Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?

KARL W. EIKENBERRY

From Parameters, Spring 1995, pp. 82-103.

Nowhere has the collapse of Soviet power had greater consequences
for security issues than in the Asia-Pacific region.[1] The Cold
War witnessed two very different US-led approaches to countering
the USSR. In Europe, America was able to forge an enduring collective
alliance among nations that shared a commitment to Western liberal
political values and open trade regimes. In Asia, however, the
potential partners of the United States were divided by historical
animosities, dissimilar developmental strategies, incompatible
security interests, and fundamentally different philosophies of
governing. Consequently, the United States implemented its policy
of containment in the western Pacific through a series of bilateral
and limited multilateral security treaties and pacts.[2] Thus,
even with an abrupt end to the Cold War, we find NATO, although
under stress, still cohesive. In East Asia, on the other hand,
the implosion of the Soviet Union removed the stimulus that linked
the defense concerns of the key players and dampened traditional
rivalries.

It should surprise no one that the People's Republic of China
(PRC) is at the center of the post-Cold War security calculations
of all East Asia regional actors. China, which has the largest
population of any nation, dominates the Asian landmass with an
area slightly greater than that of the United States.[3] Chinese
family-oriented Confucian culture, which places high premiums
on education and hard work, provides a strong foundation upon
which PRC modernization efforts are rapidly proceeding.[4] China's
growing economy, by some calculations, is now surpassed in size
only by that of the United States and Japan.[5] Additionally,
the PRC maintains more soldiers under arms than any other nation.[6]
At the same time, considerable caution attends most analysts'
estimates of the PRC's long-term stability due to the scope of
the Chinese people's political disaffection, as well as doubts
about the ability of the Communist Party leadership to maintain
unity after the passing of Deng Xiaoping.

This conjunction of uncertainty and vast potential power has led
to widely varying evaluations of the role the PRC is apt to play
in the security of East Asia. A Republic of Korea National Defense
College faculty member calls China's defense buildup a "disturbing
factor" to Asia-Pacific security.[7] A Russian journalist
notes that although his country enjoys neighborly ties with the
PRC, "It should not be forgotten that [Chinese] local museums
and historical maps show a good part of the Russian land as having
been taken from China by force."[8] The Hindustan Times
warns that Sino-military developments are "causing worries,"
while a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official expresses concern
that the rising budget of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could
trigger "a vicious circle in which Asian countries would
strangle themselves in a contest of military might."[9] In
contrast, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir counsels the countries
of the region to not be unduly worried by Chinese defense spending,
and PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian has decried the "China
threat theory" as "ridiculous tales of the Arabian nights."[10]
This broad range of views poses a difficult question: Is China
a threat to the peace of the Asia-Pacific region through the first
decade of the next century?

An understanding of the Chinese expression for "threat"
(weixie) helps inform this study. The word consists of
two characters: wei is defined as "strength"
or "power"; xie implies "to force"
or "to coerce."[11] The root meanings remind us that
the concept of "a threat" entails an awareness of both
capabilities and intentions.

This examination of the PRC's likely effect on the stability of
East Asia begins with a discussion of China's capabilities, primarily
focusing on its sources of military power. This is followed with
a much more problematic inquiry into Beijing's intentions. Synthesis
of the two dimensions of weixie suggests some inferences
about the nature of the "China threat" to Asia- Pacific
stability and leads to implications for the foreign policy and
military strategy of the United States.

Capabilities

In the field of world politics, power is generally considered
to be the capacity of a nation to control the behavior of other
states in accordance with its own ends.[12] International relations
theorist Kenneth Waltz suggests that "an agent is powerful
to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him."[13]
Such formulations make it clear that national capabilities or
power resources are usually meaningful only when measured in relative
terms. As political scientist Robert Jervis observes: "Knowing
how much leverage one state has over another tells statesmen and
analysts very little unless they also know how much leverage the
other state has."[14]

When appraising the role of power, it is analytically useful to
specify scope and domain. The former refers to the effects that
matter, and the latter to those who can be affected.[15] To illustrate,
the statement that the PRC has a great deal of capability tells
us little. However, the assertion that China is able to employ
its naval and air forces to gain control of the Spratly Islands
(a specification of scope) in a conflict with Vietnam (a specification
of domain), implies much. This inquiry will therefore examine
the absolute capabilities (the scope) and relative power (the
domain) of PRC military strength.

Absolute Power

Operationalizing the concept of military power is, of course,
a troublesome task. The Chinese define potential military
power as being determined by a state's political system, level
of economic development, military strength, territory, population,
and scope of natural resources.[16] Western thinking is generally
consistent with that view, since Clausewitz's idea of the "people's
share in the great affairs of state" is roughly analogous
to the Chinese notion of the role of the political system.[17]
This section concentrates on three generally robust indicators
of military power: defense expenditures, force structure, and
national wealth.

Defense Expenditures. The PLA's official budget has increased
about 140 percent over the past six years, from around $2.5 billion
(US) in 1988 to $6 billion in 1994.[18] This sharp rise in military
expenditures is often cited by East Asian officials and security
specialists as evidence of the threat China presents, or will
soon pose, to regional stability.[19] The numbers are misleading
for two reasons.

First, the selection of 1988 as a baseline year for PLA budget
trend analysis heavily biases the outcome. In 1979, the cost of
the brief but intense Sino-Vietnamese War drove PRC defense spending
up to $2.6 billion, a sum not surpassed until 1989 as PLA modernization
was subordinated to other economic priorities by Beijing's leaders
throughout the 1980s.[20] Thus, it is equally valid to say either
Chinese military expenditures rose 135 percent between 1979 and
1994, or 140 percent since 1988. Moreover, the rather modest size
of the 1979 starting point figure must be kept in mind. A linear
rise in spending between 1979 and 1994 would equate to only about
$230 million per annum.

