The Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Association, hereinafter referred to as the
Association, and
Milwaukee County, hereinafter referred to as the County or the Employer, were parties to a
collective
bargaining agreement which provided for final and binding arbitration of all disputes arising
thereunder. The Association made a request, with the concurrence of the County, that the
Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission designate a member of its staff to hear and decide the
appeal
of Sergeant Fatrena Hale's suspension. The undersigned was so designated. A hearing was
held in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin on September 8, 2011. The hearing was not transcribed. The
parties filed
briefs whereupon the record was closed October 10, 2011. Having considered the evidence,
the
arguments of the parties and the record as a whole, the undersigned issues the following
Award.

7775

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ISSUE

The parties stipulated to the following issue:

Was there just cause for suspending Sergeant Fatrena Hale for five days? If not,
what
is the appropriate remedy?

BACKGROUND

The County operates a Sheriff's Department and a jail. The Association is the
exclusive collective
bargaining representative for the deputy sheriffs and sergeants who work at the jail.

Sergeant Fatrena Hale has been with the Department for 23 years. She was promoted
to the rank of
sergeant in 2006. She has worked in the jail for years. Before the incident involved herein,
Hale had never
been suspended. Additionally, she has not been previously disciplined for insubordination.
She received
a written warning 12 years ago for reasons not identified in the record.

. . .

Jail deputies and corrections officers deal with unruly inmates at the jail on a regular
basis. When
that happens, the deputies and corrections officers follow specific procedures to obtain
compliance from the
unruly inmates. Deputies and corrections officers can use force to obtain compliance from
unruly inmates,
but when they do so, they are not to use excessive force. After employees use force, they
are to report it to
their supervisor. First, they report it verbally. After that, they submit a written report
wherein they explain
what they did and why it was necessary.

The reports just referenced are part of the materials included in a use of force packet.
The number
of documents in that packet varies depending on the specific facts of the incident, but usually
contains the
following: (1) an initial report completed by one of the officers or deputies who was present
at the scene;
(2) supplemental reports completed by all department personnel who were on the scene; (3) a
use of force
summary completed by all department personnel who used force on the inmate; (4) a use of
force summary
completed by each inmate against whom force was used; and (5) a major incident report filed
by the
supervisor on the scene.

The last report just referenced (i.e. item #5 above ­ the major incident report)
has to be completed
by the supervisor before he/she leaves his/her shift. The other reports referenced above do
not usually have
to be completed that quickly. The normal time frame for submitting a completed use of
force packet is this:
it is to be submitted to the deputy inspector in 7 days

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and the Internal Affairs Department in 14 days. Supervisors can shorten this time
frame (for submitting a
completed use of force packet) if they wish.

FACTS

On October 20, 2010, some corrections officers used force in dealing with inmate
Michael Roman.
The next day (October 21), Roman complained to the jail's management that he had been
"roughed up" by
the corrections officers and that the corrections officers had used excessive force on him.
The second shift
commander (Captain McKenzie) assigned Sgt. Hale to investigate Roman's charge and
prepare a use of
force packet. After being given this task, Hale started working on it. While Hale was
working on the
Roman use of force packet, her attention was diverted to another matter involving inmate
Robert Tatum.

Here's what happened in that matter. About 8:30 p.m., Hale decided that inmate
Tatum needed to
be moved from his cell to the discipline pod. Hale and several officers tried to get Tatum to
go with them
voluntarily, but he did not cooperate with them and refused to leave his cell. An officer
tried to use a taser
on Tatum, but could not do so because Tatum used his mattress as a shield. Based on
Tatum's level of
resistance, Hale authorized the use of OC spray (which is essentially pepper spray) on
Tatum. After Tatum
was sprayed, he capitulated, and officers placed him in RIPP restraints (which bind one's
hands at the waist).
Sgt. Hale and two officers then escorted Tatum to the elevator. While they were in the
elevator, Tatum again
resisted the officers. One of the officers responded to Tatum's resistance by delivering a
focused strike with
his right forearm/elbow to the back of Tatum's neck/head. The officers took Tatum to the
floor to regain
control over him. As this was happening, Hale put out an "all call" (which is a call for
emergency
assistance). Multiple corrections officers and deputies responded to the scene. Those
officers/deputies
relieved the officers/deputies who had used force on Tatum in the elevator. Tatum had
visible injuries from
the officers' use of force. He was subsequently treated by the jail's medical staff.

