Viewed under these standards, the evidence supports the jury's verdict in all respects.

The statute on which plaintiffs base their claim provides that a mortgagor may recover a penalty up to the amount of the mortgage money if the mortgagee fails to mark the mortgages satisfied within forty-five days after:

-- receipt of full satisfaction and payment of all money due (principal and interest);

-- request by the mortgagor to mark the mortgages satisfied; and

-- tender by the mortgagor of the reasonable charges or costs of marking the mortgages satisfied.

Because we are prepared to pay this today, we are not prepared to pay any interest beyond today.

By order of November 26, 1980, Judge Luongo corrected an error in his ruling to hold that Levin owed Weissman $149,407.00. Levin's counsel wrote to Harry Rutenberg on December 4, 1980 (Ex. P-19):

On behalf of Bennett Levin, I am authorized to tender to you $149,407 in satisfaction of the judgment on your counterclaim entered by Judge Luongo on November 26, 1980. I am prepared to pay this amount immediately in return for the appropriate satisfaction pieces (for the mortgages from Levin to Weissman). This request and tender is made pursuant to 21 Purdon's Penna. Statutes Annotated § 681 and § 682.

Again on September 18, 1981, the date Weissman's appeal was dismissed, Levin's counsel wrote "to tender to you, once again, $149,407, in satisfaction of the judgment. . . . I am prepared to pay this amount immediately in return for the appropriate satisfaction pieces for the mortgages from Levin to Weissman." (Ex. P-24.) A similar letter issued on October 13, 1981 to new counsel for Weissman. (Ex. P-25.)

The law provides that before a mortgagee, who is the holder of a mortgage, can be compelled to satisfy the same, the debt, interest and all reasonable costs or charges have been paid or tendered to him.

Weissman's contention that the jury could not properly have found that he was tendered the full amount due must also be rejected. There was evidence that on October 17, 1980, Levin's counsel offered the full amount of the judgment entered by Judge Luongo on October 16, 1980. Similarly, on December 4, 1980 counsel tendered the amount of judgment corrected by Judge Luongo on November 26, 1980. The fact that Judge Luongo awarded interest in April, 1982 does not make the 1980 tenders invalid. The jury could have found that this interest would not have been owing to Weissman if he had accepted the money offered by the Levins. Similarly, the fact that Weissman later recovered interest did not make the condition in the earlier tenders -- the request that the mortgages be satisfied -- unreasonable.

3. Reasonable belief of Weissman that matter disputed

The Court properly charged that there would be no recovery if Weissman had a reasonable, honest belief that the Levins were not entitled to have the mortgages satisfied. Werner v. Automobile Finance Co., supra, 347 Pa. at 220-21, 31 A.2d 898. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Weissman did not refuse Levins' tender out of such a belief. Weissman argues that his appeal demonstrates his honest and reasonable belief that the matter was disputed. However, the evidence showed that Weissman knew of the appeal (N.T. 4-123-24; Ex. D-KK), of his counsel's stroke (N.T. 4.124-25), and of the motion to dismiss the appeal (N.T. 4-152). The jury could have concluded that the fact of the appeal did not establish Weissman's honest, good faith belief that there was a genuine dispute, in view of these events and of the course of dealings and bad feelings between the parties.
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B. There Was No Error In Permitting Linda Levin To Be Joined As A Party-Plaintiff Before Defendants Began Their Case.

Defendant objects to the Court's ruling after plaintiff husband rested, permitting him to amend his complaint to add his wife as a second plaintiff. Defendant argues that Mrs. Levin is an indispensable party, that her claim is barred by one year statute of limitations, 42 Pa. Const.Stat.Ann. § 5523(2) (1982), and that it was error to submit her claim to the jury.
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First, the Court has latitude over the conduct of the litigation. There was discretion to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint immediately after he rested his case, in response to defendant's motion for a directed verdict on grounds that Linda Levin had not been named a party plaintiff. The defendant and third-party defendants identified no prejudice from this amendment in response to the Court's repeated questions at the time this matter came up at trial. The amendment added no new claims, issues or evidence to the case. Linda Levin was deposed before trial and called in Bennett Levin's case, where she was cross-examined. Moreover, the Court granted the affected parties leave to re-examine any witness in light of this amendment. (N.T. 4.54-4.68.) See Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 n. 1 (D.Md.1975) (amendment to complaint solely to add wife as plaintiff permitted "late in the litigation" where no identifiable prejudice resulted). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to defend against Mrs. Levin's claim and thus suffered no prejudice. Evans Products Co. v. West American Insurance Co., 736 F.2d 920 at 923-924 (3d Cir.1984). Moreover, defendant never claimed at trial, when the issue of amending the complaint was argued, that Mrs. Levin's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Weissman argues that the verdict was fatally inconsistent because the jury found that Harry Rutenberg had committed legal malpractice, but assessed no damages against Rutenberg. The essence of Weissman's complaint against Rutenberg was that he permitted the appeal in Levin v. Garfinkle to be dismissed for failure to file briefs. In view of the evidence that Weissman knew that Rutenberg was hospitalized for a stroke during the pendency of the appeal, yet took no steps to ensure that his case was being attended to or to get another lawyer, and in light of the testimony concerning the relationship between Weissman and the Levins, the jury could have concluded as it did that while Rutenberg may have acted negligently, any damages to Weissman were the product of Weissman's own acts or inaction. The jury could have concluded, observing Weissman's demeanor and outbursts as a witness in this case, that he acted in this business matter as an angry, vindictive and petty man and that Weissman called the shots, not his agent, Rutenberg.

Defendant's motions for a new trial and for judgment n.o.v. are denied.
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