American Mercenary had “a criminally brief introduction to the shaping operation known as military deception” the other day, and it reminded me of an old show on the Discovery Network’s Military Channel called Battleplan. In each episode they describe two battles in modern military history that employed the topic of the episode. Naturally, one of the topics is deception. For each episode, the battle plan is described as an ordered set of (mostly) sequential steps, and as the hour passes each step is described in detail. As a complement to AmMerc’s post, consider this summary of the Deception episode, which examined Operation Bodyguard (the deception around D-Day) and Desert Storm (where Gen. Schwartzkopf wanted to draw Iraqi forces towards the east while he attacked in the west).

Each Deception operation consists of five components:

Objective

Enemy Assumptions

Method Selection and Operational Options

Execution

Exploitation

Objective
As with actual military operations, false military operations must have a clear objective. What are you trying to get the enemy to believe? What do you want him to not believe? Do you intend to draw his forces away? The more detail that goes into planning and understanding the objective, the easier the implementation will be.

Enemy Assumptions
People are hungry for information, especially war planners. Feed them a careful diet. You must be careful to understand what they already believe and feed those prejudices. If, for example, your enemy believes you will conduct a blitzkrieg assault across the narrowest part of the English Channel, create a force located in Dover and make its commander your general best known for that tactic: George S. Patton, III. For extra flair points, the Allies could have made the First US Army Group a real force with real men, instead of an entirely fictional force, and used that as the reserve force for Normandy. Let the enemy believe what they want to believe.

Method Selection and Operational Options
AmMerc does a quick job of covering the basics of this, and I won’t repeat those here. Instead I’ll make two observations. First, a deception operation is generally more successful if there is more evidence (read: more methods utilized) to convince the enemy of what you want him to believe. To that end, don’t focus on using just one method; instead use several. Second, whatever method you choose must be accessible to the enemy. The cadaver loaded with false plans would have done the allies no good if the Germans hadn’t found it. Likewise, the press reports in 1991 detailing Marine rehearsals for an amphibious landing would have done no good if Saddam Hussein had no TV tuned to CNN.

Execution
This is where the rubber hits the road, or the metal meets the meat. Execution of the deception operation must be believable in order to be believed. For example, suppose your enemy sees your deception force assembling to his right. If he observes that there is no logistics train supporting it, he could correctly conclude that you’re trying to deceive him. Likewise, if a deception force is too obviously exposed, with no effort at camouflage, it is not likely to be believed.

Exploitation
The ne plus ultra of deception operations is to get the enemy to continue believing in the deception even after you’ve launched your actual operation. This is difficult, since it requires everything to break your way, including the enemy’s stupidity. But if it can be achieved, it becomes a force multiplier for you, since you now have two things working on the enemy’s OODA loop – your actual operation and your deception operation.

Counterdeceptions
The difficult trick in running a deception operation is detecting the enemy’s own deception operations. If you can’t tell when the enemy is deceiving you, you can’t really tell if your deception operation is working or not, because you can’t tell if he sees your deception and is playing along or is actually being deceived.

ConclusionsWalter Scott was right: “Oh, what a tangled web we weave When first we practise to deceive!” The right metaphor from nature for a deception operation is a web, but it is the web of a black widow – tangled, without order, confusing, with no definite center, as contrasted with the orderly spirals most people think of. You must remember that deceptions are equal parts psychology and salesmanship: know your customer and know what will make him come around to your point of view. A deception is only a supporting operation, but a critical one, for it plays to the fears the enemy manifests while the actual operation works towards his vulnerabilities. Neglect neither and you will master both.

