jrafterpoliticshttps://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com
Thu, 20 Jul 2017 11:51:41 +0000enhourly1http://wordpress.com/https://s2.wp.com/i/buttonw-com.pngjrafterpoliticshttps://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com
Assessing the drivers behind China’s naval expansion and its implications for regional securityhttps://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2017/03/24/assessing-the-drivers-behind-chinas-naval-expansion-and-its-implications-for-regional-security/
https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2017/03/24/assessing-the-drivers-behind-chinas-naval-expansion-and-its-implications-for-regional-security/#respondFri, 24 Mar 2017 11:26:15 +0000http://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/?p=28]]>Since the demonstration of the immense superiority of the USA’s military during the First Gulf War, China has reflected on its own military power and embarked upon a substantial mission to modernise its forces; in order to reduce this overwhelming capability gap. Significant funds have been channelled towards the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the necessity for China to command a ‘blue water navy’. A blue water maritime force is essentially capable of operating in deep waters of the open ocean, away from home shores- something China does not currently possess. This essay will address the reasons necessitating China’s naval expansion and the potential implications this could have on regional security. The main focus of this essay will be on China’s emphasis of securing sea lanes of communication (SLOC’s), and China’s vulnerability due to its excessive maritime trade; this will be my main argument behind the naval expansion. However, I will also delve into how maritime disputes with China’s neighbours have led to a naval build-up, as well as how US dominance of the Asia-Pacific has exacerbated China’s perceptions of its need for a modernised naval force. Unfortunately, due to space limitations, I will not be able to explore Ross’ (2009) argument that China’s build-up is fuelled by nationalism and the need to give the Chinese Communist party added legitimacy. Ultimately this essay will conclude that China’s reliance on imported energy resources and its vast volume of maritime trade have precipitated its naval growth, and I will also attempt to lay out the potential implications for regional security and whether the impending Sino-US clash, that is so often spoke of, holds much weight.

China is acutely aware of its immense dependence on SLOC’s, for both energy and trade, Zhao (2008) illustrates this “80% of China’s oil imports flow through the 630 mile Malacca Strait, a single, pirate-ridden ocean chokepoint”. This strait is imperative to Chinese prosperity and this is backed up by Scobell and Cooper (2015, p.84) “in 1993 the mainland became a net importer of petroleum…this signalled the PRC’s growing dependence on sea lines of communication radiating through the ‘near seas’ and out beyond the ‘first island chain’”. Of all SLOC’s China recognises the paramount importance of this stretch of water, and the potential for its enemies to blockade this choke point in times of war. This has the chance to potentially cripple China, thus China’s recent naval expansion has looked to develop a force capable of resisting this. This point is reiterated by Lai (2007) who states “As China lacks a blue water navy, hostile moves by external powers or a severe terrorist attack would acutely disrupt its oil routes”. This has become such a cause for concern that “China is developing alternate oil land routes to reduce its reliance on the Strait of Malacca”. (Lai, 2007) China’s naval ineptitude is resulting in the development of expensive overland oil pipelines, the PLAN is hoping to mitigate against the need this. It is also aiming to be able to respond in the event of a crisis. It is clearly demonstrated that for China to secure its interests in the region, the need for a modernised, well-trained navy is integral. With the launching of the Liaoning (aircraft-carrier) in 2011, which Erickson et al. (2012) determine “will be essential in defending Chinese interests into the Pacific and Indian Ocean”; and with the evacuation of its citizens from Yemen in 2015 (BBC, 2015) China has progressed rapidly towards being able to command an influence in these areas of strategic importance. China has recognised that its green water (near-shore) naval capabilities are unable to protect its strategic interests in the South China Sea and into the Indian Ocean. This realisation has only been intensified by the US naval dominance in the Asia-Pacific. China has looked to secure SLOC’s with its naval build-up.

As President Obama laid out his intentions for the USA to ‘pivot’ back to Asia (The White House, 2011) it became clear that the USA’s dominance of the Asia-Pacific had the potential to enlarge. Nathan and Scobell (2014, p.90) identify the Chinese unease “what strikes Chinese policy makers as most significant is the fact the American military remains deployed around China’s periphery”. The USA has significant military presence throughout the Asia-Pacific, with Bases in Guam, Japan, South Korea; and stretching out to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (RAND, 2013). Attached to this military presence is the US 7th fleet, which is the largest of the US Navy’s forward-deployed fleets (U.S. 7th fleet, 2016). This unassailable force essentially has the means to isolate China in times of conflict. China ultimately recognises it needs to develop a force, not necessarily capable of competing with the whole US Navy, but essentially one that has the means to engage the 7th fleet. Nathan and Scobell (2014, p. 96) highlight “crucial raw materials reach China across sea lanes whose security is controlled by the US Navy”. Essentially this links in with the point made in the previous paragraph, that China is concerned with its access to SLOC’s and the US dominance of these areas. China needs to develop a force capable of competing with the US to secure the valuable assets that flow to China, at the moment it doesn’t possess this and thus why it is pursuing its naval expansion. Ultimately China’s access to SLOC’s is inextricably linked to the US dominance in the Asia-Pacific. For China to feel more secure it needs to develop its naval capacities.

