Foreign Policy — Affairs of Greece (1850)

Added by Marjie Bloy
Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, National University of Singapore from Park's British Prime Ministers of the Nineteenth Century: Policies and Speeches (1916). Alvin Wee and Lee Xin Rui of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences created the electronic text using OmniPage Pro OCR software, created the HTML version, converting footnotes, and adding links.

The following speech was delivered on June 25, 1850 (HANSARD CXII [3d Ser.],
380-444). In reply to a censure of the ministerial foreign policy on the part
of the House of Lords, Mr. Roebuck, member for Sheffield, moved a resolution
which should test the confidence of the House of Commons and therefore of
the people of England in the government: "That the principles which hitherto
have regulated the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government are such as
were required to preserve untarnished the honor and dignity of this country,
and in times of unexampled difficulty the best qualified to maintain peace
between England and various nations of the world."

For background it may be well to point out that Palmerston
had behaved in a fashion that many persons believed might have led to war
with France. Feeling that the Russian and French Ambassadors to Greece were
playing their own game against British interests and realizing that outrages
such as the Fantome case which he describes in the speech were serious matters,
he peremptorily ordered the British fleet to the Piraeus with the idea of
getting settlement of the claims of Don Pacifico, a Jew from Gibraltar and
a British subject, whose house had been invaded and damaged by a Greek mob
in 1847. The Greek Government was slow in meeting British demands, and France
tendered her good offices. Unfortunately, terms applied by the British local
representative upon the Greeks rather than terms which the French and British
representatives agreed upon in London implied discourtesy to France. A risk
of war had been run for a purpose, the inferences concerning which did not
please many Englishmen.

The Lords offered their censure and Mr. Roebuck moved his resolution. Palmerston
defended himself with skill and verve, cleverly playing upon the susceptibilities
of his countrymen. Indeed, Lord Robert Cecil (Lord
Salisbury of later date) remarked subsequently, "I am aware that,
whatever folly or madness an English Government may commit, the appeal to
the Civis Romanus ["Roman Citizen"] doctrine is rarely without
its effect upon an English audience." — Marjorie Bloy

ir, anxious as many Members are to deliver their sentiments upon this most
important question, yet I am sure they will feel that it is due to myself, that
it is due to this House, that it is due to the country, that I should not permit
the second night of this debate to close, without having stated to the House
my views upon the matters in question, and my explanation of that part of my
conduct for which I have been called to account.

When I say that this is an important question, I say it in the fullest expression
of the term. It is a matter which concerns not merely the tenure of office by
one individual, or even by a Government; [153/154] it
is a question that involves principles of national
policy, and the deepest interests as well as the honour and dignity of England.
I cannot think that the course which has been pursued, and by which this question
has assumed its present shape, is becoming those, by whose act it has been brought
under the discussion of Parliament, or such as fitting the gravity and the importance
of the matters which they have thus led this House and the other House of Parliament
to discuss. For if that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough
to carry the Government by storm, and to take possession of the citadel of office;
or, if without intending to measure their strength with that of their opponents,
they conceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the conduct
of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call upon Parliament solemnly
to record its disapprobation of what has passed, I think that either in the
one case or in the other, that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining
the expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have
sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this House; or,
at least, those who act with them in political co-operation here, should themselves
have proposed to this House to come to a similar resolution. But, be the road
what it may, we have come to the same end; and the House is substantially considering
whether they will adopt the resolution of the House of Lords, or the resolution
which has been submitted to them by my honourable and learned Friend the Member
for Sheffield.

Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the
past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy, which I consider
totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honour, and
with the dignity of the country; and at variance with the practice, not only
of this, but of all other civilised countries in the world. Even the person
who moved it was obliged essentially to modify it in his speech. But none of
the modifications contained in the speech were introduced into the resolution
adopted by the other House. The country is told that British subjects in foreign
lands are entitled — for that is the meaning of the resolution —
to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which
they happen to reside. The country is told that British subjects abroad must
not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent
justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the Government and
tribunals of the country in which they may be.

