--DIRNSA, if a civilian, would likely be a 3-star equal, since that is the highest SES level available. Deputy would naturally be a 1- or 2-star. I believe the consequences of a civilian director would be very damaging to the SCCs over the long term, as it is an extension of politicizatin of intelligence begun in the 1970s. We are plenty political in the military, but not in the same way. The services who most adpetly maneuver their SIGINT efforts back into mainstream service lines will fare the best. --No combatant command "has" units. They are "on lease" and provided by other commands. They do, however, have OPCON. Thus, i can't think of an operational command that isn't supplied operational units (although I am on the fence about SOUTHCOM:-)). C10F as the force provider is largely anomalous to the way the rest of the Navy/military works. And, it likely won't be in the force providing business much longer (ID TYCOM).--A TYCOM cannot effectively be a TYCOM without ADCON. Why would anyone pay attention to their requriements? This may have been the problem with those limited M, T, and E functions performed on behalf of FCC/C10F by other commands. (**sidenote - 60+ page MOAs and MOUs are NOT a successful business model. Who thought that was a good idea, anyway?!?! I know hindsight is 20/20, but... ...really???)--NIOC/FIOC Operations SHOULD be scrutinized by USFF. USFF owns the FIOCs and all the hard Navy billets. The FIOCs exist to support the fleet, right?! The real question is why doesn't the Fleet (USFF) scrutinize them heavily now? Also, why are we still not yet standardized at all the FIOCs? If we are a different beast, we need to change to become a beast recognizable and usable by the Navy. Abandoning the TYCOM for our shore units (considering the fleet relevance) is not a good idea simply because it hasn't worked in the past. Also, don't think that is our call to make, whether as a community or a corps. Are the NIOCs themselves going to determine how they get bodies, money, and training from the USFF purse? Or will the Operational Commander at FCC/C10F decide to pay for the manning, training, and equipping? Given the direction for IDTYCOM stand up, I think the future is clear. This said, we have been miracle workers at seeking and receiving special dispensation for our commands and processes over the past several years. Our uniqueness is so profound, it is sometimes difficult to perceive our utility. Alternatively, it could just be we have invented and reinvented ourselves, marching to the beat of our own drummer, and producing a lack of understanding in our JOs for the bedrock Navy processes and requriements which supply our efforts. --Re: potential for completely supplanting kinetic action in future conflict with cyber action. Interesting. Could it? Only to the extent someone volunteers the vulnerability. Kinetic action does not depend on the decision of the targeted party to accept risk associated with vulnerability. One side or the other can decide exactly how much it wants to be vulnerable to cyber war by determining how much they want to make their data accessible and if so how it is to be accessed. So, if both sides play along, sure, I could see a totally cyber war. I think it is VERY unlikely.

yoshi wrote:Re: potential for completely supplanting kinetic action in future conflict with cyber action. Interesting. Could it? Only to the extent someone volunteers the vulnerability. Kinetic action does not depend on the decision of the targeted party to accept risk associated with vulnerability. One side or the other can decide exactly how much it wants to be vulnerable to cyber war by determining how much they want to make their data accessible and if so how it is to be accessed. So, if both sides play along, sure, I could see a totally cyber war. I think it is VERY unlikely.

We don't have to volunteer the vulnerability...or, more to the point, we already have. We are the most information(/service/"cyber") dependent society on the planet. Any attack which disables, for example, major portions of just our national energy grid system, strategically targeted at major population centers and regions (which, yes, is admittedly far more complex than is revealed in any of the hyped-up articles), and keeps them disabled for over a week or more, would be utterly devastating. Combine this with a coordinated campaign which makes people think our own government is to blame (either through incompetence or direct malice as a prelude to some kind of domestic oppression), and you have a recipe for prolonged disaster. The supply chain pipelines at grocery stores and gas stations are about three days, tops, under normal circumstances. Get people whipped into a panic, and we start eating ourselves alive. If we all knew definitively that it was an adversary attacking us with the intent to militarily defeat us, we may be able to persevere, depending on the scope and severity of the attack...but today, that is not a given (and any shrewd adversary would know this, and use this to their advantage).

das wrote: Combine this with a coordinated campaign which makes people think our own government is to blame (either through incompetence or direct malice as a prelude to some kind of domestic oppression), and you have a recipe for prolonged disaster.

