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Wednesday, 4 November 2015

Fated Future: On Ethno-Terrorism, Politics and the Future of Kenya.

Kenya
is a fragile state crippled by tribalism, corruption and
ethno-terrorism, which have operated concertedly to erode the basic
pillars of the state, besides gravitating it towards state failure.
Lack of nationalism in Kenya (even Jomo Kenyatta was unsure of it),
and politicization of Patriotism, largely owe their existence to a
clique of political elite who have consistently endeavored to
safeguard their blinkered interests from legitimate political
competition; and the need by Partisan Interests to hold and utilize
state power and privileges to suppress Political Opposition, in
addition to incapacitating the Intelligentsia.

A
government maintains its legitimacy by upholding and safeguarding
the vital
interestsof
its citizenry. Also, how the state interacts with the society
determines and charts the national, strategic, and political
culture[1]. A
state that safeguards the myopic interests of its political elite to
the detriment of the general society is exercising tyranny; while a
state that rules by popular consensus, and also safeguards the vital
interests of its citizenry is considered a democracy.

Security
is Paramount even in a Fragile State

Provision
of security - both at the national level, as well as the individual
level - is the greatest determinant of the integrity of any sovereign
nation; failure to which, the nation is considered a failed state[2].

Kenya
is presently a fragile state plagued with economic decline, group
grievances, brain drain, demographic pressures, skewed socio-economic
development, unsettled internally displaced people, factionalized
elite, weakened state legitimacy, erosion of the rule of law, and a
deeply compromised and highly tribalized security apparatus. Though
the government has precariously endeavored to provide security at the
national level; poor provision of security at the individual level
has led to the emergence of armed groups and vigilantes[3].
Though none of these armed groups compete with the state for national
power, they have nonetheless been able to supplant state authority in
their locales. Moreover, these armed groups have been, or are,
predominantly tribally-based – with some receiving state-backing.
They have therefore been central in fomenting ethno-terrorism.

Ethno-Terrorism

At
present, Kenya is ruled by a multi-ethnic alliance that is
non-integrative in nature. This means that the ruling alliance is
structured to deny political goods to groups (or entities) not allied
to the regime. Likewise, political economists have observed that the
present government has consistently negated efforts to bridge
existing ethnic cleavages, thus revealing the alliance to be
an alliance
of ethnic convenience[4].

A
discomforting feature of tribal-based governments is their promotion
and utilization of ethno-terrorism to shield state power from
competitors, in addition to protecting narrow ethnic interests at the
expense of national interests.

During
Moi’s Regime, Kalenjin terrorists were used to evict and harass
opposition-allied communities in 1992, 1994 and 1997. Besides, Moi’s
government was mostly staffed by semi-illiterates, most of them from
the Kalenjin community; and a culture of anti-intellectualism was
entrenched in government and state organs. Consequently, the economy
was run down by the ill-educated workforce, and Moi’s regime ended
up pauperizing an entire generation of Kenyans. Furthermore,
mediocrity was deeply entrenched in the national-political life, as
well as in the administrative structure of the nation.
Unsurprisingly, Kenyan politics is still tribal-based[5].
This is due to lack of competing ideologies – a result of
anti-intellectualism rooted by Moi who also contaminated, and
eventually ended up infecting, the national body politic with the
recalcitrant disease of tribal clashes[6].
A similar situation is also manifesting itself in the present
Kenyatta-Ruto Administration, with Kenyatta unabashedly promoting
tribalism, in addition to fostering Kikuyu supremacy, under the guise
of nurturing patriotism. This has gravitated Kenya towards civil
strife[7].
All the same, ethno-terrorism has a history linked to the ruling
regimes in Kenya.

Kikuyu
Hegemony

The
ascendancy of the Kikuyu to dominance over the political landscape of
Kenya is pillared on their disproportionate politicization and good
education, which is coupled with their “superior
abilities in government”[8].

On
the eve of Independence in Kenya, the then Colonial Governor, Malcolm
MacDonald, observed that:

Kenyatta
was the best protector of British interests, rather than the most
potent threat to them, as the accepted wisdom had been in London and
in the offices of the colonial government in Nairobi. Kenyatta was,
MacDonald thought, ‘the most shrewd, authoritative and sagacious
leader available to Kenya’. There were, by contrast, ‘far fewer
good brains in the K.A.D.U. Party’ and its leader Ronald Ngala was
‘rather second-rate’. The last governor thought it critical that
Kikuyu supporters of KANU should hold the upper hand
after independence[9].

