BROWN v. STEWART

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

January 11, 1996

WILLIAM A. BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
BEVERLY STEWART, Individually and as City of Pittsburgh Police Officer; PAUL HOLECZY, ROBERT COCCO, and STAN HOLLAND, Individually and as Deputy United States Marshals; CHARLES KOZAKIEWICZ, Individually and as Warden of Allegheny County Jail; JOE GRICAR, Individually and as Correctional Officer of Allegheny County Jail, Defendants. IRENE S. KUZAK, Plaintiff, v. BEVERLY STEWART, Individually and as City of Pittsburgh Police Officer; PAUL HOLECZY, ROBERT COCCO, and STAN HOLLAND, Individually and as Deputy United States Marshals, Defendants.

Stewart and Federal Defendants maintained that they had arrested the correct man despite Brown's protestations to the contrary. Compl. P 12. The Allegheny County Bail Agency also told the officers that they had arrested the wrong man, but Stewart and Federal Defendants did not investigate these contentions. Id. PP 13, 14. Stewart and Federal Defendants did not check Brown's fingerprints against those of the Billy Brown sought in the arrest warrant. Id. P 15.

We note the heightened pleading standard for evaluating the sufficiency of civil rights complaints. Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 785 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1986). We are aware that the United States Supreme Court has held that a federal court may not apply a heightened pleading standard in civil rights actions against municipalities. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1993) However, the Court in Leatherman left open the question of whether a heightened pleading standard may be applied in cases involving individual government officials. 122 L. Ed. 2d at 523. Therefore, we will continue to apply the heightened pleading standard in cases brought against governmental officials in their personal capacities. Complaints satisfy this standard if they allege the specific conduct violating the civil rights at issue, the time and place of the unlawful conduct, and the identity of the responsible officials. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 103 L. Ed. 2d 808, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).

DISCUSSION

This case easily and logically separates into two events and their associated claims and defenses: the arrest and the detention. The County Defendants had nothing to do with Brown's arrest. Similarly, Stewart and the Federal Defendants had nothing to do with Brown's detention after delivering him to the police station for processing. We address the motions according to this structure.

A. Arresting Defendants' Motions as to William Brown

1. Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment

a. Challenge to Section 1983 Claim: Not Acting under Color of State Law

Federal Defendants first assert that they are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are federal officials acting in their official capacities under federal law. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 10, ("Fed. Defs' Br.") at 8. They cite 28 U.S.C. § 566(e)(1)(B) as their federal authority, which simply states that "the United States Marshals Service is authorized to-- . . . (B) investigate such fugitive matters, both within and outside the United States, as directed by the Attorney General." Id. The Federal Defendants thus at least had general federal statutory support for their actions.

The only other information before the court about the Federal Defendants' authority is declaration testimony that they were acting as part of "Operation Trident," which "consisted of federal-state agencies making a concerted effort to apprehend federal-state felony offenders. Plaintiff's arrest on a state felony warrant was made as part of this effort by the Marshals Service with Pittsburgh Police Department Officers." Declaration of Robert Cocco, attached to Fed. Defs' Br., P 3.

In our examination of this operation to determine whether action under color of Commonwealth law can be attributed to Federal Defendants,

a showing that actions "were under color of state law," . . . does not require that the challenged action be pursuant to a state statute. Rather, the question is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974), or whether the state "has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" that there is a "symbiotic relationship" between the actor and the state such that the challenged action can "fairly be attributable to the state." Krynicky [v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 1984)].

Here, the Federal Defendants arrested plaintiff William Brown on a Pennsylvania warrant for Pennsylvania crimes with the active and immediate participation of Pittsburgh police officers. Upon his arrest, plaintiff was delivered to the Pittsburgh police and was detained in the Allegheny County Jail. Thus, while the Federal Defendants' underlying identity as agents of the federal government is unquestioned, the actions they took in participating in the arrest of plaintiff Brown are so bound up with the operation of Commonwealth law that, at least on the current record, we find action under color of state law attributable to them. There is no evidence about (1) the level and source of supervision between local or Commonwealth officers and United States Marshals or (2) the text of any agreements between such entities which might alter this conclusion. Since the Federal Defendants appear to have derived the grounds for making the subject arrest from Commonwealth law in this particular case, their actions can legitimately be labelled as taking place under color of state law. But see Amoakohene v. Bobko, 792 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (Chicago police not subject to § 1983 even though arrest made under city ordinance, city arrest forms filled out, and detention in city jail; defendants were on detail to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration drug task force pursuant to agreement, were subject to DEA supervision, and were engaging in anti-drug duties when arrest made).

