Mr. Bassett, from the committee appointed on that part of the President's message which relates to the naval establishment,* reported, in part:

That, in performance of the duty assigned them, the committee could not fail to advert to the report made to the last session of Congress on this subject; having adverted to it, they could not fail, from the justness of its reasoning, to rely on it, and pray that it may be taken as part of their report.** The little experience yet afforded us in naval warfare corroborates the principles there contended for, and in this view they think themselves supported by that passage in the President's message which says, "our trade, with little exception, has safely reached our ports; having been much favored in it by the course pursued by a squadron of our frigates, under the command of Commodore Rodgers." "They therefore concurred in the opinion that it is proper to increase the naval establishment. For information as to the mode of increase they applied to the Navy Department, and obtained the documents which they

submit to the House. The, comparative effect of vessels of different rates must be considered as demonstrated by these documents. Yet were your committee apprised that, in the complicated system of naval warfare, no one principle would be relied on as applicable to all times and all occasions; but that a patient comparison of many principles was necessary to a just conclusion. They were apprised that facility of movement should be combined with efficiency of force; nor were they regardless of the benefit of occasional division. Inasmuch, however, as great gain will sometimes follow from the power to operate on many points at once, yet, at others, it may be all important to give unity to your force. To obtain the things desired, it is essential that your naval establishment comprise ships of different rates. It is evident, too, from the documents, that you economise in men and money by providing some of the larger ships. This conclusion, so well fortified by reason, is found in unison with the practice of all nations who have had the fiscal and other means of providing a navy. Indeed it would seem almost the spontaneous effect of instinct, without the aid of reason to oppose like with like. To yield the advantage of the sabre, the bayonet, or fire arms, to your enemy, would, by all men, be deemed miserable policy. Can reason change with the element? Let us then have for defence seventy-six, thirty-eight, and sixteen gun ships; because we are opposed to an enemy possessing all these means of attack, and because they combine all advantages in naval warfare. It is not the intention of your committee to put aside the gunboats, but they believe that, considering the opportunity afforded them for action, an ample portion of that species of force has been provided. Your committee cannot conclude their report without bringing to the view of the House the fact, that the naval superiority of Great Britain, which secures her integrity and supports her dignity, is maintained at a cost much below the military establishments of the continent. And it is with something like exultation, as republicans, that they present a species of national force that, whilst it will best subserve the national defence, can operate least on the national liberty. It is a bright attribute in the history of the tar, that he has never destroyed the rights of the nation. In its defence only is he to be found. Thus aided by economy, and fortified by republican principle, your committee think they ought strongly to recommend that the fostering care of the nation be extended to the naval establishment. It is far, very far, from your committee to extend their views of a navy to the mad and wicked prospect of foreign conquest, or a silly contest to be mistress of the ocean. Their view is limited to their own defence and to enforce respect to their just rights. To the objection that it is the nature of man to run into extremes, they answer that it is the end, not the beginning, we should guard against. It is surely yielding much of the argument to surrender all of the subject that is good, and require submission to evil, that good may come thereof. Rather separate the wheat from the chaff; show the good and the bad. Let it be impressed on every citizen that, to use force to protect and maintain the rights and liberties of his country, is his first duty, whilst it is the greatest of crimes to attack with force the rights of others. It can require no subtlety to enforce the distinction between defence and offence; neither can it require argument to prove that the first ought not to be abandoned, as being more than life's worth: though the other may be deprecated as the consummation of wickedness. Limited to the. view of defence and protection, the committee directed their chairman to ask leave of the House to report a. bill to increase the navy of the United States.

Navy Department, 13th November, 1812.

Sir:

I have the honor of transmitting herewith, for the information of the committee of the House of Representatives of which you are the chairman, certain papers, marked A, B, C, and D.

From the paper A it appears that a 76 gun ship, mounting 88 guns, discharges in one round 3,176 lbs. of cannon ball: that a 44 gun frigate, mounting 54 guns, discharges in one round 1,488 lbs. of cannon ball: that a 76 discharges at one broadside 1,588 lbs., and that a 44 gun frigate discharges at one broadside 744 lbs. of ball. The question then arises, what is the intrinsic relative force of a 76 and a 44?

