On
March 18, 2015, Coleman was riding as a passenger in a
vehicle in Long Branch, New Jersey, which was pulled over by
officers of the Long Branch Police Department. (ECF No. 1,
¶ 22; Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No.
15-2, ¶¶ 1-3.) Coleman alleges that when the
vehicle was pulled over he thought “he was being
setup” because of “his history with Long Branch
Police Department and their threats against his life and use
of excessive force against him.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 22.)
Coleman began to run away, but fell while trying to climb
over a fence. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23; ECF No. 15-2
¶¶ 3-5.) He asserts that Romano then began,
“without provocation, ” beating him, and that
other defendants Bard, Passantino, Hueston, Sanders, Gant,
Dinero, Poss, Chapparo, Olski, and two John Doe defendants
soon “deliberately ran up to plaintiff and started
beating and stumping [sic] him until he lost consciousness,
causing serious and permanent bodily and psychological
injuries.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 23.) Coleman also alleges
that these defendant officers “repeatedly used racial
slurs and insults.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

Coleman
alleges that he awoke in Monmouth Medical Center Hospital
with a broken nose, black eyes, facial swelling, and other
injuries. (Id.) He asserts that he was then taken to
the Long Branch Police Department, where he was put in a
holding pen without receiving a phone call, where he was
deprived of food, as well as socks and shoes. (Id.
¶¶ 25-26.) He claims that officers, and
specifically Chapparo, taunted him and declined or ignored
his requests for medical attention, before he was
“maliciously, abusively, and wrongfully” charged
with possession of a controlled dangerous substance
(“CDS”). (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.)
Coleman avers that it was not until he was transferred to
Monmouth County Correctional Institution that he received any
further medical attention. (Id. ¶ 28.)

B.
Procedural History

On May
26, 2015, Coleman, acting pro se, filed a Complaint
claiming that Defendants violated his constitutional rights,
in contradiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.)
Coleman alleges that Schneider, the mayor of Long Branch,
Roebuck, its police chief, and the City itself “have
implemented and enforced a practice, policy, and custom of
stopping, frisking, searching, and detaining citizens,
without legal justification, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct, ” which caused him
injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) He further
alleges that Schneider, Roebuck, and the City had known that
the defendant-officers had “unlawfully, intentionally,
willfully, maliciously, recklessly, and violently beaten
other innocent African-American men, women, and children in
Long Branch because those citizens filed complaints and
lawsuits against Defendants, ” (id. ¶
31), and “were deliberately indifferent to the need to
properly train, supervise, audit, and discipline all the
individually named police officers under their command in
areas involving citizens' constitutional rights, ”
(id. ¶ 53; see also Id. ¶¶
30-45). The Complaint demanded declaratory judgment and
compensatory damages of at least $10 million, plus punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and costs. (Id.
¶¶ 58-61.)

Upon an
initial screening of the Complaint, under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), the Court construed it as asserting §
1983 claims against the defendant-officers for excessive
force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as
retaliation and conspiracy. (Order, ECF No. 3, ¶ 10.)
The Court found that the Complaint also contrued a claim
against Chapparo for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) Additionally, the Court
construed the Complaint as asserting claims of supervisory
and Monell liability against Schneider, Roebuck, and
the City for deficient policies or customs, failure to train
or supervise, and class-based discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Id. ¶ 11.) The Court dismissed the
malicious-prosecution claim for failure to plead favorable
termination, as well as the claims against Defendants in
their official capacities, but permitted the remainder of the
Complaint to proceed. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Defendants
answered the Complaint on December 1, 2015.[4] (Ans., ECF No.
9.) The Honorable Lois H. Goodman, U.S.M.J., then issued a
Pretrial Scheduling Order directing the parties to complete
all discovery by April 20, 2016 and file all dispositive
motions by May 13, 2016. (Order, ECF No. 12.)

