Thursday, May 28, 2015

In June 2014 the Islamic State (IS) swept into Mosul taking
Iraq’s second largest city. Afterward IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gave a
public sermon in a Mosul mosque declaring the return of the caliphate. That
sent shock waves through the international community, but was in fact a long term
goal of the group. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who founded the organization that would
become IS wanted to form an Islamic state long before the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. After he was killed in 2006 his successors began forming a state, but
that was largely ignored until their replacement Baghdadi began making it a
reality.

Restoring the caliphate was a major goal of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi. That started in the early
1990s when he began working with Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi. Together they
criticized the west and the Jordanian government, and called for jihad and the formation
of an Islamic state. In 2001, Zarqawi and Al Qaeda commander Saif Adl
allegedly talked
about how the impending invasion of Iraq might provide the opportunity to
restore the caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood largely inspired these ideas. It
talked about the caliphate when it was founded in the 1920s, and later in the
1950s its ideologue Sayid Qutb called for radical revolutionary activism, which
inspired many groups in the following decades. Zarqawi came from this line of
Salafi-Jihadist thought, and tried to implement it in Iraq.

Throughout Zarqawi’s time in Iraq he stated that his goal
was to form an Islamic state. In May 2004 for example, he said he was in Iraq
to wage jihad and create a state. Two months later he stated that an Islamic
state was emerging in Iraq, and in August he claimed he was fighting to launch
the caliphate. The next year he issued a strategy document, which concluded
with a state. Then in 2006 Al Qaeda in Iraq created the Mujahedeen Shura
Council with five other groups, which it said was the start of a new Islamic
nation. Zarqawi was killed a few months later, but it was evident from these
statements and more that he believed the vacuum created by the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein and the subsequent war was just the opportunity he had been waiting
for to return the caliphate. He thought starting a civil war in Iraq would
rally the Sunni population to his side in a jihad against the west and Shiites.
The ensuing victory would open the door to a new Islamic era.

After the passing of Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq would
continue on with his vision. Abu Hamza Muhajir also known as Abu Ayub Masri replaced
Zarqawi as the head of Al Qaeda in Iraq. He named Abu Omar al-Baghdad as
the official leader of the organization. In October
2006 they announced the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was to follow in
the footsteps of the Prophet Mohammed. It claimed it controlled an area about
the size of Medina under the Prophet. That included provinces in Baghdad,
Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and parts of Babil and Wasit. In
turn, Muhajir called for Muslims to give baya or allegiance to Baghdadi. This was
generally welcomed
by jihadis such as Al Qaeda initially, but caused controversy within the
Iraqi insurgency. The Islamic Army for example, criticized the idea in 2007.
The United States on the other hand didn’t pay much attention, focusing instead
upon calling Baghdadi a
fake. The Islamic State of Iraq was actually the start of the caliphate,
but was almost completely missed in the west. Muhajir and Baghdadi were
fulfilling Zarqawi’s plan. The problem was that ISI didn’t have the power in
Iraq to actually create a state on the ground. By 2007 for example, it was
suffering major setbacks. It also lacked the standing in the jihadist community
to convince many others that the caliphate was returning.

It wasn’t until the Syrian war, and the revival of IS that the
Islamic state would really gain ground. The conflict in Syria allowed IS to
gain new recruits, find new sources of income, and expand into another country.
That led to the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in
April 2013. In Iraq, the decline of politics for Sunnis after the 2010
elections, the U.S. military withdrawal in 2011, Sunni protests, and Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s hallowing out of the Iraqi Security Forces all
contributed to the return of IS. By 2014 IS was able to seize Mosul and
declared the caliphate on June 29 resulting in the name change from ISIS to simply
the Islamic State. This time the announcement was taken much more seriously and
gained headlines around the world. IS had proved itself an effective insurgent
group seizing huge tracts of land in both Syria and Iraq. That didn’t mean
there was universal agreement upon the caliphate within the jihadi community as
there were still plenty of dissenters, but IS had made gains like few other Salafists
had done before giving an air of legitimacy to the new Islamic state.