The House of Lords has not said that this proposition is limited to constitutional
countries. The House of Lords has not said that [154/155]
the proposition is inapplicable, not only to arbitrary and despotic countries,
but even to constitutional countries where the courts of justice are not free;
although these limitations were stated in the speech. The country is simply
informed by the resolution, as it was adopted, that, so far as foreign nations
are concerned, the future rule of the Government of England is to be, that,
in all cases, and under all circumstances, British subjects are to have that
protection only, which the law and the tribunals of the land in which they happen
to be, may give them.

Now, I deny that proposition; and I say it is a doctrine on which no British
subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of
the land affords them, when that law is available for such purpose. That is
the opinion which the legal advisers of the Crown have given in numerous cases;
and it is the opinion on which we have founded our replies to many applications
for our interposition in favour of British subjects abroad. (A personal reference
is omitted.) .... But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed
in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature,
not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them. It has
been said, "We do not apply this rule to countries whose Governments are
arbitrary or despotic, because there the tribunals are under the control of
the Government, and justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is not meant to
be applied to nominally constitutional Governments, where the tribunals are
corrupt." But who is to be the judge in such a case, whether the tribunals
are corrupt or not? The British Government, or the Government of the State from
which you demand justice?

I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case
in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to
be simply amenable to the laws of the foreign country in which he happened to
be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia;
nor of a country, the constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands
of the Sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where not long
ago a decree was passed, that any man who was found with concealed arms in his
possession should be brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should
be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial,
accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered
in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife, which they denounced
as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the [155/156]
prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no
proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the
place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said, that such being
the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to
go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court,
however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against
him, and the next morning the man was shot.

Now, what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British
subject? and yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found
guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country. I say, then, that our doctrine
is, that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts
of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had — and
those cases are many — to confine a British subject to that remedy only,
would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.

Then the question arises, how does this rule apply to the demands we have
made upon Greece? And here I must shortly remind the House of the origin of
our relations with Greece, and of the condition of Greece; because those circumstances
are elements that must enter into the consideration of the course we have pursued.

It is well known that Greece revolted from Turkey in 1820. In 1827, England,
France, and Russia determined upon interposing, and ultimately, in 1828, they
resolved to employ forcible means in order to bring Turkey to acknowledge the
independence of Greece. Greece, by protocol in 1830, and by treaty in 1832,
was erected into a separate and independent State. And whereas nearly from the
year 1820 up to the time of the treaty of 1832, when its independence was finally
acknowledged, Greece had been under a republican form of government, with an
Assembly and a President, the three Powers determined that Greece should thenceforth
be a monarchy. But while England assented to that arrangement, and considered
that it was better that Greece should assume a monarchial form of government,
yet we attached to that assent an indispensable condition, that Greece should
be a constitutional monarchy. The British Government could not consent to place
the people of Greece, in their independent political existence, under as arbitrary
a government as that from which they had revolted. Consequently, when the three
Powers, in the exercise of that function which had been devolved upon them by
the authority of the General Assembly of Greece, chose a Sovereign for Greece
(for that choice was made in consequence of, and by virtue of the authority
given to them by the General Assembly of Greece), and when Prince Otho of Bavaria,
then a minor, was chosen; the three Powers, on announcing [156/157]
the choice they had made, at the same time declared that King Otho would, in
concert with his people, give to Greece constitutional institutions.