One of those who responded to the "all call" was the second shift commander,
Captain McKenzie.
After Hale briefed McKenzie on the incident, McKenzie told Hale to take pictures of Tatum
and do all the
applicable paperwork for a use of force packet.

In accordance with the department's procedure, Captain McKenzie then briefed her
supervisor
(Deputy Inspector Nyklewicz) on the Tatum incident.

About 9:15 p.m., which was a half hour after the Tatum incident occurred, Hale and
McKenzie talked
on the phone. Three things were discussed in that phone call. First, Hale told McKenzie
she (Hale) was
going on vacation the next day for a week. McKenzie responded that she was going on
vacation the next
day too. Second, Hale told McKenzie that she (Hale) was working on the Roman use of
force packet.
McKenzie told Hale that since she (Hale) was going on vacation the next day, she (Hale) was
required to
stay on duty until the Roman use of force packet was finished. Third, McKenzie also told
Hale that since
she (Hale)

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was going on vacation the next day, she (Hale) was required to stay on duty until all
the officers' reports for
the Tatum use of force packet were finished. McKenzie further told Hale to submit her
major incident report
(on the Tatum matter) to Captain Jonas and the officers' reports (on the Tatum matter) to
Captain Jaskulski
before she left the building. The conversation ended with McKenzie saying "make sure all
these reports are
done" before you go on vacation, with Hale responding "okay". Hale did not ask for
clarification of
McKenzie's orders or ask any follow-up questions. Hale also did not ask for additional time
to submit both
packets.

Hale's shift was supposed to end at 10:00 p.m., but she stayed five hours longer and
worked on the
paperwork for the two use of force packets. When she left work at 3:00 a.m., the Roman
use of force packet
was finished but the Tatum use of force packet was not. While Hale completed the major
incident report
for the Tatum packet, the remainder of that report was not finished. The remainder of the
reports which were
to be included in the Tatum use of force packet were to be completed by the other officers
who were on-site
when the incident occurred.

The next morning, Deputy Inspector Nyklewicz arrived at work and wanted to review
the Tatum use
of force packet. When he found out that it was not finished and submitted, he was ticked
off.

Nyklewicz then called Captain McKenzie at her home and voiced his displeasure over
the fact that
the Tatum use of force packet was not finished. McKenzie told Nyklewicz that when she
had talked to Hale
at 9:15 p.m. the night before, she gave Hale a direct order to get the Tatum packet finished
before she left
work. McKenzie opined that since the Tatum packet was not finished, Hale had not
complied with her
order.

Nyklewicz and Inspector Schmidt then called Hale at home. At the time, Hale was
on her first day
of vacation. Nyklewicz told Hale he wanted the Tatum use of force packet finished that day.
He then
ordered Hale to come into work to finish the Tatum packet.

Hale complied with Nyklewicz's order. She went into work and finished the Tatum
use of force
packet.

All of the other officers involved in the Tatum matter were also directed to come into
work to do
their respective portions of the Tatum packet. It can be inferred from the record that, like
Hale, they were
all off duty at the time. Nevertheless, they all came into work and finished their (respective)
portions of the
Tatum use of force packet.

That day, after all of the reports for the Tatum use of force packet were compiled
from everyone who
was involved, the completed Tatum use of force packet was submitted to Deputy Inspector
Nyklewicz.

. . .

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McKenzie and Hale were subsequently interviewed about the above-referenced matter
by Captain
James Cox of the Internal Affairs Division.

In her interview with Internal Affairs, McKenzie said that when she talked with Hale
on October 21
at 9:15 p.m., she gave Hale an order to collect all the reports for the Tatum use of force
packet by the time
she left the building (since she was beginning vacation the next day). According to
McKenzie, she made
it clear to Hale that she was required to complete the Tatum use of force packet prior to
going on vacation.

In her interview with Internal Affairs, Hale said that at the end of their phone call on
October 21,
McKenzie told her to "make sure all these reports are done." Hale stated that when
McKenzie gave her the
directive to complete "these reports", she (Hale) thought that McKenzie was referring to the
Roman use of
force reports ­ not the Tatum use of force reports. Hale acknowledged that she should
have asked McKenzie
which incident she (McKenzie) was referencing when she said "these reports".

