The Definition of Lying and Deception

First published Thu Feb 21, 2008

Questions central to the philosophical discussion of lying to others
and other-deception (or interpersonal deceiving) may be divided into
two kinds. Questions of the first kind are definitional. They include the
questions of how lying is to be defined, and how deceiving is to be
defined, and whether lying is a form of intended deception. Questions
of the second kind are moral. They include the questions of whether
lying and deceiving are (defeasibly) morally wrong, and whether, if
either lying or deception, or both, are defeasibly morally wrong, they
are ever morally obligatory, and not just merely morally permissible.
In this entry, we only consider questions of the first kind.

There is no universally accepted definition of lying to others
(Kagan 1998, 113). The OED definition of lying is as
follows:

To lie =df to make a false statement with the intention
to deceive.

There are several problems with this definition. According to it, a
person who makes a statement that she believes to be true — a
person who makes a truthful statement — with the intention to
deceive another person, is lying, if, unbeknownst to her, the statement
is false. For example, if A tells B that there is not
a board meeting on Thursday, which A believes to be true, with
the intention that B believe there is no board meeting this
week, which A believes to be false (since A believes
there is a board meeting on Wednesday), then A is lying to
B, if A is mistaken, and there is a board meeting on
Thursday. Also, according to this definition, conspirators who
knowingly make untruthful and false statements to each other, without
the intention to deceive each other, but with the intention to deceive
eavesdroppers, are lying. Both of these cases are controversial, and it
is not clear that we should classify either of these cases as lies.

The most commonly accepted definition of lying that manages to avoid
these problems is the following: “I take a lie to be an
assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which
is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that
content” (Williams 2002, 96); or, more formally:

To lie =df to make an assertion that is believed to be
false to some audience with the intention to deceive the audience about
the content of that assertion.

This definition is normally unpacked as follows: “A person
lies when he asserts something to another which he believes to be false
with the intention of getting the other to believe it to be true”
(Kupfer 1982, 104); “[lying is] making a statement believed to
be false, with the intention of getting another to accept it as
true” (Primoratz 1984, 54n2). More formally:

To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another
person with the intention that that other person believe that
statement to be true.

Let us call this the most common definition of lying. According
to this definition, there are at least four necessary conditions for
lying. First, lying requires that a person make a statement (statement
condition). Second, lying requires that the person believe the
statement to be false, that is, lying requires that the statement be
untruthful (untruthfulness condition). Third, lying requires that the
untruthful statement be made to another person (addressee condition).
Fourth, lying requires that the person intend that that other person
believe the untruthful statement to be true (intention to deceive
addressee condition).

These four putative necessary conditions for the most common
definition of lying need to be explained, before objections to this
definition can be entertained, and before alternative definitions of
lying can be considered.

According to the statement condition of the most common definition
of lying, lying requires that a person make a statement. A person may
be said to make a statement when a person believes that there is some
expression, and some language, such that one of the standard uses of
the expression in that language is that of expressing some proposition,
and the person utters, writes or signs that expression with the
intention that it be believed that she intended to utter (etc.) that
expression with that standard use (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 150;
Newey 1997, 95). Making a statement therefore requires the use of
conventional signs, as opposed to natural or causal signs (Pierce, 1955), since it
requires the uttering (etc.) of an expression in a language. It is
possible for a person to sign expressions using American Sign Language,
smoke signals, Morse code, semaphore flags, and so forth, as well as by
making specific bodily gestures whose meanings have been established by
convention. Hence, it is possible for a person to make statements by
making smoke signals, or by nodding her head in response to a question.
Hence, it is possible for a person to lie by making smoke signals, or
by nodding her head in response to a question. Insofar as a person is
not signing (etc.) an expression in a language when, for example, a
person wears a wig or gives a fake smile, it follows that a person
cannot be lying by wearing a wig or giving a fake smile, even if the
person intends to deceive by these means (Siegler 1966, 128).

Insofar as a person is not signing (etc.) an expression in a language
when, for example, she wears a wedding ring when she is not married,
or wears a police uniform when she is not a police officer, it follows
that a person cannot be lying by wearing a wedding ring when she is
not married, or wearing a police uniform when she is not a police
officer, even if she intends to deceive by these means. In the case of
a person who does not utter (etc.) a declarative sentence, but who,
for example, curses, or makes an interjection or an exclamation, or
issues a command or an exhortation, or asks a question, or says
“Hello”, then, if it is not one of the standard uses of
that expression in that language to express some proposition, and the
person does not intend that it be believed that she intended to utter
(etc.) that expression with that standard use, it follows that she is
not making a statement when she does any of these things (but see
Leonard 1959). If she is not making a statement when she does any of
these things, she cannot be lying when she does any of these
things.

