I am projecting AGNC will report a minor decrease in the company’s management fees expense for the second quarter of 2016 when compared to the prior quarter.

My projections for AGNC’s net loss and earnings per share for the second quarter of 2016 are stated in the “Conclusions Drawn” section of the article.

I recommend to readers to hold off on a “final verdict” regarding AGNC’s projected results for the second quarter of 2016 until PART 3 of this article is released.

Author's Note: PART 2 of this article is a continuation from PART 1 which was discussed in a previous publication. Please see PART 1 of this article for a detailed projection of American Capital Agency Corp.'s (NASDAQ:AGNC) income statement (technically speaking, the company's "consolidated statement of comprehensive income") for the second quarter of 2016 regarding the following accounts: 1) interest income; 2) interest expense; and 3) gain (loss) on sale of agency securities, net. PART 1 helps lead to a better understanding of the topics and analysis that will be discussed in PART 2. The link to PART 1's analysis is provided below:

The focus of PART 2 of this article is to provide a detailed projection of AGNC's consolidated statement of comprehensive income for the second quarter of 2016 regarding the following accounts: 4) "gain (loss) on derivative instruments and other securities, net" (including four "sub-accounts"); and 5) "management fees." PART 2 will also discuss AGNC's projected net income (loss) and earnings per share ("EPS") amounts. For readers who just want the summarized account projections, I would suggest to scroll down to the "Conclusions Drawn" section at the bottom of the article.

By understanding the trends that occurred within AGNC's operations during the second quarter of 2016, one can apply this information to sector peers as well. As such, the discussion/analysis below is not solely applicable to AGNC but to the fixed-rate agency mortgage real estate investment trust (mREIT) sector as a whole. This includes, but is not limited to, the following fixed-rate agency mREIT peers: 1) ARMOUR Residential REIT Inc. (NYSE:ARR); 2) CYS Investments Inc. (NYSE:CYS); 3) Annaly Capital Management Inc. (NYSE:NLY); and 4) Orchid Island Capital Inc. (NYSE:ORC).

4) Gain (Loss) on Derivative Instruments and Other Securities, Net:

- Estimate of ($493) Million; Range ($773)-($273) Million

-Confidence Within Range = Moderate to High

- See Boxed Blue Reference "4" in Tables 4 and 6 Below Next to the June 30, 2016 Column

Projecting AGNC's gain (loss) on derivative instruments and other securities, net account is an analysis that involves several sub-accounts. This includes making assumptions within these derivative sub-accounts during the current quarter. One will never "fully" know management's derivatives activities for any given quarter until results are provided to the public via the company's quarterly SEC submissions. However, one can understand management's overall derivative strategy and make a projection on these derivative sub-accounts using the balances that were represented at the end of the previous quarter. Such a detailed analysis is wise to perform due to the typical events that unfold in regards to MBS prices, the fixed pay rate on newly created interest rate swaps, and U.S. Treasury yields. I believe this detailed analysis is critical once again in regards to the second quarter of 2016. When using this methodology, along with deciding specific quarterly assumptions, I have typically provided highly accurate projections within this account over the past several years (within a stated range).

Now let us take a look at AGNC's gain (loss) on derivative instruments and other securities, net account. I show my projection for this figure in Table 4 below. All past (ACTUAL) sub-account figures within Table 4 are derived from AGNC's quarterly SEC submissions via the company's 10-Q or 10-K where applicable. All projected (ESTIMATE) sub-account figures within Table 4 below are calculated and derived from multiple tables/charts that will not be shown within this particular article.

(Source: Table created entirely by myself, partially using AGNC data obtained from the SEC's EDGAR Database)

Within AGNC's gain (loss) on derivative instruments and other securities, net account is the following four material sub-accounts that will be discussed below:

a) TBA MBS

b) Interest Rate Swaps

c) Interest Rate Swaptions

d) U.S. Treasury Securities

Each of the four material derivative sub-accounts listed above will be separately analyzed and discussed in corresponding order of the blue references under the "Ref." column in Table 4 above.

a) TBA MBS (Net Long Position as of 3/31/2016):

- Estimate of $105 Million; Range ($20)-$230 Million

- Confidence Within Range = Moderate to High

- See Black Highlighted, Blue Referenced Sub-Account "a)" in Table 4 Above Next to the June 30, 2016 Column

