The Stasi of East Germany listened in on everyone's phone call. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution spied on and rat out free thinkers in Cuba. Knowing that everywhere one goes and everything one does is being watched and recorded would be profoundly chilling.

Look at how many people the Clinton's bullied into backing down with their politics of personal destruction. After Paula Jones got anally raped by Carville and the media running dogs, who was left to pay attention to Juanita Broderick's (I think I am remembering this name correctly) sexual assault claims? The only limits on that were that attention and the money of the Clinton money machine.

Where we are rapidly heading now is a brave new world of no limits at all.

I do not pretend to have a complete answer to that question, but first we need to understand that the technology presents profound questions not answered by the application of doctrines that apply to human observation.

Looks at how far things are going and how fast they are getting there!

Looks like we have the makings of a new arms race at hand. The winner will develop the tiniest lethal drone capable of blending into a crowded cityscape.

The Atlantic‘s Conor Friedersdorf points to a National Geographic piece on the future of drone technology, including one fascinating passage on how the U.S. Air Force is developing “micro-drones” the size of tiny creatures, capable of flying through major cities unnoticed.

The science writer, John Horgan, described what information he was able to access from the government:

The Air Force has nonetheless already constructed a “micro-aviary” at Wright-Patterson for flight-testing small drones. It’s a cavernous chamber—35 feet high and covering almost 4,000 square feet—with padded walls. Micro-aviary researchers, much of whose work is classified, decline to let me witness a flight test. But they do show me an animated video starring micro-UAVs that resemble winged, multi-legged bugs. The drones swarm through alleys, crawl across windowsills, and perch on power lines. One of them sneaks up on a scowling man holding a gun and shoots him in the head.

The Air Force describes these new “micro-air” weapons as “Unobtrusive, pervasive, lethal.”

Yikes.

I share Friedersdorf’s sentiment that this video is “horrifying” — namely because it signals that drone warfare is the next arms race.

According to Horgan, however, the U.S. government “takes seriously” the potential for widespread proliferation of “micro-drone” technology among terrorists and governments:

What, one might ask, will prevent terrorists and criminals from getting their hands on some kind of lethal drone? Although American officials rarely discuss the threat in public, they take it seriously.

[...] Exercises carried out by security agencies suggest that defending against small drones would be difficult. Under a program called Black Dart, a mini-drone two feet long tested defenses at a military range. A video from its onboard camera shows a puff of smoke in the distance, from which emerges a tiny dot that rapidly grows larger before whizzing harmlessly past: That was a surface-to-air missile missing its mark. In a second video an F-16 fighter plane races past the drone without spotting it.

The answer to the threat of drone attacks, some engineers say, is more drones.

Oh, joy!

In other words: another arms race to find the smallest possible drone that can not only attack the enemy but defend against similarly undetectable micro-drones. Rather than discourage this race to the bottom, we are actively leading the charge.

Moreover, the development of these fascinatingly small weapons provides yet another secretive weapon for the military to use without any sort of oversight.

Yes, in a world with micro-drones, casualties of American drone strikes will likely decrease, given that we’d be directly killing targets rather than obliterating them and everything around them with a missile from the sky. But the possibility for such precisely targeted surveillance and assassination, at the hands of a virtually-untraceable little “bug,” gives our government one more tool to easily evade supervision and accountability.

They can record video images and produce heat maps. They can be used to track fleeing criminals, stranded hikers — or just as easily, political protesters. And for strapped police departments, they are more affordable than helicopters.

Drones are becoming a darling of law enforcement authorities across the country. But they have given rise to fears of government surveillance, in many cases even before they take to the skies. And that has prompted local and state lawmakers from Seattle to Tallahassee to outline how they can be used by police or to ground them altogether.

Although surveillance technologies have become ubiquitous in American life, like license plate readers or cameras for catching speeders, drones have evoked unusual discomfort in the public consciousness.

“To me, it’s Big Brother in the sky,” said Dave Norris, a city councilman in Charlottesville, Va., which this month became the first city in the country to restrict the use of drones. “I don’t mean to sound conspiratorial about it, but these drones are coming, and we need to put some safeguards in place so they are not abused.”

In Charlottesville, police officers are prohibited from using in criminal cases any evidence obtained by drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles. Never mind that the city police department does not have a drone, nor has it suggested buying one. The police are not barred from using drones for other efforts, like search and rescue.

Mr. Norris said the advent of new policing technologies poses new policy dilemmas for his city.

Charlottesville permits the police to install cameras temporarily in areas known for drug dealing, but it has rebuffed a police request to install cameras along its downtown shopping corridor. It has also chosen not to install cameras at traffic lights to intercept speeding cars, as is common elsewhere.

“Drones are capable of taking surveillance to a whole new level,” Mr. Norris said.

