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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
November 2013:
Navy Shipbuilding:
Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting Quality:
GAO-14-122:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-14-122, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy expects to spend about $15 billion per year to provide its
fleet with the most advanced ships to support national defense and
military strategies. Problems with recently delivered ships have
focused attention on quality issues.
House Report No. 112-110, accompanying the Department of Defense
Appropriations Bill, 2012, mandated that GAO review the Navy's quality
assurance processes for new ship construction. This report discusses,
among other issues, (1) quality problems in constructing recently
delivered ships and Navy actions to improve quality and (2) key
practices employed by leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders
to ensure quality and how these compared with Navy practices.
GAO analyzed Navy data on ship quality from 2006 to May 2013 and spoke
with Navy officials and shipbuilders. GAO also reviewed deficiency
data for commercial ships and spoke with buyers and builders.
What GAO Found:
The Navy has experienced significant quality problems with several
ship classes over the past several years. It has focused on reducing
the number of serious deficiencies at the time of delivery, and GAO’s
analysis shows that the number of deficiencies-—particularly “starred”
deficiencies designated as the most serious for operational or safety
reasons—-has generally dropped. Nonetheless, the Navy continues to
accept ships with large numbers of open deficiencies (see figure below
as an example; although total deficiencies have declined for this ship
class, the last ship still had about 1,000 deficiencies that the
shipbuilder was responsible for correcting). Accepting ships with
large numbers of uncorrected deficiencies is a standard practice and
GAO found that there are varying interpretations of Navy policy with
regard to when the defects should be resolved. In 2009, the Navy
organization that oversees ship construction launched the Back to
Basics initiative to improve Navy oversight of ship construction.
However, a key output of the initiative promoting consistent and
adequate quality requirements in Navy contracts has yet to be
implemented.
Figure: Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for LPD 17 Ship Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPD)--ship number: LPD 21;
Contractor: 4,927;
Government: 1,398.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPD)--ship number: LPD 22;
Contractor: 3,338;
Government: 1,625.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPD)--ship number: LPD 23;
Contractor: 556;
Government: 847.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPD)--ship number: LPD 24;
Contractor: 1,136;
Government: 869.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of figure]
Although the environment in which leading commercial ship buyers and
builders operate differs in many ways from the Navy’s, some commercial
practices aimed at helping to ensure that ships are delivered with a
minimum number of deficiencies may be informative for the Navy.
Throughout the course of commercial shipbuilding projects, significant
numbers of quality defects and instances of non-conforming work are
identified. However, leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders
make great efforts to ensure that these issues are resolved prior to
delivery. Further, commercial ship buyers establish clear lines of
accountability and hold their personnel responsible for ensuring the
shipbuilder delivers a quality vessel. While commercial ship buyers
focus on regularly witnessing in-process work through roaming patrols
and impromptu inspections, Navy processes at the shipyards place less
emphasis on in-process work. Moreover, leading commercial shipbuilders
have strong quality management processes that track quality problems
to the worker or supervisor level. Navy shipbuilding contractors have
historically experienced difficulties in holding production workers
and supervisors accountable for their work, but some of the shipyards
reported they are making progress on increasing worker accountability.
What GAO Recommends:
To improve the construction quality of ships delivered to the Navy,
GAO is recommending, among other things, that the Navy clarify policy
on when deficiencies should be addressed, provide guidance on contract
quality requirements, and assess applicability of certain commercial
practices to Navy shipbuilding. DOD agreed with two recommendations
and partially agreed with three, stating for example that current
policy is adequate but that the Navy would monitor deficiency trends.
GAO believes that the recommendations remain valid as discussed in the
report.
View GAO-14-122. For more information, contact Michele Mackin at (202)
512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Navy Has Reduced Deficiencies at Delivery but Still Accepts Some
Ships with Numerous Construction Deficiencies:
Commercial Firms Resolve Quality Deficiencies before Delivery, with
Some Practices Potentially Informative for Navy in Spite of Different
Environment:
Classification Societies Play a Role in Commercial and Navy
Shipbuilding:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Stages of Shipbuilding:
Appendix III: Lewis and Clark Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship Class (T-
AKE):
Appendix IV: San Antonio Amphibious Transport Dock Ship Class (LPD 17):
Appendix V: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class:
Appendix VI: Arleigh Burke Guided Missile Destroyer Ship Class (DDG
51):
Appendix VII: Selected Quality Issues in Navy Ship Classes:
Appendix VIII: Characteristics of Select Commercial Ships and Offshore
Structures:
Appendix IX: Navy Shipbuilding Contract Types:
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Unresolved Deficiencies for Select Commercial Ships at Key
Delivery Milestones:
Table 2: Key Events Occurring During Navy and Commercial Shipbuilding:
Table 3: Open Deficiencies on T-AKE Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Table 4: Open Deficiencies on LPD 17 Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Table 5: Open Deficiencies on LCS Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Table 6: Open Deficiencies on DDG 51 Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Table 7: Key Characteristics of Selected Commercial Ships and Offshore
Structures:
Table 8: Common Navy Shipbuilding Contract Types and Associated Risks
to Quality Goals:
Figures:
Figure 1: Quality's Integral Role in Achieving Schedule, Cost, and
Performance and Reliability Goals:
Figure 2: Simplified Organizational Chart of Navy Organizations
Involved in the Construction of New Navy Ships:
Figure 3: Locations of Major Navy Contractor Shipyards and Associated
Product Lines:
Figure 4: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for LPD 17 Ship Class:
Figure 5: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for DDG 51 Ship Class:
Figure 6: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for T-AKE Ship Class:
Figure 7: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for LCS Ship Class:
Figure 8: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for T-AKE Ship
Class:
Figure 9: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for LPD 17 Ship
Class:
Figure 10: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for LCS Ship
Class:
Figure 11: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for DDG 51
Ship Class:
Figure 12: Select Quality Issues on Ships Delivered from 2004 to 2012:
Figure 13: Simplified Organizational Chart of SUPSHIP Indicating Those
Departments Having Delegated Responsibilities:
Figure 14: Actions Taken by a Commercial Firm to Improve Quality:
Figure 15: Example of Classification Society Technical Assistance:
Figure 16: Selected Quality Issues on USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77):
Figure 17: Selected Quality Issues on DDG 51 Class Ships:
Figure 18: Selected Quality Issues on USS Freedom (LCS 1):
Figure 19: Selected Quality Issues on USS Independence (LCS 2):
Figure 20: Selected Quality Issues on USS Makin Island (LHD 8):
Figure 21: Selected Quality Issues on LDP 17 Class Ships:
Figure 22: Selected Quality Issues on SSN 774 Class Submarines:
Figure 23: Selected Quality Issues on USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM
25):
Figure 24: Selected Quality Issues on T-AKE Class Ships:
Abbreviations:
ABS: American Bureau of Shipping:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FPSO: Floating Production, Storage and Offloading vessel:
INSURV: U.S. Navy Board of Inspection and Survey:
LCS: Littoral Combat Ship:
NAVSEA: Naval Sea Systems Command:
NAVSEA 02: Naval Sea Systems Command Contracting Directorate:
NAVSEA 04: Naval Sea Systems Command Logistics, Maintenance &
Industrial Operations Directorate:
NAVSEA 04Z: Naval Sea Systems Command Logistics, Maintenance &
Industrial Operations Directorate, SUPSHIP Management Group:
NAVSEA 05: Naval Sea Systems Command Engineering Directorate:
NAVSEA 07: Naval Sea Systems Command Undersea Warfare Directorate:
NAVSEA 08: Naval Sea Systems Command Nuclear Propulsion Directorate:
NAVSEA 21: Naval Sea Systems Command Surface Warfare Directorate:
PEO: U.S. Navy Program Executive Office:
SUPSHIP: Naval Sea Systems Command Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair:
TSM: Technical Support Management data system:
[End of section]
GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
November 19, 2013:
Congressional Committees:
The Navy seeks to provide its fleet with the most advanced ships to
support national defense and military strategies, expecting to spend
about $15 billion per year building ships. Given the difficult
operating environments and extended deployments for Navy ships, it is
essential that they operate as expected. Yet several cases of poor
quality in Navy shipbuilding programs have focused attention on
quality issues for newly constructed ships. Many of the problems were
attributed to issues with basic elements of shipbuilding, such as
welding, installation of key systems (like propulsion and anchoring
systems), and electrical work. The impact of poor quality can directly
affect operational missions; for example, the first ship built in the
USS San Antonio class (LPD 17) had to undergo emergency repairs during
its first deployment that were primarily attributed to poor
workmanship and a lack of quality control during the ship's
construction. Recognizing that quality problems in shipbuilding needed
to be addressed, the Navy established the "Back to Basics" initiative
in 2009 to ensure the efficiency and quality of ship construction. The
initiative focused on the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP)--the organization responsible for
overseeing ship construction processes--and involved senior Naval Sea
Systems Command leadership and the Navy Program Executive Offices
responsible for managing the development and procurement of ships.
Also in 2009, we identified best practices from the commercial
shipbuilding industry and made several recommendations to the
Department of Defense to improve management of shipbuilding programs
involving, among other things, knowledge needed at key decision
points.[Footnote 1] Building on that review, House Report No. 112-110,
accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2012 (H.R.
2219), mandated that we review the Navy's quality assurance processes
for new ship construction. This report assesses (1) the extent to
which newly constructed ships delivered to the Navy from 2006 through
May 2013 had quality problems and the actions the Navy has taken to
improve quality; (2) key practices employed by leading commercial ship
buyers and shipbuilders to ensure satisfactory quality and the extent
to which Navy shipbuilding programs employ these practices; and (3)
the role of classification societies (e.g., the American Bureau of
Shipping) in Navy and commercial shipbuilding.
To identify the extent to which newly constructed Navy ships had
quality problems and the actions the Navy has taken to improve
quality, we reviewed Navy inspection reports, internal Navy reviews
with regards to ship quality, ship delivery reports, shipbuilding
contracts, and other documents discussing the quality of ships
delivered to the Navy from 2006 through May 2013. We reviewed data on
all ships delivered during this period but only compared trends in
quality from those ship classes where multiple ships were delivered
during this time period. To determine the number and type of
deficiencies for each vessel, we obtained and analyzed data from the
Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey's (INSURV) Material Inspection
data warehouse and the Navy's Technical Support Management (TSM)
system. TSM is the primary database SUPSHIP uses for tracking the
status of new construction deficiencies. We reviewed these data for
completeness, and when we identified obvious discrepancies we brought
them to the attention of Navy officials and worked with them to
understand, correct, or omit the discrepancies. We determined that the
deficiency data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report with two exceptions. These exceptions relate
to data for T-AKE class ships. TSM data did not cover T-AKE 1 through
T-AKE 6. In addition, data for T-AKE 12 had numerous data errors and
is therefore not reported on. For other T-AKE ships, we reviewed
deficiency documentation (trial cards) to resolve discrepancies
between TSM and T-AKE program office data.
We visited eight U.S. private shipyards that build Navy ships and
spoke with shipyard representatives. We also met with officials and
analyzed data provided by several Navy organizations, including each
of the SUPSHIP commands and detachments; INSURV; Program Executive
Offices and shipbuilding programs; lifecycle and maintenance
organizations; Fleet Forces Command; the Military Sealift Command;
Navy Sea Systems Command Engineering, Contracting, and Logistics
directorates, among others. We catalogued several hull, mechanical,
and electrical quality problems with each ship class delivered since
2006. To create this list of illustrative examples, we asked Navy
officials and shipbuilding contractor representatives to identify
quality problems on these vessels. Further, this list focused only on
quality issues that pertain to the construction of the hull,
mechanical, and electrical systems; we did not include quality issues
with weapons systems or other warfighting systems. We also reviewed
the Navy's Back to Basics initiative and outcomes, as well as other
recent efforts to improve the quality of shipbuilding.
To learn about practices used by leading commercial ship buyers and
shipbuilders to ensure quality in new construction vessels, we spoke
with leading buyers and shipbuilders in the cruise, oil and gas, and
commercial shipping industries and reviewed our previous shipbuilding
best practices work. Where possible, we collected documentation and/or
witnessed quality assurance practices. For the purposes of this
review, the leading commercial ship buyers we spoke with are companies
that we identified as leaders in their industry in terms of being top
operators of cruise ships, oil and gas vessels or containerships, and
that agreed to participate in our review. We reviewed such indicators
as annual sales, number of vessels owned or procured, and total market
share. Leading commercial shipbuilders in this review were also
identified as high quality shipbuilders by the ship buyers in our
review or shipbuilding experts we met with. The firms participating in
our review included Carnival Corporation, Chevron Corporation, Daewoo
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, Ensco plc, ExxonMobil, Hyundai
Heavy Industries, A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, Meyer Werft, Noble
Corporation, Norwegian Cruise Line, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,
Seadrill Ltd., and STX Finland. We requested deficiency data from the
commercial ship buyers for one or more new construction ships they
acquired. With the exception of one floating production storage and
offloading vessel, all of these ships were delivered to the buyers in
2012 or 2013. We assessed the reliability of these data by obtaining
information on the systems that stored the data and interviewing ship
buyer representatives knowledgeable about the data. We determined that
the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We also identified common processes and tools used by these ship
buyers and shipbuilders to ensure the expected level of quality. To
determine the extent to which Navy quality assurance processes used
commercial best practices, we reviewed data and information obtained
from the Navy and its shipbuilding contractors as well as from the
leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders. We also held meetings
with SUPSHIP, program, and contracting officials about the Navy's
quality practices and during our site visits to the U.S. shipyards. We
discussed with shipyard representatives their quality assurance
processes and the steps taken to ensure ships meet the Navy's quality
expectations.
To better understand the role of classification societies in Navy and
commercial shipbuilding, including the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS), we met with engineering and marine surveying representatives
from ABS at the Navy contractor shipyards where they maintain a
presence to obtain an overview of how they conduct their work. We also
held discussions with officials from several Navy organizations,
including SUPSHIP and Naval Sea Systems Command Engineering
Directorate, as well as representatives from Navy shipbuilding
contractors on the role of ship classification in Navy shipbuilding.
We reviewed the classification rule set developed by the Navy and ABS
for the Navy's surface combatants, as well as other classification
rule sets pertaining to Navy and commercial vessels. We also spoke
with representatives from other classification societies, including
Det Norske Veritas and Lloyd's Register, to discuss their approach to
classification of commercial and navy vessels, and met with commercial
ship buyers and shipbuilders to discuss the classification process.
Appendix I contains additional detail on our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 to November 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
In general, a quality product is one that performs as expected and can
be depended on to perform when needed. A quality product is also one
that is free of deficiencies. For the purposes of this review, we
define deficiencies as items that require corrective action to bring
the material condition or performance of a product into compliance
with required standards.[Footnote 2]
Performance, cost, schedule, and quality goals are interrelated.
Improving quality within an organization to achieve the desired level
of performance and reliability requires time and money in the short
term. But in the longer term, such efforts can reduce costs and
production times, as process-related costs--such as labor and
materials needed to correct defects--are reduced or eliminated. Such
production efficiencies have been demonstrated by companies that have
successfully implemented quality philosophies, including the Six Sigma
methodology.[Footnote 3] Six Sigma and other quality philosophies
establish a framework by which the process of production can be made
more consistent by determining and eliminating the root causes of
process-related problems, resulting in improved quality. Figure 1
demonstrates the interrelationship between schedule, cost, performance
and quality.
Figure 1: Quality's Integral Role in Achieving Schedule, Cost, and
Performance and Reliability Goals:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated triangle]
Quality, surrounded by:
Schedule;
Cost;
Performance and reliability.
Source: GAO analysis of American Society of Quality data.
[End of figure]
Shipbuilding is a major undertaking within the Navy, and several Navy
organizations are involved, either directly or indirectly, with the
acquisition, construction, and fielding of new ships. To some extent,
all of the organizations described below have a role in helping to
ensure the Navy acquires ships that meet quality expectations.
* SUPSHIP is the Navy's primary on-site representative at the private
shipyards that build Navy ships, and is tasked with overseeing the
shipbuilder's production processes. Services provided by SUPSHIP
include contract administration, project management, engineering
surveillance, quality assurance, logistics, and financial
administration of assigned shipbuilding contracts. Typical work
activities performed by SUPSHIP's quality assurance department include
the following:
- Quality assurance planning activities, such as oversight plans for
monitoring the shipbuilder's quality program and periodic surveillance
plans identifying the areas where quality assurance personnel will be
allocated.
- Reviews of the shipbuilding contractor's quality management system
and work procedures.
- Inspection and testing of the shipbuilder's completed work,
including physical inspections, verifications, and equipment testing,
as well as witnessing or monitoring the ship construction process.
- Audits and inspections of the shipbuilder's work procedures to
verify that personnel are complying with the procedures.
- Evaluating the results of (1) SUPSHIP's quality inspections to
identify quality trends and (2) quality and test data the shipbuilder
is contractually required to provide the Navy.
* Program Executive Offices (PEO), and the program managers that
report to them, are responsible for all aspects of life-cycle
management of their assigned shipbuilding programs, including program
initiation, ship design, construction, testing, delivery, fleet
introduction, and maintenance activities.
* The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) is an independent
organization that inspects newly constructed and in-service Navy ships
to determine their material condition and reports these assessments to
Congress and Navy leadership.
* The Naval Sea Systems Command Contracting Directorate (NAVSEA 02)
awards contracts worth about $24 billion annually for new construction
ships and submarines, ship repair, major weapon systems, and services.
* The Naval Sea Systems Command Engineering Directorate (NAVSEA 05)
provides the engineering and scientific expertise and technical
authority for the Navy's ships, submarines, and associated warfare
systems.
* The Naval Sea Systems Command Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (NAVSEA
08) is responsible for all aspects of the Navy's nuclear propulsion
ships, including research, design, construction, and operations.
* The Military Sealift Command operates and maintains approximately
119 non-combatant Navy ships that deliver supplies to US forces and
conduct specialized missions, such as supporting humanitarian aid
efforts. Unlike other Navy ships, the ships are generally manned by
civilian mariners. During construction of these vessels, the Command
assigns a construction oversight representative at the shipyard to
monitor compliance with requirements.
* The Naval Sea Systems Command Surface Warfare Directorate (NAVSEA
21) and Undersea Warfare Directorate (NAVSEA 07) provide life-cycle
support for the Navy's surface combatants and submarines from when
they are introduced into the fleet until they are no longer in
service. In addition, the directorates provide the shipbuilding and
submarine program offices with information on quality problems and
lessons learned from ship deployments that may be used to improve the
construction of subsequent vessels.
* The Defense Contract Management Agency administers contracts when
delegated that authority by the contracting office. SUPSHIP commands
generally delegate quality oversight of shipbuilding parts and
equipment suppliers to the Defense Contract Management Agency.
Figure 2 depicts how those Navy organizations fit within the overall
organizational structure of the Navy.
Figure 2: Simplified Organizational Chart of Navy Organizations
Involved in the Construction of New Navy Ships:
[Refer to PDF for image: Organizational Chart]
Top level: Secretary of the Navy;
Under Secretary of the Navy.
Second level:
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development and Acquisition;
Chief of Naval Operations.
Third level, reporting to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research,
Development and Acquisition:
* Program Management:
- Program Executive Officer (PEO) carriers;
- PEO Littoral Combat Ships;
- PEO ships;
- PEO submarines.
Program Management has dual reporting structures or delegated
responsibilities with SUPSHIP program management.
Third level, reporting to Chief of Naval Operations:
* Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); (has dual reporting
structures or delegated responsibilities with Assistant Secretary of
the Navy Research, Development and Acquisition);
* Fleet Forces Command;
* INSURV.
Fourth level, reporting to Fleet Forces Command:
* Fleet operations:
- Atlantic/Pacific fleets;
- Military Sealift Command.
Fourth level, reporting to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA);
* Nuclear propulsion (NAVSEA 08).
Fifth level, reporting to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA):
* Contracts (NAVSEA 02);
* Logistics, maintenance & industrial operations (NAVSEA 04):
- SUPSHIP management group (NAVSEA 042);
* Engineering (NAVSEA 05);
* Lifecycle support:
- Undersea warfare (NAVSEA 07);
- Surface warfare (NAVSEA 21).
Sixth level, reporting to Logistics, maintenance & industrial
operations (NAVSEA 04):
Shipbuilding contract management and construction oversight:
Supervisor of shipbuilding conversion and repair (SUPSHIP) commands:
* SUPSHIP program management;
* SUPSHIP contracting;
* SUPSHIP administrative;
* SUPSHIP engineering;
* SUPSHIP quality assurance.
Contracts (NAVSEA 02): has dual reporting structures or delegated
responsibilities with SUPSHIP contracting.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of figure]
Stages of Shipbuilding:
Shipbuilding is a complex, multistage industrial activity that
includes a number of key events that are common regardless of the type
of ship constructed or whether the buyer is the government or a
commercial firm. These events are sequenced among four primary phases:
pre-contracting, contract award, design and planning, and
construction, with each successive phase building upon the work
completed in earlier stages.[Footnote 4]
In the pre-contracting stage, the ship buyer determines the ship's
requirements. Early-stage design work occurs that culminates in a set
of specifications that documents the buyer's requirements. In the
contract award phase, the specifications are incorporated into the
shipbuilding contract that the buyer enters into with the selected
shipbuilder(s). After entering into the shipbuilding contract, the
design and planning phase begins. The ship's detailed engineering
design is completed--often in the form of a three-dimensional computer
aided design model--and consists of developing all aspects of the
ship's structures and the routing of major distributive systems, such
as electrical work or piping. Any necessary modeling and simulation
analyses, such as testing the structural integrity of the design over
the service life of the ship, are also completed. In addition, during
this stage the shipbuilder plans for beginning construction and
generates two-dimensional drawings that, once approved by the ship
buyer, will be used by production workers to build the ship.
Ship construction involves the following key events:
* Block fabrication, assembly, outfitting, and erection: Metal plates
are welded together into elements called blocks--the basic building
units for a ship. Blocks are generally outfitted with pipes, brackets
for machinery or cabling, ladders, and any other equipment that may be
available for installation at this early stage of construction. The
blocks are then welded together to form grand blocks and erected with
other grand blocks in a drydock or building area. Outfitting work,
painting, and pre-commissioning activities take place prior to sea
trials.