CPX Foxtrot is, to my way of thinking, a bit presumptive and premature. It is based on a presumption that the government is planning to instigate a war, and then proceeds to discuss and/or make theoretical plans to counter such an instigation. I do not doubt the possibility of such an act by the government, but I do doubt the probability of it. These are, after all, the people who burned down a church in Waco and shot a mother with child in Idaho. The leap from that to something like a war-starting false flag is one measured in feet, not miles.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a false flag event is in the planning stages, with an execution date sometime before the end of 2012, and an execution location within the US. I see no capability within FreeFor of detecting or countering it. Tell me, how many members of the FBI or other government agencies are in the militia movement in a non-official capacity? This lack of intelligence resources is (or at least should be) a key deterrent to action. In my mind, action to oppose such an event, without the resources to verify it beforehand, would potentially constitute a Fort Sumter action if it involved ballistic solutions. Other solutions, along the lines of Vanderboegh’s “Unwanted by the FBI” poster campaign, would be much more effective (and personally speaking, morally acceptable), but only if the intelligence resources proved to be iron-clad. If anything came out afterwards that cast doubt on accusations against the government would be fatal to the FreeFor movement. In short, anything short of an FBI agent caught in bed with a dead girl or a live boy would be problematic, to say the least.

As far as the provenance of the memo, I do not know who originated it, but I do know from whom I got it and to whom I sent it. Kerodin was not in either of those lists. Beyond that, I cannot say. I can say that those who received it from me have come to similar conclusions as I.

Is there anything useful I can draw from this exercise? Yes. I have not previously served in the military, and the concept of a command post exercise and the format of the memo were both instructive. As a networking tool, the CPX was interesting, but I won’t go into details there. The comments over @ WRSA are perhaps the most enlightening aspect of it.

Summary: Don’t do anything stupid out there. Lay in your logistics. Run your PT. Let them start the shooting.

Traditionally, governments in such dire straits have resorted to rather nasty methods to distract their citizens from the troubles – namely, war. Could the US government do the same? Sure. Could they let something happen to one of their carrier groups currently operating in the Persian Gulf, in order to start a war with Iran? Sure. It certainly seems like they’re itching to start one, or let one start. Might they let one start to revive a flagging presidential campaign? Sure.

“But no,” says the small r republican patriot, “the government would never do that! They would never let American servicemen be put in harms way for a political goal!”

I do not trust the US government as currently constituted to either avoid or prevent a war. I would not be surprised in the least to find that one of their FBI sting operations ended up in a shot-up shopping mall, or bombed public monument, or destroyed government building. Too many questions were left unanswered after the Oklahoma City bombing, dismissed as unsubstantiated rantings of the crazy militia types.

This “crazy militia type” knows that when a legitimate question is is asked, the mature, reasoned, adult answers with mature reasoning, not ad hominem.

Could the government lose control of one of their efforts to control (or entrap) a terrorist enemy? Absolutely. They are not masters of all they survey, and they do not control everything they think they do.

With those prefacing remarks out of the way, please read this, and discuss below:

IT IS AN IMPORTANT FACET OF THIS CPX THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS CPX AND ITS OBJECTIVES REMAIN PRIVATE, AS DEFINED BELOW, UNTIL THE ACTION DATE NOTED ABOVE.

Overview

Given the current escalating tensions with Iran, and the known history of enemies of liberty in escalating and prompting crises to the detriment of the American people, the possibility of a large-scale or widespread false-flag attack on Americans has become a subject of conversation in FreeFor. A growing theme among liberty oriented persons is as follows: Given that such a false-flag attack would represent a crime of unprecedented magnitude, perpetrated upon thousands of innocent people (perhaps millions if executed with a nuclear weapon of whatever scale), the various diverse and often opposing elements of FreeFor could agree that preventing such an event would be of the utmost importance. The conclusion, well-founded or not, of some informal discussions appears to be the use of such a false-flag event as a common trigger for further action.

The objective of this CPX, then, is to provide a context in which to discuss this approach to assist in disrupting any such false-flag attack which may already be in the planning stages, while simultaneously exercising the capability of the FreeFor to act in concert to execute a multi-phase distributed operation at varying levels of private and public visibility, and across boundaries of interest. In this CPX, the discussion of the merits of the use of such a false-flag attack as a hypothetical FreeFor line of departure for local action plans, without discussing those hypothetical action plans themselves, may accomplish these objectives in a nonviolent way which is non-actionable given the current legal environment.

