Archive for the ‘NSG’ Category

It appears that the indictments of four Indian nationals for export violations have muddied the water on the US-India nuclear cooperation talks. The talks between India and the US are important to India in terms of its civil nuclear capacities. Good relations with the US could pave the way for the lifting of restrictions by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (a group of countries who implement guidelines for exports of nuclear items and nuclear-related items to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons) on exports to India. Symbolicly, at least, successful talks with the US could also signal that the United State implicitly accepts the legitimacy of the Indian nuclear weapons program, even though the Indians (like the Pakistanis and Israelis) developed their nuclear weapons in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Bottom Line:

This new export licensing requirement that the United States is implementing consistent with a United Nations decision is good for a laugh. Now that North Korean Government officials can’t get I-Pods and stereos, they most certainly will end their nuclear weapons program. (OK, I am not so naïve as to think this new requirement will keep Kim Il Jung from getting an I-Pod.) Seems like the United Nations is developing a taste for useless symbolic export controls so long favored by the United States just because it’s better to do something that doesn’t help than to do nothing.

Due to the flagrant and defiant actions of North Korea over the past year relating to missile testing and the detonation of a nuclear device, the United States is imposing new export and reexport controls on North Korea. This new rule is in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1718 which prohibits the direct or indirect sale of arms and other specified items to North Korea by UN Member States.

For three and a half decades now under the bargain struck between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) five acknowledged nuclear-weapons states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US) and its non-nuclear-weapon states has gone like this: in exchange for the non-nuclear-weapons states forgoing nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states agreed to provide them with peaceful civilian nuclear power technology, subject to safeguards agreements overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since the treaty entered into force in 1970, it has become the most broadly accepted arms control agreement in history. Only three states never acceded to the NPT – India, Israel, and Pakistan. (Former member North Korea withdrew in 2003.) Consistent with its obligations under the NPT, the US has long subjected countries outside the treaty to the most strict nuclear nonproliferation export controls, represented on the Commerce Country Chart (pdf) by an “X” in the NP 2 column.

But when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh bid farewell to Washington this past July after meeting with President Bush, he left with a huge prize. The United States had just committed to essentially rewrite the rules for trade in nuclear technology in favor of India, which of course continues to operate a nuclear weapons program external to the NPT. In his joint statement with Singh, Bush praised India as a “responsible state” with a “strong commitment to prevent WMD proliferation” and asserted that “India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”. To that end, the American president said he would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India”. In addition, the US committed “to remove certain Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce’s Entity List”.

The Bush Administration took the first concrete steps to implement its new stance toward India on August 30 when it published a final rule, amending the EAR effective immediately, which eases restrictions on exports and reexports to India of items controlled for unilateral nuclear nonproliferation reasons. The new regulation removes the “X” from beside India in Column NP 2 of the Commerce Country Chart and thereby eliminates several license requirements for exports and reexports to India, including those for the following items:

DAE Kundankulam 1 & 2 (this power plant, still under construction, was never explicitly named to the Entity List, but now that the Indian Government has agreed that it will be placed under IAEA safeguards once work is completed

In removing unilateral nuclear nonproliferation sanctions on India and reducing the number of that country’s organizations subject to the sanctions of the Entity List, the administration has now completed the two major steps toward its goal of a new nuclear relationship with India that it can accomplish entirely within the existing authority of the executive branch. As the Bush-Singh joint statement itself admits, further movement toward greater civilian nuclear cooperation will require the assent of the US Congress and the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group. The irony of the US seeking NSG acquiescence to increased nuclear technology transfers to India is especially rich when one considers the origins of that regime.

The NSG is a child of India’s 1974 nuclear test in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan, which spurred governments to take action to stem the export of nuclear materials and equipment to India and other states demonstrating a proliferation risk. In his testimony before the House Committee on International Relations earlier this month, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert G. Joseph hinted that some US allies participating in the NSG might be amenable to the US proposals for full peaceful nuclear cooperation with India (he specifically mentioned the UK). Still, the NSG operates by consensus, so it will be interesting to see if a State Department office not recently known for its diplomatic achievements (current US ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton was Joseph’s predecessor) can win one for the home team.

The Bush administration has yet to lift the Jan. 20 regulatory moratorium imposed by White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card – a mandate that prevents approval of any regulatory change without the signature of a Bush political appointee. Administration officials have not declared when the moratorium will be lifted, and prospects for a clearing-out of regulations in the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) appear slim. Although the administration has declared its intent to place Washington attorney Kenneth Juster in BXA’s under secretary slot, Juster isn’t expected to be confirmed by the Senate until April, at the earliest.As a result, all BXA regulations must receive the personal attention of Commerce Secretary Donald Evans, a man whose routine schedule leaves little time for scrubbing provisions of the latest license exception.