The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is an
international treaty to
prohibit production and supply of specific (nominally narcotic) drugs and of drugs with similar effects except
under licence for specific purposes, such as medical treatment and
research. As noted below, its major effects included updating the
Paris Convention of 13 July 1931 to include the vast number of
synthetic opioids invented in the intervening 30 years and a
mechanism for more easily including new ones. From 1931 to 1961
most of the families of synthetic opioids had been developed,
including drugs in whatever way related to methadone, pethidine, morphinans and dextromoramide
& related drugs; research on fentanyls and piritramide were also nearing fruition at
this point.

Russian Minister of Interior Affairs Boris Gryzlov told the State Duma that "total
prohibition" of illicit drug use was "not the government's own
initiative...but rather the result of our responsibility to
implement the UN drug conventions of 1961, 1971, and 1988."

The Single Convention has been extremely influential in
standardizing national drug control laws. In particular, the United States' Controlled Substances Act of
1970 and the United Kingdom's Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 were
designed to fulfill treaty obligations. Both Acts include analogous
schemes of drug Scheduling, along with similar procedures for
adding, removing, and transferring drugs among the Schedules. The
Controlled Substances Act follows the Single Convention's lead in
granting a public health authority a central role in drug
Scheduling decisions. It also includes a provision mandating that
federal authorities control all drugs of abuse at least as strictly
as required by the Single Convention(21 U.S.C. §
811(d)).

As of January 2005, the Single Convention had 180 Parties.

History

The League of Nations adopted several
drug control treaties prior to World War II specifying uniform controls
on addictive drugs such as cocaine, opium, and its derivatives. However, the lists of
substances to be controlled were fixed in the treaties' text;
consequently, the conventions had to periodically be amended or
superseded by new treaties in order to keep up with advances in
chemistry. The cumbersome process of conference and state-by-state
ratification could take decades.[3]

A Canadian Senate committee report notes,
"The work of consolidating the existing international drug control
treaties into one instrument began in 1948, but it was 1961 before
an acceptable third draft was ready."[4] That
year, the UN
Economic and Social Council convened a plenipotentiary
conference of 73 nations for the adoption of a single convention on
narcotic drugs. Canadian William B. McAllister, Q.C., notes that
the participating states organized themselves into five distinct
caucuses:[5]

Organic states group: As producers of the
organic raw materials for most of the global drug supply, these
countries had been the traditional focus of international drug
control efforts. They were open to socio-cultural drug use, having
lived with it for centuries. While India, Turkey, Pakistan and Burma took the lead, the group also included the
coca-producing states of Indonesia and the Andean
region of South
America, the opium- and cannabis-producing countries
of South and Southeast Asia, and the
cannabis-producing states in the Horn of Africa. They favored weak
controls because existing restrictions on production and export had
directly affected large segments of their domestic population and
industry. They supported national control efforts based on local
conditions and were wary of strong international control bodies
under the UN. Although essentially powerless to fight the prohibition philosophy directly,
they effectively forced a compromise by working together to dilute
the treaty language with exceptions, loopholes and deferrals. They
also sought development aid to compensate for losses caused by
strict controls.

Manufacturing states group: This group
included primarily Western industrialized nations, the key players
being the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Japan. Having no cultural affinity for organic
drug use and being faced with the effects that drug abuse was having on
their citizens, they advocated very stringent controls on the
production of organic raw materials and on illicit
trafficking. As the principal manufacturers of synthetic
psychotropics, and backed by a determined industry lobby, they
forcefully opposed undue restrictions on medical research or the
production and distribution of manufactured drugs. They favored
strong supranational control bodies as long as they continued to
exercise de facto control over such bodies. According to W.B.
McAllister's Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,
their strategy was essentially to "shift as much of the regulatory
burden as possible to the raw-material-producing states while
retaining as much of their own freedom as possible."

Strict control group: These were essentially
non-producing and non-manufacturing states with no direct economic
stake in the drug trade. The key members were France, Sweden, Brazil, and the Republic of China. Most of the states
in this group were culturally opposed to drug use and suffered from
abuse problems. They favored restricting drug use to medical and
scientific purposes and were willing to sacrifice a degree of
national sovereignty
to ensure the effectiveness of supranational control bodies. They
were forced to moderate their demands in order to secure the widest
possible agreement.

Weak control group: This group was led by the
Soviet Union and
often included its allies in Europe, Asia
and Africa. They considered
drug control a purely internal issue and adamantly opposed any
intrusion on national sovereignty, such as independent inspections.
With little interest in the drug trade and minimal domestic abuse
problems, they refused to give any supranational body excessive
power, especially over internal decision-making.

Neutral group: This was a diverse group
including most of the African
countries, Central America, sub-Andean South America, Luxembourg and the Vatican. They had no
strong interest in the issue apart from ensuring their own access
to sufficient drug supplies. Some voted with political blocs,
others were willing to trade votes, and others were truly neutral
and could go either way on the control issue depending on the
persuasive power of the arguments presented. In general, they
supported compromise with a view to obtaining the broadest possible
agreement.

These competing interests, after more than eight weeks of
negotiations, finally produced a compromise treaty. Several
controls were watered down; for instance, the proposed mandatory embargoes on nations failing to
comply with the treaty became recommendatory. The 1953 New York
Opium Protocol, which had not yet entered into force, limited opium
production to seven countries; the Single Convention lifted that
restriction, but instituted other regulations and put the International
Narcotics Control Board in charge of monitoring their
enforcement. A compromise was also struck that allowed heroin and some other drugs
classified as particularly dangerous to escape absolute
prohibition.[6]

The Single Convention created four Schedules of controlled
substances and a process for adding new substances to the Schedules
without amending the treaty. The Schedules were designed to have
significantly stricter regulations than the two drug "Groups"
established by predecessor treaties. For the first time, cannabis was added to the
list of internationally controlled drugs. In fact, regulations on
the cannabis plant – as well as the opiumpoppy,
the coca bush, poppy straw and
cannabis leaves – were embedded in the text of the treaty, making
it impossible to deregulate them through the normal Scheduling
process. A 1962 issue of the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs' Bulletin on Narcotics
proudly announced that "after a definite transitional period, all
non-medical use of narcotic drugs, such as opium smoking, opium
eating, consumption of cannabis (hashish, marijuana) and chewing of
coca leaves, will be outlawed everywhere. This is a goal which
workers in international narcotics control all over the world have
striven to achieve for half a century."[7]

An August 3, 1962 Economic and Social Council resolution ordered
the issuance of the Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs.[8] The
legal commentary was created by the United
Nations Secretary-General's staff (specifically, Adolf Lande, former
Secretary of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board and Drug
Supervisory Body), operating under a mandate to give "an
interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in the light of
the relevant conference proceedings and other material."[9] The
Commentary contains the Single Convention's legislative
history and is an invaluable aid to interpreting the
treaty.

The Single Convention was the first
international treaty to prohibit cannabis.

The Single Convention entered into force on December 13, 1964,
having met Article
41's requirement of 40 ratifications. As of January 1, 2005,
180 states
were Parties to the treaty.[10]
Others, such as Cambodia,
have committed to becoming Parties.[11]

On November 11, 1990, mechanisms for enforcing the Single
Convention were expanded significantly by the entry into force of
the
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, which had been signed at Vienna on December 20, 1988. The
Preamble to this treaty acknowledges the inadequacy of the
Single Convention's controls to stop "steadily increasing inroads
into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances". The new treaty focuses on
stopping organized crime by providing for
international cooperation in apprehending and convicting gangsters
and starving them of funds through forfeiture, asset freezing, and other
methods. It also establishes a system for placing precursors to
Scheduled drugs under international control. Some non-Parties to
the Single Convention, such as Andorra, belong to this treaty and thus are
still under the international drug control regime.

Medical and other drug
uses

Parties are required to phase out the traditional practice of coca leaf chewing.

Under Article 37, "Any drugs, substances
and equipment used in or intended for the commission of any of the
offenses . . . shall be liable to seizure and confiscation."

The Single Convention repeatedly affirms the importance of
medical use of controlled substances. The Preamble
notes that "the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable
for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision
must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such
purposes". Articles 1, 2, 4, 9, 12, 19, and 49 contain provisions
relating to "medical and scientific" use of controlled substances.
In almost all cases, parties are permitted to allow dispensation
and use of controlled substances under a prescription, subject to
record-keeping requirements and other restrictions.

The Single Convention unambiguously condemns drug addiction,
however, stating that "addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a
serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and
economic danger to mankind". It takes a prohibitionist approach to the
problem of drug addiction, attempting to stop all non-medical,
non-scientific use of narcotic drugs. Article
4 requires nations to limit use and possession of drugs to
medicinal and scientific purposes. Article
49 allows countries to phase out coca leaf chewing, opium smoking, and other traditional drug uses
gradually, but provides that "the use of cannabis for other than
medical and scientific purposes must be discontinued as soon as
possible."

The discontinuation of these prohibited uses is intended to be
achieved by cutting off supply. Rather than calling on nations to
prosecute drug users, the treaty focuses on traffickers and
producers. As of March 2005, 116 drugs were controlled under the
Single Convention.

Penal
provisions

Article
36 requires Parties to criminalize "cultivation, production,
manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering,
offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any
terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit,
transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the
provisions of this Convention," as well as "[i]ntentional
participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit, any
of such offences, and preparatory acts and financial operations in
connexion with the offences referred to in this article".

The Article also provides for extradition of drug offenders, although a
Party has a right to refuse to extradite a suspect if "competent
authorities consider that the offense is not sufficiently serious."
A 1971 amendment to the Article grants nations the discretion to
substitute "treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration"
for criminal penalties if the offender is a drug abuser. A loophole in the Single
Convention is that it requires Parties to place anti-drug laws on
the books, but does not clearly mandate their enforcement, except
in the case of drug cultivation.[13]

Drug enforcement varies widely between nations. Many European countries, including the
United
Kingdom, Germany, and,
most famously, the Netherlands, do not prosecute all petty
drug offenses. Dutch coffee shops are allowed to sell small
amounts of cannabis to
consumers. However, the Ministry
of Health, Welfare and Sport's report, Drugs Policy in the
Netherlands, notes that large-scale "[p]roduction and
trafficking are dealt with severely under the criminal law, in
accordance with the UN Single Convention. Each year the Public
Prosecutions Department deals with an average of 10,000 cases
involving infringements of the Opium Act."[14] Some
of the most severe penalties for drug trafficking are handed down
in certain Asian countries, such
as Malaysia, which mandate
capital
punishment for offenses involving amounts over a certain
threshold. Singapore
mandates the death penalty for trafficking in 15 g (half an ounce)
of heroin, 30 g of cocaine or 500 g of cannabis.[15] Most
nations, such as France and
the United
States, find a middle ground, imposing a spectrum of sanctions
ranging from probation
to life
imprisonment for drug offenses.

The Single Convention's penal provisions frequently begin with
clauses such as "Subject to its constitutional limitations, each
Party shall . . ." Thus, if a nation's constitution prohibited instituting the
criminal penalties called for by the Single Convention, those
provisions would not be binding on that country. However, Professor
Cindy Fazey's A
Growing Market: The Domestic Cultivation of Cannabis points
out, "Whilst this strategy may be practical politics for some
countries, critics will ask why it has taken almost half a century
to discover that the UN conventions conflict with a constitutional
principle. The argument is particularly difficult to deploy for
countries like Britain, where constitutional principles
are not formalized or codified to any significant degree." However
the current move in Switzerland to enshrine cannabis
decriminalization in the national constitution by popular
initiative could profit from this rule.

Possession for personal
use

Different nations have drawn different
conclusions as to whether the treaty requires criminalization of
drug possession for personal use.

