Planning failure aided Iraq prison abuse

August 29, 2004

Anyone still inclined to brush aside what American soldiers did to Abu Ghraib prisoners lost his case with the release this week of two military self-analyses, one ordered by Donald Rumsfeld and the other by the Army itself. The same goes for the claim that just a few rogues are to blame.

The first report said the Americans engaged in "acts of brutality and purposeless sadism." James Schlesinger, the former Defense secretary who headed the independent investigative panel, said the prison resembled "Animal House on the night shift." The report said only a minority of the abuse occurred in the course of interrogation and suggested that the best, if saddest, explanation for the majority is Lynndie England's oft-repeated "just for the fun of it."

The Army study told of prisoners being undressed, sexually assaulted, slapped, kicked, attacked with dogs. A few died. Lt. Gen. Paul Kern, who oversaw this investigation, said it revealed "serious misconduct and a loss of moral values." Maj. Gen. George Fay, one of the leaders, acknowledged that prisoners had been tortured.

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The reports constitute a terrible indictment of the soldiers directly involved - the Army's report pegged that number at 33 at Abu Ghraib, plus four civilian contractors - and the dozen or so who saw what was happening and said nothing. Schlesinger's commission said the ethical issues are serious enough to warrant implementation of a professional ethics program for all those involved in military detention.

It would be a mistake to conclude from this that there is something wrong with American soldiers, the vast majority of whom had their courses in ethics from their parents and in their schools and churches, and passed. On the same day this newspaper carried an account citing the "loss of moral values," it also published a story about Joe Sharpe, the young Marine and benefactor to hundreds of Iraqi kids during his tour of duty there. No doubt there are more Joe Sharpes than Lynndie Englands in service of country.

The commission says that what keeps one from becoming the other - apart from fundamental character, of course - is leadership, supervision, training, anticipating problems and needs, understanding the risks in war and imprisonment, and clear directives about prisoner treatment. In all of these areas, commissioners found fault. They held a "failure of military leadership and discipline" accountable for much of the "deviant behavior" and suggested the failure was evident in inadequate staffing. There was one guard for every prisoner at Guantanamo Bay, where the conditions were peaceable, but only one for every 75 at Abu Ghraib, and some of these had to respond to calls to fight. "Improvisation was the order of the day."

The two reports provide a strong argument for disciplining at least some of the military commanders who enabled or ignored what happened at Abu Ghraib, including those who failed to react quickly when the International Red Cross said something was terribly wrong. Beyond that, they make a convincing case for clarifying just what conduct America will permit from guards and interrogators in the course of separating delivery boys from terrorists. Rumsfeld's initial confusion on this issue did not help. But the strongest indictment is the one that reinforces what was already evident: America failed to anticipate the strength of the postwar insurgency and provide the training, manpower and resources to deal with it. The Schlesinger report says the damage spills beyond Abu Ghraib "to the image of the U.S. among populations whose support was needed in the Global War on Terror" and "must not be repeated."

That's a call for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to implement the commission's recommendations. Beyond that, it suggests that future leaders would be wise to rethink our role in Middle Eastern battles.