Wednesday, October 30, 2013

September and October 2013 saw major maintenance work on
Iraq’s ports in Basra which account for the vast majority of the country’s oil
exports. That caused a decline in sales for September, but prices remained
high, and the flow through the southern pipeline was actually higher than
scheduled. At the same time two oil fields came on line, and there are
continued plans for a large expansion in production and exports by the end of
the year into 2014. Iraq’s petroleum industry is steadily moving forward, but not
at the tremendous rates originally predicted.

Repairs to Iraq’s two southern ports caused a large decline
in exports for September 2013. For that month the country exported an average
of 2.07 million barrels a day. That was down from 2.58 million barrels in
August, and the lowest amount since October 2011 when Iraq exported 2.08
million barrels. The maintenance work shut down two of Iraq’s four mooring points in Basra, and extended into mid-October. The construction was
supposed to increase capacity in the south. There was also a leak in the
pipeline system at the Rumaila oil field. All together that led the Basra
pipeline to only export 1.90 million barrels in September, down from 2.30
million in August. That was the lowest amount since February 2012’s 1.639
million barrels, but was higher than the Oil Ministry scheduled for the month,
which was 1.8 million. For the year, the south has exported an average of
2.171 million barrels. For the north, the Kirkuk line exported an average of
250,000 barrels a day in September, a decline from August’s 270,900, but still
better than June and July when the pipeline was beset by leaks and repair work
that kept exports below 200,000 for each month. In 2013 the Kirkuk line has
exported an average of 267,200 barrels. The Oil Ministry said it expected
higher exports in October to make up for the drop in September. So far 2013’s
exports have not grown from last year and stand at an average of 2.41 million
barrels for the last 21 months.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits
2011-2013

Month

Avg.

Exports

(Mil/

Bar/

Day)

Avg. Price Per Barrel

Revenue (Bill)

Jan. 11

2.16

$90.78

$6.082

Feb.

2.20

$98.44

$6.064

Mar.

2.15

$107.13

$7.167

Apr.

2.14

$114.26

$7.342

May

2.22

$108

$7.45

Jun.

2.27

$105.17

$7.173

Jul.

2.16

$108.79

$7.311

Aug.

2.18

$104.91

$7.124

Sep.

2.10

$104.89

$6.619

Oct.

2.08

$104.04

$6.742

Nov.

2.13

$106.59

$6.833

Dec.

2.14

$106.18

$7.061

2011 Avg.

2.16

$105.00

$6.913

Jan. 12

2.10

$109.08

$7.123

Feb.

2.01

$112.92

$6.595

Mar.

2.31

$117.99

$8.472

Apr.

2.50

$116.79

$8.795

May

2.45

$103.03

$7.831

Jun.

2.40

$90.09

$6.487

Jul.

2.51

$97.14

$7.577

Aug.

2.56

$106.22

$8.445

Sep.

2.59

$107.59

$8.371

Oct.

2.62

$105.51

$8.578

Nov.

2.62

$104.32

$8.200

Dec.

2.34

$103.72

$7.551

2012

Avg.

2.41

$106.20

$7.835

Jan. 13

2.35

$104.92

$7.672

Feb.

2.53

$107.66

$7.644

Mar.

2.41

$103.76

$7.772

Apr.

2.62

$98.70

$7.764

May

2.48

$97.23

$7.477

Jun.

2.33

$97.41

$6.799

Jul.

2.32

$101.00

$7.272

Aug.

2.58

$104.45

$8.356

Sep.

