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Conservative commentator Monica Crowley, who is slated to serve in a top national security communications role in Donald Trump's presidential administration, plagiarized thousands of words of her 2000 dissertation for her Columbia University Ph.D., a CNN KFile review has found.

On Monday, Politico reported that it found more than a dozen examples of plagiarism in Crowley's Ph.D. dissertation. CNN's KFile has found nearly 40 lengthy instances of Crowley lifting paragraphs from numerous sources, including several scholarly texts, the Associated Press, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

The revelation comes on the heels of another CNN KFile investigation, which found more than 50 instances of plagiarism in Crowley's 2012 book, "What The (Bleep) Just Happened." On Tuesday, the book's publisher, HarperCollins, announced that it would stop selling the book until "the author has the opportunity to source and revise the material."

Crowley's first plagiarism scandal came in 1999, the year before she submitted her dissertation. After The New York Times reported a reader found that a column she wrote in the Wall Street Journal strongly resembled a 1988 article in the neoconservative magazine Commentary, a Journal editor said that the paper would not have published her piece if it had known of the parallels. Crowley denied the charge but acknowledged that the language is similar.

Columbia also declined to comment in a statement, saying that all reviews of University research were kept confidential.

"We have no comment on Monica Crowley's dissertation, which was submitted in 2000 and is publicly available," the statement said. "The University's process for addressing concerns raised about University research preserves the confidentiality of any review, and even the fact of a review's existence is confidential while it is underway. Columbia is committed to upholding the very highest standards of integrity and credibility in academic research."

Trump has tapped Crowley, a syndicated radio host, columnist, author, and longtime Fox News contributor to be his senior director of strategic communications for the National Security Council.

It said, "Dr. Crowley, a renowned scholar who holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University, is a foreign affairs and political analyst for the Fox News Channel. She is also a New York Times bestselling author and a columnist and online opinion editor of The Washington Times."

In her dissertation on America's China policy under Truman and Nixon, entitled "Clearer Than Truth," Crowley, whose Ph.D. is in international relations, lifted multiple passages from Eric Larson's 1996 book, "Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations." She also repeatedly plagiarized James Chace's 1998 book, "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World," as well as a 1982 book by Yale's John Lewis Gaddis called "Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War." Crowley's dissertation also contains passages taken from a 1996 book by Thomas Christensen of Princeton, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958.

Crowley cited these and other sources in footnotes at various points in her dissertation, but often failed to include citations or to properly cite sources in sections where she copied their wording verbatim or closely paraphrased it.

Crowley's dissertation includes plagiarized paragraphs from commentary in a 1998 collection of transcripts of Henry Kissinger's declassified conversations with other diplomats and world leaders. She also lifted material from Henry Kissinger's 1979 memoirs, using Kissinger's language to summarize Kissinger's descriptions of the Nixon administration's thought processes without quoting him.

Other sources she plagiarized include an August 1977 issue of the Libertarian Review, a 1982 report by Brookings fellow Raymond L. Garthoff, a 1971 academic article by John E. Mueller, and a 1971 article in the magazine Foreign Affairs.

Mueller found a "rally in support at the beginning of the war and high levels of public support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support had declined in the wake of such events as infighting among the South Vietnamese and the emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time, the public had also come to see that the war would not be over quickly but was instead likely to be a “long, bloody affair.” The figure below shows the course of public support forthewar. Americanforces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, supportforand oppositiontothe war had hardened to a point at which events on the battlefield or in Washington were less likely to make an impression; support for the war wasdown to hard-core supporterscoand fell onlyan additional tenpoints thereafter. The principal reasonsfor

continued support for the war were,not surprisingly, the reasons established for American grand strategy by Truman two decades before:the containment of communism, U.S. credibility, and strengthening the resolve of others to resist communism.The Roper Center's February 1968 poll found that 49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam wasthecontainment of communism; 33 percent cited the impact on the will of others to resist communism; and 23 percent cited the potential loss of prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and allies.60Compared to the benefits of a military victory, the political objective the Johnson (andlater, theNixon)administrationpursued—achieving a negotiated settlement—probably limited the expected gains from the war for most members of the public and may have contributed tothe polarization of opinion. For example, while 29 percent of those Gallup polled in November 1965 thought the war would end in a victory for the United States, 30 percent expected a stalemate or compromise, and 10 percent expected a very lengthy conflict. By May 1966, 54 percent expected the war to result in a compromise, and by February 1968, 61 percent expected such an outcome.In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat unclear for many, the value of the strategic stakes or consequences of a loss mayhavealsodiminished

over the course of the war.

Mueller found a “rally” in support at the beginning of the war and high levels of public support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support had declined in the wake of such events as infighting among the South Vietnamese and the emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time, the public had also come to see that the war would not be over quickly but was instead likely to be “a long, bloody affair.”51 Intheevent, U.S.

forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, supportand oppositionforthe war had hardened to a point at which events on the battlefield or in Washington were less likely to make an impression—supportfor the war wasgenerallydown to hard-core supportersand fell onlyperhapsan additional 10points thereafter. The principal reasonsthat lay behindcontinued support for the war were

the containment of communism, U.S. credibility, and strengthening the resolve of others to resistcommunism.53The Roper Center’s February 1968 poll found that 49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam wascontainment of communism; 33 percent cited the impact on the will of others to resist communism; and 23 percent cited the potential loss of prestige and confidence of U.S. friends andallies.Compared to the benefits of a military victory, the political objective the Johnson andNixonadministrationspursued—achieving a negotiated settlement—probably limited the expected gains from the war for most members of the public and may have contributed topolarization.55

In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat unclear for many, the value of the strategic stakes or consequences of a loss mayalsohavediminishedfor many leaders and members of the publicover the course of the war.56 For others, however, the stakes may have increased.

Crowley, page 69

Larson, 1996

Publicsupportisafluid dynamic: given information and analysis by leaders and elites, the public constantly weighsthe benefits and prospectsofsuccess against the likely and actual costs andthen reachesa determinationas towhether thelikelyoutcome isworth thesacrifice.

As new events occur or objective conditions change, they are interpreted by political leaders and experts, and the ends and means are reevaluated.Traditionally,U.S. military operationshave beenexplained and justified both in normative terms (stressingthe importance of the principles and interestsatstake) and pragmatic terms (stressing

the good prospects and reasonable costs of theinvolvement.) Further,a focus on the particular objectives of the operation and the perceptions of the principles and interests that areinvolvedestablishes a connection between the objectives oftheoperation and the larger purpose behindit.

