Three
employees from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Jagna,
Bohol were found by the Ombudsman to have perpetrated a scheme to defraud the
government of proper motor vehicle registration fees. They now seek in the
present consolidated petitions a judgment from this Court annulling the January
18, 2006 Decision1 and September 21, 2007 Resolution2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the Decision3
of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas dismissing
them from government service.

The
facts follow:

On
September 4, 2001, the Philippine Star News, a local newspaper in Cebu City,
reported that employees of the LTO in Jagna, Bohol,
are shortchanging the government by tampering with their income reports.4
Accordingly, Regional Director Ildefonso T. Deloria
of the Commission on Audit (COA) directed State Auditors Teodocio
D. Cabalit and Emmanuel L. Coloma of the Provincial
Revenue Audit Group to conduct a fact-finding investigation. A widespread
tampering of official receipts of Motor Vehicle Registration during the years
1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 was then discovered by the investigators.

According
to the investigators, a total of 106 receipts were tampered. The scheme was
done by detaching the Plate Release and Owners copy from the set of official
receipts then typing thereon the correct details corresponding to the vehicle registered, the owners name and address, and the correct
amount of registration fees. The other copies, consisting of the copies for the
Collector, EDP, Record, Auditor, and Regional Office, meanwhile, were typed on
to make it appear that the receipts were issued mostly for the registration of
motorcycles with much lower registration charges. Incorrect names and/or
addresses were also used on said file copies. The difference between the
amounts paid by the vehicle owners and the amounts appearing on the file copies
were then pocketed by the perpetrators, and only the lower amounts appearing on
the retained duplicate file copies were reported in the Report of Collections.5According to State Auditors Cabalit and
Coloma in their Joint-Affidavit, the scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees
Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma
P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, and
resulted in an unreported income totaling P169,642.50.6

On
August 8, 2002, COA Regional Cluster Director Atty. Roy L. Ursal
reported the tampering of official receipts to Deputy Ombudsman Primo C. Miro.7
According to Atty. Ursal, the irregularity is
penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code;8 Section 3(e)9
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and likewise violates
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.10

In
a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R.
Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago
found grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation.11Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed against Olaivar,
Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required to submit their
counter-affidavits.

In
compliance, Olaivar, Cabalit,
Apit and Alabat submitted
separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and
responsibility for the anomalies. As to Olaivar, he
maintained that the receipts were typed outside his office by regular and
casual employees. He claimed that the receipts were presented to him only for
signature and he does not receive the payment when he signs the receipts.12Cabalit, for her part, claimed that her duty as
cashier was to receive collections turned over to her and to deposit them in
the Land Bank of the Philippines in Tagbilaran City.
She claimed that she was not even aware of any anomaly in the collection of
fees prior to the investigation.13
As to Apit, he admitted that he countersigned the official
receipts, but he too denied being aware of any illegal activity in their
office. He claimed that upon being informed of the charge, he verified the
photocopies of the tampered receipts and was surprised to find that the
signatures above his name were falsified.14Alabat, meanwhile, claimed he did not tamper, alter
or falsify any public document in the performance of his duties. He insisted
that the initial above his name on Official Receipt No. 64056082 was Apits, while the initial on Official Receipt No. 64056813
was that of Olaivar.15

During
the hearing before Graft Investigator Pio R. Dargantes, State Auditor Cabalit
testified on the investigation he conducted in the LTO in Jagna,
Bohol. He testified that he was furnished with the owners and duplicate copies of the tampered receipts. Upon comparison
of the Owners copy with the Collector or Records copy, he noticed that the
amounts shown in the original copies were much bigger than those appearing in
the file copies. State Auditor Cabalit also declared
that the basis for implicating Olaivar is the fact
that his signature appears in all the 106 tampered official receipts and he
signed as verified correct the Report of Collections, which included the
tampered receipts. As to Apit and Cabalit,
they are the other signatories of the official receipts.16
In some official receipts, the Owners copy is signed by F.S. Apit as Computer Evaluator, G.P. Cabalit
as Cashier, and Leonardo Olaivar as District Head,
but their signatures do not appear on the file copies.17

On
February 12, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
directed18 the parties to submit their
position papers pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, dated September
7, 2003, amending the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.19
No cross-examination of State Auditor Cabalit was
therefore conducted.