The restoration of the caliphate was a long time coming for
the Islamic State. Zarqawi had talked about it years before he even entered
Iraq. He wasn’t able to declare it; that was left to his successors Muhajir and
Baghdadi. Their announcement was barely even noticed at the time with many
either ignoring it or just taking it as a name change for Al Qaeda in Iraq. It
wasn’t until IS seized territory in both Syria and Iraq that the caliphate was
taken as a reality. IS not only had the power to enforce its pronouncements,
but started acting like a state as it always talked about. It has civil
servants, provides services, runs schools, etc. It also demanded the loyalty of
not only all the other insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq, but of all Muslims
around the world. This has gained widespread support from many young jihadis. Now
the question is whether IS has the resources to maintain and expand its state.

SOURCES

Bunzel, Cole, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology
of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic
World, March 2015

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Today, the Islamic State (IS) dominates the Iraqi
insurgency. It has swallowed up opposing factions and forced others off the
battlefield. Up to 2014 however there was a range of militant groups operating
in the country. In 2005, Nicholas Haussler attempted to categorize the
insurgency into three broad groups. Those were local level actors that were usually
based upon kinship. The next were larger enterprises that had access to
weapons, independent funding, and connections to international groups and
markets. The last was the transnational Al Qaeda in Iraq that networked with Iraqis
and others across the region. These groups all interacted and competed with
each other at the local to international levels to create the country’s
insurgency. Today these different levels still exist, they just operating under
the auspices of the Islamic State.

The core of the insurgency was the local chapters. These
were usually organized along kinships, clans, occupations, mosques, etc. For
example, a person might be a former member of the secret police, be part of a
clan and tribe, and go to a specific mosque and draw
upon all of those connections to find like minded people who were willing
to fight the U.S. and Iraqi government. Ansar al-Islam for example was an
Islamist group in Kurdistan that was formed before the 2003 invasion. Most of
its core was said to come from one Kurdish clan. These groups were intimately
connected to their communities who provided them the space to operate in,
recruits, intelligence, and a means of communication. They were responsible for
the majority of killings, information gathering, and security for networks. These
groups were small and often competed with each other as much as cooperated.
They posed a serious challenge to the state with its large bureaucratic
structures that made it hard and slow to respond to this threat.

The next type of group was the enterprise. They were usually
based upon extended families and clans. Many became criminal rings during the
sanctions period. In the 1990s, the government encouraged certain officials and
preferred tribes to smuggle goods to get around the international sanctions
imposed on the country after its invasion of Kuwait. This allowed them to build
up networks into Syria, Turkey and Jordan. These groups were able to expand
with the power vacuum after the 2003 invasion. Their activities gave them
access to communications, supplies, resources, and accesses to global markets. They
also had links to institutions such as political parties, the Iraqi Security
Forces, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy through infiltration, intimidation,
and bribery. That meant these enterprises could tap into government wages,
equipment, weapons, etc. Many of these groups later joined the insurgency
providing supply networks and independent financing. They would contract out
work to the local level actors to carry out operations.

The last type of organization was the transnational, which
was represented by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal Jihad, which later became
Al Qaeda in Iraq. It was made up mostly of foreign fighters, and had networks
across the Middle East. The group was organized into cells, many of which acted
autonomously. Zarqawi would bring the smaller groups together for large
operations. He would also cooperate with local Iraqi groups and enterprises out
of their shared interests in overthrowing the government and expelling the
Americans. The local groups could cooperate on attacks, while enterprises could
launder money or procure weapons. At the same time there was plenty of
competition and rivalry, which would often break out into open fighting between
them. Eventually Tawhid wal Jihad’s successor the Islamic State would subsume
almost all of the other Iraqi groups from the local level to the enterprises
after the summer of 2014.

