The World Affairs Board is the premier forum for the discussion of the pressing geopolitical issues of our time. Topics include military and defense developments, international terrorism, insurgency & COIN doctrine, international security and policing, weapons proliferation, and military technological development.

Our membership includes many from military, defense, academic, and government backgrounds with expert knowledge on a wide range of topics. Registration is fast, simple and absolutely free so why not register a World Affairs Board account and join our community today?

Japan's naval production during WWII was anemic. Even at zero naval production, there's not enough slack industrial capacity to make up for but a smidge in matching Soviet industrial capacity. The Soviets historically had 20x the crude oil, 3x the iron, and 3x the coal production of Japan during the war.

Japan was not an industrial powerhouse during WWII.

Correct, no argument. Japan lacked mineral resources, Which is why it embarked on its colonization of Asia. Which then brought it into conflict with the US and UK etc

Alzheimer's can be a real bugger at times. I quoted the author of the citation, you even said you had the book.

Yes, and I understood the context. Stalin and Zhukov didn't even tried to avoid casualties. Only victory mattered and at times, they overstretched in pursuit of victory that was denied. Op MARS was a Soviet military disaster.

Originally Posted by Toby

the 2nd Sino-Japanese war!!!! You know? that other big war to the south!

The 2nd Sino-Japanese War didn't stopped the Imperial Japanese Empire from doing Pearl Harbour, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philipines. IJA Gen Komatsubara was determined to go for round 2 at Khalkhin Gol before Tokyo wisely cried uncle.

Originally Posted by Toby

All armies capture food. The Soviets did have the advantage of being in their own country though

The Western Allies didn't and neither did the Soviets in their invasion of Germany.

Originally Posted by Toby

From 41 onwards The Japanese were fighting the Americans, Australians, British/British Indian army, The Chinese both nationalist and communist and latterly the Soviets from 45 and still only surrendered due to 2 atom bombs! which puts holes in your conclusion.

Not one single bit. The Japanese knew the Soviets were coming and prepared themselves accordingly. They thought they had a well thought out plan and the Soviets proved them wrong within 30 days. They put up a good fight against the Fixing Force (North Front) but had no clue that they were being fixed in place and being surrounded. By the time they realized what's going on, the East and West Fronts already closed their traps and the Kwangtung Army knew it was doomed.

As for the Japanese surrender. It was a 1 (Hiroshima) - 2 (AUGUST STORM) - 3 (Nagasaki) punch. You're right about the two atomic bombs that threatened the homeland but make no mistake, the Imperial Japanese Empire ceased to exist once the Soviets took Manchuria and Korea and only the Home Islands exist.

Originally Posted by Toby

Further, just look at Japanese industry after the war and look at Soviet industry. The Japanese are far superior.

So what? What does post-war production got anything to do with wartime production?

Originally Posted by Toby

Thank you. I'll continue to be a jackass just as long as you pretend to be the font of all knowledge.

I don't pretend to be a font of all knowledge and I do not post on things that I don't know anything about such as the possibility of Trump's impeachment but I can't stand stupidity from people who pretend to speak with knowledge (you) and zero to back it up.

Originally Posted by Toby

No doubt propaganda was used on all sides. Although Bill Slim would have found it a lot harder to misplace 60,000 men! Call the British all you like but we tend not to be as proficient at mass extermination..Unlike others!

And this is the example you're setting. I pointed to you the attempted Japanese Invasion of India as an example of Japanese stupidity and nowhere close to Soviet military thought. Bill Slim didn't lose 60,000 men. He killed 60,000 Japanese when the Japanese tried to invade India.

I point to you that they should not even have tried it since they did not have sufficent food nor munitions and was counting on capturing British stock. That is pure stupidity. I also shown you that the Soviets was well prepared with food and munitions for a million+ men operations and you still tout Japanese military superiority and then tried to explain it away that they were spent. Who cares? Only losers come up with excuses.

Japan knew she couldn't take on the colonial powers without an European war to distract them. the invasion of SE Asia was opportunistic.

the weakness of the IJA vs the Soviets is apparent just from the casualty numbers of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. the Soviets were looking at a worst-case scenario of 150,000-200,000 casualties, but in reality "only" took 30,000.

contrast this with the Battle of Berlin, where the Soviets ate 300K+ casualties against the last broken parts of the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm.

the IJA did well in defensive actions where there was no room to manuever and the opposing force HAD to go in and root out the fanatics. the IJA was completely wrecked any time there was space for maneuver.

There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

reading up on it, i was really surprised by just how terrible the Japanese were when it came to logistics. forget insufficient mortar support, after they were beaten and were on the retreat, the British found that the Japanese were literally starving to death because they couldn't bring up enough food.

and that was without any real opposing supply interdiction.

i sometimes wonder if the war could have been shortened if the US wasn't so enamored with the island-hopping campaign. there was a significant anti-British faction within the US government that didn't want to help the Brits at all, because they didn't want Americans dying for the British Empire.

base out of Australia, build massive supply stocks in Aus and India, support Slim, and fight a war for maneuver in China. probably fewer casualties that way than ramming into the teeth of Japanese island defenses one at a time.

