I have
the honour to transmit herewith the eighth monthly report of the
Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118
(2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that
resolution on the activities of the United Nations from 25 April to 22 May 2014
related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

During
the reporting period, there had been no further removal of chemical weapons
material 01' verification activities allowing for the closure of additional
chemical weapons storage and production facilities. However, the Syrian Arab
Republic accessed the last site containing chemical weapons material, carried
out the destruction of its residual stockpile of isopropanol, and prepared
remaining chemical material for removal as soon as security conditions permit.

At the
time of issuance of this letter, a number of activities remain outstanding in
order for the Syrian Arab Republic to fully eliminate its declared chemical
weapons programme in accordance with the provisions of Security Council
resolution 2118 (2013) and the relevant decisions of the OPCW Executive
Council. These are: the removal of the remaining chemical weapons material; the
destruction of structures at twelve production facilities pending an agreement
on the modalities of destruction by the OPCW Executive Council; the destruction
of one item of loading equipment at one production facility; and the
destruction of one building located at another production facility.

The Joint
Mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the
United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian
Arab Republic (Joint Mission) continues to urge the authorities of the Syrian
Arab Republic to carry out all remaining activities expeditiously.

Key developments

On 27
April 2014, the internal Syrian Arab Republic timeline for the removal of all
chemical weapons material passed with close to 8% of material remaining at one
storage facility inside Syrian territory. The Syrian Arab Republic had long
before informed the Joint Mission that it did not have full security control in
the area of that site, and that they had serious concerns about the safety and
security of chemical weapons material convoys leaving the facility.

On 28
April 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic reported that armed opposition groups had
taken control of two nearby facilities which had previously been emptied of
chemical weapons material and expanded their presence in the area, rendering
the remaining active storage facility inaccessible by road. The authorities
further informed that a military operation was required to access the facility
in order to adequately secure the area to allow safe extraction of the chemical
weapons material.

On 15 May
2014, in order to destroy the remaining quantities of isopropanol held at the
site and to finalize necessary preparations for eventual transportation of
chemical weapons material to Latakia, the Syrian Arab Republic chartered an
aircraft funded by the Joint Mission to airlift various equipment and packaging
materials to the site.

Subsequently,
the Syrian Arab Republic authorities destroyed its residual stockpile of
isopropanol, and completed preparatory and packaging activities in readiness to
remove the last batch of chemical weapons material. As of 20 May 2014, 7.2%
percent of the chemical weapons material of Syria remained in country and
awaiting swift removal for onward destruction. The Government of the Syrian
Arab Republic insisted that final removal operations can be conducted solely
through ground transportation when security conditions allow. Officials of
Syrian Arab Republic pledged-to- remove the remaining chemical material as soon
as possible in the shortest possible timeframe.

Further
to the visit of the OPCW Technical Secretariat team from 22 to 28 April 2014,
which sought to address technical discrepancies in the original declaration, a
second team arrived during the reporting period to focus on subsequent
amendments and verification issues. The Syrian Arab Republic extended its
constructive cooperation to the Technical Secretariat team in the course of
their duties.

Joint Mission activities

The Joint
Mission continued its engagement with Syrian Arab Republic officials,
impressing the importance of accessing the site holding chemical weapons
material and urging them to remove and destroy as relevant all remaining
chemical weapons material. The Joint Mission continued outreach activities with
contributing international partners and Member States in the region.

The
security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be challenging. In
Damascus, shelling and mortar attacks escalated during the reporting period,
increasing the risks to Joint Mission and all United Nations personnel. On 6
May 2014, the area near the Joint Mission headquarters was hit by mortar
shelling. As a result, one Joint Mission national personnel and another United
Nations national staff member were injured when one of the mortars landed close
to their home, some 300 meters from the Joint Mission headquarters.

With the
destruction and removal of much of the chemical weapons programme completed,
and given the volatility of the security situation which continued to pose a significant
risk to personnel, the Joint Mission initiated steps to reduce its presence
inside the Syrian Arab Republic and adjust its functional footprint to a
configuration commensurate to its remaining tasks. A number of Joint Mission
personnel have already returned to parent duty stations and others transitioned
to the Joint Mission’s support office in Cyprus. The Joint Mission maintained
its core operations in Damascus to continue verification and other activities,
although it temporarily relocated personnel from Latakia to Damascus pending
the resumption of removal and verification operations. The Joint Mission
maintained relevant personnel required at the port for remaining verification
and inspection activities on stand-by.

Conclusion

Over the
last eight months, a large part of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian
Arab Republic has been either removed from its territory or destroyed
iii—country, equating to approximately 92% of its chemical weapons material.
Preparatory activities for the removal of the remaining quantities have been
completed. Other notable achievements during the past eight months include the
functional destruction of all declared chemical weapons production and mixing/
filling specialized equipment, rendering it inoperable; the destruction of all
unfilled munitions; the destruction of all containers previously holding
mustard gas; the destruction of all isopropanol on the territory of the Syrian
Arab Republic; the closure of eleven out of twelve chemical weapons storage
facilities; and the closure of five out of eighteen chemical weapons production
facilities, with the modalities for destruction of twelve facilities currently
under review in the OPCW Executive Council. All of these activities had been
verified and inspected physically by Joint Mission personnel where security
conditions allowed and through remote camera sruveillance Where security
conditions did not permit physical presence of Joint Mission personnel.

It is
imperative that the Syrian Arab Republic concludes remaining removal operations
as quickly as possible, as the authorities have pledged to do. However, it is
now evident that some activities related to the elimination of the chemical
weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic Will continue beyond 30 June
2014.

With this
in mind, and following consultation with the Director General of OPCW, I
foresee that the Joint Mission Will continue its work for a finite period of
time beyond 30 June 2014 during which most of the remaining activities for the
elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic
should be completed. This will also give sufficient time to put in place
appropriate successor arrangements for OPCW to continue any residual in-country
verification activities beyond this period.

I
continue to be very concerned by allegations regarding the use of chlorine gas
in the context of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and look forward to
the results of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission. I call on the

I want to
thank those Member States who continue to provide significant funds and in-kind
contributions towards the removal and destruction of chemical weapons material
from the Syrian Arab Republic. I am particularly grateful to those Member
States providing maritime assistance and support, who have had to deploy in the
eastern Mediterranean for considerably longer periods than had been originally
envisaged.

Once
again, I thank Special Coordinator Kaag and all the personnel of the Joint
Mission for their courageous work carried out in challenging and dangerous
conditions inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

I would
be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.