Today the situation in Iraq has changed as the diversity of insurgent
groups has largely disappeared due to the power of the Islamic State. Up to the
summer of 2014 there was a plethora of organizations active in Iraq, but they
have mostly left the battlefield or been integrated within IS. Still elements
of these different types of organizations exist, but largely under the umbrella
of IS. There are still local Iraqi groups that provide foot soldiers for the
Islamic State. Members of certain tribes for example have sided with IS and are
likely organized along kinship lines. IS has appropriated many of the crime
rings of central and northern Iraq that were once run by independent enterprises.
Where the group was strong such as in Mosul, this happened years ago. IS has
now expanded these activities after its seizure of so much territory in Syria
and Iraq to sustain itself. It has exploited its connections across the region
to smuggle oil and antiquities amongst other illegal activities. Finally, IS
still acts as the transnational actor coordinating these smaller groups and
providing leadership. Haussler’s categories are helpful in understanding how
the insurgency was organized as it was never one monolithic group, but rather a
conglomeration of like minded people united in their opposition to the new
Iraq. It still proves useful today to breakdown the components of the Islamic
State.

1. The Hashd
al-Shaabi were created after the fall of Mosul when Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
called on Iraqis to defend their nation against the insurgency. They have
become widely popular since then with dozens of Facebook pages and Twitter
posts dedicated to them along with each groups own public relations campaign.
How did the Hashd gain such a position in Iraqi society?

Well firstly let’s be clear that the massive popularity of
the Hashd is a mostly Shi’i phenomenon. As I have argued and as I think is
patently evident to any visitor to Baghdad today, the Hashd has spurred a
reinvigorated Iraqi nationalism and jingoism unseen since the early 1980’s and
the Iran-Iraq war. However, and again this is patently self-evident, this Iraqi
nationalism is of a distinctly Shi’i flavor. Despite what a certain ilk of Iraqi
patriot would have you believe, there have always been divergent, sect-centric
readings of Iraqi nationalism. These sat alongside other nationalistic
imaginations and this is perfectly natural as no people are in total agreement
as to the content and meaning of their national affinity. Since 2003,
sect-centric forms of Iraqi nationalism have been empowered and have taken
centre stage in Iraqi politics and society. These have proven divergent and
antagonistic enough to the point of tearing Iraq apart. What I mean by
sect-centric Iraqi nationalism is a reading of Iraq’s identity and its past,
present and future in an overwhelmingly sect-centric manner. This affects one’s
entire understanding of self and other and skews views towards practically
everything related to Iraq. While I am not saying this is something that marks
every Iraqi today, I think it is wishful thinking to deny that, broadly
speaking, there has been a division amongst Iraqis – one that falls along
sectarian lines – regarding views towards everything from regime change to the
nature of the Ba’ath to Iran to anti-state violence, and today we see it with
regards to the Hashd. As I’ve said elsewhere, one way to understand post-2003
Iraq is to view it as a struggle between Shi’a centric state building and Sunni
rejection (both of which encompass spectrums of varying degrees but are for the
most part concerned with the national ownership and national identity of Iraq –
or I should say Arab Iraq – and the configuration of the power relations underpinning
sectarian relations).

In accounting for the Hashd’s popularity we need to be
mindful of the above. Regardless of whatever intentions initially underlined
the Hashd’s emergence, it has turned into perhaps the most significant
manifestation of Shi’a centric state building yet. Unlike say the army, the
Hashd is a product of the post-2003 environment: it reflects the realities of
post-2003 Iraq; it is organic and it is unencumbered by older frames of
reference that – even if still recognized as an ideal – are increasingly
difficult to turn into reality. This makes the Hashd phenomenon capable of
fostering a feeling of empowerment and mobilization that the army, as an
institution, has been incapable of doing since 2003. Beyond that, for its
supporters, the Hashd’s popularity is grounded in a sense of legitimacy that
has rarely been paralleled by any actor or institution in post-2003 Iraq and
that has certainly not been paralleled by post-2003 Iraq’s political classes.
This is just one way in which the Hashd has fulfilled a pressing need for a
significant Iraqi demographic, namely the need for legitimate and inspirational
figures, leaders or institutions. Of course the Hashd’s legitimacy is derived
from the legitimacy granted by the same demographic to the marji’iya and to
Ayatollah Sistani – you could say that, for many Shi’as, Sistani’s call to mass
mobilization grants the Hashd the ultimate ISO standard!

