This opinion is subject to
further editing.If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.

A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals.SeeWis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.

Appeal Nos.

2013AP1503
2013AP1504

Cir.
Ct. Nos.2012TP58
2012TP57

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF
APPEALS

DISTRICT I

In re the termination of parental rights to Deonte H., a
person under the age of 18:

State of Wisconsin,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

Samantha S.,

Respondent-Appellant,

Deonte H.,

Respondent.

In re the termination of parental rights to Angel S., a
person under the age of 18:

State of Wisconsin,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

Samantha S.,

Respondent-Appellant.

APPEALS
from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:john
j. di motto, Judge.Affirmed.

¶1FINE, J. Samantha S. appeals the order
terminating her parental rights to Angel S. and Deonte H. Both children had previously been determined
to be in need of protection or services. See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.13, 48.33, 48.335, 48.345.
A jury found that Samantha S. had, in
connection with both children, not satisfied the conditions set for their
return to her, and that there was a “substantial likelihood” that she would
“not meet those conditions within” a nine-month period following the trial. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) (a child’s
“continuing need of protection or services” is a ground that justifies the
trial court’s consideration of whether termination of parental rights to that
child is warranted). The jury also found
that Samantha S. did not assume parental responsibility for each of the
children. See Wis. Stat. §
48.415(6) (a parent’s failure to assume parental responsibility for a child is
a ground that justifies the trial court’s consideration of whether termination
of parental rights to that child is warranted). Samantha S. claims that the trial court erred
in three respects, all in connection with the guardian ad litem’s closing argument to the jury. She complains that: (1) the trial court did not sustain Samantha
S.’s objection to what she contends was the guardian ad litem’s improper “golden rule” argument; (2) the trial court did
not sustain Samantha S.’s objection to what she contends was the guardian ad litem’s improper appeal that the jury
consider the best interests of the children; and (3) the trial court’s limiting
instruction in connection with the guardian ad
litem’s alleged best-interests argument did not address what Samantha S.
contends was the “golden rule” aspect of what the guardian ad litem told the jury. We
affirm.

¶2This appeals turns on the following part of the guardian ad litem’s closing argument to the jury
during the first phase of the proceedings, right after the guardian ad litem reminded the jury of evidence
that Samantha S. had not kept appointments for visiting the children:

The two children who needed
her the most because they’re in foster care, Angel and Deonte, obviously are
confused by her absence. Confused by the
inconsistency in her visits. Have become
-- are becoming attached to the care -- to their caregivers.

Samantha S. objected, calling
what the guardian ad litem had just
made an “[i]nappropriate argument.” The
trial court rejected the lawyer’s request for a sidebar and overruled the
objection, but cautioned the jury that it should not base its verdicts on any
consideration of what the jurors may believe was in the children’s best
interests:

But ladies and gentlemen of
the jury, I do want to tell you this.Is
that you decide what the facts are from all the evidence, and you decide the
answer to the questions on the special verdict based on the evidence in this
case. And as I indicated to you, your
focus is on the evidence and with respect to whether the State has proven the
grounds alleged. You should not construe
any of the arguments, as you should make a decision as to what you think is
best for the children. Best interest of
the children is not your concern. That’s
something that the court gets concerned with later in the case. Your goal, your focus is looking at the
conduct in light of the facts, answering the questions on the special verdict. Once again, best interest of the children
should not be considered by you in any manner, shape, or form in the decision
that you make in answering those questions.

As noted, Samantha S. claims
that what the guardian ad litem said
to the jury: (1) was an improper
“golden rule” argument; (2) was an improper appeal that the jury consider the
best interests of the children; and (3) that the trial court’s limiting
instruction was inadequate. We disagree.

A.Alleged “Golden
Rule” Argument.

¶3Both parties recognize that an appeal for a jury to place
themselves in a party’s position can be an improper “golden rule” argument. See Rodriguez v. Slattery, 54 Wis. 2d
165, 170, 194 N.W.2d 817, 819–820 (1972). A “golden rule” argument asks the jurors to
put themselves “in another’s place and decide what he would want for a
particular injury or damage to himself or his child.”Id., 54 Wis. 2d at 170, 194 N.W.2d
at 819. The guardian ad litem did not say anything that even
came close to being a “golden rule” argument.

B.Alleged Appeal to Have the Jury Consider the
Best Interests of the Children.

¶4Both parties also agree that a jury considering whether there
are grounds that warrant moving to the best-interests phase of the proceeding
should not consider whether termination of parental rights would be in the
children’s best interests; that, as the trial court correctly told the jury is
a matter that the court decides and not something the jury may consider. See Waukesha County Department of Social
Services v. C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 368 N.W.2d 47, 54 (1985). Samantha S.’s argument that the trial court erred
is without merit.

¶5First, nothing in the excerpt about which she complains asked
the jury to consider the children’s best interests. Rather, the guardian ad litem merely pointed out what Samantha S. should have realized: namely, that the visits were important to the
children and also that they were important components of concerned parenting. Thus, the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in overruling the objection. See State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d
425, 457, 247 N.W.2d 80, 97 (1976) (trial courts have broad discretion over
closing arguments).

¶6Second, the trial court fully instructed the jury to limit
their consideration of the missed visits to the issues that the jury did have
to decide. We assume that juries follow
jury instructions, see State v. Truax, 151 Wis. 2d 354,
362, 444 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Ct. App. 1989), and Samantha S. points to nothing in
the Record that indicates that the jury here did not heed what the trial court
told it.

C.Alleged Inadequacy of the Trial Court’s
Limiting Instruction.

¶7This argument, too, is without merit because, as we have
seen, the guardian ad litem never
made a “golden rule” argument.