how genuine moral renewal and evangelisation, of ourselves,
of the Church, and of society, can be achieved.

Russell D’Arcy

Russell D'Arcy worked in commerce and industry for twenty years, while also
completing some post-graduate work in philosophy. He is currently working on a book on human nature and the soul.