* Sea trials: Once the shipbuilder is satisfied that the ship is
completed, the ship embarks on a series of dockside and at-sea tests
to evaluate overall quality and performance against the contractually
required technical specifications and buyer's performance
requirements. Navy shipbuilding programs generally conduct two sets of
sea trials--builder's trials and acceptance trials.[Footnote 5]
SUPSHIP inspectors are generally responsible for observing and
identifying deficiencies during the builder's sea trials, while
acceptance trials are observed by inspectors from INSURV, the Navy's
inspection board.
* Delivery/acceptance: Following the successful completion of sea
trials and when the buyer is satisfied that the ship meets
requirements, the shipyard delivers the ship to the buyer. In Navy
shipbuilding, the official transfer of custody occurs when the Navy
signs a Material Inspection and Receiving Report (Form DD 250).
Post-delivery activities that are specific to Navy shipbuilding, which
can generally take up to a year to complete, include the following:
* Final outfitting, post-delivery tests: Following delivery and until
the ship sails away from the shipbuilder's yard--usually anywhere from
10 to 90 days after delivery--the crew boards the ship and begins
training, and the ship's mission systems are installed. Additional
training and operational tests of mission systems occur at the ship's
home port.[Footnote 6]
* Final contract trials: INSURV inspectors conduct a second round of
sea trials to assess whether the ship and all mission equipment are
operating as intended.
* Post Shakedown Availability: A period of planned maintenance follows
final contract trials. During this time, class-wide upgrades and
correction of new or previously identified deficiencies that are the
government's responsibility also occur.
* Obligation and Work Limiting Date: The official date on which full
responsibility for funding the ship's operation and maintenance is
transferred from the acquisition command to the operational fleet.
Construction-related quality deficiencies on Navy ships can be
identified at all points throughout the shipbuilding process, from
initial block fabrication to sea trials up through delivery. During
acceptance trials, INSURV inspectors label the most serious issues as
"starred" deficiencies. These issues can significantly degrade a
ship's ability to perform an assigned primary or secondary operational
capability or the crew's ability to safely operate and maintain ship
systems. Because of their importance, starred deficiencies must be
corrected by the builder or waived by the Chief of Naval Operations
prior to ship delivery.
In addition to starred deficiencies, INSURV inspectors categorize
other types of deficiencies--each of which represent a piece of the
vessel that is not in compliance with Navy standards and/or contract
specifications at the time of inspection. While not deemed as serious
as starred deficiencies, these items can nonetheless affect the
quality of life and safety of the sailors on board the vessel or the
operability of the ship. INSURV categorizes these issues into three
parts based on the professional judgment of its inspectors:
* Part I deficiencies are very significant in that they are likely to
cause the ship to be unseaworthy or to substantially reduce the ship's
ability to carry out its assigned mission. "Part I Safety" is a sub-
category that INSURV uses to indicate that an issue is severe enough
that the ship is unsafe to operate until corrected. All starred
deficiencies are Part I deficiencies but not all Part I deficiencies
are starred. An example of a Part I starred deficiency would be an
anchor that when deployed during testing was not fully retrievable.
* Part II deficiencies involve less significant material degradation
but should be corrected to restore the ship to required
specifications. Part II deficiencies can also have a safety
designation. Examples are wide ranging and can include items such as
missing signage, or areas of the ship having missing or damaged paint
and coatings.
* Part III deficiencies are generally categorized as things that
prevent the ship from meeting Navy standards but are cost prohibitive
to fix. An example is a lifeboat compartment that is too small to fit
the size of a lifeboat necessary to meet Navy requirements.
While INSURV inspectors identify deficiencies during acceptance
trials, throughout the ship construction process SUPSHIP quality
inspectors, during the normal course of their work, may observe work
being performed that is not in accordance with the technical
specifications, quality requirements included in the contract between
the Navy and the shipbuilder, or the shipbuilder's work procedures. In
such instances, SUPSHIP inspectors will issue a request for the
builder to correct the deficient work. Depending on the severity and
extent of the problems, SUPSHIP's quality officials may send a request
for corrective action to the builder to determine the cause of the
problems, correct the affected work, and improve its work processes so
that the problems will not reoccur. Once the shipbuilder takes the
appropriate actions, SUPSHIP closes out the corrective action request.
At the time of the builder's sea trials, any unresolved SUPSHIP
requests for corrective action are generally grouped together with
deficiencies identified by SUPSHIP inspectors during the builder's sea
trials process.[Footnote 7]
Navy Shipbuilding Environment:
As opposed to the commercial buyers included in our review, which
typically operate in a robust, competitive environment, the Navy has a
limited industrial base to build its ships. For example, throughout
the world there are at least 12 shipbuilding and offshore marine
companies that ship buyers in the oil and gas sector can choose from
to build their vessels. In contrast, two U.S. Navy shipbuilding
contractors--General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls Industries--own
all but three of the larger shipyards, and each yard is specialized to
build specific types of ships. For example, aircraft carriers can only
be built at one location. In addition to building Navy ships, two of
the shipyards, General Dynamics NASSCO and V.T. Halter Marine, also
build vessels for commercial shipping firms. Figure 3 depicts the
major U.S. shipbuilders and the types of ships they build.
Figure 3: Locations of Major Navy Contractor Shipyards and Associated
Product Lines:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME;
* Surface combatants.
General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation, Groton, CT and Quonset
Point, RI;
* Submarines.
Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding Newport News,
VA;
* Submarines;
* Aircraft carriers.
Marinette Marine Corporation, Marinette, WI;
* Surface combatants.
Austal USA, Mobile, AL;
* Surface combatants;
* Auxiliary ships.
Huntington Ingalls Industries, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Gulfport, MS;
Pascagoula, MS;
* Surface combatants;
* Amphibious ships.
V.T. Halter Marine, Pascagoula, MS;
* Auxiliary ships.
General Dyanmics, NASSCO, San Diego, CA;
* Auxiliary ships.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy and shipbuilding contractor data.
Note: Auxiliary ships include transport, cargo, and ammunition ships.
[End of figure]
The Navy uses several different types of contracts for shipbuilding
programs. The Navy will often use cost-reimbursement contracts for the
first ships of a new class, as in many instances the Navy and its
shipbuilding contractors do not have a full understanding of the costs
and effort needed to build and deliver the ships. Such contracts
provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent
prescribed in the contract. The Navy also typically includes incentive
or award fees on these contracts. Our prior work has shown that this
type of contract places more cost risk on the government in the event
that the shipbuilder is unable to deliver the ship on time and within
budget.[Footnote 8] For shipbuilding programs where the Navy has
greater certainty about costs and risks, the Navy typically employs
fixed-price-incentive contracts. Fixed-price-incentive (firm target)
contracts include a target cost, target profit, ceiling price (maximum
price) and a formula used to determined the shipbuilder's profit that
are negotiated at the outset. Final costs that are above the target
cost but below the ceiling price are shared between the Navy and
shipbuilder through the profit adjustment formula. If the final costs
exceed the ceiling price, the shipbuilder is generally responsible for
most additional costs. In some instances the Navy will use a firm-
fixed-price contract, in which the final price of the ship is agreed
to at the outset. This contract type generally places upon the
contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs.
Classification Societies:
The maritime industry has certain requirements to ensure ships meet a
minimum level of safety and quality. Under the International Maritime
Organization conventions, uniform requirements have been established
to, among other things, ensure safety of life while at sea and
environmental protection.[Footnote 9] These requirements stipulate
that ships are designed, constructed, and maintained in accordance
with the rules of a recognized classification society or with
applicable national standards that provide an equivalent level of
safety. Classification societies, such as the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS), Det Norske Veritas, and Lloyd's Register, develop
rules defining a minimum level of technical standards that are applied
to ships. Once a ship is "classed" with a certificate indicating that
it meets a minimum level of safety and quality, the ship is subject to
periodic inspection to verify that it continues to meet the applicable
rules of the issuing classification society. In many instances,
shipbuilders also use classification societies to audit their quality
management systems as an independent third-party, which often is
needed to maintain certain certifications such as the International
Organization for Standardization's ISO 9001 (quality), 14001
(environmental), and 18001 (occupational health and safety) series of
management systems standards.[Footnote 10]
Many of these international shipping requirements regarding
classification do not apply to Navy ships.[Footnote 11] However, in
some instances the Navy voluntarily complies with certain maritime and
commercial classification requirements, such as for ships operated by
the Military Sealift Command.[Footnote 12] Beginning in 2003, the Navy
entered into an agreement with ABS to assist with redefining the
Navy's standards for the design and construction of its non-nuclear
surface combatant ships--surface ships that are designed to engage in
attacks against land, air, and sea targets--to be more consistent with
the classification process used on commercial and Military Sealift
Command-operated ships. The result of this effort was development of
the Naval Vessel Rules, which establish a minimum set of requirements
for the basic construction of the Navy's surface combatant ships.
[Footnote 13] In addition, the Navy required shipbuilding contractors
to contract with ABS to pilot the application and implementation of
the Naval Vessel Rules on the USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) and Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) shipbuilding programs. Under this arrangement, ABS
involvement in the LCS and DDG 1000 programs is similar to that of a
commercial shipbuilding project in which, throughout design and
construction of the ship, the classification society acts as an
independent third-party assessor to ensure the ship is in compliance
with the applicable classification rule sets. Upon completion of all
requirements, ABS issues a classification certificate.
The Navy Has Reduced Deficiencies at Delivery but Still Accepts Some
Ships with Numerous Construction Deficiencies:
Recognizing that it has experienced significant quality problems with
several ship classes, the Navy has focused on reducing the number of
serious deficiencies, particularly "starred" deficiencies, which
require a waiver from the Chief of Naval Operations to defer
correction until after delivery. The number of uncorrected
deficiencies at delivery, including starred deficiencies, has
generally dropped for ships delivered over the past few years due, at
least in part, to the Back to Basics quality improvement initiative.
Even so, the Navy still accepts some ships with large numbers of open
deficiencies. Navy policy states that ships are to be delivered based
on acceptance trials and satisfactory correction or resolution of
deficiencies. Instead, correction of deficiencies is often deferred
until after the Navy accepts delivery of the ship, which can interfere
with post-delivery activities. Further, one product of the Back to
Basics initiative, a quality management provision for inclusion in
Navy shipbuilding contracts, has not been implemented on any Navy
shipbuilding contract.
The Navy Has Reduced the Number of Starred Deficiencies at Delivery:
The Navy has reduced the total number of uncorrected starred
deficiencies at delivery on both established and newer ship classes
for which multiple ships have been delivered. It is up to INSURV
inspectors to categorize deficiencies identified by severity during
acceptance trials. Because there can be ambiguity regarding who is
responsible for correcting the deficiencies, the program office,
SUPSHIP, and the shipbuilder collectively determine whether the
government or the shipbuilding contractor is responsible. Deficiencies
that the government is responsible for correcting can include, among
other things, problems requiring a change to the ship design or ship
specification, or equipment that the government is responsible for
providing. For example, during the acceptance trial of LCS 2, the
rescue boat could not be properly deployed and INSURV inspectors
categorized the problem as a starred deficiency. It was subsequently
determined that, as designed, the rescue boat system did not have the
ability to meet requirements and that the Navy would assume
responsibility for the corrective work. Figures 4 through 7 show the
open number of starred deficiencies at delivery for the LPD 17, DDG
51, T-AKE, and LCS ship classes during the 2006 through 2012 time
frame.[Footnote 14] These are the classes of ships that had multiple
vessels delivered in this time frame. The figures also show when the
Back to Basics initiative began.
Figure 4: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for LPD 17 Ship Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Starred cards:
July 2005: Delivery date.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 17;
Contractor: 81;
Government: 42.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 18;
Contractor: 69;
Government: 19.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 19;
Contractor: 3;
Government: 6.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 20;
Contractor: 19;
Government: 7.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 21;
Contractor: 3;
Government: 2.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 22;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 23;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 0.
December 2012: Delivery Date.
Amphibious Transport Dock class (LPO)--ship number: LPD 24;
Contractor: 0;
0.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Note: LPD 17 was delivered to the Navy in 2005, but is included in our
analysis as this was the lead ship for the San Antonio class.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for DDG 51 Ship Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Starred cards:
January 2006: Delivery date.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 099;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 1.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 101;
Contractor: 1;
Government: 0.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 100;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 1.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 102;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 3.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 104;
Contractor: 1;
Government: 2.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 106;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 5.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 103;
Contractor: 5;
Government: 5.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 108;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 5.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 105;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 4.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 109;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 3.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 107;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 2.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 110;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 2.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 111;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 4.
May 2012: Delivery date.
Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 112;
Contractor: 1;
Government: 3.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Note: DDG 51 class ships are built at two Navy contractor shipyards in
Bath, Maine and Pascagoula, Mississippi. Ships are presented in
chronological order based on the date of delivery to the Navy.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for T-AKE Ship Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Starred cards:
March 2009: Delivery date and Back to Basics Start.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 07;
Contractor: 1;
Government: 2.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 08;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 09;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 10;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 11;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 13;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 14;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Note: The database used for this analysis did not contain information
on T-AKE 1 through T-AKE 6, delivered between 2006 and 2008. Data
obtained for T-AKE 12 indicated that almost all of the deficiencies
were opened and closed on the same day following the ship's delivery
and, as such, data for that ship were deemed not sufficiently reliable
for the purpose of this analysis.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Open Starred Deficiencies at Delivery for LCS Ship Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Starred cards:
September 2008: Delivery date.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LCS 1;
Contractor: 16;
Government: 8.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
June 2012: Delivery date.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LCS 3;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 2.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LCS 2;
Contractor: 30;
Government: 8.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Note: Odd numbered LCS class ships (Freedom variant) are built at a
shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin, while even numbered ships
(Independence variant) are built at a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama.
[End of figure]
In addition to starred deficiencies, total deficiencies have declined
for several ship classes. Notably, the last ship of the T-AKE class, T-
AKE 14, was delivered in 2012 with no deficiencies that the
shipbuilder was responsible for correcting. Uncorrected deficiencies
were also kept to a minimum on the recently delivered Joint High Speed
Vessel and Mobile Landing Platform--both based on commercial designs
and operated by the Military Sealift Command. The first Joint High
Speed Vessel, an intratheater troop and cargo transport ship, was
delivered in December 2012 with only 54 uncorrected deficiencies, of
which 6 were categorized as Part I deficiencies. The first Mobile
Landing Platform, which will provide at-sea cargo and equipment
transfers, was delivered in May 2013 with only three uncorrected
shipbuilder-responsible deficiencies, according to the Navy. These had
not been resolved prior to delivery because the shipbuilder was
waiting for parts to correct the items.
Figure 8 shows the number of open deficiencies at the time of delivery
for the T-AKE ship class. The figure also shows when the Back to
Basics initiative began. In addition, appendix III provides additional
information on the numbers and types of deficiencies at different
points in time for T-AKE class ships delivered to the Navy from 2009
through 2012.
Figure 8: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for T-AKE Ship
Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Deficiencies:
March 2009: Delivery date and Back to Basics Start.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 07;
Contractor: 3;
Government: 172.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 08;
Contractor: 8;
Government: 38.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 09;
Contractor: 5;
Government: 158.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 10;
Contractor: 5;
Government: 38.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 11;
Contractor: 2;
Government: 21.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 13;
Contractor: 1;
Government: 34.
October 2012: Delivery date.
Dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE)--ship number: T-AKE 14;
Contractor: 0;
Government: 24.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Notes:
The database used for this analysis did not contain information on T-
AKE 1 through T-AKE 6, delivered between 2006 and 2008. Data obtained
for T-AKE 12 indicated that almost all of the deficiencies were opened
and closed on the same day following the ship's delivery and as such,
data for that ship were deemed not sufficiently reliable for the
purpose of this analysis. In some instances, similar types of
deficiencies were consolidated into a single deficiency prior to ship
delivery. The data above contains deficiencies where it was
subsequently determined no further corrective action would be taken.
[End of figure]
Notes:
It should be noted that a confluence of several factors led to
improved quality for the T-AKE and Mobile Landing Platform ship
classes. The quality of ships generally improves as ship classes
mature. Production efficiencies are gained from process improvements
and incorporation of lessons learned into the build strategy. During
early production of the T-AKE ship class, the shipbuilder initiated
shipyard-wide production improvements and other efficiencies
resulting, in part, from the shipbuilder's partnership with a leading
international commercial shipbuilder. With the improvement in quality,
the T-AKE program moved to a contract type which transfers more of the
cost risk resulting from any quality problems to the shipbuilder.
Specifically, for T-AKE 10 through T-AKE 14 the Navy transitioned from
a fixed-priced-incentive contract to a firm-fixed-price contract. The
shipbuilder for the Mobile Landing Platform attributed the delivery of
a nearly defect-free ship to its focus on ensuring that all design
engineering efforts and production planning activities were fully
completed prior to the start of the lead ship's construction.
Shipbuilder representatives stated that this was a key factor in
keeping rework rates for quality problems low.
Numbers of Other Deficiencies at Delivery Remains Substantial:
Even with the drop in the number of starred deficiencies, the Navy has
continued to accept delivery of some ships with large numbers of
uncorrected deficiencies. For example, LPD 22, which was delivered
without any starred deficiencies and was cited by Navy officials as a
turning point for the LPD 17 ship class, had over 3,300 deficiencies
that the contractor was responsible for correcting at delivery.
Subsequent LPD ships, LPD 23 and 24, both delivered in 2012, had fewer
but still sizable numbers of uncorrected deficiencies. On these ships,
examples of uncorrected Part II deficiencies that were the
shipbuilder's responsibility when delivered included pipe hangers that
were insufficiently spaced to support the weight intended or that did
not meet the Navy's requirements; fire suppression sprinklers not
providing adequate coverage due to obstructions and interference from
pipes and ductwork; and inability to fully extend a crane boom due to
overhead obstructions on LPD 24. While Part II deficiencies are
considered to be not as severe as Part I deficiencies, these
deficiencies nonetheless can require a fair amount of shipbuilder
effort to remedy.
Figure 9 shows the total number of open non-starred deficiencies (Part
I, Part II, and Part III) at the time of delivery for the LPD 17 ship
class. The figure also shows when the Back to Basics initiative began.
Appendix IV provides additional information on the numbers and types
of deficiencies at different points in time for LPD class ships
delivered to the Navy since 2009, when the Back to Basics initiative
began.
Figure 9: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for LPD 17 Ship
Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Deficiencies:
July 2005: Delivery date.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 17;
Contractor: 12,545;
Government: 1,876.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 18;
Contractor: 8,312;
Government: 3,479.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 19;
Contractor: 2,863;
Government: 1,394.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 20;
Contractor: 3,751;
Government: 1,365.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 21;
Contractor: 4,927;
Government: 1,398.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 22;
Contractor: 3,338;
Government: 1,625.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 23;
Contractor: 556;
Government: 847.
December 2012: Delivery date.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LPD 24;
Contractor: 1,136;
Government: 869.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Notes:
LPD 17 was delivered to the Navy in 2005, but is included in our
analysis as this was the lead ship for the San Antonio class.
Deficiencies closed up to 7 days after date of delivery are treated as
being closed at delivery to account for potential lags in data entry.
[End of figure]
Notes:
As another example, on LCS 3, uncorrected Part II deficiencies that
were the shipbuilder's responsibility at the time of delivery included
use of incorrect weld-filler material on pipe joints associated with
the ship's water jets; instances where cabling was insufficiently
supported, was bent, or had insufficient banding; and valves that were
inaccessible due to obstructions.
Figure 10 summarizes the number of open non-starred deficiencies (Part
I, Part II, and Part III) at the time of delivery for the LCS ship
class. The figure also shows when the Back to Basics initiative began.
In addition, appendix V provides additional information on the numbers
and types of deficiencies at different points in time for the LCS ship
class.
Figure 10: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for LCS Ship
Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Deficiencies:
September 2008: Delivery date.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LCS 1;
Contractor: 1,819;
Government: 435.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
June 2012: Delivery date.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LCS 3;
Contractor: 947;
Government: 352.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--ship number: LCS 2;
Contractor: 3,854;
Government: 1,362.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Notes:
Odd numbered LCS ships (Freedom variant) are built at a Navy contractor
shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin, while even numbered ships
(Independence variant) are built at a Navy contractor shipyard in
Mobile, Alabama.
Deficiencies closed up to 7 days after date of delivery are treated as
being closed at delivery to account for potential lags in data entry.
[End of figure]
In the above examples for the LPD and LCS ship classes, many of the
deficiencies were first identified by SUPSHIP inspectors either prior
to or during the builders' sea trials but were not corrected before
delivery.
In addition, correcting very significant deficiencies (Part I) can
require various levels of effort. For example, INSURV designated a
broken window in the helicopter control station as a Part I deficiency
on DDG 112. This may be relatively easy to fix, but is labeled a Part
I deficiency because, according to deficiency documentation, until
this issue is corrected the aviation facilities on the vessel cannot
be fully certified, limiting operations. However, other issues could
be more complex to correct. On DDG 108, for example, INSURV inspectors
identified locations within the ship where there was insufficient
corrosion protection, which if left uncorrected could result in
accelerated corrosion as it did on at least one previous hull.
Additional corrosion protection features were necessary to correct the
issue, resulting in changes to the ship specification for follow-on
hulls. Figure 11 summarizes the number of open non-starred
deficiencies (Part I, Part II, and Part III) at the time of delivery
for the DDG 51 ship class. The figure also shows when the Back to
Basics initiative began. Appendix VI provides additional information
on the numbers and types of deficiencies at different points in time
for those DDG 51 class ships delivered to the Navy since 2009, when
the Back to Basics initiative began.
Figure 11: Non-Starred Deficiencies at Time of Delivery for DDG 51
Ship Class:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Deficiencies:
January 2006: Delivery date.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 099;
Contractor: 3,286;
Government: 644.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 101;
Contractor: 1,837;
Government: 615.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 100;
Contractor: 4,772;
Government: 796.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 102;
Contractor: 2,561;
Government: 587.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 104;
Contractor: 855;
Government: 578.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 106;
Contractor: 3,295;
Government: 898.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 103;
Contractor: 8,772;
Government: 1,000.
March 2009: Back to Basics Start.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 108;
Contractor: 2,656;
Government: 549.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 105;
Contractor: 1,589;
Government: 461.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 109;
Contractor: 3,720;
Government: 670.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 107;
Contractor: 642;
Government: 292.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 110;
Contractor: 194;
Government: 139.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 111;
Contractor: 3,281;
Government: 696.
May 2012: Delivery date.