Cox subsequently wrote a report known as an "Investigative Summary". In that
report, Cox
concluded thus:

Sergeant Hale may have been confused by the dual tasks she was required to
complete. As
she noted in her internal interview, it is her responsibility to follow-up regarding any unsure
order from her direct supervision.

Based on that conclusion, Cox found that Hale committed a departmental rule violation
and two county civil
service rule violations. The departmental rule Hale was accused of violating was 202.06
(Insubordination).
It provides thus:

202.06 Insubordination

202.06.1 Purpose

The purpose of this policy is to ensure that officers understand the necessity to
maintain basic
standards of courtesy, respect, and bearing that reflect a strong degree of discipline and the
adherence to a rank structure. Law enforcement, being a quasi-military operation is based
on a strict ranking structure, which must be adhered to at every level of the organization.
When routinely practiced, these courtesies have the effect of enhancing esprit de corps,
agency discipline, and support a chain of command structure that functions well in types of
highly charged, stress-filled situations that occur in the execution of our duties.

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202.06.2 Policy

It is the policy of the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) that all employees
exhibit
a high level of respect and courtesy toward supervisors.

Supervisors shall be addressed by their rank and last name, or by such titles as "sir"
or
"ma'am". Officers shall be addressed by their rank or rank and last name, to wit:

. . .

Members of the agency shall obey any lawful order of a superior officer.

The following are examples of insubordination. This list is intended to serve as a
guide to general conduct, and is not intended to be inclusive:

Refusing to obey a proper written order from a
supervisor

Refusing to obey a proper verbal order from a supervisor

Using profane or insulting language to a supervisor

Failing to remain attentive, or openly displaying a
mocking attitude, during
a period of instruction or counseling by a higher ranking officer, or by a
member of the MCSO Training Academy staff

The County civil service rules Hale was accused of violating were subparagraphs (k)
and (l) of Rule
VII, Section 4(l). Subparagraph (k) prohibits "Refusing or failing to obey orders of
supervisors
whether written or oral", and subparagraph (l) prohibits "Refusal or failure to comply with
departmental work rules, policies or procedures."

Captain Cox's findings were subsequently reviewed by the Sheriff. On April 28,
2011,
Sheriff David Clarke issued Order No. 2167 which indicated that Sergeant Hale was
suspended for
five days for violating the three rules just referenced. Attached to Order No. 2167 was a
"Notice of
Suspension". The wording in the "Notice of Suspension" was verbatim to that contained in
Captain
Cox's "Investigative Summary". As a result, it is apparent that the Sheriff adopted Captain
Cox's
findings as his own and disciplined Hale for the reasons set forth in Cox's "Investigative
Summary".

Based on the parties' collective bargaining agreement, Hale's suspension was
appealed
to
arbitration.

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POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

Association

The Association's position is that just cause did not exist for Sergeant Hale's five-day
suspension. The Association asks that the discipline be rescinded or reduced. It elaborates
as
follows:

The Association emphasizes at the outset that on the night in question, Hale stayed
five hours
after her shift ended and worked on the following reports. First, she finished Roman's use
of force
packet. Second, she did the major incident report which was part of Tatum's use of force
packet.
The Association asserts that, at the time, Hale thought she had completed the reports that
McKenzie
wanted her to complete that night. Said another way, Hale thought that she had followed
through
with the items that McKenzie wanted finished that night. However, the next day ­
when she was
on vacation ­ she learned otherwise. She learned it, of course, when Deputy Inspector
Nyklewicz
called her at home. The Association points out that after Nyklewicz directed Hale to come
into work
to finish Tatum's packet, she did as directed. Specifically she dropped what she was doing,
came
into work and finished Tatum's packet. The Association implies that that was significant.

The Association argues that Hale's failure to finish Tatum's use of force packet the
night
before was not workplace misconduct as the Employer asserts, and certainly was not
insubordination.
Here's why. The Association submits that Hale did not intentionally disobey a clear work
order.
Instead, Hale simply did not understand that McKenzie wanted her to finish Tatum's use of
force
packet that night. According to the Association, McKenzie's order regarding same was not
clear.

