There are moment-to-moment, one-life, two-life and three-life models of Paticcasamuppada. Not satisfied, I have tried to merge them and have created a flow-chart.Of course, this is not my final understanding; I am learning and trying to make sense of this doctrine. I would appreciate your comments and insights.

Last edited by SamKR on Sun Feb 17, 2013 5:49 am, edited 1 time in total.

The Dhamma taught by the Blessed One is Excellent in the beginning, Excellent in the middle and Excellent in the end - all of Buddha's Discourses are consistent and teach the same truth. "Sanditthika" Dhamma is self-evident and can be understood in this life itself. "Akaliko" Dhamma, Noble Truths, can not be changed nor can they be altered over time. "Ehipassiko" "come and see"; Buddha's Dhamma is to be investigated. "Opanayika" Dhamma can only be understood by oneself. "Paccattam vedittabbo vinnuhiti" Dhamma is for the wise to understand and realize.

And what is right speech? Abstaining from lying, from divisive speech, from abusive speech, & from idle chatter: This is called right speech.

SamKR wrote:There are moment-to-moment, one-life, two-life and three-life models of Paticcasamuppada. Not satisfied, I have tried to merge them and have created a flow-chart.Of course, this is not my final understanding; I am learning and trying to make sense of this doctrine. I would appreciate your comments and insights.

There is a new theory that doesn't fit any of the above categories. As it is something I saw, and I'm unsure how tolerant this board is of promoting one's own stuff (though I've been here for yonks -- it's folks here pointing me to MN 117 as evidence of "the Buddha taught rebirth as necessary" that got me started on this road) so I'll just say that if you want more info you should please contact me. There's a jury-refereed paper involved so no need to worry that I'm a *complete* nutcase. And (1) it really helps clarify many problematic suttas and (2) is useful in practice, too.

How could it be otherwise? When eye or ear meet meaningless forms and sounds qua words ideas arise dependent on conditions which then may entail further ideas. Only ideas can express themselves by means of forms and sounds.

However one may refer to the words caused by the ideas of others by quoting and refraining from comment.

Yes, I do. But then, as now, I feel as though the full article is needed to convince. The reason I express reluctance is because I put the paper into a little self-published book to make it more readily available, which takes it into the "promoting products" category.

Aside from the book, and the Journal the paper was originally published in, the only other copy to be found seems to be on one of those illegal sites which I have mixed feelings about and prefer not to widely promote.

I'm pretty intrigued by the equation of anatta with "sense of self". I thought this "sense of self" is probably better equated with MN 44's sakkāya (self-identification/personality). Given MN 44's treatment of the 5 Clinging Aggregates (pañcupādānakkhandhā) as an alternative to the standard equation to dukkha, anatta seems to be an inference to be drawn from dukkha, rather than being equivalent to dukkha itself. Perhaps I'm splitting hairs here...

Sylvester wrote:I'm pretty intrigued by the equation of anatta with "sense of self". I thought this "sense of self" is probably better equated with MN 44's sakkāya (self-identification/personality). ...

From experiential perspective I would equate "sense of self" with the subtle pre-conceptual momentary impulsive intuition of self or "I" which - lacking mindfulness - transforms into conceit and/or self-identification or appropriation of aggregates.

sense of self - if lack of mindfulness of its conditioned arising and subsiding then -> taking it as self or I (felt as permanent) -> A and/or BA: ... -> full-flegded conceitB: ... -> full-flegded self-identification with or appropriation of aggregates

Sylvester wrote:I'm pretty intrigued by the equation of anatta with "sense of self". I thought this "sense of self" is probably better equated with MN 44's sakkāya (self-identification/personality). Given MN 44's treatment of the 5 Clinging Aggregates (pañcupādānakkhandhā) as an alternative to the standard equation to dukkha, anatta seems to be an inference to be drawn from dukkha, rather than being equivalent to dukkha itself. Perhaps I'm splitting hairs here...