Finally, since lying requires that a person utter (etc.) an
expression, it is not possible for a person to lie by omission (Mahon
2003, 2006a). That is, it is not possible for a person to lie by
omitting to utter (etc.) an expression. It is possible for a person
to lie by remaining ‘silent’, if the ‘silence’
is a previously agreed upon signal with others that is equivalent to
uttering an expression in a language (Fried 1978, 57). However, such a
lie would not be a lie of omission.

According to the untruthfulness condition of the most common
definition of lying, lying requires that a person make an untruthful
statement, which is a statement that the person believes to be false.
The condition that the statement be believed to be false is
not the condition that the statement be false (Grotius LWP:
611; Krishna 1961, 146). Statements that are untruthful, according to
this sense of untruthful, may be true, and statements that are truthful
may be false (Bok 1998). If a person who makes a statement does not
believe that statement to be false, then, according to this condition,
she cannot be lying, even if that statement is false, and she intends
the other person to believe it to be true. If A makes the
statement to B that “The enemy has weapons of mass
destruction”, with the intention that B believe that
statement to be true, and that statement is false, then A is
not lying, if A does not believe that statement to be false.
According to this condition, if the person who makes the statement does
not believe the statement to be false, then even if she makes that
statement with the intention to deceive another person, she is not
lying. Consider the following exchange between two travelers on a train
from Moscow (Cohen 2002, 328):

Trofim: “Where are you going?”

Pavel: “To Pinsk.”

Trofim: “Liar! You say you are going to Pinsk in order to make
me believe you are going to Minsk. But I know you are going to
Pinsk.”

Pavel does not lie to Trofim, since his statement to Trofm is
truthful, even if he intends that Trofim believe it to be false, and
hence, intends that Trofim be deceived by it.

The untruthfulness condition is to be distinguished from the putative
necessary condition for lying that the statement that the person makes
be false (falsity condition), which is not a necessary condition for
lying for the most common definition. In Jean-Paul Sartre's
short-story, The Wall, set during the Spanish Civil War, Pablo
Ibbieta, a prisoner sentenced to be executed by the Fascists, is
interrogated by his guards as to the whereabouts of his comrade Ramon
Gris; mistakenly believing Gris to be hiding with his cousins, he makes
the untruthful statement to them that “Gris is hiding in the
cemetery”, with the intention that they believe this statement to
be true. As it happens, the statement is true. Gris is arrested at the
cemetery, and Ibbieta is released (Sartre 1937; cf. Siegler 1966:
130). According to the most common definition, Ibbieta lied to his
interrogators, although the untruthful statement he made to them was
true, and he did not deceive them about the whereabouts of Gris
(Isenberg 1964, 466; Mannison 1969, 138; Lindley, 1971; Kupfer 1982, 104).

One implication of the untruthfulness condition is that if a person
makes a statement that she believes to be neither true nor false, then
she cannot be lying (Siegler 1966, 133; cf. Strawson 1952, 173). For
example, if a person begging for money says “All my children need
medical attention”, but believes that this proposition is neither
true nor false, because he has no children, then he is not lying, even
if he is attempting to deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 155-6; but
see Siegler 1966, 135).

According to the addressee condition of the most common definition
of lying, lying requires that a person make an untruthful statement to
another person. That is, lying requires that a person address another
person. According to this condition, it is not possible to lie to no
one or to an eavesdropper. If A pretends to be talking to
another person on the phone, and makes the untruthful
statement to no one, “The pick-up is tomorrow at 6:00
p.m.”, with the intention that eavesdropping B believes
that statement to be true, then A is not lying, even if
A is attempting to deceive. According to this condition,
however, it is possible to lie to a general audience. It is possible
for a person to lie by sending an untruthful e-mail to everyone on a
mailing list, or by publishing an untruthful report about an event
(Kant LE, 203), or by making an untruthful statement on a tax return,
or by making an untruthful claim in a magazine advertisement or a
television commercial.

