AAR Notes From a 2002 NTC Rotation
*** > Before anyone reports to the desert, they should get a "welcome
packet" from the gaining unit with such simple things as the names of
the chain of command, the MTOE to CO/TRP level, emergency contact
information, mailing address, etc. While this might not all be terribly
relevant to the rotation itself, it does go a long way toward making
someone feel like they're a part of the unit.
*** > Inprocessing should not be solely designed to inprocess units.
Any NTC rotation will have a hefty dose of individual replacements &
fillers and it should not be a "jump-through-you-ass" surprise when they
arrive. There's no reason that the RS-1 shouldn't know who's coming and
what unit they belong to. The Theater Briefing in the bleachers was
great for those soldiers who think they're "just going to NTC" and it
set a good tone for the soldiers to let them know they are in a theater
of war.
*** > Dustbowl layout should include some large signs that identify
who belongs to which shades. Also, not setting up shelter halves was a
great move, since no one used the damn things anyway, and it let the
cots stay under the shades.
*** > RSOI tracking needs to be trained! The overly-worshipped charts
developed by CALL over 8 years ago need to be refined to include
logistics assets (fuelers, recovery vehicles, etc.). They also need to
be used at every AT leading up to an NTC rotation. A CPX needs to be
executed down to PLT LDR level to go over the glide path so that
everyone knows how they relate to each other. Also, plan a schedule
for hard-copy and FM updates, and stick to it, even if there are no
changes. At the worst, it ensures your commo is still working.
And a healthy dose of common sense needs to be injected in the process.
Most of the troops were reporting themselves 'green' on commo because
they had tested their radios and they all worked. The reality, though,
was that with only 45 or so CVCs in the entire squadron, not too many
people could communicate at the same time.
*** > When developing packing lists for NTC, the priority should be on
mission accomplishment. The regimental packing list had MOPP suits in
the C-bags in the trailers that were shipping by train. When that
trailer didn't show up until the night of the RSOI AAR, there was an
entire squadron in a hot theater of war with no chemical protection.
This gave everyone a few laughs during the SCUD drills when members of
3-278 were seen running around the Dustbowl in PT gear and gas masks.
The MOPP suits should have been in a carried bag.
Similar problems surfaced with other mission gear: mapboards for the
TOC, CVCs, and BII for a bunch of vehicles were all in the same trailer.
*** > The schedule grid used by 1-263 AR during RSOI should become
standard. There was very little confusion about who had to be where
(and when) and what they were doing there. The lack of coherent
scheduling took its toll on the squadron after RSOI 2, when the troop
commanders started to complain about what they saw as "jumping through
their asses" to "react" to constant "last-minute scheduling." In
reality, the schedule was known, but not well-communicated.
*** > Don't set up shelter halves in the Dustbowl if you're just going
to use the to store stuff.
*** > The move-out from the Dustbowl needs to be sequenced, written in
a detailed order, REHEARSED, and controlled/tracked by the RTOC. The
best way to control it is to use the MP CO as traffic cops, since
battlefield circulation is part of their job. If a unit doesn't move
until 5th in the regimental order of march, then there's no reason from
them to be within 500m of the gate while the first unit is trying to get
out the gate. The class V upload needs to be rehearsed as a part of
this sequence also. There's no way to rehearse this event full-up
before arriving at NTC, since a National Guard unit will never have
everyone in one place at one time to try it before they all show up at
the rotation. What this means is that the unit has to do a detailed
rehearsal with a detailed order. The move-out sounds like a simple
event, but if you screw it up, it'll set a downer tone for the entire
rotation.
*** > Class V can be fixed at the individual level, by issuing small
arms ammo in the dustbowl before move-out. If you're moving into a hot
theater of war, you need to LD with some way to defend yourself,
especially if you're not stopping by the class V point to draw big
bullets. CPs and aid stations need to defend themselves. You do need
some AT weapons at locations where you have no combat vehicles. The
UMCP can load ammo on tanks that have engine problems, but the TOC is
otherwise screwed.
*** > The Regiment created it's own NTC map for the rotation. This
was good in that there was no time wasted piecing together NTC North and
South maps. However, there were a few problems with it. (1) The grid
squares were slightly smaller than a normal 1:50k map. This meant that
graphics coming from corps on the standard NTC N/S maps wouldn't work on
the map (2) There were a lot of routes marked on the map that were used
over and over in operations. This is fine for one mission, but I
imagine that after the second battle, the OPFOR had a good idea where
route Jamestown was. (3) There was a definite overkill on custom map
symbols: checkpoints, NTC plugger waypoints, and "historical data of
OPFOR OPs" (which really consisted of tagging every single possible
hilltop on the map, whether the OPFOR every actually used them or not).
The end result was a very cluttered and unusable map. Of course,
because the graphics weren't interchangable between that map and the NTC
N/S map, you had no choice but to use a shoddy map.
*** > During preparation for defensive missions, the TOC needs some
way to track the preparations made in engineer efforts, both
countermobility & survivability. There needs to be a timeline and
prioritization for the engineers issued very early in the WARNO process,
and there needs to be some guidance from the BN/SQN CDR very early on
for these things. Giving the engineers a task list, and a priority,
allows them to get to work early and continue work throughout the time
that the rest of mission is getting planned.
In addition to this, the plan needs to include the priority for post-
battlefield clean-up. Which obstacles need to come down, and in what
order. There also needs to be a tasking for security for the class IV/V
point, both before and after the mission.
*** > AFVID becomes a serious issue when dealing with thermal sights.
Vehicles look different in thermals, and none of them look like plywood
panels on an MPRC. There were times when M113s were ID'ed as BTR-60s
and stripped HMMWVs ID'ed as BRDMs. All but one of the fratricide
incidents occurred at night, when thermal sights were in use. Also,
knowing the OPFOR and their equipment would've kept an M113 from being
ID'ed at a BTR-60, even though it did look a lot like and OSV-2 BMP with
the trim vane out.
