Friday, November 29, 2013

The Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers Thus, sans further adieu (or a don't)Council Winners

Collectivist China's recent overlapping zone establishment seems kinda hokey...Any aircraft flying through the newly designated Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea must notify Chinese authorities in advance and follow instructions from its air-traffic controllers. America’s response was rapid. On November 26th Great Satan sent two B-52 bombers to fly through the new zone without notifying China

Plenty of countries establish zones in which they require aircraft to identify themselves, but they tend not to be over other countries’ territory. The Chinese ADIZ overlaps with Japan’s own air-defence zone. It also includes some specks of rock that Japan administers and calls the Senkaku islands (and which China claims and calls the Diaoyus), as well as a South Korean reef, known as Ieodo. The move is clearly designed to bolster China’s claims. On November 28th Japan and South Korea sent aircraft into the zone.East Asia has never before had a strong China and a strong Japan at the same time. China dominated the region from the mists of history until the 1850s, when the West’s arrival spurred Japan to modernise while China tried to resist the foreigners’ influence. China is eager to re-establish dominance over the region. Bitterness at the memory of the barbaric Japanese occupation in thesecond world war sharpens this desire. It is this possibility of a clash between a rising and an established power that lies behind the oft-used parallel between contemporary East Asia and early 20th-century Europe, in which the Senkakus play the role of Sarajevo.The ADIZ clearly suggests that China does not accept the status quo in the region and wants to change it. Any Chinese leader now has an excuse for going after Japanese planes. Chinese ships are already ignoring Japanese demands not to enter the waters surrounding the disputed islands.China, it needs to behave like a responsible world power, not a troublemaker willing to sacrifice 60 years of peace in north-east Asia to score some points by grabbing a few windswept rocks. It should accept Japan’s suggestion of a military hotline, similar to the one that is already established between Beijing and Washington.

In response,Great Satan convened a peace conference in Washington, between November 12, 1921 and February 6, 1922, which would later be referred to as the “Washington Naval Conference”Negotiations were primarily geared towards naval disarmament in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia, and gave way to three major treaties. These treaties helped to curtail the naval buildup in the region for a period and supported a fragile peace throughout the 1920s and 30s, up to their renunciation by Japan in 1936.

Eons later - is a New Naval Conference ready to rock?

Since 2000, China’s military spending has grown by 325.5 percent, to reach $166 billion in 2012, according to SIPRI’s estimates. Much of this spending was on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the reform and modernization of which, begun in the 1980s, accelerated rapidly in the 2000s. The creation of a nuclear submarine base in Sanya, on the island of Hainan, and the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, provided powerful symbols of China’s swelling capabilities and ambitions in the maritime domain.

Capability development were not limited to the PLAN, however. Maritime and law enforcement agencies, those most active in the territorial disputes that pit China against a number of its neighbors, have also been given greater means, and an enlarged mandate. This simultaneously demonstrates the significance of the maritime domain in Beijing’s plans and strategic outlook, and contributes to the image of a more assertive China. Both elements have a profound impact on its relationship with its neighbors, which are now also committed to military modernization programs.The balance of power between China and Taiwan is now long gone, and Taipei is no longer seeking any kind of parity, in terms of missiles, aircrafts of tanks, with a continental China whose military budget is eleven times as high as its own. Given the level of forces it continues to amass on its side of the Taiwan Strait, Beijing appears more and more capable of denying the U.S. Navy access to the Strait, especially in the event of a non-pacific reunification with the island. In reaction, despite a more accommodative diplomacy towards Beijing, Taipei is committed to the maintenance of a strong deterrent force, through more asymmetric capabilities (most of them geared towards the maritime domain).

In the East China Sea, the rise of the PLAN constitutes a major issue for South Korea and Japan, two other maritime powers extremely dependent upon their access to the sea for their security and prosperity. The South Korean navy recently went through an important upgrade, with the acquisition and indigenous development of submarine, combat and amphibious capabilities that go far beyond the needs of confronting the North Korean threat.Japan has also expressed preoccupation at Beijing’s growing military might, labeling China a concern for the international community and the region in 2010. Tokyo shifted the focus of its strategic outlook from the North and the Russian and North Korean threats, where it was traditionally geared, to the South of the archipelago, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, where the number of incidents with Chinese ships and aircrafts have skyrocketed since 2010. The Japanese Navy unveiled in August of this year one of the two Izumo-class destroyers it will operate by 2015. Such ships will be the largest Japan has built since World War II.

Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, military spending increased by 62 percent between 2002 and 2012, based on SIPRI’s estimates, and parts of that – at the very least that in Vietnam – can be attributed to the multiplication of incidents in the South China Sea.This situation is all the more worrying because there is no international arms limitation regime in the region. Is it possible to prevent regional security dilemmas from spiraling into costly and destabilizing arms races? There is no diplomatic magic formula to adequately address and resolve this question. What is certain though is that international collaboration is essential. To date, multilateral forums such as ASEAN and its offshoots have demonstrated an uneven commitment by regional actors to institution-building and to the multilateral management of security issues.Is a new version of the Washington Conference therefore possible, or even desirable? Perhaps not. Resistance would certainly be strong. In pursuing such an agenda, the U.S. would appear to be both judge and jury, and a revamped Washington Conference an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Asian countries that would also run counter to the ASEAN centrality principle of Southeast Asia. Worse, it could easily be interpreted as part of a China containment strategy.

Grand strategy has always been seductive because it promises policy coherence in the face of complexity. Yet the sorry truth is that American grand strategies are usually alluring but elusive. Containment during the Cold War, the most often cited example of grand strategy success, is a recent lonely exception that has driven political scientists and policy makers to keep hope alive. That hope is misguided. In the post-9/11 world, forging a successful grand strategy is unlikely and dangerous.

Grand strategies must be grand. That is, they must be able to anticipate and articulate a compelling future state of the world and galvanize the development of policies, institutions, and capabilities at the domestic and international level to get us there. That’s hard enough. A second challenge is the strategic interaction part of grand strategy, which requires predicting, evading, blocking, and otherwise adjusting to the countermoves of principal adversaries. Grand strategy is not a game of solitaire, where we come up with all the moves and the cards just sit there. It’s not all about us and our big ideas. Instead, grand strategy is a multi-player game with powerful adversaries who are seeking their own future state of the world to serve their own interests. Successful grand strategy, then, hinges on knowing the number and identities of these key adversaries, what they want, how they operate, and what damage they can inflict.

In Cold Warsaw Pact Time - that was pretty easy

From the earliest days of the Cold War, American leaders knew full well that there would be only one principal adversary. They knew exactly who it was, where it was, and had pretty good ideas about Soviet interests and ideas. They also knew the threat to American lives and interests was existential. The number and targets of Soviet nuclear missiles left little doubt.

"Cept in the New Millennium...

The post-9/11 threat environment is vastly different. Today, the number, identity, and magnitude of dangers threatening American interests are all wildly uncertain. Exactly how many principal adversaries does Great Satan have? Who are they and what do they want? What could they do to us? These first-order questions are hotly debated by academics and policymakers alike. Is the terrorist threat increasing, decreasing, or plateauing?

What exactly does “the terrorist threat” or the administration’s favorite catchall, “al Qaeda and its associated forces” encompass anyway? Is China a rising great power rival or a responsible stakeholder?Where do Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia rank on the adversaries list? Then there is the magnitude issue: How likely is a “digital Pearl Harbor” that disables strategicnuclear forces or brings down financial institutions, power systems, and other critical infrastructures? What is the probability and potential toll of a biological attack by a state or non-state actor? A nuclear strike? Nobody really knows. 44's 2010 nuclear posture review concluded that the risk of a global nuclear war has declined, but the risk of any other kind of nuclear attack has increased. Eliminating the possibility of Armageddon still leaves plenty of room to wonder about how bad all these other threats could be.In the past five years alone, the Director of National Intelligence has declared three #1 threats toGrea Satan's national security: terrorism, the global economic crisis, and cyber vulnerabilities. The Cold War this isn’t. We live in a hazy threat du jour world. This is too much complexity and uncertainty for grand strategy to handle.If grand strategy is too grand an ambition in the current threat environment and organizational landscape, what can be done?The first step is obvious but important: Give up on grand strategy. We should strive for what Stephen Krasner calls “orienting principles” - policy ideas that lie between ad hoc reactions to the day’s events and grand visions of how the future should unfold. Orienting principles aren’t glamorous, but they hold out the prospect of something better than foreign policy a la carte or a grand strategy that mis-estimates the threat environment and misunderstands the organizational requirements for success.

