This is a collection of eleven previously published essays
by a well-known professor of Physics and of the History of
Science at Harvard University. While the book is intended
to be a continuation of the author's Thematic Origins of
Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein (Harvard University
Press, 1973), it does not display any unifying purpose
beyond that of bringing together a number of papers
published since the appearance of the earlier volume. Two
long essays, one on the Millikan-Ehrenhaft dispute over the
electron,' the other on the impact of Enrico Fermi's
discoveries on the growth of Italian physics, account for a
third of the text and are the only real "case histories" in the
traditional historical sense. The other pieces include book
reviews, a discussion of the (Harvard) Project Physics
Course, and a few essays on topics in the sociology of
science. Of these the best is "Dionysians, Appollonians,
and the Scientific Imagination" (expanded from an article in Daedalus, Summer, 1974) which discusses the role of the
rational and irrational in scientific method.

In the opening chapter and at various points throughout
the text, Holton advocates his theory of "thematic
analysis"-the treatment of an additional component in
the examination of scientific work beyond the standard
historical, social, psychological, cultural, logical, empirical, and theoretical components (p.3-8). Themata are
quasi-structuralist conceptions, in many ways akin to A.0.
Lovejoy's "unit ideas" which are to explain or establish in
some way the continuity of the scientific endeavor as well as
the often irrational convictions of individual scientists.
They include a limited number of conceptions such as continuum, hierarchy, isotropy, synthesis, discreteness, and
family-Holton holds that there are probably less than 100
in all-which are present in a variety of combinations and
sequences. Apparently deeply imbedded in the psyche and
mainly acquired in childhood (p. 23), they are almost all of
ancient origin and all will continue to find proponents in
the future (p. 10). Scientists may embrace any thema at any
time, as well as its opposite (p. 23), each in a different area
of thoughts, and they may change themata, apparently
even by rationally considering alternative themata. (p. 22).

Thematic analysis is apparently more a descriptive than
an analytical tool, however: in Holton's principal example
he picks a dozen or so themata from one page of a Scientific American article without giving any indication as to
how such a list is supposed to help in understanding or explaining what is going on (p. I I ff). While Holton insists
that his notion of themata is to be distinguished from
theories of archetypes, paradigms, or metaphysical presuppositions, there are many similarities and it is hard to
find any advantages in Holton's view. His general theory is
too vague-there is no explanation of the genesis or
dynamics of themata, nor any standards for thematic
evaluation. At the same time the themata themselves are
too rigid and unchanging. The claim that Democritus embraced the thema of "discreteness" along with such later
scientists as Planck and Bohr surely obscures more than
clarifies; such concepts develop and evolve over time. The
conflicts between Einstein and Heisenberg over quantum
mechanics, Cartesians and Newtonians over vortices, and
Aristotle and the atomists over the plenum are distantly
related if at all, but Holton finds in them all the antithetical themata "discreteness" and "continuum."

Whatever problems beset the theory of thematic analysis
do not, however, seriously detract from the rest of Holton's
work, nor for that matter does thematic analysis noticably
contribute anything. The author admits that his study of
Fermi, one of the two long historical essays in this book,
makes no use of thernata, while elsewhere the occasional interjection of "thema-talk" can be dropped with no apparent loss. This raises the question implicit in my opening
comments above, "What is the purpose of this volume?" If
it is to establish the theory of thematic analysis, it is unsuccessful; if it is in a broad sense to investigate the scientific
imagination, it does include some illustrative case studies,
as well as material only tangentially related. As a volume of
collected essays, the paperback edition is a comparatively
inexpensive way of acquiring some of the papers which are
otherwise found only in expensive editions and symposia,
and so it is a useful source-book for those interested in its
contents.

'Appearing in Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences. 9(1978), pp. 161-224, after the publication of the volume under review.

Reviewed by Charles D. Kay, Department of History and Philosophy of
Science, University Of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The obligation to feed the hungry is a moral imperative
most human beings recognize. The evangelist Matthew
makes it one of the criteria by which all will be judged (Mt.
24:35). The contributors to this book are attempting to uncover how the hungry may be fed without prejudice to
human development on an international scale. The traditional answers of religion (charitable assistance) and
business and government (more resources) are not only inadequate but even harmful.

It would have been better to participate in February,
1978 in the give and take of the seminar put together by the
Bread for the World Educational Fund and the Economics
Department at the University of Notre Dame, This book is
an opportunity to listen in on the discussions after the fact.
That the issues are still lively is evident from World Bank

President Robert McNamara's plea for increased financial assistance from the United States, Russia, Greal
Britain and Japan for Third World Countries. OxfarWs
Tony Jackson believes the money now being spent is too
often only helping the rich get richer. David Kinley of the
Institute for Food and Development Policy of San Francisco would rather see United States foreign aid moneys
spent to alleviate the debts of poor countries. This book will help thoughtful readers understand these
disagreements and begin to formulate their own conclusions.

