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The Airport Security Follies

By Pico Iyer December 28, 2007 6:52 pmDecember 28, 2007 6:52 pm

Six years after the terrorist attacks of 2001, airport security remains a theater of the absurd. The changes put in place following the September 11th catastrophe have been drastic, and largely of two kinds: those practical and effective, and those irrational, wasteful and pointless.

The first variety have taken place almost entirely behind the scenes. Explosives scanning for checked luggage, for instance, was long overdue and is perhaps the most welcome addition. Unfortunately, at concourse checkpoints all across America, the madness of passenger screening continues in plain view. It began with pat-downs and the senseless confiscation of pointy objects. Then came the mandatory shoe removal, followed in the summer of 2006 by the prohibition of liquids and gels. We can only imagine what is next.

To understand what makes these measures so absurd, we first need to revisit the morning of September 11th, and grasp exactly what it was the 19 hijackers so easily took advantage of. Conventional wisdom says the terrorists exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling aboard box-cutters. What they actually exploited was a weakness in our mindset — a set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings.

In years past, a takeover meant hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews were trained in the concept of “passive resistance.” All of that changed forever the instant American Airlines Flight 11 collided with the north tower. What weapons the 19 men possessed mattered little; the success of their plan relied fundamentally on the element of surprise. And in this respect, their scheme was all but guaranteed not to fail.

For several reasons — particularly the awareness of passengers and crew — just the opposite is true today. Any hijacker would face a planeload of angry and frightened people ready to fight back. Say what you want of terrorists, they cannot afford to waste time and resources on schemes with a high probability of failure. And thus the September 11th template is all but useless to potential hijackers.

No matter that a deadly sharp can be fashioned from virtually anything found on a plane, be it a broken wine bottle or a snapped-off length of plastic, we are content wasting billions of taxpayer dollars and untold hours of labor in a delusional attempt to thwart an attack that has already happened, asked to queue for absurd lengths of time, subject to embarrassing pat-downs and loss of our belongings.

The folly is much the same with respect to the liquids and gels restrictions, introduced two summers ago following the breakup of a London-based cabal that was planning to blow up jetliners using liquid explosives. Allegations surrounding the conspiracy were revealed to substantially embellished. In an August, 2006 article in the New York Times, British officials admitted that public statements made following the arrests were overcooked, inaccurate and “unfortunate.” The plot’s leaders were still in the process of recruiting and radicalizing would-be bombers. They lacked passports, airline tickets and, most critical of all, they had been unsuccessful in actually producing liquid explosives. Investigators later described the widely parroted report that up to ten U.S airliners had been targeted as “speculative” and “exaggerated.”

Among first to express serious skepticism about the bombers’ readiness was Thomas C. Greene, whose essay in The Register explored the extreme difficulty of mixing and deploying the types of binary explosives purportedly to be used. Green conferred with Professor Jimmie C. Oxley, an explosives specialist who has closely studied the type of deadly cocktail coveted by the London plotters.

“The notion that deadly explosives can be cooked up in an airplane lavatory is pure fiction,” Greene told me during an interview. “A handy gimmick for action movies and shows like ’24.’ The reality proves disappointing: it’s rather awkward to do chemistry in an airplane toilet. Nevertheless, our official protectors and deciders respond to such notions instinctively, because they’re familiar to us: we’ve all seen scenarios on television and in the cinema. This, incredibly, is why you can no longer carry a bottle of water onto a plane.”

The threat of liquid explosives does exist, but it cannot be readily brewed from the kinds of liquids we have devoted most of our resources to keeping away from planes. Certain benign liquids, when combined under highly specific conditions, are indeed dangerous. However, creating those conditions poses enormous challenges for a saboteur.

“I would not hesitate to allow that liquid explosives can pose a danger,” Greene added, recalling Ramzi Yousef’s 1994 detonation of a small nitroglycerine bomb aboard Philippine Airlines Flight 434. The explosion was a test run for the so-called “Project Bojinka,” an Al Qaeda scheme to simultaneously destroy a dozen widebody airliners over the Pacific Ocean. “But the idea that confiscating someone’s toothpaste is going to keep us safe is too ridiculous to entertain.”

