09TBILISI841, GEORGIA: EUMM CONFIRMS COMPLIANCE WITH MOU ON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000841
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: PRELMOPSKBTSRSGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EUMM CONFIRMS COMPLIANCE WITH MOU ON
MILITARY MOVEMENTS
REF: A. TBILISI 171
¶B. OSCE MISSION TO GEORGIA DAILY PATROL REPORT FOR
29 APRIL 2009
Classified By: Amb. John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
released a public statement April 28 announcing the automatic
renewal of its MOU with the Georgian Ministry of Defense
(MOD) and Georgia's continued compliance with its provisions.
The statement notes that the EUMM has not been able to
substantiate any of the numerous allegations of Georgia's
violations of the MOU; the EUMM informed post that it
released the statement to respond not only to these
allegations, but also to Russian concerns that the MOU's
validity was about to expire. The EUMM and OSCE have
observed numerous trenches and other positions dug by the
Georgian military in recent weeks along the main east-west
highway, but no equipment is installed in any of the
positions. The MOD stated these are defensive positions
only, and the EUMM and OSCE have determined this is the case.
This fairly categorical statement will be useful in
rebutting continued unfounded allegations of Georgia's
alleged buildup and putting the onus for reducing tensions on
the other side of the boundaries. End summary and comment.
¶2. (SBU) The EUMM's MOU with the MOD was signed on January
26, 2009 (see ref A) and contains a provision that it will
automatically be renewed every three months unless one of the
sides decides to withdraw. Since neither side did so, the
EUMM released its statement April 28 announcing the automatic
continuation of the agreement (see paragraph 5 for text).
The MOD released a similar statement, also on April 28 (see
paragraph 6). EUMM Head of Mission Hansjoerg Haber told a
group of diplomats April 30 that the EUMM decided to release
the statement partly in response to concerns Russia has
raised with EUMM that the validity of the MOU would expire
after the initial three-month period. Head of the MOD's
Analytical Department David Nardaia told PolOff and Acting
DATT, also on April 30, that the MOD sees no reason to change
any of the MOU's provisions and expects to continue to
maintain the agreement into the forseeable future.
¶3. (C) The EUMM and OSCE have both observed in recent weeks
the digging of trenches and emplacements for military
equipment, such as tanks, at various locations along the main
east-west highway south of South Ossetia. The two
organizations have not oberved any military personnel or
equipment occupying the positions. On April 29, for example,
OSCE monitors observed a "500-meter-long system of unoccupied
trenches, foxholes, earthworks and armored vehicle positions
between Mokhisi and Agara" (ref B). The same patrol observed
similar positions west of Agara. These locations are
straight west from Gori; the organizations have observed
similar positions east of Gori as well, on either side of the
highway, but not near the South Ossetian administrative
boundary. Nardaia explained that the positions are part of
Georgia's defense plan and are designed to allow Georgia to
take up defensive positions in case of another attack on
Georgia. He stressed that they are defensive positions only,
noting that it would be difficult to move positions dug into
the ground for offensive purposes. At his meeting with
Qthe ground for offensive purposes. At his meeting with
diplomats, Haber said the EUMM has determined that the
positions are indeed defensive in nature; OSCE monitors have
made the same determination.
COMMENT: Saying Georgia is Building Up Doesn't Make it True
¶4. (C) Haber was almost embarrassed to note the statement's
very "flattering" assessment of the MOD's compliance, but he
said he and his colleagues has been genuinely impressed with
the level of the MOD's cooperation. The sweeping nature of
the finding that, of all the numerous allegations of Georgian
violations, the EUMM has not been able to substantiate a
single one is impressive. It stands in stark contrast to
Russian allegations that surfaced again on April 29, when an
Interfax story cited Kremlin sources as alleging the presence
of 2,500 Georgian forces in the areas adjacent to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. That same story suggested that active
fortification works were underway, which may be a reference
to the Georgians' new trenches and other positions. The use
of the EUMM's (as well as the OSCE's and UNOMIG's) judgments
about these developments will help ensure that such wild
allegations do not gain currency through the sheer force of
repetition. The EUMM's closing sentence, which proposes an
TBILISI 00000841 002 OF 002
arrangement similar to the MOU for the other side of the
boundaries, will help put the burden of avoiding an
escalation o
f tensions back on the other parties. Ensuring
that these objective voices are not drowned out will be
especially important in the runup to the NATO exercise,
beginning May 6, and the May 18-19 Geneva talks.
THE STATEMENTS
¶5. (U) Begin text of the April 28 EUMM statement.
EUMM satisfied with the compliance of the Georgian Ministry
of Defense with restrictions on military movements
After three months in force, the Memorandum of Understanding
between the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the
Ministry of Defense of Georgia was automatically prolonged on
26 April for another three months. None of the sides used
its right to terminate the agreement.
The Memorandum of Understanding stipulates certain
restrictions on the movements of the Georgian armed forces in
the vicinity of the administrative boundary lines of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as well as giving advance information of
movements to EUMM.
EUMM is very satisfied with the compliance of the Georgian
authorities with the Memorandum of Understanding. EUMM has
followed up all allegations of infringements of the
Memorandum of Understanding, but was not able to substantiate
any of them. The Georgian Ministry of Defense has provided
the necessary transparency to ensure that our monitors can
fulfill their duties under these arrangements.
EUMM recognizes that this is a unilateral confidence building
measure by Georgia. Security in the post conflict region
could be further enhanced if similar arrangements could be
agreed on the other side of the administrative boundary lines.
End text.
¶6. (U) Begin text of the April 28 MOD statement.
Agreement on Provisional Arrangement for the Exchange of
Information between the Ministry of Defense of Georgia and
EUMM was prolonged
The Agreement on "Provisional Arrangement for the Exchange of
Information" between the Ministry of Defense of Georgia and
the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has been
automatically prolonged for another three months.
The Ministry of Defense of Georgia and European Union
Monitoring Mission signed the document on January 26, 2009.
The document has been based on the EU-mediated Six-Point
Ceasefire Agreement. The document sets out the effective
mechanisms of information exchange and interaction between
Defense Ministry of Georgia and EUMM with a view to further
strengthening the confidence and security between the sides.
It should be mentioned, that since the date of signature, the
Parties to the Agreement have been faithfully fulfilling the
commitments under the Agreement.
The Ministry of Defense of Georgia expresses its high
willingness for further close collaboration with EUMM and
will provide the necessary support to ensure that the
Mission's monitors carry out their duties and obligations
duly mandated to them.
There follows a reference to the EUMM statement. End text.
TEFFT

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