It is unclear whether or not the treaty requires criminalization
of drug possession for personal use. The treaty's language is
ambiguous, and a ruling by the International Court of
Justice would probably be required to settle the matter
decisively. However, several commissions have attempted to tackle
the question. With the exception of the Le Dain Commission, most
have found that states are allowed to legalize possession for
personal use.

It has generally been assumed that "possession" in Article
36 includes possession for use as well as possession for the
purpose of trafficking. This is a reasonable inference from the
terms of Article
4, which obliges the parties "to limit exclusively to medical
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export,
import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs."
There is also Article
33, which provides that "The Parties shall not permit the
possession of drugs except under legal authority." [...] On the
face of Article
26 it would not be unreasonable to argue that what is
contemplated is possession for the purpose of trafficking rather
than possession for use, and that the requirements of the article
are satisfied if the former kind of possession is made a penal
offense. The prevailing view, however, is that the word
"possession" in Article
36 includes simple possession for use.

However, LeDain himself concludes

The costs to a significant number of individuals, the
majority of whom are young people, and to society generally, of a
policy of prohibition of simple possession are not justified by the
potential for harm of cannabis and the additional influence which
such a policy is likely to have upon perception of harm, demand and
availability. We, therefore, recommend the repeal of the
prohibition against the simple possession of cannabis.[17]

The Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare's 1979
report, The Single Convention and Its Implications for Canadian
Cannabis Policy, counters with circumstantial evidence to the
contrary:[18]

The substantive argument in support of simple possession
falling outside the scope of Article
36 is founded on the assumption that it is intended to insure a
penal response to the problem of illicit trafficking rather than to
punish drug users who do not participate in the traffic. (See
United Nations, 1973:112; Noll, 1977:44–45) The Third Draft of the
Single Convention, which served as the working document for the
1961 Plenipotentiary Conference, contained a paragraph identical to
that which now appears as Article
36, subparagraph 1(a). This paragraph was included in a chapter
entitled Measures Against Illicit Traffickers, but the
format by which the Third Draft was divided into chapters was not
transferred to the Single Convention, and this, apparently, is the
sole reason why this chapter heading, along with all others, was
deleted. (See United Nations, 1973:112) Article
36 is still located in that part of the Convention concerned
with the illicit trade, sandwiched between Article
35 (Action Against the Illicit Traffic) and Article
37 (Seizure and Confiscation). In addition, it should
be noted that the word "use," suggesting personal consumption
rather than trafficking, appears in conjunction with "possession"
in Article
4 (which pertains to non-penal "general obligations"), but not
in the penal provisions of Article
36.

The Sackville Commission of South Australia concluded in 1978
that:

. . . the Convention does not require signatories to make
either use or possession for personal use punishable offenses ...
This is because ‘use’ is not specifically covered by Article 36 and
the term ‘possession’ in that Article and elsewhere can be read as
confined to possession for the purpose of dealing".

The Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare report
cites the Commentary itself in backing up its interpretation:[19]

The official Commentary on the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs 1961, as prepared by the office of the U.N.
Secretary-General, adopts a permissive interpretation of possession
in Article
36. It notes that whether or not the possession of drugs
(including prohibited forms of cannabis) for personal use requires
the imposition of penal sanctions is a question which may be
answered differently in different countries. Further, the
Commentary notes that parties which interpret Article 36 as
requiring a punitive legal response to simple possession, may
undoubtedly choose not to provide for imprisonment of persons found
in such possession, but to impose only minor penalties such as
fines or even censure (since possession of a small quantity of
drugs for personal consumption may be held not to be a serious
offense under article 36... and only a serious offense is liable to
adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties
of deprivation of liberty.

Since some confusion and misunderstanding had existed in
the past and some instances still persist in respect of the legal
position laid down in the international treaties concerning the
relationship between penal sanctions and drug abuse, some
clarifying remarks are called for. These were already offered at
the XIth International Congress on Penal Law. 5 They were
reiterated at the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. 6 The international
treaties in no way insist on harsh penal sanctions with regard to
drug abuse, as is sometimes alleged by persons criticising the
international drug control system; the treaties are much more
subtle and flexible than sometimes interpreted.

First of all, Article 4 of the Single Convention contains
the general obligations for Parties to this Convention to "take
such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary,
subject to the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively
to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture,
export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of
drugs." From the contents of this provision it is clear that use of
drugs and their possession for personal consumption has also to be
limited by legislation and administrative measures exclusively to
medical and scientific purposes. Consequently, "legalization" of
drugs in the sense of making them freely available for non-medical
and non-scientific purposes-as it is sometimes demanded by public
mass media and even experts in discussions on the subject-is
without any doubt excluded and unacceptable under the present
international drug control system as established by the
international treaties. The question, however, remains whether
Parties are obliged by the international treaties to apply penal
sanctions for unauthorized use and unauthorized possession of drugs
for personal consumption. It is on this point that confusion still
exists and clarification is needed.

It is a fact that "use" (or "personal consumption") is not
enumerated amongst the punishable offences in accordance with
paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Single Convention. Although, as
mentioned above, Parties are required to limit the use of drugs
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes, the Single
Convention does not require them to attain the goal by providing
penal sanctions for unauthorized "use" or "personal consumption" of
drugs.

Unauthorized "possession" of drugs is mentioned in
paragraph 1 of Article 36, but from the context it is clear that,
as stated in the Official Commentary by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, "possession" of drugs for personal
consumption is not to be considered a "punishable offence" by a
Party to the Single Convention. The whole international drug
control system envisages in its penal provisions the
illicit traffic in drugs; this also holds true for the 1972
Protocol Amending the Single Convention and for the 1971 Convention
on Psychotropic Substances. As there is no obligation to provide
penal sanctions for "use" in the sense of personal consumption and
"possession" of drugs for personal consumption, any criticism
levelled against the international drug control system by
protagonists in favour of the so-called "liberalization" or
decriminalization or "de-penalization" of use and possession of
drugs for personal consumption is quite beside the point.

Schedules of
drugs

The Single Convention's Schedules of drugs range from most
restrictive to least restrictive, in this order: Schedule IV,
Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III. The list of drugs initially
controlled was annexed to the treaty. Article
3 states that in order for a drug to be placed in a Schedule,
the World Health Organization
must make the findings required for that Schedule, to wit:

Schedule I – The substance is liable to
similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs
already in Schedule I or Schedule II, or is convertible into a
drug.

Schedule II – The substance is liable to
similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs
already in Schedule I or Schedule II, or is convertible into a
drug.

Schedule III – The preparation, because of the
substances which it contains, is not liable to abuse and cannot
produce ill effects; and the drug therein is not readily
recoverable.

Schedule IV – The drug, which is already in
Schedule I, is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill
effects, and such liability is not offset by substantial
therapeutic advantages.

Schedule I, according to the Commentary, is the
category of drugs whose control provisions "constitute the standard
regime under the Single Convention."[21] The
principal features of that regime are:

Limitation to medical and scientific purposes of all phases of
narcotics trade (manufacture, domestic trade, both wholesale and retail, and
international trade) in, and of the
possession and use of, drugs;

Requirement of governmental authorization (licensing or state
ownership) of participation in any phase of the narcotics trade and
of a specific authorization (import and export authorization) of
each individual international transaction;

Obligation of all participants in the narcotics trade to keep
detailed records of their transactions in drugs;

A system of limiting the quantities of drugs available, by
manufacture or import or both, in each country and territory, to
those needed for medical and scientific purposes.

Schedule II drugs are regulated only slightly
less strictly than Schedule I drugs. The Commentary confirms,
"Drugs in Schedule II are subject to the same measures of control
as drugs in Schedule I, with only a few exceptions":[22]

The drugs are not subject to the provisions of Article
30, paragraphs 2 and 5, as regards the retail trade.

Governments are thus not bound to prevent the accumulation of
drugs in Schedule II in the possession of retail distributors, in
excess of the quantities required for the normal conduct of
business.

Medical prescriptions for the supply or dispensation of these
drugs to individuals are not obligatory.

Such drugs are also exempted from the provision – which in fact
is no more than a suggestion – concerning the use of official
prescription forms in the shape of counterfoil books issued by the
competent governmental authorities or by authorized professional
associations.

Parties to the Single Convention need not require that the
label under which a drug in Schedule II is offered for sale in the
retail trade show the exact content by weight or percentage.

Schedule III "contains preparations which enjoy
a privileged position under the Single Convention, i.e. are subject
to a less strict regime than other Preparations," according to the
Commentary.[23]
Specifically:

Government authorizations are not required for each import or
export of preparations in Schedule III. The import certificate and
export authorization system laid down in Article
31, paragraphs 4 to 15, which governs the international
transactions in drugs and their preparations, does not apply to the
preparations in Schedule III.

The only estimates and statistical returns that a Party need
furnish to the INCB in reference to Schedule III preparations are
estimates of the quantities of drugs to be utilized for the
compounding of preparations in Schedule III, and information on the
amounts of drugs actually so used.

Schedule IV is the category of drugs, such as
heroin, that are considered to
have "particularly dangerous properties" in comparison to other
drugs (alcohol is left
unregulated). According to Article
2, "The drugs in Schedule IV shall also be included in Schedule
I and subject to all measures of control applicable to drugs in the
latter Schedule" as well as whatever "special measures of control";
each Party deems necessary. This is in contrast to the U.S.
Controlled Substances Act, which has five Schedules ranging from
Schedule I (most restrictive) to Schedule V (least restrictive),
and the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, which has four Schedules ranging for
Schedule I (most restrictive) to Schedule IV (least
restrictive).

Under certain circumstances, Parties are required to limit
Schedule IV drugs to research purposes only:

(b) A Party shall, if in its opinion the prevailing
conditions in its country render it the most appropriate means of
protecting the public health and welfare, prohibit the production,
manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of
any such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical
and scientific research only, including clinical trials therewith
to be conducted under or subject to the direct supervision and
control of the Party.

The Commentary explains two situations in which this provision
would apply:

For a considerable period of time - and still at the time
of writing - there has been no significant diversion of legally
manufactured drugs from legal trade into illicit channels; but if a
Government were unable to prevent such a diversion of drugs in
Schedule IV, a situation would arise in which the measures of
prohibition mentioned in subparagraph (b) would be "the most
appropriate means of protecting the public health and welfare".
Whether this was or was not the case would be left to the judgement
of the Party concerned whose bona fide opinion on this matter could
not be challenged by any other Party.

Another situation in which measures of prohibition would be
"appropriate" for the protection of public health and welfare might
exist where the members of the medical profession administered or
prescribed drugs in Schedule IV in an unduly extensive way, and
other less radical measures, such as warnings by public
authorities, professional associations or manufacturers, were
ineffective. It may however be assumed that such a situation could
rarely if ever arise.

The Commentary notes that "Whether the prohibition of drugs in
Schedule IV (Cannabis and
cannabis resin, desomorphine, heroin, ketobemidone) should be mandatory or only
recommended was a controversial question at the Plenipotentiary
Conference." The provision adopted represents "a compromise which
leaves prohibition to the judgement, though theoretically not to
the discretion, of each Party." The Parties are required to act in
good faith in making this decision, or else they will be in
violation of the treaty.

The Single Convention gives the UN
Economic and Social Council's Commission on Narcotic
Drugs (CND) power to add or delete drugs from the Schedules, in
accordance with the World Health Organization's
findings and recommendations. Any Party to the treaty may request
an amendment to the Schedules, or request a review of the
Commission's decision. The Economic and Social Council is the only
body that has power to confirm, alter, or reverse the CND's
scheduling decisions. The United Nations General
Assembly can approve or modify any CND decision, except for
scheduling decisions.

