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Last month the three service chiefs released the latest iteration of the Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces. In the foreword the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Sunil Lanba, wrote that that the Joint Doctrine “provides foundations for greater integration and interdependence, to achieve higher inter-operability and compatibility within the Armed Forces”. To its credit this version of the doctrine was released to the public (the first edition written in 2006 remains classified) with the hope, as argued by Admiral Lanba, that it “should be revisited…to extend our understanding and collative (sic) understanding.” However, that is the best that can be said about this document because a closer reading leads to an inescapable conclusion — those writing this doctrine had very little idea what they were talking about.

Resistance to a joint command

The debate on jointness within the Indian military has been going on for almost sixty years. As we now know Lord Mountbatten, the architect of India’s Higher Defence Organisation, was keen to appoint a Chief of Defence and lobbied repeatedly for creation of a Joint Staff. However, there was reluctance from India’s political and bureaucratic class that were fearful of an empowered military. Later, the services also resisted jointness as they privileged the autonomy afforded by the single service approach. It was only after the post-Kargil defence reforms in 2001 that an Integrated Defence Staff (minus the post of the Chief of Defence Staff, or CDS) was established. In addition, a Joint Command was established on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with the expectation that this “experiment” would lead to other geographically delineated joint commands. However, while many in the strategic community (rightly) blame politicians and bureaucrats for their reluctance to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff, they often overlook resistance to jointness within the services. Simply put, the Army, Navy and Air Force are unwilling to embrace managerial jointness, through a CDS, or operational jointness, by agreeing to joint commands. In fact, on the latter issue, they have successfully rolled back the idea for joint commands as there are reports that the Andaman and Nicobar Command will be permanently headed by a naval officer — which runs contrary to the vision of those who created the joint command.

With that background, this joint doctrine should be read as a diversionary attempt by the services to resist any changes in the status quo. It is therefore not surprising that the doctrine is confusing even on the issue of defining jointness. Sample this: “Jointness implies or denotes possessing an optimised capability to engage in Joint War-Fighting and is not limited to just Joint-War Fighting (Joint Operations). The attention to detail is in the placing of the hyphen. It needs to be clearly understood and discerned that ‘Jointness’ is a ‘Concept’, whereas ‘Joint Operations’ are evolutions, of both, Joint operations as well as single-Service operations are sub-sets of the larger whole of ‘conceptual Jointness’.”

Noticeably, the doctrine fails to mention anything about the joint Andaman and Nicobar Command. This begs two larger questions. First, why has the joint command experiment failed? Second, as global militaries are increasing converging towards joint commands (President Xi Jinping being the latest to force this on the Chinese military), what is the exact model of jointness that the Indian military wishes to follow? The possible answer to both is that the Indian military, attached to the single service approach, just does not want any changes.

A shoddy endeavour at best

Apart from being a difficult read, the doctrine fails on other levels. First, it creates an unnecessary controversy about India’s nuclear doctrine by describing it as “credible deterrence” instead of “credible minimum deterrence”. This distinction is crucial as India’s draft nuclear doctrine specifically mentions the latter. If there is a change in the nuclear doctrine, then messaging it through the joint doctrine is peculiar. A more likely explanation is that perhaps the distinction was lost upon those who wrote this document.

Second, the doctrine’s referencing, editing and footnoting technique requires serious attention. When I ran the doctrine through Turnitin — software that checks for plagiarism — it came up with a similarity index of 26%. Citing and borrowing ideas from previously published sources is acceptable; however it is important to do so using quotations, a norm that this doctrine totally ignores. This is justified away with the disclaimer that “inputs [were] compiled from Indian National Constitution, Annual Reports of Ministry of Defence, various defence publications, journals and military pamphlets, Service Headquarters, War Colleges, etc.” More than anything else, it requires war colleges and professional military institutions in India to implement capsules on academic integrity and widely use plagiarism detection software.