One of the contributors, Paul Schervish argues that more
money going from richer countries to poorer ones only exacerbates the latter countries' problems of poverty,
unemployment, and hunger. The powerful in our own
country appreciate how difficult it is to ensure that moneys
intended to aid the most impoverished reach the target
population. It is naive to imagine the task is easier across
national boundaries.

Denis Goulet contends that "the many can only have
enough if societies so organize themselves that the few cannot have too much." When Goulet writes that "deep mutation" will be necessary, this reviewer suspects the more
precise term would be revolution.

Richard Barnet focuses on the significance of changing
values if one would alter the social and economic conditions of the poor and oppressed. The values which
"undergird the global shopping center" are not now adequate. One may well suspect they never were.

Paul Streeten writes that Transnational Corporations
could make contributions to meeting the "basic human
needs of the absolute poor." Further he is able to specify
what those needs are, namely, adequate personal incomes,
basic public services and participation. James Weaver also
makes a list of basic human needs but his list differs from
Streeten's. Weaver includes food, potable water, clothing,
shelter, medical care and education. Goulet disagrees with
both of them. He believes only the poor themselves can
define their needs and then only in reference to what is of
value to them. His examples indicate that the poor are more
likely to list a meaningful existence and a sense of selfesteem as basic human needs. This sort of difference indicates that the difficulty of satisfying human needs is more
basic than delivering goods and services.

This book is technical to the point of being difficult for
the interested non-professional. But the easy solutions have
been and are being tried again. When charity becomes big
business, often under government control, something needs
doing. These authors suggest a variety of ways to perceive
the problems and seek solutions.

Reviewed by William J. Sullivan, S.T.D., Associate Professor, Religious
Studies, St. John Fisher College, Rochester, New York 14618.

THE MASTER OF LIGHT: A Biography of Albert
A. Michelson
by Dorothy Michelson Livingston, The
University of Chicago Press (1979). 376 pages.,$6.95.

The decades spanning the turn of the century were times
of great turmoil for physics. In what Thomas Kuhn calls "a
shifting of paradigms," classical Newtonian physics was
grudgingly giving way to Quantum, or Modern physics.
More was involved than a simple change of equations: one
world view was discarded and another, full of unsettling
implications, was instituted in its place. Determinability
and continuity were replaced by uncertainty, probability,
and quantized energy levels. Though one of the movers of
this revolution, Albert Abraham Michelson nevertheless
struggled to accept that which he had helped bring about.

Born in 1852 in Strze1no, Poland, Michelson emigrated
with his family three years later to the United States. They
settled in the Sierra Gold Rush town of Murphy's Camp,
and his father eventually sent him to high school in San
Francisco. His potential attracted the notice of a local congressman, and after some difficulties he won in 1869 an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy. The direction his
career would take was already apparent by the time of his
graduation four years later. A superior student overall, he
led the class in optics, and the study of light was fast
becoming a passion with him.

More an experimenter than a theorist, Michelson had
ample work to occupy his interests and challenge his
abilities. He eagerly embraced Maxwell's newly formulated
wave theory of light, and his skill with mirrors and lenses
served him well. Though Foucault and several others had previously attempted to measure the velocity of light,
Michelson while still in his twenties obtained more accurate results in a long-running
series of tests with simple but ingenious changes in technique. His reputation on both sides
of the Atlantic was solidly established when he, with the
chemist Edward Morley, performed an experiment that was
to be pivotal in the rise of modern physics: the attempt to
measure the ether-drift.

The notion of a physical ether permeating the universe
strikes many today as absurd and somehow pathetic, akin
to the epicycles devised in astronomy to explain the motions
of the planets in a geocentric universe. But the wave theory
of light at the time seemed to demand such a substance.
After all, light waves must have some medium through
which to propagate, and the concept of an enormously
tenuous yet rigid ether was no more superstitious than
modern physicists' first inklings of antimatter or virtual
photons. A contemporary scientific journal wrote concerning the ether, that "Of its reality most [scientific men] are
as convinced as they are of the existence of the sun and
moon."

After having measured the speed of light, the logical next
step for Michelson was to measure the effects on light caused by motion of the ether. Since the earth orbited the sun at
eighteen miles per second, an ether wind of that velocity
should be streaming through the planet and everything on
it, and should influence the propagation of light waves.

Called the ether-drift, this effect was expected to be
analogous to the behavior of ripples on moving water. The
speed of the wave relative to the medium would remain
constant, but the speed relative to an observer should vary.
The Michelson-Morley experiment in 1887 failed to show
an ether-drift.

As most revolutionaries discover, once the dismantling
of the old order is irreversibly under way, events tend to get
out of hand. Michelson did not set out to disprove the existence of the ether. On the contrary, he wanted to study it.
The negative result was devastating. It threw the theories of
the time into confusion. Though a few scientists seized
upon his results and began restructuring physics, Michelson
and the majority of physicists long held to ideas such as
ether drag by the earth, or the Lorentz contraction of matter in the direction of motion, in order to keep the
necessary ether and still explain the observations.