There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

Correct, no argument. Japan lacked mineral resources, Which is why it embarked on its colonization of Asia. Which then brought it into conflict with the US and UK etc

The figures I provided cover Japan's resource production including that from all of their historical conquests.

The Japanese are not going to match, even remotely, no matter what they do, the quantity of materiel coming out of the Soviet Union. It goes without saying, that Japan was vastly technologically inferior as well. Japan was outclassed, outnumbered, and outmatched industrially in both of these areas vis-a-vis the Soviets during WWII.

base out of Australia, build massive supply stocks in Aus and India, support Slim, and fight a war for maneuver in China. probably fewer casualties that way than ramming into the teeth of Japanese island defenses one at a time.

Japan knew she couldn't take on the colonial powers without an European war to distract them. the invasion of SE Asia was opportunistic.

the weakness of the IJA vs the Soviets is apparent just from the casualty numbers of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. the Soviets were looking at a worst-case scenario of 150,000-200,000 casualties, but in reality "only" took 30,000.

contrast this with the Battle of Berlin, where the Soviets ate 300K+ casualties against the last broken parts of the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm.

the IJA did well in defensive actions where there was no room to manuever and the opposing force HAD to go in and root out the fanatics. the IJA was completely wrecked any time there was space for maneuver.

The IJA in China in 45 was not the same force it was prior to 43. While the Soviets grew in combat power, the IJA lost it both in numbers, manpower quality and relative quality vs foreign kit.

i sometimes wonder if the war could have been shortened if the US wasn't so enamored with the island-hopping campaign. there was a significant anti-British faction within the US government that didn't want to help the Brits at all, because they didn't want Americans dying for the British Empire.

base out of Australia, build massive supply stocks in Aus and India, support Slim, and fight a war for maneuver in China. probably fewer casualties that way than ramming into the teeth of Japanese island defenses one at a time.

Chiang would probably be over the moon at the idea of huge American formations in China. more money for him to steal, and "oh those Comm- I mean Japanese puppet troops are just over there".

z,

The IJA in China in 45 was not the same force it was prior to 43. While the Soviets grew in combat power, the IJA lost it both in numbers, manpower quality and relative quality vs foreign kit.

agreed. but even from the very start, they were completely outclassed by the Soviets anyway. even assuming the Soviets took 10x the casualties as they did in August Storm, it would still be nothing compared to even one portion of a campaign against the Germans.

Crossing the hump wouldn't be easy.

doubt we'd try to use the Hump then. base out of India/Aus, re-take Burma, slam right into southern China.

the Hump was a very cool piece of USAAF history but looking back on it now, an enormous waste of resources. if the Allies actually decided to duke it out in China, suddenly support for the Chinese would, ironically, go way down the totem pole.

There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

agreed. but even from the very start, they were completely outclassed by the Soviets anyway. even assuming the Soviets took 10x the casualties as they did in August Storm, it would still be nothing compared to even one portion of a campaign against the Germans.

Different levels of carnage for sure.

doubt we'd try to use the Hump then. base out of India/Aus, re-take Burma, slam right into southern China.

the Hump was a very cool piece of USAAF history but looking back on it now, an enormous waste of resources. if the Allies actually decided to duke it out in China, suddenly support for the Chinese would, ironically, go way down the totem pole.

Gonna be a slug to move down the coast before the IJN is defeated. Waiting for the navy to win control of the seas slows things down and you end up having to invade Formosa, Malaysia and the Philippines at some point.

Japan knew she couldn't take on the colonial powers without an European war to distract them. the invasion of SE Asia was opportunistic.

the weakness of the IJA vs the Soviets is apparent just from the casualty numbers of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. the Soviets were looking at a worst-case scenario of 150,000-200,000 casualties, but in reality "only" took 30,000.

contrast this with the Battle of Berlin, where the Soviets ate 300K+ casualties against the last broken parts of the Wehrmacht and the Volkssturm.

the IJA did well in defensive actions where there was no room to manuever and the opposing force HAD to go in and root out the fanatics. the IJA was completely wrecked any time there was space for maneuver.

The larger the scale & the more room to move the bigger the problems. Thus even Chinese armies proved capable of beating them despite the many & varied problems that nation faced. Every time I think about what the Red Army would do to an IJA that could still be bested in battle by NRA forces I truly shudder.

Originally Posted by astralis

reading up on it, i was really surprised by just how terrible the Japanese were when it came to logistics. forget insufficient mortar support, after they were beaten and were on the retreat, the British found that the Japanese were literally starving to death because they couldn't bring up enough food.

and that was without any real opposing supply interdiction.