Perhaps inadvertently, the doctrine reveals much about a topic familiar to those who study the Indian military — the issue of civil-military relations. There are only two appendices to this report — one describing what is a doctrine and the second one, strangely, on the topic of civil-military relations. The latter reads like a wish list and captures the litany of complaints within the military against the civilian bureaucracy. While arguing that “layered hierarchies of the National Security structures should integrate”, it called for “inclusivity in policy making” to be “led (misspelt “lead” in the original document!) by integrated and responsive structural mechanisms.”

It goes on to assert that “to address National Security imperatives, it is prudent that institutional and structural mechanisms exist that facilitate free flowing communication… The functionaries in the MoD ought to be enablers of this relationship.” This suggests that civilians in the Defence Ministry have not been doing so — a charge that one hears often from the Indian military. The divide between the military and civilian bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry is a well-known story that even this government has done little to address.

What could possibly explain such a badly written doctrine and does this suggest that the Indian military is incapable of such an intellectual endeavour? Happily we do have instances of well-written doctrines — the Indian Navy’s doctrine titled “Ensuring Secure Seas” released in 2015 represents one such effort. However, that was perhaps because the Navy has invested in its doctrine writing branch and had consulted widely. But the Indian Army and perhaps even the Air Force do not incentivise and develop such expertise. What is required therefore is not minor edits but a complete withdrawal of this document with a revised version to be released later. Not doing so reflects badly on the professionalism and does little justice to the intellectual capability of the Indian military.

Anit Mukherjee is an assistant professor at RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and a non-resident fellow at Brookings India

The biggest decision of accepting, for which the soldiers were agitating for the last four decades, one rank one pension (OROP) was announced by the government on 7 November, 2015 which will cost the government exchequer around Rs 8000 crores every year. This has ensured that pension anomaly that existed among defence services personnel of the same rank, having the same number of years in service is rectified. Till 30 November last year, under first installment and lump sum payments 19,64,350 personnel were paid Rs 3,985.65 crores. In the second installment 15,46,857 personnel were disbursed Rs 2281.63 crores.

Further the government notified the acceptance of the recommendations of the 7Th Central Pay Commission recommendation on 3rd May, 2017. This will result in hefty hike in pay and allowances of the service personnel .For the first time the commission has substantially hiked the Military Service Pay (MSP) of all service personnel and special allowances given to Naval and Air force personnel deployed in high risk duties.

How would the recent 110 billion US dollars arms sale from US to Saudi, which some say may bit 300 billion US, before its all done, affect India's relative strength vis-a-vis tha Paki ? Does anyone disagree that all these arms will be made available to Paki at short notice, when PAki asks for them ? Was this not the quid pro quo, for Paki to send its General to lead the Saudi led coalition against Iran, after initial Paki reluctance ?

US will request Saudis not to give to Pakistan and if Pakistan gets any the US will command Pak not to use it against India so India will remain totally unaffected. We can depend on the US to do things well. We need not worry at all.

rsangram wrote:How would the recent 110 billion US dollars arms sale from US to Saudi, which some say may bit 300 billion US, before its all done, affect India's relative strength vis-a-vis tha Paki ? Does anyone disagree that all these arms will be made available to Paki at short notice, when PAki asks for them ? Was this not the quid pro quo, for Paki to send its General to lead the Saudi led coalition against Iran, after initial Paki reluctance ?

Chinooks, Apaches, THAAD Batteries, Munitions, and 4-6 Frigates. Which ones will Pakistan borrow? This is one nation essentially laying out MOU's and intent for a decade plus of defense modernization of legacy systems, or procurement of new capability. I don't think Pakistan can expect to get any of this since. There are things that the Saudi's must factor in such as their bi-lateral relationships with the US, and India before trying to pass on tens of billions worth of weapons to Pakistan.