Objectives

1. To explore the possibility, credibility and implications of a false-flag threat, including means by which an inadvertent self-sustaining chain reaction of hair-trigger events might be avoided in non-false-flag circumstances.

2. To act as a confidence-building exercise among all elements of FreeFor across areas of interest, including those remaining within the governmental establishment at all levels, by selecting objectives and implementation goals of the widest possible appeal and which pose the minimum element of risk to the FreeFor participants.

3. To assist the remaining elements of FreeFor within the governmental establishment at all levels to disrupt/expose a possible false-flag attack on Americans by causing the hostile (or rogue) planners to reorient to the implications of this CPX, thus causing increased internal chatter subject to traffic analysis or leakage, which, in turn, increases the risk of the false-flag operation to exposure and blowback if executed.

4. To preserve elements of FreeFor from prosecution by limiting discussion to non-actionable hypothetical discussions of the implications of this CPX.

5. To minimize the interpersonal conflict that often mars FreeFor exercises by using multiple veils of anonymity and a deliberate lack of central control or direction.

6. To demonstrate the capability of FreeFor for communications discipline by two communication phases, one prior to the action date, one after.

7. To preserve the anonymity of covert FreeFor participants by masking their activities and greater number within a larger volume of overt participation.

8. To thwart the desires and actions of OpFor hostiles to use the CPX for its own purposes.

9. To use the assets, desires and actions of OpFor hostiles to discover elements of their influence on and penetration of FreeFor.

10. To develop a model of FreeFor exercises which communicate information in a self-disciplined and self-propagating way using various media.

Definitions

Action Date: The date and time that a planned action is to be implemented. In particular, the action date of this CPX signals the transition of communications about this CPX from private to public means. See also Execution Date.

Covert Participants: FreeFor persons or elements which, for reasons of their own, wish to maintain anonymity.

Execution Date: The date and time at which an important event is to be executed. For the purposes of this CPX, the execution date is purely hypothetical. Within that hypothetical context, the execution date would be the date at which OpFor implements a false-flag attack, or such a false-flag attack is identified as such within a reasonable certainty.

FreeFor: Freedom Forces, which includes any person or group of persons, within or without government, interested in establishing, maintaining, or restoring the rightful place of government as the servant of natural persons along principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence or the Bill of Rights, or other works which promote individual responsibility, liberty and freedom from coercive government, even if not those specific wordings.

Go Code: A pre-arranged signal or event which initiates action.

Hotline: An emergency communication path, whether secured or not, which remains covert prior to use, but which, once used, is likely to be suspect afterward.

Line of Departure: A pre-arranged location or set of circumstances from which operations transition from the preparation phase to the execution phase. Starting execution of a plan is known as “crossing the line of departure”.

OpFor: Opposition Forces, typically those hostile elements in domestic or foreign governmental positions opposed to the objectives of FreeFor.

Overt Participants: FreeFor persons or elements which are already well-known to the governmental establishment, and who are taking on little additional risk by participating in this CPX during both the private and public phases.

Private Communication: Any and all exchanges of this CPX and discussions about it which remain limited to peer-to-peer or peer-to-peers (blast) email, voice and personal conversations. Specifically excluded from private communication as defined here are postings on the Internet, blogs, social networking sites, etc.

Public Communication: Any and all exchanges of this CPX and discussions about it using an unrestricted variety of communication media and channels, including, but not limited to, blogs, posted articles, advertisements, flyers, posters, etc.

Specific Actions Requested of Participants

1. Participate in widely disseminating the text of this CPX using communication channels and networks normal and customary to a given participant during the private communication phase as defined below.

2. Participate in widely disseminating the text of this CPX using communication channels and networks normal and customary to a given participant during the public communication phase as defined below.

