For 17 years the British authorities have lied about the fatal RAF helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre in which 25 senior counterinsurgency personnel were killed. Now Global Research reveals new evidence showing that the loss of life was an intentional act of sabotage.

It was the worst single loss of life by Britain’s Royal Air Force since the Second World War. On the evening of 2 June 1994, an RAF Chinook military helicopter slammed into a mountainside on the Mull of Kintyre in thick fog, killing all 29 onboard. Among the dead were four RAF crew and 25 of Britain’s senior counterinsurgency personnel. The latter – including British Army officers and mainly members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary – had overseen Britain’s “dirty war” operations against Irish republican militants during 25 years of conflict in Northern Ireland.

The RAF Chinook – ZD576 – was taking the team of counterinsurgency experts to a high-level security conference at Fort George in Inverness (at the eastern end of the Great Glen). The helicopter took off from Aldergrove in Co Antrim, Northern Ireland, crossed the Antrim hills and the narrow Irish Sea to the Mull of Kintyre, and was to have headed along the Scottish coast to the western end of the Great Glen, thence along it to Inverness. But the ill-fated Chinook never made it to Fort George. About an hour into the journey, at around 6pm, the transport helicopter crashed into a hillside 800 feet above sea level on the Mull of Kintyre.

Initial suspicions of a Provisional IRA spectacular against the British enemy never gained traction. The crash was quickly understood to have been a tragic accident caused by poor visibility in bad fog – weather conditions that are a routine hazard in that part of the British Isles even in summertime.

Official inquiries blame pilot error

A year later, in 1995, an RAF Board of Inquiry (BOI) pointed to pilot error as the most likely cause. Controversially, two Air Vice Marshalls who reviewed the BOI judged that the pilots – Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper and Flt Lt Richard Cook – were guilty of gross negligence; it was a harsh verdict which, in the case of deceased aircrew, should only have been given if there was “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” that the crash had happened due to their fault. The RAF has continued to maintain to the public that this was a simple ferry flight, passing by the Mull at low level under Visual Flying Regulations (VFR); the planning was portrayed as vague and informal and the pilots were blamed for inappropriate action upon entering Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) near the Mull – that is, simply, that they did not carry out required (and well practised) procedures when they ran into fog.
The official conclusion was that the pilots had elected to fly over the Mull rather than turn away from it, and that they had set up a wrong rate of climb. Apart from this particular piece of bad airmanship, the public has to wonder how such an experienced crew ended up hitting what in reality was an isolated low hill?
After 17 years, the RAF and the British government finally conceded in July 2011 that the pilots were not guilty of “gross negligence”. This was in response to the last official inquiry into the incident chaired by Lord Philip, published the same month, which determined that there were insufficient grounds beyond reasonable doubt to make such a harsh judgment on the deceased. While family and supporters welcomed the partial clearing of the RAF men’s name, nevertheless the official story of what happened to the Chinook remains the same. That is, that the pilots made an error in trying to fly over the Mull, with the emphasis on sudden inclement weather inducing them to miscalculate.
Independent investigation

But a private investigation into the circumstances of the crash has now revealed exclusively to Global Research that the official account is seriously flawed. Disturbingly, there are sound reasons and evidence to indicate that the Chinook was brought down deliberately with the intention of wiping out the counterinsurgency team. And, as we will see, there is a technical “smoking gun” for how this could have been achieved.
British aviation expert Walter Kennedy, who has spent the most part of 17 years independently assessing the incident, said: “All official inquiries have totally misrepresented what happened. There have been so many lies, misrepresentations and obfuscations. Anyone with an avionics background who looks into this will see that the official account is seriously flawed.
“Do I think the Chinook was sabotaged? Absolutely,” added Kennedy, who for 30 years was a member of the Royal Navigation Institute and spent nine years working as a systems engineer in Britain’s military industry and 25 years on navigation systems in civilian aviation.
Kennedy’s investigation into the Chinook crash is based on flight data disclosed, but not followed up, by the official inquiries, and from inspecting the crash site where he interviewed local people. He has also pieced together sensitive information obtained from various RAF sources [1].
What he has found is stunning. “If you work through the flight data each aspect is like a jigsaw puzzle and from the picture that it forms it is obvious that the official story is false. It is fascinating that none of the official inquiries probed the obvious questions that arise from the known flight records. The official line seems to be determined to stick to an account that is demonstrably not supported by the data.
“My report is an objective analysis of the available data from a navigation viewpoint – instrument settings, local knowledge of weather and topography, operating procedures. Not only the last Lord Philip review but all other inquiries failed to make use of this data – indeed, many factors were severally rubbished, quite wrongly, when not only did they make sense on their own but together correlated into a clear picture. In a complex scenario, when a single picture is consistent with all the known data, the probability of this picture being correct is very high – like a repeated weak signal in signal processing technology, the more you get the more it correlates.”
Official inquiries misrepresent crash weather conditions

The official narrative conveyed in the media continually emphasises extreme weather as being a primary crash factor. This, Kennedy says, is an appalling misrepresentation of the actual conditions prevailing at the time of the crash.
“Uunderstanding the local weather most probable at the time is germane to understanding the crash,” says Kennedy. “The problem the Chinook crew faced was not one of bad weather closing in on them but rather one of avoiding hitting a fixed, fuzzy obstacle that they needed or wanted to get close to for whatever reason.”
Local sources told Kennedy that the conditions on the evening of the crash were typical for that time of day and year. Fog and poor visibility are features to be sure, but the weather is predictable. Also, the fog and cloud are generated from the landmass. Typically, the terrain overlooking the Mull was shrouded in a thin ground-hugging mist on the lower slopes whereas ground above 800 feet was covered in a dense orographic cloud. Offshore, the sea was typically not covered in fog. While the ground detail of the landmass would have been obscured by the mist and cloud, the proximity of the landmass would have been identifiable by the approaching helicopter owing to the contrast in visibility. “They would have been able to see it from a long way off and their navigation would have made them aware of their proximity to it,” says Kennedy.
He points out that the official inquiries into the Chinook crash do not take into account actual weather conditions typical of the Mull of Kintyre. The crew were not overwhelmed by sudden bad weather. As we shall, they were flying deliberately and under control towards a specific point on the Mull – albeit that the point was obscured by localized mist and cloud. Instrument settings and flight plans verify their deliberate movements. Some other untoward factor must explain their final fatal moments.
It is noteworthy that an RAF Sea King rescue helicopter arrived safely at the scene 45 minutes after the crash under the same conditions. This underlines that the conditions were not inordinately hazardous. Also remarkably, the testimony of the rescue helicopter crew about the landing conditions was never brought to the inquiries, at least publicly.
Political motives for liquidation