The Association expounds on the last point just referenced as follows. First, the
Association
asserts that when Hale and McKenzie talked on the phone at 9:15 p.m., that conversation
was
focused on inmate Roman ­ not inmate Tatum. Second, building on that premise, the
Association
notes that in that phone call McKenzie told Hale to "make sure all these reports are done."
In the
Association's view, that phrase was general in nature and therefore subject to interpretation.
Thus,
when McKenzie made the statement to "make sure all these reports are done", Hale
reasonably
thought McKenzie was only referring to inmate Roman's use of force packet ­ not
Tatum's use of
force packet. Third, the Association maintains that if McKenzie wanted both Roman's and
Tatum's
packets finished before Hale left work, she (McKenzie) should have been clearer (than she
was) in
the order she gave to Hale. Fourth, making a technical argument, the Association quotes
from the
Employer's own insubordination policy wherein it defines insubordination as "refusing to
obey a
proper verbal order from a supervisor." As the Association sees it, an unclear order cannot
be a
"proper order" within the meaning of that policy. Putting all of the foregoing points
together, the
Association believes this case boils down to whether McKenzie gave Hale a clear order to
finish
Tatum's use of force packet before she left work that night. According to the Association,
McKenzie
did not give Hale a clear order to that effect, so if anyone made a

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MA-15045

mistake here, it was McKenzie ­ not Hale. The Association asserts that, at
worst, Hale simply
misunderstood an unclear order, so she did not violate the Department's insubordination
policy.

The Association argues in the alternative that even if Hale did commit workplace
misconduct
when she failed to complete Tatum's packet that night, there still was not just cause for the
level of
discipline imposed on her. Here's why. First, the Association notes that prior to this case,
Hale had
not previously been suspended. The Association contends that under these circumstances, a
five-day
suspension was excessive. Second, the Association essentially makes a burden of proof
argument,
and contends that the Employer did not prove that a five-day suspension was warranted
(given Hale's
relatively clean disciplinary history). Accordingly, the Association asks the arbitrator to
either
rescind Hale's punishment in its entirety or reduce it to a written warning.

County

The County's position is that just cause existed for Hale's five day suspension.
According
to the County, Hale committed workplace misconduct (specifically insubordination) when she
failed
to complete an assigned task, namely the Tatum use of force packet. As the County sees it,
that
misconduct warranted the discipline imposed. It elaborates as follows.

The County begins by reviewing the following facts to give context to what
happened.
First,
it notes that on October 21, 2010, Hale was assigned the job of completing a use of force
packet for
inmate Roman. Second, later that same day, the Tatum use of force incident occurred.
After it
occurred, Captain McKenzie directed Hale to complete a use of force packet for inmate
Tatum.
Third, shortly thereafter, Hale and McKenzie talked on the phone. In that phone call, Hale
told
McKenzie that she (Hale) was starting her vacation the next day. In response to that
information,
McKenzie told Hale that she (Hale) needed to complete both Tatum's and Roman's use of
force
packets before she left the building that night. Hale responded to this directive by saying
"okay".
Hale did not ask for clarification of McKenzie's order or ask any follow-up questions.

Focusing particular attention to what happened in their 9:15 p.m. phone call, the
Employer
emphasizes that McKenzie gave Hale an order to complete both Roman's and Tatum's use of
force
packets by the time Hale left the building that night. The Employer avers that that was a
legitimate
order. According to the Employer, it doesn't matter that the usual time period for submitting
a
completed use of force packet is normally longer than that. In this instance, McKenzie
wanted the
two packets completed before Hale went on vacation. As the Employer sees it, that's
understandable. In accordance with the Employer's paramilitary structure, Hale should have
done
what McKenzie directed her to do and completed both Roman's and Tatum's use of force
packets
that night. The Employer acknowledges that Hale completed the former before she left the
building
that night. However, Hale failed to complete the latter before she left work that night.

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The Employer contends that Hale did not offer a legitimate reason for not completing
Tatum's packet that night. Addressing Hale's assertion that she thought McKenzie was only
directing her to complete Roman's use of force packet that night, the Employer avers that
that
assertion lacks a legitimate basis in fact. The Employer notes in this regard that the Tatum
incident
had just occurred, so it's logical that McKenzie would have talked to Hale about it. Also,
the
Employer submits that if Hale found McKenzie's order confusing, she (Hale) should have
asked for
clarification. She did not. Finally, the Employer maintains that Hale damaged her own
credibility
at the hearing when she "danced around the significance of the incident by saying it is a
common
occurrence and thus, not serious." The Employer submits that what happened to Tatum was
serious.

