Time will tell if the success in killing bin Laden will have long-lasting effect worldwide

The compound where Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is outlined in this 2011 image and map released to the media Monday.

By John Farmer

The positive fallout from the Obama administration’s success in finding and killing Osama bin Laden is clear enough. How long it will last, however, is far from clear.

The immediate reaction from pundits and politicians alike is that President Obama’s bold action — gutsy, some called it — has: 1) given him the credibility as a strong and confident commander he had been denied; and 2) boosted his re-election prospects.

The first part is undoubtedly true. Even critics, including former Vice President Dick Cheney, were quick to commend Obama’s decisiveness. His polls numbers certainly will improve, perhaps dramatically.

But few things are as impermanent as political popularity. Twenty years ago, President George H.W. Bush enjoyed near-iconic ratings after his Desert Storm victory in Iraq. But a year later, he was beaten in his bid for a second presidential term.

And, of course, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, his country’s idol as the victor over Nazi Germany, was tossed out of office two months after the end of the war in Europe. In politics, sic transit gratitude.

The deep thinkers in the foreign field see bin Laden’s demise as a deep wound to al Qaeda, the terrorist organization he led. And it surely is an immense propaganda blow. For it spotlights the reach of U.S. intelligence and special operations forces in a way that could damage al Qaeda morale and discourage recruitment.

But as a death blow to future al Qaeda operations against the West, bin Laden’s departure is probably overrated.

The consensus among Western intelligence officials for several years has been that his role in al Qaeda was more motivational than operational. Scores of those close to him have been killed. And it had been many months since he dared use any electronic means of communication that might lead Western intelligence operatives to him.

Bin Laden’s been reduced to using couriers for communication, which has limited, if not destroyed, the command and control he once exercised over al Qaeda operations. Al Qaeda itself has been atomized — become a collection of free-booter terrorist bands, loosely linked, if at all, rather than a globally functioning organization. But still dangerous.

If al Qaeda’s reeling today, that’s not likely to last either. If anything, bin Laden’s death could spur its most zealous adherents to seek another 9/11-type target to reassert its relevance in a changing Middle East.

We’re being confidently assured at the moment that the offing of bin Laden makes us all safer. But, in fact, security precautions at airports, government buildings here, embassies abroad and a host of gathering spots will to be increased, not reduced, on theory that al Qaeda will seek revenge.

The most stunning thing about the cornering of bin Laden and his death was how it was accomplished and by what combination of U.S. assets. Among the things it exposed was the existence of a special anti-terrorism team — the Joint Special Operations Command — that few of the most highly placed officials in Washington knew existed.

JSOC, which has its own Targeting and Analysis Center in Northern Virginia, operates under directives from the president. It’s empowered to assemble strike teams from units such as the Navy SEALs, wed them to other military elements and use secret aviation and mapping technology — the kind that perhaps permitted JSOC helicopters to evade Pakistani aerial warning systems.

It was confidence in JSOC that allowed Obama to choose a helicopter attack on bin Laden — and firsthand, eyewitness evidence of his death — rather than a drone attack as some advisers reportedly wanted.

The attack is certain to raise new questions about Pakistan. Did it know about bin Laden’s hideout cheek-by-jowl with two huge military bases? Will it cause reassessment of Washington’s hefty military and civilian aid to Islamabad, at least $9.5 billion in recent years? And how will it affect Pakistan’s part-friend, part-foe role in Afghanistan.

It’s also bound to reverberate in the wider Middle East, where an “Arab Spring” has produced optimism about democracy in the region, with U.S .encouragement and a more positive image. Ironically, however, taking out bin Laden may not have helped us.

Having done in Saddam Hussein, bombing Moammar Gadhafi and killing his son and some grandchildren, according to the Libyan government, and now taken out bin Laden, the U.S. military footprint in the region looms larger than ever just when Obama wants to reduce it.