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Last-Modified: 1999/09/14
Then there follow other instructions with regard to the
operation.
Paragraph 5: "Occupation of Norway, Weserubung Nord.
The task of Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most
important places on the coast by sea and airborne
operations.
The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out
of the transport by sea of the landing troops."
And there follows a reference to the part of the Air Force,
and I would like particularly to draw the Court's attention
to that reference.
This is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler's directive:-
"The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed,
will ensure air defence and will make use of Norwegian
bases for air warfare against Britain."
I am underlining that entry at this stage, because I shall
be referring to it in connection with a later document.
Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to
the final decision of Hitler -
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant
by whom it was initialled, Fricke, on the first page of that
document.
MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is an initial by Fricke, who is a
different person altogether from the defendant Frick. This
is a high functionary in the German Admiralty and has no
connection with the defendant who is before the Tribunal.
As I was saying, my Lord, while these decisions were being
made, reports were coming in through Rosenberg's
organisation from Quisling, and if the which is Court will
again turn, for the last time, to Document 007-PS, which is
Rosenberg's report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of
information which Rosenberg's organisation was supplying at
this time. The third paragraph, "Quisling's reports" - that
is in Annex I in Rosenberg's report, the section dealing
with Norway, the paragraph beginning with:-
"Quisling's reports, transmitted to his representative in
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit
consent of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent
by January. These increasingly better substantiated
communications were in the sharpest contrast to the views
of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the
desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygaardsvold
Cabinet and was convinced of that Government's intention
and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in
Norway knew that Quisling's representative for Germany
maintained the closest relations to him; he therefore
succeeded in gaining a foothold within governmental
circles of the Nygaardsvold Cabinet and in listening to
the Cabinet members' views. Hagelin transmitted what he
had heard to the Bureau" - Rosenberg's bureau - "which
conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter
Rosenberg. During the night of 16th to 17th February,
English destroyers attacked the German steamer 'Altmark'
in Josingfjord."
[Page 191]
The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the
action by the British destroyer "Cossack" against the German
naval auxiliary vessel "Altmark", which was carrying three
hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to
Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position
of the British delegation with regard to that episode is
that the use that was being made by the "Altmark" of
Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in
itself of Norwegian neutrality, and the action taken by
H.M.S. "Cossack", which was restricted to rescuing the three
hundred British prisoners on board-no attempt being made to
destroy the "Altmark" or to capture the armed guards on
board her - was fully justified under International Law.
Now the Rosenberg report, the reading of which I interrupted
to give that statement of the British view on the "Altmark"
episode - the Rosenberg report continues:
"The Norwegian Government's reaction to this question
permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been
covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and
the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of
Section Leader Scheidt, who in turn derived his
information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after
this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the
opposite view, and went on record as believing in the
good intentions of the Norwegians."
So the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred
the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered
judgement of German diplomatic representatives in Norway.
The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the
Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The
culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are
again found in Jodl's diary, which is the last document in
the document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of
the 3rd March:
"The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the
necessity of a swift entry into N" - which is Norway -
"with strong forces.
No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid
acceleration of the attack necessary".
Then the last entry on 3rd March:
"Fuehrer decides to carry out 'Weser Exercise' before
case 'Yellow' with a few days interval."
So that the important issue of strategy, which had been
concerning the German High Command for some time, had been
decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be
sealed before the fate of the Low Countries; and the Court
will observe from those entries Of 3rd March, that, by that
date, Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea
of a Norwegian aggression.
The next entry in Jodl's diary of 5th March:
"Big conference with the three Commanders-in-Chief about
'Weser Exercise'; Field Marshal in a rage because not
consulted till now. Will not listen to anyone and wants
to show that all preparations so far made are worthless.
Result:
(a) Stronger forces to Narvik.
(b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Lutzow
in Trondheim).
(c) Christiansand can be left out at first.
(d) Six divisions envisaged for Norway.
(e) A foothold to be gained immediately in
Copenhagen."
[Page 192]
Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court's
attention is the entry of 13th March, which the Court may
think is one of the most remarkable in the whole
documentation of this case.
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W'." - Weser
Exercise - "He is still looking for an excuse."
The entry of the next day, 14th March, shows a similar pre-
occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking an excuse for
the flagrant aggression. It reads:-
"English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to
sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard
own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer
has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser
Exercise."
Then I would like the Court to look at the entry for 21St
March, which, by inadvertence, has been included in the next
page - the bottom of Page 6.
"Misgivings of Task Force 21 ."
The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already
that Task Force 21 was Falkenhorst's Force, which was
detailed to conduct this invasion.
"Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval
between taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and
close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any
earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out
to England and America. If resistance is put up it must
be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries
must emphasise the military measures taken, and even
exaggerate them."
Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next
entry, if the Court will turn to Page 5, of 28th March, the
third sentence:
"Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning
the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst
and the other two commanders are worrying about matters
which are none of their business. Franke sees more
disadvantages than advantages.
In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and
roundly declares that he will not stand for the Navy
clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik,
Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval
forces."