Let us first briefly get accustomed with this type of derivative instrument. Typically, AGNC uses a combination of both long and (short) TBA MBS contracts during any given quarter. AGNC enters into TBA contracts with a long position where it agrees to buy, for future delivery, MBS with certain predetermined prices, face amounts, issuers, coupons, and stated maturities. AGNC enters into TBA contracts with a long position as an off-balance sheet means of investing in and financing MBS. Since TBA contracts with a long position are ultimately an extension of the balance sheet, this increases AGNC's "at risk" leverage. AGNC enters into TBA contracts with a (short) position where it agrees to sell, for future delivery, MBS with certain predetermined prices, face amounts, issuers, coupons, and stated maturities. Since TBA contracts with a (short) position are ultimately a reduction of the balance sheet, this decreases AGNC's at risk leverage.

There are two main factors that impact this derivative sub-account's valuation in a given quarter. The first factor is the dollar roll income (expense) generated on the net long (short) TBA MBS position. The second factor is the realized valuation gain (loss) upon the "settlement" of all TBA MBS contracts and the unrealized valuation gain (loss) on all contracts that have yet to be settled during the quarter (one example is a "re-rolled" TBA MBS position).

For the first quarter of 2016, AGNC reported a TBA MBS total net valuation gain of $216 million. When broken out, AGNC reported "net dollar roll" ("NDR") income of $50 million and a TBA MBS net valuation gain of $166 million. As of 12/31/2015, AGNC had a net long TBA MBS position of $7.3 billion (based on notional amount). AGNC had a net long TBA MBS position of $5.8 billion as of 3/31/2016. When calculated, AGNC decreased the company's net long TBA MBS position by ($1.5) billion during the first quarter of 2016.

As will be discussed further in PART 3 of this article, MBS prices net increased within lower coupon fixed-rate agency MBS during the second quarter of 2016. As such, three general scenarios likely occurred within this derivative sub-account. If the assumption is made that AGNC materially increased its net long TBA MBS position prior to June 2016, then the company would have a material total net valuation gain for this derivative sub-account (higher end of my projected range). If the assumption is made that AGNC materially decreased the company's net long TBA MBS position during the second quarter of 2016 (including the notion of changing this balance to a net (short) position), then the company would have a minor total net valuation gain (loss) for this derivative sub-account (lower end of my projected range). If the assumption is made that AGNC only slightly altered the company's net long TBA MBS position during the second quarter of 2016, then the company would have a minor - modest total net valuation gain for this derivative sub-account.

Through interpreting management's comments via several prior investor presentations and earnings conference calls, I have made the assumption AGNC only slightly altered the company's net long TBA MBS position as of 3/31/2016 during most of the second quarter of 2016. Therefore, I believe the third scenario likely occurred. Through a detailed analysis that will be omitted from this particular article, when combining the company's projected quarterly NDR income of $55 million and a quarterly net valuation gain of $50 million, I am projecting AGNC's TBA MBS had a total net valuation gain of $105 million for the second quarter of 2016. This should be seen as a more cautious projection.

b) Interest Rate Swaps (Net (Short) Position as of 3/31/2016):

- Estimate of ($490) Million; Range ($740)-($240) Million

- Confidence Within Range = Moderate to High

- See Purple Highlighted, Blue Referenced Secondary Sub-Accounts "b)" in Table 4 Above Next to the June 30, 2016 Column

Let us first discuss the recent history of this derivative sub-account which will lead to a better understanding of my projected total net valuation loss for the second quarter of 2016. AGNC had a net (short) interest rate swaps position of ($38.2) billion as of 3/31/2016 (based on notional amount). AGNC had interest rate payer swap additions of ($1.0) billion and interest rate payer swap expirations or terminations of $3.4 billion during the first quarter of 2016.

There was little activity within AGNC's interest rate swaps during the first quarter of 2016 for two main reasons. First, as was discussed in PART 1 of this article, AGNC only slightly altered the company's on-balance sheet MBS portfolio during the first quarter of 2016 (based on par value). Second, due to the Federal Open Market Committee's ("FOMC") rhetoric regarding a delay to a subsequent increase to the Federal ("Fed") Funds Rate during the first half of 2016, management believed the risks associated with the fixed-rate agency MBS market were somewhat suppressed going into the second quarter of 2016. This especially held true when considering certain global macroeconomic "headwinds" that were occurring. With that being said, due to AGNC's continued "cautious" risk management strategy, the company's hedging coverage ratio only decreased from 87% to 83% during the first quarter of 2016. I believe this was still a fairly "elevated" ratio, especially knowing what occurred to rates/yields during the second quarter of 2016 (especially June 2016).