In short,supportcan be thought of asaconstant rebalancing of

the benefits and prospectsforsuccess against the likely and actual costs—and

a determinationofwhether theoutcome isjudgedworth thecosts—all informed by leaders and experts.As new events occur or objective conditions change, they are interpreted by political leaders and experts, and the ends and means are reevaluated.First, as a practical matter,U.S. military operationsare typicallyexplained and justified both in normativeterms—stressingthe importance of the principles and intereststhat areatstake—andpragmaticterms—stressingthe good prospects and reasonable costs of theintervention. Second,a focus on the particular objectives of the operation and the perceptions of the principles and interests that areengagedestablishes a connection between the objectives ofa givenoperation and the larger purposesitis promoting.

Crowley, page 170

Larson, 1996

As the Sino-Soviet split became more apparent, the costs of Vietnam rose, leading to a waning of public support, an intensification of the public’s suspicion, and the emergence of increasingly skeptical criticism of the strategic importance of Southeast Asia. In fact, concern about the impact on U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal seemed to be the dominant concern for realists. As early as 1966, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau argued that defending Vietnam to contain communism was a misapplication of the containment doctrine, even though it was a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine. Kennan was, however, concerned about the ramifications for U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal.

Seyom Brown suggests that, as the Sino-Soviet split became more apparent and a multipolar world began to emerge and as the costs of Vietnam rose, increasingly skeptical criticism of the strategic importance of Indochina emerged. In fact, concern about the impact on U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal seemed to become the dominant concern for realists. As early as 1966, such realists as George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau were arguing that defending Vietnam to contain communism was a misapplication of the containment doctrine. Kennan was, however, concerned about the ramifications for U.S. credibility of a precipitous withdrawal.

Crowley, page 172

Larson, 1996

And according to Paul M. Kattenburg, the domestic consensus based upon containment of the Soviet Union and communism had been fundamentally shaken by 1969.

According to Paul M. Kattenburg, the domestic consensus based upon containment of the Soviet Union and communism had been fundamentally shaken by 1969.

Crowley, page 267

Larson, 1996

The Fulbright hearingsofearly 1966 had been highly critical of the war and had featured establishment stalwarts criticizingit, thereby

making dissent respectable. Growing congressional and elite criticism of the war called into question both the importance of U.S. interests in Vietnam and the wisdom of incurringadditionalcosts in an intervention that seemed to beshowinglittlesignof progress,and the Democrats were getting the blame.

The Fulbright hearingsinearly 1966 had been highly critical of the war and had featured establishment stalwarts criticizingthe war, thus

making dissent respectable. Growing congressional and elite criticism of the war called into question both the importance of U.S. interests in Vietnam and the wisdom of incurringfurthercosts in an intervention that seemed to beyieldinglittleevidenceof progress.

Crowley, page 278

Larson, 1996

Three years before Nixon took office,fewer than four in tenAmericans believedthatthewar in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher costs. Given thisalreadylimited willingness to accept Korea-levelcasualties,itwasremarkable thatJohnson and Nixonwere able to continue prosecuting the war so long after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those of Korea.By the time oftheTetoffensive in early 1968,the rate at which casualties were being incurred had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer than four in ten had earlier indicated a willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in the thousands, with several hundred dying each week.

Early in the war,fewer than four in tenexpressed a beliefthatawar in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher costs. Given thislimited willingness to accept Korea-likecasualtiesin a war in Vietnam,itisremarkable thattheJohnson and Nixonadministrationswere able to continue prosecuting the war so long after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those of Korea.In the event,by the time of Tet,

the rate at which casualties were being incurred had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer than four in ten had earlier indicated a willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in the thousands, with several hundred dying each week.

Crowley, page 281

Larson, 1996

Even with that flexibility, however, it was clear that the increasing costs came to be judged by majorities as being incommensurate with the expected and actual benefits of the war and its prospects for success.

In Vietnam, the increasing costs came to be judged by majorities as being incommensurate with the expected benefits of the war and its prospects for success.

Crowley, page 352

Larson, 1996

Bymid-1969,there was a general acceptance

by the Nixon administration of a policy of gradual withdrawal while it also continued and formalized the policy of Vietnamization.Thuswithdrawal of a sort became official presidential policy andmembers of theadministrationcould move tosupportit.At the same time,however,leaders of the Democratic opposition became increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people inclined to follow their lead had a model.

As Mueller (1973, p.101) summarized the process after 1968: [With] the ultimate acceptance inmid-1969by the Nixon Administration of a policy of gradual withdrawal while it also continued and formalized the policy of Vietnamization. . .withdrawal of a sort became official presidential policy andadministrationfollowerscould move toitssupport.At the same time,of course,leaders of the Democratic opposition became increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people inclined to follow their lead had a model.

Crowley, page 101

James Chace, "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World,” 1998

By modifying the China aid bill to allow the unexpended portion to be used to continue to aid the KMT, Congress had made it impossible for Acheson to abandon support for the Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with the communists based on their effective control of the government of China. Congress’ action was, of course, a reaction to the success of the anti-communist rhetorical campaign being waged by the administration, but it was met by the unintended consequence of Mao declaring on June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets that he was not an Asian Tito, he stated, “We must lean to one side...Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.”23 Mao’s announcement may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but for months before his statement, the Chinese communist leadership had been giving mixed signals; as Chou Enlai had stated: “It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union,” but he also argued that “the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.”

In effect, Congress was making it impossible for Acheson to abandon support of the Chinese Nationalists and move to a realist policy of establishing relations with Beijing on the basis of who represented the effective government of China. No sooner had the aid bill been modified than Mao Zedong declared on June 30, 1949, that China would align itself with the Soviet Union. To assure the Soviets that he was not about to become an Asian Tito, he asserted, “We must lean to one side…. Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road.” 25 Mao’s decision may have been influenced by the extension of the aid bill, but the way had been foreshadowed by Zhou Enlai a few months earlier when he said: “It is a fond dream of the United States to split China from the Soviet Union.” However, “The Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to make enemies on both sides; no force can prevent it from having two friends at once.”

Crowley, page 102

Chace, 1998

Ten days after Mao’sspeech, he

dispatched Chen Mingshu

to explain his thinking toAmbassadorStuart.In mid-July 1949, Chen toldStuart that Mao’s declaration wasgearedfordomestic consumption and thattheCCPstill hoped for formal diplomatic relations between the United States and a Chinese communist regime.Trade wasthekey issue.Theadministration

saw Sino-American trade as away to pry

the Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao andChousaw it as a hedge against too close an alignment with Stalin.(Simultaneously,Stalin, alarmed at the signing of theNATOtreaty,perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset in therapidly developingcold war.)

