Existence of special arrangements for
trade in pelagic fishery products

Only a few of the countries trade regionally or
internationally in pelagics. None of the countries reported special trade
arrangements, but prerequisite factors were identified, such as standards for
gaining access to the EU market and the swordfish certificate of eligibility for
the US market (Table 71). Countries did not report that the public or private
sectors received special assistance from sources in the importing countries to
ensure that trade was facilitated in the face of increasingly strict
international standards. Thus it appears that the onus is entirely on CARICOM
countries to ensure the feasibility of trade arrangements for large pelagic
species.

In terms of especially negative arrangements, contracting
parties may threaten to or actually impose trade sanctions for contravention of
ICCAT management measures. This aspect, not mentioned by respondents, also needs
to be considered.

Status of fish stocks
agreement

Countries were aware of the Fish Stocks Agreement and
recognized it as key to the management of large pelagic fish in this region and
elsewhere (Table 72). At the time of inquiry four countries had signed the
agreement, the most recent being Barbados. Several others were considering
signing, and almost all seemed aware that its entry into force in the near
future was likely.

Because of this, the obligations of the agreement were being
examined closely. At least one country was concerned about the cost of meeting
these obligations. Although not addressed in the questionnaire, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines noted the constraint in the Specially Protected Areas and
Wildlife (SPAW) Protocol on harvesting marine mammals.

TABLE 71

Existence of special arrangements for trade in pelagic
fishery products

Country

Special arrangements

ANT

No

BAR

No, but swordfish certificate of eligibility issued

BHA

No

BZE

No

DMI

No

GRN

Grenada is on EU List II - countries that can export to EU
until Dec. 2003

GUY

No

JAM

No

STK

SK

None, no trade

NE

None, no trade

STL

No

STV

No. Restricted now from exporting seafood to EU

SUR

No, however trading according to international rules

TRI

No, but exporters required to identify species by scientific
name for improved monitoring. Export database maintained. Swordfish certificate
of eligibility issued, except for foreign flagged vessels

TABLE 72

Status of Fish Stocks Agreement

Country

Fish Stocks Agreement

ANT

Not certain

BAR

Party from September 2000

BHA

Signed

BZE

Considering

DMI

Not considered until now

GRN

Fisheries Division recommended signature. Now with External
Affairs and will go next to Cabinet

GUY

Not actively being considered, but is reflected in action and
new legislation

Being considered; presently with Foreign Affairs. Operating
according to its specifications

TRI

Not signed

Since conducting this investigation, the Fish Stocks Agreement
came into force on 11 December 2001.

Status of compliance
agreement

The Compliance Agreement builds upon the legal framework
established by the LOSC. At the time of writing, 22 states had accepted the
agreement, leaving three more acceptances required for it to enter into
force.

Respondents were far less familiar with the Compliance
Agreement than with the LOSC - and with its status with respect to their
countries (Table 73). Only Jamaica and Barbados reported having signed it. Fewer
countries were considering the Compliance Agreement than the Fish Stocks
Agreement, but some were seeking to incorporate its provisions into legislation
as a means of preparation. On the basis of a regional technical workshop, FAO
had assisted OECS countries and Barbados by drafting a high-seas fishing bill,
mentioned previously, for harmonized ratification of this agreement and the Fish
Stocks Agreement.There was little follow-up by countries on the FAO draft
bill.

Approach to interaction with
ICCAT

ICCAT is a dominant force in any consideration of the
management of large pelagic fish in the region and elsewhere. Two countries
(BAR, TRI) are members (contracting parties) of ICCAT, although Barbados has yet
to pay fees or name its commission and scientific representatives. Belize is
planning to become a member. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia
are considering membership, especially the former because of interaction with
ICCAT over STV-flagged vessels on the open ships registry that operate in
regions beyond normal state control. Six states (ANT, DMI, GRN, GUY, JAM and
STK) are planning to interact with ICCAT via a regional effort to be led by the
CRFM (Table 74). CARICOM has been an observer at ICCAT through CFRAMP since 1990
and has taken part in numerous activities. Most recently, CARICOM coordinated
the development of a common position regarding allocations criteria that was
presented to ICCAT by Trinidad and Tobago.[25][26]

Fisheries Division recommended signature. Now with External Affairs and
will go next to Cabinet

