KOEBERG ALERT ALLIANCEhttps://koebergalert.org
Calling for a review of the nuclear power programme
Sat, 17 Nov 2018 16:21:30 +0000 en
hourly
1 http://wordpress.com/https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/cb772934acd2445efc4b19202f47a7bb?s=96&d=https%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fbuttonw-com.pngKOEBERG ALERT ALLIANCEhttps://koebergalert.org
Response from Eskom to our appeal against the Environmental Authorisation for Koeberg Nuclear sitehttps://koebergalert.org/2018/08/15/response-from-eskom-to-our-appeal-against-the-environmental-authorisation-for-koeberg-nuclear-site/
https://koebergalert.org/2018/08/15/response-from-eskom-to-our-appeal-against-the-environmental-authorisation-for-koeberg-nuclear-site/#respondWed, 15 Aug 2018 14:22:24 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2621Continue reading →]]>Back in 2007, Eskom began an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for building a large new nuclear power plant on the Koeberg site, about 28km north of Cape Town. Ten years later, after many drafts and submissions, the Department of Environmental Affairs issued an Environmental Authorisation for the project to go ahead. Many organisations appealed this decision, and Eskom was required to respond in detail to the content of each of those appeals, which they have now done (in August 2018).

Many of these responses were combined into one document, which has been widely distributed. However, KAA received the following 115 page specific response. There has not been time to go through it in detail yet, but it is published below to give you all the opportunity to have a look through it and pass it on to others.

Paging through it, a few bits stood out for me.

A tourism plus…
In a show of optimism regarding possible impacts of tourism, Eskom writes “Some nuclear power stations have a positive effect on tourism, as tourists visit specifically to see the stations.” I haven’t ever noticed tourist buses lining up outside Koeberg myself!

Over 9 million bags have radioactive debris have been collected around Fukushima

Never mind how much it could cost…
In response to us pointing out the impact of a possible accident on the Economy of the Western Cape and South Africa has not been quantified or assessed, Eskom brushed that off: “Given the unlikeliness of a severe accident occurring, it is submitted that a detailed assessment of the economic impact on each sector was not required.” We believe the decision makers should know what it would cost the taxpayer and the economy if there was a major accident. Only then can a rational decision be made as to whether the risks, however small, are worth it. As a comparison, the Fukushima nuclear plant clean up is estimated as having a direct cost of between $75 billion and $660 billion in this Scientific American article. At the current exchange rate, that corresponds to between R1 trillion to R9 trillion. Loss of property and of export markets for agricultural goods would be additional to that. Note that losses due to a nuclear incident are explicitly excluded in all property insurance policies (if you have one, go check the fine print if you find it hard to believe).

Word play…
With regard to the effects of the nuclear accident at Fukushima, Eskom does acknowledge a “Theoretical increased risk of thyroid cancer among most exposed children“. This is a clever use of language. Risks are, of course, theoretical by definition! But specifying they are theoretical risks somehow makes it sound less real. Also, these risks are apparently for most exposed children. Really!? Have some exposed children been identified who are immune to radiation? Of course not. This is just a way to further downplay the issue.

And the high level waste?

Racks in a cooling pond

The waste produced by a plant would seem at first glance to be an important part of its environmental impact, and especially so if that waste remains dangerous for thousands of years. Eskom however, disagrees. They contend that there was no need to “to assess the impact of the final disposal of the high level nuclear waste as the final disposal of high level nuclear waste will be the responsibility of the National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute“. The waste is a direct and inevitable result of building the plant, and so its impact cannot just be omitted just because someone else will be dealing with it.

Once high level waste is produced, there is no way to back off. After a few years in cooling ponds it must be disposed of so any separate Environmental Impact Assessment done later would be farcical as the “no-go’ option is by then of course impossible.

A crack in the concrete pit near reactor number 2 after the Fukushima earthquake

Earthquakes?
The Fukushima disaster demonstrated that a nuclear power station cannot withstand an unexpectedly powerful earthquake. The Koeberg site is within a few kilometres of the Milnerton fault line, which also runs through Ceres. The assessment of the risk of and earthquake damaging a nuclear plant on that site was done so poorly that Eskom’s consultants agreed it needed to be redone: “a new PSHA [Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis] will be undertaken for all three sites, following a SSHAC Level 3 process. Such a PSHA was to start in 2009 and preparations for this work were already made in 2008, but unfortunately it had to be postponed due to financial constraints.”

Ceres 1969 earthquake

Ten years later, this study has still not been completed, and Eskom are confident in the findings of a 42 year old study. In their response to an appeal, Eskom writes “Dames and Moore (1976) concluded that enough circumstantial evidence exists to postulate the presence of a northwest striking fault offshore of Duynefontein but that it does not come closer than 8 km to the site. It is however possible that such a postulated fault could pass anywhere between 7 and 10 km offshore of Duynefontein (the inferred Melkbos Ridge Fault passes 7.5 km from the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station). No new research has been performed to confirm or refute the presence of the postulated fault or its point of closest approach to the site”

Given the advances in computer modelling since 1976, as well as 42 more years of seismic data, it is likely that a new study would asses the risk more accurately. Eskom have known this for ten years, and there is no excuse for not completing this study before the Environmental Impact Assessment was submitted. In their response, Eskom are now attempting to rename this updated study the “NNR study”, so that they can delay it until the NNR licensing process .