Before addressing further the technical evidence for sabotage here, first it is important to appreciate the political context at the time of the Chinook incident and thus provide understanding of a powerful motive for why these intelligence assets could have been liquidated.
When the final official inquiry by Lord Philip was published last July, Global Research speculated then on the possibility that the Chinook disaster could have been an inside job by the British authorities for important tactical reasons to bring about an end to the war in Northern Ireland [2]. Back in the summer of 1994, the British government was conducting furtive negotiations with Irish republicans to entice them into a “peace process” and to accept a political settlement to the conflict that had ravaged Ireland and the United Kingdom for over two decades.
An end to the conflict, largely on British terms, would turn out to be a major prize for Britain’s political establishment. But the problem for the British at that crucial time in 1994 was convincing the Irish republican movement to call off its formidable armed struggle. That was because two previous ceasefires brokered in the 1970s had been used by the British as an opportunity to try to defeat the IRA through covert methods, such as infiltration with informers. As a result, there was an abiding suspicion among republicans of British bad faith. Perfidious Albion were the perennial watchwords. It would therefore take a serious token from the British to assure the IRA that this time around “the war really was over”.
Nearly three months after the Chinook deaths, the IRA announced what many analysts had believed would be unthinkable – its historic ceasefire on 31 August 1994, calling for a “complete cessation of armed struggle”. That move then paved the way for a political process that culminated in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. And the United Kingdom and Ireland have seen relative peace since.
The political gain for the British government from the “peace process” cannot be overstated. A costly and destabilising insurgency in its backyard has been successfully neutralized, and the six-county state of Northern Ireland still remains firmly part of the United Kingdom, under British jurisdiction, and for the foreseeable future. This has secured an ongoing de facto British sway over political and economic affairs in the whole island of Ireland.
Defeating Irish republicanism through ‘peace process’

In many ways, the political process spelt a huge defeat for Irish republicanism in terms of achieving its historic aim of an independent, socialist united Ireland free from British rule. Republicans have become locked into a British-partitioned Ireland where the political framework is constitutionally limited to pursue their vision. Indeed, some traditional republicans complain that the movement under the political wing of Sinn Fein has “sold out” on its principles. Furthermore, the now 17-year-old IRA ceasefire and subsequent decommissioning of weapons means that there is little chance for the armed struggle to be resumed.
So all in all, Ireland, North and South, has been safely returned to the British sphere of influence, politically, economically, culturally, in such an overarching way that it harks back to the colonial era of earlier centuries when all of the territory was seamlessly dominated by British policy.
Understanding this gain for the British establishment underscores the crucial importance of having enticed the IRA into calling its ceasefire and to enter the political process – a process that was framed to thwart opposition to British presence in Ireland. What the British couldn’t achieve by military means, they managed by political means – the defeat of the Irish republican movement. In the grand scheme of things, the sacrifice of Northern Ireland’s counterinsurgency team would be a price worth paying.
Burying dark secrets of Britain’s dirty war

In addition, the men onboard that Chinook would take to their graves many dark secrets about Britain’s “dirty war” operations, including how British forces colluded with Protestant loyalist death squads. These proxy death squads were armed and instructed by British Intelligence and are believed to have carried out over 300 murders of republicans and ordinary Catholics during the course of the 1969-1994 conflict – nearly 10 per cent of the total number of dead. Also, as Kennedy notes about the personnel onboard the Chinook: “These men dedicated their lives to fighting the IRA. They were not going to give up on their missions easily. From the British government point of view, they would have been viewed as an obstacle to the peace process it was trying to initiate. They were military men, not politicians.”
Exposing the official cover-up of what happened Chinook

To recap, the official version maintains that the pilots were overwhelmed by unexpected poor visibility due to fog. Contrary to their impressive experience and training, the RAF claims that rather than slowing down and climbing at a maximum rate, or turning back out to sea, the pilots inexplicably advanced at an inappropriate rate of climb towards the highest ground in the vicinity – and this inexplicable action on their part was solely the cause of the crash.
But what Kennedy’s analysis shows is the following:
1. Flt Lts Tapper and Cook had meticulously planned their trip to include a known landing zone (LZ) at the Mull. A waypoint (A) recorded on the computerized flight plan shows this intention. The recorded directions taken by the Chinook indicate that the pilots were intending to touch base at the Mull, either by actually landing or by homing in on the LZ before proceeding to the destination further up the Scottish coast at Fort George. Both pilots were familiar with the LZ at the Mull, situated some 300 metres from a lighthouse. Says Kennedy: “The inclusion of an element of flight testing in itineraries is normal procedure for all RAF transport even when the transport is for senior personnel.”
2. The pilots had been keeping strictly on track until they made a deliberate right turn close in to the Mull. They had been referring to the navigation computer up until that right turn; they were not contravening Visual Flying Regulations, as alleged by the official inquiries.
3. Barometric and radar altimeter settings recovered from the wreckage of Chinook ZD576 were consistent with a landing on, or close pass over, the LZ at the Mull.
4. The power settings were matched at intermediate level, consistent with the helicopter coasting horizontally towards the LZ and fully under control of the crew. “They were slowing down, letting their speed ‘wash off’, not performing a climb,” says Kennedy. Note the official version claims that the pilots were attempting an accelerated climb over the Mull, which could not be the case if the power settings were matched at intermediate level. Local sources, in particular the lighthouse keeper who was familiar with helicopters landing, also said that the engine noise from the Chinook moments before the crash was steady – again indicating that the aircraft was under control at that time and not climbing.
5. The Chinook navigator had the course set that would have taken them “handrailing” up the coast of Islay/Jura – it was obviously their intention to cross back over the sea in a north westerly direction to use this safe, clear route after touching base at the Mull, not to fly over the Mull, as the official version claims.
6. From the lateral position of the Chinook fuselage at the crash site, it appears that the pilots were attempting a “quick stop” manoeuvre in which they abruptly steered the big-bodied aircraft sideways to drastically reduce speed and take it into a vertical lift. Says Kennedy: “Not only is there is no evidence of control problems as the official account claims, but the final manoeuvre attempt showed meaningful control and expert airmanship in the circumstances. What the ‘quick stop’ attempt shows is that the pilots were surprised by their proximity to the ground. They were not flying negligently.”
Comments Kennedy: “The most obvious scenario is that the helicopter crew were approaching that known landing spot at waypoint A on the Mull; it had a safe exit, or “wave-off” option, as there was plenty of room at the elevation of that spot for a moderate turn around the lighthouse back out to sea – it was the optimum spot to aim for, given the turning radii available to a Chinook at high speed, for a turn around the lighthouse.
“One of the lighthouse keepers pointed out to me the approach line that military helicopters had previously taken in the past to achieve that manoeuvre – and the heading would have been 035 magnetic north (035M), which was as found on the Chinook handling pilot’s course selector on his main navigation display.”
Kennedy, who attended the Fatal Accident Inquiry in 1996 and who has gone through the transcripts of all the inquiries, noted that none of these recorded findings and testimonies were cause for further questioning or elaboration. “At the very least, it was apparent that previous inquiries had not had the potential value of the available data made clear to them. Indeed, it seems that it was detracted from at every opportunity. No-one at these inquiries putting questions to the RAF or Ministry of Defence seemed to have any avionics background. Their focus was on narrow legalistic issues, such as: ‘Was it appropriate or not to ascribe gross negligence to the dead crew?’. When technical questions were put, they were easily obfuscated. But anyone familiar with the technical details can see that the official explanation of what happened is demonstrably at odds with the facts.”
“I believed back at the time the original verdict of gross negligence against the pilots was so premature before sufficient exploration of so many issues that it had to have been politically motivated, that the authorities wanted to avert public disquiet by saying that it was ‘undoubtedly pilot error, no sabotage, nothing to see here, move along’.”
Technical ‘smoking gun’

