A fiber optic splitter, also known as a beam splitter, is based on a quartz substrate of an integrated waveguide optical power distribution device, similar to a coaxial cable transmission system. The optical network system uses an optical signal coupled to the branch distribution. The fiber optic splitter is one of the most important passive devices in the optical fiber link. It is an optical fiber tandem device with many input and output terminals, especially applicable to a passive optical network (EPON, GPON, BPON, FTTX, FTTH etc.) to connect the MDF and the terminal equipment and to branch the optical signal.

A fiber optic splitter is a device that splits the fiber optic light into several parts by a certain ratio. For example, when a beam of fiber optic light transmitted from a 1X4 equal ratio splitter, it will be divided into 4-fiber optic light by equal ratio that is each beam is 1/4 or 25% of the original source one. A fiber optic splitter is different from WDM. WDM can divide the different wavelength fiber optic light into different channels. fiber optic splitter divide the light power and send it to different channels.

Most Splitters available in 900µm loose tube and 250µm bare fiber. 1x2 and 2x2 couplers come standard with a protective metal sleeve to cover the split. Higher output counts are built with a box to protect the splitting components

Narus is one of the first companies to combine patented machine learning algorithms, automation, and data fusion technologies to provide the incisive intelligence, context, and control network operators need to protect against cyberthreats and ensure information security.

Narus is noted for having created NarusInsight, a supercomputer system, whose installation in AT&T's San Francisco Internet backbone gave rise to a 2006 class action lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation against AT&T, Hepting v. AT&T.[11]

The equipment that technician Mark Klein learned was installed in the National Security Agency's "secret room" inside AT&T's San Francisco switching office isn't some sinister Big Brother box designed solely to help governments eavesdrop on citizens' internet communications.

Rather, it's a powerful commercial network-analysis product with all sorts of valuable uses for network operators. It just happens to be capable of doing things that make it one of the best internet spy tools around.

"Anything that comes through (an internet protocol network), we can record," says Steve Bannerman, marketing vice president of Narus, a Mountain View, California, company. "We can reconstruct all of their e-mails along with attachments, see what web pages they clicked on, we can reconstruct their (voice over internet protocol) calls."

Inside the Secret Room Courtroom Clash!A federal judge refuses to give AT&T back its internal documents, but orders the EFF not to give them out.

Whistle-blower's PrecognitionYears before the NSA's warrantless surveillance program made national headlines, then-AT&T technician Mark Klein suspected his company was colluding with the government to spy on Americans.

– and provides documents he says proves his case.

A little-known company called Narus makes the packet-inspection technology said to be the basis of the NSA's internet surveillance. Here's how it works.

Narus' product, the Semantic Traffic Analyzer, is a software application that runs on standard IBM or Dell servers using the Linux operating system. It's renowned within certain circles for its ability to inspect traffic in real time on high-bandwidth pipes, identifying packets of interest as they race by at up to 10 Gbps.

Internet companies can install the analyzers at every entrance and exit point of their networks, at their "cores" or centers, or both. The analyzers communicate with centralized "logic servers" running specialized applications. The combination can keep track of, analyze and record nearly every form of internet communication, whether e-mail, instant message, video streams or VOIP phone calls that cross the network.

Brasil Telecom and several other Brazilian phone companies are using Narus products to charge each other for VOIP calls they send over one another's IP networks. Internet companies in China and the Middle East use them to block VOIP calls altogether.

But even before the product's alleged role in the NSA's operations emerged, its potential as a surveillance tool was not lost on corporate America.

In December, VeriSign, also of Mountain View, chose Narus' product as the backbone of its lawful-intercept-outsourcing service, which helps network operators comply with court-authorized surveillance orders from law enforcement agencies. A special Narus lawful-intercept application does this spying with ease, sorting through torrents of IP traffic to pick out specific messages based on a targeted e-mail address, IP address or, in the case of VOIP, phone number.

"We needed their fast packet-detection and inspection capability," says VeriSign Vice President Raj Puri. "They do it with specialized software that can isolate packets for a specific target."

Narus has little control over how its products are used after they're sold. For example, although its lawful-intercept application has a sophisticated system for making sure the surveillance complies with the terms of a warrant, it's up to the operator whether to type those terms into the system, says Bannerman.

That legal eavesdropping application was launched in February 2005, well after whistle-blower Klein allegedly learned that AT&T was installing Narus boxes in secure, NSA-controlled rooms in switching centers around the country. But that doesn't mean the government couldn't write its own code to do the dirty work. Narus even offers software-development kits to customers.

"Our product is designed to comply (with) all of the laws in all of the countries we ship to," says Bannerman. "Many of our customers have built their own applications. We have no idea what they do."

Full IPv6 Support, Enhanced Performance and Efficiency, Additional System Hardening, and Multiple New Features and Functions to Support the Constantly Changing Demands of Cyberspace

SUNNYVALE, CA--(Marketwire - Mar 6, 2012) - Narus, Inc., the leader in real-time network traffic intelligence and analytics, today unveiled NarusInsight 8, which continues Narus' tradition of delivering situational awareness in an ever-changing cyber environment. The latest release fully supports IPv6, keeping pace with industry and government organizations as they adopt new standards. NarusInsight 8 also offers improved efficiency for existing software and enhanced performance for more powerful hardware. Support for additional system hardening required for government environments rounds out NarusInsight 8. With this release, Narus continues its leadership in providing enhanced situational awareness with its real-time traffic intelligence and analytics. NarusInsight now supports more than 1,000 netflow sources with more than 2,500 interfaces. NarusInsight comes complete with embedded connectors to world-class data warehouses such as Teradata and SEIMs such as ArcSight. Precision targeting provides packet capture capabilities for deep analytics and session reconstruction without the need for additional packet capture applications.

NarusInsight leverages a scalable, flexible and powerful architecture and a combination of patented, real-time traffic intelligence and cyber analytics to provide unique insight into the quality of the network and traffic and subsequently the security of any critical infrastructure. NarusInsight offers a total network view of heterogeneous networks, and provides deep insight into multiple layers of network traffic. The information is provided in real time, enabling customers to see clearly what is happening in their networks from Layer 2 though Layer 7, and use this information to quickly mitigate malicious activity and optimize network assets. Network operators are able to proactively guard against cyber threats and maintain the integrity, quality and efficiency of their network and data.

NarusInsight 8 offers some key features and functionality that protect against today's cyber threats and evolve with the threat landscape of tomorrow, setting it apart from its industry peers.•Support for IPv6 - This latest release extends NarusInsight's real-time capture and processing capabilities to include IPv6. This is especially critical for government and large international organizations (healthcare and financial institutions included) that are leading the charge in adopting the latest industry standard. Most of today's security solutions operate using IPv4, and are unable to correctly parse and identify IPv6 connections. Cyber criminals seize on this lapse in visibility, creating IPv6 connections that are ignored by security solutions, and easily slipping into a network. With NarusInsight 8, the same features and functionality from previous releases supporting IPv4 are carried over to the IPv6 version.

