Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume
XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico

326. Editorial Note

In telegram 923 from Quito, May 22, 1965, the Embassy assessed the
internal threat to the junta in Ecuador. Although a change did not
appear imminent, the Embassy recommended emphasizing “the imperative of
unity” to all factions of the military, while warning opposition leaders
that a revolutionary alliance with the Communists would attract the
“deep distrust” of the United States. The Embassy also reported that it
was encouraging the junta to form a counter-insurgency group “capable of
snuffing out initial revolutionary attempts to establish insurgent
forces.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ECUADOR) On July
14 the Department noted that demonstrations had so weakened the junta
that plans to hold elections in July 1966 appeared “unrealistic.” To
avoid a violent overthrow of the government, the Department suggested
that the Embassy urge the junta to “shorten substantially scheduled
transfer of power, modify composition significantly, or transfer power
to provisional civilian government.” (Telegram 26 to Quito; ibid.,
POL 15 ECUADOR) The Embassy replied
that such interference would not “expedite the process,” since the junta
had just announced a new plan to restore constitutional order.
Meanwhile, the Embassy reiterated its proposal to support the junta in
forming a counter-insurgency group. (Telegram 59 from Quito, July 15;
ibid.)

[text not declassified] (Department of INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 24, August 26, 1965) The Department countered by citing NSAM 177 (see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume IX,
Document 150), which assigned overall responsibility for
police assistance programs, including counter-insurgency efforts, to the
Agency for International Development. The Department argued that an
overt program managed by AID and
maintained under the Ecuadorean National Police stood a better chance of
surviving the junta. (Memorandum from Vaughn to Thompson, August 16; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 24, August 26, 1965)

On August 26 the 303 Committee approved the proposal to support a
counter-insurgency group in Ecuador, subject to further clarification of
the organizational details. (Memorandum for the record by Jessup, August
27; ibid., c. 25, September 9, 1965) In telegram 221 from Quito,
September 6, Coerr explained
that, due to growing opposition within the military, “it would be
impossible to establish special unit in DGI.” Coerr recommended
transferring the unit to the army, although this might pose “a problem
in inter-agency relations within USG.”[Page 708](Telegram 221
from Quito, September 6; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–3
ECUADOR) On September 9 the 303 Committee decided that the Department of
Defense [text not declassified] should “sort out
these arrangements and keep the committee informed by phone.”
(Memorandum from Carter to Vaughn, September 13; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Special Files, July–December 1965). [text not
declassified] (Memorandum from Jessup to Vance, September 10;
National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject
Files, Ecuador)