On 3/16/2013 5:06 AM, WM wrote:> On 16 Mrz., 00:09, fom <fomJ...@nyms.net> wrote:>> On 3/15/2013 2:12 AM, WM wrote:>>>>> On 14 Mrz., 23:36, fom <fomJ...@nyms.net> wrote:>>>> On 3/14/2013 5:15 PM, WM wrote:>>>>>>> distinguishable, that means definable by finite words>>>>>> How does a definition "distinguish"?>>>>> A definition is a name.>>>> Ok. But, then I would have to ask>> what you mean by name.>> A name is a finite sequence of letters that two or more persons have> agreed upon to be used for a given object. This object may be material> or immaterial.

I had simply been a littlesurprised in the other responseand gave a slightly short-temperedremark.

So I should be asking how twoindividuals come to agreementas to the meaning of names.

The following summarizes variousdiscussions in the literature concerningagreement with regard to identifyingreference in language.

The idea of an agreement coincideswith what we have mentionedbefore. Namely, that languagemeaning does derive from pragmaticconsiderations and that the"ideal language theory" that ispredominant in metamathematicalought to be more informed bypragmatics.

With regard to "learning" scenarios,there are two of which I am aware.Mostly, people think of howchildren acquire langauge. Forthe most part, that would notapply here except in a strangeway that I will make clearnow.

Certainly, many have discussed theissue of language acquisition, butI am taking from the presentationfrom Strawson "Individuals".

What seems to be relevant isStrawson's observation thatchildren begin by treating allnouns as mass terms. A mass termis distinguished from a singularterm in the sentences,

'I drink water'

'I pet the cat'

As a child is learning, one wouldbe more likely to hear the statments,

'I drink water'

'I pet cat'

I mention this only because of astrange translator's footnotein Lesniewski,

"As the Polish language doesnot contain counterparts of'a' and 'the', the translatorhas had to add the appropriatearticle whenever English hasrequired it."

I cannot speak to what thePolish language has as counterpartsto definite and indefinitereferences, but I can imagine thatthe difference in the languagescould explain how Lesniewskihad been so astute to rejectthe claims of Russell's paradoxat such an early date.

The second learning scenariois that given by Quine in"Word and Object". The idea isthat an anthropological linguistis visiting an indigenouspopulation of people and attemptingto formulate the first translationof their language.

This is what has been referredto on wikipedia as the Quineandouble standard.

Now, the general pragmatic notionof agreement between speakers isgiven by Grice. I have nooriginal sources for Grice, butin the literature I do have thereare three principles by Levinsonthat seem to be accepted by others.They are what would be calledNeo-Gricean inferential princples.

Q-principle:

Speaker's maxim-

Do not provide a statement thatis informationally weaker thanyour knowledge of the worldallows, unless providing astronger statement wouldcontravene the I-principle.

Recipient's corollary-

Take it that the speaker madethe strongest statementconsistent with what he knows,and therefore that:

i)

if the stated expression isinformationally weaker thansome another comparablestatement, infer that thespeaker knows the strongerstatement to be false

Amplify the informationalcontent of the speaker'sutterance, by finding themost specific interpretation,up to what is judged to bethe speaker's intentionunless the speaker hasused a marked expression.

M-principle:

Speaker's maxim-

Indicate an abnormal,non-stereotypical situationby using marked expressionsin contrast to what one woulduse to describe normalstereotypical expresssions.

Recipient's corollary-

What is said in an abnormalway indicates an abnormalsituation.

Clearly these rules of implicatureare not directly relevant to theissue of naming. They are presentedhere as background for a discussionof Searle's account of referencein terms of language acts. Unlikesimple description theories, Searletakes into account the language actsof a speaker and the recognition ofspeaker intentions by a hearer.

There are some preliminary conditionsto Searle's positions given byBoersema:

1)The axiom of existence: There mustexist one and only one object towhich the speaker's utterance mayapply.

2)The axiom of identification: Thehearer must be given sufficientmeans to identify the object fromthe speaker's utterance of theexpression.

3)A necessary condition for thesuccessful performance of a definitereference in the utterance of theexpression is that either theexpression must be an identifyingdescription or the speaker mustbe able to produce an identifyingdescription on demand.

Given these conditions, Boersemapresents Searle's account asfollows:

Given that speaker S utters an expressionR in the presence of hearer H in a contextC, then in the literal utterance ofexpression R, speaker S successively andnon-defectively performs the speech actof singular identifying reference if andonly if the following 7 conditionsobtain,

1)Normal input and output conditionsobtain (speaker S and hearer Hunderstand one another and participatein the language act felicitously)

2)The utterance of expression R occursas part of the utterance of some sentenceor similar unit of discourse T

3)The utterance or discourse T is thepurported performance of an illocutionaryact