In fact,ten days after Mao’s“lean to one side” statement, Maodispatched Chen Mingshu,described as a “fellow traveler of the Communists” from the Nationalists,

to explain his thinking tothe Americanambassadorin Nanjing.In mid-July 1949 Chen toldAmbassadorStuart that Mao’s declaration wasdesigned“for his own Party.”TheChinese Communistsstill hoped for formal diplomatic relations between the United States and a Chinese Communist regime.27 If Mao and Zhou were moving closer to Stalin, they nonetheless hoped to have good relations withtheUnited States, which could eventually lead to recognition. In this respect, their policies briefly converged with what Truman and Acheson were trying to do.TheAmericanssaw Sino-American trade as ameans of weaning awaythe Chinese Communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao andZhousaw it as a hedge against too close an alignment with Stalin.At the same time,Stalin, alarmed at the signing of theNorth AtlanticTreatyon April 4, 1949,perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset in theCold War.

Crowley, page 105

Chace, 1998

In the Letter,Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the failures of the Nationalist government “do not stem from an inadequacy of aid.”Emphasizing

that “history has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the results.”The Letter was essentially a political documentmeant to portraythe Chinese communists aschumpsof Moscow; it stated that theCCPleaders “have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia,”though,

according to John Melby,whodrafted

the White Paper,Acheson did not agree withthisassessment but approved thelanguageto appease the China bloc.38 But

by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow, he made it much more difficult to pursuehis preferredpolicy ofeventualrecognition, evenifMaowere toconquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic opposition.Even at this point,Acheson was still searching for a way tokeep apartMoscowand Beijing.Heapparentlybelieved thatthe CCPwould eventually have to choose between the interests ofitsown people and those ofthe Soviet Union.By accusing Mao ofsubmittingto Stalin, he hoped toinspirethe Chinese to “throw off the foreignyoke.”39

The White Paperaroused widespread fury. JournalistWalter Lippmann, who attacked the language about China’s subservience to the Soviet Union,believedthat the United States wasdoing too muchon behalf ofahopelesscause.

The China blocwas outraged because theybelievedthe United States was doingtoo little. GeneralPatrickHurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for the pro-communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”

Republican Senatorssuch asKnowland, Styles Bridges,and Kenneth Wherry,along with Democrat Pat McCarranassailed the White Paper as “a1054 pagewhitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest.”

In the Letter,signed by the secretary of state, Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the failures of the Nationalist government “do not stem from an inadequacy ofAmericanaid.”Pointing outthat “history has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the results.”29The Letter was essentially a political documentthat portrayedthe Chinese Communists astoolsof Moscow. It stated that theChinese Communistleaders “have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia.”30 This was a position that Acheson did not hold,according to John Melby,a key adviser on China affairs for General Marshall,whohad written the draft ofthe White Paper.31 He approvedthislanguagein orderto appease the China bloc and because he thought it would be little noted. Once again, as he had in 1947 when he used the heightened rhetoric of the “rotten apples” to gain support for aid to Greece and Turkey, in the Letter Acheson dangerously overstated his case.By asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow, he made it much more difficult to pursueapolicy ofrecognition, evenshouldMaoeventuallyconquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic opposition.In fact,Acheson was still searching for a way toseparate Beijing fromMoscow.Heseems to havebelieved thatChina’s Communist leaderswould eventually have to choose between the interests oftheirown people and those ofMoscow.By accusing Mao ofkowtowingto Stalin, he hoped tospur onthe Chinese to “throw off the foreignyoke.” 32 Not only didthe White Paperarouse the ire of

Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about China’s subservience to the Soviet Unionand also believedAmerica had beendoing too muchinalosingcause,it also enragedthe China bloc,whichbelievedAmerica had donetoo little. GeneralHurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”33Republican senatorslikeKnowland, Styles Bridgesof New Hampshire,and Kenneth Wherryof Nebraska,along with Democrat Pat McCarranof Nevada,assailed the White Paper as “a1,054-pagewhitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest.”

Crowley, page 108

Chace, 1998

Walton Butterworth, the assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,arguedforaUN

plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population to vote for either mainland control or some form of UN trusteeship, pending independence,andGeorge Kennan arguedfor ridding the island of the Nationalists

but retaining it asa strategic assetto the United States,Acheson

recommended that the United States abandon any effort to prevent the island from falling to thecommunists.46 But facedwithdomestic pressure

to support Taiwan from anythreat bytheChinesecommunists,Achesonhadtoback down, at leastintheory.

When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that included an appropriation of$75 million for “the general area of China,” Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon discovered thatthe president,on Acheson’scounsel,did not intend to use the money to aid the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In

his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president, hedeclared thatthe United Statesshould not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists on Mao's government, which “would soon be widely recognized.

In the State DepartmentWalton Butterworth, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs,andGeorge Kennan offered different approaches, designed to prevent the island from coming under Mao’s control. Butterworth suggestedaUnited Nationsplebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population to vote for either mainland control or some form of UN trusteeship, pending independence.George Kennanproposed a drastic schemefor ridding the island of the Nationalist soldiersbut retaining it asstrategically valuableto the United States.He urged the use of American forces to throw Chiang’s troops out of Taiwan and the adjoining islands and, under American auspices and protection, create an independent country. This was the way “Theodore Roosevelt might have done it,” he suggested, with “resolution, speed, ruthlessness and self-assurance.” 35Achesonrejected these proposals andrecommended that the United States abandon any effort to prevent the island from falling to theCommunists. 36 In August 1949, in a meetingwithmembers of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed that military measures would be unwise. 37 Still, pressures mounted on Achesonto support Taiwan from anyattack fromthemainlandCommunists.AsAchesonwrotetohis old friend Archibald MacLeishinearly 1950, “Formosa is a subject which seems to draw out the boys like a red haired girl on the beach. It appears that what you want most is what you ain’t got.” 38When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that included an appropriation of$75 million for the “general area of China,” Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon discovered thatTruman,on Acheson’sadvice,did not intend to use the money to aid the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. Ina December 23 meeting between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Acheson argued that “Mao is not a true satellite in that he came to power by his own efforts and was not installed in office by the Soviet army.” Inhis end-of-the-year memorandum to the president hefurtherdeclared thatAmericashould not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists on Mao’s government, which “would soon be widely recognized.”