Using Table 4 above as a reference, there are two secondary sub-accounts to discuss when projecting a total net valuation gain (loss) for AGNC's interest rate swaps. The first secondary sub-account is AGNC's "net periodic interest costs of interest rate swaps" expense. If one recalls, this figure was first discussed in AGNC's interest expense account during PART 1 of this article. In regards to AGNC's interest rate swaps net (short) position as of 3/31/2016, the company had a weighted average fixed pay rate of 1.83% and a weighted average floating receive rate of 0.62%. When excluding forward-starting interest rate swaps, this weighted average fixed pay rate was 1.73%. When calculated, AGNC's weighted average fixed pay rate (when including forward-starting interest rate swaps) decreased (6) basis points ("bps"). Even more encouraging, AGNC's weighted average floating receive rate increased 22 bps.

This brings up an important topic which I believe some readers/contributors are having a hard time understanding when it comes to an agency mREIT's business model. There has been a couple articles over the past couple months in regards to the ramifications of a "flattening" yield curve regarding a company's "net spread" income. When several readers asked me to read one particular mREIT article from a contributor that specializes in the REIT sector, I took a look at his arguments/points being made. In a nutshell, this contributor basically concluded since short-term interest rates are rising while long-term interest rates are decreasing, mREIT companies will automatically suffer due to shrinking spreads between interest income from MBS and interest expense mainly associated with repurchase agreements (borrowing costs). However, when it comes to the mREIT sector (especially agency mREIT companies), I believe this generalized conclusion is overly simplified and doesn't consider some important factual data/other variables at play.

If one recalls, during PART 1 of this projection analysis (see link above), I stated AGNC's interest expense (when it comes to the company's outstanding borrowings) has steadily increased by roughly $10 million over the prior three quarters. Simply put, short-term interest rates have continued to gradually increase during this timeframe which has negatively impacted repurchase agreement interest rates. While this is certainly a negative factor to highlight, I believe this referenced article did not mention/discuss what I call "the other side of the equation."

I believe a good analogy for this discussion is a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. To make this sandwich, one needs BOTH the peanut butter and the jelly (fairly logical). In regards to agency mREIT companies (and other sector classifications as well), during most interest rate cycles (including the one the U.S. market is currently in), management teams would have hedges in place to mitigate interest rate risk. Due to the typically higher durations of agency MBS (versus non-agency MBS, CMBS, etc…), management of this type of mREIT classification typically prefers to have a higher hedging coverage ratio in place (say versus hybrid or multipurpose mREIT peers) since these securities have enhanced sensitivity to movements in interest rates.

So, getting back to my analogy, repurchase agreements are the peanut butter and interest rate payer swaps (hedges) are the jelly (could also substitute this derivative instrument with several other alternatives). Simply put, when discussing/analyzing the mREIT sector (especially when it comes to agency mREIT companies), one really cannot have one side of the equation (peanut butter; repurchase agreements) without the other (jelly; interest rate payer swaps).

So, this contributor/article I referenced earlier was basically stating mREIT companies are going to be negatively impacted (some could imply this contributor meant materially) from the rise in short-term interest rates while long-term interest/mortgage rates continue to decrease or hold relatively steady (a flattening of the yield curve). Again, while I agree there is a possibility in SOME instances some minor negative outcomes could occur under this scenario, I would also highlight when short-term interest rates rise (or remain fairly steady) while long-term interest/mortgage rates move lower (or remain the same), a company's hedging costs will typically move lower. There are two main reasons why this occurs.

First, the floating receive rate of a company's interest rate payer swaps has a 100% correlation to LIBOR (an "exact pairing"). As stated in PART 1, LIBOR has a very high correlation to the Fed Funds Rate/repurchase agreement interest rates. As such, as short-term interest rates rise, so does the floating receive rate of an interest rate payer swap. Simply put, this mitigates a decrease in net spread income (even when it is not precisely shown within a GAAP income statement). Second, all newly created interest rate payer swaps would have a fixed-pay rate that is notably lower when compared to existing payer swaps. As such, a decrease in the intermediate and/or long-end of the yield curve (which is what has recently occurred; an agency mREIT's hedges usually match to this part of the yield curve) would be mitigated by a reduction in a company's "net pay rate." Simply put, this also mitigates a decrease in net spread income.