Heightened GCC defense spending has been seen for the last many years with Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait placing high profile orders. This just extends this into the late 2020s so essentially the status quo. As far as buying new gear expect GCC nations to also diversify to both China and Russia. Saudis had their huge UAV/UCAV order with China, and UAE has signed a bunch of agreements with Russia for offensive and defensive weapons. Turkey is looking at the S400 as well.

jayasimha wrote:http://pib.nic.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=161844Welfare of the Soldiers

The biggest decision of accepting, for which the soldiers were agitating for the last four decades, one rank one pension (OROP) was announced by the government on 7 November, 2015 which will cost the government exchequer around Rs 8000 crores every year. This has ensured that pension anomaly that existed among defence services personnel of the same rank, having the same number of years in service is rectified. Till 30 November last year, under first installment and lump sum payments 19,64,350 personnel were paid Rs 3,985.65 crores. In the second installment 15,46,857 personnel were disbursed Rs 2281.63 crores.

Further the government notified the acceptance of the recommendations of the 7Th Central Pay Commission recommendation on 3rd May, 2017. This will result in hefty hike in pay and allowances of the service personnel .For the first time the commission has substantially hiked the Military Service Pay (MSP) of all service personnel and special allowances given to Naval and Air force personnel deployed in high risk duties.

don't believe it.

Most of the OROP stuff is pure BS.

The govt + the baboo(n)s have stiffed the Forces again (as usual) and they are trying to sell disinformation with the active help of the DDM

This article by Anit whosoever is so verbose - yet it neither states what the doctrine is missing and what it should have?!About the only thing this author has done is use some anti-plagiarism software and then claim footnotes should be better?!

Last month the three service chiefs released the latest iteration of the Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces. In the foreword the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Sunil Lanba, wrote that that the Joint Doctrine “provides foundations for greater integration and interdependence, to achieve higher inter-operability and compatibility within the Armed Forces”. To its credit this version of the doctrine was released to the public (the first edition written in 2006 remains classified) with the hope, as argued by Admiral Lanba, that it “should be revisited…to extend our understanding and collative (sic) understanding.” However, that is the best that can be said about this document because a closer reading leads to an inescapable conclusion — those writing this doctrine had very little idea what they were talking about.

Resistance to a joint command

The debate on jointness within the Indian military has been going on for almost sixty years. As we now know Lord Mountbatten, the architect of India’s Higher Defence Organisation, was keen to appoint a Chief of Defence and lobbied repeatedly for creation of a Joint Staff. However, there was reluctance from India’s political and bureaucratic class that were fearful of an empowered military. Later, the services also resisted jointness as they privileged the autonomy afforded by the single service approach. It was only after the post-Kargil defence reforms in 2001 that an Integrated Defence Staff (minus the post of the Chief of Defence Staff, or CDS) was established. In addition, a Joint Command was established on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with the expectation that this “experiment” would lead to other geographically delineated joint commands. However, while many in the strategic community (rightly) blame politicians and bureaucrats for their reluctance to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff, they often overlook resistance to jointness within the services. Simply put, the Army, Navy and Air Force are unwilling to embrace managerial jointness, through a CDS, or operational jointness, by agreeing to joint commands. In fact, on the latter issue, they have successfully rolled back the idea for joint commands as there are reports that the Andaman and Nicobar Command will be permanently headed by a naval officer — which runs contrary to the vision of those who created the joint command.

With that background, this joint doctrine should be read as a diversionary attempt by the services to resist any changes in the status quo. It is therefore not surprising that the doctrine is confusing even on the issue of defining jointness. Sample this: “Jointness implies or denotes possessing an optimised capability to engage in Joint War-Fighting and is not limited to just Joint-War Fighting (Joint Operations). The attention to detail is in the placing of the hyphen. It needs to be clearly understood and discerned that ‘Jointness’ is a ‘Concept’, whereas ‘Joint Operations’ are evolutions, of both, Joint operations as well as single-Service operations are sub-sets of the larger whole of ‘conceptual Jointness’.”

Noticeably, the doctrine fails to mention anything about the joint Andaman and Nicobar Command. This begs two larger questions. First, why has the joint command experiment failed? Second, as global militaries are increasing converging towards joint commands (President Xi Jinping being the latest to force this on the Chinese military), what is the exact model of jointness that the Indian military wishes to follow? The possible answer to both is that the Indian military, attached to the single service approach, just does not want any changes.