Crowley, page 114

Chace, 1998

On January 10, Acheson testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.He stated that

he saw no reason to movewith dispatch on the matter of recognizing Mao’s government, saying thathe wanted to see how the CCPwould behave toward Americans in China andhow it would handlethe foreign debtsincurred bythe Nationalist government, but he warned the senators not to get “this thing mixed up with approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should not [use] military forces of the United States to take, secure, or defend Formosa.”Two days later,hedeliveredhis famous speech atthe National Press Club,duringwhich he

reminded his audience thatno onesaid “the Nationalist government fell because it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not resist;” on the contrary, Chiang’s “support in the countryhadmelted away.” He warned Americans against “the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,” which could “deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.” He went on todescribe the military security of the Pacific area, pointing out that the American“defenseperimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippines.Foreshadowing Nixon’s later policy of Vietnamization, he stated that in South Korea,“initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations...”He did emphasize,however, that the United States bore “a direct responsibility” for KoreaandJapan.

On January 10,1950,Acheson testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.As far as recognition of Mao’s government was concerned,he saw no reason to movetoo swiftly at this time.

He wanted to see how the Chinese Communists would behave toward Americans in China, andtheir attitude towardthe foreign debtsofthe Nationalist government, but he warned the senators not to get “this thing mixed up with approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should not [use] military forces of the United States to take, secure, or defend Formosa.”44Two days laterAchesondeliveredan important address on Far Eastern policy tothe National Press Clubin Washington. Tossing aside the speech the department had prepared,which hefelt lacked life and had “no continuity of thought,” he had made extensive notes for a new speech at his house in Georgetown. Acheson’s press club speech had little to do with military matters, and indeed he had urged his listeners not “to become obsessed with military considerations.” In the main, Acheson was repeating for a larger public what he had been saying privately to members of Congress. Hereminded his audience thatnobodysaid “the Nationalist Government fell because it was confronted by overwhelming military force which it could not resist”; on the contrary, Chiang’s “support in the countryhasmelted away.” He warned Americans against “the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,” which could “deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”45 Acheson did, however,describe the military security of the Pacific area, pointing out that the American“defensiveperimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to Japan, then on to Okinawa and the PhilippineIslands.

In South Korea,on the other hand,“initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations….”Acheson emphasized,however, that the United States bore “a direct responsibility” for Korea,as it did forJapan.

Crowley, page 116

Chace, 1998

On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized American consular property in Shanghai and Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all American personnel from the Chinese mainland that spring. A month later, Moscow and Beijing signeda defense pact,the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized American consular property in Shanghai and Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all American personnel from the Chinese mainland that spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed

the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense pact.

Crowley, page 114

Chace, 1998

On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.He reiterated his argument for nonintervention and dismissed Taiwan as “not a great question in American foreign policy,” but he added that “it may become a very great question if it obscures or changes or interferes with what we are trying to do in regard to China.” And again, he stated the belief that a split with Moscow was possible:“If the devil himself runs China,if he is an independent devil, that is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow.”

Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow.”69 Further, Achesontold the senators that he wasparticularlywary ofChiang’sadventurism: the riskwasthat Chiang, who was running a war against the mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,” would drag the United States intowarwithmainlandChina.According to Acheson, Chiang “believedthatWorld War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which case “the United States will have to go back and conquer China, and he will come riding in on our coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned, Chiang wastemptingMao to invade Taiwan: “The •communists would be criminally crazyif they did not put an end to (Chiang’shold ora theisland)just as soon as possible.”Had thisactuallyhappened, Acheson believed that he could have overcomedomesticopposition to recognizingthecommunistregime.

On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized American consular property in Shanghai and Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all American personnel from the Chinese mainland that spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense pact. Yet despite this rapprochement between Russia and China, Acheson did not give up on the hope of abandoning Chiang, recognizing the People’s Republic of China, and then weaning it away from a Soviet alliance.51On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

“If the devil himself runs China,”he said,“if he is an independent devil, that is infinitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow,or China comes under Russia.”Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow.”52Acheson alsotold the senators that he wasespeciallywary ofChiangKai-shek’sadventurism, the riskthat Chiang, who was running a war against the mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,” would drag the United States intoconflictwithChinaproper.According to Acheson, Chiang “believedWorld War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which case “the United States will have to go back and conquer China, and he will come riding in on our coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned, Chiang wasactually invitingMao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be criminally crazy,”he advised the senators,“if they did not put an end to [Chiang’sislandbastion]just as soon as possible.”53Had thishappened, Acheson believed that he could have overcomeopposition to recognizing CommunistChina.

dominant role in containing the Soviet Union,but at a lower level of effortand witha diminished prospect of armed intervention and

greater material assistance from allies.

The Nixon Doctrine envisions the maintenance of America'sdominant role in containing the USSR,but at a lower level of effort,ofa diminished prospect of armed intervention, andwithgreater material assistance from Allies.

Crowley, page 137

Andrianopoulos, 1988

Theobjective wasto reduce America’s burden of involvement without undermining its global commitments and influence or the confidence of its allies,which in turn depended on

reducing the level of international tensions and the expectation of war with adversaries.

TheAdministration's abilityto reduce America's burden of involvement without undermining its global commitments and influence or the confidence of its Alliescritically depends uponreducing the level of international tensions and the expectation of war with adversaries.

A crucial part of the U.S.-China-Vietnam equation was the understanding reached on Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communique,the United States made no specific public concessions on when orifit wouldterminatediplomatic relations with the Republic of China, but it did “acknowledge” Beijing’s position that there is “but one China” and that “Taiwan is part of China.”Further, the United Statesreaffirmed the promises it hadinitiallymade in 1970 that, as “tensions in the area” diminish, Washington would “progressively reduce its forces and military installations in Taiwan.”In addition,the United Statesassertedits interest in a “peaceful settlement” of the Taiwanissue,but thecommunique did notindicatethe specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had offeredthe Chinese in order tofirm upthe new relationship. NixonalsoassuredtheChinese

that he would “actively work toward” and complete “full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by 1976,” the year that would end his second term in office.He indicated that he wouldnotsupport any Taiwanese military action against the mainland or anykind of Taiwaneseindependencemovement, and he

agreed to “discourage Japan or any other third countryfrom moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence diminished.”

The United States made no specific public concessions on when orwhetherit wouldbreakdiplomatic relations with the Republic of China, but it did "acknowledge" Beijing's position that there is "but one China" and that "Taiwan is part of China."In addition, Washingtonreaffirmed the promises it hadfirstmade in 1970 that, as "tensions in the area" diminish, Washington would "progressively reduce its forces and military installations in Taiwan."