•Increased efficiency, enhanced performance, improved scalability - With NarusInsight 8, existing software efficiency is increased by 25 percent on average, with no need for investment in new hardware. This ability to process vast quantities of data efficiently (at 10Gb/s) with no extra expenditure is a huge draw in today's cost-conscious economy. Moreover, NarusInsight 8 now supports more powerful hardware. This, combined with the efficient processing of large amounts of data, combines to deliver the perfect solution, even for big data environments.

"Our critical infrastructures are at the mercy of cyber criminals and constantly changing cyber environment, and the only way to ensure the quality of the data on these networks is to gain 'cyber intelligence' into the network traffic," said Greg Oslan, chief executive officer, Narus. "NarusInsight delivers the knowledge needed to ensure the protection of critical infrastructures, that data integrity remains intact and quality of life is maintained."

NarusInsight 8 is generally available in March. For more information, please visit http://www.narus.com.

About NarusNarus provides real-time network traffic intelligence and analytics software that analyzes IP traffic and flow data to map the digital DNA (or behavior) of the network in real time.

Through its patented analytics, Narus' carrier-class software detects patterns and anomalies that predict and identify security issues, misuse of network resources, suspicious or criminal activity, and other events that compromise the integrity of IP networks. The NarusInsight System is designed to be a next-generation Network Analysis and Visibility (NAV) solution integrated into a customer's operational environment, strengthening existing security and monitoring systems, while providing total traffic visibility across the network.

NarusInsight protects and manages the largest IP networks around the world, and has been deployed with commercial and government installations on five continents. Narus is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Boeing Company (NYSE: BA), and is headquartered in Sunnyvale, Calif., with regional offices around the world. To learn more about Narus and NarusInsight, please visit http://www.narus.com.

The Treasury Department on Monday announced the imposition of economic sanctions against Russian entities engaged in targeting undersea internet cables and cyber spying inside critical U.S. infrastructures.

The department announced sanctions on five companies and three Russians linked to the Federal Security Service, the main Kremlin intelligence service, known as the FSB, that has been linked to Russian election meddling in 2016.

For the first time, Treasury revealed one of the sanctioned companies, Divetechnoservices, has worked with the FSB since 2007 to spy on underwater cables used to connect the internet around the world.

’

The Russian underwater equipment company in 2011 was paid $1.5 million by the FSB to procure a submersible craft for underwater cable spying.

American defense officials, however, have said Russia has been aggressively probing undersea cables in the Atlantic over the past several years.

Russia's Yantar intelligence-gathering ship, which makes annual forays to the U.S. East Coast, is believed to be conducting reconnaissance of undersea cables, according to defense officials.

The Washington Free Beacon reported in 2015 that the Yantar is equipped with deep-sea surveillance craft and cable cutting equipment. The ship was engaged in identifying undersea cable trunk lines and nodes.

Pentagon intelligence officials said one major target of the Russian underwater reconnaissance is identifying links used by the Department of Defense Information Network, or DoDIN, which uses dedicated military links and leased communications and computer systems.

The underwater surveillance also has been detected in European waters.

The surveillance has raised fears among intelligence and security officials that Moscow is preparing to cut undersea internet cables in a future crisis or conflict to disrupt targeted nations, like the United States or the nations of Europe.

Severing underwater internet cables would severely disrupt the highly networked U.S. military as well as civilian populations.

The internet is connected around the world through a series of undersea cables. Several major international internet cables enter the United States through the East Coast, including through New York and near Washington.

Security analysts say it would be difficult but not impossible to completely cut off internet access to a particular state because of the numerous cables.

However, carefully targeted cable attacks could disrupt military logistics or cause other cables to be overloaded.

The newsletter Defense One reported recently that an accidentally severed undersea cable in the Mediterranean 10 years ago forced the U.S. military to curtail drone operations in Iraq.

"We are now seeing Russian underwater activity in the vicinity of undersea cables that I don't believe we have ever seen," Navy Rear Adm. Andrew Lennon, commander of NATO's submarine forces told the Washington Post in December. "Russia is clearly taking an interest in NATO and NATO nations' undersea infrastructure."

In Europe, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, chief of British defense staff, warned in December that attacks on undersea cables could produce catastrophic results on economies.

A lack of formal state ownership of undersea cable networks means the network currently does not have strong protection under international law, he said.

The air chief warned that Russia poses an immediate danger to undersea cables.

"There is a new risk to our way of life, which is the vulnerability of the cables that criss-cross the seabeds," he said in a speech, adding that NATO has made protecting the cables a priority.

The Treasury Department said in a statement that Divetechnoservices has been supporting underwater gear for the FSB since 2007.

The three Russians slapped with sanctions under the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act were officials of Divetechnoservices. They include the company's general director, Aleksandr Lvovich Tribun, program manager Oleg Sergeyevich Chirikov, and owner and former director Vladimir Yakovlevich Kaganskiy.

"The United States is engaged in an ongoing effort to counter malicious actors working at the behest of the Russian Federation and its military and intelligence units to increase Russia's offensive cyber capabilities," said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin in a statement.

"The entities designated today have directly contributed to improving Russia's cyber and underwater capabilities through their work with the FSB and therefore jeopardize the safety and security of the United States and our allies."

Mnuchin said the United States is committed to aggressively targeting companies and people working for the FSB.

Underwater spying operations are not new. The Navy partnered with the National Security Agency in the early 1980s to tap into Russian undersea communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk in the Russian Far East.

The operation known as Ivy Bells was compromised by turncoat NSA analyst Ronald Pelton, who was convicted of spying for Moscow in 1986. At his trial, government officials tried to prevent the disclosure of the Ivy Bells program.

The FSB was one of two Russian intelligence agencies linked to Moscow's cyber-enabled covert influence operation targeting the 2016 presidential election. The GRU military intelligence services also was involved in the election meddling that included cyber attacks on political figures and the release of private emails, as well as social media influence activities.

Treasury said Russia's cyber activities have included the destructive NotPetya cyber attack that shut down networks around the world, including one facilitating Britain's health care system.

Other attacks have included Russian intrusions into the U.S. energy grid that Treasury said in a statement threatened U.S. security.

Two U.S. military commanders warned in 2016 that cyber intrusions against critical infrastructures had sharply increased between 2010 and 2015 and warned that a Russian-origin malware, BlackEnergy, posed a particular danger to the electric grid. The malware was used to shut down Ukraine's electric grid in a 2015 cyber attack.

The FSB was sanctioned in March and earlier in 2016 for conducting cyber attacks.

The sanctions block all property and interests in property, and U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from conducting any business with the people or companies.

The sanctions have the effect of making it very difficult for the entities involved to conduct any business that involved international financial institutions that do business in the United States.

In addition to the underwater equipment company, sanctions were imposed on the Russian company Digital Security, which Treasury said had participated in activities that have boosted offensive cyber capabilities of Russian intelligence services, including the FSB.

Two other subsidiaries of Digital Security, ERPScan, and Embedi, were also sanctioned.

Additionally, Treasury slapped sanctions on the Kvant Scientific Research Institute that is owned or controlled by the FSB.

Mark Schneider, a former Pentagon policymaker who worked on Russian affairs, said militarily the ability to destroy U.S. underwater cable systems is a very serious threat.