Sunday, November 24, 2013

Whale, alla Preachers and their uber militant posse of bodyguards in Iran's Preacher Command have gotta be thinking they just nicked the deal of the century with the P plus Something Something Interim Deal...

Agreement was struck despite solemn incantations earlier that “no deal is better than a bad deal.”This interim agreement is badly skewed from America’s perspective. Iran retains its full capacity to enrich uranium, thus abandoning a decade of Western insistence and Security Council resolutions that Iran stop all uranium-enrichment activities. Allowing Iran to continue enriching, and despite modest (indeed, utterly inadequate) measures to prevent it from increasing its enriched-uranium stockpiles and its overall nuclear infrastructure, lays the predicate for Iran fully enjoying its “right” to enrichment in any “final” agreement. Indeed, the interim agreement itself acknowledges that a “comprehensive solution” will “involve a mutually defined enrichment program.” This is not, as the administration leaked before the deal became public, a “compromise” on Iran’s claimed “right” to enrichment. This is abject surrender by the United States.

Iran achieved three critical breakthroughs

First, it bought time to continue all aspects of its nuclear-weapons program the agreement does not cover (centrifuge manufacturing and testing; weaponization research and fabrication; and its entire ballistic missile program). Indeed, given that the interim agreement contemplates periodic renewals, Iran may have gained all of the time it needs to achieve weaponization not of simply a handful of nuclear weapons, but of dozens or more.

Second, Iran has gained legitimacy. This central banker of international terrorism and flagrant nuclear proliferator is once again part of the international club. Much as the Syria chemical-weapons agreement buttressed Bashar al-Assad, the mullahs have escaped the political deep freezer. Third, Iran has broken the psychological momentum and effect of the international economic sanctions. While estimates differ on Iran’s precise gain, it is considerable ($7 billion is the lowest estimate), and presages much more. Tehran correctly assessed that a mere six-months’ easing of sanctions will make it extraordinarily hard for the West to reverse direction, even faced with systematic violations of Iran’s nuclear pledges. Major oil-importing countries (China, India, South Korea, and others) were already chafing under sanctions, sensing 44 had no stomach either to impose sanctions on them, or pay the domestic political price of granting further waivers

Buying time for its own sake makes sense in some negotiating contexts, but the sub silentio objective here was to jerry-rig yet another argument to wield against Israel and its fateful decision whether or not to strike Iran.Most importantly, the deal leaves the basic strategic realities unchanged. Iran’s nuclear program was, from its inception, a weapons program, and it remains one today. Even modest constraints, easily and rapidly reversible, do not change that fundamental political and operational reality. And while some already-known aspects of Iran’s nuclear program are returned to enhanced scrutiny, the undeclared and likely unknown military work will continue to expandSo in truth, a military strike by Little Satan is the only way to avoid Tehran’s otherwise inevitable march to nuclear weapons, and the proliferation that will surely follow. Making the case for Little Satan’s exercise of its legitimate right of self-defense has therefore never been more politically important. Whether they are celebrating in Tehran or in Jerusalem a year from now may well depend on how the opponents of the deal in Washington conduct themselves.

Friday, November 22, 2013

The Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers Thus, sans further adieu (or a don't)Council Winners

Thursday, November 21, 2013

Crafted by Congress at the dawn of the New Millennium, the Great Satan - China Something Something and Security Review Commission commissions hot desires for a Pacific"Surge of naval assets in the event of a contingency. Fund the Navy’s shipbuilding and operations efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at least 60 ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by 2020 so that the United States will have the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Western Pacific.”"Such an increase in shipbuilding would offset China’s growing military capabilities"

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

This extends beyond one-state/two-state conversations to include a focus on rights per se, debates over how best to define Little Satan's occupation and which body of international law best applies, and calls for a return to community activism and non-violent resistance. Any national consensus or mandate in support of negotiations is fast disappearing.Without a change in the status quo, the Palestinian leadership faces some hard choices. Two areas in particular stand out. First, the leadership should consider initiating a new Palestinian national dialogue aimed at revitalising a weakened Palestinian national movement. Given that debates over Palestinian strategy are already taking place, the leadership is better served by being part of them and staying ahead of the curve rather than finding itself one of their principal targets. While not risk free, helping to facilitate such a debate in a structured and inclusive environment that allows for the participation of key Palestinian constituencies will serve as a show of national leadership and help Ramallah reconnect with those whom it has largely lost touch with, particularly Palestinian refugees.