GUY

Not actively being considered, but is reflected in action and new legislation

JAM

Signed, but not ratified

STK

Accepted in principle 24 June 1994. Unsure of further action

STL

Not signed

STV

Being considered after draft high-seas fishing bill

SUR

Being considered; presently with Foreign Affairs. Operating according
to its specifications

TRI

Not signed

TABLE 74

Approach to interaction with ICCAT

Country

Plans to interact with ICCAT

ANT

Via regional effort led by CRFM

BAR

Member since December 2000, but no contribution paid. National representatives
not yet decided. Supplies data. May attend meetings

BHA

No plans

BZE

Will apply for membership in 2002 and will attend this year as observer.
Ignored ICCAT until sanctioned. No export to EU of agricultural produce.
Wants to establish vessel monitoring system

DMI

Via regional effort led by CRFM

GRN

Via regional effort led by CRFM

GUY

Via regional effort led by CRFM

JAM

Via regional effort led by CRFM. Membership has not been considered

STK

SK

Supplies information only. Unsure of policy

NE

Via regional effort led by CRFM

STL

May join ICCAT. Probably not able to take part at national level but
via regional effort led by CRFM

STV

STV will be observer at ICCAT and is considering membership. Will try
to monitor and control flagged vessels. Attended working groups on monitoring
measures and allocation criteria

SUR

No plans as yet

TRI

TRI is member of ICCAT and plans to participate in its activities

Transshipment facility raises issues of compliance with ICCAT data requirements
for port states. Separate monitoring and compliance unit being set up
to deal with these matters

Conclusions

The need for attention to the management of shared marine
resources in the wider Caribbean region is well documented. From the early 1980s
it has been a main subject for discussion by WECAFC, for example the Expert
Consultation on Shared Fishery Resources of the Lesser Antilles (Mahon, 1987),
and was stressed at the commission meeting in 1999 (FAO, 1999). Management of
shared stocks has been discussed at other fora and agreement reached on the need
for a coordinated regional effort. Examples of these fora include: the
IOCARIBE[27]Workshop on Fisheries
Oceanography of Highly Migratory and Straddling Species of the Intra-Americas
Seas in 1995; the Africa/ Caribbean/Pacific-European Union Fisheries Research
Initiative, Third Regional Dialogue Meeting for the Caribbean and Pacific ACP
countries in 1996 (ACP-EU, 1997); and the CARICOM Symposium on the Sustainable
Utilization of Fisheries and Other Ocean Resources in 1999. At the latter,
ministers endorsed recommendations that included developing an information base
for shared living marine resources.

The signing or ratification of the various instruments as
indicated in Table 75 is an indication of good intentions to take part in
international management as specified by the Law of the Sea and related
instruments - chiefly the LOSC, Fish Stocks Agreement, Compliance Agreement and
Code of Conduct. Of these, only the first two are in force and binding for the
states that are parties to the agreements. Both are relatively new, with major
implications for countries engaging in fisheries for shared stocks. Thus it was
to be expected that, before signing, there would be a period of assessing the
implications and determining how they would be addressed. Nonetheless,
relatively few CARICOM countries have signed these two agreements.

Several other countries have initiated implementation of the
Code of Conduct by preparing implementation plans, e.g. NMFS (1997).

Evidence of actual participation in collaborative management
of shared fish stocks is generally low. Most collaborative activity is in the
area of stock assessment. For large pelagics, CFRAMP has carried out a project
to collect data and assess the major species in CARICOM countries (CFRAMP,
2001a). This was mainly a scientific exercise, but did provide management
recommendations for three species of regional importance. There was a similar
exercise for reef fish. Most countries are actively involved in collaboration on
assessment for lobster and conch. The countries involved collaborate through the
WECAFC Ad Hoc Working Group for the Guianas-Brazil Region and more recently in
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Flyingfish, again focusing primarily on stock
assessment.

WECAFC itself is another general forum for collaboration in
which CARICOM countries have taken part. All but two wider-Caribbean countries
are members; most participate at one time or another. WECAFCs mandate is
only to review and exchange information. The topic of large pelagics has not
been discussed at WECAFC often.