Complying
with the above Order, the COA submitted its position paper on March 18, 2004. Olaivar, Cabalit and Apit, for their part, respectively submitted their position
papers on April 29, 2004, March 18, 2004 and March 15, 2004.

In
its position paper,20
the COA pointed out that the signatures of Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar were
indispensable to the issuance of the receipts. As to Olaivar,
the original receipts bear his signature, thereby showing that he approved of
the amounts collected for the registration charges. However, when the receipts
were reported in the Report of Collections, the data therein were already
tampered reflecting a much lesser amount. By affixing his signature on the
Report of Collections and thereby attesting that the entries therein were
verified by him as correct, he allowed the scheme to be perpetrated. As to Cabalit, the COA pointed out that as cashier, Cabalits signature on the receipts signified that she
received the registration fees. The correct amounts should have therefore
appeared in the Report of Collections, but as already stated, lesser amounts
appeared on the Report of Collections, which she prepares. In the same manner, Apit, as computer evaluator, also signed the subject
receipts allowing the irregularities to be perpetuated.

In
his position paper,21Olaivar meanwhile insisted that he had no
participation in the anomalies. He stressed that his only role in the issuance
of the official receipts was to review and approve the applications, and that
he was the last one to sign the official receipts. He argued that based on the
standard procedure for the processing of applications for registration of motor
vehicles, it could be deduced that there was a concerted effort or conspiracy
among the evaluator, typist and cashier, while he was kept blind of their modus
operandi.

Cabalit, for her part,
questioned the findings of the investigators. She stressed in her position
paper22 that had there been a thorough
investigation of the questioned official receipts, the auditors would have
discovered that the signatures appearing above her name were actually that of Olaivar. She outlined the standard paper flow of a regular
transaction at the LTO. It begins when the registrant goes to the computer
evaluator for the computation of applicable fees and proceeds to the cashier
for payment. After paying, the typist will prepare the official receipts
consisting of seven (7) copies, which will be routed to the computer evaluator,
to the district head, and to the cashier for signature. The cashier retains the
copies for the EDP, Regional Office, Collector and Auditor, while the remaining
copies (Owner, Plate Release and Records copy) will be forwarded to the
Releasing Section for distribution and release.

Cabalit insisted that on
several occasions Olaivar disregarded the standard
procedure and directly accommodated some registrants who were either his
friends or referred to him by friends. For such transactions, Olaivar assumes the functions of computer evaluator, typist
and cashier, as he is the one who computes the fees, receives the payment and
prepares the official receipts. Olaivar would then
remit the payment to her. As the cashier, she has to accept the payment as a
matter of ministerial duty.

Apit, meanwhile, stressed in his
position paper23 that the strokes of the signatures
appearing above his typewritten name on the official receipts are different,
indicating that the same are falsified. He also explained that considering that
the LTO in Jagna issues around 20 to 25 receipts a
day, he signed the receipts relying on the faith that his co-employees had
properly accomplished the forms. He also pointed out that Engr. Dano admitted signing accomplished official receipts when
the regular computer encoder is out, which just shows that other personnel
could have signed above the name of F.S. Apit.

On
May 3, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
rendered judgment finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for tampering the
official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than
they actually collected. The OMB-Visayas ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is hereby resolved that the following respondents be found
guilty of the administrative infraction of DISHONESTY and accordingly be meted
out the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with the accessory penalties of
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
and disqualification from re-employment in the government service:

The complaint against
respondent Samuel T. Alabat, presently the Head of
Apprehension Unit of the Tagbilaran City LTO, is
hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

The complaint regarding the
LTO official receipts/MVRRs issued by the LTO Jagna
District Office, which are not covered by original copies
are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges
upon the recovery of the original copies thereof.

Petitioners
sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the
Ombudsman.25 Thus, they separately sought
recourse from the CA.

