This
appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the
High Court of Delhi passed on 2.3.1987 in C.W. No. 2657/85.

Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the
"Act") was published on November 5,1980 acquiring a large extent of land
admeasuring 50,000 bighas situated in several villages including Khirkee
village. The land in KhirkeeVillage admeasures 1011 bighas of which the appellant is in
possession of 25 bighas.

Declaration
under Section 6 was published on June 7, 1985.

Challenging
the declaration, several writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court. The
primary contention was that the declaration having been published after 3 years,
is barred by law. The notification under Section 4(1) stands lapsed. Similar to
the appellants, several persons approached the High Court. The Full Bench in Balak
Ram Gupta v. Union of India, [C.W.P. No.1639/85 decided on May 27,1987] upheld
the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under
Section 6 on the ground that some of the land owners whose land was covered
under the common notification under Section 4(1) had already approached the
High Court and obtained stay of further proceedings including publication of
declaration under Section 6. As a consequence, the stay obtained continuing in
operation stood excluded by operation of Explanation II to Section 6(1) of the
Act. Accordingly, the declaration published under Section 6(1) was held valid
in law. When the present writ petition had come up for hearing, the Division
Bench of the High Court passed an order stating that the controversy raised was
covered by the judgment of the full Bench and no other point has been raised or
argued before the Division Bench. The writ petition has been dismissed.

Thus
this appeal by special leave.

Shri Rajinder
Sachhar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that the
view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court is not correct in law. In view
of the fact that the appellants had not obtained any stay pending the writ
petition qua the appellants, there is no prohibition for the respondent U.O.I.
to proceed further by publicating the declaration under Section 6 and that,
therefore, the declaration having been published beyond three years, is invalid
in law. He further contends that after the Full Bench judgment was rendered,
the matter was remitted to the Division Bench, which quashed the declaration
under Section 6 on the ground that the objections filled under Section 5A were
not properly considered and that, therefore, publication of the declaration
under Section 6 was quashed in respect of t he writ petitioners therein. The
same benefits should inure to the appellants as well. In support thereof, he
placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Delhi Development Authority v.
Sudan Singh & Ors. [1991 Delhi Law times 602].

He
also sought support from the judgment in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nndoliya v. State
of Gujarat & Anr. [(1991) 4 SCC 531]. Learned counsel for the respondents,
on the other hand, contends that the appellants have not filed any objections
before the Land Acquisition Collector for enquiry under Section 5-A. Therefore,
the need to consider their objections does not arise. The Division Bench, after
remittance, confined the controversy of quashing the declaration in respect of
the lands of the writ petitioners.

Therefore,
it operates only with regard to them and not the persons who were not eonominee
parties to that judgment. In fact, many persons had accepted the award,
received the compensation and sought and had reference. Therefore, the
publication of the declaration under Section 6 was not bad in law on the ground
of non-consideration of the objections.

Under
these circumstances, the view taken by the Full Bench is correct in law.

Having
regard to the respective contentions, the questions that arises for
consideration is: whether the view taken by the Division Bench and the Full
Bench in Balak Ram Gupta's case is correct in law: It is an admitted position
that notification under section 4(1) was published on November 5, 1980 and the
declaration under section 6(1) came to be published on June 7, 1985. Therefore,
ex facie, it is beyond three years as contemplated under the proviso to Section
6(1) of the Act. The question is: whether the stay obtained by some of the
persons would inure the benefit to other persons under Explanation II to
Section 6? It is seen that notification under Section 4(1) is a common
notification with reference to all the lands situated in 12 villages. The Full
Bench has noted in Paragraph 6 as under :

"6.
In the cases before us, the declaration under S. 6 were made on 27.5.1985
,6.6.1985,7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986 (the individual details of which need not be
set out here).

This
is clearly beyond a period of three years from the dates of the notifications
under S.4, viz.

5.11.1980
and 25.11.1980. They are clearly barred by limitation under the proviso t o S.
6(1) unless the period can be got extended by invoking the terms of the
explanation newly substituted in 1984 (which is the attempt of the respondents
here)." It has extracted the various orders passed by the Court from time
to time in paragraphs 20,21 and 22 which reads as under:

"20.
It may be useful here to refer to the stay orders which the respondents rely on
to bring the S. 6 declarations within the scope of the explanation. In Munni Lal
v. Lt. Governor (CW 426 of 1981) wherein the validity of the notification dated
25.11.1980 was challenged by certain residents of village Satbari, the
following interim order was passed in CM 668/81 on 18.3.1981.

'Case
for 27.4.1981. in the meanwhile, respondents 1 and 2 are restrained from
issuing any declaration under S. 6' The above interim order was made absolute
on 4.5.1981, when the writ petition was admitted.;

'Stay
order passed on 18.31981 made absolute till further orders with liberty to the
appropriate authorities of the respondents to take action according to law if
the existing conditions and requirement of the Master Plan and Zonal Plan, if
any, are breached or violated by the petitioners.' This writ petition was
dismissed on 15.11.1983 (see ILR 2130). In Laguna Farms (p) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor
(CW 1251/81) also the petitioner challenged the validity of the S.4
notification dated 25.11.80. The writ petition was admitted on 26.5.81 when an
interim order in the following terms was also made in CM 1717/81.

