Human rights activists in Hong Kong, about a four-hour drive to the southwest, believe the crackdown could represent an unprecedented push to silence Wukan, whose villagers received international attention after an 2011 uprising led to authorities granting direct village-wide elections.

[…] Villagers, including old people, pelted police with bricks as they advanced with shields, batons and helmets, with clouds of tear gas wafting down the street, video footage seen by Reuters showed.

[…] One Wukan resident reached by Reuters by mobile phone said riot police hit people with batons, setting off tear gas grenades and firing rubber bullets at villagers, including old people.

He said police had entered the village in their “thousands”. Others said between 300 and 400 police were involved in the operation, including house-to-house searches.

“The riot police started attacking and shooting at us,” he said. “They are still fighting now. We want them to leave.” […] [Source]

Following initial reports on the ongoing clash, CDT resident cartoonist Badiucao has drawn the name of the village with bullet holes substituting one crucial stroke.

“Their behaviors have severely affected local life and production and exerted a bad influence. Police have therefore arrested the 13 according to law, in an effort to safeguard the interest of the masses and restore order,” local police said in a statement published online.

[… Amnesty International’s Patrick] Poon said the village was now on lockdown, “no one can enter, information is blocked.”
“The atmosphere there is very tense,” he added.

[…] Poon said Amnesty is concerned that since information is no longer getting out, many more arrests and detentions could take place without being reported. [Source]

An official statement issued Tuesday said 13 villagers in Wukan were arrested, allegedly for inciting a mob and spreading rumors.

The statement levies several allegations at “a small number of lawless persons,” including disturbing school, preventing fishermen from working and hampering shopkeepers. It says officials tried to “educate and persuade” protest leaders, but that guidance was evidently disregarded.

“In order to safeguard the interests of the masses and restore the normal order of production and local people’s lives, local police decided to take action and apprehended them,” the statement said.

Chinese law requires official permission be granted for all protests, a condition that is almost never met. Large-scale protests are usually met with action intended to quell dissent. In recent decades, China has allowed a small number of elections for positions below the township level, though national and provincial party officials continue to be selected internally. [Source]

BBC News producer Xinyan Yu and others have been tweeting more images and video footage from the clash in Wukan

]]>196670Minitrue: Delete Article on Disciplinary Official’s Deathhttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/06/minitrue-delete-article-on-beaten-to-death-disciplinary-official/
Wed, 10 Jun 2015 22:16:03 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=184187The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. The name of the issuing body has been omitted to protect the source.

Find and delete the article “Qing’an Heilongjiang Disciplinary Inspection Official Beaten to Death After Reporting on County Officials.” Do not hype this story. [Chinese]

On June 8, Caijing reported on the lack of progress in an investigation into the death of Fan Jiandong, an official with Qing’an county’s anti-corruption agency. According to Caijing, Fan was beaten by a gang of masked men on April 2, months after a trip to Beijing to report on county officials. Fan died while being hospitalized on May 1. The article has disappeared from Caijing’s website and all other Chinese news portals, but can be read in full via Vancouver-based Chinese-language news website city365.ca.

The document, jointly signed by Fan and two others, accused the county’s Party chief Sun Jingshan and county head Li Yingnan for their alleged involvement in the illegal construction of a deluxe office building after the State Council requested all government bodies not to build any new office building for five years.

At least 30 million yuan ($4.8 million) was invested, yet the new building was not being used, the document read.

No suspect has been arrested, Caijing reported.

A staff member at Fan’s office confirmed his cause of death, but refused to confirm if he had been to Beijing. [Source]

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.

]]>184187Word of the Week: To Be Johnnedhttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/word-of-the-week-to-be-johnned/
Thu, 09 Apr 2015 21:24:57 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=182732The Word of the Week comes from the Grass-Mud Horse Lexicon, a glossary of terms created by Chinese netizens and encountered in online political discussions. These are the words of China’s online “resistance discourse,” used to mock and subvert the official language around censorship and political correctness.

To be framed for visiting a prostitute. Came into common parlance from the case of muckraker Ou Shaokun, who was detained for five days in March 2015 for allegedly soliciting a prostitute.

Ou Shaokun is a Guangzhou-based activist known for exposing the personal use of public vehicles by uploading photos of license plates to social media. On March 26, 2015, Ou uploaded several photos to Weibo from Shaoshan, Hunan. A supporter later took him to dinner and karaoke in Changsha with Chen Jialuo. A woman from the karaoke parlor came to Ou’s hotel room later that evening. She undressed and they began to kiss when the police raided the room, took photos, and detained Ou. Ou now plans to sue for what he claims was a set-up in revenge for exposing official corruption.

Ou’s case is similar to that of Chinese-American businessman and Weibo celebrity Charles Xue, who in 2013 was detained for soliciting a prostitute, only to appear on national television confessing to “irresponsibility in spreading information online” several days later. The prostitution charge appeared to be an excuse to publicly shame Xue for his outspokenness online.