The US dominance in the region is only expanded by its various military alliances, once again Nathan and Scobell (2014, p. 94) identify this “the operational capabilities of American forces in the Asia-Pacific are magnified by five multilateral defence treaties”. These treaties represent a formidable naval bloc to China and its interests. This is why potentially the launching of Liaoning is so crucial, Scobell and Cooper (2015, p.86) point this out “carriers offer extended blue water capability and improved capacity for anti-submarine warfare”. Although it is commonly recognised that the Liaoning is limited in terms of competence compared to its US adversaries, it still gives China a valuable addition to its arsenal. It is also worth noting that the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines has undermined the US presence there, it demonstrates that the potential election of an individual could impact on the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific at any time and swing the pendulum back in China’s favour.

In order to secure SLOC’s and combat the US dominance China has begun searching for and securing assets in the South China Sea, and into the Indian Ocean. This has been in the form of ports and what is described as ‘island reclamation’. The Chinese are reclaiming land in the South China Sea and building military installations on them. Some analysts have dubbed this approach as a ‘string of pearls’ (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008). This is potentially comparable to the ‘one belt, one road’ policy insofar as China has moved westwards to secure vital infrastructure, key to its economic growth. Holmes and Yoshihara (2008) highlight that “the security of waterways stretching from China’s coastline to the Indian Ocean has taken on special importance for Beijing”. This has become a centrepiece of Chinese policy. Nathan and Scobell (2014) recognise that “as China’s navy grows, the Indian Ocean may emerge as a new area of strategic rivalry”. However, this already appears to be the case. Zhao (2008) identifies “China has built up a sizable submarine fleet as well as made efforts to conclude agreements on the use of port facilities in the South China Sea, and in Burma, Bangladesh and Pakistan”. To supplement this China has made a substantial investment into the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. Holmes and Yoshihara (2008) expand “Gwadar could act as a strategic hedge giving Beijing a workaround should the US blockade the Malacca Strait during a conflict”. This base also offers Beijing a vital staging point for potential operations in the Gulf, where it has already engaged in anti-piracy operations. China could potentially disrupt US oil supplies in the area during a time of crisis. The Strait of Hormuz is strategically vital to US oil supplies, and with a Chinese presence in the region, any US attempts to suffocate China’s supplies via the Strait of Malacca, would be subject to a Chinese reaction in the Middle East. This once again demonstrates China’s commitment to mitigate against the blockade of vital SLOC’s, and to have a force able to intervene if necessary.

China lays claim to what it has labelled ‘the nine dash line’ and has started to build runways on reefs in the area to help legitimise its claims to the exclusive economic zones and the vast resources that lie untapped in the region. Cheng (2015) highlights “the PLAN already outmatches every regional navy, with the possible exception of the Japanese Maritime Defence Force”. With Erickson et al. (2012) determining “a carrier could extend the reach of China’s airpower and could be decisive against the smaller, less capable navies of South East Asia”. It is clear that China’s naval expansion has outpaced that of South East Asian competitors and leaves it now, in a place of strength to lay claim to the rights of the South China Sea, and in turn help it secure SLOCs

Given the Chinese drive to secure SLOC’s there are many far reaching implications. The completion of the Liaoning will add complexities to regional relations with Erickson et al. stating “Chinese aircraft carrier capability is likely to unnerve China’s neighbours and may catalyse more formal security alignments aimed at counterbalancing China’s growing military potential”. This perfectly sums up the fact that, just like the American pivot back to Asia has unnerved the Chinese, the Chinese naval expansion is more than likely to cause instability in South East Asia. This has the potential to snowball into an arms race given that China now seems to be opening up a capability gap on its neighbours. The potential for conflict over the resources and islands in the South China Sea is the most likely flashpoint; as opposed to a direct military confrontation with the USA. The situation with the claims has flared up frequently over the past few years and China’s increased naval presence is likely to add fuel to the flames. Zhao (2008) supports this view “these territorial disputes have the potential to escalate into larger international conflicts”. The USAs numerous defence pacts in the region also create the potential for it to be sucked in, however given the reluctance of the USA to act over Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, this perhaps demonstrates the US unwillingness to be drawn into conflicts. The election of Donald trump has the potential to change this.

The Chinese acquisition of ‘pearls’ along SLOC’s is also likely to unnerve the USA, however, given the USA’s naval presence in the Asia-Pacific and its encirclement of China this is perhaps hypocritical. As mentioned earlier, the USA’s position in Asia is not always sacrosanct.

Goldstein (2015) summarises the Chinese actions perfectly “these maritime disputes do not herald a new era of Chinese expansionism, let alone Beijing’s first steps on the road to world conquest. To the contrary they are the predictable by-product of China assuming a larger role in world affairs”. This is something the USA will have to come to terms with as Chinese military strength and soft power increases vis-à-vis that of the US.