Guided Missiles Destroyers (DDG)--ship number: DDG 112;
Contractor: 601;
Government: 505.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Notes:
DDG 51 class ships are built at two Navy contractor shipyards in Bath,
Maine and Pascagoula, Mississippi. Ships are presented in chronological
order based on the date delivered to the Navy.
Deficiencies closed up to 7 days after date of delivery are treated as
being closed at delivery to account for potential lags in data entry.
[End of figure]
While our analysis indicates that deficiencies have generally been
decreasing where there are multiple ships in a class, we found
instances where ships built individually or infrequently experienced
difficulties in meeting the Navy's requirements prior to being
delivered to the Navy. These include the Wasp class amphibious assault
ship (LHD 8), the Nimitz class aircraft carrier (CVN 77), and a
missile instrumentation ship (T-AGM 25).
* The Navy accepted delivery of LHD 8 in April 2009 with over 12,000
uncorrected deficiencies which were determined to be the shipbuilder's
responsibility. Of these, almost 70 percent were for items SUPSHIP
inspectors had identified before or during the builder's sea trials,
including numerous deficiencies related to the ship's cabling and
wiring. According to representatives of the shipbuilder, following
delivery the shipbuilder undertook an intensive effort lasting several
months to assess the condition of the ship's cabling, as it was
unclear which cables and wires were properly routed. As a result of
the costs incurred by the shipbuilder for this effort, the builder
completely revised and modernized the approach used to install cables
and wires on subsequent ships built at the shipyard.
* According to the shipbuilder's list of incomplete work items and
deficiencies, the Navy took delivery of CVN 77 in May 2009, with about
7 percent of the ship's compartments unfinished; over 8,000
uncorrected deficiencies that had been identified prior to or during
sea trials; and approximately 3,900 generally minor deficiencies (such
as missing cable tags and electrical outlets) that were identified by
the crew during its inspection. In addition, INSURV inspectors noted
during CNV 77's acceptance trial that because the ship was not fully
primed and painted, longer-term cost and maintenance implications
needed to be addressed, as corrosion developed in the unfinished
spaces and machinery.
* During the May 2011 acceptance trial for T-AGM 25, INSURV inspectors
recommended that the Navy not take delivery of the ship until an
additional acceptance trial was conducted because almost none of the
major systems on the vessel were in satisfactory condition, and
several were incomplete or inoperable. The inspectors also noted that
most of the deficiencies they cited were previously identified during
builder's trials but had not been properly corrected and retested. In
the months following, the shipbuilder conducted an additional
builder's trial to demonstrate some key components along with INSURV's
second acceptance trial. At the time of delivery in January 2012,
there were 67 unresolved deficiencies from sea trials which the
shipbuilding contractor was responsible for correcting, and about 600
additional items identified by the Navy requiring correction by the
builder, including improperly secured and supported cables, damaged
paint, missing safety equipment, and loose tiles.
In these cases, the Navy gave priority to programmatic goals and
determined it was in the best interest of the Navy to proceed with key
milestones despite a large volume of uncorrected deficiencies or
incomplete work. According to Navy officials, the Navy may make such
determinations based on its strategic needs or additional costs that
may be incurred by not proceeding with key milestones. For example,
the LHD 8 program office took delivery of the ship as it was over a
year and half behind schedule, primarily due to lingering effects from
Hurricane Katrina, a shipyard-wide strike, and delays completing the
ship's machinery control system. With CVN 77, SUPSHIP and program
office officials stated it was necessary to take delivery of the ship
in its unfinished condition so that it could periodically participate
in training missions while the remaining work was being completed.
Lastly, program officials decided to proceed with acceptance trials
for T-AGM 25 to meet scheduling constraints associated with
installation of the ship's mission package at another location, which
could only be accomplished after taking delivery of the ship. In
addition, SUPSHIP officials noted that in some instances, such as with
T-AGM 25, the decision was made to proceed with sea trials in an
effort to reveal additional problems with the ship that may not have
been known at the time.
Deficiencies May Persist into Operations:
Deficiencies identified by SUPSHIP and INSURV, if not sufficiently
corrected, may link to problems later when the ship is in operation.
In some instances, issues identified by SUPSHIP's quality inspectors
during construction were closed prior to delivery--indicating the
builder had satisfactorily addressed the problems--but the root causes
of the problems were not fully resolved. For example, during the
construction of DDG 107 issues with welding were identified in the
normal course of SUPSHP's quality inspections. Specifically, SUPSHIP
inspectors identified weld defects on the ship's mast and issued a
request for corrective action to the shipbuilder. The action was
closed, indicating that the builder had resolved the identified
problems. However, during a routine training exercise in February
2011, a sub-section of the ship's mast failed when the welds could no
longer support the structure. According to Navy investigators, it is
likely that the section of the mast would have fallen onto the ship or
into the water, but cables prevented it from falling. Although the
section of the mast that failed was not at the same location where
defective welds were identified by SUPSHIP, a Navy investigation into
the issue identified several causes of the failure, including
inadequate quality assurance oversight by the shipbuilder and poor
workmanship during the construction process.
In addition, deficiencies can also combine to form larger issues.
Quality problems that stem from deficiencies are often complex and can
manifest long after the error occurred that led to the problem. Navy
documents addressing quality concerns state that hull, mechanical, and
electrical issues are often the result of one or more of the following
causes:
* Construction and workmanship deficiencies, such as weld defects or
inadequate painting;
* Design errors, such as refueling at sea systems that cannot
accommodate necessary fuel offloading rates; and:
* Supplier and subcontractor issues, such as counterfeit parts and sub-
systems that do not work properly.
For example, a gas turbine engine on LCS 1 was ruined and had to be
replaced because it was flooded with sea water. The Navy determined
that this occurred because (1) the welds for the doors and water
separators were not flush, creating gaps that allowed water to pass
through the doors (a workmanship issue); (2) there were gaps in the
sealing surfaces of the water separator that also allowed water to
penetrate (a design issue); and (3) a key filter became clogged
because it was not replaced in a timely manner (a maintenance issue).
Figure 12 catalogues select quality problems for a number of ships
related to hull, mechanical, and electrical workmanship that persisted
following delivery of the vessels. To generate this list, we asked
Navy officials from many different departments, including program
offices, maintenance units, and ship operators, to identify problems
facing the various ship classes built in the last eight years.
Figure 12: Select Quality Issues on Ships Delivered from 2004 to 2012:
[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic]
Quality problems have affected the basic construction of all classes
of Navy ships delivered in the last 8 years—from 2004 to 2012. Basic
construction includes all aspects of constructing the ship’s main
structure (hull), mechanical and electrical systems, and primarily
consists of welding blocks of steel and pipes, outfitting the ship
with major systems (such as the propulsion system), and wiring the
ship with various types of cables. This following graphic illustrates
some of these quality issues.
Click on an image to see more detailed information about each ship.
For a print version, please see Appendix VII.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data (data and images).
[End of figure]
Accepting a Vessel with Deficiencies Is Common, and Varying
Interpretations of Policy Dictate Practice:
Policy issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Navy
Instruction 4700.8J, Trials, Acceptance, Commissioning, Fitting Out,
Shakedown, and Post Shakedown Availability of U.S. Naval Ships
Undergoing Construction or Conversion) states the following:
* For new construction ships, all contractual and governmental
responsibilities should be resolved prior to delivery, except for crew
certification, outfitting, or special Navy range requirements which
cannot be met until after delivery.
* Delivery of the ship is based on acceptance trials and satisfactory
correction or resolution of deficiencies, and acceptance trials shall
be conducted when all work, including the correction of significant
known deficiencies, has been completed.
* In many cases it may be prudent to defer work until the post-
delivery period before the vessel is transferred to the fleet, for
example for financial or workload reasons.
In addition, the Navy's fixed-price shipbuilding contracts that we
reviewed included the Navy's Delivery of Completed Vessel clause,
which requires the shipbuilder, before the ship is delivered to the
Navy, to satisfactorily correct all contractor responsible
deficiencies as necessary to avoid an adverse effect on the
operational capability of the vessel.[Footnote 15]
Different units in the Navy disagree over when ships should be free
from deficiencies. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the
authors of the policy, state that the policy is to accept delivery of
a vessel from the shipbuilder that is free of deficiencies, especially
all contractor-responsible deficiencies. However, program office and
SUPSHIP officials, as well as officials from other Navy organizations,
stated that it is standard practice for the Navy to accept delivery of
a ship with numerous unresolved deficiencies and/or incomplete work.
Navy program officials point to the part of the policy that states
that the vessel should be fully mission capable by the Obligation and
Work Limiting Date--the time full financial responsibility for the
ship is transferred to the operational fleet--and this is their
quality goal. Thus, the Navy has routinely deferred correcting
deficiencies with the intention of correcting these items during the
post-delivery period, as shown in appendixes III through VI.[Footnote
16] In fact, for some, such as those in the DDG 51 class, the bulk of
deficiencies are addressed during the first four months following
delivery to the Navy during the final outfitting period. This is the
time when the crew boards the ship and begins testing and training
prior to the ship being deployed on a mission. Several NAVSEA
officials stated that addressing deficiencies during the post-delivery
period can interfere with crew training, final outfitting, and testing
of the vessel while also affecting the quality of the work being
performed.
Further, while some Navy officials told us that transferring problems
to the fleet is rare, the transfer of major problems to the fleet in
varying degrees of severity occurred on LPD 17-21, LHD 8, and DDG 103,
requiring the use of operations and maintenance funds to correct the
defects. Navy operations officials told us that following the problems
with LPD 17 and LPD 18 that were transferred to the fleet, the fleet
has become more involved in ensuring that it receives a quality
vessel. They noted that the fleet now has the ability to provide input
at key points during the acquisition process on whether identified
problems on a vessel have been adequately addressed.
Navy Has Implemented Some, but Not All, Quality Improvement Measures:
In 2007, recognizing the widespread quality problems in new
construction ships, the Commander of NAVSEA began to examine the
quantity of SUPSHIP's quality assurance inspectors in a few key
locations to determine what resources were needed to improve quality.
Following this workforce assessment, between fiscal years 2009 and
2012, the Navy hired new staff and reallocated funding for
engineering, acquisition management, and quality assurance personnel
at those SUPSHIP commands with the greatest risks to quality and in
order to keep up with the growth of shipbuilding programs.
In 2009, the Back to Basics effort was initiated. This effort
identified several quality assurance related goals and developed a
means to help SUPSHIP better communicate to the program offices the
role of quality assurance and the purpose of quality oversight. In
addition, NAVSEA standardized many of the operating procedures across
all SUPSHIP locations. Another focus of Back to Basics was improving
SUPSHIP's oversight of critical hull, mechanical, and electrical
shipbuilding processes such as welding, painting, and cabling by
standardizing and improving its use of metrics to assess shipbuilder
performance in these areas. For example, on a quarterly basis, the
SUPSHIP commands report to NAVSEA leadership on the extent to which
the shipbuilders are meeting SUPSHIP's quality goals as compared with
previous periods. These quarterly reports provide NAVSEA leadership
with insight into the reasons behind any increases in quality problems.
The Back to Basics initiative prompted at least two SUPSHIP locations
to use a process called "pulse audits" where SUPSHIP and shipbuilder
quality inspectors conduct an inspection together to ensure that their
inspections are consistent. Also, some SUPSHIP locations have regular
meetings with quality inspectors from the shipbuilder to compare
quality inspection results and metrics, and discuss any discrepancies
between the results of their inspections. As a result, SUPSHIP and
shipbuilder officials reported they now have a greater understanding
of each other's quality assurance processes.
In addition, in June 2010, the Back to Basics team developed a quality
performance standard that set forth common quality requirements to be
included in shipbuilding contracts, which was subsequently published
as a NAVSEA technical publication. The Quality Performance Standard
for Construction of Naval Vessels provides standard contract language
that, among other things, would require shipbuilders to:
* develop and submit a quality assurance plan for the government's
approval;
* conduct a review to identify special controls, processes, equipment,
and skills required for assuring product quality;
* ensure that drawings are reviewed for adequacy and completeness
before use;
* have a quality system that ensures that work is inspected and/or
tested at points necessary to ensure conformance with contract
requirements;
* respond to corrective action requests within 21 days (7 days for
safety issues) and indicate when corrective action will be completed;
* maintain and use cost data on prevention and detection of defects
and failure costs (such as scrap, rework, and repairs);
* provide the government electronic access to quality, accuracy
control, and manufacturing process data; and:
* use results-oriented indicators to demonstrate quality program
effectiveness.
Although the standard was developed in 2010, according to officials
who wrote it, as of September 2013 none of the Navy's shipbuilding
programs had incorporated this quality performance standard into their
shipbuilding contracts. Further, in a May 2013 meeting, senior NAVSEA
leadership told us they were unaware that a quality performance
standard had been developed, noting that quality clauses are already
included in the Navy's shipbuilding contracts. According to officials
from SUPSHIP and the SUPSHIP Management Group, the quality standard
was developed because of inconsistencies in quality requirements
included in shipbuilding contracts that decreased the Navy's ability
to effectively conduct oversight. For example, we reviewed two fixed-
price-incentive shipbuilding contracts awarded in fiscal year 2011
that contain very different quality requirements. On one contract for
a relatively mature ship class, the quality clause includes production
process control, data sharing, and the use of results-oriented metrics
to demonstrate quality program effectiveness. On another contract for
a newer ship class, the quality clause simply requires that the
shipbuilder develop, implement, and maintain a quality assurance plan
covering certain aspects of shipbuilding.
Further, SUPSHIP officials cited one recent contract that did not
include provisions for SUPSHIP to review the shipbuilder's work
procedures. As a result, the builder was reluctant to provide this
information as it was not contractually required, limiting SUPSHIP's
ability to discover potential problems. SUPSHIP officials noted that,
under current contracts, the range of data provided may not be
sufficient for them to do their work. For example, officials noted
that one fixed-price-incentive contract stated that "processes or
indicators (internal design changes, production rework, etc.) to be
monitored and reported shall be agreed to by the Program Office and
shall be identified in the management plan(s);" without going into any
additional detail about the specific types of data or the frequency
with which data was to be provided.
Views regarding the success of Back to Basics are mixed. NAVSEA
leadership views it as a success, noting that maintaining the
improvements made over the last few years will be critical as budgets
shrink and the shipbuilding portfolio shifts into more steady-state
production. They point to the LPD 17 and T-AKE programs as evidence of
the benefits resulting from the quality assurance staffing increases.
However, others within the Navy believe that quality improvements on
some shipbuilding programs, such as the T-AKE program, were largely
independent of the initiative.
Commercial Firms Resolve Quality Deficiencies before Delivery, with
Some Practices Potentially Informative for Navy in Spite of Different
Environment:
The environment in which leading commercial ship buyers and builders
operate differs in substantial ways from the Navy's. Key differences
include the level of competition, different incentives at play, and
the timing of ship deliveries to the end user. Nevertheless, some
commercial practices supporting delivery of ships with a minimum
number of deficiencies may be useful for the Navy. These practices
include:
* a focus on resolving deficiencies before ship delivery,
* contracting approaches that place the cost risk associated with
addressing quality problems on the shipbuilder and incentivize prompt
resolution of problems, and:
* an oversight process with clear lines of accountability and an
emphasis on observing in-process work.
Environment and Key Incentives Differ between Commercial and Navy
Shipbuilding:
The commercial shipyards and ship buyers we visited build and buy
ships that are highly complex and densely outfitted. These ships
include floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessels,
which collect, process, and store oil from undersea oil fields; large
cruise ships, some of which are comparable to the size of an aircraft
carrier and can accommodate over 5,000 passengers; liquefied natural
gas carriers; and offshore drilling ships, which in some instances can
sit unanchored and drill for oil in water depths of over 10,000 feet
while maintaining a fixed position. Construction can take up to three
years at a cost ranging from about $600 million for a drill ship to
well over $1 billion for a cruise ship or FPSO. In many cases, these
ships incorporate technological advances that are vital to improving
business operations. For example, for enhancing operational and
commercial efficiencies, the new generation liquefied natural gas
carriers developed a range of techniques from reliquefaction of the
boil off gas to its utilization as fuel for engines for propulsion.
Key characteristics of selected commercial ships and offshore
structures included in our review are presented in appendix VIII.
Commercial shipbuilders, particularly those in the oil and gas
industry, operate in a robust, competitive environment, as opposed to
the U.S. Navy's limited shipbuilding industrial base, where sole
source contracts may be awarded in order to sustain workloads and the
solvency of the companies involved. This environment provides
commercial buyers with additional leverage to expect quality at
delivery, as they can go elsewhere if they are not satisfied with the
end product. One oil and gas company reported that there are as many
as a dozen shipbuilders from which they can solicit proposals at any
one time. As a result, commercial shipbuilders put a premium on
reputation. They do not want to risk their credibility with buyers if
the ship is not delivered by the contracted delivery date with the
buyer's expected level of quality. These factors create additional
pressure on the shipbuilder to ensure that outstanding deficiencies
are resolved in a timely manner. In contrast, the Navy has fewer
choices of shipbuilders and has an interest in sustaining these
shipbuilders despite shortfalls in performance.
Figure: photograph of Celebrity Solstice:
Source: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
[End of figure]
In addition, commercial buyers and builders operate in an environment
where both parties seek to maximize profits. A delay in delivery has
significant profit impacts to both the buyer and shipbuilder. For
example, it is common for a drill ship to be leased to an oil and gas
company early during the ship's construction process, and both the
ship buyer and the company leasing the vessel rely on the ship to be
at its drill site by the contracted date to begin operations. Any
delay in meeting this schedule can not only cause the ship buyer to
lose revenue--which for some drill ships can amount to over $600,000
per day--but also may require the buyer to pay predetermined sums to
the company leasing the drill ship for lost work days. Also, newly
constructed cruise ships are expected to start generating revenue
weeks if not days after being delivered. For example, Royal Caribbean
officials told us that they had a full cruise 3 days after taking
delivery of the Celebrity Solstice in October 2008. The monetary risks
faced by the ship buyer for late delivery or acquiring a ship that
does not meet key performance requirements--such as fuel consumption--
are also passed along to the shipbuilder in the form of liquidated
damages that can potentially cost the shipbuilder tens of millions of
dollars.[Footnote 17]
Leading Commercial Ship Buyers Focus on Taking Delivery of Ships
Meeting Quality Expectations:
Throughout the construction process, the ship buyer's oversight team,
the shipbuilders' quality personnel, and classification society
personnel routinely identify deficiencies such as design errors,
supplier and vendor quality issues, and problems with workmanship.
Commercial ship buyers we met with expect that identified problems
will be corrected prior to delivery of the ship. We found this to be
the case for all types of ships included in our assessment of
commercial practices, whether a lead ship (i.e., the first ship built
according to a new design) or a ship built from a proven design.
Unresolved issues that affect the safety, seaworthiness, or
operability of the ship would be reason for the ship buyer to not
accept delivery until such items are corrected. For the generally
minor deficiencies that have not been corrected by the ship's delivery
date, the buyer and shipbuilder may enter into a formal agreement
outlining specific actions that the builder will take to ensure
correction of the outstanding issues in the prescribed time.
There is a fair amount of subjectivity as to what constitutes a major
or minor deficiency that largely depends on the ship's intended use.
While each ship-buying company may take a slightly different view of
what constitutes a major or minor deficiency, minor deficiencies are
generally those items that do not have an effect on the mission,
operability, or safety of the vessel and are not indicative of
problems with the builder's production processes. Major deficiencies
can be viewed as problems with the shipbuilder's production processes
that limit the builder's ability to meet ship specifications, or those
deficiencies that could have an adverse effect on the mission,
operability, or safety of the vessel if not resolved. We found that
commercial ship buyer definitions for major and minor deficiencies do
not necessarily align with the definitions used by the Navy. For
example, in the cruise industry, where aesthetics and the customer
experience are critical factors, a major deficiency may be an issue
such as higher than anticipated engine vibration or elevated noise
levels. Typical minor deficiencies include cosmetic defects such as
scratches on windows, paint, and furniture. For oil and gas ships that
are expected to endure harsh environments, common major outstanding
deficiencies at the time of delivery could involve equipment that has
not yet been installed or equipment that requires additional
calibration. Typical minor deficiencies might include missing signage
or technical manuals.
A drill ship for Noble Corporation, the Noble Don Taylor, illustrates
the process for correcting deficiencies leading up to delivery of
commercial ships. In this case, the shipbuilder reduced the number of
corrective items, totaling over 15,000 throughout construction, to
around 3,800 by the time sea trials were scheduled to occur. At the
time of ship delivery, the number of unresolved corrective actions was
down to just over 59 items, which the shipbuilder agreed to correct no
later than three months following the date of delivery. One day
following ship delivery, this number dropped to 37 items. These items
included minor deficiencies such as incorrect labels and missing
manufacturer documentation for equipment, and in some instances, more
significant corrective actions including replacement of equipment
which measures the weight and torque of the drill that did not have
the correct calibration.
Figure: photograph of Noble Corporation's Noble Don Taylor dynamically
positioned drill ship.
Source: Noble Corporation.
[End of figure]
Additional examples depicting the extent to which quality problems
identified by the ship buyer are resolved prior to key delivery
milestones are provided in table 1.
Table 1: Unresolved Deficiencies for Select Commercial Ships at Key
Delivery Milestones:
Ship name (type): Noble Don Taylor (drill ship);
Delivery date: April 2013;
Prior to sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 3,803;
Open major deficiencies: 7;
After sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 1,839;
Open major deficiencies: 6;
At ship delivery:
Open minor deficiencies: 37;
Open major deficiencies: 22.
Ship name (type): Seadrill Ltd. West Auriga (drill ship);
Delivery date: April 2013;
Prior to sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 387;
Open major deficiencies: 78;
After sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 455;
Open major deficiencies: 105;
At ship delivery:
Open minor deficiencies: 50;
Open major deficiencies: 0.
Ship name (type): Chevron Big Foot (tension leg platform production
facility - hull structure only)[A];
Delivery date: December 2012;
Prior to sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 436;
Open major deficiencies: 89;
After sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 16;
Open major deficiencies: 26;
At ship delivery:
Open minor deficiencies: [A];
Open major deficiencies: [A].
Ship name (type): Ensco DS 6 (drill ship);
Delivery date: January 2012;
Prior to sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: about 100;
Open major deficiencies: 0;
After sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: less than 100;
Open major deficiencies: 0;
At ship delivery:
Open minor deficiencies: 4;
Open major deficiencies: 0.