Turning to the level of discipline which was imposed, the Employer argues that a
five-day
suspension was reasonable under the circumstances. It acknowledges that prior to this case,
Hale
had not been previously suspended. Be that as it may, the Sheriff decided that a five-day
suspension
was warranted. The County requests that the arbitrator give
deferenceto the discipline imposed by
the Sheriff, and uphold Hale's five-day suspension.

DISCUSSION

The parties stipulated that the issue to be decided here is whether there was just cause
to
suspend Sergeant Hale for five days. My answer to that question is split as follows. I find
that the
Employer did have just cause to discipline Hale for failing to complete the Tatum use of
force packet
before she left work on the night in question. However, I further find that a five-day
suspension was
not warranted under the circumstances and I reduce the discipline for that misconduct to a
written
warning. My rationale follows.

The threshold question is what standard or criteria is going to be used to determine
just cause.
The phrase "just cause" is not defined in the collective bargaining agreement, nor is there
contract
language therein which identifies what the Employer must show to justify the discipline
imposed.
Given that contractual silence, those decisions have been left to the arbitrator. Arbitrators
differ on
their manner of analyzing just cause. While there are many formulations of "just cause",
one
commonly accepted approach consists of addressing these two elements: first, did the
employer
prove the employee's misconduct, and second, assuming the showing of wrongdoing is made,
did
the employer establish that the discipline which it imposed was justified under all the relevant
facts
and circumstances. That's the approach I'm going to apply here.

As just noted, the first part of the just cause analysis being used here requires a
determination
of whether the employer proved the employee's misconduct. Attention is now turned to
making that
call.

I've decided to begin my discussion on this point by noting that on the night in
question, Hale
did not leave work at the regular time. Instead, she stayed five hours after her

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MA-15045

shift ended and worked on various reports. Subjectively speaking, five hours is a long
time. In that
time period she finished the Roman use of force packet. This case is not about the work
Hale
finished on the night in question though. Rather, it's about the work that she did not finish
that
night, namely the Tatum use of force packet.

Hale's defense for not completing Tatum's packet that night is essentially that she
didn't
know she was supposed to do so (i.e. finish that packet before she left work). She thought
that she
only had to complete the Roman packet that night.

I find otherwise for the following reasons. First, it is noted that when Captain
McKenzie
responded to the "all call" concerning Tatum, she (McKenzie) told Hale afterwards to do all
the
applicable paperwork for a use of force packet. That directive clearly put Hale on notice
that she was
to complete Tatum's use of force packet. Second, the only question which was not addressed
at that
time was the timetable for completing the packet. The record indicates that the normal time
frame
for submitting a completed use of force packet to the deputy inspector is seven days. Third,
if Hale
thought she had the normal time period to complete Tatum's use of force packet, McKenzie
disabused her of that notion when they talked on the phone at 9:15 p.m. that night. Here's
why. At
the beginning of that call, Hale told McKenzie that she (Hale) was starting her vacation the
next day.
When McKenzie learned that, she (McKenzie) decided that she did not want either the
Roman
packet or the Tatum packet to be completed after Hale returned from vacation. Instead, she
(McKenzie) wanted both completed before Hale went on vacation. As a supervisor,
McKenzie was
entitled to make that decision and shorten the time frame for completing those packets.
McKenzie
then told Hale she (Hale) was to stay on duty until both the Roman and Tatum use of force
packets
were finished.

For whatever reason, that's not what Hale thought she heard. Hale thought that
McKenzie
directed her to complete just the Roman packet that night. To support her interpretation,
Hale relies
on the fact that at the end of the phone call, McKenzie told her (Hale) to "make sure all
these reports
are done" before you leave. Hale contends that she reasonably interpreted this statement to
just apply
to the Roman packet ­ not the Tatum packet. I could accept that interpretation if
nothing else had
been said in the phone call about the Tatum packet. However, that was not the case. What
McKenzie had just said ­ prior to making that statement ­ was for Hale to
submit her major incident
report (on the Tatum matter) to Captain Jonas and the officers' reports (on the Tatum matter)
to
Captain Jaskulski before she left the building. In my view, those very specific directives
concerning
the Tatum matter should have made it clear to Hale that when McKenzie said "make sure all
these
reports are done" before you leave, McKenzie was not referring to just the Roman packet;
she was
referring to both the Roman and Tatum packets.