According to the intention to deceive addressee condition of the most
common definition of lying, lying requires that a person make an
untruthful statement to another person with the intention that that
other person believe that statement to be true. That is, there is more
to lying than being untruthful. According to this condition, writing
fiction, telling tall tales, cracking jokes, making ironic statements,
using literally false metaphorical language, playacting, playing
devil's advocate, and so forth, without the intention that the
addressee believe these untruthful statements to be true, is not
lying: “this is somewhat similar to the requirement in law that,
to be convicted of fraud, a person must be shown to have intended to
defraud his victim” (Morris 1976, 391). According to this
condition, lying necessarily involves an intention to communicate with
another person by means of a statement. It is not possible to lie to
those whom you believe or know to be infants, insane adults, etc., or
to dogs, goldfish, etc., who (or which) cannot understand statements
made to them.

According to this condition, if a first person makes an untruthful
statement to a second person, without the intention that the second
person believe that untruthful statement to be true, but with the
intention that that second person believe something else to be
true, something else that the first person believes to be true, then
she is not lying. For example, if A makes the untruthful
statement to B, “She is not at home”,
without the intention that B believe it to be true
that she is not home, but with the intention that B
believe it to be true that it is inconvenient for her to see B
now, then according to the most common definition, A is not
lying (Isenberg 1964, 473); however, for A to intend that
B believe this, it must be the case that A believes
that this is how B understands “She is not at
home”.

According to this condition, it is not merely the case that the
person who makes the untruthful statement intends that some
other person believe that untruthful statement to be true; the person
intends that the addressee believe that untruthful statement
to be true. If A makes the untruthful statement “There
are no police on the road in front of us” to his accomplice,
B, without the intention that B believe that
statement to be true, but with the intention that eavesdropping
C believe that statement to be true, then A is not
lying, since C is not A's addressee (Chisholm
and Feehan 1977, 156).

According to this condition, it is also not merely the case that the
person intends that the addressee believe some statement to be
true that the person believes to be false; the person intends that the
addressee believe the untruthful statement that is made to the
addressee to be true (Williams 2002, 96). If A is a
crime boss, and B is one of A's henchmen, whom
A secretly believes is a police informant, and
A makes the untruthful statement to B “There
are no informants in my organization”, without the intention that
B believe that statement to be true, but with the intention
that B believe something else to be true, namely, that
A believes that there are no informants in his organization,
then according to the most common definition of lying, A is
not lying, since A does not intend that B believe
A's untruthful statement to be true. In this example
A has, of course, attempted to deceive B.

According to this condition, it is sufficient for lying that the
person who makes the untruthful statement intends that the
addressee believe the untruthful statement to be true; it is not
necessary that the addressee believe the untruthful statement
to be true. That is, a lie may be disbelieved. If A makes the
untruthful statement to B “I didn’t get any
homework today”, with the intention that B believe that
statement to be true, and if B does not believe that statement
to be true, then A is still lying. According to this
condition, ‘lie’ is not an achievement or success verb, and
an act of lying is not a perlocutionary act — the existence of an
act of lying does not depend upon the production of a particular
response or state in the addressee (Mannison 1969, 135; Wood 1973:
199; MacCormick 1983, 9 n. 23).

Finally, according to this condition, lying is neither necessary nor
sufficient for perjury. If a person, under oath to testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, willfully makes an untruthful and false statement as to facts
material to the hearing (Green 2006, 133), but without the intention
that any other person believe that untruthful and false statement to be
true, then the person commits perjury, but does not lie. If a person,
under oath (etc.), willfully makes an untruthful statement as to facts
material to the hearing, with the intention that another person (e.g.,
members of the grand jury) believe that untruthful statement to be
true, and that untruthful statement happens to be true, then the person
lies, but does not commit perjury.

A number of objections have been made to the most common definition
of lying. These objections are of two kinds. First, objections have
been made to each of the necessary conditions being necessary
conditions for lying. Second, objections have been made to the
necessary conditions being jointly sufficient for lying.

Against the statement condition, it has been objected that the making
of a statement is not necessary for lying. Any form of behavior, the
function of which is make others form false beliefs or to deprive them
of true beliefs, is lying (Vrij 2000, 6; Smith 2004, 14). This
behavior can simply be a matter of withholding information, without
saying anything untruthful (Ekman 1985, 28; Scott 2006, 4).

Against the untruthfulness condition, it has been objected that
untruthfulness is not necessary for lying; any statement made with an
intention to deceive is a lie, including a believed-true statement that
is made with an intention to deceive (Bok 1978, 13; Barnes 1994, 11;
Davidson 1980, 88). It has also been objected that it is not necessary
for lying that the statement that is made be believed to be false; it
is only necessary that the statement that is made be believed not
to be true, or be believed to be probably false, or be
not believed to be true (Carson 2006, 298).