One option - more viable than most - is the creation of a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new national programme capable of reunifying the Palestinian body politic around an agreed set of national goals and strategy.Second, the Palestinian leadership should prioritise much needed institutional reforms to allow for greater democratic decision-making. Such reforms should start with the renewal of the PLO, whose role and responsibilities as the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians should be clearly separated from those of the PA.Changes in PLO funding, as well as a review of its charter to strengthen internal democratic procedures, should also be considered. In addition, staging new electionsfor the PA and reviving the Palestinian Legislative Council will provide additional legislative oversight over executive decisions in West Bank. PA elections, however, should not be treated as a panacea for all of the problems facing the Palestinian leadership. Lastly, strengthening Palestinian civil society and fostering greater public policy dialogue and debate are both important in strengthening public participation and representation in West Bank.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Hello Batman!An impending new clear Persia be making for some sick hook ups!While Officially they don't dig each others action, captain - fun free choice democrazy Little Satan and unfun, cruel, totalitarian Whahabbi Arabia are hot to hook up.See, Sunni Hijazzers are totally freaking about the prospect of a Shi Ite posse cementing regional hegemony backed up with new clear weaponry.Recent Saudi LOLs about buying Pakistani weapons to counter such a nightmare aside - a military alliance betwixt Little Satan and Saudiland may be the craziest thang since Great Satan hookedup with Land of the Pure:

“Once the Geneva agreement is signed, the military option will be back on the table. The Saudis are furious and are willing to give Little Satan all the help she needs” including a "go-ahead for the IAF to use Saudi airspace in the event of an attack on Iran.” The Saudis are also reported to be willing to assist Little Satan by making drones, rescue helicopters, and tanker planes available for Little Satan.

Monday, November 18, 2013

Iran has imperialistic dreams. Apparently, it hopes to become the most powerful and influential country in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Iran created Hezbollah, at considerable expense, and ever since has used it as the terrorist wing of the Revolutionary Guard. Today Iran controls Lebanon, through Hezbollah operatives who exercise veto power over every act of the Lebanese government. They even have their own radio and TV stations. Iran’s tentacles also reach into the Assad regime in Syria; sometimes Bashar al-Assad is called an Iranian puppet.

An ambitious and barbaric theocracy with the ultimate weapon would terrify anyone, but Iran’s intentions should be seen in context. A bomb dropped on Little Satan would invite a response of equal or greater ferocity. The Iranian leaders won’t make such a suicidal move unless they are even crazier than their speeches make them sound. Their ambitions, if we judge them by their actions, go beyond Little Satan.

If the leaders of Iran produce a nuclear weapon, will they use it to bomb Tel Aviv? Or do they have something else in mind?

An Iranian bomb, when added to a powerful army and Hezbollah, would lift Iran above every other country in the Middle East (except, of course, Little Satan). Iranian regional hegemony would not be pleasant to experience for most of the Arab states in the area. This explains why Saudi Arabia is so disturbed by America’s willingness to talk to Iran.

It would also lead to nuclear proliferation. If Iran acquires a bomb, and tests it now and then as proof, other major countries in the Middle East will decide that they can’t get along without one of their own. The Saudis, the Egyptians and the Turks will soon be importing atomic weapons. Egypt plans to begin its nuclear power system, peaceful for now, early in 2014. The BBC said last week that the Saudis already have ordered a nuclear weapon from Pakistan.

Sunday, November 17, 2013

The righteous hit that vaporized the creepy intolerant Hakimullah Mehsud recently could be strangely LOL'd as yet another of Land of the Pure's legion of discombobulations.Like psychological symptoms that occur in some persons in a captive or hostage situation.Helsinki Something Something they calls it.See,