"Fiber optics has substantially replaced satellite communications and this has had the side effect of degrading our space launch industry," Schneider said.

"Information plays a major role in the modern U.S. approach to warfare," he added. "If our cable systems are taken out, our military could be in a very bad situation. The threat is asymmetric because Russia has internal lines of communications. The threat is made even worse by the [anti-satellite weapons] asymmetry."

Steffan Watkins, a researcher who monitors Russian maritime surveillance, said Treasury did not sanction the Russian Navy's Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, known as GUGI, that has been linked to technical spying operations in the Atlantic.

"The conclusion I draw is these sanctions don't have anything to do with the alleged cable tapping that's made so many headlines, or they would have said so more directly, and would have named the department which does cable tapping, the GUGI—not the more well-known FSB," he said.

For a long time, MAE West was located at NASA Ames, next-door to The Blue Cube. It was moved to San Jose at about the same time The Blue Cube's (NRO) operation was moved to Cheyene Mountain.

MAE-East was originally created in 1992, primarily by Metropolitan Fiber Systems (MFS) and Rick Adams of UUNET. Steven Feldman an Internet architect recalls "A group of network providers in the Virginia area got together over beer one night and decided to connect their networks."[3] The founding networks were AlterNet (UUNET's backbone service), PSINet and Sprint-ICM.[4] MFS was the service provider offering metropolitan fiber, co-location facilities, cross connects and switch ports for the ISPs to interconnect.[4] MAE-East was modeled after FIX East and Fix Westhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAE-East

MAE-West was an Internet exchange point located on the west coast of the U.S. in San Jose, California and Los Angeles, California. Its name officially stands for "Metropolitan Area Exchange, West", although some note the similarity to the name of the actress Mae West.Its San Jose facility was housed in the Market Post Tower.[1] Built in 1985, Market Post Tower, also known as the Gold Building, is a 15-story building located at 55 South Market at the corner Post Street in downtown San Jose, California.According to its website, “MAE West is interconnected with the Ames Internet Exchange, operated by NASA at the Ames Research Center. This connection is currently two OC3c circuits directly between the FDDI switches at each end.” [2]In the 1990s, MAE-West was operated by MCI Worldcom and was the second-busiest exchange point on the internet, handling, by some estimates, as much as 40 percent of the nation's Internet traffic. [3]MAE is a registered trademark of Verizon for internet exchange services.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAE-West33

Onizuka Air Force Station AKA The Blue Cube

Onizuka Air Force Station was a United States Air Force installation in Santa Clara County, California, just outside the city limits of Sunnyvale, at the intersection of U.S. Route 101 and State Route 237. It was operational from 1960 to 2010.Its distinguishing feature was Building 1003, known locally as the Blue Cube or simply the "Cube" given its size, color, and lack of windows. The station's other distinguishing features were its three primary parabolic dish antennas used for communication with remote tracking stations used to control military satellites; these antennas were named Sun East, Sun West, and Sun 3.In the United States space program's formative stages, Air Force Systems Command contracted with the Philco Ford division of Ford Motor Company to provide interim operational facilities at its Palo Alto, California, location. Operations commenced in the late 1950s. By 1958, the United States Air Force sought a permanent home with larger facilities. Ultimately, the United States Air Force purchased roughly 19 acres of land from Lockheed Corporation, which included Lockheed Building 100, and was named Sunnyvale Air Force Station. Construction of the station's original facilities was completed in 1960. Over time, additional structures were built as operations expanded.The station was home to the Air Force Systems Command operational unit known as the Air Force Satellite Test Center (STC, colloquially called the "stick)," and other non-Air Force Systems Command operational organizations. By 1979, the Air Force Satellite Test Center was renamed the Air Force Satellite Control Facility. In 1986, the same year of the Challenger explosion, Sunnyvale AFS was renamed Onizuka AFB in honor of Air Force Lt. Colonel Ellison S. Onizuka, an astronaut that died on the Challenger. Ultimately, both Onizuka Air Force Station and the Air Force Satellite Control Facility were transferred from Air Force Systems Command to Air Force Space Command and was operated by the 21st Space Operations Squadron, a geographically separated unit (GSU) of the 50th Space Wing. The non-Air Force System Command operational organizations remained under their respective commands.When the station was opened in 1960, the Sunnyvale area was rural and the station was predominantly surrounded by orchards. By the late 1970s, the region had become Silicon Valley and the station's physical security vulnerabilities became apparent. As a result, Air Force Systems Command commenced plans for the Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC), which would be located several miles east of Colorado Springs, Colorado at a to be built Falcon Air Force Station (ultimately named Schriever Air Force Base). Spacecraft operations would be split between the two locations and each location would serve as a backup to the other. To maintain this redundancy, when Onizuka Air Force Station was selected for closure by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the Air Force determined to relocate Onizuka's remaining operational units to the new Ellison Onizuka Satellite Operations Facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base.[1] Upon completion of this transition, Onizuka Air Force Station was ceremonially closed on July 28, 2010, and officially closed on September 30, 2010.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onizuka_Air_Force_Station

Unlike the United States Navy, which went all-in on nuclear power, Russia maintains fleets of both diesel and nuclear-powered submarines. A land power encompassing much of Eurasia, Russian submarines are based much closer to “the action” than American submarines are. While Russia maintains nuclear submarines for distant ocean patrols, its fleet of diesel submarines is more than adequate for conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and the Russian near abroad.

The mainstay of the Russian Navy’s conventionally powered fleet are Project 877–class submarines, known as the Kilo class to NATO and the West. Nicknamed the “Black Hole” submarine by the U.S. Navy, the Improved Kilos are extremely quiet. The class has been built more or less continuously for thirty years, a testament to their effectiveness at sea.

The Kilo class was originally meant to serve the navies of the Warsaw Pact countries, replacing older Whiskey- and Foxtrot-class boats. The sub measures just 238 feet long by thirty-two feet wide, and displace 3,076 tons submerged. The ship has a crew of just twelve officers and forty-one enlisted men, and has an endurance of forty-five days before needing to be resupplied.

The ships are powered by two diesel generators and an electric drive, giving them enough power to make ten knots at the surface and seventeen knots underwater. They are not fast submarines. They have a range of six thousand to 7,500 nautical miles, meaning that from the Russian Northern Fleet headquarters they can patrol for one thousand nautical miles and then go on to Cuba.

Neither are they particularly deep divers. According to Combat Fleets of the World , the Kilo class normally dives to just 787 feet, with a maximum diving depth of 984 feet. The submarines do particularly well in shallow water, where a pair of ducted props powered by low-speed motoring motors likely allows it to operate closer to the sea floor.

A lot of silencing went into the Kilos. The hull is described as having the approximate shape of a drop of water and greatly reducing water resistance over older, World War II–era submarine designs. The propulsion plant is isolated on a rubber base so it doesn’t touch the hull, preventing vibrations from turning into noise that can be heard outside the boat. The ship has a rubbery anechoic coating to deaden noise emanating from the submarine, which occasionally gives the submarines a blocky appearance noticeable in photographs. The air regeneration system can keep the crew supplied with oxygen for up to 260 hours, giving the ship almost two weeks’ worth of underwater endurance.