'Notice
for 29.7.1981. In the meanwhile, we stay further proceedings in consequence of
the impugned notification under S.4 and declaration under S. 6 Land Acquisition
Act'.

This
order was made absolute on 29.7.1981 and this C. W along with a number of other
C.Ws., was disposed of 15.11.83 along with C.W 426/81. In Gogia v. Lt. Governor
(CW 175/82) the writ petition was admitted on 21.182. An interim order was made
in C.M. 250/82 on the same date staying "further proceedings in pursuance
of the impugned notification dated 25.11.80." This order was made absolute
on 4.3.82 "with liberty to the respondents to move this Court for
variation of the order, if so advised, "This C.W. was also disposed of on
15.11.83 along with C.W. 426/81 (though the list of cases given at the top of
the judgment in C.W 175/81, apparently by oversight). An order similar in terms
to that set out above was made on 11.2.82 in CM4514/81 in Ansal Housing &
Estates Pvt. ltd.

21.
The operation of the notification dated 5.11.1980 was stayed in similar terms
by orders dated 30.9.81 and 11.2.82 in CM 4226/81 in CW 2263/81 (Bishamber Dayal
v. Lt. Governor), a writ petition filed by some of the residents of the village
of Tughlakabad following similar orders in Om Prakash v. Lt. Governor (CW
1250/81). These writ petitions were also disposed of on 15.11.83. But this list
is not exhaustive and it appears, there are other writ petitions pending in
this court today in which the stay order passed continues to be in force (e.g.
CW 861/82).

22.
Reference has also been made on behalf of the petitioners to certain orders in
CW 1203/82 (Budh Vihar Welfare Society v. Lt. Governor), though that was a writ
petition which challenged the validity of a S.4 notification dated 31.12.1981.
In that case, the Court had granted an interim order on 23.4.82
"restraining the respondents from taking further proceedings in
consequence of the impugned notification " and this was apparently, later
made absolute till disposal of the writ petition.

The
Petitioner thereafter moved C.M.315/84 on 24.1.1984 alleging that "the
respondents are misinterpreting the aforesaid stay order and are saying that
the aforesaid stay order is in respect of the entire village of Rithala"
and praying, therefore, that as the petitioners had prayed for stay only in
respect of their lands, the court should be please "to clarify the order
dated 23.4.1982 to the effect that the stay is only in respect of the
petitioners 'land, Khasra Nos. of which have been mentioned in the writ
petition".

The
above position was contested by the Union of India which urged that the stay
order had been granted qua notification under S.4 and was not in respect of
particular land.

After
hearing both parties, the court passed following order on 24.2.1984.

"We
do not understand that clarification is needed. The prayer in CM 1759/82 was in
respect of the petitioners' land. It follows necessarily that the interim order
we passed was in regard to the petitioners. No further order is, therefore,
necessary." 22A. The petitioners also seek to derive support from an order
passed by this Court on 7.8.1985 CCP 152/82 in CW 861 of 1982 (Manakvala v. Chaudhary).
That contempt petitioner was moved because the respondents had made a
declaration under S.6 in respect of some lands covered by the notification
under S.4 dated 25.11.1980 during the subsistence of a stay order at the
request of some petitioners who had challenged the said notification.

The
court observed:

`It is
no doubt true that there was stay of other proceedings but in land acquisition
matters it is really the dispossession which is of consequence. Apart from this
position, a large number of other lands were obviously the subject matter of
notification under S.4 and 6 and it could not be expected that the authorities
should delay further acquisition proceedings in regard to them.

Mere
notification under S.6 may be technically not right qua the petitioners but we
cannot agree that it amounts to contempt calling for any action.

Of
course, as long as stay order stands dispossession of the petitioners cannot
take place and no one has passed the order ordering dispossession. Dismissed."
Ultimately, after consideration of all the respective contentions, the Full
Bench has observed in paragraphs 30 and 31 which read as under:

"30.
Secondly the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also
very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope
and effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and it is
now settled law that in this type of proceedings, the principle of locus standi
stands considerably dluted.

Any
public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition
on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter
: It is a public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grounds
of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular
landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial
blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed before
us raise practically same contentions just as the previous batch of writ
petition challenging the notifications under S.4 raised certain common
contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and their lands would
virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the
initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and, if for some reason that
fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently
raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of
the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the
acquisition is intended," "31. We have, therefore, to give full
effect to the language of the section and the stay orders in question, in the
above context and background. The use of the Word "any" in the
explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the
explanation can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed.
It may be a complete stay of the operation of the entire notification or may
even be a partial stay-partial in degree or in regard to persons or lands in
respect of whom it will operate.