3. Monitor, to the extent of the individual participant’s capability, the emergence of the following, which may indicate potentially disruptive attempts by OpFor elements:

a. Any premature public dissemination of the text of this CPX prior to the action date, as defined below.
b. Any attempt by participants to generate interpersonal hostility or to act as provocateurs to goad creation, revelation or implementation of line of departure plans.
c. Any attempt by participants to transmit or encourage the transmission of the text of this CPX through hotline or other secure channels.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS CPX INVOLVES THE DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATION OF A FREEFOR CROSSING OF THE LINE OF DEPARTURE IN REACTION TO A FALSE FLAG ATTACK UPON AMERICANS, AND NOT THE PROMOTION OF SUCH A LINE OF DEPARTURE CROSSING.

Assumptions

1. That hostile elements within the governmental establishment, through various means of data collection and analysis, already have complete knowledge of this CPX. Accordingly, this CPX is structured in such a way that existing hostile knowledge is not only not harmful, but beneficial to the objectives of the CPX.

2. That these hostile elements desire to act in ways which will disrupt or discredit this CPX, including, but not limited to, provocateurs, misinformation, early triggering and initiation of interpersonal conflict.

3. That these hostile elements will seek to apply traffic analysis to the execution phases of this CPX to both discover previously unknown FreeFor linkages, or discover previously unknown covert participants or confirm suspected covert participants.

4. That FreeFor elements answer to no one, but instead apply their own judgment and discretion in taking or not taking any action. Accordingly, portions of this CPX written in the form of orders are merely suggested as recommendations for unified action.

Operational Principles

I. Phases

1. This CPX is divided into three phases:

a. A private communication phase prior to the action date and time.
b. A public communication phase after the action date and time.
c. A hypothetical execution phase which would commence after the implementation of a false-flag attack by OpFor upon Americans.

2. Although this CPX is assumed to be completely known to hostile forces from inception, division of the CPX into two communication phases allows FreeFor to demonstrate an understanding of communication discipline principles. This two-phase approach also provides multiple opportunities for hostiles to expose themselves through the initiation of early triggering in the private phase, or other disruptive activities in either phase, and in ways which can be detected and noted by FreeFor participants, overt and covert, through passive means and without centralized coordination.

3. The execution phase is purely hypothetical, and discussion of this phase by participants within the context of this CPX is restricted as detailed below for the protection of all FreeFor participants.

II. Private Communication Actions Prior to the Action Date.

1. During the private communication phase, overt participants are encouraged to communicate as widely as possible with other participants, overt or covert, about the content and implications of this CPX using only private communications. To deny hostiles additional information beyond that which they possess prior to this CPX, and for the protection of covert participants, these communications are to use only those linkages which are normal and customary for the participant. Hotline resources are to be specifically prohibited for this CPX in both phases.

2. The private communication phase is to be limited to communication means which lack permanence beyond the control of the individual participants, hostile recording, interception and storage excluded. Email, texting, handwritten notes, phone and personal conversations are examples of private communications. Blogging, tweeting, discussion with media, or posting of the CPX on social media sites, which have a public and stored nature, are specifically excluded during the private communication phase.

3. The sole exception to the use of public communications prior to the action date are teaser mentions of the CPX on public media, and then only by the single and complete phrase “CPX Foxtrot”, with no other detail about the CPX content or intentions provided. Those persons inquiring about these mentions of “CPX Foxtrot” should be provided its content during the private communication phase if those persons are within the normal and customary sphere of influence for a given participant.

An example of a public mention during the private communication phase is a blogger or commenter posting text similar to the following:

“And be sure to participate in CPX Foxtrot.”
“Remember, CPX Foxtrot is coming up.”
“Are you ready for CPX Foxtrot? I am.”

If a prospective participant then asks about details for the CPX, other participants should provide the prospect with the CPX using private communications if that prospect is within the normal and customary reach of the provider. If not, then an appropriate response would be:

“Thanks for asking about that. Ask someone you know about CPX Foxtrot. If they don’t know, ask them to ask. When you get CPX Foxtrot, you will know why it has to be this way.”