There has been much less emphasis on the broader assessment of
fisheries from the point of view of providing management advice to the
countries. The harmonization of legislation by the OECS in the 1980s was
followed by various initiatives towards the establishment of a common fisheries
zone or zones and efforts at joint surveillance. Otherwise, there has been
little activity regarding cooperation in management at the regional level,
either within CARICOM or among the countries of the wider Caribbean. This is not
surprising given the lack of a competent organization for management of shared
stocks (Murray, 2000).

Most CARICOM countries participate indirectly through CFRAMP
in international-level management of large pelagics as carried out by ICCAT. But
this is only in observer status. Two CARICOM countries are members, two more
indicate their intention of joining. Other Caribbean member countries are:
France and the United Kingdom via the European Union, the United States and
Venezuela. Recently, CARICOM countries provided collaborative, electronic input
to the ICCAT Ad Hoc Working Group on Allocation Criteria (Singh-Renton, Mahon
and McConney, 2003). This exercise and the differences between the agreed
CARICOM position and those of many of the major fishing countries provide a good
indication of the importance of participation in ICCAT, or any other
organization that deals with shared stocks of interest to CARICOM.

Many of the criteria for allocations were derived directly
from the rights and responsibilities of coastal states as defined in the Fish
Stocks Agreement. Others were conventional criteria used in allocation
negotiations in other organizations that manage shared stocks. Closer
examination of the criteria and their interpretation provides an indication of
how the readiness of and need for CARICOM states to participate may be judged in
the international arena. Demonstration of both need and readiness are important
considerations that require well-documented information on the nature of the
fisheries and on the systems that are in place for participation in
management.

TABLE 75

Membership of countries and states of the wider Caribbean
in organizations relevant to large pelagic fisheries management and development,
and their status as regards relevant regional and international
agreements

Singh-Renton, Mahon and McConney (2003) includes an overview
of the CARICOM position in relation to the key criteria (Box 2). Indications
from negotiations suggest that CARICOM countries will have difficulty in getting
their interpretation of the terms of the Fish Stocks Agreement accepted in
ICCAT. Thus the pursuit of increased shares in the allocations, upon which to
base expansion of fisheries for large pelagics, is likely to require a
substantial and persistent presence in the negotiation process, as well as
supporting analyses and arguments.

It is evident that in the past 10-15 years there has been an
increased level of activity in collaborative work on stock assessment, but much
less towards actual joint management. This emphasis on assessment has been
driven by the technical staff of national and regional institutions. However,
attention to stock assessment has not often translated into actual collaboration
in establishing cooperative management regimes or into implemented measures.
This is possibly because fisheries have a relatively low priority at national
levels and because collaboration in management of shared resources requires the
commitment of resources for personnel, training and travel, as well as for the
operation of the organization.

BOX 2

Allocation criteria considered by the ICCAT working group
and their relation to the CARICOM position (after Singh-Renton, Mahon and
McConney, 2003)

Allocating Shared Resources

Allocation of shared resources among users has been an issue
for many decades. Even before the LOSC, international commissions such as the
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, later the North
Atlantic Fishery Organization (NAFO), grappled with this problem. In the light
of the LOSC, Gulland (1980) and Caddy (1982) outlined the process of negotiating
allocations of fishery resources, including the variety of criteria that could
be applied.

ICCAT practice has been to allocate the total allowable catch
in quotas based solely on historical catches. Certain ICCAT member countries
have sought to review the catch allocation criteria in order to recognize the
needs of developing fisheries, developing states and the sovereign rights of
coastal states. In 1998, ICCAT established the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Allocation Criteria to analyse and recommend revised criteria. During 1999,
three ICCAT members - Brazil, the European Union and the United States -
proposed sets of criteria, with other countries subsequently contributing
additions and modifications. Together, CARICOM countries reviewed the catch
allocation criteria proposed by the three ICCAT members and developed a position
paper that was submitted by Trinidad and Tobago to the ICCAT working group in
May 2001 (ICCAT, 2001a). The group concluded its discussions during a fourth
meeting held in November 2001.

The identification of the parties eligible to participate in
catch allocation negotiations should rely on simple qualifying criteria that
take access rights into account. For any particular sea area, therefore, coastal
states rights should naturally be given at least equal status to those of
high-seas distant water fleets, as prescribed by international agreements
(United Nations, 1983).