Kennedy’s investigations reveal one further crucial detail that has been denied or obfuscated by RAF officials and the British government in all inquiries so far into the crash. And it is this technical “smoking gun” that points up the malicious aspect of what happened on the Mull of Kintyre and how it could have been perpetrated.
The avionics expert has obtained confirmation that Chinook ZD576 was equipped with a landing device known as a Covert Personnel Locator System. Officially, this is denied, but trusted RAF contacts have unofficially confirmed to him that ZD576 was fitted out with the system on that journey. “All the movements of the helicopter as it was approaching the Mull point to the fact that the crew were coming in for a landing or a near landing and that they were using a CPLS to achieve this. I predicted the use of the CPLS from their movements at the Mull. That has now been confirmed to me by RAF sources. This revelation of a CPLS onboard Chinook ZD576 is grounds enough for another inquiry to be opened,” he says.
The CPLS, explains Kennedy, is a precision guidance system that is intrinsically reliable. It is often used by American and British military helicopters to pinpoint special forces who are trapped behind enemy lines. The system’s various manufacturers describe it as being used for “an all-weather approach to assault zones, landing zones and drop zones”.
What makes the CPLS particularly useful is that it operates by a portable handset on the ground that sends an Ultra High Frequency radio signal to the receiver onboard the helicopter. Basically, the operator on the ground guides the helicopter to the landing zone and because the helicopter crew are following a unique signal there is little need for the pilots to have external visibility. They are relying on the ground operator to bring them safely to the LZ.
Chinook crew misled by operators on the ground?

On the evening that the pilots flew ZD576 into the fog at the shoreline of the Mull, the instrument settings show that they were preparing for landing. From their experience, they knew that the approach terrain was relatively low lying towards the LZ. Kennedy believes that the operator group on the ground was out of position and that instead of being directed to the LZ, the crew of the Chinook were misled into a “vertical corner” of nearby mountainous terrain. “Because the pilots believed they were approaching the LZ, the lower power settings they had selected would have made it nearly impossible for them to conduct a successful emergency manoeuvre at the last moment to avert collision. The Chinook is normally an agile aircraft despite its bulky size, but without the thrust power, the pilots would have had no chance of negotiating the vertical corner.”
Would the operators on the ground not have been in danger from the incoming Chinook?

Near the crash site on the Mull, on the aircraft’s track and at about the right distance inland to have caused their over-run of the shoreline, is a large fissure – a natural granite rock trench. Kennedy himself has inspected it. “Anyone hiding in that trench would have had protection from a crashing 20-ton helicopter.”
“Whether the CPLS operators on the ground were out of position wilfully or not is for another inquiry to ascertain,” he adds. “Had the operator on the ground been half a mile or so up the slope from the landing spot where the pilots expected him to be, all that is known about this crash is explained.”
Kennedy is adamant that Chinook ZD576 with all those onboard was deliberately brought down. “From the very beginning, this has smacked of a cover-up. The official account is demonstrably not true in light of the flight and instrument data. Given the strong political motives, there is powerful reason for why it could have been sabotage. And now there is evidence of the technical means by which this sabotage could have been carried out.”
If that is the case, then senior people within the British military and political establishment made a call on the lives of those who perished.
Why were 25 counterinsurgency personnel put on one helicopter?

Other questions also need to be asked. Why were all 25 counterinsurgency personnel put on one helicopter? Who took that decision for this irregular security arrangement, especially when there were other aircraft available to spread the transport of the men? If the CPLS was being deployed, as Kennedy claims, then there should have been a record of this component in the flight plans, which the meticulous navigation pilot, Flt Lt Tapper, would have logged – was this record removed from the pilot’s flight plan after the event?
Intriguingly too, for the Chinook sacrifice to have sent the intended signal to Irish republicans that the “war was over”, there must be senior persons within the IRA ranks who also know the truth of what really happened, and, importantly, would have been tipped off before it happened. This, of course, would have been conveyed to republicans in such a way that would afford plausible denial by the British contacts. Also, given the way the peace process has worked out in hindsight to the historic disadvantage of republicans, much to their bitter regret no doubt, it is unlikely that they would disclose their fatal error of buying into such a dirty trick.
Finian Cunningham formerly based in Belfast, is Global Research’s Correspondent on Middle East and East Africa affairs.

Stephen Daldry is known by his friends in British theatre to be absolutely open about his predilection for paedophilia. In 1995, one of his Royal Court Theatre directors, had to bring in his young son to work (unable to find a child-minder) and had left the child in the office that he shared with Daldry. When he returned, he found to his horror, that Daldry was sexually molesting his child. Unable to launch a complaint against his boss because he feared losing his job, the director in question, then discreetly began to circulate the information amongst other parents.
As far British Intelligence was concerned, Daldry was and is a valuable asset to them, as an agent in the arts/media world. He was allowed free rein to do his most ‘terrible desires’ because this meant that he could easily be blackmailed into any ‘black ops’ i.e. that he would follow any orders unquestioningly, no matter how terrible they were. Those who ran Daldry, therefore turned a blind eye to his paedophilia.In short, if MI5 or MI6 think that the pay-off is worth it, they tend to keep animals like Daldry on a leash i.e. ‘feeding’ them once in a while and then sending them out to do another ‘job’.
There are pages and pages that could be written about this man and what he has done but the details are simply too sickening and far worse than what has been written here. Suffice to say that British Intelligence agents have given accounts where they were punished for disobeying orders, by having to watch Daldry rape small boys – some as young as 3/4 years old but there are other things that have been reported, which are simply too obscene to mention here.As far as ‘black ops’ are concerned, Daldry’s most infamous moment came in 1994: when MI5 decided to use Daldry’s helicopter pilot skills to their benefit. He was the agent who was to tie oily rags around the mechanics of a Chinook military helicopter in order to make it crash and it did, over the Mull of Kintyre – killing 25 ‘Intelligence’ personnel and 4 crew members.

