www.thelittlehouseatorthez.com

The Battle of Orthez

Disclaimer

These notes about the Battle of Orthez are intended purely as a
summary for the purposes of readers of the website for the
holiday house known as "The Little House at Orthez". They
have been prepared after studying other, more learned, websites,
books and documents. We make no claims as to their
accuracy. For more information see, for instance, http://www.balizetfr.com/battleoforthez.html
or, if you can read French text, there is a great deal of detail
in http://www.orthez-1814.org

The Peninsular War

Napoleon had invaded Portugal via Spain in 1807. In 1808,
being deeply esconsed on Spanish soil through this process, he
reneged on his agreements with the Spanish, seized the country,
and placed his brother Joseph on the throne instead of the
Spanish monarch Ferdinand. Thus began what the Spanish
term the "War of Spanish Independence" and the British call "The
Peninsular War".

Napoleon more or less managed to retain control of Spain for
several years, despite ongoing civil disobedience and
guerilla-style resistance. But right from the start the
British had become involved with an eye to protecting their
long-term trading ally Portugal. The British cause would
be best served by removing Napoleon (who had banned trade with
the British) from the Iberian peninsula. This would
restore Spain to the Spanish as well as securing future British
/ Portuguese trade.

By mid-1813 the tide had turned against Napoleon's army, which
had been forced to retreat from Portugal and most of Spain, via
the north west, by the allied (British / Portuguese / Spanish)
forces under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been
made a Field Marshal and created Duke of Wellington in 1813
after his victory at the Battle of Vittoria. (He
subsequently became British Prime Minister and one of the most
famous men in British history). It should be added that
there were also small numbers of Swiss, German, Italian and
Polish soldiers amongst the allied forces.

Napoleon responded by appointing Marshal Soult (the Duke of
Dalmatia) to take command of his forces resisting Wellington,
with the aim of driving the allies back to the Ebro in
Spain. Soult reorganised his forces and formed the "Army
of the Pyrénnées" from 4 separate armies.

The two remaining French strongholds in Spain, at Pamplona and
San Sebastian, were under siege by Wellington, and Soult
unsuccessfully attempted to relieve them in late July and late
August 1813 respectively, causing considerable losses to the
Army of the Pyrénnées. Apart from these besieged
strongholds, the French had largely been forced for the first
time back to the Pyrénnées and onto their own national
territory. Both of these French enclaves in Spain were
subsequently forced to surrender - San Sebastian in early
September and Pamplona at the end of October 1813.

Wellington, at this stage, was held back in his further progress
by 2 factors - firstly he had to await the arrival of additional
funds from Britain but, secondly, there were also diplomatic
problems with the Spanish junta who were hesitant in accepting
Wellington's position as overall head of the allied forces.

With the loss of their garrisons, the French retreat from Spain
was executed via a series of battles at various rivers
(Bidassoa, Nivelle, Nive). Soult had decided that he would
be better to consolidate his position firmly on French
soil. This process takes us through to the end of 1813.

Napoleon's regime was now under severe pressure and the Army of
the Pyrénnées was further depleted in early 1814 by the need to
send reinforcements to the army in eastern France. This
decision was perhaps influenced by the fact that Napoleon was
putting his faith in negotiations of a treaty with the
Spanish. His hope was that, by agreeing to recognise the
rights of Ferdinand VII over Spain and by negotiating the
exchange of prisoners of war, the Spanish would withdraw their
support for the British. However, even if the Spanish
could put on one side the fact that they had been under French
occupation for more than 5 years by this time, and that the
British had helped to bring this to an end, Napoleon needed the
support of different factions within Spain, and negotiating time
was far too limited. His hopes of a treaty to relieve the
pressure on the Army of the Pyrénnées were doomed to failure.