Yet that’s exactly what we’ve been doing. The three-ounce container rule is silly enough — after all, what’s to stop somebody from carrying several small bottles each full of the same substance — but consider for a moment the hypocrisy of T.S.A.’s confiscation policy. At every concourse checkpoint you’ll see a bin or barrel brimming with contraband containers taken from passengers for having exceeded the volume limit. Now, the assumption has to be that the materials in those containers are potentially hazardous. If not, why were they seized in the first place? But if so, why are they dumped unceremoniously into the trash? They are not quarantined or handed over to the bomb squad; they are simply thrown away. The agency seems to be saying that it knows these things are harmless. But it’s going to steal them anyway, and either you accept it or you don’t fly.

But of all the contradictions and self-defeating measures T.S.A. has come up with, possibly none is more blatantly ludicrous than the policy decreeing that pilots and flight attendants undergo the same x-ray and metal detector screening as passengers. What makes it ludicrous is that tens of thousands of other airport workers, from baggage loaders and fuelers to cabin cleaners and maintenance personnel, are subject only to occasional random screenings when they come to work.

These are individuals with full access to aircraft, inside and out. Some are airline employees, though a high percentage are contract staff belonging to outside companies. The fact that crew members, many of whom are former military fliers, and all of whom endured rigorous background checks prior to being hired, are required to take out their laptops and surrender their hobby knives, while a caterer or cabin cleaner sidesteps the entire process and walks onto a plane unimpeded, nullifies almost everything our T.S.A. minders have said and done since September 11th, 2001. If there is a more ringing let-me-get-this-straight scenario anywhere in the realm of airport security, I’d like to hear it.

I’m not suggesting that the rules be tightened for non-crew members so much as relaxed for all accredited workers. Which perhaps urges us to reconsider the entire purpose of airport security:

The truth is, regardless of how many pointy tools and shampoo bottles we confiscate, there shall remain an unlimited number of ways to smuggle dangerous items onto a plane. The precise shape, form and substance of those items is irrelevant. We are not fighting materials, we are fighting the imagination and cleverness of the would-be saboteur.

Thus, what most people fail to grasp is that the nuts and bolts of keeping terrorists away from planes is not really the job of airport security at all. Rather, it’s the job of government agencies and law enforcement. It’s not very glamorous, but the grunt work of hunting down terrorists takes place far off stage, relying on the diligent work of cops, spies and intelligence officers. Air crimes need to be stopped at the planning stages. By the time a terrorist gets to the airport, chances are it’s too late.

In the end, I’m not sure which is more troubling, the inanity of the existing regulations, or the average American’s acceptance of them and willingness to be humiliated. These wasteful and tedious protocols have solidified into what appears to be indefinite policy, with little or no opposition. There ought to be a tide of protest rising up against this mania. Where is it? At its loudest, the voice of the traveling public is one of grumbled resignation. The op-ed pages are silent, the pundits have nothing meaningful to say.

The airlines, for their part, are in something of a bind. The willingness of our carriers to allow flying to become an increasingly unpleasant experience suggests a business sense of masochistic capitulation. On the other hand, imagine the outrage among security zealots should airlines be caught lobbying for what is perceived to be a dangerous abrogation of security and responsibility — even if it’s not. Carriers caught plenty of flack, almost all of it unfair, in the aftermath of September 11th. Understandably, they no longer want that liability.

As for Americans themselves, I suppose that it’s less than realistic to expect street protests or airport sit-ins from citizen fliers, and maybe we shouldn’t expect too much from a press and media that have had no trouble letting countless other injustices slip to the wayside. And rather than rethink our policies, the best we’ve come up with is a way to skirt them — for a fee, naturally — via schemes like Registered Traveler. Americans can now pay to have their personal information put on file just to avoid the hassle of airport security. As cynical as George Orwell ever was, I doubt he imagined the idea of citizens offering up money for their own subjugation.