2.07

$104.84

$6.511

2013 Avg.

2.41

$102.21

$7.474

Oil
Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February
1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917
mil/bar/day

April 2.115
mil/bar/day

May 2.086
mil/bar/day

June 2.085
mil/bar/day

July 2.216
mil/bar/day

August
2.252 mil/bar/day

September
2.178 mil/bar/day

October
2.172 mil/bar/day

November
2.122 mil/bar/day

December
2.022 mil/bar/day

2012 Avg. 2.042 mil/bar/day

January
2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

February
2.196 mil/bar/day

March 2.1
mil/bar/day

April 2.31
mil/bar/day

May 2.19
mil/bar/day

June 2.13
mil/bar/day

July 2.32
mil/bar/day

August 2.30
mil/bar/day

September
1.90 mil/bar/day

2013 Avg. 2.171 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January
2012 393,500 bar/day

February
375,800 bar/day

March
400,000 bar/day

April
393,300 bar/day

May 364,500
bar/day

June
316,600 bar/day

July
300,000 bar/day

August
312,900 bar/day

September
420,000 bar/day

October
451,600 bar/day

November
426,600 bar/day

December
325,800 bar/day

2012 Avg. 373,300 bar/day

January
2013 264,500 bar/day

February
339,200 bar/day

March
316,100 bar/day

April
306,600 bar/day

May 283,800
bar/day

June
193,300 bar/day

July
180,600 bar/day

August
270,900 bar/day

September
250,000 bar/day

2013 Avg. 267,200 bar/day

Iraq’s revenues went down in September as well, although
prices remained high. For the month the nation earned $6.511 billion, which was
the lowest since June 2012 when it brought in $6.487. On the other hand, the
country continued to benefit from continued tensions in the Middle East. That
raised prices for Iraqi crude from $104.45 in August to $104.84 in September.
It seems like the value for Iraqi oil will remain high for at least the short
term, so profits will stay up despite September’s dip. For the year Iraq has
been averaging $7.474 billion a month, and sold its oil for $102.21 per barrel
despite three months when it fell below $100.

Iraq’s production has continued to go up. In September Shell
restarted pumping at the Majnoon field in Basra. It had been closed for
several months due to maintenance work. The company wants it to reach 175,000
barrels a day by October. Malaysia’s Petronas also started producing at Gharraf
in Dhi Qar province at 35,000 barrels a day. Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi told
the press that the goal is to reach 3.5 million barrels a day in output and
2.9 million in exports by the end of December. Asian countries such as
China and India will be driving demand for that increase into 2014. The problem
is overcoming the bottlenecks, maintenance work, and bad weather that
constantly plagues the petroleum industry. Several undersea pipelines in Basra
are corroding, which means they can’t operate at capacity. There has been
delays in building new storage tanks in Basra. There’s limited pumping capacity
at some fields. The Basra ports are often hit by bad weather that limits the
ability of ships to dock. The Oil Ministry needs to invest in a water injection
system to extract oil from the southern fields. The Kirkuk line is in even
worse shape, as it is old and corroding, plus it is often attacked by
insurgents. On September 17 and September 27 (1) the pipeline was bombed in
Ninewa. The Oil Ministry wants to address all of these issues, but the work
takes time. That’s the reason why exports have flat-lined since March 2012 when
two new mooring points were opened in Basra. Expansion will probably continue
to see slow progress despite Baghdad’s plans.

The maintenance on the Basra facilities caused a predicted
dip in exports and profits for the month of September. October is supposed to
see rates return to their previous levels. The oil industry is still at a
19-month plateau however. Much more work is needed to see another jump in
exports as happened at the beginning of 2012. That’s going to happen when the
new mooring points open in 2014. If history is anything exports will then level
off until the next major piece of infrastructure is installed. The business is
seeing steady growth, it’s just not at the pace predicted.

FOOTNOTES

1. Alsumaria,
“The bombing of carrier oil pipeline to Ceyhan Nineveh and found the bodies of
implementing,” 9/27/13

SOURCES

Alsumaria,
“The bombing of carrier oil pipeline to Ceyhan Nineveh and found the bodies of
implementing,” 9/27/13

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

For the fourth time since August 2013 hundreds of Iraqis
took to the streets to protest against the lavish pensions that the country’s
politicians receive. Again these demonstrations were seen in multiple cities.
Many praised a recent
Federal Supreme Court ruling that claimed to have ended pensions, but it turned
out that it only covered a few top parliamentarians. That meant the issue is
hardly resolved. Given the history of past protest movements however, the
current one is unlikely to achieve anything.