Against the addressee condition, it has been objected that it is
sufficient for lying that an untruthful statement is made; it does not
have to be made to anyone, not even to oneself (Shibles 1985:
33; Griffiths 2004, 31). It has also been objected that it is possible
to lie to an eavesdropper (Newey 1997, 95), and that it may be
possible to lie to an animal or to a “computing machine”,
or to what is falsely believed to be another person — for
example, an imagined burglar (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 157-8).

Against the intention to deceive addressee condition it has been
objected that no intention to deceive is required for lying (Shibles
1985, 33; Kemp and Sullivan 1993, 153; Griffiths 2004, 31 (but see
Feehan 1988); Carson et al. 1982; Carson 1988, 2006;
Sorensen 2007, 252). If a sworn-in witness in a trial of a violent
criminal goes on the record and gives untruthful testimony, without any
intention that that testimony be believed to be true by any other
person (not the jury, the judge, the lawyers, the audience, etc.), in
order to avoid being physically harmed by the defendant or his criminal
associates, then the witness is lying (but see Jones 1986).

It has
also been objected that even if an intention to deceive the addressee
is required for lying, it is not necessary that it be an intention to
deceive the addressee about the contents of the untruthful statement
(Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 152). If A makes the untruthful
statement “There are no informants in my organization” to
believed informant B, without the intention that B
believe that statement to be true, but with the intention that
B believe it to be true that A believes that
statement to be true, then A is lying.

Objections have also been made to these necessary conditions being
jointly sufficient for lying. It has been objected that making an
untruthful statement to another person with the intention that that
other person believe that untruthful statement to be true is not
sufficient for lying, because in addition it is necessary that the
untruthful statement be false (falsity condition) (Coleman and Kay
1981, 28; Moore 2000; Saul 2000; Carson 2006, 284).

It has also been objected that making an untruthful statement to
another person with the intention that that other person believe that
statement to be true is not sufficient for lying, because it is also
necessary to have the intention that that other person believe that
that statement is believed to be true (believed truthfulness
condition) (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 152; Simpson 1992, 625;
Frankfurt 1999, 5; Faulkner 2007, 527). If A makes the
untruthful statement “I have no change in my pocket” to
B, then A is only lying if, in addition to intending
that B believe it to be true that A has no money in
A's pocket, A intends that B believe that
A believes it to be true that A has no money in
A's pocket (Frankfurt 1988, 120).

With these objections in mind, a number of alternative definitions
of lying have been advanced. One modified version of the most common
definition of lying avoids the objection that the four necessary
conditions are not sufficient for lying by adding the necessary
condition that the person who makes the untruthful statement has the
intention that the addressee believe that the person believes the
untruthful statement to be true (believed truthfulness condition),
which constitutes a second intention to deceive addressee condition
(Frankfurt 1988, 1999, 2002; cf. Kupfer 1982, 116):

To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another
person with the intention that that other person believe that statement
to be true and the intention that that other person believe that that
statement is believed to be true.

A second alternative definition of lying also avoids the objection
that the four necessary conditions are not sufficient for lying by
adding the second intention to deceive addressee condition (believed
truthfulness condition); however, it dispenses with the first intention
to deceive addressee condition. It also adds the necessary condition
that the person who makes the untruthful statement intends that the
addressee believe that the person who makes the untruthful statement
intends that the addressee believe that the person who makes the
untruthful statement believes the untruthful statement to be true, thus
eliminating the possibility of lying to eavesdroppers. Finally, it
amends the untruthfulness condition slightly to allow that the
statement can be believed not to be true (Chisholm and Feehan
1977):

To lie =df to make a believed-not-true or believed-false
statement to another person, under conditions that are such that the
person making the statement believes (a) that the person hearing the
statement is justified in believing that the person making the
statement believes the statement to be true, and (b) that the person
hearing the statement is justified in believing that the person making
the statement intends that the person hearing the statement believes
that the person making the statement believes the statement to be
true.

