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Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Tuesday, May 03, 2011

A pluralist approach to ethics

by Michael De Dora

The history of Western moral philosophy includes numerous attempts to ground ethics in one rational principle, standard, or rule. This narrative stretches back 2,500 years to the Greeks, who were interested mainly in virtue ethics and the moral character of the person. The modern era has seen two major additions. In 1785, Immanuel Kant introduced the categorical imperative: act only under the assumption that what you do could be made into a universal law. And in 1789, Jeremy Bentham proposed utilitarianism: work toward the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people (the “utility” principle).

These attempts, while worthy, have failed, if only because moral philosophers have tough standards — and for good reason. Each proposal has been fully deconstructed, and shown to have flaws. Many people now think projects to build a reasonable and coherent moral system are doomed. Still, most secular and religious people reject the alternative of moral relativism, and have spent much ink criticizing it (among my favorite books on the topic is Moral Relativism by Stephen Lukes). The most recent and controversial work in this area comes from Sam Harris. In The Moral Landscape, Harris argues for a morality based on (a science of) well-being and flourishing, rather than religious dogma.

Harris’ book has drawn much criticism, most of it focused on his claim that science can determine human values. I do not wish to consider that here. Instead, I am interested in another oft-heard criticism of Harris’ book, which is that words like “well-being” and “flourishing” are too general to form any relevant basis for morality. This criticism has some force to it, as these certainly are somewhat vague terms. But what if “well-being” and “flourishing” were to be used only as a starting point for a moral framework? These concepts would still put us on a better grounding than religious faith. But they cannot stand alone. Nor do they need to.

The idea I would like to propose in this essay is that while each ethical system discussed so far has its shortcomings, put together they form a solid possibility. One system might not be able to do the job required, but we can assemble a mature moral outlook containing parts drawn from different systems put forth by philosophers over the centuries (plus some biology, but that’s Massimo’s area). The following is a rough sketch of what I think a decent pluralist approach to ethics might look like.

The most basic claim is the one made by modern utilitarians and virtue ethicists: that morality ought to function to increase the well-being (the state of being happy, healthy, or prosperous) and flourishing (to grow, to thrive) of conscious creatures and societies. Of course, this is open to some interpretation. What does well-being mean? What does it entail? Who gets what? In its purest form, you might say, it is still the mob rule of early utilitarian writing. But what if we fleshed out the framework with a couple of additional moral concepts? I would propose at least these three:

1. The harm principle bases our ethical considerations on other beings’ capacity for higher-level subjective experience. Human beings (and some animals) have the potential — and desire — to experience deep pleasure and happiness while seeking to avoid pain and suffering. We have the obligation, then, to afford creatures with these capacities, desires and relations a certain level of respect. They also have other emotional and social interests: for instance, friends and families concerned with their health and enjoyment. These actors also deserve consideration.

2. If we have a moral obligation to act a certain way toward someone, that should be reflected in law. Rights theory is the idea that there are certain rights worth granting to people with very few, if any, caveats. Many of these rights were spelled out in the founding documents of this country, the Declaration of Independence (which admittedly has no legal pull) and the Constitution (which does). They have been defended in a long history of U.S. Supreme Court rulings. They have also been expanded on in the U.N.’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the founding documents of other countries around the world. To name a few, they include: freedom of belief, speech and expression, due process, equal treatment, health care, and education.

3. While we ought to consider our broader moral efforts, and focus on our obligations to others, it is also important to place attention on our quality as moral agents. A vital part of fostering a respectable pluralist moral framework is to encourage virtues, and cultivate moral character. A short list of these virtues would include prudence, justice, wisdom, honesty, compassion, and courage. One should study these, and strive to put these into practice and work to be a better human being, as Aristotle advised us to do.

As you have likely noticed, this pluralist approach does not include all moral theories (I mean, did you really expect me to bring up divine command theory?) The most notable omission is consequentialism, as far as it is distinct from utilitarianism. I’ve previously written about that here. As it relates to this essay: I think we should indeed try to imagine, and then achieve, the sort of outcomes we want. But consequences often do not match one’s original intent. Furthermore, our judgment of the consequences of acts depends on our prior conceptions of harm, rights and virtue.

Still, some say that irreconcilable tensions can arise between the different conceptions of ethics, which may mean that ethical pluralism is doomed. At least two examples are discussed in chapter 8 of Michael Sandel’s Justice, as they relate to the relationship between justice and law (an unavoidable issue when it comes to ethics). The first example highlights a potential tension between the utilitarian and virtue views. Aristotle believed that law was meant to inculcate moral virtue and make good citizens. What then about well-being? Aren’t these two different approaches to ethics? Not exactly. Law can be about instilling moral worth as a necessary step toward increasing our well-being, the overarching function of morality. The second example pits virtue ethics against rights theory. Aristotle believed the purpose of law was more to form an upstanding populace, and less to create rules and rights. But it goes both ways: forming good citizens with upstanding character requires a certain level of protection of rights; and cultivating virtue is a good way to make sure we support the correct rights.

A third potential tension has been mentioned in criticisms of Harris’ book. It is between utility and rights theory. Imagine if scientific data proved that slavery leads to greater societal flourishing. Would slavery then be moral? No. The point of a pluralist approach is that you do not rely on a single universal rule. Slavery might increase the collective well-being, but it would do so by limiting an essential right. And you don’t take away peoples’ rights just because the majority would be happier that way.

Indeed, each aspect of a pluralist ethical approach is intricately tied to other aspects. The way to increase well-being and flourishing is to feel obligated to accord conscious beings a certain level of respect and rights, to not cause harm to them without very good reason, and to actively work toward building moral character so that these promises are fulfilled.

I think most people already are ethical pluralists. Life and society are complex to navigate, and one cannot rely on a single idea for guidance. It is probably accurate to say that people lean more toward one theory, rather than practice it to the exclusion of all others. Of course, this only describes the fact that people think about morality in a pluralistic way. But the outlined approach is supported, sound reasoning — that is, unless you are ready to entirely dismiss 2,500 years of Western moral philosophy.

83 comments:

"Imagine if scientific data proved that slavery leads to greater societal flourishing. Would slavery then be moral? No. The point of a pluralist approach is that you do not rely on a single universal rule. Slavery might increase the collective well-being, but it would do so by limiting an essential right. And you don’t take away peoples’ rights just because the majority would be happier that way."

Why not? On what basis do we prefer respecting rights to promoting collective well-being? This example and others suggests that you're relying on a sort of subjectivism or emotivism. If so, why should I accept your solution to the above problem if I feel that collective well-being is more important than rights?

"I think most people already are ethical pluralists. Life and society are complex to navigate, and one cannot rely on a single idea for guidance. It is probably accurate to say that people lean more toward one theory, rather than practice it to the exclusion of all others. Of course, this only describes the fact that people think about morality in a pluralistic way. But the outlined approach is supported, sound reasoning — that is, unless you are ready to entirely dismiss 2,500 years of Western moral philosophy."