The sensor suite consists of the MGK-400 Rubikon (Shark Gill) low-frequency active and passive radar suite with a passive hull array. It also has a MG519 Mouse Roar high-frequency radar for target classification and mine avoidance. For simple surface navigation and search the Kilos are equipped with the MRK-50 Albatros radar.

Finally, the Kilos have six torpedo tubes of standard 533-millimeter diameter, and were originally configured to carry homing torpedoes and eighteen SS-N-15A Starfish antisubmarine missiles. On the last ships of the class, two of the torpedo tubes are capable of firing wire-guided torpedoes. Also unique to this class is a position for a seaman with a shoulder-figured Igla man-portable air-defense missile launcher.

Twenty-four Kilo-class submarines were operated by the Soviet Union, of which eleven are still operated by Russia. One was sold to Poland, which remains operational, but another, sold to Romania, is no longer in service. Ten were sold to India; nine are still operational while the tenth caught fire and sank pierside in August 2013. Iran has three Kilos, and Algeria has two. China had two submarines, purchased after the end of the Cold War.

Submarines were some of the first vessels Russian shipyards started building after the dissolution of the USSR. An improved version of the Kilo class, known as Project 636.3 or just “Improved Kilo,” was developed to rejuvenate a flagging Russian submarine force and gain hard currency from exports.

The 636.3 class was an all-around upgrade. The dimensions of the submarine are essentially the same, but the bow has been reshaped to improve hydrodynamic flow. It features improved quietness due to further isolation of the machinery, moving other machinery to areas where they would make less noise. The submarine also has 25 percent greater range than previous versions. Major sonar systems however are largely the same as in the original Kilo class.

One major improvement of the 636.3 class is the ability to launch Kalibur cruise missiles. Kalibur (the export version is known as Klub) is a versatile class of missile with land-attack, antiship, and antisubmarine warfare versions. In December 2016, the Russian submarine Rostov-on-Don launched Kalibur land-attack missiles against Islamic State .

The People’s Republic of China was an early customer for the 636.3, buying ten submarines in the 1990s. The subs are apparently split between the East and South Sea Fleets. Another customer has been Algeria, which has bought two modern Kilos to supplement its pair of original submarines.

So did Russian submarines really track down a British sub? As so often with the Silent Service, it's hard for those of us above the waves to know what really happened. Given that Russia had been forewarned for days that a strike on Syria was coming, it seems quite plausible that their air and sea forces were out looking for cruise-missile subs in the Eastern Mediterranean. It's also true that while nuclear-powered submarines are faster and have longer range, smaller diesel boats like the Kilos (which weigh about 2,300 tons compared to 7,400 tons for an Astute) are handier in coastal waters. The Kilo also has noise-reducing features, such as a sound-absorbing anechoic hull coating and engines isolated from the hull by a rubber base, so as not to transmit noise.

Russian diesel subs chased a British nuclear sub off the Syrian coast, according to British media last month.

The incident reportedly involved one or two Russian Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines , which have been dubbed the "Black Hole" by Western navies because they are remarkably quiet. Their prey was a British Astute-class nuclear attack submarine.

"Two Russian frigates and an anti-submarine aircraft are also thought to have been searching for the British boat as it maneuvered to put its Tomahawk cruise missiles within range of Syrian military targets," according to The Times of London ."The Astute-class submarine is believed to have spent several days trying to evade detection in a tense and dangerous contest."

The British sub did not fire its Tomahawks during last week's strike by American, British and French forces against Syrian chemical weapons sites, leading to speculation that the British boat was driven off by the Russian subs. The Kilo-class subs were reportedly based at Russia's naval installation at the Syrian port of Tartus, said The Times , citing anonymous British military sources.

Indicating just how serious the incident was, U.S. planes flew cover over the British vessel. "The British submarine has been protected by the U.S. Navy, which began flying P-8 maritime patrol aircraft over the eastern Mediterranean last Wednesday to track Russia’s ships and subs," The Times said.

"This is believed to be the first time an underwater duel has taken place in the build-up to [missile] strikes," The Times added.

Russia's Sputnik News site quickly trumpeted the incident, though it cited British media rather than the Russian military. "The Kilo-class Russian submarines, which carry an impressive arsenal of torpedoes, as well as cruise and anti-ship missiles, are considered by British military experts as a 'considerable threat,' Sputnik News added. "In comparison, the Astute-class British submarines have limited firepower and can carrying around 20 Tomahawk cruise missiles."

So did Russian submarines really track down a British sub? As so often with the Silent Service, it's hard for those of us above the waves to know what really happened. Given that Russia had been forewarned for days that a strike on Syria was coming, it seems quite plausible that their air and sea forces were out looking for cruise-missile subs in the Eastern Mediterranean. It's also true that while nuclear-powered submarines are faster and have longer range, smaller diesel boats like the Kilos (which weigh about 2,300 tons compared to 7,400 tons for an Astute) are handier in coastal waters. The Kilo also has noise-reducing features, such as a sound-absorbing anechoic hull coating and engines isolated from the hull by a rubber base, so as not to transmit noise.

But this doesn't necessarily mean the Russian subs outmaneuvered the British vessel. The Astute-class is an advanced vessel that first sailed in 2001. The Kilos are a highly successful design, but a Cold War–design nonetheless, which first sailed in 1980.

"I very much doubt it conducted any tracking or surveillance of the Astute submarine," former U.S. Navy submarine officer Bryan Clark told the National Interest . "The Kilo is not designed for ASW and has an older design passive sonar system. It is designed primarily for attacking surface ships with missiles or torpedoes or targets ashore with cruise missiles. Furthermore, as a diesel submarine, it also cannot keep up with a nuclear submarine for more than 2 to 3 hours without snorkeling to recharge its batteries.”

"The Astute is a quiet nuclear submarine, but if the Russians were using active sonar, they may have gotten lucky and detected it, although it is doubtful they would have been able to track it for a sustained period," added Clark, now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The Syria incident is sure to fuel the debate over whether nuclear-powered submarines are still superior to the latest ultra-quiet diesel-powered subs equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP). But Russia is still laboring to to develop a successful AIP-equipped diesel sub, which the Kilos off Syria almost certainly weren't.

B-585 Sankt Peterburg (Russian: Б-585 «Санкт-Петербург»; named after Saint Petersburg) is the lead boat of the St. Petersburg class of the Russian Navy. The Lada class is the fourth generation of diesel-electric submarines designed and constructed in the former Soviet Union and Russia to replace the Kilo class. Construction of the boat started in December 1997, and she was launched in October 2004. After undergoing a series of sea trials, Sankt Peterburg was commissioned in May 2010. However, the Russian Navy decided not to accept the St. Petersburg class after it was discovered that the boat's propulsion and sonar systems were inadequate. After design corrections the submarine was accepted. In 2014, Sankt Peterburg joined the Northern Fleet.

