The Giant of the Persian Gulf Oil States / A Tradition of Disdain for
Manual Labor / Frameworks of Loyalty in Saudi Arabia / American
Presence Triggers Saudi Hatred / Placating the Religious
Establishment / The U.S. War Against International Islamic Terrorism

The Giant of the Persian Gulf Oil States

The Persian Gulf is a region of outstanding anomalies and immense
energy wealth. About two-thirds of the world´s proven energy reserves
are located in the Gulf States, foremost in Saudi Arabia (25
percent). As long as the rest of the world requires this energy, its
dependence on this region will continue. Yet, the evolving U.S. war
against terrorism, coupled with the growth of non-OPEC oil output led
by the revived energy industry in Russia and other former Soviet
republics, is beginning to erode the coercive power of the Gulf
states.

Other than Iran and Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf oil states, Iraq
included, are the creations of nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century British imperialism. The United Arab Emirates, with the
highest per capita income in the world and about 9 percent of the
world´s oil reserves, consists of seven principalities that jealously
guard their independence. It has a citizen population of nearly one
million, plus about 1.5 million foreign workers and technicians.

Kuwait, practically a desert with a central oasis (Kuwait City),
controls about 10 percent of the global oil reserves and is the
second richest country in the world. Nearly half of its 750,000
citizens currently live abroad, especially in London. Those who
remain in the country share its terrible climate with 1.5 million
foreign workers (before 1991, these included largely well-to-do
Palestinians who practically ran Kuwait).

Before its formal independence in 1970, Qatar had a population of
only 100,000. Its wealth emanates from its oil reserves, but even
more so from its huge offshore natural gas field which is among the
largest in the world. Although the influence of Wahhabi Islam is
strong, as it is in Saudi Arabia, Qatar is far more liberal and,
partly out of fear of its powerful neighbors, the state welcomes
Westerners and a U.S. military presence (as does Kuwait).

Saudi Arabia is the giant of the Arabian Peninsula kingdoms with over
250 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. In 1993, while serving as
a Woodrow Wilson Institute (Smithsonian) Fellow, I was requested to
prepare a report on "Manpower Problems in Saudi Arabia." I soon
realized that official Saudi population statistics were grossly
inflated in order to improve the image and standing of this backward,
oil-rich kingdom. After careful research, I concluded that, rather
than the 9-10 million citizens and 3-4 million foreign workers
claimed by Riyadh, the number of Saudis in 1980 had barely surpassed
4 million. Saudi Arabia´s current citizen population amounts to 12-13
million (with one of the world´s highest birth rates), and not the 20
million claimed officially. There are presently about 5-6 million
foreign workers, technicians, and experts in Saudi Arabia.

It seems odd to speak of an unemployment problem among young Saudis
in a country that has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in
infrastructure and oil-related industrialization since the 1960s.
Saudi sources claim an unemployment rate in the kingdom of about 15
percent. However, neutral sources estimate that unemployment among
Saudis below the age of 25, who comprise half of the kingdom´s
citizens, is nearly 30 percent. Inasmuch as Saudis abhor manual work
and lack expertise, the kingdom´s economy would have collapsed
without foreign workers and Western experts.

A Tradition of Disdain for Manual Labor

One key problem of the Saudi populace is the traditional Bedouin
folkway that despises any kind of manual labor and even occupations
that relate to it. In researching one of my books on Saudi Arabia, I
reviewed nearly 180 doctoral dissertations written by Saudis,
principally for American universities but also for British and French
ones. (Parenthetically, it should be noted that the academic level of
these dissertations proved to be very low when compared with the
accepted academic standards). One of the initial conclusions arising
from the study of this material was the extraordinary degree of
contempt found in Sunni Saudi society (about 90 percent of the
population) for manual labor. This attitude is so deeply ingrained
that even an engineer who works with machines and wishes to marry is
considered somewhat inferior for marriage purposes because his
occupation is related to manual labor.

The Saudi government finds this attitude nearly impossible to
overcome when it attempts to bring more of its citizens into the
ranks of the employed through its endeavors to expand its economic
infrastructure and to bring about the Saudi-ization of its workforce.
Moreover, Riyadh´s plans to provide additional workplaces fall far
short of matching the rapid Saudi population growth and the number of
high school and (half-baked) university graduates that increases from
year to year. Thus, the number of unemployed young citizens rises
each year. Indeed, the majority of the unemployed are unprepared to
accept most of the lowly jobs that are now performed by a host of
foreigners from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and from poor Arab countries (Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and
Yemen), and there is little chance that this situation will change.

This factor may prove to be explosive since, in addition, the Saudis
look down on all foreigners and especially dislike Westerners who
hold most of the skilled positions in the country. This haughty
attitude toward foreigners stems from the Saudi belief that they are
chosen by God, and that all others, even if they are co-religionists,
are inferior.

Saudi jihadist Wahhabism (Muwwahidun), an Islamic trend based on the
strict Hanbali school, was developed by Muhammad Ibn ´Abd al-Wahhab
in the mid-seventeenth century and led to the emergence of the first
Saudi kingdom. This stream of Islamic fundamentalism even considered
all non-Wahhabi Muslims as infidels.

Saudi loathing for Westerners relates to their being Christian and
representing a dominant and successful civilization with
a "materialistic culture" and superior military-political power and
technology that has humiliated the world of Islam. Since the 1950s,
America has been considered the foremost representative of this
civilization. In addition to long-standing dislike for the Americans
employed by Aramco and affiliated oil industries, the U.S military
presence in Islam´s holy land since 1990, and Washington´s Middle
East policy, has turned Saudi antipathy toward Americans into
passionate hatred. This was most clearly demonstrated in the rise of
anti-Western, militant Islamic fundamentalism and the support that al-
Qa´ida´s September 11 terrorist attack on America received in Saudi
Arabia and the Muslim world, in general.

It is important to understand that the oil era has brought
revolutionary changes to Saudi society. The formerly nomadic Bedouin
have undergone an extraordinarily rapid process of urbanization. Some
still maintain camels in the desert largely as a status symbol, but
ironically they transport their camels from one oasis to another in
padded GMC trucks in order to protect them. Today, the new upper
crust of Saudi technocrats, made up largely of the offspring of
settled elements, are purchasing camels at exorbitant prices.

Frameworks of Loyalty in Saudi Arabia

Although the Saudi kingdom remains an Al Saud ("al" means clan)
autocracy (with 7,000-20,000 princes of varied royal links), it has a
more or less modern government staffed by graduates of Western,
primarily American, universities in all key and secondary positions.
At the top of this modern structure are largely non-royal ministers
(key ministries are held by the most senior Saudi princes), who are
entrusted with the execution but not the formulation of policy.
Policy-making is dominated by a royal consultative council made up of
the most senior princes of the Saud clan. Yet, alongside the modern
government structure exists the traditional tribal pyramid of "desert
democracy." This patriarchal framework allows access by the lowliest
of tribesmen to his sub-tribal sheikh, and through him and the tribal
and tribal coalition´s sheikhs, to the princely district and
provincial governors and theoretically to the king. This practice,
thus, preserves the traditional support base for the Saudi monarchy.

Television cameras occasionally show scenes of lines of Saudi
citizens waiting during weekly sessions (majlis) to speak to a
governor-prince or (theoretically) even to the monarch, to claim
justice, request economic help, or discuss other matters. This is how
a typical patriarchal government maintains the traditional
connections and loyalty of its citizens toward the rulers. However,
the process of urbanization in Saudi Arabia has been accompanied by
serious changes that have affected the traditional structure of
government (hukuma). Since the extended family and tribe members
migrated to the urban centers, they no longer live together and have
more direct access to central government services. This development,
coupled with access to the media and political agitation in the
towns, has eroded the regime´s traditional loyalty system.