On
January 18, 2006, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. SP. Nos.
86256, 86394 and 00047. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,

WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered by US DISMISSING the instant consolidated
petitions. The assailed decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas dated May 3, 2004 in OMB-V-A-02-0415-H is hereby
AFFIRMED with a modification that petitioner Olaivar be
held administratively liable for gross neglect of duty which carries the same
penalty as provided for dishonesty. No pronouncement as to costs.

According
to the CA, it was unbelievable that from 1998 to 2001, Cabalit
and Apit performed vital functions by routinely
signing LTO official receipts but did not have any knowledge of the
irregularity in their office. With regard to Olaivar,
the CA believed that the tampering of the receipts could have been avoided had
he exercised the required diligence in the performance of his duties. Thus, the
CA held him liable merely for gross neglect of duty.

Petitioners
sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions.27Hence, they filed the instant petitions before the Court.

In
her petition, petitioner Cabalit argues that

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION WHICH GAVE
RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17 IN THE PROCEEDINGS
BELOW THAT WAS ALREADY ON TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL TYPE HEARING UNDER
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07 DID NOT PUSH THRU, PETITIONER WAS STILL ACCORDED
HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DESPITE HAVING
FAILED TO MAKE A CATEGORICAL RULING ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE QUESTIONED
AND/OR FORGED SIGNATURES BELONG TO PETITIONER GEMMA CABALIT.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE DOCTRINAL VALUE
AND/OR APPLICABILITY OF THE TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (G.R.
[129124], MARCH 15, 2002) RULING HERE IN THE INSTANT CASE.28

Meanwhile,
Apit interposes the following arguments in his
petition:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN LIMITING ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ONLY.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER APIT AS MERE DENIAL.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO RECONSIDER THE EVIDENCE THAT CLEARLY PROVED THAT THE
SIGNATURES ABOVE THE NAME OF PETITIONER APIT IN THE QUESTIONED RECEIPTS ARE ALL
FORGED AND FALSIFIED.29

As for Olaivar, he assails
the CA Decision raising the following issues:

II. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR WAS NOT DENIED
DUE PROCESS WHEN THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VISAYAS FOUND HIM GUILTY FOR
DISHONESTY AND METED OUT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE.30

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1)
whether there was a violation of the right to due process when the hearing
officer at the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
adopted the procedure under A.O. No. 17 notwithstanding the fact that the said
amendatory order took effect after the hearings had started; and (2) whether Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar are administratively liable.

As regards the first issue, petitioners claim that they were denied due process of
law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based only on
the affidavits and other evidence on record without conducting a formal
hearing. They lament that the case was submitted for decision without giving
them opportunity to present witnesses and cross-examine the witnesses against
them. Petitioner Cabalit also argues that
the Office of the Ombudsman erred in applying the amendments under A.O. No. 17
to the trial of the case, which was already in progress under the old
procedures under A.O. No. 07. She stressed that under A.O. No. 07, she had the
right to choose whether to avail of a formal investigation or to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Here, she was not
given such option and was merely required to submit her position paper.

Petitioners arguments deserve scant consideration.

Suffice to say, petitioners were not denied due
process of law when the investigating
lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence
on record. Section 5(b)(1)32 Rule 3, of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, plainly provides
that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties to file, within
ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified position papers
on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer
may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing
officer determines that based on the evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under
Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be
conducted. But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests
on the sound discretion of the hearing officer. As the petitioners have utterly
failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing officers determination should
be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. We
likewise find no merit in their contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case
was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer, should not have been
applied.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have
a vested right in procedural rules. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33the Court
elucidated:

Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that
a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal,
of any other than the existing rules of procedure. (Emphasis supplied.)