How we got to this point is an interesting study in reactionary politics, fear-mongering and a disconcerting willingness of the American public to accept almost anything in the name of “security.” Conned and frightened, our nation demands not actual security, but security spectacle. And although a reasonable percentage of passengers, along with most security experts, would concur such theater serves no useful purpose, there has been surprisingly little outrage. In that regard, maybe we’ve gotten exactly the system we deserve.

Your commentary on airport security is, by far, the best I have read in the six years since 9/11. As a pilot with a major U.S. airline I am subject, daily, to the insane public policy we know as airline security. Your essay brought out most of the reasons this wasteful system needs to change, but I will give you two examples the show that our security system was NOT derived from security experts, but appears to be some government beaureacrat’s idea of security.
As a uniformed crew member, I am given more latitude in regards to carrying liquids. In uniform: shirt with epaulets, tie and I.D. badge, I get through security with all the toothpaste, after shave and water bottles I can carry. However, take away the shirt with epaulets and the tie, IOW, dressed in civilian clothes, and I am subject to the same liquid restrictions as the traveling public, despite my I.D. badge. So the difference is not my airline I.D., but a shirt and tie. This comes up when we travel for company business and personal travel. I have no choice but to play TSA’s little game by putting on my uniform, get through security, then change back into civilian clothes. Where is the sanity?
Case #2.

Let’s think about something. I am in my pilot uniform and going through security and about to fly an aircraft and passengers from point A to B. I and my co-pilot will be sealed in the cockpit in front of a security door that cannot be opened from the outside. I will have in my hands the only “lethal” weapon used on 9/11, – the control yoke. So just what is it the TSA is checking me for? A gun? A knife? What? If I had been recuited by ‘the bad guys’ do I need to carry ANYTHING lethal? Of course not! Therefore, I should not have to go through security at all! The American public have become Stepford Wives in this wasteful government charade.

The final proof of the lack of common sense in our overall security was a rule, obviously concockted by a non-security knowledgeable beaucrat, was the :30 minute rule applied to Washington National Airport. The government came to its senses a few years ago and abolished it but this was in place for several years. As you may recall, passengers had to be in their seats with seat belts fastened when within 30 minutes of take-off or landing at Washington National. The ridiculous part – this rule did not apply to neighboring airports Baltimore-Washington or Washington Dulles. Since I am based here I have first-hand knowledge of this. Stated another way, passengers on flights from BWI and Dulles can be allowed to get out of their seats after the landing gear comes up but on flights from National Airport westbound, passengers have to remain seated until somwhere over West Virginia or Ohio. Flights from Dulles Airport to Europe and Northeastern cities fly within 7-8 miles of the White House and had NO restrictions! This illustrates the lack of brains behind what is call “National Security.” If you are not scared (of our government), you are not paying attention.

yes, the outrage is even more insidious when you think how much mileage has been made of the “see they haven’t attacked since 9/11″ argument that justifies everything (iraq, domestic wiretap, gauntanamo, to airports, massive $$$) that has been done as a reaction to 9/11.

finally, someone else who gets it — we’re constantly told “they hijacked planes with box cutters!” No, they hijacked planes with the knowledge that people were told not to resist hijackers, however they were armed.

now someone needs to tell the american public that it is time to resist its government. The tactics being used by the government — they’re learned to not resist — are hardly originaly,as those 19 hijackers could well testify.

Why do I stand for all the garbage you describe? Because, otherwise, I’ll not get to fly anywhere, anytime. I’m already hassled because my name is so common; to complain is likely to put me on the no-fly list forever. Whatever its attitude toward real threats, complaints are not appreciated at all by the TSA.

At last, a voice of reason. Unfortunately, airline security has become an emotional and political issue and I do not think that any politician will dare to attempt to return any measure of dignity to the traveling public.

So very true, this is the first time I’ve seen this printed so clearly. Thanks.