The full MontyHere are all 115 pages of the response from Eskom. Enjoy! Please leave a comment below if something stands out for you.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2018/08/15/response-from-eskom-to-our-appeal-against-the-environmental-authorisation-for-koeberg-nuclear-site/feed/0koebergalertTitle page of response from Eskom to the KAA appealPhoto of blacg bags containing radiative debrisChild in Fukushima being tested for radiationPhoto p a blue open tank with a rack for hold spent nuclear fuel assembliesFukushima Reactor Pit CrackPhoto of a crack in the road and an article about the 1969 Ceres earthquakeAppeal against Environmental Authorisation for Koeberghttps://koebergalert.org/2018/03/11/appeal-against-environmental-authorisation-for-koeberg/
https://koebergalert.org/2018/03/11/appeal-against-environmental-authorisation-for-koeberg/#commentsSun, 11 Mar 2018 12:11:19 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2619Continue reading →]]>After a long Environmental Impact Assessment which began in 2007, an Environmental Authorisation was issued for the Koeberg site, 26km north of Cape Town. This gave Eskom permission to build a new nuclear plant of unspecified design, plus a nuclear waste reprocessing and/or disposal site.

At first only 30 days were allowed for appeals against this decision, and this was extended on the day of the deadline to about 90 days, until 5th March 2017. There are so many reasons this Authorisation was wrong, and we tried to describe some of them in the 43 page submission we wrote.

The moves by current Ministers to restart the renewable energy programme is to be welcomed, as are statements that South Africa cannot afford nuclear energy “for now”. However, from a legal standpoint, if this Authorisation stands, it will be valid for ten years. Who will be Minister of Energy in 2028? Who will be our president? We don’t know of course, which is why this decision must be reversed now.

Our submission begins:

We would like to start by making an appeal to the Department to encourage the applicant to withdraw this application immediately. In the region of R30m has been spent to date on consultants during the EIA, as well as other extensive internal expenses for Eskom staff such as travel and accommodation. Eskom can ill afford this money, and it would be morally reprehensible to continue to throw good money after bad, when it is publicly accepted that Eskom cannot afford a nuclear plant and that the country currently has no need for the extra electricity. This is particularly true in light of the fact that Eskom relies on bailouts from government, which means that this pointless expenditure directly affects the ability of government to provide services to the poor.

What is more, from the detailed legal and scientific criticism contained in the many appeals against this authorisation, we believe it is fatally flawed and has no prospect of withstanding a judicial review. If Eskom or the Department are put in a position where they need to defend their position in court, that would be a significant additional waste of time and money in terms of legal fees and the likely costs order that will result.

Here is the full text of the appeal for those who would like some more detail:

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2018/03/11/appeal-against-environmental-authorisation-for-koeberg/feed/1koebergalertExtension Granted for Appeal Against Nuclear-1 Authorisationhttps://koebergalert.org/2017/12/10/extension-granted-for-appeal-against-nuclear-1-authorisation/
https://koebergalert.org/2017/12/10/extension-granted-for-appeal-against-nuclear-1-authorisation/#commentsSun, 10 Dec 2017 08:56:39 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2605Continue reading →]]>On 11 October 2017 the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) issued an authorisation to Eskom for a second nuclear power plant at Koeberg, 28km north of Cape Town City centre. This was in response to a final Environmental Impact Report submitted to the Department by Gibb (Pty) Ltd on behalf of Eskom, the applicant.

Please sir, may we have some more time?
We wrote to the Department on 30 October, requesting an extension of the 30 day appeal period, which was set to expire on 1 December 2017.

We asked: “As set out above, in order for the appeal process to be fair, meaningful and legally defensible, the department will have to issue a number of corrective and explanatory public statements, and must direct the EAP to provide the public with more time within which to prepare their appeals. We are advised that a 90 day period within which to prepare an appeal is more realistic.”

Hurry up and wait…
Over the following weeks, we contacted the Department several times to ask what the status of this request was. Each time we were told:

Finally, on the morning of 30 November, after a barrage of phone calls from our members, telephonic assurance was given that the letter granting the extension had been printed a few days earlier, and was just awaiting a signature from the Director. Formal notification followed the next day, the 1st December, at 9am.

Et tu Eskom?
There were two other requests for extension acknowledged by the Department in the above letter. One was Mr Reyskens, a member of our online group and the other, to my surprise, was Eskom!

Eskom had been shown our extension request and responded to the Department on 23 November. In a mirroring of our request for 90 days, Eskom (the applicant for this project), asked for 90 days to respond to the appeals!

This means no final decision will be made until 4 June 2018.

A bit of context…This Environmental Authorisation is one piece of the chain that would be required before a nuclear plant can be procured. Some of the other pieces are:

Acceptance of the updated Integrated Resource Plan by cabinet (already done according to Energy Minister Mahlobo)

A ministerial Determination to proceed with procurement

An approval of the above by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa

An international agreement framework with one or more vendor countries

A site licence from the National Nuclear regulator

It is important that attention is paid to each of these because once an Environmental Authorisation is finally granted for example, it cannot be reversed and is valid for ten years.

Is this a victory?
For those opposing nuclear energy in South Africa, a delay is always seen as a victory. With every passing year, renewable energy becomes cheaper, storage solutions become more practical and nuclear energy becomes more expensive as more complex designs are created to increase safety. In the current political climate in South Africa, delaying the decision beyond the ANC December conference is also important. Once the power structures change, there may be less top level political pressure to rush the nuclear deal through. So for now, getting this extension is a victory.

What is next?
Note that it is now possible for anyone who failed to give notice of intention to appeal, to do that now, asking for condonation of the late notice. This is reasonable because some may have thought they would not have had time to complete an appeal within the 30 day period, and so did not give notice of intention to appeal. Given the longer period now granted, some may now wish to appeal after all by emailing ​ appeals@environment.gov.za with the subject Nuclear-1 appeal notice. If you do so, make sure you get an acknowledgement.