Suppose two 44 gun frigates should be brought into combat with a 76—one on the larboard, the other on the starboard quarter; each frigate presenting a broadside of 744 lbs. of ball, will have to contend against a battery of 1,58S lbs. As 744 lbs. is to 1,588 lbs. so would be the relative metal of a 76 and two large 44 gun frigates—difference against the frigates 844 lbs. weight of metal. It is obvious, then, that two 44 gun frigates could not contend with a 76, with the least probability of success.

Suppose a third frigate, attacking alternately on the starboard and larboard quarter, should join in the combat. While two of the frigates should be operating on one quarter with a difference in weight of metal against them of 100 lbs. the third frigate would be contending on the other with a difference against her of 844 lbs.

It might be observed, that the frigates would all attack on one quarter, and then with 2,232 lbs. of metal they would have to contend with only 1,588 lbs., having a difference in their favor of 644 lbs. In reply it may be observed, that three frigates could not take such a position, on any one quarter, as would enable them to bring all their broadsides to bear at once upon an object moving through the water with as much celerity as themselves. Moreover, a frigate would always avoid the broadside of a 76, for one well directed broadside from a 76, at close shot, would inevitably blow her out of the water. Witness the Randolph with the Yarmouth. Frigates would attack in various directions; change their positions frequently, and avoid the tremendous battery of a 76 as much as possible.

Besides, a 76 is built of heavier timber, is intrinsically much stronger than a frigate in all her works, and can sustain battering much longer, and with less injury. A shot which would sink a frigate, might be received by a 76 with but little injury—it might pass between wind and water through a frigate, when it would stick in the frame of a 76.

All things considered, it must be admitted that one 76 gun ship, mounting 86, is equal in combat to three frigates mounting 162 guns. Admitting this equality, other questions present themselves for consideration; and

1st. What is the relative expense of building and equipping these vessels?

2d. What is the relative number of their crews?

3d. What is their relative annual expense in actual service?

To ascertain the expense of building ami equipping a frigate, we will take the actual cost of one of our largest, viz: the President, which was $220,910. A frigate would then cost

$220,910

The cost of a 76 cannot be so easily ascertained: however, from the papers, B and C we may, I think, estimate the expense of building and equipping a 76 at not exceeding

S333,000

The construction then of a force in frigates, equal in combat to a 76 gun ship, would cost

662,730

Making, in this view, a difference in favor of the 76 of

329,730

As then $333,000 is to $662,730, so would be the relative expense of building and equipping a 76, and a force in frigates equal to a 76, making a difference in favor of the 76 of

$329,73

By the paper A it appears that a 76 requires to man her 650 men, and that a 44 requires 420. To man three 44 gun frigates, or a force in frigates equal to a 76, would then require 1,260 men; and in this respect, we find a difference in favor of the 76 of 610 men. That is, 650 men on board of a 76 can direct as much force as 1,260 can on board of three frigates.

As to the relative expense: we have heretofore estimated the annual cost of a frigate of 44 guns at S110,000, and from the best information we can obtain upon the subject, the annual expense of a 76 will not exceed

$202,110

The annual expense, then, of three frigates, or a force in frigates equal to a 76, would be $330,000, while a 76 would not cost exceeding $202,110, making, in this resprect, a difference in favor of the 76 of $127,890, annually.

In examining the relative strength of frigates and ships of war, and of ships of war and gunboats, we shall find similar results in favor of the larger class of vessels.

Hence, if the only object in view was to employ the greatest intrinsic naval force, at the least expense, I should think there would be no difficulty in deciding that we ought to have none but ships of the great magnitude. But in providing a naval armament, there are other considerations, of the highest importance. We should inquire, what kind of force will, most probably, be brought against us? With what description of force can we meet the enemy with the greatest probability of success, and afford the most effectual protection to our commerce? And upon these

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highly interesting points, I will take the liberty of submitting a very valuable communication, D, received from Charles Stewart, Esquire, a captain in the navy of the United States, an officer of great observation, distinguished talents, and very extensive professional experience, observing that I believe all the most enlightened officers in our service concur in the opinions he has expressed.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

PAUL HAMILTON.