Ship name (type): Celebrity Cruises, Inc. (subsidiary of Royal
Caribbean Cruises, LTD.) Reflection (cruise ship);
Delivery date: October 2012;
Prior to sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 9,110;
Open major deficiencies: 30;
After sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 8,100;
Open major deficiencies: 25;
At ship delivery:
Open minor deficiencies: 680;
Open major deficiencies: 20.
Ship name (type): Star Deep Water Petroleum, LTD (a Chevron-affiliated
company) Agbami - Floating Production, Storage and Offloading vessel
(FPSO);
Delivery date: June 2008;
Prior to sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 2,051;
Open major deficiencies: 150;
After sea trials:
Open minor deficiencies: 164;
Open major deficiencies: 10;
At ship delivery:
Open minor deficiencies: 15;
Open major deficiencies: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of industry-provided data.
[A] This project used a unit rate contract where the shipbuilder is
paid a specific rate for performance of the work that is proportional
to the volume of work needed to complete the project. The contractor
that is integrating the production facility onto the hull of the
platform, rather than the shipyard, will address the open deficiencies.
Therefore the ship buyer could not provide us with the data.
[End of table]
The commercial ships reviewed were delivered with considerably fewer
defects than is common with Navy ships, even with the recent
improvements realized by the Navy. With the exception of the Celebrity
cruise ship where there were a large number of minor (often cosmetic)
uncorrected deficiencies at the time of delivery, the number of total
deficiencies ranged from 4 to 59 for the commercial ships reviewed.
For the Navy, recent T-AKE class ships, the Joint High Speed Vessel,
and the Mobile Landing Platform were comparable to the numbers of
outstanding deficiencies found on commercial ships.
Commercial Ship Buyers Put More Risk on Shipbuilders through Choice of
Contract Type and Payment Structure:
The Navy and commercial ship buyers agree that responsibility for
quality must be put on the shipbuilders, as they are in the best
position to ensure quality. However, the commercial buyers we spoke
with structure their contracts to ensure that the shipbuilder absorbs
the cost risks associated with quality problems. For example, they
require delivery of a ship at an expected quality level for a firm-
fixed-price and delay a majority of payment until the expectation is
met. The Navy shares more of the cost risk associated with delivery of
a quality product with its shipbuilders through cost-
reimbursement[Footnote 18] and fixed-price-incentive[Footnote 19]
contracts. The Navy also makes regular progress payments throughout
construction so that the bulk of payment has already been made by
delivery.
Commercial Ship Buyers Use Firm Fixed-Price Contracts to Put Cost Risk
of Poor Quality on the Shipbuilder:
Firm fixed-price contracts used in commercial shipbuilding--even for
lead ships--put more of the cost risks associated with quality on the
shipbuilder than cost-reimbursement and fixed-price-incentive
contracts which are commonly used by the Navy. Under a firm-fixed-
price contract, the shipbuilder takes on the full cost of any quality
problems that result in rework. As many quality problems require
rework to existing blocks or compartments and can thus erode the
shipbuilder's profit that is included in the firm-fixed-price, there
is a greater incentive to minimize production deficiencies throughout
construction.
Similar to commercial ship buyers, the Navy has made some limited use
of firm-fixed-price contracts to purchase ships included in our
review, and in those cases the contractor has taken on more cost risk
associated with any quality problems. Of the 11 shipbuilding programs
we reviewed, three (DDG 51, T-AKE, and T-AGM 25) used firm-fixed-price
contracts.[Footnote 20] For example, starting with the 10th ship in
the T-AKE ship class, the Navy successfully moved to a firm fixed-
price contract for the remaining 5 ships. Whereas some of the earlier
T-AKE ships exceeded the contracted target price, the ships
constructed under firm-fixed-price contracts continued to maintain
good quality. T-AGM 25 was purchased using a firm-fixed-price
contracting arrangement from the outset, but in this case the project
experienced quality problems and delays. Although the shipbuilding
project did not perform as expected, the Navy's exposure to cost
overruns resulting from quality problems was mitigated.
Under a cost-reimbursement contract, the cost risks associated with
poor quality remain with the Navy because the government pays for all
allowable costs of construction, including any rework, although lower
costs may be incentivized by the use of award or incentive fees. The
Navy has used cost-reimbursable contracts on lead ships due to
concerns that the level of uncertainty and risk common on Navy
programs make fixed-price contracts too costly. For example, one
NAVSEA directorate stated that some Navy shipbuilding programs would
likely be deemed unaffordable under a fixed-price contract due to the
shipbuilders' need to include in the price the risk of uncertainty
associated with new construction methods, new technologies, and new
designs. However, the Navy generally moves more mature ship programs
to fixed-price-incentive contracts, and Navy officials have stated
that the cost sharing provisions in this type of contract incentivize
quality. Under a fixed-price-incentive type contract, the contract is
awarded for a target cost. The Navy and the shipbuilder share both
cost savings and cost overruns below or above the target cost
(referred to as the "share line"), pursuant to a formula, until the
ceiling price is reached. Navy officials have stated that they see
this type of contract as an incentive to quality because the
shipbuilders will receive more profit if they construct the ship
efficiently and deliver it below the target cost. Appendix IX further
illustrates how cost risks pertaining to quality are allocated under
the different contract types.
Commercial Shipbuilding Payment Terms Put More Pressure on Shipbuilder
to Deliver Complete Ship at Expected Quality Level:
In the commercial world, ship buyers use payment terms as leverage to
ensure that the shipbuilder delivers a ship to the expected level of
quality. Payments are generally made at milestones negotiated with the
shipbuilder, such as contract signing, steel cutting, and keel laying.
The bulk of the payment, sometimes 60 to 80 percent, is made only on
delivery of a ship that meets expected quality and performance levels.
The buyers we met with alter payment terms based on the quality of the
shipbuilder and also use the payment terms to incentivize the builder
to fix any outstanding deficiencies prior to making the last payment.
For example, one construction manager stated that his company normally
makes equal payments to shipbuilders at five different milestones, so
that 20 percent of the ship cost remains to be paid at delivery, but
the company would likely increase the percentage of the overall
payment outstanding at delivery with a lesser quality shipbuilder.
Another ship buyer said that his company normally pays 60 to 70
percent of contract price at delivery, but would not make final
payment if the ship had major outstanding quality issues. Two other
ship buyers told us they make milestone payments during construction,
but generally retain 5 to 10 percent of the payment as a means to
ensure that the builder addresses deficiencies before delivery. Those
buyers also said they can retain these funds at delivery to ensure
prompt resolution of any unresolved deficiencies. These practices
create a strong financial incentive for the builder to quickly
complete work and clear any outstanding quality defects. One project
manager indicated that on two recent shipbuilding projects, it was not
necessary to withhold any of the payment after taking delivery of the
vessels because of the small number of deficiencies.
Of the 11 fixed-price contracts we reviewed (with the exception of
TAGM-25), the Navy makes periodic payments to its shipbuilders
according to the progress made in construction.[Footnote 21] For
example, one contract allows the shipbuilder to submit payment
invoices every two weeks that are based on the progress made in
construction as long as the billed amount is over $5,000. While
commercial ship buyers may pay the bulk of payment at delivery, this
system also requires shipbuilders to finance construction and related
finance costs, which are ultimately passed on to the ship buyer in the
contract cost.
According to Navy contracting officials, they consider potential
impacts on pricing in developing payment provisions. In the fixed-
priced shipbuilding contracts we reviewed, we found that the Navy
generally retains a percentage from each progress payment--anywhere up
to 10 percent--that decreases as the ship is being built. Navy
contracting officials told us that they will only reduce the retention
to the lower percentage once outstanding problems have been cleared.
The following example from a recent shipbuilding contract illustrates
this process:
* Up to 25 percent of the ship's physical completion--5 percent is
retained from each progress payment;
* 25 to 50 percent of the ship's physical completion--3 percent is
retained from each progress payment;
* 50 to 75 percent of the ship's physical completion--1.5 percent is
retained from each progress payment; and:
* Once 75 percent of the ship's physical completion has been reached--
1 percent is retained from each remaining progress payment.
At delivery, the Navy retains a minimum amount of the shipbuilder's
payment as a performance reserve that ranges from 0.75 to 1.5 percent
of the ship's contract value, and will withhold additional funds from
the shipbuilder's last invoice or the amount retained during
construction if there are uncorrected deficiencies or incomplete work.
However, the Navy may be constrained in terms of how it can
incentivize contractors since the bulk of payments are made during the
course of construction rather than at delivery. As it is common for
Navy ships to have many more deficiencies and incomplete work items at
delivery than the commercial ships in our review, the amount retained
may not sufficiently motivate the shipbuilder to correct all
deficiencies. Further, there is not specific NAVSEA guidance that
addresses the extent to which retentions should be used as a means to
incentivize the shipbuilder to promptly resolve outstanding
deficiencies and incomplete work items at ship delivery. However,
standards for internal control in the federal government identify the
need for documenting policies and procedures to ensure appropriate
measures are taken to address risk.[Footnote 22] Program officials
stated that for uncorrected deficiencies that are large in scope they
will typically develop an estimated cost to complete each item. For
the remaining deficiencies, the officials stated they develop an
average cost that is based on the estimated cost to complete a
selected sample of the deficiencies and apply that cost universally
across the remaining deficiencies. In the case of LHD 8, which was
delivered to the Navy in April 2009 with over 12,000 outstanding
shipbuilder-responsible deficiencies, the Navy retained about 2.5
percent of the final estimated cost. Navy officials told us that some
of these outstanding items are still being completed during
maintenance periods.
More recently, Navy and SUPSHIP officials stated that in at least
three instances they have temporarily increased the amount of the
retained payments in an effort to prompt the shipbuilder to correct
persistent deficiencies. SUPSHIP officials told us this approach was
successful for problems they encountered with the LHA 6, DDG 51, and
LPD 17 ship classes. In the case of LPD 17 class ships, the Navy
withheld over $15 million in progress payments on four ships that were
under construction until the shipbuilder resolved persistent problems
with pipe cleanliness.
Commercial and Navy Shipbuilding Utilize Differing Approaches to
Foster Accountability and Ensure Quality:
Commercial Ship Buyer Oversight Structure Creates Clear Lines of
Accountability While Navy Oversight Is More Diffused:
Another mechanism commercial ship buyers use to ensure quality
assurance is having dedicated, trained inspection teams on site to
monitor and oversee all aspects of construction. All of the commercial
ship buyers we met with create clear lines of responsibility for
functional areas to ensure accountability within their on-site teams,
which are primarily responsible for quality during construction.
Within the on-site teams of the commercial buyers we met with,
responsibility for a functional area such as paint or hull and
structure is consolidated under one functional area lead who reports
to the buyer's overall project or construction manager on-site. The on-
site project manager has overall responsibility within the buyer's
company to ensure that the shipbuilder delivers the ship on time and
at the expected level of quality. Quality inspectors are integrated
within each functional area team. Commercial ship buyers told us that
their on-site quality inspectors are expected to independently
identify critical inspection areas during the course of their day-to-
day inspections. We found that commercial quality inspectors use
design drawings and ship specifications during their work to ensure
that the items are built in accordance with the detailed design.
Furthermore, these inspectors are also responsible for tracking and
closing all corrective actions they identify during the course of
construction and ensuring that the corrected work or work processes
resolved the identified problems. Overall, commercial ship buyers
place a high-level of responsibility on their inspectors to be able to
identify important quality issues in their functional area and ensure
that the company will take delivery of a ship that meets quality
standards.
Within the Navy, SUPSHIP quality assurance departments have limited
authority over the shipbuilder compared to commercial ship buyers'
inspectors. SUPSHIP quality assurance teams identify and report
defects found during their inspections, and can close out the
deficiencies once the defects are rectified. However, deficiencies
that are technical in nature, or with which the builder disagrees, are
adjudicated by SUPSHIP engineering and the ship's program office and
not the quality assurance department. For example, SUPSHIP's
engineering department reviews and adjudicates technical issues
related to design and system engineering that quality assurance teams
identify during inspections. If the engineering group finds that a
defect is technically acceptable, a waiver may be provided indicating
that the shipbuilder does not need to correct the defect. The ship's
program office is primarily responsible for successful delivery of the
ship, including responsibility for cost, schedule and performance
requirements. Program office officials also review certain defects
identified by the SUPSHIP quality assurance teams and make the
determination as to whether or not they will be corrected by the
shipbuilder, provided the defect is technically acceptable.
As shown in figure 13 below, there are major departments within
SUPSHIP, such as contracting, engineering, and program management that
have delegated responsibilities from the respective NAVSEA level
directorates or the PEOs and are able to elevate technical risks or
concerns about the structure of the shipbuilding contract to those
that have decision-making authority. SUPSHIP quality officials receive
policy guidance from the NAVSEA Logistics, Maintenance and Industrial
Operations Directorate (NAVSEA 04), but there is not a quality
assurance team at the NAVSEA level to which they can raise quality
related issues.
Figure 13: Simplified Organizational Chart of SUPSHIP Indicating Those
Departments Having Delegated Responsibilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: Organizational Chart]
Supervisor of shipbuilding conversion and repair (SUPSHIP)
organizational chart:
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); (has dual reporting
structures or delegated responsibilities with Assistant Secretary of
the Navy Research, Development and Acquisition);
* Fleet Forces Command;
* INSURV.
Next level, reporting to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA):
* Contracts (NAVSEA 02);
* Logistics, maintenance & industrial operations (NAVSEA 04):
- SUPSHIP management group (NAVSEA 042);
* Engineering (NAVSEA 05).
Next level, reporting to Logistics, maintenance & industrial
operations (NAVSEA 04):
Shipbuilding contract management and construction oversight:
Supervisor of shipbuilding conversion and repair (SUPSHIP) commands:
* SUPSHIP program management;
* SUPSHIP contracting;
* SUPSHIP administrative;
* SUPSHIP engineering;
* SUPSHIP quality assurance.
Contracts (NAVSEA 02): has dual reporting structures or delegated
responsibilities with SUPSHIP contracting.
Program Management has dual reporting structures or delegated
responsibilities with SUPSHIP program management:
- Program Executive Officer (PEO) carriers;
- PEO Littoral Combat Ships;
- PEO ships;
- PEO submarines.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of figure]
Officials within NAVSEA 04 told us the Navy is formulating plans to
reorganize the structure of the directorate, and plans include
establishing a centralized quality team. Although the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of the quality team are not yet
defined, the officials expect that the team would provide support to
SUPSHIP quality assurance departments in helping to ensure that
matters related to quality are given sufficient attention at the
NAVSEA level. Increasing the emphasis on quality may help contribute
to the goal of delivering ships that are defect-free, or nearly defect-
free, as called for in Navy policy and demonstrated in commercial
shipbuilding.
Commercial Ship Buyers Align Quality Inspections with Shipbuilder
Plans While Navy Has Multiple Inspection Plans, Fewer In-Process
Inspections:
Prior to construction, the commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders we
met with negotiate to one common understanding of quality inspections
through an agreed-upon quality inspection plan.[Footnote 23] The plan
identifies (1) all formal inspection points during the construction
process; (2) who attends and approves the inspections; and (3)
criteria on how the inspections will be carried out. One ship buyer
noted that establishing the quality inspection plan in conjunction
with the shipbuilder and ensuring that all parties agree to, and are
aware of, the key drivers that affect quality is of the utmost
importance in ensuring the ship is built and delivered at the expected
level of quality. According to company officials, the shipbuilder is
contractually required to notify the buyer of any formal inspection
points to provide the buyer an opportunity to inspect a product or
process at a designated point of production.
Buyer representatives, including on-site teams and headquarter-level
officials, review the builder's quality inspection plan and may ask
for additional inspections and hold points based on ship design,
criticality of the system, and previous experiences of the buyer. For
example, one ship buyer reported experiencing significant failure
rates during pressure testing of piping systems on a drill rig, and
decided to incorporate additional inspection points at the joints
where pipes are welded together on future drill ship projects. In
another instance, a ship buyer representative told us his company
solicits input on the quality inspection plan from company personnel
that operate similar types of vessels, which he noted provides
valuable information on the types of quality issues observed from an
operator's perspective. The quality inspection plan is a key tool in
ensuring quality as it enables consistency in inspections by focusing
the ship buyer and builder on the same inspection items using the same
criteria. Figure 14 further describes actions taken by one commercial
firm, Chevron's Project Resources Company, to improve quality.
Figure 14: Actions Taken by a Commercial Firm to Improve Quality:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
Chevron Corporation’s Big Foot tension leg platform undergoing
construction; Ingleside, Texas.
Chevron Project Resources Company:
When Chevron’s Project Resources Company (PRC), which manages
Chevron’s major capital projects such as deep-sea and offshore oil and
gas exploration and production projects, noticed an increase in
quality issues, it took on a stronger role in ensuring quality by
incorporating quality assurance personnel into their project team
structure—a structure that previously relied more on contractor
oversight and the builder’s quality systems. PRC’s quality inspectors
are tasked with auditing and conducting surveillance of the builder’s
and major suppliers’ quality systems and work processes. In addition,
the company established a centralized quality group to provide
functional support to project-level quality personnel and act as a
quality advocate, so that project issues affecting quality may be
elevated to a management level if necessary. From a contracting
perspective, the centralized quality group created standardized
contract language for quality that is used on projects managed by PRC.
The project-level quality managers play a role in the contracting
process in terms of tailoring the standardized quality clauses to meet
the specific needs of the project and working with the builder’s
quality department to ensure quality requirements are well understood.
PRC’s team lead for quality management said that, to be effective,
these quality improvement efforts required the full support of the
company’s leadership, a change in corporate culture, and an overall
acceptance that while there is a cost to quality, the benefits are
worth the costs.
Source: Chevron Project Resources Company Data.
[End of figure]
Inspectors for commercial ship buyers enforce quality requirements, in
part, by attending all formal inspections, according to almost all of
the commercial ship buyers in our review (seven of nine companies).
For example, one ship buyer we met with reported having up to 80
inspections in a day for the team of about 14 inspectors. These
inspectors use design drawings and review the ship specification to
ensure that the compartment or block is built in accordance with
requirements.
Along with the formal inspections, commercial ship buyers consistently
cited "roaming patrols" as central to their oversight process.
Inspectors regularly patrol the shipyard, where they observe the
shipyard's in-process work. All of the buyers emphasized the
importance of these patrols as providing assurance that shipbuilders
are adhering to their work processes even when a formal inspection is
not scheduled. These patrols facilitate the early recognition of
quality problems, which are typically less expensive and time
consuming to correct than later in the construction process. Some
officials told us that these impromptu patrols can be particularly
effective in yards with more quality issues. The percentage of
inspectors' time allocated to these roaming patrols can vary depending
on the stage of construction--but can exceed 50 percent over the
course of a ship's construction--with a greater proportion of time
allocated during the earlier stages of construction when there are not
as many formal inspections.
In contrast to commercial shipbuilding, where buyer and builder
inspection activities are aligned through one common inspection plan,
Navy shipbuilding involves layers of oversight and quality inspections
that are resource intensive and not necessarily aligned with
shipbuilders' inspections. In Navy shipbuilding, NAVSEA officials told
us formal inspection points that relate to quality are identified in
multiple ways including Navy technical documents, inspection proposals
from the shipbuilder, or the ship's technical specifications. NAVSEA's
engineering directorate reviews and approves the shipbuilder's quality-
related test and inspection documents. Other formal test and
inspection points, such as those for equipment and system
installations, are contained in separate test plans that the
shipbuilder develops and SUPSHIP engineering reviews. In addition to
attending formal inspections, SUPSHIP's quality assurance department
independently develops its own surveillance plans, and these
surveillance plans are revised several times a year.[Footnote 24]
Unlike inspectors for commercial ship buyers, SUPSHIP inspectors do
not attend all formal inspections identified in the shipbuilding
contract. SUPSHIP quality managers determine which inspections their
inspectors attend--generally based on priority or potential problem
areas--but it is understood that inspectors will not attend all call-
outs, in part due to staffing levels at the SUPSHIP locations. NAVSEA
and SUPSHIP officials noted that the unpredictability of which
inspections will be attended by SUPSHIP helps ensure the shipbuilder
maintains focus on all aspects of production.
SUPSHIP officials described their oversight approach in very different
terms than commercial ship buyers. SUPSHIP surveillance plans set
forth goals that focus on collecting numbers of observations. SUPSHIP
quality assurance teams in the locations we visited stated that they
generally focus most of their inspection efforts, in terms of
observations conducted, on performing planned inspections identified
in shipbuilding contracts and SUPSHIP surveillance plans, and less
effort conducting random inspections of in-process work (similar to
the roaming patrols used by commercial buyers' inspectors). The main
inspection activity carried out by SUPSHIP quality inspectors, as
measured by the number of observations, are product verification
inspections. These are inspections of end products such as fabricated
blocks, installed equipment, and completed compartments to ensure that
the work conforms to the contract specifications. SUPSHIP's Gulf Coast
and Bath locations reported spending 64 percent and 60 percent,
respectively, of their inspection efforts on product verification
inspections, while Groton and Newport News spent less time--39 percent
and 35 percent, respectively.
As part of SUPSHIPs' surveillance plan for a shipyard, quality
inspectors also observe work being performed by production workers--
work that is in process--for compliance with the builders' procedures
and technical specifications. Similar to commercial ship buyers,
SUPSHIP officials stated it is important to identify, and remedy, any
potential quality issues early in the construction process. Most
SUPSHIP locations reported spending about 30 percent of their
inspection efforts on in-process evaluations. These evaluations are
planned in advance and may last a few hours to several days. SUPSHIP
officials have reported that they are putting more effort into in-
process inspection activities rather than just inspecting end products
For example, one SUPSHIP location has established a goal of having 70
percent of their inspectors' observations related to in-process work.
SUPSHIP officials also told us that their inspectors conduct some
general surveillance or random inspections, but it is unclear how much
of their effort is spent on these activities as they are not recorded
as such.
