Moral Relativism

Moral relativism is an important topic in metaethics. It is also
widely discussed outside philosophy (for example, by political and
religious leaders), and it is controversial among philosophers and
nonphilosophers alike. This is perhaps not surprising in view of
recent evidence that people's intuitions about moral relativism vary
widely. Though many philosophers are quite critical of moral
relativism, there are several contemporary philosophers who defend
forms of it. These include such prominent figures as Gilbert Harman,
Jesse J. Prinz, J. David Velleman and David B. Wong. The term
‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of
ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there
are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis
that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute,
but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of
persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a
normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards
those with whom we morally disagree, most commonly that we should
tolerate them.

Though moral relativism did not become a prominent topic in
philosophy or elsewhere until the twentieth century, it has ancient
origins. In the classical Greek world, both the historian Herodotus and
the sophist Protagoras appeared to endorse some form of relativism (the
latter attracted the attention of Plato in the Theaetetus). It
should also be noted that the ancient Chinese Daoist philosopher
Zhuangzi (sometimes spelled Chuang-Tzu) put forward a nonobjectivist
view that is sometimes interpreted as a kind of relativism.

Among the ancient Greek philosophers, moral diversity was widely
acknowledged, but the more common nonobjectivist reaction was moral
skepticism, the view that there is no moral knowledge (the position of
the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus), rather than moral relativism,
the view that moral truth or justification is relative to a culture or
society. This pattern continued through most of the history of Western
philosophy. There were certainly occasional discussions of moral
disagreement—for example in Michel de Montaigne's
Essays or in the dialogue David Hume attached to An
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. These discussions
pertained to moral objectivity, but moral relativism as a thesis
explicitly distinguished from moral skepticism ordinarily was not in
focus. Prior to the twentieth century, moral philosophers did not
generally feel obliged to defend a position on moral relativism.

Nonetheless, the increased awareness of moral diversity (especially
between Western and non-Western cultures) on the part of Europeans in
the modern era is an important antecedent to the contemporary concern
with moral relativism. During this time, the predominant view among
Europeans and their colonial progeny was that their moral values were
superior to the moral values of other cultures. Few thought all moral
values had equal or relative validity, or anything of that sort. The
main impetus for such a position came from cultural anthropology.
Anthropologists were fascinated with the diversity of cultures, and
they produced detailed empirical studies of them—especially
“primitive,” non-Western ones. At the beginning
anthropologists accepted the assumption of European or Western
superiority. But this assumption began to be challenged in the
twentieth century, especially by some social scientists in the United
States. An early dissent came from the sociologist William Graham
Sumner, who proposed a version of moral relativism in his 1906
Folkways. But the most influential challenge originated with
the anthropologist Franz Boas. He and his students—in
particular, Ruth Benedict, Melville J. Herskovits, and Margaret
Mead—explicitly articulated influential forms of moral
relativism in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1947, on the
occasion of the United Nations debate about universal human rights,
the American Anthropological Association issued a statement declaring
that moral values are relative to cultures and that there is no way of
showing that the values of one culture are better than those of
another. Anthropologists have never been unanimous in asserting this,
and more recently human rights advocacy on the part of some
anthropologists has mitigated the relativist orientation of the
discipline. Nonetheless, prominent anthropologists such as Richard
A. Shweder and the late Clifford Geertz have defended relativist
positions in recent years.

An important early bridge from anthropology to philosophy was
established by Edward Westermarck (1906–8 and 1932), a social
scientist who wrote anthropological and philosophical works defending
forms of empirical as well as metaethical moral relativism. In the
latter half of the 20th century, moral philosophers began devoting
considerable attention to moral relativism and some—most notably
Richard B. Brandt (1954) and John Ladd (1957)—took quite
seriously the empirical effort of anthropology to understand the
moralities of different cultures, to the point of making such
empirical inquiries themselves (an anticipation of the recent emphasis
on experimental philosophy, to be discussed in
section 3). In the past several decades there has
been increasing consideration of moral relativism, and there is now an
enormous literature on the subject (the Bibliography below is very
limited). Most of these discussions are situated in the domain of
“pure metaethics,” but not all. For example, there is
considerable work on moral relativism in connection with human rights
(with which some forms of relativism are in obvious conflict),
political liberalism (which is sometimes allied and sometimes
contrasted with relativism) and feminist philosophy (where relativism
has been both criticized and defended vis-à-vis feminist
concerns). There are also discussions of moral relativism in applied
fields such as medical ethics.

In general, the term ‘relativism’ refers to many
different ideas. For example, in anthropology it sometimes connotes,
among other things, the rather uncontroversial notion that
anthropologists should strive to be impartial and unprejudiced in their
empirical inquires. However, in moral philosophy
‘relativism’ is usually taken to suggest an empirical, a
metaethical, or a normative position. The empirical position is
usually:

Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR). As a
matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral
disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are
much more significant than whatever agreements there may
be.

Sometimes what is emphasized is moral diversity rather than strict
disagreement. DMR is often thought to have been established
by anthropology and other empirical disciplines. However, it is not
uncontroversial: Empirical as well as philosophical objections have
been raised against it. Hence, it is one focal point of debate.

The metaethical position usually concerns the truth or justification
of moral judgments, and it has been given somewhat different
definitions. Metaethical relativists generally suppose that many
fundamental moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, and on
this basis they argue that moral judgments lack the moral authority or
normative force that moral objectivists usually contend these judgments
may have. Hence, metaethical relativism is in part a negative thesis
that challenges the claims of moral objectivists. However, it often
involves a positive thesis as well, namely that moral judgments
nonetheless have moral authority or normative force, not absolutely or
universally (as objectivists contend), but relative to some group of
persons such as a society or culture. This point is typically made with
respect to truth or justification (or both), and the following
definition will be a useful reference point:

Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The
truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not
absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions,
or practices of a group of persons.

With respect to truth-value, this means that a moral judgment such
as ‘Polygamy is morally wrong’ may be true relative to one
society, but false relative to another. It is not true, or false,
simply speaking. Likewise, with respect to justification, this judgment
may be justified in one society, but not another. Taken in one way,
this last point is uncontroversial: The people in one society may have
different evidence available to them than the people in the other
society. But proponents of MMR usually have something stronger
and more provocative in mind: That the standards of justification in
the two societies may differ from one another and that there is no
rational basis for resolving these differences. This is why the
justification of moral judgments is relative rather than absolute.

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of different
formulations of relativism (for discussion of some of these, see
Krausz 2011 and López de Sa 2011). It is important to note several
distinctions that may be made in formulating different metaethical
relativist positions. First, a distinction is sometimes drawn between
content relativism, the view that sentences may have different
contents (meanings) in different frameworks, and truth relativism, the
view that sentences have the same content in different frameworks, but
their truth-value may vary across these frameworks (for a discussion
of this distinction in terms of moral relativism, see Prinz 2007:
180-3). In the discussions that follow, truth relativism is ordinarily
assumed. Second, it is sometimes said that the truth or justification
of moral judgments may be relative to an individual person as well as
a group of persons. In this article, the latter will be assumed, as in
the definition of MMR, unless otherwise noted. Third, that to
which truth or justification is relative may be the persons making the
moral judgments or the persons about whom the judgments are
made. These are sometimes called appraiser and agent relativism
respectively. Appraiser relativism suggests that we do or should make
moral judgments on the basis of our own standards, while agent
relativism implies that the relevant standards are those of the
persons we are judging (of course, in some cases these may
coincide). Appraiser relativism is the more common position, and it
will usually be assumed in the discussion that follows. Finally,
MMR may be offered as the best explanation of what people
already believe, or it may be put forward as a position people ought
to accept regardless of what they now believe. There will be occasion
to discuss both claims below, though the latter is probably the more
common one.