Example of “being johnned”:

Duanwanjinlüshi (@段万金律师): I heard the case of Uncle Bo being johnned was banned from reporting. Sigh, even the moonlight will burn you to death. (April 2, 2015)

]]>182732Minitrue: Cool Down on Uncle Ou Shaokunhttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/minitrue-cool-down-on-uncle-ou-shaokun/
Tue, 07 Apr 2015 21:34:58 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=182669The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. The name of the issuing body has been omitted to protect the source.

All websites immediately cool down focus on “Uncle” Ou Shaokun’s visit with a prostitute. Do not make it a lead story. Control commentary, and block searches for important related information.* (April 7, 2015) [Chinese]

*The above censorship directive’s usage of the language “important information” appears to be in reference to Captain Chen’s name. Searches results for Chen Jianluo (陈检罗) are currently blocked on both Baidu and Weibo. Back.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.

The large number of people sentenced in a single trial for what their advocates have said were political rather than criminal activities was unusual. All were members of the Miao ethnic group, more commonly known in the West as the Hmong.

The former official, Long Baorong, of Fenghuang County in Hunan Province, was detained by Communist Party investigators in 2010 after he raised questions about the local government. In 2011, a court sentenced him to four or five years in prison for fraud and embezzlement, but he was unexpectedly released in 2012. He died shortly afterward, according to the lawyer, Ma Gangquan.

[…] A report by China Human Rights Defenders, an advocacy group based outside China, said that the Long brothers and about 50 others were detained in August 2012, a month after Long Baorong, the former official who had held the post of deputy county executive, died.

Mr. Long incurred the wrath of local officials after he published an online article in July 2010 about official corruption, called “58 Whys?” The Long brothers led more than 1,000 people in protest when the trial of Long Baorong began. After he died, a similar number of people, mostly Miao, showed up at his funeral. Local officials were incensed by the crowds and had the police detain the Long brothers and about 50 others, Mr. Ma, the lawyer, said. [Source]

]]>181333Former Police Attempt Suicide by Pesticidehttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/former-police-attempt-suicide-pesticide/
Sat, 06 Dec 2014 01:02:40 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=179693On December 4, China’s first official Constitution Day, six former police officers from Heilongjiang traveled to Beijing to attempt suicide by drinking poison outside of Zhongnanhai, headquarters of the CCP and China’s State Council. The public suicide attempts were staged in protest of alleged local corruption. The six were detained by authorities and sent to local hospitals for treatment. William Wan reports for the Washington Post:

The six are part of a group that calls itself “China’s Wronged Officers,” a loose affiliation of about 300 members claiming they were fired or prosecuted unfairly as a result of corruption or abuse in their local departments.

[…] Reports conflicted about whether the six swallowed a liquid pesticide or rat poison.

A former officer who founded the group, He Zuhua, said he was shocked by the suicide attempts. The former officers from Heilongjiang had not warned him or others of their plans, perhaps for fear authorities might catch wind and stop them.

The six had long complained of being fired unfairly without pay or health insurance.

[…] In view of the police, before they could be stopped, the six downed the poison. A seventh person was responsible for taking photos and sending news of their protest, said He, who founded the Wronged Officers group in 2004 after being imprisoned, he says, for uncovering corrupt prosecutors. […] [Source]

]]>179693CDT Bookshelf: Dan Washburn on Golf in Chinahttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/cdt-bookshelf-dan-washburn-golf-china/
Mon, 17 Nov 2014 19:26:10 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=178852Dan Washburn worked as a sports writer and columnist at a small newspaper in Georgia prior to his “rather impulsive decision to drop everything and move to China in 2002.” Mr. Washburn, managing editor at the Asia Society and founding editor of Shanghaiist.com, has written his first book, The Forbidden Game: Golf and the Chinese Dream. Mr. Washburn follows the lives of three men navigating the male-dominated world of golf. They are a varied trio, but one that shares a common denominator: golf. In various ways, the sport has affected their lives and livelihoods, and this in a country where course construction is officially banned. Washburn’s book touches on many facets of contemporary Chinese life and politics as he tracks the characters’ progress toward achieving the Chinese Dream.

I recently corresponded with Mr. Washburn via email about his book:

China Digital Times: The subject of your book is “golf and the Chinese Dream,” and the primary characters are Martin Moore, Wang Libo and Zhou Xunshu. Why tell the story through the lives of these three men?

Dan Washburn: Even though my book is a work of non-fiction, I wanted it to read more like a novel. I wanted it to be alive and character-driven — more show than tell. Martin, Wang and Zhou, the three people whose stories are intertwined in the book, offer readers unique first-hand looks into different aspects of China’s bizarre relationship with golf, and thus modern China itself. Martin provides a literal ground-level view of what its like to navigate China’s politically charged business environment. Wang shows what life is like for China’s villagers in the face of breakneck development. And I think Zhou, the peasant farmer turned security guard turned pro golfer, is the embodiment of the Chinese Dream, or at least some definition of that ideal. Their stories are quite dissimilar, but I think all three men have few things in common: they are relatable everymen who work hard and are easy to root for.