Thus, in early 1814, Soult knew that he was not going to be
saved by the diplomatic negotiations with the Spanish and that
he needed the numerical strength of his army to be raised
again. The Napoleonic armies were formed of conscripts,
indeed military historians claim that Napoleon's escapades would
not have been possible without the methodical system of
conscription. While this worked reasonably effectively for
some years, the gradual extension of conscription as the armies
came under pressure contributed to its increasing
unpopularity. Bearing in mind that 500,000 men were lost
(either killed, missing in action, or taken prisoner) during
1814 alone, and that nearly 40% of those born in a six year
period, 1790 - 1795, were lost as a result of conscription (a
considerably higher rate than for the 1891 - 1895 generation in
World War I), one can imagine the pressure the system was
under. The 1814 draft of conscripts had been called up a
year early and it was the 1815 draft, again taken early, by
which Soult was hoping to increase his numbers. He also
knew, though, that these could not be useful soldiers for some
months. Matters were improved for him by Napoleon's order
that 12,000 troops from Toulouse should be provided.
Nevertheless Soult still considered that his army was under
strength.

The French troops faced other problems. The local
inhabitants were somewhat hostile to the Army of the Pyrénnées
which largely lived off the land and, as such, must have felt a
little like an occupying force. The South West took the
brunt of French troop requisitions and there was no significant
voluntary "join-up" by local men. In contrast,
Wellington's troops were welcomed with comparatively open
arms. He, by and large, had a policy (which he had
implemented throughout his time in Spain and Portugal as well as
France) of paying cash for supplies obtained locally and of
expecting his forces to treat local inhabitants with respect.

Early 1814

Soult's headquarters, by this time, were at Peyrehorade, about
half way between Bayonne and Orthez, i.e. roughly 30 km from
both. He stationed a large garrison at Bayonne,
which lies on the north bank of the Adour estuary. This,
as well as controlling the lower reaches of the Adour, was
strategically important for other reasons. It would limit
Wellington's option to make progress towards the major royalist
city of Bordeaux, which had a history of trade with Britain
going back some centuries, as well as controlling the
possibility for reinforcement / supply from the sea.

From Wellington's point of view the strategy needed to be to
push inland to the east to cross the Adour or its tributary the
"Gave de Pau" ("gave" is the local word for "river"). If
Soult did not shadow this then he could find his army forced
into the comparatively inhospitable marshy land to the north to
avoid being encircled in the Bayonne area. If Soult did
shadow Wellington's movements to the east, Wellington would aim
to give battle far enough east of Bayonne to ensure that Soult's
army was sufficiently stretched to be unable to resist a
secondary action, a crossing of the river between the main
armies and Bayonne which could encircle the garrison at the
latter. Control of the estuary, the port, the city and the
river at Bayonne would provide Wellington with a significant
opportunity for future re-supply.

As Wellington was moving significant parts of his army
north-eastwards from Spain there were a few minor clashes from
mid-February onwards. But, by late February 1814, the
French were by and large occupying and controlling the north
bank of the Adour and of the Gave de Pau, and the allied forces
were to the south of this natural barrier. For the French
to contain the allied forces, or at the very least to delay
their progress, control of the crossings of the Adour and the
Gave de Pau was very important. They destroyed all bridges
over the Gave de Pau between Bayonne and Pau itself, except for
the mediaeval bridge at Orthez. Their engineers had
attempted to blow up the latter but had succeeded only in
destroying parts of the parapets, leaving the carriageway
intact.

So, by late February we see the strategic position in the Orthez
area, the first of the towns inland from Bayonne which could
offer, to Wellington, a road striking north, eventually towards
Paris itself. While Soult would have liked to be able to
unite with other French forces marching from Catalonia he had
reached a point beyond which he dare not stretch further.
With bridges destroyed, he had to use cavalry to guard against
the enemy crossing the Gave de Pau anywhere over a distance of
80 km (50 miles). This means they had to guess, and
shadow, the movements of the allied forces along the river and
could not, unless resorting to guesswork again, put in place any
significant preparatory defences of a slightly more permanent
nature to resist such a crossing.