I'm not sure what conclusion you're drawing here. You seem to be agreeing with what I suggest above. People do in fact draw on different moral theories or principles as the situation calls for. But isn't this just a from of rationalization? Aren't we acting on moral intuitions or biases, and then justifying them after the fact?

I don't dispute the difficulties of showing only one theory to be correct (e.g., deontology or Utilitarianism), but I can't help thinking that what you suggest is just subjectivism in disguise.

"The history of Western moral philosophy includes numerous attempts to ground ethics in one rational principle, standard, or rule."

The word "ground" in this case is to some degree ambiguous, although the meaning of the author seems clear. Are such "grounds" the CAUSE of ethical values held or behavior of people? I doubt it. "Grounds" in this case does not refer to an objective factor causing ethics to exist and to have certain contents. As it is used as a verb, to ground ethics on something, I guess it could be translated as "to rationalize", "to organize intellectually [the concept of] ethics as a rational-logical deduction from certain propositions or axioms". So the initial sentence should read:

"The history of Western moral philosophy includes numerous attempts to intellectually describe the concept of ethics as a rational-logical implication of one rational principle, standard, or rule." And the same rephrasing applies if several pluralistic principles are to be used instead of an overarching one.

The FACTS about ethics are to be found not in logical principles but in objective reality, in the behavior and ethical beliefs of people. The CONCEPTS about ethics may vary, and may be construed in various ways as attested by the history of ethical philosophy.

I must agree in part with Torgo's assessment. You endeavor to present (something like) a rights theory of morality without first laying down the necessary metaethical / metaphysical foundation. You make an enfeebled attempt to derive from utilitarianism and Aristotelianism the types of rights which you feel compelled to support (thus your bit about a universal right to be free from slavery and your mention of the U.N.'s Declaration of Human Rights), but neither utilitarianism (especially utilitarianism) nor Aristolianism are well-positioned to provide a foundation for those rights.

If I were to wager, I would say you would much rather reject utilitarianism and virtue ethics if both counseled you to reject of universal rights for rational agents. If so, it is curious that you hold in practice doctrines which you ostensibly reject in name: You reject deontology and / or a natural law theory of morality while you maintain a robust conception of rights. A colleague once appropriate identified what you are doing as retaining the substance after having abandoned the form abandoned the form (pun intended for you Aristotelians).

P.S.

Regarding another feature of your essay, (2) does not follow from (1). That is, it does not immediately follow that if we are morally obliged to do A, then we are rationally obliged to legislate that one does A.

Counterexample: Morality may indeed oblige me to meet my friend at the films if I agreed previously to accompany him, but it certainly does not follow that therefore we ought to legislate the keeping of dates, now does it, Michael?

"If we have a moral obligation to act a certain way toward someone, that should be reflected in law."

In general this is a reasonable principle, but I think there are particular instances in which one should doubt the principle. In general, there are many laws that obviously have some moral force. For example, murder and rape are clearly illegal because, or for the same reasons that, they are grossly immoral. However, there are some instances of immoral action that one might think should not be formalized into law. Consider adultery, non-fraudulent lying (i.e., not lying for monetary gain but merely for reputation), abandoning one's parents in a non-luxurious nursing home and then never visiting them. These things strike me as immoral, but not the sorts of behavior the law ought to regulate.

The converse to the proposed principle has similar weaknesses. The converse states, "if an action is legally obligatory, then that obligation is reflected in morality." There are many legal obligations that we do not correspondingly associate with moral obligations. For example, there is not a moral obligation to go exactly the speed limit (it is morally permissible to go a little bit faster), it is not morally obligatory that one register for the military draft (whatever that is called these days; I had to do it when I turned 18), and it is not morally obligatory that one pay for car insurance, new license plates, etc. Furthermore, there are some laws that strike us as immoral, like in contract law where a party to a contract is encouraged to breach if to do so is pareto- or kalder-hicks efficient. This is essentially legalized promise breaking, which many find to be immoral. I mention the counterexamples to the converse to highlight the conceptual independence of the law and morality.

Michael might respond by invoking his system of morality in order to show that those things I've mentioned actually are not immoral, and thus they are not counterexamples to his principle. This may work for some of my examples, but I suspect there will always be a few cases of immorality that a reasonable person does not think should be formalized into law. For me, adultery poses a difficult case for Michael's principle. It seems clearly immoral to me, but I don't think it's the law's business to regulate such matters.

Finally, Michael's principle may be making a weaker connection between the law and morality than the link I am supposing. Rather than endorsing a one-to-one link between moral obligation and legal obligation, the principle might be stating merely that for every moral obligation, the law must in some way account for it. For adultery, such an account might be something as simple as recognizing that the spouse of an adulterer is entitled to some compensation. However, I think this reply still entails that adultery is illegal, for who are we to suppose is to compensate the spouse? Surely the adulterer. Thus, the adulterer's actions result in his/her punishment, via a fine or whatever. This is to say that adultery is illegal to the some degree that warrants a fine.

In summary, I think there are good reasons to be skeptical of any proposal that forges a strong link between morality and legality.

I do not even in general find the principle reasonable, for we may, as you have, easily identify counterexamples to both the principle and its converse. As for your proposal that Michael might envision a weaker version of the principle, I am yet unconvinced. Take adultery. When one spouse violates the marriage agreement (presuming monogamy is a condition here) and the law determines the other ought to receive compensation, it is not the immorality of adultery over which the law concerns itself. Rather, it is the more general violation of contractual arrangements which the law must address. Even here, however, the law intercedes only upon request from at least party to the marriage contract.

Para cons.During millennia, and more recently during many centuries in the West (in some countries till quite recently) and even today in many Muslim countries, husband adultery was or is condoned by law and is (socially) approved of in moral terms, while for wives the opposite applies. Law and custom were in agreement at the time, and even some moral philosophers (or theologians) concurred. Is there any overarching philosophical principle, recognized or recognizable by all in spite of culture or religion, that condones both or approves of both? Is there any objective (e.g. biological) reason for the difference? (some think there is). While one may sit in an armchair somewhere in a Western university and produce a thought to the effect that mutual fidelity is a moral obligation for both spouses (or for all the spousal network, to take account of polyginy and polyandria), but what is the reason why that thought concocted in a Western university should apply to everyone, at all times and everywhere?

You write in your first post: "The FACTS about ethics are to be found not in logical principles but in objective reality, in the behavior and ethical beliefs of people. The CONCEPTS about ethics may vary, and may be construed in various ways as attested by the history of ethical philosophy."