In addition to legitimacy and Shi’a empowerment, the Hashd’s
popularity is further extended by the results that they have achieved.
Supporters of the Hashd will say that the Hashd took the fight to ISIS and has
achieved significant results in Diyala, Babil and Salah al Din. More broadly,
the narrative of the Hashd sustains its popular appeal: while detractors will
focus on the seasoned and Iranian-linked armed groups that compose vital parts
of the Hashd phenomenon, supporters focus on a different aspect: the selfless
impoverished youths of Baghdad and southern Iraq who selflessly answered the
call to defend (and crucially to avenge) Iraq. These people, supporters will
stress, stand in stark contrast to the scheming, corrupt, ineffective and
self-interested political classes. More divisively, many supporters will also
argue that this ideal-type of Hashd volunteer stands in stark contrast to the
majority of Sunnis who they will accuse of, at best a callous complacency and
at worst murderous complicity with ISIS. Finally, central to the narrative of
the Hashd (and again in contrast to all others according to its supporters) the
Hashd is fighting for Iraq. It is the savior without which Baghdad and all of
Iraq would have fallen to ISIS. It is the pinnacle of national sacrifice (the
contentious issues surrounding what constitutes ‘national’ are of course
overlooked) and it is composed of ‘our boys’, salt-of-the-earth sorts – or wild il khaybah in Iraqi parlance –
defending sacred national soil. Needless to say this is a far cry from how the
Hashd is generally viewed by Iraqi Sunnis despite some notable exceptions.

2. The Hashd began as
a Shiite paramilitary force. Now some Sunnis, Christians and Turkmen have
joined in as well. Do you think that will change the image of the Hashd or will
they be known as a Shiite sectarian one?

It is not impossible for perceptions of the Hashd to evolve
into something like a national (albeit inevitably Shia dominated) institution.
The extreme ends of the spectrums of both Shia centric state building and Sunni
rejection will always insist on viewing the Hashd as a Shi’a centric force. But
I think that for many – one hopes the majority – of Iraqis, perceptions
regarding the Hashd will be dictated more by the actions of the Hashd and less
by pre-existing bias and prejudice. A rare and very fragile silver lining to
Iraq’s ongoing war is that we have seen some instances of previously
unthinkable cooperation between the Hashd/Shi’a militias and local Sunni
forces. If such cooperation is carefully managed and supported it can be
repeated elsewhere ultimately extending the ‘Hashd franchise’ to Sunni Iraq. In
theory this could turn the Hashd into a cross-sectarian successor of the
Awakening or into a decentralized parallel Iraqi army. However, there is much
militating against this optimistic scenario: from the extremist elements on all
sides to the immeasurable mistrust that exists in Iraq today to the fact that
such a scenario would inescapably entail Sunni Hashd formations being
answerable to Shia militias.

I think three factors will be crucial to the question of the
Hashd’s future and particularly to the question of Sunni buy-in: behavior,
progress and empowerment. If excesses are kept to a minimum and the Hashd makes
progress on the field and, crucially, if cooperating Sunni forces are rewarded
(something easily done: after all someone has to administer recaptured
territory) then there is no reason to doubt further Sunni buy-in. Conversely,
excesses will feed into Sunni fears and into Sunni militant messaging and
inadequate rewards will act as a disincentive for potential Sunni partners. Success
is also crucial: if the Hashd gains momentum (and provided excesses and rewards
are adequately managed) then buy-in could come from those simply betting on the
winning horse. Furthermore, every defeat the Hashd suffers hardens sectarian
entrenchment on all sides and within the Hashd itself. I would imagine that the
more success and the more territory recaptured, the more the Hashd and their
supporters would be inclined to see themselves as saving Iraq. Conversely, the
more defeats and setbacks the more they would be inclined to retreat into a
Shi’a-garrison mentality. This has certainly been noticeable amongst Hashd
supporters on social media and elsewhere: vacillating between ‘liberate Iraq’
to ‘to hell with Iraq’ depending on the ebb and flow of war! Finally, of
course, battlefield success strengthens the Prime Minister’s hand and
consequently his vision to integrate the Hashd into the institutions of the
state – something that may help polish perceptions regarding the Hashd and
extend its membership further beyond Iraqi Shi’as.