Second, official PLA budget figures are nominal and not discounted
for the effects of inflation. Consequently, increases in military
spending are overstated in real terms. PRC yearly inflation averaged
around 5.1 percent during the 1980s and accelerated significantly
in the 1990s.[21] By mid-1994, the urban consumer price index
was rising at an annual rate of 23 percent.[22] While over the
past ten years price increases due to inflation have outstripped
the growth of military expenditures (reportedly 130 percent to
116 percent), undoubtedly reflecting some creative statistical
interpretation, the fact remains that nominal budget trends do
exaggerate the extent of the buildup of the Chinese armed forces.[23]
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), for
instance, using real prices, estimates PRC defense spending to
have risen only some 13 percent between 1985 and 1992.[24] Thus,
it seems clear that any meaningful discussion of the recent expansion
of PLA budget appropriations must be tempered with explicit recognition
of baseline and inflation factors.

It can be argued that PRC official defense budgets, like those
of the former Soviet Union, grossly understate actual outlays
and are inaccurate gauges of spending levels. Chinese military
allocations as reported to the outside world do not include the
costs of research and development, modernization of defense industry
plants and equipment, and various personnel compensation plans.[25]
Nor is PLA revenue from its numerous commercial enterprises counted.[26]
Conceivably, actual expenditure figures (by Western standards)
could be as much as double those announced by Beijing.[27]

Nevertheless, there is good reason to speculate that one of the
important reasons official outlays have been increased in recent
years is to offset shrinking non-budget revenues.[28] Most notable
has been the precipitous decline in Chinese arms sales, from some
$4.7 billion in 1987 to $100 million in 1992.[29]

Three other points help to keep Chinese military expenditures
in perspective. First, even if the IISS's estimate of 1992 PRC
defense spending is doubled, per capita outlays would still be
(in 1985 US dollars) less than $40, contrasted, in that same year,
with $136 for Japan, $268 for Russia, and $964 for the United
States.[30] Second, given the problem of inflation, as well as
the Communist Party leadership's anxiety about PLA loyalty, a
sizable portion of military budget increases since the Tiananmen
incident in 1989 has probably been earmarked for improvements
in soldier pay and quality of life.[31] Finally, with the relatively
backward state of the PRC's defense industries, there simply would
not be many high-tech, force multiplier items for the PLA to procure
domestically even if funds were made available.[32]

Force Structure. Since its establishment in 1949, the People's
Republic of China has made extraordinary progress in developing
a credible defense posture. Despite the constraints of poverty,
a large population, intermittent domestic political upheavals,
and periodic international isolation, Beijing's leaders over the
past 45 years have generally found the PLA capable of responding
to internal and external threats and, when necessary, advancing
limited foreign policy objectives by means of force.

China possesses the world's third largest nuclear weapons arsenal,
including 80-plus intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
and 20-plus intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).[33] Additionally,
China's air force operates about 180 aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear bombs, and China's navy has one nuclear-armed submarine
(SSBN) with 12 ballistic missiles.[34] Considerable resources
continue to be committed to the strategic forces. By the end of
the century, China might be deploying accurate, mobile, solid-fuel
ICBMs, perhaps with capabilities on par with the Russian SS-25.[35]
China also is expected to field ICBMs with MIRV warheads within
the next 15 years.[36]

The PLA's conventional capabilities are also impressive, somewhat
enhanced by recent efforts to improve mobility and acquire force
projection weapons and equipment. The 2.3-million-member ground
forces have 12 motorized infantry or armored divisions, the navy
commands a 6000-man marine brigade, and the air force has an organic
airborne corps of three divisions.[37] The air force has improved
its aerial combat potential with the 1992 purchase of a squadron
of 24 Su-27 fighters from Russia; moreover, some observers speculate
that China may procure additional Su-27s and possibly other sophisticated
attack and command and control platforms in the near future.[38]
Aircraft range and loiter times also have been extended with the
acquisition of midair refueling capabilities from Iran.[39] Finally,
the navy continues a steady transition from coastal defense to
a blue-water force. It has developed surface warfare, logistic,
and communications systems to the point that it can effectively
provide muscle to back Beijing's South China Sea territorial claims
against regional contenders.[40] And while the much-rumored purchase
of an aircraft carrier from Russia or Ukraine has not materialized,
the fact that some East Asian security experts have seriously
considered it a possibility indicates the progress Chinese naval
forces have made over the past decade.[41]

As with the case of PRC defense expenditures, however, assessments
about the quality of the PLA force structure need to be placed
in an appropriate context. Neither China's strategic nor its conventional
capabilities should be considered daunting.

Where the strategic capabilities of the United States and Russia
include a fully integrated triad of nuclear forces (bombers, sea-based
missiles, and land-based missiles), the PRC, with one SSBN and
a fleet of antiquated bombers, possesses only one functional strategic
arm.[42] The vast disparity in size between the Chinese missile
arsenals and those of the United States and Russia effectively
limits Beijing to a second-strike, countervalue doctrine through
the foreseeable future.[43] One PRC security expert has said that
given such realities, the PLA's approach to developing its nuclear
forces is "high in quality, few in number."[44] Thus,
although Beijing's strategic arsenal is growing in size and versatility,
it is extremely modest by superpower standards, and it will remain
so at least through the first decade of the next century.

Turning to the PLA's conventional forces, it is evident that they
can capably operate along or within their nation's borders. But
whether or not they pose a threat leads to the issue of power
projection, and therein lies a major weakness of China's military.

First, while recent PLA inquiries abroad about the purchase of
advanced weaponry and military technology have generated much
publicity, actual procurements and their effects on overall combat
effectiveness have been minor. For instance, compare the one-squadron-size
force of 24 Su-27s acquired from Russia with the 23 F-15 squadrons
(approximately 24 aircraft per squadron) fielded by the US Air
Force.[45] Additionally, the Chinese do not yet have an AWACS;
their ability to effectively command and control an Su-27 squadron
is thus problematic. Simply stated, the numbers are small, and
the combat power is diminished by the inability of China's air
force, as yet, to achieve the important multiplier effects that
accompany sophisticated supporting C3I (command, control, communications,
and intelligence), training, and logistic systems. Moreover, in
contemporary warfare, it is often the synergistic effect from
the simultaneous employment of a broad range of complex weapon
systems that proves decisive in battle.[46] The Su-27 represents
the only highly capable system in the Chinese air force inventory;
full exploitation of synergism remains a somewhat distant goal.