The extra time is going to be useful. There are many issues with the Environmental Impact Report, both procedural and substantive, and our draft appeal document has reached 20 pages so far. It’s hard to pick the most important issues, but two that have been a recurring theme in our previous submissions are the arguments for the need for nuclear power in South Africa, and the seismic risks of the Koeberg site, given the proximity to the Milnerton fault line.

A worrying recurrent theme in the Report is that the design of the nuclear plant will be so good that it will ‘practically eliminate‘ the chance of a serious accident, despite the actual design being unknown at this stage!

Those who would like to contribute to the appeal document are invited to contact info@koebergalert.org or to join our Facebook group for further information.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2017/12/10/extension-granted-for-appeal-against-nuclear-1-authorisation/feed/3Nuclear Authorisation Extension extractkoebergalertWorld Bank to fund nuclear power in South Africa?https://koebergalert.org/2017/11/20/world-bank-to-fund-nuclear-power-in-south-africa/
https://koebergalert.org/2017/11/20/world-bank-to-fund-nuclear-power-in-south-africa/#commentsMon, 20 Nov 2017 14:02:36 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2594Continue reading →]]>The South African government has been driving its nuclear power plans forward over the last few months. There have long been concerns, as recently expressed by President Zuma’s Minister of Finance, Malusi Gigaba, that South Africa cannot afford nuclear power. There has been speculation that the World Bank might be a source of funds to allow the project to go ahead. However, there are several reasons that make this is extremely unlikely, to say the least.

The World Bank has funded nuclear power in the past. Once!Nuclear plants are very expensive up front, and borrowing money to build them generates large interest repayments. In the early years of operation, almost all the profit from the plant is spent on paying this interest. As the years go by, the capital is gradually paid off, and once that is done the nuclear plant can become profitable. Towards the end of its life, after the debt is fully repaid, it generates very large profits. Assuming nothing goes wrong, that is…

From World Bank Board meeting notes

In 1959, the World Bank loaned $40 million for the construction of a 150MW nuclear power plant in Italy on the Garigliano river. This was World Bank loan number 0235, at an agreed interest rate of 6%, to be fully repaid by August 1979. The Guarantor of the loan was the Republic of Italy.

It was a uranium fuelled boiling water reactor built by General Electric and started operation in 1964. After just 12 years of operation, it was shut down in in 1978 due to damage to one of the steam generators. Four years later it was declared to be permanently out of service.

Financially speaking, it was a disaster…The scheduled total repayment of capital during the last two years of the loan, 1978 and 1979, was set to be $829 200. This amount, plus the interest due, had to be paid while the plant was not generating electricity or revenue.

It seems the plant never hit its ‘sweet spot’, where the loan is repaid and the plant finally generates profit for its owners. There is not much to be found online about the plant, so this could not be confirmed from annual financial statements. It is also not clear if the Italian taxpayer ended paying off the loan as per the Guarantor agreement.

Fool me once …Whatever the exact financial outcome, it clearly was not something the World Bank was in a hurry to try again.

Since then it has not funded any nuclear power projects, and has repeatedly been quoted as saying “The World Bank does not engage in providing support for nuclear power” and more simply, “We don’t do nuclear energy”.

Bank loans?
Some may hope that capital for a nuclear plant could be raised from banks. But banks evaluate risk and return dispassionately, and are influenced by rating agencies such as Moody’s.

Moody’s Investor Services wrote of nuclear plants in 2008, before even the Fukushima disaster: “The technology is very costly and complex, and the 10- to 15-year duration of these construction projects can expose a utility to material changes in the political, regulatory, economic and commodity price environments, as well as to new alternatives to nuclear generation“.

Insurance?There is a good reason that all household insurance policies exclude damage or loss of value from a nuclear or radioactive incident. The risk of properties in a large area losing most or all of their value would be far too vast a loss for an insurance company to cover.

Nuclear plant operators take out a limited insurance, with a low cap, somewhere around R3 billion in South Africa. That may sound like a lot, but its just a fraction of the total property values in Melkbosstrand alone (a suburb near Koeberg). And there would be many other damages for which the operator would be liable.

Why will no-one insure a single nuclear plant?
Nuclear power is inherently different to ‘normal’ insurance. Its easy to calculate the risk for a car owner. There is plenty of data to show the likelihood of an accident, and the cost of repairs. The crucial fact is that a car insurance policy will probably have more than one claim over the life of the policy. This means the premiums can be worked out to cover the costs, plus a profit for the insurance company.

For a nuclear plant, the chance of a serious accident is on average relatively very low. So low, that a specific plant is quite likely go through its life without blowing up. However, if it does, the claimed amount would be astronomical. Therefore to make the insurance policy of a single plant cover the possible costs and still make a profit, the insurance company would have to charge astronomically high premiums. A few thousand years of risk needs to be covered by sixty years of premiums.

That is why nuclear insurance is done though ‘pools’ whereby risk from many nuclear plants is rolled into one by a ‘super-insurer’, with a strict capped upper limit on the amount they would need to pay out.

This capped liability is set by law. In South Africa that is specified by the NNR Act of 1999, section 30 (2). This is in effect a government subsidy of nuclear power, without which the insurance premiums would be so high that it would be economically impossible to build a nuclear plant.

Vendor financing?
Vendor financing is where a vendor funds the project off its own balance sheet. But due to the high cost involved, a minimum of R350 billion by the most conservative estimates, no vendor could fund the full amount, especially given that mega projects usually run to at least twice over budget.