CDT: When and how did sports writing and China intersect for you?

DW: I have written about sports for as long as I can remember, and I was a sports writer and columnist at a small newspaper in Georgia prior to my rather impulsive decision to drop everything and move to China in 2002. I started freelance writing, often for the South China Morning Post, soon after my arrival in Shanghai, and some of my stories were indeed sports related: a profile of an American basketball player trying to keep his career going on Shanghai’s pro team, a feature on the search for “baseball’s Yao Ming” (they never found him), etc. But golf wasn’t really on my radar until a chance encounter led to me covering some European Tour events in Shanghai for ESPN.com in 2005. Still, in those days, I knew little about the big, complicated picture surrounding the game in China. I had no idea it would be fodder for a book or be just a good window into modern China. But I quickly learned that the story of golf in China actually has little to do with golf. So I don’t really consider my book to be sports writing — it’s just writing.

CDT: Writing about golf led you to address environmental concerns, social inequality, land disputes, growth of the middle class, political corruption, and the idiosyncrasies of doing business in China. What makes golf a unique avenue for exploring these hot topics?

DW: I guess it shouldn’t have been that surprising to me. Golf may be a sign of an economy on the rise, but it’s also a prohibitively expensive pastime in a nation of 700 million peasant farmers. It’s a game that requires a lot of land in a country with limited arable soil and 1.4 billion mouths to feed. It’s a resource intensive activity in a country with severe water shortages. It’s known as “the rich man’s game” by most Chinese, and because of this elitist reputation it’s also tied to corruption in the minds of many, and thus remains politically taboo. Adding to the intrigue, construction of new golf courses has supposedly been illegal in China since at least 2004 — but over the past decade no country in the world has built more golf courses than China. Statistically 0 percent of China’s population may play golf, but the rise of the game happens to be a great way to tell the country’s story.

CDT: The struggles and uncertainty faced by professional golfer, Zhou Xunshu are a far cry from the lavish lives led by top PGA professionals. Are the prize purses for professional events in China increasing and are sponsorship offers more plentiful?

DW: Zhou is part of the rough-and-tumble first or second generation of Chinese professional golfers. These are primarily men from poor backgrounds who stumbled into the game relatively late in life, but through hard work and raw talent were able to eek out livings as “professional golfers” — it was better than working on a farm or in a factory. They were typically self taught and coachless, and benefited form the fact that they came along when golf was still in its infancy in China. The first golf course in modern China didn’t open until 1984 and “professional golfer” wasn’t an officially recognized profession until 1994. Guys like Zhou probably would not be able to break into the game if they were just trying to get started today, and if the window of opportunity for them to be successful in competition isn’t already closed, it’s just barely open. What we’re seeing entering the scene now is the first generation of Chinese golfers who were able to start playing the game from a very young age. They are mostly rich kids, with parents willing to spend large sums of money on training and travel. There are opportunities for Chinese golfers to play domestically, but competition is more intense now. For example, if you study the leaderboards of the events on the PGA Tour China Series, which just launched this year, you’ll see just as many foreign names as Chinese names, if not more. Zhou has stopped competing and now focuses on coaching, making money from wealthy parents who want their children to be the next Chinese golf stars.

CDT: For a sport to take off in China, it seems to require the success of a Chinese athlete on the international stage; Yao Ming, Li Na, Liu Xiang. Have the successes of golfers Feng Shanshan and Guan Tianlang precipitated greater interest and investment in the sport in China?

DW: Feng Shanshan is easily the most successful Chinese professional golfer thus far. She’s won a major. She is ranked in the world top-10. No one even comes close. But she has said that she often doesn’t get recognized when she comes back to China, and she has struggled to attract domestic sponsorship. This could be because golf is very much a fringe sport in China, enjoyed primarily by a small sliver of the very wealthy, and domestic companies know that segment is already dominated by foreign brands. This could also have something to do with golf’s image problem in China, which I spoke of earlier. There’s no doubt though that the successes of Feng and Guan (who made headlines by playing in The Masters at the age of 14 in 2013) have inspired some well-off Chinese kids to pick up the game — or at least they have inspired the parents of these well-off Chinese kids. Government investment in the game has also increased dramatically, but that is due to an entirely different reason. In 2016, golf will return to the Olympics for the first time in more than a century, we all know how important Olympic medals are to China. This has given the Chinese government a reason to embrace a sport it otherwise must keep at arm’s length. Their strategy is more top-down than grassroots, but no other government is putting more money into developing its elite young golfers than China. And since Olympic eligibility will be dictated by world-ranking points, China will make every effort to get its best golfers playing on the international circuits. Success won’t come quickly, and its more likely to happen on the women’s side of the game first, but golf broadcasters the world over had better start working on their pronunciation of Chinese names.