Last week, the Seattle Police Department agreed to return its two still-unused drones to the manufacturer after Mayor Michael McGinn answered public protests by banning their use. On Thursday, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors in Oakland, Calif., listened to the county sheriff’s proposal to use federal money to buy a four-pound drone to help his officers track suspected criminals — and then listened to raucous opposition from the antidrone lobby, including a group that uses the Twitter handle @N.O.M.B.Y., short for Not Over My Back Yard.

This week, members of Congress introduced a bill that would prohibit drones from conducting what it called “targeted surveillance” of individuals and property without a warrant.

A federal law enacted last year paved the way for drones to be used commercially and made it easier for government agencies to obtain them. The Department of Homeland Security offered grants to help local law enforcement buy them. Drone manufacturers began to market small, lightweight devices specifically for policing. Drones are already used to monitor movement on the United States’ borders and by a handful of police departments, and emergency services agencies around the country are just beginning to explore their uses.

The Federal Aviation Administration has received about 80 requests, including some from police and other government agencies, for clearance to fly drones, according to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which seeks to limit their use for police surveillance.

Law enforcement authorities say drones can be a cost-effective technology to help with a host of policing efforts, like locating bombs, finding lost children, monitoring weather and wildlife or assisting rescue workers in natural disasters.

“In this time of austerity, we are always looking for sensible and cost-effective methods to improve public safety,” said Capt. Tom Madigan of the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. “We are not looking at military-grade Predator drones. They are not armed.”

For now, drones for civilian use run on relatively small batteries and fly short distances. In principle, various sensors, including cameras, can be attached to them. But there is no consensus in law on how the data collected can be used, shared or stored. =====================

State and local government authorities are trying to fill that void. As they do, they are weighing not only the demands of the police and civil libertarians but also tricky legal questions. The law offers citizens the right to take pictures on the street, for instance, just as it protects citizens from unreasonable search.

State legislatures have come up with measures that seek to permit certain uses, while reassuring citizens against unwanted snooping.

Virginia is furthest along in dealing with the issue. In early February, its state Legislature passed a two-year moratorium on the use of drones in criminal investigations, though it has yet to be reviewed by the governor.

In several states, proposals would require the police to obtain a search warrant before collecting evidence with a drone.

Arizona is among them. So is Montana. The bill’s sponsor there, Senator Matt Rosendale, a Republican, said he had no problems with drones being used for other purposes, like surveying forest fires, but he was especially vexed by the prospect of government surveillance. The manufacturers, he added, were marketing the new technology to government agencies, but neither federal nor local statutes specified how they could be used. “The technology was getting in front of the laws,” Mr. Rosendale said.

An Idaho lawmaker, Chuck Winder, said he did not want to restrict law enforcement with a search warrant requirement. He said he was drafting language that would give law enforcement discretion to evaluate if there was “reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”

The attention by lawmakers has delighted traditional privacy advocates. “I’ve been working on privacy issues for over a decade and rarely do we see such interest in a privacy threat that’s largely in the future,” said Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst with the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. “Drones are a concrete and instantly graspable threat to privacy.”

A counterargument has come from an industry group, the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, which downplays fears about wholesale surveillance. The drones for sale for civilian use, it says, are nothing like the armed military grade aircraft used in wars overseas.

“They’re another tool in the law enforcement representative’s tool kit,” said Gretchen West, the group’s executive vice president. “We’re not talking about large aircraft able to surveil a large area.”

The F.A.A. is drafting rules on how drone licenses will be issued. On Thursday, it announced the creation of six sites around the country where drones of various sorts can be tested. Pressed by advocacy groups, it said it would invite public comment on privacy protections in those sites.

The agency estimates that the worldwide drone market could grow to $90 billion in the next decade.

Out of all the mass killings in history, did any involve drones. Did Mao, Hitler or Pol Pot need drones?

No. But the mass control of the state and its people did (and does) require surveillance. And as you well know, the use of drones makes that more efficient. Your disconnect on this policy area from others in which you complain of totalitarianism or similar is pecular to me.

So do manned aircraft, radios, computers, cameras and pretty much every other bit of technology. So why the focus on drones?

Because it is current, and because it combines the other technologies.

But, it is not the only focus. Look at the backlash against stoplight cameras. Or the fear of many on the libertarian right and left about the NSA data collection site.

But, you still fail to address the issue of this unique policy space and the way that it diverges from your otherwise consistent political bent. Police and "surveillers" can do wrong. Just the president. Or the liberals.

Technology is morally neutral. It's how a sentient being chooses to use it. A scalpel in the hands of a rapist can come from the same production line as one used by surgeons to save lives. I'll bet there are more surveillance cameras in the average American city than anywhere in North Korea. Would you argue that we are more oppressed because of that?

Technology is morally neutral. It's how a sentient being chooses to use it. A scalpel in the hands of a rapist can come from the same production line as one used by surgeons to save lives. I'll bet there are more surveillance cameras in the average American city than anywhere in North Korea. Would you argue that we are more oppressed because of that?