The choice and that announcement were ratified by the King of Bavaria in the
name, and on the behalf, of his son. It was however understood, that during
the minority of King Otho, the establishment of the constitution should be suspended;
but that when he came of age, he should enter into communication with his people,
and, together with them, arrange the form of constitution to be adopted. King
Otho came of age, but no constitution was given. There was a disinclination
on the part of his advisers to counsel him to fulfill that engagement. The Government
of England expressed an opinion, through various channels, that that engagement
ought to be fulfilled. But opinions of a different kind reached the Royal ear
from other quarters. Other Governments, naturally — I say it without implying
any imputation — are attached to their own forms. Each Government thinks
its own form and nature the best, and wishes to see that form, if possible,
extended elsewhere. Therefore, I do not mention this with any intention of casting
the least reproach upon Russia, or Prussia, or Austria. Those three Governments
at that time were despotic. Their advice was given, and their influence was
exerted. to prevent the King of Greece from granting a constitution to his people.
We thought, however, that in France we might find support in the advice which
we wished to give. But we were unfortunate. The then Government of France, not
at all undervaluing constitutional institutions, thought that the time was not
yet come when Greece could be ripe for representative government. The King of
Bavaria leaned also to the same side. Therefore, from the time when the King
came of age, and for several years afterwards, the English Government stood
in this position in Greece with regard to its Government — that we alone
were anxious for the fulfillment of the engagement of the King, while all the
other Powers who were represented at Athens, were averse to its being made good,
or at least were not equally desirous of urging it upon the King of Greece.
This necessarily placed us in a situation, to say the least of it, of disfavour
on the part of the agents of those Powers, and opt the part of the Government
of Greece. I was sorry for it; at the same time, I don't think the people of
this country will be of opinion that we ought, for the sake of obtaining the
mere good-will of the Greek Government, to have departed from the principle
which we had laid down from the beginning. But it was so; and when people talk
of the antagonistic influences which were in conflict at the Greek Court; and
when people say, as I have heard it said, that our Ministers, and the Ministers
of foreign Governments, [157/158] were disputing about
the appointments of mirarchs and nomarchs, and God knows what petty officers
of the State, I say that, as far as our Minister was concerned, that is a statement
entirely at variance with the fact. Our Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, never, during
the whole time he was in Greece, asked any favour of any sort or kind, for himself,
or for any friend. No conduct of that mean, and low, and petty description was
carried on by any person connected with the English Government. It was known
that we wished the Greek nation should have representative institutions, while,
on the other hand, other, influences were exerted the other way; and that, and
that only, was the ground of the differences which existed.

One of the evils of the absence of constitutional institutions was, that the
whole system of government grew to be full of every kind of abuse. Justice could
not be expected where the judges of the tribunals were at the mercy of the advisers
of the Crown. The finances could not be in any order where there was no public
responsibility on the part of those who were to collect or to spend the revenue.
Every sort of abuse was practised.

In all times, in Greece, as is well known, there has prevailed, from the daring
habits of the people, a system of compulsory appropriation — forcible appropriation
by one man of that which belonged to another; which, of course, is very disagreeable
to those who are the victims of the system, and exceedingly injurious to the
social condition, improvement, and prosperity of the country, In short, what
foreigners call brigandage, which prevailed under the Turkish rule, has not,
I am sorry to say, diminished under the Greek Sovereignty. Moreover, the police
of the Greece Government have practised abuses of the grossest description;
and if I wanted evidence on that subject, I could appeal to the honourable Gentleman
(B. Cochrane), who has just sat down, who, in a pamphlet, which all must have
read, or ought to read, has detailed instances of barbarity of the most revolting
kind practised by the police. I have here depositions of persons who have been
subjected to the most abominable tortures which human ingenuity could devise
— tortures inflicted upon both sexes most revolting and disgusting. One of
the officers, a man of the name of Tzino, at the head of the police, was himself
in the habit of inflicting the most diabolical tortures upon Greeks and upon
foreigners, Turks, and others. This man Tzino, instead of being punished as
he ought to have been, and as he deserved to be, not only by the laws of nature,
but by the laws of Greece — this [158/159] person, I
am sorry to say, is held in great favour in quarters where he ought to have
received nothing but marks of indignation.

Well, this being the state of things in Greece, there have always been in
every town in Greece a great number of persons whom we are bound to protect
— Maltese, Ionians, and a certain number of British subjects. It became the
practice of this Greek police to make no distinction between the Maltese and
Ionians and their own fellow-subjects. We shall be told, perhaps, as we have
already been told, that if the people of the country are liable to have heavy
stones placed upon their breasts, and police officers to dance upon them; if
they are liable to have their heads tied to their knees, and to be left for
hours in that state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as
they swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives,
and have no business to complain if the same things are practised upon them.
We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I believe it is the
opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that in considering the cases of
the Ionians, for whom we demanded reparation, the House must look at and consider
what was the state of things in this respect in Greece; they must consider the
practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension
of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely
indeed more than nominal in some cases, but the granting of which would be an
acknowledgment that such things should not be done towards us in future.