On October 26, 2013 there were marches against parliament’s
pensions in at least six cities. Hundreds were seen in Nasiriyah, Hillah,
Karbala, Najaf, Basra, and Baghdad. Unlike the previous three
demonstrations in August and earlier in October activists made it into central Baghdad. The police eventually cracked down on the participants however and drove them out along with attacking some members of the media as they had done previously. Many were celebrating a recent
Federal Supreme Court ruling that was supposed to end the pension system for
both former and current members of the legislature. Sadrist lawmaker Bahaa
Hussein Ali Kamal Araji brought the lawsuit. There were several reports in the
Iraq press however that claimed the court only abrogated parts of Law No. 50 of
2007 that covers the privileges of parliament. A Sadrist lawmaker told Al Rayy
that only the speaker and his deputies were affected. At the same time, the
court is supposed to issue additional opinions on the cabinet, the provincial
councils, and the district and local councils over the course of the next few weeks.
The courts may be the only way protesters can change anything. Parliament and
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised to deal with the issue in August, but
then failed to follow up on it. Iraq’s government has consistently proven to be
unresponsive to public demonstrations. It usually gives lip service to their
demands, and then uses the security forces to pressure them to stop.

Protesters in Baghdad’s Firdos Square Oct. 26, 2013

(AFP)

(AFP)

(AFP)

Once activists find out that the court case is not as
comprehensive as originally reported they will continue to call for
demonstrations. Maintaining momentum has always been an issue for these types
of organizations. Their numbers already appear to be falling off. Just three
weeks ago there were protests in 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. This time they came
out in less than half of that. The anti-pension protests may already be going
the route of the electricity and governance protests that occurred in previous
years. They caused a stir, but were ultimately not able to shake the elite into
any meaningful action.

SOURCES

Habib, Mustafa, “why iraqi MPs can never pass a law, and why
it may endanger 2014 elections,” Niqash, 10/24/13

Iraq Times, “Demonstrations in several Iraqi cities to
celebrate cancel the salaries of deputies pensions,” 10/26/13

Monday, October 28, 2013

In October 2013 a new study was released in the PLOS
Medicine journal estimating the number of deaths following the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. It attempted to avoid and make up for some of the criticism of previous
surveys that looked at fatalities in the country. These included the 2004 and
2006 Lancet papers, the 2004 Iraq Living Conditions Survey, the 2007 Opinion
Business Research (ORB) poll, and the 2008 Iraq Family Health Survey. The new
report estimated 460,000 excess deaths occurred after the fall of Saddam
Hussein. It didn’t give a figure for all violent deaths, but did say that for
adults aged 15-60 132,000 died because of violence from 2003-2011, which is
very similar to Iraq Body Count and figures recorded by the U.S. military. The
Iraqi Family Health Survey and the Iraq Living Conditions were both within the
range of the new one as well, while the two Lancet reports and the ORB
questionnaire were far outside of it. While no survey can be authoritative the
new PLOS one at least confirms that a few of the earlier estimates were
capturing some of the death and destruction released by the Iraq War, while
largely repudiating the Lancet articles.

The PLOS paper set out to avoid some of the criticism laid
at previous Iraq death surveys on Iraq, and wanted a new up to date estimate
since the last one was done in 2007. The new report questioned 2,000 randomly
selected households in 100 clusters across the country. It used a random
selection process to generate which clusters were to be surveyed. It then
picked one house as the starting point, and then interviewed that one plus 19
adjacent ones. It wanted to use double the number of clusters as the 2004 and
2006 Lancet studies and a more sophisticated random selection process to reduce
the chance of missing high and low conflict related death areas. This was due
to one critique leveled at the two Lancet articles called the “main street bias.” That argued that pollsters went to main streets and then polled the
cross streets, which had the highest chance of violence
occurring, and thus led to high death estimates. The Lancet papers were questioned
about how exactly they went about deciding what areas were to be surveyed as
well.