Yup-- so is your argument that we can trust the government with the power that comes with all knowing, all seeing, all the time, recorded for all time?

"Government, like fire, is a dangerous servant." (working from memory-- George Washington said something to this effect)

Lets do a bit of a Socratic progression here.

You and your wife are walking down the street. We are in agreement that you can be observed, photographed, etc.

1-A) May someone walk alongside you listening to your conversation?

Sure. Have you ever overheard a conversation in public before? Were you violating that person's rights?

1-B) What is you don't want them to? If you stop so they can continue walking ahead, they stop with you. In other words, no matter what you do, where you go, they are there listening with you?

Then you start getting into violations of various laws, such as harrassment (depending on how each state codifies it).

2-A) Now, the same two questions except this time, the person in question is a policeman. Do your answers change in any way?

A law enforcement officer in a public space that overhears a conversation can use that for evidence in a criminal case. If people attempt to evade that officer and the officer pursues them, then we get into the area where courts look at it as some kind of seizure of those persons, which must be seen as reasonable.

There are the kinds of contacts with citizens for law enforcement:

1. Consentual. Not only must the person consent, it must be in the context where a reasonable person would feel free to decline to speak and leave the area.

2. Investigative stop (Terry v. Ohio) where a person(s) is temporarily detained based on reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate.

3. Arrest, based either on probable cause or a warrant.

If the above standards are not met, the officer faces both the loss of any evidence obtained, both civil and criminal liability on both state and federal levels and punitive actions from their employer.

2-B) Why?

Again, the fourth amendment forbids unreasonable search and seizure, and in the past few centuries has fleshed out what is generally accepted as reasonable and what is not.

In the early days of the FBI, J.Edgar has his agents wiretapping phones without warrants. There wasn't any such thing as a Title III wiretap warrant in those days. Even though surveillance technology has advanced to amazing degrees since those times, there are much greater legal protections and restrictions on law enforcement now than ever before in US history.

Tim: Hi, this is Tim Miller and Jenna Solari. We’re back again talking about a 4th Amendment search. We discussed previously that the Fourth Amendment is triggered by a government intrusion into a place where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Now Jenna, you told me who a government agent was, now let’s talk about reasonable expectation of privacy. Again, a government agent going into a place were one has a reasonable expectation of privacy triggers the 4th Amendment, correct?

Jenna: Yes, that’s right.

Tim: OK now, what’s a reasonable expectation of privacy?

Jenna: Well, a reasonable expectation of privacy, or “REP,” can be said to exist in a place where someone exhibits an actual expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.

Tim: Sounds like a two part test.

Jenna: It is actually. There’s a subjective component, and that’s that actual expectation of privacy. So that would mean that someone actually believes that an item or an area has been concealed from public view. So, for instance, I’m in my hotel room and I want to have a private conversation with someone so I try to keep my voice low enough that I believe no one else can hear what I am saying. But then there is that second part of the two part test you mentioned, the objective test. Society has to agree that what I am doing to conceal something is reasonable, that I have taken appropriate steps to conceal something from public view. For instance, I am in that hotel room and I actually think that I am keeping my voice low enough so no one else can hear me, so I have that subjective part satisfied. But objectively, let’s say my voice is actually loud enough that someone can hear me out in the hallway where they have every right to be. So if a federal agent just happens to be standing out in the hallway and unbeknownst to me my voice is loud enough that he can hear what I am saying, then I don’t have that objective expectation of privacy. Society is not willing to agree that what I am doing is a reasonable way to keep myself from being overheard. So I wouldn’t have any REP in my conversation.

Tim: OK, well how about giving me some examples of how a person might exhibit an expectation of privacy that society is willing to accept as being reasonable.

Jenna: OK, well, I think the simplest example would be if you have an item you want conceal from public view, put it in an opaque container. Put it inside a suitcase or a backpack, or if you want to keep it in your car, put it in the glove box or the trunk where people can’t see it when they just happen to be walking by. If we’re talking about your body, we know that people typically have the highest expectation of privacy in their bodies and in their houses. So, let’s say you have a tattoo on your left bicep you don’t want people to see. The best way to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that is to put on a shirt that covers it up. Don’t walk around, you know, with a tank top on so the whole world can see your tattoo. Things inside the body have an incredibly high expectation of privacy that’s recognized by the courts. So, if you think of your skin as a giant container, everything within your body, like blood, saliva, urine -- you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those things. Putting something inside your house, for the most part, gives you a reasonable expectation of privacy in that item, that is unless again, you put it somewhere where the whole world can see it. Let’s say you put it in your living room picture window where someone can see it from the street – then, again, society would not agree that you’ve taken reasonable steps to keep that secure from public view. But if you put it away somewhere where people couldn’t see it, then you’d have REP in that item. So things like that.

