NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part
of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,200 U.S. 321,
337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES

SMITH et al. v. CITY OF JACKSON,
MISSISSIPPI, et al.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 031160.Argued November 3,
2004Decided March 30, 2005

In revising its employee pay plan, respondent
City granted raises to all police officers and police
dispatchers in an attempt to bring their starting salaries up
to the regional average. Officers with less than five
years service received proportionately greater raises
than those with more seniority, and most officers over 40 had
more than five years of service. Petitioners, a group of older
officers, filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA), claiming, inter alia, that they were
adversely affected by the plan because of their age. The
District Court granted the City summary judgment. Affirming,
the Fifth Circuit ruled that disparate-impact claims are
categorically unavailable under the ADEA, but it assumed that
the facts alleged by petitioners would entitle them to relief
under Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,401 U.S. 424, which
announced a disparate-impact theory of recovery for cases
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII).

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

351 F.3d 183, affirmed.

Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II,
and IV, concluding:

1. The ADEA
authorizes recovery in disparate-impact cases comparable to
Griggs. Except for the substitution of age
for race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
the language of ADEA §4(a)(2) and Title VII
§703(a)(2) is identical. Unlike Title VII, however, ADEA
§4(f)(1) significantly narrows its coverage by permitting
any otherwise prohibited action where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age (hereinafter RFOA provision). Pp. 24.

2. Petitioners have not set forth
a valid disparate-impact claim. Two textual differences
between the ADEA and Title VII make clear that the
disparate-impact theorys scope is narrower under the ADEA
than under Title VII. One is the RFOA provision. The other is
the amendment to Title VII in the Civil Right Act of 1991,
which modified this Courts Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio,490
U.S. 642, holding that narrowly construed the scope of
liability on a disparate-impact theory. Because the relevant
1991 amendments expanded Title VIIs coverage but did not
amend the ADEA or speak to age discrimination, Wards
Coves pre-1991 interpretation of Title VIIs
identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.
Congress decision to limit the ADEAs coverage by
including the RFOA provision is consistent with the fact that
age, unlike Title VIIs protected classifications, not
uncommonly has relevance to an individuals capacity to
engage in certain types of employment. Here, petitioners have
done little more than point out that the pay plan is relatively
less generous to older workers than to younger ones. They have
not, as required by Wards Cove, identified any specific
test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an
adverse impact on older workers. Further, the record makes
clear that the Citys plan was based on reasonable factors
other than age. The Citys explanation for the
differential between older and younger workers was its
perceived need to make junior officers salaries
competitive with comparable positions in the market. Thus, the
disparate impact was attributable to the Citys decision
to give raises based on seniority and position. Reliance on
these factors is unquestionably reasonable given the
Citys goal. Pp. 1114.

Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer,
concluded in Part III that the ADEAs text, the
RFOA provision, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) regulations all support the conclusion that a
disparate-impact theory is cognizable under the ADEA.
Pp. 411.

Justice Scalia
concluded that the reasoning in Part III of Justice
Stevens opinion is a basis for deferring, pursuant to
Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837, to the
EEOCs reasonable view that the ADEA authorizes
disparate-impact claims. Pp. 15.

Justice
OConnor, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas,
concluded that the judgment should be affirmed on the ground
that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA.
Pp. 122.

Stevens, J.,
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, in which
Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an
opinion with respect to Part III, in which Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
OConnor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined. Rehnquist,
C. J., took no part in the decision of the case.