Background and construction[edit]

Sankt Peterburg is first boat of Rubin Design Bureau's Lada class, of which a total of eight were expected to be procured by the Russian Navy. A less capable version, the Amur class, is marketed for export. Designed during the 1990s, the St. Petersburg class is intended to be the successor to the larger Kilo class.[1] The Kilo class is considered to be one of the quietest diesel classes in operations, giving rise to the nickname "Black Hole".[4] Among the expected capabilities improvements of the St. Petersburg class over its predecessor were the incorporation of improved anechoic coating (to minimize sonar contact), extended cruise range, and the upgrade to newer weapons for anti-submarine and anti-ship operations.[4] St. Petersburg-class boats can also conduct reconnaissance and defend naval facilities and sea lanes.[2]

Amid a severe shortage of funds experienced during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,[5] the keel of Sankt Peterburg was laid down on 26 December 1997, in Saint Petersburg by Admiralty Shipyard.[1][6] The company specialises in submarine construction, having built more than 300 boats,[6] including the Victor and Alfa-class nuclear-powered submarines. By 2006, two more of Sankt Peterburg's sister boats, Kronshtadt and Sevastopol had had their keels laid down.[7] Sankt Peterburg was launched on 28 October 2004, to coincide with the 300th anniversary of Sankt Peterburg's founding, before undergoing several sea trials, to validate her systems, until 2009.[8][9]

As of 25 February 2008, Sankt Peterburg was part of the 13th Brigade of Ships Under Repair and Construction (military unit number 22875), Leningrad Naval Base.[10]

Operational history[edit]

On 6 May 2010, Sankt Peterburg was commissioned into the Russian Navy, signalling the official start of her operational service. The boat thereafter underwent combat training with the Baltic Fleet and participated in a naval parade and an exercise.[2][11][12][13] At the same time, she continued sea trials until late 2011.[12]

Despite having been commissioned, in November 2011 the Russian Navy decided that the St. Petersburg class would not be accepted into service, as Sankt Peterburg had fallen far short of requirements during trials.[3] According to Izvestia, the main drawback was the propulsion unit's inability to produce half of the expected power, along with the inefficiency of the sonar system. With the construction of the other two St. Petersburg-class submarines being halted, the Russian Navy ordered additional Improved Kilo-class submarines.[14] The decision to reject the St. Petersburg class was confirmed in February 2012 by Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, who stated, "The Russian Navy does not need the St. Petersburg in its current form."[15] Sankt Peterburg would remain an experimental prototype.[3]

Saint Petersburg successfully carried a missile launch in accordance with the combat training schedule in the Barents Sea. The cruise missile was launched from an underwater position at a naval target on 17 November 2016.[16]

A ceremony to transfer the Kolpino submarine to the Russian Navy at the Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg.Alexei Danichev/RIA Novosti The Project 636.3 submarine “Kolpino,” which will be stationed at the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s new base in Novorossiysk, is capable of detecting targets at a distance three to four times in excess of the capabilities of radar systems of a potential enemy, military experts say.

The Russian defense industry has completed the construction of a diesel-electric submarine of Project 636.3, the Kolpino, for the Black Sea Fleet.

The submarine, dubbed by NATO naval experts as the “Black Hole” for its stealth and underwater capabilities, is equipped with the newest Kalibr-PL cruise missiles with an effective range of up to 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles).

The submarine will be based at a new Russian naval base in the city of Novorossiysk in the Krasnodar Territory, 760 miles south of Moscow. However, until a dock for it has been completed, the new submarine will be carrying out service duty in the Black Sea and will undergo maintenance at the port of Sevastopol.

According to Igor Kasatonov, a former deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy and former Black Sea Fleet commander, the submarine is capable of detecting targets at a distance three to four times in excess of the capabilities of enemy radar systems.

“The capabilities of these new submarines were first demonstrated late last year when [a submarine of this project] the Rostov-na-Donu carried out a strike with Kalibr missiles against terrorist targets in Syria,” Kasatonov told RBTH.

Once the Kolpino comes into service, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will have completed the formation a full-fledged submarine brigade based in Novorossiysk.

By 2020, six similar submarines will be built for the Pacific Fleet too, said Kasatonov.

Initially, the new base in Novorossiysk, on the Black Sea coast, was set up because of disagreements in Russian-Ukrainian relations after the breakup of the Soviet Union. After 1991, the naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, part of newly independent Ukraine, was leased to Moscow, though any upgrade of the fleet (up to the very last cartridge) had to be agreed with the Ukrainian parliament. After Russia’s seizure of the peninsula in 2014, a large-scale upgrade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet began.

“Sevastopol Bay creates unique opportunities for Moscow. Together with the new base in Novorossiysk, Russia can fully control the Bosphorus, the military infrastructure in Bulgaria and can neutralize the threat posed by the U.S. missile defense base in Romania,” TASS military observer Viktor Litovkin told RBTH.

Alexander Khramchikhin, head of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, a Moscow-based independent research body, explained that the key threat that the American ABM system in Eastern Europe poses for Russia is that the U.S. bases can in an instant be converted from defensive into offensive ones.

“It is possible to develop the U.S. missile defense system and deploy cruise missiles in launch silos. In particular, launchers for Standard SM-3 interceptor missiles can be used to carry out strikes with Tomahawk strategic cruise missiles against targets on Russian territory,” said Khramchikhin.

Upsides and downsides of the new base

A significant benefit offered by the new base of the Russian Black Sea fleet is that it makes it possible to divide ships and submarines between several naval bases in the same region, say experts. However, the Novorossiysk base is very susceptible to local weather conditions.

“The coast in Novorossiysk is regularly affected by powerful northern winds coming from the Caucasus, which hit ships and houses in their path. The wind can throw ships ashore and destroy the whole military infrastructure,” Viktor Litovkin told RBTH.

“From the start, the base was built in such a way so that blasts of the wind could not be so destructive,” he said, adding that Russia was building an additional tunnel in the Caucasus to eliminate the threat posed by destructive winds.

Russia Beyond is a media project of the independent non-commercial organization

Imran Awan, just like Peter Strzok is the Skeleton Key, literally and figuratively speaking. They open the door to vast and as yet underestimated depravities and buried skeletons. If this is indeed true, we are going to Mainline straight to the motherload of information.

DOJ Agrees Not To Prosecute Imran Awan For House Cybersecurity And Theft, But Questions Remain

Luke Rosiak | Investigative Reporter

dailycaller.com

An assistant US attorney said Tuesday he would not prosecute Imran Awan, a former systems administrator for Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz and other Democrats, for any crimes on Capitol Hill in a plea agreement that had him plead guilty to one count of bank fraud.

Only one person sat at the prosecutors’ table: J.P. Coomey, who unsuccessfully prosecuted New Jersey Democrat Sen. Bob Menendez for corruption and was only added to the case Monday. There was no sign of Michael Marando, who had previously led the prosecution.

Coomey did not object to the removal of Awan’s GPS monitor, said he would not oppose a sentence of probation, and agreed to drop charges against his wife, fellow former systems administrative Hina Alvi.

The Department of Justice said it found “found no evidence that [Imran] illegally removed House data from the House network or from House Members’ offices, stole the House Democratic Caucus Server, stole or destroyed House information technology equipment, or improperly accessed or transferred government information.”

That statement appears to take issue — without explaining how — with the findings of the House’s Nancy Pelosi-appointed inspector general, its top law enforcement official, the sergeant-at-arms, and the statements of multiple Democratic aides.