In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they appear to
me to have been dealt with elsewhere in spirit, and in a tone, which I think
was neither befitting the persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom,
nor the persons before whom, the discussion took place. It is often more convenient
to treat matters with ridicule, than with grave argument; and we have had serious
things treated jocosely; and grave men kept in a roar of laughter, for an hour
together, at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of
another; at the nationality of one injured man, or the religion of another;
as if because a man was poor he might be bastinadoed and tortured with impunity;
as if a man who was born in Scotland might be robbed without redress; or, because
a man is of the Jewish persuasion, he is fair game for any outrage. It is a
true saying, and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of human
wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is another
truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind
ought to bring to the task, generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and
noble and elevated thoughts. [159/160]

Now, Sir, with regard to these cases, I would take first, that which I think
would first present itself to the mind of an Englishman — I mean the insult
offered by the arrest of the boat's crew of Her Majesty's ship Fantome.
The time has been, when a man aspiring to a public situation, would have thought
it his duty to vindicate the honour of the British Navy. Times are changed.
It is said that in this case there were only a few sailors taken out of a boat
by some armed men — that they were carried to the guard-house, but were
soon set at liberty again — and why should we trouble our heads about
so small a matter? But did we ask anything extraordinary or unreasonable on
account of this insult? What we asked was an apology. I really did not expect
to live to see the day, when public men in England could think that in requiring
an apology for the arbitrary and unjustifiable arrest of a British officer and
British seamen in the performance of their duty, we were making a demand "doubtful
in its nature, and exaggerated in its amount." Now, what is the history
of this case? for circumstances have been referred to, in connexion with it,
which do not appear from the statement of the case itself. The son of the Vice-consul,
who had dined on board the Fantome, was taken ashore in the evening by
the coxswain and a boat's crew, and landed on the beach. The coxswain accompanied
the young gentleman to his father's house, and on returning to the boat, was
taken prisoner by the Greek guard. The guard went down to the boat, and, finding
the seamen in it were without arms, began thumping them with the butt-ends of
their muskets, and wounded one man in the hand by a thrust with a bayonet. The
guard then took the seamen prisoners, and carried them to the guard-house where
after a certain time they were released, through the interposition of the Vice-consul,
and they returned to their ship. Excuses were given for this proceeding, and
the gist of them was this — that the guard thought the boat belonged to
the Spitfire, and that it had been seen landing rebels, one of whom had
escaped; this supposed rebel being a boy of. fourteen years old, who had returned
quietly to his father's house.

The matter to which these excuses related, occurred a little while before,
in consequence of the disorganised state of Greece — a disorganisation, by
the by, which arises entirely from the acts of the Government; because it has
been, and still is, the practice of the Government, instead of punishing brigands,
to amnesty and pardon them; and indeed it is even supposed that the officers
of police sometimes go shares in the plunder. That, however, is a matter of
opinion; but it is a fact that the robbers are almost always pardoned; and such
is the encouragement thereby given to the system of [160/161]
plunder, that the robbers go about armed in bands, and sometimes actually attack
and occupy towns. [About five additional pages dealing with abuses are omitted]

Then we come to the claim of M. Pacifico — a claim which has been the
subject of much unworthy comment. Stories have been told, involving imputations
on the character of M. Pacifico; I know nothing of the truth or falsehood of
these stories. All I know is, that M. Pacifico, after the time to which those
stories relate, was appointed Portuguese consul, first to Morocco and afterwards
at Athens. It is not likely that the Portuguese Government would select for
appointments of that kind, a person whose character they did not believe to
be above reproach. But I say, with those who have before had occasion to advert
to the subject, that I don't care what M. Pacifico's character is. I do not,
and cannot, admit that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion,
and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is
an abuse of argument to say, that you are not to give redress to a man, because
in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable.
Punish him if you will punish him if he is guilty, but don't pursue him as a
Pariah through life.