A second constraint on the PLA's capacity for force projection
is the PRC's weak indigenous technological and industrial base.
Chinese military R&D, production technologies, and weapon
systems generally lag 10 to 20 years behind the West and Japan.[47]
Today's armaments have become so complicated and entail the integration
of so many intricate subsystems that China faces enormous challenges
in its efforts to reach the cutting edge. The air force's difficulties
in designing and producing the Jian-8 II Finback fighter illustrate
the magnitude of the tasks ahead. Begun in 1964, the J-8 program
has led to the production of over 3000 aircraft, with a fourth
generation Finback currently under development and projected to
be fielded by the end of the decade.[48] Yet the authoritative
PRC journal Modern Weaponry notes that the "engine
and onboard equipment have not advanced [and the] development
of the model and major components is uncoordinated."[49]
It rates the current model's firepower and control systems as
15 years behind "foreign levels."[50] Such is the nature
of the design, test, and validation problems that the PLA confronts
as it labors to supply its ground, naval, and air forces with
world-class equipment.

Yet a third obstacle to Chinese endeavors to build a power projection
capability is the technological and operational demands that are
linked to the ongoing revolution in military affairs. As the major
global actors begin to fully exploit the opportunities of the
information age, the PLA finds itself significantly disadvantaged.[51]

China's military officer corps, disconcerted by the results of
the Gulf War, seems acutely aware of the problem.[52] PLA National
Defense University researchers emphasize that warfare has evolved
from a historical stage during which quantity dominated quality,
to one in which the reverse is true.[53] They candidly state that
PRC weaponry is inferior to that of the developed countries, that
its technology lags even further behind, and that the quality
of the PLA's personnel is yet a more serious handicap.[54] The
newspaper of the armed forces, People's Liberation Army Daily,
reported that participants at a military forum in 1993 concluded
that whereas the PLA has traditionally looked at tactics from
a "strategic angle," it must now do so from a "technological
angle"; to downplay the role of science would be to "try
to catch a sparrow with blindfolds" (a Chinese proverb meaning
to engage in self-deception).[55] Whether the PRC can eventually
close the technology gap is not in question; the point remains,
however, that the process will be a protracted one.

National Wealth. The military power a society can generate
is dependent not only upon the size of its economy, but on the
proportion of wealth that it can allocate to defense expenditures.
The former is measured by a nation's GNP, whereas the latter is
largely a function of GNP per capita.

Attempts to derive widely agreed-upon estimates of the size of
the Chinese economy and per capita wealth inevitably founder upon
problems related to currency conversion, purchasing power parity,
and statistical data accuracy. Assessments have differed by as
much as a factor of ten.[56] Many economists believe the official
figures of PRC aggregate and per capita GNP are somewhat or even
grossly understated.[57] Pending further reforms in price structures,
currency exchange mechanisms, and trade policies, the problem
of calculating China's wealth will remain formidable. Nevertheless,
certain key economic statistics less subject to dispute do indicate
impressive gains over the past 15 years. For example, the PRC's
economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent during the
1980s and continues to expand rapidly; China's gross domestic
savings stood at a remarkable 39 percent of GDP in 1991; its international
trade has more than quadrupled over the past 15 years; and Beijing's
international reserves in late 1993 stood at $22 billion.[58]
Moreover, the return of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty in 1997,
along with deepening trade ties with Taiwan, would seem to further
enhance China's financial prospects.[59] Barring severe political
turmoil (a possibility that cannot be dismissed lightly), it is
clear the armed forces will be able to modernize at an accelerating
pace as a key beneficiary of the PRC's burgeoning economy.

Formidable impediments to development, however, cannot be wished
away. The population will grow another 350 million by 2025, increasing
demand for jobs, housing, education, and social welfare spending.[60]
The shocks of rapid urbanization, market reforms, inflation, and
a loosening of political control have led to unemployment and
underemployment, corruption, and periodic worker and peasant discontent.[61]
The people, despite steady improvements in their standard of living,
remain poor, and the government, chary of political unrest and
eager to appease, may be inclined to favor consumption-oriented
fiscal policies. The energy import bill has escalated sharply
in the past few years and will continue to rise, at least in the
near term.[62] While the potential of the PRC's human capital
is enormous, currently less than two percent of China's adults
have graduated from universities.[63] Finally, the sector of the
national economy that has proven most resistant to market reforms
and efficiency is precisely the defense industry groups.[64] So,
while it can be said that if China remains on its current economic
growth trajectory, it will be a global superpower by the middle
of the next century, conjectures about outcomes in international
affairs five decades hence should be heavily discounted. For the
next 10 to 15 years, the PRC will remain hard-pressed to translate
economic gains into significant payoffs for its military.

Relative Power

As mentioned earlier, national power is meaningful only when discussed
in terms of both scope and domain. We now turn to the latter,
to judge PRC regional force projection capabilities on a comparative
or relative basis.

Two questions are central to understanding this issue: First,
is there a post-Cold War East Asian "power vacuum" whose
existence might prompt Beijing's use of force? Second, are any
of the particular regional actors especially vulnerable to a PRC
military threat?

Is there a power vacuum in East Asia? The United States
played a pivotal role in Asia-Pacific security from the end of
World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Regional
alliances and treaties were primarily oriented toward Washington
or Moscow, with Beijing serving as something of a wildcard. Has
the precipitous decline in Russian power since 1991, and concurrently
the significant reduction in the size of the American armed forces,
led to an unraveling of the complex East Asian security ties that
had so effectively checked local historical rivalries?

The idea of an Asian-Pacific power vacuum in the 1990s, of course,
evokes images of the region between World Wars I and II, when
the erosion of European colonial hegemony stimulated a realpolitik
response from Tokyo.[65] The absence of strong or domestically
legitimated states throughout the region increased uncertainty,
lowered the costs of war, and contributed greatly to the eventual
clash between Japan and the United States. Obviously, such conditions
do not obtain in the Asia-Pacific region of our times. East Asia
is, for the most part, composed of mutually recognized sovereign
states. It is economically vibrant, with growth rates measurably
higher than the global average; by the middle of the next century
it is expected to account for 50 percent of world GNP.[66] Moreover,
politically the states of East Asia are relatively stable. Although
US and Russian military deployments throughout the area have decreased
during the 1990s, the effect has been to make more explicit the
fundamental strength, not weakness, of the region.