Soult was obviously aware of the danger of handing over to his
enemies the strategically placed city and garrison of Bayonne as
well as transport routes to the north from Orthez.
Napoleon was also aware of these risks and, although it didn't
arrive until after the battle, he sent a written order (via his
Minister of War) to Marshal Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia, telling
him not to abandon territory without giving battle.

But, when one sees the geography around Orthez, one cannot fail
to recognise the possibilities for making a defensive stand that
are on offer. There is a ridge rising from the western
edge of Orthez and turning west towards Saint-Boès. This
ridge, along which the main road to Dax still passes, would
present a concave arc towards the approaching enemy. It
runs for at least 6 km and, apart from progressing along it, is
approachable only via very steep inclines. For all these
reasons we can see why Soult concentrated his army at Orthez.

The Immediate Build-up to the
Battle of Orthez

At about 4 in the afternoon of 22 February Soult set up
headquarters at la Maison Planté (numbers 1, 3, 5 rue Gaston
Planté) in Départ on the south side of the river, Gave de Pau.

On the 25 February a large part of the imperial troops, over
20,000 men under Major General Eloi Charlemagne Taupin,
Brigadier Claude Pierre Rouget (who was in temporary command of
the 5th division), Major General Jean Claude Barthélemy
Toussaint Darmagnac and Major General Maximilian Sébastien Foy,
met up to the west of Orthez in the area from Bérenx (9 km from
Orthez) to Castétarbe (3 km from Orthez). Another division
(the 6th) of about 4,900 men, under Major General Eugene Casimir
Vilatte, was still on the south bank of the Gave de Pau near
Orthez moving ahead of a Portuguese division and a British
division (plus a cavalry brigade and a troop of horse artillery)
which were under the overall command of Lieutenant-General Sir
Rowland Hill. Vilatte would cross the Gave on the 26th to
take up positions controlling the bridge and the town.
Meanwhile Marshal Soult had moved his headquarters across the
river to the hotel "La Belle Hôtesse" (49 rue St Gilles) in
Orthez itself.

The French cavalry, the 15th Chasseurs, trying to keep the
allied forces from crossing the river were now, on 25 February,
impossibly stretched. Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas
Picton's troops were searching for a ford near Bérenx, where the
bridge had been destroyed. Then on the night of 25 to 26
February the cavalry brigade commanded by Colonel Vivian crossed
the Gave de Pau at a ford at Cauneille, just to the east of
Peyrehorade. This was followed on the morning of 26
February by Field Marshal Beresford and 2 of his divisions, the
4th under Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole and the 7th under
Major General George Townsend-Walker, crossing the Gave at
Peyrehorade (but described as a waist-deep ford between
Cauneille and Lahonton in a history of the 82nd Regiment), where
he left a regiment to secure the village. He then pressed
forward towards Orthez, sending a detachment up the road to
Habas to put in a presence behind the French on the Dax - Orthez
road.

The French 15th Chasseurs were now between Field Marshal
Beresford (in particular Vivian's 18th Hussars) and Orthez and
were therefore having to pull back through Puyoo and
Ramous. At this point they found their route blocked by
some of their own infantry, under Foy. Their ability to
patrol the region in which Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas
Picton was seeking a river crossing near Bérenx was therefore
compromised and they pulled back further towards Orthez.
Fording of the Gave 'la gué (ford) de la Liberté', 2km west of
Bérenx, by the first elements of cavalry (Somerset) under Picton
and his 3rd Division was consequently accomplished on 26
February and the allied forces advanced as far as
Baigts-de-Béarn, 6 km west of Orthez. The allies'
engineers spent the night building a pontoon bridge at Bérenx to
allow the rest of Picton's force to get across the river the
next day.