May I also add the numerous “safety” rules that we have to endure in the plane. Do we really need to see the flight attendants’ silly demonstration of how to buckle a seat belt in every single flight. How about a simple referral to a printed page of security instructions. Also, in spite of the flight attendants’ overreactions, I don’t see why listening to music during landing and takeoff is so unsafe.

There is something about air travel that makes people endure so many meaningless rituals.

Thank you, Mister Smith: it’s time you went back to Washington. Ninety years ago, H.L. Mencken made this observation: “Civilization, in fact, grows more and more maudlin and hysterical; especially under democracy it tends to degenerate into a mere combat of crazes; the whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by an endless series of hobgoblins, most of them imaginary.” La plus ca change…

I whole heartedly agree, and I don’t believe losing our dignity and privacy for air travel is a trifling matter. We should protest, we should be infuriated but we seem to be a nation of sheep…stupid sheep at that, as we continue to fund a war in a country that had no connection to 9/11. And would-be Presidents talk about other things and we are so easily distracted, lulled, deceived.

Any seasoned FBI agent will tell you how to take C4 into an airplane — in your rectum. I have tempered my own outrage at the inane screening to keep my blood pressure down and named as just one more incompetence of the people th Bush administration have put in charge of our country.

The problem with outrage is that there is no concerted voice to say repeatedly what you have written. How many times have we read when someone protested (especially at the airport) they were delayed and questioned for literally hours and in many cases detained in holding rooms for daring to say what you have written. At the same time, because terrorism is new to us (or it used to be before it got abused by our leaders), we thought that those in power would use it with a level of common sense. It is now clear that people with a lower level of understanding who would rather focus on the “security angle” rather than how to get it right. In the 70’s airlines used to brag how their planes ran on time and how the business of America flies…now, its a very unpleasant ordeal. I hope someone who can make a difference will.

I couldn’t agree more with all of the above. But in six years of saying the exact same things to family, friends, and strangers, I’ve generally gotten a response varying from “Hmm, maybe you’re right” to “These security measures must be doing something!” I myself have inadvertently brought banned items onto planes on several occasions, but even after I tell these stories, most people I speak with seem to want to believe that their inconvenience actually means something. Only a long campaign to educate people about reality (and common sense) could alleviate this blindness, I think.

Thanks for the “Jet Lagged” editorial. The “check off” one has to go thru prior to flying is something akin to what a shuttle commander must go thru; that is with respect to process. E.g., shampoo, 3 oz-check; mouthwash, 3 oz-check, etc. all in the name of “security.” Except what the shuttle crew goes thru is not ridiculous. Protest is not allowed. We must passively accomodate the rules of the fearmongers for if we don’t, at the very least, we risk embarrassment and at the worst, physical assault.

Returning from Europe earlier this year we had airport security confiscate the water and wine bottles we’d been given on the plane, by the airline.

This was after we’d been through immigration and customs inspections which had presumably declared us and our baggage “harmless” for entry into the United States. But apparently not the airport concourse.

I have no idea what happened to the people who had been told they could purchase liquids, like perfume, in the airport we’d come from in Europe.

This was the most absurd thing I’ve ever seen in 20 years of international air travel. We had less trouble traveling in and out of Israel and Jordan two years ago, where their security procedures at least seemed to have some point behind them, and people (the locals, anyway) were more than willing to complain if they didn’t.

Here’s the key sentence of the post: “imagine the outrage among security zealots should airlines be caught lobbying for what is perceived to be a dangerous abrogation of security and responsibility — even if it’s not.”

Remember Willie Horton, the convict who perhaps cost Michael Dukakis the presidency by committing murder while out of prison on a weekend furlough? Our public climate has devolved to a point where decision-makers are less concerned with what’s plausible than filled with dread at the prospect of co-starring in the next Willie Horton story. Until this changes, we will be unable to escape the current obsession with pursuing rational ends — national security — through largely irrational means.

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The holiday season is a trying time for most Americans, but perhaps nothing taxes our patience and pocketbooks more than flying. For the month of December, The Times has asked seven writers with long experience in the industry to comment on the state of commercial air travel.