Metaethical moral relativist positions are typically contrasted with
moral objectivism. Let us say that moral objectivism maintains that
moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or
universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes
are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false
ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and
well-informed person. There are different ways of challenging moral
objectivism. Moral skepticism says that we are never justified in
accepting or rejecting moral judgments. Other views—variously
called moral non-cognitivism, expressivism, anti-realism, nihilism,
etc.—contend that moral judgments lack truth-value, at least
beyond the truth-value implied by the minimalist claim that to assert
that S is true is simply to assert S (a related view, the error
theory, claims that moral judgments are always false). MMR is
often distinguished from all of these views: Instead of denying
truth-value or justification, it affirms relative forms of
these. However, metaethical moral relativist views are sometimes
regarded as connected with positions that say moral judgments lack
truth-value, since the relativist views contend that moral judgments
lack truth-value in an absolute or universal sense. This is sometimes
simply a question of terminology, but not always. If it is said that
moral judgments lack truth-value (beyond the claim of minimalism),
then there cannot be relative truth-value in the sense that moral
relativists usually intend (though it might be contended that there is
a sense in which there could still be justification). As will be seen
below, there is a debate about the relationship between MMR
and non-cognitivist or expressivist positions.

Most arguments for MMR are based on DMR and the
contention that it is implausible to suppose fundamental moral
disagreements can always be resolved rationally. Sometimes it is said
that some moral disagreements are faultless, meaning that neither
party has made a mistake (see Kölbel 2004). For instance, Harman
(1996), Prinz (2007) and Wong (1984 and 2006) have all stressed the
importance of moral disagreements in arguing for MMR, and
such arguments will be considered in some detail in subsequent
sections. However, some arguments for MMR have a rather
different approach, and two of these should be noted here.

First, MMR might be defended as a consequence of the
general relativist thesis that the truth or justification of
all judgments is not absolute or universal, but relative to
some group of persons. For example, this general position might be
maintained on the ground that each society has its own conceptual
framework and that conceptual frameworks are incommensurable with one
another. Hence, we can only speak of truth or justification in relative
terms (see the discussion of incommensurability in the Summer 2015
archived version of the entry on
relativism (section 4.2)).
This position might be thought to have the disadvantage that
it can only be put forward as true or justified relative to some
conceptual framework (the suggestion is usually that this framework is our
own), and many find it implausible with regard to common sense
judgments and judgments in the natural sciences. However, this is one
avenue to MMR. But most proponents of MMR focus on
distinctive features of morality and reject general relativism. In
fact, they often contrast morality and science with respect to issues
of truth and justification. For example, Harman (2000b), Prinz (2007)
and Wong (1996 and 2006) all associate moral relativism with
naturalism, a position that usually presupposes the objectivity of the
natural sciences.

Second, a metaethical moral relativist position might be defended by
emphasizing aspects of morality other than disagreement. For example,
Rovane (2011 and 2013) has maintained that relativism is best
understood, not as a response to disagreement, but as a response to
alternative conceptual schemes that portray different worlds that are
normatively insulated from one another. On this account, the
truth-bearers in one world are not logically related to the
truth-bearers in another world (so there cannot be strict
disagreement), and yet it is not possible to embrace both worlds (so
they are alternatives). Rovane argues that in the moral domain, but
not in the domain of the natural sciences, there may be different
worlds in this sense. Hence, a moral judgment may be true for the
occupant of one world, but not for the occupant of another. An
implication of this view, she says, is that learning and teaching
across different moral worlds might not be possible.

In a partially similar view, Velleman (2013) has claimed, on the basis
of ethnographic and historical data, that different communities
construct available action types differently. Moreover, reasons for
action are always dependent on the perspective of the particular
community since they arise out of the drive for mutual
interpretability needed for social life within the community. Hence,
there are no perspective-independent reasons. There cannot be
straight-forward disagreement across these communities because they do
not have common sets of action types. The communities may nonetheless
address the basic themes of morality, but in incompatible ways given
their different perspectives. So moralities can only have local
validity.

Both Rovane and Velleman stress moral diversity rather than moral
disagreement. They maintain, not that disagreements cannot be
rationally resolved, but that there is no basis for showing that,
among various incompatible alternatives, one is rationally superior to
another.

In addition, it is worth noting that MMR is sometimes
justified by appealing in a significant way to a distinctive analysis
of moral judgments in combination with a claim about moral
disagreement. For example, Prinz (2007) argues that what he calls
“moral sentimentalism” implies a form of MMR once we
acknowledge moral disagreements. According to moral sentimentalism, an
action is morally right (wrong) if and only if some observer of the
action has a sentiment of approbation (disapprobation) concerning
it. Prinz defends this position on the basis of a metaethical argument
that it is the most plausible account in light of empirical studies
linking moral judgments and emotions. Since people often have
conflicting sentiments about the same action, a judgment of the form
'Action X is right' may be true (when expressed by a person
who approves of X), and 'X is wrong' may also be
true (when expressed by a person who disapproves of X). On
this view, the truth of such moral judgments is relative to the
sentiments of the persons who make them. Moral sentimentalism is a
crucial feature of this argument and many philosophers would deny that
moral rightness and wrongness depend on our sentiments in this
way. But most arguments for MMR are not based on moral
sentimentalism.

In another example, Harman (2000a) argues that a moral
judgment that a person ought to do X (an “inner
judgment”) implies that the person has motivating reasons to do
X, and that a person is likely to have such reasons only if he
or she has implicitly entered into an agreement with others about what
to do. Hence, moral judgments of this kind are valid only for groups of
persons who have made such agreements. An action may be right relative
to one agreement and wrong relative to another (this combines agent and
appraisal relativism insofar as Harman assumes that the person making
the judgment and the person to whom the judgment is addressed are both
parties to the agreement).

Harman's relativism is presented as a thesis about logical form, but
the relativist implication arises only because it is supposed that the
relevant motivating reasons are not universal and so probably arose
from an agreement that some but not all persons have made. In this
sense, moral disagreement is an important feature of the argument. But
the main focus is on the internalist idea that inner judgments imply
motivating reasons, reasons that are not provided simply by being
rational, but require particular desires or intentions that a person
may or may not have. Internalism in this sense is a controversial view,
and many would say that a moral judgment can apply to a person whether
or not that person is motivated to follow it (see the section on
'Psychological: Moral Motivation' in the entry on
moral epistemology).
However, internalism is not a standard feature of most arguments for
moral relativism, and in fact some relativists are critical of
internalism (for example, see Wong 2006: ch. 7)

It is worth noting that internalism is one expression of a more
general viewpoint that emphasizes the action-guiding character of
moral judgments. Though Harman and others (for example, Dreier 1990
and 2006) have argued that a form of moral relativism provides the
best explanation of internalism, a more common argument has been that
the action-guiding character of moral judgments is best explained by a
non-cognitivist or expressivist account according to which moral
judgments lack truth-value (at least beyond the claim of
minimalism). In fact, some have claimed that the expressivist position
avoids, and is superior to, moral relativism because it accounts for
the action-guiding character of moral judgments without taking on the
problems that moral relativism is thought to involve (for instance,
see Blackburn 1998: ch. 9 and 1999, and Horgan and Timmons 2006). By
contrast, others have maintained that positions such as
non-cognitivism and expressivism are committed to a form of moral
relativism (for example, see Bloomfield 2003, Foot 2002b, and
Shafer-Landau 2003: ch 1). For an assessment of this debate, see
Miller 2011, and for a discussion of non-cognitivism and related
positions, see the entry on
moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism.

Finally, the term ‘moral relativism’ is sometimes
associated with a normative position concerning how we ought to think
about, or behave towards, persons with whom we morally disagree.
Usually the position is formulated in terms of tolerance. In
particular, it is said that we should not interfere with the actions of
persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the
disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. This is thought
to apply especially to relationships between our society and those
societies with which we have significant moral disagreements. Since
tolerance so-understood is a normative thesis about what we morally
ought to do, it is best regarded, not as a form of moral relativism
per se, but as a thesis that has often been thought to be
implied by relativist positions such as DMR and MMR.
Despite the popularity of this thought, most philosophers believe it is
mistaken. The main question is what philosophical relationship, if any,
obtains between moral relativism and tolerance.

The remainder of this entry will discuss DMR, the contention
that it is unlikely that fundamental moral disagreements can be
rationally resolved, arguments for and challenges to MMR,
mixed positions that combine moral relativism and moral objectivism,
and the relationship between moral relativism and tolerance. But first
there needs to be some consideration of the recent contributions of
experimental philosophy to these discussions.