Further to the east, Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, with
General Carlos Le Cor's Portugese troops, had arrived at about
noon on 25 February at the heights of Départ / Magret
overlooking the old bridge and the town of Orthez from the south
of the river. Portuguese troops were ordered to descend to
the area approaching the bridge in the early afternoon to
dispute access to it with the light infantry of Major General
Jean-Isidore Harispe and Major General Vilatte who were tasked
with its defence. In due course, then, the divisions
of Lieutenant-General Sir Williams Stewart (2nd
division), Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton (6th) and
Field Marshal Le Cor (Portuguese Division), plus two regiments
of cavalry (13th and 14th Dragoons) and a troop of horse
artillery were on the south bank of the river, distributed
around the villages of Départ, Magret and Montalibet. At
this stage, Wellington and his headquarters were with these
troops. In the afternoon, a French battery on the hill at
Lamouret (on the western edge of Orthez) opened fire on
Wellington and his headquarters officers who were assessing the
disposition of the French troops from the heights at
Magret. This battery was well placed to cover the road
from Bayonne, the old bridge (Pont Vieux), and the slopes from
Magret and Départ down to the river.

At about 2pm several of Hill's infantry batallions moved down
into Départ and began exchanging fire with the French defenders
of the Pont Vieux. Later Wellington reconnoitred the
possibility of gaining entry into Orthez via the old
bridge. Coming under fire, he took refuge at number 13
Place Saint-Loup. The marks of musket balls can still be
seen on the frontage of this building. Fighting at the
bridge continued for the next 2 days.

The French troops had barely arrived in Orthez ahead of
Wellington so it is perhaps not at all surprising that on the
day of 26 February, the town itself, where the main logistics
convoys and supply depots were hurriedly located, is said to
have been somewhat disorderly, with a general air of
drunkenness. By the end of the day the French strength was
maybe about 36,000 men (although estimates vary between 30,000
and 44,500).

Marshal Soult concentrated his troops in the 6 km long, concave,
semi-circular, defensive, position previously described on the
heights to the north and west of Orthez, stretching along a
rising ridge from the river to the village of Saint-Boès.
He was aiming, by showing his re-grouped army positioned in a
strong defensive arrangement, to cause Wellington to re-consider
whether this was the place to give battle. As was perhaps
inevitable, this approach, together with earlier failure to
engage sections of the allied forces at various points where and
when they were exposed, has come in for some criticism after the
event.

The position of the extreme right of the French forces, at the
very top point of the ridge on the Dax road around and beyond
Saint-Boès, can perhaps partly be explained by the fact that it
was known that there could well be allied troops arriving from a
northerly direction on this road. Observers had seen some
on the evening of 26 February in that direction. This was
possibly the detachment that Beresford had sent via Habas that
morning. However, the main reason for the choice of this
position for the French right wing was presumably geographic -
there is enough of a plateau to locate a couple of divisions
here, and the land falls away in every direction, even in the
Dax direction followed by the main road.

The area of Saint-Boès itself, where much of the most intense
fighting was to take place was defended by Taupin's 4th
Division. Then distributed successively along the ridge
towards Orthez are divisions commanded by Paris, Rouget,
Darmagnac and Foy.

Apart from the main deployment along the ridge, Soult gave
orders for Harispe's division to protect the town of Orthez
(with 2 battalions) and to deny a crossing, by any of Hill's
forces, of the Gave de Pau upstream towards Soarns (with 2
battalions of the 115th line). The rest of the troops (5
battalions) were positioned around the Moncade tower and the
Trinité convent in order to lend their support to the positions
of the old bridge and of Soarns, and to monitor, in case it were
needed, the line of retreat along the road to Sallespisse.
Vilatte's troops stationed themselves during the night near the
hamlet of Rontrun, between this same road and the road to
Saint-Boès. From here they were in a position to move to
support Harispe, or the positions up to Saint-Boès, as well as,
above all, keeping an eye on the Sallespisse / Mont-de-Marsan
road (the line of retreat). Finally, all reserves, the
medical personnel and the administration were moved to locations
in that direction.

