Between war and peace

Despite two sets of accords, fighting hasn’t yet stopped between Ukraine and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics. Even if a ceasefire could be enforced, the economic and social problems are huge.

The second Minsk accords, in the wake of renewed fighting in eastern Ukraine in January, looked like diplomatic efforts undertaken out of desperation. The US had raised the prospect of delivering advanced weaponry to Ukraine. which led to a top-level Franco-German initiative to avert a military escalation with Russia. It took France and Germany’s full weight to secure a fresh chance of peace.

There were 16 hours of negotiations in Minsk on 12 February before the representatives of the “Normandy format” — France’s François Hollande, Germany’s Angela Merkel, Ukrainian prime minister Petro Poroshenko and Russia’s Vladimir Putin — reached a compromise agreement. The Minsk II accords consist of 13 articles plus an addendum, and closely resemble Minsk I, signed on 5 September 2014 by representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the self-proclaimed republics. The accords provided for the establishment and implementation of a ceasefire within days of signature, and set out political measures aimed at preserving Ukraine’s territorial integrity (avoiding any mention of Crimea) through the re-establishment of state functions and constitutional reform, with decentralisation at its core.

The EU has struggled to renew the long-neglected dialogue with Russia. The present difficulties have their roots in the long-term lack of a coordinated response to the challenges of the countries in their shared backyard: Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. The Ukrainian crisis has only deepened these challenges. In May 2009 the EU launched the Eastern Partnership at the instigation of Poland and Sweden, states that have historically had difficult relations with Russia. This partnership was ultimately intended to lead to the creation of a free trade zone in 2015 and exclude all other types of agreement with Russia, despite it sharing vital commercial links and standards with these states.

In response to this initiative, the Kremlin proposed the Eurasian Economic Union, (...)