Experimental philosophy is an approach to philosophy that explicitly
draws on experimental knowledge established by the sciences to address
philosophical questions (see the entry on
experimental moral philosophy).
There are three significant ways in which
experimental philosophy has played an important role in discussions of
moral relativism. These concern the extent to which there is moral
disagreement or moral diversity among people (that is, DMR),
the extent to which folk morality is committed to an objectivist or
relativist understanding of moral judgments (that is, the views of
ordinary people concerning MMR), and the extent to which
acceptance of moral relativism affects moral attitudes such as
tolerance (that is, ways in which views concerning MMR
causally influence whether or not people have tolerant attitudes).

The first of these has a long history in discussions of moral
relativism and in fact may be considered one of the earliest instances
of experimental moral philosophy. As was seen in section 1, for more than a century the work of
anthropologists and other social scientists has contributed to the
development of thought about moral relativism, both by purporting to
provide empirical evidence for extensive cross-cultural disagreement
and diversity about morality, and by proposing the notion that moral
codes are true only relative to a culture as the best explanation of
this. That is, these scientists have provided empirical grounds for
accepting DMR, and they have suggested that some form of
MMR is a reasonable inference from this data (though these
positions were not always clearly distinguished). More importantly,
the work cited in section 1 by Brandt (1954) and
Ladd (1957), involving both empirical investigations into the moral
values of Native Americans and philosophical reflection on the
significance of these investigations vis-à-vis moral relativism, are
significant examples of moral philosophers engaging in empirical
inquiry in support of philosophical aims. Their empirical work did not
immediately inspire other other philosophers to engage in similar
research. Experimental philosophy in this sense--experiments or other
empirical investigations conducted by philosophers--did not become
prominent until nearly a half-century later. Nowadays philosophers do
sometimes conduct experiments to investigate the extent of moral
disagreement (for example, see the study of Western and East Asian
values cited in Doris and Plakias 2008). What has been much more
common in recent decades has been the citation by philosophers of
empirical studies by anthropologists to establish facts about moral
disagreement or diversity (for example, see Prinz 2007, Velleman 2013,
and Wong 1984 and 2006). There is more about these issues in
section 4.

The second concern, the extent to which ordinary people accept some
form of moral objectivism or some form of MMR (or some other
non-objectivist position), has been the subject of considerable
experimental research in recent years. This research has sometimes
been conducted by psychologists (or other scientists), sometimes by
philosophers, and increasingly sometimes by both working together (for
overviews of this literature, see Quintelier et. al. 2012 and
Sarkissian Forthcoming). In the past, philosophers with a variety of
meta-ethical commitments have sometimes claimed that in everyday moral
practices people implicitly suppose that moral objectivism in some
sense is correct (for example, see Blackburn 1984: 180 and Jackson
1998: 137). By contrast, on occasion some philosophers have maintained
that ordinary people sometimes have attitudes that conflict with
objectivism. For instance, Wong has argued that in some moral
disagreements people grant that the person with the conflicting moral
judgment is reasonable in accepting the judgment to the extent that
these people are unsure if their own position is uniquely right--what
he calls “moral ambivalence” (see Wong 2006: ch. 1). So who are
correct, philosophers who claim that ordinary people accept a form of
objectivism (folk moral objectivism) or philosophers who think that
ordinary people at least sometimes accept something closer to
MMR (folk moral relativism)?

Recent empirical research suggests that both positions have some
merit: the meta-ethical views of ordinary people are rather complex. A
common method for measuring whether people are objectivists or
relativists about a moral belief is to present them with a
disagreement between two parties concerning the belief and to ask them
if at most only one party could be correct. A response that only one
could be correct indicates commitment to objectivism, while a response
that more than one could be correct suggests commitment to relativism
(or some non-objectivist position). Several studies employing this
methodology have provided evidence that, while many people are
objectivists about morality, a significant number are not objectivists
(for example, see Nichols 2004). Moreover, some studies have shown
interesting correlations with these differences, correlations that may
partly explain them. For instance, objectivists are more likely to
attribute a religious grounding to morality than non-objectivists, and
non-objectivists are more likely to be open to considering alternative
reasons than objectivists (see Goodwin and Darley 2010). In addition,
those who are more open to experience are more likely to be
non-objectivists than those who are not (see Feltz and Cokely
2008).

Other studies have shown different kinds of compexity. People are more
likely to be objectivists about some moral issues (such as robbery)
than they are about other moral issues (such as abortion). These
differences also have correlations that might be partly explanatory:
regarding an issue as objective correlates with strength of belief and
perception of consensus on the issue (see Goodwin and Darley 2008 and
2010). Moreover, people are more likely to be objectivists about some
issues than others even when they are allowed to determine for
themselves which issues count as moral issues (see Wright
et. al. 2013).

Finally, it is more more probable that people give objectivist
responses when they think that the parties to a moral disagreement
share the same culture than when they think that the disagreeing
parties belong to a very different culture. This might suggest that
many of those who give objectivist responses are tacitly assuming a
kind of objectivity on the assumption that the disagreeing parties
have a common moral framework, but not in circumstances in which there
are different moral frameworks (see Sarkissian et. al. 2011).

In short, empirical work about folk meta-ethical outlooks suggests
that there is considerable diversity in the extent to which, and the
circumstances under which, people express moral objectivist views or
moral non-objectivist views such as MMR. This might be taken
to indicate that some people are objectivists and some are not. But it
might also be taken to show that some people are “meta-ethical
pluralists”: they are objectivists about some moral issues, but they
are relativists about other moral issues (see Wright
et. al. 2013). That is, perhaps some people implicitly deny the common
assumption among philosophers that all moral beliefs should be given
the same meta-ethical analysis.

Various questions may be raised about the significance of this
experimental work. For example, some critics might wonder to what
extent the results of these experiments are indicative of the
meta-ethical commitments of all human beings. In one study, subjects
aged 17 to 29 were less objectivist than both older and younger
subjects (see Beebe and Sackris, in Other Internet Resources). Since
almost all the subjects in the studies reported above were college
students, this might cast doubt on how representative the conclusions
of these studies are of the population as a whole. Moreover, almost
all the subjects were college students in the United States, and this
might lead to concerns about how representative their views are of
people throughout the world (to address part of this concern, the
subjects in one of the six studies reported in Sarkissian et. al. 2011
were undergraduates in Singapore).

In any case, some philosophers may wonder about the philosophical
relevance of this experimental research. On response is that it could
affect criteria of success in meta-ethics. For example, it is
sometimes suggested that most people are moral objectivists rather
than moral relativists, and that a meta-ethical position such as moral
realism gains credibility because it is in accord with folk morality
so understood (see Smith 1991). The studies just cited appear to
challenge the factual premise of this meta-ethical criterion. Another
response is that some of the complexity revealed in these studies
might lead philosophers to consider more seriously the philosophical
viability of a pluralist or mixed meta-ethical position according to
which, for instance, moral objectivism is correct in some respects,
but MMR is correct in other respects (in this connection, see
Gill 2008 and Sinnott-Armstrong 2009). There is more on this issue in
section 7.

The final area in which experimental philosophy has contributed to
discussions of moral relativism pertains to the relationship between
relativism and moral attitudes such as tolerance. It is sometimes
claimed that some forms of moral relativism provide a reason for
tolerance (see section 8). But are moral
relativists more likely to be tolerant than moral objectivists? Some
recent psychological studies suggest that the answer may be “yes.” In
the face of divergent attitudes about some issue, people were more
likely to be intolerant when they regarded the issue as moral rather
than non-moral (see Wright et. al. 2008), and they were more likely to
be intolerant when they believed the moral issue was objectively
rather than non-objectively grounded (see Wright et. al. 2014). In
these studies, intolerance was measured in terms of reported
willingness to interact with or help those with divergent attitudes
(among other things).

These studies suggest that there is some correlation between
acceptance of moral objectivism and tolerance. For those who have
argued that moral relativism provides a rational basis for tolerance,
this might be regarded as an unsurprising result. Of course, a
psychological relationship does not show that there is a logical
relationship. But some support might be derived from the fact that
people are behaving in what, for this position, is a rational way. In
addition, it has been claimed that an advantage of moral relativism is
that, even though it does not provide a reason for tolerance,
acceptance of it makes people more tolerant (see Prinz 2007:
208). These studies would provide support for this empirical
claim.

