Monday, October 19, 2015

On August 19, 2015 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
President Massoud Barzani’s term ended. He remains in office however, while the
ruling parties argue over whether they should reform the powers of the
presidency or not. The on going dispute shows the limits of reforms in the
region. To help shed some light on Kurdish politics is Sherko Kirmanj who is a
visiting lecturer at the University Utara Malaysia and the author of Identity and Nation in Iraq.

1. Kurdistan’s major
parties the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), Gorran (Change), the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Kurdistan Islamic
Group (KIG) are arguing over the powers of the presidency. The KDP wants to
maintain the status quo, while the other parties would like to implement a
parliamentary system and put some limits on the presidency. How much of a
difference will it be if a parliamentary system is approved, and what will it
mean if Barzani is still president?

First of all, I have to say that the original Kurdistan
Region Presidency Act 2005 was drafted by the KDP, supported by the PUK, to
serve, or to feed, the “strategic agreement” signed between both parties
whereby Jalal Talabani was to become the president of Iraq and Massoud Barzani to
become the president of the Kurdistan Region. The Act was designed to fit
Barzani’s outfit and to make him the sole leader in the Region. It gave him an enormous
amount of power and authority. Barzani used the granted and gained powers and
his position to consolidate his grip on several key dossiers including foreign
relations of the KRG, Peshmerga Forces, oil and gas (with the support of his
nephew and son-in-law Nechirvan Barzani) and security and intelligence (with
the support of his eldest son Masrour Barzani). However, after the emergence of
Gorran in 2009 challenging both traditional forces, the KDP and PUK, and
stressing the consequences of having all the powers in one hand, repeatedly
through its media outlets. As a result of Gorran’s stance against excessive
powers of Barzani as well as a result of intense intellectual debate on the
advantages and disadvantages of a presidential system for incipient democracies
a kind of consensus emerged among all political parties, of course a part of
Barzani’s KDP, calling for changing the current political system and
arrangements.

Going back to your question, I believe if a parliamentary
system is approved it will make a significant difference, it may be not in the
immediate term but certainly in the long run, as it will bring the decision
makers and decision making process under scrutiny. At the moment nobody can
question Barzani’s decisions, direction and/or policies. In a country like
Kurdistan where the civil society is weak, the judicial system is powerless or
biased to the ruling party, and the media vastly controlled by the government
and political parties the only institution that can scrutinize the leader is
the parliament. But in Kurdistan which is an emerging democracy the system is
presidential which means that the parliament cannot question the president.

That is why when the four main Kurdish political parties
realized that they cannot contain Barzani’s powers in these circumstances, they
initiated a bill which calls for the change of the system from presidential to
parliamentary whereby the prime minister and his ministers are scrutinized and
questioned.

However, it doesn’t look like that the group of four can
exert enough pressure on Barzani and the KDP to accept the proposal as the group
is not as cohesive as it should be and as it looks. So far the KDP has been
successful in its maneuvering. First it turned the one (KDP) vs. four (PUK,
Gorran, Islamic Union and Islamic Group) game into quinque-lateral negotiations
showing itself as a partner rather than a rival. Second, it sidelined Gorran,
the most furious among the group of four. By doing so it weakened the anti-KDP
coalition. The KDP’s success is certainly related to the PUK’s weak stance on the
KDP’s move against Gorran because the top PUK leaders, not its middle and lower
cadres, think that any win by Gorran against KDP is a loss to PUK and it will strengthen
Gorran on the back of the PUK, bearing in mind that when it comes to
constituencies Gorran is the PUK’s rival more than KDP.

In short the question is more to do with the possibilities
of the change rather than what the change can bring.

2. Gorran was elected
to office on the promise that it could reform the political system. Are its
constituents going to be happy if it changes the presidency, but Barzani is
still in office, and what happens if nothing happens?

Yes, indeed Gorran gained its support and votes on the back
of its promises to reform the political system and eliminate corruption,
nepotism as well as injustices. Of course its supporters will be happy for any
kind of change. However, Gorran and its supporters are divided on this question
some believe that if Barzani holds power then expecting any change in the
political system and people’s condition is naive, however, there are others who
believe that if we can have a political system that is accountable to the
parliament then even if Barzani stays is not a big deal. Having said that, many
people, except KDP members and its supporters, believe that Barzani’s presidential
term is a legal question and should be dealt with in a legal framework. They
believe that Barzani’s term ended and he should not be allowed to remain in
power as president unless the political system is changed where he can run for
the parliament hoping that he may get the chance to form the government hence
become prime minister.

Similar to your previous question it is not about what
happens if Barzani stays or not but whether Barzani can be removed or not. I
personally don’t think that Barzani can be removed simply by relying on
internal pressure even if the pressure amounts. I think if Erdogan’s AKP (a
close ally to Barzani’s KDP) wins elections in Turkey in the coming election in
November the chances of relinquishing power by Barzani will be even more
slimmer. At the same time unless the U.S. government directly or indirectly
pressures Barzani, he may not leave office willingly. Internal pressure is not
enough. In fact I think internal pressure may backfire and result in dividing
the Region along the 1994-1998 civil war lines. This is because of several
reasons, first is that the group of four are not united when it comes to
Barzani’s presidential term. Gorran and the Islamic Group seem to be more
pressing on this issue but the PUK and the Islamic Union are ready to
compromise in return for political gains and for cutting some of Barzani’s
powers. Second, the group of four’s power base in the provinces of Erbil and
Duhok is not that strong to create enough pressure on KDP, bearing in mind that
it is Erbil which is the capital of the Region not Suleimaniya where the
protest movement is currently based. Third, the KDP’s use of carrot and stick
policy has been working in the last decades. Basically what I am trying to say
is that the political space for opposition, be within the KDP’s rival groups or
outside, is extremely limited if not completely suppressed and silenced.