Michelson's human nature showed itself in other ways,
too. A vigorous proponent of the wave theory of light, he
found it difficult to accept the mounting evidence of the
wave-particle duality of electromagnetic radiation. Once
during a visit to a German university, he realized as he
walked into the dining area that the physics students had
divided into two groups: classicists and relativists. With the
attention of both groups upon him, he walked over and sat
with the classicists.

Still, Michelson was not alone in being unwilling to accept all the conclusions of the new theories. Like Einstein
after him, a few rough theoretical and philosophical edges
did not impair his work or standing. For years he was the
premier maker of ruled glass diffaction gratings in the
world. He also made great advances in interferometry and
furthered its use in many fields. Much in demand as a lecturer and researcher, at his death in 1931 the scientific community mourned the loss of "the Master."

Dorothy Michelson Livingston is by her own admission " not a writer." Yet, in an age when biography is too often
neglected, she has written an informative, readable, and
above all enjoyable book. As the youngest of Michelson's
three daughters by his second marriage, she is in a privileged position to comment on her father. She draws upon her
own memories as well as those of Michelson's associates to
produce a rounded picture of both his personal life as a husband and father, and his academic fife of colleagues,
students, and occasional quarrels. Through the book runs
Michelson's love affair with light, a pursuit he justified to a
friend by explaining "Because it's of much fun."

Perhaps a more fundamental characteristic of Albert
Michelson was revealed in a conversation with his young
daughter, Dorothy. She had innocently asked him why the
sky was blue, and had soon become bored during
Michelson's long and detailed answer. As she sat in his lap,
he gently told her "It doesn't matter if you don't understand it now, as long as your realize the wonder of it."

Reviewed by Robert Schier, Office of Student Affairs, University of California at Irvine Medical Center, Anaheim, California

THE EIGHTH DAY OF CREATION: THE
MAKERS OF THE REVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY, by Horace Freeland Judson, Simon & Schuster, New York,
1979,686 p. $15.95.

In The Silver Chair, Asian, C.S. Lewis' representation of
Christ, said "There are no accidents." By design, then, I
finished S.L. Jaki's The Road of Science and the Ways to
God just before tackling the book under review. Jaki's
book is explicitly about how the great advances in physics
were made by believers, because of their belief; Judson's
can implicitly be read as being about how the great advances made in molecular biology were made by atheists,
because of their atheism. For that reason, and the title, I
suppose a review of it merits inclusion in these pages.

Explicitly, Eighth Day is about the history of the
development of molecular biology. Unlike other treatments
of that subject, which deal mostly with DNA, Judson is
also interested in protein structure and crystallography for
their own sakes, so they, too, are covered.

The book is well written, and attempts to set who did
what, when, in "why and how" context. It is based on a
staggering number of interviews with prominent and nonprominent participants over several years. I found the treatment compelling. The closest comparison I can make is not
Gamow's A Biography of Physics or Watson's The Double
Helix, but reading about, listening to, and watching the
history of Watergate unfold. This, of course, is consistent
with Judson's career as a professional journalist, with the
partial publication of the book in The New Yorker, and
with its length. Eighth Day, because of its perspectives on
the scientists who developed it, belongs in every academic
library, and, for the matter, in public libraries.

Jaki, if I understand him correctly, warns that science, to
be productive, must have a view of nature squarely consistent with Judaeo-Christian tradition. That is, it must
navigate between the Scylla of rationalism and the Charybdis of empiricism, or it develops either elaborate structures
with no relationship to reality, or masses of meaningless
data. The material world exists, but it has a planner back of
it.

Judson's atheists are apparently not as well informed as
were Jaki's empiricists or rationalists. Francis Crick, codiscoverer of the Double Helix, who continues active in the
field, is described as changing from physics to biology
because as an atheist he felt compelled to challenge
vitalism. Jacques Monod, author of Chance and Necessity, an existentialist tract, figures prominently in
Eighth Day, but Max Perutz, who is more than any other person the
source of Eighth Day's material, says of him that he was a
better scientist than philosopher. (See "Tributes to Jacques Monod" Quarterly Review of Biology
55:167-168, 1980)
(Although Judson mentions the anti-religious views of
several prominent scientists of recent times, he does not
mention those of Perutz. This leads me, though lacking
other evidence, to guess that Perutz is a Christian!)

Somebody said that, rather than DNA being the secret of
life, life is the secret of DNA. Even if DNA is the secret of life, Crick's attempt at disposing of vitalism poses no threat
to the believer. Regardless of the late Monod, or anyone
else, we are the products of design, not chance.