During his four years as the head of the T.T.P., Mehsud raised the Taliban game in Pakistan. No longer were they just tribal men fighting to preserve their way of life; they started dreaming they could convert everyone to it. Mehsud consolidated a number of small but ruthless militant and sectarian groups into close-knit fighting units that seemed able to strike anywhere at will. He ordered attacks on Pakistan’s military bases, organized a couple of spectacular jailbreaks, and sent an endless stream of suicide bombers after politicians and religious scholars who didn’t meet his exacting standards. After his men kidnapped an Army colonel, Mehsud delivered a short speech, and then shot him in front of a video camera. When Mehsud was killed, instead of celebrating or letting out quiet sighs of relief, politicians and journalists reacted as if they had lost a favorite son. He had killed many of us, but we weren’t craving vengeance; we were ready to make up and cuddle.Why does Pakistan’s political and military élite celebrate the very people it is fighting? The logic—or its absence—goes like this: Hakimullah Mehsud was our enemy. But the United States is also our enemy. So how dare the Americans kill him? And how dare they kill him when we had made up our minds to talk to him? If the United States is talking to the Afghan Taliban, why can’t we talk to our own Taliban? According to Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, our Taliban are not a fighting force with clear goals but merely people “who are mentally disturbed and confused.” These confused people have attacked mosques, Air Force bases, and anyone who looks remotely like a Shiite; in Swat, they barred all women from leaving home without a male companion. Not to mention shutting down girls’ schools.

The popular narrative in Pakistan holds that the Taliban’s fight is simply a reaction to American drone strikes: it’s a war between American kids sitting in front of LCD screens eating their TV dinners and our own men in the north, who are better Muslims than we are. The Pakistani logic seems to be that if America stops killing them, they’ll stop killing us. But the truth is that the Taliban leadership has made no such promises. They have only said that if the government stops drone strikes, and stops coöperating with America’s war in Afghanistan, they would be willing to talk. But what would they talk about? The little problem they have with Pakistan is that it’s an infidel state—almost as bad as America, but with some potential; they believe that they can somehow make us all better Muslims.Our Taliban are simply saying, “Save us from the U.S. drones, so we can continue to kill you infidels in peace.”

Pakistan’s rulers have developed a strange fetish for lionizing its tormenters. Watching the proceedings in Pakistan’s parliament last week, after Mehsud’s murder, you could have mistaken it all for a Taliban meeting. “This is not just the killing of one person,” Pakistan’s interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, said. “It’s the death of all peace efforts.” It was mentioned, but only in passing, that since Pakistan had proposed talks with Mehsud in September, the peacemaker and his allies had killed an Army general, blown up a church filled with worshippers, and killed hundreds of other civilians.

Friday, November 15, 2013

The Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers Thus, sans further adieu (or a don't)Council Winners

Thursday, November 14, 2013

As the post 9-11 era of the War on Terrorism winds down, the Services are rightly looking to the future. With the severe fiscal constraints, drawdown of personnel, and an uncertain future of threats there is a debate on whether the military should focus solely on traditional war fighting and deterrence or sustain and further develop the capabilities to deal with the unconventional warfare threats posed by state and non-state actors from the Iran Action Network to North Korea’s Department 39 to Al Qaeda. The Special Operations community is having this debate as well and it has resulted in controversial visions for the future including establishing a Global SOF Network (GSN).

6 specific points.

The U.S. faces national security threats in three fundamental forms of warfare: nuclear warfare, conventional warfare, and unconventional warfare.

The future is characterized by the need to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) and to be able to counter unconventional warfare.

The U.S. has the greatest surgical strike capability in the world but it needs to prioritize and resource equally our special warfare capabilities.

The U.S. needs Strategists and Policy makers who have a deep understanding of and value the strategic options of UW and Counter-UW.

Effective Special Warfare is counter-intuitively characterized by slow and deliberate employment – long duration actions and activities, relationship establishment, development, and sustainment.

SOF will always have a role in hybrid conflict and conventional warfare.

Since here is no agreed upon theory of unconventional warfare and certainly nothing to balance with theory of special operations put forth in Admiral McRaven's seminal work on special operations raids and direct action with his important principles of how small special operations forces can defeat larger ones. The no longer published 1997 Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia is that last time that UW was fully described in non-SOF military publication. This excerpt provides a foundation for the concept of UW that remains relevant today:

UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the U.S. perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving U.S. national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war.

The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. Special operations forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic or operational objectives.

When UW is conducted independently during military operations other than war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include the following:

• Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.• Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.• Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.• Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.• Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.

The future of U.S. SOF should rest on its historical foundation while adapting traditional missions for the conditions and character of conflict of the 21st Century. Unconventional warfare could very well be the dominant form of warfare. While the U.S. may not choose to conduct UW often, it is imperative that the U.S. has the capability to counter it. U.S. SOF by virtue of its training, organization and experience is well suited to make a major contribution to the U.S. efforts to counter UW.

