The Changjin Journal is designed to disseminate and solicit information
on the Chosin campaign. Comments and brief essays are invited. Subject
matter will be limited to history of the Chosin campaign, as well as
past or present interpretation of that history. See End Notes for
distribution and other notices.

Colonel George A. Rasula, USA-Ret., Chosin Historian

Byron Sims, Contributing Editor

IN THIS ISSUE we
continue the 2006 series of the Changjin Journal addressing the Chosin
Campaign from the viewpoint of Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division.
We use his Aide-Memoire as a basis, providing the reader with copies of
his memoire within which we will offer comments from various sources
that relate to the topic at hand. In the last issue (CJ 03.31.06) we
covered the advance of RCT-7 from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri where they
experienced the “first impact of extreme cold weather on personnel of
the division,” 6learning also that the weather and environment was
affecting helicopter operations. In this issue we note the pressure upon
Smith to hasten his advance to the Yalu River followed by the movement
of RCT-7 from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri, followed by OpO 21-50 which orders
RCT-5 to move into positions on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir.

Sections (…) and page
numbers […] will be included for reference purposes.
Bold typeface will be used for emphasis, with editor’s
comments in [brackets].
Readers are reminded that these documents were not written at the time
of the action, but finalized after Maj. Gen. Smith left Korea. His
primary sources were unit reports and briefings by commanders and staff,
and his own personal diary. However, they do reflect his view of what
happened, as well as how he wished them to be remembered.

OPS 581-585

(223) Renewed
Pressure to Advance to the Yalu River

On 11 November, Lt. Col. Watters, the Marine Liaison Officer to Corps
headquarters, informed me that our objective was again the Yalu River.
Although the previous orders had not been changed, after the reverses of
the 8th Army in the west
and our encounter with the Chinese at Sudong, the pressure by the Corps
for a rapid advance to the north had not been urgent. Now that the
situation in the west had been improved, the Corps was again anxious to
resume the advance. Apparently the Chinese we had met were discounted as
volunteers sent in to encourage the North Koreans and it was assumed
that more would not follow. [The
source of this assumption is not stated nor known.—GAR] The
Corps apparently was still thinking in terms of driving the remnants of
the defeated North Korean Army to the northern border of Korea before
winter set in. Unknown to us, at this very moment, the Chinese were
beginning to cross the Yalu River in massive numbers. The Chinese we had
met were a delaying force sent south to delay our advance and permit the
main body of the Chinese forces to get deep into North Korea before
meeting us.

[Note here that General Smith is addressing the
problem after the fact, again emphasizing the fact that this
Aide-Memoire was written long after the Chosin campaign, therefore not
providing the reader with his feelings on 11 November regarding his
mission and how he saw the enemy to his immediate front.—GAR]

The new orders left us in our previously assigned zone, but the zone was
widened at the Yalu River to about 40 miles so that we
might approach the Yalu River by two roads, one ending at Huch’anggangu
in the west and the other at Singalp’ajin in the east. Behind this final
objective was a long, tortuous MSR. That part of the MSR north of
Chinhung-ni was subject to being blocked by snowdrifts during the
winter. It was approximately 150 road miles from Chinhung-ni to the
border. I had continually pointed out to the Corps Commander that our
advance had left our western flank wide open. The Division was the left
flank division of the Corps and from Koto-ri, where RCT-7 then was, to
the right flank of the 8th Army was 70 air miles to the
southeast. The Corps’ attitude regarding the open flank was that there
were no enemy troops on that flank.

[Was this the attitude of the Corps (commander) or a
statement of fact? Of note in this paragraph about pressure is the
potential enemy to his front, and how the terrain could favor that
enemy.—GAR]

(224) Provisions of X
Corps OpOrder No. 6 of 11 November

X Corps OpO 6 issued at 2400, 11 November, reiterated in more detail the
instructions for units of the X Corps to advance to the northern border
of Korea. Instructions to the principal components of the X corps were
as follows:

(a) I ROK Corps,
employing the ROK Capitol Division and one regiment of the 3d ROK
Division, to operate from the line Chuch’onhujang – Hapsu and destroy
enemy in zone. . . . to maintain the 3d ROK Division (less two
regiments) in the Sinp’o area (22 miles east of Hungnam)
as Corps Reserve and to coordinate with the 7th Infantry Division in
clearing the area of guerrillas.

(b) 1st
Marine Division to advance to the north and destroy enemy in zone. To be
prepared, also, for offensive operations to the west on the Hamhung –
Sach’ang-ni axis. . . . to establish blocking positions at Huksu-ri and
at Yudam-ni (14 miles northwest of Hagaru-ri on the
western arm of the Chosin Reservoir).