In September 2016, the House Office of Inspector General gave House leaders a presentation that alleged that Alvi, Imran, brothers Abid Awan and Jamal Awan, and a friend were logging into the servers of members who had previously fired him and funneling data off the network. It said evidence “suggests steps are being taken to conceal their activity” and that their behavior mirrored a “classic method for insiders to exfiltrate data from an organization.”

Server logs show, it said, that Awan family members made “unauthorized access” to congressional servers in violation of House rules by logging into the servers of members who they didn’t work for.

The presentation especially found problems on one server, that of the House Democratic Caucus, an entity chaired at the time by then-Rep. Xavier Becerra of California.

On Feb. 3, 2017, Paul Irving, the House’s top law enforcement officer, wrote in a letter to the Committee on House Administration that soon after it became evidence, the server went “missing.”

The letter continued: “Based upon the evidence gathered to this point, we have concluded the employees are an ongoing and serious risk to the House of Representatives, possibly threatening the integrity of our information systems.”

Imran, Abid, Jamal, Alvi and a friend were banned from the House network the same day Kiko sent the letter.

The alleged wrongdoing consisted of two separate issues.

The first was the cybersecurity issues. In an April 2018 hearing spurred by the Awan case, Chief Administrative Officer Phil Kiko testified: “The bookend to the outside threat is the insider threat. Tremendous efforts are dedicated to protecting the House against these outside threats, however these efforts are undermined when these employees do not adhere to and thumb their nose at our information security policy, and that’s a risk in my opinion we cannot afford.”

The second was a suspected theft scheme. Wendy Anderson, a former chief of staff for Rep. Yvette Clarke, told House investigators she believed Abid was working with ex-Clarke aide Shelley Davis to steal equipment, and described coming in on a Saturday to find so many pieces of equipment, including iPods and Apple TVs, that it “looked like Christmas.”

In the hearing, Kiko described “egregious” behavior by Imran, saying the House “discovered evidence of procurement fraud and irregularities” on top of the “numerous violations of House security policies.”

“CAO’s Office of Acquisition Management detected and flagged unusual invoices originating from five shared employees who served more than 30 House offices,” Kiko said. “The invoices, as submitted, were structured in a way to avoid the House’s $500 equipment accountability threshold. Upon further investigation into the five shared employees’ activities, the House IG discovered evidence of procurement fraud and irregularities, numerous violations of House security policies, and violations of the Committee’s Shared Employee Manual, etc.”

Yet Tuesday’s court document said:

The Govemment agrees that the public allegations that your client stole U.S. House of Representatives (“House”) equipment and engaged in unauthorized or illegal conduct involving House computer systems do not form the basis of any conduct relevant to the determination of the sentence in this case. The Government conducted a thorough investigation of those allegations, including interviewing approximately 40 witnesses; taking custody of the House Democratic Caucus server, along with other computers, hard drives, and electronic devices; examining those devices, including inspecting their physical condition and analyzing log-in and usage data; reviewing electronic communications between pertinent House employees; consulting with the House Office of General Counsel and House information technology personnel to access and/or collect evidence; and questioning your client during numerous voluntary interviews.

It concluded that the “Government has uncovered no evidence that your client violated federal law with respect to the House computer systems,” but didn’t explain how it came to that conclusion.

The bank fraud to which Imran pleaded guilty involved withdrawing hundreds of thousands of dollars by lying on mortgage application and pretending to have a medical emergency that required draining Alvi’s congressional retirement account, court records show. That money was then wired to Pakistan in January 2017. Prosecutors previously said they believe the Awans knew they were under investigation when they made the money moves, and described Imran as a flight risk.

Though the bank fraud occurred in January 2017, Imran wasn’t arrested until July 2017, when he tried to leave the country and was taken into custody at Dulles airport. His lawyer is Chris Gowen, a former aide to Hillary Clinton.

Wasserman Schultz kept paying Awan after he was banned from Congress. A Capitol Police report shows that in April 2016, Imran left a laptop with the username RepDWS in a Capitol Hill phone booth late at night, and it was taken by police.

Police said they needed it as evidence, but Wasserman Schultz pledged “consequences” for the police chief. Wasserman Schultz’ brother, a prosecutor in the D.C. US Attorney’s office, has tweeted about the case under the handle “fedpros.”

Gowen said he felt “very strongly” that the RepDWS laptop should not be examined, and prosecutors never publicly challenged that request.

No one else connected to Imran that was banned from the House has been charged, yet the House has not re-instated them. Imran, Hina, Abid and Jamal have also shared IT duties with Haseeb Rana, former McDonalds worker Rao Abbas and Nataliia Sova, a Ukrainian who is married to Abid.

House officials told TheDCNF that the vast majority of evidence about misconduct allegations on Capitol Hill — including $120,000 in missing equipment from the office of Yvette Clarke — is actually against Abid, not Imran.

In an incredible sweetheart plea deal, Imran Awan – a former IT aide to Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-Fla., and other congressional Democrats – pleaded guilty Tuesday to one count of making a false statement on a home equity loan.

I sat flabbergasted in the courtroom in Washington as the plea agreement was entered.

I spent the last year interviewing hundreds of people and chasing leads for my upcoming book –titled “Spies in Congress” – about the alleged spy ring believed led by Awan that may have operated in the offices of more than 40 Democratic members of Congress.

If not for my extensive research on this case, I might have assumed the government just couldn’t find enough evidence to make a solid case against Awan on more serious charges than bank fraud.

When I asked Justice Department prosecutor J.P. Cooney why the government made this odd plea deal he just smiled and waved me away as he told me to ask the Justice Department Office of Public Affairs. The office declined to answer my questions.

Shockingly, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia issued a news release about Awan’s plea agreement that made no mention of his IT work for Democrats in Congress, no mention of Wasserman Schultz, and made his case sound like a minor local criminal matter of little interest to anyone. It was headlined: “Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statement on Application for Home Equity Loan.”

Ho-hum, right? Actually, nothing could be further from the truth.

Awan is due to be sentenced Aug. 21 and could get off with no jail sentence, according the plea agreement. Prosecutors said they would not recommend jail time – in effect, giving Awan a get-out-of-jail-free card.

Just like that, the Department of Justice is making an important case go away as if nothing much happened.

Awan’s wife, Hina Alvi, is having all charges against her dismissed as part of the agreement.

Awan, as a part of this plea agreement, also “will not be charged” for any other nonviolent crimes he may have committed in Washington prior to the agreement, according to this deal.

The plea deal agreement even exonerates Awan by saying in part that “the Government agrees that the public allegations that your client (Imran Awan) stole U.S. House of Representatives (‘House’) equipment and engaged in unauthorized or illegal conduct involving House computer systems do not form the basis of any conduct relevant to the determination of the sentence in this case.”

But there is so much more to this case. Even on the simple theft of government equipment there is a lot there for prosecutors. One of Awan’s former tenants, a retired U.S. Marine, even found and turned over to authorities several computers and smart phones with government markings on them that he found in Awan’s rental property.

There is also internal U.S. House of Representatives’ paperwork detailing some of what went on in the offices Awan and his associates who did contract IT work for congressional Democrats.