In conclusion, the Chinese naval expansion has primarily been driven by its concerns over sea lanes of communication (SLOC’s). China has become increasingly aware of its dependency on oil imports and the fact that eighty percent of this, as well as its maritime trade, flows through the Strait of Malacca. China is also aware that the US Navy has dominion over the Asia-Pacific and has sought to combat this, and in turn increase the safety of its SLOC’s. China’s acquisition of ‘pearls’ and its land reclamation in the South China Sea, also link into its concern with the USA’s ability to cripple it in times of conflict. It is unlikely a conflict will develop between the two powers, however, the USA does have the potential to be dragged into a dispute with China, due its numerous defence pacts. China’s actions are not necessarily a threat to the USA, although this is how it will be perceived. It is more the fact that China is becoming a global power, and like the USA, will use all available assets to secure its strategic interests.

]]>https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2017/03/24/assessing-the-drivers-behind-chinas-naval-expansion-and-its-implications-for-regional-security/feed/0China-CV-16-Liaoning-aircraft-carrier-pla-navy-J-15-flying-shark-takeoff-2jmrafterA look at the EU’s response to the migrant crisishttps://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2016/04/28/a-look-at-the-eus-response-to-the-migrant-crisis/
https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2016/04/28/a-look-at-the-eus-response-to-the-migrant-crisis/#respondThu, 28 Apr 2016 18:10:47 +0000http://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/?p=25]]>Critically assess the effectiveness of the EU’s role in a policy area belonging to the area of freedom, security and justice.

The area of freedom, security and justice that I have opted to focus on is the EU’s policy in the wake of the recent migrant crisis. In particular what will be analysed is, the influence of the Schengen area on this crisis, and how the EU’s policy on migration and asylum has exacerbated the situation. I have elected to cover this topic as it is obviously an issue of high importance at the moment; with many framing it as the EU’s main security concern. However, the issue of the migrant crisis also has a correlation with the areas of freedom and justice. A core concept of the EU is freedom of movement of its citizens, and the fair treatment, equality and justice of these citizens. It is obvious that the migrants are not EU citizens but it is interesting to see how the EU treats these people in light of its own central values. Bache et al. (2015) state “Freedom, security and justice are areas that have traditionally been understood as the core responsibilities of the nation state.” However, an issue like the migrant crisis, coupled with the open borders of the EU (the Schengen area) throws up unique issues that require all members to act in unity. In this essay I will assess whether or not this is actually the case, I will also look at the issue of burden sharing, both in terms of numbers of asylum seekers taken and in whose putting resources towards the current migration issue. In addition to this, I will also look at the EU’s successes as well as failures in this area and how, the EU has managed to breach this area of ‘high politics’ and unite members- if indeed that is the case. Ultimately I will outline how effective the EU’s role has been in the current migrant crisis, and conclude that although, the EU has made valuable inroads in harmonising member states’ policy and responses, that unfortunately the EU’s policy on asylum and the response to the migrant crisis remains fragmented, this is largely attributed to a lack of ‘burden’ sharing by member states.

Bache et al (2015) highlight the fact that “large numbers of legal and illegal migrants, as well as asylum seekers have sought to come to the EU”, they go on to elaborate “the Arab spring posed major challenges for the area of freedom, security and justice because of the acceleration of migratory flows to the EU, to flee the turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East.” Evidently, this is a situation that will only continue with the uncertainties caused by ISIS. However, the EU’s response has been fragmented at best and the issue with burden sharing has been a severe concern, this is highlighted by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras (quoted in the Guardian, March 2016) “The humanitarian crisis that we currently have in Idomeni (refugee camp on the Macedonian border with Greece) is not a Greek matter, it is a European matter and we should all face it together”. Unfortunately the Greeks have been left to face the large brunt of the crisis alone, with little aid or assistance from the rest of the EU. Just 376 officers and interpreters are currently on the ground dealing with the issue (Frontex, 2015). The ongoing situation in Greece mirrors that of Italy a few years ago. Kenealy et al. (2015) summarise this “in 2013 the Italian Government established the Mare Nostrum operation to rescue migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean. Finally the Italian government ended the operation, citing a lack of support from other EU members and costs of around £9 million per month”. A reoccurring theme is present in the fact that the countries most affected by migrant flows are being left to deal with the issue alone. This emphasises the point of a lack of burden sharing between members. Bache et al. (2015) supplement this point “the broader issue of solidarity remains, since northern EU states are not immediately affected by the migratory flows and therefore have different interests from states such as Malta and Italy”. Over the past few years, assistance in terms of frontline support for the affected states has been slow, at best. However, this is not necessarily the same when it comes to the issue of asylum seekers, but this is something I will elaborate on at a later point.