Also in contrast to commercial shipbuilding practice, not all SUPSHIP
locations use design drawings while conducting inspections. Instead,
inspectors use pre-developed checklists and ship technical
specifications to perform inspections. The use of design drawings
during inspections helps to ensure that work is being produced in
accordance with the approved design and that the builder's workers are
using the correct version of the design. For example, ABS officials
told us that during construction of the Littoral Combat Ship, ABS
found in a number of instances that the production drawings used to
build the ship were different from the approved design. In some cases
the production drawings identified different sizes of pipes and
flanges, or depicted piping arrangements that were not included in the
approved design, but such issues generally went unnoticed by the
SUPSHIP inspectors because they did not compare the design drawings to
the work performed. Quality officials at two SUPSHIP locations stated
that their inspectors have been trained and use the design drawings
during inspections, and officials from both locations view this as an
important tool for ensuring quality.[Footnote 25] Officials at one of
these SUPSHIP locations said they have long realized the benefits of
using design drawings during the course of their quality inspectors'
work and ensure the inspectors are trained to be able to read design
drawings. At the other location, officials stated they just recently
started having their quality inspectors use the design drawings when
conducting quality inspections, which they attribute as being a good
practice they observed from ABS.
Commercial Shipbuilders' Quality Management Systems Enforce
Accountability for Quality Down to the Worker Level:
Figure: photograph of No. 3 Dry dock at HHI, Ulsan Shipyard, South
Korea.
Source: Hyundai Industries (HHI).
[End of figure]
Commercial shipbuilders create an environment of accountability for
quality by implementing systems to track quality problems down to the
supervisor and individual worker level. Systems used by shipbuilders
included complex enterprise resource management systems that track
workers assigned to specific work packages or assignments, as well as
simple systems such as requiring production workers to sign their work
(on the compartment itself or related paperwork) with a unique
identifier. For example, one shipbuilder we visited conducts non-
destructive tests on welds as dictated in the quality inspection plan
developed with the ship buyer. Each test record includes information
on the welder who performed the work and the outcome of the testing.
This allows the shipbuilder to identify welders producing defective
work. Furthermore, the shipbuilder uses the test data to rate welder
performance across the yard as part of its regular performance
appraisal system. This same system allows the shipbuilder to track
performance of supervisors and individual workers in terms of
producing quality products and minimizing rework.
Most Navy shipbuilding contractors we met with (five of eight
shipyards) reported that they have historically had difficulties
identifying when and where in the production process specific quality
problems occurred, as work was not always tracked at the supervisor or
individual worker level. This has been a major challenge that they
have been trying to address in recent years. The shipbuilders agree
that quality problems are generally the result of a breakdown with the
execution of their quality management plans rather than problems with
the plans themselves.[Footnote 26] Most of the Navy contractor
shipyards we visited reported having made progress on this front, and
shipbuilder quality representatives told us they have been able to
improve the detection of quality problems earlier in the production
process and hold front-line supervisors accountable for the quality of
the work they oversee. For example, quality officials at one
shipbuilder told us that their quality personnel are now focusing more
on conducting in-process inspections to identify process-related
problems occurring within a specific trade or work crew, as opposed to
inspecting completed work products and then trying to locate the
specific source of the problem within the broader production process.
In another example, a shipbuilder has created quality advocates within
the various tradecrafts that augment the builder's quality assurance
department by assisting with day-to-day quality activities, such as
conducting inspections and providing training, as well as representing
production workers in yard-wide quality improvement efforts. Further,
there are signs that builders are starting to hold their workforce
accountable for quality issues. For example, a quality official at one
shipyard we visited told us that his inspectors now routinely collect
quality and defect data at the production supervisor level and develop
a report of where each supervisor ranks as compared to the peer group.
These reports are posted throughout the production facilities and are
visible to all employees. In some rare instances, the quality official
reported that his company instituted disciplinary actions for
supervisors that repeatedly allowed poor quality work products to
proceed to the next stage of production.
In addition, Navy shipbuilding contractors reported that quality at
some of the shipyards has been affected by high attrition rates,
making it difficult to maintain a qualified workforce. One shipbuilder
representative told us that his company is recruiting new technical
graduates from other parts of the country to fulfill their production
staff needs. Another shipbuilder representative told us that his
company has had quality problems related to inexperienced labor. The
need to put new staff in place to meet work demands puts pressure on
the builders to expedite hiring and training. According to one
shipbuilder, without a rigorous hiring and training program, under-
qualified workers could be performing the work, leading to higher
incidences of quality issues. Although the four international
commercial shipbuilders we visited did not report having similar labor
problems, we were told high turnover of the labor force is a problem
at other commercial yards.
Classification Societies Play a Role in Commercial and Navy
Shipbuilding:
In commercial shipbuilding, classification societies are an integral
part of design and construction processes. All of the commercial ship
buyers we met with pointed out that the role of the classification
society is to ensure their ships are built in accordance with the
designated classification society's rules and requirements and that it
is the buyers' responsibility to ensure that shipbuilders are building
ships in accordance with the buyer's requirements. Further, commercial
ship buyers realize that adhering to the rules and regulations of a
classification society will ensure that a new construction ship only
meets the quality and safety requirements stipulated in the applicable
rules.
During the contracting phase, the designated classification society's
applicable rules and regulations, as well as statutory requirements
(such as those pertaining to safety of life issues or marine
environmental protection), are generally incorporated into the
shipbuilding contract. The classification society also plays a role
during the design of commercial ships, as its engineers review and
approve key structural design drawings to ensure the design complies
with classification society rules. These engineers also review and
approve key design drawings to verify compliance with any applicable
statutory requirements, if so authorized by the country where the
vessel will be registered. The buyers we met with had high confidence
in the classification society's engineering review of the ship design
and viewed this expertise as a core competency. In some instances,
commercial ship buyers noted that they contract with the
classification societies for engineering services when developing and
testing new technologies. For example, officials from Royal Caribbean
told us they sought technical assistance from the classification
society Det Norske Veritas during the development and implementation
of a pilot program that tested advanced engine exhaust cleaning
technologies in two of its ships.[Footnote 27] Figure 15 below
provides additional detail on how one commercial shipbuilding project
sought technical assistance from classification societies to reduce
potential risks to quality.
Figure 15: Example of Classification Society Technical Assistance:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
Q-Max Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier.
ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum Q-Max Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers:
Project: Fabrication of Q-Max LNG carrier vessels that are designed to
transport up to 80 percent more cargo than traditional LNG ships with
a reduction of transportation costs of 20 to 30 percent.
Undertaking a very large ship acquisition project, Exxon Mobil and its
partner, Qatar Petroleum, developed two new categories of LNG
carriers. They then contracted with 3 leading shipbuilders for
detailed design and construction of a number of each type of carrier
including a total of 14 Q-Max ships, which are currently the world’s
largest class of LNG carriers. During the detailed design phase of the
project, each of the shipbuilders worked with the classification
societies (including ABS, Det Norske Veritas and Lloyd’s Register) to
conduct computer modeling and simulation analysis to ensure the
structural integrity of the ships was sufficient to accommodate an
anticipated 40 year service life. Also during this time, project
designers and engineers from Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum, along
with technical experts from the classification societies, conducted
their own analysis to model and test the effects LNG motion had on the
structural integrity of the storage tanks under normal operating and
extreme sea conditions. Modeling and testing identified tank areas
that needed strengthening. These changes were incorporated into the
ships’ design prior to the start of construction of the lead ship
without affecting the delivery schedule. Officials from Exxon Mobil
stressed that this effort not only mitigated potential risks to
quality, but also kept design changes to a minimum throughout the
shipbuilding program.
Source: GAO analysis of ExxonMobil data.
[End of figure]
Classification society surveyors also have a role in monitoring ship
construction; however, none of the leading buyers we met with use
their designated class society as a substitute for their own
construction oversight and quality assurance processes. Specifically,
while classification society surveyors assess whether the ship is
constructed in accordance with prescribed rules and regulations, these
rules may not take into account the ship buyer's own technical
specification requirements. For example, the rules do not address the
quality of every structure or piece of equipment installed on the
ship, such as the ship buyer's mission-related equipment, but rather
only what is determined to be critical to safe operation of the ship.
In addition, class societies conduct technical assessments of key
parts and equipment. For a wide range of materials, parts, and
equipment used in the construction of a ship, such as main engines,
generators, and pumps, it is generally a class society requirement
that the surveyors attend inspections and witness testing conducted at
the manufacturing facility prior to the equipment being shipped to the
builder's shipyard to certify that the items comply with the
applicable rule requirements.
ABS No Longer Provides Classification Services on Navy Surface
Combatants but Continues to Play a Role in Navy Shipbuilding:
After almost 10 years of ABS participation in the development and
implementation of the Naval Vessel Rules for the DDG 1000 and LCS
shipbuilding programs, the Navy, in late 2011, made a decision that as
a cost savings measure it would no longer seek to obtain ABS class
certification for surface combatants. ABS's services were initially
expected to end in June 2012, but the Navy extended ABS's involvement
on construction of LCS 4 for continued marine surveying and inspection
services through October 2013. The original intent of class
certification was to transfer what the Navy viewed as higher-volume,
lower-risk hull, mechanical, and electrical design and construction
oversight work to ABS, which would allow Navy engineers to focus on
higher-risk areas including mission systems and military-unique
aspects of a ship such as combat systems integration. However,
according to Navy engineering officials, this process was more
expensive than originally envisioned.
Of the three surface combatants--LCS 1 through LCS 3--that were
designed, constructed, and delivered to the Navy under the auspices of
the Naval Vessel Rules, none of the ships have received ABS class
certification.[Footnote 28] Prior to the Navy's determination to no
longer contract for ABS's services, unresolved issues precluded
issuance of class certificates.[Footnote 29] According to ABS
officials, the classification process involved a level of discipline
that the Navy found difficult to integrate into the design and
construction of surface combatants, and in some instances the Navy
chose to accept design drawings or approve completed production work
prior to ABS completing its own review and approval process. For
example, the Naval Vessel Rules require that during the design
engineering phase of the shipbuilding project computer analyses
determining the structural integrity of the ship are to be reviewed
and approved by ABS. However, the Navy allowed the shipbuilder to
commence construction and deliver the lead ship (LCS 1) and begin
construction on the second ship (LCS 3) before the ship designers were
able to submit a structural analysis that met the ABS requirements.
The analysis identified several areas on the ship's superstructure
that were under high stress and could be prone to failure. Program
officials indicated they operated the ship with knowledge of the high-
stress areas as a means to field test the strength of the ship. During
the initial operating period of LCS 1, cracks emerged in a number of
the predicted locations, requiring repair and additional strengthening
of LCS 1 and structural modifications during construction of LCS 3.
NAVSEA engineering and SUPSHIP officials indicated that the Navy's
decision to cease its arrangement with ABS was also attributed to the
view that the class society's role largely duplicated the work being
performed by SUPSHIP and Navy engineers. These officials were
confident that SUPSHIP was appropriately positioned in terms of the
needed skills and resources, as their inspectors were already tasked
with overseeing the builders' work to ensure compliance with the
specifications. In addition, the officials informed us that NAVSEA's
engineering directorate is in the process of revising the Naval Vessel
Rules to take into consideration the departure of ABS from the surface
combatant shipbuilding programs. SUPSHIP officials told us that a key
difference between SUPSHIP's and ABS's inspection processes is the
level of discretion the inspectors and surveyors have in determining
whether or not work is in accordance with the prescribed rules.
Specifically, it is common in commercial shipbuilding for the
classification rule set to stipulate that certain work be performed to
the satisfaction of the attending surveyor, which gives the
classification society surveyors the flexibility to use their
professional judgment as to whether or not completed work meets the
intent of the rules and is fit for its purpose.[Footnote 30] According
to SUPSHIP officials, the Navy's revised rules will remove such
language so that work performed either meets, or does not meet, the
applicable technical specifications.
The Navy plans to continue work with ABS in several areas:
* NAVSEA engineering officials informed us that they will continue to
contract with ABS on an as-needed basis for design and technical
assistance services on new construction surface combatants as a way to
augment the Navy's skill sets in specialized areas such as structural
drawing reviews.
* ABS will continue to provide classification services and issue class
certifications to new construction Navy ships operated by the Military
Sealift Command.
* Beginning in 2008, Naval Sea Systems Command's Surface Warfare
directorate contracted with ABS to perform baseline structural
assessments of the condition of the surface combatant fleet when ships
are dry-docked for scheduled maintenance after several years of
operations.[Footnote 31] Under this arrangement, scheduled to continue
through fiscal year 2016, ABS is conducting marine inspections on 148
surface ships. Using the information obtained during these
inspections, ABS is developing models which identify areas of ships
where there is an increased risk of failure or corrosion, which allows
the Navy the ability to selectively target its maintenance activities.
More recently, in January 2013, the Navy issued a request for
information and is seeking input from industry to look into the
feasibility of applying commercial shipbuilding design and
construction practices on its future amphibious ships. Specifically,
the Navy is seeking input from industry regarding the feasibility of
building an amphibious ship to ABS's commercial standards while still
retaining warship capabilities. One approach identified in the request
notification is to use commercial shipbuilding practices for as much
of the ship as possible and apply military standards only where
necessary.
Conclusions:
The Navy pays hundreds of millions and in many cases billions of
dollars for ships that warfighters rely on to perform as expected
under stressing conditions. Yet it routinely accepts ships with
numerous uncorrected deficiencies. Addressing these deficiencies after
delivery can be costly, time consuming, and disruptive.
In recent years, Navy leadership has increased its focus on reducing
what it considers to be the most serious deficiencies ("starred"
deficiencies") at the time of ship delivery with some notable
successes. However, the continued practice of accepting ships with a
substantial number of deficiencies differs from the commercial
practices we observed and can be attributed to differing
interpretations of what Navy policy requires. Navy policy officials
focus on provisions addressing delivery of the ship to the Navy, while
program officials focus on the provisions addressing the much later
point at which full financial responsibility for the ship is
transferred to the operating fleet. This suggests that clarification
and consistency in practice is needed. While it is understandable that
there may be instances where the Navy would accept delivery of a ship
with some level of uncorrected deficiencies, such actions should be
the exception rather than the practice. Further, waiting until after
delivery to correct known deficiencies can interfere with the
activities that should be taking place during this time--ship
outfitting, crew training, additional testing, and planned
maintenance, as well as other class-wide upgrades. This approach is a
sharp contrast to that of commercial ship buyers, who consider quality
to be the focus and expect a ship that is defect-free (or nearly so)
at delivery.
Navy shipbuilding entails building some of the world's most
technologically advanced ships in a limited competitive environment
with an industrial base that is generally reliant on the Navy to
remain in business--a landscape that is much different than commercial
shipbuilding. As such, any quality improvement effort must focus not
only on the realities of operating in such an environment, but also on
ways to incentivize the shipbuilder to produce a quality product. The
Navy's Back to Basics quality improvement effort was directed at
SUPSHIP and resulted--albeit in conjunction with other factors--in
several positive actions that had an influence on improving quality.
While the recent deliveries of the first Joint High Speed Vessel and
Mobile Landing Platform represent marked improvements over previous
lead ships, continued emphasis on quality and maintaining the momentum
created by the Back to Basics initiative is warranted, given that
other recently delivered ships had numerous deficiencies.
While the Navy and leading commercial buyers agree that quality is the
responsibility of the shipbuilder, a key difference is that the Navy
makes use of cost-reimbursement and fixed-price-incentive type
contracts, which assign less cost risk to the shipbuilder for quality
problems. Leading commercial ship buyers have made a business decision
that the risks to quality belong with the shipbuilder, and that the
premium paid to transfer this risk is worth the cost of a firm-fixed-
price contract. They also make greater use of how payments are
structured in the shipbuilding contract to incentivize the builders to
ensure timely correction of deficiencies. Even under fixed-price-
incentive type contracts, when appropriate, the Navy could choose to
structure certain payment provisions to incentivize shipbuilder
performance and to enhance contract requirements for managing quality.
For example, a standardized quality performance standard, proposed by
SUPSHIP, has not been incorporated in any shipbuilding contract.
Commercial shipbuilders also attach considerable importance to having
a robust oversight process. A few SUPSHIP locations have begun to make
use of some oversight practices emphasized by commercial ship buyers,
such as using design drawings, and these practices may be applicable
to other locations as well. Further, although SUPSHIP quality
inspectors conduct some level of random inspections, the Navy has not
defined the role these inspections should play; and we found
significant variation in their use among SUPSHIP locations.
Commercial ship buyers also place responsibility for delivering a
quality ship on the site team. Responsibility for quality is more
diffused in the Navy. Program offices, NAVSEA, SUPSHIP, INSURV, and
others all have roles, and concerns about schedule, costs, or other
strategic needs may supersede the focus on quality. While SUPSHIP's
quality assurance department is closest to the work being performed,
the organization has limited authority to make or exert influence on
the shipbuilder and on decisions made early in the contracting process
that could have a direct impact on quality. The Navy is formulating
plans to establish a quality team within the NAVSEA Logistics,
Maintenance and Industrial Operations Directorate that would promote,
in some capacity, attention to quality assurance, but the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of the team are not yet defined. If
the team is given sufficient authorities and tasked with elevating
SUPSHIP quality assurance concerns throughout the acquisition process,
this could present an opportunity to address some of the issues we
identified in our report and emphasize the importance of quality when
trade-off decisions affecting cost, schedule, and quality are at hand.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the construction quality of ships delivered to the Navy, we
recommend that the Secretary of the Defense direct the Secretary of
the Navy to take the following five actions:
1. Ensure that, when established, the NAVSEA-level quality team
provides support and a direct link to directors of SUPSHIP quality
assurance departments and is tasked with raising concerns within
NAVSEA about issues affecting or potentially affecting quality
throughout the acquisition process.
2. Clarify Navy policy (Navy Instruction 4700.8J) by clearly
identifying at what point(s) during the acquisition process contractor-
responsible deficiencies are to be fully corrected and ensure the
policy is followed.
3. Provide additional guidance on the quality requirements in
shipbuilding contracts, including the extent to which the SUPSHIP
Management Group's Quality Performance Standard for Construction of
Naval Vessels should be incorporated.
4. Provide additional guidance on use of payment withholds and
retentions as a means to incentivize the shipbuilding contractor to
promptly correct significant or persistent deficiencies and to deliver
a defect-free, or nearly defect free ship, to the Navy.
5. Assess the benefits and determine whether the following practices,
in effect at some SUPSHIP locations, would be useful in detecting
quality problems across all locations:
* use of design drawings during SUPSHIP quality inspections, and:
* increased focus on random and in-process inspections compared to use
of resources for other types of inspections and observations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its
response, DOD concurred with two of our recommendations and partially
concurred with three. DOD's written comments are reproduced in
appendix X.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation, and said that it is
formulating plans to develop a quality team within the Logistics,
Maintenance and Industrial Operations Directorate (NAVSEA 04). This
team is envisioned to provide a direct link to SUPSHIP quality
assurance departments at the shipyards to enhance communication within
NAVSEA on quality related issues. The quality team would also serve as
a resource for identifying appropriate quality requirements in
shipbuilding contracts.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation, to clarify
Navy policy regarding acceptance of ships with quality defects. DOD
said that it will continue to strive to reduce the number of open
deficiencies to zero at the time the ship is delivered to the Navy.
The Navy will monitor whether the trend of fewer deficiencies
continues to determine if future revisions to the Navy policy
instruction are needed. However, we believe the policy needs to be
clarified, given the lack of consensus about whether contractor-
responsible deficiencies are to be corrected before ships are
delivered to the Navy. As we note in the report, addressing
deficiencies post-delivery undermines the goal of constructing a
defect-free or nearly defect-free ship and can also interfere with
testing and crew training. Further, although trends have improved over
time, recently delivered ships still had a significant number of
deficiencies.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, to provide
guidance on quality requirements in contracts. The response cited
existing FAR requirements and NAVSEA's Contract Administration Quality
Assurance Program. It also stated the planned quality team within
NAVSEA 04 will be a resource for consultation on appropriate contract
quality assurance provisions and that this, along with the progress in
reducing deficiencies, is sufficient. We believe that greater
attention to contractual quality provisions is needed. SUPSHIP quality
assurance staff stated that a primary reason for the development of
the Quality Performance Standard for Construction of Naval Vessels was
to limit inconsistencies found in shipbuilding contract quality
requirements that affected SUPSHIP's ability to conduct effective
quality oversight. As discussed in the report, we observed
considerable variance in the specificity of contract quality
provisions for different ship classes, and SUPSHIP's suggested quality
performance standard has not been fully incorporated in any
shipbuilding contract. Therefore we continue to believe that
additional guidance on quality, including the extent to which the
quality performance standard should be incorporated, would be
beneficial for the Navy.
DOD concurred with our fourth recommendation, noting that, as part of
its ongoing Better Buying Power initiative, it plans to better align
contractor profitability with DOD goals through the use of contract
incentives; actions that will assist in improving quality in
shipbuilding. DOD explained that as part of this effort, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense will revise and reissue guidance on the use
of incentives in defense acquisition strategies. Its response noted
that new tools, along with existing tools, provide sufficient
opportunity for program managers and contracting officers to ensure
the construction of quality ships for the Navy.
DOD also partially concurred with our fifth recommendation, to
determine whether using design drawings in SUPSHIP quality inspections
and increasing the focus on random and in-process inspections would be
beneficial. DOD stated that use of design drawings is essential and is
being used, but not necessarily by the same personnel that use
checklists and other tools for inspections. It also said that random
and in-process inspections are all necessary, but that the correct
balance should be left to individual ship programs. We found that
SUPSHIP quality assurance teams that have trained their staff to use
design drawings--a commercial best practice--report benefits from this
approach. Also, our work on commercial buyers' quality assurance
practices consistently identified random, in-process oversight as a
key tool in assuring that shipyards are following their own
construction quality processes. DOD's response did not identify any
additional actions the Navy plans to take to address our
recommendation. We continue to believe that a SUPSHIP-wide assessment
of the potential benefits of these practices could yield quality
improvements.
DOD also provided technical comments that were incorporated as
appropriate. These comments included questions about the deficiency
data we reported for the T-AKE ship class. We reviewed individual
deficiency reports (trial cards) and compared results with program
office and shipbuilder reported data. We resolved anomalies and
updated the data on T-AKE presented in this report.
We also provided the Navy shipbuilding contractors, commercial ship
buyers, international shipbuilders, and classification societies we
met with relevant excerpts of the report and incorporated their
technical comments as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of the Navy, interested congressional committees, and other
interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on
GAO's website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or by e-mail at mackinm@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix XI.