Let us now "test" this line of reasoning when it comes to AGNC's first quarter of 2016 (where short-term interest rates net increased while long-term interest/mortgage rates net decreased). In PART 1, I provided a discussion where it was determined AGNC's repurchase agreements had an interest rate increase of 15 bps during the first quarter of 2016. When compared to AGNC's prior several quarters, this was a notable increase in the company's weighted average repurchase agreements interest rate. However, I would also refer readers to the calculation that was performed earlier in this specific derivative sub-account's projection when it comes to AGNC's interest rate swaps. During AGNC's first quarter of 2016, the company's weighted average fixed pay rate (when including forward-starting interest rate swaps) decreased (6) bps while its weighted average floating receive rate increased 22 bps. When combined, this was a decrease of (28) bps regarding AGNC's current period hedging costs which trumped the 15 bps increase in the company's weighted average repurchase agreements interest rate.

So, as mentioned in PART 1, AGNC's"cost of funds"(combination of borrowing and hedging costs) rate actually net decreased during the first quarter of 2016, even with a notable flattening of the yield curve. This is an extremely important point to mention/highlight that was not brought up in the other contributor's referenced article.

I believe this omission would likely lead readers to incorrect assertions about the mREIT sector (especially an agency mREIT business model). Simply put, the recent rise to AGNC's (or any agency mREIT's) interest expense has been mitigated (in some cases trumped) by the decreased current period hedging costs of a company's derivative instruments. I bring up this topic up solely because I want to make sure readers/other contributors understand the FULL relationship within this specific sector.

Now let us briefly discuss the impact of lower long-term interest/mortgage rates when it comes to an agency mREIT's interest income (in some cases a hybrid or multipurpose mREIT as well). Again, I believe a few key points that were not discussed/mentioned in the other contributor's referenced article should be addressed. Simply put, I do not believe a flattening yield curve is a "doomsday scenario" when it comes to mREIT companies for several reasons.

First, the secondary agency MBS market is one of the largest investment spaces in the world (also one of the most liquid; typically second to U.S. Treasuries). There are various choices companies can decide upon, when it comes to coupons/products, when investing in the secondary agency MBS market. For instance, if management is worried about decreasing long-term/mortgage interest rates, management could purchase "seasoned/vintage," higher coupon MBS versus newer, less seasoned MBS which would typically have lower coupons. While this would likely increase a company's cost basis (higher premiums associated with a higher stated coupon under most scenarios; exceptions apply) and also increase prepayment risk (specified pools can mitigate this risk), this strategy would offset a decreasing interest income. In other words, companies could sell some lower-coupon MBS (which would have appreciated in value if long-term interest/mortgage rates net decreased) and invest in some higher-coupon MBS. This point was never mentioned in the other contributor's referenced article.

Second, let us hypothetically say management actually goes ahead and redeploys capital into lower coupon MBS. While this would likely negatively impact interest income to an extent, in a net decreasing interest/mortgage rate environment, this would also directly lead to enhanced valuation gains on the lower coupon MBS (when compared to higher coupon MBS). As such, a company would record enhanced realized/capital gains which would likely trump the reduction in interest income (which also has a more favorable taxation treatment for shareholders). Again, this additional consideration was never discussed/brought up in the other contributor's referenced article.

Third, which I alluded to earlier, if there is a net decrease in long-term interest/mortgage rates, an agency mREIT's cost of funds rate will also have a high probability of decreasing. The AGNC example I provided above factually proves this notion. Dependent upon a company's weighted average maturity on its derivatives portfolio (including several other factors), a net decrease in long-term interest/mortgage rates would typically have an offsetting net decrease in hedging costs.

So, in the end, I know some people try to "simply" the mREIT model. However, with the discussion above as support, I believe the simpler one tries to portray this sector, the higher the probability of an omission of various key factors/variables. This would generally lead to a higher probability of inaccurate assertions/analysis. I hope this discussion helps readers/other contributors have a better understanding of the mREIT business model. In the end, that is one of the main reasons why I write articles here at Seeking Alpha. I want readers to get a better understanding of the companies/sectors they invest in so they can make more informed decisions. Now let us get back to a projection for this derivative sub-account.