Examples of providing the text of this CPX to others within the normal or customary scope of FreeFor communications include:

“A friend sent this to me. It is an interesting concept that probably should be discussed further.”
“I am concerned that this idea might have unintended negative consequences. Worth a read.”

4. The lack of public storage of the CPX Foxtrot details during the private communication phase will assist in not only generating additional teaser interest in the CPX, but will also make it easier for specific covert FreeFor assets to identify potential hostile infiltrants during the private communication phase. If in doubt, don’t post. Also, do not assist hostile traffic analysis by providing details of the CPX beyond those prospective participants with which you normally and customarily communicate. Avoid being ensnared by hostile fishing expeditions.

5. Prospective participants are to be treated with respect and encouraged. An “us-versus-them”, or “clique” mentality is to be avoided at all times by all FreeFor participants. FreeFor participants are also encouraged to apply their own traffic analyses to identify potential hostile provocateurs attempting to disrupt the CPX through the incitement of interpersonal discord or discouragement of prospects.

6. During the private communication phase, the text of this CPX is to be distributed as text attachments (word-wrap off) where practical, or as inserted or printed text otherwise. Other file formats, such as PDFs or DOCs, contain tagging information which reveals personal information or transmits viruses.

7. Within these restrictions, then, during this phase the CPX should be distributed as widely as possible, encouraging the recipients to in turn widely distribute, in chain letter fashion, to ensure as large a participation as possible on the action date.

III. Public Communication Actions On or After the Action Date

1. All participants are encouraged to publicly post the CPX content simultaneously on the action date and time in as many media, blogs, etc. as possible. Original postings with the CPX content, or with the CPX text content attached where possible, are more desirable rather than chain-linking back to a single source blog.

2. During the public communication phase, exposure of the CPX content is encouraged on all communication forms without restriction, other than the hotlines as discussed previously, which are not to be used for the purposes of this CPX at any time. An intention is to create as wide a historical Internet footprint as possible, as well as expose means and personnel by which hostiles attempt to minimize this footprint over time.

3. During the public communication phase, this CPX can be distributed in any form or file format.

IV. Principles During Either Communication Phase

1. A critical component of this CPX is ongoing discussion by participants of the implications of this CPX during either communication phase. However, for the protection of the FreeFor participants, discussion of the execution phase is to be limited to hypothetical discussions of the political/other implications should FreeFor use an OpFor false-flag attack as a line of departure for other covert plans which may or may not be under development. Specifically prohibited as part of this CPX is the initiation, discussion or exploration of such plans. All participants should be alert for potential hostiles who may try to use this CPX to discover or incite specific planning for line of departure actions within the context of this CPX.

Examples of acceptable discussions within the context of this CPX include:

“Is OpFor planning a false-flag, and if so, would the possibility of that as a line of departure for FreeFor be likely to disrupt those plans?”
“How might OpFor use crossing of the line of departure to its own ends, and how might that be mitigated?”
“How might inadvertent triggering of the execution phase be avoided for legitimate emergencies?”
“What effect does the existence of CPX Foxtrot have on the police? On the military?”
“How might FreeFor identify a false-flag so that it can be used as a valid go-code? Would the rapid availability of “perfect knowledge” be a tipoff?”
“Does even the discussion of this CPX have a disruptive effect on OpFor?”
“What other CPXs might we develop to continue to disrupt OpFor?”
“What benefits does FreeFor derive from exercises like CPX Foxtrot and how can we amplify that effect?”
“Outside a false-flag attack by OpFor, what other signals might FreeFor pay attention to?”
“How can FreeFor overt participants use OpFor infiltration and disruption policies and procedures to assist hostiles in exposing themselves to covert FreeFor participants?”
“How can FreeFor use traffic analysis and other techniques to hamstring the actions of OpFor by making them depart from establish procedures and thus resort to error-prone improvised operations?”