The United Statesalso statedits interest in a "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwanproblem,but theCommuniqué did notmentionthe specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had profferedthe Chinese in order tocementthe new relationship.Most significant, especially because of it implications fortheFord administration, was Nixon's assurance that he would "actively work toward" and complete "full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by 1976, the year that would end his second term in office. Besides promisingnottosupport any Taiwanese military action against the mainland or any Taiwanindependence movement--apparently a source of particular concern to Beijing--Nixon alsoagreed to "discourage Japan or any other thirdcountriesfrom moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence diminished.

Crowley, page 305

"The Kissinger Transcripts," 1998

The understandingreached between the U.S. and the PRCon Taiwan wasconnectedwith a less explicit one on Vietnam.Americanforce reductions fromthe ROCwere dependent on thegeneral reductionof tensions inAsia.Theimplicitagreement was thatChina wouldhave to helpto reducethose tensions bygetting theNorth Vietnamese towork with Washington to endthewar. During

the months after Nixon’s1972visit, Kissingercontinually briefed Chinesediplomats on the Paris peace talks andaskedthemexplicitlyto intervene with Hanoi. The Chineseexpressed

criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissingerdescribedthe remarksas“moderate,”far less hostile than they could have been. Evenwhen the peace talkscollapsed afterKissinger’s famous “peace is at hand”remark, andthe Chinese criticized him and argued that only the Soviets could benefit froma continuation ofthewar, they listened

to Kissinger and presumably delivered his December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks to the North Vietnamese. And even thoughBeijing condemnedthe Christmas bombings, it continued to play amoderatingroleuntil the

peace agreementwas signed.

The understanding

on Taiwan waslinkedwith a less explicit one on Vietnam.U.S.force reductions fromTaiwanwere dependent on thelesseningof tensions inthearea. Implicitly,

China wouldalsohave to helplessenthose tensions byencouragingNorth Vietnamtosettle at the conference table. While China's (or for that mattertheSoviet Union's) impact on the negotiations remains to be learned, inthe months after Nixon'svisit, Kissingerwas assiduous in briefing PRCdiplomats on the Paris peace talks andin asking themto intervene with Hanoi. The Chinesewould expresscriticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissingerfound

the remarks"moderate."

When the peace talksbroke down in the wake ofKissinger's famous "peace is at hand"statement,

the Chinese criticized him and argued that only the Soviets could benefit fromextended conflict. Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua admonished that "one should not losethewhole world just to gain South Vietnam." Nevertheless, the Chinese kept listeningto Kissinger and presumably delivered his December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks.WhileBeijingwould strongly condemn

the Christmas bombings, it continued to play aroleas intermediaryuntil thesigning of the Parispeace agreement.

Thepolicy coordinationthat is generated from reaching this levelimplies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce,if not necessarily minimize,their negative consequences for the other states. Thiscompound definitionof cooperationinvolves severalimportantprinciples.First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is directed toward some goal or goals,whichneed not be the samefor allofthe actors involved, butthat the behavior isrationaland grounded in some degree of self-interest.Second,itimplies that cooperation provides the actors with gainsthat they concluded could not be achieved through individualistic action.Thedistribution ofgains need not be the sameacross the board,butthe gainsare mutual.Again, self-interest is the motive:each actor helps the others to realize their goals by adjusting its policies inorder to achieveits owngoal. This dissertation will also attempttodistinguish between cooperation andthepursuitofunilateral advantage.

Cooperation is usuallyconsidered the antithesis ofcompetition or conflict, whichconsists of individualisticgoal-seekingactivitythatseeksto reduce the gains available to others.

Unilateral behaviorand

inactivitymayalso

be considered uncooperative if they do not reduce the negativeramificationsfor others ofthesepolicies.Although cooperation is usually opposed to competition or conflict, it can also take place in a competitive context; indeed, cooperation often arises to prevent existing competition or conflict from spinning beyond the actors’ control. Thus cooperation depends on self-interested goal-directed behavior that includes mutual policy adjustments so that ail participating sides believe they will end up better off than if they had not cooperated; whether or not cooperation actually produces this result is a separate issue.

Policy coordination,in turn,

implies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reducetheir negative consequences for the other states. Thisconceptionof cooperationconsists of twoimportantelements.First, it assumes that each actor's behavior is directed toward some goal(s).Itneed not be the samegoalfor allthe actors involved, butit does assumerationalbehavior on their part.Second,the definitionimplies that cooperation provides the actors with gainsor rewards.The

gains need not be the samein magnitude or kind for each state,buttheyare mutual.Each actor helps the others to realize their goals by adjusting its policies inthe anticipation ofits ownreward. Each actor is not necessarily outtohelp the other, though; it istheanticipationofbettering one's own situation that leads to the adjustment in one's policies. Defining what is not cooperation is also important.Cooperation is usuallyopposed to

competition or conflict, whichimplies

goal-seekingbehaviorthatstrivesto reduce the gains available to othersor to impede their want-satisfaction. But there are other alternatives to cooperation as well.Unilateral behavior,in which actors do not take account of the effects of their actions on others, andalsoinactivityare alternatives to cooperation. Although such behaviorsmaynot attempt to lower the gains of others, they canbe considered uncooperative if they do not reduce the negativeconsequencesfor others ofeach party'spolicies.

Crowley, page 26

Milner, 1992

The cooperation under anarchy literature stresses that fewer players are more conducive to cooperation; indeed theargumentimplicitly suggeststhat two is the ideal number of players,an argumentexplicitlymade by Waltz in his defenseofbipolarity. Butis it necessarily the casethat the fewer theplayersthe better the prospects for cooperation?Thisis an important question that Milner raises and one that requires empirical examination. Challenging the “fewer is better’claimare several arguments.First, ifthe goalisto achievea balanced agreement(in which worrying about cheating is already a given),a larger number of players mayactuallybe better, since itoffers greateropportunities for exchanges andside payments.Grieco argues that “the state will prefer more partners, for larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that relative gains advantaging....better-positionedpartners could be offset by more favorable sharings arising from interactions with weaker partners.”

that two is the ideal number of players,though the point is neverexplicitlystated. Indeed, the extensive useof two-person games reinforces this impression.Is it necessarily the case,though,that the fewer theactorsthe better the prospects for cooperation?Several strands of argument challengethisclaim.First, ifoneisconcerned about more than just cheating, such as whether

a balanced agreementcan be struck,

a larger number of players maybe better, since itprovides moreopportunities for exchanges andside-payments.Grieco argues that "the state will prefer more partners, for larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that relative gains advantaging . . . better-positioned partners could be offset by more favorable sharings arising from interactions with weaker partners."(p. 228)

Crowley, page 27-28

Milner, 1992

As Milner states,“with three actors, in the system, cooperation between two may bemore efficacious than going it alone. Indeed, balance of power theories based on anarchy predict this: states will cooperate to counterbalance others whose relative power is growing.”Grieco’s two-playermodelindicates thatcooperation is difficult; Snidaldemonstrates,however, that addingmore players increases the likelihood thatplayerswill cooperate toincreasetheirownsecurity.