Currently, some nations within the Schengen area have re-imposed border checks, including Germany and Austria (BBC, 2016). There is the potential for these checks to stand for an emergency period of two years. This supports the point that, due to the fact the northern European states have now become affected by the migrant crisis, they have actively sought changes at the EU and exploited loopholes in agreements to protect their position. Thus far the EU’s position in the migrant crisis in terms of response has been fragile and disjointed. This is acknowledged by the EU themselves, the European Commission (2015) stated that “as a first and immediate response the commission put forward a ten point plan for immediate action. The response was immediate but insufficient.” They also mentioned that “it is clear we need a new, more European approach”. The commission have recognised the EU’s shortcomings in terms of response and members not collaborating together. Caviedes (2016) summarises this perfectly “The migrant crisis of 2015, reminds us of the lack of consensus concerning burden sharing.” The EUs effectiveness at present has been minimal.

In response to the lack of cohesion and contribution by some members, it is possible to look outside of the EU’s jurisdiction for the reason behind this. A familiar scenario when it comes to the area of the security is, for many EU members to use NATO instead of acting directly through the EU. This is again a present issue when looking at the migrant crisis- with many members collaborating their efforts through another institution, undermining the EU’s effectiveness and competencies. A NATO statement (2016) says “In February 2016, on the request of Germany, Greece, and Turkey, NATO decided to join international efforts in dealing with this crisis.” EU members had sought help from another organisation, highlighting the inadequacy of the EU’s actions and responses. In addition to this, as the UK is not a member of the Schengen area, it is not obligated to provide resources to Frontex but can if it pleases. A UK government statement (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016) details that “the Royal Navy is deploying an amphibious landing ship alongside two border force cutters to join the NATO mission in the Aegean.” The UK a prominent EU member (even in light of the upcoming referendum) opted to donate resources to a NATO operation as opposed to co-ordinating alongside Frontex and the EU. This is potentially the reason behind the EU’s mediocre attempts to tackle the issue. The ability of EU members to be able to use a different organisation is situations like this undoubtedly affects the EU’s effectiveness in these instances in a negative manner. Kenealy et al. (2015) adds weight to this argument “as in the case of Europol, Frontex has been hampered by a lack of commitment and cooperation from member states, as well as by the scale of movement.”

Caviedes (2016) states “one can argue that the EU asylum policy imposes genuine obligations upon states that previously had more stringent acceptance standards.” In essence this is a valid point, and one which Geddes (2005) supports “Asylum is an area where a common EU response is evident”. On the other hand, a counter argument to this, is, although a common response is evident and that obligations have been imposed, the EU common asylum system still remains largely incoherent, with member states still having a dominion over this. Bache et al. (2015) state “the EU aims to have a fully harmonized system in which applicants for asylum would receive equivalent treatment across member states”. However, in reality this goal is still a work in progress. The Dublin system, although practical in the fact that refugees can’t apply in multiple countries has serious drawbacks. Caviedes (2016) highlights this “the Dublin system may de facto result in additional burdens on member states that have limited reception and absorption capacities and that find themselves under particular migratory pressures because of their geographical location.” This is certainly the case with Greece, who are having to deal with an influx of migrants that equates to “116,000 arrivals this year, with an average of 1,800 per day in February” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016). However, even though the Dublin system designates migrants a host country who are then responsible for their asylum application, this is currently not the case. Many migrants are being processed in Greece (their place of arrival) but then seeking onward travel across the Schengen area, particularly targeting Germany.

When it comes to the issue of asylum acceptance and distribution, the problem with burden sharing again becomes a massive issue. Although as mentioned earlier in my argument, a lot of the northern European states are reluctant to provide significant resources to preventing and resolving the migrant issue. But when it comes to the acceptance of asylum seekers Germany bears a huge brunt. Figures from Eurostat (2016) deal with this: in terms of population size Germany, France and the UK are the three largest countries in the EU (in that order) however, Germany accepted a staggering 441,800 asylum seekers in 2015, in stark contrast to this, France, the EU’s second largest member took 70,460 asylum seekers, with the UK taking 38,370. To put France and the UK’s contribution into perspective, Sweden, the EU’s fourteenth largest member took, 156,110 asylum seekers. Greece, which is the home to the arrival of the vast majority of migrants took 11,370. These statistics reiterate the large issues the EU has when it comes to burden sharing; and also reveal that it’s not just in the commitment of resources to the operation in the Aegean- but also in the amount of asylum seekers countries are taking. The European Commission (2015) state in their communication on migration that “a redistribution key based on the criteria such as GDP, size of population, unemployment rate, past numbers of asylum seekers and of re-settled refugees.” However, it is hard to see this being implemented given the current gulf in member states intake. This is again echoed by the fact that “in 2014, 5 member states dealt with 72% of all asylum application EU-wide” (European Commission, 2015). The onus cannot simply be left on a handful of states, and the EU has to effectively legislate to prevent this, however at the moment it has been ineffective in producing a system that gives fair reception to all members, and leaves a few states heavily burdened.