Most discussions of moral relativism begin with, and are rooted in,
DMR. Though this is not sufficient to establish MMR,
the most common rationales for MMR would be undermined if
DMR (or some descriptive thesis about significant moral
disagreement or diversity) were incorrect. Moreover, if DMR
were generally rejected, it is likely that MMR would have few
proponents. Hence, it is important to consider whether or not
DMR is correct. Defenders of DMR usually take it to
be well-established by cultural anthropology and other
empirically-based disciplines, and many believe it is obvious to
anyone with an elementary understanding of the history and cultures of
the world. Examples of moral practices that appear sharply at odds
with moral outlooks common in the United States are not hard to come
by: polygamy, arranged marriages, suicide as a requirement of honor or
widowhood, severe punishments for blasphemy or adultery, female
circumcision or genital mutilation (as it is variously called), and so
on (for a review of some of the literature, see Prinz 2007:
187-95). At a more general level, Wong (1984) has argued that at least
two different approaches to morality may be found in the world: a
virtue-centered morality that emphasizes the good of the community,
and a rights-centered morality that stresses the value of individual
freedom.

Though it is obvious that there are some moral disagreements, it is
another matter to say that these disagreements are deep and widespread,
and that they are much more significant than whatever agreements there
may be. Philosophers have raised two kinds of objection to this
contention: a priori arguments that DMR could not be
true, and a posteriori arguments that DMR is probably
not true or at least has not been established to be true.

A priori objections maintain that we can know DMR is
false on the basis of philosophical considerations, without recourse
to empirical evidence. One argument, expressed in general form by
Donald Davidson (1984), states that disagreement presupposes
considerable agreement (see the entry on
Donald Davidson). According to Davidson,
a methodological constraint on the translation of the language of
another society is that we must think they agree with us on most
matters. For example, suppose we believed there were numerous
disagreements between us and another society about trees. As the
disagreements piled up, we reasonably would begin to think we had
mistranslated a word in the language of the other society as
‘tree’: It is more likely that (what we take to be) their
false beliefs about trees are really beliefs about something else. By
generalization, it follows that there could not be extensive
disagreements about trees between our society and the other one. Of
course, there could be some disagreements. But these disagreements
would presuppose substantial agreements in other respects. Davidson
(2004a and 2004b) and others (for example, Cooper 1978 and Myers 2004)
have claimed that this argument applies to moral concepts. If they are
right, then there cannot be extensive disagreements about morality, and the
agreements are more significant than the disagreements. DMR
cannot be true.

Davidson's argument is controversial. One response is that, even if it
were compelling in some cases, it would not have force with respect to
moral concepts. ‘Tree’ is an ordinary, descriptive concept
based on direct observation. In view of this, mistranslation seems
more likely than substantial disagreement. But what about concepts
concerning what is amusing, interesting, or exciting? These have to do
with human reactions to the world, and it may be said that our
knowledge of human nature suggests that some reactions vary widely. A
claim that there is much disagreement about what people find
amusing—about what makes them laugh—does not immediately
generate the suspicion of mistranslation. If moral concepts were more
similar to ‘amusing’ than to ‘tree’, as some
believe, then the Davidsonian argument might not
undermine DMR even if it were convincing in other
cases. Davidson, however, believed the argument applies across the
board, to evaluations as well as empirical beliefs. Another response
to his argument is to claim that, even if it does apply to
evaluations, it would only apply to very basic ones and would leave
room for substantial disagreements beyond these (if this were the
case, then Davidson would have established only what I call a mixed
position in section 7).
For some critical responses to the Davidsonian critique of relativism,
see Gowans 2004: 144-6, Prinz 2007: 195-9 and Rovane 2013:
247-62.

Another a priori objection to DMR was suggested by
Philippa Foot (1978a and 1978b) in a response to emotivism. Just as
there are shared criteria of ‘rude’ such that not just
anything could be considered rude, she argued, there are shared
criteria of moral concepts such that not just anything could be a moral
virtue or obligation. For example, there are substantial constraints on
what could be considered courage. Hence, there are significant limits
to the extent of moral disagreements.

One response to this argument, interpreted as an objection to
DMR, is that it faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if
‘courage’ is understood broadly, in terms of confronting a
difficulty to achieve some perceived good, then it is likely that most everyone
values courage. However, this leaves room for very different
conceptions of courage. Both warriors and pacifists may value it, but
they may regard very different kinds of actions as courageous. This
puts less pressure on DMR, a point Foot later conceded to some
extent (see section 7)). On the
other hand, if courage is defined
narrowly, for example, as the virtue of a warrior who faces the threat
of death in battle (as suggested by Aristotle), then there may be
little disagreement about the scope of the concept, but considerable
disagreement about whether courage so-defined should be valued
(pacifists would say no). A proponent of DMR might say that
this is also a significant moral disagreement. Against this, it may be
said that our understanding of human nature and culture shows that
everyone values courage understood within some fairly significant
limits. This is a more empirical point, in line with the objections in
the last paragraph of this section.

Some versions of the a priori approach emphasize the
constraints imposed by “thinner” moral concepts such as
goodness, rightness, or morality itself (for example, see Garcia 1988).
Once again, a defender of DMR might say that, if these
concepts have enough content to preclude significant disagreement in
their application, then it is likely that many societies do not apply
them at all—a form of moral disagreement in itself. Another
response would be to argue, following R.M. Hare (1981), that a formal
analysis, for example in terms of a kind of prescriptivity, is
plausible with respect to some thinner moral concepts, and that this is
consistent with significant moral disagreements. However, the a
priori critics question the adequacy of any such analysis. Much of
this debate concerns the acceptability of formal versus material
definitions of morality
(see the entry on the
definition of morality).

The second approach to rejecting DMR focuses on the
interpretation of the empirical evidence that purportedly supports this
thesis. Some objections point to obstacles that face any attempt to
understand human cultures empirically. For example, it may be said that
the supposed evidence is incomplete or inaccurate because the observers
are biased. In support of this, it may be claimed that anthropologists
often have had preconceptions rooted in disciplinary paradigms or
political ideologies that have led them to misrepresent or misinterpret
the empirical data. Or it may be said that even the most objective
observers would have difficulty accurately understanding a society's
actual moral values on account of phenomena such as self-deception and
weakness of will. These concerns point to substantial issues in the
methodology of the social sciences. However, even if they were valid,
they would only cast doubt on whether DMR had been
established: They would not necessarily give us reason to think it is
false. Of course, this would be an important objection to someone who
claims DMR is established or relies on DMR to argue
for MMR.

Another objection, more directly pertinent to DMR, is that
anthropologists have tacitly and mistakenly assumed that cultures are
rather discrete, homogenous, and static entities—rather like
the shapes in a Piet Mondrian painting or a checkerboard. In fact,
according to this contention, cultures typically are rather
heterogeneous and complex internally, with many dissenting voices.
Moreover, they often interact and sometimes influence one another, and
they may change over time. From this perspective, the world of cultures
is closer to an animated Jackson Pollock painting than to the
unambiguous configuration suggested by the first image. If these
contentions were correct, then it would be more difficult to know the
moral values of different cultures and hence to know whether or not
DMR is true. As before, this would not show that it is false
(in fact, the point about heterogeneity might point the other way).
However, we will see later that these contentions also pose challenges
to MMR.

Other critics try to establish that the empirical evidence cited in
support of DMR does not really show that there are significant
moral disagreements, and is consistent with considerable moral
agreement. A prominent contention is that purported moral disagreements
may result from applying a general moral value (about which there is no
disagreement) in different circumstances or in the same circumstances
where there is a factual disagreement about what these circumstances
are. Either way, there is no real moral disagreement in these cases.
For example, everyone might agree on the importance of promoting human
welfare (and even on the nature of human welfare). But this may be
promoted differently in different, or differently understood,
circumstances. Another contention is that moral disagreements may be
explained by religious disagreements: It is only because specific
religious assumptions are made (for instance, about the soul) that
there are moral disagreements. Once again, the apparent moral
disagreement is really a disagreement of a different kind—here,
about the nature of the soul. There is no genuine moral disagreement.
Of course, these possibilities would have to be established as the best
explanation of the disagreements in question to constitute an objection
to DMR.

