Original: «To me the entire uselessness of such rules as practical guides lies in the inherent vagueness of the word "reasonable," the absolute impossibility of finding a definite standard, to be expressed in language, for the fairness and the reason of mankind, even of Judges. The reason and fairness of one man is manifestly no rule for the reason and fairness of another, and it is an awkward, but as far as I see, an inevitable consequence of the rule, that in every case where the decision of a Judge is overruled, who does or does not stop a case on the ground that there is, or is not, reasonable evidence for reasonable |men, those who overrule him say, by implication, that in the case before them, the Judge who is overruled is out of the pale of reasonable men.»

Original: «I for one would never be a party, unless the law were clear, to saying to any man who put forward his views on those most sacred things, that he should be branded as apparently criminal because he differed from the majority of mankind in his religious views or convictions on the subject of religion. If that were so, we should get into ages and times which, thank God, we do not live in, when people were put to death for opinions and beliefs which now almost all of us believe to be true.»

↑The Law Reports: House of Lords, and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and peerage cases, Volumen 3. Contribuidores Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords, Great Britain. Privy Council. Judicial Committee, Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales. Editor Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales, 1878. Procedencia del original: Biblioteca Pública de Nueva York. Digitalizado 21 enero 2016. p. 1197.