CDT: Unlike basketball, which calls for a ball, a hoop, and a hard surface, golf necessitates a set of clubs, a few balls, transportation to a course, and money to pay for a round. Faced with these hurdles to play do you think golf will ever ascend to become one among China’s most popular sports?

DW: Highly unlikely. There are just too many obstacles. The majority of the population might not even know what golf is, and even if they did they surely wouldn’t be able to afford to give it a try. Everything about golf in China is expensive, and that’s not going to change anytime soon. It all starts with the land the courses are built on. For developers to make money from a course, they have to be able to sell real estate — luxury homes, typically — alongside it. Those who buy those mansions want their communities to be exclusive, so greens fees remain very high. There are no truly public courses in China; it’s all private or semi-private clubs. And since golf remains a politically taboo topic, I just don’t see the kind of municipal courses we know in the West popping up in China. Local governments make far to much money from the sale of land — they are not about to give up some acreage so people can enjoy a cheap round of golf. Driving ranges may be the key to reaching a broader audience in China, but golf will likely always be a niche sport in China. Still, with 1.4 billion people, a niche can still mean millions of people.

CDT: A golf course demands much land and water and in resource-starved China, one expects this could create tension among different groups. Has China’s golf-course development boom you write about slowed at all in recent years?

DW: For most of the past decade golf courses were truly banned and booming in China. They popped up by the hundreds, at a time when they were disappearing in most other parts of the world. For those working in the struggling golf course construction industry it was said that if you weren’t working in China, you likely weren’t working at all. While the rate of growth slowed in recent years, China still remained one of the only places in the world where new golf courses were getting built. There were always periodic crackdowns on construction during those boom years, but they were mostly temporary, and the number of courses only continued to increase. But that doesn’t seem to be the case these days. I recently corresponded with a veteran of the China golf course industry, and he described things as being in “full stop mode.” He continued: “Things are not going well for golf these days in China and most developers are sitting on their hands and waiting. I do not blame them. While a few projects continue to sputter along, most will go nowhere anytime soon. Everyone keeps talking about new policy coming down next year to clarify things, however I do not believe this will happen anytime soon because being ambiguous right now works to the central government’s advantage.” Of course, this being China, everything could change by the time you publish this interview.

CDT: In the United States, promising and privileged junior golfers may attend golf academies, which provide both academic education and golf instruction. There is a David Ledbetter Golf Academy in Shanghai; do aspiring young golfers typically stay home to advance their games or do they prefer to leave for U.S. or international facilities?

DW: I’ve often said that the first international Chinese golf stars will have likely spent a good chunk of their formative years in Florida. And that still may be true. The best coaching and most competitive tournaments have always been outside of China. I think that could change though. There are more opportunities for junior golfers in China and nearby countries every year. And more quality coaches are entering China, as well, because that is where so much of the young talent — and money — is.

China’s state-run news agency, Xinhua, said the communist party in Guangdong had carried out a two-month investigation into a group known as “naked officials”.

The name is applied to Chinese civil servants who have sent family members to live abroad. Some then funnel ill-gotten gains to these overseas relatives, leaving the bureaucrats with few assets in China – or “naked”.

About 200 Guangdong officials had already asked their families to return to China, Xinhua said. Another 866 had agreed to accept demotion, including nine at mayoral level.

One official, surnamed Liu, told Xinhua he had quit his job instead of forcing his wife home from Hong Kong, considered a separate legal entity from the rest of the Chinese mainland.

“I told my parents and my wife about the new regulations of the central and provincial governments, but my wife preferred to live in Hong Kong. As family life is equally important to me, I decided to support my wife and give up my job,” he said. [Source]

The “naked official” phenomenon has become synonymous with corruption in China, as people ask how officials on meagre government salaries can afford to support their family members overseas.

[…] In tandem with his anti-graft campaign, Mr Xi has launched an austerity campaign to force party cadres to cut back opulent spending. It has hit sales of everything from the delicacy hairy crabs and baijiu , a fiery liquor favoured by officials, to expensive handbags, watches and Samsonite suitcases. Government employees have also been told to limit official banquets to “four dishes and one soup”. [Source]

As part of its efforts to alleviate poverty, the central government each year gives tens of billions of yuan to 592 chosen counties it keeps track of with a list.

[…] Most of the counties are truly in need, home to farmers who fall below the official national poverty line of earning 2,300 yuan (HK$2,925) a year or less. But making the list can mean receiving millions of yuan in handouts.

“Counties compete fiercely to get onto the list,” said Du Xiaoshan, deputy director of the Rural Development Institute under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. “Once selected, some counties try all means to stay on it, so they can continue to enjoy the benefits.”