I agree that people's actual ethical beliefs represent some empirical facts relevant to ethics. There remains the question, however, as to which actual ethical beliefs, if any, are correct. If you believe that some ethical beliefs are correct and some not, you must believe there is a difference between correct and incorrect ethical beliefs. Let's call the property that distinguishes correct from incorrect ethical beliefs 'P'. Is it not an additional, different, kind of fact that some ethical beliefs have P and some do not? Can you explain this fact P empirically?

Michael,

Moving to "pluralism" about ethics doesn't bypass the quest for a basic ethical principle; it only changes the quest from one seeking a simple principle to one seeking a complex principle. If we want to know which ethical beliefs are correct, we need to find the "P" I mentioned above, and it is not a great matter whether P is simple and unitary or complex and disjunctive. I agree, however, with the practical spirit in which you write: some of our ethical energy should be be spent on ways of approaching actual ethical problems practically. Peter's Singer's "Practical Ethics" is an excellent book in this regard. That said, I think that even if we had sound practical protocol for every practical ethical question, the nature of ethics would still be an important philosophical pursuit.

Paul, you have not defined "correct". An ethical norm or belief may be so defined either on empirical grounds (e.g. because most people believe it to be correct) or on theoretical grounds (e.g. because it is derived from some ethical axiom). The second one is the relevant problem in this (philosophical) context. As Massimo explained in a related discussion some days ago, ethical judgments are conditional, i.e. conditional on certain axioms. IF you believe in the axiom, THEN you should consider this or that behavior as ethically correct. Which transposes the problem to the axioms: how is one to determine which are the "correct" axioms? Popular vote? Agreement among philosophers? Divine revelation? Empirical investigation of implicit axioms in diverse cultures and epochs? However one solves the conundrum, a deep uncertainty remains about moral philosophy, since no one can determine, from one's armchair, which axioms are "correct" on solely philosophical grounds. This is apart from using the ill defined term "correct" in this context.Massimo's suggested solution is "If you do not agree with my axioms, you would be classed as a psychopath and locked away" does not seem very convincing to me, especially in view of its paltry philosophical grounds and the way in which such a methodology was applied in totalitarian societies (like the USSR) during the 20th century. It is, if anything, a Red Queen solution ("Off with their heads!") based only on a dictatorial whim. Unless, of course, the axioms are themselves chosen on some specific grounds, probably empirical (agreement across cultures, origin in biological evolution, and suchlike), but that would be a quite different approach.

A prior question, Baron, is whether it is a fact that no ethical beliefs can have P. If it were a fact, then according to what I wrote--that P is the property that makes ethical beliefs correct--it would be the case not only that there are no correct ethical beliefs but that there can be no correct ethical beliefs; correct ethical beliefs would be impossible. That's a coherent position on the surface, I think, but I would like to see an argument for it. Here's a deal, Baron: if you provide an argument that establishes the relevant proposition as a fact, then I'll tell you how about it ;)

The ordinary meaning of the word 'correct' is adequate for my point. I used 'correct' only to leave open the question of whether ethical beliefs are true/false. Stating the property P--the condition which an ethical belief is correct--is where the difficulty is. Note that in being asked for the condition under which it can be accepted as true that Obama got Osama no one, except perhaps Bill Clinton, would ask for the meaning of 'true'.

As to the axiomatic approach to ethics--which I like too--empiricism cannot be adequate to choose the axioms because ethical axioms do not follow from empirical facts without the addition of some normative premise. One cannot get an 'ought' from an 'is' alone. So the blessed armchair, to which only the wisest may ascend, is our only hope.

Paul, what you wrote as an even prior "if" in question was:"If you believe that some ethical beliefs are correct and some not, you must believe there is a difference between correct and incorrect ethical beliefs."But your interlocutor, Hector, had not made claim to any such belief, nor have I. It's only you that have proposed the existence of the differential property P.I propose that if there is no such property that in effect can accurately differentiate between ethical behaviors on the concurrent basis of their correctness and their relativity, then there are no beliefs that could rely on such a property - therefore no factual bridge from is to should. And a matter of fact that no ethical beliefs can cross it.

"Obama got Osama" is a correct description of a fact, but it is not a viable axion justifying a conditional ethical statement such as "IF Obama got Osama, THEN his getting Osama is morally good". For that we need another kind of axiom, such "Assassinating a terrorist is good" or "Taking revenge is good". The foundation of such an axiom, other than empirical corroboration by appeal to the majority of people or some such, is difficult to discover. The choice of such a philosophical axiom, which would then be used as the basis of an ethical judgment about the actual killing of Osama, is difficult to justify on purely philosophical grounds. And this is not a property of a more or less controversial axiom (such as an axiom justifying assassinations or revenge) but a property of EVERY axiom used for justifying moral judgments.

Baron - The point of Hector's that I was arguing against was that ethical facts are and only are empirical facts regarding the ethical beliefs and behaviors of people. I was aiming to show that if there is such a thing as correct ethical beliefs then whatever makes such beliefs correct must be the sort of non-empirical ethical fact that Hector is denying. Essentially and generally, I was trying to show that ethics could not be a purely empirical phenomenon.

Hector - All ethical philosophy needs to do be worthwhile is deepen our understanding of ethical reasoning and make our ethical reasoning better--which I think it does; it needn't find an ultimate, unassailable, foundation for ethics, though that would be nice. Science too can only improve our reasoning about the observable world--as opposed to finding ultimate truths--so perhaps the standard you're applying to the validity of ethical philosophy is bit extreme.

I think a hefty dose of feminist philosophy might help remedy a lot of the confusion in the OP, especially the work of Kelly Oliver, Eva Feder Kittay, Linda Martin-Alcoff, Carol Gould, Joan Tronto, and Virginia Held. Some contribute to something called care ethics (Held, Kittay), or the ethics of care, while others hash out the political consequences of care for human rights and legal theory (Tronto, Gould). Oliver and Alcoff contribute in somewhat different ways, but still provide valuable, overlapping insight into feminist ethics and political theory.

Held’s 2006 book, “The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global”, might be worth looking into. If I recall correctly, she specifically addresses problems with legal conceptions of morality – and the use of legal terminology (“obligation”, “rights”, etc.) – and explains what virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and the rest, necessarily neglect, even when bundled together.

Four years of undergraduate philosophy with numerous upper lvl moral theory courses have turned me into a pluralist as well.

