Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and Research Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.

The problems of national and global security have once again come to the fore in recent months. Russia, the United States and other leading states and their alliances (NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) are trying to adapt to the constantly changing environment. In many cases, the reality outruns people’s mentality, which remains a captive of views inherited from the past decades.

Twenty-five years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Twenty years ago, at the Congress of People’s Deputies, he was elected as the first and — as it turned out — the last president of the Soviet Union.

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis inspecting the guard of honor during his visit to Belgrade, Serbia, Feb. 12, 2010. Public opinion is strongly against NATO membership, mostly due to NATO's 1999 bombing campaign.

Europe recently celebrated the 20th anniversary of the anti-Communist revolution that put an end to the division of the world into two ideological blocs. The events of 1989 opened a new chapter in global politics; however, even two decades later, the full content of this chapter remains unclear.

At the beginning of 2008, tensions between Russia and the West increased with each passing month, reaching a peak in August during and after the Russia-Georgia war. That was followed by a state of suspension with both sides unsure about how events would unfold.

I first met former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in person in 1992 during a round-table discussion. Several months earlier, he stepped down from power. We all expected that Gorbachev, now freed from the burden of authority, would tell us what he was prohibited from saying earlier: the truth about events leading to the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The long-awaited report on the 2008 Russia-Georgia war prepared by a European Union commission did not create a sensation. It was written in true European political style, purposefully avoiding sharp conclusions or extremes and taking a balanced approach. What conclusion can be drawn following its publication?

Given that the United States is experiencing serious setbacks with its allies, Washington must make a sober evaluation of how much it can rely on Moscow for support in resolving a range of problems. Despite the numerous weaknesses that threaten the Russia’s future development, the country is one of only a few remaining in the world that possesses strategic thinking, strategic potential and the ability to apply force.

The proposal to build a new European security architecture, which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev put forward in Berlin in June 2008 and which he followed up in November in Evian, was Moscow’s first attempt in 20 years to formulate a coherent foreign-policy vision.

There has been no traditional summertime lull in Russian politics this year. The breath of the crisis is felt everywhere. In Russia, it forces the government to take preventive measures – many analysts predict a hot autumn prone with social problems. But in the international arena, new opportunities are opening up, which Moscow does not want to miss.

The economic crisis didn’t have the effect on Russia that the West was counting on. Instead of compliance, they’ve shown more aggression. Rather than being scattered around the world, Russia’s now focused on strengthening its position as an independent center of gravity. In other words, it’s expanding its markets and political influence into adjacent territories.

The main geopolitical tools of the 20th century — nuclear weapons and ideology — are losing their former value. The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple states. But it is first necessary to understand the interests that drive numerous regional conflicts.

U.S. President Barack Obama's visit next week to Moscow is generating more interest in U.S.-Russian relations than we have seen in a long time. A dozen or so presummit conferences sponsored by leading think tanks dedicated to future relations between the two countries have been held recently in Moscow and Washington.

Moscow's decision to halt negotiations on joining the World Trade Organization and to focus instead on a joint bid through a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus appears to be politically motivated. It is a step toward establishing an independent identity on the world arena. Such a policy is conceptually based on several propositions.

The global economic crisis remains the focus of everyone’s attention, but the panic of late last year has given way to a sober analysis. The world has not been turned upside down and the problems caused by the crisis have only become catalysts of processes that had begun to take shape long before the autumn of 2008.

Last week, President Dmitry Medvedev signed Russia's national security strategy to 2020. The document reflects the uncertainty in the minds of Russia's leaders regarding the path of the country's development in the 21st century. As before, Russia is in a state of transition, but we are not sure exactly where it is transiting to.

The situation in Iran will likely become the center of global tensions in the months and years ahead. Tehran's desire to establish its status as a regional power will surely clash with Washington's desire to solidify its own global leadership role. And Russia, which has one foot in both camps, will find itself in an increasingly difficult position.

The promise by U.S. President Barack Obama's administration to "press the reset button" in its relations with Russia holds promise for rapid progress in the near future as well as for dealing with serious problems down the line.

The economic crisis is obviously having a strong impact on global politics, but nobody is venturing to predict what the new alignment of forces will be. Most likely, all countries will have to economize, rein in their ambitions and set more realistic priorities.

Since around 2017–2018, the world has been living through a period of progressive erosion, or collapse, of international orders inherited from the past. With the election of Donald Trump and the rapid increase of US containment of Russia and China—which is both a consequence of this gradual erosion and also represents deep internal and international contradictions—this process entered its apogee.

The announcement of the US pullout from Syria was received with caution in Moscow. Besides the security and political challenges it may bring about, the Trump decision could mean the end of a practical, relatively constructive US-Russian approach to conflict at flashpoints.

The presidents of Russia, Turkey and Iran convened for their fourth summit on Syria in Russia’s southern resort city of Sochi on Feb. 14. Earlier leaders of the “guarantor countries” of the Astana process met in November 2017 in Sochi, in April 2018 in Ankara and in September 2018 in Tehran.

Anyone who has at least some idea about the theory of international relations should remember the oft-quoted formula put forward by the father of British geopolitics, Halford Mackinder: “Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”

Relations between the US and Russia are at their worst since the end of the Cold War, China and the US have tense relations, India and China are trying to stabilize relations after a period of acrimony. The major powers appear today to be like the unhappy families in Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: ‘Each unhappy family (major power in this case) is unhappy in its own way.’

Freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of residence can be ranked among the category of freedoms which, as part of the Global Commons, have been restricted to varying degrees at the level of communities, states, and international associations.