Finally, we note that the Federal Defendants would not be dismissed even if they were found to have been acting solely under federal law in making the arrest, and thus outside the scope of section 1983. Persons allegedly deprived of constitutional rights by federal officials may seek relief through causes of action derived directly from the Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). Plaintiff's Complaint can be read as making such allegations. Compl. PP 2, 5, 7, 29.

b. Challenge to Section 1985 Claim

Federal Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for failure to allege a conspiracy with sufficient particularity. Fed. Defs' Br. at 13-16. Plaintiffs do not address this argument in their opposition brief.

In responding to the claims against them in their personal capacity, the Federal Defendants raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
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So that public officials can carry out their duties without undue fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978) (qualified immunity protects officials who make "mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law"). Qualified immunity absolves law enforcement officers from personal liability for violations of constitutional rights if, to paraphrase a leading Supreme Court case to apply in the context of an arrest, a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her arrest was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the arresting officers possessed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).

The first question in our inquiry thus is whether the law allegedly violated was clearly established. "Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law if the applicable law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violation." Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 492 (3d Cir. 1995). It is apparent that the plaintiffs are alleging, against the arresting defendants, a violation of their right to be free from arrest without probable cause protected by the Fourth Amendment and a deprivation of liberty without due process. Compl. P 27.

This inquiry affords an opportunity to narrow the issues. At the outset the court finds no valid claims against any current defendants based on the issuance of the warrant, though plaintiffs superficially challenge the validity of the warrant itself. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment ("Pls' Br."), Doc. No. 23, at 11. We have no reason to doubt the existence of probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Billy Brown based on the criminal complaint against him for stabbing two people and threatening to kill one of them. He was identified in the criminal complaint/warrant as a black male, age 40. Pls' Br. Ex. 4. Plaintiff William Brown's complaint boils down to the lack of probable cause to arrest him; that is, it was not reasonable to confuse him with Billy Brown, and such unreasonableness translates into a deprivation of his constitutional rights. The law that applies therefore is the law of arrest based on mistaken identity.

Such law is clearly established. The Supreme Court has summarized it as follows:

The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted -- indeed for every suspect released. . . "Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."

In Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484, 91 S. Ct. 1106 (1971), the Supreme Court considered the reasonableness of a mistaken arrest in passing on the validity of the corresponding search of an apartment. In Hill, the police had a warrant to arrest Hill. When they arrived at Hill's apartment, they found a man who resembled Hill and arrested him. He was present at the address police were given, fit the descriptions given by victims and accomplices, and could not, as an alleged friend of Hill's, adequately explain his presence in a locked apartment.

The Court found that the officers had acted reasonably under the circumstances, even though the innocent arrestee produced proper identification. The Court recognized that those who are apprehended and arrested attempt to avoid arrest by giving false identification. 401 U.S. at 803. In sum, no constitutional rights are violated solely by virtue of the fact that police arrest or detain an innocent person. Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) ("The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest or misuse of the criminal process is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.")

Of course, the grounds for the arrest or detention must comport with clear constitutional standards. Law enforcement officers' failure to follow such standards places them outside the shield of qualified immunity. Here, as noted above, the application of qualified immunity to the arrest of William Brown rests on probable cause to arrest him. This question in turn rests on the reasonableness of the defendants' belief that plaintiff William Brown was the fugitive Billy Brown.