While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as
when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that
pending actions are excepted from its operation, or
where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that
application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them. Indeed,
in this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every
opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits,
position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since
petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves,
they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. Well
to remember, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in
all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person
is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often,
this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit
to present their charges and defenses.34
But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests
in due course, said party is not denied due process.35

Neither is there merit to Cabalits
assertion that she should have been investigated under the old rules of
procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, and not under the new rules. In Marohomsalic v. Cole,36we clarified that the Office of the Ombudsman has only one set of rules of
procedure and that is A.O. No. 07, series of 1990, as amended. There have been
various amendments made thereto but it has remained, to date, the only
set of rules of procedure governing cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Hence, the phrase as amended is correctly appended to A.O. No. 7 every time
it is invoked. A.O. No. 17 is just one example of these amendments.

But did the CA
correctly rule that petitioners Cabalit and Apit are liable for dishonesty while petitioner Olaivar is liable for gross neglect of duty?

Cabalit argues that the CA
erred in affirming the decision of the Ombudsman finding her liable for
dishonesty. She asserts that it was not established by substantial evidence
that the forged signatures belong to her. Meanwhile, Apit
contends that the CA erred in not considering evidence which proves that the
signatures appearing above his name are falsified. However, we note that both Cabalit and Apit raise
essentially factual issues which are not proper in petitions filed under Rule
45. Settled jurisprudence dictates that subject to a few exceptions, only
questions of law may be brought before the Court via a petition for
review on certiorari. In Diokno v. Cacdac,37 the Court held:

x xx [T]he scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions
of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law, and
questions of fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to this
rule, and we said:

Thus, only
questions of law may be brought by the parties and passed upon by this Court in
the exercise of its power to review. Also, judicial review by this Court does
not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the proper x xx tribunal
has based its determination. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is aphoristic
that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for
review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is
not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of
law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. 38

Here, the CA affirmed the findings of fact
of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas which are
supported by substantial evidence such as affidavits of witnesses and copies of
the tampered official receipts.39The CA found that a perusal of the questioned receipts would easily
reveal the discrepancies between the date, name and vehicle in the Owner's or
Plate Release copies and the File, Auditor, and Regional Office copies. It
upheld the factual findings of the Ombudsman that petitioners Cabalit and Apit tampered with
the duplicates of the official receipts to make it appear that they collected a
lesser amount. Their participation was found to have been indispensable as the
irregularities could not have been committed without their participation. They
also concealed the misappropriation of public funds by falsifying the receipts.

Now, superior
courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of
fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should be
considered as conclusive.40 This Court
recognizes the expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid
interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion.41Hence, being
supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.

As for Olaivar, he
insists that the CA erred in holding him administratively liable for gross
negligence when he relied to a reasonable extent and in good faith on the
actions of his subordinates in the preparation of the applications for
registration. He questions the appellate courts finding that he
failed to exercise the required diligence in the performance of his duties.

While as stated
above, the general rule is that factual findings of the CA are not reviewable
by this Court, we find that Olaivars case falls in
one of the recognized exceptions laid down in jurisprudence since the CAs findings
regarding his liability are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but
contradicted by the evidence on record.42

The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
found Olaivar administratively liable for dishonesty
while the CA ruled that he may not be held liable for dishonesty supposedly for
lack of sufficient evidence. The CA ruled that there was no substantial
evidence to show that Olaivar participated in the
scheme, but the tampering of the official receipts could have been avoided had
he exercised the required diligence in the performance of his duties as
officer-in-charge of the Jagna District Office. Thus,
the CA found him liable only for gross neglect of duty. This, however, is clear
error on the part of the CA.

For one, there is clear evidence that Olaivar was involved in the anomalies. Witness JoselitoTaladua categorically
declared in his affidavit43 that he personally paid Olaivar the sum of P2,675
for the renewal of registration of a jeep for which he was issued Official
Receipt No. 47699853. Much to his dismay, Taladua
later found out that his payment was not reflected correctly in the Report of
Collections, and that the vehicle was deemed unregistered for the year 2000.