Finally, some objections maintain that proponents of DMR fail
to recognize that there is significant empirical evidence for
considerable moral agreement across different societies.
Several kinds of agreement have been proposed. For example, the
role-reversal test implied by the Golden Rule (“Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you”) has been prominent beyond
Western traditions: A version of it is also endorsed in The
Analects of Confucius, some traditional Buddhist texts, and
elsewhere (see Wattles 1996). Another form of this claim maintains
that basic moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, adultery,
killing human beings, etc. are found across many different and
otherwise diverse societies. Yet another contention is that the
international human rights movement indicates substantial moral
agreement (see Donnelly 2013: ch. 4). On the basis of evidence of this
kind, some such as Sissela Bok (1995) and Michael Walzer (1994) have
proposed that there is a universal minimal morality, whatever other
moral differences there may be. In a similar vein, Hans Küng
(1996) and others have maintained that there is a common “global
ethic” across the world's major religious traditions regarding
respect for human life, distributive justice, truthfulness, and the
moral equality of men and women. These contentions, which have
received increased support in recent years, must be subjected to the
same critical scrutiny as those put forward in support of
DMR. However, if they were correct, they would cast doubt on
DMR. In the final analysis, there may be significant
agreements as well as disagreements in people's moral values. If this
were the case, it would complicate the empirical background of the
metaethical debate, and it might suggest the need for more nuanced
alternatives than the standard positions.

Philosophers generally agree that, even if DMR were true
without qualification, it would not directly follow that MMR
is true. In particular, if moral disagreements could be resolved
rationally for the most part, then disagreement-based arguments for
MMR would be undermined, and there would be little incentive
to endorse the position. Such resolvability, at least in principle, is
what moral objectivism would lead us to expect. One of the main points
of contention between proponents of MMR and their objectivist
critics concerns the possibility of rationally resolving moral
disagreements. It might be thought that the defender of MMR
needs to show conclusively that the moral disagreements identified in
DMR cannot be rationally resolved, or again that the moral
objectivist must show conclusively that they can be. Neither is a
reasonable expectation. Indeed, it is unclear what would count as
conclusively arguing for either conclusion. The center of the debate
concerns what plausibly may be expected. Adherents of MMR
attempt to show why rational resolution is an unlikely prospect, while
their objectivist critics try to show why to a large extent this is
likely, or at least not unlikely.

Moral objectivists can allow that there are special cases in which
moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, for example on
account of vagueness or indeterminacy in the concepts involved. Their
main claim is that ordinarily there is a rational basis for overcoming
disagreements (not that people would actually come to agree).
Objectivists maintain that, typically, at least one party in a moral
disagreement accepts the moral judgment on account of some factual or
logical mistake, and that revealing such mistakes would be sufficient
to rationally resolve the disagreement. They suggest that whatever
genuine moral disagreements there are usually can be resolved in this
fashion. In addition, objectivists sometimes offer an analysis of why
people make such mistakes. For example, people may be influenced by
passion, prejudice, ideology, self-interest, and the like. In general,
objectivists think, insofar as people set these influences aside, and
are reasonable and well-informed, there is generally a basis for
resolving their moral differences. (They might also say that at least
some agreements about moral truths reflect the fact that, with respect
to matters pertaining to these truths, people generally have been
reasonable and well-informed.)

Proponents of MMR may allow that moral disagreements
sometimes are rationally resolved. In particular, they may grant that
this often happens when the parties to a moral dispute share a moral
framework. The characteristic relativist contention is that a common
moral framework is often lacking, especially in moral disagreements
between one society and another, and that differences in moral
frameworks usually cannot be explained simply by supposing that one
society or the other is making factual or logical mistakes. These
moral disagreements are ultimately rooted in fundamentally different
moral orientations, and there is usually no reason to think these
differences result from the fact that, in relevant respects, one side
is less reasonable or well-informed than the other. They are faultless
disagreements. This conclusion might rest on the observation that it
is not evident that mistakes are at the root of these
disagreement. But it might also depend on a theory, developed to
explain such observations, that the frameworks are incommensurable:
They do not have enough in common, in terms of either shared concepts
or shared standards, to resolve their differences, and there is no
impartial third standpoint, accessible to any reasonable and
well-informed person, that could be invoked to resolve the
conflict.

Various objectivist responses may be made to this argument. One is
the Davidsonian approach, already considered, that precludes the
possibility of incommensurable moral frameworks. Another response is
that incommensurability does not preclude the possibility of rationally
resolving differences between moral frameworks. For example, Alasdair
MacIntyre (1988: ch. 18 and 1994) has argued that, in some
circumstances, it is possible to realize, through an exercise in
imagination, that a conflicting and incommensurable moral tradition is
rationally superior to one's own tradition. However, the most common
objectivist response is to claim that some specific moral framework is
rationally superior to all others. For example, it might be argued,
following Kant, that pure practical reason implies a fundamental moral
principle such as the Categorical Imperative
(see Kant's moral philosophy),
or it might be claimed, following Aristotle, that human
nature is such that virtues such as courage, temperance, and justice
are necessary for any plausible conception of a good life (see
the sections on
the human good
and the function argument
in the entry on Aristotle's ethics, and the entry on
virtue ethics).
If such an argument were sound, it might provide a compelling
response to the relativist contention that conflicts between moral
frameworks cannot be rationally resolved.

Proponents of MMR are unimpressed by these responses. They
may say that the Davidsonian account cannot assure sufficient common
ground to resolve conflicts between moral frameworks (or to ensure that
there is really only one framework), and that MacIntyre's approach is
likely to work at best only in some cases. And they usually consider
debates about the Kantian and Aristotelian arguments to be as difficult
to resolve rationally as the conflicts between moral frameworks the
relativists originally invoked. They may add that the fact that moral
objectivists disagree among themselves about which objectivist theory
is correct is further indication of the difficulty of resolving
fundamental moral conflicts.

A rather different objectivist challenge is that the position of the
proponent of MMR is inconsistent. The relativist argument is
that we should reject moral objectivism because there is little
prospect of rationally resolving fundamental moral disagreements.
However, it may be pointed out, the relativist should acknowledge that
there is no more prospect of rationally resolving disagreements about
MMR. By parity of reasoning, he or she should grant that there
is no objective truth concerning MMR.

To this familiar kind of objection, there are two equally familiar
responses. One is to concede the objection and maintain that
MMR is true and justified in some metaethical frameworks, but
not others: It is not an objective truth that any reasonable and
well-informed person has reason to accept. This may seem to concede a
great deal, but for someone who is a relativist through and through, or
at least is a relativist about metaethical claims, this would be the
only option. The other response is to contest the claim that there is
parity of reasoning in the two cases. This would require showing that
the dispute about the irresolvability of moral disagreements (a
metaethical debate) can be rationally resolved in a way that
fundamental moral disagreements (substantive normative debates)
themselves cannot. For example, the metaethical debate might be
rationally resolved in favor of the relativist, while the substantive
normative debates cannot be resolved.

Even if it were established that there are deep and widespread moral
disagreements that cannot be rationally resolved, and that these
disagreements are more significant than whatever agreements there may
be, it would not immediately follow that MMR is correct. Other
nonobjectivist conclusions might be drawn. In particular, opponents of
objectivism might argue for moral skepticism, that we cannot know moral
truths, or for a view that moral judgments lack truth-value (understood
to imply a rejection of relative truth-value). Hence, proponents of
MMR face two very different groups of critics: assorted kinds
of moral objectivists and various sorts of moral nonobjectivists. The
defender of MMR needs to establish that MMR is
superior to all these positions, and this would require a comparative
assessment of their respective advantages and disadvantages. It is
beyond the scope of this article to consider the alternative positions
(see the entries on
moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism,
moral anti-realism,
moral epistemology,
moral realism, and
moral skepticism). What can be
considered are the challenges the proponent of MMR faces and
what may be said in response to them.