Hon. Burwell Bassett,

Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives.

A.

Statement showing the number and description of guns mounted on vessels of different classes; the weight of ball in a round of each; the weight of a broadside; the number of men required for each; the annual expense in actual service of each; the annual expense computed by the gun, by each man, and by the weight of metal; and the relative power of each man, in each description of vessels, computed in weight of metal.

Rate of ships

No. of 68 pound carronades.

No. of 42 pound long guns on the lowerdeck.

No. of 24 pound carronades on the upperdeck.

No. of 42 pound carronades on the quarterdeck.

No. of 32 p'd carronades on the quarterdeck

No. of 42 pound carronades on the forecastle.

No. of 32 pound carronades on the forecastle.

No. of 9 pound

long cannon.

Whole number of carriage guns.

No. of guns in a broadside.

Weight of ball in a round.

Weight of ball in a broadside.

Number of men.

Whole annual expense in actual service.

Annual expense per gun.

Annual expense per man.

Annual expense per each pound of metal

Power of each man computed in weight of
metal

lbs.

oz.

76

4

30

28

16

8

86

43

3,176

1,588

650

$202,110

$2,350

$310 09

$63 63

4

14

44

30

16

8

54

27

1,488

744

420

110,000

2,037

261 90

73 92

3

08

16

18

2

20

10

594

297

130

50,202

2,520

463 00

84 51

4

08

Gunboat,

1

1

24

36

12,500

12,500

347 00

520 83

10 1/2

Estimate of the expense of building and equipping a
seventy-four gun ship, of one thousand six hundred and twenty tons,
prepared some years since by Joshua Humphreys, Esq. of Philadelphia, a shipwright of great respectability and professional talents.

Live oak timber,

$40,000

White oak and pine, &c.

30,000

Labor,

85,100

Cables, rigging, &c.

32,400

Smiths' work,

30,400

Anchors, marline,

8,700

Sailmaker's bills, two suits, including canvass,

16,200

Joiner's bill, including stuff,

7,800

Carver's bill,

1,620

Tanner's bill,

700

Rigger's bill,

2,240

Painter's bill,

3,240

Cooper's bill,

4,860

Blockmakers bill,

3,240

Boatbuilder's bill,

1,620

Plumber's bill,

2,430

Ship chandlery,

9,720

Turner's bill,

1,215

Copper bolts,

10,960

Sheathing copper, nails, &c.

17,440

Woollens for sheathing,

1,215

$311,100

Contingencies,

31,600

$342,700

NOTES BY AN EXPERIENCED GENTLEMAN.

"Labor." This item was calculated at a time when ship carpenters' wages were two dollars and fifty cents per day; they can now be obtained at two dollars.

"Cables and rigging." When the above estimate was made the price was sixteen dollars; they can now be obtained at fifteen dollars.

"Carver's bill." Expensive carving on the head and stern is abolished; one thousand dollars may be, deducted from this item.

"Rigger's bill." We employ seamen at twelve dollars per month; this item may be considerably reduced,

"Painter's bill." The present practice of painting our ships of war differs so much from that first adopted, both in point of labor and colors, that one-third of this item may be safely deducted.

"Woollen for sheathing." Now exploded; experience having established the fact, that it occasions an absorption and retention of salt water, which corrodes the copper inside, &c. nor could the copper be laid on so smooth as without it.

"Contingencies." At the time the above estimate was made we had no yards; of course wharfage, or rent of yard, was then included; and we do not now, as then, give such quantities of rum to laborers. This item may be reduced one-half.

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C.

Estimate of the expense of building and equipping a 76 gun ship, formed from the actual expense of building andequipping the frigate President.

The President, of 1,444 tons, cost $920,910, say per ton $153; a 76 would ton 1,620.

1,620 tons, at $153, make

$247,860

Add for additional guns and gun carriages,

18,599

Additional cubic feet of timber in the frame, about 4,000 feet, at $1 25,

5,000

For additional weight of rigging, anchors, and other materials, add 10 per cent, on the cost of the tonnage. $247,860, at 10 per cent.

24,786

$296,245

Say $300,000.