In its recently completed review of qualifying criteria
(ICCAT, 2001a), ICCAT has agreed to include cooperating non-member countries in
addition to ICCAT member countries as qualifying participants in its catch
allocation negotiations. ICCAT has also included another qualifying criterion -
the ability to conduct responsible fishing and scientific research.

Catch Allocation Criteria

Gulland (1980) and Caddy (1982) presented criteria that could
be used in quota allocations of shared resources, e.g. historical catches,
occurrence of spawning and nursery areas, occurrence of migration routes that
may make certain areas more suitable for fishing, and socio-economic criteria
such as investment in the fishery and impact on employment. These and other more
recent criteria can be broadly grouped as biological and conservation criteria
and socio-economic criteria. With increased awareness of the impact of fishing
on fishery resources and the development of international agreements for
conservation and management, a third category, responsibility criteria, has
emerged.

ICCATs recent review of catch allocation criteria
(ICCAT, 2001c) has grouped these into the following categories: (i) status of
the stocks and the fisheries concerned; (ii) past/ present fishing activity of
qualifying participants; (iii) status of the qualifying participants; and (iv)
contribution to compliance, data submission and scientific research. Category
(i) includes the biological and conservation criteria, categories (ii) and (iii)
address social and economic concerns, and category (iv) covers responsibility
criteria. We review these criteria below, together with their implications for
CARICOM states.

Biological and conservation criteria

Several criteria can be considered in this category, including
the status of the stock concerned, occurrence of critical habitats such as
spawning and nursery areas, the distribution of stock biomass in a
countrys EEZ (Caddy, 1982, 1987) and availability of suitable fishing
areas. ICCAT intends to address biological and conservation issues using the
following two criteria:

Status of the stock and the existing level of fishing
effort

This criterion is taken from the Fish Stocks Agreement and
addresses access to the fishery by new participants. The agreement also provides
for cooperation with developing states to facilitate their access to and
participation in high seas fisheries. Certain nations argue that additional
access to the fishery cannot be allowed when stocks are overexploited or are
being rebuilt, which would exclude CARICOM states from developing their large
pelagic fisheries. Alternatively, accommodation of new entrants, particularly
those of developing states, would require redistribution of existing total
allowable catch.

Distribution and biological characteristics of the stock,
including its occurrence in areas under national jurisdiction and on the high
seas

This criterion should include the consideration of critical
habitats, as well as the availability of suitable fishing areas. Coastal and
island states should be able to exercise their right to exploit resources
sustainably within their claimed EEZs. The proportion of the biomass of a stock
that occurs in the EEZ of a country can be the basis of a claim for an
allocation. This can be a complex issue if migratory routes and time spent in an
EEZ during migration are taken into consideration. Caddy (1982, 1987) has
developed models for various types of sharing based on migration. A quantitative
index that incorporates the size of the EEZ and the average known catch rate
within it could support CARICOM states needs for additional shares of the
resource.

Socio-economic criteria (relating to past/present
fishing activity and the status of qualifying participants)

These criteria attempt to reflect the value a country places
on the resource (Gulland, 1980). Interestingly, the recent review by ICCAT
splits socio-economic criteria into two categories: criteria relating to
past/present fishing activity and criteria relating to the status of qualifying
participants. These socio-economic criteria can help or hinder the interests of
developing CARICOM large pelagic fisheries.

Historical catches and historical use of the
resource

This criterion has featured prominently in negotiations for
allocations in several fora, notably NAFO and ICCAT. It has no rational basis
(Gulland, 1980) and is severely disadvantageous to CARICOM states. There is no
reason why any country should accept an inequitable distribution of the benefits
of a resource purely because it has been so in the past. Moreover, this
criterion is clearly linked to other, more pragmatic criteria such as
existing level of fishing effort and economic and/or social
importance of the fishery to habitual participants.

Nevertheless, the larger, developed ICCAT nations are
insistent on this criterion and have placed it in a separate category to retain
the emphasis on past fishing activities. The other criterion, in the same
category with historical catches, deals with present fishing activity in a weak,
qualitative manner by referring to a countrys fishing interests, patterns
and practices.

Interests of artisanal, subsistence and small-scale coastal
fisheries

The Fish Stocks Agreement and the Code of Conduct both
recognize the need to avoid adverse impact on and ensure access to fisheries by
persons involved in artisanal, subsistence and small-scale fishing. In
developing states such as those in CARICOM, these fisheries usually involve
significant portions of the population and promote food security and food
quality.