The vendor could on the other hand facilitate funding from another source… but then we are in effect back to the previous two options. What is more, the Treasury will likely be required to guarantee the loan, which they refused back in 2008.

In conclusion…
No World Bank loan, and no bank loan. The only hope for those driving the nuclear power agenda seems to be some complex vendor assisted finance, signed off by a captured Treasury.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2017/11/20/world-bank-to-fund-nuclear-power-in-south-africa/feed/3koebergalertSnippet of World Bank Board meeting notesTitle page of Italian government loan guarantee for World bank nulcear loanGargliano nuclear plant under construction in 1961Gargliano nuclear plant view across riverExtract from Standard Bank house insurance policyKoeberg authorised to be Cape Town’s permanent radioactive waste dumphttps://koebergalert.org/2017/10/27/koeberg-authorised-to-be-cape-towns-permanent-radioactive-waste-dump/
https://koebergalert.org/2017/10/27/koeberg-authorised-to-be-cape-towns-permanent-radioactive-waste-dump/#commentsFri, 27 Oct 2017 09:24:44 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2364Continue reading →]]>On 11 October 2017 the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) issued an authorisation to Eskom for a second nuclear power plant at Koeberg, 28km north of Cape Town City centre. It came with a surprise. The Department also authorised the “construction of facilities or infrastructure, including associated structures or infrastructure for … disposal of nuclear fuels, radioactive products and waste.”

Waste disposal not part of project…You would have been surprised if you had studied the final Environmental Impact Report (EIR) because it gave the impression this was not about waste disposal.

On page 40 of chapter 4 (Project Description) it says “The producers of spent fuel are required to store the HLW [high level waste] at the plant until a national policy surrounding the disposal of nuclear waste is finalised.” Storage is not disposal.

On page 54, it says “However, a full EIA will have to be undertaken prior to the storage
and/ or disposal of hazardous waste.” Here again the EIR seems to make it clear that the disposal of nuclear waste is not covered.

Despite this, the original application by Eskom in 2007 and the final authorisation by the DEA in 2017 both explicitly include nuclear waste disposal.

The future of Cape Town…
Koeberg started operating in 1985, and with a 40 year planned lifetime, was scheduled to be shut down in 2025. All nuclear waste was to be removed from the site. This would have allowed Cape Town to expand to the north, without concerns about impractical evacuation plans around a nuclear site.

If additional nuclear plants are built in South Africa in the future, it is likely that the high level waste from those plants will be transported by road to the dump site at Koeberg. This introduces additional risks in terms of spillage due to either road accident or terrorist attack.

High level nuclear waste contains plutonium, which is not only chemically the most poisonous known element, it also emits dangerous radiation for thousands of years. That means Cape Town will have to have an evacuation plan in place for thousands of years.

What could go wrong…?The waste is dangerous for millennia, and no structure built by mankind has survived in tact for that length of time. This means it is difficult to design any structure that we know will contain the radiation safely for as long as is required. Any waste dump will be a huge burden for future generations both in terms of costs and anxiety.

One thing is for sure – it will be very expensive. And since there is no profit in finalising a disposal solution, it will be tempting to just leave it, as has happened in other places such as Hanford in the USA and Sellafield in England.

So far, no design has even been proposed for a South African high level waste disposal site. The words ‘geological disposal’ have been mentioned in the EIR, which means digging a deep hole and dropping the waste into it. Since Koeberg is close to the shore, it is likely that over the years seawater would find its way into any holes. This means metal structures would corrode away over time. Concrete also has a limited lifetime, and starts to crumble after a few hundred years. Many concrete structures have to be demolished after just tens of years due to deterioration. And example was the cooling towers in Athlone, which became dangerous after 7o years.

If any radiation does leak into the rock, it is not known what the consequences would be. Obviously there is the risk that ground water would become contaminated with radioactive substances, and that could mean water from boreholes in the area might become radioactive. This means the water becomes unusable, but how would this be detected? How many people monitor their borehole water for radioactivity?

Cape Town may become more dependant on groundwater for household use as the years go by. It would be sad if this water become unusable, and tragic if radioactive water was used before the radiation was detected.

In the rest of the world?
So far, no final high level waste repository has been built anywhere in the world. Sweden is perhaps the frontrunner, and they only started the licence application process in September 2017, after 30 years of research into various disposal options.

In Germany, a third of the barrels used to store waste at the Brunsbüttel site were found to be damaged. “Some of the containers are so deformed that they can no longer be moved, as they no longer fit into the robotic gripping arms installed at the site, the inspectors reported.”

In the USA, the Yucca mountain disposal site has been a disaster. Fifteen years after construction started, and with $11 billion spent so far, not one gram of waste has been disposed of there to date.

Back in the RSA…
But here in South Africa, the Department of Environmental Affairs has decided that a high level waste repository at Koeberg will have an acceptably low impact on the environment. And that is after no research into isolation technologies, burial location or depth, nor a design of a disposal site.

In conclusion
Nuclear waste should never be an afterthought and if the Koeberg site is used as a high level waste dump, Cape Town will not only need an evacuation plan that spans generations but will also live with the risk of leaks or worse due to mismanagement, poor design or intentional sabotage.

