In late December 2015, Turkmenistan officially announced the completion of the East-West gas pipeline. This 773 kilometer route with an annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) will connect natural gas from fields located in eastern Turkmenistan to those along its Caspian Sea coast, with the potential of further transfer via the Caspian Sea and onward to the Turkish and European markets. The construction of the pipeline is complementary to Turkmenistan’s current strategy for gas exports. Ashgabat seeks broader export opportunities in Turkey and Europe to reduce its dependence on Russia and China as major gas export outlets. However, despite positive political shifts, which might enhance Turkmenistan’s energy cooperation with Turkey, Azerbaijan and the EU, several obstacles remain to the westward transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas.

After a decade of transformational economic growth, reduced oil prices forced Azerbaijan to a double devaluation of its national currency, significant reduction of public spending, slowdown of GDP, and most importantly, panic in the domestic market among both the general population and the business community. The government responded with several anti-crisis programs and measures, aimed at stimulating national economy, supporting local production and easing the business climate for the local entrepreneurs. President Ilham Aliyev has called 2016 “a year of deep economic reforms.” It remains to be seen whether the country will be able to shift gears and transform its economy to achieve sustainable growth from non-oil sectors.

Amidst the rising optimism emanating from Iran détente with the West, Armenian authorities have since 2015 sought to reinforce military and security ties with Tehran. Armenia’s MoD leadership visited Tehran on May 24-25, 2015 and after finding common ground on a broad spectrum of issues, Iran’s Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan pledged to visit Yerevan in the foreseeable future, though this has yet to take place. Iran indeed sees a potential for increasing its role in the South Caucasus after the sanctions were lifted. Could Iran present Armenia with an alternative in order to balance its overwhelming dependence on Russia?

The states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are in for a rough ride if recent Russian national security documents and speeches genuinely represent the Kremlin’s worldview. Not only do these texts veto their membership in NATO, but they exclude mutually profitable partnerships for these countries with the European Union and other Western institutions, constrain their domestic development, and encourage the suppression of civil liberties by warning of fictitious Western plots to change their regimes under the guise of democracy promotion and human rights.

On March 4, 2016, Georgia and Azerbaijan reached a deal that allows Georgia to receive close to 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of additional gas annually from Azerbaijan. Georgia’s Minister of Energy Kakha Kaladze announced after the signing that Georgia will no longer need to buy additional volumes of gas from Gazprom. This ends several months of speculation about Georgia’s concessions to Gazprom, fueled by a number of controversial statements by government officials. This agreement strengthens the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and keeps Georgia from becoming further affected by Gazprom’s coercive power.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.