The International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is mandated by Article
9 of the Single Convention to "endeavour to limit the
cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an
adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their
availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation,
production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use
of, drugs." The INCB administers the estimate system, which limits
each nation's annual production of controlled substances to the
estimated amounts needed for medical and scientific purposes.

Article
21 provides that "the total of the quantities of each drug
manufactured and imported by any country or territory in any one
year shall not exceed the sum of" the quantity:

Consumed, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for
medical and scientific purposes;

Used, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for the
manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule Ill, and of
substances not covered by this Convention;

Exported;

Added to the stock for the purpose of bringing that stock up to
the level specified in the relevant estimate; and

Acquired within the limit of the relevant estimate for special
purposes.

Article 21
bis, added to the treaty by a 1971 amendment, gives the INCB
more enforcement power by allowing it to deduct from a nation's
production quota of cannabis, opium, and coca
the amounts it determines have been produced within that nation and
introduced into the illicit traffic. This could happen as a result
of failing to control either illicit production or diversion of licitly
produced opium to illicit purposes.[26] In
this way, the INCB can essentially punish a narcotics-exporting
nation that does not control its illicit traffic by imposing an economic sanction on its medicinal
narcotics industry.

The Single Convention exerts power even over those nations that
have not ratified it. The International Narcotics Board states:[27]

The fact that the system generally works well is mainly due
to the estimates system that covers all countries whether or not
parties to the Convention. Countries are under an obligation not to
exceed the amounts of the estimates confirmed or established by the
INCB.

Article
14 authorizes the INCB to recommend an embargo on imports and exports of drugs from
any noncompliant nations. The INCB can also issue reports critical
of noncompliant nations, and forward those reports to all Parties.
This happened when the United Kingdom reclassified cannabis
from Class B to class C, eliminating the threat of arrest for
possession.[28]See Cannabis reclassification in the United
Kingdom.

The most controversial decisions of the INCB are those in which
it assumes the power to interpret the Single Convention. Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain continue to experiment with
medically supervised injection rooms, despite the INCB's objections
that the Single Convention's allowance of "scientific purposes" is
limited to clinical trials of pharmaceutical grade drugs and not
public health interventions.[29] These
European nations have more leverage to disregard the Board's
decisions because they are not dependent on licit psychoactive drug
exports (which are regulated by the Board). As international lawyer
Bill Bush notes, "Because of the Tasmanian opium poppy industry, Australia is more
vulnerable to political pressure than, say, Germany."[30]

The INCB is an outspoken opponent of drug legalization. Its 2002
report rejects a common argument for drug reform, stating, "Persons
in favour of legalizing illicit drug use argue that drug abusers
should not have their basic rights violated; however, it does not
seem to have occurred to those persons that drug abusers themselves
violate the basic rights of their own family members and society."
The report dismisses concerns that drug control conflicts with
principles of limited government and
self-determination, arguing, "States have a moral and legal
responsibility to protect drug abusers from further
self-destruction." The report takes a majoritarian view of the situation,
declaring, "Governments must respect the view of the majority of
lawful citizens; and those citizens are against illicit drug
use."[31]

Limitation
of scope

The Single Convention allows only drugs with morphine-like,
cocaine-like, and cannabis-like effects to be added to the
Schedules. The strength of the drug is not relevant; only the
similarity of its effects to the substances already controlled. For
instance, etorphine and
acetorphine were
considered sufficiently morphine-like to fall under the treaty's
scope, although they are many times more potent than morphine.
However, according to the Commentary:[32]

The Office of Legal Affairs of the United
Nations ruled, in an opinion given to the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs at its twenty-third session, that barbiturates, tranquillizers and amphetamines were outside the scope of the
Single Convention. It pointed out that there was an understanding
at all stages of the drafting of the Single Convention, in
particular at the Plenipotentiary Conference of 1961 which adopted
that treaty, that the Convention was not applicable to these three
types of substances, although the effects of amphetamines have some
degree of similarity to cocaine, and those of barbiturates and
tranquillizers to morphine.

Since cannabis is a hallucinogen
(although some dispute this), the Commentary speculates that mescaline, psilocybin, tetrahydrocannabinol, and LSD could have been
considered sufficiently cannabis-like to be regulated under the
Single Convention; however, it opines, "It appears that the fact
that the potent hallucinogenics whose abuse has spread in recent
years have not been brought under international narcotics control
does not result from legal reasons, but rather from the view of
Governments that a regime different from that offered by the Single
Convention would be more adequate." That different regime was
instituted by the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. The Convention on Psychotropic Drugs'
scope can include any drug not already under international control
if the World Health Organization
finds that:

The substance has the capacity to produce "[a] state of
dependence" AND "[c]entral nervous system stimulation or
depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor
function or thinking or behaviour or perception or mood"; or

The substance has the capacity to produce similar abuse and
similar ill effects as LSD or one of the other controlled
substances enumerated in Convention; or

There is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is
likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social
problem warranting the placing of the substance under international
control.

The reason for sharply limiting the scope of Single Convention
to a few types of drugs while letting the Convention on
Psychotropic Drugs cover the rest was concern for the interests of
industry. Professor Cindy Fazey's The Mechanics and
Dynamics of the UN System for International Drug Control
explains, "It should be noted that concerted efforts by drug
manufacturing nations and the pharmaceutical industry ensured that
the controls on psychotropics in the 1971 treaty were considerably
looser than those applied to organic drugs in the Single
Convention."[33]

A March 24, 2003 European Parliament committee
report noted the disparity in how drugs are regulated under the two
treaties:[34]

The 1971 Convention, which closely resembles the Single
Convention, establishes an international control which is clearly
less rigorous for the so-called 'psychotropic' substances,
generally produced by the pharmaceutical industry. . . The parallel
existence of the Single Convention and the 1971 Convention have led
to certain illogical effects such as the fact that a plant (cannabis) containing at most
3% of a principal element is dealt with more severely than the pure
substance at 100% (tetrahydrocannabinol or
THC).

Furthermore, the provisions of the Single Convention regarding
the national supply and demand of opium to make morphine contribute
to the global shortage of essential poppy-based pain relief
medicines. According to the Convention, governments can only
request raw poppy materials according to the amount of poppy-based
medicines used in the two preceding years. Consequently, in
countries where underprescription is chronic due to the high prices
of morphine and lack of availability and medical training in the
prescription of poppy-based drugs, it is impossible to demand
enough raw poppy materials from the INCB, as the Convention's
regulating body, to meet the country's pain relief needs. As such,
77% of the world's poppy-based medicine supplies are used by only
six countries (See: Fischer, B J. Rehm, and T Culbert, “Opium based
medicines: a mapping of global supply, demand and needs” in Spivack
D. (ed.) Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan,
Kabul, 2005. p.85–86. [36]).
Many critics of the Convention cite this as one of its primary
limitations and the World Health
Organisation is currently attempting to increase prescription
of poppy-based drugs and to help governments of emerging countries
in particular alter their internal regulations to be able to demand
poppy-based medicines according to the Convention's provisions (see
the WHO
"Assuring Availability of Opioid Analgesics for Palliative
Care"[37]). The Senlis Council, a European drug policy
thinktank, proposes creating a second-tier supply system that would
complement the existing system without altering the balance of its
relatively closed supply and demand system. The Council, who
support licensing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan to create Afghan
morphine, believe the opium supply in this country could go a long
way to easing the pain relief needs of sufferers in emerging
countries by producing a cheap poppy-based medicine solution (see
[The Senlis Council]: "Poppy for Medicine."[38]

Regulation of cannabis

Articles 23 and 28 of the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs require cannabis-producing nations to
have a government agency that controls cultivation.

Cultivation

The Single Convention places the same restrictions on cannabis cultivation that it
does on opium cultivation. Article
23 and Article
28 require each Party to establish a government agency to
control cultivation. Cultivators must deliver their total crop to
the agency, which must purchase and take physical possession of
them within four months after the end of harvest. The agency then
has the exclusive right of "importing, exporting, wholesale trading
and maintaining stocks other than those held by manufacturers."

Rescheduling proposals

There is some controversy over whether cannabis is "particularly
liable to abuse and to produce ill effects" and whether that
"liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages," as
required by Schedule IV criteria. In particular, the discovery of
the cannabinoid receptor system in the
late 1980s revolutionized scientific understanding of cannabis'
effects, and much anecdotal evidence has come to light about the
drug's medical uses. The Canadian Senate committee's report
notes,[42]

At the U.S.’s insistence, cannabis was placed under the heaviest control
regime in the Convention, Schedule IV. The argument for placing
cannabis in this category was that it was widely abused. The WHO
later found that cannabis could have medical applications after
all, but the structure was already in place and no international
action has since been taken to correct this anomaly.

The Commentary points out the theoretical possibility of
removing cannabis from Schedule IV:[43]

Those who question the particularly harmful character of
cannabis and cannabis resin may hold that the Technical Committee
of the Plenipotentiary Conference was under its own criteria not
justified in placing these drugs in Schedule IV; but the approval
of the Committee's action by the Plenipotentiary Conference places
this inclusion beyond any legal doubt. Should the results of the
intensive research which is at the time of this writing being
undertaken on the effects of these two drugs so warrant, they could
be deleted from Schedule IV, and these two drugs, as well as
extracts and tinctures of cannabis, could be transferred from
Schedule I to Schedule II.

Cindy Fazey,
former Chief of Demand Reduction for the United Nations Drug Control Programme, has
pointed out that it would be nearly impossible to loosen
international cannabis regulations. Even if the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs removed cannabis from Schedule IV of the Single
Convention, prohibitions against the plant would remain imbedded in
Article
28 and other parts of the treaty. Fazey cited amendment of the
Articles and state-by-state denunciation as two theoretical
possibilities for changing cannabis' international legal status,
while pointing out that both face substantial barriers.[44]See Cannabis reform
at the international level.

It is possible that the cannabis being used in Europe may not be the same
species that is used in developing countries and that is
causing untold health hazards to the young people who are finding
themselves in hospitals for treatment. Therefore, the INCB's
concern is that cannabis use should be restricted to medical and
scientific purposes, if there are any. Countries who are party to
the Single Convention need to respect the provisions of the
conventions and restrict the use of drugs listed in Schedules I to
IV to strictly medical and scientific purposes.

However, the European Parliament's Committee on
Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs issued a
report on March 24, 2003 criticizing the Single Convention's
scheduling regime:[46]

These schedules show that the main criterion for the
classification of a substance is its medical use. In view of the
principle according to which the only licit uses is those for
medical or scientific purposes (art. 4), plants or substances
deprived of this purpose are automatically considered as
particularly dangerous. Such is the case for cannabis and cannabis resin which are
classified with heroin in
group IV for the sole reason that they lack therapeutic value. A
reason which is in any event disputable, since cannabis could have
numerous medical uses.

There have been several lawsuits over whether cannabis' Schedule
IV status under the Single Convention requires total prohibition at the national level.
In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act to
implement the UN treaty, placing marijuana into Schedule I on the
advice of Assistant Secretary of HealthRoger O.
Egeberg. His letter to Harley O. Staggers, Chairman of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, indicates
that the classification was intended to be provisional[47]:

Some question has been raised whether the use of the plant
itself produces "severe psychological or physical dependence" as
required by a schedule I or even schedule II criterion. Since there
is still a considerable void in our knowledge of the plant and
effects of the active drug contained in it, our recommendation is
that marijuana be retained within schedule I at least until the
completion of certain studies now underway to resolve the
issue."