[At this time, Yudam-ni was on the boundary line
between X Corps and Eighth Army.—GAR]

(c) 3d Infantry Division
to relieve elements of the 1st Marine division in zone by
2400, 12 November, provide for the security of the Wonsan area, and
destroy enemy in zone. To establish blocking positions to protect the X
Corps’ left flank … to be prepared for offensive operations to the west
… to provide one infantry battalion as Corps’ Reserve at Hamhung.

(d) 7th Infantry
Division to advance north, destroy enemy in zone and be prepared to move
one RCT to an assembly area west of Hamhung as Corps Reserve, on order.

(e) 26th ROK Regiment,
under operational control of the 3d Division, to destroy enemy in zone.

This operation order did in some measure reduce the dispersion of the 1st Marine Division.
By its terms RCT-1 was relieved in the Wonsan area and moved 70 miles
north to the vicinity of Chigyong. At the same time, however, in
accordance with the order, it was necessary to give to RCT-1 the mission
of occupying a blocking position at Huksu-ri, 32 miles northwest of
Chigyong and of being prepared to attack to the west on the Chigyong –
Huksu-ri – Sachang-ni axis. While RCT-1 was occupied in this area, the
Division was required to continue the advance via the Chosin Reservoir
to the Manchurian border [in zone], detaching a force to move
northwest from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni to occupy a blocking position
thereat. The zone of action of the division was widened south of the
Yalu River to include the road running north to the border from Changjin
as well as the road leading northeast from Changjin to the border.

The boundary of the 3d Division had been moved north to include
Chigyong, but did not include Huksu-ri, where we were required to
establish a blocking position. To reach Huksu-ri it was necessary to
pass through Chigyong.

[585]

OPS 589-591

(228) Advance of
RCT-7 from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri

At 2130, 12 November, the Division issued a fragmentary order, referring
to 1MarDiv OpO 20-50, which directed that RCT-7 continue the advance,
seizing the Hagaru-ri area and destroying enemy in zone, at the same
time continuing the protection of Koto-ri. RCT-5 was ordered to be
prepared to move one battalion to Koto-ri, on order, to relieve elements
of RCT-7.

At 0830, 13 November, 2/7 Marines moved toward the assigned objective of
RCT-7, the town of Hagaru-ri. Following the method employed in the
advance from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri, the battalion, reinforced by a
battery of artillery, advanced astride the road and valley, sweeping the
high ground immediately flanking the valley. The objectives assigned 2/7
were Hill 1678 west of the road and Hill 1182 east of the road, both
about 3 miles north of Koto-ri. The objectives were seized
without serious opposition and patrolling was initiated. South of the
objective a small enemy force was encountered which withdrew when struck
by artillery and aircraft. The remainder of the RCT shrunk the perimeter
around Koto-ri and patrolled the area.

1MarDiv OpO 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November, confirmed the frag
orders issued earlier to seize Hagaru-ri, and in addition, provided for
RCT-5 to pass through RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri and continue the advance to the
north, while RCT-7 occupied a blocking position at Yudam-ni,
14 miles to the northwest.

[The question arising at this point is why Smith
ordered an entire RCT to Yudam-ni when, in fact, he was ordered to
establish a “blocking position” which in no way required such a large
force. On this day, 13 November, there were no indications that the X
Corps left flank boundary was to be changed, nor that the Corps was to
attack in any direction other than north.]

On 14 November the 2/7 moved forward from its positions on Hills 1678
and 1182 and occupied Hagaru-ri by 1300 without opposition. Subzero
temperatures (minus 4 F.), snow and high winds caused
considerable discomfort to the troops with resulting frostbite
casualties. All roads into the town were open except for minor obstacles
which required bulldozer clearance. Natives in the town stated that the
Chinese Communists had evacuated the town 3 days prior and had moved to
the north and west. RCT-7 consolidated its positions for the night with
the 2/7 on the high ground in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri, the 1/7 on
Hills 1162 and 1278 (astride the road 2 miles southeast of Hagaru-ri),
and the 3/7 (less G company) still guarding the installations at
Koto-ri. The Regimental [RCT-7] CP, protected by G Company was at
TA5565C (1 ½ miles south of the 1st
Battalion’s positions).

During the day of 15 November RCT-7 closed into Hagaru-ri. Temperatures
continued to be low, dropping to 15 below zero F. The 3/7, after being
relieved by the 2/5 at Koto-ri, moved by motor shuttle to Hagaru-ri and
was positioned to protect the northeastern approaches to Hagaru-ri. The
1/7 protected the northwestern approaches to the village, and the
2/7 was established defensively on the high ground south of the village
to protect the southern approaches. Patrolling was instituted. A patrol
from 2/7 reconnoitered Pokko-chi (2 miles north of
Hagaru-ri) and Poktong-ni (2 miles east of Hagaru-ri. No enemy was
encountered by the patrols, but the patrol to Pokko-chi did find an
abandoned artillery piece which was destroyed. General Craig spent the
day of the 15th
visiting RCT-7.