What happened in this case? In the middle of the town of Athens, in a house
which I must be allowed to say is not a wretched hovel, as some people have
described it; but it does not matter what it is, for whether a man's home be
a palace or a cabin, the owner has a right to be there safe from injury —
well, in a house which is not a wretched hovel, but which in the early days
of King Otho was, I am told, the residence of the Count Armansperg, the Chief
of the Regency — a house as good as the generality of those which existed
in Athens before the Sovereign ascended the throne — M. Pacifico, living
in this house, within forty yards of the great street, within a few minutes'
walk of a guard-house, where soldiers were stationed, was attacked by a mob.
Fearing injury, when the mob began to assemble, he sent an intimation to the
British Minister, who immediately informed the authorities. Application was
made to the Greek Government for protection. No protection was afforded. The
mob, in which were soldiers and gens-d'armes, who, even if officers were not
with them, ought, from a sense of duty, to have interfered and to have prevented
plunder — that mob, headed [161/162] by the sons
of the Minister of War, not children of eight or ten years old, but older —
that mob, for nearly two hours, employed themselves in gutting the house of
an unoffending man, carrying away or destroying every single thing the house
contained, and left it a perfect wreck.

Is not that a case in which a man is entitled to redress from somebody? I
venture to think it is. I think that there is no civilised country where a man
subjected to such grievous wrong, not to speak of insults and injuries to the
members of his family, would not justly expect redress from some quarter or
other. Where was he to apply for redress at Athens? The Greek Government neglected
its duty, and did not pursue judicial inquiries, or institute legal prosecutions
as it might have done for the purpose of finding out and punishing some of the
culprits. The sons of the Minister of War were pointed out to the Government
as actors in the outrage. The Greek Government were told to "search a particular
house; and that some part of M. Pacifico's jewels would be found there."
They declined to prosecute the Minister's sons, or to search the house. But,
it is said, M. Pacifico should have applied to a court of law for redress. What
was he to do? Was he to prosecute a mob of five hundred persons? Was he to prosecute
them criminally, or in order to make them pay the value of his loss? Where was
he to find his witnesses? Why, he and his family were hiding or flying, during
the pillage, to avoid the personal outrages with which they were threatened.
He states, that his own life was saved by the help of an English friend. It
was impossible, if he could have identified the leaders, to have prosecuted
them with success.

But what satisfaction would it have been to M. Pacifico to have succeeded in
a criminal prosecution against the ringleaders of that assault? Would that have
restored to him his property? He wanted redress, not revenge. A criminal prosecution
was out of the question, to say nothing of the chances, if not the certainty,
of failure in a country where the tribunals are at the mercy of the advisers
of the crown, the judges being liable to be removed, and being often actually
removed upon grounds of private interest and personal feeling. Was he to prosecute
for damages? His action would have lain against individuals, and not, as in
this country, against the hundred. Suppose he had been able to prove that one
particular man had carried off one particular thing, or destroyed one particular
article of furniture; what redress could he anticipate by a lawsuit, which,
as his legal advisers told him, it would be- vain for him to undertake? M. Pacifico
truly said, "if the man I prosecute is rich, he is sure to be acquitted;
if he is poor, he has nothing out of which to afford me compensation if he is
condemned." [162/163]

The Greek Government having neglected to give the protection they were bound
to extend, and having abstained from taking means to afford redress, this was
a case in which we were justified in calling on the Greek Government for compensation
for the losses, whatever they might be, which M. Pacifico had suffered. I think
that claim was founded in justice. The amount we did not pretend to fix. If
the Greek Government had admitted the principle of the claim, and had objected
to the account sent in by M. Pacifico — if they had said, "This is
too much, and we think a less sum sufficient," that would have been a question
open to discussion, and which our Ministers, Sir E. Lyons at first, or Mr. Wyse
afterwards, would have been ready to have gone into, and no doubt some satisfactory
arrangement might thus have been effected with the Greek Government. But the
Greek Government denied altogether the principle of the claim. Therefore, when
Mr. Wyse came to make the claim, he could not but demand that the claim should
be settled, or be placed in train of settlement, and that within a definite
period, as he fixed it, of twenty-four hours.