If you're picking this up from my usage, you'd need to recognize that it's, well, my usage. I'm not in any way suggesting that the Buddha used anatta to mean sense-of-self. It seems to me he was very careful to give anatta only a negative and not a positive meaning, and that he had good reasons for doing so, reasons tied to his time.

But I find it quite useful to think of anatta as the not-self, as what we are pointing out when we say "I have a self". In our day, we don't necessarily say "I have a self and it is eternal" or "...changeless" or "....separate" or "...the captain of the ship of my life" (i.e. "has mastery"). But we nonetheless do make assumptions about what that self is that can get us in trouble. There is something there -- even if it is only a process, or a concept -- that we are talking about when we say we have a self.

I agree that tying English "self" to sakkayaditthi and asmimana is best.

Atta is probably worth discussing in terms of English "soul", since paticcasamuppada-12 is already pedagogically structured to counter a theistic model which relies on such a thing.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]

I'm saying it lampoons an Upanisadic understanding of the creation of the cosmos and the soul, and therefore denies that claim. It's an instance of idapaccayata being held against a prevailing metaphysics in order to accomplish Dhamma instruction, which means it's possible that it can serve this purpose against modern understandings of a soul as well.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]

Then the thought occurred to Ven. Channa, "I, too, think that form is inconstant, feeling is inconstant, perception is inconstant, fabrications are inconstant, consciousness is inconstant; form is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, fabrications are not-self, consciousness is not-self; all fabrications are inconstant; all phenomena are not-self. But still my mind does not leap up, grow confident, steadfast, & released[1] in the resolution of all fabrications, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the ending of craving, dispassion, cessation, Unbinding. Instead, agitation & clinging arise, and my intellect pulls back, thinking, 'But who, then, is my self?'

Bhikkhu Bodhi says in a footnote to his translation:

Ānanda's choice of the Kaccānagotta Sutta is especially apt, as this sutta teaches how dependent origination counters the two extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism and replaces the view of self with the realization that it is only dukkha that arises and ceases.

"When one thing is practiced & pursued, ignorance is abandoned, clear knowing arises, the conceit 'I am' is abandoned, latent tendencies are uprooted, fetters are abandoned. Which one thing? Mindfulness immersed in the body." -AN 1.230

daverupa wrote:I'm saying it lampoons an Upanisadic understanding of the creation of the cosmos and the soul, and therefore denies that claim. It's an instance of idapaccayata being held against a prevailing metaphysics in order to accomplish Dhamma instruction, which means it's possible that it can serve this purpose against modern understandings of a soul as well.

"Lampoon" is a pretty strong word. What is it that indicates to you that it is ridiculing an "Upanisadic understanding of the creation of the cosmos and the soul"?

My understanding is that the PS is explaining how experience is mistaken for an existence, and how this mistake leads to suffering. So it is saying that the idea of a "god-created soul that exists in a world" is a delusion. I suppose that is a denial.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.

"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]

If you have asked me of the origination of unease, then I shall explain it to you in accordance with my understanding: Whatever various forms of unease there are in the world, They originate founded in encumbering accumulation. (Pārāyanavagga)

Exalted in mind, just open and clearly aware, the recluse trained in the ways of the sages:One who is such, calmed and ever mindful, He has no sorrows! -- Udana IV, 7

Gombrich wrote: " My conclusion is that Frauwallner and Hwang are right, and the Buddha's chain originally went back only five links, to thirst. (It could also go back six, seven, or eight links - nothing hangs on the difference.) Then, at another point, the Buddha produced a different causal chain to ironize and criticise Vedic cosmogony, and noticed that it led very nicely into the earlier chain - perhaps because it is natural for the creation of the individual to lead straight on to the six senses, and these, via 'contact' and 'feeling', to thirst. It is quite plausible, however, that someone failed to notice that once the first four links become part of the chain, it's negative version meant that in order to abolish ignorance one first had to abolish consciousness!"