When all factors and assumptions are taken into consideration, I project AGNC will record a slight decrease in the company's net periodic interest costs of interest rate swaps expense for the second quarter of 2016. This is due to the following three assumed interest rate swap factors during the quarter: 1) relatively unchanged average notional balance as AGNC remained fairly cautious regarding its risk management strategy (potential decrease by the end of the quarter); 2) notable decrease in the weighted average fixed pay rate on all newly created contracts when compared to terminated/settled contracts (mainly due to the net decrease in rates); and 3) slight increase in the average floating receive rate on all contracts. Through a detailed analysis that will be omitted from this particular article, I am projecting AGNC had a net periodic interest costs of interest rate swaps expense of $85 million for the second quarter of 2016. This calculates to a decreased expense of ($4) million when compared to the prior quarter. This should be seen as a cautious projection (possibility of an even higher reduction within this secondary sub-account).

The second secondary sub-account to discuss relates to the net valuation gain (loss) on AGNC's interest rate swaps. With the exception of very short tenors/maturities, there was a modest - material decrease in the fixed pay rate of all interest rate payer swap contracts during the second quarter of 2016. As such, results across the mREIT sector (in regards to this particular derivative sub-account) will not vary as significantly as some prior quarters.

The fixed pay rate on interest rate swap contracts with a tenor/maturity towards the shorter-end of the yield curve had a minor - modest net decrease in valuations during the second quarter of 2016. The fixed pay rate on interest rate swap contracts with a tenor/maturity towards the longer-end of the yield curve had a modest - material net decrease in valuations during the second quarter of 2016. It should be noted a sizable move in valuations occurred during June 2016. Companies who had a higher hedging coverage ratio towards the end of the second quarter of 2016 were negatively impacted by the sharp decrease in rates/yields which ultimately led to more severe valuation losses. Companies who had a lower hedging coverage ratio towards the end of the second quarter of 2016 were not as negatively impacted by the sharp decrease in rates/yields which ultimately led to less severe valuation losses.

There were two main reasons rates/yields materially net decreased during the second quarter of 2016. First, several central banks including the European Central Bank ("ECB") and Bank of Japan ("BOJ") continued to implement stimulus measures which continued to drive global rates/yields lower (negative rates/yields in some countries). Due to the global ramifications of these policies/events, the U.S. market's reaction was the FOMC would need to lower/delay its projection on the number of subsequent FED Funds Rate increases during 2016. As such, investors searching for attractive returns drove down U.S. yields which, in turn, drove down long-term interest rates. Second, as most market participants are likely aware of, Great Britain held a referendum in June 2016 to decide whether the nation would leave the European Union ("EU"). Since voters decided to leave the EU (which surprised markets), panic/volatility in rates/yields ensued as market participants were fearful how an exit would impact global economies.

At the start of the year, the FOMC was likely planning on increasing the Fed Funds Rate four times during 2016 (roughly a 25 bps rate hike each quarter). However, mainly due to the policies/events stated above, the FOMC subsequently "lowered" its projection on the number of Fed Funds Rate increases during 2016. Currently, the most "hawkish" perspective believes the FOMC has implied there will now only be one Fed Funds Rate increase during 2016. More "dovish" market participants have stated they believe there will be zero Fed Funds Rate increases during 2016.

Through a detailed analysis that will be omitted from this particular article, I am projecting AGNC's second secondary sub-account had a net valuation loss of ($405) million for the second quarter of 2016. When both secondary sub-accounts are combined, I am projecting AGNC's interest rate swaps had a total net valuation loss of ($490) million for the second quarter of 2016.

c) Interest Rate Swaptions (Net (Short) Position as of 3/31/2016):

- Estimate of ($10) Million; Range ($60)-$40 Million

- Confidence Within Range = Moderate to High

- See Pink Highlighted, Blue Referenced Sub-Account "c)" in Table 4 Above Next to the June 30, 2016 Column

Let us first briefly get accustomed with this type of derivative instrument. Interest rate swaptions are options to enter into underlying interest rate swap contracts. Whereas interest rate swap contracts have no initial "up-front" costs (gains and losses are incurred as interest rates fluctuate over the life of the swaps), interest rate swaptions have implicit up-front costs (similar to an option contract; generally speaking).

Let us discuss the recent history of this derivative sub-account which will lead to a better understanding of my projected total net valuation loss for the second quarter of 2016. AGNC had a net (short) interest rate swaptions position of ($1.8) billion as of 3/31/2016 (based on the notional balance of the underlying interest rate swaps). AGNC had no interest rate payer swaption additions and $0.4 billion of interest rate payer swaption exercises, expirations, or terminations during the first quarter of 2016. As of 3/31/2016, AGNC's interest rate payer swaptions had a weighted average of 3.5 months until expiration with an underlying interest rate swaps weighted average tenor/maturity of 7.7 years.