Whether M. Pacifico's statement of his claim was exaggerated or not, the demand
was not for any particular amount of money. The demand was, that the claim should
be settled. An investigation might have been instituted, which those who acted
for us were prepared to enter into, fairly, dispassionately, and justly.

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly
unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it
came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether,
or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year
or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim.
"Oh! but," it is said, "what an ungenerous proceeding to employ
so large a force against so small a Power!" Does the smallness of a country
justify the magnitude of its evil acts? Is it to be held that if your subjects
suffer violence, outrage, plunder in a country which is small and weak, you
are to tell them when they apply for redress, that the country is so weak and
so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be, that
the weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to obtain
redress. "No," it is said, "generosity is to be the rule."
We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot
give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it.

Well, then, was there anything so uncourteous in sending, to back our demands,
a force which should make it manifest to all the world that resistance was out
of the question? Why, it seems [163/164] to me, on the
contrary, that it was more consistent with the honour and dignity of the Government
on whom we made those demands, that there should be placed before their eyes
a force, which it would be vain to resist, and before which it would be no indignity
to yield. (There is omitted some forty of the Hansard columns that attempt
to justify the British Government in its actions)

I believe I have now gone through all the heads of the charges which have been
brought against me in this debate. I think I have shown that the foreign policy
of the Government, in all the transactions with respect to which its conduct
has been impugned, has throughout been guided by those principles which, according
to the resolution of the honourable and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield,
ought to regulate the conduct of the Government of England in the management
of our foreign affairs. I believe that the principles on which we have acted
are those which are held by the great mass of the people of this country. I
am convinced these principles are calculated, so far as the influence of England
may properly be exercised with respect to the destinies of other countries,
to conduce to the maintenance of peace, to the advancement of civilization,
to the welfare and happiness of mankind.

I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made these matters the
means of attack upon Her Majesty's Ministers. The government of a great country
like this, is undoubtedly an object of fair and legitimate ambition to men of
all shades of opinion. It is a noble thing to be allowed to guide the policy
and to influence the destinies of such a country; and, if ever it was an object
of honourable ambition, more than ever must it be so at the moment at which
I am speaking. For while we have seen, as stated by the right Baronet the Member
for Ripon (Sir James Graham), the political earthquake rocking Europe from side
to side — while we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled; institutions
overthrown and destroyed — while in almost every country of Europe the conflict
of civil war has deluged the land with blood, from the Atlantic to the Black
Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean; this country has presented a spectacle
honourable to the people of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind.

We have shown that liberty is compatible with order; that individual freedom
is reconcilable with obedience to the law. We have shown the example of a nation,
in which every class of society [164/165] accepts with
cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it; while at the same
time every individual of each class is constantly striving to raise himself
in the social scale — not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality
— but by persevering good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion
of the moral and intellectual faculties with which his Creator has endowed him.
To govern such a people as this, is indeed an object worthy of the ambition
of the noblest man who lives in the land; and therefore I find no fault with
those who may think any opportunity a fair one, for endeavouring to place themselves
in so distinguished and honourable a position. But I contend that we have not
in our foreign policy done anything to forfeit the confidence of the country.
We may not, perhaps, in this matter or in that, have acted precisely up to the
opinions of one person or of another — and hard indeed it is, as we all know
by our individual and private experience, to find any number of men agreeing
entirely in any matter, on which they may not be equally possessed of the details
of the facts, and circumstances, and reasons, and conditions which led to action.
But, making allowance for those differences of opinion which may fairly and
honourably arise among those who concur in general views, I maintain that the
principles which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the
guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve approbation.
I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, as representing
a political, a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question
now brought before it; whether the principles on which the foreign policy of
Her Majesty's Government has been conducted, and the sense of duty which has
led us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow subjects
abroad, are proper and fitting guides for those who are charged with the Government
of England; and whether, as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from
indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus sum; so also a British subject,
in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the
strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and wrong.

References

Park, Joseph Hendershot.
British Prime Ministers of the Nineteenth Century: Policies and Speeches. New York: New York University Press, 1916.