It seems appropriate, in closing, to refer to the
remarkable April 26, 1974, issue of Nature, which
celebrates the twenty-first anniversary of the publication of
Watson and Crick's "A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic
Acid." The issue contains nine articles, several of which are
of lasting value. I quote from two, those by Sydney Brenner
and Gunther Stent, both participants in Eighth Day.

Vitalism is dead, says Brenner:

"Much has been written about the philosophical consequences of
molecular biology. I think it is quite clear what the enterprise is
about. We are looking at a rather special part of the physical
universe which contains special mechanisms none of which conflict
at all with the laws of physics. That there would be new laws of
Nature to be found in biological systems was a misjudged view and
that hope or fear has just vanished."

Belief in God is alive, says Stent, who is clearly not
defending Judaeo-Christian traditions:

"And now the announcement of Watson and Crick about DNA.
This is for me the real proof of the existence of God." (Salvador
Dali, 1964)
...
my friend Crick finds Dali's statement a tremendous
joke
...
now that molecular biology has shown how life can be explained in terms of ordinary physics and chemistry, further proof
has been delivered that God designed the world and saw to it that
His plans are comprehensible to man.

Whether the achievements detailed in The Eighth Day of
Creation have delivered a convincing proof of God's existence is a question more controversial than Stent puts it,
I'm sure. Regardless, God is not worried over them, and we
surely have no reason to be. That these achievements, like
many before them, have raised philosophical and
theological questions, is, ultimately, to our good. The Road
of Science remains one of the Ways of God.

This treatise is an extension of an article published in Christianity Today in December of 1976. Its purposee iss t
substantiate further the thesis that the birth of Chri occurred in the year 2/3 B. C. rather than an earlier
date, 5/6even 7 B.C.

As to the evidence from heavenly phenomena which t
place at the birth of Christ, it is recorded that there
triangulation of the planets, Jupiter, Saturn and Mars
the year 7/6 B.C. However, Jupiter and Saturn in
three conjunctions were at least two diameters of the m
away from each other. They could not be imagined as
single "star". There were, however, unusual positionings
placed at 3/2 B.C.

The real star of Bethlehem was probably a morning star
which rose in the East. Christ said of himself, "I am the
root and offspring of David, and the bright and morning
star." (Rev. 22:16) Peter also mentioned that Christ was
symbolically associated with "the day star." (II Pet. 1:19)
Jupiter was known to rise as a morning star in conjunction
with Venus. Later, Mercury left its position with the sun
and came close to Venus. These, and other outstanding
happenings in the heavens would signify to those searching
the stars, an extraordinary event on earth-the birth of a
king.

In relating visible astronomical events with historical
documents, other conclusions can be assumed. The life and
records concerning Herod can be drawn upon. The
slaughter of the innocents and death of Herod, who according to his own wishes was to have the greatest funeral in
history, seem again to point toward the year 2 B.C.

There is also evidence from the Evangelists. Luke
(1:26,36) leads us to believe that John the Baptist was born
March 25, 2 B.C. Then Christ's birth would work out
somewhere near the month of September, 2 B.C. (The time
of census was between August and October).

When the Wise Men came, the child was already living in
a house. Considering corollary events, close calculations
place their visit at December 25, 2 B.C.

The reading of the book itself is intriguing. It explores
the peripheral historical as well as pertinent astronomical
events. It is a well documented and substantiated treatise, so that at the end, the reader is inclined to bow his head and
say, "I believe."

THE MOON: ITS CREATION, FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE,
by J. C. Whitcomb and D.B. De Young,
BMH Books, Winona Lake, 1978.

I would heartily agree with the authors of this book in
their assertion that there is no ultimate contradiction between Scripture and natural science. Yet, I must question
the manner in which they apply this concept in The Moon:
Its Creation, Form, and Significance.

The Moon is written from a strict, recent-creationist
viewpoint, and all relevant issues in the book are seen from
this perspective. It basically expands and extends the works
of other creationists such as The Genesis Flood, by Whitcomb and Morris. As a result, many of this book's
arguments and discussions will be familiar to those who
have studied the question of origins and creation. I personally do not ascribe to Whitcomb and De Young's interpretation of Genesis (particularly Genesis 1), and I feel that
this book has many problems both in its approach and
analysis. For example, many issues that are debatable at
best are treated as if they are totally supportive of the
recent-creation position; the question of moon dust layering and the reversal of the polarity of the Earth's magnetic
fields are two such topics. (These questions, and others
discussed in this book, have been addressed far more successfully in the Journal ASA
and other places.)