Through a detailed analysis that will be omitted from this particular article, I am projecting AGNC's interest rate swaptions that were either held throughout the quarter or entered into during the quarter had a net valuation loss of ($5) million for the second quarter of 2016. I am also projecting AGNC exercised, had expired, or terminated interest rate payer swaptions for a net valuation loss of ($5) million (expired worthless). Therefore, when these two figures are combined, I am projecting AGNC's interest rate swaptions had a total net valuation loss of ($10) million for the second quarter of 2016. The probability of AGNC's existing interest rate swaptions eventually being worthless continues to be very high.

Let us first briefly get accustomed with this type of derivative instrument. AGNC purchases (or sells short) U.S. Treasury securities and U.S. Treasury security futures to help mitigate the potential impact of changes in MBS prices (hence the valuation of a majority of the company's investment portfolio). AGNC borrows securities to cover U.S. Treasury (short sales) under reverse repurchase agreements. AGNC accounts for these derivative instruments as "security borrowing transactions" and recognizes an obligation to return the borrowed securities at fair market value ("FMV") based on the current value of the underlying borrowed securities.

Let us discuss the recent history of this derivative sub-account which will lead to a better understanding of my projected total net valuation loss for the second quarter of 2016. AGNC had the following three derivative secondary sub-account positions as of 3/31/2016: 1) long U.S. Treasury securities of $0; 2) (short) U.S. Treasury securities of ($3.1) billion; and 3) U.S. Treasury security futures sold (short) of ($1.9) billion. This is based on each secondary sub-account's face amount ("par"). When combining all three secondary sub-accounts together, AGNC increased the company's net (short) U.S. Treasury securities position from ($3.5) billion as of 12/31/2015 to ($5.0) billion as of 3/31/2016.

Three likely scenarios occurred within this derivative sub-account during the second quarter of 2016. If the assumption is made that AGNC switched back to a net long U.S. Treasury securities position during the first-half of the second quarter of 2016, then the company would likely have a minor total net valuation gain for this derivative sub-account (higher end of my projected range). If the assumption is made that AGNC modestly - materially increased its net (short) U.S. Treasury securities position during the second quarter of 2016, then the company would likely have a material total net valuation loss for this derivative sub-account (lower end of my projected range). If the assumption is made that AGNC maintained a minor - modest net (short) U.S. Treasury securities position throughout most of the quarter, then the company would likely have a modest total net valuation loss for this derivative sub-account. The amount of the total net valuation loss would be dependent on the timing of the net long (short) positions as yields fluctuated throughout the quarter. These three scenarios are not "every" possible scenario that could have occurred within this derivative sub-account. However, I believe these three scenarios would have caused the greatest amount of FMV fluctuations. To put things in better perspective, yields on 5-, 7-, and 10-year U.S. Treasury securities decreased 20, 25, and 29 bps during the second quarter of 2016, respectively. Simply put, this was a modest - material decrease in yields (proportionately speaking) over the course of one quarter.

Unless management modestly - materially decreased AGNC's net (short) position prior to June 2016, the company had at least a modest net valuation loss within this derivative sub-account for the second quarter of 2016. Since U.S. Treasury securities are one of the most liquid investments in the marketplace, this is an entirely possible notion to consider. AGNC trades U.S. Treasury securities throughout the quarter. However, with that being said, I have made the assumption AGNC was not overly "bearish" on U.S. Treasury yields during the quarter. Through a detailed analysis that will be omitted from this particular article, I am projecting AGNC's U.S. Treasury securities and U.S. Treasury security futures had a total net valuation loss of ($100) million for the second quarter of 2016.

As stated earlier, all remaining derivative sub-accounts within Table 4 that have not been specifically discussed above are deemed immaterial for discussion purposes. As such, these immaterial derivative sub-accounts will be omitted from any analysis even though a projected net valuation gain (loss) has been included in Table 4. This includes valuation projections on the following derivative sub-accounts: 1) interest-only ("IO") and principal-only ("PO") strips; 2) debt on consolidated variable-interest-entities ("VIE"); 3) REIT equity securities; and 4) put options (when applicable).

When combining all the derivative sub-accounts together (both material and immaterial), I am projecting AGNC's derivative instruments and other securities, net account had a total net valuation loss of ($493) million for the second quarter of 2016.