Regardless, if the current move by the group of four
resulted in nothing and if Gorran is the only one to be kicked out of the
government then I think in the next election Gorran will be the biggest winner
and the PUK the prime loser. As far as the other two Islamist groups concerned
as the Islamic Group’s stance against KDP is firmer then it takes a large
portion of votes from the Islamic Union. The KDP may not perform as it did in
the last elections. Generally speaking people are angry at the KDP because of
its authoritarian tendencies and because of its failures to protect large
portions of the disputed areas that the Kurds gained after the collapse of the
Iraqi army in those areas. Hence, even if nothing happens, I expect in the next
elections the balance of power to be tilted in favor of the political groups
who kept strong position against the KDP and Barazani. But this doesn’t mean that
a landslides will be seen. What it means is that the KDP and PUK will certainly
lose grounds, unless they conduct vote rigging on large scale, which is
anticipated!

3. The same can be
asked about the PUK. Their position vis-à-vis the KDP has deteriorated in
recent years, and Gorran has cut into their base. Will they get any boost if
they can reform the presidency, and what if nothing changes?

As I said in the previous question, the PUK’s position
against the KDP is not as firm as Gorran and the Islamic Group. The Islamic
Union is known for being moderate traditionally, so nothing new here. What
needs to be highlighted here is that the PUK’s position is untenable. On one
hand its relation with the KDP is multifaceted and they share common interest
in sharing the revenue that they get from Baghdad and what they get from the
direct sale of oil. Both the KDP and PUK have hundreds of thousands of party
employees, yes employees, that they live on the salaries paid by the KDP and
PUK. If this is cut for any reason, be reform in the current corrupt system or
as a result of tensions with the KDP, then this may lead to loss of
constituencies by both parties as most of the support and vote that the KDP and
PUK get are coming from these group of political employees. If the PUK sides
with the KDP it loses votes, this is for sure. On the other hand the PUK
relations with Gorran has always been tense, except for the last year as the
absence of Talabani tilted the balance of power towards the KDP. Hence, if the PUK
sides with Gorran against the KDP it may lead to the loss of financial benefits
that the PUK gains from keeping a blind eye on the corruption in the oil sale,
which is by in large in the hands of Nechirvan Barzani of the KDP. That is why the
PUK wants to grip the stick in the middle out of fear of losing constituencies
on one side and money on the other. Therefore, the PUK would like to see the
current political system changed because it wants to limit the ever growing power
of the KDP and Barzani as the president. So it wants to make sure that Barzani
or his substitute is brought to scrutiny or its powers curtailed. But at the
same time it doesn’t want to pressure the KDP fear of backfire.

4. How much of a push
for reform is coming from the voting public in the KRG or have they been
appeased by the patronage systems run by the ruling parties?

I think a large number of the population has had enough of the
KDP and PUK, and that is why people came on the streets in February 2011
simultaneously with people in other countries in the region as part of what is
known as “Arab Spring”, and early this month also. However, the iron fist that
is used by the authorities and the failure of the Arab Spring to bring
democratic changes in the region, except in Tunisia, made people generally
hesitant to press for radical changes and/or call for the removal of the regime.
There is a lot of anger out there not only because of corruption and nepotism
but also because of using the wages and salaries of the public servants in
dirty political games. People believe that the reason the KRG is not paying its
employees is not that there is not enough money but rather it is Barzani and the
KDP that uses this to press other political groups, and the public in large, to
extend Barzani’s term for another two years. The people are aware of the amount
of oil exported legally and illegally but they see no return. The current
protest was more to do with this dirty political game than anything else.

Having said that, as I said previously, the KDP and PUK have
appeased thousands of people through a patronage system. In fact I can say
without hesitation that the KDP and PUK are more like a factory than a
political party. They have thousands of people enlisted on the payroll for
doing almost nothing but be a part of voting during elections to the KDP and
PUK to keep them in office.

This has created a lot of problems for Gorran and the other
two Islamist parties as they cannot compete with the KDP and PUK to feed their
“employees”. You may not believe me that a few days ago somebody made a comment
on one of my Facebook posts, which is normal, but the comment was so biased so
I wanted to check his background by looking at his Facebook profile. When I looked
at his profile I found in the field which say “works at” he has written “works
at KDP”. This is not a one off case, indeed, I am well aware that hundreds of thousands
of people are getting regular monthly salaries for just attending, and most of
the time not even attending, political meetings and gatherings. As long as they
vote for the party they get their payments, or they are enlisted on retirement
benefits coming out from the public purse.

5. Finally, Barzani
remains president even though his term is up, and no one is talking about
wanting him out. What does that say about the power of personality politics and
the rule of law in the KRG?

I don’t share the view that no one is calling for Barzani to
go. In fact as far as I am aware the majority of people want him out but in the
Kurdistan Region, power and money are the arbitrators not the people; people
are threatened, elections are not fair and clean; the media is controlled etc…
etc… that is why Barzani is in power. Does this mean that nobody wants Barzani
to stay, no, there are money people even outside the KDP powerbase, some people
believe it is not the right time for handing of power to somebody else while
ISIS is on the door steps threatening the Region, and while things are not
settled with the central government.

In regard to personality politics, all that I can say is
this is the Middle East. On the one hand, politicians personalize everything,
and on the other hand people like, admire and support authoritarian leaders, be
charismatic or with no charisma at all, like Barzani.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the politics, economics, security, culture and history of Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com