The Battle

It appears, from dispatches, orders, etc. at the time, 26
February, that Wellington did not anticipate the battle starting
that day, and possibly not the next. But he was up and
about early on the 27 February reconnoitering the disposition of
Soult's forces. He presumably realised the potential
weaknesses in the positioning of his own troops, being split
between the two banks of the river. He would appear to
have decided that attack may be the best form of defence and
that it was better to be bold, at least in a limited way, while
continuing to improve the disposition of the bulk of his
forces. The estimates of the numbers of men available to
him by this time vary between 37,000 and 46,400 although it
wasn't until later in the day, perhaps noon, that many of these
were in a position to take part in an offensive. These
numbers were made up of approximately 1/3 Portuguese and 2/3
British (although the latter included the "King's German
Legion") - the Spanish, under Field Marshal Pablo Morillo,
having been left in charge of Navarrenx, about 20 km south of
Orthez.

Wellington's initial plan was to get round behind the French
right wing to cut off retreat of the Army of the Pyrénnées and
trap it in Orthez, and initial movements in pursuing this plan
began early in the morning. The 4th division under the
command of Cole, to be joined later by the 7th division of
Walker, Vivian's 2 cavalry regiments, and a battery under
Stewart, all under the overall command of Berseford, were to
move east from Baigts-de-Béarn before veering off to their left
(north) to engage the French right wing at Saint-Boès.

Before the attack commenced Wellington had established himself
and his headquarters at "Le Camp Romain" (the Roman camp).
This is not, in fact, a Roman site but an Iron Age hill fort,
well worth a visit by the tourist for that historical interest
also. While quite a lot of the modern panorama from this
high point is hidden by trees, particularly in the months in
which they bear leaves, Wellington had a commanding view of much
of the battlefield.

At about 8.30 am, Wellington ordered the initial attack
described above. To the French right, the forces of Cole
began their contact with their enemy at Saint-Boès, which sits
on a triangular plateau at the top of the ridge, with Ross's
brigade and the Portuguese of Vasconcellos: his aim was to open
a passage across the open ground and then skirt round Soult's
right wing, defended by Taupin. The engagements in this
area were fierce and sometimes at bayonet point. The
problems for the allied forces were particularly accentuated by
2 batteries of French artillery totalling 28 guns (one battery
in the region of the farm named Mousqués and the other at one
called Luc). Ross managed to lead his forces five times
into the French defences in the vicinity of the church at
Saint-Boès and five times he was forced to retreat through the
dead and dying in the face of French cannon fire. It was
during one of these retreats that Ross was seriously injured,
although he subsequently recovered. Some accounts quote
words from a Sergeant Donaldson (possibly a Royal Highlander) as
saying that "the French resisted doggedly helped by a cannonade
by which many of our men were decapitated." (Perhaps
typical for infantry advancing over the brow of a hill).
The process of advance and retreat continued for about 3 hours
until noon.

Meanwhile, from early morning until noon, Picton's Division, the
3rd, which had been moving towards Orthez along the old Bayonne
road, split into 2 groups, each moving in column; one of these
advanced on Darmagnac in the centre and the other towards Foy to
his left. The first column, consisting of 9 batallions
under Colonel Keane and the Portuguese Power, advanced via the
lane leading into the area known as "le Barat du Rey". The
second column consisting of 3 batallions under the command of
Major General Brisbane broke off the old road at Lescoute and
headed up the lane via Brana. As they proceeded, the 2
columns came under artillery fire from the batteries placed at
Lafaurie and Escouriet. They also had difficulties in
deploying effectively because of the boggy ground in the region
of the stream (Ruisseau de) Caséloupoup.