The fact the EU operates under the Schengen agreement has sought to intensify the migrant crisis. Many migrants have opted to move north instead of staying in Greece, creating the issues we see today on the Macedonian Border. The free movement of people, and lack of borders has also led to the establishment of the ‘Calais Jungle Camp’- estimated to house 5,497 migrants (BBC, 2016). Many of these migrants now have no clear jurisdiction over them as neither the UK or France ‘wants them’ and both nations see them as the others problem. This a large issue, particularly for those in Calais. Another issue with the Schengen area, in the wake of the migration crisis was after the Paris terrorist attacks. The European Institute for Security Studies (2016) highlight the fact “the authorities knew he (one of the attackers) had gone to Syria but had failed to detect his return”, the open borders initiative leaves the Schengen susceptible to movement without detection. Also they highlight that “finger-prints and photos of the attackers do clearly match those taken at a refugee registration centre in Greece in October 2015”. Again illustrating the onward movement of migrants is difficult to track. During the crisis the EU has failed to grasp the relevant risks or implement relevant policies to mitigate against this. The onus has been left on member states to put in place adequate measures. The EU once again has been found lacking as an institution in the areas of freedom, security and justice. The arguments outlined, only seek to preserve the fact that many of the issues relating to the security, justice and freedom should be left to the member states and not passed on to the EU as in times of crisis they are slow to react, and put EU ideals, such as the freedom of movement- before the security of member states.

In conclusion, as outlined through the essay, the EU has been found wanting during the migrant crisis, both in terms of its response and in the adaptation of its asylum policies. The Schengen area has only worsened the crisis. The issue with burdens is, overall the main issue, with states geographically closer to the issue bearing the price, even when, in the case of Greece, this is the last thing they can afford. Member states have been inactive in committing resources to aid the operation, and this can be put down to a lack of consensus at the EU level on what the course of action should be. Instead of collaborating or donating resources to the EU’s border force, Frontex, most member states have opted to coordinate themselves under the NATO umbrella, a clear shun of the EU and a belief that it is not adequate to fulfil such a task. Although “in the areas of irregular migration and specifically asylum, there has been a greater supranational involvement, whether through EU agencies, or through legislation and court rulings.” (Caviedes, 2016) Ultimately the EU still doesn’t wield enough influence to be effective, with member nations preferring their own course of action or to act through NATO. Though immigration and asylum were not initially situated in the first pillar, the EU has done a good job in creating a relative cohesion, however, it’s far from the finished product. The European Commission (2015) highlights “migration will become a specific component of on-going common security and defence policy” but whether the EU will become more effective in its execution remains to be seen, as it has a long way to go.

Frontex (2015) Frontex and Greece agree on operational plan for Poseidon rapid intervention. Brussels: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

]]>https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2016/04/28/a-look-at-the-eus-response-to-the-migrant-crisis/feed/0Migrant-boatjmrafterA view on the confirmation of UK airstrikes in Syriahttps://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/12/03/a-view-of-the-confirmation-of-uk-airstrikes-in-syria/
https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/12/03/a-view-of-the-confirmation-of-uk-airstrikes-in-syria/#commentsThu, 03 Dec 2015 19:15:32 +0000http://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/?p=19]]>Last night (2/12/2015) as we are all aware, the UK government passed its motion of military action in Syria. This action is meant to be solely directed at the internationally recognised terrorist organisation. The self-proclaimed Islamic state.

As I sat there responding to this historic motion, a few things deeply troubled me. One of these was the apparent cheering and jubilation at this motion being passed. This left a sour taste in my mouth and frankly, it itself was laughable. How could the people assigned to govern our country laugh at the fact they were again sending British forces into harm’s way in the Middle East, off to fight a noble crusade sanctioned by the jolly boys and girls club of ex Eton and Oxbridge scholars. Do these so called MPs have any idea of the potential implications this action could have? Not just on us at home but also civilians in Syria.

At this point I would like to point out that I am far from a ‘leftie anti-war do-gooder’. In fact if I had to align myself on a political spectrum, I’d say I have right leaning tendencies, supported by the fact I myself elected the government currently in office. However, regardless of this vote, I felt let down by a government I’d put into office. I felt betrayed and disenchanted in our democratic system, not the first-past-the-post voting system we currently employ, but more the distinct lack of public opinion that was considered before authorising this action. Let me explain.

I felt particularly unrepresented as did many Brits last night. I’m not asking for a referendum on huge decisions like the one last night, however I feel public opinion should of played more of a part. No opinion polls were considered, the general voice of the public was not heard, in fact worse-ignored. A Yougov poll on the 02/12/2015 showed that just 48% of the UK public backed support in Syria, a clear indication of our political rulers ignoring us. A democracy we live in? I am not so sure.

Another issue I feel the need to raise is the cost. At a time of great austerity, with deep cuts to public services the UK government still find the funds to finance an RAF mission in Iraq and now Syria, with the use of £100,000 pound a time brimstone missiles? I back the governments call to spend 2% of our GDP on military, but not for missions that don’t concern us. Have the west learned nothing from our continued meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan? Our intervention usually exacerbates situations rather than diluting them. The Middle East is a hornet’s nest of potential issues, as we have seen from the blowback of our ventures in Iraq over a decade ago.