Some books that support realism that I found great are:http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Realism-Defence-Russ-Shafer-Landau/dp/0199280207http://www.amazon.ca/Ethical-Intuitionism-Michael-Huemer/dp/0230573746

Also Brad Hookers rule-consequentialism appears to be a well motivated attempt at bringing numerous theories together under one tent.http://www.amazon.com/Ideal-Code-Real-World-Rule-Consequentialist/dp/0199256578

The mere idea that a moral belief could be "true" or "false" betrays a lack of logic. Such beliefs are not beliefs about the state of the world, or about the logical coherence of a set of propositions, but a belief about what OUGHT TO BE. Such belief cannot be true or false, except in relation to some transcendental morality in which things objectively OUGHT to be in a certain manner. Of course, one may always devise, in one's mind, an axiom (or set of axioms) from which any purportedly "moral" belief could be deduced, but that exercise does not make the belief more or less "true": it only makes explicit that the proposition expressing the belief is a logical consequence of such axioms (this only proves necessity, not sufficiency: the believed moral precept may also be a consequence of OTHER axioms, of course).

The idea that moral precepts are "justified" by assuming some convenient axioms is no less than a statement of moral relativism: any moral norm can be justified by an astute choice of axioms.

From all this discussion it emerges ever more clearly (to me) that the whole enterprise of a philosophical morality, "more geometrico demonstrata" as Spinoza wanted it to be, is hopeless and fruitless. One may think about morality, may put some order in any ethical system, may propose axioms consistent with it, may discover implications of such axioms and precepts, but cannot "justify" such morality, or in any way decide whether there is some TRUTH in the statement that something OUGHT or OUGHT NOT to be.

My own view is that morality is a historical thing, deeply rooted in biology (and biological evolution). It evolves, and consequently involves variety and change.

Jeff, please spare us your dose of feminist philosophy. At least for my line of argument, feminist or macho philosophy are equally ill equipped to find grounds for ethical precepts.

I agree with Paul that ethical philosophy can " deepen our understanding of ethical reasoning and make our ethical reasoning better". However, that kind of job is equally applicable to any conceivable ethical system, from the Nazis to the Stalinists, from Cicero to the Cathars, from Mahatma Gandhi to Osama bin Laden. All those "ethical systems" (or sets of ethical norms and beliefs) will emerge unscathed, except perhaps for some improvement in discursive orderliness and systematicity.

Hector, >a belief about what OUGHT TO BE< does not require >The mere idea that a moral belief could be "true" or "false"<There would be no sense of the duty that's essential to the function of all social groups and cultures without an ability to successfully predict the probable consequences all round of what ought and ought not to be done at every turn of the eventual road.

Baron,avoiding or doing things because of a prior prediction of their probable consequences is something not necessarily "moral" (I may abstain from robbing a shop because a cop is nearby and would probably catch me, or as a general rule "Do not rob shops when cops are nearby"). The "sense of duty" may be essential and habitual for human groups, but we only know that because of empirical investigations about human groups; and those groups have a sense of duty regarding different (and often opposite) behaviors across groups. So, killing your daughter after somebody saw her kissing her boyfriend is an honorable duty in some societies, an "honor killing" as they say, but it is a crime in other societies. What function does each norm perform, what are their historical origins, what "good" is socially supposed to result from either behavior or norm, are also things to be ascertained empirically. Not one of those investigations would tell you whether the kill (or not to kill) an ill-behaved daughter is morally right or wrong, except conditional on some adequate axiom (which may in turn be formulated for either norm). Also, no amount of philosophical reasoning would carry you beyond that philosophical relativity of moral judgments conditional on (logically arbitrary) axiomatic assumptions, especially because other axiomatic assumptions leading to the opposite norm are also available.

As a general comment, I find it odd that you've (Michael) neglected to take account of contractarian approaches to ethics. From the claim "that morality ought to function to increase the well-being (the state of being happy, healthy, or prosperous) and flourishing (to grow, to thrive) of conscious creatures and societies" (with special emphasis on "societies") it seems quite natural to appeal to some permutation of the device of social contract and reflective equilibrium.

After all, given the fundamentally interpersonal nature of morality, our (moral) concepts of well-being and flourishing will have to be fundamentally framed in social and communal contexts. And this invites consideration of something like a social contract.

I was a little off-put by your quick dismissal of feminist philosophy, which was probably just the tone and the narcissism of it- Jeff was making a point about the "OP" and not your posts. For the record, Jeff's suggestions lent me no insight into the OP or your posts.

I am a moral anti-realist and I would agree that feminist philosophy does not help us ground morality, but it is and has been (for instance the Mackinnon discussion on "care" ethics) important in understanding different psychological standpoints, grasping the grossly differentiating aspects of socialization programs, etc.

In other words, feminism (and its philosophical inputs) has helped shape the moral viewpoints we hold today and the behaviors we aspire to, and I would argue it has helped us create and accept a more pragmatic and pluralistic (and more rational) point of view when it comes to morality.

Lyndon: "feminism (and its philosophical inputs) has helped shape the moral viewpoints we hold today and the behaviors we aspire to".

To whom you allude when you say "we"? Do you include, for instance, the Pashtun society of Southern Afghanistan? The societies of Northeastern Africa where genital mutilation is universally practiced upon women, including both Muslim and Coptic-Christian ones? Polygynous mormons? Everyone everywhere?

I have personally visited some villages in Afghanistan where women are not given names at all. They are identified as the older, the younger, the tall one, and so on, just like we (I mean we) may identify individual chicken (we name even cats and dogs, or other domestic pets, but seldom chicken). They can be bequeathed and inherited. Honor killing is specifically prescribed. All this is codified in the sacred Pashtunwali, an ancient moral code of the Pashtun people, full of wholesome norms about how to preserve social order and morality. Their society has survived for at least 2500 years, so at least such norms seem to work in practical terms. By the way, "care" for women and children is one of its central tenets.

Which only goes to show, Hector, that you've missed the point of what morality is imagined by philosophers to accomplish. All creatures evolved to suit their needs as a social group. As such they will have developed the equivalent of a sense of duty. All moral behaviors are meant to serve that obligation to the group's survival.Morality has always been about the duty for "right action." The right way for the shark to deal with the seal will not be the right way for the seal in response. (And sharks do hunt, and dutifully, in packs.)You keep looking for some naturally intrinsic judge of right or wrong that could conceivably enforce some universal set of moral certainties.And you look because you seem to feel we need to find and obey them if we have any hope for our futures. And thus we 'ought' to find them, because what 'is' doesn't work. Not to you the way it should do anyway. Nature, if it could, would disagree.

(If this post shows up twice, it's because I had a browser freeze and thought the first attempt to do so failed.)

All of which only goes to show, Hector, that you've missed the point of what morality is imagined by philosophers to accomplish. All creatures evolved to suit their needs as a social group. As such they will have developed the equivalent of a sense of duty. All moral behaviors are meant to serve that obligation to the group's survival. Morality has always been about the duty for "right action." The right way for the shark to deal with the seal will not be the right way for the seal in response. (And sharks do hunt, and dutifully, in packs.) You keep looking for some naturally intrinsic judge of right or wrong that could conceivably enforce some universal set of moral certainties. And you look because you seem to feel we need to find and obey them if we have any hope for our futures. And thus we 'ought' to find them, because what 'is' doesn't work. Not to you the way it should do anyway. Nature, if it could, would disagree.