Occasionally, Whitcomb and De Young's analysis of a
question is incomplete, such as their discussion of transient
lunar phenomena (TLP). They do not mention the fact that
extensive, close-up lunar surveys have not unambiguously
detected or photographed any TLP. Possibly, TLP are
observing anomalies, not true lunar features. The results of
Apollo, Surveyor, etc., are discussed in detail when they
seem to support recent-creation, but results are ignored
which might refute this position. More important, though,
is the manner in which the authors handle problems in present lunar theory. It is true that all of the present explanations of lunar origin have major flaws. However, this does
not mean that we must accept the authors' interpretation of
the Genesis account. We are looking at a "God of the
gaps" philosophy, in which anything that we can't at present explain with scientific accuracy must therefore have
been accomplished by God in some magical or mysterious
way. The problem with this approach is that when a
satisfactory theory of lunar origin (or other "God of the
gaps" problems) arises, God is somehow relegated to the
background once again. The primary weakness here is that
stating that God indeed caused something, such as in
Genesis, is very different from giving information about the details of the event, which is the purpose of science.

Further, I feel that another weakness in this book is the
inconsistent manner of scriptural interpretation employed.
The authors state, as a principle, that Scripture uses the
language of appearance. Yet, they say it is "obvious" that
Psalm 93:1 is alluding to the immutability of God-ordained
functions. It was not "obvious" at all to Jews and Christians for thousands of years! It was the observations of
science that changed the traditional understanding of this
verse. Here is a clear case where science contributed to a
proper understanding of Scripture. There is no reason why
a similar situation might not exist with conflicts between
the traditional interpretation of Genesis and present scientific discoveries as, to the age of the solar system, origin of
the moon, etc. Throughout the book Whitcomb and De
Young criticize Christian scholars who believe that science
aids us in understanding Scripture. They refer to the
"double-revelationists" and include in their ranks such
scholars as Robert Newman, Bernard Ramm, Richard
Bube, and D. Gareth Jones, who the authors claim to be in
grave error. These men all hold Scripture in the highest
esteem and hold to the historicity and authority of Scripture. They simply contend that valid science is consistent
with accurate interpretation of Scripture. The author's
listing of "double-revelation" vs. "recent-creation"
authors only serves to increase the "us vs. them" attitude
that is so detrimental to the Body of Christ and the search
for understanding.

Finally, the authors contend that a sudden creation of
the universe, man, etc., demonstrates God's power and
wisdom. They imply that there would be no such awe due a
Creator who used natural orders taking long periods of
time. This is a question of perspective, not biblical
theology. To me, a long or natural process of origins in no
way weakens my respect for my Creator any more that my
understanding of the natural process of precipitation does.

Generally, I would not recommend this book alone for a
person seeking to understand lunar origins and functions.
It is, however, a good work for one who is trying to learn
the position of the recent-creationists on this subject. It
would also be a handy reference work for those involved on
either side of the controversy, keeping in mind the extreme
one-sidedness of their presentation and analysis.

Yanovsky's title and stated purpose carve out a huge territory for discussion: to understand and harmonize
medicine, science, religion and art. Just as religion speaks
of eternal life and resurrection, and art the prevention of
the decay of beauty, science attempts reversibility. In
physics, the goal is overcoming entropy; in medicine: well
being, rejuvenation and growth. The first three chapters
discuss anesthesia, "reversibility par excellence;" surgery,
"being irreversible . . . the antagonist of anesthesia;" and
general medicine, "the basis of our profession."

He reflects on the practice of anesthesia, the foibles of
patients and their surgeons, the degeneration of society to
pleasure seeking and pain avoidance, and the pitfalls of
statistics and research. He reminds us of the origin of the
surgeon as a barber, only recently having been accorded the
title doctor or being allowed to "steal the show." He
deplores the trend toward more radical surgeries, noting
that surgery is palliation and should not endanger or
shorten the patient's life. "Playing it safe" by performing
the more radical procedure assumes a degree of knowledge
of risks and consequences which is not even possible.

He relates the philosophy of medicine to his view of the
basic conflict: causality vs. indeterminism. The notion of
cause and effect heralded the beginning of the scientific era
and the demise of metaphysics and the church. But modern
physics renders the deterministic philosophies of classical
astronomy, Darwinism and Marxism naive. The answer
may be on the nuclear level where indeterminism reigns and
freedom of choice is reality. The forces of nature seem to be
imbued with a sense of direction: toward perfection, which overrides even the more rudimentary forces toward survival
and reproduction. The arts, religion, amnesty, and even
gambling all strive toward a reversal to previous perfection.
"Culture is defined by the body of reversible processes
known to a given society." An ideal society would have
privileges of social and biological Teversibility and restoration available to all.

The last chapters explore the implications of the physics
of complementarity and indeterminism. The "old science"
is obsolete. Gravitation is observer and velocity related.
Cause and effect is based on an outmoded view of time. In
thermodynamics, conservation of energy assumes a closed
system and therefore cannot be applied to the universe as a
whole. The notion of entropy contrasts with a universe
characterized by the creation of highly ordered material
structures. Both consciously and unconsciously humanity
challenges irreversibility and disorder.

If our organic and cultural life is only a lately added small appendix to the dying-out universe, it is possible to accept such a point of
view (heat death). But if the organic world and our western civilization, marked miraculously by a concept of love and light, is not a
small added after thought, not a simple episode but an immense, infinite phenomenon, then the entire elaboration of the second law of
thermodynamics appears as a contradiction: A greater part cannot
feed on a smaller!