To prepare for the survey the team met in Kurdistan in March
2011 to go over procedures, then trained the survey teams, which were made up
of Iraqi medical doctors with experience in polling. The groups set out across
the country from May to July, and then everyone reconvened in September to go
over the preliminary findings. Households were questioned about all the births
and deaths they experienced since 2001. When a passing was reported a death
certificate was requested. Those were produced 74% of the time, and a
certificate was reported but not seen 17% of the time. For war related
fatalities specific causes and who was responsible were asked for. Adults were
then queried about their siblings’ experiences. That resulted in data for
another 24,759 people. A supervisor then went to one randomly selected
household in each cluster to repeat the survey as a quality check. In the end
there was a 98.55% response rate among the 2,000 households. Training and
supervision are important facets to conducting a scientific survey. The fact
that violence had decreased considerably by 2011 when the poll was conducted
also meant that there was access to almost every part of the country. Only five
out of the 2,000 households for example could not be questioned because of
threatening or hostile behavior. Raising questions about siblings also greatly increased
the available data that could be analyzed.

Another part of the study was an attempt to account for
Iraq’s displaced and refugee population. The group consulted secondary sources
to estimate how many refugees there were. A number of calculations were then
made with that figure to come up with a number of deaths amongst refugees. The
authors knew that they missed many possible excess deaths amongst this group,
which was one shortcoming they acknowledged in their findings. At the same time
a large number of Iraqis have returned to their homes or have settled in new
parts of the country since violence subsided in 2008, so the poll might have
captured more of this group then they believed.

To come up with their findings they broke up their data by time
periods. They estimated a crude death rate by counting the number of deaths in
all households in each time period, and then divided that by the number of
persons and years they lived within those eras. The baseline crude death rate
was set for the period before the war from 2001 to March 2003. To calculate the
war time deaths they used the differences between the crude death rate for each
time period and the crude death rate for the pre-war era. For the siblings data
they knew there were biases and tried to adjust for that. Another issue was
that households might not have been able to remember everything accurately
since they had to recall events from several years ago.

The final results found almost half a million deaths since
2003. The pre-war crude death rate from 2001 to 2003 was 2.89 per 1,000. The
wartime rate was 4.55 per 1,000 from March 1 2003 to June 30, 2011. By
multiplying those rates by the estimated population they came up with
approximately 405,000 excess deaths with a range of 48,000 to 751,000 after
2003. Another 55,000 fatalities were estimated for the refugees for a total of
460,000 deaths in the post-invasion period. A total number for violent deaths
was not given, but a rate for adults aged 15-60 was estimated at 132,000 during
the war. Overall, the author’s believed that 60% of the excess deaths were a
direct result of the war. The other 40% came from the collapse of
infrastructure and services that occurred after the invasion. Like previous
surveys a major problem with calculating crude death rates was that Iraq lacks
up to date census data. That means those figures could go up and down depending
upon how many people tne report believed the country had.

The survey found a range of causes for the deaths. Amongst
violent ones gunshots not bombs was the most common at 63%, followed by car
bombs, 12%, other explosions, 9%, other war injuries, 9%, and airstrikes, 7%.
Those most responsible were Coalition Forces, 35%, militias and insurgents,
32%, others/unknown, 21%, criminals, 11%, and Iraqi forces, 1%. For nonviolent
deaths cardiovascular conditions were at 47%, then infant or childhood
deaths/injuries, 12%, and chronic illness and non-war injuries were both at
11%. The prevalence of shootings showed how bloody the civil war period was.
The deadliest period for Iraqis was from 2005-2007 when Baghdad and its
environs were the center of the fighting. There, militias and insurgents were
fighting for control of communities block by block. Bombings might have grabbed
the headlines, but the sectarian war was at the street level involving assault
rifles, pistols, and machine guns. That was also shown in the fact that the
militias and insurgents were responsible for almost as many deaths as the
Coalition, which fought pitched battles such as the two for Fallujah, the three
against the Mahdi Army, as well as various other major campaigns. The
non-violent deaths were blamed on the war as well by the authors. They wrote
that the collapse of infrastructure and essential services like electricity and
clean water were a result of the invasion and its aftermath.