Feminist philosophy isn’t just about women’s rights; it’s also a philosophical approach that unveils and brings into dialogue ideas and currents that have been historically undervalued or ignored (although it doesn’t just do that). In that regard, feminism aims for greater holism, and it’s relevant to suggest authors who have unearthed what moral philosophy has historically neglected on a thread discussing the virtues of certain moral philosophies. Several of the philosophers I mentioned have practically reconceived ethics in a way that I think is convincing – but it’s very different than how the OP conceives ethics, which is overwhelmingly law-oriented.

I didn’t put forth an argument here, because I wasn’t attempting to argue. Sometimes if you disagree with a position so thoroughly it’s best to suggest some reading material that might give the parties involved some common ground. That’s what I did. If you haven’t read the authors I suggested – don’t worry about it, they were just suggestions! But don’t bash something out of sheer ignorance.

I mostly meant those of us in the "west" and who share somewhat of a common culture. Those, for instance those on this blog, who are having critical discussions about self, society, and morals after having taken in at least some lessons from western philosophy, science, culture, arts, etc . . . and who have also asked questions about the vastly different lifestyles of people living elsewhere and how to relate it to what we are trying to do in America and in (name your state, town, (non)church organization, family).

And before declaring war on a different people, whether across the sea or across the town, or imposing our "Moral" will and viewpoints on them, I think it is best to try to coax them to the table of communicative discourse to first find common ground upon which we then convince them of practices that we believe discourage human flourishing; especially for certain parts of the human race, women for instance, but this requires making others first commit to women as part of humanity instead of as property. Hopefully feminism and cultural studies programs, for instance, have helped us hash out how such a program of communicative discourse can work, and is even helping us understand what is happening elsewhere. Globalization and psychological structures are probably going to be more responsible for the spread of our moral values than that of our deliberate attempts.

In the end, I do think we have to take strong stances about certain practices that we find abhorrent, and we do this by first coming to grips with the moral narratives we have been working within, which is what De Dora was giving an admirable contribution to, and Harris too, eventhough many of us consider his understanding misguided in certain aspects.

The world is also messier so we find heterogenous societies such as Afghanistan and Libya and really anywhere, and we naturally take allegiance with those who hold closer to our points of view and who are less likely to do us harm and then try to push it on others in that society.

Baron, I do NOT keep looking for some intrinsic or universal morality. To the contrary, I have consistently argued that the pursuit of "moral philosophy" is hopeless: it could only formulate moral implications of given axioms, which are intrinsically arbitrary. On the other side, as you rightly say, all human groups (and also other animal groups) develop norms of behavior and even systems for punishing shirkers and cheaters. This can be taken, by way of scientific (empirical) investigation, as a basis of a "science of morality", in the same sense that we can have a scientific study of art or religion or warfare: a study of one area of human behavior. "Philosophy" has no substantive place in it, except general housekeeping (e.g. detecting logical inconsistencies, helping scientists to develop better vocabularies and methods, and so on) and perhaps ex post thinking about other implications of the facts of human morality (just as other philosophers philosophize on some implications of the Big Bang), especially on aspects that are for the moment outside the reach of science. Some of these aspects might later come to be studied by science, as many philosophical subjects of Greek philosophy came later to be studied by science (elements composing the physical world, shape of the planetary system, laws of motion, forms of government, sensorial perception, and so on).

So, Baron, you are prepared to propose a morality for "us" in the West, admitting and tolerating other "moralities" outside our realm. Would you think that "our" morality is in any way superior or inferior to others? For instance, would you think there is some (universally valid) reason why genital mutilation and cannibalism are "wrong", or you would leave that to each particular culture to decide? Would the judgment of each culture be as "valid" as yours? Is there, then, a right human morality, or just a varied and variable collection of "moralities", forever multiple and forever changing?

Hector, you still don't get it that the rightnesses of moral behaviors (or degrees of such) are most relative to their respective cultures. Personally I think mutilation by circumcision is wrong because it's done for reasons that are based primarily on superstition. And all religious rites have an element of wrongness to them for much the same reason.Do we then campaign against their rights to freely practice their religions because we would find these practices harmful in our own philosophies?

If there is however general agreement among cultures that certain harmful practices are to be discouraged, and at least on moral if not legally enforceable grounds, then it would be seen as the right action on their part to do.Somewhat as we in the west had earlier tried to outlaw the 'inherently immoral' practice of communism. Which as a morality based tactic didn't work. And yes as long as there are cultural differences among us, there will be, as you say, "a varied and variable collection of 'moralities', [seemingly] forever multiple and [seemngly] forever changing."

Just an observation: genital mutilation (including sewing up the women to keep them off intercourse) is not done on the basis of superstition (e.g. to obey some sacred scripture). It is just another (and crueler) way of males keeping their women from being impregnated by other males. It is widely diffused in many animal species, some of them spraying the female genitals with some venomous chemical, in order to kill any embryo or fetus there, before engaging in sexual intercourse; others kill any puppies by previous partners of their new "brides", and most fight for their "wives" and protect them from other males. In human populations the practice of ensuring female fidelity is almost universally practiced (much more than the practice of male fidelity, which is oftentimes not condemned and is even praised; male adultery is more easily condoned (by females) than the reverse. The biological reason why those tendencies were propagated (generally by genes, and reinforced by culture) is that females produce few eggs and need care and support, while males make smaller investment in procreation and produce sperm by the billions: promiscuous males spread their promiscuity-prone genes widely, and thus those genes tend to expand in the gene pool. As far as those genes are restricted to the "male" chromosome, they are not inherited by females; nonetheless, there is female adultery also, in several species including chimpanzees and humans, but far more limited in scope (it adds genetic variety and improves the immune system of a small close-knit band of apes or hominids, and that is a possible reason for its evolutionary success). Apart from these evolutionary reasons there is no evident philosophical or moral necessity for conjugal exclusiveness, or moreover, for a more strict female than male fidelity.

Let us see whether Michael De Dora or Massimo agree with your cultural-moral relativism, Baron, and why they do or do not.

@Hector>Apart from these evolutionary reasons there is no evident philosophical or moral necessity for conjugal exclusiveness, or moreover, for a more strict female than male fidelity.<

Not only in my opinion are you wrong when you neglect the experience driven aspects of evolution, you are wrong that those are not the source of the commonality of all moral instincts.Which is that these strategies have been instinctively deemed right for this species under the anticipated short to long term circumstances.

And if you don't think superstition is involved in the genital mutilation practices, take a look at the ritual nature of the ceremonies that accompany these acts. Rites of passage and then some.