The reference to "certain studies" is to the then-forthcoming National Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse. In 1972, the Commission released a report favoring
decriminalization of marijuana. The Richard Nixon administration took no
action to implement the recommendation, however. In 1972, the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws filed a
rescheduling petition under provisions of the Act. The government
declined to initiate proceedings on the basis of their
interpretation of U.S. treaty commitments. A federal Court ruled
against the government and ordered them to process the petition
(NORML v. Ingersoll 497 F.2d 654 (1974)). The government
continued to rely on treaty commitments in their interpretation of
scheduling related issues concerning the NORML petition, leading to
another lawsuit (NORML v. DEA 559 F.2d 735 (1977)). In
this decision, the Court made clear that the Act requires a full
scientific and medical evaluation and the fulfillment of the
rescheduling process before treaty commitments can be evaluated.
See
Removal of cannabis from Schedule I of the Controlled Substances
Act.

Cannabis leaves (as opposed to buds) are a special case. The
Canadian Health Protection Branch's Cannabis Control Policy: A
Discussion Paper found that, while the Single Convention
requires nations to take measures against the misuse of, and
illicit traffic in, cannabis buds, a ban is not required on licit
production, distribution, and use of the leaves.[48]

The Single Convention defines "cannabis" as the flowering
or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and
leaves when not accompanied by the tops) from which the resin has
not been extracted. (Art. 1, s-para. 1(b)) It is generally accepted
that this definition permits the legalization of the leaves of the
cannabis plant, provided that they are not accompanied by the
flowering or fruiting tops. However, uncertainty arises by virtue
of paragraph 3 of Article 28 which requires parties to the
Convention to "adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent
the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis
plant." In summary, it appears that parties are not obliged to
prohibit the production, distribution and use of the leaves (since
they are not drugs, as defined the Convention), although they must
take necessary, although unspecified, measures to prevent their
misuse and diversion to the illicit trade.

Related
treaties

Predecessor
treaties

Article
44 provided that the Single Convention's entry into force
terminated several predecessor treaties, including:

From Wikisource

←Wikisource:United Nations

Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is
the international treaty against illicit manufacture and
trafficking of narcotic drugs that forms the bedrock of the global
drug control regime.— Excerpted fromSingle Convention on
Narcotic Drugson Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia.

As amended by the 1972 protocol amending the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs 1961.

PREAMBLE

The Parties,

Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,

Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to
be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that
adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of
narcotic drugs for such purposes,

Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a
serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and
economic danger to mankind,

Understanding that such universal action calls for international
co-operation guided by the same principles and aimed at common
objectives,

Acknowledging the competence of the United Nations in the field
of narcotics control and desirous that the international organs
concerned should be within the framework of that Organization,

Desiring to conclude a generally acceptable international
convention replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting
such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for
continuous international co-operation and control for the
achievement of such aims and objectives,

Article
1: DEFINITIONS

1. Except where otherwise expressly indicated or where the
context otherwise requires, the following definitions shall apply
throughout the Convention:

(a) "Board" means the International Narcotics Control Board,

(b) "Cannabis" means the flowering or fruiting tops of the
cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied
by the tops) from which the resin has not been extracted, by
whatever name they may be designated.

(t) "Production" means the separation of opium, coca leaves,
cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants from which they are
obtained.

(u) "Schedule I", "Schedule II", "Schedule III" and "Schedule
IV" mean the correspondingly numbered list of drugs or preparations
annexed to this Convention, as amended from time to time in
accordance with article 3.

(v) "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.

(w) "Special stocks" means the amounts of drugs held in a
country or territory by the Government of such country or territory
for special government purposes and to meet exceptional
circumstances; and the expression "special purposes" shall be
construed accordingly.

(x) "Stocks" means the amounts of drugs held in a country or
territory and intended for:

(i) Consumption in the country or territory for medical and
scientific purposes,

(ii) Utilization in the country or territory for the manufacture
of drugs and other substances, or

(iii) Export; but does not include the amounts of drugs held in
the country or territory,

(iv) By retail pharmacists or other authorized retail
distributors and by institutions or qualified persons in the duly
authorized exercise of therapeutic or scientific functions, or

(v) As "special stocks".

(y) "Territory" means any part of a State which is treated as a
separate entity for the application of the system of import
certificates and export authorizations provided for in article 31.
This definition shall not apply to the term "territory" as used in
articles 42 and 46.

2. For the purposes of this Convention a drug shall be regarded
as "consumed" when it has been supplied to any person or enterprise
for retail distribution, medical use or scientific research; and
"consumption" shall be construed accordingly.

Article 2: SUBSTANCES
UNDER CONTROL

1. Except as to measures of control which are limited to
specified drugs, the drugs in Schedule I are subject to all
measures of control applicable to drugs under this Convention and
in particular to those prescribed in article 4 (c), 19, 20, 21, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 37.

2. The drugs in Schedule II are subject to the same measures of
control as drugs in Schedule I with the exception of the measures
prescribed in article 30, paragraphs 2 and 5, in respect of the
retail trade.

3. Preparations other than those in Schedule III are subject to
the same measures of control as the drugs which they contain, but
estimates (article 19) and statistics (article 20) distinct from
those dealing with these drugs shall not be required in the case of
such preparations, and article 29, paragraph 2 (c) and article 30,
paragraph 1 (b) (ii) need not apply.

4. Preparations in Schedule III are subject to the same measures
of control as preparations containing drugs in Schedule II except
that article 31, paragraphs 1 (b) and 3 to 15 and, as regards their
acquisition and retail distribution, article 34, paragraph (b),
need not apply, and that for the purpose of estimates (article 19)
and statistics (article 20) the information required shall be
restricted to the quantities of drugs used in the manufacture of
such preparations.

5. The drugs in Schedule IV shall also be included in Schedule I
and subject to all measures of control applicable to drugs in the
latter Schedule, and in addition thereto:

(a) A Party shall adopt any special measures of control which in
its opinion are necessary having regard to the particularly
dangerous properties of a drug so included; and

(b) A Party shall, if in its opinion the prevailing conditions
in its country render it the most appropriate means of protecting
the public health and welfare, prohibit the production,
manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of
any such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical
and scientific research only, including clinical trials therewith
to be conducted under or subject to the direct supervision and
control of the Party.

6. In addition to the measures of control applicable to all
drugs in Schedule I, opium is subject to the provisions of article
19, paragraph 1, subparagraph (f), and of articles 21 bis, 23 and
24, the coca leaf to those of articles 26 and 27 and cannabis to
those of article 28.

8. The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to
substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may
be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of
supervision as may be practicable.

9. Parties are not required to apply the provisions of this
Convention to drugs which are commonly used in industry for other
than medical or scientific purposes, provided that:

(a) They ensure by appropriate methods of denaturing or by other
means that the drugs so used are not liable to be abused or have
ill effects (article 3, paragraph 3) and that the harmful
substances cannot in practice be recovered; and

(b) They include in the statistical information (article 20)
furnished by them the amount of each drug so used.

Article 3: CHANGES
IN THE SCOPE OF CONTROL

1. Where a Party or the World Health Organization has
information which in its opinion may require an amendment to any of
the Schedules, it shall notify the Secretary-General and furnish
him with the information in support of the notification.

2. The Secretary-General shall transmit such notification, and
any information which he considers relevant, to the Parties, to the
Commission, and, where the notification is made by a Party, to the
World Health Organization.

3. Where a notification relates to a substance not already in
Schedule I or in Schedule II,

(i) The Parties shall examine in the light of the available
information the possibility of the provisional application to the
substance of an measures of control applicable to drugs in Schedule
I;

(ii) Pending its decision as provided in subparagraph (iii) of
this paragraph, the Commission may decide that the Parties apply
provisionally to that substance all measures of control applicable
to drugs in Schedule I. The Parties shall apply such measures
provisionally to the substance in question;

(iii) If the World Health Organization finds that the substance
is liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as
the drugs in Schedule I or Schedule II or is convertible into a
drug, it shall communicate that finding to the Commission which
may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health
Organization, decide that the substance shall be added to Schedule
I or Schedule II.

4. If the World Health Organization finds that a preparation
because of the substances which it contains is not liable to abuse
and cannot produce ill effects (paragraph 3) and that the drug
therein is not readily recoverable, the Commission may, in
accordance with the recommendation of the World Health
Organization, add that preparation to Schedule III.

5. If the World Health Organization finds that a drug in
Schedule I is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill
effects (paragraph 3) and that such liability is not offset by
substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances
other than drugs in Schedule IV, the Commission may, in accordance
with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, place
that drug in Schedule IV.

6. Where a notification relates to a drug already in Schedule I
or Schedule II or to a preparation in Schedule III, the Commission,
apart from the measure provided for in paragraph 5, may, in
accordance with the recommendation of the World Health
Organization, amend any of the Schedules by:

(a) Transferring a drug from Schedule I to Schedule II or from
Schedule II to Schedule I; or

(b) Deleting a drug or a preparation as the case may be, from a
Schedule.

7. Any decision of the Commission taken pursuant to this article
shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to all States
Members of the United Nations, to non-member States Parties to this
Convention, to the World Health Organization and to the Board. Such
decision shall become effective with respect to each Party on the
date of its receipt of such communication, and the Parties shall
thereupon take such action as may be required under this
Convention.

8.(a) The decisions of the Commission amending any of the
Schedules shall be subject to review by the Council upon the
request of any Party filed within ninety days from receipt of
notification of the decision. The request for review shall be sent
to the Secretary-General together with all relevant information
upon which the request for review is based;

(b) The Secretary-General shall transmit copies of the request
for review and relevant information to the Commission, the World
Health Organization and to all the Parties inviting them to submit
comments within ninety days. All comments received shall be
submitted to the Council for consideration;

(c) The Council may confirm, alter or reverse the decision of
the Commission, and the decision of the Council shall be final.
Notification of the Council's decision shall be transmitted to all
States Members of the United Nations, to non-member States Parties
to this Convention, to the Commission, to the World Health
Organization, and to the Board;

(d) During pendency of the review the original decision of the
Commission shall remain in effect.

9. Decisions of the Commission taken in accordance with this
article shall not be subject to the review procedure provided for
in article 7.

Article 4: GENERAL
OBLIGATIONS

The parties shall take such legislative and administrative
measures as may be necessary:

(a) To give effect to and carry out the provisions of this
Convention within their own territories;

(b) To co-operate with other States in the execution of the
provisions of this Convention; and

(c) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, to limit
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production,
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and
possession of drugs.

Article 5: THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANS

The Parties, recognizing the competence of the United Nations
with respect to the international control of drugs, agree to
entrust to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and
Social Council, and to the International Narcotics Control Board,
the functions respectively assigned to them under this
Convention.

Article
6: EXPENSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANS

The expenses of the Commission and the Board will be borne by
the United Nations in such manner as shall be decided by the
General Assembly. The Parties which are not Members of the United
Nations shall contribute to these expenses such amounts as the
General Assembly finds equitable and assess from time to time after
consultation with the Governments of these Parties.

Article 7: REVIEW OF DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION

Except for decisions under article 3, each decision or
recommendation adopted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions
of this Convention shall be subject to approval or modification by
the Council or the General Assembly in the same way as other
decisions or recommendations of the Commission.

Article 8: FUNCTIONS OF
THE COMMISSION

The Commission is authorized to consider all matters pertaining
to the aims of this Convention, and in particular:

(a) To amend the Schedules in accordance with article 3;

(b) To call the attention of the Board to any matters which may
be relevant to the functions of the Board;

(c) To make recommendations for the implementation of the aims
and provisions of this Convention, including programmes of
scientific research and the exchange of information of a scientific
or technical nature; and

(d) To draw the attention of non-parties to decisions and
recommendations which it adopts under this Convention, with a view
to their considering taking action in accordance therewith.