Signed by:
Michele Mackin, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable James M. Inhofe:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Richard J. Durbin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Pete Visclosky:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To identify the extent to which newly constructed Navy ships had
quality problems and the actions that Navy has taken to improve
quality, we reviewed the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey reports
for all Navy ships delivered from 2006 through May 2013: including
Arleigh Burke class (DDG 51) destroyers, USS George H. W. Bush (CVN
77) aircraft carrier, USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM 25) missile range
instrumentation ship, Lewis and Clark-class (T-AKE) dry cargo and
ammunition ships, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--both the Independence
and Freedom variants, USS Makin Island (LHD 8) Wasp-class amphibious
assault ship, USNS Montford Point Mobile Landing Platform, San Antonio-
class (LPD 17) amphibious transport dock ships, USNS Spearhead Joint
High Speed Vessel, and Virginia-class submarines (SSN 774). Even
though the lead LPD and SSN ships were built outside of the last 8
years, we included these two vessels in our sample because the rest of
the class was built within the last 8 years. We also drew from our
prior work on these programs, Navy documents created to address
quality issues, and various other Navy reports, such as those from the
Navy's Judge Advocate General.
To determine the number and type of deficiencies for each vessel, we
obtained data from the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey's
(INSURV) Material Inspection data warehouse and the Navy's Technical
Support Management (TSM) system. TSM is the primary database the
Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair uses to track
the status of new ship construction deficiencies. We analyzed these
data to determine the total number of open deficiencies (1) when the
ship was delivered to the Navy; (2) 120 days following ship delivery--
the approximate time when final outfitting is completed prior to the
ship leaving the shipyard; and (3) 1 year following ship delivery.
Total deficiencies include those identified during construction,
builder's trials, and acceptance trials that were not closed by the
milestones listed above. Because TSM deficiency data is compiled on
paper forms and manually entered into the system, we considered as
being closed at delivery those deficiencies that were closed through 7
days following the date the ship was delivered to the Navy (with the
exception of the T-AKE ship class), as stated on the Navy's Naval
Vessel Register. To the extent feasible, we reviewed these data for
completeness and for obvious inconsistency errors and compared them
with paper documents that also catalogue these deficiencies. When we
found obvious discrepancies while conducting our analyses, we brought
them to the attention of the Navy Sea Systems Command and INSURV and
worked with them to understand, correct, or omit the discrepancies.
The data we collected represents the deficiencies at a particular
moment in time. Further, deficiencies may be subdivided into multiple
deficiencies or consolidated into a smaller number when the Navy and
its shipbuilding contractors determine whether the government or the
shipbuilder is responsible for correcting the respective deficiencies.
For ships we reviewed, we determined that TSM deficiency data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report with a few
exceptions. These exceptions relate to data for T-AKE class ships. TSM
data did not cover T-AKE 1 through T-AKE 6. Data for T-AKE 12 had
numerous data errors and is therefore not reported on. For other T-AKE
ships, we reviewed deficiency documentation (trial cards) to resolve
discrepancies between TSM and T-AKE program office data.
We catalogued several hull, mechanical, and electrical issues with
each ship class delivered in the last 8 years, in addition to the
individual hulls that were also delivered during this period. To
create this list of illustrative examples, we asked Navy officials
familiar with each ship class to identify problems that occurred
during the construction of the vessels. We also asked officials from
INSURV to identify significant issues that affected multiple hulls
within each major class. We then identified several of the issues to
highlight that were illustrative of hull, mechanical, and electrical
problems. Given the uniqueness of the ships' capabilities, we elected
not to catalog quality issues with weapon systems or other warfighting
systems. To supplement this analysis, we held discussions with or
requested information from a number of Navy officials involved in Navy
shipbuilding. These included the Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Bath, Maine; Groton, Connecticut;
Gulf Coast, Pascagoula, Mississippi; Newport News, Virginia; Bath
Detachment, San Diego, California; Bath Detachment, Marinette,
Wisconsin; and Gulf Coast Detachment, Mobile, Alabama. We also
interviewed the Director of the Board of Inspection and Survey and
officials in the Naval Sea Systems Command Management Group for
SUPSHIP; Naval Sea Systems Command Contracting Directorate; Naval Sea
Systems Command Engineering Directorate; Naval Sea Systems Command
Surface Warfare Directorate; Naval Sea Systems Command Nuclear
Propulsion; Program Executive Offices for Carriers; Program Executive
Office for Submarines, and the Littoral Combat Ship; representatives
from acquisition program offices including PMS 317 (LPD 17), PMS 377
(LHD 8 and LHA 6), PMS 385 (Joint High Speed Vessel and Mobile Landing
Platform), PMS 400 D (DDG 51), and, PMS 501 (LCS); Norfolk Ship
Support Activity--Regional Maintenance Center; Southwest Regional
Maintenance Center; Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force;
Military Sealift Command; Fleet Forces Command; and the Defense
Contract Management Agency.
We also visited eight U.S. Navy contractor shipyards that build some
of the larger Navy vessels and met with representatives from the
contractor that owns each shipyard, including Austal USA in Mobile,
Alabama; General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation in Groton,
Connecticut and Quonset Point, Rhode Island; General Dynamics NASSCO
in San Diego, California, and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in
Bath, Maine; Huntington Ingalls Industries Ingalls Shipbuilding in
Pascagoula, Mississippi and Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News
Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia; Marinette Marine Corporation
in Marinette, Wisconsin; and, V.T. Halter Marine at its shipyard in
Pascagoula, Mississippi. In addition, we observed the underway portion
of the acceptance trial for T-AKE 13 in San Diego, California.
Lastly, we reviewed the Navy's efforts to improve ship quality by
reviewing key memos and documents outlining the Back to Basics program
and meeting with the officials responsible for implementing these
efforts--most of whom were in the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair commands. We also reviewed selected parts of 11
fixed-priced-incentive and firm-fixed priced Navy shipbuilding
contracts, such as clauses pertaining to quality requirements and ship
delivery, for San Antonio class (LPD 17) amphibious transport dock
ships (one contract); America class (LHA 6 and LHA 7) amphibious
assault ship (two contracts); Arleigh Burke class (DDG 51) destroyer
(one contract); Joint High Speed Vessel (one contract); Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS)--Freedom and Independence variants (two contracts);
Lewis and Clark class (T-AKE) dry cargo and ammunition ship (one
contract); USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM 25) missile instrumentation
ship (one contract) ; USS Makin Island (LHD 8) amphibious assault ship
(one contract); and the Mobile Landing Platform (one contract).
To assess key practices used by commercial ship buyers and
shipbuilders, we interviewed and met with leading commercial companies
from the cruise, oil and gas, and commercial shipping industries,
including Carnival Corporation; Chevron Corporation; Ensco plc;
ExxonMobil; A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S; Noble Corporation; Norwegian
Cruise Lines; Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.; and Seadrill, Ltd. We
identified leading companies by analyzing such indicators as annual
sales, number of vessels owned and procured, and total market share.
Our methodology drew from our previous shipbuilding best practices
work that identified the commercial shipbuilding industries that
support cruise, oil and gas, and commercial shipping sectors as being
most similar to Navy shipbuilding. Cruise ships are more costly and
complex than other types of commercial ships, densely packed, and
require significant outfitting, making them somewhat similar to
military ships. Additionally, cruise ship buyers often include
innovations or design changes in their ships and start new classes of
ships regularly in order to maximize passenger satisfaction;
approaches that allowed us to examine quality oversight practices on
recent lead ship programs and the outcomes of specific commercial
practices. The cruise line companies we met with are leaders in their
industry as identified in our previous work and based on operating
revenue or fleet size. We met with ship buyers from the oil and gas
industry because drill ships, floating production storage and
offloading (FPSO) vessels and offshore oil platforms are complex,
dense structures. Furthermore, FPSOs, essentially floating refineries,
are often one of a kind, costing well over $1 billion. The oil and gas
companies we met with are leaders in their industry as identified in
our previous work as well as our assessment of top operators of
drilling vessels. Similarly, we met with Maersk Line Limited and
Maersk Drilling, two business units within A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S,
because the company was identified as an industry leader in our prior
work and remains one of the largest shipping companies in the world.
For example, Maersk Line Limited acquires many ships: in 2012 the
company took delivery of 19 new ships. For each commercial ship buyer,
we requested deficiency data on one or more new construction ships
they had acquired. With the exception of one FPSO, all of these ships
were delivered to the buyer in 2012 or 2013. We assessed the
reliability of this data by obtaining information on the systems that
stored the data and interviewing ship buyer and shipbuilder
representatives knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We
also identified common processes and tools used by these ship buyers
and shipbuilders to ensure the expected level of quality.
To determine the extent to which Navy quality assurance processes use
common commercial practices, we reviewed data and information obtained
from the Navy and its shipbuilding contractors, as well as from the
leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders. We also reviewed
relevant payment and retention clauses for 11 fixed-priced Navy
shipbuilding contracts. During our meetings with SUPSHIP and program,
engineering, and contracting officials from the Naval Sea Systems
Command directorates, we inquired about the Navy's quality assurance
practices. During site visits to eight U.S. private shipyards that
build Navy ships, we discussed with shipyard representatives their
quality assurance processes and the steps taken to ensure their ships
meet the Navy's quality expectations. During our site visits, we
collected documentation related to the shipyard's quality assurance
activities, including quality policies, plans, and procedures, and we
also observed quality assurance inspection activities when possible.
We also met with officials from international commercial shipyards
that are responsible for building a variety of complex ships,
including Meyer Werft (Germany) and STX Finland (Finland), which both
build cruise ships; and Hyundai Heavy Industries and Daewoo
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (South Korea), which build
commercial ships, including containerships, liquefied natural gas
carriers, drill ships, FPSOs, and oil tankers. We identified these
shipbuilders as producers of high-quality vessels through a
combination of our previous work and recommendations from shipbuilding
experts and the ship buyers that participated in our review. At the
shipyards, we met with ship buyers' representatives who were
responsible for overseeing the construction of the ships and
monitoring the construction schedule. Where possible, we observed
quality assurance activities at commercial shipbuilders or viewed
systems related to ensuring quality, such as quality database systems.
We collected documentation of quality assurance activities, such as
quality policies and inspection plans, where available. We met with
representatives from three classification societies, including the
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Det Norske Veritas, and Lloyd's
Register regarding their roles in commercial ship construction. We
also met with representatives from Aker Shipyard in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, to discuss how a U.S. shipbuilder that solely builds
commercial vessels approaches quality assurance.
To better understand the role of classification societies in Navy and
commercial shipbuilding, we met with engineering and marine surveying
representatives from ABS to obtain an overview of how they conduct
their work. We held discussions on the role of classification in Navy
shipbuilding with Navy shipbuilding contractors, including Austal USA,
Mobile, Alabama; General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine;
General Dynamics NASSCO, San Diego, California; Marinette Marine
Corporation, Marinette, Wisconsin; and V.T. Halter Marine, Pascagoula,
Mississippi. To learn the extent to which the Navy's approach to new
ship construction oversight is similar to or different than the marine
surveying services provided by ABS during construction of Navy ships,
we met with officials from SUPSHIP locations at Bath, Maine; Bath
Detachment, San Diego, California; Bath Detachment, Marinette,
Wisconsin; Gulf Coast, Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Mobile, Alabama.
We also held discussions on this matter with officials from the Naval
Sea Systems Command SUPSHIP Management Group; Military Sealift
Command; Naval Sea Systems Command Engineering Directorate; Naval Sea
Systems Command Surface Warfare Directorate; Program Executive Office
Littoral Combat Ship; and representatives from acquisition program
offices including PMS 385 (Joint High Speed Vessel and Mobile Landing
Platform). We reviewed the classification rule set developed by the
Navy and ABS (the Naval Vessel Rules), as well as other classification
rule sets pertaining to Navy and or commercial vessels, such as High-
Speed Naval Craft rules and the Steel Vessel rules. In addition, we
reviewed the findings and observations of ABS's marine surveyors for
the Littoral Combat Ship which is being built in accordance with the
Naval Vessel Rules, as well as the Joint High Speed Vessel, which is
built in accordance with ABS's Naval High Speed Naval Craft Guide. We
also spoke with representatives from other classification societies,
including Det Norske Veritas and Lloyd's Register, to discuss their
approach to classification of commercial and navy vessels. When
meeting with commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders, we also
discussed the ship classification process and the role of
classification societies in shipbuilding.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 to November 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Stages of Shipbuilding:
There are four primary phases in shipbuilding: pre-contracting,
contract award, design and planning, and construction, with each phase
building upon the work completed in earlier stages. Within each phase,
a number of key events have an influence on the overall quality of the
ship. In addition, within Navy shipbuilding, additional key activities
take place following ship delivery. Table 2 describes some of the more
significant events occurring throughout the shipbuilding process.
Table 2: Key Events Occurring During Navy and Commercial Shipbuilding:
Stage: Pre-contracting activities; Contract award;
Key event: Concept refinement;
Description: Ship buyer determines necessary requirements and desired
capabilities, develops an acquisition strategy.
Key event: Early-stage design;
Description: Ship buyer refines its operational and performance
requirements into specifications that will be included in the
shipbuilding contract.
Key event: Contract award and negotiation;
Description: Ship buyer selects and enters into a shipbuilding
contract with the chosen shipbuilder(s). The contract includes the
ship's specification, which details how the shipbuilder will build the
ship and meet the buyer's requirements.
Stage: Design and planning;
Key event: Detailed engineering design;
Description: Ship designer develops all aspects of the ship's structure
and routing of major distributive systems, such as electrical or
piping, throughout the ship. A three-dimension (3D) computer-aided-
design model is often generated, along with completion of any computer
modeling or simulation analyses, such as those to test the structural
integrity of the ship design throughout its service life or under
certain sea conditions.
Key event: Pre-construction and planning activities;
Description: Shipbuilder plans production flow and develops two-
dimensional paper drawings that, once approved by the ship buyer, will
be used by shipyard workers to build the ship. Ship buyer,
shipbuilder, and classification society (if applicable) collectively
determine quality-related test and inspection points during ship
construction.
Stage: Construction;
Key event: Steel cutting/block fabrication;
Description: Ship fabrication begins as large steel or aluminum plates
are cut and welded to form the basic building units for a ship called
"blocks." Blocks comprise compartments, which include accommodation
space, engine room, and storage areas.
Key event: Assembly and outfitting of blocks;
Description: Upon completion of a block, piping, brackets for
machinery or cabling, and ladders, among other things, are installed.
Installing these items at this stage is preferable because access to
spaces is not limited by doors or other machinery, requiring less time
and effort than at later stages of construction.
Key event: Keel laying and block erection;
Description: Blocks are welded to form larger sections, referred to as
grand blocks, which comprise the ship's structure. The shipbuilder
then assembles and welds grand blocks and blocks in the drydock to
form the keel. Machinery, engines, propeller shafts and other large
items are also installed during this stage.
Key event: Launch;
Description: Once the ship is watertight, the drydock is flooded and
the ship is towed to a docking area where final outfitting of
machinery and equipment occur.[A].
Key event: System testing and commissioning;
Description: Parts, materials, and machinery, such as engines, pumps,
and associated control instrumentation used in the ship, are generally
tested by the manufacturer (factory acceptance test) to ensure quality
standards, technical specifications, and performance requirements are
met. Installation and connection of these components create
subsystems. The shipbuilder and ship buyer ensure the subsystems and
systems are installed in accordance to the ship's specifications and
conduct tests to ensure systems are operating as intended and meet
performance requirements.
Key event: Sea trials;
Description: Once the shipbuilder is satisfied that the ship is
seaworthy and meets the buyer's requirements, the ship buyer's
representatives, and if applicable the classification society's
surveyors, are brought onboard and the ship embarks on a series of
dockside and at-sea tests where the overall quality and performance of
the ship is evaluated against the contractually required
specifications. Sea trials provide early verification of the buyer's
requirements and allow time for any corrective actions that may be
required to meet the buyer's requirements prior to ship delivery. Navy
shipbuilding programs generally conduct two sets of sea trials--
builder's trials and acceptance trials. Builder's trials test the
vessel's propulsion, communications, navigation and mission systems,
as well as all related support systems. Following the successful
completion of builder's trials, acceptance trials are conducted by the
Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV).
Key event: Delivery/Acceptance;
Description: Ship buyer takes custody and assumes ownership of the
vessel. In the commercial world, the ship is complete and commences
operations. In Navy shipbuilding, a Material Inspection and Receiving
Report (Form DD 250) is prepared, representing the official transfer of
custody and ownership to the Navy. Any unresolved deficiencies or
remaining work items are segregated by the entity that is responsible
for completion of the work (Navy or shipbuilder) and identified on this
document.
Stage: Post-delivery activities specific to the Navy;
Key event: Final outfitting;
Description: Crew boards the ship and begins training; and
mission systems are installed.[B].
Key event: Post-delivery tests and trials;
Description: Operational tests are conducted on the ships combat and
mission critical systems.
Key event: Final contract trials;
Description: INSURV conducts a second round of sea trials just prior
to the expiration of the ship's guarantee period[C].
Key event: Post Shakedown Availability;
Description: Planned maintenance period prior to the maiden voyage
where work is performed to install class-wide upgrades or ship
improvements, perform maintenance, and correct new or previously
identified construction deficiencies. Usually performed using a
different contract than shipbuilding contract.
Key event: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy Obligation and Work
Limiting Date;
Description: The official date where full responsibility for funding
the ship's operation and maintenance is transferred from the
acquisition command to the operational fleet.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy and industry provided data.
[A] The level of outfitting completed prior to launch varies by
shipbuilder and ship type, but is predetermined according to the
builder's production plan. Shipbuilders generally agree that launching
a ship having a lower level of outfitting completed than what was
planned can increase the costs to complete the work.
[B] On nuclear-powered Navy ships, the ship's crew begins boarding and
training prior to ship delivery.
[C] The guarantee period is the time after delivery where the
shipbuilder is responsible for correcting any defects or deficiencies
in accordance to the terms and conditions of the contract.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Lewis and Clark Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship Class (T-
AKE):
The Lewis and Clark class of dry cargo and ammunition ships (T-AKE 1)
consists of 14 ships which have been delivered to the Navy. The first
ship was delivered in 2006 and the final ship was delivered in 2012.
We analyzed data provided by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) to determine the number of open
deficiencies at delivery, 120 days after delivery, and one year after
delivery. Our analysis of the available data found that recently
delivered T-AKEs had noticeably fewer open deficiencies at delivery
compared to other ship classes. Unlike other classes in our review,
the Navy was responsible for the majority of these deficiencies.
Table 3: Open Deficiencies on T-AKE Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 7 (March 2009);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]: Total deficiencies[C]: 22;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 5;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 154;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 1;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 44;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 2;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 3;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 3;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]:
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 2;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery: 0.
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 8 (September 2009);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 20;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 40;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 18;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 18;
120 days after delivery: 6;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 2;
365 days after delivery: 50.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 33;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery: 0.
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 9 (February 2010);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 29;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 8;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 4;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 25;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 100.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 136;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 2;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 14;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 7;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 100.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 10 (July 2010);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 40;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 40;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 4;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 50.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 39;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 8;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 21;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 14;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 10;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 10.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 11 (February 2011);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 6;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 17;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 12;
[Empty];
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 20;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 2;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 50.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]:0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 13 (April 2012);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 3;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 2;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 32;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 4;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 24;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 4;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 4;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Ship (delivery date): T-AKE 14 (October 2012);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 3;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 21;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data as of March 2013.
Notes: (1) TSM relies on user-entered information, which can be
unreliable. T-AKE 12's TSM data did not pass our data reliability
standards because 98 percent of the deficiencies were opened and
closed in the system on the same day--a date after the ship had been
delivered to the Navy. (2) Deficiencies with missing Importance
designations are not included in this table.
[A] The table counts deficiencies from the Navy's Technical Support
Management (TSM) system which were closed after the official delivery
date listed in the Naval Vessel Register, [hyperlink,
http://www.nvr.navy.mil], including those deficiencies where it was
subsequently determined no further corrective action would be taken.
In some instances, similar types of deficiencies were consolidated
into a single deficiency prior to ship delivery. In other instances,
uncorrected deficiencies were closed and transferred to final contract
trials deficiencies (trial cards).
[B] Deficiencies are numbered by their significance and order of
importance as Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3. The Navy's Board of
Inspection and Survey (INSURV) defines a Part 1 deficiency is an
important deficiency which is likely to cause the ship to be
unseaworthy, substantially reduce the ability of the ship to carry out
an assigned mission, or cause serious injury to personnel or serious
damage to important material or equipment. According to INSURV, Part 2
deficiencies are less significant or do not meet the criteria for Part
1 deficiencies, but should be corrected to restore the ship to
required specifications. INSURV classifies Part 3 deficiencies as
those that will require either major alterations to correct (design
related) or modifications that are too costly to effect during the
life cycle of the ship.
[C] The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) documents all
deficiencies which require corrective action to bring the material
condition of the ship to required specifications. Deficiencies may
have been identified during INSURV or builder's trials.
[D] Percentage is rounded to the nearest whole percent. Navy program
managers and SUPSHIP may assign responsibility for correcting a
deficiency to the contractor if the contractor, sub-contractors, or
vendors do not meet the requirements of the shipbuilding contract.
Where data were available, we determined the percent of Part 1, Part
2, Part 3, and total deficiencies designated as contractor-responsible
versus government-responsible. In some cases, the responsible party
for correcting a deficiency may alternate between the Navy and the
contractor based on additional investigations into the issues.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: San Antonio Amphibious Transport Dock Ship Class (LPD 17):
The San Antonio class of amphibious transport docks (LPD 17) consists
of eight ships which have been delivered to the Navy. The first ship
was delivered in 2005. As of September 2013, the Navy has three ships
under construction. The San Antonio class has generally seen a decline
in the number of open deficiencies at delivery, yet each ship still
has a large number of open deficiencies.
We analyzed data provided by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) to determine the number of open
deficiencies at delivery, 120 days after delivery, and one year after
delivery. Our analysis found that recently delivered ships had
thousands of open deficiencies, ranging from 1,403 on LPD 23 to 6,325
on LPD 21. The majority of the deficiencies open at delivery were the
responsibility of the contractor with the exception of LPD 23 where
only 40 percent of the open deficiencies were the contractor's
responsibility. The data below indicates that many of these
deficiencies are being closed after the ships are delivered to the
Navy and are being outfitted.
Table 4: Open Deficiencies on LPD 17 Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Ship (delivery date): LPD 21 (August 2009);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 234;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 58;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 75;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 28;
[Empty];
365
days after delivery: Total deficiencies: 23;
365 days after delivery:
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 26.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 6,078;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 79;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1,385;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 49;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 465;
Percentage of contractor-
responsible deficiencies: 57.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 13;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 23;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Ship (delivery date): LPD 22 (December 2011);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 156;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 25;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 102;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 5;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 47;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 2.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 4,783;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 69;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1,074;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 49;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 453;
Percentage of contractor-
responsible deficiencies: 57.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 24;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 63;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies:100;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: LPD 23 (September
2012): 0.