The
governor’s assessment, coupled with his overbearing influence over
the Crown’s policies towards Kenya, thrust Kenyatta to power on
Kenya’s independence - despite reservations expressed by Jomo
Kenyatta concerning the state of nationalism and tribalism in Kenya.
This is aptly captured by Daniel Branch in his book, Kenya:
Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011, which notes that:

While
Kenyatta was a critical force in the efforts to push the British out
of Kenya, the cause of building a coherent sense of a Kenyan nation
was weakened by his own skepticism about the project. He thought
ethnic unity to be the first priority of any Kenyan politician; only
then could attention turn to building the nation[10].

On
the eve of Independence, Kenya had a devolved constitution, which it
transitioned with into Independence, whereupon Kenyatta and
like-minded cadre struggled unremittingly to destroy devolution and
centralize the management of national resources. The desire to
destroy devolution (or Majimboismas
it was referred then) was centered on valid uncertainties brought
about by the dynamics of devolution, which tended to favor militant
tribalism, ethnic strife, and forced population transfers; as well as
regionalization of state resources, which altogether posed an
existential threat to the infant independent Republic. Kenyatta’s
strategy to destroy Majimboismwas
quite simple, but remarkably brilliant - the regional assemblies were
starved of finances and revenues, hence bankrupting them and forcing
them to seek an acceptable accommodation with Kenyatta’s
government. Kenyatta used this opportunity to force a merger between
KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) and KANU (Kenya African
National Union), thus ushering in a unitary state ruled by a
centralized government[11].

Jomo
Kenyatta’s strategy is furtively being replicated by his son, Uhuru
Kenyatta, who serves as the present president of Kenya. Uhuru desires
to scuttle devolution and re-impose a powerful Centralized
government.

In
an effort to stabilize the nation as well as curtail political
opposition, Kenyatta centralized state powers and imposed
one-party-rule over the nation. Initially, the ruling party was
dominated by two communities, the Kikuyu and the Luo; but due to
ideological polarization between the two camps within the party, the
Luos were edged out in favor of the Kikuyu, who consequently ascended
to a position of total dominance in the ruling Party, and in
extension, to dominance over the national affairs of Kenya[12].

Turbulence
at the Coast

Likewise,
along the Coastal Strip, an indisposed Mijikenda political class
clashed with the Arab bloc, which strove to revert the area back to
the suzerainty of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Also, the Mijikenda
elite clashed with the central government because they wanted a
devolved system of governance [13].
The post-independence political dynamics were at odds with the
expectations of the political class in the Coast region, and they
ultimately lost the political battles as Kenyatta consolidated his
one-party rule over a unitary state, which also allowed him to
relocate masses of landless Kikuyus, via land settlement schemes, to
Coastal Kenya, with Mpeketoni being one of the most notable
successes.

With
the resettlement of upcountry people in the Coast, group grievances
emerged and have festered ever since, with Al-Shabaab using such
grievances to its advantages - especially when it launched a
month long terror campaign in Lamu county, which is located in North
Coast. Nonetheless, the Kikuyu establishment still dominates national
power, and they have been able to successfully project this power to
their advantage, particularly in relation to detoxifying anti-Kikuyu
sentiments. Likewise, the Kikuyu political establishment has shown
readiness to use existing instruments of power to protect its
privileges, as well as starve off persecutions. During Moi’s
regime, the Kikuyu people were subjected to pernicious
persecutions, with state-backed terrorism mortifying itself
as Kalenjin Ethno-terrorism.

Kalenjin
Ethno-Terrorism

The
Kalenjin community has been, and still is, the main ethnic group
linked to ethno-terrorism – chiefly due to its use of threats of
communal violence, and instigation of tribal clashes in the Rift
Valley Region, in attempts to influence both the political and
socio-economic processes in the region. Kalenjin ethno-terrorism has
its roots in the Moi Regime. It was borne during the formative years
of Multi-party politics in Kenya, in the late 1980s and the early
1990s[14].

This
reflected evolution of domestic politics. According to Bethwell Ogot,
the waning of leftist politics in the Post-Cold War world – under
pressure from Neoliberalism - and demands for greater political space
within Kenya ultimately shifted the focus of grievances in Kenya from
socio-economic redistribution of resources to group-identity
politics[15].
Ogot’s assessment is correct; and presently, Kenya can be
considered to be in a state of political hypostasis caused by deep
entrenchment of group-identity (principally tribal and religious)
politics in the national, strategic, and political space. It was in
this environment that Kenya witnessed its first province-wide tribal
clashes in the early 1990s.