Baron,of course moral sentiments arise in many cases from their functionality to achieve certain consequences, and are first evolved because of those consequences. But that does not provide a criterion to identify morally right behaviors: remember my example of a norm commanding "not to rob a shop when cops are around". That precept is certainly astute, because it avoids an unpleasant consequence (being caught and put in jail), but is not likely to be seen as "moral" by most people. However, I agree that many moral beliefs and norms historically and evolutionarily arise because of their (beneficial) consequences. They do not arise because they are right: they are (regarded as) right because they have successfully arisen and been selected for in evolutionary and historical terms. Note that other moral beliefs do not arise that way, or at least not evidently. Some "paradoxical" moral commands, such as "Love thy enemy", may make some convoluted evolutionary sense, but they do not spontaneously arise in evolutionary or historical time.

I find the categorical imperative to be a very useful tool as a criteria for either confirming or questioning my initial intuitions with regard to moral questions. It was Kant's critiques of logic that inspired me to develop my own personal "List of Laws" to govern my behavior. I love the feeling of freedom that comes from knowing that the decisions I make are founded in understanding derived from logic, knowledge, and experience rather than, a "blind" criteria prescribed by inculcation, environment, or impulse.

That being said, for me the Kantian philosophy is insufficient in that when followed to its natural end, I perceive it to become inconsequential. By inconsequential, what I really mean to say is un-circumstantial. This is a logical fallacy, that Kant himself observed, that I cannot sufficiently rectify via any of Kant's explanations. The only way to stay true to the universal laws of the categorical imperative, while adapting to circumstance, is to perverse and distort the law itself, in such a way, as to mislead one's self or others. For me, it is not enough to judge the moral worth of an action based solely on the intent, but rather, by both intent and results as perceived "a priori" and subsequently by the measure of the physical result manifested.

For me, the solution is to form a "personal" law, vet it with the categorical imperative, and subsequently temper the law [over time] with consequentialism (which in this schema is better referred to as "causality relative to circumstance").

Thank you for the all the comments. I am very busy at work but I am going to try to answer them as I can.

Torgo, you said:

"On what basis do we prefer respecting rights to promoting collective well-being? This example and others suggests that you're relying on a sort of subjectivism or emotivism. If so, why should I accept your solution to the above problem if I feel that collective well-being is more important than rights?"

All rules have exceptions. This is not an argument against rational morality. In fact, it seems reason to think that, as I suggested, morality complex and operates on many levels with many different compatible and reasonable ideas.

"I must agree in part with Torgo's assessment. You endeavor to present (something like) a rights theory of morality without first laying down the necessary metaethical / metaphysical foundation."

Looks like I have another idea for a post.

To be honest, I haven't really studied metathics. Would you suggest anything?

"If I were to wager, I would say you would much rather reject utilitarianism and virtue ethics if both counseled you to reject of universal rights for rational agents."

Probably, yes -- though it seems a rather unlikely choice to have to make.

"If so, it is curious that you hold in practice doctrines which you ostensibly reject in name: You reject deontology and / or a natural law theory of morality while you maintain a robust conception of rights."

Have I rejected deontology somewhere?

"Counterexample: Morality may indeed oblige me to meet my friend at the films if I agreed previously to accompany him, but it certainly does not follow that therefore we ought to legislate the keeping of dates, now does it, Michael?"

I agree. I have previously written about the intersection of law and morality here:

"If you believe that some ethical beliefs are correct and some not, you must believe there is a difference between correct and incorrect ethical beliefs. Let's call the property that distinguishes correct from incorrect ethical beliefs 'P'."

Yes, but morality deals with a wide range of issues, questions, and ideas. You admit that with use of "beliefs," plural. Can't the property that decide your question across this range change? Shouldn't it be this way? If so, there is not one property, but several different important and foundational properties.

"I agree, however, with the practical spirit in which you write: some of our ethical energy should be be spent on ways of approaching actual ethical problems practically. Peter's Singer's "Practical Ethics" is an excellent book in this regard."

Thank you. I'll add that to my reading list.

"That said, I think that even if we had sound practical protocol for every practical ethical question, the nature of ethics would still be an important philosophical pursuit."

Nancy Sherman has a very good book called "Making a Necessity of Virtue" that seeks to reconcile a Aristtole with Kant (with a little dash of Stoicism for flavor). I'm not sure she succeeds, but it is worth the read if you're interested in developing an internally consistent, principled pluralism.

My question was not a question, but an indictment of the very attempt to do a moral philosophy with any claim to validity, other than the relativistic claim that one state some axioms which entail a given moral norm (one can also adopt other axioms that entail the opposite norm, so that particular type of conditional "moral truth" has little value.I also claimed that moral facts (i.e. socially adopted and enforced moral norms, and individually held moral values supporting those norms) evolve in society, with deep roots in evolutionary biology plus elements that are culturally acquired. Any philosophical reasoning on morality should start by recognizing this state of affairs, and taking stock of objective surveys of the various moral systems that have existed in the human present and past. Last but not least, I have also claimed that no amount of empirical information or philosophical reasoning would find a way to ascertain whether certain moral values or behaviors ought to be or not to be. Only answers about what is, or was, and reasons why, can be ever found. Hic Rodhus, hic salta.

Perhaps, Massimo. However, I'm not "demanding" but noting that this once, as in another recent occasion, my comments on this very theme went uncommented, unlike most others. Perhaps there is no reason, but I'd like to know. And also, I'd like to be enlightened by Michael's comments, if any.

Hector, I'll leave the commenting to Michael, if he has time and inclination, but I can assure that there is no anti-Hector conspiracy here at Rationally Speaking.. Now of course I would say that if we did have one, wouldn't I?.

Like Massimo, I have a life outside the blogs, and I try to live that one as, or more, fully as the one I live on the blogs. But I digress ...

Hector M. said:

"My question was not a question, but an indictment of the very attempt to do a moral philosophy with any claim to validity, other than the relativistic claim that one state some axioms which entail a given moral norm (one can also adopt other axioms that entail the opposite norm, so that particular type of conditional "moral truth" has little value."

I've read this a couple times and I'm still not sure you're trying to say here. What do you mean by "claim to validity?"

"I also claimed that moral facts (i.e. socially adopted and enforced moral norms, and individually held moral values supporting those norms) evolve in society, with deep roots in evolutionary biology plus elements that are culturally acquired."

Are you under the impression I disagree? Because I don't. I just didn't deal with this issue in my essay. See my note in the fourth paragraph.

"Last but not least, I have also claimed that no amount of empirical information or philosophical reasoning would find a way to ascertain whether certain moral values or behaviors ought to be or not to be. Only answers about what is, or was, and reasons why, can be ever found."

Again, are you under the impression I disagree? Because I don't. I just don't see where I deal with this issue in my essay.