MI6 had originally blamed the Americans on this one, who are still very angry about the whole thing. MI6 then found out who was really guilty and used it to their advantage, in terms of getting Stella Rimington out of office

Director-General of MI5
Once in charge of MI5, those near VauxhallBridge had very good reason to be afraid. Rimington began to ‘knock off’ MI6 agents abroad, for a variety of ill-defined reasons. A flippant remark at a social gathering could ensure an officer or agent’s early retirement, sacking or ‘disappearance’.
Rimington had become a full-blown psychotic at this point and her downfall came when she ordered the ‘crash’ of a military helicopter containing MI6 and MI5 Northern Ireland officers, over the Mull of Kintyre.
MI6 finally got wind of what she was up to and devised a ‘sting’ operation.
It was successful.
Rimington retired, somewhat ungracefully, in 1996.

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Was the RAF Chinook Helicopter crash an accident or was it sabotage – Part 4
What really happened that terrible day in June 1994?

Were all the passenger and crew assassinated?

Chinook ZD576

The wreckage of RAF Chinook ZD 576 in which 29 people died

Memorial to Passenger and Crew

PILOT: F/LT JONATHAN P.TAPPER.

PILOT: F/LT RICHARD D.COOK.

LOADMASTER: M/SGT GRAHAM W.FORBES.

LOADMASTER: SGT KEVIN A.HARDIE.

Passengers:

Asst Chief Constable: BRIAN FITZSIMONS.

Det Chief Superintendant: DESMOND CONROY.

Det Chief Superintendant: MAURICE NEILLY.

Det Superintendant: PHILLIP DAVIDSON.

Det Superintendant: ROBERT FOSTER.

Det Superintendant: BILLY GWILLIAM.

Det Superintendant: IAN PHOENIX .

Det Chief Inspector: DENIS BUNTING.

Det Inspector: STEPHEN DAVIDSON.

Det Inspector: KEVIN MAGEE.

Home Office CB-57: JOHN DEVERILL.

COLONEL: CHRISTOPHER BILES. OBE.

LT COLONEL: RICHARD GREGORY-SMITH.

LT COLONEL: JOHN TOBIAS.

LT COLONEL: GEORGE WILLIAMS.

MAJOR: CHRISTOPHER J.DOCHERTY.

MAJOR: ANTHONY HORNBY.

MAJOR: GARY SPARKS.

MAJOR: RICHARD ALLEN.

MAJOR: ROY PUGH.

ANNE JAMES.

MARTIN DALTON.

JOHN HAYNES.

MICHAEL MALTBY.

STEPHEN RICKARD.

Before going into the latest findings lets just recap on events reported in Part 3 which resulted in Gordon Bowden and I going to the Derby Police to report possible multiple murders/assassinations.

This is the timeline:

Thursday the 19th of May 2011 I received a communication via my web page that deeply upset me but at the same time confirmed what I had been told by Ms Tara Andrea Davison some months ago that the crash of Chinook ZD576 was an inside job.

You are correct Peter, FADEC is just the smoke screen. The pathologist a “she” who carried out an examination of all the bodies reported at that time that they all died from extensive gunshot wounds.

Friday the 20thof May 2011 I received further communication and eventually got in touch with the person concerned for a full brief. Part of his email read as follows:

“We can authenticate this by either obtaining the coroners report, or getting a statement from the women coroner. The problem with this is that her life could be in danger. These are very very serious issues and allegations Peter. As with everything compartmentalisation is at play here. The coroner just did her job, it wouldn’t occur to her that this was an execution. We don’t do these things in Britain do we? Remember she was a woman, I do think that’s significant. She would be thinking Army – Northern Ireland – guns – helicopters- and so these things are quite normal to her.” He again confirmed the following:

It was reported to me that the Coroner said“they all had gunshot wounds to the head”

I spent most of Friday going over everything and just putting my own mind at rest that this could be the true reason behind this terrible event. Later I again spoke with Gordon Bowden and we both decided that we would go to the police tomorrow Saturday 21st May 2011 to open up our previous file with this additional input (Incident No 620 07/10/2010).

Saturday 21st May 2011 we went to the Derby Police HQ at St Mary’s Wharf, Derby and eventually got to speak to a civilian who deals with front desk enquiries. He advised that no police officers were available to deal with this report. I explained that this information is vital as it now involves the possible murder of 29 people who died in the Chinook crash at the Mull of Kintyre and that a new inquiry is now underway.

The gentleman explained that no one was available as it was the weekend and suggested we come back on Monday to speak with Special Branch… We both insisted that this information be logged and forced him to issue a receipt.

Monday the 22nd May 2011 we went down to the Police HQ and asked for the detective concerned who just so happened to be at a meeting and the civil operative at the counter asked us to go home and await a call from him. Gordon and I insisted that someone should see us and that we would wait considering the nature of the information (possible murder). After one hour we again complained and eventually two detectives agreed to see us. Their initial mannerism was rather abrupt and to some degree sarcastic. We both went through the entire case and they told us that we must pass this on to the review committee who are dealing with the second inquiry and that our case is now closed as it was handed over to the MoD.

I explained that this was not the case because the police are now very much involved, if this information is correct, as it involves the murder of 29 people. I insisted that they log this information under the existing incident number and then I will file my report to the inquiry board. I also explained that we are filing this for our own safety….they appeared to be rather amused about our comment.

Later that day, armed with the information I had given to the police, I emailed the Mull of Kintyre Review Board and sent them all the communications I had exchange with my informant and the details I had given the police…..the communication was marked for the attention of:

Tuesday the 22nd May 2011 I eventually got acknowledgement from Mr Alex Passa for and on behalf of the above committee.

Since this time I have been making contact with various people including the father of Flt Lt Tapper, Mr.Mike Tapper.

I found it very difficult and moving to talk to him and suggested that we could meet up……unfortunately we live some considerable distance apart and that was not possible. However, he did say to me that it was ok to discuss anything with him as it all happened a long time ago and he has now got over it.

We both talked our way through the accident and eventually I discussed my findings. He explained to me that he knows Alex Passa very well and that he would talk with him and get back to me……I explained that I had submitted two reports to date.

Later he left a message on my answer phone to say He didn’t want to be further involved in this and that he will leave it in the hands of Alex Passa. I returned the call as I felt rather bad and he again repeated that he had spoken with Alex and that he was content that I should deal with him.

On Saturday 28th May 2011, I spent much time going over many aspects of the crash and gathering more information based on the information I had previously received and to now look at this tragedy from a totally different perspective. As the day unfolding some remarkable information came to light that again revealed that this was truly a cover up with false statements being made by a Northern Ireland politician and some other strange events both within Northern Ireland’s Airspace, Scottish Airspace and at the scene of the accident.

