Tuesday, 8 September 2015

The EU's high water mark

One
of the great claims of the EU is the number of countries queuing up to
join. Amongst those being the states in the Western Balkans. Yet, even
here, the process of enlargement has stalled. I found a synopsis of "local experts" assessment on the state of EU influence. It doesn't look good.

"Local experts" argued that the EU
is basically acting on policy autopilot, with an overwhelming focus on
process (e.g. benchmark decision-making) and less on substance (e.g.
actual progress on deep democratisation and good governance). The EU’s
own internal struggles and negative politics with its Grexit and Brexits,
together with the political chill resulting from the enlargement
fatigue, have contributed to its losing leverage in the Western Balkans.
In turn, elites are often not keen on passing reforms which are
threatening their power interests or remain comfortable in spoiler
politics. In these circumstances, the costs and benefits of a distant EU
prospect are reassessed when set against the more tangible benefits
offered by other strategic actors.

You don't have to
be a "local expert" for that to ring true. We see the same dynamic
repeated in spades in Ukraine. We see token face saving efforts that
stop short of any real reform in order to avoid upsetting the applecart,
knowing that any serious and invasive reform may unsettle a fragile
equilibrium. Consequently the Ukrainian parliament is still in hoc to
the Russian oligarchs and politically the EU has reached a stalemate.

In Ukraine the EU will still take advantage of what it can where it
can, moving in to grab whatever is still available but having reached a
state of diplomatic and political paralysis, Russia is now free to act
as it chooses, and further EU integration seems implausible now.

The situation in the Balkans seems eerily familiar. The EU is adept at managing perceptions so the recent agreement in the Balkans will be held aloft as a great EU
victory, and the self-congratulatory bubble will take that point home with them, but
underneath how it works in practice is very different. Where the outer rim of the EU is concerned, agreements are merely words on a page.

Across
the Balkans the feeling is that the EU has made many promises but has
failed to deliver, leaving them to look elsewhere. Certainly while the
EU diplomats congratulate themselves the military exercises between
Russia and Serbia send the precise opposite signal. Having had Ukraine
snatched out of Russia's sphere of influence, Russia will be keen to
erode the EU's influence where it can. Thus the race is on for the soul
of the Balkans.

There are two ways this can go.
Either they will learn from the Ukraine experience or they won't. We
have seen no upper limit to the hubristic indulgences of the EU and even
though it has a full plate of woes within, and it's diplomatic
timetable is fully booked, that may not prove sufficient obstacle for
the EU not to make yet another pigs ear. The EU must have its empire and
that is that.

The
EU is keen to close the bridge to Greece, bringing Macedonia and Albania
further into the fold somehow. Why they would want any such obligations
I don't know, but if they do they will have to act soon. Serbia and the region is slipping out of the EU's sphere, and any expansion of the
neighbourhood policy will prove to be little more than an empty gesture.
It is limited in what it can do and EU promises in the region are a
weakened currency.

While all eyes are fixed on Brexit
and the possible emergence of a two tier Europe, there is that third tier
limbo to consider. It could be that while Britain is moved out to
associate status, the same will be extended to candidate states and all
point in between. It will be the EU's managed retreat. In terms of the
authority it can exercise, it will be a paper empire and as reality
intrudes the illusion will wear off. It will show the world that the EU
has reached its high water mark - and now the tide is receding. The
dream of "the colleagues" is fading.