The state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant proximately caused the (death of / injuries
to) <insert name of decedent / person injured>. Proximate cause does not
necessarily mean the last act or cause, or the act in point of time nearest to
the (death / injuries). The concept of proximate cause incorporates the
principle that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though
(his/her) acts were not the immediate cause of the (death / injuries).

An act or omission to act is a
proximate cause of the (death / injuries) when it substantially and materially
contributes, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient,
intervening cause, to the (death / injuries). It is a cause without which the
(death / injuries) would not have occurred. It is a predominating cause, a
substantial factor from which the (death / injuries) follow[s] as a natural,
direct and immediate consequence.1

[<Include if appropriate:> It
does not matter whether the particular kind of harm that results from the
defendant's act be intended by the defendant.]2
When the result is a foreseeable and natural result of the defendant's conduct,
the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the defendant
criminally responsible.

The defendant claims that (his/her)
conduct was not the proximate cause of <insert name of decedent or
complainant>'s (death / injuries) because there was an intervening cause
that was the cause of the (death / injuries). The doctrine of intervening cause
applies in a situation in which the defendant's conduct is a cause and factor of
the (death / injuries), that is, <insert name of decedent or complainant>
would not have (died / been injured) but for the defendant's conduct, but
nonetheless something else subsequently occurs -- which
may be an act of the (decedent/person injured), the act of some other person, or some nonhuman
force -- that does more than supply a concurring or contributing cause of the
injury. An intervening cause is unforeseeable and sufficiently powerful in its
effect that it serves to relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility for
(his/her) conduct. In such a case, the defendant's conduct is not the proximate
cause of <insert name of decedent or complainant>'s (death / injuries).

The doctrine of intervening cause
serves as a dividing line between two closely related factual situations: 1)
when two or more acts or forces, one of which was set in motion by the
defendant, combine to cause a person's (death / injuries), the doctrine of
intervening cause will not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility, and
2) when an unforeseeable act and force intervenes in such a powerful way as to
become the proximate cause of the (death / injuries), the doctrine of
intervening cause will relieve a defendant from criminal responsibility, even
though his or her conduct contributed, in fact,
to the (death / injuries).

In other words, when more than one
factor contributes, in a chain of events, to cause (death / injuries), in order
to be the proximate cause of that (death / injury), the defendant's conduct must
have been a cause that necessarily set in operation the factors that
accomplished the (death / injury). When the other circumstance constitutes a
concurring or contributing cause of the (death / injuries), the defendant will
be held responsible. When the other circumstance constitutes an intervening
cause of the (death / injuries), the defendant will not be held responsible.

This is a question of fact for you, as
jurors, to determine. Keep in mind, however, that the defendant does not have
any burden to prove an intervening cause. The burden rests on the state to
prove that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of <insert name of
decedent or complainant>'s (death / injuries).]

The defendant's criminal liability is
not lessened because of a pre-existing medical condition of <insert name of
decedent>. It is sufficient that the defendant's conduct set in motion a
chain of events that ultimately produced the death. If the defendant's conduct
inflicted upon <insert name of decedent> physical or emotional injury or
stress or trauma that was in this sense the proximate cause of (his/her) death,
then the defendant's conduct, under the circumstances, caused the death, even
though <insert name of decedent> had already been enfeebled by poor
physical condition and the physical or emotional stress or trauma were not the
only cause of (his/her) death. This is so even though it is probable that a
person in sound physical condition would not have died from the effects of the
defendant's conduct. It does not matter that the defendant's conduct may have
only hastened the death, or that <insert name of decedent> would have
died soon thereafter from another cause or causes. As long as (his/her)
admittedly and recognizable predisposition of <describe pre-existing
condition> was not the only substantial factor in bringing on (his/her)
death, that condition does not operate to prevent the defendant's responsibility
for (his/her) conduct having caused <insert name of decedent>'s death.
If the defendant's unlawful conduct set in motion factors that led to <insert
name of decedent>'s death, such conduct establishes the defendant's guilt
even though (his/her) conduct or the factors (he/she) set in motion were not the
only cause of <insert name of decedent>'s death.]
_______________________________________________________

