The members of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) may have thought that they were caught in limbo. Obliged under the Northern Ireland (Monitoring Commission etc.) Act 2003 following an International Agreement between the British and Irish Governments, the Commission has in recent years been able to declare that many of the groups once central to the “troubles” are now committed to exclusively peaceful means. A successive series of their Reports dealt with ever decreasing levels of political violence. The Commission’s mandate, to “monitor any continuing activity by paramilitary groups” (Article 4) and to “recommend any remedial action considered necessary” (Article 7) in response to this activity, appeared close to obsolescence.

If the Commissoners had once come round to this way of thinking, this week’s Twenty-Second Report adopted a markedly different tenor. The IMC asserts (at [2.7]) that the main dissident republican groups (the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA) have expanded their membership base (although largely through recruiting ‘inexperienced young males’). Moreover, the IMC evaluates how the attack against the Massereene Army Base in Antrim on 7 March 2009 (killing Sappers Mark Quincy and Patrick Azimkar) and the murder of PC Stephen Carroll in Craigavon on 9 March presaged a summer of increasingly ambitious attacks, often only thwarted by effective policing on both sides of the border (see [2.6]).

In other respects the Report was more hopeful. Having asserted that the Provisional IRA is committed to an exclusively peaceful path in its Nineteenth Report (at [2.7]), the IMC emphasised that (at [4.4]), particularly after the attacks in March, senior figures in Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA, ‘have continued to give leadership to the republican community to refrain from violent and other crime, to adhere to the exclusively political path, and to reject the dissident republicans who want to destroy the peace process, pointing out the futility of their actions and the lack of a political strategy on their part’. Moreover, the leadership of loyalist groups were singled out (see [4.5]) for their, ‘efforts to prevent a violent reaction on the part of members to the dissident republican murders’. This position was bolstered, on 4 September 2009, by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning’s verification of the UVF and Red Hand Commando’s weapons. The IMC also cautiously welcomed (at [2.21]) the INLA’s renouncement of violence on 11 October 2009.

For the moment the dissident republican groups remain fragmented and fractious, unable, in the words of the IMC, to undertake ‘effective strategic collaboration’. Nevertheless, focusing police resources on the dissident republican threat to the peace process will not, in the long term, deflect attention from the power vacuum which is developing at the centre of the peace process as a result of stalled efforts to devolve policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly (a point addressed in some of my earlier posts). As part of its wide mandate to recommend remedial action to counter terrorist threats, the IMC emphasised the paramount importance of devolving these powers (at [5.1]):

‘There are security and intelligence contributions to be made to addressing the developing problems. However, the early devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive could provide a potent intervention. This would not be because the dissidents would be impressed by it. It would be because policing and justice would no longer be a point of contention across the political divide; rather, it would be a platform for co-operation against those trying to undermine the peace process.’

Polls continue to suggest that the vast majority of Northern Irish voters support parties which remain committed to democratic politics. The longer this enforced hiatus persists, however, the easier dissidents will find it to persuade some people, even if they are ‘inexperienced young males’, that the peace process is not serving their interests.

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“The longer this enforced hiatus persists, however, the easier dissidents will find it to persuade some people, even if they are ‘inexperienced young males’, that the peace process is not serving their interests.”

Colin, I couldn’t agree with you more. The serious human rights implications of dissident activity, not only for victims of their activities (paramilitary and otherwise) but also more generally in terms of the creep of crisis mentality into criminal justice law and policy, requires urgent action in the devolution of policing and justice powers. For this to happen, political parties in the North will have to recommit themselves to responsible and deliberative politics rather than grandstanding.

I wonder if you have any views on whether the change in government in Westminster (if it happens) in the next general election is likely to have any impact on the pace at which devolution of policing and justice would take place?

Thanks Fiona. Without control of policing and justice powers it is too easy for dissidents to portray the Assembly as more of a playschool for politicians than a credible political institution, arguments which could influence those unhappy with the peace process. Such discontent, if coupled with a successful dissident attack, could result in the type of revenge attack so common in Northern Irland’s history bbut with did not take place after the murders of March 2009. This could escalate into a cycle of violence with the Assembly still lacking the powers to respond to such a situation.

Such concerns would therefore arise out of even a delay in devolution of policing powers for the 6-8 months likely remaining before the next UK General Election (June ’10 at the latest).