Thanks for these comments and for the reference to the blog post – which non can translated using google translate. However, as I noted in my post, interpreting SC Res 1973 as restricting the authorization to force taken only individually or through regional arrangements would mean that NATO countries can’t work with countries not part of that regional arrangement, i.e Arab States. I read that part of the resolution not as a limitation but rather as an encouragement to use cooperative arrangements. You interpret that part of the resolution that says regional organizations or arrangements as being disjunctive, i.e either regional organizations or arrangements. I think regional qualifies both organizations or arrangements as the expression regional arrangments is simply taken from Chapter VIII of the Charter. But if you’re right and the word arrangement is not qualified by “regional”, but means simply any arrangements then why not through arrangements with non-State actors?

In any event there is also the question what does acting nationally or individually mean – does it just mean through one’s own armed force or one can a State engage a militia to do its work for it (as IHL recognises). Individually here simply means not acting with other States or through a regional arrangement. But States can act on their own through their own armed forces or through other type of actors.

I would take issue with the question of the legality of arming of the rebels that you suggest. As a resolution permitting the use of force in international relations, Resolution 1973 (2011) represents an exception from the general prohibition on the use of force and thus its terms should be interpreted restrictively.

It speaks only to the Member States of the UN and does not mention the possibility of the states to use force “indirectly” or in co-operation with other subjects of international law. The only modalities it mentions in paras. 4 and 8 are acting (i) “nationally” (i.e. individually), or (ii) “through regional organizations or arrangements” (i.e. collectively on the international plane). As to the second modality, due to the use of the disjunction, this could possibly include ad hoc arrangements such as the provision of assistance to Arab States acting to enforce the no-fly zone that you mention, but not acting through non-State actors.

The resolution also places additional obligations on the willing States in order to achieve the fulfilment of the mandate (to use force only with the aim of protecting civilians and civilian areas; to inform the UN secretary-general of the measures undertaken). These do not bind the rebels nor is there any indication that they would become binding on the rebels after the proposed transfer of arms to them. However, without these limitations, further use of force by the rebels (in which the arms-supplying States would now be complicit) might endanger or even contradict the fulfilment of the mandate given by the Security Council. For these reasons, I would suggest that arming the rebels without further authorization is illegal in the current legal landscape established by the two SC resolutions.

For those advocating the supply of arms to the rebels for political reasons, a possible escape route can be envisioned through the Sanctions Committee established by Resolution 1970. This committee may according to paragraph 9(c) of that instrument approve sales or supply of arms and materiel to Libya.

I would be interested to hear about how this debate relates to ongoing arms trade treaty (ATT) negotiations. In particular, I am wondering what humanitarian and human rights law considerations come into play, e.g. in relation to your assertion that “indirect use of force” may entail “providing support or arms …non-State groups”. I’d think there may be legal requirements that go beyond knowing “who these people are and what their aims are”.

Also, when you argue that because “States using force in and against Libya must be entitled to transfer their own arms, for their own use, to the territory (which includes the airspace) of Libya”, this “amends the arms embargo somewhat.” In view of draft ATT language, and recent weapons treaties (CCM), I’d have thought that if there is no transfer of title to and control over the equipment, then this is not an international arms transfer, and hence would not affect the embargo?