Tim: Sounds to me like if you put it inside of a container or you cover it up, society’s probably going to give you an expectation of privacy.

Jenna: Yes, that’s right.

Tim: Now, you know, a lot of kids nowadays have transparent book containers, book bags, and I think I know the answer to this, but can a child reasonably expect privacy in a transparent book bag?

Jenna: No, and that’s really the whole reason behind it. They’re required to carry transparent book bags, I assume, so that everybody can see what they have in there. So, they really wouldn’t have any reasonable expectation of privacy in those things that are inside that book bag, because again, they are out there for the whole world to see.

Tim: OK, well, you know, a trash can is a container. Can I reasonably expect privacy inside my trash can?

Jenna: That depends on where your trash can is, actually. If it’s inside your house, again, things that are inside your house usually get the highest protection from the courts so, yeah, you’d have REP in your trash, inside your trash can while it is still in your house. Now it gets a little different as the trash moves further from your house. If it’s still close to the house -- let’s say it’s just inside your garage or maybe just outside your front door -- that’s on that area that we call curtilage, and we will talk about that a little later, you probably still have REP in that trash in your trash can. It’s really when you put it out wherever collection takes place -- when you put it out on the street corner or the street in front of your house, what you have essentially done is told the whole world “I don’t want any of this any more.” You’ve abandoned that property and said “I want the trash man to take it away.” So, at that point you would not have any REP in that trash, even if you thought you did. Even if you actually thought that was private until the trash man took it, at that point society says, “no, you’ve thrown that away so you don’t have REP in that anymore.”

Tim: So, first, it has to be an actual expectation of privacy, and secondly, society has to recognize it as being reasonable.

Jenna: Yes, sir, that’s right.

Tim: OK, who can reasonably expect this privacy? For example, you know, I’ve got a house, it’s my house. I live there; I assume I can expect privacy inside my house.

Jenna: Absolutely.

Tim: Anybody else?

Jenna: Sure, if you had overnight guests in your house, let’s say friends of yours or family members came to visit and you let them stay overnight. Then you’ve essentially given them the run of at least part of your house. They have brought their private belongings in there and sort of established themselves in a room; they’d have REP inside your house. Social guests who stay for an extended period of time or who come by your house pretty frequently -- maybe they keep things in your house or inside your garage -- they may have REP in your house to some extent. I can tell you that people who wouldn’t have REP in there would be your commercial visitors, somebody who comes by just to sell you something or someone you invite just inside your front door maybe for five minutes at a time wouldn’t have any REP in your house.

Tim: So my mom and dad coming to visit for the weekend, they probably have an REP inside my house?

Jenna: Yes.

Tim: However, the paperboy coming to collect the bill would not.

Jenna: Right, the paperboy wouldn’t. Or, let’s say the pizza guy, who just steps inside for a second while you go get some cash to pay him for the pizza, he wouldn’t have any REP inside your house. He’s just that commercial visitor who stopped by for a few minutes.

Tim: How about people who rent hotel rooms? I guess the person who rents the room would have an REP inside that hotel room, would he not?

Jenna: Sure, because it’s really -- our 4th Amendment protection isn’t limited to just houses as physical structures. Really we are talking about dwellings, where people live, as least for some period of time. So, that would include a hotel room. And of course if you rented the room, you would have REP in the room. Someone else could, as well. Let’s say you and someone else go on a trip and so that person is sharing a room with you. That person has REP in there even if they weren’t the ones actually paying for it. They have a room key, which means they have the right to exclude people. They’re keeping things inside the room, so they would have REP in the room as well.

Tim: OK, I’ve got a car. I own that car; it’s my car -- I assume I have reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

Jenna: Yes, you would.

Tim: How about the passengers?

Jenna: Mere -- we call “mere passengers” is what I think you’re referring to -- usually have no REP in the car itself. And when I say “mere passenger” I mean, I’ve never borrowed your car, I don’t drive your car around, but at the end of work today I say, “Hey, Mr. Miller, can I grab a ride up to the front gate with you?” “Sure no problem,” you give me a ride up to the front gate. I’m just a mere passenger; I’m just along for a ride, so I don’t have any REP in your car or in the glove box or in the trunk. But I would retain REP in, say, I carry a briefcase and a purse from home to work every day. So when I bring those things into your car, I would still have an expectation of privacy in my belongings, I just would not have any REP in your car. Now, of course, it might be a little bit different if you shared that car with someone else -- a friend, a spouse or something like that. Now that person might have REP in the car if they are authorized to drive it around or they use it a good bit. But a mere passenger wouldn’t.

Tim: OK, why make a big deal out of all this, I mean, who has the REP? For example, suppose, I don’t know, Dillinger and I rob a bank. Dillinger owns the car, he drives the getaway car and we throw the guns and the money inside the trunk of Dillinger’s car. The cops then search the car and find that evidence. Can I get that evidence suppressed if the search is unreasonable?

