In the U.N. vs. Congress, Meese Must Enforce U.S. Law

About the Author

I t is United States law that the Palestine Liberation Organization
cannot maintain an office in the U.S. This is the result of an
amendment to the State Department Authorization Act passed by
Congress l ast December. It specifically mandates the closure of
the Palestine Information Office in Washington and the Observer
Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the United
Nations in New York. The legislation won near unanimous support in
both Ho u ses of Congress, and was signed into law by Ronald Reagan
on December 22, 1987. Ibis week, refusing to bow to intense
pressure from the State Department, Attorney General Edwin Meese
apparently decided to enforce the law and was preparing to order
the PLO office closed.

State Department officials, who had opposed the amendment from the
outset, had been attempting to thwart the law by delaying the
closure of the PLO's U.N. Observer Mission. For one thing, argued
the officials, the law would damage the U.S. standing at the U.N.
The U.N. General Assembly in December passed a resolution
condemning efforts to close the Observer Mission. 1 For another
thing, the Department feared that closing the Observer Mission
could violate U.S. obligations to the U.N. under t he 1947 U.N.
Headquarters Agreement. This could mean that the matter could be
referred to the World Court. Finally, State is feeling heat from
Arab states, who threaten to call for a General Assembly Special
Session to condemn the U.S. for closing the Obs erver Mission.

Judged by a World Court. For these reasons, State was pressuring
Attorney General Meese not to close the PLO offices by March 21 as
the law requires. Instead, State wanted to refer the matter to a
special three judge arbitration tribunal, pr ovided for in the 1947
Headquarters Agreement between the U.S. and the U.N. The tribunal
would be composed of one judge selected by the U.S., one by the
U.N. Secretary-General, and one by mutual agreement between the
Secretary- General and the U'S. If the parties failed to agree on
an acceptable third judge, he would be appointed by World Court
President Nagendra Singh of India.

The decision was in Meese's hands. He apparently decided to do his
duty and enforce the law of the land regarding the the PLO off ice
in Manhattan. Earlier, the State Department had closed the
Palestine Information Office in Washington. For Meese to have done
otherwise would have 1set a troublesome, even dangerous precedent
for future disputes between the U.S. and the U.N., and

pe rhaps even in conflicts between U.S. law and international
;obligations. First, whether or not one feels that closing the
PLO's Observer Mission is sound policy, the fact is that U.S. law
mandates its closure on or before March 21. Precedence of U.S. Law.
Second, closing the Observer, Mission violates neither
international law nor the Headquarters Agreement. This reportedly
is the conclusion of both the Justice Department and the U.N.'s own
Legal Counsel. Because the U.S. feared that hosting the U.N. might
infringe!on U.S. security, the Congress in 1947 passed Public Law
80-357. Section 6 of this law states that "nothing in the
[Headquarters] Agreement shallbe construed,as in any way
diminishing, abridging or weakening the right of the United'States
to' saf e guard its own security ...... The U.S. therefore may take
appropriate measures to curtail the PLO presence in New York,
especially since Observer Missions, as distinct from normal
diplomatic missions, are conferred no right to a permanent presence
by the H eadquarters Agreement or the U.N. Charter. This position
gains- further-legal- authority because the U.S. has imposed travel
restrictions on Soviet-bloc diplomats in New York--a practice that
has not been legally challenged; Even if the law did not violat e
international law, moreover, it is well established -constitutional
doctrine that if an international treaty obligation and U.S. law
are in conflict, the U.S. law takes precedence. Third, the State
Department proposal that the matter be referred to a spe c ial
international tribunal was very unsound. Such a panel would almost
inevitably rule against the U.S., since both the judge selected by
the Secretary-General of the U.N. and any third judge appointed by
the President of the World Court are almost certai n to be
politically sympathetic toward the PLO. Furthermore, the U.S.
should firmly reject any role for the World Court in the matter.
The U.S., like most nations, has never accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court. And 'for good reason. The Court is
primarily a political body that consistently has invoked one sort
of legal rationale or another to justify an anti-American decision.
Clearly, a court that includes, as the World Court now
does,,'Judges" from Poland, the USSR, India, and Algeria i s not
competent to rule on whether Congress has the right to pass laws to
safeguard U.S. security. Reduchg the FBrs Burden. Fourth, and most
important, referring the matter to the Special Tribunal, or
allowing the World Court to issue an advisory opinion, would have
set a profoundly dangerous precedent. As host country for the U.N.,
the U.S. is involved in frequent disputes with both individual!
diplomatic missions and the U.N. over a variety of issues, ranging
from rent payments to the limits of diplomati c immunity. Allowing
any international legal body to make a judgment in the case would
undermine U.S. authority to make final determinations in these
matters. For these reasons, Attorney General Meese acted correctly
when he ordered the PLO Observer Missio n closed. If the matter is
now referred to the World Court, the U.S., as many other states
have done, should refuse flatly to recognize the World Court's
authority in this matter. And if a Special Session of the U.N.
General Assembly is called in Geneva, o r efforts are made to hold
all U.N. General Assemblies outside the U.S, the U.S. should
strongly support these actions. The U.N. is not doing the U.S. a
favor by meeting in Manhattan. Moving to Geneva, if nothing else,
at least would reduce greatly the FBI 's burden of protecting the
U.S. from the extensive espionage efforts undertaken by Soviet-bloc
spies who use their cover as diplomats and employees at the
U.N.