This is not an issue the court can resolve on the arresting defendants' motions. The application of qualified immunity often turns on the facts known by the public officials at the time of the challenged conduct. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641 ("the determination whether it was objectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given search was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances will often require examination of the information possessed by the searching officials"). The Third Circuit has noted that "the question of qualified immunity often cannot be resolved adequately until the dispositive facts have been presented at trial and reduced to findings." Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 1993); accord Karnes, 62 F.3d at 491 (3d Cir.) ("While the qualified immunity defense is frequently determined by courts as a matter of law, a jury should decide disputed factual issues relevant to that determination.").

Moreover, there is considerable confusion surrounding this important piece of evidence. In his July 11, 1995 declaration to this court, defendant Robert Cocco supplied a mug shot of a black male and stated that it was the photograph the arresting officers had on the day of the arrest. See Fed. Defs' Br., Ex. 1 to Ex. A. We now know this is not accurate; in reality, the photograph attached to the July 11 declaration was William Brown's mug shot from the arrest in question. In a September 6, 1995 supplemental declaration, Cocco notified the court of this discrepancy and stated that he was unable to find the photograph, ostensibly of Billy Brown, that the arresting defendants had at the time of the arrest. Doc. No. 17, P 4.

On November 29, 1995, Cocco filed an addendum to his supplemental declaration. Doc. No. 24. In it he states that he "recently located the actual photograph that was provided by the City of Pittsburgh Police Department with the arrest warrant at the time of plaintiff Brown's arrest." Id. P 4. He attached a copy of the photograph.

A false imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the Fourteenth Amendment protections against deprivations of liberty without due process of law. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979). The Court in Baker made it clear that an arrest based on probable cause could not become the source of a claim for false imprisonment. Id. at 143-44. On the other hand, where the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest. . . . A false imprisonment claim under § 1983 which is based on an arrest made without probable cause is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures.

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, if a person was arrested without probable cause, his or her detention may implicate the Fourth Amendment. If he or she was arrested with probable cause, the detention may amount to a deprivation of liberty without due process.

The appellate courts tell us that the Constitution has a tolerance for errors in law enforcement. In some cases, the judge and jury at trial -- and no sooner -- supply the means by which innocent persons' rights to due process are vindicated. But due process and other constitutional protections would be frail indeed if the means for correcting mistakes of identity were available and easily applied, but were not because of a measured avoidance of responsibility to do so.

Brown alleges that he was detained for almost two months while the means to positively identify him were available to prison officials. Since a mug shot of Billy Brown apparently existed, he must have been previously arrested, and so his fingerprints could have been easily compared with William Brown's fingerprints. William Brown also states that he brought his complaint of mistaken identity to Kozakiewicz, who did nothing. Brown Decl., P 19. If the number and content of Brown's protests were substantial, and the audience included Kozakiewicz, Brown may be able to state a constitutional claim.

We emphasize that we make no findings of fact as to such responsibility. We do find as a matter of law, however, that mere detention based on mistaken identity may work a deprivation of liberty without due process, or constitute an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
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We also note that since plaintiff has named Kozakiewicz as a defendant in his personal capacity, plaintiff must show personal responsibility and involvement (or lack of it) by Kozakiewicz for this claim to succeed. As with the arresting defendants, resolution of this claim must await trial.

b. Failure to Supervise Gricar

Brown implicates Corrections Officer Gricar for a single incident: a hard slap to the head on May 10, 1993. Compl. P 20; Brown Decl. P 14; Pls' Br. at 12-13. He argues that Warden Kozakiewicz should be liable for "failure to take action when [he] was assaulted and battered by Correctional Officer Gricar." Pls' Br. at 12. Kozakiewicz responds that he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions violated no clearly established constitutional right. County Defs' Br. at 9-10.

Supervisory liability exists under section 1983. It is based not on grounds of respondeat superior, but rather on actual knowledge and acquiescence. See, e.g., Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (1995); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, William Brown may properly state a claim against Kozakiewicz based on the actions of a subordinate if Kozakiewicz knew of and condoned or ignored Gricar's actions.