D.

U. S. Frigate
Constellation , November 12, 1812.

Sir:

I have received your letter of the 11th instant, in which you state "the desire of the Naval Committee to possess the most comprehensive information upon naval subjects, particularly the description of marine force best adapted to our defence, and the relative efficiency of vessels of different rates." In compliance therewith, I have the honor to answer the questions you propound, as follows:

Question 1. What, in your opinion, is the relative efficiency of ships of the line, say seventy-fours, and large frigates?

Answer. The relative efficiency or force of a seventy-four gun ship and large frigates is as one to three.

Comparative Force.

Frigate of 50 guns.

Ship of the line, 74 guns.

Gun deck,

30

24 pounders

Lower gun deck,

28

42 pounders.

Quarter deck,

14

32 pound carronades.

Upper ditto,

30

24 ditto.

Forecastle,

6

32 ditto.

Quarter deck,

16

42 pound carronades.

Forecastle,

8

42 ditto.

Guns

50 1

,360 lbs. shot each round.

Ditto,

2

24 pounders.

Men

430

Poop,

4

68 pound carronades.

480 guns and men.

Guns

88

3,224 lbs. shot each round.

Men

650

738 guns and men.

Argument. By the above comparison it appears that a seventy-four gun ship discharges at one round 3,224 lbs. of shot, and a frigate of the first class 1,360 lbs.; it therefore clearly proves the position or relative force in point of metal to be one to three, or thereabouts. When this circumstance is considered jointly with the following, it must appear to others, as it does to me, that, as you increase the class of the ship, you increase the force in the proportion of one to three, and diminish proportionately the expense of building, equipping, and supporting them in commission, which may easily be established by estimates from the Department, and the experience of all other maritime nations.

Ships of the line are much stronger in scantling, thicker in the sides and bottom, less penetrable to the shot, and consequently less liable to be torn, or battered to pieces, or sunk; the additional room being more than in proportion to the additional number of men, leaves greater space for water and provisions, and admits of her wings being kept clear, that shot penetrating below the water, the holes can readily be plugged up from the inside, and her sinking thereby prevented; hence we have seen ships of the line capable of battering one another for several hours, and, if not too much crippled in the spars and rigging, enabled to renew an action on following days. I am aware that some are of opinion that a more divided force is better calculated for action, from the advantageous position that would be given to a part, Suppose three frigates of fifty guns were to undertake to batter a seventy-four gun ship, and that two of them were to occupy the quarter and stern of the seventy-four, (this is placing them in the most favorable position) the other frigate engaged abreast, every thing would then depend on the time the frigate abreast could maintain that position, to enable the other two to act with effect on the stern and quarter. But it must appear evident to all acquainted with the two classes of ships, that the frigate abreast could not withstand the fire of so heavy and compact a battery many minutes, and, in all probability, would be dismasted or sunk the first or second broadside: this would decide the fate of the other two. Much might be said upon the superiority of ships of the line over frigates in the attack of batteries, or their defence; on the security of valuable convoys of merchant ships, or troops sent on an expedition; but their advantages, in these respects, must be apparent to all, however unacquainted with nautical affairs.

Question 2What, in your opinion, is the relative efficiency or force of large frigates and sloops of war?

Answer. The relative efficiency of large frigates and sloops of war is at least one to two.

Comparative Force.

Sloop of War.

Frigate.

Gun deck,

16

12 pounders.

Gun deck,

30

24 pounders.

Quarter deck,

8

24 pound carronades.

Quarter deck,

14

32 pound carronades.

Forecastle,

4

24 ditto.

Forecastle,

6

32 ditto.

Guns

28

480 lbs. shot.

Guns

50

1,360 lbs. shot.

Men

180

Men

430

208 guns and men.

480 guns and men.

Question 3. What description of naval force do you think best adapted to the defence of our coast and commerce? Answer. Ships of the line are best calculated for the defence of our coast, and for the protection of our inward and outward commerce, when engaged in war with a foreign maritime Power.