Additionally, America's role as the "honest broker"
or balancer of security interests in the Asia-Pacific region did
not necessarily end with the Cold War. To assert that it did assumes
US power is rapidly waning in East Asia and American military
forces are hastily being withdrawn. Yet America's aggregate economic
strength remains formidable; the collapse of the Soviet Union
did nothing to change this fact. It is also true that the United
States has continued to reduce the size of its armed forces in
the region. But since American forces committed to the Asia-Pacific
theater during the Cold War were preoccupied with the Soviet Union,
the demise of the USSR has appreciably increased comparative
US regional armed strength despite reductions in American defense
expenditures.[67]

PRC military officers and security experts themselves stress this
point in making their own appraisals of the correlation of forces
in East Asia. For instance, Guo Zhenyuan, of the influential China
Centre for International Studies, writes:

The United States is the winner in its confrontation with the
Soviet Union and is the only superpower in the world today. Though
its strength has been considerably eroded by decades of confrontation
with the Soviet Union, it still enjoys superiority in the Asia-Pacific
region and throughout the world. By readjusting its security strategy,
the United States will be able to cut back somewhat while still
maintaining its dominant position and leading role in the security
structure of the region.[68]

Additionally, the Gulf War demonstrated to PLA commanders that
the United States retains a formidable strategic deployment capability
that will offset, to a degree, reductions in forward-deployed
forces.[69] Finally, Chinese military thinkers openly acknowledge
America's continuing influence in the area, especially Northeast
Asia, pointing out that "the United States will continue
in the future to be an important factor in the maintenance of
[Asia-Pacific] regional stability."[70]

Are the regional actors vulnerable? While the overall distribution
of military capabilities in the East Asia region can hardly be
defined as a power vacuum, are there any particularly lucrative
targets in the region against which the PRC might employ force
in the years immediately ahead? Setting aside for now the issue
of Taiwan, the possibility appears remote. The matter is one of
where potential engagements would be fought. China's geographic
expanse, large population, and substantial agricultural and industrial
bases combine to make it virtually invincible against a conventional
foe bent on occupying the country. The picture is quite different,
however, for the PRC's use of force beyond its borders. Quite
simply, the PLA's punch dissipates exponentially as the distance
from the homeland increases; correspondingly, the relative strength
of the potential target states grows. Even during the 1979 one-month
limited war against Vietnam fought along China's southeast border,
PRC armed forces suffered some 26,000 casualties pushing toward
objectives only 15 kilometers beyond the Sino-Vietnamese frontier;
C3I and logistic problems proved to be severe.[71]

The PLA, of course, is much more capable today than it was in
the late-1970s; on the other hand, so are its neighbors, at least
within the confines of their own territories and littorals. For
example, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force has 158 F-15J and
F-15DJ fighter aircraft.[72] Even the smaller powers, drawing
upon the wealth accumulated from sustained economic growth, are
generally able to purchase arms that serve as effective conventional
deterrents. Malaysia, for instance, recently decided to purchase
18 Russian MiG-29 and eight US McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Hornet
fighters, both world-class aircraft, placing the Chinese air force's
acquisition of 24 Su-27s in better perspective.[73] Vietnam, the
one Asian nation against which the PRC was not reluctant to apply
military pressure over the past 15 years, was mostly distinguished
during that time by its degree of international isolation (Moscow
was an increasingly unenthusiastic sponsor after 1979). However,
with Hanoi's ongoing integration into the East Asian political
and economic system, Beijing will likely be required to adjust
its means-ends calculations when weighing the use of force against
its southern neighbor in the future.

Certainly, if the Asia-Pacific region were thrown into political
chaos (some plausible scenarios, discussed later, could lead to
such an outcome), the prospect of China committing forces beyond
its borders would increase. As the national stakes rise in value,
the price of war becomes less of an impediment to action. Yet
absent such developments, it appears that the somewhat limited
scope and domain of PRC military power, at least over the near
term, will militate against Beijing's inclination to use its armed
forces as a tool of compellence in its relations with its regional
neighbors.

Intentions

A state's military power does not, in itself, constitute a threat
to another nation. As noted earlier, it is power and intentions
that matter. Canadians do not feel endangered by US military strength,
whereas Pakistanis remain vitally concerned with the posture of
India's armed forces. The problem, of course, lies in ascertaining
what another state's intentions are.

Chinese strategic intention can be evaluated in two ways: by reviewing
PRC military doctrine, and by speculating on the degree to which
China considers maintenance of the international, and especially
regional, status quo over the next 10 to 15 years to be in its
interests. Both cases assume the state as a rational unitary actor.

Chinese Military Doctrine

Military doctrine is defined as "authoritative fundamental
principles by which military forces guide their actions."[74]
A set of approved, shared ideas about the conduct of warfare that
guides the preparation of armed forces for future wars,[75] military
doctrine enables the researcher to surmise how a state envisions
employing force in the future. Doctrine is generally correlated
with the concept of intentions.

The sources of military doctrine evolve from a complex array of
geographic, societal, economic, political, and technological factors.[76]
The core unifying element, however, is a state's interpretation
of the constraints and opportunities that obtain from its position
in the international system.[77] For example, in the case of the
PRC, the PLA doctrine from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s
of "luring the enemy in deep" and "people's war
under modern conditions" reflected a realistic appraisal
by Chinese military strategists of the vast disparity between
the national power of their country and that of the Soviet Union.[78]

Two aspects of contemporary Sino-military doctrine are particularly
helpful in analyzing Beijing's intentions regarding the use of
military force in the Asia-Pacific region: the internal defense
missions of the PLA, and the wide variety of external defense
contingencies that Chinese strategists must address.

Internal Defense. The People's Liberation Army periodically
has played a crucial role in maintaining China's domestic stability,
and ultimately Chinese Communist Party control, at critical junctures
in the PRC's relatively brief history. In the late-1940s and 1950s,
the PLA secured both China's northwest (Xinjiang) and southwest
(Tibet), and has periodically since then been called upon to counter
local uprisings in those territories. During the late-1960s, PLA
intervention at the height of the worst excesses of the Cultural
Revolution checked the PRC's slide toward self-destruction.[79]
More recently, the CCP leadership's grip on power seemed to hang
in the balance until the massive intervention of the Chinese army
during the June 1989 Tiananmen incident.