Internal House Inspector General findings have also determined that Awan copied the emails of up to 44 Democratic House members and other personal data and backed them up to a server that reportedly went missing and to a Dropbox account.

Awan, his wife and other relatives and friends were also all paid exorbitant salaries for working as IT contractors for members of Congress for years – even though many of them didn’t have any expertise in IT and even though they didn’t undergo background checks.

It is also likely that a few of Awan’s associates didn’t even show up to earn all the money they were paid. Still, no charges have been filed against Awan or his brothers relating to alleged thefts, possible espionage and for providing false information (an image of the Democratic House Caucus computer server) to Capitol Police.

It is actually very hard to sum-up all that this group of IT aides (who are almost all from Pakistan) did and the crimes they might have committed.

Writing a book on the topic was like piecing together an international spy thriller filled with anonymous sources, encrypted conversations, off-the-record meetings, foreign documents and hard facts from various court filings and from internal investigations in the House.

What is clear to me, after interviewing so many people, is there is a lot of evidence here for investigators, but also a lot of political reasons why they might want this case to go away.

Awan was even Wasserman Schultz’s IT aide when she headed the Democratic National Committee (DNC), which incidentally was when the DNC was hacked and the information given to Wikileaks.

I have no evidence that Awan was in any way responsible for the leak. Still, it is incredible how much of all this interconnects circumstantially.

Real court scenes (when Awan pleaded guilty and waved his right to a trial by jury), possible depositions of House staffers and members of Congress, and the investigations that would take place if the Justice Department pursued additional charges would have necessarily dug into a lot of things the Washington establishment would rather not deal with publicly. It also would have forced investigators to follow the trail to Pakistan.

Still, I didn’t think these investigating agencies would be brazen enough to agree to this kind of a sweetheart deal for Imran Awan and Hina Alvi.

Now Awan will not face prosecution where the more serious allegations against him can be judged.

Disclaimer: This shocking information was given to The Gateway Pundit this weekend. We decided to report this news and will post an update following Tuesday’s press conference.

The Washington, D.C. lobbyist who has been on the hunt for Seth Rich’s killer found a “credible” witness who will identify the two men he believes murdered the DNC staffer.

Jack Burkman, a Washington-based attorney and lobbyist who has worked with a private investigative team to solve the Seth Rich murder mystery, told The Gateway Pundit that the witness has conclusive evidence that will bring Rich’s killers to justice within a month.

“We believe that we have reached the beginning of the end of the Seth Rich murder investigation,” Burkman told The Gateway Pundit in an exclusive interview Sunday. “After two long hard years of work, we have a witness who is prepared to identify the two killers of Seth Rich. One is reportedly a current DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) agent, the other is reportedly a current ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) agent”

The witness, who “fears for his life,” will be accompanied by armed guards and disguise his identity as he details how two employees of the United States government killed Seth in a press conference slated for Tuesday.

Frank Whalen, a retired NYPD Detective Sergeant NYPD who served as the head of NYPD Homicide for 23 years, found the witness, Burkman explained.

“We found him through working with a retired New York City detective, who found him and brought him to us. We have thoroughly vetted this witness and we believe in this witness,” he said. “He has evidence that substantiates his claims but it will be revealed slowly. This witness is in great fear of his life – that’s why we are going with disguising him, disguising his voice and everything about him.”

Burkman, who has viewed surveillance footage from the night Rich was killed, says the witness’ testimony confirms two men involved in the shooting.

“What the witness says matches what the police say and matches what we know from the surveillance videos,” he said. “The police let me see the video. The police said the video clearly identifies the pant legs of two men. So, there were two men involved in the killing that night. I now believe that in the next 3 to 4 weeks the entire matter will be resolved. It’s the beginning of the end.”

Rich, 27, was a DNC voter expansion data director for two years and had accepted a position with Hillary Clinton’s campaign. He was murdered in Washington, D.C., on July 10, 2016, near his apartment in an affluent neighborhood. Rich was shot twice in the back with a handgun, and his wallet, credit cards, watch and phone were left in his possession. The Metropolitan Police Department has described it as a “botched robbery.”

Private investigators have claimed there is evidence Rich was the source who provided WikiLeaks with thousands of bombshell emails that rocked the Democratic National Committee in the summer of 2016 just ahead of its convention and the 2016 election. WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has also insinuated Rich was the source WikiLeaks used to obtain the emails.

The emails indicated the Democrat Party was manipulating the primary race in favor of Hillary Clinton and sabotaged the Bernie Sanders campaign, led to the resignation of then-DNC chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz. On July 22, just 12 days after Rich’s death and days before the Democratic Party Convention in Philadelphia, WikiLeaks released 20,000 emails from DNC officials.

As Gateway Pundit reported, Burkman was shot at and run over by the former U.S. Marine Kevin Doherty on March 13 who he hired to help him get to the bottom of the case. Doherty – who claims he worked as a special agent and criminal investigator in the intelligence community – was subsequently arrested by Arlington County police on charges of malicious wounding and use of a firearm in commission of a felony.

The witness informed Burkman that Doherty was well acquainted with the two government employees that killed Rich, but he was unaware Doherty worked as Burkman’s lead investigator and tried to kill him earlier in the year.

“The witness himself didn’t know that I had been shot by Kevin Doherty. Before we even told him that, he told us that Doherty was friends and palled around with the ATF agent and the DEA agent who shot Seth. That’s why we think the witness is credible,” he said. “There wasn’t much coverage of my shooting. The witness didn’t see the coverage and didn’t know. We didn’t tell him, he told us before we told him.”

“We believe that Kevin Doherty may have been a plant in my organization, to kill me and stop my investigation,” he added. “He was carefully playing the role.”

Despite nearly getting killed while investigating the Rich case, Burkman says he doesn’t “live in fear”and neither should the witness.

“I now have armed guards all the time. And we will have even more armed guards at the press conference the place will be surrounded with private armed security,” he said. “But once we start living in fear we might as well have Adolph Hitler in power. Once you live in fear, there’s no reason to have won World War II.”

Following the press conference, Burkman will hold a candlelight march to the spot where Rich was killed.

“I promised the Rich family that I would find their son’s murderer. Their son was a great patriot and a great young man and it is for that reason that I want to solve this murder,” Burkman said. “His heart was in the right place and I want to honor him. We are one big political fraternity. This could have happened to any of the young people who work for me, Republican or Democrat, I employ both. This could happen to anyone of those young people.”

Burkman has created, paid for and erected billboards in the neighborhood where Rich lived and died; built the website WhoKilledSeth.com and canvassed the neighborhood with Seth Rich’s parents. Last year, he sued the Democratic National Committee for the release of the hacked DNC server he claimed will reveal key information in solving the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich.

The DC-based attorney has also offered a $130,000 reward of his personal money for information leading to the arrest of Rich’s killer. WikiLeaks is offering $20,000, One America News Network $100,000, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department $25,000 and Businessman and investor Martin Shkreli $100,000.

The DNC has yet to offer a reward for information leading to the arrest of the murderer of its own young staffer. The DNC honored its murdered employee by dedicating a bike rack outside its headquarters to Rich’s memory.