The classical interpretations of evolution relied primarily
on chance changes in association with the principle of survival of the fittest. Mutual aid and cooperation are also
fundamental and widespread in nature, but the social
sciences reflect on the value of competition rather than
cooperation. The simplest explanation for this constant
direction of life toward complexity, the ultimately human,
and perfection is a universal force.

The most striking but ignored trait of probability is that
it has no reference to the particular case. "Statistics is the
negation of the medical ideal," If biology proceeds at the
molecular level, and if atoms have preference, we must not
41naively" apply probabilities, especially when our information and theories are both incomplete. "To tell a couple
with an abnormal gene that their child has n percent
chances of being a cripple is a crime and/or madness."

The new physics provides a new understanding of the
justification of God, the theodicy, The need to reconcile
the cruelties of the natural order, ornnibenevolence and omnipotence is a prenuclear problem. Love and omnipotence
can be considered complementarily, not simultaneously.
Finally the possibility of breaking the causal chain, giving
good for bad, establishing a new, free, undeterministic
order is apparent. The freedom of the photon and the electron make personal freedom possible.

I found Yanovsky's style exasperating. The cover leaf
states that as a novelist he "has published ten works of fiction to wide critical acclaim." He has organized this book
much like a novel, subdividing each of the chapters into as
many as fourteen divisions. There is little continuity between these small sections, or at times, even within themWhile this may serve the many subplots of a novel, it
guarantees a frustrating lack of continuity and clarity in the
development of Yanovsky's complex arguments. In addition, Yanovsky allows himself great latitude in overstatement and exaggeration. While he occasionally justifies
this, it serves only to emphasize the looseness of his deductive organization.

This is especially apparent in his discussion of probability
and statistics. While probability statements do not admittedly predict the outcome of the individual case, it is not
practical or fair to assume that the individual case is
unrelated to the series of which it is a part. His example of
genetic counselling is indeed a case in point. We are shackled by a lack of predictive tests, especially in the preconception period. But to deny relevant statistical information to prospective parents is unfair and presumptive in
itself.

These criticisms may be minimized if one accepts this
wide ranging, contemplative and theoretical work as a quite
personal, rather than strictly scholarly enterprise. Again according to the cover-leaf, Yanovsky was born in Russia in
1906, obtained his medical degree from the Sorbonne in
1937, and trained in anesthesiology in New York, where he
practiced and wrote. Yanovsky's frustrations as a theist in
the secular medical and scientific world are very familiar.
While stopping short of calling for a transcendent reality,
he argues strongly that the most important and fundamental human characteristics cannot be ignored on the
presumption of an arrogant, narrow and now dismembered
determinism. The notion that consciousness and free will
may be rooted in the fundamental properties of the
material of the universe is not new, and contrasts with
metaphysical dualism as most recently argued by Popper
and Eccles. But Yanovsky's restatement of the case and of
its implications in terms of medical practice and science is
stimulating and welcomed. His reflections on medical
philosophy and practice, and his unique parallel interpretations of culture, the arts and theology provide many interesting personal insights.

At the Lausanne Congress for World Evangelism in
1974, a covenant signed by thousands of Christians from all
parts of the world stated, in part:

All of us are shocked by the poverty of millions and disturbed by the
injustices which cause it. Those of us who five in affluent circumstances accept our duty to develop a simple lifestyle in order to
contribute generously to both relief and evangelism.

John Stott later proposed an international Consultation on Simple Lifestyle to be held in London in March 1980.
Ronald Sider convened the U.S. Consultation on Simple
Lifestyle in April 1979, in order to collect, study, and
publish personal examples and practical models for individuals, families, professional persons, and churches to
live more simply. This book is a collection of the 27 papers
presented at the U.S. Consultation.

Frank Gaebelein, in discussing the Old Testament foundations for living more simply, concludes that while the Old
Testament does not specify what our lifestyle should be, it
does give us principles by which we can measure it. He also
emphasizes the difference between God's ownership of
everything we have and our stewardship of it, citing Deut.
8:17-18 as a precaution. New Testament foundations for
living more simply were discussed by Peter Davids, who
pointed out that the Holy Spirit produced evangelism,
miracles, and sharing of goods by a change from within,
and not from a legalism, guilt trip, or ideology imposed
from without. Jesus was an example of how to trust God,
instead of earthly treasures, for our daily needs. Paul is
cited as an example of one who neither glorified poverty
nor abstained from "abounding." Yet, he had no attachments to such comforts and was suspicious of wealth
unless it was used for good works.

Ron Sider makes a common mistake of comparing only
the annual incomes of the average person in India with
U. S. middle-class people without also considering the great
differences in living costs necessary to live at the same level.
This omission is unnecessary because significant differences
in economic states can still be established when making a
proper comparison.