Examples of unacceptable discussions within the context of this CPX include:

“What are you planning to do when crossing the line of departure?”
“What should I do when crossing the line of departure?”
“I know a guy/place where you can get X, Y, or Z illegal things to help implement this plan.”
“Who do you know who might cross the line of departure?”

There is a certain amount of subjectivity as to the dividing line between acceptable discussions within the context of this CPX, and discussions which are specifically outside the context of this CPX. It is expected that OpFor will use provocateurs to attempt to goad participants into unacceptable discussions. CPX participants who stray beyond this imaginary line should be gently and respectfully encouraged to review the CPX. FreeFor participants who have been so admonished should exercise diligence in withdrawing to a suitable degree to illustrate their intentions, again, with due respect to all participants. In this way, we create an environment in which hostile provocateurs have ample opportunity to expose themselves, by violating either side of respectful admonishment.

Remember at all times, the discussion of the implications and practicality of a line of departure crossing in response to a false-flag is the topic of this CPX, not those line of departure plans themselves.

2. Participants are encouraged to remember that the rules of interpersonal conduct are merely for the purposes of this CPX, and that normal interpersonal squabbles are to continue unabated outside of this CPX.

3. Within the CPX itself, all participants should be alert to potential hostiles who insist on remaining outside its rules. Detection of potential hostiles who have infiltrated FreeFor is a key objective of this CPX as it uses OpFor’s existing policies and personnel limitations to the benefit of FreeFor.

V. Ongoing Actions

1. Participants in CPX Foxtrot are encouraged to continue to promulgate this CPX and its discussions on an ongoing basis. There is no termination date.

2. Participants in CPX Foxtrot are encouraged to use the term “CPX Foxtrot” as a signal at any time in the future to crack through interpersonal squabbles when discussing the premise of this CPX, which is the hypothetical crossing of the FreeFor line of departure in response to a false-flag attack upon Americans by OpFor.

3. Participants in CPX Foxtrot are encouraged to use this template to generate their own CPXs in the future. An objective of this CPX is to improve upon the techniques employed here to inculcate and evolve, over time, a credible counterforce to unrestricted hostile action upon FreeFor.

Hypothetical Frequently Asked Questions About CPX Foxtrot

Q1. Why should this CPX be transmitted in text form?
A1. Simple text form is immune to transmission of viruses and other detrimental side-effects. In addition, simple text lacks any potential identifying information.

Q2. Why should this CPX not be transmitted using secure or hotline channels?
A2. Two reasons. First, to deny OpFor knowledge of the existence, nature or scope of such channels. Second, a common means to break encryption is to encourage the transmission of a known plaintext through a given secure channel, followed by comparison to the resulting ciphertext.

Q3. Why is the CPX divided into private and public communication phases?
A3. Several reasons. First, as a confidence builder and to generate a sense of esprit de corps among the participants. Second, to force OpFor to remain dormant during the private communication phase, or else risk exposing some of their covert assets. This alone requires that OpFor react to FreeFor initiative, causing elements of OpFor to recognize their lack of omnipotence which plants the seeds in their minds of the potential consequences of failure of false-flag missions. Finally, to assist in generating interest in this CPX by teaser mentions of “CPX Foxtrot” during the private communication phase without the text being publicly available until later in the private communication phase.

Q4. Why is it acceptable, or even desirable, to publicly mention “CPX Foxtrot” during the private communication phase?
A4. As mentioned above, to generate interest by teaser mentions.

Q5. Why is interpersonal conflict to be carefully monitored in the context of this CPX?
A5. A common OpFor disruptive tactic is to generate interpersonal conflict. However, to avoid exposing their assets, all participants, including OpFor elements, must maintain decorum, which once again forces OpFor to play by FreeFor rules.

Q6. Why was the false flag selected as the topic of this CPX?
A6. This topic was selected because of the timely current interest in potential false flag operations given the growing tensions with Iran.

Q7. Won’t I be exposing my network of contacts by sending this CPX?
A7. OpFor has likely already mapped the normal network of contacts by each potential CPX participant. This CPX specifically requests participants to only send this CPX to those already in that participant’s normal and customary FreeFor discussion paths, thus denying OpFor information about potential “emergency” communication paths.