[…] Lawmakers questioned some aspects of the system at a meeting of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in late December. “Some poor farmers would rather stay on the list to get subsidies, while some poor counties even celebrate publicly when deemed to be a ‘poverty-stricken county’,” Xinhua cited lawmaker Gu Shengzu as saying. [Source]

“Poverty-stricken counties” are those that are verified as so poor that the central government must provide them with direct financial assistance. However, this is not an embarrassing title for some county heads, but a lucrative way to obtain funding.

[…] Although the central government has offered specific guidelines on how to use poverty-relief funds, misuse is still common. And the allocation and uses of the funds are badly supervised. Citizens barely get public information on how the funds are spent, and don’t know how to check it.

[…] The central government must not ignore this hotbed of corruption and power abuse, especially misdeeds packaged in the wrapping paper of charity. Every penny of poverty relief should go to the needy.

Maybe we need to reconsider the whole poverty-relief funding system. There are many poverty-stricken counties that stay on the list one year after another, receiving money from the central government again and again. From a certain perspective, they become “lazy” mentally, and rely on external help, rather than striving to achieve things themselves. It might be better for the government to teach them how to fish rather than simply offering fish all the time. [Source]

“The anticorruption storm has begun,” People’s Daily, the party mouthpiece, wrote on its Web site this month.

The flurry of revelations suggests that members of China’s new leadership may be more serious than their predecessors about trying to tame the cronyism, bribery and debauchery that afflict state-run companies and local governments, right down to the outwardly dowdy neighborhood committees that oversee sanitation. Efforts began just days after Xi Jinping, the newly appointed Communist Party chief and China’s incoming president, warned that failing to curb corruption could put the party’s grip on power at risk.

“Something has shifted,” said Zhu Ruifeng, a Beijing journalist who has exposed more than a hundred cases of alleged corruption on his Web site, including the lurid exertions of Mr. Lei [Zhengfu]. “In the past, it might take 10 days for an official involved in a sex scandal to lose his job. This time he was gone in 66 hours.”

Even many critics of the grave-razing program […] acknowledge that China needs to reform funeral practices (and, inevitably, encourage cremation) to meet growing land demands. What primarily offends these commentators is the brusque method used to clear away the graves in Zhoukou. On Nov. 19, Zhong Yongheng, a native of Zhoukou and a journalist with People’s Daily, the official, self-declared Communist Party mouthpiece, used his account on the Twitter-like Ten Cent microblog, to post his family’s experience with Zhoukou’s program. His family, he notes, no longer lives in Zhoukou but has relocated north to Beijing:

“You should give us notice at least before you damage our ancestral tombs, don’t you think? My family members are all in Beijing and didn’t get any advance notice from anyone. Then we suddenly received news that our ancestral tombs were leveled by an excavator. My parents turned toward the south, wailing.”

[…] So far, there’s no evidence that Zhoukou’s officials — or its government — will benefit financially from the grave- clearing program. On the contrary, the Beijing News has reported that some low-level government officials, under pressure to provide good examples for the farmers, have personally dug up their ancestors’ bones.

In one tragic case of a low-level official making an example of his ancestors, however, the digging dislodged a large tombstone that crashed onto two of his living family members, killing both. Sympathy was a rare sight in the several hundred comments left beneath the Beijing News story, many of which suggested that supernatural forces were at play. Meanwhile, other comments took a more vindictive approach, with one of the most repeated comments qualifying as the most direct: “Deserved it.”

In Chinese tradition, the removal of ancestral graves is the biggest insult one can endure, and those who excavate tombs are said to be subject to the most vicious curse.

[…] Considering the cultural and historical background of tombs and the importance they have for people, villagers’ resistance to their removal is not only understandable, but also predictable. In order for this plan to work, the government needs to both cooperate with and respect local residents.

[…] Those who excavate others’ tombs are traditionally considered to be cursed. The reputation of some historical figures is forever tainted by their merciless excavation of others’ tombs, such as Sun Dianying, a warlord in the 1920s who desecrated and looted the Eastern Royal Tombs of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). In light of strong public opposition, tomb removal in many cities has been halted, including in Zhoukou.

I am afraid the efforts of these local officials are doomed to go down in history as a bad example in the tale of China’s funeral reform. China’s local governments should understand that using force to promote reform is no longer effective today. Leaders in Henan and other provinces should take time to reflect on this.

First, there are usually serious legal complications. In the case of forced tomb removal, article 20 of the Mortuary Service Administration Act says that improperly buried remains can be forcibly removed. But according to the Administration Enforcement Law that came to effect last January, the act has no authority to enforce the provision. If enforcement is to be implemented, an administrative decision must be made by the civil affairs officials and executed by a court.

Had the Henan authorities followed this procedure, even if they had enforced their “tomb-flattening policy” for 10 years, they wouldn’t have achieved much. Sadly, the political movement is often in total contradiction with the rule of law in China.

Second, value and cost calculations follow the internal logic of bureaucracy. Career promotion is the incentive and “political achievements” are the yardstick. Officials follow this without thinking of the interests of the community as a whole.

