Keith Brian Johnson wrote on this thread referring to
a distinction I had proposed:
>Mightn't we view the distinction between (1) and (2)
>as one of implicit
>meaning? In (1), (1) is taken to have truth-value,
>so we could write
>it as
>(1) The purportedly truth-valued sentence (1)
>expresses no true
>proposition.
>We then analyze (1), find that it is neither true
>nor false, and
>conclude that the purportedly truth-valued sentence >
(1) is actually not
>truth-valued. Then we write
>(2) The actually non-truth-valued sentence (1)
>expresses no true
>proposition.
>And that's simply true. Making them more explicit
>reveals that (1) and
>(2) were never the same sentence; they only appeared
>to be.
Well, actually when we state (2) we have an
information that no one could have when uttering (not
'stating') (1). But this information need not be
entirely explicited in (2): since I now know that (1)
has no truth value, I know it expresses no true
proposition and I choose to say exactly the latter.
Obviously the sentence I utter now can be exactly the
same as (1), although this time it will express a true
proposition.
And I think there are good reasons to believe there is
no possible disambiguation for all cases of this kind.
If this is so, syntax could never completely represent
semantics.
By the way, I think this was already suggested in
Gödel's and Tarski's theorems: there is no syntactical
representation of the semantical concept of
arithmetical truth. Consequently those theorems do
have something to say about the argument Searle
proposed and Slater has reintroduced here.
Best regards
Laureano Luna Cabañero
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