Argument. It cannot be supposed that, in a war with a foreign maritime Power, that Power will only send to our coast frigates and smaller cruisers, because we possess no other description of vessels. Their first object will be to restrain, by ships of the line, our frigates and other cruisers from departing and preying upon their commerce; their next object will be to send their smaller cruisers in pursuit of our commerce; and by having their ships of the line parading on pur coast, threatening our more exposed seaport towns, and preventing the departure of our small cruisers, they will be capturing what commerce may have escaped theirs, and recapturing what prizes may have fallen into pur hands. Thirdly: they can at any time withdraw their ships of the line, should a more important object require it, without hazarding much on their part; and return in sufficient time to shut out our cruisers that may have departed during their absence. Fourthly: they can at all times consult their convenience in point of time

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and numbers; and will incur no expense and risk of transports for provisions and water, but can go and procure their supplies at pleasure, and return to their station ere their absence is known to us.

Question 4. What description of force do you think best calculated to prosecute the present war and any future war in which we may be engaged?

Answer. For the prosecution of the present war with the most effect, a mixed naval force, of the following description, is, in my opinion, the best calculated:

Ships of the line to rate, in honor of the year of our independence, seventy-six's, to mount as follows:

28

42 pounders on the lower gun deck,

30

24 do. on the upper do.

24

42 pound carronades on quarter deck and forecastle,

2

24 pounders on forecastle,

4

68 pound carronades on poop.

88

guns.

Frigates to rate forty guns to mount as follows:

30

24 pounders on gun deck,

20

32 pound carronades on quarter deck and forecastle.

50

guns.

Frigates to rate thirty-two guns to mount as follows:

26

18 pounders on gun deck,

16

24 pound carronades on quarter deck and forecastle.

42

guns.

Corvette ships to rate sixteen guns to mount as follows:

18

32 pound carronades,

2

12 pounders.

20

guns.

Argument. By having a proportion of these classes of ships of war, the inner squadron, or guard de costa, may be composed of the ships of the line and a few of the thirty-two gun ships, for repeaters and look out ships. Hence it would produce one of two results—either that the enemy would be obliged to abandon our coast or bring on it a much greater force, at least double our number, out of which they will be obliged to keep on our coast a superiority, at all the hazards of the sea, and at great additional expense and risk of transports to provision and water them. But should they, from other circumstances, be unable to keep up this superiority on our coast, the door will be kept open for the ingress and egress of our cruisers and their prizes; while our other classes of ships may be sent in pursuit of their smaller cruisers and commerce. These observations will apply to all future wars in which we may be engaged with the maritime Powers; but, as we might more frequently be engaged with the Barbary Powers, the frigates and sixteen gun ships would be better adapted to that species of warfare. They have no ships of the line. The ships of the line could then be laid up in ordinary, dismantled, and preserved at a small expense.

Question 5. Would not the erection of docks for the repairs of our vessels produce a great saving in expense, labor, and risk; and would not docks greatly expedite the refitting of our ships?

Answer. A dry dock, agreeable to a plan I furnished the Department some time since, to be freed from water by pumps or drains, will be indispensable for the repair of ships of war, and will be the least expensive way of repairing the bottoms of our ships, and will expedite the outfits in point of time one to ten.

Argument. A ship of war wanting repairs done to her bottom, or coppering, must be turned down one side at at a time to undergo that repair; therefore, to prepare a ship for that process, requires that all her upper masts should be taken down, and all her guns, stores, water casks, ballast, ammunition, &c. should be taken out; which leads to great loss, waste, and labor; and the time occupied in the process will be from two to three weeks, and as much more lime will be required to re-rig, re-equip, and replace her guns, stores, and other materials. The preparation to dock a ship of war can be done in twelve hours; all that is necessary to be done is, to take out the guns, and pump the water out of the water casks; and, when in dock, the repairs of her bottom can progress on both sides at the same time. Should a ship of war require a thorough repair throughout, it can never be effectually done but in a dock; for instance, in repairing ships of war in the water, they are liable to have the fine form of their bottom spoiled, by hogging, spreading, or warping, which will materially affect their sailing. Ships wanting thorough, repairs require all the plank stopped off inside and outside; their beams, knees, and clamps, taken out: these articles are all they have to bind their frames together, and thereby preserve their shape; but, when stripped of them to make room for the new, they are liable to hogg, from the greater weight and body of timber being in the fore and after end, at which places there is no pressure upwards, caused by the water, as those ends are sharp. The two extremes of the ship are liable to sink in the water, while the body or middle of, the ship rises with the upward pressure of water. The next consideration in repairing the bottoms in the water, though not of such vital importance, is not unworthy of serious attention: the bolting in the bottom ought to be driven from the outside; but, when repaired afloat, they are under the necessity of driving them from the inside; hence the bottom will not be so strong nor so well secured.

