Advocates see risk in cockpit doors

Some airlines have backslid on promises to install secondary barriers. | AP Photo

United and Northwest Airlines agreed to install secondary barriers after Sept. 11, in part to head off a mandate that some advocates were pushing for. But Northwest has now been merged into Delta, which had not made a commitment to install the secondary barriers. And following its merger with Continental, United appears to be backing away from its earlier promise.

Recently, United decided to uninstall the secondary cockpit barriers that had been delivered as standard equipment on its 787 Dreamliners, according to Ellen Saracini and the union that represents United’s pilots.

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Saracini and United’s pilots union are rallying behind Fitzpatrick’s bill, which has picked up 14 co-sponsors, including former House Homeland Security Chairman Peter King (R-N.Y.).

FAA rules require that cockpit doors be closed and locked during flight except for brief breaks for pilots, such as to visit the bathroom. That’s less extreme than the practice used by El Al of Israel, an airline known for its tight security, which requires that cockpit doors remain locked from before the first passenger boards until the last one leaves the plane.

Fitzpatrick told POLITICO he became involved after getting to know Saracini, who brought the issue to him. He said he came away as dissatisfied as she was after United responded to his concerns.

Fitzpatrick said relying on programs such as armed pilots and air marshals is inadequate, particularly considering that the Obama administration has proposed budget cuts to both.

“We are just asking that all of the provisions of that multifaceted flight deck security system [ordered after Sept. 11] be put into place,” he said.

The bill has been referred to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and Fitzpatrick said he has discussed the bill with Chairman Bill Shuster (R-Pa.). “I’ve raised it with him, and he knows that I’m committed,” Fitzpatrick said.

But some security experts say that though the attention to secondary cockpit barriers is well-intentioned, it zeroes in on a vulnerability that no longer poses a high risk.

Kip Hawley, former head of the Transportation Security Administration, said storming the cockpit is low on the vulnerability list because of multiple layers of security that aren’t necessarily obvious, beyond armed pilots, air marshals, trained flight attendants and passengers who won’t allow themselves to be hijacked again.

He said preventing another Sept. 11 isn’t just a matter of keeping terrorists from staging the same kind of attack they carried out in 2001 — it means “never let them exploit a vulnerability that we have in the system to get a catastrophic loss.”

“There are real vulnerabilities, real threats that absolutely need to be stopped, and this is not one of them,” Hawley said. “This is a potential scenario that’s fresh in the minds of many people. Not to disrespect it, but in the real world of protecting planes, it’s low on the list of actually where our vulnerabilities are. We have that one very well covered.”