PRC military writings explicitly emphasize the armed forces' responsibility
for maintaining domestic order. A typical article from the PLA
General Political Department Mass Work Section notes that the
basic functions of the army are (in the order listed): "1.
safeguarding the country's stability; 2. defending state sovereignty
and security; and 3. offering a fine, stable environment for the
country's reform and construction."[80] General Liu Huaqing,
Central Military Commission Vice Chairman, has underscored (as
have all of the PLA's senior leaders) that the Chinese military
must be ready to protect the "unity and security of the motherland."[81]
The establishment of the 1.2-million-man paramilitary People's
Armed Police in the mid-1980s had been intended, in part, to free
the PLA to concentrate on external defense missions.[82] The events
of June 1989 eliminated most of the progress that had been made
to this end.

China's leaders remain committed to market reform and liberalization;
they have discarded any other course of action as consigning their
country to backwardness and ultimately undermining their claim
to rule. They also are aware of the centrifugal forces and trends
toward regionalization that will attend such policies. The PLA
is viewed, in the final analysis, as the guarantor of domestic
stability, and much of its energy is accordingly directed inward.

External Defense. The PRC's land boundaries extend over
22,100 kilometers. The climates and terrains across this expanse
include tropical rain forests, deserts, glacial barriers, mountain
ranges, coniferous forests, and steppes. China's neighbors include
three powers with whom it has fought in the past 25 years (Russia,
India, and Vietnam); the increasingly unstable North Korea; and
a host of countries beset with civil strife that has implications
for ethnic minorities living within the PRC (Afghanistan, Burma,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Additionally, the PLA
must consider the possibility of instability in Hong Kong after
its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, and that of an armed
clash with Taiwan. The United States, by contrast, has land boundaries
about one-half that length (slightly over 12,200 km), and enjoys
exceptionally good relations with its only two neighbors, Canada
and Mexico.[83]

The point of this comparison is to highlight the extent of China's
security dilemma. That the United States has a tremendous amount
of power is evident. It should also be clear that having secure
borders increases the proportion of power that the United States
can project outside of North America. Current PLA military doctrine
reflects the reality that the Chinese armed forces' immediate
concerns are located near the PRC's frontiers, not in distant
regions.

The PLA is emphasizing the creation of highly mobile, elite units,
capable of bringing Chinese military power to bear swiftly at
potential flash points along its vast borders, which do encompass
much of the Asia-Pacific region. After the Gulf War demonstrated
the enormous conventional firepower of armed forces equipped with
high-technology weaponry and support systems, the People's
Liberation Army Daily announced that "today's strategy
is to first defeat the enemy troops without a war, or [alternatively]
to defeat the enemy troops by fighting small battles."[84]
The Central Military Commission's "principles for strengthening
the PLA" emphasize:

Recent local wars, especially the Gulf War, show that the defeated
side was backward in modernization and weak in fighting capacity,
although there were other reasons for this failure. . . . We must
quicken our pace of modernization in order to keep up with the
times and must not slow down.[85]

Consistent with these guidelines, large-scale training exercises
have been conducted regularly in recent years in which mechanized,
airborne, and marine units moved rapidly by transport aircraft,
helicopters, rail, ship, and vehicles to hypothetical trouble
spots, including the South China Sea region.[86]

One must remember, however, the constraints imposed by limited
resources and expansive security obligations. General Liu Huaqing
has said that the PLA doctrine of "active defense" does
not call for the procurement of long-range weapons and the capability
of performing global operations, but instead depends on the ability
to keep China's territories "free of infringement."[87]
Accordingly, PRC military leaders still feel compelled to rely
on a large standing army, contending:

The main threat to the security of our country is limited warfare.
However, our country is vast and has varied topography, long coastal
and land boundaries, underdeveloped communications, and a low
level of modernization of the army. It is necessary and appropriate
to maintain three million troops at this time.[88]

Thus, in the main, the doctrinal literature and training regimens
of the PLA's conventional forces simply do not seem to support
assertions that China is intent on fundamentally contesting the
regional security order in the near-term.

In addition, as the only openly declared Asian nuclear power,
the PRC has generally displayed a commitment to preventing the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, claiming adherence to the
Missile Technology Control Regime, and signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in 1992 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993.[89]
While it has ignored the extended voluntary nuclear testing moratorium
being observed by the United States, Russia, Britain, and France,
the PRC is participating in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
negotiations in Geneva and has not openly opposed moves to achieve
a total ban on nuclear testing by 1996.[90] China also pledges
no first use of nuclear weapons, and argues that all nuclear powers
should renounce first use against non-nuclear states.[91] By and
large, then, Beijing is not obstructing initiatives related to
the control of weapons of mass destruction. China definitely seeks
to improve its strategic strike capabilities; however, its pace
of force development is tempered not only by the resource limitations
noted earlier, but by the PRC's awareness that should it be perceived
as opposed to all efforts to limit the size of its nuclear inventories,
an uncontrolled regional nuclear arms spiral would likely result.

Is the PRC Dissatisfied With the Status Quo?

A second approach to judging Chinese intentions is to ask whether
or not the PRC is dissatisfied with the international and regional
status quo.

In his work on change in world politics, Robert Gilpin postulates
that an international system is stable if no state believes it
is profitable to attempt to change the system, and that a state
will attempt to change the system if the expected benefits exceed
the expected costs.[92] By such criteria, is China prepared to
upset the security equilibrium in East Asia?