First I would like to make note of the following exchange that took place between William Ross, former East Londonderry MP, and Mr. John Speller, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence who put down a series of questions in 2001 as follows.

15 Feb 2001 : Column: 191W

Written Answers to Questions

Thursday 15 February 2001

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Chinook helicopters were flown (a) into and (b) out of Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994; and what their flight times and routes were. [150410]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: No Chinook helicopters flew into Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994. One flew out, that being Chinook ZD 576 which left RAF Aldergrove at 17.42 hours, en route to Fort George.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for how long tasking records of helicopter flights are normally retained; in what form they are stored; how long they are retained in the case of an accident; and if the tasking records of the last flight of helicopter ZD 576 have been retained. [150409]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: Tasking forms recording helicopter flights in Northern Ireland are retained for six years. However in the case of an accident the relevant tasking record for the day it occurred will normally be held as part of the Board of Inquiry papers, for as long as it is necessary to retain the latter. The 2 June 1994 tasking record for Chinook ZD 576 is still retained with the RAF Board of Inquiry report.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many and which Chinook helicopters were stationed in Northern Ireland in the months of May and June 1994; and from which bases they operated. [150403]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: At that time two Chinook helicopters were detached to Northern Ireland. In May 1994 these were Mk1s until 15 Feb 2001 : Column: 195W

31 May when ZD 576, the first Chinook Mk2 to operate in Northern Ireland, was delivered to RAF Aldergrove, and one of the Mk1s was flown back to RAF Odiham. All the Chinook aircraft in Northern Ireland operate out of RAF Aldergrove and return there at the end of the day’s tasking.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when it was decided, and by whom, that Chinook helicopter ZD 576 would be used on the flight on which it crashed on 2 June 1994. [150411]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: The flight was tasked by the Joint Air Tasking Operations Centre (JATOC) in Northern Ireland on 1 June 1994.

I would now like to place an emphasis on the response by Mr Spellar that said no Chinooks flew into Northern Ireland on the 2nd of June 1994 and only one left which was Chinook ZDS576 which departed at 1742 local time to its first position report (Waypoint A off the Mull of Kintyre Lighthouse).

This statemeent is grossly incorrect based on the following fact that another unidentified Chinook (believed to be American) appeared to come from the Aldergrove direction and flew out to sea just before the departure of ZD576…….one can only assume that this was based temporarily at RAF Machrihanish.

One the 1st of June 1994 Chinook ZD576 was flown by Lt(RN) Kingston and upon return later that afternoon Lt(RN) Kinston discussed the following day’s tasking with Lt Lt Tapper. That tasking involved the movement of troops within Northern Ireland for which 6.5 hours had been allocated and the final task being the passenger flight from RAF Aldergrove to Fort George and return to which 3 hours had been allocated. Fl Lt Tapper elected to carry out all of this tasking using his own crew and consequently carried out flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of the 1st of June 1994. Both Fl Lt Tapper was seen preparing maps for the following day. MALM Forbes who was in another accommodation was also seen preparing maps for the next day. This aspect clearly shows the professionalism of both aircrew in preparing for the next days tasking.

The day of the tasking (2nd of June 1994) Fl Lt Tapper conducted a sortie brief with his crew. Weather data was received with Machrihanish (situated just north of their first waypoint A) being borderline. The appropriate 230 Squadron Duty Officer was not available for the brief as he was at another brief involving a Puma formation and so Fl Lt Tapper left photocopies of his maps with the Duty Officers Assistant.

The passenger for this aircraft were processed through RAF Aldergrove Air Movement Section and received a safety briefing by two RAF staff (FS Holmes and Sgt Coles) who happened to be the crewmen belonging to Lt(RN) Kingston. The passenger were provided with appropriate safety equipment but their baggage was no xrayed.

Fl Lt Tapper and crew were driven to Chinook ZD576 at approximately 1700 hours where they conducted a normal aircraft start and reposition the Chinook to the Air Movements Dispersal. At 1720 the passengers were boarded and their baggage was secured along the centre of the cabin floor. The Chinook, callsign F4J40, took off at 1742 hours and departed on track 027 (M) …comms was established on HF with 81SU (Strike Command) at 1746 and asked for a listening watch to be maintained.

The aircraft requested to leave the the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency just before the Control Zone Boundary and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747. The aircraft was not observed on radar after that time.

The aircraft was observed by several witnesses low level over the Antrim Hills heading toward the coastal point of Carnlough. At 1755 Scottish Military received a single call on their contact frequency and this call was not answered. After further investigation by myself the actual broadcast read as follows: “Scottish Military, good afternoon this is F4J40”

This is typical of calls made when entering another zone………it would have been answered by an acknowledgement and followed by any further instructions from ATC….however it was not answered and one can only assume that the crew would have called again to establish communications as it was getting close to there position report (Waypoint A) …what is extremely strange is that from this moment on their was a time lapse of approximately 4.5 minutes prior to impact and no further calls were made even though the report says that the helicopter was operating normally and was under full control. This information is critical in the investigation because this crew would have kept trying to contact Scottish Military as they were now flying in their zone with no communications to the controlling authority…….Fl Lt Tapper would have kept making calls and in the event that communications were not established he would have gone back to Northern Ireland Control (his last controlling authority) to advise them that he has no comms with Scottish Military and they would then have told him to remain on this frequency whilst they check it out. A call to Scottish would then have been made to determine the problem etc.

Lets just recall the questions and answers time between Mr William Ross and Mr Spellar when Mr Spellar said there was only one outbound movement of a Chinook that day ie no Chinnoks came in and only one left which was the one that left for Scotland ZD576.

So I would now like to point out another mistake in this inquiry and that is the fact that a second Chinock was observed flying from the direction of Aldergrove heading up towards Portrush by another reliable witness and also some witnesses in Bushmills (further to the east) heard the Chinook but did not see it.

Here is an account of that witness:

“My late parents and I were driving east from Coleraine towards Bushmills about 30 minutes before the crash. It had been a very wet afternoon and the sky was still very dark for the time of day. A Chinook with a [three colour] patchwork quilt style camouflage flew across our path just after we reached the top of Kilgrain hill. It was flying low in a northerly direction along the line of the Ballyversal road and by the time we reached the junction with that road the Chinook was just skimming the high ground to our left. There have been unconfirmed reports that the distinctive sound of a Chinook was heard over Bushmills.

