Richard Tanter

The idea that China and Japan are slipping towards war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial conflict is deeply shocking. How could the world's second and third largest economies even consider the possibility of war over half a dozen uninhabitable islets? For Australians, the question is more serious still: could Australia be drawn into the absurdly dangerous conflict between its two largest trading partners on the side of Japan because of its defence agreements with Japan and because of the pull of the ANZUS alliance?

The Australian government needs to not only urge a negotiated solution to the dispute but avoid being drawn into support for military action by the most nationalist Japanese government in half a century.

Most Australians are unlikely to know just how close our military ties with Japan have become. Japan is our fourth most important strategic partner - after the United States, Britain and New Zealand. Since the comprehensive Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation signed in 2007, new agreements on defence co-operation, intelligence sharing and, quietly coming into force a few weeks ago, defence logistics-sharing tie us more closely still.

Acquired by the Meiji government in its colonial expansion to Taiwan and Korea in the 1880s, the Senkaku Islands are under Japanese de facto control. China (and Taiwan) call them the Diaoyutai, and have long claimed them as Chinese territory. Japan simply maintains there is no dispute, and refuses to enter into any discussion. Both sides base their claims on historical association, with both being at the very least plausible. The Chinese government has called for arbitration under the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

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Japan has a talent for border disputes derived from its expansionist past, with longstanding, unresolved and bitter territorial conflicts with all of its neighbours - over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai with China and Taiwan; the island of Takeshima/Dokdo with South Korea; and the southern Kurils (aka the Northern Territories) with Russia. All three disputes are volatile because of deep and vociferous nationalisms, although all governments have shown they can control the influence of those atavistic forces - when they want to. All three are potentially soluble through compromise and co-operation given the necessary political will.

The Senkakus/Diaoyu conflict is now deeply militarised - with Chinese, Japanese and US forces all involved in increasingly risky actions. Japan has been rapidly expanding its air, naval and intelligence capacities in the region for more than a decade. China is projecting its military presence around the islands to remind the Japanese government that if your neighbour says there is an argument about your shared fence line, then there is a dispute, and it has to be faced. Chinese ships are showing their colours in Japan's claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near the islands.

All sides fear a repeat of the April 2001 incident when a Chinese fighter harassing a US spy plane crashed over Hainan, killing the pilot. An accidental downing of a Chinese or Japanese aircraft would be considered more than enough reason to go to war for nationalists of either country, including some in high office.

So what should be done? The first thing for Australia is to make clear that it has a strong and immediate interest in a peaceful resolution. Australia is and will continue to be a strong supporter of Japan's security, but at the same time it has no interest in supporting Japanese nationalist claims to colonial plunder. Territorial disputes like this must only be solved peacefully, and by co-operative dialogue. Australia's interest lies in a rule-based, peaceful international order pointing to negotiation and arbitration.

While Australia may be an ally of the United States, and the United States an ally of Japan, that does not translate into support for the peripheral interests of Japanese nationalism, whatever the provocation.

In practical terms, Australia should be calling for a range of measures from both sides (and the United States) to ensure a peaceful and sustainable outcome, including:

■ Shelving the fundamental sovereignty dispute for the present.

■ Avoiding further provocation of any kind, refraining from further military deployments and preventing unauthorised civilian landings by nationalist groups.

■ Pressing Japan on the precise nature of ASDF rules of engagement to be sure that they minimise risks of accidental conflict.

■ Establishing an effective rapid communications channel between the Japanese and Chinese authorities, including military headquarters.

■ Discussing joint fishing zone rights, and declaring the islands a nature conservation zone to be administered by an independent international body.

ANZUS alliance defenders like to boast of the seat at the Washington table the alliance is said to bring. The test is whether that seat comes with a voice that articulates Australia's independent interests in tough times. Now is one of those times, and if Australia does not find its own voice it may find itself drawn by default into support for the ugliest part of Japan's political culture.

Richard Tanter is senior research associate, Nautilus Institute, and a professor in the School of Political and Social Studies at the University of Melbourne.