However, a significant advance was not the intention at this
stage. The main point was to deliberately delay so as to
provide cover for Clinton's Division, the 6th, to cross the
pontoon bridge at Bérenx which had been put up overnight.
The crossing reduced the vulnerability of Picton's position, to
some extent isolated on the north side of the Gave de Pau.
Clinton then followed up, in reserve for the time being, behind
the smaller of the 2 groups, the one advancing on Foy.
Foy's orders were to delay Picton and, in so doing, fall back to
his proper defensive positions along the main ridge of hills
rising up the Dax road.

Finally, from Wellington's point of view, General Hill had been
given twofold orders for that morning. Firstly he was to
keep Harispe's Division occupied, especially at the bridge at
Orthez, with a Portuguese brigade under Le Cor, to make sure
that Harispe could not fall on Picton's slightly vulnerable
division. (Harispe was also being kept occupied by
Somerset's brigade of hussars who were attempting to gain entry
into Orthez from the old Bayonne road). Then secondly,
Hill was ordered to get the rest of his troops across the Gave
de Pau as soon as possible.

These initial operations lasted for most of the rest of the
morning. Wellington had, by now, his centre and his right
fully deployed. Analyses seem to be divided as to whether
the precision timing that saw this achieved was a masterpiece of
manoeuvre or whether it involved a measure of luck.

Slightly prior to this Soult, who was based in the locality of
Lafaurie (near the present day water tower) and Boutou, had been
observing the lack of progress of Picton in the centre and had
also been kept informed of the success of his right, which he
couldn't directly see, in fighting off the repeated attacks of
Cole's forces at Saint-Boès. This had caused him to
become confident of victory and he was quoted as saying, of
Wellington, "Finally I have him". But Soult's confidence
was premature.

Wellington's own despatches explain how he came to change his
plan a little before midday. He realised the strength of
the French around Saint-Boès and also that, each time Ross and
Vasconcellos had broken through, the terrain was so tight that
they couldn't deploy to attack the hills further down the
ridge. Additionally he had needed to be careful how far he
stretched his troops beyond Saint-Boès to the north to attempt
to turn the French right.

However, Wellington now, at about 11.30 am, intensified the
pressure on Saint-Boès with a multi-pronged attack using the
fresh troops of Walker's 7th Division. He ordered Anson's
brigade, which had also been in reserve, to support Ross in the
locality of the church together with one part of Walker's
division and two batteries. A second part of Walker's
division, a Portuguese brigade under the command of Doyle,
followed one of the routes used in the morning, via the land
either side of the gully containing the Montlong stream. A
third part of Walker's division, with Vivian's cavalry, was
moved towards the Dax road, from the direction of Bidaluc,
thereby reinforcing this position attacking the northern flank
of the French right wing at Maysounave. Then the final
segment of Walker's division, the 6th regiment of foot under the
orders of Lt. Col. Scott followed successively by the 68th, the
82nd [the South Lancashire Regiment (Prince of Wales
Volunteers)], and the Chasseurs Brittaniques, advanced into
Saint-Boès via the spur at Barbau towards Loustau along the road
nowadays numbered the D315. This spur, which constricted
into a narrow neck with steep slopes either side before reaching
the road, was a key location for both sides. The French
had taken up positions to concentrate their fire on this narrow
point. The 6th regiment sustained appreciable losses (2
Lieutenants, 5 NCOs and 19 men killed as well as 119 wounded)
before they finally managed to break through and charge the
French defenders, by now presumably tired and depleted in number
from successfully holding their position throughout the
morning. This French division, under Taupin, was forced to
pull out of Saint-Boès and fall back to the Dax road, between
its junction with the D 315 at Plassotte and the junction with
the D 715 (road to St-Girons), receiving some protection from
Paris's division. But, in parallel with the multi-pronged
attack on Saint-Boès, Wellington had ordered the 3rd and 6th
divisions to immediately press their attack on the French centre
/ left (i.e. Darmagnac / Foy). This helped the allies' 7th
division to deploy more fully and put Taupin and Paris under
pressure at a time when, because of the action in the centre
against Darmagnac, Rouget was unable to offer assistance.

