Does Blameworthiness Require Wrongdoing?

A commonly held presupposition is that a person can be blameworthy only for acts that are considered morally wrong. I’ll refer to this as the ‘blameworthiness requires wrongness’ (BW) principle. Recently, a few philosophers began denying this principle citing cases where it is morally permissible to act in a certain way even though such acts are suboptimal. These suboptimal acts, so the argument goes, are morally permissible yet blameworthy. If this is true then BW is false since the act is not wrong. I will briefly describe a case (recently discussed at length here by Dana Nelkin) that motivates this particular denial of BW before suggesting that this way of denying BW doesn’t work for me. Michael Mckenna and Ish Haji have also discussed this at length in recent papers.

Suppose you and I are taking an exam next to one another, and I have brought 20 pencils while you only brought 1. Your pencil breaks, and I see you’re upset as the test is timed and you do not have an extra pencil. I look at you and see that you’re upset, but, rather than offer one of my 19 extra pencils I think to myself “she should have been smart and prepared like me” and continue on with my test.**

Did I do anything wrong? Am I blameworthy in this case?

For some, this example generates a ‘no’ to the first question but a ‘yes’ to the second. The pull to say yes for the second question seems to suggest that something is “morally amiss” but not wrong, hence morally permissible. If this is your inclination then you might support a denial of BW. I’m inclined to think that I did so something wrong, and because of this wrongness I am blameworthy (a yes to both questions). If something seems wrong about the act but the axiological ethical system we’re appealing to deems the act permissible, then it seems that the ethical theory that fails to deem these acts as wrong (if in fact we think they are) is simply incomplete and not that those agents are to blame for a permissible act and that BW is false. Those acts are morally amiss because there is something amiss about them (again, assuming one finds something wrong in these cases—I do). Such “amissness” makes the acts impermissible, at least to me. So, failing to give a pencil when you have far more than you need while the other person has none, as in the pencil sharing case, is wrong and those agents are blameworthy because of that “wrongness”. Once we spell out the details for why we think there is something wrong in either case I think we will notice that we are blaming the agent for what we find amiss.

I guess I’m not convinced in the existence of suberogatoryacts (more on these sorts of acts in future posts). I more inclined to think that most ethical systems are flawed and need to be fine tuned in light of such examples. If my inclination is right then it seems, at least in cases similar to the pencil sharing case, that none of these agents are being blamed for “right” or permissible actions. The action or omission in the given case seem wrong. The wrongness seems to lie in the lack of virtue exhibited by the agents in question (does this suggest that VE is more inclusive as an ethical theory?). I can’t think of a case where one is to blame yet what they did was permissible. When we dig into any of the examples we will find something wrong. If that’s right then where this is blame there is wrongness and BW seems to stand its ground.

Now, there might be other ways to deny BW, however, cases such as the one described above do not seem to give us the resources to do so.

So to tentatively answer the question “does blameworthiness require wrongness?”, I am inclined to say yes.

What do you think?

** This case is a slightly modified version of the case Dana Nelkin and David Shoemaker discussed on the Flickers of Freedom blog I linked above.

It’s an interesting example, isn’t it? I have competing intuitions about the example. Part of my “wrongness” intuitions have to do with the context. I can imagine two cases that exactly match your description, yet have different intuitions about the wrongness and blameworthiness of the act when I add additional information. Here are the two cases:

Case 1: I have my extra pencils, the test is timed, but I am given more than enough time to ponder the questions on the test. That being said, I could stop and offer the other person a pencil and still have a decent amount of time to complete my test and do exceptionally well on it.

Case 2: The test is timed in such a way that it just gives students enough time to answer the questions. You are in a high stress environment, and time is of the essence. If you stop and offer the other person a pencil, this behavior could subtract from time I could otherwise use on another part of my test.

In case 2, my intuition is that I am not doing anything wrong, but at the same time, I don’t think I am to blame, if I didn’t stop and offer the person a pencil. I would be putting myself at risk in doing so.

Case 1, I seem more blameworthy and oddly enough, more in the wrong.