Article 9:
COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD

1. The Board shall consist of thirteen members to be elected by
the Council as follows:

(a) Three members with medical, pharmacological or
pharmaceutical experience from a list of at least five persons
nominated by the World Health Organization; and

(b) Ten members from a list of persons nominated by the Members
of the United Nations and by Parties which are not Members of the
United Nations.

2. Members of the Board shall be persons who, by their
competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, will command
general confidence. During their term of office they shall not hold
any position or engage in any activity which would be liable to
impair their impartiality in the exercise of their functions. The
Council shall, in consultation with the Board, make all
arrangements necessary to ensure the full technical independence of
the Board in carrying out its functions.

3. The Council, with due regard to the principle of equitable
geographic representation, shall give consideration to the
importance of including on the Board, in equitable proportion,
persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation in the
producing, manufacturing, and consuming countries, and connected
with such countries.

4. The Board, in co-operation with Governments, and subject to
the terms of this Convention, shall endeavour to limit the
cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an
adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to
ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit
cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking
in and use of, drugs.

5. All measures taken by the Board under this Convention shall
be those most consistent with the intent to further the
co-operation of Governments with the Board and to provide the
mechanism for a continuing dialogue between Governments and the
Board which will lend assistance to and facilitate effective
national action to attain the aims of this Convention.

Article 10: TERMS OF OFFICE AND REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD

1. The members of the Board shall serve for a period of five
years, and may be re-elected.

2. The term of office of each member of the Board shall end on
the eve of the first meeting of the Board which his successor shall
be entitled to attend.

3. A member of the Board who has failed to attend three
consecutive sessions shall be deemed to have resigned.

4. The Council, on the recommendation of the Board, may dismiss
a member of the Board who has ceased to fulfil the conditions
required for membership by paragraph 2 of article 9. Such
recommendation shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
of the Board.

5. Where a vacancy occurs on the Board during the term of office
of a member, the Council shall fill such vacancy as soon as
possible and in accordance with the applicable provisions of
article 9, by electing another member for the remainder of the
term.

6. The members of the Board shall receive an adequate
remuneration as determined by the General Assembly.

Article 11: RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE BOARD

1. The Board shall elect its own President and such other
officers as it may consider necessary and shall adopt its rules of
procedure.

2. The Board shall meet as often as, in its opinion, may be
necessary for the proper discharge of its functions, but shall hold
at least two sessions in each calendar year.

3. The quorum necessary at meetings of the Board shall consist
of eight members.

Article 12:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTIMATE SYSTEM

1. The Board shall fix the date or dates by which, and the
manner in which, the estimates as provided in article 19 shall be
furnished and shall prescribe the forms therefor.

2. The Board shall, in respect of countries and territories to
which this Convention does not apply, request the Governments
concerned to furnish estimates in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention.

3. If any State fails to furnish estimates in respect of any of
its territories by the date specified, the Board shall, as far as
possible, establish the estimates. The Board in establishing such
estimates shall to the extent practicable do so in co-operation
with the Government concerned.

4. The Board shall examine the estimates, including
supplementary estimates, and, except as regards requirements for
special purposes, may require such information as it considers
necessary in respect of any country or territory on behalf of which
an estimate has been furnished, in order to complete the estimate
or to explain any statement contained therein.

5. The Board, with a view to limiting the use and distribution
of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific
purposes and to ensuring their availability for such purposes,
shall as expeditiously as possible confirm the estimates, including
supplementary estimates, or, with the consent of the Government
concerned, may amend such estimates. In case of a disagreement
between the Government and the Board, the latter shall have the
right to establish, communicate and publish its own estimates,
including supplementary estimates.

6. In addition to the reports mentioned in article 15, the Board
shall, at such times as it shall determine but at least annually,
issue such information on the estimates as in its opinion will
facilitate the carrying out of this Convention.

Article
13: ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATISTICAL RETURNS SYSTEM

1. The Board shall determine the manner and form in which
statistical returns shall be furnished as provided in article 20
and shall prescribe the forms therefor.

2. The Board shall examine the returns with a view to
determining whether a Party or any other State has complied with
the provisions of this Convention.

3. The Board may require such further information as it
considers necessary to complete or explain the information
contained in such statistical returns.

4. It shall not be within the competence of the Board to
question or express an opinion on statistical information
respecting drugs required for special purposes.

Article 14: MEASURES BY THE BOARD TO ENSURE THE EXECUTION OF
PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

1. (a) If, on the basis of its examination of information
submitted by Governments to the Board under the provisions of this
Convention, or of information communicated by United Nations organs
or by specialized agencies or, provided that they are approved by
the Commission on the Board's recommendation, by either other
intergovernmental organizations or international non-governmental
organizations which have direct competence in the subject matter
and which are in consultative status with the Economic and Social
Council under Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations or
which enjoy a similar status by special agreement with the Council,
the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this
Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure
of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of
this Convention, the Board shall have the right to propose to the
Government concerned the opening of consultations or to request it
to furnish explanations. If, without any failure in implementing
the provisions of the Convention, a Party or a country or territory
has become, or if there exists evidence of a serious risk that it
may become, or if there exists evidence of a serious risk that it
may become, an important centre of illicit cultivation, production
or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of drugs, the Board
has the right to propose to the Government concerned the opening of
consultations. Subject to the right of the Board to call the
attention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to the
matter referred to in subparagraph (d) below, the Board shall treat
as confidential a request for information and an explanation by a
Government or a proposal for consultations and the consultations
held with a Government under this subparagraph.

(b) After taking action under subparagraph (a) above, the Board,
if satisfied that it is necessary to do so, may call upon the
Government concerned to adopt such remedial measures as shall seem
under the circumstances to be necessary for the execution of the
provisions of this Convention.

(c) The Board may, if it thinks such action necessary for the
purpose of assessing a matter referred to in subparagraph (a) of
this paragraph, propose to the Government concerned that a study of
the matter be carried out in its territory by such means as the
Government deems appropriate. If the Government concerned decides
to undertake this study, it may request the Board to make available
the expertise and the services of one or more persons with the
requisite competence to assist the officials of the Government in
the proposed study. The person or persons whom the Board intends to
make available shall be subject to the approval of the Government.
The modalities of this study and the time-limit within which the
study has to be completed shall be determined by consultation
between the Government and the Board. The Government shall
communicate to the Board the results of the study and shall
indicate the remedial measures that it considers necessary to
take.

(d) If the Boards finds that the Government concerned has failed
to give satisfactory explanations when called upon to do so under
subparagraph (a) above, or has failed to adopt any remedial
measures which it has been called upon to take under subparagraph
(b) above, or that there is a serious situation that needs
co-operative action at the international level with a view to
remedying , it may call the attention of the Parties, the Council
and the Commission to the matter. The Board shall so act if the
aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered and it has
not been possible to resolve the matter satisfactorily in any other
way. It shall also so act if it finds that there is a serious
situation that needs co-operative action at the international level
with a view to remedying it and that bringing such a situation to
the notice of the Parties, the Council and the Commission is the
most appropriate method of facilitating such co-operative action;
after considering the reports of the Board, and of the Commission
if available on the matter, the Council may draw the attention of
the General Assembly to the matter.

2. The Board, when calling the attention of the Parties, the
Council and the Commission to a matter in accordance with paragraph
1 (d) above, may, if it is satisfied that such a course is
necessary, recommend to Parties that they stop the import of drugs,
the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory
concerned, either for a designated period or until the Board shall
be satisfied as to the situation in that country or territory. The
State concerned may bring the matter before the Council.

3. The Board shall have the right to publish a report on any
matter dealt with under the provisions of this article, and
communicate it to the Council, which shall forward it to all
Parties. If the Board publishes in this report a decision taken
under this article or any information relating thereto, it shall
also publish therein the views of the Government concerned if the
latter so requests.

4. If in any case a decision of the Board which is published
under this article is not unanimous, the views of the minority
shall be stated.

5. Any State shall be invited to be represented at a meeting of
the Board at which a question directly interesting it is considered
under this article.

6. Decisions of the Board under this article shall be taken by a
two-thirds majority of the whole number of the Board.

Article 14
bis: TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

In cases which it considers appropriate and either in addition
or as an alternative to measures set forth in article 14,
paragraphs 1 and 2, the Board, with the agreement of the Government
concerned, may recommend to the competent United Nations organs and
to the specialized agencies that technical or financial assistance,
or both, be provided to the Government in support of its efforts to
carry out its obligations under this Convention, including those
set out or referred to in articles 2, 35, 38 and 38 bis.

Article 15: REPORTS OF THE
BOARD

1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work and such
additional reports as it considers necessary containing also an
analysis of the estimates and statistical information at its
disposal, and, in appropriate cases, an account of the
explanations, if any, given by or required of Governments, together
with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires
to make. These reports shall be submitted to the Council through
the Commission, which may make such comments as it sees fit.

2. The reports shall be communicated to the Parties and
subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall
permit their unrestricted distribution.

Article
16: SECRETARIAT

The secretariat services of the Commission and the Board shall
be furnished by the Secretary-General. In particular, the Secretary
of the Board shall be appointed by the Secretary-General in
consultation with the Board.

Article 17: SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATION

The Parties shall maintain a special administration for the
purpose of applying the provisions of this Convention.

Article 18: INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED BY PARTIES TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The Parties shall furnish to the Secretary-General such
information as the Commission may request as being necessary for
the performance of its functions, and in particular:

(a) An annual report on the working of the Convention within
each of their territories;

(b) The text of all laws and regulations from time to time
promulgated in order to give effect to this Convention;

(c) Such particulars as the Commission shall determine
concerning cases of illicit traffic, including particulars of each
case of illicit traffic discovered which may be of importance,
because of the light thrown on the source from which drugs are
obtained for the illicit traffic, or because of quantities involved
or the method employed by illicit traffickers; and

(d) The names and addresses of the governmental authorities
empowered to issue export and import authorizations or
certificates.

2. Parties shall furnish the information referred to in the
preceding paragraph in such manner and by such dates and use such
forms as the Commission may request.

Article 19:
ESTIMATES OF DRUG REQUIREMENTS

1. The Parties shall furnish to the Board each year for each of
their territories, in the manner and form prescribed by the Board,
estimates on forms supplied by it in respect of the following
matters:

(a) Quantities of drugs to be consumed for medical and
scientific purposes;

(b) Quantities of drugs to be utilized for the manufacture of
other drugs, of preparations in Schedule III, and of substances not
covered by this Convention;

(c) Stocks of drugs to be held as at 31 December of the year to
which the estimates relate;

(d) Quantities of drugs necessary for addition to special
stocks;

(e) The area (in hectares) and the geographical location of land
to be used for the cultivation of the opium poppy;

(f) Approximate quantity of opium to be produced;

(g) The number of industrial establishments which will
manufacture synthetic drugs; and

(h) The quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each
of the establishments referred to in the preceding
subparagraph.

2. (a) Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of
article 21, the total of the estimates for each territory and each
drug except opium and synthetic drugs shall consist of the sum of
the amounts specified under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of
paragraph 1 of this article, with the addition of any amount
required to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the
preceding year to the level estimated as provided in subparagraph
(c) of paragraph 1.

(b) Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of
article 21 regarding imports and in paragraph 2 of article 21 bis,
the total of the estimates for opium for each territory shall
consist either of the sum of the amounts specified under
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 of this article, with
the addition of any amount required to bring the actual stocks on
hand at December of the preceding year to the level estimated as
provided in subparagraph(c) of paragraph 1, or of the amount
specified under subparagraph (f) of paragraph 1 of this article,
whichever is higher.