No one has been able, so far, to explain the ownership of this Chinook or its role that day. I checked out the camouflage with someone who worked in the paintshop at RAF Odiham and he explained that this style of camouflage would most likely have been used by a special operations Chinook.” he did go on to say that the sun was breaking through the cloud to the west and was on the side of the Chinook and that he was not sure if it was RAF or American as he was aware of US Navy seals operating from RAF Machrihanish around that time. You may recall that one of the witnesses who was sailing offshore the Mull of Kintyre also passed comment about the sun breaking through the cloud and he could see the reflection on the glass cockpit as it approached……..obviously this was ZD576.

To give strength to this story I will also print the following from another report which clearly indicates another radar contact was made that remained unidentified:

There is taped data from a Scottish air traffic control room that shows an unidentified target nearing the Mull of Kintyre at precisely the same time as the disaster. And finally, we have been told by RAF sources that a United States Air Force team reached the crash site prior to any UK rescue unit and sifted through the wreckage. What were they looking for?

Someone in Northern Ireland also confirmed the same story in that when RAF staff arrived at the scene there were other people sifting through the wreckage. One of the RAF crew approached them and asked what they were doing…….the reply came back in a strong American accent “We are looking for something that belongs to us.”

This was also confirmed by two senior RAF officers at a base in Lincolnshire, one a senior communications officer, have confirmed that Americans were at the scene of the crash first. When the British servicemen asked them to explain themselves, they were told: “We are looking for something that belongs to us.”

So to recap my main questions/concerns that have not be covered by the past inquiry and is vital in the current reveiw are as follows:

Why did Mr. Spellar give a false reply to Mr William Ross regarding the outbound movements that day?

Why was this second Chinook not identified as being within the Northern Ireland Zone and later the Scottish Zone?

Why didn’t Scottish Military make this additional radar contact information available to the first inquiry and why hasn’t the current review team received this information?

Why didn’t the first inquiry board pick up the fact that almost 5 minutes had elapsed at a critical hand over point which meant that ZD576 was in a no comms situation? This would never happen in normal circumstances and Scottish would know their flight plan and Northern Ireland would have handed the Chinook over to them. Scottish would have called them to establish communications and likewise Fl Lt Tapper would have kept calling them. As the report said that the crew and aircraft were operating normally up until nearing Waypoint Alpha. It is also fact that ZD576 had also established HF comms with the RAF Strike Command and requested a listening watch be maintained how come this additional back up frequency was not used by the crew………Could the crew have been incapacitated and did not make any calls at all?

Why was such a high profile flight undertaken without meticulous monitoring by the RAF and why was all the VIP allowed to travel on one helicopter?

I am led to believe that two RAF Puma Helicopters were requested and refused and that the crew were extremely apprehensive in having to fly ZD576.

In closing this report I would be bold enough to state the possible events that took place that day:

Another Chinook (possibly US) with their own team onboard set out ahead of ZD576 and tracked up towards Portrush and then over to the Mull of Kintyre to monitor the flight of ZD576 and the actual crash (as was reported a second radar return was observed at the same time).

This helicopter carried the team that would go through the wreckage immediately after the crash and ahead of the RAF team……the only way this could occur was that if the US team knew of the intended crash and were nearby ready to move in.

This US team had no authority to enter the scene of a crash, especially when this involved an RAF aircraft with British crew and passengers. Air Crash Scenes become a sterile/secured area by the local police until such time as crash/emergency crews arrive and then after the investigation team takes over. Nothing is allowed to be taken from the scene prior to this and no other third parties are allowed to enter. I would also like to put on record that baggage and personal belongings were also removed which is also in violation of normal protocol.

I repeat again the statement made by the senior officer from Strathclyde Police who emphasised just after the crash that there was nothing suspicious about this crash and that it was simply a very tragic accident …….this statement alone made me deeply suspicious that this was a total cover-up as he does not have the experience or capacity to make such a bold statement, especially before the investigation got underway.

Summary:

Based on the statement made by ex Intel Operative Ms Tara Dacison in 2010 that this was an inside job and based on the report from the coroner that all crew and passengers died from gunshot wounds to the head (as per my two reports to Lord Philip) one can only surmise that the crew and passengers died at some time prior to the arrival at Waypoint Alpha and without course correction continued on into the hillside.

The presence of the second Chinook (US?) that tracked up to Portrush and then possible over to the Mull of Kintyre (as per Scottish second radar return) may have played a significant part in this tragic event…..especially when it was understood that collusion had possibly been taking place between the RUC and the Intelligence units with additional pressure from the US to expedite the peace talks etc….one can only guess. US Navy Seals were in situ at Machrihanish at the time and they are specialist at this type of work.

I repeat again that the only sure way of identifying the truth behind this crash is to bring Ms Tara Davison in for questioning (as per Mr. Gordon Bowden and my request to the police on two occasions) and secondly to obtain the original report from the lady who wrote that the cause of death was by gunshot wounds to the head. Obviously one would have to be rather naive to think that autopsy report are not falsified to comply with secret service activities. Finally the ultimate truth can only be gained by carrying out another autopsy on the victims concerned which would immediately reveal the true events of that day.

My latest evidence has been sent to the Review Board in Scotland as shown below:

For the urgent attention of the Mull of Kintyre Review Board – The Rt Hon Lord Philip, Rt Hon Malcolm Bruce MP, the Rt Hon the Lord Forsyth of Drumlean and the Rt Hon the Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke.
Ladies and Gentlemen

After further investigation and contact with other third parties in both Northern Ireland and Scotland I now wish to add additional evidence to my previous communications sent to you on 27/10/2010 and more recently 23/5/2011 as follows:

On Saturday and Sunday 28/29 May 2011, I spent much time going over many aspects of the crash and gathering more information based on the information I had previously received and to now look at this tragedy from a totally different perspective. As the day unfolded some remarkable information came to light that appeared to support my previous two statements, to which you all have copies.

This was in relation to question time in the House of Commons being made by a Northern Ireland politician along with some other strange events both within Northern Ireland’s Airspace, Scottish Airspace and at the scene of the accident.

First I would like to make note of the following exchange that took place between William Ross, former East Londonderry MP, and Mr. John Speller, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence who put down a series of questions in 2001 as follows.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Chinook helicopters were flown (a) into and (b) out of Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994; and what their flight times and routes were. [150410]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: No Chinook helicopters flew into Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994. One flew out, that being Chinook ZD 576 which left RAF Aldergrove at 17.42 hours, en route to Fort George.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for how long tasking records of helicopter flights are normally retained; in what form they are stored; how long they are retained in the case of an accident; and if the tasking records of the last flight of helicopter ZD 576 have been retained. [150409]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: Tasking forms recording helicopter flights in Northern Ireland are retained for six years. However in the case of an accident the relevant tasking record for the day it occurred will normally be held as part of the Board of Inquiry papers, for as long as it is necessary to retain the latter. The 2 June 1994 tasking record for Chinook ZD 576 is still retained with the RAF Board of Inquiry report.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many and which Chinook helicopters were stationed in Northern Ireland in the months of May and June 1994; and from which bases they operated. [150403]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: At that time two Chinook helicopters were detached to Northern Ireland. In May 1994 these were Mk1s until 15 Feb 2001 Column: 195W

31 May when ZD 576, the first Chinook Mk2 to operate in Northern Ireland, was delivered to RAF Aldergrove and one of the Mk1s was flown back to RAF Odiham. All the Chinook aircraft in Northern Ireland operate out of RAF Aldergrove and return there at the end of the day’s tasking.