Most of the examples do not demonstrate the "proper
motivation" of the consultation, i.e., of living simply in
order to contribute generously to relief and evangelism.
The family examples are concerned mainly with living more
simply as a way to avoid "the idolatry of materialism,"
participate in small-group communal living, avoid tax payment to support war, or retreat from an increasingly hectic,
consumption-oriented technological society. However,
most of these examples are valuable because of their good,
ecologically sound consumer economics, which many of us
had to practice while growing up during the depression and
drought of the 1930's. Many of us still drive smaller cars,
drive less, recycle materials, and lower our thermostats in
winter, but are now motivated to be living examples of
good Christian stewardship with an ecologically sound
lifestyle. This, too, needs to be more widespread in our
Christian witness.

Most of the families seem to identify with the poor by
joining them rather than maintaining existing income levels
and using the "surplus" created by the simpler lifestyle to
help the poor as called for by the Lausanne Covenant.
Walter and Virginia Hearn present 10 arguments for voluntary poverty as a radical Christian way of life. Their account of why Walter left biomedical research for a new
career in full-time writing and evangelism is also a good
model for others who may be considering a change from
their present career. They also caution against reverse snobbery.

One of the best examples of church response to the
Lausanne Covenant was a church in Wichita, Kans., which
reduced its $525,000 construction program to $180,000 and
built 26 churches and 28 pastors' homes in Guatemala with
the difference. With the exception of the National
Presbyterian Church (Washington, D.C.) which sent half
of its Hunger Covenant money to a village in India, the
other churches were mainly examples of closer fellowship
and greater mutual support within their own congregations
and communities. They were of little help to the needy in
other nations.

The section on professionals exemplifying the Lausanne
Covenant is probably the best. Howard Dahl used his professional expertise to develop a small, low-cost tractor for
poor nations. David Pullen, a lawyer, maintains just
enough paying practice to live simply and donates the rest
of his time to a legal clinic for the poor. Dennis Wood, with
degrees in law and international development, uses his
talents to help the poor by consulting on U.S.-aid programs
to poor nations.

Gladys Hunt's careful, balanced analysis of evangelism
and simple lifestyle was very good. She cautions against
legalism (that leads to pride), faddism, and "group-think
subcultures" that miss the Christian purpose of simple
lifestyles. She believes in a primary commitment to the
Lord, not to a simple lifestyle, even though our walk as
Christians involves a new lifestyle. She also states that churches should be looking for missionaries to support rather
than have missionaries spend so much time and energy raising their own funds.

In summary, this book has something for everybody.
Although few of the accounts exemplify the Lausanne
Covenant, the many examples of ecologically sound,
common-sense consumer practices will be welcomed by
many Christians. By adopting these practices and maintaining our current incomes, much more money is made
available to others who desperately need our help. This
book should be read and seriously considered by every
Christian.

In this second issue interesting first-hand reports are
given on "Reactions to Creationism in Iowa" by Stanley L.
Weinberg and on "The New York Creation' Battle" by
David Kraus. Even though intense legislative initiatives by
creationists have failed in various states, community
pressure has suppressed the teaching of evolution in about
half the high schools in this country. After analyzing the
Iowa Creation Bills (various two-model approaches) and
the National Impact, Dr. Weinberg, a college science teacher, recommends what scientists can do most effectively to defend evolution by educating the public and becoming involved in political activity. Local scientists need to be
persistent in writing letters and articles to their newspapers,
appearing on talk shows, addressing local groups, and submitting to interviews. Weinberg encourages evolutionists to
carry out locally the same kind of political activities that
creationists; use, but he emphasizes activity by concerned individuals and ad hoc groups. If other scientists correspond
with him in care of this new journal, he offers to send
names of concerned scientists in their states and to help
autonomous groups to organize. He recommends communication among the states through existing newsletters
and journals.

Kraus, a "re-treaded" high school science teacher,
reports on the efforts of a federation of the nine science
teachers' organizations in New York City to educate the
public and members of the state legislature of the need to
keep non-science out of science and to separate religion
from government (by omitting the proposed two-model approach from the new state biology syllabus). In spite of
these successes, this Journal reports a possible future threat
in the form of President Reagan's statement when he was a
candidate: "Reagan Favors Creationism in the Public
Schools." Candidate Reagan questioned the scientific
validity of evolution and favored "the teaching of the
biblical version of the origin of human life in public schools
if the theory of evolution is to be taught" (the two-model
approach).

Consulting Editor Chris Weber answers "Common Creationist Attacks on Geology" in a lively question/answer
format. He meets head on the arguments relating to fossilization, sedimentary facies, and overthrusts, arguing that
creationists have misunderstood, misinterpreted, or quoted
the literature out of context.