(c) Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of
article 21, the total of the estimates for each territory for each
synthetic drug shall consist either of the sum of the amounts
specified under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 of
this article, with the addition of any amount required to bring the
actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the preceding year to the
level estimated as provided in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1, or
of the sum of the amounts specified under subparagraph (h) of
paragraph 1 of this article, whichever is higher.

(d) The estimates furnished under the preceding subparagraphs of
this paragraph shall be appropriately modified to take into account
any quantity seized and thereafter released for licit use as well
as any quantity taken from special stocks for the requirements of
the civilian population.

3. Any State may during the year furnish supplementary estimates
with an explanation of the circumstances necessitating such
estimates.

4. The Parties shall inform the Board of the method used for
determining quantities shown in the estimates and of any changes in
the said method.

5. Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of
article 21, and account being taken where appropriate of the
provisions of article 21 bis, the estimates shall not be
exceeded.

Article
20: STATISTICAL RETURNS TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BOARD

1. The Parties shall furnish to the Board for each of their
territories, in the manner and form prescribed by the Board,
statistical returns on forms supplied by it in respect of the
following matters:

(a) Production or manufacture of drugs;

(b) Utilization of drugs for the manufacture of other drugs, of
preparations in Schedule III and of substances not covered by this
Convention, and utilization of poppy straw for the manufacture of
drugs;

(c) Consumption of drugs;

(d) Imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw;

(e) Seizures of drugs and disposal thereof;

(f) Stocks of drugs as at 31 December of the year to which the
returns relate; and

(g) Ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy.

2. (a) The statistical returns in respect of the matters
referred to in paragraph 1, except subparagraph (d), shall be
prepared annually and shall be furnished to the Board not later
than 30 June following the year to which they relate.

(b) The statistical returns in respect to the matters referred
to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 shall be prepared quarterly
and shall be furnished to the Board within one month after the end
of the quarter to which they relate.

3. The Parties are not required to furnish statistical returns
respecting special stocks, but shall furnish separately returns
respecting drugs imported into or procured within the country or
territory for special purposes, as well as quantities of drugs
withdrawn from special stocks to meet the requirements of the
civilian population.

Article
21: LIMITATION OF MANUFACTURE AND IMPORTATION

1. The total of the quantities of each drug manufactured and
imported by any country or territory in any one year shall not
exceed the sum of the following:

(a) The quantity consumed, within the limit of the relevant
estimate, for medical and scientific purposes;

(b) The quantity used, within the limit of the relevant
estimate, for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in
Schedule Ill, and of substances not covered by this Convention;

(c) The quantity exported;

(d) The quantity added to the stock for the purpose of bringing
that stock up to the level specified in the relevant estimate;
and

(e) The quantity acquired within the limit of the relevant
estimate for special purposes.

2. From the sum of the quantities specified in paragraph 1 there
shall be deducted any quantity that has been seized and released
for licit use, as well as any quantity taken from special stocks
for the requirements of the civilian population.

3. If the Board finds that the quantity manufactured and
imported in any one year exceeds the sum of the quantities
specified in paragraph 1, less any deductions required under
paragraph 2 of this article, any excess so established and
remaining at the end of the year shall, in the following year, be
deducted from the quantity to be manufactured or imported and from
the total of the estimates as defined in paragraph 2 of article
19.

4. (a) If it appears from the statistical returns on imports or
exports (article 20) that the quantity exported to any country or
territory exceeds the total of the estimates for that country or
territory, as defined in paragraph 2 of article 19, with the
addition of the amounts shown to have been exported, and after
deduction of any excess as established in paragraph 3 of this
article, the Board may notify this fact to States which, in the
opinion of the Board, should be so informed;

(b) On receipt of such a notification, Parties shall not during
the year in question authorize any further exports of the drug
concerned to that country or territory, except:

(i) In the event of a supplementary estimate being furnished for
that country or territory in respect both of any quantity
over-imported and of the additional quantity required, or

(ii) In exceptional cases where the export, in the opinion of
the Government of the exporting country, is essential for the
treatment of the sick.

Article 21
bis: LIMITATION OF PRODUCTION OF OPIUM

1. The production of opium by any country or territory shall be
organized and controlled in such manner as to ensure that, as far
as possible, the quantity produced in any one year shall not exceed
the estimate of opium to be produced as established under paragraph
1 (f) of article 19.

2. If the Board finds on the basis of information at its
disposal in accordance with the provisions of this Convention that
a Party which has submitted an estimate under paragraph 1 (f) of
article 19 has not limited opium produced within its borders to
licit purposes in accordance with relevant estimates and that a
significant amount of opium produced, whether licitly or illicitly,
within the borders of such a Party, has been introduced into the
illicit traffic, it may, after studying the explanations of the
Party concerned, which shall be submitted to it within one month
after notification of the finding in question, decide to deduct
all, or a portion, of such an amount from the quantity to be
produced and from the total of the estimates as defined in
paragraph 2 (b) of article 19 for the next year in which such a
deduction can be technically accomplished, taking into account the
season of the year and contractual commitments to export opium.
This decision shall take effect ninety days after the Party
concerned is notified thereof.

3. After notifying the Party concerned of the decision it has
taken under paragraph 2 above with regard to a deduction, the Board
shall consult with that Party in order to resolve the situation
satisfactorily.

4. If the situation is not satisfactorily resolved, the Board
may utilize the provisions of article 14 where appropriate.

5. In taking its decision with regard to a deduction under
paragraph 2 above, the Board shall take into account not only all
relevant circumstances including those giving rise to the illicit
traffic problem referred to in paragraph 2 above, but also any
relevant new control measures which may have been adopted by the
Party.

Article
22: SPECIAL PROVISION APPLICABLE TO CULTIVATION

1. Whenever the prevailing conditions in the country or a
territory of a Party render the prohibition of the cultivation of
the opium poppy, the coca bush or the cannabis plant the most
suitable measure, in its opinion, for protecting the public health
and welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit
traffic, the Party concerned shall prohibit cultivation.

2. A Party prohibiting cultivation of the opium poppy or the
cannabis plant shall take appropriate measures to seize any plants
illicitly cultivated and to destroy them, except for small
quantities required by the Party for scientific or research
purposes.

Article 23: NATIONAL OPIUM
AGENCIES

1. A Party that permits the cultivation of the opium poppy for
the production of opium shall establish, if it has not already done
so, and maintain, one or more government agencies (hereafter in
this article referred to as the Agency) to carry out the functions
required under this article.

2. Each such Party shall apply the following provisions to the
cultivation of the opium poppy for the production of opium and to
opium;

(a) The Agency shall designate the areas in which, and the plots
of land on which, cultivation of the opium poppy for the purpose of
producing opium shall be permitted.

(b) Only cultivators licensed by the Agency shall be authorized
to engage in such cultivation.

(c) Each licence shall specify the extent of the land on which
the cultivation is permitted.

(d) All cultivators of the opium poppy shall be required to
deliver their total crops of opium to the Agency. The Agency shall
purchase and take physical possession of such crops as soon as
possible, but not later than four months after the end of the
harvest.

(e) The Agency shall, in respect of opium, have the exclusive
right of importing, exporting, wholesale trading and maintaining
stocks other than those held by manufacturers of opium alkaloids,
medicinal opium or opium preparations. Parties need not extend this
exclusive right to medicinal opium and opium preparations.

3. The governmental functions referred to in paragraph 2 shall
be discharged by a single government agency if the constitution of
the Party concerned permits it.

Article 24: LIMITATION ON PRODUCTION OF OPIUM FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE

1. (a) If any Party intends to initiate the production of opium
or to increase existing production, it shall take account of the
prevailing world need for opium in accordance with the estimates
thereof published by the Board so that the production of opium by
such Party does not result in overproduction of opium in the
world.

(b) A Party shall not permit the production of opium or increase
the existing production thereof if in its opinion such production
or increased production in its territory may result in illicit
traffic in opium.

2. (a) Subject to paragraph 1, where a Party which as of 1
January 1961 was not producing opium for export desires to export
opium which it produces, in amounts not exceeding five tons
annually, it shall notify the Board, furnishing with such
notification information regarding:

(i) The controls in force as required by this Convention
respecting the opium to be produced and exported; and

(ii) The name of the country or countries to which it expects to
export such opium; and the Board may either approve such
notification or may recommend to the Party that it not engage in
the production of opium for export.

(b) Where a Party other than a Party referred to in paragraph 3
desires to produce opium for export in amounts exceeding five tons
annually, it shall notify the Council, furnishing with such
notification relevant information including:

(i) The estimated amounts to be produced for export;

(ii) The controls existing or proposed respecting the opium to
be produced;

(iii) The name of the country or countries to which it expects
to export such opium; and the Council shall either approve the
notification or may recommend to the Party that it not engage in
the production of opium for export.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b)
of paragraph 2, a Party that during ten years immediately prior to
1 January 1961 exported opium which such country produced may
continue to export opium which it produces.

4. (a) A Party shall not import opium from any country or
territory except opium produced in the territory of:

(i) A Party referred to in paragraph 3;

(ii) A Party that has notified the Board as provided in
subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2; or

(iii) A Party that has received the approval of the Council as
provided in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2.

(b) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, a Party
may import opium produced by any country which produced and
exported opium during the ten years prior to 1 January 1961 if such
country has established and maintains a national control organ or
agency for the purposes set out in article 23 and has in force an
effective means of ensuring that the opium it produces is not
diverted into the illicit traffic.

5. The provisions of this article do not prevent a Party:

(a) From producing opium sufficient for its own requirements;
or

(b) From exporting opium seized in the illicit traffic, to
another Party in accordance with the requirements of this
Convention.

Article 25: CONTROL OF
POPPY STRAW

1. A Party that permits the cultivation of the opium poppy for
purposes other than the production of opium shall take all measures
necessary to ensure:

(a) That opium is not produced from such opium poppies; and

(b) That the manufacture of drugs from poppy straw is adequately
controlled.

2. The Parties shall apply to poppy straw the system of import
certificates and export authorizations as provided in article 31,
paragraphs 4 to 15.

3. The Parties shall furnish statistical information on the
import and export of poppy straw as required for drugs under
article 20, paragraphs 1 (d) and 2 (b).

Article 26: THE COCA
BUSH AND COCA LEAVES

1. If a Party permits the cultivation of the coca bush, it shall
apply thereto and to coca leaves the system of controls as provided
in article 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy, but as
regards paragraph 2 (d) of that article, the requirements imposed
on the Agency therein referred to shall be only to take physical
possession of the crops as soon as possible after the end of the
harvest.

2. The Parties shall so far as possible enforce the uprooting of
all coca bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes
if illegally cultivated.

Article
27: ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO COCA LEAVES

1. The Parties may permit the use of coca leaves for the
preparation of a flavouring agent, which shall not contain any
alkaloids, and, to the extent necessary for such use, may permit
the production, import, export, trade in and possession of such
leaves.

2. The Parties shall furnish separately estimates (article 19)
and statistical information (article 20) in respect of coca leaves
for preparation of the flavouring agent, except to the extent that
the same coca leaves are used for the extraction of alkaloids and
the flavouring agent, and so explained in the estimates and
statistical information.

Article 28: CONTROL OF
CANNABIS

1. If a Party permits the cultivation of the cannabis plant for
the production of cannabis or cannabis resin, it shall apply
thereto the system of controls as provided in article 23 respecting
the control of the opium poppy.

2. This Convention shall not apply to the cultivation of the
cannabis plant exclusively for industrial purposes (fibre and seed)
or horticultural purposes.

3. The Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the
cannabis plant.

Article
29: MANUFACTURE

1. The Parties shall require that the manufacture of drugs be
under licence except where such manufacture is carried out by a
State enterprise or State enterprises.

