Politicisation and the Indian military

While agreeing with General S Padmanabhan who says in his recent book that "politicisation of
the military is a self defeating exercise in a democracy," it is difficult to
concede that "greed for fish and loaves of office" is how the politician would corrupt the military
establishment and wrench it from its apolitical moorings, writes
Firdaus Ahmed.

In his latest book, A General Speaks, General 'Paddy' Padmanabhan
has put down his views that on many issues he describes as being "quite different from
those of the Government of India." The General's views in the matter of politicisation and
the Indian military are of interest on account of their likely influence within
the Army he once led. His book is a distillation of his experience, though his memoirs are
still due. His candour is credible in light of his earlier work The Writing on the Wall: India Checkmates
America 2017 in which his scenario of India prevailing over the U.S. runs in the face of current
India-U.S. bonhomie.

In one of the book's key chapters, the General examines "the matter of political control
of the services in greater depth, the aberrations that have crept in and what we
must do to see that the armed forces are not politicized." The General is right
in assessing that the Indian record is one calling for self-congratulations,
particularly in light of the situation to the contrary elsewhere in our
neighbourhood.

Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2005, 234p.

The General's view is that politicisation of the Army has as its starting
point unauthorized approaches by politicians on behalf of kinfolk. This gives
rise to the 'politically infected' officer and the onset of politicisation at
the grassroots level. The 'senior league' corruption is when symbiotic ties
develop between such upwardly mobile officers and their political mentors.
Another class of 'politically sensitised' servicemen comprises those hailing
from political backgrounds such as scions of erstwhile princely families. The
General praises such officers for having "conducted themselves with dignity."
These are also thinly veiled references to former defense ministers.

But the General betrays an unsophisticated understanding of politicisation.
Politicisation is a much more complex phenomenon than a politician seeking undue favour
for his constituents and a pliant uniformed kinsman serving up the same. Politicisation
is a departure from the professional ethic of neutrality by flirting with a political
plank and is known to have sorry outcomes. In its more pernicious form it is about the
military subscribing to an ideology. We need look no further than Pakistan to see
the consequences.

During the Zia years, there was an attempt at Islamisation of Pakistan so as to
build up an Islamic identity for the state. This led up to an increased
influence of the Jamaat I Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat within the officer
corps. Strategic leverage of the Islamic card was also sought through Pakistan's
training and arming of both the Taliban and Kashmiri militants. The outcome has
been a dysfunctional democracy and growth of terrorism at home and abroad.

In India, politicisation of state agencies has also been attempted with like
consequence. During the Emergency years, the depredations of a 'committed'
bureaucracy were paid for at the polls of 1977. Politicisation of the police in
Mumbai and Gujarat has been evident in the manner of their response to communal
flare-ups. The growth of minority extremism can be partially attributed to these
violent episodes.

The General's analysis is also missing a related predisposition of the
military. Sociologically, armed services are known to be conservative entities.
They favour political realism in which power is taken as an arbiter. Their
corporate interest lies in higher defense spending. In the bureaucratic politics
that characterizes the policy and budget formulation process, the armed services
also require allies. Therefore it can be hazarded that armed forces are not
politically innocent. They would instead incline towards the conservative end of
the political spectrum.

A convergence of interests of between the military and the civil state
could result in politicisation that in theory passes for 'subjective' political
control of the military. It is this linkage that requires one to be alert against.

In the Indian case, the rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) endorses majoritarian
nationalism, favors political 'realism' and higher defense budgets. Its tenure as the
ruling dispensation at Delhi witnessed India going nuclear, one limited war and one
prolonged crisis. The period witnessed the demonisation of India's largest minority,
a hard line towards Kashmir and Pakistan, an abnegation of critical faculties in
relations with the U.S., and restructuring of the higher defense system in line with
the military's wishes, though not to their complete satisfaction. Criticism from seasoned
military watchers such as Praveen Swami and A G Noorani has been useful in keeping its
ideological inroads into the military under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the fag end of
1998 saw a close call for the military in the unprecedented sacking of the Naval
Chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, by the BJP led government.

That the military does not require 'detoxification' can be attributed to the
resilience of liberalism in India that resulted in the timely change in government
at Delhi in 2004 owing to issues as 'pani, bijli, sadak' (water, electricity, roads),
and perhaps electoral revulsion over the Gujarat episode.

Still, sensitisation to the threat of politicisation, for it remains even today a threat-in-being,
is required and towards this end a more rigorous understanding of the phenomenon is necessary.
The recent outcry that led to the defense minister retracting the government's
position on the muslim headcount in the Army indicates that the right wing of polity
continues to hold sway in issues such as national security. Even liberal governments are
compelled to be defensively hard-nosed, so as not to be accused of reneging on
national security. In times of crisis, this tendency is further accentuated.

The General, in another passage informs us, that "armies are maintained to
safeguard core values and national interests." He
elaborates this line also in his
latest writing 'Indian Army: 2020' in the
Indian Defence Review of
October-December 2005.

It is true that formation and articulation of values and interests, while being a political exercise,
does witness the participation of institutions charged with national security. But
participation may not be value-driven alone. For instance, the nuclear establishment
lent its weight to India's nuclearisation arguing in terms of national security. That
this was also in its corporate interest was not projected and it was merely taken as
being incidental to its position. Likewise, the military is a participant in defining
these values and interests,
for its strategic projections are premised on such a
definition.

There is therefore a case to be made for a more sophisticated review than the rather
bland offering of the General. For too long has the fixation with coups and the
relative political supremacy of the military vs. civil formed the subject matter of
military sociology. For India, the conclusion has invariably been that civil supremacy is sacrosanct.
(Apurba Kundu's excellent Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus
is a typical example of such an assessment.)

The lesson is that the military is not quite a neutral agency engaged purely
in an apolitical, professional and non-judgmental provision of security for its
'client', the state. Instead its position on what constitutes these values and
interests has utility for political forces. A convergence could result
in politicisation that in theory passes for 'subjective' political control of
the military. It is this linkage that requires one to be alert against in India
that is otherwise treated as a model developing state in so far as political control
of the military goes. Further, it is this linkage that usually results in the tilting
of the balance towards issues of national security and away from the social sector
or a developmental agenda.

In sum, while agreeing with General Padmanabhan that "politicisation of the military is
a self defeating exercise in a democracy," it is difficult to concede that "greed for fish and
loaves of office" is how the politician would corrupt the military
establishment and wrench it from its apolitical moorings. The threat is instead
in a tacit, if not covert, ideological affinity that a conservative military may
share, albeit unwittingly, with nationalist parties. It is this relationship
that bears future watch particularly if the political right reemerges at the helm.

Firdaus Ahmed17 April 2006

Firdaus Ahmed is a freelance writer on security issues and a regular contributor to India Together.