There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the
faithful collaborator of Hitler.
Then on 2nd April:
"Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All
confirm preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out
of the Weser Exercise for 9th April."
Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th April.
"Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of
Military Intelligence 1, returns with good results from
the talks with Quisling in Copenhagen."
Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued to
be most active.
The prosecution has in its possession a large number of
operation orders that were issued in connection with the
aggression against Norway and Denmark, but I propose to draw
the Court's attention to only two of them to illustrate the
extent of the secrecy and the deception that was used by the
[Page 193]
defendants and their confederates in the course of that
aggression. I would now draw the Court's attention to
Document C-115 which, for the purpose of the record, will be
Exhibit GB 90. First of all I will draw the Court's
attention to the second paragraph, "General Orders", with a
date, "4th April, 1940":
"The barrage-breaking vessels, Sperrbrecher, will
penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo
Fjord disguised as merchant steamers.
Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are
to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of
English steamers. I lay particular stress on the
importance of not giving away the operation before zero
hour."
Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces,
dated 24th March, 1940: "Behaviour during entrance into the
harbour." The third paragraph is the part that I wish to
draw the Court's attention to.
"The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will
be answered in English. In answer to questions a text
with something like the following content will be chosen:
'Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.'
Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:-
'Koln' -- H.M.S.'Cairo';
'Konigsberg' -- H.M.S. 'Calcutta';
'Bromsoe' -- H.M.S. 'Faulkner';
'Karl Peters' -- H.M.S. 'Halcyon';
'Leopard' -- British destroyer;
'Wolf' -- British destroyer;
E-boats -- British motor torpedo boats.
Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to
be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke."
And then finally the next order dated the 24th March, 1940,
Annex 3 "To Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces; most
secret."
Next page, Page 2:-
"Following is laid down as guiding principle should one
of our own units find itself compelled to answer the
challenge of passing craft; to challenge in case of the
'Koln': H.M.S. 'Cairo'; then to order to stop; (1) Please
repeat last signal; (2) Impossible to understand your
signal; in case of a warning shot: Stop firing. British
ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as to
destination and purpose: Going Bergen. Chasing German
steamers."
Then I would draw the Court's attention to Document C-151,
which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB 91,
which is a Donitz; order in connection with this operation.
If the Court will observe, it is headed:
"Top Secret, Operation Order' Hartmut'. Occupation of
Denmark and Norway.
This
order comes into force on the code word 'Hartmut'. With
its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the
boats taking part lose their validity.
The day and hour are designated as 'Weser-Day' and
'WeserHour', and the whole operation is known as
'Weserubung'.
The operation ordered by the code word has as its
objective the rapid surprise-landing of troops in Norway.
Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic
and from the land side."
[Page 194]
There is at the end of that paragraph another contribution
by Donitz to this process of deception:
"The naval force will, as they enter the harbour, fly the
British flag until the troops have landed, except
presumably at Narvik."
The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on 9th
April, 1940, the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and
almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched.
When the invasions had already begun a German memorandum was
handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark attempting
to justify the German action, and I would like to draw the
Court's attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB 92. That is
at the beginning of the book of documents, the sixth
document of the book. I am not proposing to read the whole
of that memorandum. I have no doubt the defending counsel
will deal with any parts which they consider relevant to the
defence. The Court will observe that it is alleged that
Britain and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of
breaches of International Law, and that Britain and France
were making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway,
and that the Government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce
in such a situation.
The memorandum states -and I would now draw the Court's
attention to Page 3 of the memorandum, to the paragraph just
below the middle of the page beginning "The German Troops":-
"The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on
Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does
not intend to make use of the points occupied by German
troops as bases for operations against England, as long
as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England
and France. German military operations aim much more
exclusively at protecting the North against proposed
occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French
forces."
In connection with that statement I would remind the Court
that in his operation order of 1st March, Hitler had then
given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases
for air warfare against Britain. That is 1st March. And this
is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9th
April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to
Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a classic Nazi
combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat.
They read:-
"The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal
Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will
respond with understanding to the German measures, and
offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to
be and would be broken by all possible means by the
German forces employed, and would therefore lead only to
absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian
Government is therefore requested to take all measures
with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the
German troops can take place without friction and
difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian
relations that have always existed, the Reich Government
declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany
has no intention of infringing by her measures the
territorial integrity and political independence of the
Kingdom of Norway, now or in the future."
What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of
Norway was shown by their conduct on 9th April. I now refer
the Court to Document
[Page 195]
TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB 93, which is a report by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces. It is at
the beginning of the document book, the last of the TC.
documents.
I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the
report. If the Tribunal will turn to the second page, it
reads:-
"The Germans, considering the long lines of
communications and the threat of the British Navy,
clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and
speed in the attack. In order to paralyse the will of the
Norwegian people to defend their country and, at the same
time, to prevent Allied intervention, it was planned to
capture all the more important towns along the coast
simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament
and other military and civilian people occupying
important positions were to be arrested before organised
resistance could be put into effect, and the King was to
be forced to form a new government with Quisling as its
head."

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