This is why even when scholars such as Yao Zhongqiu, a research fellow at Cathay Institute for Public Affairs, call for the protection of traditional Chinese culture and people’s freedom to worship, tradition still bears no weight in the face of the pressure placed on officials.

It is difficult to calculate the hidden social cost of people’s mental suffering. It does not affect officials’ “political achievements,” therefore it does not enter into their consideration.

Chen [Guangcheng], who is now receiving treatment in a Beijing hospital and preparing to go to the United States to study, said his nephew was a scapegoat of officials angered by Chen’s audacious escape and demands that they be investigated.

Asked why police in his home province of Shandong in east China would arrest his nephew, Chen said, “Revenge.”

“I think this is revenge gone wild, and it’s their final battle,” he told Reuters by telephone from the Beijing hospital where he is being kept ….

“They beat him savagely,” Chen said of his nephew. “He was beaten so badly that his face was covered in blood. I heard he was beaten so badly that three hours later his face was still bleeding,” Chen said,

“I don’t dare go over there,” one woman said, pointing across the cornfields toward the bridge that separates her village from Chen’s. “They don’t have guns, they use sticks. If you look like an outsider, like you’re not from the village, they beat you ….”

Interviews conducted in Xishigu, the nearby village, revealed a climate of fear. “We’re all scared,” said one young man, a farmer in his mid-30s with a young daughter. “They might come and arrest us.”

A 56-year-old man who gave his surname as Wang said Chen’s many relatives in the area are all under strict watch, including those not under house arrest. “Even if his family members are allowed to go out, they are followed by those thugs,” the man said.

Chen Wuquan, a lawyer based in the southern province of Guangdong, told Reuters the Guangzhou Lawyers’ Association had confiscated his license “temporarily” last week during a standard annual renewal. The lawyer Chen is not related to the Chen family from Shandong.

The association told him it could not renew his license because it had to deal with a complaint about an article he had written about the Chinese legal system.

“It must be related (to the nephew’s case),” Chen Wuquan said. “Because this kind of complaint should be processed quickly. It’s not possible that they would have to confiscate my license and not allow me to handle new cases.”

“To the Chinese government, I am very happy with the cool-headedness and restraint with which they’ve handled this case,” he said. “I hope the Chinese government, especially the central government, can continue to take steps towards further emancipating their minds, deepen reforms, and better address social injustices ….”

The activist told VOA he last spoke with Chinese authorities on Monday, and that they reaffirmed a pledge to investigate what he called the “illegal happenings” in Shandong.

“The important thing is that they will handle the case publically according to Chinese law – they expressed this very clearly. But they haven’t clearly said when this will begin,” he said.

Whether Chen’s professed faith in the central government is sincere or simply pragmatic, it gives Beijing room to co-operate without appearing to capitulate. The theme of officials abusing power behind a benevolent emperor’s back is traditional; it is found, for example, in the 14th Century classic The Water Margin, whose later chapters describe the outlaws’ amnesty and subsequent adventures as the emperor’s loyal soldiers. But The Economist dismisses this scheme as a poor reflection of the current reality:

Like many Chinese, Mr Chen portrays his own struggle as part of a wider gulf between an overwhelmed central government and maverick local authorities. After his escape, in a videotaped message, he implored the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, to investigate abuses in Linyi. Speaking from his hospital bed in Beijing, where he is recuperating from a broken foot suffered during his escape, Mr Chen says: “It is clear that the central government needs to turn over the Shandong soil in which the crimes of local officials have grown.” It is a modern rendering of an ancient countryside lament: “If only the emperor knew…”

But the emperor does know, and the emperor rewards. Although there has been an expansion of social and economic freedoms in many areas, under the Communist Party’s system of cadre evaluations, local officials are graded on the basis of a series of internal targets that have little to do with the rule of law. The targets are meant for internal use, but local governments have sometimes published them on websites, and foreign scholars have also seen copies. The most important measures are maintaining social stability, achieving economic growth and, in many areas, enforcing population controls. Cadres sign contracts that spell out their responsibilities. Failure to meet targets can end a cadre’s career. Fulfilling them, even if it means trampling laws to do so, can mean career advancement and financial bonuses.

It would be wrong to think that Chen’s case is another example of local authorities getting away with bad behavior while the central government stayed ignorant. That’s as much a canard as the belief that Beijing’s refusal to lock Chen up represents a sudden concern about China’s image overseas. Chinese officials are aware that their reputation is under the microscope again; but most are far more concerned with being seen as hanging tough than they are with being generous. In this and so many other issues, the Party line remains the hardline ….

But there’s another scenario: There are cadres who might think that Chen Guangcheng has a point, and that the continuing harassment of him and his family are reckless acts by a Party that should know better. These officials might not agree with all of Chen’s opposition, but his complaints about cadres running amok surely resonate with those in the Party who continue to be anxious about what they perceive to be the stalled state of reform ….

