1. Mrs. Meir said from first she and other Israeli officials had made
no secret of their belief it impossible make any real progress on refugee
question at this time. Last year when Ben Gurion had discussed matter
with President, former had said Israel willing to go along with attempt
repatriation and resettlement but did not expect any results. Johnson
had undertaken impossible mission. Arabs and Israelis agreed on one
thing, i.e., question of refugees could not be separated from overall
question of Arab-Israel relations. She had told Hadassah Convention
in Pittsburgh recently that until Arabs agreed to negotiate with Israel,
there is only one problem, i.e., how Arabs can be brought to acquiesce
in Israel's existence. Once negotiations start, then question of Arab
refugees, Jordan water and others can perhaps be settled.

2. Mrs. Meir said that when Johnson first came to ME, he had first
visited Arabs then had gone to Israel. She had asked him what reaction
he had found. Johnson had replied that none of top Arab leaders prepared
to accept existence of Israel. Second time Johnson came to area he had
come with proposal for test poll of 20,000 refugees. (First time he
had come he had mentioned possibility of repatriating 10,000 refugee
families per year for 10 years--proposal which Johnson had removed from
record when Mrs. Meir told him how shocking Israelis found it.) At time
of second visit Johnson had been told basis for any refugee settlement
would have to be (A) complete recognition of Israel's sovereignty, (B)
careful regard for Israel's security, matter on which Israel itself
would have to be final judge and (C) principle that there could be some
repatriation but there would have to be much greater amount of resettlement.
If matter could be handled in way in which Arabs could indicate lack
of aggressive intent against Israel, then some progress might be made.
Johnson had been told Israel would expect Arabs to agree to say nothing
hostile against Israel for six months in either Arab newspapers or on
Arab radio. This was very little to expect from Arabs in return for
repatriation. Johnson had put this proposal to Arabs and had found they
unwilling agree to moratorium on propaganda. Nor had they been willing
make statement that they would implement resettlement aspects of plan.
Johnson had indicated he would, nevertheless, go ahead with plan because
Israel had not said that they would not allow repatriation of single
refugee. At that time, Ben Gurion had repeated basis on which Israel
would consider any refugee repatriation plan.

3. Mrs. Meir said Johnson had agreed consult further before launching
plan. In fact, however, nothing more heard from him until he presented
Comay with "Plan" and "Explanation" recently. Secretary
interrupted to recall visit of Feldman to Israel. Mrs. Meir said she
had forgotten this. Changing subject slightly, she said she had previously
asked Johnson not to put forward plan for poll of refugees unless he
first got assurances from Arabs re radio and press propaganda. Again
digressing, she said Israelis convinced as long as Arab leaders continue
hold present hostile attitude toward Israel it would be impossible speak
of free choice among Arab refugees. Therefore, Israelis had not believed
rumors they had heard that Johnson had decided that all refugees would
be polled. However, when she had discussed plan with Feldman she had
found latter to be true. She told Feldman Israel considered plan "fantastic".
Feldman had assured her that US anxious preserve Israel's security and,
given its commitments, would not be foolish enough to allow any plan
to go into effect which would really endanger Israel security. Government
had assured her US would not allow plan to go through if large numbers
of Arabs chose repatriation as result final interview. Plan would begin
with seeking of preference from no more that 1,000 refugees. Ben Gurion
had asked what would happen if, of this thousand, 300 requested repatriation.
Feldman had said plan would stop. Ben Gurion had indicated that if more
than 1 in 10 refugees chose repatriation, danger point would be reached.

4. Feldman had been more patient, Mrs. Meir said, in listening to Israel's
case but he in turn had not convinced Israelis. They had told him that
if plan were to be implemented it would amount to a rallying of Arab
refugees under UN auspices and UN would have succeeded in consolidating
refugees where all other means had failed. She said she always [has]
nightmares that Arabs might wake up some day and abandon attacks on
Israel for simple expedient of pushing refugees across border into Israel.
Israel soldiers would be there to insure they did not pass but what
would world think of Israelis having to shoot thousands of innocent
women and children. In case of Johnson Plan, how could UN guarantee
that thousands who might have asked for repatriation would not merely
be pushed across borders by Arab leaders whose first objective is to
destroy Israel?