The
words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is no
justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only to the cases in
which the stay order is actually obtained".

It
concluded in paragraph 39 as under:

"39.
We have, for the reasons stated above, come to the conclusion that the period
during which stay orders were in force should be excluded in computing the
validity of the declaration under S.6 so far as the notification dated 25.11.80
is concerned, we find that the latest of the S.6 declarations was on 269.2.86.
The stay order (in C.M.P 668/81) was in operation from 18.381 to 15.11.83 i.e.
for a period of 2 years, 7 months and 27 days. They are, therefore, in time
having been issued within three years plus 2 years 3 months, i.e. 5 years 3
months of the S.4 notification dated 15.11.1980 is concerned, we find that the
latest of the S.6 declaration was issued 7.6.1980 i.e. 4 years 7 months after
the S.4 notification. The stay order in CMP 4226//81 Was operative from 30.9.81
to 15.11.83, i.e. for 2 years and 1-1/2 months. In this period is excluded the
declaration is within time. we answer the principal issue debated before us
accordingly." Accordingly, the Full Bench has upheld the validity of the
notification. It is true, as contended by Mr. Rajinder Sachhar, that the
Division Bench after remittance has quashed the declaration published under
Section 6. The operative part thereof reads as under:

"The
orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5-A and the under section 6
of the Land Acquisition Act together with further land acquisition proceedings
in all the above writ petitions are quashed and set aside with cost. There
shall be two set of counsel's fees at Rs. 1500/- each as the group of petitions
were heard mainly in the two writ petitioners . The respondents affidavits in all
the petitions as it was agreed to complete two sets of petitions with counter
affidavits. The rule is made absolute. 'Reasons to follow'.

Therefore,
the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. U.O.I. & Ors.[37{1989) Delhi Law Times 150] are obvious with
reference to the quashing of the publication of the declaration under section 6
vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question thus arise for
consideration is:

whether
the stay obtained by some of t he persons who prohibited the respondents from
publication of the declaration under section 6 would equally be extendible to
the cases relating to the appellants? We proceed on the premise that the
appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but
since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as
extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when
the court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support
of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the
matters are disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the
orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya
v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [(1991) 4 SCC 531], Hansraj Jain v. state of Maharashtra
& Ors. [1993 (4) JT 360], Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of
Karnataka & Ors. [(1994) 4 SCC 145], Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.
etc. etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1993 (8) JT 194], G. Narayanaswamy
Reddy (dead) by Lrs. & Anr. v. Govt.

of
Karnataka & Anr. [1991 (8) JT 12] and Roshnara Begum etc.

v.
U.O.I & Ors. [1986 (1) Apex Decision 6]. The words "stay of the action
or proceeding' have been widely interpreted by this court and mean that any
type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the
part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an
enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the declaration under section 6
was questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that enquiry under Section
5-A properly conducted and the declaration published under Section 6 to be
valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed further into the matter.
As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be applicable to others
also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the
correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and
consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent union.

We
express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt.

The
question then arises is: whether the quashing of the declaration by the
Division Bench in respect of the other matters would enure the benefit to the
appellants also? Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned counsel is
attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the contention,
it is difficult to give acceptance to the contention of Mr.

Sachhar.
When the Division Bench expressly limited the controversy to the quashing of
the declaration qua the writ petitioners before the Bench, necessary
consequence would be that the declaration published under Section 6 should
stand upheld.

It is
seem that before t he Division Bench Judgment was rendered, the petition of the
appellants stood dismissed and the appellants had filed the special leave
petition in this Court. If it were a case entirely relating to Section 6
declaration as has been quashed by the High Court, necessarily that would enure
the benefit to others also, though they did not file any petition, except to
those whose lands were taken possession of and were vested in the State under
Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. But it is seen
that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the quashing of the
declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons qua the writ petitioners
before the Division Bench. Therefor, the benefit of the quashing of the
declaration under Section 6 by the Division Bench does not enure to the
appellants.

It is
true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effect of such a quashing in
Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh & Ors. etc. reported in
[45(1991) Delhi Law Times 602 (sc)]. But, unfortunately, in that case the
operative part of the judgment referred to earlier has not been brought to t he
notice of this Court. Therefore, the ratio therein has no application to the
facts in this case.

It is
also true that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya's case (supra), this court had
also observed that it would enure the benefit to those petitioners. In view of
the fact that the notification under Section 4(1) is a composite on e and
equally the declaration under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the
declaration under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if that
the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that the appellants
had not filed any objections to the notice issued under Section 5-A.

Under
these circumstances, there is no need to consider their objections, as pointed
out by the Division Bench of the High Court in Delhi Development Authority case
(supra) which, relied on by Mr. Sachhar, has no application. Thus we hold that
the declaration qua the appellants has not been barred by proviso to Section 6
nor is it vitiated by any error of law warranting interference.