PRC leaders insist, not surprisingly, that "China will not
constitute any potential or real threat. Rather it will always
be a positive force for peace, stability, and development in the
Asia-Pacific region. China's foreign policy of peace is one that
can stand the test of time."[93] Yet the record is not reassuring;
it indicates that Beijing clearly has a regional territorial agenda.
As Sinologist Samuel Kim points out, China is an irredentist state
with more territorial disputes than any other power in the world.[94]
It has unresolved land claims against India, Russia, Tajikistan,
North Korea, and Vietnam, and it has extensive maritime claims
based on the continental shelf principle that involve Japan, the
Koreas, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei.[95] The
extreme negotiating position staked out in the territorial sea
law passed by the Chinese National People's Congress in 1992 is
especially disconcerting.[96]

Beijing has not been hesitant to use the PLA beyond its borders
in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. John Garver, an expert
on PRC security matters, cites 15 instances of China's international
use of force since 1949.[97] More worrisome for the future, Beijing
has not renounced the possibility of using arms against Taiwan,
officially declaring:

Peaceful reunification is a set policy of the Chinese government.
However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems
necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty
and territorial integrity. The Chinese government is closely following
the course of events [that is, efforts to establish two Chinas]
and will never condone any maneuver for "Taiwan independence."[98]

On the other hand, it cannot be argued in any convincing fashion
that China is a revolutionary or reformist power. Its era of radical
international activism of the 1960s and early 1970s coincided
with a period when it was weak and playing only a marginal role
on the world stage. The pursuit of ideological goals in the conduct
of foreign policy is a luxury afforded only to those with little
power (and little to lose) or with very great power (and much
to expend).[99] China today is neither at the periphery nor the
core; it is a middle-ranking state very much constrained by the
distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific region. While on
an upward growth path, it is still far from the point at which
it might seek to rewrite the rules, in the fashion of, say, Germany
or Japan in the 1930s.

Alternatively, it still appears that the PRC cannot be categorized
as a profoundly disaffected nation. The PRC's rapid integration
into the international trade and financial orders over the past
15 years has been remarkable for a state that pursued the goal
of autarky for the first 30 years of its existence. It is a member
of the World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank, and it
has applied for full GATT membership. China's exports and imports
as a percentage of GNP grew from about ten percent in 1978 to
around 30 percent in the 1990s.[100] Foreign direct investment
climbed from a negligible level in 1980 to over $4.3 billion in
1991.[101]

In the short run, at least, the pursuit of power and wealth do
conflict, and the amassing and exercising of military resources
entail costs that can undercut economic efficiency.[102] At present,
given the favorable conditions presented by the international
economic order, it is still very much in China's self-interest
to work within a system from which it has profited so greatly.

The influence of international institutions, norms, and ideas
on future PRC behavior regarding security issues should not be
discounted. China certainly is less inclined to project its military
power unilaterally than if the international system was simply
a Hobbesian jungle.[103] The PRC has but a 45-year history in
the community of nations, and its full participation in global
and regional political, economic, and security regimes is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Its behavior has increasingly reflected a respect
for and commitment to world societal practices and standards.
This is not to argue that somewhat fuzzy terms such as "international
norms" constrain nations from employing the means necessary
to defend their vital interests. For that matter, so-called global
values are often best understood by examining the underlying distribution
of state capabilities that give rise to and support these concepts;
power and interest do count greatly.[104] Nevertheless, the employment
of force that runs counter to world norms often entails significant
reputational costs (witness the efforts of even a superpower,
the United States, to lower such costs by building an international
coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf War with Iraq). It is likely, therefore,
that given its still limited resources, the PRC will be inclined
to work strategically within world systems to settle less serious
regional problems, rather than sacrifice its investment in future
credibility for immediate but small payoffs.

Inferences About the Threat and Implications for US Policy

There are plausible conjunctions of events that could find at
least parts of Asia engaged in the next 10 to 15 years in arms-racing,
or even in the throes of war. Uncertainty, random events, imperfect
information, and miscalculations all play important roles in international
affairs and undermine the most sophisticated of forecasts. In
1979, none of those commenting on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
concluded that within 15 years the Iron Curtain would fall, the
USSR disintegrate, and the Moscow-based communist challenge to
the West disappear. So the question of China as a threat to Asian
Pacific stability remains difficult to answer.

What are the scenarios in which Beijing might be at, or near,
the epicenter of instability or conflict in East Asia? Externally,
three possibilities are most worrisome: a declaration of independence
by Taiwan, or PRC preemption of such a possibility; war on the
Korean Peninsula arising from either Pyongyang's aggression or
internal collapse; and accelerated Japanese defense spending and
the acquisition of nuclear forces, giving rise, in turn, to a
regional arms race and alliance diplomacy.

The prospects of domestic instability cannot be ignored. There
have been no cases to date of communist regimes gracefully handing
power over to more democratic successors. Moreover, the CCP leadership's
predisposition to see Western subterfuge behind domestic demands
for political reform (the latest foreign plot being to inflict
upon China the evil of "peaceful evolution") bodes ill
for PRC external policies in the midst of severe civil unrest.[105]

At the same time, this study emphasizes that there are important
constraints and opportunities that China cannot ignore as it advances
through the first decade of the 21st century. They are derived
from the structure of the international system and East Asia regional
subsystem, the imperatives of economic growth, and the limitations
on the pace at which the PRC can accumulate relative military
power. Collectively, they pose a set of incentives and disincentives
that will strongly influence Chinese calculations about the utility
of force.

China is a rising power with enormous growth potential. It has
a capable but technologically backward military, some years away
from being able to roam far from home. Benefits from participation
in the world's liberal trading order are substantial, and Beijing
finds the benefits of the status quo outweighing the costs. Hence,
whether in terms of capabilities or of likely intentions, the
PRC cannot be regarded as a serious threat in the mid-term to
Asia-Pacific stability.

If such a conclusion is correct, what are the implications for
US foreign policy and military strategy? The question is a timely
one since the post-Cold War era marks the first time in the history
of Sino-American relations that the United States has dealt with
China for its own sake, and not simply in the context of crises
with other major powers (such as with Japan from the 1920s through
World War II, and thereafter with the Soviet Union).[106] Building
upon the preceding analysis, three recommendations seem appropriate.

First, the United States should maintain a strong military presence
in Asia. The reassurance that a credible American regional presence
provides to the potential mutual antagonists of Northeast Asia,
as well as the many actors concerned about the security of the
sea lanes of South and Southeast Asia, is crucial to the continued
stability of the region. Were a severe crisis to unfold unexpectedly
in East Asia and if US military power were found lacking for reasons
of capability or will, an arms spiral analogous to that which
consumed the European powers in the years leading to World War
I could be set in motion. As a PLA security specialist, Senior
Colonel Pan Zhenqiang, notes:

During the Cold War years, taking an explicit commitment to a
broad engagement in the affairs of the region, [the United States]
became an indispensable factor in the security pattern of the
Asia-Pacific area. To provide extended deterrence to its allies
and to maintain the US military presence is part of this security
structure.[107]

The current security structure does provide the modicum of certainty
needed to promote continued regional growth and stability. America
must not mistakenly apply the "overextended global cop"
metaphor to its current commitment of military forces in an Asia-Pacific
region so vital to US strategic and economic interests.