A third alternative definition of lying avoids the objection that
the four necessary conditions are not sufficient for lying by combining
the previous two alternative definitions of lying. According to this
definition, there are three deceptive intentions in lying: the
intention to deceive the liee about the content of the statement; the
intention to deceive the liee about the liar's beliefs; and the
intention to deceive the liee about the liar's being sincere.
According to this definition, lying necessarily trades on being
insincere about being sincere: “The liar is doubly insincere in
that he or she insincerely presents a belief and insincerely invokes
trust in this presentation. So in lying the liar intends to deceive the
liee regarding some matter, and intends to satisfy that first intention
(at least partly) by deceiving the liee regarding the liar's
belief regarding that matter. In lying, however, there is a third level
of deceptive intention. For the liar intends to satisfy the secondary
intention (at least partly) by establishing the mutual recognition of
the sincerity of that belief, and in that being insincere”
(Simpson 1992, 625). It is the liee's false belief in the
sincerity of the liar that justifies the liee in taking the
liar's intention that the liee believe the statement to be true
to be a reason for believing the statement to be true:
“A speaker S's assertion to an audience
A that p is a lie if and only if: (1) S
believes that p is false; and (2) S intends that (i)
A come to believe that p, (ii) A recognizes
his intention that (i), and (iii) A's believing that
S believes that p is A's reason for
(ii) being a reason for (i)” (Faulkner 2007, 527-8). This
definition of lying is as follows:

To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another
person with the intention that that other person believe that statement
to be true, and with the intention that that other person believe that
that statement is believed to be true, and with the intention that that
other person believe that it is intended that that other person believe
that that statement is believed to be true.

All three of these alternative definitions are vulnerable to the
following counterexample (Newey 1997, 98). Say that S, with
collaborator C, wants to play a confidence trick on
A, in order to get A to buy a lot of shares in the
company that S works for. S gets C, whom
A trusts, to tell A that “Sproggit plc is about
to launch a takeover bid for the company,” which both S
and C correctly believe to be false. S also gets C to
tell A that S, whom A distrusts, mistakenly
believes that it is false that Sproggit plc is about to launch a
takeover bid for the company. S then makes the untruthful
statement to A that “Sproggit plc is about to launch a
takeover bid for the company.” S makes this untruthful
statement to A with the intention that A believe this
statement to be true. S also makes this untruthful statement
to A with the intention that A believe that
S intends that A believe that S believes
this untruthful statement to be true. That is, S intends that
A believe that S is intending to be truthful. However, S
does not intend that A believe that S believes this
statement to be true. That is, S does not intend that
A believe that S is being truthful.
Rather, S intends that A believe that S
believes this statement to be false. That is, S intends that
A believe that S is being untruthful.
Only if A believes that S is being untruthful will
A believe this statement to be true. According to both of the
alternative definitions of lying, S is not lying to
A. However, this seems false.

This objection to all three alternative definitions could be avoided by
adapting the first alternative definition of lying so that untruthfulness,
combined with either of the two deceptive intentions, is sufficient for
lying. A fourth alternative definition of lying (Mahon 2008) is as
follows:

To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another
person with the intention that that other person believe that statement
to be true, or the intention that that other person believe that that
statement is believed to be true, or both.

All four alternative definitions of lying so far considered involve an
intention to deceive. A fifth alternative definition of lying avoids
the objection that an intention to deceive an addressee is necessary
for lying by dispensing with any intention to deceive addressee
condition (Carson 2006). According to this definition, lying is
not necessarily a form of intentional deception. In place of
an intention to deceive an addressee, it substitutes two further
necessary conditions, namely, that the context is one which warrants
the truth of the untruthful statement to the addressee, and that the
person who makes the untruthful statement does not take herself to be
not warranting the truth of the untruthful statement to the addressee.
It also adds a third necessary condition that the untruthful statement
be false (falsity condition), and amends the untruthfulness condition
slightly to allow that the statement can simply be not believed to be
true:

To lie =df to make a not-believed-true statement that is
false to another person in a context which warrants the truth of that
statement to that other person, where the person making the statement
does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of that statement
to that other person.

Whether or not a person is in a context that warrants the truth of her
statement to another person is independent of whether or not the
person believes that she is in that context. One objection that has
been made to this fifth alternative definition of lying (Fallis 2009)
is that, according to it, for example, a politician who falsely
believes himself to be giving a speech to an audience that is
expecting a serious speech, and who does not take himself to be not
warranting the truth of that statement to his audience, and who makes
a statement to his audience that he believes to be false and that is
false, when his audience is expecting a humorous speech, is not lying,
since the context is one which does not warrant the truth of that
statement to the audience. However, it seems false that the politician
is not lying in this case, because his audience is expecting a
humorous speech.

A sixth alternative definition of lying also avoids the objection that
an intention to deceive an addressee is necessary for lying, by
dispensing with any intention to deceive addressee condition (Fallis
2009). In place of an intention to deceive an addressee, it
substitutes the necessary condition that the person making the
untruthful statement believes that she is in a context in which the
Gricean norm of quality of communication — “Do no say what
you believe to be false” (Grice 1989, 27) — is in
place. This definition is as follows:

To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another
person while believing that the context is one in which the norm
‘Do not say what you believe to be false’ is in
effect.