As the attack by the 3rd and 6th divisions built up, the region
to the French left of centre was under the command of General
Foy and at about 12.30 in the afternoon he was seriously wounded
(he subsequently recovered). This occurred in the
proximity of his memorial monument, nowadays somewhat overgrown,
at the junction of the Dax, Amou and Bonnut roads. This
position was shielded from direct British fire. His own
account describes this :-

"I went on foot onto the knoll to
observe the movements of the English troops so as to adjust my
own troops accordingly; as I returned to my first brigade, a
congrève ball exploded six or eight feet above my head; a ball
from this hollow shell struck me at the lower end of my shoulder
blade"

[N.B. Colonel (later Sir) William Congreve developed a rocket
for use by the armed services. His designs made it
possible to choose either an explosive (ball charge) or
incendiary warhead. The explosive warhead was separately ignited
and could be timed by trimming the fuse length before launching.
Thus, air bursts of the warheads were feasible at different
ranges. They carried shot which was ejected like shrapnel
by the embedded gunpowder charge. The smallest of these
rockets weighed just 3 to 12 pounds (larger sizes went up to 60
pounds), and could be easily deployed by infantry units - a
forerunner of the modern-day rocket propelled grenade,
RPG. "Congreves" were used in the Peninsular War from 1812
onwards.]

The progress of Brisbane's brigade (3rd division, i.e. Picton),
by way of Brana and up the spur to Escouriet was taken up by
Clinton's division (the 6th) causing Foy's division (under the
command of Brigadier Joseph - François Fririon after Foy
received his wound) to fall back to the east of the Dax road,
and off the line of the ridge, in the region immediately around
and to the north of where the monument to the battle is now
located. This progress was a bloody affair for Brisbane's
men but the outcome not only caused the French battery at
Escouriet to retire with their infantry but enabled the allies
to establish their own battery in its place. A French
cavalry squadron (the 21st Chasseurs under Captain Leclaire) was
subsequently used to charge the British battery, sabres drawn,
but committed themselves at too great a distance and were driven
back into a cul-de-sac where men and horses were decimated by
the artillery fire (only 7 escaped).

Meanwhile the remainder of Picton's division forced their way up
the slopes in the region between Boutou and the junction of the
Amou and Bonnut roads with the Dax road. With footholds on
the ridge Picton's pressure caused Darmagnac to pull back
eastwards, initially along the direction of the road now
numbered D 56.

The successes for Wellington's centre, described in the two
preceeding paragraphs, came about at around 2.30 in the
afternoon.

The other significant element of Wellington's revised plan was
somewhat ad hoc based on a brief recce of the ground - he
ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, who commanded the
Oxfordshire light infantry (the 52nd) as part of Colonel
Barnard's brigade, to descend from the "Roman camp", a hillock,
to cross the intervening marshland, and attack on the left flank
of those French (Taupin's Division) who jutted out on a hilltop
spur at Saint-Boès and who threatened the allied progress into
the village. The focus of this attack by the 52nd was in
the region between "Plassotte" at the junction of the road into
Saint-Boès with the main Dax road and the farmstead called "Luc"
where one of the troublesome artillery batteries was located.
The men of the 52nd crossed the swamps under French fire then,
covered in mud, threw themselves on the French flank in a
position which was, earlier in the day, protected by Rouget, to
the right of Darmagnac. Unfortunately the records are not
entirely clear about the French dispositions in the "Luc" area
at the time the 52nd reached the ridge. Indeed there are 3
distinct hypotheses about what precisely went on, and why.