Chen Guangcheng is yet another cautionary tale in the run-up to the leadership handover here later this year. The decision on his fate will not change China, but it promises to provide another clue as to where some want the Party to go.

]]>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/05/reprisals-against-chen-guangchengs-supporters-continue/feed/1136303Key Phrase: Fighting to Become a Peasanthttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/07/key-phrase-fighting-to-become-a-peasant/
Thu, 15 Jul 2010 22:57:08 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=85095Southern Metropolis Daily‘s “key phrase” of the day is “fighting to become a peasant,” or 争当农民. According to news reports, the term originated when government workers of Yiwu city in Zhejiang Province illegally held rural household registration permits. Yiwu is one of China’s major international trade centers.

Over 200 government workers in Yiwu, a manufacturing hub, were found holding rural hukou, which entitled them to a plot of land in the countryside. They could use the land to build a house or keep it and sell it to the government, Xinhua Viewpoint under the Xinhua News Agency reported Tuesday.

Government workers are not allowed to obtain rural hukou. But these workers used their authority to convince officials to give them the hukou.

It was unclear whether the rural hukou holders used their new land for any purpose. After the situation was exposed, they were forced to give up their rural hukou.

[…] “This is unfair because those civil servants not only have regular income but also enjoy all kinds of benefits,” said He Guofeng, Party chief of Guanqingfan village.

The situation has hurt the interests of genuine farmers. “The compensation money for collectively owned land is divided among villagers and whenever there is a new registered villager, the real farmers will get less,” said Liao Yongfa, head of the Yiwu’s Party organization department.

At the beginning of this year, Yiwu’s municipal organization received many letters reporting on a strange phenomenon: in order to “become peasants,” some civil servants gave up their household registration permits [hukou, 户口] to move to the countryside. One Yiwu cadre explained why some government workers would be willing to “become peasants”: “One shouldn’t despise a rural hukou — the economic benefit it has in the countryside is enormous.”

In recent years, with the rapid economic development and new quickened rural construction, Yiwu rural hukou holders translated compensation into benefit in their old villages. According to Yiwu Discipline and Inspection Committee deputy secretary Hu Aifen, if a person held a rural hukou, the village could be divided into 108 square meters of residential land, which could then accommodate a four-story home. This carried enormous earnings: on the one hand, the residence could be exchanged, and the local market price of each square meter would exceed 20,000 yuan; on the other hand, home construction could take advantage of Yiwu commercial products and the geographical position of nearby cities, develop transportation logistics, property rents and other kinds of business. It would be possible to earn higher monthly salaries than those of many city dwellers.

“Besides getting residential land and building homes, a rural hukou can also bring in land requisition compensation fees. There is a profit to be gained by using the village collective to rent the property and conducting other affairs,” said one villager.

Government workers aren’t seeking hukou, but the benefits they bring. This is the conflict that comes from powers seeking profit: wherever profit lies, power-holders will rush there. That is to say that the developed region of Zhejiang Province, the double-identity phenomenon of “peasant government workers” does not only appear in Yiwu. Yiwu’s Public Security Bureau personnel stated that in order to truly block the leaks that allow “government officials to fight to become peasants,” one must “separate the rural hukou from its enormous underlying benefits.” Truer words have never been spoken!

In Beijing and Shanghai, where the hukou are valuable, it seems that people disdain holding a rural hukou because the benefits that come from an urban one are far too great. When university graduates apply and take tests to become government workers in Beijing and Shanghai — the benefits of being a government worker per se, aside — the hukou is likely a large consideration. In contrast, in small or mid-sized cities, more people are choosing rural hukou. This shows that in the eyes of the public, it’s not the urban hukou, but whether the hukou itself harms or brings benefits.

]]>85095Official Sacked for Overseas Trip, with Netizens’ Reactionshttps://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/02/official-sacked-for-overseas-trip/
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/02/official-sacked-for-overseas-trip/#commentsWed, 25 Feb 2009 18:59:30 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=34577A luxurious 14-day trip to Africa and the Middle East by Guangdong local officials financed by public funds has been met with intense scrutiny after a netizen posted a indicting 17-minute video of the trip’s exploits online. As a result of the uproar, a deputy Party secretary was dismissed from his position. From China Daily:

A deputy Party chief of a district in Guangdong province has been sacked from his post in the wake of the online exposure of a 14-day overseas group trip at public expense, a local disciplinary authority said Monday.

Tan Rigui, deputy Party secretary of Duanzhou district of Zhaoqing city in the southern province, led the group consisting of 13 district officials to Africa and the Middle East between February and March 2007, the Zhaoqing disciplinary inspection committee said on its website.

The committee has asked all members of the tour group to accept responsibility and repay the cost, estimated at more than 450,000 yuan ($65,800).

News of the trip was made public last week when a citizen from Luoding in Guangdong posted a 17-minute video on the Internet.

AFP remarks on the role of the Internet in this and other similar incidents:

However, without an independent media or judicial system, corrupt cadres have often been able to act with impunity.