The next step in our analysis is whether Gricar's actions state a constitutional claim. If they do not, neither Kozakiewicz nor Gricar should remain in the case.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989) dictates precision in identifying the source of constitutional right being invoked under section 1983 analysis. In the context of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention, the Supreme Court has decided that pretrial detainees' constitutional rights are protected by the due process clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). The Court has also expressly stated that "the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10. Thus, the validity of Brown's claim involving the May 10, 1993 slapping incident is based on the degree to which it can be equated with punishment.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), settles this question. Hudson involved a claim by a Louisiana inmate under section 1983 against three guards who punched and kicked him, resulting in bruises, swelling, and loosened teeth. Though there is a de minimis test applied to prison officials' physical contact with inmates, the Court stated that "in the excessive force context, society's expectations are different [than in the conditions-of-confinement context]. When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. . . . This is true whether or not significant injury is evident." 503 U.S. at 9. Thus the extent of Brown's injuries, which by his own admission were slight, provide no basis for questioning the validity of his claim of excessive force at this phase of the case.

It is true that Hudson involved the Eighth Amendment rather than the due process clause, and a convicted prisoner rather than a pretrial detainee. Yet these factors only add more weight to our application of Hudson. There of course is no constitutional problem in punishing a person adjudicated as guilty, so long as the punishment comports with the Eighth Amendment. By contrast, under the due process clause, pretrial detainees may not be subjected to conduct that is equivalent to punishment, because they have not been adjudicated as guilty. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 n. 16. If a convicted prisoner therefore is constitutionally protected against malicious force even in the absence of significant injury, then the same protection should be even more readily available to a person to whom no guilt has attached.

Having determined that there are no threshold infirmities to plaintiff Brown's claim against Kozakiewicz for failure to supervise, we will deny the latter's motion to dismiss.

2. Corrections Officer Gricar

Gricar does not challenge plaintiff Brown's claim of excessive force against him personally. Accordingly, this claim remains for trial.

C. Arresting Defendants' Motions as to Irene Kuzak

Plaintiff Kuzak claims that the arresting defendants deprived her "of her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by wrongfully charging her with hindering apprehension. Because the officers deliberately and unlawfully executed the warrant against a man they knew or should have known was misidentified, Irene Kuzak's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in her home were violated." Pls' Br. at 9-10. Federal Defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest Kuzak because her actions when she answered the door on May 6, 1993 on their face constitute probable cause to believe that she violated 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5105(1) and (5).
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Federal Defendants assert that Kuzak both attempted to hide William Brown in her apartment and falsely informed them he was not home.

On one hand, law enforcement officers with probable cause to make an arrest, even if they arrest the wrong person, have the right to perform acts incident to the arrest which might otherwise be unconstitutional, such as carrying out searches. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hill, 401 U.S. at 804-805. Again, the mere fact that Kuzak was arrested incident to an arrest based on mistaken identity raises no constitutional violation.

This is another matter we cannot resolve on summary judgment, however, because of disputed facts. Federal Defendants claim only that Kuzak "became confrontational and denied that William Brown was in the residence." Declaration of Robert Cocco P 5, attached to Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 7, in Civil Action No. 95-867; Decl. of Stanley Holland P 5; Decl. of Paul Holeczy P 5 (both verbatim of Cocco). Kuzak states in her declaration that the arresting defendants demanded Billy Brown, and that her husband has never been known by that name. She therefore told the defendants she did not know anyone by that name. Kuzak Decl., PP 4-8, attached to Pls' Br. Thus the court is presented with incomplete information about the interaction between Kuzak and the arresting defendants -- defendants do not provide enough detail for the court to assess probable cause for Kuzak's arrest -- and genuine conflict of material fact in how the arresting defendants named the fugitive they were seeking.

Moreover, the probable cause for Kuzak's arrest will be influenced by the reasonableness of the decision to seek Billy Brown at 139 Charles Street, rather than Arch Street. If a reasonable officer would not have proceeded to 139 Charles Street, the stage would not have been set for the confrontation with Kuzak. Thus, the probable cause for Kuzak's arrest is also tied up in the arresting defendants' decision to serve the warrant at 139 Charles Street. Our discussion above demonstrates that this is another fact issue we cannot resolve on summary judgment.
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Accordingly, the arresting defendants' motions as to Kuzak will be disposed of in the same manner as those filed against William Brown.

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