With three actors in the system, cooperation between two may befarmore efficacious than going it alone. Indeed, balance of power theories based on anarchy predict this: states will cooperate to counterbalance others whose relative power is growing.InGrieco'stwo-personmodelcooperation is difficult;asSnidalshows,however,the addition ofmore players increases the likelihood thatgroupswill cooperate toenhancetheirsecurity.

the likelihood of cooperation,then it may follow thatadding issueswill do the same.

On any single issue, twoor morestates may bedivided;on severalissues, embedded in the broader relationship,they are likely to have different preferencehierarchiesandthusbe able todealacross issues.This is the logic of linkage.

In fact,the case for expanded military assistancewas madewith unprecedented urgency by Secretaryof Defense MelvinLaird in preparation forthevastly increased Military Assistance Program

for 1972 andthe large arms transfers of thesucceeding fiscal years. Lairdcharacterized MAP as “the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units.” Laird, however, recognizedthe decliningpopular and congressional support for military assistance. His solution, consideredannually in

the DefenseDepartmentbut proposed for the first time in a secretarial posture statement to the Congress,wasthat “military assistance should be integrated into the defense budget so that we can plan more rationally and present to the Congress more fully an integrated program.” Military aid for certain “forward defense countries,” including South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos, and consisting of about 80 percent of the total category “Support for OtherNations,”106 was, in 1971,alreadyincluded intheU.S.defense budget,thoughthis legislative ployhadnot yet been applied to Taiwan or Korea.

To merge military assistancefurtherinto the regular functional appropriation categories of the defense budgetwasto institutionalizearationale for military assistance thathadbecomeatraditionalpoint ofdebate within the Department of Defense.As Laird stated,

“A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces.”

The case for expanded military assistancehas been statedwith unprecedented urgency by Secretary

Laird in preparation forvastly increased Military Assistance Program(MAP) budget requestsfor 1972 andsucceeding fiscal years.SecretaryLairdhascharacterized MAP as "the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units."[ii]But the Secretary recognizesthe declininglevel ofpopular and Congressional support for military assistance. His solution, consideredperennially withinthe Defenseand State Departmentsbut proposed for the first time in a Secretarial posture statement to the Congress,isthat "military assistance should be integrated into the Defense Budget so that we can plan more rationally and present to the Congress more fully an integrated program." Military aid for certain "forward defense countries," including South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, and consisting of about 80 percent of the total category "Support for OtherNations,"[iii] isalreadymeshed into theDefense Budget.This legislative ployhasnot yet been applied to Korea or Taiwan, though the reduction of our troops inKoreaand the insurance of Taiwan against communist pressure depend, in the judgment of this Administration, on the freedom to substitute U.S. matériel for manpower.To merge military assistanceentirelyinto the regular functional appropriation categories of the Defense Budgetwould beto institutionalizethe dualrationale for military assistance thathasbecometraditionalindebate within the Department of Defense.The first element in this rationale is the argument from "trade-off"-a calculus that compares the costs of equal units of effectiveness of U. S. and foreign troops. This is essentially an assertion of "absolute advantage" and is the basic and obvious sense of Secretary Laird's statement:"A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces,"

Crowley, page 301

Henry Kissinger, "The White House Years," 1979

The administration interpreted Chou’s remarks to mean that North Vietnam was not an extension of Chinese policy and that Chou treated Vietnam largely in the context of long-term Soviet aspirations in the region. His principal interest in seeing the war end quickly was that it weighed down the United States and deflected American interests from more important parts of the world, namely China.

We interpreted this to mean that China would not intervene militarily in Vietnam; that North Vietnam was not an extension of Chinese policy; and that Chou treated Vietnam largely in the context of long‐term Soviet aspirations in southeast Asia. His principal argument for ending the war quickly was that it bogged down the United States and deflected our energies from more important parts of the globe.

Crowley, page 300-301

Kissinger, 1979

Chouaverredrhetorical and marginal materialsupport for Hanoi, but hebased it not on national interest or ideologicalconnectionbut on an historical debt incurred by the Chinese empirecenturies before.TheChinese werenot,however, preparedtorisk warforthisdebt.

The war in Vietnam would not,Chou implied,affect the improvemento f Sino-Americanrelations;shortly thereafter,theSoviets implied the same. “Moscow and Peking, for all their hatredofeach other,andperhaps becauseofit, were agreed on this point: North Vietnam would not be permittedtooverride their greater geopolitical preoccupations. Against all odds,” proclaimed Kissinger, “our diplomacywasontheverge of isolating Hanoi.

Heaverred support for Hanoi but heagain

based it not on national interest or ideologicalsolidaritybut on an historical debt incurred by the Chinese empireseveralcenturies before.Clearly China might make some material sacrifices; it would not runtherisk of war to discharge such a debt. China, insisted the subtle Premier, had refrained from avowing any special link to Vietnam in the communiquébecause it didnotwanttoleave the wrong impression. Chou told Nixon:We have extreme sympathyforthe people of that area. We believe they are closely linked with us. We thought of using wording in the communiqué but then we thought maybe there would be other implications and so we did not do so... As Chairman Mao has pointed out, we who have been victorious have only an obligation to assist them, but not the right to interfere in their sovereignty. Thedebtwe owe them was incurred by our ancestors. We have since liberation no responsibility because we overthrew the old system... Dr. Kissinger can bear witness that we have exerted extreme restraint since July of last year. Yet the key to easing tensions in the world does not lie there and Mr. President and I and Chairman Mao all understand that. We indeed understood each other;the war in Vietnam would notaffect the improvementof ourrelations.Theavowalofrestraintandofthe fact that the keytoeasing tensions did not lie in Indochina left no doubt that Peking’s prioritywasnot the waronits Southern border but its relationship with us. Three months later Moscow revealedthesame priorities, more crudely.