When I was a kid I remember stories about Japanese cannibalism. My grandfather saw some bodies on the Kokoda track which, thinking back on what he said with an adult brain, were probably partially eaten. I'd always assumed this was a bit of exaggeration in the way that hated enemies are often made into even greater monsters. Subsequent research showed that the stories were true. The soldiers who pushed over the Owen Stanleys in PNG were at the end of such a poor logistics chain that they just couldn't feed themselves. Those forces almost got to Port Moresby, but when they were stopped they were wrecked and when they were pushed back they got hammered. This is an extreme example, but part of a bigger problem.

That disregard for logistics worked for them at times. It meant those light IJA forces that stormed across Sth East Asia could wrong foot larger forces that should have been capable of holding them up for longer or even stopping them. However, the logistics gods will not be mocked. Unless everybody gives up & goes home it eventually catches up.

to be fair, i heard the IJA was actually pretty good at the company level,

Now that I have a chance to think about this more. No, I don't think so. The IJA was the best WWI army in WWII but it was not even close to being the best WWI army of all times. Things that we learned during WWI, overlapping fields of fire, creeping barrage, were absent for the IJA.

And their one and only one answer to these tactics was the banzai charge. In fact, they've done far more bayonet training than they did marksmanship.

The 2nd Sino-Japanese War didn't stopped the Imperial Japanese Empire from doing Pearl Harbour, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philipines. IJA Gen Komatsubara was determined to go for round 2 at Khalkhin Gol before Tokyo wisely cried uncle.

I thought foolishly that an IJA operation north (if the power structures in Japan had not eventually favouring a southern maritime strategy) could have tipped the war in favour for the germans on the eastern front if it had occurred in 1941 to coincide with Barbarossa, even with an eventual Japanese defeat to be expected. I see now that it would have been a disaster for the IJA and not the drain on the soviets I had envisaged. Even with perfect timing (for the germans), the impression I take from the expertise on show in this thread is that a Japanese-russian war could not have aided the axis cause at all.

That said, Japan's attack on Pearl habour continues to look like the critical miscalculation of the war given american public sentiment to stay out of hostilities. It is a perilous task to discuss what ifs, to think that german success with the rapid fall of france, leads to the removal of the colonial french fleet from south east asia, itself creating conditions that motivated Japan to launch its attack on pearl habour, dragging the US into the war, and ultimately playing a defining role in german defeat (even just with land lease). You can go round and round even at the basic strategic implications of a single altered campaign (even if one ignores logistics, tactics).

the impression I take from the expertise on show in this thread is that a Japanese-russian war could not have aided the axis cause at all.

I think it would have been a serious Axis strategic mistake. If the Japanese attack, even in timing with BARBAROSSA, they would have handed Manchuria and Korea to the Soviets. Manchuria and Korea WAS the Imperial Japanese Empire. Without these two territories, the Japanese Home Islands would be left without the necessary raw and industrial resources needed to conduct a naval campaign against the US. The Japanese would been forced to sue for peace.

At which time, 3 USN carriers and the USMC would be tasked to the ETO. Couple that Stalin has untapped Chinese and Korean manpower and maybe even two or three penal Japanese armies. Japanese tanks and weapons maynot be on par with the Soviets but the Soviets had no qualms about throwing everything including the kitchen sink into meatgrinders. These factors would not change the face of MARS, URANUS, BAGRATION, OVERLORD, AVALANCHE (ie, how the campaigns would have been conducted) but they would have reduced the time between campaigns.

I think it would have been a serious Axis strategic mistake. If the Japanese attack, even in timing with BARBAROSSA, they would have handed Manchuria and Korea to the Soviets.

Doubtful, in fact a Japanese invasion may have doomed the Soviets. While a Japanese advance would have quickly faltered, the forces in the East didn't have the means to drive all the way to the industrial heart of Manchuria and Korea. Goes back to the lack of trucks, short ranged tanks and less than a 2:1 numerical superiority in 41 and vastly less air power against an IJA at its relative peak. However the invasion would have pinned 26 divisions in the East during the Summer and Autumn when they would otherwise have gone west to die against the Germans. Without those 26 divisions Lenningrad falls and Typhoon faces a lot less resistance. The troops transferred west were the critical stop gap between the destruction of the Red Army in the West and the new army being raised. If the Soviets lose Moscow their options are limited, they lose Lenningrad and Moscow and have thier forces in the east chewing and getting chewed up its lights out. 200 divisions of poorly and untrained cannon fodder infantry with few tanks, artillery or airplanes trying to rally out of the Gorky Reaches is going to fight even worse and have poorer logistics than the IJA did. Soviet industry would not even begin to recover until 43. Stalingrad and Kharkov in the Ukraine would be the last major industrial centers left to Stalin in 42.