The Russian company Rosatom is the most likely vendor, and the thought of a combination of Russian quality engineering and Eskom’s attention to detail with respect to maintenance is far from reassuring.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2017/10/27/koeberg-authorised-to-be-cape-towns-permanent-radioactive-waste-dump/feed/6WasteBarrelRusted2koebergalerttru_radwaste_transportationradioactive-waste-transportation-spill1HanfordSign2.jpgYuccaEntranceWasteBarrelRustedBadlyAuthorisationWasteDisposalCape Town nuclear build approved by Dept Environmenthttps://koebergalert.org/2017/10/19/cape-town-nuclear-build-approved-by-dept-environment/
https://koebergalert.org/2017/10/19/cape-town-nuclear-build-approved-by-dept-environment/#commentsThu, 19 Oct 2017 08:17:34 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2268Continue reading →]]>Before any major development, South African law requires a detailed Environmental Impact Assessment to be submitted to the Department of Environmental Affairs before the project may begin. In 2009, Gibb consulting submitted a scoping report for such a study on behalf of Eskom, with a view to building a large nuclear power plant.

During the public participation process Koeberg Alert, as well as many other organisations, scientists and members of the public submitted extensive and detailed comments on the report, and in particular the poor quality of the specialist reports. In response to this deluge of criticism, GIBB produced four versions of the report, and finally submitted its final version to the Department in February 2016. Based on a wide range of factors, the report recommended that Thyspunt in the Eastern Cape was the best site for the plant. Nearly two years later, Sabelo Malaza, the Chief Director, issued an authorisation which overrode the consultants recommendation, and specified Duynefontein (Koeberg), near Cape Town, was were the plant could be built.

If you made any submission during any of the four public participation processes, it is crucial that you indicate that you wish to appeal against this finding. [Note: we have received a legal opinion which is clear that anyone who may be affected by this decision may appeal, even if you have not participated to date]

To do this, simply send an email to appeals@environment.gov.za and to Herbstdl@eskom.co.za in which you say you intend to appeal the authorisation for a nuclear power station at Duynefontein, reference number 12/12/20/994. The price of a participative democracy is participation – please find a few minutes to do this before the deadline of 21 October 2017. [Correction: 31st October 2017]

There are many flaws in the report, some clearly intended to bias the finding for Eskom, and others perhaps just due to sloppiness or scientific incompetence. And example of the former is the ludicrously inflated projected demand for electricity, which is used to justify the need for a nuclear plant. Despite being given far more up to date data, Gibb refused to incorporate this into their report. This is dealt with in more detail, including graphs, in Eskom and GIBB living in la-la land.

An example of sloppy science is the thorny issue of seismic risk. Since the earthquake near Japan caused the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, there has been more concern worldwide about the risk of a seismic event causing a leak or reactor explosion.

Damage in Ceres from 1969 quake

In the first version of the seismic study, a specialist found that the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)_ for the Koeberg site was 0.30g. Any scientific measure is accompanied by a confidence interval, for example 0.30g ±0.01g. The scientists who write this report, Erna Hattingh and Johann Neveling, were apparently unaware of this, and did not give any interval, despite the inherent uncertainty in their methodology.

It also noted that 0.30g was the threshold over which a site is considered unsuitable for a nuclear plant. Finally, it added that the 0.30g for Koeberg was arrived at using an outdated methodology, and that this will “necessitate additional geological investigations and implementation of an advanced PSHA that will follow internationally accepted practice“, and that “may increase or decrease these values“. So if a post-Fukushima study is done using up to date methodology, it may increase the risk value, and if it increases by just 0.01g, that would make Koeberg and unsuitable site, based on seismic risk alone.

After consultations with Gibb, this wording was omitted from the second draft report

Recommended evacuation zones as per Fukushima and Chernobyl

Since the Koeberg site was chosen in the late 1970’s population patterns have changed significantly. If for any reason it was necessary to evacuate the zones as per other nuclear disasters, the number of people needing to be evacuated would make the job simply impossible.

Radiation from Caesium makes a contaminated area uninhabitable for hundreds of years. Where will the millions of displaced people live? However small the risk of an earthquake damaging this nuclear plant, the consequences in term of economic damage and human suffering are too awful to contemplate.

While it will be difficult to draw up a comprehensive appeal in the 30 day period allowed, Koeberg Alert will be doing what it can. If you can assist with this process, particularly if you have legal or scientific expertise, or if you would like assistance in formulating your own appeal, please contact us on info@koebergalert.org

A case against the Department of Energy, the Minister of Energy and Eskom was brought by SAFCEI and EarthLife Africa Johannesburg recently. Today judgement was handed down by Judge Bozalek, and it surprised everyone. He granted every single request of the plaintiffs! He also gave a costs order against the government.

For me the two most important orders of the court were related to the notorious Russian agreement, and the ministerial determination to proceed with the nuclear procurement process.

From Russia, with(out) Liability…

The Russian agreement was suspect for a few reasons. Firstly it gave the Russian company Rosatom a distinct advantage over any other potential bidders, even before a ‘fair’ procurement process begun. It also granted Rosatom indemnity for liability for any nuclear incident, including, for example, a nuclear explosion caused by faulty equipment supplied by Rosatom. Thirdly, it was never debated in parliament – it was just ‘tabled’ as a done deal. The judge was having none of this, and he declared the agreement invalid. It is widely suspected that Vladimir Putin had been reassured the nuclear deal was going ahead, and I would love to see his face when this news is brought to him! The reality is that the potential costs of a nuclear accident are so high, that no company can or will ever take on the risk for having to pay for it. Without this indemnity, Rosatom is going to be much less keen to work in South Africa.