One objection that can be made to this definition is that even if a
person believes herself to be in a context in which the Gricean
communication norm ‘Do not say what you believe to be
false’ is in effect, she may not care that this norm is in
effect, and may make untruthful statements without any intention that they
be believed. A witness in a trial who believes the norm to be in effect
may attempt to disrupt the trial by making obviously and outrageously
false statements, such as “I am a Giant Panda”. It seems
false that she is lying, however.

According to all of the definitions of lying so far considered, it is
not part of the meaning of lying that it is morally wrong,
either defeasibly or indefeasibly. According to these definitions, the
claim that lying is morally wrong, either defeasibly or indefeasibly,
is “a synthetic judgment and not an analytic one” (Kemp and
Sullivan 1993, 153). However, ‘lie’ is considered by some
philosophers to be a thick ethical term (Williams 1985, 140); they
hold that it both describes a type of action and morally evaluates that
type of action negatively. For some philosophers, “the
wrongfulness of lying is… built into the definition of the
term” (Kemp and Sullivan 1993, 153), and the claim that lying is
defeasibly morally wrong, or indefeasibly morally wrong, is a tautology
(Margolis 1962).

Some rigorist moral philosophers have defined lying in such a way that
the claim that lying is indefeasibly morally wrong is a tautology.
These philosophers have incorporated moral necessary conditions into
their definitions of lying. According to one such alternative
definition, it is part of the “stricter meaning” of a lie
that it involves “a conflict with the existing and continuing
right of him to whom the speech or sign is addressed”, where
“that right is nothing else than the liberty of judgement which,
as if by some tacit agreement, men who speak are understood to owe to
those with whom they converse” (Grotius LWP, 613-4). Note that
this right of liberty of judgment — the right to arrive at one's
own judgments based on the truthful non-deceptive statements of others
— can be “taken away” or “annulled by another
right which supervenes”, and can be “abrogated by the
express consent of him with whom we are dealing”, and also
“may be cancelled by tacit consent, or consent assumed on
reasonable grounds, or by the opposition of another right which, in the
common judgement of all men, is much more cogent” (Grotius LWP,
614). Furthermore, a lie “in the strict sense” is
“harmful” (Grotius LWP, 614). This definition of lying is
as follows:

To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another
person, with the intention that that other person believe that
statement to be true, violating that person's right of liberty
of judgment, with the intention to harm that other
person.

Since, according to this definition, lying is always a violation of
another person's right of liberty of judgment with the intention
to harm that other person, and because, according to those who defend
this definition, it is indefeasibly wrong to do this, for these
philosophers, the claim that lying is indefeasibly morally wrong is a
tautology.

According to this definition of lying, it is not possible to lie to
children or the insane: “since infants and insane persons do not
have liberty of judgement” (Grotius LWP, 614). It is also not
possible to tell an intentionally benevolent lie —
“whenever it is certain that he to whom the conversation is
addressed will not be annoyed at the infringement of his liberty in
judging, or rather will be grateful therefore, because of some
advantage which will follow, in this case also a falsehood in the
strict sense, that is a harmful falsehood, is not perpetrated”
— and hence a person does not lie when she “comforts a sick
friend by persuading him of what is not true” (Grotius LWP,
616). It is also not a case of lying when “one who has a right
that is superior to all the rights of another makes use of this right
either for his own good or for the public good” (Grotius LWP,
616-7). Hence, if legitimate political leaders make intentionally
deceptive untruthful statements to others for the public good, they are
not lying. Finally, it appears that when someone “can in no other
way be diverted from the accomplishment of a wicked crime” (LWP,
617), what would otherwise be lying is not lying, because, it seems,
the right of liberty of judgment of the would-be murderer (etc.) is
cancelled by “the opposition of another right which, in the
common judgement of all men, is much more cogent”. According to
this definition, therefore, “speaking falsely to those —
like thieves — to whom truthfulness is not owed cannot be called
lying” (Bok 1978, 14).

At least one implication of this definition of lying is that there
cannot be such a thing as a “white Lie”, that is, a lie
that “is not intended to injure any Body in his Fortune,
Interest, or Reputation” (OED), or, more generally, a
lie that is not intended to harm in any way. A ‘white lie’ is a contradiction in terms.