CARICOM fisheries are predominantly artisanal, small scale and
coastal. Owing to their complex, diverse nature, adequate statistical coverage
is often not possible. Thus total allowable catch levels should be set to
accommodate possible underreporting of catches by these fisheries. Moreover,
given their coastal nature, much of the catch may be young fish. Thus the
harvest of young fish by large-scale fisheries should be limited insofar as
possible in order to accommodate the special needs of artisanal, subsistence and
small-scale coastal fisheries.

Needs of coastal fishing communities

Coastal communities may be defined as local communities, in
coastal areas, that have traditional or cultural practices that make them highly
dependent on fishing and fish resources. As indicated above, artisanal and
small-scale coastal community fisheries are usually limited in their capacity
and options for change. The Code of Conduct and the Fish Stocks Agreement make
clear provisions for the needs of these communities.

Needs and sovereign rights of coastal states

The LOSC clearly recognizes the sovereign rights of coastal
states for the purpose of exploring and exploiting all the natural resources
found in their EEZs, and also notes that the right to fish on the high seas is
subject, inter alia, to the rights, duties and interests of coastal states. The
Fish Stocks Agreement also addresses the rights and needs of coastal states,
particularly the issues of cooperation and shared access.

Needs of developing states

Access to fish resources can contribute significantly to
poverty alleviation and basic food security - and thus to social and economic
stability. In the case of small-island and coastal developing states, access to
fish resources is a natural and essential part of their culture and development.
The Fish Stocks Agreement makes specific provisions for addressing the special
needs of developing states, including the need to accommodate socioeconomic
expansion and economic diversification and thus ensure comparable initial
development opportunities.

Economic and/or social importance of the fishery to
habitual participants. Impact on the current fishing industry

Like the historical catches criterion, this criterion supports
historical fisheries to the disadvantage of CARICOM states. It is therefore
simply a rephrasing of that criterion. Despite this, certain ICCAT nations have
argued strongly for its retention in this second format. Since many stocks are
already overfished, a criterion that seeks to protect excessive capacity and
overcapitalization would appear invalid. In view of this, its reiteration in the
form of a second criterion is clearly illogical.

Contribution of the fishery to national food-security
needs, consumption, export revenue and employment

This criterion, although accepted by ICCAT, appears to have
elements already addressed by other criteria such as economic and/or
social importance of the fishery, historical catches and
needs of developing states, including food security. Depending on
the nature of the fishery, the same catch may be taken with different levels of
employment. Arguments that favour the distribution of social benefits among a
larger number of persons, particularly in countries with low per capita income,
would be a component of the special needs of developing countries.

Responsibility criteria

These criteria, addressing adherence to conservation measures
and participation in the management process, provide direct benefit to countries
that fish responsibly. ICCAT intends to apply three responsibility criteria: (i)
contribution to conservation and management, accurate statistics and research;
(ii) exercise of responsibilities concerning vessels; and (iii) record of
compliance.

Criterion (i) appropriately rewards countries that comply with
agreed conservation and management measures and that contribute accurate
statistics and research. However, in measuring the respective contribution and
cooperation of states, differences in available management resources between
developed and developing states must be taken into account. Furthermore, it is
well accepted that enforcement of regulations is virtually impossible for widely
dispersed, small-scale fisheries that sell much of their catch locally (Berkes
et al., 2001). Applying this criterion to states that have predominantly
small-scale fisheries would place them at an immediate disadvantage that would
be virtually unaddressable. It would favour large-scale commercial fisheries,
when it is well accepted that small-scale fisheries are more efficient and
result in greater social distribution of the benefits derived from the resource
(Berkes et al., 2001).

Criterion (ii) is clear in its reference to flag-state
responsibilities prescribed by international agreements.

Criterion (iii) appears to capture the same ideas as criteria
(i) and (ii), except that it is specific in addressing compliance with ICCAT
conservation and management measures. Depending on its interpretation and
application, however, this criterion may extend the emphasis in favour of
historical fisheries, leaving new entrants comparatively empty-handed.

[25] Mahon and Singh-Renton
(1999).[26] Singh-Renton, Mahon and
McConney (2003).[27] IOCARIBE is the
Sub-Commission for the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions of the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC).