A carrot-and-stick approach to North Korea

The recently announced agreement that came from a bilateral meeting in Beijing between the United States and North Korea should be greeted with cautious optimism. According to the State Department’s statement on the meeting, the key elements of the agreement are as follows:

North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and various activities at the facilities at Yongbyon, including uranium enrichment.

North Korea also agreed to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify and monitor the enrichment moratorium and the disabling of a five-megawatt North Korean reactor.

The United States and North Korea agreed to a targeted program of U.S. nutritional assistance (food aid) to North Korea over the next 12 months.

If all of this actually comes to pass, it could be the start of a positive relationship between the two countries and help to resolve some of the serious issues that have plagued their relationship and caused serious tensions, not only between these two countries but also in the Asian-Pacific region.

However, U.S. officials are right to characterize the agreement as “important, if limited, progress.” It remains to be seen whether North Korea will actually fulfill its commitments. A North Korean spokesman’s answers to questions about the talks added the qualifier “…while productive dialogues continue” when discussing the nuclear moratorium and IAEA inspections. This opens up the possibility that if North Korea becomes dissatisfied with future discussions, it will end the moratorium and the IAEA inspections.

Relations with North Korea have never been simple and straightforward. Progress toward successfully addressing U.S. concerns requires patience and tenacity, and making effective use of both positive and negative inducements. Even if the United States plays its hand with great skill, there is no guarantee that it will achieve positive results.

Although the prospects for success are not great, the United States should follow through with the agreement. But it should be guided by the words of the late President Ronald Reagan: “Trust but verify.” Proceed carefully, and ensure that North Korea is keeping its end of the bargain. If it does, move forward and consider using other carrots (positive inducements); if North Korea does not keep its end of the bargain, then the United States should use sticks (negative inducements).

The only certainty is that relations with North Korea will be complicated. But there are important issues for the United States involving North Korea, and it is critical that we try to engage them to solve our problems.

Richard J. Stoll, Ph.D., is the Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science at Rice University. He is also a Rice scholar at the Baker Institute. Stoll’s current research includes forecasting terrorism, accounting for Chinese international economic activity and predicting support for NATO’s mission in Afghanistan among European countries.

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