Brief Discussion of MTGE's and NLY's Derivatives Portfolio:

I see some general similarities between AGNC and the company's affiliate American Capital Mortgage Investment Corp. (NASDAQ:MTGE) regarding hedging strategies. However, there usually are a few differences between AGNC's and MTGE's derivatives portfolio as well. One difference was each company's TBA MBS position as of 3/31/2016 (proportionately speaking). As stated earlier, AGNC had a net long TBA MBS position of $5.8 billion as of 3/31/2016. This was equal to 11% of AGNC's on-balance sheet MBS portfolio. In contrast, MTGE had a net long TBA MBS position of $0.2 billion as of 3/31/2016. This was equal to 6% of MTGE's on-balance sheet agency MBS portfolio. Another difference to note was MTGE had a modestly lower net (short) interest rate swaps position as of 3/31/2016 when compared to AGNC (proportionately speaking). When all derivative sub-accounts are taken into consideration, AGNC and MTGE had a hedging coverage ratio as of 3/31/2016 of 83% and 67%, respectively.

When it comes to AGNC's sector peer NLY, I see several differences that would affect the derivative sub-accounts described above. I will note a few of these differences. AGNC and NLY had a modest difference in each company's TBA MBS position as of 3/31/2016. As discussed earlier, AGNC had a net long TBA MBS position of $5.8 billion as of 3/31/2016. In contrast, NLY had a net long TBA MBS position of $14.3 billion as of 3/31/2016. Since NLY had a material net long TBA MBS position as of 3/31/2016, the probability of the company generating a modest - material amount of NDR income during the second quarter of 2016 was relatively high. Simply put, NLY continued to utilize the financing advantage of the TBA forward market. In addition, NLY likely had a larger net valuation gain within the company's TBA MBS portfolio when compared to AGNC during the second quarter of 2016 (proportionately speaking).

Second, AGNC and NLY had a material difference in each company's hedging coverage ratio as of 3/31/2016. As stated above, AGNC had a hedging coverage ratio of 83%. In sharp contrast, NLY had a hedging coverage ratio of only 48%. As such, NLY was more vulnerable if mortgage interest rates/U.S. Treasury yields modestly - materially increased during the second quarter of 2016. However, this specific scenario did not occur. In fact, basically the opposite occurred as mortgage interest rates/U.S. Treasury yields across basically the entire yield curve sharply decreased during June 2016. As such, NLY's lower hedging coverage ratio at the start of the second quarter of 2016 was likely an advantage for the company regarding a less severe total net valuation loss within its derivatives portfolio. Further analysis of NLY's MBS and derivatives portfolios was discussed within the following two-part article:

- See Boxed Blue Reference "5" in Tables 5 and 6 Below Next to the June 30, 2016 Column

AGNC has a base management fee paid in arrears equal to an amount that is 1/12th of 1.25% of the company's equity balance. Equity is defined as AGNC's month-ended stockholders' equity, adjusted to exclude the effect of any unrealized gains (losses) included in either retained earnings or accumulated OCI/(OCL).

I show my projection for this figure in Table 5 below. All past (ACTUAL) figures within Table 5 are derived from AGNC's quarterly SEC submissions via the company's 10-Q or 10-K where applicable. This excludes all recalculated figures and ratios. I have gathered specific information derived from multiple tables/charts for a more detailed analysis of AGNC's management fees expense account.

Using Table 5 above as a reference, I am projecting AGNC's management fees expense to decrease by ($1) million for the second quarter of 2016 when compared to the first quarter of 2016 ($26 million versus $27 million). Beginning in the third quarter of 2016, AGNC will officially "internalize" the company's management structure through its acquisition of American Capital Mortgage Management, LLC ("ACMM") which was purchased from American Capital Ltd. (NASDAQ:ACAS) (who is in the process of being acquired by Ares Capital Corp. (NASDAQ:ARCC)). As such, there will be a different methodology in projecting this account starting next quarter. Further analysis of this account is unwarranted.

Side Note: Two remaining accounts within AGNC's consolidated statement of comprehensive income that affect the company's net income (loss) amount are the following: 1) general/administrative expenses; and 2) income tax provision (benefit). These two accounts are immaterial for discussion purposes and will be excluded from any analysis within this article.