According to another, similar alternative definition of lying that
incorporates moral necessary conditions (Donagan 1977, 88-9), lying is
necessarily a free communication between fully responsible and rational
persons:

To lie =df to freely make a believed-false statement to
another fully responsible and rational person with the intention that
that other person believe that statement to be true.

Since, according to this definition, lying is always a free
communication between fully responsible and rational persons, and
because, according to those who defend this definition, it is
indefeasibly “impermissible for anybody, in conditions of
free communication between responsible persons, to express an opinion
he does not hold” (Donagan 1977, 88; cf. 1986), for these
philosophers, the claim that lying is indefeasibly morally wrong is a
tautology.

According to this definition of lying, it is not possible to lie to
“children, madmen, or those whose minds have been impaired by age
or illness” (Donagan 1977, 89), since they are not fully
responsible and rational persons. It is also not possible to lie to
“a would-be murderer who threatens your life if you will not tell
him where his quarry has gone” (Donagan 1977, 89), and in
general to those who place you under duress, since statements made in
such circumstances are not freely made. ‘Lying under duress’ is a contradiction in terms.

Against these alternative definitions of lying that incorporate moral
necessary conditions, and that define lying in such a way that the claim
that lying is indefeasibly morally wrong is a tautology, it has been
objected that such definitions are unduly narrow and restrictive (Bok
1978). Surely, for example, it is possible to lie to a
would-be murderer, whether it is impermissible (Augustine OL;
Aquinas ST (cf. MacIntyre 1995b); Kant GMM (cf. Mahon 2006c);
Newman 1880; Geach 1977; Betz 1985) or permissible (Constant 1964;
Mill 1863; Sidgwick [ME]; Bok 1978; MacIntyre 1995a). It has also
been objected against these definitions that they are morally lax (Kemp
and Sullivan 1993, 158-9), since, by rendering certain deceptive
untruthful statements to others not lies, they make it
permissible to act in a way that would otherwise be open to moral
censure. In general, even those philosophers who hold that all lies
have an inherent negative weight, albeit such that it can be
overridden, and hence, who hold that lying is defeasibly morally wrong
(Bok 1978; Kupfer 1982; cf. Wiles 1988), do not incorporate moral
necessary conditions into their definitions of lying.

There are several problems with this definition (Barnes 1997;
Mahon 2007). According to it, a person who inadvertently causes
another person to have a false belief deceives that other person. If
A believes that there is a talk on David Lewis and the Christians on Friday, and
A tells B that “There is a talk on Lewis and
the Christians on Friday”, and as a result B believes
that there is a talk on C. S. Lewis on Friday, then, according to this
definition, A deceives B.

A possible modified version of the OED definition of deceiving
that does not allow for inadvertent deceiving is as follows:

To deceive =df to intentionally cause another person to
have a false belief.

There are several problems with this definition also, however
(Barnes 1997; Mahon 2007). According to it, a person who
intentionally causes another person to have a false belief that she
mistakenly believes to be true deceives the other person. If A
mistakenly believes that there is a philosophy talk on Friday,
and A tells B “There is a philosophy talk on
Friday”, and as a result B believes that there is a
philosophy talk on Friday, then according to this definition,
A deceives B.

Although a number of philosophers hold that deceiving may be
inadvertent or mistaken (Demos 1960; Chisholm and Feehan 1977; Adler
1997; Gert 2005; Fuller 1976), many other philosophers have argued
that it is not possible to deceive inadvertently or mistakenly (Linsky
1970, 163; van Horne 1981, 172; Barnes 1997). They reserve the term
‘mislead’ to cover cases such as those above, and hold that
in these cases A inadvertently misleads B, and
mistakenly misleads B, respectively, rather than that
A deceives B in either case.

A possible modified version of the OED definition of deceiving
that does not allow for either inadvertent or mistaken deceiving is as
follows:

To deceive =df to intentionally cause another person to
have a false belief that is truly believed to be false by the person
intentionally causing the false belief.

According to this definition, ‘deceive’ is an
achievement or success verb (Ryle 1949); an act of deceiving is not an
act of deceiving unless the result is that another person has a false
belief. According to this definition, there is no statement condition
for deception, and deception does not require an intention to
communicate with another person. It is possible to deceive known
infants, insane adults, dogs, etc., who can be intentionally caused to
have false beliefs without making statements to them (Russow 1986). It
is possible for a person to deceive using natural or causal signs, such
as a wig or a smile, or non-linguistic conventional signs, such as a
wedding ring or a police uniform (Mahon 2006b). It is possible for a
person to deceive without uttering (etc.) a declarative sentence, by
cursing, making an interjection or an exclamation, issuing a command or
an exhortation, asking a question, saying “Hello”, and so
forth. It is also possible to deceive by omitting to make certain
statements, or by remaining silent.