[591]

OPS 592-594

(229) Provisions of
1MarDiv OpO 21-50 of 13 November

1MarDiv OpO 21-50 issued at 2000, 13 November, confirmed various
Fragmentary Orders and provided for the continuation of the advance
toward the Manchurian border as well as the movement of RCT-1 from the
Wonsan area to the Chigyong area. The tasks assigned the principal
subordinate units of the Division were as follows:

RCT-1 to move through
the 3d Division zone from vicinity of Chigyong, seize Objective 1
(Huksu-ri), and patrol west in zone to the Corps boundary, destroying
enemy encountered.

RCT-7 to seize and
secure Objective 2 (Hagaru-ri), and, on order, seize Objective 3
(Yudam-ni) and to patrol to destroy enemy in zone.

RCT-5 to protect the MSR
from positions at Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni, and Majon-dong, prepared to pass
through RCT-7 in the vicinity of Objective 2 (Hagaru-ri)
and advance to the north on Changjin (40 miles north of Hagaru-ri).

Division Recon Company
to screen the right flank of the Division by operating in the Soyang-ni
– Sinhung Valley to the Division boundary (east). [Since General Smith’s concern had been his open left
flank, we wonder today why he used his Recon Company on the right flank
where the 7th Infantry
Division was located; General Barr’s RCT-31 was already operating in the
area of the Fusen Reservoir.—GAR]

B Company, reinforced, 1st Tank Battalion
to provide local security for the Yonpo airfield until relieved by a
designated element of X Corps troops.

11th Marines,
reinforced, less detachments, maintain the 4/11, less detachments, in
position in the vicinity of Majon-dong, prepared for emplyment to the
north, on order.

1st Tank Battalion,
reinforced, less detachments, to move the Headquarters and Service
Companies, less tracked vehicles, to the vicinity of Soyang-ni, and move
the remainder of the battalion to an assembly area in the vicinity of
the LST loading area at Wonsan, prepared to move to Soyang-ni by water
and road, on order.

1st Engineer
Battalion, less detachments, to support Division operations with
emphasis on the Division MSR.

VMO-6 to support
Division operations.

1st Amphibious
Tractor Battalion, reinforced, to provide train and convoy guards as
directed by the CO, 1st
Combat Service Group.

Subparagraph (xº of the
order contained the following miscellaneous provisions:

Responsibility for the
coordination between zones, south to north.

In emergencies requiring
defense of critical points, all division units in zone were to be under
the operational control of the Regimental Commander responsible for
combat operations in that zone.

Patrol reports were to
be submitted to Division Hq daily at 2100 hours.

Results planned for the
next 24 hours. (These instructions were the result of Corps orders. The
Corps was not dissatisfied with the patrolling of the 1st MarDiv but was
dissatisfied with that of the Army units. The overlays showing patrol
routes were published in Corps orders. In view of the extensive
character of the patrolling by the 1MarDiv the preparation of these
overlays was quite a chore. Apparently the Corps desired to shame other
units of the Corps into more active patrolling by setting forth the
extensive patrolling conducted by the 1st Marine Division.) [Since
“apparently” is not a statement of fact, we wonder why General Smith
included this in his Aide-Memoire.—GAR]

Tanks were to be moved
forward of Majon-dong only on Division order. (This provision was
inserted in order to insure that tanks would not be move up the mountain
until the Division Engineers could guarantee the road as passable for
tanks.)

X Corps OpO 6 of 11 November directed the 1MarDiv to establish a
blocking position at Yudam-ni. It will be noted that 1Mardiv OpO 21-50
of 13 November directed RCT-7 to seize Yudam-ni, onorder.
By verbal instructions of the Division Commander, RCT-7 was directed to
occupy a blocking position at the pass or east of the pass between
Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni until such time as additional units of the
division could be moved to the Chosin Reservoir area. At this time the
total separation of the infantry battalions of the Division amounted to
163 miles. The Division did not share the feeling of the Corps that
there was no enemy and that the dispersion was justified.

Fifty-year hindsight
draws our attention to the last sentence of the above paragraph in which
General Smith mentions the enemy while directing the reader’s attention
to X Corps. We continue to wonder what his plans were to find the enemy
that motivates his feeling.
Where are the Chinese? No deep recon has been sent north to force the
enemy to disclose its positions. Readers are reminded that the Aide-Memoire
was written after the Chosin campaign.