Second, the United States should increase the scope of its ties
with China and promote PRC interdependence in the international
economic system. The evidence seems so overwhelming that modernity
begets political liberalization that such a policy is hard to
assail on strategic grounds. On the other hand, as Senior Colonel
Pan points out:

If Beijing fails in its formidable efforts to reorganize its economic
as well as political structures and its modernization programs
fall apart, there is a possibility that it will shrink back into
a sealed society again; or worse, like what happened in the former
Soviet Union, the country falls into a painful process of split,
with perhaps millions upon millions of refugees and immigrants
flocking to neighboring countries. The impact could really be
catastrophic.[108]

Plainly, the United States can ill afford to see Beijing's transition
from a command to a market economy fail.

Further, as part of Washington's policy of engagement with Beijing,
Sino-American security ties should be both increased and regularized.
There are important shared strategic concerns that should not
be obscured by the important contradictions between the two nations.
For example, Chen Qimao of the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies comments: "China would not like to see ultranationalism
and religious fundamentalism prevail in regions after the Cold
War. In this respect, it shares a common interest with many countries,
possibly including the United States."[109] More specifically,
within the East Asia region, Washington and Beijing agree on the
threat posed by nuclear proliferation, the desirability of ending
Cambodia's civil strife, and the importance of upholding the international
principles that underpin the liberal trading order.

At the same time, it is very much in America's own long-term security
interests to maintain access to the PLA. An enduring aspect of
Chinese strategic culture is the emphasis placed on the maxim
of Sun Tzu that "all warfare is based upon deception."[110]
The PLA, by the standards of most armies in the 1990s, remains
enshrouded in secrecy. As the PRC becomes more powerful, the United
States will require a precise understanding of Chinese military
capabilities and intentions. Routine bilateral dialogue and exchanges
will increase PLA transparency.

The third policy recommendation is that the United States work
with China and the other major actors in East Asia to establish
subregional, or issue-specific, forums for consultation and coordination
on security issues. For example, China, Japan, Russia, and the
United States all hope to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula,
and an informal mechanism could usefully be established for the
exchange of information and opinions. However, at present the
interests of the actors composing the broader region are simply
too diverse to make profitable an Asia-Pacific-wide dialogue based
upon a European model. For that matter, there is no evident reason
that what is understood to be the Asia-Pacific region should be
embraced by an overarching security condominium. Chinese leaders,
however, do remain receptive to more modest or restricted proposals,
and the United States should take advantage of the favorable existing
environment and exert the leadership necessary to create appropriate
institutions.[111]

China's leaders envision that the PLA will become one of the most
powerful armies in the world by the mid-21st century. If the PRC
continues to grow at its present rate and the country remains
unified, this expectation will be realized. Yet in international
affairs the future is highly problematic. In the time frame that
does matter in security issues relating to potential challengers,
perhaps 15 years into the future, the PRC is unlikely to disrupt
the equilibrium in East Asia. US policy nevertheless ought to
be consistent with the assumptions upon which such an analysis
is based: the United States should continue to be actively engaged
in regional security issues. To do so is both to promote Asia-Pacific
stability and to hedge against the unforeseen.

NOTES

1. The terms "Asia-Pacific" and "East Asian"
regions are used interchangeably throughout this paper. Unless
otherwise noted, both terms will refer to China, its contiguous
areas, the island states of East and Southeast Asia, and the surrounding
oceans and seas. As a global and more specifically a Pacific power,
the United States is also assumed to be a member of the region.

2. Among the most important US security relationships in Asia
during the Cold War were the 1951 tripartite security treaty with
Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) and bilateral treaties with
Japan and the Philippines; the 1953 bilateral treaty with the
Republic of Korea; the 1954 bilateral treaty with the Republic
of China (abrogated in 1979 with the establishment of diplomatic
ties between Washington and Beijing); and the creation in 1954
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) consisting of
the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France,
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. See Amos A. Jordan, William
J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Security:
Policy and Process (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1993), pp. 33-34, 356-83.

3. China's land area is 9.33 million square km, while that of
the United States is 9.17 million square km. From US Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp.
71, 358.

4. The "economic miracles" of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore, as well as the extraordinary performances of overseas
Chinese around the world, are all excellent indicators of the
enormous potential of China's population of some 1.2 billion.

9. M. K. Dhar, The Hindustan Times, 10 March 1993, p. 12;
FBIS Daily Report-Near East and South Asia, 18 March 1993,
p. 46; and Tokyo Kyodo, 17 March 1993, FBIS-EAS, p. 3. The term
PLA refers to all of the armed forces of China: the ground forces,
the navy (PLAN), the air force (PLAAF), and the strategic rocket
forces or Second Artillery.

17. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976),
pp. 585-94. Two excellent studies of the interrelationship between
economic development and military potential include Robert S.
Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1990); and Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). For the influence
of geography on military power see Harold and Margaret Sprout,
The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1939).

24. IISS, p. 226. Defense expenditure (in 1985 $US) is listed
at $19.8 billion in 1985, and $22.4 billion in 1992. These figures
are estimates of actual defense expenditures and are consequently
much larger than those stated in the official PRC budgets. Additionally,
IISS figures reflect the old official exchange rate of approximately
5.75 renminbi (Rmb) per US dollar, recently readjusted to 8.7
Rmb per dollar.

32. Economist Dwight Perkins convincingly makes this point. Incurring
high production opportunity costs to field obsolete weapon systems
is an approach that China abandoned when it launched its modernization
drive in the late 1970s. See Dwight Perkins, "The Economic
Background and Implications for China," in The Sino-Soviet
Conflict: A Global Perspective, ed. Herbert J. Ellison (Seattle:
Univ. of Washington Press, 1982), p. 110.

40. See John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China
Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,"
The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992), 999-1028,
for an excellent account of the Chinese navy's progress in developing
a power projection capability that can extend to the South China
Sea area. The PLA's recent expansion of a landing strip on Woody
Island in the Paracels has further boosted the scope of air cover
available to PLA naval and marine forces operating in the area.
See Tai Ming Cheung and Nayan Chanda, "Exercising Caution,"
FEER, 2 September 1993, p. 20.

