We created our first Arctic map in 2008 to dispel reports that the region was about to erupt in a “new Cold War”.
As the map’s notes explain, nothing could be further from truth.
Since
2001, Arctic states have been engaging in scientific research – often in
cooperation with each other – to gather the data that would enable them
to make submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).

BRU map comparing the 2001 and 2015 Russian claim
areas.

Areas in green are in the 2015 claim only. Areas in red are in
the 2001 claim only.

Areas in pale yellow are in both claims.

Author provided

The CLCS is empowered by the UN to assess whether areas of the seabed
meet a complicated series of bathymetric and geological criteria which
can permit coastal states to claim exclusive rights to the non-living
resources of the seabed, beyond 200 nautical miles from coastal
baselines.
The original Arctic map
denoted the maximum claims that could be made given the scientific data
that was then publicly available.
The map’s accompanying notes clearly
stated, however, that these were hypothetical maximums and that the
actual extent of each state’s extended continental shelf would likely be
reduced once more data were gathered.
States around the world have been making these submissions, with some 77 filed to date
for seas ranging from Oceania to the Caribbean.
The CLCS has reached
decisions on about a quarter of them.
In the Arctic, Norway’s submission
has been approved, Denmark’s is under review, Canada’s is being prepared, and Russia has just deposited a revised submission after its original 2001 submission
was returned with a request for more detailed scientific evidence.
The
United States is the sole Arctic state frozen out of the process because
it has failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The new Russian claim adds two new areas and subtracts one from the
original 2001 claim.
In total, it adds about 103,000 square kilometres
to what had been a claim of 1,325,000 square kilometres.
The new Russian
claim crosses into the Canadian and Danish sides of the North Pole for
the first time. While this may have symbolic impact (especially for
Canadians and Danes), it has no legal significance.
In short, little is actually happening on the international seabed –
in the Arctic or elsewhere – other than states using science to claim
the limited economic rights that are reserved for them by international
law.
These filings should therefore be celebrated as reaffirmations of the
will toward peace and stability, rather than feared as unilateral acts
of aggression.
All too often, however, states’ CLCS filings have been interpreted as territorial “land grabs”
(or, more correctly, “sea grabs”).
The most recent Russian claim has
been met with a predictable round of defensive sabre rattling.
The IBRU map may inadvertently aid this impression.
Solid lines and
bright colours imply that vast areas of ocean are being claimed by
individual states as sovereign territory, while overlapping areas appear
as spaces where conflict already exists.
News stories that reprint the
map rarely include the notes that explain what its colours and shadings
actually mean.
The medium of the map – which appears to communicate a
world of states “owning” territory and keeping others out – has in some
senses overtaken the message of states working together.

The Russians are coming … or are they?

In the context of Russia’s expansion into non-Arctic territories
(notably in Crimea), the revised Russian claim has struck the media as
another tale of Russian expansion. Provocative headlines noted that,
with the filing, “Russia claims North Pole for itself” in a “Move to seize oil and gas rights”.
Having drawn the revised map, IBRU had a difficult decision: Do we
issue a new map and potentially add fuel to this misleading narrative or
do we wait for the story to die down so that lawyers, diplomats and
scientists can work quietly with the data?
We soon reached a conclusion that, even when they misinform, maps
provide an opportunity for education.
Therefore, IBRU chose to release
not just the revised version of the general map, but also the second map
showing the difference between the two Russian claims.
Recent cartographic theorists have stressed that maps are not the
static representations that they purport to be.
Rather, they are living
documents that are remade with each reading.
In one reading, the IBRU Arctic map may “prove” that there is a
“scramble for the Arctic”.
But the map may also be read as testament to
the world’s commitment to the rule of law and the orderly settlement of
disputes.
The stories within – and about – the IBRU Arctic map
illustrate not just how we think about the Arctic and its resources, but
also how we think about the map as a tool of science, politics, and
law.