I would like to clarify, why I am against the strikes in Syria now, as opposed to supporting the ones in Iraq. The case with Iraq is completely a different story to the one presenting itself in Syria, for example we along with our US partners are the culprits for the ongoing situation in Iraq- we helped create that mess, so by all means we should try and resolve it. Also in Iraq we have been invited by the official government- which gives us the authorisation to act within a sovereign state. We have received no such request from Assad’s government, albeit his government is hardly legitimate. The only invitation received has been by the Russians- who seem to be bombing the WHOLE opposition, as opposed to our support for ‘moderate’ rebels. If anyone can define what a moderate rebel is I’d love to know.

A drop in the ocean. That’s how I see the UK’s operation in Syria. Currently we have 8 RAF fighters stationed at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, who fly roughly two sorties per day against Isis in Iraq. This force is to be expanded by a further 8 fighters to assist with raids now on Syria. In total we have SIXTEEN aircraft to carry out raids on ISIS. To me this is not even going to scratch the surface of the problem. As many military analysts have pointed out, it would take ‘boots on the ground’ which is obviously not an option considering our past experience in the Iraq and Afghanistan. I feel many people have overlooked the shear complexity of the problem facing us, unfortunately there isn’t a quick fix to this.

I recognise the fact that we can’t sit back and do nothing in the eyes of this threat. However, I feel we should have adopted a similar approach to our German counterparts, to provide logistical support and fly intelligence gathering operations. I feel our campaign will be limited at best. What effect can we really have in crippling ISIS from our aircraft? This needs to be a multi-pronged attack- starving ISIS of funding from its oil selling operations and punishing banks guilty of allowing money to be laundered through their systems to these terrorists. Also I’d like to point out that the case of the recent Paris attacks really doesn’t give a justification for our intervention. The vast majority of these perpetrators were ‘home-grown’ jihadists who had been poisoned over the internet. More must be done to shut down these channels, and to tackle the real problem here- not ISIS located thousands of miles from us, but the terrorists lurking in our societies at home.

Inevitably an implication of our intervention will be ‘collateral damage’ as our leaders would sugar-coat it; in other words, civilian casualties. It is these that I am truly worried about, the innocents who will be caught up in this war and how potentially we could push them into the arms of the people we are intending to stop.

This isn’t going to be a five minute fix by any means, and no one seems to have the answer of how this problem is going to go away or be resolved. One thing is for certain though, we look like we will be in this for the long-haul.

]]>https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/12/03/a-view-of-the-confirmation-of-uk-airstrikes-in-syria/feed/1blog picjmrafterA view on the Migrant crises from May 2015.https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/12/01/a-view-on-the-migrant-crises-from-may-2015/
https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/12/01/a-view-on-the-migrant-crises-from-may-2015/#respondTue, 01 Dec 2015 12:26:15 +0000http://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/?p=8]]>This is an academic piece I wrote in my first year of undergraduate study, in my second semester. The piece was about the ongoing migrant crises in Europe and potential interventions. Although my prediction about the main flow of migrants being from Libya was off the mark- the prediction of increased traffic over the summer months and potential interventions were generally accurate.

Although my interventions were relatively broad due to a word limit most are now being pursued. Perhaps a government minister read my paper before deciding on the policy to take!

Policy Paper (5): Addressing the on-going issue with migration across the Mediterranean, from North Africa to mainland Europe.

Executive Summary:

This paper is for the EU commission, specifically for the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Christos Stylianides, and the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship; Dimitris Avramopoulos. The EU’s current policy in the Mediterranean is failing. Frontex is an extremely under-resourced mission. Recent deaths, and the vast spike in people being rescued from the Mediterranean (6,800 alone on the weekend of 2-3rd of May, 2015) (The Independent, 2015) have highlighted this to us. The commission should seek to implement immediate policy change. The options that need to be considered are: enhancing Frontex’s capabilities on the water and extending their area of operation, and providing aid to countries producing the most migrants on the crossings. Additionally we should utilize the skills and knowledge of NGO’s on the ground to help discourage people from making the crossing. Also, we should aim to coordinate EU members’ naval resources, similarly to that of the ongoing operation off the coast of Somalia (CTF-151) to reduce and neutralize smugglers once in the water, and to aid in the rescuing of migrants. Lastly we should seek to tackle the smugglers on the African continent and to hamper their actions, so to reduce the number of crossings they are capable of. All of the above will require an unparalleled pooling of members’ resources and an international effort to help solve this crisis, countries should not seek to act individually or to exercise their own national interests or foreign policy goals, as this would be detrimental to the mission we are trying to achieve.

Initially our short term aim should be the collaboration of members’ navies to work alongside Frontex in the Mediterranean to prevent loss of life and deter smugglers. Longer term we should aim to expand our operation from a reactive one to one that highlights the root causes and attempts to tackle them, e.g. providing humanitarian aid. The reasoning behind our selected course of action is that this is the best immediate response we can look to achieve in the most cost effective way, also with the summer months now upon us smugglers will look to seize this opportunity to make as many crossings as possible. Nevertheless, in the long term we need a more rounded strategy to ease this problem before it reaches our waters.