Jenna: No, actually, and as I understand it it’s Dillinger’s car, right?

Tim: Right, yes.

Jenna: And you are essentially what we call a mere passenger, right? You’re basically just hitching a ride away from the bank robbery?

Tim: Check, I am just a mere passenger.

Jenna: Ok, so then, no, it would be the same situation as when you give me a ride up to the front gate -- I can’t have any REP in your glove box or in your trunk, so when the police search the car and they find the evidence in that trunk, Dillinger could complain about that search because that is his reasonable expectation of privacy. He could complain about whether it was reasonable or not. You couldn’t, though, because you don’t have any REP in that area, and we call that “no standing to object.” The only person who could object to the search is the person whose REP was intruded upon.

Tim: So, if I had no standing to object, I couldn’t object to the search even if it was unreasonable.

Technology is morally neutral. It's how a sentient being chooses to use it. A scalpel in the hands of a rapist can come from the same production line as one used by surgeons to save lives. I'll bet there are more surveillance cameras in the average American city than anywhere in North Korea. Would you argue that we are more oppressed because of that?

And I am asking about the use. And you won't answer.

There are well establish standards for the use of surveillance technology in the US legal system. There is no magical drone exemption from estabilished laws and caselaw.

I agree that there are established standards. "Well established" may be a different point. And if part of the issue of the continued use of GPS technology to surveil, at least without a warrant, is the continuous ability to gather data, the same can be said for drones that stay aloft for weeks at a time. Word is the Boeing is developing one that will stay aloft for 6 months. There is NOT "well established" standards for type of technology.

I agree that there are established standards. "Well established" may be a different point. And if part of the issue of the continued use of GPS technology to surveil, at least without a warrant, is the continuous ability to gather data, the same can be said for drones that stay aloft for weeks at a time. Word is the Boeing is developing one that will stay aloft for 6 months. There is NOT "well established" standards for type of technology.

What about manned aircraft? The feds have surveillance aircraft with FLIR and all sorts of goodies that they'll use with highly trained surveillance teams on the ground to surveil sophisticated bad guys who are well trained in counter surveillance. I'm not aware of any warrant requirement for that. Should there be?

What is the difference if a covert entry team places surveillance devices with the warrants to do so inside a home or business or a bug size drone zips inside?

28 Electronic Surveillance—Title III Applications The Application should meet the following requirements:

It must be prepared by an applicant identified as a law enforcement or investigative officer. The application must be in writing, signed by the United States Attorney, an Assistant United States Attorney, and made under oath. It must be presented to a Federal district court or court of appeals judge and be accompanied by the Department's authorization memorandum signed by an appropriate Department official and a copy of the most recent Attorney General's Order designating that official to authorize Title III applications. The application may not be presented to a magistrate. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(9) and 2516(1); see also In re United States of America, 10 F.3d 931, 935-38 (2d Cir. 1993).

It must identify the type of communications to be intercepted. "Wire communications" include "aural transfers" (involving the human voice) that are transmitted, at least in part by wire, between the point of origin and the point of reception, i.e., telephone calls. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). This includes cellular phones, cordless phones, voice mail, and voice pagers, as well as traditional landline telephones. "Oral communications" are communications between people who are together under circumstances where the parties enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). "Electronic communications" include text messages, email, non-voice computer and Internet transmissions, faxes, communications over digital-display paging devices, and, in some cases, satellite transmissions. Communications over tone-only paging devices, data from tracking devices (as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117), and electronic funds transfer information are not electronic communications under Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

It must identify the specific Federal offenses for which there is probable cause to believe are being committed. The offenses that may be the predicate for a wire or oral interception order are limited to only those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). In the case of electronic communications, a request for interception may be based on any Federal felony, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3).

It must provide a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which, or the place where, the interception is to occur. An exception to this is the roving interception provision set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) and (b). The specific requirements of the roving provision are discussed in USAM 9-7.111. Briefly, in the case of a roving oral interception, the application must show, and the court order must indicate, that it is impractical to specify the location(s) where oral communications of a particular named subject are to be intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(ii) and (iii). In the case of a roving wire or electronic interception, the application must state, and the court order must indicate, that a particular named subject's actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) and (iii). The accompanying DOJ document authorizing the roving interception must be signed by an official at the level of an Assistant Attorney General (including Acting AAG) or higher. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(i) and (b)(i). Further guidance on roving interceptions may be found on the DOJNet site of the Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU), Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO).

It must identify, with specificity, those persons known to be committing the offenses and whose communications are to be intercepted. In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 422-32 (1977), the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) requires the government to name all individuals whom it has probable cause to believe are engaged in the offenses under investigation, and whose conversations it expects to intercept over or from within the targeted facilities. It is the Criminal Division's policy to name as subjects all persons whose involvement in the alleged offenses is indicated, even if not all those persons are expected to be intercepted over the target facility or at the target location.