Thanks, Michael. Just to clarify my first statement in the comment to which you responded: what I meant is that philosophical reasoning cannot generate valid moral statements, except conditional on some prior axioms or assumptions. On this you (and Massimo) will agree. What I add is (1) That given a behavior (any behavior), one may ALWAYS find a set of axioms from which such behavior could be said to be morally good or correct. (2) Choice of axioms from which conditional moral statements are derived is essentially arbitrary, except if recourse is made to empirical observation (about what most people do or believe, or what is regarded by some people or all people as better or more "moral"). (3) That such conditional statements have little value (other than making explicit what is implicit in the axioms), and most especially, cannot establish what ought or ought not to be done, i.e. cannot give grounds for a system of ethics. In fact, instead of asking others to accept a certain moral command, this approach asks others to accept a set of axioms, from which the moral command is logically derived.It lacks proper grounds other than demanding faith. This falls short of establishing that any allegedly moral command as "correct" or "good" for people not believing in those (arbitrary) axioms.(4) Lacking either logical or empirical grounds to establish what ought to be done, moral philosophy has little to say. It may systematize or codify a set of moral rules, or perhaps show that two or more rules are (logically) inconsistent (which may be no obstacle for them both being valid moral rules, since another arrangement of axioms or rephrasing of the rules may be more inclusive). But it cannot establish a moral system with any claim to be especially valid, i.e. more valid than any other such system. "Valid" here means "entailing moral obligations for other people".

Michael De Dora said And Baron, I don't see any questions from you ...

I suppose that's because my questions were to Hector, who in turn went begging to a moderator for help.

He especially didn't like it when I commented thusly: "There would be no sense of the duty that's essential to the function of all social groups and cultures without an ability to successfully predict the probable consequences all round of what ought and ought not to be done at every turn of the eventual road."

And he's gotten you to agree with his views to the contrary, so all my expectations have been met.

To Baron's statement to the effect that "There would be no sense of the duty that's essential to the function of all social groups and cultures without an ability to successfully predict the probable consequences all round of what ought and ought not to be done at every turn of the eventual road"I responded that the ability to predict the consequences does not entail any moral duty, nor results in valid moral precepts. I cited there as an example the cynical precept "Do not steal from shops when cops are around", which is a prudent precautionary rule for thieves to avoid getting caught, but hardly qualifies as a moral norm in the ordinary sense of the word (though it would qualify once a convenient set of axioms is adopted, according to which getting caught when stealing is morally bad, but stealing is good).With that response I dismissed the "consequentialist" justification of morality advanced by Baron P., and stayed in my view that there are no empirical or philosophical grounds for an ethical system, unless it is conditional on a set of arbitrary axioms (and is thus not universally valid, but only for those adhering, without clear reason, to those arbitrary axioms).

And Hector, you seem unable to grasp that "Do not steal from shops when cops are around" is a prudent rule for anyone, as morality is primarily cautionary and only secondarily precautionary. Caution is advisory as to consequence. Precaution is advisory as to consequentially preventive measures. Sides of the same moral coin. Which I've already pointed out but you've taken the precaution to omit.

Baron:I do not understand what Michael means by "having a moral obligation to act in a certain way". Is it an objective "moral obligation", is it something subjectively felt by each one, is it something statistically prevailing as a feeling in a certain society at a certain time? Evidently he does not mean that it is something established by law. So what does he mean?

To you second comment on stealing or not stealing: Rephrase the norm this way: "Thou shalt steal from shops whenever feasible, but you shalt abstain from stealing when there are cops around". This commands you to steal, but advices not to do it when cops are around. This may make good advice for thieves, and would be included in any "Handbook for thieves", but does not claim that stealing is "good" or "moral": it can be entirely justified by anti-social and selfish values. One may formulate axioms from which such norms can be deduced (there are some Nietszchean ideas, and others, that contain axioms or values which would justify the above norm). If one can formulate a set of axioms expressing values, according to which the above is "right" and "justified", and one could also formulate other axioms to the opposite effect, then formulating "moral judgments" in the form of conditional statements dependent on axioms is a futile and nonsensical activity, "signifying nothing" to use the immortal words of the Bard.

Hector, Rephrase the norm the way you suggested and it would no longer be the norm in a society that valued either property rights or honesty.Aristotle held that ethics is a kind of practical intelligence - there was nothing intelligently practical in your revised example of a workable social and cultural strategy.

As to what Michael intended to mean by the use of moral obligation, you'll have to ask him. But in the context of moral rights, it would seem to mean that with rights come duties. Moral "ought to dos" in other words.

Of course, Baron P., it would not be the norm of a society that valued property rights or "honesty" (although it may value honor among thieves). However, this does not diminish its standing as moral norms, if they are derived from a set of suitable axioms. Many societies have not particularly valued property rights.Remember that "society" involves a great many particular groups and sub-cultures, with different norms (a classical theme in urban sociology and the study of "deviant" behavior). There is probably no set of values "valued by society" as if society had a common will or understanding. Societies are varied and often conflictive arrangements of different social classes and groups, ethnic communities, religios, and suchlike. (One certain set of values and their implicit norms, however, may be written into law, but we are abstracting from that here).Secondly, to ascertain what is "valued in society", the choice of axioms by philosophical reasoning does not suffice: you need am empirical investigations on the values prevailing in such "society" (with the caveats of the preceding paragraph). Thus, morality would depend on the whims of each "society" (or on which particular group or groups hold the most influential position in society), and the particular group or community within society about which you are talking. No amount of philosophical reasoning would take you beyond that. And that is moral relativism. At the same time, no amount of empirical information would tell you what "ought to" be done: it would only tell you what "is" considered moral in a particular society (or subgroup of that society). No opening for establishing any philosophically sound "ethical system" except one of your own making, and therefore without pretense of being valid for anyone (or everyone) else.

Hector, moral relativism obliges you to do what you then probably ought to do in the society where the axioms are suitable (and/or only suitable) to the mix of those who grew up and learned of them there, and where individuals will be found who often will not want to do it otherwise.Ethical systems are only needed where the populace have conflicting goals and motives. There will be none that ought to do exactly what all others do as no-one and nothing (i.e., no-thing) is exactly like any one other thing in nature.

Baron, the same question I asked from Michael applies to you: What exactly do you mean by "ought to do", as in your phrase "what you then probably ought to do"? If you simply mean that one ought to do something because it is implied in certain axioms, I would disagree: If you state an axiom (such as "Property rights enhance people's welfare") you cannot deduce that one "ought to" respect property rights. You may only deduce that respect for property rights is required to enhance people's welfare, but this is a descriptive statement, without any "sense of duty" (that one OUGHT TO respect them). And of course, one may as easily formulate the opposite principle (as in Proudhon's "Property is theft", and in some socialist-Hegelians, such as the young Marx, for whom the end of private property would entail the end of the era of need, oppression and inequality, and the coming of the era of freedom and common access to all goods). Given such axioms, respecting property rights becomes almost a crime. From another point of view: thinking from the perspective of your in-group (we the poor, or we the slaves, for example), you may see such commandment (to respect property rights) as an obstacle to welfare. Wherever you go down this kind of road, you end up in a conceptual quagmire, and advance not a iota in your theory of morality.