Whatever the cause, the 52nd did not face the full might of
Rouget's division. They arrived on the Dax road at about
2pm, making contact with Cole's forces. This breakthrough
put Taupin's forces in real trouble, in the triangle of high
land at Saint-Boès, as well as removing the threat of the French
battery located at Luc. Saint-Boès was no longer
defensible by the French and, in the resulting fury, Brigadier
Jean-Pierre Béchaud was killed, amongst many others. There
is a memorial plaque to Béchaud on the wall of the school at
Saint-Boès. By 2.30pm, Taupin is on his own, those
previously supporting his position (Paris, Rouget, etc.) having
started to retreat eastwards. Although their situation
might appear hopeless, at around 3 o'clock they managed to
escape down the gully heading east from Plassotte, near the
water tower, towards Laplace, manhandling all but two of their
artillery pieces down with them.

So by now the whole of the French force is on the move, to
Soult's orders. But in Wellington's revised plan,
Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill and his 12000 men had been
ordered to cross the Gave de Pau to prevent Harispe attacking
the flank of the 6th division and also to launch a final attack
to gain victory. Hill left a small force harassing the old
bridge (Pont Vieux) in Orthez and, with the bulk of his men,
crossed the Gave at a ford at Lartigué, between the modern lake
at Biron and Soarns. He managed to occupy the higher
ground immediately above the river, which had been defended by
two French infantry batallions (115th), and blocked any
possibility of French retreat along the road to Pau.

The retreat towards Sallespisse was risky because of the
geography of the region. It was therefore, initially at
least, executed slowly, step by step, leaving many casualties on
both sides. But General Hill, observing the French
circumstances, quickly advanced his division, and Brigadier
Henry Fane's dragoons reached the hill at Tury overlooking the
line of retreat. In the face of this imminent danger of
seeing their line of withdrawal cut, the French retreat became
faster and confused. But Hill forced the pace against the
French who, inevitably, faced with the circumstances, scattered
in all directions, towards the Gave, and towards Sault de
Navailles.

It was, by then, after 3pm. The British cavalry was in
pursuit of the French and the 7th Hussars first overtook
Harispe's division. During one of the charges, 300
soldiers were sabred and 2000 threw down their weapons.
Further on, the 7th Hussars took 17 officers and 700 men near
Sault de Navailles. The pursuit continued towards the
river Luy de Bearn, 7 km from the battlefield. Donaldson
told that "there were so many soldiers who put their weapons on
the ground that it became difficult to find a way through."

At 4pm Wellington (who had also sustained a minor wound, a badly
bruised hip from either a musket ball or canister shot hitting
his sword hilt / scabbard) made a grand entrance into Orthez and
named Lord Kennedy as temporary governor of the town. He
set up administrative headquarters at the hotel "La Belle
Hôtesse" (49 rue St Gilles), which shortly before had provided
the same facilities for Soult.

[N.B. Some sources refer to musket
ball and others to canister shot in relation to Wellington's
wound. Canister shot, which was an anti-personnel weapon
used by the artillery, consisted of canisters filled with balls
/ shrapnel. When it was fired, the canister would disintegrate
and its shards and projectiles would spread out in a conical
formation, causing a wide swath of destruction.]

The French are said to have lost about 2600 killed and wounded,
and 1350 taken prisoner, while the allies lost perhaps 2300
killed and wounded. By nightfall, the bulk of Soult's
troops had, however, successfully crossed the Luy of
Bearn. Soult continued his retreat during the night to St
Sever, destroying all the bridges behind him.

The Battle of Orthez was over, and nowadays there is only
limited visible evidence that it happened, despite the potential
for tourist interest. Apart from the features previously
mentioned, there is a general monument to the French dead
immediately to the right of the Dax road approximately 1 km
above the mini roundabout at the extremity of the built-up
area.

There is also a cemetery occupied by British, Portuguese and
French dead, to the south side of the D56 road about ½ kilometre
east of the junction with the Orthez - Dax road.
Unfortunately this is on private land, behind locked gates, and
is not accessible by the public without special arrangement.