There are additional concerns I have about the wrongness/blameworthiness examples and discussion. First, is wrongness and blameworthiness an all or nothing affair, or does it come in degrees? Second, there was a fairly recent study I read on the stress students have when they have to write a test. The associated stress has to do with going to excessive lengths to show the professor they aren’t cheating and pressure to show/prove that you aren’t a cheater. Perhaps this has nothing to do with the case, but I was thinking maybe people’s intuitions could be guided by these psychological factors. Perhaps students are less likely to give a pencil, and think it morally permissible not to give pencil, simply because if they were in that situation, they wouldn’t want to get accused of cheating. But, if we add to the case that the examiner would not accuse the person of cheating, even if you chose to give the person a pencil, then maybe intuitions would be different. On the other hand, maybe most people are narcissistic assholes, and this disposition informs their moral intuitions.

Sure, blameworthiness might come in degrees but I wouldn’t want to say wrongness does. Acts are usually codified as either permissible, impermissible, or obligatory.

Assume that I had the extra time and there was a sign on the door that said “no talking unless you’re sharing a pencil”. The case is not meant to be a difficult one. It’s meant to be the sort of case that is permissible by the standards of one’s ethical view yet blameworthy. So, assume I could have shared without negative repercussions (maybe I lose a bit of lead from letting my neighbor use it). Most ethical theories allow for you not to, but, rather than posit the act as right but blameworthy I would characterize it as wrong.

If we were to assume that the person was worried about getting in trouble then I wouldn’t say the act was wrong at all and I do not think blame should follow either. If we bring in your considerations then I think the act loses its blameworthy status. My point is that the concepts do not come apart, or, at least I have not seen evidence why they should.

I don’t think cases like this exist (cases where an act is permissible but blameworthy). If there is something “amiss” or “off” about the case but our ethical theory permits it then I chalk this up to an incomplete ethical system and not a case where an act is really permissible yet one is blameworthy.

Consider Julia Driver’s case in her paper on the suberogatory. I cut my grass at 7am on Saturday morning, thereby waking my neighbors. Her thought is that this act is morally permissible (and so not wrong) but is a bad act (a blameworthy act?). The negative evaluation for those who deny BW would ground blame in the acts “badness”. Let’s also assume that I know my neighbor is asleep and likes to sleep on Saturday morning.

There are a bunch of other cases as well… My inclination is that in all of the cases the agent is failing to embody a virtue that the situation calls for rendering the acts impermissible and blameworthy.

“The road to hell is paved with good intentions.” We have all heard this little chestnut at one point or another, and I think the message that underlies the common saying might be useful for appraising the BW principle. It seems to me the message is something like this: no matter how well-intentioned an agent might be in committing a particular action, the consequences of well-intentioned actions can, and so often do, turn out to be devastating. The cases you present, and the response given to Ray, seem to suggest that whether an action is morally right or wrong is just a function of whether the acting agent is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. So, in the “pencil” example, we can see that offering a pencil to a fellow student in need can be seen as morally right or morally wrong, depending on the intentions behind the action. In the case of you not wanting to get in trouble for offering the pencil to the student in need, you suggest that this act should not be deemed morally wrong or the agent morally blameworthy. However, if you just couldn’t be bothered to spend a few seconds helping a fellow student in need (at no cost to you) then not offering the pencil is morally wrong and you are morally blameworthy. So it seems that the moral status of the action and agent is dependent on the intentions and general though-processes behind the action. Given the slippery nature of intentions, this seems rather worrying to me. However, perhaps more worrying, such an approach may lead to some highly counterintuitive outcomes. Take the following two cases:

Case 1: You notice a fellow student in desperate need of a pencil, and you happen to have 19 extras. There is no one around who notices this, and so you are the only chance this person has to obtain a pencil. The nature of the test is such that providing no answer to a particular question receives a mark of zero, but providing a wrong answer receives a penalty, thereby lowing your overall score. Also, let’s suppose the test is graded on a curve. You believe the student who is need of a pencil is in fact completely inept, and are confident that if given the opportunity to complete the test, her score will be much worse than if she leaves the remaining questions incomplete, in the process lowering the curve and improving your chances of a good grade. As a result, and with this malice intention, you offer the student a pencil. However, it just so happens that you were utterly wrong in your appraisal, and with pencil in hand the student completes the test and receives the highest mark on the exam. On your view, it seems to me that given the clearly malice intention, the act of lending the pencil to your fellow student in need was morally wrong and you are morally blameworthy.