Even if I'm just plain wrong about the foregoing, and McKenzie gave Hale a
vague/ambiguous order or one that Hale did not understand, the ball was then in Hale's
court, so to
speak. There were a number of things that Hale could have said in response. For example,
she could
have asked for clarification of the order, or asked some follow up

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questions, or she could have said that she couldn't complete them that night and needed
more time
to complete them. At that point, she could have discussed alternative arrangements with
McKenzie.
However, Hale didn't say any of those things and instead responded to McKenzie's order by
simply
saying "okay". Not surprisingly, that response led McKenzie to believe that Hale understood
that
she had been directed to complete the Roman and Tatum packets before she left work, and
that she
would stay at work until they were finished.

The next question to be answered is whether Hale's failure to finish the Tatum packet
that
night warranted discipline. I find that it did for the following reasons. Employers have a
legitimate
and justifiable interest in ensuring that employees follow directives from their supervisors.
Building
on that premise, it's a generally-accepted principle in the workplace that when a supervisor
gives an
order to a subordinate, or tells an employee to do something, the employee is supposed to
comply
with the order and do what they are told. That's how work gets done in the workplace. To
effectuate
that goal, the County has adopted a civil service rule which prohibits "failure to obey orders
of
supervisors" and why the Sheriff's Department has adopted a work rule which prohibits
"insubordination". While there are many different types and forms of insubordination, it
suffices
to say here that failing to perform an assigned task qualifies as insubordination. As the
County sees
it, Hale's failure to complete the Tatum packet that night fits into both categories of
prohibited
behavior. I concur, and find that Hale should have done what she was directed to do and
finished
both the Roman and Tatum packets before she left work that night. Her failure to finish the
Tatum
packet that night constituted workplace misconduct for which she could be disciplined.

Next, rhetorically speaking, what's to be made of the fact that Hale came into work
the next
day and finished the Tatum packet? Simply put, hardly anything. The fact that she did so
did not
wipe the proverbial slate clean, meaning it did not somehow erase her misconduct (i.e. her
failure
to complete the Tatum packet before she left work). Moreover, it can't be overlooked that
the reason
Hale came into work the next day (on her vacation day) and finished the Tatum packet is
because
Deputy Inspector Nyklewicz specifically directed her to do so.

Having so found, the focus now turns to the second part of the just cause analysis
being used
here (namely, that the employer establish that the penalty imposed was appropriate under all
the
relevant facts and circumstances).

When employers decide that an employee's misconduct warrants a suspension of
some
sort,
they usually start with a relatively short suspension of, say one or two days. That didn't
happen here.
Instead, the Sheriff decided that a suspension of that length was not long enough, and he
imposed
a five-day suspension. At issue here is whether that decision passes muster.

In addressing that point, I've decided to begin by noting that the undersigned has
arbitrated
many suspension appeal cases with these parties over the years. In those hearings, what
usually
happened was that one side or the other offered some evidence to support their

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position that the discipline which the Employer imposed on the employee involved was
either
consistent with, or inconsistent with, the discipline imposed on similarly situated employees.

In this case, that lack of evidence cuts against the Employer. Here's why. When the
Employer imposes a multi-day suspension, it has to base the length of the suspension on
some
objective factors which can withstand arbitral scrutiny. Said another way, the Employer has
the
burden of showing that the punishment it meted out was not excessive. I find it did not meet
that
burden for the following reasons. First, the objective facts in the record show that Hale is a
long
term employee with no prior suspensions and a clean work record (but for a 12 year old
written
warning). Additionally, she has no history of insubordination or failing to complete assigned
tasks.
These objective facts militate against a five day suspension for the misconduct involved here.
Second, as previously noted, the Employer did not show that Hale's misconduct was similar
to other
serious misconduct cases where a multi-day suspension was imposed. Given the foregoing, I
find
that a five day suspension was excessive under the circumstances. Accordingly, I reduce
Hale's
discipline from a five day suspension to a written warning. The Employer shall make Hale
whole
for the five days she was suspended.

Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, the undersigned enters the
following

AWARD

1. That there was just cause to discipline Sergeant Hale for failing to complete
the
Tatum use of force packet before she left work on the night in question; and

2. That just cause does not support a five day suspension for that misconduct.
That
punishment was excessive and is reduced to a written warning. The County is directed to
make Hale
whole for the five days she was suspended.