Kalenjin
Ethnoterrorism as a Tool of Regime Protection

With
the repeal of the constitution in 1991 to allow for multi-party
politics, along with the demographic explosion that saw the ranks of
the disaffected swell; Moi’s government was hard pressed to find an
alternative solution to what was widely expected to be an end of
Moi’s regime. The regime conceived a sinister plot to punish
political opponents and non-pliable constituencies by subjecting them
to extreme state-sponsored violence, which was meted out by
ethno-terrorists, most of whom described themselves as Kalenjin
Warriors.

Why
did politics suddenly turn toxic in 1992? The answer lies in the
politicization of both ethnic grievances and tribal identity. Walter
Oyugi correctly observed that “ethnicity
per se, in the absence of its politicization, does not cause
conflict”[16];
and as such, acrid politicsis the most integral component of ethnic
conflicts. In 1991, Moi’s regime actively invoked, sponsored,
supported, and disseminated tribal ideologies. This was done to
consolidate its core support base in Rift Valley, as well as
victimize ethnic groups perceived to supportive of the political
opposition. A parliamentary committee in September 1992 confirmed the
existence of Kalenjin
Warriors who
were being trained and armed by KANU partisans and top-ranking
government officials for the sole purpose of evicting
opposition-affiliated communities from the Rift Valley[17].

In
December 1992, elections were held, and though marred by massive
irregularities (including the denial of identification cards and
voters card to many young Kenyans perceived to belong to
opposition-allied communities); Moi was controversially declared the
winner and sworn in as president for another term. Coincidentally,
tribal clashes erupted on the eve of the December 1992 elections,
when hordes of Kalenjin warriors armed with bows and arrows invaded
farms owned by Kikuyus, Luhyas and Luos in the Rift Valley region,
where they looted assets, killed people and burned farmlands. Moi’s
regime characterized the clashes as spontaneous, though reports
showed a remarkable degree of organization and similarity in modus
operandi, thus
revealing that the violence was premeditated. Moi’s government was
also disconcertingly hostile to anyone who sought to aid the people
affected by the tribal clashes, with government officials threatening
aid agencies and church organizations that provided relief to the
displaced communities. Poignantly, the government also showed
inaction towards the Kalenjin warriors[18].

Moi’s
government hoped that the violence would subside by 1993, but in
December 1993, fresh clashes erupted in Molo area when Kalenjins
invaded farms owned by Kikuyus and Kisiis. In 1994, clashes in Nakuru
District (and Molo division in particular) continued unabated; and
retaliatory raids were conducted against Kalenjins[19].
Interestingly, Kalenjin military officers and police officers were
implicated in organizing and coordinating some of the raids by the
Kalenjin warriors, a fact revealed when defensive battles killed some
of the Kalenjin raiders, whose identity – as ascertained from their
identifications cards or job employment cards - showed that they were
security officers still in active service[20].

Nevertheless,
Moi’s regime gained from the clashes as the political hegemony of
the Kalenjin was consolidated in the region, as the evicted masses
were unable to vote thus ensuring that the Rift Valley bloc was
dominated by KANU[21].
Kalenjin interlopers were also allowed to possess the land and
properties left behind by the displaced, thus allowing them (the
interlopers) to be economically empowered. It is estimated that at
least 1,500 people were killed during the 1992-1993 tribal clashes,
and at least 300,000 displaced[22].

In
1997, tribal clashes erupted again when Kalenjin Warriors raided
non-Kalenjin owned farms in Nakuru district. However, defensive
measures and retaliatory raids by the Kikuyu community inflicted
massive losses on the Kalenjin attackers. Also in 1997, ethnic
clashes erupted in Mombasa - with its epicenter being Likoni area, an
opposition stronghold within the sea of KANU-held areas[23].
The results were disastrous. The massive disruptions caused by the
ethnic clashes serve to reveal the dangers of Ethno-terrorism.

Dangers
of Ethno-Terrorism

Ethno-terrorism
allows an ethnic group to accumulate disproportionate political
power, as well as project it, or leverage it, at opportune moments.
Likewise, unconstrained ethno-terrorism nurtures erosion of national
integrity, besides fomenting indigenous terrorist campaigns.
Accordingly, corrosion of the state structure allows certain ethnic
groups to amass the political goods at the expense of other
communities, thus laying down the foundation for
politically-motivated ethnic violence and state collapse - especially
if the ruling government loses popular legitimacy. In unstable
theaters of actions, violence remains the most alluring avenue for
achieving political goals. This way ethno-terrorism fuels
disintegration of the state.

Ethno-terrorism
linked to group grievances may also intermingle with transnational
violent campaigns, as Kenya has agonizingly learnt from the present
Al-Shabaab terror campaign inside Kenya.