Case 2: You notice a fellow student in desperate need of a pencil, and you happen to have 19 extras. However, you know this student as someone who feels very entitled and cares little for following directions and taking precautions. You have had countless, well-intentioned discussions with this person in attempt to help her change her foolish ways, but to no avail. You think the only way this student will really change is if she is in some way punished for her carelessness, and you see this as a great opportunity for such a lesson. With the intention of trying to get your fellow student to see the error of her ways, in hopes that this lesson will help her become a more responsible and virtuous person, you withhold offering a pencil. However, despite your praiseworthy intention (though I haven’t made the argument, it seems plausible that acting in this way can be argued as praiseworthy), the student not only fails to see the error in her ways, she fails the test completely, and flunks out of the class and university. On your view, it seems that given your good intentions, the act of not lending your fellow student is morally right and you are morally praiseworthy.

So in these two cases, we have what initially seem to me to be a morally right act (lending the pencil) and morally wrong act (not lending the pencil), especially when we take into consideration the results of these actions. However, given the relevant intentions, the moral status of the actors must be seen in the exact opposite way. If we follow the BW principle, then the act of lending the pencil must now be considered morally wrong, and the act of not lending the pencil must be seen as morally right. Intentions are doing all the work as far as determing the moral status of an action. This seems rather counterintuitive to me, and I am curious as to what you think. It seems we are now forced to say “The road to hell is paved with good intentions….and morally right actions.”

You say “So it seems that the moral status of the action and agent is dependent on the intentions and general though-processes behind the action. Given the slippery nature of intentions, this seems rather worrying to me.”.

I want to say that the action evaluation and the agent evaluation MIGHT be different. But, if an ethical theory is to give us guidance I think it should also recommend the structure of reason for why an agent ought to do the act. So, in the last few lines of my post I posed the central question and gave an answer. the question and answer I posed was this; “So to tentatively answer the question “does blameworthiness require wrongness?”, I am inclined to say yes”. So even if I grant that actions are “right” and let the agent evaluation and the act evaluation come apart I would still point to the evaluation of the agent and point to some wrongness there. If I am allowed to do that, which I think I am, then the principle stays in tact as there is blameworthiness but the action is not free of “wrongness” since the agent is wrong with regards to the intentions that generated the action (or that was the first step in the action sequence). Does blameworthiness requires wrongness? If the agent has the “wrong” intentions then he is blameworthy for something wrong. I think the answer to the question is still yes if we think about it like this.

Your cases are bad ass! Especially case 1. Some thoughts.

Case 1: Absolutely blameworthy. You don’t think that bastard of a person isn’t? He was wrong to set his poor neighbor up in that way. The wrongness in this case lies in the character evaluation. But, not only having the character but by acting on that bad character. His blame is still tied to an action, right? Blame is tied to wrongness in this case.

Case 2: Absolutely praiseworthy. Now, I’d have to know more about the relationship between the agents and if the person withholding the pencil has tried other ways of helping this bad student prior to the withholding. However, it seems fairly coherent to say yes, praiseworthy here. With that said, I don’t think anything I have said has proved that the BW principle is necessarily right. A lot depends on the axiology that we are working with and a lot depends on how that axiology spells out right, wrong, and obligatory actions.

What I’m trying to do is build in the intention as part of the act process. If there is wrongness there I’m not committed to saying that I disagree with the outcome. I think that once I bring wrongess into an act that results in great things (such as saving a life for the wrong reasons) you want to resist but if we think of an act as not JUST the outcomes but as a process that begins with intention and ends with outcomes then it doesn’t seem so worrisome. We rarely blame simply for outcomes. Luck infects us all and once we recognize that I think that we will be more focused on an agent’s intent rather than on the outcomes of actions when it comes to responsibility appraisals.

I love how you started with the quote and ended with it. Nicely done. This should have been a post in it’s own right. I think you should contribute your own posts sooner than later.

Considering your schedule and the fact that having only recently been made aware of your blog I am digging into your archives and making new comments on older articles I recognize that in indulging myself by making such comments it might seem that I have put you under an obligation to respond. Obviously some have a higher priority than others and some may simply be statements to indicate interest or put in my “two cents”. With that in mind, and with the understanding that we both are capable of making choices under the doctrine of free will……I’m going to disagree that a failure to give the fellow student is either blameworthy of necessarily morally wrong.

To the larger issue of whether blameworthiness requires moral wrong doing as well.

If I pass you going five mile under the speed limit on a two lane road by increasing my speed to the point I am traveling at five miles over the speed limit I would have to assume that I am “blameworthy” of going over the speed limit but I’m not so sure it rises to the level of engaging in a morally wrong act.