It might be thought that MMR, with respect to truth-value,
would have the result that a moral judgment such as “suicide is
morally right” (S) could be both true and false—true when
valid for one group and false when invalid for another. But this
appears to be an untenable position: most people would grant that
nothing can be both true and false. Of course, some persons could be
justified in affirming S and other persons justified in denying it,
since the two groups could have different evidence. But it is another
matter to say S is both true and false.

A standard relativist response is to say that moral truth is relative
in some sense. On this view, S is not true or false
absolutely speaking, but it may be true-relative-to-X and
false-relative-to-Y (where X and Y refer to
the moral codes of different societies). This means that suicide is
right for persons in a society governed by X, but it is not
right for persons in a society governed by Y; and, the
relativist may contend, there is no inconsistency in this conjunction
properly understood.

It might be objected that the notion of relative truth fails to
capture the sense in which ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
are normative terms about what ought to be as opposed to what is the
case. The statement “suicide is morally right” is
normative in this sense, but the statement “suicide is morally
right for persons in a society governed by moral code X” is not
normative, but descriptive: it tells us what persons who accept moral
code X think, and as such it is something everyone could agree with,
irrespective of their own moral code, if in fact this is what moral
code X says (see Boghossian 2011a and 2011b). In response, it might be
said that there are expressions of relativist moral statements that
are normative. For instance, “suicide is morally right for
us,” spoken by and to members of the group referred to by
‘us’, is not merely a description of what they believe: it
tells them what they are morally permitted to do (in this sense, it is
action-guiding).

Such relativist formulations may also give rise to a related and very
common objection. Relativism often presents itself as an
interpretation of moral disagreements: It is said to be the best
explanation of rationally irresolvable or faultless moral
disagreements. However, once moral truth is regarded as relative, the
disagreements seem to disappear. For example, someone accepting
X who affirms S is saying suicide is right for
persons accepting X, while someone accepting Y who
denies S is saying suicide is not right for persons accepting
Y. It might well be that they are both correct and hence that
they are not disagreeing with one another (rather as two people in
different places might both be correct when one says the sun is
shining and the other says it is not, or as two people in different
countries may both be correct when one says something is illegal and
the other says it is not). The relativist explanation dissolves the
disagreement. But, then, why did it appear as a disagreement in the
first place? An objectivist might say this is because people thinking
this assume that moral truth is absolute rather than relative. If this
were correct, the relativist could not maintain that MMR
captures what people already believe. The contention would have to be
that they should believe it, and the argument for relativism would
have to be formulated in those terms. For example, the relativist
might contend that MMR is the most plausible position to
adopt insofar as moral judgments often give practically conflicting
directives and neither judgment can be shown to be rationally superior
to the other.

Another common objection, though probably more so outside philosophy
than within it, is that MMR cannot account for the fact that
some practices such as the holocaust in Germany or slavery in the
United States are obviously objectively wrong. This point is usually
expressed in a tone of outrage, often with the suggestion that
relativists pose a threat to civilized society (or something of this
sort). Proponents of MMR might respond that this simply begs
the question, and in one sense they are right. However, this objection
might reflect a more sophisticated epistemology, for example, that we
have more reason to accept these objectivist intuitions than we have
to accept any argument put forward in favor of MMR. This
would bring us back to the arguments of the last section. Another
relativist response would be to say that the practices in question,
though widely accepted, were wrong according to the fundamental
standards of the societies (for example, there were arguments against
slavery presented in the United States prior to the Civil War). This
would not show that the practices are objectively wrong, but it might
mitigate the force of the critique. However, though this response may
be plausible in some cases, it is not obvious that it always would be
convincing.

This last response brings out the fact that a proponent of
MMR needs a clear specification of that to which truth is
relative. For example, if S is true-relative-to the moral
code of a society, does this mean it is true-relative-to what people
in the society think the moral code says or to what the fundamental
standards of the moral code actually imply? These might not be the
same. It is often supposed that truths can be undiscovered or that
people can make mistakes about them. As just noted, a moral relativist
could make sense of this by supposing that it is the fundamental
standards of a moral code that are authoritative for people in a
society that accepts that code. Hence, what is morally
true-relative-to the moral code of a society is whatever the
fundamental standards of the code would actually warrant. By this
criterion, there could be moral truths that are unknown to people in
the society that accepts the code, or these people could be mistaken
in thinking something is a moral truth.

A similar point arises from the fact that it is sometimes thought to
be an advantage of MMR that it maintains a substantial notion
of intersubjective truth or justification: It avoids the defects of
moral objectivism, on the one hand, and of moral skepticism and
theories that disregard moral truth-value altogether, on the other
hand, because it maintains that moral judgments do not have truth in an
absolute sense, but they do have truth relative to the moral code of a society (and
similarly for justification). This is thought to be an advantage
because, notwithstanding the supposed difficulties with moral
objectivism, morality is widely regarded as “not merely
subjective,” and MMR can capture this. However, this
purported advantage raises an important question for relativism: Why
suppose moral judgments have truth-value relative to a society as
opposed to no truth-value at all? If the relativist claims that a set
of fundamental standards is authoritative for persons in a society, it
may be asked why they have this authority. This question may arise in
quite practical ways. For example, suppose a dissident challenges some
of the fundamental standards of his or her society. Is this person
necessarily wrong?

Various answers may be given to these questions. For example, it may
be said that the standards that are authoritative in a society are
those that reasonable and well-informed members of the society would
generally accept. This might seem to provide a basis for normative
authority. However, if this approach were taken, it may be asked why
that authority rests only on reasonable and well-informed members of
the society. Why not a wider group? Why not all reasonable and
well-informed persons?

A different response would be to say that the standards that are
authoritative for a society are the ones persons have agreed to follow
as a result of some negotiation or bargaining process (as seen above,
Harman has argued that we should understand some moral judgments in
these terms). Once again, this might seem to lend those standards some
authority. Still, it may be asked whether they really have authority or
perhaps whether they have the right kind. For example, suppose the
agreement had been reached in circumstances in which a few members of
society held great power over the others (in the real world, the most
likely scenario). Those with less power might have been prudent to make
the agreement, but it is not obvious that such an agreement would
create genuine normative authority—a point the dissident
challenging the standards might well make. Moreover, if all moral
values are understood in this way, how do we explain the authority of
the contention that people should follow a set of values because they
agreed to do so? Must there be a prior agreement to do what we agree to
do?

A related objection concerns the specification of the society to
which moral justification or truth are said to be relative. People
typically belong to many different groups defined by various criteria:
culture, religion, political territory, ethnicity, race, gender, etc.
Moreover, while it is sometimes claimed that the values of a group
defined by one of these criteria have authority for members of the
group, such claims are often challenged. The specification of the
relevant group is itself a morally significant question, and there
appears to be no objective map of the world that displays its division
into social groups to which the truth or justification of moral
judgments are relative. A proponent of MMR needs a plausible
way of identifying the group of persons to which moral truth or
justification are relative.

Moreover, not only do people typically belong to more than one
group, as defined by the aforementioned criteria, the values that are
authoritative in each group a person belongs to may not always be the
same. If I belong to a religion and a nationality, and their values
concerning abortion are diametrically opposed, then which value is
correct for me? This raises the question whether there is a basis for
resolving the conflict consistent with MMR (the two groups
might have conflicting fundamental standards) and whether in this
circumstance MMR would entail that there is a genuine moral
dilemma (meaning that abortion is both right and wrong for me). This
point is not necessarily an objection, but a defender of MMR
would have to confront these issues and develop a convincing position
concerning them.

The fact that social groups are defined by different criteria, and
that persons commonly belong to more than one social group, might be
taken as a reason to move from relativism to a form of subjectivism.
That is, instead of saying that the truth or justification of moral
judgments is relative to a group, we should say it is relative to each
individual (as noted above, relativism is sometimes defined to include
both positions). This revision might defuse the issues just discussed,
but it would abandon the notion of intersubjectivity with respect to
truth or justification—what for many proponents of MMR
is a chief advantage of the position. Moreover, a proponent of this
subjectivist account would need to explain in what sense, if any, moral
values have normative authority for a person as opposed to simply being
accepted. The fact that we sometimes think our moral values have been
mistaken is often thought to imply that we believe they have some
authority that does not consist in the mere fact that we accept
them.