2. The Parties shall:

(a) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged
in the manufacture of drugs;

(b) Control under licence the establishments and premises in
which such manufacture may take place; and

(c) Require that licensed manufacturers of drugs obtain
periodical permits specifying the kinds and amounts of drugs which
they shall be entitled to manufacture. A periodical permit,
however, need not be required for preparations.

3. The Parties shall prevent the accumulation, in the possession
of drug manufacturers, of quantities of drugs and poppy straw in
excess of those required for the normal conduct of business, having
regard to the prevailing market conditions.

Article 30: TRADE AND
DISTRIBUTION

1. (a) The Parties shall require that the trade in and
distribution of drugs be under licence except where such trade or
distribution is carried out by a State enterprise or State
enterprises.

(b) The Parties shall:

(i) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged
in the trade in or distribution of drugs;

(ii) Control under licence the establishments and premises in
which such trade or distribution may take place. The requirement of
licensing need not apply to preparations.

(c) The provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) relating to
licensing need not apply to persons duly authorized to perform and
while performing therapeutic or scientific functions.

2. The Parties shall also:

(a) Prevent the accumulation in the possession of traders,
distributors, State enterprises or duly authorized persons referred
to above, of quantities of drugs and poppy straw in excess of those
required for the normal conduct of business, having regard to the
prevailing market conditions; and

(b) (i) Require medical prescriptions for the supply or
dispensation of drugs to individuals. This requirement need not
apply to such drugs as individuals may lawfully obtain, use,
dispense or administer in connexion with their duly authorized
therapeutic functions; and

(ii) If the Parties deem these measures necessary or desirable,
require that prescriptions for drugs in Schedule 1 should be
written on officials forms to be issued in the form of counterfoil
books by the competent governmental authorities or by authorized
professional associations.

3. It is desirable that Parties require that written or printed
offers of drugs, advertisements of every kind or descriptive
literature relating to drugs and used for commercial purposes,
interior wrappings of packages containing drugs, and labels under
which drugs are offered for sale indicate the international
non-proprietary name communicated by the World Health
Organization.

4. If a Party considers such measure necessary or desirable, it
shall require that the inner package containing a drug or wrapping
thereof shall bear a clearly visible double red band. The exterior
wrapping of the package in which such drug is contained shall not
bear a double red band.

5. A Party shall require that the label under which a drug is
offered for sale show the exact drug content by weight or
percentage. This requirement of label information need not apply to
a drug dispensed to an individual on medical prescription.

6. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 5 need not apply to the
retail trade in or retail distribution of drugs in Schedule II.

Article 31: SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL
TRADE

1. The Parties shall not knowingly permit the export of drugs to
any country or territory except:

(a) In accordance with the laws and regulations of that country
or territory; and

(b) Within the limits of the total of the estimates for that
country or territory, as defined in paragraph 2 of article 19, with
the addition of the amounts intended to be re-exported.

2. The Parties shall exercise in free ports and zones the same
supervision and control as in other parts of their territories,
provided, however, that they may apply more drastic measures.

3. The Parties shall:

(a) Control under licence the import and export of drugs except
where such import or export is carried out by a State enterprise or
enterprises;

(b) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged
in such import or export.

4. (a) Every Party permitting the import or export of drugs
shall require a separate import or export authorization to be
obtained for each such import or export whether it consists of one
or more drugs.

(b) Such authorization shall state the name of the drug, the
international non-proprietary name if any, the quantity to be
imported or exported, and the name and address of the importer and
exporter, and shall specify the period within which the importation
or exportation must be effected.

(c) The export authorization shall also state the number and
date of the import certificate (paragraph 5) and the authority by
whom it has been issued.

(d) The import authorization may allow an importation in more
than one consignment.

5. Before issuing an export authorization the Parties shall
require an import certificate, issued by the competent authorities
of the importing country or territory and certifying that the
importation of the drug or drugs referred to therein, is approved
and such certificate shall be produced by the person or
establishment applying for the export authorization. The Parties
shall follow as closely as may be practicable the form of import
certificate approved by the Commission.

6. A copy of the export authorization shall accompany each
consignment, and the Government issuing the export authorization
shall send a copy to the Government of the importing country or
territory.

7. (a) The Government of the importing country or territory,
when the importation has been effected or when the period fixed for
the importation has expired, shall return the export authorization,
with an endorsement to that effect, to the Government of the
exporting country or territory.

(b) The endorsement shall specify the amount actually
imported.

(c) If a lesser quantity than that specified in the export
authorization is actually exported, the quantity actually exported
shall be stated by the competent authorities on the export
authorization and on any official copy thereof.

8. Exports of consignments to a post office box, or to a bank to
the account of a Party other than the Party named in the export
authorization, shall be prohibited.

9. Exports of consignments to a bonded warehouse are prohibited
unless the Government of the importing country certifies on the
import certificate, produced by the person or establishment
applying for the export authorization, that it has approved the
importation for the purpose of being placed in a bonded warehouse.
In such case the export authorization shall specify that the
consignment is exported for such purpose. Each withdrawal from the
bonded warehouse shall require a permit from the authorities having
jurisdiction over the warehouse and, in the case of a foreign
destination shall be treated as if it were a new export within the
meaning of this Convention.

10. Consignments of drugs entering or leaving the territory of a
Party not accompanied by an export authorization shall be detained
by the competent authorities.

11. A Party shall not permit any drugs consigned to another
country to pass through its territory, whether or not the
consignment is removed from the conveyance in which it is carried,
unless a copy of the export authorization for such consignment is
produced to the competent authorities of such Party.

12. The competent authorities of any country or territory
through which a consignment of drugs is permitted to pass shall
take all due measures to prevent the diversion of the consignment
to a destination other than that named in the accompanying copy of
the export authorization unless the Government of that country or
territory through which the consignment is passing authorizes the
diversion. The Government of the country or territory of transit
shall treat any requested diversion as if the diversion were an
export from the country or territory of transit to the country or
territory of new destination. If the diversion is authorized, the
provisions of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) shall also apply between the
country or territory of transit and the country or territory which
originally exported the consignment.

13. No consignment of drugs while in transit, or whilst being
stored in a bonded warehouse, may be subjected to any process which
would change the nature of the drugs in question. The packing may
not be altered without the permission of the competent
authorities.

14. The provisions of paragraphs 11 to 13 relating to the
passage of drugs through the territory of a Party do not apply
where the consignment in question is transported by aircraft which
does not land in the country or territory of transit. If the
aircraft lands in any such country or territory, those provisions
shah be applied so far as circumstances require.

15. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the
provisions of any international agreements which limit the control
which may be exercised by any of the Parties over drugs in
transit.

16. Nothing in this article other than paragraphs 1 (a) and 2
need apply in the case of preparations in Schedule III.

Article 32: SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE CARRIAGE OF DRUGS IN
FIRST-AID KITS OF SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFIC

1. The international carriage by ships or aircraft of such
limited amounts of drugs as may be needed during their journey or
voyage for first-aid purposes or emergency cases shall not be
considered to be import, export or passage through a country within
the meaning of this Convention.

2. Appropriate safeguards shall be taken by the country of
registry to prevent the improper use of the drugs referred to in
paragraph 1 or their diversion for illicit purposes. The
Commission, in consultation with the appropriate international
organizations, shall recommend such safeguards.

3. Drugs carried by ships or aircraft in accordance with
paragraph 1 shall be subject to the laws, regulations, permits and
licences of the country of registry, without prejudice to any
rights of the competent local authorities to

carry out cheeks, inspections and other control measures on
board ships or aircraft. The administration of such drugs in the
case of emergency shall not be considered a violation of the
requirements of article 30, paragraph 2 (b).

Article 33: POSSESSION OF
DRUGS

The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except
under legal authority.

Article 34:
MEASURES OF SUPERVISION AND INSPECTION

The Parties shall require:

(a) That all persons who obtain licences as provided in
accordance with this Convention, or who have managerial or
supervisory positions in a State enterprise established in
accordance with this Convention, shall have adequate qualifications
for the effective and faithful execution of the provisions of such
laws and regulations as are enacted in pursuance thereof; and

(b) That governmental authorities, manufacturers, traders,
scientists, scientific institutions and hospitals keep such records
as will show the quantities of each drug manufactured and of each
individual acquisition and disposal of drugs. Such records shall
respectively be preserved for a period of not less than two years.
Where counterfoil books (article 30, paragraph 2 (b)) of official
prescriptions are used, such books including the counterfoils shall
also be kept for a period of not less than two years.

Article 35:
ACTION AGAINST THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC

Having due regard to their constitutional, legal and
administrative systems, the Parties shall:

(a) Make arrangements at the national level for co-ordination of
preventive and repressive action against the illicit traffic; to
this end they may usefully designate an appropriate agency
responsible for such co-ordination;

(b) Assist each other in the campaign against the illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs;

(c) Co-operate closely with each other and with the competent
international organizations of which they are members with a view
to maintaining a co-ordinated campaign against the illicit
traffic;

(d) Ensure that international co-operation between the
appropriate agencies be conducted in an expeditious manner; and

(e) Ensure that where legal papers are transmitted
internationally for the purposes of a prosecution, the transmittal
be effected in an expeditious manner to the bodies designated by
the Parties; this requirement shall be without prejudice to the
right of a Party to require that legal papers be sent to it through
the diplomatic channel;

(f) Furnish, if they deem it appropriate, to the Board and the
Commission through the Secretary-General, in addition to
information required by article 18, information relating to illicit
drug activity within their borders, including information on
illicit cultivation, production, manufacture and use of, and on
illicit trafficking in, drugs; and

(g) Furnish the information referred to in the preceding
paragraph as far as possible in such manner and by such dates as
the Board may request; if requested by a Party, the Board may offer
its advice to it in furnishing the information and in endeavouring
to reduce the illicit drug activity within the borders of that
Party.

Article 36: PENAL
PROVISIONS

1. (a) Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party
shall adopt such measures as will ensure that cultivation,
production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession,
offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery
on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit,
transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the
provisions of this Convention, and any other action which in the
opinion of such Party may be contrary to the provisions of this
Convention, shall be punishable offences when committed
intentionally, and that serious offences shall be liable to
adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties
of deprivation of liberty.

(b) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraph, when abusers of
drugs have committed such offences, the Parties may provide, either
as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to
conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo measures
of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social
reintegration in conformity with paragraph 1 of article 38.

2. Subject to the constitutional limitations of a Party, its
legal system and domestic law,

(a) (i) Each of the offences enumerated in paragraph 1, if
committed in different countries, shall be considered as a distinct
offence;

(ii) Intentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and
attempts to commit, any of such offences, and preparatory acts and
financial operations in connexion with the offences referred to in
this article, shall be punishable offences as provided in paragraph
1;

(iii) Foreign convictions for such offences shall be taken into
account for the purpose of establishing recidivism; and

(iv) Serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by
nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in
whose territory the offence was committed, or by the Party in whose
territory the offender is found if extradition is not acceptable in
conformity with the law of the Party to which application is made,
and if such offender has not already been prosecuted and judgement
given.

(b) (i) Each of the offences enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2
(a) (ii) of this article shall be deemed to be included as an
extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between
Parties. Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between
them.

(ii) If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at
its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for
extradition in respect of the offences enumerated in paragraphs 1
and 2 (a) (ii) of this article. Extradition shall be subject to the
other conditions provided by the law of the requested Party.

(iii) Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences enumerated in
paragraphs 1 and 2 (a) (ii) of this article as extraditable
offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by
the law of the requested Party.

(iv) Extradition shall be granted in conformity with the law of
the Party to which application is made, and, notwithstanding
subparagraphs(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, the Party
shall have the right to refuse to grant the extradition in cases
where the competent authorities consider that the offence is not
sufficiently serious.