III.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Presently
pending before the Court is a motion by Defendants for
summary judgment on all claims.[5] (ECF No. 15.) When Coleman did
not timely oppose the motion, the Court gave him additional
time to do so, but warned that, otherwise, the motion would
be decided as unopposed. (Order, ECF No. 17.) Subsequently,
attorney Ronald J. Brandmayr entered an appearance on
Coleman's behalf. (Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 22.) The
Court again granted Coleman extra time to oppose the pending
motion. (Mem. & Order, ECF No. 23.) Despite subsequently
granting Coleman a third opportunity to oppose summary
judgment, (Letter Order, ECF No. 28), no opposition to the
motion was ever filed.

A.
Summary Judgment Standard

Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to award a party
summary judgment only if “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if supported
by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict in the non-movant's favor. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Kaucher v. County of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). A fact is
material if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute
about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Kaucher, 455 F.3d at
423. In determining whether a genuine dispute of material
fact exists, the court must view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts “in the light most
favorable to the [non-movant].” Matsushita,
475 U.S. at 587.

A
movant for summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). While a defendant moving for summary
judgment must support assertions by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, ”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), the movant is not required to
“support its motion with affidavits or other similar
materials negating the opponent's claim, ”
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Instead, “the
burden on the moving party may be discharged by
‘showing'- that is, pointing out to the district
court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325. If
the movant has shown an absence of material factual dispute,
the non-movant then bears the burden to “designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, the non-movant may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings. Id. at 324;
Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870
F.Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994), aff'd 67 F.3d
291 (3d Cir. 1995). The non-movant must “do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
A mere “scintilla of evidence . . . will be
insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

Local
Civil Rule 56.1 requires that a motion seeking summary
judgment include a statement of material facts not in
dispute, and that an opponent of summary judgment shall file
“a responsive statement of material facts, addressing
each paragraph of the movant's statement, indicating
agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each
material fact in dispute and citing to the affidavits and
other documents submitted in connection with the
motion.” L. Civ. R. 56.1(a). The rule further provides
that “any material fact not disputed shall be deemed
undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment
motion.” Id. Although a motion for summary
judgment may not be granted by default, merely because it
goes unopposed, Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax
Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990), the motion may
be granted if the undisputed facts warrant judgment as a
matter of law, Miller v. Ashcroft, 76 Fed.Appx. 457,
462 (3d Cir. 2003); Houston v. Twp. of Randolph, 934
F.Supp.2d 711, 723 (D.N.J. 2013), aff'd 559
Fed.Appx. 139 (3d Cir. 2014).

Defendants
have submitted a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts that
includes citations to relevant exhibits. (See ECF
No. 15-2.) As Coleman has filed no opposition to the motion,
despite ample opportunity to do so, the facts included in
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts are
deemed undisputed for the purposes of resolving this motion.
See L. Civ. R. 56.1.

B.
Section 1983 Generally

42
U.S.C. § 1983 is the statutory basis for asserting
violations of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. That
section provides,

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused
by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey
v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d
Cir. 2011); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988).

C.
False Arrest and False Imprisonment

The
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
guarantees a right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure occurs when a government
official restrains a person's freedom of movement such
that the person is deprived of his/her free will to leave.
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007). A
seizure is generally permissible only if it is supported by
probable cause to believe the person has committed a crime.
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013).

A claim
for false arrest thus requires that the plaintiff show (1) an
arrest and (2) that the arrest was made without probable
cause. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675,
680 (3d Cir. 2012). Similarly, a claim for false imprisonment
requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff was detained, and
(2) the detention was unlawful. Id. at 682-83.
Indeed, when a person is arrested without probable cause, a
claim for false imprisonment may be asserted as to the
detention following that arrest. See Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995); see also
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911, 919 (2017).

Defendants
argue that summary judgment is appropriate as to
Coleman's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment
because, the record shows that probable cause existed to
arrest him. (Br. in Supp., ECF No. 15-1, at 4-5.) For
support, the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, with
...

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