Mr. William Ross: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when it was decided, and by whom, that Chinook helicopter ZD 576 would be used on the flight on which it crashed on 2 June 1994. [150411]

Mr. Spellar [holding answer 14 February 2001]: The flight was tasked by the Joint Air Tasking Operations Centre (JATOC) in Northern Ireland on 1 June 1994.

I would now like to place an emphasis on the response by Mr. Spellar who said

“No Chinook helicopters flew into Northern Ireland on 2 June 1994. One flew out, that being Chinook ZD 576 which left RAF Aldergrove at 17.42 hours, en route to Fort George.”

This statement is grossly incorrect based on the following fact that another unidentified Chinook (believed to be American) appeared to come from the Aldergrove direction and flew out to sea just before the departure of ZD576…….one can only assume that this Chinook was based temporarily at RAF Machrihanish as according to the inquiry the other Chinook was out of service and thus no RAF Chinooks were left to operate that day except ZD576.

Before proceeding with more evidence I would just like to recap events leading up to the crash:

One the 1st of June 1994 Chinook ZD576 was flown by Lt(RN) Kingston and upon return later that afternoon Lt(RN) Kingston discussed the following day’s tasking with Fl Lt Tapper.

That tasking involved the movement of troops within Northern Ireland for which 6.5 hours had been allocated and the final task being the passenger flight from RAF Aldergrove to Fort George and return to which 3 hours had been allocated.

Fl Lt Tapper elected to carry out all of this tasking using his own crew and consequently carried out flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of the 1st of June 1994. Both Fl Lt Tapper was seen preparing maps for the following day. MALM Forbes who was in another accommodation was also seen preparing maps for the next day. This aspect clearly shows the professionalism of both aircrew in preparing for the next days tasking.

The day of the tasking (2nd of June 1994) Fl Lt Tapper conducted a sortie brief with his crew. Weather data was received with Machrihanish (situated just north of their first Waypoint A) being borderline. The appropriate 230 Squadron Duty Officer was not available for the brief as he was at another brief involving a Puma formation and so Fl Lt Tapper left photocopies of his maps with the Duty Officers Assistant.

The passenger for this aircraft were processed through RAF Aldergrove Air Movement Section and received a safety briefing by two RAF staff (FS Holmes and Sgt Coles) who happened to be the crewmen belonging to Lt(RN) Kingston. The passengers were provided with appropriate safety equipment but their baggage was no x-rayed.

Fl Lt Tapper and crew were driven to Chinook ZD576 at approximately 1700 hours where they conducted a normal aircraft start up and repositioned the Chinook to the Air Movements Dispersal.

At 1720 the passengers were boarded and their baggage was secured along the centre of the cabin floor. The Chinook, call sign F4J40, took off at 1742 hours and departed on track 027 (M) …comms was established on HF with 81SU (Strike Command) at 1746 and asked for a listening watch to be maintained.

The aircraft requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency just before the Control Zone Boundary and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747. The aircraft was not observed on radar after that time.

The aircraft was observed by several witnesses’ low level over the Antrim Hills heading toward the coastal point of Carnlough. At 1755 Scottish Military received a single call on their contact frequency and this call was not answered. After further investigation by myself the actual broadcast read as follows: “Scottish Military, good afternoon this is F4J40″

This is typical of calls made when entering another zone………it would have been answered by an acknowledgement and followed by further instructions from Scottish Military….however it was not answered and one can only assume that the crew would have kept calling again to establish communications as it was getting close to there position report (Waypoint A).

What is extremely strange is that from this moment on their was a time lapse of approximately 4.5 minutes prior to impact and no further calls were made, even though the report says that the helicopter was operating normally and was under full control. This information is critical in the investigation because this crew would have kept trying to contact Scottish Military as they were now flying in their zone with no communications established with the controlling authority.

Fl Lt Tapper would have kept making calls and in the event that communications were not established he would have switched his comms back to Northern Ireland Control (his last controlling authority) to advise them that he has no comms with Scottish Military and they would then have told him to remain on this frequency whilst they check it out. A communication to Scottish Military would then have been made by Northern Ireland to determine the problem etc.

Let’s again recall the Parliamentary questions and answers time between Mr. William Ross and Mr. Spellar when Mr. Spellar said there was only one outbound movement of a Chinook that day i.e. no Chinooks came in and only one left which was the one that left for Scotland ZD576.

I would now like to point out another mistake in this inquiry and that is the fact that a second Chinook was observed flying from the direction of Aldergrove heading north towards the sea (Portrush direction) by another reliable witness and that it would appear other people in Bushmills (further to the east) heard the Chinook but did not see it.

Here is an account of that witness:

”My late parents and I were driving east from Coleraine towards Bushmills about 30 minutes before the crash. It had been a very wet afternoon and the sky was still very dark for the time of day. A Chinook with a [three colour] patchwork quilt style camouflage flew across our path just after we reached the top of Kilgrain hill. It was flying low in a northerly direction along the line of the Ballyversal road and by the time we reached the junction with that road the Chinook was just skimming the high ground to our left. There have been unconfirmed reports that the distinctive sound of a Chinook was heard over Bushmills.”

“No one has been able, so far, to explain the ownership of this Chinook or its role that day. I checked out the camouflage with someone who worked in the paint shop at RAF Odiham and he explained that this style of camouflage would most likely have been used by special operations Chinook.”

This witness did go on to say that “The sun was breaking through the cloud to the west and was on the side of the Chinook and that he was not sure if it was RAF or American and that he was aware of US Navy seals operating from RAF Machrihanish around that time.”

You may recall that one of the witnesses who was sailing offshore the Mull of Kintyre also passed comment about the sun breaking through the cloud and he could see the reflection on the glass cockpit as it approached……..obviously this was ZD576.

To give strength to this story I will also print the following from another report which clearly indicates another radar contact was made that remained unidentified:

There is taped data from a Scottish air traffic control room that shows an unidentified target nearing the Mull of Kintyre at precisely the same time as the disaster. And finally, we have been told by RAF sources that a United States Air Force team reached the crash site prior to any UK rescue unit and sifted through the wreckage. What were they looking for?

Someone in Northern Ireland also confirmed the same story in that when RAF staff arrived at the scene there were other people sifting through the wreckage. One of the RAF crew approached them and asked what they were doing…….the reply came back in a strong American accent “We are looking for something that belongs to us.”