Overview/background to the issue:

The current issue with the illegal movement of people from what’s known as Central Mediterranean route has been on the European agenda for a while now but has been on a limited scale until more recently. The current unrest in Libya, and the continuing conflict in Syria has led to a sharp increase in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean seeking refuge and asylum in the EU. Recently this has moved up our agenda due to the fact “at least 1,750 people have died this year trying to cross the Mediterranean. A 20-fold increase on the same period in 2014 when 96 people died.” (BBC, 2015) This doesn’t take into consideration the thousands already rescued this year. This situation calls for an immediate and unprecedented response from the EU as a whole, not merely the countries this is affecting the most (Italy and Malta), the EU needs a collaborative response, as actions taken on an individual scale will not begin to resolve this matter. Figure one details the scale of the problem facing us, with the amount of illegal border crossings illustrated. This figure is projected to be considerably higher in 2015.

Review of current policy:

Current policy is extremely under-resourced, under-funded and frankly cannot fulfill its primary role as a search and rescue operation. With a budget of just “€2.9 million per month” and limited assets that include just “4 Fixed Wing Aircraft, 1 Helicopter, 4 Open Shore vessels, 1 coastal Patrol Vessel, 2 Coastal patrol boats.” (European Commission, 2015)

A statement by EU commissioner Cecilia Malmström (October 2014) says “I hope that Member States will now heed Frontex’s call for equipment and guest officers, so that Triton can be up and running soon” (EU Commission, 2015), however, her call has evidently been ignored as little equipment or personnel have been provided by reluctant member states shirking responsibility, for example just 65 personnel are available to Frontex’s mission. There needs to be a greater onus on member nations to act collaboratively and to meet their obligations, not just to the nations that are being burdened by this problem but also to the people put in harm’s way by the smugglers. Operation Triton needs to be expanded not purely in its search and rescue role but also in other areas, to help it become a preventative operation rather than reactive to crises’. A shift in emphasis is needed to prevent smugglers getting onto the water. The summer months will only exacerbate the current situation, with calmer waters and better conditions the smugglers will be intent on upping the ante, and the complete unpreparedness of Operation Triton, headed by Frontex will be revealed, unfortunately this will culminate in added loss of life, unless serious measures are implemented.

Necessity for Change:

With many EU member refusing funding, the scrapping of the Italian mission Mare Nostrum in late 2014, has proved a costly failure. The burden had become too large for the Italian Government to carry on its own. This situation is not acceptable and all members need to make a commitment towards continuing and expanding operations in the Mediterranean. Mare Nostrum was accredited with saving hundreds of thousands of lives. In its place, Operation Triton, however, “rather than replicating the Italian mission, which carried out proactive search and rescue across 27,000 square miles of sea, Triton will focus on border surveillance and operate only within 30 miles of the Italian coast. Its budget, €2.9m, is less than a third of that of its predecessor.” (The Guardian, 2014) Immediately we can see the limitations of this low cost operation. Although the Italian Navy and coastguard still patrol these waters they do not actively seek smugglers, and clearly the operation being limited to within 30 miles of the Italian coast will only increase deaths, as many of the people saved are closer to Libya. Currently there are just 12 vessels/aircraft available to Frontex to cover 970,000 square miles of water, this equates to one for every 81,000 square miles. With the situation currently being covered by news companies from all over Europe, I’m sure we, as well as the citizens of the European Union can accept this is insufficient.

Alternatives to current policy:

Firstly, we need to try and stem the flow of migrants taking this perilous journey by shifting our actions from a search and rescue oriented response to preventative measures, particularly pinpointed at North Africa. In October 2014 the UK government laid out its stance on the Mediterranean migration issue stating “The Government believes the most effective way to prevent refugees and migrants attempting this dangerous crossing is to focus our attention on countries of origin and transit, as well as taking steps to fight the people smugglers who willfully put lives at risk by packing migrants into unseaworthy boats.” (Parliament.uk, 2014) I agree with the stance of the UK government that first and foremost the root cause of this issue has to be tackled. Our operation cannot simply be focused on search and rescue but instead expanded into a humanitarian mission, seeking to access countries where migrants originate from, most notably: Eretria, Syria and Libya. We should advocate all OECD, EU members meet the UN goal of 0.7% of GDP to be allocated to International development. Although we recognize this is difficult in the current economic climate. Nevertheless we should press nations to donate their targets, particularly to the countries where migrants stem from. This could help ease the tidal wave of migrants currently sweeping across the Mediterranean. The UK government acting in its own manner is an issue, similarly the rest of the EU member governments having their own foreign policy agendas seriously hampers our efforts, we need a united stance to tackle the issue presenting itself to Europe.

Another cost effective way we could help tackle the issue in the country of origin is for the EU itself to allocate funding to NGO’s to help fight poverty and disease in affected areas, by allocating funds to NGO’s the EU would save money as a necessary department wouldn’t have to be sanctioned and set up, instead the NGO’s provide us with the workforce and expertise needed to try and relieve issues in problematic countries. However it is also vital to recognize that many migrants are fleeing conflict and persecution so the EU needs to target the transit points for the smugglers, mainly Libya. Money should be invested in transit nations to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants and to try and discourage them from travelling. An effective marketing campaign in transit hotspots could help this cause. Evidently this would require funding from members.