A) Net Income (Loss):

- Estimate of ($278) Million; Range ($528)-($28) Million

- Net Loss Available to Common Shareholders of ($0.87) Per Share (Excluding OCI/(OCL)); Range ($1.62)-($0.11) Per Share

-Confidence Within Range = Moderate to High

- See Red Reference "A" in Table 6 Below Next to the June 30, 2016 Column

Finally, let us look at my projection for AGNC's quarterly net loss for the second quarter of 2016. This information is provided in Table 6 below.

Table 6 is a summation of the following consolidated statement of comprehensive income accounts for the second quarter of 2016: 1) interest income of $330 million; 2) interest expense of $108 million; 3) gain on sale of agency securities, net of $25 million; 4) loss on derivative instruments and other securities, net of ($493) million; 5) management fees of $26 million; 6) general/administrative expenses of $6 million; and 7) excise tax of $0. Therefore, when these seven accounts are combined, I am projecting AGNC had a net loss of ($278) million for the second quarter of 2016. After accounting for AGNC's quarterly preferred stock dividends, this would be earnings available to common shareholders of ($0.87) per share.

Conclusions Drawn (PART 2):

To sum up the analysis above, I am projecting AGNC will report the following account figures for the second quarter of 2016 (refer back to Table 6 above):

4) Quarterly Net Loss on Derivative Instruments and Other Securities of ($493) Million

5) Quarterly Management Fees of $26 Million

I am projecting AGNC will report the following net loss and EPS amounts for the second quarter of 2016 (refer back to Table 6):

A) Quarterly Net Loss of ($278) Million and Earnings Available to Common Shareholders of ($0.87) Per Share

AGNC's projected net loss of ($278) million for the second quarter of 2016 is a notable improvement when compared to a net loss of ($772) million for the first quarter of 2016. This is mainly due to AGNC's projected net valuation loss of ($493) million pertaining to the company's derivatives portfolio for the second quarter of 2016. For the same account in the prior quarter, AGNC recognized a net valuation loss of ($933) million.

Even though I am projecting AGNC will report a notable net loss for the second quarter of 2016, readers should also understand I am projecting the company will report a notable OCI amount which will be projected in PART 3 of this article. As stated in PART 1 of this article, AGNC's OCI/(OCL) amount is part of the company's consolidated statement of comprehensive income but EXCLUDED from the company's net income (loss) and EPS amounts.

As such, I strongly suggest holding off on a"final verdict"regarding AGNC's projected results for the second quarter of 2016 until PART 3 of this article is released. In my professional opinion, I believe AGNC's "comprehensive income (loss)" amount is more important than the company's net income (loss) and EPS amounts.

My BUY, SELL, or HOLD Recommendation:

For my BUY, SELL, or HOLD recommendation for AGNC (including current price target), please see PART 1 of this article (link provided at the beginning of the article).

Final Note:PART 2 of this article is only a PARTIAL analysis of AGNC's consolidated statement of comprehensive income for the second quarter of 2016. As such, a"final"conclusion will not be provided yet. PART 3 of this article will just pick up where PART 2's analysis ends. PART 3 of this article will discuss AGNC's projected OCI/(OCL) and comprehensive income (loss) amounts. This will be followed by a projection of AGNC's BV as of 6/30/2016 and 7/22/2016 which will be available to readers prior to the company's earnings press release for the second quarter of 2016 in late July.

Each investor's BUY, SELL, or HOLD decision is based on one's risk tolerance, time horizon, and dividend income goals. My personal recommendation will not fit each reader's current investing strategy. The factual information provided within this article is intended to help assist readers when it comes to investing strategies/decisions. By reading this article, I hope readers can better understand how AGNC (or any mREIT) generates income, incurs expenses, values assets held for investment, and mitigates risk.Within the past 120 days, I have not directly increased or decreased my AGNC position (only through reinvested dividends).

On 11/27/2015, I initiated a position in AGNC's Series B Preferred Stock which trades under the symbol "AGNCB." On 12/7/2015, 12/9/2015, 12/14/2015, 1/14/2016, and 1/20/2016, I selectively increased my position in AGNCB. When combined, my current AGNCB position has a weighted average price of $23.215 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. I currently hold 0.71% of the outstanding shares of AGNC's Series B Preferred Stock. Each AGNCB trade was disclosed to readers in"real time"(that day) via the"StockTalks"feature of Seeking Alpha (readers can look up all prior disclosures regarding companies I cover here at Seeking Alpha).

Disclosure:I am/we are long AGNC, MTGE.

I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Additional disclosure: I currently have no position in ACAS, ARCC, ARR, CYS, NLY, or ORC.