Crowley, page 256

Kissinger, 1979

Kissinger reported thatone view

argued that the Soviets were so suspicious ofU.S.-Chinese cooperationthat any effort to improve relations with China would make Soviet-Americandetenteimpossible.

One view(which we might call the “Slavophile” position)argued that the Soviets were so suspicious ofUS‐ Chinese collusionthat any effort to improve relations with China would make Soviet‐Americancooperationimpossible.

The detente of the 1970’s did not succeed, in the view of manyAmericans, because of Soviet actionsthatcontravened whatthe United Statesunderstood detente to mean. Either the Soviets undermineddetente, or if they did act inways consistentwith it, detenteas a policywas flawed.From the American perspective, then, bothMoscowand detente itselfsharedthe blame forthe declineofthe policy.Theviewfrom Moscow, was, of course, very different. From the Soviet perspective,the joint detente effortwasabandoneddeliberately

by the United Statesasit sought

to seek advantages from a policy of confrontation,renewa

quest for military superiority, andwereunwilling to accept strategicparity.

The detente of the 1970s did not succeed, in the view of mostAmericans, because of Soviet actionswhichcontravened whatweunderstood detente to mean—either the Sovietleaders abuseddetente, or if they did act inaccordancewith it, detenteitselfwas flawed.Boththe Soviet Union

the joint detente effortof the 1970s (the drive for which they attribute to themselves) has been willfullyabandonedby the United States.The leaders of the United States since the late 1970s are seenashaving preferredto seek advantages from a policy of confrontation,as having launchedarenewed Americanquest for military superiority, andasunwilling to accept strategicand politicalparity.

Crowley, page 405

Garthoff, 1982

This difference in

perspective madeit difficultfor Americans and Sovietstoeven conductretrospectiveassessments of thedetente effortofof theI970’sin order todeterminethe causes of its failure.In fact,such assessmentswere not even considerednecessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each side, the actions of the otherwere blamed

for the breakdown ofdetente. But it may have been that neither side hoped that strongly that detente would succeedFrom 1969 to 1979,the rival superpowers sought—with varying degrees of success—to increase the range of cooperation and negotiation of differences while regulating competition and reducingthe likelihoodandthe intensityof confrontation.Of the many reasons for its failure, perhaps the most profound is that it was designed on the American side to be unsustainable.

This difference inperspective—like so many differences in American and Sovietperspectiveand perception—even makesit difficulttoconductparallel American and Sovietassessments of thecommondetente effortof the1970sin order todiagnosethe causes of its failure.Indeed,such assessmentsare scarcely deemednecessary in either Washington or Moscow. On each side, the actions of the otherare virtually taken for granted as having been responsiblefor the breakdown ofdetente...What we are dealing with is the concrete historical experience of a common American-Soviet effortfrom 1969 through 1975, and more tenuously through1979,

to increase the range of cooperation and negotiation of differences, while regulating competition and reducinginstancesandintensitiesof confrontation.

Crowley, page 409-10

Garthoff, 1982

Further, when Nixon returned from the 1972 summit, he not only urged ratification of the SALT agreement but an increase in strategic arms, leading Secretary of Defense Laird to make his support for the treaty contingent on congressional support for new military programs. Negotiation, as he, Nixon, and Kissinger repeatedly made clear, was to be done from a “position of strength,” cold war language that the language of detente had not fully replaced.

Also, upon the President's return to Washington from the summit he urged not only ratification of the SALT I agreements but also an increase in strategic arms. Defense Secretary Laird even conditioned his support for SALT on congressional approval of new military programs, which he justified as necessary so as to be able to negotiate "from a position of strength", wittingly or not invoking a key "cold war" symbol.

Crowley, page 141-143

John Lewis Gaddis, "Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War," 1982

The difficulty here,however,is thatwe have very limited experience with tripolar systems; indeed,our actual experience is limited to thefunctioningof a single system—the balance ofpower—operatingwithin the multipolar(generally five powers) frameworkthat characterizedworldpolitics until World War II, or the bipolararrangementthat has characterized them since. Alternative systems,such as tripolarity,remainderived primarily from multipolarandbipolar theories.

The nature of internationalpoliticssince 1945can be viewed in terms of “systems theory.” Jervis has argued thatan “international system” existswhen

interconnections exist between unitsinthe system, so that changes in some parts of it produce changes in other parts as well, andthat

the collective behavior of the system as a whole differs from the expectations and priorities of the individual units that make itup.5 Since WorldWar II,the

major powers assumedthat little couldhappen in the world withouteitherenhancing ordamagingtheir owninterests: as Jervis notes, “almost by definition a great power is more tightly connected to larger numbers of other states than is a small power.”6 Further,the collective behavior ofstates has notcorresponded to their individual expectations,particularly when manyofthe

Systems theoryprovides criteria for differentiating between stable and unstable politicalframeworks that may help toexplain whysome international systemslast longer thanothers.Deutsch andSingerdefined “stability” as “the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur.” Thissystemhasa

self-regulating mechanisms are most likely tooperatewhen thereissomebasicagreement amongthemajor statesofthe system on the objectivesof

it, when the structure of the systemaccuratelyreflectspower distribution inthesystem,and whenpre-establishedprocedures exist for resolving differences.

The difficulty here is that

our actual experience is limited to theoperationsof a single system-the balance ofpower system-operating eitherwithin the "multipolar"configuration

that characterizedinternationalpolitics until World War II, or the "bipolar"configurationthat has characterized them since. Alternative systemsremainabstract conceptualizations in the minds of theorists,andare of little use in advancing our knowledge of how wars in the real world do or do not occur.3 But "systems theory" itself is something else again: here one can find a useful point of departure for thinking aboutthe nature of internationalrelationssince 1945.