It must contain a statement affirming that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed, are reasonably unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to employ. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The applicant may then state that a complete discussion of attempted alternative investigative techniques is set forth in the accompanying affidavit.

It must contain a statement affirming that the affidavit contains a complete statement of the facts—to the extent known to the applicant and the official approving the application—concerning all previous applications that have been made to intercept the oral, wire, or electronic communications of any of the named subjects or involving the target facility or location. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e).

In an oral (and occasionally in a wire or electronic) interception, it must contain a request that the court issue an order authorizing investigative agents to make all necessary surreptitious and/or forcible entries to install, maintain, and remove electronic interception devices in or from the targeted premises (or device). When effecting this portion of the order, the applicant should notify the court as soon as practicable after each surreptitious entry.

When requesting the interception of wire communications over a cellular telephone, it should contain a request that the authorization and court order apply not only to the target telephone identified therein, but also to: 1) any change in one of several potential identifying numbers for the phone, including the electronic serial number (ESN), International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile Equipment Identification (IMEI) number, Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) number, or Urban Fleet Mobile Identification (UFMI) number; and 2) any changed target telephone number when the other identifying number has remained the same. Model continuity language for each type of identifier may be obtained from ESU. With regard to a landline phone, it should request that the authorization and court order apply not only to the target telephone number identified therein, but also to any changed telephone number subsequently assigned to the same cable, pair, and binding posts used by the target landline telephone. No continuity language should be included when the target telephone is a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone. The application should also request that the authorization apply to background conversations intercepted in the vicinity of the target phone while the phone is in use. See United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1070-72 (6th Cir. 1990).

It must contain, when concerning the interception of wire communications, a request that the court issue an order directly to the service provider, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15), to furnish the investigative agency with all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to facilitate the ordered interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). The application should also request that the court direct service providers and their agents and employees not to disclose the contents of the court order or the existence of the investigation. Id.

For original and spinoff applications, it should contain a request that the court's order authorize the requested interception until all relevant communications have been intercepted, not to exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the earlier of the day on which the interception begins or ten (10) days after the order is entered. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). For extensions, it should contain a request that the thirty-day period be measured from the date of the court's order.

It should contain a statement affirming that all interceptions will be minimized in accordance with Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code, as described further in the affidavit. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).[updated October 2012]

I have taken the liberty of editing my previous words a bit with the intention of improving the clarity of my expression:

Lets do a bit of a Socratic progression here. You and your wife are walking down the street. We are in agreement that you can be observed, photographed, etc.

1-A) May someone walk alongside you listening to your conversation?

GM: Sure. Have you ever overheard a conversation in public before? Were you violating that person's rights?

MARC: Of course not, so we are good so far.

1-B) What if you don't want them to listen to you conversation? Do they have a right to listen because you are in a public place? What if you stop so they can continue walking ahead, but they stop with you? In other words, no matter what you do, where you go, they are there listening with you? Is this OK? If not, why not?

GM Then you start getting into violations of various laws, such as harrassment (depending on how each state codifies it).

MARC: Now we are getting somewhere! We agree that you and your wife should be able to be free to have a conversation in a public place (walking down the street) without someone listening in if you don't want them to listen in. To listen in when someone is trying to keep their conversation private is harassment. So, why should the State be able to listen in to anyone anywhere with listening devices unbeknownst to those being recorded?

2-A) Now, the same two questions except this time, the person in question is a policeman. Do your answers change in any way?

GM: A law enforcement officer in a public space that overhears a conversation can use that for evidence in a criminal case. If people attempt to evade that officer and the officer pursues them, then we get into the area where courts look at it as some kind of seizure of those persons, which must be seen as reasonable.

There are the kinds of contacts with citizens for law enforcement:

1. Consentual. Not only must the person consent, it must be in the context where a reasonable person would feel free to decline to speak and leave the area.2. Investigative stop (Terry v. Ohio) where a person(s) is temporarily detained based on reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate.3. Arrest, based either on probable cause or a warrant.

If the above standards are not met, the officer faces both the loss of any evidence obtained, both civil and criminal liability on both state and federal levels and punitive actions from their employer.

MARC: True, but not really responsive. My question is whether the policeman may follow us to listen to our conversation just because he feels like it.

2-B) Why?

Again, the fourth amendment forbids unreasonable search and seizure, and in the past few centuries has fleshed out what is generally accepted as reasonable and what is not.

In the early days of the FBI, J.Edgar has his agents wiretapping phones without warrants.

MARC: Was this legal?!?

GM: There wasn't any such thing as a Title III wiretap warrant in those days. Even though surveillance technology has advanced to amazing degrees since those times, there are much greater legal protections and restrictions on law enforcement now than ever before in US history.