The press conference will be held at the Key Bridge Holiday Inn in Arlington, Virginia at 1:00PM.

The father of Peter Strzok is Peter Strzok Sr. The brother of Peter Strzok Sr is Mark Strzok. The wife of Mark Strzok is Mariana Strzok. Mariana Strzok is the daughter of General James Cartwright. General James Cartwright, was pardoned by Barrack Obama on his last day of office.

The wife of Peter Strzok, Melissa Hodgman. Just so happens she was promoted to the role of director of the SEC at the same time the FBI was drafting the exoneration letter for the HRC. Peter Strzok was the last person on earth to see the deleted HRC emails. Nothing to see here.

For the past several months, Democrats have based their "Resist 45" movement on unsubstantiated assertions that the Trump campaign coordinated with Russian intelligence officials to undermine the 2016 Presidential Election thereby 'stealing' the White House from Hillary Clinton. Day after day we've all suffered through one anonymously sourced, "shock" story after another from the New York Times and/or The Washington Post with new allegations of the 'wrongdoing'.

But, new evidence surfacing in the Seth Rich murder investigation may just quash the "Russian hacking" conspiracy theory. According to a new report from Fox News, it was former DNC staffer Seth Rich who supplied 44,000 DNC emails to WikiLeaks and not some random Russian cyber terrorist, as we've all been led to believe.

According to Fox News, though admittedly via yet another anonymous FBI source, Rich made contact with WikiLeaks through Gavin MacFadyen, an American investigative reporter and director of WikiLeaks who was living in London at the time. According to Fox News sources, federal law enforcement investigators found 44,053 emails and 17,761 attachments sent between DNC leaders from January 2015 to May 2016 that Rich shared with WikiLeaks before he was gunned down on July 10, 2016.

The Democratic National Committee staffer who was gunned down on July 10 on a Washington, D.C., street just steps from his home had leaked thousands of internal emails to WikiLeaks, law enforcement sources told Fox News.

A federal investigator who reviewed an FBI forensic report detailing the contents of DNC staffer Seth Rich’s computer generated within 96 hours after his murder, said Rich made contact with WikiLeaks through Gavin MacFadyen, a now-deceased American investigative reporter, documentary filmmaker, and director of WikiLeaks who was living in London at the time.

“I have seen and read the emails between Seth Rich and Wikileaks,” the federal investigator told Fox News, confirming the MacFadyen connection. He said the emails are in possession of the FBI, while the stalled case is in the hands of the Washington Police Department.

Then, on July 22, just 12 days after Rich was killed, WikiLeaks published internal DNC emails that appeared to show top party officials conspiring to stop Bernie Sanders from becoming the party’s presidential nominee. As we've noted before, the DNC's efforts to block Sanders resulted in Debbie Wasserman Schultz resigning as DNC chairperson.

These new revelations seem to be consistent with the findings of Rod Wheeler, a former DC homicide detective and Fox News contributor, whose private investigation firm was hired by Rich’s family to probe the case.

"My investigation up to this point shows there was some degree of email exchange between Seth Rich and WikiLeaks," Wheeler told Fox News. "I do believe that the answers to who murdered Seth Rich sits on his computer on a shelf at the DC police or FBI headquarters."

“My investigation shows someone within the D.C. government, Democratic National Committee or Clinton team is blocking the murder investigation from going forward,” Wheeler told Fox News. “That is unfortunate. Seth Rich’s murder is unsolved as a result of that.”

The botched robbery theory, which police have pursued for nearly a year, isn’t panning out, Wheeler said. Two assailants caught on a grainy video tape from a camera posted outside a grocery mart, shot Rich twice in his back, but did not take his wallet, cell phone, keys, watch or necklace worth about $2,000.

As you'll recall, Rich's death has been shrouded in mystery from the start as he was reportedly shot from behind in the wee hours of the morning but was not robbed of the nearly $2,000 worth of cash and jewelry on his body at the time.

Rich had been at Lou’s City Bar a couple of miles from his home until about 1:15 a.m. He walked home, calling several people along the way. He called his father, Joel Rich, who he missed because he had gone to sleep. He talked with a fraternity brother and his girlfriend, Kelsey Mulka.

Around 4:17 a.m., Rich was about a block from his home when Mulka, still on the phone with him, heard voices in the background. Rich reassured her that he was steps away from being at his front door and hung up.

Two minutes later, Rich was shot twice. Police were on the scene within three minutes. Rich sustained bruising on his hands and face. He remained conscious, but died at a nearby hospital less than two hours later.

Shortly thereafter, Julian Assange implied that Seth Rich was, in fact, a source for WikiLeaks and offered a $130,000 reward for information leading to his killer.

Per the Washington Examiner, Rich's family issued the following statement, via a 'spokesman', regarding the recent Fox News reports saying they have seen no evidence of the alleged emails between Seth Rich and WikiLeaks:

"As we've seen through the past year of unsubstantiated claims, we see no facts, we have seen no evidence, we have been approached with no emails and only learned about this when contacted by the press," the statement said. "Even if tomorrow, an email was found, it is not a high enough bar of evidence to prove any interactions as emails can be altered and we've seen that those interest in pushing conspiracies will stop at nothing to do so."

"We are a family who is committed to facts, not fake evidence that surfaces every few months to fill the void and distract law enforcement and the general public from finding Seth's murderers. The services of the private investigator who spoke to the press was offered to the Rich family and paid for by a third party, and contractually was barred from speaking to press or anyone outside of law enforcement or the family unless explicitly authorized by the family."

Seems that not everyone within the FBI is on board with the "Russian hacking" narrative and are finally starting to come forward.

Finally, we find it 'shocking' that while the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, etc are all too eager to regurgitate each others anonymously sourced stories that are critical of Trump, not a single one of them had a single reference of this Fox News bombshell on their website at the time this article was published.

SnipWhat is the maximum achievable speed? Forensicator recently ran a test download of a comparable data volume (and using a server speed not available in 2016) 40 miles from his computer via a server 20 miles away and came up with a speed of 11.8 megabytes per second—half what the DNC operation would need were it a hack. Other investigators have built on this finding. Folden and Edward Loomis say a survey published August 3, 2016, by http://www.speedtest.net/reports is highly reliable and use it as their thumbnail index. It indicated that the highest average ISP speeds of first-half 2016 were achieved by Xfinity and Cox Communications. These speeds averaged 15.6 megabytes per second and 14.7 megabytes per second, respectively. Peak speeds at higher rates were recorded intermittently but still did not reach the required 22.7 megabytes per second.

“A speed of 22.7 megabytes is simply unobtainable, especially if we are talking about a transoceanic data transfer,” Folden said. “Based on the data we now have, what we’ve been calling a hack is impossible.” Last week Forensicator reported on a speed test he conducted more recently. It tightens the case considerably. “Transfer rates of 23 MB/s (Mega Bytes per second) are not just highly unlikely, but effectively impossible to accomplish when communicating over the Internet at any significant distance,” he wrote. “Further, local copy speeds are measured, demonstrating that 23 MB/s is a typical transfer rate when using a USB–2 flash device (thumb drive).”

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