More, Cabalit pointed to Olaivar as the person behind the anomaly in the LTO-Jagna District Office. She narrated in her position paper
that on several times, Olaivar directly accommodated
some registrants and assumed the functions of computer evaluator, typist and
cashier, and computed the fees, received payment and prepared the official
receipts for those transactions. She also revealed that Olaivar
would ask her for unused official receipts and would later return the duplicate
copies to her with the cash collections. Later, he would verify the Report of
Collections as correct.44

Likewise, Motor Vehicle Inspector Engr. Lowell A. Dano confirmed that in several instances, he witnessed Olaivar type the data himself in the official receipts even
if they have a typist in the office to do the job. Engr. Dano
added that after typing, Olaivar personally brought
the accomplished official receipts for him (Engr. Dano)
to sign.45

Moreover, Jacinto Jalop, the
records officer of the LTO in Jagna, Bohol,
illustrated how the official receipts were tampered. He disclosed that the
correct charges were typed in the Owners copy and the Plate Release copy of
the official receipts, but a much lower charge and an incorrect address were
indicated in the other copies. He asserted that Olaivar
was responsible for tampering the official receipts.46

Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give
proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either
carelessness or indifference.47
However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to mind ones task.
Rather, they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of
dishonesty, which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a
matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of
his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle.48 Hence, the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty.

But be that as it may, still, the CA correctly imposed
the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52,
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is classified as a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time.49
Under Section 58,50
such penalty likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation
of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service.

One final note.Cabalit contends that
pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office
of the Ombudsman,51the Office of the Ombudsman can
only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose them. However, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Masing,52
this Court has already settled the issue when we ruled that the power of the
Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory
but actually mandatory. We held,

We reiterated this ruling in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Laja,where we emphasized that the Ombudsmans order
to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.
Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals, we also held

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power
to recommend x xx
removal, suspension, demotion x xx
of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that
the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of RA 6770. (emphasis
supplied.)53

Subsequently, in Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals,54and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,55
the Court upheld the Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found
to be at fault in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. In
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we held that the exercise
of such power is well founded in the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, thus:

The Court further explained in Ledesma
that the mandatory character of the Ombudsmans order imposing a sanction
should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office
or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is
not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the
action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770
intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper
officer.

Consequently in Ledesma,
the Court affirmed the appellate courts decision which had, in turn, affirmed
an order of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of suspension on
the erring public official.56

The duty and privilege of the
Ombudsman to act as protector of the people against the illegal and unjust acts
of those who are in the public service emanate from no less than the 1987
Constitution. Section 12 of Article XI thereof states:

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed
in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

In addition, Section 15 (3) of R.A.
No. 6770, provides:

SEC. 15.Powers,
Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

x xxx

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform
an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of
this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause
to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.

x xxx

Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to
the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints:

SEC. 19.Administrative
Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair,
oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the
general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or
an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral
or devoid of justification.

In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given
full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to
receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct
investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of
evidence and place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure
of a public officer or employee.57

The
provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of
administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia,
receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with
its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of
documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees
pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring
public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily,
impose the said penalty.58 Thus, it is settled that the
Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative
sanctions.

We
find it worthy to state at this point that public service requires integrity
and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their
duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully
adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a
public office is a public trust; and must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.59

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on
certiorari are DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 18, 2006 and Resolution
dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 86256,
86394 and 00047 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
Leonardo G. Olaivar is held administratively liable
for DISHONESTY and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service as
well as the accessory penalties inherent to said penalty.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(On official leave)

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

8Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. -
Presumption of malversation. Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, x xx

x xxx

Art.
171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical
minister. The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

(e) Causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

10Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

b) If the hearing officer finds no
sufficient cause to warrant further proceedings on the basis of the affidavits
and other evidence submitted by the parties, the complaint may be dismissed.
Otherwise, he shall issue an Order (or Orders) for any of the following
purposes:

1. To direct the parties to file,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, their respective verified
position papers. The position papers shall contain only those charges, defenses and other claims contained in the affidavits and
pleadings filed by the parties. Any additional relevant affidavits and/or
documentary evidence may be attached by the parties to their position papers.
On the basis of the position papers, affidavits and other pleadings filed, the
Hearing Officer may consider the case submitted for resolution.

a. The
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.