MARC: Again, not really responsive. The question I am asking has to to with everyone being monitored everywhere all the time. Two people, e.g. a husband and wife, are in a public place-- and apparently we are in agreement that to follow them in order to listen to them is "harassment"-- so why is no problem presented when hidden listening devices are involved?

MARC: Now we are getting somewhere! We agree that you and your wife should be able to be free to have a conversation in a public place (walking down the street) without someone listening in if you don't want them to listen in. To listen in when someone is trying to keep their conversation private is harassment. So, why should the State be able to listen in to anyone anywhere with listening devices unbeknownst to those being recorded?

No, you can have a conversation in a public space with other members of the public potentially overhearing your conversation, thus you do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. People talking in a public place usually discuss things they are not concerned with others overhearing, or assume no one is paying attention to their conversation. If you are disturbed by the visible interest shown by another, you can change the topic or move to another location. If, in attempting to move away from the person, they being to pursue you, then it changes the situation. But listening to a conversation in a public place where you are lawfully present isn't a crime in any jurisdiction that I'm aware of.

"So, why should the State be able to listen in to anyone anywhere with listening devices unbeknownst to those being recorded?"

It can't, absent a Title III warrant. "The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what 'a person knowingly exposes to the public.' Katz v. United States"

a) Would you regard what is happening in Britain now as pervasive surveillance?

I don't know enough about living in the UK to say. As a policing strategy, I think the UK's use of cameras hasn't proven to be effective.

b) Do you oppose pervasive surveillance in concept?

Depends how you define that. Ever live in a small town where most everyone knows you, knows your parents and grandparents? Would that fall under your definition? What sort of privacy did Thomas Jefferson enjoy in his day? Was he the center of public attention in his time?

Public places. It may sound obvious, but you have little to no privacy when you are in public. When you are in a public place — whether walking down the sidewalk, shopping in a store, sitting in a restaurant or in the park — your actions, movements, and conversations are knowingly exposed to the public. That means the police can follow you around in public and observe your activities, see what you are carrying or to whom you are talking, sit next to you or behind you and listen to your conversations — all without a warrant. You cannot necessarily expect Fourth Amendment protection when you’re in a public place, even if you think you are alone. Fourth Amendment challenges have been unsuccessfully brought against police officers using monitoring beepers to track a suspect’s location in a public place, but it is unclear how those cases might apply to more pervasive remote monitoring, like using GPS or other cell phone location information to track a suspect’s physical location.

Unless a meaningful distinction can be made between drone surveillance and more traditionalforms of government tracking, existing jurisprudence suggests that a reviewing court would likelyuphold drone surveillance conducted with no individualized suspicion when conducted forpurposes other than strict law enforcement.

I'm still waiting for that meaningful distinction between manned and unmanned aircraft.

"If, in attempting to move away from the person, they being to pursue you, then it changes the situation"

BINGO! We have a winner!

GM, of course I get the point about REP in public places. However, before the advent of the technology that is coming on stream that we are discussing here, it was possible to walk down the street and know whether someone was in earshot or not. In effect what is coming into being now is that because we cannot tell whether we are being observed, listened to etc. we cannot "move away". We can be "pursued" without even realizing it.

Please note well that the subject matter of the conversation need not be criminal, it may simply be PRIVATE.

The standards you apply would not prevent what , , , pardon the expression , , , REASONABLE PEOPLE would reasonably expect to be private-- a conversation walking down the street with no one in ear shot.

Which is why members of the Gambino crime family, knowing they were under "pervasive surveillance" by the FBI and the NYPD would walk outside to discuss "sensitive matters". The FBI then obtained a Title III warrant and placed "bugs" to record those conversations, which were later used in court.

Hiding from the U.S. government and media need not involve smearing one's self with mud.

byOleg Atbashian

Bio

February 25, 2013 - 6:24 pm

Al-Qaeda operatives: forget about that list of 22 crude anti-drone tactics discovered in an abandoned building in Mali. If those tactics had been genuinely useful, why did al-Qaeda leave there?

Granted, rubbing a mixture of mud and sugar on yourself and your vehicles could make you partially invisible to the next drone — but wouldn’t the wiser tactic be to become completely invisible to the entire U.S. government and mass media altogether?

All it takes is learning a few useful facts about the American political establishment: these 22 alternative tips will help you avoid detection, generally by encouraging Washington to either pretend you don’t even exist or to alter your public image until you become unrecognizable — even to yourself.