In parallel, there have been significant fluctuations in oil income.
By the beginning of the 1980s, the per capita income in Saudi Arabia
had surpassed $18,000 annually (some claim it reached over $20,000),
but the past twenty years have witnessed a drastic decline in the
Saudi per capita income to about $6,000- $7,000. Yet the per capita
figure fails to differentiate between the rulers and those close to
them, together with the big entrepreneurs, and the poor masses of the
Saudi people. The legendary wealth and indulgence in luxuries of the
corrupt Saudi royal princes further skews the gap between rich and
poor. Much of this wealth was amassed through the "commission system"
which required foreign businessmen to use the services of well-
connected members of the Saudi ruling class to serve as patrons for
their business dealings in the country. Indeed, even foreign workers
needed a Saudi patron.

In this way, vast wealth exists together with poverty, but the
overall situation of the Saudi citizenry remains relatively
reasonable, considering the extensive system of subsidies and welfare
services. These include subsidies for basic commodities, electricity,
water, and fuel (which costs next to nothing), and grants of plots of
land and interest-free, home-construction loans, all of which help to
promote internal stability, up to a point.

American Presence Triggers Saudi Hatred

In 1990, 500,000 American servicemen and women arrived in Saudi
Arabia in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Suddenly, Western
influences were being introduced into the most religiously
conservative country in the world. Half a million American soldiers
were on Saudi soil, among them amazons wearing pants and carrying
guns who were seen walking into supermarkets as if they owned the
place. This proved to be the breaking point for militant
fundamentalism, that rose to the surface and was directed not only
toward the ruling Saudi family but principally toward the West, as
represented by America.

In reaction, radical young religious scholars began to preach against
the Saudi government and the American presence in Arabia and the
Gulf. Their sermons won wide circulation through leaflets and
cassette tapes that were in great demand by the conservative Saudi
population. Part of this trend included the reactivation of
extremists such as Usama bin Ladin and his "Afghani" veterans.

Placating the Religious Establishment

The Saudi government has worked hard, since the establishment of the
(third) Saudi kingdom at the beginning of the twentieth century by
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, to win legitimacy by extending authority and
favors to the Wahhabi religious establishment. This group not only
controls the Saudi judicial system but also tens of thousands of
mosques in the country. Indeed, the ruling family´s practice of
buying off the religious scholars continued during the reign of King
Feisal bin Abdul Aziz (1964-1975), a reformer who was assassinated by
a deranged nephew after he introduced (religious) television into the
country, which triggered bloody demonstrations in the kingdom´s
heartland.

In return for its agreement to the introduction of "modern" education
in the late 1920s, the Saudi religious establishment was given
control of the Saudi education system, in addition to its religious
schools and (later) universities. Today, Saudi Arabia has seven
universities with branches in all the provinces and a total of about
150,000 students. Over 70 percent of the curriculum in the
four "secular" universities involves religious studies and Arab and
Islamic history, whereas only about 25 percent is devoted to other
general subjects (the Aramco-founded technical university in the
Eastern Province is an exception). Thus, religious studies hold a
central place even in educational programs for science, geography,
and the like. Moreover, those who set the academic standards in the
universities were largely Egyptians, whose level of education in
their own country is among the lowest in the Arab world. The next
generation of Saudi professors is, on the whole, not much better than
their Egyptian predecessors.

While the Saudi rulers needed the legitimization and support of the
Wahhabi ulama over time, they have been careful not to allow the
religious leaders to undermine their authority in Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, the rulers have used the religious leaders against their
political rivals in the Arab world and to further the spread of
Wahhabi Islam among various Islamic states, minorities, and groups in
Africa, Asia, and even in Europe. The Saudi state closed its eyes, if
it did not contribute directly, to the flow of Saudi funds to these
regions, thus enabling Wahhabi influence to reach into every corner
of the world including Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Philippines,
central Asia, Chechnya, southern Sudan, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Macedonia -- all locations which have suffered from the rise of
fundamentalist Islam. Thus, turning a blind eye to the spread of
Wahhabism throughout the world was part of the price paid by the
Saudi political leadership to receive legitimacy from the religious
establishment.