5. Mrs. Meir said to her horror she found late in Feldman's visit there
was an operative plan under which, beginning September 17, Acting Administrator
would start to put plan into effect, working from Government House Jerusalem.
Mrs. Meir had told Feldman if this done, Israel would not recognize
existence of Acting Administrator. She had urged Feldman to postpone
all further action until she could talk to Secretary and to Johnson.
However, this had not been way situation had developed and Israel now
had to take stand on matter. She had discussed response to be given
to PCC members and Johnson with Ben Gurion recently at their meeting
in Zurich. Principal Israeli objection was that plan did not pay proper
attention to Israel's sovereignty. Johnson seems to be saying that although
all countries were sovereign, Israel was somewhat less so. This so since
he seemed to put refugees in group apart which should have special handling.
Furthermore, Israel's sovereignty compromised by setting up of advisory
comites to which refugees could appeal if not admitted. If Israel did
not heed comites' decisions, Johnson had indicated UN would have to
deal with problem. This could constantly put Israel before bar of international
justice.

6. Another gross derogation of Israeli sovereignty was fact that, under
Johnson Plan, crossing over of refugees into Israel would not be final
act. UN would follow up by seeing that refugees properly treated. This
Israel could not allow. Resources in country were scarce and if refugees
came back they, like thousands of Jewish immigrants, would be sent into
the Negev and other development areas. Why should Arabs want to help
develop Israel? What would happen if they refused to go to development
areas? Present problem of significant Arab minority would be increased
out of all proportions. Only recently Israel had had real troubles with
Arabs when some Arab properties confiscated allow building of Negev
Canal. [sic] Arab women and children had been pushed by their leaders
into path of bulldozers.

7. Secretary asked whether there was group solidarity among Arabs of
Israel. Mrs. Meir said there was quite a bit. Many Israeli Arabs didn't
want refugees to come back, however, since their own economic and social
conditions were excellent and they didn't want any trouble. Troublesome
groups are Arab Communist Party members. Israeli Arabs not really Communist
but they hate Israel and Communist Party expresses most closely their
hatreds.

8. Returning to question of who exactly could return, Mrs. Meir said
Israel was best judge since she had everything to lose. Idea of international
body giving opinion does away at one stroke with Israel sovereignty.
Furthermore, Arabs had given no indication they willing acquiesce in
Israel's existence, nor have they given any sign of peaceful intentions
towards Israel. No Arab leader would dare acquiesce in resettlement
and if this not done, whole plan is dead.

9. Mrs. Meir asked rhetorical question, what should be done next? Should
Johnson be instructed to try again? No, she said, this not possible
for refugee problem cannot be solved alone. Perhaps she too pessimistic
and there would be peace one day, but real problem was not refugees
but US willingness maintain arms balance between Arabs and Israel and
US willingness give Israel full support on Jordan Water diversion. This
more important than 10 humanitarian missions. Sooner Arabs learn there
no chance destroy Israel because of strength her friends, sooner there
would be peace in area.

10. Secretary said he appreciated frankness with which Mrs. Meir had
spoken. He, however, genuinely believed there were many misunderstandings
which could and should be cleared up. For example, US for its part had
no doubts about sovereignty of Israel (Mrs. Meir made disclaimer of
any doubts here). If Israel felt keenly about its sovereignty, maybe
it was because she had too much sovereignty. US didn't have much sovereignty
in this day and age. Secretary said he would also like to set aside
problem of security. US would not act in way which might diminish Israel's
security in view of US commitments. However, tension and troubles ahead
and water situation likely to add to tensions. If there are any misunderstandings
between US and Israel, they should be settled now.