A shoddy endeavour at best

Apart from being a difficult read, the doctrine fails on other levels. First, it creates an unnecessary controversy about India’s nuclear doctrine by describing it as “credible deterrence” instead of “credible minimum deterrence”. This distinction is crucial as India’s draft nuclear doctrine specifically mentions the latter. If there is a change in the nuclear doctrine, then messaging it through the joint doctrine is peculiar. A more likely explanation is that perhaps the distinction was lost upon those who wrote this document.

Second, the doctrine’s referencing, editing and footnoting technique requires serious attention. When I ran the doctrine through Turnitin — software that checks for plagiarism — it came up with a similarity index of 26%. Citing and borrowing ideas from previously published sources is acceptable; however it is important to do so using quotations, a norm that this doctrine totally ignores. This is justified away with the disclaimer that “inputs [were] compiled from Indian National Constitution, Annual Reports of Ministry of Defence, various defence publications, journals and military pamphlets, Service Headquarters, War Colleges, etc.” More than anything else, it requires war colleges and professional military institutions in India to implement capsules on academic integrity and widely use plagiarism detection software.

Perhaps inadvertently, the doctrine reveals much about a topic familiar to those who study the Indian military — the issue of civil-military relations. There are only two appendices to this report — one describing what is a doctrine and the second one, strangely, on the topic of civil-military relations. The latter reads like a wish list and captures the litany of complaints within the military against the civilian bureaucracy. While arguing that “layered hierarchies of the National Security structures should integrate”, it called for “inclusivity in policy making” to be “led (misspelt “lead” in the original document!) by integrated and responsive structural mechanisms.”

It goes on to assert that “to address National Security imperatives, it is prudent that institutional and structural mechanisms exist that facilitate free flowing communication… The functionaries in the MoD ought to be enablers of this relationship.” This suggests that civilians in the Defence Ministry have not been doing so — a charge that one hears often from the Indian military. The divide between the military and civilian bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry is a well-known story that even this government has done little to address.

What could possibly explain such a badly written doctrine and does this suggest that the Indian military is incapable of such an intellectual endeavour? Happily we do have instances of well-written doctrines — the Indian Navy’s doctrine titled “Ensuring Secure Seas” released in 2015 represents one such effort. However, that was perhaps because the Navy has invested in its doctrine writing branch and had consulted widely. But the Indian Army and perhaps even the Air Force do not incentivise and develop such expertise. What is required therefore is not minor edits but a complete withdrawal of this document with a revised version to be released later. Not doing so reflects badly on the professionalism and does little justice to the intellectual capability of the Indian military.

Anit Mukherjee is an assistant professor at RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and a non-resident fellow at Brookings India

CURBING LEAKSAn official familiar with the matter told ET the new order was directed not so much at the current MoS Bhamre, but at the office of the minister of state. The logic behind the new order is an effort to control the flow of information and also prevent information leaks.

When you read the above in conjunction with this:

"The foreign office had prodded the defence ministry for Jaitley's attendance and, if that was difficult, for junior defence minister Subhash Bhamre to fill in for him, senior diplomatic and military officials confirmed to The Telegraph.

But Jaitley, who is busy preparing for the rollout of the goods and services tax from July, made it clear he would not be able to travel to the conclave, where India is traditionally represented by its defence minister.

As for Bhamre, the government decided that he might not be able to effectively articulate India's positions on security in its neighbourhood and the Asia Pacific at a conference where leaders are expected to take questions from scholars."

Ministry of Defence website (www.mod.nic.in) has migrated to the new Content Management Framework (CMF) as per the Guidelines for India Government Websites (GIGW). The new website will be dynamic in nature.

The new website would not only be user but also gadget friendly, catering to diverse needs of different sections of people, including the differently abled.

The salient features of CMF are: it standardises government websites complying with GIGW Guidelines; accommodates users with special needs, especially hearing and visual; improves presentation by giving it a contemporary look and feel; and enhances content delivery through availability of responsive interface over a wide range of devices, including smart phones and tablets.

The Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) is mandated to promote integration as a synergistic enabler for the growth of integrated National Power and provide alternatives in all dimensions of its applications through focused research and debate.

The Union government has changed the rules governing appointment in the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), giving more powers to the Defence Secretary who would now have a role in ordering inquiries against members of the tribunal and their removal. Contravening a Constitutional Bench judgement of the Supreme Court which directed the placement of tribunals under the Law Ministry, the new rules reiterate that the AFT will function under the Ministry of Defence which, incidentally, is the ministry against which all orders of the AFT are to be passed.

Talk about obscene. By the time this govt. is done the Military will be finished. Forget weapons which the last govt. neglected, these folks will destroy the armed forces from the inside out hitting the men wielding them instead.

government has now extended "full financial powers" to the Army vice-chief for now to maintain adequate stockpiles and combat readiness for "short and intense wars".

The Army, on its part, had identified 46 different types of ammunition, 22 armaments, half a dozen mines as well as spares for 10 weapon systems ranging from tanks to artillery guns as "critical requirements", which together would amount to roughly Rs 35,000-40,000 crore.

The force has already inked 19 contracts worth Rs 12,000 crore, which includes 11 kinds of ammunition, since then. Of them, 10 contracts are with Russian companies for supply of engines and 125mm APFSDS (armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot) ammunition for its T-90S and T-72 tanks to Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles and Smerch rockets.

"Now, the government has issued a notification empowering the Army vice-chief to continue with the emergency revenue procurements, as and when required, to maintain optimal stockpiles without taking clearances from the defence acquisitions council," said a source.

The Army, incidentally, did not even hold one-third of its authorized war wastage reserves (WWR) for 40 days of intense fighting. As per operational norms, the WWR should be sufficient for 30 days of "intense" and 30 days of "normal" fighting. But the Army simply did not have such reserves.

1. This is big, I do see govt anticipating some action on chinese border in near future. 2. Net net the total amount is going to $6 Bn USD at least (including the previous purchases).

anjan, Can you clarify why you think this is a bad move? By placing the AFT under the Law Ministry, Armed Forces will come under the Judicial system. This order prevents that.The judges showed their true nature during Gen. V.K. Singh date of birth related case.

The Army, incidentally, did not even hold one-third of its authorized war wastage reserves (WWR) for 40 days of intense fighting. As per operational norms, the WWR should be sufficient for 30 days of "intense" and 30 days of "normal" fighting. But the Army simply did not have such reserves.

Was it in the Army's capability for that? Did they have funds? If they had funds were the procurements placed? And who controls all that.

And this shortage was there from how long?

Right after Kargil War similar emergency purchase were made.So how did the systemic shortfall happen.

The writer Rajat Pandit is playing the usual blame the Army game that TOI is prone to.

ramana wrote:anjan, Can you clarify why you think this is a bad move? By placing the AFT under the Law Ministry, Armed Forces will come under the Judicial system. This order prevents that.The judges showed their true nature during Gen. V.K. Singh date of birth related case.

The AFT today is the primary means of redress of lots of issues that servicemen and ex-servicemen face and has come to be regarded as a potent tool for servicemen in a fight to get their dues. Pay/Pension/Disability fights etc all go through them. Inevitably these orders are passed against the MoD. Being outside of the MoD allows the tribunal a degree of freedom and autonomy in taking on the MoD. Even so the general response of the ministry has been to force people in costly appeal after appeal (90% of them were on disability pensions of all things) or simply choosing to ignore the orders(since the tribunal lacks powers of contempt). With this move the tribunal would essentially have to issue orders against their own boss. It's unimaginable to me that the Def Secy will allow any serious adverse orders to even be given after this. They have utterly and completely neutered the last serious mechanism for redress that services personnel had.

Armed Forces morale is now in continuous decline. We have an apathetic political leadership and the clowns now run the show. God help us.