Nevertheless, since the early 1980s, Saudi revenue from oil has
gradually declined and, with it, the government´s ability to buy its
population´s good will. As a result, dissatisfaction with the Saudi
ruling house by middle- and lower-class Saudis and the ulama has
increased. Furious criticism of the regime, which tolerated the U.S.
presence in Arabia and the use of its bases against Iraq, has risen
sharply. At the same time, the Saudi rulers and their allies continue
to take advantage of their power and indulge in every possible
luxury, despite the Wahhabi doctrine that frowns on external displays
of wealth.

The U.S. War Against International Islamic Terrorism

The rise of U.S. President George W. Bush has been accompanied by a
growing tension between Riyadh and Washington. The Saudi government
is under constant pressure by conservatives and Arab nationalists,
and especially the ultra-fundamentalist elements in the kingdom, to
expel the U.S. from Islam´s holy land and to oppose Washington´s
Middle East policy. Riyadh has also become increasingly apprehensive
of itself becoming the target of its own Islamic militants.

Contrary to the accepted wisdom in the press, Usama bin Ladin was not
the vanguard of anti-American activity in Saudi Arabia. He and his
former "Afghani" followers received only marginal attention and
support in the kingdom in the early 1990s. The standard bearers of
attacks on the regime and on the U.S. presence in Arabia were the new
generation of non-conformist ulama and preachers who gradually
escalated their verbal attacks on the House of Saud and the American
infidels.

A few years ago, I received a book in Arabic entitled "Let There Not
be a Civil War," by Dr. Ghazi al-Ghosabi, the "dean" of Saudi
intellectuals (who later became the Saudi Ambassador in London). The
book cites street slogans, pamphlets, and sections of recorded tapes
by the most extreme preachers that received widespread attention. In
it, Ghosabi challenges the tactics of the militant (Wahhabi)
preachers who copy the teachings of Iran´s (Shi´ite) leader Ayatollah
Khomeini and, according to the author, advocate the Shi´ite principle
of "governance by clergy." The book offers a wealth of material that
enables us to comprehend the depth of Saudi antipathy, if not hatred,
for the West and Western culture, together with evidence of the
erosion in the standing of the Saudi regime among the general
population.

With the power of extremist fundamentalist Islam on the rise in Saudi
Arabia in recent years, it is no surprise that most of the
participants in the murderous September 11 attack were Saudis, and it
comes as no surprise that thousands of al-Qa´ida fighters in
Afghanistan were Saudis and Yemenites, in addition to many others
from all the Arab states and Pakistan. Funding for bin Ladin´s al-
Qa´ida mujahidin and the cancer of international Islamic terrorism
came largely from Saudi philanthropists and from other wealthy Gulf
entrepreneurs.

America´s overwhelming and quick victory in Afghanistan and President
Bush´s determined "war against international (Islamic) terrorism"
changed the political environment in the Persian Gulf and the Arab-
Muslim world, in general. Clearly, extreme militant Islamic
fundamentalism (jihad) is still very much alive. Yet, the Saudi
rulers under the leadership of ultra-conservative Crown Prince
Abdallah finally realize that they can no longer afford to try to
gain legitimacy by closing their eyes to the support of their
countrymen for international (Islamic) terrorism, which eventually
seeks their own overthrow. Indeed, Washington has also made it clear
that it would no longer tolerate the Saudi double game.

Thus, Prince Abdallah has stopped Saudi philanthropists from funding
al-Qa´ida and other militant fundamentalist organizations. He has
also requested the Saudi ulama leadership to reduce their incitement
against America and the West, in general. Yet, simultaneously, he
declared that Saudi Arabia would not cooperate with the U.S. in an
attack on Iraq, and that America would not be allowed to use Saudi
bases and facilities in an operation against Saddam Hussein´s regime.
Abdallah also requested that Washington reduce its presence in the
kingdom.

Mordechai Abir is a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
and Professor (Emeritus) of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His books on Saudi Arabia include
Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era. Regime and Elites: Conflict and
Collaboration (1988); Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf
Crisis (1993); and United States-Saudi Arabian Relations and the Arab-
Israeli Peace Process (forthcoming). This Jerusalem Viewpoints is
based on the author´s presentation at a study evening on the outbreak
of fundamentalist Islamic terror, held in December 2001 in memory of
Professor Daniel J. Elazar.