Q8. Could this CPX be labeled as an anti-government conspiracy?
A8. Given the lack of attention to law, justice and ethics by elements of the government today, anything could be considered illegal. However, as long as the First Amendment is presumed to have any relevance, this CPX merely encourages participants to discuss the implications of a FreeFor crossing of the line of departure in response to a false flag, rather than encouraging participants to actually perform such actions. In fact, participants are specifically requested to forego the latter discussions in the context of this CPX as a means of detecting potential OpFor provocateurs.

Q9. Isn’t this CPX equivalent to yelling “fire” in a crowded theater? Could it not trigger crazies in response to any perceived false flag?
A9. This CPX doesn’t introduce the concept of crossing the line of departure in response to a false flag, it merely encourages the discussion of this concept, which already exists in the public space. One of the objectives of this CPX is to discuss potential unintended consequences of such a policy, and this is beneficial to reducing the possibility of such undesirable triggers. Stated differently, discussing the implications of yelling “fire” in a crowded theater is not the same thing as actually yelling “fire” in a crowded theater, nor is it encouraging anyone to do so.

Q10. During the private communication phase, is it acceptable to store this text on my website, and then link to that text in private emails?
A10. No. Storing this text on a web server makes it subject to being swept up by a search engine spider, and then appearing in search results. This would violate the intention of the private communication phase, which is to prevent search engines from reporting the full text of the CPX during this phase. Once the public communication phase begins, then this form of storage is an acceptable option.

Q11. If OpFor already has knowledge of this CPX and potential participants, what is to be gained by the private communication phase?
A11. As mentioned previously, to demonstrate, both to FreeFor and to OpFor, the capability to perform a decentralized operation as well as to provide an opportunity for interested covert elements of FreeFor to participate in uncovering OpFor moles.

Q12. If OpFor already has knowledge of the authors of this CPX, why keep their identities concealed?
A12. To minimize the negative effect of personality conflicts within FreeFor which might interfere with the success of this CPX.

Q13. Isn’t the use of “OpFor” creating deliberate conflict with the government?
A13. This CPX is not anti-government. This CPX is, however, intended to disrupt the actions of intra-governmental or extra-governemental actors who exceed, or who might conspire to exceed, their lawful authority, while supporting those remaining elements of FreeFor within government who perform their duties within lawful bounds.

Q14. What if this CPX itself is a probing attempt by OpFor?
A14. As mentioned previously, it is presumed that OpFor already has knowledge of FreeFor participants, particularly those who are active on the Internet. However, no prospective participant should feel, or be made to feel, any obligation to participate. Instead, such passive, or covert, participants also serve a role by assisting in watching the progress and actions of other particpants and forming their own conclusions.

Q15. This CPX has some errors and portions could be written better. Should I improve it?
A15. No. One of the roles of some covert FreeFor participants is to detect at which nodes the CPX has been altered. If a participant chooses to pass the CPX text along, it should be done with no modifications. If it must be pasted into email, please paste from the first character through to the last, with no intervening comments inserted.

But fear not. Autonomous bots are still a ways away, though closer than some people think. The semi-private sector leads the way in developing these technologies. They’re the ones not funded by the .gov, who open-source their findings and developments – the hobbyists. And like ArcPat says, what man creates, man can defeat. One of the weaknesses of the OpFor’s birds is the communications path – from eyeball to satellite to receiver to control station, each link is expensive and vulnerable.

The gumball beneath a Predator’s fuselage? It costs one quarter of the Predator’s multi-megabuck price tag. Shoot that while it’s on the ground, and it will become a giant fan with wings.

The receiver dish that sends and received commands? Take an antenna class and you’ll learn just how vulnerable those things are to electromagnetic interference, and how much their shape influences their transceiving capabilities. Then you’ll realize how vulnerable they are to ballistic interference.