Ideology
of Order

One
of Kenya’s pre-eminent historians, Eisha Stephen Atieno Odhiambo,
comprehensively described the Ideology
of Order that
informs the policies and practices of the government of Kenya since
independence (and according to the author, till now). According to
Odhiambo, the Kenyan government has displayed remarkable fixation
with upholding stability and national order as a prerequisite for
national development and economic growth[24].
Accordingly, the Kenyan government has used the mantra of political
orderto
rationalize human rights abuses, suppression of political dissension,
and oppression of non-pliant minorities. This has also allowed the
government to market Kenya as an Oasis
of Stability, even
though order is derived from a managed
democracy and tenuous
enforcement of
the Bill
of Rights.

In
the Muslim-dominated regions of North-Eastern and Coastal Kenya,
systematic marginalization, corruption, and a culture of impunity
operated in concert to create a horde of disaffected youth who
questioned not only the legitimacy of the state, but also the very
existence of Kenya’s sovereignty. At the coast, some banded and
formed the secessionist Mombasa
Republican Council,
while others sought refuge in Radical Islam. Some emigrated to
Somalia where they joined the Somalia-based Al-Qaeda-affiliated
Islamist organization, Al-Shabaab, where they were trained as terror
operatives and dispatched on missions to infiltrate Kenya and
destabilize the home front[25].

Ironically
in 1992, Moi’s government allowed the registration of thousands of
Somalia refugees as Kenyan voters in the hope of tilting the
electoral scales in KANU’s favour[26].
Also in 1992, a figure that came to haunt Kenya more than a decade
later was also rigged out of his election victory. This happened as
the government struggled to deflate Islam revivalism in Mombasa[27].
The name of the failed political aspirant is Aboud Rogo. Presently,
Kenya is dealing with the blowbacks and ramifications of the
malevolent machinations and blunders of Moi’s Era.

From
Somalia with Jihad.

Al-Shabaab
has subjected the Kenyan government to national embarrassment by
conducting sustained attacks, such as the Lamu terror campaign of
2014, which saw violent Islamists carve out a section of Boni Forest
as their territory thereby eroding the sovereignty of Kenya. During
the Lamu attacks, the terrorists targeted upcountry people whom they
viewed as interlopers implanted in the area by the political elite
from Central Kenya[28].

In
October 2011, the Kenyan Government invaded Somalia under the
auspices of Operation
Linda Nchi –
whose
stated goal was to degrade and destroy Al-Shabaab in its home
territory. However, the present reality shows that Al-Shabaab has not
degraded, but is even now more emboldened - as attested by its recent
raids against AMISOM
and the mediocre “Government of Somalia”[29].
Moreover, it has also managed to export its terror campaign into
Kenya, where it has morphed into a domestic insurgency in Lamu and
Garissa counties, thus obliging the Kenyan government to
launch Operation
Linda Bonito
expel Al-Shabaab out of the territories the terrorists control inside
Kenya[30].

In
2012, Abu Osama al-Kenyi – one of the Al-Shabaab’s strategists –
formulated the strategy of weakening nations fighting against
Al-Shabaab by attacking them and dragging them into costly wars of
attrition, as well as widening the existing cleavages within such
nations. Al-Kenyi (a Kenyan national) reasoned that by weakening such
nations, they will neither be able to sustain their operations
against Al-Shabaab, nor be able to assist the weak Somalia National
Government (which is qualitatively inferior to Al-Shabaab). In these
conditions, Al-Shabaab’s ascendancy will allow Al-Qaeda to seed the
region with its toxic ideology, besides provoking a regional
conflagration[31].

Central
to al-Kenyi’s strategy is the utility of ethno-terrorism to
pre-empt a cohesive, coherent and unified response to the Islamist
threat. With Kenya presently paralyzed by a weakened economy and
intensified ethnic polarization, it remains to be seen whether
ethno-terrorism will imperil the nation’s guard against the more
potent threat posed by Islamist terrorism; or whether the
Kikuyu-dominated regime will continue its policies - which embodies
their preference of injustice over disorder - as it strives to
consolidate the instruments of power so as to guarantee the survival
of a predatory state during the 2017 post-election turbulence.

---------------------------------------------------

References

[1] Barkley,
Blake Edward (2015). “The Last Vestiges of Statehood: Failed
States and the Groups that Work within them”. Journal
of Military and Strategic Studies 16:2
[Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2015].

[2] Rotberg,
Robert (2004). When
States Fail: Causes and Consequences.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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