The (non) determination…
The ministerial determination handed the process of procuring nuclear power to Eskom, whereas in a previous determination, it had been assigned to the Department of Energy. The latest determination was issued by the fortunately incompetent Joemat-Peterson, the previous Minister of Energy. This determination was ‘rubber stamped’ by NERSA, the National Energy Regulator. The determination was intended as an amendment to the previous determination, and hence the government argued that NERSA was obliged to approve it, and that no public participation process was needed. Once again, Bozalek was having none of it. He set aside the determination, and anything that resulted from it. That includes the approval from NERSA, and the Request For Information (RFI) issued by Eskom. This is a huge blow to the nuclear industry, which is now likely to ignore the RFI.

Gordon MacKay discusses the result with attorney Adrian Pole

An appeal?
So what is next? Will the government try to appeal the judgement? They are unlikely to get leave to appeal from a court that awarded costs against them. If they do appeal, it is not clear to me whether or not the judgement will be suspended while the appeal plays out. Gordon Mackay, the DA shadow minister of energy, was heard on the steps of the court saying that the DA will go to court for an interdict to stop any further action on the nuclear deal, such as the RFI, whether or not an appeal is lodged.Where to now, Eskom?
So the next step from Eskom’s point of view is to get a valid ministerial determination done. This won’t be hard, as this court case has clearly laid out what a valid determination should say. The next step will be much harder – NERSA will have to do a full public participation process before they concur with the determination. I would hate to be in their shoes for that!

Not only is public sentiment against the idea of nuclear power running high, there are also very compelling technical reasons why nuclear power is a bad idea. Finally, from a purely economic perspective, every month that goes by sees wind and solar energy getting cheaper, making nuclear power less and less attractive.

The ethical, logical, and financially responsible way forward is for the government, Eskom and all the nuclear ‘consultants’ to laugh off the hundreds of millions of rand that has been spent on ‘preparing’ for the nuclear deal, and to stop right now.

In conclusion…
Ii it all over? Perhaps, but the amount of money that could be made by some from a nuclear deal is staggeringly high, and they are unlikely to give up.

It is up to the public – everyone in South Africa – to be vigilant, and to participate in the public participation process if it gets that far.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2017/04/26/high-court-blasts-nuclear-plans/feed/0IMG_20170426_125619-1koebergalertGordon MacKay discusses the result with attorney Adrian PooleNuclear vs Renewables Job Creation videohttps://koebergalert.org/2017/03/29/nuclear-vs-renewables-job-creation-video/
https://koebergalert.org/2017/03/29/nuclear-vs-renewables-job-creation-video/#commentsWed, 29 Mar 2017 07:37:21 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=940Continue reading →]]>Here is a short video which describes the job creation potential in South Africa of nuclear and renewable energy. English subtitles may be switched on or off.

IntroductionSouth Africa needs electricity, and coal power stations need be replaced as they become old. We face a choice. Either we can build nuclear power stations, or use renewable energy such as solar and wind power. So, how should we choose?

The Question…Unemployment is a big problem in South Africa, so let’s look at how nuclear and renewables would affect job creation.

Nuclear Power
Nuclear power stations need a deep foundation and a containment building with concrete walls, metres thick. They also need a large steel reactor vessel weighing over 400 tons, which has to be custom built at a specialised steel forge. We do not have such a forge in South Africa, and so it would need to be imported at huge expense. Most of the highly qualified specialists would have to be flown in from other countries. The hi tech equipment and complex safety systems would also need to be imported. We wouldn’t build more than 3 nuclear power plants in South Africa. It would not be worth building factories to make components for just 3 plants, so nuclear power will create very few jobs in the manufacturing industry.

Nuclear power would create short term construction jobs in at most 3 places.
It would create only a handful of long term operating and maintenance jobs.
So nuclear energy would create very few jobs in South Africa.

Renewable energy
On the other hand a solar plant is fairly simple to construct. It needs steel racks and collection panels, such as solar panels or mirrors.

Wind turbines are also relatively simple to construct. Each one needs a concrete base and a steel tower.

South Africa has some of the best conditions in the world to make use of solar and wind energy, and technological developments have reduced the cost of these options.

So what about job creation?There are many people in South Africa with the skills needed to do this. This means work could start on many wind farms and solar plants all over the country at the same time, creating lots of long term jobs within a short time. Renewable energy plants will also be built in remote rural areas where jobs are desperately needed.

As more and more solar plants and wind turbines get built, it will become worthwhile to build factories in South Africa that can make the components. The electronic systems that control solar and wind plants can be made in South Africa and also be exported. This will create jobs in the manufacturing sector.

There will also be ongoing operation and maintenance jobs needed for these solar plants and wind farms.

Summary
For nuclear power it is not worth building factories to make components for at most 3 power stations, so nuclear power will not create many jobs in the manufacturing sector. Nuclear power would create short term construction jobs in a maximum of 3 places. It would also create only a few long term operating and maintenance jobs for mostly highly qualified people.

Renewable energy on the other hand will create long term manufacturing jobs. Renewable energy such as wind farms and solar plants will also create a large number of construction, operating and maintenance jobs distributed around the country. Jobs will be created for South African people with a wide range of skills.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2017/03/29/nuclear-vs-renewables-job-creation-video/feed/1Frame from Nuclear vs Renewabe jobs videokoebergalertFrame from a video showing a whiteboard with a drawing of South Africa facing a choice between nuclear and renewable energyFrom Russia, with Liabilityhttps://koebergalert.org/2017/03/22/from-russia-with-liability/
https://koebergalert.org/2017/03/22/from-russia-with-liability/#respondWed, 22 Mar 2017 15:14:09 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=2079Continue reading →]]>The minister of Energy signed an agreement with Russia in September 2014. More recently made a ministerial determination to allow Eskom to go ahead with the procurement of nuclear plants for South Africa. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) had concurred with this determination. I sat in for the final day of the three day high court hearings questioning the legality of these dealings.