3. Some of the larger
Hashd groups were established militias or came from political parties such as
the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr’s
Peace Brigades, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Some Iraqi
organizations that were fighting in Syria returned after the fall of Mosul such
as the Khorasani Brigade, and there are also plenty of newer ones as well like
Firqat al-Imam Ali. Almost all of the older groups were involved in politics.
What do you see as the fate of these new groups after the war with the Islamic
State is over? Will some of them just go home? Will some become in elections?

This will be something to watch out for in the presumably
distant future when the ISIS threat is sufficiently reduced. I think it’s
unlikely that the newer groups you refer to will not expect a political
dividend from the war with ISIS. The Hashd’s popularity is something no
realistic Iraqi politician can ignore today and we are already seeing it impacting
on Shi’a political dynamics. Two years ago the limit of Hadi al Ameri’s [of the
Badr Organization] political ambition would have been to play second fiddle to
Maliki, today – and as a direct result of his role in the Hashd – he may well
be one of the most popular Iraqi politicians. I think that the Hashd phenomenon
will continue to alter political dynamics amongst Iraq’s Shi’a elites. We will
also likely see competition between the various groups that constitute the
Hashd over political position particularly after the ISIS threat is diminished
– a competition over who can ‘out-Hashd’ the other. As for the newer groups you
mentioned, they may be subsumed under stronger or more established political
forces some of which are also active in the Hashd. In that sense we may see
‘Hashd’ turn into a political brand with various political formations emerging
each trying to claim the political capital of the Hashd – we briefly saw
something similar with the ‘Intifadha’ brand where several formations laid
claim to what was perceived to be the political capital accruing from
association with the rebellions of 1991. Another possibility is that newer
groups would clash with more established ones for influence and political
position. This would mirror what we have already seen in previous years such as
with the clashes between the Sadrists and Badr and then later between AAH and
the Sadrists. A similar dynamic could emerge in ‘post-ISIS’ Iraq.

4. Former prime
minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki has attempted to align with
some of the established Hashd groups such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq in what many
consider a move to return to power. What do you think of Maliki’s attempts and
does it have any chance of being successful?

The success of Maliki and others who are trying to undermine
the government with a pro-Hashd stance will largely depend on how ISF and the
Hashd fare on the field. The more ISF are seen to be failing the more those
trying to use the Hashd as a vehicle with which to undermine the PM will be
strengthened. Recently there was the rather suspicious controversy over the
‘Tharthar massacre’ and how some political figures associated with the Hashd
and Maliki tried to capitalize on it. That attempt failed – if anything it
highlighted the limits of Maliki’s political support. However, this can change
and military developments will shape political options and room for maneuver –
as highlighted by the recent loss of Ramadi and Abadi’s adoption of a more
Hashd-reliant policy than he would have liked.

Using the Hashd to undermine the PM is not the most
effective tactic; after-all Abadi is not anti-Hashd and he is no doubt mindful
of the need to claim as much credit as possible for whatever success the Hashd
achieves. In trying to do so he will be well placed to position himself as the
PM leading the war effort but he will also have to contend with rivals more
directly connected to the Hashd.

5. Finally, some of
the political parties such as the Sadrists and the Supreme Council have become
increasingly critical of the Hashd. Sadr for example, has made several
statements condemning what he calls “brazen militias” who attack civilians and
are undermining the government. What is the nature of the dispute between these
groups, and will we see more arguments in the future?

I think this falls into the category of newer forces
clashing against older ones. On the one hand Sadr has been fairly consistent in
defending the national framework and the institutions of state which would
explain his comments regarding the ‘brazen militias’. On the other hand
however, this is likely a response to the rising popularity of rival groups who
compete (perhaps outcompete) with the Sadrists for the same demographic.