Ship (delivery date): LPD 23 (September 2012);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 88;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 25;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 55;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 18;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,270;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 42;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 685;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 51;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 45;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 2;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 37;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Ship (delivery date): LPD 24 (December 2012);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 86;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 48;
120 days after delivery: Total deficiencies: 36;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 25;
365 days after delivery: Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,891;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 58;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 667;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 48;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 28;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 25;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 15;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 13;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data as of March 2013.
Notes: (1) Deficiencies with missing Importance designations are not
included in this table.
[A] For the purposes of this report, the table counts deficiencies from
the Navy's Technical Support Management (TSM) system which were closed
seven days or more after the official delivery date listed in the Naval
Vessel Register, [hyperlink, http://www.nvr.navy.mil]. Deficiencies
closed after delivery but before the seventh day are not included.
[B] Deficiencies are numbered by their significance and order of
importance as Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3. INSURV defines a Part 1
deficiency is an important deficiency which is likely to cause the ship
to be unseaworthy, substantially reduce the ability of the ship to
carry out an assigned mission, or cause serious injury to personnel or
serious damage to important material or equipment. According to INSURV,
Part 2 deficiencies are less significant or do not meet the criteria
for Part 1 deficiencies, but should be corrected to restore the ship to
required specifications. INSURV classifies Part 3 deficiencies as those
that will require either major alterations to correct (design-related)
or modifications that are too costly to effect during the life cycle of
the ship.
[C] The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) documents all
deficiencies which require corrective action to bring the material
condition of the ship to required specifications. Deficiencies may have
been identified during INSURV or builder's trials.
[D] Percentage is rounded to the nearest whole percent. Navy program
managers and SUPSHIP may assign responsibility for correcting a
deficiency to the contractor if the contractor, sub-contractors, or
vendors do not meet the requirements of the shipbuilding contract.
Where data were available, we determined the percent of Part 1, Part 2,
Part 3, and total deficiencies designated as contractor-responsible
versus government-responsible. In some cases, the responsible party for
correcting a deficiency may alternate between the Navy and the
contractor based on additional investigations into the issues.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class:
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class consists of 3 ships which had
been delivered to the Navy at the time of our review. The first hull
was delivered in 2008. Currently, the Navy has seven ships under
construction and has received funding to construct six ships. The Navy
has an additional eight ships under contract which are not yet funded.
The LCS class consists of two different seaframe designs, the LCS 1
design (Freedom variant) and the LCS 2 design (Independence variant).
We analyzed data provided by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) to determine the number of open
deficiencies at delivery, 120 days after delivery, and one year after
delivery. Our analysis found that both designs of the LCS class were
delivered with a large number of open deficiencies at delivery. The
majority of these deficiencies were the responsibility of the
contractor. Our analysis found that over half of these deficiencies
were closed after the ships were delivered to the Navy and were being
outfitted.
Table 5: Open Deficiencies on LCS Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Ship (Delivery date): LCS 1 (September 2008);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 151;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 72;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 86;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 62;
365 days after delivery: Total deficiencies: 30;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 37.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,994;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 81;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 988;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 76;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 175;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 46.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 109;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 82;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 56;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 77;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 11;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 36.
Ship (Delivery date): LCS 2 (December 2009);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 547;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 81;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 256;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 71;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 131;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 64.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 3,715;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 71;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 2,079;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 60;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 819;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 56.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 954;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 82;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 510;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 74;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 213;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 62.
Ship (Delivery date): LCS 3 (June 2012);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 103;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 57;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 40;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 63;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,178;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 75;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 482;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 65;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 18;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 50;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 80;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
365 days after delivery: Percentage of contractor-responsible
deficiencies: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data as of March 2013.
Notes: (1) Odd numbered LCS class ships (Freedom variant) are built at
a Navy contractor shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin, while even numbered
ships (Independence variant) are built at a Navy contractor shipyard in
Mobile, Alabama. (2) Deficiencies with missing Importance designations
are not included in this table.
[A] For the purposes of this report, the table counts deficiencies from
the Navy's Technical Support Management (TSM) system which were closed
seven days or more after the official delivery date listed in the Naval
Vessel Register, [hyperlink, http://www.nvr.navy.mil]. Deficiencies
closed after delivery
but before the seventh day are not included.
[B] Deficiencies are numbered by their significance and order of
importance as Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3. INSURV defines a Part 1
deficiency is an important deficiency which is likely to cause the ship
to be unseaworthy, substantially reduce the ability of the ship to
carry out an assigned mission, or cause serious injury to personnel or
serious damage to important material or equipment. According to INSURV,
Part 2 deficiencies are less significant or do not meet the criteria
for Part 1 deficiencies, but should be corrected to restore the ship to
required specifications. INSURV classifies Part 3 deficiencies as those
that will require either major alterations to correct (design related)
or modifications that are too costly to effect during the life cycle of
the ship.
[C] The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) documents all
deficiencies which require corrective action to bring the material
condition of the ship to required specifications. Deficiencies may have
been identified during INSURV or builder's trials.
[D] Percentage is rounded to the nearest whole percent. Navy program
managers and SUPSHIP may assign responsibility for correcting a
deficiency to the contractor if the contractor, sub-contractors, or
vendors do not meet the requirements of the shipbuilding contract.
Where data were available, we determined the percent of Part 1, Part 2,
Part 3, and total deficiencies designated as contractor-responsible
versus government-responsible. In some cases, the responsible party for
correcting a deficiency may alternate between the Navy and the
contractor based on additional investigations into the issues.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Arleigh Burke Guided Missile Destroyer Ship Class (DDG
51):
The Arleigh Burke class of guided missile destroyers (DDG 51) consists
of 62 ships which had been delivered to the Navy at the time of our
review. The first ship was delivered in 1991. Currently, the Navy has
received funding to construct an additional four ships. Despite being
a well established program, the Arleigh Burke class continues to have
a large number of open deficiencies at various points in time.
We analyzed data provided by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) to determine the number of open
deficiencies at delivery, 120 days after delivery, and one year after
delivery. Our analysis found that recently delivered ships had a large
number of open deficiencies, ranging from a low of 333 open
deficiencies on DDG 110 to a high of 4,385 open deficiencies on DDG
109. The majority of the deficiencies open at delivery were the
responsibility of the contractor. The data below indicates that many
of these deficiencies were being closed after the ships had been
delivered to the Navy and were being outfitted.
Table 6: Open Deficiencies on DDG 51 Class Ships at Various Points in
Time after Delivery:
Ship (delivery date): DDG 108 (July 2009);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 38;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 47;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 17;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 6;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,186;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 72;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 100;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 11;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 52;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 4.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,981;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 90;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 94;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 24;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 23;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 35.
Ship (delivery date): DDG 105 (August 2009);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 96;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 70;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 15;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 27;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 8;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 50.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,453;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 73;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 116;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 33;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 61;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 61.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 487;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 92;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 22;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 59;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 19;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 68.
Ship (delivery date): DDG 109 (June 2010);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 52;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 71;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 10;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 20;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 3;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 67.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 2,483;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 81;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 172;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 36;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 59;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 8.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,850;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]:90;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 122;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 63;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 29;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 14.
Ship (delivery date): DDG 107 (July 2010);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 16;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 56;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 7;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 14;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 4;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 25.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 672;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 63;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 61;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 38;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 31;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 29.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 235;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 86;
120 days after delivery: 7;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 71;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 3;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 100.
Ship (delivery date): DDG 110 (February 2011);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 12;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 25;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 8;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 13;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 4;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 25.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 285;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 59;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 55;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 33;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 36;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 36.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 35;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 66;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 1;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Ship (delivery date): DDG 111 (April 2011);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 17;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 29;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 2;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0.
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 2,057;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 74;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 279;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 36;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 140;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 15.
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,896;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 92;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 152;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 63;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 41;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 5.
Ship (delivery date): DDG 112 (May 2012);
Importance[B]: Part 1;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 20;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 20;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 5;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: -;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 2;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 1,085;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 55;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 159;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 20;
365 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Importance[B]: Part 3;
Delivery[A]:
Total deficiencies[C]:
Total deficiencies[C]: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies[D]: 0;
120 days after delivery:
Total deficiencies: 0;
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: 0;
365 days after delivery: [Empty];
Percentage of contractor-responsible deficiencies: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data as of March 2013.
Notes: (1) DDG 51 class ships are built at two Navy contractor
shipyards in Bath, Maine and Pascagoula, Mississippi. (2) The ships are
presented in chronological based on the date of delivery to the Navy.
(3) Deficiencies with missing Importance designations are not included
in this table.
[A] For the purposes of this report, the table counts deficiencies from
the Navy's Technical Support Management (TSM) system which were closed
seven days or more after the official delivery date listed in the Naval
Vessel Register, [hyperlink, http://www.nvr.navy.mil]. Deficiencies
closed after delivery
but before the seventh day are not included.
[B] Deficiencies are numbered by their significance and order of
importance as Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3. INSURV defines a Part 1
deficiency is an important deficiency which is likely to cause the ship
to be unseaworthy, substantially reduce the ability of the ship to
carry out an assigned mission, or cause serious injury to personnel or
serious damage to important material or equipment. According to INSURV,
Part 2 deficiencies are less significant or do not meet the criteria
for Part 1 deficiencies, but should be corrected to restore the ship to
required specifications. INSURV classifies Part 3 deficiencies as those
that will require either major alterations to correct (design related)
or modifications that are too costly to effect during the life cycle of
the ship.
[C] The Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) documents all
deficiencies which require corrective action to bring the material
condition of the ship to required specifications. Deficiencies may have
been identified during INSURV or builder's trials.
[D] Percentage is rounded to the nearest whole percent. Navy program
managers and SUPSHIP may assign responsibility for correcting a
deficiency to the contractor if the contractor, sub-contractors, or
vendors do not meet the requirements of the shipbuilding contract.
Where data were available, we determined the percent of Part 1, Part 2,
Part 3, and total deficiencies designated as contractor-responsible
versus government-responsible. In some cases, the responsible party for
correcting a deficiency may alternate between the Navy and the
contractor based on additional investigations into the issues.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Selected Quality Issues in Navy Ship Classes:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
CVN 77: USS George H.W. Bush, Nimitz – Class Aircraft Carrier.
1. Mast access unsafe:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Sailors climbing the mast are in potential danger due to lack of non-
skid coating, insecure fall arrest staples, missing handgrabs, and
sharp edges protruding into the mast access.
Resolution:
Plan to install additional fall arrest staples and improve security of
existing staples, handgrabs installed, non-skid strips installed, and
sharp edges shielded.
2. Stores elevators inoperable:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Food and other supplies must be manually brought on board.
Resolution:
Elevators replaced with conveyors.
3. Vacuum discharge system easily disabled:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
While technically sound, the system is easily disabled by the
introduction of inappropriate materials into the system, damage to the
flushing button, or inadvertent disturbance during routine cleaning
all of which can cause temporary system wide outages. Inoperability of
this system affects toilets and urinals reducing quality of life on
board the vessel.
Resolution:
Modifications to the system were made including adding a component to
catch items that clog the system. Also, modifications were made to
minimize system leaks on urinals. Research is also being done to
improve the flushing buttons.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy Photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 2nd Class Maria Rachel D. Melchor/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 17: Selected Quality Issues on DDG 51 Class Ships:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
DDG 51: USS Arleigh Burke Guided Missile Destroyer Ship Class:
1. Paint and coating deficiencies:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Improper applications and areas not coated led to increased corrosion.
Resolution:
Issues planned to be fixed following delivery, such as during post
shakedown availability.
2. Electrical distribution system fit and finish was incomplete:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Electrical components were unlabeled, dirty, and not watertight, which
is a safety issue.
Resolution:
Issues planned to be fixed following delivery, such as during post
shakedown availability.
3. Undersized pipe welds:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Undersized welds can lead to piping system failures.
Resolution:
Studies and reviews were done during construction that discovered the
problem and fixes were made throughout construction and following
delivery.
4. Inadequate shock mounting of the electrical systems:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Systems have reduced survivability.
Resolution:
Issues planned to be fixed following delivery, such as during post
shakedown availability.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 3rd Class Carla Ocampo/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 18: Selected Quality Issues on USS Freedom (LCS 1):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
LCS 1: USS Freedom Littoral Combat Ship Class:
1. Poor electrical work:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Discrepancies found throughout ships, such as wrong circuit labels,
improper grounds,insecure access covers.
Resolution:
All safety issues are resolved as a priority by the Navy. Other
electrical problems corrected after delivery as part of the deficiency
resolution process.
2. Radar mounted too close to mast:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
As built, reflections from the mast were showing up on the radar
causing false targets.
Resolution:
Applied radar absorbent material on mast for LCS 1 and LCS 3. LCS 5
and forward increase distance between the radar and the mast.
3. Superstructure cracking:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Superstructure cracked in 11 places on LCS 1.
Resolution:
Spectral Fatigue Analysis (modeling) of the superstructure
subsequently identified a number of potential high stress
concentrations. Repairs made to LCS 1 after delivery, structural
changes made to LCS 3 during construction, and design changes
incorporated on LCS 5 and follow-on hulls.
4. Gas turbine engine ruined:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Salt water intrusion due to poor construction (bad welds) and clogged
filters, which caused gaps in the sealing surfaces ultimately ruined
the engine.
Resolution:
Poor workmanship was corrected, and increased rigor to filter
maintenance implemented. Replaced engine.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist Seaman Mark El-Rayes/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 19: Selected Quality Issues on USS Independence (LCS 2):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
LCS 2: USS Independence Littoral Combat Ship Class:
1. Twin boom extendable crane issues:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Without the crane, the ship loses the capability to launch and recover
the small boat and the remote mine-hunting vehicle.
Resolution:
The contractor fixed a number of issues with the crane, including
wiring deficiencies, adjustments to improve performance in cold
weather, computer upgrades, added an additional lift winch, among
other things.
2. Multiple corrosion issues:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Corrosion primarily caused by dissimilar metals damages the vessel and
requires increased maintenance.
Resolution:
New corrosion protection system installed; improved coatings applied.
3. Engine failure during testing:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Cylinder head cracked causing engine shutdown. In addition, there were
weld failures, pump failures, and problems with the crankshaft.
Resolution:
Cylinder casting procedures were revised, crankshaft was redesigned,
and the pump failure was determined to be an anomaly.
4. Lift required to move mission modules failed:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Gearbox failed and a key seal leaked as well as misalignment between
the motor and gearbox coupling.
Resolution:
Completely rebuilt gearbox assembly and improved the alignment between
the gearbox and the motor--also replaced wires.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan
Shultis/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 20: Selected Quality Issues on USS Makin Island (LHD 8):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
LHD-8: USS Makin Island, Wasp – Class Amphibious Assault Ship:
1. Gas turbine exhaust insulation failure:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Excess noise and heat can reduce mission performance and the sailors'
quality of life.
Resolution:
The Navy is working with the contractor on a new design.
2. Contamination of lube oil piping system:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Contamination can cause engine failure.
Resolution:
Installed lube oil sampling valves for increased system monitoring.
3. Gas turbine cooling system - multiple issues:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Engine may overheat.
Resolution:
Parts of the cooling system required re-design and software upgrades.
The Navy has yet to determine the fix for some issues.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief
Mass Communication Specialist Joe Kane/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 21: Selected Quality Issues on LDP 17 Class Ships:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
LPD 17 – 24: Amphibious Transport Dock Class:
1. Unapproved cuts in ship structure:
Extent: Hull specific:
Effect:
Poorly cut and unapproved holes in key pieces of steel can reduce the
structural integrity of the vessel.
Resolution:
Ensure that proper procedures are followed to gain approval for making
holes and issue quality alerts to gain field engineer approval before
cutting holes in beams.
2. Foundation bolts not fitted properly:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Allows for engine movement during combat operations.
Resolution:
Bolt inspection/alignment checks conducted and bolt inspection
procedures updated and incorporated into construction.
3. Poor welding for pipes that carry lubrication oil:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Bad welds cause lube oil to leak from the system possibly seizing the
engine.
Resolution:
Among other things: improve supervision of weld joints for the lube
oil piping system.
4. Wrong weld material used for exhaust system:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Welds must withstand high temperatures and corrosion; thus, improper
material could cause welds to fail and burn insulation in key areas.
Resolution:
Among other things: refresher training for workers and improved
quality assurance procedures were planned to be implemented.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad V. Pritt/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 22: Selected Quality Issues on SSN 774 Class Submarines:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
SSN 774: USS Virginia – Class Fast Attack Submarines:
1. Wrong material used to weld:
Extent: Multiple submarines.
Effect:
Welds must withstand high temperatures and corrosion; thus, improper
material could cause welds to fail.
Resolution:
Conducting inspections of weld material to ensure proper material is
used.
2. Deficiencies with materials from a supplier:
Extent: Multiple submarines.
Effect:
Bad parts, such as counterfeit parts, have the potential to threaten
the reliability of the vessel.
Resolution:
The Navy conducted an investigation and banned the supplier from doing
business with the Navy.
3. Hull coating failure:
Extent: Multiple submarines.
Effect:
The coating, which peeled off of several vessels, is an acoustic
material.
Resolution:
The Navy took risk mitigation steps to address the most probable
causes, which included material selection, material processing, and
improved quality control.
4. Valves installed backwards:
Extent: Multiple submarines.
Effect:
Poor installation can result in the valves not working.
Resolution:
Ensure that design drawings are clear with regard to valves, ensure
valves have proper markings, and reinstall valves for portions of the
piping systems.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 1st Class Steven Myers/Released.
[End of figure]
Figure 23: Selected Quality Issues on USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (T-AGM
25):
T-AGM 25: USNS Howard O. Lorenzen Missile Instrumentation Ship:
1. Crane did not meet specifications to operate in cold weather:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Builder could not certify that cranes could operate in cold weather
per Navy requirements.
Resolution:
Planned to be replaced with cranes that meet requirements and can be
certified to operate in cold weather.
2. Cargo loading spaces too narrow:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
External route does not allow transfer from the deck to the aft
elevator.
Resolution:
No changes are planned as it would require significant structural
work. Issue mitigated through bringing supplies on the ship through
other means.
3. Initial acceptance trials were not satisfactory:
Extent: Hull specific.
Effect:
Ship was not ready for this series of tests.
Resolution:
Ship had to be re-tested.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo (Released).
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
[End of figure]
Figure 24: Selected Quality Issues on T-AKE Class Ships:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and information]
T-AKE: USNS Lewis and Clark Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship Class:
1. Slow jet fuel delivery rate:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Ship auxiliary pumps could only deliver jet fuel at a pace of 250
gallons per minute, far slower than the 3,000 gallons per minute rate
of cargo fuel, thus inhibiting operations.
Resolution:
Redesign and modify system on T-AKE class vessels.
2. Main engine couplings failed:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
The couplings, which connect the engine to the electricity generator,
were improperly installed leading to safety risks and system breakdown.
Resolution:
Rebuilt all main diesel generator couplings on affected hulls--T-AKE
1, 4 and 9. And rebuilds planned for other vessels.
3. Classwide main diesel engine issues:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
A multitude of issues including loose connections and damaged cables
caused erroneous system shutdowns.
Resolution:
Actions required include: hand over hand cable inspections revising
test procedures, and replaced certain parts.
4. Crankshaft vibration damper failure:
Extent: Multiple ships.
Effect:
Significant damage to an engine on one ship occurred including damage
to the cylinder, lube oil pumps, and engine block.
Resolution:
Replace all vibration damper fasteners on all T-AKE class vessels.
Sources: GAO analysis of Navy data; U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 3rd Class Bradley Evans/Released.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Characteristics of Select Commercial Ships and Offshore
Structures:
Each of the ship buyers we met with acquires large, expensive, and
technologically advanced vessels. Below are illustrative examples of
ships and offshore structures acquired by the firms we met with, and
some of the key characteristics associated with each of the respective
vessels.
Table 7: Key Characteristics of Selected Commercial Ships and Offshore
Structures:
Ship: Celebrity Cruises, Inc. (subsidiary of Royal Caribbean Cruises,
LTD.) Reflection - cruise ship; (delivered October 2012);
Builder: Meyer Werft, Germany;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $750 million;
Length (feet): 1,047 feet;
Displacement (tons): 61,609 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: The fifth and last ship of the Solstice ship
class, completing a $3.7 billion shipbuilding program. The ship has a
crew of 1,253, can accommodate 3,223 passengers, and incorporated
advanced wastewater purification technology.
Ship: Chevron Big Foot - tension leg platform production facility;
(hull delivered March 2013; vessel completion estimated to be at end of
2013);
Builder: Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $300 million (hull structure only);
Length (feet): 373 feet;
Displacement (tons): 120,000 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: Upon completion, Big Foot will be the world's
largest and deepest tension leg platform, with a capacity of 80,000
barrels of oil per day.
Ship: Ensco plc. DS-6 - drill ship; (delivered January 2012);
Builder: Samsung Heavy Industries, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $600 million;
Length (feet): 750 feet;
Displacement (tons): 105,822 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: Dynamically positioned drill ship can drill
to 40,000 feet in up to 10,000 feet of water while maintaining a
fixed, unanchored position.
Ship: Exxon Neftgas (a limited subsidiary of ExxonMobil); Sakhalin - 1
Project, Arkutun-Dagi Berkut Platform Topsides (estimated delivery June
2014);
Builder: Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): Proprietary information;
Length (feet): Horizontal dimensions: 394 feet long by 230 feet wide;
Vertical dimensions: 328 feet from bottom of the deck to top of the
drill rig;
Displacement (tons): about 40,000 tons displacement (topside unit
only);
Notable characteristics: Upon completion in 2014, the topside will be
transported and integrated to the offshore platform. The ice-resistant
gravity based structure will become the largest oil and gas platform in
Russia.
Ship: Noble Corporation Noble Don Taylor - drill ship; (delivered April
2013);
Builder: Hyundai Heavy Industries, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $600 million;
Length (feet): 752 feet;
Displacement (tons): 70,000 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: Dynamically positioned drill ship can drill
to 40,000 feet in up to 10,000 feet of water while maintaining a
fixed, unanchored position.