An "international system" exists,political scientists tell us,whentwo conditions are met: first,interconnections exist between unitswithinthe system, so that changes in some parts of it produce changes in other parts as well; and,second,the collective behavior of the system as a whole differs from the expectations and priorities of the individual units that make itUp.4 Certainly demonstrating the "interconnectedness" of post-WorldWar IIinternational relations is not difficult: one of its most prominent characteristics has beenthetendency ofmajor powersto assumethat little if anything canhappen in the world withoutin some wayenhancing ordetracting fromtheir ownimmediate interests.5 Nor has

the collective behavior ofnationscorresponded to their individual expectations:the very fact that the interim arrangementsof1945 have remained largely intact for four decades would have astonished-and quite possibly appalled-thestatesmen whocobbled themtogetherinthehectic months that followed the surrender of Germany and Japan.6 A particularly valuable feature ofsystems theoryis that itprovides criteria for differentiating between stable and unstable politicalconfigurations: these canhelp toaccount for the fact thatsome international systemsoutlastothers.KarlDeutsch and J. David Singerhavedefined "stability" as "the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics: that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur." It is characteristic of such asystem,Deutsch and Singer add, that ithasthecapacity for self-regulation:the abilitytocounteract stimuli that would otherwise threaten its survival, much as the automatic pilot on an airplane or the governor on a steam engine would do. "Self-regulating" systems are very different from whattheycall "self-aggravating" systems, situations that getout of control,like forest fires, drug addiction, runaway inflation, nuclear fission,andof course, although they themselves do not cite the example, all-out war.7Self-regulating mechanisms are most likely tofunction, in turn,when thereexistssomefundamentalagreement amongmajor stateswithinthe system on the objectivesthey are seeking to uphold by participating init, when the structure of the systemreflectstheway in which power is distributed among its respective membersand whenagreed-uponprocedures exist for resolving differencesamong them.

Advising Chinese leaders that the Soviets were determined to amass enough nuclear weapons to destroy their country,Kissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite information.

“We would be prepared, at your request, through whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces,” Kissinger told Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in1971.108 The specific referencewasto Soviet forces deployed during the war that year between India and Pakistan,but Kissinger’s offer was meant to lay the groundwork for a broader proposal of assistance. I

Advising Chinese leaders that the Soviets were determined to amass enough nuclear weapons to destroy their country,HenryKissinger secretly offered China U.S. satellite informationand a hot line long before the communist government gained American diplomatic recognition, according to transcripts of conversations about to be released."We would be prepared, at your request, through whatever sources you wish, to give you whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces," Kissinger told Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, in1971. Hewasreferringto Soviet forces deployed during the war that year between India and Pakistan.

Crowley, page 242

AP, 1999

Briefing Chou on the Soviets on November 10, 1973 in the Great Hall of the People, Kissinger repeated that it was in the interests of the United States to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack on China. “They want us to accept the desirability of destroying China’s nuclear capability,” Kissinger said. Instead, he offered China secret military cooperation with the United States, including “ideas on how to lessen the vulnerability of your forces and how to increase the warning time” before a Soviet attack.

Briefing Chou on the Soviets on November 10, 1973, in the Great Hall of the People, Kissinger said it was in the interests of the United States to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack on China. "They want us to accept the desirability of destroying China's nuclear capability," Kissinger said, according to a transcript of the conversation. Instead, he offered China secret military cooperation with the United States, including "ideas on how to lessen the vulnerability of your forces and how to increase the warning time" before a Soviet attack.

Crowley, page 243

AP, 1999

He met with Kissinger several additional times to discuss the hotline to provide China with strategic U.S. intelligence information, but the Chinese ultimately did not respond to the offer.

While Chou was interested in the proposal and met with Kissinger several times to discuss a hot line to provide China with strategic U.S. intelligence information, the Chinese did not respond to the offer, William Burr wrote in a commentary on the transcripts.

The first was theemphasison structure,theachievement and preservationof which came about bycultivatingcertain behavior of the principal actual and potential participants and giving them a stake in the system. In a balance of power system, only the large, capable nationsmatter,because only they can have enough of a stake in the system and enough resources to maintainit

by exercising self-restraint and by restraining, deliberately or implicitly, theconduct of othernations.The secondtendency of dealing

flexibly and directly with the major adversarieswas oneof maneuver.It was based onan attempt to create a more subtle and dynamic balance, rather than dealing through formal alliancesand their attendant problemsof attaining consensus,potentialsubversionand vetoesby allies,andfree-riding.It alsomade allowances for

dealing in partial alignments, such, as America’s tacitdefenseof China’s northern border against theSoviet Union. Thesetwotendencies—structure(great power politics) and maneuver (flexiblediplomacy)—describedabalance of power policy that was set into motion deliberately bytheadministrationin ordertobetter copewithshifts intheinternational environmentanddomestic pressures.

Two characteristics could be discerned, which equated roughly to a balance of power perspective and a balance of power world:the first was thestresson "structure"and itsachievement and preservationthrough

cultivatingacertain behavior of the principal actual and potential participants, and giving them a stake in the system. In a balance of power system only the large, capable nations"count,"because only they can have enough of a stake in the system and enough resources to maintainthe system,by exercising self-restraint and by restraining, deliberately or implicitly, theexaggeratedconduct of other.The secondcharacteristic was the propensity to dealflexibly and directly with the major adversaries. This constituted a policyof maneuver,an attempt to create a more subtle and dynamic balance, rather than dealing through formal alliances,with the burdenof attaining consensus,the risks of leaks orsubversionby allies,the sufferance of vetoes by inferior and otherwise ineffectual powers,andthe incurring of debts in return for support.It also constituteddealing in partial alignments, such as America's tacitreinsuranceof China's northern border against theUSSR. The twocharacteristics, structure(great power politics) and maneuver (flexiblediplomacy), can be summed up inasingle proposition:TheNixon-Kissingeradministrationdeliberately movedtorationalize relations with its two major adversaries, with the foreseen-perhaps even desired(l)- consequence of unsettling relationswithallies, and inspiring them to make further moves that would increase their independence and their distance fromtheUnited States, attenuating at once their need for our supportandtheir claim on our support

became useful inrallyingand maintaining public support for thebasicgrand strategy.

Themanipulationorextension of

short-term conflict withthe othernation,while not desirable on straightforward international or domestic grounds,became useful ingainingand maintaining public support for thecoregrand strategy.

Crowley, page 4

Christensen, 1996

Perceiving fundamental changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947 and Mao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around newly-designed long-term strategies to respond to those shifts and to preempt any resulting negative consequence.

Viewing basic changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947 and Mao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around long-term strategies, designed to respond to those shifts.

James Reston once called it “the most unpopular American war of this century”; a study group for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention o f Violence declared that it “commandedless popular support than any previous American international war”; and journalist David Wisestatedthatthe Vietnam warwas“the most unpopular war in[American]history.”

James Reston once called it "the most unpopular American war of this century" a study group for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence hasde-clared that it "commandsless popular support than any previous American international war"; and journalist David Wisehas disclosedthatinthe Vietnam War,the nation entered"the most unpopular war initshistory."