11. Secretary said there are other aspects of refugee problem which
he would like to explain. US bearing great burden for refugees, and
this not only a financial burden. Israel says there no chance for settlement
of refugee question. For US, this impossible to accept for this discloses
prospect of endless treadmill of appropriations to keep refugees alive.
Congress not likely to accept this. Whether Israel agrees or not, it
will have to understand that US must make real attempt achieve progress
re refugees. US cannot accept unresolved refugee situation as natural
part of Middle East scenery for this much too dangerous. Mere presence
of refugees in area provides inflammatory focus for troubles between
US and countries of ME. If refugees could be resettled and broken up,
this would be to great advantage of US and Israel. Furthermore, Arab
acquiescence to resettlement would be first step in acquiescence towards
Israel as whole. If Arab governments were to mount campaign of revenge
while repatriation going on, then plan would have to be reevaluated.

12. Secretary said key point was to determine what individual Arabs
believed. Arab leaders were negative but he not so certain individual
refugees would take same stand. They would be told they would not be
going "home" but would be going to Israel. Mere presentation
of facts about modern Israel would be important. US feels it essential
that somehow chance be given to ask refugees real questions rather than
phony questions about their future. Disincentives built into plan would,
he thought, be effective in discouraging repatriation. US would be surprised
if large numbers opted for repatriation. If they did so in significant
numbers, plan would have to be readjusted. However, at best plan would
be long-term operation. Beginnings would be small, indeed, and would
be focused on finding out if there is any interest in repatriation.
Secretary said he hoped there could be further talks about possibility
of finding out in limited number of cases what a small group of Arab
refugees had in mind.

13. Secretary indicated that meanwhile he thought it essential nothing
be done by Israel which would bring upon themselves full burden for
rejecting Johnson Plan. In interests of both US and Israel, it essential
any burden for rejection be shared, for Israel in near future would
need strong US backing re diversion Jordan water. Also there was question
of Hawk missile. If this issue came up when public openly critical of
Israel for rejection Johnson Plan, then US would have problems. Secretary
emphasized not equating questions but developments would come in same
period. Secretary said US had agreed to look at plan not out of any
sense it would be accepted fully, but rather out of feeling something
might come out of it which could lead to progress. Johnson Plan was
a very reasonable approach and it essential to keep trying to find out
what individual refugees would elect to do in light of all facts on
situation. Secretary asked Mrs. Meir to think over his remarks and in
any event to keep matter in play until Arabs can react, at same time
avoiding publicity.

14. Mrs. Meir said she found it necessary to say that as far as Israel
is concerned, not only Johnson Plan but entire concept of repatriation
is unacceptable. As long as Arab attitudes toward Israel remain same
there can be no free choice by refugees. She said she surprised that
there had been no leak re Johnson Plan from Israel side. This had been
accomplished by taking editors of Israeli papers into confidence. She
also did same with Israeli correspondents in New York. However, other
side had leaked news in form of release of Kennedy-Nasser letters. As
far as she was concerned this was UAR answer to Johnson Plan. Same day
these documents released, Radio Cairo had indicated there was no question
of refugees coming back to Israel but only question of whole nation
returning. Mrs. Meir repeated that Israel had no interest publishing
documents, but it miracle there had been no leak so far.

15. Mrs. Meir said she had not lost sight of US burden re refugees.
She had not meant that nothing could be done about refugees but only
that nothing positive could come from approaching refugee problem in
context of Johnson Plan. She agreed something constructive should be
tried. Israel had not changed her policy of not saying no refugee would
be readmitted to Israel.

16. Secretary said he sorry Israel seemed to feel it could not accept
Johnson Plan. It important that two parties should be quite clear about
certain points. He thought it would be useful if Ambassador could discuss
matter with . . . . At this point Mrs. Meir broke in to say she realized
conversations had gone on much too long and it would be useful if she
could meet again with Secretary.