Monday, May 25, 2015

The third week of May 2015 was marked by the fall of Ramadi
in Iraq’s Anbar province. The fighting for the city caused huge casualties
amongst the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), tribes and civilians, especially as
the Islamic State (IS) carried out executions during the entire operation. The
battle for Ramadi showed the limits of reporting in Iraq as most of the papers
were caught up in Anbar and dramatically reduced their coverage of the rest of
the country.

There were 123 security incidents in the media from May
15-21. That was the lowest since the 121 reported the first week of April. That
wasn’t because violence suddenly decreased, but rather was the result of the
press being fixated upon the fight for Ramadi. The Iraqi papers barely covered
the rest of the country during that period. Much more was going on in the rest
of Iraq, it just wasn’t mentioned.

While attacks were way down the number of casualties was
quite high due to Ramadi. 961 people died and 380 were wounded during the week.
Most of those were in the Anbar provincial capital where IS executed over 500
ISF, sahwa and civilians during and after its capture. In total 848 were killed
in Anbar, followed by 51 in Baghdad, 19 in Salahaddin, 16 in Kirkuk, 12 in
Ninewa, 7 in Basra, 5 in Diyala, and 3 in Babil. The dead consisted of 1 Hashd
al-Shaabi, 43 sahwa, 334 ISF, and 583 civilians, while the injured were made up
of 3 sahwa, 11 Hashd, 162 ISF, and 204 civilians. Like attacks the real numbers
were surely higher.