Except the American people have gotten used to government incompetence, and even a little bit of direct malice...

das wrote:Get people whipped into a panic, and we start eating ourselves alive. If we all knew definitively that it was an adversary attacking us with the intent to militarily defeat us, we may be able to persevere, depending on the scope and severity of the attack...but today, that is not a given (and any shrewd adversary would know this, and use this to their advantage).

Regardless of whatever effects you think a cyber attack may be able to create, remember that this is America!!! We can and will survive anything. It may get ugly for a little while -- ref black Friday -- but I firmly DO NOT believe that a cyber attack could result in the end of American society as we know it.

U.S. to Stick With Combined NSA, Cyber Command PostsNSA Director Will Also Lead the Military CommandBy SIOBHAN GORMAN CONNECTDec. 13, 2013 12:04 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON-The Obama administration has decided to maintain the close relationship between the National Security Agency and the Pentagon's Cyber Command by keeping the current arrangement under which the NSA director also leads the military command, the White House said Friday.

The Obama administration for months has considered splitting the two positions in anticipation of the retirement of the NSA director, Gen. Keith Alexander, in the spring. That proposal gained considerable traction after revelations by former agency contractor Edward Snowden prompted calls for a civilian to head the spy agency.

The Obama administration, however, has concluded that a merged position "is the most effective approach to accomplishing both agencies' missions," said the National Security Council spokeswoman, Caitlin Hayden.

As a result, the position of NSA director will continue to be held by a military officer who also will run Cyber Command as a four-star general, a senior administration official said.

The White House decision pre-empts draft recommendations from a presidentially appointed task force examining U.S. surveillance practices. The recommendations include a proposal that the positions be split and that the next NSA director be a civilian. That proposal hasn't yet been submitted to the White House and is due by Sunday, though drafts have been circulating in recent days.

Within the administration, the proponents of a split between the two operations have included recently departed Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, who maintained that the agency should be run by a civilian, officials say.

With the military leadership of NSA no longer in question, the search is on for a successor to Gen. Alexander, who has served an unusually long term as director since August 2005. Prior to the discussion of civilian leadership, the most-discussed name for the next director was the Navy's top cybersecurity officer, Vice Adm. Michael Rogers, who commands the Navy's 10th fleet,

Vice Adm. Rogers is well-regarded in cybersecurity circles but is not a widely known name, and former military and intelligence officials say that appointing him would not send a clear message on the importance of privacy in the wake of the Snowden revelations.

After weighing the options, the Obama administration concluded that separating the positions would be difficult and inefficient. "Elaborate procedures would have to be put in place to ensure that effective coordination continued and avoid creating duplicative capabilities in each organization," Ms. Hayden said.

The decision was made separately from the administration's overall internal review of surveillance policies and practices, which is expected to wrap up around year's end, said the senior administration official, adding, "But of course, it is related."

Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates established Cyber Command in 2009 as part of a Pentagon effort to bolster its cyberwarfare and defense capabilities. The command reached its full operating status in 2010.

At the time, he decided to merge the positions of NSA director and Cyber Command commander, which promoted the NSA director to a four-star general from a three-star general because of the new duties of the combined post. The idea behind the arrangement was to allow Cyber Command to easily tap NSA's cyberspying and hacking capabilities. Both organizations are located at Fort Meade, Md.

"NSA plays a unique role in supporting Cyber Command's mission, providing critical support for target access and development, including linguists, analysts, cryptanalytic capabilities, and sophisticated technological infrastructure," Ms. Hayden said, adding that those capabilities "are essential in enabling" the Pentagon's operations in cyberspace.