Secondly, we must aim to tackle and limit the capability of the smugglers by actively seeking and penalizing those behind the trade. The joint intelligence sharing of EU members’ police forces will be crucial to stopping those guilty of smuggling, harsh penalties will need to be implemented, and these need to be universally applied to all EU nations, which we recognize will not be easy. Targeting the smugglers in Africa will be very difficult and would require an EU equivalent to that of the FBI in the USA, we currently accept that this would not be viable- so our targeting would have to be those on the end of the operation in Europe.

Thirdly and most vitally, to prevent further loss of life it is integral to expand Frontex’s ability to respond to situations on the water. This will involve the increasing of equipment and staff to respond to vessels but also expanding its operations past the 30 mile radius currently in place. However, the responsibility cannot be Frontex’s alone, I also advocate that we encourage member nations to pledge naval ships and resources. The UK government has announced that “Britain is prepared to send HMS Bulwark, three Merlin MK 2 Helicopters and two civilian border patrol boats to deploy to the Mediterranean in light of recent tragedies.” (Gov.uk, 2015), however we need more nations to commit resources and for the response to be coordinated locally. A framework we should seek to replicate is that of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) which has operated off of Somalia to reduce piracy, although different missions, the success and organization of their international operation should be admired and potentially mirrored by ourselves to neutralize smugglers. The International Chamber of Commerce reports that “Piracy at sea has reached its lowest levels in six years, with 264 attacks recorded worldwide in 2013, a 40% drop since Somali piracy peaked in 2011.” (ICC, 2014) If we coordinate EU member resources on a similar level, I’m sure we’d reap comparable results.

Recommendation:

Our initial goal should be to expand Frontex’s capabilities so we are able to enhance our search and rescue response. However, long term we need to promote and provide aid for areas that are producing the most migrants for smugglers in order to shrink the trade. Although we should look to tackle the smugglers themselves this at the moment is unrealistic as it would require vast resources and time to tackle the heads of the operation in Africa, and something many members would be opposed to. However, the coordination of naval resources similar to that of the CTF-151, is essential. The cooperation and coordination of members is something I feel is definitely achievable as we have the framework of a successful mission elsewhere in the world. Realistically, for the time being this is the most adequate response we can assemble. However, in the long term we must attempt to tackle the core issue in developing nations, instead of responding to the problem when it’s in our waters.

]]>https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/12/01/a-view-on-the-migrant-crises-from-may-2015/feed/0jmrafterFirst Blog- Politics of the Media 2015: Media over-exaggeration.https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/first-blog-politics-of-the-media-2015-media-over-exaggeration/
https://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/first-blog-politics-of-the-media-2015-media-over-exaggeration/#respondWed, 14 Oct 2015 17:07:40 +0000http://jrafterpolitics.wordpress.com/?p=3]]>When I was told that for a second year module I would have to start a blog and start writing on what interested me I was pretty apprehensive. For one I’d never blogged before and for two I didn’t really back myself, writing frequently, on what interests me and what I hold passions for.

However, after having a little think I then became pretty open to the idea; and generally pretty excited at the prospect of this. The idea of being away from the strict and regimented essay form I’ve become accustomed to, with laborious referencing, is a breath of fresh air and to be able to type at will on interests of mine is somewhat liberating.

I am not one who usually publishes openly on thoughts, especially my political inclinations and my thoughts and opinions on both domestic and foreign affairs. But there seems no better time than in my second year at Southampton University- and hopefully people will find my thoughts and opinions both interesting and engaging!

So after my (relatively) brief introduction; here goes!

This past Sunday (11/10/2015) I noticed one of Britain’s newspapers- the Daily Star, had an ‘exclusive’ that RAF fighters operating over Iraq currently; and potentially in the near future: Syria, have been authorised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to fire upon their Russian equivalents if potentially endangered. To me this is stating the complete obvious. The fact that a newspaper can run this as an exclusive is near on embarrassing. I mean, how can RAF pilots being authorised to defend themselves in potentially life threatening situations come as news to anybody?

This same status-quo exists over U.K. sovereign airspace, the RAF are allowed to use deadly force against potential Russian aggressors- and rightly so. Although, a different scenario is clearly at play in Syria it’s a situation we are all very aware of, and I’m sure the same applies to Russian pilots in face of danger from U.K., U.S. or French aircraft and vice versa- you get the point

I just found it ridiculous how a national newspaper could print on their front page ‘RAF Jets cleared to fire on Russians’ like there is some impending third world war on the horizon. Clearly all parties involved in the complex situation in Syria will be aiming to avoid any unnecessary escalations with each other.

This story was completely blown out of proportion, so much that the British attaché in Moscow was summoned!

I just found this an interesting example of how the media, albeit a tabloid, could manipulate a story and cause, potentially, such issues.