Nuclear Weapons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards the strengthening of the inspection procedures in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; and what would be the financial implications thereof.

With European partners we put forward a list of proposed improvements to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, including greater use of special inspections, in September 1991. We welcome the recent reaffirmation by the board of governors of the IAEA of the agency's right to conduct such inspections. Extending safegurds activities will have financial implications. Within the total provision for safeguards in the agency's draft budget for 1993–94 some 500,000 US dollars are allocated for a review and analysis of background information relevant to safeguards activities, including special inspections.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the actions that may be taken against a state that violates its obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Under article XIIC of the IAEA statute, the IAEA board of governors is required to report any state which violates its safeguards obligations under the NPT to the Security Council and general assembly. It is then for the Security Council to decide on appropriate action—as it has done with Iraq. Should the state in question not take full corrective action within a reasonable time, the board of governors may curtail or suspend assistance being provided to it by the agency or by an IAEA member, and call for the return of materials and equipment. The agency may also suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) what is the effect of article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty with regard to the number of strategic nuclear warheads that the United Kingdom may deploy above the number presently deployed on Polaris;

(2) what are the implications for the United Kingdom's treaty obligations under article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of the deployment of a United Kingdom tactical air-to-surface missile;

(3) what are the impllications for the United Kingdom's treaty obligations under article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to Her Majesty's Government's decision to raise the maximum level of warhead deployment of the strategic nuclear force with the introduction of the Trident missile system.

It is the Government's policy to maintain the minimum nuclear capability necessary to ensure effective deterrence. This is consistent with the United Kingdom's obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards a greater use of special inspection procedures under the existing terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

We have long advocated greater use of special inspections. With European partners, we put forward a list of proposed improvements to IAEA safeguards, including greater use of special inspections, in September 1991. We welcome the recent reaffirmation by the board of governors of the IAEA of the agency's right to conduct such inspections.

As a matter of law, the substantive articles of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are binding upon states parties. The declarations of intent contained in the preamble to the treaty are not, but reflect the long term aspirations of the signatories. The Government attach great importance to them.

As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear in a written answer on 12 May, at column90, we have a continuing requirement to sustain a minimum programme of nuclear tests to maintain the effectiveness and safety of our nuclear deterrent.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) what representations his Department will make to the Russian Government to secure an extension of Russia's one-year moratorium on nuclear tests;

(2) what assessment he has made of the security implications for the United Kingdom of the Russian moratorium on nuclear tests.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards the conducting of an underground nuclear weapons test by any country other than those of the permanent five of the United Nations Security Council.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his Department's policy towards the strengthening of the obligations imposed upon nuclear suppliers under the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

We exercise our supplier obligations under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through our membership of the Zangger committee. We were a founder member of this committee, provide its secretariat and play an active role in its work. We are a strong supporter of strict supplier controls and are also members of the nuclear suppliers' group. Last September we adopted a policy of full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply.

The United Kingdom remains committed to a comprehensive test ban—CTB—as a long-term goal. However, we have continuing requirement to sustain a minimum programme of nuclear tests, and problems of effectively verifying a CTB remain. Progress can therefore he made only on a step-by-step basis.

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if his Department will accept(a) a testing quota or (b) a lower threshold limit on the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons testing programme.