(Daily Beast)

(Daily Beast)

There have been five previous surveys in Iraq trying to
estimate the number of deaths since 2003. Only two dealt with violent
casualties, while the other three looked at all possible fatalities. The
reports found wide differences in mortality rates, and all came in for some
sort of criticism such as potential bias in sampling, wide ranges of
uncertainty intervals, small sample sizes, disputes over statistical methods,
choice of population figures, incomplete questioning, and plausibility of
results. The new PLOS Medicine paper did a comparison of crude death rates per
1,000 with some of the previous reports. The 2004 and 2006 Lancet polls were in
the upper range of the PLOS pre-war rates, and far above it for the wartime
period. The 2004 Lancet had a pre-war mortality rate of 5.0 per 1,000 from
2002-2003 and 12.3 per 1,000 from 2003-2004, while the 2006 one recorded
5.5 per 1,000 from 2002-2003 going up to 13.3 from 2003-2006. That compared
to the PLOS’s 2.89 per 1,000 from 2001-2003 and 4.5 per 1,000 from 2003-2011.
Another outlier was the 2007 Opinion Research Business poll that estimated a
violent death rate of 10.3 per 1,000 in 15 of 18 provinces from 2003-2006. The
Iraq Living Conditions Survey and the Iraq Family Health Survey on the other
hand were both within the range of the new survey’s pre and post invasion
rates. The Iraq Family Health Survey for instance reported 5.31 deaths per
1,000 from 2003-2006. Those similarities and differences were even starker
when comparing estimated death counts. The 2004 Iraq Living Conditions survey
estimated 24,000 deaths from 2003-2004. The first Lancet covered the same
time period, and was four times higher at 98,000 killed from 2003-2004. That
did not include Anbar, so the authors believed the total figure was much larger.
The Iraq Family Health Survey released in 2008 calculated 151,000 deaths from
2003-2006. The second Lancet paper was for the same years and was more than
four times that at 654,965. Even farther apart from all the rest was the
Opinion Reach Business survey that estimated 1,033,000 deaths from 2003-2007. The PLOS report calculated figures for eight years, and found 460,000
fatalities. Its authors came up with three hypotheses for why their numbers
were different than the others. Those were sampling differences, recall bias,
and non-sampling errors. PLOS used different sampling methods from the two
Lancet and Iraqi Family Health surveys. The Iraq Family Health Survey also
skipped 115 of its clusters for security reasons and consulted Iraq Body Count
to calculate how any deaths might have occurred in those areas. Finally, households were asked to recall events about
themselves going back ten years, but also for their siblings in the newest
poll, which probably led to underreporting of deaths as some were missed. The
PLOS team also believed they missed many deaths from the refugee and displaced
populations. Although the new report compared itself to the five previous ones,
it seemed like it was going out of its way to avoid many of the criticisms laid
at the Lancet articles. Although still widely accepted, the Lancet estimates
for deaths have faced intense criticism by academics. Many thought the 2004
and 2006 papers came up with far too high estimates. The new survey is just
one more piece of evidence that those two polls were off the mark. In
comparison, the Iraq Living Conditions and Iraq Family Health Survey appear to
be more on point.