This was also confirmed by two senior RAF officers at a base in Lincolnshire, one a senior communications officer, have confirmed that Americans were at the scene of the crash first. When the British servicemen asked them to explain themselves, they were told: “We are looking for something that belongs to us.”

Why did Mr. Spellar give a false statement to Mr. William Ross regarding the outbound movements that day?

Why was this second Chinook not identified as being within the Northern Ireland Zone and later the Scottish Zone?

Why didn’t Scottish Military make this additional radar contact information available to the first inquiry and why hasn’t the current review team received this information?

Why didn’t the first inquiry board pick up the fact that almost 5 minutes had elapsed at a critical hand over point which meant that ZD576 was in a no comms situation? This would never happen in normal circumstances and Scottish would know their flight plan and Northern Ireland would have handed the Chinook over to them. Scottish would have called them to establish communications and likewise Fl Lt Tapper would have kept calling them. As the report said that the crew and aircraft were operating normally up until Waypoint Alpha.

It is fact that ZD576 had also established HF comms with the RAF Strike Command and requested a listening watch be maintained how come this additional back up frequency was not used by the crew………Could the crew have been incapacitated and did not make any calls at all?

Why was such a high profile flight undertaken without meticulous monitoring by the RAF and why were all the VIP allowed to travel on one helicopter?

I am led to believe that two RAF Puma Helicopters were requested and refused and that the crew were extremely apprehensive in having to fly ZD576.

In closing this report I would be bold enough to state the possible events that took place that day:

Another Chinook (possibly US) with their own team onboard set out ahead of ZD576 and tracked up towards Portrush and then over to the Mull of Kintyre to monitor the flight of ZD576 and the actual crash (as was reported a second radar return was observed at the same time).

This helicopter carried the team that would go through the wreckage immediately after the crash and ahead of the RAF team……the only way this could occur was that if the US team knew of the intended crash and were nearby ready to move in.

This US team had no authority to enter the scene of a crash, especially when this involved an RAF aircraft with British crew and passengers. Air Crash Scenes become a sterile/secured area by the local police until such time as crash/emergency crews arrive and then after the investigation team takes over. Nothing is allowed to be taken from the scene prior to this and no other third parties are allowed to enter. I would also like to put on record that baggage and personal belongings were also removed which is also in violation of normal protocol.

I repeat again the statement made by the senior officer from Strathclyde Police who emphasized just after the crash that there was nothing suspicious about this crash and that it was simply a very tragic accident …….this statement alone made me deeply suspicious that this was a total cover-up as he did not have the authority, experience or capacity to make such a bold statement, especially before the investigation got underway.

Summary:

Based on the statement made by ex Intel Operative Ms Tara Davison in 2010 that this was an inside job and based on the report from the coroner that all crew and passengers died from gunshot wounds to the head (as per my two reports to the Review Panel) one can only surmise that the crew and passengers died at some time prior to the arrival at Waypoint Alpha and without course correction continued on into the hillside.

The presence of the second Chinook (US?) that tracked up to Portrush and then possible over to the Mull of Kintyre (as per Scottish second radar return) may have played a significant part in this tragic event…..especially when it was understood in Northern Ireland at the time that collusion had possibly been taking place between the RUC and the Intelligence units with additional pressure from the US to expedite the peace talks etc….one can only guess. US Navy Seals were in situ at RAF Machrihanish at the time and they are specialist at this type of work.

I repeat again that the only sure way of identifying the truth behind this crash is to bring Ms Tara Davison in for questioning (as per Mr. Gordon Bowden and my request to the police on two occasions) and secondly to obtain the original report from the lady coroner who wrote that the cause of death was by gunshot wounds to the head. Obviously one would have to be rather naive to think that autopsy reports are not falsified to comply with secret service activities

Finally the ultimate truth can only be gained by carrying out another autopsy on the victims concerned which would immediately reveal the true events of that day.

This email has been recorded, duplicated and distributed to many sources (including the media) both here in the UK and overseas for the safety of all those involved in this on going investigation.

Would you please acknowledge receipt of this evidence upon returning to work on Tuesday?

Hello….I am the author of the reports and articles re the above crash which were delivered by hand to Lord Phillips for the second inquiry held in Edinburgh Scotland.

I have to say that as in any inquiry all the evidence provided has to be presented and including in the investigation and also should form part of the summary and conclusion. However, none of this vital evidence was used which is absolutely despicable to say the least .

I also knew Captain Kohn who headed up the first civilian board of inquiry who worked with their military counterparts and again I am shocked that “suspicious circumstances” had not formed part of their inuiry including that of British aviation expert Walter Kennedy…..with such high ranking intelligence officers onboard it would have been my first approach.

I have to be blunt with Walter Kennedy…..If you where part of the inquiry how come you yourself did not think beyond the norm and look at this accident as not being an accident at all……I believe your first comment was in supporting FADEC or other instrumental failure etc and now after the event you have had a rethink and bringing in the fact that the Chinook did carry CPLS .

Obviously with the CPLS if it was deliberately off station then the chopper would have homed into a wrong location……this system although unique for covert/black ops has been used in civilian aviation but it goes by a different tag called Microwave Landing System (MLS) that not only allows the aircraft to home into difficult terrain ie into mountains and valleys etc but also guides /allows the aircraft to overshoot, climb to safe altitude and track back for another approach……the unit is very mobile and can be re positioned to any location.

If Walter Kennedy knew the first inquiry was a cover up then why was this not made public or raised with Captain Kohn before the final verdict was issued (crew error) or why did he not make those findings available to Lord Phillip for the second inquiry…….he had a duty of care to make this known….not only to the investigators but also to the deceased relatives.

I carried out my duty of care with my associate Gordon Bowden (Ex RAF) which formed part of our ongoing High Court Case.

Whatever Mr Kennedy feels may have caused this crash does not take away the fact that all the deceased died from gunshot wounds to the head and not from injuries associated with a high speed impact with the headland at the Mull of Kintyre………I rest my case!!!!

A third inquiry should come into being with a totally independent board with such people as Mr. Kennedy and myself etc……. unfortunately Ralph Kohn has since passed away…..I Hope and pray that his death was natural…..its hard to know these days with such “Skull Duggery” going on.

Thank you so much for contacting me! & may i also thank you for all your hard work. Your research is outstanding & ur blogs are a joy to read! I am happily outclassed!

Unfortunately, as we know, the Mull crash is yet another great tragedy that we were lied 2 about.
I think this case in particular needs to be kept alive. It’s a huge chunk of history & its of massive importance.
I fully intend to broadcast this as far as I possibly can (assuming thats okay with you) & I shall keep you informed as to how I get on.

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