Ship: Norwegian Cruise Line, Norwegian Gem - cruise ship (delivered
October 2007);
Builder: Meyer Werft, Germany;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): about $516 million;
Length (feet): 965 feet;
Displacement (tons): 50,259 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: The fourth ship in the Jewel ship class; has
1,188 cabins that can accommodate up to 2,384 passengers with a crew
of 1,154.
Ship: Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil; Q-Max - Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) Carrier; (lead ship delivered June 2008);
Builder: (1) Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, Korea (2)
Samsung Heavy Industries, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $300 million;
Length (feet): 1,132 feet;
Displacement (tons): 179,000 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: Revolutionary size for an LNG carrier with
novel reliquefaction technology and first to use a two-rudder and
propeller design. Ship class built using three different hull and
structure designs.
Ship: Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD. Oasis of the Sea - cruise ship;
(delivered October 2009);
Builder: STX Finland Turku Shipyard, Finland;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $1.4 billion;
Length (feet): 1,187 feet;
Displacement (tons): 116,00 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: The largest cruise ship in the world, with a
crew of 2,100. The ship can accommodate 5,408 passengers at double
occupancy and incorporated advanced wastewater purification technology.
Ship: Seadrill Ltd. West Auriga - drill ship; (delivered April 2013);
Builder: Samsung Heavy Industries, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $600 million;
Length (feet): 748 feet;
Displacement (tons): 107,474 tons displacement;
Notable characteristics: Dynamically positioned drill ship can drill
to 37,000 feet in up to 12,000 feet of water while maintaining a
fixed, unanchored position.
Ship: Star Deep Water Petroleum, LTD (a Chevron-affiliated company);
Agbami - Floating Production, Storage and Offloading vessel; (delivered
June 2008);
Builder: Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, Korea;
Approximate cost (U.S. Dollars): $1.2 billion; (hull only);
Length (feet): 1,049 feet;
Displacement (tons): 460,000 tons displacement (full load);
Notable characteristics: At the time of delivery was the world's
largest FPSO, with a production capacity of 250,000 barrels of oil and
25 million cubic feet of natural gas per day.
Source: Industry-provided data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Navy Shipbuilding Contract Types:
In Navy shipbuilding, the type of contract used can significantly
influence the final cost of the ship. Table 8 below illustrates the
basic differences between fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts
and how each contract type can incentivize quality.
Table 8: Common Navy Shipbuilding Contract Types and Associated Risks
to Quality Goals:
Type of contract: Cost-reimbursement contracts with incentive fee;
Contract type use and application: Used when:
Requirements not well-defined or lack of knowledge does not permit
costs to be sufficiently estimated to use a fixed-price contract;
Applications:
Commonly used on lead ships;
Navy responsibility: Pays contractor's allowable costs incurred, to
the extent prescribed by the contract. Ship buyer is not guaranteed a
completed ship at the expected level of quality within cost or
schedule estimates;
Shipbuilder responsibility: Shipbuilder makes good faith effort to
meet ship buyer's needs within the estimated cost;
Who assumes the risk of cost overruns: Navy;
How quality is affected: Incentive fee may allow shipbuilder to earn
higher fee if costs are kept low (e.g., by minimizing rework).
Type of contract: Fixed-price-incentive (firm target) contract;
Contract type use and application: Used when:
A ceiling price, target cost, target profit and profit adjustment
formula can be established that will provide a fair and reasonable
incentive. Provides for the contractor to assume an appropriate share
of the risk;
Applications:
Commonly used for follow-on ships in a class;
Navy responsibility: Navy pays fixed target price which includes
shipbuilder's profit, but agrees to share cost overruns (or underruns)
up to a ceiling price;
Shipbuilder responsibility: Shipbuilder delivers a ship at the expected
level of quality, meeting all requirements and specifications as
specified in the contract at or below the ceiling price;
Who assumes the risk of cost overruns: Shared risk between Navy and
shipbuilder up to agreed ceiling price. Shipbuilder generally bears
most risk over that amount;
How quality is affected: The Navy and the shipbuilder share cost
overruns up to the agreed ceiling, which on previous contracts has
been up to 138 percent of the target cost.
Type of contract: Firm-fixed-price contract;
Contract type use and application: Used when:
Fair and reasonable prices can be established at the outset;
Applications:
Limited use on new construction auxiliary and support ships;
Navy responsibility: Pays fixed price even if actual total cost of the
ship falls short of or exceeds the contract price;
Shipbuilder responsibility: Shipbuilder delivers a ship at the
expected level of quality, meeting all requirements and specifications
as specified in the contract;
Who assumes the risk of cost overruns: Shipbuilder;
How quality is affected: Contract type assigns risk to the shipbuilder
and may provide direct incentive to ensure timely delivery of the ship
at the expected level of quality. Additional incentives for
shipbuilder to limit risks to quality, improve production
efficiencies, and reduce costs.
Source: GAO analysis of information obtained from the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, and the Department of Defense's Contract
Pricing Preference Guide.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Defense:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Acquisition:
3015 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3015:
September 10, 2013:
Ms. Michele Mackin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Mackin:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report,
GAO-13-527, "Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Practices Affecting Quality," dated August 2, 2013 (GAO Code 121032).
The Department acknowledges receipt of the draft report.
As more fully explained in the enclosure, the Department concurs with
recommendations 1 and 4 and partially concurs with recommendations 2,
3 and 5.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact
Mr. Jack Evans, Strategic and Tactical Systems/Deputy Director for
Naval Warfare, 703-614-3170 or john.j.evans.civ@mail.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Katrina McFarland:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 2, 2013:
GAO-13-527 (GAO Code 121032):
“Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist To Improve Practices Affecting
Quality”
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: To improve the construction quality of ships
delivered to the Navy, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action:
Ensure that the NAVSEA - level quality team provides support and a
direct link to directors of SUPSHIP quality assurance departments and
is tasked with raising concerns within NAVSEA about issues affecting
or potentially affecting quality throughout the acquisition process.
DoD Response: Concur – As stated in the report, NAVSEA is formulating
plans to reorganize the structure within the NAVSEA 04 Directorate to
include the development of a Quality Team that will provide a direct
link to the directors of SUPSHIP QA departments to enhance
communication within NAVSEA about issues affecting or potentially
affecting quality throughout the acquisition process and as a resource
for identifying appropriate QA requirements for shipbuilding
contracts. NAVSEA 08, Naval Reactors, has responsibility of quality
inspections of nuclear powered propulsion plants. NAVSEA 08 also
conducts periodic audits of both the nuclear-qualified shipyards’ and
field activities’ (to include SUPSHIP) performance and therefore
receives direct input on performance.
Recommendation 2: To improve the construction quality of ships
delivered to the Navy, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action:
Clarify Navy policy (OPNAV Instruction 4700.8J) by clearly identifying
at what point(s) during the acquisition process contractor-responsible
deficiencies are to be fully corrected and ensure the policy is
followed.
DoD Response: Partially Concur - OPNAV Instruction 4700.8J was updated
in July 2012 with specific emphasis on ensuring the material status of
the vessel is known at the CNO level prior to preliminary acceptance
of the vessel by the Navy. This instruction requires that Acceptance
Trials (AT) be conducted when all work including the correction of
significant deficiencies has been complete and provides for exceptions.
When, in special cases, it is desired to conduct AT with significant
items incomplete, the approval of the CNO shall be obtained by the
Navy shipbuilding program manager prior to presenting the ship to the
INSURV President. Requests for this type of waiver will be considered
on a case-by-case basis. The instruction provides a similar process
for the preliminary acceptance of the ship to the Navy. Upon receipt
of the INSURV AT report, the accepting authority shall request from
the CNO, permission to accept delivery of the ship. If any waivers for
delivery are required, they shall be requested in this message.
The instruction clearly states that waiver requests are to be
minimized; however, in those extraordinary circumstances where it is
considered in the best interest of the Navy to deviate from
established requirements, waiver requests will be considered by the CNO.
The instruction requires the waiver request specify the reason for non-
correction of the deficiency or trial item, including estimated
correction date if the waiver is granted. It requires the
identification of available alternatives and the consequences of not
granting the waiver and must identify any operational impact and risk
associated with the waiver. It is also important to note that the
delivery that is referred to in this section is “preliminary acceptance”
by the government, and that ‘final” acceptance by the government
occurs at the end of the guarantee period which is typically one year
following delivery and after completion of the final contract trials
and closeout of all contractor deficiencies.
Consistent with this policy, the Navy will continue to strive to
reduce the number of open deficiencies at the time of delivery to
zero. As evidenced by the data in the report, the Navy has made
noticeable improvements in the last several years. The policy as written
reflects the goal of having no open significant deficiencies at the
time of acceptance trials and no open deficiencies at the time of
preliminary acceptance, while also reflecting the reality that it may
be in the best interest to preliminarily accept the ship with open
deficiencies and defines the process for ensuring CNO approval in such
cases. One straight forward example of such a deficiency is with
select amphibious ships which must depart a shipyard without select
antennas in order to clear an overhead restriction. The policy
provides for those occasions where exceptions are necessary and should
be justified and approved on a case-by-case basis. However recognizing
that OPNAV Instruction 4700.8 was recently revised and that the trend
of fewer deficiencies at delivery needs to continue, the Navy will
monitor the alignment between the stated goal and the actual material
status at delivery to determine if future revisions to this instruction
are warranted.
Recommendation 3: To improve the construction quality of ships
delivered to the Navy, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action:
Provide guidance on the quality requirements in shipbuilding
contracts, including the extent to which the SUPSHIP Management
Group's Quality Performance Standard for Construction of Naval Vessels
should be incorporated.
DoD Response: Partially Concur - The Federal Acquisition Regulation
requires the inclusion of quality requirements in contracts, and
recognize four general categories of requirements that can be used
depending on the extent of quality assurance needed by the Government.
Specifically, Federal Acquisition Regulation Subchapter G Part 46.0
(Quality Assurance) states that the Government shall ensure that
contracts include inspection and other quality requirements, including
warranty clauses when appropriate, that are determined necessary to
protect the government’s interest. Contract requirements for quality
will vary between shipbuilding contracts as a result of the type of
acquisition, market conditions and level of technical risk and
complexity. While the DoN program manager should encourage and support
the contractor's efforts to assure quality, ultimately, the prime
contractor is responsible to deliver a quality vessel. Therefore, from
a DoD/DoN perspective, a key program success factor is selecting
contractors that can demonstrate effective quality management. DoD
guidance and support in accomplishing this objective is provided in
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook Section 11.3.3.
NAVSEA’s Contract Administration Quality Assurance Program (CAQAP)
covers both hardware and technical data and is in accordance with DoD,
DoN and NAVSEA policy. It includes provisions for tailoring the
implementation of the program to the particular need, based on
contractual requirements and specific programs being managed by the
various SUPSHIP organizations. The CAQAP outlines requirements for a
wide range of new construction, conversion, modernization, and major
repair contracts assigned to a SUPSHIP. Elements of the SUPSHIP
Management Group's Quality Performance Standard for Construction of
Naval Vessels clearly have a place in select programs at specific
SUPSHIP offices; however a blank incorporation into all shipbuilding
contracts is not appropriate given the wide range (commercial research
vessels to nuclear powered submarines) of shipbuilding programs that
NAVSEA manages.
It is also noted that a noticeable decrease to open deficiencies at
the time of delivery has occurred over the last several years and the
quantity of all open deficiencies in very recent deliveries have been
on the order of, or below the quantity of open deficiencies on the
commercial projects listed in the report. However in an effort to
continue the improvement in open deficiencies that exist at trials and
delivery, the QA team discussed in recommendation #1 will be an
available resource for consultation to the program manager and
contracts who are responsible for determining the appropriate QA
requirements for the shipbuilding contracts. The Department believes
that the current progress and guidance on quality requirements along
with the QA team discussed above are sufficient to continue the trend
towards better quality products at an affordable price.
Recommendation 4: To improve the construction quality of ships
delivered to the Navy, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action:
Provide guidance on use of payment withholds and retentions as a means
to incentivize the shipbuilding contractor to promptly correct
significant or persistent deficiencies and deliver a defect-free, or
nearly defect free ship, to the Navy.
DoD Response: Concur – The Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 32 and
the Navy’s current contracting policies and operating procedures
provide shipbuilding contract administration personnel the requisite
flexibility, consistent with applicable law, regulation and
contractual provisions, to withhold/retain progress payments, as
necessary, in response to performance issues arising during ship
construction. For example, SECNAV Instruction 7810.12C contains
guidance for payment and performance retentions for shipbuilding
contracts that provide for progress payments based on percentage of
completion basis. The Naval Sea Systems Command also provides
additional guidance for administration of shipbuilding contracts
through the SUPSHIP Operations Manual (SOM) (NAVSEA S0300-B2-MAN-010)
and the NAVSEA Contracts Handbook. The SOM Chapter 4 sets forth the
financial management criteria for the contract administration of
NAVSEA shipbuilding contracts, including retentions. Chapter 5
provides responsibilities for the SUPSHIP construction management team
including such things as the coordination, tracking, resolution and
documentation of guarantee deficiencies and all performance
retentions. The NAVSEA Contracts Handbook in Part 32 provides specific
guidance for the administration of shipbuilding progress payments and
retentions.
As part of Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0, the Department is taking
several actions that will assist in improving the construction quality
of shipbuilding. BBP 2.0 focus area 3 has an initiative to better
align contractor profitability with DoD goals through the use of
contract incentives. Also, in accordance with Section 804 (Department
of Defense Policy on Contractor Profits) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the Department is reviewing
the profit guidelines in the DoD FAR Supplement to ensure an
appropriate link between contractor profit and performance. As part of
these efforts, OSD will revise and reissue guidance document on the
use of incentives in defense acquisition strategies. These new tools
along with the existing tools provide sufficient opportunity for
program managers and contracting officers to ensure the construction of
quality ships for the Navy.
Recommendation 5: To improve the construction quality of ships
delivered to the Navy, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action:
Assess the benefits and determine whether the following practices, in
effect at some SUPSHIP locations, would be useful in detecting quality
problems across all locations:
* use of design drawings during SUPSHIP quality inspections, and;
* increased focus on random and in-process inspections compared to use
of resources for other types of inspections and observations.
DoD Response: Partially Concur - As noted in the report, the most cost
effective means of addressing quality issues is to drive the defect
out of the process as opposed to inspecting/correcting the defect
after it has occurred. The use of design drawings during the
inspection and testing phase of a program is absolutely essential and
is common practice in Navy Ship acquisition programs. It is also noted
that the use of checklists, specifications and the statement of work
are equally essential tools that may be used by different personnel
than those that inspect to drawings. The proper use of the proper
inspection tool by the appropriate personnel is occurring across the
SUPSHIP organization. The Department believes that random, work-in-
process, and process-oversight inspections are all necessary and
appropriate and that the correct balance among them must be
continually assessed for each contract and shipbuilding location.
One criteria or guidance will not fit all ship contracts and
shipbuilders given the many different shipbuilding and repair programs
within the Navy. The Department believes it is best left to the
individual ship programs in consultation between SUPSHIP, the program
manager, the technical community and contracts to establish the
correct balance of inspection types.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michele Mackin, (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant
Director; Diana Moldafsky, Assistant Director; Christopher E. Kunitz;
Peter W. Anderson; Ana I. Aviles; Mariana Calderon; Celina F.
Davidson; Laurier R. Fish; Kristine Hassinger; Jean L. McSween;
Jungjin Park, Roxanna T. Sun; Jeff M. Tessin; and Alyssa B. Weir made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322] (Washington, D.C.:
May 13, 2009).
[2] A variety of terms are often used to indicate a work item is
deficient, such as defect, nonconformance, corrective work or
corrective action, and items included on a "punch" list (essentially a
list of all remaining work and corrective work necessary to meet the
ship buyer's requirements). Remaining work or incomplete work refers
to work that has yet to be performed in order to make a finished
product or previously identified deficiencies that have yet to be
corrected.
[3] The American Society for Quality defines Six Sigma as a fact
based, data driven philosophy of quality improvement that values
defect prevention over defect detection by reducing variation and
waste in a process.
[4] See appendix II, table 2 for a more detailed description of these
phases.
[5] In some instances, commercial ships, such as liquefied natural gas
carriers or drill ships, may undergo additional sea trials following
delivery to test specific equipment related to the ships' missions and
intended uses.
[6] On nuclear powered Navy ships, the ship's crew begins boarding and
training prior to ship delivery.
[7] On non-nuclear ships, when deficiencies identified during the
builder's sea trials are not resolved prior to acceptance trials, some
of the uncorrected deficiencies are transferred and grouped together
with the deficiencies INSURV inspectors identify during the acceptance
trials process, if the inspectors determine that the deficiencies
pertain to Navy operational capabilities, contracted requirements, and
safety regulations.
[8] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322] and, GAO,
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help
Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-183] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2005).
[9] The International Maritime Organization is the United Nations'
organization responsible for maritime affairs and develops
international treaties in this area. For example, the Safety of Life
at Sea Convention is generally regarded as the most important of all
international treaties concerning the safety of commercial ships, and
specifies minimum safety standards for the construction, equipment and
operation of certain ships.
[10] In particular, ISO 9001 certification is commonly obtained by all
types of manufacturing and production companies and can indicate to
potential customers that a company has established and implements a
defined minimum level of quality policies and standards.
[11] Navy officials stated that the certification requirement for
submarines is as rigorous as that of classification societies. During
the design, construction, and maintenance of submarines, they use an
oversight and certification program analogous to ship classification--
called Submarine Safety--as a means to help ensure requirements are
met and a minimum level of safety is achieved. The officials noted the
Submarine Safety program is a cornerstone of the Navy's submarine
design, construction, and maintenance practices and provides the basis
for certification of every submarine.
[12] The Military Sealift Command is largely comprised of civilian
staff and mariners. Since 1960, Military Sealift Command-operated
ships have obtained and maintained commercial ship classification
certificates issued by ABS. Section 3316 of title 46 of the U.S. code
(as amended), designates ABS as the agency for ship classification and
related functions for U.S. Government-owned vessels.
[13] American Bureau of Shipping, The ABS Guide for Building and
Classing Naval Vessels (2004).
[14] Since 2006, the Virginia class submarine program has also
delivered multiple vessels. According to the Navy, the Virginia class
program is considered to be one of the Navy's most well run programs,
but we did not compare it to the surface ships due to differences in
the delivery process.
[15] The Delivery on Completed Vessel clause also requires that prior
to commencing acceptance trials the contractor has: (1) satisfactorily
carried out builder's trials for which the contractor is responsible,
(2) corrected all shipbuilder-responsible deficiencies discovered
before completion of the builder's sea trials, unless otherwise agreed
to by the contracting officer in writing; and, (3) corrected all
shipbuilder-responsible deficiencies discovered after completion of
the builder's sea trials which are determined by the contracting
officer to be necessary to avoid an adverse effect on the operational
capability of the ship.
[16] Appendixes III-VI provide data on the closing of deficiencies
following delivery for selected surface ship classes where multiple
ships were delivered to the Navy.
[17] Liquidated damages are amounts contractually stipulated as a
reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered by one party
if the other party breaches.
[18] The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) authorizes use of a cost
reimbursement contract when circumstances do not allow the agency to
define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type
of contract or uncertainties involved in contract performance do not
permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type
of fixed-price contract. When using this contract type the government
pays for all allowable incurred costs to the extent prescribed in the
contract.
[19] The FAR authorizes use of fixed-price-incentive contracts when a
firm fixed-price contract is not suitable; the nature of the supplies
or services being acquired and other circumstances of the acquisition
are such that the contractor's assumption of a degree of cost
responsibility will provide a positive profit incentive for effective
cost control and performance. If the contract also includes incentives
on technical performance and/or delivery, the performance requirements
provide a reasonable opportunity for the incentives to have a
meaningful impact on the contractor's management of the work. This
contract type provides that the government and the contractor
generally share costs--pursuant to a formula--above the target cost
and below the ceiling price.
[20] In late 2011, DDG 108, DDG 109, DDG 111, and DDG 112 transitioned
to firm-fixed-price contract line items from fixed-price-incentive
contract line items. At the time only DDG 112 was still under
construction.
[21] Payments made during construction of T-AGM 25 were based on the
shipbuilder's achievement of certain shipbuilding milestones, such as
keel laying.
[22] See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 1999).
[23] Leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders in oil and gas,
cruise and shipping industries referred to these plans by different
terms, such as an inspection and test plan or yard quality standard.
[24] Nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers are also subject to
additional oversight and inspection by NAVSEA 08 officials, who are
responsible for nuclear propulsion systems. Navy submarines are
subject to additional specialized inspections through its Submarine
Safety program. Inspections conducted through this program, as well as
audits and observations made by NAVSEA's Nuclear Propulsion
Directorate of all shipyard activities, can also identify broader
quality issues that affect construction. For example, Newport News
Shipbuilding experienced issues with welders using incorrect filler
material on Virginia Class Submarines. While Newport News was already
working on the issue, audits by NAVSEA 08 identified it as a systemic
problem, elevating the severity of the problem, according to
officials. The Navy and the shipbuilder subsequently led a thorough
review of weld filler materials used in potentially affected vessels.
[25] Officials at one other SUPSHIP location indicated their quality
inspectors use the builder's production drawings when conducting
inspections.
[26] We reviewed the quality assurance plans and policies of the eight
Navy shipbuilding contractors and found them to be consistent with ISO
9000 quality management standards.
[27] The advanced technologies have been installed and tested on Royal
Caribbean's Independence of the Seas and Liberty of the Seas cruise
ships.
[28] ABS did grant a temporary classification certificate to LCS 1 for
the sole purpose of transporting the ship from the shipbuilder's
facility to the Port of Norfolk, Virginia.
[29] The Navy's LCS shipbuilding contracts require that the ships are
built in accordance with the Naval Vessel Rules and other referenced
ABS Rules and Guides as necessary to obtain classification. In the
absence of ABS, the Navy intends to internally certify those aspects
of the LCS designs that were not previously approved by the class
society or were subsequently changed.
[30] Specifically, according to officials, the use of the phrase "to
the satisfaction of the attending surveyor" in the applicable
shipbuilding rule sets is meant to allow the marine surveyor the
flexibility to use professional judgment as to whether or not a
completed work item is structurally and mechanically suitable for the
intended use and application. An item is "fit for service" if it can
adequately operate as intended in its as-built condition.
[31] The Achieving Service Life Program is a cooperative agreement
established in 2008 between ABS and NAVSEA. The program covers roughly
15-20 ships per year, focusing on those ships with dry-docking
availabilities.
[End of section]
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