Wednesday, November 13, 2013

In an interview with state media last week, Senior Colonel Du Wenlong was asked what China’s “trump card” was for establishing sea and air control over the South China Sea. In response, Du highlighted the importance of cooperation between China’s fighter jets and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft would play in allowing to establish “sea and air control” in the South China Sea.Specifically, he said that cooperation between the J-10 series, J-11 series, J-16, KJ 2000, and KJ 200 “gives China control over enemy targets in an extended airspace through strong air-to-air attack capability.” Once China gained command of the skies, Du noted, it would be able to impose control over the waters in the South China Sea by using aircraft with air-to-sea functions, backed by submarines and surface vessels like advanced destroyers and frigates.Du went on to emphasize the importance of the J-16 fighter jet because it boasts extraordinary air-to-air, air-to-sea, and air-to-ground capabilities, and can therefore perform multiple roles in the PLA’s South China Sea battle plan simultaneously. The J-16 is a multirole fighter/bomber based off of Russia’s Su-30MK2, which China purchased over a decade ago. Want China Timeshas reported that China wants to make the J-16 the “fulcrum of its naval fighter force

Du also stressed the importance of acquiring more advanced AEW&C aircraft with air-to-sea and air-to-ground reconnaissance and early warning technology that had both greater accuracy and a larger scope than China’s current AEW&C aircraft. In such an environment, Du told reporters, China would control the sea and air over the South China Sea largely through cooperation between AEW&C aircraft and the J-16, working in close cooperation with naval assets. Notably, the first photos of China’s next generation early warning aircraft, the so-called KJ-500, appeared online just this week.The fact that Du’s calls for using drones in the East China Sea dispute were eventually heeded raises the possibility that his Air-Sea Battle plan for the South China Sea could become the PLA’s standard operating procedure.

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

Asides from queering the mix on Teufel Hunden Day, the mystery death of Comrade Papa Arafat - the long dead terrorist turned terrorist Nobel Peace Prizer turned terrorist loving, enabling faux head of state continues to queer the mix on events au courrant in turf betwixt the River and the Sea.Comrade Papa was exceptionally prodigious in creating enemies - just lucky perhaps - creating more enemies than were needed in his long murderous chicanery high life.And now Swizzylanders LOL that the dreaded Polonium - 210 was found dang near everywhere on the exhumed corpus delecti - even in his drawersPretty easy to think Little Satan had him knocked off - after all Panzer Arik wanted to have that cat killed like 13 different times!On the other hand - at that stage in the game - killing off an irrevelent, inconsequential gangsta holed up in a smashed compound in Ramallahopolis would pay little dividends and do tons of damage to Little Satan as she started up the old Land for Peace thing for the last time in Gaza.Besides - Polonium 210 is Commonwealth Russia's weapon of choice for trouble making bizzy bodies.Actually - suspects may be more accurately found in Palestian leadership and coterie of that era.Retired general Tawfik Tirawi, once head of the Palestinian Authority's feared West Bank intelligence himself was with Arafat during the siege; he was wanted by Little Satan, the CIA was shunning him, and he was accused of orchestrating suicide attacks. That he was in close proximity when Arafat fell ill makes him a star on the suspect listSuha Arafat. Wife to Yassir, she never stayed in Palestine much and was always hanging out in Paris and Tunisia living high on Comrade Papa's mystery stashPlus

For a start, in the turbulent world of Middle Eastern politics, he made many enemies within his own organisation, with some of the more extreme sects, such as the hardline Hamas movement, questioning his commitment to creating an independent Palestinian homeland. Nor did Arafat enjoy cordial relations with other Arab leaders, for all their overt protestations of support. They suspected him of undermining their own interests through a single-minded pursuit of his Palestinian agenda. The late King Hussein of Jordan never fully trusted Arafat following his involvement in the attempt to remove the Hashemite monarchy during Jordan’s Black September civil war in 1970, while in Syria he was at one point sentenced to death for the murder of an army officer.