Since there is no statement
condition for deception, a fortiori there is no untruthfulness
condition for deception. It is possible for a person to deceive by
making a truthful and true statement (Adler, 1997). If Pavel truthfully and truly
tells Trofim that he is going to Pinsk, with the intention that Trofim
falsely believe that Pavel is going to Minsk, and as a result Trofim
falsely believes that Pavel is going to Minsk, then Pavel deceives
Trofim. According to this definition of deceiving, there is no
addressee condition for deception, and it is possible to deceive an
eavesdropper. If A pretends to be talking to another person on
the phone, and makes the untruthful and false statement to no one,
“The pick-up is tomorrow at 6:00 p.m.”, with the intention
that eavesdropping B believes that statement to be true, and
as a result B believes that statement to be true, then
A deceives B. It is also possible to deceive an
addressee about some matter other than the content of the statement
made, whether that statement be truthful or untruthful, true or false.
Finally, deception is neither necessary nor sufficient for perjury, as
defined above.

At least two objections can be made to the definition of deception
provided above. First, it can objected that it is not sufficient for
deception that a person intentionally cause another person to have a
false belief that she truly
believes to be false; it must also be the case that that false belief
is caused by evidence, and that that evidence is brought about by the
person in order to cause the other person to have the false belief
(Linsky 1970, 163; Fuller 1976, 23; Schmitt 1988, 185; Barnes 1997,
14). If A intentionally causes B to believe falsely
that there are vampires in England by, for example, operating on
B's brain, or giving B an electric shock, or
drugging B, then A does not deceive B about
there being vampires in England. Also, if A causes B
to believe falsely that there are vampires in England by getting
B to read a book that purports to demonstrate that there are
vampires in England, then A does not deceive B about
there being vampires in England. However, if A writes a book
that purports to demonstrate that there are vampires in England, and
B reads the book, and as a result comes to believe that there
are vampires in England, then A does deceive B about
there being vampires in England.

A second objection that can be made to this definition is that it is
not necessary for deception that a person intentionally cause another
person to have a new false belief; it is sufficient to intentionally
cause another person to continue to have a false belief (Fuller 1976,
21; Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 144).

A modified definition of deceiving that avoids both of the objections
given above is as follows (Mahon 2007, 189-90):

To deceive =df to intentionally cause another person to
have or continue to have a false belief that is truly believed to be
false by the person intentionally causing the false belief by bringing
about evidence on the basis of which the other person has or continues
to have that false belief.

Two objections can be made to this definition. The first is that it
is also possible to deceive another person by causing the other person
to cease to have a true belief, or preventing the person from acquiring
a true belief (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 144). However, to this
objection it can be replied that merely causing another person to cease
to have a true belief, or preventing a person from acquiring a true
belief, without causing the person to have or continue to have a false
belief, is better described as causing another person be ignorant, or
keeping another person ignorant, rather than deceiving another person
(Mahon 2006b, 433; 2007, 187).

A second objection that can be made to this definition is that it is
not necessary for deception that the person who intentionally causes
the other person to have the false belief truly believes the false belief
to be false (van Frassen 1988, 124; Barnes 1997, 11). If A
does not falsely believe that a bridge is safe, and A does not
truly believe that the bridge is dangerous — if A has no
belief regarding the condition of the bridge — but A
nevertheless convinces B that the bridge is safe, and the
bridge happens to be dangerous, then A deceives B
about the bridge being safe. Or, if A places a fake rabbit in
B's garden, in which lives a reclusive rabbit, in order
to guarantee that B believes that B is seeing a
rabbit in her garden, and B sees the fake rabbit and calls
A and tells A “I am seeing a rabbit in my
garden”, then A has deceived B that she is
seeing a rabbit in B's garden, although A does
not truly believe that B is seeing a fake rabbit.
However, this objection is not necessarily compelling (Mahon 2007,
191-2). It may be argued that A has merely misled B, as
opposed to deceived B, about the bridge, although A
may have deceived B about A's beliefs. It may also
be argued that what A lacks is the true belief that she has
deceived B about seeing a rabbit in her garden, rather than
that she has deceived B about seeing a rabbit in her garden,
but lacks the true belief that B's false belief is
false.

MacIntyre, A., 1995a. ‘Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral
Philosophers: What Can We Learn from Mill and Kant?’, in The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 16: 307-361. Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press.