Comparison Of
Pre-Iraq War Crude Death Rates

PLOS Medicine 2.89 per 1,000 2001-2003

2004 Lancet 5.0 per 1,000 2002-2003

2006 Lancet 5.5 per 1,000 2002-2003

Comparison Of
Post-Invasion Crude Death Rates

PLOS Medicine 4.5 per 1,000 2003-2011

Iraq Family Health Survey 5.31 per 1,000 2003-2006

Opinion Research Business 10.3 per 1,000 2003-2006

2004 Lancet 12.3 per 1,000 2003-2004

2006 Lancet 13.3 per 1,000 2003-2006

Comparison Of
Estimated Deaths

Iraq Living Conditions 24,000 2003-2004

2004 Lancet 98,000 2003-2004

Iraq Family Health Survey 151,000 2003-2006

2006 Lancet 654,965 2003-2006

Opinion Research Business 1,033,000 2003-2007

PLOS Medicine 460,000 2003-2011

Chart shows that the Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) was within the middle of the range of the crude death rate in the new PLOS survey while the 2004 Lancet (Roberts 2004) and 2006 Lancet (Burnham 2006) were at the top in their pre-war crude death rate prediction, and far outside of the range of the wartime estimated rate (PLOS Medicine)

The new survey has received a large amount of press as well
as received critiques and gained supporters. John Tirman who commissioned the
Lancet study wrote that people that criticized that report were doing a
disservice by trying to play down the number of people killed by the Iraq War. He pointed to the PLOS paper as more evidence of the high cost of the U.S.
invasion. Tom Paulson in Humanosphere claimed that the new survey verified the
2006 Lancet paper. Those two ignored the fact that both the Lancet crude
death rate estimates were outside the range of the new survey, and that 460,000
killed over eight years is not close to the second Lancet’s 654,000 over just
three. Josh Dougherty an analyst for Iraq Body Count and University of London
Economics Professor Michael Spagat both pointed that out. Dougherty noted that
the PLOS survey only found 76 violent deaths from 2003-2006 compared to 300 by
the 2006 Lancet. He also estimated that if the new report was limited to
just the 2nd Lancet period it would come up with less than 200,000
deaths, more than three times lower. Spagat critiqued the wide confidence
interval in the new survey of 48,000-751,000 stating that probably made their
estimated 460,000 killed too high rather than too low as the authors have repeatedly said to the media. Joshua Keating in Slate and John Rentoul in the Independent each argued that the PLOS report is roughly
congruent to Iraq Body Count and the U.S. military’s figures released by
Wikileaks of 100,000-126,000 killed. Finally Dr. Prabhat Jha of the Center for
Global Health Research in Toronto was quoted in the Los Angeles Times pointing
out that the lack of an accurate census for Iraq could mean that the estimated
number of deaths could be lower if the population was higher than the 32
million used in the survey’s calculations. With one of the fastest growing
populaces in the Middle East and North Africa there’s a good chance of that.
Overall, those that have used the PLOS paper to support Lancet have not read
the new report. It is more of a refutation of the 2004 and 2006 Lancets than a
confirmation. There’s a chance that the estimated deaths from the new report
are actually lower, which would make it even farther away from the two Lancets.

The PLOS Medicine article adds another important piece to
the argument over how many Iraqis died after the 2003 invasion. First, it is
another paper that shows that the two Lancet reports were far too high in their
estimates for deaths following the fall of Saddam Hussein. That was previously
shown with the Iraq Living Conditions, the Iraq Family Health Survey, and
various academic criticisms. Second, it shows that Iraq Body Count’s
method of recording deaths using media reports while not perfect does a very
good job as its estimate for violent deaths is very close to the PLOS one for
adults. Finally, it highlights just how deadly the sectarian war was in Iraq.
Today bombings by Al Qaeda in Iraq are causing the majority of fatalities in
the country’s deteriorating security situation. If shootings were to suddenly
increase that would be a good sign that a civil war is breaking out again as
insurgents, militias, and the security forces battle for control. In a war,
especially like the one in Iraq where the government broke down for a few years
a definitive number for fatalities will never be determined. It’s only through
various surveys and studies that a rough estimate can be made. The PLOS report
adds to this very important debate on the human cost of the Iraq invasion.

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com