Robert Price shows how Philip Gosse's hypothesis of apparent age underlies much of the polemic of creationists in
"The Return of the Navel, the 'Omphalos' Argument in
Contemporary Creationism." He has an M.T.S. in New
Testament studies, teaches college ethics and philosophy,
and is working on a Ph.D. in systematic theology. He examines creationist polemical literature to indicate the unacknowledged debt of "scientific" creationists to Gosse's
hypothesis. Examples given are creationist views on (1)
astronomy and its implications for the age of the universe,
(2) the geographical distribution of animals, such as marsupials isolated in Australia, (3) comparative anatomy and
physiology, and (4) human evolution. Price shows how
Henry Morris admits the evolutionist's criterion of environmental "fitness" i.e., "recognizes the validity of the
processes of evolution," but then appeals to the prescientific notion of teleology. Morris grants that creatures are
fitted to survive in certain environments, because God arbitrarily wanted it that way (fiat). Transitional forms are
discounted by creationists, because these life forms were independent and just happen to look like they fall somewhere
between monkey and man, between bird and reptile. Price hastens to point out that creationists do not explain the rationale of the omphalos argument as Gosse did, since thcy
may not be aware of it themselves. But their "implicit logic is the same-the evidence points in the direction of evolution, but that is because (for whatever reason) God simply
wanted it that way. This is a throwback, not only to Gosse's
esoteric argument, but also to the pre-scientific shrugging
off of such questions by the catch-all appeal to teleology,"
which is inimical to scientific inquiry. Price then shows how
the "scientific" creation model falls short of being scientific in three ways and concludes that it is religious propaganda, not scientific theory.

Stanley Freske, an industrial R & D physicist, presents
four lines of "Evidence Supporting a Great Age for the
Universe:" the size and outward radial velocity of the expanding gas clouds of supernovae; the uneven distribution
of main-sequence star types in star clusters is a function of
age measured in billions of years; the speed of light independent of the motion of the source, enabling us to see
stars many light years away as they appeared millions of
years ago; the uneven distribution of nuclides, 40 with halflives between 1,000 and 50 million years are missing (10,000
years is not enough time for them to decay totally). All 17
nuclides with half-lives longer than 50 million years are found in nature. The probability of the earth being only
10,000 years old is calculated to be 7 x 10-11, the probability
of the 40 short-lived nuclides being absent and the 17 longlived ones being present, as opposed to some random
distribution between absence and presence which would
then be possible. The first three arguments do not in any
way depend on evolutionary theory for their validity, but
are based upon direct observations. At least the first two
arguments give strong support to the theory of stellar
evolution.

Frank Awbrey, biology professor, presents "Evidence of
the Quality of Creation Science Research" in four radio
transcripts by the Institute for Creation Research on the
weekly radio program, "Science, Scripture, and
Salvation." Point-by-point he shows how statements made
are inconsistent with the published data on immunological
distances between humans and other primates. "Other
statements demonstrated a gross misunderstanding" of
genetic terms . . . unscholarly superficiality and errors. "It
certainly does not lend any credibility to the creationist
claim that the scientific literature is 'chock full of evidence
for creation."'

"Another Favorite Creationist Argument: 'The Genes
For Homologous Structures Are Not Homologous" is
discussed by genetics professor William Thwaites. A nonparadoxical explanation based upon suppressor genes is
given to counter this argument.

Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-born,
German-educated chemist and X-ray crystallographer who,
after moving to England, studied the philosophy of science.
A confessing Christian, Polanyi noted various parallels between his philosophy and orthodox Christian theology. In
this volume, a collection of essays presented at a 1978 conference on Polanyi's thought, various of these parallels are
noted and developed.

There are six contributors: one Reformed and five Anglican theologians. Three of the contributors are also practicing scientists.

Included are discussions and theological applications of
such Polanyian concepts as indwelling, conversion, intuition, focal and subsidiary awareness, and hierarchical
analysis of reality. These concepts are then applied to
analyze the rationality of Christian faith, the Church's
understanding of scriptural revelation, conversion and
penitence, the nature of the "person", Christology, and
providence and prayer.

The book's dust jacket describes it as "designed for a
wider public untrained in theology or science who seek a
deeper understanding of the Christian faith." However,
both the book's price and use of technical philosophical
vocabulary move it beyond the reach of both student budgets and a "wider public" untrained in critical philosophical analysis. Also, in discussing the rationality of
Christian faith the authors use closely detailed philosophical and theological discussion in contrast to a rational
but intuitive and experiential apologetic which might appeal to the "wider public", e.g. C.S. Lewis'
Mere Christianity.

In a positive light this book serves as a good introduction
to Michael Polanyi's thought and its application. I recommend it especially to those scientists, theologians, philosophers, and laymen interested in the relationships of science
and theology and the rational basis for Christian belief.
Certainly, most of the readership of Journal ASA will find
this book of interest.

Also, there is a glossary of Polanyi's philosophical terminology which partially clarifies the densities of the
book's more complex or prolix passages -for the lay reader.