[…]And in December, an official in the eastern city of Nanjing was sacked after bloggers posted photos on the Internet showing him wearing a designer watch and smoking expensive cigarettes.

Other Internet postings suggested Zhou Jiugeng, head of a district housing bureau, had other habits well beyond a civil servant’s means such as driving to work in a Cadillac.

A newsclip featuring some of the video’s scenes. The full 17-minute video can be found here.

Undoubtedly, many netizens are frustrated with rampant local corruption. One blogger, Jade Pen Beacon (碧翰烽), writes on his reaction to the 17-minute video in a post entitled “Fortuitous finds or intentional indulgence? Who can believe that traveling officials are actually going on inspections?” (无意捡到还是有意放纵？谁还相信官员出国是为了考察？). Selectively translated by CDT:

This video records in detail the 14-day trip of the inspection group. Its degree of luxury is astounding. Once again, the video was a “fortuitous find.” Not only does it start recording from the first expenditure, but it also gives the trip a realistic quality: we can clearly see the inspection team members’ true faces.

But I was left perplexed. Why is it that our netizens are always the ones making these “fortuitous finds” while our political bureaus can’t intentionally uncover them? Is it because of their “intentional indulgence”? It’s really a mystery; I think they’re the only ones who know.

From this 17-minute video, we can distinctly make out the actual itinerary of the observation team: first, the places they’re inspecting are the countries’ famous landmarks and scenic spots. Perhaps they’re going to inspect their tour industry development, then? They went to an ostrich park, then the Cape Town Peninsula, and then a seal preservation zone. Out of the entire trip, there was only one instance that was relevant to the government observation team. Second, the degree of luxury on this trip is flabbergasting. They went on sumptuous tours, visited a gold mine, and a diamond factory. Furthermore, everyone purchased South African Diamonds. Third, I am struck by the trip’s vulgarity. For example, their going to see a belly dancing performance, and so on.

In regards to this situation, I don’t care if it’s real or fake; I fully believe that this sort of thing happens. This reminds me of a time when a few leaders spoke together. Between them, there were a few Party secretaries, some bureau chiefs, etc.

They said that these past few years, you can’t give out too much money to cadres — after all, policies up above are kind of strict — and there are no leaders who would take on too much responsibility, so they would write about tours. Hey, not giving out money is okay — just let the cadres take trips! One Party secretary said that nowadays inspection tours are not inspection tours; they’re just cover-ups for the real goal of sight seeing. He said that these past two years, every year there could be 2-3 “inspection tours,” and not one of them would be real. The year before last year, some village cadres organized trips to Hong Kong and Macao. Last year, they again went on a trip, this time to Hainan Island. What can you “inspect,” there, huh? It’s just having fun. And then he said last year he went two more times on “inspections.” All of them had a bit of the content of inspection, but the time spent on that was only one day. Moreover, it was just listening to introductory talks by some people, and then checking out some companies. The remaining time was spent at a number of scenic spots.

On Sohu, a detailed list of the itinerary is given. Translated by CDT:

3/6: After breakfast, get on a plane for Istanbul. The flight’s duration is 2 hours and 10 minutes. After arriving, go to the Hagia Sophia and Blue Mosque.

3/7: After breakfast, view the Istanbul Strait. During the trip, there is a performance, during which several members of the group act like fools. After lunch, see local palace. At night, board plane for Dubai.

3/9: Take a luxurious drive to a desert zone. At night, partake in a large Arabic feast, and enjoy a belly dance performance.

3/10: Visit 7 star restaurant.

3/11: (14th day). End of trip. From Dubai, fly back to Hong Kong.

There are currently over 4892 comments on the Sohu posting. Here is a selection translated by CDT:

Prohibit human flesh search engines! Clearly, there are some officials who fear being found by this method. Now, online anti-corruption is the only method. How sad!
禁止人肉搜索！明明是有的官员怕有一天被搜出来而采取的手段！现在反腐就只有网络一个手段了！可悲！

Actually, a lot of cadres are the same. This is only the tip of the iceberg!
其实很多干部都一样，这只是冰山一角罢了！

We should let them organize an inspection trip to Sichuan’s disaster areas
应该让他们组团到四川灾区去考察考察

The people’s sweat and blood money has been used to help the economy of large deserts.
老百性血汗钱就这样帮助了大沙漠经济增长

Externally, he’s had his job removed, but wait a few days — is he just going to get transferred to another position?
对外是免职，是否会瞒天过海稍后调职任用呢？

Ah, what a lovely situation. Let people around the world know that our country’s got money! Keep doing your inspections.
很好的事情啊,叫地球人都知道咱国家有钱啊.继续考察啊

The system won’t change, it’ll always govern outwardly without caring about the root of the situation!!!
There are lots of these types of people — you could say that all officials are like this!!!!
体制不改，永远治标不治本！！！
这样的人何其之多，可以说公务员都是这样！！！！