Another set of concerns arises from purported facts about
similarities among and interactions across different societies vis-à-vis
morality. People in one society sometimes make moral judgments about
people in another society on the basis of moral standards they take to
be authoritative for both societies. In addition, conflicts between
societies are sometimes resolved because one society changes its moral
outlook and comes to share at least some of the moral values of the
other society. More generally, sometimes people in one society think
they learn from the moral values of another society: They come to
believe that the moral values of another society are better in some
respects than their own (previously accepted) values. The Mondrian
image of a world divided into distinct societies, each with it own
distinctive moral values, makes it difficult to account for these
considerations. If this image is abandoned as unrealistic, and is
replaced by one that acknowledges greater moral overlap and interaction
among societies (recall the Pollock image), then the proponent of
MMR needs to give a plausible account of these dynamics. This
is related to the problem of authority raised earlier: These
considerations suggest that people sometimes acknowledge moral
authority that extends beyond their own society, and a relativist needs
to show why this makes sense or why people are mistaken in this
acknowledgement.

Discussions of moral relativism often assume (as mostly has been
assumed here so far) that moral relativism is the correct account of
all moral judgments or of none. But perhaps it is the correct account
of some moral judgments but not others or, more vaguely, the best
account of morality vis-à-vis these issues would acknowledge both
relativist and objectivist elements. Such a mixed position might be
motivated by some of the philosophical questions already raised
(recall also the suggestion in the section on
experimental philosophy that some people may be
“meta-ethical pluralists”). On the empirical level, it might be
thought that there are many substantial moral disagreements but also
some striking moral agreements across different societies. On the
metaethical plane, it might be supposed that, though many
disagreements are not likely to be rationally resolved, other
disagreements may be (and perhaps that the cross-cultural agreements
we find have a rational basis). The first point would lead to a weaker
form of DMR The second point, the more important one, would
imply a modified form of MMR (see the suggestions in the last
paragraph of section 4). This approach has
attracted some support, interestingly, from both sides of the debate:
relativists who have embraced an objective constraint, and (more
commonly) objectivists who have allowed some relativist
dimensions. Here are some prominent examples of these mixed
metaethical outlooks.

David Copp (1995) maintains that it is true that something is morally
wrong only if it is wrong in relation to the justified moral code of
some society, and a code is justified in a society only if the society
would be rationally required to select it. Since which code it would
be rationally required to select depends in part on the non-moral
values of the society, and since these values differ from one society
to another, something may be morally wrong for one society but not for
another. Copp calls this position a form of moral relativism. However,
he believes this relativism is significantly mitigated by the fact
that which code a society is rationally required to select also
depends on the basic needs of the society. Copp thinks all societies
have the same basic needs. For example, every society has a need to
maintain its population and system of cooperation from one generation
to the next. Moreover, since meeting these basic needs is the most
fundamental factor in determining the rationality of selecting a code,
Copp thinks the content of all justified moral codes will tend to be
quite similar. For instance, any such code will require that persons's
basic needs for such things as physical survival, self-respect and
friendship be promoted (these are said to be necessary for minimal
rational agency). The theory is mixed insofar as the rationality of
selecting a code depends partly on common features of human nature
(basic needs) and partly on diverse features of different societies
(values). Whether or not justified moral codes (and hence moral
truths) would tend to be substantially similar, despite differences,
as Copp argues, would depend on both the claim that all societies have
the same basic needs and the claim that these needs are much more
important than other values in determining which moral code it is
rational for a society to select.

Wong (1996) defended a partly similar position, though one intended to
allow for greater diversity in correct moral codes. He argued that
more than one morality may be true, but there are limits on which
moralities are true. The first point is a form of metaethical
relativism: It says one morality may be true for one society and a
conflicting morality may be true for another society. Hence, there is
no one objectively correct morality for all societies. The second
point, however, is a concession to moral objectivism. It acknowledges
that objective factors concerning human nature and the human situation
should determine whether or not, or to what extent, a given morality
could be one of the true ones. The mere fact that a morality is
accepted by a society does not guarantee that it has normative
authority in that society. For example, given our biological and
psychological make-up, not just anything could count as a good way of
life. Again, given that most persons are somewhat self-interested and
that society requires some measure of cooperation, any plausible
morality will include a value of reciprocity (good in return for good
on some proportional basis). Since these objective limitations are
quite broad, they are insufficient in themselves to establish a
specific and detailed morality: Many particular moralities are
consistent with them, and the choice among these moralities must be
determined by the cultures of different societies.

Wong has developed this approach at length in more recent work
(2006). His “pluralistic relativism” continues to emphasize that there
are universal constraints on what could be a true morality. The
constraints are based on a naturalistic understanding of human nature
and the circumstances of human life. For Wong, given a variety of
human needs and the depth of self-interest, morality's function is to
promote both social co-operation and individual flourishing. In
addition, morality requires that persons have both effective agency
and effective identity, and these can only be fostered in personal
contexts such as the family. Hence, the impersonal perspective must be
limited by the personal perspective. Any true morality would have to
respect requirements such as these.

Nonetheless, according to Wong, the universal constraints are
sufficiently open-ended that there is more than one way to respect
them. Hence, there can be more than one true morality. This is
pluralistic relativism. For Wong, the different true moralities need
not be, and typically are not, completely different from one
another. In fact, they often share some values (such as individual
rights and social utility), but assign them different priorities.

Wong presents pluralistic relativism as the best explanation of
what he calls “moral ambivalence,” the phenomenon of
morally disagreeing with someone while recognizing that the person is
still reasonable in making the conflicting judgment—to the point
that one's confidence in being uniquely right is shaken. It might be
wondered if moral ambivalence is sufficiently widespread to play a
central role in determining whether or not moral relativism is
correct. However, this should not detract attention from Wong's
sustained and detailed argument that an empirically-based
understanding of the nature and conditions of human life both limits
and underdetermines what a true morality could be. In many respects,
Wong's position is the most sophisticated form of relativism developed
to date, and it has the resources to confront a number of the issues
raised in the last section (for some critical responses to Wong, along
with his replies, see Xiao and Huang 2014).

A somewhat similar mixed position has been advanced, though more
tentatively, by Foot (2002a and 2002b; see also Scanlon 1995 and 1998:
ch. 8). She argued that there are conceptual limitations on what could
count as a moral code (as seen in
section 4),
and that there are common features of human nature that set limits on
what a good life could be. For these reasons, there are some objective
moral truths—for example, that the Nazi attempt to exterminate
the Jews was morally wrong. However, Foot maintained, these
considerations do not ensure that all moral disagreements can be
rationally resolved. Hence, in some cases, a moral judgment may be true
by reference to the standards of one society and false by reference to
the standards of another society—but neither true nor false in
any absolute sense (just as we might say with respect to standards of
beauty).

Foot came to this mixed view from the direction of objectivism (in
the form of a virtue theory), and it might be contended by some
objectivists that she has conceded too much. Since there are objective
criteria, what appear as rationally irresolvable disagreements might be
resolvable through greater understanding of human nature. Or the
objective criteria might establish that in some limited cases it is an
objective moral truth that conflicting moral practices are both morally
permissible. In view of such considerations, objectivists might argue,
it is not necessary to have recourse to the otherwise problematic
notion of relative moral truth.

A position related to Foot's has been advanced by Martha Nussbaum
(1993). With explicit reference to Aristotle, she argued that there is
one objectively correct understanding of the human good, and that this
understanding provides a basis for criticizing the moral traditions of
different societies. The specifics of this account are explained by a
set of experiences or concerns, said to be common to all human beings
and societies, such as fear, bodily appetite, distribution of
resources, management of personal property, etc. Corresponding to each
of these is a conception of living well, a virtue, namely the familiar
Aristotelian virtues such as courage, moderation, justice, and
generosity. Nussbaum acknowledged that there are disagreements about
these virtues, and she raised an obvious relativist objection herself:
Even if the experiences are universal, does human nature establish that
there is one objectively correct way of living well with respect to
each of these areas? In response, Nussbaum conceded that sometimes
there may be more than one objectively correct conception of these
virtues and that the specification of the conception may depend on the
practices of a particular community.