Advocate Oosthuisen driving home a point

The morning was taken up by Advocate Andre Oosthuisen defending the government actions, with Judges Lee Bozalek and Elizabeth Baartman interrupting occasionally with clarifying questions and cutting observations. In the afternoon, Advocate David Unterhalter gave a rebuttal to Oosthuisen’s points. Oosthuisen took the approach of minimising the importance of the steps government had taken, at times overdoing it to the visible irritation of the judges. Unterhalter had a more gentlemanly demeanour, although he did not pull any punches, and several times described the arguments of his ‘learned colleague’ as ‘untenable’.

In broad strokes…SAFCEI and Earth Life Africa Johannesburg (ELAJ) were asking the court to set aside the agreement with Russia, the ministerial determination, and also NERSA’s concurrence. They claimed that the Russian agreement should have been debated in parliament, and that NERSA should have held a full public participation process, as opposed to ‘rubber stamping’ the ministerial determination.

The court room was small, and only about half full. The front row was reserved for the advocates and their assistants, with the instructing attorneys in the row behind them. At the back were a handful of members of ELAJ and SAFCEI, and two reporters (and myself) sat in the side benches.

From Russia with Liability…
The agreement with Russia is a seven page document, and contains a few disturbing elements. Firstly, it guarantees that South Africa (i.e. the South African taxpayer), will be liable for any damage caused by a nuclear incident, including any accident during the transport of nuclear fuel.

Russian agreement holds no financial implications?The agreement also appears to commit South Africa to purchasing 9.6GW of nuclear power based on the VVER technology of Rosatom.

Oosthuisen attempted to persuade the court that this agreement carried no monetary implications for South Africa, and therefore the plaintiffs had no standing in court as their rights were not directly affected. Judge Bozalek wryly asked if there was also no potential effect to their rights that could occur in the future, to which Oosthuisen bravely replied ‘No’.

In his rebuttal, Unterhalter easily demolished this point of view, partly by pointing out that committing to a nuclear build was an allocative decision, and held an opportunity cost to the country, and hence its citizens. Secondly, he pointed out the massive cost that could result from an accident while transporting nuclear fuel, even if this occurred in Qatar while nuclear fuel was en route from Vladivostok.

Minsterial determination…
In 2013, the Minister of Energy issued a determination to the Department of Energy (DoE) to proceed with the nuclear build. It specified that a special purpose vehicle must be created to procure the nuclear plants. In December 2016, the new Minister of Energy issued another determination, just before the first court appearance. This was similar, but this time specified that Eskom would be the procurer of the nuclear plants. Oosthuisen argued that the 2016 determination was therefore just a minor amendment to the 2013 version, and hence did not warrant in depth consideration. He went so far as to say it would have been irrational for NERSA to not concur with the 2016 version, since it concurred in 2013. To me, it seems on the contrary that it would be irrational not to reconsider when the energy landscape and demand forecasts have changed so dramatically.

NERSA and Administrative Justice…
NERSA is bound to hold a public participation process for all decisions it takes. This is clearly laid out in the Electricity Regulation Act (ERA) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).

Oosthuisen attempted to explain to the court that this should not be applied to ‘each and every decision’ of NERSA, for example it would be silly to consult the public when deciding the date of their next internal meeting. Then he tried to stretch this to include the approval of the ministerial determination. Judge Bozalek interjected that before decisions are taken by NERSA on tariff increases, there are radio announcement of a public participation process. He added that it seemed that there was an ideal opportunity for NERSA to at least invite written comments before concurring with the determination to procure nuclear power.

Is NERSA independent?
Oosthuisen also attempted to make the point that since NERSA was appointed by the Minister of Energy, there was an obligation on their part to support her policy decisions, and hence to concur with the determination. Bozalek pointed out that the individual regulatory members of NERSA were required to be ‘independent’, and appeared unimpressed with Oosthuisen’s thin argument that the board collectively was not required to be independent, just the members individually. Judge Baartman also spoke out, saying that NERSA “cannot come to the party with a rubber stamp”.

Unterhalter takes the floor…
Unterhalter took issue with the suggestion that the decision to concur with a nuclear build was not something that required public participation. This decision was not something as minor as ‘the date for the office Christmas party’ he said, and as it was committing South Africa to a nuclear future it was in ‘in the heartland of the decision making powers of NERSA’. He put it to the judges that despite the ‘contortions of my learned colleague’ this was indeed a major decision by NERSA, and hence should have been subject to public participation.

Unterhalter was careful to make it clear he was not saying the decision to go nuclear was correct or incorrect, just that there may have been those in South Africa who could have offered technical input on the decision, and also those who may just have wanted to have their opinion heard. In addition, the electricity demand forecasts at the time of the 2013 determination turned out to be very significantly too high, and therefore NERSA should have taken this into account and reconsidered the matter in 2016.

Judgement reserved…
It was clear that Judge Bozalek was sympathetic to some of Unterhalter’s points, but also had reservations as to the negligible effect some declaratory orders would have. For example, if he declared the ministerial determination invalid, it would be likely that the Minister of Energy would simply immediately issue another one which corrected any flaws.

In summary, Unterhalter’s point was that the decision to proceed with nuclear power was something that should pass through the ‘gateway’ of public participation, while Oosthuisen said that this was not a final step, and those with a ‘bee in their bonnet’ who were against nuclear power could object at a later stage, such as when a licence to operate the plant was requested.

