Interest Groups

The Ex-Contras and Recontras

The Nicaraguan Resistance was unable to establish
itself as
a political presence in Nicaragua after the 1990
elections,
despite its part in bringing them about. The Chamorro
government
found little place in its government for the fighters and
leaders
of the Nicaraguan Resistance, described as the largest
peasant
army in Latin America since the Mexican Revolution,
outside of
national-level organizations set up to deal with the
Contras'
resettlement. Part of the reason for this exclusion was
that
prominent individuals within the new government, such as
Alfredo
César Aguirre, had served as part of the rival Southern
Front,
which disintegrated in the mid-1980s after the United
States
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) withdrew its aid. The
expulsion
also has of the Contraas been attributed to social factors
because the Chamorro government is largely made up of
Nicaragua's
old elite and the Contra leaders are from the middle and
lower
classes. In addition, the restriction of the Contras was a
political move: incorporating ex-Contras into the
government
would alienate many Sandinistas and make more difficult
the
reconciliation envisioned by Chamorro's government.
Whatever the
underlying reasons, the rationale stated by supporters of
the
Chamorro government is that even though the Contras were
important to the electoral outcome, the victory was not a
military one but an electoral one, and those who waged the
electoral battle are those who are entitled to govern. A
year
after the election former Contras who felt abandoned by
the new
government and unable to influence it within the system
began
rearming.

Obstacles to the establishment of a Contra political
presence
in Managua began with arrangements for demobilizing and
resettling the Contras set forth in transition agreements
signed
shortly before and after the Chamorro government took
power. The
first of the documents was the March 27, 1990 Toncontín
Accord
between the Nicaraguan Resistance and members of the UNO
government-elect signed in Honduras. The Contras committed
themselves to the concept of demobilizing and promised
that all
Contras remaining in Nicaragua would hand in their weapons
by
April 20, 1990. The definitive peace accord between the
outgoing
Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan Resistance was
signed on
April 18, 1990 and took effect at noon the following day.
The
agreement provided that all Nicaraguan Resistance forces
would
immediately begin to move into security enclaves under the
protection of the UN Central American Observer Group, a UN
peacekeeping force. The government was to withdraw all
military,
paramilitary, and security forces to a point at least
twenty
kilometers from the enclave borders by April 21.

These agreements seemed to be in trouble just hours
after the
Chamorro inauguration. Contra leaders, protesting
President
Chamorro's decision to retain General Humberto Ortega as
chief of
the army, stated that there would be no national
reconciliation
and that none of their troops would disarm as long as
General
Ortega remained in that post. Shortly thereafter, however,
the
Chamorro government and the resistance issued a joint
Managua
Declaration stating that the Contras would begin the
process of
turning in their weapons on May 8 and complete the process
by
June 10. In turn, the government announced on June 10 its
plans
to reduce the size of the army and to guarantee the
Contras'
safety.

The subsequent disarmament process was again halted in
May
when Sandinista unions went on strike and resistance
leaders
stated that the strike confirmed the Chamorro government's
lack
of control. Nevertheless, most of the rebels had
surrounded their
arms by the June 10 Toncontín deadline. Under separate
arrangements, the remaining rebels agreed to hand in their
weapons--the Yatama Contra forces by June 21 and the
Southern
Front rebels by July 25, 1990. Demobilized Contras
received a
change of civilian clothes, farm tools, a US$50 cash
grant,
rations of rice and beans, and a promise of land.

Within months, however, these agreements had broken
down, and
violence resumed as the ex-Contras were unable to settle
on the
land they had been promised in development areas, saw
their
economic prospects evaporate as the economy worsened, and
felt
their security threatened by the continued Sandinista
presence in
the military and in the police. The first incident
occurred in
July 1990, when some fifteen to twenty armed Contras, led
by
Commander Rubén (Oscar Manuel SobalvarroGarcía), briefly
occupied
the central bus terminal in Managua and exchanged fire
with
Sandinista labor union strikers.

A dozen members of the UN peacekeeping force negotiated
the
Contras' withdrawal. However, this incident was followed
in 1990
by ex-Contra attempts to seize land held in Sandinista
cooperatives and by their blockage, together with local
peasants,
of the Managua-Rama road, the country's major east-west
highway,
for eighteen days.

Incidents increased in 1991 as conflict between
ex-Contras
and Sandinista police and army officials continued. About
the
time the ex-Contras formally announced that they were
taking up
arms again (and were promptly dubbed the Recontras), the
OAS
cease-fire monitoring forces had documented the murders of
some
thirty-five former Contras. For some Contras, the February
16,
1991, murder of former Contra leader Enrique Bermúdez
Varela in a
Managua hotel parking lot underscored the state of
insecurity and
exacerbated their distrust of the Sandinista police.
Bermúdez,
who had taken up residence in Miami after the war, had
been
visiting Managua to conduct personal business and to urge
the
government to treat the ex-Contras better. The police
allegedly
handled investigations in a manner suggesting negligence,
ineptitude, and a cover-up, although Sandinistas countered
that
Bermúdez may have been killed by disaffected Contras.

The Bermúdez murder came just as ex-Contras, as well as
other
peasants, were increasing pressure for access to land
before the
May planting season. Thousands of the some 18,000 to
20,000
Contras who had turned in their weapons had not received
the land
promised them under the demobilization agreement, and many
others
found they could not farm the land they had received
because of a
lack of promised tools and infrastructure. In early April,
Commander Dimas (Tomás Laguna Rayo), one of several
rearming
commanders, claimed to have 200 newly rearmed Contras in
the
hills around Estelí who intended to take over territory to
use as
leverage to make demands on the government. Incidents
between
Recontras and Sandinista officials continued throughout
the year
with no major clashes. Estimates of Recontra strength
increased
from a few hundred to an estimated 1,000 personnel with
assault
rifles. By the end of the first year of demobilization,
the OAS
had verified fifty-two slayings, often of Recontras, about
half
attributed to Sandinista military or police.

The Recontras' first major action occurred in late July
1991,
when eighty Recontras attacked a local police station in
Quilalí
and battled for six hours under the leadership of
Commander
Indomable (José Angel Morán Flores). In August 1991,
Minister of
Interior Carlos Hurtado Cabrera met with Indomable and
Dimas to
discuss Recontra demands: the disarming of Sandinista farm
cooperatives, the removal of army bases from areas of
Recontra
activity, removal of police and army officials known to
violate
human rights, investigation of the killings of ex-Contras,
and
indemnification of ex-Contra families.

For several months thereafter, although the Recontra
activities centered on disruptive rather than violent
activities
and there were few major battles, the Nicaraguan
countryside
threatened to return to violence. However, by early 1992
the
government seemed to be gaining control of the situation.
The
uncertainty created by the Recontras was exacerbated in
late 1991
by the formation of Recompas, rearmed former Sandinista
soldiers.
The Recompas, many of them junior officers, acted to bring
attention to their demands for land and to respond to
Recontra
activities, including the assassination of a Sandinista
police
chief and his secretary. Eventually, there were reports of
both
groups working together on behalf of one basic demand:
land and
the equipment to work it. The government countered by
ordering
the Sandinista People's Army not to engage in combat and
retaliatory actions and by offering to meet some Recontra
demands. The OAS observer group played an important role
in
mediating disputes and calming tempers. In early 1992, the
government offered Recontra leaders money to retire,
offered both
Recontras and Recompas from US$100 to US$200 for each
weapon
turned in, and promised both groups houses and land. That
offer
led to a surprising 20,000 weapons being turned in under
OAS
supervision, although estimates were that some 30,000 to
80,000
weapons were still held by civilians.

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