As with Foot, Nussbaum came to this mixed position from the
objectivist side of the debate. Some moral objectivists may think she
has given up too much, and for a related reason many moral relativists
may believe she has established rather little. For example, bodily
appetites are indeed universal experiences, but there has been a wide
range of responses to these—for example, across a spectrum from
asceticism to hedonism. This appears to be one of the central areas of
moral disagreement. In order to maintain her objectivist credentials,
Nussbaum needs to show that human nature substantially constrains which
of these responses could be morally appropriate. Some objectivists may
say she has not shown this, but could, while relativists may doubt she
could show it.

Mixed positions along the lines of those just discussed suppose that
morality is objective in some respects, on account of some features of
human nature, and relative in other respects. For the respects in
which morality is relative, it is up to particular societies or
individuals to determine which moral values to embrace. Hence, the
authority of morality depends partly on objective factors and partly
on the decisions of groups or individuals. Insofar as this is true,
such mixed positions need to say something about the basis for these
decisions and how conflicts are to be resolved (for example, when
individuals dissent from groups or when people belong to different
groups with conflicting values). The objective features of mixed
positions may help resolve these issues, or may limit their import,
but at the point where these features give out there remain some of
the standard concerns about relativism (such as those raised in the
last section).

Another approach might be construed as a mixed position, though it
was not put forward in these terms. Isaiah Berlin (1998) argued that,
though some moral values are universal, there are also many objective
values that conflict and are not commensurable with one another. He
called his position pluralism and rejected the label
‘relativism’ (see the entry on
Isaiah Berlin). But if
incommensurability implies that these
conflicts cannot be rationally resolved, then it might suggest a
concession to relativism.

Against such a position, an objectivist may ask why we should think
objective goods are incommensurable: If X and Y are
both objectively good, then why not say that the statement
‘X is better than Y’ (or a more
restrictive comparative statement specifying respects or
circumstances) is objectively true or false, even if this is difficult
to know? Berlin's view was that there are many examples of
conflicting goods—for example, justice and mercy, or liberty and
equality—where it is implausible to suppose they are
commensurable.

Finally, it should also be noted that a rather different kind of
mixed position was proposed by Bernard Williams (1981 and 1985: ch. 9).
He rejected what he called “strict relational relativism,”
that ethical conceptions have validity only relative to a society. But
he endorsed another form of relativism. This was explained by reference
to a distinction between a “notional confrontation,” where
a divergent outlook is known but not a real option for us, and a
“real confrontation,” where a divergent outlook is a real
option for us—something we might embrace without losing our
grip on reality. Williams's “relativism of distance” says
ethical appraisals are appropriate in real confrontations, but not in
notional ones. For example, we could never embrace the outlook of a
medieval samurai: Since this is a notional confrontation, it would be
inappropriate to describe this outlook as just or unjust. This is the
sense in which relativism is correct. But in real confrontations,
relativism unhelpfully discourages the evaluation of another outlook
that is a genuine option for us.

Williams was a strong critic of most forms of moral objectivism, yet
he also criticized many of the nonobjectivist alternatives to
objectivism. His outlook is not easily classified in terms of standard
metaethical positions. With respect to his relativism of distance, it
may be wondered why appraisals are inappropriate in notional
confrontations: Why should the fact that an outlook is not a real
option preclude us from thinking it is just or unjust? On the other
hand, in real confrontations Williams thought the language of appraisal
was appropriate, but he also thought these confrontations could involve
rationally irresolvable disagreements. Though Williams rejects strict
relational relativism, objectivists may argue that his position suffers
from defects as serious as those that attend MMR. If the
confrontations are real because the two outlooks have something in
common, objectivists might ask, could this not provide a basis for
resolving these disagreements?

The central theme in mixed positions is that neither relativism nor
objectivism is wholly correct: At least in the terms in which they are
often expressed, these alternatives are subject to serious objections,
and yet they are motivated by genuine concerns. It might seem that a
mixed position could be developed that would give us the best of both
worlds (there are a number of other proposals along these lines; for
example see Hampshire 1983 and 1989). However, an implication of most
mixed positions (this does not apply to Williams) seems to be that, in
some respect, some moral judgments are objectively true (or justified),
while others have only relative truth (or justification). This should
not be confused with the claim that an action may be right in some
circumstances but not others. For example, a consequentialist view that
polygamy is right in one society and wrong in another because it has
good consequences in the first society and bad consequences in the
second would not be a mixed position because the judgments “Polygamy is
right in circumstances A” and “Polygamy is wrong in
circumstances B” could both be true in an absolute sense. By
contrast, a mixed position might say that “Polygamy is right” is true
relative to one society and false relative to another (where the two
societies differ, not necessarily in circumstances, but in fundamental
values), while other moral judgments have absolute truth-value. This is
a rather disunified conception of morality, and it invites many
questions. A proponent of a mixed view would have to show that it is an
accurate portrayal of our moral practices, or that it is a plausible
proposal for reforming them.

Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position,
usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards
those with whom they morally disagree. The most prominent normative
position in this connection concerns tolerance. In recent years, the
idea that we should be tolerant has been increasingly accepted in some
circles. At the same time, others have challenged this idea, and the
philosophical understanding and justification of tolerance has become
less obvious (see Heyd 1996 and the entry on
toleration).
The question here is whether moral relativism has something to
contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR
or MMR provide support for tolerance (for discussion, see
Graham 1996, Harrison 1976, Ivanhoe 2009, Kim and Wreen 2003, Prinz
2007: pp. 207-13 and Wong 1984: ch. 12). In this context, tolerance
does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It
means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons
that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is
not or cannot be rationally resolved. The context of discussion is
often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does
moral relativism provide support for tolerance in this sense?

Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers generally
think they are mistaken. DMR may provide the occasion for
tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory
or even permissible. DMR simply tells us there are moral
disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing
about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree.
MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very
well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be
tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. (A mixed
position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral
truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that
this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.) It might be said that
MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even
this is problematic. According to MMR, understood to concern
truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society.
Hence, the statement, “people ought to be tolerant” (T), may
be true in some societies and false in others. MMR by itself
does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact
have the result that T is false in some societies (a similar point may
be made with respect to justification).

Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant
of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can
establish this as an objective moral truth (for example, by drawing on
arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill). To the
objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance (or imperialism),
objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society
as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should
interfere with it.

Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there
is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and
tolerance. Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical
principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the
basis of the ethical principle alone. Such an approach has been
proposed by Wong (1984: ch. 12). The principle is, roughly speaking,
that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this
interference to them (if they were rational and well-informed in
relevant respects). Wong called this “the justification
principle.” Of course, it is already a tolerance principle of
sorts. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is
correct. Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right
to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is
false and unjustified in another society in which the press is
restricted for the good of the community. In this case, given
MMR, our society might not be able to justify interference to
the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any
justification we could give would appeal to values that are
authoritative for us, not them, and no appeal to logic or facts alone
would give them a reason to accept our justification.

If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument
might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a
connection between relativism and tolerance. But there is a question
about whether the position is stable. Wong derived the justification
principle from Kant, and Kant rejected MMR. If we were to
accept MMR, would we still have reason to accept the
justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of
considerations quite independent of Kant. In any case, this argument
would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for
tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the
justification principle. The argument does not establish that there is
a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it
undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T
is true in some societies and false in others.

In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism (2006), Wong has
argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable,
any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls
accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive
relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation
appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than
this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them,
preserve relationships with them, etc. Wong's defense of accommodation
is immune to the objection that relativism cannot be a basis for such
a universal value because his defense purports to be based on
considerations that any adequate morality should recognize. However,
for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting
the relativist dimension of his position (there is no single true
morality), it argues from the non-relativist dimension (there are
universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that
one function of morality is to promote social co-operation). Hence, it
is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to
accommodation.

As was noted in section 3, aside from the
philosophical question whether or not some form of moral relativism
provides a reason for attitudes such as tolerance, there is the
psychological question whether or not people who accept relativism are
more likely to be tolerant. As was seen, there is some evidence that
relativists are more tolerant than objectivists, and it has been
claimed that, even if relativism does not justify tolerance, it would
be a positive feature of relativism that acceptance of it makes people
more tolerant (see Prinz 2007: 208). Of course, this judgment
presupposes that, in some sense, it is good to be tolerant.