Judgement was reserved.

]]>https://koebergalert.org/2017/03/22/from-russia-with-liability/feed/0Advocate Oosthuisen drives home a pointkoebergalertLine drawing of Judge Bozalek in the High CourtWould you like to earn R1.7m a week?https://koebergalert.org/2016/12/01/would-you-like-to-earn-r1-7m-a-week/
https://koebergalert.org/2016/12/01/would-you-like-to-earn-r1-7m-a-week/#commentsThu, 01 Dec 2016 08:17:37 +0000http://koebergalert.org/?p=1961Continue reading →]]>

Zizamele Mbambo

On November 29 2016 the Portfolio Committee on Energy was given a presentation by the Department of Energy (DOE) on the progress of the South African nuclear build programme. For some reason, the minister of energy, the Director General of the department and the Director General for nuclear energy chose not to attend, and instead sent the Deputy Director General for nuclear energy, Mr Zizamele Mbambo.

The presentation included a list of sixteen consultancy contracts that have been awarded by the DOE. First prize for the most lucrative contract is a tie between Mahlako-A-Phahla Investments and Central Lake Trading 149, at about R1.7 million per week!

Company

Duration (weeks)

Total cost (R)

R / week

KPMG

2

341,000

170,500

KPMG

4

908,000

227,000

INGEROP

4

1,005,000

251,250

INGEROP

6

3,602,000

600,333

Deloitte

12

4,250,000

354,167

Deloitte

4

995,000

248,750

INGEROP

24

6,138,000

255,750

Nathan Gift Nhlapho

4

497,000

124,250

Nathan Gift Nhlapho

4

497,000

124,250

African Radiation Consulting

8

700,000

87,500

Zimkile Consulting

5

470,000

94,000

Nathan Gift Nhlapho

4

470,000

117,500

University of Pretoria

12

1,325,000

110,417

Mzamsi Energy

40

500,000

12,500

Mahlako-A-Phahla Investments

12

20,174,000

1,681,167

Central Lake Trading 149
(t/a Empire Technology)

104

171,000,000

1,644,231

MPs asked an array of questions, including some very hard hitting ones about procurement processes from Gordon Mackay of the DA. The question that stood out was: why did the DOE pay R171 million for a customised software system to handle the procurement of nuclear, when it will be Eskom, and not the DOE, doing the procurement? Unfortunately, due to Mackay’s over confrontational and sometimes petty style, ANC members closed ranks and his questions were lost in the sea of his invective, and so largely ignored. This transaction was first covered by the Mail & Guardian here: Zuma pals clinch first nuclear deal.

Another notable line of questioning was from ANC MP Thandi Mahambehlala. Due to her history, such as being on the discredited Nkandla ad hoc committee, it was perhaps no surprise the line this wanderer took. A long, rambling, time wasting preamble eventually led to a ‘sweetheart question’ to Mbambo, to the effect of: wouldn’t it be better to have these meetings in secret in order to protect commercially sensitive information? It was also no surprise that Mbambo ignored the hard questions from Mackay, and spent a tediously long time agreeing with Mahambehlala. In the light of the fact that the ANC had attempted to make this meeting closed to the press and the public, it was clear that this was a prearranged rear-guard action to attempt to justify future meetings being held in secret. A sad side of this is that Mahambehlala used to ask hard questions to hold officials accountable, but advancement in her financial status seems to have gone hand in hand with a retreat from an interest in good governance.

It was also saddening to see that the MPs on the committee for the EFF and Agang did not bother to turn up, nor even to send apologies.

A jarring presence at the inner table was Kelvin Kemm, who repeatedly raised his hand to attempt to speak to the committee. Kemm runs a nuclear consultancy company as well as being the chair of the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) board, and so not surprisingly, when the committee chair, Fikile Majola, eventually allowed him to speak, Kemm waxed lyrical about the wonders of nuclear power and how it should go ahead as soon as possible. Kemm of course stands to gain from future consultancy work should his advice be followed. Another disturbing link is that the executive director of Mahlako-A-Phahla (which recently received over R20 million from the DOE) is Meta Maponya, who has served on the board of NTP, a wholly owned commercial subsidiary of NECSA.

Yvonne Chetty

On a lighter note, Yvonne Chetty was called on to answer some of the questions Mbambo had evaded around procurement processes for the above consultancy work. Chetty followed her boss’s lead, and also ignored most of them, in particular the question as to why the R171 million tender was piggybacked onto a Freestate provincial tender. Instead, she gave a comically brief response consisting of a bland assurance that procedure was followed in all cases. Chetty’s previous job as senior finance manager at PRASA does not inspire confidence in these assurances. PRASA was investigated by the Public Protector, who found that there was a “culture of systemic failure to comply with the supply chain management policy”. PRASA is currently under investigation for suspect deals totalling over R14bn. According to her CV, Chetty was responsible for all PRASA supply chain services for the Gauteng region. Chetty’s reassurances that the procurement was done correctly are therefore entirely unconvincing.

Predictably, the meeting ran out of time, and the chair closed with many questions still unanswered. There was one ray of hope: in closing, Majola referred to the contradictory views that have been expressed with regards to technical aspects of nuclear power, such as the cost. To address this, he suggested having a debate before the portfolio committee, where all the diverging views can be put forward, including by NGOs opposed to nuclear power.

There are two dark clouds around this ray of hope. The first is: should such a debate not have happened before R200 million was spent? The second cloud is that Mojola has apparently made this offer of an open debate many times over the past few years. The question is therefore: will you deliver on your promise this time, Mr Mojola?