Monday, November 11, 2013

Right now, somewhere, students are debating the culpability of Germany for WWI and the dis/proportionality of the Treaty of Versailles. No surprises there. It’s a fundamental question in world history and the dominos of the July Crisis used to be among the most prestigious questions for historians to tackle. Why did the Fashoda Incident and Anglo-German East Africa Crisis remain staid diplomatic affairs and the assassination of an Archduke on the periphery of empire spark a war?

The answer, or at least a large part of it, is the Schlieffen Plan, and its reordering of national priorities.

Alfred Graf von Schlieffen

Following unification, German military thinkers saw the imperative of planning for a two front war against France and Russia. The solution–not to put too fine a point on it–was to pit Teutonic efficiency against Gallic weakness and Slavic disorganization. Using incredibly precise time tables, the German army would overrun France through Belgium in a great flank around Paris. The French defeated, and with Russia still slowly mobilizing its forces, the German army could then shift its full attention to the Eastern Front.

Schlieffen Plan

The key here is that for the O-plan to work France had to capitulate before Russia fully mobilized.

Thus during the July crisis when Russia began to mobilize BEFORE France it put the German High Command in a bind. A pretext for war with France was invented, Belgium invaded, British intervention assured and the rest is why most of us have Monday off of work. Last minute efforts by the Kaiser to put the breaks on a general European war proved feckless. The Germans had a plan, and that plan had to be executed.

Ultimately German fixation with the O-plan led to an inversion of the political and strategic levels of war. Strategy began to dictate politics. The German High Command’s O-plan had so much influence that Berchtold once exclaimed: “Who actually rules in Berlin, Bethmann or Moltke.” The results were entropic, or as Bethmann Hollweg helplessly remarked “things are out of control and the stone has started to roll.” In 1914 the Schlieffen plan ossified diplomatic efforts and political maneuverability for a dubious military advantage.

Sunday, November 10, 2013

The 11th minute of the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month,Imperial Germany gave up the ghost. America's 1st regime change in the new century. Armistice Day for the War to End all Wars, entirely achieved by the addition of the Great Satan's spiritual fore fathers to an entente of desperate states. Conscripting an army of free men, America deployed 2 million troops to save Europe from a Prussian military machine that was the world's best - until they hooked up with the Great Satan in combat. Places like Chateau-Thierry and Bellau Wood decisively crushed Teutonicism. Deutschland screamed "GOD! PLEASE! STOP!"

Americans energetically pursue commerce, science, medicine, technology and the arts. When these designs are halted by conflict, they energetically pursue absolute, decisive, and ruthless destruction of their enemies. After visiting violence and securing victory they energetically return to the pursuit of commerce, science, medicine, technology and the arts.

The Veterans Day National Ceremony is held each year on November 11th at Arlington National Cemetery . The ceremony commences precisely at 11:00 a.m. with a wreath laying at the Tomb of the Unknowns and continues inside the Memorial Amphitheater with a parade of colors by veterans' organizations and remarks from dignitaries. The ceremony is intended to honor and thank all who served in the United States Armed Forces.

The Veterans Day National Committee also selects a number of regional sites for Veterans Day observances throughout the country. From stirring parades and ceremonies to military exhibits and tributes to distinguished veterans, these events serve as models for other communities to follow in planning their own observances.

Saturday, November 9, 2013

The Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers Thus, sans further adieu (or a don't)Council Winners

During the past decade, two administrations have confounded their critics by crafting a formidable sanctions architecture and adroitly managing an unruly alliance system. It is important to have a proper estimation of the "Slamic Republic — a second-rate power with a third-rate nuclear program. Khamenei presides over a government that is despised by its constituents and distrusted by its neighbors. Great Satan's sanctions policy has offered its diplomats indispensable leverage. Great Satan is in a position to demand the most stringent of nuclear accords and should pay scant attention to Iran’s oft-proclaimed red lines.Both American and Iranian officials unwisely raised expectations in September and fed a media narrative of an imminent historic breakthrough between two old nemeses. Such raised expectations work to the disadvantage of Iran rather than Great Satan. Suddenly, the hard-pressed Iranian public has come to expect imminent financial relief. Should the negotiations not yield an accord in a timely manner, it is Khamenei, not 44, who would face a popular backlash. A disenfranchised and dispossessed population is an explosive political problem for Khamenei. The Western powers should not be afraid to suspend negotiations or walk away, should the Iranians prove intransigent. Ironically, stalemated negotiations are likely to pressure Iran intooffering more concessions.