"By taking away its pride, status and making career unattractive, the military is no longer a right choice today, which I believe is neither good for military nor for the nation," he added.

I'm hearing more and more soldiers who're vocal in dissuading younger people from taking up the profession. Armies can and do survive with bad equipment; No army will survive dispirited soldiers though. With all of this going on, the govt. still can't be bothered to appoint a full time Def. Minister.

Karan M wrote:This article by Anit whosoever is so verbose - yet it neither states what the doctrine is missing and what it should have?!About the only thing this author has done is use some anti-plagiarism software and then claim footnotes should be better?!

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has gone back on its demand for a non-lapsable capital fund for defence procurements, even as the Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) on Defence on Thursday asked the Ministry of Finance to work out the modalities for the creation of such a fund in consultation with the MoD.

In its latest report presented in the Parliament, the Committee said: “Hence, the Committee would like the Ministry of Finance to work out the modalities for the creation of a 'non-lapsable defence capital fund account' in consultation with the Ministry of Defence and apprise the Committee of the progress made in this direction at the earliest, and not later than three months of the presentation of this report to Parliament”.

However, it is surprising that the MoD is going back on its original demand for such a fund. It was earlier keen on such a fund to prevent the unspent amount in a financial year from being returned to the Finance Ministry as defence purchases generally tend to have long procurement cycles.

On February 2 this year, the MoD had sent a proposal for obtaining an 'in-principle' approval of the Finance Ministry on the creation of the account. But according to the report tabled in Parliament on Thursday, its stand has changed after consultations with the Finance Ministry.

The reasons for no longer seeking the fund are: the limited utility of such a fund, rules governing its creation that state the Government should have surplus funds (which is not so in the prevailing fiscal situation), and assurance from the Finance Ministry for additional funds, if required.

Indian military officers have embarrassingly limited powers to make decisions. They can’t even decide if they can attend a seminar or a conference without MoD clearance. US officials have told me countless stories over the years about how three-star US generals have not been allowed to meet their Indian counterparts. Instead, an MoD or foreign office mandarin takes a seat. This is just stupid.

Perhaps, the MoD thinks interaction leads to ideological infection. Why else would bureaucrats limit bilateral visits to ‘2 in, 2 out’ — two incoming and two outgoing visits a year per service? If the Indian Navy wants to host a third US delegation in a calendar year, it can’t even if the Naval chief sees a pressing need to discuss matters.

some interesting nuggets on non availability of parachutes ( I thought parachutes were made by OFB) and the rip of by the french

During the Indian Army's operations in Sri Lanka, the possibility of employment of parachute brigade came up and it surfaced that while we had a parachute brigade but there were no parachutes! Defence Finance had been sitting tight on the demand for these parachutes for close to six months. Now such items are not available off the shelf, so our military attaches were tasked to explore the possibility of obtaining these from armies of their accredited country. Our military attache in France was able to get these from the French army's reserve stocks. We paid the money only to discover that these failed the stress tests in India and turned out to be from the Vietnam war period, where many of these parachutes had blood stains. Thus these could not be put to use.

and horror stories on ammunition from the Russians

The second case relates to tank ammunition. Once we took up the project to up-gun the T-55 gun, the Russians, who did not approve of this, for the first time and out of the blue, offered us APFSDS ammunition for the original 100 milimeter gun of this tank. We purchased 20,000 rounds of this ammunition at a huge cost, which failed two separate sets of trial in India, where I conducted one of these two trials. So such emergency purchases of ammunition and other military equipment without proper trials and care have their own pitfalls.

shiv wrote:US will request Saudis not to give to Pakistan and if Pakistan gets any the US will command Pak not to use it against India so India will remain totally unaffected. We can depend on the US to do things well. We need not worry at all.

Boss ., once a transfer is made, its upon the incumbent country to use it whatever they see fit. The US will not be able to do much except make fuss or threaten. Apparently not every weapon system has a "kill switch" like those for the F 35 or 22 !!. Rest assured some of that Saudi stuff will come to paki hands, the Indians just need to be aware of such a possibility