Violence
In Iraq By Week 2015

Date

Incidents

Dead

Wounded

Jan 1-7

184

434

464

Jan 8-14

170

730

493

Jan 15-21

182

390

515

Jan 22-28

189

466

894

Jan 29-31

90

288

529

JAN

815

2,308

2,895

Feb 1-7

155

380

688

Feb 8-14

170

406

559

Feb 15-21

165

573

364

Feb 22-28

165

371

687
+ 386

FEB

655

1,730

2,683

Mar 1-7

172

372

587

Mar 8-14

133

348

656

Mar 15-21

142

1,299

503

Mar 22-28

170

235

406

Mar 29-31

72

205

219

MAR

689

2,459 + 4

2,371 + 150

Apr 1-7

121

212

422

Apr 8-14

133

626

525

Apr 15-21

169

722

714

Apr 22-28

160

483

483

Apr 29-30

50

162
+ 7

182
+ 299

APR

633

2,212

2,625

May 1-7

154

626

450

May 8-14

154

419

549

May 15-21

123

961

380

Violence
In Iraq By Province May 2015

Province

May
1-7

May
8-14

Anbar

34 Incidents

75 Killed: 21 ISF, 30 Hashd, 24
Civilians

103 Wounded: 54 ISF, 49 Civilians

15 Shootings

19 IEDs

1 Suicide Bomber

2 Suicide Car Bombs

2 Mortars

2 Rockets

36 Incidents

74 Killed: 16 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 9
Hashd, 47 Civilians

176 Wounded: 62 ISF, 7 Hashd, 26
Sahwa, 81 Civilians

26 Shootings

14 Suicide Car Bombs

4 Mortars

Babil

-

8 Incidents

5 Killed: 5 Civilians

20 Wounded: 5 Hashd, 15 Civilians

1 Shooting

3 IEDs

2 Sticky Bombs

1 Sound Bomb

Baghdad

68 Incidents

105 Killed: 3 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 101
Civilians

234 Wounded: 7 ISF, 5 Sahwa, 222
Civilians

28 Shootings

28 IEDs

4 Sticky Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

2 Car Bombs

1 Rockets

46 Incidents

99 Killed: 2 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 94
Civilians

218 Wounded: 9 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 207
Civilians

15 Shootings

22 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

1 Suicide Car Bomb

3 Car Bombs

1 Mortar

Basra

1 Incident

1 Shooting

-

Diyala

9 Incidents

23 Killed: 3 ISF, 1 Asayesh, 19
Civilians

23 Wounded: 8 ISF, 3 Asayesh, 12
Civilians

4 Shootings

2 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

18 Incidents

89 Killed: 10 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 78
Civilians

66 Wounded: 7 ISF, 59 Civilians

7 Shootings

5 IEDs

1 Suicide Bomber

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Kirkuk

9 Incidents

10 Killed: 1 Peshmerga, 1 Hashd, 8
Civilians

17 Wounded: 4 Peshmerga, 13
Civilians

4 Shootings

3 IEDs

1 Mortar

7 Incidents

13 Killed: 4 Peshmerga, 9
Civilians

6 Wounded: 5 Peshmerga, 1 Civilian

4 Shootings

1 IED

Ninewa

11 Incidents

342 Killed: 324 Civilians

5 Shootings

25 IEDs

17 Incidents

26 Killed: 2 ISF, 24 Civilians

2 Wounded: 2 Peshmerga

8 Shootings

20 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

Salahaddin

22 Incidents

89 Killed: 79 ISF, 8 Hashd, 2
Civilians

73 Wounded: 54 ISF, 10 Hashd, 9
Civilians

22 Incidents

113 Killed: 61 ISF, 52 Civilians

61 Wounded: 32 ISF, 8 Hashd, 21
Civilians

13 Shootings

1 IED

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Car Bomb

1 Mortar

Province

May
15-21

Anbar

46 Incidents

848 Killed: 321 ISF, 40 Sahwa, 488
Civilians

186 Wounded: 129 ISF, 57 Civilians

30 Shootings

8 IEDs

19 Suicide Car Bombs

2 Car Bombs

5 Mortars

2 Rockets

Babil

2 Incidents

3 Killed: 3 Civilians

11 Wounded: 11 Civilians

2 IEDs

Baghdad

44 Incidents

51 Killed: 4 ISF, 1 Hashd, 3
Sahwa, 43 Civilians

108 Wounded: 20 ISF, 3 Hashd, 3
Sahwa, 82 Civilians

17 Shootings

18 IEDs

7 Sticky Bobs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Car Bomb

1 Mortar

Basra

2 Incidents

7 Killed: 7 Civilians

4 Wounded: 4 Civilians

2 Shootings

Diyala

5 Incidents

5 Killed: 5 Civilians

6 Wounded: 6 Civilians

1 Shooting

3 IEDs

Kirkuk

4 Incidents

16 Killed: 16 Civilians

1 Sticky Bomb

Ninewa

8 Incidents

12 Killed: 12 Civilians

3 Shootings

Salahaddin

12 Incidents

19 Killed: 10 ISF, 9 Civilians

65 Wounded: 13 ISF, 8 Hashd, 44
Civilians

3 Shootings

6 IEDs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Mortar

1 Rockets

Car
Bombs In Iraq May 2015

Date

Location

Dead

Wounded

May 1

May 2

Garma,
Anbar

Karrada
x2, Baghdad

29

66

May 3

May 4

Baiji
Refinery, Salahaddin

3

5

May 5

Garma,
Anbar

Karrada,
Baghdad

6

13

May 6

May 7

Baiji
x2, Dour, Hamrin x2, Salahaddin

57

39

Totals

11

95

123

May 8

Baladrooz
& Kanaan, Diyala

22

59

May 9

Karrada,
Baghdad

8

30

May 10

Fallujah
x3, Anbar

Shaab,
Baghdad

Taji
& Tarmiya, Salahaddin

23

26

May 11

May 12

Sadoun
St & Tahrir Sq, Baghdad

14

37

May 13

May 14

Dulab
x9 & Jubba x2, Anbar

6

54

Totals

22

73

206

May 15

Ramadi
x11, Anbar

10

7

May 16

Fallujah
& Ramadi, Anbar

Baiji
Refinery, Salahaddin

8

May 17

Ramadi
x7, Anbar

Shurta,
Baghdad

17

35

May 18

May 19

Haswar,
Anbar

Abu
Ghraib, Baghdad

8

14

May 20

May 21

Totals

24

43

56

IS upped the number of vehicle borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs) for the third week in a row. In the first week of May there
were 11 VBIEDs, followed by 22 the second, and 24 the third week. 21 were in
Anbar alone showing the heavy fighting there. Many more were destroyed before
reaching their intended targets. 43 people were reported killed in these
attacks and another 56 wounded. Again, the actual figures are far higher as
many casualties were not reported for the car bombings in Anbar.