3. The provisions of this article shall be subject to the
provisions of the criminal law of the Party concerned on questions
of jurisdiction.

4. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle
that the offences to which it refers shall be defined, prosecuted
and punished in conformity with the domestic law of a Party.

Article 37: SEIZURE AND
CONFISCATION

Any drugs, substances and equipment used in or intended for the
commission of any of the offences, referred to in article 36, shall
be liable to seizure and confiscation.

Article 38:
MEASURES AGAINST THE ABUSE OF DRUGS

1. The Parties shall give special attention to and take all
practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and for
the early identification, treatment, education, after-care,
rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons involved and
shall co-ordinate their efforts to these ends.

2. The Parties shall as far as possible promote the training of
personnel in the treatment, after-care, rehabilitation and social
reintegration of abusers of drugs.

3. The Parties shall take all practicable measures to assist
persons whose work so requires to gain an understanding of the
problems of abuse of drugs and of its prevention, and shall also
promote such understanding among the general public if there is a
risk that abuse of drugs will become widespread.

Article 38 bis:
AGREEMENTS ON REGIONAL CENTRES

If a Party considers it desirable as part of its action against
the illicit traffic in drugs, having due regard to its
constitutional, legal and administrative systems, and, if it so
desires, with the technical advice of the Board or the specialized
agencies, it shall promote the establishment, in consultation with
other interested Parties in the region, of agreements which
contemplate the development of regional centres for scientific
research and education to combat the problems resulting from the
illicit use of and traffic in drugs.

Article 39: APPLICATION OF STRICTER NATIONAL CONTROL MEASURES THAN
THOSE REQUIRED BY THIS CONVENTION

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, a Party
shall not be, or be deemed to be, precluded from adopting measures
of control more strict or severe than those provided by this
Convention and in particular from requiring that Preparations in
Schedule III or drugs in Schedule II be subject to all or such of
the measures of control applicable to drugs in Schedule I as in its
opinion is necessary or desirable for the protection of the public
health or welfare.

Article 40: LANGUAGES OF THE CONVENTION AND PROCEDURE FOR
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION

1. This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be open for
signature until 1 August 1961 on behalf of any Member of the United
Nations, of any non-member State which is a Party to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice or member of a specialized
agency of the United Nations, and also of any other State which the
Council may invite to become a Party.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.

3. This Convention shall be open after 1 August 1961 for
accession by the States referred to in paragraph 1. The instruments
of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.

Article 41: ENTRY INTO
FORCE

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day
following the date on which the fortieth instrument of ratification
or accession is deposited in accordance with article 40.

2. In respect of any other State depositing an instrument of
ratification or accession after the date of deposit of the said
fortieth instrument, this Convention shall come into force on the
thirtieth day after the deposit by that State of its instrument of
ratification or accession.

Article 42: TERRITORIAL
APPLICATION

This Convention shall apply to all non-metropolitan territories
for the international relations of which any Party is responsible,
except where the previous consent of such a territory is required
by the Constitution of the Party or of the territory concerned, or
required by custom. In such case the Party shall endeavour to
secure the needed consent of the territory within the shortest
period possible, and when that consent is obtained the Party shall
notify the Secretary-General. This Convention shall apply to the
territory or territories named in such notification from the date
of its receipt by the Secretary-General. In those cases where the
previous consent of the non-metropolitan territory is not required,
the Party concerned shall, at the time of signature, ratification
or accession, declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories
to which this Convention applies.

Article 43: TERRITORIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLES 19, 20, 21 AND
31

1. Any Party may notify the Secretary-General that, for the
purposes of articles 19, 20, 21 and 31, one of its territories is
divided into two or more territories, or that two or more of its
territories are consolidated into a single territory.

2. Two or more Parties may notify the Secretary-General that, as
the result of the establishment of a customs union between them,
those Parties constitute a single territory for the purposes of
articles 19, 20, 21 and 31.

3. Any notification under paragraph 1 or 2 above shall take
effect on 1 January of the year following the year in which the
notification was made.

Article
44: TERMINATION OF PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

1. The provisions of this Convention, upon its coming into
force, shall, as between Parties hereto, terminate and replace the
provisions of the following treaties:

(a) International Opium Convention, signed at The Hague on 23
January 1912;

(b) Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in
and Use of Prepared Opium, signed at Geneva on 11 February
1925;

(c) International Opium Convention, signed at Geneva on 19
February 1925;

(d) Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, signed at Geneva on 13 July 193
1;

(e) Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East,
signed at Bangkok on 27 November 193 1;

(f) Protocol signed at Lake Success on 11 December 1946,
amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic
Drugs concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11
February 1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 193 1, at Bangkok on
27 November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936, except as it
affects the last-named Convention;

(g) The Conventions and Agreements referred to in subparagraphs
(a) to (e) as amended by the Protocol of 1946 referred to in
subparagraph (f);

(h) Protocol signed at Paris on 19 November 1948 Bringing under
International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the Convention of
13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol signed
at Lake Success on 11 December 1946;

(i) Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the
Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade
in, and Use of Opium, signed at New York on 23 June 1953, should
that Protocol have come into force.

2. Upon the coming into force of this Convention, article 9 of
the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs, signed at Geneva on 26 June 1936, shall, between
the Parties thereto which are also Parties to this Convention, be
terminated, and shall be replaced by paragraph 2 (b) of article 36
of this Convention; provided that such a Party may by notification
to the Secretary-General continue in force the said article 9.

Article 45: TRANSITIONAL
PROVISIONS

1. The functions of the Board provided for in article 9 shall,
as from the date of the coming into force of this Convention
(article 41, paragraph 1), be provisionally carried out by the
Permanent Central Board constituted under chapter VI of the
Convention referred to in article 44 (c) as amended, and by the
Supervisory Body constituted under chapter 11 of the Convention
referred to in article 44 (d) as amended, as such functions may
respectively require.

2. The Council shall fix the date on which the new Board
referred to in article 9 shall enter upon its duties. As from that
date that Board shall, with respect to the States Parties to the
treaties enumerated in article 44 which are not Parties to this
Convention, undertake the functions of the Permanent Central Board
and of the Supervisory Body referred to in paragraph 1.

Article
46: DENUNCIATION

1. After the expiry of two years from the date of the coming
into force of this Convention (article 41, paragraph 1) any Party
may, on its own behalf or on behalf of a territory for which it has
international responsibility, and which has withdrawn its consent
given in accordance with article 42, denounce this Convention by an
instrument in writing deposited with the Secretary-General.

2. The denunciation, if received by the Secretary-General on or
before the first day of July in any year, shall take effect on the
first day of January in the succeeding year, and, if received after
the first day of July, shall take effect as if it had been received
on or before the first day of July in the succeeding year.

3. This Convention shall be terminated if, as a result of
denunciations made in accordance with paragraph 1, the conditions
for its coming into force as laid down in article 41, paragraph 1,
cease to exist.

Article
47: AMENDMENTS

1. Any Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. The
text of any such amendment and the reasons therefor shall be
communicated to the Secretary-General who shall communicate them to
the Parties and to the Council. The Council may decide either:

(a) That a conference shall be called in accordance with Article
62, paragraphs, of the Charter of the United Nations to consider
the proposed amendment; or

(b) That the Parties shall be asked whether they accept the
proposed amendment and also asked to submit to the Council any
comments on the proposal.

2. If a proposed amendment circulated under paragraph 1 (b) of
this article has not been rejected by any Party within eighteen
months after it has been circulated, it shall thereupon enter into
force. If, however, a proposed amendment is rejected by any Party,
the Council may decide, in the light of comments received from
Parties, whether a conference shall be called to consider such
amendment.

Article 48:
DISPUTES

1. If there should arise between two or more Parties a dispute
relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention,
the said Parties shall consult together with a view to the
settlement of the dispute by negotiation, investigation, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, recourse to regional bodies, judicial
process or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. Any such dispute which cannot be settled in the manner
prescribed shall be referred to the International Court of Justice
for decision.

Article 49: TRANSITIONAL
RESERVATIONS

1. A Party may at the time of signature, ratification or
accession reserve the right to permit temporarily in any one of its
territories:

(a) The quasi-medical use of opium;

(b) Opium smoking;

(c) Coca leaf chewing;

(d) The use of cannabis, cannabis resin, extracts and tinctures
of cannabis for non-medical purposes; and

(e) The production and manufacture of and trade in the drugs
referred to under (a) to (d) for the purposes mentioned
therein.

2. The reservations under paragraph 1 shall be subject to the
following restrictions:

(a) The activities mentioned in paragraph 1 may be authorized
only to the extent that they were traditional in the territories in
respect of which the reservation is made, and were there permitted
on 1 January 1961.

(b) No export of the drugs referred to in paragraph 1 for the
purposes mentioned therein may be permitted to a non-party or to a
territory to which this Convention does not apply under article
42.

(c) Only such persons may be permitted to smoke opium as were
registered by the competent authorities to this effect on 1 January
1964.

(d) The quasi-medical use of opium must be abolished within 15
years from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in
paragraph 1 of article 41.

(e) Coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years
from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in
paragraph 1 of article 41.

(f) The use of cannabis for other than medical and scientific
purposes must be discontinued as soon as possible but in any case
within twenty-five years from the coming into force of this
Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of article 41.

(g) The production and manufacture of and trade in the drugs
referred to in paragraph 1 for any of the uses mentioned therein
must be reduced and finally abolished simultaneously with the
reduction and abolition of such uses.

3. A Party making a reservation under paragraph 1 shall:

(a) Include in the annual report to be furnished to the
Secretary-General, in accordance with article 18, paragraph 1 (a),
an account of the progress made in the preceding year towards the
abolition of the use, production, manufacture or trade referred to
under paragraph 1; and

(b) Furnish to the Board separate estimates (article 19) and
statistical returns (article 20) in respect of the reserved
activities in the manner and form prescribed by the Board.

4. (a) If a Party which makes a reservation under paragraph 1
fails to furnish:

(i) The report referred to in paragraph 3 (a) within six months
after the end of the year to which the information relates;

(ii) The estimates referred to in paragraph 3 (b) within three
months after the date fixed for that purpose by the Board in
accordance with article 12, paragraph 1;

(iii) The statistics referred to in paragraph 3 (b) within three
months after the date on which they are due in accordance with
article 20, paragraph 2

the Board or the Secretary-General, as the case may be, shall
send to the Party concerned a notification of the delay, and shall
request such information within a period of three months after the
receipt of that notification.

(b) If the Party fails to comply within this period with the
request of the Board or the Secretary-General, the reservation in
question made under paragraph 1 shall cease to be effective,

5. A State which has made reservations may at any time by
notification in writing withdraw all or part of its
reservations.

Article 50: OTHER
RESERVATIONS

1. No reservations other than those made in accordance with
article 49 or with the following paragraphs shall be permitted.

2. Any State may at the time of signature, ratification or
accession make reservations in respect of the following provisions
of this Convention:

3. A State which desires to become a Party but wishes to be
authorized to make reservations other than those made in accordance
with paragraph 2 of this article or with article 49 may inform the
Secretary-General of such intention. Unless by the end of twelve
months after the date of the Secretary-General's communication of
the reservation concerned, this reservation has been objected to by
one third of the States that have ratified or acceded to this
Convention before the end of that period, it shall be deemed to be
permitted, it being understood however that States which have
objected to the reservation need not assume towards the reserving
State any legal obligation under this Convention which is affected
by the reservation.

4. A State which has made reservations may at any time by
notification in writing withdraw all or part of its
reservations.

Article 51:
NOTIFICATIONS

The Secretary-General shall notify to all the States referred to
in paragraph 1 of article 40:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with
article 40;

(b) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in
accordance with article 41;