VELAZQUEZ v. HECKLER

Plaintiff Heriberto Velazquez ("Velazquez"), represented by the Legal Aid Society, brought this action pursuant to sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1381(c)(3), to review a final determination of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary") which terminated Velazquez" disability insurance benefits. Velazquez has moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) and (d)(1)(A). For the following reasons, the motion is granted, and Velazquez is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $7,820.00.

Facts and Procedural History

Velazquez is 40 years old and last worked as a copyboy, messenger and stockboy. He has not worked since 1976. In August 1978, the Secretary determined that Velazquez was disabled and entitled to disability insurance benefits due to "schizophrenic reaction, chronic paranoid type." In June 1982, the Secretary reviewed Velazquez" condition and terminated his benefits.Velazquez requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") but waived his right to appear at the hearing. In a decision dated February 28, 1983, the ALJ found that Velazquez" disability had ceased in June 1982. The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision on August 29, 1983, and on November 2, 1983 Velazquez commenced this action.

In an opinion dated June 19, 1984, the court reversed the Secretary's decision, finding that the Secretary had failed to meet the medical improvement standard set forth in DeLeon v. Heckler, No. 83-6272 (2d Cir. May 16, 1984), and ordered the Secretary to resume payment of benefits to Velazquez, including all benefits due since the date of termination.

Discussion

Velazquez contends that he is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), at the market rate of $115 per hour, a total of $7,820.00 for 68 hours, because the Secretary acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons" in pursuing this litigation, or in the alternative, that he is entitled to attorney's fees at the rate of $84.20 per hour, a total of $5,725.60, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), because the Secretary's position was not "substantially justified."

The EAJA, enacted by Congress in 1980 as Title II of Public Law 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325, provides that a prevailing party in any civil action brought against the United States may recover fees "unless the Court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
*fn1"
The statute has been found applicable to judicial review actions brought under the Act. See, e.g., Deleon V Heckler, supra, slip op. at 17; McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 712 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1983); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1983); Vega v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 52, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 497-98 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (D.Idaho 1982). Substantial justification "means that the government must have a solid though not necessarily correct basis in fact and law for the position that it took in this action." Zimmerman v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).

The Secretary has the burden of proof on establishing that her position was substantially justified and a "strong showing" must be made to meet that burden. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1085 (2d Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 872 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Ward v. Schweiker, 562 F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (W.D. Missouri 1983). The test for determining whether the Government's position is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness -- where the Government can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D. Conn. 1984); Perez v. Heckler, No. 82-8627, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984); Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (E.D.Pa. 1983). Some courts have required something more than ordinary reasonableness since the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected an amendment which would have changed the language from "substantially justified" to "reasonably justified." Environmental Defense, supra, 722 F.2d at 1084 n.5. See also Wolverton v. Schweiker, supra, 533 F. Supp. at 424.

The Secretary nonetheless contends that her position in this case was substantially justified because the Second Circuit did not adopt a medical improvement standard in termination cases until May 16, 1984 in DeLeon v. Heckler, supra, shortly after argument on the motions by Velazquez and the Secretary for judgment on the pleadings. However, the Court in DeLeon directed the district court to award attorney's fees under the EAJA, DeLeon, slip op. at 17, thus implicitly finding that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified. In light of the fact that ten circuit courts and numerous district courts had ruled against the Secretary on the medical improvement standard and the Secretary's own decision to announce a moratorium on termination cases, the Secretary's position in this case was not substantially justified. There was no evidence in the record of any improvement in Velazquez" condition prior to termination of his disability benefits and, therefore, at a minimum, an award of attorney's fees under section 2412(d)(1)(A) is appropriate.

Velazquez further contends that he is entitled to attorney's fees at the market rate under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), which provides:

(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.

&nbsp;Section 2412(b) codified and made applicable to the United States the "bad faith" and "common benefit" exceptions to the American common law rule against awarding attorney's fees. Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 726 (8th Cir. 1984). Velazquez contends that the Secretary acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons," United States v. Burke, 548 F. Supp. 724, 730 (N.D.S.D. 1982), in pursuing this litigation ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.