Plaintiff,
an inmate at Central State Prison in Macon, Georgia, filed
this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
contesting the conditions of his criminal sentence. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff also moved to procced in forma pauperis.
(Doc. 2.) For the reasons that follow, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Furthermore, I
RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS
Plaintiff's Complaint, DIRECT the Clerk
of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and
to CLOSE this case, and
DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.[1]

In his
Complaint, Plaintiff states Defendant banished him from
Lowndes County, Georgia, as part of his criminal sentence and
requests this Court lift his order of banishment. (Doc. 1,
pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff contends banishment was not part of the
plea deal he entered into in September 2008 and states
Defendant has refused to lift the banishment despite
Plaintiff moving for such relief. Further, Plaintiff states
that his family is located in Lowndes County and that he
formerly worked there. Plaintiff argues banishment deprives
him of his right to see his family and has never been written
into Georgia law. (Id.)

STANDARD
OF REVIEW

Plaintiff
seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the
Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the
prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an
inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement
of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled
to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court
must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).

When
reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in
forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions
for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading
that states a claim for relief must contain [among other
things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in
numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of
circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without arguable
merit either in law or fact.'” Napier v.
Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
2001)).

Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable
to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 Fed.Appx. 675, 678
(11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A plaintiff must assert “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also “accords judges not
only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251
F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327 (1989)).

In its
analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle
that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a
less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . .
.”) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's
unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding
procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113 (1993) (“We have never suggested that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.”).

DISCUSSION

I.
Dismissal Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

In this
cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant wrongly and
unlawfully banished him from Lowndes County as part of his
criminal sentence. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6.) This claim implicates
the conditions of his sentence and seeks this Court to
essentially overturn part of a sentence imposed by the State
of Georgia. As such, this Court is precluded from reviewing
Plaintiff's claims by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.

Pursuant
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court is without
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, which seek review
of a state-court criminal conviction and sentence imposed
against him. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263
U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and provides
that, as a general matter, federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review a final state court decision.”
McCorvey v. Weaver, No. 15-10470, 2015 WL 5751756,
at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2015).
“Rooker-Feldman applies because, among the
federal courts, Congress authorized only the Supreme Court to
reverse or modify a state court decision.” Helton
v. Ramsay, 566 Fed.Appx. 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that
Rooker-Feldman precludes “state-court losers
[from] complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgements rendered before the [federal] district court
proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district court
review and rejection of those judgments.”)). Because
Plaintiff, through this Section 1983 action, essentially asks
this Court to invalidate the terms of the conviction and
sentence he is currently serving at Central State Prison in
Macon, Georgia, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For
these reasons, the Court should DISMISS
...

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