Anbar was obviously the major focus in Iraq during the third
week of May. IS successfully took
Ramadi after 17 months of trying. Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey told
the press that the ISF commander in the city ordered a withdrawal out of
fear that the bad weather in the area would prevent coalition air support from
being called him. The use of ten Oklahoma City size truck bombs also helped
break down the defenses throughout Ramadi. From the very start, IS also executed
over 500 civilians, sahwa and ISF members. It was reported that IS had hit
lists of people they wanted to kill, and were going door to door looking
for them. The militants weren’t done either as they continued to push east into
Husaiba
and Khalidiya.

Back in Baghdad the fall of Ramadi has led to a series of
recriminations. Sheikhs
in Anbar
have accused the ISF of abandoning them during the fighting. A State of Law
parliamentarian said
that Ramadi showed that the Iraqi government should only rely upon the Iranians
rather than the U.S who was accused of helping IS. Dawa members also went
after ISF officers in Anbar claiming that they had fled without consulting
with the prime minister, were lying about the strength of their units, and some
had contacts with the Islamic State. Finally, a spokesman for Asaib Ahl Al-Haq said
that the fall of Ramadi was due to Prime Minister Abadi listening to the
Americans to keep the Hashd out of the fight. Abadi and the Americans had
gained strength from the victory in Tikrit over Iran and its friends within the
Hashd after their attack stalled, but now were put back on the defensive due to
the events in Anbar. This back and forth political battle will continue into
the future.

Baghdad continued to be a major target, but casualties
dropped there compared to the previous week. From May 15-21 there were 44
incidents just around the 46 from the week before, and way down from the 68 seen
during the first week. There were 51 fatalities and 108 injured during the
third week, down from the 99 deaths and 218 from the previous one. There were
two car bombs during the week, one at an army base in Abu
Ghraib, and another on a market in Shurta.
There were also 19 IEDs and 7 sticky bombs, which led to the majority of the
dead and wounded. The number of extra judicial killings in the province
continued at a high pace. There were twelve bodies discovered across Baghdad,
which was just around the fifteen found the week before. So Far there have been
51 bodies dumped in parts of the governorate this month compared to 38 during
April. The return of mass casualty car bombs and displaced Anbaris who have
been blamed for these terrorist acts has apparently prompted Hashd and other
Shiite elements to pick up the pace of these murders, although some are also
the work of insurgents.

Violence in southern Iraq is dreadfully under reported, but
during the week Asaib Ahl Al-Haq got caught up in a tribal conflict in Basra
leading to a shoot out that killed six and wounded four on May
18. The removal of much of the security forces from the southern provinces
to fight the insurgency has given rise to an increasing number of lawless acts
such as gang activity, tribal conflicts, and deadly political rivalries
throughout the region. The media is catching only a small portion of this.

In Salahaddin the effort to relieve the Baiji refinery
continued. Throughout the week government forces made steady progress towards
the area, finally reaching the complex by the last day of the week. The
fighting for Baiji highlights the manpower shortages Baghdad is facing as the
region was cleared in October-November, January, February, and April. Whenever
the area is attacked, reinforcements are sent in, but they then withdraw
allowing IS to move back in. This has occurred throughout the country again and
again. Unless there are strong local actors such as in Amerli and Alam in
Salahaddin or the place was totally emptied such as Jalawla in Diyala, Jurf
al-Sakhr in Babil and Tikrit the government has not been able to hold many areas
after clearing operations. They simply lack the manpower to do so. That means
Baiji will likely come under threat once again in the coming weeks.

Iraq History Timeline

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com