41. Yu, p. 302; and Godwin, p. 179.

42. The two Chinese air force bombers with nuclear delivery capabilities,
the H-5 and H-6, are adaptations of two Soviet bombers, the Il-28
Beagle and Tu-16 Badger, first flown by the Russians in 1947 and
1954 respectively. See Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles:
Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 288.

43. To illustrate, the United States currently has some 6000 strategic
nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Under START II, the number will
be reduced to 2228. China, on the other hand, has some 280 strategic
warheads, 170 of which would have to be launched from highly vulnerable
air- and sea-based platforms. See IISS, p. 235; and Lockwood and
Wolfsthal, p. 239.

44. Song Jiuguang, START and China's Policy on Nuclear Weapons
and Disarmament in the 1990's (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
Univ. Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1991),
p. 14.

46. The US Army key doctrinal manual, for instance, notes: "Arms
and services complement each other by posing a dilemma
for the enemy. As he [the enemy] evades the effects of one weapon,
arm, or service, he exposes himself to attack by another."
US Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington:
GPO, 1987), p. 25.

47. Richard A. Bitzinger, Chinese Arms Production and Sales
to the Third World (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991), pp.
20-29.

51. For a discussion of the impact of information technology on
military affairs, see General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James
M. Dubik, "War in the Information Age," Military
Review, 74 (April 1994), 46-62.

52. Jiang Zemin, Communist Chinese Party Secretary and Chairman
of the Central Military Commission, summing up the US-led coalition's
impressive application of high technology in the 1991 campaign
against Iraq, reportedly said, "To fall behind [technologically]
means to get thrashed." See Mann and Holley, p. A-26.

56. See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, The Chinese Economy
in 1990 and 1991: Uncertain Recovery (Washington: CIA, 1991)
for a discussion of PRC GNP calculation problems. Three methods
commonly used are exchange rate conversion, physical indicators,
and purchasing power parity. All have significant disadvantages.

57. In 1991, China's official GDP was estimated to be $370 billion
(US) and per capita GNP about $370 (US). See The World Bank, p.
238, 242. Given the continued rapid PRC economic growth since
that time, per capita GNP by mid-1994 is around $450 (US).

58. The World Bank, pp. 240, 254; "Prices and Trends,"
FEER, 19 May 1994, p. 60; and Samuel S. Kim, "China
and the Third World in the Changing World Order," in China
and the World: Chinese Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,
pp. 156-57.

59. For a series of essays on the prospects for Mainland-Taiwan-Hong
Kong (the so-called "Greater China") cooperative development,
see "The Emergence of Greater China," Chinese Economic
Studies (Winter 1993-1994).

60. The World Bank, p. 288.

61. Barber B. Conable, Jr., et al., United States and China
Relations at a Crossroads (Washington: The Atlantic Council
of the United States, 1993), pp. 20-27.

65. James B. Crowley, "A New Deal For Japan and Asia: One
Road to Pearl Harbor," in Modern East Asia, ed. James
B. Crowley (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1970), pp. 235-63;
and Kennedy, pp. 275-343.

67. The Russian military has suffered not only by demobilization
and severe budget cuts, but by tremendous personnel turbulence
as well, threatening to make it a "hollow force." See
Konstantin E. Sorokin, Russia's Security in a Rapidly Changing
World (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Center for International
Security and Arms Control, 1994), 39-46.

80. PLA General Political Department Mass Work Section, "Do
Good Jobs of Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People
in the New Situation of Reform, Opening Up," Qiushi,
1 August 1992, pp. 2-5, FBIS-CHI, 4 September 1992, p. 36.

81. Liu Huaqing, "Unswervingly Advance Along the Road Building
a Modern Army With Chinese Characteristics," Jiefangjun
Bao, 6 August 1993, pp. 1-2, FBIS-CHI, 18 August 1993, p.
17.

90. "China Airs Stand on Nuclear Testing," Beijing
Review, 18-24 October 1993, p. 4; Shen Dingli, "Toward
a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A Chinese Perspective," The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 50 (March/April 1994),
51-54; "Bomb Test in China Upsets US," San Jose Mercury
News, 11 June 1994, P. A-10; and "Regional Briefing,"
FEER, 23 June 1994, p. 13. PRC officials emphasize that
while the United States has conducted some 1050 nuclear tests,
Russia (the former Soviet Union) 700, and France 200, China has
tested only 39 times since it exploded its first nuclear device
in 1964. As such, they say that the PRC must continue limited
testing for reasons of safety and reliability (see Shen, pp. 51-2).

98. Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State
Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, August 1993,
Beijing Review, 6-12 September 1993, pp. VI-VII.

99. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw
Materials Investment Policy and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 329-52. Krasner cites
the US war in Vietnam as an example of a very great power applying
its vast resources in pursuit of ideological goals. States with
fewer capabilities are constrained to focus on the preservation
of their positions within the international system.

103. The concept of a world society that promotes norms, principles,
and ideas that are important determinants of state behavior has
been articulated by Hedley Bull in The Anarchial Society: A
Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1977). The importance of ideas in ensuring compliance to
rules in the absence of enforcement mechanisms is also argued
effectively by Douglass C. North in Structure and Change in
Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), pp. 33-68.

107. Pan Zhenqiang, "Future Security Needs of the Asian-Pacific
Area and Their Implication for the U.S. Defense Policy,"
paper presented at the 1993 United States National Defense University
and United States Pacific Command Pacific Symposium, Honolulu,
Hawaii, 4 March 1993, p. 16.

Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry is assigned to the staff of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Office
of the Secretary of Defense. He commanded a light infantry battalion
in the 10th Mountain Division and served as an assistant attaché
in the American Embassy in the People's Republic of China and
as a division chief with the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate
of the Army Staff. Colonel Eikenberry is a graduate of the US
Military Academy, holds a master's degree from Harvard University
in East Asian studies, has studied at the British Ministry of
Defence Chinese Language School in Hong Kong and at Nanjing University
in the PRC. He also was a national security fellow at the JFK
School of Government, Harvard University, and he is a Ph.D. candidate
at Stanford University.