The grounds on which relator seeks relief are: (1) denial of effective and adequate representation by counsel; (2) coerced confession admitted into evidence at trial; (3) his Legal Aid attorney would not file an appeal; and (4) adverse ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The facts in that case appear to be more strongly in favor of Mathis than the facts in the case sub judice are to the relator. There, the voluntary defender was appointed to represent the relator on the eve of trial. The defender did not have an opportunity to interview Mathis but did have access to the notes of a colleague who had previously conducted an interview. In addition, trial counsel spent about a half-hour with witnesses in the courtroom just before the trial. Several putative eyewitnesses to the stabbing in question failed to appear at the trial. As we read the opinion of the Court of Appeals, these facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals found, however, that the testimony of counsel at the habeas corpus hearing rebutted the relator's prima facie case. This finding was based on the testimony of counsel that he had "no reasonable expectation" that the absent witnesses would aid in Mathis' defense. Furthermore, he was "unable to say that he had been insufficiently prepared to go to trial."

It is true that the trial attorney made one mistake
*fn3"
in not objecting to relator's "coerced" confession to the burglary charge, but that mistake has been corrected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In cases where incompetency has been found, invariably the finding was based on a combination rather than a single mistake by the attorney. Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851, 855 (4th Cir. 1962). As demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, supra, 427 Pa. at p. 609, 235 A.2d at p. 355, as to the robbery charges, there were reasonable bases to support counsel's failure to investigate possible witnesses and impeach the testimony of Balser who testified against relator;
*fn4"
that these asserted errors "are not sufficient to support a conclusion that counsel's representation did not comport with constitutional mandates". Counsel's failure to move for a severance in the circumstances was certainly a matter of discretion and strategy (T., p. 115).

The evidence and circumstances disclose that the investigator's notes provided sufficient information so that the trial attorney could familiarize himself with the accusations and defenses; that the trial attorney had access and used the investigator's report; and that he sufficently discussed the cases with the relator before the trial. There were two interviews prior to the day of trial; the investigator's report provided the experienced trial attorney with sufficient information in advance of trial to materially reduce the time required for a meaningful consultation with relator. Thus, we do not think that this is a case where a late appointment of counsel is "inherently prejudicial"; it is not a case where hasty preparation deprived relator of his defenses to the robbery charges, or the presence of witnesses otherwise available, for relator had none. Therefore, we conclude that in all the circumstances, the Commonwealth by strong affirmative proof has rebutted any presumption of harm which may have resulted because the trial attorney did not contact relator until the day of the trial.

We find from the trial transcript that relator did in fact receive the effective aid and assistance of counsel as to the robbery charges. Perfection is not required. Success is not required. In the light of the overwhelming evidence against him, there was very little trial counsel could do, except make the Commonwealth prove its case as relator desired (Ex. 4). It is difficult to believe that character witnesses, if any there were, would have been of any help.
*fn5"
Counsel was experienced, having tried 400 or 500 cases up to the time of the 1959 trial (T., pp. 88-89).

Our website includes the main text of the court's opinion but does not include the
docket number, case citation or footnotes. Upon purchase, docket numbers and/or
citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a legal proceeding.
Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.