Alternative Tips for Avoiding U.S. Drone Strikes 1.Join the church where Al Sharpton is a preacher. No one knows where it is. 2.If you can’t find it, join the church Obama frequents. 3.If you can’t find that: register as a Republican Senate candidate from New York, New Jersey, or California. 4.Get a federal “green energy” loan, then declare bankruptcy. The U.S. government will cover for you. 5.Proclaim you are a victim of black-on-black crime. The media will render you invisible. 6.Come out as a black conservative. The media will render you unrecognizable. 7.If you are a woman: confess that Bill Clinton or Ted Kennedy once propositioned you. 8.Hide in the back of a Massachusetts senator’s submerged car. It will buy you at least a few hours. 9.Become a member of Obama’s Job Council. 10.Insert yourself in the next 2,000-page bill. 11.Sell birth control in the vicinity of Sandra Fluke’s residence. 12.“Hi, I’m Jon Huntsman.” 13.Pretend you’re a salad; the first lady won’t spot you. 14.Never walk in New York holding a 16oz Styrofoam soda cup. 15.Never drink from a bottle of water in front of a camera. This will interest U.S. media 24/7 for days. 16.Get in line at the DMV or another government office. 17.Impersonate an American taxpayer. 18.Hide in plain sight in Benghazi. 19.Camp out at Obama’s shooting range; no one is ever there. 20.Stay where Obama keeps his college transcripts, U.S. passport records, or financial records. You will never be disclosed. 21.Set up in one of Chicago’s highest murder-rate zones. A truckload of fighters with RPGs will go undetected. 22.Hold a sign, preferably bilingual, declaring a “Drone-Free Zone.”

These 22 tips for avoiding drones by al Qaeda came from several People’s Cube writers and appeared on Twitter under the hashtags #AlQaedaTipsToAvoidDrones and #TipsForDodgingDrones.

Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott told a gathering of reporters in Washington, D.C. today that he would consider using state-owned drones in securing his state's border with Mexico.

Asked if Texas should buy its own drones for use in border security, Abbott said "I would, it would be something to think about because with the drone you can actually see what is happening on the ground and it could help establish whether those objective criteria were being met."

Abbott acknowledged the potential for invasion of privacy problems with drones but said he believed those worries could be satisfied.

Earlier in the discussion, Abbott listed having objective criteria for determining whether a border area is sufficiently safe and secure for residents as a pre-requisite for resolution of immigration issues currently being debated in Congress.

Drones have become very much in the public consciousness in recent years as a result of their effective use by the U.S. military in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups.

The drones are pilotless, silent and deadly when armed with Hellfire missiles. The discussion with Abbott did not address whether state-owned drones would be armed or unarmed.

Civil liberties advocates and conservatives have become concerned in recent weeks, however, with the federal government's apparent use of drones over the continental United States, fearing invasion of privacy and illegal search violations of the Constitution.

Legislation banning the official use of drones is currently pending in more than a dozen states, including Illinois, Washington, Virginia, Montana, California, Oregon, Texas, Nebraska, Missouri, North Dakota, Florida, Maine, and Oklahoma.

Abbott has been mentioned as a possible candidate to succeed Texas Gov. Rick Perry in 2014. Abbott has been a leader among state attorneys general in challenging Obamacare and several Environmental Protection Agency regulations in federal court.

"Imagine living in a world where every errant utterance you make is preserved together,” Beckhusen writes in an article this week that explores a Defense Department project that’s been undertaken by its Darpa laboratories and is now in the hands of a University of Texas computer scientists named Matt Lease.

Many cars already record their speed, direction and gear setting, as well as when brakes activate and for how long. Newer systems also can track whether road surfaces are slick or whether the driver is wearing a seat belt — information potentially valuable to police and insurance companies investigating crashes. (Some car insurance companies already monitor driving behavior in exchange for discounted rates.)...One of the prototype vehicles on display here, a dark blue Cadillac ATS sedan, was outfitted with OnStar, streaming video, music apps and cameras aimed at both the interior and exterior of the car. In demonstrations, one of the car’s interior cameras took short video clips of occupants that were incorporated in animated sequences broadcast on the dashboard video screen.

Stefan Cross, an executive with public relations firm Weber Shandwick, which was assisting in GM’s announcement of the new technology, said one possible feature would alert owners by text message if their car is bumped or hit. Owners might then be able to activate the exterior cameras remotely for immediate visual reconnaissance.

“It allows somebody to stay connected to your car even if you’re not in it,” he said.

Cross said GM would protect the privacy of its customers, even as the volume of data increases. “We have that data. We’re just not prepared to release it to third parties.”

Yet experts say that in the absence of strong national privacy laws, valuable data often leaks out. Any information produced by a vehicle and transmitted over the Internet ends up on servers, making it a potential target for authorities, lawyers engaged in court cases or hackers.

Texas A&M University Professor Christopher Layne writes in “Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace” that the greater the external threat a state faces or believes that it does, the more autocratic its foreign policy making process will be and the more centralized its political structures will become. Layne argues that external threats necessitate a powerful governmental apparatus to mobilize resources for national security purposes; in turn, the more likely these states are to adopt statist forms of democracy or even authoritarian structures. As we have witnessed with past conflicts, and especially since 9/11, war concentrates power in the executive branch and thus expands the limits placed on our constitutional republic.