Hector,Morality is relative to culture, whether I look sympathetically toward that reality or not.And cultures are not monolithic, regardless of whether you or Marx might think they could or should be. Cultures evolve and morality as a set of rules or strategies evolves accordingly. Life arguably could not have evolved without the dynamics of that socially ubiquitous system.

And if a culture requires at this point in time that you respect property rights to survive in it, then that's what you "probably ought" to do (and see as your duty to). Unless you have somehow convinced yourself you have the need, the right, and the power not to. (Tolstoy101.)

Baron, I think I totally agree with your comment of 4:34 PM. So we are not in conflict after all. But such a cultural-relativist view of morality seems at odds with the idea that one could formulate a "system of ethics" or a "moral philosophy", except if one knows and states in advance that it refers only to one particular culture or subculture and to one particular period of time (Upper-Middle Class Urban Eastern US in the 2000s). I think that Michael De Dora, even if advocating a "pluralistic" morality, is after something with a wider reach, and so is, methinks, Massimo. Hence my comments, not directed originally to you.

Hector, I suspect that within a narrow range we can find basic strategies common to all human cultures, but finding a commonality of tactics will be much harder. Tit for tat, for example, seems to be ubiquitous in nature. The social tactics for its application will invariably differ.

Baron: See your assertion: " if a culture requires at this point in time that you respect property rights to survive in it, then that's what you "probably ought" to do".Well, not exactly. That is what you probably WILL do. If you do not, you will probably not survive in that society. But that does not mean you morally OUGHT TO do that. For instance, you may be immersed, for whatever reason, in a society that obliges you to do something you (morally) abhor, say buying, using and selling slaves, or being hypocritical, or beating your wife whenever she steps out of the house without your permission, or whatever it is. You'd better do it if that is the way things are in that society, and if your survival (or less dramatically your standing in society) is imperiled if you don't. But you OUGHT NOT to do it: your moral sense of duty tells you that it is wrong. Perhaps you'll do it, out of a sense of convenience, even if all your fellow citizens do it out of a moral sense of duty. The moral sense of duty does not arise from the (probably unpleasant) expected consequences of not complying. Such consequences exist for everybody, but perhaps only you have the opposite sense of duty. It does not matter here whether you follow your inner sense of duty or accept the ways of that society in which you live: my point is that the fact that something is required for survival (or prosperity) in a certain society does not imply a moral imperative that it is "right" or "ought to be done". Perhaps only a sense that it "must" be done (or else), but you would do it under (inner) protest.

Hector, you seem to be taking advantage of the fact that several comments have been lost by Google in the interim between 5-11 and today. That's not an honest way to "win" an argument, since you'll recall conceding that morality is relative to the culture one grows up in, and what one PROBABLY ought to do as the right thing is what that culture tends in general to approve of.

In fact here's a recap of the lost dialog:Hector M. said...Baron, I think I totally agree with your comment of 4:34 PM. So we are not in conflict after all. But such a cultural-relativist view of morality seems at odds with the idea that one could formulate a "system of ethics" or a "moral philosophy", except if one knows and states in advance that it refers only to one particular culture or subculture and to one particular period of time (Upper-Middle Class Urban Eastern US in the 2000s). I think that Michael De Dora, even if advocating a "pluralistic" morality, is after something with a wider reach, and so is, methinks, Massimo. Hence my comments, not directed originally to you.May 11, 2011 6:19 PM Baron P said...Hector, I suspect that within a narrow range we can find basic strategies common to all human cultures, but finding a commonality of tactics will be much harder. Tit for tat, for example, seems to be ubiquitous in nature. The social tactics for its application will invariably differ.May 11, 2011 7:47 PM

And also "if one knows and states in advance that it refers only to one particular culture or subculture and to one particular period of time (Upper-Middle Class Urban Eastern US in the 2000s," one might not be all that surprised to find how well that system of ethics resonates with the one that Shakespeare tells us of in London in the 1500s.

Of course I agree with the fact that people tend to regard as "morally right" the behaviors regarded as "morally right" in their own culture (although there are exceptions). I do NOT agree that this is an argument in favor of the statement that it IS MORALLY RIGHT to behave that way, or that every individual OUGHT TO behave that way. My position is that statements about what IS the case in one society (or in all) do not provide grounds about what OUGHT TO be done in such society or societies. Just the old Humean distinction between what is and what ought to be.This position is at odds what the position defended in this blog by Michael and also by Massimo. Even if moral statements are conceived of in the form of conditional statements (IF you believe in such and such, THEN you OUGHT TO behave in this or that way), my view is (1) that this is a moral relativistic view, and (2) that it contains zero informative value since the premises or axioms on which the obligations hang cam be designed in such a way as to make ANY behavior morally right. From these statements I conclude that the whole enterprise of a "moral philosophy" is flawed.I do not presume you disagree with this. My argument was about opinions expressed by Michael and Massimo, not you.

Come on Hector, do you want an axiom that leaves you in the end bereft of choice? The one that if you found, you'd have no choice except to choose it? An axiom with informative value will have to guide your choice, not make it for you.Like for example this one from the Old West: When in Rome do as the Romans do, or get the hell out of Dodge.

But, Baron, how would I know whether I OUGHT TO run from Dodge (or Athens) or on the contrary, do as Socrates did, stay in town even at the cost of his life, because his moral precepts said so, in opposition to his disciples' advice? There is an entire Platonic dialog on that (moral) choice. Either option may be regarded as "moral", i.e. either Socrates choice (obey the laws and decisions of the city) or the opposite axiom (being an exiled philosopher is preferable to a being a dead one).

Hector,Socrates as the story goes, chose not to remain in Athens. The strategy was fine, but his tactics were somewhat dodgy.And so it was that Aristotle took Socrates' experience to mean that ethics is a kind of practical intelligence. The moral point to also be that categorical imperatives don't work.

Pluralistic ethics is really quite simple:For any coherent society one does not do that which will cause Mrs. Grundy's nose to twitch. Whether the society actually has a Mrs Grundy or not, all members will know what not to do at the risk of serious displeasure of those closest in the society who are very effective stand-ins for Mrs. Grundy.

Each society will have its own mix of moral imperatives, some from ancient myths, some from a more rational mix of imperatives more suitable to a modern society.

God said nothing about cooking data, but in a high level academic society one does not even consider it. If your self image not to mention your livelihood rests of the trust of your peers jeopardizing that trust cannot be considered. The very few exceptions show why.