2 Use only when the defendant may have
intended one type of harm but caused another. For example, when an accused,
"with the intent to cause death by shooting, shoots the victim, who, as a
result, falls from a rooftop and is killed by the fall rather than the bullet.
That would be a particular kind of harm not intended by the accused. It
nevertheless would sustain a charge of murder if the accused intended to cause
death and the fall was the direct result of the action taken to effectuate that
intent." State v. Boles, 223 Conn. 535, 542 n.5 (1992).

4 Use if the defendant is claiming that
a pre-existing medical condition of the decedent was an intervening cause. See
State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 235 n.5 (1978) (defendant's actions
during a robbery precipitated the victim's heart attack which led to his death);
State v. Dorans, 261 Conn. 730, 736-44 (2002) (victim had a pre-existing
nervous system disorder). Do not use the language that "[a] defendant takes a
victim as he finds him." Id., 261 Conn. 744 n.16.

Commentary

When causation is an element of the
crime, but not at issue, the first three paragraphs of this instruction should
be given. See State v. Collins, 100 Conn. App. 833, 848, cert. denied,
284 Conn. 916 (2007). Whenever the facts and evidence presented require that
causation be determined by the jury, the additional sections should be included
as appropriate.

"[A] jury instruction with respect
to proximate cause must contain, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) an
indication that the defendant's conduct must contribute substantially and
materially, in a direct manner, to the victim's injuries; and (2) an indication
that the defendant's conduct cannot have been superseded by an efficient,
intervening cause that produced the injuries." State v. Leroy, supra,
232 Conn. 13; see also State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 712-16 (1999);
State v. Hannon, 56 Conn. App. 581, 591 (2000), cert. denied, 274 Conn. 911
(2005).

Intervening cause
For a discussion of the doctrine of
efficient, intervening cause, see State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 124-27
(1995). The court in Munoz also stated that a third party's conduct in
inflicting an additional stab wound might be so significant that it amounts to
an efficient, intervening cause. Id., 122. The court has now disavowed this
statement because it is contrary to the doctrine of proximate cause in criminal
cases that every person be held responsible for the consequences of his or her
acts, regardless of other causes that contributed to produce the result.
State v. Shabazz, 246 Conn. 746, 754 n.5 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1179, 119 S. Ct. 1116, 143 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1999). The court has also emphasized
that Munoz "rested primarily on the fact that the jury reasonably could
have inferred from the evidence that the intervening criminal conduct was the
sole proximate cause of the victim's death." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 755.

An instruction regarding an
efficient, intervening cause is not always required. State v. Munoz,
supra, 233 Conn. 121 n.8. The need for such an instruction "arises in those
cases in which the evidence could support a finding by the jury that the
defendant's conduct was overcome by an efficient, intervening cause, or in which
the evidence regarding proximate causation was such that, based on the doctrine
of efficient, intervening cause, the jury could have a reasonable doubt about
the defendant's guilt. Thus, in the general run of cases, in which the evidence
is susceptible of a finding of only one cause of harm contemplated by the
statute, a statement in the jury instruction referring to an efficient,
intervening cause might well be unnecessary." Id. See also State v. Delgado,
50 Conn. App. 159, 173 (1998) (insufficient evidence that actions of emergency
medical personnel may have been a sufficient intervening cause); State v.
Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790, 798 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 761 (1998) (victim's
family's decision to terminate life support was not intervening cause).

Inconsistent with
accessorial liabilityWhen two parties act in concert, it
is immaterial which of the two accomplices inflict the fatal blow. If one of
them is charged only as an accomplice, that person cannot claim that the acts of
the principal were an intervening cause relieving him or her of liability.
State v. Fruean, 63 Conn. App. 466, 475, cert. denied, 257 Conn. 908 (2001)
(court properly refused defendant's request to instruct on proximate cause and
intervening cause).