Murder or warfare? The night attack at Loudoun Heights

Thinking back to my post about Abraham Sosey’s headstone and a comment made about “murder” (a thought-provoking comment considering the nature of guerilla warfare in the Civil War), I thought I’d post a little something I read in C. Armour Newcomer’s book about Cole’s Cavalry (Newcomer was a member of Co. D of Cole’s Cavalry). In the portion that covers the night attack at Loudoun Heights (where Sosey was killed), Newcomer wrote,

Colonel Mosby, their old antagonist, had captured the pickets; he and his followers, many of whom were natives of Loudoun County, had crossed the mountain and fell upon the camp, and then fired a volley into the tents where Cole’s men lay sleeping, many of them no doubt dreaming of their sweethearts and loved ones at home. No one who has not experienced a night attack from an enemy can form the slightest conception of the feelings of one awakened in the dead of night with the din of shots and yells coming from those thirsting for your blood. Each and every man in the attack, was an assassin. But we should remember that war means to kill; the soldier in the excitement of battle forgets what pity is, and nothing will satisfy his craving but blood.

Pretty intense talk, but as we can see, Mosby’s night attack, while considered by those who experienced it an “assassin’s” venture, was a part of the unconventional warfare with which they had grown familiar. I think Cole’s men had a rather good grasp of the more complex dynamics of partisan/guerilla warfare. As I mentioned in response to the comment, had the attack truly fallen outside the conduct of warfare (even the expectations for conduct in unconventional “border warfare,” as Newcomer puts it in another paragraph), I think Cole would have taken more severe measures in dealing with those that he captured, including Mosby’s brother, “Willie.”

From a stoic tactical perspective, I’d say that night attacks, although uncommon, were not unconventional. Military tacticians knew, as we do today, that biologically speaking the best time to attack a human being is under cover of night. That said, they also knew the most difficult time to organize any activity, biologically speaking, is at night! I could support a premise that more night operations occurred in the ACW than in the Revolution or War of 1812 (or Mexican War even). But night assaults were more prevalent by far in WWI and increased in WWII, for obvious reasons.

I would say compare the remarks above to those of US soldiers in WWI and early WWII describing night attacks. Not to imply I’ve done so directly, just suggesting it might make for a good case study. Some of the word choice in Newcomer’s narrative speaks from that natural human reservations of the night. Now I wouldn’t go as far to say Newcomer needed a nightlight by his bed, but it does sound as if he is speaking more from an internal fear than to any specific commission by the attackers.

Thanks, Craig. I think Newcomer gives a little more explanation in that same chapter about the attack and its impact when he says, more or less, that they went to sleep on 1/9/64 feeling rather “snug” (my word use, not his) with their pickets in place and in a rather good protective set-up. I think, in terms of the Civil War, night attacks were, as you say, uncommon, but I think it borders on unconventional (or outside the order of the “then” perception of conventional warfare). When Newcomer speaks about the attackers descending on the camp, firing into the tents, I think this might be considered unconventional for the time, or outside the “civilized” lines for even then. Wouldn’t there be a difference in defining conventionality even between the ACW and WW1? That said, however, it appears Cole’s men had grown, to some degree, accustomed to this brand of warfare. Though I don’t believe they did anything to this level, I do believe that they may have employed “unconventional tactics” as a partisan group when Lee moved toward Gettysburg. We’ll see, in time, if I can find anything to support that. Or maybe, it’s simply that, even for then, “unconventional” was actually the perfect word in the 19th century to describe partisan tactics?

I would say in regard to the attackers descending on the camp, firing into the tents … such sounds a lot like… well 1st day at Shiloh. And that was hardly unconventional or partisan warfare.

Basically I agree with your assessment that if there were indeed some violation of those accepted practices of war (as they existed at that time), then the captured Confederates would have been dealt with differently.

Yes, you have a point there regarding Shiloh. There is, however, another comment in the Newcomer book that leaves us some additional thoughts to chew on. Newcomer was in the group of men tasked with following-up on a report that a Confederate lieutenant (William Thomas Turner) lay wounded in a nearby house. When he found the report to be true, Newcomer realized he couldn’t move the man, because it was certain he was going to die. Nonetheless, according to Newcomer, the lieutenant thanked Newcomer for his kindness and said “he did not see how one of Cole’s men could be so kind to one of Mosby’s command, after trying to murder us in our beds.” Now, if Newcomer remembered this word for word, that’s quite interesting that the Confederate lieutenant considered this attack something akin to murder.

It’s also interesting to read Newcomer’s response (sounds like Jackson talking to Gregg in the post-Fredericksburg scene on Gods & Generals)… “I told him to think no more of worldly affairs, but turn his thoughts to heaven and ask forgiveness from God, the Great Father of us all.”

It’s more correct to say it “sounds like the mythology of Shiloh.” No one was killed in his tent, the Federals were in line, in front of their camps, waiting to receive the Confederate attack. I’m not saying there wasn’t an element of surprise, just that folks had time to get ready and deploy.

James, If this is the case, the application of “Shiloh myth” cannot be made to Loudoun Heights (I’ll freely admit here that I don’t even qualify as a western theatre buff). Cole’s men were hit at Loudoun Heights not at all expecting the attack.

James, I’d say the “myth of Shiloh” would be a good way to put it. I’d agree that my and large most Federals had a chance to deploy. The point I was making with the analogy is two fold – A) that the Confederates fully intended to surprise the Federals in their camps on April 6, 1862. and B) a significant number of the participants felt they were surprised in their camps. There is a similar memory construct here from which to draw parallels. Therefore, I would submit that a “surprise in the camp” tactic was not generally considered irregular by the combatants, and what we may be seeing here is the bias of the writer in the first hand account showing through.