*** > The S-2 usually does have a pretty good read on where the OPFOR
is going to be, and it doesn't always jive with what the maneuver guys
want the OPFOR to do. Nevertheless, no one seems to get ignored more
than the S-2, and no one seems to be right as often as the S-2.
*** > During prep days, the OPFOR obstacle efforts are competitive,
i.e. you can shoot at them while they're working. Put a few guys in a
HMMWV (like a Vampire team) and get them where they can call fires on
the OPFOR engineer assets. Even if they don't kill anything, just
making them move around and take cover disrupts their work and slows
down their progress.
*** > The staff rehearsals for the orders drill should be conducted
under deployment conditions. They should take place at 2am when the
staff is dead-tired and having a tough time thinking straight. The
tools should all fit in a binder or notebook and be easy to use,
especially under deployment conditions.
*** > Incorporate all BOS into the IPB process and have all of them
conduct a "reverse BOS analysis." The ADA guys should know something
about OPFOR ADA, as well as OPFOR air. Ditto with the ENG, FA, etc.
*** > The TOC wingboards should be very modular so that they can be
broken down and particular components used as they relate to the
mission. JANUS exercises, especially offensive missions, should be
trained under these types of circumstances. They should be in red-TOC
configuration, with a map table instead of a wall array of tracking
charts. The Battle Binder is a good way to do this.
*** > Don't set up an extension under the pretense of "noise and light
discipline" if you're going to have a plans truck with a 30K generator
that makes 80db of noise heard 2km away. And if you have a light on in
the plans truck, make it a red one, or turn it off before you open the
door and blast white light all over the desert, marking your TOC as a
target for idiot-seeking missiles.
*** > Keep the plans tent clean! When the TOC came under arty fire
and had to displace in a hurry, the plans tent was left standing. That
isn't a big deal itself, but the wealth of information left in the plans
tent - overlays, regimental OPORDs, etc. - would've been a treasure
trove of intel to anyone who'd have found it.
*** > When holding a combined arms rehearsal, don't just bring
CO/TRP/BTY CDRs, but also bring key platoon leaders, and even some key
TCs/BCs. Having the lead PLT LDR/TC from K Troop at the CAR for the
last mission would've reinforced the presence of the frat fence that
everyone already knew about and would've ensured that the smoke was
called at the right time.
*** > ENG CO CDRs are maneuver commanders and can take control of a
tank or Bradley platoon, if needed. The SQN could've reorganized a bit
and given the ENG CO a platoon of Brads from one troop and a tank
platoon from the other and built the breach force around that, leaving
the other two troops free to be purely and assault force or support
force.
*** > Collecting class V and sensitive items in the field is a good
idea, but be prepared for it. Have the weapons trucks waiting, and the
ammo HEMMTs in a line that you can drive past. And if you're planning
on doing it all at Four Corners, don't stop everyone 5km away and do it
in advance just so you don't "waste time at Four Corners." That's what
Four Corners is for! Also, let the weapons trucks and class V guys get
to work as soon as their unit is together instead of waiting for the
entire SQN/BN to catch up. Three of the troops could've been done
turning in weapons by the time the HOW BTY caught up to the AA.
*** > The recovery/turn-in needs an OPORD as well, and it needs
briefing with the same attention and detail as any tactical order (maybe
moreso). You can get your butt kicked in the field and still go home
after 3 weeks. You can't lose accountability of class V or a weapon and
expect to go home after 3 weeks. Rehearsals need to be done with the
key leaders, and in this case, the "key leaders" are those that are
going to execute the bulk of the mission: 1SGs, BN/SQN and TRP/CO/BTY
XOs, PSGs, SPT PLT LDRs, and maintenance leaders. These guys all need
to be at the Regimental rehearsal.
*** > Traffic control is an MP function. Put the MPs to work
controlling the flow of traffic. This includes who has priority in &
out of gates, who gets priority in which vehicle recovery lines, and
which vehicles are allowed to drive where in the Dustbowl. It's a lot
of work, but it's also their job.
*** > While it is acceptable that the RS-1 might be surprised every
here and there by unexpected fillers/replacements coming in, there
should be ZERO surprises going home. Everyone is going home, somehow,
and there's no excuse not to have a copy of everyone's itinerary for the
trip out. This allows the RS-1 to build a list of who flies when and
when the rides to the airport need to leave, which corresponds to report
times at the MCC. The RS-1 spent an entire night getting everyone's
certificates in order (and they were going to be issued at home
station!); a fraction of that effort would've solved the rides to the
airport.
*** > Where does the SIGO work? The commo repair section (according
to our TACSOP) works at the CTCP, but does that mean the SIGO works
there? Where do the retrans guys live? There's a case for putting them
at both places.
*** > The staff rehearsals should ID rather early who needs to be at
the MDMP. You probably don't need the S-1 and the S-4 for a tactical
mission. You probably don't need the S-2 for an administrative movement
order. You also need to ensure that the people in the job are the right
people for the job, i.e. an XO that's not interested in MDMP/TOC ops
probably doesn't need to be an XO.
*** > Graphic control measures need names that everyone can pronounce,
and are easily distinguishable on the net, and that can be easily copied
on the graphics at 2am. Route Huertgen became RT Hurtegen, RT
Huertegen, RT Huertengen, and RT Huertergen.
*** > Develop an SOP for 5988-E flow for times when a LOGPAC doesn't
run.
*** > Fortunately the SQN was used to bad logistics and the soldiers
were prepared with a hefty load of MREs and personal chow.