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With a growth rate of probably 2.3% in 2017, Germany delivered the main positive surprise in the industrial world. In 2018, German GDP looks set to expand by 2.3% again. If this forecast materialises, Germany will grow at an above-potential rate for the fifth year in a row. The upcoming wage round and resilient demand combined with the global decline in free capacities might, however, push up prices more strongly than currently expected. We already voiced concerns ahead of the Bundestag elections that the new government (just like its predecessor) might not pay sufficient attention to urgent challenges such as digitalisation, demographics and globalisation as the labour market situation is favourable. Now that forming a government has turned out to be unexpectedly difficult our concerns have increased. [more]

In 2019 we've been asked lots of questions about the German economy, politics – fiscal policy and the black zero, in particular – and, more fundamentally, about Germany’s future given the risk of a more permanent reversal of globalisation, the increased environmental focus, the challenges for the German car industry and the widespread notion that Germany might miss the boat on the big data economy and other technological trends. This is why we are also discussing these issues in this report. For 2020 we anticipate a gradual recovery in global trade, which should enable a piecemeal recovery in exports and help end the industrial recession. We expect equipment spending to decline in 2020. On the other hand, the domestic growth pillars – private and government consumption as well as construction – should continue to expand at a healthy clip. But annual GDP growth of 1% forecast for 2020 after 0.5% in 2019 is clearly underwhelming, especially since the acceleration versus 2019 is almost exclusively the result of an unusually high number of working days in 2020. [more]

ETFs have gained in popularity among private investors who have expanded their ETF investment multiple times in recent years to approximately EUR 35 bn. Nonetheless, ETFs remain a niche product for private investors considering that their total mutual fund assets amount to EUR 622 bn. ETFs have been introduced as passive investment vehicles, but active ETF management is on the rise. The sustained low-interest rate environment could allow ETFs to tap into new client segments. In Q3, loans to German households were up by a record EUR 17.9 bn qoq, driven by a record surge of EUR 16.3 bn in mortgages. Deposits grew by EUR 13.6 bn – the smallest increase in seven quarters. The fact that some banks impose negative rates on deposits seems to create negative sentiment among German savers. [more]

Passenger numbers at German airports recently fell for the first time since December 2017. The decline is largely due to economic reasons, such as the cyclical slowdown and lower supply due to airline bankruptcies. Air travel is increasingly coming into the focus of climate-policy regulation. Traffic at regional airports may be hit most. In contrast, large airports are likely to see passenger numbers increase further. “Flight shame” looks set to remain a niche phenomenon. [more]

In the lending and deposit-taking business with retail customers, there are substantial differences between the federal states. 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, per capita loan volumes in east Germany are significantly lower than in the west. The latter, in turn, is characterised by a certain north-south divide. Savings banks have a market share of 25-35% throughout the country, whereas cooperative banks have a much stronger presence in the south and west than in the east and north. The large banks achieve an above-average market share of 20-25% in the city states and east Germany. The spread between the federal states is smaller for deposit volumes than for credit volumes. Primarily the savings banks, cooperative banks and other commercial banks have to cope with a considerable deposit overhang and thus an &quot;investment plight&quot; in the negative interest rate environment. In east Germany, the deposit overhang is particularly large. Due to digitisation, changes to the established regional focuses might now be possible. [more]

As German policymakers plan to do without nuclear power, coal and lignite in the future, natural gas remains the last traditional source for power generation. And since Germany targets complete climate neutrality by 2050, natural gas will also be a transitional source of energy – nothing more and nothing less. The completion and operation of Nord Stream II is clearly in line with the declared goals of German energy policy. Nord Stream II will improve supply security and pipeline gas, such as that delivered by Nord Stream II, is more environmentally friendly than LNG. [more]

German exports and global trade have been moving in lockstep recently and more or less grinded to a halt in yoy terms. We found that the Bundesbank’s leading indicator for global industrial production leads German exports by 4 to 5 months. Recent declines in this indicator do speak against a recovery in German exports before the end of Q1 2020, despite recent signs of stabilization in German foreign order intake. (Also included in this issue: house prices in Germany, labour market, automotive industry and German politics) [more]

Between 2000 and 2018, German net energy imports declined by almost 12%. Oil and nuclear energy imports were down considerably as oil heating becomes less popular and the German government has decided to give up nuclear energy. In contrast, net natural gas imports are trending upwards. Coal imports did not start to decline until 2016 and were still considerably higher in 2018 than in 2000 because domestic coal mining was abandoned. Germany’s dependence on energy commodity imports has not declined much over time. In 2018, almost 71% of the necessary energy commodities were imported (2000: 72.6%). [more]

A new (green) 'fiscal deal' in Germany? The climate protection programme is no game changer for fiscal policies as it will be largely counter-financed by additional revenues. The ecological steering effect of the climate package is also limited since the initial carbon price will be low. Speculations that Germany will finally relent and embark on a decisive fiscal policy loosening have proved to be overplayed. We stick to our call that we will not see a fiscal package unless Germany enters a severe recession. Still, Germany’s budget surpluses are set to narrow considerably in 2019/20. (Also included in this issue: German labour market, industrial production, auto industry, the view from Berlin) [more]

The future of bank branches has been under scrutiny for some time due to the increased usage of online and mobile banking. On top of the general trend, regional differences in demand for branch services may have important implications for the future of branch networks. Structurally fewer client visits in certain regions may exacerbate the pressure to close branches. Within Germany, the number of bank branches has declined sharply from around 40,000 in 2007 to some 28,000 in 2018. [more]

The climate action package is a classic example of political compromise. It aims to support climate protection without overextending private households and companies. Criticism is perfectly justified. In the final analysis, however, the climate action package is also a reflection of the society's attitude towards climate protection: Whilst a majority of Germans support more climate protection, only a few are willing to shoulder the financial burdens. [more]

So far, Germany’s efforts to arrive at a more sustainable energy profile (the ‘Energiewende’) have focused on the electricity sector. However, attention is increasingly shifting towards the transport sector and its steadily rising carbon emissions. Decades-old demands, such as replacing road by railway transport, are being repeat-ed once again, even though they have been found impossible to realise. And some new concepts are being presented, such as micro e-mobility. However, their contributions to transport reform are negligible at best; they may even prove counterproductive. Ultimately, the solution is simple, if uncomfortable: long-term climate protection goals (i.e. virtual carbon neutrality) can only be reached by a considerable decline in traffic, unless technology makes significant progress. Policymakers will find it difficult to convey this message, seeing that individual mobility is one of the key concepts of a liberal society. [more]

As our planet heats up, the public debate has increasingly focused on the use of fossil fuels in the last few years, in particular coal. There is only one major exception, namely the US, whose current administration doubts that human activities are behind the climate change. German hard coal had a share of only 6% in total coal consumption in 2018. 99.9% of the lignite consumed were mined in Germany itself, namely in the Rhineland, in Lusatia and in the Central German district. A number of market observers have been skeptical about or even downright against phasing out lignite mining, mainly due to the negative impact on employment. This is probably the main reason why policymakers have decided to provide up to EUR 40 bn to support/subsidise the exit from lignite production by 2038. [more]