The Nuclear Version of 20 Questions

Published: June 1, 1989

Until 1985, U.S. law prohibited the sharing of nuclear weapons design with any other country except Britain. Yet for a decade, American officials had been secretly helping France design nuclear weapons. The extensive help secured France's tacit cooperation in NATO plans, despite its supposed independence, and many other benefits. It's less clear that the secrecy was so necessary.

The covert assistance program is described in a Foreign Policy magazine article by Richard Ullman of Princeton. To avoid giving away weapons design information, prohibited by law, U.S. officials would have the French describe their weapons program and then respond, indicating which lines of research were unpromising. The exercise was known as ''20 Questions.''

In this way the French learned how to miniaturize nuclear warheads for use on multiple-warhead missiles, and how to protect them from the electromagnetic pulse of nearby nuclear explosions. Besides design information, they were told how to conduct underground nuclear tests, and how to prevent accidental detonations and unauthorized launches. They were given information on missile guidance and propulsion, and on Soviet targets and defense measures, Mr. Ullman reports.

The exchange policy was begun by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Its logic was that since France had a nuclear force anyway, it might as well be as safe and efficient as possible, and the French saved from wasting money on false leads. French Governments, both conservative and Socialist, seem to have greatly appreciated the sharing of nuclear secrets.

In return, Mr. Ullman relates, they coordinated their nuclear targeting plans with NATO, made supply routes and airfields available to NATO forces, shared intelligence data and even cooperated with American efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Was the assistance legal? The 20 Questions routine may have fallen within the letter of the Atomic Energy Act but hardly within its spirit. Succeeding Administrations seem to have kept Congress, or at least certain members, informed. But the program was not given a clear legal basis until 1985.

The program, if of the extent Mr. Ullman describes, brought great benefits to both sides. Why, then, did it have to be kept so secret? The French evidently insisted on secrecy, but Washington could have pressed harder for disclosure. In retrospect at least, it seems imprudent to have depended on the miraculous. Who could have reasonably assumed that the secret would, as it did, keep all these years?