The time for answering the several questions propounded to me in your letter of the 11th instant being very short, and a great deal being required by my other avocations, will, I trust, be a sufficient apology for my not going more largely and minutely into the subject, as also for any inaccuracies which I may have committed. I will, therefore, close this communication with an expression of my hopes that, whatever may be proposed by the naval committee to Congress on this subject, they will strongly recommend to their consideration the necessity of having what they propose for the increase of the navy, of the best seasoned materials, which will be by far the cheapest and be longer in a state for active service. I trust their past experience will prove to their satisfaction this position, that the best materials are always the cheapest, and that a slow increase is better than a hasty and temporary one.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

CHS: STEWART.

Honorable P. Hamilton.

We agree with Captain Stewart in the foregoing statement, in all its parts.

ISAAC HULL.

C. MORRIS.

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Ships of the United States' Navy, 1798, 1799.

United States

44, commissioned and put in service,

1798

Merrimack

24,

commissioned and put in service,

1798

Constitution

44,

do.

1798

Connecticut

24,

do.

1798

Constellation

44,

do,

1798

Baltimore

20,

do.

1799

Congress,

36,

do. early

1799

Delaware

20,

do.

1798

President

44,

do.

1799

Maryland

20,

do.

1799

Chesapeake

44,

do.

1799

Patapsco

20,

do.

1799

Philadelphia

44,

do.

1799

Herald

18,

do.

1798

New York

36,

do.

1799

Trumbull

20,

do.

1798

Essex

32,

do.

1799

Warren

20,

do.

1798

John Adams

32,

do.

1799

Montezuma

20,

do.

1798

Adams

32,

do.

1799

Norfolk

18,

do.

1798

Geo. Washington

32,

do.

1798

Richmond

18,

do.

1798

Boston,

32,

do.

1799

Augusta

18,

do.

1798

General Greene

32,

do.

1798

Pickering

14,

do.

1798

Insurgent

36,

do.

1799

Experiment

14,

do.

1798

Ganges

32,

do.

1798

Enterprise

14,

do.

1798

Portsmouth

24,

do.

1798

And a number of smaller vessels,

1799

In service in 1798, 20 vessels,

Besides smaller vessels.

Do. 1799, 33 do.

Statement showing the proportions of able seamen,
ordinary seamen, and boys, required for a ship of the line, say a76, and a 44 gun frigate.

A 76

requires 280 able seamen,

233 ordinary seamen and boys.

A 44

do. 140 do.

172 do.

Note.—280 able seamen is considered by practical men as too great a proportion for a first rate 76. The whole number of able and ordinary seamen and boys is 513, and practical men say that they maybe classed thus: 220 able seamen, 293 ordinary seamen, &c. It is observed by those acquainted with ships of the line, that to manage their sails does not require more able seamen than are required to manage the sails of a large frigate.

A force in frigates equal to a seventy-six would then require 420 able seamen; a 76 would require 220; making a difference in this respect of 200 able seamen in favor of the 76.

In 1798 and 1799 no difficulty was experienced in procuring able seamen. We could frequently in one week man a frigate. One among other considerations which induced able seamen to enter then with so much alacrity, was, because the enemy we were then contending with had not afloat (with very few exceptions) vessels superior in rate to frigates. The enemy we are now fighting have ships of the line; and our sailors know the great difference between that class of vessels and frigates, and cannot but feel a degree of reluctance at entering the service, from the evident disparity. Build ships of the line, and you would man them with more ease than you now can a sloop of war.

In 1798, 1799, and 1800, we had near four thousand able seamen in the navy; a number sufficient to man eighteen ships of the line.